ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] During negotiations for a successor agreement, the expired CNA remains in effect during the negotiations process (Ibid.).  During the negotiations for the 2019-2022 CNA, the Association first started utilizing a “Bargaining Council” (Id., ¶ 4).  The Bargaining Council was comprised of, and open to, all Association members (Pa220, ¶ 5).  Non-Association members are not able to join the group (Ibid.).  During the negotiations for the 2019-2022 CNA, the Association sought to have its Bargaining Council members attend negotiation sessions with the Board (Id., ¶ 8).  On at least one occasion during the negotiations for the 2019-2022 CNA, the Bargaining Council attended the bargaining session (Id., ¶ 9).  Subsequent to the meeting between the Board and the Association which was attended by the Bargaining Council, representatives from the Board and the Association agreed to meet in a smaller setting in an effort to expeditiously reach a successor Agreement (Id., ¶ 10).  Prior to this smaller-scale meeting, the Board and the Association agreed to pull back all proposals aside from salary and health benefits, and that the smaller setting would also exclude the Parties’ legal representation (Id., ¶ 11).  The Association and the Board executed the 2019-2022 CNA in or around the Fall of 2019 (Id., ¶ 12).
[brief] Although a “request to depose a party’s attorney itself constitutes presumptive ‘good cause’ for a protective order” under R. 4:10-3, the party seeking discovery may overcome that presumption by showing “that the information sought is relevant to the underlying action and is unlikely to be available by other less oppressive means. ”  Kerr, 295 N.J. Super. at 158-59.  In Kerr, the Appellate Division expressly recognized that circumstances exist under which a party’s attorney may be compelled to submit to a deposition, namely, “where an attorney is a fact witness in the sense that the attorney has observed or participated in the underlying transaction or occurrence giving rise to the cause of action, the presumption in favor of a protective order may be overcome.
[brief] See Kluczyk v. Tropicana Prods., Inc., 368 N.J. Super. 479, 493 (App. Div. 2004) (holding that a retaliatory discharge in violation of the NJLAD can occur if the employee is subjected to retaliation for complaining of unlawful harassment even if harassment is not established).  As such, the action in lieu of prerogative writs and civil rights complaint was not proper before [...] and the Chancery Division.  C.
[brief] The DEP is also required to make a record regarding Total Maximum Daily Loads (“TMDLs”) and any wasteload allocations for impaired waters, as well as --- 8  A  “Total maximum daily load” or “TMDL” is the maximum amount of a pollutant allowed to enter a waterbody so that the waterbody will continue to meet water quality standards for that particular pollutant.  See N.J.A.C. 7:9B-1.4.  9  A wasteload allocation is the amount of a pollutant that is allocated to a specific point source, and combined with other sources, makes up the TMDL, or total maximum daily load.  See N.J.A.C. 7:9B-1.4 (definition of wasteload allocation).  Stormwater discharged through an outfall is considered a point source discharge under the Clean Water Act.
[brief] Appellant, [...], was a Corrections Officer at the [...].  On August 16, 2019, Mr. Gales was working in Stowe Two North.  During his shift, an inmate, [...], attempted an escape through a window that had been broken.  A majority of the inmates were aware that the window had been broken and, despite requests to repair it, the [...] (the “[...]”) did not.  In addition, the [...] was aware that [...] posed a flight risk but still allowed the inmate to be housed in a dormitory with an unsecured window that could have been opened by any inmate at any time.
