ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] | Party | % Responsibility | Time “on the risk” | Damages per year | |----------|------------------|----------------------|------------------| | [...] | 37.89% | 6 years, 4 months | $777,531.10 | | [...] | 25.84% | 3 years | $1,104,947. 00 | | [...] | 36.27% | 30 years\(^3\) | $155,091.50 |  The SAM cited no law, fact, or testimony in holding that these disproportionate figures represented an appropriate and accurate allocation of damages in this case.  (Pa0158.)  The SAM held that almost ten times more property damage had occurred per year in the [...] policy period, than in the [...] period, without providing any basis for this holding.  In reaching this determination, the SAM departed from his initial, correct statement that fact-based allocation should only be applied when “possible,” and instead stated – incorrectly – that “fact-based allocation [is] required by --- \(^3\) The [...] Period represents the policy periods of insurers with whom [...] settled prior to the issuance of the R&R (Pa0149), as well as the periods of time in which [...] failed to obtain pollution liability coverage in the marketplace.  (Pb27 at fn. 15).  Massachusetts law. ” (Pa0158.)  But, as there were no facts to base his conclusions on, his determinations were not even “fact-based”.
[brief] ”).  Plaintiff did not make that showing here, and the Trial Court’s conclusory finding that “[...]’s --- 5  The two [...] partners who were served with the FAC in New Jersey are also not “general partners” of [...], as contemplated by Rule 4:4–4(a)(5); [...] is a limited liability partnership and has no general partners.  6  Several courts have held that “tag” or “transient” jurisdiction does not extend to corporate defendants at all.  See, e.g., Martinez v. Aero Caribbean, 764 F.3d 1062, 1064 (9th Cir. 2014) (“Burnham does not apply to corporations. ”); Sokolow v. Palestine Liberation Org., 607 F. Supp. 3d 323, 327 (S.D.N.Y. 2022) (“Burnham’s tag jurisdiction theory only applies to individuals. ”); see also Mallory v. Norfolk Southern Railway Co., 600 U.S. 122, 128 (2023) (“tag” or “transient” jurisdiction “applies to natural persons”).  presence within the state of New Jersey is . . . so continuous and systematic as to render the Defendants at home in the forum state,” Da13, is irreconcilable, as explained below, with the governing “at home” standard.  See infra Point I(B).
[brief] This Court was previously asked to weigh in on whether plaintiffs’ claim of negligent training and supervision should go to a jury and the answer was yes.  This Court’s decision reversing the trial court’s summary judgment ruling in favor of Lowe’s on this issue (Pa7) stated in part:  “It was for the jury, not the judge, to determine whether Lowe’s failed to train and supervise [...] properly, and, if so, whether that failure was a substantial factor in causing the harm at issue in this case. ” (Pa26).  Since then, nothing has changed.  This Court actually quoted the G.A.-H. opinion and stated that “to prove negligent supervision or training, a plaintiff ‘must prove that (1) an employer knew or had reason to know that the failure to supervise or train an employee in a certain way would create a risk of harm and (2) that that risk of harm materializes and causes the plaintiff’s damages. ’” (Pa25, citing G.A.-H., supra, at 415).  G.A.-H. actually distinguishes negligent hiring from negligent training and supervision and specifies the elements needed to establish each.  Under G.A.-H., only negligent hiring requires a showing of dangerous attributes of which the employer should have been aware.  *Ibid.*, at 416.  By contrast, negligent training and supervision requires an examination of the training and supervision which the employer provided.  *Ibid.*  This Court recognized this distinction in its opinion the last time.  There is nothing in this Court’s earlier ruling that requires a showing of dangerous attributes.  Negligent hiring and dangerous attributes were not even addressed.  In sending the case back for trial, this Court stated:  "Viewing the facts in a light most favorable to plaintiffs, a reasonable factfinder could conclude Lowe’s knew of the importance of training new customer service associates to interact with customers, including unhappy customers questioning whether the customer service associate knew what he was doing, to ensure a ‘positive customer experience’ and of pairing a new customer service associate with an experienced associate while still in training.  Yet, despite that, and contrary to industry standards, Lowe’s assigned [...] to work alone and unsupervised in the department before he had completed his training.
