ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] [...] ignored that plain language by inserting a new and unprecedented requirement into the agreement prohibiting [...] from discharging employees on temporary disability.  By doing so, he failed to interpret the CBA’s language in any meaningful way, and instead planted an impermissible caveat and limitation into the sole and unfettered discretion [...] maintains regarding determinations of an employee’s fitness for duty.  To be clear, the Arbitrator was free to “fill in the gaps” by interpreting the meaning of “just cause” as set forth in the CBA, but he cannot bind the parties to an interpretation that contravenes the CBA’s express language.  [...] did so here: he imposed his own opinion -- to use his words -- based not on an interpretation of the CBA, but on his own personal sense of justice, that [...] could not terminate an employee on temporary disability.  No such language appears in the CBA.  Indeed, as described above, the CBA provides exactly the opposite, granting [...] the right to set the standards of performance in its sole discretion.  [...] determined on January 6, 2020, based on her own doctor’s note which [...] herself had provided, that she no longer could perform her essential job duties.  [...] did not find otherwise in his arbitration award.  On the contrary, he implicitly agreed that the restrictions set forth in the initial doctor’s note -- the only note [...] had when it decided to terminate [...] on January 6, 2020 -- would not allow [...] to perform her essential job duties.  No such facts regarding either the initial doctor’s note nor the underlying medical testimony are in dispute, and [...] did not rely on any such factual findings to reach his decision.  Instead, his arbitration award is based solely on a new and arbitrary work rule the Arbitrator invented out of whole cloth and that outright thwarts [...]’s right to set the standards of performance as set forth both in the CBA and as recognized by decades of case law.  By failing to interpret the CBA, and by relying instead on his own sense of justice, the Arbitrator loses the benefit of the Court’s deference.  As this Court explained in *PBA Local 160*, if an arbitrator does not undertake an interpretation of the parties’ agreement, then there is “nothing to debate,” and no basis on which a court can determine that the arbitrator’s award is “reasonably debatable. ”  Such is the case here; [...] did not undertake an effort to interpret [...]’s managerial prerogative under the CBA, but rather fashioned a new work rule based upon nothing beyond his own personal sense of fairness.  Accordingly, the Arbitrator’s decision here, to replace the rights granted to [...] under the CBA with his own sense of justice, constitutes reversible error.  The Court therefore should reverse the trial court’s order confirming the arbitration award.
[brief] 9  I.  STANDARD OF REVIEW .......................................................................  9  (Raised Below: 5T 48:16-19)  II.  DEFENDANT IGNORED BOTH THE DEFEERENCE OWED TO MANSFIELD AND THE NATURE OF THE RELIEF SOUGHT FOR THE FLORENCE PORTION OF THE PROPERTY .....................................................................................  12  (Raised Below: 5T 15:21-25 through 17:1-20; 43:19-25; 52:1-8)  A.  DEFENDANT FAILED TO GIVE APPROPRIATE DEFEERENCE TO MANSFIELD’S ZONING ORDINANCE .................. 12  B.  EVEN ASSUMING THAT DEFENDANT  APPLIED  THE APPROPRIATE DEFEERENCE, IT DELIBERATELY IGNORED THAT PLAINTIFF SOUGHT A USE VARIANCE FOR PERMITTED ACCESSORY USES THAT ARE ENTIRELY HEIGHT NEUTRAL .............................................................  20  III.  DEFENDANT AND THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE APPLIED  THE STANDARD ARTICULATED IN THE COVENTRY SQUARE LINE OF CASES FOR “D” VARIANCES FOR PERMITTED USES, RATHER THAN THE HEIGHTENED STANDARD UNDER MEDICI FOR NON-PERMITTED USES; THEIR FAILURE TO DO SO WAS ARBITRARY, UNREASONABLE AND CAPRICIOUS.................................................................23  (Raised Below: 5T 21:20-25; 22:1-24; 48:24-25 through 50:1-24)  IV.  PLAINTIFF PRESENTED SUFFICIENT PROOFS FOR A USE VARIANCE APPROVAL UNDER THE MEDICI STANDARD AS SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL CREDIBLE EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD.
[brief] The common law doctrine known as the discovery rule (N.J. Ct. R. 4:104) is accepted by courts in both New Jersey and New York:  “New Jersey has adopted the discovery rule (N.J. Ct. R. 4:104) that postpones the accrual of a cause of action when a plaintiff DOES NOT and CANNOT KNOW the facts that constitute an actionable claim” as demonstrated in Grunwald v. Bronkesh, 131 N.J. 483, 492 (1993) that applies specifically to this case before the court due to defective service as service of process was unable to be validated (fully documented in this appeal).
