ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] And I think the charge does satisfy.  We talked about it.  But yes, that’s why I wanted to bring it up. ” (13T45-14 to 16).  The AP had to revisit this testimony after the sidebar due to a failure by the trial court to “unmute. ”  Defense counsel did not object to [...]’s testimony this time, allowing the doctor to testify that this text message, along with “all of the other pieces of evidence” allowed him to “build [his] own time frame around what’s happening with the defendant in the months leading up to the crime. ” (13T47-10 to 48-23).  Thus, the totality of this testimony made clear that [...] relied upon these text messages, along with all of the evidence he reviewed, to form his opinion.  As all of defendant’s current challenges to [...]’s testimony are factually unsupported, they should be rejected by this Court as a basis for reversal.  Defendant’s conviction should be affirmed.
[brief] He testifies that of the records he reviewed, there are no tax bills or tax revenues for Lot 3 or Lot 3.01 (4T25:23).  He testifies that the earliest date in D-7 is 1970 and the record goes through 2015 (4T27:1-8).  He testifies that on the third page back from D-7 there is a property two-thirds of the way down that says: “Block 10, Lot 1-A” and upon counsel’s questioning it is his understanding that this was the former designation of this property (pre-1980) (4T29:1).  He has no evidence of any other taxpayer making payments on Lot 3 or Lot 3.01 (4T29:16).  Lot 3 contains a municipal parking lot, a bay walk, which is a wooden boardwalk for the public that was built with Green Acres funding.
[brief] First, the trial court found that the prerequisite for making a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict under *Rule* 4:40-2 had not been met.  The rule contemplates a renewal of a motion, which was not present here—there was never a motion for judgment, or an equivalent, made before the verdict.  Accordingly, the motion JNOV was denied.  The trial court also denied Plaintiff’s Motion for a New Trial, brought under the high standard of *Rule* 4:49-1.  The trial court correctly recognized that it could “not sit as the eighth juror” and that upon a motion for new trial, it is not a matter of what the court would decide, but rather whether there was *clear and convincing* evidence that that the jury’s verdict was so against the weight of the evidence such that no reasonable jury could come to the conclusions it reached.  As the trial court observed, “[i]t is not for the Court to substitute its assessment of the credibility of the witnesses, or the proofs adduced at the trial. ”  Here, the jury had sufficient evidence to make a determination as to each of the questions on the verdict sheet.  The trial court found the jury was attentive and, after being instructed on the law, they considered the facts and made credibility determinations that resulted in a defense verdict on each.  Plaintiff’s Motion JNOV or for a New Trial was properly denied.  Respectfully, the trial court’s October 6, 2023 Order denying Plaintiff’s Motion for JNOV or for a New Trial must be affirmed.
[brief] The court must determine by inquiry of the defendant and others that the plea is being made voluntarily, with a full understanding of the nature of the charge and the consequences of the plea.  Moreover, the court must be satisfied that there exists a factual basis for the guilty plea.  The defendant must admit to the violation of the law and all of its elements.  In State v. Barboza, 115 N.J. 415 (1989), the Supreme Court acknowledged that a defendant who pleads guilty waives important constitutional rights.  This is why the Rules of Court have been designed to assure that a guilty plea be entered voluntarily, with a full understanding of the nature of the charges and the penal consequences of the sentence to be imposed.  The recitation of the factual basis for the plea allows the court to ascertain whether the defendant is actually guilty of the offense charged.  A plea of guilty that is entered under circumstances that are not voluntary and knowing violates the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  McCarthy v. U.S., 394 U.S. 459 (1969).  It is for this reason that New Jersey law permits a defendant who has entered a plea of guilty without a sufficient factual basis to support it to vacate the plea through a post-conviction relief (PCR) application.  Rodriguez v. Rosenblatt, 58 N.J. 281 (1971).
[brief] There would be 29 residential units located on same, which equates to development at a density of 49 units per acre [29 units/0.59 acre].  The non-residential component, which previously comprised 951 sq. ft. of office space, had been increased to include 1,180 sq. ft. of office space and 1,246 sq. ft. of retail space:  7.  ...  the Board continues to believe that the proposed development is not particularly suitable for the subject property.
