ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Defendant is, once again, mistaken.  First, it was not a subjective opinion that defendant threatened [...], it was a fact.  It was not “interpretation” to say that defendant’s multiple statements about “don’t offend the wrong one” and “Doug got killed recently.  His own brother shot him in the head.  Google Piscataway shooting.  Something to ponder upon,” were threats.  (25T:31-17 to 43-20).  It is also a fact that hitting someone hard enough to knock them over, (25T:34-17 to 21), is an assault.  These are not opinions [...] divined from the ether or his own subjective interpretation.  Moreover, [...] personally observed and found those threats through his investigation, making him a competent witness to present these pieces of evidence as he was the one who rationally perceived them.  As for characterizing the statements as “confrontational” or defusing\”keeping the peace,” these were rationally based on [...]’s perception.  Regardless, these fleeting words in a case with over 30 witnesses, in a days-long testimony presentation by the witness in question, are not capable of producing an unjust result.
[brief] In prevailing on its punitive damages claims, Plaintiffs demonstrated that [[...]] knew their actions would deprive Plaintiffs of significant assets and did so for a number of years.  They took great pains to conceal this deprivation through withholding financial information, and fraudulent charges for payroll, loans, insurance and management fees.  (223T88:19-103:2 (recounting the various types of improper payments [[...]] made to themselves); 233T87:18-88:19 (describing use of partnership as a “piggy bank” and [[...]]’ refusal to produce financial information to Plaintiffs).)  This same evidence was necessary for Plaintiffs to establish their RICO claims.  To prove that [[...]] committed the predicate acts of theft, they needed to demonstrate that [[...]] purposefully deprived Plaintiffs of their rightful payments from the partnership -- i.e. that it was their conscious object to deprive the Plaintiffs of money owed to them.  See N.J.S.A. 2C:20-3; N.J.S.A. 2C:20-4; N.J.S.A. 2C:20-9; N.J.S.A. 2C:2-2(b)(1).  Therefore, by proving that [[...]] acted purposefully to establish the requisite mens rea for the predicate acts of the RICO claims, Plaintiffs also established the relevant criteria for punitive damages (acting with actual malice or wanton and willful disregard of Plaintiffs’ rights for a prolonged period of time and with the intent to conceal its actions) and vice versa.  This “common core of facts” demonstrates that these claims are related, and therefore work on Plaintiffs’ punitive damages claims is compensable.
[brief] [...] also argues the trial court erred in its application of N.J.A.C. 14:5-7.1, which provides that whenever a public utility, like [...], constructs an overhead transmission line, it shall “[m]ake use of available railroad or other rights-of-way whenever practicable, feasible and with safety, subject to agreement with the owners[.]” (Db44).  [...] claims the trial court ignored the language requiring “agreement with the owners. ” (Db44).  The trial court found in line with the New Jersey Supreme Court in In re [...] that the municipal consent requirement to use public streets for the construction of overhead lines under N.J.S.A. 48:7-1 does not apply to high-capacity transmission power lines which provide electricity to multiple jurisdictions.  See In re [...], 35 N.J. at 373.  Accordingly, [...]’s consent is not required.³  ³  Alternatively, [...] consented to utility poles per its agreement with [...]’s predecessor over a century ago in 1892.  See N.J.S.A. 48:7-1.  Likewise, pursuant to Finally, [...] claims that the trial court erred in its interpretation and application of N.J.A.C. 14:3-8.5(d).  (Db44-45).  [...] posits that this regulation, concerning cost, only applies to extensions as defined in N.J.A.C. 14:3-8.2, and is inapplicable to this case.  (Db44).  Once again, this argument was not raised below by [...], but could have been asserted.  Likewise, as set forth above, the question of concerning the cost of extensions is irrelevant to the determination of whether [...] had the power to enact the Ordinance.  Accordingly, this Court should affirm the Opinion and Order.
[brief] If grantors intend to create easements for the benefit of others, they can, and should, do so through a transaction directly between them and the benefitted party, documented by an instrument suitable for recording in the grantee’s chain of title.  Even if the minority view is adopted, the grantors’ intent was not clear enough, in this case, to find an express easement in [...]’s favor.  And even if it was, [...] is barred by the *res judicata*, collateral estoppel and the entire controversy doctrine from pursuing that claim.  The judgment of the Chancery Division should be reversed and summary judgment entered in favor of [...] dismissing the complaint.
