ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] | Cases | Pages | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|-------| | Alves v. Rosenberg, 400 N.J. Super 553 (App. Div. 2008) | 3 | | Barber v. ShopRite of Englewood & Assocs., Inc., 406 N.J. Super. | | | 32 (App. Div. 2009), certif. denied, 200 N.J. 210 (2009) | 20 | | Eden v. Conrail, 175 N.J. Super. 263 (App. Div. 1980), modified | | | and affirmed, 87 N.J. 467 (1981) | 20 | | Hrymoc v. Ethicon, Inc., 254 N.J. 446 (2023) | 9,10 | | Manata v. Pereira, 436 N.J. Super. 330 (App. Div. 2014) | 7,8 | | New Jersey Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. V. Duran, | | | 251 N.J. Super. 55 (App. Div. 1991) | 17,18 | | Pellicer v St. Barnabas Hosp., 200 N.J. 22 (2009) | 20 | | Peterson v. Peterson, 374 N.J. Super. 116 (App. Div. 2005) | 3 | | State v. Fort, 101 N.J. 123 (1985) | 3 | | State v. Jenewicz, 193 N.J. 440 (2008) | 20 | | Statutes | | |---------------------------------------------------------------------|-------| | Regulations | | |---------------------------------------------------------------------|-------| | Rules of Court | | |---------------------------------------------------------------------|-------| | N.J.R.E. 801(f) | 16 | | N.J.R.E. 803(c)(6) | 18 | | N.J.R.E. 803(c)(8) | 16,17 | | Other Authorities | Pages | |-------------------|-------| | [...], Phantom Impeachment, 77 A.B.A.J. 82 (Nov. 1991) | 8 | LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I DEFENDANT DID NOT PROVIDE A PROPER FOUNDATION FOR THE ADMISSION OR THE USE OF THE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH’S ALLEGED INVESTIGATION.
[brief] B.  Debt Adjustment, When Performed by an Attorney on Behalf of a Client, Constitutes the Practice of Law.  The [...] impermissibly regulates the conduct of attorneys in furtherance of the legal representation of their clients.  A New Jersey licensed attorney who performs debt adjustment services within the context of an attorney-client relationship is engaged in the practice of law.  Attorneys routinely provide debt adjustment services to clients as part of their legal representation.
[brief] The Trial Court Erred In Failing To Examine That The Two Permitted Principal Uses Proposed In The Application Were “Part Of A Single Site Plan. ” (5T 25-11 to 28-7).  According to Ordinance § 250-4, multiple principal industrial or commercial uses are allowed on a site in the Industrial Zone as long as the Planning Board determines that the “uses are part of a single site plan, with cross easements for utilities and stormwater management, and access, ingress and egress utilizing shared, common driveways. ” (Pa3-13).  The Ordinance authorizes this decision to be made by the Planning Board not the Zoning Board.  Unfortunately, the trial court would not consider the arbitrary action by the Board to conduct this review.  Instead, the judge imposed an unnecessary use variance examination by the Zoning Board.  Proper consideration would review the plain language of the Ordinance and find the two principal uses proposed in Plaintiff’s site plan Application – the previously permitted cell tower use and permitted as-of-right industrial warehouse use – were permitted in the Zone and were “part of a single site plan” complying with the Ordinance.
[directive] Establishment 3.1 of system establish a shall Justice Criminal of Division the Prosecutor and County  Each to basis 24/7 on a available be to general attorneys deputy and prosecutors assistant on-call to pursuant officers enforcement law to approvals charging and advice legal real-time provide duty on-call to assigned general attorneys deputy and prosecutors assistant  All Directive.6 this for required functions perform the experience to sufficient have shall Directive this to pursuant Advice Directive.  this of 14
[brief] The question this case presents is not how a school district must handle specific parental requests for officials records—or what information must go in that record.  Instead, the issue before the trial court, and now on appeal, is whether the Amended Policy’s decision to require blanket affirmative notification to parents regarding their transgender children’s gender identity is likely consistent with the LAD.  On that score, FERPA and NJPRA are silent: neither statute requires schools to affirmatively notify parents of their children’s gender identity or expression in the absence of records request.  See (Da115) (finding that enjoining schools from affirmatively “notifying parents of a child’s transgender identification or expression” on a blanket basis in no way “would prevent parents from ‘inspect[ing] and review[ing] the education records of their children. ’” (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(a)(1)(A))).  Nor do they provide a justification for promulgating a blanket rule that discriminates on the basis of gender identity or expression.