[brief] THERE WERE NO CUMULATIVE ERRORS WHICH WARRANT THE REVERSAL OF DEFENDANT’S CONVICTIONS.  (Responds to Defendant’s POINT III).  Defendant contends that the purported errors outlined in POINT I and POINT II of his brief in the aggregate deprived him of a fair trial. \(^6\)  When multiple errors are alleged, "the predicate for relief for cumulative error must be that the probable effect of the cumulative error was to render the underlying trial unfair."  *State v. Wakefield*, 190 N.J. 397, 538 (2007).  However, even where a defendant alleges multiple errors, "the theory of cumulative error will still not apply where no error was prejudicial and the trial was fair."  *State v. Weaver*, 219 N.J. 131, 155 (2014).  Given that there were no trial errors regarding defendant’s ability to argue third-party guilt or [...]’s testimony, there was no cumulative effect that denied defendant a fair trial.  Defendant’s argument that his inability to present evidence of third-party guilt and [...]’s cell phone mapping testimony cumulatively prohibited him from receiving a fair trial is contradicted by the evidence.  The “inconsistencies” defendant argued were present in [...] and [...] testimony are unpersuasive.  Instead, as argued by the State in its closing, the jury \(^6\)  At the time of the filing of his initial brief, defendant had not raised the argument included in his pro se brief.  The state assumes defendant includes the argument he raises in POINT I of his pro se brief as part of the cumulative error he alleges. was presented with a plethora of evidence that corroborated [...] and [...] testimony and statements to police and increased their overall credibility as witnesses.  Further, as argued above, the State presented additional circumstantial evidence to place defendant in Willingboro at and around the time of the murder, and there was insufficient evidence in the record to suggest there was possibly a third-party who committed the crime.  Similarly, defendant failed to establish his Sixth Amendment rights were violated.  Defendant’s argument that his conviction should be reversed due to cumulative error should be denied because he fails to establish that there were any trial errors, let alone trial errors that were so cumulatively prejudicial that the jury’s verdict should be disrupted.
[brief] [...]'s argument in opposition to reversal essentially boils down to purported claim that Plaintiffs' litigation claims were properly barred since Plaintiffs "benefited" from the unauthorized taking, excavation, and other activities that occurred on Plaintiffs' property without authorization or consent.  First and foremost, the claim that Plaintiffs obtained a benefit has never been adjudicated by the trial court below.  While Plaintiffs acknowledge there has been some form of environmental remediation, the remediation, to date, remains ongoing, and the current status of the remediation is not entirely clear.  The [...] never supplied an expert report that its activities resulted in a net benefit to the Plaintiffs, and whatever benefit may have been conferred is entirely speculative.  Second, whether or not Plaintiffs may or may not have received a benefit is entirely irrelevant as to whether or not there was a taking.
[brief] “[T]he tax exemption laws exist to incentivize private developers to invest in the development of a property or area of a municipality in a manner that may not be economically viable without a financial incentive. ”  Municipal Tax Abatement Handbook, Department of Community Affairs at 5.  A 2010 report by the Office of the State Comptroller entitled A Programmatic Examination of Municipal Tax Abatements, (OSC Report) makes the same point:  “While abatement of taxes otherwise owed is uniformly positive from the perspective of the developer, it results at least in the short term in lost revenues for  The “findings” made by the Township likewise confirm that the Township understood the test of “appropriateness” under 40A:20-11 to be whether the exemption is necessary to make the development happen.
