ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] Per AG Directive 2021-12, please complete this form and obtain specified approval prior to presenting any search warrant application with a “no-knock”  Attach a copy of the warrant application to this form.  provision to a court.  I.  BASIS FOR NO-KNOCK REQUEST (check all that apply)  Please check the applicable boxes relating to specified criteria for a finding of a risk to officer safety or safety of nearby civilians.  If “other” selected, please provide brief explanation of the relevant facts.  Information received that the target of the search warrant or other known occupant of the residence n has recently been in possession of a firearm, other weapon or explosives that are readily capable of causing serious bodily injury.  Information received that there currently are, or recently have been, readily accessible firearms, n weapons, or explosives located inside the target residence that are readily capable of causing serious bodily injury.  The target of the search warrant is being investigated for an offense involving the use or possession n of a firearm or other weapon that is readily capable of causing serious bodily injury that has yet to be recovered by law enforcement officers, or is being investigated for an especially violent offense.  The presence of a fortified structure or exterior surveillance system at the residence capable of n being monitored.  The target of the search warrant or other known occupants of the target residence have a documented n history of violent offenses (to include arrests and/or convictions) or offenses involving the use or possession of a firearm (to include arrests and/or convictions).  If this factor is applicable and includes arrests and/or convictions, the certification/affidavit shall include a synopsis of the relevant offenses and whether they are arrests or convictions.  Additionally, a criminal history sheet shall be attached.  Information received that the target of the residence or other known occupants of the target n residence have been affiliated with a gang or gang activity or terrorist organization or other group that engages in or supports violence against the government or the public.  The layout of the target residence is such that the risk to officer safety or the safety n of nearby civilians is heightened.  The target of the search warrant or other known occupants of the premises have made n threats to harm law enforcement if law enforcement action is taken against them.  (explain)  Other risk(s) to officer safety and/or the safety of nearby civilians:  n 1 (continued)  12/2021  OAG  No-Knock Application Form, Privileged & Confidential / Attorney Work Product / Deliberative Process Communication
[brief] It would all but guarantee that a large number of irrelevant and nonresponsive documents would be produced, in direct violation of New Jersey law.  This harms the producing party, as well as many nonparties, by forcing the production of private, sensitive documents that are not otherwise discoverable.  And it could harm the requesting party by inundating it with thousands of irrelevant documents to sift through.  It is for these reasons that the overwhelming majority of courts around the country, when confronted with a request to require a party to turn over all documents that hit on search terms without a subsequent relevance review have rejected such requests.
[directive] 1  New Jersey Transit PBA Local 304 v. New Jersey Transit Comp., 290 N.J. Super 406, 432 (App. Div. 1996)  2 Caldwell v. New Jersey Department of Corrections, 250 N. J. Super. 592, (App. Div. 1991) certif. denied, 127 N.J. 555(1991)  3  Drake v. County of Essex, 275 N.J. Super. 592, 609 (App. Div. 1994)  4  Id. 5  Id. 4 should be evaluated to determine the quality and relevance of the information acquired by the law enforcement agency: a.  The nature and source of the information; b. Whether the information constitutes direct evidence or is hearsay in nature; c. The reliability of the informant or source; d. Whether corroborating information exists and the degree to which it corroborates the accusation; and e.  Whether and to what extent the information may be stale.  Every law enforcement agency subject to the jurisdiction of the Attorney General must include in its rules and regulations a provision governing reasonable suspicion drug testing.
[brief] 97 N.J. at 327.  That was because the agency’s action “was not otherwise expressly provided for by the statute, nor was it clearly and obviously implied. ”  Id. at 334.  Similarly here, even if the Department’s specific (and belated) interpretation of “excessive” was not objectively unreasonable, the Department was required to promulgate regulations to implement that interpretation because nothing about the Department’s application of the term was “inferable from the enabling statute itself” and instead “reflect[ed] a new . . . position.
[brief] Finally, Plaintiffs’ argument that [...] cross-appeal should be denied because the prior appellate panel reversed [...]’ summary judgment and ordered a trial on the issue of negligent training and supervision is without merit.  The reversal of summary judgment is not determinative of whether or not a directed verdict is appropriate after the Plaintiffs rest their case.  Summary judgment is decided upon proofs generated in discovery while a directed verdict is determined based upon evidence presented at trial.  And the evidence presented at trial in this case does not support a claim for negligent training or supervision.
