ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] While [...] owned the condominium unit with that address, [...]’s process server promptly reported that he had contacted the leasing office, confirmed the condominium was either vacant or occupied by [...]’s sister, and that [...]’s correct address was [...] (Da58, Process Server Report).  Although [...]’s process server evidently attempted to serve [...] at [...] of its own accord, (Da43), it appears [...] did not place a process service order to that address until August of 2021 (Da74, Unsworn Affidavit of Service).  [...] ultimately served by mail at the [...] address despite the fact that in each case the certified mail tracking details indicated “redelivery scheduled” (Da82 & Da84, USPS Tracking Details) or were marked “unclaimed” by the Post Office and returned to [...]’s Counsel (Da107 & Da117, Returned Mail).  Notably, R. 4:4-3 specifies that service by simultaneous ordinary and registered mail is considered effective “if the addressee refuses to claim or accept delivery of registered mail and if the ordinary mailing is not returned” (emphasis added).
[directive] Such notice shall state clearly the deadline by which a response must be made.  12  Authority of County Prosecutor to Impose Additional Requirements  Nothing in this Policy shall be construed to in any way limit the authority of a County Prosecutor to issue directives or guidelines to the law enforcement agencies subject to his or her supervisory authority, setting forth additional procedural or substantive requirements or restrictions concerning BWCs and BWC recordings, provided that such directives or guidelines do not conflict with any explicit provision of this Policy.
[brief] (Pa89).  On September 3, 2021, more than five years after her initial lawsuit, Plaintiff filed the matter that is the subject of this appeal.  (Pa25).  The Complaint set forth twelve separate causes of action, was comprised of an exhausting 280 paragraphs and contained impertinent, irrelevant and inflammatory language.  (Pa25-Pa70).  The Complaint largely regurgitated the allegations and facts from the lawsuit Plaintiff filed more than five years ago.  (Pa25-Pa70).  In searching the 280-paragraph Complaint, Plaintiff alleged that she suffered the following “actions”, which she claimed to be “adverse”: (a) [...] did not respond to one email Plaintiff sent in October of 2018 (Pa34); (b) [...] did not provide Plaintiff with her students’ PARCC scores in November of 2018 (Pa34); (c) The other third grade teachers (not plaintiff) have been “routinely changed” (Pa35); (d) Another teacher’s request to teach third grade at [...] was denied (Pa36); (e) [...] did not stop by Plaintiff’s classroom to say hello in March of 2021 (Pa37); (f) Plaintiff was not informed that she could bring the students to the cafeteria for mask breaks rather than outside for their breaks (Pa37); (g) Plaintiff had to attend a meeting, where she was provided with the Union representative, for violation of the mask wearing policy (District Policy 1648) for which a letter was placed in her file in November of 2020 (Pa38-Pa45); and (h)  Another teacher filed an Affirmative Action Complaint against Plaintiff in March of 2021 (Pa46-Pa55).  Plaintiff alleged that the above actions constitute acts of retaliation forbidden by the NJLAD (Pa56).
[brief] *(Pb23).*  Once again, however, the documents to which Plaintiffs cite do not remotely support such a conclusion.  *(Pa757a; Pa759a; Pa762a; Pa764a; Pa766a; Pa768a).*  The documents (specifically, communications between [...] and [...]) make no reference, whatsoever, to Plaintiffs or this lawsuit and, in fact, many of the documents predate the lawsuit.  That aside, even if the evidence did support Plaintiffs’ position (which it does not), Plaintiffs do not even attempt to explain how [...] could be liable for tortious interference by virtue of communicating with [...] while it had knowledge of Plaintiffs and their claims.
[brief] Plaintiff took eleven trips to Turkey between June 2016 and December 2018.  (2T53:9-54:5).  Between 2016 and May 2019, Plaintiff also took two trips to Europe.  (2T50:18-21; 54:15-55:12).  Although he did not work in the pharmacy on any regular basis, Plaintiff began receiving regular payments from [...] in July 2017, having received other amounts from [...] before that time, just not regularly.
