ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] VICTIM NO. OF VICTIMS - Enter the victim number and the total number of victims involved with this incident.  Example:  If three victims were robbed as part of the same incident, and this is the second victim of the three, enter "2/3."  7.  OWNERS NAME - Enter the full name (last, first, middle) of the owner of the property, if known.  8.  PHONE (AREA) - Enter the full phone number of the owner, if known.  9.  OWNERS ADDRESS - Enter the full address(premise number, street name, municipality, state and zip), if known.  10.
[brief] ’”  *Ramirez v. Dep’t of Corr.*, 382 N.J. Super. 18, 23 (App. Div. 2005) (quoting *Henry v. Rahway State Prison*, 81 N.J. 571, 579-80 (1980)) (alteration in original).  In determining whether an agency’s decision is arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable, reviewing courts assess: (1) whether the agency’s action violates express or implied legislative policies, that is, did the agency follow the law; (2) whether the record contains substantial evidence to support the findings on which the agency based its action; and (3) whether in applying the legislative policies to the facts, the agency clearly erred in reaching a conclusion that could not reasonably have been made on a showing of the relevant factors.
[brief] After [...] terminated the Subject Contract in April of 2021, [...] filed the underlying Complaint on or about May 10, 2021.  (Pa17)  [...] then filed an Answer and Counterclaim on or about June 21, 2021.  (Pa24)  After discovery commenced and following [...]’s initial responses to [...]’s First Set of Interrogatories and First Set of Document Demands, [...] notified [...] of extensive deficiencies and demanded more specific answers.  See (Pa51 – Pa54)  Thereafter, [...] filed a Motion to Dismiss.  On May 2, 2022, the Court ordered [...] to produce various items of discovery.  (Pa64)  Specifically, in pertinent part, [...] was ordered to either produce all documentation regarding its alleged purchases of replacement materials from [...], [...]  (“[...]”), and any and all vendors from April 2021 to September 2021, or, alternatively, to produce a written Certification confirming all such documentation is contained within [...]’s discovery responses Bate Stamped P0078-88.  (Pa64 – Pa65)  In response to the Court’s May 2, 2022 Order, [...] produced vague answers to certain limited interrogatories, a completely unsubstantiated Statement of Damages in the amount of $581,916.40, (Pa66), approximately two hundred (200) pages of unrelated emails exchanged between [...]’s and [...]’s representatives, and a Certification confirming [...]’s assertion that all documentation regarding [...]’s alleged purchase of replacement materials were contained within the documents Bate Stamped P0078-88.  (Pa67)  As to these documents, [...]’s discovery responses Bate Stamped P0078-79 contain two (2) unsigned quotes from [...] dated May 13, 2022.  (Pa69-Pa70)  In pertinent part, P0078 relates to Schedule 10 pipe, which bore no relationship to the Subject Contract.  Compare (Pa69) with (Pa15 –Pa16)  Additionally, P0080 - P0087 include eight (8) checks [...] allegedly issued to [...].  (Pa71 – Pa78)  No additional explanatory and corroborative proofs such as emails, letters, or other correspondence, or any account statements, packing slips, receipts, or other documentation were ever produced that would clarify the issue of what specific pipe, if any, was allegedly purchased with these [...] checks.  On or about November 29, 2022, on the eve of the depositions of Joann [...] and Shallan [...], [...]’s President, [...] produced five (5) additional pages of discovery, Bate Stamped P0278-282.  (Pa79 – Pa83).  This consisted of five (5) additional checks that [...] allegedly sent to [...].  Once again, the [...] checks were devoid of any supporting documentation or information relating to the specific items/materials that were allegedly purchased.  There are no invoices, packing slips, or any other documentation as to what was actually purchased with any of these checks.  **The Deposition of Shallan [...].**
[brief] Pb10  Ten Stary Dom Partnership v. Mauro, 216 N.J. 16 (2013) .................................................................  Pb13  Tomko v. Vissers, 21 N.J. 226 (1956) .................................................................  Pb10  Twp. of Stafford v. Stafford Twp. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 154 N.J. 62 (1998)  ........................................................................  Pb27  Valenti v. Plan. Bd. of City of Absecon, 244 N.J. Super. 77 (App. Div. 1990) ..............................................  Pb13  Village of Hudson v. Albrecht, Inc., 458 N.E.2d 852 (Ohio), appeal dismissed, 467 U.S. 1237 (1984).  ..................................................  Pb24 Wilson v. Brick Twp. Zoning Bd., 405 NJ. Super. 189 (App. Div. 2009) .............................................  Pb14
[brief] In his January 8, 2024 reply brief and during his January 24, 2024 oral argument, [...] argued that the matter was not moot because [...] subsequently amended its previously unequivocal rescission of employment to state that if at some point the restrictions in [...]’s Employment Agreement were modified, [...] could begin employment at [...].  (RA169).  [...] also argued the Practice had already been compensated for his potential breach of the Restrictive Covenant because [...] had forfeited his 2023 incentive bonus in the approximate amount of $80,000.  (Ra165, 170, 176-178).  The Chancery Court Dismissed [...]’s Complaint And Application Because They Were Moot.
