ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] 2.2  Boxing In.  The surrounding of a violator’s moving vehicle with moving pursuit vehicles which are then slowed to a stop along with the violator's vehicle.  2.3  Divided Highway.  A road which includes a physical barrier between traffic traveling in opposite directions.  2.4  Heading Off.  An attempt to terminate a pursuit by pulling ahead of, behind, or toward a violator's moving vehicle to force it to the side of the road or to otherwise come to a stop.  2.5  Law Enforcement Officer.  Any person who is employed as a sworn member of any State, county, or municipal law enforcement agency, department, or division of those governments who is statutorily empowered to act for the detection, investigation, arrest, conviction, detention, or rehabilitation of persons violating the criminal laws of this State.  The term law enforcement officer shall include sworn members of the New Jersey State Police, the Division of Criminal Justice and the Juvenile Justice Commission.  It shall include State Correctional Police Officers pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:154-4, County Correctional Police Officers pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:154-3, Special Law Enforcement Officers of all classes pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40A:14-146.8 et seq., Humane Law Enforcement Officers appointed pursuant to N.J.S.A. 4:22-14.1 or 4:22-14.4, Auxiliary Police Officers appointed pursuant to N.J.S.A. App.A:9-45(c), and Constables appointed pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40A:9-120.  For purposes of this policy, the terms law enforcement officer, police officer and officer shall have the same meaning.  2.6  Paralleling.  Street Paralleling is driving a police vehicle on a street parallel to a street on which a pursuit is occurring.  Vehicle  Paralleling is a deliberate offensive tactic by one or more patrol vehicles to drive alongside the pursued vehicle while it is in motion.  2.7  Pursuit Driving.  Pursuit driving is an active attempt by a law enforcement officer operating a motor vehicle and utilizing emergency warning lights and an audible device to apprehend one or more occupants of another moving vehicle when the officer reasonably believes that the driver of the fleeing vehicle is aware of the officer's attempt to stop the vehicle and is resisting apprehension by increasing vehicle speed, committing traffic violations or otherwise attempting to elude the officer.  It shall not constitute pursuit driving if the fleeing vehicle follows all traffic regulations after the officer activates the emergency warning lights and audible device (siren).  2
[brief] In Count 4 of the Complaint, Complainants allege that Respondent's Facebook posts that are critical of Governor [...]'s face mask mandate "could be reasonably be seen as compromising the Board and as speaking for the Board as a member of the public."  Ca201.  They further allege that Respondent "held herself out as a member of the Board on her Facebook page.  Ca201.  Count 5 of the Complaint concerns Respondent's December 5, 2021 Facebook post which contains an image of [...] and the statement that "IF AMERICA WAS FILLED WITH AS MUCH WHITE SUPREMACY & RACISM AS THE MEDIA SAYS THERE WOULDN'T BE A NEED TO FAKE HATE CRIMES."  Ca202.  Complainants allege that this Facebook post was "racist" and "could be reasonably be seen as compromising the Board and as speaking for the Board as a member of the public."  Ca202.  They further allege that Respondent "held herself out as a member of the Board on her Facebook page.  Ca202.
[brief] Pa30.  Included with the Petition were other retired Troopers who are requesting registration and amended health benefits in retirement.  Pa30.  All of those Troopers provided affidavits that they also did not receive notice of the Ricci Bill’s passage.  Pa30.  Pa70-106.  Furthermore, other Troopers who are not currently ill, but were only seeking to register for the Ricci Act also filed affidavits that they did not receive notice of the Ricci Act and were included in the Petition.
