ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] ”  Zive v. Stanley Roberts, Inc., 182 N.J. 436, 447-449 (App.Div. 2005) (internal citations omitted); See also Torre v. Casio, Inc., 42 F.3d 825, 829 (3d Cir.1994) (describing prima facie case as “relatively simple”); Massarsky v. Gen. Motors Corp., 706 F.2d 111, 118 (3d Cir.1983) (describing prima facie case as “easily made out”); Peper v. Princeton Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 77 N.J. 55, 81 (1978) (writing “the standard for presenting a [p]rima facie case cannot be too great lest rampant discrimination go unchecked. ”).
[brief] To obtain a hearing under the *Henderson* legal framework, "a defendant has the initial burden of showing some evidence of suggestiveness that could lead to a mistaken identification," tied to a "system . . . variable."  *Henderson*, 208 N.J. at 288-89.  "System variables" are "variables within the State's control," and include, for example, "[p]re-identification [i]nstructions" and "[s]howups."  *Id.* at 248, 250, 259-61.  "[E]stimator variables are factors beyond the control of the criminal justice system," and "can include factors related to the incident, the witness, or the perpetrator."  *Id.* at 261.  If a defendant makes a threshold showing, the burden shifts to the State to "offer proof . . . that the proffered eyewitness identification is reliable -- accounting for system and estimator variables."  *Id.* at 289.  If the court finds the identification procedure was impermissibly suggestive, it must then determine whether the procedure was nevertheless reliable.  *Id.* at 232-33.  "The totality of the circumstances must be considered in weighing the suggestive nature of the identification against the reliability of the identification."  *State v. Herrera*, 187 N.J. 493, 504 (2006).
[brief] Respondent Errs in Its Analysis of the Diagrammatic Elevation (aka “the Sketch”) and Again Misrepresents the Appellant’s Basis for Appeal.  To address the substantial factual misrepresentation, [...] states:  The key issue in the Appellant’s claim is whether the actual building height exceeds the approved building height of 43’-6” above DFE as shown on the plans approved by the Board.  The Appellant sought to introduce the Sketch as evidence of the building’s approved height despite it having no bearing or “relevance” to that issue.  (Turteltaub-Rb 23)  This is another, clearly false statement.  Appellant has not argued – neither in his brief to this Court nor in his complaint to the Trial Court – that [...] had violated the building-in-question’s approve height.  Appellant describes the distinction between “approved” height and the relative height violation [...] exceeded at considerable length in his initial brief (Ab 17-18).  Consequently, the arguments based on this false claim should be disregarded as irrelevant to Appellant’s actual basis for appeal.  One point that Appellant would like to address, however, is the issue of the Diagrammatic Elevation not being drawn to scale.  Aspects of the Diagrammatic Elevation may well not have been drawn to scale.  Of course, one could ask the question of why the rendering was not drawn to scale -- other than with the possible goal of misleading [...] as to the size of the building relative to adjacent properties and the visual magnitude of the requested height variance.  But this is speculation.  That said, Appellant’s complaint to the Trial Court is based on the heights represented on this rendering as “+/- 50” feet for [...], the adjacent building to the south, and “+/- 51” feet for the subject property.  Neither respondent seeks to explain how one can provide a number “not to scale”.  One can give approximations for numbers, as they rendering does, but a disinterested party would be hard-pressed to explain how a difference of “+/-” one foot winds up being “+/-” more than four feet.  Whatever was not drawn to scale in the Diagrammatic Elevation, it is not going to be actual numbers.  Consequently, Respondents’ arguments about what aspects of the Diagrammatic Elevation are or are not drawn to scale are irrelevant and should be disregarded, as should their demonstrably false claim.
[directive] Therefore, as the chief law enforcement officer of the State, I am directing that all law enforcement officers who received basic training prior to July 1, 2004, and have not taken the required courses, complete domestic security preparedness training on an in-service basis.  Moreover, I recommend that members who have taken these required courses in the past use this opportunity as a training refresher.  I remind you that under the Public Employees Occupational Safety and Health Program (PEOSH) every law enforcement officer is required to undergo Hazmat refresher training annually.  It is my belief that the training, which will be coordinated by the [...], will serve to ensure the efficient delivery of law enforcement services to the citizens of this State.  Additional information concerning the implementation and administration of the mandatory minimum training program for veteran law enforcement officers will be distributed by the [...].