[brief] --- 6  The court does not take this step lightly.  Nearly forty years ago, [...] said in Ford v. Weisman, 188 N.J. Super. 614, 619 (App. Div. 1983) that, until the suit ends, a trial court "has complete power over its interlocutory orders and may revise them when it would be consonant with the interests of justice to do so."
[brief] ”  (Id.).  The Appellate Division, in its March 23, 2021 opinion in the first legal fee appeal, cited the Administrator’s finding that Plaintiff had “maintained a remarkably obstinate and impractical approach to the many efforts made by [him] to reach a consensual and amicable resolution of the numerous . . . issues”; that “plaintiff never provided him with any hard evidence of additional New Jersey assets belonging to the estate or other gifts made by decedent to defendant”; that “plaintiff could have inquired into these matters himself before he moved for summary judgment in 2014”; that “plaintiff appeared to want to turn this ancillary proceeding into a never-ending ‘circular chase to prove a construct/thesis of his own creation so that he can continue to strategically exert pressure on his family and stepmother in the probate proceedings pending in the Republic of Korea’”; and that “plaintiff failed to take into consideration the substantial costs the estate would incur if the investigation were to continue. ” (Ibid., Da241-243).  I.  The Trial Court’s Rulings on the Remand Of the Legal Fee Award
[brief] *Hunstein II* vacated *Hunstein I* to consider the jurisdictional question following a U.S. Supreme Court decision on standing which was issued shortly after *Hunstein I*.  After concluding the plaintiff still had standing, *Hunstein II* repeated verbatim its decision in *Hunstein I* as to the sufficiency of the complaint to state a claim.  Subsequently, *Hunstein II* was vacated for rehearing *en banc*.  *Hunstein v. [...]*, 17 F.4th 1103 (11th Cir. 2021).  The Eleventh Circuit’s *en banc* decision concluded there was no subject matter jurisdiction without undermining the panel decisions that the complaint stated a claim for violation of § 1692c(b).  *Hunstein v. [...]*, 48 F.4th 1236 (11th Cir. 2022).  Where a decision is vacated on other grounds, its undisturbed decision remains as precedential authority.  *Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp.*, 870 F.2d 1292, 1298 (7th Cir. 1989) explained:  [T]he Supreme Court vacated the Federal Circuit’s decision on the ground that it was inappropriate for the Federal Circuit, in the interests of justice, to decide the merits of a case over which it did not have jurisdiction.  Nevertheless, there is no indication that the Supreme Court found any error in the Federal Circuit’s decision.  Thus, although vacated, the decision stands as the most comprehensive source of guidance available on the patent law questions at issue in this case.  See also Action All. of Senior Citizens v. Sullivan, 930 F.2d 77, 83 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (“Although the Supreme Court vacated our prior opinion, […] it expressed no opinion on the merit of these holdings.  They therefore continue to have precedential weight, and in the absence of contrary authority, we do not disturb them. ”); United States v. Adewani, 467 F.3d 1340, 1342 (D.C. Cir. 2006); United States ex rel. Espinoza v. Fairman, 813 F.2d 117, 125 n.7 (7th Cir. 1987) and Cty. of L.A. v. Davis, 440 U.S. 625, 646 n.10 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting).  Thus, although Hunstein I and II are not binding, they remain as precedential authority with respect to the sufficiency of the mail vendor claim.
[brief] Dated: June 24, 2024  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION  DOCKET NO.: [...]  On Appeal from: SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY CHANCERY DIVISION: BERGEN COUNTY GENERAL EQUITY PART DOCKET NO. [...]  Civil Action  Sat Below: Hon. [...], P.J.Ch. REVISED  BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF/RESPONDENT, [...], IN OPPOSITION TO APPEAL OF DEFENDANT/APPELLANT, [...]
