ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] 12.1  Thorough and meaningful review of vehicular pursuit incidents is vital to ensuring the safety of law enforcement officers and the public.  Every vehicular pursuit must undergo the following procedures for a meaningful command-level review pursuant to a written policy established by the law enforcement executive:  (a)  The meaningful command-level review of the incident shall be undertaken by at least two levels of supervisors.  These levels may include the immediate supervisor, internal affairs, training officers, or command staff.  At least one reviewer must be two levels or more above the officer who engaged in the vehicular pursuit; (b)  The review shall include an examination of all available sources of information about the incident, including any video of the incident, recordings of 911 calls and police radio transmissions, reports, officer or other witness statements, medical records, or records of injuries; (c)  The reviewing supervisors shall make a recommendation of what action, if any, should be undertaken, including policy changes, remedial training, disciplinary action, administrative action, or, if appropriate, referral for criminal prosecution; and (d)  The law enforcement executive, or a command level officer no more than one rank below the law enforcement executive for departments with more than 100 officers, shall review each vehicular pursuit investigation and approve or reject the recommendations of the supervisors who conducted the review.  The law enforcement executive’s decision, or the decision of the designee, shall be memorialized and retained in the vehicular pursuit investigative file.  (e)  Vehicular pursuits that are determined to not be in compliance with the Attorney General’s Use of Force Policy, or agency policy, shall be forwarded quarterly by municipal and county agencies to the County Prosecutor’s Office for review.  The reports shall be forwarded within 30 days of the end of each quarter.  Vehicular pursuits involving statewide law enforcement agencies, or county prosecutor’s office personnel, that are determined to not be in compliance with the Attorney General’s Use of Force Policy, or agency policy, shall be forwarded quarterly to the Director of the Office of Public Integrity and Accountability or their designee for review.  The reports shall be forwarded within 30 days of the end of each quarter.  12.2
[directive] BODY WORN CAMERA January 2022 Version POLICY Office of the Attorney General | State of New Jersey Contents 1 Governing Principles .................................................................................................................. 1 2 Definitions ................................................................................................................................. 2 3 Police Department Policies Governing Deployment and Use of BWCs and Recordings ........... 5 4 Notice that BWCs are Deployed and Activated ......................................................................... 9 5 Standards Governing the Activation of BWCs ......................................................................... 11 6 Standards Governing the De-activation of BWCs upon the Request of a Civilian, When Discussing Investigation Strategy or Planning, or on Instruction of a Prosecutor .................. 15 7 Circumstances When BWC Activation/Use Is Subject to Special Conditions or Restrictions.. 18 8 Retention of BWC Recordings ................................................................................................. 21 9 Standards to Ensure Secure Storage and Accessibility of BWC Recordings ............................ 23 10 Restrictions on Access to and Use and Dissemination of BWC Recordings ............................ 26 11 Public Disclosure of BWC Recordings ...................................................................................... 30 12 Authority of County Prosecutor to Impose Additional Requirements .................................... 30 13 Violations ................................................................................................................................. 30 BODY WORN CAMERA POLICY | January 2022 i 1 Governing Principles
[brief] This case involves a tree that toppled over onto the vehicle Plaintiff was parked and seated inside.  (Pa31.)  The incident happened on November 2, 2020, at around 9:37 a.m. at [...].  (Pa32.)  Officers from the Passaic Police Department and fire personnel from the Passaic Fire Department responded to the scene.  (Pa32.)  Plaintiff was immediately extracted from his vehicle and transported to the [...] in Paterson, New Jersey.  (Pa32.)  Personnel from the Passaic DPW also responded to the scene, and the tree, which was blocking the street, was cut up and removed, so Plaintiff’s vehicle could be towed from the scene and the street reopened.  (Pa32.)  Google’s street view permits one to look back into the past to see what a street looked like at a particular point in time.  (Pa32.)  The Google Street View images for the subject tree from 2019, which is the year before the incident occurred, make clear that the tree itself looked perfectly healthy to all outward appearances: it had a full, green leafy canopy throughout, there were no dead spots whatsoever in the canopy, the tree did not show any signs of obvious disease or decay, and there were no dead limbs or leaves lying about its base.  (Pa32.)  The color images the City provided to the Law Division are in the record.  (Pa108-Pa112.)  Due to its large size, it is clear that the tree had been growing for many years without issue before the incident occurred on November 2, 2020.  (Pa33.)  The weather on the date of Plaintiff’s incident, as obtained from the Internet, specifically TimeandDate.com, reflects that it was clear with a breeze between twelve (12) to twenty (20) knots.  (Pa33.)  Wikipedia has an article entitled “List of New Jersey Hurricanes,” and it reflects that there were many hurricanes (which by definition have very strong winds) in the 1990s, the 2000s, the 2010s, and even in 2020 before the subject incident occurred, which demonstrates that the toppling over of the subject tree was a random, fluke, unpredictable incident.  (Pa33; Pa195-Pa218.)  Plaintiff’s expert report from his Arborist, [...], which was untimely and improper, was relied upon in his Opposition to the City’s Motion for Summary Judgment.
