ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] ”  The Defense further attempts to illustrate this point by mentioning that the trial court’s Facts included 29 paragraphs as opposed to the 37 paragraphs in the Defendant's Statement of Facts.  However, the facts that are stated in the Memorandum of Law and the facts, as by the Defendant in its Brief are strikingly similar.  Moreover, as the Defendant themselves admit, the Plaintiff summarily denied eight facts, as stated by the Defendant in its brief.  While the Defendant was generous enough to point out the facts that the Plaintiff denied in part and explain why those facts in and of themselves may not give rise to a material issue of fact, the Defendant made no mention of the specific facts that the Plaintiff summarily denied.  Moreover, the Defendant failed to mention that after the Defendant submitted its Statement of Facts as part of the moving papers, Plaintiff submitted a response brief.  In its response, Plaintiff included its own Statement of Facts.  (Pa 433-439).  Plaintiff’s Statement of Facts, like Defendant's Statement of Facts, also included 37 paragraphs.  Of those paragraphs, none of those facts were mentioned by the trial court.  (Pa 714-Pa720).  Of the 37 facts that were mentioned in Plaintiff’s Statement of Facts, the Defendant admitted 12, summarily denied 9 facts and partially denied 16.  (Pa 693-699).  It is a movant’s burden to exclude any reasonable doubt as to the existence of genuine issue of material fact, and all inferences of doubt are to be drawn against the movant in favor of opponent of the Motion.  Boule v. Borough of Bradley Beach, 42 N.J. Super. 159 (App. Div. 1956).  Every Factual Statement that is denied either in whole or in part by either party raises an inference of doubt as to that fact.  This means that in order for a court to find in favor of a Defendant and grant summary judgment, the Court must find that all facts even if taken as true and viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party still does not allow the Plaintiff to meet its burden.  In this case, even the Defendant has admitted that the Court did not consider any fact in its moving papers that the Plaintiff summarily denied.  Moreover, the Court failed to consider any fact that was stated by the Plaintiff.  As such, a proper summary judgment analysis was not done and this decision should be reversed.
[brief] Here, the Plaintiff maintained regular office hours in a specific office at the Administration Building where there was an assistant counsel and a paralegal.  The three were known as the Legal Department ([...] Certification, ¶ 4; Pa-46).  The control of an attorney is limited by the Code of Professional Conduct.  The trial Court failed to understand the important social ramifications of CEPA, and the relationship of CEPA to the Code of Professional Ethics.  As to “the seminal case” of D’Annunzio v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, supra, the Court below failed to recognize the central theme of that case.
[brief] THE TRIAL COURTS DECISION WAS NOT BASED SOLELY ON THE ABSENCE OF OBJECTIVE RADIOLOGICAL STUDIES.  As [...] noted in his decision, the reports of [...], (plaintiffs’ only medical expert), describe a scenario where the individual injuries of [...] and [...] are “mirror images” of one another.  Their complaints, pattern of treatment and even the times when they experienced resolution and recurrence of their symptoms are, as [...] put it, “virtually identical”.  Although each of the reports is a paragraph in length the similarities are outlined as follows.  Both plaintiffs were diagnosed with “joint dysfunction in the right shoulder” and radiating pain in the lower back (Wu also report radiating neck pain).  According to [...], Wu was initially discharged from treatment on October 7, 2019, with symptoms resolved.  Her husband, Yan, was initially discharged on November 4, 2019, a month later, also reporting that his symptoms were resolved.  Wu returned on February 10, 2020, reporting that all her symptoms had returned.  Yan returned (12) days later, on January 29, 2020, also reporting that all his symptoms had returned.  On March 16, 2020, Wu returned to Cohen and reported that all her symptoms were resolved.  Yan also returned on March 16, 2020, and reported that all his symptoms were resolved.  Then, more than a year later, June 11, 2021, Wu returned and reported that all her symptoms had returned.  Three weeks later on July 2, 2021, Yan returned and reported that all his symptoms had returned.  Both plaintiffs received additional treatment and were discharged the same day on August 6, 2021.  In adjudicating the summary judgement motion, the trial judge was required to determine if plaintiffs’ proofs were sufficient to establish prima facie case under the limited tort threshold (N.J.S.A. 39:6A-8), where plaintiffs’ burden is to present “objective, credible medical evidence of the injury”, DiProspero v Penn, 183 N.J. 477 (2005).  The question before the trial judge was whether a “rational factfinder” could ascribe reason and credibility to an identical pattern of treatment where both plaintiffs’ individual symptoms waxed, waned and returned at the same time on multiple occasions.  Applying common sense and fundamental logic, the trial judge rightly determined that [...]’s bizarre description of the parallel course followed by his two patients was a departure from reality.  Stated simply, “incredible” medical evidence is the opposite of credible medical evidence.  POINT III
[directive] Moreover, the Judiciary should attempt to ensure that defendants spend no more time in custody than they would have served if the court system were fully operational.  That entails consideration of the sentencing range, the likely sentence, and any applicable period of parole ineligibility.  For this factor, judges should weigh the actual amount of time to be spent in jail in case of a conviction, against the expected length of pretrial detention.  A fourth-degree offender facing a statutory maximum of eighteen months’ incarceration, and considerably less actual time in jail in most cases, will naturally be in a different position than a first-degree offender facing a range of ten to twenty years in prison.  See N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(a).
[brief] ”  State v. Hock, 54 N.J. 526, 538 (1969), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 930 (1970).  “If a defendant fails to object to a trial court's instructions, the failure to challenge the jury charge is considered a waiver to object to the instruction on appeal. ”  State v. Maloney, 216 N.J. 91, 104 (2013).  However, we will reverse if the error is “clearly capable of producing an unjust result. ”  In the absence of a request for the charge, we do not presume prejudice but review the charge and the corroborative evidence to determine whether the deficiency was harmless, or “clearly incapable of producing an unjust result. ”  State v. Gaines, 377 N.J. Super. 612, 623 (App. Div. 2005); R. 2:10–2.
[brief] THIS COURT SHOULD AFFIRM THE TRIAL COURT’S ORDERS DISMISSING WITH PREJUDICE PLAINTIFF’S CONSUMER FRAUD ACT CLAIMS AGAINST INSURANCE PRODUCERS** | 8 | | A.  Based on *Plemmons* and the Complaint, the Consumer Fraud Act Does Not Apply to [...] and [...] | 10 | | B.  The Trial Court Correctly Determined that *Shaw* Does Not Alter the Application of the CFA Exemption to [...] and [...] | 18 | | C.  Repeating an Analysis of the Application of the Exemption to the Consumer Fraud Act Supports Affirming the Trial Court’s Decision | 22 | | CONCLUSION | 29 | # TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | Cases: | Page(s) | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|---------| | **All the Way Towing, LLC v. Bucks Cnty. Int’l, Inc.,** | 12 | | 236 N.J. 431 (2019) | | | **Blatterfein v. Larken Assocs.,** | 13 | | 323 N.J. Super. 167 (App. Div. 1999) | | | **Call v. Czaplicki,** | 15, 16 | | No. 09-6591 (RBK/AMD), 2010 WL 3724275 | | | (D.N.J. Sept. 16, 2010) | | | **Call v. Czaplicki,** | 16 | | No. 09-6591 (RBK/AMD), 2011 WL 2532712 | | | (D.N.J. June 23, 2011) | | | **Channel Cos. Inc. v. Britton,** | 11 | | 167 N.J. Super. 417 (1979) | | | **David v. Gov’t Emps. Ins. Co.,** | 9 | | 360 N.J. Super. 127 (App. Div. 2003) | | | **DiBernardo v. Mosley,** | 11, 12 | | 206 N.J. Super. 371 (1986) | | | **Donato v. Moldow,** | 3 | | 374 N.J. Super. 475 (App. Div. 2005) | | | **Finderne Mgmt. Co., Inc. v. Barrett,** | 12, 25, 26 | | 402 N.J. Super. 546 (App. Div. 2008) | | | **Hampton Hosp. v. Bresan,** | 13 | | 288 N.J. Super. 372 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 144 N.J. 588 | | | (1996) | | | **In re Petition of Hall,** | 27 | | 147 N.J. 379 (1997) | | | **Knorr v. Smeal,** | 27 | | 178 N.J. 169 (2003) | | | **Kugler v. Romain,** | 11 | | 58 N.J. 522 (1971) | | Lee v. First Union Nat’l Bank, 199 N.J. 251 (2009) ................................................................. 11, 14, 15 Lemelledo v. Beneficial Management Corp., 150 N.J. 255 (1997)
[brief] The Application set forth the process that the Borough would follow for evaluating applications.  (48a).  The RFA provided that:  After submission to the [...], completed Applications will be sent to the [...] for background check and processing.  Following review and approval by the [...], the Application will be sent to the [...], established in accordance with [the Ordinance], for review and recommendation to the [Council] as to whether the license should be granted or denied.  The [Subcommittee’s] review will also include an interview with the Applicant.  Following a review of the Application and interview by the [Subcommittee,] the Applicant will be invited to attend the next scheduled public meeting of the [Council] to make a presentation to [the Council] and the public and to respond to questions raised.  After the public hearing, the [Subcommittee] will make a recommendation to the [Council] at the next scheduled public meeting regarding the Applicant.  The award of a municipal cannabis business license will be made contingent upon the Applicant reviewing a State license and all applicable State and local requirements.
[brief] So, you put that fund of knowledge in your head when you evaluate his testimony.  And particularly his lack of experience for those twelve years.  Lack of experience in abdominal surgery, and bowel surgery.  And even to this day, to this day, still, no abdominal or bowel surgery, or consultations on abdominal or bowel surgery.  [...]’s qualification and bias issues contrasted starkly with the experts the defense had called, [...] stressed:
[brief] The Trial Court Erroneously Failed To Afford The Bureau’s Interpretation Of N.J.S.A. 49:3-69(a)(2)  The Substantial Deference To Which It Is Entitled. **  “The Bureau has broad powers in order to fulfill ‘its responsibility to protect the investing public against fraud or misrepresentation. ’”  *Greer v. [...]*, 288 N.J. Super. 69, 77 (App. Div. 1996) (quoting *Data Access Sys., Inc. v. [...]*, 63 N.J. 158, 168 (1973)).  Similarly, the Third Circuit held in *A.S. Goldmen & Co. v. [...]*, 163 F.3d 780 (3d Cir. 1999), that the Bureau has “broad powers” to enforce the Securities Law “when it is deemed in the public interest. ”  \(^6\)  For example, restoring the status quo in cases where some investors sold their securities and some retained them requires awarding both restitution and rescission.  See *SEC v. McNamee*, 481 F.3d 451, 457 (7th Cir. 2007) (explaining rescission refers to process by which an “investor returns the security and receives the purchase price in return. ”).  Because the Securities Law is a remedial statute intended and designed to protect the investing public, the trial court should have interpreted it in a similarly flexible manner in this case so as to further its remedial purposes.  Instead, it adopted a reading of N.J.S.A. 49:3-69(a)(2) that limits available remedies and substantially diminishes the broad powers with which the Legislature invested the Bureau to enforce the Securities Law and protect the investing public.  Because the Bureau is charged with enforcing the Securities Law, the court should have afforded deference to its interpretation of N.J.S.A. 49:3-69(a)(2).
[brief] An overpass on the Defendant [...]’s dark street with potholes was too low and not properly marked.  [Da35 & 5T36:1 to 84:8]  The Plaintiff, a New Jersey citizen operating a truck as a part of his job struck the low overpass and following that occurrence had a neck fusion.  [Da35 & 5T36:1 to 84:8 & Da185]  A statute effective September 1986, N.J.S.A. 27:5G-4, sets out the Defendant/Appellant City’s duties:  a.  Every bridge or overpass carrying a railroad, with a clearance of less than 14 feet 6 inches from the roadway beneath, shall have the maximum clearance marked or posted thereon in accordance with the current standards prescribed by the Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices for Streets and Highways.  b.  Signs warning persons driving motor vehicles that they are approaching a bridge or overpass with less than 14 feet 6 inches clearance shall be posted at the last safe exit or detour preceding the bridge or overpass and the maximum clearance of the bridge or overpass shall be indicated on these signs.  c.  The signs or markings required by this section shall be posted or marked, as appropriate, by, and shall be maintained by the governmental entity, be it the State or the political subdivision, which has jurisdiction over the roadway underneath the bridge or overpass.  The provisions of this section shall not apply to the toll road authorities.  [4T150:1 to 52:8 & 5T4:10-14 & the Plaintiff Request for Admission which were deemed admitted by the Trial Court and moved into evidence at trial.  Id. & Pa1-13]  Appellant, [...], was negligent relating to the signing in connection with the overpass.  [Da35 & 5T36:1to 84:8]  Therefore, Respondent respectfully requests that this Honorable Court affirm the trial court’s rulings.  **STANDARD OF REVIEW**
[brief] That case simply dealt with the issue of when a client is sued by an attorney for fees whether the client has a duty to assert as a counterclaim for legal malpractice.  The Court held that when a client is sued by a lawyer for fees, the Court must look to see whether or not the entire controversialy doctrine requires a client to assert his or her claim against a former attorney when they are already adversaries in a lawsuit.  Certainly, that is not the case here.  Indeed, the Dimitrakopoulos Court reiterated the holding in Olds v. Donnelly, 150 N.J. 424, 443 (1997) that “the entire controversialy doctrine does not require an attorney’s current or former client to assert a legal malpractice claim against that attorney in the litigation that gave rise to the malpractice claim even if the two claims arise from the same or related facts and otherwise would be subject to mandatory joinder. ”.  237 N.J. at 112.  The Court further reiterated that it declined to adopt a separate rule for the application of the entire controversy doctrine to legal malpractice claims from transactional matters and thus all of those claims were also exempt from application of the doctrine.  *Id.* see note 4.  See also *Sklodowsky v. Lushis*, 417 N.J. Super. 648 (App. Div. 2011); *Short Hills Associates in Clinical Psychology v. Rothbard, Rothbard, Kohn & Kellar*, (Pa332).  **B.
