ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] [...], Esq.  On the Brief Table of Contents  Page Table of Citations.................................................................ii  Index to Supplemental Appendix...........................................iii  Introductory Statement.......................................................1  Standard of Review.............................................................1  Point I  The Issue Of Conveying Rights To Strangers To The Transaction Was Sufficiently Raised Below........................................2  Point II  The Historical Deeds Relied Upon By The Trial Court, Standing Alone, Were Insufficient To Support The Trial Court’s Ruling........6  Point III  The Trial Court Wrongly Rejected [...]’s Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel Defense..............................................7  Point IV  The Trial Court Wrongly Rejected [...]’s Entire Controversy Doctrine Defense..........................................................9  Conclusion.............................................................................10
[brief] Issued to [...],** | | | 152 N.J. 287 (1997) | 46, 47 | | **Cleveland & P.R. Co. v. City of Cleveland,** | | | 235 U.S. 50 (1914) | 50 | Comm. Workers of Am., Local 1034 v. N.J. State Policemen’s Benevolent Ass’n, Local 203, 412 N.J. Super. 286 (App. Div. 2010)
[brief] If this Court declines to suppress the evidence for the reasons explained above, a remand is also necessary for the trial court to consider [...]’s attendance at the October 2021 Street Cop Conference and the OSC report.  According to the report, instructors encouraged attendees to engage in an array of unconstitutional, harassing and discriminatory practices.  New Jersey Office of the State Comptroller, *The High Price of Unregulated Police Training to New Jersey*.  Particularly relevant here, the instructors encouraged officers to stop cars for pretextual and innocent reasons and also “to stop a designated number of cars to get a ‘general baseline’ of normal behavior during a motor vehicle stop” by asking them generic questions.  *Id.*  In addition, as explained earlier, instructors encouraged attendees to unconstitutionally prolong stops and seek consent to search without reasonable suspicion, which is precisely what [...] is arguing occurred here.  *Id.*  Lastly, the instructors made over one hundred discriminatory or harassing remarks and “promot[ed] a militaristic style of policing, undermin[ed] state-mandated training and safety initiatives, encourag[ed] insubordination, and dehumanize[ed] civilians. ”*16*
[brief] On PCR, [...] provided a report from [...], prepared in 2014 at the request of trial counsel.  It analyzed data from phone records, cell tower evidence, surveillance, and [...]’s Facebook account, and created a timeline.  (Da464-87)  That report included the Facebook screenshots.  (Da467, 470)  [...] also verified in his amended PCR petition that he was, in fact, in [...], sending those Facebook postings with his phone.  (Da213)
[directive] Administrators should establish a mechanism to determine whether an agency's policies and procedures are being properly implemented.  It is necessary for management to know if behavior is, in fact, consistent with the agency's rules and regulations, policies and procedures.  The task of detecting such defects should be delegated to an inspection unit or function.  3.5.2  Large agencies might establish an inspection unit operating directly out of the office of the law enforcement executive.  Small and medium size agencies can successfully accomplish this function by periodically assigning the inspection task to selected unit supervisors.  Individuals so assigned must be of unquestioned integrity and hold sufficient rank to achieve the objectives of the inspection function.  3.5.3  The inspection function should determine by actual on-site inspection whether personnel are properly implementing management’s policies at the operational level.
[brief] (1T398:5-20; 1T732:11-739:8.)  [...] undoubtedly had experience at the Site.  He had worked there with [...] since 1986.  Backed by this experience, [...] readily admitted: there isn’t in this data record a specific information on how much solvent was released at any one location at any point in time.  It’s not as if we have detailed manifests that say on a certain day we disposed of ten gallons of solvent into AOC 5.  We know from company records and from our examination where the releases occurred, but we don’t know the specific quantities that were – that occurred, and we don’t know within the boundaries of the time that that AOC operated which days or weeks, or what have you, that the releases actually occurred.  (Pa0264-0265.)  There was nothing in the record that allowed [...] to provide an accurate estimate of the amount of “property damage” that took place during any time period.  He could provide no testimony as to the precise amount of contamination that took place at any time or at any particular AOC.  (Pa0491) (stating a factor considered by [...] was a “Lack of data regarding specific timing, amount and/or location of CVOC releases.
