ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The process server had no recollection of the service of process.  The Briefs of the Plaintiff and the Intervenor seem to imply that the process server [...] testified as to the facts of this particular service of process and the facts in the filed Affidavits of Service.  To be clear, [...] had no independent recollection of this particular job.  [...] testified that within a minute and a half to two minutes he hits the button to record the service of process.  T4, p. 21:5-7.  He was very clear that his testimony was not based upon a recollection of what actually happened on the date of service.  T4, p.21:8-11.  In fact the Court found that the process server “has no idea what he did on this – on this particular instance. ”  T4, p. 98:19-21.  The Defendant and Intervenor make much of the fact that the trial court found the process server’s testimony to be credible but what did he actually find?  The trial court held that “I found the testimony of the process server to be credible.  Yes, his testimony was that he doesn’t—he doesn’t remember.  But whatever is in the affidavit is—what took place because that—that’s all that exists. ”  T4, p.98:5-10.  If the process server does not remember anything about this service and is testifying to what he usually does, and we look to the affidavit, does that mean that service was effectuated upon [...] on the date the Affidavit was notarized, i.e. two months prior to the alleged date of service?  Does it mean that the GPS time stamp provided for the year 2031 is also a valid recitation of the year?  Accordingly, if we just look to the Affidavits which are facially defective and the testimony surrounding them that they were not properly notarized, as the trial court suggests, then it is clear that the Default Judgment should not have been entered upon these defective and deficient Affidavits.
[brief] If the challenged right is not fundamental, the injunction need only bear a “rational relationship” to a “legitimate state interest. ”  Heffner v. Murphy, 745 F.3d 56, 79 (3d Cir. 2014) (noting the “strong presumption of constitutionality” and deferential nature of rational basis review).  If a right is fundamental, the injunction must be narrowly tailored to advance a compelling interest.  See Holland, 895 F.3d at 292.  This injunction satisfies either test.  The State has a compelling interest in ensuring an LAD-protected class does not suffer discrimination.  See, e.g., Doe, 2024 WL 706797, at *23-24 (finding that a school policy “recogniz[ing] transgender students by their preferred gender identity without affirmatively notifying” their parents advances “legitimate objectives”); Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 624 (1984) (agreeing “eliminating discrimination ... plainly serves compelling state interests of the highest order”); Dixon v. Rutgers, 110 N.J. 432, 451 (1988) (confirming “[t]he eradication of ‘the cancer of discrimination’ has long been one of our State’s highest priorities”); Peper, 77 N.J. at 80 (adding “New Jersey has always been in the vanguard in the fight to eradicate the cancer of unlawful discrimination of all types”); Gallo v. Salesian Soc’y, 290 N.J.
[brief] 16  Thompson v. City of Atlantic City, 190 N.J. 359, 378-79 (2007)...........................................  13 Thorn v. Langue, 122 N.J.L. 342, 346 (Sup.Ct. 1939).  .........................................................  18 Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Nat'l Roofing, Inc., 108 N.J. 59, 64, 527 A.2d 864 (1987)  ..................  26 Trumpson, 431 N.J. Super. at 181-82 .....................................................................................  24 Tumarkin v. Friedman, 17 N.J. Super. 20, 24, 85 A.2d 304 (App.Div. 1951)............................  27  Tumpson v. Farina 218 N.J. 450 (N.J. 2014).......................................................................  31 Verry v. Franklin Fire Dist. No. 1, 230 N.J. 285, 294 (2017)....................................................  27 Ward v. Merrimack Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 312 N.J. Super. 162, 166 (App.Div. 1998)......................  14 Wells Fargo Bank v. Carrano, DOCKET NO. [...], 3 (App.Div. Dec. 30, 2020)...........  31 Wells Fargo Home Mortg. v. Stull, 378 N.J.  Super. 449, 453-54 (App.Div. 2005).......................  30 Wells Fargo Home Mortg. V. Stull, 378 N.J. Super. 449, 876 A.2d 298 (App.Div. 2005) ...........  21  Wisniewski v. Murphy, 454 N.J. Super. 508, 186 A.3d 321 (App.Div. 2018).............................  35  Other Authorities
