ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Id.  He stated that "the fact remains, however, that the transmittal of such vulgar, offensive, and pornographic material, even if unintentional, places into question the Respondent's [[...]] judgment, character, and fitness to serve in a public appointed position as Commissioner of the [...]. ”  (Da 40) (emphasis added).  The Hearing Officer also found legal justification for [...]'s termination.  The Hearing Officer found, inter alia, that [...]'s removal as Commissioner of the Sewerage Authority was governed by N.J.S.A. 40:14A-5(c), (Da 39), which states in pertinent part that, "A member of a sewerage authority may be removed only by the governing body by which he was appointed and only for inefficiency or neglect of duty or misconduct in office."  N.J.S.A. 40:14A-5(c).  He found that the Borough Municipal Code was applicable to [...], and that his violations of the Municipal Code constituted misconduct and neglect of duty under N.J.S.A. 40:14A-5(c).  (Da 39).  In so ruling, the Hearing Officer relied on New Jersey Supreme Court precedent which holds that misconduct need not be predicated on the violation of any particular department or regulation but may be based merely upon the implicit standard of good behavior which devolves upon one who stands in the public eye as the upholder of that which is morally and legally correct.  (Da 40) (citing In re Phillips, 117 N.J. 567, 569, 576 (1990); In re Emmons, 63 N.J. Super. 136, 140 (App. Div. 1960)).  The Hearing Officer also relied on Karins v. Atlantic City, 152 N.J. 532 (1998), where the Supreme Court of New Jersey held that conduct unbecoming a public employee "is an elastic phrase that has been defined as "any conduct which adversely affects the morale or efficiency of the bureau, or which has a tendency to destroy the public respect for municipal employees and confidence in the operation of municipal services."  Id. at 554.  The Hearing Officer held that like in Karins, [...]'s conduct adversely affected the morale, the public trust, and confidence necessary to the effective operation of Carlstadt's departments.  (Da 41).  He held that "it matters not whether the misconduct relates directly to performance of the Respondent's [[...]] official duties, so long as the acts charged tend to reflect upon and impair the morale and discipline of his position. ”  Id.  Having determined that [...] was an employee under the Borough's Municipal Code and as such was subject to disciplinary action under their ordinances, he also found that [...]'s heinous conduct was a violation of the Municipal Code and clearly misconduct and neglect of duty which warranted his removal under N.J.S.A. 40:14A-5(c).  (Da 41).  He stated, "It is this Hearing Officer's determination that the transmission of the pornographic and highly offensive, sexist, and misogynistic video, in and of itself, constitutes misconduct and neglect of duty," id., and recommended [...]’s removal (Da 42).  On April 7, 2021, the Mayor and Council removed [...] as the Sewerage Authority Commissioner through [...].  (Da 43).
[brief] In *State v. Rose*, 206 N.J. 141, 180 (2011), the Supreme Court of New Jersey adopted the Third Circuit’s test in *United States v. Green*, 617 F.3d 233 (3d Cir. 2010), for determining whether evidence of uncharged acts is intrinsic to the charged crime.  Under this test, evidence is intrinsic if it (1) directly proves the charged offense or (2) if the uncharged acts are performed contemporaneously with the charged crime and facilitate the commission of the charged crime.
[directive] (b) collect available information; (c) assess situations, threats, and risks; (d) identify options for conflict resolution; (e) determine the best course of action; and (f) act, review, and re-assess the situation as it evolves.  2.5  De-escalation.  De-escalation is the action of communicating verbally or non-verbally in an attempt to reduce, stabilize, or eliminate the immediacy of a threat.  De-escalation may also be used to create the time needed to allow the situation to resolve itself or to position additional resources to resolve the situation with the least amount of force necessary.  Officers should employ de-escalation techniques when feasible, which include, but are not limited to, the following: (a) communication techniques to calm an agitated subject (e.g., regulating tone and pitch, such as speaking slowly in a calm voice); (b) techniques to promote rational decision making, such as ensuring that only one officer addresses the person and the other officers remain detached as safety permits as to not escalate the situation; and splitting up individuals at the scene who may be arguing; (c) active listening techniques, such as sharing the officer’s name, asking the subject their name, and exhibiting a genuine willingness to listen; (d) slowing down the pace of the incident by taking deep breaths, slowing speech, and/or applying strategic or critical thinking; (e) using calming gestures and facial expressions (e.g., arms extended with palms out and avoid angry expressions); (f) practicing procedural-justice techniques, such as explaining the officer’s actions and responding to questions; (g) verbal persuasion and advisements (e.g., explaining, without threats, how the person would benefit from cooperation, and the subject’s rights or what the officer wants the subject to do); and (h) avoiding the unnecessary display of weapons, including firearms, Conducted Energy Devices (CEDs), batons, or OC Spray.  2.6
[brief] As outlined above, the automobile exception requires that law enforcement officers acquire probable cause to believe contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a vehicle before searching it.  But unlike federal law and most other states, where exigency is satisfied by the vehicle’s inherent mobility, our Supreme Court created an exigency standard that requires probable cause that has arisen unforeseeably and spontaneously.  Witt, 223 N.J. at 421, 425-26.
