ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Nor did Appellant make any allegation that he acted or refrained from acting as a result of receiving and reviewing the collection letters in question, or the letter vendor’s involvement.  Appx., at 7a-10a.  He notably did not allege that Respondent collected any such money from him relating to the debt which was the subject of the collection letter.  *Id.*  Thus, absent any future attempt to coerce payment on Appellant’s personal account through a court of law, Appellant has suffered no harm or adverseness from Respondent’s attempts to solicit voluntary payment of his debt.  Having made no payment on the account as a result of Respondent’s collection activities, Appellant did not suffer any pecuniary injury and risked no harm from any unfavorable decision from the Superior Court.  *See In re Camden Cty.*, 170 N.J. at 449; *State v. A.L.*, 440 N.J. Super. at 418; *Elshabba Transcript*, at T9; *Rabinowitz v. Alltran Financial, LP*, Case No. [...] (N.J. Sup. Ct. August 24, 2023), T7 16-23 (dismissing case for lack of standing where plaintiff could not demonstrate any actual damage that he sustained as a result of the FDCPA violation.).
[brief] [...] was a close friend of the Decedent who knew her for almost fifty years.  They belonged to the same church, which the Petitioner did not attend.  During this time, they regularly confided in each other.  (10T132-14 to 16; 10T134-1 to 12.  The Decedent told [...] that she was not happy that [...] was not contributing to the household expenses.  The Decedent was fearful, because her father abandoned her when she was very young.  [...] testified that the Defendant told her that the marriage was “different” and it appeared as if “she was taking care of him. ”  She noted that the Decedent told her that she did not want [...] “to get anything of mine.
[brief] *Lapsley*, 249 N.J. at 435; *Kristiansen*, 153 N.J. at 316.  Therefore, the fact that an employee had punched out on the time clock does not preclude compensability.  *Lapsley*, 249 N.J. at 435-36 (emphasis added); see also *Brower v. ICT Group*, 164 N.J. 367, 372 (2000).  “The Legislature used the phrase ‘excluding areas not under the control of the employer’ in its definition of employment because it intended to include areas controlled by the employer within the definition. ”  *Lapsley*, 249 N.J. at 436; *Kristiansen*, 153 N.J. at 316.
[brief] A lower court’s interpretation of a contract is a matter of law and subject to *de novo* review.  *Kieffer v. Best Buy*, 205 N.J. 213, 222-223 (2011) (citing *Jennings v. Pinto*, 5 N.J. 562, 569-70 (1950)).  Indeed, “[a] trial court’s interpretation of the law and the legal consequences that flow from established facts are not entitled to any special deference. ”  Id. at 223 (quoting *Manalapan Realty, L.P., v. Twp. Comm.*, 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995)).  APPLICABLE LAW
[brief] Likewise, no public-policy considerations justify treating prosecutorial employees as an exclusive class entitled to greater protections under the TCA than all other public employees.  In short, the [...] cannot meet its burden to show that [...] acted arbitrarily and capriciously in denying the request to defend [...]’s action in lieu of prerogative writ seeking only injunctive relief because the [...] retains statutorily defined discretion to deny such a request.  **CONCLUSION**
[directive] The law enforcement executive should consult with counsel about compliance with the 45- day rule, which includes several exceptions and tolling provisions.  For example, the "45-day rule" does not apply to internal affairs investigations alleging incapacity.  In addition, members of the public are not required to make their complaint within 45 days of the incident.  But once the agency has received the individual's complaint, the 45-day rule applies.  6.1.8
[brief] During the early morning hours of August 11, 2015, [...] was shot in the back of the head after attempting to elude a pursuing vehicle during a car chase through Bridgeton.  Defendant was in the pursuing vehicle.  * * *  At 3:16 a.m., officers from the [...] were dispatched to the area of North Laurel Street and Myrtle Street where they observed a minivan that had crashed into a parked car and a utility pole.  (2T48-8 to 49-10; 2T51-11 to 22; 2T60-12 to 61-1; 2T72-12 to 18; 2T75-20 to 76-20; 2T125-20 to 21).  A man later determined to be [...] was in the driver’s seat slumped over with a single gunshot wound to the back of the head.  (2T49-11 to 23).  The bullet traveled through the driver’s headrest.  (2T87-12 to 88-3; 4T111-13 to 17; Pa17-18).  The window of the driver side sliding door and rear windshield were shattered.  (2T61-15 to 25; 4T108-8 to 10; Pa2, 5).  Bullet strikes were observed in the rear passenger side tire, rear driver side hubcap, low on the front driver side door, rear bumper, and just below the rear windshield.  (4T108-6 to 112-12; Pa9-16, 19).  Butler’s cellphone and a projectile were collected from inside the van.  (4T112-13 to 113-10).  Seven .40 caliber and nine 9-millimeter shell casings were collected around the minivan and along Myrtle Street, extending two blocks east, and submitted to the [...] for analysis.  (2T50-24 to 51-5; 2T54-1 to 55-9; 2T78-5 to 82-6; 2T92-15 to 98-17; 6T215-20 to 216-8).
