ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] So I have two instructions, one is as to the arm tattoo, the other one is as to the facial tattoo.  So first with respect to the arm tattoo, there's been some testimony in this case regarding whether the defendant and [...] obtained matching tattoos on their arms after March 5, 2018.  The question of whether the defendant and [...] obtained matching tattoos and, if so, what those tattoos mean is another question of fact for your determination in this case.  As you know, there's nothing unlawful about obtaining a tattoo.  Further, there's nothing unlawful about obtaining a tattoo which says "Loyalty is Royalty."  Having a tattoo in general is not evidence of guilt or innocence and you may not use it for that purpose.  Moreover, having a tattoo which says Loyalty is Royalty by itself is not evidence of guilt or innocence on any of the counts in the indictment.  Many factors may motivate or contribute to a person's desire to obtain a tattoo, including a Loyalty is Royalty tattoo.  Having such a tattoo does not make someone a bad person, nor does it make that person likely to commit any crime.  You may not consider the tattoos for that purpose.  There may be, there are many perfectly legitimate and lawful reasons why a person would obtain a tattoo including one which would say Loyalty is Royalty.  However, the State has introduced evidence and claims the defendant and [...] obtained matching forearm tattoos depicting the phrase Loyalty is Royalty after the alleged murder.  In this case, the evidence was introduced to show whether the defendant and [...] engaged in a conspiracy, as I will define that for you at the end of the case in my final instructions.  The State asserts defendant and [...] obtained these tattoos to solidify their conspiracy to commit the alleged murder of [...] and to perpetuate their agreement to keep the killing a secret.  You may consider this evidence for those limited purposes only and nothing else.
[brief] And [...] and her counsel both knew that multiple companies other than [...] were involved in the restoration and cleaning of [...]’s property.  Pa65, page 156.  In accordance with its contractual obligations to [...], [...] performed a site inspection of [...]’s property and provided [...] with an inventory, together with [...]’s recommendations relative to the condition and value of the items of personal property that [...] claimed were damaged as the result of the water leak at her home.  Pa24.  The information concerning the value of the damaged items was a combination of input from [...] and the independent investigation and research conducted by [...].  Id.  At the time of her deposition on January 8, 2021, [...] contended that [...] failed to clean items of her damaged personal property.  [...] further contended that [...] caused additional damage to some of those items of her personal property that were already damaged as the result of the water leak.  Pa70-80, inclusive.  But when asked [...] was unable to identify with any degree of specificity the particular items she contends [...] damaged.  In addition, she conceded that all of the items in question were already damaged as the result of the water leak at her property, and she was not able to differentiate between damage done by the water leak and damage purportedly done by [...].  Id.; See also, Pa97-98.  [...] testified that the first time [...] came out to her home to perform an inventory was approximately three (3) months after the water leak occurred.
[directive] Subject to any applicable retention periods established in Section 8.4 to the extent such retention period is longer, a BWC recording shall be retained for not less than three years if voluntarily requested by: (a) law enforcement officer whose BWC made the video recording, if that officer reasonably asserts the recording has evidentiary or exculpatory value; (b) a law enforcement officer who is a subject of the BWC recording, if that officer reasonably asserts the recording has evidentiary or exculpatory value; (c) any immediate supervisor of a law enforcement officer whose BWC made the recording or who is a subject of the BWC recording, if that immediate supervisor reasonably asserts the recording has evidentiary or exculpatory value; (d) any law enforcement officer, if the BWC recording is being retained solely and exclusively for police training purposes; (e) any member of the public who is a subject of the BWC recording; (f) any parent or legal guardian of a minor who is a subject of the BWC recording; or (g) a deceased subject's next of kin or legally authorized designee.
[brief] In State v. Carroll, 256 N.J. Super. 575 (App. Div. 1992), this Court addressed the propriety of allowing the jury to compare the handwriting on a motel registration card with samples of defendant’s handwriting.  At issue in that case was whether the signature on the registration card belonged to defendant.  *Id.* at 589.  The handwriting samples the prosecutor sought to introduce were a box of work orders obtained from defendant’s employer, with the defendant’s signature on them.
