ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Thus during the calendar call, I asked for an adjournment to formally oppose the motion, which was granted.  However we then participated in mediation, where the parties had verbally agreed to a settlement; but then out of nowhere [...] changed his mind and wanted to significantly alter the already-agreed-upon terms.  And then when I pushed back, he started screaming and shouting like a maniac, calling me a liar, and refused to participate in the mediation any further.
[brief] He then radioed a description of these vehicles to other officers stationed in the area and requested a marked vehicle to stop both cars.  (1T23-17 to 24-2).  [...] followed [...] and [...] began to follow defendant.  (1T24-22 to 25).  [...] drove westbound on Route 37 and stopped in a residential area at [...].  (1T25-6 to 7; 1T25-25 to 26-1).  [...] approached the driver and displayed his badge.  He noted [...] was very cooperative but “clearly nervous. ” (1T26-21 to 25; 1T27-1; 1T27-14 to 16).  [...] consented to a search of the Toyota.  (1T27-17 to 19).  During the search, police found a plastic bag containing about twenty capsules filled with white powder.  (1T27-21 to 22).  [...] performed a field test on the substance in the capsules which came back positive for cocaine.\textsuperscript{4} (1T28-1).  Meanwhile, [...] followed defendant as he traveled eastbound on Route 37.
[brief] On May 23, 2022, the Zoning Board held a hearing regarding the underlying application.  This was the second meeting regarding this application on May 23, 2022.  At the May 23, 2022 meeting certain witness for the Respondents testified and were cross examined by [...], attorney for the Appellants.  The attorney for the Appellant also presented witnesses, who were cross examined by the attorney for the Respondents.
[brief] Although [...] did not appear at trial or testify, plaintiff's counsel read portions of [...]'s deposition into the record, wherein [...] stated he believed he had the sole authority to enter into the loan agreements, without executive board approval, because of the Repurchase Agreement.  o (1T 42:8-44:5; 48:3-15; 51:24-53:13; 54:9-17).  •  She stated [...] sent an email to plaintiffs in August of 2017, advising him he would be issuing paper payroll checks to employees because their liquid funds were "dangerously close" to the $200,000 cushion they had all agreed to maintain.  She testified paper checks were issued for payroll "a couple of times."  o (1T 58:9-59:23).  •  Her first notice of the fraud was when [...], a client, sent her a UCC lien in January of 2018.  She had never heard of the companies mentioned in the lien.  When she asked [...] about it, he said it was a "mistake" and they would issue a "retraction letter" to give to the client.  She was fired by [...] shortly thereafter.  •
[brief] Here, like Berger, the record shows that [...] did not discover the collection lawsuit/default judgment until 2019—two years after default judgment had been entered.  See T2 21:24-22:2; 46:23-24 (“He has been aware of a complaint against him for $600 from 2019 . . . .”; “Mr. [...] was aware of it as of 2019 .  . . .”); see also [...]’s Br. at 6, 23 (“Appellant admitted to becoming aware of the Judgment in 2019. ”; “Appellant . . . became aware of the Collection Action at the latest in 2019. ”).
[brief] [N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2(a). ]  The “major basis of conspiratorial liability [is] the unequivocal evidence of a firm purpose to commit a crime that is provided by the agreement . . . .  Actual commission of the crime is not a prerequisite to conspirator liability.  . . .  It is the agreement that is pivotal. ”  In re State ex rel. A.D., 212 N.J. 200, 222 (2012) (citing State v. Samuels, 189 N.J. 236, 245–46 (2007) (quotations and citations omitted)).
