ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] For more than twelve years, our State judicial and executive branches have avoided adjudicating on non-preclusive lack of standing subject matter jurisdiction dismissal grounds whether our State Legislature intended to repeal and to replace the non-urban renewal entity [...] long term tax exemption statutory scheme effective April 17, 1992.  In addition, our State judicial and executive branches have avoided adjudicating whether [...] failed to monitor and to collect all long term tax exemption revenues due the County under post April 17, 1992 long term tax exemption laws, rules and regulations.  This Appeal represents our State judicial and executive branches latest efforts not to touch these radioactive statutory interpretation third rail issues.  This Appeal arises, in part, from four post-remand pre-answer pre-discovery lack of standing dismissals with prejudice orders of plaintiff’s entire 69 pages 434 paragraphs  Eight Counts hybrid prerogative writ/declaratory judgment/civil rights act violations complaint.  This Appeal also arises from a trial court shirking its judicial umpire responsibilities and failing to analyze separately and distinctly each prerogative writ, declaratory judgment and civil rights act violations count and cause of action including distinct declaratory, injunctive, equitable and monetary remedies sought thereunder.  In addition, this Appeal involves whether certain non-State related executive and legislative branch defendants breached their sworn oaths of office to execute and to enforce our State Constitution and certain post April 17, 1992 long term tax exemption laws, rules and regulations.  This Appeal also involves whether these non-State related executive and legislative branch defendants could retain the same defense attorney to represent them simultaneously.  The trial court avoided this preliminary disqualifying conflict of interest/appearance of impropriety issue on mootness grounds.  Plaintiff also alleged that defendants deprived him of substantive rights, privileges and immunities secured by our State Constitution and certain post April 17, 1992 long term tax exemption laws, rules and regulations.  In addition, this Appeal involves the boundaries of legitimate legal advocacy.  This Appeal involves whether defendants-fiduciaries of a public trust-transgressed these boundaries.  This Appeal ultimately involves preserving trust and confidence in our judicial system and disavowing the impression that the judiciary denies equal justice under the law and places its thumbs upon the scales of justice in favor of public fiduciaries.  Since the commencement of this hybrid prerogative writ/declaratory judgment/civil rights act violations case on April 8, 2019, our State Legislature repealed the statutory rights of third-party taxpayers to contest in the Tax Court the validity of a long term tax exemption granted in their taxing district.
[brief] [...]’s third and fifth arguments are closely linked because they are both concerned with negative externalities that are at the heart of the second prong of the Grasso special reasons proofs, as well as the negative criteria.  In his third argument, [...]s asserted that there would be little detriment to the public good or impairment of the zone plan as a result of the proposed development, which he asserted would have only minimal impacts on light, air, noise and the intensity of the development.
[brief] You also have some buildings to the north and to the west that are generally around 39 feet.  While we are above that, the uniqueness of the design that I was referencing and with the architectural design what we’ve done is the top floor, the fifth floor, is actually a slightly smaller floor when compared to the floors below it.  So, what we’ve done we’ve sort of shrunk that top floor from the outside in so that it doesn’t have the appearance of just a gigantic building.  So, we have a lot of the façade elements that you see that provide depth and variety to the building elements and we also have a top floor that is inset.  So, I believe that the increase in setbacks to that top floor softens the overall building height.  [...] testified as to the proposed special reasons height variance under (d)(6), many of the special reasons overlap in support of the application:
[directive] Rule 3:26-2  Bail for all other offenses may be set by any other judge, or in proceeding or a person arrested under 2C:29-9b for violating a domestic violence restraining Authority to Set Bail. the absence of a judge, by a municipal court administrator or deputy court administrator.  Notably, the Rule does not require a Superior Court judge to set bail on any of the enunciated offenses when the defendant is charged solely with an attempt to commit that crime or a conspiracy to commit that crime.  Hence, such attempt or conspiracy charges may be set by a Municipal Court judge or, in the absence of the judge, a municipal court administrator or deputy court administrator.  This Rule provides for proceedings to be conducted by a Superior Court judge in a matter where either the prosecutor or defense counsel is concerned that a Rule 3:26-3 person with material and relevant information in a pending case may fail to respond to a subpoena.
