ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] The arresting/investigating police agency should then notify the victim as soon as is reasonably possible.  Telephone notification to the victim or a responsible member of the victim's household should be deemed sufficient.  Where telephone contact is not feasible, the arresting/investigating police agency should take reasonable action under the circumstances to make personal notification.  Where the arresting/investigating police agency has been unable to effect notification, the agency should inform the .County Victim-Witness Coordinator promptly on the next business day.  The Victim-Witness Coordinator should then be responsible for prompt notification to the victim.  Where the arresting/investigating agency is responsible for notification to the victim, the officer who made the initial contact with the victim should, whenever possible, be designated to provide notification to the victim of the defendant's release from custody.  Upon verification of the escape of a defendant from the custody of the county jail or the return of an escapee to confinement in the county jail, notification of the escape or return to custody of the defendant should be provided to the victim as specified above.  D.
[brief] This constitutional guarantee also provides a defendant with the right to dispense counsel and proceed *pro se*.  *State v. Crisafi*, 128 N.J. 499, 509 (1992) (citing *Faretta*, 422 U.S. at 836).  A defendant’s right to self-representation can only be exercised after a knowing and intelligent waiver.  *Id.* (citing *McKaskle v. Wiggins*, 465 U.S. 168, 173, 104 S. Ct. 944, 948 (1984)).  The New Jersey Supreme Court, in *Crisafi*, held that a court must inquire into several factors to determine whether a defendant can proceed *pro se*.  *Id.* at 510-12.  To ensure that a waiver of counsel is entered knowingly and intelligently, the trial court must: (1) notify the defendant of the charges against him, the defenses available to him, and the possible punishment if convicted; (2) inform the defendant of technical difficulties and risks of proceeding *pro se*; (3) inform the defendant that he is bound by the rules of court and evidence and that his lack of knowledge may hinder his ability to put forth an adequate defense; and (4) inform the defendant of the difficulties of representing himself and that it is inadvisable to proceed without an attorney.
[brief] We apply an objective inquiry to determine whether a restriction gave notice of the amendments at issue.  See 1 Williston on Contracts § 3:4 (4th ed. 2021) (‘Whether there is mutual assent to the terms of a contract is determined by an objective test, rather than the subjective intentions of the parties. ’)”.  Id. at par.16.  The restriction itself does not have to necessarily give notice of the particular details of a future amendment; that would rarely happen.  Instead, it must give notice that a restrictive or affirmative covenant exists and that the covenant can be amended to refine it, correct an error, fill in a gap, or change it in a particular way.  See Armstrong, 633 S.E.2d at 87.  But future amendments cannot be “entirely new and different in character,” untethered to an original covenant.  Lakeland Prop. Owners Ass’n v. Larson, 459 N.E.2d 1164, 1167 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984).  Otherwise, such an amendment would infringe on property owners’ expectations of the scope of the covenants.  Kalway, supra at par. 16.  The *Kalway* case is on all fours, the [...] restrictions here provide for no height restriction nor is there sufficient notice that the building restrictions can be changed or altered.  After two years of litigation and document production, Defendant cannot point to any height restriction in Plaintiffs’ [...].  Nor can they point to any language that clearly and manifestly provides authority to the [...] to impose new building restriction forty years after the beach club was created.  The trial judge was correct in assessing *Kalway* as persuasive and consistent with New Jersey law.
[brief] **2023  Amendments to the NJFCA**  As the parties briefed summary judgment motions, the Legislature amended the NJFCA, effective June 30, 2023.  See Pa24-31.  Many of the changes, including the one at issue here, are procedural mechanisms that safeguard the State’s ongoing authority over an NJFCA action.  They include: (1) allowing the Attorney General, upon intervention, to file its own complaint or amend or supplement a relator’s complaint, Pa26; (2) providing that, upon intervention, any pleading the Attorney General files would relate back to the filing date of the original complaint for statute of limitations purposes, Pa26; (3) giving the Attorney General authority to issue civil investigative demands, subpoena out-of-state witnesses, and take sworn testimony, Pa30-31; and (4) allowing the Attorney General to pursue remedies through alternate means, including administrative proceedings, Pa27-28.
