ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] In affirming the decision below, this Court found that the trial court “did not abuse its discretion in weighing the factors under State v. Slater, 198 N.J.  \(^1\)  Pursuant to Rule 2:11-6(a), a copy of this Court’s decision is annexed to this letter-brief.  But [...]’s withdrawal motion was not governed by Slater.  Rather, it was governed by Rule 3:9-3(f) ("Conditional Pleas"), which requires that defendants be permitted to withdraw from their guilty pleas following successful appeals from pretrial rulings.  See R. 3:9-3(f) ("If the defendant prevails on appeal, the defendant shall be afforded the opportunity to withdraw his or her plea.") (emphasis added); see also State v. Diloreto, 362 N.J. Super. 600, 616 n.6 (App. Div. 2003) (acknowledging that the right to withdraw under the conditional plea rule applies when "the defendant simultaneously pleads to multiple indictments and the pre-plea motion relates to only one").  In other words, in the case of a conditional plea, the plea is just that — conditional.  Thus, while a defendant who files a motion to withdraw pursuant to Rule 3:9-3(e) (before sentencing) or Rule 3:21-1 (after sentencing) must meet the factors articulated in State v. Slater, 198 N.J. 145 (2009), a defendant who enters into a conditional plea and succeeds on appeal has a right to withdraw under Rule 3:9-3(f), and Slater provides no grounds for denying the withdrawal motion. --- 2  Ma = appendix to this motion
[brief] Here, DCF determined that [...] had engaged in purposeful and repeated misnaming based on DCF’s evaluation of the credibility of both [...]’s and [...]’s respective version of events, a text message exchange between [...] and a witness to the incident outside the NJDOL building, and video footage of that incident.  (Aa1-12).  Further, under N.J.A.C. 4A:7-3.2(m)(3), appeals from State agency discrimination complaint determinations are decided by the Commission on the written record, which is consistent with the Commission’s general practice of determining other types of appeals on the written record except where “a material and controlling dispute of fact exists that can only be resolved by a hearing. ”  N.J.A.C. 4A:2-1.1(d).  [...] had the opportunity to submit evidence in his defense at multiple points in the process but never did, (Aa32-34; Aa11; Aa17), despite being the party bearing the burden of proof.  N.J.A.C. 4A:7-3.2(m)(4) (appellants in discrimination appeals have the burden of proof).  Therefore, the Commission correctly determined this appeal on the written record and affirmed DCF’s determination based on the substantial evidence in that record.  The Commission’s determination that DCF had jurisdiction to investigate the complaint is also consistent with applicable law.
[brief] DEFENDANT IS CONFINED TABLE OF CONTENTS  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT .........................................................................................1  PROCEDURAL HISTORY ..............................................................................................3  STATEMENT OF FACTS ...............................................................................................5  LEGAL ARGUMENT .....................................................................................................9  POINT I THE TRAFFIC STOP WAS UNLAWFUL BECAUSE N.J.S.A. 39:4-126 CANNOT BE CONSTRUED TO REQUIRE A MOTORIST TO SIGNAL AN INTENTION TO CHANGE LANES.  EVEN IF SUCH A CONSTRUCTION WERE PERMISSABLE, POLICE LACKED REASONABLE AND ARTICULABLE SUSPICION THAT A SIGNAL WAS REQUIRED UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES.  (Da 3-9)  ...........................................................................................................................................9  A.  The Plain Language of N.J.S.A. 39:4-126 Does Not Require a Motorist to Signal a Lane Change Because a Lane Change is Not a “Turn” Within the Meaning of the Statute.  Alternatively, the Word “Turn” as Used in the Statute is Unconstitutionally Vague as Applied to the Conduct of Changing Lanes ........................................................................................................................................11  B.  Assuming that a Lane Change is a “Turn”  Within the Meaning of N.J.S.A. 39:4-126, Police Lacked Reasonable and Articulable Suspicion that a Turn Signal was Required Under the Circumstances ..................................................20  CONCLUSION .............................................................................................................24  JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS BEING APPEALED
[brief] | | | Liberman v. Drill, | 7 | | 94 N.J.L. 387 (1920) | | ## Statutes N.J.S.A. 5:15-1, et seq ("Equine Activities Liability Act") 8, 9  PROCEDURAL HISTORY & STATEMENT OF FACTS  Plaintiffs respectfully refer to their initial Appellate Brief for the relevant procedural history and a detailed statement of facts in this case.