[brief] (Da23-Da27)  This was Defendant’s fourth DWI.  On February 8, 2013, Defendant appeared with counsel at the [...] and entered a negotiated plea of guilty.  (1T5-6 to 7-2)  The Hon. [...], J.M.C., accepted Defendant’s plea and sentenced him to 10 years’ loss of driving privileges; 180 days in [...], 90 days of which would be served at an inpatient rehab program; $1006.00 fine; $33.00 costs; $200.00 DWI surcharge; $50.00 VCCB; $75.00 --- 1
[brief] ”  S.S., 229 N.J. at 382-83.  “Unless the suspect makes clear that he is not invoking his right to remain silent, questioning may not resume. ”  Id. at 383.  Thus, “[w]here the invocation of the right to remain silent is followed by no interruption in questioning, and where the interrogation continues as if nothing had happened, the right is not scrupulously honored. ”  Id. at 384.  Although a suspect may reinitiate questioning himself, such re-initiation must be entirely “of his or her own volition,” *State v. Kucinski*, 227 N.J. 603, 622 (2017), and “a suspect does not ‘reinitiate’ discussions when the suspect’s comments are made during the course of an ongoing interrogation” that never stopped in the first place, *Rivas*, 251 N.J. at 156-57 (discussing re-initiation after invoking the right to counsel).
[brief] ”  Id.  The Plaintiff’s record request was only made under OPRA and did not include a request under the common law right of access.  On April 19, 2022, the Plaintiff filed the verified complaint alleging an improper denial of access under OPRA relating to the unreleased criminal investigatory record.  (Da3).  Prior to filing the verified complaint, the Plaintiff never requested information pertaining to a criminal investigation, nor was the Township’s custodian given an opportunity to supply such information.  (Da53 at T20:2-5).  In fact, the Plaintiff drafted its verified complaint on April 8, 2022, which was four days before the Township’s response period elapsed and the Plaintiff received the Township’s timely response.  (Da93).  LEGAL ARGUMENT
[brief] SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION Docket No. [...]  Civil Action  On appeal from [...]  Bergen County Law Division, Special Civil Part Sat Below: Hon. [...], J.S.C. PLAINTIFF/RESPONDENT’S SECOND AMENDED  BRIEF AND APPENDIX  [...] – BAR ID# [...]  [...]  [...]  Attorney appearing pro se as Plaintiff/Respondent  [...]  On the brief TABLE OF CONTENTS FOR THE SECOND AMENDED
[brief] In a half-hearted attempt to contest these facts, [...] claims it plans to move forward with an “alternative site[]” where the “Borough Engineer believes [it] is suitable for between eight (8) and twelve (12) units” surrounding “wetlands,” purportedly allowing for a “about a 60x120’ building. ”  [...]’s two-page argument on this point is asserted as fact without a single record citation or basis in the record below.
[directive] A review of Department payroll records indicates that [...] did request and was granted a full day sick leave on March 7, 2022.  When interviewed, the Officer confirmed that he did play golf on that date at approximately 3:15 pm.  However, he had two medical appointments earlier that day and did not return home until around 2 pm.  Since Department policy only permits leave to be taken in ½ day increments and his appointments took longer than ½ day, the Officer was aware he would be charged a full day of sick leave.  However, the policy further provides that Officers do not need to return to work for unused leave if it is less than ½ day.  Therefore, he contacted a friend to play golf.  The Officer also provided written documentation of his medical appointments.  Finding: Exonerated
[brief] On that same note, it was also primarily the government which relied on [...]’s statement during closing argument, going so far as to re-play a portion in the State’s summation.  (27T 76-1 to 80-6)  To the extent that defense counsel referenced the defendant’s statement after it had been introduced into evidence by the prosecutor, “defense counsel did not precipitate the error, but was responding to the prosecutor’s line of inquiry on direct examination.
