ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] 9.11.1  On an annual basis, every law enforcement agency shall provide to the County Prosecutor and publish on its public website a report summarizing the types of complaints received and the dispositions of those complaints.  This report should be statistical in nature.  The County Prosecutor shall submit a summary of the reports from all agencies in its jurisdiction to the Office of Public Integrity and Accountability.  The Annual Internal Affairs Summary attached to Appendix K may be used to satisfy the requirements of this Section.  This provision is not intended to require that law enforcement agencies initiate internal affairs investigations into the 11 accuracy of every statement, report or certification that may be filed with respect to civil litigation, including matrimonial and employment matters or any other personal or financial matters not directly related to the officer's employment.  In most cases, such investigations would be inappropriate.  Determinations as to the credibility of statements or certifications made in the context of litigation should be made by the courts or administrative tribunals.  Determinations as to the credibility of statements or certifications in other personal or financial matters should be addressed if they arise in the context of an ongoing internal affairs investigation.  63  INTERNAL AFFAIRS POLICY & PROCEDURES | August 2020 9.11.2
[brief] 1.  Plan layout issues.  2.  Bagel kettle equipment located with insufficient clearances and protections for persons.  3.  Floor finish materials that contribute to potential slip hazards for persons.  4.  Lighting levels that are insufficient for employees to perform their duties in a safe manner.  In his expert report and deposition testimony, [...] asserted that in designing the layout of [...] with these safety hazards, defendants breached their duty to "recognize the primary obligation to protect the health, safety, and welfare of the public in [their] performance of professional duties, and . . . act with reasonable care and competence."
[directive] See: (2)  The victim is at least 13, but less than 16 years old; and A- 7  ATTORNEY GENERAL STANDARDS FOR PROVIDING SERVICES TO VICTIMS OF SEXUAL ASSAULT (a) The actor is related to the victim by blood or affinity to the third degree, or (b) The actor has supervisory or disciplinary power over the victim by virtue of the actor’s legal, professional, or occupational status, or (c) The actor is a resource family parent, a guardian, or stands in loco parentis within the household; (3) The act is committed during the commission, or attempted commission, whether alone or with one or more other persons, of robbery, kidnapping, homicide, aggravated assault on another, burglary, arson, or criminal escape; (4) The actor is armed with a weapon or any object fashioned in such a manner as to lead the victim to reasonably believe it to be a weapon and threatens by word or gesture to use the weapon or object; (5) The actor is aided or abetted by one or more other persons and the actor uses physical force or coercion; (6) The actor uses physical force or coercion and severe personal injury is sustained by the victim; (7) The victim is one whom the actor knew or should have known was physically helpless or incapacitated, intellectually or mentally incapacitated, or had a mental disease or defect which rendered the victim temporarily or permanently incapable of understanding the nature of his conduct, including, but not limited to, being incapable of providing consent.
[directive] Every supervisor must establish a familiarity with the agency's disciplinary process and develop an understanding of how to implement specific disciplinary procedures when called upon to deal with inappropriate behavior or misconduct.  If a supervisor fails to follow these procedures or avoids their responsibility, that supervisor is not conforming to expected behavior and must receive some sort of corrective action.  Some supervisors occasionally need to be reminded that the fundamental responsibility for direction and control rests with the immediate supervisor at the operational level, not with the law enforcement executive.  2.3.3  To provide such direction and control, supervisory personnel must be granted the proper authority to carry out their responsibilities.  To properly exercise this authority, supervisory personnel must be fully familiar with applicable agency rules and regulations.  Based on the size and needs of the individual agency, supervisory personnel may be permitted to impose specific disciplinary measures (subject to approval of the law enforcement executive) including oral reprimands or performance notices, written reprimands and suspensions.  In addition, the supervisor should be permitted to make written recommendations for other disciplinary actions.  The extent of this authority must be clearly stated in the agency's disciplinary rules and regulations.  9
[brief] ......................  8  a.  The trial court’s determinations must be reviewed de novo  8 b.  The County’s determination of whether a bid conforms to the specifications and whether a non-conformity is material must be reviewed for abuse of discretion...........................................  9  c.  The County’s determination of whether to waive a non-material defect must be reviewed for clear abuse of abuse of discretion..................................................................................  10  II.  The trial court erred in reversing the County’s determination that [...]’s bid was materially defective for failing to provide its NJDOT Notice of Classification with the bid where the Specifications required submission of the NJDOT Notice of Classification with the bid.
