ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] [...] raised the Holmdel public’s concerns about the Project’s potential impact on the environment, gas rates, and “quality of life. ” (Aa405-406). \footnote{[...] is an elected official of Holmdel Township.  (Aa402).}  Additionally, [...] testified that “safe, efficient, and reliable service” had already been provided to Holmdel residents for the past twenty years, and thus, there was no need for the Project.  (Aa406).  Next, [...] testified as to the Project’s impact on property values.  (Aa343). \footnote{[...] is Holmdel’s expert in real-estate valuation and economics.  (Aa343).}  In support of Holmdel’s position that the Project would adversely impact the value of nearby properties, [...] testified that the Project would create environmental and safety risks, such as the emission of noxious odors and the creation of noise pollution.  (Aa347-48; Aa351).  In addition, [...] noted that the Project would create an “environmental stigma,” which would cause “risk, uncertainty, market resistance and diminished value. ” (Aa348).  Furthermore, [...] testified that a “repeat-sales” methodology to compare the sales value of the same residence before and after the construction of a nearby regulator station would be a “better example” of whether the Project would adversely impact property values since “[a]ny differences in sales price . . . could be ascribed to the proximity” of the Project.  (Aa351).  Lastly, [...] testified as to the Project’s impact on EMP goals.
[brief] ”  *Id.* at 454-55 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  The fee award here was improperly low and unexplained.  (Pa21).  The court inexplicably cut 67.3 hours of legal services performed over a two-and-a-half-year period to 6.2 and cut plaintiff’s counsel’s hourly rate to reduce the fee awarded by 93 percent.  *Ibid.*  In its purported “Statement of Reasons,” the court stated only that the award was “based on the results obtained” and that no fees would be awarded for legal research.  *Ibid.*  Thus, reversal is warranted.
[brief] POINT TWELVE [Deficiency of court order] (Pa153 – Pa159)  The court’s summary judgment order never articulated which of the three counts it granted favor of [...].  This obvious deficiency cannot make the [...] liable to [...].  (Argued at Pa466 – Pa467)  The court’s order granting summary judgment on the Counterclaim was woefully deficient in that it never identified which of the three counts in the Counterclaim, if any, the court was granting.  The individual analyses of each of the three counts in the Counterclaim establishes that [...] did not meet any of the elements of a claim for breach of contract and unjust enrichment under counts one and two, and was out of time and used the wrong procedure for an order to require the public entity-[...] to follow a statutory obligation under count three.  Nowhere in the court order and opinion does the court analyze or articulate that [...] met all of the elements for a breach of contract under Count One or unjust enrichment under Count Two.  The court order and opinion further does not state that it is granting Count Three of the Counterclaim.  Even with a liberal reading of the court’s summary judgment reconsideration order, it is impossible to identify which of the three counts of the Counterclaim the court was granting.  Thus, there is no basis to hold the [...] liable to [...]’s Counterclaim.
[brief] For each of the foregoing reasons, Defendants [...], and [...], respectfully submit that Plaintiff’s appeal from the trial court’s order denying his motion for reconsideration should be denied in its entirety.  McElroy, Deutsch, Mulvaney & Carpenter, LLP  Attorneys for Defendants/Respondents, McElroy, Deutsch, Mulvaney & Carpenter, LLP, and [...]  By:/s/ [...]  [...]  Dated: May 30, 2024  Superior Court of New Jersey – Appellate Division  Reply Brief
[brief] As set forth hereinabove, R. 1:4-8(b) mandates service of a written notice and demand pursuant to R. 1:5-2.  In pertinent part, R. 1:5-2 provides:  Service upon an attorney of papers referred to in R. 1:5-1 shall be made by mailing a copy to the attorney at his or her office by ordinary mail, by handing it to the attorney, or by leaving it at the office with a person in the attorney's employ, or, if the office is closed or the attorney has no office, in the same manner as service is made upon a party.  Service upon a party of such papers shall be made as provided in R. 4:4-4 or by registered or certified mail, return receipt requested, and simultaneously by ordinary mail to the party's last known address.
