ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] ”  1T20:1-4\(^5\).  As soon as that happened, the suspect made eye contact with him again and then began to move faster.  1T20:5-6 and 69:24-70:1.  [...] testified that he was about five feet away from the suspect at this point, and he observed the suspect had a fanny pack around his torso and that it was swaying from left to right “like it had something heavy in it.
[brief] ARGUMENT I. STANDARD OF REVIEW (Not Argued Below).  The Appellate Division’s standard of review of a trial court's factual findings and conclusions of law is well-settled.  This Court is only bound by the findings of the court below when that are supported by adequate, substantial, and credible evidence.  Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Investors Ins. Co. of Am., 65 N.J. 474, 484, (1974).  Thus, this Court is empowered to disturb the factual findings and legal conclusions of the trial judge when it is convinced that they are so manifestly unsupported by or inconsistent with the competent, relevant and reasonably credible evidence as to offend the interests of justice.  *Rova Farms* id.  A trial court’s interpretation of the law and the legal consequences that flow form established facts are not entitled to any special deference.  See *Manalapan Realty v. Manalapan Twp. Comm.*, 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995).  An award of counsel fees in a matrimonial action is discretionary.  On appeal, a decision regarding counsel fees will be reversed upon a showing of an abuse of discretion involving a clear error in judgment.  *Tannen v. Tannen*, 416 N.J. Super. 248, 285 (App. Div. 2010), aff’d, 208 N.J. 409 (2011).  When a court of review address a trial court's construction of a statute, its review is *de novo*.  In that inquiry, the court of review looks to the Legislature's intent as expressed in the statute's plain terms.  *Matter of A.D.*, 259 N.J. 337, 351 (2024).  In this matter, the factual findings of the court below are entitled to a lower level of deference, if any, because of the Due Process infirmities from which those factual findings are borne.  A litigant in civil proceedings is entitled to a fair hearing, imbued with the protections of due process.  The due process guarantee expressed in the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution includes “the requirement of “fundamental fairness” in a legal proceeding.  D.N. v. K.M., 429 N.J. Super. 592, 602 (App. Div. 2013).  Criminal proceedings such as this are entitled to equal or greater due process protections.  II.
[directive] Legal advice via a Special Victims’ Counsel  The DoD SafeHelpline is a 24/7 crisis support service for adult service members of the DoD community affected by sexual assault.  The Safe Helpline provides live, one-on-one expert advice and information.  SafeHelpline staff can also transfer callers to the installation or base SARC, on-call SAPR VAs, civilian sexual violence services organizations, or the Suicide Prevention Lifeline.  Victims can access the SafeHelpline the following three ways:    Online: Log on to www.safehelpline.org to receive live, one-on-one confidential help with a trained professional through a secure instant-messaging format;   Telephone: Call 1-877-995-5247 to speak with Safe Helpline staff for personalized advice and support; and   Text: Text your location to 55-247 (inside the U.S.) or 202-470-5546 (outside of the U.S.) to receive automated contact information for the SARC at their installation or base.  Victims may also speak to a chaplain.  While a report to a chaplain is not a restricted report under the policy, it is a privileged communication protected under the Military Rules of Evidence.16  For further information, consult the DOD’s Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Office.
[brief] Suppression of the tire iron must not be underestimated.  Trial argued in summation that [...]’s injuries resulted from his crashing into an object in the woods.  (9T 131-23 to 132).  Therefore, absent the tire iron’s discovery, the State’s case relied upon the dubious credibility of [...], the fugitive, who possessed approximately ten prior convictions (2T 190-5 to 199-6); and [...], the possessor of four prior convictions, who previously had denied that defendant had a weapon or assaulted anyone, and whose recommended sentence in this matter was contingent upon her “truthful” testimony.  (4T 9-2 to 10-10; 4T 53-4 to 18; 4T 57-12 to 58-13).  Therefore, trial counsel’s failure to move to suppress the tire iron established a prima facie case of ineffectiveness pursuant to the Strickland/Fritz two-pronged test and/or the Cronic/Davis per se analyses, thereby necessitating an evidentiary hearing to resolve defendant’s claim.
