ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] 6  Kramer v. Public Employment Relations Comm'n, 475 U.S. 1072 (1986)  18  Lemke v. Barclays Bank Delaware, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 69598 (E.D. Mich. 2015)  23 Macdonald v. Cashcall, Inc., 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64761 (D.N.J. 2017)  16  Malanga v. Township of West Orange, 253 N.J. 291 (2023)
[directive] Page 2 citizen complaints charging indictable offense.  Similarly, County Prosecutors are to review an all private citizen complaints charging a disorderly persons offense when the complaint is being made against a candidate or nominee for elected public office or against someone holding elected public office.  Additional details the rule changes and the corresponding procedures being on implemented are provided below.  Further, significant changes have been made to the Judiciary's computer systems, most notably the eCDR system, to support these changes.  of  While some these technical changes are referenced this Directive, court staff and law in enforcement should review the system Release Notes, which are being promulgated under separate cover, for more detailed instructions.  Private Citizen Complaints
[brief] The police understood that the surveillance cameras and the footage were solely the landlord’s property.  Therefore, if the police wanted to search the surveillance cameras, they were required to get a warrant or prove that they obtained informed and voluntary consent from the landlord.  State v. King, 44 N.J. 346, 352 (1965).  But no warrant was obtained in this case, and the State failed to prove that the absent landlord gave informed and voluntary consent.  Thus, the warrantless search of the landlord’s surveillance cameras was unconstitutional, and the footage seized must be suppressed.  U.S. Const. amend. IV; N.J. Const. art. I, ¶ 7; Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 487-88 (1963); State v. Lee, 190 N.J. 270, 277-78 (2007).  Moreover, [...]’s father signing the consent form could not save the warrantless search: he lacked common or apparent authority over the surveillance cameras and his so-called consent was involuntarily given after he had refused to consent to search, based on the police’s misrepresentation that his signature was just a formality.  State v. Cushing, 226 N.J. 187, 192, 201-02 (2016).  A.
[brief] In its cross-appeal, Landlord does not appear to take issue with the trial court’s deduction under step one of the lodestar analysis of the 5.6 hours expended by attorneys on matters pertaining to different tenants.  Rather, the sum and substance of Landlord’s challenge to the trial court’s discretionary ruling on the appropriateness of the counsel fees awarded was that the court referenced “personal experience” in making its determination in step two, “which is prohibited in this State,” according to Landlord (Pb61).  Landlord’s analysis not only sweeps too broadly, but more importantly it misses the point.  Again, it was Landlord’s burden, not the judge’s, to provide evidence of the as to the prevailing market rate in the relevant community for the services for which Landlord is seeking attorneys’ fees compensation.
[brief] I.  RESPONDENT/CROSS-APPELLANT BEARS THE BURDEN OF PROOF TO ESTABLISH HIS CLAIMS, PURSUANT TO THE CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE STANDARD UNDER THE DEAD MAN’S STATUTE.  As reflected by the Appellant Brief and the Opposition Brief, the parties apparently have different positions on the material facts in the case.  Only two men in the world knew the truth of the key facts subject to this litigation, namely, [...] and [...], but unfortunately [...] passed away.  [...]’s lawyer [...], who prepared the two (2) defective deeds both dated December 10, 1998, also had certain knowledge of facts and circumstances surrounding these two (2) deeds.  However, [...] passed away as well.  (Trial Tr., Jan. 11, 2023, Pg. 73, Ln. 5 – 6)  Thus, to the extent a determination needs to be made in connection with material facts in dispute, the Court should keep in mind that as the plaintiff in the underlying litigation, Respondent/Cross-Appellant is the one that bears the burden to establish his claims, pursuant to the clear and convincing evidence standard under New Jersey’s dead man’s statute.  N.J.S.A. 2A:81-2.  II.  THE COURT SHOULD GRANT RELIEF REQUESTED BY APPELLANTS
[brief] "Reviewing appellate courts should 'not disturb the factual findings and legal conclusions of the trial judge' unless convinced that those findings and conclusions were 'so manifestly unsupported by or inconsistent with the competent, relevant and reasonably credible evidence as to offend the interests of justice.'"  Griepenburg v. Twp. of Ocean, 220 N.J. 239, 254 (2015) (quoting Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Invs. Ins. Co. of Am., 65 N.J. 474, 484 (1974)).  On Review of Equitable Remedies
[brief] I have provided the Inspections Report that states the property in question was free and clear of any hazardous materials a month prior to the closing.[sic].  5.  I have provided to the Plaintiff a copy of the Defendants’ Federal and State 2019-and 2020-Income Taxes, which are the exact Income Tax years for the year of the transaction subject to this litigation.  --- \(^6\)  Defendant [...] explained that she had mistakenly answered Interrogatories addressed to Rocco [...] (a named defendant but subsequently dismissed and no longer a party to this case).  But Ms. [...] certified that her answers to plaintiffs’ Demand for Interrogatories and Demand for Production of Documents were the same.  Indeed, when plaintiffs subsequently deposed Ms. [...], plaintiffs’ counsel referenced [...]’s Answers to Interrogatories to question her.  A353. 6.  On January 25, 2024, I am in receipt of Defendants’ 2015, 2016, 2017 and 2018 Tax Returns and the same was produced to the Plaintiffs.  I am amending this Reply Certification to certify that the Plaintiffs are now in receipt of all the Tax Returns to the Defendant, [...].
