ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
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[brief] DEFENDANT RECEIVED A FAIR TRIAL, AND THERE WERE NO CUMULATIVE ERRORS TO WARRANT A NEW ONE.  “When legal errors cumulatively render a trial unfair, the Constitution requires a new trial. ”  State v. Weaver, 219 N.J. 131, 155 (2014).  “[T]he predicate for relief for cumulative error must be that the probable effect of the cumulative error was to render the underlying trial unfair. ”  State v. Wakefield, 190 N.J. 397, 538 (2007).  “If a defendant alleges multiple trial errors, the theory of cumulative error will still not apply where no error was prejudicial and the trial was fair. ”  State v. T.J.M., 220 N.J. 220, 238 (2015) (quoting Weaver, 219 N.J. at 155).  As discussed, defendant has not demonstrated any prejudicial error that occurred at trial.  The principle of cumulative error, thus, does not apply here.
[brief] THE COURT SHOULD AFFIRM DISMISSAL OF THIS CASE ON THE BASIS OF COMITY DUE TO THE PENDENCY OF THE MISSOURI ACTION.  (Pa057, Pa077).  Plaintiff argues in its Point II that the trial court erred in dismissing this case because it was filed before the Missouri Action. (Pb20-29).  This court should reject plaintiff’s argument and affirm the trial court’s dismissal because the trial court’s thorough, well-reasoned decision is supported by the record and consistent with [...] and Century Indem. Co. v. Mine Safety Appliances Co., 398 N.J. Super. 422, 438 (App. Div. 2008).  In short, the trial court properly exercised its discretion to dismiss this anticipatory declaratory judgment case in favor of the more comprehensive and coercive Missouri Action.  A.
[brief] The Petitioner also cites the testimony of [...], a witness who claimed the Respondent manipulated the Decedent during the time that the Respondent was going through a difficult time in her life.  (Pb 24).  However, the Chancery Division properly found that her testimony was irrelevant in terms of the time period testified to, noting that “her experience living next to Respondent when she was struggling in the relationship with the father of her children who had substance abuse issues.
[brief] The State still has failed to provide this Court with an explanation (valid or otherwise) as to what exactly constitutes “cock fighting” for the purposes of N.J.S.A. 4:22 – 17(c)(1) or N.J.S.A. 4:22 – 24.  “Dog Fighting” is succinctly defined in 2C:33 – 31(a).  Nowhere in the New Jersey Statutes is “cock fighting” defined (or specifically criminalized for that matter).
[brief] See O’Neill, 193 N.J. at 180 (“The two-step, ‘question-first, warn-later’ interrogation is a technique devised to undermine both the efficacy of Miranda and our state law privilege. ”).  That [...]’s statement was capable of causing an unjust result “is reflected in the prosecutor’s argument in summation. ”  Pearson, 318 N.J. Super. at 136.
[directive] In response to recent case law dealing with identification procedures in New Jersey, and the New Jersey Supreme Court’s adoption of new changes to Rule 3:11, the Attorney General’s Office has promulgated these new Guidelines for Preparing and Conducting Out-of-Court Eyewitness Identifications (“Identification Guidelines”).  On March 13, 2019, the New Jersey Supreme Court issued its decision in State v. Anthony, 273 N.J. 213 (2019), which clarified that law enforcement must record identification procedures electronically, preferably by video and audio, if feasible, and, if that is not feasible, a contemporaneous written account must be made.  If either of those options is not feasible, the administrator must provide a detailed summary of the identification procedure.  If either the electronic recording or contemporaneous record is not feasible, the reasons must be documented.  On July 23, 2019, the New Jersey Supreme Court issued a second opinion on identification in State v. Green, 239 N.J. 88 (2019), which imposed new obligations on the State when officers use either an old-fashioned hard-copy mug book, or a digital database of mugshots, to search for an unknown suspect based on a witness’s physical description of the suspect.  Law enforcement must now preserve certain photos the witness views when making an identification and/or suggesting that a particular image looks like the suspect.  Specifically, to allow for appropriate review, administrators should preserve: (1) the photo of the suspect the witness selected, along with all other photos on the screen or page; and (2) any photo that a witness says depicts a person who looks similar to the suspect, along with all other photos on that screen or page.  When relevant, the State will also have the burden of showing that a witness was not exposed to multiple photos or viewings of the same suspect.  The underlying concern is the risk of “mugshot exposure,” which may occur when an eyewitness sees more than one photo of the same potential suspect.  It can affect the reliability of any resulting identification because of the possibility that the witness will make an identification  1  This document is not intended to create, does not create, and may not be relied upon to create any rights, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law by any party in any matter civil or criminal.
