ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] -  A developer of a solar project must have a legal right to possess the land where the solar project will be constructed.  •  Appellant [...] had entered into a Lease with [...] to lease the land tied to the Solar Project.  •  Appellant [...] defaulted in the payment of the rent due under the Lease and, the Landlord exercised its right to terminate the Lease.  •  Appellants’ payment default was the result of the Appellants’ disagreements among the owner members.  •  By failing to maintain site control of the Property, among other things, the Appellants left themselves unable to abide by the obligations in their contracts, including the WMPA with [...], resulting in a breach of the WMPA.  •  After losing site control of the Property, [...] voided the Solar Rights for which Appellants now seek a declaratory judgement and resulting damages.  Based on these undisputed facts, Appellants cannot establish as a matter of law that they owned the Solar Rights.  Accordingly, the trial court properly dismissed Appellant’s claim for a declaratory judgment.
[brief] [...] was always a difficult, and sometimes toxic, personality.  Although [...] completed his assigned tasks, he incessantly whined about [...]’s directors and managers, because he “didn’t like to be told what to do. ” (Pa356 at 59:11-60:23; Pa99 at 63:10-65:9).  These petty gripes were about his colleagues, his supervisor, managers and the hospital more broadly—indeed, just about anyone he interacted with.  (Pa102 at 75:15-76:4; Pa231 at 27:2-5).  [...], who always believed he knew better than others, would constantly complain about [...] management.  (Pa356 at 60:8-15).  Moreover, [...] exhibited behavior that was “difficult in the office,” including his frequent bickering with [...] and his constant boasting as to his workplace accomplishments.  (Pa354 at 52:5-14).  [...] would consistently refer to the other staffing coordinators as “lazy” and he “tried to make his persona that he was doing more than like what they were doing and he was the, you know, he was the greatest back stabber. ” (Pa357 at 63:3-8).  [...] also regularly made inappropriate comments about his sexual relationship with his wife and comments related to his divorce.  (Pa356 at 60:4-6).  In addition, [...] would make “very inappropriate,” personal comments directly to other staffing coordinators, once even suggesting that [...] should have let her daughter, who suffered from, and struggled with, addiction, “just die. ” (Pa287 at 40:3-13; Pa288 at 41:10-18).  [...] would also inappropriately “touch people at work. ” (Pa288 at 42:8-22).  [...] complained about having to work during the COVID-19 pandemic.  (Pa359-60 at 72:8-73:3).  [...] also frequently disagreed with [...]’s management decisions.  (Pa238 at 54:18-56:14).  [...] explained to [...] that although he might not agree with a particular supervisor’s decision, it was not his place to decide how those managers should do their jobs.  (Pa357 at 61:16-63:8).
[brief] **[...] Was Never Found to Have Been “Negligent”**.  [...] claims in its brief that “[s]trict liability includes negligence” and that because the trial court accepted [...]’s Verified Complaint as competent evidence, the trial court similarly accepted [...]’s allegations of negligence against [...].  As support for this contention, [...] relies on paragraph 2 of its Verified Complaint, in which it alleged that “[the [...] driver] negligently scraped against a sharp object” as well as an alleged admission of liability by [...] where it stated that “one of our drivers . . . had an accident with our chassis parked next to the container. ”  First, [...] is incorrect that “[s]trict liability includes negligence”: strict liability is liability by operation of law, without regard to whether a party breached a duty of care.  A party can be liable under the Spill Act simply based upon its status (as purchaser of contaminated property, as a discharger, etc.).  *Housing Authority of City of New Brunswick v. Suydam Investors, LLC*, 177 N.J. 2, 18 (N.J. 2003) (“The Spill Act imposes strict liability, ‘jointly and severally, without regard to fault,’ on ‘any person who has discharged, . . . or is in any way responsible’ for the discharge of any hazardous substance”); *McCay Development Co., Inc. v. Jenny Oil Corp.*, 1996 WL 592654, *7 (N.J. App. Div., August 8, 1996) (“[N]ot only does the Spill Act not incorporate a common-law negligence standard of care, but it provides for strict liability without regard to fault.
