ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] 9.3.1  An internal affairs investigation file is needed for all internal affairs reports.  Given the wide range of internal affairs allegations a law enforcement agency receives, these investigation files might consist of only the initial report form and the appropriate disposition document.  On the other hand, investigation files might include extensive documentation of an investigation.  9.3.2  The internal affairs investigation file should contain the investigation’s entire work product, regardless of the author.  This includes investigators' reports, transcripts of statements, and copies of all relevant documents.  The file should also include all related material from other agency incidents that may be applicable.  For instance, if an allegation is made of excessive force during an arrest, the internal affairs investigation file should contain copies of the reports from that arrest.  9.3.3
[brief] This tautological reasoning does not obviate the arguments advanced by the Appellants in their opening brief.  Regardless of the detailed nature of the process by the trial court, the process itself limited public participation and the participation of Township professionals and Zoning Board members.  The goal of the Open Public Meeting Act, N.J.S.A. 10:4-6, et seq. (“OPMA”) is to encourage and ensure public participation at its highest levels.  See S. Jersey Pub. Co. v. N. J. Expressway Auth., 124 N.J. 478, 494 (1991).  While Respondents focus their arguments on whether the public was properly noticed of the hearing, they offer no meaningful rebuttal to the fact that even with proper notice, the time and location of the hearing was inconvenient and restrictive of their participation.  Generally, open public meetings of public bodies take place at town hall or, at the very least, within the municipality itself and during evening or after work hours.  This, of course, is to advance the goals of the OPMA by maximizing public participation.  Not only that, but it is without question that members of public bodies, including the Zoning Board in this matter and the Township’s professionals, ordinarily have day jobs, which limit their ability provide their public services until after regular business hours.  Here, the trial court provided a process that required anyone seeking to participate to go to the Middlesex County Courthouse during regular court hours, which is typically 8:30 a.m. to 4:30 p.m. M6-7.  Not only was the matter removed from the locale, but it was also held at a time when most members of the public are not available to participate.  Tellingly, the trial notes that the hearing before the Zoning Board on the Amended Application had hundreds of objectors show up and seventeen residents offered public comment.  Though its unclear from the record how the court came to the conclusion that all of the “hundreds” of people in attendance were objectors, what is clear is that this was an application that had an interested public.  The purpose of the OPMA is to allow that interested public to engage in these matters of public concern.  It does not matter whether that concern was raised by the residents solitary reading of the news or if their concern grew after hearing from a public official.  What matters is that they have an opportunity to hear and be heard.  That could not and did not happen once the trial court removed the matter through its flawed process.
[brief] \textit{Atlantic Northern Airlines v. Schwimmer}, 12 N.J. 293, 301 (1953) (emphasis added); see \textit{Conway v. 287 Corporate Center Associates}, 187 N.J. 259, 269 (2006).  It is true enough that extrinsic evidence of the contract’s formation can be considered in interpreting the agreement.  However:  The admission of evidence of extrinsic facts is not for the purpose of changing the writing, but to secure light by which to measure its actual significance.  \textit{Such evidence is admissible only for the purpose of interpreting the writing — not for the purpose of modifying or enlarging or curtailing its terms, but to aid in determining the meaning of what has been said}.  So far as the evidence tends to show, not the meaning of the writing, but an intention wholly unexpressed in the writing, it is irrelevant.
[brief] See Jerista v. Murray, 185 N.J. 175, 190-91, 883 A.2d 350 (2005) (Proximate cause is an essential element of a legal malpractice claim).  Again, in a professional malpractice case, jury is not permitted to infer causation and damages from circumstantial evidence.  In a legal malpractice case, proximate causation must ordinarily be established by expert testimony.
