ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Heyert v. Taddese, 431 N.J. Super. 388, 413-14 (App. Div. 2013); Martin v. Rutgers Cas. Ins. Co., 346 N.J. Super. 320, 323 (App. Div. 2002).  This is because “[i]t is evidence that must be relied upon to establish a genuine issue of fact.  Competent opposition requires competent evidential material beyond mere speculation and fanciful arguments. ”  Cortez v. Gindhart, 435 N.J. Super. 589, 605 (App. Div. 2014).  In this case, the Appellant is unable to establish a prima facie case of negligence against the Respondent based on her inability to establish the critical element of notice.  As succinctly set forth by The Honorable [...], J.S.C., the Appellant is unable to establish the Respondent’s actual or constructive notice of the alleged hazard, namely the unidentified clear liquid on the floor.  [...]’s ruling was not erroneous.
[brief] The [...] application proposed construction of a single family dwelling with dimensions of 30 feet x 40 feet with a breezeway attached Pole Barn having dimensions of 30 feet x 40 feet.  Ja158.  The dimensions of the single family dwelling were amended during the hearing to 30 feet X 60 feet.  Ja224 9.  The [...] application also proposed construction of a single family dwelling with dimensions of 30 feet x 60 feet with garage.
[brief] ” (Pa000001–04.)  She further alleged that Respondents [...] and [...] were “at all relevant times hereto” employees of “Corporate Defendants. ”  (Pa000004.)  She should not be heard to disavow those allegations now in order to argue that the arbitration agreement should not equally apply to the very entities and individuals that she, herself, alleged to have acted as one.  Nor can she deny that the Agreement clearly manifested the parties’ intent for the agreement to apply to third parties—specifically, [...]’s “subsidiaries, affiliates, officers, directors, employees, agents, and/or any of its clients or customers. ”  (Pa000092.)  [...]’s effort to limit the scope of the Agreement’s coverage only to [...] cannot prevail.
[brief] Our Supreme Court has long "adhere[d] to the canon of statutory construction that 'the general intention of a statute will control the interpretation of its parts.'"  Waterfront Comm'n of N.Y. Harbor v. Mercedes-Benz of N. Am., Inc., 99 N.J. 402, 414 (1985) (quoting State v. Bander, 56 N.J. 196, 201 (1970)).  Although we ordinarily accord substantial deference to an agency's interpretation of a statute the agency is charged with enforcing, no deference is required when "an agency's statutory interpretation is contrary to the statutory language, or if the agency's interpretation undermines the Legislature's intent."  In re N.J. Tpk. Auth. v. AFSCME, Council 73, 150 N.J. --- 9  The [...] asserts that since Exemption 11 "was codified in [...]'s rules, [...] has consistently interpreted the word 'routine' in Exemption #11 as only 331, 351 (1997).  "Clear legislative intent cannot be trumped by countervailing administrative practices."  Ibid.  In enacting the Highlands Act in 2004, the Legislature initiated an ambitious undertaking to protect the water and natural resources of the New Jersey Highlands, a nearly 800,000-acre area in the northwest part of the State "covering portions of 88 municipalities in seven counties," which provides clean drinking water to more than half the State's residents, against the environmental degradations of sprawl development.
[brief] In fact, Defendants failure to object to Plaintiff’s testimony and/or move for a mistrial belies any claim that they were somehow prejudiced in the presentation of their case, since a reasonably prudent counsel would object if that were so.  See Argument Point I.B, supra.  More importantly, unlike the Plaintiffs in McKenney, who had already completed their factual presentation and thus were prevented from challenging the surprise evidence with their own presentation (see id.), Plaintiff’s alleged “surprise” testimony came before the Defendants presented their defense.  See Defendants’ Motion at Exhibit F4, 110:9-201:11 (Plaintiff’s testimony); see also, Defendants Brief at Exhibits F5-F6 (Defendants’ Factual presentation, coming after Plaintiff’s testimony).  In other words, Defendants could, and did, put on a vigorous defense consisting of six fact witnesses and one expert, all specifically designed to counteract the evidence and allegations Plaintiff presented at trial.  See generally 5T and 6T.  They also had the opportunity to, and did, vigorously cross-examine Plaintiff.  See 4T at 158:17-191:25; 199:201:1-3.  One witness’ testimony stands out as a stark example of the lack of prejudice suffered by the Defendants because of any “surprise” testimony by the Plaintiff, namely the testimony of Defendant’s psychiatric expert, [...].
