ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] [Da9-10].  Paragraph 63 of the Complaint asserts that the Board deprived members of the public (i.e., [...]) of their rights protected by the MLUL and the New Jersey Constitution, and that the hearing was conducted in violation of the MLUL.  [Da11].  The trial court, relying on Dover, supra, noted the illegal acts alleged in the Complaint gave [...] and its members – whom it noted were unquestionably residents of the municipality – standing to sue based upon the impacts to the integrity of the zoning ordinance.
[brief] 6-19 POINT I  THE STANDARD OF REVIEW IS DE NOVO WITH ANY RULING OF THE TRIAL COURT REVIEWED FOR AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION .................................................................  6 POINT II  THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY HELD THE DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS DID NOT OWE A DUTY OF CARE TO REMOVE ICE DURING AN ONGOING STORM EVENT …  9 POINT III  THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED THE OPINIONS SET FORTH IN THE “SAFETY REPORT” OF PLAINTIFF’S LIABILITY  EXPERT DID NOT CREATE A GENUINE ISSUE OF FACT.  ..........  14  CONCLUSION……………………………………………………………
[brief] In early 2022, Plaintiff and [...] entered an ACO for the purpose of establishing new case-specific timeframes for completing the remediation due to the difficulty in remediating contamination under the two (2) concrete layers which form the floor of the building on the Property.  (T1 (July 17 hearing), 12:18-21).  The ACO and Plaintiff’s compliance therewith have no relevance to whether the Property meets the criteria to be designated as a redevelopment area.
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT’S STATEMENT OF REASONS DID NOT MEET THE REQUIREMENTS OF RULE 1:7-4 AND IS THEREFORE ENTITLED TO NO DEFERENCE.  (Pa82)  Trial courts must comply with the dictates of Rule 1:7-4 when deciding summary judgment motions.  Rule 4:46-2(c).  This requires an opinion setting forth detailed findings of fact and conclusions of law.  “The obligation to make specific findings on summary judgment motions in accordance with R. 1:7–4 has been explicitly stated in R. 4:46–2 since 1972.  A trial judge is obliged to set forth factual findings and correlate them to legal conclusions.  Those findings and conclusions must then be measured against the standards set forth in Brill v. Guardian Life Insurance Co. of America, 142 N.J. 520 (1995). ”  Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., Inc. v. Checchio, 335 N.J. Super. 495, 498 (App. Div. 2000).  The trial court’s reasoning, as set forth in its Section V, Legal Analysis and its Section VII [sic], Substantive Analysis, of its Statement of Reasons, cites only one case, Township of Bernards v. State of New Jersey Department of Community Affairs, 233 N.J. Super. 1 (App. Div. 1989).  (Pa. 80.)  The trial court relied on this single decision to justify its conclusion that notice of the Planning Board’s December 16, 2021, special meeting was properly forwarded to the Borough’s designated newspapers, despite the “FOR YOUR RECORD ONLY!” directive not to publish.  The trial court’s conclusion is based on a misreading of the law; a municipality’s obligations under OPMA must include a good faith effort to get its notices published in a timely manner or the statute is meaningless, thereby allowing local governments to operate in secret, as the [...] has tried to do.  (This legal issue is discussed in Point VI, infra.)  The trial court’s analyses do not address any other defects in the reorganization meeting notices, or defects in the notices for other special meetings, or the allegations that the Borough amended the Redevelopment Plan by an ordinance adopted in violation of N.J.S.A. 40:49-2 and the LRHL.  A comparison of the Verified Complaint, the record below, and the trial court’s Statement of Reasons demonstrates the failure of the trial court to meet the requirements of Rule 1:7-4.
[brief] In response to the State’s proposed sentence, defense counsel stated:  I did agree to [...]’ proposal about sentencing him to a term which was not the maximum that my client faced with the mandatory extended term which would have been 20 years.  Certainly, because he possessed -- he was convicted of possessing these two drugs at the same time, I would certainly argue that anything be concurrent, his possession of the methamphetamine, his possession of the fentanyl, that those should have been concurrent terms.  So, although perhaps esoterically he faced 40 years, actually, he probably only faced 20 years but I believe that the sentence of 12 years, serve a minimum of four years before eligibility for parole is a reasonable sentence under the terms of this case.
[directive] 3.  Você entende que se descumprir as condições da supervisão de liberdade condicional  [Sim/Yes]  [Não/No] sua liberdade condicional poderá ser revogada e poderá voltar à prisão para cumprir o período total ou remanescente da supervisão de liberdade condicional, mesmo que tenha cumprido o termo de prisão imposto anteriormente?
[brief] --- \(^8\)  [...] charged that the $4.6 million figure did not include vast other assets the parties had, including properties at [...], with an estimated value of $500,000 (A320), and [...], with an estimated value of $3 million dollars (A323).  [...] – which [...] took via the agreements – also owned [...], with an estimated value of $500,000 and which sold for $470,000 on March 22, 2015 (D414).  The parties’ personal bank accounts, vehicles, and personal property was also retained in addition to the proceeds from the bankruptcy estate and the above referenced assets.  [...] affirmed below, “[...] and my personal bank accounts, money market accounts, vehicles, and personal property was also retained in addition to the proceeds from the Bankruptcy estate and the above referenced assets.  The facts of the matter are the Bankruptcy estate were not the only assets [...] and I had.
[brief] ”  When using subsection (f), there is no “perfect” situation to apply it.  It may only be used in “exceptional cases” so that there can be “equity and justice” reached for both parties.  Courts have typically granted this kind of motion, or have vacated judgments, for situations involving a showing of fraud or misconduct by one party lying about their assets.  Rosen also provides that if over a year has passed since the entry of the final judgment of divorce, there MUST be a “showing of inequity and unfairness” for the court to grant relief under subsection(f).
[brief] This is set forth in a Joint Exhibit (Pa927) which contains a number of different attachments, including a Tax Sale Certificate made by [...], Collector to [...] (1T70:10-14).  He opines that the foreclosure documents show Keansburg only acquired Riparian rights in the Tax Sale Certificate foreclosure.  The only party named as a defendant in the foreclosure is [...], who would have been the owner of the property pursuant to the Deed from [...], individually.  [...] points out that the Tax Sale Certificates is the predicate of foreclosure.  There are two Tax Sale Certificates both made by the Tax Collector to the [...].
[brief] (Da1-3)\(^1\)\(^2\)  Before trial, the trial court granted the State’s motion to dismiss Counts Three and Four with prejudice as to [...], leaving only Count Six unresolved.  (6T 22-2 to 25; Da4) --- \(^1\)  The following abbreviations will be used:  Da – Defendant-Appellant’s Appendix  1T – Motion Hearing – July 29, 2021  2T – Motion Hearing – December 10, 2021  3T – Motion Hearing – January 27, 2022  4T – Motion Hearing – March 18, 2022  5T – Trial – July 11, 2022  6T – Trial – July 13, 2022  7T – Trial – July 15, 2022  8T – Trial – July 20, 2022  9T – Trial – July 21, 2022  10T – Trial – July 22, 2022  11T – Motion and Sentencing Hearing – October 7, 2022  \(^2\)  Codefendant [...] was charged with Counts Three, Four, and an additional count for resisting arrest (Count Five).  (Ibid.)  Codefendant [...] was charged with Count Three and additional counts for attempted murder (Count One) and endangering another person (Count Two).  (Ibid.)  Because codefendant [...] and appellant [...] Mills III share a last name, this brief refers to them by their first names to avoid confusion.  On December 10, 2021, January 27, 2022, and March 18, 2022, the Honorable [...], J.S.C., held an evidentiary hearing on [...]’s motion to suppress physical evidence, specifically trail camera\(^3\) footage and surveillance camera footage.  (2T to 4T)  On March 18, Judge Lawhun granted [...]’s motion as to the trail camera footage but denied the motion as to the surveillance camera footage.  (4T 71-19 to 23, 75-8 to 12; Da6)  From July 20 to July 22, 2022, Judge Lawhun presided over [...]’s jury trial.  (8T to 10T)  On July 22, during deliberations, one juror -- juror twelve -- informed the judge that he had been contacted by a family member or friend of [...] and asked to be dismissed from the jury.  (10T 87-14 to 18; 94-19 to 23; 11T 32-8 to 11)  After interviewing all the jurors, the judge replaced juror twelve with an alternate.  (10T 101-6 to 17)  [...] moved for a mistrial, which the judge denied.  (11T 20-8 to 13)  Less than one hour later, the jury returned a verdict convicting [...] of Count Six, the certain persons offense.  (10T 105-17 to 107-13; Da7-8)  On August 1, 2022, [...] moved for a new trial, arguing that juror twelve tainted deliberations by alerting other jurors that someone close to the defendant had contacted him.  (Da12-13)  Judge Lawhun denied the motion.  --- \(^3\)  A trail camera is a camera typically attached to post or tree that captures pictures and video to monitor a game trail for hunting purposes.  (2T 16-17 to 21)  On October 7, 2022, Judge Lawhun sentenced [...] to five years in prison without parole.  (11T 48-25 to 49-7; Da14)  On November 29, 2022, [...] filed a Notice of Appeal.  (Da15-18)  STATEMENT OF FACTS
[directive] The Court directs use of the forms under the following guidelines:  (1) information contained on the intake form can be used by the court without restriction for purposes of the setting of bail, appointment of counsel and pretrial intervention; (2) the information on the intake form is prohibited from use in grand jury proceedings and at trial, even for purposes of cross-examination; and (3) information contained on the intake form may be used at sentencing unless the defendant objects.  Should the defendant object, the information cannot be used over his or her objection.  Of course, whether or not the defendant objects to the use of the intake form, he or she should still be instructed to appear for a presentence report interview wherein he or she shall be asked whether there are any statements he or she wishes to make for inclusion in the presentence report, as under present practice.  EDITOR=S  NOTE  No change has been made to the original text.  Only the introduction to the system has been reproduced here.
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[brief] See *id.* at 3.  [...]’s proven insubordination and untruthfulness for which she served a forty-five (45) day suspension, in addition to her multiple reprimands and counseling which she admits she received in April 2011, November 2013, and September 2017 surpasses the disciplinary history at issue in that case.  The undisputed disciplinary history record before the Commission and this Court clearly demonstrates that [...] lacks judgment and reliability, which is simply unacceptable for someone seeking the high ranking law enforcement lieutenant position.  Indeed, the public interest would not be served by rewarding a person who has engaged in serious insubordination and untruthfulness in the past with elevation to such a high ranking law enforcement position.  That is why the [...] determined that she was unsuitable for promotion to the rank of Lieutenant and chose to promote an eligible other than [...].  For the same reasons, the Commission correctly recognized that [...]’s adverse employment history supported her removal from the eligible list.  It acted within its authority to remove her under the Civil Service rules.  The Commission did not “err” when it removed [...] from the eligible list as she alleges.  Ab30-34.  [...] fails to satisfy her burden of demonstrating that the Commission’s decisions were arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable, or unsupported decision as would be required to reverse those decisions on appeal.  As such, the Commission’s decision must be affirmed.
[brief] Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 13:1B-24, all of the Council’s members are appointed by the Governor with the advice and consent of the Senate.  See supra at 2-3.  While the [...] recommends the six sportsmen-members, nothing in N.J.S.A. 13:1B-24 mandates that those sportsmen be members of [...] itself.  And the [...]’s responsibility of recommending nominees is not a delegation of legislative power.  See *Group Health Ins. v. Howell*, 40 N.J. 436, 447-48 (1963).
[brief] (1)  Plaintiff was in a protected category based on age because she was beyond the age of forty years old.  (2)  Plaintiff received effective ratings on observations and summative reports for 2017 and 2018.  Plaintiff received two effective Observations for school year ending 2019.  [...] testified that he was told by the attorney for the [...] to not perform the third observation and summative report in 2019.  Appellant received effective Observation scores for 2019.  *(Pa348, (Redler Deposition 10/28/22, T30:6-8, 18-22, T31:11-12, Pa298, Pa314, Pa326, Pa327)*  [...] testified that the determinant factor in measuring how an employee was faring in the performance of the job was the performance evaluations, the Observations and summative reports.  (3)  Plaintiff was subjected to adverse employment action because she was non-renewed and was terminated from employment.
[directive] Purpose of Statute  The key element of this statute is, that a vehicle must be impounded for at least 12-hours from the time of arrest of the person operating that vehicle.  Any release of the vehicle before the expiration of the 12-hour period of impoundment is governed by specific provisions in the statute, by these Guidelines, and by the Guidelines for the use of the “POTENTIAL LIABILITY WARNING - N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.22 (Rev. 2-20-2004) FORM,” found in Appendix A of Attorney General Law Enforcement Directive No. 2004-1.  Release of an impounded vehicle after the 1  General legal advice for law enforcement agencies is to be obtained from the following entities: Municipal Police Departments from the Municipal Attorney or Solicitor; County law enforcement agencies from the County Counsel; Bi-state law enforcement agencies from the General Counsel for the Bi-state agency; State law enforcement agencies, including the Division of State Police, from the assigned Deputy Attorney General in the Division of Law.  Legal advice on issues pertaining to criminal law and procedure are to be obtained from the County Prosecutor or the Division of Criminal Justice.  -1-  ATTORNEY GENERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT DIRECTIVE NO. 2004-1 - APPENDIX B - GUIDELINES
[brief] Sat Below: Honorable [...], J.A.D. (ret. & t/a)  Honorable Judges:  Please accept this letter memorandum, pursuant to R. 2:6-2(b), in lieu of a more formal brief submitted on behalf of the State of New Jersey.  TABLE OF CONTENTS  COUNTERSTATEMENT OF PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND FACTS........1  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT  I  DEFENDANT MADE A KNOWING, VOLUNTARY AND INTELLIGENT WAIVER OF COUNSEL, AND THEREFORE IS NOT ENTITLED TO LAURICK RELIEF  ..................................................................................................................9  POINT II THIS RECORD REFLECTS THERE WAS A SUFFICIENT FACTUAL BASIS ..............................................15  CONCLUSION.................................................................................................................................19
[brief] The court followed the reasoning in Spano, noting that among other things, the indictment must be sufficient to inform the defendant of what they must defend against and must also preclude the substitution of an unindicted charge.  Id. at 10.  The court noted that those principles are not rigidly applied.  Ibid.  However, a defendant cannot be convicted on a theory of guilt that was not advanced by the State, charged by the court, or otherwise constituted a lesser included offense.  Ibid.  The Elliot court found that even though the indictment there only referenced one subsection of robbery, it was not error to include an additional subsection in the jury charge.
[brief] See Pb 12.  But lack of training or supervision is not enough on its own to establish a claim for negligent training or supervision.  The factfinder must also determine that it was foreseeable that the employee would harm others if he/she did not receive additional training or supervision.  The knowledge, experience, and attributes of the employee are critical in determining whether or not the employer knew or should have known that a risk of harm existed. \(^1\) \(^1\) [...]’s testimony likewise undermines Plaintiffs’ argument, because he opined the employee should be trained so that he can provide accurate product knowledge.  8T 116:2-5; 118:22-25.  [...] even conceded that a trainee who misses a training [...]’ arguments in its cross-appeal are not inconsistent with the prior appellate panel’s analysis.  The prior panel’s comments explaining that [...] – when viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs – knew of the importance of training new customer service associates to interact with customers, including unhappy customers, to ensure a positive customer experience, implicitly acknowledges that if the specific trainee is without the appropriate knowledge and skill, a harm could arise while dealing with an unhappy or frustrated customer.
[brief] As the following shows, the trial judge was materially influence by and had formed a judicial opinion upon the said misrepresentations:  “THE COURT: [...], do you want to sign it by virtue of your power of attorney?  Then we can get the space.  Get conformance, get the space right in front of your house” (1T10, 14-17).  THE COURT: “And, [...], if you want to explain that to [...], you're free to have the floor.  I know you're trying to work out a compromise with him, but it doesn't seem that he's open minded at this time,” (1T12, 20 - 23).  You see__ the aforesaid bamboozles by [...] had influenced the trial judge to such an extent that he had blind eye to evidence before him, e.g., the HUD written stipulation (Pa37), which showed that in 2020 HUD had relinquished its direct involvement in the matter, as it had officially referred the matter to the DOJ.
[brief] See Bayer, 2024 WL 875633, *6. information.  See Kennard, 363 F.3d at 1046 (relators were original source because they were “responsible for ferreting [out fraud] in the first place”); Harman, 2014 WL 47258, at *6 (knowledge is “independent” when the “crux of [relator’s] cause of action” “was made plain only through his own efforts. ”).  Springfield Terminal teaches how a relator’s knowledge must be direct and independent.  To qualify as an original source “does not require that the qui tam relator possess direct and independent knowledge of all of the vital ingredients to a fraudulent transaction. ”  Springfield Terminal, 14 F.3d at 656-57.  Rather, “direct and independent knowledge” may be knowledge of any essential element of the underlying fraud transaction.  Id.; see also Rockwell Int’l Corp. v. United States, 549 U.S. 457, 470-71 (“information on which the allegations are based” must mean “facts underlying the relator’s alleged fraud”); Kennard, 363 F.3d at 1044 (to be original source, knowledge underlying or supporting fraud allegation is sufficient); see, e.g., Cooper, 19 F.3d at 568 (relator acquired independent knowledge of fraud through years of communications with government and research).
[brief] ”  In Smart, the police received a tip from a concerned citizen two months prior to the motor vehicle stop in question, which connected a particular residence and vehicle like defendant’s to drug deals.  Id. at 172.  One month later, officers received information from a confidential informant that defendant had used his vehicle for drug distribution.  Police began surveilling the defendant in his car for forty-seven minutes until they observed circumstances resembling a drug transaction that would normally justify a warrantless search.  *Ibid.*  The police then conducted a canine sniff, which confirmed their belief that the car contained drugs.  They then searched the car's interior without a warrant.
[brief] Pa703-04.  Indeed, the notion that [...]’s retiring principals would agree to such a granular level of claim-splitting is, to put it \(^9\) [...] has also argued that Section 1.7(a)(i) of the PTA permitted [...] to unilaterally decrease the Hackensack Project EGP down to $0.00.  Not only is the scant testimony from [...] on this theory merely self-serving, this argument was not credited, at all, by the Arbitrator in his Award.  See generally Pa568-80.  Moreover, that provision only required the parties to “provide for a project specific cost reserve amount relating to any issue that has been identified by [...] in connection with the Hackensack Project. ”  Pa92 § 1.7(a)(i).  It further required that all “issues shall be resolved within sixty (60) days” and that “EGP shall be increased by the amount of such reduction or the full amount of the cost reserve, as applicable. ”  Pa92.  But, the parties never established any “cost reserve” for any construction project, and [...] actually decreased the Hackensack EGP well after the 60-day deadline; and so this provision, and all [...]’s arguments relating thereto, are wholly inapplicable.  mildly, absurd.  The Arbitrator also did not bar [...] from asserting its claims connected to the Hackensack Project and, indeed, entertained (and likely “credited”) them.  See Pa574.  To hold otherwise would subject [...]—who brought all of its claims against [...] under the PTA (and under all subsumed agreements thereunder) in one proceeding—to the uncertainty of not even knowing what inning of the ballgame it is in with [...].