ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] These additional questions need to be answered if you are pleading guilty to the offense of or any attempt to commit the offense of aggravated sexual assault, sexual assault, aggravated criminal sexual contact, kidnapping under 2C:13-1c(2), endangering the welfare of a child by engaging in sexual conduct which would impair or debauch the morals of the child under 2C:24-4a, endangering the welfare of a child pursuant to 2C:24-4b(4), endangering the welfare of a child pursuant to 2C:24-4b(5) (if the offense was committed on or after February 1, 2018), or leader of a child pornography network pursuant to 2C:24-4.1 (if the offense was committed on or after February 1, 2018)  [Sí/Yes]
[brief] Because the Trial Court’s Interpretation of the MOU Leads to an Absurd Result (Da7, 9)  “It is well-settled that [c]ourts enforce contracts based on the intent of the parties, the express terms of the contract, surrounding circumstances and the underlying purpose of the contract. ”  Barila v. Board of Educ. of Cliffside Park, 241 N.J. 595, 615-16 (2020) (quoting Matter of County of Atlantic, 230 N.J. 237, 254 (2017)) (internal quotations omitted).  “The plain language of the contract is the cornerstone of the interpretive inquiry; ‘when the intent of the parties is plain and the language is clear and unambiguous, a court must enforce the agreement as written, unless doing so would lead to an absurd result. ’”  Id. at 616 (emphasis added) (quoting Quinn v. Quinn, 225 N.J. 34, 45 (2016)).  Plaintiff no doubt will argue, contrary to its own prior assertions, that the payment of $1.00 does not constitute the substance of its obligations under the MOU because it is also purportedly assuming the Property owner’s debt.  But, as the major creditor of that debt, the holder of the mortgage on the Property, pointed out before the trial court, neither Plaintiff nor [...] had actually taken on the obligation to do anything:  [...]:  They have not agreed.  [...] certainly has not agreed to assume this debt.  All they’ve agreed to do is purchase the entity.  They – there is no requirement that they pay this mortgage off, and I have argued this over and over, Your Honor, there is no requirement.  They could easily mess around with this, the application for two years and then decide it is not working, and then walk away.  Rather, Plaintiff simply now owns the Property, and could ultimately choose to abandon it to foreclosure, leaving the guarantor to deal with any deficiency under the Note.  Such a result creates a windfall for Plaintiff, as this would allow it both to obtain the Property – which it was previously willing to buy for $45 million – for $1.00, and to be able to “walk away” if its plans to construct a “big box” store do not come to fruition.  On the other hand, this result provides no benefit whatsoever to the [...], who have lost the Property for essentially no compensation, and remain – in the case of [...] – on the hook for the Guaranty.  A result in which the [...] would lose the Property to Plaintiff for no compensation, yet retain exposure to the Loan via the Guaranty, would be absurd, particularly in light of [...]’s repeated assertions to the trial court, set forth above, that he had agreed to pay the debt.
[brief] Moreover, the cases are distinguishable because the detective in this case properly responded to defendant’s inquiry.  Specifically, before any substantive questions occurred, [...] told defendant “[i]f you do not have money to hire a lawyer, one will be appointed to represent you before any questioning if you wish. ” (Pa31).  This response was not misleading and it correctly answered defendant’s question.  Indeed, unlike the Detectives in Gonzalez, who misled the defendant by saying she would have better options by telling the truth, the detective in this case not only provided a proper answer to defendant’s question, she reiterated that defendant had a right to an attorney before any questioning occurred.  (Pa31).  Thus, the trial court erred in using the holding of Gonzalez to grant defendant’s Motion to Suppress.
[brief] The defendant sought to have the adverse inference charge given to the jury in regard to the plaintiff’s absence from trial.  (6T152:13-158:19).  The Trial Court properly denied the request because the plaintiff was an unavailable witness.  *State v. Clawans*, 38 N.J. 162, 171 (1962); see also; (6T163:3-23).  Although the Trial Court ruled that the adverse inference charge was not proper, defense counsel repeatedly commented on the plaintiff’s absence from trial in a tone that suggested that the plaintiff was being kept from the jury to prevent them from judging her credibility.
