ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] [See 4T 86:17-138:4, 146:21-151:13].  [...] noted that no grout appeared on [...] but that he saw significant evidence of grout present on the back of [...]’s body, including his neck and back.  [4T 160:25-162:13].  Bodycam footage played for the jury showed Corporal [...], audibly frustrated, confront [...] after he observed the grout on [...]’s back:  [...]: Why is this guy covered in grout on the back of him?  . . .  [...]: Did he dump the down the back of his shirt or did you throw the grout at the back of him?  . . .  [...]: Okay.  So I’m going to ask my question again.  Why is the back side of him covered in grout?”  [...]: Because it went up.  [...]:  It went up so there’s nothing in the front of him.  There nothing on – . . . .  [...]: . . . . the front of this kid.  It’s on the back of him.  So it miraculously just went to the back of him.  Give me the ID.  I’m not going to ask you again.  Why is this guy covered in grout on the back of him?  [...]: Why are you yelling?  [...]: Because you’re not listening to me.  [...]: I am.  [...]:  Why is the back side of this kid covered in grout?  [...]: I have no idea.  [7T 84:3-86:5].
[brief] Defendants presented three arguments that are unsupported by law or fact.  First, they claimed they owed no duty to maintain the public sidewalk on their property.  That is incorrect as a matter of law and the facts of this case.  Defendants have a duty not to create or to exacerbate a dangerous sidewalk condition.  They suggest that the condition of the sidewalk was pre-existing so there can be no liability for the hazardous condition that it presented.  That claim is definitively negated by the testimony of [...] that he had the sidewalk constructed while he owned the property, thus creating the dangerous condition.  There is no immunity from liability for a hazardous condition created by defendants.
[brief] This argument was not raised at the trial court level.  See Pa050, Defendant’s Motion for New Trial.  See also Da077, Appellant’s Notice of Appeal.  25.  Appellant agreed to the amounts sought for costs and interest; and did not dispute counsel’s calculation of hours relative to attorney’s fee.  Pa082.  26.  The determination of attorney’s fee, which was upon certifications of experience and qualifications, as well as Court Ordered determination in another matter, relative to trial counsel with similar credentials.  In other words, the amount was not arbitrary.  (5T: 03:01 – 14:03, Trial Court’s opinion upon record).  27.  The trial level having decided the Motion on December 8, 2023, although not uploading an Order until January 17, 2024, did not consider Respondent’s amended proposed Order, submitted December 19, 2023, which was to enter the Offer of Judgment penalties against Appellant’s insurer, [...]; who did not make a single settlement offer in this matter despite an arbitration award in excess of the liability coverage and an Offer of Judgment.
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT’S INSTRUCTIONS ON THE STATE’S BURDEN OF PROOF WERE NOT CONFUSING OR CONTRADICTORY.  (NOT RAISED BELOW).  Defendant, for the first time on appeal, contends that the trial court’s jury instructions and verdict sheet were contradictory regarding the State’s burden to prove the elements of aggravated manslaughter and reckless manslaughter beyond a reasonable doubt and its burden to disprove self- defense.  Defendant also lodges a belated attack on the form of the verdict sheet, which did not contain a question about self-defense.  Defendant has not sustained his burden of establishing plain error with the trial court’s instructions and the verdict sheet.  Accordingly, this court should affirm defendant’s convictions.
[brief] Nor did he identify the man who broke away as the one who was eating corn chips; thus, the only reasonable inference to draw is that the man who “broke away” was not [...].  [...]’s testimony as to what he observed before activating his BWC – which established, at best, that while [...] was eating corn chips and standing with his friends, one of his friends walked with another person between two parked cars a couple of times – did not establish reasonable suspicion to believe any of the men, let alone [...], was involved in narcotics activity.  And it certainly did not provide probable cause to arrest the men for loitering for the purpose of committing a drug offense, as [...] also asserted.
