ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] See The Sedona Principles, Third Edition: Best Practices, Recommendations & Principles for Addressing Electronic Document Production, 19 Sedona Conf. J. 1, 65 (2018) (“When balancing the cost, burden, and need for electronically stored information, courts and parties should apply the proportionality standard embodied in Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) and its state equivalents, which requires consideration of the importance of the issues at stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the parties’ relative access to relevant information, the parties’ resources, the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and burdensomeness was then memorialized in Rule 4:10-2(g), which limits the scope of discovery if “the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit, taking into account the needs of the case, the amount in controversy, the parties’ resources, the importance of the issues at stake in the litigation, and the importance of the proposed discovery in resolving the issues. ”  Rule 4:10-2(g)(3).  That Rule provides a trial court with “express authority to limit discovery in the circumstances enumerated by the rule in an effort to curb the proliferating discovery abuses attending modern litigation practice.
[brief] Under the Criminal Justice Act of 1970, N.J.S.A. 52:17B-97 to -117, the Attorney General (AG), as the “chief law enforcement officer of [this] State,” see N.J.S.A. 52:17B-98, is charged with adopting guidelines, directives and policies that bind local police departments in the day-to-day administration of the law enforcement process.  See In re Gen. Disciplinary Hearing of Carberry, 114 N.J. 574, 577–78, 556 A.2d 314 (1989), the articulated design is to promote the “uniform and efficient enforcement of the criminal law and the administration of criminal justice throughout the State. ”  N.J.S.A. 52:17B-98.  Such provisions “shall be liberally construed. ”  Ibid.  Accordingly, consistent with statutory authority, the AG issues guidelines, directives and policies concerning appropriate application of the State's criminal laws.  See In re Carroll, 339 N.J. Super. 429, 439, (App. Div.), certif. denied, 170 N.J. 85, 784 A.2d 718 (2001).  Indeed, our courts have “acknowledged the validity of various guidelines issued by the Attorney General,” such as the plea offer guidelines, the sex offender registration guidelines, the drug screening guidelines, and the guidelines assisting prosecutors in rendering uniform decisions concerning drug testing.  Ibid.; see also, e.g., State v. Henderson, 397 N.J. Super. 398, 411, 937 A.2d 988 (App. Div. 2008) (addressing AG guidelines regarding eyewitness identification).  O'Shea v. Twp. of W. Milford, supra, at 382-383.  As in O’Shea, in the present matter, the OAG has exercised its supervisory authority in issuing both the IAPP, as well as Law Enforcement Directive 22-14 on how IA investigations are to be conducted, and how the reporting of those investigations’ conclusions are to be handled.
[directive] They are also designed to complement the Attorney General's model policy, as indicated.  Although individuals adjudicated incapacitated are not necessarily dependents as that term is utilized herein, the procedures have been updated to require that a detainee inform the court if he or she is currently a guardian or co-guardian for an incapacitated person.  These guidelines also offer both procedures to assist detainees to inform the court of the needs of a dependent and to help the court identify dependent persons who may need care prior to the detention or sentencing of a caretaker.  2.0
[brief] (Ca172-173).  In doing so, the Commission directly contradicted an Advisory Opinion it publicly issued in 2018 which clearly stated that it has jurisdiction over newly elected school board members who have not yet been seated.  Advisory Opinion 36-17 (2018) states in relevant part:  Similar to all other newly elected, as well as currently seated, Board members, this Board member is bound by and charged with understanding and complying with the ethical standards set forth in the Act.  (Ca194) (emphasis added).  By abandoning its own precedent, which was reasonably relied on by Appellants, the Commission has denied Appellants due process and the right to be heard on this issue.
[directive] 2.3.2  Every supervisor must establish a familiarity with the agency's disciplinary process and develop an understanding of how to implement specific disciplinary procedures when called upon to deal with inappropriate behavior or misconduct.  If a supervisor fails to follow these procedures or avoids their responsibility, that supervisor is not conforming to expected behavior and must receive some sort of corrective action.  Some supervisors occasionally need to be reminded that the fundamental responsibility for direction and control rests with the immediate supervisor at the operational level, not with the law enforcement executive.  2.3.3
[brief] The PCR court correctly concluded that defendant “received the benefit of a concurrent sentence [as opposed to a presumed consecutive term] on matters to which he plead guilty” and, therefore he was unable to show how plea counsel’s performance was deficient within the meaning of *Strickland*.  (Da45).  Indeed, in the circumstances of this case, defendant failed to show how by receiving a lenient sentence “counsel's acts or omissions fell outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance considered in light of all the circumstances of the case. ”  *Allegro*, 193 N.J. at 366.  Therefore, the PCR court properly held that he did not meet the performance prong of the *Strickland* standard to establish ineffective assistance of counsel.  For the above reasons, the State urges this court to affirm the PCR court’s denial of his petition because he failed to establish a prima facie case of ineffective assistance of counsel.
