ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] B.  All County Prosecutors in jurisdictions where a Qualified CBVI organization operates shall provide the notification described in II.4.1 of the Report,6 and shall provide assistance to any Relevant Law Enforcement Agencies in their jurisdiction in implementing these Guidelines, which includes support for Relevant Law Enforcement Agencies in coordinating with Qualified CBVI providers and working with the [...] ([...]) in accordance with the recommendation in II.4.2 of the Report.7
[brief] ”, and - “The loss of value as to the assets which originated from [[...]’s] pre-marital assets must be substantially considered when determining the fairness of the PSA. ” (Id. at 35).  Similarly, the trial court was not swayed by [...]’s attempt to inflate the estate: - While [...] had a value of $3,000,000, [...] ignored the fact that the evidence in the trial show this was a jointly titled home which was foreclosed by Sheriff’s sale.  The trial court confirmed, “Avolyn Avenue was lost to a foreclosure and was carrying a large mortgage in both parties’ names at the time of the foreclosure. ” (A229, Op. at 30).  -  While [...] won two poker tournaments, [...] ignored the fact that those tournaments were won after the Property Settlement Agreement was executed and the Final Judgement of Divorce.  The trial court recognized, “all of plaintiff’s poker records were requested and exchanged in discovery and are in evidence “ (A229, Op. at 42) and found “plaintiff’s testimony more credible that the cash was primarily from his real estate holdings/ sales and poker/ gambling winnings prior to and some during the marriage. ” (A229, Op. at 32).  •  Regarding the [...] and [...], the trial court found that the LLC’s and transfers were a part of “a detailed Asset Protection Plan organized by legal counsel to preserve assets which substantially if not completely, [[...]] had acquired prior to the marriage. ”  The trial court rejected [...]’s testimony that they were gifts because [...] “loved her. ” (A229, Op. at 31).  [...] continues to make her same illogical and unpersuasive claims about the marital estate’s value that were properly rejected by the trial court.
[brief] portion) was the market need of [...] and [...] – not the reliability need of [...]; consequently, the activity reviewed by DEP did not qualify as a “routine upgrade” under the general principles from the 2013 case of Highlands Applicability.  Accordingly, DEP’s April 25, 2012 HAD for NEUP is not a valid precedent for the East 300 Upgrade Project currently at issue.  In addition, neither DEP’s HADs regarding 300 Line Project or NEUP have been upheld by New Jersey courts – unlike DEP’s HAD regarding [...]’s substation; thus, DEP’s HADs regarding 300 Line Project and NEUP should be accorded less deference by this Court than DEP’s HAD regarding [...]’s substation.  E.
[brief] The rule is designed to be a shield to protect the integrity of written contracts, but [...] is using it as a sword to strike otherwise admissible evidence of its wrongdoing.  Knowing which falsehoods its agents use to trick potential owners into purchasing timeshares, [...] puts otherwise unnecessary language into its contract documents to contradict those falsities used to procure sales.  If a defrauded owner files a lawsuit calling out they were promised something other than what they were sold, [...] claims the parol evidence rule prohibits them from providing evidence of [...]’s fraud.  Properly applied, “the parol evidence rule prohibits the introduction of evidence that tends to alter an integrated written document.
[brief] The State argues that the police still did not have proof of insurance and that they were therefore justified in continuing the detention to prevent an uninsured driver from getting back on the road.  (Sb 13)  But there is no legal basis to continue an investigation or impound a vehicle for failure to provide proof of insurance, not even where the police have probable cause to believe that the vehicle is uninsured.  While statutes give officers authority to remove unregistered cars from public highways, they do not provide the police with authority to move or impound uninsured vehicles.
