ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] [...]’s preference to withdraw if the exam is recorded constitutes his own personal preference and not that of his organization because as the Appellate Division recognized under the Policy Statement, “psychologists are not necessarily barred from performing an exam under Standard 9. ”  DiFiore, 472 N.J. Super. 125 (citing ABN 2016 Policy Statement).  Moreover, Defendant’s citation to Gensollen supports Plaintiff’s position to permit recording rather than Defendant’s demand to preclude it.  In Gensollen, 416 N.J. Super. at 587, 592, a party was denied additional proofs that would require an expert physician to provide proofs specifically setting forth the percentage of his forensic work devoted to defendants when the doctor had already testified that over 95% of his work was for the defense.  Because the discovery was exchanged, further discovery would only harass the doctor, and thus the Appellate Division found a protective order was an appropriate remedy.  Id. at 592-93.  Here, Defendants have not established entitlement to a protective order because Defendants seek to preclude Plaintiff from preserving relevant evidence that would document what occurs in the exam when Plaintiff cannot do so due to his cognitive impairment, anxiety, and language barrier.  Plaintiff has established good cause to record even though Defendants bear the burden to show good cause why the exam should not be recorded.
[brief] Laidlow, 170 N.J. at 622-623 (emphasis added).  The substantial certainty determination “requires a case-by-case analysis. ”  Fisher, 363 N.J. Super. at 466.  “[N]o one fact is dispositive. ”  Id. at 469.  There is no requirement of prior incidents or injuries in order to establish that an employer’s acts or omissions constituted an intentional wrong by creating a substantial certainty of injury:  “[T]he absence of a prior accident does not preclude a finding of an intentional wrong. ”  Crippen v. Central Jersey Concrete Pipe Co., 176 N.J. 397, 408 (2003).  The Laidlow decision also abrogated earlier case law that relied on a more restrictive conception of “intentional wrong” as requiring a subjective or deliberate intent to injure on the part of an employee.
[brief] (1T64-21 to 65-3).  [...] was detained "[t]wo to three blocks" from the house.  (1T79-23 to 80-1).  The Warrant was signed "[w]ell before, about an hour before"  [...] detained defendant.  (1T76-21 to 77-5).  [...] "felt comfortable detaining the suspects because . . . the warrant was signed at this time."  (1T78-14 to 20).  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT ONE THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE MOTION TO SUPPRESS AND ERRED IN APPLYING A "REASONABLE SUSPICION" RATHER THAN "PROBABLE CAUSE" STANDARD; BECAUSE THE SEARCH WARRANT DID NOT PARTICULARLY LIST [...], OR ANY PERSON, THE STOPPING AND ARRESTING OF [...] BY THE POLICE WAS IN VIOLATION OF AND CONTRARY TO THE FOURTH AMENDMENT (1T93-3 to 95-3).
[brief] The MLUL further emphasizes the pivotal importance of the master plan to the regulation of zoning and land use by municipalities by providing that “[t]he absence of the adoption by the planning board of a reexamination report pursuant to section 76 of P.L. 1975, c 291 (C40:55D-89) shall constitute a rebuttable presumption that the municipal development regulations are no longer reasonable. ”  N.J.S.A. 40:55D-89.1.  [...] adopted the resolution updating the Master Plan.
[brief] In the instant case, there was a clear factual dispute regarding the actual cause of [...]’s wrist injury, as well as regarding whether remoteness, fortuity, or [...]’s own volitional act interrupted the chain of causation between [...]’s actions and [...]’s wrist injury.  [...] testified that he sustained “a small fracture” in his right wrist when he “fell rolling around with Dua trying to gain control of his right arm. ”  (6T:163-19 to 164-5)  In his motion for acquittal, defense counsel argued that [...] likely hurt his wrist by falling on it himself while taking [...] down, and that therefore, the State could not demonstrate that [...] had caused his wrist injury.
[brief] (Ra21)  Article XI of the Agreement sets forth the Grievance Procedure, and states as follows:  “The following constitutes the sole and exclusive method for resolving grievances between the parties covered by this Agreement and shall be followed in its entirety unless any step is waived by mutual consent. ”  (Ra42)  The claims made by the Plaintiff in his complaint are subject to the Grievance Procedure set forth in the Agreement between [...] and the [...] FOP.  [...] Cert. [...] has not waived the requirement that disputes subject to the Agreement are required to proceed through the grievance process.  (Pa005)  Neither the Plaintiff, nor anyone acting on his behalf, filed any grievances concerning the subject matter of the Plaintiff’s complaint.  (Pa0015).  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I
[brief] The statute expressly provides that a person, such [*6] as plaintiff, who fails to maintain "medical expense benefits coverage . . . shall have no cause of action for recovery of economic or noneconomic loss."  N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.5(a).  Plaintiff does not argue the language is ambiguous and acknowledges that "[o]n its face, the statute deprives an uninsured motorist of the right to sue for any loss caused by another."