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY EXERCISED ITS EQUITABLE DISCRETION IN REFORMING THE REDEVELOPMENT AGREEMENT AND OPERATING AGREEMENT  “[E]quity will generally conform to established rules and precedents, and will not change or unsettle rights that are created and defined by existing legal principles. ”  *Dunkin’ Donuts of Am., Inc. v. Middletown Donut Corp.*, 100 N.J. 166, 183 (1985), citing S. Symons, 2 J. Pomeroy *Equity Jurisprudence*, § 425 at 188 (5th ed. 1941); 27 Am.Jur.2d, *Equity* § 123 at 649 (1966); 30 *C.J.S.*, *Equity* § 103 at 1066 (1965).  See, Da458-Da459.  While the trial court sought to craft an “equitable” remedy in this instance, the reformation ordered by the March 15, 2024 Order defied settled legal principles, by which a court of equity is bound.  “This is the basis for the equitable maxim ‘equity follows the law,’ which instructs that as a rule a court of equity will follow the legislative and common-law regulations of rights, and also obligations of contract. ”  *Dunkin’ Donuts of Am., Inc.*, 100 N.J. at 183, citing *Natovitz v. Bay Head Realty Co.*, 142 N.J.Eq. 456, 463–64 (E. & A.1948) .  “[T]he settled precedent is that in the absence of fraud, accident, or mistake, a court of equity cannot change or abrogate the terms of a contract. ”  *Id.*, citing *Mfrs.’ Fin. Co. v. McKey*, 294 U.S. 442, 447, 55 S.Ct. 444, 449, 79 L.Ed. 982, 986 (1935).  Further, “[e]quitable relief cannot be claimed because a contract is oppressive, improvident, or unprofitable, or because it produces hardship. ”  *Id.* at 183-184.  Reformation of a contract is an equitable remedy, and the precedent is well-settled.  “Equity will reform a contract in the case of a mistake of one party accompanied by fraud or other inequitable conduct by the other party. ”  *Santamaria v. Shell E. Petroleum Prods.*, 116 N.J. Eq. 26, 31 (1934), citing *Forman v. Grant Lunch Corp.*, 113 N. J. Eq. 175 (1933).  As set forth at length in [...]’s brief in chief and in [...]’s opposition, the trial court record is devoid of any facts or evidence that demonstrate mutual mistake, unilateral mistake, or fraud on the part of [...].  As has been stated previously, both parties were represented by competent counsel throughout the negotiation of the both the Redevelopment Agreement and Operating Agreement.  The terms of these agreements accurately reflect the terms agreed upon by [...], [...], and [...].  The negotiation and execution of a series of agreements that one party now seeks to avoid does not support any charge of fraud or unconscionable conduct on the part of [...].  In this case, the trial court’s attempt at crafting an equitable remedy did not follow the well-settled law governing reformation of a contract.  For this reason, the reformation of the Redevelopment Agreement and Operating Agreement, as set forth in the March 15, 2024 Order, must be reversed and set aside.
[brief] [...]’s promissory estoppel claim is also premised on municipal water service being a “proprietary” function creating a commercial-type relationship between the municipality and each resident.  See Pb19.  [...]’s promissory estoppel claim is essentially identical to his breach of contract claim.  [...] simply recharacterizes his allegations that [...] breached implied contractual commitments as to water quality, rephrasing them as allegations of unfulfilled implied “promises” as to water quality.  Pa80-81.  In short, all of [...]’s claims lack merit as a matter of law for the same reason.  They are all founded on the same defunct fiction that municipal distribution of potable water is a proprietary, commercial function, rather than a governmental function.  Thus, it was proper for [...] to grant summary judgment dismissing [...]’s Complaint in its entirety.
[brief] In concluding that the defendants did not violate plaintiff’s rights by disallowing her from making her court appearances the trial Court stated “there is nothing from the record suggesting that the nature of these appearances—which are wholly unspecified by Plaintiff—required Plaintiff’s presence. ”  *(Pa).*  This Judge clearly forgot about the 6th Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1 para 10 of the New Jersey Constitution.  The plaintiff had a constitutional right to a speedy trail and wanted to make haste to defend herself from other charges in the municipal court.  The Judge then goes on to state “reasonably competent officers could dispute whether neglecting to facilitate Plaintiff’s unfettered access to Court appearances violates a clearly established constitutional right. ” (Pa).  Based on this analysis, the Court should not have dismissed plaintiff’s complaint because whether or not a matter could be disputed is not the standard for dismissal under Rule 4:6-2 (e).
[brief] *See* N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1a; *Model Jury Charge (Criminal), Robbery in the Second-Degree*.  (Approved 4/13/92).  [...] correctly charged the jury on the elements of robbery three times.  It was only when he expounded on the mental culpability state of “purposely” in the context of the second-degree robbery charge that he varied from that portion of the Model Jury Charge.  However, at that point, the jury had been well apprised that the judge was referencing robbery and not theft of movable property.  Thereafter, the judge reiterated that the jury had to find that the State had proved the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.  [...] restated the elements of robbery again when he reviewed the verdict sheet with the jury.  The jury was correctly charged on the elements of robbery four times.  We are, thus, satisfied that the judge gave a comprehensive and correct explanation of the law of second-degree robbery and that there was no risk that the jury could have misunderstood the elements of second-degree robbery.