[brief] The only reason Defendant can make this convoluted argument is because the driveway is located in Florence; if the driveway was in Mansfield, Defendant’s entire argument falls apart as there is no question that the remaining accessory uses are calculated by square footage.  Ja097; Ja146; Ja158-Ja159; 4T 9:5-25.  The driveway’s location in Florence means everything, as it is the “Jenga” block upon which Defendant’s entire argument is built.  A glance at the project’s site plan illustrates the proximity of Mansfield’s border to the Interstate 295 interchange.  See Ja72-Ja73.  Simply put, the driveway has to be in Florence for reasons of safety and functionality.  (1T 34:2-23; 2T 77:12-18).  Defendant bases its argument on the following line of logic: the driveway is in Florence, cars will leave that driveway and travel through roads also in Florence, traffic is a function of intensity of use, increased height increases intensity of use, the building in Mansfield is taller than permitted in Florence, and therefore it will be a more intense use with more traffic that will travel roads in Florence.  This entire theory is a farce, not only unsupported by reality, or any evidence in the record, but actually contradicted by them.
[brief] Thus, the facts of the case at bar are more aligned with Gonzalez—a case that actually analyzed subsequent performance under the CFA—than DepoLink.  Á propos, relevant to Defendants’ unlicensed debt collection activity here, the DepoLink court acknowledged that violations of the CFA can arise from “affirmative misrepresentation[s], even if unaccompanied by knowledge of [their] falsity. ”  DepoLink, 430 N.J. Super. at 338 (quoting Monogram Credit Card Bank of Ga. v. Tennesen, 390 N.J. Super. 123, 133 (App.Div.2007)).  Here, Defendants affirmatively misrepresented that they were legally allowed to enforce [...]’s alleged debt when they lacked the licensure to do so—thus committing fraud in connection with the subsequent performance of the sale of merchandise.  Lastly, the New Jersey Supreme Court reiterated the broad scope of the CFA in a decision in response to a question certified to it by the Third Circuit in Sun Chemical Corporation v. Fike Corporation, 243 N.J. 319 (2020).
[brief] (340a ¶ 20 – 341a ¶ 22).  Critically, Respondents never provided [...] with “bank statements, balance sheets, financial documents, or any similar documents demonstrating [their] assets, liabilities or ability to fund litigation. ” (340a ¶ 16).  It is axiomatic that Appellants do not believe Respondents have a proverbial war chest; this entire dispute arises from Respondents’ inability to pay back loans owed to Appellants, so no unique insight can be gleaned from this vague information about “attitudes. ”  Respondents use of vague terms is a tacit admission they cannot point to specific information that can be used against Respondents in this case.  Moreover, the [...] disputes the *in camera, ex parte* Certification of [...].  Therein, [...] states: - He represented [...] in the [...] matter (339a ¶ 4); - He represented [...] in the [...] matter (339a ¶ 5); - He is *not* involved in this instant matter (339a ¶ 6); - The [...] matter bears no factual relation to this matter (339a ¶ 8); - The [...] matter also bears no factual relation to this matter (339a ¶ 11); - Both matters were resolved by or before May 17, 2021 (339a ¶ 9; 340a ¶ 12); - [...] only told him information related to those [...] and [...] matters (340a ¶ 14); • Respondents did not disclose any information about [...]’s business operations or practices beyond information needed to litigate those two matters (340a ¶ 15); • Respondents did not provide any bank statements, balance sheets, financial documents, or comparable documents to [...] (340a ¶ 16); • The only “confidential business plans” provided to [...] regarded a non-party, [...] Waste Management (340a ¶ 17); • The general business information provided has no relation to the allegations of this matter, which involve allegations of Appellants’ misappropriation of funds and Respondents’ failure to repay loans to Appellants (340a ¶ 18); • Respondents’ attitudes towards settlement have no bearing on their attitudes in this matter (340a-341a ¶ 21); • [...] predominantly communicated with Respondents’ secretary after an initial consultation with Respondents (341a ¶ 22); and • [...] was not aware of any document that would prejudice Respondents (341a ¶ 23).
[brief] The terms of the PSA contemplated that the title to the real property would be conveyed directly to Plaintiff at the closing – and not to [...].  *(Pa104, PSA § 6.1; Pa111, PSA § 10.3; Pa3-4, Complaint, ¶ 9).*  Hence, read logically and in context, the use of the word “*thereupon*” in that clause simply establishes that Plaintiff’s ability to seek specific performance is triggered if and when [...] proceeds to close the transaction with the Fee Owner and “*thereupon*” fails to ensure that title to the real property is conveyed directly to Plaintiff.  *(Pa115-116, PSA § 13.1).*  *See Republic Bus. Credit Corp. v. Camhe-Marcille*, 381 N.J. Super. 563, 568-69 (App Div. 2005) (“*[w]ords and phrases are not to be isolated but related to the context and the contractual scheme as a whole, and given the meaning that comports with the probate intent and purpose.*”).  By giving undue emphasis to the word “*thereupon*” (while altogether disregarding the phrases “notwithstanding the foregoing” and “in addition to its termination right” in the same sentence), the trial court ignored well-settled precepts of contract construction and concluded that [...]’s obligations to Plaintiff under the PSA totally ceased when the Earnest Money Deposit was returned to Plaintiff in July 2022 – regardless of the fact that [...] went ahead and closed on the transaction with the Seller and “thereupon” failed and refused to arrange for the Fee Owner to convey title to Plaintiff, as contemplated by the PSA.  (2T, at 12-16; Pa104, PSA § 6.1; Pa111, PSA § 10.3).  This flawed construction of Section 13.1 of the PSA enabled [...] to cut Plaintiff out of the deal and close with the Fee Owner with total impunity, while leaving Plaintiff without any remedy for the tremendous loss of the contract value and the heavy expenses it had incurred in order to arrange for financing of its end of the deal.  (Pa5, Complaint, ¶ 19).  This interpretation of the contract is unsound and inconsistent with the public policy against rewarding a party for breaching its contractual duties.  See Saxon Const. & Mgmt. Corp., 273 N.J. Super. at 238.  Finally, the trial court’s reasoning entirely ignored the Complaint’s allegations that, after the return of the Earnest Money Deposit, [...] and [...] took affirmative steps to conceal the closing from Plaintiff.  Indeed, after the deposit had been returned to Plaintiff, [...] instructed [...] not to tell Plaintiff of the anticipated closing.  (Pa11-12, Complaint, ¶¶ 42-48).2  2  As discussed above, in September 2022, after the Earnest Money Deposit had been returned, [...] of [...] falsely told Plaintiff that the deal Republic informed Plaintiff that the transaction was “on hold” and that it would advise Plaintiff if that changed. (Pa11-12, Complaint, ¶¶ 42-48).  If [...] and [...] truly believed that Plaintiff had no right to participate in the transaction with the Fee Owner, they would have had no reason to collude and affirmatively work to deceive and conceal the details of the transaction from Plaintiff.  **POINT III**
[brief] ”  As pointed out in Appellant’s brief pursuant to his Motion for Reconsideration of the Order of 4/4/2022 (paragraph no. 22) the Court’s statement is:  “...simply not true.  It appears that the Court misread [...]’s letter of 2/18/2022 (Exhibit W) wherein she discussed conferring with her client, Probation, and not Defendant.  For the record, no effort whatsoever was made by Probation to confer with me.
[directive] Recent decisions from the Appellate Division have addressed whether marijuana-related offenses pending against the same defendant in different municipal courts may be consolidated with the defendant’s consent, pursuant to Rule 7:8-4, in order to maintain the defendant’s eligibility for a diversion program.  See State v. Whooley, No. A-3395-15T2, 2017 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2016 (App. Div. Aug. 8, 2017); State v. Sokolovski, No. A-4734-15T2, 2017 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2537 (App. Div. Sept. 17, 2017).
[brief] Such determinations regarding issues distinctly within the realm of “planning” are those for which planning boards are granted “wide latitude in the exercise of [their] delegated discretion” due to their “peculiar knowledge of local conditions. ”  Fallone Props., LLC v. Bethlehem Twp. Planning Bd., 369 N.J. Super. 552, 651 (App. Div. 2004) (quoting Burbridge v. Mine Hill Twp., 117 N.J. 376, 385 (1990)).
[brief] *Id.*, at 27:21 to 25.  Thus, without any certification or affidavit from any member of the Court’s staff or anything from the Plaintiff, the Court rejected the certification.  Doing so, it made unsupported assumptions concerning the experience, knowledge and sophistication of both the adjuster and the members of its staff and erroneously “read into” the certification an assertion that Plaintiff had purposely attempted to influence the jury.  The trial court’s analysis failed to distinguish Plaintiff’s conduct during trial from his conduct prior thereto.
[brief] SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY  APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. [...]  STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. [...], Defendant-Appellant.  CRIMINAL ACTION  On Appeal from a Judgment of Conviction of the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Monmouth County.  Indictment No. [...]  Sat Below: Hon. [...], J.S.C., and a Jury  REDACTED
[brief] [...] could have declined to address the express easement claim but instead chose to decide it squarely on the merits, and rejected it for lack of any supporting deed language.  See part III of [...]’s decision (“Express Easement Claim”) and the Conclusion (“Plaintiff has failed to show a prima facie case for an express, implied or prescriptive easement. ”)(emphasis added)  (Da106-Da107)  Having done so, the issue must be considered actually litigated.
[brief] ---  3  Plaintiff cross-appealed from the First and Second Stay Continuation Orders.  Those orders granted a stay pending appeal conditioned on posting timely a supersedeas bond that the court below set in the amount of $645,000.00.  Plaintiff contended that the bond amount should be higher and that the stay of delivery of the Sheriff’s Deed should be dissolved.  Defendants failed to post the bond and the stay was dissolved.  The Sheriff delivered the Deed, which Plaintiff has submitted for recording.  This moots Plaintiff’s cross-appeal and therefore Plaintiff has not addressed its own cross-appeal.  SB PB [...], Plaintiff, v. [...], [...], [...], [...], AND [...], Defendants.
[brief] (23T113-22 to 25; 23T114-5 to 7; 23T115-16 to 18).  Defendant told the disc jockey to stop playing the music.  He then left the stage.  (23T114-13 to 14).  When he was off the stage, he claimed to hear people saying they would "smoke" him.  (23T116-5 to 11).  He estimated the time to be around 1:30 a.m. (23T116-21 to 23).  Defendant claimed that a friend of his named [...] came up to him in a nervous and excited state.  (23T120-4 to 11).  They spoke after which defendant became scared.  (23T121-8 to 14).  [...] asked defendant if he could give [...] and two female friends a ride, and defendant said yes.
[brief] “The jury should be instructed in terms of inferences which may or may not be drawn from a fact, the jury being at liberty to find the ultimate fact one way or the other. ”  State v. Stasio, 78 N.J. 467 (1979).  “Of course, the State must still be held to its burden of proving each element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt, and that burden may not be shifted to the defendant. ”  Thomas, 132 N.J. at 256-57.
[brief] Frontline Asset Strategies, LLC, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61015, 2018 WL 1744674 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 11, 2018)  ...........................................  24 Funderburke v. Midland Funding, L.L.C., No. 12-2221-JAR-DJW, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13438, 2013 WL 394198 (D. Kan. Feb. 1, 2013)
[brief] He “fired once in the air, just to get them to back off,” and then ran toward his car.  (23T 173-2 to 175-2; 24T 203-8 to 10)  As he ran, he heard two more shots; he heard four or five in total but did not see the shooter or shooters.  (23T 175-2 to 7)  [...], who was running across the parking lot in front of Harriott, saw a “big guy” in a hat holding a gun coming at him.  (22T 236-6 to 237-2, 241-17 to 23, 291-14 to 23)  [...] thought he was “about to die,” and swung a bottle at the gunman.  [...] testified that the gunman tried to block the bottle with his left hand while holding the gun in his right hand.  (22T 243-3 to 245-7, 246-11 to 13; 23T 175-11 to 18; 24T 203-16 to 20)8  After trying to fend off the gunman, [...] ran toward the parking-lot exit.  (22T 245-9 to 16, 246-25 to 247-2)  But then he “saw someone else with a --- 8  [...] was initially charged with assault for swinging the bottle, but the charges were dropped.
[brief] Pa49-62.  [...] contacted [...] regarding the [...] Louver Roof system and engaged in discussions with both [...] and the Sales Director for [...], who provided product specifications, architectural binder, customization options, and a manual for the [...] product.  Pa49-62; 1T 160-161.  The parties engaged in discussions over a period of months regarding the customization of the product to [...]’s plans and the veranda it would cover.
[brief] Realty LLC v. Sport-A-Rama, 2013 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2550 (Essex County 2013), “most residential evictions are based on the grounds provided in N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.1 whereas all commercial evictions are based on the grounds found at N.J.S.A. 2A:18-53 .  . . .”  Seeking eviction for non- payment of money is speedy, efficient, and usually results in judgment of possession within weeks of filing.  At common law, self-help evictions were not unlawful and were frequently practiced.  *Vasquez v. Glassboro Serv. Ass'n*, 83 N.J. 86, 105, 415 A.2d 1156 (1980) (citing *Mershon v. Williams*, 62 N.J.L. 779, 784, 42 A. 778 (E. & A. 1899)).  Some landlords resorted to ejectment actions which were “slow and expensive. ”  *Id*.
[directive] See system. with arisk-based system pretrial release resource-based current the replacing limited some In appropriate. and is authorized bail monetary where however, cases be There may, the that amount bail an at monetary setting by flight discourage to possible be may it situations, only is bail monetary used that ensure  To forfeit. to afford not could but post to afford can defendant a preventing of purpose the for is sought and not court in appear to defendant a incentivize to having without bail monetary of imposition seek shall not prosecutor a release, defendant's amount requested the post to used be could that assets has defendant the that indicate information to the that in amount bail monetary an of imposition seek shall not prosecutor A bail. monetary of satisfy. to afford cannot defendant 56 Page Monetary Bail.
[brief] As Garrison makes clear, “[i]f a public entity’s property is dangerous only when used without due care, the property is not in a ‘dangerous condition. ’”  Garrison, 154 N.J. at 287 (emphasis added).  “When the property poses a danger to all users,” id. at 292, such as the “residents of the surrounding public housing units just trying to live their lives,” Def. [...]’s Brief at 26, “an injured party may establish that property was in a dangerous condition notwithstanding his or her failure to exercise due care. ”  Garrison, 154 N.J. at 292.  Defendant [...] argues, and Plaintiffs agree, that “[a] reasonable use of the [Subject Premises] (i.e., an outdoor public basketball court/common area) would be for playing basketball or some such other related activity. ”  Def. [...]’s Brief at 27.  Defendant [...] ignores the fact that members of the general public present at the Subject Premises while the illegal, large, makeshift liquor concession stand was operating may have been at the Subject Premises to play basketball or otherwise “live their lives” and not consume alcohol.  The illegal, large, makeshift liquor concession stand was a danger to all users of the Subject Premises, whether or not they acted with due care, and whether or not they were there to purchase alcohol.
[brief] ”  N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-8(f).  In this case, the City negotiated and collected the $2 million redevelopment fee from [...] in order to effectuate the purpose of the LRHL as well as the terms of the Amended Redevelopment Plan.  In this case, it is the actual development of the 290 Property itself which effectuates the purpose of the LRHL and the Amended Redevelopment Plan.  The City negotiated and collected the $2 million fee as a contractual consideration to enable [...] to redevelop the [...] Property in accordance with the terms of the Amended Redevelopment Plan.
[brief] Our Supreme Court has affirmed that “a random stop based on nothing more than a non-particularized racial description of the person sought is especially subject to abuse. ”  *State v. Shaw*, 213 N.J. 398, 420-21 (2012).  In *Shaw*, police went to a multi-unit building to execute an arrest warrant for a fugitive.  *Id.* at 401, 411.  The officers saw two Black men, the defendant and another individual, exit the building and immediately part ways, seemingly after seeing the officers.  *Id.* at 403.  “[T]he only features that [the testifying officer] could say [the defendant] shared in common with the targeted fugitive were that both were black and both were men. ”  *Id.* at 403.  That similarity did not create reasonable suspicion to justify the stop, even when considering the officer’s suspicion that the defendant and other man parted ways to avoid police attention.  *Id.* at 411-12; see also *State v. Nyema*, 249 N.J. 509, 531 (2022) (Holding that the defendant matching a description of suspects’ race and sex alone was of little to no value in a reasonable suspicion analysis).
[directive] D. C. B. E. A. Section 66 60 69 in #3 54 60 63  Characteristic 48 54 57  Offense 63 54 60  Special 57 48 54 (See 42 48 51  #5  Table use marijuana, 48 42 51 36 42 45 or 30 36 39 methamphetamine 2C:35-7 ZONE) 36 42 45 of N. J.S.A. amount SCHOOL 39 30 36 1 TABLE first-degree 33 24 30 UNDER (DRUG-FREE a OFFENSES involves 30 36 39 offense 24 30 33 the 18 24 27 If ineligibility).
[brief] The [...] argument against an adverse inference is two-fold.  First, the [...] argued that “is it [not] clear what specific inference [...] is seeking. ” (Rb at 18).  Second, the [...] argued that “[i]f [...] had any questions regarding [...]’s involvement on August 16, 2019, his counsel had the opportunity to ask during his cross-examination. ” (Rb at 19).  Both of these arguments fail to squarely address the issue.