ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] **B.  The adoption of the SHO’s recommendations was procedurally flawed.  (M1-64; M462-473). **  In rebuttal to the Appellants’ arguments that the trial court erred in adopting the SHO’s recommendations in violation of R. 4:41-5(b), the Respondents essentially contend that since the Appellants did not file a motion on the SHO’s recommendations, the trial court was permitted to enter an order adopting the recommendations.  In support of this conclusion, the Respondents only quote a portion of the rule.  They argue that the filing of objections to the SHO’s recommendations and the filing of a motion “for action on the report and the objections thereto” are permissive and therefore, there is no requirement that a hearing take place.  However, the rule expressly provides that only after a hearing on the motion may the court adopt, modify, or reject the report in whole or in part, receive further evidence, or recommit it with instructions.  See R. 4:41-5(b).  No party moved before the trial court for the adoption of the recommendations by the SHO.  Objections were indeed submitted.  The trial court, however, had no basis to move forward with adoption of the recommendations without a motion and hearing having first occurred.  Undeniably, this did not occur.  Failure to adhere to this requirement under the rule requires reversal.
[brief] Defendants’ Counsel confirmed on August 26, 2022, they were provided with interrogatories and their production of documents request from Plaintiff’s prior Counsel, prior to the June 2021 settlement conference.  Defendants’ Counsel confirmed there was mutual agreement between Counsel, the discovery exchange would be limited.  Plaintiff adhered to Defendants’ Counsel requests for additional substantiating documents from their First Set of Production Documents request between July 13, 2022, and July 27, 2022.  Per August 26, 2022 court order, Plaintiff provided HIPAA authorizations within Rule 1:3-1 and Rule 1:3-3, written responses to First Production of Documents were mailed to the trial court and Defense Counsel on September 24, 2022 titled as August 26, 2022 order, and produced specific documents per Defendants’ 100 page discovery questionnaire submissions took place either email, NJ JEDS, US mail solely and/or secured link either as instructed by Defendants’ Counsel instruction or agreement between parties (AP 49 – AP 51; AP 68 – AP 71).  In addition, Defendants’ Counsel confirmed on August 26, 2022, they were provided with interrogatories and their production of documents request from Plaintiff’s prior Counsel, prior to the June 2021 settlement conference.  They further confirmed there was mutual agreement between Counsel, the discovery exchange would be limited.  ---
[brief] Store employee [...] observed the Appellant on the floor just after she had fallen.  Pa76, at 18:2-10.  14.  [...] observed a small spill consisting of a clear odorless liquid that was not that viscous or thick, but which [...] described as oily because of its texture.  Pa76, at 19:10-20:3.  15.  The area of the liquid was about the size of a baseball.  Pa76, at 21:17-20.
[brief] If that is not done, the tax obligation is unaffected, and the owner is dutybound to ascertain the amount owed.  Due process does not require tax collectors, municipalities and their staff to examine the tax rolls to search for outdated or incorrect addresses supplied by the property owners, or to communicate with property owners to ascertain whether their addresses remain correct.  . . .  The New Jersey Supreme Court has clearly ruled that municipalities are not constitutionally required to search out taxpayers in foreclosure suits to see if they have furnished up-to-date addresses.
[brief] In this case Plaintiff even ratified his marriage by first having a civil ceremony, and then having a religious ceremony later.  Further, Plaintiff argues that the marriage was never consummated.  (Pb33).  However, the testimony at trial appears to reflect that the parties engaged in sexual activity.  (1T116).  Specifically, when Plaintiff was asked on cross-examination whether he had a “sexual relationship” with Defendant, Plaintiff said “no,” but when asked if Defendant ever touched Plaintiff’s penis, he said “yes. ”  (1T117).  Plaintiff then testified that he never “touched” Defendant “physically or sexually” or attempted to put his penis inside of Defendant but then stated “… as soon as I would start, we would even have, she was like oh…it’s too big. ” (1T40-17; 2T40-17).  Plaintiff’s own testimony is contradictory.
[brief] No language exists in the Amended resolution that supports the Court's claim that the Diagrammatic Elevation and the limitations it imposed on [...] were somehow rendered inoperative.  If those limitations were still operative, then the documents memorializing those limitations represented would fit the definition of relevant evidence per NJRE 401 for a complaint seeking to demonstrate that those limitations had been disregarded and exceeded.  The Diagrammatic Elevation, as well as the [...] illustration should both have been admitted as evidence at the 03/27/2024 hearing for this matter under the provisions of NJRE 402.  REQUESTED
[brief] #  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES  ##  CASES CITED: | Case | Page | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | Balsley v. N. Hunterdon Reg'l Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 117 N.J. 434 (1990) | 28 | | Banco Popular N. Am. v. Gandi, 184 N.J. 161 (2005) | 75 | | Bendar v. Rosen, 247 N.J. Super. 219 (App. Div. 1991) | 74 | | Bondi v. Citigroup, Inc., 423 N.J. Super. 377 (App. Div. 2011) | 47, 52 | | Borough of Berlin v. Remington & Vernick Eng'rs, 337 N.J. Super. 590 (App. Div. 2001) | 32 | | Brunt v. Bd. of Trustees, Police & Firemen's Ret. Sys., 455 N.J. Super. 357 (App. Div. 2018) | 27 | | Bucinna v. Micheletti, 311 N.J. Super. 557 (App. Div. 1998) | 41 | | Buckelew v. Grossbard, 87 N.J. 512 (1981) | 57 | | Burd v. New Jersey Tel. Co., 76 N.J. 284 (1978) | 23, 24 | | Catena v. Raytheon Co., 447 N.J. Super. 43 (App. Div. 2016) | 22, 23 | | Chicago Title Ins. Co. v. Ellis, 409 N.J. Super. 444 (App. Div. 2009) | 46, 52 | | Cmty. Realty Mgmt. v. Harris, 155 N.J. 212 (1998) | 29 | | Cohen v. Fair Lawn Dairies, Inc., 86 N.J. Super. 206 (App. Div.), aff'd, 44 N.J. 450 (1965) | 27, 30 | | Dean v. Barrett Homes, Inc., 204 N.J. 286 (2010) | 51 | | CASES CITED | PAGE | |-------------------------------------------------|------| | Dynasty Bldg. Corp. v. Ackerman, 376 N.J. Super. 280 (App. Div. 2005) | 21 | | Est. of Hanges v. Metro Prop. & Cas. Ins., 202 N.J. 369 (2010) | | | Fastenberg v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 309 N.J. Super. 415 (App. Div. 1998) | 31 | | First Atl. Fed. Credit Union v. Perez, 391 N.J. Super. 419 (App. Div. 2007) | 27, 29 | | Globe Motor Co. v. Igladev, 225 N.J. 469 (2016) | 63, 76 | | Green v. Morgan Properties, 215 N.J. 431 (2013) | 28, 30, 44 | | Grzanka v. Pfeifer, 301 N.J. Super. 563 (App. Div. 1997) | 57 | | Hayes v. Delamotte, 201 N.J. 373 (2018) | 31 | | Helton v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 205 N.J. Super. 196 (App. Div.1985) | 43 | | Hill v. Macomber, 103 N.J. Super. 127 (App.Div.1968) | 74 | | Hirsch v. Tushill, Ltd., Inc., 110 N.J. 644 (1988) | 41, 43 | | Iliadis v.Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 191 N.J. 88 (2007) | 73 | | In re Niles Trust, 176 N.J. 282 (2003) | 26 | | Innes v. Marzano-Lesnevich, 224 N.J. 584 (2016) | 27 | | Jennings v. Cutler, 288 N.J. Super. 553 (App. Div. 1996) | 30 | | CASES CITED | PAGE | |-------------|------| | Josantos Constr. v. Bohrer, 326 N.J. Super. 42 (App.Div.1999) | 41, 42 | | Jugan v. Friedman, 275 N.J. Super. 556 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 138 N.J. 271 (1994) | 31 | | Kaur v. Assured Lending Corp., 405 N.J. Super. 468 (App. Div. 2009) | 31 | | Kendall v. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc., 209 N.J.
