ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Defendant/Appellant [...] (hereinafter referred to as “[...]”) owns two of four condominium units located at [...].  [...] (hereinafter referred to as “[...]”), the Plaintiff/Respondent, is the entity that governs the condominiums.  Well before any pleadings were filed in the Superior Court, [...] advanced nearly $14,000.00 to repair condominium common elements, including an emergency replacement of the main sewer connection serving the development (Da154-Da155, Second [...] Cert., ¶¶4-5).  Although these repairs were made with [...]’s blessing, [...] never reimbursed [...] for the expenditure.  Ibid.  Accordingly, [...] elected to treat the expenditure as a credit toward association dues payable on his two units.  (Da155, Second [...] Cert., ¶6).  While the parties disputed the accounting of [...]’s association dues, [...] began charging interest and legal fees to [...]’s accounts (Da27-Da28, [...] Cert., ¶8(d) & ¶10(d); Da36 & Da37, Statements of Account).  Ultimately, in or around the Fall of 2020, the parties—with the assistance of counsel—came to a tentative agreement to resolve their dispute, whereby [...] would receive credit for payments made on behalf of the association but would remain responsible for interest and legal fees accrued (Da124, Settlement, ¶3.1).
[directive] Page 7  Attachment 2 to for Promotion Application  Court Drug Phase & Track A B 12571a)  2, (CN to for Promotion Application Court Drug Phase & Track A B 12571b)  3, (CN to for Promotion Application Court Drug Phase 4, Track A 12571c) (CN to for Promotion Application Court Drug Phase 4, Track B 12571d) (CN to for Promotion Application Court Drug Phase 5, Track A 12571e) (CN for Application Court Graduation, Drug Track A 12571f) (CN for Application Court Graduation, Drug Track B 12571g) (CN ., Courts
[brief] In balancing the hardships, the trial court found that the harm to Plaintiff outweighed the harm to [...].  (1T54:8-55:7).  Specifically, the court found that the potential hardship to Plaintiff would be the potential inability to secure financing if [...] takes steps toward condemnation.  (1T55:1-7).  The court did not find any harm to [...] except that, “I guess there are some old barns or something on that property that need to be knocked down, but they have been standing there for I guess a really long time, they can continue to stand there. ” (1T54:17-20).  First, the court below erred because its stated potential harm to Plaintiff – its potential ability to secure lending – is not irreparable harm.  See infra.  Point I.A.  As previously stated, Plaintiff did not present any evidence it needed financing from lenders or that its financing would be jeopardized if an injunction was not granted.  The court’s finding is wholly unsupported by the evidence and rests purely on speculation.  Further, the court below erred by not considering the harm to [...] as the Township is losing its constitutional right to redevelopment as well as redevelopment opportunities in the Property, where there is great interest and has sat stagnant and blighted for years.  [...] is also harmed in its inability to serve the public interest by revitalizing the Property with commercial development that will improve the quality of life for its residents and spur new job growth and business opportunities.  The Commercial Tract was to be developed with commercial uses, highlighting the importance of a pedestrian-friendly, walkable, bikeable area offering food and beverage, entertainment, grocery, restaurants, cafes, and essential services to the residents of the Residential Tract, which includes affordable housing, and other nearby neighborhoods.  (Da114-Da116, Da121).  The court failed to consider that the [...] was only subdivided as into two parcels to further its Redevelopment Plan, which included both commercial and residential uses with a 25% set aside for affordable housing.  The court erroneously prioritized a potential inclusionary development under Mount Laurel over [...]’s well-settled, longstanding right to exercise its eminent domain and redevelopment powers without any legal authority to establish that preference.  Because the trial court abused its discretion by considering harm to Plaintiff that was not presented by Plaintiff and is unsupported by the evidence, and failed to evaluate the potential harm to [...], this Court should reverse.
[brief] See R. 3:22-2(c); State v. Acevedo, 205 N.J. 40, 45 (2011) (“an illegal sentence is one that ‘exceeds the maximum penalty provided in the Code for a particular offense’ or a sentence ‘not imposed in accordance with law. ’” (quoting State v. Murray, 162 N.J. 240, 247 (2000)).  Here, defendant did not claim his sentence was excessive or unauthorized; rather, he claimed his sentence was unfairly disparate in comparison to his more culpable co-defendants.
