ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] *(2T28-2-3; 2T29-10-11)* (“Q.  When did you first discover this collection action against you?  . . . Q.  So, does 2019 sound about right to you?  A.  2019 sounds about right, Your Honor. ”).  Despite becoming aware of the Judgment in 2019, Appellant failed to file the instant Motion until over four (4) years after becoming aware and six (6) years after the Judgment was entered – on June 7, 2023.
[brief] [A85]  Only in August 2017 did the couple’s union actually begin to come apart and [...] began to understand the true effect of the documents she had signed.  During proceedings in a legal malpractice case that [...] had filed, [...] heard testimony about the Mid-Marriage Agreement, the “global settlement agreement” from the bankruptcy, and related matters.  She asked [...] what these documents really meant.  He became angry.  Shortly afterward, [...] wanted to go to Harrah’s Cherokee Casino Resort in North Carolina to play poker; [...] refused to go with him.  This culminated in a heated argument and domestic violence incident after which [...] left the home.  With assistance from family and friends\(^3\) and eventually lawyers, she searched and found the documents her husband and his lawyers had her sign and began to understand this was not just a divorce “on paper”; these were filed court documents that had left her with little assets or rights from her marriage.
[directive] Standard 14: SART COMPLAINT PROCEDURES  The following procedures shall be implemented to address any complaints, issues, or unusual occurrences concerning a County SART.  These procedures are designed to ensure best practices are followed by both the Team and the individual members.  Complaint Procedures    Complaints, issues, or unusual occurrences regarding an activation, response, examination, interview, or SART Member shall be reported to the County SART Coordinator as soon as possible after the incident.  It is recommended that the County SART Coordinator be advised within three business days of the event.    Victims who would like to address complaints, issues, or unusual occurrences regarding their SART activation, response, examination, or interview shall call the Statewide SART Advisory Board phone number.    The County SART Coordinator shall document and report all complaints, issues, or unusual occurrences, as well as the prescribed resolution, to the assistant prosecutor or detective supervising the County SART program.    The County SART Coordinator shall report complaints, issues, or unusual occurrences, and the resolution, to the County SART Advisory Board for its information and/or assistance in preventing similar events.    Complaints, issues, or unusual occurrences pertaining to the SART Coordinator’s actions shall be reported directly to the assistant prosecutor or detective supervising the County SART program, who shall document the incident, as well as the resolution.    If the complaint, issues, or unusual occurrences cannot be resolved after conferring with the County Prosecutor’s Office, the matter shall be referred to the Statewide SART Advisory Board, who will determine the resolution.    At the Statewide SART Advisory Board meetings, all feedback pertaining to the 21 County SART programs will be reviewed.  -33-  ATTORNEY GENERAL STANDARDS FOR PROVIDING SERVICES TO VICTIMS OF SEXUAL ASSAULT
[brief] The Trial Court noted that there was testimony provided before the Planning Board from Borough Planner, [...], that the plan amendment “‘is in fact consistent with the master plan . . . and designed to effectuate the Borough’s [M]aster [P]lan”, that the Planning Board ultimately concluded that “the proposed Ordinance Amendment (Ordinance No. 1667) is, in fact, consistent with the Borough’s Master Plan”, and that the Borough Council heard testimony that the plan amendment was “consistent with the Borough’s vision for the redevelopment of the Beachway tract” and then voted to adopt Ordinance 1667 approving the Second Amendment to the Redevelopment Plan.  The Trial Court stated that:  Based on the foregoing alone, the court concludes that the Resolution adopting the Plan was supported by ample facts and was in no way arbitrary or capricious.
[brief] Defendant first killed his mother after waiting for her with the lights off.  In a short period of time thereafter, defendant shot his father.  Instead of discontinuing his actions, defendant left the room, as I pointed [out], went down the steps, the 13 or 15 steps.  He then made another left turn, another 13 to 15 steps and he made conscience {sic} choices.  At first, he decided to take his sister out with chase a separate motive than what he had for [...].
[directive] 6.2.5  If the complaint is sustained, the superior officer so authorized should determine the appropriate disciplinary action.  Typical disciplinary actions for minor infractions include performance notices, oral reprimands or written reprimands.  The superior officer shall complete the appropriate disciplinary document and provide a copy of that document to the officer being disciplined.  A copy of the disciplinary document shall be forwarded to the law enforcement executive or appropriate supervisor for review, placed in the officer's personnel file and sent to internal affairs for entry into the index file and filing.
