ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The Complaint is therefore barred by the Consent Order (defined below), res judicata, and the entire controversy doctrine, as well as the doctrines of waiver, estoppel, and because Appellants failed to file the appropriate application under Rule 4:50-1 to vacate the Consent Order.  The Trial Court granted Respondent’s motion to dismiss the Complaint on September 29, 2023 when it entered an Order (the “Order”) and an accompanying Opinion (the “Opinion”) finding, amongst other things, that Appellants’ Complaint was untimely filed, in violation of a Consent Order (the “Consent Order”) dated November 14, 2018 that resolved an earlier action in the Union County Chancery Division (the “Chancery Action”).  (See Pa3a to Pa13 (Opinion)).  The Consent Order required Appellants to file their Complaint in the Union County Chancery Division within a sixty-day deadline.  (Pa110 at ¶3 (Consent Order)).  Rather than filing in the Chancery Division within the sixty-day deadline, Appellants waited a staggering 620 days and filed the Complaint in the Law Division.  (Pa3 at ¶ 2 (Opinion)).  The Trial Court properly dismissed the Complaint as untimely and in violation of the clear and unambiguous terms of the Consent Order, and for the alternative reasons of application of the doctrines of *res judicata* and entire controversy.  The doctrines of waiver and estoppel, as well as Appellants’ failure to file the required application under Rule 4:50-1 to vacate the Consent Order, also support the dismissal of the Complaint.  So, too, does the extreme prejudice that Respondent would suffer if the Consent Order was vacated on account of Appellant [...]’s spoliation of evidence, see, infra, at pp. 10-11 (No. 7 of Procedural History and Statement of Facts).  **Procedural History and Statement of Facts**
[brief] Just two days later, on September 30, 2018, [...] received another call of the same nature in the middle of the night from his security company. (5T15-3 to 8).  Again reviewing surveillance footage to find an intruder, [...] stated that the intruder appeared to be the same intruder from two days prior, but that he did not recognize the burglar personally.  (5T16-23 to 17-3; Pa4 at 00:37-00:48).  This time, the intruder went to the safe where the change bag was located two days prior; finding no such bag, he attempted and failed to open the cash register before leaving empty-handed.
[brief] Here, Appellant cannot rely on case law defining the contours of the Tort Claims Act for protection, because there are no public entities or public employees involved.  *Jones* does not apply because – unlike the plaintiff in *Jones* that destroyed the private-party defendants’ third-party claim against the public entity – Plaintiff/Respondent did nothing to destroy any contribution claims that Appellant may have had against [...] and [...].  The fact that Plaintiff/Respondent did not originally sue [...] and [...] did not affect that right.  Amending the Complaint would not affect that right.  Not amending the Complaint would not affect that right.  Appellants right to seek contribution was unaffected by anything Plaintiff/Respondent did or did not do.
[brief] ”  State v. Comer, 249 N.J. 359, 384 (2022) (citing State v. A.T.C., 239 N.J. 450, 466 (2019)); Whirlpool Props., Inc. v. Dir., Div. of Tax’n, 208 N.J. 141, 172 (2011)).  “A statute ‘will not be declared void unless its repugnancy to the constitution is clear beyond a reasonable doubt. ’”  Ibid. (quoting Gangemi v. Berry, 25 N.J. 1, 10 (1957)).  Moreover, defendant shoulders the burden to overcome the strong presumption that a statute is constitutional.  Ates, 217 N.J. at 268 (citing State v. One 1990 Honda Accord, 154 N.J. 373, 377 (1998)).  Here, as previously mentioned, New Jersey’s Wiretap Act models federal law, which the Supreme Court has found to be constitutional.  Dalia, 441 U.S. at 247-48 (finding law enforcement officers could constitutionally break and enter to execute a search warrant if such entry was the only means by which the warrant could effectively be executed).
