ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The facts and procedural history are combined herein for the sake of clarity.  2  “Aa” refers to Appellant’s Appendix.  “JRa” refers to Respondent [...]’s Appendix. vegetation habitat, there is no alternative mooring area for a boat which would have less impact on submerged aquatic vegetation and confirmed that no dredging will be performed.  (Aa0034).  The former dock constructed by [...]’s predecessor in 2006 did not meet the CZM Rules as the mooring would have impacted submerged aquatic vegetation and dredging is no longer permitted by NJDEP.  (Aa0033; Aa0021 (dark area in the photograph partially depicts the SAV impacting the area outside of [...]’s property); Aa0052; Aa00196).  [...]’s dock extension was extended in order to meet the NJDEP required 4 ft. water depth for the mooring area at the very end of the dock.  (Aa0033).  In response to [...]’s Waterfront Development Permit application, neighboring property owners on [...] submitted comments objecting to [...]’s dock.
[directive] Is the information in the flag in the CAD system informing First Responders that an individual has tested positive for COVID-19 confidential?  Yes, this information is confidential, sensitive, personal and medical information pursuant to the Emergency Health Powers Act (N.J.S.A 26:13-1, et seq.) and New Jersey Communicable Disease law (N.J.S.A. 26:4-1, et seq. and N.J.A.C. 8:57-1.1).  Q:
[brief] This is not a sensible argument; however, it is correct that the Statute’s effective date, April 14, 2020, does post-date the commencement of the period for which [...] sought payment pursuant to its counterclaim, and for that reason, retroactive application of the Statute requires some discussion.  Generally, newly enacted laws are applied prospectively.  *James v. N.J. Mfirs. Ins. Co.*, 216 N.J. 552, 556 (2014).  That approach is based on “long-held notions of fairness and due process,” *Cruz v. Cent. Jersey Landscaping, Inc.*, 195 N.J. 33, 45 (2008), because “although everyone is presumed to know the law, no one is expected to anticipate a law that has yet to be enacted. ”
[brief] THE TRIAL JUDGE ERROR FOR NOT INSTRUCTING JURY ON ADVERSE INFERENCE, BECAUSE PATERN POLICE, AND STATE FAILURE TO RECOVER, ENHANCE VIDEO OF SHOOTING, WEAPON, LICENSE PLATE IDENTIFICATION (BLACK CAR)  VIDEO, TWO MALES (ALTO RANGO)  IDENTIFICATION, FOOT PRINTS OF FLEEING SUSPECT, CLOTHING OF DEFENDANT AND VICTIM TO CHECK FOR GUNPOWDER RESIDUE MATCH.  (Not raised Below)  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
[brief] Tri-State Ship Repair, 349 N.J. Super. at 424.  “[A]s a general proposition, ‘ignorance of the existence of a cause of action will not prevent the running of a period of limitations except when there has been concealment. ’”  Hopewell Valley Citizens' Grp., Inc., 204 N.J. at 571.  Here, Plaintiff relies upon mere ignorance of the cause of action to justify its delay.
[brief] (T2 61:22-62:12).  [...] did not find any evidence of drug abuse by [...], but testified that “any use is abuse. ” (T2 67:5-68:1).  By this logic, the lawful prescribing of medication would make [...] unfit for duty.  (T2 67:5-68:1).  Guller agreed that [...] could have been prescribed opioids for pain.  [...] had no idea how much pain [...] was in because Guller had never asked or treated him.  (T2 71:16-73:25).  [...] provided a list of recommendations to the City regarding [...] including attending IOP and AA meetings, and urine tests.  (T5 19:22-2013; Pa202).  [...] would have recommended that [...] attend inpatient rehab, but [...] had already done so at [...].  (T2 47:6-48:1; T5 97:9-21).
[brief] N.J.S.A. 34:15-31.11 is often referred to as the "Presumption Statute" because it entitles an essential employee to a rebuttable presumption that her COVID-19 disease was related to her employment.  N.J.S.A. 34:15-31.11 states that:  "Essential employee" means an employee in the public or private sector who, during a state of emergency: (1) is a public safety worker or first responder, including any fire, police or other emergency responders; (2) is involved in providing medical and other healthcare services, emergency transportation, social services, and other care services, including services provided in health care facilities, residential facilities, or homes; (3) performs functions which involve physical proximity to members of the public and are essential to the public's health, safety, and welfare, including transportation services, hotel and other residential services, financial services, and the production, preparation, storage, sale, and distribution of essential goods such as food, beverages, medicine, fuel, and supplies for conducting essential business and work at home; or (4) is any other employee deemed an essential employee by the public authority declaring the state of emergency.