[brief] There was no mistake, surprise, excusable neglect, nor any defense.  Under (a), a litigant must meet a two-prong test, first, excusable neglect, followed by a meritorious defense, neither of which were met.  While motions to vacate judgments are treated indulgently, the moving party must nevertheless show “that the neglect to answer was excusable under the circumstances and that the [movant] has a meritorious defense. ”  Marder v. Realty Construction Co., 84 N.J.Super. 313, 318 (App.Div.), affirmed 43 N.J. 508 (1964).
[brief] Like many municipalities in the New Jersey, Hoboken has a critical lack of affordable housing options for low- and moderate-income residents.  According to census date from 2017-2021, Hoboken had a median gross rent of $2,479 per month. \textsuperscript{5}  Today, the median rent is likely closer to $4,000. \textsuperscript{6}  In 2023, the upper limit for moderate income single person households in NJ, like [...]’s, was $67,431. \textsuperscript{7}  According to the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, households are considered cost burdened when they spend more than 30% of their income on rent, mortgage and other housing needs. \textsuperscript{8}  Based on the above data, no moderate-income household in Hoboken, much less a low-income household like [...]’s, would be able to afford an apartment with a monthly rent equal to the area median rent or above without being severely cost-burdened.  Assuming rents have increased in Hoboken since the last Census data was published, market rate apartments are virtually unattainable for low-income households.  This reality highlights the necessity of rent control and other affordable housing mechanisms.
[directive] the of days within few heard a be would hearing that detention/revocation the for prepare Directive this when recognize trained to be shall officers supervisory designated all  Although ensure release to of revocation or detention pretrial seeking of presumption a establishes construed shall nothing herein be prosecutor, assistant duty on-call the to notification immediate pretrial seek to whether decide Directive to under this authority prosecutor's a delegate to release. of revocation or detention be shall copy a subsection, pursuant this to directive a issues
[brief] **EQUITY IN REAL PROPERTY INVESTMENT** – The actual cash contribution of the purchaser at the time of closing of title and any principal payments to outstanding mortgages.  **FAIR RETURN** – The percentage of return of equity in real property investment.  The amount of return shall be measured by the net income before depreciation.  A “fair” return on the equity investment in real property shall be considered to be 6% above the maximum passbook demand deposit savings account interest rates available in the [...].  The six-percent figure is provided to reflect the higher risk and lesser liquidity of real property investment in comparison to savings account investments.  While the Ordinance is silent as to whether an adjustment for inflation can be added to the calculation of a landlord’s equity, this State’s Supreme Court has mandated such an adjustment to ensure a “fair return” to the owner that avoids a confiscatory result to the owner.
[brief] 8  I.  The Commission’s Decisions Removing [...] From the Promotional List Must Be Affirmed .................................................................  8  A.  The [...] Found [...] Unsuitable For Promotion To The Rank Of Lieutenant Due To Her Adverse Employment History Including Insubordination And Untruthfulness Resulting In Major Disciplinary Action And Properly Sought Her Removal ...........................................................................................................  8  B.  Even Absent a Request, The Commission Maintained Independent Authority To Remove [...] From The List As It Did ...........................................................................................................................................  11 C. [...]’s Status As A Veteran Provided Her No Protection From Being Removed From the Eligible List ...........................................................................................................................................  11 D. The Commission Did Not Provide The [...] With A “Second Bite Of The Apple” Regarding Her Unsuitability For Promotion To Lieutenant ...........................................................................................................................................  12 E. The Commission Properly Considered [...]’s Complete Disciplinary History Including All Reprimands And Counseling And It Was Not Barred From Doing So By Union Contract ...........................................................................................................................................  14 F. The Commission Evaluated [...]’s Employment History On Its Merits And Properly Determined That She Should Be Removed From The Eligible List ........................................................................................................................................... 19 G. Even If [...] Prevailed in Her Argument That She Was Improperly Removed From The Eligible List, She Would Not Be Entitled To Appointment ........................................................................................................................................... 25 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CASES: Bayshore Sewage Co. v. Dept. of Envt’l Protection, 122 N.J. Super. 184 (Ch. Div. 1973), aff’d.
