ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] DIANA’S CLAIMS ARE NOT BARRED BY THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT, THE DOCTRINE OF RES JUDICATA, OR THE ENTIRE CONTROVERSY DOCTRINE  Defendants have argued that [...]’s claims are barred by a settlement agreement in Lopez v. [...], Civil Action No. [...], 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124730 (D.N.J. Sep. 14, 2016); however, as noted by the trial court, the settlement agreement relates “[s]olely the claims for statutory damages under the F.D.C.P.A. ”  T1 13:6-9.  As [...] has asserted no claims under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act here, (as reasoned by the trial court) the settlement agreement is inapplicable to [...]’s claims under the CFA.  Moreover, “any arguments defendant[s] raise[] that fall outside the four corners of the notice of appeal likewise fall outside the scope of . . . appellate jurisdiction and are therefore not reviewable as a matter of law. ”  *Fannie Mae v. Gissubel*, No. A-3389-16T3, 2018 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 699, at *8-9 (App. Div. Mar. 28, 2018) (Pra5).  Here, the trial court determined that it would not reach the issues of res judicata or the Entire Controversey Doctrine (“ECD”) and, therefore, the trial court made no determinations as to the same.  See T1 58:18-59:9.  Accordingly, [...] did not raise the issues of res judicata or the ECD in his Notice of Appeal.  Thus, Defendants arguments as to res judicata or the ECD are improper and should not be considered by the Court as they are outside the scope of this Appeal.  CONCLUSION
[directive] To most the that employ processes establish to allow agencies will that practices identify best reviewing in practicable as procedures operating standard and technology efficient and effective handgun purchase and cards identification purchaser firearms approving and applications permit ensure to procedures include should also practices best  These applicants. qualified for permits set criteria the meet who applicants by submitted applications to priority given is appropriate that 13:54-2.4(x. or 13:54-1.4(j) in N.J.A.C. forth should standards regulatory statutory and of the all meet that applications permit sum,
[brief] This action was initiated by [...] by way of Complaint filed in August 2019, as amended May 4, 2021, which set forth various allegations with respect to the Redevelopment Agreement and the Operating Agreement.  Through the Amended Complaint, [...] sought relief as follows: (i) specific performance compelling [...] to construct [...] Garage and release the surface lot parcel to [...] for construction of the Office Project and Residential Project, and enjoining [...] from expending resources on any parking facility “in the vicinity” of the Project Garage; (ii) a demand to compel accounting of [...]’s operations and finances of the Project Garage; (iii) reformation of the Redevelopment Agreement and Operating Agreement to create new parking rate standards for the Project Garage; (iv) reformation of the Redevelopment Agreement to account for the Office Project, Residential Project and Authority Garage not being constructed, directing all capital and operating expenses of the Project Garage be paid from general revenue of the Project Garage and directing that [...] retain all net revenue of the Project Garage; (v) rescission of the Operating Agreement; and (vi) demand for alleged damages related to breach of contract, breach of the obligation of good faith and fair dealing, unjust enrichment and breach of fiduciary duty with respect to the Redevelopment Agreement and Operating Agreement.
[brief] (Pa745-Pa789)  R. 1:6-6 is unambiguous:  “If a motion is based on facts not appearing of record or not judicially noticeable, the court may hear it on affidavits made on personal knowledge, setting forth only facts which are admissible in evidence to which the affiant is competent to testify and which may have annexed thereto certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to therein. ”  Applicants were required to submit an affidavit or certification around matters for which they have personal knowledge.  The mandates of R. 1:6-6 “are not merely formal requirements.  They go to the heart of procedural due process."  _Celino v. General Acc. Ins.,_ 211 N.J. Super. 538, 544 (App. Div. 1986).  Moreover, "[e]ven more egregious is the attempted presentation of facts which are neither of record, judicially noticeable, nor stipulated, by way of statements of counsel made in supporting briefs, memoranda and oral argument.  Such statements do not constitute cognizable facts."  (_emphasis added_)  Ibid.  While Applicants did submit a certification, it was the certification of Counsel of Applicants, so all of their presentation of facts were “by way of statements of facts.  Conversely, Appellants supported their motion with their own certification.  However, in reply, Counsel for Appellants has no choice but to submit his certification, but only as to what is publicly available with no assertion as to what his client thought or believed.  Notwithstanding Applicants failure to submit a certification, the motion judge determined that:
[brief] ”  Id. at 746.; see also In re Contest of November 8, 2005, 192 N.J. 546 (2007).  A complaint should not be dismissed under Rule 4:6-2(e) when a cause of action is suggested by the facts and a “theory of actionability may be articulated by amendment of the complaint. ”  Printing Mart v. Sharp Electronics, 116 N.J. at 746.(emphasis added).  Furthermore, a court has discretionary powers to allow a party to amend its complaint to allege additional facts to state a cause of action.  *Hoffman v. Hampshire Labs, Inc.*, 405 N.J. Super. 105, 116 (App. Div. 2009).