[brief] STATEMENT OF FACTS  Suppression Hearing  At the suppression hearing, the State presented the testimony of one arresting officer, [...] Detective [...], and played body-worn camera (“BWC”) footage of the motor vehicle stop from two detectives on the scene.  Detective Camacho testified that on May 12, 2022,\(^5\) he was on patrol with two other detectives in an unmarked police vehicle.  (2T:8-22 to 9-22)  A fourth detective drove “directly behind” them in a marked police vehicle with a drug-sniffing dog.  (2T:9-23 to 10-5, 23-16 to 22)  Around 11:00 a.m., while the detectives were on patrol, they pulled over a Jeep they noticed “circling the area. ”  (2T:10-6 to 12, 11-2 to 4, 14-14 to 18; 43-21 to 44-21)  Although Detective Camacho testified that the car had tinted front windows and a broken rear brake light (2T:11-6 to 24), the BWC footage corroborates neither traffic infraction.  As for the broken brake light, footage of the rear of the car shows that no glass is broken, and the lights are not --- \(^5\)  There is a discrepancy as to what date this incident occurred.  At different times before the grand jury, the State referenced both May 11 and May 12, a point of confusion for one grand juror.  (1T:4-1 to 3, 19-8 to 17)  The indictment states that the charged offenses occurred on May 12.  (Da1-9)  However, the BWC footage is dated May 11 in the upper-right-hand corner, and one detective clearly states on the video that the date was May 11.
[brief] ###  TABLE OF PROCEDURAL HISTORY | Date | Event/Proceeding | Filed by | Result Number | |------------|-----------------------------------|--------------|---------------| | 2-6-2015 | Complaint | Plaintiff | Pa8-12 | | 2-11-2015 | Summons | Plaintiff | Pa13 | | 2-13-2015 | Affidavits of Service | Plaintiff | Pa6 & Pa7 | | 3-23-2015 | Request to Enter Default | Plaintiff | Pa16 | | 4-29-2015 | Final Judgment by Default | Plaintiff | Pa17 | | 5-4-2015 | Final Judgement Order | Court Clerk | Entered | | 8-10-2023 | Request of Court Records | Defendant | Pa1 | | 9-15-2023 | PDF of Court Records | Defendant | Pa4 | | 9-18-2023 | Motion to Vacate Judgment | Defendant | Pa19 | | 10-19-2023 | Court Hearing on Motion | Judge | Held | | 10-19-2023 | Vacate Judgment Order | Judge | Denied | | 11-2-2023 | Motion to Reconsider | Defendant | Pa60 | | 11-8-2023 | Motion for Travers Hearing | Defendant | Pa39 | | 11-14-2023 | Affidavit for Hearing | Defendant | Pa43-45 | | 11-29-2023 | Brief for Traverse Hearing | Defendant | Pa40-42 | | 12-1-2023 | Traverse Hearing Order | Judge | Pa61 | | 12-1-2023 | Reconsideration Order | Judge | Pa62 |
[brief] Fitzgerald v. Stanley Roberts, Inc., 186 N.J. 286, 317-18 (2006).  [...] does not argue that the Court’s instructions on this issue meet the plain error standard.  The Court properly instructed the jury on this issue and this argument should be denied.  POINT V THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ADMITTED EVIDENCE OF ADMINISTRATIVE CODE VIOLATIONS OF WHICH FLAGSHIP WAS ON NOTICE.
[brief] On the Brief: [...], Esq. [...], Esq.  JOHN DOES 1-10 (a fictitious designation representing a class of as yet unknown individuals involved directly or indirectly in Plaintiff’s medical care and/or are otherwise responsible for Plaintiff’s injuries)  JANE DOES 1-10 (a fictitious designation representing a class of as yet unknown individuals involved directly or indirectly in Plaintiff’s medical care and/or are otherwise responsible for Plaintiff’s injuries), DOE PHYSICIAN GROUP, P.C. or DOE MANAGED CARE COMPANY  1-10 (a fictitious designation representing a class of as yet unknown individuals involved directly or indirectly in Plaintiff’s medical care and/or are otherwise responsible for Plaintiff’s injuries)  Defendants
[brief] Midler v. Heinowitz, 10 N.J. 123, 128-29 (1952).  In the instant case, the defendant claims the municipal court and Law Division erred in finding that the defendant operated his motor vehicle in contravention of the DWI statute.  According to the defendant, the evidence in this case was simply incapable of satisfying the standards required to prove the defendant operated his vehicle while under the influence beyond a reasonable doubt.  Additionally, because the defendant’s version of events, namely that the accident was caused by him swerving in the road to miss a deer was plausible, and his Alcotest results were not a per se violation, he is not culpable under the DWI statute.
[brief] Again, no other person was charged or disciplined – even those that made the posting on the members only Facebook website.  At the time of the administrative hearing, [...] did not testify as he was longer with the [...] because he had been terminated for disciplinary reasons.  [...] was found to have violated various Administrative Codes as well as internal [...] Rules and Regulations.  Despite his limited disciplinary record, the [...] terminated [...].  However, his termination was disparate as compared to other persons.
[brief] Plaintiff [...] (“[...]”) files this brief in support of his interlocutory appeal from the trial court’s grant of a protective order prohibiting the audio recording of a neuropsychological defense medical exam (“DME”) in this medical malpractice matter.  The New Jersey Supreme Court remanded this matter for the trial court to determine whether Defendants have good cause to restrict the recording of the examination of a non-English speaker whose exam will be conducted with an interpreter, and whose cognitive, mental health, and memory issues are critical issues in the litigation.  But the trial court did not fulfill the mandate of the remand.  Here, the trial court summarily decided the issue without oral argument or any evaluation of the factors that the Supreme Court required be considered in hearing these motions.  As a result, the trial court’s failure to consider the factors renders the decision so wide off the mark that this Court should summarily reverse and deny Defendants a protective order.  Defendants did not meet the good cause burden to show why his selected examiner’s requirement that the exam not be recorded outweighs the needs to counteract the power imbalance between a hired expert and Plaintiff, who is partially blind, speaks only Spanish, and whose cognition, memory, and anxiety are elements of damages in the case.  The neuropsychologist’s only basis for refusing the recording is a 2016 Policy Statement of the American Board of Neuropsychologists ("ABN"), but as pointed out by the Supreme Court, that policy statement is not being followed when the neuropsychologist conducts the examination in the presence of a third-party interpreter as will occur here.  The trial court failed to address this inherent dichotomy, nor why the examiner’s self-imposed restriction not to record the examination outweighs [...]’s need to preserve evidence given his cognitive deficiency, impaired memory, and need to have the examination translated.  Defendants are seeking an exam of the most private part of [...] – his psychological condition.  The exam should be recorded because it is the only means that [...] has to preserve what is said, how it is said, and the length of the exam.  Because of [...]’s psychological injury, which includes noted deficits in his memory and concentration, he is limited in combatting inconsistencies between the actual exam and the neuropsychologist’s report and testimony.  Because of the adversarial nature of the exam, [...] should be permitted to record the exam due to his deficits in concentration and memory, and his inability to communicate in English.
[brief] Jury Charge 5.60B alternatively provides that a jury may find an animal’s owner knew or should have known of the animal’s vicious or dangerous trait or propensity if the animal had a “habitual tendency” to do and act in a way that endangered the people around it.  Jury Charge 5.60B further explains that a jury need not find that an animal previously engaged in the same kind of vicious behavior that injured the plaintiff to find a habitual tendency for dangerous behavior.  But, the jury is also instructed that the “mere barking of a dog or other articulations of an animal” would “not necessarily” demonstrate a habitual tendency for dangerous behavior that constituted a vicious or dangerous trait or proclivity.  Jury Charge 5.60B elaborates that, instead of being established through isolated incidents or regular benign behaviors, a vicious or dangerous trait or propensity may only be established “if the nature and frequency of its acts furnished reasonable ground to believe that it might cause an injury by biting / overzealousness / mischievousness / playfulness / over-demonstrated affection. ”  This sentence immediately follows the sentence explaining that “mere barking” or “straining of a leash” will not establish vicious traits or propensities.  Therefore, in order to establish vicious or dangerous traits or propensities by “habitual tendencies” as opposed to “natural inclination,” plaintiff must establish that the “nature and frequency” of the animal’s prior troublesome behavior furnished reasonable grounds to believe the animal’s “habitual tendencies” may cause injury.  Plaintiffs set forth sufficient facts to establish a *prima facie* case that, when in the breeding environment, [...] exhibited “habitual tendencies” for aggressive behavior that could foreseeably cause injury.
