ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN RELYING UPON THE DATE OF THE VERDICT RATHER THAN THE JUDGMENT OF ACQUITTAL TO DETERMINE WHEN THE MALICIOUS PROSECUTION CLAIM ACCRUED.  (Raised below: Appellant’s Opposition to Respondents’ Motions to Dismiss)  The trial court erroneously concluded that the Appellant’s malicious prosecution claim accrued two years after the date of the verdict (on June 6, 2019), rather than two years from the entry of the judgment of acquittal (July 31, 2017), and accordingly found that such claims were out of time by twenty-four (24) days.  By mechanistically and erroneously applying an equitable tolling doctrine to bar the Appellant’s claims as untimely, the trial court minimized and inappropriately treated this civil rights litigation as if it were a were run-of-the-mill slip-and-fall case.  Rather than appropriately focusing on the essential guiding principle of finality to determine the date when the criminal proceeding ended, the trial court erroneously parted from modern civil rights jurisprudence and regressed to a time when courts analyzed the accrual of such claims based on when plaintiffs first knew, or should have known, of their injury.  After submitting to the conduct of lengthy discovery, untold depositions, and expert reports in the federal litigation did the Respondents finally collectively argue that the Appellant was acquitted more than two years before he filed the federal action, and otherwise chose to ignore the date upon which the judgment of acquittal was filed and entered as the official act of the Clerk of the Superior Court.  But most notorious was their failure to cite any legal authority, even to the United States District Court, which ultimately and erroneously relied in holding that the Appellant’s claims brought two years and twenty-four days after the Appellant’s claims had accrued.
[brief] *State v. A.G.D.*, 178 N.J. 56 (2003); *O’Neill*, 193 N.J. at 176-77.  After receiving these warnings, a suspect may waive his rights, but the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the waiver was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.  *State v. L.H.*, 239 N.J. 22, 42 (2019); see *Moran v. Burbine*, 475 U.S. 412, 421 (1986) (requiring a suspect’s waiver be “made with a full awareness of both the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it”).  Courts evaluate the totality of circumstances to determine if the State has proven a valid waiver, including the “characteristics of the defendant and the nature of the interrogation.
[directive] Authority to Set Bail - Rule 7:4-2 ...................................................................................................................................................................  98  Bail After Conviction - Rule 7:4-8 ..................................................................................................................................................................  98 Bail Before Conviction - Rule 7:4-1 ...............................................................................................................................................................  98  Summons or Warrant – Determination of Which to Issue - Rule 7:2-2(b) ......................................................................................................  98  Ten Percent Cash Bail - Rule 7:4-3(g) ..........................................................................................................................................................  98  13  Bail Schedule 1 STATUTES WHICH REQUIRE BAIL TO BE SET BY A SUPERIOR COURT JUDGE PURSUANT TO RULE 3:26-2
[brief] It is well-established that this Court reviews such legal issues *de novo*.  *L.A. v. Bd. of Educ. Of Trenton*, 221 N.J. 192, 204 (2015); *Univ. Cottage Club of Princeton N.J. Corp. v. N.J. Dept.* of Envtl. Prot., 191 N.J. 38, 48 (2007); In re Taylor, 158 N.J. 644, 656-58 (1999).  For all the reasons set forth, infra, this Court owes no deference to the [...]’s irrational, procedurally deficient, and fundamentally unfair action.
[brief] Longstanding case law, which treats the cancellation of divisible risks within a policy as severable, further undermines [...]’s erroneous regulatory interpretation.  In Studzinski v. Travelers Ins. Co., 180 N.J.Super. 416, 421 (Law Div.1980), the court invalidated the cancellation of that portion of an automobile policy covering a principally insured vehicle after the insured failed to pay the premium on a subsequently added vehicle.  The “add-on” vehicle’s coverage was deemed “divisible” from the already-paid-for coverage on the originally insured vehicle, creating “an ambiguous situation” that had to be construed in favor of continuing coverage for the principal vehicle, although coverage for the add-on vehicle, instead of the entire policy, remained cancelled.  Cf., Pawlick v. N.J.A.F.I.U.A., 284 N.J.Super. 629, 632 (App.Div.1995) (upholding cancellation as to a named insured, but noting that an additional insured vehicle lessor, to which the insurer “neglected to send notice of cancellation,” remained covered by the policy and was successfully defended by the insurer).
