ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The police officers represented by Appellants/Plaintiffs, the [...] (“[...]”) and the [...] (“[...]” together with the [...] “Police Unions”), make tremendous sacrifices and expose themselves daily to unfathomable harm to protect the residents, visitors and businesses of the [...] (“City”).  In 2016, the City was in one of its darkest hours financially and was unable to fund promotions within the [...] (“[...]”) which were necessary to maintain public safety.  Desperate, the City asked officers to accept promotions without receiving any contractually required pay increase with a promise that they would be properly compensated at a later time.  Many officers answered the call by agreeing to take promotions with the added responsibilities that those promotions required without receiving the contractually required pay increase at that time.  Respondents/Defendants, [...] (“State”) through the Director of the [...] (“[...]”) in the [...] (“[...]”) and the City, never honored their promises of subsequent, retroactive pay increase for those who accepted the promotions resulting in the underlying litigation which was improperly dismissed by the Trial Court.  The Trial Court in this matter found that the Respondents/Defendants can dissolve agreements for earned wages and ignore New Jersey law which unequivocally requires the payment of earned wages pursuant to the New Jersey Municipal Stabilization and Recovery Act (“MSRA”), N.J.S.A. 52:27 BBBB-1, et seq., P.L. 2016, c. 4.  This holding is patently inconsistent with longstanding judicial precedent, express statutory terms, fundamental concepts of fairness and common sense.  In the underlying action, Plaintiffs seek to recover these earned but unpaid wages on behalf of numerous officers who were promoted in 2016 without receiving pay increases as required by the parties’ Collective Negotiations Agreements (“CNAs”), Memoranda of Agreement (“MOAs”), and New Jersey wage and hour law.
[brief] Frankly, Plaintiffs contend that, even in making these observations, the lower court was giving these bare assertions by the Respondents more value than they were actually worth.  The record reflects that Plaintiffs made numerous and repeated efforts, over the course of ten months, to secure what should have been readily provided to Plaintiffs long before the second anniversary of the accident: a list of tenants on the date of the incident; and a copy of their leases.  By way of background, Plaintiffs’ first Complaint, filed on July 3, 2018, named as defendant the Landlord of the strip mall, [...] and [...] (the “Landlord”).
[brief] In three separate 1995 home invasions, defendant and two co-conspirators, [...] and [...]: kidnapped for ransom a Staten Island man, [...], who they transported to Paterson before he escaped; attempted to kidnap [...] at his home in Englewood Cliffs; and murdered [...], dumped his corpse in front of his elderly mother, [...], and robbed [...] at the Lewises’ Teaneck home.  *Ibid.*  DeJesus and Torres were arrested and tried shortly after the crimes, but defendant was not apprehended until 2006.  *State v. Tairi*, No. A-2684-09, 2012 WL 489101, at *2-7 (App. Div. Feb. 16, 2012).  B.  Torres’ 2008 Habeas Corpus Petition.  In December 2008, shortly before defendant’s trial, Torres filed a habeas corpus petition in the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey.  Relevant to defendant’s instant appeal, Torres claimed:  Counsel on the initial PCR [filed by Torres] ignored [Torres’] request to investigate claims that [Torres’] co- --- 2  Because these sections are intertwined, they are combined in this brief.  defendant [[...]] would have submitted an affidavit on [Torres’] behalf, which would have explained that [Torres] had no knowledge of the Staten Island robbery and kidnapping of [...].  [(Da79). ]  Torres added that DeJesus was deceased and that he had letters from DeJesus in which DeJesus expressed his willingness to provide an affidavit.  (Da79).  Only one such letter has been produced by defendant throughout his numerous appeals and PCR filings.  That one letter, dated August 4, 2005, and sent by DeJesus to Torres, does not include any discussion of the Staten Island kidnapping, let alone any assertion that Torres had no knowledge of it.  (Pa1-3).
