ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] When authorizing a as may the release court the recognizance, personal or bail on trial before custody with any contact from having the defendant prohibiting the order an issue release of condition victim's residence, entering the from defendant the restraining to, limited not but including, victim the the or or victim stalking harassing from and school, or business, or employment of place order an enter may court also The any way. in relatives or co-workers, friends, victim's animal possessed, owned, leased, any with contact any having from defendant prohibiting the addition, the may In court household.  residing the in child minor a or party either by held or kept, shall be animal not providing the that animal and of possession the the directing order an enter order may an enter court The or offense. of crime disposition the the to prior of disposed subsection in enumerated weapon other or firearm any possessing from defendant the prohibiting any location such in weapon any of and seizure for search ordering the and 2C:39-1 N.J.S. of r. with shall judge located.  state
[directive] Cf. Protection Bureau, 15 Consumer Complaints Throughout the Credit Life Cycle, by Demographic Characteristics (Sept. 2021), https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_consumer-complaints-throughout-credit-life- cycle_report_2021-09.pdf (“[A]s the share of African American residents increases, the rate of submitting complaints [to the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau] continues to increase across virtually the whole range of shares.  This difference is substantial, but it is unclear what factors contribute to the higher rates of submission in communities with a high share of Black or African American residents. ”); Federal Trade Commission, Serving Communities of Color: A Staff Report on the Federal Trade Commission’s Efforts to Address Fraud and Consumer 3 (Oct. 2021), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/serving- Issues Affecting Communities of Color communities-color-staff-report-federal-trade-commissions-efforts-address-fraud-consumer/ftc-communities-color- report_oct_2021-508-v2.pdf (noting communities with different demographic populations reported different types of concerns at different rates).
[brief] Robbery is a crime of the second degree, but is a crime of the first degree “if in the course of committing the theft the actor ... is armed with, or uses or threatens the immediate use of a deadly weapon. ”  *N.J.S.A. 2C:15–1b*.  The victim was unable to identify the object in defendant's hand as a weapon.  The judge acknowledged that “it's a jury question whether [the victim] recognized [the “long and pointy” object] as a weapon; whether [the victim] was put in fear of it....”  If the jury concluded that the object was not a weapon, they could still determine that the victim was put in fear of bodily injury by the mere presence of two men who entered her residence without permission through the back door at 9:00 in the evening.  Thus, the jury could acquit on first-degree robbery and convict on second-degree robbery.
[directive] (ODARA) in certain domestic violence Assessment Assault Risk  Domestic Ontario the applying for preserve the option of acomplaint-warrant would issuance of moreover, that Note, and/or violate a release condition, if defendant were to of release revocation detention, or pretrial release pretrial services program as a bracelet) by the ankle monitoring (an electronic to seek Section 4.6.  See condition. case in violence acomplaint-summons a domestic issue decision to that the note Also Prevention set forth in the mandatory arrest policy impact the not Directive does pursuant to this for a determination whether apply 2C:25-21(a).
