ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] II:  THE ENTIRE CONTROVERSY DOCTRINE SEPARATELY MANDATED DISMISSAL OF THIS LAWSUIT.  (Raised Below, Not Addressed).  Defendants also believe that the entire controversy doctrine (ECD) independently mandates dismissal of this lawsuit. \(^{11}\)  The ECD, which is codified within R. 4:30A, requires litigants in a civil action to raise all affirmative claims arising from a single controversy that each party might have against another party.  \(^{10}\)  The statute of limitations for inverse condemnation is six years.  N.J.S.A. 2A:14-1; Klumpp v. Borough of Avalon, 202 N.J. 390, 406-07 (2010).  \(^{11}\)  Though Defendants raised this argument below, the trial judge did not address it in her statement of reasons.  Oliver v. Ambrose, 152 N.J. 383, 394 (1998).  It differs from collateral estoppel in that the issue sought to be precluded need not have been actually litigated: the ECD “applies not only to matters actually litigated, but to all aspects of a controversy that might have been litigated and determined. ”  Mori v. Hartz Mt. Dev. Corp., 193 N.J. Super. 47, 56 (App. Div. 1983).  The ECD “encompasses virtually all causes, claims, and defenses relating to a controversy. ”  Oliver, supra, 152 N.J. at 394.  The ECD “requires that a party who has elected to hold back from the first proceeding a related component of the controversy be barred from thereafter raising it in a subsequent proceeding. ”  Wm. Blanchard Co. v. Beach Concrete Co., 150 N.J. Super. 277, 292-93 (App. Div. 1977).  The purpose of the ECD is to promote efficiency and discourage piecemeal litigation through mandatory joinder of all claims related to a single transaction.
[directive] 1.  a court-issued Dyal subpoena rather than grand-jury subpoena, see State v. Dyal, 97 N.J. 229, 232 (1984) (“[T]o obtain the results of a blood test protected by the patient-physician privilege, the police should apply to a municipal court judge for a subpoena duces tecum. ”), abrogated on other grounds by State v. Adkins, 221 N.J. 300, 316 (2015); or 2. a search warrant based on probable cause, see U.S. Const. amend. IV.; N.J.S.A. Const. art. 1, ¶ 7; or 3. an administrative subpoena (or appropriate court process) issued in a missing- persons or unidentified-body case under N.J.S.A. 52:17B-9.7 to -9.8d.  III.
[brief] 31  LEGAL POINT I 31  THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY DENYING MY REQUEST TO ATTEND THE ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE HEARING IN PERSON.  THE TRIAL COURT FORCED ME TO ATTEND THE HEARING VIA ZOOM AGAINST MY WILL.  Raised Below:  I raised this issue at the very beginning of the hearing and [...] dismissed it as not relevant to the hearing.  I looked for that conversation in the transcript 1T, but could not find it).  LEGAL POINT II
[brief] POINT II ..................................................................................................................................7  The trial court correctly held that THE USE OF VENDOR TO PRINT LETTERS DOES NOT VIOLATE THE FDCPA  .........................................................7  A.  The Appellate Division Has Rejected Plaintiff’s Theory ....................8  B.  The Trial Court’s Interpretation of the FDCPA Was Logical And Supported By The Legislative History ..............................................13  i.  Transmission Of Data To A Mailing Vendor Does Not Constitute A Communication Under the FDCPA  14  ii.  Transmission Of Data To A Mailing Vendor Is Not A Communication In Connection With The Collection of a Debt .........................................................................................16  iii.  A Mailing Vendor Is Not A “Person”  The FDCPA Prohibits Contact With Under § 1692c(b) .........................20  iv.  The Cases Cited By Plaintiff Are Unavailing ......23  POINT III ...............................................................................................................................29
[directive] Gun violence claims tens of thousands of lives across America every year, and the problem continues to worsen.  Over 45,000 people died from gun-related injuries in 2020, the most recent year for which the final numbers are available.  That number has never been higher.  The percentage of homicides which involve firearms is climbing too: 79 percent of all homicides involved firearms in 2020, the highest rate recorded in over 25 years.  And more than half of all reported suicides from that year involved firearms.  New Jersey’s commonsense firearm safety laws have helped the State maintain one of the lowest firearm mortality rates in the country.  Nonetheless, New Jersey suffers hundreds of gun-related deaths each year.  And New Jersey has not been immune from the nationwide rise in mass shooting events, including one in May 2021 that left three dead and eleven wounded.  As a result, members of the public cannot go to school, to church, or to the supermarket with the same sense of security they once enjoyed – and are entitled to enjoy.  In short, gun violence is a public health and safety crisis in New Jersey and across the country.  And it is a crisis that imposes significant costs beyond the lives lost and shattered.  According to one study, American taxpayers pay $34.8 million on an average day for medical care, first responders, ambulances, police, and criminal justice services related to gun violence, and the overall costs to the country amount to $280 billion annually.  Keeping the people of New Jersey safe from gun violence using all of the tools available to us is one of the most important responsibilities of the [...].
