[brief] *State v. Daniels*, 182 N.J. 80, 102 (2004) (quoting *State v. Macon*, 57 N.J. 325, 336 (1971)).  Errors in a jury instruction that are "crucial to the jury's deliberations on the guilt of a criminal defendant . . . are presumed to be reversible" and "are poor candidates for rehabilitation under the plain error theory."  *State v. Jordan*, 147 N.J. 409, 422 (1997) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).  The limiting instruction given here met that test.  Although in this matter the State’s case largely hinged on surveillance videos and other tangible evidence, the credibility of the officers definitely played a role in some of their testimony.  For example, [...] testified, based on his observations of the videos, that there had been two occupants of the Corolla, and he described what he believed to be their appearances and clothing.  (11T 72-21 to 73-18)  Because of the prosecutor’s improper bolstering of his witnesses, any juror whose observations based on the videos had differed from Raynor’s would have been inclined to question the accuracy of his own observations and substitute Raynor’s for them.  For another example, Raynor testified to a hearsay\(^2\) statement allegedly made to him by [...], a resident of [...], that at one time [...] had lived in the house.  (11T 135-11 to 136-3)  This testimony served to establish that [...] had more than a casual connection to the house and its occupants, and to explain why he would have felt comfortable driving to that house after the shooting.  There was no other evidence produced at trial to corroborate Poland’s second-hand statement.  Thus, the jury was required to evaluate the credibility of both Poland, who had not been present at trial for critical observation and had not been cross-examined, and Raynor.  Was Raynor truthfully reporting a statement that had been made to him?  And if so, had the statement itself been truthful?  Although the prosecutor’s bolstering would not have affected the jurors’ assessment of Poland’s credibility, about which they knew nothing, it certainly \(^2\) Hearsay is not admissible unless an exception to the general rule applies.  N.J.R.E. 802.  The prohibition of hearsay “ensure[s] the accuracy of the fact-finding process by excluding untrustworthy statements, such as those made without the solemnity of the oath, and not subject to cross-examination by the accused or the jury’s critical observation of the declarant’s demeanor and tone. ”  *State v. Engel*, 99 N.J. 453, 465 (1985). would have had an impact on their judgment as to whether or not Raynor was telling the truth about what she had said to him.  In addition, the credibility of witnesses offered by the defense was squarely in issue.  Obviously, the flip side of the prosecutor’s assertion that he knew his witnesses were entirely truthful was that any witnesses presented by the defense who described a contrasting version of events were, by definition, lying.  Although the judge instructed the jurors that they must make their own credibility determinations, she did not instruct them to disregard the prosecutor’s comments while doing so.  Thus, the door was left wide open for the jurors to factor in the prosecutor’s credibility assessments when they “independently” evaluated the testimony of [...] and [...].  In sum, there is a clear likelihood that the effects of the prosecutor’s comments bolstering his own witnesses, and somewhat indirectly disparaging the defense witnesses, were for the most part exacerbated, rather than cured, by the judge’s limiting instruction.  There is a very real possibility that they influenced the jury’s decision to convict [...] of conspiracy.  Consequently, reversal is required.