[directive] 법원에 제출하는 고소장, 신청 및 모든 서류들은 영어로 작성해야 합니다.  Complaints, motions and other papers submitted to the court should be in English 카운티 뉴저지 주 사법부  County  New Jersey Judiciary 검사 파일 번호 유죄 인정 합의서  Prosecutor File Number  Plea Form (Korean)
[brief] (14T 137-6 to 138-7; 14T 148-16 to 148-23)  When asked why he did not tell police those details, [...] explained, “Because honestly it was kind of a shock to me that the whole thing that was going on.  I really couldn’t remember.  . . .  At the time I’m just like all I could hear was murder in the back of my head.  Like I am being charged with murder, so a lot of the things I couldn’t recollect at the time. ”  (14T 138-8 to 138-16)  [...] testified that since his arrest, he was able to jog his memory by talking to \(^9\) [...] said he uses the term “Newark” to refer to surrounding towns, such as Irvington and East Orange, as well.  (14T 147-10 to 148-1) people and reviewing the discovery.  (14T 122-13 to 122-18; 14T 136-14 to 136-21)  [...] testified that he “bounced around” a lot that day: he remembered being at his father’s house and aunt’s house with [...] and [...] and then going to Piscataway with them; at some point, his aunt picked him up in Piscataway and took him back to Newark; later in the night, his aunt and her boyfriend drove him to meet [...] and [...], so he could go back to the hotel with them; [...] did not remember exactly where he met up with [...] but remembered that his aunt and her boyfriend had to help him into the Chrysler because he was very drunk.
[brief] (P423a-P424a).  In support thereof, [...] argued that it was frivolous for Plaintiffs to assert a claim of tortious interference without the existence of a subsequent transaction.  (P423a-P424a).  In opposition, Plaintiffs asserted that their claim was not frivolous and sanctions were not warranted, as prevailing case law provided Plaintiffs a good-faith basis to --- 5 1T = transcript of August 6, 2021. believe that they could satisfy the required elements of a tortious interference claim.  (2T 10:22-12:9, 13:6-18).6  Nevertheless, the Trial Court determined, “I do find that he had the right to bring the complaint.  He had the right to do some discovery but at some point I think that the litigation became frivolous in nature. ”  (2T 18:15-18 (emphasis added)).  Critically, however, the Trial Court made no further analysis as to when that “point” occurred, or what happened in the litigation to render it suddenly frivolous.  (2T 17:12-18:14).  Additionally, the Trial Court did not provide any analysis justifying the amount of fees awarded.  (2T 18:15-25).  Instead, the Trial Court made a conclusory finding that “I think [[...]’s counsel are] entitled to at least 50 percent of the fees that they suffered in this case. ”  (Id.).  On December 9, 2021, Plaintiffs, together with their law firm, [...] (collectively, the “Sanctioned Parties”), filed a motion for reconsideration of the Sanctions Order.
[brief] DA at 101a.  [...] officials identified concerns with the proposed route and asked [...] to evaluate additional routes, including one that would involve using an existing 120-foot right-of-way that contains a 230kV transmission line.  DA at 101a.  This route would go south from the Front Street substation and then go along the [...] railroad tracks, where [...] already has high voltage power lines, and it would not require going through any residential or commercial areas at all.  DA at 321a – 322a.  [...] complied with this request and ultimately determined that the route was feasible.  DA at 388a et seq.  [...] did not want to use this route because it would cost more money than the route they wanted through [...].