[brief] In Henderson, the New Jersey Supreme Court directed the preparation of model jury charges for eyewitness identification, taking into account scientific evidence about how a witness’s memory works.  208 N.J. at 283, 298.  Now, New Jersey courts have model charges that explain factors that are relevant to the reliability of eyewitness identifications and inform jurors that 15  https://www.njcourts.gov/sites/default/files/charges/non2c009.pdf?cb=5b9183a5.  “research has shown that there are risks of making mistaken identifications. ”  Model Jury Charges (Criminal), “Out-of-Court Identification Only” at 2 (rev. May 18, 2020). 16  New Jersey appellate courts have similarly directed the development of jury charges that instruct juries about how to evaluate drug recognition expert testimony, Olenowski, 255 N.J. at 614, and testimony that narrates or comments on video recordings, Watson, 472 N.J. Super. at 405-06, 474-75, 506.  Other courts have also required jury instructions about similar types of comparative identification evidence that explain limitations of that evidence analogous to the limitations of fingerprint comparisons.  See, e.g., United States v. Starzecpyzel, 880 F. Supp. 1027, 1049-51 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (requiring jury instructions that explain limitations of handwriting comparison expert testimony).  The rationale underlying these decisions applies with equal force to fingerprint identification.  Much like eyewitness testimony and handwriting comparison, fingerprint analysis is identification evidence that can be unjustifiably persuasive to jurors who believe such evidence to be more reliable than scientific studies prove it actually is.  See supra Section I.
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[brief] The trial court denied [...]’s motion for attorneys’ fees for the reasons articulated on the record on September 22, 2023.  (Pa688; 5T, at 5-12).  Specifically, the court held that the indemnification provisions set forth in Section 17.1 of the PSA were intended only to address claims by third-parties as against [...], and were not designed to act as a fee-shifting provision in first-party disputes between the parties to the contract itself.
[brief] A corporate defendant bears "an obligation to institute procedures for receiving and responding to lawsuits."  *Davis v. DND/Fidoreo, Inc.*, 317 N.J.Super. 92 (App.Div.1999).  Defendant received all notices, read them, but failed to act.  He simply tried to juggle funds between multiple properties and failed.  “Suffering the downside of a financially risky undertaking is not a forfeiture in law or equity. ”  *Phillipsburg v. Block 1508, Lot 12*, 380 N.J.Super. 159, 174 (App.Div. 2005).
[brief] *State v. Galicia*, 210 N.J. at 388.  Otherwise, plain error requires demonstration of “legal impropriety in the charge prejudicially affecting the substantial rights of the defendant and sufficiently grievous to justify notice by the reviewing court and to convince the court that of itself the error possessed a clear capacity to bring about an unjust result. ”  *State v. Montalvo*, 229 N.J. 300, 321 (2017) (quoting *State v. Chapland*, 187 N.J. 275, 289 (2006)).  The jury charge must be read as a whole, and not just the challenged portion, to determine its overall effect.  *State v. Garrison*, 228 N.J. 182, 201 (2017).  “The test to be applied . . . is whether the charge as a whole is misleading, or sets forth accurately and fairly the controlling principles of law. ”  *State v. Baum*, 224 N.J. 147, 159 (2016).  Instructions given in accordance with the model jury charge, or which closely track the model jury charge, are generally not considered erroneous.  *Mogull v. CB Com. Real Est. Grp., Inc.*, 162 N.J. 449-466 (2000).  In addition, plain error is mitigated by the overall strength of the respondent’s case.  See *State v. Galicia*, 210 N.J.at 388 (“The error must be considered in light of the entire charge and must be evaluated in light of the overall strength of the State’s case. ”).  The same standard applies to appellate review of purported defects in the verdict sheet.  *Ibid.*  However, any error in the verdict sheet may be rendered harmless by the trial court’s jury instruction.  “When there is an error in a verdict sheet but the trial court’s charge has clarified the legal standard for the jury to follow, the error may be deemed harmless. ”  *Id.* at 387.  **B.