[brief] Under similar circumstances and based on affidavits almost identical to those before this Court, the Northern District of Illinois held that [...] established chain of title and was able to enforce the arbitration agreement.  *See* Valentine v. [...] Funding LLC, 2020 U.S. Dist. Lexis 185521, 2020 WL 5646975 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 7, 2020) (Da103-Da107) (citing Fuller v. [...], 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61015, 2018 WL 1744674, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 11, 2018) (Da27-Da29)) see also Smith v. [...], 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 153607, at fn. 4 (D. Md. Aug. 24, 2020) (Da98) (based on virtually identical affidavits to those here, even though Defendants are not parties to the underlying card agreement, they may nevertheless invoke its arbitration provisions).
[brief] ”  The New Jersey Assembly Rules also provide:  No bill or joint resolution shall be considered on third reading in the General Assembly until after the intervention of one full calendar day following second reading.  However, if on motion at least 60 members agree that a bill or joint resolution is an emergency measure, it may proceed immediately from second to third reading.  Assembly Rule 15:11 (Pa107).  By its own Certification, the Legislature, namely the Assembly, shirked its constitutional responsibilities in order to quickly pass this legislation.  (Pa236-37.)  The Constitution does provide an outlet if the bill is an emergency measure.
[brief] communicated “mostly over the phone” with [...] regarding quotes for general liability insurance and “extra insurance” for rented vans.  (Ia336).  [...] leased the 4 vans from [...] on July 9, 2019.  (Ia114-117).  [...] was told to apply online with [...]’s underwriter for the extra insurance.  (Ia409).  [...] subsequently completed [...]’s “Camps, Clinics and Conferences Application” online.  (Ia336; 122-126; 409-411; 456-463; 582-586).  The application states that “[a]ccident and liability insurance coverage is offered as a standard product with optional coverage also available such as . . . hired and non-owned automobile” (Ia582), however, there is nothing in the application excluding 12-15 passenger vans.  (Ia582-586).  Applicants are permitted to select hired and non-owned auto liability coverage in the amount of $150,000 or $500,000 without being subject to additional underwriting.  (Ia585).  There is an additional note that “$1,000,000 hired and non-owned automobile liability coverage is available but subject to additional underwriting. ” (Ia585).  This paragraph does not indicate that 12 to 15 passenger vans are ineligible at the $1,000,000 coverage option, nor does it make any reference at all to 12 to 15 passenger vans.  (Ia585).  On July 30, 2019, [...] sent an email to [...], the --- 3
[brief] Finally, as to the planned nature of the incident, the State cites no authority for its argument that “the details in this case showed no impetuousness” simply because the act was planned.  (Sb28)  Indeed, the seminal cases on juvenile sentencing actually involve fact patterns where juveniles made a plan.  In *Roper*, the juvenile “talked about his plan” to “commit burglary and murder” in “chilling, callous terms[.]”  543 U.S. at 566-57.  Despite the planned nature of the incident, the Court held that he could not be sentenced to death because his behavior was a result of the “impetuous and ill-considered actions and decisions” that are characteristic of juvenile offenders, and that “render juveniles less culpable than adults.