[brief] “An essential ingredient of a fair trial is that a jury receive adequate and understandable instructions."  *State v. McKinney*, 223 N.J. 475, 495 (2015); *State v. Concepcion*, 111 N.J. 373, 379 (1988) (“Accurate and understandable jury instructions in criminal cases are essential to a defendant’s right to a fair trial”).  “[T]he trial court has an absolute duty to instruct the jury on the law governing the facts of the case. ”  *State v. Butler*, 27 N.J. 560, 595 (1958).  “A charge is a road map to guide the jury, and without an appropriate charge a jury can take a wrong turn in its deliberations.  Thus, the court must explain the controlling legal principles and the questions the jury is to decide. ”  *State v. Martin*, 119 N.J. 2, 15 (1990).
[directive] 2.4.3  At the same time, law enforcement work places an extraordinary mental and emotional toll on officers, and all officers must be free to seek treatment and support that enables them to cope with those pressures.  Accordingly, under no circumstances shall an officer face any sort of discrimination or adverse internal affairs consequences for the sole reason that the officer decided to seek medical or psychological treatment for a mental health concern, including depression, anxiety, post-traumatic stress disorder, or substance use disorder.
[brief] ”  *United States v. Salamone*, 800 F.2d 1216, 1218 (3d Cir. 1986) (quoting *Taylor v. Louisiana*, 419 U.S. 522, 537 (1975)).  A trial court violates a defendant’s jury trial rights when it disqualifies a juror on the basis of a particular trait without establishing that the trait renders them unfit to serve.
[brief] Finally, to the extent it might be relevant, we note that this case presents an even more compelling case for application of collateral estoppel compared with Pivnick.  As noted above, in Pivnick, the Probate judge applied a clear and convincing standard to [...]’s claims.  One of [...]’s arguments on appeal was that a less onerous preponderance standard should have been applied to his legal malpractice claim (an argument this Court also rejected).  Here, by contrast, the Probate judge applied the less onerous preponderance standard to [...]’s claim, and yet [...] still failed.  (Pa000076, quoting the Probate Judge: “I cannot conclude based on the evidence before me that the plaintiff has proven by a preponderance of the evidence that the probable intent of the father was not to forgive [...] from this loan, it was just to forgive [...], and not discharge the entire loan[.]”)  If [...] could not meet the preponderance standard applied by the Probate judge, he certainly cannot meet the heightened “clear and convincing” standard of proof required by Pivnick in this type of case.  Since all of plaintiffs’ legal malpractice claims require plaintiffs to show that [...] did not intend to release [...] from her mortgage obligations, and because they are collaterally estopped from doing so, the Law Division properly dismissed this case.
[brief] In Point I, Section B of Plaintiff’s appellate brief, he suggests that the [...] have “to some degree” in conjunction with the [...] make a “mootness” argument. ” (P44).  Plaintiff is simply incorrect.  Plaintiff does not allege that the [...] engaged in any conduct regarding the prosecution of Plaintiff and/or the decision to grant PTI to Plaintiff.  The [...] never made any argument regarding mootness or Plaintiff’s entitlement to declaratory relief at the Trial Court level whatsoever and thus any argument of Plaintiff’s in that respect does not apply to the [...].
[brief] Id. at 337-38.  Specifically, in his LAD action, [...]’s position was that he was not disabled from his employment with a reasonable accommodation.  Id. at 335.  To be considered for Ordinary Disability, [...] was required to certify he is disabled.  Id. at 336.  Thus, [...] was legally barred by the operation of “the doctrine of judicial estoppel” from filing his application for Ordinary Disability while his LAD action was pending.  Ibid.  The court noted that it has found “equitable and countervailing considerations” in particular circumstances to allow a plaintiff to assert a claim.  Id. at 337 (quoting SMB Assocs. v. Dep’t of Env’t Prot., 264 N.J. Super. 38, 59 (App. Div. 1993) (“[A]n “agency has inherent power to waive de minimis violations of objective standards. ”)).  The court concluded that under the circumstances presented, fairness and equity required [...] to be permitted to apply for Ordinary Disability.  Id. at 338.  Here there was no such legal impediment to [...] filing his Eligibility Registration Form nor would he have been sacrificing discrimination claims or other litigation positions by doing so.  [...] simply failed to file his Eligibility Registration Form until approximately one year and nine months past the statutory deadline, which is not a de minimis violation.
