ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The trial court here rejected this interpretation, doing so in the strongest terms, holding:  In addition to the purpose being clear in the Title itself, Plaintiffs argument that a separate explanation of purpose is required, does not make sense under a plain reading of the statute.  If the title of the Ordinance sufficiently explains the purpose of the Ordinance (which it does in the present matter), it would make no sense to state the purpose a second time, which is what the Plaintiff’s reading of the statute would require.  If anything, this could confuse the reader.  [Pa61].  The courts—both trial and appellate—have noted requiring a notice to restate the ordinance’s purpose where, as here, the title of the ordinance clearly does so “does not make sense under a plain reading of the statute. ” (Pa61).
[brief] 12  State v. Marcus, 294 N.J. Super. 267 (App. Div.  1996)...........................................  13  Suanez v. Egeland, 353 N.J. Super. 191 (App. Div. 2002)...........................................  13 Townsend v. Pierre, 221 N.J. 36 (2015) .................................................................. 6, 7, 14  Vuocolo v. Diamond Shamrock Chem. Co., 240 N.J. Super. 289 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 122 N.J. 333 (1990)  ......................................................................................  13  Statutes & Other Authorities: N.J.R.E. 702 ..................................................................................  11 N.J.R.E. 703 ..................................................................................
[brief] [Pa12-Pa13]  All record evidence clearly demonstrates Plaintiff did not suffer a permanent injury, as correctly determined by the trial court.  For Plaintiff to recover pursuant to the TCA, she must show “(1) an objective permanent injury, and (2) a permanent loss of a bodily function that is substantial. ”  Knowles v. Mantua Twp. Soccer Ass’n, 176 N.J. 324, 329 (2003) (citing Gilhooley v. Cty. of Union, 164 N.J. 533, 540-41 (2000)).  In that regard, New Jersey Courts have found that a plaintiff meets the permanent injury requirement when a plaintiff provides “objective medical evidence of a permanent injury. ”  Knowles, 176 N.J. at 330.  “An injury causing lingering pain, resulting in a lessened ability to perform certain tasks because of the pain, will not suffice because ‘[a] plaintiff may not recover under the Tort Claims Act for mere subjective feelings of discomfort. ”  Id. (citing Gilhooley, 164 N.J. at 540).  In this case, Plaintiff’s claims for damages are for merely lingering pain and general allegations of a lessened ability to perform certain tasks due to such pain.  To rectify Plaintiff’s lingering ankle issues, she underwent surgery on September 5, 2019, to remove an anterolateral ankle mass.  [Pa72, ¶ 33].  By Plaintiff’s own testimony, she merely gets “very quick” dull pain in her ankle and that it “locks up. ”  [Pa72, ¶ 34-35].  Similarly, Plaintiff’s foot gets “swollen,” and Plaintiff no longer wears heels.  [Pa72, ¶ 36].  Given that Plaintiff has no permanent injury, she cannot recover against the Township as a matter of law.  Now on appeal, Plaintiff raises the same arguments the trial court disagreed with in deciding the Township’s Motion for Summary Judgment.
[brief] All of the occupants of the vehicle were then handcuffed.  (1T24-22 to 24).  The occupants were then Mirandized and stated that they did not know anything about the items that were discovered.  (1T25-8 to 21).  Thereafter, the occupants were taken to headquarters.  (1T26-9 to 14).  When they arrived at headquarters, defendant, who was the front seat passenger of the Toyota, asked about his cellphone and admitted it was the one located on the floor of the front seat.  (1T26-15 to 27-11).  Eventually, [...] went upstairs, spoke with the dispatch operators, obtained paperwork related to the warrant, and confirmed there was no active warrant against this M.P. (1T27-12 to 22; 1T68-14 to 18).  Plea Facts:
[brief] The [...] [...] Contract Terms  Plaintiff and [...] entered into three (3)  Contracts, June 23, 2016, (the “2016 Contract”)($1,200.00 funded; 33% accrual rate) August 22, 2018 (the “2018 Contract” ($2,900.00 funded; 24% accrual rate) and February 1, 2019.  (the “2019 Contract”) ($5,500.00 funded; 32% accrual rate) (the “Contracts”) (Da128-134; Da194-200; Da208-216)
[brief] (Raised Below: Da11)  Estoppel certificates and due diligence are distinct concepts, differentiated by their purposes, timing, and contractual implications.  However, when coming to its decision, the trial court erroneously interpreted the Estoppel Provision as a mechanism for [...] to reassess due diligence, suggesting that it provides “additional protection” beyond the warranties in the contract.  (Da11.)  This view conflates the distinct purposes of an estoppel certificate and due diligence.  In arriving at its final conclusion, the trial court reasons as follows:
[directive] Any action undertaken by the pursuing officer intended to result in contact between the moving police vehicle and the pursued vehicle.  2.12  Violator.  Any person who an officer reasonably believes (1) has committed, or is engaged in a conspiracy or attempt to commit, any crime of the first degree or one of the violent or serious crimes of the second degree enumerated in Section 3.2 of this policy, or (2) poses an imminent threat to the safety of the public or other police officers, as that threat is defined in Section 3.2 of this policy, set forth below.