[brief] All parties effectively conceded below that Plaintiffs and other customers of the mall were entitled to seek relief from any violation of Article 3 as intended beneficiaries of the obligation to remove snow and ice.  The arguments they raised was that Article 3 did not impose any such duty on them.  But no one claimed that Plaintiffs could not seek relief for violation of such an obligation.  The cases cited by [...] concerning “privity” and lack of intended third-party beneficiary pertain to cases in which an injured person has sought the tortfeasor’s insurance company.  These cases have nothing to do with a case in which an injured party sues a defendant directly for the defendant’s failure to abide by a safety requirement in a lease.  Plainly New Jersey case law allows a direct claim based on such a contract provision, based on both contractual and common law.  See, e. g., Kandrac v. Marrazzo’s Market at Robbinsville, 429 N.J. 79 (App. Div. 2012) (resolving a plaintiff’s claim against a tenant by reference to the terms of the lease, and specifically whether the tenant had assumed any duty for snow and ice maintenance).  Indeed, as Kandrac and Nielsen v. Walmart Store #2, 2171, 429 N.J.Super. 251, 260 (App. Div. 2013) make clear, the existence of a contractual duty is a significant factor in weighing the scope of the overall duty owned by the tenant to a customer.  D.
[brief] ”  That the sale to [...] was a time earlier on the same day as the motion filed, is of no effect.  The “day” of the event constitutes a full twenty-four hours.  See Fiduccia v. Intercont. Restaurant, 310 N. J. Super 52 (App. Div 1998) and statutory construction as to the “next business day” application in Mercer County Park Commission v. DiTullio, 139 N. J Super 36 (App Div. 1976), cert den. 70 N.J. 276 (1976).
[brief] Rule 4:6-2(e) provides that a defendant may move to dismiss a complaint for “failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. ”  R. 4:6-2(e).  On appeal, this Court may conduct a plenary review from the lower court’s decision to grant Defendants’ motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 4:6–2(e).  *Sickles v. Cabot Corp.*, 379 N.J. Super. 100, 106 (App. Div. 2005), certif. denied, 185 N.J. 297 (2005).  However, it is well settled that a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 4:6-2(e) must be granted if a “generous reading of the allegations does not reveal a legal basis for recovery. ”  *Edwards v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Co.*, 357 N.J. Super. 196, 202 (App. Div. 2003).  A court must dismiss a plaintiff’s complaint if it has failed to articulate a legal basis entitling plaintiff to relief.  *Camden County* Energy Recovery Assocs., L.P. v. New Jersey Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 320 N.J. Super. 59, 64 (App. Div. 1999); see Printing Mart-Morristown v. Sharp Electronics Corp., 116 N.J. 739, 771-72 (1989) (setting forth standard for motions to dismiss); see, e.g., Sickles, 379 N.J. Super. at 105–06 (motion to dismiss “must be evaluated in light of the legal sufficiency of the facts alleged in the complaint”); Donato v. Moldow, 374 N.J. Super. 475, 482 (App. Div. 2005) (same).  “If the complaint states no basis for relief and discovery would not provide [the claimant with a basis for relief], dismissal is the appropriate remedy. ”  Banco Popular North America v. Gandi, 184 N.J. 161, 166 (2005).  Because Plaintiffs cannot assert a claim against Defendants as a matter of law, this Court should affirm the Superior Court’s dismissal with prejudice.  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I THE MSRA EXPLICITLY AUTHORIZES THE UNILATERAL TERMINATION OF CONTRACTS AND THE SUPERIOR COURT CORRECTLY FOUND THAT PLAINTIFFS FAIL TO ALLEGE ANY ACTIONABLE CONDUCT (Pa17-29).
[brief] THE COURT BELOW PROPERLY FOUND THAT ALL CLAIMS AGAINST THE ESTATE OF ARTHUR PUGLIA ARE BARRED BY THE ENTIRE CONTROVERSY DOCTRINE (23a-24a)  [...] filed a counterclaim against Brian and [...] in the Law Division action, alleging that they wrongfully contaminated the Property.  21a-22a; Da93-Da96.  Inexplicably, they failed to assert any claim against [...] or the Estate of [...] based upon [...] supposedly having had knowledge of the wrongful conduct, yet having done nothing about it.
