ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] -i'J~.Q.]%~~78~-i'J~.Q.]~1tl~~~~-1•~~~~~4£•~~~47s~~t"~¾g~- 31 0}1l cl g i:!. 1} 9-t" Y 77}?  ~  If  Have you discussed with an attorney the potential immigration consequences of your plea?  [Yes/ofl]  [No/01-1...]..8..]  d.  If the answer is "No," proceed to question 17e. the answer is "Yes," proceed to question 17f.
[brief] [...] contends that because the Holding Company Act’s definition of “insurer” does not expressly mention reciprocal exchanges, they are exempted from the definition of “insurer. ” (Ab23).  That simplistic formulation ignores the fact that the statutory definition does not enumerate any specific types of entities that come within the term “insurer. ”  Rather, it is a broad definition, which includes any person or type of entity authorized to transact the business of insurance in New Jersey.  It cannot be denied that [...], as well as other reciprocal exchanges, are authorized to (and do) transact the business of insurance in this State; therefore, they are included in the Holding Company Act’s definition of “insurer.
[brief] C.  The Court Should Reject [...]'s Attempt to Invoke the Parol Evidence Rule  While the parties agree that the express language of the Consent Order is clear and unambiguous, [...] nonetheless attempts a "Hail Mary" to craft an alternative narrative, in the event that this Court properly reverses the decision of the Trial Court.  Specifically, [...] argues that the Court should consider parol evidence to change the contents of the Consent Order.  [...]'s argument is without merit, and should be rejected for two reasons.  First, as the Consent Order is clear and unambiguous, the Parol Evidence Rule bars [...] from introducing extrinsic evidence in an attempt to vary the terms of the Consent Order.  See e.g. Atlantic Northern Airlines v. Schwimmer, 12 N.J. 293 (1953) (“The admission of evidence of extrinsic facts is not for the purpose of changing the writing, but to secure light by which to measure its actual significance. ”).  Second, even if the Court were to consider the e-mail attached to counsel's certification, which it should not, that document fails to create an ambiguity in the clear language of the Consent Order, which would permit the Court to consider evidence outside of the four corners of the Consent Order.  See e.g. Conway v. 287 Corporate Ctr. Assocs., 187 N.J. 259, 268–70 (2006) (holding that resorting to parol evidence is improper where, as here, a contract is clear an unambiguous).  [...] argues that counsel's statement – referencing a "filing deadline" – operates as a term in the Consent Order.  (See Pa115).  It does not.  Instead, consistent with Plaintiffs' position throughout this litigation, counsel's e-mail statement – concerning a "filing deadline" – references the deadline to file a new action under the Consent Order while still receiving the benefit of tolling.  (See Pa115).  As such, counsel's statement is consistent, does not alter the plain meaning of the Consent Order, and should not serve as a basis to dismiss Plaintiffs' Complaint.  D.
[brief] *Midland Funding LLC v. Thiel*, 446 N.J. Super. 537, 549 (App. Div. 2016) (quoting *Douglass v. Convergent Outsourcing*, 765 F.3d 299, 303 (3d Cir. 2014)).  The first three elements determine whether the FDCPA applies to the defendant’s conduct and the last element determines whether that conduct violates the consumer’s statutory rights.  Here, Defendant does not challenge that the Plaintiff is a consumer, Defendant is a debt collector, or that Defendant’s conduct involves a “debt. ”  Instead, the dispute is over the fourth element: whether Defendant violated a provision of the FDCPA.
[brief] [...] IN SUPPORT OF ITS CROSS-APPEAL AND IN OPPOSITION TO APPELLANT’S APPEAL  [...]  Headquarters  Plaza  [...] (973)  538-0800  Attorneys for Defendant-Cross-Appellant, Old Republic National Title Insurance Company Of Counsel: [...], (No. 030491988)  On the Brief: [...]  (No. 021012002)  Submitted: May 15, 2024
[brief] \(^{11}\)  [...] received $418,779,890 in actual K-12 formula aid in FY2017.  (Aa1108; Aa1459; Aa1872).  The FY2019 Appropriations Act also required that “[a]ny reduction in State aid pursuant to this provision shall first be deducted from the amount of adjustment aid in the school district’s March 2018 aid notice.
[brief] This is the same situation here.  Plaintiff incurring $449,798.59 in attorney fees and costs was for the purpose to obtain an entirely new judgment of divorce, which is unrelated to the original judgment.  (See Da180-193)  This new judgment was not an amended PSA or an amended judgment to fix the errors that were allegedly caused by Defendants’ negligence.  Defendants’ error in the underlying matrimonial case, if any, was harmless to the Plaintiff.  In addition, the purpose of a legal malpractice claim is to put the plaintiff in as good a position as he or she would have been had the attorney kept his or her contract.
[brief] Compare DepoLink, 430 N.J. Super. at 339 (“Debt collection activities on behalf of a third party who may have sold merchandise are not unconscionable activities ‘in connection with the sale’ of merchandise. ”), with Gonzalez, 207 N.J. at 577-78, 582 (“[C]ollecting or enforcing a loan, whether by the lender or its assignee, constitutes the ‘subsequent performance’ of a loan, an activity falling within the coverage of the CFA .  . . .  We roundly reject defendants' argument that the collection activities of a servicing agent . . . do not amount to the ‘subsequent performance’ of a loan, a covered activity under the CFA. ”).  Lastly, Defendants assert that Plaintiff suffered no ascertainable loss, arguing that “Appellant’s sole basis for pleading an ascertainable loss is that she received and reviewed the [...] . . .
[brief] ”  *Grasso*, supra, at 49 (citing *Cell S. of N.J., Inc.*, supra, at 83).  For instance, in *Medici v. BPR Co.*, 107 N.J. 1 (1987), the New Jersey Supreme Court established the appropriate standard of review for a conditional use variance pursuant to *N.J.S.A.* 40:55D-70(d)(1), which requires the zoning board of adjustment to find: that the use promotes the general welfare because the proposed site is particularly suitable for the proposed use... that the grant of a use variance is not inconsistent with the intent and purpose of the master plan and zoning ordinance... [and that] the variance ‘will not substantially impair the intent and purpose of the zone plan and zoning ordinance.
[directive] 8  According to the AOC, that number has risen to approximately 6,700 because system’s of the court inability to conduct trials during the pandemic.  Space limitations have also played a significant role.  Twenty or more individuals must be present in the courtroom to conduct a single-defendant trial.  When the Judiciary restarted in-person trials in June 2021, with six feet of social distancing in place, few courtrooms throughout the State were large enough to house a criminal trial.  See Sup. Ct. of N.J., Resumption of Certain In-Person Jury Trials Effective June 15, 2021; Prioritization of Criminal Trials That Involve Detained Defendants, at 1 (May 11, 2021 Order); Notice -- COVID-19 -- Criminal and Civil Jury Trials -- Public Information and Guidance Pursuant to the Supreme Court’s May 11, 2021 Order, at 7 (May 19, 2021).  Even with social distancing relaxed to three feet in March 2022, Sup. Ct. of N.J., Conclusion of Masking and Social Distancing Requirements in Judiciary Facilities; Adjustments to Jury and Grand Jury Proceedings (Mar. 9, 2022 Order), many courtrooms still cannot accommodate a criminal trial.
[brief] So, she endorses it.  Since she is on board, we thought it wise to ask [...] to speak to [...].  She spoke to [[...]’s] [...], he is ok with it, although initially wanted a 15% setaside, rounding up, that would mean 2 of the 10 would be AH units.  In a response email, Pa187, which specifically included [...] on the distribution list, [...] responded:  Thank you, [Board counsel].  I have the draft resolution which will be going out later today or tomorrow for your review.  [To Court Master]  [...], Avalon will do the elevator in the final MF family building with the additional units.  But that requires another story to be added, which requires an amended settlement agreement and then an amended ordinance to avoid a D variance.
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT’S RULING  Following trial, the court issued an Order and Opinion dated May 22, 2023 granting [...]’s quiet title cause of action.  [...]’s remaining causes of action, including fraud, conspiracy to commit fraud, fraudulent conveyance, unjust enrichment, and punitive damages were denied.  Similarly, the Court’s Order and Opinion denied all of the Appellant/Cross-Respondents’ counterclaims and affirmative defenses.
[brief] Seigelstein, 464 N.J. Super. at 406, n. 6; RPC 1.5(a).  The party seeking attorney’s fees has the burden of proving that its fee request is reasonable, which burden can be satisfied by submitting evidence in the form of a certification supporting the hours worked and the rates claimed.  Seigelstein, 464 N.J. Super. at 407; Walker, 209 N.J. at 131.  While the trial judge may reduce the hourly rates of a prevailing party’s attorneys and paralegals, such reduction must be based upon the above analysis and may not be based solely upon the judge’s personal experience.  Seigelstein, 464 N.J. Super. at 408; Walker, 209 N.J. at 147.  Here, Landlord’s Fee Application meets the above-standards and should have been granted in its entirety.
[brief] This appeal involves the death of [...] while a patient at defendant, [...].  Plaintiff, his daughter and executrix of his estate, [...], brought claims for negligence against the defendant and its nursing staff and for violations of Mr. Boehm’s rights pursuant to the Nursing Home Responsibilities and Rights of Residents Act (“NHA”).  After a trial spread out over three weeks, the jury found defendant had violated the standard of care, but its failures were not a proximate cause of Mr. Boehm’s death.  The jury also found that the nursing staff did not violate the standard of care and that there was no violation of Mr. Boehm’s rights under the NHA.  Plaintiff appeals the jury’s verdict and the denial of her motion for a new trial because of several erroneous evidentiary rulings of the trial court, the effect of which was to deprive plaintiff of a fair trial.
[brief] Defendant's attorneys ent a letter requesting $35,517.70, plus costs of $352.33, on account of the motion.  (Pa 82)\(^1\)  The letter was not submitted to court, and did not contain any documentation to support the fee claim on Defendant's motion to dismiss in lieu of an answer.  (Pa 82)  Plaintiff timely filed a notice of appeal on June 20, 2024.  (Pa 85)  On June 25, 2024, the Law Division filed an amended order which included a statement of reasons.  (Pa 3)  Plaintiff filed a notice of motion to amend its notice of appeal to include the supplemental order.  The amendment was important since the original notice of appeal focused on the fact no statement of reasons, findings of fact, or conclusions of law from the Law Division.  (Pa 88)  On July 19, 2024, the Appellate Division granted Plaintiff's motion authorizing the amended notice of appeal and case information statement.  (Pa 92)  Plaintiff promptly filed its amended notice of appeal and case information statement on July 23, 2024.  (Pa 93 and Pa 98)  \(^1\)  The document has been redacted to exclude bank account information.
[brief] Plaintiff was dissatisfied with the decision of the Dispute Resolution Professional and filed an a summary complaint in the Superior Court, Law Division, resulting in [...]’s December 8, 2023 order confirming the arbitration award.  (Pa36)  Under N.J.S.A. 2A:23A-18(b), there is no right to a further appeal of that determination in this or any other court.  Section N.J.S.A. 2A:23A-18(b) reads:  Upon the granting of an order confirming, modifying or correcting an award, a judgment or decree shall be entered by the court in conformity therewith and be enforced as any other judgment or decree.  There shall be no further appeal or review of the judgment or decree.  [N.J.S.A. 2A:23A-18(b) (emphasis supplied.)]  Furthermore, an arbitration under AICRA, such as the present matter, is required to follow APDRA.  N.J.A.C 39:6A-5.1, Also, Allstate Ins. Co. v. Sabato, 380 N.J. Super. 463, 470 (App. Div. 2005) (noting that the Commissioner of Banking and Insurance may promulgate rules and regulations respecting the conduct of PIP dispute resolutions); Coal. for Quality Health Care v. New Jersey Dep't of Banking & Ins., 348 N.J. Super. 272, 312 (App. Div. 2002) (noting that the regulation adopting APDRA was authorized by AICRA, and properly approved by the Commissioner.)
[brief] The decision whether to impose concurrent or consecutive sentences for multiple offenses is often the single most important decision that “drives the real-time outcome at sentencing. ”  State v. Zuber, 227 N.J. 422, 449 (2017).  In this case, the Court’s finding that a consecutive sentence was justified under Yarbough because the crimes and their objectives were predominantly independent of each other, the crimes were committed at different times, and there were multiple victims was unsupported by the facts or by Yarbough or its progeny.
[brief] It is well-established in precedent that a court may only reconsider a prior decision if: “it has expressed its decision based upon a palpably incorrect or irrational basis, or [. . .] it is obvious that the court either did not consider, or failed to appreciate the significance of probative, competent evidence. ”  Guido v. Duane Morris LLP, 202 N.J. 79, 87-88 (2010) (emphasis added).  A court may exercise its discretion to reconsider such decisions “in the interest of justice. ”  R. 4:42-2(b).  Moreover, until the end of suit, a trial court “has complete power over its interlocutory orders and may revise them when it would be consonant with the interests of justice to do so.
[brief] Likewise, the record is devoid of any mention of blame cast upon [...] by [...] for the happening of the accident.  Any assertion that [...] has “thrown [...] under the bus,” is imaginary.  Moreover, any argument by the Respondents that the “miscommunication theory” was a fabricated maneuver that was orchestrated by [...], is simply disingenuous.  [...] used the term “miscommunication” upon being questioned at his deposition about his use of the paved cut-through:  Q: Why did you use the emergency vehicle turnaround at 87.5?  A: Because I was instructed to use the turnaround by the foreman on the job.  It was a **miscommunication**, I thought that that was the one I was supposed to use when there was one further back over the grass that he was talking about.  Q: Who was this person that instructed you?  A: [...]. \(^1\)  Q: [...] told you to use a turnaround, but you made a mistake and you used the emergency vehicle turnaround at 87.5 instead of the grass covered turnaround which is closer to 84 and 85, yes?  [...]: Object to the form.  He can answer it.  A: Yes.  [Da46, 27:10-25 (emphasis added). ]  If anything has been fabricated within this litigation, it is the assertion that [...]’s dual representation of [...] and [...] presents a direct, concurrent conflict of interest.  In fact, the Respondents have failed to put forth any evidence contained within the record wherein [...] and [...] utilized adverse legal positions, wherein they assigned responsibility to the other, or wherein each attempted to distance themselves to the detriment of the other.
[brief] 356a-357s (39:18-4014).  Even though the Assignment and Assumption Agreement set forth that Defendant [...] would no longer represent Plaintiff [...] or [...], Defendant [...] continued to advise Plaintiff [...] on the [...] transaction.  449a-452a (132:21-135:19).  Indeed, Defendant [...] advised Plaintiff [...] that [...] had provided him with a Notice of Termination if [...] did not consummate the sale with [...].  449a-452a (132:21-135:19).  Plaintiff [...] was left “upside down”: because of [...]’s default he no longer had a buyer for his interest in [...], he could no longer qualify as a COAH developer and had lost his opportunity to develop the project, and [...] was now threatening to hold [...] in default unless it closed on the 2006 Assignment and Assumption Agreement.
[brief] Any attorney would know that the OAE’s extensive investigation and complaint against [...], culminating in findings of fact that he engaged in intentional misconduct and made misrepresentations to the OAE, involved a “disciplinary proceeding. ”  ii.  Even if the Applications did ask about a “Disciplinary Proceeding,” the Disciplinary Action constitutes a “Disciplinary Proceeding” and should have been disclosed.  (19)  Even if “disciplinary proceeding” in the 2016 Application had the same meaning as the bolded and capitalized term in the 2016 Policy, the Firm was required to disclose the Disciplinary Action in the 2016 Application (and having failed to do that, in the subsequent renewal Applications) because it constitutes a “Disciplinary Proceeding,” i.e. a “proceeding initiated by a . . . disciplinary . . . board . . . to investigate charges made against an Insured alleging professional misconduct in the performance of or failure to perform Legal Services.
[brief] (Pa 367).  And the 2016 agreement again unambiguously placed responsibility for all maintenance and repair upon the tenant, repeating the same language as in the earlier lease:  Repairs.  Section 9.01  The tenant shall keep the lease premises, including but not limited to, the roof, exterior walls, windows, plumbing, electrical, HVAC, parking areas, driveways, storm sewers, lighting, and sidewalks, in good condition and repair and shall redecorate, paint and renovate the lease premises as may be necessary to keep them in good condition and repair and in good appearance.
[brief] ’”  Loigman v. Twp. Committee, 185 N.J. 566 (2006) (quoting Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 334-35 (1983)).  While the privilege was typically asserted by attorneys to shield them from defamation claims arising from comments made during judicial proceedings, the privilege has since been expanded to encompass “unconventional and sometimes novel causes of action” within the judicial process, often including claims for negligence, abuse of process, conspiracy, and fraud, among other things.  Id. at 583 (citing [...], Absolute Immunity from Civil Liability: Lessons for Litigation Lawyers, 31 Pepp. L. Rev. 915, 928 (2004)).  Here, to the extent that they had any involvement in the criminal action, the State Defendants are entitled not only to absolute judicial and prosecutorial immunity (to be discussed next), but they are also entitled to immunity by virtue of the litigation privilege.
[brief] The State's account of the circumstances of [...]'s arrest came from the testimony of [...].  According to Monaghan, while on duty on the night in question, he heard radio reports of shots being fired.  As he and his partner, [...], were driving towards the scene of the incident, he heard a “radio transmission[ ] of a foot pursuit going south on MLK Drive now going west on Dwight” Street.  Heading towards Dwight Street and Bergen Avenue, Monaghan “observed a black male standing on the … northeast corner of Dwight and Bergen” and “heard transmissions from officers that were coming west on Dwight that that's him on the corner. ”  *5  This individual, later identified as [...], was the only person on the street.  Monaghan and Minervini stepped out of their marked police vehicle, drew their weapons, and ordered Rodney to show his hands.  Instead of doing so, however, Rodney “nonchalantly just walked across Bergen Avenue to the other side never taking his hands out of his pockets” and informed the officers that he was “just here to see [his] son … in front of the building. ”  Monaghan walked across the street and, because the suspect had refused to show the officers his hands, Monaghan “kicked the individual in his chest, put [his] service weapon away” and “turned him over on his stomach and [ ] started to pat him down. ”  Rodney was then transported to the [...] where he was treated for a gunshot wound.
[brief] While defendant failed to preserve this objection below yielding plain error review, defendant nevertheless unsuccessfully made the argument to the jury, and the facts --- \(^3\) State v. Fair, 256 N.J. 213 (2024).  elicited at trial showed quite definitively that the result would not have been different.  A jury charge is presumed to be proper when it tracks the model jury charge verbatim because the process to adopt model jury charges is “comprehensive and thorough. ”  State v. R.B., 183 N.J. 308, 325 (2005).  Generally, the failure to object to jury instructions when given constitutes a waiver of the right to challenge the instruction on appeal.
[brief] Furthermore, “[t]he past practice of the contracting parties is entitled to ‘great weight’ in determining the meaning of ambiguous or doubtful contractual terms. ”  *Hall*, 125 N.J. at 306 (citing *Kennedy v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp.*, 16 N.J. 280, 294 (1954)); *Bd. of Educ. v. Woodstown-Pilesgrove Reg’l Educ. Ass’n*, 164 N.J. Super. 106, 109-10, (App. Div. 1978).
[directive] (a)  Any firearm discharge by agency personnel, whether on-duty or off-duty, unless the discharge occurred during the course of (1) a law enforcement training exercise; (2) routine target practice at a firing range; (3) a lawful animal hunt; or (4) the humane killing of an injured animal; or Biehunik v. Felicetta, 441 F.2d 228 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 932 (1971).  5  INTERNAL AFFAIRS POLICY & PROCEDURES | November 2022 41  (b)  Any discharge of an agency-owned firearm by anyone other than agency personnel.  7.11.2  Upon receiving notice, the internal affairs function shall determine whether additional investigation is necessary and whether information must be reported to the [...] and/or [...], pursuant to AG Directive 2019-4, also known as the “Independent Prosecutor Directive,” and other state law.
[directive] Pursuant to my authority as chief law enforcement officer of the State of New Jersey, and to ensure uniform statewide compliance with the requirements set forth in the Supreme Court,s ruling in State v. W.B., __ N.J___~. __ (2011), I hereby issue the following Directive:  A.  DEFINITIONS  For the purposes of this Directive: 1.  The term "contemporaneous notes" means any notation, whether handwritten, typed, entered into an electronic note-taking device or audio recorded, that describes or memorializes the note taker’s personal perception of what transpired in the course of a witness interview or that memorializes the officer’s personal observations at the scene of the crime.  The term includes notations made after the witness interview, provided that they memorialize the officer’s personal recollection of what transpired during the interview.  The term does not include, among other things, notations concerning investigative tasks to be accomplished a "to do" list), references to (i.e., New Jersey L~" An Equal Opportunity Employer.
[brief] See Smith v. Millville Rescue Squad, 225 N.J. 373, 394 (2016).  Here, Defendants suspended Plaintiff and falsely branded him as a racist as a direct result of his enforcing the law on July 5, 2016 and his refusal to refrain from his sworn duty to do so.  The record is sufficiently demonstrative of Defendants’ retaliatory intent, including [...]’s comments in August 2017 at public Township Committee meetings that Defendants sought to ensure Plaintiff never returned to work, in the context of discussing non-existent allegations of racial profiling against Plaintiff.
[brief] Exhibit A to Certification, First Amended Complaint, filed September 11, 2023 (omitted here – see 44a)  -- Exhibit B to Certification, Commercial Excess and Umbrella Insurance Policy, filed September 11, 2023  90a  Exhibit C to Certification, [...], [...] policy, filed September 11, 2023  163a (Volume 2 of 3 – Ja181 to Ja360)