[brief] Da392.  3.  The Arbitrator abandoned the figures contained in the Forecasts and relied exclusively on [...]’s EGP calculations that were, to the extent challenged, not supported in the Financial Reporting or Forecasts, to establish the amounts the EGP erroneously awarded in the Award.  Incredibly, the Arbitrator compounded his erroneous treatment of the Financial Reporting and Forecasts as amendments to the PTA by then abandoning those very spreadsheets in determining the amount of the EGPs awarded for five of the non-Backlog projects in favor of simply defaulting to the amounts alleged by [...] in its last of 5 iterations of its Statement of Claim.
[directive] Defendants Who Hold or are a Candidate/Nominee for Elected Public Office and after January 2020, private citizen complaints charging a disorderly persons  On 1, offense against a defendant who a candidate or nominee for elected public office or a is 19:1-1,2 person holding elected public office, as defined N.J.S.A. shall be reviewed by the in of County Prosecutor prior to a judicial officer's finding of probable cause and issuance a CDR-1 (Complaint-Summons) or CDR-2 (Complaint-Warrant).  With one noted difference, as explained below, the protocols and procedures detailed under the previous section concerning private citizen complaints involving indictable an offense apply to these complaints.  Specifically, the County Prosecutor has 45 calendar days to approve (with or without modification) or deny these complaints; the prosecutor may also request extensions of time of up to 10 calendar days each, which the court shall grant a on of showing good cause.  If the County Prosecutor denies the complaint, the denial to be is reported to the Assignment Judge the record or writing, with written notice of the denial on in sent by the County Prosecutor to the citizen complainant and to the defendant.
[brief] The [...]’s failure to issue a formal decision and the City’s failure to notify Appellant of its actions are in violation of N.J.A.C. 4A:10-1.1, contrary to the City’s argument.  (City’s brief-14).  The rule states, in part, “…(c)  No person or appointing authority shall obstruct a person's lawful opportunity to participate in the selection and appointment process or a person's lawful pursuit of any remedy or appeal under Title 11A, New Jersey Statutes, and Title 4A, N.J.A.C. ”  The failure to notify Appellant that the City had, without authority, retroactively applied actual vacancies to promotions that had already occurred, and which were vacancies applicable to Appellant’s promotion, via Final Administrative Decision or otherwise, indisputably obstructed Appellant’s promotional opportunities.  For these same reasons, and contrary to the [...]’s findings, Appellant could not rebut the City’s “indication” that the vacancies of September and October 2022 had already been filled.  Despite Appellant’s requests from the City for the reasons for the failure to promote him, the City never stated that it retroactively applied the September and October vacancies to the July 2022 promotions which caused the lack of “actual” vacancies.  Pa55; 58; 62; 74; 81-82; 85; 90; 95; 99.  Appellant was not notified of such until the [...] rendered the subject Final Administrative Decision.  II.
[brief] 54 N.J.R. 2169(a) ((Dec. 5, 2022).  The DEP described the necessity of the new data as follows:  The proposed amendments are intended to ensure the use of current precipitation data and reliable climate science to aid New Jersey communities in better preparing themselves to confront one of the most critical threats to public safety presented by climate change-increased intensity of precipitation events and the resulting effects of additional stormwater runoff on stormwater management systems and flood elevations in fluvial areas.  [54 N.J.R. 2169(a) (Dec. 5, 2022).
[directive] Guidelines, offer.  current the accept to interests best their in is it that and enforced will be policy plea 78 Page evidence);32 suppress evidentiary to (e.g., motions hearings post-indictment any before thus counsel (e.g., and defense prosecutor the negotiation between may permit policy the (e) of verdict, outcome of guilty a likelihood and case strength the of concerning the arguments criminal in role the and culpability defendant's pretrial motions, other suppression and a when time of period during the tendered, and plea an is offer initial before etc.) scheme, and not expired; outstanding has offer remains plea tendered otherwise or Court, for apply Drug not agree to to defendant a require shall policy not the (~ defendant Court, the where to sentenced being Drug from defendant a preclude categorically imprisonment pursuant of lieu in to treatment sentenced be to legally eligible and is clinically Court (compulsory Drug 2C:35-14.2 N.J.S.A. or probation) (special 2C:35-14 N.J.S.A. to and defendant); by application the court without the by ordered pleading guilty.