[brief] The way to harmonize the No-Fault Law and IFPA is to hold that claims like [...]’s premised on PIP benefits disputes belong in arbitration—the Legislature’s longstanding forum of choice for disputes about a medical practitioner’s eligibility or entitlement to PIP benefits.  See N.J.S.A. 39:6A-5.1(a); *Churm*, 276 N.J. Super. at 634 (explaining legislative history of No-Fault Law arbitration).  It also means holding that prior individual PIP benefits arbitrations retain their finality, like any other adjudication, and are not merely a practice run for insurers.  The statute specific to PIP benefits disputes, the No-Fault Law with its arbitration provision, governs over the more general statute, the IFPA, which applies insurance fraud of all stripes.  See Williams v. New Jersey State Parole Bd., 255 N.J. 36, 47 (2023) (“A statute or provision relating to a specific subject may be understood as an exception to a statute or provision relating to a general subject. ”); Matter of Restrepo Dep’t of Corr., 449 N.J. Super. 409, 419 (App. Div. 2017) (“It is a well-established precept of statutory construction that when two statutes conflict, the more specific controls over the more general. ”).  Moreover, the No-Fault Law already contemplates that one of its purposes is to combat fraud.  N.J.S.A. 39:6A-1.1(b).  As such, [...] should not be permitted to escape the requirement to arbitrate PIP benefits disputes by relabeling the dispute as insurance fraud.
[directive] Sanction Matrix: "What do we want the participant to learn from this?"  Behavior  Step 1.  Identify the Moderate Very High • Late for scheduled • Failure to complete • Criminal behavior (new • Unexcused absence • Missed UA event assignments crimes, drinking and • Alcohol use driving) • Missed payment • Drug use • Arrest • Adulteration of UA* • Dishonesty Response Level  Step 2.  Determine the • Moderate Very High Level 1 Level4 Level2 Level2 Level 1 Level2 Level4 Level 3 Level2 Level5 Level 3 Level4 Level 3 Level4 Level 5 Level 5 Responses (paired with Judicial Disapproval as appropriate)
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[brief] R. 4:53-7(b) – Audit by clerk  The appellants argue that R. 4:53-7(b) provides judicial oversight, and that the clerk of the superior court is tasked with auditing the accountings filed by the receiver.  However, here, as noted by the appellants, there was no accounting because there were no funds to pay for it.  That was noted by [...].  The speculative argument made by the appellants is that there was no oversight over [...] as receiver, and he operated the business at a loss for two years at [...]’s expense.  As note by [...] in his certification in support of the motion to be discharged, the assistance of [...], a hotel and restaurant operator, [...] set up procedures for the operation of the diner, and had an account established at [...] for credit cards to be processed through a merchant account in his name at [...].  (Ca19).  Thereafter, cash sales were deposited into the [...] receiver account and [...] receiver account since October 20, 2022.  (Ca19).  [...] set up the operating account at [...] so that all checks could be made through that account with monies to be transferred from [...] to [...].  (Ca19).  All cash sales were made and deposited at [...] as well.  (Ca19).  In addition, [...] retained the services of an accountant, [...], CPA, to file the necessary returns and reports in connection with the operation of the diner on an emergent basis.  (Ca20).  [...] explained in his certification that the diner operates in a building that sits on a condominium property owned by the owner of a hotel directly behind the diner/restaurant facility.  That is one of three condominium units.  The hotel directly behind the restaurant/diner is the main property, and to the south of the diner are commercial buildings utilized for physician/medical purposes.  (Ca20).  The bank requested the court to appoint [...] as receiver to help them protect any assets of the diner.  (Ca20).  [...] further explained in his certification, that while his receivership continued, on November 4, 2021 he was appointed by the court as special master to sell the property in place of the sheriff, since that was during the period of the Covid restrictions when the sheriffs were unable to sell the properties in Camden County.  (Ca20).
[brief] In summation, the State argued that [...] would be guilty of murder as an accomplice if [...] was the shooter and [...] hid the gun later.  Specifically, the State argued that the issuance of the “interesting” “accomplice liability charge” meant that “even if you didn’t believe that this Defendant was the one who pulled the trigger, he’s still guilty, because they acted together.  That he acted with Dametre [...], and that they committed the murder, and that he aided him. ”  (14T 96-22 to 97-8)  The State went on to explain:  “What does it mean to aid somebody?  To help them.  It means calling a friend to help you hide the murder weapon, so that you won’t get caught. ”  (14T 97-14 to 16)  This is an incorrect statement of law.  (14T 97-17 to 19)  In *State v. Whitaker*, 200 N.J. 444, 448-49 (2009), our Supreme Court rejected exactly this argument, holding that a person who helps a murderer dispose of a murder weapon does not act as an accomplice to murder.  In other words, “after-the-fact accomplice liability [is] an impermissible basis on which to find defendant guilty” of murder.  *Id.* at 455.  In *Whitaker*, the Supreme Court reversed the defendant’s conviction when the prosecutor argued this legally erroneous theory of vicarious liability even though the jury was given the model charge on accomplice liability and no objection was raised by the defense at trial.  The Court explained that “[a]lthough no objection was raised to the prosecutor’s legal theory, if accepted and acted on by the jury, it would have led to defendant’s wrongful conviction of robbery and felony murder. ”  *Id.* at 465.  The prosecutor’s misstatement of the law was not cured by the fact that the trial court gave the jury the model charge on accomplice liability.  As our Supreme Court explained, that charge is insufficient in the face of a legally incorrect argument made by the State: “[t]he trial court had the obligation not only to give the model charges on accomplice liability and the substantive crimes to the jury, but also to dispel the tantalizingly simple but mistaken legal theory the prosecutor offered in summation to the jury. ”  *Ibid.*  *Whitaker* controls this case and requires reversal.  The State presented the same erroneous accomplice-after-the-fact theory, which was “tantalizingly simple”: if [...] was killed, which he was, and [...] put the murder weapon in the closet, he was guilty of murder as an accomplice, regardless of his intent.
[brief] *Id.*  The plaintiff in *Cox* had incurred a debt for home repairs under a contract with [...] by which [...] had also recorded a lien on the plaintiff's property.  Analogous to the instant action, the plaintiff in *Cox*, “by virtue of his contract with [a merchant] . . . incurred a legal obligation in the form of a debt. ”  *Id.*  However, in *Cox*, “the debt and the lien, although losses to Cox . . . were not the result of [the merchant’s] violation of the [CFA].  Rather, those losses occurred before any consumer fraud took place. ”  *Id; see also Hoffman v. Asseenontv.Com, Inc.*, 404 N.J. Super. 415, 428-29 (App. Div. 2009)  (In *Hoffman*, the Court held that an improper credit card authorization was not an ascertainable loss under the CFA because it was not a “charge,” but reasoned that a charge on a credit account—even if unpaid—constitutes an ascertainable loss under the CFA; the factors considered by the Court in *Hoffman* included the loss of creditworthiness and overall effect on credit due to the existence of the improper debt—factors highly relevant here).  Thus, the court in *Cox* held that even though an improper debt constitutes a loss under the CFA, the plaintiff had failed to show causation.  *See Cox*, 138 N.J. at 23.  In the case at bar, [...]’s alleged debt is void—and thus improper—due to [...]’s first chronological violations of the CFA, *i.e.*, illegally and fraudulently purchasing the debt in violation of NJCFLA.  Defendants then committed additional CFA violations by dunning [...], attempting to enforce a void debt, collect unlawful interest, then suing her.  Thus, the improper debt causally arose from Defendants’ violations of the NJCFLA and CFA—distinguishing the facts here from Cox.  At bare minimum, the unlawful interest assessed by Defendants after the debt became void is an improper debt and ascertainable loss borne entirely out of Defendants’ unlawful conduct.  By the letter of N.J.S.A. 17:11C-33(b), Defendants’ unlawful conduct voided the contract governing [...]’s account, rendering the alleged debt improper under Cox and making any representations to the contrary fraud in connection with the subsequent performance of the sale of merchandise.  Here, the trial court reasoned simply “[t]o the extent [[...]] relies on Cox, 138 N.J. at 23, for the proposition that imposition of an improper debt or lien against a consumer-fraud plaintiff may constitute a loss under the CFA, that fails because plaintiff cannot establish the debt is improper . . . she cannot establish her claim under NJCFLA. ”  SoR p. 19 (Pa51).  Completely aside from the private right of action under the NJCFLA, discussed supra, the trial court did not analyze the statutory functioning of N.J.S.A. 17:11C-33(b)—which explicitly declares contracts acquired by unlicensed entities to be void.  Thus, the trial court erred in holding that [...]’s CFA claims fail for lack of an ascertainable loss.
[brief] Respectfully submitted, [...], ESQS.  Attorneys for Appellant, [...] BY: ____________________________  [...]  ESQ.  Dated: July 14, 2023  Superior Court of New Jersey  APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. [...]  CRIMINAL ACTION STATE OF NEW JERSEY, : Plaintiff-Respondent, : v. : [...], a/k/a [...], : Defendant-Appellant.
[brief] For the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully submitted that the trial court erroneously granted [...] motion for summary judgment.  Accordingly, the trial court’s June 20, 2024, orders should be reversed and remanded.  Respectfully submitted, [...], Esq.  Date: 9-23-24  [...] and [...]  Plaintiffs/Appellant, vs. [...], JOHN DOES 1-100 (fictitious names) and ABC COMPANIES 1-100 (fictitious names)  Defendants/ Respondents.  THE SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY, APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO: [...]  Civil Action On Appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Middlesex County
[brief] Neither the Board’s engineer, nor the traffic engineer hired by the Mayor and Council to oppose this application, offered contrary testimony, nor did they dispute [...]’s methodology and conclusions.  Defendant’s mere dislike of the accepted industry standard does not render [...]’s testimony a net opinion.  To the contrary, it was well founded, but unreasonably rejected.  Similarly, Defendant rejects [...]’ planning testimony regarding the negative criteria.  Db35-Db44.
[brief] “If a reviewing court concludes that a decision of the Commission is arbitrary, the court may either finally determine the matter by fixing the appropriate penalty or remand it to the Commission for redetermination. ”  *In re Stallworth*, 208 N.J. 182, 194–95 (2011), quoting *Henry*, 81 N.J. at 580, citing *West New York v. Bock*, 38 N.J. 500, 520, 527–28 (1962)).  Pursuant to Rule 2:10-5, “the appellate court may exercise such original jurisdiction as is necessary to the complete determination of any matter on review. ”  The Supreme Court has recognized that in determining whether to exercise original jurisdiction the Appellate Court “must weigh considerations of efficiency and the public interest that militate in favor of bringing a dispute to a conclusion. ”  *Prince v. Himeji, L.L.C.*, 214 N.J. 263, 295 (2013).  Accordingly, Plaintiff requests that this Court exercise original jurisdiction and enter judgment dismissing the disciplinary charges against [...] and reinstating him to service with back pay and seniority.  In the instant matter, considerations of efficiency, most notably the excessive delay in the ALJ’s determination of this matter, weigh in favor of bringing this matter to a conclusion.  For the foregoing reasons, the disciplinary charges against [...] should be dismissed in their entirety and [...] reinstated to the position of police officer with the [...], with back pay and seniority.
[brief] The statute and procedure outlined in the statute protect property owners from unlawful entry onto and activities within the property owner’s land.  The statute provides that only reasonable access may be granted, and the property owner is entitled to indemnification and other protections for the conduct of the environmental remediation entity.  None of these requirements was met.  N.J.S.A. 58:10B-16 provides the means by which [...] might have obtained a lawful right of access to Plaintiffs’ Property for the purpose of environmental remediation.  [...] did not avail itself of the statute.  As a result, [...]’s entries onto Plaintiffs’ private Property by its contractors constituted a taking.
[brief] In still yet another example, this court reversed a CSC determination under the *State Policy* where the “factual landscape . . . plainly reveals a need for a hearing. ”  *In re [...]*, No. A-4628-11T1 at *4.  The court explained that a conclusion about the appellant’s alleged statement “depends on which witness is believed, making it impossible to determine whether [appellant] violated the State Policy without first resolving which version is accurate. ”  *Id.*  Where the “most basic finding—what did [appellant] say?—is in sharp dispute, and the Commission never determined what he said,” this court found that “the record is both incapable of effective review and insufficient to sustain a State Policy violation.
[brief] [...] purports to have served another letter of reservation in September 2017 regarding the amended pleading in the Underlying Action.  During his deposition, [...] testified that he did not receive this letter.  (Da210 at 23:12-17.)  [...] did not produce this letter or any proof it was sent during the course of discovery.  Instead, it attached a letter and return receipt to its March 13, 2023 reply brief in further support of its motion.
[brief] C.  Exclusions  This insurance does not cover:  4.  Any obligation imposed by a workers compensation, occupational disease, unemployment compensation, or disability benefits law or any similar law; 5.  Bodily injury intentionally caused or aggravated by you . . .  [Ibid.]  Exclusion C.5., which is cited by Plaintiff in the First Amended Complaint, was amended by the adoption of an endorsement.  In 2007 the [...] through the [...] adopted the following endorsement, which is now a part of every Workers’ Compensation and Employer’s Liability Insurance Policy issued in the State of New Jersey:  With respect to Exclusion C5, this insurance does not cover any and all intentional wrongs within the exception allowed by N.J.S.A. 34:15-8 including but not limited to bodily injury caused or aggravated by an intentional wrong committed by you or your employees, or bodily injury resulting from an act or omission by you or your employees, which is substantially certain to result in injury.  [Ja76.]  It is worth emphasizing that the adoption of this endorsement is not unique to [...].  The Part Two Employers Liability Insurance Endorsement was made part of the New Jersey Workers’ Compensation and Employers Liability Insurance Manual, which governs all workers compensation insurance policies issued in the State of New Jersey.  Every workers’ compensation insurance policy issued in the State of New Jersey is required to follow the forms contained in the Workers Compensation Manual, including the Part Two Employers Liability Insurance Endorsement.
[brief] (Da7)  While [...] included a copy of his proposed Amended Complaint with his Order to Show Cause and included a copy in his appellate Appendix (Pa27), review of the eCourts docket reveals that it was never actually filed.  The Amended Complaint purports to add an allegation that the [...] withheld responsive documents.  (Pa27)  On July 25, 2022, the [...] filed an Answer.  (Pa87)  The [...] submitted an Amended Answer on October 17, 2022.  (Da10)  On August 3, 2022, [...] improperly served interrogatories and a request for production on the [...] aimed at determining what, if any, responsive records the agency possessed.  (Pa97)  On September 12, 2022, [...] served a subpoena \textit{duces tecum} on the [...] similarly seeking to determine the existence of any responsive records.  (Pa92)  On October 14, 2022, the [...] filed a Motion to quash [...]’s discovery requests, which included Certifications of Assistant County Counsel [...] and [...] Chief of Civil Litigation [...].  (Da19; Da21 and Pa114)  The [...] joined the [...]’s Motion.  (Da23)  [...] filed a Motion to Compel discovery against the [...] on November 17, 2022, arguing that the requests are proper on a common law right of access theory – separate and apart from OPRA.  (Da59)  The trial court entered an Order on January 17, 2023 granting the [...]’s Motion to quash [...]’s subpoena and a separate Order denying [...]’s Motion to compel discovery.