ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Entry of final judgment in the matter now on appeal brought to a conclusion roughly fifty-five months of contentious litigation between the parties.  In the months and years that elapsed between the filing of the initial complaint on January 18, 2018 (Da629) and entry of final judgment on August 26, 2022 (Da4), the case now on appeal was before three separate Presiding Judges in the Chancery Division.  During that time, Plaintiffs (through their counsel and by directing the actions of [...]) engaged [...], his family, friends, business associates, and affiliated companies in more than a dozen separate actions, (Infra.) all premised on the same set of transactions, and in furtherance of a well-planned, well-executed, and well-disguised scheme to destroy the Bakers personally, professionally, and financially.  Theories of liability advanced in one case were conspicuously absent from others, as it would have been impossible for the Plaintiffs’ conflicting stories to stand up against each other in the same action.  For example, in [...] v. [...] et al, Docket No. [...], more than thirty motions were decided during the roughly two years the case was pending.  (See ACMS).  Five separate Superior Court judges in Morris and Sussex Counties\(^4\) were involved at different stages of those proceedings, each deciding at least one of the motions filed.  After the trial court dismissed the entirety of [...]’s complaint – with prejudice – on a motion for summary judgment (See ACMS) with respect to three of the defendants, [...] voluntarily dismissed all claims against the eleven remaining defendants, also with prejudice.  (Da1077-79).  This included some of the same claims asserted \(^4\) Judges Brennan (t/a on recall), Hansbury (t/a on recall), McGovern, Ramsay, and Weaver. here against [...], namely, those claims alleging conversion (Da1025) and unjust enrichment.  (Da1024).  The other matters included five separate AAA arbitrations against five businesses owned by or affiliated with [...] and decided by two separate AAA arbitrators (Da157-67 and Da225-38); five separate summary cases before three separate judges (See [...], -2437-19, -2438-19, & 2439-19 ([...]); [...] (Judges Weaver & Brennan)) in Morris and Sussex Counties to convert the AAA awards into judgments; [...]’s intervention in a foreclosure matter involving [...]; intervention in and opposition to confirmation of [...]’s personal bankruptcy as well as that of [...]\(^5\); and at least four Law Division cases involving [...] and [...] by virtue of personal guarantees executed by him (See [...], -478-19, -464-19, and -224-18).
[brief] *[...] v. [...]*, 2014 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1868 (Sup. Ct. App. Div. July 31, 2014)²⁵ (citing *Isetts v. Borough of Roseland*, 364 N.J. Super. 247, 255-256 (App. Div. 2003)).  “[I]n the absence of fraud, misrepresentation or overreaching by the releasee, in the absence of a showing that the releasor was suffering from an incapacity --- ²⁵ (Da20-Da28).  affecting his ability to understand the meaning of the release and in the absence of any other equitable ground, it is the law of this State that the release is binding and that the releasor will be held to the terms of the bargain he willingly and knowingly entered. ”  *Raroha v. Earle Finance Corp.*, 47 N.J. 229, 234 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1966).  Where the settlement agreement bars the claims in the complaint, the causes of action waived by the release must be dismissed.  *See [...]*, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1868, at *16-17* (dismissing causes of action in the complaint on the basis that the settlement agreement bars the claims in the complaint).
[brief] (9T89-1 to 93-16).  [...] advised that he could not determine the sequence of the gunshot wounds and opined that while all four wounds were “potentially fatal,” the “most rapidly fatal” gunshot wound entered [...]’s back and traveled through his ribs and lungs.  (9T89-1 to 93-16).  Immediately after the shooting, [...] testified that he observed a group of people running down Kaign Avenue followed by a male, later identified as defendant, dressed in black clothing and a black ski mask riding a red bicycle.  (6T36-1 to 38-4).
[brief] Indeed, there is a strong presumption in favor of retaining jurisdiction where the plaintiff is a resident who has chosen his [or her] home forum."  Yousef v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 205 N.J. 543, 557 (2011)  Pasono v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. DOCKET NO. [...] (App. Div. Feb. 28, 2014)  Plaintiff has a right under the New Jersey State Constitution and the NJLAD to be free from harassment and interference with his constitutional and statutory rights.  Plaintiff is entitled to relief under NJCRA (Pa 175-176) and the NJLAD (Pa 212-262).  This case is about harassment, discrimination, deprivation, and interference with Constitutional [N.J. Const. Art. I] and Statutory rights [N.J.S.A. 2A:17-36, N.J.S.A. 10:5-1 et seq.].  It is a matter at law.
