ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] ”  *Association of Data Processing Service Organizations v. Camp*, 397 U.S. 150, 152, 153, (1970).  As part of the “injury in fact” requirement, plaintiff must demonstrate a personal harm that would be eliminated if plaintiff's claim were accepted.  See *Linda R.S. v. Richard D.*, 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973); *Warth v. Seldin*, 422 U.S. 490 (1975).  To have standing, a plaintiff must have suffered, or may presently suffer, a direct impairment of his own constitutional rights.
[brief] ”  “First, a court considers the ‘conduct prong,’ examining the employer’s conduct in the setting of the particular case.  Second, a court analyzes the ‘context prong,’ considering whether the resulting injury or disease, and the circumstances in which it is inflicted on the worker, may fairly be viewed as a fact of life of industrial employment, or whether it is plainly beyond anything the Legislature could have contemplated as entitling the employee to recover only under the [WCA].”  Id. at 461; see Millison, supra, 101 N.J. at 178-79.  New Jersey courts have sought to define the conduct prong in a number of different cases.
[brief] ”  Harrison Riverside Ltd. P'ship v. Eagle Affiliates, Inc., 309 N.J. Super. 470, 473 (App. Div. 1998).  Accord Borough of Fort Lee v. Banque Nat'l de Paris, 311 N.J. Super. 280, 292 (App. Div. 1998); McGuire v. City of Jersey City, 125 N.J. 310, 320–21 (1991).
[brief] Ridge at Back Brok, LLC v. Klenert, 437 N.J. Super. 90, 97 n4 (App. Div. 2014)(stating “[w]here the appeal is untimely, [we lack] jurisdiction to decide the merits of the appeal”).  Here, the Decision and Judgment were issued by the trial court on November 1, 2024, meaning that the County had forty-five (45) days (until December 16, 2024) to file a Notice of Appeal appealing same.  Rule 2:4-1(a).  Moreover, on November 1, 2024, [...] filed its Notice of Appeal in this matter, providing the County fifteen (15) days (until November 16, 2024), to file a Notice of Cross-Appeal.  Rule 2:4-2.  In blatant violation of the Court Rules, the County filed a “Respondent’s Brief” which challenges the trial court’s Decision and Judgment.  Because the County’s arguments are not supported by a Notice of Appeal or Notice of Cross-Appeal, the Court lacks jurisdiction to consider same.
[brief] In holding that the Board’s actions were arbitrary and capricious, [...] stated that:  •  He had “never read a Transcript like this before.  This Court’s review of the proceedings of this matter were particularly difficult to follow.  The lack of adherence to proper procedure and the continual cross talk and lack of attention by board members to others’ opinions, attempted to be expressed.  During the deliberations in particular, made it particularly difficult for this Court to follow. ”  (4T:15:4-13)  •  “The Court appreciates the time and purported effort that the Board took in considering the issues in this case.  However, what is overwhelmingly apparent is that more time was consumed in modifying the numbers and without a basis to do so.  Percentage reductions, modifications of existing numbers and divisions by half of expenses articulated without any additional support represents the arbitrariness for which this Court is critical. ”  (4T:16:14-22)  •  “It is clear that the Board was motivated by personal feelings rather than consideration of the merits of this matter. ”  (4T:17:13-15)  B.  The Second Set of Hearings Leading to the Second Remand
[directive] If complaint- a issue to declines application reviewing the officer court other or judge the and facilitate to acomplaint-summons, of issuance the directs or issues instead but warrant general attorney deputy prosecutor or assistant the or officer the system the of evaluation on a denial the of circumstances the document shall 3.2 Section with accordance in consulted Justice.  Criminal of Division the of Director the by prescribed be may manner as a in and form the to sent be shall reports these means, electronic automatically by transmitted is report a Unless (ongoing 15 Section also See basis. monthly than a less not on Justice Criminal of Division impact).
[directive] 7.4.2, and 4.5.1, subsections e.~., See, required.  when court in appear to fail or released, if activity criminal provide to Directive this in used are PSA a by generated numeric scores the of descriptions ordinal-ranking  Those that decisions enforcement/prosecution law informs PSA the how of understanding general a prosecutors and police and warrant, complaint or complaint-summons by charge to whether (i.e., Directive this to pursuant made are not are results numeric score of characterizations release).
[brief] “To judge a threat to another, in the robbery context, in technical terms of tense, syntax or grammar would allow too much leeway to an artful and articulate robber.  The threat, in the totality of the circumstances presented, should be judged by a trier of fact. ”  *Id.* at 196.  “Robbery is elevated to a crime of the first degree when the defendant is armed with, or uses or threatens the immediate use of a deadly weapon. ”  *State v. Chapland*, 187 N.J. 275, 283 (2006).
[brief] [...], [...], [...], [...], and [...].  Of the approximately $19 million in damages sought by [...] at the trial, the court determined that [...]’s covered costs (i.e., costs not subject to any exclusion) were approximately $12 million.  The court also identified the dates that contamination purportedly began based on operations at a number of different locations on the Site.  But, the court did not determine the end-date of that contamination, which is critical to allocating [...]’s damages across the full time period implicated by the contamination.  Thus, in order to calculate the allocation of damages, an end-date to the allocation period had to be established.  The process of allocating these costs across the period when “property damage” occurred was bifurcated for a separate allocation phase of the case.
[directive] Person Making Report Preferred?  Full Name Phone □ _______________________________________________________  _______________________________________________________  Address Email □ _______________________________________________________  _______________________________________________________  City, State DOB _______________________________________________________  ______________________________________________________________  (Provide Whatever Info Is Known)  Officer(s)  Subject to Allegation  Officer(s)  Badge No.  ____________________________________________________  _______________________________________________________  Incident Site Date/Time ____________________________________________________  _______________________________________________________  In the space below, describe the type of incident (traffic stop, street encounter) and any information about the alleged conduct.  If you cannot fit your response below, feel free to use extra pages and attach them to this document.  If you do not know the officer’s name or badge number, provide any other identifying information.  Other Information
[brief] It is estimated that the deepest portion of the pothole approximates 18-inches long by 12-inches wide by a minimum of 2-inches deep (the depth of the surface course).  (Pa 609).  As [...], P.E. noted in her report, a depression in the ground the size of that pothole would have posed a danger not only to the Plaintiff but to drivers and emergency personnel.  (Pa 313: report of [...].)  Therefore, the pothole constituted a dangerous condition.
[brief] The Trial Court Improperly Altered the Instructions As Set Forth In Davis v. Devereaux.  (11T169:12-19)  In its earlier opinion in this case, this Court cited the Davis case, supra, at 303, and stated "[a]s our Supreme Court Supreme Court recognized in Davis, '[w]hen the employee's conduct - however aggressive or misguided - originated in [an] effort to fulfill an assigned task, the act has been held to be within the scope of employment. ”  (Pa28).  But the trial judge here changed that language around at the request of [...], substituting “intentional or wrongful” for “aggressive or misguided” so as to accommodate [...] request and sidelining plaintiff’s version.  (11T169:12-19).  In arguing that the “aggressive or misguided” language should be replaced with something else, counsel for [...] revisited his erroneous self-defense argument and stated “I think there’s an issue there because plaintiff can only recover his negligence claim if [...] was using self-defense improperly. ” (10T62:14-25).  Plaintiff’s counsel argued that the “aggressive and misguided” language should remain because that was the language used in this Court’s opinion, and in Davis.  (10T63:20-64:15).  The trial judge went with [...] version of that part of the instruction too, leaving out “aggressive and misguided,” which is the law as set forth in the cases.  2.
[brief] TABLE OF CONTENTS  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES  ........................................................................................................ ii  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS ...................................................... vi  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT .................................................................................................  1  PROCEDURAL HISTORY .......................................................................................................  2 STATEMENT OF FACTS .........................................................................................................  4 LEGAL ARGUMENT ...............................................................................................................  5 POINT I.  THE STANDARD OF REVIEW (Raised Below T1; T2) ......................... 5 POINT II.  THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN EMPLOYING AN EQUITABLE DOCTRINE TO BAR [...]’S REQUESTED RELIEF DESPITE FINDING THAT [...] DID NOT ACT IN GOOD FAITH (Raised Below: T2) .........................  7 POINT III.  THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING [...]’S MOTION  BECAUSE [...] VIOLATED A REMEDIAL CONSUMER PROTECTION STATUTE TO OBTAIN THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT (Raised Below: T1; T2) ......................... 11 CONCLUSION .........................................................................................................................