[brief] R-311  Exhibit E- Accounting of [...] dated November 13, 2020 .  R-313  Exhibit F- Court Order dated November 20, 2020 . . . .  R-321  Exhibit G- [...] letter to attorneys for [...] dated December 29, 2020 . . . . . . . .  R-323  Exhibit H- Email sent by [...] to [...] dated January 6, 2021 . . . . . . . .  R-324  Exhibit I- [...] email to Surrogate Court Clerk dated January 8, 2021 . . . . . . . .  R-326
[brief] (Pa120); *Gunton Corp. v. Diorio*, 2023 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1881 (App Div. Oct. 23, 2023) (holding that the creditor did not waive its right to arbitration by commencing a collection action and then seeking to compel arbitration upon the filing of the debtor’s counterclaims).  And second, a motion to dismiss is a technical motion, and one that does not reach the merits or proof of Appellant’s claims asserted in his Complaint.  Rather, *Rule* 4:6-2(e) simply “tests ‘the legal sufficiency of the facts alleged on the face of the complaint. ’”  *Guzman v. M. Teixeira International, Inc.*, 476 N.J. Super. 64, 69 (App. Div. 2023) (quoting *Printing Mart-Morristown v. Sharp Electronics Corp.*, 116 N.J. 739, 746 (1989)).  Indeed, the fact that a *Rule* 4:6-2(e) motion does not reach the proof or merits of a claim is evidenced by the fact that “[i]n deciding whether to grant dismissal, the complaint’s allegations are accepted as true…”  *Mac Property Group LLC & The Cake Boutique LLC v. Selective Fire and Cas. Ins. Co.*, 473 N.J. Super 1, 16 (App. Div. 2022) (citing *Watson v. New Jersey Dep’t of Treasury*, 453 N.J. Super. 42, And, in fact, “[d]ismissals under Rule 4:6-2(e) are ordinarily without prejudice,” such that Appellant, should he wish to do so, may be able to revive the unjust enrichment claim in arbitration.  *Id.*, at 17 (citing *Printing Mart-Morristown v. Sharp Electronics Corp.*, 116 N.J. 739, 772 (1989)).  Regardless, at best this is only one factor under the seven-factor *Cole* totality test and does not tip the scales in favor of waiver.  Under the *Cole* seven-factor test, there is no question that the totality of the circumstances supports the Lower Court decision.
[brief] Per Rule 4:14-2:  (a)  Notice.  Except as otherwise provided by R. 4:14-9(b), a party desiring to take the deposition of any person upon oral examination shall give not less than 10 days’ notice in writing to every other party to the action.  The notice shall state the time and place for taking the deposition, which shall be reasonably convenient for all parties, and the name and address of each person to be examined, if known, and, if the name is not known a general description sufficient to identify the person or the particular class or group to which the person belongs.  If a defendant fails to appear or answer in any civil action within the time prescribed by these rules, depositions may be taken without notice to that defendant.
[brief] Finally, the Union’s citation to *Mobil Oil*, *supra*, warrants little discussion.  Beyond the fact that the case is not binding precedent, it did not concern an arbitration in which the arbitrator clearly exceeded his authority by violating the express terms of the parties’ agreement.  Accordingly, it is of little value to this Court and should yield to the extensive and binding case law set forth in [...]’s appellate brief.  As previously explained, the case law requires that a reviewing court set aside an arbitrator’s decision where that decision contradicts the express terms of the parties’ agreement.  This Court should reach that conclusion here and set aside the Arbitrator’s award.
[brief] Harrison v. Johnson, 3.C. E. Green 420; S.C., on appeal, 3 C.E. Green 488..........................  19  Herder v Garman, 106 N.J. Eq. 13 (Ch. 1930).........................  24  Heyder v. Excelsior Bldg.Loan Ass’n, 42 N.J. Eq. 403 (Ch. 1886)..................................  18 Hill v. Middletown Bd.of Ed., 183 N.J. Super. 36, 41 (App. Div. 1982)............................
[brief] N.J.S.A. 26:3-45 requires that nuisance ordinances be passed by the local health board.  [...] has, along with many other municipalities, opted to utilize the [...] as a regional health board, thereby surrendering its authority to enact such nuisance ordinances under Title 26 to the [...].  Since the [...] is the entity responsible for adoption of health nuisance ordinances in [...] (and has in fact done so through its adoption of the Public Health Nuisance Code (Da108-109), which the trial court found contained provisions inconsistent with the Noise Ordinance), Defendants are preempted from attempting to usurp that jurisdiction and adopt their own noise nuisance ordinance.
[brief] Via [...], Appellee alleged permanent injuries to his left shoulder, by way of superior and anterior labrum tears, as well as permanent and constant inflammation/pressure on the nerves concerning the cervical spine.  However, Dr. Rizzo’s findings of objective deficits, including compromised range of motion on physical exam concerning the left shoulder was contradicted by Appellee’s own physical therapy discharge exam, defense orthopedic expert, [...] and Appellee’s other expert, [...]; these three experts found no objective deficit on physical exam.  Via Dr. Momi, Appellee presented evidence he sustained cervical disc herniations which caused myelopathy and radiculopathy.  Appellee’s treatment consisted of a six (6) month course of chiropractic care, two (2) small courses of physical therapy, an arthroscopic procedure of the left shoulder, and three (3) cervical epidural injections.
