ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] In [...]’s case, it was virtually uncontested that he was suffering from some kind of mental health problems during the time of the incident.  As discussed in Point II of this brief, all parties understood that those issues would be a focal point at trial.  At sentencing, defense counsel noted how several witnesses testified about [...]’s mental health issues.  Defense counsel also provided the sentencing court with hospital records from the time [...] was briefly committed for those issues.  (11T46-19 to 47-8).  Likewise, in arguing for the application of mitigating factor four, defense counsel described how [...] had been receiving medication and mental health treatment while in prison (services he obviously would not be receiving if he did not in fact suffer from some kind of condition), and how those treatments seemed to be significantly improving his mental health and behavior.  (11T47-23 to 48-16).  In ultimately refusing to apply the factor, the trial court stated:  As far as mitigating factor 4, there are ground[s] tending to excuse or justify his conduct.  I don’t know what that could be.  The fact that he engaged in bizarre behavior, any of us could commit acts of bizarre behavior, it wouldn’t shield us from criminal liability.  And what sin did she commit, other than driving home with her high beams on, that set something off in this man’s mind.  So I do not find that mitigating factor 4 applies.  [(11T60-7 to 15).
[directive] General Principles  1.1  The first priority of the law enforcement officer or agency receiving an infant under the Act shall be 1.1.1 to ensure the safety and well-being of the infant.  All other procedures herein are subject to this priority.  Law enforcement officers or agencies should not delay taking action necessary to ensure the safety and well-being of the infant in order to complete the additional procedures outlined below.  The term “State, county or municipal police station” is not defined in the statute.  However, in order 1.1.2 to carry out the intent of this act, this should be read broadly to include Division of State Police barracks, Campus Police headquarters, community policing substations, or any other law enforcement facility.  No person attempting to deliver a child to a law enforcement facility should be turned away or directed to take the child to another law enforcement facility.  If a person attempts to deliver a child to an officer on patrol, or to a facility where it is impractical to complete the procedures outlined herein, the child shall be taken immediately to a hospital emergency room, either by the law enforcement officer, or an ambulance or first aid squad.  The decision of how to discretion.1 transport the child shall be within the law enforcement officer’s  In making this decision, the officer shall consider the physical condition of the infant, the availability of an infant car seat, and the potential need for haste in reaching the hospital.  Safe Haven Applicability Determination  1.2  A law enforcement officer should immediately make a visual assessment of the infant for readily 1.2.1 apparent signs of abuse or neglect.  Law enforcement officers are not obliged to remove the clothing of an otherwise apparently healthy infant in order to make this assessment.  If signs of abuse or neglect are present, the person delivering the infant to the law enforcement agency should be detained and the local Division of Youth and Family Services District Office should be contacted.  The Act does not provide a defense against child abuse or neglect prosecutions.  P.L. 2000, Ch. 58, §4e.  Under these circumstances, therefore, a child abuse or neglect investigation should be conducted in the normal course.  However, the Act does not automatically exclude an abused or neglected infant from being left for placement.  Consequently, the infant should be transported to a hospital, as described below.  The State Police Missing Persons Unit should be contacted if the infant cannot be identified during the course of the ensuing investigation.  1See § 1.3.5.
[brief] On December 9, 2022, Plaintiff filed a Verified Complaint in Foreclosure since foreclosure is a judicial remedy in New Jersey and the Arbitrator could not award foreclosure on a mortgage as a matter of law.  Da1; Da6.  On February 22, 2023, Plaintiff and Defendants jointly filed the Stipulation and Judgment Confirming Arbitration Award in the United States District Court of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania (No. [...]) (“First Stipulation Confirming Award”).
[brief] Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration (Pa416-Pa417) of the dismissal of his complaint was little more than a rehash of his earlier arguments in opposition to [...]’s motion to dismiss, and does not warrant significant discussion.  We note however, that plaintiff attempted to submit certain “video evidence” that could have been, but was not, submitted in opposition to [...]’s motion to dismiss.  That “video evidence” has now found its way to the record\(^6\) in this matter.  It remains the position of [...] that the 2016 “video evidence” was submitted \textit{in this case} for the first time on plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration, was rejected by the motion judge (2T.5-6, 2T.8-9), and is not properly before this Court.
