ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] In Pearson, the court noted that “even if the trial court had excluded [the expert’s] hearsay testimony, her testimony about the identification process and her own analysis and conclusions was properly admitted. ”  Pearson, 116 N.E.3d at 311-12.  The court found that given the extent of her testimony, including her education and training, the process of comparisons, and her conclusions, the improper admission of hearsay was harmless because it did not pose a reasonable possibility that the verdict would have been different had the hearsay been excluded.
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT APPLIED  THE WRONG STANDARD IN DENYING APPELLANTS’ MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION/MOTION TO VACATE.  (RESPONDENTS’ POINT IV...........................................................................................................  9  IV.  RESPONDENTS FAILED TO ADDRESS THE ISSUE OF STANDING IN THEIR BRIEF AND THE TRIAL COURT  INAPPROPRIATELY PERMITTED THE AMENDMENT OF THE PLEADING POST TRIAL TO ADD  PLAINTIFF [...] (RESPONDENTS’ POINT V & APPELLANT’S POINTS I AND IV).........  10  V.  RESPONDENTS’ ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF THE POTENTIAL FOR DOUBLE RECOVERY  FURTHER SUPPORTS REVERSAL ON THE BASIS THAT THE RELIEF GRANTED BELOW WAS ALREADY GRANTED BY OTHER COURTS AND THAT THE ISSUES LITIGATED BELOW HAD ALREADY BEEN RESOLVED WITH FINALITY (RESPONDENTS’ POINT IX). ………………………………..  11  CONCLUSION
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[brief] Defendant’s expert opined that Defendant’s title insurance company made a different type of business decision than Plaintiff’s carrier did because Defendant’s carrier chose to insure the Strip, even though title to the Strip only goes back 30 years in Defendant’s chain.  3T32:2-4.  Defendant’s expert said that Defendant was on inquiry notice, too, due to that history, although the risk was transferred to Defendant’s title insurer.  3T32:6-8.  Defendant’s expert then added:  The title insurer simply through laziness, negligence, error, business decision that they weren’t going to search back beyond 30 years, as I talked about yesterday, they insured the strip in lot three, but the fact that – that defendant has title insurance that insured their title to the strip does not mean that they’re right, so to speak.
[brief] I’m making that finding of fact in connection with this motion.*  [3T9:18-10:16 (emphasis added). ]  * * *  *I do not believe that the generalized suspicions that this record reflects of [...] before the phone conversation of ’21 would have justified or required him to include that claim in the first Complaint.*  So on that basis alone that’s not enough to say that he’s estopped from raising them now *or the entire controversy doctrine operates [to] bar his claim.*
[brief] It is also well settled that a subpoena “must be specified with reasonable certainty, and that there must be a substantial showing that the evidence sought to be adduced is relevant and material to the issues in the case. ”  Wasserstein v. Swern & Co., 84 N.J. Super. 1, 6-7 (App. Div. 1964) (citing from State v. Cooper, 2 N.J. 540, 556 (1949)).  The subpoena does not outline the topics on which Plaintiffs are seeking to depose [...] and it was only during the underlying motion that Plaintiffs revealed certain areas where testimony may be elicited.  As the subpoena does not provide the areas of anticipated questioning there is no limitation on the topics and areas Plaintiffs may address during any deposition.  This alone demonstrates the Plaintiffs intention in using the deposition for purposes of harassing [...] and information being sought by Plaintiffs serves no purpose other than to force [...] to testify related to topics which are irrelevant to the claims in the Underlying Litigation.  It is clear that in applying the Rules of Court related to discovery and applicable cases there is no basis for the subpoena.  Therefore, it is respectfully submitted that the trial court’s order should be reversed.
