ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The first *Berrie* factor, “the interest of the proposed deponent in the outcome of the litigation,” weighs heavily in favor of the deposition.  [...] was the primary communicator when [...] and [...] stole the [...]’ assets.  Aa325, 330-31, 344, 349, 354.  It was [...] who communicated with the L3 investors (Aa339, 354), advised them on the [...]’ investments (Aa339), solicited them to invest in duplicative projects for [...] (Aa330-32), deprived them of information, claiming he had been “slapped” by [...] before for giving away too much information (Aa332), and then tried to short-change them when reimbursing the investor monies.  Aa333, 337.  It was [...] who admits he is employed by [...] (Aa5), the entity that took the assets.  Aa326-27, 333, 337, 341-42, 346, 351, 357.  He is hardly a disinterested third party.
[brief] \(^7\) --- \(^7\)  For the sake of completeness, [...] addresses *State v. Frankel*, 179 N.J. 586, 608–09 (2004), which the State cites in support of the claim that a 9-1-1 call on its own is equivalent to probable cause, although that case is entirely irrelevant.  In *Frankel*, the Court address the scope of the emergency aid exception when dispatch received a 9-1-1 call, called the number back but received no response, and an officer who came to the location had a face-to-face interaction with a resident that seemed very nervous.  The Court concluded that “[a] 9–1–1 call is tantamount to a distress call even when there is no verbal communication over the telephone to describe the nature of the emergency.  The responding police officer is not required to accept blindly the explanation for the 9–1–1 call offered by the resident answering the door but must base his decision on the totality of the circumstances. ”  *Ibid.*  In *Frankel*, the officer “was entitled to conclude that the person who attempted to make the 9–1–1 call may have been prevented from completing the call and was in need of emergency assistance.  We find that [...] had an objectively reasonable and good-faith basis to believe that an emergency was at hand that could not brook delay. ”  *Id.* at 610.  In this case, the 9-1-1 system was not used to signal any distress, there was no claim of an emergency, and there was no face-to-face interaction to assess.  In sum, while a 9-1-1 call may be more considered more reliable than an informant’s tip it is not so reliable that the traditional inquiry for anonymous calls and the requirement of corroboration of those calls are dispensed with, other than when the tip refers to a potentially intoxicated driver.  See also Golotta, 178 N.J. at 228 (“[A]s a general rule, an anonymous tip, standing alone, is rarely sufficient to establish a reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal activity.  This case, however, falls within that narrow band of cases in which a 9-1-1 call carries sufficient reliability to sustain a motor vehicle stop when the purpose of that stop is to prevent imminent harm to the vehicle’s driver or to the public. ”) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added).  Because the tip was uncorroborated before officers stopped [...], and because the special public safety interests involved in stopping intoxicating drivers is not present in this case, the stop was illegal.
[brief] 8 Coppola v. State, 177 N.J. Super. 37, 39 (App. Div. 1981), certif. den. 87 N.J. 398 (1981) .........................................................................................................................  8  Coyne v. N.J. Dep’t of Transp., 182 N.J. 481, 488 (2005) .........................................................  8 Danow v. Penn Central Transportation Company, 153 N.J. Super. 597, 603 (Law Div. 1977) .................................................. 16-17  Dimitrakopoulos v. Borrus, Goldin, Foley, Vignuolo, Hyman and Stahl, P.C., 237 N.J. 91, 107 (2019)
[brief] THE LOWER COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY FINDING THAT DEFENDANT IS NOT RESPONSIBLE FOR ANY OF HIS CHILDREN’S COLLEGE EDUCATION COSTS (P-452)  Putting aside for a moment that Defendant lacks all credibility where he committed perjury on his CIS by omitting his one-half interest in his father’s home that was deeded to him 2 months prior to his execution of that CIS, and where his matrimonial attorney, [...], also prepared the deed transferring the one-half interest in Defendant’s father’s house to Defendant, thus suborning perjury, and where [...] invoked the Fifth Amendment during the pre-trial deposition when the Undersigned attempted to explore this issue, entitling Plaintiff to an adverse inference, which was requested but not given, the lower court respectfully committed abuses of discretion in otherwise drawing its conclusions upon evaluating the Newburgh factors, which evaluation largely favored Plaintiff.  1T204:7-23; 2T12:2-14:21 see also Plaintiff’s Exhibit 14 (P-785).  Duratron Corp. v. Republic Stuyvesant Corp., 95 N.J. Super. 527, 533 (holding it is "a logical, traditional, and valuable tool in the process of fair adjudication"), certif. denied, 50 N.J. 404 (1967).  