ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Once again, [...] advances a claim, devoid of any factual or legal support, that the Borough erroneously failed to consider, evaluate, and score applicants for a Class 5 Cannabis Retail License in accordance with certain enumerated criteria, and without any deference to additional considerations identified in the cannabis retail license applications, or the Borough Council members’ particular knowledge of local conditions.  Between March 2022 and September 2022, the Borough engaged in a lengthy, thorough and exhaustive process to accept and evaluate applications from interested cannabis businesses to operate within the Borough.  The process involved the acceptance of applications; the consideration thereof; interviews with and presentations by applicants; multiple deliberations by both the Borough’s Cannabis Subcommittee and the Borough Council; the recommendations of the Borough’s Cannabis Subcommittee to the Borough Council as to which applicant should be granted a local support resolution; and, ultimately, independent consideration of the applications, public hearing presentations, site visits, and public comment, all by the Borough Council, which resulted in a 5-1 bipartisan vote by the full Council on September 20, 2022 supporting the award of the support resolution to [...].  Despite this exhaustive process, [...] claims that the process was flawed, and the Council arbitrarily and unreasonably awarded a resolution of support to [...] because the Borough failed to score the applicants for the Class 5 Cannabis Retail License in accordance with an Evaluation Sheet created by the Borough, and thereafter select the applicant with the highest score.  There is no support for [...]’s claim in either the factual record or in law.  Indeed, the record developed in the trial court and presented to this Court conclusively demonstrates that the Council relied on adequate evidence to award a resolution of support in favor of [...].  For the reasons that follow, the Court should affirm trial court’s Order affirming the Borough’s resolution of support and denying [...]’s prerogative writs complaint.  **PROCEDURAL HISTORY**
[brief] (1T53:4-62:21)  A.  [...] Fails to Explain How the Police Officers’ Opinions and Conclusions Impeach Plaintiffs’ Expert.  Plaintiffs have appealed that portion of the trial judge’s rulings which admitted the police officers’ opinions and conclusions through the cross-examination of plaintiffs’ expert, [...].  (Pb18; 1T53:4-62:21).  In opposition, [...] claims, as does [...], at times using identical language, that the hearsay evidence of the police officers’ opinions and conclusions was properly admitted to impeach plaintiff’s liability expert, [...].  (Db40).  They claim, first, that [...]’s opinion is impeached by that evidence because he “only takes cases if he agrees with the theory of the case. ” (Ibid.).  Yet they fail to explain how [...]’s opinion on negligent training and supervision is impacted one way or the other by what the police think.  Regardless of who the police believed, [...]’s opinion would be the same because, as he testified, the police testimony was “not relevant to the opinion that I was going to give. ”  (8T52:19-20)
[brief] What name, if any, [...] referred to Complainant as during the morning and afternoon incidents – and whether Complainant asserted during the morning incident that [...] misnamed her – are material factual questions that are in dispute.  [...] contended that if, in the morning, he called Complainant by any name, it would have been the only name he had known her, D[].  [...] further asserted that he did not know that she preferred D[a] until she was leaving the local union office at the end of the afternoon incident.  This is not a case where [...] was “merely denying evidence so undeniable that the Commission ‘would have to ignore reality to credit [[...]’s] denial.  J.L., at *3 (citing Liberty Surplus Ins. Corp. v. Nowell Amoroso, P.A., 189 N.J. 436, 450 (2007).  These could not be more obvious disputes of material facts that requires a hearing.
[brief] As a result, search terms “often are over-inclusive”—“they find responsive documents but also large numbers of irrelevant documents. ”  *Moore v. Publicis Groupe*, 287 F.R.D. 182, 191 (S.D.N.Y. 2012), adopted, 2012 WL 1446534 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 26. 2012).  For that reason, courts that have considered the issue “have almost uniformly found that a relevance review, and the withholding of irrelevant documents, is appropriate” even after the use of search terms.  O’Donnell/Salvatori Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 339 F.R.D. 275, 276 (W.D. Wash. 2021).
[brief] In finding aggravating factor one, the nature and circumstances of the offense, the judge noted that defendant “was in . . . a position of great influence” as a forty-two- year-old man whom the [...] “looked up to” as “kind of a father figure, or an older brother,” and that he “exerted that influence” to use [...] to fight [...].  The judge also considered that defendant: (1) paid [...] to fight [...]; (2) led the group to [...]’s house; and (3) attempted to “distance himself” although he “set it in motion. ”  (15T27-9 to 16).  In applying aggravating factor three, the risk that defendant will commit another offense, the judge found that defendant’s “fairly substantial” history of municipal offenses outweighed his compliance with the pre-trial release order.  (15T28-10 to 29-24).  The judge likewise concluded that defendant’s municipal court history and the need for general deterrence supported aggravating factor nine.  (15T31-4 to 12).  Regarding aggravating factor seven, whether defendant committed the offense pursuant to a payment agreement, the judge found that defendant paid [...] to fight [...].  (15T30-11 to 31-3).  The judge also found aggravating factor six, the defendant’s criminal record and the seriousness of those offenses, which was not argued by the State, because of the seriousness of the conduct for which defendant led the conspiracy.  (15T31-15 to 2).  The court found no mitigating factors, rejecting defendant’s arguments concerning factors three, seven, nine, ten, and twelve.
[brief] Here, however, the significantly delayed arbitration [...] now proposes would prejudice [...] in a number of ways.  First, as the Law Division found, [...] expended considerable time and expense in producing documents and other evidence for use in litigation and trial.  Hearing Tr. 74:15-20 ("there is prejudice that is suffered by [...] under the circumstances.  The time and expense to produce documents, they certainly – there was substantial efforts that were taken...").  That burden rested disproportionately on [...], as the plaintiff property owner, compared to [...], an arms-length insurer and part of one of the largest families of insurers in the world, [...].  Such discovery tends to be much more rigorous, time consuming, costly and voluminous in litigation than arbitration.  Accordingly, [...]’s belated arbitration demand, if granted, would effectively result in [...]’s needless over-expenditure on discovery, thereby wasting [...]’s (and this Court’s) time and resources.  Relatedly, [...] would also be prejudiced because [...] obtained the benefit of this broader disproportionate discovery to use against [...] in arbitration.  *See, e.g.*, *Marmo*, 478 N.J. Super. at 612 (denying motion to compel arbitration noting that the “delay in moving to compel arbitration allowed it to obtain the early benefit of discovery that might not have been as easily obtainable in arbitration. ”)  Pa59 (Cook Cert. Exh. D).  Second, as the Law Division also correctly found, abandoning this litigation to compel arbitration after such a long delay would deprive [...] of the benefit of its bargain under the Policy.
[brief] (Da2823).  With [...] purchasing [...]’s 51% interest in [...], the company could continue as a DBE and Woman-Owned Business Enterprise (“WBE”).  (15T 121:21 to 122:11).  [...] agreed to pay back the $700,000 portion of the SPA purchase price that he had been paid to date, and received in return new checks for that same amount issued by [...] [...].  (15T 122:12-23; Da2836).  Despite having executed the MIPA and SPA, the parties’ relationship vis-à-vis [...] did not change.  They continued as partners with [...] continuing to run the lab, and [...] continuing to run the business.  (16T 38:2-6; 57:24 to 59:19).  [...] completed his additional three-year stint with [...] as the SPA contemplated as of December 31, 2017.  (Da2816).  F.
[brief] ”).  In addition, pertinent contacts for purposes of specific jurisdiction must “result from the defendant’s purposeful conduct and not [as here] the unilateral actions of the plaintiff. ”  \textit{Bayway Ref. Co. v. State Utilities, Inc.}, 333 N.J. Super. 420, 429–32 (App. Div. 2000) (that defendant mailed payments to plaintiff’s New Jersey office as instructed did not “support the proposition that [defendant] availed itself of the ‘benefits’ or ‘protections’ of New Jersey law, or militate in favor of New Jersey’s jurisdiction”).