[directive] 3.8.1  Prior to using force against people in a crowd, officers shall: (a) provide clear instructions and warnings in a manner that can be heard by persons in the crowd, such as through a bullhorn or speaker system when available; 11 USE OF FORCE POLICY | April 2022 (b) state the consequences of refusing to comply with a mandatory directive, including that arrests will occur and force may be used unless persons comply; and (c) give a reasonable opportunity to comply.  3.8.2  Force shall not be used against crowds engaged in peaceful demonstrations.  The visible presence or deployment of canines for crowd control purposes is prohibited in peaceful demonstrations.  Canines may be used for explosive detection or similar security sweeps at such gatherings.
[brief] Plaintiff asserts then that [...] had a good faith duty to provide Plaintiff with a copy of the application and the deposit agreement or advise him where they could be located before transferring his funds into the new accounts or at the very least upon transfer of the funds.  Plaintiff’s account statement dated 7/31/23 (Pa 80), contrary to the Bank’s insistence, does not advise the depositor the account agreement is available online.  First, Plaintiff can find no disclosure on the account statement providing that use of the account is an agreement to the arbitration clause and other terms of a deposit agreement or the location of the deposit agreement.  The only reference to account agreement terms appears on pages 2 and 4 of the statement, (Pa 81, 83):  Page 2 - “New Jersey account terms and conditions apply, (Pa 81); Page 4 - (Pa 83)  Monthly service fee summary -  For a complete list of fees and detailed account information see the disclosures applicable to your account or talk to a Banker.  Go to wellsfargo.com/feefaq for a link to these documents, and answers to common monthly service fee questions”.  That link takes you to a one page document entitled “Checking and Savings Monthly Fee Questions” with no reference to the account agreement or arbitration clause.  (Pa 155-156).  This is certainly not a clear, unambiguous reference to an arbitration or any agreement.  Nor does it explain where to find it.  No where in the nine page application (Pa 29-37) does it state that the Plaintiff acknowledges he was given a paper copy or provided the location of the application or any account agreement, that he was given the opportunity to review these, that he was given a copy of or the opportunity to review the arbitration agreement (which is not included in the application but in the account agreement which he did not see and was not referred to specifically).
[brief] [...] thoroughly addressed and rejected the [...]’ arguments (also re-asserted on this appeal [Db41]) that fees for pre-trial motions should be disallowed.  (39071a-79a)  His Honor specifically found each such motion was reasonably devoted to the pursuit (or defense) of Plaintiffs’ NJRICO claims.  For example, in recommending that [...]’s Motion for Statutory and Equitable Relief (Db41) “remain in the fee award,” [...] found that motion … …. sought a variety of relief all centered around halting [the [...]]’ persistent misuse of partnership funds and gaining access to documents that would further help [...] prove that misuse.  As previously noted, [the [...]]’ ongoing misuse of partnership funds -- to the detriment of Plaintiffs -- formed the basis for the predicate acts needed to establish [...]’s RICO claims.  …  In support of the[] motion, [...] submitted, among other evidence, a detailed certification from their accounting expert laying out the various ways in which [the [...]] misused partnership funds -- the actions that later formed the predicate acts of Plaintiffs’ RICO claims.  This shared factual basis demonstrates that this motion is based on the same common core of facts, and therefore should be compensable.  Even if [...]’s only claim in his complaint had been under RICO, this motion still likely would have been filed, as the basis for the relief was also the basis for the RICO claims.
[brief] Da36, ¶ 105, with Da158.  Defendant [...] has also been spreading malicious falsehoods about Plaintiff to at least one attorney at [...] Law, stating falsely that Plaintiff is attempting to “sabotage” [...] Law, has acted “unethically” and is trying to “steal” Defendants’ clients.  [...] knew these statements were false, and made them to hurt Plaintiff and future business prospects of Plaintiff.
