ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] See e.g. *Bove, supra*, 460 N.J. Super. at 149.  Also on Db20, he also misstates a fact about his own case that he had filed against his former law partner where he lacked standing.  He falsely stated that he “did not further pursue the case after receiving a R. 1:4-8 letter”.  However eCourts clearly shows that soon after it was initially dismissed (w/o prejudice), he then filed an amended complaint; and he then spitefully named his own former co-plaintiff as a defendant (i.e. after she had written to the court saying that she had no idea of [...]’s actions).  The case was settled a year and a half later.  (Pa86-87, ¶¶29-39; Pa94-104)  But as I argued in my principal brief, even assuming arguendo if I did misunderstand the law, sanctions should not be imposed because a litigant is wrong about the law.  See *Tagayun v. AmeriChoice*, 446 N.J. Super. 570 (App.Div. 2016).  Interestingly and tellingly, although I cited *Tagayun* repeatedly in my principal brief, he makes no mention of that authority anywhere in his Respondent brief.
[brief] ”  Other factors are “[t]he nature of the parties’ relationship” as well as “the purpose and context of the communications. ”  Id.  In *Simon v. FIA Card Servs.*, N.A., 732 F.3d 259, 266 (3d Cir. 2013), an argument was made that a communication was not covered by the FDCPA because it did not include a demand for payment.
[brief] [...] asserts that the Trial Court did not err in “barring the testimony of Plaintiff’s liability experts as net opinions and granting Summary Judgment to [...] on that basis”.  (DbL40).  As support for this position, [...] provides the following quote from the trial Court’s opinion granting it summary judgment:  While the experts opine as to back lighting as a dangerous condition, their reports failed to provide any information demonstrating the prevalence of same, or that safety professionals have raised concerns about same, in a general fashion.  Their reports never addressed any standards, code, or recommendation, as to what entities should do with regards to the potential of the back lighting.  This Court is unable, based upon the factual record, to determine whether back lighting is a common or rare condition, and whether any recognized (indiscernible) the organizations have offered any publications or made any recommendations, addressing not only the conditions, but presume the actions to be taken to(indiscernible) the condition.  Neither [...] -- Mr. [...], nor [...] references of any publication of any kind addressing dangers of back lighting and actions to be taken.  While the Court commends the efforts of plaintiff’s counsel in seeking to find a further remedy for a tragically injured person, the proofs are lacking to support a claim against the [...].  There are insufficient proofs to a dangerous condition, notice of palpably unreasonable conduct.  There’s no prof of -- there is no proof of unreasonable conduct in the record.  Again, no prior complaints, no prior accidents, no reports of inoperable lighting.  (Indiscernible) the question of palpably unreasonable conduct, and that of a dangerous condition, is one for the jury.
[brief] \(^6\)  Our caselaw has called the diminished capacity charge conceptually similar to the voluntary intoxication charge.  *State v. R.T.*, 411 N.J. Super. 35, 61-62 (App. Div. 2009) (discussing similarities between voluntary intoxication and diminished capacity).  Counterintuitively, the trial court even stated, “the facts underlying the intoxication charge are far less compelling than the defendant’s bizarre behavior with respect to any diminished capacity charge. ” (9T16-12 to 19).  If the record was sufficient to charge a voluntary intoxication defense, clearly it should likewise have been sufficient for the much more “compelling” diminished capacity defense.
[brief] The summons and complaint were sent to the address provided by the Defendant, which turned out to be a post office box that Defendant [...] would open and close whenever convenient for her.  The same post office box that she provided to the trial court.  The same address used by the Bergen County Fee Arbitration.  On May 10th, 2019, “[...], representing Miss [...] entered -- sent a letter into the Court.  It was asking the Court not to enter a default judgment against her. ”  [T32:2-5]  The trial court found that “where it says out-of-State for 4:4-4 and 4:4-5 when we read them in para materia, which allows service by certified mail by the Clerk to an out-of-State defendant on a Special Civil Part case. ”  [T33:13-17]  Significantly, on August 27th, 2019, there was a Substitution of Attorney filed by Defendant [...] to represent herself in the underlying lawsuit.  [T34:10-15; Pa3]  Defendant [...] argued that “He should have gone and done the rule, the summary judgment procedure, and we wouldn’t even be here.