[brief] Whatever the conceptual difficulties inherent in any definition of a “cause of action,” often the presence of a single cause of action is clear.  *Davis*, 688 *F.2d* at 171 (emphasis added)(citations omitted).  Although we declined to adopt *one* specific legal theory in *Davis*, we indicated a predisposition towards taking a broad view of what constitutes identity of causes of action --“an essential similarity of the underlying events giving rise to the various legal claims.
[brief] (Aa2553-Aa2575).  It has been acknowledged by the [...] that bald eagles utilize the subject property.  (Aa2553-Aa2557).  As further set forth in the [...] report dated April 13, 2023 and a report by [...], MES, QAWB, Senior Wildlife Biologist, dated July 7, 2022 and last updated April 7, 2023, adult bald eagles have been and continue to be observed on the site.
[brief] The Superior Court has denied Appellant’s applications for relief from Probation account errors by implicitly, or in some cases, explicitly adopting a “Law of the Case” determination in a manner of repeated misapplication, including Appellant’s Motions for Reconsideration of the Order of 3/30/2023 and 5/12/2023.  2.  First, from “day one” of this case, Oct. 1, 1998, no court took the time to diligently analyze Appellant’s evidence of Probation account error.
[brief] Bybee v. Abdulla, 189 P.3d 40, 41 (Utah 2008).  The plaintiff’s husband had signed a pre-suit arbitration agreement and the defendant physician wanted to compel arbitration.  Id. at 42.  The Utah Supreme Court found that in wrongful death cases, arbitration agreements are least likely to be enforceable when the agreement includes “provisions that purport to affect the rights of heirs but do not affect the existence of the decedent's personal injury claim during his lifetime.
[brief] (17T 54-5 to 55-20)  But then [...] realized that he had left his phone at [...]’s apartment, so they went to get the phone first, arriving there at 4 p.m.  (17T 54-5 to 56-16)  Then they drove to [...] in [...], where the [...]’ house is, arriving at a time that [...] initially estimated to be sometime between 5:50 and 6:30 p.m., but dropping [...] off, at his request, down the street from that house, and agreeing to pick him up “in an hour or two” whenever he called for a ride.  (17T 57-14 to 65-22)  [...] admitted that she was “[a] little bit” concerned about [...], because he was not “letting them” drop him off at his intended destination, but they nevertheless did what he asked and then she and [...] drove to the [...] where [...] was going to meet her boyfriend.  (17T 65-23 to 66-19)  A receipt shows that she checked in there at 6:01 p.m., so she then estimated that she dropped off [...] at 5:45 or 5:50 p.m. (17T 67-5 to 20; 17T 109-19 to 20)  There, they waited almost three hours, [...] claimed, for [...] to call, but he never did, so, after trying in vain to call [...], [...] called [...] and left a message that she was worried about [...].  (17T 70-8 to 71-21)
[brief] Transgender individuals who experience high levels of family rejection are three-and-a-half times more likely to attempt suicide and two-and-a-half times more likely to misuse substances compared to those who experience little or no family rejection.  *Id.* at 195 (Da99).  And those who experience moderate levels of family rejection are two times more likely to attempt suicide and one-and-a-half times more likely to misuse substances.  *Ibid.*  Further, 65.5% of transgender youth who reported that their families never refer to them with correct pronouns screened positive for depression, and 72.1% screened positive for anxiety.  *2023 LGBTQ+ Youth Report*, Figs. 5a, 5b.  As stated, this risk of familial rejection may be increased in these circumstances.  And even in the absence of familial rejection, the district policies are discriminatory and will exacerbate these mental health harms.
[brief] Sportsmen, farmers, and commercial fisherman feel directly the impact of decision-making in this area and are likely to have the necessary expertise to make the required decisions competently.  *Humane Society* at 573.  The statute specifies that six of the eleven Council members must be sportsmen.  Assuming this category consists of the hunters and fisherman of the state, it is difficult to conceive of a group with a keener interest in maintaining a plentiful supply of game, in developing regulations to insure safety in hunting, and in overseeing the operations of the state’s hatching and game farm and its stocking activities.  *Humane Society* at 573.  To the extent that sportsmen and farmers have special interests which may at times conflict, the presence of both groups on the Council is at once a rational legislative decision.  For the same reason it is appropriate that these Council members be recommended to the Governor by organizations consisting of their peers.