[directive] • pdf  Brimage Guidelines  2 Brimage Guidelines  Revised Attorney General Guidelines for Negotiating • 2 Cases Under N.J.S.A.  2C:35-12 Revised 2004, Effective for Offenses Committed on or after September 15, 2004  Conducted Energy See Below – Use of Force – Conducted Energy Devices (Stun-Guns) • Devices Crime Victims' Attorney General Standards to Ensure the Rights of Crime Victims (Updated April • Rights 1993)  Guidelines for Investigating Domestic Violence Incidents Involving Domestic Violence • • Police Officers (2009) pdf Domestic Violence Procedures Manual Update June 2004 • Guidelines for the Enforcement of Out-of-State Restraining Orders or Orders • of Protection in Domestic Violence Cases pdf (Updated SEPTEMBER 2000)  Guidelines on Police Response Procedures in Domestic Violence Cases • (Updated November 1994)  AG Directives 2000-3 and 2000-4--Directive Implementing Procedures for • the Seizure of Weapons from Municipal and County Law Enforcement Officers Involved in Domestic Violence Incidents AND Directive Implementing Procedures for the Seizure of Weapons from All State Law Enforcement Officers Involved in Domestic Violence Incidents (Updated SEPTEMBER 2000) pdf Drug Court Implementation of Drug Court Reforms (August 13, 2012) • Drug Free School Attorney General's Executive Directive Concerning Law Enforcement Operations On • Zone Or Near School Property (Updated August 1988) 1 of 5 8/4/25, 11:35 AM
[brief] See, e.g., Dryer v. NFL, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 194684, at *19 (D. Minn. May 21, 2012) (weighing burden against benefit for each of the five custodians from whom ESI was sought and denying request for ESI where “the burden of production for the Defendant to produce ESI of four of the five custodians outweighs the likely benefit”); Lewis v. Bd. of Supervisors of La. State Univ., 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 214628, at *12 (M.D. La. Dec. 2, 2023) (“mere skepticism that an opposing party has not produced all relevant information” and “a mere desire to check that the opposition has been forthright in its discovery responses” do not suffice to “warrant drastic discovery measures”).  The trial court’s refusal to consider relevancy concerns here—including its complete disregard for Defendants’ relevancy objection—was particularly puzzling given that a Special Discovery Adjudicator had already been appointed to assist the court in resolving such disputes.  Da97-101 (Hon. [...], J.S.C. (Ret.) vested with authority to “consider, hear, and recommend resolution of all discovery disputes between the parties”).
[brief] ...................... 81 N.J. 208, 221 Levin vs. Frishman .........................................................  73 N.J. Super. 324 (App. Div. 1962)  Liskovsky vs. Blau ..........................................................  114 N.J.L. 324 (E.& A. 1935)  Lorril Co. vs. La Corte ..................................................... 352 N.J. Super. 433 (App. Div. 2002)  Manalapan Realty, L.P. vs. Township Committee of Tp. of Manalapan ...........................................
[brief] There is no support for the notion that the phone call at 11:30 a.m. on August 23, 2021, had a different, independent purpose from the phone call a few hours later at 4:00 p.m.; rather, the voice messages were left as part of a series of calls [...] placed throughout the day (factor (a)).  The content of each indicted voice message is also substantively identical.  The 11:30 a.m. voicemail includes the statements, “I catch you in Northfield I will beat your ass [...],” and “if I come to Northfield and I see you I will break your fucking jaw, [...]. ”  The 4:00 p.m. voicemail contains the same threat, nearly verbatim: “I will break your fucking jaw mother fucker. ”  (Da7-8)  Thus, these were hardly separate threats of violence; they were substantively identical and part of the same continuing diatribe (factor (b)).
