ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Second, and putting aside the absence of privity, [...]’s assertion that he would have avoided litigation if the Will was not “ambiguous” is demonstrably wrong.  Plaintiffs initiated the Chancery Action after [...] claimed that she was discharged from the subject mortgage.  (Pa000003 at ¶¶s 12-17.)  [...] believed that the Will was clear (not ambiguous) in his favor and used the Will to argue that [...] was not discharged.  In other words, [...] argued that the Will as drafted was consistent with [...]’s intent to discharge only him.  (Pa000020 at ¶ 41.)  The Chancery Judge’s eventual finding of ambiguity did not cause the litigation.  Rather, the litigation was a consequence of [...]’s claim and the later ambiguity finding was a consequence of plaintiffs bringing litigation that should never have been brought in first place.  Plaintiffs were well aware of [...]’s position as to [...]’s intent (Id. at ¶ 44), and the fact that plaintiffs disregarded that position and sued anyway cannot provide the foundation for a damages claim against [...].  [...] was clear at all times that [...] intended the complete discharge of the mortgage.  [...] spoke to [...] alone about the issue and [...] was the scrivener.  Regardless of whether the Will could be construed as ambiguous, [...] as the scrivener knew what [...] intended and what he ([...]) had intended to convey by the words [...] used in the Will.  [...] was unwaveringly certain that [...] intended a complete discharge.  In this factual setting, the “ambiguity” finding -- which opened the door for plaintiffs to put forward all of their evidence and arguments despite [...]’s position -- was a potential win for the plaintiffs, not a loss.  Given the strength of [...]’s conviction that [...] only intended to discharge him, it also strains credulity for him to suggest that he would have abandoned his claim if the Will by its terms incontestably called for a complete discharge.  Plaintiffs would undoubtedly still have pursued the Chancery Action arguing that the Will was wrong and negligently drafted just as in Pivnick.  Regardless, [...]’s unsuccessful effort to turn an alleged ambiguity in his favor does not render [...] liable in any respect, particularly given the trial judge’s wholesale rejection of [...]’s position which was affirmed on appeal.  If the Will was indeed ambiguous, that ambiguity could only have harmed [...] if the mortgage had not been discharged.  Once again, and as a matter of law, [...] intended the discharge.  [...] told [...] and swore in an early certification that was what [...] intended.  If plaintiffs wanted to litigate anyway, they needed to pay for the endeavor.  Plaintiffs cannot offload the costs of their rejected claims on [...].  Conclusion
[brief] Finlay & Assocs., Inc. v. Borg-Warner Corp., 146 N.J. Super. 210, 220 (Law. Div. 1976), aff'd, 155 N.J. Super. 331 (App. Div. 1978).  “In a broad sense, any arrangement between manufacturer and seller or distributor or retailer to sell brand name product could be considered a ‘franchise’; however, merely because there is sale or distribution agreement does not make it a franchise within purview of Franchise Practices Act. ”  Id. at 218.  In so holding, the Court noted the NJFPA’s purpose of affording “protection against arbitrary cancellation of affected franchises and to deal with certain economic coercion. ”  Id.  In considering the Act’s purpose, the Court held that the plaintiff continued its business under its own name without interruption since the termination of the distributorship.  Id.  The Court also noted that other manufacturers made comparable products that the plaintiff could purchase.  Id.  The Court concluded: in the present case there is no requirement for economic dependency except to the extent plaintiff by its own choice elected to concentrate on the line of merchandise it preferred for whatever business reasons, including profit motive.  Here, plaintiff’s business does not operate under the name of any ‘franchisor,’ but under the name ‘[...],’ its own name.  Id.  The Finlay court determined that although the parties had a written distributorship agreement, the plaintiff was not a franchisee.
[brief] Relator cites no case holding that an analysis of publicly disclosed data is not based upon public disclosures simply because an expert analyzed the public data supposedly with the aid of patented software. \(^8\)  To the contrary, overwhelming --- \(^7\)  See *Cooper v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Fla., Inc.*, 19 F.3d 562, 566–67 (11th Cir. 1994); *United States v. CSL Behring, LLC*, 855 F.3d 935, 944–46 (8th Cir. 2017); *United States v. Sodexho, Inc.*, No. CIV.A. 03-6003, 2009 WL 579380, at *11 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 6, 2009).  Other cases cited by Relator are likewise inapt, and do not even refer to generalized allegations of fraud.  *United States v. Omnicare, Inc.*, 903 F.3d 78, 92 (3d Cir. 2018) (“non-public contract information” necessary to infer fraud); *U.S. ex rel. Mitchell v. CIT Bank, N.A.*, No. 4:14-CV-00833, 2022 WL 135438, at *4–6 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 13, 2022) (alleged fraud was publicly disclosed).
[brief] [...] [...]  [...]  Telephone [...]  Fax [...]  [...]  Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant, [...]  Of counsel: [...] (ID 010992005)  On the Brief  [...] (ID 010992005)  [...]  [...] (ID 441392023)  [...] #  TABLE OF CONTENTS | Section | Pages | |----------------------------------------------|-------| | TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | ii | | STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY | 1 | | SCOPE OF REVIEW | 2 | | LEGAL ARGUMENT | 3 | | I. REPLY BRIEF TO PLAINTIFF’S LEGAL ARGUMENT | 3 | | CONCLUSION | 6 | # TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | CASES | PAGES | |--------------------------------------------|-------| | Carr v. Johnson, | | | 211 N.J. Super 341 (App. Div. 1986) | 2, 3, 4 | | Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. Of Manalapan, | | | 140 N.J. 366 (1995) | 2 | | Morocco v. Felton, | | | 112 N.J. Super 226 (Law Div. 1970) | 4 | STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[brief] a.  The delay in seeking the arbitration request.  In this case there was no delay in seeking arbitration.  [...] asserted that there was a delay on [...]’s part in initiating arbitration.  The facts clearly demonstrate otherwise.  It is recalled that [...]’s Complaint alleged that the Parties entered into a contract, indicated that it was prepared by [...] and quoted a time of the essence provision.  No writing purporting to be the contract at issue, however, was annexed to the Complaint.  Therefore, from [...]’s Complaint it is not possible to discern whether or not the version of the writing to which the Complaint was referring even contained an arbitration provision.  Indeed, it was not until [...] responded on March 11, 2024 to [...]’s January 17, 2024 Notice to Produce Documents that [...] actually committed itself to reliance upon any particular document as the contract to which the Parties are bound.  That document contained the arbitration provision at issue.  Within two days of [...] actually committing itself to that particular written document as being the contract to which the Complaint was referring, [...] initiated arbitration in the manner provided by the Arbitration Act.  Accordingly, while there was delay subsequent to [...]’s filing of an Answer, once [...] committed itself to reliance upon a particular document containing an arbitration provision, there is absolutely no factual support for an assertion that there was delay on the part of [...] in demanding arbitration and initiating the arbitration process in the manner dictated by the Arbitration Act.  b.
[brief] In Lavin, the Supreme Court noted the following:  Pomeroy defines laches as “such neglect or omission to assert a right as, taken in conjunction with the lapse of time, more or less great, and other circumstances causing prejudice to an adverse party, operates as a bar in a court of equity. ”  ***  “Long lapse of time, if unexplained, may create or justify a presumption against the existence or validity of plaintiff’s right and in favor of the adverse right of defendant; or a presumption that if, plaintiff was ever possessed of a right, it has been abandoned or waived, or has been in some manner satisfied; or that plaintiff has assented to, or acquiesced in, the adverse right of defendant; or a presumption that the evidence of the transaction in issue has been lost or become obscured, or that conditions have changed since the right accrued; or a presumption that the adverse party would be prejudiced by the enforcement of plaintiff’s claim. ”  Lavin, 90 N.J. at 151-152 (citations omitted).
[brief] Cases  Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543 (1968) ..................................................24  Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925) ......................................................27  Commonwealth v. White, 371 N.E.2d 777 (Mass. 1977) ........................................32  Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971) ..................................................28  Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 481 (1983) .................................................................  20,21,22,23,24 Harrison v. United States, 392 U.S. 219 (1968) .....................................................15 Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983) .................................................................26 Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948) .......................................................27 Marshall v. Barlow’s Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (1978) .....................................................28 Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338 (1939) ....................................................15 People v. Brownlee, 713 N.E.2d 556 (Ill. 1999) ................................................... 19,24 People v. Holveck, 565 N.E.2d 919 (Ill. 1990) .....................................................23 People v. Kruckenberg, 2019 Il App. 3d 170 (2010) .............................................. 16,17,18,19 Silverthorn Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920) .................................15 State v. Anderson, 198 N.J. Super. 340 (App. Div.), certif. den., 101 N.J. 283 (1985) .........................................................................................................................26 State v. Bijackso, 2019 N.J. Super. Unpub. Lexis 1510 ...........................................35
[brief] AS A SUPERVISING COURT, THE APPELLATE DIVISION SHOULD REVIEW  MOTION  JUDGE’S DILATORY CONDUCT AND ACTIONS WITHOUT ANY DEFERENCE.  (Pa1149, Pa1224)  The motion judge’s orders reek of a disconcerting propensity on the part of the judge to cut corners, evade judicial responsibilities, and needlessly delay the disposition of the real issues raised by the pro se litigants.  Considering the March 8, 2024 denial of the motion for reconsideration on baseless grounds to furnish a USPS tracking number, as mentioned before, defendant made no representation to the court that she did not receive the motion papers.  Yet the motion judge conveniently assumed that she had not been served the motion, inexplicably called off the remote hearing that had been scheduled for 9:00 am on March 8 (Pa1241) and denied the motion.  Had the remote hearing proceeded, it would have established right away at the outset of the hearing whether defendant received plaintiff's motion or not.  Even if the judge was too busy to conduct a remote hearing, he could have reserved his order and directed plaintiff to submit additional evidence of service of motion to the satisfaction of the court as provided in Rule 1:5-3.  Just because defendant elected not to respond to plaintiff's motion by filing a reply certification or a cross-motion, the motion judge opportunistically assumed that defendant did not receive the motion.  The motion judge’s presumption in favor of the contumacious party perversely encourages that party to not respond to a motion that was seeking inter alia enforcement of plaintiff's litigant’s rights.  The judge’s conduct failed to adhere to the standards of Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct.
[brief] *See Rendine*, 141 N.J.at 336 (“[A] trial court should reduce the lodestar fee if the level of success achieved in the litigation is limited as compared to the relief sought. ” [emphasis added]).  The court placed no limits on the amount of the reduction that a court may impose within its discretion.  Otherwise, a plaintiff’s attorney seeking fees may simply run up the bill with unnecessary tasks such that they could guarantee recovery of some minimum percentage of those fees regardless of the reasonableness.  Finally, although Plaintiff argues that there was an improper “proportionality” analysis conducted by the trial court, the Statement of Reasons does not support Plaintiff’s conclusion.  Specifically, the trial court set forth the specific hourly rate it deemed reasonable and the number of hours it deemed reasonable.  *See Statement of Reasons*, P021a.  The trial court *did not* make any comparison to the actual dollar amount recovered by Plaintiff but instead, reduced the total amount recovered “based upon the result obtained” (id.).  In sum, the trial court: (1) articulated the appropriate factors and process it was to follow; (2) considered those factors and followed the process; and (3) explained in detail its conclusions in a separately labeled statement of reasons.  See Statement of Reasons at p. 13, P021a.  Plaintiff’s argument that the Court’s decision was not proper is baseless.  At the very least, Plaintiff has fallen well short of demonstrating that the trial court’s decision was the product of a “clear abuse of discretion. ”  Therefore, the trial court’s decision should not be disturbed.
[brief] Pursuant to an affidavit from New Jersey State Trooper II, [...], a search of the New Jersey State Police Firearm Records was conducted to determine if defendant had a permit to carry a handgun, a permit to purchase a handgun, a firearms purchaser identification card, or permit for an assault weapon.  He had none of the above.  (8T:54-7 to 17).  The parties also stipulated that if [...], a Forensic Scientist II, with the New Jersey State Police Office of Forensic Science were called to testify as a witness, she would be qualified as an expert and would testify that on October 19, 2018, she compared the buccal swabs taken separately from inside the cheeks of [...] and defendant to the swabs taken from the trigger and grip and all other areas of the .38 caliber Smith and Wesson revolver found in the truck of defendant’s car.  Neither were of sufficient quality and/or quantity for comparison purposes.  Both stipulated affidavits were moved into evidence.  (8T:55-10 to 56-11).  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I THE JURY VERDICT WAS NOT INCONSISTENT.
[brief] The trial court awarded $45,860.70 for deposition and trial support services and for court reporting at trial.  Although N.J.S.A. 22A:2-8 does allow a party entitled to an award or allowance of costs the "costs of taking depositions when taxable, by order of the court," our case law makes clear that depositions should not be routinely taxed as expenses.  To the contrary, our cases make clear that deposition costs are not generally recoverable as taxed costs.  See Hirsch., 110 N.J. at 649.  They should not have been awarded here.
[directive] 지령 제01-18호(02/23/2018)에 의거 공포된 양식, 페이지 CN 11168-Korean 1/2 Form Promulgated by Directive #01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 11168-Korean page 1/2 의무적 벌금은 다음과 같습니다: The mandatory penalties are as follows: 첫 번째 위반/1st Offense $ 500 두 번째 위반/2nd Offense $ 750 세 번째 또는 차후의 위반/3rd or Subsequent offense $ 1000 $ 총 벌금/Total Penalty  [예/Yes]  [아니요/No]  귀하가  1대 이상의 차량 절도 또는 차량을 불법 탈취한 것에 대해 유죄를  3.  인정하는 경우, 부과되는 면허 몰수와 의무적 벌금들은 서로 순차적으로 집행될 수 있다는 것을 알고 있습니까?  Do you understand that if you plead guilty to more than one theft of an automobile or unlawful taking of a motor vehicle that the license forfeitures and mandatory penalties imposed can be consecutive to each other?
[brief] (Pa56).  “While the residents whose homes are close to the Redevelopment Area might be opposed to the Ordinance or any applications that might be considered, that is not enough for this Court to find that a significant public interest is present that would warrant an exception to the filing of a complaint so far out of time. ”  (Pa56).  Plaintiff simply did not present a sufficient basis to warrant enlargement under Rule 4:69-6 and the Trial Court properly denied their request.
[brief] The U.S. Postal Service acknowledges that dogs consider it an act of aggression to deliver a package to its owner.  In the 2023 campaign for National Dog Bite Awareness Week, the USPS warned:  “Parents should remind their children and other family members not to take mail directly from carriers in the presence of the family pet, as the dog may view the person handing mail to a family member as a threatening gesture. ”  Da128.  [...] was barking and pawing at the gate in reaction to [...]’s intrusion on the property.  At the same time, [...]’s nemesis [...] was outside.  She had been barking for over three hours before [...] arrived and possibly had ventured onto the Defendant’s property at some point.  These factors combined to “incite” or provoke [...] to action, within the common meaning of the word.  Both courts concluded that since [...] was lawfully on the premises, he did not provoke [...].
[brief] The court further failed in its abuse of discretion to recognize that a Motion to Vacate a default judgement “should be viewed with great liberality, and EVERY reasonable ground for indulgence IS tolerated to the end that a JUST RESULT is reached. ” Citing; Marder v. Realty Constr. Co. 84 N.J. Super. 313, 319, 202, A.2d 175 (App. Div.) aff’d. 43 N. J. 508, 205 A.2d 744 (1964).  (This referenced case exhibits relevance as it establishes EXPANDED precedents for this defendant’s challenge of jurisdiction of the court in March of 1990 (Pa6; Pa10; Pa21; Pa33-Pa35; Pa39-Pa41).
[brief] (Da001a.)  [...]’s theory in this dispute is truly “illogical,” to adopt the term used by the Trial Court.  (Da277a.)  Notwithstanding her clear and unequivocal release of all “Claims, rights, and interests” relating to [...]’s Estate’s 21.5% share of the Palm Beach Property, [...] contends she somehow recaptured that interest under Paragraph 24(G) of the Settlement Agreement, a general provision preserving [...]’s right to receive “other” property she is entitled to as a beneficiary of [...]’s Estate or [...]’s Revocable Trust.  The Trial Court flatly rejected [...]’s interpretation of Paragraphs 24(F) and 24(G) as directly belied by the Settlement Agreement’s plain and unambiguous terms and [...]’s Will and [...]’s Revocable Trust.  (See Da270a-278a.)  LEGAL ARGUMENT I.
[brief] (Ja37)  Of note regarding the [...]/[...] Order is the fact that [...] and [...] had the same owners, [...] and [...], when the Bulletin was issued. \(^4\)  The management of [...] and [...] are the same, as demonstrated by their respective annual statements.  The Directors/Trustees of both companies are the same, the CFO for each company is the same person, and the two entities \(^4\)  [...] remains an owner of [...] and [...].  [...] remains an owner of [...] but is no longer an owner of [...] after the change of control approved by the [...]/[...] Order was consummated.  share office space.  (Compare Ja66 with Ja67).  They even use the same email address.  (Ja72).  [...] and [...] allocate administrative and operating expenses.  (Ra33, § A, 2nd paragraph).  Therefore, the [...]/[...] Order and hearing officer report demonstrate that [...] was more than likely aware of the proceedings leading up to and the issuance of the [...]/[...] Order, which includes reciprocal exchanges within the purview of the Holding Company Act.
