ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Where does the justice lie to award attorney fees of $1,311,832.94 to attorneys who had openly admitted to commit fraud upon the court at the expense of the innocent victim!  The power to vacate a judgment that has been obtained by fraud upon the court is inherent in courts.  See Universal Oil Products Co. v. Root Ref. Co., 66 S.Ct. 1176, 1179, (1946), 328 U.S. 575, 580, 90 L.Ed 1447.
[directive] Where the officer deems there is no probable cause to arrest or sign a criminal complaint against the defendant for a violation of no contact court order, the officer must advise the victim of the procedure for completing and signing a 1. criminal complaint alleging a violation of the court order.  a.  During regular court hours, the officer should advise the victim that the complaint must be filed with the Family Part of the Chancery Division of Superior Court.  b.  On weekends, holidays and other hours when the court is closed.  (1) the officer should transport or arrange for transportation to have the victim taken to headquarters to sign the complaint; (2) the alleged offender shall be charged with contempt of a domestic violence court order, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-9.  The victim must sign the complaint.  A complaint-warrant (CDR-2) must be prepared; (3) the officer in charge shall follow standard police procedure in arranging to have a court set bail.  2.  civil complaint against the defendant for violations of a court order pertaining to support or monetary compensation, custody, visitation or counselling.  The victim should be referred to the Family Division Case Management Office to pursue this civil enforcement of the court order.  IX.
[directive] 3.7.3  CEDs shall not be utilized in the following manner: (a) against a person in drive stun mode more than twice unless deadly force would be authorized and permitted pursuant to this Policy; (b) against a handcuffed subject unless deadly force would be authorized and permitted pursuant to this Policy; (c) against the operator of a moving vehicle unless deadly force would be authorized and permitted pursuant to this Policy; (d) to prevent a subject from damaging property; or (e) against a person simultaneously with two or more CEDs.
[brief] ”  *Sensient Colors*, 193 N.J. at 387.  Where, like here, the facts and circumstances establish there are “special equities,” a trial court has the discretion and authority to “disregard the traditional deference paid to the first-filed action” and defer to a second-filed action while dismissing or staying the first-filed action.  *Id.* at 387-88.  While there is no inflexible or exhaustive list of “special equities,” the Supreme Court recognized a number of quintessential “special equities” in *Sensient Colors*, which include “when one party has engaged in jurisdiction shopping to deny the other party the benefit of its natural forum. ”  *Id.* at 387.  A prime and highly relevant example of this “special equity” is when “a party acting in bad faith has filed first ‘in anticipation of the opposing party’s imminent suit in another, less favorable forum.
[directive] 9.  Oferta de una sentencia reducida  Plea Offer  Exponga detalladamente el acuerdo una reduccion de sentencia que se le haya propuesto e incluya las de recomendaciones en cuanto a la sentencia.  Set forth in detail the plea agreement offered including sentencing recommendations ..  10.  lEntiende usted que si rechaza esta oferta de una sentencia reducida y se le condenara [No/No]  [Si!Yes] eljuez despues de unjuicio, podria imponerle una sentencia mas dura que la que se recomienda en la oferta de una sentencia reducida hasta la sentencia maxima permitida?  if  Do you understand that you reject this plea offer, the Court could impose a more severe sentence than by if recommended the plea offer, to the maximum sentence permitted you are convicted after trial?  up que 11.  ;,Entiende usted rechaza hoy esta oferta para admitir su culpabilidad, este Juez si [Si/Yes] [No/No] un no puede aceptar acuerdo negociado con una condena reducida, a menos que sea de autorizado especificamente por el Juez Presidente de lo Penal acuerdo con la R. 3:9-3(g)?  if  Do you understand that you reject this plea offer today, no negotiated plea can be accepted this Court unless by R. specifically authorized by the Criminal Presiding Judge pursuant to 3:9-3(g)?
