ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The defense here has already argued that there were various investigatory steps that the State failed to do when ... investigating this case, such as not running certain reports, not checking certain EZ-Passes.  And again, having raised those questions, to redact those portions of the statement would leave gaps in the discussion with the defendant that ... I think would be misleading to the jury and would withhold from the jury valuable information that the jury could use.  Again, not to determine guilt or anything like that, but rather for the voluntariness of the statement, the context of the statement ... (16T:106-5 to 111-7); see also (23T:34-18 to 36-15).
[brief] Here, [...] had served at the prosecutors office for two decades, no doubt handling thousands of cases during her tenure there and being present at the office for the processing of thousands more she never saw.  However, Defendant’s case was never within her purview as a supervisor of an unrelated unit.  At no time was [...], then [...], involved with the investigation, litigation, or post-conviction proceedings of the defendant’s case, and even the defendant does not assert that she was.
[directive] The critical question at a hearing that is reopened is not whether the initial detention decision was correct, but whether the circumstances at the time of the later hearing warrant a defendant’s continued detention.  In the words of the statute, does the new information have a “material bearing” on the standard that governs release decisions?  That issue, in turn, calls for a renewed examination of whether any combination of conditions would reasonably assure against the risk of non- appearance, danger, or obstruction in light of delays caused by the pandemic.
[brief] (b)  A lawyer shall not knowingly represent a person in the same or a substantially related matter in which a firm with which the lawyer formerly was associated had previously represented a client, (1) whose interests are materially adverse to that person; and (2) about whom the lawyer, while at the former firm, had personally acquired information protected by RPC 1.6 and RPC 1.9 that is material to the matter unless the former client gives informed consent, confirmed in writing.
[directive] :38  Defendants appearing Municipal Court will be informed by Municipal Court judges the in in opening statement about the Veterans Diversion Program, and advised to consult with the .J. Complex• [...]  Directive #05-18 Veterans Diversion Program  Page 3 prosecutor for information applying.  Similarly, those appearing Superior Court will on be in informed at the centralized judicial processing/first appearance court event.  Defendants may apply the prosecutor for admission to the program at any time prior to to disposition of the charges.  Admission shall not conditioned the person's admission or plea be on of guilt.  The prosecutor will ask the court for a postponement of the proceedings when a person admitted to the program.
[brief] . . .  Such revised lot grade shall not include mounding, terracing, or other devices designed to allow increased building height” (emphasis added).  Plaintiffs contend that the proposed building height for this development will exceed the allowable building height under the Ordinance by more than 10% for two (2) of the six (6) buildings, thereby requiring a d(6) use variance pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70d(6) since the applicant’s revised lot grade includes “mounding, terracing, or other devices designed to allow increased building height. ”  Thus, the Planning Board had no jurisdiction of the application since building height is properly calculated by measuring from the lowest original lot grade to the top of a building.  However, the defendant Planning Board found that it had jurisdiction over the subject application since the applicant’s revised lot grade did not include “mounding” designed to increase building height.  As such, the Board’s misinterpretation of the definition of the Building Height Ordinance incorrectly resulted in the Board finding that none of the proposed six (6) buildings in the development exceeded the Building Height Ordinance.  First, the trial court erred in its interpretation of the word “design” in the context of the Building Height Ordinance language “designed to allow increased building height. ”  Second, the trial court failed to consider whether the revised lot grade was the result of “mounding, terracing, or other devices designed to allow increased building height” as stated in the Ordinance.  Third, the trial court erred in adopting the Board professionals’ legal definition of the Ordinance under the “arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable” standard.
[brief] See Pa15-16.  Finally, Count Six sought an order reforming the Condominium’s Master Deed to reflect Unit 74’s status as a ‘common element. ’ See Pa17-18.  After the close of discovery, the Plaintiff filed a motion for partial summary judgment as to Counts One, Four, Five and Six.  In response, the Defendants filed a cross-motion for summary judgment.  The trial court determined that Unit 74 is a common element.  See T1 at p. 4, Ins. 8-14.  Notwithstanding Unit 74’s status as a common element, the court determined the Developer held marketable title because the Section 8(e) of the Master Deed “allows for this particular issue. ”  See T1 at p.17, Ins. 10-15.  Based upon this finding, the Court denied Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and granted the Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment in its entirety.  All six counts of Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint were dismissed with prejudice.  The Plaintiff appeals from these Orders, and, in particular, the trial court’s conclusion that Section 8(e) authorized this particular transaction.
