ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] Specific Information Necessary to Identify Other Law Enforcement Agencies that Might Have an Interest in the Execution of the Search  The uniform application form developed by the Division of Criminal Justice pursuant to Section 11 of this Directive shall require the applicant to Page 10 disclose to the best of the applicant’s knowledge and belief the following information to be used and relied upon by the Designated Attorney in determining whether any other law enforcement agency has a sufficient interest in the target of the investigation or in the premises to be searched as to require prior notification and consultation:  a.  Whether this investigation was conducted jointly with any other agency or task force, or whether any other law enforcement agency was involved in or contributed to the current investigation or to any related investigation; b.  Whether the applicant’s agency in conducting the current investigation relied to any degree upon information supplied by another law enforcement agency; c.  Whether the target of the investigation or the premises to be searched is believed to be involved in or associated with terrorist activities, a sophisticated criminal enterprise, or any organized criminal activity; d.  Whether the suspected criminal activity or operation extends to any other jurisdiction beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the applicant’s agency; e.  Whether the premises to be searched or any commercial business at that premises is believed to be the subject of an investigation of another law enforcement agency; and f.  Whether any target of the current investigation: (1) is a defendant in any pending criminal action; (2) is an informant or cooperating witness for any other law enforcement agency; (3) is the target of an investigation conducted by any other law enforcement agency; (4) has ever been detained or questioned by another law enforcement agency; or (5) is the subject of an arrest warrant or a be-on-the-lookout (B.O.L.O.) bulletin or advisory issued by any other law enforcement agency.
[directive] b)  Èske w konprann ke si w bay fo enfòmasyon konsènan adrès kote w abite a oubyen si w pa [Wi/Yes] [Non/No] ta verifye adrès ou yo ta kab akize w de yon enfraksyon klasifikasyon penal twazyèm degre (si zak la te komèt swa le ou aprè le epi w ta ka resevwa yon santans 5 lane nan prizon 1ye jiyè 2014) oubyen yon enfraksyon klasifikasyon penal katriyèm degre ak resevwa yon Fòm Revize Kreye pa Direktif #01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 10080-Haitian Creole paj 2 nan 7 Revised Form Promulgated by Directive #01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 10080-Haitian Creole page 2 of 7 (si zak la te komèt le ou aprè le 7 mas 2007)?  santans 18 mwa nan prizon  Do you understand that if you provide false information concerning your residence or fail to verify your (if address you may be charged with a third degree crime and receive a sentence of imprisonment up to 5 years the offense was committed on or after July 1, 2014) or a fourth degree crime and receive a sentence of (if the offense was committed on or after March 7, 2007)?
[brief] On May 10, 2019, the State related defendants (DAG [...]) wrongfully removed this action to the federal court without the consent of all served defendants.  (Pa109).  Plaintiff promptly filed a motion to remand.  On July 23, 2019, a federal magistrate agreed with plaintiff’s analysis.  On February 11, 2020, the federal district court finally entered an order remanding the case back to the state trial court.  (Pa113).
[brief] Date: July 29, 2024  [...] and [...], her husband, Plaintiffs, v. [...]; [...]; [...]; JOHN DOE 1-10; JANE DOE 1-10; JOHN DOE CORP. 1-10, fictitious names, Defendants.  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE  DIVISION  DOCKET NO.: [...] ON APPEAL FROM: SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY LAW
[brief] (Da120 – Da122).  2.  On July 19, 2020  [...] filed a Medpay arbitration that was assigned Docket Number [...] as a result of a motor vehicle accident which occurred on October 25, 2019 involving the injured party [...] and the [...] insured, [...].  On or about July 22, 2022, the Arbitrator entered an award in favor of [...] NJ Insurance Company in the amount of $8,115.84.  See arbitration award (Da123 – Da129).