[brief] *Brady* dismissed an indictment for the grand-jury equivalent of nearly precisely what was done here.  In that case, the prosecutor presenting the matter to the grand jury failed to explain the scope of the legal duties of the public official in the case and instead left the grand jury to conclude what the exact scope of those duties was.  452 N.J. Super. at 165-166.  The only difference here is that it was the judge who failed in that regard with the petit jury.  Just as the [...], and [...], and thus, defendant’s convictions, all of which hinged on an explanation -- that was never given -- of his legal duties regarding turning in the ID once suspended, must be reversed and the matter remanded for retrial of those counts.
[brief] Finally, the Board’s conclusion that the project would cause a visual impact is a red herring.  The Resolution concludes that the height of the building, which is proposed to be 3 stories, rather than 2.5 stories as permitted for single-family residential dwellings in the zone, was problematic.  [Da139, ¶ 39].  But as noted above, the Resolution provides no explanation for how exceeding the limit on the number of stories applicable to a single-family dwelling impacts nearby uses when the building meets the height limit in feet imposed by the zoning code for those uses.  Indeed, the visual impacts associated with a 3-story, 35 foot tall building are identical to those of a 2.5-story, 35-foot tall building, as the number of stories in a building is an internal feature, not an external one.
[brief] (Aa29).  During settlement discussions, [...], for the first time, sent the amendment to the Redevelopment Plan and Design Guidelines to [...].  (Aa32).  In the amendment, [...] noted that the Property is one of the “last remaining undeveloped parcels in the portion of the Beachfront South Redevelopment area. ” (Ra164).  [...], thus, sought to redevelop the vacant parcel as a multi-family building that would “benefit from the proximity to the ocean, boardwalk, open space and public transit opportunities” through, in part, “[e]stablishing site and building design standards that foster a visually pleasing streetscape and inviting, high-quality construction. ”  Ibid.  The amendment specifically set a fifty feet setback from Ocean Avenue, a minimum distance of sixty feet from adjoining buildings, and a maximum building height of 100 feet, among other requirements.  (Ra166).  [...] chose not to require a maximum density or a building envelope bulk placement standard.  Ibid.  [...] concluded that because the Project is proposed within the [...] Redevelopment Zone, it need not comply with the Scenic Resources and Design Rule, N.J.A.C. 7:7-16.10.
[brief] TABLE OF CONTENTS  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT ........................................................................................................1  ARGUMENT ......................................................................................................................................3  I.  [...] Has Not Waived Its Right to Arbitration Under Cole .............................................3  A.  [...]’s Arbitration Demand Was Timely .................................................................3  1.  Arbitration Would Have Been Futile Before 2024 .................................4  B.  [...]’s Participation in the DJ Action Does Not Support Waiver ..................................................7  C.  [...]’s Allegations of a “Delay Strategy” Are Baseless .......................8  D.  Discovery on the Indemnity Claim To-Date has Not been “Extensive” and Would be Available in Arbitration ..................................................8  E.  [...]’s Pleadings Do Not Support a Finding of Waiver .........................10  F.  [...] Will Not Suffer Any Prejudice ............................................................12  II.  The [...] Pollution Policy’s Arbitration Clause is Mandatory ..........................12  III.  The Umbrella Policy’s Mandatory Arbitration Clause Applies .....................14  CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................................................15
[brief] Plaintiff also testified that after returning from FMLA leave, Defendant [...] and others in the office made fun of her for taking FMLA leave and made fun of her by saying she needed to be on medication.  See id. at 129:1-13; 155:14-22.  Plaintiff testified that these insults were a constant and at least weekly occurrence.  See id. at 129:16-130:1.  In addition to the constant insults, Plaintiff further testified how [...] engaged in a campaign against her to harass her based on her disability.  She testified how while she was on FMLA leave, Defendant [...] had her things from her office dumped in her driveway without warning.  See id. at 139:12-17.  Furthermore, Plaintiff testified about how on her return from FMLA leave, she was shocked to find that [...] (a person she had previously made numerous complaints about) had taken over her office and had been promoted above her.  See id. at 124:17-20.  More importantly, she testified immediately after she returned from FMLA leave, [...], as her new direct supervisor, made significant changes to her job responsibilities.  See id. at 123:22-124:1.  Specifically, she testified how [...] made her perform menial tasks such as folding t-shirts, and took away her responsibilities for running recreation programs that she had before.  See id. at 141:7-18.  In addition to the forgoing, Plaintiff further testified to additional slights that Defendant [...] engaged in to spite her and further aggravate her anxiety issues.  For example, Plaintiff testified how [...] would log into her computer and using her phone at a time when she was publicly dealing with her mother’s cancer treatment was being fastidious about germ transmission.  See id. at 152:17-153:7.  She further testified how when she was physically threatened by another staff member and the police were called, she heard [...] laughing about it and treating the whole incident like a joke.  See id. at 145:22-146:11.  This would result in her requiring to take a second FMLA leave.
