ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] McGlynn v. Schultz, 95 N.J. Super. 412, 416 (App. Div. 1967); Charles Bloom & Co. v. Echo Jewelers, 279 N.J. Super. 372, 381 (App. Div. 1995) (“Any corporate officer, or director who participates by aid, instigation, or assistance in a conversion, is liable. ”).  This is true even when the conversion was for the benefit of the corporation and directors did not receive the misappropriated funds.  See id.  The trial court found that the [...] received misappropriated monies, either directly or through the other defendant entities.  Under McGlynn, there is little question that both [...] must be liable for the entire judgment amount.  [...] controls the defendant entities.  He was the “man behind the curtain” pulling the strings, moving the money, and facilitating the transactions.  [...] shared a joint bank account with her husband into which a significant portion of the misappropriated funds flowed.  She acquired [...]’s Chemtech shares via the 2017 SPA and is the sole principal in [...] (which held a 50% interest in [...]).  There is no logical reason to diminish the [...]’ liability by apportioning damages to them severally, rather than jointly and severally.  Finally, the Court must reject the defendants’ attempts to exculpate [...], [...], [...], [...], and [...].
[brief] The State objected to the admission of photographs offered by the defense that showed the area of [...] taken on July 14, 2021 with a pole camera in the picture.  (14T:111-12 to 19).  The trial court then clarified that the objection was based on lack of relevance, since no witness could establish that the camera shown in the photograph from July 14, 2021 was also at that location on the date of the incident, May 7, 2019.
[brief] In the case at bar, the letter vendor was given debt information and was tasked with creating and sending letters to the debtor in connection with alleged debts.  *It strains credulity that this is the type of practice that Congress sought to curtail.  Plaintiff has not shown how the letter vendor could inflict the type of reputational harm that Congress is seeking to prevent.  As such, it is clear that the use of letter vendors for the purpose of debt mailings does not fall within the type of third-party disclosures which Congress sought to bar under the FDCPA.*  Therefore, the Court finds that the Plaintiff has failed to state a claim as to the First Count of the Complaint.
[brief] The cases cited by the [...] in an attempt to escape the inevitable yet earned consequences of their own malfeasance are inapposite.  In Sandler, only contract claims were upheld on appeal.  Even so, this Court nonetheless recognized that punitive damages can be awarded in “contractual litigation … involving a fiduciary relationship ….  ”  See Sandler v. Lawn-A-Mat Chem. & Equip. Corp., 141 N.J. Super. 437, 449 (App. Div. 1976), holding modified by Ellmex Const. Co. v. Republic Ins. Co., 202 N.J. Super. 195 (App. Div. 1985).  The issue of punitive damages never reached appeal in Ellmex.  By contrast here, this Court has affirmed the Trial Court’s findings and conclusions that the [...] repeatedly and deliberately violated the fiduciary duties they owed to [...] in the most fundamental of ways.  The [...]’ reliance on Buckley is similarly misplaced.
[brief] Cases  Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America, 142 N.J. 520 (1995)..............................9  FFRF v. Morris Cty Bd, 232 N.J. 543, 553 (2018).................................................2  Longobardi v. Chubb Ins. Co., 121 N.J. 530 (1990)  ..............................................10  Palisades Safety & Ins. v. Bastien, 175 N.J. 144 (2003) ..........................................10  Velantzas v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 109 N.J. 189 (1988)  .......................................12
[directive] This order is to be used for defendants who are incarcerated.  A qualified psychiatrist or licensed psychologist may conduct the initial evaluation to determine competency.  If the defendant is found indeterminate and a qualified expert designated by the Commissioner determines hospitalization clinically is necessary to perform the examination then the court shall order defendant be placed in of of the custody the Commissioner the Department of Health for such examination.  If hospitalization is necessary this case, the court shall utilize Order #2 infra.  If the in of defendant is found incompetent but a danger to self, others, or property as a result mental illness, then Order #3 infra, should be utilized.  of  This order also contemplates a thirty day control date for counsel to inform the court of the status the examination and a forty-five day date for a conference the case status.  on of  These dates are implemented only to help the court and parties keep track the case as the defendant awaits commitment and further examination.  _____________  Attorney Name _ _________  NJ Attorney ID Number _ ----------------- Address ____________  Telephone Number _  Attorney for --------------- of Superior Court  New Jersey Law Division - Criminal Part _______ of State  New Jersey County Plaintiff, Indictment Number: -------- v. Criminal Action  Defendant.  Initial Screening Order of Mandating an Evaluation  Defendant's Fitness to Proceed - Defendant Incarcerated
[brief] Finally, the very limited discovery allowed in a PIP arbitration clearly shows that the Legislature never intended that broad, multi-defendant IFPA and RICO claims be arbitrated there.  The statute, N.J.S.A. 39:6A-13, does not permit discovery of the exact types of information required to prosecute the CPMD, kickback and self-referral violations alleged in this case.  Instead, it only provides for discovery rules specific to individual claims regarding benefits; it thus provides specific rules relating to matters like lost earnings, medical reports, and physical or mental examinations.  Had the Legislature intended PIP arbitration to include IFPA claims, its discovery parameters would not have been so narrow.  B.
[brief] Regardless, [...]’s proposed “setoff” counterclaim is already being heard in the [...] (Docket No. [...]) and before the [...] (Case No. [...]), and thus has no place here in a third forum.  It was not until [...]’s Fourth Amended Statement of Counterclaim that it asserted, for the first time, that because the parties did not apply wet signatures to separate formally notarized documents, that [...] was apparently owed nothing (and, astonishingly, [...] owed [...] money), and that [...] gets to keep 100% of the EGPs on all jobs.  Compare Pa006 ¶ 25 ([...]’s 3rd Amended Statement of Counterclaim), with Pa028 ¶ 61 ([...]’s 4th Amended Statement of Counterclaim).  In fact, despite purchasing [...], gaining new business, and establishing its foothold in New Jersey, [...] sought an incredible $17,459,885.48 from [...] in a wildly contrived counterclaim.  Pa036 ([...]’s Table of Damages).  The Arbitrator heard and considered substantial testimony on [...]’s counterclaim and awarded [...] only $732,533.75 as reimbursement for preconstruction expenses, finding the remainder of [...]’s purported damages “unpersuasive” and “highly speculative. ”  Da140.  [...]’s counterclaims were nothing more than a thinly veiled attorney-manufactured attempt to sell a legal-escape-hatch theory to the Arbitrator, whereby [...] could keep 100% of the profits earned under the PTA for itself and need not pay [...] any of its 65% earn-out—at all.  The law, the facts, and plain common sense defeated [...]’s nonsense position.  On January 19, 2024, the Arbitrator awarded [...] $4,310,849.48 on its claim for unpaid EGPs, plus contractual interest, and awarded [...] $732,533.75 as reimbursement for preconstruction expenses.  Da143.  Thus, the Arbitrator awarded [...] a net award in the amount of $4,043,887.27.  Da144.  C.
[brief] ”  In order to impose liability upon a public entity under N.J.S.A. 59:4-2, a property must have been in a “dangerous condition at the time of injury. ”  To establish a dangerous condition of public property, a plaintiff must prove that “a condition of the property” created “a substantial risk of injury when such property is used with due care in a manner in which it is reasonably foreseeable that it will be used. ”  N.J.S.A. 59:4-1(a).  Thus, a plaintiff must prove that: (1) there was a defect in the property; (2) the defect was so severe as to create a “substantial risk of injury”; and (3) the property was being used with due care at the time of the injury.
[brief] “Trichothecene Mycotoxins,” Toxinology [sic] Division of the [...], Chap. 34.........................................................30, fn. 6 N.J.S.A. §46:8B-14(a)........................................................................17  R. 4:46–2(c)..........................................................................................14  | Judgment, Order, or Ruling | Record reference | |--------------------------------------------|------------------| | Order/Judgment dated May 24, 2023 | 1a | | Opinion | 3a | | Order dated May 24, 2019 | 156a | | Order dated October 17, 2022 | 154a |
[brief] Regarding the Fence Violation, Defendant does not deny it installed a fence across the Sixth Street Lot immediately after the October 18, 2018 ZBA hearing.  Following the ZBA hearing and the ZBA’s oral ruling, Defendant immediately (even prior to the memorialization of the ZBA’s ruling in the Resolution) applied for a fence permit over the objection of Plaintiff.  Defendant argues, in part, that the Trial Court should not have found it in contempt because the fence was erected only after a permit was issued by [...].  (Db75)  However, as noted by the Trial Court, the “highly unusual” way in which Defendant obtained the fence permit and the installation of the fence was evidence of its continued effort to avoid the restraints in the 2017 Judgment:
[brief] On March 29, 2002, following his release defendant was arrested.  This arrest led to the return of [...].  On September 30, 2003, a jury found defendant guilty as charged.  On February 10, 2004, the State’s motion to sentence defendant on [...] as a persistent offender was granted and defendant was sentenced to an aggregate extended term of 50 years with an 85% parole bar.  Because defendant’s sentence on [...] was illegal, defendant’s sentence on [...] is illegal as well.  For the reasons that follow, defendant’s conviction and sentence on [...] must be vacated and charges reinstated.  Likewise concerning [...].
[directive] Attachment 6  Supplemental Plea Form for Drug Offenses  English, English-Spanish, English-Haitian, English- Polish, English-Korean, & English-Portuguese Versions  NOTICE:  This is a public document, which means the document as submitted will be available to the public upon request.  Therefore, do not enter personal identifiers on it, such as Social Security number, driver’s license number, vehicle plate number, insurance policy number, active financial account number, or active credit card number.  New Jersey Judiciary Supplemental Plea Form for Drug Offenses
[brief] Instead, in *Davis v. Barkaszi*, 424 N.J. Super. 129, 148 (App. Div. 2012), the Appellate Division found that a spoliation charge was erroneous where plaintiff “failed to make the ‘threshold showing’” that the defendant improperly destroyed the surveillance footage.  The owner of the defendant-bar in *Davis* looked at surveillance video and saw nothing on the recording to contradict a bartender’s version of the incident and therefore did not preserve any footage.  *Davis*, supra, 424 N.J. Super. at 137-138.  Of note, the bar did not have any policy concerning data preservation and the footage was re-recorded every week.  *Id.* at 149.  Plaintiffs should not be able to impose what amounts to a super duty to preserve video evidence that could allegedly assist Plaintiffs’ attorney’s theory of the case over four years after the fact without ever serving a timely notice of preservation letter and when all parties agree the subject incident was never captured on video.
[brief] Furthermore, defendant has not cited to a single case in which our Courts have enforced the UIM definitional exclusion involved here as invoked by an excess carrier through a “follow form” clause.  The first case cited by defendant [...] is Aubrey v. [...] Ins. Cos., 140 N.J. 397 (1995).  The Aubrey decision had absolutely nothing to do with a household vehicle exclusion in a UIM policy, let alone in an excess policy issued to an insured.  The case dealt with a step-down clause in a garage policy issued by an automobile dealership.  Id. at 399 (“The issue is whether plaintiff, [...], a purchaser under contract of an automobile from [...] ([...]), is covered under the underinsured motorist (UIM) provisions of a garage policy issued to [...] by defendant, [...] ([...]), for injuries Aubrey sustained while operating a loaned automobile with [...]'s permission. ”).  [...] insured a car dealership who had given permission to a plaintiff-customer to drive a car that the plaintiff-customer was intending on purchasing and had, in fact, signed a contract to buy pending loan approval.  Id. 399-400.  The [...] garage policy contained $1,000,000 in UIM coverage.  Id. at 400.  The plaintiff was also insured under her own personal automobile insurance policy providing $15,000 in UIM coverage.  Ibid.  The Aubrey court concluded that defendant [...] could invoke a step-down clause that limited their UIM coverage to the amount that plaintiff had selected under her own policy.
[brief] [...]’s disciplinary history is minimal.  Over the course of an nearly twenty (20) year career, he has been subject to one four-day suspension (Pa220) and handful of instances of counseling/reprimand.  (Pa224; Pa225).  The conduct alleged herein is not sufficiently severe to justify not applying progressive discipline and advancing directly to termination.  Herrmann, 192 N.J. 28–29.
[brief] 350a-351a (33:9-34:14).  On or about July 30, 2008, Defendants [...] and [...] provided Plaintiff [...] with a memorandum confirming those representations.  866a; 434a (119:7-17); 464a-465a (147:22-148:3)  To further entice Plaintiff [...], Defendants [...] and [...] presented Plaintiff [...] with an executed Letter of Intent from [...] pertaining to the Pork Chop Hill market rate development.  311a; 347a (30:6-15); 359a (42:8-11); 463a (146:19-25).  According to Defendants [...] and [...], the Letter of Intent confirmed that Defendant [...] was going to develop Pork Chop Hill and that the affordable housing development at Duncan Farms needed to happen in order for the Pork Chop Hill project to move forward.  311a; 347a (30:6-15); 359a (42:8-11); 463a (146:19-25).  Plaintiff [...] was convinced, and instead of allowing [...] to help him become the COAH developer at Duncan Farms, he continued to follow Defendants [...] and [...]’s lead.  464a-465a (147:22-148:3).
[brief] However, the trial court never entered the stay order nor altered the deadlines set forth in its executed order to show cause.  Rather, the trial court and [...] ignored the stay, and plowed forward with the litigation in spite of [...]’s demand for security.  As such, [...] was required to respond to the substance of [...]’s claims, which it did while specifically reserving its rights to the statutory stay pending the posting of security.  Pa19 ([...] Cross-Motion to Dismiss); Pa49 (Excerpt from [...] Brief) (reiterating the mandatory statutory stay and noting that [...] had filed papers because the trial court had not altered the response deadlines, but “to be clear, [...] does not waive its right to demand security and a stay”).  In fact, [...] acknowledged that it was required to post security to proceed with its claims and on December 12, 2023, submitted a proposed order to the trial court to allow it to post security in the Superior Court Trust Fund.  Pa50.  On December 14, 2023, [...] again reiterated that “no further proceedings \(^6\) As [...] noted in its letter, the demand for security “upon filing automatically stayed all proceedings in this litigation.  Nevertheless, as eCourts is not equipped to handle such a filing directly” a confirming form of order was provided for the trial court’s convenience.  Pa15. should occur until [...] complies with that mandatory, statutory requirement” of N.J.S.A. 2A:15-67 to post security.  Pa53.  Yet, [...] never received the benefit of the stay.  The trial court ignored its repeated invocations of statutory stay and proceeded to oral argument on the order to show cause on December 19, 2023 as if no stay was, or ever had been, been in place.  T1.  While the trial court signed an order that day allowing [...] to deposit security with the Superior Court (Pa56), the record is devoid of any proof such deposit was ever made and no notice of deposit was ever provided to [...].  See N.J.S.A. 2A:15-70 (requiring notice of deposit to the defendant).  As such, the statutory stay remains in place to this day and the trial court’s disposition of the merits of the case below violates that stay.
[brief] The refried beans were directly ordered from an outside vendor, (Pa5), and the Inmate Handbook clearly put [...] on notice that the ordering of food items was “at your own risk. ” (Ra2).  In short, [...] had no legitimate claim of entitlement to a refund of the refried beans.  Further, [...] clearly received due process as to his claims.  N.J.A.C. 10A:2-6.1 requires the [...], in receipt of an incarcerated person’s property claim form,\(^3\) to investigate the claim and issue a decision as to whether the claim is approved or denied with substantiating reasons.  The [...] acted consistently with N.J.A.C. 10A:2-6.1: it received [...]’s property claim form, and despite it being three years after the issue with his food order, [...] investigated the claim and denied it because it found no negligence on behalf of the prison.  (Pa8-Pa10; Ra2-4).  Lastly, the Court should deny [...]’s request for punitive damages because the [...] was acting upon its statutory authority when it denied the property claim.
[brief] T2 refers to the Certified Transcript of (the virtual) Proceedings in the [...] on March 23, 2022.  T3 refers to the Certified Transcript of Proceedings in the [...] on June 15, 2023.  [...], in accepting the Defendant’s guilty plea, ultimately stated, “All right.  I’ve a - - the Court finds the plea to be entered voluntarily.  The factual basis being placed on the record, both by way of the admission, couple with my review and marking of the Alcotest tolerance worksheet, which is C-1 and confirms readings well above the presumptive level. ” (T1:6-5 to 6-10).  [...] then sentenced Defendant to penalties consistent with his status as a second offender under the DWI statute.  (T1:6-14 to 7-1).  Defendant was then advised of the penalties for a third or subsequent DWI offense.  (T1:7-2 to 7-17).  [...] advised the Defendant of the consequences of operating his vehicle while suspended and of his right to appeal the determination of the Court.  (T1:7-19 to 8-3; 8-8 to 8-12).  On October 18, 2021, Defendant filed a Motion to Vacate Guilty Plea with the [...].
[brief] (Id.)  On March 8, 2022, the attorney for the [...] confirmed that [...]’ development application was on the agenda for the next [...] meeting, scheduled for March 24, 2022, and that [...] must send a ten (10) days’ advance notice of the hearing, via certified mail, to all properties located within 200 feet of the Property.  (Da440; Da479-480.)  The very next day, on March 9, 2022, an ordinance was introduced by Councilwoman [...], classified as Ordinance B-446 (the “Ordinance”).  (Da521 at ¶15.)  The proposed Ordinance sought to amend Hoboken Zoning Ordinance §196-33.1 by, among other things, providing that no “cannabis retailer or dispensary. . .shall [] be located within 600 feet in all directions of any primary or secondary school.  . .” (Da521 at ¶16.)  Although included on the [...] agenda on March 24, 2022, [...]’ development application was not heard on March 24, 2022 due to time constraints borne from hearing other applications.  As a result, [...]’ development application was carried to the next [...] meeting, scheduled for April 21, 2022.
[directive] The Director of the Division of Criminal Justice and each County Prosecutor shall designate in writing Assistant Attorneys General, Deputy Attorneys General, and Assistant Prosecutors who shall be authorized pursuant to this Directive to approve an application by a law enforcement officer to appear before a judge to request the issuance of a search warrant.  These Designated Attorneys shall have sufficient training and experience to comply with all of the requirements of this Directive, and shall be subject to such additional training and continuing education requirements as the Attorney General may from time to time direct.  The designation of an individual attorney may be limited to certain types of cases.  For example, a given assistant prosecutor may be authorized in writing by the County Prosecutor only to approve applications for search warrants in cases involving narcotics, or only cases presented by certain specified law enforcement agencies.  The Division of Criminal Justice shall maintain a current registry of all Assistant Attorneys General, Deputy Attorneys General and Assistant Prosecutors who have been authorized in writing to approve search warrant applications.
[brief] (Pa. 386).  Another email from [...] to [...], dated October 2, 2020, states, “[...] . . .as previously requested we have an item for resetting pavers included in the Kearny Avenue Roadway Improvements project.  I have the Town’s DPW list for the paver problem areas and our office also has walked the streetscape and generated a list. ”  (Pa 400).  On September 17, 2020, there was a damaged pole reported at [...] that was assigned to the [...].  (Pa 519: Deposition of [...] at 30:21-31:5.).  [...] is the Acting Superintendent of Public Works for the [...].  (Pa 514: Deposition of [...] p.10:14-19.).  At the time of the Plaintiffs accident, he was the Assistant Superintendent of Public Works.  (Pa 514).  He stated that the [...] was responsible for maintenance and inspection of roads in Kearny.  (Pa 514).  He stated that if a DPW worker discovers a pothole or if a pothole is reported, it is the responsibility of DPW to repair the pothole and to decide how soon the pothole is repaired based on whether it is a “dangerous” pothole.