[brief] Surprisingly, Plaintiffs cite to *McClellan v. Feit*, 376 N.J. Super. 305 (App. Div. 2005), even though there the Appellate Division recognized that the N.J.A.C. § 11:1-20.2 was “not applicable” and held that changes in coverage “must be called to the insured's attention so that the insured can decide whether to continue the coverage or purchase new insurance,” as was done here when [...] was notified of its unenrollment, and maintained its direct insurance coverage for the Project.  Plaintiffs also rely on *Harvester Chemical Corp.*, 277 N.J. Super. 421, for public policy purposes of cancellation rules, including: (1) “prohibit[ing] arbitrary mid-term cancellation,” (2) ensuring an insurer “notify [the insured] of an intent to cancel” and (3) “protect[ing] injured third parties” by obviating “uncompensated injury that ought rightfully be renumerated. ”  However, here, none of the three public policy purposes are at issue.  [...] did not effectuate an arbitrary mid-term cancellation, but instead unenrolled [...] from the CCIP based on the excluded demolition work and, further, the unenrollment happened upon [...]’s request.  Also, [...] was notified that it was being unenrolled and acknowledged the same on multiple occasions.  Last, [...] was not left bare without coverage, but was defended by [...] (Pa2551), and plaintiffs in the Hood Lawsuit were fully compensated based on a settlement partially funded by [...] and [...], each of which provided coverage for [...].  Plaintiffs contend that the decision in *Barbara Corp. v. Bob Maneely Ins. Agency*, 197 N.J. Super. 339 (App. Div. 1984), compels notice obligations to remain with the insurer.  (TRVb39.)  While that may be true in certain circumstances, such as to avoid lapse or protect innocent third parties, as was the case in *Barbara*, it should not be expanded to cover CCIPs where communications flow through the CCIP administrator and sponsor.  Additionally, subsequent to *Barbara*, this Court has found that automatic renewal was not appropriate where a broker, instead of the insurer, had provided notice to the insured and the insured acknowledged its uninsured status.  *See Insinga v. Hegedus*, 231 N.J. Super. 562 (App. Div. 1989).  (“We clearly did not intend to hold that if the broker did send an effective, proper and timely notice, the insurer would be deprived of the benefit thereof. ”)  Finally, Plaintiffs point to an email from [...] of [...] to argue that, even if [...] was authorized to unenroll [...], [...] did not have properly documented proof that termination was made because Kelly allegedly confirmed “we don’t have a copy of any request” to unenroll [...].  (Pb13 and 41.)  But that citation brazenly ignores the fact that she testified: it was her understanding that “the policy was already cancelled” and that she was simply “trying to find out how it came to be cancelled” ten days later ([...] Tr., 87:19-88:21 at Pa2119); and that the referenced email was transmitted in the course of [...]’s search and, importantly, that such documents, including [...]’s request to unenroll and [...]’s endorsement removing [...] from the CCIP, were ultimately discovered ([...] Tr., 65:8-68:4 at Pa2114, 82:11-20 at Pa2118 and 115:9-116:3 at Pa2126).  Thus, Plaintiffs’ misleading argument falls flat.  II.