ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] [...]’s statements during the booking video should have been suppressed because the detectives interrogated him without first reading him his Miranda rights.  The State argued that none of these statements were induced through any interrogation by the detectives and that the only questions posed by the detectives dealt with “magisterial procedures,” such that there was no requirement to Mirandize [...].  (8T 51-19 to 54-5)  The court accepted the State’s argument, ruling that, though [...] was in custody, there was no need to read him his Miranda rights as there was no interrogation.  (8T 64-18 to 79-16)  The court’s ruling was in error.  The detectives did interrogate [...].  Their failure to secure a valid Miranda waiver before this custodial interrogation requires suppression of [...]’s statement.  “[T]he term ‘interrogation’ under Miranda refers not only to express questioning, but also to any words or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect.
[brief] Plaintiffs also are silent on why they commenced this case so late despite having both record and actual notice of their purported claims well in advance of the expiration of the limitations period.  A litigant who seeks an enlargement should disclose to the court what they knew about their supposed claims and when they knew it so the court can be equipped to properly assess “all relevant equitable considerations. ”  Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules, cmt. 7.3 on R. 4:69-6 (2024).  Plaintiffs have not done so, and that failure alone should have precluded their enlargement request.
[brief] All medical personnel had left.  The Mazda Protégée was positioned to the extreme left of the exit ramp and there was a clear skid mark that went from the passenger side tires straight back 52 feet.  (66-6 to 22).  The driver’s door and the passengers front and rear doors were open and located on the rear passenger side was a child safety seat.  The rear driver’s side window had a bullet hole.  There was broken glass throughout the inside of the car, as well as on the outside of the car.  (5T:56-4 to 57-8; 62-13 to 16; 68-16 to 69-7).  Blood, biological staining and brain matter were observed on the rear seat and the front passenger seat.  The exterior of the vehicle was photographed and forensically processed.  (5T:58-17 to 59-20; 68-16 to 81-18).  Afterwards, it was towed from the scene to the evidence garage at the [...].
[brief] *Id.* (citing *Lawson*, 177 N.J. at 140).  Moreover, the court stated that there was “no basis” to conclude the question at issue was ambiguous, “or that it should be construed in favor of the insured [.]”  *Id.* at 711.  As such, the Court held “[...]’s answer to the question by the insurer for a description of all losses over $5,000 was objectively untruthful, constituting equitable fraud justifying rescission even if the answer was an innocent misrepresentation. ”  *Id.* at 713 (emphasis added) (citing *Liebling*, 337 N.J.Super. at 453).  Similarly, [...] cannot be excused for responding untruthfully to a simple and objective application question.  Finally, the information sought in the Supplemental Form was material and relied upon by [...] when issuing the [...] Policy, which is precisely why the information was requested in the first place.  As will be detailed further below, [...]’s underwriting guidelines specifically provide that 12 to 15 passenger vans are ineligible for non-owned/hired auto coverage.  (Ia134 at 62:23-64:3; Pa008).  Consequently, [...] could not have issued non-owned/hired auto coverage to [...] if it had known that [...] would be using 15-passenger vans in connection with the camp, thus making the misrepresentation material.  Further, [...] specifically requested the Supplemental Form before writing non-owned/hired auto coverage, and the president of [...] affirmed that [...] relies on information in the Supplemental Form in its underwriting process.  (Ia124; Ia134 at 62:23-64:3; Pa002).  Simply put, U.S. Fire cannot be required to provide coverage for a risk that it was not aware of, and which was not disclosed, despite clear, objective and highly relevant questions that were specifically asked during the application process.  Thus, the trial court correctly granted rescission of the [...] Policy.
[brief] A Consent Order was entered on November 16, 2018 staying any such enforcement actions (Da105).  Thereafter, the [...] in Pre-Trial submissions to Trial [...] (Da171-173, Note 8) indicated an intent to submit as Trial exhibits a large volume (57) of documents from the Chancery litigation not presented to the Zoning Board (Da174).  [...] filed a Motion in Limine in May 2019 to Limit the record to the record before the Zoning Board (Da177-186).  [...] filed their Opposition (Da195-213)  The Trial Court ([...]) had Oral Argument on May 24, 2019 (2J), but only rendered her Order denying the Motion on June 2, 2022 (Da214).  On June 25, 2019, the Appellate Court rendered a Decision/Opinion in the easement Appeal reversing all [...]’s 2016/2017 easement decision/Orders and all Enforcement Orders, and remanded for further proceedings to determine the rights, if any, created by the 1963 Agreement and whether any such rights remain in effect.
[brief] At KVDb27-28, Defendants brush aside Plaintiff’s arguments regarding practical construction and waiver of a writing.  --- \(^4\)  Note that the Lease was signed by all three members of [...].  Arguably the termination notice was ineffective because it was only signed by one member of [...].  \(^5\)  Even if we use August 31, 2016 as the “effective date” of [...] and [...]’s exit from the business, they benefited from the rental concessions in May, June, July, and August, totaling $12,000.00.  Defendants argue “practical construction” only applies to a signed contract.  Here the contract (Lease) was signed and the modification was placed in writing by [...]; and the parties’ conduct was consistent with that written modification.  With respect to waiver of Paragraph 17 of the Lease, Defendants argued their conduct did not amount to a waiver.  However, the actions of [...] as recounted above, clearly showed a waiver of the requirement that any modifications of the Lease be in writing, i.e. the failure of [...] to vacate or surrender the premises, the reduction of $3,000.00 per month by [...], and the acceptance of the reduction of $3,000.00 per month by Defendants, and the continued occupation of the property, the continued payment of rent through 2020, the written Consent Order where [...] confirmed the Lease was in effect, the termination in 2020 making reference to the February 20, 2015 Lease.
[brief] Moreover, the alleged waiver of a constitutional right herein is worthy of even more protection than the waiver of a contractual right as in Wein.  Even the mere filing of a lawsuit does not constitute a waiver of the right to arbitrate.  Glens at Pompton Plains Condo. Ass'n, Inc. v. Kleeff, 2015 WL 9486151 (App. Div. 2015) (Da1389):  In April 2012, [...] filed suit against plaintiff for breach of fiduciary duty and failure to perform, alleging plaintiff failed to adequately maintain the common area adjacent to defendants' property.  [...] did not request ADR and the complaint was dismissed with prejudice for failure to state a claim.  ***
[brief] *Manhattan Woods Golf Club, Inc. v. Arai*, 711 A.2d 1367 (N.J. App.), cert. denied, 156 N.J. 411 (1998).  The Supreme Court has held that the entire controversy doctrine rests upon "the principle that the adjudication of a legal controversy should occur in one litigation in only one court; accordingly, all parties involved in a litigation should at the very least present in that proceeding all of their claims and defenses that are related to the underlying controversy. ”  *Cogdell v. Hosp. Center at Orange*, 116 N.J. 7 (1989).  The doctrine “compels the parties, when possible, to bring all claims relevant to the underlying controversy in one legal action,' including defenses and counterclaims.  *Napoli v. HSBC Morg. Servs.*, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 121204 at *8-10 (D.N.J. Aug. 27, 2012).  The failure to assert claims in a prior proceeding that a party knew or should have known about will bar such claims from being raised in subsequent litigation.
[brief] APPENDIX TABLE OF CONTENTS  Volume I  Plaintiff’s Verified Complaint in Foreclosure, filed on December 9, 2022 ..............................................  Da1  Plaintiff’s Notice of Motion for the Entry of a Final Judgment of Foreclosure, filed on April 6, 2023 ..................................................  Da17  Plaintiff’s Proposed Form of Final Judgment of Foreclosure, filed on April 6, 2023 .....................................................  Da19  Certification of Amount Due of [...], filed on April 6, 2023 ........................................................  Da22  Denial of Plaintiff’s Motion for the Entry of a Final Judgment of Foreclosure, filed on April 26, 2023 .................................................... Da29 Certification of Amount Due of [...], filed on May 2, 2023 ....................................................... Da33 Plaintiff’s Notice of Motion for the Entry of a Final Judgment of Foreclosure, filed on May 10, 2023 .....................................................  Da40 Plaintiff’s Proposed Form of Final Judgment of Foreclosure, filed on May 10, 2023 .....................................................  Da42 Certification of Amount Due of [...], filed on May 10, 2023 .....................................................  Da45 [...]’s Objection to Plaintiff’s Motion, filed May 19, 2023 ..........................................................  Da52 Administrative Order of the Clerk of the Superior Court, filed May 24, 2023 ..........................................................
[brief] ”  *Jones*, 475 N.J. Super. at 535.  As argued by defense counsel and admitted by [...], [...] violated the statute and the Attorney General Guidelines by failing to turn on his BWC contemporaneously record objective, impartial evidence for use in investigations, disciplinary matters, and court proceedings .  . . .”; Exec. Order No. 201 (Nov. 24, 2020) (“WHEREAS, the Attorney General has sought . . . to promote the professionalism, accountability, and transparency . . . ; and WHEREAS, ensuring trust between the police and the communities they serve is a critical component of public safety; . . . and WHEREAS, the deployment of body worn camera systems . . . can be a powerful tool for building community trust, both by creating a record of law enforcement professionalism in interactions with the public, and by providing evidence of officer misconduct when it does occur .
[brief] 21 State v. Hock, 54 N.J. 526 (1969) ..................................................................................................................  8  State v. Horne, 376 N.J. Super. 201 (App. Div.) ............................................................................................ 14 State v. Hudson, 209 N.J. 513 (2012) .................................................................................................................. 17 State v. Johnson, 118 N.J. 10 (1990) .................................................................................................................. 21 State v. Kluber, 130 N.J. Super. 336 (App. Div. 1974) .................................................................................... 14 State v. Koskovich, 168 N.J. 448 (2001) .................................................................................................................. 8 State v. Macon, 57 N.J. 325 (1971) .................................................................................................................. 7 State v. Nero, 195 N.J. 397 (2008) .................................................................................................................. 8 State v. Reyes, 50 N.J. 454 (1967) .................................................................................................................. 14 State v. Roth, 95 N.J. 334 (1984) .................................................................................................................. 17 State v. Singleton, 211 N.J. 157 (2012) .................................................................................................................. 7 State v. Spivey, 179 N.J. 229 (2004) .................................................................................................................. 14 State v. Wakefield, 190 N.J. 397 (2007) .................................................................................................................. 7 State v. Walker, 203 N.J. 73 (2010) .................................................................................................................. 8 State v. Wilbely, 63 N.J. 420 (1973) .................................................................................................................. 8, 19 Torres, 183 N.J. 554 (2005) ..................................................................................................................
[brief] Page TABLE OF CONTENTS ...........................................................................................................  ii  APPENDIX TABLE OF CONTENTS ..................................................................................  iv  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES  ................................................................................................. vi  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS BEING APPEALED ..........................................................  vii TABLE OF TRANSCRIPTS ................................................................................................. vii  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT ..............................................................................................  1  STANDARD OF REVIEW .................................................................................................  4  A. Municipal Ordinances ...............................................................................................  4  B. State Statutes .............................................................................................................  6  C. Caselaw ....................................................................................................................  7  PROCEDURAL HISTORY ..................................................................................................  9  STATEMENT OF FACTS ..................................................................................................
[brief] The Complaint is bereft of any allegation that [...] acted with an improper or malicious motive.  Indeed, Plaintiff fails to cite a single paragraph of the Complaint where this type of conduct was alleged.  It merely points to allegations of actions taken by Plaintiff, which it then characterizes in its brief.  (See Pb37-38 (Pa1112, ¶¶ 45-51) (which alleges the alleged failure to alert of a new closing date and the occurrence of the rescheduled closing), Pa15-16, ¶¶ 73-76 (alleging only actions relating to communications concerning notice of the closing date and the performance of the closing), and Pa17, ¶¶82, 86-89 (consisting of nothing but legal conclusions)).  Plaintiff’s reliance on Section 13.1 of the PSA to avoid the application of Section 17.1(b) is also misplaced.  As noted above, Section 13.1 addresses what was to happen if [...] defaulted under the PSA, provides for the return of the escrow funds, and gives Plaintiff the right to bring an action for specific performance against [...].  (Pa115-116).  Nothing in this provision has anything to do with the limitation of [...]’s liability set forth in Section 17.1(b).
[brief] As to the latter, I certainly had an argument (i.e. exactly the same argument that the co-plaintiff in *Tagayun* had), that my sister and I were intended third party beneficiaries.  Moreover, here in this case I had actually found and cited multiple authorities to support that argument, one of one which was *NJ State Chamber of Commerce v. NJ Election Law*, 82 N.J. 57, 68 (1980), which was the very same authority that [...] had cited in his Aug 24, 2022 motion to dismiss (albeit just one sentence, and only as to the Court’s holding that: “Among the considerations when a Court reviews standing is … the relationship of plaintiffs to the subject matter of the litigation …”).  Thus, [...]’ own argument is that the issue of standing is something that a Court must decide, on a case-by-case basis, after weighing the facts and circumstances surrounding any given case.
[directive] 19 USE OF FORCE POLICY | April 2022 Core Principle Seven Duty to Report and Review Uses of Force.  Every use of force must be reported and receive a meaningful command level review as set forth in a written department policy that includes review by the law enforcement executive.  The law enforcement executive shall also conduct an annual review and analysis of the overall use of force by the department.  7.1  Reporting.  Notification of fatal and serious bodily injury law enforcement incidents shall be made in accordance with AG Directive 2019-4.  As soon as any local, county, or state law enforcement agency learns of a law enforcement incident as defined below, the agency shall immediately notify the County Prosecutor’s Office for the county in which the incident occurred, who shall in turn immediately notify the Attorney General’s Office of Public Integrity and Accountability (OPIA) Director or their designee.  7.2  Law enforcement incidents are defined as: (a) any use of force by an officer resulting in death; (b) any use of force by an officer resulting in serious bodily injury; (c) any use of deadly force (including the discharge of a firearm as defined in Section 4.1) by an officer, regardless of whether such force resulted in injury; (d) the death of any civilian during an encounter with an officer; and (e) the death of any civilian while in the custody of law enforcement.
[directive] D.  The requirement in Section II.F of AG Directive 2018-2 that every law enforcement agency report by December 31 to their County Prosecutor the dates of testing, total number of sworn officers employed, total number of sworn officers tested, and total number of sworn officers who test positive, shall be extended from December 31, 2022 to March 31, 2023 for calendar year 2022 only.  The reporting requirement for December 31, 2023, shall remain in place for calendar year 2023 reporting.  E.  The requirement in Section II.G of AG Directive 2018-2 that each County Prosecutor report by January 31 to the Attorney General, through the Division of Criminal Justice's Prosecutors’ Supervision and Training Bureau, those agencies under the County Prosecutor’s supervision that are in compliance with this Directive and those that are not, shall be extended from January 31, 2023 to April 30, 2023 for calendar year 2022 reporting only.  The reporting requirement for January 31, 2024, shall remain in place for calendar year 2023 reporting.
[brief] In short, when the State argues that the totality of the circumstances establish guilt of driving while intoxicated beyond a reasonable doubt, they really mean that they want the Court to disregard all objective evidence and accept their subjective opinion.  Period.  Everything detailed and argued by the State in fact establishes probable cause to bring [...] to the [...] to administer the Alcotest but does not prove beyond a reasonable doubt intoxication.  The video evidence, coupled with the defense expert’s testimony, is the best evidence of the fact that the State failed to prove the DWI beyond a reasonable doubt.  The State argues the totality of the circumstances, including the repetition of speech, admission as to drinking alcohol, changing of stories, etc., is observational evidence.  It is, and it establishes probable cause but then when all the objective evidence contradicts, not that he drove after drinking alcohol, not that he may have been impaired to a certain extent, but that he was impaired beyond the legal limit, he is not guilty of DWI.  The objective evidence in this case is the Alcotest which was a .07, and therefore, not a per se DWI violation so we then have to go to the field sobriety tests which the defendant/appellant passed.  Not only did the defense expert render his opinion in this regard, but viewing the video clearly shows same.  The defense expert.
[brief] ”  *In re Liquidation*, 165 N.J. at 83.  But if a document is “not relevant” to the action at issue, then the requesting party has no right to obtain it at all, and a trial court necessarily abuses its discretion in compelling its production.  *K.S.*, 330 N.J. Super. at 294 (reversing trial court order to produce information that was “not relevant” to plaintiff’s case); see Pressler & Verniero, cmt. 1 on R. 4:10-2(a) (collecting cases applying the “relevancy standard [to] bar[] pretrial discovery”).
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