ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The teachers and counselors having these conversations are not medical professionals, and the students are not their patients.  See Parents United for Betters Schs., 148 F.3d at 269 (quoting with approval trial court holding that, while condom distribution is a “health service,” “[i]mpact upon health . . . does not transform a health service into a medical treatment”).  Indeed, under [...]’s reasoning, using a student’s chosen name and pronouns would have the absurd result of subjecting teachers, counselors, and others to criminal penalties.
[brief] On the same date, citing the poor condition of the existing bulkhead, [...] requested permission to begin construction of the replacement bulkhead while its appeal of Pre-Construction Condition #1 was pending.  On December 14, 2020, [...] granted permission to [...] to commence reconstruction of the bulkhead.  [...] did not ask that the requirement for submission of a plan be stayed at that time because its reading of the applicable [...] regulation, N.J.A.C. 7:7-28.3, does not require compliance with a contested permit condition until the appeal is resolved.
[brief] The State cannot have it both ways—collecting money to bolster unemployment and state labor accounts and simultaneously eradicate pension payments.  It is a plainly irreconcilable position.  The constant reference to annual appointments or contracts is a red herring.  It is irrelevant.  Employees enter employment contracts every single day of the year around the country.  It is customary in many positions.  The change in methodology as to calling his position a professional services contract once again did not come about until 2015.  (See Pa166-173)  Notwithstanding, [...] had no choice but to sign it if he wanted to keep his position which he relied on for supplemental income as a part-time employee.  Even with all the changes, [...] still pays [...] on a W-2 as an employee.  [...] still has unemployment contributions and all other customary employee-based taxes removed from his compensation.  [...] was always and is still paid a salary.  Independent contractors and professional service agreements are paid on 1099’s with contract payments based on invoice or other agreement.  No such structure has ever existed prior, or subsequent to, [...]’s removal from the pension.  **CONCLUSION**
[brief] *[...] v. United States*, 568 U.S. 186, 201 (2013; separate concurring opinion by Scalia, J., Ginsburg, J. and Kagan, J.), (holding that the "search all persons present provision" in the warrant "applies only to seizures of 'occupants' - that is, persons within 'the immediate vicinity of the premises to be searched.'  ***[...] was seized a mile away.  Ergo, [...] cannot sanction [...]'s detention.
[brief] # TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | Cases | Page(s) | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|---------| | DiFiore v. Pezic, | 2, 4, 11| | 254 N.J. 212 (2023)  | | | Estate of Lasiw v. Pereira, | 4, 5, 13, 14| | 475 N.J. Super. 378 (App. Div. 2023) | | | In re Actavis Holdco U.S., Inc., | 10, 11 | | 2019 WL 8437021 (3d Cir. Dec. 6, 2019) | | | In re Takata Airbag Prods. Liab. Litig., | 7 | | 2016 WL 1460143 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 1, 2016) | | | K.S. v. ABC Pro. Corp., | 4 | | 330 N.J.  Super. 288 (App. Div. 2000) | | | Lipsky v. N.J. Ass’n of Health Plans, Inc., | passim | | 474 N.J. Super. 447 (App. Div. 2023) | | | Montana v. Cnty. of Cape May Bd. of Freeholders, | 10 | | 2013 WL 11233748 (D.N.J. Sept. 20, 2013) | | | Moore v. Publicis Groupe, | 8 | | 287 F.R.D. 182 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) | | | Nestle Foods Corp. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., | 4 | | 135 F.R.D. 101 (D.N.J. 1990) | | | O’Donnell/Salvatori Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., | 11 | | 339 F.R.D. 275 (W.D. Wash. 2021) | | | R.L. v. Voytac, | 5, 6, 8 | | 402 N.J. Super. 392 (App. Div. 2008) | | | Shambry v. N.J. Transit Bus Operations, Inc., | 9 | | 307 N.J. Super. 390 (App. Div. 1998) | | | Spano v. Boeing Co., | 7 | | 2008 WL 1774460 (S.D. Ill. Apr. 16, 2008) | | # TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | Authority | Page(s) | |--------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------| | **State v. Hernandez,** | | | 225 N.J. 451 (2016) | 6 | | **Target Corp. v. ACE Am. Ins. Co.,** | | | 576 F. Supp. 3d 609 (D. Minn. 2021) | 7 | | **Rules** | | | Rule 4:10-2 | passim | | Rule 4:10-2(g) | 13, 14, 15 | | Rule 4:14-3(c) | 7 | | **Other Authorities** | | | Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 Advisory Committee’s Notes (2000) | 5 | | Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 Advisory Committee’s Notes (2015) | 5 | | Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules (2024) | 4, 6 | PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
[brief] On March 2, 2022, Defendant filed a motion to (1) stay the sheriff's sale, (2) seek the recusal of [...], and (3) grant other equitable relief.  This motion was denied on April 1, 2022.  (Pa 26)  On January 4, 2023, the Defendant filed a motion seeking to strike the assignment to [...], vacate the summary judgment order, withdraw the alias writ of execution, and dismiss the foreclosure complaint.  This motion was denied on May 12, 2023.  (Pa 27-29)
[brief] (See Pb28).  However, the trial court explicitly considered [...]’s contentions within the context of the harassment statute, noting:  And internal disputes within the workplace are not criminal harassment.  They are just that, just disagreements within the workplace, unhappiness with their supervisor, and this one isolated incident where [...] screams and yells at Mr. [...] is not a basis in my view of criminal harassment.  [1T 29:5-15.]  The court continued:  I find that the activities, the events that gave rise to Mr. [...]’s complaints in June of 2020 do not give rise and cannot objectively or subjectively on behalf of the plaintiffs give rise to a – a charge of criminal harassment.
[brief] Similarly, in Palamar Construction v. Twp. Of Pennasauken, 196 N.J. Super. 241, 250 (App Div. 1983) the Appellate Division determined that a “reviewing Court cannot overturn the decision of the municipal body unless it finds that the decision was arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable. ” (citing Kramer v. Sea Girt Bd. Of Adj., 45 N.J. 268, 296 (1965)).  Based thereon, the law is clear that bid disputes are to be given a deferential standard of review.  In re Protest of Award of On-Line Games, 279 N.J. Super 566, 590 (App. Div. 1995).  Appellant’s reliance on Hanges v. Metropolitan Property & Cas. Ins. Co. 202 N.J. 369 (2010) as the standard for appellate review in the instant case is misplaced and readily distinguishable.  First and foremost, the Hanges case did not involve a bid protest appeal under the Local Public Contracts Law, N.J.S.A. 40A:11-1 et sec.  Rather, the Hanges court assessed the standard for review as to whether a decedent’s statements to the police were inadmissible under N.J.R.E. 804(b)(6) and whether the trial court properly exercised its discretion on excluding those hearsay statements on summary judgement. \(^1\)  Accordingly, the decision of the [...] to award the Contract to [...] as the lowest responsive bidder must stand barring a finding by this Court that said award was “arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable”.
[brief] The Zoning Board’s adoption of the Resolution of denial due to the unlawful interference of the Mayor is sufficient “formal approval” to establish liability under Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), which establishes the definitive test for municipal liability under the FCRA.  In fact, the Resolution denying Plaintiffs’ Amended Application itself incorporates the false narrative of the Mayor’s publicity campaign against Plaintiffs.  Specifically, it states:  The Board further notes that the presence of the eagle’s nest and the required buffer does create a hardship; however the number, type, character and extent of the Bulk Variances requested are far too intense and exceed a reasonable modification of the site to offset the impact of the eagle’s nest.  These variances result in an overly intense use of the developable portion of the site and serve only to advance the Applicant’s economic interest which has been specifically rejected by the Courts as a basis to justify the granting of variances.
[brief] (1T20-1 to 6).  [...] testified that through his experience, he is aware that users will often examine the CDS they have just purchased and believed that was what [...] was doing.  (1T20-6 to 9).  [...] looked up and made eye contact with [...] as he drove by, and when [...] circled the lot back to [...]’s vehicle again, he noticed [...] was leaning down and then quickly picking his head up, which [...] testified to him to be “indicative of [[...]] snorting something.
[directive] Page 39 release.19 conditions that may be needed to manage the risks that would be posed by defendant’s  Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to require that the charging decision be made without the benefit of a preliminary automated pretrial risk assessment, and the assistant prosecutor, deputy attorney general, or designated supervisory officer may elect to postpone the charging decision pending the results of the preliminary automated pretrial risk-assessment process, provided that the matter is presented to a judge or judicial officer within 12 hours of arrest as required by Rule 3:4-1.
[brief] Plaintiff—an Aggrieved Millburn Taxpaying Resident—Was Deprived of the Benefit of the Millburn Secession Settlement and Amending Long Term Tax Exemption Legislation.  History matters.  For more than thirty years, plaintiff has been a Millburn taxpaying resident.  In or about 2002, Millburn attempted to secede from Essex County.  Millburn complained about subsidizing other financially distressed communities and the impact of urban long term tax exemptions upon its county portion of taxation.  See, [...] “Why Millburn Wants Out” The New York Times (Nov. 24, 2002).  Partly in response to this secession threat, our State Legislature amended the superseding Long Term Tax Exemption Law so that the county would now receive 5% of the long term tax exemption revenues.  N.J.S.A. 40A:20-12(b).  In addition, courts focused upon the underlying land tax credit, our State Constitution uniform taxation clause (Article VIII, Section I, paragraph 1(a)) and the right of the county and the local school district to receive allocated payments based solely upon the underlying land (and not the exempted improvements).  In his hybrid prerogative writ/declaratory judgment/civil rights act violations complaint, plaintiff alleged that he was deprived of the benefits of these secession settlement legislative amending enactments and intervening long term tax exemption land tax credit case law.  In his hybrid complaint, plaintiff set forth specific violated constitutional and statutory provisions.  See, [...] “Failure to Allege Civil Rights Violation Is Fatal to Attorney Fees Claim, Says Appellate Division, New Jersey Law Journal, 229 N.J.L.J. 2904 (Dec. 4, 2023); Azuowch Rotini v. Brock Russell, A-2155-21 (App. Div. Oct. 13, 2023) (Pa674).  It is this alleged injury and deprivation of constitutional and statutory rights that affords plaintiff constitutional, statutory and common law standing in this hybrid prerogative writ/declaratory judgment/civil rights act violations action.  IV.
[brief] (Pa81-13-18).  [...] answered the questions to the best of her ability and as the Court can see, she offered estimations and testified that she could not attest to certain things as she may not have been working.  (Pa85-11-17, 85-22-25, 86-5-7).  In fact, she goes on to testify that she had no direct knowledge of this accident as she was not there.  (Da53-11 to19).  [...] employee [...] inspected the theater and wrote in the incident report, "I checked the lights on the steps, and they were all fully lit and the lights in the auditorium itself were at trailer level and in working order as well."
[brief] B.  [...] Commenced Arbitration to Seek the Return of the Wrongfully Withheld EGP  On July 5, 2022, [...] filed a Demand for Arbitration with the [...] pursuant to its Construction Arbitration Rules.  Da39.  On August 3, 2022, [...] filed an Answering Statement and Counterclaim in the Arbitration.  Da39.  [...] served as the parties’ Arbitrator, who the parties jointly selected given his vast and impressive experience in the construction industry (35+ years of practice, professor of Construction Law at [...], presided over 200 arbitration proceedings, etc.).  Da40.  The Arbitration consisted of discovery requests, substantial document productions, depositions, expert reports, motion practice, pre-trial submissions, a full trial, witness testimony from 14 individuals, post-trial submissions, post-trial arguments, and a reasoned Award.  The parties consented to this arbitral process as a full and final determination of the parties’ contractual rights under the PTA and all related contracts.
[brief] [...], who just so happen to be attorneys, were co-conspirators in the torts committed by all Defendants.  The mere fact that [...] are attorneys should not shield them from liability for the Tort Claims that survived against all other non-attorney co-conspirator  Defendants.  Besides clearly frustrating the purpose of the AOM statute to weed out meritless claims, such a result is exceptionally unjust and troubling on its face.
[brief] (4T8-23 to 9-4; 4T14-7 to 15-1; 4T15-22 to 19; 4T17-13 to 15).  [...]’s records indicated that the passenger did not board at the transfer point.  (4T17-3 to 15).  On May 17, 2020, a ticket to Houston, Texas was purchased with cash for a passenger named [...].  (4T18-17 to 19-25; 4T20-9 to 11).  C.  Defendant fled New Jersey and confessed to murdering her wife.
[directive] P~et~ial and Offense of Impact for' Accounting 7.6.3 decision,24 detention pretrial the to relevant is victim a on crime the of impact  When the of completion or appeal, sentencing, trial, pending release other or parole, probation, other state; any or this of law or law, the federal under offense an for sentence posed would be community that person the or other any danger to the of seriousness and nature the (d) applicable; if release, defendant's eligible the by justice criminal the obstruct to attempting or obstructing of risk the of seriousness and nature the (e) and applicable; if release, defendant's eligible the by posed be would that process assessment risk using a obtained program services pretrial of the recommendation release the (~ 2A:162-25.
[brief] 1T17 to 1T18.  In response to additional assertions by the Respondents over the binding nature of the TRC meetings, the Board Planner retorted:  [W]hy do we keep hearing about [Technical Review Committee] . . . but the board has to stand on the testimony that it’s hearing.  The professional staff does not make decisions for the board, so I want to make that absolutely clear.  And we keep hearing that over and over tonight and it’s pushed in our face.  1T68.  In reply, the Respondents’ legal counsel acknowledged the non-binding nature of TRC meetings; stating:  Well I would like to address that.  I think that you’re correct, with the fact that you don’t make a decision on the application . . . 1T68-1T69.  Therefore, both the Board and the Respondents clearly understood the purpose and binding effect of the TRC meetings at the time of the hearing in 2019 on the 2018 Amended Application.
[brief] Plaintiffs cite to Hirsch v. General Motors Corp., 266 N.J. Super. 222, 234 (Law Div. 1993) and claim that [...] failed in its affirmative duty to preserve evidence.  In Aetna Life and Cas. Co. v. Imet Mason Contractors, 309 N.J. Super. 358, 366-377 (App. Div. 1998), this Court found that the duty to preserve evidence arises when there is: 1) pending or probable litigation involving the defendants; (2) knowledge of the existence or likelihood of litigation; (3) foreseeability of harm, or in other words, discarding the evidence would be prejudicial; and (4) evidence relevant to the litigation.  Initially, [...]’s Accident Investigation Form dated April 26, 2019, provides that there was no surveillance video of the incident.  (Pa153-Pa154).  After the accident, Plaintiff was taken to the manager’s office to fill out her statement.  (Pa033).  While in the office, Plaintiff claims [...]’s manager showed her a video.  (Pa033).  Plaintiff conceded that the video did not capture the actual impact of her being struck by [...]’ U-boat.  (Pa033).  Plaintiff did not even know if the video she saw captured the actual aisle where the accident happened.  (Pa033).  Plaintiff admitted that neither she nor the [...] employee she was talking to were ever seen on the video.  (Pa033-Pa034).  Moreover, the facts demonstrate that this was a very minor incident.  On the date of loss, Plaintiff executed a Medical Attention Waiver which provides:  I understand that I have been given an opportunity to seek medical attention for my injury however I do not wish to seek medical attention because I feel my injury is minor.  I have reported my injury only as a precautionary measure.  (Pa155).  Plaintiff, who is 5’ 2”, admitted that she later walked out of the store under her own power and she was able to climb up into her Hummer and drove herself home.  (Pa042).  No police or EMS were ever called to the store.  [...] testified that if an incident was not captured on camera, then [...] would not preserve any video.  (Pa096).  Plaintiffs concede that they never sent any notices of preservation sent to [...].  Unlike the progeny of cases cited by Plaintiffs, here there is no evidence [...] failed to preserve.  There also no foreseeability of harm or prejudice to Plaintiffs and nor is there any indication that [...] failed to preserve evidence that would be relevant to a litigation in such a scenario where it is undisputed that no video evidence of the actual incident exists.  Accordingly, the trial court found that [...] did not fail in its duty to preserve evidence and that Plaintiffs were not entitled to an adverse inference.
[brief] (Da 1-4)  On June 6, 2020, the defense moved to exclude testimony by the victim’s father about an alleged dying declaration.  (Da 5)  On August 8, 2020, the defense moved for a Wade hearing to determine the admissibility of an eyewitness’s out-of-court identification.  (Da 6)  On October 19, 2020, following argument but no testimony, the Honorable [...], P.J.Cr., denied both motions.  (Da 7-8; 1T 93-14 to 99-22, 124-20 to 130-11)  Between January 4 and 10, 2023, trial was held before the Honorable [...], J.S.C., and a jury.  The jury convicted [...] of all counts.  (12T 7-22 to 8-7; Da 9)  On February 24, 2023, [...] sentenced [...] to 35 years in prison, subject to the No Early Release Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2, with the mandatory 30 years without parole for murder, concurrent with five years, 42 months without parole for gun possession.  (13T 21-3 to 12; Da 13-15)  A Notice of Appeal was filed on April 21, 2023.
[brief] ACPO’s case depended on the supposed strength of eyewitness testimony, especially that of [...] who was closest to the gunman, claimed to know [...] well, and testified as to the certainty of his identification.  Brown all but admitted that he expected the shooter to be [...], whom he believed wanted to kill him to prevent him from retaliating for the murder of [...].  As [...] explained, this sort of expectation is a recipe for unconscious transference, especially when coupled with at best a fleeting glance.  But contrary to Brown’s belief, the trial prosecutor acknowledged that [...] had nothing to do with the Lindo killing.  (6T36-18 to 20)  [...] was entitled to see the information related to the Lindo murder that was essential to further developing his argument on counsel’s failure to call an identification expert, and could have enabled an additional claim regarding counsel’s failure to adequately investigate [...]’s claims.  Under these circumstances, good cause was established.  When [...] later faulted the defense for not having further developed the record on the third-party guilt defense, this only underscored that the discovery was warranted, and [...]’s motion should have been granted.
[brief] .........................................................................................21 - **Battaglia v. United Parcel Serv., Inc.,** - 214 N.J. 518 (2013)  ....................................................................................................................29, 30 - **BOC Group v. Chevron Chemical Co.,** - 359 N.J. Super. 135 (App. Div. 2003)  .........................................................................................23 - **Branch v. Cream-O-Land Dairy,** - 244 N.J. 567 (2021)  ....................................................................................................................20, 37 - **Bray v. Marriott Hotels,** - 110 F.3d 986 (3d Cir. 1997) ........................................................................................................26 - **Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am.,** - 142 N.J. 520 (1995)
[brief] THE PLAINTIFF ESTABLISHED THAT [...] HAD CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE OF A DANGEROUS CONDITION OF PUBLIC PROPERTY UNDER N.J.S.A. 59:4-2(Pa.442-Pa.451)  "The Tort Claims Act., N.J.S.A. 59: 1-1 et.seq. ("TCA") indisputably governs causes of action in tort against governmental agencies within New Jersey."  Gomes v. Cnty. of Monmouth, 444 N.J. Super. 479, 487 (App. Div. 2016); see also Nieves v. Adolf, 241 N.J. 567,571 (2020).  One of the fundamental principles embodied in the TCA is governmental immunity is the rule unless the legislature created an exception.
[brief] Id. at 548.  The Court said the "explanation of the manner in which the surveillance video informed his processing of the crime scene did not invade the jury's province."  Id. at 548.  Instead, his testimony represented two types of admissible testimony: (1) fact testimony from a forensic investigator about the steps he took at the crime scene, and (2) testimony rationally based on the witness's perception and helpful to the trier of fact.  *Ibid.*  [...] offered both factual testimony detailing the investigative steps she undertook regarding the "vehicle of interest" and testimony regarding her perception from reviewing numerous and extensive videos.  This testimony benefited the jury in their analysis of the same videos.  Hence, it is crucial to delineate [...]'s testimony for its content, what it did not entail, and the sequence in which the jury received the information.