ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] “‘The doctrine of invited error operates to bar a disappointed litigant from arguing on appeal that an adverse decision below was the product of error, when that party urged the lower court to adopt the proposition now alleged to be error. ’  “N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. N.D., 417 N.J.Super. 96, 113–14 (App.Div.2010) (quoting M.C. III, supra, 201 N.J. at 340 (2010)).
[brief] This argument is not relevant to this case.  At trial, [...] testified consistently with his pretrial testimony.  Notably, he testified that it was “highly highly unlike[ly]” that the Parkway Tower did not cover the crime scene based the tower’s coverage distance.  Id. at 15.  After his testimony, the defendant made a new objection, arguing that [...]’s testimony was impermissible net opinion because it did not have an underlying justification.  Id.  The trial court rejected the defendant’s argument.  Id.  The defendant was found guilty of all but one charge.  Id. at 16.  The Appellate Division found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it allowed [...] to provide expert testimony at trial.  Id. at 16-17.  The Supreme Court reversed the Appellate Division’s holdings.
[brief] Contrary to the court’s finding, the Bodycam of the incident reveals that [...] was Mirandized and handcuffed prior to her consenting to search the car.  See Disc #2 Seq. No. ending with 7001,( time stamp @8:32:00- Diaz signs the consent form while under arrest and wearing handcuffs.)  Indeed, Diaz had been arrested prior to her consenting, and based on the “totality of the particular circumstances of the case,” King, 44 N.J. at 53, her consent was negated.  Additionally, the tire iron was identified and recovered from the car subsequent to Diaz’s consenting (which as per the [...] Consent To Search, was signed by [...] at 8:22 PM on the 25th day of March 2015…..see attached)  Also note that the officers claim of the tire iron in the Impala took place at @8:11:40 as per time stamp on disc #2 ending in seq. # 7001…..as well as the officer being seen opening the door of the Impala at @8:11:40 followed by the same officer being seen in the same video @8:11:47 and being heard saying “he beat him with the Jack thingy. ”  Also note that in the same video @8:18:35 the officer is seen and heard reading [...] her rights, and placing her in handcuffs, under arrest.  Again reiterating that this video proof is well before the actual signing of the Consent to Search form, which again was signed at 8:22 PM while [...] was in fact under arrest.  Therefore undermining any prior plain-view exception.
[brief] Tender of Additional PCB Lawsuits ......Pa179 --- 2  Certain exhibits within the Appendix bear confidential tags.  The documents were publicly filed as exhibits in the trial court below and need not be under seal.  Ex. K (omitted) .................................................................Pa189  Ex. L (omitted) ........................................................................Pa189  Ex. M (omitted) ........................................................................Pa190  Ex. N (omitted) ........................................................................Pa191  Ex. O - [...]’s Answer to the First Amended Petition in the Missouri Action ..................................................Pa192
[brief] See, e.g., New Jersey Dep’t of Env’t Prot. v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 453 N.J. Super. 272, 286 (App. Div. 2018); Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules, cmt. 2.3 to R. 4:33 (2024) (“The court has discretion to determine the timeliness, under all the circumstances, of the intervention application, and may deny the application if deemed untimely. ”)  On the issue of timeliness, a court must consider both the procedural posture of the matter as well as “the purpose for which intervention is sought. ”  Chesterbrooke Ltd. P’Ship v. Planning Bd. of Twp. of Chester, 237 N.J. Super. 118, 125 (App. Div. 1989).  To that end, where a party seeks to intervene as of right:  [a]n essential prerequisite to intervention is timeliness, which should be equated with diligence and promptness.  One who is interested in pending litigation should not be permitted to stand on the sidelines, watch the proceedings and express [her] disagreement only when the results of the battle are in and [she] is dissatisfied.  [Twp. of Hanover v. Town of Morristown, 118 N.J. Super. 136, 143 (Ch. Div.), aff’d, 121 N.J. Super. 536 (App. Div. 1972). ]
[directive] Three-Year Retention Period Upon Request.  Subject to any applicable retention periods established in Section 8.4 to the extent such retention period is longer, a BWC recording shall be retained for not less than three years if voluntarily requested by: (a) law enforcement officer whose BWC made the video recording, if that officer reasonably asserts the recording has evidentiary or exculpatory value; (b) a law enforcement officer who is a subject of the BWC recording, if that officer reasonably asserts the recording has evidentiary or exculpatory value; (c) any immediate supervisor of a law enforcement officer whose BWC made the recording or who is a subject of the BWC recording, if that immediate supervisor reasonably asserts the recording has evidentiary or exculpatory value; (d) any law enforcement officer, if the BWC recording is being retained solely and exclusively for police training purposes; (e) any member of the public who is a subject of the BWC recording; (f) any parent or legal guardian of a minor who is a subject of the BWC recording; or (g) a deceased subject's next of kin or legally authorized designee.
