ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] The following words and terms, when used in this manual, shall have the following meanings unless the context clearly indicates otherwise.  9-7 Revised (5/03)  Semi-Annual Firearms Qualification and Requalification Standards  Ammunition.  Equivalent load.  Ammunition used in training programs that resembles the service load in size, weight, velocity, recoil and trajectory, but not carried as a duty round.  Service load.  Ammunition authorized by the agency and issued for duty use.  Chief or Agency Executive.  The chief executive officer of any law enforcement agency in New Jersey.  Firearms Instructor.  An individual who is certified by the Police Training Commission to instruct firearms in a basic recruit training program or possesses equivalent training as outlined in Section 6 of this manual.  Firearms Record.  A record of firearms qualification activities for each officer required to participate.  A record is to be completed, and maintained chronologically, each time the officer is required to qualify or requalify on a firearm.
[brief] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Da342  Exh Z (First Addendum to Contract of Sale between Defendants and [...] ([...])—Redacted as Redundant) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Da096  Letter Memorandum of [...], Esq. to [...] supplementing Plaintiff's Reply Brief with Plaintiff's appended Counter Statement to Defendants' Counter Statement of Material Facts dated February 7, 2024 . . . . . . . . Da344 Defendants' Letter Memorandum of [...], Esq. dated February 12, 2024 (Legal Argument Redacted Pursuant to R. 2:6-1(a)(2)) . . . . . . Da349 Order Granting Plaintiff's Motion For Summary Judgment and denying the [...]' Cross Motion for Summary Judgment entered By [...] on February 20, 2024 . . . . . . . . Da350 TRANSCRIPT KEY 06/21/2023 Hearing of Plaintiff's Order To Show Cause Before Hon. [...], J.S.C. . . . . . . 1T 07/25/2023
[brief] Reviewing the evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom, a reasonable jury could have found that a reasonable person in [...]’s situation would have been adequately provoked.  In assessing the “reasonable provocation” element, the critical inquiry is whether “loss of self-control is a reasonable reaction” to the provocation. \(^4\)  Id. at 412.  While words alone cannot constitute adequate provocation, “battery, except for a light blow, has traditionally been considered, almost as a matter of law, to be sufficiently provocative. ”  Canfield, 470 N.J. Super. at 276 (citations and \(^4\)  The “reasonable” person standard in this context is something of a misnomer, as one would think that a reasonable person would never lose control to the point of committing an intentional killing no matter how upset or provoked he or she was.  Accordingly, it is important to look at that question in relation to the facts of cases where our Supreme Court has found that there was adequate provocation in the record, like Mauricio and Carrero, as discussed later in this Point.
[brief] Under the Prior Approvals, the [...] and the [...] (“Combined Properties”) received a Use Variance pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70(d)(1) and certain Bulk Variances, in order to develop the site with 65,000 square feet of commercial/retail uses (on the [...] only); and, 215 residential units (206 were allocated to and to be built on the [...] and nine (9) were allocated to and to be built on the [...]), with 20% or 43 affordable apartment units with all affordable housing units to be built on the [...] only; however, two (2) of which are generated by the nine (9) townhomes on the [...].  M70-71.  The “Property” (known as [...] on the tax maps of the Township) is located in the Township’s HD Highway Development Zone and in the VC-2 Village Center Overlay, and, the rear portions are also in the FHC Flood Hazard/Conservation District.  M69.  The Township, for its part, has been compliant with its obligations under Mt. Laurel.  A review of the Township’s Mt. Laurel compliance history reveals the following: (1)  The Township proactively and voluntarily sought to satisfy its Mt. Laurel obligation by creating a plan wherein properties in the Township (such as the property at the center of this litigation) were zoned as inclusionary affordable housing developments; (2) that Respondents were not a part of the Township’s Declaratory Judgment action as an intervenor, interested party, or otherwise; and (3) that the Township’s Mt. Laurel obligation settlement was reached by and through the Township’s settlement agreement with [...] (the “FSHC Settlement Agreement”) and not with Respondents.
