ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] ” (Pa000093.)  These acknowledgements also provide sufficient explanation that her agreement to arbitrate would result in any potential claim being heard in arbitration, not by a judge or jury in a court of law.  *Forsyth v. First Trenton Indem. Co.*, A-5080-08T2, 2010 WL 2195996, at *6 (App. Div. May 28, 2010) (“[A] party’s signature to an agreement is the customary and perhaps surest indication of assent . . . .”) (unpublished) (Ra20-Ra26); *also id.* (“[A]n employee’s signature on the pre-printed agreement is sufficient to effectuate such a policy. ”).  At the beginning of the two-page Agreement, in bold-face, which [...] acknowledges she read and understood, it stated that any claims or disputes “are subject to confidential arbitration pursuant to the terms of this Agreement and will be resolved by Arbitration and NOT by a court or jury.  The parties hereby forever waive and give up the right to have a judge or a jury decide any Covered Claims.
[brief] Trial  Defendant has not provided all of the trial transcripts in support of his appeal of his re-sentence.  See (Db2 n. 1).  His attempt on appeal to present a one-sided story of this case, focusing on himself and not his victims or his co-defendants whose crimes he directed, is consistent with what the resentencing judge characterized as defendant’s continued failure throughout this case to “truly acknowledge his full culpability for” the 16-year-old victim’s death.  (5T22-15 to 23-1).  On direct appeal, this Court summarized the facts underlying defendant’s convictions in this way, which will suffice for purposes of the present appeal:
[brief] Appellant’s theory is contrary to decisions from the federal agencies tasked with implementing and enforcing the FDCPA.  In construing a federal statute, courts consider the decisions of the congressionally empowered agencies as binding and, at the very least, highly persuasive.  Madison v. Res. for Hum. Dev., Inc., 233 F.3d 175, 187 (3d Cir. 2000).  The agencies Congress tasked with interpreting and implementing the FDCPA — the [...] (“[...]”) and [...] (“[...]”) — have expressly approved of the use of service providers—and specifically, letter vendors.
[directive] 2.  Law enforcement officers and prosecutors submitting applications electronically to the judge shall encrypt the email in accordance with procedures promulgated by the of Administrative Director the Courts.  3.  Any revisions to the application deemed necessary by the judge shall be incorporated into the application.  If of 4. the judge decides to authorize issuance the warrant, an electronic authorization may be sent by encrypted email to the applicant, with instructions to the applicant to judge's affix the electronic signature to the warrant.  judge's 5.  The email authorization shall be retained by the appropriate county prosecutor for discovery purposes.  6.  For communications data warrants, arrangements should be made locally to assign the appropriate number.  Law enforcement shall be responsible for delivering the return to the county 7. prosecutor in the issuing county.  The county prosecutor in the issuing county shall be responsible for: (a) retaining 8. the executed search warrant, any inventory, and any other accompanying documents, of (b) complying with any request for a copy the inventory as authorized by Rule 3:5- of 5(a), and (3) providing all search warrant information to the defendant as part discovery pursuant to Rule 13-3.
[brief] **CONCLUSION**  The record makes clear that Unit 74 is a common element – not a condominium unit.  As a common element, the Developer cannot have lawfully leased or licensed Unit 74 to the Association.  The Developer wrongfully leveraged over its control of the Association to profit of the improper renting of Unit 74.  This arrangement continued for 35 years until the Developer conveyed its ‘title’ to Unit 74 in consideration of $199,000.  The trial court’s finding that the Developer conveyed marketable title to Unit 74 was fatal to each of the Plaintiff’s causes of action.  However, this brief shows that the trial court’s conclusion is inconsistent with the New Jersey Condominium Act.  As a common element, Unit 74 cannot be individual sold or otherwise separated from the remaining common elements.  As such, the Developer lacked marketable title to Unit 74.  For these reasons, the dismissal of the Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint should be reversed.
[brief] (2T:62-17 to 72 -16)  Factors that the Court considers in determining whether a juvenile’s waiver of his Miranda rights were knowing, and voluntary are suspect’s age, education and intelligence, advice as to constitutional rights, length of detention, whether the questioning was repeated or prolonged in nature and whether physical punishment or mental exhaustion was involved and prior experience with the criminal justice system. ”  State in the Interest of [...] 455 N.J. Super. 492 (2018) (citing Presha, 163 N.J. at 313).  a.  The Trial Court Erred in Finding that the Defendant’s Waiver was Knowing, Intelligent, and Voluntary and did not put Appropriate Weight on the Fact that the Defendant did not have an Opportunity to Consult with his Guardian in Private Prior to the Interrogation.
[brief] He asserted in his testimony that the proposed warehouse development was actually less intense than permitted under the SM Zone District’s building coverage because an additional 309,000 sq. ft. of warehouse could be constructed.  6T 9:24-10:12.  Plaintiffs did not submit for review an alternative development plan that demonstrated the actual feasibility of such additional warehouse area being constructed in light of site constraints and the need for supporting facilities such as drainage basins, parking and loading areas, buffers etc.
[directive] Under these circumstances, the methods employed in the criminal investigation conflict with those used in the administrative investigation.  8.1.3  Typically, this conflict will become most apparent during subject officer interviews.  As already explained, a subject officer has the right to remain silent during a criminal N.L.R.B. v. Weingarten, 420 U.S. 251 (1975) (unionized employee who reasonably believes that an investigatory 7 interview may result in disciplinary action against him or her is entitled to union representation).  47  INTERNAL AFFAIRS POLICY & PROCEDURES | August 2020 investigative interview.  But the same officer must cooperate and answer questions posed by their employer during an administrative disciplinary interview.  So while the internal affairs investigator cannot require a subject officer to answer questions during a criminal interview, he or she can require that officer to answer questions during an administrative disciplinary interview.  8.1.4
[brief] ” (4T:51-24 to 52-1).  As the State’s expert opined that the cause of death was “multiple gunshot wounds,” not any particular gunshot wound, it is reasonable to infer that [...] felt the pain of the additional gunshot wounds before succumbing to his injuries.  (4T:55-15 to 22).  Defendant further argues that the trial court “punished” him for “not providing an explanation” for killing [...].  (Db46 to 47).  However, the trial court only emphasized the senseless brutality of [...]’s death, as he appeared to be cordially interacting with defendant only minutes before he was suddenly shot and left to die in the middle of a snow-covered street.  (9T:39-5 to 40-9; see 3T:9-13 to 10-3).  The trial court did not comment on defendant’s refusal to provide a motive.
[brief] On April 11, 2023 [...] filed an Answer with a counterclaim seeking to enforce the inter-company arbitration awards.  (Da89-Da97).  On March 24, 2023 counsel for [...] filed a motion to enforce litigant’s rights; an Order was entered on April 19, 2023 enforcing litigant’s rights.  On April 18, 2023, [...] filed an answer to [...]’s counterclaim in docket number [...].  (Da98-Da101).  On May 2, 2023, counsel for [...] filed a motion to consolidate which was granted on May 12, 2023 by [...] (Da102-Da103).
[brief] [...], Esq. N.J.  Attorney ID. No. 017861978  [...] [...] [...]  Attorney for Plaintiff October 4, 2024  Appellate Clerk's Office P.O. Box 006 Trenton, New Jersey 08625  Re: [...] individually and as Executor of the [...], deceased v [...], [...] et al. et al.  On Appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey – Law Division – Morris County under Docket No. [...] – Sat Below Hon. [...], J.S.C. Appellate Docket No. [...]
[brief] EXCLUDING ALL EVIDENCE OF FLOOR MOPPING AND HAZARD SIGNS WAS IMPROPER PURSUANT TO EVID.  R. 407  Again, while not challenging that the floor was wet, the Defendant’s case relied upon it seeking to establish that its wet floor was not slippery.  Demonstrating the slippery nature of the wet floor was indeed directly related to the subsequent remedial measures the trial Court erroneously excluded, allowing the jury to be misled on this critical issue.  In sum, the excluded evidence went directly to establishing Defendant’s “liability, not [its] negligence,” and should have been allowed.  *Harris v. Peridot Chem. (NJ), Inc.,* supra., at 292.  **POINT II**
[brief] *Id.* at 456-58, 828 A.2d at 896-97.  In evaluating *[...]*'s claim, the Court analyzed the specific rights afforded and conduct proscribed by the cited provisions of the LMRDA and found no relationship between her claims and the statute.  *Id.* at 468, 828 A.2d at 903-04.  The Court concluded that plaintiff’s dispute merely concerned a disagreement regarding access to information and the adequacy of the union's internal procedures, thus she did not possess an objectively reasonable belief the LMRDA was being violated.  *Id.* at 467-68, 828 A.2d at 903-04.  However, the New Jersey Supreme Court has explicitly rejected the notion that a plaintiff must present facts, that if true, would violate the respective statute, rule, or public policy.  *Id.* at 464.  Instead, courts will reject claims that rely upon “a broad-brush allegation” pursuant to the idea that a Plaintiff cannot seek protection under CEPA for disagreeing with their employer’s *lawful* policies, procedures, or priorities.  *Klein v. Univ. of Med. & Dentistry of N.J.*, 377 N.J. Super. 28, 42-43 (App. Div. 2005) (asserting CEPA was “not intended to shield a constant complainer who simply disagrees with the manner in which the hospital is operating one of its medical departments, provided the operation is in accordance with lawful and ethical mandates”); see also Young v. Schering Corp., 275 N.J. Super. 221, 237 (App. Div. 1994) (CEPA “was not intended to provide a remedy for wrongful discharge for employees who simply disagree with an employer’s decision, where that decision is entirely lawful”), aff’d, 141 N.J. 16 (1995).