[brief] 1  PROCEDURAL HISTORY ...............................................................................................................  2  STATEMENT OF FACTS  ..................................................................................................................  4 LEGAL ISSUES  .................................................................................................................................  9  POINT I THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING UNRELIABLE EXPERT TESTIMONY PURPORTING TO DETERMINE THAT THE GUN FOUND WHERE DEFENDANT WAS STAYING WAS THE ONE THAT FIRED THE SHOTS THAT KILLED THE VICTIM.
[brief] 15 U.S.C. Section 1601(a).  To achieve these goals, TILA contains a variety of mandatory disclosures that creditors must make to consumers both prior to the establishment of any legal obligations and at specified points in the creditor-consumer relationship.  Rossman v. Fleet Bank (R.I.) Nat’l Ass’n, 280 F.3d 384, 389 (3d Cir. 2002).  To violate a regulation that lawfully implements statutory requirements is to violate the statute.  Global Crossing Telecommunications, Inc. v. Metrophones Telecommunications, Inc., 550 U.S. 45, 54 (2007).  Cowen v. Bank United of Texas, FSB, 70 F.3d 937, 941 (7th Cir. 1995), states that “hypertechnicality reigns. ”  Congress imposed a severe punishment for violating TILA: a creditor who violates TILA may be subject to a criminal penalty.  15 U.S.C. Sections 1611 and 1692k.  In its Rider and Statement of Reasons of November 9, 2022, the lower Court stated: “Defendant’s opposition consists of bare legal conclusions that are entirely unsupported by affidavit or competent evidence.
[brief] Trial counsel’s lack of advocacy continued to starkly contrast with that of the State as the sentencing hearing, where the State presented hearsay victim impact testimony without objection and requested a term of 110 years with 98 years subject to NERA.  Defense counsel did not argue for a lower sentence to counter the State’s "lock him up and throw away the key" approach.  He offered minimal argument on two mitigating factors, and then concluded his remarks by "offering" his client for sentencing.  This lopsided advocacy resulted in a severe sentence that was grossly disparate to petitioner's similarly situated co-defendants, one of whom received a term of over half a century less.
[brief] Id. at 277-78.  In that case, “the rebuffed purchasers argued that the purpose of the attorney review clause was to permit consultation on technical terms and details and not to create an interval to accommodate a rethinking of the entire transaction or for the receipt of a better offer. ”  Levinson, 215 N.J. Super. at 277 (citing Trenta, 191 N.J. Super. at 621-622) (emphasis added).  The Levinson Court approved the following “treatment”:  Attorneys offer advice on a limitless range of matters.
[brief] ATTORNEY GENERAL OF NEW JERSEY  By: s/[...]  [...]  Deputy Attorney General  Dated: July 25, 2024  [...], [...], [...], [...], and [...], Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. [...] d/b/a [...], d/b/a [...], d/b/a [...], d/b/a [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], d/b/a [...], d/b/a [...], d/b/a [...], [...], [...], d/b/a [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...] [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], Defendants-Respondents.
[brief] **  Defendants argue generally that the “concept” of pay-when-able loans is not binding under New Jersey law.  Da21.  Other than arguing that no published Appellate Division cases “confirm” the concept of pay-when-able loans, Defendants fail completely to address the published opinion of *Denville Amusement Co. v. Fogelson*, 84 N.J. Super. 164, 169 (App. Div. 1964), and fail to demonstrate how the trial court’s careful analysis of all relevant case law, and its finding that New Jersey has never rejected the concept of pay-when-able loans, was in error. \(^{18}\)
[brief] 136, 140 (App. Div. 1960).  Stated another way, “[s]uch misconduct need not necessarily ‘be predicated upon the violation of any particular rule or regulation, but may be based merely upon the violation of the implicit standard of good behavior which devolves upon one who stands in the public eye as an upholder of that which is morally and legally correct’."  Jones Richardson v. [...], 2015 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 749, *12, OAL DKT. NO. [...]; AGENCY DKT. NO. [...] (December 22, 2015) quoting Hartmann v. Police Dep't of Ridgewood, 258 N.J. Super. 32, 40 (App. Div. 1992) and Asbury Park v. Department of Civil Services, 17 N.J. 419, 429 (1955).
