ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] *See In re Ordinance 2354-12 of West Orange, Essex Cnty. v. Twp. of West Orange*, 223 N.J. 589, 601(2015).  **Substantial and Novel Constitutional Question**  Applicants’ proposed “Addition” is an ultra-modern structure (Pa253 and Pa253) that is in stark contrast to the other homes in the [...] (“[...]”) (Pa322-Pa335).  Applicants were extremely effective in misleading the motion judge as to the significance as to whether a home is “contributing. ”  Their argument is that a “non-contributing” home within a historic district is not subject to any restrictions as to aesthetics.  This conflates two unrelated concepts.  The term “contributing” related to a determination made as part of the application process for [...] to be placed on the National Register of Historic Places.  If a particular home is “historic,” and when aggregated with other historic homes, justifies the neighborhood being designated a “historic district,” that home is “contributing. ”  (Pa259-Pa319)  Invariably, any historic district will have homes that are non-contributing and any new home even if it replicates the identical characteristics of a “historic” home will never be considered “contributing. ”  Stating the obvious, a “contributing” home must, in fact, be historic.  However, once a historic district is established, whether a particular home was deemed “contributing” to that determination is irrelevant under the Municipal Land Use Law ("MLUL").
[brief] Defendants presented evidence that [...], unaware of the tax foreclosure proceeding, emailed the Tax Collector requesting redemption figures on February 22, 2022 (19 days after default had been entered, but before the Plaintiff transferred the property).  On February 22, 2022 at 3:50 p.m., the Passaic Tax Collector replied and copied Plaintiff’s in-house counsel, [...] as well as [...] ([...]) on the email.  The evidence showed that Plaintiff’s knew when they sold the property to [...] that [...] was attempting to redeem the tax sale certificate and was unaware of the foreclosure proceeding.  It was the tax assessor who, on February 22, 2022 informed [...] that a final judgment had been entered by stating “This email is to inform you that we are unable to provide figures for redemption on this certificate as the final judgement [sic] was entered on 02/07/22.  As per the lienholder’s attorney, redemption was barred as of this same date. ”  259a-260a.  After gaining this knowledge Plaintiff [...]/Schwab promptly (within days) transferred the property by purported Deed on March 3, 2022 to [...].  344a.  It was not recorded until April 6, 2022 again after the Order to Show had already been filed.  Offers to Purchase the Property
[brief] The Scope of the Arbitration Clause as described in the Application is not superceded by the Deposit Agreement.  The Bank in its brief takes a curious position in regard to the issue concerning the scope of the arbitration agreement raised by the Plaintiff.  (See Pb  In an attempt to avoid the inconsistency and ambiguity raised between the scope of the arbitration agreement set forth in the application and the DAA, the Bank states, (with no explanation), while there is no conflict, even if there was, “that conflict would be controlled by the terms of the DAA” because “the DAA expressly supplemented all prior agreements regarding [...]’s bank account, including any verbal or written statement or representations” citing PA 092.  PA 092 is an informational page (page 2 of the DAA) before the table of contents and body of the DAA setting forth general information.  The page starts out as follows:  Thank you for doing business with us  This Deposit Account Agreement applies to new and existing consumer and business accounts and together with the following documents, is your contract with [...] and constitutes the “Agreement” that governs your account with [...].  • The Consumer Account Fee and Information Schedule (“Consumer Schedule”) or the Business Account Fee and information Schedule (“Business Schedule”), • Our interest rate sheet for interest-bearing accounts, • Our privacy notice, and • Any additional disclosures, amendments, or addenda we provide to you.  Presumably this last sentence would include the application which the Bank claims [...] executed.  Yet the next sentence is apparently being relied upon by the Bank to vitiate the contents of the application according to the Bank’s brief and its reference to Pa 092:  This Agreement is applicable to new and existing accounts and replaces all prior agreements regarding your account, including any verbal or written statements or representations.  When you sign an account application or use your account ... you ... consent to the terms of this agreement.  What does this mean?  Is the application an agreement, disclosure, a notice?  What would an ordinary consumer understand this to mean?  The Bank has continuously relied upon the application throughout its brief as the document signed by [...] which binds him to the DAA because the application states he received a copy of the DAA:  “[...]’s failure to read or otherwise ask about what he was signing or the affect of his signature, does not excuse him from the consequences of his inattention (Db 7 - quoting the judges opinion at Pa 8).  The Bank’s argument that the DAA supersedes the Bank’s representations in the application and certification included therein, which the Bank claims Plaintiff signed, is not supported by these documents or this above language and does not absolve the conflict.  III.