[brief] Appellant Failed to Preserve “Discovery” Argument Before the Trial Court and is Therefore Barred from Advancing Argument  Appellant failed to argue that the Motions were premature because discovery was needed and therefore did not preserve the argument for appeal pursuant to R. 2:10-2.  “The lack of any record is a fatal flaw” in preserving an argument for appeal.  8  Appellant also continues to speak out of both sides of its mouth by taking inapposite positions both before the Trial Judge and in its appellate brief.  Even though Appellant now claims, for the first time, it needs discovery and Summary Judgment was not ripe, it also insists that the Court should have granted its Cross-Motion.  (See Appellant’s Brief, pp. 25-36).  See *State v. Jones*, 232 N.J. 308, 321 (2018); and *State v. Robinson*, 200 N.J. 1, 3 (2009) (ruling that defendant never raised an issue argued before the appellate court before the trial court and “because its legal propriety never was ruled on by the trial court, the issue was not properly preserved for appellate review.
[brief] Furthermore, to the extent that the decision not to mold the verdict involves an exercise of discretion, it cannot be said to have been an abuse of discretion in this case and thus there is no basis to disturb it.  See Hisjenaj v. Kuehner, 194 N.J.6, 16 (2008).  Plaintiff cites Kassick v Milwaukee Electric Tool Corp., 120 N.J. 130 (1990) for the proposition that “[i]n New Jersey there is a general rule that a Trial Court may not mold a jury verdict according to its perception of the jury's view” (Pb6), but the argument is “backwards.
[brief] In support of the statutory sleight-of-hand, Appellant focuses primarily on Heagan v. Borough of Allendale, 42 N.J. Super. 472 (App. Div. 1956), a decision that preceded the MLUL by nearly two decades, and also cites “numerous cases” that follow Heagan on the burden of proof issue, all pre-dating the MLUL (Sb28-Sb30).  Needless to say, cases decided before the MLUL was drafted offer no insight on the meaning of the  The post-MLUL case law relied upon by Appellant serves Appellant no better.  Appellant relies heavily, for example, on Berkeley Square Assoc. v. Zoning Bd. Of Adjustment of Trenton, 410 N.J. Super. 255 (App. Div. 2009), a case in which the Appellate Division grappled with the issue of whether a nonconforming use had been abandoned.  But that is totally distinguishable from this matter where (1) there is no proof that Respondent’s use is nonconforming and (2) the Chancery Division twice found that Respondent had not abandoned the use (Aa29-Aa48;Ra240-Ra265).  Appellant cites Ianieri v. East Brunswick Zoning Bd., 192 N.J. Super. 15 (Law Div. 1983) for the proposition that as a matter of law “the burden of proof is with the proponent of the nonconforming use” (Sb31).  But that situation is distinguishable from Appellant’s application regarding a use by Respondent that Appellant has never proven is non-conforming, now or before.  Moreover, as Appellant acknowledges the genesis of the dispute in Ianieri was when “the new owner obtained a sign permit and erected a business sign” and the “neighbor ‘appealed’ the sign and use to the Zoning Board, with the new owner participating” (Sb31).  In other words, the property owner was both the proponent of the use and the applicant before the zoning board in Ianieri, as was the case in Ferraro v. Zoning Bd. of Keansburg, 321 N.J. Super. 288 (App. Div. 1999) and [...] v. Keansburg Planning Bd. of Adjustment, 407 N.J. Super. 432, 436-37 (Law Div. 2008), other cases on which the Appellant relies.  Nor does [...], v. Borough of Spring Lake, 350 N.J. Super. 420 (App. Div. 2002), also relied upon by Appellant, warrant a different outcome, because, as the Appellate Division noted in Berkeley, the issue before the zoning board in that case concerned a property owner who had “expanded a non-conforming use,” which is distinguishable from whether a nonconforming use existed to begin with.  Berkeley, 410 N.J. Super. at 264 n.4.  This was not a situation in which the property owner applied for a permit or a variance and then an objector presented the issue to the Board.  Here, Appellant initiated the issue and therefore under the clear terms of N.J.S.A. 40:55D-68, Appellant was the applicant who inescapably had the burden of proof, as the statute lends itself to no other interpretation.
