ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] *Lombardi v. Masso*, 207 N.J. 517, 538 (2011) (quoting *In re Estate of Stockdale*, 196 N.J. 275, 311 (2008)); see also *Arizona v. California*, 460 U.S. 605, 618 (1983) (“[W]hen a court decides upon a rule of law, that decision should continue to govern the same issues in subsequent stages in the same case. ”); *State v. Reldan*, 100 N.J. 187, 208 (1985 ([...], J., dissenting) (“[T]he ‘law of the case’ rule ordinarily precludes a court from re-examining an issue previously decided by the same court, or a higher appellate court, in the same case. ” (internal quotation marks omitted)).  Law of the case is a discretionary rule that calls on one court “to balance the value of judicial deference for the rulings of a coordinate [court] against those ‘factors that bear on the pursuit of justice and, particularly, the search for truth.
[brief] ...............................................................................................................................11  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS  Order Enforcing Settlement (January 4, 2024)  Da15  Oral Decision (January 4, 2024)  1T:48  #  TABLE OF RESPONDENT’S APPENDIX | Appendix Document | Appendix Page Number | |--------------------------------------------------------|----------------------| | Notice of Motion to Enforce Settlement, Filed Nov. 29, 2023 | Da1 | | Certification in Support of Motion to Enforce Settlement | Da3 | | Exhibit A to Motion to Enforce Settlement | Da8 | | Exhibit B to Motion to Enforce Settlement | Da10 | | Exhibit C to Motion to Enforce Settlement | Da12 | | Order Enforcing Settlement, Filed Jan. 4, 2024 | Da15 | ### TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
[brief] Plaintiff [...] filed this lawsuit against the defendants in Superior court of Jersey, Law div. Hudson County.  (Aa137).  The complaint against the defendant was amended.  (Aa).  Both defendants [...] and or [...] (hereinafter [...]) and [...]  (Hereinafter [...]) filed answer to the original complaint and the amended complaint.  (Aa14;Aaa142;Aa158).  [...] filed a counterclaim against the Plaintiff seeking damages for what they considered fraudulent representations by Plaintiff in her insurance claim submitted after a flood in her home in [...].  [...] answered the counterclaim.  (Aa174).  Defendants both moved for summary judgment.  (Aa1; Aa127).  The motions were opposed by the Plaintiff.  (Aa344).  Orders were entered against the Plaintiff and her complaint was dismissed.  (T; Aa411-Aa414).  Plaintiff moved for reconsideration and defendants both opposed that motion; (Aa415: Aa449-Aa451).  That motion was denied.  (Aa452) (2T).  The defendant [...] moved for summary judgment on its counterclaim and that motion was opposed.  (Aa453).  The court entered the order on the motion.  (Aa538).  (3T).  This appeal follows (Aa540).  STATEMENT OF FACTS
[brief] In the trial court’s haste to jump immediately to equitable tolling, without first deciding when the claim accrued, it overlooked the analysis that it was required to conduct before deciding whether the discovery rule applied.  Accordingly, even were the trial court correct in applying the discovery rule, there was an undeniable, insufficient and underdeveloped record to decide whether the Appellant was entitled to its protection, thereby causing resultant and intolerable prejudice to the Appellant.  II.
[brief] STANDARD OF REVIEW R. 3:23-8(a) provides for a de novo review on the record when a municipal court conviction is appealed to the Law Division.  However, because the arguments addressed also appear to involve questions of law, the standard of review is plenary.  Accordingly, the Court gives no "special deference" to the Municipal Court’s "interpretation of the law and the legal consequences that flow from established facts."  Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Manalapan Twp. Comm., 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995).  Also, if the record shows that the judge either failed altogether to ask the required questions, or that the answers elicited failed to show voluntariness, understanding of the charge and consequences, and factual basis, the appellate court can remand for trial or new plea.  See State v. Rhein, 117 N.J. Super. 112, 121 (App. Div. 1971).  LEGAL ARGUMENT
[brief] Appellants claim that Respondents gained “a wealth of material and information that [Respondents] would not have been entitled to or received” under the rules of the [...] (“[...]”) [Appellants’ Brief, pg. 14-15].  Appellants attempt to paint Respondents’ actions as intentional by insinuating that Respondents were worried about being unable to depose the Appellants under the [...]’s rules.  However, such discovery would certainly be permitted if the two parties to the arbitration agreed to it as a condition of the arbitration.  Counsel for Respondent handles various litigations involving trampoline park injuries, and has taken multiple such matters to arbitration.  It is a standard practice of this firm to enter into discovery exchange agreements with claimants once the matter has been compelled to arbitration, but before the claimant files a demand with [...].  Such agreements provide for the exchange of written discovery and document production between the parties, as well as site inspections, independent medical evaluations of the claimant and depositions of all parties.
