ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Upon concluding oral argument on June 8, 2022, disputed facts remained regarding both properties, including purchase price and right to purchase the entire property or shares.  “If a factual issue remains, the court must conduct an evidentiary hearing. ”  In re Nelson, 454 N.J. Super. 151, 162-63 (App. Div. 2018) (citing Matter of Estate of Baker, 297 N.J. Super. 203, 212–13 (App. Div. 1997)).  Additionally, on June 19, 2023, the court denied Defendants’ motion for reconsideration, explaining that “[the] Court found, and still finds, that the Trust terms are ambiguous. ”  “If an ambiguity exists, then resolution of the document’s intended meaning is a fact issue.
[brief] 4  I.  THE RECORD DOES NOT SUPPORT A FINDING THAT [...] WAIVED HIS RIGHT TO ARBITRATION AND THE TRIAL COURT’S CONTRARY FINDING WAS CLEAR ERROR (Da033; T.3-1 – T.24-23).  .........................................................................................  4  II.  RESPONDENT’S EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL ARGUMENT WAS NOT RAISED BY RESPONDENT BY WAY OF CROSS-APPEAL AND THEREFORE SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED OR, IF CONSIDERED, SHOULD BE REJECTED AS LACKING MERIT.  (Briefed, but not argued below)  ...........................................................................  10  Conclusion ....................................................................................................................
[directive] if  Correspondingly, Pretrial Services staff will no longer ask defendants they used marijuana or hashish.  II.  Certain marijuana related offenses, specifically N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(b)(12) and N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10(a)(3), are prohibited from consideration in making a pretrial detention decision.  of N.J.S.A. 2A: 162-20, entitled "Information considered in determination pretrial of detention," was amended to provide that the court may not consider part making a pretrial as detention decision whether the defendant engaged in manufacturing, distributing, or dispensing, or possessing or having under control with intent to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, marijuana of of or hashish in violation N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(b)(12), or possession marijuana or hashish in of violation N.J.S.A. 2C:35-l 0(a)(3).
[brief] I received in discovery in trying to deal with this case, a copy of an email, and the email is from [...].  And that email goes to two people in the firm, and he cc's [...].  And in that email -- this is when [...] was in the hospital with Covid critically ill -- Mr. Groff gives the instructions as to what is to be done legally.  And he writes this email -- and I remember saying who is Mr. Groff- (7T 29)  THE COURT: Yeah.  [...]: --to [...].  And it's very short.  He says: "Tyrone is in isolation room 308 at [...].  He has pneumonia and possibly COVID-19.  Here is the response to the motion.  Get the social worker on the phone or director of nursing for his floor.  Explain that he is expecting this and it must be signed and sent back to us as the Court is waiting.  Do what you need to do to get it done.  Once done, let me know."  Now, the attorney reacts to Mr. Groff's email.
[brief] Defendant hereby incorporates the Statement of Facts articulated by the Appellate Division in its November 6, 2020 Opinion and the Supreme Court in its August 17, 2022 Decision.  See, [...], 251 N.J. at 578.  The property at issue is located in [...], Gloucester County, New Jersey, and is commonly referred to as [...] and in this litigation as the “Property. ”  Pa 2.  In December 2007, pursuant to a certain General Release, Plaintiffs acquired an interest in the Property for $250,000.00.  Pa 4 at ¶ 15.  In May 2009, Plaintiffs assigned their interest in the Property to an entity known as [...] Development Company, LLC (“[...]”) for $2,000,000.00.  Pa 7 at ¶ 36.  The assignment between Plaintiffs and [...] was terminated after [...] had paid Plaintiffs a total of $630,000.00, which funds were retained by the Plaintiffs.  Pa 1 at ¶36, 42.  In May 2010, Plaintiffs assigned their interest in the Property to [...] for $480,000.00.  Pa 8 at ¶45.  In total, Plaintiffs received $1.1 million for selling their interest in the Property.  During his May 3, 2017 deposition, [...] confirmed that he made more money ($1.1 million) from the sale of his interest in the Property than Plaintiffs spent acquiring their interest in the Property and obtaining governmental approvals ($700,000-$900,000):
[brief] See Wattles v. Plotts, 120 N.J. 444, 577 (1990).  Similarly, Courts have expressed its disfavor of those described as “intermeddlers”; “title raiders”; or “heir hunters”.  See O Y Old Bridge Dev. Corp. v. Cont'l Searchers, Inc., 120 N.J. 454, 577 (1990); Bron v. Weintraub, 42 N.J. 87 (1964); Savage v. Weissman, 355 N.J.Super. 429 (App.Div. 2002).  In Bron, the Court found that it was against public policy for heirs of a prior owner to capitalize on a defect in an initial tax foreclosure action initiated by a municipality, after the property had been developed and occupied by subsequent residential purchasers.  The Court said:  [N]o one disputes the right of the holders of existing interests to convey them to third persons if they wish.  What is challenged is the legality of the intrusion into the scene by third persons who seek only to further their own interests rather than the interests already on hand.  As we have pointed out, the policy of the statute is to support tax titles, a policy which overall is burdened by the conduct before us.  . . .  We see no social value or contribution in the activities of [the intervenor].  On the contrary, decent men must sense only revulsion in this traffic in the misfortunes of others.  Id. at 95.  The Court in Bron found that the provisions of New Jersey Tax Sale Law should be liberally construed to encourage the barring of the right of redemption so as to secure the marketability of titles.