[brief] SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE  DIVISION  Docket No.: [...]  [...], AS ADMINISTRATOR : CIVIL ACTION  AD PROSEQUENDUM OF THE ESTATE OF : [...], DECEASED, : ON APPEAL FROM : Plaintiff/Appellant, : Superior Court of New Jersey : Law Division : Cumberland County : Docket No. : [...]  V. PREFERRED CARE AT CUMBERLAND : NURSING AND REHABILITATION; : SAT BELOW [...]; JOHN DOE #1–10 AND ABC CORP. #1–10, : The Honorable : [...], J.S.C.  Defendant/Respondent.  REPLY BRIEF FOR [...], AS ADMINISTRATOR
[brief] (2T89-11:25).  Plaintiff doesn’t even bother to mention those cases in his appellate brief.  Instead, Plaintiff cites to Botteon v. Borough of Highland Park, A-1127-22 (App. Div. May 1, 2024) (Pa427), an unpublished opinion by the Appellate Division to support his contention that he should have been afforded an opportunity to conduct unspecified discovery; however, even that unpublished decision is consistent with the trial court’s handling of this matter.  In Botteon, where this court reversed the dismissal of the complaint on a motion to dismiss - as opposed to a motion for summary judgment - the panel recognized that a trial court has the power to limit discovery to reasonable discovery only as necessary to the issues in the case.  (Pa450.)  In this case, the trial court recognized, as Plaintiff admitted, Plaintiff’s claims were based on the record of how the Township noticed and conducted its public meetings as reflected in the public records, including the public notice, agenda, meeting minutes and video recordings as to what transpired at the meetings where Plaintiff claimed his civil rights were violated.  There was no need for discovery as the relevant facts were matters of public record and admitted by Plaintiff.  Plaintiff also cites to federal cases involving civil rights claims under Section 1983 as to the supposed requirement for discovery before adjudication; however, those federal court decisions on motions to dismiss are neither binding nor persuasive as to the need for discovery.  The bottom line is that Plaintiff was afforded the opportunity to identify discovery necessary to prove facts supporting his claims, but he did not because the material facts were known and undisputed.  The trial court properly granted summary judgment based on the undisputed facts in the motion record.
[brief] ”  One, he says the Settlement Agreement does not include that term.  Pb22–Pb23.  But Section 1.29 covers settlement class members’ claims that “could have been” “asserted or alleged in” [...] “in the future. ”  Settlement Agreement, § 1.29 (Pa000044).  In other words, Plaintiff and the remaining Settlement Class Members released claims they could otherwise have brought in the future related to [...] and [...]’s fees and amendments.  Two, Plaintiff relies on nonbinding District of New Jersey language to argue the “relating to” language in Section 1.29 does not cover future claims unless “the factual predicate for future claims is identical to the factual predicate underlying the settlement agreement. ”  Pb25 (quoting Dando v. Bimbo Food Bakeries Distr., LLC, No. 14-2956 (NLH/JS), 2015 WL 5770014, at *3 (D.N.J. Sept. 30, 2015), and adding emphasis).  Plaintiff misunderstands that the Third Circuit has interpreted this principle to mean that “identical” means “similar,” not “the same. ”  Freeman v. MML Bay State Life Ins. Co., 445 F. App’x 577, 578–80 (3d Cir. 2011) (holding claim was barred by previous class release and the factual predicates were “identical” where the claims arose out of the same insurance policy; it did not matter that the new claim challenged different practices with respect to the policies); Monaco v. Mitsubishi Motors Credit of Am., Inc., 34 F. App’x 43, 45 (3d Cir. 2002) (holding claim was barred by previous class release arising from the same early termination charge provisions in a lease agreement; it did not matter that the new claim was brought under a different statute).  Here, as [...] recognized, the two cases share the same fee and amendment basis.  Pa000108.
[brief] The Board’s findings regarding the 2009 injury are completely unsupported by the record.  First, [...]’s description of the 2009 injury is almost identical to previous descriptions of the 2000 injury.  [...], who evaluated [...] in 2015, described the incident as follows:  [[...]] was in a fight as a police officer.  He tackled a man to the ground.  He hit the back of his head on a car as he fell.  He lost consciousness for 10-15 seconds.  He reports neck injury and back injury.  He had PT.  He was out of work for 3 months.  He denies any injections or surgeries.
[brief] The Genesis Deed specifically accounted for the possibility that the “property owner’s association” may not be in existence at the time of conveyance when requiring all property owners to become members of the club “known or to be known as” [...].  (Da54).  The trial court’s factual conclusion that [...] did not exist at the time of the Genesis Deed’s conveyance ignores all the evidence [...] assembled—before the close of discovery—demonstrating that the [...] themselves obviously expected and intended for [...] to implement and enforce the “rules” governing the community, which in fact happened and existed for 75 years.
[brief] CONTRARY TO RESPONDENTS’ ARGUMENT, APPELLANTS DO NOT RELY ON THE THEORY OF RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR TO HOLD [...] LIABLE FOR THE ACTIONS OF ITS SURVEYOR, BUT RATHER ON THE DIRECT NEGLIGENCE OF [...] IN PROVIDING THE SURVEYOR WITH AN INACCURATE GRADING PLAN.  Respondents argue (at Db10, paragraph 17) that the legal doctrine of respondeat superior cannot work to hold [...] liable for the actions of [...].  But this is not [...]’s current theory of liability.  Instead, we argue that [...] is liable based on its own direct negligence in failing to provide its surveyor with up-to-date grading plans for the site.  Appellants originally pleaded respondeat superior among other theories of negligence against [...] in the event [...] was alleged to be negligent by [...].  This theory was dismissed in 2020 by [...] as no argument was made by [...] that [...] did anything wrong.  (Pa2).  However, other theories of liability against [...] remain in the case (See Plaintiff’s Complaint filed March 3, 2017, Counts Two and Three, at Pa35-37), so it is irrelevant that Count Four, Respondeat Superior, was dismissed.
[brief] Though the Commission itself clearly and publicly reaffirmed this line of cases in Advisory Opinion A02-22 (2022) – a mere six days before the filing of the present Complaint – it arbitrarily applied an entirely different standard altogether in deciding this case.  This was highly improper.  *Mary Carter Paint Co. v. Federal Trade Commission*, 333 F.2d 654, 660 (1964) (“But the law does not permit an agency to grant to one person the right to do that which it denies to another similarly situated.
[brief] Fieramosca was a Law Division case that involved a site plan application and has nothing to do with the determination of the “record below” on the adoption of a Redevelopment Plan.  335 N.J. Super. 526.  Further, a planning board rendering a decision on a site plan application acts in a quasi-judicial capacity, which is distinct from the legislative decision of the Governing Body approving a redevelopment plan.  As such, what comprises the appropriate record in each is completely different.  *Id.* at 530.  Thus, *Fieramosca* has no legal applicability here.
[brief] “PIP dispute” includes, but is not limited to, matters concerning: 1.  Interpretation of the insurance contract’s PIP provisions; 2.  Whether the medical treatment or diagnostic tests are in accordance with the provisions of applicable statutes and rules for the basic and standard policies and in compliance with the terms of the policy; 3.  Eligibility of the treatment or service for compensation or reimbursement, including whether the injury is causally related to the accident and the application of deductible and copayment provisions; 4.  Eligibility of the provider performing the service to be compensated or reimbursed under the terms of the policy and the provisions of N.J.A.C. 11:3–4, and including whether the provider is licensed or certified to perform the treatment or service; 5.  Whether the treatment was actually performed; 6.  Whether the diagnostic tests performed are recognized by the Professional Boards in the Division of Consumer Affairs, Department of Law and Public Safety, administered in accordance with their standards, and approved by the Commissioner at N.J.A.C. 11:3–4; 7.  The necessity and appropriateness of consultation with other health care providers; 8.  Disputes involving the application of, or adherence to, the automobile insurance medical fee schedule at N.J.A.C. 11:3–29; 9.  Whether the treatment or service is reasonable, necessary and in accordance with medical protocols adopted by the Commissioner at N.J.A.C. 11:3–4; or 10.