[brief] (Pa134 35).  Dissatisfied with the funds that she received from [...], Appellant testified that she went “back and forth” with [...] over the contents list “several times and there were several changes. ” (Pa134, 36).  During discovery, [...] asked Appellant to identify the personal property items that challenged its payment of.  (Pa134, 37).  Appellant responded to that Interrogatory by not only answering the same, but by preparing a list with her own contrary valuations.
[directive] you will be required to serve 85% of the sentence imposed for that offense(s) before you will be eligible for parole on that offense(s)?  Formulario Promulgado por la directriz #01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 11171-Spanish página 1 de 2 Form Promulgated by Directive #01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 11171-Spanish page 1 of 2 2.  ¿Entiende que porque se ha declarado culpable de estos cargos, el juez al dictarle la pena tiene [Sí/Yes] [No/No] que imponerle un período de supervisión de la libertad condicional de años, y que dicho período comenzará en cuanto usted termine de cumplir la sentencia de encarcelamiento?  Período de supervisión de la libertad condicional por un delito de primer grado - 5 años  Período de supervisión de la libertad condicional por un delito de segundo grado -3 años  Do you understand that because you have pled guilty to these charges the court must impose a year term of parole supervision and that term will begin as soon as you complete the sentence of incarceration?  First Degree Term of Parole Supervision - 5 years  Second Degree Term of Parole Supervision - 3 years 3.  ¿Entiende que si infringe las condiciones de la supervisión de su libertad condicional, se podrá [Sí/Yes] [No/No] revocar su libertad condicional y es posible que tenga que volver a la prisión para cumplir todo el período de supervisión de su libertad condicional o cualquier porción del período de supervisión de la libertad condicional restante, aun cuando ya usted hubiera terminado de cumplir el período de encarcelamiento que se le impuso anteriormente?  Do you understand that if you violate the conditions of your parole supervision that your parole may be revoked and you may be subject to return to prison to serve all or any portion of the remaining period of parole supervision, even if you have completed serving the term of imprisonment previously imposed?  Fecha/Date: Acusado/Defendant: Defensor/Defense Attorney: Abogado Fiscal/Prosecutor Formulario Promulgado por la directriz #01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 11171-Spanish página 2 de 2 Form Promulgated by Directive #01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 11171-Spanish page 2 of 2
[brief] Plaintiffs also contend that Tretina v. Fitzpatrick & Assocs., 135 N.J. 349, 364 (1994) held that vacatur is limited to “rare circumstances”, but again ignores that one such circumstance is expressly stated to be, “for public-policy reasons”.  Ibid.  In fact, Plaintiffs admit that, “mistakes of law or fact may constitute undue means” to vacate “where such mistakes violate public policy....”  (Pb62)  However, Plaintiffs then inexplicably contend that fee-shifting in violation of the American Rule is not a matter of public policy.  They even ignore that the very case they cited to the Arbitrator to justify fee-shifting here, *In re Niles Trust*, 176 N.J. 282, 293 (2003) ruled to the contrary that, “[t]he history of [R. 4:42-9] demonstrates that New Jersey has a strong policy against the shifting of counsel fees. ”  The Court in *Niles* even cited to the Supreme Court in *N. Bergen Rex Transp. v. Trailer Leasing Co.*, 158 N.J. 561, 569, (1999), which held that, “New Jersey has a strong policy disfavoring shifting of attorneys' fees. ”  Plaintiffs also ignore that the Supreme Court in re *Estate of Vayda*, 184 N.J. 115, 120, (2005), reiterated that, "New Jersey has a strong public policy against the shifting of costs" and that "[t]his Court has embraced that policy by adopting the 'American Rule,' which prohibits recovery of counsel fees by the prevailing party against the losing party."  Thus, there is no question that, according to the Supreme Court: (1) improper fee-shifting violates New Jersey’s public policy; and (2) an arbitrator’s decision doing so is one of the expressly allowed grounds for vacating an award.
[directive] 5.1.2  Members of the public should be encouraged to submit their complaints as soon after the incident as possible.  If the complainant cannot personally appear at the agency to file the complaint, a member of the agency, preferably a member of the internal affairs function, should visit the complainant at their home, place of business or other location if necessary to complete the report.  Law enforcement agencies are encouraged to establish systems to enable complaints to be accepted by telephone or by email if a complainant does not wish to be interviewed in person or wishes to remain anonymous.  Under no circumstances shall it be necessary for a complainant to make a sworn statement to initiate the internal affairs process.  Furthermore, every police agency shall accept and investigate anonymous complaints.  5.1.3
[brief] As the Supreme Court observed in Kahrar v. Borough of Wallington, 171 N.J. 3, 9-10 (2002):  In Willis v. Department of Conservation & Economic Development, 55 N.J. 534, 540, 264 A.2d 34 (1970), this Court abrogated the doctrine of sovereign immunity for tort claims.  In response, the Legislature adopted the Tort Claims Act in 1972, primarily to “re-establish immunity of public entities in New Jersey, on a basis more current and equitable than that which had obtained prior to Willis. ”  [...] & [...], Claims Against Public Entities, Introduction, at ix (2001).  What emerged is the general rule that public entities are immune from tort liability unless there is a specific statutory provision imposing liability.  Collins v. Union County Jail, 150 N.J. 407, 413, 696 A.2d 625 (1997).  At no time while discovery was open, nor on the summary judgment motion, did Plaintiff serve a report of any expert opining that Plaintiff suffered a permanent injury or otherwise met the verbal threshold provisions of the New Jersey Tort Claims Act.
[brief] **STATEMENT OF FACTS**  Sometime prior to the initiation of this action—and without a license under the NJCFLA—[...] allegedly acquired a pool of default consumer debts allegedly purchased for a fraction of their face value, including [...]’s alleged [...]/[...] credit account.  As [...] was unlicensed under the NJCFLA (see Da55), [...]’s account and the contract governing the same were void upon assignment to [...].  See N.J.S.A. 17:11C-33(b).  Thereafter, in an attempt to collect the void debt, [...] commenced a collection lawsuit against [...] by filing a collection Complaint (Da1) in the Special Civil Part of the Bergen County Law Division, later obtaining a default judgment.  (Da3).  However, due to the severity of [...]’s psychiatric diagnoses—requiring in-patient treatment—he was unable to fully understand and/or appreciate the nature of the action against him or the cause of the legal proceedings.  Moreover, the default judgment obtained against [...] stems from an action that [...] had no right or authority to bring.  By purchasing or otherwise taking assignment of the debt, [...] engaged in the “consumer loan business” as defined at N.J.S.A. 17:11C-2; however, [...] was not licensed as a consumer lender at the time it took possession of or attempted to enforce [...]’s account.  See [...]’s License Verifications from the New Jersey Department of Banking and Insurance (“NJDOBI”) Licensing Services Bureau (Da55).  As a result of [...]’s unlicensed status, the assignments or purchases and any rights to the account were void ab initio and unenforceable as of the date [...] purchased or took assignment of the account, pursuant to the NJCFLA at N.J.S.A. 17:11C-33(b), which states, in pertinent part, that a contract for a loan acquired in violation of the act “shall be void and the lender shall have no right to collect or receive any principal, interest or charges.  . . .”  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I.
[brief] ”  Walker, 209 N.J. at 132 (quoting Singer, 95 N.J. at 500-01).  The Chancery Court’s opinion does not even address that issue.  Rather, the Chancery Court’s opinion as to the rates was limited to the following conclusion:  “Fees customarily charged.  I think they are similar for legal services for the type of attorneys and the work that is involved here. ” (1T71:5-7).  That is simply not sufficient analysis in that it is unclear what the Chancery Court’s conclusions as to rates were based on.  The Global Fee Application did not include any objective information as to the “prevailing market rate in the relevant community” or any information whatsoever about the rate “that would be charged by an adequately experienced attorney possessed of average skill and ordinary competence. ”  Instead, the Global Fee Application simply referred to the Chancery Court’s prior approval of [...]’s counsels’ rates in two earlier fee applications (Da25-26, ¶¶77-78).  Even in those prior fee applications, however, the Court did not engage in the required analysis of the rates and almost no information was provided by [...]’s counsel in those prior fee applications to support their claim that their proposed rates were not well above the applicable standard.  (See 3T42:8 -19\textsuperscript{10}; Da246-270; Da271-78)  In fact, in previously claiming that their rates are consistent with rates customarily charged in the area, [...]’s counsel cited solely and exclusively to the rates of [...] set forth in that firm’s request for professional compensation pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§327, 328, 330 and 331 as bankruptcy counsel for [...] in a highly complex Chapter 11 bankruptcy matter.
[brief] ”  7T146:3-7.  \(^6\)  Moreover, in a blatant attempt to over-inflate the purported value of the FFE, [...] added a 10% general contractors overhead, a 10% general contractors profit, 12% architect or engineering fees and 2% plans and permitting surcharges to the value of all 516 items.  Ibid.  These miscellaneous fees added up to a 34% markup on values that already include subcontractor fees, ostensibly for the benefit of a fictitious general contractor but in reality just the [...] themselves.  These fees are not supported by any actual legitimate facts justifying their inclusion or a legal basis that permits them to be tacked on at the tail end, rather than already built into the book value.  The Trial Court erred when it denied the Township’s Motion to Bar the [...] Report.
[brief] Rather, Plaintiffs’ expert claims to have distilled this obligation from the penumbras of various “contracts” between the parties.  When questioned about this opinion during his deposition, [...] could offer only unsubstantiated rhetoric and vague references to “inspections” and “contracts”:  --- 3  A copy of this unpublished opinion is attached in accordance with R. 1:36-3.  Q.  What about this contract, though?  [...] had a contract with the [...].  Where in that contract was it within [...]’s scope of work as a chief inspector to go out and do an inspection of all of the road surfaces at structure 40 to look for preexisting problems?  A.  They’re the inspector.  They’re the inspecting contractor.  They’re the consultant hired to do the inspection work.  It’s their job.  That’s their contract.  That whole work area is the responsibility by contract of [...] to do the inspection work.
[brief] An examination of plaintiff’s second amended complaint (Pa319-330) further belies plaintiff’s stated reasons for the delay in amending the complaint.  The first count of the complaint alleges negligence against all named defendants.  The second count of the complaint alleges vicarious liability on the part of any or all named defendants for the alleged negligence of [...] in performing snow removal.  The third count of the complaint contains a per quod claim on behalf of [...] that incorporates counts one and two by reference.  Plaintiff and/or his counsel did not need the leases in order to assert common law negligence claims.  As fully explained in this defendant’s initial brief, the provisions of the lease could not create a common law duty or a tort remedy for plaintiff.
[directive] Intelligence Guidelines on the collections, handling, storage and dissemination of Intelligence in • Concepts New Jersey.  pdf  Internal Affairs  Internal Affairs Policy and Procedures • pdf ***(Revised, November 2017)  Insurance Fraud Implementation  Insurance Fraud Laws, effective June 9, 2004  N.J.S.A. 39:3-29 & • Laws 3-29 & 39:3-29.1a - Warrant of Impoundment pdf 2 of 5 8/4/25, 11:35 AM
[brief] T32-15.  •  He pointed out the tremendous redevelopment that has taken hold in [...] (T32-19 to T32-24) and the borough’s desire for redevelopment and branding as part of its Master Plan and Vision Plan.  T44-17 to T45-6.  •  He emphasized the care taken in design particularly with the rooftop design which was scaled back to allow views of the ocean and bay without creating an imposing structure.