[brief] ”  Furthermore, it is well-established that a party capable of establishing imminent, concrete, and non-speculative harm is legally entitled to enjoin such harm before it occurs through the imposition of interim restraints.  See, e.g., Subcarrier Commc’ns v. Day, 299 N.J. Super. 634, 638 (App. Div. 1997); Waste Mgmt. of N.J., Inc. v. Union Cnty. Utils. Auth., 399 N.J. Super. 508, 519-21 (App. Div. 2008).  In other words, a party does not need to suffer an injury before asserting its rights.  Plaintiff could have done so in the tax foreclosure.  To the extent Plaintiff claims she could not have raised this in the tax foreclosure because she lacked notice of the proceeding, caselaw and statutes clearly establish that the fault lies with her.  Notice for *in rem* foreclosures is based on the municipal tax duplicate.  R. 4:64-7(c).  The municipal tax duplicate, in turn, is created, maintained, and updated by tax assessors. \(^{12}\)  When a property changes owners, there are two methods by which an assessor may update the municipal tax duplicate to reflect the new owner’s information.  The first is if the new owner “presents his deed . . . to the assessor,” who will then update the assessment records according to the information within.  N.J.S.A. 54:4-29; *Prime Accounting Dep’t v. Twp. of Carney’s Point*, 212 N.J. 493, 504 (2013).  If the new owner does not do so, the county clerk in the county where the deed is recorded is directed to ascertain the grantee’s identity and address from the face of the deed, prepare an abstract of the deed, and forward it to the municipal assessor.
[brief] retirement and a proposed retirement date of October 1, 2021.  (Ra1).  As stated in that estimate, she would have nine years and nine months of service credit if she continued to work until September 30, 2021, and she would not be entitled to any life insurance benefits after retirement.  Ibid.  It again advised her that the estimate was generated based on current information available, and that the projected benefits may be recalculated based on new information provided.  Ibid.  On or about September 9, 2021, [...] applied and was approved for extended medical leave by her employer.
[brief] Plaintiff misstates the standard of review governing this appeal.  [...] appeals the trial court’s orders denying its: (1) June 7, 2019 motion for summary judgment; (2) November 2, 2023 motion for directed verdict at the close of Plaintiff’s case; and (3) November 9, 2023 motion for a directed verdict after all the evidence had been presented.  (Da1; Da3; Da5). ¹  This court reviews those orders de novo, applying the same standard that governed the trial court.  Woytas v. Greenwood Tree Experts, Inc., 237 N.J. 501, 511 (2019); Carbajal v. Patel, 468 N.J. Super. 139, 157 (App. Div. 2021).  That standard does not, as Plaintiff contends, require this Court to determine whether there was a gross miscarriage of justice shocking the conscience of the court.
[brief] (Da29).  On July 6, 2023, Plaintiff filed a motion in limine to bar admission of evidence concerning his mental and sexual health.  (Da30 to 31).  Plaintiff’s motion was supported by a certification of counsel.  (Da32 to 34).  On July 6, 2023, Plaintiff also filed a motion in limine to bar admission of evidence relating to a prior motor vehicle accident.  (Da35 to 36).  Plaintiff’s motion was supported by a certification of counsel.  (Da37 to 39).
[brief] The Trial Court’s Alternative Ruling Was Correct (Ja1-3; 4T)  A. Standard of Review (Ja1-3; 4T)  In reviewing the grant or denial of summary judgment, this Court should apply a de novo standard of review and utilize the standard employed by the trial court.  Crisitello v. St. Theresa Sch., 255 N.J. 200, 218 (2023).  Brill teaches that, if “the court finds the evidence, even viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party with all reasonable inferences, is so one-sided that there are no genuine issues of disputed material facts, the court may decide the issue without a jury. ”  Pantano v. New York Shipping Ass’n, 254 N.J. 101 (2023) (citing Brill).  Applying Brill, the trial court regarded the decision to deny summary judgment as not “even close. ”  4T 29:18-30:3.3  B.
[directive] :5-16  Local unit, requirements for paying out moneys.  40A  40A :5-16.  The governing body of any local unit shall not pay out any of its moneys unless the person claiming or receiving the same shall first present a detailed bill of items or a. demand, specifying particularly how the bill or demand is made up, with the certification of the party claiming payment that it is correct.  The governing body may, by resolution, require an affidavit in lieu of the said certification, and the clerk or disbursing officer of the local unit may take such affidavit without cost, and unless it carries a written or electronic certification of some officer or duly designated b. employee of the local unit having knowledge of the facts that the goods have been received by, or the services rendered to, the local unit.  c.  Notwithstanding the piovisions of subsection a. of this section, upon adoption by the Local Finance Board of rules adopted pursuant to the "Administrative Procedure Act," P.L.1968, c.410 (C.52:14B-1 et seq.) that provide for procedures to be followed by local units and under those to circumstances deemed appropriate by the board, a local unit shall be permitted pay out its moneys without requiring a certification of the party claiming payment as otherwise required by subsection a. of this section.