[brief] (Da131)  [...]’s instruction was essentially instructing the jury that [...]’s conduct had been found deviated from the standard, which had been decided by another court already.  Clearly, [...]’s misrepresentation had significant impact on jury’s determination of the outcome of the malpractice trial.  In addition, [...]’s material misrepresentation in open court was just a portion of the misrepresentations that he knew was not true, when he made the misrepresentation to the Court to set aside the PSA.
[brief] ”  Pb12.  The Ciocon case involved whether setbacks for development of a pool and tennis court in [...] should be measured from the nearer municipal boundary between [...] and [...] that transects the subject parcel, or from the farther boundary of the parcel which was in [...].  Significantly for the court, [...] had granted a use variance to allow recreational uses like those that were proposed in [...].  *Ciocon* at 202, 204.  The 2023 edition of the *Cox* treatise notes this fact:  “Thus, absent the variance from the adjoining municipality in *Ciocon*, it is doubtful that the court would have granted the relief sought.
[brief] ”  Mehlman, 153 N.J. at 187.  “The recognized sources of public policy within the ambit of subsection [c][3] includes state laws, rules and regulations. ”  Turner, 396 N.J. Super. at 593.  Our Supreme Court in Maimone reasoned as follows: it is easier for an employee who proceeds under [subsection] [c][3] to prove that he or she reasonably believed the employer’s conduct was ‘incompatible’ with a clear mandate of public policy expressed in a law, rule or regulation than to show, as required by [subsection][c][1], a reasonable belief that the employer’s conduct ‘violated’ a law, rule or regulation.
[brief] And if they fail to render an award within the time requirements set forth in the Interest Arbitration Act, they “shall be fined $1,000 for each day that the award is late. ”  Ibid.  Clearly, it is not easy to become or remain an IA arbitrator by PERC.  Currently, the Commission’s website reflects that [...] is one of only eight (8) arbitrators who have been specially selected to perform interest arbitration.  C.
[brief] As a general matter, [appellate courts] will not reverse if an erroneous jury instruction was incapable of producing an unjust result or prejudicing substantial rights. ”  Prioleau v. Ky. Fried Chicken, Inc., 223 N.J. 245, 257 (2015) (internal quotation marks omitted).  Defendants contend that the trial court should have charged the jury with Model Jury Charge
[brief] Importantly, courts accord “a ‘strong presumption of reasonableness’ to an administrative agency’s exercise of its statutory delegated responsibilities. ”  Lavezzi v. State, 219 N.J. 163, 171 (2014) (internal citations omitted); see also Aqua Beach Condo. Ass'n v. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs, 186 N.J. 5, 16 (2006).  A reviewing court may “not substitute its judgment . . . for that of [the] administrative agency. ”  In re Young, 202 N.J. 50, 70 (2010).  In considering these inquires, the court “may not vacate an agency determination because of doubts as to its wisdom or because the record may support more than one result,” but is “obliged to give due deference to the view of those charged with the responsibility of implementing legislative programs. ”  In re N.J. Pinelands Comm’n Resolution PC4-00-89, 356 N.J. Super. 363, 372 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 176 N.J. 281 (2003).  Where substantial evidence in the record supports more than one conclusion, the agency’s choice prevails.  Flanagan v. Civil Service Dept., 29 N.J. 1, 12 (1959); see also United Hunters Ass'n of N. J., Inc. v. Adams, 36 N.J. 288, 292 (1962) (Where a subject is debatable, the agency determination must be upheld, because a court would usurp the legislative body if it attempted to determine the results of the debate).
[brief] Appellate Division  Richard J. Hughes Justice Complex  Post Office Box 006 Trenton, New Jersey  08626  Re State of New Jersey (Plaintiff-Respondent) v. [...] (Defendant-Appellant)  Appellate Division  Docket No. [...]  Municipal Appeal No. [...]; Misc. Case No. [...]  Criminal Action: On Appeal from an Order Denying Defendant’s Municipal Appeal in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division (Criminal), Monmouth County Sat Below: Honorable [...], J.A.D (ret. & t/a)  Honorable Judges:  Please accept this letter memorandum, pursuant to R. 2:6-2(b), in lieu of a more formal brief submitted on behalf of the State of New Jersey.
[brief] "Property does not have rights.  People have rights.  The right to enjoy property without unlawful deprivation, no less than the right to speak or the right to travel, is in truth a 'personal' right, whether the 'property' in question be a welfare check, a home or a savings account.  In fact, a fundamental interdependence exists between the personal right to liberty and the personal right in property.  Neither could have meaning without the other.  That rights in property are basic civil rights has long been recognized."  405 U.S. at 552, [ 92 S.Ct. 113].
