ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Appellants Failed To Identify An Unconscionable Commercial Practice In Which [...] Purportedly Engaged  Under the CFA, unlawful conduct includes “any unconscionable commercial practice, deception, fraud, false pretense, false promise, misrepresentation, or the knowing, concealment, suppression, or omission of any material fact with intent that others rely upon such concealment, suppression or omission. ”  N.J.S.A. 56:8-2.  To establish an unconscionable commercial practice, a plaintiff must show that the defendant’s practice lacked “good faith, honesty in fact and observance of fair dealing. ”  Cox v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 138 N.J. 2, 18 (1994) (quoting Kugler v. Romain, 58 N.J. 522, 544 (1971)).  “The capacity to mislead is the prime ingredient of all types of consumer fraud. ”  Id. at 17.  Before the trial court and on this appeal, Appellants argued that [...] engaged in an unconscionable commercial practice by (i) including the Concession Recovery Provision in the Lease Rider; (ii) charging the Concessions back to Appellants; and (iii) suing “twice” to collect it.\(^6\) (2T24:21-25:1).
[brief] Da82.  No evidence was presented suggesting that [...] or [...] were compensated excessively, or excessively compared with plaintiff.  In fact, during [...]’s employment at [...] until 2018, he spent down all his savings and investments to live on because of his lack of compensation.  2T131:17-132:8.  [...] also allowed [...] to use [...]’s personal credit card for [...] expenses, which ran up a bill of $45,000 including interest.  2T132:9-133:7.  [...] had over time also loaned [...] between $84,000 and $85,000, which, with interest, came to $93,455.65; a Promissory Note was executed by [...] for [...] for these amounts.  3T79:2-80:5, 107:2-7, 107:14-20, 110:1-112:4, 117:5-24; Da84.
[brief] On June 17, 2019, [...] again sends a 20 Factor Questionnaire as required to [...] in Pensions and Benefits (Pa104-112).  (P-3)  On July 14, 2020, State notifies [...] by letter of [...], investigator for Pension Fraud and Abuse Unit that [...] was ineligible for PERS as of January 1, 2008 (Pa162-165).  [...] was advised that no further appeal was necessary and the matter was scheduled for Board of Trustees hearing on December 9, 2020 (Pa162-165) (R-3).  Thereafter, [...] receives letter improperly dated January 7, 2020 (it was January 7, 2021) in response to determinations that occurred at the December 9, 2020 Board of Trustees of PERS from [...], secretary of PERS (Pa158-161).  Said letter (R-2) determined again that [...] was ineligible as of January 1, 2008 for PERS.  [...] responded by letter of February 21, 2021 (P-4) to [...], secretary of PERS (Pa113-118).  P-4 includes with it an attachment published by the State of New Jersey Department of Labor outlining the process of worker misclassification.
[brief] With respect to damages in the Instant Action, Plaintiff claims that they are entitled to damages in the amount of approximately $117,500.00, including $80,000.00 for the security deposit and rent; $15,000.00 in architectural fees; $10,000 in engineering fees; and $12,500.00 in costs in cleaning up the Property.  (Pa0015).  Similarly, these items were the same exact damages claimed by Plaintiff in the Lease Litigation.  Ibid.  C.
[directive] 2.  [예/Yes]  [아니요/No]  결과, 검사 귀하의 행위가 반복적이고 충동적인 행동양식이라고 단정할 경우, 만한 특성이 나타나는 판사는 귀하의 정신상태에 대한 전문화된  치료 프로그램에 참여하도록 귀하를 성인진단  및 치료센터에 구금을 아십니까?  선고할 수도 있다는 것을  Do you understand if the examination reveals that your conduct is characterized by a pattern of repetitive and compulsive behavior, the judge may sentence you to confinement at the [...] for a program of specialized treatment for your mental condition?
[brief] As stated above, the B-3 Zone already contains a mix of uses and, notably, efficiency apartments are permitted.  To that end, [...] emphasized that the B-3 Zone allows for “efficiency apartments,” but the Borough’s own 2018 Master Plan acknowledges that, “[t]he restriction of units to efficiency apartments conflicts with Section 5:80-26.3 of [UHAC.]”  Pa391.  “Efficiency units” are not defined in the Borough Code but refer to studio units which have “one habitable living space (i.e., shared living room and bedroom). ”  Id.  The market rate units proposed within the Second Application are one-bedroom units with the same intensity as studio apartments (except the affordable units that comply with UHAC).
