ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] While a board “may choose which witnesses, including expert witnesses, to believe[,]” “that choice must be reasonably made. ”  *Id.* (citations omitted).  “In addition, the choice must be explained, particularly where the board rejects the testimony of facially reasonable witnesses. ”  Id. (citing Kramer, 45 N.J. at 288).  In Ocean Cty. Cellular Co. v. Twp. of Lakewood Bd. of Adjustment, the Appellate Division reversed the zoning board’s variance denial because, “based on the uncontradicted evidence submitted by [the applicant], it satisfied both the positive and negative criteria under N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70d necessary to obtain a special reasons variance. ”  352 N.J. Super. 514, 519 (App. Div.), cert. denied, 175 N.J. 75 (2002) (emphasis added).  The court held, in relevant part:  One additional observation.  We have reached our conclusion that [the applicant] satisfied the positive and negative criteria necessary for the grant of a special reasons variance based upon the uncontradicted testimony presented by its experts.  We recognize that the Board was free to either accept or reject the testimony of those experts.  “‘Where reasonably made, such a choice is conclusive on appeal. ’”  [Kramer, 45 N.J. at 288 (quoting Reinauer Realty Corp. v. Nucera, 59 N.J. Super. 189, 201 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 32 N.J. 347 (1960))].  However, in this case, we question whether the Board could have “reasonably” rejected the witnesses’ testimony.
[brief] *Smith v. Millville Rescue Squad*, 225 N.J. 373, 397 (2016); *ADS Assocs. Grp. v. Oritani Sav. Bank*, 219 N.J. 496, 511 (2014); *Frugis v. Bracigliano*, 177 N.J. 250, 269 (2020).  Appeal of an order denying a motion for \(^7\) [...] did not renew their motion pursuant to Rule 4:40-2.  involuntary dismissal is governed by the same evidential standard as applied by the trial court: “If, accepting as true all the evidence which supports the position of the party defending against the motion and according him the benefit of all inference which can reasonably and legitimately be deduced therefrom, reasonable minds could differ, the motion must be denied .  . . .”  Verdicchio v. Ricca, 179 N.J. 1, 30 (2004) (quoting Estate of Roach v. TRW, Inc., 164 N.J. 598, 612 (2000)).  The motion should be granted if “no rational juror could conclude that the plaintiff marshaled sufficient evidence to satisfy each prima facie element of a cause of action. ”  Smith, 225 N.J. at 397 (quoting Godfrey v. Princeton Theological Seminary, 196 N.J. 178, 197 (2008)).  In this case, the motion for involuntary dismissal should have been granted because no rational juror could have concluded that [...] had reason to know that [...] posed a risk of danger to customers without additional supervision or training.
[directive] When a Superior Court judge adjudicates a disorderly persons or petty disorderly persons offense or other non-motor-vehicle quasi-criminal matter usually adjudicated in municipal court (such as local ordinance, weights and measures, or fish and game violations), the Superior Court shall record the disposition in PROMIS/Gavel, the electronic criminal case management system, and shall retain the paperwork.  In such matters the Superior Court also shall retain jurisdiction of the matter.  The county Probation Division shall be responsible for collecting any fines, penalties, or assessments associated with such adjudication.  See N.J.S.A. 2C:46-4(a)(1).  All such monies collected shall be distributed in accordance with statute, including N.J.S.A. 2C:46-4.  Nonadjudicated Matters
[brief] The trial court committed reversible error by (a) erroneously failing to apply Appleman’s rule to [...]’s claims; (b) erroneously failing to consider the impact of changes in the wording of the mold exclusions in the [...] policies; (c) effectively rewording the language of the exception to the mold exclusion regarding “mold on or in” food “intended for human consumption” to favor [...]’s position; and (d) by erroneously failing to recognize [...]’s claims for continuous injurious, but unknown, exposure to mold, ruling instead that the symptoms for which [...] sought treatment constituted “manifestation” of mold-related injury before the [...] policies’ coverage commenced.  The Trial Court’s erroneous rulings should be reversed and the case remanded for entry of judgment in favor of Larry [...].  [...]  Attorneys for Larry [...]
[brief] Whatever the Major or the Captain needed, those assignments were given to [...] (1T; 90:15).  When Plaintiff came into the Training Support Unit, she was told that her work as the Admin Officer was being done by “[...]” (1T; 92:21).  During the time that the Plaintiff was the Admin Officer, she was not given any work to do because [...] was doing it all (1T; 95:6).
[brief] Here again, the Prosecutor’s remarks in summation were appropriately responsive to defense counsel’s summation.  More specifically, defense counsel, in speaking directly to aggravated manslaughter, stated that it requires “number one, that the person who did the shooting acted recklessly.  Well, that’s an easy one.  We can all agree on that.  No if’s, and’s or but’s, its reckless. ” (9T:40-11 to 18).  He then went on to the “second element” being the extreme indifference to the value of human life and stated that death in this case was “highly improbable” and “there was much less than a 50 plus one percent chance that death would ensue. ”  He went on to opine that it was “obviously reckless to go firing a gun in the direction of anything” and “so that would be reckless manslaughter on the part of whomever the shooter was. ” (9T:40-19 to 41-11).  In response to defense counsel’s overly simplistic and matter-of-fact description of the crime committed in this case, the Prosecutor argued that manslaughter was not applicable to this case and focused the jury’s attention on what it means to be reckless or engage in reckless conduct.
[brief] ”  It is a well-recognized principle that zoning ordinances are strongly presumed valid, *Kozesnik v. Montgomery Tp.*, 24 N.J. 154 at 167 (1957), and, as will be explained below, Plaintiff has failed to overcome this presumption.  It is a well-settled principle that "a decision of a zoning board may be set aside only when it is 'arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable.'"  *Cell S. of N.J., Inc. v. Zoning Bd. of Adj.*, 172 N.J. 75, 81 (2002), quoting, *Medici v. BPR Co.*, 107 N.J. 1, 15 (1987)).  “[P]ublic bodies, because of their peculiar knowledge of local conditions, must be allowed wide latitude in their delegated discretion. ”  *Jock v. Zoning Bd. of Adj.*, 184 N.J. 562, 597 (2005).  Therefore, “[t]he proper scope of judicial review is not to suggest a decision that may be better than the one made by the board, but to determine whether the board could reasonably have reached its decision on the record. ”  *Ibid.*
[brief] “Just as combining publicly available information with \(^{23}\) See, e.g., Express Scripts, 602 F. App’x at 882 (relator’s “assessment of publicly available information” insufficient, even if informed by years of experience); Oliver, 826 F.3d at 477 (knowledge of industry practice insufficient); Rosenberg, 2019 WL 3643035, at *12 (“[F]orensic analysis of data and transactions that are already publicly disclosed on publicly accessible websites is insufficient to qualify the relator as an original source. ”), aff’d sub nom. Rosenberg, 169 N.E.3d 445; Patriarca, 295 F. Supp. 3d at 202–03 (same); Alcohol Found., 186 F. Supp. 2d at 463–64 & 464 n.4 (extensive compilation of publicly available facts creating “the ‘mosaic’ of information that shows a fraud” insufficient), aff’d, 53 F. App’x 153; Stinson, Lyons, Gerlin & Bustamante, 944 F.2d at 1160 (explaining that, if the reverse were true, “then a cryptographer who translated a ciphered document in a public court record would be an ‘original source,’ an unlikely interpretation of the phrase”); U.S. ex rel. Sirls v. Kindred Healthcare, Inc., 536 F. Supp. 3d 1, 7 (E.D. Pa. 2021) specialized expertise is not sufficient to overcome the first step of the public disclosure bar, neither does conducting an analysis based on such expertise qualify a relator as an original source.
[brief] Pa0087.  Section 4 of the Agreement states that Appellant, on behalf of himself and his Child Participant, “warrants that he/she has read this Agreement in its entirety, acknowledges that the Activities contain inherent risks which vary with the activity, … appreciates the types of injuries that may occur as a result of the Activities…, and asserts that participation is voluntary and that Participant knowingly assumes all risks inherent with the Activities. ”
[brief] (5T9-20 to 22).  Earlier in the night of October 7, 2020, police were called to the residence because [...] complained about the defendant making too much noise.  (5T29-19 to 23).  [...] leaves the residence.  (5T37-12 to 15).  While she was away, [...] calls her and advises her that the defendant was walking around with a butcher knife.
[brief] [...] received a five-year prison sentence subject to NERA, pursuant to a negotiated plea.  (Da 286)  [...] received a five-year flat prison sentence pursuant to a negotiated plea the included testifying against petitioner at trial.  (Da 290, 8T 26-3 to 12)  [...] was not even prosecuted.  Even considering that co-defendants either plead guilty or cooperated with the State, the 65 year disparity has no justification or explanation.
[brief] While under N.J.S.A. 20:3-38, The value of any land or other property being acquired in connection with development or redevelopment of a blighted area shall be no less than the value as of the date of the declaration of blight by the governing body upon a report by a planning board.  N.J.S.A. 20:3-38.  See also, Twp. of W. Windsor v. Nierenberg, 150 N.J. 111 (1997); Jersey City Redev. Agency v. Kugler, 58 N.J. 374 (1971); Hous. Auth. of Newark v. Ricciardi, 176 N.J. Super. 13 (App. Div. 1980).
[brief] [...], [...], AND [...] [...] [...] [...]/[...]  Attorneys for Defendants  Email: [...], [...]  [...], Esq.  Of counsel and on the brief NJ Attorney ID #032321983  Elliott J.  Almanza, Esq.  Of counsel and on the brief  NJ Attorney ID #017542012  TABLE OF CONTENTS  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS ...........................................................................................................  ii  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES.......................................................................................................  iii  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT .................................................................................................  1  PROCEDURAL HISTORY .......................................................................................................  3 STATEMENT OF FACTS .......................................................................................................  4 LEGAL ARGUMENT ..................................................................................................................  8  POINT ONE  THE LOWER COURT  CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT PROVIDING A CAUSE OF ACTION TO PLAINTIFF MEANS THAT TYLER IS GIVEN FULLY RETROACTIVE EFFECT, IN CONTRAVENTION OF ROBERTO (Ja410-416) .............................................................................................................  8  A: TYLER AND ROBERTO .................................................................................................  8 B: ROBERTO AS APPLIED TO THIS CASE .................................................................  9  C: NONE OF THE CASES  PLAINTIFF RELIES ON CALLS FOR A DIFFERENT RESULT .................................................................................................................................  11  D: THE NEW JERSEY RETROACTIVITY DOCTRINE DOES NOT SUPPORT FULLY RETROACTIVE APPLICATION OF TYLER .........................................................................................................................  14  POINT TWO  THE ENTIRE CONTROVERSY DOCTRINE  SEPARATELY MANDATED DISMISSAL OF THIS LAWSUIT (Raised Below, Not Addressed)  .................................................................................................................................  16  POINT  THREE PLAINTIFF'S NOTICE OF SUPPLEMENTAL AUTHORITY DOES NOT SUPPORT REVERSAL AND IT IS NOT EVEN PERSUASIVE (Not Raised Below)  .................................................................................................................................  22  CONCLUSION  ............................................................................................................................  24  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS, AND RULINGS BEING APPEALED
[brief] [...] submitted an Application for Subdivision approval and an Application for Site Plan approval at the same time.  Pa001-Pa077; Pa78-Pa119\(^1\).  The overall submission package contained certain reports and other material, including, but not limited to, an EIS.  Pa067; Pa097.  That EIS was reviewed by the Board Engineer, Planner, Traffic Engineer and various other Township professionals and [...] addressed all comments related to the document.
[brief] State v. Williams, No. A-2256-15T3, 2018 WL 2292999, at *4 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. May 21, 2018), rev’d and remanded, 240 N.J. 225 (2019).  (Dra131-134) does not point to any facts in the record to support the court’s findings but rather simply quotes the court’s recitation of the sequence of events that transpired during the [...] robbery.  (Sb15-16)  Particularly problematic are the court’s and State’s assertions that the court’s finding of factor 3A was justified because “[n]othing in the record suggests that Defendant obtained the handgun in order to carry out a robbery at the [...]. ”  (Da47; Sb15)  This suggests that in the absence of evidence to negate a finding of factor 3A—“the crimes and their objectives were predominantly independent of each other”—a court should find factor 3A and use it to justify a consecutive sentence.
[brief] Second, the trial court correctly determined that Goldsmith was not applicable and that officers had reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigatory stop.  The State asks this Court to affirm.  The Appellate Division reviews a trial judge's decision on whether to grant or deny a motion for rehearing or reconsideration under Rule 4:49-2\(^3\) (motion to alter or amend a judgment order) for an abuse of discretion.
[brief] Ignoring this indisputable fact, Plaintiff’s negligent misrepresentation claim depends on Plaintiff’s ability to enforce the PSA when it alleges that [...] chose to ignore Plaintiff’s inquiries about the closing and its efforts to proceed with the transaction, per the [PSA].” (Pa18, ¶89).  In essence, as admitted by its attorney, Plaintiff alleges that because [...] did not inform it of the date of the [...] closing, Plaintiff was unable to “pursue [its] rights” under the PSA.  (1T7:15-8:6; 1T10:16-23).  As a matter of law, however, none of these things can be said to have prevented Plaintiff from obtaining the Property, because Plaintiff no longer had the right to purchase the Property at the time of the [...] transaction.  As such, there can thus be no claim of “justifiable reliance” by Plaintiff upon a representation by [...] relating to Plaintiff’s decision to not exercise its rights under the PSA because the PSA was not in effect at the time the “misrepresentation” occurred.  Arcand v. Brother Int’l Corp., 673 F. Supp. 2d 282, 305-06 (D.N.J. 2009) (“A party reasonably relies on a misrepresentation where the ‘facts to the contrary were not obvious or did not provide a warning’” of the issue underlying the alleged misrepresentation) (quoting Nappe v. Anschelewitz, Barr, Ansell & Bonello, 189 N.J. Super. 347, 355 (App. Div.1983)).
[directive] A.  In-Service Training Program  The Division of Criminal Justice shall within ninety days of the effective date of this Directive develop human trafficking training programs for law enforcement officers and prosecutors.  The Division shall to the extent feasible make the training programs available on-line through the NJLEARN system.  The Division may from time to time develop additional human trafficking training programs and aids to facilitate implementation of this Directive and to achieve the goals of enhancing the thoroughness, timeliness, quality, and coordination of human trafficking investigations and prosecutions.  B.
[brief] *Ibid.* (applying res judicata); *First Union Nat’l Bank v. Penn Salem Marina, Inc.*, 190 N.J. 342, 252 (2007) (applying collateral estoppel).  1.  **Res judicata bars the relitigation of claims for stormwater runoff litigated in the [...]. **  The doctrine of res judicata bars plaintiff’s claim for property damage resulting from water runoff that plaintiff litigated to a final adjudication in the [...].  Res judicata applies when, first, the prior action resulted in a final judgment on the merits; second, the parties to the current claim are in privity with the parties to the earlier action; and, third, the claim in the current action involves the same occurrence as the claim in the earlier action.
[brief] Smith, 390 N.J. Super. 209, 215; Mount v. Bd. of Trs., P.E.R.S., 133 N.J. Super. 72, 86 (App.Div.1975) (recognizing that the members of “[t]he board of trustees are fiduciaries and therefore have a duty to protect the fund and the interests of all beneficiaries thereof,” which duty must be exercised “with due care, diligence and skill in administering the trust”).  Petitioner’s counsel disparages the Board’s decision by, among other things, depicting the Board as “mainly laymen” who purportedly lack legal training and sophistication, in contrast to the ALJ (Petitioner’s Br., pp. 7, 20, 23-24).  Counsel’s attempts to prejudice this Court by personal attacks on the Board are both improper and unsupported.
[brief] POINT III  THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY FINDING THAT THE ENTIRE CONTROVERSY DOCTRINE BARS PLAINTIFFS’ COMPLAINT  [Pa1 – Pa13]  The Entire Controversy Doctrine “seeks to impel litigants to consolidate their claims arising from a single controversy whenever possible. ”  Thornton v. Potamkin Chevrolet, 94 N.J. 1, 5 (1983) (citation omitted).  “[T]he boundaries of the entire controversy doctrine are not limitless.  It remains an equitable doctrine whose application is left to judicial discretion based on the factual circumstances of individual cases. ”  Brennan v. Orban, 145 N.J. 282, 291 (1996) (citing Mystic Isle Development Corp. v. Perskie & Nehmad, 142 N.J. 310 (1995)).  Nonetheless, New Jersey law is clear, that “[t]he entire controversy doctrine does not affect a plaintiff’s right to file a new action based on the same factual allegations as a prior action which has been dismissed without prejudice pursuant to Rule 4:37–1(a).  The entire controversy doctrine bars a subsequent action only when a prior action based on the same transactional facts has been tried to judgment or settled. ”  Arena v. Borough of Jamesburg, Middlesex County, 309 N.J. Super. 106, 111 (App. Div. 1998) (citing Kaselaan & D'Angelo Assocs., Inc. v. Soffian, 290 N.J.Super. 293, 299 (App. Div. 1996)) (emphasis added).  Indisputably, Plaintiffs’ Complaint is unaffected by the Entire Controversy Doctrine, as the Prior Litigation was dismissed by the parties without prejudice.  (See Pa150 – Pa152).  In the same manner that the Trial Court erred in applying the doctrine of res judicata, here too, the Trial Court erred by finding that the Entire Controversy Doctrine applies because “the Chancery Action has been adjudicated on the merits. ” (Pa12).  It is clear, from the face of the decision in the [...] Arbitration, that no claims asserted in Plaintiffs’ Complaint or in the Prior Litigation were adjudicated, at all.  (Compare Pa14 – Pa32 with Pa131 – Pa142).  While Plaintiffs’ claims here (and in the Prior Litigation) are premised upon [...]’s abuse of the judicial system through the use of the Forged Agreement and unabashed perjury, the [...] Arbitration focused upon an entirely separate nexus of facts.  In this regard, the [...] Arbitration focused upon: (i) whether distributions made by [...] were proper; (ii) whether [...] properly valued [...]; (iii) whether certain distributions from [...] were proper; and (iv) whether certain payments made by [...] were appropriate.  (See Pa135 – Pa139).  Clearly, nothing adjudicated in the [...] Arbitration arises from the same core nexus of facts as those asserted in Plaintiffs’ Complaint, or those asserted in the Prior Litigation, which was dismissed without prejudice.  As such, the Trial Court’s application of the Entire Controversy Doctrine was clearly erroneous.  Accordingly, this Court should reverse the decision of the Trial Court below, find the Entire Controversy Doctrine inapplicable, and reinstate Plaintiffs’ Complaint, in its entirety.
[brief] The trial court’s denial of [...]’s Motion to Compel was also correct.  “[A] trial court's factual findings in support of granting or denying a motion to [compel] must be upheld when ‘those findings are supported by sufficient credible evidence in the record. ’”  State v. C.J.L., 471 N.J. Super. 477, 483 (App. Div. 2022), quoting State v. Gamble, 218 N.J. 412, 424 (2014).  Since plaintiff’s discovery request is identical to the information plaintiff seeks to access under the OPRA and common law right of access, the Court shall not enlarge plaintiff’s right to those documents simply because plaintiff is now a litigant.
[brief] ”).  This is particularly true here given the innocuous nature of the debt collection letter in question and Respondent’s use of a letter vendor.  This Court should therefore uphold the decision of numerous state and federal courts finding that Appellant’s letter vendor theory has little to do with the purposes of the statute and is itself an abuse of the FDCPA legislation.  *See e.g., In re FDCPA Mailing Vendor Cases*, 551 F. Supp. 3d 57, 59-61 (E.D.N.Y. 2021) (explaining how the letter vendor theory and other recent FDCPA claims are attempts to apply the FDCPA in ways Congress never imagined or intended, and themselves are an abuse of the law.).
[brief] Application of the *Yarbough* factors clearly indicates that the homicide and the robberies were part of a single incident, warranting the imposition of concurrent sentences.  Under *Yarbough*, sentencing judges must consider the following factors to determine whether to impose consecutive or concurrent sentences: (a) whether the crimes and their objectives were independent of one another; (b) whether the crimes involved separate acts of violence or threats of violence; (c) whether the crimes were committed at different times or separate places, rather than being committed so closely in time as to indicate a single period of aberrant behavior; (d) whether the crimes involved multiple victims; and (e) whether the convictions for which the sentences are to be imposed are numerous.  *Yarbough*, 100 N.J. at 643-44.  Among the most important factors in determining whether sentences are to be concurrent or consecutive is whether the offenses were "predominantly independent of each other."  See *State v. Lester*, 271 N.J. Super. 289, 293 (App. Div. 1994) (holding “[w]here separate crimes grow out of the same series of events or the same factual nexus, consecutive sentences are not imposed. ”)  Here, the robberies and the homicide were not “predominantly independent of each other” where the shooting that killed [...] began when [...], the individual in the yellow jacket, attempted to flee the ongoing robbery.