[directive] Causing Death or Injury While Driving with a Suspended License or Without a License • N.J.SA 2C:40-26-  Operating a Motor Vehicle During Period of Suspension • N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6.4d-  Violation of Community Supervision for Life/Parole Supervision for Life • N.J.S.A. 2C:41-2-  Racketeering • N.J.S. 30:4-123.94-  Non-Compliance with Sex Offender Monitoring • N.J.S. 54:52-18-  Possession of Goods (Including Cigarettes) without Paying Tax  2.
[brief] To begin with, this Court had at least twice before held that conclusory allegations of actual malice are insufficient to survive a motion to dismiss.  See Newton v. Newark Star-Ledger, No. A-3819-11T3, 2014 WL 3928500, at *1, 4 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Aug. 13, 2014) (allegations, “without any supporting facts,” that the defendant “purposely authored and published false statements” in “reckless disregard for [their] veracity[] and truthfulness” were insufficient to plead actual malice); Darakjian v. Hanna, 366 N.J. Super. 238, 250-51 (App. Div. 2004) (granting pre-answer motion to dismiss for failure to plead actual malice in a non-conclusory fashion).
[directive] Upon request, prior the or current employing agency shall share the officer's EW System review process files with the subsequent employing agency.  H.  Notification to Prosecutor County  Upon initiation of the System EW review process, the agency's chief executive or a designee shall make confidential a written notification to the County Prosecutor or his/her designee of the identity of the subject officer, the of nature the triggering performance indicators, and the planned remedial program.  Upon completion of the EW System review process, the agency's chief executive shall make confidential a written notification to the County Prosecutor or his/her designee of the outcome of EW the System review, including any remedial measures taken behalf on of the subject officer.
[brief] The documents Plaintiffs cite here suggest she does not.  Instead, they again show that [...] wields her influence through collaboration with teams of management personnel, many of whom, such as [...], [...], and [...], are already custodians.  See Weaver Decl., Ex. 22.  Plaintiffs argue that [...]’s files are needed to [Redacted] Mot. at 10 (quoting Weaver Decl., Ex. 25).  This argument reflects Plaintiffs’ general strategy of trying to shamelessly stuff every third-party relationship imaginable into the so-called “business partner” allegations that [...] allowed to move forward.  Having found no gaps in [...]’s productions that collections from [...] could possibly fill, Plaintiffs are attempting to manufacture a gap by arguing that [...] may have documents relating to allegations that [...] expressly said would not move forward.
[brief] On April 1, 2022, the Plaintiff submitted an OPRA request to the [...] seeking:  All police reports + notes relating to:  1.) [...], DOB [...], from 1-1-15 to present 2.) [...], DOB [...], from 2-3-19 to 2-28-19 3.) [...] for 4-11-19 to 4-12-19; and 2-3-19 to 2-4-19 (Da10).
[brief] [...]’ argument that “[...] personnel internally recognized that [...] was insured on the CCIP policy” or that [...] “conceded” it didn’t have a copy of a request to unenroll [...] relies on partial testimony.  (TRVb19, citing TRVa1320.)  [...] of [...] clarified that the Wrap Up List she consulted was a cumulative list of every subcontractor ever enrolled, meaning, as she testified, the list included subcontractors “who were enrolled and are no longer enrolled,” such as those no longer working on designated projects or that were erroneously enrolled (i.e., [...]).  (Vogt. Tr. at 14:15-23 at TRVa2828.)  When asked if a contractor would “stay on that list even if they’re unenrolled,” she testified that was “correct. ”  (Vogt. Tr., 14:15-23, TRVa2828 and 32:17-33:1, TRVa2832.)  She also testified that she ultimately located [...]’s request to unenroll [...], as well the Cancellation Endorsement for the workers’ compensation component thereby removing coverage for [...] under the entire CCIP.