[brief] ......................................................................................................................18  Quigley v. KPMG Peat Marwick, LLP, 330 N.J. Super. 252 (App. Div. 2000) .....................................................................................26  Riddell v. Medical Inter-Insurance Exchange, 18 F.Supp.2d 468 (D.N.J. 1998) ............................................................................................29, 30, 31  Rowen Petroleum Properties, LLC v. Hollywood Tanning Systems, Inc., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33685 (D.N.J. Apr. 20, 2009) .............................................................29  Rudbart v. Water Supply Comm’n, 127 N.J. 344 (1992)  ..................................................................................................................33  Shaner v. Horizon Bancorp, 116 N.J. 433 (1989) ..................................................................................................................23  Swarts v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 244 N.J. Super. 170 (App. Div. 1990) .....................................................................................29  Teaneck Bd. of Educ. v. Teaneck Teachers Ass’n, 94 N.J. 9 (1983) .........................................................................................................................25  Vasquez v. Glassboro Service Ass’n, Inc., 83 N.J. 86 (1980) .......................................................................................................................34  Statutes Assembly Judiciary, Law L.1990, c.12 ......................................................................................23  Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq.
[brief] [...] Has Provided No Evidence it Satisfied the Condition Precedent to Lifting the Automatic Stay.  As [...] pointed out in its initial brief, while the trial court entered an order (on December 19, 2023, the same day it held oral argument on [...]’s application to compel arbitration) (Pa57-58) allowing [...] to deposit security into the Superior Court Trust Fund, there is no evidence that [...] ever actually deposited the funds.  [...]’s appellate submission again provides no such evidence.  Presumably, if it had posted a statutory bond or cash with the Superior Court, it would have provided the same in its appendix.  Yet, it did not do so.  More fundamentally, however, is that upon [...] filing the demand for security pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:15-67 et seq. on November 1, 2023, all proceedings should have been automatically stayed.  See N.J.S.A. 2A:15-69 (“Whenever a notice is given demanding from a nonresident party security for costs, all proceedings on his claim shall be stayed until the required security is filed or deposit made.”); Lawrence v. Commercial Cas. Ins. Co., 22 N.J. Misc. 179, 37 A.2d 683, 683 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1944) (Holding “statute is mandatory and selfexecuting.  It provides that the plaintiff shall give bond to defendant, and when demanded, all proceedings shall be stayed until such security is filed or deposit made. ”); Marino v. Shiff Realty Co., 164 A. 577, 578 (N.J.Com.Pl. 1933) (holding that upon filing notice of demand “the action [is] stayed in so far as the nonresident plaintiffs are concerned until the security is furnished. ”)  The trial court never recognized that stay, forcing [...] to brief the merits and appear for oral argument on the merits before it even entered an order allowing [...] to deposit security into the Superior Court Trust Fund.  Even if [...] did subsequently make that deposit (and there is no evidence it did), the trial court still violated [...]’s right to a mandatory stay of the proceedings up to that point.  See Pa49; Pa53 (Continued attempts by [...] to assert is right to a stay).
[brief] D.  "New Jersey's Global Warming Response Act: 80x50 Report: Evaluating Our Progress And Identifying Pathways To Reduce Emissions By 80% By 2050"  A policy issuance occurred as the hearings in this case were underway.  On October 15, 2020, the [...] issued a report entitled, "New Jersey's Global Warming Response Act: 80x50 Report: Evaluating our Progress And Identifying Pathways to Reduce Emissions By 80% By 2050."  (80x50 Report).  Ha108.  We requested that the [...] take judicial notice of this report.  N.J.R.E. 201(b)(1)-(3); N.J.R.E. 803(c)(8).  We briefed this report to the [...] and [...], but both ignored it.