[brief] No.  If the sidewalk - if it was an issue, the homeowner or the company or whatever, if they wanted to do the sidewalk, they would have to get a permit from the engineer.  Then after, then they would contact [...] to go check it out, check out the roots or anything like that.  And then either we take down the tree or they can work around the roots.  We might shave it down a little bit, maybe an inch or so.  But besides that, they have to call the [...] if there's a tree in front of it. ”  Pa172-193, Tr 36:3-13  Additionally, the dangerous condition of the tree root, like the property in the Vincitore and Roe matters, was apparent.  However, the defendant herein did not take any action to correct it.  POINT II
[brief] There was no testimony elicited at trial to support the allegation that the above statement was made by anyone specific, let alone anyone who was aware of any disability claimed by Plaintiff.  Thus, the statement is not only inaccurate, but misleads the jury to believe that a statement about FMLA leave is evidence of disability discrimination.  In addition to not mentioning the remaining prongs of the test for this claim, Plaintiff’s counsel mistakenly advised jurors that religion or disability must only be a reason, not the only reason, for Appellants alleged actions, thereby lowering her burden of proof substantially on the issue of the hostile work environment claim.
[directive] Conduct condition with no legitimate purposes or engages in unreasonably loud or offensive Persons language in a public place with purpose to offend others or in reckless disregard of doing so.  Wandering, Remaining in or Prowling Public Places with Actor, whether on foot or in motor vehicle, wanders, prowls, or remains in public place for 2C:33-2.1  Disorderly Persons $500 to $2,500 10% permissible
[directive] All Legal Affairs Division DA'sG must confer with the SDAG before approving the use of new investigative techniques to determine the appropriate legal implications and requirements of such technology.  In cases referred to a county prosecutor, or in cases originating from a county prosecutor's office, that county prosecutor shall provide all legal advice and services for those cases.  The Legal Affairs Division may provide legal support to the county as needed.  (b)  The SDAG is responsible for establishing and maintaining a system for providing training and legal advice to county prosecutors, by chairing the -4- Computer & Telecommunication Coordinator program, which consists of county prosecutors assigned to prosecute computer crimes.  (c)  The SDAG shall monitor current cases, laws and proposed legislation concerning high technology and computer crimes, and identify further legislative needs and recommend to the Director of the Division of Criminal Justice and the Attorney General legislative proposals to address such needs in this area.  5.
[brief] Section B(2) immunizes railroads when the injured party is under influence of drugs.  Similar to section B(1), there is no language specific to location in this clause.  This means that if a person is under the influence of drugs and is injured or killed by railroad equipment anywhere—on railroad property, on a right of way, or even if they are a passenger utilizing parts of railroad designated for passenger use or in a crossing established by the railroad, the railroad is immune.  Section B(3) addresses parties trying to harm or kill themselves and immunizes railroads in those situations.
[brief] However, this court has also cautioned that “[s]uppression of evidence ... has always been our last resort, not our first impulse. ”  *Caronna*, 469 N.J. Super. at 490 (quoting *State v. Presley*, 436 N.J. Super 440, 459 (App. Div. 2014).  Defendant provides no principled reason for this court to reject the trial court’s finding that police complied with the knock-and-announce requirement of the warrant.  At the suppression hearing, [...] testified before the trial court that both an agent from the Homeland Security Investigation Task Force and [...] knocked on defendant’s door and stated “police, search warrant”; waited twenty to twenty-five seconds and then gained entry into defendant’s apartment; and, that the pause depicted on the body cam footage in between attempts to enter defendant’s apartment was so that an officer could announce their presence.
[directive] i.  Multa del Fondo de Prevención de Delitos con una Computadora (Computer Crime Prevention [Sí/Yes] [No/No] Fund Penalty (CCPF)), 2C:43-3.8 (L. 2009, c. 143).  Si el delito tiene que ver con una N.J.S.A. infracción de 2C:24-4b(3) (causar o permitir que un/una menor participe en un acto N.J.S.A. sexual al que se le va a tomar fotografías o se va a exhibir) si el delito se cometió el 1 de febrero de 2018 o después de esa fecha, 2C:24-4b(4) (tomar fotografías o películas de N.J.S.A. un/una menor en un acto sexual) si el delito se cometió el 1 de febrero de 2018 o después de esa fecha, 2C:24-4b (5)(b) (poseer a sabiendas o mirar a sabiendas pornografía N.J.S.A. infantil), 2C 24-4.1 (ser dirigente de una red de pornografía infantil) si el delito se N.J.S.A. cometió el 1 de febrero de 2018 o después de esa fecha, 2C:34-3 (vender, distribuir o N.J.S.A. exhibir material obsceno a una persona menor de 18 años) o una infracción que envuelva una actividad delictiva en la computadora que infringe cualquier disposición del Título 2C, capítulo 20, se le fijará una multa obligatoria de acuerdo con la lista que sigue a continuación para cada infracción de la cual se haya declarado culpable?
[brief] However, in its brief [...] concedes it was responsible to ensure the “smooth and constant flow of traffic” and to use proper traffic signs.  (Db21).  Despite [...]’s arguments, here, the contract between the [...] and [...] specifically provided for the maintenance and protection of traffic.  (Pa1379); (Pa1381).  In fact, the contract specifies that “[f]ull responsibility for the adequate safety measures for the protection of all persons and property on and adjacent to the work site shall rest with the contractor. ” (Pa1208); (Pa1209).  In furtherance of that obligation, [...]’s was responsible to perform miscellaneous repairs and to install traffic protection devices as necessary.  (Pa1381).  Traffic control devices must be used pursuant to the MUTCD.  (Pa1337); (Pa1225).  Although [...] and [...] were hired to help ensure that [...] complied with these contractual obligations, their involvement did not relieve [...] from its’ contractual duties.  (Pa1208); (Pa1209).  [...]’s contract specifically required that they assign a traffic control coordinator.  (Pa1214).  That traffic controller was to, among other things, perform daily inspections to ensure compliance with the Traffic Control Plan and other approved Standards and to correct deficiencies of traffic control devices within 2 hours of discovery or notification by the engineer.  (Pa1214).  Although, when viewing the facts most favorable to the Plaintiffs, the record reflects that [...] was aware of the dangerous condition, at a minimum, [...] should have been aware of it.  “Full responsibility for the adequate safety measures for the protection of all persons and property on and adjacent to the work site shall rest with the contractor. ”  (Pa1208); (Pa1209).  Plaintiffs’ do not contend, as [...] suggests, that the duties and responsibility of the [...] were completely transferred to [...].  However, Plaintiffs do submit, and the record reflects, that [...]’s contract with the [...] required them to ensure the maintenance and protection of traveling public on the Parkway in their construction area.
[brief] The United States Supreme Court created the automobile exception in 1925 in *Carroll v. United States*, 267 U.S. 132, 160, 162 (1925).  In that case, the police developed “convincing evidence” that the defendants were illegally transporting prohibited liquor.  *Id.* at 160.  One night, they saw the defendants in Carroll’s vehicle, but were unable to pull it over.  *Ibid.*  Two months later, officers “suddenly met the same men” on the road again, and this time, were able to effectuate a motor vehicle stop.  *Ibid.*  The officers searched Carroll’s car on the side of the highway and located the illegal liquor inside.  *Ibid.*  The Supreme Court found the officers’ subsequent search of defendant’s car was permissible.
[directive] Amendments to N.J.S.A. 2C:25-26 Section 2 of L. 2023, c. 46, amended N.J.S.A. 2C:25-26(b), which details the requirement that when a defendant is released pretrial by the court with a condition restricting the defendant’s ability to have contact with a victim, the victim must be provided with a copy of that order.  The amendment specifically places the duty on the prosecutor to provide a copy of the release order to the victim.  Specifically, N.J.S.A 2C:25-26(b), is amended as follows:
[directive] It is therefore not properly before the Court.  See 11  If a litigant abuses the above process by filing repetitive motions that demonstrate “a pattern of frivolous litigation,” the Presiding Judge for Administration of the Appellate Division can enter an order consistent with control the practice and curtail “harassing Rosenblum v. Borough of Closter to and vexatious” motions.  333 N.J. Super. 385, 387, 391 (App. Div. 2000).  Such orders must be entered with caution to avoid impinging on a defendant’s “fundamental right of . . . access to the courts. ”  D’Amore v. D’Amore, 186 N.J. Super. 525, 530 (App. Div. 1982); see also Zehl v. City of Elizabeth Bd. of Educ., 426 N.J. Super. 129, 139-40 (App. Div. 2012).  33 State v. Lawless, 214 N.J. 594, 605 n.2 (2013); see also State v. Cabbell, 207 N.J. 311, 327 n.10 (2011) (declining to consider an argument first raised in a Hirsch v. State Bd. of Med. Exam’rs, supplemental brief to the Court); 128 N.J. 160, 161 (1992) (declining to address a claim presented after the Court granted a petition for certification).