[brief] ”  Pa135.  Additionally, [...] at his deposition explained that his analysis completely assumed that the applicable redevelopment plan actually in place including the subject property (the Morris Canal Redevelopment Plan) was not in place for the purpose of this condemnation matter, but nevertheless concluded that it was highly probable that an 8-story building with 98 apartments would have been approved for the reasons set forth in his report.  Pa181.  In sum, both of [...]’s experts grounded their opinions in market evidence and facts that would be considered by any buyer of the subject property on the date of value and concluded that it was reasonably probable that the subject property would have received approvals for a multi-family development as of the date of value.
[brief] *Id.* at 372-73.  Likewise, one of the principal purposes of N.J.S.A. 20:3-30(d) is to protect the owner against the adverse effects on value caused by a declaration of blight.  *See* Nierenberg, 150 N.J. at 124 (citing Ricciardi, 176 N.J. Super. at 19).  But where such value suffers not because of the conduct of the condemnor, but rather unrelated market factors due to the owner’s failure to modernize a fifty-eight year old strip mall, this purpose is not served.  The purposes of N.J.S.A. 20:3-30 are not limited to the protection of owners, but extend to the protection of condemnors as well.
[directive] The agency should state, in writing, that it retains the right to enter and review the contents of any agency-issued device at any time.  This notice may be worded as follows:  The agency may assign to its members and employees agency-owned electronic devices, including computers and smartphones, for business purposes.  Such equipment and its contents are and remain the property of the agency.  Personnel are prohibited from installing unauthorized software and from storing personal information in the device, regardless of any password protection or encryption.  The devices, their contents, and any email or electronic correspondence originating from or arriving at the device are the property of the agency and are subject to entry and inspection without notice.  7.8.8
[brief] The Planning Board’s review of the Second Ordinance  In the case at bar, the Second Ordinance, before its adoption by the Borough’s Town Council on October 24, 2022, was referred to the Borough’s Planning Board.  The Planning Board considered the Second Ordinance at its ---  1  While the LRHL requires that all provisions of the redevelopment plan, including any amendments, be substantially consistent with the master plan, the municipality may free itself from this requirement and adopt a plan “inconsistent with or not designed to effectuate the master plan by affirmative vote of a majority of its full authorized membership with the reasons for so acting set forth in the redevelopment plan. ”  N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-7d (emphasis added).
[brief] The [...]’s membership is troubled by the NJDACCA and its impact on the practice of law in New Jersey and resulting harm to members of the bar and, ultimately, the public they serve.  Accordingly, the [...] respectfully requests that this Court hold that the Limited Attorney Exemption is unconstitutional as applied to New Jersey attorneys.  Respectfully submitted, [...]  By: /s/ [...]  [...], Esq. President  Attorney ID No.: [...]  Dated: February 3, 2025  REPLY BRIEF OF PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS
[brief] The situation faced by the Court in [...] is further distinguished from the case at bar as the Redeveloper was given an option, by both the Redevelopment Agreement and the Planning Board, to locate seven (7) of its required affordable housing units off-site.  Clearly, this is an advantage to the Developer, since it allows for the construction of more market rate units in the redevelopment area.  However, the Redeveloper, not satisfied with the bonus of an ability to construct affordable units at any other site in [...], now effectively, is asking the Court to remove all zoning restrictions and requirements for obtaining site plan approval, just because it chose a specific site to develop.  That clearly was not contemplated in either the Redevelopment Agreement or the Resolution adopted by the Planning Board and should not be permitted by this Court.
[brief] Printing Mart-Morristown v. Sharp Electronics Corp., 116 N.J. 739 (1989) ...........................................  18, 19 Raspantini v. Arocho, 364 N.J. Super. 528 (App. Div. 2003) .........................................................  22 Rivera v. Gerner, 89 N.J. 526 (1982) .................................................................................. 36 Rosenblum v. Borough of Closter, 285 N.J. Super. 230 (App. Div. 1995) ............................................. 8 Schneider v. E. Orange, 196 N.J. Super. 587 (App. Div. 1984) ...................................................... 18, 19 Scott v. Salerno, 297 N.J. Super. 437 (App. Div. 1997) ............................................................... 26 Sikes v. Twp. of Rockaway, 269 N.J. Super. 463 (App. Div. 1994) .................................................... 12, 13 Skibinski v. Smith, 206 N.J. Super. 349 (App. Div. 1985) ............................................................... 29, 30 Sklodowsky v. Lushis, 417 N.J. Super. 648 (App. Div. 2011) ............................................................ 6 Spade v. Select Comfort Corp., 232 N.J. 504 (2018) ..................................................................... 44, 45 Springdale Park, Inc. v. Andriotis, 30 N.J. Super. 257 (App. Div. 1954) ............................................. 25, 26 State v. Neal, 361 N.J. Super. 522 (App. Div. 2003) .......................................................................
[brief] 20  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, OPINIONS, ORDERS BEING APPEALED  Order granting defendant’s Motion to preclude BZE evidence, dated February 20, 2024 Da1; 1T12-3 to 13-20  INDEX TO APPENDIX  Indictment No. [...]  Pa1  Arraignment Order Pa3 Notice of Motion to Suppress, dated June 10, 2020 Pa5  Order Denying Defendant’s Motion to Suppress, dated June 13, 2022  Pa6  Pretrial Memorandum, dated June 26, 2022  Pa7 Notice of Trial, dated April 10, 2023  Pa10  Notice of Motion to Preclude Blood Evidence, dated April 4, 2023  Pa11  Order Denying Defendant’s Motion to Suppress, dated April 25, 2023  Pa12  Omnibus Order, dated May 5, 2023  Pa13  Superseding Indictment No. [...] Pa15  Notice of Motion to Preclude State’s experts, dated September 29, 2023  Pa18  Notice of Motion to Preclude defense’s experts, dated September 29, 2023  Pa19  Order Denying State’s Motion to Preclude, dated, December 1, 2023  Pa20  State’s Notice of Motion for Leave to Appeal, dated December 19, 2023  Order Granting the State’s Motion for Leave to Appeal dated January 8, 2024  Order Granting Defendant’s Motion to Preclude BZE evidence, dated February 20, 2024  Investigative Report  Defendant’s Medical Admission Report  [...]’s Expert Report  Victim’s Death Certificate Autopsy Report  Excerpt of Phone Dump of Defendant’s Phone Transcript of [...]’s Statement to Police, dated August 1, 2019  Body worn Camera Video¹ ¹  The video will be sent under separate cover.  STATEMENT OF PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[brief] The 2017 Judgment also restrained Defendant from interfering with Plaintiff’s easement rights, as well as other equitable and monetary relief.  (Da207-209)  5.  The Trial Court also determined Plaintiff established, based on the evidence and testimony provided at trial, that the interference by Defendant was, in part, because of Defendant starting to utilize the Sixth Street for student drop off and pick up instead of Fifth Street which had been historically utilized.  Previously and prior to 2010 children [attending school] have been dropped off and picked up from the Fifth Street – from Fifth Street, and currently, parents drop off at [Sixth Street]¹.  As the unloading ¹ It appears the Trial Court’s reference to Fifth Street rather than Sixth Street was in error. of the children in the morning during the religious services constitutes, as this Court finds, an unsafe condition, the unloading of the children while cars are parked in the Sixth Street lot for morning services unnecessarily interferes with the plaintiff’s easement rights.  (Da177-206; Da201 49:4-12)  6.  Among other relief granted therein, the 2017 Judgment specifically prohibited Defendant from permitting egress or ingress of children to the school by way of the Sixth Street Lot during religious services, ordered Defendant to remove certain obstructions from the Fifth Street Lot, and ordered Defendant to pay $4,529.60 for actual damages suffered because of Defendant’s interference with Plaintiff’s easement.
[brief] In April of that year, Defendant’s visa was approved, allowing Plaintiff to travel to India to bring her to the United States.  He took 2 weeks off from his job as a pharmacist manager based in New Jersey, knowing he could not extend his leave beyond that period.  (1T90-91).  Plaintiff recounted for the court below the exhausting journey he undertook to reach his hometown in India.  After working a full day, he boarded a late-night flight, arriving at his hometown at 3:00 in the morning.  From there, he took a connecting flight to Hyderabad.  By the time he reached Defendant [...]’s hometown, he had been awake for almost three days straight, feeling the weight of sleep deprivation.  (1T92)