ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] FACILITIES  All victims of sexual assault shall be provided with a medical forensic exam and treatment in a timely, compassionate, and respectful manner.  Examination Facilities  Sexual assault victims may seek medical attention at any healthcare facility.  However, the specialized services of an FNE are only accessible at SART-participating healthcare facilities.  Adult victims of sexual assault who are eligible for SART services have the option of obtaining these services without reporting the incident to law enforcement.  And although incidents of adult sexual assault that do not involve the use of a weapon or result in certain injuries (N.J.S.A. 2C:58-8) are not required to be reported to any law enforcement agency by hospital personnel, special reporting requirements do exist for juvenile, disabled, and elderly victims.  (See Standards 6 and 7).  All healthcare personnel who provide care or information to victims of sexual assault must complete mandatory training to ensure medically and factually accurate and objective information about emergency contraception and sexually transmitted infections/diseases is given to all victims of sexual assault.  Further, the law requires emergency healthcare facilities to dispense complete emergency contraception to sexual assault victims when medically appropriate.  (See N.J.A.C. 8:43G-12A-4).  There is no fee for services associated with the medical forensic examination at any New Jersey healthcare facility pursuant to N.J.S.A. 52:4B-52(k).  These services include the following: routine medical screening; medications for prophylaxis of some sexually transmitted infections/diseases; pregnancy tests; and emergency contraception, supplies, equipment, and use of space.  Victims requiring emergency healthcare services beyond the scope of the medical forensic examination may be charged pursuant to hospital policy for any services provided.  Every healthcare facility must provide sexual assault victims with information about the services of the local sexual violence program, as well as afford the victim an opportunity to contact a CSVA and determine if they would like the assistance of a CSVA prior to and during any medical procedures.  (See N.J.S.A. 52:4B-22(b)).  If the services of a CSVA are requested, the healthcare facility shall contact the sexual violence agency on the victim’s behalf.  Victims shall also be provided with information about the [...], the [...] ([...]), and a [...] application form for potential reimbursement for fees associated with their victimization.  Victims shall be informed that [...] benefits are only eligible to those victims who report the crime to law enforcement.  -17-  ATTORNEY GENERAL STANDARDS FOR PROVIDING SERVICES TO VICTIMS OF SEXUAL ASSAULT
[brief] (Da41) (emphasis added).  Citing the same principals already laid out in Stewart, the Court held the duty to remove snow and ice from a public sidewalk is in addition to a commercial property owner or contractor’s duty to keep its commercial property safe, rather than a distinction or limitation of their duty to public sidewalks.  (Da40-41).  Here, plaintiff did not fall during an ongoing snowstorm.  She fell almost twelve hours later.
[directive] County Prosecutors should conduct reviews of agencies with concerning patterns, as well as instituting a process for random reviews of the internal affairs functions of agencies in their jurisdiction.  For instance, a County Prosecutor might direct a randomly selected agency to share all internal affairs files for cases that were closed in the previous quarter, so that the prosecutor can ascertain whether the internal affairs guidelines are being rigorously observed both in the procedures being employed and in the substance of the results.  Likewise, if excessive force complaints are never sustained by an agency, the County Prosecutor may elect to review the body worn camera footage of force incidents to make an independent assessment.  Even if the County Prosecutor’s Office finds that there have been no substantive errors in an agency’s dispositions or disciplinary decisions, periodic reviews might uncover procedural deficiencies that, if allowed to continue, might INTERNAL AFFAIRS POLICY & PROCEDURES | November 2022 69 result in serious errors in the future.  In instances where a County Prosecutor reviewed a matter for potential criminal prosecution, declined prosecution and referred back for administrative action, the County Prosecutor must review the ultimate disposition of those matters.  INTERNAL AFFAIRS POLICY & PROCEDURES | November 2022 70  Appendix O SAMPLE SUMMARY and CONCLUSIONS
[brief] Q.  Is there anything in the project documents that you reviewed in preparing your report that specifically required [...] as a chief inspector to go out and identify preexisting dangerous conditions on structure 40?  A.  I would have to look at [...]’s contract, their actual contract, which spells out what their duties were.  Again, just based on my own personal experience, there is likely language in the contract.  I just can’t remember it.  (Pa295 at T57:15 – Pa296 at T58:1.)  Rather than “look at [...]’s contract,” [...] clarified his response, admitting that [...] had no contractual obligation to inspect the entire roadway surface for pre-existing conditions.  A.  I want to clarify what you’re asking for.  There may not be specific language in the contract that tells them that, for example, the resident engineer and the inspectors were required to go out and inspect the entire job for preexisting conditions.  However, there clearly will be language in the contract, and I will provide this, that’s going to tell, state that [...] is responsible for providing the inspection services for the entire project.  That would be from beginning of the work area to the end of the work area.  [...] never provided this information.  Without more, his testimony has no bearing on the issue of [...]’s negligence.