[brief] See State v. Allegro, 193 N.J. 352, 370 (2008) (“defendant’s belatedly tendered witnesses well could have been harmful to him at trial. ”).  The failure of defendant “to offer the information when it would have been natural to do so might well cast doubt on the veracity of the witness[es’] trial testimony. ”  Gideon, 244 N.J. at 560 (quoting State v. Silva, 131 N.J. 438, 446 (1993)).  Even assuming defendant told [...] about [...] and [...], [...] made a sound strategic decision to not investigate them because neither were credible, as the PCR court found.
[brief] But it was also, even then, well within the authority of the trial court, if not the trial court's obligation under R. 1:13-4(a), to sever and transfer those causes of action instead of dismissing them.  See Ran-Dav's, supra, 243 N.J. Super. at 237-38 n. 3, 579 A.2d 316.  In the light of the entire controversy cases of 1995, it is now clearer than ever that, where litigants have discharged their entire controversy obligations by raising all related causes of action in a single proceeding, the trial court is obliged to assume a proactive management role in such matters, by, for example, severing or joining claims, staying or accelerating their consideration, and retaining or transferring jurisdiction."
[brief] The two principal parties here are plaintiff [...] and defendant [...].  In 2014, after decades of a successful business relationship, they divided their properties, with defendants paying $6.3 million for plaintiffs’ interests.  Plaintiffs received every dime of the purchase price.  But after Mehta received a tax deficiency notice in 2019, he retained an accountant friend, [...], to rake through business records reaching back as far as 2008.  Without a business evaluation, Prajapati formed an opinion that the businesses’ net values had been artificially depressed by various transactions.  Without investigating the underlying facts, he assumed there was a nefarious motive for the transactions.  Upon this shoddy basis, Prajapati opined that the amount of each transaction he questioned had a dollar-for-dollar negative impact on the net value of each company and contended plaintiffs suffered a loss approaching $10 million.  At the close of the case, the trial court correctly rejected this theory and the fraudulent inducement claims it was intended to support.
[brief] Plaintiff would have to file the claim and Defendants can raise any defense it sees fit once the claims are ripe.  The Court cannot prematurely decide these matters without even knowing the basis for such claims.  Subsequent claims for rent are not barred by the entire controversy doctrine.  Sequential actions for money judgments as the rent becomes due after the tenant has been evicted/vacated are allowed under the law.  Gonzalez v. Stabley Morland Little Friends Etc. Docket No. A-5004-11T3 (App. Div. 2013).  The court held that the entire controversy doctrine does not apply in this instance.  The tenant shall remain liable and shall pay monthly payments to the landlord subsequent to the re-entry by the landlord during the remainder of the lease term.  Damages will be determined as per R. 4:42-7.  While Plaintiff is not seeking any damages at this time and any remand would simply vacate the Trial Court’s Order with no further trial or action, Plaintiff should not have a blanket ban from filing a future breach of contract claim.  Plaintiff should have the right to bring a future claim if so desired as the relevant lease term is through 2025 and each month of non-payment of rent is considered a subsequent breach.  CONCLUSION
[brief] 11  Morgan v.  Sanford Brown Inst., 225 N.J. 289, 137 A.3d 1168 (2016)  .......................................................  8  NAACP of Camden County East v. Foulke Mgmt. Corp., 421 N.J. Super. 404, 24 A.3d 777 (App. Div. 2011)  .....................................
[brief] 70 N.J. at 106 (emphasis added).  “A trial judge has an independent obligation to protect th[e] right [to a fair and impartial jury], regardless of inaction by counsel or the defendant. ”  State v. Irby, 347 P.3d 1103, 1108 (Wash. App. 2015); Frazier v. United States, 335 U.S. 497, 511 (1948) (“[I]n each case a broad discretion and duty reside in the court to see that the jury as finally selected is subject to no solid basis of objection on the score of impartiality. ”); Williams, 93 N.J. at 62-63 ("[T]he court has an independent duty to act swiftly and decisively to overcome the potential bias of a jury from outside sources.").  “Accordingly, the . . . trial judge has the authority and responsibility, either sua sponte or upon counsel's motion, to dismiss prospective jurors for cause.
[brief] The language in the latter—granting “an offset and deduction against Tenant’s Allowance for all costs, payments, and expenses Tenant is obligated to pay to Landlord . . . at the time an installment of Tenant’s Allowance shall be due”—can only mean one thing: if Tenant is delinquent in rent at the time a Tenant’s Allowance installment payment is due, the amount of arrears will automatically be deducted from the amount of Landlord’s annual installment payment.  If Tenant were not delinquent in payments there would be no purpose for the Allowance Offset, because otherwise no amounts would be already owed “at the time an installment of Tenant’s Allowance shall be due. ”  The Lease provides that the Tenant “expressly grants” in advance, as of the date of the Lease execution, a future deduction against Tenant’s Allowance for any amounts that it may owe the Landlord at the time of an annual installment payment, and contains no provision granting the Landlord discretion to decline to accept the deduction that has been automatically granted.  “A covenant in a lease can arise . . . by necessary implication from specific language of the lease or because it is indispensable to carry into effect the purpose of the lease. ”  Marini, 56 N.J. at 143.  “In determining, under contract law, what covenants are implied, the object which the parties had in view and intended to be accomplished, is of primary importance. ”  Ibid.  In this instance, “the object which the parties had in view” with respect to the reciprocal offset provisions in § 4.02 was clearly resolving issues related to delinquent payments between the parties amicably through accounting adjustments rather than through the courts.  Ibid.  This is a “necessary implication” of the offset clauses as well as § 17.06 which allows either party to recover attorneys’ fees against the other if the prevailing party has established a breach of the Lease.  As this Lease requires reciprocal performance by payment, the offset clauses sensibly ensure that both parties’ rights to be made whole are protected.  For these reasons, it is clear from the language and purpose of § 4.02 that any rent or other charges owed at the time an annual installment payment becomes due are automatically deducted from the installment payment.
[brief] [...] has not shown any specific questions he would be asked that invade confidentiality, nor has he made any showing of confidentiality.  *Aetrex Worldwide, Inc.*, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 172857, at *16 (denying motion to quash where “no attempt has been made to identify the confidential information which is purportedly sought by the subpoenas. ”).
[brief] Pa008-009; Pa018-019; Pa050-052; Pa305.  [...] (the Mandelbaum firm) (together with the [...], the Firms) was retained to represent six other defendants, including [...] ([...]), the owner of multiple medical practices alleged to have both aided the CPOM violations and to have received unlawful referrals from [...], and an employee of some of those entities, [...] ([...]) (the [...] defendants).  Pa010-011; Pa305.  Defendants have not denied that the superiors are paying the subordinates’ legal fees for their shared representation.  1.  The [...] Defendants  Defendant [...] ([...]), a New Jersey licensed chiropractor, allegedly orchestrated the insurance fraud scheme.
[brief] (3T126:9 to 127:5; 5T163:8-20.)  During a subsequent phone call between Defendant [...] and [...], [...] proposed that the purchase price for the Property be reduced to $100,000 and, in exchange for the $900,000 discount, Plaintiff would assume Defendants’ environmental obligations under the PSA.  (5T163:8 to 164:18.)  Although Defendant [...] was in agreement with the proposal, she declined to accept the offer after receiving the proposed terms in writing.  (5T163:8 to 164:18, 166:8-21.)  Thereafter, consistent with their access rights under the PSA, and as permitted by the trial court, Plaintiff and [...] performed additional sampling and surveying between September and December 2022.  (4T62:12 to 67:13, 86:2-22, 104:1-22, 114:2-15; 6T103:12-14.)  [...] also continued pleading with [...] to provide them with necessary data and documentation, but [...] was ultimately unable to produce anything, and to date, [...] has not received any of the data or documentation it sought.  (4T67:14 to 69:13; Pa2376.)  In addition, because [...] failed to conduct the ground penetrating radar (“GPR”) survey that he indicated in the 2018 RI Summary Report would be done, [...] engaged a subcontractor to do so, and the GPR survey revealed a previously undisclosed UST on the northeast corner of the Property.  (4T64:19 to 67:13, 114:2-15, 203:10 to 204:4; 6T54:16 to 55:4, 125:1-23; Pa2378-81.)  Although Defendants submitted the RIR to the NJDEP in December 2021, the remedial investigation remains incomplete; to date, Defendants have not fully completed the vertical and horizontal delineation required by the NJDEP and are unable to determine whether there is any off-site contamination.