[brief] 3.  The Court may not weigh the amount of the evidence presented or decide which evidence should be given greater weight.  *Tomeo v. Thomas Witesell Construction Co.*, 176 N.J. 336, 370 (2003); Mandel v. UBS/Payne Weber, Inc., 373 N.J. Super. 55, 71 (App. Div. 2004).
[brief] This is not [...]’s appeal, nor did [...] cross-notice an appeal of the trial court’s ruling that it may decide issues of arbitrability under the ECD as applied through the AAA Construction Industry rules.  See In re Hill, 241 N.J. Super. 367, 372 (App. Div. 1990) (“Where the appeal is untimely, the Appellate Division has no jurisdiction to decide the merits of the appeal. ”).  Thus, the Court here has no jurisdiction to hear [...]’s new appeal on arbitrability.
[brief] “[C]ourts are required to instruct the jury on lesser-included offenses only if counsel requests such a charge and there is a rational basis in the record for doing so[;] or, in the absence of a request, if the record clearly indicates a charge is warranted. ”  *State v. Denofa*, 187 N.J. 24, 42, 898 A.2d 523 (2006) (second emphasis added) (citing *State v. Garron*, 177 N.J. 147, 180 n. 5, 827 A.2d 243 (2003), *cert. denied*, 540 U.S. 1160, 124 S.Ct. 1169, 157 L. Ed.2d 1204 (2004)); *Accord, State v. Walker*, 203 N.J. 73, 87, 999 A.2d 450 (2010); see also *N.J.S.A. 2C:1–8(e)*.
[brief] Moreover, when talking about the error rate, [...] noted that there have been recorded human errors.  (3T134-14 to 16).  The jury could have thus listened to his testimony with skepticism, considering that he, being human, could have committed the same errors he described in processing the stains in this case, especially since he also noted that bloodstains are not always easily distinguishable from each other.  (3T138-7 to 10).  Defendant never objected to this testimony nor did he cross-examine the expert about the zero-error rate.  In fact, the judge commented that cross-examination only took five minutes.  (3T175-8 to 10).  And in her closing, defendant relied on [...]’s conclusions, hoping that the jury would “go back and look at his words” to show that if defendant had beaten [...] to death, there would not be blood on her clothing, in an attempt to diminish the inculpatory nature of the blood found on defendant’s bra.  (8T10-9 to 11-6).  Defendant's “zero-error” claim fails to reach the level of plain error—she relied on the expert and in the context of his entire testimony that one comment did not lead to an unjust result.
[brief] Here, the trial court exercised that discretion appropriately.  The jury was made well-aware of the fact that [...] had recanted his testimony and then un-recanted it in the [...] case – in fact, that made up several pages worth of cross-examination.  The only additional fact that was not allowed was that [...] was later exonerated, and why is clear: [...]’s testimony was not at the core of why [...] was exonerated.  Moreover, a Rule 104 hearing was not necessary here as the State conceded that the recantation testimony can, and should, come in as evidence of a prior false accusation.
[brief] As to [...]’s motion to dismiss [...]’s counterclaim, the lower court denied it as untimely.  165a.  With respect to the parties’ summary judgment motions, the lower court appeared to reject [...]’s strained construction of the COVID Statute, 167a, but accepted [...]’s argument that since [...] had not provided [...] with certified payrolls along with the invoices for the period that it did not provide services due to the schools’ closure, it was out of compliance with the contract provision that required them, thus entitling [...] to no relief.  168a.  This determination also led to the lower court’s granting of [...]’s motion for summary judgment and dismissal of [...]’s counterclaim.  The lower court had apparently overlooked the fact that since [...] had not rendered any services during the time period at issue, and had laid off its custodians for that period, there were no certified payrolls for it to produce.  Recognizing that the lower court’s decision on the parties’ motions was plainly the product of error, [...] filed a motion for reconsideration, and renewed its motion for summary judgment.
