ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] As noted in Appellant’s initial brief, the 2017 WFD permit and 2019 WFD permit modification applications only include summary conclusions that the navigation and access condition is met.  [Aa37 and Aa107.]  Furthermore, there is no analysis in the record concerning how the [...] concluded that the evidence in the record satisfied N.J.A.C. 7:7-12.5(b)9, aside from one sentence in the [...]’s decision to deny Appellant’s adjudicatory hearing request, which was issued approximately four years after the 2019 WFD permit modification was granted.  [Aa135; Aa89-Aa91.]  Again, pertaining specifically to the 2019 WFD permit modification, [...]’s general statement that navigation or access will not be hindered does not comment on, or otherwise reference, the location of the dock at issue in the modification application.  [Aa106; Aa101.]  Simply stated, the location of the dock in which [...] sought approval with the permit modification application does in fact hinder Appellant’s ability to navigate to and from its waterfront facilities and the navigational channel in Barnegat Bay as evidenced by the record.  [Aa351-Aa353; Aa380-Aa382.]  The record in this matter does not contain any support for the position that [...]’s extended dock will not hinder Appellant’s navigation or access to and from its waterfront facilities and the navigational channel in the bay as required by N.J.A.C. 7:7-12.5(b)9.
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT [...]’ SUBMISSION OF A COMPLETE APPLICATION TO THE [...] DID NOT TRIGGER THE TIME OF APPLICATION RULE.  (DA532; 3T13-21.)  Under N.J.S.A. 40:55D-10.5, (the “TOA Rule”), the court must consider the law in effect when an application for development was made.  Specifically, N.J.S.A. 40:55D-10.5 provides, in relevant part, as follows:  Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, those development regulations which are in effect on the date of submission of an application of development shall govern the review of that application for development and any decision made with regard to that application for development.  Any provisions of an ordinance . . . that are adopted subsequent to the date of submission of an application for development, shall not be applicable to that application for development.  The Planning Board’s determination of whether Blue Violets’ application was afforded the protection of the TOA Rule turned on whether the application submitted to the [...] constituted an application for development under the MLUL.  The Planning Board correctly found in the affirmative.  The trial court, however, reversed that decision based on its erroneous conclusion that “[t]he submission of an applicant’s application to the [...] is not an application for development under the MLUL . . . because the [...] does not give approval for conditional use variances or subdivision plat, site plan, planned development, cluster development, zoning variance for direction of the issuance of a permit.
[brief] Defendant argues that the ice was caused solely by an overnight freeze, not by the snow mound created six days earlier.  However, this claim contradicts Plaintiff’s evidence.  Plaintiff’s expert, [...], concluded that the ice was longstanding, displaying a ripple effect caused by layers of water repeatedly flowing and freezing.  This pattern suggests the ice formed over time from snowmelt runoff, not an isolated freeze.  Defendants further asserts that the sloping property left no option but to mound snow uphill.  This admission supports Plaintiff’s argument that Defendants’ actions in piling snow uphill six days before the fall directly increased the risk at the incident site.  Plaintiff does not dispute Defendants’ argument that they do not have a common law duty to remove snow and ice from a public sidewalk abutting their property.  Nor does Plaintiff dispute Defendant’s interpretation of Luchejko v. City of Hoboken, which held that Defendants cannot be held liable solely for melting snow on a cleared sidewalk because the “refreeze” would not be an “`element of danger or hazard other than one caused by natural forces. ’”  207 N.J. 191, 201 (2011) (emphasis added) (quoting Foley v. Ulrich, 94 N.J. Super. 410, 424 (App. Div.).  Or phrased differently, an owner’s negligence must create “`a new element of danger or hazard, other than one caused by natural forces. ’”  Luchejko, 207 N.J. at 201.  Defendants created/exacerbated the hazardous condition by improperly mounding the snow which caused plaintiff to fall and sustain injury.