[brief] She denied the affidavit of my expert witness [...] and she failed to enforce the NJ UCC laws which was the NJ laws to enforce a residential mortgage Note.  She dismissed my answer and counterclaim (171a).  She denied my jury trial demanded in my answer and counterclaim filed on 7/27/2016.  She did not allow me to talk in my defense in the hearing.  [...] violated my constitutional rights specifically the US 1st and 4th, 7th and 14th Amendments, and Article One of the NJ State Constitution.  In the motion for Summary Judgment hearing of 3/3/2017 the trial judge [...] and [...]’s attorney [...] agreed that since the unauthenticated copy of the alleged assignments of the mortgage were recorded in the Monmouth County Hall of Records they were not defective.  The transcript of 3/3/17 page 6 lines 8-14:  “MR. BLAINE: … But the assignments of mortgage Are before the Court as a legal question for the Court to examine them.  And if they’re defective somehow legally the Court should make that determination.  THE COURT: They’re recorded.  MR. BLAINE: And they’re recorded, yes.  And I would assert they’re not defective. ”  On 8/20/19 [...] filed a motion for final judgment in the NJ OFF.  In this motion, once again, [...] pleaded that it owned the mortgage; not [...].  [...] attached the fraudulent mortgage assignments of 2009 (065a) and 2014 (097a), the fraudulent affidavit of lost note of 2/12/14 (088a), and the forged HAM agreement of 2015 notarized by [...] (103a).  My deadline to oppose it was 9/3/19.  On 9/3/19 I filed my opposition to [...]’s motion for final judgment.  But the NJ OOF ignored my opposition and recommended a final judgment order to [...].
[directive] Deposits  2.  Fed Wire or Electronic Funds Transfers (EFT) can be accomplished by the agency utilizing a . commercial bank to forward funds to the Customs Suspense Account at the [...].  New  A copy of the Deposit Ticket and a copy of the ’A”, Deposit Information Form, Attachment shall be FAXED to the [...] the same day the EFT is executed.  There is no standardized format or form in the banking industry for the processing of wire transfers.
[brief] “The duty to defend extends only to claims on which there would be a duty to indemnify in the event of a judgment adverse to the insured. ”  *Trs. of Princeton Univ. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co.*, 293 N.J. Super. 296, 297 (App. Div. 1996).  Here, the only remaining claim in the underlying litigation is tortious interference with business.  To succeed, the [...] must show that [...] acted maliciously, that is, he intended to injure them.  *Printing Mart*, 116 N.J. at 751.  As mentioned above, [...]’s Policy does not cover advertising injuries that were intended.