[brief] N.J.R.E. 702 allows an expert who is qualified “by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education” to testify in the form of an opinion “[i]f scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact” in understanding the evidence.  Our Supreme Court has explained that expert testimony is admissible under N.J.R.E. 702 when: (1) the intended testimony . . . concern[s] a subject matter that is beyond the ken of the average juror; (2) in this case.
[brief] J. 414 (2001) | | | **Myska v. New Jersey Mfrs. Ins. Co.,** | 7 | | 440 N.J. Super. 458 (App. Div. 2015) | | Olds v. Donnelly, 150 N.J. 424 (1997) ................................................................. 8, 9, 16 Printing Mart-Morristown v. Sharp Electronics Corp., 116 N.J. 739 (1989) ........................................................................... 6 Rapaport v. Robin S. Weingast & Assocs., 859 F. Supp. 2d 706 (D.N.J. 2012) ....................................................... 7 Rieder v. State Dept. of Transp., 221 N.J. Super. 547 (App. Div. 1987) ............................................... 6 Savage v. Old Bridge-Sayreville Med. Group, 134 N.J. 241 (1993) ............................................................................. 9 Sickles v. Cabot Corp., 379 N.J. Super. 100 (App. Div. 2005) .................................................. 6 Tevis v. Tevis, 79 N.J. 422 (1979) .............................................................................. 8 Vastano v. Algeier, 178 N.J. 230 (2003) ............................................................................  8, 9, 10, 17 Vision Mortgage Corp. v. Patricia Y. Chiapperini Inc., 156 N.J. 580 (1999) ...........................................................................  13, 16, 17  Statutes & Other Authorities: N.J. Ct. R. 4:6-2(e) ..................................................................................
[brief] See *County of Warren v. State*, 409 N.J. Super. 495, 506 (App. Div. 2009) (courts are “obligated to construe a challenged statute to avoid constitutional defects…”) (citation omitted).  c.  The Restatement Also Favors Applying New Jersey Law (Pa5).  Even if the Court determines that the MBPA did not automatically void the Agreement’s choice-of-law clause, the Restatement favors New Jersey law.  [...] cannot establish otherwise.
[directive] 7.12.3  The identification and examination of collateral issues is critically important to the internal affairs process.  Internal affairs investigators are in the unique position of examining law enforcement operations from the inside.  Their insight, if properly used, can be extremely helpful to management.  In contrast, the failure to use this resource can deprive the law enforcement agency of the ability to identify and correct problems with personnel and procedures through self-critical analysis.  It can also lead to an erosion of community support for the agency.  An internal affairs process that is objective and complete is critical to the credibility and reputation of the law enforcement agency within the community.  44  INTERNAL AFFAIRS POLICY & PROCEDURES | June 2021  8
[brief] The New Jersey Uniform Securities Law (1997), N.J.S.A. 49:3-47 to –89 (the “Securities Law”) and similar laws in other jurisdictions with which the Securities Law must be harmonized, are designed not only to prevent and root out fraud, but also to deter wrongdoing.  Accordingly, N.J.S.A. 49:3-69(a)(2) authorizes the Chief of the New Jersey Bureau of Securities (“Bureau”) to seek, and the courts to order “rescission, restitution or disgorgement or any other order within the court’s power, directed to any person who has engaged in any act constituting a violation of any provision of this act or any rule or order hereunder. ”  As with all remedial statutes, the Securities Law must be broadly interpreted to prevent fraud and protect the public.  Charged with enforcing the Securities Law, the Bureau and our courts have consistently interpreted N.J.S.A. 49:3-69(a)(2) to allow multiple remedies in the same action.  Additionally, federal and sister state courts have interpreted similar statutes similarly.  That common sense reading recognizes that those who violate the Securities Law inflict numerous harms that must be penalized, rectified and deterred.  Based on the egregiousness of defendants’ conduct and the extent of their fraud, the trial court entered an order: (1) permanently enjoining and restraining [...], [...], and [...] from engaging in certain conduct defined in the Securities Law; (2) ordering [...] and [...] to pay $15,161,043 as restitution for investors; (3) assessing civil monetary penalties of $1,505,000 against [...] based on his 753 combined violations of the Securities Law; and (4) assessing civil monetary penalties of $1,505,000 against [...] based on its 753 combined violations of the Securities Law.