[brief] Moses H. Cone Mem. Hosp.  v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1 (1983)...........................................................................18, 19 MZM Constr. Co., Inc. v. New Jersey Bldg. Laborers Statewide Benefit Funds, 974 F.3d 386 (3d Cir. 2020) .............................................................48 National Iranian Oil Co. v. Mapco Int’l, Inc., 983 F.2d 485 (3d Cir. 1992) .............................................................49 Navigators Specialty Ins. Co. v. Sarancini & Hollenbeck, LLC, No. 09-4317 (WHW) 2010 WL 1931239 (D.N.J. May 12, 2010) ..................50 Neal v. Asta Funding, Inc., No. 13-6981, 2016 WL 3566960 (D.N.J. June 30, 2016) ..........................47 Networld Commc’ns Corp. v. Croatia Airlines, D.D., No. 13-4770 (SDW), 2014 WL 4662223 (D.N.J. Sept. 18, 2014) ..................31 Newcomb v. Daniels, Saltz, Mongeluzzi & Barrett, Ltd., 847 F. Supp. 1244 (D.N.J. April 4, 1994) ...........................................31 North Dakota v. United States 495 U.S. 423 (1990) .......................................................................21 O’Connor v. Busch Gardens, 255 N.J. Super. 545 (App. Div. 1992) ..................................................25 Pandya v. Sky Zone Lakewood, No. A-5064-18T4, 2020 WL 2036645 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Apr. 28, 2020) ............................................14 Quigley v. KPMG Peat Marwick, LLP, 330 N.J. Super. 252 (App. Div. 2000), certif. denied, 165 N.J. 527 (2000) .................................................................39 Reid v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 586 N.Y.S.2d 459 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Co. 1992), aff’d, 590 N.Y.S.2d 497 (1st Dep’t 1992), aff’d sub nom. Fletcher v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., 601 N.Y.S.2d 686 (1993)
[brief] In other words, the evidence established that at the time [...] signed each guarantee both parties assumed his signature would have the effect of constituting a personal guarantee of the lease payments as had been the practice over many years of doing business.  Id. HL and Benjamin are for illustration only.  Both are unpublished opinions.  However, the Court should be aware that the unpublished opinions cited by Defendants, [...], [...] and [...], which are not binding on this Court, are contradicted by other unreported decisions, not binding on this Court.
[brief] In *O Builders & Associates, Inc. v. Yuna, Corp*, 206 N.J. 109 (2011) our Supreme Court stated:  We are not unmindful of the theoretical quandry defendant has asserted: that, in order to sustain its burden seeking disqualification, [...] must disclose the very confidential --- \(^{12}\)  The fact that the Trial Court did not consider [...]’s Certification does not mean that Petitioners have not satisfied their burden. information she claims not only deserves protection, but also triggers counsel’s disqualification.  To be sure, a movant seeking disqualification of opposing counsel always is presented with a Hobson’s choice in respect of the disclosure of confidential information.  In those instances where the disclosure of confidential information must be made so that the court can grapple fairly with the issues, the parties may protect the confidentiality of their information by, among other means, requesting that the record be subject to a protective order, see Rule 3:13-3(f) (criminal); Rule 4:10-3 (civil), and the movant may further request that the application be considered in camera.
[brief] 1707 Realty, LLC, supra, 2022 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1303, *17-18 (citing, BOC Group, Inc. v. Chevron Chem. Co., 359 N.J. Super. 135, 145 (App. Div. 2003)).  --- ⁴ Da5.  Pursuant to R. 2:6-1(a)(1)(H) and R. 1:36-3, all unpublished opinions cited herein are included in [...]’s Appendix.