[brief] - The sole purpose of photographs taken during due diligence were to assist in the drafting of the DOT Application and drafting plans - the photographs were not taken at the direction of the Town nor shared with the Town.  o Plaintiff issued a partial denial indicating that [...] did not specifically state that the photos were never shared with the Town.  (Pa432).  - It was not the purpose and scope of survey photographs to identify specific deteriorations on [...].  o Plaintiff issued a partial denial based on the fact that specific defects such as a crack or an age of pavement wouldn’t be evident in all photos. ” (Pa432).  -  The 2020 Grant Application contained photos of multiple potholes, but not the pothole Plaintiff alleges caused his fall.  o Plaintiff issued a partial denial based on the fact that it is uncertain whether potholes depicted were all the potholes addressed by [...] during the project.  (Pa432).  The sole basis of Plaintiff’s argument that the Trial Court did not properly apply the Brill standard is that the Trial Court listed the DSOMF verbatim.  That is false, thereby rendering Plaintiff’s argument without merit.  Furthermore, as set forth above, of the six facts that were listed by the Court, wherein the Plaintiff issued partial denials, those partial denials are not sufficient to create genuine issues of material fact and overcome the immunities and defenses afforded to [...] under Title 59.  POINT II
[brief] 539-1000  [...]  [...] (admitted pro hac vice)  [...] (816)  474-6550  [...] (admitted pro hac vice)  [...] [...]  #  TABLE OF CONTENTS | Section | Page | |------------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | TABLE OF CONTENTS | i | | TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | iv | | TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS, AND RULINGS | ix | | PRELIMINARY STATEMENT | 1 | | STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY | 3 | | A.
[brief] Neither the Board’s professionals, nor any objector the Application, presented any expert testimony or evidence refuting the evidence presented by Plaintiff.  Furthermore, the Board spent absolutely no time deliberating about the requested d(5) variance or the positive and negative criteria.  Immediately after Plaintiff’s counsel finished his final summation, the Board went directly into its vote on the application.  (Pa483 to Pa484).  Again, there was no deliberation amongst the Board members, no evidence presented refuting Plaintiff’s testimony and no discussions whatsoever regarding the d(5) variance criteria.  After a motion for denial was made, the Board members voted and set forth minimal reasoning behind their votes.  (Pa484 to Pa492).  Only a few of the Board members even mentioned density as a concern leading to their vote against the Application, and not a single Board member specifically addressed the positive or negative criteria as it relates to a d(5) variance request.
[brief] We discern the following undisputed facts from the record and view the facts and all reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the party against whom summary judgment was entered.  Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N. J. 520, 540, 666 A.2d 146 (1995).  On April 12, 2011, plaintiff and defendant were involved in an automobile accident during which plaintiff suffered injuries.  At the time of the accident, plaintiff was uninsured for medical expense benefits coverage as required under N.J.S.A. 39:6A-3.1, -3.3, and -4.  For most of the seven-year period prior to the accident, plaintiff was insured under his mother's [*2] automobile insurance policy, and he contributed $75 per month toward the cost of that coverage.  In March 2011, he was removed from his mother's policy and endeavored to obtain his own policy.  Plaintiff performed an internet search, called a company that advertised itself as an insurance broker, and scheduled a meeting with a broker.  Plaintiff met with the broker, paid $150 in cash for six months of liability coverage, and received an insurance identification card bearing the name [...] covering a six-month period.  Plaintiff believed he purchased six months of liability insurance.  He was told by the broker that if an accident was his fault "it would have to come out of [his] pocket and basically, fix the other car."  He also understood that "if [he] were to get into a collision it wouldn't cover, . . . payments of any injury [he] sustained or anything like that.  It would just be to protect [him] from the - from any type of fraud or anything like that so [he] wouldn't get into any issues with the law."  After plaintiff's April 12, 2011 accident with defendant, it was discovered he had been the victim of a scam.  The broker was a fraud, and plaintiff did not have any [*3] automobile insurance at the time the accident occurred.¹  Plaintiff filed suit against defendant, claiming he suffered economic and non-economic losses as a result of the accident.  Defendant moved for summary judgment, claiming that plaintiff was barred from bringing suit under N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.5(a).  The court heard argument and granted defendant's motion.  Plaintiff appealed.  II.
[directive] Revised Form Promulgated by 12/31/2019 Supplement to Directive #01-18, CN I 0079-Portuguese Defendant's Initials a Reu Fonnulario Revisado Promulgado em 12/31/2019, Complementa\)ao Diretriz no 01-18, CN 10079-Portuguese lniciais do page of 7 /pagina de 7 5 5 17.  Having been advised of the possible immigration consequences and of your right to seek f.
