ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Appellant’s requested charge begins with the phrase “If a driver is operating his/her car as a reasonable person would under the circumstances, he/she is not to be held negligent merely because his/her car skidded or slid…”.  In other words, the jury would first have to find that Appellant had operated his vehicle as would a reasonably prudent person under the same circumstances; which based upon the jury’s verdict, was not the case.  Furthermore, skidding and/or sliding can certainly be viewed as evidence of negligence, in the context of all of the facts; including but not limited to speed, driver action/inaction and the overall conditions involved.
[brief] PRELIMINARY STATEMENT  The [...]’s (the “Department”) opposition brief is more notable for what it omits rather than what it actually addresses.  The Department completely ignores its years of conduct and admissions that confirm new legislation was required in order for it to apply the requirements of the Holding Company Act, N.J.S.A. 17:27A-1 to -14 (the “Holding Act”) to reciprocal insurers such as [...] and its attorney-in-fact, [...] (“[...]”) or to apply Statement of Statutory Accounting Principle No. 25 (“SSAP No. 25”) to the fees that the individual subscribers agree to pay to [...] (“AIF Fees”).
[directive] of - Background  CourtSmart and Current Uses  Court Reporters of 2007 the Judiciary transitioned from tape recorders and frequent use court In reporters to the digital sound recording system CourtSmart.  The CourtSmart system uses both to a primary and a back-up recording server, one provide a public record for playback in court of of of for or other creation a transcript and the to ensure a backup in the event a failure the We to primary recording. transitioned a digital recording system to provide enhanced of The functionality, greater convenience, and improved security the record.  Judiciary's one of many widespread reliance on CourtSmart reflects ways in which we ensure consistent, high-quality services through technology while efficiently using staff resources.
[brief] Transcript of 11.1.23 hearing page 33-34.  This deferment is reasonable because the subdivision approval was for the creation of a total of three (3) lots, including two (2) new lots, each of which would be the location for one of the new proposed warehouse-distribution-office buildings (which would be subject of the companion Application for Site Plan Approval submitted at the same time).  Transcript of 11.1.23 hearing page 33-34.
[brief] ”  *Id.* at 561.  The trial court’s “mandatory duty” included “specifically charg[ing] the jury that it was the State’s burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that it was defendant who had [committed the crime], that it was not defendant’s burden to prove that he was elsewhere when the offense occurred, and that the State’s case depended on the eyewitness identification[s]. ”  *Green*, 86 N.J. at 293.
[brief] 22  POINT I: [...] MADE A FAIR RETURN ON ITS INVESTMENT (DA7) ........................................................................................................................................ 22  POINT II: IT WAS ERROR TO DEPART FROM [...]'S ORDINANCE ON THE ISSUE OF EQUITY (DA7, DA21)  .........................................................................................  27  POINT III: IT WAS ERROR TO ALLOW CONDOMINUM ASSOCIATION FEES TO BE COUNTED AS EXPENSES FOR PURPOSES OF THE HARDSHIP APPLICATION (DA7, DA14)  .........................................................................................  32  POINT IV: IT WAS ERROR TO OVERTURN  THE BOARD'S FINDINGS ON MAINTENANCE FEES (DA7, DA20)  .........................................................................................  35  APPENDIX