[brief] The standard of review --- 6  A nearly identical provision is found in the NJCRA, which also covers violations of state statutes and the New Jersey Constitution. is analogous to the substantial evidence standard.  *Cell South of New Jersey, Inc. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment of W. Windsor Twp.*, 172 N.J., supra, at 89.  Reviewing courts are to review the complete record made before a local board and then decide whether the board decision should be sustained.
[brief] REDEVELOPMENT  DESIGN GUIDELINES  ENCOURAGED AND WERE UNDERSTOOD TO REQUIRE STEPPED-BACK BUILDINGS PRIOR TO THE 2020 AMENDMENTS (REPLYING TO [...]’S BRIEF POINT I AND [...]’S BRIEF POINTS I AND II)  8  POINT II  [...] ARBITRARILY AND CAPRICIOUSLY CONCLUDED THAT THE STEP-BACK REQUIREMENTS OF THE SCENIC RESOURCES AND DESIGN RULE WERE NOT APPLIED BY LONG BRANCH OR [...] IN THE REDEVELOPMENT ZONE (REPLYING TO [...]’S BRIEF POINT I AND [...]’S BRIEF POINTS I AND II) 9
[brief] Courts must interpret a statute to comport with the State Constitution so long as the statute is reasonably susceptible to such interpretation.  Generally, “[a] court is duty-bound to give to a statute a construction that will support its constitutionality. ”  Whirlpool Props., Inc. v. Dir., Div. of Tax’n, 208 N.J. 141, 151 (2011).  “[W]hen a statute is susceptible to two reasonable interpretations, one constitutional and one not,” New Jersey courts apply the doctrine of constitutional avoidance.  State v. Pomianek, 221 N.J. 66, 90–91 (2015) (citing State v. Johnson, 166 N.J. 523, 534 (2001)).  This doctrine rests on the “assum[ption] that the Legislature would want [the court] to construe the statute in a way that conforms to the Constitution. ”  Id. at 91 (citing Johnson, 166 N.J. at 540–41).  The court may construe an ambiguous statute narrowly or broadly, depending on which interpretation aligns the statute with the Constitution.  Compare State v. Carter, 247 N.J. 488, 520 (2021) (narrowly construing a statute requiring legible license plates), with Mueller v. Kean Univ., 474 N.J. Super. 272, 285–89 (App. Div. 2022) (broadly construing immunity granted by the Emergency Health Powers Act, N.J.S.A. 26:13-1 to -36).  B.
[brief] (PA000008).  This occurred because Defendants’ training of DSPs merely involved watching videos.  Id.  Plaintiff complained about the poor DSP training to Defendants, as she reasonably believed this violated N.J.A.C. § 10:44 A-2.7(a).  The regulation requires “basic staff training programs…to ensure staff competency…[which] shall address, at a minimum:…(2) medication training; (3) preventing abuse and neglect…”  N.J.A.C. § 10:44 A-2.7(a).
[brief] Here, [...] assumed the risk of purchasing the property knowing that it was subject to rent control and that the tenant was a protected tenant under the TPA.  The RCO states that “it is presumed that a prospective purchaser of real property in Hoboken shall be familiar with the terms of this chapter. ”  Id.  To the extent [...] feels like he has not earned as large a return as he anticipated because unit 11 is occupied by [...], the Board is not the proper forum to remedy that grievance.  Accordingly, [...]’s assertion that it has failed to realize a just and reasonable return is without merit.
[brief] At the outset, defendant suffered no constitutional injury, as the police merely told him to stop when he fled from a valid investigatory detention intended to facilitate the arrest of [...].  As the motion judge concluded, added to the other circumstances, the flight elevated the reasonable suspicion against defendant, giving the police probable cause to make an arrest and to search him incident to arrest:  Again, I find that in the totality of the circumstances, everything taken together, the drugs, the drug transactions being observed, the high-crime area, conducting two drug transactions, the defendants walking with Mr. [...], the defendants fleeing the officers, defendant [...] having his gun dislodge from his person in less than -- I would say five seconds after, um, he took flight.
