ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The Appellant, [...] (“[...]” or “Appellant”) presented an application to the [...] (“[...]”) seeking Minor Site Plan approval and bulk variances related to the proposed development of the subject property with a Class 5 Retail Cannabis Dispensary (“Application”), a use that is indisputably permitted within the Tourism District of Atlantic City where the property is located.  Based on traffic “concerns” raised by objectors, [...] improperly denied the Application.  Specifically, the denial was based on whether the use was compatible with existing, off-site traffic.  Where a land use regulator is reviewing an application for a permitted use, such concerns are not valid considerations, as the zoning rules governing development in any given area are legislative determinations that cannot be usurped by any planning board or authority such as the [...].  The determination of whether a use is suitable for a location is made through adoption of zoning and development regulations.  Where the zoning rules provide a use is permitted for a property, the land use agency reviewing an application for development cannot render a decision to the contrary, on grounds that the area is already too congested, or that the use is purportedly not a good fit given such conditions.  Where a decision has been reached on such basis, it is contrary to law and should be reversed.  Moreover, the proposed development, within the first floor of an existing multi-story structure on Atlantic Avenue, would be an adaptive re-use of an existing “grandfathered” building that functioned as a popular restaurant in that location for over 40 years.  Again, while the [...] was swayed by objectors who fretted over how parking for patrons and deliveries would be accommodated at the site, the applicant [...] addressed all of these issues and noted that there were thousands of parking spaces available nearby through a network of parking garages developed for the multitude of retail outlets in the area, and that patrons would generally be walking to and from the premises from those parking areas, not driving up.  [...] also presented testimony as to how loading and deliveries would be effectuated, consistent with the same manner as loading and unloading had previously been handled by the restaurant at that same location for 40 years and at other businesses throughout the City.  The position expressed by the objectors that such activities would now be inappropriate and somehow unsafe is meritless.  [...] was improperly swayed by this specious postulation in denying the application.  As a matter of law, an application for site plan approval of a permitted use, even one that requires reasonable variance relief, may not be denied on the basis of existing, off-site traffic conditions.  The [...] acted in an arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable manner in denying the application based on such purported traffic concerns, and denial of the Application should be reversed.
[brief] (9T 51-15 to 52-6)  [...]’s partner [...] owned a car (9T 51-14), but [...] rented a vehicle that weekend so he could drive his daughter [...] around and also get around to his planned boxing training on February 1.  (9T 110-10 to 17; 11T 25-18 to 23)  \(^7\)  [...] did not specify which “[...]” called him.  (8T 22-10 to 14)  [...] testified and called [...] as well as his father [...] to establish that he was at home on February 1, 2016, at the time the burglary took place.
[directive] Strategic Redeployment.  Repositioning by an officer to increase space and time to react to a subject.  It includes gaining time to de-escalate by withdrawing from the immediate vicinity of the subject if doing so will not create a threat to the safety of the public or the officer in doing so.  Tactical Communication.  Verbal communication techniques that are designed to avoid or minimize the use of force.  Such techniques include giving clear, simple instructions or directions, using active listening techniques to engage the suspect, and explaining the consequences of failure to comply with directions or instructions, including that force may be used.  Tactical Positioning.  Making advantageous uses of position, distance, and cover to reduce the risk of injury to an officer and avoid or reduce the need to use force.  Tactical Team.
[brief] I.  THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN FINDING THAT THE SUBPOENA SEEKS RELEVANT INFORMATION.  (819A-821A)  .........................1  II.  THE TRIAL COURT OVERLOOKED THAT THE UNDERLYING PURPOSE FOR THE SUBPOENA IS TO HARASS [...].  (819A-821A)  ...............................8  A.  THE SUBPOENA DOES NOT SEEK ANY RELEVANT INFORMATION........................................................................................................... .  8...  B.  THE SUBPOENA SEEKS DUPLICATIVE DISCOVERY................................. ....9  C.  THE CITED ORDER ARE RELEVANT................................................................. .  9  III.  THE TRIAL COURT OVERLOOKED THAT [...] IS ENTITLED TO A PROTECTIVE ORDER DUE TO RESPONDENTS  SEEKING CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION (819A-821A)  ....................................................................................10  CONCLUSION
[directive] C. Teams.  A new Subsection 3.4(c) is Reporting Requirement for Pointing of Firearms by Tactical inserted to clarify reporting requirements for the pointing of firearms by tactical teams.  The new subsection makes clear that an officer engaged in the operation of a tactical team is required to report the pointing of a firearm only when the pointing involves a sustained active engagement with a person in order to gain that person’s compliance.  The new subsection clarifies that a member of a tactical team who quickly “sweeps” a room during an operation need not report each person at whom a firearm was momentarily pointed during the sweep.  D. Officer.