[brief] On pages 23 to 24 of its Opinion, the trial court correctly found that [...]’s assertions concerning lack of understanding, force or coercion, and her signatures on the operative documents were not credible:  The court finds the assertions made by defendant to be incredible under the totality of the circumstances.  Although this court can understand that there may be certain language barriers for defendant, the court’s observations of defendant at trial do not support her assertions that she misunderstood questions and facts at the time she executed the documents being challenged herein, at her depositions or at trial.  The court finds defendant understood the vast majority of questions during cross examination and all of the questions posed to her on direct.  The court finds that defendant was not so controlled by plaintiff to completely vitiate her free will to review documents which were presented to her for signature including those surrounding the settlement agreements and other legal documents which she signed.  The court finds defendant has not proven by a preponderance of the evidence that she was forced or coerced to sign the documents in question.  The court finds she signed the documents freely and voluntarily.  The court finds multiple witnesses testified including notaries employed by [...] concerning the circumstances surrounding the procurement of her signature on the documents.  The court finds the testimony of the notaries to be credible in that they testified that their typical procedure is to properly identify the signee, provide the full document referenced and witness the signature of the signee.  The court finds the notaries used this same procedure when obtaining the defendant’s signatures.  Additionally, defendant testified the signatures on the documents were hers but that she did not have the full documents, did not ask to review the full documents and simply signed them based on plaintiff’s instruction.  She testified that she simply signed the documents because plaintiff told her to do so.  The court’s observations of defendant over the 23-day trial and during her multiple days of testimony do not support her claims that she was forced to sign the documents or that she was so cognitively deficient or unable to process or understand what she was signing.  The court finds defendant was well aware of what was being presented to her and what she was signing.  [Id. at 23-24].
[brief] This speaks to similar circumstances as service of process was defective as demonstrated in this appeal with evidence that the trial court ignored and case law clearly establishes through precedents when: A default is entered without proper service of the complaint, it is “a fortiori void, and should be set aside; Gold Kist, Inc., 756 F.2d at 19; see Grand Entertainment Grp. v. Star Media Sales, Inc., 988 F.2d 476, 493 (3d Cir.1993).  The government must afford the person NOTICE, an opportunity to be heard, and a decision made by a neutral decision maker (which all evidence cited has demonstrated this defendant was NOT AFFORDED in 1990 and was ignored by the trial court which speaks to the PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS RIGHTS VIOLATION that occurred in March of 1990 albeit first noticed in May of 2023).  It becomes matter of law that Procedural Due Process is REQUIRED and guaranteed by the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.  Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(c), A court “may set aside an entry of default for good cause. ”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(c); see also Mrs. Ressler's Food Prods. v. KZY Logistics, LLC, 675 F. App'x 136, 139 (3d Cir. 2017).  In considering whether to vacate a default judgment, a court should consider (1) whether the plaintiff will be prejudiced by a vacatur of default, (2) whether the defendant has a meritorious defense, and (3) whether the defendant's culpable conduct led to the entry of default.  See Feliciano v. Reliant Tooling, Co., 691 F.2d 653, 656 (3d Cir. 1982); see also Sourcecorp Inc. v. Croney, 412 F. App'x 455, 459 (3d Cir. 2011).  However, an entry of default may be set aside WITHOUT consideration of these factors where the entry of default was “IMPROPER (lacking service of process),” as established in; Gold Kist, Inc. v. Laurinburg Oil Co., Inc., 756 F.2d 14, 19 (3d Cir. 1985); Mettle v. First Union Nat. Bank, 279 F. Supp. 2d 598, 603 n.3 (D.N.J. 2003).
[brief] The MSRA provides the Director with broad powers in taking employment actions in municipalities “in need of stabilization and recovery,” and specifically authorizes the Director and/or his Designee to: [T]ake any steps to stabilize the finances, restructure the debts, or assist in the financial rehabilitation and recovery of the municipality in need of stabilization and recovery, including, but not limited to: ***  (f) amending or terminating any existing contracts or agreements, which shall not include bonds, notes, indentures, or other similar financing instruments and documents to which the municipality is a party, in accordance with the terms thereof; or unilaterally amending or terminating any contracts or agreements which shall not include bonds, notes, indentures, or other similar financing instruments and documents to which the municipality is a party, provided that the director determines that the unilateral termination or amendment is reasonable and directly related to stabilizing the finances or assisting with the fiscal rehabilitation and recovery of the municipality in need of stabilization and recovery; (g) unilaterally modifying, amending, or terminating any collective negotiations agreements, except those related to school districts, to which the municipality is a party, or unilaterally modifying, amending, or terminating the terms and conditions of employment during the term of any applicable collective negotiations agreement, or both, provided that the director determines that the modifications, amendments, or terminations are reasonable and directly related to stabilizing the finances or assisting with the fiscal rehabilitation and recovery of the municipality in need of stabilization and recovery; *** (i) with respect to any expired collective negotiations agreement to which the municipality in need of stabilization and recovery is a party, unilaterally modifying wages, hours, or any other terms and conditions of employment[.]