[brief] The Board found that petitioner’s settlement “disallowed the processing of his disability claim” because he had no job to return to and could not comply with the return to work statute, N.J.S.A. 42:16A-8(2).  Ibid.  The Appellate Division affirmed the Board’s decision to not process [...]’s disability application, finding that the issue of eligibility was a “critical threshold issue” and that [...]’s inability to return to the Judiciary rendered him “ineligible for participation in the disability pension scheme.
[brief] Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 42:2C-65(a), entitled Effect of Failure to Have Certificate of Authority, “[a] foreign limited liability company transacting business in this State may not maintain an action or proceeding in this State unless it has a certificate of authority to transact business in this State. ”  N.J.S.A. 42:2C-65(a).  By its own sworn admission, Plaintiff, a North Dakota LLC, did not have such a certificate when it commenced this action in September 2022.  Da148–49.  Nor did Plaintiff seek or obtain one for the ensuing eleven months that it prosecuted the case.  Da5; Da9.  In fact, it was not until Defendants flagged the jurisdictional bar to suit that Plaintiff obtained for the first time on September 2, 2023 a certificate of authority to transact business in New Jersey.  Da324.  Contrary to the Trial Court’s conclusion, Plaintiff’s belated procurement of a certificate did not automatically “cure[] this defect” or retroactively remedy the absence of subject matter jurisdiction\(^{13}\) that it caused.  Da16.
[brief] 1.  Extreme Hypothetical—Archaeologist Works Every Day, Every Hour of the Project—[...] Still Wins (0017a).  The [...] believed that the monitoring and reporting of excavation activities expected from the archaeologist on this Project was minor in scope and would not impact the bid results depending on whether the archaeologist was PWCRA-registered or not.  To test this theory, the [...] considered the following extreme hypothetical whereby the archaeologist would work every day, all day for the entire project, whether demolition or excavation work was being performed or not and whether its services were needed or not.  The Total Project duration for this Contract is set at 670 days.  See 0367a Art. II(b) at C-1.  Total work hours are 8 hours per day.  The cost comparison is as follows:  | Comparison in Costs between Archaeologists | [...] | [...] | Difference | |-------------------------------------------|---------|--------|------------| | Total Project Days | 670 | 670 | | | Hours /day | 8 | 8 | | | Total Project Hours | 5360 | 5360 | | | Hourly Rate | $160.00 | $300.00| | | Cost of Archaeologist | $857,600.00 | $1,608,000.00 | $(750,400.00)  |  Using the analysis above, the following adjustments show that the bid result would not change:  | | [...] | [...] | Difference | |------------------------|---------------|---------------|----------------| | Bid | $41,819,780 | $44,732,529 | $ (2,912,749.00) | | Adjustment for Full-Time, PWCRA-Registered Archeologist (Hypo) | $750,400 | | | | Adjusted Bid Prices and Result | $42,570,180 | $44,732,529 | $ (2,162,349.00)  |  Result:  [...]'s bid is still lower than [...]'s.  Therefore, with the aid of the above, extreme hypothetical most favorable to [...], we respectfully submit that the [...] has ruled out [...]’s claim.  The [...] believes that [...]’s position as the successful bidder had nothing to do with its archaeologist’s status under the PWCRA versus that of [...]’s.