[brief] DA-13.  Specifically, [...] challenged the reduction of the property tax expense, condominium fee, and management fee on their hardship increase application.  Id.  [...] further challenged the Board’s determination of their equity in [...]’s unit and accused the Board of ignoring the testimony of their witnesses regarding the value of [...].  Id.  On November 20, 2019, the court found that the Board’s determination regarding the unit’s tax liability was not arbitrary or capricious, but well-reasoned and supported by the testimony of [...]’s witness and caselaw.
[brief] An expert’s opinion is only as good as the data upon which the expert relied.  *Greenblatt v. City of 280 Englewood*, 26 *N.J. Tax* 41, 54 (Tax 2011).  New Jersey Rule of Evidence 702 is the starting point for determining the admissibility of expert testimony.  *State v. Torres*, 183 *N.J.* 554, 567 (2005).  It states:  If scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.  *N.J.R.E.* 702.  The three (3) basic requirements that an expert’s testimony must meet before it can be presented to the jury are: (1) the intended testimony must concern a subject matter that is beyond the ken of the average juror; (2) the field testified to must be at a state of the art such that an expert’s testimony could be sufficiently reliable; and (3) the witness must have sufficient expertise to offer the intended testimony.
[directive] 11.  Predisposition Detention.  a.  Each county prosecutor should seek the predisposition detention of juvenile offenders only in those cases where such detention is necessary and appropriate to protect public safety or to assure the juvenile's appearance at court proceedings, and it shall be the policy of this State that each county prosecutor should recommend the use of alternatives to detention in cases where the safety of the community would not be threatened thereby, and where the subsequent appearance by the juvenile at court proceedings would not be jeopardized.  Prosecutors in no case shall advocate the use of predisposition detention as a form of punishment directed against a juvenile prior to an adjudication of delinquency.
[brief] Appellant appears to argue that this legislative history relates to and limits only § 1692b of the FDCPA, and not the more relevant § 1692c(b) which prohibits third-party communications more generally.  Appellant’s Br., at 34.  A clear review of the cited sections of the Senate Report, however, reveals this is not true.  In fact, several New Jersey courts have cited this Senate Report to support their position that § 1692c(b) was intended to prohibit only third-party communications to “a consumer’s friends, neighbors, relatives, or employer. ”  *See*  S. Rep. No. 95–382, at 4.  *See also supra* (citing cases).  professional harm.  There is no reason to believe that Congress ever intended to outlaw the innocuous act of using a letter vendor for business efficiency.  Courts have repeatedly relied on the Senate Report in concluding that Congress did not intend to prohibit the use of a letter vendor through § 1692c(b).
[brief] After considering its equitable power and the affidavits presented, the Board reasonably concluded that “[...] did not exercise reasonable diligence nor demonstrate reasonable grounds for such a protracted delay in filing the eligibility registration form,” where he filed his form one year and one month past the deadline.  (Pa14).  Nor did [...] demonstrate extreme hardship in this matter, as he will continue to receive his Special Retirement benefits with concurrent retiree health benefits coverage.  (Pa68-69).  It should also be noted that cases involving the use of the Board’s equitable power for reopening proceedings or relaxing deadlines “were bottomed on the inherent power of an administrative agency, in the absence of legislative restriction, to reopen or to modify and to rehear orders previously entered by it. ”  Duvin v. Bd. of Trs., Pub. Emps.’ Ret. Sys., 76 N.J. 203, 207 (1978).  Here, [...] seeks to avoid an obvious legislative restriction outlined in the Ricci Act that provides he is ineligible for the presumption or recalculation after July 8, 2021.  Even if [...] did not receive the postcard or any of the other notice provided by the Division, he cannot evade the two-year limitation period.
[brief] **STATEMENT OF (THE MOST SALIENT) REBUTTAL FACTS**  Most notably and most egregiously, the Respondents continue to argue about a newly-purported “fact”, which they introduced for the very first time in their Respondents’ brief(s), and which this Court has expressly prohibited them from doing in the prior motion order.  (Pra1).  However despite this express ruling from this Court, they continue to assert the same newly-purported (and false) “fact” – namely, that when I entered the 2017 tournament, I had supposedly already known about the undisclosed prize limitation - even though they had offered absolutely no testimony or exhibits about this whatsoever, at any time during the trial.  Moreover, early on in my direct testimony, I had unequivocally testified to the exact opposite fact – I had testified that I had not been aware of the limitation:  [...]: “But unbeknownst to me, there was an undisclosed limitation of only one prize per player. ”  (1T3:24 - 1T4:1)  However at no time did the defendants attempt to cross examine me on this testimony, nor did they ever provide any of their own testimony to the contrary, nor did they ever present any documents / exhibits (e.g. even such as my own complaint) to challenge my testimony.  Instead, they had accepted this as true.  Yet this third-amended Respondent brief still primarily relies upon numerous references to their false and newly-purported fact of what I had supposedly known about in 2017.
[brief] “Item 9.  As per the court records received this year on 9/15/2023, in February of 2015, the Complaint dated 2/6/2015, the Summons dated 2/11/2015, and the Affidavit of Service dated 2/13/2015, were to [...], at [...] – A virtual office that had been CLOSED for ten (10) months. ”  “Item 10.  As per the court records received this year on 9/15/2023, in February of 2015, the Affidavit of Service, served on [...]. at 116 Village Blvd, Princeton, NJ 08540, and the Affidavit of Service served on [...] at [...] were served on the Same Day 2/13/2015 and at the Same Time 2:35 p.m. – NOT possible.  And, the service on [...]. was to an unnamed general receptionist of many companies with physical and/or virtual offices at that location – NOT an authorized agent to receive said documents. ”  “Item 11.  In March of 2015, the Request to Enter Default, stamped 3/25/2015 by the court, as per the court records received this year on 9/15/2023, filed by [...] with Proof of Mailing, submitted by his secretary, [...], dated 3/23/2015, is addressed to [...]., at 116 Village Blvd., Princeton, NJ and is addressed to the defendant, [...], at 116 Village Blvd., Princeton, NJ, (NOT his home address), sent ‘by certified mail, return receipt requested and regular, first class mail, with postage prepaid thereon. ’”  “Item 12.  In April of 2015, the Request to Enter Default and Certification, the Final Judgment by Default, stamped 5/4/2015 by the court, the Affidavit of the Amount Due, filed by [...] III with Proof of Mailing, submitted by his secretary, [...], dated April 29, 2015, is addressed to [...]., at 116 Village Blvd, Princeton NJ, and is addressed to [...] at 116 Village Blvd., Princeton NJ (NOT his Home Address), sent “by first class mail, with postage prepaid thereon. ”  “Item 14.  Before September 15 of 2023, the defendant, [...]. and the defendant, [...], HAD NOT SEEN: the Plaintiff’s COMPLAINT, the SUMMONS, the CASE INFORMATION STATEMENT, RELATED CASE CERTIFICATION, the TRACK NOTIFICATION NOTICE or the LAWYERS REFERRAL LIST, before the REQUEST TO ENTER DEFAULT and the FINAL JUDGMENT BY DEFAULT were filed with the Court, as well as many other records from 2/5/2015 through 7/31/2017.
[brief] **iii.  Plaintiff intended [...] to rely upon the misrepresentations**  Plaintiff’s own sworn statements prove that she intended that [...] to rely upon her misrepresentations.  Plaintiff’s certification states, despite [...] advising Plaintiff to not sign, she signed anyway, because she “needed the money desperately. ”  *(Da347)*  Clearly, she intended [...] to rely on the representations because she needed the money.  **iv.
