ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] (Pa10).  The Board also noted the Ricci Act required the Board to provide notice to members and retirees within thirty days of the effective date of the act, and if members or retirees did not file a written and sworn statement with the retirement system within two years of the effective date of the Act they would be ineligible for the presumption or recalculation.  (Pa10).  The Board found it undisputed that the Division had mailed notice of the Ricci Act to [...] and that [...] did not submit his Eligibility Registration Form until approximately one year and three months past the statutory deadline.  (Pa13- The Board also considered the matter under its inherent power to extend the deadline if good cause, reasonable grounds, and reasonable diligence could be demonstrated.  (Pa14-15).  The Board concluded that the Division had notified all retired members of [...] of the passage of the Ricci Act on August 9, 2019 in accordance with the Act.  (Pa14).  [...]’s assertion that he did not remember receiving the postcard notice did not establish good cause nor reasonable grounds to allow him to file over one year and three months past the statutory deadline.  (Pa15).  Further, the Board concluded that [...] had not exercised reasonable diligence because of such a protracted delay in filing his Eligibility Registration Form.  (Pa15).  Therefore, the Board concluded that [...] was ineligible to register for amended benefits under the Ricci Act.  (Pa15).  This appeal followed.
[brief] For the foregoing reasons, Defendants respectfully request that this Court reverse the trial court’s judgment in its entirety.  **[...]**  *Attorneys for Defendants [...] and [...]*  By: /s/[...], Esq. [...], Esq. [...], Esq.  Dated: January 25, 2024  [...]  Plaintiff-Respondent, v. STEPHEN E. SWEENEY and LeREGAZZI, L.L.C., Defendants-Appellants.  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE  DIVISION DOCKET NO.: [...]  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY LAW  DIVISION DOCKET NO.: [...]  Civil Action SAT BELOW: Hon. [...], J.S.C.  Trial: June 6, 7, 15, 2023  Defendants’ Motion for Reconsideration: September 5, 2023  PLAINTIFF’S MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS’ APPEAL FROM THE TRIAL COURT’S ORDER AND FINAL JUDGMENT, AND FROM THE TRIAL COURT’S DENIAL OF DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
[brief] [...]’s legal argument and conclusion begins by reciting the applicable legal standard – whether the employer has met their burden of proof, demonstrated by a fair preponderance of the competent, relevant, and credible evidence, that Appellant committed the charges listed in the FNDA.  [Pa39].  [...] proceeded to cite the correct statutes, regulations, and precedent to support this legal standard.  [Pa39].  [...] specifically cites to State v. Lewis, 67 N.J. 47, 49 (1975) (citation omitted) (defining “fair preponderance of the evidence” as the greater weight of credible evidence in the case, meaning the evidence which carries the greater convincing power to our minds); Zive v. Stanley Roberts, Inc., 182 N.J. 436, 457 (2005) (applying this standard to a wrongful termination).  [Pa40].  [...] found that based on the relevant statutes, regulations, and TPD policies, Appellant was required to report, and failed to report, the Incident, the Vehicle Incidents, and his opioid prescriptions.
[brief] In this case, defendant’s inclusion and incorporation of the incorrect and inapplicable rulings and analyses in Sullivan and in Stitsworth (a case involving Pennsylvania law) to its opposing papers was specious and deceptive.  (Pa160-170).  The federal court in Sullivan failed to apply New Jersey law and, thus, unlawfully reduced and/or eliminated New Jersey’s statutorily mandated attorney’s fees.  (Pa232-242; Pa285-289).  Defendant’s strategy employed here was create the false impression that plaintiff’s counsel fees were outrageous and mislead the court into believing it, too, possessed the discretion to eliminate with impunity, any and all fees requested in plaintiff’s counsel’s fee application.