[brief] Generally, summary judgment is premature when the opposing party has not yet had an opportunity to conduct discovery and develop the facts on which it intends to base its claims.  *Friedman v. Martinez*, 242 N.J. 449, 472 (2020) (cautioning against granting summary judgment when discovery is incomplete and "critical facts are peculiarly within the moving party's knowledge") (quoting *James v. Bessemer Processing Co.*, 155 N.J. 279, 311 (1998)).
[brief] Contrary to [...]’ contention (TRVb7), [...] maintained a CCIP for “some (but not all)” of the subcontractors at the Project (4/16/15 CCIP Manual at TRVa510).  [...]  (“[...]”) was the broker that procured the CCIP policies for [...], as well as the CCIP’s administrator.  (TRVa4, ¶ 16; 4/16/15 CCIP Manual at TRVa512 and ZURa208.)  The CCIP was jointly comprised of: (1) a CGL Policy issued by [...]; (2) an Excess Policy --- 2 “Wrap-up insurance program” is defined as any agreement …, including any contractor controlled … or similar insurance program…” (TRVa283.) issued by [...]; and (3) a Workers Compensation Policy (collectively, the “CCIP Policies”).  (4/16/15 CCIP Manual at TRVa510 and ZURa 206.)  [...] issued a CGL Policy to [...] effective December 23, 2013 to December 23, 2018, with limits of $2M Each Occurrence (the “[...] Policy”).  (TRVa75 and 102.)  The [...] Policy contained a Named Insured – Contractor Controlled Insurance Program endorsement, which adds certain qualifiers to “Section II - Who Is An Insured” in the [...] Policy, which [...] does not satisfy.  (TRVa146.)  Notably, the [...] Policy contains a Sole Agent for Insureds endorsement, by which all insureds assigned [...] the right to act with regards to policy cancellation or changes.  (TRVa123.)  [...] issued [...] an Excess Liability Policy effective December 23, 2013 to December 23, 2018, with policy limits of $25M per occurrence (the “[...] Policy”).  (TRVa176.)  [...] also provided [...] a “[...] in North America Contractor Controlled Insurance Program Confirmation of bound program” (“Binder”), an initial contract generally laying out the terms of the CCIP Policies.  (TRVa2612 and ZURa291; Faust Tr. 74:20-75:22, TRVa2581.)  The Binder section entitled “COMMENTS / RESTRICTIONS / QUOTE SUBJECT TO:”, provides in part:  Enrollment in the Workers' Compensation program automatically enrolls the subcontractor in the General Liability portion of the program.  If a subcontractor is not enrolled in the Workers' Compensation program there will be no coverage provided under the General Liability program until such time as that subcontractor is specifically approved and endorsed onto the General Liability policy by the [...] underwriter.  (TRVa2615-16 and ZURa294.)  The section of the Binder entitled “Schedule of Named Insureds:” provides, in relevant part, as follows:  UNLESS OTHERWISE ENDORSED ON THIS POLICY, NO COVERAGE WILL BE PROVIDED TO VENDORS, SUPPLIERS, MATERIAL DEALERS, ABATEMENT CONTRACTORS, TEMPORARY LABOR SERVICES, DEMOLITION, OR OTHER HAZARDOUS WASTE REMOVAL CONTRACTORS WHO VISIT, MAKE DELIVERIES TO OR WORK TEMPORARILY AT THE PROJECT SITE(S).  (Italics added.)  (TRVa2617 and ZURa296.)  II.  [...]’S ROLE AT THE PROJECT AND CCIP COMMUNICATIONS
[brief] See infra at 28-30.  But fundamentally, it does not matter whether Appellants were intending to comply with other laws: the LAD “is not a fault- or intent-based statute. ”  C.V., 255 N.J. at 314 (explaining discrimination has harmful effects whether intentional or otherwise, and so “the perpetrator’s intent is simply not an element of the [LAD] cause of action”).  Whether the challenged conduct “involves disparate treatment through explicit facial discrimination does not depend on why the [entity] discriminates but rather on the explicit terms of the discrimination. ” A.D.P. v. ExxonMobil Research & Eng’g Co., 428 N.J. Super. 518, 537 (App. Div. 2012) (emphasis added).