[brief] **24A.**  On January 28, 2020, the Court held a Ferreira Conference.  2R.  At the conference it was confirmed that Defendant objected to [...]’s AOM and had filed a Motion challenging its sufficiency.  2R.  Following the Ferreira Conference  Plaintiff filed opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, but did not seek a waiver of the AOM requirement and did not request additional time to serve an appropriate AOM.
[brief] See Sponsor’s Statement to S.775 23-27 (L. 2002, c. 26); Sponsor’s Statement to S.1296 18-20 (L. 2002, c. 26).  (Excerpted in Pa12-19).  The Legislature clearly had a rational basis to enhance punishment for threats to commit crimes of violence made during declared periods of emergency.  See *State v. Maldonado*, 137 N.J. 536, 552 (1994).
[brief] [...] is applying the statute mechanically – comparing his credentials with those of [...].  He claims that because the credentials are not identical, Skudder’s qualifications are not sufficient.  He provides no discussion of the facts of this case, and thus avoids having to admit that his treatment fell within the rubric of critical care, and not pulmonology.  [...] is clearly qualified to render an opinion as to Defendant [...]’s treatment – or lack of treatment- of [...].  [...] is Board-certified in Critical Care, and his treatment of [...] was limited to Critical Care.  [...]’s qualifications as a Surgical Critical Care specialist are equivalent to the Critical Care practiced by [...].  CONCLUSION
[brief] Defendant filed a motion for reconsideration of that opinion and was denied.  Defendant then sought relief from the New Jersey Supreme Court in 2022, and was denied cert.  Still failing to comply with the clear terms of the Settlement Agreement and the prior Order of the Court, Defendant filed a Motion in the Trial Court in 2023.  His contested relief was soundly and rightfully denied.  [...] begins his brief by stating that he has actively practiced law in the State of New Jersey for forty-seven years.  Obviously, then, he knows how Orders and Decisions work, not to mention Contracts.  In fact, Defendant has owned his own practice since 1980.  Although his primary area of expertise is debt collections, he did handle at least one family court matter, and he has represented his firm in Superior Court, District Court, and the Third Circuit Court of Appeals.  Debt collection is a practice area that requires the ability to read and interpret a contract and to read and interpret a statute.  The “single” issue he asks this Court to review was previously considered and addressed by the Superior Court (twice), this Appellate Division once already, and the New Jersey Supreme Court declined to take up the issue.  It is a term specifically included in the Agreement that has been upheld at every stage of this litigation.
[brief] 11  LEGAL ARGUMENT: ..............................................................  15  THE APPELLATE DIVISION MUST UPHOLD [...]’S DECISION IN FULL  (Pa215-Pa247)  ..................................................  15  A.  STANDARD OF REVIEW OF FINAL ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY DECISION  ..................................................  15  B. [...] CORRECTLY REJECTED THE BOARD’S CLAIM THAT THE [...] FAILED TO IDENTIFY “DESIGNATED REPRESENTATIVES” AS DEFINED UNDER THE NJEERA.  (Pa227-Pa228; Pa240-Pa243).  ..................................................  17  C. [...] CORRECTLY HELD THAT THE [...] WAS ALLOWED UNDER THE NJEERA TO INSIST ON ITS BARGAINING COUNCIL MEMBERS BEING ABLE TO PARTICIPATE AT NEGOTIATIONS SESSIONS.  (Pa229-Pa233; Pa237-Pa243).  ........  21  D.  IT WAS WITHIN [...]’S AUTHORITY TO ORDER THE BOARD TO NEGOTIATE WITH THE [...]’S FULL NEGOTIATIONS TEAM.  (Pa233-Pa237; Pa243-Pa245).  ...........................................  25  E.  THE BOARD’S ARGUMENT THAT [...]’S DECISION COULD LEAD TO ABSURD RESULTS IS NOT LEGALLY SIGNIFICANT.  (Pa227-Pa228; Pa242-Pa244).  ..............................................  27 F. [...] CORRECTLY HELD THAT THE BOARD VIOLATED THE NJEERA.  (Pa244-Pa245).  ..................................................  29  CONCLUSION .................................................................