[brief] N.J.S.A. 58:16A-55(a)  N.J.S.A. 58:16A-64  Regulations: 40 C.F.R. 130.2(j)  N.J.A.C. 7:8 N.J.A.C. 7:9B-1.4 N.J.A.C. 7:13-1.1 N.J.A.C. 7:13-1.2 N.J.A.C. 7:13-3.1 N.J.A.C. 7:13-11.1 N.J.A.C. 7:13-11.2 N.J.A.C. 7:13-12.7 N.J.A.C. 7:13-21.1(e)
[brief] The Arbitration Agreement further states:  Class actions and other similar procedures in which individuals seek to represent similarly situated individuals or seek relief on behalf of the general public, and consolidation or joinder of Claims (except for claimants on the same account), are NOT available under this agreement to arbitrate.  Claims in arbitration will proceed on an INDIVIDUAL basis only.  UNLESS YOU REJECT THIS AGREEMENT TO ARBITRATE, YOU AND WE WAIVE THE RIGHT TO ASSERT OR PARTICIPATE IN A CLASS ACTION OR ANY REPRESENTATIVE OR CONSOLIDATED PROCEEDING IN COURT OR IN ARBITRATION.  The arbitrator shall have no authority to entertain any Claim as a class action or private attorney general action or on any other similar representative basis, nor shall the arbitrator have any authority to consolidate or join Claims brought by separate claimants (except for claimants on the same account).
[brief] (Final Order at Ia269 to Ia270; opinion at 4T36-18 to 4T47-1)  POINT III ....................................................................................................  26  THE PUBLIC NOTICE WAS INSUFFICIENT, THUS DEPRIVING THE PLANNING BOARD OF JURISDICTION TO CONSIDER THE APPLICATION.  (Final Order at Ia269 to Ia270; opinion at 4T37-5 to 4T-37-14; 4T50-10 to 4T50-11)  CONCLUSION
[brief] The present-day iteration of the NJCFLA originated as the New Jersey Small Loan Law (“NJSLL”), enacted in 1914.  The NJSLL was meant to curtail predatory loan practices widely unregulated at the time.  The small loan business has long been the subject of study, legislation and judicial determination.  See Gallert, Hilborn and May, Small Loan Legislation (Russell Sage foundation, 1932); Hubachek, Annotations on Small Loan Laws (Russell Sage Foundation, 1938); 8 Law and Contemporary Problems (Winter, 1941).  New Jersey was one of the five large industrial states which early adopted general acts designed to regulate and control the business of making small loans.  Thus P.L. 1914, c. 49 provided for the licensing of small loan companies and granted power to the Commissioner of Banking and Insurance to reject an application for license because of lack of character or fitness of the applicant.  Family Fin. Corp. v. Gough, 10 N.J. Super. 13, 19 (App. Div. 1950).  (cited in Pb9-10).  It may easily be deduced from the aforementioned discussion that the NJCFLA was concerned with the formation of loans made by local entities.  There is no indication that the NJCFLA was meant to apply to credit accounts issued by national banks which have their own sets of laws and regulations.
[brief] (4/16/15 CCIP Manual, Pa512 and Pa517.)  [...] issued a CGL Policy to [...] effective December 23, 2013 to December 23, 2018, with policy limits of $2M  Each Occurrence (the “[...] --- \(^3\) Despite quotation marks, “wrap up” is not defined in the Evanston Policy. Policy”).  (Za034.)  The [...] Policy contained a Named Insured – Contractor Controlled Insurance Program endorsement, which adds certain qualifiers to “Section II - Who Is An Insured”, which [...] does not satisfy.  (Pa125; and Za078.)  Notably, the [...] Policy contains a Sole Agent for Insureds endorsement, by which all insureds assigned [...] the right to act with regard to policy cancellation or changes.  (Pa125; and Za055.)  [...] issued Excess Liability Policy to [...] effective December 23, 2013 to December 23, 2018, with policy limits of $25M per occurrence.
[brief] The [...] is a non-Civil Service municipality.  After an extensive internal investigation, on March 27, 2019, [...] was charged with Conduct Unbecoming a Police Officer, in violation of N.J.S.A. 40A:14-128 and 40A:14-147, Department Rules and Regulations, 3.2.4 (Truthfulness), 3.3.3 Neglect of Duty, 4.1.6  Repeated violations.  Pa5.  After multiple days of hearing, [...] was terminated from his employment as a law enforcement officer from the [...] for cause in conformance with the recommendation of Hearing Officer [...] on or about June 22, 2020.
[brief] See *Meyer v. Nebraska*, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (statute barring the teaching of foreign languages to children); *Pierce v. Society of Sisters*, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (law obligating parents to send children to public school); *Wisconsin v. Yoder*, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (same); *Troxel v. Granville*, 530 U.S. 57, 66 (2000) (plurality) (ordering visitation rights for non-parents over parent’s objections); *Anspach*, 503 F.3d at 263-64 (summarizing these precedents).  Conversely, Appellants cannot cite a single decision from the United States Supreme Court, our Supreme Court, the Third Circuit, or this court finding a fundamental substantive due process right to affirmatively provide parents with information, let alone regarding the gender identity or expression of transgender, gender non-conforming, and non-binary students—let alone on a blanket basis in violation of the LAD.
[directive] These requirements are necessary to meet the mandates of N.J.S.A. 2C:39-6J.  Subsection J, which became effective on March 17, 1986, provides in part:  A person shall qualify for an exemption from the provisions of N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5, ...if the person has satisfactorily completed a firearms training course approved by the Police Training Commission.  Such exempt person shall not possess or carry a firearm until the person has satisfactorily completed a firearms training course and shall annually qualify in the use of a revolver or similar weapon.  This new directive and accompanying manual augment the original directive and provisions of N.J.S.A. 2C:39-6J by incorporating minimum standards for semi-annual firearms qualification.  This directive and qualification procedures shall be implemented by all New Jersey law enforcement agencies.  The system of firearms qualification to be implemented is designed to measure basic firearms skills using uniform standards.  The manual includes: standards for firearms qualification for revolvers, semi-automatic handguns and shotguns, as well as automatic and semi-automatic assault-type weapons.  The manual also includes training guidelines, procedures regarding non-qualifying participants, record keeping and reporting procedures, and requirements for firearms instructors.  Officers must continue to qualify twice annually following the procedures and 9-5 Revised (5/03) Semi-Annual Firearms Qualification and Requalification Standards requirements contained in the manual.  These procedures do not prevent individual agencies from conducting additional in-service firearms training.  Agencies are encouraged to conduct supplemental training to meet the special needs of their personnel.  I therefore direct, as a matter of law enforcement policy, that effective January 1, 1991 all officers must meet the minimum standards set forth in the Semi-Annual Firearms Qualification and Requalification Manual.
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY GRANTED SUMMARY JUDGMENT WHERE PLAINTIFF FAILED TO PRESENT SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE UPON WHICH A JURY COULD FIND PROXIMATE CAUSE.  An Appellate court reviews de novo the trial court’s grant of summary judgment.  *Townsend v. Pierre*, 221 N.J. 36, 59 (2015).  The court therefore applies the same standard applicable to the trial court and must determine whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.  *Brill v. The Guardian Life Insurance Company of America*, 142 N.J. 520, 536 (1995).  While the court must grant all legitimate favorable inferences to the non-moving party, it may pick and choose inferences from the evidence to the extent "a miscarriage of justice under the law" is not created.  *Ibid*.  A legitimate inference must be a reasonable inference, as distinguished from mere speculation.  *Kulas v. Public Service Elec. and Gas Co.*, 41 N.J. 311, 317 (1964).  That is, the claimed conclusion from the offered fact must be a probable or more probable hypothesis and well founded in reason as opposed to a mere guess or conjecture.  *Dwyer v. Ford Motor Co.*, 36 N.J. 487, 518 (1962) (internal quotation omitted).  It is well settled that to establish a *prima facie* case of medical malpractice, a plaintiff must present expert testimony establishing: (1) the applicable standard of care; (2) a deviation from that standard of care; and (3) that the deviation proximately caused the injury.
[brief] Respondent argues, at best, that “prudence should have been the cautionary process to at least wait for the expiration of no less than the statutory time frame from recording the final judgment. ”  Rb35.  As argued in our merits brief, there is no law or rule that required [...] to wait 90 days or even 365 days to sell a property.  There is no law or rule that required [...] to carry a dangerous liability on its books, praying that no one would be hurt or killed as each day passed.  [...], in fact, had a constitutional right to sell its property even on the day after the final judgment was entered.  Respondent’s argument, unsupported by even one single fact, simply fails.