[brief] **  PLAINTIFF [...]’S CLAIM THAT [...] SHOULD HAVE RECUSED HERSELF LACKS MERIT (6T:215:1) | 18 | | **II. **  THE INCIDENT BETWEEN DANIEL [...] AND THE SHERIFF’S OFFICER WAS SOLELY CAUSED BY DANIEL [...] AND DID NOT CREATE A JURY ISSUE (4T:70:1) | 20 | | **III.**  THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY PERMITTED THE JURY TO LOOK AT THE DOCUMENTS THAT COMPRISED OF DANIEL [...]’S CLIENT FILE (2T:15; 5T:30) | 27 | | **IV.**  THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY BARRED DANIEL [...]’S EXPERT FROM TESTIFYING BASED ON THE NET OPINION STANDARD (3T:5) | 29 | | **V.**  THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY PERMITTED [...] EXPERT TO TESTIFY AS THE EXPERT WAS A SIGNATORY TO THE REPORT (Failed to be raised below)
[brief] The following facts were elicited at defendant’s trial:  On September 28, 2018 at around 4:00 a.m., [...] responded to a call from his security company indicating that someone had broken into [...], the restaurant he owned in [...].  (5T7-1 to 17).  Arriving at the restaurant a few minutes later, Babcock noted that the alarm was on and a window screen had been removed and discarded on the ground outside.  (5T8-1 to 16).  Babcock reviewed the surveillance footage, which revealed that an intruder climbed into the kitchen window between the pizza ovens and walked to the area containing the cash register, stealing an unsecured bag containing $168 in coins from atop the restaurant’s safe before leaving.\(^1\) (5T9-11 to 10-13, 12-15 to 22; Pa1 at 00:31-00:48; Pa2 at 00:11-00:21).  [...] Officer [...] arrived shortly thereafter.  (4T60-21 to 23, 61-9 to 20, 61-11 to 22).  His investigation confirmed that the screen on one of the windows had been removed, and he noticed footprints and fingerprints on a prep table in the kitchen.  (4T62-12 to 19, 71-1 to 7).  After reviewing the surveillance video, Pascal described the suspect as “a white or Hispanic male wearing a two-tone sweat jacket with camo pants. ” (4T76-6 to 9; Pa1; Pa2).  \(^1\)  Babcock explained at trial that it was his practice to keep the windows cracked overnight for ventilation purposes.  (4T110-17 to 25, 116-1 to 5).  At around 4:30 a.m., [...] Detective [...] responded to the restaurant.  (5T32-9 to 16).  His review of the surveillance video aligned with Babcock’s.  (5T34-12 to 35-9).  He further noted that the intruder only touched the cash-register area, and that it “looked like the suspect reached underneath and grabbed a bag and walked out. ” (5T35-10 to 20; Pa1 at 00:37-00:48).  Burk then noticed a latent fingerprint on the face of one of the pizza ovens.  (5T36-12 to 37-10).  Reviewing his body-worn camera footage for the jury, Burk shared his conclusion that the intruder stepped on the prep table to enter and exit the window because the table had a “Timberland[-]boot[-]type shoe print” on it.  (5T40-8 to 23).  At that time, Burk photographed, scaled, and processed the fingerprint on the oven.  (5T41-5 to 42-21; Pa3).
[brief] Most importantly for the argument below, the principal use as a warehouse and distribution center is a permitted use in both [...]’s ODL and [...]’s SM Zone, as are all of the proposed accessory uses.  Ja085; Ja097; Ja146.  Upon its review of Plaintiff’s application, Defendant applied the (d)(1) use variance standard and the enhanced quality of proof as articulated in Medici v. BPR Co., 107 N.J. 1 (1987).
