ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] It deprives [...] of regular due process in the form of discovery, defenses, expert opinions, cross-examination, trial and the ability to sue any responsible third parties—if there is any damage to the property at all—and have the claim adjudicated by a neutral tribunal.  “Equity should and does intervene when it can prevent the injury which would otherwise give rise to an action for money. ”  *Del. River & Bay Auth. v. Hunter Constr. Inc.*, 344 N.J. Super. 361, 368 (Ch. Div. 2001).  A pre-judgment attachment is an “extraordinary remedy in rem for the collection of an ordinary debt by seizure of the property of the debtor. ”  *Wolfson v. Bonello*, 270 N.J. Super. 274, 289 (App. Div. 1994) (emphasis in original).  Granting a reversal of the Trial Court’s denial of the motion to enforce the Settlement Agreement would have disastrous consequences for [...].  [...]’s allegations that [...] allegedly dumped contaminated debris onto the Property are not addressed by the pleadings in the current lawsuit or the Settlement Agreement.  The Settlement Agreement simply required [...] to make monthly rent payments to [...], which it did until [...] wrongfully took over and locked [...] out of the Property in breach of the Settlement Agreement.  The Trial Court was correct in holding that [...] should file a new lawsuit related to any environmental contamination claims.  So, [...] is not harmed by the Trial Court’s ruling.  Puzzlingly, although [...] indicates it will file a new lawsuit for contamination claims, which it has yet to do, it nonetheless seeks to use the Consent Judgment as an improper vehicle for a pre-judgment writ of attachment.  The Settlement Agreement should not be used to impose liability on [...] in a draconian, egregious and oppressive way for matters which arose after settlement was reached.  [...] will have the same fair and full opportunity to litigate and seek relief in a separate action as [...] will have to defend itself.  There is no reason to impose liability before [...] has even proven its case against [...] for highly contested environmental contamination claims.  **CONCLUSION**
[brief] In fact, the opposite is true.  [...] filed a third party complaint against [...] on December 16, 2021, a Motion for Summary Judgment against [...] on September 8, 2023, a Motion for Reconsideration on November 9, 2023, and this very appeal each of which were premised on the argument that the indemnification clause was unambiguous.  To argue that [...] somehow invited the Law Division’s error is absurd.  B.
[brief] To make matters worse, there was not only no basis for the accomplice liability instruction to be given, but the prosecutor then presented a legally erroneous basis for conviction on that basis: that hiding a murder weapon after-the-fact is sufficient for conviction for murder as an accomplice.  The State claims that this error is harmless because, in its view, there was sufficient evidence that [...] was guilty as a principal.  (Sb 24)  When improper jury instructions and argument “permit[] the jurors to convict” a defendant “either upon a valid theory of guilt . . . or upon an invalid theory,” a court “cannot know upon which theory the jury found” a defendant guilty.
[brief] As discussed in their opening brief, Br. at 5–6, Defendants submitted a Proposed Order to Show Cause along with their reply brief in support of their motion for an extension of time that sought “relief . . . pursuant to the Uniform Public Expression Protection Act (UPEPA). ”  Da47.  Although the trial court failed to act on Defendants’ proposed order to show cause, it remains true that Plaintiff’s action was “the subject of an order to show cause,” and Defendants therefore have the right to seek their statutorily authorized attorneys’ fees.  Plaintiff will have the opportunity to provide argument and evidence on the merits of that application once this case is reopened and Defendants file a motion for attorneys’ fees.  CONCLUSION  For the reasons set forth above, Defendants respectfully request that the trial court’s denial of their motion to reopen the judgment be reversed.
[brief] Id.  After discovery ended, [...] filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that: (1) [...]’s bodily injury and property damage were not covered because they manifested before the [...] Policy periods; (2) the Consumption Exception did not restore coverage barred by the Mold Exclusion; and (3) the Settlement was unenforceable.  Pa22-Pa23.  [...] filed an opposition and cross-motion for summary judgment on February 9, 2021.  Pa24.  The trial court ([...], J.S.C.) denied both the motion and cross-motion, holding that issues of material fact existed.  Pa25-Pa52.  To resolve these factual issues, the parties proceeded to a bench trial before the Hon. [...], J.S.C. from October 11-14, 2022.
[brief] This denial was attributed to the court’s abuse of judicial discretion by not recognizing service of process had not been properly executed (Pa6; Pa34-Pa35; Pa39-Pa40) while additionally citing missed case law (Pa17-Pa18; Pa33) in misapplying the doctrines of Laches (Pa17-Pa18) as reason for said denial of claims which will be addressed in Argument II.  The court’s basis for denial was erroneously exercised to deny a FUNDAMENTAL Rights violation (defective Service of Process) to which it will be demonstrated such that laches does not govern civil rights actions.  If a defendant was served with proper notice a state’s statutes of limitations would normally govern an issue of time restraints, however, the court failed to recognize that Notice of Service had not been validated by Plaintiff [...] when challenged (Pa1; Pa6; Pa34-Pa35; Pa39-Pa40) as established through case law cited in this appeal.
[directive] Shoplifting offenses shall not be downgraded to disorderly persons offenses and remanded to municipal court except in accordance with the following criteria:  Second degree shoplifting offenses shall not be downgraded to disorderly persons offenses and remanded to municipal court.  Third degree shoplifting offenses shall not be downgraded to disorderly persons offenses and remanded to municipal court if the full retail value of the merchandise taken is equal to or greater than $2,000.  Ordinarily, third degree offenses where the full retail value of the merchandise is less than $2,000 should not be downgraded to disorderly persons offenses and remanded to municipal court.  However, such cases may be downgraded and remanded to municipal court if there are trial proof issues.  Fourth degree offenses may be downgraded to disorderly persons offenses and remanded to municipal court, at the discretion of the County Prosecutor or his or her designee.  However, a fourth degree offense shall not be downgraded if the offense constitutes the offender’s third or subsequent shoplifting offense.  Page 4 IV.  Prosecution of Shoplifting Offenses in Municipal Court
[brief] To lawfully stop an automobile, the police must have “reasonable and articulable suspicion that an offense, including a minor traffic offense, has been or is being committed. ”  Carty, 170 N.J. at 639-40; see also State v. Sloane, 193 N.J. 423, 432 (2008)(“As a seizure, a traffic stop is lawful if it is reasonable.  That requirement may be met where the police have probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred. ”)(internal quotation marks omitted.)  Therefore, the police may lawfully stop an automobile when they have reasonable suspicion to believe the driver is engaged in criminal wrongdoing, or when they observe the driver commit a traffic offense, even one that is minor.
[brief] (1T10-6 to 8; 1T53-23 to 54-1).  [...] advised the occupants of the vehicle to lower their windows.  (1T10-13 to 14).  [...] then exited the vehicle from the passenger’s side and [...] exited the vehicle from the driver’s side.  (1T10-11 to 12).  As [...] approached the Toyota, he observed five people: the driver, one passenger in the front seat, and three passengers in the rear passenger compartment.  (1T10-20 to 11-1).  [...] also could smell the odor of raw marijuana as he approached the Toyota.  (1T11-2 to 4).  After confirming the driver of the vehicle, [...], was the owner of the vehicle, the officers asked her about the warrant.  (1T11-5 to 17).  She responded that “she had some issues in Orange, but that was taken care of. ” (1T11-18 to 20).  The officers then contacting dispatch with the newly discovered information to determine if the warrant was still active.  (1T11-21 to 12-1).
[brief] The Highland Park court staff, either negligently, recklessly, or purposefully and intentionally failed in its procedural duty to provide the party convicted of the documentary proof from which it could take the appeal and know the details of the conviction and penalty.  58a.  PLAINTIFF was tried over multiple days in Highland Park with the Judge denying all substantive motions brought by [...]’S Counsel and finding [...] GUILTY of possible possession of that CDS pill of resisting arrest and interfering with the police in their official functions (trying to protect himself from his perceived SURE ENOUGH COMING BUT WHOOPING).
[brief] There are innumerable cases involving confidential relationship, but the courts have not been able precisely to define what it is.  See *Foster v. Medela*, 9 N.J. Super. 195 (App. Div. 1950); *In re Fulper*, 99 N.J. Eq. 293 (Prerog. 1926).  A confidential relation is not confined to any specific association of the parties; "Its essentials are a reposed confidence and the dominant and controlling position of the beneficiary of the transaction."