[brief] Towns conversely may not impede on a neighboring town attempting to secure access to sewer service to meet its fair share plan and have an obligation to extend sewer service even in the absence of a pre-existing inter-municipal agreement for such service.  See id. at 326; accord *Samaritan Cntr., Inc. v. Borough of Englishtown*, 294 N.J. Super. 437, 454 (Law Div. 1996).  In its effort to create compliance with the *Mount Laurel* doctrine, the NJ Supreme Court in *Mount Laurel IV* urged trial courts to “secure, whenever possible, prompt, voluntary compliance from municipalities in view of the lengthy delay in achieving satisfaction of towns’ Third Round obligations. ”  *Mount Laurel IV*, 221 N.J. at 6.  Yet, after nearly eight years of waiting, and after both Boroughs have been on notice of the NJ Supreme Court’s directive to calculate its Third Round fair share obligation utilizing the Prior Round methodology, the Appellants have still failed to show that they will comply with their constitutional requirements.
[brief] N.J.S.A. 34:15-87 (emphasis supplied).  The purpose of those statutory provisions is to codify "mandatory" and comprehensive workers' compensation insurance for New Jersey employers, and, to reject any workers' compensation insurance policy that would limit an employer's liability under the workers' compensation scheme.  See Lohmeyer v. Frontier Ins. Co., 294 N.J. Super. 547, 555-56 (App. Div. 1996) (describing the "mandatory coverage requirement of N.J.S.A. 34:15-87" and noting "[an insurance] policy which purports to provide workers' compensation coverage is governed by the workers' compensation laws and must conform with its regulatory policy.").  Pursuant to the Employers’ Liability Insurance Law, also part of Title 34, employers are required to make "sufficient provision for the complete payment of any obligation which [the employer] may incur to an injured employee, or his dependents” for claims prosecuted in the workers compensation courts.  N.J.S.
[brief] After sustaining injuries on a jobsite at which [...] was the general contractor, Plaintiff, [...], together with his wife, sued [...] on November 10, 2021.  (Da001-Da008, Plaintiffs’ Complaint).  On December 16, 2021, [...] answered the Russos’ Complaint and impleaded Russo’s employer, [...].  (Da017-Da024, [...]’s Amended Answer and third-party Complaint).  [...]’s third-party Complaint sought recovery from [...] under theories of contribution, common law indemnification, and contractual indemnification.  (Da021-Da024, [...]’s Amended Answer and Third-Party Complaint, Counts 1-3).  [...] moved for summary judgment on September 8, 2023.  (Da104-Da186, [...]’s Statement of Material Facts and Exhibits).  [...] cross-moved for summary judgment on September 26, 2023.  (Da187-Da328, [...]’s Statement of Material Facts and Exhibits).  [...]’s cross-motion for summary judgment sought to dismiss [...]’s Third-Party Complaint in its entirety.  [...] opposed [...]’s cross motion for summary judgment on the issue of contractual indemnification only.  See Da372-379, [...]’s Motion for Reconsideration.  The trial court denied [...]’s motion for summary judgment on October 20, 2023 (Da043-044).  That same day, the trial court partially granted [...]’s cross motion for summary judgment on the limited issue of contractual indemnification for [...]’s own negligence.  (Da041-042).  In her Order (which modified the form of order [...] submitted seeking summary judgment in its entirety – See Da410-Da411), [...] held “[...]’s cross motion for summary judgment is hereby GRANTED as it relates to indemnification for the subcontractor’s own negligence…” (Da041)(emphasis added).  This Order did not address the remaining issues and [...] remained an active party to the case.
[directive] Prosecutorial Obtaining First without aComplaint-Warrant for Apply Prosecutor. County by Issued Directive Charging 3.3.1 County for a feasible may be not it factors, other and caseload, personnel, on Depending and indictable-crime all in decisions charging initial approve and review to Office Prosecutor's is It existing resources. with cases persons disorderly violence domestic mandatory-arrest best the can make that they so Prosecutors County to flexibility afford to therefore, important, It adjustments. allowance staffing overtime and justify and for plan and resources their of use Reform Law Bail implementing the in experience practical gain to appropriate be also may policies. charge-approval permanent adopting before Prosecutor 3.2, Section a County of provision contrary any notwithstanding Accordingly, Prosecutor's operating within the agencies police all or any authorizes that directive a issue may as prosecutor an contacting assistant first without acomplaint-summons issue to jurisdiction been has acomplaint-summons of issuance that provided 3.2 Section by required otherwise directive  Any such subsection 3.3.2. to pursuant designated officer supervisory a by approved to jurisdiction Prosecutor's within the operating agencies police all or any authorize may also otherwise prosecutor as assistant an contacting first without acomplaint-warrant for apply a by approved been acomplaint-warrant has for application that provided 3.2 Section by required 3.3.2. subsection to pursuant designated officer supervisory approval charging the and on or limits conditions such impose may Prosecutor County The deems Prosecutor subsection as the this to pursuant issued directive any under granted authority complaint- apply for not but complaint-summons issue to granted authority (e.g., appropriate approval prosecutorial without to charge granted authority approval; prosecutorial without warrant Early  No the to not subject are that offenses example, for such as, cases, of types specified only in etc.). violence; domestic involve not do that offenses or Act, Graves or the Act Release is authority if any, circumstances, in what whether and specify shall directive such  Any complaint- a of issuance approve officer to supervisory designated specially a to granted Directive, of 4 this Section under presumed is acomplaint-warrant for application when summons designated specially a to granted is authority any, if circumstances, what in and whether and complaint- of a issuance when acomplaint-warrant for application approve to officer supervisory to authority 3.3.2.
[brief] “The vagueness concept . . . rests on principles of procedural due process; it demands that a law be sufficiently clear and precise so that people are given fair notice and adequate warning of the law’s reach. ”  Carter, 247 N.J. at 518 (internal quotations omitted).  A statute is unconstitutionally vague in violation of due process if “persons of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. ”  State v. Smith, 251 N.J. 244, 263 (2022) (internal quotations omitted).  The Supreme Court has applied the vagueness principle to motor vehicle laws, which are presumed “to be written ‘in language that can easily be grasped by the public so that every motorist can obey the rules of the road. ’”  Id. at 264. (quoting Scriven, 226 N.J. at 34).  A law may be challenged as facially vague or vague as applied to certain conduct.  State v. Cameron, 100 N.J. 586, 593 (1985).  If a statute is vague as applied to the particular conduct of a party, it may not be enforced even though the law might be validly imposed against others.  Ibid.  By contrast, “if a statute is not vague as applied to a particular party, it may be enforced even though it might be too vague as applied to others. ”  Ibid.  In this case, the word “turn” in N.J.S.A. 39:4-126 is unconstitutionally vague as applied to the conduct of changing lanes.  The public cannot easily grasp that “turn” means, among other things, switch lanes, given that the word “turn” is not commonly used to refer to the act of moving a vehicle from one lane to another.  In addition, the Motor Vehicle Code contains no indication that the word “turn” as used in the code has any special meaning.  To be sure, many motorists utilize their blinkers to signal an intention to switch lanes.  But the fact that this practice is commonplace does not indicate that the average person understands it to be compelled by law.  Such behavior may demonstrate a desire to be cautious and courteous to other drivers on the road.  It does not bespeak the public’s understanding that the failure to properly signal a lane change is grounds to be pulled over by police.  Because N.J.S.A. 39:4-126 does not require a motorist to signal a lane change, or because the word “turn” is unconstitutionally vague as applied to the conduct of changing lanes, [...] and [...] did not have reasonable and articulable suspicion that the sedan violated the motor vehicle laws by failing to activate its blinker prior to changing lanes.  Accordingly, the traffic stop was unlawful and all evidence seized during the course of the stop must be suppressed.
[brief] Negative inferences are drawn by jurors from conduct, or non-conduct, all the time in the criminal law.  Indeed, in State v. Marroccelli, 448 N.J. Super 349, 372-373 (App. Div. 2017), this Court held similar habit evidence to have been improperly excluded and also held that habit evidence can be properly used to prove a negative.  There, the defendant in a death-by-auto case sought to introduce habit evidence that she “never” speeds and “never” drives in the left lane.  The trial judge was held to have viewed Rule 406 too restrictively when he held that a habit of not doing something is not admissible under the rule.