ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Order from [...] holding in abeyance all pending motions pending a decision of the Supreme Court in Barila v. Board of Educ., 199 A. 3d 295...........................................993a Exhibit B The February 23, 2022 Consent Case Management Order....................995a Exhibit C The April 28, 2023 Order extending the discovery end date Omitted see 652a Exhibit D The October 5, 2023 Case Management Order extending the discovery end date.........................................................998a Exhibit E November 29, 2023 cover letter and notice to take deposition pursuant to R. 4:14-2(c)  Omitted see 755a February 15, 2024 Order from [...] denying Plaintiffs' Motion to Amend their Complaint, granting Defendants' Motion for Reconsideration, and Dismissing Plaintiffs' Complaint with prejudice.................................................................1001a eCourts Civil Case Jacket.................................................................1032a PRELIMINARY STATEMENT  Plaintiffs [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], and [...] appeal the Trial Court's Order granting Defendants [...]'s and the [...]'s cross-motion for reconsideration of the June 8, 2021 Order partially granting their motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted pursuant to R. 4:6-2.
[brief] Q: Where is this in the bar?  A: This is a little bit west of the bar, and it leads to like an upstairs officer area, a storage area, tool room area, and there’s also an access point just on the other side of that door to a stairwell that goes downstairs.  (9T:30-8 to 31-18).  Contrary to defendant’s argument, the sergeant’s testimony largely focused, as it was required, on describing what appeared in the recordings.
[brief] PCR counsel acted precisely as would be expected from diligent counsel.  He scoured the record on his client’s behalf and brought forward the most cognizable meritorious issue he found in the case.  The State wants this Court to ignore counsel’s diligence and treat this case as it was initially brought by defendant pro se.  In other words, as if defendant did not have the benefit of counsel’s expertise.  To do so, would violate both the purpose and the spirit of Rule 3:22-6(d), requiring assignment of counsel whenever an application for PCR is filed pro se.
[brief] An appellate court reviewing a motion to suppress must uphold the factual findings underlying the trial court’s decision so long as those findings are supported by sufficient credible evidence in the record.  State v. Elders, 192 N.J. 224, 243 (2007).  An appellate court will disregard only those findings that are “clearly mistaken”.  *State v. Hubbard*, 222 N.J. 249, 262 (2015).  Review of legal conclusions of the trial court are de novo.  *State v. Watts*, 223 N.J. 503, 516 (2015).  Thus, this Court should review the trial court’s determinations regarding Defendant’s startled look and alleged flight court de novo.
[brief] *State v. Robinson*, 448 N.J. Super. 501, 516 (App. Div. 2017) (quoting *Wiese v. Dedhia*, 188 N.J. 587, 592 (2006) (citations omitted) (alterations in original)).  The trial court correctly applied the plain language of R. 4:42-11(b) in calculating pre-judgment interest from July 20, 2022, which is the date Plaintiffs refiled their case ([...] to 53-4; Da02533).
[brief] First-degree aggravated manslaughter requires that the actor “recklessly causes death under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to human life. ”  N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4(a)(1).  In contrast, second-degree manslaughter requires that the actor recklessly cause the death of another.  N.J.S.A. 2C:11–2(a); N.J.S.A. 2C:11–4(b)(1).  Both offenses require recklessness, which the sentencing code defines:
[brief] Notably, courts often take judicial notice of data such as weather conditions under N.J.R.E. 201(b)(2).  Hanna v. Woodland Cmty. Ass'n, 2022 WL 16984707 (App. Div. 2022) (Da 157); see also, Weiss v. Nicola Porchetta Co., 2015 WL 1540919 (App. Div. 2015) (allowing the court to take judicial notice of the fact that the Chief Justice closed the State’s courts for weather related reasons) (Da 166).  Here, we are dealing with a weather-related State of Emergency issued by the Governor of the State of New Jersey.  This is a quintessential example of a fact that must be judicially noticed since Defendants made an application for same and since this fact is undisputed.  See, Wisseman v. Rengifo, 2016 WL 1618659 (App. Div. 2016) (Da 172) (“Indeed, we can take judicial notice of the fact that the Governor had declared a state of emergency on the morning of the accident”).