[brief] In Znoski, plaintiff, a customer of defendant, [...], parked his car and was on the sidewalk, near the entrance of the store, when an unknown youth hit him in the back with one of [...]’s shopping carts.  Id. at 276.  This resulted in plaintiff falling and sustaining injuries.  Id.  While a jury awarded plaintiff damages, defendant appealed and the Appellate Division reversed, entering a judgment in favor of defendant.  Id. at 245, 249.  However, *Znoski* is readily distinguishable from the instant matter.
[directive] 2C:4-  This order is to be used when the court needs an expert report pursuant to N.J.S.A. of 1, that is, a sanity evaluation, due to questions regarding a defendant's state mind at the of time the offense, where the defendant is not detained at the time the order is entered.  of 11.  Order Mandating a Psychiatric Evaluation  Defendant's Attachment 11 of at Criminal Responsibility the Time the Crime (Sanity Evaluation) - (Defendant Detained)
[brief] 156a Exhibit 9, OSHA Citation and Notification of Penalty to [...], dated January 9, 2015, filed April 26, 2018  163a Exhibit 10, Stipulated Settlement between [...] and [...], dated July 28, 2015, filed April 26, 2018  173a Exhibit 11, Excerpts of the Deposition of [...], dated February 7, 2017, filed April 26, 2018  182a (Volume 2 of 15 – Pa192 to Pa379) Exhibit 12, Excerpts of the Deposition of [...], dated March 1, 2017, filed April 26, 2018
[brief] Plaintiff relies on the following references:  Db – Defendant’s brief Pa – Plaintiff’s appendix  Da – Defendant’s appendix  2  The volumes of the transcript cited in this brief are as follows, in parallel with Appellants’ citations:  1T – Transcript of the September 15, 2023  Hearing before the Hon. [...], P.J.Ch. associated obligations encumbering the Property, presently determined to exceed $47,000,000.\textsuperscript{3} \textit{Id.} (\S\ 22). \textsuperscript{4}  By its express terms, and as the trial court found, the MOU states the parties’ unequivocal intention to be bound, and all essential terms of the agreement are contained therein.  It states unequivocally:  The parties to this MOU further agree that even though they envision that they will enter into more formal documentation, this MOU shall be binding on each of them and is not merely an expression of the parties’ interest in pursuing a transaction.  [Da30.]  Under the MOU, the only other documents referenced are ancillary documents to be prepared in the normal course including, but not limited to, an amendment to the [...] Operating Agreement and an assignment of interests, with the closing of a purchase and sale agreement to occur within ten \textsuperscript{3}Appellants appear to suggest that [...]’ principal, [...], personally assumed the debt because he stated in argument before the Court that he was “stepping into those obligations” as the “new shareholder.
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT’S SENTENCE WAS APPROPRIATE AND ITS REASONING ADEQUATELY ARTICULATED  Defendant argues that the trial court “double counted” its justifications for imposing both an extended term and aggravating factors 3, 6, and 9.  (Db33).  This, defendant offers, constitutes grounds for resentencing.  However, defendant’s reliance on the “double counting” standard exceeds, by a wide margin, the boundaries of its application.  The Court’s reasoning for its sentence was articulate and its decision justified by the sentencing structure by which it was bound.  Resentence is therefore inappropriate.