[brief] [5T148:13-17].  There is no record evidence to support this alleged disclosure.  Appellant also confirmed that he would not have disclosed his prescriptions at all if he had not been randomly selected for the September 2015 drug test.  [5T148:21 – 5T149:6].  Appellant further concedes that the alleged forms for his September 2015 drug test were reviewed by an Internal Affairs officer, not an immediate supervisor as required by the Medication Policy.  [5T163:13-18].  Even if Appellant did list his prescription opioids on the September 2015 drug test, this notification was not made to his immediate supervisor, and this delay of six (6) months cannot possibly be considered “immediate”.
[brief] REPLY ARGUMENT POINT  I.  [...] Has Correctly Asserted [...]’s Violations of the NJCFLA as an Affirmative Defense to the Void Default Judgment  [...]’s Brief argues that, because there is ostensibly no private right of action under the NJCFLA, [...] cannot assert [...]’s failure to be licensed as a means to vacate the default judgment obtained on [...]’s void debt.  However, [...]’s arguments ignore the fact that “[t]he absence of a private right of action is irrelevant to the instant application . . . defendant is not seeking to utilize the CFLA as a sword, by asserting a private right of action under the statute.  Instead, defendant is asserting the right to utilize the CFLA as a shield against enforcement of a judgment which defendant contends was void ab initio. ”  New Century Fin. v. Trewin, 2018 N.J. Super. Unpub.
[brief] [...]: [...] [12/6/22, 12:36:58 PM]  ✷: change to [...] [12/6/22, 12:37:40 PM]  Frenkel [...]: Why [12/6/22, 12:37:49 PM]  ✷: better lawyer [12/6/22, 12:38:03 PM]  Frenkel  [...]: Do I really need so expensive Conclusion as to Stipulations and Fraud by the Plaintiff  The foregoing facts and documents were stipulated to at time of the hearing.
[brief] (P563a).  When news of [...]’s arrest was circulating throughout the small community of Brigantine, Decedent was distraught in light of [...]’s continuing, five-year relationship with Respondent.  (12T79:14 to 80:10).  Decedent expressed worry about Respondent’ reputation and standing in the community.  (12T79:25 to 80:6).  Thirteen days later, during this period of distress and embarrassment, Decedent made the 2014 Will that benefited Respondent.
[brief] Questions of fraud are inherently factual and require analysis of “the subjective elements of willfulness, intent or good faith. ”  *Judson v. Peoples Bank & Trust Co. of Westfield*, 17 N.J. 67, 76 (1954).  Defendant presented no proof that Plaintiff ever misrepresented her assets during the negotiation of the Settlement Agreement.  Indeed, the Agreement sets forth in the fourth “Whereas” clause that each party “has made a full disclosure of all relevant financial information to the other of his or her financial worth and income. ”  (A2)  Given the issues addressed in the Settlement Agreement, the only relevant financial information was the parties’ approximate annual income.  The Settlement Agreement addresses ongoing support, not a distribution of assets.  *N.H. v. H.H.* rejects the proposition that “full and broad discovery” is necessary for a fair and equitable settlement to be reached.  418 N.J. Super. 262, 281 (App.Div. 2011).  The New Jersey Supreme Court rejected the very argument Defendant makes, that despite waiving further discovery and confirming that the entire Agreement is fair and equitable, if he had known more about Plaintiff’s financial situation at the time, he would not have signed it.
[brief] - Appellee never contacted [...] and never told [...] she could return to [...] after removing her from the schedule.  The record is devoid of any evidence that Appellee ever contacted [...], and Appellant clearly testified she was never contacted.  A fact finder can use this fact to infer that the reason Appellee did not contact her was retaliatory.  -  [...], an upper-level manager for Appellee, testified that an Area Director or Program Director should have contacted the Appellant to let her know she could return to work.  However, no one from [...] ever contacted Appellant.  A fact finder can use this fact to infer that the reason Appellee did not contact her was retaliatory.  -  The record establishes that Appellant’s whistleblowing activity continued through January 8, 2020, immediately prior to Appellee putting Appellant on leave from work and then never contacting her again.  A fact finder can use this highly suggestive temporal proximity to conclude that Appellant’s January 8, 2020 whistleblowing complaint caused Appellee to not bring her back to work or contact her again for retaliatory reasons.  -  A January 2020 e-mail shows that individuals at the [...] did not want Appellant working there, at least in part because she brought up the investigation at the [...].  A fact finder can use this fact to infer that Appellant’s involvement in the investigation stopped her from being called back to work at this location.  •
[brief] (1T 124-20 to 130-11)  As [...] was looking through the photos a second time, he paused at [...]’s photo and said, “I think it was 3.  Yeah.  I think it was 3. ”  (Da 34; Da 40 at 3:44:20 to 3:44:41)  Rather than neutrally ask [...] how confident he was in his choice, [...] instead pressured [...] to offer a conclusive answer: “So that’s a yes or no?”
[brief] Affirmed.  All Citations Not Reported in A.3d, 2012 WL 3731805  Footnotes  1  Different spellings of [...]'s name appear throughout the trial transcripts.  2  The State introduced cellular phone records at trial to corroborate the communication among the conspirators.  3  According to the medical examiner, stippling results when a gun is fired at close range and specks of gunpowder are deposited on the skin.  4  [...] negotiated a plea and testified against [...] and [...].  For that reason, we will refer to [...] and [...] collectively as “defendants.
[brief] ”  (Ibid.).  Following the trial court’s ruling, in July 2020, Plaintiffs filed an Amended Complaint which included the same allegations and claims against [...] as they set forth in their initial Complaint.  (Pa96-Pa129a).  The Amended Complaint, however, included new allegations concerning the [...], specifically that they had engaged in wrongdoing while the litigation was pending, (Pa110 ¶¶ 73, 75).  IV.
[brief] See N.J.S.A. 34:13A-16e(2).  The Commission is required to give interest arbitrators annual training, and any arbitrator who does not satisfactorily complete the annual training “shall be immediately removed from the special panel. ”  See N.J.S.A. 34:13A-16e(4).  They remain subject to suspension, discipline or removal by the Commission on the basis of good cause at any time.  See N.J.S.A. 34:13A-16e.
[directive] (d)  Threatening Assailant.  In general, when dealing with a threatening assailant, officers may use all types of force options other than deadly force.  This includes striking with batons or asps, less lethal ammunition, and CEDs.  Although a range of force options is generally available, the officer shall only use force that is proportional to the threat faced.  Any strikes to the head or neck with a baton or asp are considered deadly force and can only be used when deadly force is allowed.
[brief] 2 Lobek v. Gross, 2 N. J. 100, 102, 65 A.2d 744 (1949)  ---------------------- 46 Manahawkin Convalescent v. O'Neill, 217 N.J. 99, 118, 85 A.3d 947 (2014)  -----------------------------------------------  3  Marioni v. 94 Broadway, Inc., 374 N.J. Super. 588  ---------------------- 35, 45 Matter of County of Atlantic, 230 N.J. 237, 254 -------------------------------
[brief] ”  And I should point out that in the current redevelopment plan, there are very specific requirements for the use of the adjoining properties adjacent to the Bayshore, the beachfront areas that are co-terminous with and adjoin the redevelopment plan area and the access points and the ability to provide for both public parking and access to those beachfront areas and walkways are essentially unchanged in the proposed redevelopment plan area.  So, the redevelopment plan in fact does contemplate comprehensive assessment and comprehensive access to the beachfront areas.  So that hasn’t changed and that consistent level of consistency is still in place.  And then going into the 2015 master plan re-examination report, there’s a reference at the bottom of page 7, the 2015 master plan re- examination report recommends the following.  “Encouraging major redevelopment along the Borough’s mixed use commercial residential area.  Extending along Beachway Avenue from Raritan Avenue to the Waackaack Creek that provides for mix of uses designed according to an overall plan that enhances public access to the waterfront, connects beaches and dunes and contributes substantially to [...]’s economic well being. ”  And with the amendment, and consistent with the original plan as amended, back in 2017, the plan is intended to effectuate that goal and as noted, there is a mix of uses that are contemplated, multifamily residential and a small scale, potential small scale retail component.  So, I just highlighted a couple of specific areas that are identified in the document, the plan document that identifies consistency with the master plan but overall we’ve made a determination that in fact the redevelopment plan is in fact consistent with the master plan aside, defined and designed to effectuate the Borough’s master plan.  So with that, again this is a pretty high level presentation.  I tried to make it as concise and direct as possible.  That’s my presentation.