[directive] (A multa e $30 se o crime ocorreu entre 9 de janeiro de 1986 e 22 de dezembro de 1991, inclusive.  °  Se o crime ocorreu antes de 1 de janeiro de 1986 a multa e $25).  If d. the offense occurred on or after February l, 1993 but was before March 13, 1995, and you [Yes/Sim] [No/Nao] are being sentenced to probation or a State correctional facility, you must pay a transaction If fee of up to $1.00 for each occasion when a payment or installment payment is made? the offense occurred on or after March 13, 1995 and the sentence is to probation, or the sentence otherwise requires payments of financial obligations to the probation division, you must pay a transaction fee ofup to $2.00 for each occasion when a payment or installment payment is made? ° Se o crime ocorreu dia 1 de fevereiro de 1993 ou ap6s esta data, mas antes de 13 de mari;:o de 1995 e a n9 senteni;:a imposta e a suspensiio condicional da pena ou reclusiio em penitenciaria estadual, voce tera que pagar uma taxa administrativa de ate $1.00 na efetuai;:ao do pagamento do total ou ao pagar cada prestai;:iio? Se o crime ocorreu no dia 13 de mari;:o de 1995 ou ap6s esta data e a senteni;:a e a suspensiio condicional da a pena ou a senteni;:a requer outros pagamentos monetarios divisiio de suspensiio condicional da pena, voce tera que pagar uma taxa administrativa de ate $2.00 na efetuai;:iio do pagamento do total ou a cada prestai;:iio?
[brief] In her very first order, April 17, 2019 (Da281), [...] refers to a March 28, 2018 order which “provided for the appointment of officers for [...] and [...]. ”  (Da282).  That statement finds no support in the record, as neither the March 28, 2018 order (Da626) nor the March 1, 2018 hearing transcript (4T) state any such thing.  Continuing on at Da284, [...] refers to “a formal meeting of [...]’s members. ”  This is the first moment at which it is obvious that the court has failed to distinguish between the Capital Company ([...] Capital Partners LLC, a plaintiff here) and [...]  (a non-party and a distinct and separate entity) – the Capital Company has members, as a limited liability company; a corporation, on the other hand, has no members.  This error in failing to differentiate between [...] and the Capital Company is a critical error that permeates the bulk of the trial court’s reasoning.
[brief] The statute specifically states that after the first 60-day period “a court may grant no more than one additional period, not to exceed sixty (60) days, to file the affidavit pursuant to this section, upon a finding of good cause. ”  N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-27.  In this case, as discussed in the previous section, Appellants’ claim that [...] breached professional and ethical duties could only be proven by evidence of professional malpractice to establish a deviation from the applicable standard of care.  Therefore, an affidavit of merit was required.  [...] filed its answer to the Appellants’ complaint in the underlying matter on April 1, 2019.  (Pa63).  After the passage of 120 days (based on the 60 days provided in the statute and the generally accepted 60-day extension)  Appellants had not served an Affidavit of Merit by a licensed professional against [...].  Accordingly, [...] moved for dismissal of Appellants’ complaint with prejudice pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-29.  On August 30, 2019, the trial court ruled that an affidavit of merit was required and dismissed Appellants’ complaint and all crossclaims thereto against [...] with prejudice.³ (Pa969; and Pa984).
[brief] Pa28.  The correspondence also requested that the Board take administrative or judicial notice of all affidavits submitted in all actions with respect to the issue of lack of notice of the Ricci Act for members of the State Police Retirement System.  Pa28.  To date, over ninety-eight (98) active and retired Troopers have submitted affidavits attesting that they did not receive any notice of the Ricci Act.  Pa72-267.
[brief] [...] concluded that “the first prong in [State v.] Carty[, 170 N.J. 632, 647 (2002)]” – the existence of “reasonable and articulable suspicion to believe that an errant motorist … has engaged in, or is about to engage in, criminal activity” – was “not satisfied” because, “[g]iven the totality of the circumstances, the Officers request to search the vehicle was not based on information obtained during the motor vehicle stop.
[brief] That decision was solidly based upon statutes and established case law.  As discussed in Points I and II infra, Petitioner is barred by statute (N.J.S.A. 43:16A-8[2] and N.J.A.C. 17:1-6.4[b]) from receiving AD because he entered into a settlement agreement with his former employer [...] which was reached due to pending disciplinary charges, and because he is forever barred from returning to work for his former employer.  All of Petitioner’s arguments were properly rejected by the Board in light of the complete statutory bar to Petitioner receiving AD.  The Board’s Final Administrative Decision should be affirmed.