The following well-known principles inform the Appellate Division’s review.  Substantial deference is given to the Family Part’s findings of fact because of its expertise in family matters.  Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 411 (1998); Thieme v. Aucoin-Thieme, 227 N.J. 269, 282-83 (2016).  The Appellate Division “should uphold the factual findings undergirding the trial court’s decision if they are supported by adequate, substantial and credible evidence on the record. ”  MacKinnon v. MacKinnon, 191 N.J. 240, 253-54 (2007) (quoting N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. M.M., 189 N.J. 261, 279 (2007)).  A trial court’s findings of fact will not be disturbed unless they are “so manifestly unsupported by or inconsistent with the competent, relevant and reasonably credible evidence as to offend the interests of justice. ”  Clark v. Clark, 429 N.J. Super. 61, 70 (App. Div. 2012) (quoting Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Invs. Ins. Co. of Am., 65 N.J. 474, 484 (1979)).  “Only when the trial court’s conclusions are so ‘clearly mistaken’ or ‘wide of the mark’” should we interfere to ‘ensure that there is not a denial of justice. ’”  N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. E.P., 196 N.J. 88, 104 (2008) (quoting N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. G.L., 191 N.J. 596, 605 (2007)).  It is well established that a parent’s responsibility may include paying for college and graduate studies even after the child is emancipated.
[brief] Waiver, under New Jersey law, involves the intentional relinquishment of a known right, and thus it must be shown that the party charged with the waiver knew of his or her legal rights and deliberately intended to relinquish them. ”  *Shebar v. Sanya Bus. Sys. Corp.*, 111 N.J. 276, 291, 544 A.2d 377 (1988)  “The intent to waive need not be stated expressly, provided the circumstances clearly show that the party knew of the right and then abandoned it, either by design or indifference. ”  *Knorr v. Smeal*, 178 N.J. 169, 177, 836 A. 2d 794 (2003).  The doctrine of waiver also operates to bar Plaintiff’s claims.  When Plaintiff [...] forged [...]’s signature as the Grantee, he obviously knew that he was not [...]; yet, he knowingly signed [...]’s name, and allowed the title of the 293 Property to be transferred to [...]’s name [...], as the Grantee (Da359 – Da366).  To the extent Plaintiff [...] would otherwise have certain legal rights with respect to the property ownership subject to this litigation, by signing [...]’s name as the Grantee, he knowingly and deliberately allowed, and in fact facilitated, the title to be transferred to [...].  In light of his such conduct, Plaintiff [...] has demonstrated his “intentional relinquishment of a known right,” to the extent he had such a right.  Therefore, his claims are barred by the doctrine of waiver.  The trial court failed to analyze this and the appellate court should take this argument into account.
[brief] “The agency decision must be supported by substantial credible evidence in the record as a whole” and the decision “must not offend either the state or federal constitution and must be in accord with the agency's legislative mandate. ”  Ibid.  “The burden of demonstrating that the agency's action was arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable rests upon the person challenging the administrative action. ”  In re Arenas, 385 N.J. Super. at 443–44.  If the court is satisfied that the evidence and the inference drawn from the evidence support the agency decision, the court must affirm even if it would have arrived at a different decision.
[brief] Notwithstanding the above, the trial court did not err in instructing the jury that [...] could only be negligent if the jury found that he was acting in self-defense.  Despite alleging that [...] intentionally assaulted [...], Plaintiffs made a tactical decision to voluntarily dismiss their claim for battery in order to appeal summary judgment on the remaining claims against [...] and [...].  Plaintiffs then proceeded to make the faulty argument that they could recover on a theory of negligence based on [...]’s intentional conduct.
[brief] If Defendant [...] never took title to the subject property, then [...] is entitled to a Court Declaration Quieting Title in their favor and monetary damages.  The answer to this disputed question of material fact—the only actual disputed material relevant question at issue in this trial—is the “Expert Opinion” of the expert witnesses from both sides to the single question:  Whether in 1939 when the Borough of [...] took title to the subject property by Sheriff’s Deed whether the Deed conveyed to them legal title to the (then) dry land only, or to BOTH the (then) dry land and the riparian grant at issue.  There is no reasonable dispute as to the answer to this determinative question: Defendant [...] never took or acquired title.  They do not own the subject property.  All the Borough cites to is future actions taken by the Borough and not taken by a defunct company, not the undisputed fact that the Borough never acquired title to the Riparian Grant through the foreclosure.