[brief] 269 F. Supp. 2d 547, 557–58 (D.N.J. 2003).  Here, Defendants do not represent Plaintiff in any New Jersey litigation, let alone this lawsuit, and [...] has never been admitted pro hac vice in New Jersey.  Da181. can scarcely be deemed at home in all of them. ”  BNSF Ry. Co. v. Tyrrell, 137 S. Ct. 1549, 1559 (2017) (quoting Daimler, 571 U.S. at 139 n.20).  The contacts upon which Plaintiff relies are also misguided for the additional reason that nearly all of them amount to purported contacts with New Jersey in 2016 and prior, Pb18–19, and not “at the time of suit.
[brief] (Pa1).  On July 23, 2018, the New York action was discontinued and defendant/counterclaimant [...] filed its Answer and Counterclaim in the New Jersey action.  (Pa7).  \(^5\)  After [...] was terminated, [...] handled the underlying construction defect case, and also was the attorney for plaintiff in this action.  [...] was counsel until he filed a Motion to be Relieved as Counsel.  (Da121).
[directive] Any provision of any directive, guideline, or law  Supersession of prior enforcement manual issued by or under the authority of the Attorney General that is inconsistent with any provision of this Directive is hereby superseded to the extent of such inconsistency.  In addition, this Directive repeals and supersedes the provisions of Attorney General Law Enforcement Directive No. 2008-2; the 1998 Attorney General Guidelines on Procedures for Collecting Juvenile Fingerprints and Photographs; and Attorney General Executive Directive No. 1990-1.
[brief] POINT III – THE PCR JUDGE’S REFUSAL TO RECUSE HERSELF WAS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION, REQUIRING REVERSAL.  A judge who makes a decision without rational explanation, departs from established policies, or rests a decision on an impermissible basis abuses her discretion.  United States v. Scurry, 193 N.J. 492, 504 (2008); Flagg v. Essex County Prosecutor, 171 N.J. 561, 571 (2002).  An abuse of discretion may occur when a decision was not premised upon a consideration of all relevant factors, was based upon a consideration of irrelevant or inappropriate factors, or amounted to a clear error in judgment.  Flagg, 171 N.J. at 571.  Such is plainly the case here.  First, [...] failed to consider anything other than her own lack of personal involvement in the case, and that she had left [...] in 2017.  This was despite clear mandates of the Code of Judicial Conduct’, Court Rules’, and Advisory Letter’s requirements that judges consider many other factors, as explained in [...]’s opening brief.  Moreover, the State fails to address the fact that as a [...] supervisor for two decades, including during [...]’s investigation and prosecution of [...], D’Arcy has personal knowledge of [...]’s policies and practices.  Several issues in this matter related directly to those policies and processes, and prosecutorial misconduct on an individual and institutional level, though [...] ignored them, and the proper standard.  Her refusal to recuse herself was an abuse of discretion, requiring reversal.
[brief] The decisions the trial court made were not in error and surely does not rise to the level of cumulative error resulting in a new trial.  However, if the Appellate Division were so persuaded to entertain Defendants’ arguments, Plaintiff contends a new trial on all issues should be ordered, not simply on damages.  Limiting the new trial to liability alone risks leaving in place a damages verdict that may have been improperly compromised or inadequately calculated based on decisions made by the jurors when considering liability.  As such, the interests of justice require a fresh look at both issues, if necessary.
[brief] [Pa1]  [...] did not respond to the Complaint and a default was entered.  Six years later on September 2, 2021 [...] successfully moved to vacate the default [Pa4] and subsequently filed an Answer to the collection action, alleging among her affirmative defenses that [...] was unlicensed pursuant to the NJCFLA.  [Pa6]  On September 15, 2021 --- 5  For some inexplicable reason, Appellant makes the claim in her brief (Ab 7) that the Court also relied on the decision by this Court in Asset Acceptance, LLC v. Toft, No. A-2827-22, 2024 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 820 (App. Div. May 8, 2024), notwithstanding that it was issued several months after [...] issued his Order of Dismissal under review here.  [...] filed the underlying putative class action in the matter now on appeal.  [Pa11]  The underlying complaint did not allege a violation of the NJCFLA and therefore the application of the NJCFLA that was not an issue before the Court.  [...] alleged that (1) she was entitled to a Declaratory Judgement and Injunctive Relief based on an alleged violation of the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act (“NJCFA”; (2) that [...] violated the NJCFA and (3) that she was entitled to Disgorgement based on a theory of Unjust Enrichment.  Of note is the fact that [...] did not allege she paid any monies to [...] might justify disgorgement.  Subsequent to discovery ensuing, [...] moved to dismiss the Complaint [Pa55] relying on decisions both in the trial courts and the appellate division holding that the NJCFA does not apply to third party collection actions.  LEGAL ARGUMENT
[brief] THE STATE’S LOSS / DESTRUCTION OF THE DISCOVERY AT ISSUE CONSTITUTED A VIOLATION OF DEFENDANT’S RIGHTS TO DUE PROCESS AND A FAIR TRIAL, WHICH REQUIRED THE TRIAL COURT TO DISMISS THE INDICTMENT.  More than seventy years ago, the Supreme Court stated that the role of the prosecution in the criminal justice system: is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done.
[directive] Date  Judge Prosecutor's Office: Defendant's Attorney: --------------- ---------------  Name Name Address Address ----------- -----------  Telephone Number Telephone Number ---------------- ----------------  Fax Fax --------------- ail  Em Em ail _________  If D Yes  D yes, language _ No  Interpreter needed?  _________  If ADA accommodation needed?  D Yes D yes, describe _ No 3  3  Published Directive# (11/01/2018), 12325 (Competency CN: Order of 17~18 18)
[brief] In denying the motion for reconsideration on this issue, the trial court noted that both its Opinion and the trial record are “replete with evidence of this Court providing ‘equitable’ reasons for imposing the ten percent post-judgment interest rate. ”  Da95.  Among those equitable reasons were that (i) [...] had the use of [...]’ funds since 2008, (ii) [...] disregarded the interests of [...] who refrained from taking action to protect himself on account of their friendship, and (iii) other abundant evidence of [...]s’ “deceitful actions.
[brief] See, e.g., *Public Service Elec. & Gas v. Oldwick*, 125 N.J. Super. 31 (App. Div. 1973).  In *Oldwick*, the trial court found damages to the property not only from the easements taken but from the project.  On appeal, the Appellate Division eliminated the damages from the project, concluding that the aerial transmission lines over a corner of the property had little effect on the value of the owner's remaining property, whereas the transmission towers could have made the entire remainder less desirable for purchase by an interested developer.  The Appellate Division in *Oldwick* distinguished the cases relied upon by the property owner:  In those cases, unlike here, the damages to the remaining lands resulting from the taking of a portion of the tract were inseparable from the damages to the remaining land attributable to the whole improvement.  Since it is here practicable to separate the use of the land taken from that of the adjoining land, defendant is entitled to compensation only for the land taken and the use to which it will be put, and not for the use which will be made of the adjoining lands.  [125 N.J. Super. at 38]  It is apparent that *Karan* has overruled *Oldwick*.
[brief] The *Coventry Square* Court, citing *Medici v. BPR Co.*, 107 N.J. 1, 4 (1987) explained that a use or "special reasons" variance needs to satisfy both positive and negative criteria, and summarized the three circumstances that constitute special reasons for use variances as follows:  If the use for which a variance is sought is not one that inherently serves the public good, the applicant must prove and the board must specifically find that the use promotes the general welfare because the proposed site is particularly suitable for the proposed use ***.  Alternatively, the statutory special reasons standard can also be addressed by proof of undue hardship, i.e., that the property cannot reasonably be developed with a conforming use.  138 N.J. 285,295-6.  The Supreme Court noted further that "the high standard of proof required to establish special reasons for a use variance is necessary to vindicate the municipality's determination that the use ordinarily should not be allowed in the zoning district."  *Coventry Square*, supra at 297.  Applicants did not meet this high burden of proof at the hearing.  Accordingly, the Board's Decision and Resolution must be voided.