[brief] Because defendant's inactive guilty plea in this PTI matter is non-evidentiary in any civil action pending unsuccessful termination from supervisory treatment, the court's order was premature.  We recognize the Rules of Court do not address the effect of an inactive plea on a civil reservation order.  Further, Rule 3:9-2 instructs the trial court to enter the order "in accepting a plea of guilty."  However, in those cases, where PTI is not a condition of defendant's guilty plea, the civil reservation generally is ordered at sentencing and included in the judgment of conviction.  See [State v.] Faunce, 244 N.J. Super. [499,} [ ] 500-01, 582 A.2d 1268 [(App. Div. 1990)].  That procedure permits the court to consider the victim's impact statement, see N.J.S.A. 52:4B-36; N.J.S.A. 2C:44-6(b), and the defendant's financial circumstances and other good cause at the time the civil reservation is considered.  Thus, the sentencing judge is then in a better position to decide whether a civil reservation should be entered.  In those cases where the judge determines the defendant has not satisfied his burden, the defendant should be allowed to rescind the guilty plea — if the civil reservation was a condition thereof.  That, of course, is not the case here.
[brief] (1T141:1-18).  Counsel for plaintiffs informed the judge that he would not put forth any evidence of the plaintiff's injuries in the liability phase of the trial, and that "the story ends" once plaintiff left [...] that day. (Ibid.).  Nevertheless, the trial judge allowed that evidence in (7T142:11-160:2) over the objections of plaintiff's attorney.  (1T138:18-148:18; 3T21:5-26:18; 7T150:14-19; and 7T158:17-25).
[brief] (Pa32).  She then asked “Is there anything about this that you, a word or something that you do not understand or anything that you want me to explain to you or do you understand?  Or if you want to read it. ”  Ibid.  Defendant asked what he had to do and eventually signed the waiver.  (Pa32 to 33).  Focusing on the underlined portion of the above conversation, the trial court found defendant made an ambiguous invocation of his right to counsel.  (Pa23 to 24).  The court further held that the detective’s response was confusing and did not clarify defendant’s request.  Ibid.  These findings were erroneous.  Foremost, defendant did not make an ambiguous invocation of his right to counsel.  Defendant asked if he needed to find his own attorney or if one would be provided.  Such a question is not a request for an attorney at that time, but rather a request about how to obtain an attorney if/when defendant decides that he wants one.  It is a question about procedure and not an invocation of defendant’s right to counsel, ambiguous or otherwise.  Thus, the trial court’s finding was incorrect.  However, even assuming defendant’s comment was ambiguous and could be viewed as a possible invocation of his right to counsel, the detective’s responses and subsequent comments were proper and the totality of the circumstances clearly establish that defendant was not invoking his right to have an attorney present during questioning.
[brief] The Agreement and Arbitration Clause at issue are not the form consumer contracts the Atalese Court addressed.  The Plaintiffs-Respondents [...] and [...] (“Plaintiffs”) are experienced investors in high-risk pre-construction condominium units.  They are not the “consumers” the Atalese Court intended to protect.  Individuals with bargaining power and legal representation are definitionally sophisticated, and wholly unlike the average consumer in Atalese.  Even if there is a presumption under Atalese that a consumer contract must contain “clear and unmistakable” language that references a loss of “access to Courts” or a “jury trial,” it does not and cannot apply here.  The present appeal before this Court arises from a trial court’s Order invalidating an Arbitration clause contained within the Subscription and Purchase Agreement (herein the “SPA” or “Agreement”) for the purchase of a luxury condominium.
[brief] On January 27, 2021, the [...] introduced Ordinance 1667 proposing the adoption of a Second Amendment to the Redevelopment Plan which would supersede and replace the First Amendment to the Redevelopment Plan.  As required under both the LRHL and the Municipal Land Use Law, N.J.S.A. 40:55D-1 et. seq. (the “MLUL”), that proposed ordinance and the proposed redevelopment plan amendment were referred to the [...] prior to the consideration of the ordinance for final adoption (1T; Pa68).  On February 8, 2021, the [...] held a public hearing and heard testimony from witnesses regarding this proposed Second Amendment to the Redevelopment Plan (2T).  After concluding the public hearing, the [...] determined that the proposed zoning ordinance to adopt a Second Amendment to the Redevelopment Plan was consistent with the Borough’s Master Plan and authorized the [...] attorney to report the [...]’s findings to the [...], which he did in a detailed letter submitted to the [...] (Pa573).
