[brief] ”  New Jersey Model Charge 5.20B(B)(l)(b).  In their attempts to navigate around this imposition of liability, we respectfully submit that the defendant heavily relies upon the unreported Appellate Division decision of Nunez v. [...], 2018 WL 6836109 (App. Div. 2015).  In that decision, the Court cites precisely what we have cited above; a residential homeowner will be liable for dangerous abutting sidewalks where they “create or exacerbate a dangerous condition. ”  Luchejko v. Hoboken, 207 NJ 191, 210 (2011).  Luchejko also makes clear that where a property owner removes snow, the property owner will be liable for a pedestrian’s injury if they create a hazard or exacerbate a condition that does not exist as a result of “natural forces. ”  Id. At 201.  That is precisely what occurred here – failed snow removal efforts are not “natural forces. ”  The facts in Nunez are readily distinguishable from the case currently before the Court.  In Nunez, there was a continuing snowfall that did not end until after the plaintiff’s fall.  The defendant [...] removed the snow that had accumulated up and until 7:15 a.m., but then left his residence for work at approximately 8:45 a.m.  The significant snowfall continued (an intervening natural event), and the plaintiff fell at approximately 10:00 a.m.  Here, in the case before the Court, the snowfall ended two days prior to plaintiff’s fall, and if he is believed by a jury, two days after the respondent’s failed attempt to remove the snow, which dangerously changed the condition of the walking surface.  New snow in the case before this Court did not fall until after her injury, and the new snowfall had no bearing on the plaintiff’s injury, like what occurred in Nunez.  We submit that in consideration of all of the facts viewed most favorably to the plaintiff, it is clear that the appellant can establish all of the necessary elements to sustain her burden of proof, and there are material questions of fact that must be resolved by a jury.  Brill v. Guardian Life Insurance Co. of America, 142 N.J. 520, 523 (1995).  The determination of whether a genuine issue of material fact exists "that precludes summary judgment requires the motion judge to consider whether the competent evidential materials presented, when viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, are sufficient to permit a rational factfinder to resolve the alleged disputed issue in favor of the non-moving party."  Brill, 142 N.J. at 540.  Here, we respectfully submit that the issue of whether or not the condition of the property was caused and created by the defendant’s failure to properly remove the snow is a material factual dispute, and that dispute must be resolved by a jury.  This is true whether or not the Court determines that the subject property would be deemed a residential, commercial property, or some kind of hybrid.  The manner in which the snow removal occurred, whether or not it was completed in a reasonable manner, or whether or not the conduct created a new hazard or worsened an existing hazard are also factual issues that would need to be resolved by a jury.  It is for these reasons and the reasons outlined above that the appellant respectfully submits that the Order entering summary judgment should be reversed and this matter should respectfully be remanded for trial.