[brief] Here, plaintiff challenged the underlying validity of the non-urban renewal entity long term tax exemption under post April 17, 1992 long term tax exemption laws, rules and regulations.  Here, plaintiff sought to compel the County to monitor and to collect all long term tax exemption revenues due the County under State law.  Also see, Dobco Inc. v. Bergen County Improvement Authority, 250 N.J. 396 (2022) (per curiam) (finding an individual principal officer had individual taxpayer standing to seek injunctive and declaratory relief challenging the validity of a public bid award).  All residents are entitled to equal protection and uniform consistency under the law.  Municipalities are creatures of State law.  Financially distressed municipalities lack the statutory discretion and authority to disobey the law and to favor certain developers over others.  Long term tax exemptions are discretionary legislative actions.  See, Millenium Towers v. Municipal Council, 343 N.J. Super. 367 (Law Div. 2001).  Today, all post April 17, 1992 long term tax exemptions must be governed by the same State preemptive “exclusive” enabling statute: the Long Term tax Exemption Law (“LTTEL”).
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ADMITTED THE CARDMEMBER AGREEMENT AND ACCOUNT STATEMENTS INTO EVIDENCE AS AN EXCEPTION TO THE HEARSAY RULE COMMONLY KNOWN AS THE BUSINESS RECORDS EXCEPTION  [NOT RAISED BELOW]  Plaintiff respectfully submits that [...] properly admitted and considered Plaintiff’s Certification and the documentation annexed thereto under the business records exception.  Hearsay is defined as “a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted. ”  N.J.R.E 801(c).  “Hearsay is not admissible except as provided by these rules or other law. ”  N.J.R.E. 802.  The New Jersey Rules of Evidence set forth various exceptions to the inadmissibility of hearsay from evidence.  Business records are generally admissible as an exception to hearsay.  N.J.R.E. 806(c)(6).  Plaintiff’s Certification was executed by a “litigation support coordinator” who was “familiar with the books and records of the plaintiff in this matter. ”  PA – 47.  Plaintiff’s Certification had annexed thereto “statements, exhibits, and supporting documents” that were “copies produced from [Plaintiff’s] records. ”  PA – 47.  Plaintiff’s Certification was based upon a review of Plaintiff’s “system to ensure that the [statements, exhibits, and supporting documents] accurately reflect the status of this account”.  PA – 47.  Plaintiff respectfully submits that such facts provided a sufficient foundation for Plaintiff’s Certification, and the documentation annexed thereto, to qualify as business records and an exception to the hearsay rule.  N.J.R.E. 803(c)(6).  In fact, Defendant does not challenge their trustworthiness, i.e., that those documents are not what they are proffered to be.  D)
[brief] As for judges, the courts recounted, “[t]he principle animating the common law at the time of the Fourth Amendment’s framing was clear: a warrant may travel only so far as the power of its issuing official. ”  Krueger, 809 F.3d at 1123-24 ([...], J., concurring) (“[W]arrants issued by justices of the peace—county officials empowered to act only within their respective counties—were executable only within those same limited bounds. ” (citations omitted)).  For example, [...] “wrote that a warrant is valid only ‘within the jurisdiction of the justice granting or backing the same. ’”  Henderson, 906 F.3d at 1116 (quoting 2 Matthew Hale, Historia Placitorum Coronae 110 n.6 (1736)); accord Engleman, 546 F.3d at 948 (“At the time the Bill of Rights was adopted, a warrant issued in one English county was not valid in another county unless a justice of the peace in that county ‘backed’ the warrant. ”).  As well, “[...] later recognized the same principle in his canonical treatise on American constitutional law: in order for a reasonable search or seizure to be made, ‘a warrant must issue; and this implies . . . a court or magistrate empowered by the law to grant it. ’”  Henderson, 906 F.3d at 1116 (quoting [...], The General Principles of Constitutional Law in the United States of America 210 (1880)).
[brief] As noted in Point II, supra, the judge chose to split the verdict on official misconduct into two questions: (1) a “Guilty/Not Guilty” question on all of the non-benefit elements of that crime, and (2) a separate “Yes/No” question on the benefit element.  (Da 13 to 14)  The same thing was done with the theft count, asking two questions: (1) a “Guilty/Not Guilty” question on the ordinary elements of theft and (2) a separate “Yes/No” question on the issue of whether the wallet ID was a “public record or writing. ”  (Da 14)  Two problems immediately are evident from the approach that was used.  First, while the judge told the jury to vote “not guilty” if they had a reasonable doubt, she never told them that that same burden of proof governed the “Yes/No” questions.  Second, submitting the elements of a crime in individual “Yes/No” format violates the decision in State v. Simon, 79 N.J. 191, 204 (1979), which reversed convictions for that very error.  With respect to both errors, defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial, his Fourteenth Amendment rights to a fair trial and due process, and his corresponding state-constitutional rights were violated, and his convictions\textsuperscript{15} should be reversed and the matter remanded for retrial.