[brief] [[...]:]  Q.  The temporary regulator station operates safely and does not represent a safety hazard to the surrounding area, correct?  [...]: Can you repeat the question again, please?  [...]: The temporary regulator station operates safely and does not represent a safety hazard to the surrounding area?  [...]: That's correct.  [1T140:18-25, -141:1-11, -144:19-25, -145:1-6.]  BY [...]: Q.  Yes or no, Mr. Sanders, does the temporary regulator represent a safety hazard to [...]'s gas infrastructure?  A.  No, it does not.  [1T140:18-25, -141:1-11, -144:19-25, -145:1-6.]  In addition, the current regulator is designed and configured such that it can reasonably accommodate [...]'s current and projected future load served by this line:
[brief] Regarding the police seizure of the marijuana-filled duffel bags in New Jersey, [...] found that defendant validly signed consent forms to search his property, resulting in the police seizure of 175 pounds of marijuana, two vacuumed sealed bags of cocaine, and $60,000 to $70,000 in cash.  (Da24; see also Pa1-4).  The judge ruled that the police had secured written waivers to search defendant’s property, which weighed strongly in favor of consent and “nothing in the facts indicates that Defendant was unduly coerced to sign the consent forms. ” (Da24; Pa1-4).  Contrary to defendant's claim (Db9; Db24), there was no need for law enforcement to obtain any anticipatory search warrant to seize marijuana and cocaine from defendant.
[brief] 2  The Property consists of Block 8, Lots 1, 2, 3, 12, 16, 20, 28, 32.01, 39, 40, 41, 45, 46, 47 and 49; and Block 15.14, Lots 18, 19, 20, 22 and 75 of the Tax Maps of [...].  3  The Application originally requested freshwater wetland general permits in addition to the Flood Hazard Area Verification and Flood Hazard Area Individual Permits at issue in this appeal.
[brief] [...] AND [...]  [...]  Attorneys for Defendants-Respondents  [...] and [...]  [...] [...] [...]  [...]  [...]  Date Submitted: November 13, 2024  #  TABLE OF CONTENTS | Section | Page | |------------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | ii | | PRELIMINARY STATEMENT | 1 | | PROCEDURAL HISTORY | 2 | | STATEMENT OF FACTS | 3 | | LEGAL ARGUMENT | 6 | | SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT | 6 | | **I.
[brief] Report by [...].........................................................(omitted)  Exhibit AA, 8/15/2017  Expert Report by [...]  (omitted, see 274a)  Exhibit BB, 10/12/2017  Expert Report by [...]…………………………(omitted)  Exhibit CC, 10/11/2017  Report by [...].  …………………………………….(omitted)  Exhibit DD, 8/17/2017  Unpublished Opinion  Herring v. Kettleman’s Bagels Deli & Grill, A-2465-15T1 (App.Div. August 17, 2017).
[brief] The Relationship of Decedent and Respondent  The Petitioner contended that the Decedent was manipulated and controlled by the Respondent, which allegedly resulted in the Petitioner’s exclusion from the Will.  (7T13-7 to 14-5; 7T64-9 to 16).  However, [...], Esq. testified that Decedent and Respondent had a loving mother-daughter relationship.  (9T226-3 to 13).  The Respondent testified that she had a very close relationship with Decedent.  (10T148-6 to 149-7).  The Respondent openly acknowledges that she went through a rebellious period of about two years, starting in 2006, where she had substance abuse issues and that the father of her children had been involved with drugs and he subsequently passed away.  The substance abuse arose of prescriptions for pain killers given to the Respondent for neck and back pain after she was injured in an automobile accident.  The doctor who prescribed this medication - [...], M.D. -- was eventually convicted and was incarcerated.  (11T97-1 to 99-15).  The Respondent, however, turned her life around.  She entered the [...] rehabilitation clinic for inpatient treatment, where she successfully recovered from her painkiller addition.  As of the time of trial, she had been “clean” for 13 years.  (11T106-7 to 109-16).  D.
[brief] N.J.S.A. 34:15-8.  Without ruling on particular applications, we note only that there are a number of opportunities for damage awards for local employee injuries by accident arising out of and in the course of employment.  [Id. at 471-472.]  [...] demonstrates that the purpose of Part Two coverage is to insure an employer’s obligations under the Act for payment of damages for which an employer may legally be responsible in lieu of the traditional statutory benefits that are covered by Part One of the NJM Policy.