[brief] Another decision relied upon by the Borough is Lombardi v. Masso, 207 N.J. 517 (2011), a contract action involving the sale of real estate where interlocutory orders were entered and appealed.  The Borough paraphrases the Lombardi court’s opinion as concluding that “[a]n interlocutory order may become the law of the case when final judgment is entered, and it is no longer subject to reconsideration,” citing Lombardi at page 539.  (Borough’s Brief, Page 25.)  This is a gross misrepresentation, as the Lombardi court reached the exact opposite conclusion, as evidenced by the actual quote from the opinion:  Importantly, the law of the case doctrine is only triggered when one court is faced with a ruling on the merits by a different and co-equal court on an identical issue.  . . .  It is entirely inapposite where, as here, in trial court proceedings, the same judge is reconsidering his own interlocutory ruling.  . . .  Because such a ruling is always subject to reconsideration up until final judgment is entered, . . . , it is not considered “law of the case. ”  Id. at 539 (citations omitted.)  The Borough’s argument that the law of the case doctrine bars plaintiff’s appeal is without merit.
[brief] [...] had allowed defendant [...] (“[...]”), to park trailer-mounted “intermodals” (metal containers) containing waste oil on the property until the intermodals/trailers were driven by [...] to area ports for shipment overseas.  On June 1, 2021, an intermodal containing waste oil was punctured as a [...] driver was pulling the intermodal/trailer out of a “parking space. ”  Cleanup began immediately.  On October 21, 2021, [...] filed suit against [...] under the Spill Act for compensatory damages (cleanup/remediation costs), fines, treble damages, attorneys fees and other damages.  On May 17, 2022, [...] sued appellant [...]  (“[...]”), its motor vehicle liability insurer, as a third party defendant for coverage for [...]’s claims.  [...] answered and sued for judgment against all parties and new third parties declaring rights under its policy.  On April 6, 2023, [...]’s motion for summary judgment against [...] on all claims was granted by default; [...] was unrepresented, its counsel having been granted leave to withdraw and the order allowing counsel to withdraw having failed to set a date by which [...] would have to retain new counsel or have its pleadings stricken.  On February 23, 2024, [...]’s motion for summary judgment ordering [...] to pay up to $750,000 of the judgment against [...] was granted.  [...] now appeals from an order dated May 24, 2024 that denied reconsideration of the trial court’s February 23, 2024 order against [...]; but this appeal, of necessity, seeks review of the April 6, 2023 “final judgment” for [...] against [...] for cleanup/remediation costs, treble damages, fines and attorney’s fees under the Spill Act; and a February 23, 2024 “final judgment” in favor of [...] against [...] for $750,000 pursuant to an MCS-90 endorsement to the [...] Policy.
[brief] Courts dismiss actions where the plaintiff fails to point to “a specific action, process, or formula” that might be protectable.  E.g., Oakwood Labs., LLC v. Bagavathikanun Thanoo, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 194935, at 4 (D.N.J. 2017); see also Givaudan Fragrances Corp. v. Krivda, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 153437, at 5 (D.N.J. Oct. 25, 2013) (holding that "[g]enerally, a plaintiff in a misappropriation of trade secrets case must identify with precision the trade secrets at issue at the outset of the litigation.").  In *Oakwood Laboratories*, the court dismissed plaintiff’s complaint where it alleged misappropriation of its microsphere system technology by defendant but did not identify any specific process as a trade secret.  *Id.*  Here, Appellants did not plead a single allegation defining the trade secret it sought to protect.  (Pa001608 - Pa001659).  Moreover, Appellants cannot establish a protectable trade secret here.  Appellants might be arguing that the amount it paid under its Lease with [...] was a protectable trade secret, but lease payments are not “a specific action, process, or formula” that are protected by New Jersey trade secret law.  *See Oakwood Laboratories*, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 194935 at 4.  Appellants did not spend monies researching or developing a specific amount to pay under their Lease with [...], and this is not the type of information trade secret law protects in New Jersey.  The lease payment is merely a term negotiated with [...], not a trade secret protected from third parties by Appellants.  Unlike a customer list or a proprietary process, the amount paid in rent does not provide a unique competitive advantage to Appellants.  Thus, Appellants cannot establish a critical element.  10.