[brief] I have personal knowledge of all matters contained herein.  Our entire legal system is geared toward a trial of the facts of a matter by jury.  The facts of a matter usually consist of the law of the matter at the time of the cause of action and the facts giving rise to a cause of action.  Per a law of a congress of the United States - 73d CONGRESS. SESS. II .  CHS. 651.  JUNE 19, 1934.  - there is a 7th amendment right to trial by jury.  The size of the jury is 6 in the state of New Jersey per New Jersey statutory law.  Per the Supreme court rulings in *Insurance Company v. Folsom*, 85 US 237 and *Slocum v. New York Life Insurance Co.*, 228 US 364 there is a right to trial of all evidence presented by a pleading by a jury of 12.
[brief] 3.  The Defendants’ answered the Plaintiffs’ requested punch list on November 20, 2023.  4.  The Court instructed me to produce o the Plaintiffs all of the documents that are also in possession of the Plaintiffs, which were 1) Purchase Agreement; 2) Transfer Documents that include Deed and HUD; and 3) OPRA documents.  I have provided the Inspections Report that states the property in question was free and clear of any hazardous materials a month prior to the closing.[sic].  5.  I have provided to the Plaintiff a copy of the Defendants’ Federal and State 2019-and 2020-Income Taxes, which are the exact Income Tax years for the year of the transaction subject to this litigation.  6.  On January 25, 2024, I am in receipt of Defendants’ 2015, 2016, 2017 and 2018 Tax Returns and the same was produced to the Plaintiffs.  I am amending this Reply Certification to certify that the Plaintiffs are now in receipt of all the Tax Returns to the Defendant, [...].
[brief] (1)  Defendant made both of his co-defendants promise that no one would get hurt before he went into the house.  After [...] killed the female, [d]efendant was afraid, and he was then ordered to shoot the man (not kill him) by a killer still holding the smoking murder weapon .  . . . the killer had threatened to kill [d]efendant if he did not shoot the male victim .  . . .  [...] threatened to come after and kill [d]efendant if he didn’t go get the man before he could call the cops.  [Pa121].  (2)
[brief] [...] was driving home from work when he was violently struck by Defendant.  1T37:1-1T40:18.  The Defendant was intoxicated at the time.  4T5:14 – 4T10:3.  After the complaint was filed and discovery completed, Plaintiff filed an Offer to Take Judgment against Defendant for the sum of $200,000, on July 14, 2021.  Pa1.  On September 2, 2021, the case proceeded to arbitration which resulted in an award in Plaintiff’s favor in the amount of $300,000.  Pa2.  On September 27, 2021 Defendant filed for a trial de novo.  Pa3.  On January 25, 2022 Plaintiff sent correspondence to Defendant’s counsel advising that Defendant was being exposed to an excess verdict and that Plaintiff intended to pursue a Bad Faith claim against his insurers.  Pa4-5.  The case proceeded to trial, with the resultant jury verdict in favor of Plaintiff in the amount of $1,600,000.  3T68:2-6.  After Defendant’s efforts for remittitur and/or a new trial were denied, an Order for Judgment was entered against Defendant in the amount of $1,823,006.96, which included the jury verdict, Offer to Take Judgment penalties and interest.  Da23-24.  Thereafter, on July 19, 2023, Defendant filed a Motion to Amend Judgment.  Pa7-8.  However, on September 22, 2023, the Motion to Amend Judgment was denied.  Pa9-10.  On October 12, 2023, Defendant filed a Motion to Reconsider the denial of the Motion to Amend Judgment.  Pa11-12.  On December 1, 2023, Defendant’s Motion to Reconsider the denial of the Motion to Amend Judgment was denied, however, an Order has not yet been signed.  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I:
[brief] Specifically, the arbitrator found that, in order to fund even a 2% across-the-board salary increase the City would need to divert all of its surplus and cap banking for CY 2024 and still end up approximately $400,000 short, possibly requiring layoffs or service shutdowns to make up the shortage.  (Award at 55-56).  Accordingly, he concluded:  In addressing the public interest/financial criteria, even though I would otherwise find that the unit in question deserved, at a minimum, to be treated like the City treated its non-uniformed union and non-represented employees, i.e., 2% across-the-board with retroactive pay, in the current fiscal setting, I cannot award that amount.  [Award at 55.] (Aa056-058).  Finally, the [...] argued before the Commission that while the parties jointly sought consolidation of the 3 separate units (Captains, Battalion Chiefs and Deputy Chiefs) into a single consolidated unit, the arbitrator failed to make a final and definite award because “he did not provide all the language necessary to fully unify its three units’ previous contracts into a single unified contract” due to not having “enough time to merge the contracts.