[brief] •  **[...]**  ….Leonard[] was a partner and thus owed the other partners and the partnership itself a fiduciary duty.  At trial, he testified he was aware of [...][‘s] improper taking of partnership funds and was aware of discrete events constituting theft, conversion, and breach of fiduciary duty, all from which Leonard benefitted financially.  In fact, Leonard[] testified he received the partnership’s financial statements and was specifically aware of the exorbitant “management fees,” but elected not to say anything about them to [...].  Leonard[] knew a wrong was being committed and was benefitting from that wrong by failing to stop [...]’s theft; therefore, Leonard[‘s] omission was committed with actual malice and with a wanton and willful disregard of the other partners from whom he was stealing.….  Leonard’s omissions were certain to result in harm during the non-RICO [SOL P]eriod.  ….  From 2004 [forward], Leonard received the partnership’s financial statements and was aware of [...]’s theft, but never interfered with his theft because “that [was] what we do. ” (225T54:10-56:2).  As such, Leonard knew for an absolute certainty that if he did not interfere with [...][‘s] theft, as was his fiduciary obligation, then plaintiffs would be harmed because [...][] was taking their money.  ***  Leonard[] testified he was aware that [...] was taking enormous funds from the partnership, and witnessed sharp and unjustified increases in management fees depending on the year (e.g., $1.5 million in fees in 2004 increased to $1.760 million in 2005).  Leonard[] testified he did not interfere even though he himself thought the fees were excessive.  As such, he was aware that the fees were unjustifiable and thus aware that the taking of those “fees” would harm the partnership and were a direct result of (1) [...][‘s] stealing and (2) his failure to stop [...][].  ….  Accordingly, he was aware that serious harm would result if he did not stop his [cousin] from stealing from the partnership. ….  [With respect to] the profitability [and] financial condition[,] … Leonard is financially secure, and the imposition of punitive damages will not burden him in any material way.  ….  Despite the limited sting of punitive damages in this case, considering [his] expansive wealth, the court must nonetheless impose punitive damages to deter future illegal conduct.  ....  Leonard will be responsible for 20% [of the punitive damages awarded].  ....  Leonard owed the partnership and his partners the highest duty of loyalty and honesty.  He was tasked with upholding the trust they placed in him as a business partner.  For over 20 years, and during the entire non-RICO [SOL P]eriod, Leonard[] rebuffed that duty.  He kept quiet in the shadows, saying not a word as ... [...][] stole millions of dollars from their partners.  Leonard[] was complicit in [...][’s scheme of manipulation, fraud, theft, and conversion by remaining silent and quietly accepting his share of the stolen funds.  As such, the award of punitive damages is proper and reasonable to punish Leonard for his omissions.  .... •
[brief] Hodges v. Sasil Corp., 189 N.J. 210 (2007) ...........................................................................  8  Hoover v. Monarch Recovery Mgt., Inc., 888 F. Supp. 2d 589 (E.D. Pa. 2012) ..................................................  12  Hopkins v. Convergent Outsourcing, Inc., Case No. [...] (N.J. Sup. Ct. May 31, 2023) ...............................................................
[brief] Several of respondent’s postings on Facebook have been the subject of community criticism at Board meetings and caused the Board to take official action to formally condemn and denounce certain posts, request the respondent to remove the posts, and publicly condemn and denounce certain posts, and publicly comment that no one Board member has the authority to speak for the Board.  (Ca024).  As a result, [...] found:  As previously determined, respondent used her Facebook account when she campaigned to get on the Board and when she was sworn in as a Board member.  It is also the same platform that she used after she became a Board member to publish her opinions, political viewpoints, and/or calls for action.  When she became a member of the Board, not only did her Facebook rhetoric take on greater weight, it also carried the potential to be viewed as Board endorsement or action.  The latter point is evidenced by the multiple Board resolutions that were passed disavowing respondent’s postings and demanding that they be taken down and the litigation that was filed against the Board.  (Ca034).  Nowhere in the Commission’s Final Decision does the Commission state that these findings were not credible, that they were disputed, or that they were incorrect.  As a result of this clear evidentiary record, [...] found:
[brief] To the extent that this court finds any of [...]’s factual allegations of malice to be sufficiently pleaded, so as to create a factual issue as to the applicability of the statutory prosecutorial immunity under N.J.S.A. 59:3-8, the State Defendants would request that this court remand these claims with direction for [...] “precisely identify each instance forming the basis for his claims, including the specific defendant(s) alleged to be involved. ”  See Aletta, 2024 WL 2744677, at *10.  CONCLUSION
[brief] POINT II  THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RECONSIDERED ITS MARCH 13, 2023 ORDER AND CORRECTLY ENTERED SUMMARY JUDGMENT BASED ON THE CITY’S AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE.  (Pa271-282).  As the trial court properly found, Appellant’s claims must fail because the [...] produced evidence in the record to demonstrate that it was entitled to the affirmative defense that it maintained and utilized an effective anti-harassment and anti-discrimination policy at the time of the incident.  While the trial court initially denied summary judgment on March 13, 2023, it correctly reconsidered same when it noted that the issue of the [...]’s affirmative defense was raised at summary judgment, but the record was devoid of any analysis or consideration of same.
