ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Investors Ins. Co., 65 N.J. 474 (1974) .....................................................................49  Sashihara v. Nobel Learning Communities, Inc., 461 N.J. Super. 195 (App. Div. 2019) ...........................................14  Scott v. Jovil Constr., Inc., 2009 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2947 (App. Div. 2009), Pa2726-Pa2731 ...........................................................................30  Sears Mortgage Corp. v. Rose, 134 N.J. 326 (1993) ....................................................................48  Sinopoli v. N. River Ins. Co., 244 N.J. Super. 245 (App. Div. 1990) ..........................................16, 19 Skeete v. Dorvius, 184 N.J. 5 (2005)  .......................................................................28  St. Peter’s Univ. Hosp. v. New Jersey Bldg. Laborers Statewide Welfare Fund, 431 N.J. Super. 446 (App. Div. 2013) ......................15
[brief] 1.  The 1925 Plan [...] had the ability to develop “Normandy Beach” in any way it sought fit, subject to the approval of local government.  Its 1925 Plan laid out the law. ”  Boddy v. Cigna Prop. & Cas. Cos., 334 N.J. Super. 649, 659 (App. Div. 2000) (internal quotations and citations omitted).  its intentions: there would be residential lots (and homes) abutting its retained beach property; there was the potential to build a boardwalk and restrooms; and the beach would be available for fishing, bathing, and recreational purposes, the very uses one would expect from such property.  (Da420-Da424; Da430; Pa270).  While these details are visible in the 1925 Plan, it was filed without attachments, amendments, or covenants regarding future, alternative uses for the areas [...] retained to wit: the [...].
[brief] 416 N.J. Super. 30 (2010).  In Moore, the Appellate Division ruled that an arbitration agreement in a wrongful death medical malpractice case was unenforceable as to the spouse and child of the deceased who signed the agreement, as their claims were independent, and they did not accept the terms of the agreement.  Id. at 45-46.  In New Jersey, an arbitration agreement is not enforceable as to the rights of persons who are not parties to the agreement.
[brief] Nor is it a legitimate inference that can be drawn, as a jury could not rationally find that more likely than not [...] would have placed his own patient in jeopardy to evaluate [...].  The fact [...] recalled his other patient was “fine” after the C-Section he performed does not change the indication for the emergent procedure or contradict his testimony that whenever he decides one of his patients needs a C-Section, particularly at night, he considers it one that needs to be done as quickly as possible.  (Pa285; Pa290-Pa291).  See Acken v. Campbell, 134 N.J. Super. 481, 490 (App. Div. 1974), aff’d, 67 N.J. 585 (1975) (“W]hen the proof of a particular fact is so meager or so fraught with doubt that a reasonably intelligent mind could come to no conclusion but that the fact did not exist there is no question for the jury to decide.
[brief] Punctuation is part of a statute’s plain language.  Courts have recognized that, “[p]unctuation is part of an act and may be considered in its interpretation. ”  Angus v. Bd. of Educ. of Borough of Metuchen, Middlesex Cty., 475 N.J. Super. 362, 372 (App. Div. 2023).  Stated differently, “‘punctuation affords some indication of the true legislative intent” and is not ordinarily to be disregarded. ””  Commerce Bancorp, Inc. v. InterArch, Inc., 417 N.J. Super. 329, 336 (App. Div. 2010).  “A ‘semicolon’ is a punctuation mark used to denote a degree of separation greater than the comma but less than the period. ”  Morella v. Grand Union/New Jersey Self-Insurers Guar. Ass'n, 391 N.J. Super. 231, 241 (App. Div. 2007).  It “indicates a ‘separation in the relations of the thought’ and sets off one phrase from another[.]”  In re Estate of Fisher, 443 N.J. Super. 180, 192 (App. Div. 2015).  ““When[, as here,] items in a list are joined by a comma or semicolon, with an “or” preceding the last item, the items are disjunctive”” and indicates an alternative.  Angus, 475 N.J. Super. at 372.  In other words, “[t]he use of “or” plainly indicates that any of those . . . listed actions is sufficient to satisfy the . . . definition. ””  Norman Int'l, Inc. v. Admiral Ins. Co., 251 N.J. 538, 554 (2022).  Based on the Legislature’s use of a semi-colon and the word “or” at the end of N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-5(b), the plain language indicates a clear intention that each of those listed items separated by a semicolon is to be an independent basis to qualify a property for a redevelopment designation under criterion (b).
[brief] The Legislature added “real estate” to the CFA in 1976.  *Arroyo v. Arnold-Baker & Associates, Inc.*, 206 N.J.Super. 294, 296-97 (Law Div. 1985).  reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs and “any other appropriate legal or equitable relief. ”  The private right of action “is integral to fulfilling the [CFA’s] legislative purposes,” and by allowing recovery of attorneys’ fees and costs, private attorneys are incentivized to bring CFA claims, thus reducing the enforcement burdens that otherwise would fall on the State.
[brief] To establish wire or mail fraud, Plaintiff must allege that Defendants “acted with an intent to defraud, which is to act knowingly and with the intention to deceive or to cheat. ”  Levine v. First Am. Title Ins. Co., 682 F. Supp. 2d 442, 462 (E.D. Pa. 2010) (citing United States v. Hoffecker, 530 F.3d 137, 181 (3d Cir. 2008)).
[brief] (Da170).  Even Appellants’ brief characterizes their policy as requiring parental notification if “a transgender student” takes certain covered actions.  (Db17).  Appellants’ brief assertion that “the [Amended] Policy is not triggered by one’s status alone” misses the mark.  (Db30).  Appellants say that the Amended Policy instead is triggered when a student takes “certain steps along their public social transition accommodation spectrum. ”
[brief] ”  N.J.A.C. 7:15-1.5.  Areas eligible for sewer service are established pursuant to N.J.A.C. 7:15-4.4.  Rules, N.J.A.C. 7:8, but nowhere raises concern about DEP’s application of its WQMP rules, N.J.A.C. 7:15.  Accordingly, Appellant’s WQMP consistency determination argument should be dismissed.
[brief] In 2002, the [...] (“the County”) contracted with [...]  (“[...]”) to administer the County’s self-funded health benefit plan sponsored by the County.  Id. at 501.  This “relationship” lasted until 2021 when the County filed an action claiming that [...] had failed to implement the modified reimbursement rates thus breaching the current contract.  Id.  [...] subsequently moved to compel arbitration based on the 2009 written agreement that stated “[i]n the event of any dispute between the parties to this Agreement arising under its terms, the parties shall submit the dispute to binding arbitration under the commercial rules of the American Arbitration Association."  Id. at 501.  The County claimed that this was unenforceable as the agreement did not contain the waiver of rights language required by Atalese.  Id.  The Appellate Panel in [...] first clarified that Atalese, and its progeny, “focus on the unequal relationship between the contracting parties. ”  Id. at 503.  “Throughout the Atalese opinion, the Court mentioned that the arbitration provision was contained in a consumer contract, and, in its holding, the Court emphasized that an arbitration provision must "be sufficiently clear to place a consumer on notice that he or she is waiving a constitutional or statutory right. ”  Id at 502-503.  “All these decisions reveal the Court's concern about the nonexistence of a waiver of the important right to seek relief in a court of law in contracts involving consumers and employees, who are not “necessarily versed in the meaning of law-imbued terminology about procedures tucked into form contracts. ””  Id. at 503 (citing Atalese, 219 N.J. at 442).  Yet, this concern “vanishes” when contracts are negotiated between sophisticated parties – “often represented by counsel at the formation stage - possessing relatively similar bargaining power. ”  Id. at 503-504.  In [...], because the parties were “represented by counsel at all relevant stages of their negotiations” the panel determined that the express waiver in Atalese was not triggered because the parties to the contract “are sophisticated” and “possess comparatively equal bargaining power.  Id. at 504.  Here, both parties involved and named in this case were sophisticated parties involved in a transaction who each had the opportunity to bargain over the terms of the SPA.
[brief] [...]’s application is a litigation tactic designed to deprive [...], his practices, and [...] of their freely chosen counsel, to splinter a unified, joint defense, and to undermine the fair administration of justice by driving up costs and leveraging defendants into settling.  Put simply, [...] is afraid of a fair fight.  What [...]’s disqualification motion is truly about is what the Supreme Court foresaw in Opinion 552 would happen: a plaintiff, like [...], would name multiple defendants to bludgeon defendants forced to pay for their own counsel into settling for reasons untethered to the merits of the plaintiff’s claims.
[brief] The failure of the trial court to consider the Ludwig Line due to a restrictive view of its authority under N.J.S.A. 2A:28-3 is an error that needs to be rectified.  C.  Post trial notice to neighbors and the remedy of more litigation does not provide an appropriate solution under N.J.S.A. 2A:28-1.  In addition to the problem now presented for the owners of the properties affected by the Report of the Boundary Commissioners, the procedure followed by the trial court should be reviewed.
[directive] Other than the “POTENTIAL LIABILITY WARNING - N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.22 (Rev. 2-20- 2004) FORM,” to be given to a person summoned to transport or accompany an arrested person, these Guidelines do not require the use or adoption of any specific forms.  To the extent that any existing forms of the law enforcement agency may require modifications or revisions to otherwise conform to the provisions of this statute, those modifications should be reviewed by the legal advisor to the law enforcement agency.  Arrest and Impoundment !  When a law enforcement officer has arrested a person, based upon the officer's reasonable suspicion that the operator of a motor vehicle has been operating that vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or drugs (N.J.S.A. 39:4-50), or for refusing to submit to chemical breath testing (N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.2), the provisions of N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.23 mandate that the vehicle being operated by the driver must be impounded for 12-hours from the time of the arrest of the operator of the vehicle.
[brief] (Pa0063).  Initially, Plaintiff retained [...], Esq. of the law firm, [...], for the purpose of arbitration and then mediation.  However, due to differences in strategy Plaintiff replaced Mr. Kasper with the [...] firm.  (Pa0063).  In March of 2013, Plaintiff who had been upset with the pace of co-defendant [...] in conducting the litigation, indicated he would retain substitute counsel.  In late March of 2013, Plaintiff replaced [...] with [...], Esq. as trial counsel.  (Pa0063).  Although the matter was referred to Arbitration on October 28, 2013, the arbitrations hearings did not begin until November 15, 2016.  During this roughly three (3) year time period, additional discovery occurred and Plaintiff reached a settlement with [...], who paid $45,000 to Plaintiff and released $10,000 owed to them by Plaintiff.  (Da168-Da169).  The arbitration hearings occurred in November of 2016 and [...] issued his decision in December of 2016.  [...] made a finding against Plaintiff.  (Pa0065).  [...] did note that the failure to obtain the necessary permits for the construction project were partially the fault of Plaintiff.  After the arbitration, Plaintiff entered into separate agreements with both [...] and [...], in which Plaintiff assigned his rights to the legal malpractice claim that Plaintiff filed against [...] on July 25, 2016.
[brief] On June 1, 2022, Plaintiff wrote to [...], requesting assurances that [...] would honor its obligations to Plaintiff under the PSA.  Such assurances were requested because Plaintiff had growing concerns, based upon certain discussions with [...], that the latter might not adhere to the terms of the PSA and honor its obligations to Plaintiff.  (Pa7, Complaint ¶ 27).  Receiving no response and no written assurances as requested therein, Plaintiff followed up again with [...] by email on June 6, 2022.  On June 7, 2022, [...] responded by email, claiming that, because the separate Mack-Cali Agreement had been amended by [...] and the Fee Owner to allow [...] to pursue a potential assumption of the existing loan on the Real Property, Plaintiff would effectively be cut out of the deal.  [...] asserted that the parties could **not** proceed with “the original structure” of the deal, because of [...]’s “inability to secure leasehold financing. ”  Thus, [...] contended that it was no longer bound by the terms of PSA and would proceed to close on the deal with the Fee Owner, without Plaintiff’s participation.  (Pa8, Complaint ¶¶ 28-29).  Counsel conferred, and Plaintiff rejected the claim that [...] had a right to renege on its obligations to Plaintiff under the PSA.  Plaintiff also rejected the notion that Plaintiff had somehow agreed to, or otherwise acquiesced in, being cut out of the deal.  (Pa8, Complaint ¶ 30).  [...] implicitly acceded to Plaintiff’s demand that the PSA was still in place and continued to pursue its contractual obligation to close the transaction.
[brief] ”  Id. at 556.  The facts of R.D. are similar to this case in that Juror 12 did not realize she knew [...] until after he testified.  However, while the tainted juror in R.D. was excused and did not deliberate, Juror 12 was a deliberating juror in this case.  Although defendant did not request that Juror 12 be excused, the Supreme Court in Deatore, held that a trial court should “handle the situation of a prospective juror having connections with a party or witness which might possibly affect impartiality is [by] excus[ing] the juror by consent at the outset, with that course suggested by the judge if counsel do not propose it. ”
[directive] Actor commits sexual penetration with victim under age 13; or victim age 13 to 15 and actor is related by blood or affinity to third degree; or actor has supervisory or disciplinary power over victim; or actor is parent or stands in loco parentis within the household; or act is committed during commission of other designated crimes; or actor is armed with weapon  Aggravated Sexual and threatens to use weapon; or actor is aided by other person(s) and physical force or 2C:14-2a(1-7)  1st Degree $150,000 to $300,000  No 10%  Assault coercion is used; or actor uses physical force or coercion and victim suffers severe personal injury; or actor knew or should have known that victim was physically helpless, or had a mental disease or defect which rendered the victim temporarily or permanently incapable of understanding the nature of his conduct, including, but not limited to, being incapable of providing consent, or was mentally incapacitated.  2C:14-2b  Sexual Assault
[brief] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25, 32 Waskevich v. Herold Law, P.A., 431 N.J.Super. 293 (App.Div. 2013)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
[directive] 8.  Victim faces at least 1 barrier to support  SAMPLE QUESTIONS:  Do you have any children at home for whom you provide care?  Do you live in a home with no phone?  Do you live where there is no access to transportation?  Barriers to support:  Count any of these specific circumstances faced by the Victim.  Circumstances not included in this list do not count.  ✔The Victim has 1 or more children age 18 or under who live with the Victim and for whom the Victim provides care.  ✔The Victim has no telephone, e.g., no mobile, cell, or landline in the home.  ✔The Victim has no access to a vehicle, no access to public transportation near his/her home, and no money for a taxi.  ✔The Victim lives in a rural area with nobody living close by.  ✔The Victim consumed alcohol or drugs just before or during the Index Assault, or the Victim has a history of alcohol or drug abuse (e.g., alcohol intoxication, frequent alcohol use, use of street drugs, misuse of prescription medication).  ✘Do not include medications taken as prescribed.  The Victim need only experience 1 of these barriers to score 1 for this Item.
[brief] ”  Pitney Bowes Bank, Inc. v. ABC Caging Fulfillment, 440 N.J. Super. 378, 382 (App. Div. 2015).  Rule 4:49-2 provides for reconsideration of a trial court’s decision if the aggrieved party “state[s] with specificity the basis on which [the motion for reconsideration] is made, including a statement of the matters or controlling decisions which counsel believes the court has overlooked or as to which it has erred. ”  R. 4:49-2; Kornbleuth v. Westover, 241 N.J. 289, 301 (2020).  Thus, a trial judge’s denial of a motion for reconsideration will not be disturbed absent “a clear abuse of discretion.
[brief] See 2Ra83; see also 2Ra78.  A copy of Ordinance No. 26-20, pursuant to which [...] adopted the Redevelopment Plan Amendment, was provided with the CAFRA Application, although a copy of the actual Redevelopment Plan Amendment was not provided therewith.  2Ra24; 2Ra67-69.  Prior notice of the Application was provided by [...] to Appellant.  Aa1-4.  Appellant objected to the Application by email to the Department on March 3, 2021.  2Ra80.  Appellant then submitted an objection letter dated March 8, 2021 by email to the Department on March 9, 2021.  Appellant asserted, inter alia, that the Project failed to comply with the SRD Rule and, therefore, the Application should be denied.  Aa5-9.  Appellant argued that the Project was not visually compatible with surrounding buildings and did not enhance scenic resources in accordance with Subsection C.  Aa6-7.  Appellant --- 6  Appellant submitted the same March 8, 2021 objection letter to the Department on May 5, 2021 and June 15, 2021.  See 2Ra92-93; 2Ra106.  also argued that the Project did not comply with the 30% open view corridor and 2-to-1o setback requirements under Subsection D.  Aa7.  On March 29, 2021, the Department issued a letter to [...] advising that the CAFRA Application was complete for public comment and requested additional information with respect to compliance with Subsection D of the SRD Rule.  Aa13-15.  Notice of the CAFRA Application and commencement of the public comment period was published in the April 7, 2021 DEP Bulletin.  2Ra86-87.  On May 10, 2021, [...] responded to the Department’s March 29, 2021 letter and asserted that the SRD Rule did not apply to the Project because, due to Ocean Avenue, it was “not ‘adjacent’ to the features which trigger compliance with” the Rule.  2Ra95-96.  D.  The Department’s Denial Of The CAFRA Application.
[brief] This particular case dealt with medical malpractice, the statute of limitations and the discovery rule.  In this case, the New Jersey Supreme Court acknowledged that the discovery rule was first announced in Fernandi v. Strully, 35 N.J. 434, 173 A.2d 277 (N.J.1961).  It went on to analyzing this decision, as well as New Market Poultry, Inc. v. Fellows, 51 N.J. 419, 241 A.2d 633 (N.J. 1968), Diamond v. NJ Bell Telephone Company, 51 N.J. 594, 242 A.2d 622 (N.J. 1968) and Yerzy v. Levine, 57 N.J. 234, 271 A.2d 425 (N.J. 1970) stating that "[i]n the first place, the question as to the application of the statute of limitations is ordinarily a legal matter, and as such, should traditionally be within the province of the Court."  Id. at 274, 300 A.2d at 566.  The Supreme Court went on to state that "[t]he determination by a judge should ordinarily be made at a preliminary hearing and outside the presence of a jury."  Supra. at 275, 300 A.2d at 567.  More importantly, it noted "[w]here credibility is not involved, affidavits with or without depositions may suffice; it is for the Trial Court to decide."  Supra.  Finally, the Court noted "that the burden of proof will rest upon the party claiming the indulgence of the rule."  Supra. at 276.  300 A.2d at 568.  Accordingly, the Supreme Court found that the statute of limitations in the State of New Jersey commenced when the party knew or should have known the accrual of fair cause of action.  Applying the New Jersey Discovery Rule to the applicable matter, it is undisputed that it confirms [...]'s analysis that the Plaintiff/Appellant knew or should have known that when he was found not guilty, the statute of limitations commenced against the parties.
[brief] CONCLUSION  Plaintiffs’ arguments attacking the validity of Resolution PB10-2022 and Ordinance 22-1516 fall flat.  As [...] held, the effect of the Amended Redevelopment Plan, with its preservation of affordable housing and increase in open space, is consistent with the Master Plan and “can be characterized as a model of concinnity in sound land use planning over – and in spite of-decades of ever-continuing litigation over this site. ”  Pa 128.  The Court should not second guess the Planning Board’s or Mayor and Council’s determinations that the Amended Redevelopment Plan is substantially consistent with the Master Plan.
[brief] [...] was insured directly by two\(^1\) liability policies.  [...] issued a commercial general liability (“CGL”) policy to [...] effective January 28, 2015 to January 28, 2016, with policy limits of $1M  Each Occurrence (the “[...] Policy”), which contained a Wrap-Up Exclusion that excludes coverage to [...] for: “Bodily injury” [] arising out of any project that is or was subject to a “wrap-up insurance program”.\(^\text{2}\) (Pa226 and Pa285.)  In excess to that, [...] issued --- \(^1\) [...] also maintained a Worker’s Compensation Policy with [...].  (Pa2095.)  \(^2\)  “Wrap-up insurance program” is defined as any agreement …, including any contractor controlled … or similar insurance program … (Pa285.) a commercial umbrella liability policy effective January 28, 2015 to January 28, 2016 (the “[...] Policy”), which generally follows form to the [...] Policy, but contains an endorsement titled Contractors Limitation that excludes coverage for losses insured under a “wrap up”,\(^3\) stating: “the insurance provided by this policy shall not apply to the ‘Ultimate Net Loss’ for any loss, cost, and/or expense arising out of, resulting from, or in any way contributed to … 4.  [] any project insured under a ‘wrap up’ plan. ”  (Pa34 and Pa72.)  **C.  The Contractor Controlled Insurance Program**
[brief] THE STANDARD PLAINTIFFS ARGUE FOR IS MANAGEABLE  Defendant [...] argues that “no one can prove the ultimate profitability or financial viability of an affordable housing project or its ultimate success in advance, or that a project would not be built unless the tax exemption is granted,” and for this reason the statute does not require such a showing.  (Dlb3)  [...]’s position, apparently, is that it is enough to show that an exemption is “helpful” (Dlb45), a standard that can always be met and would render [...]’s requirements meaningless.  [...]’s concerns about the problems of proof with plaintiff’s position are, in any event, unfounded.  Plaintiffs’ expert, [...], has explained that private capital markets follow numerical standards when assessing the feasibility of a real estate project for financing and investment purposes.  (Pb11-12)  No doubt [...] does assessments of this kind on a regular basis.  Moreover, the standard of proofs in a challenge to an [...] exemption is “substantial basis. ”  This is a concept that courts have dealt with in land use and other contexts for generations.  IV.