[brief] Plaintiff paid more than $130,000 for a system that it reasonably expected would function properly based on representations by the defendants.  Defendants failed to account for drainage and downspouts, which they knew or should have known is an essential element of their product’s function.  In addition, to the extent defendants argue they have no duty in this regard and customers are entirely on their own as to whether the system will properly drain, the defendants also completely fail to indicate this in their marketing materials, proposals, and “months” of communications.  Their attempted “disclaimer” on that issue appears for the first time only in the context of this litigation.  The Court in its April 4, 2022 Order dismissed plaintiff’s affirmative claims on summary judgment.
[brief] Comer, 249 N.J. at 403 (quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 573).  Courts must therefore “consider the totality of the evidence” lest they assign undue aggravation to the offense while undervaluing the mitigation of youth.  Ibid.  Courts must apply all five Miller factors, with a focus on factors 1 (immaturity) and 5 (rehabilitation) which bear heightened significance because they “could not be fully considered decades earlier[.]”
[brief] 2023).................................................................P55  A true and correct copy of Poppy Holdings v. [...], A-2549-22 (N.J. App. Div. Oct. 2, 2024).................................................................60  A true and correct copy of [...] v. [...], Docket No. A-1939-22 (N.J. App. Div. Oct. 16, 2024).................................................................Pa82  A true and correct copy of [...] v. [...], A-1982-22, (N.J. App. Div. March 4, 2024).................................................................Pa91  A true and correct copy of [...] v. Block 5.04, Lot 16, A-2384-21, (N.J. App. Div. Dec. 15, 2023)..................................................Pa101  A true and correct copy of [...] v. Block 268, Lot 7, No. A-2193-21 (N.J. App. Div. Jan. 18, 2024)........................................Pa133  Frivolous litigation letter dated June 19, 2024........................................Pa153
[brief] (Da15).  Defendant submits that this ruling was erroneous.  "[A]n appellate court reviewing a motion to suppress must uphold the factual findings underlying the trial court's decision so long as those findings are supported by sufficient credible evidence in the record."  *State v. Elders*, 192 N.J. 224, 243, (2007).  The governing principle, then, is that "[a] trial court's findings should be disturbed only if they are so clearly mistaken that the interests of justice demand intervention and correction."  *Id.*  Even applying this deferential standard, it is submitted that the trial court erred in denying defendant’s motion to suppress.  The warrant requirement embodied in both the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, *U.S. Const.* amend. IV, and in paragraph 7 of Article I of the New Jersey Constitution, *N.J. Const.* art. I, ¶ 7, limits the power of the sovereign to enter our homes and seize our persons or our effects.
[brief] i.  No local government officer shall be deemed in conflict with these provisions if, by reason of his participation in the enactment of any ordinance, resolution or other matter required to be voted upon or which is subject to executive approval or veto, no material or monetary gain accrues to him as a member of any business, profession, occupation or group, to any greater extent than any gain could reasonably be expected to accrue to any other member of such business, profession, occupation or group[.]  [Emphasis added.]  At the time of adoption of the Bond Ordinance, Defendant [...] owned and operated a business known as “[...]” located at [...].  (Pa164 and Pa215 at ¶25.)  The Flex Parking Removal Project that was authorized by the Bond Ordinance included flex parking in front of Defendant [...]’ business in Millburn’s downtown and within 200 feet of the Project.  (Id. No. 26.)  Plaintiff alleges that Defendant [...] made many campaign promises in 2018 related to the revitalization of the downtown where she operates her business.  (Id. No. 27.)  Plaintiff contends that Mayor [...] had a disqualifying conflict of interest in the Flex Parking Removal Project and should have abstained from voting thereon.  (Id. No. 28.)  Defendant [...]’s operation of a business in proximity to the public street improvement project did not ip so facto create a conflict of interest.