[brief] The court reserves the right to revise its findings of fact and conclusions of law.  /s/  [...]  United States Bankruptcy Judge  Dated: June 18, 2024  February 13, 2025  Via eCourts - Appellate Clerk, Superior Court of New Jersey  Appellate Division  R.J. Hughes Justice Complex Trenton, New Jersey 08625  Re: [...] (Respondent) v. Block 270, Lot 14, [...], [...], New Jersey, Assessed to [...], [...] and [...] (Appellants); [...] (Intervenor/Respondent)
[brief] 2.  The Local Fair Share.  A significant distinction between the SFRA and older school funding formulas is that “virtually all aid under the new formula is wealth equalized. ”  Abbott XIX, 196 N.J. at 556; (Aa6).  This means that while the SFRA allocates aid to school districts, it “requir[es] certain levels of funding at the local level. ”  Abbott XX, 199 N.J. at 152.  As a result, “[e]ach district contributes to its adequacy budget an amount that is based on its ability to raise local revenue. ”  Abbott XIX, 196 N.J. at 556-57; (Aa6; Aa1105).  This local portion, commonly referred to as the “local fair share” or “LFS,” is calculated by “indexing the district’s property wealth and aggregate income using statewide multipliers. ”  Abbott XIX, 196 N.J. at 556-57; (Aa6; Aa1105; Aa1256; Aa1260-61); see also N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-5(b) and -52(a).  A district “must provide the lesser of either its LFS, as calculated using SFRA’s formula, or the local share it raised in the previous year” — often referred to as the “required local share. ”  Abbott XX, 199 N.J. at 155; N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-5(b); (Aa6; Aa1105; Aa1257).  So a district’s presumed contribution to its annual budget is the amount of funds, based on its relative wealth, which may be raised through local taxes to support the district’s annual budget.  N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-52; N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-5(b) and (c); (Aa6; Aa1105).  The LFS is also not static, but must be annually recalculated to capture current property wealth and income of each district.  N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-52(c).  3.
[brief] The discovery rule only postpones the accrual of a cause of action until the plaintiff “discovers, or by an exercise of reasonable diligence and intelligence should have discovered[,] that he may have a basis for an actionable claim. ”  Catena v. Raytheon Co., 447 N.J. Super. 43, 52 (App. Div. 2016).  It is not necessary “that plaintiff knew for a certainty that the factual basis was present.  It is enough that plaintiff had or should have discovered that he ‘may have’ a basis for the claim.
[brief] In summation, the defense argued that the surveillance videos corroborated [...]’s alibi -- that he turned off of East 16th onto Governor and went home -- because the Beef Town video showed the suspect wearing light-colored clothing, but the Alto Rango video showed [...] wearing dark-colored clothing.  (5T 70-11 to 79-21)  The prosecutor argued, based on still-shots from the car wash video, that [...] was wearing light-colored clothing consistent with the suspect’s.  (5T 95-22 to 98-11)  For the first time at trial, the prosecutor also claimed that the Alto Rango video showed [...] look towards [...] and do “something,” which the prosecutor argued was evidence of premeditation; that the Beef Town video showed flashes of light indicative of gunfire; that the electric company video contradicted [...]’s alibi because it showed a second person walking just after Governor; and that the second person in the post-Governor videos was [...] because that person had the same height and “style of walk” as [...] in the pre-Governor videos.  (5T 88-8 to 105-9)  Notably, the prosecutor did not argue that the suspect’s face was visible in any of the surveillance videos or that the jury could compare the suspect’s face to [...]’s.  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I REVERSAL IS REQUIRED BECAUSE THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO COMPLY WITH THIS COURT’S PRIOR REMAND ORDER MANDATING COMPLETE REDACTION OF THE INTERVIEWING DETECTIVE’S LAY OPINIONS ON DEFENDANT’S GUILT AND CREDIBILITY.
[brief] ”  Id. at 256-59, 271-72.  The Court also rejected the detective’s subjective claims that he did not consider the defendant a suspect because an objective review of “the targeted questions reflect[ed] a clear attempt on the part of the detective to cause defendant to incriminate himself. ”  Id. at 257, 271-72; accord Ahmad, 246 N.J. at 613-14 (explaining a detective’s subjective belief that the defendant is not a suspect is “of no moment” where the objective circumstances indicate custody); Pearson, 318 N.J. Super.  at 133-35 (same).  The same is true here.
[directive] The critical question remains whether the public employee has a reasonable expectation of privacy in information stored in a device.  While the determination of a INTERNAL AFFAIRS POLICY & PROCEDURES | November 2022  38 reasonable expectation of privacy must be decided on a case-by-case basis, the law enforcement agency should take steps to actively and affirmatively diminish this expectation.  The agency should state, in writing, that it retains the right to enter and review the contents of any agency-issued device at any time.  This notice may be worded as follows:  The agency may assign to its members and employees agency-owned electronic devices, including computers and smartphones, for business purposes.  Such equipment and its contents are and remain the property of the agency.  Personnel are prohibited from installing unauthorized software and from storing personal information in the device, regardless of any password protection or encryption.  The devices, their contents, and any email or electronic correspondence originating from or arriving at the device are the property of the agency and are subject to entry and inspection without notice.  7.8.8