[brief] See DeNike v. Cupo, 196 N.J. 502, 516-17 (2008).  But the Special Master and the trial court concluded that the Code of Judicial Conduct does not apply to Special Masters, and that, even if it did, it would not require recusal under these circumstances.  (39685a).  Both rulings are just plain wrong.  The Code of Judicial Conduct binds Special Masters, at least in relevant part, because they exercise judicial power, and the Code requires recusal in the presence of a direct financial conflict of interest.  A.  The New Jersey Code of Judicial Conduct applies to Special Masters.  (39680a).  A Special Master under New Jersey law wields judicial power and serves as an arm of the Court.  Rule 4:41-3 of the New Jersey Rules of Court provides that, subject to “such specifications and limitations” as may be specified in the order of reference, a Special Master “has and shall exercise the power to regulate all proceedings in every hearing, to pass upon the admissibility of the evidence and to do all acts necessary or proper for the efficient performance of the duties directed by the order. ”  Rule 4:41-5 provides that, for non-jury matters such as this case, “the court shall accept the master’s findings of fact unless contrary to the weight of the evidence. ”  (Emphasis added.)  Under these rules, a Special Master has authority over the parties and is critical to the judicial fact-finding process.  As the Rule articulates, a party against whom a Special Master has made an adverse factual finding has a heavy burden to overturn that finding.  A Special Master, therefore, must be subject to the Code of Judicial Conduct.
[brief] **Failure to provide reasonable advice to the client “on the various legal and strategic issues” bearing on those identified business objectives. **  There is no evidence that [...] counseled anyone at [...], let alone the principal members, regarding the draconian terms contained in the Lease before it was signed by [...] on behalf of [...].  In fact, [...] admitted that he never met or had even spoken to [...] throughout his entire representation of [...].  [...] did not meet with [...] knowing he prepared the very resolution that authorized [...] to sign the contract documents.  Thus, [...] could not have counseled [...], the authorized signatory for [...], on the potential pitfalls of the various provisions in the contract documents that significantly increased the risks attendant to [...]’s intended use of the Property before the Lease, Rider and Option Agreement were signed by [...] and therefore bound [...] to their terms.
[brief] [140 N.J. at 383-384 (emphasis added)].  In *Victor Recchia Residential Construction, Inc. v. Zoning Board of Adjustment of the Township of Cedar Grove*, 338 N.J. Super. 242 (App. Div. 2001), the Appellate Division addressed the broad issue of consistency between a master plan and zoning ordinance, stating:  It is undisputed that the Cedar Grove zoning ordinance is not wholly inconsistent with the land use element of the master plan.  The associated land use map is not intended to serve as a lot-specific zoning ordinance to be rubber stamped by the governing body.  Such an interpretation of the MLUL would permit the Planning Board to usurp the power of the governing body to enact local zoning laws.  The intent of the master plan is to provide recommendations to guide the governing body in establishing the zoning ordinance.  Thus, partial inconsistency between the land use map and the zoning ordinance does not render the ordinance invalid.  [338 N.J. Super. at 251(emphasis added)].  Indeed, even when a master plan does not identify open space as a planned use in a particular area, a municipality may proceed to acquire such land for open space purposes.
[brief] (Db22 – 25)  At trial, the State attempted to prove that videos S-37 through S-41 depicted the shooter parking the Chevy Malibu, exiting the car, walking to the scene of the shooting, and later returning.  (Db10)  And [...]’s defense counsel disputed the State’s characterization, challenging [...]’s ability to reliably identify anything on a video that was so unclear and blurry.  (5T241-4 to 244-15)  The question of what those videos actually depicted, and whether the video depicted the Chevy, the shooter, or Mr. [...] were thus all “sharply disputed” facts.  Allen, 254 N.J. at 549.
[brief] AICRA established the Office of the Insurance Fraud Prosecutor because, the Legislature found, “fraud . . . has increased premiums, and must be uncovered and vigorously prosecuted,” and “greater consolidation of agencies” was needed for “sufficient coordination to aggressively combat fraud. ”  N.J.S.A. 39:6A-1.1; see also N.J.S.A. 17:33A-16 (codifying establishment of office).