[brief] Pub. Serv., 35 N.J. at 377.  As a practical matter, [...]’s suggestion that [...]’s decision somehow undermines its zoning authority has no basis in the record.  [...]’s expert witness [...] testified without dispute that in [...]’s OL-2 zoning district, public utilities are a conditionally permitted use provided that the applicable requirements in [...] Code § 30-155.2(a) are met.  (Aa856-57); [...], N.J., Mun. Code § 30-155.2(a) (2022).  Namely, the municipal code requires that: (1) the public utility project provide “direct utility services”; (2) the public utility submit “[s]ite plans, specifications and a statement” regarding “the need and purpose” of the project; and (3) the public utility submit proof that “the proposed installation in a specific location is necessary and convenient for the efficiency” of the public utility system or “the satisfactory and convenient provision” of utility service to the relevant area.
[brief] Instead of focusing on [...]’s capacities as an adult, the court focused only on [...]’s capacities and incapacities as a teen:  “when I look at the Miller factors, both of these individuals were under the age of 18.  I don’t – I don’t find that there was a great deal of failure to appreciate the consequences.  Maybe there was some.  Maybe there was some. ”  (5T81-1 to 6)  The court made no mention of [...]’s findings on this precise question – that as an adult, [...] had “reflected on the consequences” of his actions and had “established a pro-social attitude hallmarked by consistent work performance, attaining his high school diploma, and participation in a variety of prison programs over the years.
[brief] Udechukwu v. Udechukwu, 2017 WL 744691 at *3 (App. Div. 2017).  My Statements of Facts & Legal Arguments provide extensive probative competent evidence that the Court expressed its rulings for cited provisions of those 3 Orders based upon palpably incorrect & irrational bases that were in contradiction to evidence, decedent’s Will, cited NJ statutes, & Court’s own Oct. ‘22 Order, par. 2; and it was obvious Court did not consider & failed to appreciate significance of probative, competent evidence & arguments, and all of which made its rulings arbitrary, contradictory, and/or unreasonable.
[brief] The [...] felt strongly enough about the negative effects of non-radial lot lines in [...] to create an ordinance provision declaring non-radial lot lines a design waiver.  While it is not within the board attorney’s purview to question or analyze the thought process behind the ordinance and the ordinance itself was not at issue in the prerogative writ matter, this appellant submits that radial lot lines, in part, regulate lot yield in [...], and the Board’s concerns regarding the application went directly to the layout, the number of homes, and the size of the homes proposed.  This is squarely a planning issue, as pursuant to the Municipal Land Use Law, if an application is not completely conforming the Board is not required to grant the application, which means that it is within the Board’s discretion, authority and judgment to deny the application.
[brief] An arbitrator cannot rewrite the terms of the parties’ agreement.  In doing so, the arbitrator exceeded his powers and the determination below must be reversed.  The collective bargaining agreement states in Article XII, F., 3(b)(3), that the Arbitrator is prohibited from adding to, subtracting from, modifying, or amending the provisions of the contract.  Pa39.  The Arbitrator relied on the Treasury Circulars instead of interpreting the language in the collective bargaining agreement.  The Arbitrator’s determination that the Division was not required to follow the plain language in the contract and was instead permitted to follow the annual Treasury Circulars was a mistake of law.  The Arbitrator has exceeded his authority by ignoring the clear and unambiguous language of the agreement and instead relied on a past practice.  Therefore, we respectfully request that the [...] be vacated.  CONCLUSION  For the foregoing reasons, we respectfully request that the determination below be reversed and that The Court vacate the Arbitration Award dated October 2, 2023, in P.E.R.C. Docket No.: [...].
[brief] Although unlawfully concealing a weapon poses a public-safety risk, driving a pickup truck erratically on a highway such as Route 206 is a more immediate threat.  *Id.* at 226.  See also *J.L.*, 529 U.S. at 272 (rejecting “an automatic firearm exception to our established reliability analysis”).  None of the cases the State cites to argue that the 9-1-1 call itself is sufficient to uphold the police action in this case condoned a stop and search on the basis solely of a 9-1-1 call about anything other than drunk driving.