[directive] The Attorney General Guidelines for Negotiating Cases Under N.J.S.A. 2C:35- 12 (“Brimage” Guidelines) issued on May 20, 1998 are revised as follows:  I.  ESTABLISHMENT OF NEW TRIGGERING EVENT FOR ESCALATING TO A FINAL POST-INDICTMENT PLEA OFFER.  Under the current “Brimage” Guidelines, the initial post-indictment plea of- fer expires either 20 days after it has been offered or immediately upon the conven- ing of a hearing under R. 3:5-7(d) and 3:9-1(e).  The provision that requires an automatic escalation in the event that a pretrial suppression hearing is convened is premised on a recognition that the prosecutorial and judicial resources expended in litigating a pretrial motion to suppress evidence are often comparable to the resources that would be expended at a trial on the merits of the drug charge, since the pretrial hearing and any ensuing trial will often involve the same witnesses describing the same events and transactions.  Experience under the “Brimage” Guidelines confirms that a significant pro- before portion of prosecutorial resources are expended the pretrial hearing date (i.e., e.g, reviewing reports and interviewing police witnesses, researching legal issues, and preparing formal briefs in response to a defendant’s pretrial motion).  Accordingly, the “Brimage” Guidelines are hereby amended to permit a prosecutor offer”1 to tender a “final post-indictment on the date when the State’s brief is filed or required to be filed pursuant to R. 3:5-7(b) or a scheduling order fixed by the 1  It should be noted that this escalation event could occur before the return of an indictment were a court to direct a prosecutor to file a brief responding to a defendant’s motion to suppress prior to indictment.  See Application Note #14, establishing an automatic escalation to a final post-indictment offer when a court convenes a pre-indictment suppression hearing.  court, rather than upon the convening of a hearing under R. 3:5-7(d) and 3:9-1(e).  To ensure that the defendant has a reasonable opportunity to accept the offer before it graduates to a final post-indictment offer, the plea offer worksheet should expressly advise the defendant if the offer will expire upon the filing of the State’s brief in response to any such motion to suppress and, where feasible, the worksheet provided to the court and the defendant should indicate the specific date when the plea offer will expire and be replaced by a final post-indictment offer.  II.
[brief] [...] INCORRECTLY INTERPRETATED THE STATUTORY LANGUAGE SET FORTH IN N.J.S.A. 34:13A-5.3 (Db17; Rb8)  Rather than address [...]’s substantive legal arguments and caselaw on the issue of statutory interpretation (Pb10), [...] “supports and adopts [...]’s arguments [referring to [...]’s opposition brief against [...]],” accuses [...] of “twist[ing] this plain language [of N.J.S.A. 34:13A-5.3] to instead claim that this language limits which members of a majority representative can participate in collective bargaining,” and alleges that “[...] trie[d] to portray” a [...] holding “differently,” which [...] relied on for an entirely different legal argument (Db17) (See Pb18, where [...] cites to I/M/O Brielle Board of Education and Brielle Education, 3 NJPER ¶ 3 (1977) for its legal argument that “[t]he Association’s demand to conduct ‘open negotiations’ is an unlawful precondition to negotiation.
[brief] New Jersey cases applying this standard have arrived at similar conclusions.  For example, in *Pro. Recovery Servs., Inc. v. Gen. Elec. Cap. Corp.*, 642 F. Supp. 2d 391 (D.N.J. 2009), the court found that even though the source had gotten facts wrong and was a “disgruntled” former employee of the plaintiff, she was not an informant of “dubious veracity” because she was “not only readily identifiable, but also provided her personal contact information, a written statement, and demonstrated commitment to her allegations....”  Id. at 404.  Similarly, in Turf Lawnmower Repair, Inc. v. Bergen Rec. Corp., 139 N.J. 392, 426 (1995), the court found the evidence was insufficient to supporting a finding of actual malice even where the reporter had relied solely upon sources “whom he knew had bias against” the plaintiffs, omitted relevant information, and his reporting was described by an expert as “totally unprofessional.
[brief] First, “continuous” is defined in the Ordinance to mean “any sound that is not impulsive sound” and “impulsive sound” is defined as “a single pressure peak or a single burst (multiple pressure peaks) that has duration of less than one second. ”  Da110.  A child playing and letting out an impulsive shout does not fall under the Ordinance.  Further, any such noise must be deemed unreasonable to be a violation of the Ordinance and surely children playing is most reasonable.  The language of the Ordinance is both clear and reasonable.