[brief] ”  While fee shifting in a successful plaintiff’s favor is mandatory under the IFPA and RICO, PIP arbitration does not permit arbitrators to award attorneys’ fees to insurers.  “We find nothing in the Legislature's findings and declarations contained in N.J.S.A. 39:6A-1.1(b) expressing an intention to permit an award of counsel fees to an insurance carrier against an insured or injured person in the statutory dispute-resolution process. ”  N.J. Coal. of Health Care Pros., Inc. v. Dep’t of Banking and Ins., 323 N.J. Super. 207, 263 (App. Div. 1999).  PIP arbitration also does not permit an arbitrator to award punitive damages, and a PIP arbitrator cannot award the treble damages required by the IFPA and RICO.
[brief] Defendant next takes issue, although not raised below, with the fact that [...] testified that he spoke with “family members [of the victim] at the hospital,” and that he came away with a “nickname” of the then still unidentified murderer.  (8T168:4-9).  The State notes this was not objected to and is thus reviewed for plain error.  R. 2:10-2.  Read in isolation, [...]’s remarks could appear to be problematic.  However, given the context—a re-cross examination by defense counsel, counsel invited the purported “implied hearsay,” by repeatedly questioning [...] regarding his report and whether [...] got “the name of Pee-Wee” from the victim’s father.  (9T169:20-21).  And in response to this question by the defense, [...] answered “family members of” the victim, provided him with the nickname.  (9T169:22).  Defense counsel appeared to be focused on advancing defendant’s theory of the case, that is the victim’s father fabricated the dying declaration.  The State therefore submits this is a textbook example of invited error.  “The doctrine of invited error does not permit a defendant to pursue a strategy . . . and then when the strategy does not work out as planned, cry foul and win a new trial. ”  State v. Williams, 219 N.J. 89, 101 (2014).  “Under that settled principle of law, trial errors that were induced, encouraged or acquiesced in or consented to by defense counsel ordinarily are not a basis for reversal on appeal[.]”  State v. A.R., 213 N.J. 542, 561 (2013).  Indeed, rather than objecting to testimony elicited from [...] by the State, the defense “acquiesced” to the State’s line of questioning of [...], and then doubled down and “pursued a strategy” of advancing the notion the victim’s father fabricated his story.
[brief] In this case, [...] was not removed for charges of misconduct directly related to his employment, a necessary predicate for being deemed ineligible to receive deferred retirement benefits in accordance with Hess.  Rather, [...] was removed pursuant to the results of a random urinalysis conducted by his employer.  Tellingly, the disciplinary charges underlying the removal did not allege [...] was: (1) utilizing any controlled dangerous substances at the workplace; and/or (2) under the influence of any controlled dangerous substance while at work.  Even more importantly, the drug test was not administered to [...] based upon any “reasonable suspicion,” pattern of erratic behavior, or in connection with a specific, work-related incident.  Instead, the test was randomly administered pursuant to County and/or Department of Corrections policy.
[brief] The Board’s decision is supported by substantial credible evidence and should be affirmed.  The Legislature vested [...] with broad discretion in the exercise of its authority under Title 48.  *In re Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas Co.’s Rate Unbundling, Stranded Costs and Restructuring Filings*, 167 N.J. 377, 384 (2001).  Our Supreme Court recognized that “[t]he Public Utilities Act specifically prohibits courts from reversing [...] decision” except for the grounds enumerated in N.J.S.A. 48:2-46.  *Ibid.*  As the Supreme Court recognized, under N.J.S.A. 48:2-46, “a reviewing court may set aside an order of the Board only ‘when it clearly appears that there was no evidence before the board to support the same reasonably. ’”  *In re Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas Co.’s Rate Unbundling*, 167 N.J. at 393 (quoting N.J.S.A. 48:2-46); accord *In re Herrmann*, 192 N.J. 19, 27-28 (2007).  When reviewing an agency’s factual findings the courts defer to the agency’s expertise.  *In re Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas Co.’s Rate Unbundling*, 167 N.J. at 384.  The standard of review of an agency decision is well settled and subject to “an arbitrary and capricious standard. ”  *Zimmerman v. Sussex Cnty., Educ. Servs. Comm’n*, 237 N.J. 465, 475 (2019).