[brief] Pa248 at 14:8-15:22; Pa319 ([...]’s survey, depicting distance between [...] property line and curb of Ford Lane).  Thus, plaintiff’s argument that [...]’s alleged statement that he placed the tree branches on plaintiff’s plants is an admission by a party opponent fails because that argument turns on an inaccurate characterization of plaintiff’s testimony regarding [...]’s alleged hearsay statement.  Cf. Pb23 (stating that [...] “admitted that he caused the branches to be placed on Plaintiff’s property”) with Pa130-31 at 25:14-26:17 (plaintiff’s testimony that [...] admitted that he caused the tree branches to be placed near the curb on Ford Lane, not on plaintiff’s plants).
[brief] The Jury Should Have Been Given the Option to Find [...] Both Directly and Vicariously Liable.  Plaintiffs claim that the jury should have been allowed to consider whether [...] was BOTH vicariously and directly liable for plaintiffs' injuries.  (Pb35).  Instead, the jury was told it was either/or, not both, and the verdict sheets reflected this.  (Pa71-75; 11T178:14-179:8).  They were given three verdict sheets, with the first one listing one question: "Was defendant [...] within the scope of his employment with [...] when the altercation with plaintiff [...] occurred?" (Pa71).  Depending on their answer to that question, they were instructed to move on to one of the other two verdict sheets: "Within the Scope of Employment" (Pa74), and "Outside the Scope of Employment." (Pa72).  They were specifically told by the judge: "You don't do them both." (11T179:7).  This was erroneous.  All causes of action should have been submitted to the jury.  "'Where fair-minded men might honestly differ as to the conclusions to be drawn from the proofs, the questions at issue should be submitted to the jury.'"  Burney v. Washington Nat. Ins. Co., 68 N.J.Super. 373 (A.D. 1961), citing Scarano v. Lindale, 121 N.J.L. 549, 550 (E. & A. 1938).  In this case, the proofs at trial could support verdicts of both vicarious and direct liability on the part of [...].
[brief] POINT II.  ASSERTING THE NJCFLA AS A DEFENSE IS NOT CLAIMING A RIGHT OF ACTION  [...] next argues that [...] is barred from asserting its violations of the NJCFLA as a defense because that defense is “required to have been raised in a timely answer to the complaint as opposed to as a defense first raised in a motion to vacate the default judgment. ”  [...]’s Br. at 21.  However, [...]’s argument forecloses the possibility of ever asserting a meritorious defense in a motion to vacate under R. 4:50-1.  Other than for defective service of process, [...]’s argument (if applied) would effectively render the provisions of R. 4:50-1 completely superfluous.  Thus, [...]’s argument fails.  [...] then asserts that an ostensible lack of a private right of action under the NJCFLA precludes [...] asserting [...]’s undisputed violations of the same as a defense.  However, “defendant is not seeking to utilize the CFLA as a sword, by asserting a private right of action under the statute.  Instead, defendant is asserting the right to utilize the CFLA as a shield against enforcement of a judgment which defendant contends was void ab initio. ”  New Century Fin. v. Trewin, 2018 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1688, at *6-7 (Ch. Div. May 24, 2018).  Even assuming arguendo that no private right of action exists, “a borrower such as defendant may rely upon the CFLA to challenge a judgment that is void as result of the debtor's [sic] ‘unlicensed’ status. ”  Id. at *9.  Thus, the private right of action is of no consequence here.  Nonetheless, [...] argues that [...] ‘held’ there is no private right of action under the NJCFLA.
[brief] A condition precedent is an event that must occur or a fact that must exist before any right to performance can arise; it is a condition that must be satisfied before there can be any breach of contract or right to judicial remedies.  *Moorestown Management v. Moorestown Bookshop*, 104 N.J. Sup. 250, 249 (Ch. Div. 1969).  The intention of the parties comes in the making and in the construction of contracts.  The parties may make contractual liability dependent upon the performance of a condition precedent; and where the performance of the condition made vital to the existence of the contract is impossible as in violation of public policy, a contractual obligation does not come into being.
[brief] Back at the house, the group “chill[ed]” in the living room for about “five, ten minutes,” and then [...] went upstairs to go to bed.  (5T110-14 to 112-14).  The events that followed are less clear.  According to [...]’s testimony at the trial, she at some point in the night got up from bed and saw a man she believed to be [...] with a mask on arguing with her cousin [...] in the doorway.  (5T113-16 to 114-16).  [...] was watching them from the top of the first-to-second-floor stairs.  (5T114-17 to 115-2).  The argument ultimately developed into a physical struggle between the masked individual, [...], and [...].  (5T120-13 to 120-  During the fracas, [...] could see that her brother was hiding a 9-millimeter handgun behind his back.