[brief] (Pa274, ¶5).  Paragraph one (1) of the Mortgage states that the Borrowers shall make all payments “when due. ” (Pa274, ¶1).  Appellant has consistently maintained that it was entitled to accelerate the sums due and owing under the Loan pursuant to paragraph nine (9) of the Mortgage.  (Pa276, ¶6).  Respondent has not disputed that Appellant was entitled to accelerate.  Accordingly, all sums were due pursuant to paragraph one (1) of the mortgage once Appellant decided to accelerate.  Reading paragraph one (1) and three (3) together, the Mortgage specifically provides that “[a]ll payments” “when due,” received by Appellant, which clearly includes the First Wire Transfer, must be applied to the balance due on the Loan.
[brief] They contend that, unlike in *Forsythe*, the public here received inadequate notice of the bills, because access to the State House was limited, the legislative calendar did not list the bill, the Legislature’s website did not post the text of either bill, and the Governor had issued a State of Emergency due to inclement weather.  (Pb41).  As a result, Petitioners assert that they were deprived of their “constitutional right to make their opinions known to their law-makers before enactment. ” (Pb34; 37).  But these claims fail as a matter of fact and law.  Factually, their assertions are belied by the record.  The Legislature’s official record establishes that the legislative proceedings took place, despite the bad weather.  (Pa230-31; Pa250; Pa234; 256-57).  Although some COVID protocols remained in place, public participation was encouraged, either in person (for the Senate Health, Human Services and Senior Citizens Committee), or virtually through the internet (for the Assembly Appropriations Committee).  In both proceedings, the public was able to view and participate in the meetings, testify, or submit written testimony on the bills presented.  (Pa113).  In fact, Petitioners participated in this process as they were among those who offered testimony on A6260.  (Pb9; Pa162-166).  Finally, the first and second readings of the two bills were reported in the Legislative Digest published on January 7, 2022, and the bills were listed on the Legislative Calendar posted on January 7, 2022 for the voting sessions on January 10, 2022.
[brief] Appropriate action includes, but is not limited to, changing the venue of the matter, if permitted,[ ] or otherwise insulating the individual from the matter.”  State ex rel. M.P., 450 N.J. Super. 539, 547 (App. Div. 2017).  The Order transferring venue to [...] indicates that transfer was “necessary in the interests of justice to avoid the appearance of impropriety. ”  Aa268.
[brief] Instead of engaging with any of this material, or holding a hearing to better understand the issues, the trial court decided that the defense had not met its non-existent burden.  (5T 126-10 to 20)  The burden to “clearly establish” the establish scientific reliability of a technique is on the proponent of the evidence.  State v. Chun, 194 N.J. 54, 92 (2008).  Other than flipping the burden, the trial court came to its conclusion by relying on two cases — State v. McGuire, 419 N.J. Super. 88 (App. Div. 2011), and State v. Ghigliotty, 463 N.J. Super. 355 (App. Div. 2020) — neither of which relieved the trial court of its gatekeeping role.
[brief] Allan-Deane Corp. v. Bedminster, 205 N.J. Super. 87 (Law Div. 1985)  --------- 5, 29 Banach v. Cannon, 356 N.J. Super. 342 (Ch. Div. 2002)  ------------------------ 19 Borough of Essex Fells v. Kessler, 289 N.J. Super. 329 (Law Div. 1995)
[brief] As a result of the [...]’s actions in 2006, [...] obtained a letter, from the [...], certifying that [...] had no criminal violations from the years 1960 to 2006.  The only indication on that report is the acquittal of [...] in the state court tax matter.  This reveals that the only source for the multiple publications by the [...]s and their [...] lawyers was the unlawful seizure that occurred on January 11, 2006, in [...].  Also, [...] was deprived of his due process right to notice and an opportunity to be heard before his private papers were unlawfully seized, by law enforcement and [...]’s former counsel.  This was a substantive violation of due process.
[directive] Reasonable force to obtain a blood sample may be used, subject to the limitations set forth in State v. Ravotto, 169 N.J. 227, 250-1 (2001), rev’g. 333 N.J. Super. 247 (App. Div. 2000).  When a defendant, in a DWI prosecution, was also the victim of some injury sustained in a motor vehicle accident, the defendant’s blood is often drawn by hospital personnel for medical Attorney General Guideline: Page 10
[brief] See, e.g., Skuse v. Pfizer, Inc., 244 N.J. 30, 48 (2020) (upholding unrepresented employee’s signed agreement that did not contain explicit waiver language and instead merely acknowledged that a “training” module would be emailed later and that the contract would be binding after continued employment).  Finally, the incorporation of the AAA Construction Rules provides clarity as to the arbitration procedures that would replace, and are distinct from, a judicial forum.  The AAA Construction Rules incorporated by reference in the Arbitration Provision were “described in such terms that [their] identity may be ascertained beyond doubt. ”  Alpert, Goldberg, Butler, Norton & Weiss, P.C. v. Quinn, 410 N.J. Super. 510, 533 (App. Div. 2009).  By analogy to the question of arbitrability, which the U.S. Supreme Court holds to a heightened standard under the FAA, federal courts have resoundingly found as it relates to sophisticated parties, that the incorporation of the AAA’s Rules rises to the level of “clear and unmistakable evidence” that the parties agreed to submit arbitrability issues to the arbitrator.
[brief] On June 24, 2020, [...], [...], and [...] were on duty in the staffing coordinators’ office, with [...] working in her office.  (Pa245 at 78:17-24).  [...] was complaining about [...]’s supposed lack of productivity, and [...]’s alleged refusal to address it.  (Pa368 at 101:9-24; Pa368 at 101:25-102:5).  A day earlier, some of [...]s’s Kronos reports, which should have been completed, but had been misplaced and left undone, had accidentally fallen on the ground.  (Pa301; Pa245 at 79:3-14).  [...] often complained about [...], whom he described as “lazy” and the weakest link,” and seemingly upset about the unaddressed Kronos reports, muttered to [...]: “and let me guess, [...] didn’t do anything about it. ” (Pa468; Pa170 at 44:1-7; Pa245 at 79:3-14; Pa301-02 at 92:9-93:4).  [...] overheard [...]’s comment.  (Pa368 at 102:13-21).  Having grown tired of [...]’s repeated efforts to undermine her management, [...] walked over to [...] at his desk, raised her voice, and told [...] she “had enough of him complaining” and that he could bring any of his complaints to Human Resources.  (Pa368 at 102:13-21; Pa302 at 95:2-11; Pa302-03 at 96:23-97:23).  In her frustration, [...]’s voice was raised in a yelling fashion and she drew close to [...].  (Pa245 at 79:15-21).  [...] is a physically imposing man, and a former member of the military, while [...] is much smaller in stature.  (Pa162-63 at 12:21-13:2; Pa176 at 65:7-66:15).  [...] ignored [...] while she spoke to him, and was unfazed by the confrontation.  (Pa162 at 11:3-11; Pa189 at 118:20-119:24; Pa245 at 79:15-21; Pa302 at 96:10-15).  Having vented her frustrations, [...] left [...] alone.  (Pa189 at 120:4-5).  [...] continued working for some time thereafter before leaving the staffing office for the remainder of the workday.  (Pa190 at 121:9-122:11).  [...] did not touch [...].  (Pa189 at 119:7-18).  That same evening, [...] called [...] and apologized for yelling at him.  (Pa368 at 104:1-15).  [...] further explained to [...] that personal issues, combined with COVID, caused her stress to boil over.  (Pa368 at 104:2-11).  [...] told [...] not to worry about anything and that he understood [...]’s circumstances.  (Pa368 at 104:11-15).  [...] admitted he did not think [...] was rude or condescending, and did not feel intimidated.  (Pa185 at 102:7-10; Pa185 at 104:8-18).  [...] discussed her behavior with the other staffing coordinators as well.  (Pa367 at 97:5-21).  [...] referred to [...]’s June 24, 2020 conduct as an isolated incident and the worst she had seen.  (Pa247 at 85:11-21; Pa246 at 86:7-9).  [...], meanwhile, admitted that she never raised any complaints about [...]’s treatment of [...].  (Pa304 at 105:7-15).  VII.
[brief] . . .  To establish a claim of estoppel, a party must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the alleged conduct was done, or representation was made, intentionally or under such circumstances that it was both natural and probable that it would induce action.  Further, the conduct must be relied on, and the relying party must act so as to change his or her position to his or her detriment.  Id. at 647. (internal citations omitted).  The Boritz Court also cited to and relied on the matter Barrett v. N.J.