[brief] STATEMENT OF PROCEDURAL HISTORY  Plaintiffs filed the Complaint on March 4, 2020.  1a.  Plaintiffs filed an Amended Complaint on April 30, 2020.  68a.  [...] filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint on May 28, 2020.  142a.  The [...] filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ Complaint on May 29, 2020.  144a.  [...] filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ Complaint on June 3, 2020.  146a.  Plaintiffs filed opposition briefs to said motions to dismiss on July 30, 2020.  On August 28, 2020, the Trial Court erroneously granted all of said motions to dismiss.  148a – 185a.  The [...] and [...] filed motions for sanctions and counsel fees on September 15, 2020.  186a – 189a.  Plaintiffs filed opposition briefs to said motions on October 8, 2020.  The Trial Court granted the [...] and [...]’s motions on January 25, 2022.  190a – 203a.  The [...] and [...] filed motions for sanctions and counsel fees on February 8, 2022.  204a – 207a.  Plaintiffs filed an Opposition and Cross-Motion to Reconsider the Orders of January 25, 2022, on February 24, 2022.  208a.  On June 30, 2022, the Trial Court granted in part Plaintiffs’ Cross-Motion and reconsidered its Order of January 25, 2022, granting counsel fees to the [...].  209a – 232a.  Also on June 30, 2022, the Trial Court denied in part Plaintiffs’ Cross-Motion to Reconsider its Order of January 25, 2022, granting counsel fees to [...], and granted [...]’s motion for counsel fees.  209a – 232a.  Plaintiffs timely filed a Notice of Appeal on July 29, 2022 (233a), and timely filed an Amended Notice of Appeal on August 8, 2022.  The appeal against the [...] was dismissed on March 2, 2023.
[brief] *7  There are three exceptions to the automatic standing rule in searches of real property, that is, an accused will not have standing to challenge the search of: (1) an “abandoned property,” (2) “property on which he was trespassing,” or (3) “property from which he was lawfully evicted. ”  Randolph, 228 N.J. at 585 (citing Brown, 216 N.J. at 527-29; State v. Hinton, 216 N.J. 211 (2013)).
[brief] Plaintiffs, as the parties asserting unconscionability, bear the burden of proving unconscionability.  See Vector Foiltec LLC v. Becker, No. A-3293-22, 2024 WL 3153194, at *13 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. June 25, 2024) (not reported); see also Harrington v. Atl. Sounding Co., Inc., 602 F.3d 113, 124 (2d Cir. 2010).  To determine whether Plaintiffs have met their burden, the court must “conduct a fact-sensitive analysis and assess both procedural and substantive unconscionability. ”  Pace v. Hamilton Cove, 258 N.J. 82, 103 (2024).  “Courts generally have applied a sliding-scale approach to determine overall unconscionability, considering the relative levels of both procedural and substantive unconscionability. ”  Delta Funding Corp. v. Harris, 189 N.J. 28, 40 (2006).  Under that approach, even “a high level of procedural unconscionability” in which one party possesses “greater sophistication and bargaining power” may not be enough to “render an entire agreement unenforceable. ”  *Stelluti v. Casapenn Enters., LLC*, 203 N.J. 286, 301 n.10 (2010).  Here, Plaintiffs cannot show that [...]’s terms are so substantively or procedurally unconscionable that they should be regarded as unconscionable and therefore unenforceable.
[brief] Id.  [...]’s argument that the trial court evaluated [...]’s bid as of August 20, 2024, and not the bid opening date, is wrong.  In its decision denying [...]’s motion for reconsideration, the trial court explained that it made its determination (that [...]’s omission of the Notice of Classification was an immaterial and waivable defect) by examining the facts as they existed at bid opening and determined the omission to be immaterial and waivable.  3T31:15-32:17.  Indeed, there is no dispute that, on the date of bid opening, [...] was registered and possessed a valid Notice of Classification.  Da362.  It is also undisputed that [...] cured its trivial omission, by supplying a copy of its existing and publicly available Notice of Classification (which could not be altered), as permitted by law.
[brief] Any actions taken by [...] after that Closing would be subject to the law on corporate waste which can be brought by the directors or congregants on [...]’s behalf.  Notably, no such action has been filed against [...]’s directors to date.  Moreover, such an action would fail because [...]’s transfer of the Property to [...] was to protect the Property and the mosque from any further damage by the [...], [...] or any other party.  Having been through the almost three years of angst and litigation caused by [...], [...] did not want to incur any further disruption or interference with its existential purpose of providing for its congregation.  If the Trial Court did not understand why the [...] board undertook certain actions, then it should have held a plenary hearing to determine the facts prior to adjudicating on an incomplete record.