[brief] Second, the inferences that Plaintiffs draw from the evidence regarding [...]’s “knowledge” are hardly reasonable.  Plaintiffs take a huge leap by suggesting that because the Draft LOI makes passing reference (on one page) to the “[...],” (Pa755a), [...] must have known about Plaintiffs’ optical shop and their alleged de facto partnership with [...].8  Neither the Draft LOI, nor any other document in the record, remotely supports such a conclusion.
[brief] (Aa3; Aa53).  Following Petitioner’s employment violation, he was then charged with six (6) separate consequential NJ Administrative Code employment charges that culminated from his employment violation.  (Aa3; Aa6; Aa5-Aa6).  His subsequent suspension and eventual termination occurred following his requested hearing, which sustained the findings of the urinalysis result and the six separate violations of the NJ Administrative Code.
[directive] AVI:  Sa se yon dokiman piblik.  Pa mete okenn enfòmasyon idantifikasyon pèsonèl sou li, kankou nimewo Sosyal, nimewo Lisans pou kondwi, oswa nimewo kont an bank ak kat kredi aktif yo.  Dokiman sa a ap disponib ba piblik la sou demann jan li soumèt la.
[brief] “First, the court must determine as a matter of law whether plaintiff is entitled to seek an attorney fee award under the fund in court exception as articulated in *Henderson v. Camden County Municipal Utilities Authority*, 176 N.J. 554 (2003).  If the court determines plaintiff has met the threshold it then has the ‘discretion’ to award the amount, if any, it concludes is a reasonable fee under the totality of the facts of the case.  *Porreca v. City of Millville*, 419 N.J.Super at 228.  The Court in *Porreca* observed that the “critical question in considering plaintiff’s entitlement to request attorney’s fees under this Rule is whether a fund in court was created as a result of his litigation. ”
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY ALLOWING THE JURY TO HEAR THE AUDIO PORTION OF THE POLICE DASH CAM VIDEO. (Da41; 1T:16-3 to 20-2).  Evidence should be excluded under N.J.R.E. 403 where its “probative value i[s] substantially outweighed by the risk of undue prejudice. ”  State v. Alston, 312 N.J. Super. 102, 114 (App. Div. 1998).  To determine whether undue prejudice exists, the inquiry is “whether the probative value of the evidence ‘is so significantly outweighed by [its] inherently inflammatory potential as to have a probable capacity to divert the minds of the jurors from a reasonable and fair evaluation of the “issues. ””  State v. Cole, 229 N.J. 430, 448 (2017) (quoting State v. Thompson, 59 N.J. 396, 421 (1971).  “It is not enough for the opposing party to show that the evidence could be prejudicial; ‘[d]amaging evidence usually is very prejudicial but the question here is whether the risk of undue prejudice was too high. ’”  Cole, 229 N.J. at 448.  The Appellate Division standard of review is an abuse of discretion in respect of an evidentiary ruling.  Feaster, 156 N.J. at 82.  Here, the dash camera video Plaintiff introduced at trial is the type of evidence that should have been precluded under N.J.R.E. 403 because the video’s probative value was substantially outweighed by the risk of undue prejudice.  The trial judge’s ruling that the dash camera video was not inflammatory under N.J.R.E. 403 was erroneous.
[brief] Wolf v. Mayor of Shrewsbury, 182 N.J. Super. 289 (App. Div. 1981) .................................. 11, 14, 31, 34, 35  Statutes N.J.S.A. 40:49-2 ................................................................. 16, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 35, 36, 41 N.J.S.A. 40:49-2.1 .............................................................. 30, 31 N.J.S.A. 40:55D–62 ............................................................
[brief] As a result of the continued violations, on June 4, 2018, Plaintiff filed its second Order to Show Case seeking an award of attorneys’ fees and a sanction of daily fines (“Second OTSC”).  (Da295-440)  On or about June 18, 2018, Defendant filed opposition thereto.  (Da441-541)  On or about July 25, 2018, Plaintiff filed a reply to Defendant’s opposition and in further support of its Second OTSC.  (Da542-669)
[brief] Members who have involuntarily or voluntarily terminated service for any of the reasons listed below will not be permitted to apply for a disability retirement: 1.  Removal for cause or total forfeiture of public service; 2. Settlement agreements reached due to pending administrative or criminal charges unless the underlying charges relate to the disability; 3. Loss of licensure or certification required for the performance of the member's specific job duties; 4.  Voluntary separation from service for reasons other than a disability; and 5.  Job abolishment or reduction in force.  N.J.A.C. 17:1-6.41.  The Supervisor quoted the law accurately and then stated nothing further as to what portion of the statute would apply to bar [...] from applying for early retirement disability.
[brief] The waiver and arbitration provisions of [...]’s Small--Business Contract are not enforceable.  | 5 | | A.  Defendant [...] is in default in this litigation and has waived the right to participate in these proceedings.  | 5 | | B.  Under both the Federal Arbitration Act [9 U.S.C. secs. 1-307] and the New Jersey Arbitration Act [2A:23B-1 to 36] Arbitration is Fundamentally a Matter of Contract.  | 8 | | C.  The January 4, 2024 Consent Order Has No Bearing On This Appeal.  | 9 | | D.  [...]’s Small Business Contract Bears Only One Signature.  | 11 | | E.  The Validity and Enforceability of this Contract Should Be Decided Upon This Record | 12 | | CONCLUSION | 13 | | CASES | PAGE NUMBER | |-------------------------------------------|-------------| | **Antonucci v. Curvature Newco, Inc.** | 9 | | 470 *N.J.Super.* 553 (2020), | | | **Atalese v. U. S. Legal Servs. Grp., LP.**| 1, 9, 14 | | 219 *N.J.* 430 (2014)
[brief] Incredibly, this appeal is the eighth attempt by the Appellant to reverse a ruling that they are not satisfied with, culminating over ten years of litigation.  In the August 2015 hearing on the [...]’ motion for hardship stay before [...], the Appellant represented to the Court:  This is a farm property, so the inspection process was somewhat more intensive[.]  Environmental inspections, farmland preservation inspections, home inspections, surveys, things of that nature had to be done.  It was discovered during the inspection process that the existing tenant had done some things to the property that needed to be remediated.  For example, he put a parking lot on part of it with what I’ll refer to as asphalt millings….  That had to be removed.  And that’s been done. ”  (Da 41.)  Accordingly, the Appellant represented the Property was remediated satisfactorily in August 2015.  This was confirmed by the [...] representative who stated that no further action was needed on the Property.  (Pa 5a; Pa 39a.)  Notably, the [...] serves as the local agent for the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection.  (Da 29.)  The Appellant also had the option not to purchase the Property, but chose to do so in spite of the alleged environmental conditions.  Both [...] and [...] have relied on Appellant’s representations that the Property, which was under contract in an “as-is” condition, was remediated satisfactorily when the Puglia’s removed the millings.  First, [...] relied upon this representation when she expedited the [...] eviction.  (Da 41.)  Second, [...] relied on the Appellant’s representations when she ruled that the Spill Act claims previously asserted in the Chancery Division proceeding were already barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel.  (Pa 68a.)  Any contrary interpretation of Appellant’s representations would result in the miscarriage of justice against the [...], who have since August 2015 held the understanding that the Property was properly remediated in preparation for its sale under the January 2015 As-Is Contract.  Notably, the [...] were ready and willing to purchase the Property, but the Appellants refused to terminate the 2015 As-is Contract and purchased the Property in May 2016, well after any alleged contamination was discovered.  To this day, no information has been provided to this Court, or any prior Court of which these proceedings have been before, that requires another review of this issue.  Accordingly, the Trial Court correctly dismissed the Complaint.