[brief] (39024a-89a)  [...]’ assertion that [...]’s lodestar should be reduced for work done in connection with his unsuccessful cross-appeal (Db44) – which contention fails to address [...]’s counsel’s work in defending the Wilfs’ appeal – is wrong as a matter of law.  Courts uniformly have held that a reduction of the lodestar would be inappropriate where, as here, in order to obtain a favorable result on his successful claims, a plaintiff “had to litigate everything else. ”  See e.g. Eichenlaub v. Twp. of Indiana, 214 F. App’x 218, 222 (3d Cir. 2007); Abrams v. Lightolier Inc., 50 F.3d 1204, 1222 (3d Cir. 1995).  See also L.T. v. Mansfield Twp. Sch. Dist., 2009 WL 1971329 (D.N.J. 2009); and Tran v. Tran, 166 F. Supp. 2d 793, 802-03 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).  Finally and contrary to the Wilfs’ suggestion, the Supreme Court in Hansen did not impose any new or more exacting standard for evaluating fee applications.  In fact, after reviewing its longstanding precedent under “Rendine and its progeny,” the Supreme Court expressly affirmed “[t]hat standard” as what “govern[ed] [its] determination of th[e Hansen] appeal. ”  See Hansen v. Rite Aid Corp., 253 N.J. 191, 219 (2023), reconsideration denied, 253 N.J. 552 (2023).  In all events, the record here unequivocally establishes that the Judges on remand did, in fact, “undert[a]k[e] the meticulous analysis that [the Supreme Court] envisioned in Rendine. ”  Hansen, 253 N.J. at 221.  “In [his] detailed [and several recommendations] and [tables], [[...]] [did] identif[y] categories of legal work that were improperly included in [the parties’] fee application, … [and] excluded time spent on … categories of legal work that did not further plaintiff’s cause. ”  Hansen, 253 N.J. at 221 (2023).  See 14547a-67a, 14529-31a, 14566a-68a, 14578a-80a, 14593a-99a, 14711a, 14717a-18a, 14727a-28a, 14733a-35a, 14739a-40a, 14743a-44a, 39036a-37a, 39149a-154a; 39165a-67a, 39171a-73a, 39179a-39494a-39360a.  POINT III
[directive] The notification of escape should include the indictment number, the arresting/investigating agency, the name of the victim and the victim's residence as may be recorded in the pre-sentence investigation report.  County Prosecutor's Offices should provide the Department of Corrections with alternate telephone numbers in order that notification requirements may be complied with in the cases of weekend and night escapes.  The Department of Corrections should immediately notify the appropriate County Prosecutor's Office by phone upon the return of an escapee to the custody of the Department of Corrections.
[brief] Raspberry Trail and Strawberry Lane form a loop in a hilly neighborhood of large houses with deep setbacks.  2T91:21, Da20.  [...] and [...] bought their home in January 2016.  3T4:16-20.  The house sits at the top of a hill and is surrounded by a six-foot metal fence with gates on two sides.  3T4:20-24.  The right gate is perpendicular to an oversized garage with three bay doors and one exit door.  See Exhibits D-22 (Da79) and D-24 (Da82).  [...]’s property ([...]) is across the street and slopes down from the curb.  D-21, Da77-78, D-22, Da79, and D-23, Da81.  The front yard of #12 is not visible from the top of [...]’s driveway due to the steep slope.  3T105, 12-17.  [...] and [...] are experienced dog owners 3T66:18-21 and long-time volunteers and fosters with [...], 3T4:11-13, they are familiar with dogs’ body language, and they are trained to conduct temperament tests for the purpose of evaluating and placing foster dogs in adoptive homes.
[brief] (Ra530-541).  The caps are based solely on the attained age of the policyholder, without regard to whether greater rate increases are actuarially justified and necessary to achieve rate adequacy.  The New Hampshire Supreme Court agreed with [...], finding that the amended regulations make no exception for LTCI policies that require increases in excess of rate increase caps, do not afford the Commissioner discretion to approve rate increases that exceed the cap, and were ultra vires.
