ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] All of the aforementioned factors are present: •  The Law Division’s ruling will have “wide coverage” encompassing a large segment of the regulated insurance industry and the general public served by those insurers.  *Metromedia*, 97 N.J. at 331.  (Factor one).  •  The Law Division’s decision was “intended to be applied generally and uniformly to all similarly situated persons,” as any Defendants sued in Superior Court for violations of the IFPA can rely upon the Law Division’s decision.  *Ibid.* (Factor two).  •  All current and future Defendants in a pending IFPA lawsuit related to automobile accidents will be subject to PIP arbitration and all current and future IFPA claims related to automobile accidents will be subject to PIP arbitration.  *Ibid.* (Factor three).  •  When the Law Division adopted the Defendants’ proposed course of action, it prescribed “a legal standard or directive that is not otherwise expressly provided by or clearly and obviously inferable from the enabling statutory authorization,” a factor which deserves significant weight.  *Ibid.; Doe v. Poritz*, 142 N.J. 1, 98 (1995) (declined to follow on other grounds) (according the greatest weight to this factor in assessing whether promulgation of guidelines constituted rulemaking).  The Law Division’s adoption of a legal standard or directive specifying additional parties and additional issues that are subject to PIP arbitration constituted rulemaking.
[brief] TABLE OF CONTENTS  Page  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT ...........................................  2 STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY ............  2 LEGAL ARGUMENT .....................................................  2  POINT I THE LAW  DIVISION PROPERLY DENIED THE DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR POST CONVICTION  RELIEF BASED ON THE APPELLATE DECISION OF STATE V. PETRELLO ...........................................  4  CONCLUSION ..........................................................  9  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
[brief] In August 2022, Defendants, Daniel and [...] (the “[...]”), applied to the Defendant, [...], Gloucester County (the “Board”) for a use variance to allow an existing accessory structure to be larger than the principal use on their property at [...] (the “Property”).  The structure was a 2160 square foot garage where their home was only 1152 square feet.  The Board granted the [...]’ application notwithstanding the fact that: (1) the notices published in advance of the hearing were defective in that they did not contain an accurate description of the Property and did not advise the public that the principal use of the property was a pre-existing non-conforming use, and did not accurately disclose what the accessory structure was to be used for, thereby depriving the Zoning Board of jurisdiction to hear the application because the notice was defective; (2) the grant of the [...]’ application was in conflict with the Monroe Township Master Plan; and (3) the [...] failed to sustain their burden of proof for the grant of a use variance including both the negative and positive criteria.  Therefore, Plaintiffs ask this court to reverse the trial court’s decision to grant judgment in favor of the Plaintiffs.
[directive] Investigation Files  9.3.1  An internal affairs investigation file is needed for all internal affairs reports.  Given the wide range of internal affairs allegations a law enforcement agency receives, these investigation files might consist of only the initial report form and the appropriate disposition document.  On the other hand, investigation files might include extensive documentation of an investigation.  9.3.2  The internal affairs investigation file should contain the investigation’s entire work product, regardless of the author.  This includes investigators' reports, transcripts of statements, and copies of all relevant documents.  The file should also include all related material from other agency incidents that may be applicable.  For instance, if an allegation is made of excessive force during an arrest, the internal affairs investigation file should contain copies of the reports from that arrest.  9.3.3
[brief] They were supplied to provide full context to [...]’s discussions with [...].  Petitioners at no time took the position that such emails contained prejudicial information. of information contained in those papers, as, for instance, when despite that information there remains gaps that must be filled before a factfinder can with a sense of assurance render a determination, or when their looms a question of witness credibility.  No gaps need to be filled here by an evidentiary hearing.  [...]’s Certification unequivocally states that [...] knew Petitioners’ settlement position and what Petitioners thought Respondents may or may not be entitled to. \(^{18}\)  On the other hand, [...], in his Certification, only supplied equivocal details of such consultations.  Further, there would be no credibility issue or nothing unusual about a former prospective client’s statements that she discussed “settlement posture” and the “strengths and weaknesses” of her case with a prospective attorney at the initial consultation.
[brief] A.  The Concept Of “Pay-When-Able Loans” Is Not Binding On This Court (Da1-69)  The concept of a “pay-when-able loan” is unsettled and unfounded in New Jersey.  There is no binding Appellate Division case that discusses “pay-when-able loans” or affirms their existence.  The only cases presented by Plaintiff for support are an unpublished Appellate Division case, Flynn v. Sevastakis, No. A-3263-04T2, 2006 WL 664180 (App. Div. Mar. 17, 2006)(Da222), and a Chancery Division case cited by the Flynn court, Guerin v. Cassidy, 38 N.J. Super. 454 (Ch. Div.1955).  No other New Jersey case exists that discusses “pay-when-able loans. ”  Meanwhile, there are no published Appellate Division cases confirming the concept of “pay-when-able loans” in New Jersey that are binding on this Court.  Specifically, R. 1:36-3 provides that “no unpublished opinion shall constitute precedent or be binding upon any court. ”  It also provides that “no unpublished opinion shall be cited by any court” unless it is an Appellate Division opinion that has “been reported in an authorized administrative law reporter. ”  Ibid.  An unreported Appellate Division decision has “neither controlling nor precedential value.
[brief] THE PROBATE COURT ERRED IN ITS ALTERNATIVE HOLDING THAT [...] WAS NOT ENTITLED TO THE PALM BEACH PROPERTY UNDER HARRIET’S TRUST.  With respect to the interpretation of [...]’s Trust, [...] again fails to satisfy his burden.  He does not dispute that it is his burden to prove that his interpretation of the trust by at least a preponderance of the evidence and—if he advocates for reformation of the trust—by clear and convincing evidence.  (See Pb31).  [...] came forward with no such evidence\(^3\).
[brief] Plaintiff’s entire ascertainable loss argument boils down to her conclusory statement that “Plaintiff alleged the economic impact of the impermissibly disclosed information. ” (Pb35).  In other words, Plaintiff claims that the transmission of data itself is by itself sufficient to meet the ascertainable loss required by the CFA.  As the Trial Court pointed out, this argument runs contrary to the well-settled law that ascertainable loss cannot be hypothetical or speculative: Plaintiff has failed to plead facts establishing an ascertainable loss causally linked to the transmission of information to the letter vendor.  In the absence of any factual averment that employees of the letter vendor did anything other than process the information transmitted to them into a letter that was then mailed only to the debtor, the Plaintiff has not established, and cannot demonstrate, an ascertainable loss.  Instead, the loss, if any, suffered by the Plaintiff is merely theoretical, as demonstrated by the Plaintiff’s claim for statutory damages under the FDCPA.  (Pa59)  The Trial Court’s holding aligns with the Appellate Division’s recent holding that there is no ascertainable loss when debt information is transmitted to a mailing vendor.
[brief] The final judgment in the companion case is sufficiently firm and deliberated, meeting the Restatement (Second) of Judgments §13 (1982) criteria, to be accorded preclusive effect in the present case.  In addition to the doctrine of collateral estoppel, this Court's adherence to the principle of stare decisis further mandates upholding [...]'s decision.  Stare decisis requires courts to follow established precedent in deciding cases with similar facts and legal issues.  This doctrine not only ensures consistency and predictability in the law but also reinforces the integrity and authority of judicial decisions.  [...]'s ruling in the companion case, which established the validity of Ordinances 5-23 and 7-23, is not merely a precedent but also a well-reasoned judicial determination that thoroughly examined the legality and public purpose of these ordinances.  By upholding this decision, this Court will be honoring the principles of legal stability and continuity that are central to stare decisis.
[brief] Plaintiff attempts to rely on these two facts as “circumstantial evidence” of a defect, but it is pure speculation.  Plaintiff has not connected the dots between the recall generally, the alleged defect in the specific product she used, and her alleged injuries.  Without evidence that the actual product she received had the defect that led to the recall, and that that defect could cause, and in fact did cause, her injuries, the trial court transformed strict liability into absolute liability.  Clearly, that outcome contravenes the statutory plain language of the PLA and undermines the Legislature’s intent to rein in product liability litigation in this State.