[brief] ”) (citing [...], HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS, §7 (4th ed. 1971)); see also [...] & [...], CONTRACTS, §14-8, at 599-600 (West 3d. ed. 1987) (“It has been said that damages must be certain, both in their nature and in respect to the causes from which they proceed.  It seems to be generally recognized that absolute certainty is not required; ‘reasonable certainty’ will suffice. ”)  Plaintiffs have the further burden to establish the “fact” of damages.  Tessmar v. Grosner, 23 N.J. 193, 203 (1957)
[brief] PCAST Report at 3 (emphasis added).  [...]’s testimony is “not scientifically valid and should not [have] be[en] permitted. ”  Id. at 19.  This testimony made his subjective determinations of the evidence at the scene—which explained away why there was barely any blood on the shirt [...] was supposedly wearing when she killed [...] because it was supposedly consistent with the bloodstain pattern that would occur during a bludgeoning event followed by the removal of the shirt—as objective, incontrovertible evidence.  C.
[directive] the Supreme Court addressed the search warrant provision within the Prevention In of Domestic Violence Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:25-280).  Specifically, the Supreme Court required that "before issuing a warrant to search for weapons under the Act, a court must find that there is (1) probable cause to believe that act of domestic violence has been committed by the defendant, an (2) probable cause to believe that a search for and seizure of weapons is 'necessary to protect of the life, health or well being a victim whose behalf the relief is sought,' see N.J.S.A. 2C:25- on 28(f); and (3) probable cause to believe that the weapons are located the place to be in searched."  Slip op. at 3-4.  The Supreme Court further clarified that "The probable cause requirement for warrants is adaptable to civil and administrative search warrants to ensure that only reasonable searches are conducted under our Federal and State Constitutions, as the United States Supreme Court made clear"  Camera Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 538-39 (1967).  Slip in v. op. at 24.
[brief] standing order must be issued which appoints the judge to serve as an acting judge in another municipal court.  N.J.S.A 12-16(b); N.J.S.A. 2B:12-6; R. 7:7-11(a).  And even after being appointed, the acting judge can only consider matters from a neighboring jurisdiction “[i]n the event of the disqualification or inability for any reason of a judge to hear any pending matter[.]”  R. 1:12-3(a); see Broom-Smith, 201 N.J. at 235-36 (requiring that officers first “attempt to contact the judge of the territorially-appropriate court” because “that judge’s disqualification or inability to hear the case that will trigger the cross-assignment order”).  Yet, in this case, [...] testified that he did not even consider seeking a warrant from the [...].  (1T13-16 to 24, 29-21 to 24)  Thus, the moment [...] officers executed [...]’s warrant outside [...], the warrant itself was invalid.
[brief] It also ignores the expectations set by the plain language of the contractual fee-shifting provision of the Operating Agreement that is quoted above.  (Section 10.5 of the Operating Agreement (Pa1).  To find Defendant was not a prevailing party here is contrary to the language of the parties’ agreement that contemplate an action to enforce, just as Plaintiff had brought, all the while contemplating that such an action may not be successful and thus either party could prevail.  To find otherwise would abrogate the purpose of the clause and its impact on decisions to either bring or defend such actions.
[brief] (Aa126-133).  - Rule 2:6-2(a)(6) requires that:  “For every point, the appellant shall include in parentheses at the end of the point heading the place in the record where the opinion or ruling is located or if the issue was not raised below a statement indicating that the issue was not raised below. ” (emphasis added).  See State v. Kyles, 132 N.J. Super. 397, 400 (App. Div. 1975):  [D]efendant’s brief fails to mention, as required by R. 2:6-2(a), that this point was not presented below.
[directive] 3.3.2  Officers face a dynamic environment in which interactions with individuals can escalate very quickly from one level of resistance to another.  For example, a passive resistor may become an active assailant in an instant.  In responding to the level of resistance, the officer may use the level of force that corresponds to the level of resistance the officer is facing, and need not use lesser levels of force that will not address the threat that the officer faces at the time.  If the individual’s resistance diminishes, the officer shall immediately reduce the level of force used against the individual.  If the individual stops resisting entirely, the officer must immediately cease using force.