[directive] Notification of RPO appointments.  Within 15 days of appointing one or more RPOs, the appointing official shall provide the name and contact information of the RPO(s) to State officials in the following manner:  1.  For local and county law enforcement agencies, the appointing official shall provide the relevant information to the County Prosecutor in the county where the agency is located.  The County Prosecutor shall in turn provide the information to the Division of Criminal Justice, Prosecutors Supervision and Training Bureau.  2.  For the New Jersey State Police, the appointing official shall provide the relevant information to the Office of Law Enforcement Professional Standards (OLEPS).  OLEPS shall in turn provide the information to the Division of Criminal Justice, Prosecutors Supervision and Training Bureau.  3  3.  For all other state law enforcement agencies, the appointing official shall provide the relevant information to the Division of Criminal Justice, Prosecutors Supervision and Training Bureau.  4.  Appointing officials shall follow the above notification procedures when appointing any new or replacement RPO(s), and on at least an annual basis shall ensure the accuracy of the name and contact information of the agency’s RPOs.  D.
[brief] The Civil Service Commission’s Final Decision is, therefore, arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable.  \(^3\)  A certification is “returned” to the CSC with the disposition codes.  See N.J.A.C. 4A:4-4.8(b).  Finally, by the CSC’s own admission, and as per Civil Service regulation, *N.J.A.C. 4A:4-4.8(b)*, Appellant’s certification for promotion remained in effect until March 28, 2023 notwithstanding that his promotional list expired on either January 16, 2023 or February 7, 2023.  **Pa8.**  As such, Appellant remained eligible for promotion until that time.
[brief] The evidence presented at the plenary hearing will support that statement.  [...] cannot prove any of her allegations contained in her certifications supporting her motion.  [...]’s “set aside” case has been dismantled by the documentary and testimonial evidence Plaintiff marshalled in discovery. ” (emphasis added).  [Briefs are omitted from Plaintiff’s Appendix pursuant to R. 2:6-1(a)(2)].  The trial court’s own decisions on dispositive motions indicated [...]’s claims were indeed frivolous:
[directive] c.  [예/Yes]  [아니요/No]  귀하의 유죄 인정이 귀하의 이민 신분에 미칠 영향에  대해 변호사로부터 개인사정에 아십니까?  맞는 자문을 구할 권리가 있다는 것을  Do you understand that you have the right to seek individualized advice from an attorney about the effect your guilty plea will have on your immigration status?
[brief] (Pa42 to 44; Pa46 to 53).  The State intends to prove that defendant was intoxicated at the time of the crash through the results of his blood test, text messages to his wife, testimony of a co-worker, testimony of an eye witnesses, and body worn-camera video.  Specifically, at about 5:12 a.m., defendant texted his wife:  “I tried driving into work but I did not drink yesterday and my head is so dizzy and I am having trouble walking.  I need to go home. ”  (Pa60 to 61).  According to defendant’s coworker, [...], defendant also was disoriented at lunch.  Mr. Ortiz testified that, at about noon, he went to lunch with defendant at a pizzeria.  (1T4-18 to 6-7).  Defendant drove, as he usually did.  (1T5-19 to 25).  During their lunch break, Mr. Ortiz observed defendant to be driving “erratical[ly]”; defendant was “swerving” to and from the pizzeria and “almost got into an accident. ” (1T7-8 to 8-9; 8T9-9 to 11; 1T10- 17 to 22).  More specifically, defendant almost struck a parked vehicle while exiting the pizzeria parking lot.  (1T9-9 to 10-8).  When Mr. Ortiz asked defendant about defendant’s condition, defendant admitted to taking medication, “muscle relaxers,” in an amount “more than prescribed. ” (1T8-7 to 21; 1T9-12 to 22; 1T10-17 to 22).  Defendant further stated that “he wasn’t feeling well” and was “leaving early that day. ” (1T10-17 to 22).  When they got back to work from lunch around 1:00 p.m., Mr. Ortiz “advise[d] [defendant] that he should not be driving in the condition [he] observed.” (1T10-23 to 11-5).  Mr. Ortiz “told [defendant] that he should call an Uber.  Call someone to come pick him up. ”  Id.  Mr. Ortiz informed police that he believed defendant was out the night before, partying.  (Pa71 to 72).  