[brief] A.  Old Case Law Treating Municipal Water Supply as a “Proprietary” Function is No Longer Good Law.  [...] does not allege that he and the Borough entered into an express contract.  Instead, [...] relies on an old, now defunct line of case law in which courts held that a municipality’s supply of water created an “implied contract”, on which the municipality could sue to recover unpaid water charges.  When that line of cases arose in the 1870s, municipalities lacked a statutory basis to recover such charges, so the courts created a judicial remedy.  Courts held that a municipality’s supply of water was a “proprietary” rather than “governmental” function, and created an implied contract obligating the recipient of water service to pay for water received.  Many decades later, New Jersey’s legislature enacted statutes to comprehensively govern and regulate the supply of potable water.  Statutory provisions now authorize municipalities to assess charges to recoup their expenses in providing potable water service, and expressly allow placement and enforcement of liens to recover unpaid water charges.  Moreover, New Jersey’s Supreme Court held nearly 50 years ago that municipal supply of water is not a “proprietary” function, dismissing the former “proprietary” vs. “governmental” dichotomy as an antiquated and invalid legal fiction.
[brief] Homeowners would suddenly be placed in the position of wondering whether any form of home renovation or improvement would be worth undertaking if they may be exposed to liability for accidents that occur on abutting sidewalks during the course of said renovations.  The scope of such a change would, furthermore, be entirely unclear.  Would such a niche carveout for residential immunity include a situation where homeowners must temporarily vacate the property to fumigate or to have the property inspected?  Surely, most likely faced with the fear of exposing themselves to this heightened threat of liability, the homeowners would shy away from making renovations and needed improvements to their home that would require them to vacate the premises for a period of time.  To dissuade home owners from engaging in such activities would surely not serve the public interest.
[brief] Defendant’s Fourteenth Amendment and state-constitutional rights to due process and a fair trial were violated.  N.J.R.E. 701 provides:  “If a witness is not testifying as an expert, the witness’ testimony in the form of opinions or inferences may be admitted if it (a) is rationally based on the perception of the witness and (b) will assist in understanding the witness’ testimony or in determining a fact in issue. ”  That rule has been clearly interpreted in State v. McLean, 205 N.J. 438, 457-458 (2011), to only allow a “narrow” category of lay opinion: that which will "assist the trier of fact by helping to explain the witness's testimony or by shedding light on the determination of the disputed factual issue"; moreover, it is specifically "limit[ed] to the perceptions of the testifying witness."
[brief] ”  In the incident report, prepared on that same date, [...] similarly wrote, “After placing the spotlight on [defendant's] face and asking [[...]] if he recognized [defendant], he became extremely emotional and stated[,] ‘That's him that's the guy who tried to kill me. ’ ”  Defendant filed a pretrial motion for a Wade/Henderson hearing to determine the admissibility of [...]'s out-of-court identification.
[directive] Apply for Must Enforcement Law Where Cases  4.4  Complaint-Warrant. by Charged Be Must That Crimes Specified 4.4.1 of 4  Section of provision other any notwithstanding and -1(e), :3 3  Rule by required  As probable is if there acomplaint-warrant for apply shall agency enforcement law a Directive, this committed: defendant the that believe cause to 2C:11-3); (N.J.S.A. murder — heard offenses persons disorderly apply to which would practice, court municipal governing VII rules Part  The a authorizes recently amended, as 7:2-2(e), Specifically, Rule provisions.
[brief] The jury could have given [...]'s testimony great weight given the fact that he was the cousin of [...].  If the jury had heard [...]'s testimony they could have found that [...] was lying to get a plea deal and that his testimony cannot be trusted and could have found petitioner was not guilty on some or all of the remaining 19 counts that he was found guilty of at trial.  [...]'s exculpatory testimony could have raised reasonable doubt for the jury concerning [...]' testimony as well.  [...] received the best "plea deal" of all, [...] who by his own admission at trial was the mastermind behind all crimes, was not even prosecuted by the State.