[brief] SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY, APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. [...]  [...]  AS TRUSTEE FOR [...], ASSET-BACKED  PASS-THROUGH CERTIFICATES SERIES WHQ2, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, V. [...] AND [...], DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS, V. [...], AS TRUSTEE FOR [...]  ASSET BACKED  PASS-THROUGH CERTIFICATES SERIES 2004-WHQ2  [...], SUBSIDIARY OF [...], AND SUCCESSOR TO [...] ([...]), THIRD-PARTY DEFENDANTS/RESPONDENTS.  On appeal from a final order entered in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law and Chancery Divisions, Passaic County, Docket Nos. [...], [...]; Hon. [...], J.S.C.; Hon. [...], J.S.C.
[brief] ” (Aa54; Aa76-77).  D.  The Record Supports the [...]’s Determination that the Project Will Not Adversely Impact the Area’s Ambient Noise Levels and Air Quality.  Fourth, substantial evidence in the record supports the [...]’s reasonable finding that the Project will have “no adverse impact on the area’s ambient noise levels or air quality” and will present “a negligible impact on the State’s overall air quality and greenhouse-gas emissions. ” (Aa54).  The [...] and the [...] reviewed the testimony of [...], [...]’s air quality and noise expert witness.  (Aa80).  Based on his undisputed noise assessment of ambient noise levels at four sites near [...], the manufacturers’ noise measurement data for the proposed regulator station and CWT heater, and the proposed installation of a sound wall to minimize noise from the regulator station, the resultant noise generated by the regulator station would be “lower than the measured existing noise levels at the near residences,” and both the regulator station’s and the CWT heater’s noise levels would be lower than the daytime and nighttime sound level limits, in compliance with the State’s noise regulations.  N.J.A.C. 7:29-1.2; (Aa944-46; Aa966-67).  As such, the generated noise would not adversely impact nearby residences.  (Aa945-46).  Regarding the proposed regulator station’s impact on air quality and greenhouse-gas emissions, the record indicates that the regulator would not emit any odors or air pollutants.  (5T34:3-12; 5T61:21-25; Aa946-47).  As such, the [...] reasonably found that the proposed regulator station would not adversely affect air quality in the surrounding areas and the State.  (Aa54).  With respect to the CWT heater’s impact on air quality and greenhouse-gas emissions, the record reflects that [...] prepared an air-quality assessment to determine the Project’s air quality impact at surrounding areas.  (5T20:6-21:2; 5T21:22-22:2; 5T45:3-9; Aa943; Aa946-48; Aa951-52).  The record indicates that the majority of the CWT heater’s emissions would be carbon dioxide and water vapor, which are non-criteria emissions.  (Aa947; Aa949).  While the heater may emit trace amounts of criteria pollutants where the CWT heater does not achieve “proper combustion temperatures,” [...]’s undisputed assessment indicated that concentrations of criteria and non-criteria air pollutants generated by the heater would be negligible compared to overall greenhouse-gas emissions and other sources of emissions in the State and would not adversely impact public health or welfare.  (5T20:6-21:2; 5T21:22-22:2; 5T45:3-9; Aa943; Aa946-48; Aa951-52).  Therefore, the [...] and [...] reasonably found, based on substantial evidence in the record, that the proposed heater would only have a negligible impact on the State’s overall air quality and greenhouse-gas emissions.  (Aa56; Aa78; Aa80).  POINT II
[brief] 2 LEGAL ARGUMENT ............................................................................................  2  I.  THE COURT BELOW ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY GRANTING INJUNCTIVE RELIEF BECAUSE PLAINTIFF FAILED TO SATISFY THE CROWE FACTORS.  [Da9-Da11; Da12-Da13]  .........................................................................................................................  2  A.  The Court Below Erred by Finding Irreparable Harm.................................  2  B.  The Court Below Erred by Finding a Well-Settled Legal Right and Likelihood of Success on the Merits.................................................................  6  C.  The Court Below Erred by Finding that the Harm to Plaintiff Outweighed the Harm to [...].................................................................  8  II.  THE COURT BELOW ERRED IN ITS INTERPRETATION OF EMINENT DOMAIN LAW AND BY CREATING NEW LAW THAT LACKS SUPPORT IN NEW JERSEY JURISPRUDENCE.
[brief] | | | McGinty v. Zheng, No. A-1368-23, 2024 WL 4248446, at *10 | 10 | | (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Sept. 20, 2024) | | Moore v. Woman to Woman Obstetrics & Gynecology, L.L.C., 416 N.J. Super. 30 (App. Div. 2010)........................................... passim Perez v. Sky Zone LLC, 472 N.J. Super. 240, 248 (App. Div. 2022).............  10  State v. O’Driscoll, 215 N.J. 461, 73 A.3d 496 (2013) ..................................
[brief] Defendant and his attorney evidently resolved any issue to which he referred at the motion to dismiss hearing.  As soon as three weeks later, defense counsel asked the court to allow him to meet privately with defendant at the close of oral argument to present any additional arguments defendant wanted.  (2T5-1 to 20).  Indeed, after conferring with defendant, counsel expressed to the court defendant’s account of the events and that the State described the video shown to the grand jury as “grainy,” at defendant’s request, although he had already included same in his brief.  (2T15-4 to 16-24).  The record contains no evidence, outside of a heat-of-the-moment exchange after the very first motion hearing, that defendant had any issue with his counsel.  To the contrary, defendant’s conduct revealed a client who had a productive conversation with his attorney, and his attorney responded to his anxieties by adapting to defendant’s wishes for the duration of his representation.  This is unlike Rose, where there were questions about whether defendant resolved his issues or believed the court’s inaction after his four requests constituted a denial.  458 N.J. Super. at 637-38.  A remand is therefore unnecessary.  By his conduct, defendant waived his right to self-representation.
[brief] See id.  Similarly, Appellant was never provided with any receipts indicating that she had acknowledged or accepted any employee policies.  See id.  Instead, Respondent [...] provided web links to each of the forms; however, when Appellant tried to access those forms after allegedly acknowledging them, she could not access the portal to review the forms.  See id.  Therefore, after Appellant clicked through the screens of the portal on the first instance, she was unable to view them again.  See id.  Appellant further certified that she was surprised to learn that there was an Arbitration Agreement buried within the several pages of the company policies she was instructed to hurriedly rush through.
[brief] TABLE OF CITATIONS OF CASES  _Scardigli v. Borough of Haddonfield Zoning Bd.,_ 300 N.J. Super. 314, 322-23, (App. Div. 1997)  10  _Carbone v. Planning Bd.,_ 175 N.J. Super. 584, 586, (Law Div. 1980)  10  _Kempner v. Edison,_ 54 NJ Super 408, 417 (App. Div. 1959).  12  2.  TABLE OF CITATIONS OF STATUTES AND ORDINANCES  Rule 4:69-6(c)  1, 3 NJSA 40:55D-10  9  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS, AND RULINGS BEING APPEALED  Order of the Honorable [...], J.S.C.
[brief] I.  THE STANDARDS OF REVIEW (THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ADDRESS THE STANDARDS)  a.  R. 4:50-1  Applications  Relief from a final judgment or order, whether entered by trial or default, is available under R. 4:50 1.  Middlesex Concrete Corp. v. Carteret, 32 N.J. Super. 226, 235 (App. Div. 1955).  R. 4:50-1(c) allows judgments to be vacated "for fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party."  R. 4:50-1(d) allows judgments to be vacated for being void.  R. 4:50-1(f) is a catch-all provision that authorizes a court to relieve a party from a judgment or order for "any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment or order."  "Because of the importance that we attach to the finality of judgments, relief under Rule 4:50-1(f) is available only when 'truly exceptional circumstances are present.'"  Hous. Auth. of Morristown v. Little, 135 N.J. 274, 286 (1994); US Bank Nat. Ass'n v. Guillaume, 209 N.J. 449 (2012).
[brief] This negligence matter seeking damages for personal injuries arises out of a motor vehicle accident, the date, time, and location of which are agreed upon between the parties.  Respondent/Defendant (hereinafter “Defendant” or “[...]”) and Appellant/Plaintiff (hereinafter, “Plaintiff” or “[...]”) agree that [...] was in the left turn only lane waiting to make a turn onto Route 280 westbound from the intersection of the on-ramp to West 280 and First Street in Newark as both drivers were stopped at a red light.  The parties also agree that at the same time, Plaintiff was in the lane immediately to [...]’s right, which was a designated “straight only” lane.  Plaintiff admits that despite this being a designated “straight only” lane, she attempted to make a left-hand turn to enter westbound 280 and the collision ensued.  Defendant did not breach his duty of reasonable care as a motorist and there is no genuine issue of material fact as to how the accident occurred sufficient for liability to be imputed to him.  The arguments put forth by the Plaintiff are filled with facts that are either immaterial to the case or are unsubstantiated by the record before the court; therefore, summary judgment dismissing Plaintiff’s Complaint was properly granted by [...] in the Law Division and should be affirmed.
[brief] In re Hunterdon County Bd. Of Chosen Freeholders, 116 N.J. 322 (1989) ..............................................................................................................16  In re State, 443 N.J. Super. 380 (App. Div. 2016) ..................................................................................18  In re Stream Encroachment Permit, Permit No. 0200-04-0002.1FHA, 402 N.J. Super. 582 (App. Div. 2008) ..................................................................................16 International Ass’n. of Machinists, Lodge 1292, Ind. v. Bergen Ave. Bus Owners’ Ass’n., 3 N.J. Super. 558 (Law Div. 1949) .................................................................14, 42 In the Matter of [...] and [...], P.E.R.C. No. 2012-34, 2011 NJ PERC Lexis 142 (Jan. 20, 2011) ..................34
[brief] Page(s)  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES  ........................................................................................................ iii  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT .................................................................................................  1 STATEMENT OF FACTS  .......................................................................................................  2 LEGAL ARGUMENT ..................................................................................................................  2 POINT I  THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO ANALYZE  WHETHER PLAINTIFFS ASSERTED A SETTLED LEGAL RIGHT (Da393-417)  ..........................................................................................................................  2 POINT II  THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ENTERING RESTRAINTS DESPITE A LACK OF CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE OF A LIKELIHOOD OF SUCCESS ON THE MERITS (Da393-417)  ..............................................  3 POINT III  THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ENTERING RESTRAINTS DESPITE A LACK OF CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE OF SUBSTANTIAL AND IMMINENT IRREPARABLE HARM (Da393-417)  ..........................................................................................................................  11  POINT IV  THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ENTERING RESTRAINTS GIVEN A LACK OF CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE THAT PLAINTIFFS’ HARM GREATLY OUTWEIGHED COUNTERVAILING HARMS AND ITS FAILURE TO CONSIDER THE PUBLIC INTEREST (Da393-417)  ....................................................................................  12  POINT V THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADJUDICATING A MOOT ISSUE (Da393-417)  ..........................................................................................................................  13  CONCLUSION
[brief] [...] testified that his father was either sleeping on the couch in the living room or that he was watching TV, when his father realized what was occurring, and stood up to confront the two individuals inside of the house.  (1T 62).  [...] could not see what was happening because of the duct tape on his eyes (1T 62); however, he confirmed that only two men were in the house: one that was holding the gun to his head, and one that was somewhere in the vicinity of his father.  (1T 64:11).  [...] testified that his mother heard the commotion from upstairs, came to the stairs, and put the light on.  (1T 64).  The men ordered her to come down and placed her next to [...] on the floor between the foyer and the living room.  (1T 64-65).  The men then placed [...] in the same area as [...] and his mother, while at gunpoint.  The individuals asked the family where their money and valuables were, and made threats to cut [...]'s fingers off, to rape [...], and to kill them all.  (1T-66).  The individual who made the threats did not speak with an accent or stutter.  (1T 109, 110, 140).  [...] testified that there were only two men in the room with him and his parents, and that the men’s voices were the same voices he had heard in the car.  (1T 67-68).  [...]’s mother and father told the men that the jewelry was in their basement.  The men took all three victims down to the basement.  (1T 68).  While in the basement, the two men duct taped [...]’s body, while keeping his arms flush with his torso.  [...] gave the men all of their jewelry and told them that “this is what we have of value. ” (1T 71-72).  The two men decided that they were going to take [...] for ransom and demanded $250,000.00.  (1T 72-73).  The man who made the demand did not speak with an accent or stutter.  (1T 109, 110, 140).  The men then took [...] to the car, a 1984 blue Mercedes sedan in the garage, and put him inside of the trunk.  (1T 75).  The car traveled for about 40 to 45 minutes.  (1T 76-77).  After the car stopped, [...] was able to release the trunk’s lock and escape, running frantically down the street.  (1T 78-79); (1T 80-8).  On April 28, 1997, [...] of the [...] presented [...] with a photo array, where he was able to identify with certainty the man who had held the gun to his head—[...].
[brief] On August 10, 2015, [...] of [...] sent an e-mail to [...], [...]’s Program Administrator, confirming that “Our work was excluded from the [Project], please make any adjustments accordingly. ”  (Italics added.)  (Pa2431.)  Plaintiffs’ current contention that this referred to July 2015 payroll issues at the Project (see Pb10) is illogical as [...] did not start work until some point in August 2015, at the earliest.
[brief] ”  *A.M.*, 237 N.J. at 397 (quoting *Nyhammer*, 197 N.J. at 402).  Factors relevant to this determination “include the suspect’s age, education[,] ... intelligence[, and previous encounters with the law,] advice as to constitutional rights, length of detention, whether the questioning was repeated and prolonged in nature[,] and whether physical punishment or mental exhaustion was involved. ”  *State v. Miller*, 76 N.J. 392, 402 (1978); see also *Tillery*, 238 N.J. at 317.
[brief] ⁵  In fact, under the TCA a public entity is generally not liable “for an injury caused by the failure to provide ordinary traffic signals, signs, markings or other similar devices. ”  N.J.S.A. 59:4-5.  Moreover, Plaintiff completely disregards ⁴ “Pa” refers to Plaintiff’s appendix.  ⁵  Plaintiff notes that whether a public entity has acted palpably unreasonable is an issue of fact for the jury.  Although the issue of palpable unreasonableness is typically one for the trier of fact, “the issue may may be decided by the court as a matter of law in appropriate cases. ”  Maslo v. [...], 346 N.J. Super. 346, 350 (App. Div. 2002).  testimony by [...], a representative of the City, who explained the City is limited as to where it can place the sign on Avenue P:  Q: Okay.  All right.  Now let me ask you this.  The City had repeatedly put the sign back up in the place where it was located, correct?  A: Yes.  Q: Why has that site - - has that been chosen?  A: Say again?  Q: Why has it been placed there and not somewhere else?  A: Because it’s within the City right-of-way and it’s one of the few places we can put that sign at.  Q:  Why are there so few places?  A: Because putting it anywhere else would probably be on somebody else’s property, if it’s not in the City right-of-way.  [5T115:24-116:13.]  It is not up to Plaintiff to second guess the City’s exercise of its discretion.  Nor should the City be liable for exercising its discretion without some evidence that it acted in a palpably unreasonable manner.  N.J.S.A. 59:2-3; see also Gonzalez by Gonzalez, 247 N.J. at 571.  As set forth in the City’s opening brief, Plaintiff failed to present sufficient evidence to support his contention that the City’s placement of the sign on Avenue P constituted a dangerous condition, or that the City had notice that such placement constituted a dangerous condition.  Simply put, Plaintiff asks this court, as he asked the trial court and jury, to speculate about the propriety of the City’s exercise of its discretion to place the sign in question.  This court must decline to do so and reject Plaintiff’s argument.  III.
[brief] 662a–664a.  Pursuant to the representations and direction of [...] and [...], Plaintiffs signed, pertaining to the PCHA-MTDC Assignment, the General Release of April 25, 2008, the Amended General Release of September 2008, and the Second Amendment and Restatement of the General Release of January 2009 (“Releases”).  564a–569a; 591a–595a; 611a–615a.  However, neither [...] nor [...] ever saw or executed the PCHA-MTDC Assignment or Releases.