ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Second, Tenant is judicially estopped from raising this argument because it admitted in the Underlying Action that it was liable for Landlord’s legal fees due to the undisputed Events of Default.  “Judicial estoppel is an equitable doctrine precluding a party from asserting a position in a case that contradicts or is inconsistent with a position previously asserted by the party in the case or a related legal proceeding. ”  *Tamburelli Properties Ass'n v. Borough of Cresskill*, 308 N.J. Super. 326, 335 (App. Div. 1998).  In the Underlying Action, Tenant, on multiple occasions, took the position that it was liable for Landlord’s legal fees and costs; going so far as to craft its Motion for Reconsideration around this tenet.  Specifically, in its Notice of Motion, Tenant sought the following, in relevant part:  Compelling Landlord to pay the remaining presently due amount of fit-up reimbursement to Tenant *after set-off for Landlord’s attorneys’ fees and costs* and after Tenant’s recoupment of its escrow deposit with the Court (Da174 (emphasis added)).  Tenant’s proposed Order submitted with the Motion for Reconsiderations similarly sought entry of the following:  **ORDERED** that Landlord is hereby compelled to pay Tenant the remaining balance of Tenant fit-up reimbursement *after set-off credit for Landlord’s reduced fee award*, in the amount of $______ within ten (10) days of the date of this Order.  (Pa100-101 (emphasis added)).  Tenant’ counsel further stated the following on the record during oral argument on the Motion for Reconsideration:  …  My client is looking for a determination from the Court that there is still money owed to my client for the fit up under Section 4.02 of the lease, for the years 19, 20 and 21.  And that should be, that amount, 334,000 and change, should be offset against the 196.  Then whatever fees Your Honor awards to [...]’s [i.e. Landlord’s] firm, deduct that, we do the math, and then everything gets squared up and we’re right back where we should be under the lease and everybody is current.  (3T6-12 to 3T6-21)  Having repeatedly taken the position in the Underlying Action that it was liable to Landlord for its legal fees and cost, Tenant is judicially estopped from changing this position and arguing, on appeal, that not only should it not pay Landlord’s legal fees but that Landlord should pay Tenant’s.
[directive] 7.4.1  The New Jersey State Police will not examine marijuana weighing less than 50 grams (disorderly persons offense) unless the defendant has appeared in Municipal Court and entered a plea of not guilty.  When drafting complaints charging defendants with possession of less than 50 grams of marijuana, schedule the case to be heard on the closest court date A-14 following the arrest.  If the defendant pleads not guilty on his first court appearance, the court will schedule another date so that the evidence may be examined and the results obtained.  7.4.2
[brief] Re-sentencing counsel submitted a detailed memorandum in advance of the hearing.  (Da267).  She noted the relatively minor nature of petitioner’s prior adult convictions - related to a single incident for third-degree burglary and third-degree fraudulent use of a credit card.  Petitioner had never been sentenced to a single day in State prison.  (Da 284 ).  Counsel submitted evidence of Petitioner’s troubled childhood.  She submitted a letter from his grandmother, which detailed that she took custody of him when he was two years old because his drug-addicted mother would leave him home alone and his father was too unstable to take care of him.  Petitioner has physical and intellectual limitations due to his mother's drug use.  His grandfather was his father figure, but he died in the time petitioner has been incarcerated.  (Da 277, Da 337)  Counsel also submitted letters from the mother of petitioner’s children and one of the petitioner’s children.  The mother requested a sentence that would allow petitioner to see his children again.  The child said that he and his little brother want their father to come home.  (Da 278, Da 335).  Counsel also argued the difference in sentences between petitioner and two of his equally culpable co-defendants, [...] and [...], who each received five-year sentences, one subject to NERA and the other not.  (Da 272, 286)  [...] had a similar prior record to petitioner.  (Da 290)  Counsel also presented evidence of other defendants who received significantly lower sentences for more serious multiple robberies in Camden County.  [...] and [...] committed eight armed robberies.  In one, a clerk was shot multiple times, paralyzing him.  [...] pleaded guilty to attempted murder, first-degree robbery, and two counts of criminal restraint and received an aggregate 20-year sentence, subject to NERA.  (Da 273 to 275).  Based upon these arguments and supporting materials, re-sentencing counsel requested a 20 year sentence, subject to NERA.