[brief] [...] further testified that [...] was going through a divorce and was losing “a million dollar home” so 2014 was not a good time (2T48:21-49:11).  14.  The Florida property was purchased by [...] Cueto on August 18, 2014 (6T11:17-21).  15.  [...] contributed $900.00 per month to the carrying costs (2T34:20-21).  16.  The only documentation in evidence was the closing statement and a gift letter prepared by [...] in the amount of $50,000.00, signed by both [...] and [...] Cueto (6T13:18-19).  17.
[brief] (Da49).  [...]’s answer (relevant as his defense is also effectively controlled by [...]) contains a complete Rule 4:5-1 certification to that same effect.  (Da61); see also Zaccardi v. Becker, 88 N.J. 245, 256-60 (1982) (defendant estopped from asserting statute of limitations where its conduct was inconsistent with intention to raise defense and led plaintiffs to reasonably believe it would not).
[brief] In doing so, the Committee had endowed the Redevelopment Plan with the attributes necessary to override any determination of inconsistency with the Master Plan per the requirements of N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-7.d.  In so acting, the Committee left no doubt as to its commitment to the Redevelopment Plan and left Appellant with no academic claim that the Committee failed to set forth a rationale for adopting the Redevelopment Plan.  In other words, the Committee had done what the Appellant had requested.  Incredibly, the Appellant then argues that the Committee was prohibited from providing such reasons because the Committee had previously failed to do so (even though the Committee was not required to) with the adoption of Ordinance 2022-15.  Specifically, Appellant claims that the Committee was attempting to make a finding of both consistency and inconsistency and that such an alternative-type approach is not contemplated by N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-7.d. Db18.  Like nearly all other arguments it has advanced, Appellant directs this Court to no support for its novel/frivolous claim.  In sum, Appellant would have this Court invalidate the actions of the Committee because the Committee was being too detailed and too proactive in explaining to the Appellant and the public why the Committee was proceeding with the adoption of the Redevelopment Plan, irrespective of whether or not it may have been later determined to have been inconsistent with the Master Plan.  Clearly, Appellant’s position cannot stand.
[brief] [...] has established “real, substantial and reasonable circumstances” to support his claim that good cause forced his decision to leave his job because his work environment aggravated his medical condition and there were no accommodating alternative positions with [...].  Domenico v. Bd. of Review, 192 N.J. Super. 284, 288 (App. Div. 1983).  The record supports [...]’s assertion that any attempt to be reassigned to a position with [...] that would not aggravate his medical condition would have been futile.  **CONCLUSION**
[directive] Rule 3:3-1(c)(2-6) (indictable offenses) and Rule 7:2-2(b)(1-6) delineate factors regarding whether a warrant or summons should issue for other offenses.  Rule 3:26-1 (indictable offenses) and Rule 7:4-1 (non-indictable offenses) delineate factors to be considered when setting bail and provide for the option of R.O.R. bail where appropriate.
[brief] “Hearsay is ‘a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted. ’”  State v. Branch, 182 N.J. 338, 357 (205) (quoting N.J.R.E. 801(c)).  Even if [...]'s statement had been admissible during his own testimony, it was not admissible through the testimony of the police detective who took the statement.  Id. at 371-72.  The admission of the statement was not harmless error because it contained additional, significant allegations that were not included in [...]'s trial testimony.  For example, in his police statement [...] repeatedly made defendant the protagonist who, for example: found the duct tape used to tie up [...], (24T152-19 to 20); ran the duct tape around [...]'s face (24T152-1); and gave [...] his sweatshirt; gloves and bandanna to wear (24T154-23 to 25).  These statements did not contradict what [...] said at trial, but they introduced additional hearsay evidence in support of the State's case.  Moreover, the introduction of the statement through [...]'s testimony on the second to last day of trial, seventeen days after [...] had testified, allowed the State to completely re-present its key witness's evidence for a second time at trial, and twice during deliberations.  "Mere repeated telling of the same story is not relevant to whether the story, when told at trial is true."  [...], *From Toro to Tome: Developments in the Timing Requirements For Substantive Use of Prior Consistent Statements*, 1995 Army Law. 21, 25.  The tenets of Rule 607 were misused to bolster the credibility of the State's key witness by the unwarranted repetition of his allegations.  The introduction of this hearsay evidence cannot be deemed harmless in this case where [...]'s allegations were the only evidence of defendant's direct involvement in the robbery and killing.  Defendant's convictions must be reversed because the court abused its discretion when it allowed the State to introduce the videotaped evidence of its key witness's police statement through a police detective's testimony.