[brief] There was virtually no basis to reason that the separation of the NJRLMA from the rest of the current NJCFLA suddenly also removed the implied private right of action from the statute.  In context, *Veras*’s citation to *In re Resolution* in ostensible support of the notion that the NJCFLA does not provide for a provide right of action does not make practical sense given that the enforcement mechanisms in subsection 18 have always coexisted with the implied private right of action in the NJSLL, NJLLA, and NJCLA.  The sudden reading of the private right of action out of the NJCFLA by *Veras* was simply not rooted in an examination of the NJCFLA’s legislative intent and history—as *Veras* acknowledged was the linchpin in determining whether an implied private right of action existed.  Rather, *Veras* acknowledged the existence of subsection 18 and determined that that, in and of itself, was sufficient to show that no implied private right of action existed in the statute, *without acknowledging further that there had always been a private right of action.*  Since *Veras* was decided in 2014, every case that has determined that no private right of action exists under the NJCFLA can, directly or indirectly, be traced back to *Veras*, thereby compounding the inexplicable reasoning and holding.
[brief] [...] has not, nor cannot, cite to any precedent where the Entire Controversy Doctrine supersedes the requirement to exhaust administrative remedies before it seeks redress through Superior Court.  Nothing has stopped [...] from seeking redress under R. 4:69-1, et seq., and the Entire Controversy Doctrine does not extinguish this requirement.  D.  [...]’s failure to exhaust its administrative remedies means that the Entire Controversy Doctrine defense is inapplicable to [...].
[brief] (1T38:5-8).  [...] was thrown from the driver side of his vehicle to the passenger side, and immediately “blacked out. ” (1T38:8-11).  As a result, [...] sustained serious neck injuries, and was forced to have surgery so that doctors could “remove two discs out of [his] neck and put two artificial discs in [his] neck. ” (1T45:3-18).  It is undisputed that [...] became permanently and totally disabled as a result of the 2015 incident.
[brief] The Court (applying Burd) held that “in circumstances in which the underlying coverage question cannot be decided from the face of the complaint, the insurer is obligated to provide a defense until all potentially coverage claims are resolved...”  Also see Stafford (1998) at 130.  In New Jersey, an insurer must provide a policyholder with a defense against any claims that are potentially (not even actually) covered by the policy.  An insurer’s duty to defend is triggered whenever a complaint filed against an insured contains allegations that may be covered by the policy.  The duty to defend applies whether or not the third-party claim has merit, even if the cause of action against the insured is groundless, false, or fraudulent.  Voorhees v. Preferred Mut. Ins. Co., 128 N.J. 165 (1992).
[brief] Second, and alternatively, if this Court does not enter a judgment of acquittal as to all homicide charges, the passion/provocation manslaughter charge nonetheless must be reversed.  Although a defendant generally cannot challenge a conviction on one count simply by arguing that it is inconsistent with an acquittal on another count, this rule only applies “when the reason for the inconsistent verdicts cannot be determined. ”  State v. Gray, 147 N.J. 4, 11 (1996).  If the reason for the inconsistent verdicts can be determined and that reason is due to a mistaken instruction by the court, then the conviction cannot stand.  Id. at 17 (reversing defendant’s felony murder conviction because “this case is not about speculation as to the reasons for the inconsistent verdict but, rather, about a misleading charge that led to a verdict not permitted under our law”).  Such is the case here.
[brief] State v. Patino, 83 N.J. 1, 7 (1980).  Moreover, a police officer may conduct an investigatory stop if, based on the totality of the circumstances, there is a reasonable and particularized suspicion to believe that an individual has just engaged in, or is about to engage in, criminal activity.  State v. Maryland, 167 N.J. 471, 487 (2001); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22, (1968).
[brief] (4T 16-4 to 17-15)  Specifically, she admitted an eight-second video clip (Da 20, video of statement) of most of the exchange about the sneaker.  The judge excluded from the video the few questions about what to do with the sneaker -- i.e., regarding throwing it in the garbage -- so the clip went: from [...]’s initial question (Whose sneaker?”) through the responses of [...] and defendant that it was defendant’s, through [...]’ question to defendant (“This is your sneaker?”) and defendant’s affirmative response, straight to defendant’s claim that the other sneaker was taken at the station.  (Da 20, video of statement).  The judge’s reasoning for admitting the video was utterly bizarre: that despite the fact that questions were asked by both [...] and [...] about who owned the sneaker, defendant’s statements about it were “spontaneous” because [...] was not looking directly at defendant when he asked his initial question (“Whose sneaker?”).  (4T 16-11 to 18)  The judge skipped right over the fact that [...] directly asked defendant about the sneaker right after [...].  She then held that the questions about what to do with the sneaker were interrogation, and needed to be suppressed, along with the defendant’s answers that were given to throw out the sneaker (4T 17-6 to 9), but she then strangely ruled the defendant’s statement that followed that improper questioning -- the lie that police had taken the other sneaker at the station -- to have been “spontaneous,” and thus admissible, as if it occurred in a vacuum away from the other questioning.
[brief] Out of town buildings –  The parties acknowledge that some users are located outside of the [...] for which sewerage is transmitted through mains and lines through the [...] to the [...] Treatment Plant.  The [...] agrees that it will bill said commercial users directly and further acknowledges that the [...] may reserve the right to impose an additional fee upon such user, for the use of the [...] pipes and other property by said user, which fee shall be billed to the user by the [...].  [Da115-Da116].  Further, on June 7, 2017, a “Settlement Agreement and Release” (the “2017 Agreement”) was entered into by and between the [...] and [...].  [Da120-Da129].  Therein, the parties agreed for out-of-town properties whose sewage is treated at the [...]’s treatment plants, albeit with the effluent flowing through the [...], the connection fee is due and owing to the [...].
[brief] I highlighted some of the problems with [...]'s false claims regarding my Exceptions.  I addressed in greater detail the problems with previously undisclosed unethical bombshells (see par. 70 above).  They ignored my letter (App. Exh. "J") (208a-213a).  72.  I issued August 30th letter (App. Exh. "K") (215a-218a).  It went into greater details to refute [...]'s false claims about my Exceptions.  It emphasized my requests to resolve matters, & work towards a 3-Way Settlement.  Their only response was to decline a 3-Way Settlement.  73.
[directive] Voir dire practices must be geared to eliciting meaningful information from prospective jurors so those with a real potential for bias can be excused.  The process should be designed to provide the attorneys and judge with sufficient information to appropriately excuse jurors for cause.  The process should also provide the attorneys with sufficient information to intelligently exercise peremptory challenges.  It should be noted that in many courtrooms, judges are currently conducting voir dire in a thorough and meaningful manner.  However, some judges conduct the process in a more perfunctory manner, which is not properly geared to achieve the purpose of voir dire.  In those courtrooms, a more expansive practice is required.  The role of counsel in proposing questions and participating in the voir dire process should not be unduly restricted.  Judges and counsel should be mindful that the jury selection process is an important part of the trial.  Indeed, in the eyes of many attorneys, it is the most important part of the trial.