[brief] (Da1)  The same day, [...], again, inquired of the tax collector’s office, the status of the amount to redeem.  He was informed by [...], a staff member, that he would contact the lienholder of the tax sale certificate.  Later than day, [...] emailed [...] that “The lien holder has responded and told us you are not allowed to redeemed(sic) the lien as it has been foreclosed. ” (Aa179).  [...] was referred to [...] for assistance in his effort to redeem.  On February 10, 2023, [...], inquired of Plaintiff’s counsel if its client would accept redemption of its tax lien.
[brief] New Jersey Model Civil Jury Charges  Model Civil Jury 5.30G(6), “Duty as to Obstacles and/or Defects in the Roadway” (March 2021) …………………………………………………………..40  Model Civil Jury Charge 8.11F, “Aggravation of the Preexisting Disability” (January 1997)………………………………………..2, 6, 14-15, 41, 44, 46-47  I
[brief] It is simply illogical to conclude that Plaintiff was 0% at fault when she was traveling 55 miles per hour as she approached the intersection and was intending to pass through the intersection with a yellow light and simultaneously conclude that [...] was 40% at fault for doing the exact same thing as Plaintiff — but actually reaching the intersection before Plaintiff.  As Plaintiff and [...] approached the intersection with a yellow light, [...] entered the intersection against the red light causing the accident.  In fact, Plaintiff stated at the scene of the accident that [...] ran the red light for traffic heading west on Jackson Road.
[directive] SUBJECT: ATTORNEY GENERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT DIRECTIVE NO. 2004-3: MANDATORY TRAINING FOR ALL LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS IN THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY IN THE FOLLOWING DOMESTIC SECURITY PREPAREDNESS COURSES: INCIDENT COMMAND SYSTEM (ICS-100)  HAZMAT AWARENESS  WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION  AWARENESS  COUNTER-TERRORISM AWARENESS  The Domestic Security Preparedness Task Force was established by the New Jersey Domestic Security Preparedness Act which was signed into law on October 4, 2001.  The Task Force is responsible for ensuring the statewide coordination of all activities related to domestic preparedness for a terrorist attack.
[directive] 2 the administration of criminal justice throughout the State, I hereby direct all law enforcement and prosecuting agencies operating under the authority of the laws of the State of New Jersey to implement and comply with the directives outlined below.  In accordance with current medical forensic research and technology, the standard SART activation period will be expanded to seven days from when the incident is reported to have occurred.  In situations where the victim seeks assistance beyond the seventh day but reports continued pain, presence of visible injury, or other extenuating circumstances, the forensic nurse examiner should be consulted to determine the benefit of a sexual assault forensic medical exam up to nine days post assault.  In such cases, the sexual assault forensic exam should be conducted.  Other Provisions  1.  Supersession.  This Directive supersedes any provisions in prior guidance contrary to those found herein.  2.  Non-enforceability by third parties.  This Directive is issued pursuant to the Attorney General’s authority to ensure the uniform and efficient enforcement of the laws and administration of criminal justice throughout the State.  Nothing in this Directive shall be construed in any way to create any substantive right that may be enforced by any third party.
[directive] If the offense occurred on or after January 5, 1994 and you are being sentenced to probation, [Yes/Tak] [No/Nie] you must pay a fee of up to $25 per month for the term of probation?  Jesli przestypstwo mialo miejsce po 4 stycznia 1994 r. i zostal(a)  Pan(i) skazany(a) na nadz6r kuratora SiJdowego, musi Pan(i) placic maksymalnie 25 USO miesiycznie przez caly okres tego nadzoru?
