ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] First, the tortious interference claim is not a strict-liability claim and does require an intent to injure.  Second, the [...] unambiguously alleged the [...] acted with an intent to injure.  [...] recognizes there is some *dicta* in the opinion that suggests that mere allegations of intent are an insufficient basis to refuse to provide a defense.  Rather, the underlying plaintiff must present some evidence that the insured subjectively intended to injure the claimant.  *Id.* at *23* (citing *SL Indus., Inc. v. Am. Motorists Ins.*, 128 N.J. 188, 212 (1992)).  Despite this statement, this Court in *Superior Integrated Solutions* relied only on the allegations of the complaint.  And, as mentioned in the last paragraph, in *Superior Integrated Solutions*, the underlying plaintiffs’ claims could survive a finding there was no intent to injure because it was a strict liability claim.
[brief] Plaintiff’s cross motion brief only further highlights how important it is for this specific case to be heard by the Appellate Court not just for the sake of [...]’s family but for all homeowners.  Plaintiff claims the matter is frivolous because Plaintiff fails to recognize how significantly the law has changed.  We must recognize this change and that many tax foreclosure judgments in New Jersey were simply unconstitutional.  Although this case did fall through the cracks as stated herein, once reviewed on the merits, we are confident the Court will apply Tyler and vacate [...]’s judgment.
[brief] At that time, Plaintiff also withdrew his claim for medical expenses, and Defendants stipulated that no testimony would be presented from Defendant [...] at trial.  On March 31, 2023, the trial court entered orders: (a) denying Plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgment as having been rendered moot by Defendants’ stipulation of liability, (Da27); (b) denying Plaintiff’s in limine motion to bar Defendant [...]’ trial testimony as having been rendered moot by Defendants’ agreement not to present such testimony, (Da28); and (c) denying Defendants’ motion to bar Plaintiff’s medical expense claim as having been rendered moot by Plaintiff’s withdrawal thereof.
[directive] Unlawful Taking of a without consent of owner and drives recklessly, third degree; rides in a motor vehicle knowing 2C:20-10(a-d)  4th Degree  $1,000 to $2,500  10% permissible  Means of it has been taken without consent of the owner; fourth degree.  Takes a means of Conveyance conveyance other than a motor vehicle; disorderly persons offense.
[brief] In order to spur redevelopment, a redevelopment plan was prepared for the Redevelopment Area known as the [...], dated March 30, 2023 (“Redevelopment Plan”).  According to the Redevelopment Plan, “[t]he overall goal of the King's Landing Redevelopment Plan is to build a cluster of warehouse and distribution facilities in a location that provides easy access to regional truck corridors, including Route 322 and the New Jersey Turnpike.  The development will span both sides of Swedesboro Road and include parcels in both [...] and [...]. ” (Pa101).  Included with the Redevelopment Plan is a discussion as to how the Redevelopment Plan is designed to effectuate the goals of the Master Plan.  It notes that one of the Master Plan’s major employment goals is to:  [D]irect its [the Township’s] efforts toward the location and development of planned office industrial warehouse areas in the immediate vicinity of the major regional traffic arteries in order to take advantage of the regional transportation network and to limit impacts within the critical portion of the Township.  (Pa97).  To achieve this goal, the Township needs to “[p]romote the development of clear industrial uses, office warehouse uses, and commercial services uses in locations which have good regional roadway service which will not adversely affect existing or proposed residential development. ” (Pa97).  Economic Goals of the Master Plan include locating commercial enterprises “in the immediate vicinity of the limited access highway interchanges…” (Pa97).  To achieve these employment and economic goals of the Master Plan as well as [...]’s redevelopment goals, the Redevelopment Plan continued to allow warehouse and distribution use as permitted uses on the Redevelopment Area, but eliminated the maximum building size for warehouse buildings and increased the permitted height to 60 feet.  (Pa102).  The Redevelopment Plan also included several provisions designed to protect neighboring residential uses.