[brief] The trial court granted summary judgment to the [...] because plaintiff’s experts offered only net opinions and because plaintiff offered no admissible evidence to support a claim of trespass.  After hearing extensive oral argument, T1-59, the trial court ruled on the [...]’ motion for summary judgment.  T59:23-60:24.  Turning to Count One of the complaint, which alleged nuisance, the court looked to whether plaintiff’s expert reports could support plaintiff’s contentions or whether they were net opinion.  T63:22-64:18.  Having reviewed the relevant case law governing net opinions, T64:24-67:19, the court ruled that:  There is nothing in this record that the Court will be able to look to other than pure speculation on the part of these experts, because nothing is tied to anything other than their opinion.  Without more, as cited in all the cases that I just put on the record, this court will not be in any position at trial to have any different of an opinion than I said right now.  I understand it’s summary judgment.  I understand that’s a high burden.  But the plaintiff cannot, as I’ve said a number of times, create a genuine issue of facts simply by pointing to something that they said, well, the expert said it.  That’s just not enough.  I am not going to repeat what I said already.  And that’s my ruling.  I’m granting summary judgment on the First Count, as well.  [T67:20-68:10.]
[directive] ....................................................................66  Release Revoke to Authority General 8.1 ..................................67 .  Release of Revocation for Applying Against Presumption 8.2  Filed Be Must Release of Revocation for Motion Where a Cases 8.3 ..........................................67  Circumstances Extraordinary Compelling and Absent of Revocation Seek to Presumed Prosecutor Is the Where Cases 8.4 Release...................................................................................................................67  New a When Release of Revocation Seeking Presumption of 8.4.1  Offense  Any for Release on While Committed Is Crime .................................................................67  Complaint-Warrant by Charged 7 Page When Release Revocation of Seeking of Presumption 8.4.2  Monitoring Device Electronic an with Tampers Defendant ...........................................................68 .  Conditions with Release on While When Release of Revocation Seeking of Presumption 8.4.3 or Restraining Order Violence  Domestic a Violates Defendant  ...............................................................................68  Release of Condition a When Release Revocation of Seeking of Presumption  8.4.4  Survivor Protection Assault  Sexual a Violates Defendant  .........................................................................................................68  Order.  Revocation of Seeking of Presumption  Overcoming the 8.4.5 ......................................................................................................68  Release.  .........................................................................69  Circumstances and Facts Relevant 8.5 ..................................69  Release of Revocation for Application of Filing Electronic 8.6  Detention Pretrial Initial and Revocation-of-Release Combining 8.7 .................................................................................................................69  Motions.  ...................69  Denied Is Release of Revocation for Application When Notification 8.8  PRETRIAL OF VIOLATIONS
[brief] *North Bergen Rex Transport v. TLC*, 158 N.J. 561, 570-574 (1999).  Hence, the amount of fees actually charged is the starting point.  In any case, an application for fees must be supported by an appropriate certification of services.  After all, a conforming affidavit is a prerequisite to an allowance of fees.  *Glen v. June*, 344 N.J. Super. 372, 381-382 (App. Div. 2001); *Scullion v. State Farm Ins. Co.*, 345 N.J. Super. 431, 439 (App. Div. 2001) (holding certified copy of bill is required in an application for fees).  *R.* 4:42-9 (b) stipulates that all applications for the allowance of fees shall be supported by an affidavit of services addressing the factors enumerated by *R.P.C.* 1.5(a).
[brief] It appears that the trial judge held the view that it was reasonable for the 92 years old, who was unable to walk to hop across the county road ([...]) and traverse over 50 yards to access such non-existing handicapped parking space, just to be able to access in and out of a car.  This factual indifference by the trial judge, suggests why the mediation and arbitration process were circumvented, altogether.  Appellant believes that by circumventing mediation and arbitration, altogether, the trial court erred.
[brief] The goal of the Stormwater Rules is to minimize development impacts on the natural processes with regards to onsite groundwater recharge and stormwater runoff.  N.J.A.C.  7:8-2.2.  Technical guidance for stormwater management measures are contained within the New Jersey Stormwater Best Management Practices Manual (“BMP Manual”).  N.J.A.C. 7:8-5.9; In re Stormwater Management Rules, 348 N.J. Super. 451, 457 (App. Div. 2006).
