ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The [...] contract further provides that unless specifically “abridged, limited or modified” by the terms of its contract, the State retains its right “to enforce reasonable rules and regulations governing the conduct and activities of employees. ”  Id. at Art. 1 § B.2.  Because there is nothing in the [...] contract that abridges, limits or modifies the State Policy, [...] had jurisdiction to investigate [...]’s alleged violations of the State Policy under N.J.A.C. 4A:7-3.1(a)1.  Nor, as [...] contends, did the alleged State Policy violation arise out of, or involve exclusively, an activity in connection with a union campaign.  (Ab33).  While true that the alleged conduct took place during union electioneering activity, [...]’s allegations are unrelated to any union activity or the election itself.  (Aa19-20; Aa25-26).  Rather, [...] claimed that [...] (a State employee) continuously misnamed her (another State employee), despite being informed about [...]’s preferred name, in violation of the State Policy’s prohibition against discrimination based on gender identity.  Ibid.  Because [...] was not investigating an election dispute, but rather, alleged gender identity discrimination, it had jurisdiction to investigate here.  Finally, though [...] is correct that EERA governs protected union activities under N.J.S.A. 34:13A-5.4a(1), it does not provide carte blanche protection from being investigated for discriminatory conduct unrelated to such activities.  See, e.g., In re Bridgewater, 95, N.J. 235, 237 (1984) (despite EERA protections, public employers still retain the right to take adverse action against an employee for a legitimate business reason, unrelated to the employee’s union activities.).  Thus, because [...] was investigating claims of gender identity discrimination, and not union business, the Commission appropriately found that EERA did not preclude [...]’s investigation of [...]’s conduct, and its final determination should be upheld.  **CONCLUSION**
[brief] If Defendants’ *crazy* story about [...] is not “wholly unbelievable,” then it would be hard to picture what kind of story *would* meet that standard.  Defendants improperly attempt to use [...]’s reputation as a shield against liability, arguing that Defendants had “every reason” to believe [...]’s third-hand version of events because [...] was a “public figure” who “authored three books” promoting girls wearing hijab.  (Db 25-26); (Da 004-06).  But Defendants have it backward—evidence of [...] as a well-known partisan advocate, culture warrior, and author of books in favor of using the hijab, is exactly why [...]’s libel *should have been questioned more* by Defendants, *not less*.  [...]’s bias is explicit on the face of the [...] Statement #1, which she prefaced with a publicity plug for her pro-hijab children’s book.  Am. Compl. ¶¶ 21-26 (Da 013-15) (“I wrote this book with the intention that moments like this would never happen again.  When will it stop?” (emphasis added)).  Using this opportunity to peddle her book and her ideological bias was a bright red flag that should have made Defendants pause before blindly parroting [...]’s third-hand account of an unnamed seven-year-old’s outrageous and wholly unbelievable story.
[brief] This matter comes before the court on Plaintiff’s First Motion to Compel.  (ECF 63.)  By way of this motion, [...] asks the court to order [...] to produce documents in response to [...]’s First Requests for Production of Documents (“RFP”) Nos. 4 and 7.  [...] opposes the motion on the grounds that [...]’s document requests seek irrelevant information that is not proportional to the needs of the case, and the requests are overly broad.  For the reasons stated below, the motion is granted as to RFP No. 4 and denied as to RFP No. 7 and as to [...]’s request for attorneys’ fees.  [...]’s related Motion for Sanctions (ECF 72) is denied.  I.
[brief] Besides [...] submitting a certification regarding his subjective intent, (Da202-04), [...] admitted that [...] did not impact [...]’s relationship with [...].  (Da242 at 18:3-23; Da246 at 34:24 to 35:3).  In addition, [...] admitted that he could not prove damages when --- \(^1\) [...] does not have access to the policy to determine if the word “allege” or “allegation” was used in the exclusion involved in *Superior Integrated Solutions*.  Even so, the Appellate Division held that more than mere “allegations” was required.  he voluntarily dismissed the Underlying Action on the eve of trial on July 25, 2023 – after six years of litigation.
[brief] B. Sentence .....................................................................................................  6  LEGAL ARGUMENT ..........................................................................................  7  POINT I  DEFENDANT’S ANIMAL CRUELTY CONVICTION MUST BE REVERSED BECAUSE THE JURY INSTRUCTIONS FAILED TO DEFINE THE CENTRAL ELEMENT OF THE OFFENSE.  (Not Raised Below)  ...........................................................................................................  7  POINT II  THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING  DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR A JUDGMENT OF ACQUITTAL BECAUSE THE STATE FAILED TO PRESENT EVIDENCE THAT DEFENDANT ACTED UNNECESSARILY OR CRUELLY.  (3T 15-22 to 18-4)  .........................................................................................................................  16  TABLE OF CONTENTS  POINT III  THE NON-CUSTODIAL PORTION OF DEFENDANT’S SENTENCE IS ILLEGAL AND MUST BE VACATED BECAUSE THE COURT HAD NO AUTHORITY TO IMPOSE CONDITIONS ON DEFENDANT’S PAROLE SUPERVISION FOR LIFE, AND BECAUSE ALL SENTENCES MUST BE AUTHORIZED BY LAW.  (4T 29-4 to 14)...........................................  18  1.  Sentencing courts lack jurisdiction to impose conditions of parole.  .................................................................  19  2.  Sentencing courts may only impose sentences authorized by statute.  .............................................................  22 CONCLUSION..................................................................................................................................................
[directive] General questions regarding this directive should be directed to the Criminal Practice Division at (609) 815-2900 x55300.  Questions concerning speedy trial motions for leave to appeal should directed to [...] or [...] in the Appellate Division Clerk's Office at (609) 815-2950 x 52618 or x 52623.  Attachment: State  [...] ([...]) ( decided June v. S. 27, 2022) (slip op.) cc: Chief Justice [...]  Hon. [...], P.J.A.D.  Appellate Division Judges  Criminal Presiding Judges  Criminal Division Judges  Municipal Court Presiding Judges  Municipal Court Judges of [...], Chief Staff D. AOC Directors and Assistant Directors of Clerks Court Special Assistants to the Administrative Director  Criminal Division Managers and Assistant Division Managers  Municipal Division Managers and Assistant Division Managers  [...], Chief, Criminal Court Services  [...], Chief, Pretrial Services Program  [...], Chief, Municipal Court Services  [...], Chief, Municipal Court Services  [...], Assistant Chief, Criminal Practice  [...], Assistant Chief, Criminal Practice  SYLLABUS  Court’s  This syllabus is not part of the opinion.  It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader.  It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Court and may not summarize all portions of the opinion.
[brief] STATEMENT OF PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL HISTORY  A.  The May 21, 2022 Attack And Beating Of Minor Plaintiff [...]  This litigation arises from a May 21, 2022 incident in which moving Defendant [...] (“[...]”), along with co-defendants [...] and [...], brutally attacked and beat the minor Plaintiff [...]  See generally Plaintiff’s amended complaint, Da94-8.  As a result of Defendants’ attacks, [...] sustained severe injuries, including, but not limited to, a fractured orbit/facial bone requiring the implantation of surgical hardware, a concussion/traumatic brain injury, and severe emotional distress.  Da98, ¶ 19.  On May 21, 2022, [...] and his girlfriend went to a party at a home owned by Defendants Richard and/or [...], which was being attended by minors and non-minors, including current and former students from local high schools.  Da94-6, ¶¶ 1-2, 11.  Alcohol was served or provided to the underaged guests at the Veltri party.  Da95, ¶ 8.  Some of the underaged attendees, including the ones who attacked [...], had previously been provided, served, and/or permitted to consume alcohol by Defendants Ray [...] ([...]’s father) and/or Nicholas and [...] (Defendant N.D.’s parents).  Da120, ¶ 4; Da122, ¶ 7.  ---
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW BY CHARGING BOTH THE RETA AND THE CFA TO THE JURY NOTWITHSTANDING DIRECT CONFLICT BETWEEN THE TWO AND THE NATURE OF THE CASE.  (Da1158-1166; Da1421).  A.  **The Conflict Triggering Application of RETA Only**  On September 24, 2022, [...] submitted its brief in support of proposed jury instructions arguing that the RETA was the only cause of action legally permitted to be submitted to the jury.  [...]’s position was that the RETA requires that a defendant “knowingly engaged in false, deceptive, misleading promotional or sales methods ...” while the CFA does not require any intent or standard of culpability for affirmative acts.  And the RETA statute makes clear that the RETA controls when there is a conflict between it and any other law.
[brief] Respondents Failed To Specifically Identify The Purported Confidential Information (289a – 290a).  Respondents also failed to specifically identify the purportedly confidential information that they claim was disclosed to [...].  Other than facts and information specific to the claims involved in the prior unrelated matters, as is set forth in the Certification of [...], Esq. (the “Shapiro Certification”), Respondents did not provide [...] with confidential information.  (340a ¶¶ 15 – 18).  “To demonstrate a lawyer received confidential information from the prior relationship, the client must make more than bald and unsubstantiated assertions that the lawyer disclosed business, financial and legal information related to the matter for which disqualification is sought. ”  Dental Health Assocs. S. Jersey, P.A. v. RRI Gibbsboro, LLC, 471 N.J. Super. at 194.  Respondents made precisely those types of assertions: undescribed and unsubstantiated assertions of disclosure of a string of vague “business operations, proprietary information, business models, clients, customers, contracts, and Atlas financials” without any description or specification or even identifying a single document or communication.  (115a).  This is precisely what is not permitted for the basis of disqualification.  Not only did Respondents fail to provide any of the allegedly disclosed “financial information,” they failed to even identify what the information is.  Clearly, Respondents did not specifically identify any information because they could not, instead repeatedly resorting to the vague and generalized term “Atlas financials” to obscure their inability to meet their burden.  Respondents then resorted to the misplaced argument that [...] has “insight” into [...]’s attitude towards settlement and litigation based on the prior representations.
[brief] *Cole v. Jersey City Med. Ctr.*, 215 N.J. 265, 280–281 (2013).  *All* of those factors weigh strongly in favor of finding no waiver here.  [...] did not delay in moving to compel arbitration; it pleaded the affirmative defense of contractual arbitration in its first responsive pleading (its Answer).  [...]’s counsel then reached out to Plaintiffs’ counsel in July 2023 to request that they agree to stay the action in favor of arbitration.  When Plaintiffs refused to agree, [...] promptly filed its motion to compel.  No other motions, save for [...]’s motion to compel arbitration and Plaintiffs’ premature motion to compel discovery, have been filed, let alone dispositive motions.  And only very limited, *mandatory* discovery has been conducted: Plaintiffs have answered the Form A Uniform Interrogatories, as they were required to do without action from [...].  No trial date set was set when [...] filed its motion.  And no party would suffer prejudice due to any delay because there has been no delay.  In short, there is no waiver here, as New Jersey case law makes plain.
[brief] N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-41(a).  It is undisputed that at the time of the alleged malpractice, [the AOM doctor] specialized in hematology.  Although hematology is a subspecialty of internal medicine, it is likewise undisputed that [the AOM doctor] did not practice internal medicine at the time of the alleged malpractice.  Accordingly, pursuant to the plain terms of the PFA, as explained by the Court in Nicholas, plaintiff's proffered AOM expert failed to satisfy the statute's kind-for-kind mandate for both defendant doctors.  Pfannenstien, 475 N.J. Super. at 102.  The Court went on to hold that “the PFA's requirement is not satisfied where the affiant's practice falls within a subspecialty of a defendant doctor's specialty, when the subspecialist no longer specializes, nor is board certified, in the specialty. ”  Id.  Furthermore, clarifying the purpose of N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-41:  [T]he apparent objective of N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-41 is to ensure that, when a defendant physician is subject to a medical-malpractice action for treating a patient's condition falling within his [or her] ABMS specialty, a challenging plaintiff's expert, who is expounding on the standard of care, must practice in the same specialty.  Id. at 102-103.  The case at hand is clearly distinguishable from Pfannenstien and meets the objective of N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-41.
[directive] To effect an immediate suspension pending the investigation, at least one of the following conditions must be met: (a) The employee is unfit for duty; (b) The employee is a hazard to any person if permitted to remain on the job; (c) An immediate suspension is necessary to maintain safety, health, order, or effective direction of public services; (d) The employee has been formally charged with a first, second or third degree crime; or (e)  The employee has been formally charged with a first, second, third or fourth degree crime or a disorderly persons offense committed while on duty, or the act touches upon their employment.  5.2.2  Before the immediate suspension of an officer, the law enforcement executive or authorized person should determine which of those criteria apply.  The decision whether or not to continue to pay an officer who has been suspended pending the outcome of the investigation rests with the law enforcement executive and appropriate authority, who should carefully consider all ramifications of these choices.  5.2.3  It should be clear that the suspension of an officer before completing an investigation or disposing of a case is a serious matter.  Such suspensions may be immediately necessary, as in the case of an officer reporting for work under the influence of alcohol.  In other cases, however, a suspension need not be immediate but rather would follow a preliminary investigation into the matter that indicates that one of the above criteria has been met.  In any case, suspension prior to disposing of the case must be clearly documented and justified.  At the time of the suspension, the individual shall be provided with a written statement of the reasons the action has been taken.  (A sample form is found in Appendix 22 INTERNAL AFFAIRS POLICY & PROCEDURES | August 2020 D).  In the event of a refusal by the individual to accept that written statement, a copy shall be provided to the individual's collective bargaining representative as soon as possible.  If a supervisor or commander authorized to do so imposes an immediate suspension, the law enforcement executive must be advised without delay.  He or she will then determine the status of the suspension given the facts of the case in light of the above criteria.  In no case shall an immediate suspension be used as a punitive measure.  23  INTERNAL AFFAIRS POLICY & PROCEDURES | August 2020 6  Investigation of Internal Complaints  6.0.1
[directive] Case No.: _____________  Date of Incident: __________________________________  Arresting Officer: _______________________________________________  Complainant: _______________________________________________  Juvenile: _______________________________________________  Ethnicity*  _____________  D.O.B. _____________  Age ______  Sex: M / F *  1.  Caucasian 2. Black 3. Hispanic 4. Asian/Pacific Islander 5. American Indian 6.  Southern Asian 7.  _______  (If ethnicity is not apparent, ask the subject or her/his parent/guardian/caregiver/designee.)  Parent(s)/Guardian(s)/Designee: ________________________________________________  Address: ________________________________________________  Offense: ________________________________________________  I _____________________________ agree to have the juvenile listed above guided through complainant/victim the stationhouse adjustment program by the ______________________________________ law enforcement agency  I understand that _____________________________ cannot be prosecuted before the juvenile juvenile’s name court if the juvenile fulfills the conditions agreed below.  I ______________________________ admit to my involvement in this offense.  I also waive my juvenile’s name right to a trial in this matter and elect that the above offense be adjusted by the law enforcement agency in this community instead of filing a juvenile complaint with the court.  I agree to abide by the following:  Terms and Conditions  1.  ________________________________________________________________________ ________________________________________________________________________ ________________________________________________________________________  2.  ________________________________________________________________________ ________________________________________________________________________ ________________________________________________________________________  3.  ________________________________________________________________________ ________________________________________________________________________ ________________________________________________________________________  Attorney General Guidelines - Stationhouse Adjustments Page 12  Signatures: Victim/Complainant: ______________________________________________________ (or telephone authorization)  Parent/Guardian/Designee: ______________________________________________________  Juvenile: ______________________________________________________  Officer/Detective: ______________________________________________________  Date: ________________________________________________
[brief] [...] relies on *Ferrante v.  New Jersey Manufacturers Ins. Grp.*, 232 N.J. 460 (2016) in support of its argument, but that case involved the peculiar narrow facts of an insured’s failure to provide notice in the context of an Uninsured Motorist claim.  Unlike *Ferrante* where the insurer’s entitlement to notice and subrogation was clear, [...] has not established its entitlement to anything in the instant matter; its subrogation argument is purely hypothetical.  Moreover, and as acknowledged by [...], the purpose of subrogation is “a device of equity to compel the ultimate discharge of an obligation by the one who in conscience ought to pay it.
[brief] Thus, the robbery charge submitted to the jury on accomplice liability was a second degree offense.  Defendant’s sentence is illegal and he must be resentenced to a term within the second degree range.  For arguments sake, a judgment of conviction for armed robbery could not be sustained based upon the jury’s findings relating to other charges against the defendant.  State v. Smith, 279 N.J. Super. 131, 141-42, 652 A.2d 241, 246-47 (App. Div. 1995) although defendant did not object to the trial court’s failure to instruct the jury on the essential element of accomplice liability—“shared purpose to commit an armed robbery,” our Supreme Court has repeatedly indicated that the failure to charge a jury of an element of an offense is prejudicial error, even in the absence of a request by defense counsel.
[brief] The sentencing court imposed a sentence that was authorized by statute.  The sentence imposed by the sentencing judge was authorized by statute.  Under N.J.S.A. 2C:43-2(d) sentencing courts may order the forfeiture of property…or “any other civil penalty. ”  At the time of Defendant’s sentencing there was not a specific statute that said a sentencing judge could impose the Defendant not to own or have custody or control over any other animals.  Nevertheless, there was also no statute banning such a sentence.  “[I]t is well settled that when reviewing a trial court’s sentencing decision, ‘[a]n appellate court may not substitute its judgement for that of the trial courts.
[brief] These provisions are intended to prevent what occurred along the [...] boardwalk, namely that the massive hotel casino structures were constructed with no setbacks from the boardwalk:  [...] is specifically exempt from the 30% open view and the 2 to 1 step back requirements of the Scenic Resource and Design rule.  *N.J.A.C* 7:7-16.10(d).  [...] and the rest of the State’s Atlantic coast line are bound by those requirements in order to prevent what happened in [...].  The Settlement Agreement also bafflingly explains [...]’s reasoning for waiving adherence to the Scenic Resources and Design Rule as follows:
[brief] [...] cannot make that argument because the custodian certified that they located the responsive emails.  There is no ambiguity about precisely which records Plaintiff seeks—[...] simply needs to comply with the trial court’s order to review the emails, redact them, and produce those records that are not exempt.  Despite having located the records, [...] perplexingly continues to insist that Plaintiff was not specific enough in his request and that his request should be denied for not meeting the hurdles to access it has created.  It cites case law involving drastically different types of requests to justify its position.  For example, it cites decisions which have held that a requestor cannot request “all of an agency’s documents” or the agency’s “entire project file,” especially when no date range was provided.  Plaintiff did not, as [...] claims, request “any and all records on file. ”  Rather, he sought a single type of record (emails) for a discrete date range (three days).  This court and the Supreme Court have found requests for “all” records of a single type—i.e., all settlement agreements, all complaint-summonses, all OPRA requests—to be valid.
[brief] **Legal Argument**  **Point I**  The PCR Court Properly Rejected Defendant’s Claims that His Trial Counsel Was Ineffective by Failing to Investigate the Alleged Alibi Witnesses and by Failing to Hire a Cell Phone Expert to Examine the Phone Records.  Defendant claims that the PCR court erred in denying his petition because he established that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to: (a) investigate the two alleged alibi witnesses, [...] and [...]; and (b) hire a cell phone expert to examine the cell phone records.  (Db19-28).  After an extensive evidentiary hearing, the PCR court properly concluded that defendant failed to meet both prongs of Strickland by a preponderance of the credible evidence, and properly denied the petition.
[brief] On March 15, 2023, Plaintiffs filed a nine-count complaint against Defendants in the Middlesex County Law Division, alleging that defendants conspired to violate the corporate practice of medicine (CPOM), codified in N.J.A.C. 13:35-6.16, and the prohibition against practicing medicine without a license under N.J.S.A. 2C:21-20, as well as New Jersey’s anti-kickback and anti- self-referral laws and regulations in violation of the IFPA, N.J.S.A. 17:33A-1 to -30, and New Jersey racketeering statute (RICO), N.J.S.A. 2C:41-1 to -6.2.