ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] TABLE OF CONTENTS  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT .................................................................1  PROCEDURAL HISTORY ........................................................................1  LEGAL ARGUMENT ..............................................................................9  POINT I  THE “LAWFUL INTEREST” AWARDED BELOW WAS CORRECT AND INCLUDES THE CONTRACT RATE (January 22, 2024 T13-T17; Da47-48)..................................................................................................................9  A.  The Default Rate Post-Judgment Was Properly Awarded by the Arbitrator.  (January 22, 2024 T15; Da47-48)..................................................10  B.  Case Law Warrants Award of Default Interest Post-Judgment.  (January 22, 2024 T16-T17; Da109-111).........................................................12  C.  Defendants Abandoned Any Challenge to the Default Rate as the Post-Judgment Rate.  (January 22, 2024 T13-T14; Da47-48).....................17  POINT II  DEFENDANTS CANNOT SHOW THAT THE JUDGMENT AMOUNT NOTICED BY THE SHERIFF AFFECTED THE SALE OUTCOME ADVERSE TO DEFENDANTS (January 22, 2024 T14-T15).......................................................................................................................18  A.  The Sheriff’s foreclosure sale notice stated a properly “approximate” amount of the judgment.  (January 22, 2024 T14-T15, T21).........................................................18  B.  Defendants fail to offer any evidence of“fraud, accident, surprise, irregularity” to overturn the Sheriff’s sale.  (January 22, 2024 T21)  ........19  C.  The posted sale amount had no adverse effect on the sale outcome.  (Not raised below).................................................................20  CONCLUSION  ......................................................................................21
[brief] The Kronos Time Card Audit Trail establishes that [...] entered “hourly charge” pay on [...]’s behalf thirty-five times over a period of two months, comprising four pay periods, from May 30, 2020 to July 11, 2020.  (Pa482-528).  It further shows that [...] entered “hourly charge” pay on [...]’s behalf nine times for one pay period, ending June 27, 2020.  (Pa482-528).  [...] does not dispute that he entered “hourly charge” for [...] and [...].  (Pa168 at 40:9-16).  The Kronos Time Card Audit Trail establishes that [...] entered “hourly charge” pay on [...]’s behalf ten times for one pay period, ending July 25, 2020.  (Pa482-528).  Neither [...], nor [...], the two senior staffing coordinators, received charge pay.  (Pa232 at 32:11-15; Pa482-528).  [...] never would have approved extra compensation for only three of her five staffing coordinators.  (Pa475).
[directive] A PRETRIAL MEMORANDUM  New Jersey Judiciary Pretrial Memorandum County  Defendant's Name: ---------------------------------------  Judge: Indictment  No(s): ----------------------------------- .  1.  List all indictments, counts, degrees and maximum jail sentence.  # Indictment Count Charges Degree Max Jail  Please Circle Appropriate Answer  Does the defendant qualify for extended term?  [Yes]  [No]  2.  If yes, discretionary mandatory of  Does the presumption imprisonment apply?  [Yes]  [No]  3.  If yes, what counts?  4. of  [Yes]  [No]  Does a mandatory period parole ineligibility apply?  _______________________  If what yes, counts?  _ Term 85% Law (NERA)  Term Term Act Graves Term Term School Zone Term Term Other Term if convicted.  5.  Maximum sentence if (Including extended term, applicable) period.  6.  Maximum parole ineligibility if  [Yes]  [No]  Do you understand that you are found guilty, the Court in its discretion could impose a 7. of minimum period confinement to be served before you become eligible for parole, of be which could to one-half the total sentence imposed?  up  [Yes]  [No]  if  Do you understand that you are found guilty, the Court could order that any sentence 8. of imposed be served consecutively to any sentence on a violation probation, and/or parole, and/or sentence presently being served?  [Yes]  [No]  Are you presently on probation?  a.  [Yes]  [No]  Are you presently on parole?  b.  [Yes]  [No]  Are you presently serving a custodial sentence on another charge?  c.  Defendant's Initials of3 page 1  Pretrial Memorandum - Revised Form Promulgated Directive# 23-17 (8/21/2017), CN: 11216 by 9.