[brief] The defendants moved for summary judgment on all remaining claims on July 29, 2022.  (Pa233).  Relative to this appeal, defendants argued that [...] failed to make a prima facie case under discrimination, retaliation, or free speech principles.  (3T5:25-3T6:5).  They also argued that [...] could point to no evidence in the record suggesting that a causal connection existed between any EEO complaint and adverse action.  (3T34:20-23).  Thus, defendants argued, plaintiff failed to meet any of the four prongs required to make a prima facie case under LAD retaliation law.  (3T:28:11-20).  8  Plaintiff makes no argument on appeal how dismissal at this initial stage of LAD retaliation or free speech claims against these defendants was legally deficient.  Thus, they are not properly subject to this appeal.  Defendants also argued that plaintiff could not cite facts suggesting that the legitimate reasons given by defendants for the written warning and one-day suspension were a pretext for discrimination or retaliation.
[brief] Under N.J.S.A. 39:4-88(b), “[a] vehicle shall be driven as nearly as practicable entirely within a single lane and shall not be moved from that lane until the driver has first ascertained that the movement can be made with safety. ”  In Regis, the Supreme Court determined that the above language “consists of two separate, independent clauses, each of which addresses a distinct offense. ”  208 N.J. at 447.  The first clause “is not limited to circumstances in which the deviation from the lane is demonstrated to be a danger to other drivers,” but rather “imposes a continuous requirement upon the driver: to maintain his or her vehicle in a single lane, by avoiding drifting or swerving into an adjoining lane or the shoulder.  . .”  Id. at 448 (emphasis added).  The second clause, similar to the first sentence of N.J.S.A. 39:4-126, “requires a driver to ascertain the safety of switching lanes before conducting a lane change.
[brief] Id.  On March 25, 2022, Plaintiff had a meeting with Defendants [...], [...] and [...], whereby Plaintiff sought to address why she was being disciplined and placed on a development plan.  Id.  During this meeting, Defendants would not let Plaintiff speak.  Defendants told Plaintiff she was being placed on a development plan due to two write-ups that were present on her disciplinary record.  Id.  Investigations were conducted regarding the allegations surrounding both write-ups and all allegations were proven false.  Id.  Therefore, the write-ups Defendants were referencing should have been removed from Plaintiff’s disciplinary record long ago.  *Id.*  Specifically, one write-up occurred after a parent’s allegation that Plaintiff choked their child.  This was found to be *false*.  *Id.*  The second write-up arose from [...], a former co-worker’s complaints that Plaintiff often cursed and spoke to her inappropriately.  *Id.*  This too was proven to be *false* when employee [...] submitted a letter substantiating [...]’s allegations against Plaintiff were *untrue*.  (PA000011).  Despite this, Defendants refused to remove the old and *untrue* allegations from Plaintiff’s disciplinary record.  *Id.*  Defendants then showed Plaintiff a picture of her smoking outside of a garage and told her she was not following the new fire code.  *Id.*  Plaintiff recognized the photo as being taken in June 2021, well *before* the new fire code went into effect.  *Id.*  Confused, Plaintiff asked why this issue was not addressed with her in June 2021 and why Defendants were now bringing this photo up, nearly nine (9) months later.  *Id.*  In response, Defendants claimed Plaintiff had an aggressive demeanor, and without further explanation, terminated Plaintiff from her position with Defendant [...].  *Id.*  Suffice to say, Defendants resorted to baseless criticism to try and dispose of Plaintiff for complaining to the DOL and management about mistreatment and safety concerns.  *Id.*  In fact, Plaintiff’s former coworker [...] told the Plaintiff that Defendants were trying to get rid of Plaintiff for calling and complaining to the DOL.  *Id.*  Clearly, Plaintiff was terminated in blatant retaliation for her complaint to the DOL, as well as her complaints about Defendants violation of N.J.A.C § 10:44A-2.8(b) and N.J.A.C. § 10:44 A-2.7(a).  Id.  As a result of her termination, Plaintiff experienced and continues to experience significant economic and emotional distress damages.  Id. B.  **Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss And Plaintiff’s Cross Motion to Amend.
[brief] In *Rock Work*, the arbitrators set a deadline for submissions of proposed awards.  [...] timely submitted their proposed award, but interpleader [...] argued that this submission contained impermissible legal arguments.  Norwood attempted to respond to Pulaski’s submission with an untimely letter, which the arbitrators refused to consider.  *Rock Work*, 396 N.J. Super. at 350.  The Appellate Division characterized the arbitrator’s decision to set a deadline as “procedural” and found that vacatur under this circumstance would be inconsistent with a court’s limited standard of review over an arbitration award.  *Id.* at 355.
[brief] **A.  Defendants’ Alleged Fraudulent Insurance Scheme**  Plaintiffs’ complaint centers around [...], a medical practice that is alleged to have been structured in violation of the CPOM, a regulatory framework designed to prevent the commercial exploitation of medical practices and protect public health and safety by ensuring that such practices are owned and controlled by licensed physicians.  Pa015-017; Pa020-021; *Allstate Ins. Co. v. Northfield*, 228 N.J. 596 (2017); N.J.A.C. 13:35-6.16(f).  The complaint alleges that [...]’s formation and operation contravened the CPOM by allowing non-plenary physicians to exert control over the practice.  Pa020-021.  Further, according to Plaintiffs, defendants built upon the ongoing CPOM violations to violate the statutes and regulations prohibiting medical providers from paying or receiving kickbacks and engaging in self-referrals.  The complaint alleges that [...] and its professionals referred patients insured by Plaintiffs to certain of the other defendants for pain-management and surgical procedures.  Pa065 (Compl. ¶ 385).  Those defendants, who simultaneously owned, or were associated with, sizable independent medical practices, consulted with the patients at [...]’s offices and acted contrary to their own economic interests by allowing [...] to bill for and profit from the consultations and services instead of billing for them directly.  See Pa065-066; Pa069; Pa072 (Compl. ¶¶ 385, 388-390, 393, 409, 423).  To account for that lost revenue, those defendants also recommended that the patients undergo procedures at an outpatient facility that they owned, and during the procedures, anesthesia was provided by professionals who worked for entities owned or controlled by those defendants.  Pa065 (Compl. ¶¶ 386-387).  Defendants’ participation in and receipt of the unlawful kickbacks and self-referrals rendered them ineligible for PIP-benefit payments.
[brief] The issue on appeal is of great public importance given its unquestionable impact on all public improvement projects and all public improvement procurements in the State of New Jersey.  The Legislature enacted a statute requiring all entities performing work on public lands and receiving tax dollars, directly or indirectly through a contractor, be registered so that the [...] (“[...]”) may ensure that such entities comply with all federal and state laws.  Yet, the trial court created a broad judicial exception to the statute that runs afoul of the statutory language, Legislature’s intent and the [...]’s determination of the statute’s scope.  Absent appellate intervention, the statute faces repeated future violations.
[brief] N.J.S.A. 40:55D-19 itself does not specify that the petitioning utility has the burden of proof, and so the decisions of our courts, specifically, the Supreme Court, govern.  The Supreme Court has recognized that the burden of persuasion" can vary depending upon the type of proceeding, the comparative interests of the parties, the relative litigational strengths or weaknesses of the parties, the access of the parties to proof, and the objectives to be served by the evidence in the context of the particular proceeding."  Romano v. Kimmelman, 96 N. J. 66, 89 (1984)(emphasis added).  Normally, the allocation of burdens is not embodied in statutory law, but is a decision reserved for the courts.  In re Will of Smith, 108 N.J. 257, 264 (1987).  Generally, the burden of persuasion is imposed on the party best able to satisfy it because of its "greater expertise and access to relevant information."  *J.E. on behalf of G.E. v. State*, 131 N.J. 552, 569-70 (1993).  "[T]he burden of establishing the existence of a fact or circumstances is on the party relying thereon."  *Snyder v. I. Jay Realty Co.*, 53 N.J. Super., 336, 347 (App. Div. 1958), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 30 N.J. 303 (1959).  Thus, the burden of proof in this proceeding is on the petitioner, [...], and that burden never shifts.  In cases under *N.J.S.A.* 40:55D-19, this applies with greater force.  In these cases, the utilities enjoy overwhelming advantages.  The utility can spend substantially more money than any other party because it has access to ratepayer funds.  [...] deployed two law firms and corporate counsel, with at least four active lawyers, and another law firm at the zoning board.  It retained five experts.  The issues mostly concern matters peculiar to the detailed operations of utility infrastructure, which is certainly the case here, and the utility can rely substantially on its own employees and officers.  Much if not most of the information is closely held by the utility.  [...] has "greater expertise and access to relevant information."  *J.E. on behalf of G.E. v. State*, 131 N.J. at 560-70.  3.
[brief] Pa58.  [...] was present and involved in the aftermath of the World Trade Center attacks which took place on September 11, 2001.  Pa58.  [...] certified that he participated in the rescue, recovery, and/or cleanup at the World Trade Center site between September 11, 2001, and October 11, 2001, or September 11, 2001, and/or September 12, 2001.  Pa58.  [...] submitted the Ricci Act Eligibility Registration Form and Request for Amended Benefits Form with his affidavit.  Pa60.  Pa62.  [...] also provided his World Trade Center Health Program certification of 9/11 illnesses.  Pa63.  [...] also provided Witness Prescence Statements submitted to the World Trade Center Victim’s Compensation Fund.  Pa. Pa66.  Pa70.  On March 3, 2023, a Petition to the [...] was filed on behalf of [...] and many others.
[brief] Second, evaluation of the potential and possible impacts on competition would, to the extent it does not render the defect material, still provides another sufficient justification for discretionary rejection.  While [...] ultimately supplemented its bid, it simply could have refused to do so.  As previously discussed, that creates a competitive advantage.  [...] can underbid and walk away if it ultimately does not want to perform, it can walk away if a more profitable opportunity comes along, and it can walk away after seeing the bids of its competitors.  See Muirfield, 336 N.J. Super. at 136–37; cf. Palamar, 196 N.J. Super. at 256-57 (permitting waiver where missing qualification statement was omitted due to a clerical error and provided just one and one-half hours after bid opening, limiting any competitive advantage).
[brief] The June 13, 2022 approval was then memorialized by way of the December 12, 2022 Original Resolution, which further confirmed that approval was not conditioned on [...] placing an elevator in Building “E. ”  The bad faith misconduct occurred when the Board adopted a blatantly *ultra vires* January 23, 2023 Stealth Resolution without any notice whatsoever, which effectively reversed the June 13, 2022 approval and December 12, 2022 Original Resolution—after the record was closed and after approval was already obtained and published—by now conditioning the June 13, 2022 approval on [...] placing an elevator in Building “E.
[brief] (4T140:7 to 142:6; 6T122:21 to 126:15; 8T69:7 to 70:21.)  To do so, after the remedial investigation phase is complete, Defendants would need only ensure that the Property is adequately capped.  (4T140:4 to 141:9.)  In fact, most of the Property already qualifies as being capped by the concrete and asphalt foundations that are in place, and AOC-2 is the only remaining AOC that is uncapped.  (4T141:2-9; 8T69:7 to 70:4.)  In addition, the mere fact that Plaintiff intends to redevelop the Property in no way affects Defendants’ ability to obtain a RAO; rather, after Defendants sufficiently cap the Property and obtain the RAO, Plaintiff can perform the redevelopment and modify the Remedial Action Permit to indicate that the previous cap was removed and replaced during redevelopment.
[brief] (Da186.)  Specifically, the Defendant filed a complaint dated November 3, 2021, and submitted it on November 11, 2021.  (Da51; Da54-60)  In this complaint, the Defendant alleged it had issued a notice of default to the tenant on July 17, 2021, and was seeking $2.5 million in damages as well as $102,310 in unpaid and future rent.  (Da54-60 at ¶¶17,19 and 29.)  These facts directly contradicted the representation in paragraph \(^4\) 15.2  If Seller defaults, or breaches any of its representations, under this Agreement, or if Seller fails to satisfy any aspect of the conditions obligation Purchaser [sic] to close as set forth in Sections 4.2() (ii), 3.2(d) and 3.2(e) above (and Purchaser does not elect to close the transactions contemplated hereby in accordance with those provisions in their sole and absolute discretion), the Purchaser may either (i) terminate this Agreement upon written notice to Seller, in which event (i) Escrow Agent shall promptly return the Down Payment to Purchaser, (ii) Seller shall immediately reimburse Purchaser in an amount equal to Purchaser’s Diligence Expense Reimbursement, and (iii) upon Purchaser’s receipt of the Down Payment, plus the amount owed to Purchaser pursuant to the immediately preceding clause (ii), this Agreement and all rights and obligations of the parties hereunder will be null and void, except for those rights and obligations that expressly survive the termination of this Agreement; or (b) file an action for specific performance.  Notwithstanding the foregoing, if the remedy of specific performance is not available due to the conveyance by Seller of any portion of the Premises to a third party, then Purchaser will be entitled to pursue any remedies available at law or in equity.  (Da277.)
[brief] (Pa386).  "A condition already exists" on the site is not an argument in support of new construction.  The Board took the requested "c" variances into consideration during their vote.  However, without the d (5) density variance the requested bulk variances were moot.  The Appellants argument that the Board used insufficient analysis and consideration is false.  The Board throughout the transcripts as highlighted above and in their decisions during the vote took into consideration the surrounding neighborhood and the impact the proposed development would have on it.  The impact on the surrounding neighborhood is something the board must consider.
[brief] For example, amicus asserts that the safety features at issue must be made available gradually because “[a]dapting each of these elements for each vehicle model takes time, equipment, and resources. ”  Ab3.  All of the safety systems at issue have been available for as much as a dozen years and were available on this vehicle model – at a cost.  There is nothing in the record to support a claim that the available alternative safer design needed additional time, equipment or resources to be made available.  That it was available at a cost suggests that it was held back for economic benefit, not because of need or an altruistic desire to protect consumers or public safety.  Similarly, amicus asserts that “regulatory agencies like the [...] ([...]) often provide for new regulations, including new safety regulations, to be phased in over time.
[brief] ”  Rahway Hosp., 374 N.J. Super. at 111 (quoting Bar on the Pier, Inc. v. Bassinder, 358 N.J. Super. 473, 480 (App. Div. 2003)); (T215:5-7).  The fact that Plaintiff claims to have “reserved all of its rights” when demanding back its Deposit (see Pb15) does not change this.  Plaintiff could not “reserve” a right that it did not have.  As set forth above, Plaintiff did not have the right to both secure the return of its deposit and to seek specific performance.  (See Pa115-116, §13.1 and supra Section II).  Moreover, [...] made it clear that Plaintiff’s request for a return of the Deposit was an election of the remedy to terminate the PSA, and Plaintiff proceeded take back the deposit nonetheless.
[brief] The rules in this subchapter set forth the standards and procedures used by [...] to perform its allocation and monitoring responsibilities and this subchapter represents the qualified allocation plan for New Jersey required by Section 42 of the Code.  (b)  In each calendar year, the total dollar value of the credits that can be allocated under these rules, except for the credits issued in connection with buildings financed with the proceeds of certain tax-exempt bonds, is limited by the State housing credit ceiling provided in Section 42 of the Code.  [...], therefore, has determined to award these limited credits on a competitive basis.  Applicants seeking an allocation of these credits must apply under one of the cycles set forth in N.J.A.C. 5:80–33.4, 33.5, 33.6 or 33.7.  [...] ranks the applications received in each cycle according to the respective point scales provided in N.J.A.C. 5:80–33.15, 33.16, 33.17 and 33.18.  The credits assigned to each cycle are then reserved for the highest ranking applications that meet the eligibility requirements set forth in N.J.A.C. 5:80–33.12.  [emphasis added].
[directive] See the referral agency list appended to these guidelines.  When a detainee has a dependent requiring care, a written notation is to be made and 4.6 placed in the case file indicating the arrangements that were made either by the detainee or through referral by the court for the care of each dependent.  The notation shall identify the person or agency taking charge of the dependent, the name of the agency's representative, a contact telephone number, and any additional information the judge deems pertinent to the case.  5.0
[directive] You are not subject to a mandatory Graves Act parole ineligibility term if you are pleading guilty to unlawful possession of a handgun, that is an air gun, spring gun, or BB gun pursuant to 2C:39-5b(2); unlawful possession of an N.J.S.A. unloaded rifle or shotgun, 2C:39-5c(1); or unlawful possession of a rifle or shotgun that is an air gun, spring gun, N.J.SA. or BB gun, 2C:39-5c(2).  N.J.S.A.  You are pleading to a Graves Act offense.