[directive] A.  Personnel  1.  Applicants for a position as a law enforcement officer who, if appointed, will be responsible for the enforcement of the criminal laws of this State and will be authorized to carry a firearm under N.J.S.A. 2C:39-6.  2.  Law enforcement officer trainees subject to the Police Training Act or in the pre- service training program of the New Jersey State Police, while they attend a mandatory basic training course.  3.  Sworn law enforcement officers who are responsible for the enforcement of the criminal laws of this State, come under the jurisdiction of the Police Training Act or are members of the New Jersey State Police and are authorized to carry a firearm under N.J.S.A. 2C:39-6.  4.  The Law Enforcement Drug Testing Policy does not apply to civilian employees of a law enforcement agency.  Agencies that wish to drug test civilian employees should consult with legal counsel to establish drug testing policies and procedures consistent with human resource policy and/or collective bargaining rights.  B.
[brief] The grant of the first amended complaint, naming [...], coupled with Fiberville’s dismissal from the 2019 docket number, “without prejudice,” clearly showed that the motion judge did not perceive any prejudice being suffered by [...], and this obviously showed everyone that Appellants’ claims against [...] were appropriate for filing in a new action.  The new action was filed when the first action was clearly pending, and incomplete; indeed, the motion for leave to file the second amended complaint in the first action was itself filed when discovery could have been extended and all claims resolved fully and properly, to say nothing of the Covid-19 Omnibus Orders of the Supreme Court directing the bench and bar to grant extensions liberally.
[brief] ”  Id.  Providing extensive detail regarding the qualifications of experts executing an AOM, N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-41 states, in pertinent part:  In an action alleging medical malpractice, a person shall not give expert testimony or execute an affidavit pursuant to the provisions of P.L.1995, c. 139 (C.2A:53A-26 et seq.) on the appropriate standard of practice or care unless the person is licensed as a physician or other health care professional in the United States and meets the following criteria:
[brief] On November 28, 2012, [...] plead guilty to referring approximately 100 patients from his chiropractic facility for other healthcare services in exchange for cash kickbacks as well as filing a false tax return and was sentenced to seven years in prison.  [...], a layperson and office manager for [...] and [...], was also charged with illegally accepting thousands of dollars in exchange for the referral of patients.8  Once again, without the ability to engage in non-party discovery or to subpoena lay witnesses, which avenues of discovery are not available in no-fault dispute resolution, individuals such as [...] or [...], who were the runners and facilitators of the kickback scheme involving Drs. [...] and [...], could not be subpoenaed or called as witnesses.  This inability to investigate and prosecute insurance fraud in the courts is contrary to the clear 8 https://www.law.com/njlawjournal/almID/1202653572302/ and unequivocal intent of the New Jersey Legislature rendering the IFPA meaningless.
[brief] Coal. for Quality Health Care, 348 N.J. Super. at 296 (quoting Metromedia, Inc. v. Dir., Div. of Taxation, 97 N.J. 313, 331-32 (1984)) (emphasis added).  Had those procedures been followed and the corresponding opportunity for notice, comment, and fact-finding been provided, [...] would not be in a position of having no recourse short of seeking intervention with this Court in connection with what it respectfully submits was a rule change with widespread prospective implications that materially change the existing dynamics between AIFs and the Department.  Indeed, [...] would have been given the opportunity to submit evidence and argument as to the “material and significant change from a clear, past agency position” on this very subject for consideration at the administrative agency level, and a fuller record could have been created at that time.
[brief] The Code provides that use of force upon another is “justifiable” when the actor reasonably believes that the force was immediately necessary to protect himself from the use of unlawful force.  N.J.S.A. 2C:3-4(a).  If the State fails to disprove the defense, the defendant is acquitted, meaning the use of force against the victim was justified and lawful.  *State v. Canfield*, 470 N.J. Super. 234, 277 (App. Div. 2022), aff’d as modified, 252 N.J. 497 (2023).
[brief] In Miranda, "the United States Supreme Court imposed procedural safeguards to try to dispel the inherent pressures of custodial interrogations and protect the right against self-incrimination."  State v. O.D.A.-C., 250 N.J. 408, 419-20 (2022) (citing Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467, 478-79).  The Miranda Court held that before law enforcement can interrogate a person in custody, the person must be advised that he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires.
[brief] New Jersey Courts have held that the Legislature intended the NJCRA to serve as a state law equivalent to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  See Ramos v. Flowers, 429 N.J. Super.  13, 22-24 (App. Div. 2012); Rezem Family Assocs., LP v. Borough of Millstone, 423 N.J. Super. 103, 115 (App. Div. 2011).  Indeed, federal and state courts have articulated that the NJCRA is modeled after § 1983 and counsels an analogous interpretation and incorporation of existing § 1983 jurisprudence, including immunities from suit.  See Tumpson v. Farina, 218 N.J. 450, 474 (2014); Coles v. Carlini, 162 F. Supp. 3d 380, 404 (D.N.J. 2015).  In Will v. Michigan Department of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 70-71 (1989), the Court held that immunity from suit under §1983 is enjoyed by states, governmental entities that are considered “arms of the State, and that a suit against a state official in his or her official capacity is not a suit against the official as an individual person, but rather is a suit against the official’s office, and thus a suit against the state.
[brief] When imposing a sentence, a court must “identify the aggravating and mitigating factors and balance them to arrive at a fair sentence. ”  State v. Natale, 184 N.J. 458, 488 (2005).  Simply enumerating the applicable aggravating and mitigating factors is insufficient.  State v. Kruse, 105 N.J. 354, 363 (1987).  Rather, a court’s sentencing decision must “follow[] not from a quantitative, but a qualitative analysis. ”  *Ibid.*  That is, the Code requires “a thoughtful weighing of the aggravating and mitigating factors, not a mere counting of one against the other. ”  *State v. Denmon*, 347 N.J. Super. 457, 467-68 (App. Div. 2002).  In order to ensure proper balancing of the relevant factors, at the time of sentencing, a court must “state the reasons for imposing such sentence, including. . . the factual basis supporting a finding of particular aggravating and mitigating factors affecting sentence. ”  *State v. Fuentes*, 217 N.J. 57, 73 (2012).  A clear explanation of the balancing process is “particularly important,” and that explanation “should thoroughly address the factors at issue. ”  *Ibid.* (internal citations omitted).  A remand for resentencing is required when the trial court considers an improper aggravating factor, *State v. Carey*, 168 N.J. 413, 424 (2001), fails to find mitigating factors supported by the evidence, *State v. Dalziel*, 182 N.J. 494, 504 (2005), or if the trial court’s reasoning in finding aggravating and mitigating factors is not based on factual findings “supported by substantial evidence in the record.
[brief] *Atlantic Ambulance Corp.* confirmed that “ascertainable loss” under the CFA includes imposition of an improper debt through billing, regardless of whether the debt was actually paid.  *Atlantic Ambulance Corp. v. Cullum*  451 N.J. Super. 247, 253 (App. Div. 2017) (“The [trial] judge expressly rejected appellants’ argument that an excessive bill from Atlantic was sufficient to prove an ascertainable loss…We conclude that the judge’s denial of class certification on that basis was flawed because appellants were not required to have paid Atlantic’s bill to demonstrate an ascertainable loss. ”) (emphasis added).  The present matter is distinguishable from *Cox* since [...] were *actually charged* back the rent concessions of $17,920 and then [...] twice sued in an attempt to collect the unlawful chargeback in the eviction action and through the collection action.  In addition to vesting at the time they charged back the rent concession on the ledger in January 2023, based on *Cox*, the ascertainable loss is also the demand for an improper debt through the eviction action and the collection action.  *Cox* demonstrates that an improper debt is a loss under the CFA.  The Walshes were charged an unlawful penalty consisting of the concessions amount offered to induce them to enter into the lease.  The concessions chargeback amount that [...] charged [...] is an improper debt, and is therefore a loss under the CFA.  Additionally, since [...] had to hire attorneys to represent them, such is also a debt [...] had to incur and a loss under the CFA.  See, e.g., *McGahey v. Fannie Mae*, 266 F. Supp. 3d 421, 441 (ID. Me. 2017) (finding in the context of RESPA that attorneys' fees incurred to remedy a violation "are recoverable as actual damages").  III.
[brief] All other proposals of the parties were denied.  (Aa145-160).  --- 3  Only the September 21, 2023 and October 26, 2023 hearings were transcribed.  Citations to the transcripts are identified as “1T” for the September 21, 2023 hearing and “2T” for the October 26, 2023 hearing.  On or about January 2, 2024, the [...] appealed the Interest Arbitration Award to [...].  (Aa560).  On February 29, 2024, [...] affirmed the Interest Arbitration Award.  (Aa036-064).
[brief] Ab21-22.  [...], in support of its assertion that state agencies enjoy broad discretion with respect to the timing of rulemaking required by statute, relies on In re Failure by the Dep’t of Banking & Ins., 336 N.J. Super. 253 (App. Div. 2001).  In re Failure is distinguishable from the matter at hand in several respects.  In re Failure involved a statute that requires the [...] to update a dental fee schedule every two years to reflect inflation.  The agency first adopted the fee schedule in 1990 as required and updated it again in 1996, but did not do so in 1999.  The [...] (“[...]”) thereafter sought a writ of mandamus requiring the agency failed to update the fee schedule.  The Appellate Division ultimately declined to compel the agency to engage in rulemaking, largely because of the possibility that inflation data may not always indicate that costs have risen enough to justify updating the dental fee schedule.  See In re Failure, 336 N.J. at 264.  But, in doing so, the In re Failure Court cautioned that “[o]ur Supreme Court has held that undue delay in administrative proceedings may result in a denial of ‘fundamental procedural fairness.
[brief] ## Table of Rulings on Appeal | Description | Page(s) | |----------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------| | Order Granting Summary Judgment to Plaintiffs (06/23/2023) .................. | Ja700 | | Memorandum of Decision (06/23/2023)  ........................................... | Ja708 | Table of Transcripts  Page(s)  Transcript of the May 4, 2023 Summary Judgment Hearing .................. T1 | Authority | Page(s) | |--------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------| | Allstate New Jersey Ins. Co. v. Lajara, 222 N.J. 129 (2015) | 17 | | Bacon v. New Jersey State Dep't of Educ., 443 N.J. Super. 24 (App. Div. 2015) | 19 | | Boddy v. Cigna Prop. & Cas. Companies, 334 N.J. Super. 649 (App. Div. 2000) | 33 | | Bouie v. New Jersey Dep't of Cmty. Affairs, 407 N.J. Super. 518 (App. Div. 2009) | 19 | | Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520 (1995) | 15, 34, 43 | | Burnett v. Cty. of Bergen, 198 N.J. 37 408 (2009) | 36 | | Camp Clearwater, Inc.v. Plock, 52 N.J. Super. 583 (Ch. Div. 1958) | 39 | | Civic S. Factors Corp. v. Bonat, 65 N.J. 329 (1974) | 16 | | Colegrove v. Behrle, 63 N.J. Super. 356 (App. Div. 1960) | 24 | | Cox v. RKA Corporation, 164 N.J. 487 (2000) | 23, 32, 36 | | Customers Bank v. Reitnour Inv. Properties, LP, 453 N.J. Super. 338 (App. Div. 2018) | 15, 45 | | De Hanne v. Bryant, 61 N.J. Eq. 141 (Ch. 1901) | 17 | | Dickerson v. Bowers, 42 N.J. Eq. 295 (Ch. 1886) | 24 | | Donovan v. Bachstadt, 91 N.J. 434 (1982) | 26 | | Dugan Const. Co. v. New Jersey Tpk. Auth., 398 N.J. Super. 229 (App. Div. 2008) | 17 | Edgerton v. Edgerton, 203 N.J. Super. 160 (App. Div. 1985) .................. 32, 47 Envtl. Ins. Declaratory Judgment Actions, 149 N.J. 278 (1997) ............ 17 Feigenbaum v. Guaracini, 402 N.J. Super. 7 (App. Div. 2008) .............. 16, 18 Francavilla v. Absolute Resolutions VI, LLC, 478 N.J. Super. 171 (App. Div. 2024) ...........................................
[brief] (Pa533; Pa534; Pa536; Pa053-Pa055; SeePa505; Pa469)  POINT FIVE  THE COURT ERRED IN NOT CONCLUDING THAT THE DEFENDANTS VIOLATED  N.J. CONSTITUTION VIOLATION OF ARTICLE PARAGRAPHS  1, 5, 6, 7, 10, 18, 20 , 22 (Pa319; Pa533; P534; Pa469; Pa505; (Pa185-Pa189; Pa218, Pa309)  POINT SIX THE COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING PLAINTIFF’S CLAIM FOR RECKLESS AND INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EXTREME EMOTIONAL DISTRESS BECAUSE ALL ELEMENTS WERE MET (Pa093; Pa471; Pa017; Pa533; Pa534)  POINT SEVEN  THE COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING PLAINTIFF'S CAUSE OF ACTION FOR CLASS OF ONE ENDANGERMENT; RES IPSA LOQUITUR (Pa022-Pa023; Pa533; Pa053; Pa534; Pa093-Pa096; Pa505; Pa469)  POINT EIGHT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY
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[brief] Nothing in the ESI Order or the Protective Order (Da89) eliminates the harms caused by this overbroad directive.  Defendants estimate an additional $750,000 in costs to comply with the ESI Order, *i.e.*, to review the 68,000 irrelevant documents for privilege and confidentiality (which would not be necessary if those documents were screened for relevance).  Da126 ¶ 23.  That number is astonishing, particularly where the trial court undertook no effort to utilize a “convenient, less burdensome, and less expensive” means of acquiring relevant data.
[brief] [...]  Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant [...] [...]  [...]  On the Brief: [...]  Attorney ID# [...]  Date Submitted: March 15, 2024 # TABLE OF CONTENTS | Section | Page | |------------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | ii | | TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS BEING APPEALED | iii | | PRELIMINARY STATEMENT | 1 | | PROCEDURAL HISTORY | 1 | | REPLY TO COUNTERSTATEMENT OF FACTS | 1 | | REPLY ARGUMENT | 5 | | A.
[brief] ”  SAC ¶ 104; this was the first discovery of “smoking gun” evidence showing that [...] were holding themselves out as the “new owners” of the solar-energy development rights that had been acquired by plaintiffs and for which these defendants were “negotiating” their stated intention to purchase from plaintiffs, while they deployed a scheme of duplicity.  Further, in paragraph 116 of the SAC, we quoted from a July 31, 2018 email of defendant [...] to the [...], “I am pleased to file with you a fully executed copy of an agreement between the [...] developer, the Milford Solar farm landowner and the [...] regarding the disposition of the 6 acre lot to be created by the minor subdivision .  . ."  In SAC paragraph 117, we then showed that a certain "Memorandum of Understanding with the [...] dated July 25, 2018, in the fourth recital, refers to a "lease," by reference:  WHEREAS [...] has entered into a Ground Lease with [...] dated October 17, 2017 pursuant to which [...] shall develop, construct and operate a 10 MW DC grid supply solar farm (the "Project") on portions of the Premises as the same are depicted on Exhibit 1 attached hereto and made a part hereof (the "Ground Lease"); and [emphasis in SAC ¶117.  It is from this revelation that we came to understand that "[...]," [...] had entered into a lease with [...] for the land covered by plaintiffs’ land/lease, which was the subject of a "default notice letter," dated October 17, 2017, with no judicial declaration of breach or eviction then or thereafter.  Through hard work, investment of time, and diligence, it was plaintiffs (by their principal [...]) who identified [...] as being interested in selling its solar-energy developmental rights in perpetuity.  It was plaintiffs that entered into the purchase agreement and paid $600,000 plus costs or almost $700,000.  It was plaintiffs who entered into an independent land/lease with [...].  Plaintiffs became the owners of the Wholesale Market Participation Agreement dated July 11, 2011, [...] ("WMPA") between [...], [...] ([...]), and [...].  [...] had sold all of its right, title and interest in and to the WMPA and the IA, and any and all other assets related to construction and operation of a solar farm on Seller's real property; and those developmental rights were purchased in perpetuity without regard to the land/lease which was separately made by the parties.