[brief] [...], her replacement at [...], became a Lieutenant before she did (1T; 86:6).  When she was sent to the Academy, she was supposed to be the Admin Officer, but she wasn’t allowed to function in that capacity, and she had “no responsibilities whatsoever” given to her as the Admin Officer which is unheard of (1T; 87:1).  She was at the Academy from the beginning of December 2016 to March 4, 2017 (1T; 86:4).  When asked what she did from day to day, her answer was “I did nothing” (1T; 87:10).  A person by the name of [...] was doing the work that she was supposed to do (1T; 87:19).  In other words, she was transferred from [...] to be the Admin Officer at the Academy and they had no work for her (1T; 87:15).
[brief] See *Benjoray, Inc. v. Acad. House Child Dev. Ctr.*, 437 N.J. Super. 481, 488 (App. Div. 2014) (“[A] court hearing a summary dispossess action lacks general equitable jurisdiction. ”).  Instead, Landlord attempts to distract this Court by pointing to three highly distinguishable, matrimonial cases--two unpublished and one sixty-four years old.
[brief] A proper foundation for the admission of the documents in question was, indeed, laid.  [...] testified that he was familiar with the Medicare and Medicaid compliance annual survey process in giving his negligence—not proximate cause—opinions.  (See 7T123:24-125:18.)  [...] testified that the regulations, which in his opinion were violated, “serve as the basis for survey activities for purposes of determining whether the facility meets the requirements for participation in Medicare and Medicaid”. (7T134:4-7; see 7T86:15-88:21; 7T123:18 to 125:18.)  [...] also was aware that [...] submitted a complaint to the NJDOH regarding her father’s care, and that in response, a survey was conducted, including a tour to assess resident care, discussions with residents and staff, a review of medical records and other pertinent facility documents, including staffing reports.  (See 7T125:9-130:3, 7T190:7-198:24; Pa66-80.)  The surveyor concluded that the facility was in compliance with the requirements of 42 C.F.R. Part 483, Subpart B, for long term care facilities, and [...] was advised that the surveyor was unable to identify a citable deficient practice related to her concerns, based upon the evidence reviewed.
[brief] POINT I  PRE-SUIT ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS IN MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CASES INVOLVING THE PERFORMANCE OF SURGICAL PROCEDURES, OR THE DEATH OF A PATIENT, SHOULD BE DEEMED AGAINST PUBLIC POLICY...............................................................2  A.  Pre-Suit Arbitration Agreements in Cases Involving Patient Death Must be Deemed Unenforceable Based on Public Policy.............................................................4  B.  Pre-Suit Arbitration Agreements in Cases Involving Surgical Procedures Should be Unenforceable Based on Public Policy..6  POINT II
[brief] [...]  [...]  [...]  Assistant Attorneys General Of Counsel  [...] (Attorney ID: 278422018)  Deputy Attorney General  On the Brief #  TABLE OF CONTENTS | Section | Page | |------------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | PRELIMINARY STATEMENT | 1 | | PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND STATEMENT OF FACTS | 4 | | ARGUMENT | 10 | | POINT I: THE TRIAL COURT’S DECISION FAILED TO CONSIDER WELL-SETTLED LAW
[directive] No the subject not to are that for offenses only complaint-warrants release, of revocation or detention pretrial for motion a warrant to likely more are crimes which Act, violence).  domestic involve not do that offenses or 31, 2016.  on operational October become shall subsection This 23 Page Denied.  Complaint-Warrant Is for If Application to Prosecutor Notice 3.3.3  Required must directive 3.3.1, subsection the directive to pursuant Prosecutor a issues the If County obtaining without first acomplaint-warrant for officer applies enforcement if law provide a that application, officer the other denies judicial or court prosecutor the and approval an from assistant 4.11
[directive] The process of informally resolving internal affairs complaints requires the exercise of discretion by supervisors.  The proper exercise of discretion in such matters cannot be codified.  5.1.13  Even if the complainant is satisfied with the informal resolution, the process should be recorded on an internal affairs report form.  Regardless of the means of resolution, the integrity of the internal affairs process, particularly the receipt of complaints, demands that complaints and inquiries from any member of the public be uniformly documented for future reference and tracking.  The form should indicate that the matter was resolved to the satisfaction of the complainant and sent to internal affairs for review and filing.  The internal affairs supervisor should periodically audit those reports indicating that the complaint was informally resolved to ensure that the agency's supervisors are properly implementing their authority to resolve complaints from members of the public.  5.1.14
