ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] THE DECISION OF THE LAW DIVISION SHOULD BE AFFIRMED a.  LEGAL STANDARD APPLICABLE TO MOTION TO DISMISS  A Motion to Dismiss a Complaint for failure to set forth a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to New Jersey Court  Rule 4:6-2(e) is governed by the principals enunciated by the New Jersey Supreme Court in Printing Mart v. Sharp Electronics, 116 N.J. 739.  (1989).  We approach our review of the judgment below mindful of the test for determining the adequacy of a pleading: whether a cause of action is “suggested” by the facts.  In reviewing a complaint dismissed under Rule 4:6-2(e) our inquiry is limited to examining the legal sufficiency of the facts alleged on the face of the complaint.  However, a reviewing court “searches the complaint in depth and with liberality to ascertain whether the fundament of a cause of action may be gleaned even from an obscure statement of claim, opportunity being given to amend if necessary. ”  At this preliminary stage of the litigation the Court is not concerned with the ability of plaintiffs to prove the allegation contained in the complaint.  For purposes of analysis plaintiffs are entitled to every reasonable inference of fact.  The examination of a complaint's allegations of fact required by the aforestated principles should be one that is at once painstaking and undertaken with a generous and hospitable approach.  [Printing Mart-Morristown v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 116 N.J. 739, 746 (1989).  (Citations omitted). ]  In addition, a Motion to Dismiss “may not be denied based on the possibility that discovery may establish the requisite claim; rather, the legal requisites for [the] claim must be apparent from the Complaint itself. ”  Edwards v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Co., 357 N.J. Super. 196, 202 (App. Div. 2003).  In ruling on a Rule 4:6–2(e) Motion to Dismiss, the Court may consider “‘allegations in the Complaint, exhibits attached to the Complaint, matters of public record, and documents that form the basis of a claim. ’”  Banco Popular N. Am. v. Gandi, 184 N.J. 161, 183 (2005) (quoting Lum v. Bank of Am., 361 F.3d 217, 222 n. 3 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 918 (2004)).  On appeal, the standard of review of a motion to dismiss is plenary.  W.S. v. Hildreth, 252 N.J. 506, 518 (2023).  It is respectfully submitted that the Plaintiff’s Complaint failed to set forth any viable cause of action against the Defendants therefore was properly dismissed.
[brief] . . .  And from there the actions of [...] are to flee back in the arms where the officer is basically following him down the alleyway going forward, back toward the premises that’s under surveillance for the search warrant that is executed.  And certainly we have the search warrant executed and going forward from there, and the inventory happened.  So that stop, that Terry frisk, that fleeing and certainly the admission and consent of the defendant that there is a weapon on him I find entirely valid.
[brief] The Legislature has not preempted municipal governing bodies from enacting noise ordinances pursuant to the Home Rule Act.  1.  The ordinance does not conflict with State law and does not forbid what the Legislature has permitted or permit what the Legislature has forbidden.  Ordinance 17-2017 was enacted pursuant to a specific legislative grant of authority at N.J.S.A. 40:48-1(8).  Nothing in the ordinance conflicts with legislative proscriptions.  In fact, Ordinance No. 17-2017 regulates in precisely the same manner, pursuant to the Home Rule Act, that other ordinances that have been upheld by the Appellate Division have done.  In *Bynum*, supra, 181 N.J. Super. 2, the court rejected the plaintiff’s challenge of an ordinance as being an *ultra vires* exercise of a municipality’s police power.
[brief] Records that are generated by private third parties in the course of their work for public entities are public records subject to OPRA.  We can readily identify such records.  The invoices of outside counsel who represent public entities are public records.  The payroll records of public employees that are maintained by payroll companies are public records.  Municipal emails and municipal databases maintained on private servers and data companies are public records.  The assessments prepared by private valuation companies are public records.  We could go on.  At Db23, Defendants concede, as they must, that “courts have determined that the fact that a third-party maintains records does not mean those records are exempt from OPRA.
[brief] *(Pal-Pa19).*  The same facts that form the basis for [...]’ claims against [...], form the basis of its claims against [...].  *(See Order, Pa70)* (“[T]he merits of [[...]’] dispute with [] [...] [are] bound up/intertwined with [[...]’] contract with [] [...]. ”)  In fact, there would be no claim against [...] but for the intertwinement of [...]’s obligations as defined in the Contract.  *See e.g., Sakyi v. Estee Lauder Companies, Inc.*, 308 F. Supp. 3d 366, 385 (D.D.C. 2018) (finding intertwinement of claims exist when “plaintiff asserts the exact same claims, based on the same operative set of facts, against all [] defendants, [and] discuss[es] the ‘Defendants’ generally without specifying which claims pertain to which defendant.
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR BY INFORMING THE JURY THAT HE OVERRULED DEFENDANT’S OBJECTION (Not Raised Below).  For the first time on appeal, defendant claims the trial court deprived him of a fair trial by informing the jury that the court overruled defendants’ objection to the admission of the recreation evidence and the “Court has determined that it is properly admissible and it is admitted into evidence.
[brief] As previously noted, it will be up to you to arrange for your client to be properly attired for his civil trial.  [Ibid. (emphasis added). ]  Therefore, even if defense counsel did not read [...]’s earlier letter dated February 16, 2024 – and defense counsel’s February 23rd letter indicates that he did indeed read it – [...]’s February 27, 2024 letter reiterated the contents of the February 16th letter and referred defense counsel back to that letter.
[brief] N.J.S.A. 18A:12-22(b) (emphasis added).  The Commission was created with an express legislative purpose – to uniformly and consistently apply the Act to school board members.  It failed to do so here.  As a result, it is clear that the Commission issued its August 22, 2023 Final Decision in this matter in an arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable manner, and that it did so contrary to sufficient credible evidence in the record.  That being the case, the Appellate Division must now reverse that decision.
[brief] (2T 46-18 to 24)  After the violation at the beginning of the interview, the State could not dispel the reasonable doubt regarding whether [...]’s subsequent statements were made with a knowing and voluntary waiver of his rights.  (2T 33-3 to 34-9)  [...] considered these circumstances carefully and found that the procedures used here violated [...]’s fundamental right against self-incrimination.  (3T 17-11 to 19-7, 20-9 to 16)  Given the circumstances presented by the record, the decision to suppress the phone call recordings was a sound exercise of discretion.  [...] explained the clear basis—following established precedent—for his decisions on all five suppression determinations.  (2T 51-17 to 55-5; 3T 16-8 to 17-3, 19-5 to 20-22)  The State does not—and cannot—contest [...]’s suppression of the formal interview that occurred after the failure to follow Miranda.  The one factual finding the State took issue with, regarding banked phone numbers, was already addressed on the motion to reconsideration.  (3T 15-5 to 17)  Once again, [...] demonstrated sound discretion by revisiting his factual findings and determining that the key facts were unchanged: [...]’s invocation of his rights was not respected, and the phone call process used here was the functional equivalent of interrogation.  (3T 20-23 to 21-10)  Under the circumstances, it was clear that the words and actions of the police officers following the failed interrogation waiver procedure were reasonably likely to elicit incriminating responses.  The record demonstrates that [...] considered the facts, reconsidered the facts, and correctly applied the law to reach a conclusion that was well within the bounds of his discretion.  **CONCLUSION**
[brief] The slender amount of marital assets that [...] received, with zero alimony, couples with the abject lack of fairness in the process to show that Rule 4:50 relief was warranted below, we submit.  [...] said that the value of the marital estate was about $4.6 million.  A262.  Even accepting that figure (which [...] vehemently disputed\(^8\)), [...] retained almost all of it.  [...] affirmed to [...] that he kept all of the money from the bankruptcy settlement – approximately $4.6 million, and he received $2.5 million returned to him as part of a separation agreement.