[brief] ” (See 1T 25:21-24; see also id. at 25:24-26:5 (“yet [Plaintiffs] kind of go about, around about saying, well [...] said it was okay or as long as she didn’t get caught or get in trouble for it.  But I think that those assertions at that point in time were just inconsistent with how it went down and how they went about trying to surreptitiously hide this additional pay. ”); Id. at 26:7-13 (“at some point in time they try to say hey well look, maybe she did approve it, or she didn’t really approve it, or she didn’t say no.  But clearly that’s not the case, because if it was approved, it would’ve been part of the regular pay that [...] would have approved during her regular approval of their pay process. ”)).
[brief] \(^{14}\)  N.J.S.A. 2A:18-53(b) permits commercial eviction proceedings “[w]here such person shall hold over after a default in the payment of rent, pursuant to the agreement under which the premises are held. ”  \(^{15}\)  It’s curious that Tenant would argue that its remittance of the Rent Arrears to the Clerk did not cure the Events of Default.  If this is true, Tenant must be compelled to refund the Tenant Allowance payments made by Landlord after the Rent Arrears were escrowed and pay to Landlord late fees, interest and cost from November 29, 2021 to the disbursement of these funds to Landlord in December 2023.
[brief] The rationale of *Adams* is inapposite to a case in which the plaintiffs belatedly and unsuccessfully attempted to sue two doctors, then changed course to disavow any basis for liability on those doctors while simultaneously seeking to impose joint liability on [...].  The *Adams* panel framed the issue as whether judicial estoppel applies “to prevent a plaintiff from reversing position as to the negligence of a settling joint tortfeasor at trial. ”  *Adams*, 475 N.J. Super. at 8 (emphasis added).  This case is distinguishable in that it involves a dismissed joint tortfeasor, absent based on the plaintiffs’ failure to comply with the statute of limitations.  In essence, the plaintiffs’ lack of diligence and timeliness is *rewarded* by allowing them the benefit of both disavowing those doctors negligence *and* imposing joint and several liability, *retroactively* via a reconsideration motion, after learning that their disavowal was unsuccessful.  Thus, the trial court erred in precluding [...] from offering evidence as to the plaintiffs’ pleadings against [...] and [...] in this matter.  **CONCLUSION**
[brief] *State v. Sanchez-Medina*, 231 N.J. 452, 469 (2018).  It was undisputed that [...] was killed—no issue of accident or causation was in this case.  Who the killer was and what their mental state was were the only two issues before the jury.  The only evidence of [...]’s guilt was the “confession” relayed secondhand by an informant with pending charges and, perhaps, [...]’s DNA on [...]’s undergarments.  To bolster its case, the State elicited from its forensic experts inaccurate testimony about the infallibility of the scientific fields at issue in this case.  This testimony placed [...]’s fingerprint on the murder weapon beyond dispute, presented as an unerring truth that the blood pattern found on a shirt at the scene was consistent with the wearer removing it after beating [...], stated as a blanket truth that [...]’s DNA was in the blood on [...]’s bra, and explained away any physical issue that [...] might have creating these kinds of injuries by presenting [...]’s supposed “rage” as a scientific excuse.  The State also allowed its star witness to opine about similar, uncharged conduct of choking her as they slept together.  Between these errors in the evidence presented, and the errors in the jury instructions, which prevented the jury from properly deliberating on [...]’s mens rea, [...] was deprived of a fair trial.  Her convictions must be reversed.
[brief] ”  Id. (citations omitted).  If an employer can show a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for its decision, “‘the plaintiff must then be given an opportunity to show that defendant’s stated reason was merely a pretext or discriminatory in its application. ’”  El-Sioufi v. St. Peter's Univ. Hosp., 382 N.J. Super. 145, 166 (App. Div. 2005) (quoting Dixon v. Rutgers, 110 N.J. 432, 442 (1998)).  There is no dispute that Plaintiff is a member of a protected group (she is Black and over the age of 40) and that she was terminated (through non-renewal).  Plaintiff, however, cannot establish the second element of her *prima facie* case based upon the record—that she was performing her job at a level that met Defendants’ legitimate expectations.  Further, although Defendants hired someone else to perform the same work after Plaintiff left, her non-renewal did not take place under circumstances that give rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination.  **A.
[brief] (Wilf\_Db 32-33).  [...] formalistically argues that there is no reasonable basis for doubting the appearance of impartiality where a law firm delivers a financial benefit to a Special Master considering a fee award application prepared by that same law firm \textit{based on that} \(^1\)  Every case cited by [...] on this issue is readily distinguishable from this case.  \textit{See In re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig.}, 737 F. Supp. 735 (E.D.N.Y. 1990) (denying motion to disqualify mediator brought by an asbestos manufacturer objecting to confidential information allegedly acquired during mediator’s years-old representation of a coalition and committee sponsored by asbestos manufacturers); \textit{Nuckel v. Borough of Little Ferry}, No. A-4940-11T1, 2013 WL 4104100, at *6–8 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Aug. 15, 2013) (denying motion to disqualify Special Master where Special Master had represented, without pay, a distinct party not before the court); \textit{Fuhrmann v. Wolf}, No. A-6031-07T3, 2009 WL 4255529, at *5–7 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Nov. 19, 2009) (denying motion to disqualify discovery master where master’s law firm inadvertently retained defendant’s counsel’s law firm without the knowledge or involvement of master or defendant’s counsel); \textit{Cirba, Inc. v. VMware, Inc.}, No. CV 19-742-LPS, 2022 WL 606655 (D. Del. Jan. 7, 2022) (denying motion to disqualify special discovery master where master’s law firm partner concurrently served as co-counsel to defendant’s counsel in representation of an unrelated party).
[brief] *Faustin v. Lewis*, 85 N.J. 507, 510 (1981) (considering a sham marriage entered into knowingly by both parties as qualifying for annulment; “We conclude that the plaintiff’s marriage, entered into for the sole purpose of securing permanent residence in the United States, clearly falls within the language of the 1971 amendment to paragraph (d).  Here, neither party intended to marry, nor did they thereafter enter into any kind of marital relationship with each other.  Consequently, the plaintiff alleged facts that, if proven, establish a statutory ground for a judgment of nullity of her marriage. ”).  The only evidence presented at the trial below was from the plaintiff and his witnesses, and all that evidence demonstrated that the defendant married the plaintiff with the fraudulent intention of obtaining a green card and leaving the marriage once she obtained it -- which she promptly did.  The defendant lied to the plaintiff about her true intentions to trick the plaintiff into the marriage so the defendant could obtain the green card—lying to the plaintiff about wanting to have children immediately upon marriage, lying about her and her family’s adherence to traditional Indian culture and traditions that were so important to the plaintiff and his family, and even lying about her last name.  If these facts do not warrant annulment under New Jersey law, then none do.
[directive] First Degree Term of Parole Supervision - 5 years  Second Degree Term of Parole Supervision - 3 years  [Wi/Yes]  [Non/No]  3.  Èske w konprann ke si w ta dezobeyi kondisyon libète kondisyonèl sou sipèvizyon a yo ta kab revoke libète kondisyonèl ou an epi yo ta kab fè w retounnen nan prizon pou pije swa tout oubyen pati nan tèm libète kondisyonèl sou sipèvizyon ki rete a, menm si ou te finn pije tèm prizon yo te deja enpoze w? Do you understand that if you violate the conditions of your parole supervision that your parole may be revoked and you may be subject to return to prison to serve all or any portion of the remaining period of parole supervision, even if you have completed serving the term of imprisonment previously imposed?
[brief] Because [...] suffered adverse health “symptoms,” such as headaches, nose bleeds, and respiratory problems for which he was treated before the [...] damages loss, subject to their limits and time on the risk.  This “sharing” of proportionate loss is precisely the type of allocation that the three settling insurers undertook in settling the [...] claims in the underlying case.  The remaining unpaid portion of the Consent Judgement is precisely the amount that should be allocated to [...].
[brief] As such, the trial court’s order denying Defendant’s motion for reconsideration should be denied for the same reasons articulated by this Court in *Poppy Holdings*.  *Id.* at 21.  Furthermore, the Defendant’s reliance on the *Johnson* opinion, which was issued 1 day after the *Kemp* decision, is nonsensical.  *[...] v. [...]*, A-1274-21 (N.J. App. Div. Jun. 9, 2023).  First, the Appellate Division did not vacate the Final Judgment in *Johnson*; rather, it vacated the order denying the former property owner relief from the final judgment pursuant to R. 4:50-1(f).  Thus, the Appellate Division left the final judgment intact after its consideration of *Tyler*.  Contrariwise, even knowing *Tyler* had been issued, the Appellate Division in this case affirmed the trial court’s order denying Defendant’s motion to vacate final judgment and motion for reconsideration.  Of course, the Appellate Division could have remanded this case back to the trial court for consideration in light of *Tyler*, but it declined to do so, despite its awareness of *Tyler* as evidenced by the *Johnson* case.  Instead, it specifically stated, “we conclude the court here did not exceed its discretion in refusing to vacate the judgment based on R. 4:50-1(f). ”  *Kemp* at 12.  As such, affirmance of the April 26, 2024 order is appropriate because the Defendant’s untimely new legal argument related to *Tyler* did not provide a mechanism upon which the trial court could grant reconsideration.  III.
[brief] ” (20T205-8 to 10) (emphasis added).  That is, the jurors were told that the answers to the additional questions were “verdicts,” just as much as their answers to the questions asking for an answer of either “not guilty” or “guilty,” and she told them, twice, the verdict on each charge “must be unanimous. ” (20T203-8 to 10; 20T204-2 to 5).  Further, for Counts One and Two (the official misconduct charges), which on the verdict sheet were structured identically to Count Five (the theft charge), (Da13-15), the jury was twice instructed that it must answer Question B under the reasonable-doubt standard.
[directive] (Victim’s Name)  Form Promulgated by Directive # 01-10 (03/02/2010), CN: 11353-English (Nicole’s Law Restraining Order) page 1 of 2  Check the appropriate box(es):  1.  You are barred from the following location(s):  Residence(s) of Victim Place (s) of Employment of Victim Schools of Victim Other  If these locations are known to the defendant, list with specificity  2.  You are:  Prohibited from having any oral, written, personal, electronic, or other form of contact with the victim or others identified in this order.  Prohibited from making or causing anyone else to make harassing communication to the victim or others identified in this order.  Prohibited from stalking, following, or threatening to harm, to stalk or to follow the victim or others identified in this order.  3.  Other appropriate relief:  Duration of Order  It is Ordered that this Order shall remain in effect until modified or terminated by further Order of the Court or until the prosecutor administratively dismisses or downgrades the charge(s) supporting the issuance of this Order.
[brief] HJI Associates, 295 N.J. Super 445 (App. Div. 1996) certif. denied, 149 N.J. 35 (1997).  ..............................................................................  40  Seidman v. Clifton Sav. Bank, S.L.A., 205 N.J. 150 (2011)  ................................. 37, 81  Spedick v. Murphy, 266 N.J. Super. 573 (App. Div. 1986), certif. denied .....  61 State v. Buckner, 437 N.J. Super. 8 (App. Div. 2014)  .............................................  64  State v. J.J., 397 N.J. Super. 91 (App. Div. 2007), certif. granted, 194 N.J. 446 (2008).  .................................................................................................  69 State v. Medina, 349 N.J. Super. 108 (App. Div. 2002).  ........................................ 63, 70 State v. Posntery, 19 N.J. 457 (1955) ........................................................................ 61 State v. Walker, 33 N.J. 580 (1960).
[brief] ... Did talk about pat-down for weapons.  But the circumstances of the stop and investigatory method of the officers in this Court's opinion is respectfully completely different than what occurred in this particular matter.  It appears that the Supreme Court of New Jersey felt that the stop was really sort of based on a hunch because they're in a high drug area and because they had investigations related to a certain walkway where they found [...] in that matter.  Not the case here.  As [...] said, my evaluation of the evidence back in October that certainly it was a real time incident regarding investigation of a murder.  There was a search warrant in progress.  The officer who observed the three individuals at this time, but certainly wasn't responsible for [...].  They were investigating a homicide in regards to having known addresses that they're getting warrant for, to find evidence of that as well as a motor vehicle.  And certainly my findings in that matter still stand as previously stated on the record concerning the reasonable, articulable suspicion they also had their probable cause related to that.  (2T21-6 to 22-4).  When asked by the trial court "[w]hat is that probable cause evidence so we have it on the record" (2T14-14 to 15) the State argued "multiple witnesses who indicated the description of the individual . . . video surveillance which tracks the three suspects from the location of the homicide through Camden and then exiting the vehicle.
[brief] In \textit{Estate of Olsen}, A-5542-11T1 A-5542-11T1 (App. Div.), cert. denied 220 N.J. 98 (2014) (attached as PB1 to PB10) the Court invalidated a will that gave the bulk of decedent’s estate to her son, leaving only small dispositions to her other two children.  (PB 2 at p. 5, 21).  The court found that the son had a confidential relationship, being the only child who remained in the family business, moving close to the mother and thereafter, having daily contact with her.  (PB6 at p. 18).  The Court also found ample proof of suspicious circumstances including the decedent’s pattern of incrementally benefiting the son and his wife to the exclusion of all others.  (PB7 at p. 19).  The Court also found proof of the son’s bullying.  \textsuperscript{15}  The Court barred Petitioner from getting discovery from Respondent about Decedent’s discussions with her about the newspaper publication about [...] (P84a; P245a at pg. 124, P63a) in contravention of R. 4:10-2(a).  haranguing behavior towards the decedent, strongly suggested that the decedent, in her testamentary dispositions, followed not the dictates of her own mind and will but rather, submitted to the domination and influence of her controlling son.
[brief] ESTATE OF [...], by [...], Administrator  Plaintiffs, -v- [...], M.D., [...], C.R.NA., [...], [...], JOHN DOES 1-10, JANE DOES 1-10 (representing presently unknown health care providers or health care providers with regard to which negligence is not presently suspected, including but not limited to, doctors, surgeons, emergency medicine doctors, anesthesiologists, hospitalists, physician assistants, nurses, nurse practitioners, nurse anesthetists, technicians, and others); and ABC CORPS 1-10 (representing presently unknown facilities or entities who rendered care to the plaintiff who have deviated from the standard of care or facilities or entities with regard to which negligence is not presently suspected), Defendants.
[brief] As correctly observed by the motion court, there is an overlap between these two cases because “they have a lot to do with each other” and involve the same parties.  (1T49:20-22; 1T40:4011).  Another important observation by the motion court was that if these cases are not arbitrated together, the parties will be duplicating discovery.  (1T48:24).  The duplication of discovery can be time consuming and very costly to litigants.  The motion court aptly noted that handling these cases separately will only cause problems in discovery.  (1T50:21-22).  Therefore, it behooves Defendants to want to arbitrate this Chancery Action with the Law Division Action, and any claim of prejudice is speculative.
[directive] 5.3  Continuous Recording Pending Completion of Encounter.  To ensure that the entire encounter/event/episode is recorded, in accordance with this Policy and the law, a BWC should be activated before a uniformed officer arrives at the scene of a dispatched call for service or other police activity listed in Section 5.2.  See also note 1.  However, the officer need not begin recording at the moment he or she receives instructions from a dispatcher  When circumstances necessitating the use of constructive authority or force arise suddenly during the 3 course of swiftly-developing events, it may not be safe and practicable for an officer to activate a BWC before employing constructive authority or force.  Nothing in this Policy should be construed or applied in a manner that jeopardizes officer safety by distracting the officer’s attention from the immediate need to use such constructive authority or force.  It should be noted that in many circumstances where the need to use constructive authority or force arises, the officer already would have initiated a police activity, such as a motor vehicle stop, Terry stop, or response to a call for service, that would have triggered the requirement to activate the BWC; see note 2 (recognizing that two or more police activities enumerated in this section often will co-occur during the course of a single police-citizen encounter).
[brief] ”  United States v. McMillian, 898 A.2d 922, 936 (D.C. Ct. App. 2006) (quoting 5 [...], Search and Seizure 11.2(g), at 103 (4th ed. 2004)).  See id.  (“If it were necessary to appeal solely for the purpose of avoiding the application of the rule of issue preclusion, then the rule might be responsible for increasing the burdens of litigation on the parties and the courts rather than lightening those burdens”) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Judgments 28 comment 1 (1980)).