[brief] ]  Here, the Trial Court properly held that Defendant’s refusal to build the Authority Garage, combined with the inability to perform the agreement following the June 30, 2022 Order, resulted in an unconscionable result where [...] bore the costs of the parking garage, and Defendant enjoyed all the profits.  As such, reformation was the appropriate remedy in light of all the facts detailed by the Trial Court, and as set forth above.  Defendant cannot escape its obligation to “turn square corners” with [...] even if it did not act in “bad faith” or fraudulently.  Defendant’s attempt to have its cake and eat it with the subject property demonstrates that it did not turn square corners in litigation and, as a result, the Trial Court’s decision should stand.  Accordingly, [...] respectfully requests that this Court affirm the Trial Court’s March 15, 2024 Judgment and dismiss Defendant’s appeal.
[brief] (1T:4-6) which became the subject matter of this litigation.  Plaintiff received 3 violations for said installation and despite dismissal/consolidations of two of the violations, “decided as a way of settling the matter we would apply for a Zoning Permit.  The Zoning Permit was merely to get the matter before the HPC.  And we then applied to the HPC for approval of the walkway” (1T5:7-9).  It should be noted that there is no directive or Order provided from the Municipal Court to stipulate as to what the actual intent of the Court was, but it was clearly to go through the municipal process to obtain a Certificate of Appropriateness which would have been INCLUSIVE of a Zoning Permit.
[directive] If the requesting and agency is unable to pay the costs and Treasury’s share, the property shall be sold the proceeds distributed in accordance with these Guidelines.  Exceptions to this (1) requirement may be granted by the deciding official upon assurance that the requesting agency lacks funds or authority to satisfy the costs and Treasury’s share, (2) and the forfeited item will fill a demonstrable need of the requesting agency.  Such exceptions shall be granted conservatively.  Task Force Agreements 3 6
[brief] In its brief, Plaintiff speculates that the consent provision of the Amended Redevelopment Plan was meant to “encourage developers to invest in blighted areas rather than in more profitable less risky projects outside of those areas. ”  Pb34.  Yet there is nothing in the record to support Plaintiff’s conjecture that it was granted perpetual veto power over any amendment to the Redevelopment Plan as an incentive to invest in the redevelopment area or to disallow “competing developers more advantageous development opportunities. ”  Ibid.  Plaintiff’s speculation in this regard is a self-serving, yet unsupportable, interpretation of the Redevelopment Plan.
[brief] At the time, [...] thought these problems could be resolved with a quick fix by having [...]’s IT populate custodian information; [...] blamed the breadth of the production on the broad search terms.  (ECF 66, at 13-16.)  The court therefore ordered [...] “to populate the metadata fields with custodian names for documents produced in response to RFP No. 7 by July 14. ”  (ECF 49, at 1.)  In attempting to resolve the problems, however, [...] learned that the prior search had not been run correctly and had therefore generated a large number of false hits.  [...] also discovered that it was missing a document collection from one of the agreed-upon custodians, [...]’s CEO, [...].
[brief] Complaint (In Rem Foreclosure)  Filed on June 22, 2022  35a-80a.  Motion to Determine Property is Abandoned  Filed on September 14, 2022  39a-42a - Certification in Support of Motion 43a-45a - Exhibit A - Certificate of Sale 46a-50a - Exhibit B - E-Mail Correspondence 51a-58a - Exhibit C - Proof of Service 59a-65a - Exhibit D - Certification of Posting 66a-80a - Exhibit E - Inspection Report and Photographs of Property 81a-84a  Order Determining that Property is Abandoned  Filed on October 7, 2022  85a-88a.  Civil Action  Final Judgment Docketed on November 7, 2022  89a.  Order Substituting Plaintiff  Docketed on November 7, 2022  90a-142a.