[brief] Disciplinary Letter.  228a.  Similarly, Defendant [...] is the one who lodged the complaint that raised both the 2016 Lawsuit and three other issues.  235a.  Thus, Plaintiff’s allegations regarding Defendants [...] and [...] must be accepted as true for the purposes of evaluating the motion to dismiss.  The lower court also erroneously relied on El-Sioufi v. St. Peter’s Univ. Hosp., 382 N.J. Super. 145 (App. Div. 2005) and Spinks v. Township of Clinton, 402 N.J. Super. 465 (App. Div. 2008), two pre-Roa cases, to find that Defendant [...] was obligated to authorize the sham investigation and thus could not be held liable.  17a.  Once again, these cases should be disregarded, as they do not incorporate the findings in Roa.  Under Roa, context matters, and evaluation of the alleged retaliatory activities must be viewed within the appropriate context, against the backdrop of the Injunction.  Also, once again, the lower court ignored that Plaintiff’s pleadings relate to the method the investigation was conducted, not the investigation itself.  261a, ¶ 133.  This critical distinction was not considered by the lower court, which found that Plaintiff did not allege that Defendant [...] had any involvement with the sham investigation beyond authorizing it.  17a.  The irony here is that Plaintiff would have no way of knowing Defendant [...]’s involvement, given that the Defendants possess all of the requisite information, and only responded to her OPRA request in a limited fashion.  But, there is simply no information in the pleadings to suggest that Defendant [...] was not involved.  To the contrary, the Court was required to accept as true Plaintiff’s allegations that Defendants [...] and [...] allegedly knowingly and substantially assisted in the retaliatory conduct.  It did not do so.  For all of these reasons, the lower court’s dismissal of Counts Three and Five as to Defendants [...] and [...] should be reversed.
[brief] U.S. CONST. AMEND.  VIII, XIV; N.J. CONST. ART.  I, ¶ 12.  (ruling below at Da 17-28)¹  The logic is inescapable.  Comer was based on the Miller factors.  The Miller factors are applicable at least through age twenty.  Therefore, Comer must be extended through age twenty -- and certainly to an nineteen-year-old offender like [...].  Respondent’s brief conspicuously ignores this analysis.  Respondent makes no reference to Comer’s three-part test for cruel and unusual punishment.  That is, a punishment is unconstitutional if any one of the following ¹ “Da” refers to the appendix attached to defendant-appellant’s main brief.  “Db” will refer to that brief.  “Pb” will refer to plaintiff-respondent’s brief.  three propositions is true: (1) the punishment does not “conform with contemporary standards of decency”; (2) the punishment is “grossly disproportionate to the offense”; or (3) the punishment goes “beyond what is necessary to accomplish any legitimate penological objective. ”  State v. Comer, 249 N.J. 359, 383 (2022).  Except in an oblique way, respondent also fails to acknowledge Comer’s reliance on the characteristics of young people described in the Miller factors.  (Pb 15)  See Comer, 249 N.J. at 387, 399 n.5 (citing Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 40, 477-78 (2012)).  The Miller factors are what caused Comer to hold that a thirty-year parole bar for juveniles failed two of the three tests for cruel and unusual punishment.  That is, given the immaturity and diminished culpability of juveniles, the thirty-year bar is in many cases grossly disproportionate to the offense.  Comer, 249 N.J. at 397-98.  Given these same characteristics -- plus juveniles’ likelihood of reform with maturity -- the punishment goes beyond what is necessary for retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, or rehabilitation.  Id. at 398-400.  Nor does respondent dispute that the Miller factors apply equally to eighteen- to twenty-year-olds.  As explained in appellant’s main brief, the sci- --- 2  The Court also held that the punishment failed the third test because current trends in the law show that it does not conform to contemporary standards of decency when applied to juveniles.  Id. at 394-96.  ence is incontrovertible.  (Db 14-20)  Thus, other states are following the inescapable logic of extending constitutional protection against long sentences past age seventeen.  (Db 20-22)  See Commonwealth v. Mattis, 224 N.E.3d 410 (Mass. 2024); People v. Parks, 987 N.W.2d 161 (Mich. 2022); In re Monschke, 482 P.3d 276 (Wash. 2021).  Rather than grapple with the actual legal test and the implications of the developmental science, respondent’s principal argument is that prior precedent forecloses the Law Division and Appellate Division from applying Comer to a nineteen-year-old.