[brief] True or false:  An attorney licensed in New Jersey will violate a statute and be subject to criminal penalties solely because that attorney is, by some unknown measurement, deemed to be “principally engaged” in one area of legal practice.  Correct answer:  True, and Defendants do not contend otherwise.  This case presents a significant legal issue, specifically the constitutionality of a statute that regulates the practice of law and imposes criminal penalties upon any violator.
[brief] THE PROBATE COURT MISINTERPRETED THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT TO FIND THAT PERELMAN WAIVED HER RIGHT TO HARRIET’S INTEREST IN THE PALM BEACH PROPERTY (Da265 – Da266; Da274 – Da275).  This Court should reverse the Probate Court’s ruling that [...] waived her rights to receive [...]’s 21.5 percent interest in the Palm Beach Property.  The Probate Court failed in its obligation to attempt to read Paragraphs 24(F) and 24(G) in harmony before applying canons of construction to modify an unambiguous term.  The Probate Court also improperly applied canons of construction to use Paragraph 24(F) (concerning assets from [...]’s Estate Plan) to modify and limit Paragraph 24(G) (concerning [...]’s Estate).  The Probate Court’s ruling modifies an unambiguous contract and misapplies the canons of construction to create an unreasonable reading.  A.
[directive] this Section is See warrant.  a for complaint apply to or complaint-summons a in specified grounds the of any where persons offenses  disorderly domestic violence limited to involving domestic offenses persons disorderly other any or apply, (4) to to 2C:25-21(a)(1)  S.A. N.J. officer arresting an that general requirement the 3.2 (limiting Section Cf. 5.  violence.  note See mandatory-arrest and crimes to indictable approval charging for prosecutor assistant an contact persons offenses).  disorderly violence domestic another of laws the under with offenses charged apply fugitives to not Directive does  This under Jersey  New offense an with charged is defendant also the unless States, United or State, the an for arrested Persons Directive.
[brief] Da247 Exh N (Email of [...] to [...] dated May 2, 2023-Redacted As Redundant) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Da145 Exh O (Email of [...], Esq. to [...], Esq. dated May 4, 2023-Redacted as Redundant) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Da070 Exh P (Email of [...], Esq. To [...], Esq. dated June 7, 2023) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Da248 Exh Q (Correspondence of [...], Esq. to [...], Esq. dated April 21, 2023) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
[brief] He must make his motion within a reasonable time”); *Sobel v. Long Island Entertainment Productions, Inc.*, 329 N.J. Super. 285, 293-94 (App. Div. 2000) (holding where defendant had notice of judgment, equitable considerations precluded relief from a void judgment because defendant did not act within a reasonable time).  On May 8, 2024, this Court affirmed a denial of an identical motion brought by identical counsel seeking to vacate a judgment on the same grounds as is sought here by Defendant.
[brief] Id. at *5-*7.  (311a to 312a).  While the court in Delaney did not remove [...] due to plaintiff’s delay of several years to move for disqualification.  The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court which had found a conflict and stated:  Analyzing RPC 1.9(b), the court held [...] and [...] "were privy to confidential information from . . . Delaney" and that [...] "certainly has some insights into [Delaney's] personality, thinking, [and] how he approaches particular decisions whether it be in litigation, business, etc." determined [...] and [...] should be disqualified because they represented Delaney regarding CCH matters during the events giving rise to Delaney's current suit.  Id. at *5.  (311a).  In the subject case, during oral arguments on August 2, 2024, Respondent argued, *inter alia*, that [...] had previously represented [...] and [...] would know whether or not [...] was or was not able to litigate the subject lawsuit.
[brief] (Da395).  One of the major decisions being the sales price for the Subject Property.  (Da383).  On January 18, 2023, [...] informed the five sibling co-owners that he had retained [...] as the realtor in charge of selling the Subject Property.  (Da34).  During the sales and minuscule marketing of the home, [...] made numerous complaints in writing through counsel about the process, all in accordance with the Consent Judgment and the January 12, 2023 Order.