[brief] She noted:  Um, Plaintiff has alleged -- and I don’t think there’s really much of a dispute, really, and I am going to take as factual for the purpose of this motion the jobsite was not kept really well.  It was messy, um, there’s photographs showing how it was kept.  (T36:16-20)  The trial court went on:  I think we can all again accept he was carrying things to the dumpster, uh, so we have to understand that it must have been debris, you’re not going to throw out anything but debris into a dumpster.  (T37:15-18)
[brief] On September 8, 2022, Plaintiff filed a Notice of Motion to Enforce the Property Settlement Agreement and other Relief.  (Da 17). ¹  On October 27, 2023, Defendant filed his Certification in Response to Plaintiff’s Notice of Motion to Enforce the Property Settlement Agreement.  (Da 58).  ¹Da_ refers to Defendant’s Appendix  On November 1, 2023, Plaintiff filed a Notice of Order to Show Cause (Da 68), together with the Certification of [...] in Support of Order to Show Cause.  (Da 71).  On November 8, 2023, Plaintiff’s Letter Brief in support of Plaintiff’s Response to Defendant’s Certification.  (Da 71).  On November 9, 2022, a Zoom Hearing was held before the Honorable [...] at which time an Order was entered denying Plaintiff's Order to Show Cause, without prejudice.  (Da 89).  On January 19, 2023 an Order was entered by the Honorable [...] following the January 6, 2023 Hearing, on setting forth the deadlines for discovery, depositions and the filing of Trial Memoranda, as well as scheduling a Plenary Hearing for March 20, 2023.  (Da 91).  On January 20, 2023, Plaintiff served a Notice of Deposition, (Da 100- Da 101), and a Request for Production of Documents upon the Defendant (Da 107), to which Defendant provided his Response on February 9, 2023.  (Da 110).  On March 12, 2023, Plaintiff filed their Trial Memorandum, together with Plaintiff’s trial exhibit lists (Da 92).  On March 16, 2023, Defendant filed their Trial Memorandum, together with Defendant’s trial exhibit lists (Da 282- Da 299).
[brief] R. 1:1-2 provides that the New Jersey Court Rules “shall be construed to secure a just determination, simplicity in procedure, fairness in administration, and the elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay.  . .”  R. 1:1-2.  The invocation of the rule in this matter would swallow the fictitious party pleading rule whole.  Given that [...] has been litigating this issue for years after the accident occurred and was joined after the statute of limitations had expired, [...] has been subject to significant delays and incurred significant expense.  Further, relaxation of the requirements of the fictitious pleading rule would enable future plaintiffs to join any potential defendant well beyond the expiration of the statute of limitations by broadly including them in their complaint as those generally responsible for plaintiff’s damages.  “Rule 1:1-2 is not meant as a safe harbor for the dilatory; its “catch-all” nature is not intended to serve as cure-all.
[brief] During oral argument before the trial court, the Board Attorney confirmed he did not permit cross-examination or testimony regarding the environmental impact assessment or any other topic that had previously been mentioned during the use variance application.  (2T22-15 to 2T22-22).  The Board Attorney also held that the community impact statement, required by Robbinsville Ordinances for major subdivision applications, was not permitted to be reviewed.  (2T23-8 to 2T23-12).  As such, the Trial Court erred in finding that there was no contrary testimony provided, as no contrary testimony was permitted to be presented.
[brief] State v. Weaver, 219 N.J. 131, 151 (2014).  (stating, “underlying a criminal defendant's ‘right to confront his accusers’ is the belief that subjecting testimony to cross-examination enhances the truth-discerning process and the reliability of the information”); State v. Branch, 182 N.J. 338, 348 (2005) (quoting California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158 (1970) (“Cross-examination has frequently "been described as the 'greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of truth'”)); State v. Hockett, 443 N.J. Super. 605, 619 (App. Div. 2016) (stating, "Cross-Examination necessarily includes the right to impeach or discredit a witness”).
[brief] (9T7-4 to 9-4).  [...] knew [...] and described him as “a good friend of the whole block. ” (9T9-20 to 22; 9T16-10).  [...] was standing at the window on the third floor when [...] was shot.  (9T9-5 to 24).  A surveillance video from [...] showed [...] walking around on the sidewalk in front of his house.  (9T11-18 to 12-1).  He was seen exiting the front door of his house, handing a syringe to someone in a car, then returning to his home.