Mr. Ortiz further testified that, a few weeks after the crash, defendant approached him and told Mr. Ortiz, “if [the police] come interviewing people, don’t say anything. ” (1T12-5 to 7; 1T63-12 to 21).  An eye-witness to the accident, [...], also observed defendant’s status that day.  (Pa38).  Immediately after the accident, defendant emerged from his car and asked [...] how the accident occurred.  Ibid.  He then stated that he must have fallen asleep following a long shift; however, that “long shift,” according to defendant and his employer, was shortened at defendant’s request for him to obtain an MRI.  Ibid.  Lastly, body worn camera footage depicts defendant after the crash.  Additionally, it shows [...] and [...] repeatedly wondering aloud to officers as to whether defendant was intoxicated/impaired/“drunk. ” (Pa79).  **Expert Testimony Relevant to Issue on Appeal:**
[brief] (Da38735.)  The court found, among other things, that the parties to the case in which [...] served as a mediator -- not counsel or the law firms representing the parties -- paid the mediator’s fee.  (Da38735.)  According to the court, “the only fact that the [...] case and this case have in common is that [...] represents a party,” and no reasonable person would conclude that [...] has a bias from the simple fact that he interacted with the same firm. ”
[brief] After redeveloping its own oceanfront property on Ocean Boulevard, Plaintiff looked to the court to prevent the redevelopment of an adjacent oceanfront parcel by Defendant, [...] (“[...]”).  In its Appeal, Plaintiff jettisons all but three arguments rejected by the lower court.  As to Count I, Plaintiff contests the lower court’s finding that a $2 million fee (the “Redevelopment Payment”) negotiated by Defendant, [...] (the “[...]”) was a valid exercise of the [...]’s authority under the Local Redevelopment and Housing Law (“LRHL”), N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-1 et seq.
[brief] ”  (emphasis added)  The Court unfathomably relied upon the unsupported hearsay of an unidentified person, with date of conference, the extent of claimed discussions and conclusions reached unknown.  In this manner, Appellant’s case was adversely prejudiced without opportunity to defend against [...]’s unsupported assertions, was denied cross-examination of Probation as to its misrepresentation of the facts, and denied opportunity to present his proofs before a court of law.  Appellant was thus denied due process and the Court erred and abused its judicial discretion.
[brief] Post Trial Proceedings 246T December 12, 2013  Post Trial Proceedings 247T December 13, 2013  Post Trial Proceedings 248T December 16, 2013  Post Trial Proceedings 249T December 17, 2013  Post Trial Proceedings 250T December 19, 2013  Post Trial Proceedings 251T December 20, 2013  Post Trial Proceedings 252T September 12, 2019
[directive] B.  “Chief Resiliency Officer” refers to a detective or deputy attorney general assigned to the Division of Criminal Justice, who is designated by the Director of the Division of Criminal Justice, to ensure implementation of this Directive and oversee the Division’s efforts to strengthen resiliency among state, county, and local law enforcement officers in New Jersey.  C.  “New Jersey Resiliency Program for Law Enforcement” (NJRP-LE) refers to a training program developed by experts in academia, the military, and federal and state law enforcement that is comprised of specific domains and tenets.
[brief] Our Supreme Court has made clear that "[p]lain error is a high bar," and has further "cautioned that \(^2\) Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).  rerun[ning] a trial when the error could easily have been cured on request[] would reward the litigant who suffers an error for tactical advantage either in the trial or on appeal."  Singh, 245 N.J. at 13 (alterations in original) (quoting Santamaria, 236 N.J. at 404-05).  "To determine whether an alleged error rises to the level of plain error, it 'must be evaluated in light of the overall strength of the State's case."  Clark, 251 N.J. at 287 (quoting State v. Sanchez-Medina, 231 N.J. 452, 468 (2018)).  "The right against self-incrimination is guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and this state's common law, now embodied in statute, N.J.S.A. 2A:84A-19, and evidence rule, N.J.R.E. 503."  State v. Bullock, 253 N.J. 512, 532 (2023) (quoting State v. Nyhammer, 197 N.J. 383, 399 (2009)).