[brief] * * *  my personal feelings are that the marriage should dissolve and that you should have the freedom to deal with your life as you see fit.  In that light, I have no claim against any of your assets as I believe that you would like to preserve them all for your family and [...].  (Pa 536).  The Petitioner admitted into evidence many cards sent to Petitioner from Decedent declaring her love and affection.  (Pa 378-467).  However, the record reveals the marriage as troubled, as reflected by the above noted periods of separation.
[brief] The Trial Court did not make any factual findings; it decided Defendant-Respondent’s motion for summary judgment based on the law.  On appeal, the standard of review concerning legal findings is *de novo*.  *In Re: Ordinance 2354-12 v. Tp. Of West Orange*, 223 N.J. 589, 596 (2015); see also *Branch v. Cream-O-Land Dairy*, 244 N.J. 567, 582 (2021) (providing that a trial court’s grant of summary judgment is reviewed *de novo*).
[brief] (17T217-18 to 22, 220-12 to 13).  The testimony reveals and both parties admit defendant was part of a supportive caring home environment.  The family was neither dysfunctional nor brutal.  It is unfortunate defendant did not receive the help he asked for.  However, the failing of his dependent mother and grandfather and understanding the mental health, does not overcome the rest of defendant’s supportive home environment.  He was loved.  He was taken care of.  His mother made him his chicken and Sprite.  She would make him his special dinners.  His brother would make sure that he would win some basketball games to try to make him feel more loved and supported.  He had a love in his family that a lot of people in this world would beg to have, to have the ability to have parents that love them so much and love them unconditionally.
[brief] \(^4\)  The Original Policies also include instruction for school personnel on how to manage potential disagreements between students and their parents about how the schools accommodate the students’ gender identity.  [...] Orig. Pol’y (D2a54–55); [...] Orig. Pol’y 5657 ([...] Ra8–9); [...] Orig. Pol’y 5657 ([...] Ra8–9).  ARGUMENT
[brief] That is not the case here.  Again, the sentencing court’s opinion was thorough and sufficiently laid out varied and proper reasons for imposing a consecutive sentence.  Based on the court’s statements, it is clear that more than the “no free crimes” factor was considered when imposing sentence.  While the New Jersey Supreme Court created the Yarbough factors to achieve the Code’s goal “that there be a predictable degree of uniformity in sentencing,” 100 N.J. at 630, it “did not supplant the ‘long-standing common-law principle’ that ‘sentencing courts have discretion to impose consecutive sentences in appropriate cases. ’”  Torres, 246 N.J. at 269 (quoting State in Interest of T.B., 134 N.J. 382, 385 (1993)).  This is such a case.
[brief] Third, the 1892 Resolution is void under the authority of the decision in Public Service Corp. v. [...], 80 N.J. Eq. 295 (Ch. 1912), which operates to nullify [...]'s putative expansive construction of the “prudential rule and regulation” language contained in the 1892 Resolution.  [...] heavily relies upon this 1912 decision, arguing that it validates the 1892 Resolution and “allows the Town to dictate where new poles are installed on its streets and highways, except for those poles and lines that existed prior to 1903[.]” (Db40).
[brief] In SB Bldg. Assocs., the [...] selected [...] (“[...]”) as the redeveloper of the subject property and entered into a redevelopment agreement in 2004.  Id. at *4.  Thereafter, [...] submitted an application to the [...] for preliminary and final major site plan and subdivision approval.  Ibid.  Before a decision was reached on that application, the plaintiffs filed an action in lieu of prerogative writs, in which the court found that the costs of improving the infrastructure may be borne by [...] “upon the proviso that [...] and [[...]] enter into a reimbursement agreement whereby [...] is to reimburse [[...]] a pro[-]rata share of costs which are not directly related to the redevelopment project. ”  Id. at *5.  Thereafter, the Agency and [...] amended the redevelopment agreement to provide that [...] was responsible for its pro rata share of the infrastructure improvement costs which “shall be determined in connection with its site plan application…”  *Id.* at *6-7*.  The Planning Board approved [...]’s second application and required [...] to enter into a developer’s agreement that was to require it to make “[p]ayment of [its] fair share contributions for off-tract improvements to the Borough’s infrastructure…”  *Id.* at *9*.  The plaintiffs filed a complaint seeking to invalidate the “developer’s agreement” provision of the Planning Board’s resolution of approval, arguing that as a matter of law, the Board’s condition for payment of contributions to off-tract improvements was illegal.  *Id.* at *10*.  The court concluded that the “developer’s agreement” provision was ultra vires because the imposition of a requirement for a contribution to off-tract electrical improvements was not authorized under the MLUL.  *Id.* at *12*.  In reaching this conclusion, the court focused on a planning board’s authority to require contributions to off-tract improvements under the MLUL—an issue which is entirely irrelevant to the case at bar.
[directive] Core Principles 1  The Sanctity of Human Life and Serving the Community.  In serving the community, law enforcement officers (hereinafter “officers”) shall make every effort to preserve and protect human life and the safety of all persons.  Officers shall respect and uphold the dignity of all persons at all times in a non-discriminatory manner.  2  Force as a Last Resort and Duty to De-Escalate.  Force shall only be used as a last resort when necessary to accomplish lawful objectives that cannot reasonably be achieved through verbal commands, critical decision making, tactical deployment or de-escalation techniques.  Force shall never be used as a retaliatory or punitive measure.  3  Duty to Use Only Objectively Reasonable, Necessary, and Proportional Force.  Officers shall use the least amount of force that is objectively reasonable, necessary and proportional to safely achieve the legitimate law enforcement objective under the circumstances.  4  Duty to Use Deadly Force Only as an Absolute Last Resort and Duty to Avoid Actions Which Create a Substantial Risk of Death or Serious Bodily Injury.  Deadly force shall only be used as an absolute last resort and in strict compliance with this Policy.  Other actions by law enforcement that create a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury must be avoided or employed only under the strictest of conditions.  5  Duty to Intervene and Report.  Every officer, regardless of rank, title, seniority, or status, has an affirmative duty to take steps to prevent any use of force that is illegal, excessive, or otherwise inconsistent with such policies, regulations, and laws, if possible, before a fellow officer uses excessive, illegal, or otherwise inappropriate force.  Every officer has a duty to immediately report any improper use of force.  6  Duty to Render Medical Assistance.  After any use of force, and when the environment is safe, officers shall promptly render medical assistance to any injured person consistent with the officer’s training and shall promptly request emergency medical assistance for that person, if needed or requested.  Officers also have a duty to monitor individuals for potential medical intervention after any officer uses force.  7  Duty to Report and Review  Uses of Force.  Every use of force must be reported and receive a meaningful command level review as set forth in a written department policy that includes review by the law enforcement executive.  The law enforcement executive shall also conduct an annual review and analysis of the overall use of force by the department.  ii  USE OF FORCE POLICY | April 2022
[brief] Certification to Declare Property Abandoned | 11 Tax sale certificate | 15 Confirmation of Publication | 18 Published Notice | 21 Notice of In rem foreclosure | 22 Service list | 23 Certification of Posting | 25 Certification of Posting | 26 Certification of Posting | 27 Certification of Posting | 28 Certification of Posting | 29 Certification of Posting | 30 Abandoned Property Certification | 31 Photographs | 33-38 Abandoned Property Certification 180 Substitution of Attorney 184 Certification of Tax Assessor 185 Certification of Attorney 187 Redemption Statement 192 Volume Two Consent Order for Intervention 209 Certification of [...] opposing motion 211 Proof of Payment 215 Deed 217 Photograph of leaning railing 221 Photograph of trash in yard 222 Photograph of broken steps & missing soffit 223 Photograph of trash/debris 224 Photograph of siding 225 Photograph of broken windows 226 Photograph of exterior 227 Photograph of interior 228 Photograph of interior 229 Photograph of interior debris 230 Photograph of interior debris 231 Photograph of interior debris 232 Certification of counsel 233 [...] foreclosure complaint 236 [...] foreclosure judgment 244 Certification of Plaintiff’s Counsel 250 Tax sale certificate [...] 257 Special Assignment of Tax sale certificate 261 Abandoned Property Special Tax Sale Agreement 262 Tax sale certificate 275 Assignment of Tax sale certificate 276 Notice of Intent to Foreclose 277 Certified mail receipts for NOI 279
[brief] Consequently, "the State bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that [the] warrantless search or seizure '[fell] within one of the few well-delineated exceptions to the warrant requirement.'"  *Ibid.* (quoting *State v. Pineiro*, 181 N.J. 13, 19-20 (2004)).  One such exception is the protective frisk for weapons.  Under the federal and New Jersey constitutions, the police may conduct a protective frisk for weapons when they have reasonable suspicion that a weapon may be found on that person.  *Terry v. Ohio*, 392 U.S. 1, 26-27 (1968).
[brief] Reference to same is made in the Hearing Officer's Decision and the Memorandum of Decision of the Superior Court Judge.  addressed the necessary desire to promote proportionality and uniformity in the rendering of discipline of public employees.  *Bock* involved a fireman who was dismissed from his position based on a pattern of tardiness.  The former Commission reduced the discipline, and the Appellate Division reduced it further.  In affirming the Appellate Division's reduction of sanctions, we determined that just cause for dismissal could be found where there had been "habitual tardiness" or "chronic misconduct."  *Id.* at 522.  *Bock* further stated that although a "single instance" of aberrant conduct may not itself be sufficient for dismissal, "numerous occurrences over a reasonably short space of time, even though sporadic, may evidence an attitude of indifference amounting to a neglect of duty" and, thus, constitute sufficient grounds for termination.  *Ibid.*  *In re Anthony Stallworth*, 208 N.J. 182, 195-196 (2011).  (Internal citations and quotations omitted).  In *Stallworth*, the New Jersey Supreme Court further explained how progressive discipline should be used:  Since *Bock*, the concept of progressive discipline has been utilized in two ways: (1) to ratchet-up or support imposition of a more severe penalty for a public employee who engages in habitual misconduct; and (2) to mitigate the penalty for an employee who has a record largely unblemished by significant disciplinary infractions.  *Stallworth* at 195-196.  *[...]*, who has faithfully served the citizens of [...] for 15 years should not removed given the attendant circumstances.  CONCLUSION
[brief] Id. at 219.  As to the first issue, the issue of easement was based on the doctrine of prescription which referenced the statute of limitations which addressed adverse possession of lands.  Id. at 219.  This issue of the doctrine of prescription follows the same principles as adverse possession.  Id. at 219 citing Cobb v. Davenport, 32 N.J.L. 369, 385-387 (Sup. Ct. 1867).  This general view was noted in a number of texts of the time including 17 Am.Jur.Easements, section 55; See also Thompson on Real Property, Perm.Ed. (1939) sec. 415 pp. 677-680.  There must exist a user that is adverse, hostile, continuous, uninterrupted, visible and notorious.  Cobb v. Davenport, supra at 385.  See also DeLuca v. Melin, supra at 144.  “This action must be continuing, open, visible and exclusive user, hostile, showing intent to claim as against the true owner, and must be under a claim of right with such circumstances of notoriety as that the person against whom it is exercised may be so aware of the fact as to enable him to resist the acquisition of the right before the period of prescription has elapsed. ”  Poulos v. Dover Boiler & Plate Fabricators, 5 N.J. 580, 588 (1950).  See also Carlisle v. Cooper, 21 N.J. Eq. 576, 596 (E. & A. 1870).  Thus, the general rule is that where adjoining proprietors have an alleyway between the properties which is used by both homeowners, neither can obstruct or close that portion of the area which is within the boundary of his own land.  Id. at 220.  There cannot be an exclusive use to the joint alleyway.  Id. at 220.  Plaintiff had a prescriptive right to use the alleyway and the Defendants had to take the fence down.
[brief] (Da6)  “As a general rule, a dismissal on the merits is with prejudice while a dismissal based on the court’s procedural inability to consider a case is without prejudice. ”  *Watkins v. Resorts Int’l Hotel & Casino*, 124 N.J. 398, 415-16 (1991).  Defendant [...] argued that the lower court “refused to reinstate [the complaint] by finding it violated R. 1:20A-6’s mandatory service of Pre-Action Notice before filing a complaint, . . . .”
[brief] There, this Court squarely addressed the question of “whether prejudgment interest should run from the date of the complaint or when monies were wrongfully taken. ”  *Id.* at *1*.  This is, of course, the precise issue presented in the instant matter.  The Court in *Sogliuzzo* explained that while R. 4:42-11 addresses post judgment interest in tort actions and generally provides for simple interest calculated from the date of the institution of action, “under some circumstances, interest may be assessed form the date of the actual defalcations. ”  *Id.* at *6*.  In adopting the latter approach, this Court relied on *Lesh’s* conclusion that “calculating interest form the date of the wrongdoing is more equitable in that lost interest is an integral part of the [plaintiff’s] damage claim as a result of the defalcation. ”  *Id.*  This Court also recognized that *Lesh* “made no distinction between tort and contract damages and nothing in [Lesh] limits the doctrine to contract cases only. ”  *Id.* at *7*.  Thus, this Court concluded:  “The dates of misappropriation mark the point at which [the defendant] benefitted from his wrongdoing as well as the point at which [the plaintiff] was injured.  Equity compels calculating prejudgment interest from the date of defalcation.  . . .”  *Id.*  The facts here call for a similar approach.  After 22 days of trial and an extensive weighing of the evidence and witness credibility, the trial court unequivocally found that the defendants (including [...]) misappropriated funds.  It also found that the defendants took steps to conceal these misappropriations from the Plaintiffs via “webs” and “mazes” of accounts and a series of accounting gimmicks like conduit accounts, comingling, and step transactions.  (36T 22:21 to 23:7; 33:14-16; 53:9-10; 37T 72:13-15; 73:3-13; 75:14-21; 79:7-16; 86:18-20; 89:5-11).  In light of the foregoing, the trial court abused its discretion by denying Plaintiffs prejudgment interest from the date of each of the defendants’ misappropriations.  Therefore, this Court should reverse the trial court’s judgment on that sole issue and direct the entry of an award of prejudgment interest in the amount of $838,810.40.
[brief] (“[...]” or “Respondents”) are accused of negligently causing an injury to Plaintiff/Appellant [...] (“[...]” or “Appellant”), an employee.  Appellant was waiting to board a New Jersey Transit train in Newark Broad Street Station when he was suddenly and unexpectedly attacked by an emotionally disturbed homeless woman (later identified as [...], “[...]”).  Appellant was knocked down by the blow, but quickly recovered and attempted to confront [...].  Within minutes of the attack, two New Jersey Transit Police Officers responded to the scene.  The officers intervened and prevented Appellant from confronting [...].  Appellant did not press charges against [...].  Witnesses to the incident, including the Appellant, have all agreed that, prior to the attack, [...] was not acting unusually or aggressively towards Appellant or any other person.  [...] was taken from the scene by EMS and determined to be emotionally disturbed.  After the incident, Appellant boarded his train and returned to the Hoboken station where he reported the incident to his supervisor.  Appellant was taken to Hoboken Hospital where he received an x-ray and a CT scan.  Neither test showed anything significant, and Appellant was released from the hospital that same day.  The attack on Appellant was the result of the unprovoked and unpredictable actions of an emotionally disturbed person.  The nature and manner of the attack was completely unprecedented and happened despite an active police presence at the station.  [...] takes all necessary precautions to protect all of its employees, including Appellant.  Nothing [...] did makes it responsible for the unpredictable, out of control actions of an emotionally disturbed person.  At both the Trial Court and in the present appeal Appellant has failed to show how any negligence on the part of [...] that led to any injury.  Appellant has merely pointed out alleged problems that are completely unrelated to the matter at hand.  Importantly, Appellant has not shown how any of these alleged problems, even if proven, led to Appellant’s injury.  It is not enough to show a problem and an injury, Appellant must also link the two, and he has failed to do that.  The trial court rightly considered the facts at summary judgment and determined that Appellant could not reasonably prevail.  **Procedural History**
[brief] An award pursuant to the Frivolous Litigation Statute “require[s] proof of bad faith” because “clients generally rely on their attorneys to evaluate the basis in law or equity of a claim or defense[].”  Bove, 460 N.J. Super. at 151 (emphasis added) (quoting Ferolito v. Park Hill Ass’n, Inc., 408 N.J. Super. 401, 408 (App. Div. 2009)).