ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] He mischaracterized the “tenant’s position” to be “we don’t have to pay rent while [Gym Closure] is going on” (3T15-10 to 3T15-11), even though, at the time of that November 2023 hearing, Tenant had, approximately two years earlier, already paid into court the entirety of the Escrow Funds, representing all rent Landlord claimed to be owed (Da179-Da181).  The trial judge did not reference the Rent Offset or Allowance Offset, instead ruling simply it would not be “equitable” for Tenant to receive the Tenant Allowance reimbursement, relying on a quote by the fictional antagonist in the movie *The Maltese Falcon* (3T15-20 to 3T15-22).  He added, “[y]ou can’t have everything your way in equity” (3T15-23 to 3T15-25), apparently not recognizing the irony that he was de facto ruling that Landlord would be entitled to every cent of rent owed by Tenant but that Landlord did not have to pay one cent of Tenant’s Allowance for 2020 and 2021, or the unpaid interest from 2019.  Regarding Tenant’s Allowance, the trial judge held that he did not “need to decide those issues to decide this case” (3T16-21 to 3T16-23).  Moments later, he decided the issue anyway, ruling “when you’re in breach . . . the landlord does not have to pay the fit up costs.  And I think that’s clearly outlined in the lease documents” without citing the Lease provision(s) on which he relied (3T17-1 to 3T17-4).  But he hedged back yet again, stating that he was not reaching that issue because there were “a lot of ways that that could be interpreted,” (3T17-13 to 3T17-15).  When Tenant’s counsel sought clarification, the trial judge said “if you press me for a decision on it, my decision would be actually harsher” (3T23-5 to 3T23-10).  The trial judge decided the attorney’s fees issue, ultimately awarding Landlord $38,462.50 (3T18-24 to 3T19-4), but did not definitively rule in 2023 on whether Tenant was entitled to receive Tenant’s Allowance for 2020 and 2021, or the unpaid interest for 2019, finding he had no “jurisdiction” to decide those issues (3T14-5 to 3T14-8; 3T14-13 to 3T14-4).  Nonetheless, the trial judge also declined to vacate, revise, or amend in any way paragraph one of the November 10, 2021 order that had stated that Tenant could not be reimbursed because it was “in breach” (Da1).  Indeed, he reiterated the opinion that “Tenant was in breach” (3T16-25 to 3T17-1) without acknowledging that Landlord had breached earlier or that Landlord owed Tenant more money than Tenant owed Landlord, or that the Allowance Offset clause was relevant to the analysis.  Viewing the trial judge’s 2021 and 2023 rulings in concert, the judge decided: (1) as a landlord-tenant judge he lacked jurisdiction to rule on whether Landlord owed Tenant more money under the Lease than Landlord claimed Tenant owed under the Lease; but also (2) Landlord did not owe Tenant money under the Lease.  As a factual matter, these propositions are inconsistent.  On December 1, 2023, Defendant wrote a letter to the court seeking disbursement of the Escrow Funds. \(^8\)
[brief] [...] should be required to collect [...]’s and [...]’s custodial files, with the manner of review and production of their files subject to the parties’ agreement or the Special Master’s direction.  Respectfully submitted, [...]  By: /s/ [...]  [...]  [...] (SBN 191305)  [...]  Tel.: [...]  Fax: [...]  [...]  Plaintiffs’ Co-Lead Counsel
[brief] The matter on appeal before the Court arises from an improper subpoena ad testificandum seeking irrelevant information from non-party/Appellant, [...] ("[...]").  Although the subpoena was solely issued to harass and intimidate [...] as well as to seek confidential information not subject to discovery, the trial court denied [...]’s motion to quash the subpoena and for a protective order.  In doing so, the trial court overlooked well established case law and Court Rules which are designed to protect non-parties from this exact type of conduct.  The result of the trial court’s decision forces a non-party to testify related to irrelevant and confidential information as well as allow the Plaintiffs to continue to use the legal system to harass innocent and uninvolved non-parties.  It is therefore respectfully submitted that the trial court’s orders should be reversed and an order be entered quashing the subject subpoena as well as issuing an protective order.