[brief] B.  Summary Judgment Standard.  Rule 4:46-2(c) dictates the summary judgment procedure and standard as follows:  The judgment or order sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact challenged and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment or order as a matter of law.  An issue of fact is genuine only if, considering the burden of persuasion at trial, the evidence submitted by the parties on the motion, together with all legitimate inferences therefrom favoring the non-moving party, would require submission of the issue to the trier of fact.  The court shall find the facts and state its conclusions in accordance with R. 1:7-4.  Rule 1:7-4(a) provides that the court hearing the motion “shall, by an opinion or memorandum decision, either written or oral, find the facts and state its conclusions of law thereon * * *.”  “[A] determination whether there exists a ‘genuine issue’ of material fact that precludes summary judgment requires the motion judge to consider whether the competent evidential materials presented, when viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, are sufficient to permit a rational factfinder to resolve the alleged disputed issue in favor of the non-moving party.  The ‘judge's function is not himself [or herself] to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial. ’  Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986).
[brief] Id.  In response to the order setting this case for trial, the parties filed a joint motion requesting that the trial court adjourn the trial date and set a briefing schedule on defendants’ anticipated renewed motions to dismiss.  (Pa083, Da005).  The trial court granted the parties’ motion (Pa064) and defendants filed renewed motions to dismiss on September 21, 2022.  (Pa083, Da013-014, Da040-041).  IV.
[brief] A.  Plaintiff Failed to Comply With the Applicable Court Rule.........................................................37  B.  Plaintiff Did Not Have the Authority/Impunity to Blatantly Disregard the Law Division’s Numerous Orders Regarding Discovery Deadline; He Must Be Held to the Same Standard as the [...] Which Fulfilled Its Discovery Obligations in Timely Fashion..............................................40  C.  Without Expert Testimony, Plaintiff’s Case Was Evidentially Deficient and Warranted Summary Judgment.........................................................42  CONCLUSION .................................................................44
[directive] Law Enforcement Executive.  A law enforcement agency’s highest-ranking sworn law enforcement officer, typically the chief of police.  In situations where the highest-ranking officer is recused from a matter, then “law enforcement executive” refers to the next highest-ranking officer without a conflict.  Law Enforcement Officer.  Any person who is employed as a sworn member of any state, county, or municipal law enforcement agency, department, or division of those governments who is statutorily empowered to act for the detection, investigation, arrest, conviction, detention, or rehabilitation of persons violating the criminal laws of this State.
[brief] The IFPA was enacted “to confront aggressively the problem of insurance fraud in New Jersey. ”  N.J.S.A.17:33A-2.  It provides that an “insurance company damaged as the result of a violation of any provision of this act may sue therefor in any court of competent jurisdiction .  . . .”  N.J.S.A.17:33A-7(a).  Until now, courts have interpreted this provision to mean that “the Legislature did not contemplate that a claim of a violation of the Insurance Fraud Prevention Act would be heard by an arbitrator.
[directive] Hindering 2C:29-3(a)(b)  Apprehension or b.  Actor has purpose to hinder his own apprehension by concealing or destroying evidence  Prosecution or by using force or intimidation toward another or by giving false information to a law 4th Degree $1,000 to $2,500 10% permissible enforcement officer.  If force or intimidation is used, then second degree; third degree if the actor has been charged or is liable to be charged with a second degree crime or greater; fourth degree crime if underlying offense would be third degree.  Otherwise, a Disorderly Persons $500 to $1,000 10% permissible disorderly persons offense.
[brief] In appeals from final agency action outside of such settings, there similarly must be a sufficiently developed record to permit a reviewing court to engage in meaningful review.  See In re Issuance of Permit by DEP, 120 N.J. 164, 173 (1990) (relying on State v. Atley, 157 N.J. Super. 157, 163 (App. Div. 1978)) (noting necessity of agency fact-finding to facilitate appellate review).  When the challenged agency action arises in a setting where the record is too meager to permit meaningful review, supplementation of the record may be necessary.  The Court Rules provide that a reviewing court may remand, on its own motion, for supplementation of the record in order to permit meaningful review.  R. 2:5-5(b).