[brief] Passim | | | Daniels v. Hollister Co. | 440 N.J. Super. 359 (App. Div. 2015) | 39 | | D.D. v. UMDNJ | 213 N.J. 130 (2013) | 28, 31| | Delgozzo v. Kenny | 266 N.J. Super. 169 (App. Div. 1993) | 40 | | Douglas v. Harris | 35 N.J. 270 (1961) | 8 | | Dubin v. Hudson County Probation Dept. | 267 N.J. Super. 202 (Law Div. 1993) | 29 | | Duff v. Trenton Beverage Co. | 5 N.J. Super. 283 (App. Div. 1949) | 16 | | Dugan v. TGI Fridays, Inc. | 445 N.J. Super. 59 (App. Div. 2016), aff’d in part, rev’d in part on other grounds, 231 N.J. 24 (2017) | 5 | | Edwards v. Wyckoff Elec. Supply Co. | 42 N.J. Super. 236 (App. Div. 1956) | 15 | | Farmers Mut. Fire Ins. Co. of Salem v. N.J. Prop.-Liab. Ins. Guar. Ass’n | 215 N.J. 522 (2013) | 34 | | Ferraro v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment of Tp. of Holmdel | 119 N.J. 61 (1990) | 13 | | Ford Motor Co. v. Kearny | 91 N.J.L. 671, 103 A. 254 (E. & A. 1917) | 21, 22| | Case Name | Citation | Page | |-----------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | Franconia Assocs. v. United States | 536 U.S. 129, 122 S. Ct. 1993, 153 L. Ed. 2d 132 (2002) | 17 | | Gallano v. Running | 139 N.J. Super. 239 (Law Div. 1976) | 39 | | Georgine v. Amchem Products, Inc. | 83 F.3d 610 (3d Cir. 1996) | 45 | | Giarusso v. Giarusso | 455 N.J. Super. 42 (App. Div. 2018) | 13 | | Greenway Dev. Co. v. Borough of Paramus | 163 N.J. 546 (2000) | 13 | | Goldfarb v. Solimine | 245 N.J. 326 (2021) | 19, 20| | Gorczynski v. Electrolux Home Prods., Inc.
[brief] Statement of Chief Justice on Suspension of Civil and Matrimonial Trials in Vicinages Due to Vacancy Crisis.  (7/5/2023).  Though the Senate has made progress in appointing judges to address some of the backlog, the crisis if far from over.  The AICRA law, implemented by the Legislature in 1998 to address skyrocketing premium increases due to overutilization and fraud, supersedes the civil cause of action contained in the NJIFPA enacted fifteen years earlier in 1982 and the NJRICO law, enacted in the 1970s.
[brief] The Lease provides that in that situation, an amount equal to the charges owed from Tenant to Landlord are automatically deducted from the installment payment Landlord owes Tenant without Tenant going into default.  By operation of this deduction the Tenant owed Landlord no rent as of trial.  A.  Because the Offset Allowance is mandatory under the Lease, Tenant was never in monetary default as of trial  The Lease provides six specific Reimbursement Conditions and states that “Landlord shall pay to Tenant up to the sum of Seven Hundred Thirty Thousand and 00/100 ($730,000) Dollars . . . as reimbursement for the actual cost of Tenant’s leasehold improvements comprising Tenant’s Work as and for ‘Tenant’s Allowance. ’” (emphasis added).  There is no Lease provision suggesting that the Tenant’s Allowance reimbursing Tenant for its construction and improvements to Landlord’s premises was waivable, forfeitable, or otherwise capable of being canceled or voided.  While the Lease is rigid in providing that, upon fulfillment of the Reimbursement Conditions, the Landlord “shall pay” Tenant’s Allowance in full, the Lease is more flexible with respect to the “manner” of Reimbursement that Landlord may “elect[]” to use “to pay the Tenant’s Allowance.
[brief] The trial court’s decision contains multiple errors.  The trial court incorrectly brushed off the Appellants’ important unclean hands argument, despite [...]’s forgery of [...]’s signature on the title transfer documents, which was admitted by the Cross-Appellant [...].  In addition, the trial court incorrectly decided the statute of limitations issue.  Further, the trial court failed to analyze the other legal issues contained in the Appellant’s Affirmative Brief.