[brief] Moreover, the Board’s own planner confirmed that there was a nearby apartment building located on [...] that was three stories in height, and the LUDO contains numerous zones that permit buildings more than 2.5 stories and taller than 35 feet, so the Board’s conclusion that [...]’s project would negatively impact the neighborhood is not based upon any evidence in the record.  The fact that there is a partial additional floor level inside the building has no impact on adjacent properties; the only substantive visual difference from the boundaries of the Property is that there might be more windows\(^4\) on the façade, since the exterior of the building complied with the height limit imposed by the ordinance.  And that façade received approval from the body of experts charged by [...] with undertaking a review of the design pursuant to § 230-34 and -35 of the LUDO.
[brief] *Id.* at 235.  The court remanded for a new trial concerning the apportionment of the damages.  *Ibid.*  Thus, *Bendar* actually refutes the proposition advanced by plaintiffs.  Therefore, contrary to providing support for the argument that joint and several liability is warranted merely to ensure plaintiffs’ full recovery, the cases plaintiffs relied upon affirm the principle that a defendant’s fault must be established and measured against the fault of other defendants before joint and several liability is appropriate.  POINT VII
[brief] The Finding Of Bad Faith Was Not Supported By The Record Of Conduct After The Settlement Agreement Was Executed. **  Bad faith is often referred to as the doing of an act for a dishonest purpose.  The term also “contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating with a furtive design or some motive of interest or ill will. ”  *Borough of Essex Fells v. Kessler Institute for Rehab.*, 289 N.J. Super. 329, 338 (1995), citing *Lustrelon Inc. v. Prutscher*, 178 N.J. Super. 128, 144 (App. Div. 1981).  The party making a claim that the government has conducted itself in bad faith or in a fraudulent manner has the burden of proof.  *Texas East, Trans. Corp. v. Wildlife Preserves, Inc.*, 48 N.J. 261 (1966); *State v. Totowa Lum. & Supp. Co.*, 96 N.J. Super. 115 (App. Div. 1967).  Furthermore, evidence showing that the government acted in bad faith must be clear and convincing.  *Klump v. Cybulski*, 274 Wis. 604, 81 N.W.2d 42, 47 (1957).  A party who acts in good faith on an honest but mistaken belief that his/her actions were justified has not breached the covenant of good faith and fair dealing.  *Silvestri v. Optus Software, Inc.*, 175 N.J. 113 (2003).  A review of the correspondence between [...] and the Board’s counsel between June and December does not demonstrate - and certainly not by adequate, substantial, credible, and clear and convincing evidence - that the Board or the Township acted in “bad faith”.  To the contrary, the Board deemed elevators in the multi-story building as important to the health, safety and welfare of the community and of the future residents of the [...] Project, which are the charge and jurisdiction of the Board.  Indeed, the stated legislative purpose of the MLUL is, in part, "[t]o encourage municipal action to guide the appropriate use or development of all lands in this State, in a manner which will promote the public health, safety, morals, and general welfare."
[brief] Shortly after this last complaint in January of 2020, Appellant was told she could not work anymore because of an issue with her background check, and nobody ever communicated with her when that issue was resolved.  See Plaintiff/Appellant’s deposition transcript, Appx 399 at 50:12-18.  Appellant felt she was terminated from [...] because nobody ever called her to tell her she could come back and nobody offered her shifts.  See Appx 404 at 58:24 to Appx 405 at 59:15.  [...] testified that it would have been the job of the program director or the area director to call the Appellant and let her know she could come back to work.  See deposition transcript of [...], Appx 449 at 28:15-24.  This put the responsibility to call [...] back on [...], on whom Appellant previously blew the whistle.  Id.  [...] testified that employees were automatically terminated after 30 or 60 days of not working as a per diem employee.  See Appx 451at 45:3-20.
