ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The $70,000  When the parties were purchasing the townhouse in April 2011, some five months before executing the Settlement Agreement, Plaintiff was acutely aware that she had been saving money her entire working life, from at 18 to 59, and if she removed $70,000 from those savings, she would be jeopardizing her retirement.  (2T 50:22-51:4)  $70,000 was more than a year’s gross income to Plaintiff.  (2T 51:5-6)  At the time that the $70,000 was needed (either when the contract was entered into in April 2011 or at the closing in June 2011), Plaintiff had no idea what her ongoing financial picture would be.  No agreement had been reached regarding monthly support, nor would it be for months yet to come.  (2T 44:1-3)  While it may have been an incomplete statement, it was entirely accurate for the Settlement Agreement to read that “[...] does not have access to such funds,” when those funds are specifically required for closing in June 2011.  The parties had discussed that the $70,000 due to Defendant would be paid upon the sale of Plaintiff’s property in [...].  (2T 49:10-14; 122:16-18)  Plaintiff did immediately list the property for sale (2T:50:9-11), however it did not sell and then after Hurricane Sandy in fall 2012, property values in that area fell substantially and the property was removed from the market.  (2T 49:18-50:11)  In fact, Plaintiff had initially listed the property in April 2011, as Defendant knew, in anticipation of the purchase of the [...] property and her need to reimburse Defendant for the $70,000.  (2T 49:22-24; 96:17-21)  However, it did not sell prior to the June 2011 closing on the [...] property, nor the execution of the Settlement Agreement later in the fall of 2011.  (2T 49:18-21)  Plaintiff further extended the listing into 2012, but understandably removed the listing following Hurricane Sandy and its impact on the real estate market in and around [...].  (2T 50:5-11)
[directive] •  To review semi-annually all firearms policies as they relate to:  1.  Warning shots 2.  Moving vehicles 3.  Removal of firearm from holster or display of firearms 4.  Surrender of firearm 9-12  Revised (5/03) Semi-Annual Firearms Qualification and Requalification Standards 5.  Disposal of animals 6.  Carrying of weapons, on and off duty 7.  Consumption of alcohol, use of prescription drugs 8.  Covert operations  •  To review semi-annually all relevant state, and municipal procedures for reporting the accidental or intentional discharge of a firearm while on or off duty, except those fired in training/requalification.  •  To develop and review semi-annually agency policies, rules and regulations defining:  1.  Official firearms and service ammunition  2.  Off-duty firearms 3.  Service ammunition  4.  Leather gear, to include loading devices for service and off-duty firearms.  •  To provide agency personnel with appropriate training for specialized weapons such as rifles and other tactical weapons.
[brief] As for the third reason [...] denied Defendants’ Motion for Reconsideration, Defendants suggest that the Court must effectively incorporate the allegations of the Certification absent any competing accounts.  Again, Defendants fail to provide any case law supporting a shifting of the burden of proof to Plaintiff.  More critically, this argument discredits the fact that there already are competing accounts of what occurred.  Out of all of the other individuals monitoring the courtroom with the Defense adjuster, not a single one alerted the Court to anything improper (7T, at 27:18-25).  All of them were explicitly instructed to do so by the Court, with some being judiciary employees well-versed in the rules and protocols of the courtroom (7T, at 9:25-10:10).  Their silence speaks with more veracity than anything the Defense adjuster could put into words.  IV.
[brief] The Litigation and Judgment in the Korean Action  Plaintiff filed a lawsuit in January 2013 (the same month in which he filed his Verified Complaint in New Jersey) in the Korean Family Court to resolve the issues among the beneficiaries surrounding the Decedent’s Estate.  After several years of litigation, the Korean Family Court entered its judgment on September 20, 2017.  (Da1109-25).  The court’s decision included a determination that Decedent’s Estate held a total interest of 40.8% in [...], which interest the Court valued at approximately $900,000, and that Plaintiff’s financial interest in [...] totaled 7.76 percent.