[brief] [...]  Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant [...]  By: ___/s/ [...]_________  [...]  Dated: February 12, 2024 [...]  Plaintiff-Respondent, vs. GETZEL BEE, LLC and [...]  Defendant-Appellant.  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY  APPELLATE  DIVISION  DOCKET NO.: [...]  CIVIL ACTION ON APPEAL FROM: LAW DIVISION, OCEAN COUNTY
[brief] Moreover, “[w]e must presume that every word in a statute has meaning and is not mere surplusage, and therefore we must give those words effect and not render them a nullity. ”  *N.J. Highlands Coal. v. N.J. Dep’t of Env’t Prot.*, 236 N.J. 208, 214 (2018) (quoting *In re Attorney Gen.’s “Directive on Exit Polling: Media & Non-Partisan Pub. Int. Grps. ”*, 200 N.J. 283, 297-98 (2009).  Again, [...] does not address these tenets.  If, for example, as [...] contends, the [...] is bound to apply only common-law public trust doctrine principles under the Law, the mandate in N.J.S.A. 13:1D-153(a) that [...] “shall require as a condition of the permit . . . additional public access” would be rendered extraneous and a nullity.  Similarly, [...]’s position reads out numerous terms in the Law’s purpose, including the [...]’s “duty to make all tidal waters and their adjacent shorelines available . . . to the greatest extent practicable” and “provide public access in all communities equitably” under both “the public trust doctrine and statutory law. ”  N.J.S.A. 13:1D-150(e).  However, [...] does not explain how its public trust codification theory “sensibly” interprets any of this plain statutory language, or how its theory comports with the legislative purpose directing the [...] to “remove physical and institutional impediments to public access to the maximum extent practicable. ”  N.J.S.A. 13:1D-150(e).  The plain language and structure of the Law confirm the Commissioner’s finding that “the Legislature did in fact intend to expand upon the public trust doctrine.
[brief] (7T 40-20 to 23, 42-2 to 7).  A cellular telephone was confiscated from defendant’s person.  (7T 36-6 to 10, 41-4 to 9).  [...] --- ⁴  The [...]’ DVD pretrial statement was the only evidence attributed to a person at the scene who identified defendant as participating in the drive-by shooting.  [...], though, retracted his identification of defendant at trial.  The issue here, however, does not involve whether the found [...]’ retraction credible.  The issue here is whether defendant’s attorney was constitutionally ineffective for not investigating an alibi which defendant presented at the PCR evidentiary hearing through three witnesses, one of whom was a digital forensic examiner regarding cellular telephone tower locations.
[brief] Give a concise statement of the offense and the judgment including date entered and any sentence or disposition imposed:  This appeal is from a ☐ conviction ☐ post judgment motion ☐ post-conviction relief ☐ pre-trial detention  If post-conviction relief, is it the ☐ 1st ☐ 2nd ☐ other ____________________________ specify  Is defendant incarcerated?  ☐ Yes ☑ No  Was bail granted or the sentence or disposition stayed?  ☑ Yes  ☐ No  If in custody, name the place of confinement:  Defendant was represented below by:  ☐ Public Defender ☐ self ☑ private counsel  ____________________________ specify  Notice of appeal and attached case information statement have been served where applicable on the following:
[brief] “The sentence must therefore be affirmed unless (1) the sentencing guidelines were violated; (2) the aggravating and mitigating factors found were not ‘based upon competent credible evidence in the record;’ or (3) ‘the application of the guidelines to the facts of [the] case makes the sentence clearly unreasonable so as to shock the judicial conscience. ’”  State v. Rivera, 249 N.J. 285, 298 (2021) (quoting State v. Roth, 95 N.J. 334, 364-65 (1984)).
[brief] Among other things, the trial court had already concluded based on undisputed facts that the Appellants’ losses were “the direct and proximate result of [Appellants’] failure to cure the default under the Lease with --- \(^4\)Futility of the proposed amendment was also argued below in opposing Appellants’ motion for leave to file a Second Amended Complaint.  T2 10:9-13:25.  [...]. ”  As the Court noted, “If [Appellants] had not defaulted under the Lease, they would have the Solar Rights and Solar Project, and the subject action would be moot. ”  As described below, that same logic applies to the claims Appellants belatedly sought to assert against [...] and rendered those claims futile.  Indeed, “[I]ateness of a motion coupled with apparent lack of merit virtually dictates denial” of a motion for leave to amend.  PRESSLER & VERNIERO, CURRENT N.J. COURT RULES, cmt. 2.2.1 on R. 4:9-1 (2023).  A.  The Standard Governing Motions For Leave To Amend
[brief] EVEN IF [...] WAS NOT ENROLLED IN THE CCIP AT THE TIME OF THE HOOD [...]IDENT, ALLIANT WOULD STILL BE LIABLE TO PROVIDE COVERAGE DUE TO ITS NEGLIGENCE AS [...]’S INSURANCE BROKER (PA2752-PA2754)  The trial court also erroneously held that, in the event of [...] and [...]’s non-coverage, [...] did not act negligently as [...]’s insurance broker.  The court found that there was “no theory under which [...] can be held responsible for the money [...] and [...] spent to defend and settle the Hood Lawsuit.