[brief] For example, to prevail on a conversion claim, a plaintiff must prove: (1) that the money converted by a tortfeasor belonged to the plaintiff; (2) that the tortfeasor exercised dominion over its money and repudiated the superior rights of the owner; and (3) the repudiation must be manifested in the injured party’s demand for the funds and the tortfeasor’s refusal to return the monies sought.  *Bondi v. Citigroup, Inc.*, 423 N.J. Super. 377, 432 (App. Div. 2011).  Conversely, if a party did not wrongfully convert money belonging to the plaintiff or did not knowingly receive misappropriated funds, they cannot be liable for the tort of conversion.
[brief] 1.  The granted Warrant of Satisfaction of Judgment shall be vacated and further proceedings shall be held regarding the missing portions of the 11 students' records and in furtherance of compelling the Board fully comply with the affirmed 8/28/20 final order; 2.  The denial of interest from 8/28/20 to 7/20/22 on the stayed $78,646 attorney's fee order is reversed and a new award of interest shall be entered on remand; 3.  The denial of [...]'s prevailing party attorney's fees for the enforcement is reversed and the amount of an award shall be determined on remand; and 4.
[brief] This argument is erroneous because it is only under the Eminent Domain Act in which the Legislature established the exclusive procedure for the acquisition of property by eminent domain and the right of property owners to contest the government’s authority to take their property.  The [...] action was a challenge to the Ordinance granting the swap that was not contingent upon inclusion of the Defendants’ properties.  The right to take issue was not and could not have been disposed of there.
[brief] On October 27, 2021, Complainant [...], a resident of West Amwell, filed a 17-count Complaint with the Commission against the nine members of the [...].  The Complaint alleged that Respondents shirked their ethical responsibilities to all of the voters by providing the public only with reasons to vote in favor of the Referendum, and by omitting information as to any drawbacks such as the extent to which the measure’s cost would increase voters’ property taxes.  The Commission notified [...] that the language of certain claims was technically defective, and on November 2, 2021, [...] filed an Amended Complaint with 18 counts (“Complaint”, Pa19).  On November 2, 2021, the voters of the three constituent municipalities of the regional district approved the Referendum by only two (2) votes of 3,544 votes cast, which was referred to in Complainant’s Opposition To Motion to Dismiss.  On November 19, 2021 a lawsuit was filed in New Jersey Superior Court seeking a recount of the vote.  On December 10, 2021 a judge ordered a recount, which was held on December 14, 2021.  The recount did not change the Referendum result.  These facts were also noted in the Opposition to Motion to Dismiss to indicate to the Commission the seriousness of the situation and how close and controversial the Referendum truly was to the community.
[brief] (5T:85-15 to 87-24).  The bullet that entered the car through the rear passenger window was not recovered inside the vehicle, nor located within the surrounding area.  (5T:79-13 to 19).  At approximately 10:36 a.m. on the morning of May 4, 2018, search warrants were obtained for both the Mazda Protégé and defendant’s Chevy Impala.