[brief] ”  In many instances, insurance companies and sureties grant different individuals within the company varying levels of monetary authority.  Further, construction companies are typically granted a finite amount of bonding capacity.  It is not a given, then, that \(^5\) Section 103.02 of the Contract Specifications was Exhibit 12 to [...]’s Recommended Decision, and thus part of the record below.  See A68.  However, Section 103.02 is not part of [...]’s appendix.  the attorney-in-fact appointed to execute the Proposal Bond would have the necessary authority to issue a Contract Bond that is ten times higher in exposure for the company.  Not only is [...] precluded from its after-the-fact attempt to cure its materially defective bid, its attempt to do so, substantively, is woefully inadequate.  [...] also attempts to seize upon the term “concern” used in the decision below to posit that a mere “concern” is not a valid basis to reject an otherwise qualified low-bid (see [...]’s Brief, p. 42).  [...] then boot-straps that semantical posture by attempting to stretch and morph the holding of Greenwood v. State Police Training Center, 127 N.J. 500 (1992) to fit its baseless narrative arguing that a “concern” serving the basis for an agency’s decision is arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable.  Initially, the term “concern” is used once in the decision below to simply describe what [...] became aware of regarding the [...]’s finding that its bid was materially defective (A65).  Contrary to its argument, the decision below was premised upon the undisputed fact that [...] did not present a valid Consent of Surety as there was nothing evidencing the attorney-in-fact’s authority to bind [...] to its undertaking, in violation of New Jersey law.
[brief] Here, [...]’s expert witnesses on causation have set forth the “why and wherefore” of their opinions and not just the mere conclusions.  The testimony has been given in terms of reasonable medical certainty or probability.  Indeed, the expert witness testimony is supported by [...]’s medical records from [...], the [...] and [...]; deposition transcripts of [...], [...], [...] and [...]’s [...] and [...]; [...]’s Benefit Risk Assessment for Ozurdex; [...]’s Field Alerts for Ozurdex; [...]’s worldwide recalls; the December 28, 2018 Urgent Drug Recall for Ozurdex in the United States; as well as the experts’ own knowledge and experience.  Plaintiff’s experts have not only set forth their conclusions, but have also testified to the reasons for reaching their conclusions.
[brief] The “Double /10 bill” term is designed to produce documents responsive to request for production 45, 38, and 39.  [...] is interested in learning whether rental car customers encountered problems with the toll process because of PToll, as [...]’s letters alleged.  They are also designed to discover whether [...] had a protectable reputation that could have been damaged by such problems.  The “Geotoll” term is designed to produce documents responsive to requests for production 10 and 11.  [...] wants to know whether [...] was concerned about other apps, and therefore wrote its letter out of an altruistic concern for consumer protection, or was only concerned with [...]’s app, and therefore wrote the letters in order to damage [...].  Again, [...] argues that this will provide evidence of [...]’s motives in sending its letters.  The essence of [...]’s argument is that it and [...]’s email negotiations over these specific search terms—which are memorialized in a series of emails—constituted a binding and enforceable agreement between the parties.
[brief] **Allstate New Jersey Insurance. Co. v. Lajara,** 222 N.J. 129 (2015)  .........................................................................................................................9, 10, 11  **Gov’t Emps. Ins. Co. v. Mount Prospect Chiropractic Ctr., P.A.,** 98 F.4th 463 (3d Cir. 2024)  ..............................................................................................................9, 14  **Habick v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co.,** 320 N.J. Super. 244 (App. Div. 1999) ...............................................................................................4  **In re Freshwater Wetlands Prot. Act Rules,** 180 N.J. 478 (2004) ..........................................................................................................................14  **Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co. v. Melcar Utility Co.,** 212 N. J. 576 (2013) ..........................................................................................................................10, 11  **Kutcher v. Hous. Auth. of City of Newark,** 20 N.J. 181 (1955) ............................................................................................................................4  **Riverside Chiropractic Grp. v. Mercury Ins. Co.,** 404 N.J. Super. 228 (App. Div. 2008) ...............................................................................................8  **Whirlpool Props., Inc. v. Dir., Div. of Tax’n,** 208 N.J. 141 (2011) ..........................................................................................................................11  ###  Statutes N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4 .................................................................................................................................4  N.J.S.A. 39:6A-5.1 .............................................................................................................................7  N.J.S.A. 39:6A-5.2 .............................................................................................................................7  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
[brief] Under R.P.C. 3.3 – Candor Toward the Tribunal states the following:  (a)  A lawyer shall not knowingly:...  (3) fail to disclose to the tribunal legal authority in the controlling jurisdiction known to the lawyer to be directly adverse to the position of the client and not disclosed by opposing counsel; (5) fail to disclose to the tribunal a material fact knowing that the omission is reasonably certain to mislead the tribunal, except that it shall not be a breach of this rule if the disclosure is protected by a recognized privilege or is otherwise prohibited by law.  (Emphasis Added)  The sealing and striking orders were not protected by privilege or prohibited by law.  No litigant, including learned counsel, is permitted to publish legally protected and confidential information that is prohibited from being disseminated by law.  [...] knew that the information was highly contested, under seal, and stricken (Pa 271).
[brief] [2T].  Defendant’s counsel, [...], Esquire, waived defendant’s appearance.  [2T3-14 to -19].  After hearing the arguments of counsel, [...] found defendant guilty of harassment, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:33-2a(1).  [2T14-9 to -11].  In reviewing the transcript of the trial from the municipal court, [...] made several credibility findings.  [2T14-23 to -24].  [...] stated that it was difficult to determine [...]’s credibility because the questions posed to him by defendant were largely leading and repetitive.  [2T15-14 to -25].  He stated that [...]’s testimony was of little evidential value.  [2T16-1 to -7].  He held that defendant’s testimony was incredible.  [2T16-8 to -9].  He held that there were many inconsistencies in her testimony.  [...] examined defendant’s question: “Was there anybody besides me, did you see anybody there that day?”  [2T16-10 to -18].  He held that question constituted an admission that defendant was present at her father’s house on the day of the incident.  [2T16-16 to -18].  [...] held that defendant testified inconsistently about her knowledge of rap music.  [2T16-19 to -23].  He held that the victim, [...], was credible.  [2T14-23 to 26-1].  He testified consistently and answered the questions directly.  [2T15-1 to -3].  [...] held that [...]’ “ability to recall was very good. ”  [2T15-2 to -10].  [...] turned to the in-court identification of defendant.  [2T17-14 to -17].  He held the victim’s identification of defendant was unequivocal and proper.  [2T17-23 to 18-2].  He also held that defendant implicitly indicated her presence at the scene through her line of questioning.  [2T18-6 to -12].  [...] found defendant guilty of Disorderly Conduct beyond a reasonable doubt.  [2T19-18 to -23].  He held that defendant used racially charged language with the intent to alarm or annoy the victim.  [2T19-10 to -13].  He discredited defendant’s assertion that she was not present at the scene of the incident.  He noted defendant made remarks that included a promise of violence to the victim.  [2T19-24 to 20-4].  [...] imposed the same sentence as imposed in the municipal court: $500 fine, $33 court costs, $50 VCCB, and $75 Safe Neighborhoods.  [2T20-5 to -10].  This appeal follows the finding of guilt at defendant’s trial de novo.
[brief] It is only when the evidence is so “utterly one-sided” that a Court may decide that a party should prevail as a matter of law.  *Gilhooley v. County of Union*, 164 N.J. 533, 545 (2000).  In the present matter, the Trial Court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the basis that it determined that they did not owe the plaintiff a duty.  (Pa47-Pa48; 1T11:20-13:18).
[brief] ”  *Id.* at 159.  But even with this new rule, juries “were permitted to draw a negative inference from the lack of a fresh complaint,” “courts continued to adhere to the prevailing idea that it was ‘natural’ for a woman to complain, and that if she failed to complain, the only rational explanation was that she had not really been raped. ”  *Id.* at 159-60.  Despite the sexist history of the fresh complaint rule, the Court in *Hill* declined to abandon it altogether in part because, without the rule, “rape victims would suffer whenever members of the jury held prejudices that women who do not complain have not really been raped.
[brief] 9 Hoffman v. Asseenonty. Com, Inc., 404 N.J. Super. 415, 425-26 (App. Div. 2009) ........................................  9 Heyert v. Taddese, 431 N.J. Super. 388, 413-14 (App. Div.  2013) ...............  10 Martin v. Rutgers Cas. Ins. Co., 346 N.J. Super. 320, 323 (App. Div. 2002)  .....  10  Cortez v. Gindhart, 435 N.J. Super. 589, 605 (App. Div. 2014)  ....................
[brief] [10T53-13 to -15].  At approximately 3:00 a.m., [...] called [...] and told her that she was still at work and would be done soon.  [10T53-19 to 54-9].  She stated that [...] was going to take her home from work.  [10T54-6 to -9].  [...] was supposed to call [...] when she left work, but [...] never received a call.  [10T54-17 to -23].  Upon waking up at 6:30 a.m. and realizing [...] never called, [...] called and texted [...] but did not get a response.  [10T55-10 to -19].  [...] also spoke with [...]’s niece that morning, who stated that she also hadn’t heard from [...].  [10T56-14 to 57-18].  At that point, [...] was very concerned because it was not typical for [...] to not be in contact with her family members and [...].
[brief] DEFENDANT RECEIVED A FAIR TRIAL AND FAILS TO DEMONSTRATE THE VIOLATION OF HIS RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS.  (raised in Defendant’s pro se submission)  In his pro se brief, defendant argues his due process rights were infringed because: (1) the [...] conducted an incomplete investigation due in part to [...]’s obstruction; (2) the evidence presented in the case, namely the surveillance footage depicting defendant’s clothing on the night of the murder, exonerated defendant; (3) the State failed to produce additional evidence exonerating defendant, such as DNA evidence or eyewitnesses; (4) [...] had a “proclivity to lie” and implicated defendant in exchange for [...] officers’ assistance with his bail, and; (5) the State prevented defendant from calling any witnesses or putting witnesses on the stand who would testify that Paterson Police Officers falsified their reports and conducted an incomplete investigation.  (Pb10 to 11).  Defendant effectively argues that the jury erred by returning a guilty verdict based on the evidence presented.  Jurors are judges of fact who “determine the credibility of witnesses [and] the weight to attach to the testimony of each witness. ”  (*State v. Mahoney*, 444 N.J. Super. 253, 259 (2016)).  “It is the jury’s sworn duty to arrive at a just conclusion after considering all the evidence presented during the course of the trial,” which must be accomplished by “weighing the evidence calmly, without passion, prejudice, or sympathy. ”  (*Id.* at 259-60).  A jury’s verdict should not be disturbed if, based on the entirety of the evidence and after giving the State the benefit of all its favorable testimony and all favorable inferences drawn thereof, a reasonable jury could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
[brief] Nature of the Case and Exclusivity of RETA  Furthermore, the RETA provides a very specific, pinpoint cause of action for timeshare owners.  While it is indisputable that two different statutes can be charged to a jury on the same factual predicate, this case presents the exception.  The law with regard to what the focus should be when charging two different statutes is as follows:  We conclude that, irrespective of the nature of the damages, a CFA claim alleging express misrepresentations – deceptive, fraudulent, misleading and other unconscionable practices – may be brought in the same action as a PLA claim premised upon product manufacturing, warning or design defects.
[brief] Like the mother in Wolpaw, 272 N.J. Super. at 45, whose interests were served by arguing that she properly instructed her son in the safe use of the BB gun but he disregarded her commands, the [...]’ interests are served by their argument that they properly instructed [...] to use the grass-covered, cone-marked turnaround, not the police turnaround, but [...] disobeyed their instructions.  Like the son in Wolpaw, [...]’s interests are served by his argument that [...] never instructed him not to use the police turnaround and that [...] failed to adequately instruct him as to which turnaround to use.