[directive] Tracking numbers shall be unique and only used once.  Regardless of whether a kit is destroyed, the tracking number shall not be reused.  3.  The electronic evidence tracking system, at a minimum, shall include the following information: a.  Date, time, and identity of the individual who collected the SAFE/DFSA kit; b. Date, time, and identity of any person(s) in possession of the kit(s) before and during transport; c. Date, time, and identity of person(s) who initially submit the kit(s) for storage; d. Date, time, and identity of the evidence custodian who received the kit(s); e. Date, time, and identity of any person to whom the kit(s) was released and the purpose of release; and f. Date, time and identity of person(s) who returned/resubmitted the kit for storage.  4.  Evidence items created from analysis or separated from the original item should be documented to show the linkage to the original evidence.  The tracking system utilized must enable cross-referencing of all items associated with any single examination.  5.  Locations (ex: shelf number/bin) where kit(s) and related items of evidence are stored must be accounted for in the tracking system.  4  6.  Date, time, and identity of person who stored the kit(s), must be accounted for in the tracking system.  7.  Date of SAFE/DFSA kit destruction must be recorded in the tracking system.  The resources available to each of the 21 County Prosecutor’s Offices vary greatly.
[brief] Plaintiffs’ reliance on Matter of Morris Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 310 N.J. Super. 332 (App. Div. 1998), is equally unavailing.  In Matter of Morris School District, a teachers union agreed to accept the findings of a neutral factfinder appointed by the Commissioner of Education when they could not agree on terms to a renewed collective bargaining agreement with the Board of Education.  The factfinder proposed a retroactive cap on paid leave that had not been previously raised by either party, and the Court found that the union members could not be forced to accept the cap absent a knowing waiver.  Id. at 343.  In that case, there was no MSRA or statute that provided the Board of Education with the right to modify or terminate the collective bargaining agreement, rendering the decision irrelevant to the present matter.  Finally, the question in *Owens v. Press Publ’g Co.*, 20 N.J. 537 (1956), the remaining case cited by Plaintiffs, was whether the plaintiffs’ right to severance pay survived the expiration of a collective bargaining agreement, which, again, is irrelevant here given the MSRA.  Plaintiffs do not, because they cannot, cite an analogous case supporting their Takings Clause claim and the Superior Court’s Order should be affirmed on appeal.
[directive] An officer should not fire a conducted energy device if there is a substantial risk that the electrode/darts will strike an innocent person unless firing the device in such circumstances is reasonably necessary to protect the innocent person(s) from being killed or seriously injured by the person against whom the conducted energy device is targeted.  6.  To ensure officer safety, when feasible, at least one law enforcement officer other than the one deploying the conducted energy device should be present, be armed with lethal ammunition, and be prepared to deploy deadly force in the event that the use of a conducted energy device for any reason fails to incapacitate the suspect and prevent him or her from causing death or serious bodily injury to the officer equipped with the device, or any other person.  7.  During the deployment of a conducted energy device, the deploying officer shall, when feasible, continually evaluate the options selected against changing circumstances.  -10-
[brief] [...] knew taxes were due on the property because it acquired the certificate in the third-quarter of 2020 and didn’t even pay the fourth-quarter taxes which formed Plaintiff’s certificate.  He received and read all of the notices but “assumed” it would take 6-12 months - despite the notices that said forty-five days and despite the fact that his own foreclosure took only six months.  “A property owner knows that he must pay taxes on his property, and that if he fails to do so the municipality will sell the property (or the tax sale certificate) for the price of taxes due and owing. ”  *Long Beach v. Lot 3, Block 9*, 189 N.J.Super. 116, 125 (Ch. Div. 1983).  “[T]hey cannot have been unmindful that their interest in the property would not continue forever if they failed to pay taxes. ”  *Id.* at 126.  Considering that [...] had just prosecuted its own tax foreclosure, it obviously knew what it faced when a tax foreclosure was filed against it.