[brief] ” (Db35).  This Court should reject Defendant’s argument because the Prosecutor’s reference to Defendant’s statement was a fair comment on evidence that was already admitted and was made in response to arguments made in Defendant’s summation.  A prosecutor’s summation is not “evidence” subject to the New Jersey Rules of Evidence.  See R. 1:7-1(b) (noting that parties may make closing statements only “[a]fter the close of evidence”); see also, New Jersey Courts, Model Criminal Jury Charges, Parts 1 & 2 (“Arguments, statements, remarks, openings and summations of counsel are not evidence and must not be treated as evidence. ” (emphasis added)).  Rather, in summation the “prosecutor is granted wide latitude to make ‘fair comment’ on the evidence so long as he or she stays within legitimate inferences that can be deduced from the evidence. ”  McGuire, 419 N.J. Super. at 142 (quoting State v. Mayberry, 52 N.J. 413, 437 (1968)).  To assess whether a prosecutor’s remarks in summation rise to the level of plain error, appellate courts “must not only weigh the impact of the prosecutor's remarks, but must also take into account defense counsel's opening salvo. ”  State v. Engel, 249 N.J. Super. 336, 379 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 130 N.J. 393 (1991) (quoting United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 12 (1985) (internal quotation marks omitted)).  During summation, the prosecutor is permitted to “respond to an issue or argument raised by defense counsel. ”  State v. Johnson, 287 N.J. Super. 247, 266 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 144 N.J. 587 (1996).  Finally, trial errors that “were induced, encouraged, or acquiesced in or consented to by defense counsel ordinarily are not a basis for reversal on appeal .  . . .”  State v. A.R., 213 N.J. 542, 561 (2013).  This doctrine is implicated “when a defendant in some way has led the court into error. ”  Id. at 562 (internal markings and citations omitted).  When the doctrine applies, reversal is only appropriate where the error “cut mortally into the substantive rights of the defendant [causing] a fundamental miscarriage of justice. ”  Ibid. (internal markings and citations omitted).  Here, the Prosecutor’s reference in summation to Defendant’s own admission that he “may steal” was merely a “fair comment” on the evidence.
[directive] If No yes, the preliminary recommendation is Release Recommended, and proceed to Step 12.  If Step 6. no, continue to if of Step 6: Determine there is an NVCA flag and one the current charges is violent.  If No yes, the preliminary recommendation is Release Recommended, and proceed to Step 12.  If Step 7. no, continue to if Step Step 4 7:  Determine any current charge, not captured by above, is:  - Escape (N.J.S.A. 2C:29-5(a)) Aggravated manslaughter or manslaughter (N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4(a)(l) or (2), 2C:11- or(2)) 4(b)(l) or Aggravated sexual assault (N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(a)(2)(a), (b) (c), 2C:14-2(a)(3) through (7))
[brief] First – as an initial matter – defendant’s assertion that his "severe mental health issues" went uncontested is factually incorrect.  At no time did the State concede or stipulate to the fact that defendant suffered from any type of mental illness.  While the State, in its opening statement, addressed the fact that defendant had seen a psychiatrist to get a prescription for Adderall (3T:34-10 to 14); the fact that based defendant’s continued use of the internet, he drove around Monmouth County believing people on the roadways were invading his space, tailing him and he became increasingly preoccupied with that narrative (3T:34-21 to 35-12); and that his brother told police that defendant "had some issues and was in [...] the past weekend" (3T:41-2 to 8), these statements – in no way – were a concession by the State that defendant suffered from any type of mental illness, even in the most general sense.  What is more, the State alluding to the fact that jurors “may end up considering some mental health defense of a diminished capacity because I’ve talked to you about some of the issues that were going on with defendant during the weeks before this horrible event” simply addressed the possibility—at the outset of any evidence being presented—that such evidence may be forthcoming by the defense and certainly was not a concession that defendant actually suffered from a mental illness.  Indeed, the State followed up that statement by telling the jurors, “But, I’m going to ask you when you consider seriously and diligently as I know you will, considered all the evidence in this case, I submit that you’ll be firmly convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant, [...], shot and killed knowingly and purposefully [...], a complete stranger, on that fateful night of May 3, 2018. ”  (3T:49-14 to 20); (Db 19).  As such, the State clearly recognized in its opening that defendant may bring forth evidence of diminished capacity, but certainly never conceded it existed.  To be sure, an opening statement is not evidence, only a roadmap of possible evidence presented.  Contrary to defendant’s assertion as to the “understanding of the parties,” the actual understanding of the parties is clear from the record.  Defendant prior to trial even commencing, made it clear that he had instructed his counsel to withdraw the insanity defense, thereby taking his defense for “severe mental health issues” off of the table.
[directive] A voluntary consent to a search may preclude some Fourth Amendment problems.  A consent search eliminates the need to determine what threshold standard must be met before conducting the search or seizure, either for an administrative or criminal investigation.  For consent to be legally valid in New Jersey, a person must be informed that he or she has the right to refuse to permit a search.4  If a consent search is undertaken, the internal affairs investigator shall follow standard law enforcement procedures and have the subject officer sign a consent form after being advised of the right to refuse such a search.