[brief] The court ultimately held that Plaintiff met its burden of proving the factors required under Crowe v. DeGioia, 90 N.J. 126 (1982), by clear and convincing evidence.  (1T52:9-14).  The court found that the prospective use for the property was important in its determination, stating, “If a hospital were going there . . . open space is important but it’s not being condemned for open space.  You know, if a hospital or a school were going there, [but] it's going to be condemned for commercial development?” (1T51:11-16).  The court held that Plaintiff made a showing of irreparable harm, although acknowledged that “technically . . . money damages isn’t an irreparable harm” but could potentially affect Plaintiff from moving forward with the development of the Property.  (1T52:15-17).  The court held that “unless the developer has all of the money themselves, and they are just taking it out of their piggy bank to build this,” Plaintiff would need lending from a bank.  (1T52:17-19).  The court held that “any lender is going to know” if [...] takes steps toward condemnation, which could “cast a shadow potentially on being able to move forward with development. ” (1T52:24-53:1).  The court held that “while it technically is a money issue, it’s bigger than that I think.  It’s the potential for being able to move forward with development of a project.  Nothing has been approved yet and no determination has been made that the property is appropriate for the development of affordable housing but I think that they have satisfied the first principle. ” (1T53:2-9).  In its discussion of whether the legal right underlying Plaintiff’s claim is unsettled, the court held that the law under the Mount Laurel doctrine is “pretty clear. ” (1T53:23-25).  However, the court earlier had made the finding that the law under these particular set of facts was not clear; there is no case law that says a court can preemptively enjoin a municipality that is not constitutionally compliant under Mount Laurel from taking any steps towards a potential condemnation of property that is the subject of a builder’s remedy lawsuit.
[brief] Near the beginning of the booking video, [...] unambiguously invoked his right to counsel, telling the detectives, “I’m [sic] got a lawyer coming cause I ain’t do nothing bro. ”  (Da 45)  Rather than halting any subsequent interrogation, either in the booking room or in the interrogation room, [...] instead told [...] that they will continue to talk to him:  “I’m gonna bring you upstairs and throw you in the interview room.  I know you said something about a lawyer.  . . .  If you want to talk to us about it, we’ll advise you of your rights again like that and you can talk to us and then we’ll air it all out.  I’ll let you know where we’re at with this case cause since we talked to you the last time, a lot more things have come to light.  [(Da 47)  (emphasis added]  A little while later, [...] again invoked his right to counsel, asking the detectives, Could I use my cell phone so I can see, see what’s up with my um, my girlfriend and get the number to call this lawyer or something cause I don’t know how, if, if you guys aren’t charging me with nothing, then I’ll cooperate but if not, I’ll, I better get a lawyer because I think you guys are (INAUDIBLE)  [(Da 55) (emphasis added)]  All these statements were clear invocations of [...]’s right to counsel.
[brief] Timmendequas, 161 N.J. at 576.  Moreover, trial counsel’s failure to object similarly deprives the trial court of taking any curative action.  Ibid.  “In the absence of objections by defense counsel to the assistant prosecutor's summation, we may not reverse unless his excesses ‘so grievously affect the substantial rights of the defendant as to convince [the court] that they possessed a clear capacity to bring about an unjust result. ’”  State v. Sherman, 230 N.J. Super. 10, 18-19 (App. Div. 1988) (quoting State v. Hipplewith, 33 N.J. 300, 309 (1960)).  On assessing a challenge based on prosecutorial misconduct in summation, a reviewing court must look at the prosecutor’s comments in the context of the entire trial record as well as against the remarks of defense counsel.