[brief] 2.  Plaintiffs may argue that the courts (not the arbitrator) must resolve their challenge to the arbitration agreement because *Atalese* is about contract formation, and contract-formation issues are reserved for courts.  That argument would be wrong.  *Atalese* is not about contract *formation*—Plaintiffs could not seriously contend that [...] did not form a contract to, for example, pay for the rides that she requested through the [...].  (*See Da93–95.* )  *Atalese* is instead about whether one particular clause in the plaintiff’s contract (the arbitration provision) is *enforceable* as a matter of public policy.  While *Atalese* referred to principles of mutual assent and meeting of the minds, in truth those concepts are objective and not subjective.
[brief] *Cummings v. Bahr*, 295 N.J. Super. 374, 389 (App. Div. 1996).  Reconsideration should be granted “only in ‘those cases which fall into that narrow corridor in which either 1) the [c]ourt has expressed its decision based upon a palpably incorrect or irrational basis, or 2) it is obvious that the [c]ourt either did not consider, or failed to appreciate the significance of probative competent evidence .
[brief] Appellant filed its Verified Complaint on September 21, 2023 challenging the Council’s statutory authority on grounds that it violates Article III, Par. 1 and Article IV, Sec. 1 Par. 1 of the New Jersey State Constitution and constitutes an arbitrary or unreasonable delegation of authority by the New Jersey Legislature.  (Pa1-13).  On October 4, 2023, [...] denied Appellant’s request for injunctive relief that would have prevented the Council from implementing the new CBBMP and stay the 2023 black bear hunting season.  (Pa50-70).  On October 18, 2023, [...] filed an answer.  (Pa71-78).  In November, 2023, the Respondents/Defendants [...] (“State”) and [...] filed motions to dismiss.  (Pa80-88).  Appellant filed a cross-motion for summary judgment that same month.  (Pa89-101).  By Opinion and implementing Order, dated January 10, 2024, [...] granted the State and [...]’s motions to dismiss for failure to set forth a cause of action.  (Pa115-133).  **STATEMENT OF FACTS**
[brief] From the onset, the Third Circuit made apparent that Schwartz was non-precedential.  Schwartz, 256 F. App’x at 516 (“We write exclusively for the parties[.]”).  Parrella, 2022 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 59, is likewise non-precedential and is not binding on this Court per Rule 1:36-3.  (“No unpublished opinion shall constitute precedent or be binding upon any court.  . . .  [N]o unpublished opinion shall be cited by any court. ”).  [...]’s reliance on these opinions is, therefore, irrelevant to any analysis of the arbitration agreement.
[brief] The parking area abutting [...] is part and parcel of a public recreational facility for which the government entity has no liability for supervision.  *Ibid.*  If a parking lot at a stadium is considered a public recreational facility, then there can be no doubt that an outdoor basketball court and surrounding public area with a playground open to not only the residents of the public housing project, but the community-at-large would also be considered a public recreational facility.  Accordingly, similar to the situation in *Verni*, the [...] has absolute immunity since “[a] public entity is not liable for failure to provide supervision of public recreational facilities[.]”
[directive] Este é um documento público, o que significa que o documento tal como apresentado estará disponível ao público mediante solicitação.  Portanto, não inclua dados de identificação pessoal, tais como número de Social Security, número da carteira de motorista, número da placa do veículo, número da apólice de seguro, número de conta financeira ativa ou número de cartão de crédito ativo.  NOTICE:
[brief] Defense counsel’s repeated reliance on the employer-employee relationship between [...] and [...] ignores the fact that Plaintiffs have asserted direct claims of liability against [...] for negligent training, supervision, hiring and retention, which direct claims have nothing to do with vicarious liability for the conduct of [...].  See Pa3, ¶¶ A, B and D; Pa6, ¶¶ A, B and D.  As this Court has held, “a claim based on negligent hiring or negligent supervision is separate from a claim based on respondeat superior.
[brief] *Id.* at *4-5.  The purchasers appealed, arguing that the trial court erred by making purchasers’ contractual right to purchase the property conditioned upon the purchasers’ assumption of the sellers’ environmental obligations under the contract.  *Id.* at *1.  The Appellate Division agreed with the purchasers, finding that the trial court misinterpreted the contract and that the evidence did not support the trial court’s findings as to the parties’ expectations.  *Id.* at *7.  Among other things, there was no evidence to suggest that the parties contemplated a limitation on costs, and the sellers’ conduct until December 2012 demonstrated that the sellers were not concerned with the time or expenses, but rather moved forward with the matter as originally contemplated by the parties’ agreement.