[directive] All services shall be provided in a manner that is specific to the physical, emotional, and developmental needs of the child or adolescent.  Whenever there is reasonable cause to believe that a person under the age of 18 has been sexually assaulted or sexually contacted by someone who has assumed responsibility for the care, custody, or control of the child, [...] shall be contacted.  Under these circumstances, [...] shall contact law enforcement and make appropriate medical and counseling referrals, including, but not limited to, the [...], and the designated county sexual violence program.  In these cases, the medical forensic exam, if collected, will be forwarded to law enforcement.  Every county shall have protocols developed for the medical forensic evaluation of child and adolescent (minor) victims of sexual assault/contact that are in accordance with these Standards and additional policies and/or best practices that have been incorporated into a county’s standard operating procedure for child interviews.
[brief] ’”  233 N.J. at 40 (quoting in part _King_, 44 N.J. at 353).  In _King_, the Court cautioned that “the existence or absence of one or more of the factors . . . may be of great significance . . . in one case, yet be of slight significance in another. ”  _Ibid._  The Court has also explicitly recognized that consent may be voluntarily given “even though the consent was obtained under the authority of the badge or after the accused had been arrested. ”  233 N.J. at 40 (citing _King_, 44 N.J. at 353).  “Voluntariness depends on ‘the totality of the particular circumstances of the case’ with each case ‘necessarily depend[ing] upon its own facts. ’”  Ibid.  “The State has the burden of proving consent was given freely and voluntarily. ”  Lamb, 218 N.J. at 315.
[brief] The Court abused its discretion by making findings that lack foundation, are based solely on hearsay and conjecture and are so widely off the mark that a manifest denial of justice resulted.  It is respectfully requested that: A. The Court reverse the Order as to Counts One and Three of Petitioner’s Amended to Complaint and that those counts be reinstated; B.  That the Court find that the Photocopy should not have been entered into evidence pursuant to the Best Evidence Rule, that it is unenforceable under the Uniform Pre-Marital Agreement Act and that Petitioner did not waive his statutory rights to an elective share of the Estate Assets.  C.  In the alternative, the life estate with restrictions on alienation should be set aside and Petitioner should be granted a fair allocation of Estate assets under his claim for a constructive trust.  Respectfully submitted, [...]  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. [...]  IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF [...], DECEASED  On Appeal from Final Order of Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Probate Part  Docket No. [...]  Below: Hon. [...], P.J.Ch. BRIEF AND APPENDIX OF RESPONDENT-RESPONDENT/CROSS APPELLANT, [...]
[brief] The Trial Court Properly Found that Public Policy Weighs in Favor of Dismissal Here.  As in Cedeno, the Trial Court here weighed the public policy inherent to CEPA against the public policy inherent to the Statute, and similarly found that the Statute’s heavy public policy of protecting vulnerable individuals with developmental disabilities, who may be non-verbal or unable to communicate, outweighed the public policy espoused by CEPA.  (Appx 573-75, 578 at 25:7-16; 27:24-28:12; 34:2-9); see also Cedeno, 163 N.J. at 478.  The Trial Court’s reasoning is consistent with New Jersey law and the evidence on the record and therefore should be affirmed.
