ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] Bail Schedules – Indictable Offenses  The Bail Schedules will only continue to apply to defendants arrested for indictable offenses on or prior to December 31, 2016 at bail reduction/bail review hearings conducted thereafter in Superior Court.  The option of R.O.R. is available whenever a judge deems it appropriate.  The option of 10% cash bail will remain available where permissible under N.J.S.A. 2A:162-12.  The Bail Schedules will not apply to defendants initially charged on complaint- summonses for indictable offenses on or after January 1, 2017, who thereafter fail to appear in court.  Monetary bail may be set upon issuance of the bench warrant or upon arrest for that failure to appear, but the advisory monetary ranges in the Bail Schedules will not apply.  The Bail Schedules will not apply to defendants initially charged on complaint- summonses for indictable offenses before January 1, 2017 who thereafter fail to appear in court.  Monetary bail may be set upon issuance of the bench warrant or upon arrest for that [...] • [...] • [...]  Directive #06-16  Revised Statewide Bail Schedules/ Permissible Use of Monetary Bail Schedules Page 4 failure to appear, but the advisory monetary ranges in the Bail Schedules will not apply.  Bail Schedules - Disorderly Persons Offenses/Petty Disorderly Persons Offenses
[brief] \(^2\) *Miller v. Americollect, Inc.*, 2022 WL 20470401 at *9; *Mhrez Decision* at p.10.  Of course, to use telegram operators under any circumstances, even those permitted by the statute, the debt collector must transmit the information about the debt to be included in the telegram to the telegram operator—just as it would do with a letter vendor.  Yet under Appellant’s theory, a debt collector’s transmitting the information to the telegram operator is itself unlawful under § 1692c(b), which would render the telegram provisions null surplusage.
[brief] 14  d.  Statutory Construction ............................................................................................  16  e.  The Planning Board is limited to Fact-finding, not policy-making ......................  18  POINT I - The Subject Property has an Actual, Physical Hardship (Ja41, L. 14-21; Ja44, L. 5-21; Ja46, L. 7-20; Ja48, L. 4-7; Ja94 L. 9-22; Ja106, L. 14-16, L. 21-24; Ja151, items 1, pars. 4, 5, 7, 8; Ja192-195; Ja197-199-letter; Ja205-206-letter; Ja217, sect. IV, #1,2,3; Ja260-272-Pineland findings letters) ........................................................................................................  19  POINT II - The Result when the Pinelands findings must be accepted.  (Not argued below)  .........................................................................................................................  21 POINT III - [...] application Suggested a Second Substantial Use, [...] did not contain specific reference to second principal use (Transcript, Ja218, item #5)  .................................................................  23 POINT IV - The Nature of a ‘Substantial Change’ in an application.
[directive] If you find probable cause to believe the defendant has purposely or knowingly violated their electronic monitoring condition of release you may charge the defendant with Criminal Contempt in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:29-9.  6.  Provide complaint number if needed.  7.  If asked whether you have photos:  “I’m sorry, I only have the same information you do from the CCH. ”  Provide [gender, race, date of birth, height, weight, SBI number and other identifying information as provided in the Complaint or UDIR].  8.  If asked to come to the police station and file a report or provide additional documentation to support probable cause:  “I’m sorry, I cannot sign a complaint.  A copy of the Pretrial Release Order can be found in the Home Detention/Electronic Monitoring Dashboard to which you should have access.
[directive] 4.  Do you understand that by pleading guilty and admitting that the crime(s) [Yes] [No] are a violent crime you are waiving your right to have a jury determine, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the circumstance(s) that make the crime(s) a violent crime(s) are present?  Date: Defendant: Defense Attorney: Prosecutor: Form Promulgated by Directive # 01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 11170
[brief] Unfortunately, the evidence should be crystal clear that [...] has engaged in major deliberate, fraudulent falsifications and omissions of the record in order to try and deceive the Appellate Court with his Brief.  [...] should know that “Verified Complaint sought [for the Court] to approve the IA [only after Exceptions by Interested Parties (as per Verified Complaint, par. 4) (52a), incl. [...], were addressed by [...], as also required by R.4:87-8, which was dictated by March 25, 2022 Order, par. 1 (13a), and only after addressing Surrogate Audit feedback]”.  In his citation of the Will, par. 10.6, he deliberately and fraudulently omitted that “Prior to transferring any or all of the assets of each trust to a Successor professional Co-Trustee…. the professional Co-Trustee may require an approval of its account either by a court of competent jurisdiction or by such of the beneficiaries it deems appropriate.
