ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] Juvenile Delinquency Matters Docket)  {FJ (1)  If ordered by the court, the Predisposition Report (PDR) or its functional equivalent must completed and available to the parties prior to the scheduled disposition date.  be  Defense counsel should make arrangements to remotely review the PDR with the If juvenile prior disposition.  defense counsel did not review the PDR with the to juvenile prior to disposition, defense counsel shall acknowledge that the record.  on  The proceeding should interrupted, and defense counsel should be given time to be privately review the PDR with the juvenile.  Thereafter, the disposition may proceed.  At disposition, juveniles must be asked to provide the court with their telephone if numbers and their address, and email address applicable.  Parents/guardians also must provide their contact information to the court, including telephone numbers, addresses, and email addresses if applicable.  This information will be necessary for Family Sentencing Guidance - Issued by Directive# 13-20 (April 30, 2020)
[brief] The Trial Court’s Holding Disregards the “In Addition To” and “Notwithstanding”  Language in Section 13.1 of the PSA  In the trial court, [...] argued that, once Plaintiff requested return of the Earnest Money Deposit in July 2022, Plaintiff had elected its remedy to terminate the PSA and thereby waived any right to demand specific performance when [...] later closed the deal with the Fee Owner in October 2022.  In support of this contention, [...] argued that “[t]he second part of Section 13.1 provided Plaintiff with two mutually exclusive remedies: terminate the 101 Agreement and recover Plaintiff’s Deposit, or seek specific performance. ”
[brief] Defendant’s Certification of [...], Esq.  In Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion Filed 09/01/22 ........................................  Da499 Exhibit A Curriculum Vitae of [...] ............ Da436 Exhibit B 12/29/20  Preliminary Report of [...] ........................................  Da331  Exhibit C 04/07/21  Report of [...] .............  Da310  Exhibit D Email of [...]  Dated 04/09/21  Providing Plaintiff’s Counsel  Via Drop Box eight attachments to [...] 04/07/21  Engineering Evaluation ......................  Da502 Order Barring Defendant’s Appraiser from Relying at Trial on the Raichle Engineering Report (wave overtopping)
[brief] | Cases | Page(s) | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|---------| | Arrovo v. Durling Realty, LLC, 433 N.J. Super. 238 (App. Div. 2013) | 11, 12 | | Bahrle v. Exxon Corp., 279 N.J. Super. 5 (App. Div. 1995), aff’d, 145 N.J. 144 (1996) | 15 | | Butler v. Acme Mkts., 89 N.J. 270 (1982) | 8 | | Dare v. Freefall Adventures, Inc., 349 N.J. Super. 205 (App. Div. 2002) | 9 | | Davis v. Barkaszi, 424 N.J. Super. 129 (App. Div. 2012) | 5, 6 | | Dombrowska v. Kresge-Newark, Inc., 75 N.J. Super. 271 (App. Div. 1962) | 11, 12 | | Est. of Cordero ex rel. Cordero v. Christ Hosp., 403 N.J. Super. 306 (App. Div. 2008) | 13, 14 | | Giantonnio v. Taccard, 291 N.J. Super. 31 (App. Div. 1996) | 9 | | Hirsch v. General Motors Corp., 266 N.J. Super. 222 (Law Div. 1993) | 4 | | Jerista v. Murray, 185 N.J. 175 (2005) | 4, 5, 11| | Mavrikidis v. Petullo, 153 N.J. 117 (1998) | 12 | | Meier v. D’Ambrose, 419 N.J. Super. 439 (App. Div. 2011) | 10 | | Nagy v. Outback Steakhouse, Civil Action No. 19-18277(MAS)(DEA), 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29288, *1-22 (D.N.J. Feb. 21, 2024) | 2, 3, 6, 7 | Rosenblit v. Zimmerman, 166 N.J. 391 (2001).