[brief] (Raised Below.  Pa16. Pa30.)  Contrary to Respondent’s contention, adequate, timely, proper notice of the Ricci Act was not provided.  Respondent claims that posting the Ricci Act on the Division’s website is somehow adequate “notice” to all members and retirees enrolled in the State Police Retirement System.  Rb10.  However, this argument fails for several reasons.  The Ricci Act states:
[brief] One issue that does merit comment involves an arguably false statement made regarding the Diagrammatic Elevation that is the essential piece of evidence motivating this appeal.  Respondents attempt to argue that the Diagrammatic Elevation has somehow been deleted from the list of renderings that bind the dimensions of the building constructed by [...] while at the same time apparently pretending that the frequently referenced Paragraph 21 does not really contain binding conditions.  [...] states:  Amended Resolution Paragraph 21 is simply a finding of fact regarding the documents that [...] submitted to the Board as part of its application.  (Pa11).  Nothing in Amended Resolution Paragraph 21 either adopts the Sketch or makes it part of the final approval.  ([...]-Rb18).  The paragraph that [...] refers to in this quotation is, in fact, located in the section of the Amended Resolution that lists the conditions to which the developer must comply (24a, 28a).  So this statement is simply false.  And, as discussed in this Reply Brief’s Preliminary Statement, the same Diagrammatic Elevation remains listed among the plans and renderings that made up [...]’s application for variance relief in the Amended Resolution (11a).  It therefore most certainly would be among the plans and renderings referred to in the now-infamous Paragraph 21 of the Amended Resolution’s “Conditions” section (28a).  The Amended Resolution contains no language indicating that it had been deleted, merely that it had not been discussed or relied upon during deliberations concerning the granting of variances.
[brief] Jurors are now told what the factors that are relevant to the reliability of an eyewitness identifications are, as well as that eyewitness identifications are “not foolproof” and that “research has shown that there are risks of making mistaken identifications. ” Model Criminal Jury Charge, Out-of-Court Identification 2 (Da 199-207).  The principles of Henderson apply here.  Just like with eyewitness testimony, fingerprint analysis is a method of identification.  Both forms of identification evidence can be quite compelling and believed by jurors to be far more reliable than scientific studies reveal the evidence is.  Even if the trial court did not believe the defense’s proposed charge was the appropriate one to give, it was obligated to determine what the appropriate charge was.  Leaving the jury alone to consider the weight of the fingerprint expert testimony—especially when jurors who may have been biased to believe fingerprint analysis was infallible were not discovered during voir dire and the examiner overstated the strength of the conclusions he could reach—was inappropriate.  The jury, at the very least, should have been informed that ACE-V is a subjective framework that is subject to error, and the court should have told the jury the relevant factors that lead to error, as discussed above: the quality of the print, the proficiency of the examiner, and the presence of any biasing information.
[directive] (2)  Do you understand that being sentenced to community supervision for life [Yes] [No] [NA] means that: you will be supervised for at least 15 years as if on parole, and subject to conditions appropriate to protect the public and foster rehabilitation, including, but not limited to counseling; Internet access or use; and other restrictions, which may include restrictions on where you can live, work or travel?  (3)  Do you understand that the restrictions on where you can live may include [Yes] [No] [NA] restrictions on residing in a home with minor children?  Revised Form Promulgated by Directive #01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 10080 page 2 of 5 4.