[brief] Ibid. (emphasis added).  Rather, the claim only accrued upon the trial court's dismissal of the medical malpractice complaint.  Ibid.  The Court in Olds limited this exception of the Entire Controversy doctrine to legal malpractice claims and their underlying litigation.  Specifically the Court found *With transactional malpractice, such as negligence in drafting a contract or will or performing a real estate closing, the need for an exception to the entire controversy doctrine is not as compelling.*  The attorney is not saddled with the conflicting roles of advocating on behalf of the client in the underlying litigation and representing his or her own interests as a defendant.  Moreover, a legal-malpractice claim alleging transactional negligence is a claim against a primary tortfeasor.  As such, *the entire controversy doctrine's purposes are served by requiring plaintiffs to notify the trial court of their potential malpractice claims.  The attorney, like the other defendants, is a potential cause of a plaintiff's damages.*  *Olds*, 150 N.J. at 442 (emphasis added).  Thus, the New Jersey Supreme Court in *Olds v. Donnelly* found that the plaintiff's legal malpractice claim was not barred by the Entire Controversy Doctrine because the alleged malpractice occurred in the "underlying action that [gave] rise to the claim."  150 N.J. at 443.  The Supreme Court revisited this decision in *Dimitrakopoulos v. Borrus*, 237 N.J. 91, 109 (2019), and refined the *Olds'* analysis as to the Entire Controversy Doctrine’s application for legal malpractice cases.
[directive] If the allegation was unfounded or the officer was exonerated, this conclusion shall be stated and defined for the civilian complainant.  If the allegation was not sustained, the letter shall provide the complainant with a brief explanation why the complaint was not sustained (e.g., insufficient proof, lack of witnesses, etc.).  If the allegation was sustained and discipline was imposed, the letter shall state that the allegation was sustained and that the officer has been disciplined according to agency procedures.  See Appendix E.  6.4
[brief] ”  Department of Env'tl. Protection v. Ventron Corp., 94 N.J. 473, 504 (1983).  However, if a contract contains a clearly stated attorneys’ fee provision, then a New Jersey court can order the payment of fees at the end of litigation.  See Satellite Gateway Communications, Inc. v. Musi Dining Car Co., 110 N.J. 280, 286 (1988).  Importantly, when such a contractual fee-shifting provision exists, however, the court must strictly construe the provision considering the general policy disfavoring the award of attorneys’ fees.  McGuire v. City of Jersey City, 125 N.J. 310, 327 (1991).  Therefore, while such “fee-shifting” provisions can be enforceable, they must be carefully worded, and will be the subject of court scrutiny.  Id.  At the outset, the evidence at trial did not establish that Defendant breached any contracts at issue.
