ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] So, again, so as to that issue, I agree that the bid responsiveness as of the date of the bid opening but, ultimately, much of the evaluation went to what was submitted as of August the 20th.  [3T31-21 – 3T32-17]  As to the trial court’s refusal to consider possible and potential impacts, the court explained:  First, my analysis is based upon the facts that are before me and that's important because there's a lot of speculation as to what could have happened, what might have happened, and the legal analysis in this case is hard enough with what did happen.
[brief] One of the most remarkable aspects of the decision below was its contention that Plaintiff had not set forth the basis for a finding of procedural unconscionability.  Defendant asks this Court to affirm this clearly infirm ruling.  Plaintiff explicitly argued:  In connection with the issue of procedural unconscionability, New Jersey courts have held that a consumer contract between a consumer and a commercial entity are “contracts of adhesion” if the commercial party presents a pre-printed standard agreement to the consumer on a “take-it-or-leave it basis. ”  “[T]he essential nature of a contract of adhesion is that it is presented on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, commonly in a standardized printed form, without opportunity for the ‘adhering’ party to negotiate except perhaps on a few particulars. ”  Muhammad, 189 N.J. at 15 (quoting Rudbart v. North Jersey Dist. Water Supply Com’n, 127 N.J. 344, 353 (1992).  Plaintiff contends that the one-sided arbitration clause is procedurally unconscionable.
[directive] De-escalation.  De-escalation is the action of communicating verbally or non-verbally in an attempt to reduce, stabilize, or eliminate the immediacy of a threat.  De-escalation may also be used to create the time needed to allow the situation to resolve itself or to position additional resources to resolve the situation with the least amount of force necessary.  Officers should employ de-escalation techniques when feasible, which include, but are not limited to, the following: (a) communication techniques to calm an agitated subject (e.g., regulating tone and pitch, such as speaking slowly in a calm voice); (b) techniques to promote rational decision making, such as ensuring that only one officer addresses the person and the other officers remain detached as safety permits as to not escalate the situation; and splitting up individuals at the scene who may be arguing; (c) active listening techniques, such as sharing the officer’s name, asking the subject their name, and exhibiting a genuine willingness to listen; (d) slowing down the pace of the incident by taking deep breaths, slowing speech, and/or applying strategic or critical thinking; (e) using calming gestures and facial expressions (e.g., arms extended with palms out and avoid angry expressions); (f) practicing procedural-justice techniques, such as explaining the officer’s actions and responding to questions; (g) verbal persuasion and advisements (e.g., explaining, without threats, how the person would benefit from cooperation, and the subject’s rights or what the officer wants the subject to do); and (h) avoiding the unnecessary display of weapons, including firearms, Conducted Energy Devices (CEDs), batons, or OC Spray.  2.6
[brief] TABLE OF CONTENTS  TABLE OF DECISION BEING APPEALED  ........................................ ii  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES.........................................................  ii  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT .....................................................  1  STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY ..................  2  LEGAL ARGUMENT  I.  THE DEP ERRED BY FAILING TO GIVE PROPER MEANING TO THE WORDS  “ROUTINE” AND “PUBLIC UTILITY” IN THE STATUTORY EXEMPTION.  (Aa0001)  .................................................................  2  II.  THE PROPOSED PROJECT IS NOT CONSISTENT WITH THE BROAD POLICIES OF THE WATER QUALITY MANAGEMENT ACT.  (Aa0001)  .................................................................  10  CONCLUSION ...............................................................
[brief] See supra at 24-25 (“[i]t was only after the confirmation of the [Sonehan Arbitration] award that [[...]] could be sure that they would receive a fractional amount”).  If [...] is incorrect on that point, however, then the Sonehan Arbitration had no bearing whatsoever on [...]’s alleged $2.1 million claim against [...], and [...] could have brought it any time after December 2020 (and certainly during the First Arbitration).  So, a question remains regarding whether [...]’s claim is indeed capped at the Sonehan recovery; and, if not, then why would [...] have to wait for the Sonehan Arbitration to conclude to bring its claim against [...]? and conditions of the [subcontract] construction agreements governing such Backlog Projects. ”  Pa172; see also Pa90 § 1.5(b) (“ARC and [...] shall enter into a subcontract agreement” for each “Backlog Project,” e.g., [...]).  All claims with respect to the PTA-based subcontracts between [...] and [...] were, therefore, compulsory within the First Arbitration.
