ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] A change in the law or in the judicial view of an established rule of law is not such an extraordinary circumstance as to justify relief from a final judgment where the time to appeal has expired.  This is unquestionably the general rule and rests principally upon the important policy that litigation must have an --- 9  Moreover, Tyler has nothing to do with “voiding” a foreclosure judgment.  Tyler is a putative class action where the only issue was whether the plaintiff had stated a valid claim for a taking without just compensation.
[brief] RESPONDENT DID NOT ESTABLISH THAT APPELLANT OPERATED A VEHICLE BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT.  Respondent claims that based on Appellant’s “own admissions, he clearly had the intent to drive, and in fact did drive, the vehicle” in question.  (Resp. Brief at 19).  In so arguing, Respondent relies solely on [...]’s testimony that Appellant informed [...] that he was on the way to visit a friend in Hackettstown when the vehicle petered out on the side of the road.  (Id.)  Respondent’s argument, however, fails to address that [...]’s testimony does not elucidate on several key facts needed to establish operation beyond a reasonable doubt, including: (1) at what time Appellant allegedly left his home in his vehicle, (2) at what time Appellant again planned to use his vehicle to complete his trip to Hackettstown, or (3) what occurred during the interim period from the time Appellant left his home to the time he was stopped by [...] at 2:18 a.m. on the morning of November 5, 2019.  (App. Brief at 20).  Absent these crucial facts, which were not contained in the factual record before the Law Division, Respondent cannot establish that Appellant operated a vehicle beyond a reasonable doubt.
[brief] 4.  On August 20, 2020  [...] filed a Medpay arbitration which was assigned Docket Number [...] as a result of a motor vehicle accident which occurred on November 19, 2018 involving the injured party [...] and the [...] insured, [...].  On or about August 23, 2022, the Arbitrator entered an award in favor of [...] NJ Insurance Company in the amount of $1,972.84.  See arbitration award (Da139 – Da146).
[brief] ”  *Id.* at 79-80.  [...] fails to offer a shred of evidence -- not a single document, certification or deposition testimony -- demonstrating that the hypothetical information sought at the deposition is highly secretive, that disclosure of the information would harm him in any way, or that the [...] would seek to compete in some way if it could gain access to the information.  This utter failure is significant because it is [...]’s burden to demonstrate that he will be prejudiced by his disclosure of such information.  *Capital Health*, 230 N.J. at 80 (“The party attempting to show that secrecy outweighs the presumption of discoverability must be specific as to each document; broad allegations of harm, unsubstantiated by specific examples or articulated reasoning, are insufficient.
[brief] Generally, a reviewing court “should not reverse the Attorney General's determination unless it is arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable or it is not supported by substantial credible evidence in the record as a whole. ”  *Prado v. State*, 186 N.J. 413, 427 (2006).  However, when as here the issue presented to the Court is legal in nature, this court’s review is de novo.  *Lavezzi v. State*, 219 N.J. 163, 172 (2014).  The present matter requires the court to make a finding as to whether or not the State is obligated to defend and indemnify the [...] in a civil lawsuit.  Thus, while the Attorney General’s factual determinations are subject to a deferential standard of review, as noted by the Supreme Court in *Lavezzi v. State*, supra, the review of the Attorney General’s legal conclusions are subject to de novo review because courts are not “bound by [an] agency’s interpretation of a statute or its determination of a strictly legal issue. ”  *Id.* citing *Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. Intermodal Props., LLC*, 215 N.J. 142, 165 (2013).  In the present matter, there were no factual findings made by the Attorney General.  Instead, the Attorney General made its determination not to defend and indemnify the [...] based solely upon the allegations contained in the underlying complaint, and specifically based on the fact that [...] was not seeking monetary damages in his Complaint.  Accordingly, as [...] contends the decision of the [...] was wrong as a matter of law, de novo review is the appropriate standard of review.  LEGAL ARGUMENT