[brief] See N.J.S.A. 17:11C-33(b).  Cox . . . were not the result of [the merchant’s] violation of the [CFA].  Rather, those losses occurred before any consumer fraud took place. ”  *Id*; see also *Hoffman v. Asseenontv.Com, Inc.*, 404 N.J. Super. 415, 428-29 (App. Div. 2009) (In *Hoffman*, the Court held that an improper credit card authorization was not an ascertainable loss under the CFA because it was not a “charge,” but reasoned that a charge on a credit account—even if unpaid—constitutes an ascertainable loss under the CFA; the factors considered by the Court in *Hoffman* included the loss of creditworthiness and overall effect on credit due to the existence of the improper debt—factors highly relevant here).  Thus, our Supreme Court in *Cox* held that even though an improper debt constitutes a loss under the CFA, the plaintiff had failed to show causation.  *See Cox*, 138 N.J. at 23.  In the case at bar, the debt is void—and thus improper—due to [...]’s violations of the CFA, *i.e.*, illegally and fraudulently purchasing the debt in violation of NJCFLA.  [...] then committed additional CFA violations by dunning [...], attempting to enforce a void debt, collect unlawful interest, and then suing her.  Thus, the improper debt is an ascertainable loss which causally arose from [...]’s violations of the NJCFLA and CFA—distinguishing the facts here from *Cox*.  At bear minimum, the unlawful interest assessed by [...] after the debt became void is an improper debt and ascertainable loss borne entirely out of [...]’s unlawful conduct.  By the letter of N.J.S.A. 17:11C-33(b), [...]’s unlawful conduct voided the contract governing [...]’s account, rendering the alleged debt improper under Cox and making any representations to the contrary fraud in connection with the subsequent performance of the sale of merchandise.
[directive] 2.  [예/Yes]  [아니요/No] 하고, 귀하가 유죄 시인을 이 범죄들 중 하나를 저지르거나  미수하는 (총기의 종류)인 과정에서 총기를 사용 또는 소지하고 인정함으로써, 있었던 것을 이 범죄들 중 하나를 저지르거나 미수하는 과정에서 총기를 사용 또는 소지하고 있었다는 사실을 배심원단이 합리적 의심의 여지 없이 결정하게 하는 귀하의 권리를 포기한다는 아십니까?
[brief] (Da3182)  Relying on In re Estate of Lash, 169 N.J. 20, 30-32 (2001), the trial court further ruled that an award of attorneys’ fees were not warranted, because—the trial court reasoned—there was no third party with whom the Company was forced to litigate.  (Da3180)  This was simply wrong; [...] controlled the Company during Phase I, and during Phase I, the Individual Defendants were that third party that the trial court believed did not exist.  This ruling was both legally and factually incorrect and must be reversed.
[brief] Dismissal Order | [...] demands Order be vacated (it was -- see below) as well as below "unopposed" issue be corrected in call/email to Judge's Law Clerk.  | Clerk gave no reasoning; Judge seemed to suggest since the file was incompletere in some manner (e.g., "rebuilt") the Aff. Of Service were not in file.  Pa329.  | | Date | Judge | Ord/Judg | Description of Result | Transcript Reference et al. | |--------------------|---------|----------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | 7/7/2023 (entered 7/10/23) | [...] | Order | Dismissing Case v. State as "Unopposed" -- State's Motion was styled as one for more time (with 12-word "typo" stating such with no doubt), to which we always demure; State said they'd allow "fix" in 7/10 phone call then vigorously opposed both R. 1:13-1 & 4:50-1 Correction Motions; N.B. Opp Brief & Reply v. both [...] & State already in the case file; see Point Heading VI. | Oral Opinion at 3T-3-1-24.  Notes would be "absolutely the same reasoning" (3T-3-14) as for [...], which possibly moots lack of response due to State's "dirty trick," especially given the Opp Brief & Reply were already in the file.  States regarding unopposed, "That'sJ weird ... maybe he gave up?" (Not in Transcript -- on audio)  Staff should have called -- esp. given "Vigorous Prosecution" below.  | | Date | Judge | Ord/Judg | Description of Result | Transcript Reference et al. | |------------|---------|----------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------| | 8/23/2023 | [...]| Order | Vacates LoP Order with several guesses how it happened.