[directive] AS PROSPECTIVE GRAND JURORS, YOU HAVE BEEN RANDOMLY SELECTED FROM THROUGHOUT THE COUNTY TO REPRESENT YOUR FELLOW CITIZENS IN CARRYING ON THIS VITAL FUNCTION.  YOUR NAME WAS DRAWN FROM A LIST THAT CONTAINS NAMES OF REGISTERED VOTERS, LICENSED DRIVERS, FILERS OF NEW JERSEY PERSONAL INCOME TAX RETURNS, AND APPLICANTS FOR HOMESTEAD REBATES.  IF SELECTED, YOU WILL BRING TO THE GRAND JURY THE ATTITUDES AND EXPERIENCE OF THE CITIZENRY.  IN A VERY REAL SENSE YOU WILL FUNCTION AS THE CONSCIENCE OF THE COMMUNITY.
[brief] Pa517-18.  He testified as follows:  Q.  Okay.  Did you ever establish a specific torque that would be applied to the steering wheel to cause the lane departure?  A.  I did not establish a specific torque, no.  Q.  What about a specific steering rate?  A.  Not a specific steering rate.  The methodology was to try and approximate you know about five degrees or less of steering input to move the vehicle over the centerline.  There was no torque or steering velocity as part of that.  Q.  Was the steering input consistent between tests?  A.  It varied parametrically.  Q.  What do you mean by that?  A.  There were some tests with one degree of max steering input to move it towards the centerline.  There were some tests where there were four degrees max steering to move it towards the centerline.  There was some with over five degrees of max steering input to move it over the centerline.  So the goal was to collect a number of different tests under a number of different conditions to see how it performed.  Pa224-25 at 66:12 – 67:11.  The issue of steering torque is one of smoke and mirrors.
[brief] See *Caldwell*, 158 N.J. at 468 (Handler, J., concurring).  If that description alone were sufficient to allow police to conduct an investigatory stop of defendants’ vehicle, then law enforcement officers would have been permitted to stop every Black man within a reasonable radius of the robbery.  Such a generic description that encompasses each and every man belonging to a particular race cannot, without more, meet the constitutional threshold of individualized reasonable suspicion.
[brief] 29  A.  The Legislature Required Formal Rulemaking for Any Change in Flood Data Used for Permits..................  30  B.  The Flood Hazard Area Control Act and Regulations Expressly Include a Legacy Provision that Grandfather the Permit ...........................................  31  C.  The [...]’s Assessment and Use of the Cornell Studies in All Future Permitting Requires Formal Rulemaking ...........................................................................  33  D.  The Record Supports the [...]’s Position that Floodway Delineation was Unnecessary .......................  36  CONCLUSION ...........................................................................................................
[brief] ’”  Ibid.  “With respect to the second element, the cooling-off period, we have recognized that ‘it is well-nigh impossible to set specific guidelines in temporal terms. ’”  Ibid. (quoting Mauricio, 117 N.J. at 413).  However, the New Jersey Supreme Court has found “that a reasonable person in the defendant’s position ‘might not have had time to cool down between the provocation and the retaliation’ where the defendant shot his uncle ‘almost immediately’ after being provoked.
[brief] The attached insurance certificate is provided to evidence your coverage for Workers’ Compensation, General Liability, and Excess/Umbrella while working at the [Project]. ”  (TRVa2774-2777.)  With that, [...] also provided a Certificate of Insurance (a “COI”) listing the CCIP Policies.  (TRVa2775.)  B.  [...]’s Confirmation That [...] Was Excluded Critically, on July 30, 2015, at 12:38 p.m., five hours after [...]’s erroneous enrollment, [...] of [...] emailed several people, including [...]’s contact for the Project, [...], and [...]’s [...], clarifying that [...] was not permitted to enroll in the CCIP, writing: “if the [[...]’s] work referred to below is the Ritz work then please note that since it involved structural demolition, [[...]] will not be able to enroll into the CCIP for that work.
[brief] The power to adopt an ordinance is in the governing body.  To rule otherwise would permit a planning board, by declining to find inconsistency, to impose a de facto veto over any proposed zoning ordinance that was inconsistent with the master plan.  The need for municipalities to make consistency determinations is therefore critical to (1) provide for public scrutiny of whether ordinances impacting land use, are contrary to a town's zoning vision as embodied in the Land Use Element of the Master Plan; (2) giving courts a basis for reviewing such ordinances; (3) encouraging contemporaneous debate on the merits of a proposed ordinance; and (4) insuring that the authority to enact land use ordinances are not effectively transferred to a planning board who is unwilling to find inconsistency or to do the hard work necessary to make that determination.