[brief] ORDERS AND RULINGS | iii | | TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | iv | | PRELIMINARY STATEMENT | 1 | | PROCEDURAL HISTORY | 3 | | COUNTERSTATEMENT OF FACTS | 5 | | LEGAL ARGUMENT | 8 | | I.  STANDARD OF REVIEW | 8 | | A.  The Standard Of Review For A Motion For Reconsideration Is Abuse of Discretion [Issue Not Raised Below] | 8 | | B.  A Deferential Standard Of Review Applies To An Order of Judgment In A Non-jury Trial [Issue Not Raised Below]  | 8 | | C.  [...]’s Standard of Review Is Improper And Inapplicable [Issue Raised in Appellate Brief Db12] | 10 | | II.  THE AUGUST 24, 2023 ORDER OF JUDGMENT IS NOT PROPERLY BEFORE THIS COURT AND THE COURT SHOULD DECLINE TO CONSIDER [...]’S ARGUMENTS [ISSUE NOT RAISED BELOW]  | 12 | | III.  DISMISSAL OF [...]’S CLAIMS AGAINST THE THIRD-PARTY DEFENDANTS SHOULD BE AFFIRMED BECAUSE [...] FAILED TO ESTABLISH D[...]GES  [ISSUE RAISED BELOW 5T12-20; 6T30-3] | 14 | | A.  [...]’s Failure Is Fatal To Its Claim [Issue Raised Below 5T12-20; 6T30-3] | 14 |  IV.  THE TRIAL COURT’S DENIAL OF [...]’S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION SHOULD BE AFFIRMED BECAUSE [...] FAILED TO MEET ITS BURDEN UNDER R. 4:49-2 [ISSUE RAISED BELOW 6T24-13; 6T30-6]  ……………  18  A.  [...] Failed To Show That The Trial Court’s Decision Was Palpably Incorrect or Irrational [Issue Raised Below 6T24-13]  …………………………………………  18  B.  [...]’s Cross Motion For Reconsideration Was Properly Granted Under R. 4:49-2 And Should Be Affirmed [Issue Raised Below 6T32-6]  ……………………  19  V.  THE TRIAL COURT’S JUDGMENT DISMISSING ALL CLAIMS AGAINST THIRD-PARTY DEFENDANTS SHOULD BE AFFIRMED BECAUSE IT WAS SUPPORTED BY ADEQUATE, SUBSTANTIAL AND CREDIBLE EVIDENCE  [Issue Raised Below 5T11-11; 5T12-3; 5T12-18]
[brief] (*Pizzo* at 97).  Here, however, the Board did not base its denial on the “broad purposes of the Municipal Land Use Law. ”  Rather, the Board had significant concerns regarding specific issues – as evidenced by specific examples–directly tied to the property in question.  The record is replete with concerns on the part of the Board members as to traffic, parking, and safety in the immediate vicinity of the subject property.  The Board voiced concerns regarding the submitted traffic report, which was indicated to be based on nine (9) residential units whereas there was the potential for 18 single-family homes at the site.  [...], with intimate knowledge of [...] considering he lives in a nearby neighborhood in the Township, explained: “but my block, which is also ten houses with no basements . . . we generate triple that amount on peak hours” (referring to the 14 peak hour trips indicated in the [...] traffic study submitted with this application).  (2T20-6 to 2T20-10)  He further noted that while the traffic counts are on 14th Street, the property at issue is not located on 14th Street, and that this is a very congested area: with many shuls, school bus routes, and narrow shoulders with cars parked in the shoulders.  (2T24-1 to 2T24-10)  A board member asked [...] if there was any indication of how many cars will be turning left and/or turning right out of this development, and if there is any way to restrict it to right turn only out of the development.  (2T48-8 to 2T48-11)  [...] responded negatively to the first question, and as to the second, opined that to restrict the flow of traffic would be detrimental as it would send people down towards 14th Street or they’d make a U-turn and come back.  (2T48-16 to 2T48-19)  The Board expressed concern that, with the relatively new traffic light installed at Hope Chapel Road and 14th Street, traffic backs up very far during peak hours in this neighborhood.  (2T49-17 to 2T49-18)  The Board was also aware of the fact that two sewer lines were proposed for every new lot, indicating the presence of basement apartments at these proposed new homes was a probability, and thus would further add to congestion in the neighborhood and on this street.  (2T64-4 to 2T64-13)  Despite all of these concerns centering around traffic, the applicant failed to provide expert testimony in an attempt to quell concerns or answer the questions of the Board and rather chose to sit back and rely on the controversial traffic report that had been submitted and that the Board had made very clear it was rejecting.