[brief] third meeting, [...] and [...] represented to Plaintiffs that [...] should be rezoned for affordable housing to create coverage for the affordable housing obligation of the intended [...] development, thus pushing said obligation onto the [...] offsite.  473a (703:18–704:20).  [...] and [...] assured Plaintiffs that they would ultimately convey [...] to an affordable housing developer.  473a (704:21–705:9).  Based on [...]’s and [...]’s representations that [...] would purchase the [...] from Plaintiffs approved and improved at a certain price, eventually set forth in a Letter of Intent and Memorandum of Understanding, Plaintiffs decided to pursue the proposed real estate opportunities.  634a–636a; 690a–693a.  Plaintiffs retained [...] as counsel in the pursuit of the purchase and development of the [...] and the [...] transaction.
[brief] Yet, after making those statements on February 13, 2020, [...] did not include a bad faith claim in his first complaint, which was dismissed on January 8, 2021.  Instead, seeking a second bite of the apple, [...]—in a post-judgment motion for leave to amend his complaint—raised the bad faith allegation that “the City’s decision to declare the Study Area as a condemnation area was intended to disguise the City’s ulterior and true motive, i.e., to secure a multi-million dollar benefit [a school] from [...]. ” (See Pa176 ¶¶ 120–21.)  After that motion to amend was denied, [...] tried a third bite of the apple.
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[brief] Similarly, the Prosecutor inappropriately argued hearsay opinions of non-testifying medical professionals as substantive evidence in his closing argument.  (15T:174-17 to 23).  Specifically, he told the jury that “other mental health professionals knew the difference. ” (15T:174-17-18).  “You heard about the report of [...], the nurse practitioner. ” (15T:174-18 to 19).  “He spoke with the defendant almost immediately after these crimes. ” (15T:19 to 20).  The Prosecutor offered the report of a nurse practitioner who didn’t testify, whose opinion [...] didn’t rely upon, as substantive evidence that [...] was wrong.  (15T:174-17 to 175-5).  The State should not have been allowed to cross examine [...] on reports that she did not rely on and then argue it as substantive evidence in their closing argument.  Mesz, 459 N.J. Super. at 319; Spencer 319 N.J. Super. at 299-300.
[brief] a.  Based on gross tract area.  b.  When calculating the maximum permitted number of units, any computation resulting in a fraction of a unit shall be rounded upwards to the next whole number if said fraction is equal to or greater than 0.5 unit, or downwards to the next whole number if said fraction is less than 0.5 unit.  However, in no event shall the total number of units to be produced in the Senior Housing – 1 Overlay Zone exceed 275 units.  c.  For the purposes of calculating required setbacks, all yards abutting any public right-of-way shall be considered a front yard, the westerly yard parallel to and most opposite the tract's Route 202 frontage shall be considered the rear yard and all other yards shall be considered side yards.  d.  Historic structures existing prior to the creation of the Senior Housing – 1 Overlay Zone which do not comply with the zone’s minimum setback requirements shall be considered pre-existing nonconforming conditions and shall not require variance relief.  e.  Parking structures and garages attached to or under a principal residential building shall be exempt from the calculation of building stories.