[directive] If you do not know the officer’s name or badge number, provide any other identifying information.  Other Information  How was this reported?  □ In Person □ Phone □ Letter □ Email □ Other __________________________  Any physical evidence submitted?  □ Yes □ No  If yes, describe: __________________________________________  Was incident previously reported?  □ Yes □  No  If yes, describe: __________________________________________  To Be Completed by Officers Receiving Report
[brief] TABLE OF ORDERS  Order Denying Plaintiff's Motion in Limine  Filed on May 11, 2020, by the Honorable [...], P.J.Ch. Pa131  Order of Dismissal filed on September 25m 2023 by the Honorable [...], P.J. Ch. Pa1088  TABLE OF CONTENTS FOR APPENDIX OF PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT, [...]  A/K/A [...]2
[brief] During trial, plaintiff presented the expert testimony of [...], Esq.  Mr. O’Donnell testified to the standard of care in a matrimonial case.  Specifically, he testified that an attorney is required to communicate with his client, make sure the client is aware of his/her rights at issue, and to be informed about the client’s finances.  6T113:9-22.  As it relates to communication, Mr. O’Donnell said that in his review of the file he did not see communication between [...] and his client [...] aside from a perfunctory email about the time and location of the court hearing.  6T:117-118:1.  Instead, he saw that most of the communication from defendants was with [...].  6T:118:2- 4.  This observation matched the testimony of both [...] and [...] that almost all of defendants’ communication during the divorce process was with [...], not their client [...].  4T180:8-9; 7T14:18-22.  This lack of communication then led to [...] not meeting the other standards of care because without communicating with his client he did not learn information that was necessary to inform her of her rights and protect her in the judgment for divorce.
[brief] See Db1 (Incorrectly stating that “rents in Hoboken must now be linked to a property’s value as real property in the real estate market”); Db28 (Incorrectly stating that landlord’s actions “push[ed] the rent leveling board to go outside of its ordinance and link the rent to the unit’s market value as a condominium”).  [...]’s equity in the Unit, $301,105, was not based upon the Unit’s market value, much less its value as a condominium without a protected tenancy in place.  Indeed, [...]’s expert testified that both the $622,500 appraisal and Hoboken’s unequalized assessment of the Unit reflected a substantial discount for the Unit being occupied by a protected tenant.  6T:20:9-21:13, 30:9-14, 33:20-24, 35:17-19, 40:17-22.
[brief] The Township and the Board, including all of its officials, employees, agents, committees, departments, shall fully cooperate and assist with [...]’s efforts, to the extent permitted under any applicable state or federal law, rule or regulations, to secure necessary municipal, county and state permits, approvals, licenses, waivers, exceptions, easements, variations and variances for the development, including the SPA, Treatment Works Approval applications/permits, soil conservation district approvals, NJDEP Freshwater Wetlands and Flood Hazard Area approvals/permits, construction/building permits, and all other necessary or useful governmental approvals (“Government Approvals”).  While the Parties recognize that it shall remain the responsibility of the Developer, and not of the Board or the Township, to secure Government Approvals, the Township and the Board shall cooperate with the Developer as set forth herein.  . . .  The Township and the Board shall expedite the review and approval of all necessary governmental approvals, within its jurisdiction, including scheduling special meetings as may be required to meet the schedules as set forth in other provisions of this Agreement.  [Emphasis added].  On or about December 21, 2021, Pa173, almost a year after the January 8, 2021 Settlement Agreement, Pa041, [...]Bay filed an application with the Board seeking preliminary and final major site plan approval under N.J.S.A. 40:55D-46, bulk variance relief under N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70c and design waiver relief under N.J.S.A. 40:55D-51, (the “Application”), Pa106.
[brief] This POINT responds to POINT VI of defendant’s brief.  Db37-40.  memory have emphasized the importance of winnowing out weaker arguments on appeal and focusing on one central issue if possible, or at most a few key issues. ”  Id. at 751-52.  See also, State v. Love, 233 N.J. Super. 38, 45 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 118 N.J. 188 (1989) (counsel will not be found to be ineffective “for failing to make every conceivable motion that can be made on behalf of his client”).  Here, any argument that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the defendant’s motion would not have meritorious, thus it was not ineffective for appellate counsel to disregard this argument by defendant.  Indictments are presumed valid.
[brief] Za206.  Nor does, as [...] and [...] contend, [...] tendering its defense and indemnity to its own liability insurance carriers rather than the CCIP carriers reflect some “implicit understanding” that it was not enrolled for demolition work.  [...] Db37.  Indeed, after initiation of the [...] litigation, [...] tendered its defense to and sought indemnification from [...] as the CCIP insurer on June 29, 2017 and August 15, 2017, when [...] improperly denied coverage.  Pa669-75.  Thus, [...] and [...] were forced to defend [...], subject to their reservations of rights, resulting in this litigation.