[brief] [(48a.)]  Additionally, to guide the Subcommittee members in their evaluation of the applications, the Borough attorney, with input from the Subcommittee members, prepared an evaluation sheet (the “Evaluation Sheet”) to help guide the Subcommittee during its review.  The Evaluation Sheet included a statement that the Subcommittee would “review and evaluate each Applicant based on the [Evaluation Sheet] in making its recommendation to the [Council].”  (63a).  The Evaluation Sheet lists the following criteria as relevant to the Subcommittee’s review: (1) Applicant’s owners’ or principals’ qualifications and experience operating in highly regulated industries, including cannabis, healthcare, pharmaceutical manufacturing, and retail pharmacies; (2) Results of Applicant’s background check; (3) Applicant’s commitment to employ Borough residents; (4) Applicant’s ties to the Borough; (5) Applicant’s proposal to provide community benefits; (6) Applicant’s demonstrated commitment to diversity in its ownership; (7) Public input; (8) Applicant’s financial capability to open and operate; and (9) Applicant’s completed *Application for a Municipal Cannabis Business License*.  (63a).  The Evaluation Sheet was strictly an internal guidance document that the Borough’s attorney prepared for the Subcommittee’s use.  (74a-75a).  The Council did not “adopt” the Evaluation Sheets, nor was there any requirement that the Subcommittee or Council fill out the Evaluation Sheets for each applicant.  (74a-75a).  Critically, neither the Evaluation Sheet nor the RFA indicated that the Subcommittee and Council could *only* consider the criteria identified in the Evaluation Sheet.
[brief] The result should likewise mirror Graves.  In addition, the Plaintiff’s own officers attended Defendant’s national conventions multiple times, as the convention minutes establish.  The Plaintiff submitted financial reports to the Defendant and paid assessments to the Defendant.  The Plaintiff cannot simply decide they will not follow certain Rules, Regulations, and doctrine of their own religion.  “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; . . . .”  U.S. Constitution, 1st Amend.  The Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution is applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.
[brief] [...] simply failed to file his Eligibility Registration Form until approximately one year and seven months past the statutory deadline, which is not a de minimis violation.  Contrary to [...]’s argument, the court’s decision in *Ensslin* did not turn on the timeliness or adequacy of the Division’s notice.  *(Pb11).*  Instead, the court found that because the notice from the Division was sent “more than four years from the date of petitioner’s last contribution,” the Division’s own “day- to-day administration of its affairs” and interpretation of the two-year time limitation as expressed by the four-year notice further supported allowing Ensslin to file.  Id. at 338.  Here, there was no such letter informing [...] that he was eligible to file under the Ricci Act past the statutory deadline.  Thus, Ensslin does not support [...]’s proposition that untimely notice allows individuals to file at any time past the statutory deadline.
[brief] ”  Other factors are “[t]he nature of the parties’ relationship” as well as “the purpose and context of the communications. ”  Id. In *Simon v. FIA Card Servs.*, N.A., 732 F.3d 259, 266 (3d Cir. 2013), an argument was made that a communication was not covered by the FDCPA because it did not include a demand for payment.  “We rejected that argument[…].”  *Simon* at 266.  *Romine v. Diversified Collection Servs.*, 155 F.3d 1142 (9th Cir. 1998), held that [...] could be subject to the FDCPA when it marketed a service to debt collectors designed to obtain consumers’ telephone number.
