ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Based on the foregoing, I maintain that there is indeed a basis for this Court’s September 13, 2022 and April 13, 2022 to be reversed, remanded “in the interest of justice,” as I have shown that it contained clear manifest errors of fact including, but not limited to, violations of my constitutional rights.  Reversal and remand of my case is justified and necessary to provide an objective judicial review, complete with my clarifications of the facts on the record, and the opportunity to supplement this record through full and fair discovery.  Finally, at this time, I also respectfully request oral argument at your Trenton location without interruption, so that I may have an equitable opportunity as a pro se litigant to present my case.  Respectfully submitted, [...] PRO SE Plaintiff-Appellant
[brief] Plaintiff failed to present evidence to the court below of a constitutional violation on the part of a [...] employee.  Given that there is no underlying constitutional violation, there can be no liability visited on the [...], nor the [...], under *Monell v. Dept. of Social Services*, 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978).  If a person has suffered no constitutional injury at the hands of an individual defendant, there will be no entity liability.  *City of Los Angeles v. Heller*, 475 U.S. 796, 799 (1986).
[brief] ## TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | Cases | Page(s) | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|---------| | *Application of Howard Sav. Inst. of Newark*, 32 N.J. 29 (1960) | 5 | | *Boller Beverages, Inc. v. Davis*, | | | 38 N.J. 138 (1962) | 13, 15 | | *Matter of Farmers’ Mut. Fire Assur. Ass’n of N.J.*, | | | 256 N.J. Super. 607 (App. Div. 1992) | 13 | | *Friedler v. Gen. Serv. Admin.*, | | | 271 F. Supp. 3d 40 (D.D.C. 2017) ([...], J.) | 7 | | *Metromedia, Inc. v. Dir., Div. of Taxation*, | | | 97 N.J. 313 (1984) | 15 | | *N.J. Bell Tel. Co. v. Commc’ns Workers of Am.*, | | | 5 N.J. 354 (1950) | 2, 3, 5, 6 | | **Statutes** | | | N.J.S.A. 17B:27E-1 | 11 |
[brief] . . .  OSAC’s mission is to strengthen the nation’s use of forensic science by facilitating the development of technically sound standards, expanding the OSAC Registry with standards that have completed a technical assessment, and promoting the implementation of those standards by OSAC’s stakeholders and the forensic science community. ”  See Nat’l Inst. of Standards & Tech., About Us, https://www.nist.gov/organization-scientific-area-committees-forensic-science/about-us.  Experts “should not report or testify, directly or by implication, to a source attribution to the exclusion of all others in the world. ”  NIST Report at 72, Recommendation 3.7.  It is critical that courts address jurors’ preconceived beliefs about the accuracy and reliability of fingerprint evidence.
[brief] [...] v. [...] and [...]; slip op., [...] (Law Div. April 29, 2009) ..................................  40, 41 Twp. of Hanover v. Twp. of Morristown, 118 N.J. Super. 136 (Ch. Div.), aff’d o.b. 121 N.J. Super. 536 (App. Div. 1972) ...........................................
[brief] The requirements to establish adverse possession were satisfied by [...].  It is requested that the Appellate Court find that [...] has satisfied the factors to establish ownership via the Doctrine of Adverse Possession.  It is requested that the Court find that [...] owns the disputed land which is Lot 22 by operation of law.  As a result of this, it is requested that the Appellate Court vacate the Summary Judgment decision granted to [...] and vacate the decision which denied [...] Summary Judgment.  It is requested that the Appellate Court find that per Adverse Possession that [...] is the owner of Lot 22.  POINT III
[brief] 1.  Approve my Aug. 8, '22 Exceptions to Intermediate Accounting (114a-119a par. 8) for revisions & resubmittal by [...] for my final acceptance.  2.  Approve my requests (128a) for [...] to submit requested back-up info & documents to me, as Qualified Beneficiary, for my review/verification of Final & Intermediate Accountings figures, based on his Co-Trustee obligations under NJ Uniform Trust Code, R.3B:31-67.  3.  Require payback for prior Trust payments of $15,022.72, as shown in Accounting, for [...]’s legal fees (122a-124a, 1st par.).
[brief] According to [...], “[[...]] asked me where is [[...]] now and I told him I think he went to a club or something. ” (Emphasis added).  [...] then asked where [...] was staying, and [...] “told him that [[...]] was staying at a hotel. ”  That exchange occurred after [...] told [...], “I was with this guy and, you know, he took me shopping and, you know, he had a nice car and he was walking around with a bag of money....” (Emphasis added).  *12*  [...] had seen [...] carrying the money; she never told [...] that [...] left the money in a hotel room.  When [...] decided to steal the money, he did not know where [...] was, but he knew that [...] was staying in the [...].  Contrary to [...]'s argument, the jury was not compelled to infer from those facts that [...] believed [...]'s money was hidden in an unoccupied hotel room.  The jury could have inferred from those facts, and from [...]'s statement that he was “going to get him,” that [...] kept the money bag with him, and that [...] intended to take the money when [...] returned to the hotel.  Significantly, [...] did not hear all of the conversations between [...] and [...].  For example, when [...] and [...] were at the basketball court and [...] first told him about [...]'s cash, [...] made telephone calls and [...] appeared shortly thereafter.  [...] and [...] then spoke face-to-face immediately before [...] told [...] to take [...] to the hotel where [...] was staying.  [...] did not hear all of that conversation.  Later when [...] and [...] entered the [...], [...] had a gun, gloves, and duct tape, evidence that he had previously formed the intent to rob [...].  The jury could have reasonably inferred from the totality of those circumstances that [...] and [...] conspired to rob [...] when [...] returned to the hotel.  Unquestionably, the State's proofs concerning [...]'s accomplice liability and conspiratorial culpability were circumstantial.
[brief] \(^8\)  To this point, defendant asserts in his brief that “the police had probable cause for an arrest” after defendant “indicated that there were in facts drugs in the car. ” (Db32).  That same probable cause to arrest defendant established probable cause to search his vehicle’s passenger compartment under *State v. Witt*, 223 N.J. 409 (2015).  Nor is there any reasonable debate that [...] intended to search the vehicle once defendant admitted that it contained drugs – because that is precisely what occurred.  After defendant admitted that his car contained narcotics, [...] asked defendant to show him where the drugs were located.  Defendant guided [...] to the spot inside the vehicle where the drugs were stashed.  During subsequent questioning, [...] asked defendant if the vehicle contained any additional drugs, explaining that he was “going to search it anyway. ”  Defendant denied that the vehicle contained anything else.  (V:16:59:28 to 17:00:30).  Despite defendant’s denial, [...] searched the vehicle and found many other illegal items including a handgun.  \(^8\)  The State notes that defendant admitted his vehicle contained narcotics before the point in time in which defendant alleges, in his alternative argument (Point III.B.), that he was in custody.  In sum, because this case in all fours with O’Neal regarding the remedy for the Miranda violation, all of the physical evidence obtained during the search of defendant’s vehicle is admissible.
[brief] 130 N.J. 324, 341-42 (1992).  Specifically, where a conflict of law exists, the state contracted for will apply unless:  (1)  The chosen state has no substantial relationship to the parties or the transaction and there is no other reasonable basis for the parties’ choice, or (2)  Application of the law of the chosen state would be contrary to a fundamental policy of a state, which has a materially greater interest than the chosen state in the determination of the particular issues and which . . . would be the state of the applicable law in the absence of an effective choice of law by the parties.
[brief] (Ca251).  Then, on May 27, 2022, the chancery division denied [...]’s cross-motion to intervene in the foreclosure matter, and granted the special master’s motion to approve the foreclosure sale.  (Ca114).  The record demonstrated that [...] acknowledge the communication with the receiver, and was aware of the foreclosure prior to the special master sale.  (Ca114).  The chancery division held that the special master sale was proper, and [...] waited too late to raise any objection.  (Ca114).  Also, as part of discovery in the consolidated Parke v. [...] Restaurant, Docket No. [...], and eviction matters, [...] produced the accountings relating to the restaurant’s operation from October 2021 through November 2022.  (Ca150).  In the eviction matter, [...] never sought to amend the Complaint to add additional claims against the receiver.  In the eviction matter, which was filed over 20 months ago, [...] never sought to amend to include claims against the receiver.  Any claims should have been asserted at that time.  Significantly, [...] was in possession of the receiver’s accountings through the special master’s sale, and never took any action related to the accountings.  On May 27, 2022, the Honorable [...], J.S.C., in the matter of [...] and 320 Route 73, LLC v. [...] Restaurant, Inc., et al., in the superior court of New Jersey, Civil Part, Docket No: [...], found that [...]’s services were appropriate, and there were no issues regarding his services.  (Ca308 at p.34, lines 1-7).  [...] denied [...]’s application for intervention.  (Ca308 at p.34, lines 14-17).  The receiver, [...], filed a motion to be discharged as receiver.