[brief] Plaintiff argues on appeal that the trial court erroneously remanded this matter back to the [...].  Plaintiff contends the [...]’s interpretation is not necessary because the plain language of the controlling municipal ordinances is apparently unmistakably clear—so much so that the only reasonable construction of the various, interwoven ordinances is the one proposed by Plaintiff.  Plaintiff further contends that no use variance is required to permit multiple principal uses at the Property because two principal uses already occupy the parcel and the individual uses are permitted by Township Ordinance.  Contrary to Plaintiff’s assertions, the Board correctly construed the relevant provisions of the [...] as only allowing multiple principal uses on a single lot in the Industrial Zone when an application satisfies certain ordinance criteria.
[brief] Physical Safety  Disclosing transgender students’ status to a parent without consent can endanger their physical safety.  Every day, transgender and gender-nonconforming youth encounter alarmingly high rates of “discrimination, harassment, and violence because of their gender identity,” including physical and sexual assault.  *Whitaker v. Kenosha Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 Bd. of Educ.*, 858 F.3d 1034, 1051 (7th Cir. 2017).
[brief] This bait-and-switch – which is improper in the first instance – left the Court with the need to determine which approach to utilize.  [...]’s method of isolating compensable legal services was based on nothing more than “estimates” and “educated guesses”.  (Da0205; Da0222.)  Instead of actually reviewing [...]’s invoices in a manner consistent with the “time necessary to litigate” approach, the court employed a calculation entirely distinct from either the “time necessary to litigate” or “relative culpability” approach, creating the following conglomeration:
[directive] This Directive serves to clarify certain procedural requirements regarding the expungement process and to provide additional information on the eCourts Expungement System and enhancements.  GUIDANCE TO JUDGES AND STAFF ON THE NEW COMPELLING  (1)  CIRCUMSTANCES  STANDARD  Judges and staff should not require that an applicant provide plea or sentencing transcripts or presentence reports regarding the underlying offense(s).  This direction is based on the June 15, 2020 statutory change that replaced the "public interest" standard with a "compelling circumstances" test.  Further, consideration of expungement petitions should not be delayed by any requests by rm the State that applicants supply such materials.  The reasoning is set forth below.  ADA ENSURING tm AN OPEN DOOR TO :ITJSTICt Americans with Disabilities Act  Page 1 of 5  Le2islative Amendment  On June 15, 2020, N.J.S.A. 2C:52-2(a)(2) and (c)(3) was amended to remove the requirement that the court consider the public interest in determining whether to grant an expungement and to require instead that the court find that compelling circumstances exist to grant an expungement.
[brief] POINT II APPELLANT HAS FAILED TO PROVE THAT THE APPLICABLE STATUTE AND RULE REQUIRE AN ACCOUNTING IN ALL CASES  R. 4:87-1 states:  (a)  Actions to settle the accounts of executors, administrators, testamentary trustees, non-testamentary trustees, guardians and assignees for the benefit of creditors shall be brought in the county where such fiduciaries received their appointment.  The action shall be commenced by the filing of a complaint in the Superior Court, Chancery Division, and upon issuance of an order to show cause pursuant to R. 4:83.  A non-testamentary trustee shall annex to the complaint a copy of the written instrument creating the trust and stating its terms.  The order to show cause shall state the amount of commissions and attorney's fee, if any, which are applied for.  (b)  An action may be commenced by an interested person to compel a fiduciary referred to in paragraph (a) of this rule to settle his or her account, and, in appropriate circumstances, to file an inventory and appraisement.  N.J.S.A. 3B:17-2 states:  A personal representative may settle his account or be required to settle his account in the Superior Court.  Unless for special cause shown, he shall not be required to account until after the expiration of 1 year after his appointment.  The court properly found that R. 4:87-1 and N.J.S.A. 3B:17-2 are permissive, not mandatory with regard to compelling an accounting, and such is left to the discretion of the judge.  The language is clear.  Nothing in either the statute or the rule states that a court must direct an administrator to provide an accounting upon the beneficiary’s request one year after appointment.