[brief] b., 201 N.J. 5 (2010) | | | Asbury Park Press v. Ocean County Prosecutor’s Office, | 4 | | 374 N.J. Super. 312 (Law Div. 2004) | | | Bozzi v. City of Jersey City, | 7, 8, 9, 10 | | 248 N.J. 274 (2021) | | | Brennan v. Bergen County Prosecutor’s Office, | 6, 8, 9, 14 | | 233 N.J. 330 (2018) | | | Burnett v. County of Gloucester, | 18 | | 415 N.J. Super. 506 (App. Div. 2010) | | | Burnett v. Cty. of Bergen, | 6, 10 | | 198 N.J. 408 (2009) | | | Carter v. Doe, | 14 | | 230 N.J. 258 (2017) | | | Doe v. Poritz, | 6 | | 142 N.J. 1 (1995) | | | Fair Share Housing Center, Inc. v. N.J. State League of Municipalities| 4 | | 207 N.J. 489 (2011) | | | Green Knight Capital, LLC v. Calderon, | 19 | | 469 N.J. Super. 390 (App. Div. 2021) | | | Libertarian Party of Cent. New Jersey v. Murphy, | 4 | | 384 N.J. Super. 136 (App. Div. 2006) | | ### TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (CONTINUED) | Cases | Page | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | **L.R. v. Camden City Public School District,** | 10 | | 238 N.J. 547 (2019) | | | **Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan,** | 5 | | 140 N.J. 366 (1995) | | | **Mason v. City of Hoboken,** | 22 | | 196 N.J. 51 (2008) | | | **Paff v. Galloway Township,** | 16 | | 229 N.J. 340 (2017) | | | **Rise Against Hate v. Cherry Hill Township,** | 2, 17| | ___ N.J. ___ (2023), Docket Number [...] | | | **Rivera v. Union County Prosecutor’s Office,** | 10 | | 250 N.J. 124 (2022) | | | **Simmons v. Mercado,** | 5 | | 247 N.J. 24 (2021) | | | **Telebright Corp., Inc. v. Director, New Jersey Div. of Taxation,** | 19 | | 424 N.J. Super. 384 (App. Div. 2012) | | | **Times of Trenton Publ’g Corp. v. Lafayette Yard Cmty. Dev. Corp.,**| 4 | | 183 N.J. 519 (2005) | | | **Wolosky v. Somerset County** | 16-17| | 2017 WL 1179852 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Mar. 30, 2017) | | | **Yueh v. Yueh,** | 5 | | 329 N.J. Super. 447 (App. Div. 2000) | | | Statutes | Page | |------------------|------| | N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1 | 4, 6 | | N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1.1 | 5 | | N.J.S.A. 47:1A-5 | 8 | | N.J.S.A. 47:1A-6 | 4, 22| | N.J.S.A. 47:1A-15| 7 |
[brief] PROCEDURAL HISTORY .................................................................  1  STATEMENT OF FACTS ..................................................................  4 LEGAL ARGUMENT ........................................................................  11 POINT I  THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING A WADE HEARING AND IN ALLOWING THE WITNESS TO PROVIDE A CONFIDENCE STATEMENT AT TRIAL.  (Da 8; 1T 124-20 to 130-11; 6T 113-23 to 114-8)  ...........................................  11  A.  The Court Erred In Denying A Wade Hearing Because The Defense Presented Some Evidence Of Suggestiveness.  (1T 124-20 to 130-11)  ..............................................  12  B.  It Was Error To Permit The Witness To Testify About His Confidence When Police Failed To Take A Confidence Statement During The Identification Procedure.  (6T 113-23 to 114-8)  .......................................................  19  POINT II  THE COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING THE HIGHLY UNRELIABLE ALLEGED DYING DECLARATION.  ALTERNATIVELY, THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO INSTRUCT THE JURY ON THE IDENTIFICATION CONTAINED IN THE DYING DECLARATION.  (Partially Raised Below: Da 5; 1T 93-14 to 99-22)  .............................................................................
[directive] 5.1  No pursuit shall be conducted under the following circumstances: (a) in a direction opposite to the flow of traffic on a divided highway or a one-way street; or (b) in a police vehicle in which an individual who is not a law enforcement officer is either the driver or passenger.  5.2  There shall be a strong presumption against the initiation or continuation of vehicular pursuits in areas where pedestrians are located or in areas of high density vehicular traffic.
[directive] N.J.S.A. 39:4-50(a), DWI (Check appropriate boxes)  [ ]  N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.2, Refusal to submit to chemical breath testing  Usted ha sido citado por o a favor de la persona cuyo nombre aparece arriba como “acusado”, para que transporte o acompañe al acusado desde esta agencia policial.
[brief] *Ibid.*  The IRS Revenue Ruling 87-41 specifically noted that certain professions, such as lawyers, are generally not employees.  (Rev. Rul. 87-41, 1987-1 C.B. 296, at *10; Pa19-20).  In weighing the twenty-factors, the ALJ highlighted some facts which, taken in the totality of circumstances, tipped the scales in favor of finding [...]’s status as an independent contractor—specifically, Factor #1 – Instruction; Factor #2 – Training; Factor #3 – Integration; Factor #10 – Order of Sequence Set; Factor #11 – Oral or Written Reports; Factor #17 – Working at More Than One firm at a Time; and Factor #18 – Making Services Available to General Public.  (Pa20).  Based on these factors, the ALJ found that [...] did not control, supervise or direct [...]’s work effort.