[brief] In its HAD Request, [...] also made claims regarding the need for Project – such as that it “is also necessary to provide added reliability during planned and unplanned maintenance activities on [[...]’s] natural gas transmission system within the state and to provide natural gas to customers in the northeastern United States” – that have not been verified by the [...] (“[...]”).  Aa0079.  (emphasis added).  On October 16, 2020, the [...] sent [...] a letter with its determination that the construction, operation, and maintenance of new Compressor Station 327 was consistent with the goals of the Highlands Act.
[brief] Moreover, the opinion makes clear that the analysis is confined to notice of the viciousness of a particular animal, not an entire class.  Relying on cases in other jurisdictions, the panel affirmed dismissal because the “[p]laintiff offered no proof that the dog that 5  The parenthetical statements summarizing these holdings further demonstrate that the rule focuses on prior behavior of a particular animal.  bit her was known to have vicious propensities, let alone that the landlord knew of the dog’s prior vicious propensities. ”  Id. at 73 (emphasis added).  If, as Plaintiff suggests, the analysis of a landlord’s common law duty to prevent a tenant’s animal from harming another tenant is identical to the strict liability standard set forth in Model Jury Charge § 5.60B, then [...] offers no support for the proposition that Defendants are strictly liable for an inherent trait common to all breeding stallions.
[directive] Any conduct proscribed by N.J.S.A. 2C:14-3(a) or N.J.S.A. 2C:14-3(b) of the New Jersey Criminal Code, including acts of intentional touching performed or perpetrated on one person by another under circumstances indicating a lack of consent, either due to force, or an inability of one party to consent due to age, relationship, mental defect, or physical incapacitation, to degrade or humiliate the victim or sexually arouse or sexually gratify the actor.  VICTIM-CENTERED APPROACH  A systematic focus on the individuality of the victim, driven by their needs and concerns, to ensure the delivery of appropriate, accessible, and culturally-responsive services to a diverse population of victims.
[brief] ..........................................................................  13  **Mazzilli v. Acc. & Cas. Ins. Co.,** 35 N.J. 1 (1961)  ..............................................................................  4, 8, 13  **Memorial Properties, LLC v. Zurich American Ins. Co.,** 210 N.J. 512 (2012)  ...........................................................................  7, 9  Nav-Its v. Selective Ins. Co., 183 N.J. 110 (2005)  .................................................................  9  Progressive Cas. Ins. Co. v. Hanna, 316 N.J. Super. 63 (App. Div. 1998)  ...........................................  5  Wilson v. Amerada Hess Corp., 168 N.J. 236 (2001)  ..................................................................  14  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
[directive] II.  Revisions to relating to supersession authority  Internal Affairs Policies & Procedures  A.  Introduction.  IAPP  Section 1 is revised as follows:  1.0.1  The purpose of is to assist the State’s law Internal Affairs Policy & Procedures enforcement agencies with investigating and resolving complaints of police misconduct that originate with members of the public or are generated by the supervisors, officers, or employees of a law enforcement agency.  The goals of the policy are to enhance the integrity of the State’s law enforcement agencies, improve the delivery of police services, and assure the people of New Jersey that complaints  The policy applies to all sworn law of police misconduct are properly addressed. enforcement employees, as well as County Prosecutors and assistant prosecutors and Assistant Attorneys General and Deputy Attorneys General in the Division of Criminal Justice.  This policy can also be more broadly applied to non-law enforcement employees.  1.0.5  It is important for county and municipal law enforcement agencies to recognize that, as they conduct internal affairs investigations, they do so under the general supervision of the Attorney General.  The Criminal Justice Act of 1970 designates the Attorney General as the State’s chief law enforcement officer.  As the chief law enforcement officer of the State, the Attorney General possesses broad authority over criminal justice matters in order to secure the benefits of a uniform and efficient enforcement of the criminal law and the administration of criminal justice throughout the State.  N.J.S.A. 52:17B-98.  This authority includes the issuance of the IAPP, which carries the force of law.  N.J.S.A. 40A:14-181.  In re Attorney 2020-6, 246 N.J. 462 (2021).  General Law Enforcement Directive Nos. 2020-5 and Subordinate law enforcement agencies, including county and municipal police forces, have a duty to cooperate with the Attorney General to improve the administration of the criminal justice system, including the efficient delivery of police services.  For county and municipal law enforcement agencies, cooperation in internal affairs matters begins with strict adherence to the Attorney General’s policy requirements.  Furthermore, N.J.S.A. 52:17B-107 grants the Attorney General broad authority to supersede in any investigation, criminal action or proceeding, which includes internal affairs investigations and disciplinary proceedings.
[brief] On November 29, 2016, [...] was forced under duress to enter into a global Conditional plea agreement, Under Rule 3:9-3(f).  Without having full discovery and knowledge of the case against him.  Myers took this conditional plea because illegally obtained evidence from the unrelated robbery case that was obtained through an unlawful search and seizure was improperly and illegally admitted into [...] homicide trial.  Myers also plead guilty due to threats to kill his family if he spoke on his innocence and did not take the charge.  [...] plead guilty to the felony murder charge in indictment number [...] and the armed robbery charge in indictment number [...] that is protected my Court Rule 3:9-3(f) (Da 1-16).
[brief] The Board members were concerned with the mass and scale of having one 3-story building and continually asked for assistance in understanding exactly how large this would appear.  Applicant’s witnesses were unwilling to answer many of the questions about the mass, scale, and view of the building, especially from Changebridge Road.  2T 71:21-25; 6T127:4-14; 7T 72:18-25.  The trial court also failed to appreciate how the Applicant’s own architect testified that the flatter roof design that [...] proposed in order to meet the 35 feet height requirement, while keeping 3 stories, was not compatible with this residential area and contradicted its own architect, who conceded, “I think it would detract, I don't think it would be appropriate for this neighborhood.
[brief] For this reason, [...] actively litigated the duty to defend and sought to stay the litigation of [...]’s Indemnity Claim.  Notably, there is good reason that [...]’s Indemnity Claim was largely stayed until June of 2024 – it was not ripe until the Utilities Settlement at the end of 2023, and the stay of the DJ Action was lifted by the lower court after certain procedural pleading issues were addressed during the first part of the year.  Indeed, it would have been impossible to arbitrate [...]’s Indemnity Claim before the Utilities Litigation was resolved because [...] had made a demand for reimbursement and its indemnity costs were wholly speculative until the Utilities Litigation was settled.  Thus, while the entire controversy doctrine required [...] to raise its Indemnity Claim in this action, it was not ripe until June of 2024 when the claim was liquidated and the stay was lifted.  Accordingly, the passage of time, when looked at in context as Cole requires, is approximately five weeks – June 24, 2024 through August 1, 2024 – not from 2018 through 2024.  As such, there was no delay that could warrant a finding of waiver.
[brief] [...] argues that the trial court should have dismissed the case against her on summary judgment because the Amended Complaint “failed to assert any viable causes of action against her as a matter of law. ” (Db21-22).  This position cannot be squared with the motion record.  In denying summary judgment, the trial court explained that the allegations and evidence were sufficient to keep [...] in the case.  Two particular issues of fact were discussed in detail: whether funds were diverted to accounts that [...] owned and/or controlled, and the last-minute decision to swap in [...] as the purchaser of [...]’s [...] shares via the 2017 SPA.  (13T 65:9-25; 68:19 to 70:4).  First, there was an issue of fact about whether [...] and/or [...] funds were improperly transferred to [...], either individually, jointly with [...], or to entities that she controlled.  The lower court ultimately resolved this fact question at trial in the Plaintiffs’ favor (36T 50:18-25; 37T 79:7-12), but even on summary judgment, the record evidence from [...]’s report and other financial records that he reviewed indicated that [...] shared control over the funds that [...] wrongfully diverted from [...] and [...].  (Da764-896).  Even if [...] was the owner on paper of certain defendant entities, the proceeds from them flowed to both he and [...].  She and her husband had beneficial ownership in the same entities.  (11T 292:15 to 293:8; 13T 67:21 to 69:24).  Also, diverted funds were moved into accounts that [...] and [...] jointly owned.  (Da4602; Da764-896).  Funds were also diverted to [...], an entity that [...] purportedly controlled.  (Da1584; 1590; 1673).  Questions about intent and state of mind were pervasive in the motion record.  (13T 54:19 to 55:11; 92:17-23).  These issues were more than sufficient for the Plaintiffs to demonstrate disputed issues of material fact, and for the trial court to deny summary judgment.  (13T 90:2-20).  Second, prior to finalizing his obligations under the 2014 [...] SPA, [...] decided at the last minute to substitute [...] as the purchaser of [...]’s [...] stock to enable [...] to qualify as a woman-owned business (WBE).  [...] accomplished this by requesting that [...] enter into the 2017 [...] SPA, which had the effect of rescinding the 2014 [...] SPA, [...] refunding the $700,000 he had to that point received from [...] for his [...] shares, and [...] paying $740,000 back to [...].  (Da4602).  Because [...] signed the 2017 SPA, paid the consideration for [...]’s [...] shares, and accepted of [...]’s shares, she assumed liability under the SPA.  (Da4589-4602).  The trial court correctly concluded that keeping [...] in the lawsuit was crucial to the Plaintiffs obtaining complete relief after trial.  In a case where Plaintiffs alleged fraud, misappropriation, and diversion of funds, these fact issues were more than sufficient to defeat summary judgment.  B.
[brief] Here, neither of the parties intended to marry, nor did they thereafter enter into any kind of marital relationship with each other.  Consequently, plaintiff alleged facts that, if proven, establish a statutory ground for judgment of nullity of her marriage. ”)  As plaintiff contended and the undisputed evidence – with no testimony presented by the Defendant -- showed, Defendant married Plaintiff with the fraudulent intention of obtaining a green card and leaving once financially independent.  After securing her green card and achieving independence, Defendant left Plaintiff.  Defendant lied to Plaintiff about her true intentions in order to trick Plaintiff into entering into the marriage.  Plaintiff, meanwhile, was unaware of Defendant’s intent to lure him into a sham marriage solely to obtain her green card and whatever financial support she could wedge out of the plaintiff during the time.  Because of the Defendant’s lies and false shows of affection for him, Plaintiff believed the marriage was okay and viable, rooted in Indian culture and tradition, until Defendant left and abandoned the marriage after such a short a time following the arrival of her green card.  This was not an issue that suddenly arose during the marriage.  [...]’s intent was always fraudulent – to marry Plaintiff solely to obtain a green card.  Defendant lied to Plaintiff in order to cover up her true intention throughout the pre-marital period.  Defendant never had a legitimate purpose, never actually loved or even liked Plaintiff such that she wanted to share a life with him as Defendant falsely claimed, and never intended to make the marriage viable from the beginning – all unknown to the unwitting and naïve young Plaintiff.  Plaintiff’s case here is unlike Patel, supra, 265 N.J. Super. 408.
[brief] When passing the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”), Congress found “the use of abusive, deceptive, and unfair debt collection practices […] contribute to the number of personal bankruptcies, to marital instability, to the loss of jobs, and to invasions of individual privacy. ”  15 U.S.C. § 1692(a).  Here, Defendant invaded Plaintiff’s and numerous other New Jerseyans’ privacy interests.