[brief] Plaintiffs’ case is fatally flawed, both procedurally and substantively.  As for procedure, Plaintiffs cannot properly rely on the archaic writ of quo warranto to oust a member of the Rutgers’ Board of Governors (BOG).  That is because volunteer BOG members, who are reposed with no authority to implement state law in the traditional governmental sense, do not hold “office” for purposes of the quo warranto statute.  Moreover, the Rutgers Act envisions only limited circumstances under which a BOG member may be ousted, namely, by receiving a salary from the State or renumeration from the University, see N.J.S.A. 18A:65-17, or by committing malfeasance.  See N.J.S.A. 18A:65-19.  Those circumstances do not exist in this case.  The general language of the quo warranto statute cannot displace the specific removal provisions of the Rutgers Act.  Nor can Plaintiffs overcome the fact that their quo warranto action, assuming it could be filed at all, is grossly out of time.  Plaintiffs have not offered a single word to explain why they waited to file a lawsuit that is 37 months too late.  Before ejecting a long-serving BOG member such as Defendant [...], who has served without blemish, equity demands more from Plaintiffs beyond the rote incantation that their action is one of public importance.  The interest of justice standard was never intended to allow litigants to sit on their rights without so much as offering a single reason for such dilatory conduct.  As for the merits, Plaintiffs confuse the legal import of the Rutgers Act with the Medical and Health Sciences Restructuring Act, L. 2012, c. 45 (the Restructuring Act), going so far as quoting language from the Restructuring Act and labeling it as language from the Rutgers Act.  Perhaps it is that misunderstanding that allows Plaintiffs to disregard the dispositive rule from our Supreme Court in Berg v. Christie.  That rule instructs that Plaintiffs’ interpretation of the Rutgers Act—which would force [...] to reside continuously in Middlesex County for the entirety of her volunteer service—can stand only if that purported obligation is clearly stated under the Act.  The Rutgers Act’s language, however, is far from clear.  Indeed, it is open to rigorous disagreement as evinced by the parties’ competing interpretations.  Thus, under Berg, this court should reverse the judgment below and immediately restore [...]’s rightful place on the BOG.
[brief] In Red Roof, plaintiff was a [...] hotel franchisee in New Jersey and brought claims against the [...] franchisor for violation of the NJFPA, as well as common law claims, regarding the franchisor’s termination of the franchise agreement, which contained a Texas choice-of-law provision.  See 877 F.Supp.2d at 126-127.  The Court found that because of New Jersey’s “strong policy in favor of protecting its franchisees” the NJFPA “applies to claims relating to the franchise agreement notwithstanding the Texas choice-of-law provision.  Thus, plaintiff’s claim for breach…relate to the franchise agreement which would implicate the NJFPA and application of New Jersey law. ”  Id. at 131 (citation omitted) (emphasis added); see also King v. GNC Franchising, Inc., 2007 WL 1521253, at *2, n. 1 (D.N.J. May 23, 2007) (though the franchise agreement contained a Pennsylvania choice-of-law provision, the court found “New Jersey choice of law jurisprudence clearly holds that the law of the state in which the franchisee has its principal place of business should apply, despite a contractual choice of law provision”) (emphasis added).  In Winer Motors, another case invoking the NJFPA, the Appellate Division found that the trial judge erred in applying New Jersey law to a franchise agreement dispute for a franchisee located in Connecticut.
[brief] (16T 72-9 to 22)  He also testified that the business card that he had “looks similar to the wallet ID. ”  (16T 64-6)  Defendant testified that he lost his wallet on the afternoon of New Year’s Eve 2015, and believes he did so when it fell out of a pocket in “baggy sweatpants” that he was wearing at a physical-therapy appointment at [...] in [...].  (16T 79-2 to 80-19)  He noticed that the wallet was missing a few hours later when he was at the home of his girlfriend, [...], in [...].  (16T 81-9 to 16)  Inside the wallet were his NJSP wallet ID, along with credit cards, cash, and other cards.  (16T 85-13 to 23)  His immediate reaction was to search his car and around Ogle’s home, and then to drive back to [...], but they were closed by that point.  (16T 81-18 to 82-4)  He even searched garbage cans and the parking lot outside that orthopedic office, but to no avail.  (16T 82-2 to 4)  Thereafter, Ogle contacted that office and there was some “correspondence” between Ogle and that office, but again to no avail, eventually leading to defendant filing an official report with the NJSP regarding the missing wallet ID.  (16T 82-14 to 84-7)  Defendant testified that he referenced January 4, 2016, in that report as the date he lost the ID because he had waited a few days to see if the wallet would turn up.  (16T 83-16 to 84-18)  That report was dated January 6, 2016.  (16T 89-3 to 11; 16T 181-19 to 182-8)  Defendant testified that he believes he received his replacement wallet ID on January 16, 2016.  (16T 90-15 to 91-3)  He also filed a missing-property report on January 19, 2016, with the [...] Police Department because his supervisor at NJSP ordered him to do so.  (16T 89-18 to 25; 16T 183-9 to 184-2)  Defendant never found the missing wallet ID.  (16T 91-19 to 21)
[brief] The Court gave insufficient weight to the overwhelming evidence of [...]’s good behavior.  The Court’s verdict was based on speculation over what might happen, rather than clear and convincing evidence that it is likely to happen.  The Court did not find a “serious threat” but “could not take a chance” and tried to prevent “all injuries. ”  T70-1:2.  That is the wrong standard; the law is intended to prevent a serious risk of “serious bodily injury” or death.
