ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The history of that litigation is both relevant and necessary for the Court to understand what transpired in this matter.  On March 17, 2006, Appellant executed a note to [...] dba [...] in the amount of $151,920.00.  To secure this Note, Appellant executed a Mortgage of even date covering his residence.  On June 1, 2011, Appellant defaulted under the terms of this Mortgage.  On January 23, 2102, Fremont assigned the Mortgage to [...] (“[...]”).  On July 31, 2012, [...] filed a foreclosure complaint.  Appellant contested the foreclosure at every stage, and it wasn’t until February 26, 2015, that [...] secured a final judgment in Foreclosure (Ra 1).  After the entry of final judgment, Appellant continued to engage in motion practice seeking to set aside the judgment.  This was unsuccessful.  On July 30, 2015, a Sheriff’s sale was conducted, and [...] was the successful bidder.  Prior to the July 30, 2015, sale, Appellant requested, and received his two (2) statutory adjournments pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:17-36 on May 28, 2015 and June 11, 2015.  (Ra 2).  On August 10, 2015, [...] issued a Sheriff’s Deed.  Even after the issuance of the Sheriff’s Deed, Appellant continued to engage in motion practice seeking to set aside the prior judgment.  This was again unsuccessful.  After securing the Sheriff’s Deed, it is unclear what [...] did with the property.  However, in 2017, [...] discovered that the legal description attached to the original mortgage was to another property and [...] moved to vacate the Sheriff’s sale and final judgment of foreclosure on October 31, 2017.  On December 1, 2017, the Court entered an Order voiding the Sheriff’s sale and vacating the final judgment in the matter (Ra 3).  After the vacation of the final judgment in foreclosure, [...] instituted a separate suit in the Burlington County Chancery Division, to quiet title.
[brief] The standard of review of the Trial Court’s evidential rulings is abuse of discretion.  When a Trial Court admits or excludes evidence, its determination is “‘entitled to deference absent a showing of an abuse of discretion, i.e., [that] there has been a clear error of judgment. ’”  Griffin v. City of E. Orange, 225 N.J. 400, 413 (2016) (quoting State v. Brown, 170 N.J. 138, 147 (2001)); see Hisenaj v. Kuehner, 194 N.J. 6, 16 (2008) (explaining that a Trial Court’s admissibility determinations are to be reviewed for an abuse of discretion); Carey v. Lovett, 132 N.J. 44, 64 (1993) (recognizing that a Trial Court’s admissibility determinations are usually reviewed for abuse of discretion); State v. McDuffie, 450 N.J. Super. 554, 574 (App. Div. 2017) (stating that an evidentiary decision is reviewed for an abuse of discretion).  Thus, an appellate court “will reverse an evidentiary ruling only if it was so wide off the mark that a manifest denial of justice resulted. ”  Griffin, 225 N.J. at 413 (emphasis added).  Under N.J.R.E. 403(a), a Trial Court has discretion to exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the risk of undue prejudice, confusion of issues, or misleading the jury.  B.
[directive] I.  Revision to Internal Affairs Policy & Procedures  A. records.  IAPP Section 9.6 is amended to include the Confidentiality of internal affairs following addition:  Page 4 9.6.6  Law enforcement agencies may not waive, restrict, or otherwise limit the power of the County Prosecutor or Attorney General to direct that the information or records of an internal investigation be released or shared pursuant to Section 9.6.1(c).  B. identities.  IAPP Section 9.11 is amended in part to read:  Confidentiality of victim at least once a year no later than 9.11.2  On a periodic basis, and January 31 of the following year, every agency shall the Attorney General and submit to the County Prosecutor, and publish on the agency’s public website, a brief synopsis of all complaints where a termination, reduction in rank or grade, and/or suspension of more than five days was follow assessed to an agency member.  This synopsis shall the format provided in Appendix L and shall include the identity of each officer subject to final discipline, a brief summary of their transgressions, and a statement of the sanction imposed.  This synopsis shall not contain the or any victims.  Where identities of the complainants discipline relates to domestic violence, the synopsis shall not disclose the relationship between a victim and an officer.