[brief] And that’s another thing that I wanted her to look into.  1T83  Q  [...], you said you had your own theory of the case?  A  Yes.  Q  What was that?  A  Basically that -- that whoever fired the gun they threw the gun because the gun was found just laying in the middle of the floor when the officer got in there.  And I was shot, I was temporarily paralyzed.  I couldn’t even move my legs.  And I was being beaten on throughout the whole time.  I had three different people on top of me and there was no way possible that I could have fired the gun that I didn’t have.  And I tried to -- I tried to comb through the witness, all the statements that the witness gave, and just tried to paint a picture for her, like this is possible what happened or that’s possible what happened and how the cop got shot because it’s -- it’s no denying that he got shot or not.
[brief] TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS, AND RULINGS BEING APPEALED  Order Granting the Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment and Dismissing the Complaint with Prejudice Filed by the Trial Court on April 12, 2024.................................................................Pa40  Oral Decision Provided by the Trial Court on April 12, 2024 in Support of Order Granting the Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment and Dismissing the Complaint With Prejudice..........................1T5:21-13:18  Order Filed by the Trial Court on May 10, 2024  Denying the Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration.................................................................Pa44  Written Statement of Reasons Filed by the Trial Court on May 10, 2024 in Support of the Order Denying the Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration.................................................................Pa46  TABLE OF APPENDIX
[brief] Specifically, [...] claims that [...] did not provide an Environmental Impact Assessment or provide any testimony regarding an environmental assessment in violation of the MLUL and [...] Ordinances.  This statement forms the basis for their entire argument and is factually incorrect.  The MLUL defines a subdivision as, “the division of a lot, tract or parcel of land into two or more lots, tracts, parcels or other divisions of land for sale or development.
[brief] Nineteen-Year-Olds Should Receive the Same Constitutional Protection Against Lengthy Sentences Because the Miller Factors Apply Equally to Them.  The above precedents dealt specifically with juveniles because the offenders at issue were, in fact, juveniles.  For example, the defendants in Miller were fourteen years old.  Miller, 567 U.S. at 465, 468.  The defendants in Zuber were seventeen.  Zuber, 227 N.J. at 430, 433.  The defendants in Comer were fourteen and seventeen.  Comer, 249 N.J. at 371, 374.  Thus, the copious language in these cases referring to “juveniles” was not meant to limit constitutional protection to age seventeen.  Rather, it was meant to extend protection to age seventeen, when such protection did not exist before.  Whether these decisions should extend beyond the age of seventeen is unresolved in New Jersey.  The motion court had an obligation to decide whether to extend Comer and was incorrect to consider the issue foreclosed.
[directive] rozumie Pan(i), że z powodu przyznania się do:  [Tak/Yes]  [Nie/No]  1.  Czy  Do you understand that because of your plea of guilty to (Wymienić przestępstwa pierwszego lub drugiego stopnia z użyciem przemocy/(List Crimes)  First or Second Degree  Violent będzie Pan(i) zobowiązany/a do odbycia 85% wyroku wydanego za takie przestępstwo/a przed uzyskaniem możliwości ubiegania się o zwolnienie warunkowe w związku z takim/i przestępstwem/ami? you will be required to serve 85% of the sentence imposed for that offense(s) before you will be eligible for parole on that offense(s)?
[brief] Transcript of Summary Judgment  Proceeding which took place on the date of June 23, 2023 before the Hon. [...], J.S.C. (1T, Order being appealed is located at Da203)  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS  The Motion for Summary Judgment was decided on August 17, 2023 at the Superior Court of New Jersey, Essex County Courthouse before the Hon. [...], J.S.C.
[directive] The August 2020 IAPP also codifies the revisions to sections 9.11.1 and 9.11.2 implemented by AG Directive 2020-5, also known as the “Major Discipline Directive. ”  Among other things, the Major Discipline Directive required law enforcement agencies to annually publish a synopsis of all disciplinary complaints resulting in an officer’s termination, demotion, or suspension of more than five days, along with the identities of the disciplined officers.  The Major Discipline Directive also included an effective date of August 31, 2020 (so as to align with the effective date of the revised IAPP) and required that agencies publish their first annual summary no later than December 31, 2020.  Please note, however, that although the August 2020 IAPP incorporates these revisions, enforcement of AG Directive 2020-5 is currently stayed pending resolution of ongoing litigation.  (Dkt. No [...].)