[brief] In Northfield, the reservation of rights letter was unclear about whether the insured could reject the offer of a defense.  Id. at 143-45.  Here, [...] clearly informed [...] that he could reject the defense that [...] was providing under a reservation of rights and that [...] would assume his consent if he did not object:  [T]he defense of this action by the [assigned] attorney on your behalf is not to be considered a waiver of such policy defense or of any policy defenses which may be involved in this suit.  You have the right to accept or reject this Company’s offer to defend this matter subject to these terms.  If we do not hear from you to the contrary, we will assume that it is acceptable for us to continue handling the suit on these terms.  (Da297).  This language complies with New Jersey law, which provides that [...] can “properly reserve its rights, so as to control the defense while avoiding estoppel, [by] advis[ing] its insured of the potential of a disclaimer, fairly inform[ing] the insureds of their right to reject the insurer’s defense on those terms, and secur[ing] the insureds’ explicit or implicit consent. ”  Petersen v. N.J. Mfrs. Ins. Co., No. A-0459-12T4, 2014 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 995, at *14-15 (App. Div. May 2, 2014) (citing Eggleston, 37 N.J. at 127-28).  Therefore, under New Jersey law, [...] properly protected its right to withdraw a defense.  POINT 7 - The Trial Court Properly Dismissed [...]’s Counterclaims against [...]
[brief] Further, even if all five elements are met, the doctrine shall not be applied to limit claims when it is “unfair” to do so, particularly when the precluded party did not have an adequate opportunity to obtain a full and fair adjudication in the prior action or if compelling circumstances make it appropriate to litigate the issue.  Id. (citations omitted); Restat. 2d of Judgments, §28.  “The ultimate question is whether there is good reason, all things considered, to allow the party to relitigate the issue. ”  Allen, 208 N.J. at 138.  While it is true that the [...] have previously attempted to raise concerns related to the environmental contamination at the property, the distinct issue of legal liability for that contamination has never been heard on the merits in any court, at any time.  The environmental claims alleged in the Complaint have never been decided on their merits; therefore no issue is being “relitigated” and the doctrines of res judicata, collateral/judicial estoppel and entire controversy doctrine do not preclude such claims by [...] or [...] at this time.
[brief] *N.J. Transit Corp. v. Franco*, 447 N.J. Super. 361, 367-69 (App. Div. 2016).  Though the land was not zoned to be a street, the property owner argued that it would not need to obtain a variance because it could simply dedicate the street to the municipality.  *(Id.* at 375.)  The court rejected that argument because the municipality could, and would likely, reject the hypothetical dedication, seeing as the street would service property in other municipalities that provided no tax revenue to [...].  *(Id.* at 375-77.)  In other words, the property owner could not use dedication as an end-run around the variance requirement.  *(Id.* at 377.)  That holding is inapposite to the instant matter, however, because it addressed undeveloped, non-entitled property that was not a street dedicated to the municipality on an approved plat map, and on which the municipality had not already approved the construction of roads and required a performance bond in connection with the construction of same.
[brief] ”  Gerba v. Bd. of Trs., Pub. Emps.’ Ret. Sys., 83 N.J. 174, 189 (1980) (citations omitted).  An agency’s factual determinations are presumptively correct; on review of the facts, a court will not substitute its own judgment where the agency’s findings are supported by sufficient credible evidence.  Rooth v. Bd. of Trs., Pub. Emps.’ Ret. Sys., 472 N.J. Super. 357, 365 (App. Div. 2022).  Additionally, this court gives “substantial deference to an agency’s interpretation of a statute that the agency is charged with enforcing,” Richardson v. Bd. of Trs., Police & Firemen’s Ret. Sys., 192 N.J. 189, 196 (2007).  “Such deference has been specifically extended to state agencies that administer pension statutes,” because “a state agency brings experience and specialized knowledge to its task of administering and regulating a legislative enactment within its field of expertise. ”  Piatt v. Police & Firemen’s Ret. Sys., 443 N.J. Super. 80, 99 (App. Div. 2015) (quoting In re Election Law Enforcement Comm’n Advisory Op. No. 01-2008, 201 N.J. 254, 262 (2010)).  Indeed, “if the language is plain and its meaning clear, the inquiry ends there . . .”