[brief] 49.  Court tries to support its biased & illegitimate ruling by stating (p. 15) that "New Jersey case law suggests that contingent remaindermen under a testamentary trust (such as [...]) who are unaffected by allowances out of income or from payment of corpus commissions cannot file exceptions to such items in an accounting."  Court raises this red herring, bogus argument, even though my Exceptions to Trust Accounting had **PRACTICALLY NOTHING** to do with income allowances, & **ABSOLUTELY NOTHING** w/Commissions.  My filed Exceptions, as supported by this Certification, were focused on the Accounting reporting mistakes &/or problems, that would adversely affect me, regarding Trust Corpus, Trust Assets, Trust paid expenses that were deducted against Trust Corpus, Trust paid expenses improperly allocated between Trust Corpus & Income, & unsubstantiated Trust paid expenses, deducted against Corpus, w/o back-up docs for review that were requested by me, as qualified Remainder Beneficiary, that [...], as Co-Trustee, was obligated to provide, as required by NJ R.3B:31-67 (Exh, “L", p. 20, par. 11) (128a).
[brief] [...] CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT [...]’S PROJECT QUALIFIES FOR EXEMPTION #11 (Aa0001) | 13 | | A.  The Plain Language Of Exemption #11 Does Not Require Upgrades To Be “Routine” (Aa0001) | 15 | | B.  The Construction, Maintenance and Operation Of CS327 Is Consistent With The Goals And Purposes of the Highlands Act (Aa0001) | 22 | | II.  [...]’S DETERMINATION THAT [...]’S PROJECT IS CONSISTENT WITH THE WQMP IS NOT ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS (Aa0001) | 26 | | CONCLUSION | 31 | | Cases | Page | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------| | Bergen Pines Hosp. V. Dept. Of Human Serv., | 11, 12, 25, 31 | | 96 N.J. 456 (1984) | | | Campbell v. Dept. of Civil Service | 10, 11 | | 39 N.J. 556 (1963) | | | Clowes v. Terminix Int’l., Inc.
[brief] PROCEDURAL HISTORY  Plaintiffs filed a Complaint, an Action In Lieu of Prerogative Writs, in this matter on May 18, 2017, challenging a noise ordinance of the [...].  Da1.  On July 19, 2017, Defendant filed an Answer to Complaint and Separate Defenses.  Da23.  On June 29, 2017, Plaintiffs filed an Amended Complaint.  Da32.  Thereafter, on August 28, 2017, Defendant filed an Answer to Amended Complaint and Separate Defenses.  Da48.  The parties, pursuant to the Court’s direction and in preparation for a pretrial conference on September 6, 2017, prepared Pretrial Submissions and filed same with the Court on August 30, 2017 and August 31, 2017 respectively.  On May 3, 2018, counsel for Plaintiffs advised the Court that the parties agreed to dismiss Counts Four, Six, Seven and Eight of the Complaint; however, Counts One, Two, Three and Five remained unresolved.  And pursuant to a July 13, 2018, Case Management Order the Court severed the Third Count (Inverse Condemnation) of the Amended Complaint.  The Honorable [...], A.J.S.C. entered an Amended Pretrial Order on August 15, 2018, and trial briefs were submitted by Plaintiffs on September 14, 2018 and Defendant [...] on October 12, 2018.  Da57.  Trial was held on December 7, 2018\(^1\).  The parties submitted supplemental briefing upon Judge Thornton’s request and an additional hearing took place on March 5, 2019.  On October 24, 2023, the Honorable [...], J.S.C. entered an Order finding [...] Municipal Ordinance 17-2017 preempted by a [...] (“[...]”) Ordinance; unconstitutionally overbroad; and held the [...] Ordinance 17-2017 void.
[directive] AVISO:  Este é um documento público, o que significa que o documento tal como apresentado estará disponível ao público mediante solicitação.  Portanto, não inclua dados de identificação pessoal, tais como número de Social Security, número da carteira de motorista, número da placa do veículo, número da apólice de seguro, número de conta financeira ativa ou número de cartão de crédito ativo.  NOTICE:  This is a public document, which means the document as submitted will be available to the public upon request.  Therefore, do not enter personal identifiers on it, such as Social Security number, driver’s license number, vehicle plate number, insurance policy number, active financial account number, or active credit card number.
[directive] IAPP.  E.  IAPP is further amended as follows:  Additional changes to 2.2.3(b)  Unfounded.  A preponderance of the evidence shows that the misconduct alleged did not occur.  2.2.3(c)  Exonerated.  A preponderance of the evidence shows the alleged conduct did occur, but did not violate any law; regulation; directive, guideline, policy, or procedure issued by the Attorney General or County Prosecutor; agency protocol; standing operating procedure; rule; or training.  (For example, at the conclusion of an investigation into an excessive force allegation, the agency finds that the officer used force (alleged conduct) but that the force was not excessive (alleged violation). )  4.2.5  Law enforcement executives shall not assign to the internal affairs function any person responsible for representing members of a collective bargaining unit.  The conflict of interest arising from such an assignment would be detrimental to the internal affairs function, the subject officer, the person so assigned, the bargaining unit and the Also, a bargaining unit representative agency as a whole. should not be permitted to represent more than one witness or subject in a single investigation, in part to avoid potential conflicts of interest.
