ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Email to/from [...] regarding Friday’s motion relative to the subpoenas | 2.25 | $855.00 | $16,435.00 | | 2/14/22|  Voicemail from [...], EA regaining [...] subpoena.  Email from the same.  Email [...] . . .  [redacted]  . . . | .5 | $190.00 | $16,625.00 | | 2/25/22|  Receive multiple emails with documents attached relative to [...] and its sale to [...].  Draft supplemental response to counsel regarding the same.  Email from/to counsel regarding the deposition of [...] and discovery.  | .75 | $285.00 | $16,910.00 | | 3/7/22 |  Email [...] regarding . . . [redacted]  Assemble docs.  Draft a formal response to Jan. 20, 2022 request for documents.  Review of [...]’s Merchant Data Release and [...]’s Retail Acquisition Owner Guide.  | 2.3 | $874.00 | $17,784.00 | | 3/14/22|  Email counsel regarding the . . . | .3 | $114.00 | $17,898.00 | --- 30 Pa839.
[brief] That brings us to the other factors that the State argues contribute to a finding of reasonable suspicion based on the totality of the circumstances.  [...] testified that when he shined the spotlight on defendants’ car and illuminated the interior, the three men did not react at all.  He recalled that, as he observed defendants for a second or two, “[a]ll three heads remained straight ahead, focused on their path.  No squinting, ducking, shielding their eyes, which is, in my experience, uncommon.
[brief] Cases Cited F.G. v. MacDonnell, 150 N.J. 550 (1997).........................................................13  Grabowski v. Twp. of Montclair, 221 N.J. 536 (2015)........................................9,10  Hill v. Warner, Berman & Spitz, P.A., 197 N.J. Super. 152 (App. Div. 152)..........14  Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Tp. Comm. Of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366 (1995).................................................................8  Newman v. Chase, 70 N.J. 254 (1976)...............................................................11  N.J. Realty Concepts, LLC v. Mavroudis, 435 N.J. Super. 118 (App. Div. 2014)..................8  O'Connell v. New Jersey Mfrs. Ins. Co., 306 N.J. Super. 166 (App. Div. 1997)......................10  Rowe v. Bell & Gossett Co., 239 N.J. 531 (2019).............................................8  Statutes Cited N.J.S.A. 2A:56-2.........................................................................................10  N.J.S.A. 2A:61-3.........................................................................................11  N.J.S.A. 46:2B-8.13....................................................................................11  Court Rules Cited Court Rule 4:67-1.........................................................................................9  Court Rule 4:67-5.........................................................................................9  Court Rule 4:83-1.........................................................................................9  TABLE OF APPENDICES
[brief] Pa169.  On August 17, 2015, [...] obtained assignment of an Interconnection Agreement [...] (the "Interconnection Agreement") which allows the owner of the Solar Project to connect to the utility.  The Interconnection Agreement is a separate and distinct asset that belongs to [...] and therefore to plaintiffs.  Pa169.  Contemporaneously, [...] obtained assignment of a Wholesale Market Participation Agreement (the "WMPA") with [...] ("[...]"), and [...] ("[...]"), a [...] company, [...] Queue #W1-082, which allows it to sell the electricity generated at the Project Site to the local utility.  The WMPA is a separate and distinct asset belonging to [...] and therefore to plaintiffs.  Pa169.  The development of a solar farm implicates a new, different set of rights and facilities unrelated to the SRECs, including WMPA and an “Interconnection Agreement” and the land on which to operate the solar farm.
[brief] .................................................................................. | | Elco v. R.C. Maxwell Co., 292 N.J.Super. 118, 126, (App.Div.1996) ........ | 11 | | Feiler v. Ft. Lee Bd. of Adjustment, | 24 | | 240 N.J. Super. 250, 256, (App.Div. 1990)  ....................................... | | Funeral Home Mgmt., Inc. v. Basralian, 319 N.J. Super. 200, 208 | 10, 11 | | (App.Div.1999) ...................................................................................... | | Grasso v. Boro of Spring Lake Heights, 375 N.J.