[brief] [...] and [...] submitted their final offers to the arbitrator on September 11 and 12, 2023, respectively.  The first interest arbitration hearing was held on September 21.  On October 12, 2023, the arbitrator requested that the parties “each revise your final offer to include, where applicable, the existing contract language, followed by your proposal to change the existing language and the rationale for the change” or “[i]f the proposal is for a new contract provision, please indicate same. ”  On October 18, the arbitrator reiterated that the revised final offers should “include a verbatim insert of the existing contract language (or designate the proposal as a new provision of the contract), the proposal itself and the rationale underlying the proposal. ”  The parties submitted revised final offers on October 26.
[brief] An essential ingredient of estoppel is prejudice.  Merchants Indem.Corp. Of N.Y. v. Eggleston, 37 N.J. 114, 129 (1962).  In the recent case of Knopka v. Foster, 356 N.J. Supr. 223 (App. Div. 2002), the Appellate Division described the operation of the doctrine of equitable estoppel as follows:
[brief] I agree that [...] can’t testify about the nursing standard of care, but he is qualified to testify to nursing home standards of care, and he can testify about the treatment of plaintiff as to the nursing home care.  And just like you said, [defense counsel], he can testify that [...] said that the nursing home standard of care was, in fact, violated and therefore led to poor care of [...].  (12T98:2-14.)  A thirteen-day jury trial was conducted before the Honorable [...], J.S.C. from March 15 to April 4, 2023.  As described in plaintiff’s appellant’s brief, [...], age sixty-nine, suffered a stroke on November 15, 2015.
[brief] (Not raised below)  The Court should grant leave to appeal in the interest in justice pursuant to R. 2:2-4.  Leave to appeal from interlocutory orders is granted only “sparingly” and “in the interest of justice”.  See State v. Reldan, 100 N.J. 187, 205 (1985).  This case calls for relief because the trial court’s orders allowing Defendant’s plea of guilty to failure to report an accident to be admitted in evidence at trial were errors of law that possess a clear capacity to produce an unjust result.  To allow the plea to be admitted in evidence in this case effectively destroys Defendants’ defense to liability.  In Brundage v. Estate of Carambio, 195 N.J. 575, 598-600 (2008), the Supreme Court explained that:
[brief] See Da125-157 doctors start -- even '14, when the doctors stopped, you know, basically, when they did not cooperate with the medical records, there was a policy established that if any of those doctors that are on some sort of hospital stipend, or whatever, like [...] was, those doctors' payments were delayed until they fulfilled their obligations.  Q.  Do you know how that policy was communicated to [...]?  A.  I don't know exactly, but I know that everybody, every physician had received the letters and the email messaging from the medical records, from the revenue cycle, from VP operating cycle, message that, you know, what the policy is, that they have to comply with the policy. ”  After the sale of the Hospital and Plaintiff’s role with [...] was terminated in December 2017, Plaintiff erroneously demanded additional payments from [...], despite being paid in full for all services.
[brief] ” (alteration in original) (collecting cases)); Kuehn v. Citibank, N.A., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 173346, 2012 WL 6057941, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 6, 2012) (Da61-Da64) (“The arbitration agreement between the parties in this case provides that ‘[c]laims relating ... to application, enforceability or interpretation of my Account, including this arbitration provision’ are subject to arbitration.  This provision plainly delegates resolution of questions about the arbitration agreement’s enforceability to an arbitrator. ”).  Thus, the arbitration provision here clearly and unmistakably delegates issues concerning the class action waiver's enforceability to the arbitrator. ”  arbitration); *Maisano v. LVNV Funding, LLC*, 2019 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2421 (N.J. App. Div. Nov. 27, 2019) (Da71-Da74) (holding because the arbitration agreement required the dispute to be submitted to arbitration, it must be adjudicated in arbitration).
[brief] U.S. Const. amends. V, VI, and XIV; N.J. Const. art. I, ¶¶ 1, 9, and 10; N.J.S.A. 2A:84A-19; N.J.R.E. 503.  Second, allowing [...] to identify Defendant as the person in S-113 violated N.J.R.E. 701 because [...] was not an eyewitness to the moment depicted in the photograph and had no personal knowledge of Defendant’s appearance on March 5.
[directive] Incident Preliminary Law the and/or Cause Probable of Affidavit throw risk exist all factors of to found presence the indicating statements concise include durin the confined victim the was that determined was it if example, For investigation. officer's Incident Enforcement Law Preliminary and/or the Cause of Probable Affidavit the assault, cases violence all domestic in Moreover, confined. was victim the that indicate shall Report Preliminary the andlor Probable Cause of Affidavit the note, or scored is ODARA the (whether a to posed risks the circumstances to relevant include shall Report Incident Enforcement Law 4.6.10. subsection See victim. Directive. of this upon issuance immediately operational become shall Section This Incident Report. Enforcement Law Preliminary Uniform of Development 5.2 easily and may quickly officers which police by process a develop to appropriate is It circumstances relevant factual the succinctly describes that document electronic prepare an arresting the the for and basis arrested was defendant the which for offense the to pertaining a by reviewed/approved be could document This exists. cause probable that belief officer's designated supervisory or officer a Directive of 3.2 this Section to pursuant consulted prosecutor complaint- decision to whether a issue inform the to helping 3.3.2, subsection to pursuant issued, is acomplaint-warrant If Directive. under this acomplaint-warrant for apply or summons inform might Incident also Report Enforcement Law Preliminary in a captured information the the assist detention, may and motion pretrial for a file to whether decision prosecutor's the (requiring 3:4-2(c)(1)(A) R. hearing.
[brief] The Original Sentencing: May 18, 1995 (2T)  At [...]’s original sentencing, testimony was presented from [...], a psychologist, and [...], a psychiatrist, both of whom had interviewed and conducted psychological tests on [...].  (2T7-9 to 53-3)  [...] testified that, early on, [...] fell behind in developmental markers such as crawling, walking, and talking.  (2T9-23 to 10-5)  Thereafter, he continued to struggle with “developmental problems” which never resolved, and which required him to receive “specialized instruction throughout his life in reading comprehension, speech, and mathematics. ”  (2T10-5 to 12; 38-20 to 21)  [...] tested at a “perfectly normal” degree of intelligence, but had “neurological deficits” resulting in his “very poor” auditory and visual memory, “very limited” vocabulary, and “poor ability to function independently in casual, informal settings or unusual social settings. ”  (2T13-23 to 14-3)  In eleventh grade, he was not able to pass the high school proficiency test.  (2T10-10 to 12)  [...] also faced substantial challenges at home.
[brief] Troublingly, the new precipitation data publicly announced and touted by the DEP on November 18, 2021, and October 27, 2022, and relied on as compelling and scientifically sound in the DEP’s IFPR, is not mentioned anywhere by the applicant or the DEP in this administrative record.  There is simply no explanation or factual findings in the administrative record as to whether this updated information was either ignored or applied herein.  The Appellant even submitted a public comment, found in this record, which stated as follows:  While the applicant has asserted that the stormwater management system for the [...] development meets current state requirements, precipitation is likely to increase by more than 20% from the 1999 baseline by 2100.  This system is not sized to manage future storms and as a result, threatens to further inundate areas that already flood.  [Aa105.]  And the Appellant was part of a group that submitted a comment specifically requesting that the DEP employ the Cornell Studies for this permit review:  We very much support the Inland Protection Rule and using updated rain data.  It is extremely important that the application use the projected data to look at contamination and volume.  [Aa046.]  But the DEP never provided any response to Appellant’s comments.  The only mention of the IFPR or the DEP’s newest data was an inappropriate effort between the applicant and the DEP permit review staff to have this permit application deemed administratively complete before the IFPR was proposed and adopted.  It is unclear why the DEP preferred to rush towards “administrative completeness” under the old rules, by bifurcating the FWW and FHACA permit applications, rather than patiently and efficiently requiring the applicant to iron out all of the deficiencies in the multi-permit application at the same time (even if it meant the permit applications would be governed by the IFPR).
[brief] To quote the trial court in more detail:  [J]ust to go back and address [Defendants’] argument about relevance and the old days of going through the documents, ESI is different.  Okay.  ESI is fundamentally different than just paper documents because ESI is voluminous.  . . .  I mean, these particular searches that are understandably and we all recognize that there are going to be a lot of irrelevant documents . . . .  [B]ut ESI is just fundamentally different.  T20:18-21:3.  And a few pages later:  “I understand [Defendants’] point that the rules say that relevancy is the touchstone but . . . this is something different.  ESI is different. ”  T24:14-18.  That ruling is indefensible, Db25, as Plaintiffs admit, Pb33 (disclaiming position that “different rules” govern e-discovery).
[brief] On January 14, 2022, the Board filed an unfair practice charge against the Association, alleging that the Association violated 5.4b(1), (3), and (5) of the Act, which was docketed by [...] as [...] (Pa001).  On February 9, 2022, the Association filed a cross-unfair practice charge against the Board, alleging that the Board violated 5.4a(1) and (5) of the Act, which [...] docketed as [...] (Pa003).  [...]’s Deputy Director of Unfair Practices issued a Consolidated Complaint and Notice of Pre-Hearing on February 28, 2023 (Pa049).  On June 15, 2023, the parties filed a joint stipulation of facts “and agreed to submit the matter to the full Commission for a final agency decision, waiving a hearing examiner’s report and recommended decision” (Pa066).  On October 26, 2023, [...] issued a decision and order, finding that “the Board violated N.J.S.A. 34:13A-5.4a(5), and, derivatively, 5.4a(1),” and dismissing the Board’s charge against the Association (Pa215).
[brief] See Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 445-46 (2006); see also Goffe v. Foulke Mgmt. Corp., 238 N.J. 191, 195 (2019) (holding that "Supreme Court holdings treat an arbitration agreement as severable and enforceable, notwithstanding a plaintiff's general claims about the invalidity of the contract as a whole.").  This means that unless a plaintiff's challenge to an agreement is specifically directed towards the arbitration clause, any dispute regarding the agreement must be presented to the arbitrator.  See e.g., Buckeye, 546 U.S. at 445-46.  A challenge to the enforceability of the agreement as a whole cannot be a basis to avoid arbitration.  See Goffe, 238 N.J. at 213.  Based on the foregoing, and as established, the Trial Court correctly stayed the Superior Court litigation and compelled arbitration.  Consequently, the Appellate Division should affirm the Trial Court's May 2, 2024 Orders staying the Superior Court action and compelling arbitration.  POINT VI.
[brief] [...]'s actions began with him attempting to serve his employer by approaching plaintiff, a customer.  As this Court recognized earlier, [...]’s duties placed him in situations where “physical consequences may follow in an uninterrupted sequence from verbal exchanges with third parties,” and thus could be found to be within the scope of his employment.  (Pa29).  Simultaneously, the proofs could have supported a verdict holding [...] directly liable.  It was shown through the testimony of plaintiffs’ expert that [...] violated the retail industry standard for the training and supervision of employees.  [...] claims that submitting both theories to the jury would be redundant because once a verdict is rendered on, say, vicarious liability, the question on direct liability could become unnecessary.  (Db61).  From a practical standpoint that may be true, but experience shows that the jury’s input on all issues should be elicited while they are there, because a verdict supporting either theory could be subject to attack.  C.