[brief] (Pa0261 at Art. 11.2.)  With respect to specific performance, the trial court’s order for specific performance is premised on its erroneous determination as to the parties’ obligations under the PSA.  To that end, Defendants attempt to distinguish this case from 89 Water Street Assocs. v. Reilly, 2019 WL 4793073 (App. Div. Oct. 1, 2019) (unpublished opinion, cited in accordance with R. 1:36-3) (see Pa2383-92), on the grounds that the contract in 89 Water Street Assocs. “laid the obligation on the Seller” to secure the clearance document (i.e., the RAO), whereas Defendants’ obligation here, they contend, was only to cooperate with Plaintiff.
[brief] The Trial Court’s reasoning, if read aloud, would not evoke a loud guffaw or involuntary gasp.  See D’Atria v. D’Atria, supra.  For all of the foregoing reasons, the Trial Court properly denied [...]’s Motion for reconsideration.  Conclusion.  For all of the foregoing reasons, the Trial Court’s September 26, 2022 Order granting summary judgment in favor of [...], and the November 18, 2022 Order denying [...]’s motion for reconsideration of the summary judgment, should be affirmed.  Respectfully submitted, [...]  [...]  Dated: 11/09/2023  By: [...], Esquire  Attorney for Defendant/Respondent, [...] Contents Services, Inc.
[brief] LEGAL ARGUMENT I.  Respondents Misrepresent the Relief [...] Seeks.  (1a).  Respondents not only contort the issue raised in this appeal but also misrepresent the relief sought by [...].  The issue raised in this appeal is whether the Borough can create and publish a process to evaluate applications related to retail cannabis licenses and then failed to follow the very process it adopted.  [...] respectfully submits that the Borough cannot abandon the process in mid-stream and must adhere to the review criteria it publicly announced it would use in evaluating applications.  See Kane Props., LLC v.  City of Hoboken, 325 N.J. 199, 229 (2013) (stating that when governing body adopts an ordinance it must follow that ordinance).  The Borough’s failure to follow its own process resulted in an arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable decision.  Respondents spend pages of their briefs discussing whether the Borough complied with N.J.S.A. 24:61-36.  [...], however, is not arguing that the Borough did not comply with N.J.S.A. 24:61-36.  Rather, the record confirms that the Borough adopted a process and criteria that the Borough publicly announced it would be using to evaluate applications.  But the Borough did not follow its own process, and [...] is challenging the Borough’s failure to adhere to its process, as it is required to do.  To be certain, on October 11, 2022, the Borough published a document titled, “Municipal Cannabis Business License Application Evaluation Criteria” (“Evaluation Sheet”), via the Borough’s website stating:  The criteria enumerated thereunder were provided to the public via the Borough’s website, to ensure transparency in the evaluation process and as previously stated, were discussed during various Subcommittee meetings as a means to direct the Subcommittee’s deliberations.  [(48a-63a (emphasis added))].  The Evaluation Sheet states: “The Borough’s Cannabis Subcommittee will review and evaluate each Applicant based on the following criteria in making its recommendation to the Borough Council. ”  (Ibid. (emphasis added)).  Any suggestion by Respondents that the Borough did not adopt or formally announce criteria to evaluate the applications, therefore, is contradicted by the record before the Court.  Moreover, [...] is not asking the Court to substitute its judgment for that of the Borough or the trial court.  [...] simply is asking this Court to conclude that it was arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable for the Borough to adopt a process and criteria for evaluating applications and then fail to abide by its own procedure.  If the Court reaches that conclusion, the trial court’s order affirming the resolution must be reversed and the matter remanded for the Borough to consider the applications pursuant to the process and criteria it adopted.  II.