[brief] [...]’s punitive damages claim is frivolous.  This is clearly not a case where [...] should be entitled to any punitive damages under the applicable standard.  First, [...]’s unclean hands bars him from seeking any damages, not to mention punitive damages, in light of his egregious forgery of [...]’s signature on the title transfer documents.  In addition, the transaction at issue, which was complained by [...], is justified by the December 10, 1998 deed listing [...] as the property owner.  Moreover, there is nothing in the record showing that [...] was even aware of the fact that it was [...], not [...], that signed [...]’s signature on the December 10, 1998 deed.  Further, Defendants hired an attorney [...] to conduct research with respect to the title issue, and acted accordingly based on [...]’s advice.  There is no way for [...] to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that Appellants/Defendants’ conduct was malicious, or they acted in wanton and willful disregard of [...]’s rights.  N.J.S.A. 2A:15-5.10.  CONCLUSION  None of the arguments advanced by Respondent/Cross-Appellant [...] has any merit.  Therefore, the Court should grant the relief requested by Appellant, and outright deny the Cross-Appeal.  Dated: May 7, 2024  By: [...]  [...] [...]  Tel: [...]  Fax: [...]  Counsel for Appellants  REPLY BRIEF FOR RESPONDENT/CROSS-APPELLANT
[brief] In *Polito v. Millburn Twp.*, 2011 W.L. 1405044 (App. Div. April 14, 2011), plaintiff was injured when a large tree branch fell on his truck.  The trial court granted summary judgment to the municipal defendant because “(1) the fallen branch did not constitute a dangerous condition under N.J.S.A. 59:4-2; (2) the municipal defendant lacked notice, either actual or constructive, of the alleged dangerous condition; and (3) the municipal defendant’s actions or inactions were not palpably unreasonable. ”  *Id.* at *6*.  The Appellate Division affirmed:  Applying the terms of N.J.S.A. 59:4-2 to the present case, we need not focus upon the elements of dangerous condition and notice; notwithstanding the substantial evidential deficiencies identified by the motion judge concerning those two elements.  Instead, we rest our analysis upon the pivotal element of palpably unreasonable conduct.  Even if, for the sake of argument, we construed [...]’s statements and [...]’s expert report to raise genuine issues of material fact as to whether (1) the oak tree constituted a dangerous condition before the accident, and as to whether (2) the Township’s received notice of that danger, we agree with the motion judge that, as a matter of law, there is insufficient proof that the conduct of the municipal defendants was ‘palpably unreasonable.
[brief] TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS BEING APPEALED  Page  Final Judgment of the Honorable [...], dated August 4, 2023 .................................................................Pa1  Order of the Honorable [...], dated July 22, 2022 ......................................................................Pa8  Decision of the Honorable [...], dated July 22, 2022 ........................................................................Pa10  Order of the Honorable [...], dated July 22, 2022 ........................................................................Pa43  Transcript of Ruling by the Court, dated July 31, 2023 .....................6T31-42 | Description | Page | |----------------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | Transcript of Trial, dated March 20, 2023 | 1T | | Transcript of Trial, dated March 21, 2023 | 2T | | Transcript of Trial, dated March 22, 2023 | 3T | | Transcript of Trial, dated March 23, 2023 | 4T | | Transcript of Trial, dated April 3, 2023 | 5T | | Transcript of Ruling by the Court, dated July 31, 2023 | 6T | | Transcript of Motion for Stay Pending Appeal, dated September 14, 2023 | 7T | ## TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ### Cases: **Haydock v. Haydock,** 34 N.J. Eq. 570 (E. & A. 1881) ................................................................. 5 **In re Fulper’s Estate,** 99 N.J. Eq. 292 (Prerog. Ct. 1926) ......................................................... 5-6 **Massa v. Laing,** 160 N.J. Super. 443; 390 A.2d 624 .......................................................... 4 **Moses v. Moses,** 140 N.J. Eq. 575 (Court of Errors and Appeals, 1949) ............................. 11 **Mott v. Mott,** 49 N.J. Eq. 192 (Ch. 1891) .................................................................... 5, 6 **Pascale v. Pascale,** 549 A.2d 782, 113 N.J. 20 (1988) ........................................................... 4, 6, 7, 9 **Seylaz v. Bennett,** 5 N.J. 168 (1950)