[brief] Finally, there is no merit to [...]’ argument that the ALJ should have drawn an adverse inference against the Department because, although the Department called [...] to testify, it did not question [...] about the events of August 16, 2019.  (Ab20).  [...] provides no citations to the record for this contention nor is it clear what specific inference [...] is seeking.  Nonetheless, the ALJ’s properly concluded that an adverse inference was inappropriate in this matter.  (Pa020a).  [...]’s testimony showed that [...] only conducted inmate counts only when the responsible officer, including [...], was on break.  Ibid.  [...] also failed to satisfy the prongs required for an adverse inference charge.  When evaluating if an adverse inference charge should be given, a court must demonstrate that it has taken into consideration all relevant circumstances by placing, on the record, findings on each of the following: (1) that the uncalled witness is peculiarly within the control or power of only the one party, or that there is a special relationship between the party and the witness or the party has superior knowledge of the identity of the witness or of the testimony the witness might be expected to give; (2) that the witness is available to that party both practically and physically; (3) that the testimony of the uncalled witness will elucidate relevant and critical facts in issue[;] and (4) that such testimony appears to be superior to that already utilized in respect to the fact to be proven.  State v. Hill, 199 N.J. 545, 561-62 (2009).  In this matter, [...] testified.  The Department called him to the stand and so [...] is not an uncalled witness.  If [...] had any questions regarding [...]’s involvement on August 16, 2019, his counsel had the opportunity to ask during his cross-examination.  In addition, [...]’s testimony would not be superior to the remaining testimony presented by the Department.  As the ALJ noted, the issue here is not whether [...] might have performed counts during [...]’ break; rather it is whether [...] “actually conducted the counts he wrote in his logbook for 2:00 a.m., 2:30 a.m., 3:00 a.m., 3:30 a.m., 4:00 a.m., and 4:30 a.m. ” (Pa020a).  Thus, [...]’s testimony would be wholly irrelevant.  Because [...] was not an uncalled witness and his testimony was not superior to testimony provided by the Department, no adverse inference should have been drawn.  As the ALJ explained, this is merely an attempt to “to obfuscate the issue of [A]ppellant’s culpability by introducing an issue of negative inferences. ”  Ibid.  When issuing the Final Agency Decision, the Commission reviewed the record, including the findings and facts and conclusions of law made by the ALJ, as well as the specific concerns pointed out in [...]’ exceptions.
[brief] (2T Pg. 6, Ln. 12-17).  First, the Defendant argued that all of the summonses should be dismissed because the ordinances were not in effect at the time of issuance.  (2T Pg. 6, Ln. 12-17).  The second issue was regarding summonses [...] and [...].  (2T Pg. 7, Ln. 12-16).  The Defendant argued that the penalty provision in all six summonses has a maximum penalty of $1,000.00.  (2T Pg. 8, Ln. 4).  The Defendant argued that the [...] was limited to a maximum penalty of $500.00.  (2T Pg. 8, Ln. 4-6).  The Defendant also argued that the ordinances were vague.  The Municipal Court denied the motion to dismiss on July 14, 2022.
[brief] Kirby --- 7  On August 2, 2019, [...], an [...] Board member and attorney wrote to counsel for the [...]:  “[...] demands that your client cease and desist from accessing the [...] property on or about the area in question or otherwise.  Additionally, violations of [...]’s rights in this regard will be considered acts of trespass and will be dealt with accordingly. ”  (Da543).  testified he was the only witness to the allegations stated in his criminal complaint.  (Pa317-Pa320).  The handwritten criminal complaint averred:  Block 1, Lot 1 is the beach in Normandy Beach, owned by the [...] on behalf of its members.  After the dune replenishment project, two Boards representing membership voted to keep the dunes from residents crossing over the property.  They can use 8 public street entrances.  [...] placed fencing and continuously walks over the property.  The [...] sent an NOV to us to remove the fence.  We did but [...] broke through our beach fence and crosses our property against our wishes.
[brief] SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE  DIVISION  DOCKET NO.: [...]  ON APPEAL FROM: SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY LAW  DIVISION  MONMOUTH COUNTY  Docket No. Below: [...]  Sat Below: Hon. [...], J.S.C. Hon. [...], J.S.C. Hon. [...], J.S.C.  BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS/RESPONDENTS
[brief] \(^{22}\)  Point II.A was partially raised below by defense counsel’s attempt during cross-examination to impeach [...]’s partial identification, though counsel did not cite the correct rule.  (9T 70-12 to 72-16)  It is unclear whether counsel sought redactions beyond references to [...]’s prior police encounters, as such discussions were evidently held off the record prior to playing his statement.  (8T 32-16 to 35-14)  That said, each error was plain error.  R. 2:10-2.  Even if [...]’s entire statement was not inadmissible, the trial court still erred by permitting the jury to hear several inadmissible portions of it.  First, the court violated his confrontation rights by failing to redact the detectives’ claims that a non-testifying eyewitness identified him and by preventing defense counsel from cross-examining those claims.  Second, the court permitted the jury to hear his multiple invocations of his right to silence, on which the prosecutor impermissibly commented.  Third, the court failed to redact the detectives’ improper lay opinions on the ultimate issue of his guilt.
