[brief] Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 473-74, clearly provides that if a defendant “indicates in any manner … during questioning, that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease. ”  See also State v. Hartley, 103 N.J. 252, 263 (1986).  When a defendant invokes his right to silence, it must be “scrupulously honored;” and the police may not simply continue with the questioning.  Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 103-04 (1975).  A valid waiver “cannot be established by showing only that the defendant responded to further police initiated custodial interrogation.  Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91 (1984)(quoting Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981)).  Moreover, “[i]f police are unsure whether a defendant is asserting his right to silence, they must either stop the interrogation completely or ‘ask only questions narrowly directed to determining whether defendant was willing to continue. ”  State v. Harvey, 151 N.J. 117, 121 (1997)(quoting State v. Johnson, 120 N.J. 263, 284 (1990)).  “The critical question is whether defendant’s words or conduct could reasonably be viewed as an assertion of his right to remain silent; if they could be, the officers were obligated to cease their questioning or limit their questions solely to clarify that issue. ”  *State v. Burno-Taylor*, 400 N.J. Super 581, 605-06 (App. Div. 2008).  A suspect is not required to express a desire to terminate the investigation with the “utmost of legal precision. ”  *State v. Bey (I)*, 112 N.J. 45, 65 (1988).  Instead, [a]ny words or conduct that reasonably appear to be inconsistent with defendant’s willingness to discuss his case with the police are tantamount to an invocation of the privilege against self-incrimination. ”  *State v. Bey (II)*, 112 N.J. 123, 136 (1988); see also *State v. Johnson*, 120 N.J. at 280-281 (199).  Here, when [...] is initially asked what happened, he says “I don’t want to tell you much. ” (7T:302-10 to 13).  [...] says “What’s that?” (7T:302-14).  [...] responds by saying “I wouldn’t say anything for the most part. ” (7T:302-19 to 20).  Instead of following *Johnson* and clarifying that ambiguous invocation of the right to remain silent by [...], [...] asked him the same question again and said, “Ok well, tell me what happened?”  120 N.J. at 283; (7T:302-21 to 22).  The statement “I won’t say anything for the most part” is susceptible for interpretation and could be construed that he did not wish to speak with the detectives at this time.  (7T:302-19 to 20).  The detectives never had [...] clarify if he was invoking his right to remain silent or whether he wished to continue speaking.  Similarly, when [...] asked [...] to explain what happened that night he said “Well, I mean, I don’t like to talk about it. ”  (7T:321-8 to 9).  “But – but just say, like, the rest is history pretty much. ” (7T:321-9 to 10).  Again, neither [...] nor [...] clarified whether [...] wished to continue speaking.  Instead, Detective [...] simply said “Tell us what happened, buddy. ” (7T:321-19 to 20).  A valid waiver “cannot be established by showing only that the defendant responded to further police initiated custodial interrogation. ”  Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. at 98.  Here, the detectives ignored his statement and asked him to tell them what happened for the second time.  (7T:321-8 to 20).  Because the detectives did not clarify whether [...] was invoking his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent and continued questioning him, his statement must be suppressed under Johnson and Miranda.