[brief] Factual Background.  On Saturday, October 31, 2020, around 1:23 a.m., [...] was on patrol in [...] when he saw defendant driving “a dark colored BMW … [on] State Highway 70 at what appeared to be a high rate of speed. ” (Da5; Da25).  [...] employed his patrol vehicle radar unit and observed that the BMW’s speed was 64 miles-per-hour despite a posted speed limit of 40 miles-per-hour.  (Da5).  [...] then observed the vehicle --- 2  These facts are drawn from the affidavit of probable cause for defendant’s arrest, (Da1-7), and from [...]’s memorandum denying defendant’s motion to dismiss the indictment or compel her admission into PTI, (Da24-31).
[brief] ” (Da 64) (citing N.J.S.A. 4:22-24a).  Although the statutory language does not expressly provide a type of culpability, “[t]he reference in N.J.S.A. 2C:2-2c(3) to N.J.S.A. 2C:2-2b(2) establishes ‘knowingly’ as the required state of mind if an offense is defined without a specified culpability requirement. ”  *State v. Demarest*, 252 N.J. Super. 323, 327 (App. Div. 1991) (citing *State v. Rovito*, 99 N.J. 581, 586 (1985)).  See also *State v. Sewell*, 127 N.J. 133, 139 (1992).  A person acts knowingly with respect to the nature of his conduct or the attendant circumstances if he is aware that his conduct is of that nature, or that such circumstances exist, or he is aware of a high probability of their existence.  A person acts knowingly with respect to a result of his conduct if he is aware that it is practically certain that his conduct will cause such a result.  “Knowing,” “with knowledge” or equivalent terms have the same meaning.  [N.J.S.A. 2C:2-2b(2). ]  Accordingly, subsection a(2) of N.J.S.A. 4:22-24 prohibits a person from knowingly being present at and witnessing, paying admission to, encouraging, or assisting a place kept or used for the purpose of, fighting or baiting a living animal or creature.
[brief] This case began when Plaintiff, [...]  (“Plaintiff”), filed a Verified Complaint and Order to Show Cause on October 5, 2023, (Da1-Da68),\(^1\) which was denied on November 3, 2023.  (Da75-Da76).  On November 3, 2023, Defendant filed a Notice of Removal to remove the matter to the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey.  (Da77).  An Order for Remand back to this Court was filed in this case on December 18, 2023.  (Da89-Da90)  A case management conference was held on January 16, 2024, and following the same, a Case Management Order was entered on January 16, 2024, allowing discovery to be filed within thirty (30) days from the date of the Order.  (Da91).  Defendants filed an Answer on January 22, 2024, (Da92-Da104), and a Consent Order was entered on January 23, 2024, in which Counts III and IV were stricken with prejudice.  (Da106-Da107).  A Motion for a Protective Order was filed by Defendants on February 1, 2024, requesting that discovery not be had in this case, (Da108-Da109), which was granted on March 1, 2024.  (Da138-Da139).  A case management conference was also scheduled for March 8, 2024.  (Da140).  Following the case management conference, a Case Management Order was entered on March 8, 2024 which set a briefing schedule and trial date of June 28, 2024.  (Da140).  Trial occurred on June 28, 2024, and the Trial Court --- \(^1\) References to “Da” are to Defendants Appendix filed with this Merits Brief. issued an oral decision in this matter the same day.  (T3, 38: 8-58:22).  A Notice of Appeal was filed by Defendants on August 8, 2024.  (Da150-Da154).  **STATEMENT OF FACTS**
[brief] The August 2, 2024 Oral Arguments.  Oral arguments were first conducted on August 2, 2024.  At oral arguments in August, the Court was not inclined to have supplemental briefs or certifications submitted and indicated that it would consider only the papers that were submitted.  (1T7:16-17).  Thereafter, at the conclusion of oral arguments, the Court requested supplemental briefs on a specific issue.  During oral arguments, Respondent argued, inter alia, that [...] had previously represented [...] and [...] would know whether or not [...] was or was not able to litigate the subject lawsuit.  (1T18:15-19).  [...] could know if [...] was of the mind- set to settle and the reasons why.  (1T18:15-19).  The Court agreed with Respondents and stated that the technical argument were matters which it agreed and fully understood and were “all things that have been recognized by the court as a potential basis for exclusion. ” (1T30:5-11).  Appellant raised the argument that the afore-mentioned had not been argued in Respondent’s moving papers.  (1T30:20-25).  Thereafter, the Court afforded Appellants and Respondents the opportunity to serve supplemental briefs addressing those specific issues.  (1T45:21 to 1T46:16-18).  2.
[brief] D. **The loans made by [...] were neither loans to a director nor loans to an officer. **  Respondents do not allege that a single loan was made to Appellant, in his individual capacity.  Just as the Respondents and the trial court failed to distinguish entity from entity ([...] from [...]), so too do they fail to distinguish entity from its ownership, whether that be a shareholder in a corporation or a member in a limited liability company.
[brief] After the parties agreed to the Third Loan on the day of the Closing, [...] and [...] continued to interact as friends and, between April 2013 and October 2019, [...] repeatedly begged for [...]’ patience and forbearance while categorically promising that he would repay Plaintiff in full and as soon as he was able.  Da26; 1T185-1 to 186-4, 188-17 to 195-6.  [...] represented time and again that he was working on new deals that he expected would soon enable him to pay his debt.  Da26; 1T185-1 to 186-4.  Although [...] never pressured his friend for repayment, the parties discussed the Third Loan at various times throughout the time period 2013 to 2019, including at a 2016 dinner in Bergen County.12  1T192-2 to 194-1.  12  Although [...] denied these conversations, the trial court again resolved the credibility dispute in favor of [...].  Da28.
[brief] TABLE OF CONTENTS  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ........................................................................................................ iv  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT .................................................................................................1  FACTUAL AND LEGAL BACKGROUND ...............................................................................1  LEGAL ARGUMENT ..................................................................................................................6  I.  AS A MATTER OF LAW, HOPEWELL BOROUGH AND PENNINGTON BOROUGH’S REQUEST TO OVERTURN HOPEWELL  TOWNSHIP’S AFFORDABLE HOUSING ORDINANCE AND FINANCIAL AGREEMENT IS INAPPROPRIATE .........................................................6  II.  THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE TOWNSHIP OF HOPEWELL AND [...] OCCURRED AFTER A LENGTHY PUBLIC HEARING PROCESS ......................................................................................................................................................8  III.  THE TOWNS CHALLENGING THIS AGREEMENT HAVE NO COURT-APPROVED FAIR SHARE PLANS OF THEIR OWN AND IGNORE THE FACT THAT MOUNT LAUREL IS A REGIONAL OBLIGATION ..................................................................................................................................................11  CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................................13
[brief] In relevant part, the trial court’s Memorandum of Decision states:  [...] alludes to what type of interest could rise to the level of warranting an extension to the filing deadline.  “There are no public funds involved, no political upheavals, no significant impact on density, traffic, ratables or any other interest other than the concerns expressed by the individual plaintiffs and their supporters and no constitutional implications. ”  Id.  None of these significant issues exist in this matter either.  There are no public funds involved, no political upheavals, and no significant impact on density, traffic or ratables.  Plaintiffs loosely reference tax ratables as a reason for the public interest, but do not support such an argument.  There is nothing in the record to suggest that the Ordinance creates a significant tax ratable issue.  Plaintiff’s [sic] also reference the potential for increase in traffic.  This may be accurate, but there is nothing in the record to suggest that there will be a “significant impact” on traffic or that the traffic situation will affect most of the Township or just the small area around the project.  Many ordinances, if not most, may have some effect on the public, but that does not justify an extension of filing deadlines.  There must be something significant that has an effect on the larger portion of the Township, not potentially just some of the roads around the project.  (Pa57-Pa58).  It is respectfully submitted that the trial court erred in its application of [...] to this case, particularly considered in the context of the defendants’ motions to dismiss (the standard for which is more fully discussed infra).