[brief] She conceded that the evidence “would certainly be material if true,” but decided it was “contradictory,” “conclusory and speculative” because the certification from [...] was not detailed enough, [...] had not provided the court with a possible motive for [...] to target [...], and did not identify [...] as the shooter “with certainty. ”  (Da376-77)  The judge also suggested that she did not find [...]’s certification credible.  (Da377)  First, it was improper to dismiss the credibility of [...]’s certification and the other supporting evidence provided.  See Porter, 216 N.J. at 355 (“Even a suspicious or questionable affidavit supporting a PCR petition ‘must be tested for credibility and cannot be summarily rejected. ’”) (holding court erred in denying motion for new trial without evidentiary hearing where defendant offered affidavit of fellow inmate in support of motion)).  As discussed infra Point III, it was unfair to hold further development of the record against [...], since the PCR court denied his repeated discovery requests to glean additional information about [...] and [...].
[brief] PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND STATEMENT OF FACTS ...........................................1  LEGAL ARGUMENT ..................................................................................................................3 POINT I  THE PLEA MUST BE VACATED BECAUSE THE FACTUAL BASIS IS INADEQUATE.  (Not Raised Below)  .................................................................................................................................3  POINT II  A RESENTENCING IS REQUIRED BECAUSE THE SENTENCING COURT WAS REQUIRED TO ORDER A PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUATION.  (Not Raised Below)  .................................................................................................................................12  A.  A Psychological Evaluation Was Mandated Both Because of the Nature of the Present and Prior Convictions and Due to [...]’s Mental Condition.  The Court Did Not Waive and Could Not Have Waived the Evaluation Because It Would Have Included Information Relevant to Sentencing.  ..............................................16  B.  A Psychological Examination Was Also Required, and Could Not Be Waived, Because the Case Involves a Child Endangering Conviction.............................................................................21  POINT III  IN THE ALTERNATIVE, RESENTENCING IS REQUIRED BECAUSE THE COURT ERRED IN APPLYING THE MITIGATING AND AGGRAVATING FACTORS AND IN IMPOSING A SECOND MAXIMUM CONSECUTIVE SENTENCE.
[directive] 3.  Officer Testing  Sworn law enforcement officers shall be ordered to submit a urine specimen for testing when they have been randomly selected to submit to a drug test.  Random selection shall be defined as a method of selection in which each and every sworn member of the law enforcement agency, regardless of rank or assignment, has an equal chance to be selected for drug testing each and every time a selection is conducted.  Sworn law enforcement officers shall also be required to submit a urine specimen for testing when there exists reasonable suspicion to believe that the officer is illegally using drugs or is under the influence of a controlled dangerous substance or cannabis during work hours.  An officer shall be ordered to submit to a drug test based on reasonable suspicion only with the approval of the county prosecutor or the chief executive officer of the officer's agency.  Urine specimens may also be collected from law enforcement officers during a regularly scheduled and announced medical examination or a fitness for duty examination.  However, the collection and analysis of these specimens are not governed by this policy.  C.
[brief] *State v. Washington*, 453 N.J. Super. 164, 190 (App. Div. 2018).  In light of the “general policy of admissibility,” it is preferable for the trial judge to explore alternatives such as “according defense counsel an opportunity to [analyze the new evidence], by granting a brief continuance, or by some other procedure which would have permitted defense counsel to prepare to meet the evidence. ”  *Id.* at 191.  In the exercise of its “broad discretion to determine what remedy, if any, it should impose because of a failure to make expert disclosures,” the court may consider whether: (1) “the party who failed to disclose intended to mislead”; and (2) “the aggrieved party was surprised and would be prejudiced by the admission of expert testimony.
[brief] ’”  (23T 162-24 to 163-2, 164-10 to 25, 170-11 to 171-1, 196-9 to 19)  [...] understood “cap” to mean shoot or kill.  (23T 165-1 to 3)  With [...] and [...] coming from one direction and the group uttering threats coming from another, [...] was being “ambushed from the back and front at the same time” and felt “trapped. ”  (23T 169-12 to 170-4, 172-4 to 6, 198-23 to 199-12; 24T 203-7 to 8).
[brief] The issue in this matter is notice.  As mentioned earlier, the Defendant [...] had constructive and actual notice of a dangerous condition on its property.  Unlike Polzo, in which the County had to account for an extensive network of roads, the extent of Kearny Avenue was approximately 0.87 miles.  (Pa 258).  Although the Defendant has indicated that the entire town consists of 105 miles of roadway, the Defendant has not tendered any information to indicate that it is entitled to immunity for Discretionary Activities under N.J.S.A 59:2.3.
[brief] (Pa7).  In the same order as that which pertained to the experts, the judge sua sponte bifurcated the trial, as is permitted under Rule 4:38-2.  (Pa93).  Then, after the witness [...] came forward with family snapshots and text messages which appeared to show the plaintiff doing various activities four and five years after the incident complained of, [...] put the trials back together, and allowed the plaintiff to be cross-examined about [...]’s evidence during the liability phase of the trial.
[brief] The DNA Expert’s Testimony Violated N.J.R.E. 702 And 403.  [...] testified that [...] was “the source” of a stain found on [...]’s shirt and that a DNA profile on the bra supposedly taken from [...] was “determined to be [...][s].”  (5T 56-6 to 23, 59-1 to 6)  [...] did not give any supporting statistic for the jury to evaluate the weight of that match.  The failure to do so renders the testimony scientifically unreliable as well as of limited probative value.  The scientific community and the courts that have examined the issue agree that DNA evidence must be presented with a statistical weight in order for its meaning to be given proper context.  See e.g., Commonwealth v. Mattei, 920 N.E.2d 845, 858 (Mass. 2010) (“The challenged expert [DNA] testimony concerning the nonexclusion results should not have been admitted without accompanying statistical explanation of the meaning of nonexclusion. ”).  Deloney v. State, 938 N.E.2d 724, 730 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (deeming DNA evidence inadmissible without “accompanying testimony explaining the statistical significance of those non-exclusion results”); United States v. Davis, 602 F. Supp.  2d 658, 673 (D. Md. 2009) (“DNA evidence cannot be admitted in a vacuum; the Government must also present some additional information with which a jury can accurately assess the significance of the consistency between a defendant’s DNA profile and that of the evidence. ”); State v. Tester, 968 A.2d 895, 909 (Vt. 2009) (“[A]dmission of DNA match evidence, without additional evidence of the frequency with which such matches might occur by chance, is error. ”).  “Without the probability assessment, the jury does not know what to make of the fact that the [DNA] patterns match: the jury does not know whether the patterns are as common as pictures with two eyes, or as unique as the Mona Lisa. ”  United States v. Yee, 134 F.R.D. 161, 181 (N.D. Ohio 1991), aff’d sub nom.  United States v. Bonds, 12 F.3d 540 (6th Cir. 1993).  Our courts have taken for granted that a statistic would be provided with DNA evidence.  State v. Marcus, 294 N.J. Super. 267, 278 (App. Div. 1996) (“Once a match is found, the final part of the interpretative stage is the calculation of the statistical significance of the match. ”).  Because no statistic was provided in this case, the DNA evidence was misleading and did not provide any information for the jury to properly assess its probative value.  D.
[directive] No 10%  age 16 to 17 and actor is related by blood or affinity to third degree; or actor has supervisory or disciplinary power over victim; or actor is parent or stands in loco parentis within the household; or victim is age 13 to 15 and the actor is at least 4 years older.  21  Bail Schedule 1 10%  Cash Bail Statute Charge Description Degree Bail Range Option  Actor commits sexual contact with victim age 13 to 15 and actor is related by blood or affinity to third degree; or actor has supervisory or disciplinary power over victim; or actor is parent or stands in loco parentis within the household; or act is committed during commission of other designated crimes; or actor is armed with weapon and threatens to use Aggravated Criminal weapon; or actor is aided by other person(s) and physical force or coercion is used; or actor 2C:14-3a 3rd Degree $25,000 to $100,000
[brief] The Mayor again expressed concern regarding potential health and safety impacts of the contamination.  As a pathologist and an epidemiologist, there is a, you know, there is a danger in polluted land and there is a – there has been a huge increase in cancer associated with gas stations throughout the entire country, not just in [...] or along the coastal areas.  We are, I think, more vulnerable along the coastal areas.  I think many oncologists would tell you that they’ve seen an increase in cancer in areas like this.  (T2, 38:25-39:8).  The Borough Council noted that private enterprise has not been successful in redeveloping this contaminated property.
[brief] Applying the equitable doctrine, Plaintiff is barred from pursuing the specific performance remedy.  Plaintiff made a conscious choice to accept the return of the Deposit, which constituted an intentional abandonment of the transaction, making the PSA null and void.  Plaintiff’s decision to terminate the PSA is inconsistent with the remedy of specific performance.  “A party will not be permitted to carry water on both shoulders . . . a contract cannot be entirely valid at the same time in which it is entirely void Ab initio. ”  Ray v. Beneficial Fin. Co. of N. Jersey, 92 N.J. Super. 519, 535 (Ch. Div. 1966); see also Krisher v. Murphy, 11 N.J. Super. 231, 235 (App. Div. 1951) (finding that plaintiff was barred from enforcing a sale agreement by specific performance where plaintiff made an election to demand the return of the deposit, which constituted an irrevocable election to rescind the contract).  For similar reasons, Plaintiff’s argument that it expressly “reserved” its abandoned right to specific performance, while simultaneously accepting the return of the Deposit, is not only barred by the express terms of the PSA, but also by the equitable doctrine of election of remedies.  Plaintiff cannot “reserve” rights that it forfeited by seeking and receiving the return of its Deposit.  D.
[brief] [...] found that on May 16, 2018 Defendant appeared with [...] who stipulated that Defendant was pleading guilty to his second DWI offense and that his BAC was .17.  (3T17-17 to 17-25)  [...] then cited the plea colloquy which occurred between Defendant and [...] in which Defendant admitted consuming alcohol prior to driving; that his consumption affected his ability to drive; and that he was under the influence of that alcohol.  (3T18-2 to 18-13)  [...] acknowledged [...]’s acceptance of Defendant’s plea and the subsequent sentence he imposed.  (3T18-14 to 18-25)  Next, [...] found that on March 23, 2022, Defendant moved to vacate his plea.
[brief] On June 11, 2021, [...] received approval from the [...] to advertise for bids for the construction of the Treatment System.  Id. at ¶ 18.  On June 16, 2021, the [...], Municipal Finance and Construction Element, also approved [...] to advertise for bids for the construction of the Treatment System.  *Id.* at ¶ 19.  The project was advertised for bids on August 10, 2021.  Pa169 at ¶ 20.  And, on September 8, 2021, [...] adopted Resolution 51-2021, which identified [...] as the winning bidder for the construction of the Treatment System.  *Id.* at ¶ 21.  To ensure that [...] would promptly complete its work to address the PFNA MCL exceedances, in December 2021, [...] required that [...] enter an Administrative Consent Order (“ACO”) that set a series of deadlines for [...] to take the steps necessary to address the PFNA MCL exceedances.
[directive] Conflict Alerts.  Resolving for Principles  General D. resolved be should target/suspect a in interest shared a with agencies between Disputes be based should resolution  The command. of chains respective their within parties by amicably the been have already resources that of amount particular the in including considerations, equitable all on and charges significant most potential the for the and investigations respective their in expended submits that agency  The safety. on public impact greatest the have would that outcomes sentencing primary have automatically not does first system information the to location event or target/suspect location. that at planned operation a conduct or to target/suspect, that investigate to rights superior or as Directive this to information pursuant deconfliction submit to agencies encourage to However, consideration. relevant system a the is to submission of timing data the possible, early as Director. or Prosecutor of tes Dis Countv Resolution by un E. the of laws the of the authority under operating agencies between dispute a that event the
[brief] It is beyond dispute the Agreement does not contain Appellant’s physical signature.  However, it is disputed as to whether the language of the Agreement clearly suggests to a layperson that they are waiving their right to sue Respondents in Superior Court for future claims of discrimination brought pursuant to the NJLAD.  Accordingly, there is a genuine dispute of material fact regarding the issue of whether Appellant actually “signed” or otherwise agreed to be bound by the purported Agreement; nevertheless, and as previously noted, we respectfully request that the matter be remanded to the trial court to hold a plenary hearing on this issue if deemed necessary by the Appellate Division.
[brief] TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS  Order denying Motion to Suppress Evidence, 8/16/22……………………………………Pa020  Judgment of Conviction, 10/19/22…………………………………………………Pa021 to Pa024  Appellate Division decision, State v. [...], [...], 3/8/24…………………………………………………………………………………………Pa030 to Pa044  Order granting Motion to Suppress Evidence, (granted 6/28/24, order dated 7/5/24)……………………………………………………………………………………………..Pa055  2  References are to the appendix submitted with the State’s motion for leave to appeal on July 25, 2024.  ##  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES