ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The Zuber Court then turned to the question of how this jurisprudence applied in a case like [...]’s, in which the court could impose a sentence that is not formally designated life without parole for a single offense, but instead a term-of-years effectively assuring [...]’s death in prison for aggregate offenses.  Applying the Supreme Court’s “clear message” that “‘children are different’ when it comes to sentencing,” Id. at 429 (quoting Miller, 567 U.S. at 480), Zuber held that under both the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article 1, paragraph 12 of the New Jersey Constitution:  The focus at a juvenile’s sentencing hearing belongs on the real-time consequences of the aggregate sentence.  To that end, judges must evaluate the Miller factors when they sentence a juvenile to a lengthy period of parole ineligibility for a single offense.  They must do the same when they consider a lengthy period of parole ineligibility in a case that involves multiple offenses at different times—when judges decide whether to run counts consecutively, and when they determine the length of the aggregate sentence.  [Id. at 447.]  In addition, Zuber held that considering the “overriding importance” of Miller, “we direct trial judges to exercise a heightened level of care before imposing multiple consecutive sentences on juveniles.
[brief] See 5T44-20/45-21, 52-7/11.  *Inglis* holds “that the insanity defense is unavailable to a defendant being prosecuted under the provisions of N.J.S.A. 39:4-50. ”  Id. at 209.  In support of this conclusion, as defense counsel at trial stated, “Defenses based on a particular driver's subjective state of intoxication had a high potential of being pretextual, thus prolonging trials and obscuring the truth. ”  Id. at 211.  “As with involuntary intoxication, entrapment, and duress, the insanity defense has a high potential for serving as an instrument of pretext.  When evaluating whether a particular defense has a high potential for pretext, the focus should be on the ease with which a defendant can allege a frivolous defense. ”  Id. at 212; see *State v. Hammond*, 118 N.J. 306 (1990) (involuntary intoxication precluded as “pretextual” as a matter of law where trial court weighed and rejected the defense on factual evidence), and *State v. Fogarty*, 128 N.J. 59 (1992) (a divided Supreme Court precludes quasi-entrapment and duress defenses as a matter of law).  In the context of post-conviction relief [“PCR”], [...], in his concurrence with the unanimous New Jersey Supreme Court opinion in *State v. Rue*, 175 N.J. 1 (2002), spoke of “the Hobson's choice faced by a defense lawyer who honestly views a client's PCR petition to be so lacking in merit that it constitutes the functional equivalent of a fraud on the court.
[brief] A.  The interrogation video included [...]’s impermissible opinion evidence regarding [...]’s credibility and guilt.  At trial, the State played a redacted recording of Egan’s interrogation of [...] for the jury, and the jury requested to view the video again during its deliberations.  On both occasions, the jury heard Egan both accuse [...] of lying no fewer than fourteen times and assert his opinion that surveillance footage showed [...] step inside of [...].  Because lay witnesses are prohibited from opining on a defendant’s credibility and “invad[ing] the fact-finding province of the jury,” [...]’s conviction must be reversed.  State v. McLean, 205 N.J. 438, 443 (2011).
[brief] (Pb12).  Nor do the equities weigh in his favor.  The Board found on the basis of undisputed facts that notice was sent to [...], that information about the Ricci Act was available to him through the Division’s website and publications, and that he had sufficient time to file his Eligibility Registration Form within the statutory period.  Thus, contrary to [...]’s contention, (Pb15), there was ample evidence for the Board to reasonably conclude that he failed to demonstrate good cause, reasonable grounds, and reasonable diligence to warrant consideration of his application well beyond the statutory deadline.  (Pa14).  Finally, [...]’s argument and reference to a different applicant is misplaced.  (Pb16).  That applicant asserts that he attempted to file his Eligibility Registration Form but was told he was ineligible because he was not currently sick.  (Pb16; Pa113).  But those facts are not in the record before this court.  And that applicant’s assertions are irrelevant to [...]’s appeal as they deal with an entirely different set of circumstances not alleged by [...], so they should be disregarded.  **CONCLUSION**  For these reasons, the Board’s final administrative determination denying [...]’s request to file his Eligibility Registration Form for amended benefits approximately one year and one month past the statutory deadline of the Ricci Act should be affirmed.
[brief] Toms River Police stopped defendant’s vehicle after they had sufficiently established reasonable suspicion to believe defendant, [...], was involved in a drug transaction.  To make an investigative stop of defendant, police were only required to establish reasonable suspicion, which is a low threshold.  Here, based on the training and experience of the detectives and officers, police had sufficient reasonable suspicion because they saw defendant and co-defendant engage in conduct indicative of a drug transaction in a known high-narcotics area.  This conduct included entering a shopping plaza parking lot in separate cars, co-defendant getting into defendant’s car, the pair making a loop around the parking lot, defendant parking an aisle away from co-defendant’s car, and then both individuals leaving in their respective cars without either having entered any stores or businesses in the plaza.  The officers’ suspicion was then confirmed when they pulled co-defendant over and conducted a consensual search of his car which revealed suspected drugs that field tested positive for cocaine.  This information was relayed to the officers who conducted an investigative stop and search of defendant’s vehicle.  Requiring more than the facts here—such as witnessing a hand-to-hand transaction—would improperly elevate the requisite suspicion standard to something more akin to probable cause, an ask that has been repeatedly rejected by both the federal and New Jersey courts.  Because the officers had reasonable suspicion to conduct and investigatory stop of defendant, the motion judge’s ruling of such should be affirmed.  Regardless, defendant has failed to state a claim on appeal on which his requested relief, suppression of evidence, can be granted.  The outstanding evidence sought to be suppressed after the motion to suppress was granted in part and denied in part, was a clear, empty capsule found in defendant’s car often filled and used with drugs.  But the drug charges against defendant were dismissed, and the only charge defendant was convicted of was driving with a suspended license.  Defendant’s status as an individual with a suspended license preexisted in a source independent from the search and is not suppressible.  Defendant being charged with driving while suspended was so thoroughly attenuated and essentially independent from the underlying drug investigation that led to the challenged stop of his car, that the exclusionary rule would serve no purpose as his pre-existing status and unrelated fact that defendant was driving while having been suspended for drunk driving are not suppressible.  He must, therefore, remain accountable for this separate and dangerous violation of the law, regardless of the legality of the initial investigative stop for drug activity.
[brief] Here, to the extent that [...] had pre-existing pathology in his neck, the external forces generated on [...]’s neck on October 17, 2015, resulted in injury to his neck.  This injury was disabling.  Even the Board's expert, [...], conceded that the accident of October 17, 2015, resulted in an injury to [...].  (1T99:16).  [...] also conceded that [...] was working full duty up until the date of the accident.  Plus, it must be remembered that Respondent did not disturb [...]’s conclusion that [...]’s “reported disability was the result of a traumatic event, caused by a circumstance external to the member. ” (Compare Pa111-Pa113 with Pa76-Pa94).  Since [...] experienced an accidental injury on October 17, 2015, even if he had pre-existing pathology, under Cattani and Sigafoos, it was sufficient as a matter of law that [...] was injured in an accident on October 17, 2015.  Like in Sigafoos, where the officer had pre-existing back pain but was injured and rendered totally and permanently disabled moving a television set, so too was [...] rendered totally and permanently disabled as a result of a motor vehicle accident which subjected [...]’s neck to external forces which did not originate in his neck.  The accidental workplace injury of October 17, 2015, generated external forces on [...]’s neck which rendered him disabled.  That “combined effect of a traumatic event and a pre-existing disease” satisfies the traumatic event standard and requires a grant of ADR benefits irregardless of pre-existing pathology.  CONCLUSION
[brief] B.  The Court Failed To Specify That The Jury Had To Unanimously Agree On The Identity Of The Persons Against Whom The Defendant Committed Various Acts.  In this case, there was one count of robbery but two potential victims—[...] and [...].  It was therefore essential that the court instruct the jury that it had to unanimously agree on (1) the identity of the person from whom money was stolen, (2) the identity of the person who was threatened in the course of that theft, and (3) the identity of the person who was purposely led to believe that the perpetrator was armed in the course of that theft.  The failure to provide a specific unanimity instruction created the risk of a non-unanimous verdict and requires reversal of [...]’s conviction.  See State v. Gentry, 183 N.J. 30, 33 (2005).  The unanimous jury requirement is “an indispensable element at all criminal trials. ”  State v. Parker, 124 N.J. 628, 633 (1991).  Our Constitution “requires jurors to be in substantial agreement as to just what a defendant did before determining his guilt or innocence. ”  State v. Frisby, 174 N.J. 583, 596 (2002) (quotation omitted); N.J. Const. art. I, ¶ 9.  Although the unanimity rule does not require jurors to agree on every detail, the jury must “reach[] a subjective state of certitude on the facts in issue. ”  Frisby, 147 N.J. at 596 (quotation omitted).  The failure to properly instruct jurors as to unanimity leaves the door open for an unacceptable “patchwork verdict” and mandates reversal of a defendant’s convictions.  State v. Tindell, 417 N.J. Super. 530, 551, 558 (App. Div. 2011).
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY FOUND THE DEFENDANTS JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY LIABLE.  (37T 79:7 to 80:14).  To protect the Plaintiffs, the trial court correctly entered judgment jointly and severally.  [...] exerted control over all of the entity defendants and monies were transferred from [...] and [...] into joint accounts that he and [...] controlled.  Despite this, the defendants below advocated for a convoluted set of allocations: 60% to [...]; 11% to [...]; 16% to [...]; 84% to [...]; and 98% for [...]; and nothing to the rest of the defendants.  (37T 44:6-13).  They now press that argument on appeal.  (Db45).  In New Jersey, “liability is presumed to be joint and several” except when a reasonable basis exists to determine the contribution of each cause of a single harm.  *Bendar v. Rosen*, 247 N.J. Super. 219, 232 (App. Div. 1991).  This presumption exists so that the innocent plaintiff need not establish what portion of the eventual damages are attributable to each act by the defendants.  *Id.*  Joint and several liability exists to provide an injured party with full recovery.  *Kustka v. Batz*, 236 N.J. Super. 495, 499, (App. Div. 1989).  “It provides the injured party with complete financial exoneration when some, but not all, of the tortfeasors are able to respond to the judgment. ”  *Id.*  The trial court, looking at the full picture, rather than each party and claim in a vacuum, concluded that the defendants’ allocation was unworkable.
[brief] You can still say, you know what, I don’t want to talk to you anymore.  [...]:  Okay.  I understand what you’re saying.  Now I have initialed here that I understand these rights.  Okay?  My problem here is signing that I wish to waive or give up these rights, is the problem that I have.  [...]:  So, [...], what that’s saying is, if you are going to talk to us today, if you agree to talk to us, in order to do that, you need to sign that saying that you’re waiving those rights.
[brief] THE SHERIFF’S NOTICES OF SALE DID NOT STATE THE APPROXIMATE AMOUNT OF PLAINTIFF’S JUDGMENT (Da188; T27-5 to 28-4)  “The right to redeem was devised by equity to protect [mortgagors] from the forfeiture of [their] title.  It is a favored right. ”  Hardyston National Bank v. Tartamella, 56 N.J. 508, 513 (1970) (citing Mansfield v. Hammond, 117 N.J. Eq. 509, 510 (E. & A. 1935)).  Upon the filing of a motion for the hearing of an objection pursuant to R. 4:65-5, the right of redemption is expanded beyond the rule’s 10-day period until the entry of an order confirming the sale.  Id. at 513.  Courts have the inherent equitable power to determine the correct redemption amount.  See Morsemere Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n. v. Nicolaou, 206 N.J. Super. 637, 645 (App. Div. 1986); Little Falls Sav. and Loan Ass’n. v. Chas. O. Holmberg & Sons, Inc., 165 N.J. Super. 93, 95 (Chan. Div. 1978).  N.J.S.A. 2A:17-34 mandates that the sheriff’s published notices and advertisements “shall state the approximate amount of [plaintiff’s] judgment. ” (Emphasis added).  The definition of “approximate” is “nearly correct or exact”.  www.meriam-webster.com/dictionary/approximate, last visited May 10, 2024.  The Sheriff’s August 31, 2023 notice and advertisement pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:17-34 stated that the judgment amount as of the scheduled sale date of September 7, 2023 was $29,563,967.11.  Da85-86, ¶7.  However, the actual amount of plaintiff’s judgment as of that date was $21,714,825.12.  $29,563,967.11 is not nearly correct or exact to $21,714,825.12.  The Sheriff’s notice of sale for the December 14, 2023 sale stated that the judgment amount as of December 14, 2023 was $25,664,199.21.  Id.  However, the actual amount of plaintiff’s judgment as of that date was $21,844,717.26.  $25,664,199.21 is not nearly correct or exact to $21,714,825.12.  Courts also have “the inherent power to set aside a sale or to order redemption when there is an independent ground for equitable relief, ‘such as fraud, accident, surprise, irregularity [or impropriety] in the sale and the like. ’”  Orange Land Co. v. Bender, 96 N.J. Super. 158, 164 (App. Div. 1967) (quoting Penn Federal Savings and Loan Ass’n. v. Joyce, 75 N.J. Super. 275, 278 (App. Div. 1962)).  See also Brookshire Equities, LLC v. Montaquiza, 346 N.J. Super. 310, 317 (App. Div. 2002).  Additional grounds include the equitable doctrine of mistake.  Crane v. Bielski, 15 N.J. 342, 347-48 (1954).  Here, the accident, irregularity, impropriety and/or mistake in the sale was the posting and advertising by the Sheriff of the incorrect judgment amounts of $29,563,967.11 as of the September 7, 2023 sale date and $25,664,194.21 as of the December 14, 2023 sale date, neither of which was “approximately” the actual amount due on those dates of $21,714,825.11 and $21,844,717.26, respectively.
[brief] However, the ultimate outcome of this attempt to renegotiate that term never resulted in any change to the contract between [...] and [...].  Moreover, even if it HAD resulted in a change to the issue of who would be paying the penalties for debranding, that term would have no impact whatsoever on the ROFR holder’s position (i.e. whether to exercise its ROFR or not).  The debranding penalty would not apply to [...] because as the new owner of the property they would be paying that penalty to themselves (in other words, they would not be paying any penalty).
[brief] [...] continued as to her Honor’s basis for granting Summary Judgment as to [...];  “And – and as, um – as Counsel stated previously to establish negligence, there’s four things you must prove; that Defendant owed Plaintiff a duty of care.  I think that the answer to that question is certainly with regard to [...], yes.  They owed – that Defendant owed Plaintiff a duty of care. ”  “But with regard to [...], it – it’s much simpler, uh, to grant a summary judgment and I don’t think anybody really doubts that with regard to [...] as the property owner alone, uh, that the property owner in this particular case would not have that liability.
[brief] (See Pb29).  However, the trial court explicitly considered [...]’s contentions within the context of the harassment statute, noting:  And internal disputes within the workplace are not criminal harassment.  They are just that, just disagreements within the workplace, unhappiness with their supervisor, and this one isolated incident where [...] screams and yells at [...] is not a basis in my view of criminal harassment.  [1T 29:5-15.]  The court continued:  I find that the activities, the events that gave rise to [...]’s complaints in June of 2020 do not give rise and cannot objectively or subjectively on behalf of the plaintiffs give rise to a – a charge of criminal harassment.  It was just disagreements within the workplace, not very vice, uncomfortable disagreements, but certainly not giving rise to a criminal violation.  [1T 32:25-33:7 (emphasis added). ]  Second, the trial court did not unreasonably dismiss testimony from Plaintiffs as self-serving.
[directive] While guidance from prior  As a practical matter, so long as EO 106 remains in effect, virtually all evictions constitute a violation of Section 1 33.11-1, insofar as EO 106 has halted the lawful execution of warrants for possession.  Note, however, that EO 106 does permit enforcement of removal actions in the rare circumstances when a court determines on its own motion or a motion of the parties that enforcement is necessary in the interest of justice.  Section 33:11-1 does not limit who may be charged for violations, provided that the person either illegally evicted 2 occupants or refused to immediately restore them to their residence.  Although the law does not define what constitutes a refusal, the term implies that the person has the power to readmit the displaced occupant, and so this Directive instructs officers to only charge those who can authorize reentry, such as landlords, property owners, or property management executives with decision-making power.
[brief] **THE TRIAL COURT’S ULTIMATE ORDER SOLELY IMPACTS THE PARTIES TO THIS LITIGATION. **  The Trial Court’s February 8, 2024, is a Final Order only as to the [...] and [...] and does not implicate the surrounding Lots or Lot owners.  (Pa96).  *N.J.S.A.* 2A:28-2 only considers an action to resolve the disputed boundary line between two neighboring properties and does not contemplate a reorganization of an entire neighborhood.  The statute provides the remedy for ascertaining the true boundary line between disputing neighbors and solely contemplates appointing Boundary Commissioners to resolve the discrepancy which formed the Disputed Boundary Line.  The statute requires notice only as to the owners of the properties containing the contested boundary line, stating Boundary Commissioners may be appointed “on application of either owner on notice to the other. ”  *N.J.S.A.* 2A:28-2.  Considering the notice requirement only extends to the two disputing neighbors, the statute clearly only contemplates that the Report of the Boundary Commissioners affects the subject owners and their properties.  Further, the Complaint brought by the Plaintiffs pursuant to the statute, solely sought to “ascertain the true boundary line” between the [...] and [...] properties, more specifically analyze the 4.5-foot discrepancy that existed between the Worley Survey and the Sweeney Survey which formed the Disputed Boundary Line.  (Pa1).  Thereby, pursuant to both the statutory authority and the Plaintiffs’ Complaint, the instant litigation is limited with respect to the [...] and [...] properties, and does not extend to nor affect the sounding properties.
[brief] Defendant’s arguments that [...]’s response was confusing and diminished the importance of the *Miranda* warnings is similarly unavailing.  As previously argued, defendant’s view of the interview is based upon an unnatural, line-by-line parsing of what occurred.  However, the conversation was not nearly as cold and disjointed as defendant asserts.  The detective did not answer defendant’s question and stop for long pauses.  The answers provided were not “one and done. ”  The whole conversation, tone, tenor, demeanor need to be considered.  Indeed, [...]’s answer to defendant’s question was comprised of multiple statements, which completely answered defendant’s inquiry.  [...] may have told defendant she could not give him legal advice or that she was reading off the form, she also told him what he wanted to know: that an attorney would be provided if he could not afford one.  That answer was not diminished by any prior comments and that answer should not be ignored merely because it was not the immediate response that was provided.  Moreover, contrary to defendant’s claim, (Db12), it was made in response to defendant’s question.  Finally, this Court also should reject defendant’s claim that [...]’s responses undermined the importance of the Miranda warnings.
[brief] POINT II  THE SENTENCE AS A WHOLE IMPOSED “CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT [HAS BEEN] INFlicted,” [sic]  U.S. CONST. amend. VIII; N.J. CONST. art. I, ¶ 12, [THE JUDGE][,] DID NOT “STATE THE FACTUAL AND LEGAL BASIS SUPPORTING HIS IMPOSITION OF SENTENCE,” N.J.S.A. 2C:43-2[8], CAUSING AN ILLEGAL SENTENCE OF “LIFE[,]” ...  “85%” AS ARBITRARILY IMPOSED, MITIGATING FACTORS NOW  [OUTWEIGH]  THE AGGRAVATING FACTORS TO DROP BY ONE DEGREE THE ROBBERY CRIMES, REQUIRES APPELLATE REVIEW TO MODIFY  THE CONVICTION  PURSUANT TO N.J.S.A. 2C:44-7, THE CONVICTION MUST BE REVERSED, OVERTURNED AND VACATED[.] (Partially raised below).  II.
[brief] Appellee filed a personal injury matter on December 16, 2019, against Appellant [...] (“State Court Action”) in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Ocean County.  Da6-12.  The State Court Action arose out of personal injuries being claimed by Appellee from a motor vehicle accident caused by Appellant on January 27, 2018.  On May 14, 2021, in the midst of discovery, Appellant filed for Chapter 7 Bankruptcy (“Bankruptcy”) and listed Appellee as a creditor and identified the State Court Action as within Appellant’s Voluntary Petition.  Along with the Bankruptcy, an Automatic Stay was instituted and was applicable to the State Court Action.  Rather than file an adversary proceeding to except the debt under 11 U.S. Code § 523(a)(9) or seek to limit his recovery to non-dischargable debts, Appellee filed a Motion to Lift the Automatic Stay to the Extent of the Insurance Coverage on July 16, 2021.