[brief] The history and public policies to be upheld of the common law Public Trust Doctrine is explained further in the administrative regulations at N.J.A.C. 7:7-16.9(x), which provides in pertinent part:  (x)  Rationale:  The Public Trust Doctrine states that natural resources, including, but not limited to, tidal waterways and their shores, air and wildlife in this State are held by the State in trust for the benefit of all of the people.  Further, the Public Trust Doctrine establishes the right of the public to fully utilize these natural resources for a variety of public uses.  The original purpose of the doctrine was to assure public access to waters for navigation, commerce and fishing.  In the past two centuries, State and Federal courts in New Jersey have recognized that public uses guaranteed by the Public Trust Doctrine also include public recreational uses such as swimming, sunbathing, fishing, surfing, sport diving, bird watching, walking and boating along the various tidal shores.  As the trustee of the public rights to natural resources, including tidal waterways and their shores, it is the duty of the State not only to allow and protect the public's right to use them, but also to ensure that there is adequate access to these natural resources.  As the State entity managing public access along the shore, the Department has an obligation to ensure that this occurs.
[brief] [...] v. [...], 69 N.J. 578 (1976).  In [...], a firefighter with a pre-existing cardiovascular condition was performing normal, albeit strenuous, work effort and thereafter experienced a heart attack.  Id.  At a fire, [...] was unloading several sections of hose from the back of the pumper.  Id. at 589.  Normally the task was performed by three (3) men, but [...] carried the heavy load by himself.  Id.  [...] performed several other strenuous work tasks over the course of several hours.  Id.  Upon returning to the fire station, [...] was unable to move his arms or legs or speak and was rushed to the hospital.  Id.  Medical testing revealed [...] had a pre-existing cardiovascular condition.  Id. at 590.  The Board denied [...]'s application for accidental disability benefits.  The Appellate Division reversed the [...].  The Supreme Court held that where a member's disability is the end result of a pre-existing cardiovascular condition, work effort alone whether unusual or excessive, cannot be considered a traumatic event, even though it may have aggravated or accelerated the pre-existing disease.  *[...]* at 586.  (Emphasis added).  However, the *[...]* Court also held that a basis for an accidental disability pension would exist if it were shown that the disability directly resulted from the combined effect of a traumatic event and a pre-existing disease.
[brief] (Aa0093).  The NJDEP’s approved Engineering Report confirmed this, indicating:  “[t]he forebay is actually not the forebay but is lower marsh area of the constructed wetlands basin.  Because there is no requirement for a constructed wetlands basin to be elevated above the seasonal highwater table and instead it is fed by groundwater, this concern is alleviated. ” (Aa0087).  Accordingly, [...]’s stormwater management design was found by the NJDEP, based upon substantial credible evidence, and pursuant to NJDEP’s expertise in reviewing and interpreting its own requirements, to meet the water quality requirement of the Stormwater Management Rules and the FHA permit was properly issued.
[directive] of of  A "victim domestic violence" means a person protected under the Prevention Domestic Violence 2 of Act and shall include any person who is 18 years age or older or who is an emancipated minor and who or has been subjected to domestic violence by a spouse, former spouse, any other person who is a present of or household member was at any time a household member.  "Victim domestic violence" also includes any person, regardless of age, who has been subjected to domestic violence by a person with whom the if of or victim has a child in common, with whom the victim anticipates having a child common, one the in of parties is pregnant.  "Victim domestic violence" also includes any person who has been subjected to domestic violence by a person with whom the victim has had a dating relationship.  See N.J.S.A. 2C:25- 19(d}. of or of of
[brief] **BUILDING RESTRICTIONS (OCEANFRONT LOTS)**  No building, alteration, addition, or structure of any kind shall be erected closer than THIRTY-FIVE (35) FEET to the front or easterly side of an ocean front lot; nor closer than FOUR (4) FEET to side lines.  (Da53)  The building restrictions above do not contain any height restrictions affecting the subject premises.  The building restrictions above do not contain any height restrictions affecting the ocean front lots.  The subject premises is not an Oceanfront lot, so these restrictions do not apply to Plaintiffs’ property but are relevant to show that these building restrictions have, likewise, not been uniformly applied by [...].