[brief] State v. Canfield, 470 N.J. Super. 234, 269 (App. Div. 2022), aff'd as modified, 252 N.J. 497 (2023) (quoting State v. Jenkins, 178 N.J. 347, 361 (2004)).  But the review is not done "in isolation [of] those statements alleged to be obscure or ambiguous, but looks to the charge as a whole."  Concepcion, 111 N.J. at 376 (quoting State v. Freeman, 64 N.J. 66, 69 (1973)).  "Where there is a failure to object, it may be presumed that the instructions were adequate."  State v. Morais, 359 N.J. Super. 123, 134-35 (App. Div. 2003).  Thus, "[w]hen a defendant fails to object to an error or omission at trial, [appellate courts] review for plain error."  State v. Funderburg, 225 N.J. 66, 79 (2016) (quoting R. 2:10-2).  When applied to jury instructions, "plain error requires demonstration of 'legal impropriety in the charge prejudicially affecting the substantial rights of defendant and sufficiently grievous to justify notice by the reviewing court and to convince the court that of itself the error possessed a clear capacity to bring about an unjust result.'"  State v. Belliard, 415 N.J. Super. 51, 66 (App. Div. 2010) (quoting State v. Hock, 54 N.J. 526, 538 (1969)).
[directive] Active Resistor.  When dealing with an active resistor, in addition to the options available for passive resistors, officers may use physical strikes with hands or feet, OC spray, batons or asps applied with non-impact pressure, and taking the person to the ground.  Intentional strikes to the head or face, which are only allowed in an act of self-defense, are not permitted when dealing with an active resistor.  Police canines shall not be utilized against an active resistor.
[directive] 2 Policy  2.1  The Use of Force Policy formally recognizes four distinct types of force: physical force; mechanical force; enhanced mechanical force; and deadly force.  2.2  Enhanced Mechanical Force is an intermediate force option between mechanical force and deadly force, generally requiring a greater level of justification than that pertaining to physical or mechanical force, but a lower level of justification than that required for the use of deadly force.  Unlike deadly force, enhanced mechanical force does not require an imminent threat of death or serious bodily injury.  Examples include CEDs and less-lethal devices and ammunition.  2.3  As with any type of force, officers shall exhaust all other reasonable means to gain compliance before resorting to enhanced mechanical force, if feasible.  Thus, if a safe alternative would achieve law enforcement’s objective, enhanced mechanical force shall not be used.  Officers shall, therefore, use verbal commands, critical decision making, tactical deployment and de-escalation techniques to gain voluntary compliance, when feasible.  Officers shall never engage in unnecessary, overly aggressive, or otherwise improper actions that create a situation where force becomes needed.  2.4  In situations where officers are justified in using force, officers shall use only that degree of force that is reasonable, necessary and proportional considering the totality of the circumstances, including the subject’s mental and physical condition, the nature of the offense, and the level of resistance or threat known to the officer at the time.  2.5  The decision to use force and the appropriate amount of force requires careful attention to the facts and circumstances of each incident.  2.6  Any deployment of a CED or less-lethal device against a person, except as authorized by this policy, is prohibited.  Any intentional misuse or reckless abuse of any such device will not be tolerated and will result in administrative action, discipline, or criminal prosecution.  2  USE OF FORCE POLICY  Addendum A | December 2020  CEDs and Other Less-Lethal Devices and Ammunition
[brief] (11T135-11 to 137-1; 11T139-9 to 141-14; 9T234-22 to 237-17).  Petitioner testified that Decedent was unable to use her phone after she was hospitalized.  Petitioner stated that he believes it was not Decedent talking on the phone to [...], [...], Respondent, or [...] just prior to her death.  (Pb 29).  However, the Chancery Division rejected this testimony, stating: “This court finds that Decedent had her phone in the hospital and that she did call the above-named individuals during her stay.
[brief] The rights now granted to the plaintiff are without limitation or any notice requirement; defendant’s [...] is left with limited capability to use its [...] and no safe use at all of the [...] by its students at any time.  Any use of the courtyard for entry/exit or assembly is precluded under imposition of sanctions.  The [...] has been granted total priority rights to the Fifth Street Lot and [...] for its parking use, with the [...] left with only the obligation to own and maintain those facilities for the [...]'s priority use.  This is certainly and clearly far beyond the incidental and temporary "permission" granted in the 1963 Agreement.