[brief] [...] is paid by [...] by trip.  (Pa00065, Pa00066, Pa00069, Pa00078, Pa00088).  [...] provides no specific instructions regarding how much time Mr. [...] should spend shopping, how many other clients he could simultaneously shop for, nor what type of vehicle he uses to transport the goods.  (Pa00070, Pa00076, Pa00082, Pa00083, Pa00086)  [...] did not retain the right to control how the work was completed.
[brief] A. 2A:53A-41(a)).  Lomando 667 F.3d at 380 - 381.  More recently, in Wiggins v. Hackensack Meridian Health, 478 N.J. Super. 355 (App. Div. 2024), the Appellate Division again was tasked with reviewing the adequacy of an AOM.  In Wiggins defendant doctor was board certified in internal medicine and gastroenterology and the care at issue involved those specialties.  Wiggins, 478 N.J. Super. at 359.  Plaintiff served an AOM from an affiant who only specialized in internal medicine, not gastroenterology.  The Appellate Division ultimately held that "plaintiffs' submission of only [...]'s AOM as an internist did not comply with the underlying purpose of the Act and did not suffice to support the continuation of the lawsuit."  Id, at 374.  Similar to Pfannenstei n, the Appellate Division reinforced the purpose of the AMS and the Nicholas ruling that "[w]hen a physician is a specialist and the basis of the malpractice action 'involves' the physician's specialty, the challenging expert must practice in the same specialty."
[brief] Both allegations were ultimately rejected in full.  Even when the Plaintiff was told that certain of his contentions lacked merit, Plaintiff continued to argue.  For example, [...], in his summary judgment ruling on May 8, 2014, had rejected Plaintiff’s argument that another entity, [...], contained assets that were a part of the Estate, but Plaintiff continued vociferously make that argument throughout the litigation.  Plaintiff also continuously argued that the Administrator should search for Estate assets in Hawaii clearly outside of the jurisdiction of the New Jersey courts, until the Administrator told him in no uncertain terms that the proper procedure was for him to file a petition in Hawaii for the appointment of an administrator there.  As was set forth, supra., the Plaintiff thereafter filed a petition in Hawaii, an administrator was appointed, and, after a search, the administrator concluded that there were no assets in Hawaii belonging to the Estate.  The court also improperly awarded in full $309,760.71 in fees billed by [...], a New York law firm that had not appeared in the New Jersey action, and whose work was duplicative of the work of the attorneys of record.
[directive] 15.  Você está ciente de que terá que pagar uma restituição se o juiz concluir que há uma [Sim/Yes]  [Não/No]  [NC/NA] vítima que sofreu danos e se o juiz concluir que você é capaz ou será capaz no futuro de pagar a restituição?  Are you aware that you must pay restitution if the court finds there is a victim who has suffered a loss and if the court finds that you are able or will be able in the future to pay restitution?
[brief] On August 25, 2023, oral argument on the motion was heard.  On September 26, 2023, [...] denied plaintiffs’ motion, without deciding the issue of whether the arbitration clause is invalid under Atalese.  She reiterated her denial in an October 24, 2023 Order on plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration.  Plaintiffs filed a notice of appeal from [...]’s Orders on the grounds that they effectively compelled arbitration.  In moving to dismiss the appeal, defendants took the position that neither Order by [...] had determined whether the arbitration clause is invalid under Atalese.  On January 11, 2024, this Court granted defendants’ motion to dismiss the appeal, holding that in those Orders "the trial court did not make a substantive decision on the enforceability of the arbitration clause at issue” and that the appellate panel was “confident” that “defendants’ motion to dismiss or to compel arbitration… will result in a determination by the trial court of whether the arbitration clause at issue is enforceable and orders either compelling or denying arbitration, which can be appealed pursuant to R. 2:2-3(b)(8).