[brief] [...] further cites to Mid-Century Insurance Co. v. Freeman, 2016 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1127 (Law Div. May 16, 2016) which was also addressed by the arbitrator who stated:  Respondent also relies upon Mid-Century Insurance v. Freeman which is an unpublished trial court opinion and unpersuasive.  The Court in Mid-Century didn't address the applicability of N.J.S.A. 39:6A-1, et seq. by way of the application of the verbal threshold nor did it address the fact that the calculation of medical benefits pursuant to the med pay benefits coverage portion of the policy was required to be accomplished by using the calculations in N.J.S.A. 39:6A-1, et seq. (Da130 – Da138).  With regard to Walsh v. Starr Transit, 2008 WL 199740 (N.J. Super. A.D.) the arbitrator stated:  Walsh v Starr Transit is also unpublished and more importantly, does not involve a med pay subrogation claim.
[brief] Post-execution, Defendants continued with the process to create an RI, in order to proceed to closing.  Plaintiff did not accept that and insisted that Defendants were required to act further and obtain an RIR.  While neither [...] nor [...] believed that to be accurate, they nonetheless continued with the process in order to reach a closing date.  8T44-16 to 45-24.  From November 2019 to December 2021, there were delays, including COVID-19 and a substitution of the LSRP, but ultimately an RIR was filed on December 21, 2021.
[brief] Da61  1  This document is included in defendant’s appellate Appendix because it is expressly incorporated by reference in the Custodian of Records’ Statement of Information in response to item # 12 which requests “all facts and legal arguments in support of the Custodian’s actions …”  (Pa85)  Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Notice of Motion/Cross-Motion  Filed: March 13, 2023 .................................................................Da63  Amended Notice of Appeal Filed: October 3, 2023 ...............................................................Da65 | Cases | Page | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | ACLU of N.J. v. Cnty. Prosecutors Ass'n of N.J., | 12, 13| | 474 N.J. Super. 243 (App. Div. 2022) | | | Cent. State Bank v. Hudik-Ross Co., | 21 | | 164 N.J. Super. 317 (App. Div. 1978) | | | Gannett Satellite Info. Network, LLC v. Township of Neptune, | 12 | | 254 N.J. 242 (2023) | | | Higg-A-Rella, Inc. v. Cnty. of Essex, | 17 | | 141 N.J. 35 (1995) | | | Home News v. Dep't of Health, | 14 | | 144 N.J. 446 (1996) | | | In re DeAvila-Silebi, | 5 | | 235 N.J. 218 (2018) | | | In the Matter of the New Jersey Firemen's Association | 14 | | Obligation to Provide Relief under the Open Public Records Act, | | | 230 N.J. 258 (2017) | | | Irval Realty Inc. v. Bd. of Pub. Util. Comm'rs, | 13 | | 61 N.J. 366 (1972) | | | Keddie v. Rutgers, | 13, 14| | 148 N.J. 36 (1997)
[brief] Therefore, the change that might have made a difference -- a significant reduction of units -- was taken off the table by applicant.  Further, no testimony was offered that might have informed the Board how to craft a condition related to a reduction in units.  The Board could not dictate which of the “multi-uses” to reduce, nor was it privy to how unit reductions in each type of use would affect the number of employees or the overall size of amenity spaces, the parking needs and/or recreation needs.  The Board simply could not be expected to make those judgment calls and redesign the project for [...].