[brief] The trial court’s decision dismissing [...]’s complaint under the common law right of access should likewise be affirmed because she fails to provide any support that the common law right of access allows the manipulation, testing, or permanently altering and possible destruction of government records.  The common law right to access public records is not limited by OPRA.  Mason, 196 N.J. at 67; see also N.J.S.A. 47:1A-8.  “Under the common law rule of access to public documents, a citizen is entitled to inspect documents of a public nature ‘ . . . provided he shows the requisite interest therein. ’”  Nero v. Hyland, 76 N.J. 213, 222 (1978) (quoting Ferry v. Williams, 41 N.J.L. 332, 334 (1879)).  And while the definition for a public record under the common law “is broader than the statutory definition of ‘government record’ contained in N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1.1[,]” Bergen Cnty. Imp. Auth. v. N. Jersey Media Grp., Inc., 370 N.J. Super. 504, 509-10 (App. Div. 2004), it is not absolute.
[brief] STATE OF NEW JERSEY, : SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY  Plaintiff, : APPELLATE  DIVISION v. : Docket No. [...]  Team 02  Defendant. : On Appeal From: : Superior Court, Law Division, Monmouth County : Docket No. Below: [...] : Sat Below: : Hon. [...], J.S.C. (r/r) : Hon. [...], P.J.Cr.  _________________________: DEFENDANT’S BRIEF TO: Honorable Judges Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division 25 Market Street, Box 971 Trenton, New Jersey 08625-0971
[brief] “There must be particularized suspicion” for every individual that the police detain.  State v. Kuhn, 213 N.J. Super. 275, 282 (App. Div. 1986) (emphasis added).  The seizure of a person must be supported by suspicion “particularized with respect to that person,” and “[t]his requirement cannot be undercut or avoided by simply pointing to the fact that coincidentally there exists probable cause to search or seize another.  . . .”  State v. Rivera, 276 N.J. Super. 346, 352 (App. Div. 1994) (quoting *Ybarra v. Illinois*, 444 U.S. 85, 91 (1979)).  [...] did not see [...] do anything suspicious.  He did not see [...] give [...] any drugs.  He did not see [...] give [...] any containers that could contain drugs.  He did not see [...] give [...] any money.  At most, Taranto saw [...] talking to someone who later used drugs.  That cannot provide reasonable, particularized suspicion to detain [...].  The motion court erred in ruling otherwise, and this Court should reverse.
[brief] I believe that the [...]’s failures were palpably unreasonable because: 1) they were fully aware that the incident intersection was dangerous (due to the signage they posted there before the incident occurred); 2) they failed to consult a qualified electrical engineer to determine necessary and proper illumination levels and equipment at the incident location; 3) they failed to trim the tree adjacent to the incident stop sign such that vehicle operators were aware of the need to stop there; 4) they failed to conduct any type of regular evaluations of streetlight functionality within their municipality whatsoever; and 5) they had no knowledge of their agreement with [...] with regard to their own responsibilities in selecting appropriate lamps, etc. and coverage.  Even a simple twice a year lighting survey could be considered a minimal and necessary safety measure to ensure the safety of their residents.  [...] alleged that they did not know why the intersection was originally identified as being dangerous nor who removed the “dangerous” signs.  [...]’s actions/inactions were palpably unreasonable.  All of the opinions contained in my 8/9/19 report, as potentially modified above, remain unchanged.
[brief] In *[...] v. Smith*, 210 N.J. Super. 127, 142-44 (App. Div. 1986), the Appellate Division recognized the rule’s common law roots and its acceptance by “most jurisdictions. ”  The panel also noted a minority view, adopted in the *Restatement of the Law of Property*, § 472 and by some jurisdictions, that a grantor may reserve an easement for the benefit of a third party where it is manifestly clear that was the grantor’s intent.  *Wildwood Crest*, 210 N.J. Super at 142-44.  The deed recital at issue in *Wildwood Crest* read as follows:  . . .  Under and subject to an easement to be given by the party of the first part to the [...] for the area from the mean high water line to 150 feet westerly thereof, the purpose of said easement being to reserve said area as a public bathing beach.  This language explicitly stated an intention to create “an easement” that did not previously exist, and precisely delineated its boundaries.  The panel did not categorically reject the common law rule but, given the clearly expressed intention of the grantor “under the circumstances present in [that] case,” adopted the minority view.