[brief] [...] REAFFIRMS THE POSITION [...] ADVANCED IN ITS MERITS  BRIEF:  NEITHER THE EXISTENCE OF EQUITY, NOR THE ADVENT OF [...], IS A BASIS TO VACATE A JUDGMENT UNDER 4:50-1(F).  At the appellate level, a panel of this court held that the forfeiture of equity in a tax-foreclosed property qualifies as a truly exceptional circumstance justifying vacation of the foreclosure judgment under R. 4:50-1(f).  257-261 20th Avenue Realty, LLC v. Roberto, 477 N.J. Super. 339, 369-70 (App. Div. 2023).  Our Supreme Court did not agree, stating: "we do not adopt the Appellate Division's analysis under Rule 4:50-1(f).”  Roberto, ___ N.J. ___ (2025) (slip op. at 18).  This bears on the present appeal because it directly undermines Defendants’ argument that they are entitled to relief under R. 4:50-1(f) due to their forfeiture of equity.
[brief] 1T15:15 to 17:5.  [...] testified that he did the majority of the work, 1T54:10, but that there were issues with the project.  1T54:11–17.  He conceded he did not complete the project but did not specify what was done nor what was left.  He admitted there were structural issues, squatters, and theft of materials, though he also testified that --- \(^1\) 1T is the trial transcript and 2T is the trial court decision on remand.
[directive] Bail for Persons Accused of Minor Offenses – N.J.S.A. 2C:6-1 ....................................................................................................................  18  Procedure after Arrest - Rule 7:3-1 ...............................................................................................................................................................  18 Right to Pretrial Release - Rule 7:4-1 ............................................................................................................................................................  19 Authority to Set Bail or Conditions of Pretrial Release - Rule 7:4-2 ...............................................................................................................  19 Ten Percent Cash Bail - Rule 7:4-3(g) ..........................................................................................................................................................  20  Bail After Conviction - Rule 7:4-8 ..................................................................................................................................................................  20  Changes in Condition of Release for Defendants Charged on Initial Complaint Warrant on Disorderly Persons Offenses - Rule 7:4-9 ........  20  13  SUMMARY OF RULES AND STATUTES REGARDING BAIL FOR INDICTABLE OFFENSES
[brief] Photograph Extracted from Video at [...] (Signed by [...] on August 11, 2017)  ……………………..Da 139-140  Video of Defendant’s Recorded Statement (March 11, 2016)  ………………Da 141  Transcript of Defendant’s Recorded Statement (March 11, 2016)  ………Da 142-144  Model Instruction: In-Court and Out-of-Court Identifications  …………..Da 145-156  Verdict Sheet…………………………………………………………………………Da 157-160
[brief] Defendant’s wife’s name is [...] and she goes by [...]—she has never been known by the name of Linda.  T3, p. p. 26:3-8.  The process server, [...], testified to certain physical characteristics of this Linda who was allegedly served but [...] admitted that he didn’t know who he served, what she looked like or what she was wearing.  T4, p.20:14-23.  It is important to note that the entire Affidavit is editable by the in-house process service company.  This Affidavit was not filed at the time of service but was filed in support of the Motion in Support of Default on October 1, 2021 – any number of revisions or edits could have occurred that were out of the control of [...] and in the control of the in-house process server, Plaintiff and Plaintiff’s counsel in that time period.  [...] admits that once he presses the button he has no control over the affidavit and no access to it and he doesn’t know if anyone can alter it.  T4, p.19:16-p.20.  **Point IV**
[brief] Appellees’ rely upon Hartford Ins. Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 68 N.J. 430 (1977) in their primary briefs for the proposition that "a change in the law or in the judicial review of an established rule of law is not such an extraordinary circumstance as to justify relief from final judgment where the time to appeal has expired..."  Hartford Ins. Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 68 N.J. at 434.  Appellants acknowledged this case and its potential applicability, but the Supreme Court’s decision in Roberto definitively rejects Appellees reliance upon Hartford.
[brief] The Board had previously affirmed the determination that the Petitioner was eligible for continuing membership in PERS as municipal prosecutor for [...].  This case centers around the applicability of Chapter 92 P.L. 2007 (N.J.S.A. 43:15A-7.2b) (“Chapter 92b”) to a vested member in PERS who has not yet retired or received benefits.  As the transcripts and evidence at the administrative proceedings make evident, Petitioner established that as a municipal prosecutor, she was eligible for an intra-fund transfer of her PERS benefit from [...] to the [...] for the time periods at issue.  The record below demonstrates that the Petitioner was an employee with the [...] in which she served as municipal prosecutor and met substantially all of the factors in the “IRS 20 Factor Test” to establish that she was a bona fide employee from 2015 to the present.  The Respondent’s determination was based upon fact finding that was arbitrary and capricious and not based upon substantial credible evidence in the record.
[brief] Their position is aptly summarized in the Township’s claim that “it is for the governing body to determine what is appropriate. ”  (Dtb27)  At the same time, defendants quarrel with the basic facts suggesting that no exemption is needed for a project that stands to make defendant [...] a 67.9% return on unleveraged capital and approaches full taxation for 25 years of its 30 year life, thus belying any claim that it will attract buyers looking for a significant break in property taxes.
[brief] TABLE OF CONTENTS | HEADING | PAGE | |--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | I.  Appellant Objects To The Hearsay Documents Attached By Respondents In Their Appendix As They Have No Relevance To Whether Appellant’s Plea Was Adequate, Which Includes Whether Appellant Had A Complete Understanding Of The Penal Consequences Of His Plea.  | 1 | | II.  Respondent’s Reliance On State v. Slater, 198 N.J. 145 (2009) Is Misplaced/Erroneous Since A Slater Analysis Is Not Reached Where The Factual Basis For The Plea Is Inadequate, Which Includes Whether A Defendant Had A Complete Understanding Of The Penal Consequences Of His Plea.  | 2 | | PRAYER FOR RELIEF | 2 | # TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
[brief] Moreover, the [...] specifically advised that the "General Duty Clause . . . which requires employers to furnish to each worker 'employment and a place of employment, which are free from recognized hazards that are causing or are likely to cause death or serious physical harm' " applies "to preventing occupational exposure to SARS-CoV-2."  Id. (quoting § 654(a)(1)); see also United States v. Pitt-Des Moines, Inc., 168 F.3d 976, 982 (7th Cir. 1999) (OSHA's general duty clause, § 654(a)(1), "requires employers to protect their own employees from obvious hazards even when those hazards are not covered by specific safety regulations imposed by the Act.").  Courts have interpreted mandatory COVID-19 mitigation policies to be an adequate source of public policy to sustain a claim for retaliatory discharge in Illinois.
[directive] An prosecutor the where (1) to N.J.S.A.162-17(b)(2)(a) by authorized condition other release any impose appearance defendant's the assure to reasonably condition needed such is that believe to reason has community, that and the other or person any of of safety protection the the when required, court in subsection See process.  also criminal justice the obstruct or to attempt obstruct not will defendant the a when cases no- violence domestic in program pretrial services monitoring by 6.2.2 (electronic imposed).  is condition or order release restraining contact
[brief] For clarity, that is not a newly revealed reference, and was already cited by defendant in his original brief.  Compare (11T123-13 to 14) with (Da45).  In *Feaster*, the Court found an invocation of the right to counsel was erroneously heard by the jury, but it determined that its admission was not plain error because: (1) reference to the invocation was “fleeting”; (2) the prosecutor did not comment on it during his summation; (3) jury instructions barred them from drawing negative inferences based on the invocation; and (4) defense counsel did not request further jury instructions.
[directive] Revised Statewide Bail Schedules/ Permissible Use of Monetary Bail Schedules  Page 3  Administrator or Deputy Court Administrator.  For defendants who are eligible for monetary bail but unable to post the monetary bail amount set, the defendant shall have that monetary bail reviewed promptly and may file an application seeking a monetary bail reduction, which must be heard in an expedited manner.  See Rules 3:26-2(c)(1) , 7:3-1(e), and 7:4-9(a).  Additionally, Criminal Presiding Judges and Municipal Presiding Judges must ensure that procedures are in place for periodic bail reviews for incarcerated defendants who cannot post the monetary bail.  Bail Schedules – Eligible Defendants  Under the Criminal Justice Reform Law, an “eligible defendant” is defined as a person for whom a complaint-warrant is issued for an initial charge involving an indictable offense or a disorderly persons offense allegedly committed on or after January 1, 2017.
[brief] As detailed previously at pages 17-18, supra, such a substitution would have resulted in considerable expense to the defendant.  Defendant will not repeat what he has already detailed; in short, a substitution would have rendered the considerable time and expense in preparing for and deposing [...] a waste of enormous effort.  This court in Tynes, supra, has also noted that the age of a case and a defendant’s “strong interest in having [a] matter concluded” are factors to consider in evaluating the prejudice to the defendant opposing a motion to extend discovery to allow a plaintiff to furnish an expert report.  Id. at 172.  Factor nine -- what motions had been heard and decided by the court to date—is likely not relevant to these issues.  Indeed, it cannot be overlooked that plaintiff never filed a formal motion for an extension of discovery as required by the Court Rules.
[brief] [N.J.S.A. 58:16A-52(a) (emphasis added). ]  Appellant’s blatant failure to cite this fundamental statutory language is remarkable.  Clearly, the [...], through the IFPR, sought to update its delineations of flood hazard areas by way of studying and implementing new scientific data.  As set forth above, such updates require formal rulemaking pursuant to the New Jersey Administrative Procedures Act.  B.
[brief] And secondary gain can lead to good things, but the problem with secondary gain is it’s hard to assess what’s permanent and what’s not.  And the only way we will ever know that is when your sentence is done.  You understand?  That’s the only time we’ll ever really know.  And as I say to individuals at sentencing all the time, words are great, but actions are everything.  And unfortunately, until a sentence is complete we don’t really know what the actions really are because you’re not back in society where it counts.  And so when I say to you and the others here how difficult sentencing is, I don’t have a crystal ball.  I don’t have the ability to tell the future.  I have the experience of seeing individuals go through the system and see those who make it and those who fail and I try to make sure that I get that assessment right.  And I try to do it within the boundaries that our legislature created by these aggravating and mitigating factors.  [(18T80-9 to 81-22) (emphasis added).
[brief] In [...], a confidential informant informed officers that an individual known as “[...]” trafficked drugs out of a particular vehicle, gave officers a picture of the vehicle, and provided them with “[...]’s” detailed descriptors.  Id. at 160.  One month later, an officer observed a GMC Yukon that he believed matched the photograph in an area known for frequent CDS transactions.  Ibid.  The officer then searched a law-enforcement database and found [...], who he believed was the person the informant was referencing, and learned he had the moniker “[...]” and had several felony convictions for CDS.  Id. at 161.  Several officers then discretely surveilled [...] for over an hour and then deliberately conducted a stop of the GMC for investigative purposes.  Id. at 161-62.  One of the officers ordered [...] out of the GMC and patted him down, but found nothing incriminating.  Id. at 162.  [...] was questioned and refused consent to search.  Ibid.  Still suspecting the GMC contained drugs, but without any additional information to establish probable cause, officers called for a canine to perform a sniff of the GMC.
[brief] Ordinance 2022-15 was invalid. \textsuperscript{4}  Moreover, because Ordinance 2022-15 adopted the Redevelopment Plan and Ordinance 2022-17 simply adopted certain amendments to the plan, the Trial Court’s Order makes no sense if interpreted to mean enactment of the Redevelopment Plan was “null and void” but enactment of amendments to the plan was valid.
[brief] (Doc. 1).  Presently before the Court are several new disputes that have arisen during the course of discovery.  On October 10, 2018, [...], pursuant to the procedure of the Court, filed a letter with the Court (Doc. 107) seeking: (1) the production of “all documents related to Defendants so that Defendants can review them and determine whether they are relevant to the issues of the case,” as [...] asserts the [...] has improperly withheld thousands of documents from production (id. at 1-3); (2) remedies related to alleged deficient privilege logs provided by the [...], such as in camera review of the purportedly privileged documents (id. at 3-7); and (3) the appointment of a special master to handle these and other issues arising from the complex nature of the case and the entailing discovery (id. at 7-8).
[brief] This Honorable Court revisited the issue of waiver of counsel in State v. Rose, 458 N.J. Super. 610 (2019).  The Appellate Division stated that the determination of whether the right to counsel has been waived is a two-step process.  First, the right must be asserted “in a timely fashion so as not to disrupt the criminal calendar or a trial in progress. ”  Id. at 626.  The request cannot be ambiguous.  Second, the court must conduct a Faretta hearing to determine if the waiver was knowingly and intelligently made.
[brief] 3)  CORRECT OCT. 6, ’22 ORDER, PAR. 1C, & MARCH 7, ‘23 ORDER, PAR. 3, & REQUIRE MR. ROTH’S SUBMITTAL OF DETAILED INVOICES (ITEM 2)  FOR ROTH & SPELLMAN’S $31,259.74 FEES FROM 2019-2022, AS PER ACCOUNTING, FOR REVIEW BY J. ROSS FOR POTENTIAL EXCEPTIONS OF THOSE FEES FOR COURT APPROVAL OR DENIAL  4)  CORRECT OCT. 6, ’22 ORDER, PAR. 1D, & MARCH 7, ‘23 ORDER, PAR. 3, & DENY PRIOR TRUST PAYMENT OF FERRO LABELLA’S FEES FOR $15,022.72, AS PER ACCOUNTING, FOR WORK FROM JUNE 6, 2021 THRU JAN. 31, 2022, & REQUIRE PAYBACK  5)  CORRECT OCT. 6, ’22 ORDER, PAR. 1, & MAR. 7, ‘23 ORDER, PAR. 3, & REQUIRE PAYBACK OF PRIOR TRUST PAYMENT OF $74,248.18, AS PER ACCOUNTING, FOR CULLEN & DYKMAN’S FEES FOR 2019-2021 WORK ON BEHALF OF MS. ROSS FOR ESTATE CASE [...] RATHER THAN ANY TRUST CASE 6)  CORRECT MARCH 7, '23 ORDER, PAR. 1, & DENY TRUST PAYMENT OF $93,277.54 FOR FERRO LABELLA FEES FOR LEGAL WORK FROM FEB. 1 TO OCT. 25, 2022, AND REQUIRE PAYBACK 7)  CORRECT MARCH 7, 2023 ORDER, PAR. 2, & REDUCE TRUST PAYMENT FOR ROTH & SPELLMAN ACCOUNTING FEE FOR INTERMEDIATE ACCOUNTING FROM $17,649.57 TO $16,575, & REQUIRE PAYBACK OF OVERPAYMENT 8) CORRECT MARCH 7, 2023 ORDER, PAR. 2, & REDUCE TRUST PAYMENT FOR MR. ROTH’S 2022 COMMISSION FROM $2,039.53 TO $1,946.56, & REQUIRE PAYBACK OF OVERPAYMENT