[directive] Search and Seizure  7.8.1 All people, including police officers, have a Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures.  In an internal affairs investigation, the Fourth Amendment applies to any search the employing agency undertakes.  The internal affairs investigator must be cognizant of the various principles governing search and seizure, particularly where the investigator will conduct a search as part of a criminal investigation or will search personal property belonging to the subject officer.  7.8.2  Criminal investigations generally require the investigator to obtain a search warrant to conduct a search.  Search warrants require probable cause to believe that the search will reveal evidence of a crime.  In internal affairs investigations, a search warrant should be obtained before a search is conducted of a subject officer's personal property, including any home, personal car, bank accounts, safety deposit boxes, briefcases, etc.  A warrant also may be necessary where a search of the subject officer's workplace is conducted and it is determined that the officer has a high expectation of privacy in the place to be searched.  The internal affairs investigator should consult with the County Prosecutor’s Office before undertaking the search of any workplace area in a criminal investigation.  37
[brief] In addition to its new interpretation of the Holding Act, the Department is using the Bulletin to misapply and misuse language of SSAP No. 25 to subjectively regulate AIF fees paid by individual subscribers to the exchange.  SSAP No. 25 governs accounting and disclosures for transactions between affiliates and related parties.  The AIF for a reciprocal exchange is considered to be a related party to the exchange, as it exercises control over and makes decision on behalf of the exchange.  A transaction between the exchange itself and the AIF may implicate SSAP No. 25.  In contrast, AIF fees, which are set forth in the Power of Attorney (the “POA”) filed with the Department, are paid individually by each new subscriber as a pre-requisite to join the exchange, and do not involve a related party transaction between the AIF and the exchange itself.  SSAP No. 25 has never been used by the Department to regulate transactions between individual subscribers to an exchange and the AIF because the payment of AIF fees is an arm’s length transaction between two willing and unaffiliated entities—the individual subscriber and the AIF—who lack common interests or control/ownership.  Indeed, [...] has filed over seventy quarterly and annual financial statements, and the Department has never once sought to regulate [...]’s AIF fees through SSAP No. 25 until now.
[brief] FOR LEAVE TO APPEAR AS AMICUS CURIAE [...]  [...] [...]  ON THE BRIEF: [...], Esquire  Attorney ID No.: 025091996  [...], Esquire Attorney ID No.: 023292008  Table of Contents  Table of Citations ........................................................................................................ ii  Procedural History & Statement of Facts .................................................................  1 Argument ..................................................................................................................  2  Point I  The [...] policy conflicts with well-settled state law ...........................................  3  Point II  In light of the conflict between the [...] policy and state law, the reasonable expectation of the insured that a 6-year limitation period applies should control ........................................................................................................  7  Point III  Settlement offers made by Respondent [...] after the 4-year limitation period evidence  Respondent’s belief that the 6-year limitation period applied ........................................................................................................  9  Conclusion ..................................................................................................................  11
[brief] In addition to that sheriff’s officer, multiple other individuals observed voir dire, including when [...] and counsel were in the jury deliberation room.  Among them were: a second sheriff’s officer, the court clerk, Defendants, the Defense insurance adjuster, and various other court personnel (6T, at 55:8-19; 7T, at 14:7-12; 26:8-16; 27:22-25). ¹  None of these individuals, and none of the members of the jury array, reported that Plaintiff attempted to speak to, interact with, or in any way influence any member of the jury pool (6T, at 55:8-19; 7T, at 25:21-4; 26:8-16).