[brief] This is the remedy that Appellant has consistently sought.  At the 03/27/2024 hearing for this case, the Court refused to admit the rendering in question as evidence citing the following passage from Paragraph 46 of the “Findings of Fact” Section of the [...] amended resolution as justification:  ...  During deliberation, none of the Commissioners expressed reliance on the [...] rendering, nor mentioned same or gave it any weight on the record and during deliberation.  [...] took exception to the [...] rendering during the hearings.  The architectural plan prepared by [...] contained the height of the proposed building, in terms of number of stories and height and the Applicant is bound by same unless additional relief is requested by way of an amended application to the Board.  During deliberation, none of the Commissioners expressed reliance on the [...] rendering, nor mentioned same or gave it any weight on the record and during deliberation.  (25a)  The Court’s analysis of this:  THE COURT:  -- in determining whether -- what the height of the building would be, you can’t then tell me that the building violated the heights in this rendering because they didn’t rely upon that.  Now it goes back to you.  How do you prove that the building did not comply with the plans?  (T2 p 32 lines 14 – 17).  The Court’s argument in this regard suffers from a number of fatal flaws because it contradicts the actual language of the Amended Resolution.  Building Height vs. Relative Height
[brief] Those comments do not suggest the [...] considered and decided whether the type of information Defendant shared complies with § 1692c(b).  Defendant then refers to the use of a vendor to receive mail from consumers.  Under 12 CFR § 1006.34(c)(2)(i), a validation notice must include “the mailing address at which the debt collector accepts disputes and requests for original-creditor information. ”  Supplement I to Regulation F provides the [...]’s Official Interpretations of the Regulation.  The Official Interpretation provides, “A debt collector may disclose a vendor’s mailing address, if that is an address at which the debt collector accepts disputes and requests for original-creditor information. ”  The rule and its interpretation concern mail from consumers, not the data which a debt collector sends to third-parties.
[brief] The Court rejects defendant's argument that the [...] reports only became relevant after plaintiff amended his pleading in June 2012 to include a failure to promote claim.  To be sure, the Court is only concluding that the [...] reports are relevant for discovery purposes.  The Court is not weighing in on whether the reports are admissible at trial.  Further, although plaintiff (not the Court) characterizes the reports as a “bombshell,” plaintiff has a right to pursue his trial strategy and arguments as he deems fit.  Defendant also argues that [...] did not remember the grievances involving plaintiff until August 2012.  Most certainly, however, if defendant had conducted a thorough document search it would have identified and produced the documents earlier.  Although the Court declines to default defendant for its discovery transgressions, sanctions are nevertheless appropriate.
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[brief] Final Agency Decision, issued August 22, 2023.  .......................  Ca014  Initial Decision of Administrative Law Judge, issued June 9, 2023.  ...... Ca019  Agency Decision on Motion to Dismiss, issued July 26, 2023 ............  Ca166  Commissioner of Education’s Order Declining Interlocutory Jurisdiction, issued August 11, 2022  .................................................. Ca160  #  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN FINDING THE EXCLUSIONS DID NOT VIOLATE THE PUBLIC POLICY (1T at 22:4 to 23:18)  As a matter of public policy, an insurance company is not free to any policy exclusions it sees fit — such exclusions must be “specific, plain, clear, prominent and not contrary to public policy. ”  Mem’l Props., LLC v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 210 N.J. 512, 528 (2012) (quoting Princeton Ins. Co. v. Chunmuang, 151 N.J. 80, 95 (1997)).  Moreover, because insurance contracts are contracts of adhesion, “courts must assume a particularly vigilant role in ensuring their conformity to public policy and principles of fairness. ”  Voorhees, 128 N.J. at 175.  In the instant matter, public policy dictates that coverage should be extended to causes of action stemming from the same conduct that would otherwise have indisputably been covered.  Said differently, the policy at issue covered the original complaint for defamation.  “A defamation claim has three elements: ‘(1) the assertion of a false and defamatory statement concerning another; (2) the unprivileged publication of that statement to a third party; and (3) fault amounting at least to negligence by the publisher. ’”  G.D. v. Kenny, 411 N.J. Super. 176, 186 (App. Div. 2009) (Leang v. Jersey City Bd. Of Educ., 198 N.J. 557, 585 (2009)).  Because defamation does not require (1) any level of intent, or (2) knowledge of falsity, the exclusions cited by [...] would not have barred coverage for that claim.  After the defamation claim was dismissed as violative of the statute of limitations, [...] simply recast the exact same facts into a tortious interference claim.  There is no dispute that the complaint for defamation would have been covered by the Policy.  Therefore it is axiomatic that a mere recasting of the same facts into a different claim would likewise be covered.  If [...] were allowed to disclaim coverage by such mere recasting of allegations, then such a holding would condone an unfair litigation tactic of pleading claims to fit into an exclusion so that insurance coverage will be denied, thereby imposing the punishment of litigation fees and any potential monetary award on an individual.  In addition and ironically, [...] relied heavily on *N. Plainfield in its moving papers*, but ignores other aspects of the District Court’s opinion.  The District Court applied a breach of contract exclusion to numerous tort claims because the tort claims were based on the same set of facts as the breach of contract claim.  *N. Plainfield Board of Educ.*, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39555 at *44-45.  If such a holding is accurate, then the inverse should be true.  In other words, [...] cannot disclaim coverage on a claim that is based on the same set of facts as a claim that requires coverage.  As such, the trial court erred as a matter of law in holding the Policy’s exclusions were in line with the public policy regarding insurance agreements.
[brief] However, the court believed that it was only required to consider mitigating factor fourteen, which did not exist at the time of the original sentencing, and to which it assigned “great weight. ”  (5T:24-19 to 23)  This was a fundamental misunderstanding of what a Zuber resentencing requires.  Had the court made the required findings regarding the mitigating factors, it would have been forced to address the evidence in the record at resentencing clearly supporting the existence of mitigating factors seven, ("The defendant has no history of prior delinquency or criminal activity or has led a law-abiding life for a substantial period of time”), eight, 2C:44-1b(8) ("defendant's conduct was the result of circumstances unlikely to recur”), nine, 2C:44-1b(9) (“The character and attitude of the defendant indicate that he is unlikely to commit another offense”), and thirteen, 2C:44-1b(13) (conduct of youthful defendant substantially influenced by more mature co-defendant).
[brief] [...]’s trial testimony was consistent with his deposition testimony from the Underlying Action.  At trial, as in the Underlying Action, he emphasized the extent to which he complained to [...] in the 1990s of leaks and damage to his property and on the severe impact of his injuries beginning in the 1990s and continuing over time.  1T47-2-12; 1T47-19 to 1T48-9; 1T47-25 to 1T49-3.  For instance, the water infiltration was so severe that he hired a lawyer to write to [...], he stopped paying his condo dues, and a lessee moved out prematurely.  1T51-16 to 1T52-14.  [...] testified that his symptoms were contemporaneous with the water infiltration and that he sought treatment in the early 1990s.  1T52-20-24; 1T53-10-13.  He was not the only one to experience symptoms because of mold.  [...]’s wife lived in the condo with him in the early 1990s, during which time she also allegedly experienced mold-related symptoms.  These symptoms caused her to become argumentative, delusional, sickly, and irrational.  [...] believes this caused the downfall of his marriage.  1T53-14 to 1T54-19.  [...]’s brother [...] also lived in the condo with [...] for about four or five years in the 1990s.  During that time, [...] also experienced symptoms which [...] believes were caused by mold, including shortness of breath, weight gain, and open sores.  1T54-23 to 1T55-13.  ii.
[brief] Parties acknowledge that [[...]] will incur substantial costs if the deadlines set forth herein are not achieved by the dates provided.  As a result of the foregoing, **if any deadline or timeframe set forth herein** that is the responsibility of the [...] or the [...] is not achieved in accordance with the timeline set forth above.  there shall be a penalty in the amount of five hundred ($500) per day (“Per Diem Penalty”) . . .
[directive] 13 stycznia 2008 r. lub później: posiadania strzelby, 2C:39-3b; posiadania broni z usuniętymi znakami N.J.S.A. identyfikacyjnymi, 2C:39-3d; posiadania broni (palnej) do celu niezgodnego z prawem, N.J.S.A. popełniania przestępstwa związanego z 2C:39-4a; posiadania broni palnej podczas N.J.S.A. niebezpiecznymi kotrolowanymi substancjami lub innych przestępstw, 2C:39-4.1a; N.J.S.A. nielegalnego posiadania broni maszynowej, broni krótkiej, karabinu lub strzelby, 2C:39-5a., b N.J.S.A. lub c; ograniczenia prawa pewnych osób do posiadania broni, 2C:39-7; albo wytwarzania, N.J.S.A. transportu, utylizowania i usuwania znaków identyfikacyjnych z broni maszynowej, strzelb z obciętymi lufami, broni z usuniętymi znakami identyfikacyjnymi lub broni palnej szturmowej.  2C:39-9a., N.J.S.A. b, e lub g. lub  (2)  You are pleading guilty to one of the following offenses that occurred on or after January 13, 2008: possession of a shotgun, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-3b; possession of a defaced weapon, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-3d; possession of a weapon (firearm) for an unlawful purpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4a; possession of a firearm while in the course of committing a CDS offense or other offenses, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4.1a; unlawful possession of a machine gun, handgun, rifle or shotgun, 2C:39-5a, b or c; N.J.S.A. certain persons not to have weapons, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-7; or manufacture, transport, disposition and defacement of machine guns, sawed-off shotguns, defaced firearms or assault firearms.  2C:39-9a., b, e or g, or N.J.S.A. Formularz udostępniony na mocy Dyrektywy #01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 11172-Polish strona 1 z 2 Form Promulgated by Directive #01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 11172-Polish page 1 of 2 przyznaje się Pan(i) do następującego przestępstwa, do którego doszło 8 sierpnia 2013 r. lub później: (3) nielegalnego posiadania broni palnej szturmowej, 2C:39-5(f).
[brief] [...], a family member of [...]’s, was at her mother’s house on Cohansey Street when [...] texted her around 2:39 a.m. (3T82-8 to 84-3; 3T92-8; 3T114-10 to 12; 6T115-7 to 10).  After a conversation via text, Jamison got dressed and went outside to wait for him.  (3T84-4 to 87-7).  When [...] arrived in his van around 3:00 a.m., Jamison noticed there was another car behind him.  (3T3T87-11 to 89-12).  Jamison got into the front passenger seat.  (3T88-16 to 22).  [...] started going in “circles” around the block.  (3T89-1 to 92-2).  As they approached Irving and Pearl Streets, [...] stated, “Cuz, somebody following me. ” (3T92-1 to 8).  [...] started “flying,” so Jamison “[got] down. ” (3T93-21 to 94-6).  [...] turned right onto Irving, left onto Walnut Street, and left onto Myrtle Street when shots started being fired.  (3T94-23 to 96-8).  When they reached the intersection of Myrtle and Bank Streets, [...] fell over onto Jamison.  (3T96-9 to 97-14).  She unsuccessfully attempted to steer the van as it passed through the intersection of Pearl Street before crashing at Laurel Street.  (3T96-18 to 98-8).  When she regained consciousness, Jamison asked a bystander to call 911 because her cell phone was not working.  (3T98-15 to 20; 3T99-18 to 21).  Seeing that [...] was unresponsive, Jamison panicked, and escaped through the shattered driver’s side window.  (3T98-21 to 99-5; 3T101-24 to 102-24).  She returned to her mother’s house around the corner.  (3T102-25 to 103-6).  Jamison’s cousin took her to the hospital two hours later.  (3T105-6 to 17).
[brief] ...................... 9, 28 Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000)  .................................................................................. 8, 20, 27 Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995)  .................................................................................. 23 Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997) .................................................................................. 21, 22 Waste Mgmt. of New Jersey, Inc. v. Union Cnty. Utilities Auth., 399 N.J. Super. 508 (App. Div. 2008) ..........................................................  7  Whitman-Walker Clinic, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., 485 F. Supp. 3d 1 (D.D.C. 2020) ...............................................................  13  Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) ..................................................................................  15  Statutes N.J.S.A. 2C:14–3 .........................................................................................  24 N.J.S.A. 2C:34–3 .........................................................................................  24 N.J.S.A. 37:1–6 .........................................................................................
[brief] (Id.)  The Resolution noted that no Applicant made no claim for alternative relief by application or public notice which was undisputed through the course of the litigation.  (Id.)  More specifically, the Resolution noted the Plaintiff failed to request an Interpretation of Zoning Ordinance by the Board in order to establish the location, width, or number of proposed walkways for installation.  *Id.*  The Resolution likewise noted the material to be used for installed pavers would be solely within the discretion of the Historic Preservation Commission for this “key structure” under the Design Guidelines and must look like “brick” per Section R.  (*Id.* paragraph 13, 15, 16 ZBA Resolution).  Lastly, at no time was there a request made by Plaintiff to seek Zoning Approval via “c” variance or waiver for the installation of not one but THREE walkways in the Historic Flare which installation is specifically prohibited under Section 413.02 of the NLDO entitled “Flared Avenue Open Space Areas” which advises the purpose of the Historic Flare is a “unique and invaluable resource that is recognized within planning, urban design and historic preservation circles *as one of the first evidences of this type of streetscape treatment in the country*”.
[brief] That makes sense: if there is a reasonable probability of success, there is logically an underlying well-settled right on which that reasonable probability is based.  See *Waste Mgmt.*, 399 N.J. Super. at 528 (explaining that the “time-honored approach in ascertaining whether a party has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of success” includes consideration of whether “the law upon which plaintiff’s claim is based is well-settled”).  And as explained above, Appellants do not challenge on appeal the State’s arguments regarding the LAD itself.  In any event, the trial court properly found that the State’s claims do rest on well-settled rights.  As to substance, “the legal right underlying” the State’s action, *Crowe*, 90 N.J. at 133, is explicit, well-recognized, and longstanding: the LAD itself.  The LAD expressly prohibits unlawful discrimination in places of public accommodation; expressly extends this prohibition to schools; expressly includes discrimination based upon gender identity or expression; and expressly extends to disparate-treatment and disparate-impact theories alike.  See supra at 4-5; N.J.S.A. 10:5-5(1); N.J.S.A. 10:5-12(f).  The LAD also expressly grants the State authority to seek relief enjoining ongoing or future statutory violations, as it did here.  See supra at 5; (Da125-26) (decision below confirming this well-established right to relief); N.J.S.A. 10:5-14.1 (authorizing State to “proceed in a summary manner in the Superior Court of New Jersey to obtain an injunction” against any defendant violating the LAD after filing an administrative complaint against them before DCR); *Pfaus*, 97 N.J. Super. at 8 (same); *Poff v. Caro*, 228 N.J. Super. 370, 374-75 (Law Div. 1987) (preliminarily enjoining actions while LAD administrative litigation remained pending).
[brief] Indeed, when the conversation between the detective and defendant is viewed completely and not artificially parsed, line-by-line from afar, it is clear that defendant did not invoke his right to counsel.  Rather, defendant merely was inquiring how he would obtain an attorney if he wanted one.  In response, and prior to asking any substantive questions, [...] properly advised defendant that an attorney would be appointed if he could not afford one.  And, despite that advisement and stating that he understood that right, defendant nevertheless did not ask for an attorney and answered the detective’s question.  Thus, a review of the whole record establishes that defendant knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently spoke with the detective and, therefore, defendant’s Motion to Suppress should have been denied.