ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] 468 N.J. Super at 500-03.  The *Racioppi* court applied the exact same standard, and made no finding as to which category of “wrap” best characterized the defendant’s web design.  2023 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1200, at *1-10.  *Vercammen* applied the very same legal test to what that panel considered a sign-in-wrap.  2022 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 110, at *8.  Thus, the lawfulness of --- 5  The *Racioppi* decision remarked that it considered *Wollen* to involve a sign-in wrap agreement, underscoring that these factual matters are subject to interpretation.  *Racioppi*, 2023 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1200, at *5.  an agreement does not rise or fall with the court placing the agreement in a particular box.  Here, regardless of what category or label is appropriate, the material question is whether under the facts and circumstances the [...] afforded its users reasonably conspicuous notice of the terms of use, and this standard was met here.  Respondents’ attempt to distinguish *Racioppi* and *Vercammen* by asserting that each involves “claims premised upon allegations related to the access and use of the defendants’ websites” (Pb33) is a flawed distinction.  In *Racioppi*, for example, the plaintiffs sued [...] when another user cancelled their rental and caused plaintiffs to expend additional monies to book a replacement rental nearby.  2023 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1200, at *1-4.  [...]’s web interface was only material to whether [...] adequately notified plaintiff of website terms, which, as here, existed in a document accessed via hyperlink from [...]’s sign-up page.  *Id.* at *4-10.  The Court’s holding that [...] provided reasonable notice of its terms of use did not hinge on whether the parties’ dispute related to the website.  *See id.*  The same is true of *Vercammen*.  2022 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 110, at *6-10.6 --- 6  Appellant did not discuss *Hoffman v. Supplements Togo Mgmt.* in its merits brief because it is clearly inapposite for pre-dating *Wollen* and rejecting use of “submerged” website terms the user would not know even existed unless they scrolled near the bottom of the webpage.
[brief] _____________________  14T refers to trial transcript, dated October 19, 2016.  15T refers to trial transcript, dated October 20, 2016.  16T refers to trial transcript, dated October 25, 2016.  17T refers to trial transcript, dated October 27, 2016.  (Vol. I).  18T refers to trial transcript, dated October 27, 2016.  (Vol. II).  19T refers to trial transcript, dated November 1, 2016.  20T refers to trial transcript, dated November 2, 2016.  21T refers to trial transcript, dated November 3, 2016.  22T refers to trial transcript, dated November 4, 2016.  23T refers to trial transcript, dated November 7, 2016.  24T refers to trial transcript, dated November 9, 2016.  25T refers to sentencing transcript, dated July 21, 2017.  26T refers to transcript of PCR hearing, dated April 28, 2023.  27T refers to transcript of motion hearing, dated October 6, 2023.  2C:20-7 (count fifteen); fourth-degree prohibited device, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:39-3(d) (count sixteen); third-degree financial facilitation of criminal activity, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:21-25(a) (count seventeen); two counts of fourth-degree resisting arrest (by flight), in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:29-2(a) (counts eighteen and twenty-two); third-degree hindering apprehension or prosecution, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:29-3(a) (count nineteen); third-degree apprehension or hindering prosecution, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:29-3(a)(4) (count twenty); third-degree false government documents, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:21-2.1(c) (count twenty-one); and third-degree hindering apprehension, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:29-3(b)(1) (count twenty-three).  Defendant was also charged under [...] with second-degree certain persons not to have weapons, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:39-7 (count one).
[brief] There is a strong preference under New Jersey law for confirmation of arbitration awards.  *Minkowitz v. Israeli*, 433 N.J. Super. 111, 135 (App. Div. 2013).  Arbitration awards are granted great deference.  *Borough of E. Rutherford v. E. Rutherford PBA Local* 275, 213 N.J. 190, 201 (2013).
[brief] N.J.S.A. 5:12-219(e), (g), (h).  The [...] was also authorized to adopt development and design guidelines and land use regulations for the Tourism District that are ---  1  The Procedural History and Facts of this matter are closely intertwined and have been combined to avoid repetition. consistent with and in furtherance of the Tourism District Master Plan.  N.J.S.A. 5:12-220(a).  As a result, the [...] Tourism District Land Development Rules, N.J.A.C. 19:66-1.1 et seq. (the “Land Development Rules”) were adopted.
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING JUDGMENT TO PLAINTIFF BECAUSE THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS REGARDING REAL PROPERTY HAD EXPIRED PRIOR TO FILING THE LAWSUIT.  Da072  The trial court erred as a matter of law in granting judgment to Plaintiff because the trial court failed to properly analyze statute of limitations.  Defendant made a motion to dismiss the action at the close of Plaintiff’s case, including an argument based on statute of limitations.  However, the judge improperly denied Defendant’s motion at that time (12T).  The parties submitted post-trial briefs where Defendants supplied further written argument, including supportive case law, but the judge simply noted that the statute of limitations issue has already been ruled on and did not consider Defendants’ written submission (Da072).  In a quiet title action, the statute of limitations is twenty (20) years.  See N.J.S.A. 2A: 14-7.  A party’s failure to bring an action within the statutorily set time limit bars a party from relief or an opportunity to continue the case, regardless of the merits of the case.
[brief] ”  Ibid.  “When feasible, a verbatim account of any exchange between the law enforcement officer and witness should be reduced to writing.  When not feasible, a detailed summary of the identification should be prepared. ”  Ibid.  At that time, electronic recordation was advisable, but not mandated.  Ibid.  Here, the officer filled out the worksheet, a form that is still in use today, which was designed to comply with Rule 3:11 and Delgado.  The officer documented the time and place where the procedure was conducted, and the exact words that [...] used when identifying defendant.  However, as in Anthony, the officer did not comply with Rule 3:11 or Delgado in full because he did not record the identification or prepare a contemporaneous written account.
[brief] Some jurisdictions identify factors for consideration, whereas other jurisdictions decline to specify factors.  But all jurisdictions recognize that authentication depends on the particular facts of the case, not on any particular criteria.  Thus, any evidence can supply sufficient indicia of the reliability of a video recording.  This is the approach that New Jersey has long followed in substance, if not in name, and it can continue to ensure the threshold reliability of video recordings for presentation to the jury, which remains the ultimate arbiter of authenticity.
[brief] On December 13, 2022, Defendant-Respondent, [...], forwarded correspondence acknowledging receipt of Plaintiff-Appellant’s correspondence and requesting additional information.  (Da035).  On December 27, 2022 and December 28, 2022, counsel for Plaintiff-Appellant forwarded the information requested by Defendant- Respondent.  (Da037).  On January 12, 2023, Defendant-Respondent, [...], sent correspondence to counsel for Plaintiff-Appellant, [...], that the claim was still under review and it was anticipated that the review would be completed by January 27, 2023.  (Da038).  On January 16, 2023, an email was sent by counsel for Plaintiff-Appellant, [...], providing a prior medical record.  (Da040).
[directive] Accordingly, if the prosecutor has reason to believe that a defendant has satisfied a monetary bail condition by means of a bond posted by a surety company, or by posting money obtained from another, whether by gift or any form of loan, the prosecutor shall ask the court to conduct a monetary bail source/sufficiency inquiry pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:162-13, unless the County Prosecutor or First Assistant Prosecutor, or the Director of the Division of Criminal Justice or a Deputy Director in cases prosecuted by the Division, determines that such an inquiry is not needed to determine whether the defendant has an adequate interest in ensuring that monetary bail is not forfeited.
[brief] [...] Commenced Litigation Against [...] in Union County that was Without Probable Cause and Actuated by Malice  In 2017, as part of a years-long campaign to inflict harm upon his only son, [...] commenced the Prior Litigation in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Union County, Chancery Division, to unlawfully seize control of the parties’ real estate venture, [...], together with other limited liability companies.  (See Pa19 at ¶30).  In the Prior Litigation, [...] argued that he had taken control of 51% of the outstanding membership interests in [...] and, through an *ultra vires* Fourth Amendment to [...]’s operating agreement, [...] claimed that he had replaced [...] as the manager of [...].  (Pa19 at ¶31).  To manufacture the majority interest required to amend [...]’s operating agreement, [...] created – out of whole cloth – a forged “agreement,” dated January 14, 2014, between himself and [...] (the “Forged Agreement”).  (Pa19 at ¶32).  The Forged Agreement was purportedly “witnessed” by [...]’s wife, [...] (“[...]”) and [...]’s attorney, [...] (“[...]”), who notarized the Forged Agreement.  (Pa19 at ¶33).  Based upon the Forged Agreement – which [...] imaginatively used to unlawfully assert control over the majority of [...]’s membership interests – [...] filed a *lis pendens* to prohibit a sale of [...]’s property.  (Pa20 at ¶37).  Equally --- 1  The Statement of Procedural History and Statement of Facts have been combined in the interest of judicial economy and given the limited issues on appeal.  egregious, in the Prior Litigation, [...] requested that the Court ratify the Forged Agreement.  (Id.).  B.
[brief] (SeePa505; Pa469).  Rule 3:24 entitled “appeals from orders in courts of limited criminal jurisdiction” states that appeals pursuant to this rule shall be taken within 20 days after the entry of such order.  Thus, plaintiff was denied of public accommodation by the [...] and [...] and the Court Clerk who failed to COMPLY with New Jersey’s Rules of Court to ensure that there was an Oder from which plaintiff could appeal his criminal conviction.
[brief] (3T37-1 to 38-18).  Between March 18 and May 16, 2014, these investors provided the funds to defendant either by wire transfers to an account held by [...] (“[...]”), or checks made payable to [...].  (4T206-12 to 208-7; 4T220-17 to 23; 4T227-16 to 19; 4T231-19 to 232-3; 4T244-11 to 18; 4T249-9 to 250-6; 4T252-1 to 253-4; 4T254-19 to 255-8).  [...] is a company owned by defendant’s sister [...], but which defendant was running for her and for which he had signing rights.
[brief] In the order issued by the trial court on March 31, 2023, the trial judge erred by mishandling the plaintiff's request for medical records as pre-trial discovery and subsequently rejecting plaintiff's motion to obtain those records.  A.  Defendants violated the HIPAA privacy rule (45 C.F.R. § 164.502 (2002)), N.J.S.A. 45:9-22 to -27 and N.J.A.C. 8:43G-15.3.  According to the HIPAA privacy rule (45 C.F.R. § 164.502 (2002)), N.J.S.A. 45:9-22 to -27 and N.J.A.C. 8:43G-15.3, Defendant [...], as a managed care organization, and Defendant [...], as a home care service provider, are required to provide copies of requested health records, billing information, and plan information within 30 days after the patient's personal representative or guardian submits the requests.  In the latter half of 2019, plaintiff made multiple requests, but both defendants repeatedly violated these statutes by ignoring plaintiff's requests.  On August 16, 2021, plaintiff filed a Motion to Amend Complaint and Demand Documents (Pa35 – Pa43).  Subsequently, on March 10, 2023, plaintiff submitted another Motion to Demand Documents (Pa74 – Pa87).  However, both motions were dismissed by the trial court on October 22, 2021 (Pa44 – Pa48) (1T), and March 31, 2023 (Pa103 – Pa104) (2T), respectively.  As the personal representative of her father and appointed administrator following his passing, plaintiff is entitled to these documents regardless of whether a legal case is pending.  The statutes do not impose a requirement for plaintiff to retain an attorney when making such requests.  B.  The appellate court’s order does not prevent plaintiff from obtaining these documents on her own.  In its order issued on December 2, 2022, the appellate court remanded that plaintiff, as the administrator, should be represented by counsel to pursue wrongful death and survivor actions (Pa49 – Pa66).
[brief] The basis of this appeal is that [...] violated the binding conditions of Paragraph 21 of the 08/15/2024 Amended Resolution of Approval (hereafter “Amended Resolution) and that the Trial Court – because of its errors of interpretation – denied admission of evidence relevant to proving this fact.  In their briefs, Respondents pursue a somewhat Oz-like strategy that encourages this Court to look everywhere but at the suppressed evidence and its relevance to Appellant’s case.  We hear a refrain of the Trial Court’s error regarding the fact that the [...] (hereafter “[...]”) did not discuss the rendering in question when granting a variance.  We hear about the fact that some aspects of the rendering were not drawn to scale – although Appellant’s complaint is based on actual numbers found in the rendering.  We hear about the “approved height” of the building, which has nothing to do with the relative heights of the two facades.  “Pay no attention to the rendering referenced in the zoning resolution,” one might hear the “Lawyers of Oz” say.  But a violation of a condition of a zoning resolution is a violation of law.  Can a Court really ignore it or “misinterpret” it away without poking a small hole in our system of laws – a “hole” likely to encourage actors to violate Hoboken’s land use laws with ever greater impunity, which Appellant would argue is already the case.  As the musician [...] says: “Rust never sleeps. ”  And, as Appellant asked in his initial brief: Is the law to be taken seriously or not?
[brief] See also Ginsberg ex rel. Ginsberg v. Quest Diagnostics, Inc., 441 N.J. Super. 198, 248-49 (App. Div. 2015), aff'd o.b., Ginsberg v. Quest Diagnostics, Inc., 227 N.J. 7 (2016); Akhtar v. JDN Props. at Florham Park, LLC, 439 N.J. Super. 391, 399-400 (App. Div. 2015); Johnson v. Benjamin Moore & Co., 347 N.J. Super. 71, 82 (App. Div. 2002); Hart v. City of Jersey City, 308 N.J. Super. 487, 497-98 (App. Div. 1998).  The prior order was interlocutory in nature.  Further, the prior order lacked analysis of the jurisdictional discovery and an application of the law to that discovery.
[brief] Because both defendant [...] and his family (through [...]) were in agreement with the fraudulent transfer of the Property to [...], signed the deed, and/or were present when the transaction occurred, they all bear liability for the plaintiff’s conspiracy claim.  See Awonusi v. Yaboh, A-3023-18T1, 2020 WL 1062395, at *1 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Mar. 5, 2020) (finding liability on co-defendant who knew or should have known that property was being fraudulently transferred without authority from the true owner).  D.
[brief] [...] at that time (1972) owned nearby vacant Lots 6 and 10, available for parking.  [...] later conveyed Lot 10 for development; it still owns Lot 6.  5.  That there was no Zoning approved curb cut on Sixth Street to allow vehicles access into Lot 5.  The Synagogue chiseled out the curb in 2013 in front of its own Lot 8, not the School Lot 5, and vehicles then enter the Synagogue Lot 8 and drive and park haphazardly in the School courtyard.  6.
[brief] Also, it collapses the distinction between: (i) a matter that simply involves a law firm as representative of a party, and (ii) a matter specifically involving an attorneys’ fees request and award that turns on the reasonableness of that law firm’s work and fees.  “Motions for recusal ordinarily require a case-by-case analysis of the particular facts presented. ”  State v. McCabe, 201 N.J. 34, 46 (2010).  [...] conflates factually dissimilar circumstances.  The case law cited by [...] — all unpublished or from other jurisdictions — also does not support its position.  Jenkins v. Sterlacchi, 849 F.2d 627 (D.C. Cir. 1988), supports the [...].  That case involved a Special Master who was opposing counsel in a separate matter to a law firm representing a party before him, and the court concluded that this conflict required disclosure because “his impartiality might otherwise have reasonably been questioned. ”  Id. at 633.  The court simply held that the party seeking recusal had waived its objection.  Id. at 634.  The [...] did not waive their objections to the Special Master in this case. and instead sought his removal.  The other cases [...] cites are factually far afield. \(^1\) [...]’s other arguments are similarly unavailing.  [...] erroneously focuses on whether the attorneys’ fee award directly impacts how much [...] is paid (\textit{see} [...]\_Pb 22), ignoring the [...]’ argument that the attorneys’ fees issue required considering the reasonableness of [...]’s work and [...]’s fees — matters directly implicating [...] lawyers, including [...], not just the firm’s client.
[brief] **FACTOR 7 – SET HOURS OF WORK**  1.  Petitioner testified extensively that she has set Municipal Court hours where the Township requires her to prosecute from 8:30am to 12:30pm and 1:30pm to 4:30pm on the first and third Wednesdays of the month and from 8:30am to 12:00pm on the second and fourth Wednesdays of the month at the [...] or, during the Pandemic, off premises.  (T41-10)  2.  [...] noted in her report that the Petitioner is required to work established and fixed hours with the approval of the location.  (Pa95)  3.  [...] also noted there were no time-keeping records because Petitioner did not submit vouchers but rather is a salaried employee which also confirms employee status.  (Pa95)  4.  [...] felt Petitioner does not meet the definition of independent contractor but yet again stated this is another Factor that is not a strong indicator of such status.  5.  The only information indicative of the Board’s view of independent contractor status, was the Township would contact the Petitioner by cell phone or on her Law Firm’s phone when Municipal Court was not in session and the issue about the special DWI prosecutor substituting for her the few times, she was either sick or on vacation.  (Pa95)  6.  [...] had to concede that despite there not being any time-keeping records for the Petitioner because she was a salaried employee, she did not evaluate any other employees at the Township and believed that other salaried employees, like the Court Administrator and Municipal Court Judge, also do not have time-keeping records.  Essentially, there was absolutely no evaluation of anyone else in the Township, including the Petitioner.  (T166-9)  **FACTOR 8 – FULL-TIME REQUIRED**
[brief] 9)  CORRECT SEPT. 6, 2023 ORDER, PAR. 3, & REQUIRE [...]’S COMPLIANCE W/OCT. 6, 2022 ORDER, PAR. 2, TO ISSUE  FINAL INFORMAL TRUST ACCOUNTING THAT HE REFUSED TO ISSUE  10)  CORRECT SEPT. 6, 2023 ORDER, PAR. 3&4, & REQUIRE REVISIONS TO OCT. 6, ’22 ORDER & MARCH 7, 2023 ORDER BASED ON ITEMS
[brief] On June 22, 2023, Plaintiff filed their Complaint alleging *inter-alia* that a “dangerous condition” of public property was the cause of the death of [...] by an unknown third-party.  (See P1-P7).  On July 12, 2023, Defendant, [...], filed their Answer (see P42-P56) and on July 28, 2023, Defendants, [...] and [...], filed their Answer (see P15-P35).  On September 29, 2023, Hoboken filed their Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be Granted (see P10-P35) and on October 13, 2023, [...] filed their Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted (see P36-P58).  Subsequently, Plaintiff filed their Opposition to both Defendants’ Motions and Defendants filed their respective Replies.  On November 17, 2023, the Trial Court heard Oral Argument on both Defendants’ Motions and rendered an Oral Decision on the record.  (See T1-T14).  On November 22, 2023, the Trial Court entered an Order dismissing with prejudice Plaintiff’s Complaint for the reasons set forth on the record.  (See P59-P60).  This Appeal followed.
[brief] [...]  [...] 16  CHERRY TREE FARM ROAD [...] [...]  Attorney ID No. [...]  Tel No.: [...]  Fax No.: [...]  Email [...] [...] Attorney for Defendant/Respondent  Submitted by: [...] on the brief Borough of Rumson Planning Board  Date of submission: July 3, 2024  TABLE OF CONTENTS TABLE OF AUTHORITIES  3 STANDARD OF REVIEW 5 PROCEDURAL HISTORY 7 PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 8 STATEMENT OF FACTS 9 JURISDICTION 11 THE RECORD 12 LEGAL ARGUMENT 19 POINT ONE 19
[brief] ”  Id.  This Court, too, should reject [...]’s similar projection and instead hold that justice favors full retroactivity.  On a more practical level, [...]’s forecast of “open floodgates” is unpersuasive.  Only a fraction of individuals with valid claims are likely to bring them to court.  For example, in *Bowles v. Sabree*, No. 2:20-cv-12838-LVP-KGA, 2022 WL 141666 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 14, 2022), only about 13% of eligible individuals submitted claims as of the fairness hearing.  See *Bowles*, ECF No. 111, 14:25 (Transcript of Fairness Hearing).  Low claims rates are unsurprising because confiscatory tax foreclosures primarily harm society’s most vulnerable members—the elderly, the ill, the impoverished, and the bereaved.  See *Cherokee Equities, LLC v. Garaventa*, 382 N.J. Super. 201, 211 (Ch. Div. 2005) (tax foreclosure defendants are often “among society’s most unfortunate. ”).  These individuals are unlikely to bring a *Tyler*-style claim for the very same reasons that made them unable to keep up with their tax burden or to redeem their property from foreclosure in the first place.  Moreover, recent opinions by the Sixth Circuit demonstrate that courts may ultimately deny class status to *Tyler*-style cases for a variety of reasons.  See *Fox v. Saginaw Cnty.*, 67 F.4th 284, 301 (6th Cir. 2023) (class action status in similar cases out of Michigan may not be appropriate); *Tarrify Props, LLC v. Cuyahoga Cnty.*, 37 F.4th 1101, 1106–08 (6th Cir. 2022) (denying class status to a similar case in Ohio).  When these practical limitations on liability are considered, [...]’s concerns about the ill effects of retroactivity on the administration of justice evaporate.