[brief] Final Agency Decision Decision of Board of Review, Dept. of Labor, affirming decision of the Appeal Tribunal, mailed November 16, 2023…………………………………………………  Pa1  Initial Agency Decision Decision of the Appeal Tribunal, Dept. of Labor, denying unemployment benefits for claimant due to voluntary quit, mailed May 17, 2022………………………………  Pa3  APPENDIX TABLE OF CONTENTS  Final Agency Decision Decision of Board of Review, Dept. of Labor, affirming decision of the Appeal Tribunal, mailed November 16, 2023…………………………………………………  Pa1  Initial Agency Decision Decision of the Appeal Tribunal, Dept. of Labor, denying unemployment benefits for claimant due to voluntary quit, mailed May 17, 2022………………………………  Pa3 Notice of Appeal, filed December 21, 2023 ……………………………………  Pa7 Amended Notice of Appeal, filed January 4, 2024 ………………………………  Pa8  Appellant’s Civil Case Information Statement, filed December 21, 2023………………………………………………………Pa12  Appellant’s Amended Civil Case Information Statement, filed January 4, 2024 ……………………………………………………………Pa16  Court Transcript Request, filed December 21, 2023¹ ……………………………………………………………Pa20  ¹  The Appellant completed the Court Transcript Request included herein, and the fee for the transcript request was waived pursuant to N.J.S.A. 43:21-15(b).  Respondent Board of Review’s Civil Case Information Statement, filed March 6, 2024 .................................................................Pa21
[brief] “The Defendant shall receive a credit for any overpayments or improper garnishments discovered from the full accounting of child support and alimony arrears and records previously paid by Defendant. ”  (emphasis added)  The trial court in its Order of 4/4/2022 determined (DA83):  “Here, the court finds that Probation has submitted a full accounting has been provided, after obtaining the microfiche records prior to October 1, 2000, to the Defendant.
[brief] . . . . . . .  Aa0040 i. Public Officials List . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Aa0042 ii. Copy of Notification Letter  . . . . . . . . . .  Aa0043 iii. Certified Mail Labels .  . . . . . . . . . . . .  Aa0045 d. Section 4 – Narrative Report in Support of HAD – Highlands Exemption Request . . . . . . . . .
[brief] (Pa472).  Based upon the factual record of the negotiations of the $2,000,000 fee which was before the Court, it is clear that this money was paid in return for eliminating the density requirement on behalf of the one property owner within the Redevelopment Area willing to make that payment - [...].  And even were there any doubt as to the purpose of the fee, that issue should not have been resolved on summary judgment.  Discovery has revealed ten versions of the Redevelopment Agreement.  In several, the parties acknowledge the fact that the payment is a *quid pro quo* for a density bonus.  However, as the negotiations proceeded, the language explaining the payment which was calculated at a price of $50,000 per extra unit was amended to conceal its purpose.
[brief] See id. at ¶ 20.  On May 18, 2022, Department Administrator, [...] (“[...]”), dispatched a text message to Appellant confirming that Appellant’s request for a space heater near her desk was approved on May 2, 2022.  See id. at ¶ 21.  On May 4, 2022, [...] sent Appellant an email advising Appellant that said space heater arrived and was awaiting Appellant’s return under her desk.  See id.  On or about May 9, 2022, Respondents’ insurance carrier, [...] (“[...]”), was provided with paperwork from Appellant’s physician which confirmed (1) Appellant’s medical disability; (2) that Appellant would be cleared to return to work on May 16, 2022; and (3) as a part of Appellant’s return to work, she would require an accommodation in the form of “a private area to work where [Appellant] can work without a mask on” because mask wearing “should be limited as much as possible.
[directive] detention the report shall promptly case the prosecuting for responsible prosecutor the met, been not Justice.  Criminal of Division of the Director the through General Attorney the to circumstances N.J.S.A. to pursuant found court whether a delay, for reasons the indicate shall report  The requirements time with the accordance in trial commence to failure the that 2A:162-22(b)(2)(a) that steps prosecutor, the the by delay unreasonable due to was Law  Reform Bail in the forth set the with comply to attempt to agencies enforcement law and prosecutor the by taken were failure of the result as custody a from released was defendant a whether and deadlines, statutory Law.  Reform Bail the of requirements indictment/trial speedy the with comply to POLICY
[brief] Unlike in *Tung*, there was no allusion to defendant mentioning a lawyer during opening statements, testimony of any of the six witnesses, or closing statements.  Cf. *Tilghman*, 345 N.J. Super. at 577 (holding prosecutor invited the jury to infer guilt by suggesting in summation that the defendant requested an attorney when he perceived that his “alibi didn't work”).  And the judge issued an instruction that the jury “must not consider for any purpose or in any manner in arriving [at] your verdict the fact that defendant did not testify.
[directive] [...], et al., See Potential Legal Liability for Withdrawing or Reforms, Withholding Ventilators During COVID-19: Assessing the Risks and Identifying Needed JAMA (Apr. 1, 2020), available at https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jama/fullarticle/2764239.  This Directive is designed to address those concerns and provide a clear framework for medical providers seeking guidance during peak COVID-19 hospital admissions.  Therefore, pursuant to the authority granted to me under the New Jersey Constitution and the Criminal Justice Act of 1970, N.J.S.A. 52:17B-97 to -117, I hereby DIRECT all law enforcement and prosecuting agencies operating under the authority of the laws of the State of New Jersey to implement and comply with the following policies, procedures, standards, and practices.