[brief] The Supreme Court has also stated:  Whether exceptional circumstances exist is determined on a case by case basis according to the specific facts presented ...  Among the factors to be taken into account on a Rule 4:50 motion are the ‘extent of the delay in making the application for relief, the underlying reason or cause, fault or blamelessness of the litigant, and any other prejudice that would accrue to the other party. ’ [IMO Guardianship of J.N.H., 172 N.J. 440, 474 (2002), emphasis added].  [...] knew more about tax certificates and tax foreclosure than any other defendant in any published or unpublished case found because, after all, *it was a tax certificate investor and even acquired the property as a result of tax foreclosure*.  Despite a knowledge curve far ahead of any other foreclosure defendant, [...] intentionally chose to invest its funds in more tony communities than [...] – [...] and [...] – and chose neither to pay its taxes to [...] nor secure the property from entry by vagrants, squatters, and illicit drug and alcohol use.  The pictures in the record demonstrate beyond any doubt the dangerous nature of the property.  Ia268-288, and Defendant admitted as much.  1T16:3-5.  Only the smell of human waste cannot be reproduced in the appendices.  Ia258, ¶10.  [...]’ decision to not pay its [...] taxes as a means of financing its [...] and [...] investments is not only inexcusable but an abuse of the tax sale process.  Many will remember the new phrase of “zombie houses” after the 2009 foreclosure crisis where houses became vacant, abandoned, and dangerous to local communities.  Our Legislature enacted specific laws to combat such blight, N.J.S. 55:19-78 et. seq., empowered municipalities to enforce code violations against foreclosure plaintiffs, N.J.S. 46:10B-51, and permitted immediate foreclosure of tax certificates.  N.J.S. 54:5-86(d).  Allowing [...] to *intentionally* not pay its 2020- 2023 taxes runs against the concept that the Tax Sale Law is intended to prevent owners from using a municipality as its involuntary banker.  *East Orange v. Palmer*, 52 N.J. at 334.  Yet that is exactly what [...] did – it used its intentional non-payment of [...]’s taxes as a financing source for its [...] and [...] investments.  That was grossly inexcusable.  Homeowners garner more sympathies for equitable relief than others, however, a corporate, absentee owner who knowingly and intentionally doesn’t pay its taxes and allows the property to remain a blight on the community is entitled to no such sympathy.
[brief] 10.  The Facility will be located within an easement on private property.  Specifically, it will occupy an easement area of approximately 100 feet-by-85 feet on a parcel of land located on [...] in [...] (the “Proposed Site”).  The street address for the Proposed Site is 970 [...] Road, [...], New Jersey, where [...] Power [...] (“[...]”) operates a solar farm; the Regulator Station will be situated on a small section of the property between the solar farm and [...] Road on which no solar panels are located.  The location and design of the Facility are more fully described in Exhibits P-1, P-2, P-3 and P-4 attached hereto.
[brief] The role of the Motion Court was not to make a factual finding as to whether [...], as a stallion in the breeding environment, was inherently vicious.  The determination regarding [...]’s inherent viciousness and Defendants knowledge of such viciousness is a finding of fact for the jury to make.  Defendants never challenged the qualifications of [...] as an expert or the admissibility of her opinion testimony.  The Motion Court was tasked with determining whether Plaintiff “adduced sufficient evidence, direct and circumstantial, to permit a reasonable jury to conclude by a preponderance of the evidence that the fact was proven.
[brief] ”  [...] cautioned the parties “to comply with N.J.S.A. 10:4-8(d) in the future by sending notice to the designated newspapers in time for the newspapers to publish the notice at least forty-eight hours before the meeting. ”  Id. at 15-16.  The explicit purpose of the OPMA is to keep the public informed, but [...]’s interpretation would have the direct opposite affect, as evidenced by the failure of the Borough’s newspapers to publish any of the notices sent by the [...] containing the directive not to publish. \(^6\) “[S]trict adherence to the letter of the law is required in considering whether a violation of the [OPMA] has occurred. ”  Polillo v. Deane, 74 N.J. 562, 578 (1977).  The public policy goals of the OPMA, as set forth in N.J.S.A. 10:4-7, create “an affirmative duty upon a public body to use its resources to fulfill the obligations of the statute.  Compliance must be real and not merely formal or --- \(^6\)Publication has always been the rule in this State.  In 2016, then Governing [...] tried to get legislative approval to eliminate the need to publish in newspapers, permitting instead the use of municipal websites.  In a message posted electronically on December 17, 2016, in support of his effort, [...] acknowledged that his proposal “maintains the requirement for local governments to provide advance notice for matters such as meetings,” while eliminating “the requirement of publishing exorbitantly expensive notice in a newspaper. ”  (Pa 309.) technical.  ‘A statute should not be construed to permit its purpose to be defeated by evasion. ’  *Accardi v. North Wildwood*, 145 N.J. Super. 532, 545 (Law Div. 1976). ”  *Jenkins v. Newark Board of Education*, 166 N.J. Super. 357, 366 (Law Div. 1979).  Neither the *Bernards* decision nor any other court opinion found by Plaintiff has endorsed actions similar to the Borough which effectuate a policy designed to deliberately deprive the public of notice of special meetings.  The Borough has violated the OPMA for years.