[brief] The Respondents agreed that Appellant satisfied prongs 1, 3 and 4 and denied that she satisfied prong two which is that she was performing her job satisfactorily.  The documentary evidentiary material presented by the Appellant supported the fact that she was performing her job satisfactorily.  Appellant was not tenured in her position which meant that the Principal, [...] was required to conduct three Observations of Appellant per year and he was also to provide a Summative Report at the end of the school year.
[directive] Internal Affairs  Summary Date Agency Name: Year: Annual Internal Affairs Summary Source of Complaint Criminal Outcome Internal Discplinary Outcome Pending Administra- Pending from Prior New Cases  Not tively End of Conviction Dismissal Years cases Closed Agency Civilian Anon. Diversion Acquittal Exonerated Sustained Unfounded Closed Sustained Year Excessive Force 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Improper Arrest 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  Improper Entry 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  Improper Search 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Other Criminal Violation 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Differential Treatment 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Demeanor 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Domestic Violence 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Other Rule Violation 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Total Cases Opened 0 Total Cases Closed 0 Total Pending Cases 0 Total Cases >180 Days 0 Annual Internal Affairs Summary Date Appendix L
[brief] (ECF 1.)  The court convened a scheduling conference and issued a scheduling order in late January (ECF 12, 13), after which the parties served written discovery and ESI disclosures.  (ECF 15, 17, 20.)  [...] also served subpoenas on the [...] and [...].  (ECF 22, 23.)  At issue here are [...]’s responses and objections to [...]’s First Requests for Production of Documents—specifically, [...]’s responses to RFP Nos. 4 and 7.
[directive] 12 6.4  Decision to Decline a Civilian’s De-Activation Request.  If an officer declines a request to de-activate a BWC pursuant to Section 6.1 or 6.2, the reasons for declining the request (e.g., the officer believes that there is a reasonable possibility that it may be necessary to use constructive authority or force during the encounter) must be documented and shall be reported to the officer’s superior as soon as it is safe and practicable to do so, unless the agency’s policy prohibits de-activation authorized by Section 6.1 or 6.2.  6.4.1
[directive] Officer [...] was suspended for eight (8) days for insubordination.  The Officer refused a direct order to complete a report.  Officer [...] was suspended for twelve (12) days for failing to safeguard department property.  The Officer was found to be at fault for a motor vehicle accident.  Detective [...] was suspended for fifteen (15) days for neglect of duty.  He was found on three occasions to be absent from his post.  Officer [...] was fined ten (10) vacation days for abuse of sick leave.  Officer [...] was suspended for seven (7) days for conduct unbecoming an employee.  He attempted to collect a private debt while in uniform.  Sgt. [...] was demoted for failing to take police action.  The Officer failed to arrest an individual who had an active warrant.  Appendix M
[brief] He IGNORED the second step of Entry of the Default, where notice must be given to the defendant, with an opportunity to respond.  And, he IGNORED the third step of Final Judgment by Default, where notice must be given to the defendant, with an opportunity to respond.  On 10-17-23, before the hearing on October 19, 2023 (Pa 30-33) the defendants list several court cases that dealt with matters of law when not followed, similar to the problems in the court records. obtained by the defendant, [...], on September 15, 2023, items 9-14.  And, the trial judge ERRED when he FAILED to consider the certified facts (Pa 25-26) by the defendant, that he received, before the 10/19/23 hearing.