[brief] (Pa 118, 121, 126-130)  A municipality derives its authority to enact land use ordinances from the grant of such power from the State, specifically by the Municipal Land Use Law, N.J.S.A. 40:55D-1 to -163 ("MLUL").  See 388 Route 22 Readington Realty Holdings, LLC v. Township of Readington, 221 N.J. 318, 339-340 (2015).  Similarly, the municipal power to adopt and implement a plan of redevelopment is derived from the State and is governed by the Local Redevelopment and Housing Law, N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-1 to -73 ("LRHL").  See Vineland Constr. Co., Inc. v. Township of Pennsauken, 395 N.J. Super. 230, 250-251 (App. Div. 2007), dismissed as moot, 195 N.J. 513 (2008).  Both the MLUL and LRHL require that the municipal exercise of power must be done in adherence with the requirements imposed by these statutes in order for the municipal exercise of powers to be valid.
[brief] He gave a statement shortly after midnight, repeatedly maintaining his innocence.  In the interrogation video, played at trial, [...] signed and initialed the Miranda card with his left hand.  (14T7-16; Da16 1:52-2:21)  At first, [...] said he was at Hill’s or his cousin’s home in [...] for most of the day and had taken his daughter to the playground around 3pm with [...].  (Da19-23, 29, 38)  Though he first said he had not been in [...], he eventually acknowledged he woke up around 10am and walked to his cousin’s home and to the store to get cigarettes around noon, all in [...].  (Da78)  [...] picked him up, and they went to get his daughter in [...] around 2pm.  (Da62-64)  They drove to [...]’ house in [...] and stayed for about two hours before driving back to [...].  (Da79)  They went to the playground with his daughter, then [...] took her back to [...] while he stayed in [...].  (Da79).  Police told [...] several times that they had video proving he committed the crime, and he responded it was impossible, asking to see footage.
[brief] These Cross Appellants now try to claim the benefit of the alleged twenty-four months statute of limitations.  Plaintiffs named “[...]” lessors because, on the date they filed their original complaint, they did not know the identity of the strip mall tenants \textit{on} \(^4\)  Of the leases produced by the law office, and Respondents, only [...]’s ([...]), lease was in effect on March 16, 2017. the date of the accident; or whether any tenant was potentially liable for the accident.  Plaintiffs further had no knowledge of the content of any leases between the Landlord and the Respondents.  Accordingly, rather than file a complaint that violated Rule 1:4-8, Plaintiffs responsibly proceeded to seek discovery of the lease terms before adding any tenants to the complaint.
[brief] First, as the State argued during the Clawans motion, and the judge recognized, [...] was serving a State prison term at the time of the instant trial.  (See 15T:168-11 to 169-8; 174-19 to 175-12).  Importantly, the court further recognized that not only the [...], but specifically the Assistant Prosecutor in the instant case, was directly involved in the previous prosecution of [...], for which he was serving a prison term.  (15T:175-7 to 12; see also, 15T:168-14 to 169-12).  As such, the State was not in a peculiar position more so than the defense, or the court.  (15T:174-21 to 175-5).  And simply because [...] was housed in State prison does not automatically equate to the State having control over him, as defendant suggests.  (Db 27).  Indeed, even when the court issued an order and a writ for [...] to appear, he refused to leave State prison and be transported to the Monmouth County courthouse.  (15175-1 to 3).  [...] was no more in the custody, control, or power of the State than the defense, thus the court properly concluded that factors one and two did not weigh in favor of a Clawans charge.