[brief] When [...] ordered the defendant to take his hand out of the bag, the defendant immediately attempted to zipper the bag and turned the side of his body with the open pocket away from [...] to conceal its contents, further heightening [...]’s suspicion that the defendant was involved in the criminal activity that had just occurred inside the store.  [...]’s experience with these types of bags was a legitimate factor that should have been, and was not, considered by the court below.  See State v. Pineiro, 181 N.J. 13 (2004)(holding that a police officer’s knowledge that drugs are often transported in cigarette containers was an appropriate factor to be considered); State v. Citarella, 154 N.J. 272 (1998)(holding that the officer’s knowledge that bicycles were often used to transport drugs was a legitimate factor).  Here, the court did not even consider this portion of [...]’s testimony in its analysis.  The court’s failure to consider all of the facts presented at the hearing when conducting its legal analysis.
[brief] POINT I  THE SUBJECT PROPERTY HAS AN ACTUAL, PHYSICAL HARDSHIP (Ja41, L. 14-21; Ja44, L. 5-21; Ja46, L. 7-20; Ja48, L. 4-7; Ja94 L. 9-22; Ja106, L. 14-16, L. 21-24; Ja151, items 1, pars. 4, 5, 7, 8; Ja192-195; Ja197-199-letter; Ja205-206-letter; Ja217, sect. IV, #1,2,3; Ja260-272-Pineland findings letters)  Applications for hardship relief were submitted by both [...] and [...] due to physical features uniquely affecting this property.  N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70(c)(1)(b) affords hardship relief “by reason of exceptional topographic conditions or physical features affecting a specific piece of property. ”  The Report on an Application for a Waiver of Strict Compliance, issued for the subject lot on August 8, 1986 (Ja260-263), contains two and one-half pages of single-spaced findings of fact that support the basis for the waiver.  These findings irrefutably establish exceptional topographic conditions, including an active watercourse at the south end of the lot, which requires a buffer as mandated by the Pinelands.  A copy of this report was sent to the [...], and on January 29, 1987, the [...] issued a Notice of Filing, with a copy also sent to the [...].
[brief] The Chevy was then tracked by multiple surveillance cameras as driving to [...]’s house at [...], where another surveillance camera captured defendant and [...] exiting the Chevy at 7:48 a.m., defendant entering the residence with a box while [...] waited outside, and driving away minutes later.  Importantly, the surveillance videos capturing the Chevy’s journey to [...]’s house do not show any individual getting in or out of [...]’s vehicle or any individual besides defendant, and later [...], entering or exiting [...]’s house.  The State submits that this evidence plotting defendant and [...]’s movement and conduct before and after the murder is indicative of a specifically coordinated plan evidencing [...]’s participation.  As such, the State respectfully asks this Court to affirm this conviction.
[brief] Although the Revised Policy removes the Original Policy’s list of examples of specific “matters” that require parental notification—including sexual orientation, transitioning, and gender identity or expression—the Revised Policy still provides that all school staff (regardless of their certifications, expertise or experience) “shall” make notifications to parents “whenever a student discloses an issue and/or exhibits behaviors that may have an adverse impact on the student’s physical and/or mental health, safety and or social/emotional well-being.
