[brief] ”  Richmond & Burns, *N.J. Municipal Court Practice*, comment 35:1-2 (GANN, 2024) (citing N.J.S.A. 39:4-129(d)).  Further, the ‘knowing’ element of being involved in an accident can be gleaned from the circumstances surrounding the accident.  See e.g., *LoBiondo v. Allan*, 132 N.J.L. 437 (1945); *State v. Valeriani*, 101 N.J. Super. 396, 400 (App. Div. 1968); State v. Fisher, 395 N.J. Super. 533, 545-546 (App. Div. 2007).  Specifically, the leaving the scene of an accident statute creates a permissive inference of knowledge if the accident caused personal injury, death, or damage in the amount of $250 or more to any vehicle or property.  See N.J.S.A. 39:4-129(e).  In the instant case, there was testimony about the extent of the damage, which was noticeable and severe, to the [...]’s vehicle caused by the defendant’s vehicle.  (1T 6-16 to 9-16; 1T 11-19 to 13-6; 1T 32-7 to 34-3).  Further, when the [...]s and the [...] arrived at the scene and noticed the damage to the [...]’s car, it was not immediately apparent where the defendant was located.  Body-cam evidence and testimony showed that a canvass needed to be conducted which ultimately led to the defendant’s driveway.  The defendant, when questioned about his damaged car in his driveway, gave “vague and ambiguous” statements about his involvement in the accident.  (1T 22-1 to 11).  While clearly such evidence does not represent the most blatant violations of the leaving the scene of an accident statute, the clear language and spirit of the statute was violated by the defendant in this case.  Further corroborating this fact was [...]’s testimony that the defendant had a distinct odor of alcohol on his breath and appeared disheveled when questioned.  (1T 19-18 to 22-18).  This testimony provides a rationale for why the defendant did not immediately alert either the [...]s or the police to the accident – he feared arrest for driving while intoxicated.  As the Law Division judge held,  This court finds ample evidence proving that the [defendant] violated N.J.S.A. 39:4-129(b) and N.J.S.A. 39:4-130 beyond a reasonable doubt.  The totality of the evidence, including but not limited to, the damage to the two vehicle, police officers interactions with the [defendant] at his home where he admits ownership of the vehicle and operation earlier in the evening, coupled with [defendant’s] intoxicated appearance and equivocation, [defendant’s] admission and/or statement against interest to [...] admitting responsibility for the damage to the vehicle (witnessed by Evan [...]) combine both circumstantial and direct evidence, along with the inferences this court chooses to draw from the evidence, that is sufficient for this court to conclude that the [defendant] was the driver of a vehicle, that he knowingly was involved in an accident resulting in damage to his neighbor’s vehicle and his own vehicle, and that he failed to immediately stop his vehicle at the scene of such accident, or as close thereto as possible, and did not forthwith return to the scene of such accident until after police had already located him and charged him with motor vehicle offenses.  Further, he failed to report the accident to police as required by the applicable statute.  [Da 14].  Given all of the evidence presented, the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant left the scene of the accident and failed to report same.  **CONCLUSION**