[brief] Dated: March 25, 2024  Superior Court of New Jersey Appellate Division  Docket No: [...]  [...] :  CIVIL ACTION : ON APPEAL FROM THE Plaintiff-Appellant :  FINAL ORDER OF THE v. : SUPERIOR COURT OF : NEW JERSEY, LAW  DIVISION  UNITED SERVICES : ATLANTIC COUNTY  AUTOMOBILE : ASSOCIATION : DOCKET NUMBER: [...]  Defendant-Respondent : : Sat Below: : HON. [...], P.J.C.v.  BRIEF ON BEHALF OF DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT
[brief] For more than half a century, it has been a well-established principle in this state that “another trial judge of equal jurisdiction should regard as binding the decision of his brother that probable cause had been sufficiently shown to support a warrant, unless there was clearly no justification for that conclusion. ”  *State v. Kasabucki*, 52 N.J. 110, 117 (1968).  Here, instead of starting from the position of seeing [...]’s decision as binding, that probable cause had been sufficiently shown to support the warrant, [...] made his own assumptions about the affiant’s intentions—that the affiant’s “conclusions and his opinions were primarily based on the reputation of the parties involved. ” (1T15-18 to 20).  Instead of regarding the warrant-supported search as “cloaked with an aura of prima facie legality,” id. at 122-23, and requiring the defendant challenging the validity of the warrant to prove there was no probable cause, *State v. Jones*, 179 N.J. 377, 388 (2004), the court’s reasoning put the State in a position to reargue the probable cause that had already been accepted as sufficient.  The purpose of the deference given to a warrant-issuing judge’s probable-cause determination is “[t]o encourage police to resort to search warrants rather than warrantless searches and to submit to the superintendence of a neutral judicial officer. ”  *State v. Jones*, 308 N.J. Super. 15, 30 (App. Div. 1998).  Accordingly, “after-the-fact scrutiny by courts of the sufficiency of an affidavit should not take the form of de novo review,” and “courts should not invalidate . . . warrant[s] by interpreting affidavit[s] in a hypertechnical, rather than a commonsense, manner. ”  *Ibid.* (alterations in original) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 236 (1983)).  This court therefore owes deference to [...]’s probable-cause determination as the warrant-issuing judge, not to [...]’s de novo overruling of that determination.
[brief] MISLED DEFENDANT AND ALSO DID NOT GIVE PROPER NOTICE IN MAKING ITS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND VIOLATED THE FDCPA  (Not raised below)  Db13  A.  Plaintiff misled Defendant as to the right under R. 1:6-2(d).  Db13  B.  Plaintiff violated FDCPA because of misleading statements.  Db14  C.  Plaintiff’s statements are inconsistent with R. 1:4-8(a)(2) and (c).  Db17  D.  Plaintiff did not give required information in its notice of motion.  Db17  V.  DEFENDANT WAS DENIED DUE PROCESS
[brief] [Pa54-55]  Nor was the notice defective for the purpose of providing a description of the application or the relief sought.  In the leading case Perlmart of Lacey, Inc. v. Lacey Tp. Planning Bd., 295 N.J. Super. 234, 237-238 (1996), there was a notice with regard to an application being made to the board and the application specifically said minor subdivision approval with variance from lot area, front yard setback and rear yard setback, and minor subdivision approval with variance from lot area, front yard setback and rear yard setback, and minor subdivision resulting in creation of three commercial lots for a total of 42.53 acres.
[brief] Plaintiff/Appellant [...] (“Plaintiff” or “[...]”) now appeals the lower court’s orders fully granting Defendants-Respondents’ various motions to dismiss Plaintiff’s September 3, 2021 Complaint (“2021 Lawsuit”).  Despite the lower court’s express finding that Plaintiff had pled all of the required elements and facts of her cause of action, it inexplicably proceeded to dismiss the Complaint for failure to state a claim.  This Court should reverse the lower court’s order granting the motions to dismiss and order this case to proceed below.  Plaintiff alleged that Defendants, a local public school district, its superintendent, a principal, and fellow staff members, engaged in a pattern of unlawful retaliation against Plaintiff in violation of the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (“NJLAD”).
[brief] Appellant is currently employed as a police officer with the [...].  [...] Ordinances, chapter 68, Article I and Article II, which governs the establishment and operation of the [...].  Section 68-21 of the Ordinance states the following:  “Promotions shall be made in accordance with the terms and conditions of the collective bargaining agreement(s) in effect between the Township and collective bargaining units representing police officers. ”  (Ra08)  Section 68-5 of the Ordinance states the following:  “The Mayor shall, from time to time, as may be necessary, adopt and amend the rules and regulations for the government and discipline of the Police Department and employees thereof.  Said rules and regulations may fix and provide for the enforcement of such rules and regulations and the enforcement of penalties for the violation of such rules and regulations.  All employees of the Police Department shall be subject to such rules and regulations and penalties. ”  (Ra01.)  Pursuant to the Ordinance, Mount Olive has adopted various Rules and Regulations governing the management and operation of the [...].  (Ra11)  Those regulations include provisions related to promotions.  (Ra11)  Plaintiff is a member of the [...] and was formerly its president.