[brief] 6  Notably, Plaintiff also makes a confusing and vague argument regarding Congress’ enactment of HIPAA.  (Pb32).  The information protected by HIPAA is plainly distinguishable than the debt information at issue here and, indeed, the fact that Congress permits use of mailing vendors in the HIPAA context actually cuts against Plaintiff’s argument because expressly allowing the use of mailing vendors rejects Plaintiff’s position that an entity must fully integrate its mailing process without outside help.  POINT III
[brief] “‘A bargain collaterally and remotely connected with an illegal purpose or act is not rendered illegal thereby if proof of the bargain can be made without relying upon the illegal transaction. ’”  *Id.* at 141 quoting *Restatement, Contracts* § 597.  “‘How closely a bargain must be connected with an illegal purpose in order to make the bargain illegal is a question of degree. ’”  *Manning* at 113 quoting *Restatement, Contracts* at 785, n. 62.  There can be no question in the instant matter that the contract between Plaintiff and Defendants was collateral to the prohibited agreement between Plaintiff and the Property’s seller, but no such analysis was performed by the Trial Court.
[brief] In Re Order Dated May 12, 2023  Order dated March 30, 2023  [...], plaintiff/respondent vs. [...]  defendant/appellant pro se SUPERIOR COURT OF NJ APPELLATE DIVISION, DOCKET NO. [...]  CIVIL ACTION ON APPEAL FROM: SUPERIOR COURT OF NJ CHANCERY DIVISION – FAMILY PART MORRIS COUNTY DOCKET NO. [...] Sat Below HON.  [...], J.S.C.  TABLE OF CONTENTS
[brief] 195a (83:15–85:10); 197a (122:21–124:19); 198a (158:18-23); 199a (178:9–179:14); 200a–201a (189:10–190:16); 201a (191:12–193:8); 301a–302a (49:14–52:4); 307a–308a (106:17–111:7); 309a–310a (119:10–122:5); 310a–311a (124:12–127:15).  [...] and [...] testified they never opened any bank accounts on behalf of [...] and were never aware of any money paid by Plaintiffs to [...] or of any money paid by [...] to the Defendants or anyone else.  194a (53:19-22); 303a–304a (89:10–90:20); 309a (120:24–121:9); 311a (127:16–128:10); 313a (165:5-10); 315a (191:9–192:8).  Said [...]-MTDC Assignment and Releases required Plaintiffs to make certain payments on specified dates as were allegedly negotiated by [...] and [...].
[brief] *Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins*, 578 U.S. 330, 341–42 (2016) (identifying slander *per se*).  There, the Supreme Court confirmed that “Congress may elevate to the status of legally cognizable injuries concrete, *de facto* injuries that were previously inadequate in law[, and] Congress has the power to define injuries and articulate chains of causation that will give rise to a case or controversy where none existed before. ”  *Spokeo*, 578 U.S. at 341 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).  In contrast with the U.S. Constitution, “the New Jersey Constitution does not restrict the exercise of judicial power to actual cases and controversies.