[brief] (1T18-7 to 19-7).  And contrary to his position on appeal, defendant also demonstrated his knowledge that they could be pulled over for not signaling, testifying that he became attuned to [...]’s driving—including her use of a “blinker”—when he saw the sheriff’s officers pulling motorists over.  (1T71-22 to 72-21).  [...] had fair warning of the unlawfulness of her conduct in failing to signal until she was partially in the adjacent lane.  Because N.J.S.A. 39:4-126 plainly requires a driver to signal their intention to change lanes when other traffic may be affected, [...] and [...] had reasonable and articulable suspicion that [...] violated the Motor Vehicle Code by failing to activate her signal before changing lanes.
[brief] Homeowner information is located online at [http://wipp.edmundsassoc.com/Wipp/?wippid=0306](http://wipp.edmundsassoc.com/Wipp/?wippid=0306); subpoena for [...] was submitted as requested by [...] and to the trial court with [...] in September 2021 and wanted to file a complaint against [...] for his violent behavior, however she was denied and the issue dismissed immediately.  At no point and time did the defendant throw a white bag at him, saying “he aint shit, fuck you, turn rap music up loud with lyrics that says specifically, “Kill that Nigger”.  Kill the Nigger, proceed to call him a Nigger and stated that the defendant would fuck him up”.  [...] proclaims an argument occurred with the defendant and proceeded home without calling the police.  Then on the next following incident, he states the defendant came back in her BMW.
[brief] | Cases | PAGE NOS. | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------| | Arizona v. Arevalo, 470 P.3d 644 (Ariz. 2020) | 21 | | DeNike v. Cupo, 196 N.J. 502 (2008) | 26, 27 | | Florida v. O.C., 748 So. 2d 945 (Fla. 1999) | 20 | | State in the Interest of C.K., 233 N.J. 44 (2018) | 16 | | State v. Afanador, 151 N.J. 41 (1997) | 13 | | State v. Brown, 138 N.J. 481 (1994) | 28 | | State v. Case, 220 N.J. 49 (2014) | 34 | | State v. Cassady, 198 N.J. 165 (2009) | 35, 37 | | State v. Dalal, 221 N.J. 601 (2015) | 25, 26 | | State v. Dalal, 438 N.J. Super. 156 (App. Div. 2014) | 26 | | State v. Dalziel, 182 N.J. 494 (2005) | 40 | | State v. Davis, 68 N.J. 69 (1975) | 28, 29 | | State v. Fair, 256 N.J. 213 (2024) | 1, 11, 12, 13, 14 | | State v. Federico, 103 N.J. 169 (1986) | 13 | | State v. Fuentes, 217 N.J. 57 (2014) | 39 | | State v. Grate, 220 N.J. 317 (2015) | 13 | | State v. Hill, 182 N.J. 532 (2005) | 28, 31 | | State v. Jordan, 147 N.J. 409 (1997) | 12 | | Authority | Page Nos. | |------------------------------------------------|-----------| | State v. McCabe, 201 N.J. 34 (2010) | 26 | | State v. Miller, 108 N.J. 112 (1987) | 28 | | State v. Miller, 205 N.J. 109 (2011) | 35 | | State v. Nataluk, 316 N.J. Super. 336 (App. Div. 1998) | 40 | | State v. Nayee, 192 N.J. 475 (2007) | 40 | | State v. Njango, 247 N.J. 533 (2021) | 16 | | State v. Roberson, 246 N.J. Super. 597 (App. Div. 1991) | 13 | | State v. Rodriguez, 97 N.J. 263 (1984) | 28 | | State v. Tate, 216 N.J. 300 (2013) | 27, 28, 29| | State v. Yarbough, 100 N.J. 627 (1985) | 9, 33, 34, 36, 37, 38, 39, 41 | | Tennessee v. Bonds, 502 S.W.3d 118 (Tenn. 2016)| 20 | | Washington v. Barnes, 103 P.3d 1219 (Wash. 2005)| 20 | | Washington v. Brown, 173 P.3d 245 (Wash. 2007) | 20, 31 | | Williams v. Florida, 305 So. 3d 673 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2020) | 19 | **Statutes** - Fla. Stat. § 810.02 ................................................................. 18 - La. Stat. Ann. § 62.5 .................................................................. 18 - N.J.S.A. 2C:12-10(a) .................................................................. 28 - N.J.S.A. 2C:12-10(b) .................................................................. 4, 5, 28 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (CONT'D) PAGE NOS. N.J.S.A. 2C:12-3(a) ................................................................. 1, 2, 4, 12, 14, 15, 21, 22, 23 N.J.S.A. 2C:12-3(b) ........................................................................