[brief] CONCLUSION  For the reasons expressed above, the [...] ask this Court to affirm various Orders of the trial court, including the following:  1.  Order of January 19, 2016, Dismissing Plaintiffs’ Complaint against Defendants [...], and [...] (41a); 2.  Order of November 10, 2016, Denying Plaintiffs’ Motion to Vacate the Order of January 19, 2016 (50a); 3.  Order of April 3, 2018, Denying Plaintiffs’ Motion to Vacate the Order of January 19, 2016 (188a); 4.  Order of January 24, 2020, Denying Plaintiffs’ Motion to Amend the Complaint (376a); and 5.  Order of December 16, 2020, Denying Plaintiffs’ Motion to Reconsider the Order of January 24, 2020 (379a).
[brief] Last, all error, including both plain error and harmful error, is tested by the standard set forth in Rule 2:10-2, that is, as set forth above, whether the error is "clearly capable of producing an unjust result."  See [...] & [...], Current N.J. Court Rules, cmt. 2.1 on R. 2:10-2 (2022).  Rule 2:10-2 provides that "the appellate court may, in the interests of justice, notice plain error not brought to the attention of the trial or appellate court."  This means that even when no party to the appeal raises a particular issue, the appellate court may raise it "where upon the total scene it is manifest that justice requires consideration of an issue central to a correct resolution of the controversy and the 21 lateness of the hour is not itself a source of countervailing prejudice."  Ctr. for Molecular Med. & Immunology v. Twp. of Belleville, 357 N.J. Super. 41, 48 (App. Div. 2003) (quoting In re Appeal of Howard D. Johnson Co., 36 N.J. 443, 446 (1962)).  See Fitzgerald v. Stanley Roberts, Inc., 186 N.J. 286, 318 (2006); Morales-Hurtado v. Reinoso, 457 N.J. Super. 170, 191 (App. Div. 2018), aff'd o.b., 241 N.J. 590 (2020)
[brief] Of Counsel: [...], Esq. (011041994)  On the Brief: [...], Esq. (017621980)  TABLE OF CONTENTS  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ...........................................................................................................  i  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT .....................................................................................................1 STATEMENT OF FACTS IN REPLY .........................................................................................2 ARGUMENT ..................................................................................................................................7 POINT I: THE WESTFIELD ORDINANCE IS NOT PREEMPTED BECAUSE IT DOES NOT CONFLICT WITH ANY STATUTE AND BECAUSE THE LEGISLATURE PERMITTED WESTFIELD TO HAVE THE POWER TO REGULATE THE POLES ..............................................................................................................7 POINT II: WESTFIELD PROPERLY RAISED AND/OR PRESERVED THE ARGUMENTS IT ASSERTS ON APPEAL ........................................................................................................14  CONCLUSION ...............................................................................................................................15  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS BEING APPEALED
[brief] Once a municipality without its own operating school district has its board of education merged into another district, it never can get out without the express permission of the district into which it merged.  In such cases, the larger receiving district could exercise veto power over the sending municipality’s efforts to withdraw and form or enlarge a limited or all- purpose regional district.  Indeed, as Appellants note, [...] holds at-large elections for its board of education, and the seats are not apportioned between [...] and [...].  Because [...] is four times more populous than [...],\(^5\) its candidates likely will win any open seat by an overall majority.
[brief] (Pa552, 3-16-23 Updated Chait Report).  Defendant acknowledged that she never accounted for her personal expenses and unauthorized distributions from [...].  3T122:19-3T127:5.  She was the managing member, and it was her obligation to do this.  (Pa1-22)  She was required to maintain the books and records and to account to Plaintiff.  Id.  But she breached her duties under the Operating Agreement and the LLC Act by treating the company as her own personal piggy bank and not even bothering to keep track of what she took, let alone keeping Plaintiff informed.