[brief] Balaclavas, which can “serve[] as multi-purpose facemasks” became a fashion “phenomenom” during the pandemic.  [...], “All the Cool Kids Are Wearing Balaclavas,” Vogue, February 14, 2023.  https://www.vogue. com/article/all-the-cool-kids-are-wearing-balaclavas  Between 2021 and 2023, the balaclava became a staple of street fashion:
[brief] (2T 42-7 to 14)  [...] and [...] (who did not testify) conducted a video-recorded interrogation of [...], a redacted version of which was played for the jury.  (2T 42-15 to 67-4; Da 67) without having been shown any surveillance videos, grant freely admitted that he knew [...]; they both attended [...] earlier that night; and they left together, walking along [...].
[brief] POINT II  THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT CONCLUDING THAT THE [...] IS THE FUNCTIONAL EQUIVALENT OF AND AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE [...] PROCESS.  (3T.19:4-25, 3T.20:1-8)  This case is different and unique from a land use prospective.  Normally, there is no condition precedent for an Applicant to file an application with the Planning Board for a conditionally permitted use such that the Applicant is required to first obtain an approval from another public entity before the Applicant can even file an application for development with the appropriate land use board let alone proceed to a public hearing before such board, which in this instance is the Hoboken Planning Board.  The MLUL under N.J.S.A. 40:55D-22(b) addresses the issue of conditional approvals.  N.J.S.A. 40:55D-22(b) states:  “in the event that development proposed by an application for development requires an approval by a governmental agency other than the municipal agency, the municipal agency shall, in appropriate instances, condition its approval upon the subsequent approval of such governmental agency; provided that the municipality shall make a decision on any application for development within the time period provided in this act or within an extension of such period as has been agreed to by the Applicant unless the municipal agency is prevented or relieved from so acting by the operation of law. ”  N.J.S.A. 40:55D-22b.  Under Hoboken Code Section 36-4A, an Applicant is required to file an application with the [...] before an Applicant can file a land development application with the appropriate land use board.
[brief] [...] and [...], Defendants-Respondents- Cross-Appellants  [...], [...], [...], [...], [...] and [...], Defendants-Respondents, KWONG  HUI NAM KOONG, Defendant-Respondent- Cross-Appellant and JOHN DOES 1-10 AND/OR ABC CORPORATIONS  1-10, in their Corporate Capacity and as to the Principals and Owners  Individually (Names being fictitious and Unknown but described as Corporate or Individual Owner(s), Manager(s), Lessor(s), Supervisor(s), who had Control of the premises located at [...], who contributed To the March 16, 2017 loss)  Defendants-Respondents  TABLE OF CONTENTS
[brief] Table of Judgments, Orders, and Rulings  Exhibit  Honorable [...] J.S.C. April 28, 2023  Order Denying Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment and Defendants’ Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment  73a Honorable [...] J.S.C. May 18, 2023  Amended Order Denying Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment and Defendants’ Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment  75a  June 20, 2023  Trial Order 77a  Cases Cited Cite Riggs v. Township of Long Beach, 109 N.J. 601, 610 (1985)  8 Northgate Condo Ass’n v. Borough of Hillsdale Planning Board, 2014 N.J. 120, 137 (2013)  8  Berardo v. City of Jersey City, 476 N.J. Super. 341, 359 (App. Div. 2023)  9  Motley v. Seaside Park Zoning Board, 430 N.J. Super. 132, 148 – 149 (App. Div. 2013); Certif. den. 215 N.J. 458 (2013)  18  S&S Auto Sales, Inc. v. Zoning Board of Adjustment for Borough of Stratford, 373 N.J. Super 603 (App. Div. 2004)  18  Borough of Belmar v. 201 16th Ave Belmar, 309 N.J. Super. 663, 674 (Law Div. 1997)  18 | Statutes and Codes | Page(s) | |-------------------|---------| | **Cite** | | | N.J.S.A. 40:55D-65.1 | 6 | | N.J.S.A. 40:55D-107 | 6 | | N.J.S.A. 40:55D-111 | 6, 7 | | | 8, 9 | | | 11, 13 | | N.J.A.C. 5:23-2.2 and 2.7 | 9 | | N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70 | 12 | | N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70(a) | 13 | | N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70.2 | 13, 14 | | N.J.S.A. 40:55D-80(a) | 14 | | N.J.S.A. 40:55D-68 | 18 | | Ordinance Section 1102 | 1, 10 | | Ordinance Section 413.02 | 1 | | Ordinance Section 900 | 1 | | Ordinance Section 200 | 4 | | Ordinance Section 201 | 4, 10 | | | 13, 16 | Ordinance Section 900B 6, 7 8, 9 10, 11
[brief] [...] outlined the Applicant’s security plan and protocols, ensuring they meet the requirements of the Cannabis Regulatory Commission and the City.  (T1/98:13-17; 100:9-101:2; 106:12-23).  [...] also confirmed that the queuing issue is not something he sees often and that no one will be allowed to queue on the sidewalk; customers will be in a queuing vestibule area, with security guards present an hour before and after opening.  (T1:102:2-5; 109:2-12).  After the presentation by [...], there were objections to the Application presented by [...], a neighboring property owner, from three (3) witnesses: (1) [...], a Government Relations Officer and Corporate Director for Construction and Real Estate for [...] (“Mr. Levinson”); (2) [...], P.E., P.P. (“Mr. Nasser”), who was qualified as an expert in planning and engineering; and (3) [...], P.E., P.P. of [...] (“Mr. Shropshire”), who was qualified as an expert in the field of traffic engineering.
[brief] [...] who has lived in the house on the property for many years, was there during project construction.  He personally experienced the house shaking during the project.  (Da107-108)  The floor shifted, ceiling plaster separated, and doors went out of plumb.  (Da317, 333)  The project included pre-construction and post-construction inspections and vibrations monitoring during construction.  When the ground vibrations from the project exceeded even the high U.S.B.M. threshold limits, (Da316) the monitoring report simply says: "Not Believed to be Construction related, due to Waveform Analysis".  (Da197)  The post-construction monitoring report acknowledged the owner's contemporaneous reports of damage to the house from the project (Da220), but nonetheless stated that the post construction conditions were consistent with pre-construction conditions.  (Da317, 218-220)  The post-construction report of the property (Da211) is virtually verbatim with the pre-construction report.  (Da344)  The pre-construction report provided no information as to the condition of the second floor interior of the home, yet reported that the post-conditions of the second floor were consistent with the before conditions, and this despite the owner's contemporaneous, contradictory report of damages.  (Da220)  Based on his inspection, conversations with the property owner and review of the reported project vibrations, [...] concluded that it was reasonably likely that the project construction damaged the house as reported by the owner.
[brief] There is no genuine dispute that [...] dropped the branches that killed [...]’s plants**  Defendants’ effort to designate as inadmissible hearsay [...]’s testimony that [...] admitted he had been the person who dropped the branches [Db26-29] makes a mountain out of molehill.  Defendants do not dispute that any statements [...] made to [...] are a “party- opponent’s own statement” that are not excluded by the hearsay rule.  [See Db28].  They also do not dispute that [...], and no one else, was the person who placed branches in that area.  [Db27].  Any quibbling over whether [...] had admitted to placing branches on the plants or merely admitted to placing branches on the land presents, at the very least, a genuine dispute of material fact that should be resolved at trial.
[directive] Bail Schedule 2  STATUTES WHERE BAIL MAY BE SET BY A SUPERIOR COURT JUDGE OR A MUNICIPAL COURT JUDGE OR, IN THE MUNICIPAL COURT JUDGE’S ABSENCE, THE MUNICIPAL COURT ADMINISTRATOR OR DEPUTY COURT ADMINISTRATOR, PURSUANT TO RULE 3:26-2 requires warrants  Rule 3:3-1(c)(1) on the Bail Schedule 2 charges of robbery, criminal sexual contact, second degree aggravated assault, aggravated arson, arson, burglary, first or second degree violations of Chapter 35 (drug offenses), any crime involving the possession or use of a firearm, or conspiracies or attempts to commit such crimes.  Rule 3:3-1(c)(2-6) (indictable offenses) and Rule 7:2-2(b)(1-6) delineate factors regarding whether a warrant or summons should issue for other offenses.  Rule 3:26-1 (indictable offenses) and Rule 7:4-1 (non-indictable offenses) delineate factors to be considered when setting bail and provide for the option of R.O.R. bail where appropriate.  Bail  Ranges for attempts or conspiracies should generally be the same as the actual substantive crime.  Statute Charge Description  Degree Bail Range 10%  Cash Bail Option  Knowingly Leaving the Scene of a Motor  Actor operating a motor vehicle knows he is involved in an accident and knowingly leaves the 2C:12-1.1  Vehicle  Accident scene under circumstances which violate N.J.S.A. 39:4-129 (“Action in Case of Accident”)  3rd Degree $2,500 to $7,500 10% permissible  Resulting in Serious and the accident results in serious bodily injury to another person.  Bodily Injury  Actor causes bodily injury to any person or solicits, aids, encourages, or attempts or agrees  Endangering an to aid another who causes bodily injury to any person, and leaves the scene of the injury 2C:12-1.2  3rd Degree $20,000 to $50,000 10% permissible  Injured Victim knowing or reasonably believing that the injured person is physically helpless, mentally incapacitated or otherwise unable to care for himself.  2nd Degree $25,000 to $50,000  10% permissible  Actor threatens a crime of violence or threatens to kill; third degree; if threat of crime of 2C:12-3(a)(b)  Terroristic Threats violence occurs during declared period of national, state or county emergency, then second degree.  3rd Degree $10,000 to $20,000 10% permissible  23  Updated December 2, 2013
[brief] Instead, the defendant negligently failed to hold his turn and he went wide and crossed over into the right lane of Route 280 where the plaintiff already was traveling.  By entering the right lane, he ended up colliding with the plaintiff’s vehicle.  The defendant was aware that there was room for two lanes to travel, both fast and slow, left and right, both going into Route 280 West.  Pa153, Pa129:13-17.  Had the defendant stayed on his path into the left lane this accident never would have happened.  The defendant fixed the point of impact entirely differently than the Police Officer recorded it on the official Police Report and plaintiff asserts that it is obvious that [...] had fixed the point of impact much too close to the concrete median.  Pa153.  The plaintiff testified that the point of impact was within the right lane where she was intending to go.
[brief] However, a large part of the [...] and [...] fees was incurred pursuing Plaintiff’s goal of attempting to prove that additional assets should be included in the Estate.  The court’s opinion contained no analysis of the time entries.  In view of the fact that the Verified Complaint shows that the Plaintiff’s ultimate goal in the lawsuit was to obtain proof in support of his false allegations that there were $10,000,000 in additional transfers and malfeasance in the operation of [...], and the fact that the discovery pursued both prior to and subsequent to the May 8, 2014 summary judgment was in pursuit of the same, the amount that should have been considered for fee shifting should have been substantially less than $313,198.00.  Defendant’s submission to the court on the remand, on the other hand, did analyze the time entries, and that analysis demonstrated that most of the fees incurred should not have been awarded.  (See Point II, infra, and Subsection C below).  On the remand, all the above errors by the trial court in its first legal fee opinion were repeated.  The trial court not only once again accepted the Administrator’s date of January 5, 2017 as the determinative date, but he also accepted the spreadsheet totals attached to the Administrator's Certification.  (Da191-193).  The court once again awarded fees and disbursements for each and every time entry that was included in Plaintiff’s fee application up to the Administrator’s hand-selected date, without examining the entries.  The total award was $1,049,589.14, the identical amount as the trial court’s initial award.  The Supreme Court has cautioned that “trial courts should not accept passively the submissions of counsel to support the lodestar amount’ but should instead inquire as to what a reasonable amount of time expended should have been, as opposed to the hours actually expended by counsel. ” (Da258).  According to the Appellate Court in this case, the trial court had adopted a dollar amount in the most “conclusory of fashions” by rigidly utilizing that January 5, 2017 date as the cut-off without analyzing the reasonableness of the services occurring within that time frame.  The trial court repeated that error on the remand.  The Appellate Division instructed that the determination “required a more searching analysis than that. ”  (Da259).  C.
[brief] ”  M38.  The Trial Court noted that:  Instead of electing to exercise his right to appear at the hearing, either himself or through the Township attorney, to express his views on the Amended Application in his official capacity – or, even as a private citizen-resident of the Township off the dais, as was his irrefutable right - the Mayor did neither.  Instead, unbeknownst to the Applicant, he resorted to surreptitiously authorizing publication of a press release that was posted to the Township’s official website to convey his sentiments utilizing the Township’s resources (which release, inferably, was likely email blasted as an E-Newsletter to all Township residents who subscribed to the website or otherwise taken from electorate lists).
[brief] (Raised Below – Aa81; Aa85; 1T15:19-24; 1T19:14-23; Aa121-22; 3T13:1 to 14-3).  In dismissing Appellant’s defamation claims, the trial court reasoned that Appellant failed serve Defendants with a Notice of Claim.  Aa81; Aa85; 1T15:19-24; 1T19:14-23.  The Court subsequently denied Appellant’s motion for reconsideration, relying on its previous ruling.  Aa121-22; 3T13:1 to 14-3.  However, Appellant completed a Civil Case Information Statement required for the filing of this action, which reflected in pertinent part:  Please check off each applicable category:…  Title 59?  NO. Aa44.  Title 59 is “[t]he New Jersey Tort Claims Act, N.J.S.A. 59:1-1, et seq., effective July 1, 1972. ”  Wright v. State, 169 N.J. 422, 435 (2001).  Appellant filed this action as both a malicious prosecution and civil rights action and not a TCA action.
[directive] (1)  The Presentence Investigation Report (PSI) must be completed and available for the parties the eCourts case jacket prior to the scheduled sentencing date.  Defense in counsel should make arrangements to remotely review the PSI with the defendant If prior to sentencing.  defense counsel did not review the with the defendant prior PSI to sentencing, defense counsel shall acknowledge that the record.  The proceeding on should be interrupted, and defense counsel should be given time to privately review the with the defendant.  Thereafter, the sentence may proceed.  Defense counsel PSI must provide to the court the defendant's telephone numbers and address, and email if address, applicable so that Probation will be able to communicate with the defendant and arrange for phone or video reporting.  (2)  Pursuant to the April 20, 2020 Order, victims shall have opportunity to participate an of the sentencing hearing or to object to the scheduling or method proceeding.  in  In that regard, County Prosecutors and other law enforcement agencies shall, to the of of extent applicable, provide notice to victims the scheduling the sentencing hearing, including how the hearing proposed to be conducted and whether the court is of If will consider staying the commencement the custodial portion.  a victim or family of member the defendant, or other appropriate person wishes to participate/ address the court, such arrangements should be made by the prosecutor or defense counsel.  of of  The court must be advised these arrangements advance the sentencing.  in (3)  Defense attorneys, prior to sentencing, should review with the defendant the Notice of Appeal Rights and Time to File Post-Conviction Relief form.  At sentencing, defense Criminal Sentencing Guidance - Issued by Directive 13-20 (April 30, 2020)
[directive] A defendant always has the option of entering plea of guilty to the charges as filed, under the provisions of R. 7:6-2(a)(1).  However, it is important that the State be represented in these situations, in order to assure that the proper sentence is imposed by the Court, that the Court has Attorney General Guideline:  Page 12  Prosecution of DWI & Refusal Violations addressed “the defendant personally” and that the Court has determined “by inquiry of the defendant ... that the plea is made voluntarily with the understanding of the nature of the charge and the consequence of the pleas and that there is a factual basis for the plea. ”  Ibid.  Of particular significance is the necessity for the Court to advise the defendant of the consequences of pleading guilty, such as the penalties that can imposed.  State v. Laurick, 120 N.J. 1, 10 1989),5 (1990), rev’g 231 N.J. Super. 464 (App. Div. citing State v. Kovack, 91 N.J. 476 (1982).  See, State v. Manzie, 168 N.J. 113 (2001); State v. Smith, 109 N.J. Super. 9 (App. Div. 1970), certif. den. 56 N.J. 473 (1970).  The presence of the prosecutor can assist the Court in its compliance with the requirements of this Court Rule.