[brief] Second attempted amendment to the Redevelopment Plan**  Rather than defend the First Ordinance in the Prior Action, the Borough replaced the First Ordinance.  *(Pa 113)*.  On September 27, 2022, the Borough’s Town Council adopted, on “first reading”, Ordinance 22-1516 (the “Second Ordinance”) which also sought to approve the same amendment to the Redevelopment Plan as the First Ordinance.  *(Pa 91-94)*.  On October 12, 2022, the Planning Board adopted Resolution No. PB10-2022 (the “Second Planning Board Resolution”), which provides that the “Amended Redevelopment Plan is consistent with the goals and objectives of the Master Plan of the [...]. ”.  *(Pa 69-71).*  *(Emphasis added). *.  At the October 12, 2022 Planning Board meeting, as the transcript of the meeting shows, the Planning Board did not make any analysis or factual examination to determine if the Second Ordinance was consistent with the most current [...] Master Plan or to analyze the Ordinance in any way to gage the impact on the Borough.
[brief] Indeed, the point of the law is to make sure that voters are who they say they are, and if that can be done through alternative means, then the courts should encourage such practices in support of the legislative intent.  In *Kriso*, the Appellate Division deviated from the statute to hold that failure to complete the outer envelope of the ballot did not invalidate the person’s vote.  See *Kriso*, 276 N.J. Super. at 344.  While no longer in effect, *N.J.S.A.* 19:57-37.1 concerned delivery of ballots by someone other than the voter.  The *Kriso* Court held that despite the statute imposing a mandatory duty upon a voter and any person mailing or delivering an absentee ballot on a voter’s behalf to properly complete the outer envelope, the statute does not state that the failure to perform this duty automatically requires the enclosed ballot to be invalidated.  The *Kriso* Court’s holding remains applicable to [...], whose ballot was rejected for failing to complete the certification in its entirety—absent an express legislative directive that a violation of an election law requires invalidation of a ballot, the Court must determine whether “under the circumstances” a ballot should be invalidated to “effectuate the legislative intent” in establishing a particular voting requirement.
[directive] All FROM: [...], J.A.D. – SUBJ: COVID-19  Protocol for Matters that Cannot Proceed in a – Remote Format Without Consent  In Furtherance of the Supreme Court’s Orders  Dated April 20, 2020 and February 22, 2021  DATE: February 23, 2021  This directive provides a protocol to support consistent management of cases that require the consent or lack of objection of all parties to proceed in a remote format during the temporary modifications necessitated by the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic, and for so long as court operations are not conducted primarily in record a party’s person.  It sets forth a series of steps (1) to memorialize on the objection to proceeding remotely, or the inability of counsel to ascertain a party’s position; (2) to provide notice to the parties, attorneys, and other participants when a matter is scheduled for an in-person court event based on an objection to proceeding remotely; and (3) to provide an opportunity for participants to request individual adjustments and accommodations that will enable the scheduled court event to proceed.  This protocol is applicable to the trial divisions of the Superior Court and to the Municipal Courts, subject to limited exceptions as noted.
[brief] Q.  Can you estimate for me how many times a day you were up and down those steps after they were painted but before your incident?  A.  How many times a day?  Q. Yes.  A.  I would say four.  Q.  And at any point in time after the paint -- after the stairs were painted but before your incident while you were going up and down them approximately four times a day, did you ever make any complaints to anybody at the condominium association about any condition of the stairs?  A. No.  Q.  Prior to the date of your incident, did you ever have any difficulty traversing or walking over the stairs after they were painted?  A. No. (Pa330, plaintiff deposition P18, L25 – P19, L16).
[brief] Nor did [...] demonstrate extreme hardship in this matter, as he will continue to receive his Special Retirement benefits with concurrent retiree health benefits coverage.  (Pa86-87).  It should also be noted that cases involving the use of the Board’s equitable power for reopening proceedings or relaxing deadlines “were bottomed on the inherent power of an administrative agency, in the absence of legislative restriction, to reopen or to modify and to rehear orders previously entered by it. ”  Duvin v. Bd. of Trs., Pub. Emps.’ Ret. Sys., 76 N.J. 203, 207 (1978).  Here, [...] seeks to avoid an obvious legislative restriction outlined in the Ricci Act that provides he is ineligible for the presumption or recalculation after July 8, 2021.  Even if [...] did not receive notice provided by the Division, he cannot evade the two-year limitation period.
[brief] Defendant argues -- for the first time on appeal -- that he was subjected to custodial interrogation without the benefit of Miranda\(^2\) warnings when he gave his February 8, 2016 videotaped statement to detectives, so [...]'s admission of that statement into evidence was improper.  (Db12-36).  For the reasons discussed below, this argument lacks merit and should be rejected.  "If a defendant, as here, does not object or otherwise preserve an issue for appeal at the trial court level," an appellate court "review[s] the issue for plain error."  State v. Santamaria, 236 N.J. 390, 404 (2019) (citing R. 2:10-2).  "Under that standard, an unchallenged error constitutes plain error if it was 'clearly capable of producing an unjust result.'"  State v. Clark, 251 N.J. 266, 287 (2022) (quoting R. 2:10-2).  "Such an 'error will be disregarded unless a reasonable doubt has been raised whether the jury came to a result that it otherwise might not have reached.'"  State v. Gonzalez, 249 N.J. 612, 633 (2022) (quoting State v. Singh, 245 N.J. 1, 13 (2021)).
[brief] The decisions to be reviewed pertain to the award of attorneys’ fees, punitive damages, and prejudgment interest.  The [...] respectfully disagree with certain other holdings and conclusions of this Court in its 2018 decision and intend to seek review of them by the Supreme Court.  Most prominently, although not to the exclusion of other issues, the [...] adamantly maintain that the trial court erred in ignoring over 40 years of jurisprudence to sanction, after a limited remand, a vast expansion of the case after a final judgment was entered in 2004.
[brief] Rather, the individual subscribers are responsible for the AIF Fees, which refutes the Department’s “overcharging theory”.  (R033a)  Moreover, [...]’s financial statements do not contain any representation about the AIF Fees complying with SSAP No. 25 because [...]’s auditor has never reviewed the AIF Fees for such compliance, which the Department knows.  The Department does not deny that historically it admitted that SSAP No. 25 could not be applied to the AIF Fees absent legislation.  Even the Department auditor’s July 6, 2022 request admits that the request “to gather information to review the POA services fees for compliance with SSAP No. 25” is a “new request”.
[brief] (9T 26-1 to 48-25).  First, [...] testified that the suspect was heading to the tool room, where he opined that the tool room was not well organized, but “if you knew what was supposed to be there and where it was supposed to be, you would know where it is. ”  (9T 32-1 to 21)  After he stated that the suspect left the tool room, he opined that there appeared to be something in the suspect’s hand, although he did not opine as to precisely what the object was.  (9T 33-23 to 34-2)  The following exchange then ensued:
[brief] **Nieder v. Royal Indem. Ins. Co.,** 62 N.J. 229 (1973)  .....................................................................................................................  33  Orologio of Short Hills, Inc. v. Swatch Grp. (U.S.) Ltd., Inc., 2015 WL 4496653 (D.N.J. July 23, 2015) .................................................. 16, 18, 21  Ramos v. Browning Ferris Indus. of South Jersey, 103 N.J. 177 (1986)  .................................................................................................  39  Regent Care Center, Inc. v. Hackensack City, 20 N.J. Tax 181, 185 (2001)  ....................................................................................  24  Singer v. Beach Trading Co., 379 N.J. Super. 63 (App. Div. 2005) ........................................................................  39  State v. Jones, 232 N.J. 308 (2018) ..................................................................................................  33  State v. Robinson, 200 N.J. 1 (2009) ......................................................................................................  33  Vosough v. Kierce, 437 N.J. Super. 218 (App. Div. 2014) .......................................................................  39  Zaman v. Felton, 219 N.J. 199 (2014) ..................................................................................................  33
[brief] Nash, 212 N.J. at 527.  Here, in a letter to the Court, PCR counsel represented that it was petitioner’s intention to advance the argument that his sentence is constitutionally prohibited.  Notably, applications to correct an illegal sentence can be made “at any time. ”  See State v. Zuber, 227 N.J. 422, 437 (2017); State v. Acevedo, 205 N.J. 40, 47 n.4 (2011); R. 3:21-10(b)(5).  [...]’s PCR motion contains additional PCR claims which are not subject to the time bar that can prohibit raising ineffective assistance of first PCR counsel.
[brief] (Da 9.)  At the time of the Contract, Respondents, the [...] were living on the Property.  (Pa 4a.)  The [...] had been living and working on the Property as of the date the January 2015 As-Is Contract was executed.  Id.  After entering the January 2015 As-Is Contract, the Appellant was allowed to conduct due diligence to evaluate the condition of the Property, including its environmental status, through April 1, 2015.
[brief] **Extended Marital Separations**  The record establishes that there were multiple extended periods of time when Petitioner was not living in the Decedent’s Home.  In seeking to rebut this evidence, the Petitioner misrepresents the Respondent’s position.  For example, he inaccurately states: “Respondent contends that they did not live together between 2005 to 2007.  Db at 13” and complains about the lack of a citation to support this statement.  However, that was not the Respondent’s statement, which, in fact, states: “There were also other periods when Petitioner and Decedent did not live together between 2005 and 2007. ” (Rb 13; emphasis added).  In any event, the Petitioner’s absences during this time period was testified to by the Respondent:  Q.  Can you tell us about those other periods of times where [...] was not at the house?  A.  Yes.  So he left in 1997.  He came back sometime while I was in college, I’m guessing around 2001, after his surgery.  Sometime between 2005 and 2007, he left.  I don’t remember him being back in the house until I have my son, [...], which was November 2009.  (5T74-18 to 24).
[brief] N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24(b) states that “[n]o school official shall use or attempt to use his [or her] official position to secure unwarranted privileges, advantages or employment for himself [or herself], members of his [or her] immediate family, or others. ”  Relatedly, N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(f) requires Board members to swear the following oath:  “I will refuse to surrender my independent judgment to special interest or partisan political groups or to use the schools for personal gain or for the gain of friends. ”  The Commission’s regulations offer guidance to help determine whether a school board member’s conduct rises to a violation of N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(f):  “[f]actual evidence of a violation of N.J.S.A. [18A:12-24.1(f)] shall include . . . evidence that the respondent(s) used the schools to acquire some benefit for the respondent(s), a member of the respondent's immediate family or a friend. ”  N.J.A.C. 6A:28-6.4(a)(6).
[brief] Although [...] correctly admitted to the first offer of towing it back to my sister's house at no cost, and also correctly admitted to the second offer which I made (i.e. where he would pay us $466 in return for either the title or a bill of sale), what he misrepresents is when and why he changed the deal which we had all already accepted.  That is, he claims that “promptly” after we all agreed to the deal, only then did his client inform him of the status of the title, and that was why he wanted to change his mind.  However this is totally untrue.  For starters, the status of the title was clearly discussed repeatedly throughout the mediation (i.e. that my mom had signed it and left the buyer's name blank), before we had agreed to anything.  And then on top of that, not only did all the parties (including defendant [...] and his counsel) agree to all the terms, including our agreeing upon all of the specifics (e.g. when, how and where payment would be made), but at the time when [...] changed his mind, he was not even speaking to his client at all!
[brief] A "conspiracy" is acknowledged as unlikely, but Vicinage I clerks' concerted retaliation is understandable.  The clerks work together daily, facilitating a common plan, especially when condoned by “Management. ”  Further, they rarely encounter [...] filing Law Division actions, so they seize every opportunity, “digging” themselves a deeper and deeper, unlikely probability “hole. ”  One well-connected individual, who knows many police officers in southern Atlantic County due to his prior roles as a county-wide investigator, prosecutor, and judge, harbors animosity towards [...].
[brief] The Complaint should be reinstated in its entirety.  Upon such reversal, the Court should also vacate the Order awarding [...] its attorneys’ fees and costs, as prevailing party.  (3T; 5T; Pa704-705).  Contrary to the arguments raised by [...] on its cross-appeal from the order denying its motion for attorneys’ fees, the trial court correctly determined that [...] should not be awarded its attorneys’ fees incurred in this action.
[brief] Plaintiffs do not deny having such advance notice.  The reality of such notice is significant because the limitations period may be enlarged only if it is “manifest that the interest of justice so requires. ” R. 4:69-6(c).  And justice hardly requires an enlargement when, as here, Plaintiffs knew about their supposed claims, yet slept on their rights.  See Washington Twp. Zoning Bd. of Adj. v. Washington Twp. Planning Bd., 217 N.J. Super. 215, 225 (App. Div. 1987) (Rule 4:69-6 “is designed to give an essential measure of repose”).
[brief] The party seeking sanctions bears the burden to prove bad faith.  Ferolito v. Park Hill Ass'n, 408 N.J.Super. 401, 408 (App.Div. 2009).  Here in this case, [...] has not even attempted to meet that burden (i.e. nowhere within anywhere of his trial court papers does he even mention the phrase “bad faith”, let alone any purported bad faith by either my sister or myself); and then in his Apr 28, 2023 opposition to my Appellate motion for a stay, he (incorrectly) argued “R. 1:4-8 ... does not require any showing of bad faith”
[brief] “The finance charge and APR, more than any other disclosures, enable consumers to understand the cost of credit and to comparison shop for credit.  …  Additionally, section 226.17 (a) (2) requires that the terms “finance charge” and “annual percentage rate” be disclosed more conspicuously than any other required disclosure.  A creditor’s failure to disclose those values accurately can result in significant monetary damages to the creditor, either from a class action lawsuit or from a regulatory agency’s order to reimburse consumers for violations of law. ”
[directive] To be authorized for deployment and use under the vehicular pursuit policy, the tire deflation device must be capable of the following: (a) producing a controlled deflation of one or more tires of a pursued vehicle; (b) being deployed or activated immediately before the pursued vehicle drives over it, and removed or deactivated immediately after the pursued vehicle drives over it; and (c) allowing the officer to remain a safe distance from the roadway at the time of deployment or activation.  6.3  Prior to the deployment and use of an authorized tire deflation device, the law enforcement agency shall to the following: (a) modify its vehicular pursuit policy to provide for the proper use of the authorized tire deflation device; and (b) train all officers in the use of the authorized tire deflation device, which training must include practical, hands-on operation of the authorized tire deflation device.  6.4
[brief] PROCEDURAL HISTORY  [...] filed a complaint and jury demand for negligence and damages against the Defendants [...], [...], [...], [...], and [...] (“[...]”).  (Pa¹60-70).  [...] alleged that the Defendants were liable for the dangerously unsafe condition of the exterior front stairs of the building at [...], which caused [...] to slip and fall on the steps and sustain serious personal injuries.  (Pa60-70).  [...] thereafter filed an Amended Complaint and added [...] (“[...]”) as a Defendant.  (Pa146-159).  Defendants each filed answers to the Amended Complaint with affirmative defenses and cross-claims against each codefendant.  (Pa255-263; Pa265-281; Pa285-295; Pa313-319).  First Street Condo Association, Inc. and [...] have been dismissed from the action.  (T²4:12-18).  [...] and [...] (sometimes referred to collectively as the “[...]”) filed a motion for --- ¹ “Pa” refers to Plaintiff-Appellant’s Appendix.  ² “T” refers to the transcript of motion for summary judgment, dated May 10, 2024.  summary judgment.  (Pa303-403).  [...] filed a cross-motion for summary judgment.  (Pa404-426).  [...] also filed a motion for summary judgment.  (Pa427-504).  The Superior Court heard oral arguments on the summary judgment motions on May 10, 2024.  (T1-36).  The Superior Court entered orders granting summary judgment in favor of the [...] and [...].  (Pa1-7).  The court also entered an order granting [...]’s cross-motion for summary judgment.  (Pa8-10).  [...] timely filed a Notice of Appeal to this Court from each of these orders.
[brief] [Da24a-25a, 10T4-1/4]  [...] drove through a red light in an area free of any traffic in a rush to get home (7T12-18/14-2, 38-9/40-7, 80-16/22\(^4\))—a reasonable explanation completely divorced from the consumption of alcohol and contrary to the finding of the Hon. [...], J.S.C., that “this Court does not believe there is another reasonable explanation for Defendant’s driving behavior on the evening of the offense other than that he had consumed alcohol to a point where his driving would be impaired.