[brief] Expert opinion must be grounded in “facts or data derived from (1) the expert’s personal observations, or (2) evidence admitted at trial, or (3) data relied upon by the expert, which is not necessarily admissible in evidence, but which is the type of data normally relied upon by experts.  Townsend, supra, 221 N.J. at 53.  “The net opinion rule is a corollary of N.J.R.E. 703 * * * which forbids the admission into evidence of an expert’s conclusions that are not supported by factual evidence or other data. ”  Id. at 53-54.  An expert’s proposed testimony should not be excluded merely because it fails to account for some particular condition or fact that the adversary considers relevant.  Id. at 54.  In defect/warnings cases, establishing that the absence of a warning was a substantial factor in the harm alleged to have resulted from exposure to the product is particularly difficult.  Coffman, supra, 133 N.J. at 598-600.  A rule requiring proof that a warning would have been heeded undermines “the purpose of strict tort liability since any such testimony would be speculative at best. ”  Id. at 599; see Nissen Trampoline Co. v. Terre Haute First Nat’l Bank, 332 N.E. 2d 820, 826-27 (Ind. Ct. App. 1975) (holding that heeding presumption would discourage manufacturers who would rather risk liability than provide a warning which would impair the marketability of the product) (cited with approval in Coffman).  With respect to the issue of product-defect causation in a product-liability case sounding in warning defect or failure to warn, the plaintiff is afforded a “heeding presumption” that he or she would have followed an adequate warning had one been provided, and, to rebut that presumption, the defendant must produce affirmative evidence that such a warning would not have been heeded.  Coffman, supra, 133 N.J. at 602-603.  Otherwise, a plaintiff would be forced to prove that which a defendant’s malfeasance did not allow to come to pass.
[brief] Da36, ¶ 106.  Upon information and belief, [...] has made similar statements to at least one client of Plaintiff and/or [...] Law.  Da36, ¶ 107.  Several of Plaintiff’s clients have nonetheless contacted him seeking information about his status with the firm, and have stated that based on communications from [...], they “thought something happened” to Plaintiff or that “he was dead. ”  Id., ¶ 108.  Several clients have stated to Plaintiff that they felt, based on communications from Defendants, that they had no choice but to remain with [...] Law and were advised by [...] that keeping their cases with Plaintiff would “delay their case”.  Id., ¶ 109.  Some of these same clients have indicated their desire to keep their cases with Plaintiff.  Id., ¶ 110.  Additional facts in support of each separate count are set forth in detail in the 218 paragraph First Amended Verified Complaint.
[brief] \(^{12}\)[...]’s testimony left no doubt as to the malice that she and her family had for the Plaintiff.  13T84:23-86:3 (“Because I don’t like him, and my husband don’t like him either, and we don’t like our son and daughter to contact with him, so it is only my husband to contact with him. ”); 13T88:2-12 (“That is all managed by my husband and [...] because I don’t like him.  I have no contact with him. ”)  CONCLUSION
[brief] *Ibid.*  The ALJ also considered [...]’ claim that he should take an adverse inference against the Department for failing to question [...] about the incident on August 16, 2019.  *Ibid.*  [...] claimed that [...]’s testimony confirmed [...] conducted at least one inmate count for [...] during his shift.  *Ibid.*  [...] contended that, in these circumstances, an adverse inference may be drawn from failure the State’s failure to question [...] about that shift.  *Ibid.*  The ALJ, however, determined [...]’s testimony shows that [...] worked during this shift but only performed inmate counts that night when the responsible officer was on a break.  *Ibid.*  Therefore, at most, [...] may have performed one or two of [...]’ counts that shift.  *Ibid.*  Additionally, the ALJ noted the issue in this matter is whether [...] conducted his inmate counts that he wrote in his logbook for 2:00 a.m., 2:30 a.m., 3:00 a.m., 3:30 a.m., 4:00 a.m., and 4:30 a.m., making [...]’ argument ultimately irrelevant.
[directive] A copy of each of the above Standard (Refusal) Statements is attached to this Guideline.  Copies can also be found, in an Adobe (.pdf) format, on the Division of Criminal Justice internet web site at www.njdcj.org or www.state.nj.us/lps/dcj, under the heading Attorney General Guidelines, DWI Enforcement, “NJ MVC Standard Refusal Statements. ”
[brief] ”  Assembly Appropriations Committee, Statement to A.2100 (Jan. 30, 1996) (Pra1.)  The legislative history explains “the bill changes the Legislative Budget and Finance Officer’s response time to a fiscal note sent by the director from ‘10 business days’ to ‘a date consistent with legislative consideration. ’”  Id. (Pra1-3.)  In fact, the statute anticipates that the fiscal statement be returned to the bill sponsor who may object to the findings that are available to the legislators and public.
[brief] The opinion includes a scholarly discussion of how to interpret the words of the exemption according to canons of construction.  *Id.* at 10-22.  But it did not stop there.  It proceeded to a robust discussion of the --- \(^4\) [...] says it has nearly completed construction of the proposed regulator.  We note that in *Compressor Station* the applicant had also begun construction, and the court noted that this was “at [the applicant’s] own risk, of course.  Slip op. at 8, fn.8; Hra8.  The same would be true here; [...]’s application for a stay was denied by this court.  purposes and history of the Highlands Act.  So here must this court give meaningful consideration to the consistent, repeated expressions of the Legislature that use and consumption of natural gas and other fossil fuels must be reduced and phased out.
[brief] Garcia, 245 N.J. at 436.  When determining whether prosecutorial misconduct warrants reversal, appellate courts should evaluate (1) whether defense counsel made timely and proper objections to the improper remarks, (2) whether the remarks were withdrawn promptly, and (3) whether the court ordered the remarks stricken from the record and instructed the jury to disregard them.  Jones, 364 N.J. Super. at 384.  In this vein, our courts have made clear that “[p]rosecutors should not make inaccurate legal or factual assertions during a trial. ”  State v. Frost, 158 N.J. 76, 85 (1999); see also State v. Whitaker, 402 N.J. Super. 495, 515 (App. Div. 2008) (holding inaccurate statements about accomplice liability were reversible error).  “[Prosecutors] are duty-bound to confine their comments to facts revealed during the trial and reasonable inferences to be drawn from that evidence. ”  Ibid.  By way of example, in State v. Rivera, 437 N.J. Super. 434 (App. Div. 2014), a defendant was on trial for attempted murder and had claimed self-defense.  Id. at 441-42.  During summation, the State used a PowerPoint presentation that had statements about the law of self-defense that were, in this Court’s view, “so oversimplified as to be misleading. ”  Id. at 463.  The phrases included: “CANNOT BRING A KNIFE TO A FIST FIGHT,” “NO SELF-DEFENSE TO USE DEADLY FORCE” repeated several times, and “CANNOT KILL AS FIRST CHOICE. ”  *Id.* at 464.  This Court found that, although the judge properly instructed the jury on the law, the prosecutor’s confusing and misleading statements about the defendant’s primary argument sufficiently undermined the integrity of the verdict to require reversal.  *Ibid.*
[brief] Since Plaintiff suffered permanent injuries, Plaintiff’s counsel naturally focused the jury’s attention on Plaintiff’s life expectancy (4T, at 194:21-194:2).  For a 40-year old like Plaintiff, life expectancy was calculated at 40.5 years (4T, at 194:21-194:2).  To expound upon this argument, Plaintiff’s counsel showed the jury how 40.5 years extrapolated into days (4T, at 194:3-8).  Defense counsel objected to this presentation on grounds that Plaintiff’s counsel never indicated their intent to make a time-unit argument (4T, at 194:10-14).  Plaintiff’s counsel immediately responded that it was included in their pretrial submission, and that it was their belief that the charge was included for use at trial (4T, at 194:15-16).  [...] noted that the parties did not discuss the time-unit rule during the charge conference, but that “it might have been my mistake of not including it when it’s requested.
[brief] (Pa000478).  Attached to this certification were invoices showing that [...] had incurred $89,072.19 in attorneys’ fees since June 29, 2022 (when Plaintiffs were first served the safe harbor letter).  (Pa000482; Pa000490-556).  In the certification, [...], lead counsel [...] in this matter, confirmed that he personally reviewed each invoice and deducted “any time and expense [believed] to be inefficient or excessive. ” (Pa000479 at ¶ 4).  After this, the [...], [...]’s insurance company who pays the invoices, performed a second review of the invoices and made any further deductions deemed necessary.  (Id. at ¶ 5).  This double-review process was brought to the trial court’s attention so it could “consider any reductions [as] part of the overall reasonableness of the fee request. ” (Id. at ¶ 6).  The certification also pointed out that [...] personally spent $25,000 of its own money, in the form of a deductible, towards the defense of this frivolous claim.  (Id. at ¶ 24).  Plaintiffs opposed this amount on the basis that it was unreasonable.  (Pa000637).  In its December 5, 2023 written decision granting only partial fees, the trial court essentially adopted Plaintiffs’ opposition arguments without conducting a thorough analysis of the invoices attached to [...]’s certification.
[brief] During the argument, counsel for [...] referred to accountings.  (1T:18:18-25).  However, [...] made the point that, with respect to an accounting, who would pay for it?  [...] did not have to pay for the same.  (1T:19:7-9).  In addition, [...] had accountings which were available to everyone on a monthly basis.  These were P&Ls.  (1T:19:10-13).  [...] had statements done in-house because [...] did not have the money to do the same, or hire someone to do it.  (1T:19:14-17).  The point was that [...] had the data for everyone’s use, which could have been viewed by [...].  Under the circumstances, there was nothing left for [...] to do.
[brief] Statement of the Facts  The genesis of this case was the plaintiff’s March 29, 2019 knee replacement surgery.  (See, Pa1-7; 15-20)  Plaintiff has alleged experiencing negative effects from that surgery.  (Id.)  She has also asserted that those negative outcomes were the result of alleged medical malpractice by, *inter alia*, [...].  (Id.)  Plaintiff filed a complaint on March 23, 2021 and an amended complaint on August 18, 2021.  (Id.)  During discovery, [...] moved twice to strike plaintiff’s complaint for failure to provide discovery.  (Pa54-56; Motion filed July 19, 2022)  The first motion resulted in an order striking the complaint without prejudice and a motion to strike the complaint with prejudice was pending when Plaintiff finally answered interrogatories.  (Pa77; Withdrawal of Motion filed on August 24, 2022)  The case proceeded through discovery yet plaintiff never produce an expert report critical of [...].  As a result, after the discovery end date, [...] filed his motion requesting summary judgment in light of the fact that the Plaintiff did not produce an expert report against him.  (Pa101-104)  Plaintiff cross moved to reopen discovery and for an extension of discovery—by this point a trial date had been set—but failed to establish any exceptional circumstances warranting the reopening of discovery.  (Pa121-122)  Because there is no question that a lay jury would be unable to determine negligence in this medical malpractice action the absence of expert testimony, summary judgment was ordered.  (Pa121-122)  After two post-judgment motions seeking to put aside the summary judgment were denied, this appeal followed.  (Pa131-134; 144-167)
[brief] On April 17, 2018, Appellant filed a motion to enforce litigants rights seeking to force Respondents to pay him moneys he alleged [...] owed him.  One claimed expense was supposed internet expenses set forth in a Verizon bill attached as an exhibit to Appellant’s Certification.  While that motion was pending, on May 16, 2018, Respondents filed a motion to remove Appellant from his employ with [...] based on a series of newly discovered fraud, including that Appellant had doctored the Verizon invoice he certified to in an attempt to ‘seek litigant’s rights’ and force [...] to pay for the internet charges from his personal companies.  The return date of [...]’s motion was adjourned from July 6, 2018 at the request of counsel for Appellant.  On that adjourned return date, Appellant filed for Chapter 13 Bankruptcy protection, resulting in an automatic stay of the sanctions hearing.  On July 27, 2018, [...] terminated Appellant’s employment after noticing and holding a meeting (which Appellant declined to attend) on the issue of Appellant’s forged documents.  Appellant’s bankruptcy matter ultimately was dismissed by the Hon. [...], U.S.D.J., on December 17, 2018.  With the automatic stay lifted, Appellant filed a motion to enforce litigant’s rights seeking to have [...] sanctioned for terminating him.
[brief] ”  *Id.* at *11*, Pa446.  “Limiting a redevelopment entity to defraying its costs in the manner suggested by [the redeveloper] would substantially impede these entities from fulfilling their primary and salutary purpose of rejuvenating all areas in need of redevelopment throughout the municipality. ”  *Ibid.*, Pa446.  See also *Gillette Enters. v. Borough of Sayreville*, No. A-5838-10T1, 2012 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1181 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. May 29, 2012) (holding that redevelopment agency was authorized under *N.J.S.A.* 40A:12A-8(f) to require payment of annual redevelopment fee of $10,000 by redeveloper).  In this case, the City was statutorily authorized under *N.J.S.A.* 40A:12A-8(f) to negotiate the payment of a $2,000,000 fee to defray its costs.  As explained in *Genon*, the plain language of the LRHL amply demonstrates the Legislature’s intent to delegate broad power to the City to contract with designated redevelopers such as [...] without the constraints of any nexus requirement.
[brief] State v. Hartobey, [...] (App. Div. October 25, 2024) (slip op. at 7); (Pa 21).16  In finding that the --- 15 Pursuant to Rule 1:36-3, a copy of this unpublished opinion is included in the State’s appendix.  16  See supra note 15.  trial court provided adequate instructions to the jury consistent with the applicable model criminal jury charge, this Court noted that not “every word used in a charge must be further defined even when it has a readily and commonly understood meaning. ” (Slip op. at 12) (quoting State v. N.I., 349 N.J. Super.  299, 308 (App. Div. 2022); (Pa 23).  To be sure, “[c]ertain words can be understood by ‘a person of average intelligence’ and ‘would not send the average citizen scrambling for a dictionary. ’”  Id. at 308-09 (quoting State v. Afanador, 134 N.J. 162, 171 (1993)).  As such, “[w]ords ‘used by ordinary citizens in everyday conversation’ need not be defined. ”  Id. at 309 (quoting Afanador, 134 N.J. at 175).  . . .  “[C]ruelly” and “unnecessarily” required no further definition or clarification for the jury.  [(Slip op. at 12-13); (Pa 23). ]  As defendant’s constitutional challenges to the face and application of N.J.S.A. 4:22-24a(2) and N.J.S.A. 4:22-17c(3) are without merit, the trial court properly denied defendant’s motion to dismiss the complaint.
[brief] The only testimony offered on the balancing required by *Sica* came from [...]’s planner.  He offered uncontradicted testimony that there were significant benefits to the public good.  [6T 12-17 to 17-8].  He then confirmed that there were limited detriments associated with the project and explained, in detail, why he reached that conclusion.  [6T 17-10 to 67-13].  He further noted that the project had been revised on several occasions to account for concerns raised by the Board, and that [...] had stipulated to numerous conditions on the record to address those issues, which he believed were minor in scope, and that if there were additional concerns, [...] would mitigate them as well.  [6T 75-14 to 76-21].  Finally, he compared the positive aspects of the design against the negative impacts and concluded that not only was there not a substantial detriment to the public good nor a substantial impairment to the intent and purposes of the zone plan and zoning ordinance, but that the positive attributes of the project substantially outweighed any detriments.  [6T 76-21 to 77-14].  No witness contradicted [...]’ expert testimony.  The Resolution does not even reject [...]’ testimony.  All the Resolution did was brush [...]’ testimony aside and conclude, without foundation, that the benefits are minimal (they are not), the detriments substantial (they are not), and the Board was unable to mitigate the detriments associated with the project, and therefore, finds that the benefits do not outweigh the detriments.
[brief] The length of time from purchase – 1993, when all 11 units were occupied, until 2001 when [...] was the only remaining tenant also strongly implies that the investment was made in the first place for the sole purpose of converting the building to condominiums.  It appears that the landlord attempted to wait until the building was fully vacant prior to undertaking conversion by warehousing 10 rental units in direct violation of Hoboken’s anti-warehousing laws over the 8-year period from purchase to conversion.
[brief] [...] filed a Third-Party Complaint against [...], the primary claims of which allege a breach of the New Jersey Franchise Practices Act. \(^1\)  On January 13, 2023, [...] filed a Motion for Summary Judgment to dismiss Appellant’s third-party complaint in its entirety (“Motion for Summary Judgment”).  (Pa46).  [...] opposed the motion (Pa160) and the trial court heard lengthy oral argument on February 27, 2023, (T1) and again on March 27, 2023 (T2).  On March 27, 2023, the trial court issued its oral opinion and an Order granting [...]’s Motion for Summary Judgment thereby dismissing Appellant’s claims against [...] with prejudice.  (Pa6).  On the same date, the trial court denied as moot [...]’s Motion to Bar the Expert Opinion of [...] (“Motion to Bar”).  (Pa8).  On April 17, 2023, Appellant filed a Motion to Amend the March 27, 2023 Summary Judgment Order pursuant to Rule 4:49-2 (“Motion to Amend”).  (Pa732a).  The motion specifically stated that [...] was seeking to amend the trial court’s March 27, 2023 Order granting Third-Party Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment.  (Pa732a).  It did not include any reference to the March 27, 2023 Order on [...]’s Motion to Bar.  Again, the trial court conducted oral argument on two separate days.  \(^1\)  This case arises out of a Book Account Complaint filed on November 13, 2020, by Plaintiff [...], Assignee of [...] (“[...]”) against Defendant/Third-Party Plaintiff.