[brief] (AA0006)  The Respondent Commission incorrectly found in its decision as follows:  … and a September 6, 2022, incident where the appellant was advised during roll call that her duty weapon was not serviceable, the appellant wrote a memo as required and then proceeded to her assigned duty, but never asked what was wrong with her weapon which led to counseling.  (AA0006)  As set forth above and in Appellant’s Certification submitted below to the Respondent Commission, this was a false entry on the discipline history summary, as she did not receive any discipline.  (AA0054)  Furthermore, during the pendency of the appeal below, Appellant certified she reviewed her file, which contains no documentation relative to this false entry.  (AA0054)  Even worse, even if this was not a false entry, the Respondent Commission’s findings are drastically different than the unsupported allegations of the “discipline history summary” submitted by the Respondent [...], which provided as follows:  On September 6, 2022, [...] told [...] at roll call that his duty weapon was not serviceable.  [...] told him to write a memo.  Massano wrote the memo and proceeded to his assigned duty.  Zirrith never asked Massano what was wrong with his weapon.  (AA0131).  This incorrect factual finding regarding a false entry of discipline was very significant as it was the only allegation which was after the Respondent [...]’s promotion of Appellant to Sergeant and the Respondent Commission specifically relied upon this erroneous finding in the final sentence of its analysis in support of denying her appeal:  Concerning the appellant’s comment that her 2013 discipline did not impact the appointing authority’s decision to promote her in 2018 to Sergeant, that decision was at the appointing authority's discretion and not relevant to the subject matter as the Commission was not asked to review the appellant’s background for the Sergeant promotion, and that discretionary decision by the appointing authority did not prohibit or estop it from requesting that the appellant’s name be removed from a future list based on the subject major discipline, since the appellant has subsequent adverse history, and a Sheriff’s Officer Lieutenant is a higher title than Sheriff’s Officer Sergeant.
[directive] (The rule establishing the automatic right to appeal the denial of a Fourth Amendment suppression motion was intended to correct what has been described by one commentator as the “wasteful” practice under the predecessor rule, which Page 26 [...] Guidelines 2 (2004 Revisions) required a defendant “to stand trial for the sole purpose of preserving his right to an appellate attack upon the search. ”  Pressler, Current N.J. Court Rules, Comment R. 3:5-7(d).  This rule is thus designed to promote efficiency by avoiding needless trials — a goal completely consistent with the objectives of a graduated plea system.)
[brief] SFRA, instead of being the promised uniform and equitable basis for statewide educational funding, was effectively overridden by the Legislature’s annual appropriations process.  That totally undermined the Supreme Court’s constitutional requirement that funding of T&E be certain, predictable, non-discretionary and timely to facilitate effective educational planning.  To reach the conclusion it did, the Final Decision had to ignore not only the 50-year state constitutional principle of ultimate State responsibility for T&E, but also:
[brief] PROCEDURAL HISTORY  On January 18, 2023, Appellants, Helene and [...], filed suit against [...] d/b/a [...] asserting bodily injury negligence claims as a result of an alleged fall on May 1, 2021 at a [...] store located in Manalapan, New Jersey.  Pa1-6.  On February 6, 2023, Appellant filed an amended complaint naming [...] of Elizabeth, NJ, Inc. as the Defendant.  Pa7-11.  Appellant claims to have slipped and fallen on a clear liquid on the floor of the subject [...]’ store.  On March 8, 2023, Respondent, [...] of MA, Inc. i/p/a [...] of Elizabeth, NJ, Inc., filed a responsive pleading to the amended complaint.  Pa12-22.
[directive] Persons who are subject to a restraining order or curfew issued by a court or by • the Parole Board, or who are subject to any other duly issued order restricting their movements  Persons wanted by a law enforcement agency who are of interest in a specific • investigation, whether or not such persons are themselves suspected of criminal activity  Persons who are on any watch list issued by a state or federal agency • responsible for homeland security downloading.  BOLO list information may be downloaded in batch form from other Batch databases, including but not limited to the [...], [...], [...], and [...] database. lists.  A BOLO list may be revised at any time.