[brief] Defendant was nineteen years old when he brutally murdered [...] in his own residence.  He may have been a young adult, but he was an adult nonetheless.  Defendant asks this Court to extend the New Jersey Supreme Court's decision in *State v. Comer*, 249 N.J. 359 (2022)—creating a twenty-year "look-back" provision for juvenile homicide offenders—to eighteen-to-twenty-year-old offenders.  This Court should decline to do so, especially where, after *Comer*, the Supreme Court maintained the constitutional line of eighteen between juveniles and adults.  See *State v. Ryan*, 249 N.J. 581 (2022).  In short, defendant's sentence for his egregious adult criminal conduct, under which he will have an opportunity for parole after serving forty years, is constitutional and should be affirmed.  "An illegal sentence is one that is contrary to the Code of Criminal Justice or constitutional principles."  *State v. R.K.*, 463 N.J. Super. 386, 400 (App. Div. 2020) (citing *State v. Acevedo*, 205 N.J. 40, 45 (2011); and *State v. Veney*, 327 N.J. Super. 458, 462 (App. Div. 2000)).  "An illegal sentence may be corrected at any time so long as the sentence has not been completely served."  Ibid.  (citing *State v. Schubert*, 212 N.J. 295, 309 (2012)).  A trial court's determination of the constitutionality of a sentence is a legal question subject to de novo review.  Ibid.  (citing *State v. Drake*, 444 N.J. Super. 265, 271 (App. Div. 2016)).  Under N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(b)(1), the Legislature mandated a thirty-year period of parole ineligibility for adults convicted of murder.
[directive] More than 1 indicator of substance abuse is needed to score 1 for this Item.  Count any 2 of these specific indicators pertaining to the Defendant.  The Defendant consumed alcohol or used drugs immediately before or during the Index Assault.  ✔  The Defendant abused drugs and/or alcohol in the days or weeks before the Index Assault (e.g., alcohol intoxication, frequent ✔ alcohol use, use of street drugs, misuse of medication).  The Defendant noticeably increased his/her abuse of drugs and/or alcohol in the days or weeks before the Index Assault (without a ✔ return to normal consumption prior to the Index Assault).  The Defendant had been more angry or violent when using drugs and/or alcohol before the Index Assault.  ✔  The Defendant consumed alcohol before or during an offense (including driving while intoxicated) pre-dating the Index Assault.  ✔  From age 18 to the time of the Index Assault, the Defendant’s alcohol use resulted in problems or interference in his/her life; this can ✔ include alcohol use related to violations of the law resulting in a charge or revocation of conditional release, withdrawal symptoms, inability to decrease use, or problems attributable to alcohol use (such as financial, job, relationship, legal, or health problems).  From age 18 to the time of the Index Assault, the Defendant’s illicit or street drug use or misuse of prescription drugs resulted in ✔ some problems or interference in his/her life; this can include drug use related to violations of the law resulting in a charge or revocation of conditional release, withdrawal symptoms, inability to decrease use, or problems attributable to drug use (such as financial, job, relationship, legal, or health problems).  Do not include medications taken as prescribed.  ✘  ________________________________________________________________________________________________________ ________________________________________________________________________________________________________ ________________________________________________________________________________________________________
[directive] W związku z tym wypełniono „Uzupełniający formularz oświadczenia o przyznaniu się do winy dotyczący zarzutów w przypadkach niewynegocjowanych oświadczeń o przyznaniu się do winy”.  This plea is the result of the judge’s conditional indications of the maximum sentence he or she would impose independent of the prosecutor’s recommendation.  Accordingly, the "Supplemental Plea Form for Non-Negotiated Pleas" has been completed.  Inicjały oskarżonego / Defendant’s Initials Główny formularz oświadczenia o winie/Skorygowany formularz udostępniony na mocy Dyrektywy #01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 10079-Polish strona 7 z 7 Main Plea Form/Revised Form Promulgated by Directive #01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 10079-Polish page 7 of 7
[directive] Dated: June 9, 2021 on member.  for publish Instructions agency and Prosecutor, below.  an here to menu assessed listed  Synopsis County dropdown period was here the days time and from name five the General county agency than during Description more Attorney Select Type imposed of <‐‐ <‐‐ suspension the Form was Susp. to sanction submit L  Days  Appendix Reporting and/or # to final required Suspended? grade, | or Procedures reached or is Sanction Discipline rank Jersey document.  was in Demoted? & New reducation agreement  Policy in agency this Affairs  Major termination, of plea 2020  Terminated? version enforcement Internal a which Annual 31, Excel a in where December disciplines the law of local complaints tab and "Instructions" major county, Name all to all of include