[brief] ”  *Id.*  The New Jersey Supreme Court has also cited approvingly to the Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 205 (1981), for the proposition that “[g]ood faith performance or enforcement of a contract emphasizes faithfulness to an agreed upon common purpose and consistency with the justified expectations of the other party; it excludes a variety of types of conduct characterized as involving ‘bad faith’ because they violate community standards of decency, fairness or reasonableness. ”  *Wilson*, 168 N.J. at 245.  Allegations of bad faith or improperly motivated intentions are elements of a claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.  *See id.* at 251.  However, each case is fact-specific, and various forms of conduct have been held to constitute a violation of the covenant.  *See Brunswick Hills Racquet Club, Inc. v. Route 18 Shopping Ctr. Assocs.*, 182 N.J. 210, 225 (2005).
[brief] ONE APPELLANT BREACHED THEIR DUTIES UNDER THE SUBJECT AGREEMENT AND THE COURT MADE APPROPRIATE FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS IN ITS ORDER OF JULY 25, 2023 (Raised below at Da198, Da202)  The Court Order of July 25, 2023 notes that the intent of the parties is shown in the language of the Agreement itself: the parties mutually drafted an Agreement they intended would be accepted by the [...] and would allow a vote on the merits of Respondent’s disability application (Da16, Par.7).  To that end, the parties acknowledged that the [...] has the legal authority to determine the application and is therefore a legal forum, both as in fact, as contemplated under the Agreement at Par. 7, and as admitted by the Appellant before the Trial Court (Da198) and in their submission at Db28.  The [...] letters (Da81, Da24-Da25) concerned the [...]’s legal determination that in this Separation Agreement was unlawful and this called for severance under Par. 18 of the Agreement – this declaration evidenced a potential condition contemplated by the parties at the time of drafting wherein a legal forum may declare aspects of the Separation Agreement to be a problem - once such declaration is made, then “such provisions, terms, clauses, or waivers or release of claims or rights shall be deemed severable, such that all other provisions, terms, clauses, and waivers and releases of claims and rights contained in this Agreement shall remain valid and binding upon all parties. ”  (Da19)  The language of the Separation Agreement shows that the parties included a vehicle for resolution - any offending terms that triggered Paragraph 18 were to be stricken, with no limitation as to what terms are stricken.  Appellant stated at Point II, Section B (Db16) that provisions concerning the disability application were at the forefront of negotiations and the parties appreciated the risk of some language in the Separation Agreement causing a problem, so they specifically memorialized as much in the agreement.  This admission includes the severance clause and obligations to effectuate the process of disability determination by the [...].  Appellant, however, in its breach, blocked that process and still refuses to sever the terms deemed “declared illegal, unenforceable, or ineffective” despite Appellant’s admission that the [...] is a legal forum as contemplated in Par. 18 of the Separation Agreement (Da19).  The Court determined that Appellant breached this agreement (Da202).  Paragraph 18 requires necessary action that should have immediately been taken pursuant to the mutual covenants under Paragraph 6 (Da16).  The Court’s July 25, 2023 Order enforced those terms and should be left undisturbed.  **POINT TWO**
[brief] In other words, Appellant invoked N.J.S.A. 40:55D-68 for the purpose of obtaining relief directly contrary to the statute’s plain purpose of "expressly protect[ing] a vested right by permitting a pre-existing nonconforming use to co-exist with an ordinance that facially prohibits it."  *Fairfield*, 198 N.J. at 271-72.  Because “a certificate certifying” a nonconforming use “existed before,” is not the same thing as a “certificate certifying that the use did not exist before,” Appellant’s application was contrary to the statute’s text and purpose and should never have been entertained by the Board.
[brief] (Pa0052.)  In calculating attorneys’ fees, the trial court did not adopt the “relative culpability approach” or the “time necessary to litigate approach. ”  Instead, the trial court fashioned a new method to calculate fees.  The trial court adopted the amount of fees calculated by [...] under the “time necessary to litigate approach” ($1,193,281), multiplied that figure by the erroneous allocation percentage originally entered against [...] (36.4), and then divided that figure by the allocation percentage ultimately entered against [...] (85).  (Pa0054.)  In reaching this calculation, the trial court rejected the argument that deductions should be made for issues on which [...] was unsuccessful, like choice of law and allocation.  (Pa0053-Pa0055.)  The trial court also did not appear to review a single legal invoice in reaching its ultimate calculation of fees.  With respect to costs, the trial court reiterated its holding that [...] was successful in this case.
[brief] 16.  Plaintiff makes no allegation that [...] ever subjected plaintiff to any disparate treatment.  (See Pa001 ¶¶1-21).  17.  Prior to filing the subject Complaint, Plaintiff filed a Tort Claims Notice ("TCN") on April 17, 2020\(^2\), which is beyond the 90-day period for some of the alleged mistreatment identified in the TCN -- specifically the mistreatment that purportedly occurred between December 29, 2019 and January 15, 2020 (not being permitted to attend church or receive her psychiatric medications).
[brief] This fact was confirmed by the Respondent.  (11T109-19 to 111-5).  [...] had no reason to believe that (1) the Will was signed unwillingly, (2) Decedent was of unsound mind, (3) Decedent was under any form constraint, or (4) Decedent was being unduly influenced by anyone in any way with reference to the Will.  (9T232-3 to 25).  These facts were confirmed by [...] at trial.  (10T44-22 to 45-9).
[brief] More specifically, even if this Court finds that the Trial Court’s discussion of the applicable interest rate is appropriate, and it is not, it is abundantly clear that the Trial Court made no such findings with respect to the justification for an award of compound interest, as [...] similarly did not make any such findings with respect to compound interest.  See 40007a; 40010a.  **B.  The Trial Court awarded an excessive interest rate for the period after December 20, 2013 (40006a-40007a; 40009a-40010a).
[brief] | Pa 10 | | Carpet Remnant Warehouse. Inc. v. N.J. Dep't of Labor.  125 N.J. 567 (1991) | Pa 14,16 | | Hargrove v. Sleepy’s, LLC, 220 N.J. 289 (2015) | Pa 17 | | Prado v. State, 186 N.J. 413, 427 (2006) | Pa 10 | | In re Proposed Quest Academy Charter School, 216 N.J. 370 (2013) | Pa 10 | | Lanza v. Bd. of Trs., 2019 NJ Super, Unpub, Lexis 497.
[directive] Domestic Violence Incidents Involving Agency Personnel  6.4.1  Law enforcement personnel may become involved in domestic violence incidents.  It is important to the integrity of the agency, the safety of the victim and the career of the officer that such matters are handled appropriately.  Thus, it is imperative that every law enforcement agency establish a policy for investigating and resolving domestic violence complaints involving its employees.  6.4.2  Whenever an officer is involved in a domestic violence incident, either as an alleged perpetrator or as a victim, internal affairs must be promptly notified.  Where the officer was the alleged perpetrator, investigating officers must seize their service weapon or any other weapon possessed, as mandated by AG Directives 2000-3 and 2000-4.  6.4.3  Every law enforcement agency should promulgate a rule which requires any officer or employee to notify the agency if he or she has been charged with an offense, received a motor vehicle summons or been involved in a domestic violence incident.  In cases of domestic violence, the investigating agency should also notify the employing agency's internal affairs investigators as soon as possible.  INTERNAL AFFAIRS POLICY & PROCEDURES | November 2022 31
[brief] N.J.S.A. § 13:20-2 also refers to “the adoption by the Department of Environmental Protection of stringent standards governing major development in the Highlands preservation area. ”46  And N.J.S.A. 13:20-10 (“Goals of regional master plan”) lists one of the “[t]he goals of the regional master plan with respect to the preservation area” as “prohibit[ing] or limit[ing] to the maximum extent possible construction or development which is incompatible with preservation of this unique area. ”47  In light of the “overall policy and purpose” of the Highlands Act to establish “stringent protection” and “stringent standards” as so to prohibit or limit construction or development “to the maximum extent possible,” interpreting Exemption #11 as only allowing for “routine upgrades” would set the bar for construction or development appropriately high.
[brief] PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 1 STATEMENT OF FACTS 2 PROCEDURAL HISTORY 7 LEGAL ARGUMENT 9 POINT ONE THE COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW BY NOT FINDING THAT PLAINTIFF ESTABLISHED THAT HE WAS WRONGFULLY ARRESTED FALSELY IMPRISONED, SUBJECTED TO ASSAULT AND BATTERY AND EXCESSIVE FORCE AS WELL AS MALICIOUS PROSECUTION (Pa22-Pa23; Pa53-Pa54; Pa093, Pa094-Pa096; Pa30-Pa31; Pa561; Pa588; Pa621; Pa29; Pa041; Pa533; Pa534)  9 POINT TWO THE COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW BY FAILING TO FIND THAT PLAINTIFF HAD SHOWN THAT THE DEFENDANTS HAD VIOLATED N.J.S.A. 10:6-2 (c) (Pa023; Pa561; Pa588; Pa621; Pa546; Pa533; Pa534)  17 POINT THREE  THE COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW BY FAILING TO FIND THAT THE POLICE DEFENDANTS EXCEEDED THE SCOPE OF THEIR LAWFUL AUTHORITY BY THE USE OF EXCESSIVE FORCE AND AS SUCH WERE NOT ENTITLED TO QUALIFIED IMMUNITY  (1T24-1-4, Pa093; Pa22-Pa23; Pa533; Pa534)  21 POINT FOUR THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO FIND THAT THE DEFENDANTS DENIED PLAINTIFF OF HIS RIGHTS UNDER N.J.S.A. 10:5-4, 12(D),(E)(F), N.J.S.A. 10:1-2, PLACE OF PUBLIC ACCOMMODATIONS.
[brief] (Da125)(Da52).  Second, even if the [...] are charged with knowledge of the by-laws and subsequent changes, “[t]he law will not subject a minority of landowners to unlimited and unexpected restrictions on the use of their land merely because the covenant agreement permitted a majority to make changes to existing covenants. ”  Kalway, supra at par. 15 citing Boyles v. Hausmann, 517 N.W.2d 610, 617 (Neb. 1994).  Had the restrictions provided that grantee is subject to the changes in the building setback and height restriction as may be changed by the club, we have a different case.  No such language exists.  To the contrary, the development rights are specifically reserved to the [...] or [...].
[brief] The Court received a motion to substitute the [...] name as “[...]”, and this motion went to the Milov home address.  9a; 7a.  The Court then entered default upon request, and upon motion (again delivered to the Milov home address) the Court ordered October 18, 2021, as the Order Setting Time, Date and Amount for Final Redemption.  24a; 21a; 33a.  They did not redeem.  [...] assigned its [...] to related company [...] (hereafter “[...]”), and a substitution of plaintiff motion was filed (again served at the Milov home) and this Order was entered on December 1, 2021.  34a; 37a; 39a.  Final Judgment was applied for (again by a motion delivered to the Milov home) on January 11, 2022, 40a; 43a; 44a; and was ultimately entered on February 3, 2022.  This effectively ended the case.
[directive] Supplement to Directive #01-18, CN 10079-Polish Defendant's Initials  Skorygowany fonnularz opublikowany 31.12 .20  I 9r. w suplemencie do Dyrektywy #0 I -I 8, CN 10079-Polish lnicjaly oskarzonego page 4 of7/strona 4 z 7  Specify any sentence the prosecutor has agreed to recommend:
[brief] Statutes 28 U.S.C. § 1341 ..................................................................................  3 N.J.S.A. 12A:9-602(5) ...........................................................................  9 N.J.S.A. 12A:9-602(8) ...........................................................................  9 N.J.S.A. 12A:9-602(9) ...........................................................................  9 N.J.S.A. 12A:9-608 ...............................................................................  9 N.J.S.A. 20:3-2(d) ...............................................................................  9  Other Authorities
[brief] If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.  Under the New Jersey Rules of Evidence, expert testimony is admissible only where it will assist the trier of fact.  It is well-established that expert witnesses simply may not render opinions on matters which involve a question of the law.  See, Boddy v. Cigna Property & Cas. Companies, 334 N.J. Super. 649, 659 (App. Div. 2000) and Healy v. Fairleigh Dickinson Univ., 287 N.J. Super. 407 (App. Div.), certif. den. 145 N.J. 372, cert. den. 519 U.S. 1007 (1996).