[brief] ............................................................... 14, 15, 19 Luchejko v. City of Hoboken, 207 N.J. 191 (2011)  ...........................................................................8, 9  Mac Prop. Grp. LLC & The Cake Boutique LLC v. Selective Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 473 N.J. Super. 1 (App. Div. 2022), cert. denied sub nom.  MAC Prop. Grp. LLC v. Selective Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 252 N.J. 258 (2022), and cert. denied sub nom.  MAC Prop. Grp. LLC v. Selective Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 252 N.J. 261 (2022).  .............................................8  Macedo v. Dello Russo, 178 N.J. 340 (2004) ........................................................................ passim Malik v. Ruttenberg, 398 N.J. Super. 489 (App. Div. 2008)..................................................3  Manahawkin Convalescent v. O’Neill, 217 N.J. 99 (2014) ..............................................................................21  Mizrahi v. Allstate Ins.
[brief] The standard governing review of factual finding is different, requiring this Court to “uphold the trial court’s factual findings … ‘so long as those findings are supported by sufficient credible evidence in the record. ’”  State v. Hagans, 233 N.J. 30, 37 (2018)(quoting State v. Gamble, 218 N.J. 412, 424 (2014)); State v. S.S., 229 N.J. 360, 374 (2017).
[brief] See supra at 3.  Still, that has no bearing on the relief in this case, where the Amended Policy unlawfully subjects a protected class to discrimination in violation of the LAD; where N.J.S.A. 10:5-14.1 empowers courts to maintain the status quo to prevent future unlawful acts as the administrative proceeding remains pending; and where Appellants continue to claim that only blanket notification satisfies parental constitutional rights.
[directive] ATV Use on Public Roads  Similar to public lands, certain vehicle use is broadly prohibited on public roads.  Pursuant to New Jersey law, “[n]o person shall operate a snowmobile, all-terrain vehicle, or dirt bike upon highways8 limited access or within the right-of-way limits thereof. ”  N.J.S.A. 39:3C-17(a).  Additionally, “[n]o person shall operate a snowmobile, all-terrain vehicle, or dirt bike upon the main traveled portion or the plowed snowbanks of any public street or highway or within the right- of-way limits thereof.  . . .”  N.J.S.A. 39:3C-17(b).  Further, individuals are not permitted “to operate a snowmobile, all-terrain vehicle, or dirt bike upon [any] railroad or right-of-way of an operating railroad. ”  N.J.S.A. 39:3C-19(f).  Further, counties and municipalities may have similar local ordinances or regulations limiting the use of ATVs, snowmobiles, and dirt bikes on public roads.  Municipalities should also consider utilizing N.J.S.A. 39:3C-35(e) for unlawful ATV or dirt bike use on public roads.
[brief] Our Supreme Court has long applied the hearsay rule and Confrontation Clause “to protect criminal defendants from the incriminating statements of a faceless accuser who remains in the shadows and avoids the light of court. ”  Medina, 242 N.J. at 413.  “When the logical implication to be drawn from the testimony leads the jury to believe that a non-testifying witness has given the police evidence of the accused’s guilt, the testimony should be disallowed as hearsay. ”  Bankston, 63 N.J. at 271.  In Bankston, a detective testified that he and other officers approached the defendant because an informer told them an individual wearing certain clothing was at a tavern and was in possession of drugs.  Id. at 266-67.  Even without a specific reference to what the informant said, the Court found that the logical inference of the testimony was that he had provided the police with evidence of defendant's guilt, and therefore, reversed the conviction.
[brief] The trial court went further:  . . .  Um, at some point while outside he claims that he woke up on the ground, and I think we -- we for the purpose of this motion again, we are accepting as true that the Plaintiff, um, fell at some point for -- and -- and putting aside what the cause may have been -- fell and sustained an injury, hit his head.  There’s no doubt there was a gash on his head and that he sustained a significant injury because he went to the hospital where he had a hematoma, you know.  He had a significant injury as a result of this fall.  (T37:19-25; T38:1-4)
[brief] (Pa16).  At that same October 27, 2022 meeting, the Committee introduced Ordinance 2022-17, amending Ordinance 2022-15, and specifically providing reasoning as to why the Committee intended to move forward with the Redevelopment Plan whether or not the Redevelopment Plan was consistent with the Master Plan.  (Pa51).  Ordinance 2022-17 was then referred to the Board.