[brief] ..............................................31  (Raised Below: 5T 15:3-20; 22:20-25 through 24:1-13; 53:23-25; 54:1-10)  V.  DEFENDANT’S DENIAL IS STILL ARBITRARY, CAPRICIOUS, AND UNREASONABLE UNDER THE MEDICI STANDARD  BECAUSE THE FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS ARE NOT SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL CREDIBLE EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD  .............................................36  (Raised Below: 5T 6:21-25; 7:1-8; 23:1-5; 31:14-25; 32:1-16; 37:19-25; 38:1-22; 51:16-25; 53:4-10)  A.  THE FINDINGS REGARDING THE 1999 MASTER PLAN AND THE INTENT OF THE SPECIAL MANUFACTURING ZONE ARE NOT SUPPORTED BY THE DOCUMENT ITSELF..................................................................................37  B.  THE RECORD SUPPORTS THE CONCLUSION THAT THE DRIVEWAY MUST BE LOCATED ON THE FLORENCE PORTION OF THE PROPERTY.........................................................40  VI.  DEFENDANT’S REJECTION OF [...]’ PLANNING TESTIMONY WAS UNREASONABLE .......................43 (Raised Below in Plaintiff’s Brief, Not Addressed by the Trial Court)  CONCLUSION  ...........................................................................................................47
[brief] In his report dated December 22, 2021, [...] after reviewing many deposition transcripts, notes that the incident area was quite dark, and tree branches were overgrown and obstructing the stop sign.  He is of the view that [...] should have been more proactive regarding street lighting and tree trimming to provide a safer area for residents (Pa384).  Moreover, the Borough should have retained full engineering support for lighting designs to ensure calculations, layouts, specifications for the type of lighting systems they had (Pa384).
[brief] Judgment Of Conviction.................................................................Da57-Da60  Evidentiary Decision Admitting Co-Defendant's Video Statement..............................17T10-12 to 17T12-11  Oral Jury Instructions On Robbery And Accomplice Liability.............26T131-6 to 26T137-21; 26T140-15 to 26T141-2  Written Jury Instructions On Robbery And Accomplice Liability...............................................................Da38-Da46  Sentence.................................................................33T32-24 to 33T40-8 | CASES | PAGE NOS. | |-------------------------------------------|-----------| | **Neno v. Clinton**, 167 N.J. 573 (2001) | 21 | | **People v. Santamaria**, 229 Cal.App.3d 269 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) | 36, 38 | | **State v. Afanador**, 151 N.J. 41 (1997) | 31 | | **State v. Branch**, 182 N.J. 338 (205) | 22 | | **State v. Bunch**, 180 N.J. 534 (2004) | 24 | | **State v. Case**, 220 N.J. 49 (2014) | 43-45 | | **State v. Casilla**, 362 N.J. Super. 554 (2003) | 33 | | **State v. Dunbrack**, 245 N.J. 531 (2021) | 24 | | **State v. Fuentes**, 217 N.J. 57 (2014) | 43, 44 | | **State v. Hubbard**, 176 N.J. Super. 174 (1980) | 46 | | **State v. Lopez**, 187 N.J. 91 (2006) | 25 | | **State v. McKinney**, 223 N.J. 475 (2015)| 24 | | **State v. Mejia**, 141 N.J. 475 (1995) | 26 | | **State v. Muhammad**, 359 N.J. Super. 361 (App. Div. 2003) | 21 | | **State v. R.D.**, 169 N.J. 551 (2001) | 35 | | **State v. Rivera**, 249 N.J. 285 (2021) | 42 | | **State v. Roach**, 146 N.J. 208, (1996) | 46 | | **State v. Roth**, 95 N.J. 334, 364 (1984)| 42 | | **State v. Savage**, 172 N.J. 374 (2002) | 33 | | CASES (CONT'D.) | PAGE NOS | |-----------------|----------| | State v. Wakefield, 190 N.
[brief] Not only does Respondent fail to acknowledge the arresting officer’s failure to abide by the Chun pre-requisites for alcotesting, Respondent further fails to address the arguments put forth by _____________________ 4  Aa__-__ refers to Appellant’s Appendix.  Appellant, which establish that the Law Division further erred in crediting the testimony of [...].  For these reasons, the Law Division’s decision with respect to finding Appellant guilty of DWI under N.J.S.A. 39:4-50 should be reversed.