[brief] The Trial Court heard and acknowledged the arguments raised by Appellant as to alleged “self-dealing”, but dismissed the same.  T4 98:1-5.  There is no new evidence and the Appellant simply re-states arguments that were heard and rejected by the Trial Judge.  As for the GPS testimony, the Court heard the Appellant’s arguments including that of its expert witness.  It did not exclude any testimony, and it fully heard weighed and addressed the conclusions.  But nothing in the record swayed the Trial Judge who concluded that service occurred, and even considering the expert testimony and the time periods stated.
[directive] Thus, each County Prosecutor has the option to either centralize their county’s evidence tracking system for all SAFE/DFSA kits collected within the county, or provide direct oversight of the county’s individual law enforcement agencies’ tracking systems for compliance with this Directive.  If individual law enforcement agencies track their own SAFE/DFSA kits collected, the County Prosecutor’s Offices shall review and approve all procedures used by their law enforcement agencies to ensure comply with this Directive.  Individual law enforcement agencies must report to the Office of the Attorney General an inventory of all kits in its custody biannually utilizing a standardized reporting mechanism to be Directive.8 established by DCJ within 90 days of the issuance of this  The reporting requirement will be biannual and submitted January 31 and July 31 of each year.  The purpose of the biannual report is to ensure ongoing accountability for all kits collected and to accurately evaluate the timeline for SAFE/DFSA kit processing in New Jersey.  The specific reporting requirements are detailed in Appendix A.  Using a standardized evidence tracking system in each county will ensure efficiency, credibility, and confidence, in the storage of SAFE/DFSA kits in New Jersey.  B.
[brief] ---  1  Due to the limited nature of this reply brief, the procedural history and statement of facts are consolidated.  2  Da – appendix to defendant’s plenary brief  Pb – state’s responding brief  1T – suppression-hearing transcript – November 4, 2020  2T – trial transcript – July 1, 2021  3T – trial transcript – July 2, 2021  4T – trial transcript – July 6, 2021  LEGAL ARGUMENT REPLY
[brief] And the purpose of the NJCFLA is illustrated by, inter alia, the provisions requiring annual criminal background for licensees and ensuring ongoing compliance with the same, as well as those provisions that evidence the NJCFLA’s history of private enforcement by aggrieved consumers.  See, e.g., N.J.S.A. 17:11C-7(e); N.J.S.A. 17:11C-11; N.J.S.A. 17:11C-33(b); N.J.S.A. 17:11C-43.  N.J.S.A. 17:11C-18 was not meant to limit consumer remedies—the statute has a history of dual relief mechanisms.  Indeed, if the Legislature intended for the NJCFLA to exclude any and all private enforcement, the Legislature would have said so—either through one of the statutory progressions of the NJCFLA or in one of its many revisions.  The Legislature did not even though it was being privately enforced for decades.
[brief] In the plaintiff’s Brief, the plaintiff argues that “the Trial Court abused its discretion in admitting evidence related to the plaintiff’s prior medical history, falls, and handicapped placard in the absence of any expert opinion establishing that the evidence was related to either the cause of the plaintiff’s fall or her injuries.  Furthermore, the admission of this evidence in the absence of any expert medical opinion had the clear capacity to result in a miscarriage of justice because it was utilized by the defendant as substantive evidence and allowed the jury to speculate that the plaintiff did not fall as a result of the wheel of her rollator striking the low- lying tripping hazard but rather fell as a result of a prior medical condition without any expert guidance.
[directive] 1  7- Policy Statement 7- 1 7:l Preparation Form A of 7 7:2 - 1-3  Failure to Submit Form A to Prosecuting Agency 7- 3 7:3 2pp.  A Form -Request for Distribution of Forfeited Property  7 - - SOP No. County Forfeiture Program Reoorts 08 8 - 1  Applicability: All Forfeiture Program Administrators 8 - 1
[brief] On September 19, 2023, Plaintiffs’ counsel sent letters to [...] advising that [...]’s joint representation of [...] and the [...] represented a concurrent conflict of interest and requested any conflict waivers that [...] had obtained.  Da189-190; 192-3.  On September 20, 2023, [...] responded, saying that he saw no conflict of interest.  Da195.  On December 19, 2023, when [...] foreman [...] testified at his deposition in a manner that directly contradicted the testimony of [...], Plaintiff’s counsel again advised [...] that [...]’s continued representation of all defendants posed a conflict of interest and offered him the opportunity to adjourn the deposition so that [...] and the [...] could obtain separate counsel.  Da226, 90:10-92:3.  [...] refused to recognize any conflict.  *Id.*, 91:2-5.  Tellingly, later in the same deposition, [...] stated during a colloquy, “I am protecting the interest of [...],” making no mention of his [...], who was also his client.  Da237 (133:17) (emphasis added).  **F.