[brief] Pa271.  In its background discussion within the Opinion, the trial court noted:  Following the incident, Plaintiff advised his union president of the incident leading to a City investigation.  On March 17, 2020, Plaintiff submitted a letter, or M-13, explaining the incident at the request of the Fire Department Director.  A written reprimand was prepared for Defendant [...] as a result of the investigation, but the reprimand was never served due to issued with COVID-19 and Defendant [...]’s terminal leave in advance of his retirement.  Despite the incident, Plaintiff maintained that he received support from the Department regarding the incident and stated that his tenure with the Fire Department was not impacted by the incident or his subsequent complaint.  Pa 273.  The trial court noted that Appellant’s arguments centered on the premise that there were grounds for denial of summary judgment on the issue of liability “even if there was no reasonable dispute that the City maintained policies for reporting and investigating same.
[brief] Assembly Bill No. 2161 (1R) requires certain contractors and subcontractors who perform public works contracts to register with the Department of Labor.  The registration system will better enable the department to enforce existing State and federal labor laws concerning wages, unemployment and temporary disability insurance, workers’ compensation insurance, and the payment of payroll taxes.  * * *  Under the bill, the Commissioner of Labor may sanction a contractor by requiring the contractor, as a condition of initial or continued registration, to provide a surety bond payable to the State for the benefit of workers damaged by any failure of the contractor to pay wages or benefits or otherwise comply with applicable labor laws.  [1420a]  [...] reiterated this point, stating:  The purpose of the registration system is to enable the department to better enforce existing State and federal labor laws concerning wages, unemployment and temporary disability insurance, workers’ compensation insurance, and the payment of payroll taxes.  [1423a].  It is also settled that registration with the DOL must occur before the time of bid opening and cannot be cured once bids are opened.
[brief] Appellants rely upon the statement of facts and procedural history submitted in their initial brief.  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT  The Amici brief, similar to the Respondents’ brief, continues to mischaracterize the carefully tailored Amended Policy 5756 and the safeguards in place.  The Amici attempt to circumvent the fundamental rights of parents guaranteed in the constitution in directing the upbringing of their children and reiterate the notion that governmental actors are better equip to handle the emotional well-being of their child.  In doing so, the Amici rely on the premise that parents are viewed as a negative actor that will only harm the emotional well-being of the child.  This convoluted idea requires a determination by a governmental actor whether a parent is capable of handling their own child’s gender identity and expression.  Surely, these are not the type of policies the State should support in providing governmental actors more autonomy over the upbringing a child than the parent.  Furthermore, the overarching goal of the Laws Against Discrimination (“LAD”) is to ensure that individuals are not treated differently based on certain traits or characteristics, including gender identity or expression.
[directive] Order #6B may be used where the defendant has either previously been detained until trial or on his/her present charge a detention hearing has not taken place.  In either case, the order may be used to return the defendant to the appropriate correctional facility.  of Order #7 - Order Mandating the Transfer  Defendant from Attachment 9 9. of of the Care and Custody the Commissioner Health to the Correctional Facility  This order is to be used to transfer the defendant back to the correctional facility when he/she has gained his/her fitness to proceed to trial and is no longer dangerous to self, of others or property by reason mental illness.
[brief] Moreover, there was uncontradicted testimony that not only did the website change, but the 3.0 GPA requirement was published in the Graduate Student Manual, provided to all incoming students on or about August 26, 2012.  ([...] Dep. T108:19-T109:2 at Pa. 366-67.)  The 3.0 GPA was also announced in other publications as well and in the introductory course “Beyond the Curriculum. ”  Id. [...]’s testimony at his deposition was that he looked at the [...] website every single day until admission, because he was aware that it was a new, unaccredited program and he wanted to be aware of changes.  (Plaintiff Dep., T89:2-14 at Pa.161).  He testified that after admission, he no longer had to monitor it every day and cannot recall when he saw it again.  (Plaintiff Dep., T92:21-93:7 at Pa.162).  The law is clear: it is not when a plaintiff actually learns of his claim that determines when the six-year Statute of Limitations begins to run.
[brief] Defendant points to the Senate Report to obfuscate the plain meaning of “a debt collector may not communicate, in connection with the collection of any debt, with any person. ”  15 U.S.C. § 1692c(b).  But a court may not consider extrinsic sources unless (i) the language is unclear or (ii) applying its plain meaning frustrates the statutory purpose (which is sometimes referred to as an absurd result).  Defendant does not assert any ambiguity.  Instead, it contends the construction adopted in the federal decisions is absurd.