[brief] [...] was questioned with respect to a [...] bank account she shared with her husband and which was produced in discovery pursuant to subpoena by Plaintiff.  Notwithstanding her testimony, as noted above with respect to [...]’s management of the Property, only one check – Check No. 2236 – from the bank record had anything to do with the Property.  (9T 90:7- 92:23, Jan. 24, 2023).  The check was signed by [...] and was issued to [...], Esq., [...]’s attorney, in the amount of $400 on February 4, 2016.  (Pa1396).  The memo line for the check reads: “[...], Title Search. ”  Id.  When questioned about the check and the title search performed in 2016, Ms. Wu testified as follows:  Q: Do you know in 2016, as far as you know at that time, who owned this 293 property?  A: My husband.  Q: Okay.  How did you come to know your husband own that property in 2016  A: Because, you know, there were many times that I went with my husband to [...]’s office and I don’t know the details but I always heard they talk about the house and about the owners, [...] and [...].  Q:  So how did you come to know your husband owned the 293 property in 2016?  2016?  A:  I don’t quite understand the detail because [...] was thinking about the title of the 293 property, and he had to do some research.  Q:  That is not my question.  My question, is, how did you come to know your husband owned the 293 property in 2016?  A:  [...] had done some research and then he found that the property at 293 still belongs to [...], and then he did some further research about it.  (4T 135:3-23, Jan. 10, 2023).  Despite this realization in 2016, [...] did not take any action with respect to the Property until October 2019, just over twenty (20) years following the December 1998 deed and the January 1999 re-recording of the December 1998 deed.  b.
[brief] See N.J.S.A. 46:10B-60(a), (b), and (c).  Most critically, this provision of the FRFPA requires inclusion of a ten (10) day right to cancellation provision in such a contract, and a specifically worded Notice to that effect.  See N.J.S.A. 46:10B-60(c)(6) and (7); N.J.S.A. 46:10B-62.  The agreements prepared by [...] in this attempted transaction violated all the above FRFPA provisions – and perhaps most critically, the 10-day right to cancellation set forth above in a separate provision of the FRFPA providing for this right of recission.
[brief] “Whenever an application is made for such an enlargement, a court must weigh the public and private interests that favor an enlargement against ‘the important policy of repose expressed in the forty-five day rule. ’”  Gregory, supra, 391 N.J. Super. at 189.  It is only when there is a “clear potential for injustice” that the sound policy of repose should be disturbed.  Hopewell Valley Citizens' Grp., Inc., 204 N.J. at 578 (noting that discretion to enlargement under Rule 4:69-6(c) can be exercised when the court “perceives a clear potential for injustice”).
[brief] THE NATURE OF A ‘SUBSTANTIAL CHANGE’ IN AN APPLICATION.  (Ja45, L. 8-14; Ja49, L. 24-P. 50, L. 20; Ja51, L. 1-11)  In Toll Brothers v. Board of Chosen Freeholders of Burlington, 194 N.J. 223 (2008), the court emphasized that:  The question for a municipal agency on a second application thus centers about whether there has occurred a sufficient change in the application itself to warrant entertainment of the matter again.  In the present case, both the Board and the trial court failed to ask this critical question and did not consider the fact-based answers that were evident.  In the instant case, Plaintiff [...] submitted a significantly revised plan, reducing the house size from 1800 square feet in the [...] application to 1200 square feet.  Additionally, she removed the breezeway, eliminated one full driveway, removed the basement garage, and increased the western side yard from 50 feet to 100 feet.  These substantial changes clearly meet the criteria for considering a second application and should have been properly evaluated by the Board and the trial court.  POINT V PLAIN ERROR IS IN THE INITIAL OPINION OF THE TRIAL COURT (Ja12-20)
[brief] The Act was amended by legislation signed on July 22, 2021 and allowed for Remote Notarial acts.  N.J.S.A. 52:7-10.9.  That change to the act did not go into effect until October 20, 2021, which is after the service, in this case.  However, even if you apply those changes, the Affidavits were not properly notarized.  The changes provided that if the signatory is not in the notary’s physical presence, the notary may nonetheless perform a notarial act using “communications technology. ”  Communications technology encompasses any electronic device or process that allows a notary and a remotely located individual to communicate with each other simultaneously by sight and sound or, if the individual is impaired as to sight, hearing or speech, facilitates communication between the notary and signatory.  N.J.S.A. 52:7-10.10.  The notary still needs personal knowledge or satisfactory evidence of the individual’s identity.  That was not done in this case and the Affidavits of Service which supported the Entry of Default Judgment are, therefore, presumptively invalid.  "The requirements of the rules with respect to service of process go to the jurisdiction of the court and must be strictly complied with.  Any defects . . . are fatal and leave the court without jurisdiction and its judgment void."
[directive] Total number of Criminal History Points  Table 1.  Degree Adult Conviction points  Juvenile Adjudication points  First 20 10 Second 12 6  Third 6 3 Fourth 4 2  Disorderly Persons 2  1  Select the appropriate Criminal History Category from Table 2 below.  Table 2.  Criminal History Category  Criminal History Points or Criteria I (Minor)  0 to 9 II (Significant)  10 to 19 III (Serious)  20 or more  IV (Extended Term)  Previous conviction for distribution or possession with intent to distribute CDS, regardless of the degree of the prior drug distribution-type offense or the number of criminal history points.
[brief] 3  Appellants note that the Certification of Deputy Attorney General [...] dated June 21, 2023 mistakenly includes a broken hyperlink for Exhibit F to the declaration, [...], Issues Impacting LGBTQ Youth: Polling Analysis 12 (2022).  The State apologizes for this error.  A full copy of the survey is available at: https://www.thetrevorproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/TrevorProjectPublic1.pdf (last visited Feb. 19, 2024).  4
[brief] Appellate courts should defer to the trial court’s factual findings and legal conclusions, especially in non-jury trials, so long those facts are supported by adequate competent evidence in the record.  The appellate court should not disturb those findings and conclusions unless it concludes that “they are so manifestly unsupported by or inconsistent with the competent, relevant and reasonably credible evidence as to offend the interests of justice. ”  *Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Investors Ins. Co.*, 65 N.J. 474, 484 (1974).  This standard applies no matter the type of evidence presented, whether live, recorded, or written evidence.  *State v. McNeil-Thomas*, 238 N.J. 256, 271 (2019).  Furthermore, when witness credibility is an important factor – as it was here – “the trial court’s conclusions must be given great weight and must be accepted by the appellate court unless clearly lacking in reasonable support. ”  *N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. F.M.*, 375 N.J. Super. 235, 259 (App. Div. 2005).  “Deference is especially appropriate when the evidence is largely testimonial and involves questions of credibility” because an appellate court’s review cannot replace “the trial court’s opportunity to hear and see the witnesses who testified on the stand. ”  *Balducci v. Cige*, 240 N.J. 574, 594-95 (2020).  This deferential standard holds even if the trial judge’s reasons for the credibility determination are not articulated in detail.  *State v. Locurto*, 157 N.J. 463, 470 (1999).  In this 22-day bench trial, [...] watched and listened to the witnesses and reviewed the documentary evidence.  As discussed below, the evidence supports the trial court’s factual findings and legal conclusions.  Deference by this Court is warranted, and the judgment must be affirmed.
[brief] Ptaszynski v. Uwaneme 71 N.J. Super. 333, 853 (App. Div. 2004)  13, 15 Robbiani v. Burke, 77 N.J. 383, 395 (1978)  8  Simmons v United States, 390 US 377 (1968)  18 State v. Arthur, 149 N.J. 1, 8 (1997)  5 State v Carty, 170 N.J. 632, 910 (2002)  6 State v. Colvin, 123 N.J. 428, 429 (1991)  9 State v. Dunlap, 185 N.J. 543, 548-549 (2006)
[directive] 9.1  Procedures to Protect Integrity of BWC Recordings.  Every department shall establish and maintain a system and procedures to ensure the integrity and proper handling and storage of all BWC recordings.  This system shall include provisions to: (a) ensure that all recordings are uploaded to a secure data storage system in a timely fashion; (b) prevent tampering with or deletion of recorded data both before and after downloading from the BWC and uploading to the storage system; (c) prevent unauthorized access to stored BWC recordings; (d) document all instances where BWC recordings are accessed, viewed, copied, disseminated, or deleted; and (e) permit auditing of all instances where BWC recordings are accessed, viewed, copied, or deleted.
[brief] HEARING RULINGS, WHICH LED TO MARCH 7, 2023  ORDER, PAR. 1  1.  See Section “C” for Item 1  SECTION E [...]’ CERTIFICATION REPLY, DATED NOV. 28, 2022, IN ORDER TO FOCUS ONLY ON APPEAL ISSUES REGARDING [...]’S REPLY, DATED NOV. 16, 2022, TO OPPOSITIONS BY [...] & [...] TO HIS OCT. 26, 2022
[directive] 0~ 5 of Scope Assessment Risk Assault Domestic Ontario 7.4.2.c not in cases ODARA and of the completion require the that cases violence domestic  In 25 detained, will be defendant the presumption that a establishes Law Reform Bail the circumstances,  In these evidence. of preponderance the a by rebutted presumption is the that finds court the unless 2A:162-19(b), N.J.S.A.  2A:162-19(e)(2).  N.J.S.A.  See 26 the overcome to sufficient evidence prima facie as consider may court a that provides 3:4A(b)(5)  Rule not is release defendant's the program that services pretrial the by recommendation a release of presumption  This conditions").  maximum released, if or recommended not "release determination that a (i.e., recommended the AOC. by approved process risk-assessment pretrial objective the on based turn, is in recommendation, 68 Page is detention pretrial seeking of presumption the unless 7.3, Section under covered otherwise the if detention pretrial for apply shall prosecutor the 7.4.6, subsection to pursuant overcome
[brief] Ibid.  While denying [...]’s Second Count for Trespass and Third Count for Conversion, the trial court granted [...] summary judgment on its Fourth Count for Quiet Title and Fifth Count for Nuisance.  Pa163-64.  The trial court also granted [...]’s motion for summary judgment dismissing [...]’s Counterclaims for Trespass, Conversion, Quiet Title and Adverse Possession with prejudice.
[brief] POINT I  THE APPLICABLE STANDARD OF REVIEW IS DE NOVO .............................................................................................................10  POINT II  THE COURTS RESOLVE ANY DOUBTS IN FAVOR OF ARBITRATION .......................................................................................11  POINT III  THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY NOT COMPELLING ARBITRATION BASED UPON RESPONDENTS’ COURSE OF CONDUCT AND ACCEPTANCE OF BENEFITS OF THE BROKERAGE RELATIONSHIP WITH [...].  (2T17:25-2T18:24).  ........................................12  POINT IV  THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE [...] SAM ACCOUNT REGISTRATION WEBSITE DID NOT PROVIDE NOTICE OF THE TERMS OF USE.  (2T14:9-2T18:7).  ....................................................................................18  A.  [...]’s notice of its terms of use was proper in light of Vercammen and Racioppi.  .................................................................19  B.  As this Court recognized in Racioppi, Wollen is distinguishable.  .........................................................................................22  i.  [...]’s SAM registration website provided more prominent, clear, and timely notice than the site in Wollen.  .........................22  ii.  The “consumer context” and relationship with the site-user are also distinguishable from *Wollen*.  **CONCLUSION**
[brief] Complaint did not state date or time period of alleged default.  Defendant was deprived of fundamental notice because the Complaint did not state the date or time period upon which the Complaint was based (Exhibit A) (Da2).  A fundamental tenet of due process is that notice must be given to a defendant as to when the claim arose in order to prepare a proper defense.  R. 4:5-8(e).  See NJ Civil Action Complaint, Form 11210, which requires the statement of the date or time period on which plaintiff bases the complaint.  Defendant was denied due process because Plaintiff was permitted to prosecute a void Complaint lacking the required notice of the time period of the alleged default.  D.
[directive] This type of assessment is inherent in plea negotiations, where both the prosecutor and defense counsel gauge the strengths and weaknesses of their respective cases and the likelihood of prevailing at trial.  Often, these factual and legal assessments by counsel become the subject of face-to-face negotiations, where each side attempts to convince the other of the merits of their respective positions.  A prosecutor when initially “screening” a case and throughout the course of plea negotiations and trial preparation must consider a number of legal, factual, and practical issues that bear on the likelihood of prevailing at trial, and that account for the costs associated with litigation.