ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Pb80.  However, there is a difference between the legal question whether an award is expressly authorized by a contractual provision and the determination of what an appropriate fee is once that legal question has been resolved.  None of the cases cited by plaintiffs to promote the abuse of discretion standard presented an issue as to whether a fee award was authorized by contract.  In each case, a fee was clearly authorized, whether by statute, *Rendine v. Pantzer*, 141 N.J. 292, 298 (1995) (Law Against Discrimination, N.J.S.A. 10:5-27.1); *C.E. v. Elizabeth Pub. Sch. Dist.*, 472 N.J. Super. 253, 267 (App. Div. 2022) (Open Public Records Act, N.J.S.A. 47:1A-6); or by judicial decision, *Packard-Bamberger & Co. v. Collier*, 167 N.J. 427, 440-41 (2001) (authorizing award of attorney fees to successful legal malpractice plaintiff).  The authorities cited by plaintiffs therefore fail to support the contention that an abuse of discretion standard, rather than de novo review, applies here.
[brief] Trial counsel provided a copy of [...]'s statement to the State's prosecutor on November 3, 2015.  (Da 242)  Nonetheless, trial counsel failed to subpoena and failed to call [...] to testify on petitioner’s behalf.  Trial counsel's error in failure to subpoena and call [...] as a witness on behalf is gross ineffective assistance of counsel.  Petitioner has been prejudiced where there was certainly "a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, (failing to subpoena and call [...] to testify on petitioner’s behalf) the result of the proceeding would have been different.
[brief] (161a [8:4-20]).  Either [...] or [...]’s co-worker [...] prepares the file prior to closing.  (161a [9:6-9]).  [...] typically confirms proof of any conditions for a title commitment prior to attending a closing.  (162a [10:2-9]).  It is [...]’s job to issue title insurance policies, and she issued one for this Property.  (162a [13:5-19]).  [...] disbursed checks to the parties on the settlement sheet, including to itself, on the date of the closing, and issued a title commitment calling for a deed to the Plaintiff, despite the fact that no such deed was present at the settlement table.
[brief] (13T 174-16 to 17)  [...] admitted that he did not see a gun in the running suspect’s hands when he turned initially onto Wilmot Alley.  (13T 187-16 to 20)  He also testified that when the suspect ran into the walkway between 22 and 24 Ellsworth, he lost sight of that man and that person “could have went [sic] anywhere,” which caused [...] to back up his vehicle all the way onto Stuyvesant Avenue between Ellsworth and Edgemere Avenue, the next street over.  (13T 189-14 to 194-3)  From that spot, he could no longer see the area near 18 Ellsworth and did not see [...] tackle defendant.
[brief] B.  The N.J.A.C. regulations adopted by [...] are inconsistent with the position of [...] and the Amici Curiae.  .................................................................11  1)  The regulations provide broad powers to the arbitrator and are designed to promote efficient resolution of disputes .....................................................12  2)  [...]’s plan is inconsistent with the statutes and regulations...16  3)  [...] and the public would not be prejudiced by arbitration of IFPA claims.  .........................................................................................................................19  CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................................20
[brief] (Da262, Da264)  [...] has a strong presence in the area of [...], [...] and [...] as this corporation owns multiple properties in this location.  (Da278)  The claim that there was gravel in the church’s lot that alerted [...] that there was now a basis to claim trespass is puzzling given that [...] placed a tall fence around Lot 20 and Lot 22 years ago with a sign on the fence which notified people that this lot was private property which belonged to [...].
[brief] The record is clear that following this *ex parte* communication, [...] encouraged the parties to “re-evaluate some of our respective positions” and then went through each of [...]’ claims pressuring her to dismiss each.  2T8:10-14; 88:3-91:16.  Further, Respondents assertion that the presence of [...], counsel for Third-Party Defendant [...], during the *ex parte* meeting render the communications inconsequential is specious.  Importantly, following the *ex parte* communication, the Trial Court pressured Plaintiff on dismissal of her claims and Plaintiff asked to speak to [...] and was rebuked:
[brief] "New Jersey courts take a broad and liberal approach to standing".  New Jersey Citizen Action v. Riviera Motel Corporation, 296 N.J. Super. 402, 415 (App.Div. 1997).  Generally, the threshold to prove a party's standing is "fairly low."  *Reaves v. Egg Harbor Twp.*, 277 N.J.Super. 360, 366, 649 A.2d 904 (Ch.1994).  "A financial interest in the outcome ordinarily is sufficient to confer standing."  *Strulowitz v. Provident Life & Cas. Ins. Co.*, 357 N.J.Super. 454, 459, 815 A.2d 993 (App. Div. 2003).  That is, in order to possess standing, the plaintiff need only have a sufficient stake in the outcome of the litigation, a real adverseness with respect to the subject matter, and there must be a substantial likelihood that the plaintiff will suffer harm in the event of an unfavorable decision.
[brief] The Appellate Division’s review in determining the validity of Ordinance No. 17-2107 is de novo.  State v. Clarksburg Inn, 375 N.J.  “A trial court’s interpretation of the law and the legal consequences that flow from established facts are not entitled to any special deference. ”  *Manalapan Realty v. Township Comm. Of Manalapan*, 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995).  A trial court’s determination as to the meaning of an ordinance is not entitled to any deference by the Appellate Division, rather the ordinance’s plain language will be reviewed de novo.  *Dunbar Homes, Inc. v. Zoning Board of Adjustment of the Twsp. Of Franklin*, 448 N.J. Super. 583, 595 (App.Div. 2017).  The question of whether Ordinance No. 17-2017 was overbroad was not raised by the parties below, rather, Plaintiffs argued the Ordinance was vague.
[brief] WESTFIELD’S REMAINING ARGUMENTS PRESENTED ON APPEAL ARE DEVOID OF MERIT  A.  The presumption of validity is inapplicable to [...]’s Ordinance  B.  [...]’s reliance on the 1892 Resolution is misplaced C. [...]’s reliance on other “statutory authority” is misplaced  D. [...]’s reliance on the Red Bank case is misplaced  CONCLUSION # TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
[brief] The Attorney General contends that the surveillance video of a burglary in Tuncap was properly authenticated despite no evidence bearing on the recording process.  In Tuncap, there was plenty of evidence presented.  First, The investigating officer viewed the surveillance video the same day the burglary occurred at the restaurant, which did not occur in this matter.  Second, the investigating officer confirmed that the video he viewed on the same day as the burglary is the same video now being played in court, which could not have occurred because [...] could not confirm the video being played in court was the same video he viewed at the bodega because he did not view the entire video at the bodega.  And third, the video played in court was the same one the investigating officer viewed at the restaurant, which [...] could not have known.  Cleary there was evidence presented to authenticate the video in *Tuncap*, while there was no such evidence presented in the instant matter.
[brief] ”  Additionally, like [...], the MBPA entitles prevailing parties who bring claims under the MBPA to reasonable attorney’s fees, whereas the ABC Law does not.  See N.J.S.A. § 33:1-93.18(a).  Critically, ABC Law clearly does not afford wholesalers the same protections that the MBPA provides and, in fact, does not even apply to sales within New Jersey.
[brief] *United States v. Harris*, 660 F.3d 47, 52 (1st Cir. 2011); cf. *State v. Mann*, 132 N.J. 410, 418-19 (1993) (“For departure to take on the legal significance of flight, there must be circumstances present and unexplained which, in conjunction with the leaving, reasonably justify an inference that it was done with a consciousness of guilt and pursuant to an effort to avoid an accusation based on that guilt. ”) (internal quotation marks omitted).  Here, there were decidedly not “circumstances present and unexplained which . . . reasonably justify an inference that [Defendant’s refusal to give a buccal swab] was done with a consciousness of guilt. ”  Mann, 132 N.J. at 418-19.
[brief] The Court cited N.J.S.A. 34:19-3 that provides as follows:  An employer shall not take any retaliatory action against an employee because the employee does any of the following:  a.  Discloses, or threatens to disclose to a supervisor or to a public body an activity, policy or practice of the employer that the employee reasonably believes is in violation of a law, or a rule or regulation promulgated pursuant to law; b. Provides information to, or testifies before, any public body conducting an investigation, hearing or inquiry into any violation of a law, or a rule or regulation promulgated pursuant to law by the employer; or c.  Objects to, or refuses to participate in any activity, policy or practice which the employee reasonably believes: (1) is in violation of a law, or a rule or regulation promulgated pursuant to law; (2) is fraudulent or criminal; or (3) is incompatible with a clear mandate of public policy concerning the public health, safety or welfare.
[brief] First, the standard of review for Defendant’s motion at the close of the case is not the proper burden of proof overall.  The trial court judge, in denying the Defendant’s motion at close of business, analyzed the Defendants’ argument about statute of limitations under Rule 4:40-1, which in turn meant that the court analyzed the argument under a Rule 4:37-2(b) analysis for involuntary dismissal.  Importantly, analysis under a Rule 4:40-1 motion specifically ignores credibility determinations of the witnesses and holds true all evidence that supports the non-moving party’s position plus any inferences that can be made therefrom.  (12T).  It does not factor in evidence presented by the defendant.  While this is the correct analysis for a motion to dismiss filed at the close of Plaintiff’s case, this is not ultimately the standard of analysis for the case as a whole.
[brief] The pertinent language of the superseded N.J.S.A. 40:44-50 is substantially similar to the current N.J.S.A. 40:55D-19.  *N.J. Natural Gas Co. v. Borough of Red Bank*, 438 N.J. Super. 164, 180 (App. Div. 2014). was not required for a reasonable necessity determination. \(^3\)  In that matter, the Board determined that the increased costs to [...]’s ratepayers would likely be offset by a decrease in energy and capacity costs due to the increased competitive supply that would result from the project.  \(\text{Id.}\) at p. 75.  In 2015, the Board considered avoided costs of a service interruption to approximately 142,000 [...] customers as an added benefit to its reasonable necessity determination. \(^4\)  In 2016, the Board considered the costs of a potential service interruption and restoration to approximately 400,000 [...] customers in its determination that the building and operating an intrastate pipeline pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40:55D-19 to be reasonable, instead of the more costly alternative of restoring gas service to those customers. \(^5\)  Moreover, the cost is of importance to the utility.
[brief] (1)  Any person, entity, organization or business seeking to conduct a temporary tent or parking lot sale in the [...] shall first complete an application and obtain a zoning permit from the Zoning Officer.  A fee of $150.00 per tent or parking lot sale shall be remitted with the application.  (2)  Applications for a special permit shall be made to the Zoning Officer and shall be signed by the applicant.  The application shall contain the following information:  (a)  Name, address, phone number and email address of person, entity, organization or business making the application.  (b)  Name, address, phone number and email address of person owning the premises, if other than the applicant, and notarized consent of the owner of the premises to the tent or parking lot sale application.  (c)  Dates and hours of tent or parking lot sale, including start and end dates.  (d)  Name, address, phone number and email address of the tent company, size of the tent to be used, and Flame Retardant Certification, when applicable.  (e)  Sketch on an accurate site survey indicating the proposed location of the tent on the property.  Tent or parking lot sales shall only be permitted within parking lots where the principal use on the property has available parking in excess of the number of parking spaces required pursuant to Chapter 230, Schedule E, Off-Street Parking Requirements.  Should the plan not comply with established parking requirements, applications shall be rejected.  Applicants may thereafter apply to the Planning Board and/or Board of Adjustment for a site plan amendment.  (f)  Statement as to how the applicant proposes to provide adequate sanitary facilities and adequate provision for garbage/recycling collection.  (g)  A signage plan.  (h)  Proof of comprehensive general liability insurance in an amount of at least $1,000,000.  (3)  Upon submission of a complete application, the Zoning Officer shall forward the application to the [...] as to traffic safety as it relates to the placement of any temporary structure and to the Fire Official for compliance with the Uniform Fire Code.
[directive] Remands for New Trials Directive #3-63 September 24, 1963  Issued by: [...]  Administrative Director  In a criminal case where the mandate of the Appellate Division or the Supreme Court states that the case is "reversed and remanded for a new trial," does this require a new trial eliminating any discretion in the trial court or the prosecutor, or does this merely operate to restore the case to the trial calendar?  The Supreme Court is of the view that such a direction in the mandate merely operates to restore the case to the trial calendar.  The language is used to make plain that the reversal is not to be deemed an acquittal.  After the case is restored to the trial calendar it may be nolle prossed in the same manner and for the same reasons as any other pending matter.  Will you please so advise your County Prosecutor?
[brief] Q:  The only marking – and there is no signs for yield to pedestrians, watch out, beware of pedestrians, drive with caution, lower your speed, there is no signage like that in back parking lot, correct?  A: Correct.  There is no signage.  [Pa319 (70:17-71:1). ]  It is also undisputed that there is no posted speed limit signage in the area of the employee-designated lot where [...] was struck.
[brief] June 3, 2024  Reply  Certification of [...], Esq. in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Arbitration ..............................................Da362-64  Exhibit A – Unpublished Decision, Intentionally Omitted as Not Relevant to Appeal and/or as Related to Prior Briefing and Legal Arguments ........................................................................Da365  Exhibit B – Unpublished Decision, Intentionally Omitted as Not Relevant to Appeal and/or as Related to Prior Briefing and Legal Arguments ........................................................................Da366  Exhibit C – May 2022 Email Exchange Between Counsel ................Da367-69  Exhibit D – Unpublished Decision, Intentionally Omitted as Not Relevant to Appeal and/or as Related to Prior Briefing and Legal Arguments ........................................................................Da370  Exhibit E – Unpublished Decision, Intentionally Omitted as Not Relevant to Appeal and/or as Related to Prior Briefing and Legal Arguments .................................................................Da371  Exhibit F – Unpublished Decision, Intentionally Omitted as Not Relevant to Appeal and/or as Related to Prior Briefing and Legal Arguments ........................................................................Da372  Exhibit G – October 23, 2023  Letter Order, Intentionally Omitted as Duplicative, see Da219 ................................................................................Da373  Exhibit H – Consent Order in Law Division Case, Intentionally Omitted as Duplicative, see Da332-33 ........................................Da374  Exhibit I – August 23, 2023  Defendants’ Counsel’s Correspondence to the Court, Intentionally Omitted as Not Relevant to Appeal and/or as Related to Prior Briefing and Legal Arguments  ........................................................................................................Da375  Exhibit J – September 8, 2023  Defendants’ Counsel’s Correspondence to the Court, Intentionally Omitted as Not Relevant to Appeal and/or as Related to Prior Briefing and Legal Arguments  ........................................................................................................Da376  June 4, 2024  Defendants’ Correspondence Serving Interrogatory Responses ........................................................................................................Da377  July 26, 2024  Defendants’ Notice of Appeal ........................................................Da378-82 August 19, 2024  Certification of Transcript Completion and Delivery ................................................................................................................Da383  January 21, 2025 - February 4, 2025  Email Exchange with Hon. [...], A.J.S.C. (Ret.) Regarding Arbitration .........................Da384-92  VOLUME III
[directive] That is why disclosures pursuant to the common law and under OPRA have long allowed for redactions, Rivera, 250 N.J. at 150, and why disclosures pursuant to this Directive should be no different.  This Directive also clarifies and confirms the Attorney General’s broad supersession authority over internal affairs.  New Jersey law assigns the Attorney General responsibility to ensure the proper, efficient, and uniform handling of law enforcement business in the State and it provides him with the authority to supersede investigations and criminal actions as one tool to achieve those goals.  Because proper, efficient, and uniform handling of internal affairs investigations are integral to the law enforcement business of the State, and because oversight over is specifically assigned to the Attorney General by N.J.S.A Internal Affairs Policy & Procedures 40A:14-181, this Directive confirms the Attorney General’s supersession authority includes internal affairs matters.
[directive] 1.  Aggravated sexual assault or sexual assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2; 2.  Aggravated criminal sexual contact or criminal sexual contact, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-3; 3.  Murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3; 4.  Manslaughter, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4; 5.  Second-degree aggravated assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(1) & (b)(6); 6.  Kidnapping, N.J.S.A. 2C:13-1; 7.  Luring or enticing a child, N.J.S.A. 2C:13-6; 8.  Endangering welfare of children, N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4, except for paragraph (2) of subsection a; or 9.  Any attempt to commit any of the above crimes.