[brief] The two units were supposed to arrive at the fire scene at the same time, and each carried special equipment specific to their functions.  Ibid.  [...] had received training in using special tools to break down doors, not in forcing entry with his body.  *Id.*, at 350.  The “unusual circumstances” involved in [...]’s injury were the failure to arrive of the unit whose duty it was to force entry into burning buildings to save occupants, and “the discovery of victims trapped inside a fully engulfed burning building” that was previously believed to be vacant, all “at a point when [...] did not have available to him the tools that would ordinarily be used to break down the door.
[brief] B.  There Is No Mutual Assent To Arbitrate MBPA Claims Since The MBPA Was Not Enacted When The Wholesaler Agreement Was Executed (Pa5-7).  There can be no “mutual asset” to arbitrate Appellants’ MBPA claims under the Agreement because the MBPA did not exist when the parties executed the Agreement.  See Quigley, supra, 330 N.J. Super. at 267-270 (finding that a plaintiff did not knowingly and voluntarily waive his right to a trial by jury on his statutory remedies because the statute providing plaintiff with a jury trial for his claims did not exist at the time he signed the contract at issue).  In this case, the Wholesaler Agreement was executed in March 2005.  (Pa72).  The MBPA did not become law until December 15, 2005, and did not go into effect until approximately March 15, 2006.  Appellants did not, and could not, have agreed to arbitrate statutory claims—nor waive the provisions of the MBPA requiring certain disputes to be resolved by a court—when those statutory rights and claims did not exist at the time the Wholesaler Agreement was signed.  See Atalese, supra, 219 N.J. at 442-45 (any waiver of a right “must be a product of mutual assent” and “a meeting of the minds”).  To determine otherwise, would permit brewers to force wholesalers to waive away rights that do not yet exist, and preemptively nullify any rights the Legislature intends to protect wholesalers with in the future.  The intent of the Legislature was for wholesalers to bring an action invoking the MBPA and addressing issues governed by the MBPA in Superior Court.
[brief] “We are constrained to comment on the matter in which defendant offered its proofs on the motion for summary judgment.  As we have noted, the critical documents, … were merely annexed to its trial brief.  Facts intended to be relied upon which do not already appear of record and which are not judicially noticeable are required to be submitted to the court by way of affidavit or testimony.  See R. 1:6-6.  And see R. 4:46-2.  ….  These are not merely formal requirements.  They go to the heart of due process. ”  Celino v. Gen. Acc. Ins., 512 A.2d 496, 544 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1986).  (Emphasis Added).  Based on the Sellers and Celino cases, the lower Court “improperly relied upon incompetent, inadmissible evidence” and, in doing so, denied Defendant his right to due process.
[brief] Speed limit signs or speed limit pavement markings - which is a suggestion to drivers and not a police-enforceable speed limit) - are not required in private parking lots by any absolute engineering standard.  The ITE Traffic Engineering Handbook notes too that this typically only influences good drivers who proceed at reasonable speeds anyway.  (Da27-Da28, §2.1.4 Speed Limit Signage).  Pedestrian circulation in the lot was typical for a parking lot design utilizing a combination of pedestrian routes within drive aisles and separate dedicated pedestrian crosswalks and sidewalks.  [...] advised that there was no ubiquitously accepted engineering standard relating to the maximum distance from parking stalls to pedestrian facilities in parking lots (crosswalks/sidewalks).  (Da29-Da30, §2.1.8 Pedestrian Circulation).
[brief] With regard to Count VI, the Court concluded that, “[...] and [...] have both chosen to relinquish their rights and rescind the contract”\(^{83}\) and that “because [P]laintiffs’ relief is limited to [C]ount VI, rescission of the Repurchase Agreement, and the signatories are in agreement, there are no material facts in dispute. ”\(^{84}\)  In reaching its conclusion, the Court reasoned that “[o]nly the parties to an agreement or the intended third-party beneficiaries of such agreement have \(^{83}\) Da315.  But note that Plaintiffs relied on a certification (Da336) of since-disqualified counsel, [...], Esq.  [...] was removed from the case due to a potential conflict of interest.  (Da298).  Because of [...]’s various conflicts, a certification by him waiving [...]’s rights should not have been admitted on summary judgment.  \(^{84}\)  Id. standing to bring an action to declare the validity or enforceability thereof.\textsuperscript{85}  As such, only [...] and [...], the signatories, have standing to enforce or waive the benefits pursuant to the Repurchase Agreement.