[directive] Decision Making Framework (DMF)  [November 2024]  Determine if the defendant has previously been arrested on two separate occasions Step 8: and those charges were still pending at the time of the current offense.    If yes, the preliminary recommendation is No Release Recommended, and proceed to 12.  Step   If no, continue to 9.  Step  Apply the FTA and NCA scales to the DMF Matrix to determine preliminary  Step 9: recommendation.  Determine if any current charge is No Early Release Act (NERA) not included in Step 10: Step 2, 4, or 7.    If yes, increase the preliminary recommendation as follows to the revised preliminary recommendation and proceed to 11:  Step   Release  ROR = Release with PML 1    Release with PML 1 = Release with PML 2    Release with PML 2 = Release with PML 3    Release with PML 3 = Release with PML 3 + EM/HD   Release with PML 3 + EM/ HD = No Release Recommended    If no, proceed to 11.  Step  Determine if any current charge is one of the following weapons charges:
[brief] Furthermore, the notice for the sheriff’s sale must include a description of the property.  N.J.S.A. 2A:61-1 requires the identification of the property consist of either a diagram of the premises or a concise statement indicating the municipality, the tax lot and block and the street and street number when available.  The Court indicated that the description of the property in the notice for the sheriff’s sale was the same as the property description of the upland lot set forth in the 1995 deed.  Accordingly, it was only this property that was included in the sale.  In the present case, the [...] insisted it acquired title to the Subject Property as a result of the 1939 tax foreclosure action in the Matter of [...], etc. v. [...] et al., Fourth Tract; however, when [...] conveyed property to [...] in 1920, the Riparian right the State of New Jersey granted to [...] in 1879 was not identified or included.
[brief] Plaintiff complied with R. 4:46-2(a), which provides in “part, The motion for summary judgment shall be served with a brief and a separate statement of material facts with or without supporting affidavits.  The statement of material facts shall set forth in separately numbered paragraphs a concise statement of each material fact as to which the movant contends there is no genuine issue together with a citation to the portion of the motion record establishing the fact or demonstrating that it is uncontroverted.  The citation shall identify the document and shall specify the pages and paragraphs or lines thereof or the specific portions of exhibits relied on. ”  (Emphasis added)  With her Opposition brief, Plaintiff included a Counter Statement of Material Facts with seventy (70) separate paragraphs all citing to the record\(^7\).  Pa199.  Counsel attached the referenced documents as Exhibits A through T to the Certification of [...] submitted in opposition to the motion for summary judgment.  Pa216-562.  The Counter Statement of Facts was incorporated by reference directly into the brief.  Pa163.  Defendants had the opportunity to respond to these statements in their Reply brief and did just that with their own response to Plaintiff’s Counter Statement of Facts.
[brief] Amended Verified Complaint Filed 04/20/20 ..................................  Da86  Exhibit A (legal description) ......................................................... Da56  Exhibit B (map) ...........................................................................  Da96  Amended Declaration of Taking Filed 04/20/20 ......................... Da97  Exhibit A (legal description) .........................................................  Da100  Exhibit B (map) ...........................................................................  Da101  **Motion for Expert Fees**
[brief] trial court awarded.  [...] is an accountant, so his fees are covered by the plain definition of “Losses” in Section 6.2 of the SPA.  “Costs of investigation and defense” from Section 6.2 of the MIPA, and “investigations” and “expenses” from Section 6.2 of the SPAs encompass the expert investigation necessary to respond to the counterclaims and third-party claims that the trial court ultimately dismissed.  The term “reasonable expenses” and “costs of suit” from those same sections serve as catchalls for anything not expressly covered elsewhere within the definitions of “Damages” and “Losses” in the documents.  B.  The Trial Court’s Fee Award Was Reasonable.
[brief] Section 246-36(B)(2)(b)[1].  The Applicant sought to construct a total of 17 residential units necessitating a use variance for density wherein each unit will have approximately 1,092 square feet, requiring a density variance.  Relief under an application for a density variance under N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70(d)(5) would be granted only upon the showing of “special reasons. ”  See Commercial Realty v. First Atlantic, 235 N.J. Super. 577 (App. Div. 1989), aff’d 122 N.J. 546 (1991); Coventry Square v. Westwood Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 138 N.J. 285 (1994); Randolph Town Center v. Tp. of Randolph, 324 N.J. Super. 412, 416 (App. Div. 1999).  Therefore, the applicant need not show that the site is particularly suited for more intense development.  Randolph Town Center at 416.