[brief] 264 N.J. Super. at 420; 136 N.J. at 151.  Evidence at trial, including testimony and NJSP forms signed by [...], showed [...] was “stripped of all police powers, required to return all equipment which had been issued to him, and advised of the conditions of his suspension including the fact that he could no longer carry an off-duty weapon. ”  264 N.J. Super. at 421; see 136 N.J. at 156 ([...] “signed a form advising him of the terms of his suspension”).  In other words, [...] “reverted” “to the status of an ordinary citizen. ”  264 N.J. Super. at 421.  Yet, according to trial testimony, [...] “was obligated to abide by the rules and regulations governing behavior of a State Trooper. ”  *Ibid.*  All of those things, including the display of the allegedly lost ID, were proven here.  The Supreme Court reversed this Court’s opinion in *[...]* that a suspended trooper was not a “public servant” subject to prosecution for official misconduct.
[brief] (2T7:5-8:14).  The Committee also heard from [...], who, consistent with his statement before the Planning Board, reiterated his conclusion that the Plan was wholly inconsistent with the Township's Master Plan.  (2T13:7-17:8).  [...] noted: (1) the Plan had no rehabilitative component whatsoever, despite being designated as "an area in need of rehabilitation"; (2) the Plan appeared to be fiscal zoning; and (3) the Plan would allow a use unsupported by the Township's Master Plan.  (2T13:7-17:8).  After [...] concluded his statement, the Committee opened the meeting for public comment.  (2T17:15-16).  Approximately seventeen members of the public rendered comments regarding the Plan—most urging the Committee to reject the Plan.  (2T17:20-55:22).
[brief] (1T 6-1 to 6-14).  [...] immediately responded to the dispatch and proceeded to Stevens Avenue.  (1T 7-13 to 7-15).  Approximately 100 yards down Stevens Avenue, [...] observed a telephone pole, snapped in half and leaned over, a debris field, and a trail of fluids and tire marks leading north on Stevens Avenue.  (1T 7-17 to 7-22).  As he drove in the direction of the trail of fluids, he saw that the fluid crossed over the yellow lines into the oncoming lane of traffic.  (1T 8-18 to 9-9).  He continued to follow the trail of fluids and found a white pickup truck with the hazards on and smoke coming from the engine compartment on Lopez Road.  (1T 12-5 to 12-8).  He approached the driver, identified as [...] (defendant).  [...] told him to exit the vehicle and he “escorted him, held his hand, towards the side of the street where” he sat [the defendant] down on the curb.  (1T 13-17 to 13-21).  When the defendant first exited his vehicle, he stated to [...], “‘A deer ran across the road. ’ And reiterated, ‘A deer ran across the road. ’” (1T 14-24 to 15-1).  The video recording played at trial, labelled as S-7, demonstrates the defendant as saying, “Fucking deer.  It just crossed the street…[i]t just fucking, you know, cross down the street. ” (1T 51-19 to 24).  When the defendant spoke, [...] smelled the “strong odor” of “alcoholic beverage emanating from his breath. ” (1T 15-1 to 15-6).  Because [...] smelled the odor of alcoholic beverage, he asked the defendant where he was coming from and how much he had to drink.  (1T 15-19 to 15-24).  The defendant initially admitted to having two beers.  (1T 16-6 to 16-11).  The video played during the trial shows the defendant first saying he had a “couple glasses of wine” but then pivoted to saying he had two or three beers.  (1T 52-5 to 52-21).  Based on this admission, [...] conducted standardized field sobriety testing on the defendant.  (1T 16-17 to 16-22).  [...] administered an HGN, which demonstrated nystagmus and other clues that the defendant was under the influence of alcohol.  (1T 22-20 to 24-8).  [...] also performed a walk-and-turn field sobriety test during which the defendant did not follow all directions, turned incorrectly, and stepped off the line.  (1T 24-18 to 26-5).  [...] followed that by administering the one-legged stand test.  (1T 26-9 to 26-10).  During the test, the defendant failed to maintain a one leg stand, swayed, and repeated a number during the counting phase of the test.  (1T 27-10 to 27-16).  Based on his training and experience and upon the totality of the circumstances, including the admission, odors, and clues from the standardized field sobriety tests, Office Watson testified “that, due to [defendant’s] consumption of alcohol, he was impaired, and he shouldn’t have been driving that night. ” (1T 29-16 to 30-4).  After that, [...] arrested the defendant and transported him to police headquarters.  (1T 30-6 to 30-10).  At police headquarters, the defendant was Mirandized\(^2\) for a second time and “stated he had two Coronas and one shot” of cognac.  (T1 39-1 to 39-7).  [...] also testified.
