ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] Training Association cooperation with County Prosecutors in the Criminal Justice, Division of The within Association of Chiefs of Police, shall Jersey the New State Police, and the of New Jersey, program for police made training officers, Directive develop a of issuance this of the 60 days the to explain other electronic means if feasible, or by Learn system through NJ the available as they requirements of this Directive and the Bail Reform Law under the established policies of of issuance Division shall within 60 days the also officers.  The and police agencies pertain to concisely police officers that for dissemination to instruction card an prepare Directive this  The agencies and officers. that pertain to police Directive features of this summarizes the key the State Association of New Jersey, Prosecutors with the County cooperation in Division, training special develop of Chiefs of Police, may a Association the New Jersey Police, and subsection 3.3.2. to designated pursuant supervisory officers for program of this operational immediately upon issuance shall become Section  This amended Directive.  LAW
[brief] Although the court cited to N.J.S.A. 48:3-17.1, that statute is irrelevant.  It only applies where municipality seeks the removal of a pole that has occupied a location for at least 10 years regardless of whether permission was actually given, and that no court can order the removal of said pole.  It is inapposite to the present matter because nobody is questioning whether [...] has permission to keep its existing poles where they are currently situated, and nobody has filed a lawsuit to remove said poles. municipality as to where poles may be placed).  Critically, our Supreme Court has further explicitly held that electric utility services are not automatically exempt from local regulations.  See *State v. Jersey Central Power & Light Co.*, 55 N.J. 363 (1970) (holding that the State Legislature has evinced an intent to give municipalities some ability to regulate utilities within their boundaries).  Contrary to the lower court’s and [...]’s interpretation of *In re Pub. Serv. Elec & Gas Co.*, 35 N.J. 358 (1961) as prohibiting any and all municipal regulation related to “high-capacity power lines,” such was not the holding in that case.
[directive] Record on line the name and number of any law enforcement 1.  9 - a agency receiving funds as a result of contributing share or any N. J. other reason.  Other agencies include, but are not limited to: the Department of Law and Public Safety, other County Prosecutor's Offices and police departments.  Provide individually; the local OR1 agency name, the agency number, the amount distributed and the total amount of all distributions for the period. and '.
[brief] A copy of the amended complaint is appended hereto as Pa95.  Defendants, [...], [...], [...], [...], and [...] Washington Division Et Al., through [...], filed a Response to Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint on May 5, 2022.  The Response is appended hereto as Pa123.  On December 22, 2023, Defendants [...], [...] Washington Division, [...], [...], and [...] Et Al. filed a Motion for Summary Judgment alleging in relevant part that Plaintiff cannot recover from the ‘railroad defendants’ because Plaintiff violated N.J.S.A. 48:12-152.  The Motion for Summary Judgment is appended hereto as Pa148.  Plaintiff filed opposition to Defendant’s filed Motion for Summary Judgment on January 23, 2024.  The submission is appended hereto as Pa761.  On January 30, 2024, Defendant filed a Reply Brief in response to Plaintiff’s Opposition.  On February 2, 2024, [...] heard Oral Arguments on Defendant’s filed Motion for Summary Judgment.  A copy of the transcript of the Oral Argument is appended hereto as T\(^2\).  After hearing Oral Arguments,  On February 5, 2024, [...] entered an Order Granting Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment and dismissing the claim.  A copy of this Order is appended hereto as Pa1.  After a request for a more detailed Order, [...] signed an Order vacating his February 5, 2024 Order (Pa3) and entered an updated Order Granting Summary Judgment on February 14, 2024.  A copy of the February 14 Order is appended hereto as Pa4.  Plaintiff filed a Notice of Appeal on February 20, 2024.  A copy of the Notice is appended hereto as Pa6.  The Notice was subsequently amended to correct deficiencies.  The Amended Notice of Appeal is appended hereto as Pa11.  **STATEMENT OF FACTS**
[brief] Courts Have Consistently Upheld the Invalidation of Ballots that Violate Technical Statutory Requirements, Even Absent Bad Faith  New Jersey courts have long recognized that strict compliance with election statutes is essential to preserving the integrity of the electoral process.  The enforceability of these statutory requirements does not depend on the presence of fraud, foul play, or voter misconduct.  Rather, courts have acknowledged that liberal judicial interpretation has its limits; when a statute is explicit, the judiciary is not permitted to interpret it in a manner that conflicts with its plain language.  *De Flesco v. Mercer Cty. Bd. of Elections*, 43 N.J. Super. 492, 498 (App. Div. 1957) (holding that voting by absentee ballot is a privilege and that failure to comply with statutory deadlines for receipt renders a ballot void).