[brief] 30 N.J.R. 645(a) (Feb. 17, 1998); 47 N.J.R. 1392(a) (July 6, 2015).  developments which are designed in accordance with the Redevelopment Plan Ordinance and Design Guidelines Ordinance will be acceptable. ”  Ibid.  A project in the Redevelopment Zone can get a [...] Redevelopment Zone Permit from [...], or alternatively, get a CAFRA permit.
[brief] While an accused may waive the right to Counsel, whether there is a proper waiver should be clearly determined by the trial court, and it would be fitting and appropriate for that determination to appear upon the record.  Perfunctory questioning is not sufficient.  The trial judge has the responsibility of ensuring that any choice of self-representation is made knowingly and intelligently, with an awareness of the dangers and disadvantages inherent in defending oneself.  See Faretta v. California, supra.
[brief] .................................................................  9 Linden v. Solomacha, 232 N.J. Super. 29 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 117 N.J. 88 (1989)  ..............................................  10 Maggio v. Migliaccio, 266 N.J. Super. 111 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 134 N.J. 563 (1993)  .............................................  10 Manole v. Carvellas, 229 N.J. Super. 138 (App. Div. 1988) ....................................... 7,8,9,11,12,14  McDaniel v. Man Wai Lee, 419 N.J. Super. 482 (App. Div. 2011) .......................................  10,12  Mule v. NJM, 356 N.J. Super. 389\(^2\) (App. Div. 2003) .................................  6,7,8,9,11,12,14  Mull v. Zeta Consumer Products, 176 N.J. 385 (2003) ..................................................................  5  RULES AND STATUTES R. 4:5-6 ....................................................................................  14  N.J.S.A. 2A:15-5.10 .................................................................  6 N.J.S.A. 34:15-8 .....................................................................  6,8,9,12,13 N.J.S.A. 34:15-36 ...................................................................  12,13 P.L. 2021, c. 334 .....................................................................  12  OTHER AUTHORITIES
[brief] The trial court, on the critical issue of “materiality” and “reasonable detrimental reliance”—critical elements to the rescission claim—accepted as true statements in the Certification of [...] (“Deyette Certification”), Assistant Vice President in [...]’s underwriting department.  Deyette made statements that the answer given to Question 11 was material and that he reasonably relied upon it, which is inconsistent with Defendants’ underwriting guidelines, which state that an Application will be declined if there is a “pattern of disciplinary complaints” or “suspensions in the last 5 years. ”
[brief] Anticipating an objection from defense counsel, the State argued that the drugs transactions were intrinsic evidence and not N.J.R.E. 404(b) evidence.  [4T92-18 to 93-25].  Defense counsel, in response, stated:  With respect to the distribution issue that had come up over the last week or so, that was specifically in reference to issues involving his possession with intent to distribute and distribute drugs to parties unknown to him, people he would meet up with, people perhaps that he might meet at [...] let's just say hypothetically.  But with respect to these drugs, I think -- it's interesting that [...] is characterizing my client's alleged giving of drugs to [...] as distribution of CDS, where actually facts support constructive possession by both of them to these drugs, of these drugs.  So I'm not going to object to him describing -- having her describe instances where my client may have shared or given drugs to her.  And I would leave it in the record and let us argue to the jury what all that really is.
[brief] The Amendments also gave the City discretion to impose a local employer payroll tax to be used exclusively by the District.  N.J.S.A. 40:48C-15.  In response, the City adopted Ordinance 18-133, imposing a 1% employer payroll tax, effective January 1, 2019.  (Pa207-Pa218.)  The Ordinance does not set a specific revenue amount, nor does it require the payroll tax to be sufficient to offset the cuts to state Adjustment Aid mandated by the Amendments.  (Id.); see also N.J.S.A. 40:48C-15.  The City payroll tax generated approximately $30.7 million for the District in 2019-20 and $86 million in 2020-21.  (Pa1996; Pa2007.)  4.  Review of SFRA’s Operation in [...]