[brief] 545a.  Instead, it notes “no affordable units have been physically rehabilitated or constructed within the Borough. ”  Ibid.  In a February 28, 2022, report on “Off-Site Affordable Housing Production Block 610/Lot 1,” [...] determined, in connection with [...]’s application to the Implementation Monitor, that the use was suitable and the Court should exercise its powers to grant site specific relief at the Off-site Property:
[brief] 1.  On October 15, 2021, Plaintiff [...] (“[...]”) filed a Verified Complaint and proposed “Order to Show Cause Summary Action” against Defendant [...] (“[...]”).  (PPCIa001-042).  2.  Despite the fact that [...]’s complaint sought damages under the New Jersey Spill Act and had alleged environmental contamination caused by the accidental discharge of waste fuel oil, the case was incorrectly assigned to discovery Track I.  (PPCIa043).  3.  On October 27, 2021, the trial court granted [...]’s application for and signed an Order to Show Cause, which order was to be returnable on November 30, 2021.  (PPCIa044-052).  4.  On November 22, 2021, [...] filed an Amended Verified Complaint that added [...], as a defendant and alleged that Beacon was liable as the “alter ego” of [...].  (PPCIa53-75).  5.  [...] did not file papers in reply to the Order to Show Cause and, on November 30, 2021, the trial court entered a “Final Judgment Order [sic] by Default” in favor of [...] and against [...].  (PPCIa076-079).  6.  On May 9, 2022, despite a “final judgment” having been entered and without leave of court, [...] attempted to file a Second Amended Complaint that added, [...] and [...], the principals of [...], as party defendants.  (PPCIa080-083).  7.  By notification dated May 11, 2022, the court informed counsel for [...] that “since this case is disposed by an order entering judgment, a motion needs to be filed to reopen and amend the complaint. ” (PPCIa084).  8.  On May 17, 2022, counsel for [...] appeared and filed a motion to vacate the November 30, 2021 “Final Judgment Order by Default (PPCIa085-121), which motion was granted on July 15, 2022 by order “restor[ing the case] to the trial list. ” (PPCIa122).  B.  [...] is Impleaded as a Third-Party Defendant 9.  On July 20, 2022, [...] filed its answer, affirmative defenses and crossclaims, and a third-party complaint against [...] for judgment declaring that [...]’s claims would be covered under a policy of motor vehicle liability insurance.  (PPCIa123-128).  10.  On November 4, 2022, [...] filed its answer and affirmative defenses (PPCIa129-226), which defenses incorporated defenses asserted by [...] in its answer to [...]’s Complaint.
[brief] With respect to Defendant [...], police officers observing the presence of the illegal, large, makeshift liquor concession stand and its intoxicated patrons would have a duty to shut it down, and this act would be ministerial.  The Supreme Court of New Jersey has found that police officers have a duty to respond to accident scenes and render assistance, and such an act would be ministerial.  *Gonzalez, supra,*  247 N.J. at 572.  The Supreme Court of New Jersey has found that an officer’s conduct during a car chase was not immunized as discretionary because “[t]he officer’s conduct, comprised of the decision whether to pursue, how to pursue, and whether to continue to pursue, is … infinitely distant from high-level policy or planning decisions. ”  Tice v. Cramer, 133 N.J. 347, 351 (1993).  Police officers, faced with reports of violent and intoxicated persons causing a fight similar to those at the illegal, large, makeshift liquor concession stand, also have a duty to respond and investigate it, and this act would be ministerial.  See [...] v. [...], Docket No. [...], at *11-12 (N.J. Super. App. Div. Nov. 1, 2013) (“[I]t is reasonable for a [police] officer to patrol outside a [legally operating] bar at closing time so as to observe patrons leaving and prevent them from driving while intoxicated . . . faced with a report of a fight in which a knife was involved, the police had a duty to respond and investigate it. ”)  (P-80.)  Accordingly, this Court should respectfully reverse the lower court’s grant of dismissal of Plaintiffs’ Complaint with prejudice with respect to Defendant [...] and remand the matter back to the lower court for further proceedings.
[brief] Helmy v. City of Jersey City, 178 N.J. 183, 190 (2003).  “Since a suit for malicious prosecution must await a favorable termination of the criminal proceeding, the statute of limitations does not begin until such termination. ”  Muller Fuel Oil Co. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 95 N.J. Super. 564, 577 (App. Div. 1967).  By its very own legal elements, the timeliness of the tort of malicious prosecution simply cannot be analyzed in like manner as a personal injury claim.