[brief] Despite Respondent referring to itself as an “innocent party” (Resp. Br. at 34), that is not an accurate depiction of the facts in the record.  The Trial Court erred by not considering the actions of both parties after the funds were returned, and ending its “best position” analysis at the point in time when the funds were returned to the escrow agent.  (1T61:9-23.)  Indeed, the Trial Court failed to consider that Respondent did nothing to mitigate its damages and failed to seek any information from the escrow agent about the whereabouts of the funds, despite being well-aware of an issue with the funds for over one year before the escrow company became a defunct entity.  (App. Br. at 11, 24.)  The Trial Court also improperly discounted the significance of Respondent’s (and its agents’) failure to confirm the payoff amount, despite remitting funds after the payoff good through date expired (and into a new month).  (1T55:1-16.)  These facts should have been considered on the spectrum of the “best position” analysis.
[brief] Appellees argued before the trial court that the Board had to accept all of [...]’s expert testimony and compelled the Board to approve their application.  However, that proposition ignores the law on the subject.  The law is clear in holding that a zoning or planning board need not accept the testimony of any particular expert.  In *El Shaer vs. Lawrence Tp. Planning Bd.*, 249 N.J.Super. 323, 329 (App.Div. 1991), certif. denied, 127 N.J. 546 (1992), the Court held:  [The applicant’s expert] did not address the Board's overall concern that increased volumes of water created by the development may cause additional flooding on contiguous properties and Route 206.  Moreover, the Board was not bound by appellee's expert's testimony.  See *Allen v. Hopewell Tp. Zoning Bd. of Adj.*, 227 N.J.Super. 574, 581, 548 A.2d 220 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 113 N.J. 655 (1988).
[brief] Lastly, the 300 micron silicone particulate was either aspirated out during the November 14, 2018 vitrectomy or remains embedded in scar tissue in [...]’s eye.  As a result of [...]’s intentional concealment of the defect until December 28, 2018, [...] could not have known or otherwise been aware to look for the silicone particulate during the November 14, 2018 vitrectomy surgery.  [...] testified that the offending silicone particulate is either still lodged in a portion of [...]’s eye “that becomes scarred and ingrained into her tissue,” or that it was aspirated during the November 14, 2018 vitrectomy surgery.  (Da0694; Da0697-Da0698)  [...]’s expert agrees, and testified that “it is possible that it could have been sucked out,” or missed during the vitrectomy surgery (Pa98; Pa103-Pa104)
[brief] He expressed his disbelief and stressed the sanctity of marriage, vehemently objecting to the idea of divorce.  In a conversation with Defendant’s family, they suggested sending her to North Carolina for ten days, hinting that she would return afterward with her uncle.  (2T34-35).  Considering this suggestion, Plaintiff had booked a one-way ticket, operating under the assumption that she would return with her uncle.  He was hopeful that Defendant would come back to him and their marriage.  (2T34-35).  On the night before her departure, [...] observed his wife unusually dressed up and looking attractive, a stark change from her usual behavior.  (2T43).  The next morning, as Plaintiff and his parents dropped Defendant off at the Philadelphia airport, she displayed affection by holding his hand and kissing him on the cheek, which confused Plaintiff.  Plaintiff felt manipulated into believing that Defendant would return and that their relationship had a future.  Plaintiff’s father overheard Defendant saying she intended to stretch their relationship until December to appear as a long-standing relationship for the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS).  After Defendant left, Plaintiff discovered through phone records that she was communicating with immigration lawyers and had no interest in the relationship.  Defendant did not respond to Plaintiff’s calls and communications for over 70 days after she left – and even then, despite the prolonged silence, Plaintiff remained optimistic that the situation would resolve, and their marriage would continue.  (2T44-45).  Plaintiff noted that his father had warned him about the potential outcome, but he chose to hold onto hope, believing that people from India did not just leave without any explanation.  On their wedding anniversary, November 28, 2022, he reached out to Defendant’s mother, seeking her assistance in mediating and resolving the issues, but this did not resolve the issue.  Plaintiff attempted one last effort to reconcile with [...] in March 2023.  He continued trying to salvage the marriage until various cultural holidays and festivals, only filing for annulment in March 2023 when it was undeniable that he had been defrauded to enter into the marriage by the Defendant.
[brief] ”  State v. Allen, 254 N.J. 530, 543-44 (2023).  Satisfaction of the first requirement generally “rests on the acquisition of knowledge through use of one’s sense of touch, taste, sight, smell or hearing,” but can be satisfied by “[a]n investigator who has carefully reviewed a video a sufficient number of times prior to trial. ”  Id. at 544, 546 (quoting State v. McLean, 205 N.J. 438, 457 (2011)); Watson, 254 N.J. at 601.  Satisfaction of the second requirement “depends heavily on the nature of the recording and the proposed comments. ”
[brief] The application had been brought to the Zoning Board by the School pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40:55D-68 of the Municipal Land Use Law (MLUL).  The defendant [...] submitted its Appeal Brief and Appendix on July 11, 2023.  The defendants Zoning Board and Township have submitted their Briefs.  Plaintiff/respondent [...] has submitted its responding Brief and Appendix on November 28, 2023.  Kindly accept this Letter Reply Brief on behalf of [...], in support of this Court reversing and voiding the Opinion/Order of the Law Division and restoring and affirming the Resolution/determination of the [...].
[brief] Here, too, the Borough seeks to utilize the Home Rule Act’s broad grant of general police powers instead of the more specific grants of authority in the NCA and the public health nuisance provisions of Title 26.  Perhaps the Borough would arguably have the authority to pass an ordinance without DEP approval if it only addressed the noise emanated by the ringing of bells and crying of goods at auction, as that much is specifically provided by *N.J.S.A.* 40:48-1.  However, to the extent that statute tacks on the phrase “and to prevent disturbing noises”, it is undoubtedly general in nature.  Those five words provide no framework or standards, unlike the NCA and regulations promulgated thereunder, and to borrow a phrase from the *Earrusso* court, that section of the Home Rule Act appears to be “clearly aimed at something different. ”  And to the extent the Borough relies on the “necessary and proper” or “police power” provision of *N.J.S.A.* 40:48-2 as authority for the Noise Ordinance, that section is clearly an even more generalized “catch-all” provision which, again, cannot overcome the specific statutes at issue.
[brief] (Da 17; Da 56; 25T 64-12 to 20)  Detectives kept him in the interrogation room for six minutes.  (Da 17)  When detectives returned, [...] said, “That’s not right ….  That’s not right ….  I don’t know who that person is. ”  (Da 56; 25T 65-13 to 18; Da 17 at 49:11 to 49:21)  For a twelfth time, detectives pressed [...], “[Y]ou don’t recognize him you said, right?”  (Da 56; 25T 65-24 to 25; Da 17 at 49:27 to 49:29)  [...] responded, “I swear I don’t know. ”  (Da 56-57; 25T 66-6 to 7; Da 17 at 49:35 to 49:40)  Detectives then collected additional information from [...] on his alibi and movements on February 6.