[brief] In determining whether a party has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits, our courts consider “whether the legal or equitable principles upon which the claim is based are doubtful or unsettled, or whether the material facts are in dispute, or both. ”  Waste Mgt., 433 N.J. Super. at 452 (citation omitted).  This inquiry requires an examination of whether Plaintiff demonstrated that the material facts favored its position.  See id. at 452-53.  In analyzing whether the legal right underlying Plaintiff’s claim is settled, the trial court held that the law under the Mount Laurel doctrine is “pretty clear.” (1T53:23-25).  However, the court had already acknowledged that the law under these particular set of facts is not clear, stating that, “[n]one of the cases that were cited to me were directly on point on this, and the cases that were cited to have very big differences,” meaning the cases did not “involve a municipality that has been found to be not constitutionally compliant . . . and where you have a developer who is ready, willing and able to come forward with development that will include affordable housing.
[brief] Because the first Miller factor “invites consideration of the ‘hallmark features’ of youth,” including “impetuousness” (Zuber, 227 N.J. at 445) the judge was required to analyze the details of the crime and determine whether impetuousness was a motivating factor.  It is undeniable that the details in this case showed no impetuousness.  Defendant and co-conspirators deliberately selected an isolated home in a wooded area, equipped themselves with masks, and brought along pliers to cut what they thought was alarm wires.  They planned their crime before execution, and even defendant’s expert conceded that the crime reflected “well thought out planning. ”  When this matter was reviewed by the Appellate Division following the second sentencing, the panel found that “the double-murder home-invasion burglary does not appear to be an example of children lack[ing] maturity and responsibility’ .  . . .  Defendants intended to commit murder.  The victims were not slain incidental to burglary. ”  Baker, No. A-2961-18 (slip op. at 12).  The Miller factors have not changed since this matter was last reviewed, neither have the relevant facts, and the panel’s finding is therefore law of the case.
[brief] At Db26 to Db27, defendants point out (again) that there was no response to the cross-motion statement.  They already said this, several times, in their Point II.  At Db28, defendants refer to "peaceable possession of lands" for purposes of N.J.S.A. 2A:62-1.  The plaintiff was in possession of the land.  The litigation started because of the defendants' interference.
[brief] (“In adjudicating disability discrimination claims under the NJLAD, our courts have regularly looked to cognate principles under the ADA and related federal law for guidance. ”)  Dial, Inc. v. City of Passaic, 443 N.J. Super. 492, 513 (App. Div. 2016)  In interpreting the ADA the Federal [...] has regularly found “no fault” attendance policies, similar to the one under challenge in this case, to facially violate the ADA.  The [...] has stated in its 2016 policy document (“Employer-Provided Leave and the Americans with Disabilities Act”)¹ (See Table of Authorities) that protected leave may not be penalized:  An employer may not penalize an employee for using leave as a reasonable accommodation.  Doing so would be a violation of the ADA because it would render the leave an ineffective accommodation; it also may constitute retaliation for use of a reasonable accommodation.  The [...] has also stated in its May 19, 2016 policy document that punishing some employee who utilize protected leave and not punishing others for other types of leave constitutes disparate treatment.
[brief] [...]:  Thank you, Judge.  And, Judge, just to go a little bit deeper into the procedural history -- THE COURT: Of course.  [...]: -- yes, [...] is what I'd refer to as the murder/felony murder/robbery superseding indictment.  The Indictment [...] is what I'll refer to as the robbery case.  There was the motion to suppress in that [...] robbery case, THE COURT: Right.  Right, okay.  It was [...], but the way you said things -- [...]: Yes.  THE COURT: -- and I know it wasn't, you know, deliberate.  [...]: No.  And to be quite clear, none of us, meaning myself, Your Honor or [...] were the parties involved back then.  THE COURT: Right.  [...]:  But I know that we are all experienced and can relate to things of similar nature happening in other cases that we've either overseen or handled ourselves.  But the plea transcript is very clear that, you know, the colloquy went on in the morning that basically, this is your last chance to plea.  So this was not an otherwise, you know, set up as a final disposition conference, set up as a possible plea negotiation, set up as a way where, you know, [...] was walking in thinking he was going to have more time to speak to the attorney or go through anything else.