[brief] Probation’s withdrawal of its fabricated $16,000 support arrearage charge after 23 years, but its refusal to post the full extent of payments made by Appellant as accepted by the original trial Court ([...]) in compliance with the Remand Order of 1/17/2002 does not fully correct Probation’s error on this issue.  Nor does acknowledgment of a $10,454.73 credit by way of the Order of 3/25/2004, but failure to post the remaining awards granted by that Order amounting to $57,973.20 ($16,519.20 in eliminated arrearage charges + $36,711 in reduced support charges +$4,753 in credit for overpayment starting Oct. 1, 1998 = $57,973.20) does not fully resolve the full extent of Probation’s error on this issue.  Nor does the Court’s failure to consider [...]’s forensic Certification of Probation Account Error (DA266) promote justice or equity in this case.  Again, the Court failed in its continued obligation to resolve disputed facts of the case and determine findings of fact.  6.
[brief] Moreover, the ALJ threw cold water on the Board’s clearly faulty view that [...] could not come back to the PPD even when it was already at the five-year ending point when it ruled [...] could in the natural world theoretically of this imaginary speculative process.  The ALJ recognized as any objective observer would find, namely, that [...] was disabled forever and needed to go on disability retirement and to work out some complex financial compensation contractual elements in a binding MOU agreement which is what occurred.  The ALJ correctly chastised the Board’s erroneous views that [...] somehow can regain fitness in a five-year period when it stated after conducting a thorough review of the statutes involved, and correctly stated as follows:  I CONCLUDE that the plain language of N.J.S.A. 43:16A-8(2) does not contemplate barring a member from applying for benefits, and any such interpretation or use of N.J.S.A. 43:16A-8(2) would conflict with the plain language of N.J.S.A. 43:16A-7(a)(1) as cited above.  In addition, the very settlement agreement that the Board points to as a means by which to preclude [...]’s application from being processed contemplates and specifically provides that [...] will apply for accidental disability benefits.  It seems somewhat contradictory to reference a document that specifically states [...] is to apply for accidental disability benefits as a reason to bar [...] from applying for said benefits.
[brief] [...] suggests the Redevelopment Plan’s implementation of superseding zoning removes this ordinance, as a redevelopment plan ordinance, from the ambit of the LRHL and makes it subject to provisions such as N.J.S.A. 40:49-2.1 or N.J.S.A. 40:55D-62.1 that specifically deal with zoning ordinances.  (Pb32, Pb35 n.8).  This, however, is contrary to this Court’s decision in \textit{Hirth}, 337 N.J. Super. at 165, and the Legislature’s decision in the LRHL to assign a different notice standard to redevelopment plan ordinances.
[brief] It is well established that an appellate court does not consider arguments which were “not properly presented to the trial court when an opportunity for such a presentation [wa]s available unless the questions so raised on appeal go to the jurisdiction of the trial court or concern matters of great public interest. ”\(^2\) *Zaman v. Felton*, 219 N.J. 199, 226-27 (2014) (quoting *State v. Robinson*, 200 N.J. 1, 20 (2009)); *Nieder v. Royal Indem. Ins. Co.*, 62 N.J. 229, 234 (1973); see also *Strickland v. Foulke Mgmt. Corp.*, 475.
[brief] (Resp. Br. at 18 (emphasis in original). )  Rather, the Trial Court said, without more, that which provision of the mortgage applies would payoff is not a “monthly payment. ”  As to the former, Respondent’s argument that an accelerated debt becomes the “when due” amount under Paragraph 1 ignores the interplay with the acceleration of the debt, which Appellant was entitled to do under Paragraph 9 of the Mortgage.  (Pa190-91.)  Once accelerated, a lender no longer needs to accept anything less than the full amount due and owing on the mortgage.  Respondent’s argument also ignores that this short payoff was not being made on behalf of Appellant’s borrowers, but rather on behalf of a third-party – a non-party, stranger to the Loan.  This amounted to a short sale, which even the Trial Court agreed would have different restrictions and requirements.  (1T8:20-9:20 (“[I]f this was presented as a short sale, there’s a lot of things that has to happen before the lender accepts that.  I fully appreciate that. ”).)  As such, Respondent’s reliance on Paragraphs 1 and 3 of the Mortgage have no bearing on the analysis here.  B.
[brief] Lay opinion testimony by officers, like all lay opinions, “must be[] firmly rooted in the personal observations and perceptions of the lay witness in the traditional meaning of the Rule 701. ”  State v. McLean, 205 N.J. 438, 459 (2011).  However, there are limits on lay testimony.  Namely, “[t]he Rule does not permit a witness to offer a lay opinion on a matter ‘not within [the witness’s] direct ken...and as to which the jury is as competent as he to form a conclusion[.]”  Ibid. (quoting Brindley v. Firemen’s Ins. Co., 35 N.J. Super. 1, 8 (App. Div. 1955)).  Lay-witness officers are thus able to “set forth what he or she perceived through one or more of the senses,” but does not include any “opinion, lay or expert, and does not convey information about what the officer ‘believed,’ ‘thought’ or ‘suspected,’ but instead is an ordinary fact-based recitation by a witness with first-hand knowledge.
[brief] Plaintiff’s adversaries in the lease litigation could have sought to pierce the attorney-client privilege, could seek to join [...] as a third-party Defendant tortfeasor, could cross-examine representatives of the Plaintiff that they were contemplating suing the attorney who “negotiated” the lease on their behalf or other such litigation tactics which would cause the same concerns which resulted in the Supreme Court’s adoption of a blanket exemption of all attorney malpractice claims from the Entire Controversy Doctrine.
[directive] If the County Prosecutor grants use immunity, the agency shall advise the subject officer in writing that he or she has been granted such immunity in the event their answers implicate him or her in a criminal offense.  The officer must then answer the questions specifically and narrowly related to the performance of their official duties, but no answer given nor any evidence derived from the answer may be used against this officer in a criminal proceeding.  At this point, any officer refusing to answer is subject to disciplinary charges and possible dismissal from employment.  8.2.7
[brief] POINT II  THE COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING UNRELIABLE EXPERT TESTIMONY REGARDING THE TIMING OF THE SKELETAL INJURIES WHERE THE COURT DID NOT FIND – AND THE STATE PRESENTED NO EVIDENCE ESTABLISHING – THAT SUCH TESTIMONY WAS GENERALLY ACCEPTED AS RELIABLE UNDER FRYE.  (10T:34-16 to 42-6; Da 5)  Prior to trial, defense counsel moved to exclude expert testimony by [...], who works as a forensic anthropologist for the State of New Jersey.  The trial court erroneously denied this motion without holding the State to its burden to show that forensic analysis of bone is sufficiently reliable to support the conclusions drawn by Bird regarding the timing of injuries.  See J.L.G., 234 N.J. at 308-09.  Instead, the court surmised that Bird’s testimony “seems reliable” because “I don’t have anything before me to show me that this type of methodology that he used is not the proper way that forensic anthropologists work. ”  (10T:39-17 to 22)  Critically, a defense attorney has no burden to show that the State’s expert’s methodology is “not proper”; instead, the proponent of the evidence – the State – bears the burden to demonstrate the reliability of scientific evidence it seeks to admit.  In admitting Bird’s testimony, the trial court failed to apply the “general acceptance” standard that governed admission of scientific evidence and improperly inverted the burden of proof.2  The erroneous admission of this --- 2  This year, our Supreme Court moved from the Frye standard in place at the time of this trial to the standard drawn from Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).  State v. Olenowski, 253 N.J. 133 (2023).  Under Olenowski, trial courts must assess new factors to determine whether a scientific theory is sufficiently reliable to be admitted.  Olenowski, 253 N.J. at 147 (the factors are (1) whether the scientific theory can be or has been tested; (2) whether it has been subjected to peer review and publication; (3) the known and potential rate of error as well as the existence of standards governing the operation of the particular scientific technique; and (4) general unreliable but compelling evidence deprived [...] of her rights to due process and a fair trial.  *U.S. Const.* amend. XIV; *N.J. Const.* art. I, ¶¶ 1, 9, and 10.  Her convictions must be reversed.