[directive] Exceptions are those involving foreign sharing EOAF. or real property, which requires approval from the Director of 2.  $1,000,000  Forfeited Assets  More Than $1,000,000  Where the forfeited assets are valued at or more, and in all cases EOAF involving the transfer of real property, the Director of must approve the amour& of the equitable share.  Further, Treasury field offices’ equitable sharing U.S. recommendations on judicial forfeitures &all be conveyed the Attorney. to U.S.  The recommendation of the Attorney is highly valued and shall be considered by the Treasury decision making authority.  23
[brief] The Court should reject Plaintiffs’ argument that they were entitled to pre-judgment interest from the date of the alleged misappropriation of their funds because their claim was for “liquidated damages” since they never raised the issue below (37T8-1 to -12); Johnson v. Benjamin Moore & Co., 347 N.J. Super. 71, 97 (App Div. 2002).  Plaintiffs have not identified where in the record below they raised this argument.  During oral argument on their post-judgment motion, Plaintiffs did not argue that the pre-judgment interest calculation guidelines mandated under R. 4:42-11(b) should be ignored because they presented a liquidated damages claim, rather they argued that the Court should grant pre-judgment interest from the date the alleged misappropriation occurred (i.e. 2008) on an “equitable contractual ground. ” (37T53-14 to 54-8).  Therefore, Plaintiffs waived this argument.  B.
[brief] He didn’t violate Merit statute, they could have consulted with an engineer who would have advised them that [...]’s plans did not call for remediation work.  (Pa000389).  As for Plaintiffs’ meritless “per se” negligence claim, [...] responded by presenting an affidavit from [...], the Vice President and Director of Engineering for [...].  (Pa000389).  Nardelli is a licensed professional engineer and a certified municipal engineer.  (Id. at ¶ 1).  Nardelli confirmed, in his affidavit, that “[t]he preparation of a preliminary site plan [does] not require [...] to obtain the consent of Plaintiffs,” and that neither the preliminary site plan nor the final site plan called “for any remediation efforts, soil excavation, storage of construction materials, or installation of security fencing to be performed on Plaintiffs’ property,” rebutting Plaintiffs’ deficient reliance argument.  (Pa000390 at ¶¶ 6, 7).  Nardelli’s affidavit further discussed the general practice engineering firms follow when drafting site plans for projects such as this one:  For large redevelopment projects within the scope and scale of the Bridgeton project, it is fairly common for the client [[...] in this case] to request modifications to site plans before these plans are finalized.  It is also common to include other property in preliminary site plans.  The consent of the private property owners is not anybody’s duty at that point in time.  The site plan was out there and if somebody else wrongly relied upon it, that’s not [...]’s fault. ” (4T at 31:11-17).  required and would not be the responsibility of the civil engineer preparing the preliminary site plans.  (Pa000391 at ¶ 11).  An engineering expert, had Plaintiffs retained one, would have explained that engineers do not need to obtain the consent of adjacent property owners when they are retained to prepare preliminary plans.  (Pa000390-91 at ¶¶ 6, 11).  The Court granted [...]’s Motion for Summary Judgment on August 25, 2023.
[directive] imprisonment of up to 18 months 3.  Notifikasyon  Notification  Èske w konprann ke egzijans pou anrejistre a ta kab deklanche notifikasyon ba tout òganizasyon  [Wi/Yes]  [Non/No] kominotè fòsdelòd, oswa ba tout moun, oubyen liberasyon w de prizon oswa prezans ou nan kominote a?  Do you understand that the requirement of registration may result in notification to law enforcement, community organizations, or the public at large, of your release from incarceration or presence in the community?
[brief] See also [...]:  While it is true that the Nunziato case arose in the context of a zoning board grant of a variance under the MLUL, the overriding public policy concern expressed by the Appellate Division in that matter are just as applicable – if not more so under the circumstances presented in this matter.  The concerns for significant relief for abuse, favoritism, bad faith on the part of a municipality are far greater when it is a [Mayor or Council], which may engage in ‘free-wheeling bidding’ for contributions, “as opposed to bodies like planning boards.
[brief] For example, in the Respondent’s Statement of Facts (at Db7 – Db10), [...] now admits that his client had made me two separate settlement offers, each of which involved my getting the car back and no cost.  He also admits that my concern, about each/both of those offers, was my fear that his client may have already stripped some parts off of the car.  Moreover, he specifically admits that the second offer occurred during the August 12, 2022 mediation session, where his client would not only give us the car back at no cost, but would even tow it back to my sister's house for free.  However other "facts" stated therein are either inaccurate, misleading, or in some cases, completely false.
[brief] (Da132)  This request was denied by the [...] because of [...]’s failure to timely request a stay pursuant to the [...] regulations, despite having had knowledge of the Interim Orders for a period of three months.  (Da131).  On May 18, 2021, the [...] entered an Interim Order which found that [...] had failed to comply with the March 30, 2021 Interim Order because he failed to provide the responsive records.