[brief] **THE TRIAL COURT NEVER ASSESSED PLAINTIFF'S COUNT IV AND THEREFORE ITS DISMISSAL WAS IMPROPER**  Count IV of Plaintiff's complaint asserts that the City policy, was facially deficient and violated both state statute under the Civil Service and simultaneously the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination.  The claims in Count IV asserted that a “no fault” attendance policy was an arbitrary and capricious exercise of government authority and violated the NJLAD.  Accordingly the policies were void.  The Trial Court never addressed the claims in Count IV and therefore the arguments advanced by the Defendant that Count IV was properly dismissed do not stand upon reason.  POINT IV
[brief] I.  Defense’s Motion for Mistrial should have been Granted (4T158:21).  a.  There is no trial court decision to afford deference.  When inadmissible evidence is presented before the jury, the trial court must determine whether the improper disclosure can be cured by a cautionary or limiting instruction, or requires the more severe response of a mistrial.  *State v. Winter*, 96 N.J. 640, 646-47 (1984).  This decision is particularly “within the competence of the trial judge, who has the feel of the case and is best equipped to gauge the effect of a prejudicial comment on the jury in the overall setting. ”  *Id.*  As such, the appropriate standard of review for a trial court’s decision to deny a request for mistrial is abuse of discretion.  *State v. Herbert*, 457 N.J.Super. 490, 503 (App. Div. 2019).  While it is true that the decision as to whether to declare a mistrial is left to the sound discretion of the trial court, no such deference is warranted in this matter as the motion was never actually ruled upon.
[brief] Plaintiffs did not establish that they are unable to get the discovery they are seeking through other means (i.e. depositions or basic discovery) or that this information is relevant or necessary to the claims in the Underlying Litigation.  With regard to the fourth Berrie factor, [...] stated in the underlying motion that [...] is a “competitor equity firm”.  While Plaintiffs have still not stated what exact information would be seeking, it is assumed that Plaintiffs would be seeking information about investments at [...], [...]’s finances and other information, all of which are confidential in nature.  With regard to the last Berrie factor, it is also unclear what “unique knowledge” [...] possesses.  This is a dispute between Plaintiffs and Defendants; [...] and [...] are partners of [...] and it has not been alleged in the Underlying Litigation that [...] had any involvement related to the underlying claims and as demonstrated by the affidavits, does not have any unique knowledge related to the Underlying Litigation.  Therefore, when applying the Berrie factors it is clear that the deposition seeks irrelevant information and must be quashed.  Further, given the numerous other litigations and discovery that has already been conducted, there is no conceivable testimony that could be given by [...] that is not already known to [...], either due to his personal knowledge or obtained during discovery in the other litigations.  In truth, [...] is seeking to insert [...] into the litigation mix to harass him and distract from [...]’s own investment frauds.  Plaintiffs have not demonstrated that there is no less burdensome means to obtain the information they are seeking such as taking the depositions of the Defendants or conducting basic discovery in the Underlying Litigation related to the involvement of the parties.  Therefore, it is respectfully submitted that the trial court’s order should be reversed.
[brief] On December 15, 2023, Sergeant [...], along with other Penns Grove police officers, were called out to [...] for a fight inside a [...] gas station and convenience store.  The fight was alleged to involve several black male individuals possibly with weapons.\(^1\) (T6-5 to 20)\(^2\).  Hemple was traveling from \( \frac{1}{2} \) mile away and was one of the first arriving officers—another patrol officer was arriving at the same time from another direction.  (T7-4 to 9; 45-12 to 16).  He observed multiple people exiting the business and it seemed like the fight was beginning to settle down.  (T7-11 to 13).  Individuals were going in all directions.  (T40-2 to 3).  One of the individuals, later identified as the defendant, was observed by Sgt. Hemple walking towards his patrol car as Sgt. Hemple was pulling in the parking lot of the store.  The defendant had a mask and was reaching into the satchel that was strapped across his body.  (T7-16 to 21).  Hemple was concerned that the defendant was holding a firearm and ordered him to take his hand out of the bag.  (T8-5 to 7).  