ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] Rule 7:4-1  This Rule provides that every defendant shall have a right to bail before conviction on such terms as, in the judgment of the court, will insure the defendant’s Right to Bail Before Conviction.  presence when required, having regard for the defendant’s background, residence, employment and family status and, particularly, the general policy against (Includes Option of R.O.R. Bail) unnecessary sureties and detentions.
[brief] .........................................................................................................................  27  POINT III: THE COURT’S OPINIONS BELOW, GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND DENYING RECONSIDERATION, REST ON SEVERAL INCORRECT STATEMENTS OF LAW OR FACT (Pa5-Pa15; Pa18-Pa29).  .........................................................  33  A.  THE COURT BELOW MISSTATED THE RULING OF AN EARLIER COURT REGARDING THE NEED FOR EXPERT TESTIMONY (Pa6; Pa1-Pa2)  ..........................................................  33  B.  THE GRADING ERROR AT THE CORE OF THIS CASE AFFECTED THE ENTIRE PROPERTY, NOT JUST THE [...], AND MULTIPLE ELEMENTS OF DAMAGE FLOW DIRECTLY FROM THAT GRADING ERROR (Pa23)  ...........................................................................................................  36  POINT IV: THE COURT BELOW WRONGFULLY REJECTED SEVERAL OTHER ARGUMENTS
[brief] ”  Allen v. Cape May Cty., 246 N.J. 275, 291 (2021) (quoting Kolb v. Burns, 320 N.J. Super. 467, 478 (App. Div. 1999)).  At this stage of the McDonnell-Douglas burden-shifting framework, a plaintiff cannot survive a motion to dismiss unless the plaintiff presents “evidence which: 1) casts sufficient doubt upon each of the legitimate reasons proffered by the defendant so that a factfinder could reasonably conclude that each reason was a fabrication; or 2) allows the factfinder to infer that discrimination was more likely than not a motivating or determinative cause of” adverse employment action.
[brief] ”  [AB19a - AB20a].  In the ten-page opinion that accompanied the March 9, 2012 injunctive order, [...] described plaintiff as a “frequent pro se filer,” finding he had filed approximately seventeen lawsuits in five years, nearly all of which had been dismissed.  [AB21a – AB22a]  [...] found that Plaintiff’s “actions patently demonstrate[d] a willful desire to abuse the judicial process and absorb State and judicial resources” and that other sanctions would not be effective.  [AB29a].  [...] held that an injunction was “the only alternative which remain[ed] to protect against future frivolous litigation.
[brief] *1  Defendant, [...], was tried before Judge [...] and a jury between March 16, 2004 and March 18, 2004 and was found guilty on count one of Salem County Indictment Number [...] of second-degree robbery contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1.  At the sentencing hearing on May 4, 2004, count two, charging defendant with second-degree conspiracy to commit robbery, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2 and N.J. S.A. 2C:15-1, was dismissed.  The judge determined the conspiracy count was subsumed in the robbery conviction.  Defendant was sentenced for second-degree robbery to a ten-year term of imprisonment with an 85% parole ineligibility period pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2, the No Early Release Act (NERA).  Defendant was also sentenced to three years of parole supervision, appropriate monetary penalties were assessed and he was ordered to pay $165 in restitution.  Defendant appeals his conviction and sentence.
[directive] In addition, each law enforcement chief executive must annually review the overall use of force by their department to ensure compliance with the Policy and necessary reporting to their respective County Prosecutor’s Office.  Finally, strict adherence to the Policy will ensure a mutually respectful relationship between the public and law enforcement, allowing law enforcement to effectively do their jobs as guardians of public safety.  If the public understands that officers prioritize de-escalation and only when necessary as a last resort, use force with restraint and in an even-handed, non- discriminatory manner, they will be more likely to support law enforcement and comply with their lawful requests.  This, in turn, will reduce the number of instances in which force is needed and improve both public and officer safety.
[brief] The Supreme Court held that plaintiff’s ascertainable loss was not measured by the improper debt/lien because the improper debt did not arise from violations of the CFA.  [T]he debt and the lien, although losses to [...], and properly cancelled by the trial court for [...]' breach of contract, were not the result of [...]' violation of the Act.  Rather, those losses occurred before any consumer fraud took place.  The “causation” provision of N.J.S.A. 56:8-19 requires plaintiff to prove that the unlawful consumer fraud caused his loss.  Ramanadham v. New Jersey Mfrs. Ins. Co., 188 N.J. Super. 30, 33, 455 A.2d 1134 (App.Div.1982) . . .  In the case before us, the contract price is not the correct measure of consumer-fraud damages because the consumer fraud occurred in the course of performance, not in the actual contracting for the home-improvement work.  See Truex v. Ocean Dodge, Inc., 219 N.J. Super. 44, 529 A.2d 1017 (App.Div.1987).  [...], 138 N.J. at 23-24.  Here, Plaintiff has argued that improper debt asserted by Defendants causally arose from Defendants’ violations of the NJCFLA and CFA—distinguishing the facts from [...], but not as Defendants argue.
[brief] However, [...]’s misstatements that (1) [...] had other realistic options for transportation, and (2) this was not a one-sided waiver must be addressed.  A.  [...]’s arbitration agreement is procedurally unconscionable because Appellants had no other meaningful choice but to rely on [...] for transportation.  [...]’s argument that [...]’ lack of bargaining power does not make [...]’s terms procedurally unconscionable because she could have taken her business elsewhere is a flawed argument.  (Db21-23).  The examples of other means of transportation [...] suggests are [...], train, bus, or taxi.  (Db23).  If [...] had chosen a [...], she would have been forced to agree to arbitration as well.  [...] is also well aware of its success in essentially running taxi services out of business in New Jersey.  Given the lack of transportation, [...] would probably need to rely on a rideshare service to get to a bus or train station.  So the only realistic choice [...] had was to rely on [...] for transportation to make it to her children’s doctor’s appointments.  Transportation is a necessity and is distinguishable from the case Stelluti v. Casapenn Enters., LLC, 203 N.J. 286, 300-302 (2010), which [...] relies on.
[brief] See Pa232 – Pa234.  This Court was never tasked with, nor has it ever decided whether there existed a Brady violation that undermined [...]’s constitutional rights.  See Da024-27; Da071-73; Da145-47.  Indeed, the standard for granting a new trial based on newly discovered evidence is **not** the same as the standard for granting a new trial based on a substantial denial of a defendant’s constitutional rights.  Thus, contrary to the State’s assertion, the PCR court did not “ha[ve] a fair opportunity to consider the . . . claim and to correct that asserted constitutional defect. ” (State Br. at 24-25) (quoting *Picard v. Connor*, 404 U.S. 270, 276 (1971)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  Accordingly, the instant PCR petition cannot be barred under Rule 3:22-5.
[directive] The following timeframes for Evidence Destruction Authorization are suggested for statewide usage by County Prosecutor’s Offices.  Each County Prosecutor’s Office shall develop all and follow its own Evidence Destruction Policy and Procedures.  The County Prosecutor may impose additional requirements, if necessary.  Authorization Requirement  The mere fact that an item of evidence may satisfy the qualifications for being subject to destruction does not mean that it is automatically destroyed.  The appropriate Prosecutor’s Office must review and provide authorization pursuant to their respective Policy and Procedures, before any destruction is to take place.  The reference to "Prosecutor" contained herein shall include and also refer to the Director of the Division of Criminal Justice for purposes of this document.  A County Prosecutor or the Director of the Division of Criminal Justice may designate one or more Assistant Prosecutors or Deputy Attorneys General to authorize evidence destruction on their behalf.  Completion of Sentence
[brief] (3T23-2 to 7, 34-17 to 24; 5T262-8 to 13)  Police Officer [...] received descriptions of the suspected shooter from a number of people on the scene, and, according to his report, put a call over the airways describing the shooter as “a black man. ”  (2T31-13 to 21)  Another Elizabeth police officer recorded the scene on his body-worn camera, part of which was played for the jury depicting a man describing the shooter as “African American with gray hoodie. ”  (7T23-13 to 14, 29-20 to 15)  (Da12 at 2:10 to 2:20)  That witness was never located, and the lead detective, [...], testified that she never attempted to locate him.
[brief] The LAD requires that a party elect between an action in the Law Division of the Superior Court and the DCR administrative proceeding.  N.J.S.A. §10:5-27; Garfinkel, 168 N.J. at 130-131.  If a plaintiff elects the latter, he is barred from bringing a judicial action based on the same alleged misconduct while the DCR investigation is ongoing and after the DCR has rendered its determination.  N.J.S.A. --- 4
[brief] In the first sentence of the statute, the Legislature provided that the administrator “may settle his account or be required to settle his account” in court.  It is in the interpretation of these two grammatical clauses that the trial court has erred in its ruling.  The word “may” in the first clause gives a personal representative the option to settle his account formally.  On the other hand, the words “be required” in the second clause makes the account mandatory.  In In re Hekemian, [...], 2023 WL 176098 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Jan. 13, 2023), where co-Executors disputed a beneficiary’s right to an accounting due to an arbitration clause in the Last Will, the Court stated that “Defendants do not contest the expiration of the one-year period or otherwise deny [Appellant's] entitlement to an accounting.
[directive] Pursuant to the authority granted to me under the New Jersey Constitution and the Criminal Justice Act of 1970, N.J.S.A. 52:17B-97 to -117, which provides for the general supervision of criminal justice by the Attorney General as chief law enforcement officer of the State in order to secure the benefits of a uniform and efficient enforcement of the criminal law and the administration of criminal justice throughout the State, agencies3  I hereby direct all law enforcement follow the guidelines for testing, tracking, storage, retention, and destruction, outlined in this Directive.
[brief] Defendant also moved to dismiss the indictment as unconstitutional, arguing that it violated the Full Faith and Credit Clause and Second Amendment.  (Da26-27).  [...] rejected the motion, observing that, “[n]othing in the Constitution ensures unlimited extraterritorial recognition of all statutes,” (Da27) (quoting Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 498 (1941)), and that the Full Faith and Credit Clause does not require “a state to substitute the statutes of other states for its own statutes dealing with a subject matter concerning which it is competent to legislate. ” (Da 28) (quoting Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Hyatt, 538 U.S. 488, 494 (2003)).  As “[t]he State of New Jersey is certainly competent enough to legislate its own criminal code,” [...] held that the State could prosecute defendant for her violation of New Jersey law in New Jersey without offending the Clause.
[brief] As a result of the COVID19 national health emergency, the appellant was temporarily laid off from his position in [...] as of March 24, 2020.  [Pa3,11,14]  On September 21, 2020, the appellant returned to work with [...] and was re-enrolled as a multiple member in the State Pension System.  [Pa4,5,7,8]  The [...] refused to re-enroll [...] as a multiple member in the State Pension System which prompted further inquiries from both [...], and from the appellant.  [Pa9,11,12]  On February 12, 2022, the New Jersey [...] contacted the appellant and advised him that he had a break in service and, therefore, would not be re-enrolled as a multiple member.  [Pa13]  After the Borough of [...] and the [...] exchanged various correspondence, the appellant hired legal counsel who wrote to the [...] on March 22, 2022.  [Pa20]  On October 13, 2022, the appellant received an official response from the [...] advising that due to a break in service the appellant could not be re-enrolled in the State Pension System.  [Pa26]  On November 17, 2022, appellant wrote to [...], Assistant Director of Pension Operations, the Pension Benefits Specialist requesting a further review of the October 13, 2022, decision.  [Pa28]  On November 23, 2022, [...] respond denying the appellant’s request to reconsider the decision from the [...].  [Pa30]  On December 8, 2022, after efforts to resolve the matter were unsuccessful, the appellant filed a request for administrative appeal of this decision with the [...].  [Pa31]  The appellant’s matter was placed on the agenda of April 19, 2023.  [Pa33]  Appellant’s counsel appeared and made a presentation on behalf of the appellant to the Board of Trustees.  Subsequent to the April 19th meeting, appellant’s counsel supplemented the record with correspondence from [...] confirming the appellant had been laid off from his position.  [Pa37,14]  On May 12, 2023, appellant received correspondence from the [...] indicating the Board of Trustees had denied his application to be re-enrolled in the State Pension System.  [Pa38]  On June 23, 2023, appellant filed an appeal of the decision of the Board of Trustees denying the appellant’s request to be re-enrolled in the [...].  This appeal requested the Board reconsider their decision or in the alternative send this case to the Office of Administrative Law pursuant to the Administrative Procedures Act N.J.S.A. 52:14B-1 [Pa41]  On August 17, 2023, the appellant received a formal denial of his appeal for re-enrollment in the State Pension System.  In addition, the Board refused to send this case to an Administrative Law Judge for a hearing.  [Pa54]  On or about September 7, 2023, the appellant filed a timely Notice of Appeal with the New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division.  [Pa58]  **STATEMENT OF FACTS**
[brief] In this matter, as noted throughout, the conduct not only of [...] but also of her counsel was repugnant.  [...] and counsel missed deadline after deadline, provided incomplete accountings, repeatedly lied to the Court, hid assets, apparently attempted to steal assets and engaged in misconduct all of which was clearly intended to deprive and defraud.  The only error committed by the Court with respect to the issuance of the fee award is that it was not enough.
[directive] Incident Response Unit (IRU).  The IRU shall be reflected as a unit within the Division of Criminal Justice and shall be led by a DCJ Supervising State Investigator.  The IRU shall be comprised of both DCJ State Investigators and DSP detectives.  It may also include investigators who are members of the DSP task force, such as FBI agents or members of county or municipal law enforcement agencies.  Personnel assigned to the IRU shall:
[brief] In addition, the court’s assumption that the Town would not apply the Ordinances provisions for an exemption ran afoul of yet another precept for denying facial challenges – it short circuited the democratic process by preventing the application of the will of the people that their municipal officials apply the Ordinance for the benefit of all in accordance Ordinance’s provision that the public officials have the right, power, and ability to apply the exemption process contained in the Ordinance to the extent they determine that any exemption is be required by law.  In short, the process used by the court below in this matter violated the requirement that [...] apply for a permit and exhaust its administrative remedies before the municipality prior to seeking a judicial declaration that the Ordinance was invalid on its face.
[brief] As of March 5, 2018, [...] owed [...] $18,000—a debt that he was several weeks late in paying.  (29T174-12 to 175-2)  [...] was trying to collect the debt by repeatedly calling [...] and showing up at [...]’s former residence—[...]—where [...]’s wife [...] resided.  (29T175-3 to 176-2, 187-1 to 3)  At first, [...] intended to pay [...] the amount he owed him.  (29T186-1)  But after [...] paid a visit to Daly in Apartment D-4, [...] decided to ask Defendant to “take care of” the debt by killing [...], and in exchange [...] would pay Defendant the $18,000 he owed to [...].
[brief] JUDGMENT ON PLAINTIFF’S DESIGN DEFECT CLAIMS WAS ERRONEOUS BECAUSE THERE WAS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE ON THE ISSUE OF WHETHER THE VEHICLE WAS DEFECTIVE TO BE SUBMITTED TO THE JURY.  (1T24:17-18)  In the instant case, the trial court decided, despite the disputes between the parties and their respective experts about the foreseeable risks and safety benefits of lane departure technology, that as a matter of law, the [...] CR-V was not defective in design without including the available safety technology.  The trial court effectively ruled as a matter of law that [...] had no duty to provide that safety technology as standard equipment.  That conclusion was based not on the absence of available and reasonable alternative technology but on the notion that the driver of the CR-V had a duty to keep her vehicle in her lane of travel.  In reaching its conclusion, the court substituted its judgment for the judgment of the jury, who by constitution and caselaw is the arbiter of disputed facts.  The evidence before the court on summary judgment showed that defendant [...] had developed needed accident-avoidance safety systems over a decade before the crash that, if installed in the CR-V, would have alerted the driver and mechanically redirected the CR-V back into its lane of travel, avoiding this collision.  [...]’s documents prove that its engineers perfected those safety features, included it in some of its vehicles marketed in Japan, Europe, and the United States, but chose not to include it as standard equipment in the 2016 model CR-V.  The systems were available in other CR-V models or at an additional cost.  The technological and economic feasibility of the alternative safer design at the time of marketing the vehicle is undisputed.  The failure to incorporate that design in the 2016 CR-V sold to the [...] resulted in the marketing of a defectively designed product.  Defendant’s published admissions prove the technological feasibility, availability and functionality of the safety features that should have been included but were not included in the CR-V that defendant sold to [...].
[brief] **FACTOR 6 – CONTINUING RELATIONSHIP**  1.  Petitioner testified she has been the municipal prosecutor for the past 20 years except for 2008.  (T9-20)  2.  [...] notes in her report that the parties are in a continuing relationship.  (Pa95)  3.  Due to statutory requirements, a municipal prosecutor must be reappointed each year.  [...] indicated in her report that she felt Petitioner met the definition of independent contractor due to the 2009 to 2014 RFP process.  (Pa95)  4.  However, in [...]’s report she conceded there was no RFP process from 2015 to the present and testified the Petitioner was taken out of PERS at the direction of the Division in 2009.  (T164-9)
[brief] ³  Though the Department of Children and Families (DCF or Department) concurrently investigated a September 9, 2022 complaint alleging that [...] discriminated against two of its employees based on their sex and gender, that complaint was not substantiated and is not part of this appeal.  (Aa1; Aa19-20; Aa25; Aa36).  [...] is a New Jersey Department of Labor and Workforce Development (NJDOL) employee; [...] is also a transgender female.  (Aa19).  [...] is a DCF employee.  (Aa19; Aa26).  On or around September 14, 2022, [...] filed a complaint with DCF’s Office of Equal Opportunity/Affirmative Action against [...] (Aa19-20; Aa25-26).  At the time, [...] was President of his ¹
[brief] When, as here, the identity of the perpetrator is a “key issue” and “the major, if not the sole, thrust of the defense,” the defendant has a “right to expect that the appropriate guidelines” on the “identification question … w[ill] be given. ”  Green, 86 N.J. at 291-92.  A trial court has a “mandatory duty” to instruct the jury on such “control[ling] legal principles,” especially in “a criminal case when a person’s liberty is at stake.
[directive] On an annual basis, each agency shall publish on its public website a report to the public summarizing the allegations received and the investigations concluded for that period.  These reports shall not contain the identities of officers or complainants.  (o)  On a periodic basis, and at least once a year, each agency shall submit to the County Prosecutor and publish on the agency’s public website a brief synopsis of all complaints where a fine or suspension of 10 days or more was assessed to an agency member.  The synopsis shall not contain the identities of the officers or complainants.  Training (p)
[brief] The Union agrees with the Authority that *Linden* compels a clear result in the instant case: that the Arbitrator was not acting with undue means by defining an ambiguous term in the CNA, and that his award is entitled to confirmation.  Similarly, in *Mobil Oil Corp. v. Independent Oil Workers Union*, 679 F.2d 299 (3rd Cir. 1982), deferred to an arbitrator’s definition of just cause where the applicable CBA did not provide one.
[directive] Crime victims shall receive assistance in submitting a written statement to a representative of the county prosecutor's office about the impact of the crime prior to the prosecutor's final decision concerning whether formal charges will be filed.  I.  When appropriate, the views of victims of violent crime should be brought to the attention of the court on bail decisions, continuances, plea agreements, dismissals, sentencing and restitution.  Practices should be established that promote opportunities for victims to make their views on these matters readily known.  COMMENTARY
[brief] Plaintiff’s experts did not identify any standard of care that they claim the [...] violated in connection with the driveway.  Pa252 at 30:19-33:16; Pa255 at 42:8-:18; Pa272-73 at 41:21-45:17.  Plaintiff offered no evidence that the [...] violated any ordinance or code regarding their driveway.  Pa252 at 31:4-  Indeed, neither expert even reviewed [...] municipal code on curbing.  Pa252 at 32:14-16; Pa266 at 14:8-14.  [...], plaintiff’s surveyor, admitted that the slope of the [...]’ driveway as it runs from the [...]’ house toward plaintiff’s property actually decreased after the [...] had it paved.  Pa12, ¶ 68; Pa332, ¶ 68.  Likewise, the downward slope of the [...]’ front lawn was shallower in 2023, when he surveyed the property, than in 2018, when it was previously surveyed.  Pa53, ¶¶ 72-74; Pa332, ¶¶ 72-74.  The three- to four-foot drop between the [...]’ property and plaintiff’s property existed in 2018, and [...] agreed that the [...] did not cause that drop in height.