[brief] (1T181:15-18).  It does not matter to whom this information is being reported.  (1T181:15-16).  Here, [...] trained officers by discussing their investigation reports and how to improve them, discussing the case law, and relaying developments in the case law or new directives.  (1T28:6-23).  She also met regularly with the animal control officers, zoning officer, and the code enforcement officers to “get their input, instructions, advice, and recommendations on what the Township want[ed].” (1T29:4-12).  Further, the Municipal Judge monitored her plea agreements and DWI dispositions to ensure they were legally sufficient.  (1T33:20-35:17).  The ALJ noted that [...] gave conflicting answers on the Questionnaire and Checklist about whether [...] had to prepare regular reports.  (Pa16).  In the Checklist, for the question “Is the individual required to prepare regular reports?. ” [...] answered “yes. ” (Pa56).  In the Questionnaire, [...] responded “N/A” to questions regarding whether she submitted regular written or oral reports and whether the public entity tracked the member’s productivity or work accomplishments.  (Pa51).  The ALJ found that [...]’s answers in the Questionnaire and Checklist, combined with [...]’s testimony indicated a lack of knowledge about [...]’s duties which demonstrated that [...] did not control, direct, or supervise [...]’s work.
[brief] [4T24:14-22].  Appellant cannot have it both ways by saying his sweating, erratic behavior, slurred speech, and pinpointed pupils on the night of the Incident cannot be attributed to his opioid use [Pb26-Pb27], but also claims Appellant was being honest when stating he only took opioids on his days off.  [4T103:22 – 4T104:3].  This is yet another example of Appellant’s dishonesty.  [...]’s conclusion that Appellant lied about being “on the job” on the night of the Incident was not the only reason Appellant’s testimony was rejected and therefore does not impact [...]’s conclusion that Appellant was not a credible witness.
[brief] It should be noted that if a suit was pending prior to the matter going to fee arbitration, a summary action should not be filed.  Rather, default can be entered pursuant to R. 1:20A-3(e).  See R. 1:20A-3(e).  • Actions for civil penalties for violations of the animal cruelty laws.  N.J.S.A. 4:22-17.  • Actions to recover wages paid at less than the minimum wage.  N.J.S.A. 34:11-56.40.  • Actions by crime victims to recover the proceeds of sale of criminal memorabilia.  N.J.S.A. 52:4B-28.  •  Actions for a determination of costs and expenses when the court vacates arbitration awards.  N.J.S.A. 2A:23A-18.  Notably, actions to enforce a contract – such as the Consent Judgment or settlement agreement – is not listed among the matters that can proceed summarily, nor is a breach of contract action listed.
[brief] 5  E.  Defendant’s Initial Motion to Dismiss and Remand by Appellate Division ..............................................  6  F.  The Order and Decision Appealed From .........................................................................................  7  G. Plaintiff’s Expert Testimony ............................................................................................................  7  1.  [...], P.E. .................................................................................................................. 7  2. [...], P.E. .......................................................................................................................  9  3.  [...] .......................................................................................................................  10  H.  The Trial Court’s Holding in Again Granting Dismissal ..................................................................  11  I.  The New Jersey Supreme Court Decision in Haviland v. Lourdes Medical Center ..................................  12  POINT I  THE COURT’S HOLDING IN *HAVILAND v. LOURDES MEDICAL CENTER OF BURLINGTON CTY, INC.*, 250 N.J. 368 (2022), IS INAPPLICABLE AND AS SUCH, THE JUDGMENT OF THE TRIAL COURT MUST BE AFFIRMED
[brief] III.  [...]’s arguments for reversal all fail.  The Agreement contained clear, unequivocal, and unmistakable language reflecting the parties’ knowing and voluntary decision to pursue any and all disputes only in arbitration.  [...] signed the Agreement and proceeded with her employment as a Clinical Research Educator.  (Pa000092-94; Pa000137-Pa000138).  Nevertheless, [...] raises numerous arguments of alleged error with the trial court’s order compelling her to arbitrate her claims as she agreed.  None have merit.
[brief] ”); Cumberland Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Murphy, 183 N.J. 344, 349-50 (2005) (finding a policy exclusion did not apply, which precluded coverage for injuries stemming from “an insured’s willful harm or knowing endangerment” or “knowing violation of penal law,” when an insured fired a BB-Gun into a jeep as a prank, accidentally injuring the driver due to the jeep’s soft top).  While [...] may allege that [...]’s actions were intended to cause injury, [...] certainly is not privy to [...]’s thought processes and cannot opine on his subjective intentions.  [...] provided no undisputed facts that shed any light on [...]’s subjective intentions, nor did it proffer any evidence that [...] intended to inflict an injury on [...]. \(^3\)  Having no proofs on the issue of subjective intent, and with the understanding that all facts must be viewed in a light most favorable to [...] on [...]’s motion for summary judgment, it was reversible error to grant summary judgment, especially in light of the fact that the trial court did not make findings of fact on this issue.  **B.  Material Issues of Fact Preclude Summary Judgment Regarding the Claims in the Underlying Action**
[brief] On February 20, 2019, appellant arrived at the Property at 10:30 am.  (Pa216-217).  There was snow present on the exterior of the property.  (Pa233).  At some point, appellant went outside to throw something out in the dumpster.  By appellant’s own admission he does not recall the precise time nor does he recall what he went to throw out.  (Pa219).  However, at some point while outside, appellant alleges he woke up on the ground.  Appellant cannot recall what caused him to end up on the ground, however, appellant believes he fell, causing him to go unconscious.  The only evidence that appellant has that supports his allegation of falling is that when he woke up from being unconscious, he was lying on top of a piece of plywood on the driveway.  (Pa230)  [...] provided an expert report from [...], who concluded “There is insufficient evidence to conclude to a reasonable degree of engineering certainty that plaintiff [appellant] experienced a slip and/or trip and fall incident…” (Pa178).  Furthermore, [...] medical expert [...] concluded in his supplemental report that there is no evidence that appellant fell.  However, he suffered from a medical-cardiologic disease.  (Pa178).  Appellant’s own liability expert, [...], would not commit to concluding how appellant fell.
[brief] Therefore, Respondents respectfully submit that this Court should affirm the decision below.  A.  THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF N.J.S.A. 48:12-152 AND ITS LEGISLATIVE HISTORY SHOWS THAT IT BARS RECOVERY OF DAMAGES CAUSED BY CONTACT WITH A TRAIN WHILE THE PERSON WAS WRONGFULLY PRESENT ON A RAILROAD RIGHT OF WAY, INCLUDING AT A CROSSING ESTABLISHED BY A RAILROAD.
[brief] A trial court’s determination on counsel fees is highly discretionary and only to be disturbed “on the ‘rarest occasion,’ and then only because of clear abuse of discretion. ”  Feliciano v. Faldetta, 434 N.J. Super. 543, 548-49 (App. Div. 2014) (quoting Strahan v. Strahan, 402 N.J. Super. 298, 317 (App. Div. 2008)).
[brief] TABLE OF CONTENTS  TABLE OF CONTENTS ........................................................................................................i  TABLE OF ORDERS BEING APPEALED ........................................................................i  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ..............................................................................................ii  TABLE OF APPENDIX .....................................................................................................ii  STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY ........................................1  LEGAL ARGUMENT .........................................................................................................1  I.  NEITHER TYLER NOR ROBERTO PROVIDE THE DEFENDANT WITH AUTOMATIC ENTITLEMENT TO RELIEF FROM THE FOUR (4) YEAR OLD FINAL JUDGMENT AS CONFIRMED BY THE NEW JERSEY SUPREME COURT  ..................................................................................................................1  II.  THE DEFENDANT HAS FAILED TO ARTICULATE THE LEGAL AUTHORITY UPON WHICH THE TRIAL COURT HAD JURISDICTION TO RECONSIDER THIS COURT’S DECISION .........................................................................................................................3  III.  THE PROSECUTION OF THE FRIVOLOUS MOTION AND APPEAL BY THE DEFENDANT AND HIS COUNSEL IS THE CAUSE FOR THE IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS  ............4  CONCLUSION
[directive] Aggravated Assault  2C:12-1c(4) by Auto or Vessel  Actor purposely drives a vehicle in an aggressive manner directed at another vehicle; third 3rd Degree $15,000 to $35,000 10% permissible degree if serious bodily injury results; fourth degree if bodily injury results.  21  Updated December 2, 2013  Bail Schedule 2  STATUTES WHERE BAIL MAY BE SET BY A SUPERIOR COURT JUDGE OR A MUNICIPAL COURT JUDGE OR, IN THE MUNICIPAL COURT JUDGE’S ABSENCE, THE MUNICIPAL COURT ADMINISTRATOR OR DEPUTY COURT ADMINISTRATOR, PURSUANT TO RULE 3:26-2 requires warrants
[brief] [6T].  The State filed a motion for an extended-term sentence but withdrew it orally at sentencing and requested that defendant’s sentence run consecutively to the sentence defendant was currently serving.  [6T4-15 to -24].  Defendant argued that mitigating factors (1) and (4) applied.  [6T6-18 to 7-20].  Defendant argued that he was addicted to drugs at the time of the robbery.  Defense counsel acknowledged that the factors do not amount to a defense.  Defendant argued that he should receive a 15-year sentence and that the sentences should run concurrently.  [...] analyzed defendant’s potential sentence pursuant to *State v. Yarbough*, 100 N.J. 627 (1985).