[brief] Case Information Statement .................................................................Pa001  Text Messages between Plaintiff and Defendant (6/2/22 - 6/23/22)  ..............Pa005  Deposition Transcript ([...]) dated April 9, 2024 .......................Pa006  Defendant’s September 27, 2023 Amended Discovery Responses ...............Pa035  Defendant’s Response to Plaintiff’s Request for Admissions .......................Pa043  Certification of Attorney [...], Esquire .................................Pa049  Offer of Judgment (Redacted)  ..................................................................Pa052  Email between Counsel dated March 20, 2024  ...........................................Pa054  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
[brief] Assistant Prosecutor Of Counsel and On the Brief email: [...]  Honorable Judges of the Superior Court of New Jersey  Appellate Division  Richard J. Hughes Justice Complex  Post Office Box 006 Trenton, New Jersey  08626  Re State of New Jersey (Plaintiff-Respondent) v. [...] (Defendant-Appellant)  Appellate Division  Docket No. [...]  Indictment No. [...]  Case No. [...]  Criminal Action: On Appeal  From a Final Judgment of Conviction in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division (Criminal), Monmouth County
[brief] She.  See "Number; gender," supra, this section.  Sheet.  See "Folio," supra, this section.  Ship.  The word "ship" includes vessels, steamers, canal boats and every boat or structure adapted to navigation or movement from place to place, upon the ocean, lakes, rivers or artificial waterways, either by its own power or otherwise.  Singular.  See "Number; gender," supra, this section.  State.  The word "State" extends to and includes any State, territory or possession of the United States, the District of Columbia and the Canal Zone.  Sworn.  See "Oath; sworn," supra, this section.  Taxing district.  The words "taxing district," when used in a law relating to the assessment or collection of taxes, assessments or water rates or water rents, include every political division of the State, less than a county, whose inhabitants, governing body or officers have the power to levy taxes, assessments or rates.  Territory.  The word "territory" extends to and includes any territory or possession of the United States, the District of Columbia and the Canal Zone.  United States.  The words "United States" extend to and include every State, territory and possession of the United States, the District of Columbia and the Canal Zone.  Year.  See "Month; year," supra, this section.
[directive] The internal affairs investigator should interview the complainant, all witnesses and the subject officer, review relevant reports and documents, and obtain necessary information and materials.  6.3.6  If an officer subject to an administrative investigation has a good-faith basis to question the impartiality or independence of the investigation, then they may report their concerns to the County Prosecutor.  Law enforcement officers employed by a County Prosecutor’s Office or the Division of Criminal Justice may report concerns to the Office of Public Integrity & Accountability (OPIA).  The County Prosecutor may, within their discretion, conduct their own review of the internal affairs investigation and determine whether any further action is warranted, including potential reassignment of the investigation to a different entity.  6.3.7  An administrative investigation may commence with the disposition of a complaint against the subject officer by the Superior Court or a municipal court.
[brief] (Da260)  ...........................................................................................................  16  II.  THERE IS NO EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD TO SUPPORT THE CLAIM THAT THE ORIGINAL PLAINTIFFS SUFFERED ANY DAMAGES WHATSOEVER.  (See 1T and 2T)  ........................................................................  27  III.  THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN FAILING TO CONSIDER THE IMPACT THAT THE PASSAGE OF TIME HAD ON THE PLAINTIFFS’ CALCULATION OF DAMAGES.  (Da59 & Da85)  .........................................................................................................................  32  IV.  THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN PERMITTING PLAINTIFFS TO AMEND THEIR COMPLAINT.  (Da260) ...........................................................................................................