[brief] The Rules of the Court, the Code on Judicial Conduct, and the applicable case law do not support a recusal in this matter.  In deciding the Motion for Recusal, [...] correctly found that her time in the N.J. Legislature, when she was there for the 2016, 2018, and 2020 legislative sessions, and was one of many sponsors of the “Presumption Bill,” did not preclude her from sitting on this case.  (1T17-3 to 25).  [...] stated that there was nothing that Respondent had pointed to, nor was there an affidavit submitted showing any appearance of impropriety to the Movant’s client.  (1T19-7 to 9).  [...] cited many published and unpublished decisions in which recusal was disfavored and the Courts made it clear that a judge should not step aside “unless the alleged cause of recusal is known by him to exist or shown to be true in fact. ” (1T20-15 to 18, where [...] quoted Panitch v. Panitch, 339 N.J. Super. 63, 66-67 (App. Div. 2001).  [...] also quoted State v. Marshall, 148 N.J. 89 (1997), and the holding in that case is applicable to the present matter:  “Judges are not free to err on the side of caution; it is improper for a court to recuse itself unless the factual bases for its disqualification are shown by the movant to be true or are already known by the court. ” (1T20-23 to 21-4).  N.J. Court Rule 1:12 sets forth the standard for “Disqualification and Disability of Judges. ”  The disposition of disqualification by a party’s motion rests in the sound discretion of the judge whose recusal is sought.  See, e.g. Chandok v. Chandok, 406 N.J. Super. 595, 603 (App. Div., certif. den. 200 N.J. 207 (2009).  The comment section to Court Rule 1:12-2, which is the rule based on a party’s motion for recusal, states that for further information on the standard for recusal, one should look at the Comment Section to Rule 1:12-1 (Rule regarding cause for disqualification on the Court’s Motion).  This comment section shows that there is an abundance of case law to support that the Motion for Recusal was properly denied.
[brief] See Metromedia, Inc. v. Director, Div. of Taxation, 97 N.J. 313, 331-32 (1984); accord Airwork Serv. Div. v. Director, Div. of Taxation, 97 N.J. 290, 301 (1984) (holding that an assessment did not constitute de facto rulemaking because the taxability of the services at issue was “sufficiently clearly and directly inferable from the statute itself”).  In Airwork, the Court also found that, as is the case here, “it has not been demonstrated that the determination represents a material and significant change in administrative policy, even though the taxing authority did not impose the tax. ”
[brief] Indeed, *Humane Society* already rejected the claim that “the statutory delegation of the power of appointment to a private organization such as the [[...]] violates due process. ”  70 N.J. at 571.  While N.J.S.A. 13:1B-24 empowers individual sportsmen – who represent interests “most directly affected by the Council’s regulations and possess the requisite expertise for achievement of the statutory objective” of managing populations of game animals – it does not require membership in the [...] itself.
[brief] The claims in the Lawsuit were based upon allegations that Defendants breached their fiduciary duty and that they were personally in an adversary role against the [...] (“Association”).  On August 3, 2020, the Court ruled, concluding that these allegations were true.  The Court granted summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ claim for breach of fiduciary duty with respect to Defendants’ conduct “personally benefitting the Defendants financially, and harming the Association financially. ”  Notably, the remaining claims in the Lawsuit, including intentional conversion, have since been dismissed.
[brief] (1)  On permitted single-family lots, up to eight (8) small animals are permitted on lots of at least 20,000 square feet; and one (1) additional small animal is permitted for each 5,000 square feet of lot area in excess of 20,000 square feet.  Accessory structures, including fences, for eight (8) or more animals must be at least ten (10) feet from any other lot in a residential zone, unless the Township Code otherwise requires a greater setback for certain types of structures.