[brief] Williams, 218 N.J. at 593; Dekowski, 218 N.J. at 599, 608.  The jury instructions in this case did not make clear that the jury had to agree on the identity of that person.  Instead, the court told the jury that “[t]he State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt the defendant purposely led employees and patrons of the [...] to reasonably believe by words and conduct or gestures that the defendant possessed such a deadly weapon. ”  (4T 126-15 to 19)  Not only did this phrasing not communicate the unanimity requirement, but it also misleadingly suggested that it did not matter whose subjective belief the jury evaluated, so long as that person or those persons were “employees and patrons of the [...]. ”  Given that the only two potential robbery victims were [...] and [...], it is only the subjective beliefs of those two individuals that the jury should have been evaluating.  The court erred by failing to explain that it is a robbery victim, as opposed to a bystander, who must be led to believe that the defendant is armed in a simulated deadly weapons case and by failing to inform the jury that it had to unanimously agree on the identity of that person.
[brief] In light of the purported immediate effect of the rescission of the Policies and, in particular, to ensure compliance with the New Jersey Supreme Court’s requirement that [...] maintain current malpractice insurance, [...] undertook to obtain a replacement policy.  [Pa573]  The new insurance policy obtained by [...] was far less favorable than the Policies.  It provided only half of the coverage (half of the indemnification) of the Defendants’ Policies and, otherwise, had less favorable coverage (e.g., a higher deductible and legal fees that erode the coverage amount), being purchased through the surplus lines market.  In addition, the policy cost approximately three times (3x) as much as the Policies, precipitated by the abrupt and unlawful cancelation.  [Pa573]  The Firm also filed an appeal with Defendants, on November 19, 2019, focused on Defendants improper rescission of the Policies as to the “Innocent Insureds”.  [Pa731]  In accordance with well-settled New Jersey law, an insurer may not rescind a policy as to innocent insureds.  First American Title Ins. Co. v. Lawson, 177 N.J. 125 (2003).  [Id.]  Defendants at no time meaningfully responded to the appeal as to “innocent insureds. ”  [Pa574]  Defendants also at no time withdrew the rescission of the Policies as to the Innocent Insureds.  [Pa650]  Indeed, at no time did Defendants take any affirmative step to void the rescission as to any Innocent Insured.  In particular, following the rescission in October 2019, Defendants at no time issued any declaration page indicating that current coverage existed at any point after October 2019 as to the Innocent Insureds.²  [Pa575]  ²  While the trial court erroneously dismissed the claims of the Innocent Insureds too, no appeal has been filed on their behalf solely because, with the passage of time since the rescission, and the duplicative coverage obtained immediately by [...], the Innocent Insureds fortunately suffered no material damage as a result of Defendants’ overreaching rescission of the Policies.  LEGAL ARGUMENT I.
[brief] Resurrecting these claims will only protract an already lengthy litigation, and the end result will be the same.  Appellants have had two years to prove their damages here, and they cannot.  Appellants regret losing their Lease, but even they admit that the [...] are not at fault for that.  There are no facts at issue, no additional discovery to be had.  [...] already testified that [...] did not cause him to default under the Lease with [...], so no other documents or testimony will change the simple fact that Appellants’ damages are Appellants’ fault here.  Therefore, the Panel should affirm the decision below.
[brief] A party bringing a claim of breach of contract has the burden of proving all elements of its cause of action.  Cumberland Cnty. Improvement Auth. v. GSP Recycling Co., 358 N.J Super. 484, 503 (App. Div. 2003).  Under New Jersey law, a plaintiff must plead and prove the following elements for a valid breach of contract claim: “(1) a contract between the parties; (2) a breach of that contract; (3) damages flowing therefrom; and (4) that the party stating the claim performed its own contractual obligations. ”  Frederico v. Home Depot, 507 F.3d 188, 203 (3d Cir. 2007)(emphasis added).  “A party bringing a claim for breach of contract has the burden of proof to establish all elements of its cause of action, including damages. ”  Improvement Authority v. GSP Recycling Co., Inc., 352 N.J. Super 484, 503 (App. Div. 2003) (citation omitted)(emphasis added).