[brief] [...] knew of the applicable standards based on its prior 2016 and 2017 rate filings, as confirmed by its own expert witness ([...]) who acknowledged the applicability of the ASOPs.  [...] points to *Crema v. New Jersey Dep’t of Env’t Prot.*, 94 N.J. 286 (1983), and *Dep’t of Labor v. Titan Constr. Co.*, 102 N.J. 1 (1985), to argue in favor of established standards, limits and procedures to govern any agency’s decision making and to contend that the lack of such rules was fatal to the agency’s actions.  (Ab25).  *Crema* concerned the review of the DEP’s “conceptual approval” of a large commercial and residential development in an environmentally sensitive area governed by the Coastal Area Facilities Review Act, N.J.S.A. 13:19-1 to -21.  94 N.J. at 290.  The developer in *Crema* had applied to the DEP for a permit authorizing the development, but the DEP granted a permit approving only the “concept” of development.  94 N.J. at 289.  *Crema* is distinguishable from this case because here the Department is applying a standard identified by the Legislature in the LTCI Act, where the DEP in comparison was attempting to apply a new term/condition that did not reflect any such Legislative intent.  *Titan* is also distinguishable because that case concerned an aggressive and not previously contemplated standard adopted by the Commissioner of Labor to debar a corporate contractor and three of its corporate officers for violation of the Prevailing Wage Act.
[brief] Da166  Certification of [...], Esq.  In Support of Plaintiff’s Motion to Bar Filed 07/07/21 …………………………  Da169  Exhibit 1 (Verified Complaint) ……………………………..Da1 Exhibit 2 (excerpts from Plaintiff’s Appraisal Report)…………………………………Da177 Exhibit 3 (Vibrations Monitoring Data from locations in Sea Bright) (not provided) Exhibit 4 (Report of [...], P.E. Dated 04/07/21) …………………………….. Da183,311 Exhibit 5 (Excerpts from Defendant’s Appraisal Report by [...], M.A.I. Dated 09/05/18) ……………………………………Da185 VOLUME II (Da190 to Da389) Exhibit 6 (Vibration Monitoring Data report generated 09/21/18) …………………………………………..Da191 Exhibit 7 (Post Construction Interior Inspections 05/13/19; 06/14/19)…………………………….. Da211 Exhibit 8 (Plaintiff Counsel Cover Letter filing Defendant’s Appraisal Report by [...] Dated 05/06/21(includes A. Raichle of [...] dated 04/07/21) (Filed 07/28/21) ……………………………………Da233;Da235 Defendant’s Objection to Plaintiff’s Motion to Bar Evidence and Cross-Motion for Discovery Filed 07/28/21 …
[brief] The much younger [...], who came into the marriage with limited resources, had an extramarital affair and betrayed [...], who spent his entire life before the marriage building an empire.  (See A229, Op. at 35-36).  He lost nearly all in bankruptcy.  \textit{Id.}  To make matters worse, post-divorce in 2017, his ex-wife (a) [...] stole title and possession of his Lexus automobile, (b) stole $15,459.21 from his [...] Checking Account, and (c) fraudulently conveyed title to [...]’s Delaware --- \(^7\)
[brief] [...]’ application to the CRB was not an application for development.  [3T 19:4-10].  Otherwise, as the trial court noted, why else submit the actual application for development?  [3T 19:13-16].  Because [...]’ submission of the application for development came after the Ordinance took effect, and it was incomplete at that, the Board lacked jurisdiction over the application, and [...] required conditional use variance relief from the [...] because the Property is within 600 feet of a school.
[brief] [...] and [...] reviewed P-48 and P-50.  In their review, [...] purported to explain each line item and his various adjustments, where applicable.  As to [...], [...] subtracted liabilities from assets and arrived at a value of about $1,192,363.52.  (Da981-82).  A similar discussion ensued about P-50, including for each of the cash and liability accounts and fixed assets for [...] and [...].  (5T82:12 to 90:11).  [...] then took the net asset figures that he calculated for [...] and [...] and added them to reach $8,467,115.57.  (Da1500).  He then deducted out several supposedly forthcoming expenses, and third-party sale commission to arrive at a value for [...] and [...] of $7,570,115.57.  (Da1500).  [...] told [...] that he would add that third party sale commission back since they were not selling to a third party to arrive at a value for [...] and [...] of $8.3 million.  (5T90:13-23).  For [...] and [...], [...]’ share of that $8.3 million figure would have been 50%, or $4.15 million.  (5T96:13 to 97:1).  For [...], after calculating net equity at just shy of $1.2 million, [...] applied a multiplier of 3 to arrive at a $3.6 million company valuation.  [...]’s 51% interest in [...] yields a value attributable to him of $1.8 million.  (5T97:2-21).  Thus, using these figures, [...]’s total interest in [...], [...], and [...] would have been about $5.9 million.