[brief] We presume that the Legislature is aware that New Jersey’s jury-trial right attaches to statutory actions that confer legal remedies and resemble actions in common law.  In other words, we will presume, as we must, that the Legislature intended to conform to the Constitution.  We have no reason to conclude that, in IFPA private-party actions, the Legislature intended a result inconsistent with the demands of our State Constitution.  When the Legislature provides for legal remedies, it can be inferred that it “intended to authorize a jury trial. ”  (citations omitted)  "[Id. at 149-150].  ". . .  [A] jury trial in an IFPA action is not a recent advent or a break from a long-accepted practice of bench trials.  **IFPA claims have been tried before juries since at least 1994."**  Id. at 153.  (Emphasis added).  Ultimately, the Lajara Court held:  By this measure, we conclude that the right to a civil jury trial provided by Article I, Paragraph 9 of the New Jersey Constitution applies to private-action claims seeking compensatory and punitive damages under the IFPA.  We also presume that the Legislature, in passing the IFPA, intended the statutory scheme to conform to the Constitution.  We therefore remand to the trial court to allow defendants in this case to exercise their right to a jury trial.  [Id. at 134].  As [...]’s IFPA case has been dismissed in favor of PIP dispute resolution, the Law Division has overruled the express command of this State’s highest court and deprived the parties of their constitutional right to a jury trial under the IFPA.  In fact, the Law Division fails to even mention this controlling Supreme Court of New Jersey case in its decision and that nine of the Defendants in the case asserted their right to a jury trial when they filed their respective Answers to [...]’s Complaint. (Pa0152, Pa0215, Pa0257).
[brief] A trial court should never put trial counsel to make such an assessment.  But in the present case, the trial court did not do this.  Rather, trial counsel volunteered it over and over again.  “In no event…is counsel empowered to denigrate or dismiss the client's claims, to negatively evaluate them, or to render aid and support to the state's opposition. ”  *Ibid.*  By doing so, trial counsel in the present case, like the Law Division judge in *Inglis*, short-circuited due process and shortchanged the ability of trial judges to distinguish between pretextual and sincere defenses, to separate the wheat from the chaff, and weigh affirmative defenses at trial.
[directive] The Parties Shall Complete and Submit an EM Screening Form of  In Part 1 the EM Screening Form ([...]), the prosecutor must provide the reasons why EM is necessary.  This includes victim information and whether the of victim lives within a short distance the defendant.  It also requests specific information when the prosecutor is requesting that the defendant be ordered to EM based on extraordinary circumstances.  The prosecutor shall fill out Part 1 even in those instances where the court is considering HD or EM over the State's objection.
[brief] On August 4, 2020, [...] was walking her dog “Coco” down Raspberry Lane.  (2T:91-12 to 23).  Shilpa then saw Koda running from the defendant’s backyard toward them.  (2T:93-19 to 24).  Koda then attacked Coco from behind, biting her eight to ten times, hard enough to leave marks.  (2T:94-7 to 22; 96-1 to 3).
[brief] Although, for the reasons articulated in more detail below, it is Plaintiff’s position that the claims against the [...] survive even if analyzed under N.J.S.A. 59:4-2, on this record the [...]’s conduct should be analyzed under an ordinary negligence standard for its failure to warn or repair a known hazard.  Here, although the [...] did present the argument that its conduct was discretionary and in the face of “competing demands”, on this record, the [...] has not actually produced any evidence to support that notion.  That is, other than the simple fact that the construction of portions of the Parkway had been contracted out to third parties there is no evidence of “competing demands” and the resources for the construction project had already been allocated.  The record here shows that the [...] failed to appropriately and safely maintain its roadway when it failed to repair or warn motorists of a known settlement defect in the roadway.  Even though the subject construction project was underway, the [...] still maintained a level of responsibility for roadway maintenance and safety.
[brief] (1T65:25-66:3.)  [...] admitted to conducting the walk and turn test with dark lighting in the rain after turning off his vehicle’s front lights.  (1T14:18-22; 1T15:15-24.)  [...] testified that [...] performed the walking and turn test without stumbling, “he was just walking a straight line. ”  (1T20:3-4.)  [...] conceded that in demonstrating the walk and turn test, he did so in a manner that changed the test from landing on the even foot to landing on the odd foot, which affects the pivot involved in the test, and thus, the standardization.  (2T31:2-32:4.)  [...] also conceded that, in order to fail a standardized test, there must be a failure of more than one scoring factor for the one-leg raise test.  (2T34:13-19.)
[brief] In determining whether a ruling, action or inaction by the lower court or agency constituted error, the appellate court applies a standard of review that gives the appropriate deference to the lower court's decision.  That standard may allow for no deference (review of purely legal decisions), some degree of deference, or a substantial degree of deference (review of findings of fact).  See, [...], *N.J. Appellate Practice* § 34:2-1 (2022).
[brief] In appeals from final agency action outside of such settings, there similarly must be a sufficiently developed record to permit a reviewing court to engage in meaningful review.  See In re Issuance of Permit by DEP, 120 N.J. 164, 173 (1990) (relying on State v. Atley, 157 N.J. Super. 157, 163 (App. Div. 1978)) (noting necessity of agency fact-finding to facilitate appellate review).  When the challenged agency action arises in a setting where the record is too meager to permit meaningful review, supplementation of the record may be necessary.  The Court Rules provide that a reviewing court may remand, on its own motion, for supplementation of the record in order to permit meaningful review.  R. 2:5-5(b).  In re State & Sch. Emples. Health Benefits Commissions' Implementation of Yucht, 233 N.J. 267, 280 (2018).
[brief] In fact, the Berent court held that:”  [A]fter reviewing the law in other jurisdictions, we decline to overrule or modify the ruling in Taylor.  Applying Taylor to the contract in this case, we conclude that the sellers’ retention of a judicial forum for limited purposes does not render the arbitration agreement unconscionable. ” Berent, 466 S.W.3d at 742.  Thus, a jurisdiction can hold that egregious carveouts, like one allowing the corporate party the single right to sue for money in court, are not legal; however, a carveout allowing the corporate party access to court to seek foreclosure remedies is legal.
[brief] Plaintiff [...] filed an Amended Complaint on December 21, 2022, attempting to reinterpret the provisions of a 1983 Master Deed, thirty-five (35) plus years after transition was turned over to the homeowners.  The Complaint additionally sought to nullify the sale of Unit 74 to the Association which was negotiated by counsel on February 1, 2016, which closing took place on April 7, 2016.  The Complaint additionally sought to hold Individual Defendants personally liable for executing a Deed and Affidavit of Title at the April 7, 2016 closing, claiming the developer did not have marketable title, despite the Plaintiff’s obtaining a title insurance policy from its title company, insuring marketable title.  After the conclusion of discovery, the Plaintiff filed a motion for Partial Summary Judgment as to Counts One, Four, Five and Six of its Complaint.  Defendants filed a cross-motion for Summary Judgment.  See Pa 178.  The Trial Court denied Plaintiff’s motion for Partial Summary Judgment in full and granted the Defendants’ motion for Summary Judgment, finding the Master Deed specifically contemplated the sale of Unit 74 to the Association.  See Pa 276.  **STATEMENT OF FACTS**
[brief] Table of Authorities…………………………………………………………………………………V  Table of Judgments, Orders, and Rulings…………………………………………………..ix  I.  Preliminary Statement……………………………………………………………………1  II.  Procedural History………………………………………………………………………..4  III.  Factual Background………………………………………………………………………6  A.  Appellant’s Allegations in the Complaint………………………………………………6  1.  Appellant Begins Working with Respondent [...] and [...]…………………………………………………………7  2.  Appellant Is Diagnosed with a Rare Medical Disability Which Forces Her to Take a Brief Medical Leave of and Immediately Faces Discrimination and Retaliation Because of Her Disclosure of Same and Requests for Reasonable Accommodations in Connection with Same………………………………………………………………………………8  B.  The Purported Arbitration Agreement………………………………………………….13