[directive] prosecutorial of the exercise channel to serves detention that pretrial seek to whether to needed office prosecutor's within a authority of level the specifies framework addition, this In presumption. a overcome decision to the approve detention, pretrial for motion filing a ainst a presumption a establishes category first  The or Prosecutor, Assistant First or Prosecutor County the when only overcome can be which the by prosecuted matters in Justice Criminal of Division the of Director Deputy a or Director first  This detention. preventive justify to exist conditions special certain that finds Division, is It categories.
[brief] (Da91).  The only portions of the Trial Order under appeal are the final two paragraphs, awarding the Plaintiff attorneys’ fees with respect to the motion to file a second amended complaint and the due process motion.  (Da92).  The Plaintiff has performed her duties as required by the Trust and applicable law.  She has provided [...] and [...] with bank and account statements.  7T97-23 to 98-1.  She has distributed the proceeds of the sales of both the Florida and Boonton Properties.  7T85-15-20.  After those distributions, she was ready to finish distributing the Trust assets and close things out, but the Defendants continued their motion practice.  7T85:21 to 86-7.  The Trustee is looking to close out the Trust, by administering what is left “as quickly as [she] possibly could.
[brief] (footnotes omitted)  Vague laws offend several important values.  First, because we assume that man is free to steer between lawful and unlawful conduct, we insist that laws give a person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited, so that he may act accordingly.  Vague laws may trap the innocent by not providing fair warning ...  Thus, the constitutional ban on vague laws is intended to invalidate regulatory enactments that fail to provide adequate notice of their scope and sufficient guidance for their application.  *Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville*, 405 *U.S.* 156, 162, 92 *S.Ct.* 839,843, 31 *L.Ed.2d* 110, 115 (1972).
[directive] Absent additional action, this provision will remain in force after December 31, 2022; c.  Receiving Stolen Property (Motor Vehicle Only), N.J.S.A. 2C:20-7; N.J.S.A. 2C:20-2(b)(2)(b).  This Policy authorizes vehicular pursuits for receiving stolen property (motor vehicle) until at least December 31, 2022.  The [...] has been directed to review the available data as of that date, including stolen vehicle trends, effectiveness of pursuits, and resulting accidents, and determine whether this provision should remain or be modified.  Absent additional action, this provision will remain in force after December 31, 2022; d.
[brief] The material fact that the trial court also overlooked was the Planning Board’s consideration of where additional senior housing should be permitted in the Township and its master plan reexamination designated additional properties for senior housing, but intentionally omitted this Property, even after receiving a planning memo discussing its possible inclusion.  The fact that the Township had not yet adopted the implementing ordinance creating the new senior housing zones recommended by the master plan is not determinative, because the Property at issue would in no event be included in the new zone.  The trial court erred by mistaking the significance of the Master Plan update and its weight as a planning document in creating the long term zoning plan for a municipality, and the updated Land Use Element adopted by the Planning Board specifically omitting these uses for this Property.  The trial decision fails to consider the history of zoning and the mandates of the MLUL statute.
[brief] [...]’s own statements show that she herself was an “informant of dubious veracity,” who cannot be blindly relied upon for the truth of her allegations she was publishing to promote her own brand, social media agenda, and her 2019 children’s book.  See Neuwirth, 476 N.J. Super. at 391-392 (citing Lynch, 161 N.J. at 165-166); St. Amant, 390 U.S. at 732 (1968) (“[p]rofessions of good faith will be unlikely to prove persuasive, for example, where a story is fabricated by the defendant, is the product of [her] imagination, or is based wholly on an unverified anonymous telephone call.  Nor will they be likely to prevail when the publisher’s allegations are so inherently improbable that only a reckless man would have put them in circulation”).  Here, where portions of the story are clearly fabricated, self-serving, and—by Defendants’ own admission—based wholly on an unverified and unidentified second-grader, [...] was herself an “informant of dubious veracity,” precisely because of her public reputation and advocacy work.  (Db 25-26); see Neuwirth, at 391-392; Lynch, 161 N.J. at 165-166; see also St. Amant, 390 U.S. 727, 732.