[brief] (5T107-24 to 5T108-6; 5T117-1 to 8).  The State argued that the elements of passion/provocation manslaughter were not supported by the evidence.  (5T89-17 to 5T90-6).  There was no evidence that the victim threatened defendant with a knife or that defendant refused to have more sex and said, “no, no, no. ” (5T114-16 to 20; 5T114-23 to 24).  There was no evidence to show that the victim was mad.  (5T114-25).  [...] observed that the court had scoured the record, and it was not able to connect the dots based upon the evidence produced at the retrial.
[brief] Rather, implicit in [...]’s argument is that the Arbitrator improperly evaluated documentary evidence and incorrectly resolved discrepancies in that evidence in [...]’s favor.  See App. Br. at 35-36 (“the Arbitrator improperly inflated the interest calculation on the ongoing projects because he discounted the payments made by [...]…which makes no sense - mathematically or otherwise”).  [...] does not point to a single computational error or “imperfection” or inaccuracy in the Award’s calculations, but rather merely suggests that the Arbitrator somehow misevaluated conflicting documentary evidence, and [...]’s award of interest should have been “offset” by other alleged amounts—going as far as proposing a “correct method to calculate” interest, and submitting “Alternative Calculations.
[brief] It simply states:  "To satisfy the requirements of authenticating or identifying an item of evidence, the proponent must present sufficient evidence to support a finding that the item is what its proponent claims."  [...] has acknowledged that the standard is low.  His argument is that the aforementioned [...] testimony does not meet that standard for purposes of admitting video footage which does not actually show the shooting, and which has 'inaccurate' date/time stamping – especially when he would be expected to be in front of that camera a good portion of each day in connection with his job.
[brief] [...] should have been permitted to confront [...] at trial with evidence that his deposition testimony in October of 2022 about his criminal convictions was at best evasive and likely a flat out lie.  The truth is that [...] was convicted of possession of controlled dangerous substances with an intent to distribute on June 1, 2018, just over five years before the trial began.  Da104.  [...] was sentenced to four years of probation.  Ibid.  That means [...]’s period of probation – including the random drug testing, meetings with his probation officer, and drug and alcohol evaluations – ended only weeks before his deposition.  [...] should have been permitted to confront [...] with this evidence at trial and the trial court’s refusal to allow this evidence at trial deprived [...] of a fair trial.  It must also be noted that the trial court’s rulings on the admissibility of [...]’s criminal convictions, in part, were made in the context of a motion for reconsideration.
[brief] Nor could he have done so.  The Arbitrator was only asked to determine what interest rate should apply once his award of the amount due under the promissory note and guaranty was confirmed in an *in personam* judgment.  *See* Da435 (“[T]he Arbitrator finds in favor [plaintiff] on its claim for breach of Note against [...] and for breach of the Guaranty against [...]. ”); Da469-71 (*In personam* judgment of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania confirming the Arbitrator’s award of post-judgment interest on the note and guaranty (not the subsequent New Jersey mortgage foreclosure judgment) at the contract rate.  Indeed, [...]’s calculations that plaintiff presented to [...] are based exclusively upon what “is currently due Plaintiff under the Note. ”  Da35, ¶18 and Da47, ¶18 (emphasis added).  Moreover, there is no mention whatsoever in the Arbitrator’s award or the federal *in personam* judgment of a post-New Jersey mortgage foreclosure judgement interest rate.  *See* Da430-71.  Thus, plaintiff’s reliance on principles that apply to issues actually litigated and decided by the Arbitrator is unavailing.  *See* Pb10-11.  For example, issue preclusion does not apply because the post-New Jersey mortgage foreclosure judgment interest rate was not “actually determined” in the arbitration proceeding.  See Habick v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 320 N.J. Super. 244, 256 (App. Div. 1999).
[brief] Defendant [...], the Mayor in 2017, testified that there were allegations from citizen and community groups that the officers on scene during the July 5, 2016 incident supposedly engaged in racial profiling or racially biased behavior, and he was concerned about “backlash from the community”, but he was not aware of Plaintiff’s name coming up in any such allegations.  ([...] Dep. 82:12-22, 687a; 83:24-84:1, 687a).  [...] received several inquiries from the media regarding this issue of ‘alleged racial profiling’ in which Plaintiff became ensnared by way of Defendants’ unjustified removal of Plaintiff from his duties in a public forum, even though, as Defendants concede, there was no factual basis for such an allegation and there was no such specific complaint against Plaintiff by anyone.