[brief] The Plain Language of the LRHL Authorized the City to Negotiate and Collect the $2 Million Redevelopment Fee  The LRHL was enacted to correct and ameliorate deteriorating real estate conditions through the concerted effort of responsible public bodies.  N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-2.  The importance of the redevelopment powers under the LRHL has been recognized as “a valuable tool for municipalities faced with economic deterioration in their communities. ”  Gallenthin Realty Dev., Inc. v. Borough of Paulsboro, 191 N.J. 344, 365 (2007).  In enacting the LRHL, the Legislature addressed and consolidated the multiple statutory enabling mechanisms for redevelopment and rehabilitation of “commercial, industrial, residential and civic facilities” into a single procedural framework.
[brief] [...]’s biggest mistake concerning Opinion 552 is its backwards misunderstanding of the main sentence from the decision that it emphasizes.  [...] relies on the Court’s statement that joint representation is permitted if the face of the pleadings or early discovery do not clearly show that the claims against the defendants “‘will result in different or inconsistent defenses, or will, if successful, probably lead to independent or several, rather than overlapping or joint, compensatory relief against each class of defendants. ’”  Pb22 n.3 (quoting Opinion 552, 102 N.J. at 205).  Put a different way, if (1) the defendants have different or inconsistent defenses, or (2) the plaintiff succeeding on its claims against defendants will probably lead to independent or several liability, then joint representation is not permissible.  Conversely, if (1) the defendants have the same or consistent defenses, or (2) the plaintiff succeeding on its claims against defendants will probably lead to overlapping or joint liability, then joint representation is permissible.  Opinion 552, 102 N.J. at 205; see also 47 N.J. Practice, Civil Trial Handbook § 3:1 (stating an attorney “is not barred from representing two parties in the same case as long as the parties’ . . . defenses are consistent”).
[directive] To be eligible for participation in K-9 officer training, the trainee must be a certified law enforcement officer, employed by a law enforcement agency.  Approval to participate in training must be granted by the agency executive or designee.  K-9 Patrol Teams  Patrol dog teams must demonstrate to the satisfaction of a K-9 trainer or supervising K-9 trainer successful completion of all performance objectives included herein.  Successful completion of the basic program must be accomplished prior to deployment of a patrol dog team for law enforcement purposes.  The areas of training to be covered in the basic program for police K-9 patrol teams are listed hereafter.  Performance objectives have been developed for each of these areas of training and are outlined in Appendix B.  Basic training for K-9 patrol team officer handlers must cover:  The Role and Use of the Police Patrol Dog Techniques and Field Procedures Policy, Procedures, and Legal Issues  Report  Writing Record Keeping  The Care and Handling of the Police Patrol Dog  Basic training for police officer handler-police dog patrol teams must cover:  Obedience Agility Scent Work  Criminal Apprehension Handler Protection  K-9 Specialty Teams  Specialty dog teams must demonstrate to the satisfaction of a K-9 trainer or supervising K-9 trainer successful completion of all performance objectives included herein.  Successful completion of the basic program must be accomplished prior to deployment of a specialty dog team for law enforcement purposes.  The basic training for K-9 specialty team officer handlers must cover:  The Role and Use of the Police Specialty Dog Techniques and Field Procedures  6  7/2002  K-9 Training Standards and Qualification Requirements
[brief] "Disability permanent in quality and partial in character" means a permanent impairment caused by a compensable accident or compensable occupational disease, based upon demonstrable objective medical evidence, which restricts the function of the body or of its members or organs; included in the criteria which shall be considered shall be whether there has been a lessening to a material degree of an employee's working ability.  Subject to the above provisions, nothing in this definition shall be construed to preclude benefits to a worker who returns to work following a compensable accident even if there be no reduction in earnings.  Injuries such as minor lacerations, minor contusions, minor sprains, and scars which do not constitute significant permanent disfigurement, and occupational disease of a minor nature such as mild dermatitis and mild bronchitis shall not constitute permanent disability within the meaning of this definition.