[directive] [BRIEFLY EXPLAIN SELECTION PROCESS IN YOUR COUNTY]  Grand Jury Standards  Promulgated by Directive #23-06 (December 22, 2006)  Page 8 of 18  ATTACHMENT  2 ELEMENTS -- ORIENTATION FOR SITTING GRAND JURORS  Welcome  Sign in process for daily attendance  Remind grand jurors of the term of service/number of weeks involved  Schedule -- starting time, approximate times for breaks and lunch, ending time  Restrooms and items such as vending machines, refrigerators, microwaves, lockers, etc.  Screening/security procedures  Parking locations and procedures  Dress code/appropriate attire  Smoking regulations and appropriate smoking locations  Attendance/work letters -- procedures  Emergency contact telephone number/court closing procedures  Emergency evacuation procedures  Judiciary policy regarding cell phones  Juror ID badges -- avoiding contact with others in/near the courthouse  Absence/lateness policies – need to contact Judiciary  Availability of daily calendars – to see if they know anyone listed  Procedures regarding note-taking -- including securing notes, destroying notes  Review voting procedures, quorum, duties of foreperson/deputy foreperson  Note:  The grand jury foreperson and deputy foreperson will require further specific orientation regarding their duties, including required paperwork, administering oaths, procedures for returning indictments in open court, confirming appropriate attendance, and the proper procedures to bring a matter to a vote before the grand jury.  Grand Jury Standards
[brief] DATED: November 6, 2024  [...]  On the Brief: [...], Esquire  On the Brief: [...], Esquire  Attorney  I.D. Nos.: 019441979/331365  [...] [...]  [...]  [...]  #  TABLE OF CONTENTS | Section | Page | |------------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS, RULINGS | iii | | TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | iv | | I.
[brief] Such intent was memorialized in Ordinance No. 5-23 adopted by the Township on February 14, 2023.  (Da25-26)  The Developer owns two ¹ Da = Defendants/Appellants’ Appendix lots with about 31.5 acres and as of February 2023 was seeking approvals to construct four religious education institutions that are permitted “as of right” under the Township’s land use regulations.  (Da46)  In exchange, the Township will provide the Developer approximately 42 acres of land it owns in another section of the municipality along with Defendants’ Properties that are referenced in Ordinance No. 5-23 with a statement that the Township does not own the Property, but the ordinance does not state that the Township intends to acquire Defendants’ Properties for such purpose.  (Da25).  Ordinance 5-23 suggests the lands to be exchanged are of “substantially equal value” and that “it is more beneficial to the Township to obtain title to the [...] property than it is for it to continue to remain the owner of the various blocks and lots currently owned by the municipality. ”  (Da25)  The ordinance does not provide any findings as to the purported benefit.  It does not impose any limitation on the Developer’s use of the municipal lands and Defendants’ properties to be acquired.  Nor does the ordinance provide any findings related to the proposed use by the Township of the lands after the exchange to the Developer.  The Township and Developer entered into a Contract for Exchange of Real Estate effective February 21, 2023 (“Contract”).
[brief] For example, counsel’s contention that the statement “we have more work because you’re on FMLA…they had no reason to know why [Plaintiff] is on FMLA leave,” is patently misleading in that it conflates knowledge of FMLA leave with knowledge of the reason why the leave was taken.  7T:74:11-12.  29 U.S.C. § 28, the Family and Medical Leave Act, entitles eligible employees of a covered employer to take job-protected, unpaid leave, or to substitute appropriate paid leave if the employee has earned or accrued it, for up to a total of 12 workweeks in any 12 months for a variety of reasons, not only for their own medical condition.  Leave may be taken for the following reasons:  (1)  Because of the birth of a child and to care for the newborn child, (2) because of the placement of a child with the employee for adoption or foster care, (3) because the employee is needed to care for a family member (child, spouse, or parent) with a serious health condition, (4) because the employee's own serious health condition makes the employee unable to perform the functions of his or her job, or (5) because of any qualifying exigency arising out of the fact that the employee's spouse, son, daughter, or parent is a military member on active duty or call to covered active duty status.
[brief] The Trial Court’s error essentially resurrects the buried new business rule disguised as a reasonable certainty test.  The Trial Court erroneously obsessed on the novice nature of Plaintiffs’ business despite uncontroverted facts in the record and the expert testimony of [...] and [...] establishing that the novice nature of Plaintiffs’ business was irrelevant in this unique context.  There is no doubt that the Trial Court barred [...]’s expert report for no other reason than the Trial Court’s belief that Plaintiff [...] was engaged in a new business, while completely ignoring the unrebutted testimonies of [...] and [...] that the newness of a business in 100% affordable housing development is completely irrelevant.
[brief] On November 10, 2022, the Court denied [...]’s order to show cause.  (191a)  According to the transcript, the lower court denied the order to show cause because of procedural flaws pursuant to Rule 4:67-2(a).  (2T:11/10/22 35:12-13)  On November 15, 2022, [...] refiled their order to show cause as a motion (194a) as required by [...].
[brief] The trial denied the motion for the reason that “[Y]ou were aware in June of 2020, and it wasn’t until three years later that you filed this motion. ” (1T13:14-1T13:15).  The trial court acknowledged that the Affidavits of Service may have been “mistaken” or a “lie,” but the basis for the court’s ruling was that Defendant had actual knowledge of the Judgment in 2020 and took no action for three years (1T16:20).  The court reasoned:  My ruling is based upon a more narrow problem I have.  The information that this motion is essentially based on was available three years ago.  This case has gone on now.  It’s – it’s heated up since 2020.  There probably wasn’t a huge amount of activity from 2015 to 2020, but it’s been eight years since the original default judgment was entered.  And while there’s no reason to rush these things when they don’t have to be rushed, eight years is a long time for courts to vacate default judgments when the judgment debtor had the information, the essential information in his possession to file the motion three years earlier.
[brief] *Ibid.*  The Court then went on to discuss the history of acceptance by a governmental unit, specifically the origination of the roads and road returns in registered records.  *Ibid.*  The court noted that “only those roads which are so tabulated are those which the public body might be obligated to maintain. ”  *Ibid.*  In essence, in order for a resident to establish a right to public maintenance it must be shown that the road at issue is accessible to the public and has been formally recognized, by the government, as a public road through a system of public records  *Ibid.*  Here, public records demonstrate that the access road was initially described as an ingress and egress driveway for the Church Lot 1.10.  At no time was the road designated as a public street.  The access road was characterized as a right of way and the issues of ownership and maintenance were left for further determination.
[brief] Incident on January 25, 2021 and Arrest  On January 25, 2021, at approximately 11:30 p.m., [...] was driving home from a long day of work, intending to meet his date, [...], at his house later that evening.  (5T101:13-19; 102:4-5).  Gary headed down Bristol Street in New Brunswick, New Jersey when he approached the stop sign located at the intersection with Bristol and Easton Avenue.  (5T108:11-17).  Gary needed to make a left turn intersection in order to get home, but when he went to make this turn, he was halted by a young woman nearly stopped in the middle of the street distracted by her phone.  (5T109:3-6).  Admittedly annoyed, Gary honked his horn at the woman, causing her to drop her phone and began angrily cursing at him.  (5T109:21-23).  Gary laughed at what he felt was a ridiculous and uncalled for reaction, which seemed to only anger the woman more and she kept screaming and cursing as she walked past his truck.  (5T110:4-25).  When Gary made his turn, the woman kicked the rear passenger side of his truck.  (5T111:1-3).  Gary completed his turn and continued on his route home, but as he drove, he became increasingly annoyed and frustrated that this woman had the nerve to kick his car.  (5T111:17-20).  This is where Gary, by his own admission, made the worst decision of his life and turned around to give the woman a piece of his mind.  (5T112:14-20).  Gary pulled up beside the woman in front of a local eatery, [...], and cursed the woman out, demanding to know who she thought she was kicking his car.  (5T113:6-21).  After going back and forth for several seconds, the woman started coming toward Gary’s parked truck and he thought she was going to kick his car again.  (5T114:15-17).  Gary made the extremely poor decision at this point to pick up the starter pistol he kept in his truck for protection, and say to the woman, “Get the f*** away from my car. ” (5T114:22-23).  Gary did not point the starter pistol directly at the woman, but his holding the starter pistol caused the woman screamed and jumped behind a nearby pile of cardboard boxes.  (5T115:1-16).  Gary made no attempt to follow the woman and drove away.  (5T115:21).  Later that evening, Gary met up with [...] as planned.