[brief] At 1T-35-23-25 & 1T-37-11-13, Her Honor again holds my arguing in the alternative against me.  All the “ifs” show that if [...] cannot pursue a damage or direct action, he’d like to at least be able to use *Ex Parte Young* to obtain declaratory relief against the Judge/Managers (or the AG) in their official capacity.  At 1T-40-12-14, Her Honor seems to suggest that [...] needs to sue the two judges in their personal capacities to obtain injunctive relief.  That’s just incorrect.  In *Pasqua*, counsel took the “nasty” step of suing the judges in both capacities.  The personal actions were covered by judicial or legislative immunity.  This did not deny the Plaintiff’s Declaratory Relief directed at the AOC AD in his administrative capacity to assure counsel in contempt proceedings.  At 1T-42-2-10, Her Honor says [...] does not allege he was denied accommodations.  That’s right!  This case is the other side of the coin: [...] just wanted to be given his Constitutional Rights in Absecon and to be eligible for the PTI program, THE SAME AS ANYONE ELSE.
[brief] II.  PLAINTIFF’S NEED TO STRETCH AND USE THE RESTROOM IN NO WAY INFLUENCED THE JURY, AND IN FACT, WAS FULLY PERMISSIBLE UNDER THE RULES OF THE COURTROOM.  IT IS APPELLANTS’ BURDEN TO PROVE THAT THERE WAS ACTUAL IMPACT ON THE JURY TO OBTAIN A NEW TRIAL, NOT RESPONDENT’S BURDEN TO DO THE OPPOSITE.
[brief] For example, [...] called [...] at noon and 12:13pm and they had brief conversations.  For those and other calls made to [...] midday, historic cell-site analysis placed [...]’s phone in Mays Landing.  For [...]’s text messages and 12:53 and 12:58 calls to [...], his phone connected to a cell tower between Mays Landing and Atlantic City.  It connected to a tower in Atlantic City at 1:18pm, then Pleasantville tower between 1:45 and 2:34 p.m. (Da92-93, 98; 12T100-17 to 106-11, 108-6 to 9, 13T109-3 to 116-13, 117-20 to 119-10, 156-14 to 21; 15T7-16 to 22)⁴
[directive] Recyclable Paper is and Recycled on Prinled • Employer Opportunity Equaf  An Jersey New !s l~\ 2 Page to pursuant promulgated are  Guidelines following The 2C:43-12.  N.J.S.A. violence. domestic Justice Criminal of Division the and Prosecutors County all on binding are and requirement, that applications.  PTI handling when PTI i~ito Admission Against Presu~nptioii 1. into admission presumption against only 98, the c. P.L. 2015, of enactment
[brief] (Aa12).  Prior to Permit issuance, each of the unnamed tributaries on [...]’s property contained at least one culvert.  (Ra92-94).  [...]’s Permit allows for the placement of an additional two-foot wide pipe culvert in one of the unnamed tributaries to Duck Pond Run to facilitate a road crossing over the tributary to U.S. Route 1.  (Aa33).  The pipe culvert will operate by allowing water to flow in the narrow, manmade tributary once the road crossing is constructed.  DEP reviewed [...]’s Project plans showing the road crossing over the tributary, (Aa39-40), and [...]’s application representing that the tributary bed is less than five feet in width, (Aa155), and determined that a bridge is not feasible, N.J.A.C. 7:13-12.7(g)(5).