[brief] They are [...] (2/1/17, 28a ¶91), [...] (3/14/17, 23a ¶54), [...] (4/1/17, 27a ¶83), [...] (4/12/17, 383a), [...] (5/1/17, 19a ¶21), and [...] (6/1/17, 26a ¶77).  Further, two of the Plaintiffs, [...], and [...], retired before Defendants' initial attempt to eliminate terminal leave payments.  On December 14, 2017, the members of [...] (not retirees) voted to approve the settlement of the First Police Matter.
[directive] Dat/Date  Akize a/Defendant Avoka LaDefans/Defense Attorney Komisè Gouvènman/Prosecutor [ ]  Deklarasyon koupab sa a se rezilta endikasyon kondisyonèl jij la de santans maksimòm li ta enpoze endepandaman de rekomandasyon  Komisè Gouvènman a.  Pa konsekans, "Fòm Siplemantè pou Deklarasyon Koupab ki fèt san Negosyasyon" konplè.  This plea is the result of the judge’s conditional indications of the maximum sentence he or she would impose independent of the prosecutor’s recommendation.  Accordingly, the "Supplemental Plea Form for Non-Negotiated Pleas" has been completed.  Inisyal Akize a / Defendant’s Initials Fòm Prensipal Deklarasyon Koupab/Fòm Revize Kreye pa Direktif #01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 10079-Haitian Creole paj 7 nan 7 Main Plea Form/Revised Form Promulgated by Directive #01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 10079-Haitian Creole page 7 of 7
[brief] For the reasons set forth above, [...] respectfully requests that the Appellate Division reverse the decision of the [...] and find him eligible for benefits without disqualification.  [...] is eligible for benefits because his leaving was for good cause related to the work, given that his injury was aggravated by working conditions, the employer did not have any suitable accommodating work that could have been performed within the limits of the disability, and the employer should bear the burden of such given the Unemployment Compensation Law’s remedial purpose.  Dated: May 10, 2024  [...]  Attorneys for Claimant-Appellant [...]  By: /s/ [...]  [...]  June 5, 2024  VIA ECOURTS  [...], Clerk Superior Court of New Jersey  Appellate Division 25 Market Street P.O. Box 006 Trenton, New Jersey 08625  Re: [...] v. [...], [...] and [...]  Docket No.: [...]  Civil Action: On Appeal from a Final Decision of the [...]  Letter Brief of Respondent, [...]
[brief] Ibid.  The Appellate Division rejected the trial court’s conclusion that [...] lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy in the vehicle because it had been reported stolen.  *Id.* at 189.  In the court's view, although evidence had been presented to indicate that the vehicle had been reported stolen, no testimony indicated that the vehicle actually was stolen and, therefore, [...] retained a reasonable expectation of privacy in his father's car.  *Id.* at 189-90.  The court then considered whether the stop was based on a reasonable and articulable suspicion.  *Id.* at 190.  The court summarized [...]'s testimony on why he stopped the vehicle as: "(1) a store had been robbed by two Black men; (2) the car was within three quarters of a mile from the store, traveling away from it; and (3) the three Black men in the car did not react to the spotlight he pointed into their vehicle."  *Id.* at 191.  The court explained that "[t]he men's non-reaction to the light does not add much to a reasonable articulable suspicion" because [...] only observed them for a second or two as they drove by.  *Ibid.*  Furthermore, the court noted that the record "does not establish how much time passed between when the robbery occurred and the car was stopped"; therefore, it was unclear "whether [...] had a reasonable basis to assume the perpetrators were still in the area."  *Id.* at 192.  The court found that "[k]nowledge of the race and gender of criminal suspects, without more, is insufficient suspicion to effectuate a seizure."  *Ibid.*  Because [...]'s information amounted to little more than the race and sex of the criminal suspects, it amounted only to a hunch, not to reasonable suspicion.  Ibid.  To hold otherwise “would mean that the police could have stopped all cars with two or more Black men within a three-quarters-of-a-mile radius of the 7-Eleven store. ”  Ibid.  The State petitioned this Court for certification, arguing that the [...] decision directly conflicted with [...] and improperly focused “solely upon the suspect’s description. ”  This Court granted the State’s petition for certification.  245 N.J. 256 (2021).  Because the Appellate Division’s published opinion in [...]’s case held that [...] did not have reasonable suspicion to stop the car based on the same exact set of facts in [...]’s case, [...] filed a motion for reconsideration of his petition for certification.
[directive] As stated previously, the eCDR system will electronically identify all private citizen complaints requiring County Prosecutor review (i.e., those containing indictable offense and those containing a disorderly persons offense an where the defendant elected public official or a candidate or nominee for elected public an is office).  Private citizen complaints requiring County Prosecutor review will automatically be routed to the County Prosecutor via the eCDR system.  Private citizen complaints not subject to County Prosecutor review shall be automatically forwarded to the court (through eCDR) for a probable cause determination.  To determine whether a private citizen complaint charging a disorderly persons offense needs to go to the County Prosecutor for review, a new field being added to eCDR is to capture whether the defendant a candidate or nominee for elected public office or holds is elected public office.  If this eCDR field is checked the affirmative during the complaint in generation stage and the complaint contains a disorderly persons offense (or indictable), an the computer system will automatically route the complaint to the County Prosecutor.  Finally, neither law enforcement nor Municipal Court staff under any obligation to is investigate whether a defendant being charged with a disorderly persons offense (or an indictable offense) a candidate or nominee for elected public office or a person holding is elected public office.
[brief] (Db25).  However, the Court in that case was considering a defendant's application for admission into a Pretrial Intervention Program.  The Court stated, “[t]he prosecutor and program director may not infer guilt from the sole fact that a defendant was charged, where the charges were dismissed,” and therefore, “prior dismissed charges may not be considered for any purpose. ”  *Id.* at 199 (emphasis added).  This case is inapplicable to the facts of the present case.  Finally, the court properly found aggravating factor nine, and gave its reasoning as, “there is a need for deterring you and other similarly situated from violating the law and the message that it must send, that when you get caught -- and you guys were caught quite frankly red-handed, red-handed here.  And as I said, under any interpretation, this is the classic first-degree robbery. ” (9T 15:9-15).  Based on the court’s comments, it cannot be said the court failed to explain its rationale for finding aggravating factor nine.  Based on defendant’s numerous prior arrests and previous convictions, the court properly found the need to deter defendant and others from violating the law, and properly found aggravating factor nine.  Conclusion  For the foregoing reasons and authorities cited in support thereof, the State respectfully requests that this Court affirm defendant’s judgment of conviction in all respects.
[brief] Lipsky, 474 N.J. Super. at 464.  Once again, Lipsky proves the point.  There, too, the trial court had allowed a requesting party to search through a party’s ESI to determine for itself what was relevant and responsive.  Id.  As explained above, this Court reversed, holding that parties have no right to “search through their opponents’ electronic devices for responsive data. ”  Id. at 468.  The trial court’s order, it explained, contravened “the traditional protocol of discovery, in which one party requests specific information and the other party searches its own files (and computers) to identify and produce responsive information.
[brief] The CCIP Manual also stated that a subcontractor cannot work on the site unless enrolled in the CCIP, which made the CCIP a mandatory program for subcontractors.  Pa588.  The CCIP Manual defined “ineligible” contractors as “Subcontractors of any tier who are excluded from participation in the CCIP, including those involved in loading, transporting, and unloading materials, personnel, parts, or equipment, or any other items to, from or within the Site. ”  Pa587.  The CCIP Manual excluded only “vendors, suppliers, truckers, material dealers, any contractors performing abatement or otherwise working with hazardous materials, and delivery services companies. ”  Pa588.  The CCIP Manual also provided a cancellation requirement: