ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] They argue that the court's order should be vacated, because according to plaintiffs, an affidavit of merit was not required as to their legal malpractice claims, because according to plaintiffs, those legal malpractice claims fall within the common knowledge exception to the requirement for an affidavit of merit.  Plaintiff assert that no legal expert is necessary to explain any aspect of defendants’ purported legal malpractice.  Plaintiffs also argues -- plaintiffs also argue that a dismissal of the entire complaint for failure to provide an affidavit of merit was improper, asserting that the dismissal of the non-legal malpractice claims of fraud, tortious interference, conspiracy, based on an affidavit of merit was not proper, because according to plaintiffs, those claims do not constitute legal malpractice, and thus, do not require an affidavit of merit.
[directive] The following questions need to be answered only if you are pleading guilty to one of the following first on or after or second degree crimes, or an attempt or conspiracy to commit such crime, that occurred June 29, 2001: murder, aggravated manslaughter or manslaughter, vehicular homicide, aggravated assault, disarming a law enforcement officer, kidnapping, aggravated sexual assault, sexual assault, robbery, carjacking, aggravated arson by placing another person in danger of death or serious bodily injury, burglary, theft by extortion by obtaining property of another by threatening to inflict bodily injury on, or physically confine or restrain anyone or commit another offense, booby traps in manufacturing or distributing of CDS facilities, or strict liability for drug induced deaths; or that occurred on or after June 18, 2002: terrorism, or producing or possessing chemical weapons, occurred on or after January 13, 2008: biological agents or nuclear or radiological devices; or that occurred on or after August 14, 2013: first degree racketeering; or that child pornography; or that occurred on or after November 1, 2013: firearms trafficking; 1.  Do you understand that because of your plea of guilty to [Yes] [No] NERA (List First or Second Degree Violent Crime(s) to Which Applies) you will be required to serve 85% of the sentence imposed for that offense(s) before you will be eligible for parole on that offense(s)?
[brief] On the brief: [...], Esq. Bar No. 047401995  Date Submitted: October 17, 2024  #  TABLE OF CONTENTS | Section | Page No. | |------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------| | TABLE OF CONTENTS OF BRIEF | i | | TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS BEING APPEALED | iii | | TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | iv | | PRELIMINARY STATEMENT | 1 | | RELEVANT PROCEDURAL HISTORY | 4 | | STATEMENT OF FACTS | 6 | | LEGAL ARGUMENT | 10 | | THE DECISIONS BELOW  DEPRIVE PLAINTIFF OF FUNDAMENTAL DISCOVERY TO WHICH HE IS ENTITLED UNDER THE COURT RULES (Pa4, 9) | 10 | | A. Standard of Review | 10 | | B.  The Trial Court’s Order Requiring Plaintiff to Subpoena [...] Was an Abuse of Discretion (Pa4, 9) | 11 | | C.  The Court’s Finding that the Corporate Defendants Lack Control over [...] Was an Abuse of Discretion (Pa4, 9) | 13 | | 1.  A corporate party’s control over its own directors, officers and employees is implicit under R. 4:14-2 | 13 | | 2.  The undisputed facts demonstrate the corporate defendants’ control under [...] | 16 | 3.  The Inherent Contradiction in the Trial Court’s Orders Make Them Impossible to Carry Out and Effectively Deprive Plaintiff of the Opportunity to Depose [...] (Pa4, 9)  .................. 18  4.  The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion in Denying Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration (Pa4, 9)  ...........................................  21 CONCLUSION .........................................................................................
[brief] Plaintiffs argue they should have had an opportunity to depose “[...] witnesses” to “address[] [...]’s knowledge of [...]’ optical shop at the time it offered a LOI that explicitly included an expense for the ‘Union NJ Optical Start Up. ’” (Pb27).  Putting aside that the Draft LOI does not actually evidence “[...]’s knowledge” (as explained above), Plaintiffs defensively insist that “depositions of [...] witnesses would not have been a fishing expedition or merely an attempt to salvage Plaintiffs’ claims either. ” (Pb27).  But that is precisely what the depositions would have entailed.  Plaintiffs wanted to take depositions to find evidence of [...]’s “knowledge[,]” (Pb27) -- the “element” of Plaintiffs’ tortious interference claim that was “missing” at the time they filed their Complaint, (Pb30 (emphasis added)).  Plaintiffs’ reliance on discovery to find support for the “missing” element of their claim contravenes well-settled New Jersey law.  See Glass, 317 N.J. Super. at 582 (“It has long been established that pleadings reciting mere conclusions without facts and reliance on subsequent discovery do not justify a lawsuit. ”).  In the end, additional discovery would have only enabled Plaintiffs to continue their fishing expedition to bolster the conclusory allegations in the Complaint.  The best Plaintiffs would be able to do is create an *ungenuine* issue as to an *immaterial* fact -- neither of which preclude the entry of summary judgment.  See Manhattan Trailer Park Homeowners Ass’n, Inc. v. Manhattan Trailer Court & Trailer Sales, Inc., 438 N.J. Super. 185, 193 (App. Div. 2014) (“Factual disputes that are merely immaterial or of an insubstantial nature do not preclude the entry of summary judgment. ” (quotation marks and citation omitted)).  For example, even if Plaintiffs could demonstrate that [...] had “knowledge” of Plaintiffs’ optical shop at the time it sent the Draft LOI (which, again, it did not), Plaintiffs’ tortious interference claim would *still* fail, as a matter of law.  The trial court, therefore, correctly granted summary judgment in [...]’s favor and dismissed the Complaint.
[directive] 4.  Prawo do odmowy odpowiedzi na pytania?  [Tak/Yes]  [Nie/No]  The right to remain silent?  Prawo do skonfrontowania świadków oskarżenia występujących przeciwko Panu(i)?  c.  [Tak/Yes]  [Nie/No]  The right to confront the witnesses against you?  się Czy rozumie Pan(i), że przyznając się do winy prawa do odwołania od nie zrzeka Pan(i) d.  [Tak/Yes] [Nie/No] wniosku o wyłączenie dowodu rzeczowego (R. (1) odrzucenia 3:5-7(d)) lub (2) odmowy przyjęcia do przedprocesowego programu interwencyjnego (PTI) (R. 3:28(g))?  you are not waiving d.  Do you understand that by pleading your right to appeal (1) the denial of a motion to suppress physical evidence (R. 3:5-7(d)) or (2) the denial of acceptance into a pretrial intervention program (PTI) (R. 3:28(g))?
[directive] 체중, 색깔, 문신, 사진, 눈 귀하가 지닌 특징적인 흉터 또는 귀하의 귀하가 제조회사, 모델, 색깔, 번호, 운전하는 차량의 연도 및 면허판 귀하가 거주하는 거리명, 변호, 카운티, 곳의 우편 시 및 그리고 귀하가 유죄를 인정하고 있는 아십니까?  범죄의 내용을 인터넷에 공개적으로 게시할 수 있다는 것을  Do you understand that as a result of your conviction your name, age, race, sex, date of birth, height, weight, eye color, any distinguishing scars or tattoos you have, your photograph, the make, model, color, year and license plate number of any vehicle you operate, the street address, zip code, municipality and county in which you reside and a description of the offense for which you are pleading guilty, may be publicly available on the Internet? [예/Yes] [아니요/No] 귀하가 유죄 판결을 받고 귀하의 행위가 반복적이고 충동적인 행동 양식을 b) 이름, 연령, 인종, 성별, 생년월일, 나타내는 특성이 있다고 판단될 경우, 귀하의 신장, 체중, 색깔, 문신, 사진, 눈 귀하가 지닌 특징적인 흉터 또는 귀하의 귀하가
[brief] See 40 CFR §279.45 (“Used oil transfer facilities are transportation related facilities including loading docks, parking areas, storage areas, and other areas where shipments of used oil are held for more than 24 hours during the normal course of transportation and not longer than 35 days. ”); 40 CFR §264.175(a) (“Container storage areas must have a containment system that is designed and operated in accordance with paragraph (b) of this section, except as otherwise provided by paragraph (c) of this section. ”); 40 CFR §264.175(b)(1) (“A containment system must be designed and operated as follows:  . . .  (1)  [a] base must underlie the containers which is free of cracks or gaps and is sufficiently impervious to contain leaks, spills, and accumulated precipitation until the collected material is detected and removed”).  (See generally, PPCIa137-38; PPCIa436-38).  Notwithstanding [...]’s liability under the Spill Act as a “responsible party,” the trial court entered “final judgment” against [...] for 100% of all of [...]’s alleged cleanup costs, without any allocation (or even giving consideration to an allocation) between [...] and [...] – as required by the Spill Act.
[brief] *State v. Thomas*, 195 N.J. 431, 435 (2008) (“[W]here a defendant files an appeal, courts are permitted to revise a sentence ‘notwithstanding his initial commencement of the sentencing term, providing that any new sentence is in accordance with the substantive punishment standards under the Code and not in excess of the sentence originally imposed. ’”).  The seven-year sentence is excessive because the court erred in finding a need to deter without explanation and in light of its finding that [...] was unlikely to reoffend.  This Court should remand for resentencing where the trial court explains the basis for factor 9 and considers whether, in light of appropriately found aggravating and mitigating factors, a five or six-year sentence is instead appropriate.
[brief] The City submitted to state monitorship pursuant to N.J.S.A. 52:27BB in February 2011 in response to tax appeals filed by various casinos which, among other economic conditions, triggered an unprecedented financial crisis.  (Pa00020); (Pa000034, Compl. ¶ 9).  Despite the monitorship, the City continued to struggle financially, and “has experienced a $14,000,000[] reduction in its real property tax base, substantial decline in tax revenue, drastic property tax increases, and suffocating tax appeals.  The economic downturn resulted in the closure of 5 casinos, more than 11,000 people have lost their jobs, and [...] has one of the highest foreclosure rates in the nation. ” (Pa000308).  \(^2\)  In the March 4, 2024 Order and Decision, the Superior Court did not reach Defendants’ motion to dismiss to the extent it was based on *res judicata* and the entire controversy doctrine.  (Pa000028-29).  In the event this matter is remanded to the Superior Court, Defendants reserve all rights to renew these issues as grounds for immediate dismissal.
[brief] Generally, “[a] planning board’s role in considering a site plan application is circumscribed.  The object of site plan review is to assure compliance with the standards under the municipality’s site plan and land use ordinances.  Generally, the Board concerns itself with on-site conditions. ”  *Shim v. Wash. Tp. Planning Bd.*, 298 N.J. Super. 395, 411 (App. Div. 1997); see also, *Meridian Quality Care, Inc. v. Bd. of Adjustment of The Tp. of Wall*, 355 N.J. Super. 328, 344 (App. Div. 2002); *Sartoga v. Borough of W. Paterson*, 346 N.J. Super. 569, 581 (App. Div. 2002); *W.L. Goodfellows & Co. of Turnersville, Inc. v. Wash. Tp. Planning Bd.*, 345 N.J. Super. 109, 116 (App. Div. 2001).  While “site plan review affords a planning board wide discretion to [as]sure compliance with the objectives and requirements of the site plan ordinance, ‘it was never intended to include the legislative or quasi-judicial power to prohibit a permitted use. ’”  *PRB Enters., Inc. v. S. Brunswick Planning Bd.*, 105 N.J. 1, 7 (1987) (*citing Lionel’s Appliance Ctr., Inc. v. Citta*, 156 N.J. Super. 257, 268 (Super. Ct. 1978)).
[brief] Id. at 465.  Despite the write-in vote on the machine being identical to the name of the candidate, this court held that the vote was properly rejected pursuant to the “unambiguous statutory direction” of N.J.S.A. 19:49-5.  Id. at 473.  The court in *In re Ocean County* conducted a thorough review, and rejection, of all arguments made to count the improper write-in vote.  First, the court rejected any suggestion that a voter’s right to vote was wrongly impacted by voiding improperly cast write-in votes.  The court held that the voter in *In re Ocean County*, just like the voter at issue here, was not denied the opportunity to vote for the candidate of his or her choice.  “The printed ballot gave the voter” the opportunity to vote for the candidate of his or her choice.  *Id.* at 476-77.  The court distinguished situations present in *In re Ocean County* and here, from that in *In re Gray-Sadler*, 164 N.J. 468 (2000) which dealt with different facts and law than present now.  In *Gray-Sadler*, voters were attempting to vote for candidates who did not appear on the ballot, however, because of “confusing instructions and an awkward mechanism for casting a write-in vote,” those voters were unable to cast their ballot for their preferred candidate.  They had no other way to vote for their candidate except through a write-in, and because of the election process they were barred.  *In re Ocean County*, 379 N.J. at 474-75.  However, as held in *In re Ocean County*, a different analysis applies here.  First, it is a different sentence of the statute.
[brief] See Ab32.  For the reasons set forth below, these arguments have no merit.  Contrary to Appellants’ newly raised claim that the purpose of the Project will “enable further sprawl development in the region”, Asb11, the Project was designed to meet the needs of one of Tennessee’s shippers, [...], to serve its customers in New York City and Westchester County, New York.  As such, the Project was not designed to meet the needs of customers in the Highlands Region and would clearly not induce sprawl or any other development within the Preservation Area.  [...], in its staff report issued as part of the New HAD, specifically found that, “[t]he project will not serve any customers within the Highlands region and … [a]s such, the project will not promote growth or development in the Highlands region.
[brief] [...] is referenced as developer in the deed, but this company was never incorporated.  Another real estate holding company with that name was formed in --- 3 [...] never challenged Plaintiffs’ engineering calculations or documentation showing 35 properties as approved exceed the club height restriction.  They denied these statements of fact based upon boilerplate technical objections.  (Da798-810).  Plaintiffs, on reply brief, submitted an additional 32 of 52 homes west of 35 South that exceeded the single-story restriction showing a total of 67 homes within the community approved as excess heights.  See, Chart of Excess Heights (Da441), See also, [...] (Da835) 1989 with no relationship or legal ties to [...].  The formation of this LLC appears to be limited to a real estate holding company on the remaining parcels of the original developer, but they do not convey any original development rights over Plaintiffs’ property (Da391) (Da39).  The Plaintiffs have no claim against the [...], as they are deceased.  No claim is presented against the [...], as they have not imposed any restrictions on Plaintiffs’ deed which give rise to challenge.
[brief] 496 (1997) | 45 | | Colucci v. Oppenheim, 326 N.J. Super. 166 (App. Div. 1999) | 41 | | Conrad v. Michelle & John, Inc., 394 N.J. Super. 1 (App. Div. 2007) | 47 | | Correa v. Maggiore, 196 N.J. Super. 273 (App. Div. 1984) | 44 | | Corridon v. City of Bayonne, 129 N.J. Super. 393 (App. Div. 1974) | 44 | | Dolson v. Anastasia, 55 N.J. 2 (1969) | 11 | | Fernandes v. DAR Dev. Corp., 222 N.J. 390 (2015) | 44 | | Fertile v. St. Michael’s Medical Center, 169 N.J. 481 (2001) | 39 | | Fleuhr v. City of Cape May, 159 N.J. 532 (1999) | 44 | | Gaido v. Weiser, 115 N.J. 310 (1989) | 46 | | Grand View Gardens v. Borough of Hasbrouck Heights, 14 N.J. Super. 167 (App. Div. 1951) | 28 | | Green v. N.J. Mfrs. Ins. Co., 160 N.J. 480 (1999) | 11 | | Hill v. Yaskin, 75 N.J. 139 (1977) | 45 | | Hisenaj v. Kuehner, 194 N.J. 6 (2008) | 28 | | Hynes v. Gibson, 2020 WL 4723742 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Aug. 14, 2020) | 40 | | James v. Arms Tech., Inc., 359 N.J. Super. 291 (App. Div. 2003) | 45 | | James v. City of East Orange, 246 N.J. Super. 554 (App. Div. 1991) | 29 | | Kassick v. Milwaukee Elec. Tool Corp., 120 N.J. 130 (1990) | 10 | | Kemp ex rel. Wright v. State, 174 N.J. 412 (2002) | 31 | | Komlodi v. Picciano, 217 N.J. 387 (2014) | 44 | Lanzet v. Greenberg, 126 N.J.
[brief] A district’s ability to raise its local levy is capped.  In April 2007, the Legislature enacted L. 2007, c. 62, which imposed a 4% limitation on school district and municipal tax levy increases.  L. 2007, c. 62 §§ 1-2; N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-38 and -39.  In July 2010, the Legislature further revised the tax growth limitation provisions, reducing the amount by which local tax levies could increase from 4% to 2%.  L. 2010, c. 44, § 4; N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-38.  The new law permitted districts to submit a special question to the voters to increase the levy above the capped amount under certain circumstances and to “bank” any portion of the permitted 2% increase plus applicable adjustments not used by the school district in a budget year.  L. 2010, c. 44, § 5.  4  “Aa” refers to Appellants’ appendix; “Ra” refers to Respondents’ appendix; and “Ab” refers to Appellants’ brief.  1.  **The District’s Financial Condition and SFRA Funding.
[brief] STATEMENT OF FACTS  The Applicants will rely on the Statement of Facts, submitted by the co-respondents, the Board.  To summarize, Appellants, [...] and [...] are owners/operators of [...].  The Respondent [...] is a duly constituted Board of the [...].  The jurisdiction and authority of the [...] is established by the New Jersey Municipal Land Use Law, N.J.S.A. 40:55D-1, et seq. and Monroe Township Code, § 175-30 to 32.\(^1\) (Pa 40)  The Applicants are the owners of [...] (the “Property”), which was the subject of an application before the [...] and the property is located in the RD-C (Rural Development-Commercial) Zoning District of Monroe Township.  This property is where the Applicants currently reside and they submitted their application pro se.  (Pa 1-30; 1T10-9-1T11-18)  The Applicants requested a use variance to allow an accessory structure to be larger than the principal use on the property.  Township Code §175-89D provides that the combined square footage of any accessory buildings shall not exceed the square footage of the principal building.  The accessory building is 2,160 square feet and the principal structure is approximately 1,152 square feet.  Accordingly, a use variance was required.  (Pa 88; 1T15-12-IT-13)  The [...] determined that the Applicant’s Notice complied with the Municipal Land Use Law (the “MLUL”) and expressed the relief sought in a common sense manner, as required by established precedent.  See Cox & Koenig, New Jersey Zoning and Land Use Administration (Gann), § 18-1.2 (citing Perlmart \(^1\)  Plaintiff’s Appellants Appendix is cited as “Pa”, while Co-Defendant, [...] of the [...] is cited as “Da”.  “T” references Court transcript.  Specifically, the notice stated:  “The applicant is seeking a use variance to allow an accessory structure larger than the principle [sic] use on the property, along with any other variances deemed necessary by the Board.  The accessory is approximately 2160 square feet and the principle [sic] structure is approximately 1152 square feet. ”  (Da10)  (Pa31)  The above Notice was provided to all necessary parties and a public hearing was held on August 18, 2022, where the Applicants represented themselves pro se.  (Pa 40-41; 1T10-9-1T10-20; 1T13-8-1T13-21)  At the hearing, plaintiff objected to the application.  Appellants took issue with the Notice of the hearing and had the opportunity to be heard by the zoning board.  Nevertheless, based on the application materials, photographs, evidence submitted, testimony of the Applicants and the Appellants, and the applicable law, the [...] granted the requested use variance from the requirements of Township Code §175-89D to allow the existing accessory structure to be larger than the principal use on the property, where the accessory building at issue is 2,160 square feet and the principal structure is approximately 1,152 square feet, with the necessary reasonable conditions for approval.  (1T11-19-1T37-8)  On October 20, 2022, the Board’s decision was memorialized in [...].  (Pa 40-50)  PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[brief] Weichert Co. Realtors v. Ryan, 128 N.J. 427 (1992) ..................................................................................  25  Willingboro Mall, Ltd. V. 240/242 Franklin Ave., L.L.C., 421 N.J. Super. 445 (App. Div. 2011), aff’d, 215 N.J. 242 (2013) .......................................................................  25  NEW JERSEY COURT RULES CITED R. 1:4-8 ........................................................................................................
[brief] That proposition is incorrect as a matter of law.  *Jones*, *Jardines*, and *Collins* all pertain to warrantless searches, and *Collins*, the latest of these cases, declares that officers may arrest an offender in the offender’s home if they have a warrant.  584 U.S at 595.  Because *Collins* cites *Payton* in that declaration, the warrant at issue is not the search warrant for the home, but the arrest warrant itself.  *Payton* clearly states that a separate search warrant is not required, as “an arrest warrant founded on probable cause implicitly carries with it the limited authority to enter a dwelling in which the suspect lives when there is reason to believe the suspect is within. ”  445 U.S. 602-03.  Our State Constitution does not afford broader protection.  Under New Jersey law, “police officers are permitted to enter the subject of an arrest warrant's home when they have reason to believe the subject is inside. ”  *State v. Bookman*, 251 N.J. 600, 619 (2022); see also *State v. Brown*, 205 N.J. 133, 145 (2011) (“An arrest warrant “implicitly carries with it the limited authority to enter a dwelling” where the suspect lives when there is reason to believe the suspect is inside. ” (internal quotation marks omitted)).  If an arrest warrant carries with it the implicit authority to enter a dwelling to effectuate the arrest, a GPS warrant carries with it the authority to enter the suspect’s driveway for installation purposes.
[brief] In the State’s summation, the Prosecutor acknowledged that [...] did not have any violent outbursts or problems while in the Youth Detention Center.  (15T:177-2 to 5).  Moreover, at the time of the incident, [...] was not diagnosed with any mental health issue and his mother forbade him from getting treatment.  (10T:151-18 to 152-4); (10T:241-22 to 25).  However, [...]’s mother was afraid they were going to put him in the “looney bin” and would not allow him to tell anybody about his issues.  (10T:241-5 to 16).  The Court improperly considered mitigating factor number nine.  [...] expressed remorse in his pre-sentence report.  (Da463).  In addition, one of the evaluations of [...] indicated “while he has expressed feelings of sadness and remorse verbally, he has not shown emotions that are congruent with these feelings.