[brief] See Sullivan, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2503 at *4-*23; (Pa232-242); cf. Rendine, 141 N.J. at 323-337.  The court in Sullivan was bound to apply the plain language and meaning of N.J.S.A. 56:12-42 to the plaintiff’s fee application, set the lodestar in accordance with the Rendine factors and consider awarding a fee enhancement if the plaintiff’s counsel had taken the case on contingency.  Ibid.; see also Erie, 304 U.S. 58-64.  Thus, the Sullivan opinion is inapplicable and should have been disregarded by the trial court as it is fatally flawed for failure to apply the substantive laws of New Jersey to its analysis and rulings.  See JHC Indus. Services, LLC, 469 N.J. Super. at 312 (holding fee determinations that are based on “a clear error of law” cannot stand) (internal citations omitted).
[brief] In or around July 2020, Appellant requested clarity from [...]’s then Chief Financial Officer, [...], on the process for cellular phone expenses.  (Pa80, Da74-76).  Respondent Barron informed Appellant, that employees should request reimbursement through an expense reimbursement process.  However, after this exchange, a charge for Appellant’s Sprint cellular phone bill again appeared on Appellant’s PCard usage.  (Id.).  A subsequent review of Appellant’s PCard transactions revealed that in addition to the Sprint Charge, Appellant made several charges that appeared to be personal purchases.  (Pa81, Da113-120, Da404-415).  On July 16, 2020, Respondent Barron and Human Resources Manager [...], met with Appellant to discuss the irregular purchases and frequent personal expenditures.  (Pa4, Pa81, Da404-415).  When confronted about these purchases, Appellant initially maintained that all purchases were made for the benefit of [...] or were an inadvertent mistake.  (Pa4, Pa81, Da89-91, Da93-95, Da404-415).  Appellant also asked for a breakdown of what he owed Respondent and asserted any personal purchases were accidental and that he would reimburse the company.  **[...]:**  So I have given you the week transactions.  What do you think would happen if I went and looked at prior weeks?  **Appellant:**  Obviously, you have them there, so just tell me what I owe ya.  I truthfully did not realize that I was screwing up until you told me about that one the prime [ * * * ]  **[...]:**
[brief] (9T 131-23 to 132-8). but mistakenly unlocked it.  At that point, the Impala pulled alongside his car.  (2T 213-22 to 214-23).  [...] testified that after he stopped his car, his phone, which he identified in court, was on the front seat.  He testified he would have called the police, because he was afraid that he would be shot, but could not because his phone was locked.  (2T 212-11 to 213-14).  [...], who drove the Impala chasing [...], followed [...] into the woods behind [...].
[brief] THE COURT FAILED TO CONSIDER EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE INCLUDING VIDEO EVIDENCE WHICH CONTRADICTS THE STATEMENTS MADE BY THE PROPERTY MANAGER AND TRIGGERS COVERAGE  (Raised Below: Pa429; 2T: 5-6, 8, 9, 13-14)  Plaintiff has video evidence which contradicts the statements made by the property manager and demonstrates that the allegations are false, fraudulent, and groundless, and triggers coverage.  In the interest of justice, Plaintiff should be granted a hearing to present evidence.  New Jersey Courts also consider extrinsic evidence presented by the insured when determining if a duty to defend exists.  *SL Industries, Inc. v. American Motorists Insurance*, 128 N.J. at 198-99 holding that facts outside the complaint may trigger the duty to defend.  See Video (Pa526).  Defendants were aware of additional facts at the time of claim denial which triggered coverage.  (Pa249).  **X.
[brief] Section 1:1-2 of the Revised Statutes is amended to read as follows:  1:1-2.  Unless it be otherwise expressly provided or there is something in the subject or context repugnant to such construction, the following words and phrases, when used in any statute and in the Revised Statutes, shall have the meaning herein given to them.  Affirmation; affirmed.  See "Oath; sworn," infra, this section.  Assessor.
[directive] When a defendant charged with a school zone offense would be eligible to be sentenced under N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7b, the prosecutor may in the exercise of discretion dismiss the school zone charge(s) in consideration for the defendant’s agreement to plead guilty to one or more non-school zone offenses.  Cf., Revised Brimage Guidelines, Sections 1.1 and 3.11 (heretofore permitting dismissal of a school zone charge only when the defendant pleads guilty to another Brima.gc- eligible offense, and which provisions are hereby superseded and amended by this Supplenaental Directive).4  Nothing herein shall be construed to require the prosecutor to dismiss the school zone charge(s) as part of a package deal.  Standard for invoking the "organized criminal activity" aggravating factor to trigger the presumption of imprisonment in a school zone case