ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Further, while New Jersey pension statutes are construed liberally because of their remedial character, *Geller v. Dep’t of Treasury*, 53 N.J. 591, 597-98 (1969), “an employee has only such rights and benefits as are based upon and within the scope of the provisions of the statute. ”  *Francois v. Bd. of Trs., Pub. Emps.’ Ret. Sys.*, 415 N.J. Super. 335, 349 (App. Div. 2010) (citation omitted).  Here, the statute provides for the benefit if a retiree files for it within two years of the effective date of the Ricci Act, i.e., by July 8, 2021.  [...] did not file for the benefit within the time permitted by the statute, so even under a liberal construction, the statute expressly states he is ineligible for the benefit he now seeks.
[brief] Petitioner asserts that Respondents violated section (g) of the Code of Ethics when they showed the “Referendum Community Presentation” and published a “Referendum FAQ” because these materials made an appeal to the public's emotion and equated investment in schools as a way to increase property values.  However, even if accepted as true, Petitioner did not plead that Respondents provided inaccurate information concerning these communications.  Accordingly, Counts 3 and 4 and cannot establish a violation of section (g) of the Code of Ethics.  In Count 6, Petitioner alleges, among other unsupported facts, that "Referendum Video #2" misrepresented the impact of flooding at one of the schools at issue in the referendum in order to persuade voters that flooding in the school was not as bad as feared.
[brief] Plaintiff sued defendant [...] ("[...]"), a homecare service agency, and defendant [...] ("[...]"), a managed care organization, for causing her father’s wrongful death on June 2, 2019, while under a homecare service contract from May 12, 2019, to June 8, 2019, and for subsequent cover-up.  Plaintiff pursued ten causes of action, including contract-based actions, torts, and fraudulent concealment.  The statute of limitations for contract-based actions will not expire until July 14, 2025 (N.J.S.A. 2A:14-1).  On October 22, 2021, the trial court issued an order dismissing the case without prejudice on the basis that the plaintiff was not appointed as administrator at the time of filing.
[brief] **a court of competent jurisdiction may, for cause, order further adjournments. **  "Bankers Trust held that the statutes relating to the adjournment of sheriff sales, N.J.S.A. 2A:17-36 and N.J.S.A. 2A:61-5, as considered in a context indistinguishable from the present matter, do not provide the sheriffs of this State with the discretion to deny an adjournment when requested either by the judgment creditor or with the mutual consent of the parties.  While it is true that N.J.S.A. 2A:17-36 states that a sheriff may permit two adjournments of the sale "and no more," the statute further states that "a court of competent jurisdiction" may order, "for cause," other adjournments.  As a result, these statutes have been understood as providing the parties with the vested right to two adjournments from a sheriff without court intervention.  Thereafter, the power to make a substantive ruling on an adjournment request resides solely with the court.  Wells Fargo Home Mortg. v. Snell, 378 N.J. Super. 449, 453-54 (App. Div. 2005)" (Pa 317-322)  [...] further argued in his May 5, 2023, letter (Pa 146) without merit or supporting case law:  "After the filing, but before the status conference held on March 22, 2023, the Sheriff's Office granted the relief sought by Plaintiff."  "When the Defendants granted Plaintiff his two (2) statutory adjournments to the Sheriff's sale on his property, all claims that Plaintiff had against the Defendants were extinguished.  Thus, based on the foregoing reasons and facts one (1) through thirty (30), the court should reverse because plaintiff's choice of forum was entitled to preferential consideration.
[brief] .................................11, 17, 20, 28, 32  Plaintiff-Appellant/Cross-Respondent, [...] ("Plaintiff"), respectfully submits this brief in further support of its appeals of the Final Judgment and the Discovery Order, and in opposition to the cross-appeals by Defendants-Respondents/Cross-Appellants, [...], as the Administrator of the [...] ("Defendant Grammer"), and [...] ("Defendant Ippolito" and, together, "Defendants").
[brief] If any documents demonstrating subsequent due diligence or “services performed” existed, Appellants would produce them.  They have not.  Moreover, the record indicates that [...] was entertaining offers from multiple solar developers at the time.  After all, [...] had advertised this project before Appellants even entered into their lease.  This was a well-known solar opportunity, and [...] took numerous steps to warn Appellants of the dire consequences that would flow from their failure to pay rent.  Appellants ignored the warnings, and they lost land control.
[brief] Model Act, in 1924.  See Andrews v. Ocean Twp. Bd. Of Adj., 30 N.J. 245, 255 (1959); Commercial Realty v. First Atlantic, 122 N.J. 546, 553-555 (1991).  The constitutional validity of zoning was confirmed in Euclid v. Ambler, 272 U.S. 365 (1926).  As a consequence, in 1927 the State Constitution was amended to allow an Enabling Law to authorize municipalities to adopt zoning regulations within limitations.
[brief] Exhibit H, 10/4/2018  Plaintiffs' Letter Brief in Opposition to Defendants [...] and [...]'s Motion to Exclude Expert Testimony of [...]  ...................................................................................................................................(omitted)  Exhibit I, 9/13/2018  Order Denying Defendants [...] and [...]'s Motion for Reconsideration of Order Denying Motion for Summary Judgment  ...........................................................................................................(omitted, see 298a)  Exhibit J, 8/15/2018  Transcript of Motion Re: Summary Judgment Motions...311a Exhibit K, 9/28/2018  Transcript of Motion Re: Motion for Reconsideration of Order Denying Motion for Summary Judgment by Defendants [...], Esquire, and [...].........334a Exhibit L, 10/12/2018  Transcript of Motion Re: Defendants [...] and [...]'s Motion to Exclude Expert Testimony of [...]..................................................................................................................(omitted, see 1T) Exhibit M1, 7/24/2018
[brief] S.B.B. v. L.B.B., 476 N.J.  Super. 575, 596-607(App. Div. 2023) (applying stricter scrutiny of trial court protective order ruling when free expression under the First Amendment implicated).  The trial court failed to consider developing expansive state constitutional rights persuasive case law.  See, Barron v. Kolenda,491 Mass. 408(2023) (invalidating as unconstitutional local public meeting comment restrictions); Belin v. Reynolds, 989 N.W. 2d 166 (Iowa 2023)(rejecting governor’s narrow interpretation of public records access); Khan v. Yale University, 347 Conn. 1(2023)(finding student denied right to cross-examine witnesses in quasi-judicial disciplinary matter).  Also see [...] “States of Play: Can advocates use state courts to preserve-and perhaps expand-constitutional rights” The New Yorker (June 10, 2024) (Pa473).  Rather than mitigating future litigation, the trial court created a host of unanticipated and avoidable future issue preclusion and entire controversy doctrine issues relating to claims and causes of action arising or relating to this hybrid prerogative writ/declaratory judgment/civil rights act violations action.  Finally, both the trial court and all sworn officers of the court had a professional and ethical duty to report and to refer public wrongdoing up the reporting ladder.  See, State v. Brady, 452 N.J. Super. 143 (App. Div. 2017); In the Matter of [...], 243 N.J. 395 (2020) (per curiam); Loigman v. Twp. Comm. of Middletown, 185 N.J. 566 (2006).  Accordingly, the “totality of the circumstances,” including post August 30, 2023 developments and the interests of justice, supported reconsideration, vacation, amendment, and alteration of the “manifestly unjust” September 22, 2023 Pre-Discovery Summary Judgment in Favor of All Defendants.
[brief] At its regularly scheduled meeting on February 14, 2023, the Governing Body conducted a Second Reading and approval of the Ordinance to adopt the Redevelopment Plan, along with comments and questions during the public hearing on the Ordinance (the “Second Reading”).  (Pa594-649.)  In her opening remarks, the Mayor recounted how the One Westfield Place proposal, the provisional name given to the project, was the “culmination of four years of planning and collaboration” with input from numerous community groups and the proposed redeveloper, [...].  (Pa596, at 4:17-20.)  The Mayor noted that “[t]here is no such thing as a perfect project, but we have strived to find a balanced proposal that addressed long-standing challenges that have gone ignored for decades while mitigating any potential negative impacts. ”  (Pa597, at 6:3-7.)  Members of the public were given the opportunity to present their views on the development.  (Pa599, at 11-57.)  Westfield’s consultants, planners, and officials addressed those comments in great detail in addressing the rationale and support for the Redevelopment Plan.  (Pa623-48, at 67:10-71:16; 84:23-24; 86:9-88:31.)  The Mayor also noted that there was “no group more intimately familiar with the Master Plan than the Planning Board,” which had determined that the Redevelopment Plan was consistent with the Master Plan.  (Pa638, at 90:11-91:6; Pa645, at 102:3-7.)  The members of the Governing Body clearly articulated the rationale for their approval, showed great respect for various viewpoints, and noted that public feedback had “already been incorporated in the Redevelopment Plan….” (Pa623-43, at 59:14-66:7; 91:23-92:3; 94:6-95:15; 98:1-99:24.)  The Town adopted the Ordinance by a vote of 7-1, thereby approving the Redevelopment Plan.
[brief] Defendant [...] was, in fact, successful in impeding any investigation into her conduct, which was recognized by the Trial Court in its opinion.  In referencing the investigation into the June 2020 incident, the Trial Court noted that:  “But clearly, as a result of them getting terminated there really wasn’t much to do to [...] because [...] got terminated for this. ” (T26-20).  Instead of investigating Defendant [...], Defendant [...] performed a mish-mashed dual “investigation,” primarily into the charge pay incident.  (Pa107).  For example, Defendant [...] permitted Defendant [...] to be present at staff interviews in connection with the investigation.  (Pa109 - Pa 110).  Defendant [...] also permitted Defendant [...] to exercise her discretion in recommending termination of even though she had an open HR complaint pending against her.  (Pa117).  The decision to terminate Plaintiff, [...], and [...] is further weakened by the failure of Defendants to abide by their own progressive discipline policy and their prior handlings of employees who were alleged to have “stolen” time.
[brief] However, this point was argued in connection with plaintiffs’ unsuccessful Motion to Amend the Complaint, plaintiffs’ unsuccessful Motion for Reconsideration of the Court January 24, 2020 Order denying plaintiffs’ Motion to Amend the Complaint (376a) and was argued in the 2020 Lawsuit filed by plaintiffs (Da5), which was promptly dismissed and which led to attorneys fees and sanctions being awarded to counsel for the [...] and against plaintiffs and their counsel.  (Da98).  Plaintiffs’ allegation of “newly discovered evidence” was first considered by the trial court in connection with plaintiffs’ February 28, 2018 Motion to Vacate the Order of [...] of November 10, 2016\(^2\) (which denied plaintiffs’ Motion to Vacate the January 19, 2016 dismissal order).  (50a).  On March 29, 2018, [...] held oral argument on plaintiffs’ Motion to Vacate the November 10, 2016 Order (2T) and on April 3, 2018, [...] entered an Order denying plaintiffs’ Motion to Vacate the --- \(^2\)  In the Statement of Facts section, Plaintiffs cite to the testimony of [...], which are baseless *ad hominem* attacks on [...], and have no relevance to this case.  The content of the Russo complaint was renounced by [...] prior to his death which led to the filing of a complaint by [...]’s estate against [...] for his handling of the Russo matter.
[brief] (Da23).  Reference is made to the Statement of Procedural History above for a detailed recitation of these proceedings.  During the course of this litigation, the Court set forth the procedures for the sale of the Property in an Order dated May 25, 2022.  (Da131).  While the sale was open to the public, [...] and [...] were the only parties who sought to buy the mosque Property and submitted several competing bids.  The Chancery Division then ordered the parties to submit last and final sealed bids.  [...] prevailed with a final bid in the amount of $1,500,050.55 for [...]’s Share in the mosque Property.  (Da202).  E.  **[...]’s D[...]GES.**
[brief] Indeed, [...] had argued that the Board and the Township breached the Settlement Agreement, so clearly the operative facts related to the parties’ actions after the Agreement was executed.  The Township and its Planning Board complied with all of their obligations under the Settlement Agreement.  They timely rezoned the subject property and approximately 9 months later, [...] made its application to the Planning Board for development approvals.  As presented, the project was to contain five (5) buildings; [...] proposed to include elevators in only two (2) of the buildings.  For various health, safety and welfare reasons, both the Township and the Board wanted elevators in all five (5) buildings.  During the hearings, [...] initially agreed to amend its application to include elevators in four (4) of the five (5) and before the hearings closed agreed to include elevators in all buildings on condition that additional units be approved.  The hearings before the Board concluded in June 2022 with the Board’s belief that the project would contain an elevator in Building E and the unit count would be increased by ten units.  The presentation of the proposed form of resolution to the Board was delayed while the resolution, Amended Settlement Agreement and amended zoning ordinance were being drafted to effectuate the additional ten units.
[brief] The Trial Court, Having the Benefit of a Full Evidentiary Record Including Deposition Testimony, Finds that Plaintiff Did Not Know of the Illicit Agreement Until After the Conclusion of the First Action  Despite the lack of evidence to support an argument that Plaintiff’s claims were barred by the entire controversy doctrine, on May 13, 2022, Defendants filed another motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint, or in the alternative, for summary judgment.  (Pa368.)  On July 8, 2022, the trial court conducted oral argument on Defendants’ second motion to dismiss.  (3T.)  During oral argument, the trial court found, based on the complete evidentiary record before it, that Plaintiff did not know of the illicit quid pro quo agreement until February 2021 and, therefore, Plaintiff’s claims are not barred by the Entire Controversy
[directive] The admonitions of the Court in Manley are as true today as they were when that opinion was written.  The undue consumption of time and the undesirable practice of juror indoctrination as consequences of attorney participation must be avoided.  The judge thus should continue to exercise the primary role in questioning jurors.  The Special Committee in its report encouraged the allowance of some attorney participation if requested.  But whether to allow it and, if allowed, the manner and scope of the practice must remain discretionary with the trial judge.
[brief] Per the DiMisa Court:  That exception reflects the principle that those fees incurred in an action against a third party are merely an additional element of “‘damages flowing from the tort. ’”  State, Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. v. Ventron Corp., 94 N.J. 473, 505, 468 A.2d 150 (1983) (quoting Dorofee v. Pennsauken Twp. Planning Bd., 187 N.J.Super. 141, 144, 453 A.2d 1341 (App.Div.1982)) (holding defrauded party who is sued by third party may recover counsel fees from tortfeasor as damages flowing from tort); In re Estate of Lash, 169 N.J. 20, 27–28, 776 A.
[brief] ”); N.J.R.E. 403(a) (noting that evidence “may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the risk of . . . undue prejudice, confusion of issues, or misleading the jury”).  “[R]eliability [is] the linchpin in determining admissibility’ of evidence under a standard of fairness that is required by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. ”  Michaels, 136 N.J. at 316. (quoting Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 114 (1977).  As “[c]ompetent and reliable evidence remains at the foundation of a fair trial, . . . [i]f crucial inculpatory evidence is alleged to have been derived from unreliable sources[,] due process interests are at risk. ”  Michaels, 136 N.J. at 316.  Here, as defense counsel argued, [...]’s testimony about the alleged dying declaration was wholly unreliable and thus inadmissible.
[brief] 7T17:21-25.  [...] themselves knowingly purchased the Property subject to the [...] lease, and accounted for the below-market rent in their asserted $2.475M purchase price.  [...] agreed that any potential buyer would have been aware of the [...] lease as of January 27, 1994.  7T18:1-4; 7T18:23-20:17.  He did not explain how a potential buyer would then disregard that long-term lease in favor of ascribing a $8.50 market rent.  [...] cannot cite to any New Jersey case that holds that an appraiser must only value the fee simple of a property in an eminent domain proceeding.  Casino Reinvestment Dev. Auth. v. Katz, one of the few New Jersey condemnation cases that even touch upon the concept of long-term leases, held that it is error for an appraiser not to factor a long-term lease into fair market value.
[brief] Prior to a 1979 amendment, N.J.S.A. 13:1B-24 included two (2) commercial fisherman, but they were replaced by the chairman of a committee established by the Endangered and Nongame Species Conservation Act, N.J.S.A. 23:2A-1 and a person knowledgeable on land use management and soil conservation.  L. 1979, c. 199, §72, eff. Sept. 19, 1979. for appointment to the Council by becoming sportsmen, farmers and members of the private organizations designated by the Legislature.  While the Court concluded that the delegation to the designated private organizations pursuant to N.J.S.A. 13:1B-24 was not in derogation of the due process and equal protection rights of the plaintiff organizations, in the end, the Court acknowledged that a better balance would be achieved by the presence of public members on Council that could advocate the interests of public interest groups and individuals other than farmers, sportsmen, and commercial fishermen.
[brief] (2T174:8 to 175:10, 179:5-19; 4T69:14 to 70:9; 5T48:9 to 50:3; Pa2284-86; Pa2288-89.)  In October 2022, the [...] notified [...] that the RIR was incomplete because Defendants had not performed the required door-to-door survey of nearby properties in connection with groundwater contamination, and on December 19, 2022, the [...] advised [...] that they would be holding their review of the RIR until the door-to-door survey was completed.  (4T123:8-25; 6T22:16-24, 121:7-22; Pa2292-95.)  Despite receiving this feedback in October 2022, [...] did not complete and submit the results of the door-to-door survey until the morning of July 20, 2023—just hours before he testified at trial.
[brief] ”  Barber v. ShopRite of Englewood & Assocs., Inc., 406 N.J. Super. 32, 52-53, (App. Div. 2009)(quoting Eden v. Conrail, 175 N.J. Super. 263, 267 (App. Div. 1980), modified by 87 N.J. 467 (1981).  None of the trial courts decisions constitute an abuse of discretion, reversible error or harmful error, nor collectively rise to the level of cumulative error.  The trial court properly charged the jury with Model Jury Charge 5.20(F)(5) as Plaintiff was an invitee, and as almost twelve hours had passed since the storm officially ended, properly determined that the “the duty of an owner of land is to make the premises reasonably safe for the proper use of an invitee and requires the owner to make reasonable inspection of the land to discover hazardous conditions.
[brief] The relatively minor difference in cost between retaining an archaeologist from a PWCRA-registered construction entity versus an archaeologist without this registration is inconsequential to the bid results primarily because the price differential between [...]’s bid ($41,819,780) and [...]’s bid ($44,732,529) is so large.  The [...] analyzed the figures under an extreme hypothetical most favorable to [...] to test [...]’s claim for the sake of argument, and the most extreme “advantage” that [...] could have received over [...] for not using a PWCRA-registered archaeologist was just over $750,400.00.  This hypothetical, perceived “advantage” would have narrowed the gap, but the margin between [...]’s and [...]’s would still be quite significant—over $2 million.  Although [...] argues that [...] and [...] were able to submit their bids “at a significant discount,” (see Carb27), the bid submissions themselves show otherwise.  The bids do not specify the exact amount allocated to the designated archaeologist subcontractor across the entire Project (which is combined with other contract work under Item L5), however, they indicate under Item U22 the rate at which the archaeologist subcontractor will be paid for any additional work required, with [...] providing $175 per hour ($2,800 for 16 hours), [...] providing $160 per hour ($2,560 for 16 hours), and [...] providing $300 per hour ($4,800 for 16 hours).  Compare items U22 for [...], [...], and [...] at 0037a, 0101a, and 1342a.
[brief] Defendant’s cause of action here, however, is one seeking an equitable remedy, not a remedy at law.  Indeed, as outlined in Plaintiff’s complaint, Plaintiff is seeking a correction in the December 1998 deed to vest title in its true owner, [...].  This precise circumstance was ruled on by the Appellate Division in its recent decision in *Lott v. Borough of Roselle*, A-1123-19T4, 2020 WL 7688039 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Dec. 28, 2020).