ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] However, this case is to be distinguished from that one in several respects.  First, in *Shikinsky*, the Court noted that “inherent dangers confront pedestrians on roadways that are not faced by operators of motor vehicles."  *Ich.*  A "depression . . . that a car would harmlessly pass over" might trip a pedestrian.  *Id.*  Therefore, the Court stated that it was not palpably unreasonable for the Borough not to repair a depression.  *Id.*  In the matter before the Court, the overall size of the subject pothole was approximately 4-feet in length (measured perpendicular to the roadway) and 12-inches wide (measured parallel to the striping).  (Pa 609)  It is estimated that the deepest portion of the pothole approximates 18-inches long by 12-inches wide by a minimum of 2-inches deep (the depth of the surface course).  (Pa 609).  As [...], P.E. noted in her report, a depression in the ground the size of that pothole would have posed a danger not only to the Plaintiff but to drivers and emergency personnel.  (Pa 313: report of [...].)  Therefore, this is not a pothole that “that a car would harmlessly pass over" as was the case in *Shikinsky.*  The Defense has offered no evidence to rebut this fact.  Moreover, the Defendants themselves have acknowledged through a representative that they have a responsibility to maintain roadways that are safe for both motor vehicles and pedestrians, which is the very point that they now seek to argue against.  (Pa 514:Deposition of [...] at 14:9-20.)  Therefore, there is an issue for the trier of fact as to whether the conduct of the [...] was palpably unreasonable and as such, Summary Judgment should have been denied.
[brief] The ZBA’s Resolution #1040A on the School’s Application was adopted on November 19, 2018 (“ZBA Resolution”).  After a hearing and full briefing by the parties in the PW Action, on December 1, 2022 the Honorable [...], A.J.S.C. --- 4  Defendant had filed a prior application with the ZBA in November of 2017 requesting an interpretation of a prior owner’s 1972 Application for variance relief and other related documents pursuant to N.J.S.A. 4055D-70.
[brief] ”  The claims made by the [...] against [...] did not implicate any service rendered by [...] or his Firm “for others”—but were actions by [...] for his personal benefit.  Defendants disagree and seek to impose a broader definition of Legal Services that would render “for others” to include non-client matters.  But, in **Blackburn**, a case pending in parallel to this action but not reported to the Court by Defendants, Defendants pressed for, and obtained, a contradictory interpretation to that sought here—one that narrowly construes Legal Services so that Defendants could deny coverage.
[brief] Substantial prejudice in this context means substantial prejudice in maintaining one's defense.  Generally, that implies the loss of witnesses, the loss of evidence, fading memories, and the like. ”  Ibid.  In Escalante v. Township of Cinnaminson, we observed that the delay alone does not serve to create substantial prejudice.  283 N.J.Super. 244, 253, 661 A.2d 837 (App.Div.1995) (citing Kleinke v. Ocean City, 147 N.J.Super. 575, 581, 371 A.2d 785 (App.Div.1977)).  Instead, it is the lack of availability of information which results from the delay that is, for the most part, determinative of the issue of substantial prejudice.  Id. at 252–53, 661 A.2d 837.  Thus, a party's “access to relevant information is largely dispositive of the ‘substantial prejudice’ issue....”  Lamb v. Global Landfill Reclaiming, 111 N.J. 134, 152, 543 A.2d 443 (1988).  Mitchell v. Procini, 331 N.J. Super 445, 453 (App. Div. 2000).  Case law establishes that in order to obtain a dismissal pursuant to the entire controversy doctrine after the doctrine was softened by Olds v. Donnelly, 150 N.J. 424, 443 (1997), the movant must show both 1) an inexcusable failure to comply with the notice provisions of the entire controversy doctrine and 2) substantial prejudice.