[brief] Along the same line, [...] misrepresents that on the second call back to me 10 minutes later, [...] had withdrawn the offer (i.e. again indirectly and misleadingly suggesting that they had a problem with whose name was on the title, which is totally 100% false).  Instead the real truth is that when [...] called me back, they wanted to change the offer, not to withdraw it.  And the only change they wanted to make was my monetary compensation - that is, instead of paying me $400 net when I brought in the “as-is” title, then they wanted to change that $400 amount into a credit to be applied against a $530 amount they were then alleging would be owed for towing and storage.  So when [...] called back, they still wanted to keep the car, and still wanted me to bring them the as-is title – but now instead of my receiving $400 for doing so, now they wanted me to pay them $130 out of my own pocket to do so (for them to keep the car to sell parts off of).  That quickly turned into an argument, because the $400 amount we had previously agreed to reflected a flat $100 offset for a short period of storage involved - as just a few weeks earlier, [...] had offered to pay us $500 for the car, where they were going to come out to my sister's house (i.e. the same exact location) and pick up the car, and they were going to give us $500 in cash.  So when I called on May 12th and the offer was then reduced to $400, I did not make a fuss over it and immediately agreed to it, because I understood that they had already held/kept it there for 3 days without knowing that they would become the car's new owners.  But as of my May 12th phone call, they then knew that they were going to keep the car, and my bringing them the as-is title was just a formality, which they wanted merely to cover their butts.  So the mutually accepted offer was for me to receive $400 net, once I brought in the as-is title; and it was mutually understood that it may take me a couple days to do so, because as I told the employee, my scatterbrain sister had misplaced the title and I might not be able to bring it down until Monday (i.e. May 16, 2022).
[brief] If anything, the willingness to resort to such tactics should make any court chary of relying on a Certification, particularly one whose contents are undisclosed and not subject to the crucible of cross-examination.  It strains credulity for [...] to assert that between Friday, July 28, 2023 and August 1, 2023, when the real concern was filing suit by August 3, that there were substantive discussions about and how much she would take to settle.  Plus, any alleged strategy became moot in light of the fact a second Will had to be invalidated for petitioners to take from decedent's Estate.  Indeed, [...] cannot not squarely rebut Knoll's undisclosed assertions (at least to the satisfaction of petitioners' counsel) if only because he did not know what they were.  In short, [...]'s assertion that he remembers nothing and has "no information which [he] may use to Petitioners’ detriment" (Pa152, ¶¶10), is direct and unequivocal.
[directive] The following uses of CEDs are prohibited:  (a)  A CED shall not be used or threatened to be used to retaliate for any past conduct or to impose punishment; (b)  A CED shall not be used against a person who is a passive resistor or an active resistor; (c)  A CED shall not be fired or discharged for the sole purpose of preventing a person from committing property damage; (d) A CED shall not be deployed against the operator of a moving vehicle unless the use of deadly force against the operator of the motor vehicle would be authorized; and (e)  Two or more CEDs shall not be discharged upon a person at the same time.  8
[brief] RESENTENCING IS REQUIRED BECAUSE THE COURT IMPROPERLY CONSIDERED DEFENDANT’S EXERCISE OF HIS RIGHT AGAINST INCrimINATION, AND ACCORDED INSUFFICIENT WEIGHT TO YOUTH AS A MITIGATING FACTOR.  (9T15-23 to 26-2)  The sentencing court sentenced [...] to an aggregate term of fifty-five years of imprisonment subject to the No Early Release Act.  (9T24-15 to 25-14)  In reaching this sentence, the court found that aggravating factors three, six, and nine “substantially outweigh[ed]” mitigating factor fourteen – the only mitigating factor the court found.  (9T22-22 to 24-14)  The court made two prejudicial errors in reaching this sentence: it improperly considered [...]’s exercise of his right against self-incrimination, and it failed to accord appropriate weight to mitigating factor fourteen, resulting in an excessive sentence.  As such, if this Court does not concur that the convictions should be reversed for the reasons above, the matter should be remanded for resentencing.
[brief] CONCLUSION  For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully urges this Court to affirm defendant’s conviction and sentence.  Respectfully submitted, [...]  ATTORNEY GENERAL OF NEW JERSEY  ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT BY: /s/ [...]  [...]  Deputy Attorney General [...]  DEBORAH BARTOLOMEY  ATTORNEY NO. 030611989  DEPUTY  ATTORNEY GENERAL DIVISION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE  APPELLATE BUREAU OF COUNSEL AND ON THE BRIEF  DATED: JANUARY 6, 2025  January 15, 2025  [...] ID. NO. 381892021  Assistant Deputy Public Defender Of Counsel and  On the Letter-Brief REPLY LETTER BRIEF ON BEHALF OF DEFENDANT-APPELLANT  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY  APPELLATE  DIVISION DOCKET NO. [...]  INDICTMENT NO. [...]  STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. [...]  A/K/A [...], Defendant-Appellant.