[brief] Regarding the disposition of defendant’s request seeking enforcement of the June 6, 2023 order, the trial court had only two options - either it should have enforced the June 6 order by ordering distribution of the marital assets pursuant to R. 2:9-1(a)(7) or it should have expressly stayed the distribution of marital assets pursuant to R. 2:9-5(b).  By denying defendant’s request for distribution of assets, the motion judge effectively reversed the June 6, 2023 order and violated Rule 2:9-1.  Further, trial court’s January 26, 2024 order directing plaintiff to deposit an amount of $125,000 to secure his equitable distribution obligation despite its clear finding that “defendant offered nothing other than her concern that plaintiff may not return to the United States” has no legal basis.  While it is true that I offered to deposit security with the court in the January 16, 2024 OTSC that I filed (Pa1188), I did so to secure relief from the trial court’s draconian, arbitrary, and whimsical decision of impounding my passport.  Having already complied with the trial court’s questionable decision by depositing $125,000 into the trust account of the Superior Court of New Jersey (Pa1223), I question the legality of the decision as the trial court did not cite any authority in support of its decision.  To the best of my knowledge, the trial court’s decision has no precedent in case law.  Trial court’s decision may have been tenable only if it had found any evidence of plaintiff planning to flee the country to evade his equitable distribution obligation.  POINT IV
[directive] B. accommodations.  If the pregnant officer makes a request to the agency’s human Full-duty resources unit or LAD/ADA coordinator to remain on full duty but avoid assignment to units in which the work may involve substances or situations that may pose a risk to the health of the officer or the pregnancy, the agency and officer should engage in an interactive process and the agency should communicate with the officer to determine whether a reasonable accommodation(s) is available under applicable law.  This may involve a temporary transfer of units.  III.
[brief] Pa74.  However, Plaintiff’s claims are not time-barred under the New Jersey Tort Claims Act.  *N.J.S.A.* 59:8-8 requires that a Plaintiff must file a Notice of Tort Claim within ninety (90) days of accrual of the claim.  In the present matter, Plaintiff filed her Notice of Tort Claim on May 31, 2019.  Pa74.  The lower court reasoned that Plaintiff’s driveway and landscaping claims accrued in June 2018, and because more than ninety (90) days passed until Plaintiff filed her Notice of Tort Claim on May 31, 2019, that her claims were barred pursuant to N.J.S.A. 59:8-8.  In the present matter, Plaintiff was advised that she should bury the swimming pool in June 2018 by the [...] and her driveway and landscaping were damaged in June 2018.  However, Plaintiff also trusted that the [...] would repair any damage to the Property because she was a lifelong resident of the [...] and had historically a very good relationship with the [...].  It was not until May 2019 that the Plaintiff realized that the [...] was not going to repair the Property, and she had no option but to file a lawsuit against the [...], which she never wanted to have to file.  It should also be noted that the “discovery rule” also applies to the ninety (90) day time limit contained within N.J.S.A. 59:8-8.  In Beauchamp v. Amedio, 164 N.J. 111 (2000) the New Jersey Supreme Court held that the ninety (90) days begin to accrue when plaintiff knew of his or her injury or claim.  Id. at 122.  Accordingly, although the Plaintiff knew of the damage to the pool, driveway and landscaping in June 2018, Plaintiff did not know that the [...] was not going to repair the Property until the work was completed and the [...] took no corrective action by May 2019.  Therefore, the ninety (90) day time period did not start to run in June 2018.  Lastly, N.J.S.A. 59:8-9 permits a claimant to file a Notice of Tort Claim up to one (1) year from the accrual of the claim if the claimant submits an affidavit setting forth extraordinary reasons for a late filing and no prejudice has been suffered by the public entity.  Lowe v. Zarghami, 158 N.J. 606 (1999).  Notice provisions of the Tort Claims Act were not intended to be a trap for the unwary.  Id. at 629.  Extraordinary reasons must be analyzed on a case-by-case basis.  O’Donnell v. New Jersey Turnpike Authority, 236 N.J. 335, 337 (2019).  Any doubt as to the sufficiency of the reasons should be resolved in favor of the claimant.  Escalante v. [...] of Cinnaminson, 283 N.J. Super. 244, 249 (App. Div. 1995).  Here, Plaintiff is not an attorney and was unaware of her obligation to file a Notice of Tort Claim.  However, the Plaintiff became aware that she had to file a Notice of Tort Claim when she was advised by the [...] that a notice was required.  Once she was advised she need to file a Notice of Tort Claim she immediately filed it, and the [...] knew of the claim because of discussions with the Plaintiff between June 2018 and May 31, 2019.  Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims are not barred under the New Jersey Tort Claims Act for failure to file a timely Notice of Tort Claim.  POINT II
[brief] (7T3-4 to 8).  Juror number nine, while using the bathroom, told the officer that, unbeknownst to her at the time, she had spoken to [...] during the lunch break outside the courthouse where there were benches.  (7T3-9 to 16).  The juror told the officer that it was “small talk. ” (7T3-17 to 18).  The trial court ruled that probing questions needed to come from the court.  (7T3-21 to 22).  The trial court conducted an individual voir dire of the jurors, starting with juror number nine.  (7T5-19 to 7T41-5).  Juror number nine told the court that on the prior Thursday, she and two other jurors were sitting on some benches outside the courthouse at the end of the lunch break.  (7T6-2 to 5).  She saw three other jurors approach them and they started talking; she saw a man with them that looked familiar to her, but she did not know who he was at the time.  (7T6-2 to 13).  He participated in the conversation, which was about food.  (7T6-11 to 12).  It was not until later when she and two other jurors were leaving the courthouse that she realized the man was one of the witnesses.  (7T6-13 to 16).  The juror characterized the conversation as “small conversation,” and recalled some talk about “Boba tea. ” (7T7-1 to 7).  The juror assured the judge that she could remain fair and impartial.  (7T8-25 to 7T9-3).  The court asked counsel if they had any further questions, and they said no. (7T9-4 to 7; 7T9-14 to 17).
[brief] (7T68-18 to 69-15; 8T 56-10 to 12, 72-21 to 24 to 73-3, 94-15 to 95-12)  [...] testified he had previously observed [...] appear on the surveillance system over 200 times while [...] was an employee, and his identification of the burglar as [...] was based on all these prior observations as well as the burglar’s walk and his nose.  (7T 69-3 to 24)  [...] said he had also observed [...] on the surveillance system “multiple times” and identified the burglar as [...] based on “his walk, his mannerisms, his height. ”  (8T 73-6 to 9).  [...] testified that he had worked with [...] for many years and that he could recognize [...] in the surveillance video because “it looks like him” and because of the way he was walking—“like hunched and his arms swing a little. ”  (8T 55-20 to 57-19)  [...], an employee of Kelly’s, testified that he had seen [...] in person hundreds of times over the years, and said he was able to recognize the suspect in the video as [...] from the suspect’s nose and chin line.  (8T 95-10 to 15)  [...] identified two still shots from the surveillance video as images in which he believed the suspect was making a phone call because his hand was held to his ear like he was holding a phone; [...] had told police he believed the suspect had made a phone call.  (8T 79-2 to 81-13)  [...]’s phone records did not show any phone call from around that time.  (9T 96-13 to 97-2)  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I THE COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING [...] TO IDENTIFY DEFENDANT FOR THE FIRST TIME AT TRIAL.
[brief] [Molnar v. Hedden, 138 N.J. 96, 104 (1994) (internal cites, quotes and bracketing omitted.)]  As such, the relation back doctrine has no application in this case.  **ISSUE V: PLAINTIFF’S ATTEMPT TO ARGUE THAT HE DID NOT VIOLATE THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS EVEN THOUGH HE KNEW [...]’S IDENTITY MUST FAIL.
[brief] THE BOARD PROPERLY DETERMINED THAT THE APPLICATION NECESSITATED A  (D)(5)  SPECIAL REASONS  VARIANCE FOR DENSITY WHEREIN  EACH UNIT WILL HAVE APPROXIMATELY 1,092 SQUARE FEET WHEREIN  1,200 SQUARE FEET IS REQUIRED  The term “density” is defined in N.J.S.A. 40:55D-4 as “the permitted number of dwelling units per gross area of land to be developed. ”  Pursuant to the Borough Zoning Ordinance, for multi-family dwellings, the minimum allowable size of property upon which development may occur within the Residential Zone, 1,200 square feet of lot area per unit in the Residential Zone.