[brief] Q.  All right.  So, if the baby were born 15 minutes earlier, more likely than not would the outcome be the same?  A. Yes.  Q.  If the baby were born 20 minutes earlier, more likely than not, would the outcome be the same?  A.  Yes.  Q.  If the baby were born 25 minutes earlier, more likely than not, would the outcome be the same?  A.  Hang on one second.
[brief] There, a group of shareholders brought a derivative suit against former executives of [...].  *Id.* at 555.  The executives had signed arbitration agreements with [...] providing that ‘any controversy ... arising out of [the employee's] employment ... shall be settled by arbitration at the instance of any such party in accordance with the Constitution and rules then obtaining of the [[...]].’  *Id.* at 558.  The executives moved to compel arbitration, and the district court granted the motion, referring the matter to the [...] (“[...]”).  *Id.* at 555.  [...] declined to arbitrate the dispute, invoking its discretion under its constitution to decline to arbitrate cases referred to it.  *Id.* at 555–56.  The executives then returned to the district court and requested that the court appoint a substitute arbitrator pursuant to Section 5.
[brief] Plaintiff’s misinterpretation of the Act’s compulsory insurance provisions is also fueled by a similar misunderstanding and misreading of the Supreme Court’s decision in *Schmidt v. Smith*.  Like the minor plaintiff in *Variety Farms*, the injured worker in *Schmidt* was not limited to the compensation provided by the Act for her alleged bodily injuries associated with alleged sexual harassment in the workplace.  155 N.J. at 51.  Relying on the reasoning of the court in *Variety Farms*, the Schmidt Court concluded that the workers’ compensation insurer in *Schmidt* was required to provide coverage for the same reasons that the insurer in *Variety Farms* was required to provide coverage for the claims of the minor plaintiff.
[brief] Exhibit A to Certification, [...] Manual Amendment Bulletin #436, filed October 30, 2023  Exhibit B to Certification, Brief of [...] and [...], dated January 13, 2006, filed October 30, 2023 Exhibit C to Certification, Brief of [...], dated March 8, 2006, filed October 30, 2023 Response of [...] and [...] to Plaintiff’s Statement of Material Facts, filed October 30, 2023 | Cases | Pages | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|-------| | Central Nat’l v. Utica Nat’l, 232 N.J. Super. 467 (App. Div. 1989) | 2 | | [...] v. O’Gorman & Young, 188 N.J. 542 (2006) | 11,12 | | Do-Wop Corp. v. City of Rahway, 168 N.J. 191 (2001) | 3,4 | | Hardy ex rel. Dowdell v. Abdul-Matin, 198 N.J. 95 (2009) | 13 | | Jones v. Heymann, 127 N.J. Super. 542 (App. Div. 1974) | 4 | | Lehroff v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Ins. Co., | | | 217 N.J. Super. 340 (App. Div. 1994) | 13 | | Marchitto v. Central R.R. Co., 9 N.J. 456, 463 (1952), overruled on | | | other grounds, Donnelly v. United Fruit Co., 40 N.J. 61 (1963) | 4 | | Millison v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 101 N.J. 161 (1985) | 11 | | Motor Club of Am. Ins. Co. v. Phillips, 66 N.J. 277 (1974) | 6 | | New Jersey Mfrs. Ins. Co. v. Delta Plastics, 380 N.J. Super. 532 | | | (App. Div. 2005), aff’d, 188 N.J. 582 (2006) | 2,12 | | Obst v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins., 123 N.J. Super. 60 (Ch. Div. 1973)| | | aff’d o.b., 127 N.J. Super. 458 (App. Div. 1974) | 6 | | Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. United Ins. Co., | | | 264 N.J. Super. 460 (App. Div. 1993) | 13 | | Pasterchick v. Insurance Co. of North America, | | | 150 N.J. Super. 90 (App. Div. 1977) | 5,6 | | Perez v. Am. Bankers Ins. Co., 81 N.J. 415 (1979) | 5 | | Rodriguez-Ortiz v. Interstate Racking & Shelving, | | | A-1614-19 (N.J. App. Div. Sep. 3, 2021) (Pa475) | 7,8,9,10 | | Cases | Pages | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------| | Salem Group v. Oliver, 128 N.J. 1 (1992) | 12 | | Schmidt v. Smith, 155 N.J. 44 (1998) | 1,2,3,10,12 | | Simpson v. State Farm Automobile Insurance Co., | | | 318 F. Supp. 1152 (S.D. Ind. 1970) | 6 | | Trinity Cemetery Ass'n v. Twp. of Wall, 170 N.J. 39 (2001) | 7 | | Walton v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., | | | 518 P. 2d 1399 (Sup. Ct. Hawaii 1974) | 6 | | Zacarias v. Allstate Ins. Co., 168 N.J. 590 (2001) | 12 | | Statutes | Pages | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------| | N.J.S.A. 34:15-1 to -6 | 9 | | N.J.S.A. 34:15-8 | 10,11 | | N.J.S.A. 34:15-71 | 9 | | N.J.S.A. 34:15-72 | 3,9,10 | | N.J.S.A. 34:15-78 | 10 | | Regulations | Pages | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------| | Rules of Court | Pages | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------| | R. 1:36-3 | 7 | | Other Authorities | Pages | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------| | Report of the Employers' Liability Comm'n For the Year 1914 at 6 | 8 | LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I THE ARGUMENTS OF DEFENDANTS [...] AND [...] ARE INCONSISTENT AND OTHERWISE LACK MERIT.
[brief] ’  Hence, once the insurer's duty to defend is triggered, the insurer must defend the entire suit including any claims that might not be covered by the policy.  (Citations omitted.)  *Id.* at 440; accord *SL Indus., Inc. v. Am. Motorists Ins. Co.*, 128 N.J. 188, 198-99, 607 A.2d 1266, 1272 (1992) (“Insureds expect their coverage and defense benefits to be determined by the nature of the claim against them, not by the fortuity of how the plaintiff, a third party, chooses to phrase the complaint against the insured”).  Here, the Policy insured against liabilities associated with “any negligent act(s), error(s), or omission(s) directly related to the operations of the condominium property of the Named Insured. ”  The complaint in the HCH Action contained express allegations of negligence on the part of [...] and his co-defendants.  Pa317–18 ¶ 19.e; Pa327 ¶¶ 54–56.  “Duty of care” is a negligence standard, which is presumably why [...] agreed to defend the HCH Action in the first place.  See Baisley v. Missisquoi Cemetery Ass’n, 167 Vt. 473, 477, 708 A.2d 924, 926 (1998) (“To prove negligence, plaintiffs must show a duty of care on the part of defendants, failure to perform that duty, and injury resulting from the breach of that duty”).  Even assuming that the Vermont Trial Court’s summary judgment decision could rightly be characterized as resting solely on an alleged “breach of the duty of loyalty” (T83-8), such a characterization would not terminate [...]’s duty to defend because the HCH Action continued to be a “suit” that [...] was duty-bound to defend, i.e., one “in which ‘loss’ because of ‘wrongful acts’ to which this insurance applies are alleged.
[directive] (For example, at the conclusion of an investigation into an excessive force allegation, the agency finds that the officer used force (alleged conduct) but that the force was not excessive (alleged violation).)  (d)  Not Sustained.  The investigation failed to disclose sufficient evidence to clearly prove or disprove the allegation.  6.2.4  If the investigator determines that the complaint is unfounded, exonerated or not sustained, the investigative report is to be forwarded to internal affairs for review and entry in the index file and filing.  The subject officer shall be notified in writing of the investigation’s outcome.
[brief] \(^3\)  [...] later on September 8, 2016 granted an additional courtesy discount of $3,000.00 for September of 2016.  [...] left the business until 2019.  Pa54, Pa90-91.  [...] testified in depositions that if [...], [...] and [...] had asked him to release them from their guarantees, he would have requested substitute collateral such as a bank letter of credit or an escrow.
[brief] In response to Appellant’s formal complaint with HR regarding [...]’s sexual harassment, Appellant was met with immediate retaliation, unwarranted discipline, hostile behavior, culminating in her constructive discharge.  Specifically: •  When Appellant had reported [...]’s sexual harassment to Respondent [...], he berated and blamed Appellant for the predicament claiming it was Appellant’s fault for speaking to her caseworkers.  (Pa274-99, Pa230).  •  Respondents then transferred Appellant— the victim — as a result of her complaints even after Appellant objected to such transfer.  Id.  •  During the same meeting where Respondents should have been investigating Appellant’s complaints of sexual harassment, Respondents ignored Appellant’s complaints, and instead, focused on bogus allegations regarding Appellant’s attire, her “over socialization,” and her apparent “substance abuse. ”  (Pa655-722)  80:1-81:23, 93:10-22, 94:1-106:23.  Such allegations were apparently made by [...] management.  Id.  •  Following Appellant’s retaliatory transfer, Appellant was ostracized by her coworkers, who knew she was transferred due to the sexual harassment.  The same coworkers spread false, defamatory rumors that [...] was sleeping with someone in the office.  (Pa324-417)  89:7-96:24, 223:15-225:25.  •  Appellant made another complaint of discrimination and retaliation to Respondent [...] after Appellant had learned that Respondent [...] called Appellant “too immature” for her position and remarking that she was like a “drunken prom date. ”  (Pa999)(Pa324-417) 98:17-109:19, 233:3-234:13; (Pa655-722) 105:17-113:14  •  Respondents once again refused to investigate Appellant’s complaints, which was pure retaliation.  Id.  •  Respondents’ human resources department completely ignored Appellant’s emails regarding long-term disability while she was out on doctor prescribed leave.  (Pa230); (Pa324-417) 135:21-143:4; (Pa998); (Pa997).  Moreover, Appellant’s constructive discharge claim is for the jury.
[brief] (4T53-5 to 8; Da24). as the judge, and explaining how the proceedings would unfold.  (3T10-1 to 13).  The victim recognized defendant in the courtroom at the instant trial, as the participant the victim was able to see and hear virtually in court that day, as well as someone with whom he had had a previous court hearing.  (3T11-14 to 12-9; 3T14-18 to 22).  On August 23, 2021, following a day of court, the victim returned to his law office and retrieved three phone messages from defendant on his direct office line.  (3T12-14 to 13-18; S-1 in Evidence).  Defendant identified himself in the messages as “[...],” but the victim also recognized defendant’s voice from court, describing it as “a very distinctive voice…[that] is very overly aggressive....” (3T14-9 to 22).  The victim described the phone messages as “very nasty, aggressive [and], threatening” in tone, threatening physical harm and violence, with defendant seeming to know where he lived and worked; he saved the recordings, and out of concern for himself and his family, he called the police.
[brief] ”).  Not only was there a justifiable impression that [...] engaged in conduct which violated the public trust, the public itself actually stated that such public trust was violated – to the Board and [...] in her role as Board member – at meetings of the Board.  Respondent stated clearly, in plain text and with photographic evidence, that she was a Board member from her Facebook account.  (Ca222-224).  Then, within 5 days, she made the Facebook posts that were the subject of Appellants’ Motion for Summary Decision.  (Ca199-202; Ca214-226).  Then, Respondent was protested at meetings of the Board as a result of the Facebook posts which addressed Board issues.  (Ca075-076, Ca86, Ca098-099, Ca100-105).  News articles and Board minutes clearly reflected that she was being protested in her role as Board member because she held herself out as a Board member from her Facebook account.  *Id.*  If this is not a “sufficient nexus” between her Facebook posts and her Board membership, it is difficult to imagine how such a nexus could ever exist.
[brief] ”).  As the Appellate Division has made clear, CEPA “is not intended to shield a constant complainer who simply disagrees with the manner in which [a] hospital is operating one of its medical departments, provided the operation is in accordance with lawful and ethical mandates. ”  Klein, 377 N.J. Super. at 42; see also Young v. Schering Corp., 275 N.J. Super. 221, 237 (App. Div.1994) (noting CEPA “was not intended to provide a remedy for wrongful discharge for employees who simply disagree with an employer’s decision, where that decision is entirely lawful”); Battaglia v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 214 N.J. 518, 559 (2013) (“Vague and conclusory complaints, complaints about trivial or minor matters, or generalized workplace unhappiness are not the sort of things that the Legislature intended to be protected by CEPA.
[directive] If a juvenile fourteen or older at the time of the commission of an offense that would be a crime, if committed by an adult, is photographed by the county law enforcement agency, an original photograph should be submitted to the State Bureau of Identification within the Division of State Police.  D. collection.  Juveniles taken into custody for an act which, if committed by an adult, DNA would constitute the following offenses, shall have a biological sample collected by the charging agency for purposes of DNA testing, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 53:1-20.20(b) & (e):
[brief] See Da046 (27:10-18; 29:5-20); Da050 (44:4-8, 21-23).  When asked what his basis was for saying that a “miscommunication” had occurred, Defendant [...] admitted that his saying so was based entirely on what his [...] attorney had told him and not his own personal knowledge.  Id. In other words, the alleged “miscommunication”, upon which Defendants repeatedly rely in attempting to deny the existence of a conflict of interest, appears to have originated from the actions of conflicted [...] counsel, who was apparently attempting to spoon-feed a factual scenario to Defendant [...] that had no basis in [...]’s own personal knowledge, that contradicted [...]’s own testimony, and that undercut [...]’s own position regarding liability, in order to benefit [...].