[brief] Aa425 (emphasis added).  [...] and [...], the Defendants in the Underlying Action, tried to employ one of their delay tactics in the Underlying Action by claiming that it overlapped with the Federal Case, and should be stayed.  The Court in the Underlying Action soundly rejected that delay tactic – finding that the cases had “different parties,” “different claims,” “different relationships,” and “different conduct. ”  Id.  It is understandable why.  In the Federal Case, [...] and [...] have sued [...], his wife, and two related companies -- none of the [...] is parties to that action.  Aa68.  In that action, [...] and [...] have demanded payment for the fair market value of their membership interest at the time of their resignation and withdrawal (Count I), claimed breach of fiduciary duty based on [...]’s alleged failure to disclose his personal interests (Count II), conversion for [...]’s alleged “siphon[ing]” of funds (Count III), fraudulent misrepresentation related to corporate members and administrative expenses (Counts IV-V), conspiracy to commit fraud and civil conspiracy between [...] and his wife (Counts VI-VII), and aiding and abetting [...]’s alleged breach of fiduciary duty against [...]’s wife (Count IX).  Id.  That is not the issue in the Underlying Action, where the [...] are the plaintiffs asserting that [...] and [...] stole their assets and information.  Finally, [...] misrepresents the orders in the Federal Case.  The Orders concerning the Titan Subpoena expressly invited\(^5\) and permitted a subpoena of a non-party [...].  Aa32.  When the deposition was obstructed with numerous objections and instructions not to answer, the Court allowed a second deposition to go forward, but this time in the presence of the presiding Magistrate Judge.  Aa503.  **POINT III**
[brief] (Da5).  At the sentencing hearing, the Honorable [...], P.J. Cr. (“[...]”) found aggravating factors 1, 3, 6, and 9.  (Da7).  [...] did not find any mitigating factors.  (Id.).  [...] thus found that the aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating factors.  (Id.).  On the murder charge, [...] imposed a sentence of life in prison, subject to the No Early Release Act, to be followed by five years of parole supervision.
[brief] [...] SHOULD HAVE BEEN PRECLUDED FROM ARGUING THAT PLAINTIFF WAS NOT SUING HASSAN FOR ASSAULT.  (11T4:19-5:7)  The trial judge erred in permitting counsel for Lowe's to tell the jury in his closing argument that plaintiff was NOT suing [...] for assault and battery, because the only allegation at trial against [...] was negligence.  (11T4:19-5:7).  In his closing argument counsel said:  "You may be surprised -- you may have been surprised to learn that the plaintiff in this case is not alleging an assault and battery.  We have had all this testimony, right?  All this back and forth about who punched who, and who caused the fight.  And the plaintiff isn't seeking to recover for an assault and battery by Mr. [...].  What he's seeking to recover is negligence, right?  Acting unreasonably.  And so that negligence of Mr. [...] is alleged improper self-defense.  . . . the only legal remedy that plaintiff has in this case is for you to believe that the self-defense was improper."  (11T59:1-24).  The trial judge's ruling permitting this argument (11T4:19) was exactly at odds with his ruling earlier in the case where the colloquy went as follows:  "[...]: Can I then say there is a tort claim known as "battery" that is not being brought?  [...]: It's not before them.  THE COURT: No.  [...]: So leave it at the "he's only bringing a negligence claim."  THE COURT: He's only bringing a negligence claim."  (3T18:13-20).  Compounding the error, counsel also improperly used his closing argument to once again erroneously argue that plaintiff could only recover if [...] negligently defended himself.  See section III(B)(1), above.  (1T59:1-24).  Allowing counsel to compare assault and negligence in referring to plaintiff's allegations against [...] in this manner was "clearly capable of producing an unjust result."
[directive] Whenever a defendant is convicted after trial of a qualifying Post-trial agreements.  Chapter 35 offense, the prosecuting attorney shall offer the defendant the opportunity to enter into an agreement prior to sentencing that contains the following terms:  1.  Pursuant to Section 12, the court at sentencing shall impose a period of parole ineligibility for any qualifying Chapter 35 offense equal to one-third of the sentence, less commutation, minimum custody, and work credits earned while in custody, consistent with N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.51(a), as if the individual had not been subject to a mandatory minimum term; and 2.  The court at sentencing shall retain discretion to impose any other sentencing terms it deems just and appropriate, including, where appropriate, the imposition of an additional, discretionary period of parole ineligibility, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:43- 6(b), if the court is clearly convinced that the aggravating factors substantially outweigh the mitigating factors.  Any such period of discretionary parole ineligibility Page 8 would be served in addition to the period equal to one-third of the sentence, less prison credits, described in Section I.B.1 above.  C.
[brief] (Aa11).  The effective date in the FNDA was April 13, 2020.  (Aa3).  Although five business days from April 3 would normally be April 10, State offices were closed on that date in 2020 in observance of the Good Friday holiday.  Thus, the next business day was the following Monday, April 13, 2020, the effective date contained in the FNDA.  (Ibid.).  [...] challenged the FNDA and the case was transmitted to the Office of Administrative Law (the "OAL").