[brief] See ECF No. 52-7 at 7-8 (letter from Plaintiff’s counsel dated December 19, 2023, listing custodians and search terms).  Plaintiff’s demand as stated is overly broad and unduly burdensome, and not proportional to the needs of discovery in this case.  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) (scope of discovery); Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(d)(1) (“A party or attorney responsible for issuing and serving a subpoena must take reasonable steps to avoid imposing undue burden or expense on a person subject to the subpoena. ”); Va. Dep’t of Corr. V. Jordan, 921 F.3d 180, 189 (4th Cir. 2019) (explaining that, when considering whether to quash or narrow a third-party subpoena, “courts should consider not just the relevance of the information sought” as well as the burden on the third party of complying with the subpoena, but also “the requesting party’s need for [the requested documents or information]”) (emphasis added).2
[brief] 4)  THE FOURTH ELEMENT: A REASONABLE NOTICE OF PLAINTIFF’S CLAIM  The fourth element requires Plaintiff to have given Defendants reasonable notice of Plaintiff’s claim.  In this case, the only notice which Defendants had was the Complaint, which amounted to little more than a bare-bones recitation of the conclusory facts which were perhaps sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss, given New Jersey’s status as a notice-pleading state.  *Printing Mart-Morristown v. Sharp Elecs. Corp.*, 116 N.J. 739, 746 (1989); *Velop, Inc. v. Kaplan*, 301 N.J. Super. 32, 56 (App. Div. 1997).  However, the fourth element of the substantial compliance doctrine requires more.  This Court in *Est. of Yearby* found that “generic, non-descriptive allegations,” free from any identification of “the [applicable] standard of care” nor any description of “actions defendants took or failed to take that deviated from the relevant standard care,” were insufficient to meet the fourth element of the substantial compliance test.  *Est. of Yearby*, 453 N.J. Super. at 403–04.  In this case, Plaintiff’s complaint is the same kind of minimal notice which this *Est. of Yearby* Court rejected.  As such, the fourth element was not met.  **5)
[brief] Lakehurst, March 27, 2017.  On March 27, 2017, [...] was on duty for the [...].  (14T6-8 to 9; 14T7-9 to 13; 14T7-24 to 8-2).  Video from his body-worn camera, viewed by the jury, showed his encounter with defendant, driving a Dodge Durango.  (14T8-3 to 11-3; S-43\(^8\)).  As the video confirmed, [...] did not issue a ticket to defendant.  (14T11-5 to 8).  He said that he had discretion to issue a warning instead.  (14T12-15 to 13-4).  The video, and still photographs taken from it, showed [...] approaching defendant’s car on the passenger side.  (S-43; Pa34-39\(^9\); Pa50-52\(^10\)).  While [...] reclined in the front passenger seat, defendant held in his right hand, and showed [...], a two-section black object.  In the upper portion, there was a white item, which in its center, contained printing consistent with the NJSP insignia, inside a yellow triangle.
[brief] We cannot blue pencil the unlawful provision to delete the offending overage and rescue the valid remainder ...The penalty provision is wholly invalid and cannot support an otherwise appropriate sentence.  Verona v. Shalit, 96 N.J. Super. 20, 232 A.2d 431 (App Div. 1967); State v. Laurel Mills Sewerage Corp., 46 N.J. Super. 331, 134 A.2d 720 (App Div. 1957).  Defendant's convictions cannot stand without a penalty, and therefore the judgment of the Law Division must be reversed.
[brief] POINT V DEFENDANT’S FORTY-FIVE YEAR SENTENCE WAS BASED ON AN APPROPRIATE BALANCING OF AGGRAVATING AND MITIGATING FACTORS.  The Legislature’s goal in sentencing “was to achieve greater uniformity in sentencing. ”  State v. Torres, 246 N.J. 246, 262 (2021).  “The Legislature was also guided by ‘the concept that punishment of crime [should] be based primarily on principles of deserved punishment in proportion to the offense and not rehabilitative potential. ’”  Ibid. (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Yarbough, 100 N.J. 627, 636-37 (1985)).  “Under the Code, ‘the severity of the crime is now the single most important factor in the sentencing process. ’”  Ibid. (quoting State v. Hodge, 95 N.J. 369, 378-79 (1984)).  Defendant received a fair sentence, and defendant’s age alone is insufficient to reduce her sentence.
[brief] [...] testified that she never saw defendant after May 27, 2012.  (14T77-24 to 78-5).  No one told her defendant was arrested, convicted and sentenced in 2012 to 2014.  (14T74-4 to 75-2).  She learned about defendant’s criminal matter in August or September 2019 from someone hanging around outside a bodega.  (14T57-10 to 58-16; 14T59-11 to 60-14).  It is more likely, as the PCR court found, that defendant never told [...] about [...] and [...] because they would not have benefitted his defense.
[brief] (1T, Pg. 10, lines 4-9).  In this action, [...] also got a sheriff involved, in the middle of trial, and that turned out to further prejudice the trial against [...].  Specifically,  On November 30, 2022, [...] asked a Sheriff’s officer to sit in at the trial (3T, pg. 43, lines 16-25).  Despite, the prior angst regarding the sheriff’s officers confronting [...] (as described above regarding the occurrences reflected on the Sept. 16, 2022 transcript)  There is no indication in the record that [...] ever instructed the Sheriff’s officer regarding how to interact with [...].  On December 1, 2022, during the trial, [...], who was not on the witness stand at the time, left the Courtroom to use the bathroom.  Notably, [...] noted on the record that she had not previously ever instructed [...] that he was not free to do so (4T, Pg. 71 line 18 – pg. 72, line 2).  When [...] left the court room, the sheriff’s officer followed him out and questioned him in the hallway.  (4T, Pg. 56 line 19 – pg. 57, line 14).  The Sheriff’s officer wanted to ask the judge if [...] was allowed to use the bathroom.  (4T, Pg. 58, lines 14-17).  A Juror had noted that “there’s a fight going on outside. ” (4T, Pg. 55, line 22).  [...]’s counsel requested a Mistrial at the time.
[brief] [...] certainly could not have concluded that he was complying with the law when he denied plaintiff access to her counsel.  Willful misconduct” has been defined as falling somewhere between simple negligence and the intentional infliction of harm.  *Alston v. City of Camden*, 168 N.J. 170, 185 (2001).  The Supreme Court of New Jersey in *Fielder v. Stonack*, 141 N.J. 101, 123-127 (1995), defined “willful misconduct” as a knowing failure to follow specific orders.  Here, the “willful misconduct constituted a knowing violation of a plaintiff’s constitutional and civil right which does not exonerate the public employees in case pursuant to NJSA 59:3-14.
[brief] (2T160:20 to 161:5; 6T88:1-19; 8T82:12-16.)  Between September 2019 and December 2021, Defendants did not conduct any delineation at the Property, and other than six holes allegedly dug by [...] in March 2020, there was no sampling done to determine the full extent of contamination on the Property.  (4T103:5-25; 6T82:21 to 83:17, 88:1-24; Instead, Defendants and their representatives repeatedly lied and withheld information regarding the status of the remedial investigation, concealed their communications with the [...], disregarded deficiencies in their documentation, and otherwise wholly failed to cooperate with Plaintiff and its representatives throughout the process.  (2T141:12 to 142:5, 174:8 to 175:10, 179:5-19; 4T45:20 to 47:18, 49:2 to 50:7, 54:16 to 55:12, 69:14 to 70:4; 5T46:21 to 47:6; 6T88:1-24, 92:2-8, 94:10 to 95:3, 102:12 to 103:5; 8T87:18 to 89:7, 91:3 to 92:5, 93:15 to 94:4, 94:13 to 95:4, 100:14 to 101:11.)  [...] was the Defendants’ registered LSRP for the Property between approximately 2012 until February 2020.
[brief] See Mountville Tax Map, Pa102.  After attempting unsuccessfully to mediate this boundary dispute, the [...] filed their Complaint to the appoint Boundary Commissioners pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:28-1 without objection from the [...] (Pa55).  The Boundary Commissioners proceeded to survey both Properties and other surrounding properties.  The significance of the Boundary Commissioners’ Report (Pa105) for this appeal is the determination that the descriptions of the Properties and two other lots subdivided at same time in 1956 (Lots 9 & 12) are accurate.  The dimensions, size and deeds of the Properties and that of their neighbors do not change.  As stated by the Boundary Commissioners, the problem is fixing these accurate property descriptions on the ground.  In this respect, the Boundary Commissioners found that the survey of Lot 11 along with prior surveys of the other lots in their residential subdivision dating back to the 1950's, including the initial 1956 subdivision, did not agree with the most recent surveys of Lot 10 and of the surrounding properties.  Essentially, the Boundary Commissioners determined that the boundaries of these subdivided properties (Lots 9-12) had to be shifted from 2-4 feet to the south in order to be brought into agreement with the surrounding properties, although no affected property owner had complained about the location of any of the prior boundary lines to their properties, except the [...].  The [...] applied to set aside the Boundary Commissioners’ Report under N.J.S.A. 2A:28-3.
[brief] DIVISION OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT SERVICES IN THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNITY AFFAIRS, [...]  On the Brief: [...] (040231996)  [...] (033642010)  #  TABLE OF CONTENTS | Section | Page | |------------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | TABLE OF CONTENTS | i | | TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | iii | | TABLE OF JUDGMENTS AND ORDERS | vi | | PRELIMINARY STATEMENT | 1 | | PROCEDURAL HISTORY | 4 | | STATEMENT OF FACTS | 5 | | A. ATLANTIC CITY’S FINANCIAL CRISIS AND DESIGNATION UNDER THE MSRA | 5 | | B. THE MSRA CONFERRED THE DIRECTOR WITH BROAD POWERS TO STABILIZE ATLANTIC CITY AND FACILITATE ITS RECOVERY | 8 | | C. COURTS HAVE CONSISTENTLY CONFIRMED THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE MSRA | 10 | | D. PLAINTIFFS’ COMPLAINT | 15 | | E. THE SUPERIOR COURT’S WELL-REASONED DECISION | 17 | | STANDARD OF REVIEW | 19 | | LEGAL ARGUMENT | 20 | | POINT I | 20 | | THE MSRA EXPLICITLY AUTHORIZES THE UNILATERAL TERMINATION OF CONTRACTS AND THE SUPERIOR COURT CORRECTLY FOUND THAT PLAINTIFFS FAIL TO ALLEGE ANY ACTIONABLE CONDUCT (PA17-29) | 20 | POINT II ........................................................................................................................................25
[brief] ”  First, Plaintiffs concede [...] was notified it was being unenrolled from the CCIP mere hours after [...] received the auto-generated “Welcome Letter” on July 30, 2015, due to [...]’s erroneous enrollment, when [...] e-mailed [...] of [...] stating “Atlantic will not be able to enroll into the CCIP for that work” because the CCIP “cannot enroll subcontractors into the CCIP who are performing structural demolition.
[brief] Missing pages from Complaint Warrant, No. [...], dated November 5, 2021 ......................................................  Ra1 to 3 Certification by [...], dated September 7, 2023 ..........................................................  Ra4 to 7 State’s Brief in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss the Indictment with Prejudice, filed January 30, 2024 ...................... Ra8 to 16 State’s Notice of Motion for Leave to Appeal, filed June 6, 2024 ........................................................................ Ra17 Defendant’s Notice of Motion for Leave to Appeal, filed June 10, 2024 ....................................................................... Ra18 Defendant’s Amended Notice of Motion for Leave to Appeal, filed June 10, 2024 ....................................................................... Ra19 Appellate Division Orders granting both the State’s and Defendant’s Motions for Leave to Appeal, filed July 15, 2024 ....................................................................... Ra20 to 23 State’s Exhibit 2 (from October 2022 Hearing), Crime-Scene Photograph of Kitchen Door and Second Floor Kitchen .................
[brief] The Complaint itself consists of eight counts.  Count One seeks to void [...]’s 30 year NJHMFA Long Term Tax Exemption Ordinance 6PSF-E adopted by the [...] March 6, 2019 as, in plaintiffs’ view, the exemption should have been made under LTTEL.  (Compl. Pars. 370-371).  The exemption given under the NJHMFA does not provide for 5% of quarterly revenue payments to the County.  (Compl. Par. 376).  The only relief specifically directed to the County in Count One is that the Court declare that the County “is entitled to 5% of the long term tax payments from any new post 2003 PILOT authorized by Newark,” (Compl. Par. 390 L), and that Newark should be compelled “to disclose all monies paid to the County” pursuant to LTTEL.  (Compl. Par. 390 R).  Count Two seeks to compel the County defendants to identify all post 2003 long term exemptions granted in the County, account for the revenues received (Compl. Second Par. 390 E & F), and compel them “to create a task force to examine all outstanding and proposed long term tax exemptions within [...]. ” (Compl. Second Par. 390 H).  Count Three does not reference the County defendants.  Count Four appears to allege fraud against the County for “submitting offering materials that misrepresented or concealed material information***. ” (Compl. Par. 397).  Count Five makes a claim against the County Executive for failure to properly supervise.  (Compl. Pars. 398-403).  Count Six alleges that the County created a danger to [...] taxpayers.  (Compl. Pars. 404-420).  Count Seven alleges violations of the New Jersey Civil Rights Act (“NJCRA”).  (Compl. Pars. 421-433).  Finally, the Eighth Count claims there have been federal Section 1983 violations against plaintiffs.  (Compl. Par. 434).  The arguments made by the plaintiffs below and by the remaining plaintiff on this appeal against the County Defendants are premised on the contention that the tax exemption awarded defendant Weequahic Preservation, LLC. by Newark under the NJHMFA was invalid and instead should have been awarded under LTTEL as the latter statute repealed the former.
[brief] Order dismissing Complaint as “Moot” | Pa 13 | Table of Contents for Complaint in Lieu of Prerogative Writs and Civil Rights Action, Motion for Stay and Adjournment Motion to Amend Complaint, For Removal of Improperly Filed Documents; To Correct; Reopen; For Change of Venue and Division; For Disqualification and Relief From Judgment & Exhibits  Complaint in Lieu of prerogative Writs and Action
[brief] First Atl. Fed. Credit Union v. Perez, 391 N.J. Super. 419, 432 (App. Div. 2007) (quoting Fagas v. Scott, 251 N.J. Super. 169, 190 (Law Div. 1991)).  “Where a party has [a] reasonable and good faith belief in the merit of the cause, attorney’s fees will not be awarded. ”  *Id.* (citing *DeBrango v. Summit Bancorp.*, 328 N.J. Super. 219, 227 (App. Div. 2000); *K.D. v. Bozarth*, 313 N.J. Super. 561, 574-75 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 156 N.J. 425 (1998)).  When considering whether to award sanctions under *Rule* 1:4-8, the court must give a “restrictive interpretation” to the term “frivolous” in order to avoid limiting access to the court system.
[brief] Plaintiff being placed in disciplinary detention is an additional cognizable injury.  Plaintiff’s right to access her counsel while she was on disciplinary detention was impaired and abridged.  Defendant incorrectly stated that plaintiff did not state facts that show threats or coercion.  Plaintiff presented adequate facts in her Notice of Claim that was attached to satisfy threat and coercion.  Plaintiff expressed that while completing a witness statement she was accused of having an attitude as she perceived, and that she was threatened with bodily harm by an officer if she did not “lose” the “attitude. ”  Plaintiff showed that the failure to supervise government employees acting under color of law, led to Substantive and Procedural due process violations, and other Constitutional and Civil rights violations against her, and that the deprivation was based on a custom of not having any policies at the County prison, which prevents dismissal of Counts One, Four and Five of her Amended Complaint.  Plaintiff showed specifically that the defendants violated New Jersey Constitution Article 1 paragraph 1, 3, 10, 11, 6, 18, and 22.
[brief] POINT III  THE LAW DIVISION HAD THE WRONG PARTY AND SHOULD HAVE PERMITTED SCHIANOS TO AMEND THEIR COMPLAINT.  [...] decided that [...] could seek to amend their complaint to include [...] ([...]) in the future, see attached Appendix April 2022 Order.  Once [...] testified at trial that the Wells Fargo trust department has nothing to do with refinance and refinance denials, Trial Transcript p. 234-235, ([...] twice denied refinance due to title)  A, it should have been clear to the Law Division that the only party that should answer [...]’ allegations of wrongful denial of refinance due to title would be [...] – the bank, and therefore should have permitted [...] to add same as a party.  [...] – the bank was not without notice as it was named in [...]’ original third party complaint, and served with the third party complaint.  Thus, there was no prejudice to [...].  [...] testified that he spoke with [...] and was aware of her letter forwarded to the [...] stating that [...] “does not hold (Schiano) mortgage as trustee. ” and that refinance was twice denied due to title, see Trial Transcript 234-235, and A642-A650.  The Law Division should have permitted the [...]’ to amend their complaint to include the proper party [...] – the bank – the entity who wrongfully twice denied refinance due to a foreclosure assignment that the Plaintiff wrongfully recorded.  POINT IV
[brief] -------------------------------------  33  Rutkowski v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, 209 N.J. Super. 140 (App. Div. 1986)  ------------------------------------------------------  59  State v. Frost, 242 N.J. Super. 601 (App. Div. 1990)  -----------------------------  33  Taylor v. DeLosso, 319 N.J.Super. 174 (App. Div. 1999)  -----------------------  35, 37  Walker Rogge, Inc. v Chelsea Title & Guarantee Co., 222 N.J. Super. 363 (App. Div. 1988), rev’d. on other grounds, 116 N.J. 517 (1989)  ---------------  33  Younger v. Cracke, 236 N.J. Super. 595, 602-03 (Law Div. 1989)  --------------  57
[brief] THE COURT:  No, no, no, I can't let a jury hear that, that he departed from this, because it's pretty much saying to the jury that this is the reason why, right?  We can't do that unless an expert explains departing from that did cause it because this type of high gloss paint will, it shouldn't be used on the stairs.  Is there someone -- I still don't know as I sit here right now whether the paint recommended by [...] was the right one.  High gloss to me sounds shiny and that I'll fall.  I don't know.  But this is why we would need someone to tell us, I don't know what type of paint to use in places, right?
[brief] PPD Detective [...] testified that when he responded to the scene, he located shell casings and a shattered bottle of Patron tequila near [...]’s body.  (3T:10-1 to 13).  The State’s ballistics expert later opined that the shell casings possessed unique markings that indicated they were fired from a Glock semi-automatic pistol.  (See 3T:152-7 to 164-21).  [...] and the other officers believed the tequila bottle indicated [...] had purchased the alcohol from a nearby liquor store shortly before his death.