[brief] ..................................................................  12  Jablonski v. Ford Motor Co., 955 N.E.2d 1138 (Ill. 2011) ......................................................................  10  Javens v. GE Healthcare, Inc., 2020 WL 2783581 (Mag. D. Del. May 29, 2020), adopted, 2020 WL 7051642 (D. Del. June 18, 2020)  ...............................................  25 Jones v. Bowie Industries, Inc., 282 P.3d 316 (Alaska 2012) ..................................................................
[brief] ”  Bosland v. Warnock Dodge, Inc., 197 N.J. 543, 557 (2009) (citations omitted).  A consumer who can prove these elements “is entitled to legal and/or equitable relief, treble damages, and reasonable attorneys’ fees. ”  Lee v. Carter-Reed Co., LLC, 203 N.J. 496, 521 (2010) (citing N.J.S.A. 56:8-19).
[brief] (3T6-22 to3T7-21). \(^{15}\)  Simply put, Tenant’s contention that it is entitled to the 2020 and 2021 Tenant Allowance payments in the form of an “offset” despite the fact that it was admittedly in monetary default under when these payments came due is belied by the express terms of the Lease, which must be enforced as written by this Court.
[brief] \(^2\) *Vastano*, 178 N.J. at 242.  Here, the AG Notice was thorough, \(^2\)  We make no finding that Defendant [...] was, in fact, negligent and in fact deny same.  However, we assume negligence solely for the purpose of our analysis in this brief.  as it specifically set forth the following information as to [...]’ registration/charitable status: (1) [...] was not registered with the CRI; (2) pursuant to various New Jersey laws, regulations and statutes, a charitable organization, unless exempt, must file a registration annually; (3) the failure to satisfy [...]’ registration with the CRI may result in further action by the Division of Consumer Affairs; (4) that until registration requirements were met, [...], was not properly registered as a charity with the State of New Jersey.  (Pa 38).  The Appellants initiated the within action on August 28, 2023, wherein they allege that [...] retained [...] in the Fall of 2008 to assist her in creating a charitable not for profit entity, “[...], Inc. ”.  (Pa 1).  However, as the Trial Court correctly determined, the Appellants were aware of a potential cause of action no later than March 25, 2014.  (T1).  Specifically, the Trial Court determined that when [...] received the AG Notice, certified mail return receipt requested, she “became aware that her organization was not registered or may not have been registered as a charitable organization” and further, “was aware or should have become aware….of defendant’s legal malpractice”.  (T1: 13:1-14).  Further, the Trial Court unequivocally found that the AG Notice “specifically indicates that failure to satisfy the registration may result in further actions by the division[]” and “[a]t this moment, the use of reasonable diligence [Appellant] should have or could have discovered facts essential to the malpractice claim.  (T1 14:16-16:14).  Therefore, the Trial Court correctly determined that the Appellants’ Amended Complaint against [...] is time barred by the applicable six-year Statute of Limitations.
[directive] If the officer has invoked their Miranda rights but the agency deems that it must have the answers to specific questions to properly conduct its investigation, the agency must contact the County Prosecutor to request use immunity for the interview to continue.  This contact should be made timely so that the County Prosecutor can review all relevant reports and have a full briefing prior to determining whether to grant use immunity.  Use immunity provides that anything the officer says under the grant of immunity, and any evidence derived from their statements, cannot be used against him or her in a criminal proceeding (except for perjury or false swearing if the information is not truthful).  But use immunity does not eliminate the possibility that the subject officer will be prosecuted.  A criminal prosecution may proceed even though the target or defendant has received use immunity.  8.2.6
[brief] During argument Defendant’s attorney made two concessions.  (Da9-10, Da15-16)  First, Defendant did not “contest the first estoppel certificate was unacceptable”.  (T24-4-6.)  Second, “[f]rom defendant’s perspective, we don’t read the provision as ambiguous and, therefore, I didn’t make such an argument.  I don’t think I could make a good faith argument that the provision is ambiguous.  I think it’s very clear. ”  (T30-21-25.)  Also, although the record was devoid of any response to Plaintiff’s counsel’s letter of July 1, let alone one that construed the PSA as being argued in opposition to the summary judgment motion, Defendant was invited to supplement the record and never did.  (T41-47.)  On June 27, 2024, [...] issued his decision.