[brief] The trespass in *Jones* was the warrantless attachment of the GPS to the vehicle; not a trespass on the curtilage of a home.  The Motion Judge’s “implied invitation” conclusion obviated consideration of any *Jones* curtilage trespassing violation to invalidate that CDW.  That Motion Judge’s opinion was that the driveway was an “implicit invitation” to UPS and Amazon drivers, and also law enforcement, to approach the home via the driveway as there was no direct pathway leading from the street; there was only a pathway leading from the driveway to the front door.  The Motion Judge did not appreciate that the “warrant” which the police had “in this case” was only a CDW which did not authorize entry onto private property but only granted authority to install a GPS on a vehicle.  Notably, in *United States v. Jones*, that tracking device was twice attached to that vehicle when the vehicle was in a public parking lot.  Not so here.  Review of the CDW [Confidential Appendix at CDa3, CDa6] contains no authorization for entry onto private property.  In addition, the Motion Judge’s “implied invitation” conclusion is countermanded by *Florida v. Jardines*, 589 U.S. 1 (2013) where that “implicit invitation” rationale was analyzed and rejected by the *Jardines* majority:  This implicit license typically permits the visitor to approach the home by the footpath, knock promptly, wait briefly to be received, and then (absent invitation to linger longer) leave.  *Jardines*, 133 S. Ct. at 1415  The Motion Judge, in denying Reconsideration, relied on the photographs of [...] showing the pathway leading from the driveway [R1, 2 at Da31, 32] and concluded that UPS, Amazon and the State Police could all utilize the driveway.  What was not analyzed is that the “invitation” to use the driveway was simply to gain access to the front door.  There is no authorization to allow any tinkering [by UPS, Amazon or next-door neighbor] with vehicles parked in the driveway.  So also, as to law enforcement.  Our Supreme Court has recognized, in its analysis of the third-party intervention doctrine, that law enforcement conduct cannot exceed conduct accorded to the general public [the “plumber, dinner guest, or landlord” as described by [...]] i.e., conduct to simply walk up the driveway, traverse the pathway to approach and then knock at the front door.
[brief] This value is well articulated by Executive Order No. 362, which cites to clemency as a way to "temper the impact of a criminal justice system that does not always produce justice."  Among the injustices that could render an applicant eligible for clemency is if the "sentence reflects an excessive trial penalty, based upon a comparison of the sentence and a documented plea offer."  Ibid.  Petitioner is not now suggesting he is eligible for clemency, rather, that an excessive trial tax is a recognized injustice.  He also recognizes that there will be some difference in sentences between those who plead guilty, provide truthful testimony and those who are found guilty after trial.  It is the extent of this difference that violates State v. Roach, 146 N.J. 208 (1996).  The prosecution controlled factual distinctions on the legal posture between petitioner and his co-defendants do not explain or justify a sentence difference of over one-half a century among persons who participated substantially equally in the crimes charged.
[brief] See id.  In State v. Moore, 181 N.J. Super. 40 (App. Div. 2004), a detective was surveilling a high narcotics area when he observed three men move away from a group of men standing in a vacant lot and move to the back of the lot.  The detective the observed the defendant and the codefendant give money to a third person in exchange for small unknown objects that they placed in their pockets.  Based on these observations, the detective conducted a stop of the defendant.  The Court held that the stop was justified, reasoning that “based on [the detective’s] experience and the factors present here—a neighborhood known for heavy drug trafficking, observations of three men moving away from a group to a vacant lot, and the exchange of money for small objects—it was reasonable for [the detective] to have a well-grounded suspicion that he had witnessed a drug transaction.
[brief] In particular, [...]’s prior refusal to cooperate or consent, and the police’s coercive promises and threat while she was handcuffed and facing legal jeopardy, heavily undermined the voluntariness of her eventual consent.  The totality of circumstances plainly indicated that [...] “would [have] prefer[ed] to refuse. ”  *Carty*, 170 N.J. at 645.  The motion court failed to consider those critical facts and thus wrongly denied [...]’s motion to suppress.  Ultimately, “[i]t was the State’s obligation to put forth facts at the suppression hearing to establish” that the warrantless search of [...]’s home was based on voluntary consent, “which it patently failed to do.
[brief] Standard of Review  When considering an appeal from an action taken by a planning board, courts will employ an arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable standard of review.  *Fallone Properties, LLC v. Bethlehem Twp. Planning Bd.*, 369 N.J. Super. 552, 560 (App. Div. 2004).  In other words, "[t]he factual determinations of the planning board are presumed to be valid and the exercise of its discretionary authority based on such determinations will not be overturned unless arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable."  *Ibid.*  However, "a court is not bound by an agency’s determination on a question of law, and the court’s construction of an ordinance under review is de novo."  *Id.* at 561 (internal citations omitted).  Therefore, courts review de novo planning board decisions concerning questions of law, which includes questions regarding the scope of a planning board’s own authority or jurisdiction.  II.
[brief] Should the Court determine that the arbitration clause in the Agreement is enforceable under the FAA, the [...]’s provisions mandating adjudication of the parties’ disputes by courts supersedes the FAA pursuant to the Twenty-First Amendment.  Section 2 of the Twenty-First Amendment to the Constitution provides that the “transportation or importation into any State, Territory or possession of the United States or delivery or use therein of intoxicating liquors, in violation of the laws thereof, is hereby prohibited.  U.S. Const. art. XXI, § 2.  The U.S. Supreme Court states that the Twenty-First Amendment gives a state “virtually complete control over the importation and sale of liquor and the structure of the liquor distribution system. ”
[brief] In those appeals, the [...] (“Department”) failed to provide any coherent explanation for the vastly disparate application scores, such as when different reviewers gave the same applicant zeros and perfect scores in the same category.  Id. at 370 (“The Department has done little to justify these anomalies or explain why they should be disregarded. ”).  After cataloguing the numerous problems with the scoring, the panel found that “[t]here is no escaping the fact that some of these scores simply ‘don’t compute’ and that, no matter how the Department and the other respondents may attempt to slice it, the results are still unsettling. ”  *Id.* at 371.  In other words, the Court opined that the Department’s decisions “present little more than sets of numbers that declare the appellants placed out of the money. ”  *Id.* at 369.  The panel observed that “the final agency decisions provide only the scores resulting from the work of the review committee. ”  *Id.* at 385.  The Court also was concerned about whether “members understood or followed instructions” and noted “there [was] no evidence that the scores were verified in some manner or whether anomalies . . . have been harmonized in some reasonable, non-arbitrary way. ”  *Ibid.*  The Court then noted it had “considerable concerns about the Department’s processes and the results produced that—without further agency proceedings and explanation—would leave us to conclude that the decisions in question are arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable.
[brief] Atl. City Superior Officers' Ass'n 2022 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1194 at *20.  The Appellate Division did not reach a decision on the matter stating the following:  In the end, although no case law directly addresses whether lump sum payments upon promotion for accumulated sick leave constitute a vested right, [...]'s reasoning that the vested right was the sick leave days, not the dollar amount, is also persuasive.  The Director disapproved the arbitration award granting [...] and [...] lump sum payments for accumulated sick leave when they were promoted.  But the Director permitted them to use the accumulated leave during their tenure.  Thus, because plaintiffs retain their sick leave benefit, the arbitration award does not infringe on their vested contractual rights, if any.  Id. at 24-25 (emphasis added).  In this matter, the promoted officers never received earned wages and have no equal benefit, unlike the officers who were able to maintain their sick time but were prohibited from cashing it out.  The Appellate Division did find that a reasonableness standard applies to State actions involving MSRA Section 5(3)(g) and presumptively (f) and (i) as well.
[brief] *State v. Abrams*, 256 N.J. Super. 390, 396 (App. Div. 1992) (citing *State v. Melvin*, 65 N.J. 1, 14 (1974)).  A valid waiver continues until the defendant revokes it.  See *State v. Perez*, 334 N.J. Super. 296, 302-03 (App. Div. 2000) (affirming admission of statements where defendant validly waived his rights and did not request counsel).  As noted, a totality of the circumstances approach is the proper analysis where police do not repeat a suspect’s *Miranda* rights.
[brief] (Tb20, Dta1309.)  Even [...]’s alleged delegatee, [...], denied awareness of any written notice [...] issued to inform of [...]’s alleged coverage termination.  (Tb24, Dta1077-80.)  Thus, there is nothing for [...] to argue that it delegated.  Furthermore, although acknowledgment of receipt of formal notice of cancellation through a third-party such as a broker may not necessarily invalidate improperly communicated notice,\(^6\) [...] cites to no case that provides a derelict insurer the benefit of unclear, inferential third-party notice that it did not generate.  In the absence of “specific” and “clear” notice of termination by [...], as a matter of law, [...] remained covered under the policy.  *Millbrook Tax Fund*, 344 N.J.Super. at 54.  And, as [...]’s thirty-four-and-a-half page redundant rehash of [...]’s alleged “unenrollment” confirms, that second and third-hand “notice” was anything but the “specific,” “clear” and “properly placed” notice the law requires.  It is significantly more \(^6\) See, *Insigna v. Hegedus*, 231 N.J.Super. 562, 567 (App.Div.1987) (insurer’s “non-delegable” obligation “is a non-delegability of responsibility for performance, not non-delegability of the performance itself”; *N.J.A.C. 11:1-20.2(1)* (delegation “shall not relieve the insurer of its responsibilities.
[brief] PRELIMINARY STATEMENT ..................................................................................  1  PROCEDURAL HISTORY ......................................................................................  3  STATEMENT OF FACTS  .....................................................................................  6  A.  Toms River Police Obtain a Warrant from the Toms River Municipal Court to Search a Car Located in Toms River ...........................................................................................................  6  B.  Toms River Police Effectuate a Car Stop of [...] in Lakewood to Execute the Toms River Search Warrant ...........................................................................................................  7  C.  Toms River Police Eventually Obtain [...]’s Consent to Search His Lakewood Home .................................................................9  D.  The Trial Court Denies [...]’s Motion to Suppress .................................................................................................................................12  LEGAL ARGUMENT ............................................................................................
[brief] *Water is an essential commodity which all of nature requires for survival.*  Our food supply is derived through water which combines with nutrients and minerals to form the fruits and vegetables which become part of our daily diet.  The plants of the soil, nurtured by water and consumed by animals, provide our main staple of meat.  Like the plants and animals, we too must be nurtured by water.  *Potable water, then, is an essential commodity which every individual requires in order to sustain human existence.*  Frequently, residents in rural areas have individual wells and thus become somewhat self-sufficient and independent with respect to their water supply.  However, *residents in urban and suburban areas are dependent upon the agency or institution which supplies potable water.*  While the original purpose of the public trust doctrine was to preserve the use of the public natural water for navigation, commerce and fishing, *Arnold v. Mundy*, 6 N.J.L. 1, 69–78 (Sup.Ct.1821), it is clear that since water is essential for human life, *the public trust* doctrine applies with equal impact upon the control of our drinking water reserves.
[brief] The clearance, replanning, development or redevelopment of blighted areas shall be a public purpose and public use, for which private property may be taken or acquired.  Municipal, public or private corporations may be authorized by law to undertake such clearance, replanning, development or redevelopment; and **improvements made for these purposes and uses, or for any of them may be exempted from taxation, in whole or in part, for a limited period of time during which the profits and dividends payable by any private corporation enjoying such tax exemption shall be limited by law.  The conditions of use, ownership, management and control of such improvements shall be regulated by law. **  (emphasis supplied).  **STANDARDS OF REVIEW**
[brief] [...] would not provide further explanation or clarification of the Building Height Ordinance at the hearing other than stating that she believes it is a conforming application and that none of the proposed buildings in the subject development exceeds the allowable building height.  (Pa162;93:11-14).  The Board attorney interpreted the Building Height ordinance by referring to whether “mounding” is used in order to increase building height.  The Board agreed with [...]’s interpretation of the Building Height Ordinance stating that the revised lot grade was not for the purpose of raising the building heights, but rather required grading for stormwater management.  The Board attorney stated that the Building Height Ordinance does not have a bright line for measuring height from existing grade such as five (5) or ten (10) feet.  Rather, the Building Height Ordinance simply states that if mounding is used in order to increase building height that is not appropriate.  (Pa170, 125:15-26-127:1-7).  An objector during public comment questioned the Board as to what is the process or guideline by the Board in which they can test and evaluate the “intent” of the builder on whether the mounding of the revised lot grade was made increase the building heights.  (Pa171;130:25-131:1-14).  The Board professionals could not provide any comment or answer to that question other than advising that the question was already addressed by the Applicant’s engineer and Board planner.  (Pa171;131:19-23).  At the next hearing, the Board approved the application.
[directive] TREATMENT  A.  Immediate emergency referral capability shall include assistance with securing: - medical care - medical health care - shelter - relocation - food - clothing - child care  1.  The victim must receive immediate medical care for injuries.  If the victim requests medical attention, it shall be provided through: - on-site first aid - transport to medical facility - call for ambulance 2.  Crisis intervention counseling should be provided through the use of 24-hour hotlines, emergency psychiatric services and victim assistance agencies.  3.  In non-emergency situations, referrals should be made to the appropriate County Office of Victim-Witness Advocacy.  4.  All police departments/stations should maintain a current social service resource directory for referral.  COMMENTARY
[brief] The Department’s authority to supervise the transfer is not new.  N.J.S.A. 17:23-1 requires every insurer authorized to transact business in New Jersey to file an annual financial statement.  “The annual statement shall be prepared in accordance with the annual statement instructions and the Accounting Practices and Procedures Manual [“APPM”] adopted by the National Association of Insurance Commissioners, and all applicable provisions of law. ”  The APPM has included SSAP No. 25 since its inception in 2001 and is reflected in versions of the APPM maintained by the Department as far back as 2005.  (Ra23-30 (2005), 4-12 (2023)).  Like the current version, the 2005 version of SSAP No. 25 includes attorneys-in-fact as related parties, SSAP No. 25 ¶ 2(i) (Ra23) and requires that transactions between related parties be at arm’s-length, SSAP No. 25 ¶ 15 (Ra27) and fair and reasonable, SSAP No. 25 ¶ 16 (Ra27).
[brief] See Da225 (87:7-21); Da219 (62:7-63:6).  This designated grass cut-through was located in an area where the trucks would be turning into a safely closed, coned-off lane, in contrast to the police cut-through, where vehicles would be turning into the active, open left lane of the GSP.  See Da220 (65:22-66:3); Da249 (182:19-183:5); Da065 (103:22-24).  [...] further testified that [...] called him “right after” the July 20, 2022 crash occurred.
[brief] interpretation – specifically that interpretation adopted by the Board, and affirmed by the trial court.  See Wynfield Corp. v. Killam Assocs., 385 N.J. Super. 20, 32 (App. Div. 2006) (holding that “[i]f the statute is clear and unambiguous on its face and admits of only one interpretation, a court need look no further in divining the Legislature’s intent).  The Building Height Definition is clear on its face, defining building height as “the vertical dimension measured to the highest point of the building… from the lowest original lot grade or any revised lot grade shown on a site plan….  Such revised lot grade shall not include mounding, terracing, or other devices designed to allow increased building height. ” (Pa61-Pa62) (emphasis added).  The trial court used the Merriam-Webster Dictionary definition of “design” to point out that intent is just another word for design or purpose.  Was it designed to increase the height?  Was it intended to increase the height?  Was its purpose to increase the building height?  All of these are asking the same question.  The trial court correctly made the determination that, “the definition of ‘building height’ adopted by the [...] in its ordinance specifically includes consideration of the plan or purpose of the revised grading that is included within the site plan and other documents presented to the land use board.
[brief] It is subject to judicial notice N.J.R.E. 201(b)(4).  It is offered here in response to Plaintiffs’ argument at Pb32, et seq., relating to the Supreme Court’s March 13, 2023 decision in Malanga v. Twp. of West Orange, 253 N.J. 291 (2023), which was not raised below.  The Redevelopment Agreements Permit [...] to Terminate the Agreement if a Tax Exemption is Not Granted 11.