[brief] In *State v. Purnell*, 126 N.J. 518 (1992), despite looking at the evidence in a light most favorable to the defendant, the New Jersey Supreme Court found that a passion/provocation charge was not appropriate:  “Even in *State v. Perry*,...124 N.J. 128[, 141 (1991)]... where there was evidence that the victim, angered in a dispute over drug money, spoke harshly to the defendant, walked toward him, and pointed at him while the defendant was trying to inject himself with drugs, we held that that evidence ‘provided no basis for a passion/provocation manslaughter charge. ’”  Id. at 542.  Moreover, defendant looks to his claims that [...] threatened to shoot him in the past, (Db40), but this too is summarily debunked by the evidence at trial.
[brief] Expert testimony is treated no differently ....”).  Courts allow any perceived thinness and other vulnerabilities in an expert's background to be explored in cross-examination and avoid using such weaknesses as a reason to exclude a party's choice of expert witness to advance a claim or defense.  That the strength of an individual's qualifications may be undermined through cross-examination is not a sound basis for precluding an expert from testifying as part of a defendant's defense, even if it likely will affect the weight that the jury will give the opinion.
[brief] A.  The District’s Ineffective Policies and Extreme Mismanagement Are a Root Cause of its Inability to Provide T&E.  As the record clearly demonstrates, [...] is plagued by severe mismanagement, which has directly and negatively impacted the level and quality of education district students receive.  There are reasons why this court concluded that [...] has failed to provide its students T&E, Alcantara, 475 N.J. Super. at 70, and they have little to do with the SFRA.
[brief] Here, the Questionnaire asked [...]:  4.  Do you hire or rent vehicles during your fair/festival/event?  ___Yes  ___x__ No  If yes, please describe the vehicle types, estimated number, duration and usage:  _____________________________N/A____________________________________  [Ia143]  FL  [...] should have automatically denied the application upon seeing the “No” checked off.  Indeed, the sole purpose of the Questionnaire was to determine if Hired/Non-owned 12-15+ vans were going to be used by the applicant.  So, if the applicant denied that it would be hiring or renting any non-owned vehicles and used “N/A” to describe them, how could the underwriter even consider issuing the policy?  How could reliance by [...]’s underwriter have been reasonable if, on an application for insurance for leased vehicles, it stated there would be no leased vehicles?  By saying "No" and “N/A” to Question 4, any alleged misrepresentation about using 12-15+ passenger vehicles became immaterial because the application should have been denied outright.  [...] would have the Court affirm the rescission of a policy that never should have been issued in the first place.
[brief] (1T42-6 to14)  Here, the issue of discovery was never resolved and contrary to the defense, videos can be tampered, cut and edited, because as plaintiff’s counsel stated, the video certainly did not show the amount of force used.  (1T5-12 to 18).  Had officers [...] and [...] been “polite … calm … and reasonable” as the judge contented, plaintiff would not have sustained a dislocated jaw, multiple cuts and bruises, and injuries to neck from being choked, warranting treatment in the ER, as well as PTSD from psychological trauma (Pa093- Pa097, Pa053-Pa054; Pa041, Pa152, 1T3-21 to 22).
[brief] State v. Branch, 182 N.J. 338, 348 (2005) (citing U.S. Const. amend. VI; N.J. Const. art. I, ¶ 10); State v. Bankston, 63 N.J. 263, 268–69 (1973)(holding the accused as a right under the Sixth Amendment “to be confronted by witnesses against him)(citations omitted); see N.J. Const. art. I, ¶ 10.  The remedy here is a new trial de novo with a clear record of the evidence being considered by the court.  As noted by the de novo court, on a trial de novo, the “standard requires the reviewing court to make original findings of fact and rulings on the evidence, while limited to the evidentiary record created in the municipal court. ” (Da19 (citing State v. Thomas, 372 N.J. Super. 29, 31 (App. Div. 2004)).  But here, the de novo court sought evidence of the police report that was not a part of the evidentiary record in the municipal court.  (Da43-44.)  The de novo court then discussed information about the administration of Alcotest in the trial de novo even though it exceeded the scope of the hearing in the municipal court under R. 3:23-8(a)(2).