[brief] Those mistakes all bear on the process employed by the [...] and the failure to apply a uniform and fair process for all applicants.  Put simply, the [...]’s failure to enforce its own rules was an abuse of discretion requiring reversal of the trial court order and remand to evaluate the applications consistent with the process the [...] adopted.  See Cell South of N.J., Inc. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment of W. Windsor Twp., 172 N.J. 75, 81-82 (2002) (noting that local decision should be overturned on finding of abuse of discretion).
[brief] [...]’s testimony did not “fail” to take into account the newness of [...]’s business; rather, [...] explained that the newness of [...]’s business in this particular enterprise, was immaterial, since any person or entity who owns the land, new business or otherwise, could have developed the land precisely as [...] and [...] expertly explained.  The Trial Court’s errors of fact, and the Trial Court’s impermissible contesting and rebutting of the uncontroverted facts in the record and established by [...] and [...], require that the Trial Court’s Order barring [...]’s expert report be reversed and the matter be remanded to Law Division for trial.
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS INTERPRETATION OF THE WORD “DESIGN” IN THE CONTEXT OF THE BOROUGH OF RUMSON BUILDING HEIGHT ORDINANCE STATING “DESIGNED TO ALLOW INCREASED BUILDING HEIGHT. ” (SEE APPENDIX – OPINION Pa14-15).  The trial court erred in its interpretation of the word “design” in the context of the Building Height  Ordinance language “designed to allow increased building height”.  Interpretation of an ordinance is essentially a legal issue.  Wyzykowski v. Rizas, 132 N.J. 509, 518 (1993); Pullen v. Tp. of South Plainfield, 291 N.J. Super. 1, 6 (App. Div. 1996); Jantausch v. Borough of Verona, 41 N.J. Super, 89, 96 (Law Div. 1956), aff’d, 24 N.J. 326 (1957).  Thus, in construing ordinances, the courts attempt to determine legislative intent along the same lines as in interpreting and construing statutes.  Atlantic Container, Inc. v. Eagleswood Planning Bd., 321 N.J.Super. 261, 269 (App.Div.1999); see Township of Pennsauken v. Schad, 160 N.J. 156, 170 (1999) ("The established rules of statutory construction govern the interpretation of a municipal ordinance.").  An "analysis of a statute begins with its plain language, giving the words their ordinary meaning and significance."  In re Estate of Fisher, 443 N.J. Super. 180, 190 (App. Div. 2015) (citing State v. Olivero, 221 N.J. 632, 639 (2015)), certif. denied, 224 N.J. 528 (2016).  "It is a basic rule of statutory construction to ascribe to plain language its ordinary meaning.  When that language ‘clearly reveals the meaning of the statute, the court's sole function is to enforce the statute in accordance with those terms. ’"  Ibid. (citations omitted).  The term "building height" is not defined in the Municipal Land Use Law, but is usually defined in a local ordinance.  See Moskowitz, et al.  "The Complete Illustrated Book of Development Definitions"  Transaction Publishers, 2015.  The [...]’s Building Height Ordinance calculates in Section 22-2.4  Building Height as follows:  BUILDING HEIGHT – Shall mean the vertical dimension measured to the highest point of a building from the lowest original lot grade or any revised lot grade shown on the Site Plan.  . . .  Such revised lot grade shall not include *mounding, terracing, or other devices designed to allow increased building height.*” (emphasis added).  (Pa60-62).  The [...] Building Height Ordinance is very clear that building height shall mean the vertical dimension measured to the highest point of a point of a building from the lowest original lot grade or any revised lot grade....  The last sentence of the definition states: "Such revised lot grade shall not include mounding, terracing, or other devices designed to allow increased building height."  (Pa60-62).  The definition has no qualifier for or concept of intent that allows one to ignore the clear language.  However, the trial court failed to properly interpret and define the meaning of the word “design” in the context of the Building Height Ordinance language “designed to allow increased building height.