[brief] The Respondent claims that when it comes to training, “it is important to compare an individual’s situation with other similarly situated employees in order to determine a baseline, to analyze how much control an employer is exerting over the individual.” (Rb30).  However, in the very next sentence, the Respondent admits that, “the security trainings and trainings with the Camden County Prosecutor’s office and Attorney General’s office that [...] participated in were unique to her position as Municipal Prosecutor and were not required for other Winslow employees. ”  Respondent’s argument is inconsistent.  They want the Court to compare similarly situated employees to the Petitioner, yet acknowledge that her position is unique in the Township.  Moreover, the Respondent admits that Petitioner’s position is unique when analyzing Factor 9 - Doing Work on the Employer’s Premises (Rb34) and Factor 10 - Order or Sequence of the Work (Rb35).  Moreover, neither the Respondent nor its investigator ever performed an evaluation of similarly situated employees such as other court personnel.  **Factor 3 – Integration**
[brief] The Restrictive Covenant Protects The Practice’s Legitimate Business Interests: Its Investment in [...], Its Patients and Referral Base  [...] began his employment with the Practice in 2018.  (Pa3 ¶16).  At that time, he entered an employment agreement (“Employment Agreement”).  (Ra22-31).  It set forth [...]’s compensation formula that included an tiered incentive bonus, with the first tier requiring the physician generate revenue between $800,000 and $1,000,000.  (Ra25, ¶6).  The Employment Agreement also contained a restrictive covenant governing where he could practice after his employment with the Practice ended, which occurred on December 31, 2023 (“Restrictive Covenant”).  (Ra26-27, ¶8).  The Restrictive Covenant is a five (5) year, twenty (20) mile restriction, the terms of which [...] specifically negotiated and to which he agreed.  (Ra11 ¶18-20).  It applied to Practice’s offices and the hospitals where its physicians worked.³ (Ra12 ¶21).  The ENT market in Central Jersey is very crowded, so the Restrictive Covenant is necessary to protect the Practice’s legitimate business interests.  (Ra33-59).  The temporal restriction protects Practice’s investment in its physicians, including paying for their insurance, licensing and continuing education.  ³  The Practice’s Princeton and Freehold office locations were actually located on hospital premises.  And it protects the Practice’s patient and referral base to which it is giving the physicians access.  (Ra6-9 ¶¶27-36; 39-45).  By his own admission, [...] had no presence, patients or referrals in the Central Jersey area before he was hired by the Practice.  (Ab22).  The Practice introduced [...] to its patients and referral sources.  It also paid for his licenses, insurance, continuing medical education and all of his other expenses, in addition to his compensation, which exceeded $1.5 million dollars in total.  [...] lived in [...].  (Pa2-3 ¶10).  He was already commuting at least 15 miles just to get to Practice’s Lawrenceville office, and even further to get to its Freehold office and [...].  He could simply drive ten (10) miles in the opposite direction to comply with the Restrictive Covenant following the termination of his Employment Agreement. \(^4\)  [...] did not need to move or uproot his family in order to find a new position.  **[...] Fails To Negotiate An Amendment To His Employment Agreement**
[brief] N.J.A.C. 7:38-3.4(b); N.J.A.C. 7:9A-2.1, -1.8, -7.4.  (Aa31).  [...]’s office building and control room is an “establishment” that is not a “single residential occupancy,” and the corresponding subpart of the rule directs applicants to estimate sewage flow based upon the “types of activities that are expected to occur that will generate sanitary sewage, the size of the facility and the maximum expected number of persons that may be served during any single day of operation. ”  N.J.A.C. 7:9A-7.4(a) and (c).  Based upon the square footage of the proposed office building, control room, and shower, [...] calculated it would produce approximately 603.125 gallons per day of wastewater.  N.J.A.C. 7:38-9.2(c).  (Aa32).  This Project would not require DEP permitting through a treatment works approval or New Jersey Pollution Discharge Elimination System permit because the system connected to [...]’s office building and control room will handle less than 2,000 gallons of wastewater per day of sanitary sewage only.
[brief] (Aa309)  Notwithstanding notice of the post judgment attempts by the Defendant to redeem and its intention to file a motion to vacate the final judgment, the Plaintiff and [...] concluded the sale on April 21, 2023.  Plaintiff’s counsel did not inform [...], in during the conversation of the contemplated sale of the Premises, or that a potential buyer had made an offer of purchase or the existence of an executed contract for sale.  The Defendant filed its motion to vacate the final judgment on April 21, 2023.