[brief] To the contrary, our courts review a board’s decisions to determine whether the board’s findings were in error and lacking a basis in the record.  Anastasio v. Planning Bd. of Tp. of West Orange, 209 N.J. Super. 499, 522, (App. Div.) certif. denied 107 N.J. 46 (1986).  Boards are entitled to weigh the testimony of experts who provide their opinions and assign such weight to those opinions as they deem appropriate under the circumstances of the case.  Nextel of N.Y., Inc. v. Borough of Englewood Cliffs Bd. of Adjustment, 361 N.J. Super. 22, 41 (App. Div. 2003).  However, “while a board may reject expert testimony, it may not do so unreasonably, based only upon bare allegations or unsubstantiated beliefs. ”  New York SMSA v. Bd. of Adjustment, 370 N.J. Super. 319, 338 (App. Div. 2004).  In this case, the Trial Court correctly applied those legal principles and entered judgment in favor of Plaintiffs on the Second Count of the Complaint, reversing the Zoning Board’s denial and approving the use variance and bulk variance relief sought through the Amended Application in its entirety.
[brief] This is an action in lieu of prerogative writ, with Plaintiff challenging the defendant [...]’s denial of a use variance.  The use variance was brought under N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70(d)(1).  It sought approval for accessory uses (stormwater basins, parking spaces, and a driveway), permitted in the zoning district in which the property is situated.  However, the principal structure, a warehouse, is to be located in neighboring [...].  The subject property is bifurcated by the [...]/[...] municipal boundary line.  As a result, these otherwise permitted accessory uses became the principal uses on the [...] side of the boundary, thus necessitating a (d)(1) use variance.  The [...] Joint Land Use Board had already granted preliminary site plan approval for the warehouse and accessory improvements on its side of the municipal line when the defendant [...] began its public hearings.  The question presented is whether the [...] properly denied this variance for uses otherwise permitted as accessory to a structure, where the structure is to be built entirely within (and has already been approved by) the adjoining municipality, at a height of 48 feet, but [...] limits building heights to 30 feet.  Stated differently, may a zoning board theoretically apply its height requirements to a building already approved in the adjoining municipality; presume that it would have denied a height variance if the building had been proposed for its side of the boundary line; and then conclude that since it would have denied the hypothetical height variance for that building, that it is therefore justified in denying these otherwise permitted, height neutral accessory improvements to a use permitted on both sides of the municipal boundary line?  PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[brief] “I focused on whether or not parole is meaningful….Parole exists for a reason.  Okay?  It’s a more in depth look than the Court can actually give in any of this type of proceeding. ”  (5T84-25 to 85-6)  (emphasis added)  Instead of ruling on whether [...] had demonstrated maturation and rehabilitation – and was thus eligible for release – the court left those questions for the Board:
[brief] 2T.  At that time, [...] held that “I’m going to enforce the first [December 12, 2022] resolution that the [...] passed.  And then 42 days later or whatever it is was they decided to—that was only a conditional approval.  And they went back and they unpassed the [December 12, 2022 resolution].  I quite frankly find this is a tactic in a long line of tactics that [...] has utilized to delay meeting its constitutional obligation of affordable housing.
[brief] ......................................................... 8, 22, 30 Rules R. 4:6-2(e) .................................................................................. 6 Statutes N.J.S.A. 17:10-13 ........................................................................ 11 N.J.S.A. 17:11C-18 .................................................................... 9, 14 N.J.S.A. 17:11C-18(i) ................................................................ 14 N.J.S.A. 17:11C-20 ................................................................... 11 N.J.S.A. 17:11C-3(a) ................................................................ 1 N.J.S.A. 17:11C-33(b) ................................................................. passim N.J.S.A. 17:11C-7(c) ................................................................ 13 N.J.S.A. 17:11C-7(e) ........................................................................................................... 13 N.J.S.A. 2A:16-53 .................................................................................................................. 29 N.J.S.A. 52:9M-15.................................................................................................................. 30 N.J.S.A. 52:9M-15(a) ......................................................................................................... 16 N.J.S.A. 56:8-2...................................................................................................................... 2, 20, 24 Other Authorities 1996 N.J. ALS 157 ..................................................................................................................  11  1996 N.J. Ch. 157....................................................................................................................  11  1996 N.J. Laws 157 ...............................................................................................................  11  1997 N.J. A.N. 2513 ..............................................................................................................  11  Federal Trade Commission, Collecting Consumer Debts: The Challenges of Change, a Workshop Report, at 55 (Feb. 2009)  .................................................................  1 Federal Trade Commission, Repairing a Broken System: Protecting Consumers in Debt Collection Litigation and Arbitration, at 7 (July 2010)  ........................................  1  New Jersey Judiciary, Superior Court Caseload Reference Guide 2010 – 2014  1 NJLLA, 1997 N.J. A.N. 2513 ...............................................................................................  12  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS