ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] This is a case about a simple business relationship between Appellant [...] a.k.a. [...] (“[...]” or “Appellant”) and Respondent [...] d/b/a [...] (“[...]” or “Respondent”), which [...] improperly seeks to elevate to that of a franchise.  Simply put, [...] manufacturers grills and grill accessories branded as Summerset Grills and [...] bought some of [...]’s grills to sell for its business, which includes a lucrative “outdoor living” business selling much more than just grills.  [...]’s bread and butter are its sale of [...] (“[...]”) systems, which are outdoor kitchens that include stone islands, steel framework, cabinetry, fire features, LED lighting, grills and non-grill components from other manufacturers aside from [...], and outdoor furniture.  Importantly, the [...] systems are not specific to [...] grills and any grill can be used in the kitchen systems.  This is not a case about a franchisor and franchisee.  Nonetheless, [...] filed suit under the New Jersey Franchise Practices Act (“NJFPA” or “the Act”) alleging that [...] wrongfully terminated the relationship between the parties.  The NJFPA defines a franchise as “a written arrangement for a definite or indefinite period, in which a person grants to another person a license to use a trade name, trademark, service mark, or related characteristics, and in which there is a community of interest in the marketing of goods or services at wholesale, retail, by lease, agreement, or otherwise. ”  N.J.S.A. 56:10-3 (emphasis added).  The trial court rightfully found (twice) that [...] was not a franchisee of [...] and was therefore not entitled to the protections of the NJFPA.  The record supports the trial court’s decisions.  As Appellant did in the lower court, it seeks to cloud undisputed facts and binding law, bypass the record evidence, and create a franchise where none exists.  [...] attempts to complicate a straightforward statute that has clear requirements.  As the trial court held, [...] did not provide evidence of a written arrangement between the parties transferring a license.  Appellant failed to meet the very first requirement under the NJFPA, and so its case was dismissed.  In addition, as the judge in the lower court alluded, [...] failed to show it met the “community of interest” factors mandated by the statute.  As a result of all these shortcomings, [...] fell woefully short in opposing [...]’s motion for summary judgment.  Even when it introduced “new” documents in a motion to amend the summary judgment order, the trial court similarly found the new documents fell short and did not meet the NJFPA threshold.  It its final desperate attempt to prejudice [...] and the Court, Appellant misrepresents the record on appeal and argues that the trial court added the requirement of a written agreement (as opposed to a written arrangement).  The record evidence, including four days of oral argument, demonstrates the court properly held that there was no written arrangement.
[brief] He did consider it, but found that “it really doesn’t tell you that much” because when he reviewed previous proceedings, he saw a “consistent . . . adaptation from these [d]efendants. ” (5T69-80).  Defendant had changed his presentation to the court over time and his “approach ha[d] become mollified” with the benefit of prior decisions.  (5T71-72).  “That’s an intelligent way to approach things,” the judge stated, “but does it really mean that you’ve changed that much?” (5T80:5-7).  He then concluded “[i]t doesn’t definitely say that. ” (5T80:7).  [...]’s holdings in this regard are unassailable.  He has been involved in this matter for ten years and had many opportunities to observe defendant’s demeanor.
[brief] *[...] v. State* at *13.  The jury considered the value of the fee takings and temporary taking of a work area belonging to [...], “but did not consider the impact of the [...]’s takings on the rest of the [...] property or [...]’s claim that the [...] denied its rights of reasonable access over the two and one-half years of construction. ”  *Id.*  In a separate bench trial on [...]’s inverse condemnation claim, the court held that without full access it had previously enjoyed to major roadways, [...] could not use the property for its permitted commercial uses, and had no choice but to lease it to the [...]’s agent, [...], for the non-permitted use of a construction yard.
[directive] Court Events That Only Can Proceed Remotely if Parties do not Object affirmed the Judiciary’s  The Supreme Court in its April 20, 2020 Order commitment to continuing court operations in a remote format during the COVID- rm ADA ENSURING TO AN OPEN DOOR JUSTICE with Americans Act Disabilities Directive # 06-21 February 23, 2021  Page 2 19 crisis.  That April 20, 2020 Order carved out limited exceptions for particularly serious matters, which would proceed remotely only with the consent of all parties.  The Court in its November 19, 2020 Order amended the provisions of the April 20, Order to provide that “the consent of the parties shall not be required for 2020 quasi-criminal (FO) matters to proceed remotely. ”  Family  The Court’s February 22, 2021 Order refined the language of the April 20, 2020 Order to avoid unintended delays in cases in which an attorney is unable to communicate with their client and to ascertain their position to proceeding the Court’s remotely or in person.  Accordingly, February 22, 2021 Order provides:  1.  The following matters will be conducted remotely using video and/or phone options only with the consent of all parties: a. Sentencing hearings in Criminal, Family Juvenile Delinquency (FJ), and Municipal matters; b. Juvenile delinquency adjudications; c. Evidentiary hearings and bench trials in Criminal matters; d. Evidentiary hearings and trials in Municipal matters that involve a reasonable likelihood of a jail sentence or loss or suspension of license; e. Termination of parental rights trials; and f. Hearings for an adjudication of incapacity and appointment of a permanent guardian.
[directive] Offenses Involving First-Degree Amounts of Methamphetamine and Marijuana (Special Offense Characteristic #3)  By adoption of P.L. 1997, c. 186, the Legislature amended the original Comprehensive Drug Reform Act by establishing first-degree crimes for manufacturing, distributing, or possessing with intent to distribute large quantities of methamphetamine, see N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5b(8), and marijuana, see N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5b(10)(a).  These first-degree crimes do not automatically carry a mandatory term of imprisonment and parole ineligibility subject to waiver under N.J.S.A. 2C:35-12, and thus are not Brimage-eligible offenses within the meaning of these Guidelines.  However, applying the principle established in State v. Dillihay, 127 N.J. 42 (1992), if a defendant is convicted of both the third-degree offense under N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7 (Drug-Free School Zone) and a first-degree methamphetamine or marijuana crime under N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5 (i.e., the first degree methamphetamine or marijuana crime happened to occur in a school zone), the defendant would be subject to a mandatory term of parole ineligibility prescribed by the school zone offense, which must be applied to the range of sentence appropriate to a first-degree conviction.  Accordingly, pursuant to Section 3.2 (Structuring Plea Agreements), where a defendant commits a violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7 involving a first-degree quantity of methamphetamine or marijuana, the plea offer must provide that the defendant plead guilty to both Page 55 Attorney General Brimage Guidelines 2 (2004 Revisions) counts.  If the school zone offense involves a first-degree amount of either methamphetamine or marijuana, a prosecutor must use Table 5, Rows A or B (depending on whether the weapons Special Offense Characteristic applies).  If the defendant is charged with a first-degree methamphetamine or marijuana offense and is eligible for an extended term under N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6f as a repeat offender, a prosecutor must use Columns IV or V of Table 5 and the appropriate Row of Table 5, reflecting whether the weapons Special Offense Characteristic applies and/or whether the offense involved a “substantial quantity” of methamphetamine or marijuana (i.e., ten or more times the amount necessary to established the first-degree violation).  See Section 7.2.
[brief] ........  H548a Holm-33: [...] response to [...]-11 seeking status and details of [...]’s assessment of compliance with the EMP; objected to (SOICR p. 12)  ...........................................  H549a Holm-34: [...] response to [...]-12 asking if electric power could provide the heating (SOICR p. 12)  .........................  H550a Holm-35: [...] response to [...]-13 re whether any alternative sources of heat are technologically feasible (SOICR p. 12)  .......... H551a Holm-36: [...] response to [...]-14 asking whether the use of catalytic heaters are technologically feasible as an alternative (SOICR p. 12)  ..................................................  H552a Holm-37: [...] response to [...]-15 asking if any [...] regulators use electric heat (SOICR p. 12)  .........................  H553a Holm-38: [...] response to [...]-16 asking if any [...] regulators use catalytic heaters or if any other N.J. regulators do (SOICR p. 12)  ..................................................  H554a Holm-39: [...] response to [...]-17 asking how the proposed regulator complies with Executive Order 100 to reduce carbon dioxide emissions (SOICR p. 12)  ...........................................  H555a Holm-40: [...] response to [...]-18 requesting details on the [...] as an alternative to the proposed (SOICR p. 12).  ........  H556a Holm-41: [...] response to [...]-19 seeking why the fourth site was not used (SOICR p. 12)
[brief] [...] contends that Plaintiffs cannot prove that the subject roadway settlement at the abutment joint was a dangerous condition or that it was a proximate cause of the accident.  As support for its’ position, [...] argues that opinions of Plaintiffs expert are speculative because he did not consider things such as other causes of the crash, inspect the roadway, or reconstruct the accident.  For the reasons stated above and below, [...] is wrong.
[brief] N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(d); (Ra1-6).  This Court has held that when a defendant is convicted of an offense with a presumption of imprisonment, probation is generally not available and therefore this mitigating factor does not ordinarily apply.  State v. Sene, 443 N.J. Super. 134, 144-145 (App. Div. 2015).  Our Supreme Court has held that a court may, in its discretion, impose a sentence other than imprisonment upon conviction of a first or second-degree crime in those “‘truly extraordinary and unanticipated’ cases where the ‘human cost’ of punishing a particular defendant to deter others from committing his offense would be ‘too great. ’”  *State v. Evers*, 175 N.J. 355, 389 (2003) (quoting *State v. Rivera*, 124 N.J. 122, 125 (1991).
[brief] [...] asks this Court to condone its unclean hands by awarding it the full amount of the $796,484 Consent Judgment despite [...]’s abrupt, impetuous and premature interference with the Lease and the Settlement Agreement.  In fact, quite beyond that, [...] in effect wants an automatic judgment close to $800k for alleged contamination, without [...] having any right to defend itself and have a court adjudicate this alleged “contamination” claim.  If, in September of 2023, [...] truly feared that the asphalt millings were contaminated, the correct course of action was to a) communicate with [...]; b) join [...] in investigating the allegation and pausing whatever work was being conducted; and c) if this failed, file a lawsuit focused on the alleged “dumping” or contamination. ”  [...] elected not to do so and unilaterally and impetuously instead took matters into its own hands, acting as judge, jury, and executioner.  This clearly violated [...]’s rights under the Lease Agreement and under the Settlement Agreement and negated (if not rendered impossible) any further compliance by [...] and most importantly, any purported right or entitlement [...] had to have the Court enter and enforce the Consent Judgment.  The Trial Court was correct in denying the motion to enforce the Settlement Agreement based upon [...]’s failure to bear its burden of proof on this issue, its wrongful and improper self-help lockout of [...], and unquestionable breach of the Settlement Agreement.  There is no support in the record to disturb its finding.  II.
[brief] See, e.g., State v. Jefferson, 413 N.J. Super. 344, 351-52, 361- 122070ef.pdf; N.J. Att’y Gen., Law Enforcement Directive Regarding Police Body Worn Cameras (BWCs) and Stored BWC Recordings 9, 11 (Directive No. 2015-1) (July 28, 2015), https://nj.gov/oag/newsreleases15/AG-Directive_Body-Cams.pdf (as applied to police departments that opt to deploy BWCs, generally requiring that BWCs be actively recording during searches, investigative detentions and arrests, and interviews of witnesses or suspects; and generally requiring that BWCs “remain activated throughout the entire encounter”).  The search in this case occurred prior to the enactment of the BWC statutes, N.J.S.A. 40A:14-118.3 to -118.5, which mandate similar BWC policies.
[brief] | | | *(quoting Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Invs. Ins. Co. of Am.,* | | | *65 N.J. 474, 484 (1974)) | | | Sears Mortg. Corp. v. Rose, | 5 | | 134 N.J. 326, 354 (1993).  | | | Kaye v. Rosefielde, | 5 | | 223 N.J. 218, 231 (2015) | | | Crowe v. De Gioia, | 5 | | 90 N.J. 126, 132-34 (1982)  | | | Garden State Equal. v. Dow, | 6 | | 216 N.J. 314, 320 (2013) | | | *(quoting McNeil v. Legis.Apportionment Comm'n,* | | | *176 N.J. 484, 486 (2003)* | | | *([...], dissenting)* | | | Massa v. Laing, | 17 | | 60 N.J. Super. 443, 446 (App.Div. 1977).
[brief] [...], owner of the subject [...], testified during his deposition that when the lease was entered into, Defendant [...] was responsible for the maintenance of those spots that were designated as [...] spots in the lease as they were responsible for maintaining everything inside of the shaded area.  (Pa543; Pa542)  Defendant [...] was specifically assigned 10 designated [...] parking spots in the lot that they were in control of.  Further, the Lease requires the Tenant to purchase and maintain “…general public liability insurance adequate to protect against liability or damage claimed through public use of, or arising out of, accidents occurring in or around the Premises…”.  (Pa207-225)  As discussed previously, the “Premises” included the 10 designated spots.  This shows that [...] and Respondent [...] both entered into a contract with the intent that Respondent [...] is responsible for the maintenance of their store and the surrounding premises which includes the designated parking spaces.  As the only issue as to duty that was found by the trial Court is the public interest factor, however they erred in finding that imposing a duty would result in “duplicative efforts” and would “create uncertainty and confusion as to which tenants are responsible for certain portions of a parking lot”.  (Pa32-33)  The Court erroneously found that it is not fair to hold Respondent [...] responsible for the condition of a parking lot where it was maintained by the landlord “and where there is no assignment of a duty to maintain the parking lot in the Lease” (emphasis added) and did not properly take into consideration that the parking spots were included in the description of the Premises under the Lease and were therefore included in the responsibility and duty of Respondent [...] to maintain and repair.  (Pa33)  The trial Court found that all other Hopkins factors were satisfied, except for the public interest factor.  (Pa32-34)  In so finding, the Court erred for the reasons set forth herein above.  For the foregoing reasons, Appellant submits that the decision below was erroneous and incorrect and must be reversed.
[brief] In its role as gatekeeper, a trial court should carefully scrutinize a new business’s claim that, but for the conduct of the defendant, it would have gained substantial profit in a venture in which it had no experience.  *If a new business seeks lost profits that are remote, uncertain, or speculative, the trial court should bar the evidence supporting that claim and should enter summary judgment pursuant to Rule 4:46-2.*  *Id.* (emphasis added).  On remand, the trial court conducted a Rule 104 hearing on January 19, 2023 and January 20, 2023.  See 6T and 7T.  On March 9, 2023 the trial court entered an order barring [...]’s experts report and granted defendants summary judgment.  Pa 1280.  Plaintiffs filed a Notice of Appeal on April 22, 2023.  Pa 1297.  --- 3  The Supreme Court felt that, because it considered itself constrained by [Weiss v. Revenue Building & Loan Assn., 116 N.J.L. 208 (E. & A. 1936)], the trial court had no opportunity to conduct a fact-sensitive analysis of the evidence and decide whether plaintiffs can prove lost profits damages with reasonable certainty. ”  Schwartz, 251 N.J. at 577.  STATEMENT OF FACTS
[brief] In January of 2021, the Plaintiff figured that he had worked about 500 hours (1T; 29:3).  On March 10th, the Plaintiff texted [...] telling him, “I don’t get alerts anymore” (1T; 65:13).  Then, he stated, “So, that’s how you and your cronies eliminate people” (1T; 65:18).  Plaintiff was advised there were open dates that were in the system, but he had no notification and he felt he was being intentionally eliminated from the system, so that he couldn’t work (1T; 66:3).  Plaintiff thought that by taking him out of the system, and if there was work, he wouldn’t get it (1T; 67:14).  Plaintiff testified that he was out of the system and [...] told him he’d have to talk to [...] (1T; 72:16).  The Plaintiff, in his experience, thought that [...] was part of the administration (1T; 73:11).  [...] estimated that Plaintiff worked 10 to 15 hours per week.  Plaintiff was now getting no assignments, even though he was told that there were openings, but he was not contacted.  Plaintiff resigned because he thought he was being terminated.  Actually, with no assignments and after speaking to [...] and being excluded from the high school, his conclusion was correct.  As a result of the EEOC complaint which [...] revealed to [...] and Gregroy’s statement about a female, together with the absence of assignments, the Plaintiff was on a path to termination.
[brief] First, it is important to note that all such cases were decided prior to the Appellate Division’s decision in *State v. Krause* in 2008, which as noted above specifically recognized the possibility of a municipal noise ordinance being preempted as the trial court found below.  Indeed, all of those cases except for *Clarksburg Inn* were decided prior to the adoption of the DEP’s preemption provision, N.J.A.C. 7:29-1.8, which specifically requires written approval of the DEP; that regulatory provision only became effective on June 19, 2000.  The focus of all those cases was not whether the municipalities complied with State law and regulations, but instead were limited to the question of whether the ordinances at issue were unconstitutionally void as vague or arbitrary.
[brief] While [...] was a member, he had no access to or knowledge concerning [...] accounts.  2T164:24-165:19.  [...], as the majority member, was in full control both practically and legally.  Moreover, plaintiff misses the fact that [...] is not a New Jersey LLC, but a Delaware LLC.\textsuperscript{12}  Under \textit{N.J.S.A.} 42:2C-57, the “internal affairs” of a foreign LLC are governed by the laws of the state under which it was formed.
[brief] ....................................................................................  26  Del. Riverkeeper Network v. N.J. Dep’t of Env’t Prot., 463 N.J. Super. 96 (App. Div. 2020)  .........................................................  17  Doe v. Portiz, 142 N.J. 1, 108 (1995)  ..............................................................................  26  In re Distrib. of Liquid Assets, 168 N.J. 1 (2001) .......................................................................................
[directive] 15 4.2 Selection of Personnel for the Internal Affairs Function ....................................................... 16 4.3 Training of Internal Affairs Personnel ....................................................................................  18  5  Accepting Reports of Officer Misconduct .................................................. 19 5.1 Accepting Reports Alleging Officer Misconduct .................................................................... 19 5.2  Immediate Suspension Pending Investigation and Disposition ............................................. 22  6  Investigation of Internal Complaints .........................................................  24 6.1 Time Limitations ....................................................................................................................  24 6.2  Investigation and Adjudication of Minor Complaints ............................................................ 26 6.3  Investigation and Adjudication of Serious Complaints .......................................................... 28 6.4  Domestic Violence Incidents Involving Agency Personnel .................................................... 31  7 Internal Affairs Investigation Procedures .................................................. 33  7.1 Interviewing the Complainant and Civilian Witnesses .......................................................... 33 7.2 Reports, Records and Other Documents ............................................................................... 34  7.3 Physical Evidence ................................................................................................................... 35 7.4  Photographs ........................................................................................................................... 35  7.5  Physical Tests ......................................................................................................................... 36 7.6  Drug Testing ........................................................................................................................... 36 7.7  Polygraph ............................................................................................................................... 37 7.8  Search and Seizure ................................................................................................................. 37 7.9  Electronic Surveillance ...........................................................................................................  39  INTERNAL AFFAIRS POLICY & PROCEDURES | August 2020 7.10  Lineups ................................................................................................................................... 41 7.11  Investigation of Firearm Discharges ...................................................................................... 41 7.12  Collateral Issues ..................................................................................................................... 43  8
[brief] The documents sought by Defendant are relevant and otherwise discoverable.  There is nothing in the provisions of N.J.S.A. 2A:23B et seq. or the Inter- Company Arbitration Agreement, cited by [...], which would create a privilege with regard to the production of arbitration awards entered in favor of a party to litigation.  Rather, the Medical Payment Subrogation Arbitration Agreement states “all matters concerning arbitration proceedings shall beheld in strict confidence. ”  That reference is insufficient to create a claim of privilege as to an arbitration award.  (Da111 – Da117).  On September 21, 2023 counsel for [...] filed the Motion to vacate the arbitration awards which was returnable on October 20, 2023 that filing consisting of over 286 pages of arguments and evidence.