[brief] N.J.A.C. 7:8-5.4(b)(1)(i)-(ii).  Here, DEP found that the Project met these criteria.  In its Engineering Report, DEP determined that the Project satisfied N.J.A.C. 7:8-5.4(b)(1)(ii) because the post-construction recharge deficit (i.e. the increase in stormwater runoff volume) is 904,330 cubic feet and the stormwater management system provides a recharge volume of 925,231 cubic feet, resulting in an annual surplus of 20,901 cubic feet.  (Aa88).  In other words, [...]’s proposed stormwater \textsuperscript{13}  https://dep.nj.gov/wp-content/uploads/stormwater/bmp/nj_swbmp_1_final_-9-27-16.pdf, at 3.  management system will provide more groundwater recharge than the Property currently experiences.  Similar to the water quality arguments, [...] does not challenge the overall recharge values DEP determined, but rather levies several more targeted attacks.
[brief] e.  The boardwalk not being built  The trial court further concluded that [...]’s subsequent decision not to build the boardwalk that appeared on the 1925 Map supported its ruling that at the time of the initial conveyance of the [...] the parties intended an unwritten easement to cross the [...] to the beach.  (T69:19—T71:1)  However, the subsequent decision not to build the boardwalk is irrelevant to inferring reasonable conclusions about [...]’s intent at the time the map was filed.
[brief] 5.  [...] also cannot satisfy the hostility prong because its presence on the Property, even if mistaken, was neither continuous nor exclusive.  Finally, [...] also fails to satisfy the hostility requirement.  In order to satisfy this fifth element, [...] must show its use was adverse and hostile, meaning that the rightful owner did not consent or give the claimant a license to use the property.  Mannillo v. Gorski, 54 N.J. 378 (1969).  Setting aside that [...]’s appeal, trial court submissions, pleading and written discovery responses articulate its belief that it owned the Property (and its confusing claim that [...]’s Property at Lot 22 is masquerading as [...]’s Lot 20 despite the dispositive conclusions of the Surveys), the Mannillo Court clarified [...]; however, [...] advertises the church as “253” Bergen St.
[brief] In the matter at bar, the Applicant provided expert testimony from a traffic engineering expert, who evaluated current traffic patterns and any potential impacts from or upon the proposed development.  [...] concluded:  ...we’ve reviewed this project from a purely traffic impact and the amount of traffic to be generated by the project is insignificant when compared to state and national standards.  We’ve looked at the interaction with the existing pedestrians that are out there just to make sure there won’t be any safety concern and based upon the volume that we are generating, and even the volume of the adjacent driveway…there isn’t any negative interaction so I don’t see a safety concern in that.  The design that we proposed for the loading zone will provide safe and efficient access for that loading and delivery vehicle.  (T2/25:25-26:14).  The [...] made no findings that the testimony presented by [...] (or any of the Applicant’s witnesses) was not credible or that it chose to accept one expert witness’ testimony over another.
[brief] | Item | Description | |------|-------------| | 1ra | Unpublished decision in *Boria v. Bowers*, 2009 WL 902421 (E.D. Penn. Mar. 31, 2019) | | 24ra | Unpublished decision in *Kircher v. Penn. State Police Dept.*, 2016 WL 4379143 (M.D. Penn. Aug. 17, 2016) | | 73ra | Unpublished decision in *Mathias v. Billet-Barclay*, 2019 WL 568903 (M.D. Penn. Feb. 12, 2019) | # TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | Cases | Page(s) | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|---------| | **Boria v. Bowers,** | 12 | | 2009 WL 902421 (E.D. Penn. Mar. 31, 2019) | | | **Brown v. City of Bordentown,** | 11, 12 | | 348 N.J. Super. 143 (App. Div. 2002) | | | **Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White,** | 6 | | 548 U.S. 53 (2006) | | | **Casano v. Livingston Bd. of Educ.,** | 9 | | 2014 WL 4916845 (App. Div. Oct. 2, 2014) | | | **Clarke v. Atlantic City Bd. of Educ.,** | 7 | | 2010 WL 4107750, *5 (N.J. App. Div. Dec. 8, 2009) | | | **Coward v. Englewood,** | 9 | | 2019 WL 470080 (App. Div. 2019) | | | **El-Sioufi v. St. Peter’s Univ. Hosp.,** | 8 | | 382 N.J. Super. 145 (App. Div. 2005) | | | **Green v. Jersey City Bd. of Educ.,** | 8 | | 177 N.J. 434 (2003) | | | **Greenman v. City of Hackensack,** | 13 | | 486 F. Supp. 3d 811 (D.N.J. 2020) | | | **Hernon v. Webb-McRae,** | 9 | | 2018 WL 4204440 (D.N.J. Sept. 4, 2018) | | | **Kircher v. Penn. State Police Dept.,** | 12 | | 2016 WL 4379143 (M.D. Penn. Aug. 17, 2016) | | | **Lovett v. Flemington-Raritan Regional Board of Educ.,** | 9 | | 2013 WL 5925615 (App. Div. Nov. 6, 2013) | | | **Mathias v. Billet-Barclay,** | 12 | | 2019 WL 568903 (M.D. Penn. Feb. 12, 2019) | | | **Miller v. New Jersey,** | 11 | | 144 Fed. Appx. 926 (3d Cir. 2005) | | | **Nardello v. Township of Voorhees,** | 8 | | 377 N.J. Super. 428 (App. Div.  2005) | | Nead v. Union County Educ. Services Com’n, 2011 WL 166245 (N.J. App. Div. Jan. 20, 2011) ..................................................8 O’Keefe v. State, 2007 WL 1975603 (N.J. App. Div., July 10, 2007) ..............................................8 Prager v. Joyce Honda, Inc., 447 N.J. Super. 124 (App. Div. 2016) ....................................................................9 Roa v. Roa, 200 N.J. 555 (2010) .................................................................................................6 Rodriguez v. Torres, 60 F. Supp. 2d 334 (D.N.J. 1999) ...........................................................................11 Royster v. New Jersey State Police, 2007 WL 4441103 (N.J. App. Div. Dec. 20, 2007) ...............................................8 Smith v. SBC Communications, Inc., 178 N.J. 265 (2004) .................................................................................................5 Spinks v. Township of Clinton, 402 N.J. Super. 465 (App. Div. 2008) ....................................................................8 Tarr v. Ciasulli, 181 N.J. 82-83 (2004)
[brief] The Court was emphatic that the LRHL does not authorize payments “for any expenses or public improvements that have no relationship to an area in need of rehabilitation or a project in that area. ”  Id. at *7 (emphasis added).  Here, though, the Senior Center project certainly furthers the objectives and terms of the Redevelopment Plan.  See, infra, at Point II(b).  Thus, unlike in Hoboken, a connection between the Redevelopment Payment and the Redevelopment Area and Redevelopment Plan did exist.  The City could invoke its authority to collect revenues pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-8(f), an authority that the court in Hoboken Land never considers, acknowledges, or in any way mentions.  As the Redevelopment Payment was collected to further a community improvement amenity, specifically the Senior Center, N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-8(f) is applicable, whereas it was simply irrelevant to consider in Hoboken Land.  Finally, Plaintiff is just as misguided in its use of the case Nunziato v. Planning Bd. of Edgewater, 225 N.J. Super.
[brief] STATEMENT OF FACTS .........................................................................4  PROCEDURAL HISTORY ........................................................................14  STANDARD OF REVIEW .......................................................................15  LEGAL ARGUMENT ...............................................................................18  POINT ONE: THE LAW REQUIRES PLANNING BOARDS AND GOVERNING BODIES TO DETERMINE WHETHER THE PROPOSED ORDINANCE IS INCONSISTENT WITH THE LAND USE ELEMENT OF THE MASTER PLAN (Pa 114-118)  .................................................................18  POINT TWO: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT  BECAUSE THE ADOPTION OF THE SECOND ORDINANCE WAS ARBITRARY, CAPRICIOUS AND UNREASONABLE SINCE IT WAS ONLY BASED UPON THE PLANNING BOARD’S DETERMINATION OF THE SECOND ORDINANCE’S CONSISTENCY WITH ONLY GENERALIZED OBJECTIVES OF THE MASTER PLAN, WHICH DETERMINATION WAS ITSELF ARBITRARY, CAPRICIOUS AND UNREASONABLE AND UNSUPPORTED IN THE RECORD.  FURTHER, THERE WERE NOT FINDINGS OF FACT (Pa 114-118, 123-130)  ..................................................................................................................19  POINT THREE: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY RUBBER STAMPING THE PLANNING BOARD’S CONSISTENCY DETERMINATION BASED SOLELY ON THE GENERAL OBJECTIVES SET FORTH IN THE MASTER PLAN  CREATING A PRECEDENT FOR FUTURE PLANNING BOARDS AND GOVERNING BODIES TO APPROVE ORDINANCES  CONTRARY TO THE SPECIFICS OF THE LAND USE ELEMENT OF THE MASTER PLAN WITHOUT EXPLAINING THEIR REASONS FOR DEVIATING FROM THE MASTER PLAN’S LAND USE VISION, CONTRARY TO THE LEGISLATURE’S REQUIREMENTS IN ITS DELEGATION OF POWER TO MUNICIPALITIES (Pa 124-130)  ..................................................  33  CONCLUSION ...........................................................................................................
[directive] Reform Bail the under defendants" "eligible so-called of universe the defining law new of the provisions the many of used as defendant" "eligible term the (defining 2A:162-15 N.J.S.A. See statute. under the of One issued").  is acomplaint-warrant whom "for person a as Reform Law Bail the throughout complaint- a when that decision is charging initial the of consequences practical significant the to taken a be defendant must officer, the judicial authorized other or judge a by issued is warrant  During 2A:162-16(a).
[brief] 9.  On October 13, 2020 [...] filed a Medpay arbitration which was assigned Docket Number [...] as a result of a motor vehicle accident which occurred on October 18, 2018 involving the injured party [...] and the [...] insured, [...].  On or about October 27, 2022, the Arbitrator entered an award in favor of [...] NJ Insurance Company in the amount of $5,000.00.
[brief] FAC ¶ 62, Pa3106.  As [...] and plaintiffs came to learn subsequently, while CEP-Defendants were playing the coy role of confidential business interlocutor, in reality they were the “wolf” disguised in the “grandma” outfit ready to steal the bag of goods for “grandma. ”  [...] and his minions approached the owner of [...] and began direct negotiations to “lease” the land that had been leased for 20 years to plaintiffs.  CEP-Defendants were uniquely possessed of knowledge that, because of [...]’s internal strife and suspended ability to pay the annual rent, a declaration of “default” under the lease by the landlord would likely enable them to thereafter obtain a same or similar lease from the [...].  FAC ¶ 63, id.  Based upon the confidential disclosures and confidential interactions between plaintiffs and CEP-Defendants, [...] and his minions knew that the [...]’ land was unsuited for any purpose other than for solar energy or open, undeveloped land, and that the potentiality of displacing plaintiffs from the land was readily available to them.  FAC ¶ 64, id.  By late 2017, rather than pursuing their stated intentions of negotiating a price to acquire plaintiffs’ solar rights, [...] and his minions, including defendants’ counsel [...], began to scheme to steal plaintiffs’ business assets for nothing.
[brief] All of defendant’s arguments rely on its presumption that “the CR-V at issue here was reasonably ‘fit,’ ‘suitable,’ and ‘safe’ as designed. ”  Db12.  Defendant, however, is not entitled unilaterally to demand any such presumption.  The technology had been developed and was available.  There is no indication that it was not feasible; it was, in fact, available and promoted as a premium safety system.  Failure to make a product safer with warnings, lights, audible prompts, proximity sensors, cameras or even vibrations, when the technology is economically and technically feasible, may be the most common type of breach of duty in product liability jurisprudence.  A manufacturer "may have a duty to make products pursuant to a safer design even if the custom of the industry is not to use that alternative."  O'Brien v. Muskin Corp., 94 N.J. 169, 183 (1983).  A manufacturer is obligated to produce a reasonably fit, suitable and safe product regardless of what prevailing industry standards may be.  Ibid.; see Michalko v. Cooke Color & Chem. Corp., 91 N.J. 386, 398 (1982) (the existence of a duty to make a product safe or to give adequate warning must be said to attach without regard to prevailing industry standards); Freund v. Cellofilm Props., 87 N.J. 229, 242-243 (1981) (duty to provide sufficient warnings is one that includes directions, communications and information essential to make the use of a product safe, regardless of prevailing industry standards).  "Unquestionably, it is in the public interest to motivate individuals in the context of commercial enterprise to invest in safety. ”  Michalko, supra, 91 N.J. at 398 (citing Beshada v. Johns-Manville Corp., 90 N.J. 191, 207 (1982)).  Whether the product is reasonably fit, suitable and safe under the totality of the circumstances is for a jury.
[brief] (Pa80)  On May 2, 2022, the [...] filed a response to the [...] Complaint, claiming to have responsive emails but asserting that [...] was not entitled to the records as they are criminal investigatory and inter/intra agency advisory, consultative, or deliberative materials. ³  (Id.)  On May 23, 2023, based on the [...] response and in an attempt to reinstate his Complaint, [...] filed an Order to Show Cause declaring that the [...] falsely represented to the trial court that it had no documents other than the Complaint previously supplied to [...], seeking to hold the [...] and its Chief of Civil --- ² 1T refers to the transcript dated March 4, 2022.