[brief] COURTS MUST IMPOSE APPROPRIATE GUARDRAILS ON EXPERT TESTIMONY REGARDING FINGERPRINT ANALYSIS.**  **A.  Expert Witnesses Must Not Exaggerate their Conclusions and Must Phrase their Testimony as Opinions. **  As this State’s Supreme Court recently confirmed, the harm of exaggerated and misleading expert witness testimony cannot be overstated, and witnesses must not be allowed to provide testimony that goes beyond what the science has established.  See Olenowski, 255 N.J. at 609-10 (holding that drug recognition expert ("DRE") testimony “must not go further than” opining that “the protocol has presented indicia that are ‘consistent with’ the driver’s usage of certain categories of drugs,” because permitting otherwise would allow a DRE’s testimony “to prove too much”).  Where, as here, the scientific community has established that a technique is subjective, that unqualified individualization opinions are scientifically indefensible, and that there is an error rate, jurors must be provided with that information to properly weigh the value of the testimony.  Cf. Abruquah v. State, 296 A.3d 961, 997-98 & n.32 (Md. 2023) (reversing criminal conviction where expert testified that bullets were fired from defendant’s gun but identification method “did not provide a reliable basis for [expert’s] unqualified opinion” even though technique was “until relatively recently, accepted almost entirely without critical analysis”).  An expert’s testimony is helpful only when juries are given full, honest, and accurate information.  Because the public vastly underestimates potential error rates associated with fingerprint evidence, experts must not over-state their conclusions or the inferences that can be drawn from their analyses.
[brief] *Britwood* was, as the Respondents argue, a challenge to a fee which was brought on behalf of a land owner who was not a redeveloper.  However, the plaintiff’s status was not the sole basis for the Court’s decision.  This Court based its decision on two other grounds.  First, the LRHL does not “independently authorize [] the City to impose off-site infrastructure costs on plaintiff” because the “MLUL is not superseded by the LRHL” and, second, a contrary ruling would usurp the Planning Board’s authority.  See *Britwood*, 376 N.J. Super. at 566-70.
[brief] “FACT-BASED” ALLOCATION CANNOT BE PROPERLY APPLIED BASED ON RECORD EVIDENCE AND THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY REJECTED [...]’s EFFORTS TO DO SO.  In concluding its opinion in Boston Gas, the court defined what a “fact-based” analysis would be:  We do not foreclose the possibility that in some cases the facts may permit a more accurate estimation of how much property damage took place in each period.  If the evidence permits an accurate estimation of the quantum of property damage in each policy period then proration by time on the risk may be inappropriate.  Given the factual complexities of cases of this sort, we defer to trial judges in the first instance to determine whether losses can be allocated based on the amount of property damage that in fact occurred during each policy period, or must instead be allocated on the basis of each insurer's time on the risk.  Boston Gas, 454 Mass. at 373 (emphasis added).  The situations in which fact-based allocation is appropriate are limited to those where the insured can accurately establish the amount of property damage that “in fact” took place during each policy period.
[brief] PAGE(S): TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS ...........................................  i  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CITED ......................................................................  i  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT .............................................................................  1  PROCEDURAL HISTORY/STATEMENT OF FACTS .........................................  1 ARGUMENT I.  AN ILLEGALLY LENIENT SENTENCE IS ALSO SUBJECT TO CORRECTION AT ANY TIME BY MOTION OR BY THE COURT ACTING SUA SPONTE.  ............................................................................  2 CONCLUSION ..................................................................................................  4
[brief] On February 17, 2022, the Plaintiff filed a motion seeking partial summary judgment on the Public Trust Doctrine claims that it asserted within Count Four of its Complaint (Pa224-425).  On March 24, 2022, the Borough filed opposition to the Plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgment and cross-moved for summary judgment in favor of the Borough dismissing the Plaintiff’s Public Trust Doctrine claims (Pa426-500).  The Trial Court heard argument from counsel on these summary judgment motions on April 7, 2022 (5T).  On that same date, [...] issued an Order denying the Plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgment and granting the Borough’s cross-motion for summary judgment along with a statement of the reasons for his decision (Pa1718; Pa1720).
[brief] It is Plaintiffs position that the Chancery Division Judge lacked subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate the complaint in lieu of prerogative writs and said interception of the action in lieu of prerogative writs was in violation of N.J. Const., Art. VI, § V, ¶ 4., (Pa 160-163), R. 4:3-1-Divisions of Court; Commencement and Transfer of Actions (Pa 187-191) and R. 4:69-1-Actions in Superior Court, Law Division (Pa 195-197).  "See Prado v. State, 186 N.J. 413, 422, 895 A.2d 1154 (2006) (noting that R. 2:2-3(a)(2) vests the Appellate Division with exclusive jurisdiction of an appeal of a final State administrative agency decision).  See also R.1:13-4(a) (allowing transfer of action from court that lacks jurisdiction to the proper court); R. 1:13-4(b) ("If any action transferable under paragraph (a) because of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter is appealed without having been transferred, the appellate court may decide the appeal ....").
[directive] The waiver discussion and determination must be on the record.  1.  In order to be qualified under New Jersey law to serve on a jury, a person must have certain qualifying characteristics.  A juror must be: • Age 18 or older • A citizen of the United States • Able to read and understand the English language.  • A resident of ____________ county (the summoning county)  Also, a juror must not: • Have been convicted of any indictable offense in any state or federal court • And must not have any physical or mental disability which would prevent the person from properly serving as a juror.  Is there any one of you who does not meet these requirements?  Standards for Jury Selection
[brief] Second, [...]’s argument that this was a case “where a pro se litigant recently retained counsel” is untrue.  Db43.  [...] had already retained counsel to oppose a motion filed by Plaintiffs in the trial court seeking additional sanctions against [...].  (Pa249)  That lawyer was the very same counsel who wrote to the Arbitrator nearly two months later to request a 45-day third adjournment of [...]’s opposition deadline.  The timeline is critical.  [...]’s current counsel appeared in the trial court on September 7, 2018, three days before Plaintiffs had even filed their arbitration summary judgment brief.  (Da2209)(Pa249)  Yet, [...] did not reveal the existence of counsel to the Arbitrator for 20 days (until a September 27, 2018 letter).  And [...]’s current counsel did not write to the Arbitrator seeking additional time to oppose the summary judgment motion—the one filed after [...]’s current counsel appeared in the trial court—until October 22, 2018, 45 days later, i.e., the exact amount of time he sought to adjourn the Arbitration summary judgment motion.  This was solely the latest [...]-manufactured delay tactic, and nothing more.  [...] is a lawyer, and was represented by new counsel at the time he received the arbitration summary judgment motion.
[brief] 473 N.J. Super. at 503.  Additionally, this Court may affirm the trial court’s decision that an extension of time under R. 4:69-6(c) was warranted in the “interest of justice,” on the separate grounds of the continuing violations theory.  In Borough of Princeton v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders of Cnty. of Mercer, 169 N.J. 135, 152 (2001), the Court expressly noted that among the “factors that will ordinarily guide courts [about whether the interest of justice exception applies] include whether there will be a continuing violation of public rights. ” (citing Reilly v. Brice, 109 N.J. 555, 559 (1988) and Jones v. MacDonald, 33 N.J. 132, 138 (1960)).  This theory was also reaffirmed in Hopewell Valley Citizens’ Grp., Inc. v. Berwind Prop. Grp. Dev. Co., L.P., 204 N.J. 569, 581 (2011) and in Point Pleasant Borough PBA Local No. 158 v. Borough of Point Pleasant, 412 N.J. Super. 328, 334 (App. Div. 2010).  As Defendants note, the theory is also used in other domains of law, e.g., Shepherd v. Hunterdon Dev. Ctr., 174 N.J. 1, 18 (2002), but it is a well-established component of a R. 4:69-6 analysis.  It is not seriously disputed that the BOG meets regularly – approximately once a month – where its agenda can include financial, governance, bonding, or other policy matters.  It is the essence of a continuing violation to have an ineligible person like [...] unlawfully participating in these future decisions.  Therefore, whether for the “important public interest” reason cited by the trial judge, or the equally valid continuing violations theory, the Court should affirm the conclusion that this matter is timely.