[brief] 1.  Both Probation and the Court apparently missed the entire point of Appellant’s Motion for Correction of Probation Account Record, which was to submit further evidence of Probation account error not previously litigated.  As Appellant noted on page 2 of his Certification:  “As the Court has not yet issued a decision with respect to my pending Motion for Reconsideration, and as noted in my Certification (paragraph 25) and in my Reply (paragraph 13), motion page limitations prevented my listing all Probation account errors, audits errors, and errors in [...]’s filing of 3/17/2022, and as the Court denied my request for a plenary hearing by way of its Order of 4/4/2022 (Exhibit I), stating “The Court notes the Defendant always has the right to file a new motion if he uncovers any discrepancies.
[brief] See, e.g., State v. Reeds, 197 N.J. 280, 298-301(2009) (finding plain error where prejudicial expert testimony was admitted on the central issue); *State v. Pasterick*, 285 N.J.  Super. 607, 622-23 (App. Div. 1995) (finding plain error where the expert’s “testimony was so prejudicial to [the] defendant that, even if it were marginally relevant and otherwise admissible, failing to exclude it under N.J.R.E. 403 was a mistaken exercise of the trial judge's discretion”).  In *Burney*, the Supreme Court considered whether it was error for the State’s expert on historical cell-site location analysis to testify that the defendant’s cell phone must have been within a one-mile radius of a cell tower based on a “‘rule of thumb’ for the area -- a ‘good approximation’ based on his training and experience.
[brief] (Da30-41).  The same day, the State filed the instant suit in the Superior Court, Chancery Division, under N.J.S.A. 10:5-14.1, which authorizes the Attorney General or the Director to “proceed against any person in a summary manner in the Superior Court of New Jersey to obtain an injunction” at any time after filing an administrative complaint or whenever it appears that a person is engaging in any practice that violates the LAD.
[brief] Id. at *16.  [...]’s argument that the bidder’s submission of an expired registration certificate (in Suburban Disposal) is somehow different than submitting no certificate (as [...] did here), was appropriately rejected by the trial court.  Indeed, nowhere in Suburban Disposal did the court consider the bidder’s submission of an expired certificate a prerequisite to the bidder’s ability to cure its defect (as [...] argues).  Rather, the court relied solely upon the bidder’s undisputed active registration status at the time of bid submission and that, in light of this status (which could not be altered post-bid opening), the bidder’s failure to supply an active registration certificate did not deprive the public owner of assurances that it could perform the work and did not obtain any competitive advantage over the other bidders.  Suburban Disposal, Inc., 2014 N.J. Super LEXIS 1186 at *15.  [...]’s attempts to disparage the relevant portions of the Suburban Disposal decision as being “superfluous dicta” or “simply wrong”, is predicated on a misunderstanding of the law and misreading of the case.
[brief] Schmidt involved a claim for insurance coverage where the plaintiff alleged bodily injury caused by sexual harassment committed by [...], the president of the plaintiff’s employer.  Id. at 47.  The employers liability insurance policy in that case provided coverage for bodily injury to employees but also contained the generally worded, pre-2007 C.5 exclusion for intentional wrongs of the employer.  It also contained an exclusion for damages arising out of harassment, discrimination, and similar acts.  Id. at 50.  In its decision, the Supreme Court only minimally addressed the pre-2007 Exclusion C.5 of the insurance policy, stating that it “does not apply because there is no evidence that [the employer] intended to harass” the plaintiff.  Id. at 51.  Rather, the Court in Schmidt concluded that the policy’s exclusion for damages arising out of harassment, discrimination, and similar wrongful acts was unenforceable where that conduct was alleged to have caused bodily injury to the employee.  The Court focused on whether there was sufficient allegation of “bodily injury” to require coverage.
[brief] 4.  Documents satisfactory to the Company that convey the Title or create the Mortgage to be insured, or both, must be properly authorized, executed, delivered, and recorded in the Public Records.  a.  Deed from [...] and [...] to [...]. ”  The agreement was not ambiguous, and these conditions were not met because this obviously did not occur.  Plaintiff’s argument made here is equally meritless.  [...] admitted that he undertook efforts to obtain a new Deed conveying the property from the Nugent’s jointly to [...] in her individual capacity by going to visit [...] in prison to obtain his signature.