[brief] The Standard of Review in the Superior Court, Appellate Division.  The issue presented by this matter is whether [...] waived his right to arbitrate the Parties’ contractual dispute. \(^1\)  The leading decision on the topic of waiver of a contractual arbitration provision is *Cole v. Jersey City Medical Ctr.*, 215 NJ 265 (2013).  In that case the Supreme Court established an analytical framework to be applied when waiver of a contractual arbitration provision is at issue.  Resolution of a waiver issue requires a fact-sensitive analysis.  In this case, rather than engaging in a meticulous examination of the relevant facts, as required, the trial court engaged in a cursory review of the record and thereafter clearly erred in finding that [...] waived his right to arbitration.  This appeal now comes before this Court pursuant to Rule 2:2-3(b)(8) which allows an appeal of “orders compelling or denying arbitration, whether the action is dismissed or stayed.
[brief] *N.J.R.E.*  403(b) also provides that relative evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the risk of undue delay or waste of time.  Here, the Defendants seek to consume, perhaps days, of court room time litigating lawsuits that have nothing to do with the suit currently being tried by the Court.  In each case where the Defendants bring up a disputed lawsuit or bankruptcy, they will invite the litigation of these collateral lawsuits and bankruptcies, all of which can have no possible purpose other than to attempt to tarnish [...] in the jury’s eyes.  The presentation to the jury of the issues in these collateral lawsuits and [...]’s perception of the causes of these lawsuits will not in any way result in the presentation of evidence that will assist the jury in determining whether or not the Defendants breached their fiduciary professional duties to [...] and whether or not such a breach proximately caused him damages.  The Court should exclude this evidence, not only because its slim, hypothetical probative value is greatly outweighed by its risk of substantial prejudice, confusing issues and misleading the jury, but also because any such probative value is dwarfed by the undue delay and waste of time that would be occasioned by its introduction.
[brief] .........................................................................................  33  A.  The Court Must Dismiss Count I Of Plaintiff’s Complaint Because Defendants Did Not Breach Any Alleged Contract (Da1-69)  ..........................................................  34  B.  The Court Should Dismiss Count II Of Plaintiff’s Complaint Because Defendants Were Not Unjustly Enriched (Da1-69)  ..............................................................................  37 POINT V LIABILITY WAS IMPROPERLY IMPOSED AGAINST [...] BECAUSE [...] DID NOT EXECUTE ANY WRITTEN GUARANTEE (Da1-69; Da84-98)
[brief] If an insurer has paid those benefits and the insured is entitled to, but has failed to apply for, workers' compensation benefits or employees' temporary disability benefits, the insurer may immediately apply to the provider of workers' compensation benefits or of employees' temporary disability benefits for a reimbursement of any benefits pursuant to sections 4 and 10 of P.L. 1972, c.70 (C.39:6A-4 and 39:6A-10), medical expense benefits pursuant to section 4 of P.L. 1998, c. 21(C.39:6A-3.1) or benefits pursuant to section 45 of P.L. 2003, c. 89(C.39:6A-3.3) it has paid.  This statutory section allows a PIP carrier paying benefits pursuant to N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4 or 10 to recover their PIP payments from a workers compensation carrier.
[brief] ”  Newark Morning Ledger Co. v. N.J. Sports & Exposition Auth., 423 N.J. Super. 140, 174 (App. Div. 2011) (quoting Union Cnty. Improvement Auth. v. Artaki, LLC, 392 N.J.  Super. 141, 149 (App. Div. 2007)).  “Judicial abuse of discretion is tantamount to harmful error, i.e., error clearly capable of producing an unjust result. ”  Cmty. Hosp. Grp. Inc. v. More, 365 N.J. Super. 84, 94 (App. Div. 2003).  As set forth below, the trial court record soundly supports the granting of injunctive relief in favor of Plaintiff and barring [...] from taking any further action towards the commercial redevelopment and condemnation of the Property while this matter is pending, as any such action would (a) clearly produce an unjust result to the protected class and (b) cause an extreme chilling effect on inclusionary zoning litigation against significantly noncompliant municipalities.  Accordingly, before addressing the individual Crowe factors, it is critical to understand the importance of the Mount Laurel doctrine and the consequences which result from a municipality’s constitutional noncompliance.
[directive] Restrictions that do exist, however, must be recognized and followed.  Failure to do so may result in improperly gathered evidence being deemed inadmissible in court.  Restrictions that apply to internal affairs investigations may have their basis in state statutes, case law, collective bargaining agreements, local ordinances, Civil Service Commission rules or agency rules and regulations.  Internal affairs investigators shall familiarize themselves with all of these provisions.  7.0.4
[brief] Both [...] and [...] testified at trial, each describing the care provided to [...].  The Trial Court ruled that Drs. Goldsmith and Nguyen were only to be referred to as treating doctors.  (5T18:12-14).  In line with that ruling, the Trial Court also instructed counsel that, at most, they could tell the jury that Drs. Goldsmith and Nguyen had been procedurally dismissed, and that the jury would be told not to speculate as to why.  (5T17:8-11).  The Trial Court ruled that information beyond the doctors being procedurally dismissed was irrelevant to the case.  (5T17:11-13).  When defense counsel attempted to go beyond this very clear instruction during cross-examination, the Trial Court re-affirmed its prior ruling that any information beyond Drs. Goldsmith and Nguyen being procedurally dismissed was out of the case.  (11T65:1-8).  During the charge conference, the Trial Court again ruled that the jury would not hear any information about the Plaintiff/Respondent’s Complaint because, during the trial, it was Appellant who had made allegations of deviation against Drs. Goldsmith and Nguyen.  (18T14:6-18T15:22).  The jury was instructed in accordance with the Trial Court’s ruling, (20T137:21-20T138:7), and Drs.  Goldsmith and Nguyen were included on the verdict sheet.  (20T155:12-20T156:10).  After deliberation, on December 20, 2022, the jury found both Appellant and [...] liable, and allocated sixty percent (60%) fault to direct Appellant, the only direct defendant, and forty percent (40%) fault to [...].
[brief] 6 appendices that were included with the Award and transmitted to [...] on December 17, 2023.  (Aa559).  By email dated April 9, 2024, [...]’s counsel provided counsel for the [...] with the 6 appendices that were provided to [...]’s counsel by [...].  (Aa557).  [...] has not reissued the Award to the parties with the 6 appendices attached.  This Appeal of the February 29, 2024 [...] Decision was filed with Court by the [...] on April 11, 2024.
[brief] ”  *Id.* at 51.  The Court expounded on *Carroll’s* holding and progeny, finding that because the circumstances that furnish probable cause to search a vehicle for particular contraband are most often unforeseeable and “the opportunity to search is fleeting since a car is readily movable[,]” warrantless searches of vehicles are permissible.  *Id.* at 52 (emphasis added).  For constitutional purposes, we see no difference between on the one hand seizing and holding a car before presenting the probable cause issue to a magistrate and on the other hand carrying out an immediate search without a warrant.  Given probable cause to search, either course is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.
[brief] The Court in making a determination on the summary judgment motion filed by the Defendant was aware of the fact that the Appellant’s deposition when taken by the Respondent was incomplete.  Counsel for the Appellant did not have the opportunity to ask questions after Counsel for the Respondent finished her questioning.  The reschedule of the Appellant’s deposition never happened.  This Counsel filed a Motion to Compel Respondent’s Counsel to reschedule the deposition so that it could be completed and so that this Counsel could put her questions on the record and the Court denied this motion.
[brief] Plaintiff’s expert reports should have been barred by the trial court; however, the Court elected not to strike same affording Plaintiff every opportunity and inference to defeat summary judgment.  Plaintiff still failed to meet his burden even with these reports in play.  Four (4) separate discovery Orders, each of which required Plaintiff to produce his expert reports by a date certain, were ignored by Plaintiff; he then provided same beyond the court-ordered deadlines for same.  On September 25, 2023, Plaintiff provided the expert report of [...], an arborist, and also an expert report by [...] (“[...]”) and [...] (“[...]”), purported weather experts.  On October 11, 2023, Plaintiff provided an expert report by [...] (“[...]”), a physical engineer.  Finally, on October 23, 2022, twelve days after discovery had ended, Plaintiff provided an expert report by [...], M.A., an economist (“[...]”).  On October 13, 2023, the case was arbitrated, and despite his two late-provided expert reports, Plaintiff’s case was still issued an award finding that he had “No Cause For Action.
[brief] BRIEF OF PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS  Date Submitted: November 20, 2023  Of Counsel and On the Brief: [...], Esq. (005501979)  [...], Esq. (041131997)  On the Brief: [...], Esq. (026671978)  [...], Esq. (054431992)  [...]  [...]  [...]  [...]  Telephone: [...]  Facsimile: [...]  Attorneys for Plaintiffs-Appellants