[brief] (Pa105-106).  And to be clear, contrary to the vague aspersions made by [...] (Db15; Db17), the time sought and awarded in Plaintiff’s application had not been previously awarded in several prior awards related to other bad acts of defendants, including [...]’s efforts to obtain a prejudgment attachment order in Connecticut in May 2017 that has thwarted, from 2017 and continuing to this day, execution on his $8 million mansion (that he pledged as security for the judgment in September 2016 and that was forfeited to [...] in February 2017) and more than $1 million in financial accounts at [...] (ordered turned over to Plaintiff the day prior to [...] seeking the attachment order in Connecticut).  (Da6-9).  [...]’s complaints concerning quantification of the awarded fees also lack merit, and many were not raised below.  The trial court had ample evidence before it to justify the quantum of fees awarded.  Just as he strategically chose to do before the trial court, [...] has opted in his appellate brief not to identify specific time entries that are objectionable, but instead claims it was “impossible” for the court to have reviewed them.  Plaintiff’s motion was fully briefed as of November 14, 2022, and not argued until April 2023, providing the trial judge, and [...], with more than ample time to review and consider it.  Indeed, [...] explicitly stated that he had reviewed the fee application and supporting invoices carefully, and made all findings required by the applicable Court Rules, R.P.C.s and governing caselaw.  1T68; 1T70-72.  The trial judge reasonably exercised its discretion in granting the full quantum of attorneys’ fees sought, and the judgment awarding fees should be affirmed.
[brief] *N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-3*.  In *Hirth*, once the “designation” of the redevelopment area was made by the governing body, plaintiff was also permitted to challenge in his prerogative suit the change of use to commercial for the property he had contracted to buy to construct new residences.  The redevelopment plan barred residential uses in the zone where plaintiff’s property was located.  *Hirth*, supra, 337 N.J. Super. at 161.  Thus, the brief of Special Counsel in this case totally mischaracterizes the holdings and meaning of the *Hirth* case.
[brief] [...]’ prejudgment interest argument is premised on, yet another, bright-line rule they concocted solely to serve their interests and without any basis in the law.  [...] suggest, inaccurately, that Rule 4:42-11 requires application of a simple interest rate unless there is a contractual agreement “or specific findings of fact justifying a higher rate of interest. ” (Db56-57.)  Rule 4:42-11 imposes no such requirements.  Rather, Rule 4:42-11 provides that judgments generally bear “simple interest” “[e]xcept as otherwise ordered by the court or provided by law. ”  R. 4:42-11(a) (emphasis added); see also R. 4:42-11(b) (applying Rule 4:42-11(a)’s calculations for prejudgment interest to tort actions).  In other words, Rule 4:42-11 sets a flexible guidepost for prejudgment interest awards, and trial courts have discretion to decide to deviate from that guidepost by order or law as they deem fit.  The heightened standard of review this Court applies to a trial court’s prejudgment interest award further supports this interpretation.  That standard recognizes that “[a] trial court has the discretion to grant or deny prejudgment interest according to the equities,” and thus, the Appellate Division “will defer ‘to [the trial court’s] action unless it represents a manifest denial of justice. ’”  Bussell v. DeWalt Prod. Corp., 259 N.J. Super. 499, 521 (App. Div. 1992) (citation omitted); see also Musto v. Vidas, 333 N.J. Super. 52, 74 (App. Div. 2000) (explaining that trial courts have “broad discretion” to award prejudgment interest “in accordance with principles of equity”).  New Jersey courts have consistently exercised this broad discretion to award compound rather than simple interest.
[brief] STANDARD OF REVIEW  The standard of review in determining whether the February 20, 2024 ruling by the Trial Court constituted error is de novo.  Fernandez v. Nationwide Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 402 N.J. Super. 166, 170 (App. Div. 2008); Prudential Prop. Cos. Ins. Co. v. Boylan, 307 N.J. Super. 162 , 167 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 154 N.J. 608 (1998)("We employ the same standard that governs trial courts in reviewing summary judgment orders.")
[brief] *Brenman v. Demello*, 191 N.J. 18, 31 (2007).  “A trial court’s discretion is abused when relevant evidence offered by the defense and necessary for a fair trial is kept from the jury. ”  *State v. R.Y.*, 242 N.J. 48, 66 (2020), quoting *State v. Cope*, 224 N.J. 530, 554-55 (2016).  When a criminal defendant seeks to cast blame on a specific third-party, the defendant must notify the State in order to allow the State an opportunity to properly investigate the claim.  *State v. Loftin (Loftin I)*, 146 N.J. 295, 345-46 (1996) (see *State v. Cotto*, 182 N.J. 316, 334 (2005)).
[brief] 15  ## TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ### CASES | Case | Page | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | Borough of Carteret v. Firefighters Mut. Benevolent Ass’n, Loc. | 5 | | 67, 247 N.J. 202 (2021)  ........................................................................... | | City Ass’n of Supervisors & Adm’rs v. State Operated Sch. Dist. | 5 | | Of Newark, 311 N.J. Super. 300 (App. Div. 1998) ................................ | | Cty. Coll. of Morris Staff Ass’n v. Cty. Coll. of Morris, 100 N.J. | 13 | | 383 (1985)  ............................................................................................... | | Linden Bd. of Educ. v. Linden Educ. Ass’n ex rel. Mizichko, 202 | 13 | | N.J. 268 (2010)  ....................................................................................... | | Mobil Oil Corp. v. Independent Oil Workers Union, 679 F.2d 299 | 13, 14| | (3rd Cir. 1982)  ..................................................................................... | | PBA Local 160 v. Township of North Brunswick, 272 N.J. Super. | 5, 10, 12| | 467 (App. Div. 1994)  ............................................................................ | | Tynan v. Vicinage 13 of Superior Ct., 351 N.J. Super. 385 (App. Div. | 9 | | 2002)  ..................................................................................................... | ### OTHER AUTHORITIES - [...], *Arbitrating “Just Cause” for Employee Discipline and Discharge in the Era of Covid-19*, 34 GEORGETOWN J. LEGAL ETHICS 1237, 1243 (2021) ..............................................
[brief] Of counsel and on the brief: [...], Esq. (01227-2010)  TABLE OF CONTENTS  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES  ........................................................................................................ iii  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND DECISIONS BEING APPEALED ..........................................................  viii  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT .........................................................................................-  1 - REPLY PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND STATEMENT OF FACTS  ......-  4 - REPLY LEGAL ARGUMENT .......................................................................................-  4 - I.  THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY FINDING DEFENDANT LIABLE FOR CONVERSION (13T51-21 to 56-22, 64-9 to 66-8; 23T96-3 to 99:1; 36T28-1 to 52-25)
[directive] Attorney General Law Enforcement Directive No.2016-6 v3.0, Section 4.  3  See N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-23 defines “delinquency” as the commission of an act by a juvenile which if committed by an 4 adult would constitute a (a) crime; (b) disorderly persons offense or petty disorderly persons offense; or (c) violation of any other penal statute, ordinance or regulation.  4  B.  Presumption in favor of curbside warnings for certain minor, non-violent conduct.  1.  There shall be a presumption in favor of engaging in a curbside warning—rather than initiating more formal action involving a juvenile—when the officer personally encounters a juvenile who has allegedly engaged in conduct that appears to constitute: a. An ordinance violation, such as loitering or curfew violations; or b. Activity that is dangerous or disruptive, but not necessarily unlawful.  2.  An officer may overcome this presumption and initiate action more formal than a curbside warning when: a.  The officer has reason to believe that the juvenile is presently engaged in other, more serious unlawful conduct; or b.  The juvenile continues to engage in the same unlawful conduct following the issuance of a prior curbside warning; or c.  The juvenile has a pending formal complaint, demonstrating a continuing course of improper conduct, related or unrelated to the pending charge.  C. warnings.  For unlawful conduct more serious than described in Section Other curbside I.B above, such as petty disorderly persons offenses, disorderly persons offenses, and fourth-degree crimes, there is no presumption in favor of a curbside warning, but an officer may nonetheless engage in a curbside warning at the officer’s discretion, provided that the conduct did not cause serious or significant bodily injury to another.  D. collection.  Each law enforcement agency is responsible for developing Reporting and data its own system for collecting information about the use of curbside warnings by its officers, in order to report cumulative data to the Division of Criminal Justice and to their County Prosecutor.