[brief] The plaintiff held the status of an invitee as a customer of the defendant’s commercial establishment.  *O’Shea v. K Mart Corp.*, 304 N.J. Super. 489, 492 (App. Div. 1997).  The defendant, therefore, owed the plaintiff a duty of reasonable care “to provide a reasonably safe place to do that which [was] within the scope of the invitation. ”  Butler, 89 N.J. at 275.  This duty is an affirmative duty that obligated the defendant to discover and eliminate any potentially dangerous condition or circumstance on the property, to maintain the property in a safe condition, and to avoid creating any conditions that would render the property unsafe.  Jerista v. Murray, 185 N.J. 175, 191 (2005).  The undisputed proofs presented at trial establish that the plaintiff was walking along a shopping aisle of the defendant’s store when the wheel of her rollator walker impacted the corner of the raised base plate and protruding bolt of a roof support column that encroached into the walking aisle causing her to fall.  The plaintiff’s liability expert testified that the base plate of the subject column and its protruding bolts created a trip hazard and obstruction of the customer walking aisle and that allowing the hazardous condition to exist fell below the accepted standard of care.  The jury clearly agreed with the plaintiff’s expert as it found that the defendant was negligent.
[brief] Courts routinely permit the disclosure of confidential information in litigation and protect against improper use through carefully crafted protective orders.  Thus, the claimed confidential nature of the information -- whatever that is -- is not a basis to object to its production here.  See, e.g., Capital Health, 230 N.J. at 83 (approving chancery judge’s determination that “any legitimate claim asserted by [defendants] that the material was proprietary would be adequately protected by the confidentiality order”); ALK Assocs., Inc. v. Multimodal Applied Sys., Inc., 276 N.J. Super. 310, 316 (1994) (finding, in trade secret context, that trial court may enter protective order limiting disclosure of confidential information to parties’ attorneys and experts who must agree to make no further disclosure to their clients); see also Selective Ins. Co. of Am. v. Smiley Body Shop, Inc., 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 148649, at *19 (S.D. Ind. Oct. 27, 2016) (denying motion for new protective order where prior protective order already “mitigates any possible prejudice” to movant and explaining that the court “declines to assume that any party would violate the Court’s protective order and use, in any way, the information learned from this case to further its cause in any other case”); U.S. ex rel. Daugherty v. Bostwick Labs., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89683, at *45 (S.D. Ohio June 24, 2013) (where use of potentially competitive documents is “already governed by a protective order,” holding that it is “inappropriate” to assume that party would violate protective order); Med. Ctr. at Elizabeth Place, LLC v. Premier Health Partners, 294 F.R.D. 87, 97 (S.D. Ohio 2013) (“Assuming the information possesses the sensitivity that [...] attributes to it, [...]’s concerns assume that the parties will violate the Protective Order.  There is no basis to presume that such a violation will occur.  This Court has repeatedly recognized that an appropriate Protective Order provides the necessary safeguards.” (citing cases)); Pfizer Inc. v. Apotex Inc., 744 F. Supp. 2d 758, 765 (N.D. Ill. 2010) (refusing to bar litigation counsel from reviewing competitor’s documents where Pfizer “submitted no evidence supporting its [m]otion” and “[w]ithout such evidence, a party has not shown why a court should impose a bar on opposing counsel’s activities”); U.S. Steel Corp. v. United States, 730 F.2d 1465, 1467-68 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (reversing denial of motion for access to confidential information based on assumption that counsel might “breach their duty under a protective order” and holding that any risk of disclosure can be “achievable in the design of a protective order”).
[directive] Procedures to File a Waiver of First Appearance  1.  The attorney for a defendant who is not incarcerated and who is charged with an indictable offense on a complaint-summons may waive the first appearance on behalf of his or her client by completing the “Waiver of First Appearance for Indictable Offenses on a Complaint-Summons” form.  2.  The attorney must contact the Criminal Division Office to obtain the date of the pre-indictment disposition conference, which date must be specifically noted on the form.  3.  The attorney must certify that the defendant has been advised of the information as set forth in Rule 3:4-2(f) and as contained on the form.  4.  The attorney must file the form electronically in e-Courts, either at or before the time fixed for the first appearance, and must provide notification to the prosecuting attorney.  5.  Upon the completion of the above requirements, the waiver is accepted by the court as filed and the attorney and defendant need not appear at the first appearance, unless otherwise ordered by the court.  * * *  Required Elements of the Attorney Certification in Support of Defendant’s Waiver of the First Appearance