[brief] Because the Court’s reasoning in finding and weighing aggravating factors three and nine and mitigating factor fourteen and in declining mitigating factor nine failed to address the extremely relevant adolescent brain science and age-crime curve, the Court’s findings were not supported by competent, credible evidence in the record.  In both his brief and at oral argument, defense counsel cited scientific articles concerning: (1) the underdeveloped prefrontal cortex prior to age twenty-five and the corresponding recklessness and impulsivity of young people in that age bracket; and (2) the age-crime curve.  Defense counsel argued that this science—coupled with the six years [...] had aged from committing the offense at nineteen to his age of twenty-five at the time of resentencing—supported his arguments that (1) the Court should either not find aggravating factors three and nine or at least give them much less weight; and (2) the Court should find mitigating factor nine and place great weight on mitigating factor fourteen.  (Da70-75; 8T 25-8 to 27-17)
[brief] [...], 311 N.J. Super. at 335.  This court reversed the Board, holding “that the two-year standard of N.J.S.A. 43:16A-3(3) is not jurisdictional, especially in the circumstances presented” in the particular matter.  Id. at 337-38.  Specifically, in his LAD action, [...]’s position was that he was not disabled from his employment with a reasonable accommodation.  *Id.* at 335.  To be considered for Ordinary Disability, [...] was required to certify he is disabled.  *Id.* at 336.  Thus, [...] was legally barred by the operation of “the doctrine of judicial estoppel” from filing his application for Ordinary Disability while his LAD action was pending.
[brief] Decision to Run the Sentence on Indictment  [...]  Consecutive to the Sentence on Indictment [...] ........................................................Da44-52  Judgment of Conviction (March 2, 2018) ........................................Da28-31  INDEX TO APPENDIX  Essex County Indictment No. [...] .........................................................Da1-3  Verdict Sheet ........................................................................................................Da4  Judgment of Conviction for Initial Sentencing - February 3, 2012 (Indictment No. [...], count 1)  ..............................................................Da5-7
[directive] To address the question of criminal liability, Attorney General [...] on April 11, 2020 issued Attorney General Law Enforcement Directive No. 2020-03.  That Directive provides, in relevant part:  1.  No prosecuting agency in New Jersey shall bring a criminal prosecution against any health care facility that adopts the Department of Health’s model policy Allocation of Critical Care Resources  During a Public Health Emergency, or against any of the health care facility’s agents, officers, employees, servants, representatives or volunteers, arising from an injury to a patient caused by any act or omission pursuant to, and consistent with, such policy.  2.  No prosecuting agency in New Jersey shall bring a criminal prosecution against any healthcare provider, including but not limited to a doctor, nurse, or hospital, for any act or omission in contravention of such an allocation policy without the approval of the Attorney General.  Following these actions by the Executive Branch, the Legislature codified an additional measure of civil and criminal immunity for healthcare providers in P.L.2020, c.18 (approved April 14, 2020, retroactive to March 9, 2020).
[brief] Nowosleska v. Steele, 400 N.J. Super. 297 (App. Div. 2008)  ....................................................................................9, 10, 20  In re R.D., 384 N.J. Super. 61 (App. Div. 2006)  .......................................................................................10, 11  Sisler v. Gannett Co., Inc., 104 N.J. 256 (1986)  ..................................................................................................................12, 19 State, ex rel. T.M., 412 N.J. Super. 225 (App. Div. 2010)  ......................................................................................25  Stoney v. Maple Shade Twp., 426 N.J. Super. 297 (App. Div. 2012)  .....................................................................................24  Turner v. Wong, 363 N.J. Super. 186 (App. Div. 2003)  ......................................................................................13  US Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Guillaume, 209 N.J. 449 (2012) ..................................................................................................................8  Zwebner v. Coughlin, 2006 WL 8455423 (S.D.  Cal. Jan. 25, 2006) ........................................................................15  Statutes N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:15-59.1 ........................................................................................................26  N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:53A-49 ........................................................................................................5 N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:53A-50 ........................................................................................................13 N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:53A-51 ........................................................................................................13 N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:53A-52 ........................................................................................................13 N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:53A-53 .................................................................13 N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:53A-55.................................................................13, 14, 17 N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:53A-58...............................................................3, 17, 23 Other Authorities Press Release, [...], Governor, State of New Jersey, Governor Murphy Signs Bipartisan Bill Protecting Against Lawsuits Designed to Suppress Free Speech (Sept. 7, 2023) ..............................................12