[brief] N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(6) refers not only to a defendant’s “prior criminal record” but also to “the seriousness of the offenses of which defendant has been convicted. ”  The definition of “offense” under N.J.S.A. 2C:1-14(k) includes “a disorderly persons offense or a petty disorderly persons offense. ”  See State v. Ross, 335 N.J. Super. 536, 542 (App. Div. 2000) (finding “four disorderly persons convictions” contributed to application of aggravating factor  Defendant’s prior municipal record runs the gamut through a variety of offenses from lewdness to probation violations to defiant trespass, thus establishing that aberrant and illegal conduct is not new to defendant.  Thus, the court properly considered defendant’s municipal court record when assigning great weight aggravating factor six.
[brief] PRELIMINARY STATEMENT ........................................................................................................1  ARGUMENT ......................................................................................................................................3  I.  The Trial Court  Erred in Denying [...]’s Counterclaim ..................................................3  A. Appellants’ Actions in Transferring the Property Constitute Fraud, Fraudulent Conveyance, Conspiracy, and Warrant Punitive Damages .........................3 B. Appellants Conspired To Commit The Fraud And Acted In Concert To Commit The Fraud....................................................................................................................7 CONCLUSION ..................................................................................................................................12
[brief] (Da1, Da5.)  The complaint sought to remove [...] and [...] from the BOG.  (Da11.)  Plaintiffs alleged that those members were holding their positions in violation of the [...] Act because they resided in a county other than Camden in the case of [...] and Middlesex in the case of [...].  (Da5-14.)  On February 28, 2024, the court granted the motion to proceed summarily.  (Da3-4.)  The court heard oral argument; issued its decision from the bench ejecting [...] and [...] from the BOG, with immediate effect; and denied Defendants’ motion for a stay—all occurring on June 27, 2024.  (1T1-86.)  [...]’s term on the BOG would have expired three days later on June 30, 2024.  (Da77.)  (As noted below, if [...]’s membership on the BOG were restored, her term would expire on June 30, 2025.  Da72.)  [...] and [...] timely opened this appeal by submitting their notice of appeal and case information statement on August 12, 2024.  (Da95-110.)  With respect to Defendants’ subsequent motion, filed on August 23, 2024, 1 “Da” refers to Defendants-Appellants’ Appendix, filed October 7, 2024.  2 “1T” refers to the Transcript of Motion Hearing, dated June 27, 2024, which was uploaded to this appellate docket on August 12, 2024.  this court denied a stay of the trial court’s judgment pending appeal but granted acceleration of this appeal.  (Da118.)
[brief] Id. at 710 (emphasis added).  Interestingly, in California, ACC clauses intended to avoid application of the efficient proximate cause doctrine are unenforceable as contrary to California public policy.  Howell v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 267 Cal. Rptr. 708, 218 Cal. App. 3d 1446 (Cal. App. 1990).  [...]’s argument and the Trial Court’s summary judgment ruling that Appelman’s Rule does not apply to CGL coverage is simply wrong under controlling New Jersey law.  [...]’s alternative argument that Appleman’s rule only applies to CGL coverage involving “concurrent” causes of loss also is wrong.  The entire purpose of the Rule is to eliminate operation of a policy exclusion when the claim involves a covered cause of loss in the chain of causation and the policy does not contain an ACC clause.  The Flomerfelt Court recognized that the Rule applies in cases involving sequential as well as concurrent causes of loss:  “[W]e have adopted the approach known as ‘Appleman’s rule,’ pursuant to which the loss is covered if a covered cause starts or ends the sequence of events leading to the loss. ”  Flomerfelt, 202 N.J. at 447 (emphasis added).  The ACC clauses in the first two [...] policies bar coverage “regardless of” whether the causes of loss occurred concurrently or sequentially.  [...] then eliminated the ACC clauses from the three policies at issue in this case.  This change in policy language, like the change in the policy language addressed in Cypress Point Condominium Ass’n, Inc. v. Adria Towers, L.L.C., 226 N.J. 403 (2016), discussed below, plainly broadened the coverage available to the insured.  The elimination of the ACC clause warrants application of Appleman’s Rule when at least one of the events in the chain of causation is covered.  The undisputed evidence establishes that the “first cause” in the chain of causation leading to [...]’s injuries – water intrusion – is covered by the [...] policies; therefore, the Trial Court’s refusal to apply Appleman’s Rule to find coverage constitutes reversible error.
[brief] Additionally, this was not a long detention.  The entire episode lasted less than 30 seconds.  The motion court, in its decision, highlights that no fight was occurring when [...] arrived in the parking lot.  (T83-15 to 21).  Respectfully, case law does not require that the crime be ongoing at the time of the detention.  Requiring this element was a misapplication of the law.  All that is required is a reasonable particularized suspicion that the individual has just engaged in or is about to engage in criminal activity.  See State v. Stovall, 170 N.J. 346, 356 (2002) quoting Terry at 21.  The court’s characterization of the events as similar to stopping people at Wawa or Target and “order(ing) people around and put(ting) them on the ground and do(ing) searches on them” (T83-17 to 21) is simply not analogous to what transpired in the case before it.  Further, the court discounted the fact that the defendant’s hand was in the bag indicating that any person could have their hand in a bag.  In doing so, the court failed to consider [...]’s testimony that the position in which the hand was in the bag led him to believe the defendant was holding a gun and his experience on how this type of bag has been increasingly used to conceal guns.  It was reasonable for [...] to suspect that the defendant, who he encountered just after receiving the call about the fight, who matched the general description of the individuals engaged in the fight, who was one of multiple individuals dispersing from the fight location, who was still on the sidewalk between the parking lot and the Speed Mart, who was holding his hand in a satchel in a manner that led [...] to believe he was holding a gun, who tried to conceal the gun when told to take his hand out of the bag and was using a satchel that, according to [...]’s experience, was consistent with how guns have been increasingly often been carried.  These facts created a reasonable articulable suspicion that the defendant was engaged in the criminal activity inside the store and the court erred in suppressing the handgun that was seized.  The Court below committed error in finding that [...] did not have a reasonable suspicion to justify asking the defendant to sit on the curb.
[brief] As testified to at trial, the heavy snow fall ended around 5 p.m. with just light flurries falling which ended completely at 8:30 p.m. on March 7, 2018, and accordingly, the winter storm advisory was cancelled at 8:50 p.m. that night.  (3T54:14-20).  Almost 12 hours later, Plaintiff drove forty-eight miles, taking over an hour and a half, from Hamilton to Basking Ridge, with no issue.  (6T16:21-24).  She entered this private office complex, owned, and controlled by Defendants, unlike the property considered in *Pareja*.  Defendants contend that they themselves prioritized the retail tenants for snow removal over the office tenants.  However, there is no distinction or priority with regard to retail tenants versus office tenants provided by the law or the snow removal contract when it comes to snow removal efforts.  (Da150-178).  Defendants had close to twelve hours to clear a property and it could have prevented people from entering [...].  (4T77:16-18)  There is no dispute that there was sufficient time for the Defendants to make its property reasonably safe for Plaintiff and others.  Defendants owed Plaintiff and others the duty to inspect and look for hazardous condition such as ice.  Despite this, none of the Defendants did so.  In fact, not one Defendant could tell the jury the condition of the property the morning Plaintiff fell.  (4T49:20-25; 4T87:5-7; 4T89:2-4; 4T182:11-15; 5T88:12-16; 7T65:5-11).  There is a clear difference in the duty that is owed to an invitee under 5.20(F)(5) and 5.20(B)(2)(b), which provides no protections or make any distinction as to what is owed is to an invitee on the commercial owners’ property versus a pedestrian on an abutting sidewalk.  Accordingly, in the interest of justice, and providing a clear remedy for seriously injured invitees, such as Plaintiff, the trial court properly charged the jury with 5.20(F)(5) and did not commit reversible error.