[brief] (7T29:25; 30:5, 11-12).  When [...] worked with [...] they were required to perform property checks.  (7T31:10).  [...] was not aware of any written directives, SOPs, or even training manuals on how to perform a property check.  (7T32:4).  [...] showed [...] how to perform property checks and explained to [...] that you are not going to see anything from inside the patrol car, you would preferably want to be out walking around because the police cruiser is a "beacon."  (7T32:14-18).  Most of the property checks [...] performed were on foot and it was not unusual to do so.  (7T33:7, 9).  [...] explained that the radio system had problems with transmission and that an officer sometimes would make a transmission and it would not go through.  (7T34:12-13).  If an officer realized the transmission was not going through the officer would have to say it a few more times, walk to different locations and try again to get a response.  (7T34:9-15).  [...] indicated that some property checks were possible to conduct by driving.  (7T34:22).  [...] indicated that riding by the [...], or driving by the old canine academy could constitute property checks.  (7T35:7, 12).  [...] testified that walking on foot patrol is the best way to catch bad folks doing bad things.  (7T37:9-10).  [...] ("[...]") works for HT's Police Department, has been a Detective for one year and a Police Officer for fourteen (14) years.
[directive] [...], J. THEREFORE, JOHN I, NOW, Act Justice Criminal and the Constitution by in the vested by me authority the of virtue by Jersey, and agencies enforcement law all DIRECT that do hereby ., se,~c et 52:17B-97 N.J.S.A. of 1970, to shall adhere Jersey of State New the of laws the of authority under the operating while officers below: forth set procedures policies and the Definitions.
[brief] Second, the Parental Secrecy Policy violates parents’ right to make the “important decisions” in their children’s lives.  *H.L. v. Matheson*, 450 U.S. 398, 410 (1981); see also *C.N. v. Ridgewood Bd. of Educ.*, 430 F.3d 159, 184 (3d Cir. 2005) (discussing parents’ right to make those decisions in their children’s lives that go to the “heart of parental decision-making”).  “It is not educators, but parents who have primary rights in the upbringing of children,” *Gruenke*, 225 F.3d at 307, and parents cannot play this crucial role if their children’s school is actively concealing its actions from them, *Hodgson v. Minnesota*, 497 U.S. 417, 483 (1990) (noting that, under the common law, parents had the right, “not merely to be notified of their children’s actions, but to speak and act on their behalf”) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  Regardless of whether social transitioning is considered psychological treatment, the decision of whether a school socially transitions a child is indisputably an “important decision” in the child’s life.  See *Ricard v. USD 475 Geary Cnty., KS Sch. Bd.*, No. 522CV04015HLTGEB, 2022 WL 1471372, at *8 (D. Kan. May 9, 2022) (observing that parents must “have a say in what [their] minor child[ren are] called” by their school); *Mirabelli v. Olson*, No. 323CV00768BENWVG, 2023 WL Notification Policy appropriately requires parental notice before a school socially transitions students, to comply with the Constitution, it must go further and require parental consent as well.
[brief] “chief of police denied this request in an e-mail dated August 5th, 2019, stating that the applicant had a significant driveway and that there was a handicapped parking space across the street. ”  In fact finding in such way, the trial judge overlooked (1) the picture before him, showing that there was NO significant driveway (Pa5) and (2) vivid statements in the appellant’s complaint, which told that there was NO such handicapped parking space across the street (Pa93, §G).
[brief] See e.g., [...], *Forensic Science: Oxymoron?* 302 *Science* 1625 (2003) (“[T]he analysis of bullet markings exemplifies kinds of ‘scientific’ evidence whose reliability may be exaggerated when presented to a jury”).  And statisticians (a group vital to the appropriate design of research studies and thus to any analysis of whether a discipline can lay claim to demonstrated validity) have widely endorsed the NAS reports and called for greater rigor in the design of experiments, increased transparency, and well-supported analysis and reporting or error rates.  [...], *ASA Board Policy Statement on Forensic Science Reform*, (April 17, 2010) (Da 892-897).  identification evidence falls short under Daubert due to failings in testability, reliability, and error rates.  A year later, [...] again limited the testimony of a firearm expert in United States v. Monteiro, holding that, while the scientific principles underlying firearm identification might be reliable, “there is no reliable . . . scientific methodology which will currently permit the expert to testify that [a casing and a particular firearm are] a ‘match’ to an absolute certainty, or to an arbitrary degree of statistical certainty.