Hemple indicated that based on his training and experience and the way the defendant had his hand positioned led him --- \(^1\) Hemple later clarified that there was no mention of a firearm in his report and was unsure if dispatch advised him that firearms were involved.  (T37-18 to 19)  \(^2\)  T refers to Motion Transcript of October 18, 2024 to believe that it was a firearm.  (T42-6 to 11; 43-14 to 19; 53-23 to 25).  Hemple took the defendant’s actions as threatening.  (T54-4 to 5).  The defendant took his hand out of the bag but he then attempted to quickly zipper the bag concealing what was inside.  (T8-9 to 12).  Hemple then ordered the defendant to sit on the curb and not put his hand in the satchel again.  (T8-12 to 13).  As the defendant sat down, Hemple immediately observed a handgun sticking out of the satchel.  (T8-16 to 18).  The entire interaction lasted approximately 15 seconds.  (T11-25; Pa8)  The defendant indicated that he had been involved in the fight inside of [...].  (T27-16 to 17).  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I:
[brief] Order  Barring Portions of Defendant’s Appraisal Report And Engineering Evaluation [Vibrations Damage] and Statement of Reasons Filed 08/06/21 ........................................  Da390  Motion to Exclude Damages for Loss of Ocean View and Increased Vulnerability to Wave Overtopping  Plaintiff’s Notice of Motion to Bar  Defendant’s Engineering Report Filed 12/01/21 .................................................................  Da401  Certification of [...], Esq.  In Support of Motion to Bar Filed 12/01/21 .................................................................  Da404 Exhibit 1  Amended Verified Complaint .................. Da86 Exhibit 2  Excerpts from Plaintiff’s Appraisal Report .........................................................  Da411 Exhibit 3  [...] 04/07/21  Engineering Report...  Da310 Exhibit 4 [...] Appraisal Report Dated 05/06/21  Da235  Exhibit 5  Review of Engineering Evaluation Impacts of Seawall Construction prepared by [...] (A. [...]) by [...], PhD, Dated 10/21/21 ...............  Da418  Certification of [...], Esq.  In Opposition of Motion to Bar [...] Filed 01/13/22 .................................................................  Da433  Exhibit A 12/29/20  [...] Report ...................... Da331  Exhibit B 04/07/21  [...] Report ...................... Da310  Exhibit C  Andrew [...], P.E. Curriculum Vitae ........................................................................  Da436  Order Granting Plaintiff’s Motion to Exclude Loss of Ocean View and Privacy and Denying, without Prejudice, Plaintiff’s Motion to Preclude Owner’s Engineer as Net Opinion Filed 1/28/22 .................................................................
[brief] A.  Background of the Case  Plaintiff, [...], a resident of the Republic of Korea, is the natural son of [...] (Da1).  Decedent, [...] ("Decedent"), died on February 06, 2012.  (Da1).  The Decedent was a citizen and domiciliary of South Korea all his life and resided at [...] at the time of his death.  (Da1).  Decedent died intestate and no Administrator has been appointed for the Estate, as is customary in Korea.  (Da1).  The instant matter arises from the dispute over legal fees and costs incurred in the litigation regarding the Estate of [...] ("Decedent").  Plaintiff, [...], initiated legal proceedings seeking clarification on matters pertaining to the Estate.  On January 18, 2013, Plaintiff filed a Verified Complaint, commencing the case.  (Da1).  The litigation endured a lengthy and complex trajectory, progressing through various stages of judicial review over the course of several years.
[brief] Assignment of a named insured’s or eligible injured person’s rights to receive benefits for medically necessary treatment, durable medical equipment tests or other services is prohibited except to a licensed health care provider who agrees to:  (a)  Fully comply with [...] Decision Point Review Plan, including pre-certification requirements, (b)  Comply with the terms and conditions of the [...] policy (c)  Provide complete and legible medical records or other pertinent information when requested by us, (d)  Utilize the “internal appeals process” which shall be a condition precedent to the filing of a demand for alternative dispute resolution for any issue related to bill payment, bill processing, Decision Point Review Request or Precertification request, (e)  Submit disputes to alternative dispute resolution pursuant to N.J.A.C. 11:3 … (C.C.Da.138)(emphasis added).  Based upon this valid, binding arbitration agreement, health care providers enter an Assignment of Benefits of the Automobile Insurance policy with their patients/[...] insureds and are mandated to arbitrate all of their claim disputes with the New Jersey arbitration forum, [...].
[brief] [...] FAILED TO SUBSTANTIVELY OPPOSE [...]’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS TO THE TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE AND INDEMNIFICATION CLAIMS AND [...]’S CONCESSIONS AS TO ITS REVENUES AND ABSENCE OF A CONTRACT SIMILARLY DOOM  [...]’S CLAIMS.  In the underlying motion for summary judgment, [...] failed to cite to any case law or precedent in opposition to [...]’s motion as to its tortious interference and indemnification claims.  [...] conceded that it ended the relationship with [...] and made a business decision not to purchase any more products, although it was offered the same distributor pricing.  [...] also conceded that its revenues increased after the termination of the relationship with [...].  As such, it had no damages.  See Vosough v. Kierce, 437 N.J. Super. 218, 247 (App. Div. 2014).  Damages are required for a tortious inference action.  See Singer v. Beach Trading Co., 379 N.J. Super. 63, 81 (App. Div. 2005).  As such, the trial court properly dismissed [...]’s claims in their entirety.  Lastly, [...] conceded that it had no contract with [...].  An indemnification claim requires a contract or the presence of a special legal relationship.  See Ramos v. Browning Ferris Indus. of South Jersey, 103 N.J. 177, 188-89 (1986).  A “longstanding business relationship” is not enough to show that a special legal relationship exists for indemnification purposes.  Katz v. Holzberg, 2013 WL 5946502, at *3 (D.N.J. Nov. 4, 2013).  Therefore, the trial court properly dismissed [...]’s claims in their entirety.  POINT VI THE APPEAL AS TO [...]’S MOTION TO BAR IS UNTIMELY AND MUST BE DISMISSED
[brief] This is an action in lieu of prerogative writs filed by the Plaintiff [...] a/k/a [...]  (the “Plaintiff” or “[...]”) challenging the propriety of the legislative actions taken by the Defendants the [...] (the “Borough”) and the [...] (the “Planning Board”) in adopting a Second Amendment to the Beachway Avenue Waterfront Redevelopment Plan (the “Redevelopment Plan”).  The relief sought by the Plaintiff through this action is the entry of an Order invalidating these legislative actions and setting aside the Second Amendment to the Redevelopment Plan.  This case was tried before the Honorable [...] (“[...]” or the “Trial Court”).  Prior to the trial, [...] dismissed the Plaintiff’s Public Trust Doctrine claims in response to motions for summary judgment filed by the parties.  All other claims were tried on the record below, as supplemented by exhibits and expert reports submitted by the parties.  After considering this evidence, [...] entered judgment in favor of the Defendants dismissing the Plaintiff’s remaining claims with prejudice.  There are two issues presented through this appeal: (i) whether the Trial Court properly granted summary judgment to the Borough dismissing the Plaintiff’s Public Trust Doctrine claims; and (ii) whether the Trial Court properly concluded that the Borough’s adoption of an ordinance approving the Second Amendment to the Redevelopment Plan was not arbitrary, capricious or unlawful.  The Trial Court correctly determined that the Borough’s adoption of an amendment to its redevelopment plan, which merely created a redevelopment zoning overlay option to the existing zoning for the redevelopment area, did not violate the Public Trust Doctrine.  In reaching this decision, the Trial Court properly recognized that the Plaintiff’s Public Trust Doctrine claims were premature as the Plaintiff is challenging a zoning decision made by the municipality rather than a specific development application for a particular development project.  The Trial Court noted that the Plaintiff is essentially seeking to challenge a future conceptual development of the property that might never actually happen and that the Plaintiff will have the opportunity to raise these claims if and when such a development application is filed.  Likewise, the Trial Court also properly concluded that there was substantial credible evidence in the record supporting the Borough’s decision to amend its redevelopment plan to add this redevelopment overlay zone option and that this amendment was not substantially inconsistent with the goals and objectives of the Borough’s master plan.  For these reasons, the judgment entered by the Trial Court dismissing the Plaintiff’s claims in this action should be affirmed on appeal.
[brief] In *Maestranzi*, the Massachusetts Superior Court applied *Boston Gas* in an environmental liability case.  The *Maestranzi* court discussed various possibilities for an end date of the allocation period.  *Id.* at *13-14.  First, the court considered the date “when the pollution ends,” but rejected that because it was “future date is impossible to even estimate. ”  *Id.*  Next, the court considered the date of the jury verdict, but rejected that because it “is plainly a random date that does nothing to ensure predictability or fairness.
[brief] Appellant staunchly disagrees.  Refuting [...]’s nonsensical allegations came at a significant cost to [...].  He was forced to delve into the embarrassing, unsavory, and unflattering aspects of his former romantic relationship in order to discredit [...]’s claims and demonstrate why her story should not be trusted.  The Defense may have successfully refuted [...]’s claims, but this required [...] to inadvertently portray himself to the jury as an unlikable womanizer who associates with addicts in the process.  When the trial court permitted all counts to be tried together, this resulted in an entirely foreseeable circus centered almost exclusively around [...] and her tumultuous past with [...].