ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] This Legislative Calendar (Vol. XLV No. 54, Internet Update II), which can be accessed here, https://pub.njleg.state.nj.us/publications/legislative-calendar/122121.pdf (last visited May 1, 2024), is also included in the State’s appendix for the court’s convenience.  \(^6\)  Past versions of the legislative digests are archived and publicly available on the Wayback Machine.
[brief] 255 N.J. Super. 552, 554-57 (Law. Div. 1991), aff’d, 255 N.J. Super. 420 (App. Div. 1992).  The students already enrolled in the dental program brought suit against [...].  Of critical importance in the Beukas case was the existence of [...]’s “Graduate Studies Bulletin,” which provided, in relevant part:
[directive] 12.  Maintain contact with community leaders concerning the bias incident, realizing that not all information may be able to be shared.  13.  Conduct appropriate media relations.  Prepare accurate and timely public information news releases, as appropriate.  14.  Ensure that all suspected and confirmed bias incidents are reported as required through the eUCR system using the NJSP Uniform Crime Reporting procedures.  15.  Ensure that victims, and as appropriate, other concerned parties, are informed of the final disposition of the investigation.  Page 5 of 16  7.  INITIAL LAW ENFORCEMENT RESPONSE TO A BIAS INCIDENT
[directive] Sistèm Jidisyè  New Jersey  New Jersey Judiciary (N.J.S.A.  Fòm Pledwaye Siplemantè pou Eskive 2C:29-2b) oswa (N.J.S.A. vòlè Machinn oubyen pran yon Machinn Ilegalman 2C:20-2.1) (N.J.S.A. Supplemental Plea Form for Eluding 2C:29-2b) or Theft of a Motor Vehicle or (N.J.S.A. Unlawful Taking of a Motor Vehicle 2C:20-2.1) (Haitian Creole)
[brief] "[A] functional approach to abuse of discretion examines whether there are good reasons for an appellate court to defer to the particular decision at issue."  *State v. R.Y.*, 242 N.J. 48, 65 (2020) (quoting *Flagg v. Essex Cnty. Prosecutor*, 171 N.J. 561, 571 (2002)).  When reviewing a decision related to the relief to a litigant, *Rule 1:10-3* provides in part that "notwithstanding that an act or omission may also constitute a contempt of court, a litigant in any action may seek relief by application in the action."  The Rule is "a device to enable a litigant to enforce his or her rights."  In re Adoption of N.J.A.C. 5:96 & 5:97, 221 N.J. 1, 17 (2015).  It provides a "means for securing relief and allow[s] for judicial discretion in fashioning relief to litigants when a party does not comply with a judgment or order."  N. Jersey Media Grp., Inc. v. State, Off. of Governor, 451 N.J. Super. 282, 296 (App. Div. 2017) (alteration in original) (quoting In re Adoption of N.J.A.C. 5:96 & 5:97, 221 N.J. 1, 17-18 (2015)).  The Appellate Division reviews an order entered under Rule 1:10-3 under an abuse of discretion standard.
[brief] Although prosecutors have “considerable leeway” in delivering their summations, they are generally limited to commenting upon the evidence and the reasonable inferences that may be drawn therefrom.  State v. Munoz, 340 N.J. Super. 204, 217-18 (App. Div. 2001); State v. Pindale, 249 N.J. Super. 266, 285 (App. Div. 1991).  Accordingly, a prosecutor may not denigrate defense counsel, cast “unjustified aspersions on defense counsel’s motives,” or “impugn the integrity of a particular lawyer . . . as a means of imputing guilt to the defendant. ”  Pindale, 249 N.J. Super. at 286; State v. Lockett, 249 N.J. Super. 428, 434 (App. Div. 1991).  For example, a prosecutor may not accuse defense counsel of deceiving or confusing the jury.  Lockett, 249 N.J. Super. at 434.  In Lockett, the prosecutor told the jury that defense counsel wanted jurors to “look at some smoke in the corner of the room” so that they would not “look at the defendant’s conduct. ”  Ibid.  The court held that these statements impermissibly impugned defense counsel’s motives.  Ibid.  Likewise, in Pindale, a prosecutor told the jury during summation that defense counsel’s role “is to try to confuse you” and that defense counsel was “hoping that by some stroke of luck somehow you guys might drop the ball and get so confused that you misread the evidence. ”  249 N.J. Super. at 286.  Just like Lockett, the Pindale Court held that the prosecutor’s statements improperly demeaned the role of the defense attorney.  Ibid.; see State v. Sherman, 230 N.J. Super. 10, 16 (App. Div. 1988) (finding improper the prosecutor’s statements that defense would “use certain courtroom maneuvers” and that “the first defense is a defense of confusion”).
[brief] ”  Skuse, 244 N.J. at 53 (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Riverside Chiropractic Grp. v. Mercury Ins. Co., 404 N.J. Super. 22, 238 (App. Div. 2008)); see also Roman v. Bergen Logistics, LLC, 456 N.J. Super. 157, 174 (App. Div. 2018) (“An employee who signs but claims not to understand an arbitration agreement will not be relieved from an arbitration agreement on those grounds alone. ”).  Likewise, case law dictates that neither [...] nor [...] can be faulted for failing to ask Plaintiff if she understood the terms of the MAA or whether she wished to consult an attorney about the same.  Goffe v. Foulke Mgmt. Corp., 238 N.J. 191, 212 (2019) (“[T]he argument that [a] plaintiff did not understand the import of the arbitration agreement and did not have it explained to her by the [employer] is simply inadequate to avoid enforcement of [the] clear and conspicuous arbitration agreement[] that [she] signed. ”); Stelluti v. Casapenn Enters., 203 N.J. 286, 305 (2010) (“When a party enters into a signed, written contract, that party is presumed to understand and assent to its terms unless fraudulent conduct is suspected.
[brief] (11T169-9 to 13; Sa2 at 11:04:50 to 11:05:08; Da71).  Defendant quickly asked whether his charges would “go away” if he told the detectives what he knew.  (11T170-10 to 19; Sa2 at 11:05:39 to 11:05:51; Da72 to 73).  [...] responded by informing defendant that any statement would not instantly change his charges, but that the truth could help lead the investigators to other defendants in the case.  (11T170-21 to 171-4; Sa2 at 11:05:58 to 11:06:19; Da73).  [...] summarized: “I can’t make any promises ... but all I can say is the truth is what it is and the truth can only help your case. ”  (11T171-4 to 6; Sa2 at 11:06:19 to 11:06:29; Da73).  A few minutes later, when defendant responded with an offer to testify against other defendants if [...] “[p]ut it in writing that I get to leave today and just go free,” [...] reminded him multiple times that he could not make promises, but that “cooperation gives you consideration. ” (11T188-23 to 189-22; 11T192-14 to 18; Sa2 at 11:21:40 to 11:24:18; Da94 to Da95; Da99).  Moments after, defendant again sought a deal: “[I]f you want the fucking truth, I’m telling you two that I’ll give you the fucking truth.  It goes away.  I go home. ” (11T193-8 to 13; Sa2 at 11:24:48 to 11:25:05; Da100).  [...] reiterated that it was “impossible” for him to offer defendant leniency in exchange for a statement.  (Sa2 at 11:25:37; Da101).  In response, defendant stated, “[w]ell I want a lawyer then. ” (Sa2 at 11:25:27 to 11:25:37; Da101).
[brief] Plaintiff argues once again that the Trial Court did not follow the standard applicable to a motion to dismiss under R. 4:6-2(e) set forth in the 1987 case *Printing Mart-Morristown v. Sharp Electronics Corporation*, 116 N.J. 739 ,746 (1987) that a reviewing court should search the “complaint in depth and with liberality to ascertain whether the fundament of a cause of action may be gleaned even from an obscure statement of claim” and considered facts outside of the pleading.  *Id.* at 746.  First, [...] was *not* deciding a Motion to Dismiss under R. 4:6-2(e) and therefore this case is completely irrelevant.
[brief] At the State’s request, all briefing on the instant PCR was suspended, pending decision by the Appellate Division.  (Da141).  In a July 15, 2022 per curiam decision, the Appellate Division “address[ed] the issue solely in the context of whether the habeas petition, along with the testimony of [...], the affidavits referenced in Tairi IV, and . . . the testimony of [...] combine[d] to meet the standards justifying a new trial based on newly discovered evidence. ”  (Da145)  (emphasis added).  This Court did not evaluate whether the State’s conduct constituted a Brady violation.  Finally, on June 22, 2023, the PCR Court denied [...]’s petition, finding that:  (1) [...]’s Brady and Strickland/Fritz claims were procedurally barred under Rule 3:22-4(b)(2)(B); (2) notwithstanding the procedural bar, [...] failed to demonstrate a prima facie Brady or Strickland/Fritz claim; and (3) [...]’s Jencks and Giglio claims were procedurally barred as they were raised for the first time in his reply brief, rather than in the original petition and original brief.
[brief] 5  A.  The [...]’s Affordable Housing Obligation .......................5  B.  The Property and the Borough’s “B-3 Zone” ........................................6  C. [...]’s First Application ......................................................7  D.  The Zoning Board Denies [...]’s First Application ...8 E. [...]’s Second Application ...............................................8 F. The Zoning Board Denies [...]’s Second Application ......................................................................................................................... 19 G. The Trial Court’s Decision ........................................................................20 LEGAL ARGUMENT ........................................................................................................... 22 POINT I STANDARD OF REVIEW ................................................................................................. 22 POINT II THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THAT 66 KINDERKAMACK DID NOT SATISFY THE POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE CRITERIA FOR A D(1) USE VARIANCE (Pa35-38) ................................................. 25 A. [...] Carried Its Burden Regarding the Positive Criteria (Pa35-38) ........................................................................................................... 27 B. [...] Carried Its Burden Regarding the Negative Criteria (Pa35-38) .............................................................................................................31 POINT III THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THAT 66 KINDERKAMACK DID NOT SATISFY THE POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE CRITERIA FOR THE D(4) FAR VARIANCE (Pa37-39)
[brief] STANDARD OF REVIEW  Plaintiffs’ discussion of the standard of review and citations to relevant cases properly presents the applicable arbitrary and capricious standard, the presumption of validity that attaches to board decisions, and the heavy burden of a party attacking a board decision to overcome that presumption of validity in light of the deference to be accorded to boards’ decisions.  Plaintiffs also properly discuss boards’ obligation to base their decisions on substantial credible evidence in the record, and the courts' duty to determine whether challenged decisions are supported by the evidence and follow proper statutory guidelines.  Plaintiffs do acknowledge that board decisions which are supported by substantial evidence in the record and reflect a correct application of the relevant principles of land use law are proper exercises of the discretion vested in boards that should not ordinarily be disturbed.  Plaintiffs’ citations in support of their recitation of these well-understood principles are accurate and do not need to be repeated.  Plaintiffs failed, however, to discuss that greater deference is accorded to denial of a variance than to a grant.  *Funeral Home Mgmt., Inc. v. Basralian*, 319 N.J. Super. 200, 208 (App.Div.1999).  Consequently, the deference to be accorded by the Court to the Board’s variance denial decision in this case should be even greater than if this case were a challenge to a variance approval.  II.
[brief] ”  (Id.)  The Estoppel Certificates  In response to [...]’s prior request to execute an estoppel certificate relative to the sale of the Property to [...], [...] provided an estoppel certificate dated June 7, 2022, that purported to disclose a default with respect to [...]’s obligations to provide [...] with parking as well as regarding a payment of a broker’s commission.  (Da323.)  [...] promptly forwarded the certificate to [...].  (Da342.)  In response, in a letter dated July 1, 2022, [...]’s counsel purported to cancel the PSA.  (Da332-334.)  The grounds for canceling the PSA were (i) the fact that the estoppel certificate alleged that [...] was in breach of the lease for failing to provide necessary parking, and (ii) as an alternative, that the execution of the Settlement Agreement with [...] constituted an amendment of the lease with [...] in breach of the PSA.  (Da333.)  [...] promptly reached out to [...] and pointed out that the items set forth as purported defaults in the estoppel certificate were in fact not defaults, and that [...] was required to provide a compliant estoppel certificate pursuant to its lease.  (Da342.)  In response, on August 12, 2023, [...] duly forwarded a new estoppel certificate which confirmed that it was unaware of any defaults under the lease.  (Da336-337.)  A copy of the certificate was promptly forwarded to [...].  (Da342.)  However, [...] had already decided that it had no interest in consummating the purchase under the PSA because some of its mortgage funding had fallen through (although the PSA had no mortgage contingency).
[brief] 1.  By way of Complaint, the Plaintiff/Appellant alleges that his civil rights were violated by Officers [...], [...], [...] and [...] of the [...] for their involvement in an investigation of an alleged assault that occurred on March 13, 2016, following an incident with an individual by the name of [...] at the [...] in [...].  According to the complaint, the Plaintiff/Appellant was charged by the [...] with aggravated assault and subsequently indicated by a [...].  The matter proceeded to trial without a jury and on June 6, 2017, the Honorable [...], J.S.C. found the Plaintiff/Appellant not guilty on all charges.  (Pa 004-Pa029).  2.  The Plaintiff/Appellant initiated suit first in Federal Court on July 1, 2019.  (Pa 110-Pa122).  3.  On March 7, 2024, the Honorable [...], U.S.D.J. dismissed the Plaintiff/Appellant's Federal Court complaint on the grounds that he did not file the same within the applicable two year statute of limitations.  As an aside, it should be noted that while Judge Castner’s Order dismissed Plaintiff/Appellant's Federal causes of action, it did not dismiss the Plaintiff/Appellant's State Court causes of action.  (Pa110-Pa122).  4.  Plaintiff/Appellant subsequently filed on April 11, 2024, the identical Complaint in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Somerset County.  (Pa004-Pa029).  5.  On August 16, 2024, the Honorable [...], J.S.C. dismissed the Plaintiff/Appellant's State Court actions on the identical grounds, i.e., statute of limitations.  (Pa002).  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I THE HONORABLE JOHN E. BRUDER, J.S.C. PROPERLY DISMISSED THE PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT'S STATE COURT CAUSE OF ACTION FOR FAILING TO COMPLY WITH THE APPLICABLE TWO YEAR STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.
[brief] (2T30:4-31:7).  After publishing those photographs to the jury, the prosecutor asked, “based on your investigations and following your interview with [the victim], what did you do next?” (2T32:8-10).  [...] noted he attempted to look for the suspect, and when asked “did you identify who that suspect was,” he identified defendant.  (2T32:11-24).  [...] did relay that “I took a few statements from witnesses,” which defendant argues implied “that all of the out-of-court declarants had identified [defendant] as the shooter. ” (Db9).  However, this single part of the detective’s testimony did not create an “inescapable inference” that an unavailable source had implicated the defendant.  As the Court in Medina aptly noted, the question that the court must determine is, “whether a jury would likely be compelled by a lack of record evidence to infer from the officer's use of the phrase that the officer ‘possesses superior knowledge, outside the record, that incriminates the defendant.
[brief] Walker, 209 N.J. at 132 (quoting Rendine 141 N.J. at 335).  This Court has made clear that an “unquestioning acceptance of all plaintiff’s requested attorney’s fees” is error, and when there is a “lack of critical analysis of counsel's fee request … the judge's assessment of the reasonableness of the hours expended cannot be given weight and hence is not entitled to any deferential treatment. ”  Yueh v. Yueh, 329 N.J. Super. 447, 467-68 (App. Div. 2000) (emphasis added).  Here, the Chancery Court’s oral decision clearly lacks any careful or critical evaluation.
[brief] Here, Plaintiff’s malicious prosecution-related claims easily fall into the sphere of Heck because his allegations arise from the use of false testimony in a criminal proceeding.  (Compl. ¶¶ 23, 24, 35.).  Insofar as Plaintiff’s claims are analogous to the tort of malicious prosecution, the accrual date will be the date the violation of probation charge “ended without a conviction.
[directive] This Executive Directive is intended to ensure the uniform and aggressive enforcement of every provision of the Comprehensive Drug Reform Act, while also ensuring strict compliance with the underlying principles embodied in Directive 5.10 of the Statewide Action Plan for Narcotics Enforcement (SNAP), which provides that:  It shall be the policy of this State that no law enforcement activity or operation shall interfere with school substance abuse counselling and education initiatives.  Accordingly, all undercover, surveillance and "clean sweep" narcotics operations taking place on school property shall be coordinated and approved by either the county prosecutor or the Attorney General.  In the absence of compelling or exigent circumstances, no such operation shall be conducted in or on school property unless the appropriate school authorities have first been consulted.  Such operations should not be undertaken without giving due consideration to their impact on the educational environment, existing substance abuse counselling programs and the relationships between school authorities, the law enforcement community and the student population.  The provisions of this Executive Directive are intended to direct law enforcement as to the manner in which all operations and activities directly affecting schools are to be conducted.
[brief] **Nothing in the record suggests that that ordinance was “pursuant to” or “in implementation of” any plan for the redevelopment of the property. **  Rather, it seems to have wholly disregarded the fact that the property had already been declared blighted and predates the adoption of the first redevelopment plan for either [...] or the entire [...] area of which [...] is a part.  Pa213 [emphasis added].  The [...] and [...] opinions, while unpublished, represent the actual application of the legal tenets of [...].
[brief] The Board’s role in the redevelopment plan adoption process is narrow in scope under the Local Redevelopment and Housing Law, N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-1, et seq.  Specifically, N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-7.e provides:  Prior to the adoption of a redevelopment plan, or revision or amendment thereto, the planning board shall transmit to the governing body, within 45 days after referral, a report containing its recommendation concerning the redevelopment plan.  This report shall include an identification of any provisions in the proposed redevelopment plan which are inconsistent with the master plan and recommendations concerning these inconsistencies and any other matters as the board deems appropriate.  The governing body, when considering the adoption of a redevelopment plan or revision or amendment thereof, shall review the report of the planning board and may approve or disapprove or change any recommendation by a vote of a majority of its full authorized membership and shall record in its minutes the reasons for not following the recommendations.  Failure of the planning board to transmit its report within the required 45 days shall relieve the governing body from the requirements of this subsection with regard to the pertinent proposed redevelopment plan or revision or amendment thereof.  Nothing in this subsection shall diminish the applicability of the provisions of subsection d. of this section with respect to any redevelopment plan or revision or amendment thereof.  [...], adopting the challenged Redevelopment Plan in question was introduced on September 8, 2022.
[directive] Public employees convicted of certain offenses and crimes are subject to the forfeiture of their public office or employment under the provisions of N.J.S.A. 2C: offense1 51 -2.  Forfeiture of public office is mandated for a conviction of any that involves dishonesty or any offense that touches upon the defendant’s office, or for a conviction for any crime of the third degree or greater.  N.J.S.A. 2C:51-2(a)(1); 2C:51-2(a)(2).  Forfeiture of office is also required if the Constitution or a non- criminal code statute mandates forfeiture.  N.J.S.A. 2C: 51-2(a)(3).  Further, in cases where the offense touched the defendant’s public office, a permanent bar to any future government employment is also required.  N.J.S.A. 2C: 51-2 d.  Under N.J.S.A. 2C: 51-2 (b)(1), forfeiture of office should be immediate upon a finding of guilt by the trier of fact or where the defendant entered a guilty plea to one of the offenses or crimes mentioned above.  This section also provides for the possibility of the granting of a stay where the defendant makes a showing of good cause and the stay can extend to a hearing on the merits concerning forfeiture of office at the time of sentencing.  The showing of good cause is restricted by the provisions of N.J.S.A. 2C: 51-2(c) and specifically prohibits a court from granting a stay of the order of forfeiture pending appeal of a conviction or appeal of the forfeiture of office order “unless the court is clearly convinced that there is a substantial likelihood of success on the merits. ”  In practice, forfeiture of office upon conviction occurs in three ways.  The first method is when a prosecutor immediately moves for forfeiture of office upon conviction.  N.J.S.A. 2C: 51-2(b)(1).  The second method is when the forfeiture is based upon a conviction of an offense in another state or of the United States and the county prosecutor or the Attorney General makes an application to order forfeiture of public office.  N.J.S.A. 2C:51-2(b)(2).  The third method of forfeiture of office occurs when the issue of forfeiture has not been raised at the time of the 1An offense is defined under N.J.S.A 2C:1-4 to include petty disorderly and disorderly persons offenses with maximum sentences under 6 months.  Offenses that subject the defendant to terms of imprisonment greater than 6 months constitute a crime.  1 finding of guilt and the courts may order forfeiture after application has been made by the Attorney General, county prosecutor or the defendant’s public 2 employer.  N.J.S.A. 2C: 51-2(g).  Even in the absence of a court order, the appointing authority has the power to remove the defendant from public office.  Under the statute, waiver of forfeiture of office is permitted in cases where a defendant is convicted of either a petty disorderly or a disorderly persons offense that involves dishonesty or that has touched his public office.