[brief] **CONCLUSION**  Defendant urges that the decision be summarily reversed for insufficiency of the evidence, and that the tattoo requirement of N.J.S.A. 4:19-24(a)(1) be deemed unconstitutionally vague.  Respectfully submitted, [Signature]  [...]  ATTORNEY ID# 016461984  THE SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY  APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. [...]  STATE OF NEW JERSEY  Plaintiff-Respondent v. [...], Defendant-Appellant Criminal Action On Appeal from an Order of the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division - Criminal Part, Somerset County  Dated: August 21, 2023  Sat Below: Hon. [...], J.S.C. BRIEF ON BEHALF OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY
[brief] It must also evaluate the existing zoning for the Property and its inconsistency with the Master Plan, the uses in the surrounding area, the zoning in neighboring [...], its affordable housing obligation, and its binding agreements with other entities.  The Borough’s decision to adopt [...] was reasonable considering all of these factors and struck a reasonable balance between them.  The lower court aptly concluded that it “compatibly” ensured the construction of affordable housing and increased the amount of open space on the Property.  Pa 128.  This Court should not second-guess the Borough’s decision.  For that reason, the trial court correctly determined that the Plaintiffs failed to show that the Borough acted arbitrarily, capriciously or unreasonably, and dismissed Plaintiffs’ complaint.
[brief] Pa1.  STATEMENT OF FACTS  [...] graduated from the 106th Academy Class of the New Jersey State Police.  Pa16.  [...] retired from the New Jersey State Police on a Service Retirement on or about February 1, 2012.  Pa16.  Pa68.  While employed by the New Jersey State Police, [...] was dispatched to Ground Zero on September 11, 12, 13, and 14, 2001 for 14 hours each day.  Pa18.  On or about July 8, 2019, “The Bill Ricci World Trade Center Rescue, Recovery, and Cleanup Operations Act” was signed into law (hereinafter referred to as the “Ricci Act”).
[brief] (Pa34-88).  That separate agreement between Fee Owner and [...] was referred to throughout the PSA (and herein) as the “[...]. ” (Pa34-88).  The PSA was executed the day after the [...] was executed.  The PSA contemplated that the closing would occur in October 2021, a date that was “intended to be concurrent with the Closing Date under the [...]. ” (Pa5, Complaint ¶ 16).  [...] affirmatively undertook, in Article VI of the PSA, to “cause Fee Owner to convey directly to [Plaintiff] by bargain and sale deed the Real Property,” subject to certain enumerated conditions.  (Pa104, PSA § 6.1).  Thus, it was [...]’s contractual obligation, among other things, to ensure that Plaintiff acquired fee title to the Real Property from the Fee Owner at the eventual closing.  (Pa104, PSA § 6.1; Pa3-4, Complaint ¶ 9).  Stated another way, [...] had no right to take title to the Real Property at the closing with the Fee Owner.  Under the PSA, that right belonged exclusively to Plaintiff.  (See id.).  The purchase price for Plaintiff to acquire the fee interest in the Real Property (excluding the Improvements), was set at $165 Million, subject to adjustment.  (Pa5, Complaint ¶¶ 16-17).  Among many other pertinent provisions, Section 13.1 of the PSA gave Plaintiff the right to demand specific performance, in the event that [...] breached the PSA by closing title under the [...] and thereupon defaulting in its obligation to close title under the PSA with Plaintiff.
[brief] (4)  All principal and accessory buildings shall be located at least fifty (50) feet from a property line except as follows:  (a)  If the setback requirement for the zone in question exceeds fifty (50) feet, the greater setback requirement shall apply.  (b)  For those buildings serving a purely residential function and any other accessory building not exceeding two thousand five hundred (2,500) square feet in gross floor area, the setback requirements of the zone in question, if less than fifty (50) feet, shall apply.  (5)  Maximum height of all principal and accessory buildings related to a place of worship shall be thirty-five (35) feet and two-and-one-half (2 ½) stories, except as provided in § 230-131, which exempts church spires, belfries, towers designed exclusively for ornamental purposes, chimneys, flues or similar appurtenances not exceeding the height limit by more than ten (10) feet.
[directive] SUMMARY OF RULES AND STATUTES REGARDING BAIL FOR INDICTABLE OFFENSES  Rule or Statute Description  This Rule provides that “Except in first or second degree cases as set forth in N.J.S.A. 2A:162-12 and unless the order setting the bail specifies to the contrary, Rule 3:26-4(g) whenever bail is set pursuant to Rule 3:26-1, bail may be satisfied by the deposit in court of cash in the amount of ten-percent of the amount of bail fixed and the Ten Percent Cash Bail. 4 defendant’s execution of a recognizance for the remaining ninety percent.
[brief] (Da 8-14)  On September 14, 2020, [...] moved to suppress the physical evidence retrieved by [...] officers in the August 7, 2020, searches of his car and home in [...].  On June 30, 2022, the Honorable [...], J.S.C., held a hearing on that motion.  (1T)  [...] subsequently issued an oral opinion and an order denying the motion.  (2T4-4 to 19-14; Da 65)
[brief] ”  On June 7, 2023, the trial court began the remand hearing (1T)\(^2\) and concluded it on July 14, 2023 (2T). \(^3\)  Although the Plaintiff's Appendix in this proceeding is 856 pages long, she only three (3) exhibits were entered into evidence P – 10 (loan documents), P – 11 (medical bills and receipts excluding calculation logic) and P – 12 (including both letters dated 2/28/2012 and 3/27/2012) (Da9).  Defendant moved four (4) exhibits into evidence to wit D – 12 (Plaintiff’s CIS dated 06/05/1998), D – 13 (Plaintiff’s CIS dated 2/7/2017), D – 24 (Deed for [...] Property) and D – 28 (Defendant’s letter to Plaintiff dated 1/1/2018) (Da13).  None of those exhibits are contained in the Plaintiff’s Appendix.  \(^2\) T1 = Transcript of June 7, 2023.  \(^3\) T2 = Transcript of July 14, 2013.  In fact, neither is the trial court’s statement of reasons which forms the basis of this appeal (Da5 – Da24).
[brief] Likewise, this Court has previously applied the same rationale to an officer’s threat to prolong a search to use a drug-sniffing dog, finding that the threat does not constitute coercion where the officers had reasonable suspicion to prolong the search to use a dog.\textsuperscript{12}  See \textit{State v. Baum}, 393 N.J. Super. 275, 290 (App. Div. 2007), (finding the codefendant’s confession was not coerced because “[w]hen there is reasonable suspicion of drugs and the threat to call for a dog is calmly given, as it was here, such a threat will not be considered coercive. ” (citation omitted)), affirmed on other grounds, 199 N.J. 407 (2009)\textsuperscript{13}; \textit{State v. Elders}, 386 N.J. Super. 208, 230 (App. Div. 2006) (finding that the threat did not render the consent to search involuntary because the officers had reasonable suspicion to prolong the investigation to use drug dogs), affirmed in part and reversed in part on other grounds, 192 N.J. 224 (2007).
[brief] ” (V:16:59:25 to 59:31).  The officer asked defendant to show him where the narcotics were located, and defendant guided the officer to drugs located in the passenger door compartment.  (1T30-4 to 15, 78-2 to 5).  The officer saw three containers: two were empty and one contained suspected methamphetamine.  (1T30-23 to 25).  [...] asked defendant whether the drugs belonged to just him or to him and his wife.  Defendant initially denied that the methamphetamine belonged to him.  The officer responded: “Am I going to have to arrest her, too? Because it’s in the car. ”  Defendant acknowledged that the drugs belonged to him shortly thereafter.
[brief] The remedy for breach of the duty to defend is clear: [...] is “is liable for the amount of the judgment obtained against the insured or of the settlement made by him. ”  Griggs v. Bertram, 88 N.J. 347, 364, 443 A.2d 163, 172 (1982); accord Passaic Valley Sewerage Comm’rs v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 206 N.J. 596, 615, 21 A.3d 1151, 1162 (2011) (“A breach of the duty to defend will trigger indemnification of the [...] settlement, and will not be limited to the Coregis Policy’s definition of ‘loss.
[directive] 3.  The Director of the Division of Criminal Justice shall report annually to the Attorney General on the number of officers who have completed human trafficking in-service training, and shall make recommendations as appropriate as to whether the Attorney General should require that additional officers receive in-service training.  Nothing herein should be construed to prevent a County Prosecutor from requiring officers who are subject to his or her authority to receive the human trafficking training developed by the Division of Criminal Justice, or to receive additional training developed or approved by the County Prosecutor.