[brief] Ibid.  The first provision therefore was unenforceable because it did not unequivocally express an intent that [...] would indemnify [...] for [...]’s own negligence.  Ibid.  Next, the Englert Court ruled that the inclusion of “two very different indemnification provisions in the same contract” created an additional ambiguity.  Id. at 57.  In light of those differences, the contract, taken as a whole, did not meet the Azurak standard of expressing an intent for [...] to indemnify [...] for [...]’s own negligence.
[brief] On May 2, 2022, Appellants filed their Brief in Opposition to Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss.  (Ca175-195). ¹  On June 3, 2022, Appellants filed a Motion to Supplement the Record with documents which had not been made available to Appellants at the time any prior motion or response had been filed.  (Ca074-105).  On June 6, 2022, the Commission granted that Motion to Supplement the Record.  (Ca014) (“On June 3, 2022, [Appellants] filed a ‘Motion to Supplement the Record,’ with several exhibits, which was granted by the Commission’s Staff, as Respondent did not object. ”)  On July 26, 2022, the Commission issued its decision on Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss.
[brief] The law does not require a defendant, such as [...], to remove a product from the market entirely, or else face universal liability simply for selling that product.  Where consistent with the PLA, New Jersey law follows the Third Restatement in product-liability cases.  E.g., Cavanaugh v. Skil Corp., 164 N.J. 1, 4-5 (2000); Myrlak v. Port --- 3  Plaintiff’s recall-based warning claim also fails because the recall here was not safety related (Da0252).
[brief] ...........................................  H587a Holm-65: [...] response to discovery request  HOLM-[...]-PNL-62, re secondary or system-wide failure due to operating one portion at lower pressures (SOICR p. 12)  ...........................................  H589a Holm-66: [...] response to discovery request  HOLM-[...]-PNL-63, procurement process for the CWT heater, with (SOICR p. 12)  ........  H590a Attachment A from [...], quotation for CWT heater .........................................................
[brief] For all of the foregoing reasons, and as set forth in the [...] merits brief, the [...] respectfully submit that the Court should affirm the trial court’s order compelling [...] to arbitrate its claims.  Respectfully submitted, **[...]**  Dated: September 25, 2024  By: /s/ [...]  [...]  [...]  [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], and [...], Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. [...], d/b/a [...], d/b/a [...], d/b/a [...], d/b/a [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], d/b/a [...], d/b/a [...], d/b/a [...], [...], [...], d/b/a [...], [...], SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. [...]
[brief] APPENDIX TABLE OF CONTENTS ### VOLUME I (CONFIDENTIAL) | Document | Page | |-------------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | Notice of Appeal | Pa1 | | Case Information Statement | Pa5 | | [...] Final Decision 11/29/23 | Pa9 | | Amended Eligibility Registration Form | Pa17 | | Correspondence from [...] 8/1/23 | Pa19 | | Reply to [...] 7/17/23\(^1\) | Pa20 | | [...] Initial Decision 6/13/23 | Pa29 | | Correspondence to [...] 3/23/23 | Pa33 | | Petition for Ricci Action Registration 3/3/23 | Pa35 | | Affidavit of [...] | Pa61 | | [...] Eligibility Registration Form | Pa63 | | [...] Request for Amended Benefits Form | Pa65 | | Medical Examination 3/30/22 | Pa66 | | Medical Examination 4/28/22 | Pa68 | | Administrative Denial of Ricci Benefits | Pa76 | | Legislative Notice August 2019 | Pa77 | | Postage Statement | Pa79 | \(^1\) Per R.2:6-1(a)(2), Pa20, Pa29, Pa33, and Pa35 are included in the Appendix because they are germane to the appeal.
[brief] (Pa60-Pa61)  ...........................................................................................................  26  V.  The Trial Court Properly Determined that No Enlargement of the Appeal Period was Warranted.  (Pa55-Pa58).  .........................................................  30  A.  Plaintiff has not Shown a Valid Reason for Their Delay.  (T2, 36:23-38:8)  ..............................................................................................................  30  B.  Plaintiff Interest is Purely Private.  (T2, 10:5-18 & 15:10-19)  ............  34  1.  Plaintiff Does Not Raise any Constitutional Claims.  (T2, 9:20-10:4).  .................................................................................................................. 35  2.  Plaintiff Raises Only Private Dissatisfaction of a Project Near It’s Members’ Properties.  (T2, 15:12-19).  ............................................. 36  C.  The Policy of Repose Outweighs Any Interest Plaintiff has Asserted.  (T2, 8:2-12:1 & 19:20-20:13).  .........................................................  41  D.  The Trial Court Properly Concluded that Rocky Hill Rather than Willoughby Provided the Proper Framework for Determining Enlargement in this Case.  (T2, 10:19-11:9).  ....................... 44  1.  Willoughby is Significantly Factually Distinguishable.  (T2, 14:24-15:9).  .................................................................................................................. 44  2.  Rocky Hill Provides the Correct Framework for Analysis.  (T2, 10:19-14:14)  ............................................................................................................. 48  CONCLUSION ..................................................................................................................
[brief] ”  The comments to Rule 1.7 explain that “[a] conflict may exist by reason of substantial discrepancy in the parties’ testimony, incompatibility in positions in relation to an opposing party or the fact that there are substantially different possibilities of settlement of the claims or liabilities in question. ”  The question is whether there is a “significant risk that a lawyer’s ability to consider, recommend or carry out an appropriate course of action for the client will be materially limited as a result of the lawyer’s other responsibilities or interests,”  In re Op. No. 17-2012 of Advisory Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, 220 N.J. 468, 478-79 (2014) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), and whether the lawyer would be impeded from “considering alternatives or foreclose courses of action that reasonably should be pursued on behalf of the client. ”  Ibid.; see also Hill v. New Jersey Dep't of Corr. Com'r Fauver, 342 N.J. Super. 273, 309 (App. Div. 2001).  To identify such a risk, “[t]he critical questions are the likelihood that a difference in interests” will arise, and “if it does, whether it will materially interfere with the lawyer’s independent professional judgment in considering alternatives or foreclose courses of action that reasonably should be pursued on behalf of the client. ”  Op. No. 17-2012, 220 N.J. at 478-79.  And where, as here, the lawsuit is brought against an employer and employee, “[t]he elements of mutuality must preponderate over the elements of incompatibility. ”  Hill, 342 N.J. Super. at 309 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Petition for Review of Op. 552, 102 N.J. 194, 204 (1986)).³ --- ³
[brief] 1.  Between July 9, 2020 and September 20, 2022, [...] (hereinafter “[...]”) filed nine (9) claims for med-pay subrogation with [...] (hereinafter “[...]”) (Da123-Da209).  In each case, [...] paid New Jersey New Jersey Medical Expense Payment (“Med-Pay”) benefits on behalf of its insureds in accordance with N.J.S.A. 39:5H-10(c)(2) (Da123-Da209).  These claims were submitted under a limited agreement to arbitrate (the Medical Payment Subrogation Arbitration Agreement, hereinafter “the Agreement”), to the Med-Pay Arbitration Forum of [...] (Da118-Da119).  [...], [...] and/or [...] (hereinafter “[...]”) responded to each claim and timely asserted the affirmative defense med-pay subrogation was prohibited in New Jersey and therefore, the dispute was outside of the scope of the Agreement.  In each case, the arbitrator denied this affirmative defense based on the fact that [...] was a signatory to the Agreement (Da123-Da209).  2.
[brief] (Ra92); N.J.A.C. 7:7-7.1(b).  [...] instead applied for a CAFRA permit, as the regulations direct.  N.J.A.C. 7:7-7.1(g). 6  Because the Design Guidelines control “setback, bulk, height and building line requirements” in the Redevelopment Area, 29 N.J.R. 3920(a), [...] ultimately determined it could not apply the standard of its Scenic Resources and Design Rule, N.J.A.C. 7:7-16.10.  In its environmental report, [...] acknowledged that the design standards in the Design Ordinance and the Scenic Resources and Design Rule differ, but the Ordinance supersedes [...]’s rule in the Long Branch Redevelopment Zone.  (Ra6-7).  This makes sense – otherwise the Redevelopment Zone design standards along the waterfront would all conform to the Statewide standard and not have any greater “flexibility in design” as the rest of the State.  29 N.J.R. 3920(a).  [...]’s resolution between the Long Branch rule and the Scenic Resources and Design Rule is owed deference.
[brief] (1T 30:2-33:9).  The court went on to state that the MCS-90 surety endorsement “is distinct and separate from the insurance policy and its conditions and limitations;” and that it applies to a final judgment, which is arrived at after vigorous or non-vigorous litigation efforts are undertaken.  (1T 34:17-21).  Here, the court noted that, “no one conducted any discovery, and the defendants gave up pretty quickly.  [...] had no ability to mount a defense and [...] took a no coverage, no defense position regarding [...]’s insurance claim related to the oil spill incident.  In fact, in this case, [...] did not answer the complaint, they suffered a default judgment, they came into the case late, they got the default judgment lifted, they filed an answer and third-party complaint against [...] for coverage, then gave up again when it filed no opposition again to [...]’s motion for summary judgment against [...], and that resulted in the final judgment being rendered against [...] for the oil spill.
[brief] (Da3)  Trial de novo was held on November 2, 2023 before the Hon. [...], J.S.C.  Again Defendant’s primary argument was that his sentence should be “corrected” to run the 10-year suspension of his driving privileges concurrent with the suspension period he was already serving at the time of his plea.  (3T12-6 to 12-8)  Alternatively, Defendant again argued that he should be permitted to vacate his plea, yet still provided no support for this argument.  (3T12-10 to 12-18)  As to the argument that Defendant’s sentence should be corrected, the De Novo Court found the plain language of N.J.S.A. 39:4-50(a)(3) “clear and unambiguous. ”  (3T41-13 to 41-14)  The Court found that even if it “were to accept Defendant’s argument…it cannot do so because having the suspensions run concurrently would be tantamount to an illegal sentence which this Court cannot endorse. ”  (3T42-18 to 42-23)  The Court thus denied Defendant’s request to have his license suspension run concurrently.  (3T45-24 to 45-25)
[brief] ”).  As the *Hill* Court explained, at common law, the prosecution was required to prove that the victim of a violent crime immediately cried out and alerted neighbors about the crime.  *Hill*, 121 N.J. at 157.  Even after this “hue and cry” --- \(^7\)  Defense counsel objected to this portion of the State’s argument, explain that “it wasn’t her obligation to speak after an arrest,” but the court overruled the objection because this silence occurred before [...] was arrested, rather than afterwards.  (8T 55-21 to 25, 57-8 to 13) requirement for most violent felonies was abandoned, “courts continued to require hue and cry in rape cases, and held it against the State if the woman had not confided in anyone after the attack.
[brief] The Nacirema Award was rendered on July 15, 2021.  (Pa46 at ¶19 (Blaine Cert.) and Pa132 to Pa142 (Exhibit F thereto - Nacirema Award)).  September 13, 2021 was sixty days after the issuance of the Nacirema Award.  The Consent Order’s mandatory filing deadline for commencing a Refiled Action was therefore September 13, 2021.  Appellants did not commence a Refiled Action by September 13, 2021.  Instead, Appellants waited 620 days – 560 days longer than the 60-day deadline – before attempting to resurrect their long-expired Chancery Action claims that were dismissed in November of 2018 by the Consent Order.  It was not until March 27, 2023 that Appellants initiated the matter at hand by filing the Complaint in the Union Count Law Division rather than Chancery.
[brief] ” (Pa35–36, Complaint ¶35–41, Count Three).  C.  The Superior Court Order and Opinion  Upon [...]’s motion, the trial court dismissed Plaintiff’s Complaint in an order and twelve-page opinion dated May 30, 2024.  (Pa1–14).  Relevant here, the trial court found the arbitration clause in the parties’ Agreement satisfied the requirements set forth in Atalese v. U.S. Legal Servs. Grp., L.P., 219 N.J. 430, 437 (2014) because it clearly and unambiguously advised Plaintiff that he would arbitrate his claims against [...] and informed him that he was waiving his right to seek relief in a judicial forum.