[brief] A review of the adopted Substitute Assembly Bill No. 1788, which contains essentially a “redline” of the edited Act, reveals that the first and third sentence of the original became Subsection (a).  Subsection (b), which we will focus on, was partly formed out of the original’s second sentence.  Like the original, N.J.S.A. 48:12-152(b)(5) (hereafter, (b)(4)), bars recovery for trespass, phrased as “the conduct prohibited by Subsection (a), i.e., coming into the railroad’s right of way or into contact with the railroad’s “equipment, machinery, wires or rolling stock” not at a crossing or not intended for passenger use.  For Subsection (b)(5), the obvious intent was to maintain the immunity against the claims of “[a]ny person injured by an engine or car while walking, standing or playing on a railroad or by jumping on or off a car while in motion” from the prior version of the Act.  Without Subsection (b)(5), railroads may face liability for that always impermissible conduct because of the newly added language within Subsection (a) permitting a passenger for hire to utilize parts of the railroad intended for passenger use.  Compare N.J.S.A. 48:12-152 (1937); with N.J.S.A. 48:12-152 (1998).  “Property” within Subsection (b)(5) is intended to refer to the list contained in Subsection (a) and repeated in Subsection (b): “equipment, machinery, wires or rolling stock of any railroad. ”  N.J.S.A. 48:12-152 (1998).  This is the “property” that may be misused, for which the Legislature intended to immunize the railroads even if that property were intended for passenger use.  The statute’s language supports this more limited interpretation, where the Legislature has even copied over one of the original examples of misuse: “jumping on or off a car while in motion[,]” now “attempting to board or disembark from a moving train[.]”  N.J.S.A. 48:12-152 (1937); and (b)(5) (1998).  If property included the crossing itself, there would be no actual need for Subsection (b)(5) at all.  Subsection (a) provides only one exception to its prohibition on entering a railroad’s right of way or making contact with enumerated railroad property – “using a crossing established by the railroad[.]”  N.J.S.A. 48:12-152(a).  A claimant misusing the crosswalk area at the time they were struck, by doing a gymnastics routine for example, would not be “using a crossing” in any meaningful sense.  *Ibid.*  Thus, the claimant would have engaged in conduct prohibited by Subsection (a) and therefore barred from recovery by Subsection (b)(4).  Interpretation of Subsection (b) that limits Subsection (b)(5) to misuse of tangible railroad property gives the provision purpose, comporting with the axiom “that courts ‘must avoid an interpretation that renders words in a statute surplusage. ’”  *Johnson & Johnson v. Director, Div. of Taxation*, 244 N.J. 413, 422 (2020) (quoting *Shelton v. Restaurant.com, Inc.*, 214 N.J. 419, 440 (2013)).  Last, interpreting (b)(5) to expand the immunities of the Act in this vague manner contradicts the manner in the Legislature’s other 1998 amendments to the Act.  It included three new immunities, barring recovery for injury resulting from (b)(1) (alcohol intoxication); (b)(2) (drug intoxication); and (b)(3) (intended self-harm).  Clearly where the Legislature intended to expand the Act, it did so by express enumeration.  If the Legislature wanted to limit the crossing exception or expand the concept of misuse, it could and would have done so expressly.  As our Supreme Court has noted in this very context, we should not “encroach upon a field where the Legislature has spoken. ”  *Egan v. Erie R.R. Co.*, 29 N.J. 243, 247-48 (1959).  This is particularly true when since the Act’s inception, contributory negligence has not attached where a railroad operator failed to avoid a collision.  POINT II: