ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] See, e.g., 53 Cal.2d 313 (1959); Vallerga v. Dept. of Alcoholic Beverage Control, People on Arenella, 139 N.Y.S.2d 186 (N.Y.C. Mag. Ct 1954).  We cannot simply Complaint of Fasone v. ignore this history and move on.  For that reason, I recently spoke with the leadership of [...], New Jersey’s largest statewide LGBTQ+ organization, to offer my sincere apology for the harm caused by these actions.  And later today, on June 29, 2021, I will be joining [...] and local leaders in [...] to install a memorial at the former site of [...], which was subject to three separate enforcement actions between 1957 and 1960.
[brief] SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE  DIVISION  Docket No. [...]  TEAM 01  Submitted: July 17, 2024  Civil Action On Appeal  From: Chancery Division/Probate Part Docket No. [...]  SAT BELOW: Hon. [...], P.J.Ch.  BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF/RESPONDENT, [...], TRUSTEE OF THE [...]
[brief] bizarre event and for her mistaken belief that “several” people had witnessed the event when it turned out only two people saw it.  (Pa679).  Plaintiff also claims that [...] “revealed confidential information” from a meeting with [...] about the investigation of [...] being under her desk.  (Pa684).  Plaintiff identifies the recipients of “confidential information” about her complaint as [...]’s husband, defendant Steve [...], and [...], who had advised Linda [...] of the report of [...] being under her desk.  (Pa684).  Matthew [...]
[brief] *Tretina*, 135 N.J. at 358.  The *Tretina* standard of review, which is now the governing standard, provides:  *[A]rbitration awards may be vacated only for fraud, corruption, or similar wrongdoing on the part of the arbitrators.  [They] can be corrected or modified only for very specifically defined mistakes as set forth in [N.J.S.A. 2A:24-9].  If the arbitrators decide a matter not even submitted to them, that matter can be excluded from the award.  For those who think the parties are entitled to a greater share of justice, and that such justice exists only in the care of the court, I would hold that the parties are free to expand the scope of judicial \(^{15}\)
[brief] The review is not to be of some Reexamination Report that was never legally adopted as incorporated into or as part of the Master Plan, nor can it be based upon some vague platitudes, such as advancing “economic development” in the Master Plan, and certainly not some vague platitudes in any unincorporated Reexamination Report.  The reviewing Court is required to carefully review the in-place Master Plan and its Land Use Element to determine the actual consistency of that Master Plan to the Redevelopment Plan.  That was not done here by the Planning Board, the Governing Body, or the Trial Court.  There can be no question that the Redevelopment Plan is “substantially inconsistent” with the 1988 Master Plan in its most important particulars --- the density/height of the mixed use development approved, and the increase and enhancement of public parking to be available for the amusement businesses, and public beach/recreation.  The specifics of the Master Plan in its Land Use Element cannot be ignored or trumped by vague references to an amorphous goal of “appropriate use of waterfront locations” or similar vagueness.  The record confirms that both the Planning Board and Governing Body “consistency” review was misguided and cursory.  No analysis, such as found required in Willoughby, Riza and Mahwah Realty, to warrant deference was done.  The “inconsistencies” between the 1988 Master Plan and its Land Use Element and the Redevelopment Plan are clear and substantial.  (B)  AS THE REDEVELOPMENT PLAN IS NOT SUBSTANTIALLY CONSISTENT WITH THE 1988 MASTER PLAN, THE FAILURE TO ADHERE TO THE SPECIAL REQUIREMENTS FOR ADOPTION OF SUCH AN ORDINANCE REQUIRES INVALIDATION  As the Development Plan is not consistent with the 1988 Land Use Plan and Master Plan, the failure of the Municipality to recognize that lack of consistency and to follow the special requirements under N.J.S.A. 40A:12-7 requires the invalidation of the Ordinances.
[directive] Many changes in criminal justice over the past two and a half decades which have benefited defendants have come about through the diligent efforts of law enforcement officials.  Now, the law enforcement officials need to be equally conscientious and effective in working to assist victims and witnesses.  In an effort to balance the scales of justice, on November 3, 1991, the citizens of New Jersey voted to amend article 1 of the New Jersey State Constitution.  Pursuant to the amendment crime victims are entitled to be treated with fairness, compassion and respect by the criminal justice system and to be present at public judicial proceedings when not sequestered.  In addition to the amendment, several statutes have been passed and enacted that enhance the ability of crime victims to actively participate in the criminal justice process.  "Victim" means a person who suffers personal, physical or psychological injury or death or incurs loss of or injury to personal or real property as a result of a first, second, third or fourth degree offense committed against that person; or as a result of a motor vehicle accident involving another person's driving while under the influence of drugs or alcohol; or as a result of a bias incident, domestic violence or a motor vehicle violation involving a fatality.
[brief] N.J.S.A. 40:55D-2.  During the public hearings, the Board and [...] discussed inclusion of ambulance stretcher compliant passenger elevators in buildings “C”, “D” and “E” and the Board received testimony and commentary from various Township personnel recommending and otherwise requesting that such elevators be included in building “C", “D” and “E” for the benefit, health, safety and welfare of the residents and of the first responders; the Board shared such concerns.
[directive] 7.1  Reporting.  Notification of fatal and serious bodily injury law enforcement incidents shall be made in accordance with AG Directive 2019-4.  As soon as any local, county, or state law enforcement agency learns of a law enforcement incident as defined below, the agency shall immediately notify the County Prosecutor’s Office for the county in which the incident occurred, who shall in turn immediately notify the Attorney General’s Office of Public Integrity and Accountability (OPIA) Director or their designee.  7.2  Law enforcement incidents are defined as: (a) any use of force by an officer resulting in death; (b) any use of force by an officer resulting in serious bodily injury; (c) any use of deadly force (including the discharge of a firearm as defined in Section 4.1) by an officer, regardless of whether such force resulted in injury; (d) the death of any civilian during an encounter with an officer; and (e) the death of any civilian while in the custody of law enforcement.
[brief] The Trial Court  Erred in Dismissing Count Three of the Complaint  The trial court’s dismissal of Plaintiff’s claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is based primarily on its determination as to the parties’ obligations under the PSA which, as explained above, is factually and legally improper, and the dismissal is otherwise based on the trial court’s finding that Plaintiff failed to sufficiently indicate that Defendants acted in bad faith or with wrongful motives in their performance of the PSA.
[brief] (Pa16; Da1.)  On June 24, 2022, Defendants moved for summary judgment regarding the remaining three claims against it: breach of contract and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, violation of the New Jersey Constitution, and False Light Invasion of Privacy against Defendants, (Pa29), and on February 29, 2024, the trial court heard oral argument and entered an Order granting Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, (Pa1).  On April 8, 2024, Plaintiff filed a Notice of Appeal with this Court, (Pa186), which was subsequently amended on April 16, 2024, (Pa194).  **COUNTERSTATEMENT OF FACTS**
[brief] In the case of *Orner v. Liu*, 419 N.J. Super. 431 (App. Div. 2011).  This case involved a motion under several sections of Rule 4:50-1 for relief from a judgment.  Defendants, the movants, waited until one day less than one year from the entry of the judgment to make that motion.  The Law Division denied the motion.  On appeal, using the “clear abuse of discretion” standard that is applicable to decisions on motions under Rule 4:50-1, the Appellate Division affirmed.
[brief] In Gruenke, 225 F.3d at 307, the Third Circuit determined that the “parents … sufficiently alleged a constitutional violation” where a swim coach who suspected their daughter/student was pregnant did not advise the parents thereof but instead asked the student to take a pregnancy test and discussed the matter with the school counselor.  The Court expressed “considerable doubt about the[] right” of school counselors “to withhold information of this nature from the parents. ”  Id.²  More recently, in Mirabelli v. Olson, 2023 WL 5976992, __ F.3d __ (S.D. Cal., Sept. 14, 2023) the United States District Court for the Southern District of California entered preliminary restraints in favor of teachers challenging a school district policy which prohibited them from apprising parents of their child’s transgender status absent the child’s consent.
[brief] This evidential obligation carries with it a limited duty to present to the grand jury evidence that both “directly negate guilt and must also be clearly exculpatory. ”  Id. at 237; State v. Scherzer, 301 N.J. Super. 363, 426-27 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 151 N.J. 466 (1997); State v. Cook, 330 N.J. Super. 395, 410 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 165 N.J. 486 (2000).  This obligation does not, however, require the prosecutor to “construct a case for the accused or search for evidence that would exculpate the accused,” but instead presentation of such evidence only in the “exceptional case” where the prosecutor’s file actually contains evidence meeting both requirements.  Hogan, 144 N.J. at 237-38.  “Only when the prosecuting attorney has actual knowledge of [the] … evidence … must such evidence be presented to the grand jury.
[directive] The assigned prosecutor files a motion to dismiss that (a) explains the conclusion that the relevant count is not supported by probable cause; (b) provides notice to 9 the decedent’s family; (c) appears on the court’s public docket; and (d) asks that the court stay any ruling on the motion for 14 days.  B.  trial.  From time to time, the strength of a case will Change in circumstances prior to change substantially between the date of the indictment and start of trial, and it is not uncommon for prosecutors to dismiss a case prior to jury selection if the proofs unexpectedly deteriorate.  This could occur, for example, if the sole eyewitness to a crime died suddenly and prosecutors lacked adequate other evidence.  Should this happen in a case involving a fatal police encounter, the assigned prosecutor should consult with the Executive Director to determine whether the prosecution remains viable and notify the decedent’s family representative of the change in circumstances.  If the Executive Director determines that dismissal of one or more counts of the indictment is warranted, and if the Attorney General concurs, then the assigned prosecutor may move for dismissal consistent with standard practice in similar situations.
[brief] Da67-68.  In it, she described being seated just outside the courtroom, with full view thereof and observing:  >  [o]n multiple occasions, the Plaintiff walked to the rear of the courtroom and just outside the door holding his back and grimacing in pain while walking in front of potential jurors.  On several occasions, he stood at the door of the courtroom next to a juror who ended up on the panel, put his hands on the wall and did multiple stretches indicating he was in back pain.  *Ibid.*  The adjuster certified that the officers overseeing the courtroom “were placed at the end of the hall at a desk with their backs primarily to the courtroom” and “periodically” checked the courtroom but “did not stand in or near the courtroom for any length of time. ”  Ibid.
[brief] The transcript of the trial court’s oral decision and statement of reasons as stated in the May 13, 2024 telephone call to the court that occurred during the deposition of Defendant [...] .................................................................2T13:12-21:9¹  The trial court’s order granting in part and denying in part Plaintiff’s motion to enforce litigant’s rights against Defendant [...], Dated July 19, 2024…………………………………………………………Da444  The trial court’s order memorializing the court’s Oral decision of May 13, 2024 and denying Defendant [...]’s cross-motion for a stay, Dated July 19, 2024…………………………………………………………Da446 ¹ “1T” refers to the transcript of the May 13, 2024 “emergent call” during the deposition of Defendant [...]; “2T” refers to the transcript of the July 19, 2024 oral argument and statement of reasons by the trial court.
[brief] The Commissioner correctly determined that [...]’s undisputed actions constituted a violation of N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24(b) and -24.1(f) because, regardless of whether [...]'s position as Board president authorized him to ask the Board attorney to conduct legal research, “the public could infer that [[...]] requested the research against [...] to secure an advantage for himself and for his own personal gain[.]” (Aa235) (citing Friends Retirement Concepts v. Borough of Somerville, Board of Education (Friends), 356 N.J. Super. 203, 214 (Law Div. 2002) (“[i]n determining an ethics violation, the question is not whether a school board member intended to secure an unwarranted benefit for themselves or others, but whether a reasonable person could infer that such was the reason for their conduct.
[brief] Super. 138 (App. Div. 2011) | 16 | | State v. Murray, 240 N.J. Super. 378 (App. Div. 1990) | 24 | | State v. Natale, 184 N.J. 458 (2005) | 45 | | State v. O’Brien, 377 N.J. Super. 389 (App. Div. 2004), aff’d in part relevant part, 183 N.J. 376 (2005) | 24 | | State v. Olenowski, 253 N.J. 133 (2023) | 14, 16 | | State v. Olenowski, 255 N.J. 529 (2023) | 34 | | State v. Pickett, 466 N.J. Super. 270 (App. Div. 2021) | 37 | | State v. Pierce, 188 N.J. 155 (2006) | 44, 46 | | State v. Rivera, 249 N.J. 285 (2021) | 49 | | State v. Singh, 245 N.J. 1 (2021) | 40, 41, 42| | State v. Torres, 183 N.J. 554 (2005) | 16 | | State v. Townsend, 186 N.J. 473 (2006) | 34 | | State v. Watson, 254 N.J. 558 (2023) | 41 | | State v. Williams, 93 N.J. 39 (1983) | 23 | | United States v. Mitchell, 365 F.3d 215 (3d Cir. 2004) | 29 | | TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (Cont’d.) | PAGE NOS. | |-------------------------------|-----------| | **STATUTES** | | | N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(b) | 48 | | N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7 | 46 | | N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7(a)(4) | 46 | | N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.1 | 47 | | N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7c | 47 | | N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a) | 45 | | N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b) | 46 | | N.J.S.A. 2C:44-3a | 47 | | **RULES** | | | R. 2:10-2 | 43 | | **RULES OF EVIDENCE** | | | N.J.R.E. 104 | 16 | | N.J.R.E. 104(a) | 15 | | N.J.R.E. 403 | 41 | | N.J.R.E. 602 | 41 | | RULES OF EVIDENCE (Cont’d.) | PAGE NOS. | |-----------------------------|-----------| | N.J.R.E. 701 | 40, 41 | | N.J.R.E. 702 | 15, 16 | | N.J.R.E. 801 | 31 | | N.J.R.E. 802 | 31 | | CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS | | |-----------------------------|-----------| | N.J. Const. art.
[brief] Victor Recchia Residential Construction v. Zoning Bd. of Adj. of Cedar Grove, 348 N.J. Super. 242, 251 (App. Div. 2001).  The Trial Court properly concluded that there were not any inconsistencies herein which materially undermine the fundamental objectives of the master plan (Pa11742-1746).  The Trial Court noted that some of the alleged “inconsistencies” identified by the Plaintiff overlapped with each other.  The Trial Court therefore combined them into four topics which it analyzed as follows.
[brief] Plaintiff, in his brief, argues that the area where he slipped was not part of the parking lot, but a walkway. \(^6\)  He makes this claim so that he can then argue that [...] somehow had the obligation to maintain it as a “sidewalk” “adjacent to the premises” under Section 3 of the lease.  However, [...] properly determined that the photographs of the area where Plaintiff identified the spot where he fell show that it is “neither a sidewalk nor a walkway.  It is a part of the parking lot blacktop on the side of the building, which falls under the definition of common areas.
[brief] The Appellate Division’s review of a trial judge’s factual findings of a non-jury trial is limited.  *Cesare v. Cesare*, 154 N.J. 394, 411 (1998).  Such findings are binding “when supported by adequate, substantial, credible evidence. ”  Id. at 411-412; see *Gnall v. Gnall*, 222 N.J. 414, 428 (2015).  “We review the Family Part judge’s findings in accordance with a deferential standard recognizing the court’s ‘special jurisdiction and expertise in family matters. ’”  *Thieme v. Aucoin-Thieme*, 227 N.J. 269, 282-83 (2016), quoting *Cesare* at 413.  Reversal is warranted only in cases when the trial court’s factual findings are “so manifestly unsupported by or inconsistent with the competent, relevant and reasonably credible evidence as to offend the interests of justice. ”  *Fagliarone v. Twp. of No. Bergen*, 78 N.J. Super. 154, 155 (App.Div. 1963); certif. den., 40 N.J. 221 (1963).  Despite being couched as an appeal of a motion Order, Defendant is again attempting to reverse the outcome of a trial and the findings of [...].
[brief] In their motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, Defendants had argued sovereign immunity as a defense to Plaintiffs' CRA claims.  Plaintiffs sought to add direct constitutional claims to counter that argument. earlier on January 11, 2019.  (739a).  This was Defendants' second motion to reconsider the Court's decision to deny their motion to dismiss.  On February 8, 2024, during oral argument, Plaintiffs' counsel repeatedly brought up that Plaintiffs have constitutional arguments to support their claims.  (1T13:3-21; 1T14:7-15:2; 1T20:6-22; 1T21:3-15; 1T22:1-24; 1T22:25-23:10).  Plaintiffs also made constitutional arguments in opposition to the initial motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.  (592a-593a).  On February 16, 2024, the Trial Court filed an Order denying Plaintiffs' motion to amend their complaint, granting Defendants' motion for reconsideration, and dismissing Plaintiffs' Complaint with prejudice.
[brief] (Da7 ¶29.)  [...] acted, in part, through a collusive scheme with [...], a vendor of claims-pricing services.  (Da8-Da9 ¶¶ 32-36.)  Knowing that federal and state law require emergency medical care to be provided regardless of insurance status, [...] terminated [...]’ network agreements and those of other [...]-affiliated medical practices, thus forcing the practices out of network.\(^5\) (Da6-8 ¶¶ 28-31.)  Following the contract terminations, [...] dramatically reduced the rates it would pay, often to amounts less than half of what it had paid in-network.  (Da7 ¶ 29.)  As required by law, however, [...] continue to provide medical care to [...]’s members in emergency departments on an out-of-network basis.  (Da6 ¶¶ 23-25.)  The trial court denied [...]’s motion to dismiss all claims except the claim for breach of an implied-in-fact contract.
[brief] [...] also argues on appeal that the Board’s denial of his request “for a referral to the Office of Administrative Law was arbitrary and inconsistent with established law. ” (Pb10-11).  He claims that there are “contested facts,” such as “what action [...] took with respect to the appellant and other employees in the very early days of the COVID 19 Health Emergency. ” (Pb10).  He also says that he is entitled to a hearing because the Board erred in making a “critical factual determination” that there was no layoff and also because there is “a legal question concerning what law should apply . . . to the facts of this case. ” (Pb10-11).  [...] has unnecessarily complicated the analysis here.
[directive] Si el delito tiene que ver con una infracci6n de N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4b(3) (causar o permitir que un/una menor participe en un acto sexual al que se le va a tomar fotografias o se va a exhibir) si el delito se cometi6 el 1 de febrero de 2018 o despues de esa fecha, N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4b( 4) (tomar fotografias o peliculas de un/una menor en un acto sexual) si el delito se cometi6 el 1 de febrero de 2018 o despues de esa fecha, N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4b (5)(b) (poseer a sabiendas o mirar a sabiendas pomografia infantil), N.J.S.A. 2C 24-4.1 (ser dirigente de una red de pomografia infantil) si el delito se cometi6 el 1 de febrero de 2018 o despues de esa fecha, N.J.S.A. 2C:34-3 (vender, distribuir o exhibir material obscene a una persona menor de 18 afios) o una infracci6n que envuelva una actividad delictiva en la computadora que infringe cualquier disposici6n de! Titulo 2C, capitulo 20, se le fijara una multa obligatoria de acuerdo con la lista que sigue a continuaci6n para cada infracci6n de la cual se haya declarado culpable? (I) $2,000 en el caso de un delito de primer grado (2) $1,000 en el caso de un delito de segundo grado (3) $750 en el caso de un delito de tercer grado (4) $500 en el caso de un delito de cuarto grado (5) $250 en el caso de un delito contra la moral publica o una infracci6n menor contra la moral publica Multa total de! CCPF $ --------  Do you understand that in its discretion, impose a minimum time in [Yes/sf] 6. the court could, [No/No] confinement to be served before you become eligible for parole, which period could be as long as one half of the period of the custodial sentence imposed? l,Entiende que usando su poder discrecional, imponerle un tiempo minimo de reclusion que tendra el juez podria que cumplir antes de que pueda ser apto para la libertad condicional, y que ese periodo podria ser tan largo como la mitad de! periodo de la sentencia de privaci6n de libertad que se le haya impuesto?
[directive] Jersey Law Division, Criminal Part ------------ Vicinage ----------- of State  New Jersey Indictment Number: Prosecutor's Number: vs. (Check appropriate event)  D D  Arraignment/ Initial (Defendant)  Conf Case Disposition ere nee Order D  D  D Status: Jail Monetary Bail  Pretrial Release -------  Arraignment date: , 20 ------- 20  Initial Case Disposition Conference (ICDC) date: ORDERED: it  As a result thereof, is hereby Offer:  Plea of Terms plea agreement offered by the State:  1.  D  Discovery: 2.  All Discovery has been provided.  State: D  The following Discovery is to be provided:  D  No Discovery has been provided.  Defense: D  All Discovery has been provided.  D  The following Discovery is to be provided:  20  All Discovery shall completed no later than be Co - Defendant Status: 3.  Motion: Dispositive 4.  [...], of  With the exception all motions shall be heard prior to the Trial Memo.  of of imposition the plea cutoff and execution the Dispositive Motions: Non"Dispositive Motions: Court File Pink: Prosecutor Gold: Defense Counsel  Original: Criminal Division Copy: of2 Form Promulgated via Directive# 33·17 (12/18/2017), 12030
[brief] (17T179-10 to 23).  Seven:  Defendant argues that the judge improperly rejected mitigating factor nine (defendant’s character and attitude indicate that defendant is unlikely to commit another offense).  (Db85-86).  Having already given significant weight to aggravating factor three (the risk exists that defendant will commit another offense) (17T210-17 to 211-16), the judge’s rejection of mitigating factor nine was consistent and not an abuse of discretion.