[brief] NUNC PRO TUNC This matter having been opened to the Court, by [...], attorneys for co-petitioner [...] (“the Township”) ([...], Esq. and [...], Esq. appearing), on notice to [...], attorneys for co-petitioner Planning Board of the [...] ([...], Esq. appearing); [...], attorneys for Intervenors [...] and [...] ([...], Esq. appearing on behalf of [...]); [...], attorneys for Intervenor/Defendant [...]; [...], attorneys for Intervenor/Defendant [...]  (“[...]”) ([...], Esq., appearing); [...] (“[...]”) ([...], Esq. and [...], Esq.  appearing) and the Court-Appointed Special Master [...], P.P., A.I.C.P. (Ms. Cofone appearing); and the Court having reviewed and considered the moving papers and the opposition by [...]; and having heard and considered the arguments of counsel and the Special Master, and for good cause shown; It is on this 5 day of Feb 2021, ORDERED and adjudged as follows:
[brief] Following the Plenary Hearing, the trial court required the parties to file their counsel fees applications.  (A227 Order ¶7, July 22, 2022).  [...] filed a motion requesting the trial court to award him attorney’s fees against [...] pursuant to R. 5:3-5(c), paragraph 27 of the MSA (Ca14) which was incorporated into the Final Judgment of Divorce (A15) and the trial court’s July 22, 2022 Order (A227).  (Pa21, Mot., Sep. 22, 2022).  He also requested sanctions, including attorney’s fees, against defense counsel for their wrongful litigation conduct promoting [...]’s false and frivolous “set aside” case.  (Id.)  On January 10, 2023, the trial court issued a 15-page written Opinion deciding the parties’ fee applications.
[brief] Here, all that the Borough has done is to adopt a zoning ordinance establishing zoning standards for an overlay redevelopment zone for this Redevelopment Area.  The Borough has not filed an application for the development of any properties within the Redevelopment Area (and, indeed, the designated redeveloper will be the entity that will ultimately have to file a planning board application seeking approval to develop these properties and will be seeking any necessary outside agency approvals for its development).  For these reasons, the underlying premise of [...]’s summary judgment motion—that the Borough’s adoption of a redevelopment plan amendment changing the zoning of the properties in the Redevelopment Area violates the Public Trust Doctrine Laws—is simply wrong.  Those laws are only triggered by a development application seeking NJDEP permits to build something.  While that may occur at some point in the future, it has not occurred yet.  Therefore, [...]’s Public Trust Doctrine claims are premature as no development application has been filed yet.
[brief] (Da3).  Thereafter, on November 1, 2022, the Boundary Commissioners issued their Boundary Commissioners Report.  (Pa57).  The Commissioners concluded that, “For the reasons set forth at length below, the Commissioners have reached the conclusion, to a reasonable degree of scientific certainty, that the [...] (defined and discussed below) accurately delineates the true location of the parties’ boundary line that is the subject of this dispute, in accordance with N.J.S.A. 2A-28-2 and the January 25, 2022, Order. ” (Pa57).  After undertaking their field work, reviewing historical records and preparing calculations, the Commissioners stated, “Based on the foregoing, the Commission has concluded, to a reasonable degree of professional certainty, for the reasons set forth at length in this report, that the [...] (Exhibit D) [[...]] properly identifies the true location of the Boundary Line Dispute, and the [...] (Exhibit B) [[...]] does not.
[brief] Second, the defense requested that the fingerprint examiner not testify beyond the bounds of what is demonstrably reliable.  There is no basis to claim that a fingerprint examiner’s conclusion is absolutely correct.  Fingerprint examination is subjective and subject to error.  However, the fingerprint examiner testified over and over again that [...] “was the source” of the fingerprints found at the scene, that [...] “made” those fingerprints, and that his work was checked by another examiner, which eliminates all possibility of error.  This testimony significantly overstated the reliability of the examiner’s opinion and understated the risk of error in fingerprint analysis, also violating [...]’s right to a fair trial.
[brief] R. 4:65-2...............................................................................................................10  R. 4:65-5..............................................................................................................21  www.meriam-webster. com/dictionary/approximate, last visited May 10, 2024.............................................................................................................20  | Orders/Rulings | Place in Record Where Located | |----------------------------------------|------------------------------| | Judgment entered on June 9, 2023 | Da61 | | Order, entered on January 22, 2024 | Da188 | | Order, entered on March 1, 2024 | Da210 | | Order, entered on March 1, 2024 | Da212 | | Order, entered on April 12, 2024 | Da405 | | Order, entered on May 30, 2024 | Da508 | | Order, entered on May 30, 2024 | Da509 | | Order, entered on May 30, 2024 | Da510 |
[brief] In that time and in all of those venues, the Borough never once asserted that Plaintiffs did not have clean title to the land on which the Roads were built that would prevent them from being dedicated, nor did it ever assert that the Roads were built in violation of municipal zoning laws.  Now, after Plaintiffs spent all of the time and money to build the Roads to the standards of public roads so that they could be dedicated to the Borough, the Borough has now conveniently decided to take the position that it does not want them.  That is not how the process is supposed to work.
[directive] 3.3.1  An individual’s status evolves from a resistor to an assailant when they use force, threaten to use force, or otherwise act in an aggressive manner that increases the likelihood that they may cause physical injury to an officer or to another person.  However, flight from an officer does not, on its own, qualify a person as an assailant.  When dealing with an individual who poses a threat to the officer, the individual could be considered either a threatening assailant or an active assailant.
[brief] Further, [...]’s attempt to avoid the application of an “as applied” analysis requirement based on the assertion that such an analysis only applies to constitutional challenges is contrary to accepted precedents.  See, e.g., Redd v. Bowman, 223 N.J. 87, 106 (2015) (holding that statue, as applied, was not invalid); New Brunswick Cellular Tel. Co. v. Old Bridge Tp. Planning Bd., 270 N.J. Super. 122, 140 (Law Div. 1993) (remanding to board for determination whether application of zoning requirements impair the national interest).
[brief] POINT I THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE LEGAL MALPRACTICE CLAIMS AGAINST NICHOLAS MENAS AND COOPER LEVENSON DID NOT FALL UNDER THE COMMON KNOWLEDGE EXCEPTION TO THE AFFIDAVIT OF MERIT STATUTE (50a-51a).  The Complaint against [...], Esq., and [...] (hereinafter collectively “[...]”) was dismissed for lack of an Affidavit of Merit (“AOM”) when no AOM was required, since [...]’s legal malpractice fits plainly under the “common knowledge exception. ”  Bender v. Walgreen E. Co., 399 N.J. Super. 584, 590, 945 A.2d 120, 122-23 (App. Div. 2008).  The Court below held that Plaintiffs’ claims do not fit under the common knowledge exception because of “the importance of legal expert testimony in cases involving complex commercial transactions, the structure of those transactions”  1T 37:9-11.  However, contrary to the Court’s erroneous belief, Plaintiffs’ legal malpractice claims against [...] do not allege that any of the legal work of the transaction was structured inappropriately or negligently.  The Trial Court’s fixation on the so-called “complexity” of the legal work performed is misplaced, because Plaintiffs never call into question [...]’s legal work.  Instead, Plaintiffs simply allege that within the context of a transaction, [...] received Plaintiffs’ money for the transaction, sent said money to certain Defendants, and said Defendants divided said money among all Defendants, unbeknownst to Plaintiffs.  No expert testimony is required to demonstrate that the scheme devised and implemented by [...] with the other co-conspirator Defendants intended and resulted in Defendants wrongfully taking approximately $1,400,000.00, and generated legal fees for [...] for hundreds of thousands of dollars.  No AOM is required because no legal expert is necessary to explain that this was a fraudulent scheme no different from any fraudulent scheme structured and perpetrated by anyone, attorney or otherwise.  There was no legal work, complex or otherwise, in the structure and perpetrating of this fraudulent scheme that requires an expert to explain to a juror a deviation from a professional standard of care, because the quality of that legal work in structuring the transaction is not at issue.  Instead, the legal malpractice claims against [...] simply arise out of their failure to tell Plaintiffs of their fraudulent scheme and participation in the conspiracy, and how Plaintiffs’ money would actually be wrongfully taken and distributed among Menas and his co-conspirators Defendants.  Plaintiffs do not claim that [...] negligently drafted transactional documents or negligently performed land use work.  Instead, the legal malpractice that Plaintiffs are alleging is that [...] failed to tell them that Menas and his co-conspirator Defendants would defraud Plaintiffs of a certain amount of the money Plaintiffs paid in pursuit of the transaction.