[brief] This was because it was first raised by the defendants in an unrelated Mercer County Law Division case, [...], then again in my subsequent appeal ([...], *D'Agostino v. [...]*, 2022 WL 1553717), in which I prevailed on May 17, 2022 (i.e. less than 2 weeks before I filed this small claims case).  So even though the car’s title was not in my name, and even though neither my sister or I was an “executor” of our mom’s “estate” (which consisted solely of her vehicle), nonetheless I believed then, as I still do now, that we both had standing to bring our claims as intended third party beneficiaries.  But unfortunately for both me and my sister, as of 2022 I could only vaguely recall seeing an authority specifically on the issue of standing pertaining to a car and its titled owner; and sadly I did not find it again (i.e. *Haylett v. Baladi*, 2010 WL 2346713) until many months later.
[brief] The Borough Fails to Follow the Process Set Forth in the Ordinance, RFA, and Evaluation Sheet  In response to the RFA, [...], [...], and [...] (“[...]”) applied for resolutions of support from the Borough in connection with their respective Class 5 cannabis retailer license applications.  (65a).  On September 20, 2022, the Council awarded a resolution of support to [...], which was memorialized in Resolution #2022-208 (the “Resolution”).  (65a-68a).  On October 6, 2022, [...] wrote to the Borough regarding its application and requested information about the RFA process.  (70a-72a).  On October 11, 2022, the Borough responded to [...]’s letter.  (74a-75a).  The Borough’s response revealed numerous problems with the application review and scoring process, revealing the process was devoid of the objective criteria required to ensure a fair review.
[brief] He stated that defendant was not at his house on the night of November 2, 2021.  [T41-10 to -13].  He was unaware of his wife approaching [...] after the events on November 7, 2021.  [T42-18 to -20; T49-5 to -8].  He stated defendant was not at his house on November 7, 2021.  [T49-14 to -23].  [...] stated that [...] did not know the whole [...].  [T46-24 to 47-2].  He did not see any police officers at [...]’ house.  [T47-3 to -12].  On cross-examination, [...] could not remember what he was doing on November 2 or November 7, 2021.  [T49-24 to 50-16].  He also did not know if [...] had spoken to [...] because he could not account for what she did while he was at work.  [T49-5 to -12].  On re-direct examination, [...] stated that [...] did not tell him that she spoke to [...].  He also stated that they had difficulties with [...] over parking when the [...] first moved in to their house.  [T52-1 to 53-21].  Defendant testified that she was not present at her parents’ house on November 2, 2021.
[brief] A.  A LTTEL EXEMPTION  REQUIRES FINDINGS THAT A REDEVELOPMENT PROJECT WOULD NOT BE FINANCIALLY FEASIBLE WITHOUT IT  The Long Term Tax Exemption Law was enacted in 1991 to further the purposes of the Local Redevelopment and Housing Law (LRHL)(Local Redevelopment Law), N.J.S.A. 40:12A-1 et seq., through the use of special financial arrangements, including the granting of property tax exemptions.
[brief] 355 N.J. Super. at 323, citing to Albemarle Paper Company v. Moody, 422 US 405, 416, 95 S.Ct. 2362, 2371 (1975).  Thus, given that the Trial Court has the authority exercise its discretion when admeasuring and blending the damages to which a successful carrier is entitled to under the Fraud Act, that Act’s remedy is equitable in nature.  The Land court also hinted that the liability aspect of [...]’s complaint should not have been tried to a jury.  In ruling upon the parties’ appeal, the court stated that “We start with the proposition that [...]’s recovery in this case was solely enabled by a statutory — not a Common Law — remedy.
[brief] Hahn v. [...] – [...]  The statute of limitations sets forth the period of time within which a party may file a complaint.  In the case of a medical malpractice claim, suit must be filed within two years of the accrual date, which generally is the date of [***17] the negligent act or omission.  Martinez v. Cooper Hosp., 163 N.J. 45, 52, 747 A.2d 266 (2000).
[brief] But the Court stopped far short of finding that [...] was entitled to all of the emails that the information in the log was derived from, instead making it abundantly clear that its decision “did not end the inquiry,” and that it “offer[ed] no opinion” on whether the emails could, or should, be released.  Id. at 457-58.  Thus, contrary to [...]’s claims, the Court was not tasked with nor did it determine whether a requestor is required to include a subject when submitting an OPRA request for emails.