[brief] THE COURT’S DISMISSAL OF COUNT FOUR SHOULD BE REVERSED BECAUSE LIABILITY CAN BE IMPOSED UPON THE INDIVIDUAL DEFENDANTS WITHOUT PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL (T1, p. 17, lns. 16-20).  Count Four alleged the individual [...] violated the CFA by misrepresenting the quality of Defendant’s title to Unit 74.  The Court dismissed this Count for two reasons.  First, it found dismissal was appropriate because there were no misrepresentations concerning the Developer’s ability to convey marketable title.  See T1 at p. 17, lns. 7-20.  Second, the Plaintiff could not pierce the corporate veil.  Id.  The Court’s decision should be reversed.  As set forth above, the Developer did not possess marketable title.  Therefore, there certainly was a misrepresentation as to Developer’s ability to convey marketable title.  Second, the Plaintiff is not seeking to impose liability upon the individual Defendants by ‘piercing the corporate veil. ’  Instead, the Plaintiff seeks to impose liability directly upon these individuals for violating the CFA.  The caselaw expressly permits the Plaintiff to impose liability upon a corporation’s directors and officers for their individual violations of the CFA.  Here, the Plaintiff contends that each of [...] violated the CFA by misrepresenting the quality of the Developer’s title to Unit 74.  Because [...] actually made the misrepresentation on behalf of the Developer, they may be held individually liable under the CFA without having to ‘pierce the corporate veil. ’  Accordingly, the Court should reverse the dismissal of Count Four against the individual [...].
[brief] The Appellate Division need go further in its analysis of the Commission’s August 22, 2023 Decision.  However, Respondent now attempts to raise a generic First Amendment argument it waived below by failing to raise it in her Answer and her Amended Answer.  What is more, the Commission’s own decisional law – as exhaustively cited by Appellants and 2 separate Administrative Law Judges (ALJs) – has repeatedly addressed the First Amendment issue.  Since Respondent has chosen to raise this waived defense on appeal, Appellants will briefly address it below.  Respondent also appears to call into question the validity of the School Ethics Act (Act) as a whole, making a simultaneously broad-sweeping yet ill-defined argument that the Legislature should have left all school board member discipline to the electoral process.
[brief] .........................................................................................................................  25  #  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | Case | Page(s) | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|---------| | **Cases** | | | Bar on the Pier, Inc. v. Bassinder, | 12 | | 358 N.J. Super. 473 (App. Div.) | | | Barila v. Bd. of Educ. of Cliffside Park, | 19 | | 241 N.J. 595 (2020) | | | Continental Bank of Pennsylvania v. Barclay Riding Academy, Inc., | 15 | | 93 N.J. 153 (1983) | | | Del Sontro v. Cendant Corp., | 17 | | 223 F. Supp. 2d 563 (D.N.J. 2002) | | | E. Brunswick Sewerage Auth. v. E. Mill Assocs., | 11 | | 365 N.J. Super. 120 (App. Div. 2004) | | | Graziano v. Grant, | 12 | | 326 N.J. Super. 328 | | | Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., | 21 | | 32 N.J. 358 (1960) | | | Hutnick v. ARI Mut. Ins. Co., | 11 | | 391 N.J. Super. 524 (App. Div. 2007) | | | In re Cendent Corp. Lit., | 17 | | 264 F.3d 286 (3rd Cir. 2001)
[brief] 276 N.J. Super. at 351.  Rivera involved the search of a defendant for no reason other than that the police had chased a juvenile suspect into a house, and the defendant happened to be inside the house when the officers arrived.  *Id.* at 352.  Similarly, in *Ybarra*, the defendant was searched only because he was present in a tavern that was being searched under a warrant because the police had reason to believe that the bartender would have heroin for sale.  444 U.S. at 91.  In this case, defendant was pursued because of his own suspicious conduct.  Defendant’s assertion that nothing in the record indicates his involvement, and his claim that he only ran because he did not realize that the police officers were actually police officers, is belied by the credible testimony at the hearing and by the video footage, and it was properly rejected by the motion judge.