[brief] A.  Plaintiff’s Breach of Contract Claims Fails Since It Did Not Obtain Title and Failed to Satisfy the Condition Precedent Necessary for the Title Insurance Commitment to Become a Valid, Enforceable Contract (39a-40a) (this aspect of the summary judgment motion was not decided below) ..............................................................................................................39  B. Plaintiff’s Negligence Claims Fails as a Matter of Law  Since Plaintiff’s Expert Report is Inadmissible as a Net Opinion (39a-40a) (this aspect of the summary judgment motion was not decided below) ..............................................................................................................45 C. Plaintiff’s Consumer Fraud Act Claims Fails as a Matter of Law  Under the “Learned Professional” Exception (39a-40a) (this aspect of the summary judgment motion was not decided below) .........................50 CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................................51
[directive] Officers shall take the following actions to reduce the risk of positional asphyxiation:  (a)  As soon as handcuffed and restrained, a person should be immediately rolled to the side and taken to an upright position that does not impede the mechanism of normal breathing.  This requirement is especially important when the subject is handcuffed face down in the prone position; (b)  Care should be taken not to put sustained pressure on the neck or back, as breathing can be restricted even if the person is placed in the recovery position.  This includes sitting, kneeling, or standing on a person’s chest, back, or neck for a prolonged period of time; 9  USE OF FORCE POLICY | April 2022
[brief] TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | Cases | PAGE NOS. | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------| | **DiProspero v. Penn**, 183 N.J. 477 (2005) | 13 | | **Paroline v. United States**, 572 U.S. 434 (2014) | 15 | | **State v. Atwood**, 232 N.J. 433 (2018) | 9 | | **State v. Cameron**, 100 N.J. 586 (1985) | 18 | | **State v. Carter**, 247 N.J. 488 (2021) | 9, 10, 12, 18 | | **State v. D.A.**, 191 N.J. 158 (2007) | 13 | | **State v. Ferguson**, 238 N.J. 78 (2019) | 16 | | **State v. Heisler**, 422 N.J. Super. 399 (App. Div. 2011) | 22 | | **State v. Jones**, 326 N.J. Super. 234 (App. Div. 1999) | 12, 20 | | **State v. Moss**, 277 N.J. Super. 545 (App. Div. 1994) | 20, 21, 22| | **State v. Scriven**, 226 N.J. 20 (2016) | 9, 12, 18 | | **State v. Smith**, 251 N.J. 244 (2022) | 18, 19 | | **State v. Williamson**, 138 N.J. 302 (1994) | 11, 12, 20, 22 | | **Wong Sun v. United States**, 371 U.S. 471 (1963) | 19, 23 | | Statutes | PAGE NOS. | |---------------------------------------------|-----------| | N.J.S.A. 2C:18-3a | 3 | | N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10a(4) | 3 | | N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5a(1) | 3 | | N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5b(5) | 3 | | N.J.S.A. 39:4-88 | 16 | | Other Authorities | | |---------------------------------------------|-----------| | The American Heritage Dictionary, | | | https://ahdictionary.com/word/search.html?q=turn (last visited Nov. 27, 2023) | 14, 15 | | Constitutional Provisions | | |---------------------------------------------|-----------| | N.J. Const. art. 1, para. 7 | 9, 19, 23 | | U.S. Const. amend. IV | 9, 19, 23 | | U.S. Const. amend. XIV | 9, 19, 23 |
[brief] Defendant argues that the court erroneously concluded that the factual bases he provided on October 4, 2006 for his guilty plea to the first of the seven first-degree robberies that were to be resolved by that plea bargain was insufficient.  We agree with defendant that the trial court seemed to be operating under the erroneous assumption that the simulation of use of a gun in a robbery is insufficient to establish commission of the first-degree offense.  However, the court never rejected this proposed plea bargain.  After erroneously stating that defendant had not established an adequate factual basis for his plea to the first of the seven robberies to which he had agreed to plead guilty, the court observed that it was 4:30 p.m. and that it was “shutting down” the plea proceedings “for the day. ”  The court also observed that this would afford defense counsel “more time to meet with [defendant],” and that “[i]f [defendant] wants to plead guilty, and the factual bases match up to what he's pleading to, that's fine. ”  The court concluded the day's proceeding by stating: “Yeah, this is no time to mess around with all these counts, okay.  Okay, if we can work it out, we can do that at anytime.  If we can't, we'll see you November 29th. ”  Therefore, the trial court did not reject defendant's second plea bargain with the State at the proceeding conducted on October 4, 2006.
[brief] (1T47-19 TO 48-22; Pa5-6; 3T65-4 to 66-18; Pa1-2)  As set forth in defendant’s initial brief, [...] improperly focused on whether or not plaintiff knew or should have known of a legal basis for his claims against the tenant defendants, and then found (without a factual basis) that plaintiff had been misled by [...]’ answers to interrogatories.
[brief] Respondents’ prior attempts to distinguish the DOL’s determination in [...] are without merit.  Specifically, Respondents’ previously argued that the DOL’s decision “reinforces the conclusion that registration is directly tied to the payment of prevailing wages. ”  Respondents’ argument is simply untrue.  While the DOL in [...] separately held that the particular professional was also obligated to pay prevailing wages, that conclusion did not in any way inform its determination that the professional was also required to be PWCRA-registered.  Rather, the DOL’s conclusion was limited to its analysis of the PWCRA and conclusion that the PWCRA does not draw distinctions among the types of subcontractors required to be registered, regardless of whether they are professionals or not.  Moreover, Respondents’ prior argument that archeologists are not “licensed” professionals like land surveyors (the professional at issue in [...]), is a distinction without a difference.  The DOL’s determination in [...] was not dependent upon (nor did it discuss) the fact that the land surveyor was licensed.  Rather, the DOL broadly rejected any attempt to distinguish between professional and non-professional subcontractors with respect to the obligation to register under the PWCRA, and determined that any subcontractor performing work on a public project must be registered.
[brief] (Da21).  Both the Trial Court found, and the Plaintiff admits, that the Property could not be used because of ongoing remediation.  (See T3, 44:12-14, stating “the property was leased and in use until the ongoing remediation required access to areas under and around the building that prohibited continued use”).  (See T3, 52:10-23 stating “during this phase it was impossible to lease the premises”).  (See also Pb16, stating “Plaintiff notified the tenant that it would not be renewing or extending the lease so it would not disturb the tenant if aggressive remediation were needed” & Pb21, stating “[s]o we allowed the lease to expire so that we could get in there and dig up whatever needed to be dug up”).  Thus, there was a discontinuance of use.  To support its “use” theory, Plaintiff also argues that storage is a permitted use, citing to the Borough Code and claiming that storage is a “service.
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED, BASED ON THE FACTUAL RECORD CREATED AT TRIAL, THAT CHENAULT FAILED TO PROVE THAT THE CONSUMPTION EXCEPTION RESTORES COVERAGE  After the trial court granted summary judgment to [...] declaring that the Mold Exclusions bar coverage for the Consent Judgment, [...] began his journey to reimagine his case to fit it within the narrow Consumption Exception.  [...] fundamentally altered his interpretation of the Consumption Exception to lessen his burden of proof, he retained a retired emergency room physician and professional expert, [...], to support him, and he offered testimony that was not credible.  The trial court ([...]) was unpersuaded.  After a multi-day bench trial, the court rejected [...]’s belated and misguided attempt to squeeze his Consent Judgment into the Consumption Exception.  Carefully dissecting its many flaws, the trial court rejected [...]’s absurd interpretation of the Consumption Exception as conferring coverage without evidence of a consumption-caused injury.  Da31a-Da39a.  Then, based on its assessment of the evidence and credibility of the witnesses, the trial court issued findings of fact and conclusions of law that “did not find [Dr. Guzzardi’s] opinion to be credible,” “found [...] to be extremely credible,” and held that [...] failed to prove an injury through consumption of mold-contaminated food.  Da38a-Da39a.  As a result, the trial court determined that the Consumption Exception did not restore coverage for the Consent Judgment.  This Court should affirm that decision.
[brief] I [...] PROPERLY DENIED DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO SUPPRESS THE SEARCH OF HIS MOTOR VEHICLE.  Violations of motor vehicle law justify an officer's stop of vehicles.  In the seminal case, Delaware v. Prouse, the United States Supreme Court held that an officer can stop a vehicle when he has at least an articulable and reasonable suspicion that either the vehicle or an occupant is subject to seizure for violation of law.  Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 664, 99 S. Ct. 1391, 1401 (1979).  The Court further stated that "the foremost method of enforcing traffic and vehicle safety regulations . . . is acting upon observed violations."  Id. at 659, 99 S. Ct. at 1399.  Subsequent to the Court's decision in Prouse, the violation of motor vehicle law has consistently been held to provide an officer with the requisite articulable and reasonable suspicion to effectuate a motor vehicle stop.