[directive] 3.5.2  Large agencies might establish an inspection unit operating directly out of the office of the law enforcement executive.  Small and medium size agencies can successfully accomplish this function by periodically assigning the inspection task to selected unit supervisors.  Individuals so assigned must be of unquestioned integrity and hold sufficient rank to achieve the objectives of the inspection function.  3.5.3  The inspection function should determine by actual on-site inspection whether personnel are properly implementing management’s policies at the operational level.  This function is also responsible for reviewing and evaluating procedures.  In addition, the inspection unit or function should evaluate the material resources of the agency and the utilization of those resources.  This includes, but is not limited to, motor vehicles, communications equipment, computers, office machinery and supplies.  The inspection function or unit should report any deficiencies to the law enforcement executive, and recommend any possible solutions and improvements.  3.6  Community Outreach  3.6.1  Commanding officers should strive to remain informed about and sensitive to the community’s needs and problems.  Regularly scheduled meetings to discuss community concerns should be held with public advisory councils, religious groups, schools, businesses and other community leaders.  These meetings help commanding officers identify potential crisis situations and keep channels of communication open between the agency and the community.  The disciplinary process should be publicized and clearly explained in these forums.  14
[brief] Should the Board have considered the applicable development standards, and the character of the use and principal building proposed to be constructed on the [...] part of the overall parcel when deciding a use variance to allow upon the [...] part of the overall parcel uses and structures accessory to the development proposed in Mansfield?  Restated more narrowly, does it matter for purposes of weighing proofs for this use variance under NJSA 40:55D-70(d)(1) by the [...] that the warehouse proposed to be constructed in Mansfield will be very substantially taller than would be allowed under [...]’s ordinances when the sole access for the warehouse is via a driveway that joins the public road system in [...]?  If this Court finds as a matter of law that the nature of the use and the height of the building proposed in Mansfield are simply immaterial to the Board’s use variance decision and improper subjects for consideration by the Board, then the Court should find for Plaintiffs on this legal issue.  But, the Board does not see how, under relevant statutes and cases, the Board or the Courts can simply ignore the nature of the proposed principal use of the overall parcel when weighing a request for use variance relief for uses accessory to that principal use.  Contrary to the assertion in Plaintiffs’ Brief, there is no competent credible evidence in the record to support Plaintiffs’ claim that the driveway is “height neutral”.  The failure of the Plaintiffs’ Planner to discuss the impact of the differing development standards in the two Townships on the positive and negative use variance criteria left the Board without the competent, credible evidence necessary to find for Plaintiffs.  This Court should affirm the decision of the Trial Court that consideration by the Board of nature of the proposed principal use of the overall parcel and the height of the principal building to be constructed on the Mansfield part of the overall parcel was proper.  The Court should affirm the Board’s use variance denial because, as found by the Trial Court, the Board’s denial decision is in accord with applicable law, is well-supported by the record, is fully explained in the Board’s Resolution, and should, as a valid exercise of the Board’s discretion, be accorded substantial deference by the Court.
[brief] The pertinent procedural history and statement of facts in this matter are as follows:  Plaintiff’s discrimination complaint with jury demand against [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], and [...] is filed on September 10, 2020.  December 22, 2020, [...] submits Motion to Dismiss complaint, notifications of appearance and answer with jury demand.  Plaintiff’s Counsel enters a stipulation of dismissal on behalf of Plaintiff against [...] on January 4, 2021; as a result, Defendants’ Counsel withdraws Motion to Dismiss on January 7, 2021.  The first settlement conference for the matter was scheduled for March 30, 2021, adjourned to May 20, 2021, with the case transitioning to a Mediator without Stay.  May 12, 2021, Defendants’ Counsel submits adjournment request for the May 20, 2021, settlement conference, adjournment is granted and rescheduled to May 25, 2021.  The settlement conference was adjourned and rescheduled to June 2, 2021; conference was adjourned again after Defendants’ Counsel submits adjournment request due to scheduling conflict.  Settlement conference is rescheduled to June 15, 2021.  January 8, 2022, court notice informs the discovery period for the case will end on March 17, 2022.
[brief] During his mugshot, he asked for his cell phone to call [...] to “get the number to call this lawyer or something,” and that if they were charging him with a crime, “[he’d] better get a lawyer. ”  After [...] acknowledged that defendant was “saying [he] wanted to call [his] lawyer,” defendant continued to volunteer statements.  Finally, after booking, defendant made his knowing and voluntary waiver of Miranda clearer than ever, telling the detectives to “just fucking ask” him about what they “need[ed] to know” and were “missing,” and to “[t]alk to” him.  Defendant was fully aware of his Miranda rights during booking and yet continued offering statements about the fight.  The court below thus correctly ruled that the statements made at booking were admissible.7
[brief] N.J.R.E. 801(e) ..........................................................................................  25 N.J.R.E. 902 ..............................................................................................  24  TREATISES  Final Report of the New Jersey Criminal Law Revision Commission, Vol. II: Commentary (October 1971)  .........................  43  New Jersey Model Civil Jury Charge, 1.18, revised October 2016 ...... 21 Model Jury Charge, Criminal, 3:180 ..........................................................  16  Model Criminal Charge  N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4 (revised January 9, 2012) ...  42  2 Wigmore, Evidence §285 (3d ed. 1940) .................................................. 20, 21 2 Wigmore, Evidence §290 (3d ed. 1940) .................................................. 21  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS
[brief] This is an appeal from an Order granting Respondents [...]’s Motion to Compel Arbitration and Stay the Case.  Appellants filed their Complaint on April 7, 2023 against [...], [...] ([...]’s driver), and the driver and company who owned and drove the other vehicle involved in this subject collision, namely, [...] and [...]  Pa23-40.  [...] filed their Answer on July 17, 2023.  Pa41-55.  [...] asserted as an affirmative defense in its Answer that there was an arbitration clause which should be enforced.  Pa50.  On August 25, 2023, an Order was granted, consolidating the matters between Leon and [...], since he also had an affirmative claim against [...] due to this crash, along with [...] and [...].  Pa56-57.  Thereafter, on March 14, 2024, Respondents [...] filed a Motion to Compel Arbitration and Stay the Case.  Pa78-401.  After hearing oral argument on May 10, 2024, [...] issued a written opinion on July 17, 2024 granting Respondents’ motion.
[brief] That court “has the feel of the case and is best equipped to gauge the effect of a prejudicial comment on the jury in the overall setting. ”  Id. at 647.  A denial of a mistrial motion is reviewable only for an abuse of discretion that has resulted in a manifest injustice.  Ibid.  This same degree of deference applies to the review of whether the given limiting instruction was adequate.  *Ibid.*  In determining the adequacy of the instruction, we focus on “the capacity of the offending evidence to lead to a verdict that could not otherwise be justly reached. ”  *Ibid.*  When the erroneous admission of evidence does not violate a defendant's constitutional rights, it will be disregarded “unless it is clearly capable of producing an unjust result.
[brief] [...], unlike the officer in Dubaniewicz, was not a drug expert – he was not even qualified to do field sobriety tests.  See Dubaniewicz, 208 A.3d at 620-625 (finding the officer’s belief that the defendant was intoxicated was reasonable due to his specialized expertise).  [...] could not explain why he believed [...]’ pupil size could be indicative of intoxication, and ultimately conceded that small pupil size was not indicative of criminal activity.  (Db 16-17)  As argued in [...]’ opening brief, [...]’s training or lack thereof, and inability to explain the basis for his beliefs matters because the State has the burden to prove that the officer’s beliefs were objectively reasonable.  (Db 17)  To determine whether [...]’ pupils were actually constricted relative to a normal baseline and whether constricted pupils, without any other purported signs of intoxication, warrant an officer in a reasonable belief that an individual is involved in drug use and activity, the trial court (and officer) would have needed to know more.  Finally, the fact that no one ever performed any sobriety tests, undermines the State’s argument that the police had reasonable suspicion to believe [...] was under the influence, much less reasonable suspicion that drugs would be inside once pulled over, appeared pale, had a red nose, constricted pupils, and the police had recovered a small pipe with powdery residue upon performing a lawful frisk).  the car.  Dubaniewicz, 208 A.3d at 620-625 (the officer did not have reasonable suspicion of drug activity where he decided sobriety tests were unnecessary).  For these reasons, even assuming for the sake of argument that constricted pupils could be a sign of intoxication, this one factor is not enough.  C.
[brief] On or about July 14, 2022, Plaintiff learned that Defendant [...] had further amended the Closing Date in the Mack-Cali Agreement, without Plaintiff’s consent and without extending the Closing Date in the Agreement — in breach of the terms of the Agreement.  Plaintiff’s counsel wrote to Defendant [...]’s counsel, notifying them that they were in breach of the Agreement.  Plaintiff’s counsel also advised that, as a result, Plaintiff would direct the Title Company to return to Plaintiff the $5 Million Earnest Money Deposit, plus interest — while reserving and without waiving their rights, remedies, and claims.
[directive] Page 10 of the court concerning any the factors listed in Guideline 3(d) are confidential and may not be disclosed except as provided Guideline S(a).  in Information from Prosecutor.  addition to information referenced In in Guideline 3(e), the county prosecutor or designee shall produce for the court's of consideration information obtained through sources including the execution any of search warrant and any additional information obtained through the performance its et responsibilities under N.J.S.A. 2C:58-20 seq.  Guidelines for Extreme Risk Protective Orders Directive#  Promulgated by 19-19 (August 12, 2019)
[brief] However, Defendants fail to acknowledge that the courts of New Jersey liberally grant a litigant standing to bring a legal claim, Jen Elec., Inc. v. Cnty. of Essex, 197 N.J. 627, 645 (2009), especially claims raised in a Mount Laurel setting.  Oceanport Holding, L.L.C. v. Borough of Oceanport, 396 N.J. Super. 622, 631 (App. Div., 2007).  Generally, a litigant has standing under the common law to challenge a governmental action when he has “a sufficient stake in the outcome of the litigation, a real adverseness with respect to the subject matter, and a substantial likelihood that the party will suffer harm in the event of an unfavorable decision. ”  In re Camden Cnty., 170 N.J. 439, 449 (2002); see also Jen Elec., 197 N.J. at 645; see also In re Adoption of Baby T., 160 N.J. 332, 340 (1999).  Further, the NJLAD itself provides that it “shall be liberally construed in combination with other protections” available under New Jersey’s laws in order to reflect New Jersey’s strong public policy to fight discrimination against any of its inhabitants.  N.J.S.A. 10:5-3; See also Hernandez v. Region Nine Hous. Corp., 146 N.J. 645, 651-52 (1996); Montells v. Havnes, 133 N.J. 282, 298 (1993); Pukowsky v. Caruso, 312 N.J. Super. 171, 177 (App. Div. 1998); Grigoletti v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 118 N.J. 89, 96 (1990).  Plaintiffs meet the criteria set forth in Camden Cnty.  The Plaintiffs, as the property owners, clearly have a sufficient stake in the outcome of the litigation, are clearly adverse to the Defendants, and have been and will be substantially harmed if they are not compensated given the Defendants’ unlawful actions.  Further, as set forth in the Plaintiffs’ initial Brief, they are entitled to standing under the NJLAD’s policy to afford standing broadly.  Under the NJLAD, non-protected class members harmed due to their relationship with a protected class member may pursue a civil action against the perpetrator of unlawful discrimination.  N.J.S.A. 10:5-13; O’Lone v. New Jersey Dept. of Corrections, 313 N.J. Super. 249, 254-55 (App. Div.,1998); Berner v. Enclave Condo Ass’n, 322 N.J. Super.229, 235 (App. Div. 1999) (citing N.J.S.A. 10:5-13).  As the owners of property designed to assist the Township in meeting its affordable housing obligations, Plaintiffs have clear standing to maintain this claim on behalf of the racial minorities and families who will, among others, occupy the housing units in Plaintiffs’ planned development on the Subject Property.
[brief] Not “bodily injury or death” but “death. ”  Period.  Although he uttered the word “serious” once in his opinion, [...] was simply reading the statute, not rendering an opinion.  4T64:19.  In his continued recitation of N.J.S.A. 4:19-23, he omitted the word “serious” twice:  ... and poses a threat – serious threat of bodily injury or death to a person or 2, severely injured or killed another domestic animal.  And A poses a threat of serious bodily injury ... or death to a person or B, poses a threat of death to another domestic animal.