[brief] Under the revised framework, in order to obtain a hearing, “a defendant has the initial burden of showing some evidence of suggestiveness that could lead to a mistaken identification,” tied to a “system variable. ”  *Henderson*, 208 N.J. at 288-89.  “System variables” are “variables within the State's control,” and include pre-identification instructions and showups.  *Id.* at 248, 250, 259-61.  If a defendant makes a threshold showing for a hearing, the burden shifts to the State to “offer proof to show that the proffered eyewitness identification is reliable—accounting for system and estimator variables ....”
[brief] (7T52-16 to 53-23).  After announcing his presence outside the front door, [...] opened the door and appeared “shaken up, pretty scared. ” (7T58-6 to 10).  [...] noted he was bleeding heavily from the head.  (7T58-10 to 11).  [...] stayed with him and did not go inside the business.  (7T59-1 to 7).  Another unit arrived and then transported him to [...].  (7T59-8 to 14).  He was in the hospital for over a week.  (9T95-10 to 11).  [...] of [...] testified that a CAT scan revealed three types of inside head bleeding consistent with blunt force trauma that could have been fatal if left untreated.  (7T76-1 to 2, 79-17 to 23).  [...] also had injuries to his ankle, elbow, and arm, including contusions and bruises.  (7T79-11 to 16).  He was given anti-seizure medication and required staples to close the wound on his head.  (7T81-4 to 18).  [...] of the [...] arrived at the hospital to photograph [...]’s injuries, and then proceeded to [...] to photograph the crime scene.
[brief] Table of Authorities Cases Hedgpeth v. Pulido, 555 U.S. 57 (2008).....................................................12 State v. Alexander, 233 N.J. 132 (2018)....................................................5 State v. Banko, 182 N.J. 44 (2004)............................................................3 State v. Camacho, 218 N.J. 533 (2014)....................................................12 State v. C.W.H., 465 N.J. Super. 574 (App. Div. 2021)...............................9 State v. Hill, 121 N.J. 150 (1990)............................................................9  State v. Jamerson, 153 N.J. 318 (1998)...................................................6, 7 State v. Kelly, 118 N.J. 370 (1990)..........................................................10  State v. Locascio, 425 N.J. Super. 474 (App. Div. 2012)............................6, 7 State v. L.V., 410 N.J. Super. 90 (App. Div. 2009)....................................16  State v. Miller, 237 N.J. 15 (2019)...........................................................15  State v. Oguta, 468 N.J. Super. 100 (App. Div. 2021)...............................11  State v. R.K., 220 N.J. 444 (2015)...........................................................9  State v. Thomas, 187 N.J. 119 (2006)......................................................5  Counterstatement of Procedural History
[brief] 33 State v. Carter, 247 N.J. 488 (2021) ..........................................................................  16, 26 State v. Carty, 170 N.J. 632 (2002) ..........................................................................  35 State v. Casimono, 250 N.J. Super. 173 (App. Div. 1991) .................................  14 State v. D.A., 191 N.J. 158 (2007) ..........................................................................  16 State v. Dabas, 215 N.J. 114 (2013) ..........................................................................  14 State v. DeCamp, 622 N.W.2d 290 (Iowa 2001) .................................................. 19 State v. Dunbar, 229 N.J. 521 (2017) ..........................................................................  35 State v. Elders, 192 N.J. 224 (2007) ..........................................................................  35 State v. Frye, 217 N.J. 566 (2014) .................................................................  29 State v. Galicia, 210 N.J. 364 (2012) ..............................................................  12 State v. Gargano, 476 N.J. Super.
[directive] At that time, I stated:  “Situations involving people who are barricaded within a room or other confined space pose significant challenges and risks for all involved – civilians and officers alike – and such situations may arise for any number of reasons.  In order to ensure that law enforcement’s response is as effective and consistent with our Use of Force principles as possible, the Attorney General’s Office and the Office of Public Integrity and Accountability will engage with experts and stakeholders to develop protocols that guide the appropriate use of force, and the successful use of mental health professionals, in such situations. ”  Over the past year, staff members from my Office have been meeting with law enforcement professionals, community stakeholders, and faith leaders.  They have been studying national trends and best practices, with the goal of crafting policies for New Jersey that will maximize our chances of resolving every encounter involving a barricaded individual without injury to anyone.  As this research progressed, the team realized that many of the bedrock principles necessary for the successful resolution of these difficult police-citizen encounters were already contained within the Attorney General’s Statewide Use of Force Policy.  Principles such as respect for the sanctity of human life; consideration of the factors often hindering communication with a person experiencing a mental health or substance use crisis; utilizing all available de-escalation tactics; only utilizing force as a last resort; and using time as a critical de-escalation strategy.  Because the Barricaded Individual Policy announced today is an expansion on the current Use of Force Policy, it has been added as Addendum C New Jersey Is An Equal Opportunity Employer • Printed on Recycled Paper and is Recyclable of that Policy,1 re-affirming the vital communication and de-escalation requirements contained in the Use of Force Policy.
[brief] (1029a-1031a); (1T13:3-21; 1T14:7-15:2; 1T20:6-22; 1T21:3-15; 1T22:1-24; 1T22:25-23:10).  Both the New Jersey and Federal Constitutions prohibit the passage of laws impairing the obligations of contracts.  Burgos v. State, 222 N.J. 175, 193 (2015).  --- 9  Plaintiffs concede that if they were employees of [...] and active union members at the time that the First Police Matter was settled (they were not), they would be bound by the $15,000 cap that the parties to that lawsuit negotiated pursuant to Barila v. Board of Educ. of Cliffside Park, 241 N.J. 595 (2020).  The Federal Constitution’s Contract Clause, Article I, Section 10, Clause 1, provides that “[n]o State shall … pass any … Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts. ”  U.S. Const., art. I, §10, cl. 1.  Likewise, the New Jersey Constitution, Article 4, Section 7, Paragraph 3, holds that “[t]he Legislature shall not pass any … law impairing the obligation of contractors, or depriving a party of any remedy for enforcing a contract which existed when the contract was made. ”  These constitutional protections provide “parallel guarantees. ”  Burgos, 222 N.J. at 193.  When determining whether there was a violation of the Federal or State Contract Clauses, a court must undertake a three-part analysis: (1) whether the law has operated as a substantial impairment of a contractual relationship; (2) whether the government entity, in justification, had a significant and legitimate public purpose behind the regulation; and (3) whether the impairment is reasonable and necessary to serve this important public purpose.
[brief] It is clear that neither he nor the bank took [...]’s portion of the paperwork seriously, since [...] left off [...]’s employment information and the Toms River property about which [...] undeniably knew.  (2T 101:19-102:11)  Defendant went to “the guy [he] had always used as a mortgage loan officer” to process this mortgage.  (2T 133:13-17)  [...] had no direct contact with the bank regarding the mortgage: no meeting, no phone call, no correspondence.  (2T 99:4-15)  It is also impossible to consider this $70,000 question to be material to Defendant.
[brief] In an internal e-mail between [...] (an [...] employee) and [...] dated 8/10/17, Ms. George wrote that “[...] came into Medical Records while I was there and spoke to [...] about his [delinquent chart] list advising that he was completing all.  [...] has not complied[.]  [...] has gone to his office with the list and [...] has continued to pursue him.  All of the items on his list are not dictated.  There are a significant number of accounts for each doctor which needs attention. ”  See Da164
[directive] It is important to note that Procedures for Gathering and there are three separate and distinct processes: gathering and material; Brady Giglio disclosing and material to the defense or the court; and admitting and Brady Giglio Brady material at a defendant’s trial.  This section of the Directive applies only to the Giglio gathering process.  Gathering such material occurs when the prosecutor collects the information for the only.  Gathering does not mean that the prosecutor’s review information will be disclosed to the defense or the court, and it does not mean that it will be admitted at trial.  Each county’s policy shall establish and maintain procedures for prosecutors to gather and review potential and information prior to any plea offer, testimonial Brady Giglio hearing, or trial.
[brief] Docket #: [...]  Appellate Letter Brief  3.  [...] was ordered to make the 2 children beneficiaries of his Life Insurance, per the divorce decree of filed March 17, 1983.  (pa26-29)  4.  [...] left state of NJ and moved away, with no known address, phone number, or employer information forwarded to me.  [...] had absolutely no conscience or have a moral compass for Leaving behind and neglecting his 2 Children, with zero communication with us, and disregarding the weekly child support, which was stated in the Divorce decree of March 17, 1983.  5.
[brief] ”  State v. Buckley, 216 N.J. 249, 261 (2013).  Probative value is “the tendency of the evidence to establish the proposition that it is offered to prove. ”  State v. Wilson, 135 N.J. 4, 13 (1994).  Meanwhile, “[a] material fact is one which is really in issue in the case. ”  State v. Hutchins, 241 N.J. Super. 353, 359 (App. Div. 1990).  When determining whether evidence is relevant, the “inquiry focuses on ‘the logical connection between the proffered evidence and a fact in issue.
[brief] [...] takes directions from [...] in these exchanges.  180a.  [9/21/20, 4:42:20 PM]  [...]  Josh [...]: adam sueing me [9/21/20, 5:51:51 PM]  ✷: Why?  [9/21/20, 7:04:29 PM]  [...] Josh [...]: Where should I sent you to review [9/21/20, 7:15:21 PM]  ✷: So what do you want from me?  You keep doing this crap [9/21/20, 7:16:58 PM]  [...] Josh [...]:  No, that was from a long time ago I didn’t know that companies are going and checking after 3 month, I am only doing intervening legally [9/21/20, 7:17:35 PM]  [...] Josh [...]: But that owner who live there is still there I didn’t defraud her, she signed [...]  Josh [...]:  Which lawyer do I need to take?  What is the worst?  If it’s only the home I am ready to lose, but owner will lose, I didn’t give her money, instead Cheap rent/payment [9/22/20, 9:29:32 AM]  Use flower [9/22/20, 9:42:22 AM]  [...] Josh [...]: Ty [9/22/20, 9:42:36 AM]  [...] Josh [...]: Or just try to settle?  [9/22/20, 9:42:55 AM]  [...] Josh [...]: Give home the home and next time only intervene [9/22/20, 9:43:44 AM]  [...]  Josh [...]: I should tell him you sent me?  25.
[directive] Where a filing party transmits a document multiple times and the court receives it multiple times; 2.  Where pleadings such as complaints or trial de novo applications are filed by both parties on the same day or within a few days of each other; 3.  Where a motion is either denied by the court or withdrawn by the filing party after the document was stamped as received; 4.  Where a writ of execution or wage execution is denied or withdrawn after the document was stamped as received; 5.  Where a warrant is denied or withdrawn after the document was stamped as received; and 6.  Where a document is considered "non-conforming" or is missing required documents (such as a certification or proof of mailing).
[brief] The Commission recommended a statute creating a “uniform practice and procedure for the exercise of the power of eminent domain, equally applicable to all bodies vested with such power. ”  *County of Monmouth v. Wissell*, 68 N.J. 35, 38 (1975) (citing to *Report of the Eminent Domain Revision Commission* 6-7 (1965)).  [...], who oversaw the passage of the Eminent Domain Act, also recognized the necessity for uniformity on laws enabling government entities to take private property for a public purpose.