[brief] ”\textsuperscript{152}  \textsuperscript{149}  Georgine v. Amchem Products, Inc., 83 F.3d 610, 632 (3d Cir. 1996).  \textsuperscript{150}  Lee v. Carter-Reed Co., LLC, 203 N.J. 496, 518 (2010) (quoting Iliadis v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 191 N.J. 88, 120 (2007)).  \textsuperscript{151}  See California v. Yamaski, 42 U.S. 682, 700-01 (1970).  \textsuperscript{152}  Amchem Products, Inc., v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 617, 117 S. Ct. 2231, 138 L. Ed. 2d 689 (1997).
[brief] “State courts are understandably frustrated when they faithfully apply existing constitutional law only to have a federal court discover… new constitutional commands. ”  *Engle*, 456 U.S. 107, 128, n. 33 (1982) (referring to matters occurring on writs of habeas corpus).  “State courts cannot ‘anticipate, and so comply with, this Court's due process requirements or ascertain any standards to which this Court will adhere in prescribing them. ’”  *Teague* at 310 (quoting *Brown v. Allen*, 344 U.S. 443, 424 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring in result)).  Accepting Defendant’s implicit argument, New Jersey courts would be required to remand for resentencing every case invoking the persistent offender statute, no matter how distant and despite the fact that *Erlinger* was decided within the last two months.  This would be a practical impossibility and an unnecessary burden considering the patent obviousness inherent of most separate-occasions analyses.  Here, Defendant was convicted in January of 2008 of third-degree shoplifting under a Gloucester county indictment, of third-degree receiving stolen property in September of 2008 under a Camden county indictment, and of third-degree aggravated assault and third-degree resisting arrest in September of 2010 under a Cape May county indictment. \(^2\)  14T 27:6-14.  Therefore, it is “evident beyond a reasonable doubt that the failure to submit the different-occasions question to the jury had no effect on the defendant’s sentence. ”  *Erlinger*, 144 S. Ct. at 1866 (Kavanaugh, J. dissenting).  As it is unquestionable that Defendant committed his prior crimes on separate occasions, it was harmless error for the trial court to decide the occasions inquiry.  Thus, the trial court appropriately and correctly determined that Defendant is subject to an extended term of imprisonment as a persistent offender.  *N.J.S.A.* 2C:44-3a.  \(^2\)  Defendant did not append any record of his criminal history to either of his briefs, nor did he reveal the nature or dates of his previous convictions in any submissions.  However, Defendant did submit the presentence report in tandem with the first submission of his opening brief (which was later amended).  This information is gleaned from this presentence report as well as 14T: 27:6-14.  CONCLUSION
[brief] Specifically, while the Court Rules require that all pleadings be construed liberally in the interest of justice, R. 4:5-7, “a party’s pleadings must nonetheless fairly apprise an adverse party of the claims and issues to be raised at trial. ”  *Miltz v. Boroughs-Shelving, Div. of Lear Siegler, Inc.*, 203 N.J. Super. 451, 457 (App. Div. 1985).  “To be adequate the pleadings must contain a claim for relief, a statement of the facts on which the claim is based showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, and a demand for judgment for the relief to which the pleader deems him or herself entitled. ”  *Miltz*, supra, 203 N.J. Super. at 457, citing, R. 4:5-2.  As aptly noted by the New Jersey Supreme Court:  … the fundament of a cause of action, however inartfully it may be stated, still must be discernable within the four corners of the complaint.  A thoroughly deficient complaint -- a complaint that completely omits the underlying basis for relief-- cannot be sustained as a matter of fundamental fairness.  An opposing party must know what it is defending against; how else would it conduct an investigation and discovery to meet the claim?  Bauer v. Nesbitt, 198 N.J. 601, 611 (2009).  Where a complaint is deficient, R. 4:6-2(e) allows a party to seek dismissal by motion based on a failure to plead a claim upon which relief can be granted.