[directive] The State shall provide notice to the defendant’s counsel, or to the defendant if he or she is unrepresented at the time the request is made.  The court shall grant the State’s request for a hearing if the defendant is charged with a crime enumerated in paragraph (a) of N.J.S.A. 2A:162-12.  If the defendant is not charged with a crime enumerated in paragraph (a) in N.J.S.A. 2A:162-12, the State must demonstrate a reasonable and well grounded basis to warrant an inquiry by the court regarding: Rule 3:26-8(a–g)  Bail Sufficiency; Source Hearing (1) the reliability of the obligor or person posting cash bail, the value and sufficiency of any security offered, the relationship of the obligor or person posting cash bail to the defendant, and the defendant’s interest in ensuring bail is not forfeited, or (See also 2A:162-13, page 97 herein) (2) whether the funds used to post the cash bail or secure the bail bond were acquired as a result of criminal or unlawful conduct.  If the court grants the State’s request for a hearing as to a defendant who is not charged with a crime enumerated in paragraph (a) of N.J.S.A. 162-12, the court shall set forth on the record and in the bail order the reasons for granting the request.  The court shall conduct a hearing within three (3) business days after bail is posted or proffered if the defendant is incarcerated, or within a reasonable period of time after granting the request if the defendant has been released on bail.  This statute provides that the court shall not require a bail in excess of $2,500 for a person charged with a fourth degree crime or disorderly persons offense or petty disorderly persons offense unless the court finds that the person presents a serious threat to the physical safety of potential evidence or of persons involved 2C:6-1 in circumstances surrounding the alleged offense; or unless the court finds that bail of that nature will not reasonably assure the appearance of the defendant as Bail for Persons Accused of Minor required.
[brief] The Planning Board of the [...] has created a record that not only misaligns the facts associated with this property and this application but also seeks to collaterally attack the Pinelands relief granted.  The Board exerted jurisdiction in areas where it had none and arbitrarily and unreasonably ignored the substantive differences between the [...] application and the [...] application.  The trial court compounded this arbitrary and capricious act by selectively listening only to points that supported a favored conclusion, rather than conducting a balanced and thorough *de novo* review of the evidence presented.
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUS DETERMINED THAT CRIMINAL INVESTIGATORY RECORDS ARE EXEMPT FROM THE COMMON LAW RIGHT OF ACCESS TO PUBLIC RECORDS (raised below, Pa-9; 3T9-4 to 10-4; 3T17-9 to -12)  The responsive emails and other documents related to the [...]'s handling of official misconduct charges against [...] fall under the definition of common law records and the trial court erroneously ruled otherwise.  After failing to require the [...] to provide the affidavit and information required by Paff and failing to require the agency to produce a Vaughn Index, the trial court finally dismissed the complaint with prejudice by again distorting the law.  It achieved this by (1) contorting and misapplying the language in Keddie which defines a common law record as "one that is made by a public official in the exercise of his or her public function, either because the record was required or directed by law to be made or kept, or because it was filed in a public office."  Keddie v. Rutgers, 148 N.J. 36, 49 (1997) and (2) transposing OPRA's criminal investigatory records exception onto the common law right of access.  It is apparent the trial court improperly narrowed the definition of a common law record when it held that "Like the language in OPRA, the definition for criminal investigatory records and common law public document is one that is required by law to - made, maintain or kept on file."  3T19-22 to 24.  Common-law records, however, are any "records 'made by public officers in the exercise of public functions."  *Higg-A-Rella, Inc. v. County of Essex*, 141 N.J. 35, 46 (1995).  "'These materials include almost every document recorded, generated, or produced by public officials whether or not required by law to be made, maintained or kept on file,' as required under" the Right-to-Know Law.'"  Id. (emphasis added) (quoting *Shuttleworth v. City of Camden*, 258 N.J. Super. 573, 582 (App. Div.), cert. denied, 133 N.J. 429 (1992)).  Furthermore, OPRA's criminal investigatory records exception does not apply to the common law right of access to public records.  *N.J.S. 47:1A-8* ("Nothing contained in [OPRA] shall be construed as limiting the common law right of access to a government record, including criminal investigatory records of a law enforcement agency.")  The trial court erroneously lifted the definition of "criminal investigatory record" in OPRA, which is "a record which is not required by law to be made, maintained or kept on file that is held by a law enforcement agency which pertains to any criminal investigation or related civil enforcement proceeding", *N.J.S. 47:1A-1.1*, and imposed it on the common law right of access.  As the Supreme Court has repeatedly held, "OPRA does not limit the right of access to government records under the common law" and "[t]he definition of a public record under the common law is broader than under OPRA."
[brief] (Pa103-04 at 77:23-78:1; Pa363 at 83:3-21; Pa480-81).  [...] informed [...] that none of them should have been receiving the charge pay.  (Pa363 at 83:10-21; Pa480-81).  Upon investigating, [...] learned that Plaintiffs entered the charge pay on each other’s behalf at approximately 11:00 am each Monday before payroll closed.