[brief] In the matter below, after having granted frivolous litigation sanctions, the trial court requested an affidavit of legal services from [...].  (Pa000484).  Thereafter, [...] submitted an affidavit of legal services in the amount of $89,072.19.  (Pa000478).  Plaintiffs objected to the affidavit of legal services on the grounds that the time spent on the matter was duplicative and excessive.  (Pa000557).  Thereafter, the trial court entered an order granting sanctions in favor of [...] in the amount of $30,000.00.
[brief] (Raised Below. Pa16. Pa30.)  Contrary to Respondent’s contention, adequate, timely, proper notice of the Ricci Act was not provided.  Respondent claims that posting the Ricci Act on the Division’s website is somehow adequate “notice” to all members and retirees enrolled in the State Police Retirement System. Rb10.  However, this argument fails for several reasons.  The Ricci Act states:  The board of trustees shall promulgate rules and regulations necessary to implement the provisions of this subsection and shall notify members and retirants in the retirement system of the enactment of this act, P.L.2019, c.157, within 30 days of enactment.  N.J.S.A. 53:5A-10(e).  Pursuant to the Ricci Act, the Board was required to provide notice to members and retirants in the system.  A website posting is not sufficient notice to retirees or active members of the retirement system.
[brief] ANY ERROR BY JUDGE ARRE IN INSTRUCTING THE JURY AT THE CERTAIN-PERSONS TRIAL WAS HARMLESS.  Defendant argues -- for the first time on appeal -- that [...] erred in instructing the jury on the certain-persons offense by incorrectly stating that N.J.S.A. 2C:39-7(b)(1) prohibits a person from possessing any "weapon" and by disclosing the nature of his two predicate offenses -- both possession of a controlled dangerous substance with intent to distribute within 1000 feet of a school.  As discussed below, because any error by the judge in instructing the jury was harmless, defendant's certain-persons conviction should be affirmed.  The State acknowledges that [...] should have instructed the jury that the certain-persons statute prohibited the possession of a "firearm," not a "weapon," and should have refrained from disclosing that the two predicate offenses were for possession of a controlled dangerous substance with intent to distribute within 1000 feet of a school.  See Model Jury Charges (Criminal), "Certain Persons Not to Have Any Firearms (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-7(b)(1)" (rev. Feb. 12, 2018); State v. Bailey, 231 N.J. 474, 488 (2018) ("If a defendant chooses to stipulate, evidence of the predicate offense is extremely limited: '[t]he most the jury needs to know is that the conviction admitted by the defendant falls within the class of crimes that . . . bar a convict from possessing a gun[.]'  A defendant who stipulates can therefore prevent the State from presenting evidence of the name and nature of the offense.  Provided that the stipulation is a knowing and voluntary waiver of rights, placed on the record in defendant's presence, the prosecution is limited to announcing to the jury that the defendant has committed an offense that satisfies the statutory predicate-offense element."  (alteration in original) (citation omitted).  But defendant never interposed an objection to the jury instructions he now challenges for the first time on appeal.
[brief] He rejected mitigating factor three, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1b(3) (defendant acted under a strong provocation) because “the facts adduced at trial do not indicate that the defendant acted under any provocation. ” (17T205-20 to 25).  He rejected mitigating factor six (defendant has compensated or will compensate the victims) because “defendant has not indicated that he will compensate the victims.
[brief] (5T52-1 to 13, 55-19 to 58-23, 63-12 to 64-17, 73-2 to 25, 138-2 to 139-13, 145-3 to 146-6, 152-11 to 17)  [...] testified she alone decided only those clips should be kept and disclosed.  Someone said they needed to free up space; she chose them since she --- \(^1\)Camera C-6 (12:20-12:40pm); C-21 (4:40-4:50pm) (5T64-3 to 17, 68-18 to 24) thought would fit on a single disk. [...] did not believe there was a written policy about who can decide to keep or destroy evidence retained by [...], though she admitted that even if a soda can turned out to not be of evidentiary value, it would still be kept in evidence.