[brief] The transfer made no provision for a right-of-way to a public road so [...] claimed he was entitled to an easement by necessity from his property across the [...] property to [...].  (Da557)  The legal status of the driftway across [...]’s property was necessarily implicated because, as an element of his easement-by-necessity claim, [...] was obliged to prove that traversing the [...] property was his only option.  [...] rejected the claim, in part because [...] presented no evidence of any attempt to negotiate easement rights to the driftway across [...]’s property and, at least to that point, [...] was voluntarily allowing [...] to use it.  In analyzing the evidence presented at the trial, [...] specifically found that [...]’s access across [...]’s property was “apparently pursuant to a revocable license. ”  (Da612)  This finding met all the criteria for a finding of collateral estoppel.  The legal status of the driftway across the [...] Lot was squarely in issue before [...] and [...].  It was actually litigated in both cases.  [...]’s two detailed opinions in 2006 and 2008 are proof positive that [...] had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the matter.  She issued a final judgment on the merits which was affirmed by the Appellate Division.  A determination of whether [...] had an express easement was essential to [...]’s judgment.  And [...] was in privity with [...].  [...] rejected [...]’s collateral estoppel argument for much the same reason as she rejected *res judicata* -- because the 1966 [...]-to-[...] deed was never presented to [...].  (Da831)  But [...]’s legal right to access [...]’s property was certainly litigated, and [...] squarely addressed it in both of her opinions.  As we argued above, as long as there is a full and fair opportunity to litigate the matter, there is no exception to the collateral estoppel doctrine for doing a poor job of it.
[brief] TABLE OF SUPPLEMENTAL APPENDIX (Following the order set forth in R. 2:6-1(a)) (H) Unpublished Opinions: Szelc v. Stanger, 2011 WL 1467187, at *13 (D.N.J. Apr. 18, 2011) .................................................................Pa2309  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases Blitz v. 970 Realty Associates, 233 N.J. Super. 29, 37 (App. Div. 1989) ..................7 State v. Walker, 385 N.J. Super. 388, 410 (App. Div. 2006) ...........................................7 Szelc v. Stanger, 2011 WL 1467187, at *13 (D.N.J. Apr. 18, 2011)............................4 U.S. v. Guaranty Trust Co. of N.Y., 293 U.S. 340, 345, 55 S.Ct. 221, 79 L.Ed. 415 (1934)
[brief] 7  A review of Appellant’s pleadings shows that no allegations were included in his Complaint concerning the deceptive nature of the letter’s specific use of the word “savings,” as Appellant now contends on appeal.  See Appx., at 2a-3a, 6a-7a; Appellant’s Brief, at 1, 3, 5, 31.  Because Appellant’s Complaint did not include such a claim, it should not now be considered on appeal.  N. Haledon Fire Co. No. 1 v. Borough of N. Haledon, 425 N.J. Super. 615, 631 (App. Div. 2012) (“An issue not raised below will not be considered for the first time on appeal. ” [citing Brock v. Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 149 N.J. 378, 391 (1997)]).
[brief] ”  *Id.* (quotations omitted).  The *Cofield* factors are as follows: (1) the evidence of the other crime must be admissible as relevant to a material issue; (2) it must be similar in kind and reasonably close in time to the offense charged; (3) the evidence of the other crime must be clear and convincing; and (4) the probative value of the evidence must not be outweighed by its apparent prejudice.  *State v. Fortin*, 162 N.J. 517, 529 (2000).  Evidence regarding prior bad acts, wrongs, or crimes by a criminal defendant must be examined cautiously, because such evidence “has a unique tendency to turn a jury against the defendant,” and “poses a distinct risk of distracting the jury from an independent consideration of the evidence that bears directly on guilt itself[.]”
[directive] Electronic Monitoring Screening Criteria (for Electronic Monitoring as a Condition of Pretrial Release)  Defendant Name Complaint/Indictment Number  SBI Number  Other requests to allow defendant to leave the home:  1.  Purpose of leave: Frequency: Length: Comment: 2.  Purpose of leave: Frequency: Length: Comment: 3.  Purpose of leave: Frequency: Length: Comment: 4.  Purpose of leave: Frequency: Length: Comment:  Defense Attorney’s Name  Defense Attorney’s Signature Date s/ I, (defendant) do hereby certify that by residing at the above address, I will not be in violation of any court ordered Temporary or Final Restraining Order, any Division of Child Protection and Permanency orders/agreements, a court order barring me from contact with any person or persons, or any other court order.  Defendant’s  Defendant’s Name  Signature Date s/ Revised Form Promulgated by Directive #19-23 (10/17/2023), CN: 12220 page 5 of 5
[brief] At trial, [...] confirmed that he was asserting he has been unable to work due to his injuries.  [7T142:11-14].  He was then confronted with pictures of him using a ladder and chainsaw for tree removal and operating ATVs and dirt bikes, as well as text messages in which he provided work estimates for a home remodeling project and indicated that he was performing labor for a contractor.  [7T142:15-160:19].  This evidence was highly relevant to [...]’s dishonesty about a material fact – his claimed injuries and inability to work – and, under the “false in one, false in all” rule, it was also highly relevant to [...]’s credibility as to how the incident occurred.