[brief] Mass. Mar. 1, 2023) ....................... 27 Syrie v. Knoll International, 748 F.2d 304 (5th Cir. 1984) .................................................................. 17 Tabieros v. Clark Equipment Co., 944 P.2d 1279 (Haw. 1997) ...................................................................... 10 Talarico v. Skyjack, Inc., 191 F. Supp.3d 394 (M.D. Pa. 2016) .................................................................. 17 Thomas v. Bombardier Recreational Products, Inc., 682 F. Supp.2d 1297 (M.D. Fla. 2010) ............................... 14 Timm v. Goodyear Dunlop Tires North America Ltd., 309 F. Supp.3d 595 (N.D. Ind. 2018) ............................... 14 Tober v. Graco Children’s Products, Inc., 2004 WL 1987239 (S.D. Ind. July 28, 2004), aff’d, 431 F.3d 572 (7th Cir. 2005) ............................................. 14 Trejo v. Johnson & Johnson, 220 Cal. Rptr.3d 127 (Cal. App. 2017) ............................................................... 25 Trisvan v. Heyman, 305 F. Supp.3d 381 (E.D.N.Y. 2018) ........ 25 Utts v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 251 F. Supp.3d 644 (S.D.N.Y. 2017), aff’d, 919 F.3d 699 (2d Cir. 2019) ............ 25 Weams v. FCA US L.L.C., 2019 WL 960159 (M.D. La. Feb. 27, 2019) .................................................... 15 Wilhite o/p/o Est. of Wilder v. Medtronic, Inc., 2024 WL 968867 (N.D. Ala. Mar. 6, 2024) ....................... 13 Williamson v. Walmart Stores, Inc., 2015 WL 1565474 (M.D. Ga. April 8, 2015) ........................................... 14 Wright v. Howmedica Osteonics Corp., 2017 WL 4555901 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 12, 2017), aff’d, 741 F. Appx. 624 (11th Cir. 2018) ......................................................... 14 Yarbrough v. Actavis Totowa, LLC, 2010 WL 3604674 (S.D. Ga. Sept. 13, 2010) ............................................
[brief] Defendant [...] does not meet the residency requirement of her office and Plaintiffs thus brought this quo warranto action.  N.J.S.A. 18A:65-14(b)(ii) (requiring [...] to reside in Middlesex County).  In addition, while clear that Ms. [...] holds a public office, the quo warranto statute is not even limited to holders of public office.  On the contrary, the statute applies to many other circumstances, including “to test the title to office in a corporation, public or private. ”  Scott v. Cholmondeley, 129 N.J. Eq. 152, 156 (Ch. 1941).  To that end, in New Jersey, it has been used in disputes over elections of unincorporated associations, Wolff v. Wolf, 122 N.J. Eq. 243, 244 (Ch. 1937); for-profit corporations, Hankins v. Newell, 75 N.J.L. 26 (Sup. Ct. 1907); religious groups, Smith v. Trustees of Bethel African Methodist Episcopal Church of Jersey City, 89 N.J.L. 397, 398 (Sup. Ct. 1916); and professional associations established by state statute, Wilson v. Thompson, 83 N.J.L. 57, 59 (Sup. Ct. 1912).
[brief] Paragraph 42 of the rider obligated the Defendants to make all interior repairs.  The fire damage was limited to inside the Defendants' rented space.  There was no proof submitted by Defendants at trial that the fire damage was attributable to the roof, foundation and structural repairs which Paragraph 42 would have obligated Plaintiffs to address.  Defendants argued at trial that Paragraph 15 of lease obligated Plaintiffs to make the repairs because there was no proof that Defendants caused the fire.  (Pa 19).  The trial court concluded that Paragraph 15 applies in terms of a fire loss or other casualty and that Paragraph 45 of the applies to routine repairs and maintenance.  (3T 16-11-23).  The rider clearly obligates the Defendants to make all repairs to the property.  It does not exclude Defendants from any loss due to fire or other casualty.  Paragraph 46 is clear that any inconsistency between the Lease and Rider, the terms of the Rider prevail.  Defendants offered no evidence, other than the fire was not her fault, to overturn the unambiguous language of the Rider.  The chosen words and phrases in a contract are to be realistically assessed in relation to the context and obvious general purpose of the compact, for the meaning that is reasonably clear, such as is within the reasonable understanding of the symbols of expression.  Cozzi v. Owens Corning Fiber Glass Corp., 63 N.J. Super. 117, 121 (App. Div. 1960).  The trial court failed to take into consideration that this was a commercial lease for a commercial establishment so the bargaining positions of the parties was equal.
