[brief] In *McQueen v. Fein, Such, Kahn & Shepard, P.C.*, [...], 2023 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 640 (Law Div. April 26, 2023), [...] denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss and addressed the licensure requirements of the NJCFLA:  The question of whether the Plaintiff has stated a viable claim for relief turns ultimately upon whether [...] and the other assignees of the Plaintiff’s credit card account and debt were functioning as a “consumer lender” and/or “sales finance company” under the NJFCLA at the time they accepted assignment of such account and debt and/or sought to enforce and collect the same and were thereby required to secure a license.  If they were so obligated, the Plaintiff has stated a viable claim for relief under the FDCPA as against [...], inasmuch as one could reasonably conclude in such circumstances that the letter [...] sent to the debtor was misleading and/or unconscionable because it did not report that the serial creditors were unlicensed at the time they accepted assignment of the debt and/or initiated legal proceedings against the debtor in the Bergen County Action and that the debt was void.  [The NJCFLA] captures within the definitions of “consumer lender” and “consumer loan business” a wide range of other participants in consumer lending.  As a result of the second sentence of the definition, the statutory coverage extends not only to those making or extending loans, but those that solicit such loans, those that assist in the procurement or negotiation of the same and those that purchase or acquire “notes. ”  The purpose of the second sentence of the definition is pellucid – to expand the scope of the statute and its licensure and other requirements well beyond the entities that actually provide the credit ab initio.  It is in this context that one must examine the explicit text that the statutory scheme encompasses those in the business of “buying, discounting or endorsing notes. ”  Because the statutory definition includes (i) those that initiate consumer loans by issuing credit cards and credit card agreements; and (ii) via the second sentence, intended to broaden the coverage, those engaged in purchasing “notes,” there is no reason to suppose that the Legislature intended by use of that term to limit the same to negotiable promissory notes.  . . .  Put differently, as the statute and licensing requirement apply to original credit card issuers, there is ample reason to suppose that the Legislature intended to include purchasers of credit card accounts within the scope of a provision – the second sentence – that brings within its reach the purchasers of consumer loans.  . . .  Both parties acknowledge there is no controlling authority . . . addressing this issue.  This Court has examined the federal cases cited by the movant (which are also unpublished) and the contrary decision of a different New Jersey trial-level court in Woo Padva.  Although this Court has the greatest respect for the court and the Judge that decided Woo Padva, it disagrees with the conclusions reached in that case for the reasons set forth herein.  McQueen, [...], 2023 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 640, at *9-15.  In the context of the NJCFLA’s legislative history, it becomes clear that the premise upon which the trial court based its granting of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is inconsistent with the legislative intent of the NJCFLA and its predecessors.  Thus, the October 20, 2023 Orders granting Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss and denying [...]’s Cross Motion to Vacate, Transfer, and Consolidate should be reversed.