[brief] 1.  The Parkway was in a Dangerous Condition at the Time of the Injury ................................................................. 35 (Raised below, Pa1360, Pa1351, Pa1367)  a)  A Defect Existed in the Roadway ............................... 36 (Raised below, Pa1350, Pa1351, Pa13670 b)  The Defect Created a “Substantial Risk of Injury” ................................................................. 37 (Raised below, Pa1296, Pa0021, Pa0625)  c)  The Property Was Being Used with Due Care at the Time of the Injury ......................................................... 38 (Raised below, Pa0380)  2.  The Dangerous Condition Caused Plaintiff’s Accident ..... 38 (Raised below, Pa0521, Pa0523, Pa0522)  3.  The Dangerous Condition Created a Foreseeable Risk of Injury ................................................................. 39 (Raised below, Pa1193)  4.  The [...] was on Actual Notice of the Condition ........... 39 (Raised below, Pa1343, Pa1191)  5.  The Failure to Fix the Condition for Almost 7 months Was “Palpably Unreasonable” ...........................................  39  (Raised below, Pa1343, Pa0799, Pa1396)
[brief] By letter dated December 20, 2023, [...] notified counsel for [...] that [...] must immediately prepare and submit to the Department an onsite public access plan as required by Pre-Construction Condition #1.  On January 17, 2024, following receipt of the December 20, 2023 letter from [...], [...] filed a motion with [...] pursuant to N.J.A.C. 1:1-12.1 requesting that it stay the requirement for submission of an engineering plan pending the resolution of this appeal.  On January 31, 2024, [...] issued a letter rejecting the stay request.  On February 15, 2024, [...] filed a motion with this Court requesting a stay of Pre-Construction Condition #1 pending the outcome to [...]’s appeal.  On March 6, 2024, [...] filed its brief in opposition to [...]’s request for stay.  On March 14, 2024, this Court denied [...]’s motion for stay of Pre-Construction Condition #1.  On April 2, 2024, [...] filed a motion to remand this matter for further fact-finding.  On April 15, 2024, [...] filed its brief in opposition to [...]’s motion.  On April 22, 2024, this Court denied [...]’s motion for remand.  ARGUMENT I.
[brief] Finally, [...] asserts that Plaintiff’s claims lack merit because “New Jersey courts have long uniformly held that there is no express or implied private right of action for NJCFLA claims. ”  LNVN’s Br. at 33.  However, in support of its argument, [...] cites only to unpublished authorities from 2014 and after.  Thus, it is clear that New Jersey courts have not “long uniformly held” any one thing about the NJCFLA—it is a novel area of law.  [...] does not address the plain language of the NJCFLA that determines the contract governing [...]’s alleged debt to be void due to [...]’s unlicensed activity as a consumer lender, as defined by the NJCFLA.  See N.J.S.A 17:11C-2; N.J.S.A 17:11C-3; N.J.S.A 17:11C-33(b).  Further, though [...] argues that there is no private right of action under the NJCFLA, it does so without addressing any of the factors\(^4\) necessary to analyze the provision of the implied private right of action established by the United States Supreme Court in *Cort v. Ash*, 422 U.S. 66 (1975), and adopted by the New Jersey Supreme Court in *In re Resolution of State Com. of Investigation*, 108 N.J. 35, 41 (1987).
[brief] (17T:228-23 to 235-9).  Furthermore, the Court stated that [...] shot his mother and father because he was not happy with the way school was going.  (17T:232-14 to 17).  However, that information was introduced in trial through based upon a hearsay statement of a counselor that didn’t testify.  (13T:49-15 to 51-16).  Furthermore, there was no evidence in the case that [...] was going to be transferred to another school or that he was so upset that it provided a motive to kill his parents.  This information is mentioned zero times in [...]’s statement to the police.  (7T:270-20 to 326-12); (8T:18-13 to 66-9).  Furthermore, the Court incorrectly distinguished between the shooting of his mother and father upstairs and the shooting of his sister and [...] downstairs.  The incident happened within the same house at the same time.  There was no break in time between [...] shooting his parents and then going downstairs.  (7T:324-18 to 326-7).  It all happened as part of the same event while [...] was in the dissociative State.  (7T:322-7 to 326-7).  The Court improperly considered the Miller factors and put zero weight on the fact that [...] was a mentally ill sixteen-year-old boy who begged his mother for help and never got it.