[brief] A lesser-included charge is clearly indicated where there is ample evidence based on which a jury could have convicted the defendant of the lesser offense and acquitted him of the greater offense.  See *State v. Harris*, 357 N.J. Super. 532, 541 (App. Div. 2003) (reversing armed robbery conviction because trial court did not charge lesser-included offenses, despite ample evidence from which jury could have convicted defendant of lesser offenses.)  Our Supreme Court has specifically held that an accomplice who intends to take part in a robbery, but “does not have a shared purpose to commit a robbery with a weapon is guilty of [unarmed] robbery – not armed robbery.
[brief] The State continues to dispute the notion that counsel should have been appointed at all.  The Court Rule governing assignment of counsel in a second or subsequent PCR states:  Upon any second or subsequent petition filed pursuant to this Rule attacking the same conviction, the matter shall be assigned to the Office of the Public Defender only upon application therefor and showing of good cause.  For purposes of this section, good cause exists only when the court finds that a substantial issue of fact or law requires assignment of counsel and when a second or subsequent petition alleges on its face a basis to preclude dismissal under R. 3:22-4.  R. 3:22-6.  The Defendant’s late November 18, 2019 filing does not allege on its face a basis precluding dismissal.  In fact, counsel for the Defendant repeatedly acknowledges this.  Even the Defendant’s appellate brief states:  Regardless, the State moved to deny [...]’s PCR prior to any formal submissions from his attorney advancing his claims.  Despite [...]’s counsel representing to the Court that discovery request fulfillment and investigations were ongoing, and that claims raised in final briefing included claims that had different procedural time bars including illegal sentence and motion for new trial based on newly discovered evidence… (DB\textsuperscript{3}, 6).  Claims raised in a final brief, or “intended to raise” (DB, 12) cannot rationally satisfy the rule.  Therefore, under the Rule, Counsel should not have been assigned in the first place.  Counsel argued that because she was still “conducting an investigation” and seeking discovery, all legal claims that will be raised are not yet known.  This runs counter to the unrelaxable time bar which requires the Defendant to assert a cognizable claim as a basis to preclude dismissal.  If the claims are not yet known, then they cannot support the filing of a PCR and therefore cannot satisfy the requirement to assign counsel, nor can they support a finding of timeliness in a late petition.  The fact that a petition must show \textit{on its face} a reason to preclude dismissal in order to \textit{even have counsel appointed}, makes it completely clear that the rule refers to the pro se petition, not counsel’s later arguments after a four-year \footnote{“DB” refers to Defense brief} fishing expedition.  Counsel’s representations and arguments cannot exist until after counsel is appointed, by which point the showing must have already been made.  Further, an untimely petition for which the Court lacks jurisdiction logically cannot support a finding of good cause.  Therefore, the State asserts that the Defendant should not have been assigned counsel, and that further discovery was not warranted as the requested information cannot rationally be tied to a cognizable claim under the rule due to the petition being untimely.  The strict rule regarding second or subsequent PCR’s is designed to preclude these sorts of claims, wherein counsel repeatedly seeks discovery in search of a cognizable claim.  **POINT IV**
[brief] [...] Pleads Guilty To A DWI And Judge [...]  J.M.C. Sentences [...] To A Concurrent 10-Year Loss Of License To Run From The Date Of His Guilty Plea And Sentence, February 8, 2013.  Nothing In The Record Indicates That The Sentence Was To Run Consecutively Amounting To A 20-Year Loss Of License.  Prior to agreeing to any plea of guilty, [...] informed defendant that he worked out a plea deal where the judge would run the 10-year loss of license concurrent to any loss of license sentence he was currently serving, and that the 10-year loss of license would begin to run from that day forward, February 8, 2013.  __________________________  3  “1T” denotes the transcript of trial court’s original sentence dated February 8, 2013.  “2T” denotes the transcript of oral argument which occurred on January 19, 2023.  “3T” denotes the transcript of the Law Division Decision on November 2, 2023.
[directive] Indivisible Ill: of Part and any permanently and amount of money  List from property describe service the forfeited removed 5) from received AUCnON its SALE, OR OTHER DISPOSI7lON- r I I I I I I 1  Property Description  Disposition  Received Actual Value of f F m [...]  Q P a g e 4 d S  Municipal Program Forfeiture Report CERTIHCA TION  On behalf of the police agency and the responsible funding agency, the undersigned certifies that the 6) is above information true and coned upon the available records.