[directive] 5.1  BWCs Used Only in Performance of Official Duties.  A BWC shall be activated only while in performance of official police duties and for the purpose of recording incidents, investigations, and police-civilian encounters involving those law enforcement activities specified in this Policy, or specified in a department’s policy, standing operating procedure, directive, or order promulgated pursuant to this Policy.  A BWC shall not be activated while the officer is on break or otherwise is not actively performing law enforcement functions (e.g., while eating meals, while in a restroom, etc.).  A BWC shall not be activated or used by an officer for personal purposes, or when engaged in police union business.  Nor shall a BWC be used to record conversations involving counseling, guidance sessions, personnel evaluations, or any similar supervisory interaction.  Any recordings from a BWC recorded in contravention of this Policy or any other applicable law shall be immediately brought to the attention of agency command staff and immediately destroyed by command staff following consultation and approval by the County Prosecutor or Director of the Office of Public Integrity and Accountability.
[brief] 3  Defendants admit that In re Christie’s Appointment of Perez, 436 N.J. Super. 575 (App. Div. 2014) is controlling on the issue, but dismiss the relevant language as dictum.  That, however, does not end the inquiry, as statements in a higher court’s decision that are germane but not decisive “are not dicta, but binding decisions of the [C]ourt. ”  Marconi v. United Airlines, 460 N.J. Super. 330, 339 (App. Div. 2019).  B.  Members of the Board of Governors hold an office
[brief] But the record shows that’s precisely what [...] and his conflicted attorney ([...]) did by obtaining the “waiver” from [...] before the divorce complaint was even filed, then lying to [...] that [...] had “independent counsel” who’d reviewed the settlement with her.  The conflict of interest by [...], and the other flaws with the process leading to the entry of the final judgment, only add further to this showing.  Affording relief to [...], as [...] erroneously failed to do in the proceeding below, is fully consistent with Rule 4:50.  R. 4:50–1 provides that a court (among other grounds) “may relieve a party or the party's legal representative from a final judgment or order” for “(c) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party.
[brief] ”  Brunswick Hills Racquet Club, Inc.  v. Route 18 Shopping Ctr. Assocs., 182 N.J. 210, 224 (2005).  To establish a claim for breach of the implied covenant, a party “must provide evidence sufficient to support a conclusion that the party alleged to have acted in bad faith has engaged in some conduct that denied the benefit of the bargain originally intended by the parties. ”  Id. at 225 (quotation omitted).  In Brunswick Hills, the Supreme Court held that specific performance of a real estate contract was warranted as a result of the defendant’s breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
[brief] Next, the Court must determine whether [...] possess the requisite legal authority under New Jersey law to impose the Ordinance.  The Ordinance effectively prevents [...] from completing the Project as it regulates utility pole installation by regulating the precise pole placement, pole height, pole diameter, and pole material.  However, the Court finds that the Ordinance is preempted by the Supreme Court’s decision in *In re [...]* as applied to high capacity transmission lines.  See *In re Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas Co.*, 35 N.J. 358 (1961).  Generally, a municipality has broad power as delegated by the State.  *Id.* at 370.  However, that power is restricted in matters in need of uniform treatment.  *Id.* at 371.  The Supreme Court stated that “It is rather difficult to conceive of a subject which more requires uniform regulation at a high and broad level of authority than the method of transmission of electric power. ”  *Id.* at 373.  Further, the Court determined that *N.J.S.A.* 48:7-1—the sole potentially applicable statute granting limited consent power to municipalities—only requires “municipal consent where an electric company desires to use public streets for the construction of overhead ... lines, obviously for service to local residents. ”  *Id.* at 373.  Thus, the Court determined that the statute's municipal consent requirement does not apply to high-capacity transmission power lines which provide electricity to multiple jurisdictions.  Here, it is undisputed that the Project is multi-jurisdictional.  The Project will upgrade power lines through [...] and eight other municipalities including [...], [...], [...], [...], [...] Park, [...], [...] and [...].  Thus, because the Project is multijurisdictional, the municipal consent requirement pursuant to *N.J.S.A.* 48:7-1 does not apply.  Accordingly, the Ordinance is preempted as [...] does not have the authority to impose a comprehensive regulatory regime on the installation of electric utility poles.