[brief] *Humane Soc’y*, 70 N.J. at 569, 573-74 (“Legislature may prescribe such qualifications as reasonably relate to the demands of a specialized office. ”) (citing *Alongi v. Schatzman*, 57 N.J. 564, 577-78 (1971).  In that respect, the Legislature’s conclusion is similar to those made for several other regulatory entities whose members include individuals with particular expertise or qualifications.  See id. at n. 4, 5 (citing N.J.S.A. 45:9-1 (doctors for medical boards); N.J.S.A. 45:11-24 (nurses for nursing boards); N.J.S.A. 13:1B-15.120, -15.123 (trustees of the New Jersey Natural Lands Trust)); see also N.J.S.A. 4:1-4 (members of the State Board of Agriculture).  Given the statutory basis for its authority and membership, courts have long held that the Council is a “unit of government” and “a specialized body, with statutorily prescribed duties and statutory limits on its powers and activities,” and have rejected equal protection and due process challenges to its composition.  *Humane Soc’y*, 70 N.J. at 572; accord *Animal Prot. League of N.J. v. N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot.*, 423 N.J. Super. 549, 557 n.3 (App. Div. 2011); *Mercer Cnty. Deer Alliance v. State Dep’t of Envtl. Prot.*, 349 N.J. Super. 440, 450 (App. Div. 2002).
[brief] We argued in Point I that the deed recital in [...]’s chain of title was not a “clear and unambiguous reservation,” but even if it was, there is no authority for the proposition that the entire controversy doctrine turns on the strength of the claim the plaintiff failed to join in the original action.  We suspect [...] may have had in mind the line of cases holding that the entire controversy doctrine does not bar related claims which were unknown at the time of the earlier action, see, e.g., Milkap Corp. v. Industrial Constr. Co., Inc., 281 N.J. Super. 180, 185-86 (App. Div. 1995), but those cases do not require conscious awareness of a cause of action.  To the contrary, knowledge of the existence of a cause of action, for purposes of the entire controversy doctrine, is the same as would trigger the running of the statute of limitations under the discovery rule.  Circle Chevrolet Co. v. Giordano, Halleran & Ciesla, 274 N.J. Super. 405, 413 (App. Div. 1994), aff’d, 142 N.J. 280 (1995).  That is, the point when a plaintiff knows, or through the exercise of reasonable diligence, should know of facts suggesting a breach of legal duty attributable to another.  Lynch v. Rubacky, 85 N.J. 65, 70 (1981).  By that standard, [...] surely had the requisite knowledge of a potential express easement claim.
[brief] ”  *Fawzy v. Fawzy*, 199 N.J. 456, 476 (2009).  Moreover, our Appellate Division elaborated on that right:  We begin with a review of the principles applicable to the right of a parent to make decisions, both philosophical and mundane, regarding his or her child.  “Our law recognizes the family as a bastion of autonomous privacy in which parents, presumed to act in the best interests of their children, are afforded self-determination over how those children are raised. ”  *In re D.C.*, 203 N.J. 545, 551, 4 A.3d 1004 (2010).
[brief] ”  Id. at 602-04 (contrasting, for example, permissible testimony about a “distinctive shirt or a particular style of car,” with impermissible testimony claiming, “that’s the same blue car” or “that’s the defendant” (emphasis added)).  Indeed, that is precisely what the defense did during the presentation of evidence with the still-shots from [...] and the electric company, on which the defense properly based its summation argument.  However, the State chose not to rebut that testimony and instead waited until summation to spring not just argument but new and critical facts that, it alleged, disproved [...]’s alibi and proved his guilt and premeditation.  Strategically waiting until summation to raise any factual basis for those critical points created the precise harm that Watson and Williams cautioned against: The prosecutor was “essentially testifying without being subject to cross-examination,” which “prevented defendant from any opportunity to rebut the ‘evidence.
[brief] [Pa132].  Appellant wanted to keep the Incident “on the low” and informed [...] he did not want to get in trouble.  [4T59:6-8].  Appellant admits that he struggled with the decision to call 911 because he had to weigh trying to save [...]’s life with his own fear of being embarrassed at work.  [4T128:12 – 4T129:3].  Appellant also admits his reluctancy to save [...]’s life because he was “worried about my job, my job’s going to find this out, you know, it looks bad.  Okay.  I didn’t want - - that was one of the reasons why I didn’t want to call 911[.]”  [4T130:10-13].