[brief] Amounts claimed for PIP income continuation benefits, essential services benefits, death benefits and funeral expense benefits.  [N.J.A.C. 11:3-5.2.]  The Law Division concluded that Plaintiffs’ claims under the IFPA, RICO, the Declaratory Judgments Act, and equitable principles alleging that Defendants submitted false and misleading insurance-benefit claims, unlawfully operated a medical practice, engaged in kickbacks and illegal self-referrals, and operated a RICO enterprise through a pattern of racketeering were “dispute[s] regarding the recovery of” PIP benefits.
[brief] Veras v. LVNV Funding, LLC, No. 13-1745 (RBK/JS), 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34176 (D.N.J. Mar. 17, 2014)  .................................................................. 13, 14  Woo-Padva v. Midland Funding LLC, 2022 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 96 (Law Div. Jan. 21, 2022)
[brief] After completing the Questionnaire, [...] sent it back to [...] on July 31st.  [...] sent it to [...] on August 1st, but Dean did not send the (4 page) price quotation (the “Quote”) until August 6th, the day camp opened.  (Ia124; Ia145-148).  [...] points out that the third page of the Quote states that 12-15+ passenger vans were excluded from coverage.  (Rb9).  However, this Quote was provided only to [...].  (Ia124; Ia145-148).  There is no evidence that it was ever provided to [...].
[brief] (E.g., T20-18 to 21-7.)  The court’s observation is simply a reflection of the enormously greater volume of documents typical with eDiscovery.  Indeed, the same principle would also apply to paper discovery.  A very different protocol might apply to potentially relevant information housed exclusively within a single filing cabinet than to potentially relevant information spread throughout tens of thousands of boxes in multiple warehouses.  Ultimately, a trial court’s task is to fashion a protocol tailored to the needs of a given case.  That is precisely what occurred here.\textsuperscript{16}
[brief] (7T60:4-7 See P-66).  While convalescing, Decedent encouraged Petitioner to return to college, after learning that VA paid the tuition and a monthly stipend.  (7T60:2-15).  In 2003, Petitioner enrolled at [...] for paralegal studies, commuting between his Home and Wilmington, Delaware for the next four years.  (7T60:13-19).  In December 2007, Petitioner graduated from Widener with a bachelor’s degree and was offered a number of positions.  (7T61;10-18; 7T37:16-20).  Decedent insisted that Petitioner take the DLA position, although that required that he work in Philadelphia.  After accepting the DLA position, Decedent thanked him:  I know you will do well with your new position.  Relax… and don't be too hard on yourself.  [...], thank you for all that you do.  I am very mindful that you always have my best interest at heart.  My life is so much richer because you are in it.  Please know that I will always be there for you, too and want to share our lives together.  Loving and missing you.  [...], See you soon!  (P482a-483a; 7T62:14 to 64:12).  Beginning in 2009, Petitioner rented a small apartment near his office and returned to his Home in [...] whenever he was off from work.
[directive] The agency and officer should engage in an interactive process and communicate to determine whether a reasonable accommodation(s) is available under applicable law, which may include the agency’s request for medical documentation from the officer.  1.  Regardless of whether modified or light duty status is generally offered by the agency, the LAD (N.J.S.A. 10:5-12(s)) requires agencies to consider any specific restrictions identified by a pregnant officer’s health care provider, such as “temporary transfers to less strenuous or hazardous work,” in providing a reasonable accommodation, unless it would pose an undue hardship on operations.
[brief] He testified that there will always be this line of demarcation between the uplands and the lands that are waters were from the uplands.  As far as the reference he had before to artificial fill not depriving an underlying property owner of title, he refers to Justice Albin in City of Long Branch v. Liu, 203 N.J. 464 (2010).  He agrees that if any of the conveyance documents after the initial conveyance to [...], used the word Riparian Grant, the intent of the document was to convey the Riparian Grant (7T98:7).  On September 25, 2023, the Trial Court rendered an oral decision, in pertinent part as follows:  "The Court has reviewed everything, looked at my notes.  And the Court finds that the plaintiffs’ position is not persuasive to the Court.  The Court finds that the Borough legally obtained all interest in the subject property.  That was what was conveyed in the foreclosure action.  And that the plaintiffs’ claims for relief should be denied in their entirety.  The Court makes that ruling, finding the testimony of [...] with regard to the title issues to be more credible than those asserted by [...] and [...].