[brief] (9T91:16 to 92:6; 110:9-23).  The Court found that [...]’s testimony was credible.  P25a.  Respondent’s contention that Petitioner did not live in the home from 2006 to 2009 disregards her own testimony.  Respondent testified that she talked to Decedent every day about Petitioner and would frequently hear Petitioner in the background.  (12T49:8-18).  Respondent also overlooks that she and her then boyfriend, [...], gave Petitioner an anniversary card on his 14th Anniversary, on November 22, 2006.  (12T19:23 to 20:14; P666a-P667a).  In that Anniversary Card, the Respondent writes:  - Congratulations on your 14th year.  I hope you’re happy and your love lasts forever.  (P667a).  Likewise, Decedent gave Petitioner a Christmas card dated 2006.  (P437a).  Petitioner’s contention that Respondent left the home from 2005 to 2007 is contrary to the competent evidence in the record.  Respondent’s portrayal of the Decedent’s living arrangements with Petitioner from 2005 to 2009 also lacks any foundation.
[brief] Appellants stand by their other arguments with respect to the statute of limitations issue, including the arguments based on [...]’s handling tax rebate checks, and utility bills still listing [...] and his wife [...]’s names.  For instance, [...] admitted that he deposited only the tax rebate checks for only the 291 property, but did not deposit the tax rebate checks he received for 293 property because they were sent to his brother’s name for 22 years.  Thus, for at least 22 years, he knew, or should have known, that there existed a title issue with respect to the 293 property subject to this litigation, but failed to initiate any legal action to address it until after the applicable statute of limitations had expired.  [...] baselessly argued the discovery rule.  However, given the fact that the clock already started to tick when he fraudulently created the December 10, 1998 deed, and how he handled tax rebate checks for at least 22 years, there is no room for the discovery rule to apply.  Appellants stand by their arguments set forth in the Appellate Brief with respect to multiple equitable doctrines, such as equitable estoppel, fraud, waiver, laches, and statute of frauds.  Among other things, Appellants vigorously dispute [...]’s assertion that his egregious forgery of [...]’s signature on the title documents (although allegedly pursuant to advice of counsel) should be deemed merely “an error made in good faith. ”  (Opp. Br., Pg., 57)  These equitable doctrines, which were presented by Appellant in the underlying litigation but the trial judge failed to analyze, would also result in the dismissal of the Complaint.
[directive] [Yes/Tak]  c.  Do you understand that if you are permitted to take back your plea of guilty because of the [No/Nie] judge's sentence, that anything you say in furtherance of the guilty plea cannot be used against you at trial?  Czy rozwnie Pan(i), i:e jesli uzyska Pan(i) pozwolenie na wycofanie przyznania si¥ do winy ze wzgl¥du na wyrok wydany przez ~dziego, wtedy Pana(i) wypowiedzi zwiqzane z przyznaniem si¥ do winy nie ~d!l mogly bye wykorzystane przeciwko Panu(i) podczas procesu?  24.
[directive] Accordingly, each agency should have a plan for ensuring that its services are accessible to individuals with disabilities or with limited English language proficiency.  Among other things, plans should address translation of significant documents, such as complaint forms; interpretation and translation services during intake, investigations, and proceedings; and the availability of bilingual and multilingual staff.  Regarding intake processes in particular, complaint forms should be available in English and Spanish, at a minimum, and intake staff should understand when and how to use interpreter, translator, and relay or other assistive services.  VII.
[brief] ”  Pa289.  The Amended Redevelopment Plan set forth the area, bulk and off-street parking standards applicable to the 290 Ocean Property.  --- 1  The cover of the transcript of the December 9, 2020 meeting erroneously refers to the date of the meeting as “November 12, 2020. ”  Specifically, the Amended Redevelopment Plan provided that there would not be any maximum density limit and that the maximum building height would be 100 feet (excluding roof-top mechanical equipment and screening).  *Ibid.*  The Amended Redevelopment Plan further provided that “[a]ll projects shall be subject to all required fees from the [...] unless otherwise waived or amended by the City Council in the redeveloper’s agreement. ”  Pa294.  The Amended Redevelopment Plan also described its relationship to the Master Plan and other county and state plans.  Pa296.  Specifically, the Amended Redevelopment Plan provides:  The Plan Area is designated as part of the Beachfront South Redevelopment Area on the Land Use Map of the 2010 Master Plan.  The Master Plan, at that time did not recommend any specific changes to that area.  Design Guidelines Handbook #6 indicates that the objective of the plan is to continue and reinforce the existing residential pattern of 4 to 8 story structures that maximize the views of the ocean.  Consequently, this plan is consistent with both the 2010 Master Plan and the Beachfront South Redevelopment Plan.