ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Plaintiff [...] seriously injured his foot at work.  He received full worker’s compensation benefits through his employer’s insurance policy issued for that purpose by Defendant [...] (“[...]”).  Seeking additional monetary compensation, Bunting filed suit against his employer, [...], alleging that the accident occurred because of the employer’s intentional conduct in failing to correct a defect in the machine that caused his injury.  [...] denied insurance coverage to Schroth for Bunting’s additional tort claim.  After Bunting and Schroth entered into a settlement agreement, the trial court correctly dismissed Bunting’s claim for insurance payments from [...]’s Workers Compensation and Employers Liability Insurance Policy.  The part of that policy that applies to employers liability (“[...] Employers Liability Policy”) contains a plainly-worded, unambiguous exclusion for all intentional conduct of the employer, including express reference to the kind of intentional conduct that Bunting alleged in his lawsuit.  The trial court also dismissed Bunting’s claims against the excess and umbrella insurance policy issued to Schroth by [...] (“[...]”), and his claims against [...] (“[...]”), as to which no claim for coverage was articulated in Bunting’s pleading.  On this appeal, Plaintiff Bunting presents essentially a single argument: that New Jersey statutory law prohibits employers liability insurance policies from excluding coverage for employer conduct that is substantially certain to result in injury to an employee.  No court has so held in the past.  No court has declined to enforce the exclusion on the basis of the statutes Plaintiff cites.  The challenged exclusionary language has its genesis in decisions of the New Jersey Supreme Court regarding employer’s liability policies.  In those decisions, the Court noted the distinction between intentional conduct that is subjectively intended to cause injury and intentional conduct that is not intended to cause injury but is substantially certain to result in injury.  Both kinds of intentional conduct are exceptions from the statutory bar of New Jersey’s Workers Compensation Act against an injured employee suing his own employer for causing the injury.  The Supreme Court has held that employer’s liability insurance policies that generally exclude coverage for intentional conduct exclude only the first type of conduct, where the employer subjectively intends to cause injury.  Policies with only the generally-worded exclusionary language do not exclude coverage for employer conduct that is not intended to cause injury but is substantially certain to do so.  In response to these decisions, amended exclusionary language was proposed to address the second type of intentional conduct and approved by the [...] ("[...]") in 2007.  The revised exclusion prevents coverage for both kinds of intentional employer conduct.  The revised Exclusion C.5 is consistent with the public policy of this State of encouraging employers to correct defects and hazards in their workplace and also, maintaining the costs of insurance coverage for injury to workers.
[brief] See State v. Delgado, 188 N.J. 48, 60 (2006) (“The importance of recording the details of what occurred at an out-of-court identification flows from our understanding of the frailty of human memory and the inherent danger of misidentification. ”).  At the hearing, [...] testified that she observed defendants entering the courtroom but did not see “whether or not they had anything on their hands. ”  Although she recognized both defendants' faces from the date of the robbery, she stated that when [...] looked at her, she peered away because of nervousness.  Nevertheless, she said, “When I saw them, yes, I recognized them, and it all came back to me like I was reliving it. ”  After a weighing of relevant factors, the trial court found that [...]'s identification of both defendants “was reliably independent of any prejudicial pre-testimonial procedure and that the verdict returned by the jury was not clearly and convincingly a result of prejudice or passion.
[brief] It’s much more than a breach of fiduciary duty and a breach of contract….  (235T59:11-60:14)  [...] brought value to the property.  That was supposed to excuse the misappropriation of tens, tens and tens of millions of dollars, and it doesn’t.  This is why the elements that have to be proven under the Punitive Damages Act seem so self-evident in this case.  The likelihood at the relevant time that serious harm would arise from the defendant’s action, a hundred percent likelihood.  (235T74:2-9)  [[...]’ conduct] was a consistent, pervasive method of removing funds from this entity so that they would not reach the partners.  ***
[directive] A Conducted Energy Devices and Other Less-Lethal Devices and Ammunition Contents  1  Scope ............................................................................................................................................  1 2 Policy............................................................................................................................................. 2  3  Definitions ....................................................................................................................................  3  4  Authorized Officers .......................................................................................................................  6  5  Authorization to Use CEDs............................................................................................................  7  6  Unauthorized Uses of CEDs ..........................................................................................................  8 7  Deployment Techniques for CEDs ................................................................................................ 9  8  Handling of Injured Suspects Following CED Use .......................................................................  11  9  Approved CEDs ...........................................................................................................................  12  10  Authority to Use Less-Lethal Devices and Ammunition .............................................................  13  11  Training and Qualification for CEDs and Less-Lethal Devices .....................................................  15  12  Reporting and Evaluation ...........................................................................................................  16  1  Scope  1.1
[brief] An action to settle an account on an estate trust is a formalistic proceeding, unique to probate.  Its stylized format involves a line-by-line review on the exceptions to an accounting.  Higgins v. Thurber, 205 N.J. 227, 229 (2011).  “An action for an accounting on an estate provides a means for addressing “the conduct of the executor, not the conduct of others. ”  Id. (quoting Perry v. Tuzzio, 288 N.J. Super. 223, 229 (App. Div. 1996).  The court has reviewed the exceptions by…[Appellant] and is satisfied with the Intermediate Account and that the “exceptions” raise no genuine disputes.  The Intermediate Account accurately details the assets, expenses and liabilities of the Trust.  The co-trustees, [Respondent] and [...], adequately answered the audit questions by the [...] and paid the audit fee.  ***
[brief] See Mynster, at 480; Donovan, at 197.  In sum, Appellant’s FDCPA claim fails because it is based on a hyper-literal and isolated reading of the provision that is contrary to Congress’s intent and the statute as a whole, and would lead to absurd results.  Appellant improperly conflates his literal reading of prohibited third-party disclosures with its “plain” meaning, and, even then, fails to set aside that “plain” reading to avoid absurd results and inconsistencies within the fuller statutory scheme.  c.
[brief] Together with all Riparian rights adjoining the above-described premises.  This description relies upon calls to known references rather than an exact metes and bounds or tax lot and block.  This description does not include all of the property represented as Lots 3 and 3.01 on the current tax map.  It merely includes a thin strip of land located immediately north of Beachway and south of the 1918 mean highwater line as shown on the tax map in yellow (Pa202).  When the [...] brought its tax foreclosure in 1939, it named [...] and other defendants (Pa937, 946) but failed to include [...], the fee simple owner of and successor to the 1879 tidelands grant to [...] (Pa917, 923).
[brief] Though ⁴ Times are EST (four hours behind GMT, which is used in the text records). it was locked, she could answer the incoming calls.  (11T113-11 to 114-11)  [...] and [...] testified similarly to their pretrial testimony, with [...] adding for the first six weeks of the investigation, she thought that the homicide happened a little after 12:30pm, 20 minutes later than it actually occurred.
[brief] On appeal, defendant cites to and relies on an unpublished opinion, *State v. Bijacsko*, 2019 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1510 (App. Div. 2019) (Da59-65).  As the New Jersey Supreme Court recently ruled in *Hansen v. Rite Aid Corp.*, Court Rule 1:36-3 provides that “[n]o unpublished opinion shall constitute precedent or be binding upon any court.
[brief] THE STANDARD OF REVIEW | 5 | | I.  BY GRANTING THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION, THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR (931a-954a) | 6 | | II.  BY DENYING THE CLASS CERTIFICATION MOTION, THE | 37 | | TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR (931a-954a) | | |--------------------------------------------------|--| | CONCLUSION | 47 | ### TABLE PURSUANT TO R. 2:6-2(2)
[brief] [Ja043].  There are several issues with these findings and conclusions.  First, putting aside the fact that the record is devoid of any discussion among the Board Members of the intent of the 1999 Master Plan, the language selected in the Resolution does not provide the full story of 1999 Master Plan.  Notably absent from the quoted language in the Resolution, is the following:  “The category of general manufacturing poses special concerns because it can have significant offsite impacts: noise, dust, odors and visual. ”  Ja123 (emphasis supplied).  The passage quoted in the Resolution then discusses the SM Zone as an intermediate area of development as it is “less likely to result in offsite impacts” than the GM Zone.  Ja123.  While the Defendant relies upon traffic as an offsite impact sought to be addressed by the Master Plan, the word “traffic” does not appear in the actual excerpt.  Rather, the “potential negative externalities” sought to be avoided were “noise, dust, odors and visual. ”  None of these are at issue in this application; none of them are identified as a reason for the denial.  Second, despite the Board’s imaginings to the contrary, the Master Plan is silent on height.  Ja123.  Without the Master Plan even making mention of the permitted heights in the SM and GM Zones, the Defendant assumes that the height differential in the SM and GM Zones, was an intended method to limit intensity.  Without any langue in the Master Plan to support it, the Defendant correlates height to intensity of use: “[t]here is no credible, probative evidence before the Board that would allow it to deviate from the zoning standards set down by the governing body or which would justify the Board rethinking the determinations of the Planning Board and governing body that link the height of permitted structures with their anticipated intensity. ”  Ja044 (emphasis added).  There is simply no language in the Master Plan to support Defendant’s unfounded invention that the differences in permitted building heights in the SM and GM Zones was to limit or reduce the “negative externalities” in the SM Zone.  Nor was any evidence adduced during the hearing to support this fiction; and again, the Board never even mentioned it.  The 1999 Master Plan is silent on any correlation between building height and intensity of use, and again, height is not mentioned in the Master Plan whatsoever.  Despite the lack of any reference to height, Defendant concluded that the increased height of the structure to be located in [...], and the accessory uses to be located in [...], will be more intense than intended.  Ja044.  This conclusion is unsupported by the plain language in the 1999 Master Plan.  It is also contradicted by the evidence.  B.
[brief] Pb13.  Yet it is wholly silent as to the same blunder when made by their side when Plaintiff’s Counsel confused these acronyms as well, referring to “RAO” when he meant “RIR” in his opening statement.  2T13-4 to 14.  Plaintiff, when it was still a “prospective purchaser,” was allowed unfettered access to the property as early as May 2018, some fourteen (14) months before the PSA was executed.
[brief] **United States v. Bonds**, 12 F.3d 540 (6th Cir. 1993) | 20 | ### Statutes | Statute | PAGE NOS. | |------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------| | N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3 | 25 | | N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3a | 2, 25 | | N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3a(1) | 2 | | N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3a(1), (2) | 2 | | N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4a | 36 | | N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4d | 2 | | N.J.S.A.
[directive] The law enforcement executive shall then provide a written report documenting the annual review to the County Prosecutor for that department.  Each County Prosecutor’s Office and each statewide law enforcement agency shall make its report to the Attorney General’s Office of Public Integrity and Accountability (OPIA).  16  USE OF FORCE POLICY  Addendum B | December 2021  Vehicular Pursuit Policy 13  Training  13.1  The Division of Criminal Justice, by June 21, 2021, shall develop a training program to explain the requirements of this Policy as they pertain to state, county, and local law enforcement agencies and officers.
[brief] The Petitioner also argues that he did not move out of the house after the February 1997 incident.  (Pb 7).  However, this fact was confirmed by [...], whose “testimony was found to be “reasonable, well-founded and credible” by the Chancery Division.  (Pa 28).  As noted above, the Petitioner’s testimony was found to lack credibility by the Court.  The Petitioner further argues that “the first time Petitioner heard of this alleged incident was during this litigation. ” (Pb 9).  Such an allegation is entitled to no weight.  In addition, the 2011 “thank you” card and related materials (Pb 8-9) are irrelevant to the issue at hand and prove nothing.  The Petitioner also asserts that the Respondent “did not produce any police reports, medical records, legal action, or any other responsive action that a ‘protective’ mother would have taken to investigate the circumstances. ” (Pb 8-9).  Such argument, blind to the realities of such a situation, requires no response.  2.
[brief] 2T54:6.  They also had labs in Edison and Englewood, employing a combined number of 90 employees.  2T56:1-21.  [...]’s responsibilities included “solving various technical issues, solving client technical issues; . . . dealing with the State agencies for making sure the certifications and licenses are there, working with the State agency in terms of auditing, . . . making sure everything is in compliance. ”  2T56:23-57:7.  [...] described this compliance responsibility as “very demanding in terms of technical” because penalties were imposed for non-compliance.
[brief] Most significantly, Plaintiff admitted that neither [...], nor [...], nor anyone else employed by the [...] ever said anything about her or to her that she felt or viewed was inappropriate or discriminatory; rather, the only statements that were made which she felt were “inappropriate” were made by teachers to students.  (Pl. Tr. 237:8-24; 238:6-12).  Moreover, each teacher in each instance was either spoken to or reprimanded in some way by either Plaintiff or another Vice Principal.  (Pl. Tr. 238:14-24; 241:19-22; 252:1-7; Da272).  Further, [...]’s use of the n-word was not directed at anyone in particular, let alone Plaintiff, as it was part of a discussion with students about the use of that word in general.  Thus, it is not disputed that to the extent any racial slurs were made, they were uttered by a teacher—neither [...] nor [...]—and were never made in Plaintiff’s presence nor directed at her.  Similarly, with regard to [...]’s political statement about agreeing with [...]’s wall, while perhaps the comment may be viewed by some as anti-Hispanic or merely anti-immigration, the statement cannot be viewed as anti-Black or ageist.
[brief] **The Substantive Issues**  In presenting their case, Plaintiffs acknowledged their “high burden” to demonstrate that the Governing Body’s actions were “arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable” and that the standard is “deferential” to the Governing Body.  (T55:24-56:4; T90:9-12.)  Without addressing that burden, Plaintiffs sought to argue against the “scale and scope” of the project.  (T56:4-8.)  Plaintiffs stated that while “[n]o one argues really that the [...] property should be redeveloped,” they were critical of the square footage of office space contemplated.  (T56:7-12.)  Plaintiffs also proposed their interpretation of the standard set forth in *Hirth*, which they misapply here.  (T53:21-54:8.)  Other than wanting a different plan, Plaintiffs pointed to no evidence that the Governing Body acted in an arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable manner.  In upholding the Town’s decision-making, [...] argued, among other things, that Plaintiffs were asking the Trial Court to apply the wrong standard, which was applicable to designation decisions, not approvals of redevelopment plans.  (T57:20-58:10; 60:2-61:10.)  [...] explained that the governing standard for redevelopment plans was Section 7 of the LRHL, which requires that a redevelopment plan be either “substantially consistent” with the Master Plan or “designed to effectuate” the Master Plan.  (T58:8-60:3.)  [...] noted that differing opinions and even the existence of “more preferable alternatives” are insufficient grounds on which to disturb a Governing Body’s deferential decision to approve a Redevelopment Plan, which if “exercised honestly and upon due consideration, it is not arbitrary and capricious. ”  (T59:14-19; see also T59:20-75:22.)  The Town similarly rebutted Plaintiffs’ arguments and misapplication of the applicable standards in failing to carry their burden.  (T76:1-82:19.)
[brief] (Pa 165)  The content was transmitted on the same day to [...] and published in the [...] Complaint filed March 7, 2006.  (Pa 165 id 6 ¶ 32-36)  Once that Complaint was sealed by two federal Magistrates and stricken by the Court, there was no basis for [...] to further publish the FBI data or fail to file under seal.  The prejudice created by these acts is significant.  **[...]’S CONDUCT WAS A KNOWING FRAUD UPON THE COURT**
[brief] To prevent a jury from convicting a defendant due to its perception that he is “a ‘bad’ person in general” rather than because of the evidence presented at trial, N.J.R.E. 404(b) restricts the admission of evidence of a defendant’s other crimes or past wrongs.  *State v. Cofield*, 127 N.J. 328, 336 (1992).  Evidence of a prior wrong “‘has a unique tendency’ to prejudice a jury,” and thus “must be admitted with caution. ”  *State v. Willis*, 225 N.J. 85, 97 (2016) (citations omitted).  Prior-bad-act evidence has the distinctive effect of “suggesting to a jury that a defendant has a propensity to commit crimes, and, therefore, that it is more probable that he committed the crime for which he is on trial. ”  *Ibid.* (internal quotation marks omitted).  To ensure that such evidence will be used only for appropriate, limited purposes and not to demonstrate a defendant’s propensity to commit crime, *Cofield* set out a four-pronged test for admissibility under N.J.R.E. 404(b): (1) the evidence of the other crime must be relevant to a material issue in dispute; (2) it must be similar in kind and reasonably close in time to the offense charged; (3) the evidence must be clear and convincing; and, (4) the evidence’s probative value must not be outweighed by its apparent prejudice.
[brief] (Pa045).  During his deposition, [...] identified the Will of September 20, 2011, and the witness signatures.  (Da74).  Mr. [...] testified that he did not know [...].  (Da77).  [...] signed the Will “willingly as his free and voluntary act for the purpose therein expressed ….” (Da78).  The Will provided that [...] was not under any undue influence.  (Da78).  Mr. [...] testified if he ever saw any evidence that the Testator did not act freely or voluntarily, or saw any evidence that the Testator was under undue influence, or saw any evidence that the Testator was not of sound mind, he would not proceed with the signing of the Will.  (Da 81).  The Will of September 15, 2011 provided that the remainder of the Estate was given to the children – [...], [...], and [...].  (Da 79).  Mr. [...] had no recollection of [...] ever coming to his office to tell him what to write in any of the Wills.  (Da78).  Also, Mr. [...] testified that he was the attorney who drafted the Power of Attorney, of September 20, 2011.  (Da78).  [...] (“[...]”) was deposed on June 14, 2021.
[brief] It should be further noted that the entire Introduction to the Petitioner’s Brief is devoid of any reference to the record.  The Introduction is therefore completely unsupported by any facts or evidence of record, and should be ignored by the Court.  In any event, even if this Court should for some reason determine to consider Petitioner’s improper Appendix and Brief, nothing presented by Petitioner merits reversal of the Board’s Final Administrative Decision, which held that Petitioner is ineligible to receive AD.
[brief] Ja167, Ja711.  This frontage made Plaintiffs’ property subdividable by right.  Ja274, Ja710.  However, the Subdivision Plan, the Subdivision Deed, and the subsequent [...] Confirmatory Deed, and [...] Consolidation Deed contained two errors: (1) the combined 21st Street South frontage of Lots 2 and 3 was shown as 186.33’ rather than 185.00’, providing an additional 1.33’ to Lot 3 on that side; and (2) the combined public alley frontage of Lots 2 and 3 was shown as 192.06’ rather than 190.69’, providing an additional 1.37’ to Lot 3 on that side.  Ja148, Ja156-82, Ja.161-63, Ja711.  While the deeds and plan reference the transfer and consolidation of a 40’ by 90’ parcel, following the written metes and bounds results in Lot 3 being pushed 1.33’ onto Lot 2, and Lot 2 being pushed 1.33’ onto Lot 1, which was not involved in these transactions, by the discrepant amounts.  Ja156-82, Ja.161-63, Ja711.  Defendants’ Acquisition of the Remainder of Lot 3
[brief] Standard Gas Power Corp. v. New England Cas. Co., 90 N.J.L. 570 (E&A 1917)....................................................................................................................23  State v. Grimes, 235 N.J. Super. 75 (App. Div.) certif. denied, 118 N.J. 222 (1989) .................................................. 25 Stewart v. 104 Wallace Street, 87 N.J. 146 (1981) ......................... 42
[brief] We also take note of what was not presented at trial by the State.  Although [...] made a positive in-court identification, there is no indication in the record that she ever made an out-of-court identification or even was asked to do so.  [...] candidly acknowledged at trial that she could not remember any distinguishing characteristics of the robber because she was too scared to remember details.  Cf. Henderson, 208 N.J. at 261–62, 27 A.3d 872 (recognizing that high levels of stress undermine the reliability of eyewitness identification and that eyewitness memory of such high-stress events “may be subject to substantial error. ”).  That circumstance undermines the reliability of the identification she made in court when she was shown the surveillance video of the robbery and when she observed defendant live in the courtroom.  See Watson, —— N.J. Super. at ——— (slip op. at 108–54) (discussing the inherent suggestiveness of an in-court identification procedure and addressing the defendant's contentions regarding the reliability of “first time” in-court identifications).  *16