[brief] Weather Conditions  Plaintiff’s weather expert, [...], provided an expert report indicating that the snow began in Basking Ridge on March 7, 2018 near 2 AM and concluded at approximately 8:30 PM.  During this time, 14 inches of heavy wet snow fell in the area.  (Da 64-79).  Governor [...] issued a weather-related State of Emergency via Executive Order on March 6, 2018 due to massive snow storm of March 7, 2018.  (Da 36-41).  The State of Emergency Order anticipated that there would be hazardous travel conditions and that normal operations of both private and public entities would be impeded.  (Da 36-41).  The conditions giving rise to the weather-related State of Emergency did not abate or terminate until March 13, 2018 at 10 AM.  (Da 36-41).  Plaintiff’s slip and fall occurred less than 12 hours after the snow abated in Basking Ridge, and after having accumulated a 14-inch snow fall total, and while the State of Emergency was in full effect.  C.
[brief] THE COURT SHOULD REVERSE THE DEPARTMENT’S DISAPPROVAL OF GENWORTH’S APPLICATIONS.  [...]’s brief showed that reversal is required because the purported basis for denying the requested rates has shapeshifted and was illegal in any event.  After the Department issued a disapproval letter that was unmoored from regulatory or statutory text and made no mention of “excessiveness,” that decision transformed into something new in the ALJ’s hands (“excessive and unreasonable”), then was re-written again by the Commissioner to rest on “excessiveness” alone.  See Pb13–45.  In sum, the Commissioner purported to affirm a determination that the agency had never made.  Regardless, the Commissioner rested on a ground—dependent excessiveness—that cannot be invoked absent the promulgation of an explanatory regulation.  The Department’s brief confirms as much.  It effectively concedes that the disapproval letter had a different basis from the mid-litigation “excessive” finding, see, e.g., Db28–31; it illustrates, through myriad inconsistent definitions, that the term “excessive” is too broad to be enforced without the regulations that the legislature mandated, see, e.g., Db13, 33–36, 41–44; and it fails to offer cases to support its positions on appeal (rather than unsuccessfully trying to distinguish [...]’s cited cases), see Db28–48.  This Court should reverse and annul the unlawful determination.
[directive] 2.  b)  ¿Entiende usted que si suministra información falsa sobre su residencia o no verifica su [Sí/Yes] [No/No] dirección, puede que se le acuse de haber cometido un delito de tercer grado y podría recibir una (si el delito se cometió el primero de julio del condena de encarcelamiento de hasta 5 años 2014 o después de esa fecha) o un delito de cuarto grado y recibir una condena de (si el delito se cometió el 7 de marzo del 2007 o después de encarcelamiento de hasta 18 meses esa fecha)?  Do you understand that if you provide false information concerning your residence or fail to verify your address (if the offense you may be charged with a third degree crime and receive a sentence of imprisonment up to 5 years was committed on or after July 1, 2014) or a fourth degree crime and receive a sentence of imprisonment of up to (if the offense was committed on or after March 7, 2007)?
[brief] However, there is no indication in this record that the judge improperly considered the more serious acquitted charges in deciding to impose a sentence in the highest range for a second-degree offense.  Melvin, 248 N.J. at 350 (explaining that consideration of acquitted charges in sentencing defies the principles of due process and fundamental fairness).  The judge focused only on defendant's lengthy past criminal history and did not, like in Melvin, make any findings as to the weapons charges for which defendant was acquitted.  That lengthy criminal conduct, beginning in 1993 when defendant was a juvenile, and continuing to the time of his arrest in this case, despite repeated attempted rehabilitation and punishment, supported the judge's finding as to aggravating factors three, six, and nine, because it presented a strong risk of re-offense and underscored the need to deter him from future criminal activity.  See State v. Ross, 335 N.J. Super. 536, 543 (App. Div. 2000) (finding aggravating factors supported by the defendant's lengthy criminal history).  Last, defendant's argument that the judge, in effect, improperly applied aggravating factor two, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(2), the “gravity and seriousness of harm inflicted on the victim,” is not persuasive.  The judge expressed sympathy for the victim and his family based on this incident, but specifically found that aggravating factor two did not apply in this case.10  We conclude defendant's sentence was in accord with the sentencing guidelines, was based on a proper weighing of the factors, and does not shock the judicial conscience.
[directive] Law enforcement officers also have the authority to impound ORVs for unlawful use on public lands.  Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 39:3C-34(b)(1)–(3), the following penalties apply when impounding ORVs:  1.  The ORV may be impounded for not less than forty-eight (48) hours and a fee of $500 for towing and storage may be imposed (first violation); 2.  The ORV may be impounded for not less than ninety-six (96) hours and a fee of $750 for towing and storage may be imposed (second violation); 3.  The ORV may be forfeited and sold at auction and a fee of $1,000 for towing and storage may be imposed (third or subsequent violation).  Additionally, if the owner fails to claim the impounded ORV, and if the fees addressed above have not been paid, by noon of the 30th day following the date of conviction, the ORV may be sold at 39:3C-34(c)(1).7 auction.
[brief] In its answer to that petition, defendant admitted that the accident arose out of and in the course of employment and paid benefits.  Plaintiff admitted that benefits were received and paid by [...]’s employer defendant [...].  Plaintiff then filed wrongful death and survivorship claims against [...] seeking compensatory and punitive damages alleging that [...]’s death was the result of an “intentional wrong” by her employer for compelling non-management employees like her to park in an area of the parking lot which it knew lacked appropriate pedestrian safeguards.  More specifically, plaintiff alleges that because [...] was compelled to park in and area of the parking lot without adequate pedestrian safeguards and walk a greater distance to the hospital entrance than the others (physicians, management, patients/visitors), it was substantially certain that injury or death would result.  During discovery, plaintiff proffered no evidence that the defendant rejected safety precautions recommended by civil engineers or did anything to alter the parking lot’s design.  Likewise plaintiff proffered no evidence to demonstrate that the defendant knew of safety concerns to drivers or pedestrians traversing the parking lot.  Conversely, the defendant served a report from a certified traffic engineer who offered the opinions that the parking lot was designed in accordance with industry standard, and that the accident was caused by the negligent operation of the [...] vehicle.  Defendant timely filed a motion for summary judgment arguing that no reasonable jury could conclude that the defendant committed an intentional wrong within the meaning of N.J.S.A. 34:15-8.  Following oral argument on the motion, the trial judge appropriately granted summary judgment to defendant [...] including all claims for punitive damages.  That order should now be affirmed.
[brief] ”  Pa169-70; CPa3.  Later on November 8, 2021, [...] reiterated to plaintiff that he was no longer going to recommend plaintiff as his successor.  167-68, 172.  [...] was not willing to recommend plaintiff because he had reported his unlawful conduct to Germany.  Id.; CPa3.  In late November 2021, [...], [...], and [...] decided to terminate plaintiff’s employment because of his complaints to [...].
[brief] The [...] Biennial Bridge Inspection Report fails to provide evidence of a dangerous condition.  In reviewing the [...] Biennial Bridge Inspection Report dated April 22, 2015, the trial court correctly found that there was no indication of a dangerous condition requiring emergent repair.  Specifically, the [...] report stated there was, “settlement at the southbound north abutment joint up to 2”.  Small in the southbound north approach roadway. ”  The appraisal of the approach was, “Fair (5)”.  The Conclusions and Recommendations section states that “the overall condition of Structure 40.0 is satisfactory. ”  The Maintenance Repair and Recommendations section states as item number 2: “Repair joints at abutments and pier.  See photos 11, 12, and 14. ”  Photograph 14 is described as: “Southbound north abutment joint looking east.  Ramped up and deteriorated in the left shoulder and left lane.  Small pothole in the north approach roadway. ” (Pa2123) (See Pa1202; 1343; 1349; 1358).  The trial court found that there was nothing in the [...] report that would allow anyone to reasonably conclude that there was a defect in the road so severe or so dangerous that immediate action was required.  To the contrary, the report stated that the repairs should be made as part of regular maintenance.  (See Pa2145; Pa2166; Pa2168).  Based in part on the [...] report, the trial court correctly found that the roadway was in satisfactory condition and there was no indication that there was a dangerous condition in need of emergent repair.
[brief] 5 - **Dalia v. United States**, 441 U.S. 238 (1979) ......................................................... 26, 29 - **Katz v. United States**, 389 U.S. 347. 16 (1967) ......................................................  27 - **Strickland v. Washington**, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) .................................................... 19, 20, 21, 22, 36, 37, 42 - **United States v. Cronic**, 466 U.S. 648 (1984).  .......................................................  22  ####  NEW JERSEY OPINIONS CITED - **Gangemi v. Berry**, 25 N.J. 10 (1957) ........................................................................ 29 - **State v. A.T.C.**, 239 N.J. 450 (2019) ........................................................................ 29 - **State v. Abdullah**, 241 N.J. 60 (2020) .....................................................................
[brief] In email correspondence that [...] transmitted to [...] on June 25, 2008, the day the Second Loan was made, [...] thanked his friend for his willingness to make what he described as a “patch” loan and for being a “lifesaver” for making the Second Loan.  Da14; Da162-63 (Ex. P1); 1T64-7 to 65-4; 4T243-14 to 21.  The trial court also found that email and documents drafted by [...] himself confirmed his agreement that the Second Loan always carried the 10% per annum interest rate just as [...] first proposed and, as noted, the same interest rate that governed the First Loan.  Da13-15 (“this Court finds both the first and second loans carried interest rates of ten percent (10%) per annum. ”).  [...] also agreed to pay the Second Loan, the “patch,” as soon as he was able to do so.  1T147-21 to 23; 3T8-9 to 17, 9-13 to 18, 126-4 to 5, 136-25 to 137-3, 140-19 to 20, 4T243-3 to 13.  The trial court found that “[...] traded on his close friendship with [...] to obtain the loans which he desperately needed and could not obtain elsewhere. ”  Da15.  C.
[brief] Here, Defendant cannot hide from the facts of this matter:  - On March 18, 2022, this Court entered default judgment against Defendant.  - More than a year has passed.  - It was not until June 21, 2023, that Defendant filed his second motion to vacate; the lower court’s denial of which is the basis for the instant appeal.  Accordingly, the instant motion to vacate is untimely.  Indeed, even to the extent that Defendant seeks to vacate the judgment pursuant to Rule 4:50-1(d), his motion is still not timely.  “The Rule does not mean that it is reasonable to file such a motion within one year; the one-year period represents only the outermost time limit for the filing of a motion based on Rule 4:50–1(a), (b) or (c). ”  Orner v. Liu, 419 N.J. Super. at 437.  “All Rule 4:50 motions must be filed within a reasonable time, which, in some circumstances, may be less than one year from entry of the order in question. ”  Ibid.  Here, Defendant’s renewed motion was not brought within a reasonable amount of time because: - Defendant became aware of the default judgment entered against him no later than August 12, 2022, since that was the date that he filed his first motion to vacate.  - On September 9, 2022, the Court denied Defendant’s first motion to vacate.  Over ten months have passed since that date, affording Defendant more than enough time to file a motion before this Court.  - Defendant allegedly took steps to hire at least two (2) attorneys to assist him in moving to vacate the default judgment.  Defendant’s lack of diligence in confirming that his retained attorneys were working to vacate the judgment entered against him is not an excuse.  In fact, it is more evidence that Defendant sat idly as the time to move to vacate the judgment expired.  Simply put, enough is enough.  The aforementioned Rules were put in place to preclude the very issue that is now before this Court.  Not only is the appeal time barred, it is the third attempt to vacate the same default judgment.  Plaintiff should not be forced to continue to defend against such meritless claims.  POINT IV
[brief] The Named Insured endorsement cited by [...] and [...] says nothing of submission or reporting of payroll, but rather, in the context of the endorsement, is intended to refer to service providers who would not have payroll “dedicated” to on-site operations like [...] would, \textit{e.g.}, “[v]endors, suppliers, material dealers, abatement contractors, blasting contractors, delivery persons, haulers, [and] hazardous waste removal contractors. ”  Za00078.  In any event, this is yet another attempt to categorize [...] as “not a named insured” despite [...] clearly falling within the Policy’s definition, referenced above.