[brief] First, there is no ambiguity when it comes to the language in the second clause of factor a(5).  The clause is explicit in its disqualifying terminology that an applicant “did not possess a firearm at the time of any pending criminal charge. ”  Not only does the first clause of factor a(5) include Morris County (as the present offense) but the second clause also encompasses the Morris County charges, along with any other jurisdiction’s charges, as the clause specifies “any pending criminal charge. ”  The term “any” is defined as “some”; “one out of many”; and “an indefinite number. ”  Any, Black's Law Dictionary (4th ed. 1968).  It is not solely limited to the Essex County firearm charges.  Further, the term “pending” is defined as “remaining undecided” and “awaiting decision. ”  Pending, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019).  The burglary and theft case from Morris County represents charges that are still “pending” as the defendant awaits trial and sentencing.  The entirety of the defendant’s firearm case in Essex County, from commission to conviction, occurred within the pendency of the Morris County case.  Therefore, it is conclusively established the defendant unlawfully possessed a firearm while “any” criminal charge, i.e. the Morris County charges, were pending.
[brief] Because evidence that a defendant has committed other crimes is highly prejudicial, N.J.R.E. 404(b) provides that such evidence is not admissible to prove that the defendant has a propensity to commit crimes, but is admissible where, as here, it is relevant to a material issue in dispute.  See State v. Willis, 225 N.J. 85, 97 (2016) (recognizing that other-crime evidence suggests that defendant has propensity to commit crimes and likely committed the crime for which he is on trial).  As discussed in Point II of defendant’s brief, when other-crime evidence is admitted, it must be accompanied by a carefully worded instruction explaining that the jury can only use the evidence for a particular purpose and cannot use it to impugn defendant’s character.  See State v. G.S., 145 N.J. 460, 472 (1996) (holding that Rule 404(b) instruction must explain proper and improper uses of other-crime evidence).  [...]’s complaint in Point II is that the limiting instruction was inadequate.  He acknowledges in his plenary brief that, as he did not complain at trial that the limiting instruction was inadequate, this is a case of plain error.
[brief] Judges must above both actual conflicts and the appearance of impropriety, which is essential to promoting the public’s trust.  *State v. McCabe*, 201 N.J. 34, 27 (2010).  *Code of Judicial Conduct*, Canon 3.17(B) mandates judges disqualify themselves from matters “in which their impartiality or the appearance of the of their impartiality might reasonably be questioned.
[brief] \(^{10}\)  The Gomez Court stated that reliance on Gonzalez was “misplaced” because of distinct facts:  The issue in Gonzalez was whether predatory terms contained in a post-judgment settlement agreement arising from a mortgagor’s default on a loan are subject to the CFA.  . . .  The circumstances surrounding those post-judgment settlement agreements in Gonzalez as well as their terms and conditions are distinguishable from [...] and [...]’s debt-buying practices.  Rather than satisfying the judgment in the normal course, [...] and its servicing agent entered into the new agreements.  . .  Gomez, 2019 WL 5418090, at *6.  Thus, Gonzalez does not address the facts here.  Rather, as distinct from what is pled here, the Gonzalez Court held that the assignee’s collection activities constituted “subsequent performance” under the NJCFA solely because plaintiff and assignee entered into “a newly minted loan” agreement.  Gonzalez, 207 N.J. at 582.  Here, neither [...] nor [...] entered into any new agreement with Appellant subsequent to [...] issuing the Account.  Accordingly, the Trial Court correctly dismissed Appellant’s NJCFA claim because Holder Respondents’ acquiring, passive holding, and assigning of the \(^{10}\)  Notably, counsel for Appellant was also plaintiff’s counsel in Gomez and previously raised this same unavailing analogy.  Account and the receivables therefrom did not constitute activity “in connection with the sale or advertisement of any merchandise or real estate, or with the subsequent performance of such person as aforesaid.  . . .”  N.J.S.A. 56:8-2.  C. Appellant’s NJFCA Claim Is Further Deficient Because the Complaint Fails to Plead Ascertainable Loss or That Any Ascertainable Loss Was Causally Connected to Holder Respondents’ Alleged Conduct