[brief] 16  LEGAL ARGUMENT ..................................................................................................................  17  POINT ONE ..................................................................................................................................  17  This Court Should Reverse Because Defendant’s Rights Under the Confrontation Clause Were Violated.  (Da17; Da43-44.)  .................................................................17  POINT TWO .................................................................................................................................  21  The De Novo Court Demonstrated Bias By Inquiring Into Matters that Exceeded the Scope of the Hearing.  (Da17, Da43-44.)  .................................................................21  POINT THREE ............................................................................................................................  25  The De Novo Court Erred in Denying Defendant’s Request for an Adverse Inference.  (Da18).  .......................................................................................................................25
[brief] BECAUSE THE PARTIES ENTERED INTO A VALID AND ENFORCEABLE ANTENUPTIAL AGREEMENT, THE PETITIONER IS NOT ENTITLED TO AN ELECTIVE SHARE UNDER N.J.S.A. 3B:8-1.  Together with the Will, the Antenuptial Agreement ("Agreement") signed and executed by the parties in October 1992 is valid and enforceable.  Because (1) compelling evidence shows that the Petitioner destroyed the original, and because (2) the rules of evidence permit the use of a copy as admissible and competent evidence, the fact that original is missing fails to support the Petitioner’s position.  As a result of the signing of the Agreement, the Petitioner waived his right to an elective share under N.J.S.A. 3B:8-1.  A.
[directive] Time: 35 seconds.  5 rounds.  Point Shoulder Position.  •  On command, with shotgun in an empty, safe condition and action open, combat load 1 round, close action and load 2 rounds into the magazine.  •  Assume point shoulder position; fire 3 rounds, keeping the action open after firing the third round.  •  Combat load 1 round, close the action and load 1 round into the magazine.  •  Assume point shoulder position; fire 2 rounds.  ---STOP TIME--- •  Place weapon in safe condition with the action open and the safety on.  ---END OF COURSE--- 9-51
[directive] (1)  Identify the defendant by name to the summoned person, and confirm that the summoned person has arrived to transport or accompany the named defendant.  (2)  Inform the summoned person that the defendant has been arrested, and the specific violations with which the defendant has been charged.  The law enforcement officer should use the statutory reference for each violation, as well as a plain language description for each charge.  (3)  Ask the summoned person for some form of positive, and verifiable, identification.  It is not required or necessary to make a copy of the identification provided, that decision is left to the determination of each law enforcement agency.  If the summoned person refuses to appropriately identify himself or herself to the law enforcement officer, then the defendant should not to be permitted to leave with that person.  In that circumstance, the defendant may elect to contact another person to transport or accompany him or her.  -4-
[brief] Returning again to the jury charge, the judge correctly instructed the jurors that for them to find that either defendant had been guilty of conspiracy, the State would have to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that “it was his conscious object or purpose to promote or make it easier to commit the crime. ”  (16T 161-7 to 13)  (Emphasis added)  Since the record contained no evidence that [...] had done anything whatsoever to promote or make it easier for [...] to commit the crime – or anything at all other than remain in the passenger seat - there was no basis for the jurors to conclude that it had been his conscious object or purpose to do so.
[brief] The application sought two (2) design waivers; one from providing radial lot-lines pursuant to UDO § 18-805(c), and the other from providing street trees along the entirety of the Fourteenth Street frontage pursuant to UDO § 18-803(d), both located in the “Design Standards” section of the UDO.  (Ia213)  It must be understood that these design waivers are governed by the UDO.  UDO § 18-805 (c) governs the lot line waiver, and says the following, “Insofar as is practical, side lot lines shall be at right angles to straight streets and radial to curved streets. ”  As such, the lot line waiver is governed, not by hardship, but by practicality.  Practicality that, as will be explained below, has been proven by the Plaintiff’s expert testimony, as well as the comments from the Board’s own professionals.  Interestingly, the Intervenor’s own brief recognizes this standard on page 8-9, by their citation of UDO § 18-805(c).  As such, the Intervenor’s notations regarding the development regulations of [...] and [...] are wholly irrelevant.  The applicable regulations are those of [...]’s, and as such, only those of [...] matter.  It must be further understood that while the design waivers were properly proven, the application was conforming to all bulk requirements of the UDO in every other way, aside from the two waivers.