[brief] 37 PLIVA v. Mensing, 564 U.S. 604 (2011).........................................................................  22 Pomerantz Paper Corp. v. New Cnty. Corp., 207 N.J. 344 (2011) ........................................................................... 31-32 R.F. v Abbott Labs, 162 N.J. 596 (2000) .................................................................  21 Roberts v. Rich Foods, Inc., 139 N.J. 365 (1995) ........................................................................  29  Roening v.  City of Atl. City, 2022 WL 151940 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Jan. 18, 2022), cert denied, 251 N.J. 16 (2022) ...................................................... 36 Rutigliana v. Valley Bus. Forms, 929 F. Supp. 779 (D.N.J. 1996) .................................................... 34, 36 Scanlon v. General Motor Corp., 65 N.J. 582 (1974) ........................................................................ 23, 25-27, 30 Scott v. Eli Lilly & Co., 2016 WL 1741241 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. May 3, 2016) ............... 34 Schweiger v. Standard Tile Supply, Co., 2019 WL 5783478 (N.J. Super. App. Ct. Nov. 6, 2019) ..................... 24, 28 Sikkelee v. Precision Airmotive Corp., 822 F.3d 680 (3d Cir. 2016) .......................................................... 19 Townsend v. Pierre, 221 N.J. 36 (2015) ....................................................................... 32, 34, 36, 38-39 Vinci v. Clifton Bd. of Educ., 2012 WL 5869576 (N.J. Super. App. Div. Nov. 21, 2012) .................. 32 Vuocolo v. Diamond Shamrock Chemicals Co., 240 N.J. Super. 289 (Ct. App. 1990) .............................................. 32-33, 38-39 Wein v. Morris, 194 N.J. 364 (2008) ..................................................................... 22 Zaman v. Felton, 219 N.J. 199 (2014) ................................................................... 22 Zaza v. Marquess & Nell, Inc., 144 N.J. 34 (1996) ........................................................................................................29, 31 Statutes N.J.S.A. § 2A:58C-2 ...........................................................................................................18, 24 N.J.S.A. § 2A:58C-4 ...........................................................................................................18 New Jersey Product Liability Act ....................................................................................passim Rules N.J.R.E. 702 ..........................................................................................................................3, 17, 36 N.J.R.E. 703 ..........................................................................................................................3, 17, 36 Rule 4:46-2 .............................................................................................................................16 Regulations 21 C.F.R. Part 7 Subpart C, § 7.40 et seq. ........................................................................20
[directive] OPP shall be organized to address three policy goals:  a. analysis.  The Bureau shall oversee Department efforts to Data collection & improve the collection and analysis of data that relates to law enforcement operations in New Jersey.  Among other tasks, the Bureau shall supervise the development and operation of an online portal designed to facilitate the statewide collection and analysis of law enforcement use-of-force data.  b. development.  The Bureau shall oversee the development and drafting Policy of policies, procedures, and standards, including Attorney General Directives, relating to the mission of the Office, including the initiatives described in this Directive.  c. personnel.  The Bureau shall oversee efforts to Training for law enforcement develop enhanced policies, procedures, and standards governing the training of law enforcement officers in New Jersey.  Among other tasks, the Bureau shall coordinate with the Police Training Commission and assist the Commission in the development of new statewide training requirements.  E. Standards.  The Coordination with the Office of Law Enforcement Professional Executive Director shall also ensure that OPIA coordinates its responsibilities with the Office of Law Enforcement Professional Standards (OLEPS), established pursuant to the Law Enforcement Professional Standards Act of 2009.  N.J.S.A. 52:17B-222, seq. et Executive Director shall work closely with the OLEPS Director to develop standards, policies, and best practices that promote professionalism in the law enforcement community.  The Attorney General may assign to OPIA such employees of OLEPS as may be necessary to assist the Executive Director in completing projects that further the statutory mission of OLEPS.  Page 5 F.  Resources.  The Office shall be authorized to call upon the Access to Departmental expertise and assistance of every division, agency, office, bureau, and unit within the Department of Law & Public Safety, and the County Prosecutors’ Offices, in order to carry out its mission.  Such entities are hereby required, to the extent not inconsistent with law, to cooperate with the Office and to provide such assistance as the Office may require to accomplish the purposes of this Directive.  II.