[brief] Equally, [...]’s observation of more than one individual in the maroon sedan at the time he saw defendant, the testimony that defendant would borrow [...]’s vehicle and was looking to borrow a vehicle the day of the shooting, and the ballistics evidence of two guns having been used, all supported a rational inference that defendant was the driver of the vehicle with potentially two other occupants.  Even if these other occupants had a murderous intent, defendant did not have to share this intent.  See Whitaker, 200 N.J. at 458.  A rational jury could find that defendant’s conduct in pursuing the minivan at a high rate of speed through the streets of [...], while other armed occupants fired at the minivan, constituted a conscious disregard of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that his conduct, or the conduct of the other occupants, would result in [...]’s death.  To be sure, the State presented evidence of defendant’s intent through statements of [...] and [...] suggestive of planning.  But “[j]urors are free to believe some, all or none of a witness’ testimony. ”  Gaines, 377 N.J. Super. at 622 (citation omitted).  Thus, the jurors were free to accept their statements supporting, for example, defendant’s presence in the pursuing vehicle, and reject their statements inasmuch as they shed light on his intent.  In sum, the verdict was not inconsistent.  More importantly, the evidence and rational inferences supported the reckless manslaughter conviction.  This Court should affirm the proper denial of the motion for judgment of acquittal.
[brief] Id. at 496.  Lastly, Relator urges its cost for the subscriptions as an additional reason to deem the information not publicly disclosed.  Again, that Relator paid for the Bloomberg and MSRB SHORT subscriptions is an undisputed fact.  See Ja3896 \textsuperscript{4}  See Ja2104–05 (¶ 19 and response); Ja2191–201 ([...] Cert., Exs. 2–3); Ja2986–3004 ([...] Cert., Ex. J); Ja3906–08 (¶¶ 151–55).  (¶ 131), Ja3902–03 (¶ 144).  (Relator does not dispute that EMMA is free.
[brief] Defendant’s reliance on *[...]* is misplaced.  There, [...] raised the issue of representation four times over six weeks to multiple judges.  *Id.* at 621-23.  He first wrote a letter seeking removal of his attorney for failing to “me[e]t with him or request[] information about witnesses. ”  *Id.* at 621.  The following week, receiving no response, [...] wrote the court again.  *Id.* at 621-22.  In front of another judge at a hearing the next month, [...] stated on the record that he wanted counsel removed from his case and that he would “put in a motion to go pro se. ”  *Id.* at 622.  The judge encouraged him to do so, and the defendant quickly wrote a third letter, to which the judge neither responded nor forwarded to the judge who presided over the trial.  *Id.* at 622-23.  This Court ruled that a *Faretta* hearing was required, but it remanded to determine whether defendant waived by conduct his assertion of his self-representation right.  *Id.* at 629, 639.  The circumstances here fall far short of *[...]’s* unequivocal desire and repeated attempts to appear pro se.  Contrary to *[...]*, defendant’s sole reference to self-representation—in the emotional heat following a ruling against him—should not suffice as a clear and unequivocal invocation of the right to appear pro se.  Nor did the court abuse its discretion in declining to entertain defendant’s off-hand solitary remark of wanting to represent himself, instead of proceeding with a hearing.  The court acted well within its discretion to allow defendant to first consult with his attorney, and if he chose to proceed pro se, submit an application to the court to address his request at a hearing.
[brief] TABLE OF CONTENTS  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES  ........................................................................................................ ii  LEGAL ARGUMENT ..................................................................................................................  1 POINT I.  DEFENDANTS  MISINTERPRETATION OF THE FACTUAL RECORD AND THE UNPUBLISHED DECISIONS.  ...........................................................................................................  1 POINT II.  DEFENDANT’S ARGUMENTS DO NOT AVOID ENFORCING CONGRESS’S INTENT AS EXPRESSED IN THE ORDINARY MEANING OF THE STATUTORY LANGUAGE  .........................................................................................  4  POINT III.  THERE IS NO BASIS FOR DEFENDANT’S JUDICIAL ESTOPPEL ARGUMENT  ..................................................  12  CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................................................
[brief] Completely absent from Plaintiff’s brief is any mention of the fact that [...] paid [...] substantial workers’ compensation benefits under Part One of the Policy.  [...] filed a workers’ compensation claim under Article 2 of the Act.  [...]’s medical expenses were paid and [...] paid disability benefits to [...] in accordance with Article 2 of the Act and Part One of the [...] Policy.  Pa437.  At the time of the disclaimer, [...] had paid over $120,000 in benefits.  \(\text{Ibid.}^2\)  The payment of these benefits constitutes the guaranteed compensation promised by the Act and fulfills its public policy objectives.
[brief] I  THE COURT ERRED FOR LIMITING THE CROSS EXAMINATION OF DETECTIVE SZBABZ WHEN HE DID NOT ALLOW THE DEFENDANT TO PRESENT THE 9-1-1 CAD REPORT DURING HIS TESTIMONY; THE COURT ERRONEOUSLY RULED THAT THE CAD REPORT WAS HEARSAY.  THUS VIOLATING DEFENDANT'S RIGHTS TO CONFRONTATION AND TO PRESENT A COMPLETE DEFENSE.  THEREFORE A NEW TRIAL IS WARRANTED.  U.S. CONST. AMENDS V XIV, N.J. CONST. ART. I PAR. 10 (ruling 13T:21-6 to; 24-23)  The trial court abused his discretion for not allowing the defense to introduce the 9-1-1 CAD report during the cross-examination of [...].  Appellant's primary argument is the CAD report falls within the exception to the hearsay rules.  Therefore its entry should have been admissible.  Instead the court's rejection limited the cross-examination of [...].  Thus violating defendant's confrontation rights as well as his right to present a complete defense.  A new trial is the remedy for this constitutional violation.
[brief] Pomerantz Paper Corp. v. New Cmty. Corp., 207 N.J. 344, 371-72 (2011).  The admissibility of expert testimony is governed by N.J.R.E. 702, which provides:  If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.  The Rule has three requirements for the admission of expert testimony: (1) the intended testimony must concern a subject matter that is beyond the ken of the average juror; (2) the field testified to must be at a state of the art such that an expert's testimony could be sufficiently reliable; and (3) the witness must have sufficient expertise to offer the intended testimony.  See *State v. Kelly*, 97 N.J. 178, 208 (1984), holding modified by *State v. Olenowski*, 253 N.J. 133 (2023); see also *State v. Townsend*, 186 N.J. 473, 494 (2006) (same).
[brief] He further claimed that grout was everywhere on him following the incident.  [7T134:14-24].  He testified it was apparent from reviewing the bodycam video that you could see grout on him and [...].  [7T 134:25 – 135:10].  Yet [...] admitted at trial that he did not see any grout on [...] in the bodycam video.  [7T 135:11-36:1; 8T 25:18-27:12; DLa 004 - 013].
[brief] First, the [...]’s ordinance prohibited all above ground power lines.  Second, the application of Roselle’s ordinance was with respect to all property in the municipality (including all private property), and not just with respect to streets and municipal rights-of-way.  Westfield’s Ordinance is limited to the public streets and rights of way.  Third, and perhaps most importantly, Roselle’s ordinance contained no provision for any exemption from its requirements if the requirements conflicted with any state law; destroying any uniformity between local and state requirements.  Fourth, in *In re \(^2\)
[brief] ”  (3T 49-5 to 52-25)  The detectives continued to accuse him uninterrupted for over two minutes, but he remained silent and shook his head, so [...] said, “you’re not saying nothing . . . .  [Y]ou’re not telling me anything else,” prompting him to again deny their accusations.  (1T 85-12 to 86-4; Da 109, 03:26:50 to 03:29:10)  They continued to press him to “explain,” but he sat silently and looked away for another thirty seconds, so [...] insisted, “What? No? Yes?” and kept questioning him.  (1T 86-5 to 13; Da 109, 03:29:10 to 03:30:11)  He again sat silently for eighty-four seconds until [...] leaned in and said, “[Y]ou’re not telling me anything. ”  (1T 87-6 to 17; Da 109, 03:31:48 to 03:33:12)  After yet another minute of silence from [...], [...] accused him of “lying since [he] walked in the door”; repeatedly told him to “[m]an up”; said he was “in the way” of [...] doing his job; and then launched into a 110-second-long period of uninterrupted accusations.  (1T 88-11 to 91-1; Da 109, 03:35:02 to 03:41:50)  After an unidentified detective entered, [...] asked and repeated, “Can I go home to my kids?” but the detective replied, “You may not be going home” and continued to question him.
[brief] In response to Plaintiff’s Request Nos. 1 through 6, defendants submitted the following certified answer:  “On Friday, February 9, 2024, I personally contacted the three possible banking institutions [...], [...], and [...], I was informed by the banks’ representative that no accounts are found in these banks as it relates to [...].  I have searched all electronic and hard copy records to determine if and what banking intuition was utilized by the LLC, there are none.  The Property in question was sold in 2019, the closing records that were retained in reference to the LLC were in possession of [...], which was provided to the Plaintiffs.  I have examined the tax returns which were also produced to the Plaintiffs, to determine if the bank is listed, but have not seen it stated.  Defendants reserve the right to amend this answer in accordance with the Court Rules.
[brief] Here, defendant’s presence in the vehicle and his knowledge regarding ownership of the vehicle and the BB gun are relevant to identity and possession of the BB gun.  The probative value of this evidence is not outweighed by the fact that defendant was involved in a traffic stop since traffic stops are common occurrences.  Likewise, the fact that defendant was charged and such charges were dismissed is not so prejudicial that it would warrant exclusion of the statement.  The court thus properly determined the statement was admissible.
[brief] Applying the FAA is particularly appropriate here given the parties and their contractual relationship.  The Wholesaler Agreement covers two states, the parties are incorporated in different states, and Appellants hold multiple federal permits to engage in interstate commerce. \(^4\) (Pa28-Pa29 ¶¶ 16-17; Da63-Da66.)  In arguing that the Wholesaler Agreement’s arbitration clause is unenforceable under New Jersey law, Appellants ignore that the FAA preempts any state laws that “stand as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the FAA’s objectives.
[directive] Réu/Defendant  Advogado de defesa/Defense Attorney Promotor/Prosecutor no Formulário Promulgado pela diretiva 01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 11172-Portuguese página 2 de 2 Form Promulgated by Directive #01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 11172-Portuguese page 2 of 2  Attachment 12  Supplemental Plea Form Mandatory Sentence to Special Probation
[brief] First, [...] asserted that the monies awarded in the Vermont suit did not even arguably fall within the scope of the undefined term “damages” in the policy.  But under both Vermont and New Jersey law, when a policy does not define the term “damages,” that term encompasses all forms of financial loss that a court imposes on an insured, including sums compensating a “prevailing” adverse party for attorneys’ fees incurred asserting a successful claim.  Second, [...] argued that the monies awarded in the Vermont suit constituted an excluded “fine” or “penalty. ”  But under both the Vermont statute and the declaration of condominium invoked by the plaintiffs in the underlying case, no showing of fault was or is required to support a compensatory award of attorneys’ fees to a “prevailing” party.  Third, [...] cited an inapplicable policy exclusion for damages awarded in a suit “brought by or on behalf of [an] insured. ”  But none of the plaintiffs in the Vermont suit were “insureds” under the policy at the time that they filed their complaint.  The Trial Court’s decision should accordingly be reversed and remanded with instructions to enter judgment that Plaintiff recover $399,352.34 in damages from [...], and with leave for Plaintiff to apply for “successful claimant” attorneys’ fees under R. 4:42-9(a)(6).
[brief] For the same reasons, Plaintiff also could not prove that the City acted palpably unreasonable.  There is no evidence that this particular alleged condition had caused accidents prior to Plaintiff’s accident, and no indication that the City disregarded complaints regarding the sign.  See also *Maslo v. City of Jersey City*, 346 N.J. Super. 346, 349 (App. Div. 2002) (plaintiff failed to present evidence suggesting that the defendant's failure to repair and monitor the Borough's boardwalk was palpably unreasonable).  Here, Plaintiff did not indicate that he, or anyone else, had previously complained to the City about the alleged dangerous condition.  Although the issue of palpable unreasonableness is typically one for the jury, it may be decided by a court as a matter of law in “appropriate” cases.  *Polzo v. County of Essex*, 209 N.J. 51, 75 n.12 (2012).  Here, due to the clear lack of notice and additional sufficient evidence, the trial court should have also granted summary judgment because Plaintiff could not prove palpable unreasonableness as a matter of law.
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[brief] The trial court detailed many photographs that the defense sought to admit, and ultimately determined that some of them were admissible for the purposes of “location of the buildings, location of the walkway”.  (15T:14-19 to 17-10).  After discussing the ruling, the defense then admitted D-117 and D-118 – over the State’s objection – which were said to depict the vacant lot in the area of the police pursuit.  (15T:26-13 to 29-25).  As the record shows, defendant was also not actually precluded from arguing to the jury that police may have tackled someone who was not the actual perpetrator in front of [...].
[brief] Judicial Review of the Board’s Ordinance Interpretation  A planning board has the inherent jurisdiction to determine the meaning of an ordinance in connection with a pending application.  See, e.g., Fallone Prop. v. Bethlehem Plan. Bd., 369 N.J. Super. 552, 566–67 (App. Div. 2004); Terner v. Spyco, Inc., 226 N.J. Super. 532 (App. Div. 1988).  However, this determination is purely a legal issue that is reviewed de novo by the Superior Court.  See, e.g., Piscitelli v. Garfield ZBA, 237 N.J. 333, 350 (2019); Bubis v. Kassin, 184 N.J. 612, 627 (2005); Wyzykowski v. Rizas, 132 N.J. 509, 518 (1993); DePetro v. Tp. Of Wayne Planning Bd., 367 N.J. Super. 161, 169 (App. Div.), certif. den. 181 N.J. 544 (2004).  While reviewed anew and not entitled to a presumption of validity, courts will accord deference to a board’s informal ordinance interpretation due to the board’s unique and peculiar knowledge of local circumstances and conditions. Fallone, 369 N.J. Super. at 561–62; see also Price v. Strategic Capital, 404 N.J. Super. 295, 301–02 (App. Div. 2008).  This is particularly true where a board must interpret an ordinance as part of its review because “the planning board can be expected to have some insight into the legislative intent at the time of the enactment. ”  Cox & Koenig at § 42-2.1.  B.  Principles of Zoning Ordinance Interpretation
[brief] *L.I.M.A. Partners*, 219 N.J. Super. at 513-16.  The plaintiffs also “challenged the constitutionality of [...]’s zoning ordinance, insofar as it had been construed to prohibit the erection of dish antennas. ”  *Id.* at 516.  Notably, in its discussion of the facts, the Appellate Division stated that “the parties agree that the zoning indirectly prohibits dish antennas by failing to list them as a permitted use and by expressly stating that all uses not permitted are prohibited. ”  *Id.* at 515 (emphasis added).