[brief] Gonzalez, 185 N.J. at 114.  Moreover, for the reasons already described above, the trial court’s rulings as to whether it has jurisdiction to decide the issue of Tenant’s Allowance are hopelessly internally inconsistent, with the trial judge several times stating he lacked jurisdiction to decide the issue and other times ruling that Tenant was precluded from recovering Tenant’s Allowance on the circular grounds that Tenant was “in breach. ”  This inconsistency alone on the issue of whether the trial judge thought he had jurisdiction is sufficient grounds to vacate the 2021 and 2023 orders and remand.
[brief] That delegation clause is another arbitration agreement that must be enforced pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act, as interpreted by the Supreme Court of the United States.  Plaintiffs attempted below to evade [...]’s agreement to arbitrate on various other grounds that the trial court did not reach.  But none of those arguments has merit.  First, even accepting as true [...]’s self-serving assertion that her daughter was the person who agreed to the December Terms while using [...]’s phone to order a meal, that fact would not relieve [...] of her agreement.  Plaintiffs’ daughter agreed to the December Terms with both actual and apparent authority.  Moreover, even if [...]’s consent to the December Terms were found invalid, the only result would be that Plaintiffs remain bound by [...]’s earlier agreement to the January Terms, which also required arbitration of this dispute.  Next, [...]’s claim in this lawsuit is expressly covered by the arbitration agreement because he rode in a vehicle that his wife requested on their behalf through the [...] App, making him an unmistakable third-party beneficiary of his wife’s contract with [...].  And last, contrary to Plaintiffs’ contention, [...] never did anything to waive its right to enforce the arbitration agreement.  The Court should reverse the trial court and hold that Plaintiffs are required to arbitrate their personal-injury claims against Defendants in accord with [...]’s contractual promise.
[directive] Please select all that apply for untested SAFE Kits maintained by your agency and add any reason that may not be listed:(*This does not include “hold” kits, which refer to SAFE Kits that have not yet been provided to law enforcement pending the victim’s decision to report the crime.  However, your agency may have “hold” kits you are storing anonymously/without identifiers of the victim.)  N/A  Victim declined to ﬁle a complaint  Victim informed police the crime did not occur DNA evidence was not needed to convict  The SAFE Kit is scheduled to be sent to the lab Investigator had no suspects Investigator suspected the act was consensual  Victim ﬁled complaint against spouse/partner, former spouse/partner  Prosecutor advised it was not necessary  Unknown due to age of SAFE Kit  Other, please provide all additional reasons:  15.  Does your agency require the reason why SAFE Kits are not submitted to an authorized lab for testing to be documented?
[brief] The [...] (“District”) is a Pre-Kindergarten through 8th grade district which serves students ranging in age from three (3)-years-old to fourteen (14)-years-old (Da099).  The [...] (“Board”) has a policy which pertains specifically to transgender students, Policy 5756, entitled, “Transgender Students,” which it first adopted in 2015 (Ibid.).  The Board voted to approve a revised version of the policy at the June 20, 2023 public Board meeting, which became effective as of that date (Da043).  The revised policy includes several amendments which facilitate the Board’s family-centered approach to accommodating students who wish to 1
[brief] Taylor v. Arizona, 471 F.2d 848, 851 (9th Cir.), cert. den., 409 U.S. 1130 (1972).  And where such facts exist, even an affirmative "statement by a police officer that a suspect was free to leave may be incredible and not worthy of belief as a matter of law."  State v. Micheliche, 220 N.J. Super. 532, 537 (App. Div. 1987), certif. den., 109 N.J. 40 (1987).  Time and again, courts have addressed and rejected police contentions that a Defendant "consented" to accompany them to police headquarters, or other place of interrogation, on facts similar to, or even less egregious, than those in the instant case.  See, e.g., Florida v. Royer, supra; Dunaway v. New York, supra; Hayes v. Florida, supra; State v. Rodriguez, supra; Taylor v. Arizona, supra; United States v. Tucker, 610 F.2d 1007 (2d Cir. 1979); People v. Holveck, 565 N.E.2d 919 (Ill. 1990); State v. Riley, 704 S.W.2d 691 (Mo. App. 1986).