[brief] ”).  Employees at all levels of government must be able and willing to engage in candid discussion to reach the best decisions for the sake of the public.  Allowing a requestor to harass a particular employee or agency with daily requests for every email sent or received each day will indisputably cause that same employee to think twice before sending an email, regardless of whether that exchange of ideas is necessary to fully inform the agency’s ultimate decision.  This outcome in no way serves the public’s interest.
[brief] ” (Db10; Db8).  While the state concedes that the trooper initially testified that he was moving at the time that he made the observation of Defendant’s vehicle, he later explained that he could not recall exactly where he was when he observed the Defendant’s car, whether he was moving or stationary, and that the MVR speaks for itself.  (1T 7-14 to -15; 1T 8-3 to -6; 1T 11-17 to -18; 1T 12-4 to -8; 1T 19-2 to -17; 1T 20-16 to -19; 1T 21-12 to -13; 1T 28-12 to -14; 1T 30-1 to -5; 1T 24-2).  In denying the Defendant’s Motion, the lower court noted as follows:
[brief] In this regard, the District Court opinion in Sinclair v. Dunagan, 905 F.Supp. 208 (D.N.J. 1995) advances the position, in the context of a negligence action, that an electric company owes no duty to repair or fix or replace light fixtures within a specific time frame, in that no statute or common law imposes that duty on the company.  (Id. at 213-14).  As seen, Weinberg, supra, and its progeny clearly impose that duty.  At least in one case, the rationale of Sintclair, seeming to "revive" the type of immunity abrogated in Weinberg, was not adopted by the Appellate Division.  See Press v. Borough of Point Pleasant Beach, 2010 N.J.Super.Unpub. LEXIS 183 *7 (App. Div.) (Pral)("The motion judge also relied upon the rationale of Sinclair v. Dunagan, 905 F. Supp. 208 (D.N.J. 1995), that the electric company owes no duty of care to pedestrians or the general public.  We do not embrace that rationale").
[brief] Pa047; DSOF ¶ 12.  In the text message chain Appellant stated that the employees’ concerns were brought up and that the situation is fluid.  Pa047; DSOF ¶ 13.  As part of this text chain Appellant stated “def they are divas I’m having anxiety may need a donut” to which [...] stated “So it is all business as usual?” and Plaintiff responded “definitely. ”  Pa048; DSOF ¶ 14.  [...] stated that the employees had been informed that they “will likely only work from home if the city or the building instructs is [sic] to shut down. ”  Pa048; DSOF ¶ 15.  [...] responded “I know they are watching the situation very closely.  There isn’t a map for this because it hasn’t happened before.  And i [sic] hope you know I am willing to step in and do all I can for you all.  I am sorry I am not with you right now. ”  Pa048; DSOF ¶ 16.
[brief] At the trial of this matter, the trial judge made significant errors concerning what the attorneys were permitted to argue in opening statements and in closing arguments.  [...] was permitted to argue that the plaintiff was NOT suing [...] for assault, and plaintiffs were precluded from even mentioning the fact that [...] failed to appear and testify live.  Such trial court decisions should be reversed when they are "clearly capable of producing an unjust result."  R. 2:10-2.  If there is "some degree of possibility that [the error] led to an unjust result" a new trial should be ordered.  *State v. R.B.*, 183 N.J. 308, 330, (2005).  B.
[brief] $2,300,000 transferred from [...]’s bank account on November 26, 2014 to [...]’s bank account ending in #8309.  (26T37:17-23).  - Schedule 21 to [...]’s expert report identified a transfer of $2,300,000 from [...]’s bank account to [...]’s account ending in 8309, which was corroborated via the [...] November 2014 bank statement showing a transfer to the [...] account.  (Da880; 13T26:21 to 28:18).  -  This transaction was significant because it meant that [...] did not use its own capital (or capital infused by the [...]) to acquire [...]’s interest in [...].  Rather, [...] used [...] funds to purchase [...]’s interest in [...].
[brief] To be sure, [...]’s poor performance as a subcontractor at several projects was squarely at issue, especially concerning the Hackensack Project (where the Arbitrator found “serious issues with the project” permeated, Pa574), and [...] even testified that its work and its alleged entitlement to unpaid monies at Hackensack should be considered in reducing the EGP [...] owed to [...].  See also Pa176 ¶ 18 (“ARC’s performance on the Hackensack project was poor…”).  Whether the Arbitrator ultimately credited this testimony or not in his Final Award\(^{12}\) is irrelevant—the fact remains that [...] had a “fair and reasonable opportunity” to, and indeed did, argue its claim for offsetting --- \(^{12}\) But, to be sure, the Arbitrator absolutely credited this testimony.
[brief] In 2018, plaintiffs served various affidavits of merit against all defendants pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-27.  With respect to defendant, plaintiffs initially served an affidavit of [...].  (Pa38).  On December 14, 2018, defendant moved to dismiss plaintiffs’ complaint on the basis that Dr. Collier specialized in vascular surgery, not in defendant’s specialty of general surgery, and was therefore unqualified under N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-27 (Pa177).  On November 21, 2018, plaintiffs served the affidavit of merit of a new expert, [...], a general surgeon (Pa148-150), and ultimately served [...]’s expert report, dated August 30, 2020.  (Pa41).  [...] was deposed on June 8, 2021.  (Pa57).  On July 6, 2021, defendant moved to bar [...]’s testimony at trial due to his lack of sufficient qualifications under N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-41 to render an expert opinion critical of his care.  (Pa20)  Plaintiffs opposed the motion but also filed a cross-motion to designate a new expert witness in [...]’s stead (A89).  Defendant opposed the cross-motion.  (Da31)  On July 30, 2021, while defendant’s motion to bar [...] was pending, plaintiffs served the expert report of [...], dated July 29, 2021.
[brief] [...]:  Well, I was going to make a suggestion.  How about a 10-foot conservation easement and if the conservation easement, your plot plan, is left undisturbed, they won't have to provide a double row of screening trees.  If it is disturbed, then they've got to put a double row of screening trees and a conservation easement.  [...]: That makes so much sense.  [...]: Exactly.  Doesn't that make a lot of sense?
[brief] Plaintiff ultimately prosecuted professional malpractice claims against [...] (“[...]”), which served as the resident engineer for the road widening project, and [...]  (“[...]”), which served as the project’s chief inspector.  Plaintiff also brought negligence claims against the project’s general contractor, [...] (“[...]”) and the owner/operator of the Garden State Parkway, the [...] (“[...]”).  As resident engineer, [...] administered the project and oversaw the coordination and procedural requirements inherent to the construction activities.  Plaintiff has relied upon liability expert [...] to establish multiple positions essential to plaintiff’s prima facie case of professional malpractice against [...] related to [...]’s provision of services as resident engineer: 1) the standard of care governing the provision of [...]’s professional services required [...] to identify the subject roadway condition and facilitate its remediation prior to the date of plaintiff’s accident; 2) the subject roadway condition presented as a dangerous condition; and, 3) the subject roadway condition caused plaintiff’s accident.  Through service of a narrative expert report, two days of deposition testimony and another full day of testimony provided by way of a Rule 104 hearing, [...] has been unable to provide plaintiff with the foundation necessary to articulate a prima facie case of professional malpractice against [...].