[brief] Importantly, all iterations of the consumer lending based provisions—whether the NJCFLA, the NJSLL, NJCLA, or NJLLA—were enacted remedially to protect New Jersey consumers by, *inter alia*, curtailing predatory and usurious lending practices, limiting what property could be held as collateral, conducting ongoing criminal background checks on applicants and licensees, and ensuring that only qualified, regulated, licensed entities would enter the marketplace as consumer lenders in New Jersey.
[brief] Id. at 153.  Defendant, citing to a passage in State v. Rivera, 276 N.J. Super. 346, 352 (App. Div. 1994), which is in turn quoting a passage from Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 91 (1979), also argues that this investigatory stop involved an unmet particularity requirement.  (Db13).  This argument and its legal support are taken out of context.  The issue being discussed in Rivera, after the Court acknowledged that “the police may have probable cause in the totality of circumstances to pursue and search a fleeing suspect,” was whether there was probable cause to search those in the suspect’s vicinity.
[brief] [...]’s prior administrations began taking steps to secure compliance.  On February 3, 2004, the Council authorized an investigation to declare the blocks containing [...] Station and the Off-site Property, Block 419 and Block 610, among others, as areas in need of redevelopment and on September 7, 2004, declared a need for redevelopment.  266a.  By 2006, [...] put in place a Redevelopment Plan to provide affordable housing:  In addition, the redevelopment plan shall include the provision of affordable housing in accordance with the “Fair Housing Act”.  All development within the designated redevelopment area shall provide for the appropriate number of affordable dwellings.  The number of affordable units shall be provided pursuant to the State of New Jersey Council On Affordable housing third round rules that mandate a minimum of one affordable housing unit for every eight units of market rate housing and one affordable housing unit for every twenty-five jobs created.  448a.  [...] adopted the redevelopment plan on July 11, 2006.  266a.  After hearings throughout 2008, the Planning Board adopted revisions to the redevelopment plan on February 19, 2009.  480a.  On December 20, 2016, the Borough amended the Redevelopment Plan, with the “purpose” of, among other things, to “provide for affordable housing in an appropriate location within the Borough,” including the locations Blocks 419 and 610, among others.  271a.  On July 8, 2015, upon forming a plan to meet its obligations, [...] filed this action by verified complaint seeking a declaratory judgment to “declare that its fair share plan is in compliance with the requirements of the Mt. Laurel Doctrine and issue a judgment of repose insulating the Borough from exclusionary zoning lawsuits .
[brief] For the reasons set forth above, [...] respectfully requests that the trial court’s decision dated October 20, 2023, sanctioning Plaintiffs and awarding attorneys’ fees to [...], be AFFIRMED; and that the trial court’s decisions dated December 5, 2023 and May 7, 2024, limiting the fee award to $30,000, be REVERSED; and that [...] be awarded its full fees in the amount of $89,072.19.  Respectfully Submitted, [...]
[brief] New Jersey courts have consistently allowed them to voir dire on whether jurors would be willing to convict in the absence of forensic evidence.  Along the same lines, this State’s high court has found that voir dire on the absence of key evidence is appropriate.  See State v. Little, 246 N.J. 402 (2021) --- 10  https://www.njcourts.gov/sites/default/files/administrative-directives/2007/05/dir_04_07.pdf.  11  Id. 12  When jurors have been asked questions at voir dire regarding the lack of forensic evidence in a case, courts in New Jersey have reversed convictions when the questions were not appropriately balanced such that jurors knew they could convict based on a lack of forensic evidence and also consider this lack of evidence in acquitting the defendant.
[brief] Following supplemental briefing, the trial court heard a second round of argument on [...]’s summary judgment motion on October 21, 2022 (the “Second Argument”).  (2T).  During the Second Argument, the trial court reiterated its finding that the question at issue was unambiguous, found New Jersey’s equitable fraud standard applicable to the case, and held that “[s]cienter is not an essential element of equitable fraud. ” (2T46:5-48:2).  The trial court also rejected a contention, made by [...], that the “Concealment, Misrepresentation or Fraud” Policy condition changed New Jersey’s equitable fraud standard.  The trial court stated that equitable fraud was present here, and that the cases cited by [...] for this contention were from out of state.  (2T12:23).  The trial court further rejected the argument that reformation of the Policy, rather than rescission, was a more equitable remedy.
[brief] 12  II.  IT WAS UNFAIR AND VIOLATED RES  JUDICATA FOR THE COURT TO IMPOSE A DISCOUNT TO FAIR VALUE BASED ON MISCONDUCT THAT HAD PREVIOUSLY BEEN THE SUBJECT OF FINAL MONEY DAMAGE AWARDS BY THE ARBITRATOR (Pa3202-3204)(11T7:2-8:11).............................................  22  III.  THE CHANCERY COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE DISCOUNTED FAIR VALUE OF BRAD CONWAY’S INTERESTS AT ALL WHERE IT DID NOT FIND THIS CASE WAS “EXTRAORDINARY” AND WHERE THE PRIOR MONETARY DAMAGE AWARDS PRECLUDED SUCH A FINDING (Pa3202-3204)(11T7:22-8:11).................................................................  25  IV.  THE ARBITRATOR’S 2018 PARTIAL AND FINAL AWARDS WERE INVALID WHERE THE PARTIES’ ARBITRATION AGREEMENT AND [...] RULES REQUIRED  3 ARBITRATORS TO DECIDE MONETARY CLAIMS GREATER THAN $1,000,000 (3T80:12-92:5).................................................................  30  V.  THE ARBITRATOR’S UNREASONED DECISION TO DENY BRAD’S COUNSEL  A POSTPONEMENT OF PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR FINAL RELIEF SO THAT HE COULD LEARN THE FACTS OF THE CASE AND PRESENT BRAD’S SIDE, CONSTITUTED MISCONDUCT REQUIRING VACATUR (Pa3172-3173).................... 42 VI. THE $503,000 SANCTION AGAINST BRAD CONWAY WAS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND MISAPPLICATION OF LAW THAT PRECLUDES SANCTIONS AS PUNISHMENTS (1T46:25-47:6) (3T13-24:14-12)(3T32:19-33:16)(Pa3155).......................... 47 CONCLUSION................................................................. 50 | Cases | Pages | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|-------| | Abbott v. Burke, 206 N.J. 332, 371, 20 A.3d 1018 (2011) | 48 | | Allstate Settlement Corp. v. Rapid Settlements, Ltd., 559 F.3d 164, 169 (3rd Cir. 2009) | 31 | | Avis Rent A Car System, Inc. v. Garage Employees Union, Local 272, 791 F.2d 22, 25 (2d. Cir. 1986) | 32, 42 | | Balsamides v. Protameen Chems., 160 N.J. 352 (1999) | 26, 27, 28, 29 | | Barcon v. Tricounty Asphalt, 86 N.J. 179 (1981) | 39, 41, 42 | | Bd. of Educ. of the Twp. of Middletown v. Middletown Twp. Educ. Ass'n, 352 N.J. Super. 501, 509 (Ch. Div. 2001) | 48 | | Brown v. Brown, 348 N.J. Super. 466, 483 (App. Div. 2002) | 28, 29, 30 | | Cargill Rice, Inc. v. Empresa Nicaraguense Dealimentos Basicos, 25 F.3d 223, 224, (4th Cir. 1994) | 40 | | Casey v. Brennan, 344 N.J. Super. 83, 112, (App. Div. 2001) | 27, 28, 30 | | Chattin v. Cape May Greene, 216 N.J. Super. 618, 637 (App. Div. 1987) | 23 | | Daloisio v. Peninsula Land Co., 43 N.J. Super. 79, 94, (App. Div. 1956) | 14, 15, 18 | | Dockser v. Schwartzberg, 433 F.3d 421 (4th Cir.
[brief] M68.  This Amended Application is a substantial change from the approvals granted Respondents’ predecessor in title.  --- 2  The relevant factual and procedural history are intertwined, and are therefore combined.  3  Use Variance pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70(d)(1), two (2) Height Variances pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70(d)(6)), and various Bulk Variances pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70(c), in order to develop the Property with 43,568 square feet of commercial uses and 206 residential units with 43 affordable apartment units (two of which are generated by the 9 townhomes on the [...]) under Board Application No.: [...], and memorialized in the Board’s April 26, 2016 Resolution (the “Prior Approvals”).
[directive] Disorderly Persons Offenses and Petty Disorderly Persons Offenses  Unlawful Taking of a Means of Conveyance .................................................................................................................................................  47  Unlicensed Entry of Structures; Defiant Trespass .........................................................................................................................................  47  Wandering, Remaining in or Prowling Public Places with Purpose of Obtaining or Selling Controlled Substances .......................................  48  11 Index of Rules and Statutes Regarding Bail for Indictable Offenses
[brief] [...]  COUNTY OF MONMOUTH - STATE OF NEW JERSEY  REGULAR MEETING FOR:  TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS  [...]  Wednesday, December 7, 2016  8:00 p.m.  BEFORE: [...], Chairman [...]  [...] [...] [...] [...] [...]  ALSO PRESENT:  [...], ESQ., Board Attorney [...], P.E., Board Engineer [...], P.P., Board Planner [...], Board Secretary  [...], Certified Court Reporter  [...] [...]  APPEARANCES: | EXHIBIT NO. | DESCRIPTION | PAGE NO. | |------------|----------------------|----------| | | Exhibits were not marked.
[brief] ”  Cole v. Jersey City Med. Ctr., 215 N.J. 265, 280-281 (2013); Hearing Tr. 67:5-68:16.  While no one factor is determinative, the length of the delay here, [...]’s filing and prevailing upon a dispositive motion, its active engagement in discovery, and its failure to preserve any purported rights to arbitration in these circumstances all weigh heavily against the motion.
[brief] 33  State v. Pineiro, 181 N.J. 13 (2004) ...................................................  15 State v. Pontery, 19 N.J. 457 (1955) ...................................................  22 State v. Ramseur, 106 N.J. 123 (1987) ..................................................  32  State v. Reininger, 430 N.J. Super. 517 (App. Div. 2012) ......................  14 State v. Reyes, 50 N.J. 454 (1967) .........................................................  4 State v. Rinaldi, 58 N.J. Super. 209 (1960) ...........................................  12 State v. Rose, 206 N.J. 141 (2011) .......................................................  14 State v. Roth, 95 N.J. 334 (1984) .......................................................... 36, 37 State v. Scher, 278 N.J. Super. 249 (App. Div. 1994), certif. denied, 140 N.J. 276 (1995) .............................................................................
[directive] Yet individual cases, which are not the subject of the Order to Show Cause, can be subject to challenge on due process grounds based on the length of detention.  12  Accetturo offers guidance on how to assess whether such a violation has occurred:  [D]ue process judgments should be made on the facts of individual cases, and should reflect the factors relevant in the initial detention decision, such as the seriousness of the charges, the strength of the government’s proof that defendant poses a risk of flight or a danger to the community, and the strength of the government’s case on the merits.
[brief] The final decision notes that on August 8, 2019, an email was sent to the Certifying Officers advising them of their obligations under the Ricci Act.  However, no August 8, 2019, email was provided.  A Memorandum to the Certifying Officers was provided with no date other than “August 2019. ”  Pa77.  Even still, this Memorandum was to State Agency Certifying Officers, not to members of the retirement system.  If anything, it is proof that the members of the retirement system could not have possibly been notified within the statutory timeframe, as the Certifying Officers were not even notified within 30 days.
[brief] The trial court took this remarkable step in plain disregard of the [...]’ intent as reflected within the Genesis Deed.  Moreover, the trial court made this determination prior to the completion of discovery, without any participation or meaningful discovery from an indispensable party, [...], and without a hearing wherein testimony was given and evidence entered into the record.  In its opposition to Plaintiffs’ partial summary judgment motion, [...] provided compelling evidence that [...] is the “property owner’s association” contemplated by the Genesis Deed, that the [...] expected and required [...] to regulate construction within the community, and that [...] has been doing so for over 75 years.  Rather than grant all reasonable inferences to [...], the trial court disregarded this evidence, substituted itself as the factfinder, and upended nearly a century of history and past practice.  Despite the trial court’s stated intent to exercise “judicial restraint” by limiting the scope of its holding to just Plaintiffs’ Property, if the trial court’s order is permitted to stand, the [...]’ conveyance of beachfront property to [...] in a separate instrument is also threatened as this conveyance was conditioned on [...]’s enforcement of the Genesis Deed’s restrictions and its own rules.