[directive] VI.  A Certificate shall no longer be valid if the person is indicted for a first or A. second degree crime or convicted of a crime.  A Certificate may be revoked at any time upon application of the prosecutor B. or on the Court’s own initiative when information is received that circumstances have materially changed such that the relief would not be authorized or is no longer in the public interest.  Upon presentation of satisfactory proof that the criminal charges or C. indictment have been dismissed, or of an acquittal after trial, a revoked Certificate may be reinstated by the Court.  Revised: 03/2024, CN: XXXXX Page of 7
[directive] Furthermore, immediate assure the necessary to is reasonably other restraint or no-contact of imposition a acomplaint-warrant of issuance moreover, that subsection Note, 4.6.3. victim.  See the of protection defendant of if release revocation or pretrial detention, for applying the of preserve option would the by bracelet) monitoring ankle (an seek electronic and/or condition, to release were a violate to Section See 4.6. condition. release program a services as pretrial pursuant case violence a in domestic acomplaint-summons toissue decision the that note Also of Prevention Domestic the in forth policy arrest set mandatory the impact does Directive not this to acomplaint-warrant for apply to whether determination
[brief] ..................................................  37 Weiss v. New Jersey Transit, 128 N.J. 376 (1992) ..............................................................................  39 Statutes New Jersey Tort Claims Act .....................................................................14, 38 Other Authorities  Federal Manual of Traffic Control Devices available at https://mutcd.fhwa.dot.gov/pdfs/2009r1r2/mutcd2009r1r2editio n.pdf ...........................................................................................................  27 New Jersey Rule of Evidence 703 ............................................................17, 19, 30 New Jersey Court Rule 1:6-2(d).................................................................35, 37  New Jersey Court Rule 104.......................................................................passim | Proceeding Type | Proceeding Date | Transcript Number | |-----------------------------------------------------|-----------------|-------------------| | Oral Argument on Defendant [...]’s Motion for Summary Judgment | 9/27/2019 | 1T | | Oral Argument on Defendant [...]’s Motion for Summary Judgment | 3/18/2022 | 2T | | Rule 104 Hearing | | 3T | #
[brief] Anspach v. City of Phila., Dep’t of Pub. Health, 503 F.3d 256 (3d Cir. 2007) .............................................................................. 32, 33 Blau v. Fort Thomas Pub. Sch. Dist., 401 F.3d 381 (6th Cir. 2005) ..................................................................................36  C.N. v. Ridgewood Bd. of Educ., 430 F.3d 159 (3d Cir. 2005) ....................................................................................36  C.V. v. Waterford Twp. Bd. of Educ., 255 N.J. 289 (2023) .................................................................................................. 4, 16, 24 Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760 (2003)
[brief] Moreover, a decision denying a suppression motion is not final insofar as it is still amenable to a motion for reconsideration.  See State v. Keogh, No. A-0773-23 (App. Div. Feb. 7, 2025)\(^6\) (a trial court has an “inherent power” to “review, revise, reconsider, and modify its interlocutory orders at any time prior to the entry of final judgment”) (citing Lombardi v. Masso, 207 N.J. 517, 534 (2011)).  This Court specifically emphasized that interlocutory orders like the \(^5\) Other jurisdictions have reached the same result. See People v. Hernandez, 155 Colo. 519, 395 P.2d 733 (1964) (order sustaining motion to suppress evidence in narcotics case was not a final judgment); State v. Curcio, 191 Conn. 27, 463 A.2d 566 (1983) (denial of pretrial motion to suppress is purely interlocutory and, therefore, is not appealable as a final judgment); Doe v. State, 185 Ga. App. 347, 364 S.E.2d 78 (1987) (order denying motion to suppress is not a final judgment and must be reviewed under interlocutory appeal procedure); McDowell v. State, 158 Ga. App. 712, 282 S.E.2d 125 (1981) (because denial of motion to suppress evidence is not a final judgment, appeal dismissed for want of jurisdiction where defendant failed to follow prescribed interlocutory appeal procedures); Matthews v. State, 59 Md. App. 15, 474 A.2d 530 (1984) (order granting motion to suppress could properly be reconsidered upon motion of the State because it was not a final judgment); State v. Ensor, 27 Md. App. 670, 342 A.2d 1 (1975) (order granting motion to suppress evidence was interlocutory a not a final judgment); State v. Donley, 2017 Ohio 562, 85 N.E.3d 324 (Ohio Ct. App. 2d Dist. Montgomery County 2017) (trial court was authorized to reconsider its ruling on defendant's motion to suppress evidence because the ruling was interlocutory and not final judgment in defendant's criminal case); Martinez v. Craven, 429 F2d 18 (9th Cir. 1970) (order granting defendant's motion was not final judgment on merits and, therefore, doctrine of res judicata did not apply).
[brief] *Id.* at 337-38.  Specifically, in his LAD action, [...]’s position was that he was not disabled from his employment with a reasonable accommodation.  *Id.* at 335.  To be considered for Ordinary Disability, [...] was required to certify he is disabled.  *Id.* at 336.  Thus, [...] was legally barred by the operation of “the doctrine of judicial estoppel” from filing his application for Ordinary Disability while his LAD action was pending.  *Ibid.*  The court noted that it has found “equitable and countervailing considerations” in particular circumstances to allow a plaintiff to assert a claim.
[brief] *Newark v. Natural Resource Council*, 82 N.J. 530, 539-41, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 983 (1980); *In re Vey*, 272 N.J. Super. 199, 205 (App. Div. 1993), aff'd, 135 N.J. 306 (1994).  This is particularly true when it comes to matters involving employee discipline at correctional facilities.
[brief] N.J.S.A. 13:1D-1.  The Governor appoints the commissioner of the department with the advice and consent of the Senate and to serve at the pleasure of the Governor.  N.J.S.A. 13:1B-2.  The Commissioner’s role is to “coordinate and oversee the DEP’s environmental protection and conservation initiatives. ”  N.J.S.A. 13:1B-3.  The Commissioner’s duties include the administration of the work of the department, the appointment and removal of officers and the exercise and discharge of functions, powers and duties of the department through divisions.  N.J.S.A. 13:1B-3.  While the Commissioner had the right to approve or disapprove of comprehensive policies for the protection of fish, birds and game animals that are formulated by the Council, the Commissioner does not have the authority to formulate those comprehensive policies.
[brief] [Da094a, at Paragraph 23 (emphasis added). ]  Importantly, the term “Claims” was not limited to claims involving [...] as [...] suggests in her brief (See Db10).  To the contrary, the Trial Court correctly recognized that the term “Claims” applies to “any and all” claims against [...], [...], [...], [...] and [...], among other instruments and individuals as noted above.  (Da094a; see also Da274a-75a.)  Immediately following [...]’s broad release, the parties included a paragraph that excepted certain rights from the breadth of the Paragraph 23 release.  (Da094a-96a.)  In a provision expressly addressing the [...], Paragraph 24(F) of the Settlement Agreement: (i) created a carveout allowing [...] to retain certain limited rights to use the [...] arising under [...] and; (ii) confirms her release of all other “Claims, rights or interests” in the property that carve out provision preserved:  [[...]]’s rights and interest in the [...] as set forth in Section 3.3(A)(4)(d) of [...] including, without limiting any other rights, interests or obligations that [[...]] may have as expressly provided by Section 3.3(A)(4)(d), the following: (i) her right to make use of the [...] for a period of not more than twenty-one (21) days per year; and (ii) her right to receive a portion of the sale proceeds in the event of a sale of the [...] as provided therein.  The Parties acknowledge that [[...]]’s portion of the proceeds of any sale shall be reduced by the amount of any and all legal fees, other professional fees and expenses described more fully in Section 3.3(A)(4)(d) of [...] and the Parties acknowledge that such fees and expenses total fifty-three million, seven-hundred forty-nine thousand, eight hundred and three dollars ($53,749,803).  For the avoidance of doubt, [[...]] agrees to comply with all conditions and obligations imposed upon her by Section 3.3(A)(4)(d) and to refrain from asserting any Claims, rights or interests with respect to the [...] other than as may be necessary to enforce the rights and interests provided to her by Section 3.3(A)(4)(d).  [Da095a-96a, Paragraph 24(F) (emphasis added). ]  Accordingly, [...] relinquished all “Claims, rights or interests” with respect to the Estate’s 21.5% interest in the [...] when she executed the Settlement Agreement.  (Id.)  As to the [...], she retained only her rights under Section 3.3(a)(4)(d) of [...].  Again, “Claims” was broadly defined in the release contained in Paragraph 23 of the Settlement Agreement and that same broadly-defined term was used again in Paragraphs 24(F) and (G).  (Da094a-96a.)  IV.
[brief] TABLE OF AUTHORITIES  Bender v. Walgreen E. Co., 399 N.J. Super. 584 (App. Div. 2008)  .......................1  Berman v. Gurwicz, 189 N.J. Super. 89, 93–94, 458 A.2d 1311, 1313–14 (Ch. Div. 1981), aff’d, 189 N.J. Super. 49, 458 A.2d 1289 (App. Div. 1983)  .........................11  Couri v. Gardner, 173 N.J. 328, 340, 801 A.2d 1134, 1141 (2002).....................4, 5  Mazur v. Crane’s Mill Nursing Home, 441 N.J. Super. 168, 183, 117 A.3d 181, 191 (App. Div. 2015) ...........................................................................................................3