[brief] Id 116 N.J. 739 (1989).  C. COUNT IV - VIOLATIONS OF ARTICLE 1 OF THE NEW JERSEY CONSTITUTION FOR DEPRIVATION OF PLAINTIFF’S SUBSTANTIVE AND PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS RIGHTS WAS PROPERLY PLEAD  Both state and Federal laws hold that prisoners have a right to due process.  Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555-56, (1974).  In examining a procedural due process claim, courts first assess whether a liberty or property interest has been interfered with by the government, and second, whether the procedures attendant upon that deprivation are constitutionally sufficient.  Doe v. Poritz, 142 N.J. at 99 (citing Valmonte v. Bane, 18 E. 3d 992, 998, (2d. Cir. 1994) (quoting Kentuck v Dept. Of Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U.S.454, 460, (1989)).  Plaintiff although an inmate, has a liberty interest and a constitutional right in proper access to the Courts.  Bounds v. Smith, 430 U. S. 817 (1977).  Plaintiff has a liberty interest in her constitutional right to petition the government for the redress of grievances, Johnson v. Avery, 393 U. S. 483 (1969).  Plaintiff has a liberty interest in access and communications with her attorney.  See, e.g., Ex parte Hull, 312 U. S. 546,549 (1941); Hudspeth v. Figgins, 584 F.2d 1345, 1347 (4th Cir. 1978).  Plaintiff had an absolute right to her psychiatric medication while confined.  See Saint Barnabas Medical Center v. Essex County, 111 N.J. 67, 74 (1988).  Our laws hold that County prisoners, while confined, are classified as “wards of the county” with the "right to proper medical care."
[brief] The trial court also should have found that the third factor weighed in favor of [...].  “A defendant does not . . . have an obligation to bring himself to trial. ”  Cahill, 213 N.J. at 274.  “It is the State’s obligation to prosecute and do so in a manner consistent with defendant's right to a speedy trial. ”  Id.  As previously explained and acknowledged by the trial court, [...] did not discover that there was a warrant for his arrest until after he reviewed a record check in early 2018, at which point he promptly sent a letter to the court requesting the disposition of the warrant.
[brief] This Ordinance will permit the Township to exchange the subject properties, along with surrounding properties, to protect and maintain open space within the Township.  The Township has entered into a contract for the exchange of land.  Such contract includes the exchange of the subject parcels.  The purpose of the land exchange is to provide open space for the residents of Jackson township.  The land exchange, with the inclusion of these two subject properties, will permit the township to preserve open space in a desirable location of the Township.  The location of the open space which will be made possible by adoption of this Ordinance and condemnation of the subject parcels, will create open space in a centrally located portion of the Township, creating open space to be utilized by residents.  The [...] has determined that this condemnation best serves the [...] and promotes public use of open space within the municipality.
[brief] The Model Nuisance Code contains regulations regarding the “existence or presence of any accumulation of garbage, refuse,” etc. Da96.  Yet, N.J.S.A. 40:66-1 et seq. provides extensive enabling authority for municipal governing bodies in the field of solid waste collection and disposal.  Section II, Subsection 2.1(d) of the Model Nuisance Code regulates as a nuisance “the escape into the air from any stack, vent, chimney or any entrance to the open air, or from any fire into the open air of such quantities of smoke, fly ash, dust, fumes, vapors, mists, or gasses as to cause injury, detriment or annoyance to the inhabitants…”.  However, in N.J.S.A. 40:48-1(16 & 19), the Legislature entrusted regulations of chimneys and boilers, and soft coal, respectively to municipal governing bodies.  The Legislature also conferred powers on a municipal governing body, in other realms in the Home Rule Act, which might be said to touch upon areas dealing with public health.  These include N.J.S.A. 40:48-1(10) prohibiting annoyance of persons or animals; (11) establishment and regulation of animals in pounds; (15) regulation of dangerous structures; (22) regulation of sample medicines; N.J.S.A. 40:48-1.1 removal or demolition of dangerous buildings or structures; as well as N.J.S.A. 40:48-2.3 regulation of unfit buildings including those found to be “insanitary”; and N.J.S.A. 40:48-2.12(m) ordinances regulating condition of rental property prior to new occupancy, including regulation for the purpose of “healthfulness” and “public health and safety”.  Hence, a uniform policy is not needed in the sense that it will preclude a governing body from adopting ordinances specifically for the powers entrusted to it by statute, which is the case here pursuant to the Home Rule Act.