ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Consequently, Appellant cannot now complain that his actions may bar any contribution to which he may have been entitled under the JTCL or that he lacks the remedy of contribution.  The so-called “Burt defendant” status of [...] and [...] was requested by Appellant.  Plaintiff/Respondent opposed that application.  (1T9:7-1T10:1).  Appellant sought the so-called “Burt defendant” designation at trial, and the Trial Court so ordered.  Appellant sought that the so-called “Burt defendants” not be represented by counsel at trial, and the Trial Court so ordered.  Appellant sought an Order relieving the so-called “Burt defendants” of any and all financial responsibility upon trial of the case, and the Trial Court so ordered.  Plaintiff/Respondent opposed each of these applications, but was bound by the Trial Court’s rulings.  As a result, the trial was conducted under the exact terms sought by Appellant.  Now that Appellant has received an unfavorable outcome and the JTCL has been properly applied as mandated by the Supreme Court in Mejia, Appellant seeks relief, claiming ignorance or misunderstanding of the consequences of those rulings.  Under the invited error doctrine, this appeal cannot succeed.
[brief] Moreover, the land exchange with [...] is structured to ensure that the public gains tangible and significant benefits from the exchange.  The properties to be acquired by the Township are strategically chosen to enhance the public's access to natural and recreational resources, thereby fulfilling the overarching goal of eminent domain: to promote the public good.  This strategic use of eminent domain authority to facilitate a land exchange demonstrates [...]'s commitment to utilizing all available mechanisms to enhance the quality of life for its residents, firmly grounding the arrangement within the legal framework that supports such innovative approaches to public land management.
[brief] Plaintiffs also misconstrue [...]’s assertion that he had complied with the June 7, 2016 restraining Order to be an argument that he complied with the February 8, 2016 “change in control” Order.  [...] only argued, and it is not refuted, that 1.5 years passed after the Court’s June 7, 2016 restraints without any interference with operation or management of the Company.  [...] himself made that argument at the R. 1:10-3 hearing.  (1T33:12-23)  The Plaintiffs’ November 2017 R. 1:10-3 Motion was based on allegations in pleadings only and [...]’s effort to remove this action to federal court, which are far less than the actions that led to the June 7, 2016 restraint.  (1T20:24021:3)(1T35:8-18)  The only perceived threat to Company operation from [...]’s SDNY action was alleged to be defense costs for them.  (1T24:11-21)  Thus, [...] rightly argues that the Court was required to consider the level of conduct that violated the June 7, 2016 Order as to what sanction was the least that was necessary to ensure future compliance, but did not do that.
[brief] The Agreement must be interpreted and enforced accordingly.  Barila, supra, 241 N.J. at 616.  Likewise, a review of [...] and [...]’s enabling statute, the Police and Firemen’s Retirement System Act, N.J.S.A. 43:16A-1 to -68, confirms they both lack jurisdiction to declare a contractual provision illegal, unenforceable or ineffective.
[brief] Whether a relator’s allegations are substantially similar to the public disclosure turns on whether “public disclosures exposed all the essential elements of the alleged fraud. ”  *Id.* (cleaned-up).  One such is scienter.  N.J.S.A. § 2A:32C-3; *id.* § 2A:32C-2.  There is a considerable body of decisional law applying the based upon/substantially similar test in a case, like this, where the fraud consists of misconduct by multiple actors within an industry with many participants.  Ja2280-81.  In such cases, whether an action is based on/substantial similar to the claimed public disclosures depends on whether the claimed public disclosures remove the case “from a situation where the government would need to comb through myriad transactions” to find the fraud.  *In re Natural Gas Royalties*, 562 F.3d 1032, 1042-43 (10th Cir. 2009).  The public disclosure bar applies only where disclosures “enabled the government to readily identify wrongdoers through an investigation,” *id.* at 1039 (emphasis added), and permitted the government to determine how the industry’s bad actors are engaged in wrongdoing, *Omnicare*, 903 F.3d at 89-92.  There are many cases applying this test and holding, in general, that, where the government needs to comb through myriad transactions to find the fraud or identify the participants in it, the public disclosure bar does not apply.  This is because the gulf between the allegations in a complaint and what is disclosed is simply too great such that it cannot be said that there is a substantial similarity.  *United States ex rel. Lager v. CSL Behring, L.L.C.*, 855 F.3d 935, 941-45 (8th Cir. 2017) (to bar claim, public disclosure must explicitly identify participants in fraud or provide enough information to identify participants); *Cooper v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Florida, Inc.*, 19 F.3d 562, 566 (11th Cir. 1994) (where fraud consists of industry-wide misconduct, public disclosure bar requires “allegations specific to a particular defendant” because government has difficulty identifying all parties engaging in it and needs help to catch misbehaving parties); *United States v. Sodexho, Inc.*, 2009 WL 579380, at *11 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 6, 2009), aff’d, 364 F. App’x 787 (3d Cir. 2010) (public disclosure bar did not apply when “fraud occurs on a transactional level and individual perpetrators are difficult to discern”).
[directive] Bail Ranges for attempts or conspiracies should generally be the same as the actual substantive crime.  Statute Charge Description  Degree Bail Range 10%  Cash Bail Option 4th Degree $1,000 to $5,000  10% permissible Actor, with purpose to harass another, engages in anonymous or offensive communications  Harassment  While in or subjects another to kicking or shoving or other offensive touching or threatens to do so, or Prison or on Parole or 2C:33-4(a-e) engages in alarming or such repeated conduct.  Fourth degree offense if the actor is in prison  Probation for an or on parole or probation for an indictable offense.  Otherwise, it is a petty disorderly persons Petty Disorderly Indictable Offense
[brief] Defendants.  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE  DIVISION DOCKET NO. [...] ON APPEAL FROM LAW  DIVISION DOCKET NO. [...]  BRIEF OF RESPONDENT  PARKE BANK BRAVERMAN  KASKEY GARBER, PC [...], Esq.  (No. 009801992)  [...], Esq.  (No. 307122019)  [...]  Telephone: [...] Facsimile: [...]  Attorneys for Respondent [...]  TABLE OF CONTENTS
[brief] SO HOW CAN ANY COURT IGNORE A FINDING OF AN INTENTIONAL MISREPRESENTATION THAT IS GIVEN WITH THE INTENT TO DECEIVE.  Plaintiff further has the audacity to state on Page 6 of her Brief that "For approximately six years, the parties abided by the agreement without incident."  If we dissect this statement utilizing the relevant facts to place same in context, Plaintiff is saying [...], in good faith followed through on his promises for six years (72 straight months of payments) while [...] continued her deception that she didn't have the funds, so she wouldn't have to pay him and, in fact, didn't pay him.  [...], not yet aware of Plaintiff's financial situation, and after having made requests to be paid which were ignored, stopped paying the $1,500.00 monthly payment for 46 months (which totals $69,000.00 or $1,000.00 less than [...] was withholding).  Plaintiff, then files suit, her contention being that she did not receive the 46 payments that Defendant withheld.  And here is the critical point that each of the Courts have ignored.  In order for Plaintiff to legitimately make that complaint wouldn't the precondition have to be that she was deprived/didn't have the funds which she needed to live.  It could not be more plain that Plaintiff had those funds.  In fact she had $70,000.00 in her possession that she intentionally hid.  AGAIN THE COURT MUST UNDERSTAND THAT THE PURPOSE OF THE PENALTY WAS TO ASSURE PLAINTIFF THAT SHE WAS ALWAYS IN POSSESSION OF FUNDS NECESSARY FOR LIVING.  PLAINTIFF HAD THOSE FUNDS WHICH SHE INTENTIONALLY HID (AND WHICH SHOULD HAVE BEEN INITIALLY PROVIDED TO HARRISON).
[brief] *See id.* at 577–81.  In so holding, the court expressly rejected the plaintiff’s “preferred approach,” pursuant to which “a plaintiff could engage in harassing and meritless litigation up until the point at which they sense the court might dismiss the case, and then voluntarily dismiss the suit themselves, all while keeping the threat of refiling hanging over the defendants’ heads and running up their legal bills. ”  *Id.* at 581.  “If [Plaintiff] were correct that a voluntary dismissal nullifies any right to attorneys’ fees,” the court continued, “then plaintiffs could inflict the harm the Anti-SLAPP Act was meant to combat—siphoning defendants’ money, time, and resources—without recompense. ”  *Id.*  For the same reasons, Plaintiff’s procedural machinations seeking to thwart [...] review constitute an exceptional circumstance warranting reopening of the judgment.
[directive] Vehicular Pursuit Policy 2 Definitions  2.1  Authorized Tire Deflation Device.  A device designed and intended to produce a controlled deflation of one or more tires of a pursued vehicle and capable of operation consistent with criteria established in this Policy.  2.2  Boxing In.  The surrounding of a violator’s moving vehicle with moving pursuit vehicles which are then slowed to a stop along with the violator's vehicle.  2.3  Divided Highway.  A road which includes a physical barrier between traffic traveling in opposite directions.  2.4  Heading Off.  An attempt to terminate a pursuit by pulling ahead of, behind, or toward a violator's moving vehicle to force it to the side of the road or to otherwise come to a stop.  2.5  Law Enforcement Officer.  Any person who is employed as a sworn member of any State, county, or municipal law enforcement agency, department, or division of those governments who is statutorily empowered to act for the detection, investigation, arrest, conviction, detention, or rehabilitation of persons violating the criminal laws of this State.  The term law enforcement officer shall include sworn members of the New Jersey State Police, the Division of Criminal Justice and the Juvenile Justice Commission.  It shall include State Correctional Police Officers pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:154-4, County Correctional Police Officers pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:154-3, Special Law Enforcement Officers of all classes pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40A:14-146.8 et seq., Humane Law Enforcement Officers appointed pursuant to N.J.S.A. 4:22-14.1 or 4:22-14.4, Auxiliary Police Officers appointed pursuant to N.J.S.A. App.A:9-45(c), and Constables appointed pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40A:9-120.  For purposes of this policy, the terms law enforcement officer, police officer and officer shall have the same meaning.  2.6  Paralleling.  Street Paralleling is driving a police vehicle on a street parallel to a street on which a pursuit is occurring.  Vehicle  Paralleling is a deliberate offensive tactic by one or more patrol vehicles to drive alongside the pursued vehicle while it is in motion.  2.7  Pursuit Driving.  Pursuit driving is an active attempt by a law enforcement officer operating a motor vehicle and utilizing emergency warning lights and an audible device to apprehend one or more occupants of another moving vehicle when the officer reasonably believes that the driver of the fleeing vehicle is aware of the officer's attempt to stop the vehicle and is resisting apprehension by increasing vehicle speed, committing traffic violations or otherwise attempting to elude the officer.  It shall not constitute pursuit driving if the fleeing vehicle follows all traffic regulations after the officer activates the emergency warning lights and audible device (siren).  2  USE OF FORCE POLICY
[brief] Most Christian cathedrals, Jewish synagogues, Hindu temples, and Muslim Mosques were built using funds from generous benefactors who desired to practice their religion by building such edifices for the use of their fellow Christians, Jews, Hindus, or Muslims.  If a donor felt one of their houses of worship was under attack, they too would naturally be willing to “put up any amount of money” necessary to remove the threat and none would fault them for doing otherwise.  That [...] donated such a large sum to [...] is a testament to his regard for the organization, an acknowledgement of the danger it was in, and that such a donation was necessary to assist [...] and its congregation.  Contrary to the Trial Court’s inexplicable concern, [...] received no personal benefit for his donation other than the satisfaction of doing what he felt was best for his fellow Muslims.  As a donation, that money was the Property of [...].  If [...] were successful in recovering any damages from [...] or [...], [...] also testified that he has no expectation of the money being returned nor does he want the money returned.  (2T 14: 1-7).  The donation was a gift to [...].  To date, [...] and its congregation manage their own affairs at the Property, hold daily and weekly prayers, congregate for weddings and funerals, and function exactly as they did prior to [...]’ actions with one notable exception: [...] immediately filed for, and received, a property tax exemption from [...], ensuring that [...]’s annual budget was instantly $16,000 richer.  POINT II THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT HELD THAT [...] WAS NOT RESPONSIBLE FOR ONE HALF OF THE CAPITAL IMPROVEMENTS MADE TO THE PROPERTY.
[brief] Furthermore, the State asserts that [...] could not “claim self-defense” for two reasons: because he was the initial aggressor and because “a reasonable person in [his] position would have understood” that if he submitted to the officers, their use of force would cease.  (Sb 18)  However, the State’s arguments rely entirely on the State supplying its own answers to the key factual disputes at trial – which were for the jury alone to decide – and its misapprehension of the relevant law.  See *Mulvihill*, 57 N.J. at 278-89 (holding that “for the purpose of determining whether the legal issue of self-defense is available for jury consideration, it is necessary to consider the facts in the light most favorable to the defendant. ”)  First, the State argues that [...] “cannot raise self-defense” because he “was the initial aggressor,” claiming that [...] punched and pushed [...] inside the restaurant.  (Sb 18)  However, the State’s claim is based entirely on [...]’s testimony – which was hotly disputed at trial.  (See Db 22); (See 8T:59-4 to 11) ([...]’s testimony that [...] never pushed or punched [...], but that [...] grabbed [...]’s arm and began “forcefully pushing him” towards the door, and [...] put his hands up “in a kind of … self-defensive motion” in response.)  Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to [...], the court was clearly required to instruct the jury on self-defense.
[brief] Instead, it expressly characterizes the forms of relief granted to carriers under the statute as being restitutionary.  See *N.J.S.A.* 17:33A-2.  See also, *State v. Sailor*, 355 *N.J Super.* 315, 323-324 (App. Div. 2001), wherein the court concluded that the statutory remedies sought under the Fraud Act were "equitable in nature."  The Legislature's description of the Fraud Act's remedies as restitutionary justifies the conclusion that the Legislature did not intend to authorize a right to a jury trial.  Moreover, damages are an element of a cause of action under the CFA.  Only parties who have sustained an "ascertainable loss" may file suit under the CFA.  See N.J.S.A. 56:8-19 and Zorba, 362 N.J. Super. at 138.  In contrast, damages are not an element of a cause of action under the Fraud Act.\(^6\) ("The statutory language of IFPA does not require proof of reliance on a false statement or resultant damages.")  Land, 186 N.J. at 175.  Since a carrier is not required to prove damages as an element of its cause of action, whether a party is entitled to a jury trial in a Fraud Act case cannot be determined by reviewing the nature of the damages sought by the carrier.
[brief] (6)  No article, material, vehicle, or equipment to be stored outdoors shall exceed the height of the principal building.  (7)  All outdoor storage shall be screened by planting, slatted fencing or its equivalent in accordance with §230-159, or both so as to minimize the view of such storage from any adjacent property or any public street.  No wall or fence used to screen outdoor storage shall be permitted in any front yard.  (8)  No outdoor storage shall be located in a manner that would obstruct parking, loading, or pedestrian circulation.  (9)  Outdoor storage shall be placed on a suitable surface such as pavement, crushed stone, or other suitable material, and not on bare earth, grass, mulch, or other similar surface.  (10)  No outdoor storage shall be located or stored in a manner that could reasonably be expected to result in littering, spillage, or leakage of material; dispersion of materials by wind, rain, floodwater, or animals; creation of offensive odors; creation of fire or explosion hazards; contamination of air, soil, or water; or other similar adverse effects.  (11)  Outdoor storage of any hazardous, toxic, or corrosive substances, as defined in regulations promulgated by the United States Environmental Protection Agency or the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection, is prohibited.
[brief] That does not withstand scrutiny.  Limiting the ability of attorneys to charge for services and/or limiting the type of entities through which they may practice is, itself, a burden on attorneys.  It also directly invades the regulatory prerogative of the Supreme Court (which has already promulgated its own rules regarding the type and manner of legal fees attorneys may charge clients and the business entities under which they may choose to organize).  There is simply no proscription barring an attorney from charging fees to a client for performing legal services under the attorney’s license.  The trial court’s suggestion only highlights the impermissible encroachments imposed by the Limited Attorney Exemption.  4.
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY NOT FINDING THE ARBITRATION CLAUSE UNCONSCIONABLE.  (Pa03)**  Congress enacted the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA"), 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16, "to abrogate the then-existing common law rule disfavoring arbitration agreements 'and to place arbitration agreements upon the same footing as other contracts.'"  *Martindale v. Sandvik, Inc.*, 173 N.J. 76, 84 (2002).  The FAA, however, does not prevent an examination into whether the arbitration agreement at issue is unconscionable under state law.  *Muhammad v. County Bank of Rehoboth Beach, Delaware*, 189 N.J. 1, 12 (2006).  Unconscionability may be applied to invalidate arbitration agreements.  *Id.*  The New Jersey Supreme Court has consistently “refused to enforce contracts that violate the public policy of the State” or are “inconsistent with the public interest or detrimental to the common good. ”
[directive] Calculation of Grand Total of Aggravating/Mitigating Points  The completed Brimage Worksheet should indicate for each Aggravating and Mitigating factor whether the factor applies, does not apply, or that there are insufficient facts presently available to determine whether the factor applies.  The prosecutor must add up all of the aggravating (positive) and mitigating (negative) points.  If the grand point total ranges from -2 to +2 (i.e., -2, -1, 0, +1 or +2), the prosecutor must tender the appropriate presumptive plea offer, subject to the provisions of Section 11 (Special Application and Enhancement Features), and except as provided in Section 12 (Downward Departure for Trial Proof Issues) or Section 13 (Downward Departure for Substantial Cooperation).  Subject to the provisions of Sections 11, 12 and 13 of these Guidelines, when the combined point total is +3 or more (e.g., +3, +4, +5, etc.), the prosecutor must tender an offer within the applicable range that is greater than the presumptive offer.  The offer may be at the upper end of the range.  Subject to the provisions of Section 11, 12 and 13, if the combined point total is less than -2 (e.g., -3, -4, -5, etc.), the prosecutor must tender an offer within the applicable range that is less than the presumptive offer.  The offer may be at the lower end of the range.  If the absolute value of the grand point total is 7 or more (e.g., -7, -8, -9, +7, +8, +9, etc.), the prosecutor must tender a plea offer fixed at the top (or bottom) of the appropriate range, except as provided in Sections 11, 12 or 13.  Page 85
[brief] Db2, Db22.  But there is nothing in the record to support those contentions and the R. 4:6-2(e) standard bars considering them.  Furthermore, the recipient may be storing or using the data for other purposes yet to be discovered.  But the FDCPA does not impose liability based on what the recipient does with the data; instead, liability arises because the debt collector shared data with a third party regardless of the recipient’s subsequent conduct.  If a comparison could be made to telephone and telegraph operators, the data Defendant shared far exceeds the type of information which can be given to a telephone or telegraph operator.  In addition to the FDCPA’s restrictions specific to the use of telephones and telegrams (e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692d(6), 1692f(5), 1692f(8)), debt collectors must still comply with the FDCPA’s other provisions.
[brief] RATEPAYERS SHOULD NOT BEAR UNREASONABLE COST INCREASES FOR THE REGULATOR ASSOCIATED WITH HOLMDEL’S REQUESTS AND THE RESULTING PASSAGE OF TIME.  When a utility requests recovery on a capital project such as the Regulator, Rate Counsel will weigh in on the prudency of the project and the Board will ultimately make a decision regarding the prudency of the cost to determine if it is reasonable for the utility to recover a portion or all of the cost of the project through customer utility rates.  See, Public Service Coordinated Trans. v. State, 5 N.J. at 222.  If the Holmdel Regulator is ultimately placed into service, a BPU decision on the prudency of the project will be made at a later date during a [...] base rate case.  As a result, the legal rulings and the information in the record of the instant matter may impact a future determination of whether costs associated with the Regulator are prudent.  Although Rate Counsel recognizes that this Court will not specifically determine which costs will be passed onto to ratepayers, Rate Counsel seeks to highlight that any decision made by this Court will ultimately impact [...] customer rates if and when the finished Regulator is placed in-service.
[brief] JUDGMENT IS APPROPRIATE AS THERE IS NO GENUINE ISSUE AS TO ANY MATERIAL FACT AND DEFENDANTS ARE ENTITLED TO JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW.  Summary judgment must be granted where, as here, the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, together with any affidavits, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that Defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  N.J. Court R. 4:46-2(c).
[brief] At the very end of my principal brief, I asked this Court to explicitly award me my R. 2:11-5 costs incurred in this appeal, which I approximated to be around $1,300.  But just to be clear, that $1,300 did not include the costs I incurred during the trial court proceedings, nor does it include the hundreds of dollars per month in interest charges I have been incurring since November of 2023.  (On Oct 26, 2023 I paid [...] $7,070 on my Discover Card, so as to prevent him from taking all of my possessions in an attempt to execute upon the sanctions judgment).  Please also be advised that my sister has paid [...] $2,430 in full to settle her portion of the $8,900 judgment.  Thus [...] has already received a total of $9,500 from both of us combined.