[brief] [T39:17-40:1.]  In response to [...]’s inquiry, [...] confirmed that [...] could not continue to represent any of the Defendants in light of the privileged knowledge it obtained regarding both sets of Defendants’ positions.  T40:13-41:7.  In prosecuting their present interlocutory appeal from the disqualification order, Defendants continue to be represented by a single law firm (now the firm of [...]), in apparent violation of [...]’s order requiring non-conflicted, separate representation for [...] and the [...], which order has not been stayed or modified by the trial court or this Court.  See Da001-2.  **STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW**
[brief] And this is what I referred to earlier.  Elements, factors, or points of law.  This is what the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt.  (1)  That the defendant, this defendant, [...] was in the course of committing a theft.  (2)  That while in the course of committing that theft, the defendant threatened another with, or purposely put another in fear of immediate bodily injury.  The State must prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant was in the course of committing a theft.  In this connection, you are advised that an act is considered to be in the course of committing a theft, if it occurs in an attempt to commit the theft, during the commission of the theft, or in immediate flight after that attempt or commission [sic] to commit a theft.  Theft is defined as the unlawful taking, or exercise of unlawful control over property of another, with the purpose to deprive him or her, or it, in the case of a news agency, thereof.
[brief] Here, the assurance that all of the envelopes listed on the proof of mailing register “were really given over to the Post Office for mailing” is the stamp on the last page of the register, documenting that the Post Office was paid the .41 fee for each of 147 pieces of mail listed, totaling $60.27 (Pa140).  Plaintiffs note that N.J.S.A. 17:29C-10 requires that the carrier retain a duplicate copy of the cancellation notice that is “certified to be a true copy. ”  [...] produced a duplicate copy of the cancellation notice mailed to [...] on December 13, 2019, and the notice reflects that it is “certified to be a true copy, original mailed December 13, 2019” (Pa39).  That verbiage, appearing near the top right of the cancellation notice (Pa39), is sufficient to comply with N.J.S.A. 17:29C-10.  N.J.S.A. 17:29C-10 does not require a signed certification directly on the copy of the cancellation notice to verify that the cancellation notice produced is certified to be a true copy of the notice mailed to the policyholder.
[brief] [...]  Of Counsel: [...], Esq.  (Atty. ID # 014321986)  [...], Esq.  (Atty. ID # 025881995)  On the Brief: [...], Esq.  (Atty. ID # 034252003)  [...], Esq. (Atty. ID # 261312018)  [...], Esq.  (Atty. ID # 334482021)  COLE SCHOTZ  P.C. [...]  [...]  [...]  [...]  [...]  [...] [...]  Attorneys for Plaintiff-Respondent, James S. Cohen
[brief] [...] replies to the State’s brief defending the seizure and searches in order to correct four inaccurate assertions.  First, there was no reasonable suspicion because the stop of [...] occurred before officers had any idea who he was.  The State argues there was reasonable suspicion because officers saw [...], a suspected drug dealer, performing “yet another transaction . . . in an identical manner to the other[]” transactions in which [...] was selling drugs.  (Sb 12)\(^1\)  But this interaction was not identical, because [...] approached [...]’s car with money in this hand, not drugs.  (1T 81-8 to 17)  [...] was suspected of selling drugs.  This involves other people giving him money and him giving them drugs.  That is not what officers saw right before the stop.  What they saw—a probable drug dealer approaching a car with money in hand and saying “nice car—does not give rise to reasonable suspicion that the person in the car was buying drugs.  Because police cannot stop every single person who speaks with a suspected drug dealer, even people who do non-drug business with a drug dealer, the stop was unlawful.  Second, contrary to the State’s assertions, the relevant part of Johnson’s holding, which belies any claim that officers could enter the car to search for credentials due to safety concerns, is not prospective.