[brief] Transcript of Oral Opinion of the Hon. [...], J.S.C., dated March 27, 2023, hereinafter “2T. ”  Transcript of Oral Opinion of the Hon. [...], J.S.C., dated July 7, 2023, hereinafter “3T. ”  Transcript of Oral Opinion of the Hon. [...], J.S.C., dated July 17, 2023 hereinafter “4T. ”  2  [...] and [...] subsequently resolved [...]’s claim against [...], and [...] dismissed its Complaint against [...].
[brief] (3T242-5 to 8; 4T26-3 to 27-6; 4T33-15 to 18; 6T66-5 to 67-18; 6T153-12 to 17).  At trial, [...] denied having any recollection of what she told detectives about the night of the offense.  (4T28-23 to 29-19; 4T31-1 to 32-17).  Following a mid-trial Gross\(^6\) hearing in which [...] found her claimed memory loss to be feigned, (5T40-7 to 11), the State was permitted to play her redacted statement for the jury.
[brief] ”  Konop v. Rosen, 425 N.J. Super.  391, 420 (App. Div. 2012).  A “judge’s function is not [] to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial. ”  Brill, 142 N.J. at 540 (quoting Anderson v., Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986)).  Plaintiff has offered sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude by a preponderance of the evidence that [...], as a stallion in the breeding environment, was inherently vicious, and that Defendants, as professional equine breeders, knew or should have known of [...]’s natural tendency for dangerous aggression when in the breeding environment.
[brief] (8T 41-9 to 43-11; 8T 52-7 to 52-16)  Surveillance video from the barbershop and nearby businesses established that a red Chrysler 300 drove into the area around 8:30 p.m. and parked about a block away from the barbershop.  (8T 84-6 to 102-10; 13T 55-10 to 55-23)  A few minutes later, two Black males – one wearing red sneakers and a jacket that had a NASA emblem – entered the shop, and without stopping, walked directly through the main room to a backroom, behind the counter and past the cash register.  (12T 78-2 to 78-13; 13T 50-19 to 53-4; 13T 120-16 to 120-24)  The two males emerged seconds later – the one in the NASA jacket was holding a gun – and quickly left the shop.  (13T 52-16 to 53-4; 14T 10-20 to 10-22; 14T 11-16 to 13-11)  The two suspects were in the shop for less than a minute (14T 8-19 to 9-2); after leaving the shop, they got into the red Chrysler and drove away (13T 53-22 to 54-15); the entire time, their faces were concealed by the hoods and masks.  (14T 17-22 to 17-22)  There was no video footage of what transpired in the backroom because no surveillance cameras were located there.
[brief] ”  See also N.J.S.A. 19:14-6 (providing that ballots must have a personal choice column to the right of other columns where “the voter may write or paste the name of any person for whom he desires to vote, whose name is not printed on this ballot…” (emphasis added); N.J.S.A. 19:14-4 provides for the instructions that are to appear on an official ballot, and in relevant part, informs the voter that “[t]o vote for any candidate whose name is not printed on this ballot, write or paste the name of such person under the proper title of office in the column designated personal choice…” (emphasis added)).  N.J.S.A. 19:49-5, applying specifically to all machine balloting, reads:  Ballots voted for any person whose name does not appear on the machine as a nominated candidate for office are herein referred to as irregular ballots.  Such irregular ballot shall be written or affixed in or upon the receptacle or device provided on the machine for that purpose.  **No irregular ballot shall be voted for any person for any office whose name appears on the machine as a nominated candidate for that office** or for a delegate or alternate to a national party convention; **any irregular ballot so voted shall not be counted**.  An irregular ballot must be cast in its appropriate place on the machine, or it shall be void and not counted.  N.J.S.A. 19:49-5 (emphasis added); see also N.J.S.A. 19:53A-5(e) (addressing ballot design for machines in “elections in which voters are authorized to vote for persons whose names do not appear on the ballot…); N.J.S.A. 19:53A-7(f) reaffirms the same principle, and directs that if an improper write-in vote is cast, that improper write-in vote will not invalidate otherwise proper votes, consistent with the holding, discussed herein, of Monroe, 245 N.J. Super. at 70.