[brief] [...]: It lulls the plaintiff into a sense of security, and -- THE COURT: But the Statute had already run by December of 2017 under my scenario, when he spoke to the guy who allegedly owes him the money.  See T2 at 6:18-7:7 …  THE COURT …the plaintiff had many occasions to respond to specific discovery requests and at the time of deposition to bring out any and all statements that were relevant to this case from the defendants or their representatives.  Plaintiff was specifically asked that question.  Nowhere on this motion record did the plaintiff disclose in discovery that they were told to wait until the hospital was sold by anybody, not the Russian accountant, not [[...]], not [...], not anybody.  So even giving the plaintiff the benefit of all reasonable doubt I am finding on this motion record that there’s no genuine issue of material fact: i.e. the plaintiff was never told to wait until the hospital was sold, and the hospital was sold in December of 2017.
[directive] Prior to the start of any questioning, the officer shall be advised that he or she is being questioned as the subject of an investigation into potential violations of agency rules and regulations, or fitness for duty.  He or she should be advised of the subject matter under investigation, and that he or she will be asked questions specifically related to performing their official duties.  N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.6(c).  8  50  INTERNAL AFFAIRS POLICY & PROCEDURES | August 2020  8.4.4
[brief] In the matter at bar, it is undisputed that Defendant is a specialist in a field that is recognized by the [...] ('[...]'), i.e. internal medicine, pulmonology and critical care and it is also undisputed that the care and treatment at issue involved a specialty recognized by the [...], i.e. critical care.  21A; 28A; 1T 13:2 – 13:18; and Pl. Br. at 19.
[brief] 29  POINT I ......................................................................................................  29  THERE IS NO RECORD BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT THAT SUPPORTED OR JUSTIFIED THE TRIAL COURT’S FINDINGS OF MISCONDUCT OR BAD FAITH BY THE BOARD AND/OR THE TOWNSHIP (2T4-15 to 2T6-1)  A.  “APPROVED AND THEN “UNAPPROVED” – BOARD MISCONDUCT (2T4-15 to 2T6-1) .................................................  33  B.  “BAD FAITH” (2T4-15 to 2T6-1) .......................................................  36  POINT II .........................................................................................................................  43  THERE IS NO RECORD BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT THAT SUPPORTED OR JUSTIFIED THE TRIAL COURT’S CONCLUSION THAT THE BOARD AND/OR THE TOWNSHIP BREACHED THE PARTIES’ SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT (Pa-001 & 2T4-17)  POINT III ......................................................................................................................... 50 THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING [...] ATTORNEY’S FEES AND/OR A DELAY PENALTIES (Pa021, 1T62-3 to 63-23; 3T-17 to 33:14; 3T40-22 to 41-14)  CONCLUSION .................................................................................................................. 51 Table of Judgments, Orders and Rulings Being Appealed Court Order in Aid of Litigant's Rights, Dated Aug. 8, 2023, .................................. 001a Court Order Dated Nov. 10, 2020, ........................................................................... 005a [...] Report Dated Oct 19, 2020, ...................................................... 009a Court Order Awarding AvalonBay Attorney Fees & Delay Penalty, Dated Dec. 19, 2023, ................................................................................................. 021a Table of Authority Table of Cases Cases Aldrich v. Schwartz, 258 N.J. Super. 300, 311 (App. Div. 1991)
[brief] Direct Appeal  On direct appeal, this Court affirmed defendant’s convictions but vacated his aggregate 55-year NERA sentence.  Importantly, however, this --- 3 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).  Court did not accept every argument defendant made against his sentence, and vacated the sentence for the very narrow reason that the sentencing court did not adequately consider his youth in conjunction with recent case law\(^4\) when imposing the aggregate sentence.  First, this Court found that consecutive sentences were appropriate in this case.
[directive] Multa del programa estatal de enfermeras examinadoras de víctimas de agresiones sexuales Statewide Sexual Assault Nurse Examiner Program Penalty  ¿Entiende usted que si el delito ocurrió el 4 de mayo de 2001 o después de esa fecha, como resultado [Sí/Yes] [No/No] de su declaración de culpabilidad, se requerirá que pague una multa de $800 por cada delito del cual se está declarando culpable?  Do you understand that if the crime occurred on or after May 4, 2001 as a result of your guilty plea you will be required to pay a penalty of $800 for each offense for which you are pleading guilty?