[brief] This is directly opposite of what [...] stated.  (Pa97-104).  In the event this Court is not satisfied with Mr. Young and his methodology, one of the many other experts in the field contacted by [...] and interested parties is [...].  Dr. Corthals’ CV reflects that Dr. Corthals is a renowned subject matter expert in the field of DNA collection from antique items and has worked on cases including Egyptian royal mummies and the frozen Incan children of Llullaillaco.  (Pa161).  Dr. Corthals contends that “With respect to the Lindbergh case, I can indeed confirm that it is possible to retrieve DNA from historically important documents both uninvasively and in a non-destructive manner. ” (Pa182-183).  It is also noteworthy that the Court did not address the arguments from the Appellant regarding the condition of the items requested.  When Appellant advised that she had learned from the previous Archivist who spent over 30 years at the State Police Museum that to his knowledge, only one person (interested party [...]) in 30 years ever asked to see the back of the envelopes, the Court did not allow for an adequate discussion on this point from Appellant’s counsel.  The fact remains that DNA testing to the back of the envelopes and the stamps as described by Appellant, interested parties and their expert will not alter the historical envelopes and will not deprive the public access to viewing these envelopes in their original state.  Professional, modern-day forensics can extract DNA from these envelopes as described by Appellant expert [...] (Pa97) or through the swabbing method describe by Dr. Corthals (Pa182) with no substantial risk of damage, contrary to Respondent’s claims.
[brief] PROCEDURAL HISTORY  On October 18, 2016, Plaintiff predecessor [...] purchased tax sale certificate number [...] for $2,330.07.  (Da21)  On December 17, 2018, [...] filed a foreclosure complaint.  (Da8)  Plaintiff filed an amended complaint on February 25, 2019.  (Da8)  [...] filed a contested answer on April 1, 2019.  (Da22)  May 1, 2019  [...] filed chapter 13 petition for bankruptcy (which was dismissed four months later.)  (Da8)  On June 21, 2019 the Court granted Plaintiff [...] summary judgment, struck [...]’s answer and entered default.  (Da8-Da9)  The Court set February 28, 2020 as the last date for redemption.  (Da9)  Plaintiff filed a motion for final judgment on May 24, 2020 (Da9) and the Court entered final judgment in favor of Plaintiff on June 29, 2020 barring [...]’s right to redeem and vesting title to [...]’s property over to Plaintiff.  (Da1)  December 2, 2021  [...] filed a motion to vacate judgment.  (Da9)  On January 7, 2022 the Court denied the motion finding that [...] failed to satisfy Rule 4:50-1 noting the judgment was over a year old, [...] did not certify he had funds to redeem and circumstances were not compelling.  (Da11)  The Court denied [...]’s request to carry the motion to finalize the loan and redemption due to the fact that the lender did not file a motion to intervene (despite the fact that same is not required by law.)  (Da12)  On January 11, 2022 the Court entered Plaintiff’s writ of possession.  (Da12)  On January 11, 2022 [...] filed Chapter 7 petition for bankruptcy which was dismissed February 28, 2022.  (Da12)  On January 31, 2022 [...] filed a motion for reconsideration and informed the Court that [...] had the funds of $111,095.40 to redeem the tax sale certificate  (Da12)  On February 18, 2022 the Court denied the motion for reconsideration stating there “was nothing new” and the judgment was 18 months old.  (Da13)  [...] filed an appeal arguing that the Court errored in entering judgment and again in denying the motion to vacate and motion for reconsideration.
[brief] Zoning amendments are not routinely made or granted.  A purchaser in a voluntary transaction would rarely pay the price the property would be worth if the amendment were an accomplished fact.  See, Gorga, *supra* at 118 [emphasis added].  Later, the New Jersey Supreme Court would expand on this reasoning, explaining:  We view Gorga as expressing a preference that condemned property be valued under the existing ordinance and then some value be added to reflect the likelihood of the proposed zoning change.