[brief] Factually deficient and misleading “principal place of business”.  R. 1:4-1(a) requires that in the plaintiff’s first pleading, plaintiff shall state the address of its principal place of business.  In the Complaint, Plaintiff stated that its “principal place of business” is: “C/O [...] [...]” (Exhibit A) (Da2).  However, on Plaintiff’s Form 8-K, filed with the SEC on February 22, 2022, Plaintiff stated that the address of its principal executive offices is [...].  Plaintiff’s Summons was served on March 23, 2022, which is more than three weeks after the public filing of its Form 8-K.  Thus, Plaintiff knew, or should have known, its correct and proper “principal place of business” in preparing the Complaint.  The Court may take judicial notice of Plaintiff’s Form 8-K filing of February 22, 2022.
[brief] (Da18-19.)  The de novo court found the MVR footage supported [...]’ testimony that there was a lane deviation justifying the stop.  (Da20-21.)  Despite [...]’ testimony about [...] being tired, the trial court found “[b]ased on the erratic driving, slow movements and the odor of alcohol, [...] concluded that defendant was under the influence of alcohol and asked defendant to step out of his vehicle to complete field sobriety tests. ”  (Da22.)  The de novo court found that defendant failed the walk-and-turn test by walking without touching heel-to-toe, failed the one leg stand test by putting his foot down several times, and failed the alphabet test by not following instructions, noting Defendant said “C, D, T, F, G, A, B, C, D, E, F, D,” even though nowhere in the record is there evidence that Defendant said these letters.
[brief] This motion was granted on September 3, 2019.  (Pa 22-24)  On February 26, 2022, Defendant filed a motion to (1) vacate the alias writ of execution, (2) have the [...] recuse itself, (3) disqualify Plaintiff’s attorney from the case, (4) refund a $50.00 motion filing fee, (5) order the [...] and Plaintiff to compensate him for pain and suffering, (6) Order the [...] and Plaintiff to pay punitive damages, and (7) request that the court grant other equitable relief.  This motion was denied on April 1, 2022.  (Pa 25-26)
[brief] Again, the United States Supreme Court has specifically held “a court may not decide an arbitrability question that the parties have delegated to an arbitrator. ”  *Henry Schein, Inc. v. Archer & White Sales, Inc.*, 139 S. Ct. 524, 530 (2019).  Any issues including whether the agreement is void pertaining to the validity of the assignment of the Agreement must be submitted to arbitration.  *See Williams-Hopkins v. LVNV Funding, LLC*, 2019 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 957 (App. Div. Apr. 26, 2019) (holding that plaintiff’s arguments that the agreement is void must be referred to the arbitrator).  The facts of *Williams-Hopkins* are directly on-point.  In *Williams-Hopkins*, the plaintiff – represented by the same counsel as here – challenged whether the action should be compelled to arbitration and, like the plaintiff here, argued that defendant cannot enforce the arbitration agreement because it lacked licensure at the time of assignment, but the court held that these issues must be submitted to arbitration:  Here, plaintiff's claim relates to the Bank's assignment of the Agreement to defendant.  This issue, as well as other issues raised by plaintiff, must be submitted to arbitration in accordance with the terms of the Agreement.  During oral argument before the panel, defendant conceded the arbitrator should determine whether the Bank assigned to defendant all rights under the Agreement, including the right to compel arbitration.  2019 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS at *4-5.  No different here, any challenge to Respondents’ ability to enforce the Agreement as a result of the licensure status must be determined by the Arbitrator, consistent with *Henry Schein, Inc.* and *Williams-Hopkins*.  **C.
[brief] “Excusable neglect” may be found when the default was “attributable to an honest mistake that is compatible with due diligence or reasonable prudence. ”  See US Bank Nat. Ass’n v. Guillaume, 209 N.J. 449, 38 A. 3d 570 at 468-69 (2012) quoting Mancini, supra, 132 N.J. At 335; see also Baumann, supra, 95 N.J. at 394(stating that “mere carelessness or lack of proper diligence on the part of an attorney is ordinarily not sufficient to entitle his clients to relief from an adverse judgment” (quotation omitted)).