[directive] For the internal affairs investigator, it is critical to distinguish between those investigations involving potential criminal conduct and those limited to administrative disciplinary infractions.  The investigator also must be able to identify and apply the appropriate procedures to be utilized during the interview process in either a criminal or an administrative investigation.  Failure to identify and apply the appropriate procedures can compromise and render inadmissible evidence gathered during the interview process in a criminal investigation or needlessly complicate the interview process during an administrative investigation.  8.0.6
[brief] Appellants initially filed their Verified Complaint on March 18, 2019, but did not name [...] as a defendant therein.  [Pa1]  [...] was first named as a defendant in Appellants’ First Amended Complaint (the “Amended Complaint”), filed on July 19, 2021.  [Pa1608]  On their Amended Summons [Pa1604], Appellants appropriately identified [...]’s primary business address ([...]) as an address where [...] could be served with the Amended Complaint.  However, [...] was never personally served with the Amended Complaint at this address, nor was it or any other authorized agent for service of process ever served at any other location or in any other manner.  1  For ease of the Court’s review, [...] has combined its concise procedural history and counterstatement of facts.
[brief] Ja042, Ja043.  In the absence of credible, probative testimony from anyone about comparative traffic generation, the effect of building height on the intensity of the proposed use, and the use variance criteria more generally, the Board properly relied upon the very clear discussion of the purposes of the SM zoning of the subject property in the Township Master Plan.  This language of the Township Master Plan was highlighted to the Board in the summation of the applicant’s counsel.  4T 116:7-118:22.  The Board’s Resolution focused upon and explained the way in which the intent of the Master Plan is expressed in the specific and differing standards of the SM and GM Zone Districts, where the SM allows buildings with maximum heights of only 30 ft. and the GM heights of up to 75 feet.
[brief] In fact, the court’s conclusion is incongruous with [...]’s actions both prior to and after the agreement was signed.  It is undisputed that [...] sought to challenge the will as he had contacted [...] about filing a caveat to the Will.  If [...] did not believe he was represented by Respondents, then one would think that he would have had [...] take further action to challenge the Will as well or at least have notified the Respondents that their letter incorrectly identified him as a client.  Yet, [...] took no further action until after it was discovered that the Respondents had contacted the wrong surrogate.  A reasonable factfinder could conclude that [...] believed the Respondents were representing him based on their letter sent to the surrogate.  The Law Firm knew [...] and [...] were brothers and that their interests mirrored one another’s.  The Law Firm’s actions during the relevant time period demonstrate that it was well aware of the risk of harm [...] was facing and that [...], who did not retain another attorney, would rely on their representation.  A successful outcome for [...] would be a successful outcome for [...].  [...] did not, as Respondents alleged, and the lower court implied, have an attorney representing him in the action.
[brief] ’”  State v. Mahoney, 444 N.J. Super. 253, 260 (App. Div. 2016) (quoting State v. Case, 220 N.J. 49 (2014)).  During sentencing, defendant’s counsel argued for a number of mitigating factors, and mentioned the circumstances of the robbery in order to persuade the judge to sentence him in the second-degree range.  However, the court noted:
[brief] [...] also argued that the actions and omissions complained of in the Complaint refer to the breach by [...] of “extra-contractual duties” – i.e., duties or “actions outside the term of the PSA. ” (Pa562, [...] Mem. at 20).  In particular, [...] asserted that “the PSA has no terms imposing an obligation on [...] to perform or abstain from any of these activities. ” (See id.).  Thus, [...] argued, these allegations do not support a claim for breach of contract.  This argument fails.
[brief] The store owner completed a consent form after speaking with a detective.  (1T76-7 to 10; 1T79-7 to 80-3).  Defendant’s contention that [...] did not view the entire surveillance video derives from the officer’s testimony that he viewed “part of” the video with respect to determining the time and date of the video.  (1T81-7 to 82-8).  But this was immediately followed by the prosecutor’s question whether [...] viewed the video with him in preparation for trial, which the officer confirmed he did.  (1T82-9 to 11).  That the date and time included in the video are inaccurate is irrelevant to the admissibility of the video.  [...] testified that the timestamp on the video was approximately twelve hours ahead, indicating the 6:00 a.m.-hour of July 17, 2019, instead of the 6:00 p.m.-hour of July 16, 2019.  (1T81-14 to 24; 1T94-4 to 23).  The discrepancy in the time did not affect the admissibility of the video, but only its weight.  See Dennis, 956 N.E.2d at 1005; Stangle, 97 A.3d at 639.