[brief] *Liebling v. Garden State Indem.*, 337 N.J. Super. 447, 465, 767 A.2d 515 (App. Div. 2001), certif. den., 169 N.J. 606 (2001) (however, even where credibility is in issue, if single, unavoidable resolution of alleged disputed issue of fact exists, that issue should be considered insufficient to constitute genuine issue of material fact for purposes of N.J. Ct. R. 4:46-2)  The material facts, however, remain uncontroverted and Appellant’s misrepresentations are straightforward and uncontroverted.
[brief] And the Defendant was controlling the narrative.  Certainly, it could have as part of its TLE settlement had direct conversation on what the estoppel would look like.  Instead, it chose to send what it received knowing all it had to lose was the return of the deposit.  Being a sophisticated party, it knew of the costs incurred by Plaintiff to that point, and termination decision was a difficult one to say the least.  That, combined with the fact the disqualified estoppel did not amount to a default played into Defendant’s thinking.  Plainly the trial court did not “impose additional protections” for Plaintiff as Defendant argues.  Rather, the trial court showed how if implemented the Defendant’s interpretation would create a radically different balance then that put forward in the PSA.  Putting a finer point on this are the facts as they actually transpired.  The whole of the argument here, as was the case throughout, fails to prove the Defendant’s interpretation is reasonable and, therefore it was proper to grant partial summary judgment, and the decision should be affirmed.
[directive] AVISO:  Este es un documento público, lo cual significa que el documento tal como se envíe estará a la disposición del público cuando se solicite.  Por lo tanto, no anote en el mismo ningún identificador personal, como por ejemplo: el número de Seguridad Social, el número de la licencia de conducir, el número de la matrícula del vehículo, el número de la póliza del seguro, el número de una cuenta financiera activa, o el número de una tarjeta de crédito activa.  NOTICE:  This is a public document, which means the document as submitted will be available to the public upon request.  Therefore, do not enter personal identifiers on it, such as Social Security number, driver’s license number, vehicle plate number, insurance policy number, active financial account number, or active credit card number.  Las demandas, pedimentos y demás papeles presentados al tribunal deben estar en ingles  Complaints, motions and other papers submitted to the court should be in English  Poder Judicial de Nueva Jersey  New Jersey Judiciary Formulario suplementario para una declaración de culpabilidad en causas Ley Contra Excarcelación  Prematura sujetas a la (NERA) (N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2)  No Early Release Act
[brief] [...]: You know eso está en español si usted lo entiende.  *(You know that is in Spanish if you understand it).*  [...]: Mm-hmm.  [...]: Es algo que usted tiene que decir si usted, usted mismo.  *(That is something that you have to say if you, on your own). *  [...]: Si pues.  *(Well yes).*  [...]: So usted puede poner su respuesta y sus iniciales.  Si usted no tiene dinero para contratar o a un abogado se le asignara uno para que lo represente antes de ser interrogado si usted así lo desea.  Entiende usted este derecho?  *(So you can put your answer and your initials.  If you do not have money to hire a lawyer, one will be appointed to represent you before any questioning, if you wish.  Do you understand this right?).*
[brief] (108a)  [T]he Court does not find [...]’s testimony credible with respect to the circumstances surrounding his purchase and sale of the Boonton Property.  He misrepresented to the Court with respect to his intent to move into the house, and during the extensive litigation regarding the sale of the Boonton Property never once mentioned any potential immigration issues that would preclude his family from occupying the Boonton Property.  It appears to the Court that [...] always intended to sell that Boonton Property after he purchased it, which was his right, but he misrepresented his intent during these proceedings.