[brief] amidst highly suggestive circumstances,” because “[t]he Defendant does not point to any source of outside influence; he simply relies on the alleged change in [...]’s description of the Defendant and concludes summarily without any evidentiary basis that is must have been because of outside influence. ”  (4T 16-14 to 15)  In Watson, the Court held that first-time in-court identifications are “inherently suggestive.
[brief] These legal principles are crucial when considering the Appellant’s arguments.  Here, the fact that Plaintiffs chose not to take appropriate action after receiving the AG Notice has no bearing on the applicability of the statute of limitation.  To the contrary, Plaintiffs’ receipt of the notice demonstrates that they were fully capable of asserting the instant malpractice allegation within the statutorily permitted time period but simply chose not to do so.  Plaintiffs admit that [...], on behalf of [...], received the letter but chose not to take action because the notice stated that [...] “may have to register” and that the Division “may take action”.  Plaintiffs contend that the AG Notice does not constitute actual damage as required by Grunwald.  However, pursuant to the discovery rule, Plaintiffs knew or should have known that a potential cause of action existed against [...] no later than March 25, 2014.  Upon receipt of the AG Notice in 2014, Plaintiffs were obligated to investigate the potential claims which it has now alleged in this litigation.  This conclusion is consistent with New Jersey case law.
[brief] The New Jersey Supreme Court has held that the question of enforceability of an arbitration provision is distinct from the question of its formation.  See Leodori v. CIGNA Corp., 175 N.J. 293, 302 (2003) (asking two questions with respect to an arbitration provision: (1) whether the “waiver-of-rights provision reflect[s] an unambiguous intention to arbitrate a [statutory] claim,” and separately, (2) whether the “plaintiff clearly had agreed to that provision”).  The Court in Atalese stated that it was applying a general contract law principle that contractual waivers of constitutional or statutory rights are not enforceable unless the waiver is “clearly and unmistakably established.
[brief] However, this argument fails for several reasons.  The Ricci Act states:  The board of trustees shall promulgate rules and regulations necessary to implement the provisions of this subsection and shall notify members and retirants in the retirement system of the enactment of this act, P.L.2019, c.157, within 30 days of enactment.  N.J.S.A. 53:5A-10(e).
[brief] Within the renewable energy field, it is common knowledge that certain renewable energy rights, known as Solar Renewable Energy Credits (SRECs or S-RECs) are tradeable commodities in their own right, without regard to any physical solar farm or solar energy generator systems.  FAC ¶ 17, Pa1611; Pa2550-59 ([...] Cert Opp SJ)  In its elemental concept, an SREC is an energy credit you can earn from your state for energy produced by your solar energy system, even those installed in residential property solar systems.  According to https://www.solarpowerauthority.com/srecs-explained:  When  You can earn a single SREC when your solar panel system produces 1,000 kWhs of electricity.  If you were to get 5,000 kWhs of solar energy in a year (a fair estimate for an average-size 5 kW system), you would earn five SRECs.  Each SREC you earn can then be sold back to utilities.  An SREC is separate from the electricity your home solar system produces.  That means you can use all of your solar electricity and still receive SRECs.  How much is an SREC worth?  It depends.  SRECs are a tradable commodity, so their sell price is determined by market supply and demand.  An increase of SRECs will decrease prices; a shortage of SRECs will increase prices.  Prices can range from less than $50 to more than $300 per SREC.  Higher prices benefit you, but there are controls in place to ensure a (somewhat) stable market.  FAC ¶ 18, Pa1611; Pa2550-59 ([...] Cert Opp SJ).  According to a SREC industry association, “SREC Trade,” see https://www.srectrade. com/markets/rps/srec/new_jersey, the New Jersey SREC market said to be the largest in the United States and the State has been a pioneer in the renewable energy field for almost two decades.  Companies engaged in the renewable energy field, both large and small, both publicly-traded and privately-held, strive to launch or acquire a presence and ability to trade in SRECs in New Jersey for years now.  FAC ¶ 19, Pa1611; Pa2550-59 ([...] Cert Opp SJ).  Defendant [...] and his companies, along with their lawyer [...] and his firm [...], scoured the State of New Jersey in search of SREC opportunities.  FAC ¶ 20, id.  **PLAINTIFFS’ LONG-RUNNING INVESTMENT AND EFFORTS TO ESTABLISH SREC TRADING ENTERPRISE IN NEW JERSEY**