[brief] THE COURT ERRED WHEN IT RULED THE GUARANTEES WERE TERMINATED ON MAY 11, 2016. ALL OF THE UNDISPUTED FACTS INDICATE THAT THERE WAS A MODIFICATION OF THE LEASE, NOT A TERMINATION.  (Pa8, Pa9, 1T64-12 to 1T66-2)  A.  Factually there was no termination of the Lease or guarantees.(1T65-2 to 7).  Based on the facts set forth above, it is undisputed that [...] occupied the premises continuously and without interruption from February 20, 2015 to April 19, 2020 and operated its business out of the premises from February 20, 2015 to April 19, 2020, under the Lease of February 20, 2015.  There was a modification of the Lease between the time of notice of termination, April 11, 2016, and the time the termination would have taken place under the terms of the Lease, May 11, 2016 (or May 31, 2016, See fn2) but there was no termination of the lease.  The parties agreed on May 5, 2016, that [...] would rescind its termination notice, and [...] agreed to give a $12,000.00 discount.  The parties performed accordingly, whereby [...] did not vacate the premises (as would be required by ¶3 and ¶12(b)) Pa61; Pa65,and [...] reduced his rental invoices for May, June, July and August (and September, see fn3) by $3,000.00, and [...] paid those invoices for May, June, July and August (and September) at the discounted rate.  Moreover, the Consent Order of April 17, 2019 specifically admits that the Lease of February 20, 2015, “remained in effect”, meaning it had been in effect since February 20, 2015 and continued to be in effect.  Finally, in the termination notice of March 19, 2020, [...] acknowledges the February 20, 2015 Lease was in effect when [...] gave notice it was terminating same.  Pa102.
[directive] SOP Program of Forfarure New - SOP 1 9 - No, - 09  Municipal Forfernre Proqram Reports 1 9 - Applicability: AN  Forfeiture Program Administrators  SOP - No- 10 & Law Reallocation the Department of to of Public Safety  Purchased Property Funds a with by Forfeited  1 10- Governmental Aqency - 10  1 App/icabi.it AM  Forfeiture Program Particbating Agencies y: SOP No. 11 - a Fund Disbursement Non-Law to 1 7 - 1 Enforcement Aqencv - All 11
[brief] APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. [...]  Civil Action ON APPEAL FROM THE FINAL ORDER OF THE SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY, LAW DIVISION, HUDSON COUNTY DOCKET NO. [...]  Sat Below: Hon. [...], J.S.C. Brief  Submitted to the Appellate Division on April 17, 2024  REPLY BRIEF ON BEHALF OF DEFENDANT-APPELLANT, [...]
[brief] Courts have found that New Jersey Rule of Evidence 703 requires: an expert's testimony “may be based on facts or data derived from (1) the expert's personal observations, or (2) evidence admitted at the trial, or (3) data relied upon by the expert which is not necessarily admissible in evidence but which is the type of data normally relied upon by experts in forming opinions on the same subject.  See Davis v. Brickman Landscaping, Ltd., 219 N.J. 395, 410 (2014)  An expert’s bare conclusions, unsupported by factual evidence, are inadmissible and may not be considered.  Id. at 410.  “A trial court may not rely on expert testimony that lacks an appropriate factual foundation and fails to establish the existence of any standard about which the expert testified. ”  Pomerantz Paper Corp. v. New Cmty. Corp., 207 N.J. 344, 373 (2011); see also Nextel of N.Y., Inc. v. Borough of Englewood Cliffs Bd. of Adj., 361 N.J. Super. 22, 43 (App. Div. 2003) (finding “an expert opinion that is not factually supported is a net opinion or mere hypothesis to which no weight need be accorded. ”).  Additionally, plaintiff must produce expert testimony upon which the jury could find that the consensus of the particular profession involved recognized the existence of the standard defined by the expert.
[directive] 4th Degree  $1,000 to $2,500  10% permissible  a(1)  Actor has legal duty for the care of a child or has assumed responsibility for the care of a child and engages in sexual conduct which would impair or debauch the morals of the child, second degree.  Any other person who engages in conduct or who causes harm as described  Endangering in this paragraph to a child, third degree.  Welfare of 2C:24-4(a)(b)  Children/Possession/ a(2)  Actor has legal duty for the care of a child or who has assumed responsibility for the 1st Degree
[brief] (30T57-8 to 13; 30T57-11 to 16; 30T57-21 to 25; 30T58-13 to 30T59-6; 30T59-7 to 10).  For the same reasons, the judge rejected defendant’s argument that the victim induced or facilitated the crime, which would be a mitigating factor under N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1b(5).  Now, on appeal, defendant contends that [...] penalized him for not admitting his guilt, improperly accused him of committing perjury, engaged in improper judicial fact-finding that ignored the jury’s verdict on counts one and two for passion/provocation manslaughter and improperly rejected the mitigating factors he urged the judge to consider.