[brief] As the dismissal of plaintiff’s case was erroneous, the complaint was reinstated (Db 5).  Defendants’ Statement of Procedural History faults plaintiff’s counsel for not scheduling the depositions of [...] and [...] until May 26, 2022(DB5, Para. 2).  The purpose of discovery end dates is to prevent adjournments which delay trials.  Ponden v. Ponden, 374 N.J. Super. 1 (App. Div. 2004), certif. denied 183 N.J. 212 (2005); Leitner v. Toms River Regional School District 392 N.J. Super. 80, 87-88 (App. Div. 2007).
[brief] ”  *Karins v. City of Atl. City*, 152 N.J. 532, 547 (1998) (citing *Horizon Health Ctr. v. Felicissimo*, 263 N.J. Super. 200, 214 (App. Div. 1993), modified and aff'd, 135 N.J. 126; [...], *The New Jersey State Constitution* 34 (1990)).  Thus, Plaintiff does not have any constitutional free speech right to remain employed while running against his own employer.  Indeed, courts have routinely upheld terminations of employees with access to confidential information who openly supported campaigns against their current or subsequently elected employer.  *Curinga v. City of Clairton*, 357 F.3d 305, 311 (3d Cir. 2004) (affirming grant of summary judgment against city manager fired after campaigning against members of city council); *Williams v. City of River Rouge*, 909 F.2d 151, 155-56 (6th Cir. 1990) (affirming grant of summary judgment against city attorney fired after campaigning against newly elected mayor).
[brief] In that regard, adoption of a redevelopment plan, does not require a judicial hearing or fact finding.  Id.; Hirth, 337 N.J. Super. at 165-66 (“At a hearing before a governing body concerning the proposed adoption of a municipal ordinance, there is no requirement that evidence be presented providing a factual foundation for the ordinance, and the governing body does not ordinarily make any findings of fact to justify its action.
[brief] In this case, the Trial Court was anything but impartial.  Throughout the hearing, the Trial Court repeatedly disparaged Mother’s law firm and their attorneys.  See the following examples:  •  Referring to the [...], the Court said, “I got so much nonsense from them before it was ridiculous.  So they’re not top on my list right now. ”  (Tr. 8-10-21 at 60)  •  “Because the [...] has been the worst, if I could figure out a way to sanction them, I would because they have been despicable in this case” (Tr. 4-20-22 at 47)  •  “So you know what . . . she [Mother] ought to go back and sue that [Lento] law firm. ”  (Tr. 4-28-22 at 84)  •  “So, the next phone call you [[...]] make after the case is over should be to the Lento law firm to put their carrier on notice because [...], because you represent her now, you have an obligation to tell her what her recourse is against that law firm. ”  (Tr. 4-28-22 at 66)  •  “It’s her -- her [Mother] investment with the [...].  If she’s foolish enough to leave it with these people . . .”  (Tr. 2-7-22 at 19)  • Court accuses [...] of malpractice.  (Tr. 8-10-21 at 28; 4-10-22 at 39; 10-28-22 at 14)  •  Refers to the [...] as causing suspicion.  (Tr. 2-7-22 t 43)  •  “[A]ll these other things are going on with Lento . . .”  (Tr. 2-7-22 at 43)  •  “[F]rom the beginning the [...] kind of dropped the ball on this thing over and over and over again. ”  (Tr. 4-4-22 at 64)  Multiple disparaging remarks about only one party’s law firm is not the hallmark of an impartial judge.  There is another interesting statement by the Trial Court that reflects its partiality against, and prejudice toward, Mother and her counsel.
[brief] Based upon the foregoing and the arguments to be made during trial in support of the relief sought, Plaintiff respectfully requests this Court to reverse the decision of the Law Division by: 1.  Declaring that the Second Planning Board Resolution is vacated, void, invalid and of no force or effect.  2.  Declaring that the Second Ordinance and the actions taken therein, including, but not limited to, the approval of the Amended Redevelopment Plan are vacated, void, invalid and of no force or effect.  Respectfully submitted, [...]