[brief] Appellants’ reliance on 62-64 Main Street LLC v. Mayor, 221 N.J. 129, 158 (2015), is also misplaced.  The issue in 62-64 Main Street was “whether the designation of plaintiffs’ properties as part of an area in need of redevelopment under N.J.S.A. 40A:12-5(a), (b) and (d) [of the LRHL] conforms to the Blighted Areas Clause of the New Jersey Constitution. ”  Id. at 144.  By Appellants own concession, designation is not an issue in this lawsuit, and Section 5 of the LRLH has no relevance to the adoption of a redevelopment plan under Section 7.  62-64 Main Street did not even address a redevelopment plan, or the Section 7 standards applicable to a redevelopment plan approval at all.  Appellants ignore the fact that Section 7 of the LRHL explicitly permits a redevelopment plan to include “an area in need of redevelopment or in an area in need of rehabilitation, or in both[.]”
[brief] [N]either the contract nor the statute provides what [...] would like us to infer into the contract: that because the policy's one-year requirement is void, the two-year minimum that Indiana Code section 27-1-13-17 requires for an insurance policy creates a two-year statute of limitations when the statutory minimum voids a contractual time requirement.  The contract could have said that a claim must be filed within one year or within the applicable minimum time requirement allowed by state law, but it did not.  The legislature could have said that if a policy provides a time requirement of less than two years, a two-year requirement will be substituted, but it did not.  In other words, we agree with [...] that, pursuant to the policy's provision requiring conformity with state law where a policy provision is in conflict with state law, the statutory default applies.  However, we find Indiana Code section 27-1-13-17 is unambiguous and does not provide a two-year default statute of limitations.  It merely provides that an insurance policy requiring the filing of a claim in a time period less than two years is void.  Indiana Code section 34-11-2-11, on the other hand, does provide a default statute of limitations period, and pursuant to the conformity with state law term in the policy, that default applies to the parties.  (Da053).
[brief] 39:4-50.2  Consent to taking of samples of breath; record of test; independent test; prohibition of use of force; informing accused.  (a)  Any person who operates a motor vehicle on any public road, street or highway or quasi-public area in this State shall be deemed to have given his consent to the taking of samples of his breath for the purpose of making chemical tests to determine the content of alcohol in his blood; provided, however, that the taking of samples is made in accordance with the provisions of this act.  Table of Authorities – Definitions
[brief] [...]’s decision to grant Exemption #11 to [...] is entitled to substantial judicial deference.  It is well established that in reviewing an administrative agency’s decision, appellate courts have a limited role.  \textit{Clowes v. Terminix Int’l., Inc.}, 109 \textit{N.J.} 575, 587-588 (1988); \textit{Public Service Elec. and Gas Co. v. N.J. Dept of Environment Protection}, 101 \textit{N.J.} 95, 103 (1985); \textit{Henry v. Rahway State Prison}, 81 \textit{N.J.} 571, 579 (1980); \textit{Campbell v. Dept. of Civil Service}, 39 \textit{N.J.} 556, 562 (1963).  In fact, appellate courts will not typically reverse an agency’s judgment in the absence of a finding that it was “arbitrary, capricious, or --- \(^6\) This Court should take judicial notice of the Rehearing Order pursuant to \textit{N.J.R.E.} 202(b) and \textit{N.J.R.E.} 201(b)(3).
[brief] Pa211.  The property was owned and occupied by defendants.  Pa212.  Defendants purchased the property in 1972.  Pa213.  Defendants replaced the sidewalk during their ownership of the property.  Pa213.  Plaintiff’s fall occurred on the sidewalk adjacent to a carport on the property.  Pa212.  The sidewalk at the incident location forms a ramp with an abrupt and excessive change in walking surface slope, which increases the likelihood of a pedestrian slipping there.  Pa121-23; Pa142-55.  While walking on the sidewalk adjacent to the carport, plaintiff’s right foot slipped out from under her, and she fell on her back and left elbow.