[brief] United Steel Paper v. Gov’t of Virgin Islands, 842 F. 3d 201, 205 (3d Cir. 2016) (citing Energy Reserves Grp., Inc. v. Kan. Power & Light Co., 459 U.S. 400, 411-13 (1983)); Nieves v. Hess Oil V.I. Corp., 819 F. 2d 1237, 1243 (3d Cir. 1987).
[brief] 07068 (973) 509-7500 OF COUNSEL AND ON THE BRIEF: [...], ESQ.  (Attorney ID#00182-1973)  Email: [...]  TABLE OF CONTENTS  TABLE OF CONTENTS ........................................................................................................i  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .................................................................................................i  TABLE OF ORDERS BEING APPEALED ........................................................................ii  PROCEDURAL HISTORY .....................................................................................................1  STATEMENT OF FACTS ....................................................................................................1  LEGAL ARGUMENT ..........................................................................................................2 POINT I IF THIS COURT AFFIRMS THE DECISION OF THE COURT BELOW COMPELLING PLAINTIFFS TO ARBITRATE THEIR CLAIMS AGAINST [...] THIS COURT SHOULD CONTINUE THE STAY OF THE CASE GRANTED BY THE COURT BELOW .........................................................................................................................2 CONCLUSION ......................................................................................................................4 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Annum v. Santana, MID-L-6170-22 Nov. 3, 2023 Pa197 .................................................3 Bell v. Uber, ESX-L-1603-23 Oct. 19, 2023 Pa 194-195 ...................................................3 Cavallo v. Uber Techs, Inc., U.S.D.C.N.J. May 31, 2017 Pa 130-149 ...............................3 Dukes v. Weiss, ESX-L-7297-23 undated Pa 205-206 .....................................................3 Holdbrook Pediatric Dental, LLC v. Pro Computer Srvc, U.S.D.C.N.J. July 21, 2015 Pa 158-169 ..................................................................................................................3 Lanier v. Uber Technologies, Inc. U.S.D.C.Ca. May 11, 2016 Pa 150-156 .........................3 Roncero v. Segura-Diaz, ESX-L-1701-23 Nov. 8, 2023 Pa 199-192.....................3 Siperavage v. Uber Technologies, Inc., U.S.D.C.N.J. June 20, 2021 Pa 208-223 ..............................................................................................................3 Smith v. Khosrowshahi, U.S.D.C.Pa. Dec. 7, 2020 Pa 258-260...............................3 Taylor v. Jimenez, UNN-L-2025-23 Oct. 20, 2023, July 27, 2022 Pa. 191-192 ...............................................................................................................3 Williamson v. Alexander, July 27, 2022 S.C.N.Y. Kings County Pa 227-241..........3 Williams v. Ysabel, et al., Superior Court, App.Div. A-1391-22 Sept. 7, 2023 Pa 0171-0183 ....................................................................................3 TABLE OF ORDERS BEING APPEALED Order and Statement of Reasons of Hon. [...], J.S.C. ...
[brief] The trial court found *Honeywell* to be distinguishable on the basis that *Honeywell* principally involved an allocation dispute from the beginning of the litigation, whereas the present dispute only became an allocation dispute after a dispute as to liability.  This conclusion fails to give full consideration to the facts of *Honeywell* and the purpose of allocation.  *Honeywell*, like this case, focused primarily on what amount of damages could be allocated to a specific policy period.  Specifically, in *Honeywell*, the court rejected claims from two excess insurers that the “unavailability” exception did not apply, and allocated additional damages to the policy periods of those carriers.  *Id.* at *10-13*.  The court still rejected the policyholder’s claim for attorneys’ fees, because the case was “about nothing more than allocation. ”  *Id.* at *21.  Here, similarly, the heart of the parties’ dispute was whether any significant amount of [...]’s claimed damages could be allocated to [...]’s policy period.  While [...] succeeded at the liability trial in establishing that some “property damage” occurred during the [...] policy period, it ultimately failed in the key dispute in any environmental contamination coverage case – establishing that a significant portion of damages could be allocated to the [...] policy period.  See New England Insulation Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 83 Mass. App. Ct. 631, 636 (Mass. App. Ct. 2013) (quoting Boston Gas, 454 Mass. 337, 358-59 (reasoning that “because the policies in question specif[y] that coverage would apply to injury or damage occurring ‘during the policy period,’ they should be read to cover only that portion of the insured’s liability ‘attributable to the quantum of property damage occurring during a given policy period.’”).  Thus, like Honeywell, this case boiled down to allocation, and [...]’s failure to establish an allocation methodology supporting a significant allocation to the [...] policy period renders it unsuccessful under R. 4:42-9(a)(6).
[brief] Unnamed class plaintiffs need not make any individual showing of standing, because the standing issue focuses on whether the claimant is properly before the court, rather than if absent class members are properly before it.\textsuperscript{145}  Even were there individualized damage issues, court can utilize various “management tools … to address any individualized damages issues that might arise in a class action, including: (1) bifurcating liability and damages trial with the same or different juries; (2) appointing a particular judge or special master to preside over individual damages proceedings; (3) decertifying the class after the liability trial and providing notice to class members concerning how they may proceed to prove damages; (4) creating subclasses; or (5) altering or amending the case. ”\textsuperscript{146}  The New Jersey Supreme Court has repeatedly found predominance to be met and affirmed certification under R. 4:32-1(b)(3) in cases despite specifically noting that numerous individual issues and potential individual defenses existed.\textsuperscript{147}  Thus, the question the “predominance” prong seeks to answer is not whether there are any individual issues or defenses, but rather does “the core of the case concern common issues of fact and law”\textsuperscript{148} and this case involves common issues.
[brief] App’x 787 (3d Cir. 2010) | | | United States ex rel. Springfield Terminal Ry. Co. v. Quinn, | 40, 45, 46, 47 | | 14 F.3d 645 (D.C. Cir. 1994) | | | United States ex rel. Totten v. Bombardier Corp., | 10 | | 286 F.3d 542 (D.C. Cir. 2002) | | | United States ex rel. Wilson v. Graham Cnty. Soil & Water Conservation Dist., | 23-24 | | 777 F.3d 691 (4th Cir. 2015) | | | STATUTES | | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|---------| | 15 U.S.C. § 78o-4(b)(2) | 34 | | 15 U.S.C. § 78o-4(b)(2)(J) | 35 | | 15 U.S.C. §§ 78o-4(b)(3)(B)(ii) | 35 | | 35 U.S.C. § 101 | 43 | | 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) | 43 | | 35 U.S.C. § 103 | 43 | | Federal False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3730 et seq. | passim | | N.J.S.A. § 1:1-14 | 15-16 | ### TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (cont’d) | STATUTES | Page(s) | |----------|---------| | N.J.S.A. § 2A:32C-1 | 3 | | N.J.S.A. § 2A:32C-2 | 38 | | N.J.S.A. § 2A:32C-3 | 38 | | N.J.S.A. § 2A:32C-5(a-d) | 3 | | N.J.S.A. § 2A:32C-5(c) | 4 | | N.J.S.A. § 2A:32C-5(f) | 3 | | N.J.S.A. § 2A:32C-5(g) | 3 | | N.J.S.A. 2A:32C-6(b-c) | 4 | | N.J.S.A. 2A:32C-6(f) | 4 | | N.J.S.A. 2A:32C-6(g) | 4 | | N.J.S.A. § 2A:32C-9(c) | passim | ### RULES & OTHER AUTHORITIES - MSRB Notice 2011-25, Fee Change for Historical Transaction Data Product (Apr. 27, 2011) ........................................... 35-36 - N.J. R. Evid. 508(a) .................................................................................. 29 - N.J. R. Evid. 508(b) .................................................................................. 29 - SEC Release No. 34-66522, dated Mar. 6, 2012 ...................................... 35 - SEC Release No. 34-59881, dated May 7, 2009 ..................................... 35 TABLE OF TRANSCRIPTS Transcript of Decision Granting Motion to Dismiss Third Amended Complaint, dated Nov. 30, 2020 ..........................................................1T Transcript of Decision Denying Motion to Dismiss Fourth Amended Complaint, dated Sept. 13, 2021 .........................................................2T Transcript of Oral Argument on Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment, dated Oct. 13, 2023 ...........................................................................3T