[brief] We review a trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion to amend the complaint for abuse of discretion.  Rule 4:9-1 requires that motions for leave to amend be granted liberally' and that 'the granting of a motion to file an amended complaint always rests in the court's sound discretion.  In exercising that discretion, a court must go through "a two-step process: whether the non-moving party will be prejudiced, and whether granting the amendment would nonetheless be futile.  The court determines whether the proposed amendment would be futile by asking whether the amended claim will nonetheless fail and, hence, allowing the amendment would be a useless endeavor.  Grillo v. State, 263 A.3d 520, 525 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2021) (internal quotations and citations removed); see also, Vineland Ice & Storage v. City of Vineland, 2020 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1856, at *14 (Super.  Ct. App. Div. Oct. 1, 2020) (“The trial court's dismissal of the amended complaint with prejudice was an appropriate exercise of discretion here. ”  2.  **Motions to Dismiss pursuant to Rule 4:6-2(e)**
[directive] Forms  DATE: June 2019 4, This Directive supersedes Directive #14-05 "Standardized Pretrial Intervention Program (PTI) Forms" (issued October 4, 2005), and the two Supplements to that Directive.  Directive #14-05 and the January 2007 Supplement promulgated a number 2, of standard forms for processing PTI cases through the Criminal and Probation Divisions.  The October 19, 2018 Supplement issued an updated PTI Application.  This Directive of of promulgates updates to all those prior forms necessitated by the adoption the new PTI rules (R. 3:28-1 through 3:28-10), effective July 2018, and revised effective 1, September 1, 2018.  The appended forms replace all prior versions and should be used beginning June 14, 2019.  The modifications to the forms are as follows: (1) the PTI Application was updated of to remove the place birth question; and (2) six PTI forms were updated to reference of conditions release where appropriate, include terminology contained the rules, and in stylistic changes were made for consistency.  Specifically, addition to the revised in Application, the six revised forms appended to this Directive are as follows: (1)  PTI Order of of Postponement, (2) PTI Standard Conditions PTI Supervision, (3) PTI Special of of of Conditions PTI Supervision, (4) PTI Order Termination, (5) PTI Order Dismissal, of of of and (6) PTI Order Dismissal, Order to Discharge Bail, and Order Entry Civil Judgment by Confession.  Additionally, the corresponding changes to the three forms prepared and stored in the web-based application called the Criminal Case Management (CCM) System will be implemented on June 14, 2019.  Specifically, the three forms the CCM System are as in of of follows: (1) the PTI Order Postponement, (2) the PTI Standard Conditions PTI of Supervision, and (3) the PTI Special Conditions PTI Supervision.  The "Additional Conditions or Comments" field the PTI Special Conditions form has also been on expanded to permit more information to be included, if appropriate.  [...]• Box 037 • [...]
[brief] Ibid.  As such, [...] was subject to a traumatic event.  Moreover, as stated above, when a “disability directly result[s] from the combined effect of a traumatic event and a preexisting disease,” an accidental disability pension should be granted.  Cattani, 69 N.J. at 586 (1976) (emphasis \(^1\)  As stated above, between 2006 and 2015, [...] did not experience back or neck pain.  (1T31:13-32:5; 1T51:12-52:2).  added); see also Sigafos, 143 N.J. Super. at 474 ("The proofs here clearly show that petitioner's disability directly resulted from the combined effect of a traumatic event and a preexisting disease [and therefore] he is entitled to an accidental disability retirement allowance.") (emphasis added) (citation omitted) (internal quotations omitted).  Here, [...] was performing his duties as a law enforcement officer without issue until he was struck by a car.  Thereafter, [...] needed surgery, and could no longer work as a law enforcement officer.  These facts demonstrate that the traumatic event of being struck by a vehicle caused—either on its own or in combination with a pre-existing condition—[...]'s disability.
[brief] ”  These controlling decisions can be shown the court by citations to the applicable case law, statutes, or regulations.  In Cummings v. Bahr, 295 N.J. Super. 374, 384 (App.Div. 1996), this language from Rule 4:49-2 was held to define the parameters of when a trial court should grant a motion for reconsideration.  The Appellate Division discussed the grounds upon which a court may grant a motion for reconsideration.  The first ground is that the Court has based its decision on an “incorrect or irrational basis,” i.e., that there is controlling case law overlooked or the court has misapplied the case law.  In Morey v. Wildwood Crest Borough, 18 N.J. Tax 335, 341 (App. Div. 1999), the Court stated, “generally, counsel should use reconsideration motions to acquaint the court with controlling decisions counsel believes the court has overlooked or on which it has erred. ”  The second ground is that the Court obviously did not consider or failed to appreciate the probative value of competent evidence.  Cummings v Bahr, Reconsideration is a matter to be exercised in the trial court’s sound discretion.
[brief] In Britwood, the Appellate Division observed that under the LRHL, the municipality may “negotiate and collect revenue from a redeveloper to defray the costs of the redevelopment entity. ”  Id. at 564.  Yet the Appellate Division held that “[b]ecause there is no contract or proposed contract between plaintiff and the City ... plaintiff is not a redeveloper. ”  Id. at 565.  “[T]he absence of a contract between plaintiff and either the City or [...] is fatal to the effort to impose a contribution toward off-site infrastructure improvement costs on plaintiff. ”  Id. at 566.  The Appellate Division found that in the absence of such contract, the MLUL did not independently authorize the City to impose off-site infrastructure costs on the plaintiff.  Id. at 566-67.  The Appellate Division concluded that “our review of the record and the relevant statutes compels us to conclude that the LRHL did not permit the City to impose off-site infrastructure contributions on plaintiff because plaintiff was not a party to a contract and therefore was not a redeveloper...”  Id. at 570 (emphasis added).  The Britwood holding is readily distinguishable from this case since [...] is a party to a contract with the City and is a redeveloper.
[brief] *Pareja v. Princeton Int’l Props*, 246 N.J. 546, 549 (2021)  Thus, when the key issue is the adequacy of the defendant’s snow/ice removal efforts, such as here, this 5.20B(2)(b) charge with the additional adequacy of removal language should apply.  Plaintiff’s extremely narrow interpretation of this charge only applying to active snow storms is unsupported by the plain language of the charge.  Clearly, the facts of the case required the lower court to charge the jury with 5.20B(2)(b) – specifically the general duty, minus the ongoing storm language, but including the adequacy of removal language.  This would have tailored the charge to the facts of the case here.  The lower court also erred by adopting Plaintiff’s narrow interpretation of 5.20B(2)(b) by limiting its application only to public sidewalks.
[brief] TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, RULINGS AND ORDERS  Order Dated November 5, 2020 of Hon. [...]  Denying Motion to Suppress Searches.........................................................Da 5  Order Dated June 20, 2022 of Hon. [...]  Denying Motion for Judgment NOV and Alternative Motion for New Trial........................Da 10  Judgment of Conviction.................................................................Da 11-14  INDEX TO APPENDIX
[brief] Based upon the record below the State has failed to sustain its burden that [...] [hereinafter: “[...]”] had a reasonable and articulable suspicion that Defendant [...] [hereinafter: “[...]”] had committed a motor vehicle violation.  Initially, [...] testified that his vehicle was traveling in the opposite direction of [...]’s vehicle when observing the motor vehicle infraction.  [...] then contradicted himself and swore his vehicle was stationary.  Only upon being questioned by the Court did [...] admit he had perjured himself not once, but twice, conceding he could not recall where he was located when making his alleged observations.  There is no credible evidence in the record to justify this motor vehicle stop.  The decision of the Court below must be reversed in the interests of justice.  **PROCEDURAL HISTORY**
[brief] “2T” shall refer to the transcript of the oral argument that took place on April 28th, 2023, to decide Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration.  court that “[a]ctually, Your Honor, that -as far as the liability argument, I mean, based on the Mason (phonetic) case, that, that was -- I don’t feel like that was our strongest argument. ”  (1T5:23 to 6:1)(Emphasis added.)  The trial court asked counsel for the Defendant, “So you want to give up your argument about, about the negligence?” (1T6:24-25)  To which counsel promptly replied, “I don’t want to give it up.  I’m just going to rely on the papers on that argument. ”  (1T7:1-2)  The lower court thus found that “this motion record plaintiff will prove the bus was driving along and it stopped suddenly and it caused her to fall. ”
[brief] Like other municipal ordinances, zoning ordinances are accorded a presumption of validity that can be overcome only by an affirmative showing that an ordinance is arbitrary or unreasonable.  *Id.* at 226.  Turning to the Municipal Land Use Law, it provides, at *N.J.S.A.* 40:55D-62, as follows:  49.  Power to zone.  a.  The governing body may adopt or amend a zoning ordinance relating to the nature and extent of the uses of land and buildings and structures thereon…  In addition to giving municipalities the authority to zone, the Municipal Land Use Law also requires, pursuant to *N.J.S.A.* 40:55D-25, a proposal for development to be submitted to the Planning Board for site plan review.
[brief] See Ab44-47.  [...]’s purported new joint employer theory for the NJLAD is completely unsupported by New Jersey case law interpreting the statute.  Instead, it is supported by a number of unrelated State and federal court cases that set forth the definition of a “joint employer” in other statutory contexts – such as workers compensation law, and the National Labor Relations Act – that she self-servingly interprets so as to create a joint employer relationship between herself, [...], and [...].
[brief] Plaintiff [...]’s counsel fees for 2007, 2008, and most of 2009 cannot form part of any fee award in the absence of any evidence in the record that [...] was considering RICO claims.  During those years, the sole issue in the litigation was valuing [...]’s 25% share of the partnership, and there is no indication that [...]’s counsel was investigating potential RICO claims.  Plaintiffs argued, and the Special Master found, that [...]’s work prior to October 2009 was designed to, or helped, develop [...]’s RICO claims.
[brief] Further, [...] is necessarily barred from disclosing any information shared by [...] in accordance with Rules of Professional Conduct 1.18(a) (“A lawyer who has had communications in consultation with a prospective client \textit{shall not use or reveal information acquired in the consultation}, even when no client-lawyer relationship ensues, except as Rules of Professional Conduct 1.9 would permit in respect of information of a former client”) (emphasis added).  \textbf{POINT II} \textbf{PETITIONERS SATISFIED THEIR BURDEN OF PROOF (T3:1-12:16)} \textit{City of Atlantic City v. Trupos}, 201 N.J. 443 (2010) provides that a movant seeking disqualification has the burden of persuasion as follows:
[brief] See id.  - As previously stated, Defendant has admitted that [...] is his address.  (Def.’s Br. at 3-4).  - [...] also made telephonic contact with an individual who is believed to be Defendant’s daughter [...].  She agreed to forward a message to Defendant.  (Pa146).  - Moreover, [...] also left a telephonic message on Defendant’s voicemail machine.  (See id.)  Therefore, Plaintiff’s substitute service was not subject to submission of an affidavit of inquiry and, in any event, was substantially supported by the aforementioned service attempts.
[brief] LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I THE DETECTIVE'S COMMENTS WERE PROPER RULE 701 TESTIMONY THAT HELPED EXPLAIN THE POLICE'S INVESTIGATION OF A "VEHICLE OF INTEREST."  The unchallenged narration presented during the State's case in chief, though preceding the State v. Watson decision, adhered to the framework outlined by the Supreme Court.  The testimony was primarily limited to objective pointing testimony and was used to explain the police's investigation of a "vehicle of interest."  The narration was based on the detective's personal review of the videos obtained from various sources, including city cameras, residential homes, and commercial businesses.  The police investigation was based on the lead they had at the time, focusing on a dark colored Chevy Malibu.  The narration was, therefore, helpful to the jury as it explained the investigative steps that led to additional evidence.  Moreover, it guided the jury on where to focus their attention while viewing short clips of moving traffic with multiple cars.  Any potentially inappropriate remarks made during the narration, which were not objected to, were promptly addressed by the judge.  Consequently, they were harmless considering the comprehensive evidence presented and the parties' arguments.  A.
[brief] 25 State v. Scott, 229 N.J. 469 (2017) ....................................................................  19 State v. Vaster, 601 P.2d 1292 (Wash. Ct. App. 1979) .......................................  24 State v. Williams, 461 N.J. Super. 80 (App. Div. 2019), certif. denied, 241 N.J. 92 (2020)  ..........................................................................................  31 United States v. Austin, 66 F.3d 1115 (10th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1084 (1996)  .........................................................................................  20 United States v. Botsch, 364 F.2d 542 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 937 (1967)  ........................................................................................................  30 United States v. Diggs, 544 F.2d 116 (3d Cir. 1976) (en banc) .........................  30 United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194 (2002) ....................................................  25 United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164 (1974) ....................................................  22 United States v. Mazzella, 295 F. Supp. 1033 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) .........................  30 United States v. Miller, 636 F.2d 850 (1st Cir. 1980) ..........................................  20