[brief] (2TR42:21-46:3).  However, after counsel for the Plaintiffs set forth that no evidence has been presented to make a determination on the employment status of any of the medical professionals, coupled with the inability of the Plaintiffs’ counsel to obtain an Affidavit of Merit that complied with the Court’s ruling without discovery, [...] reserved on the motion as to the Defendant.  (2TR46:7-51:20).  Thereafter, on October 11, 2024 – 119 days after the Defendant filed an Answer - the Court held an additional hearing on the Plaintiffs’ motion.³ (See e.g., 3TR)
[brief] Dawson, 289 N.J. Super. at 323.  The trial court therefore correctly ruled that their testimony was inadmissible net opinion.  Endre v. Arnold, 300 N.J. Super. 136, 147 (App. Div. 1997) (stating that expert’s testimony based on “‘unfounded speculation and unquantified possibilities’” is inadmissible net opinion).  Because plaintiff could not proceed to trial without expert testimony on how, if at all, [...] allegedly increased the amount of stormwater runoff from their driveway onto plaintiff’s property, Hopkins v. Fox & Lazo realtors, 132 N.J. 426, 450 (1993), the trial court properly granted summary judgment to [...].  Wyatt, 217 N.J. Super. at 591 (App. Div. 1997) (affirming grant of summary judgment in absence of expert testimony where expert testimony is needed to enable finder of fact to draw valid conclusions).  The Court should affirm the judgment below on that ground.
[brief] Da394-395.  [...], which had raised objections to paying the termination penalties for the MFSA and sought [...]’s contribution towards same after the PSA was signed, abandoned those objections and acquiesced to proceeding with the closing upon the execution of Addendum II.  Although the ROFR does not require that any changes to the terms and conditions of the offer need to be material in order to trigger a new 30-day period, it is undisputed that the existence of a ROFR is a material term in any purchase agreement for real estate.
[brief] ”  (Ca075-076);(Ca086)(Asbury Park Press Article: “The Board’s actions came in response to racially charged social media posts made by Board member [...]. ”); (Ca100-105)  (PATCH Article: “Board members [...] and [...] have been under fire since March for racist social media posts, copies of which have been shared throughout the community and sparked complaints at board meetings. ”)  15.  On April 21, 2022, the [...] ([...]) and the [...] ([...]) filed an Unfair Practice Charge against the Board before the [...], based specifically on Respondent’s January 10, 2022 Facebook posts telling teachers to drop out of the [...] and the [...].
[brief] 26 Fisch v. Manger, 24 N.J. 66 (1957) ..........................................................  7  Geler v. Akawie, 358 N.J.  Super. 437 (2003) ............................................. 42, 48 Green v. Jersey City Bd. of Educ., 177 N.J. 434 (2003) ....................................................... 28 Henker v. Preybylowski, 216 N.J. Super. 513 (App. Div. 1987) ............................. 42 Johnson v. Dobrosky, 187 N.J. 594 (2006) ....................................................... 43 Lehmann v. Toys R’ Us, Inc., 132 N.J. 587 (1993)......................................................... 18, 34 Lockley v. Dep’t of Corr., 177 N.J. 413 (2003)......................................................... 28 Matthews v. Nelson, 57 N.J. Super. 515 (App. Div. 1959) ............................. 41 Morales-Hurtado v. Reinoso, 2018 N.J. Super. LEXIS 169........................................... 33, 47 Pellicer ex rel. Pellicer v. St. Barnabas Hosp., 200 N.J. 22 (2009)......................................................... 32 Pritchett v. State, 248 N.J. 85 (2021) .................................................. 25, 27 Reynolds v. Gonzalez, 172 N.J. 266 (2002) ..................................................
[brief] (8T 44-18 to 24)  They knocked on [...]’s door, and he initially told them he had not seen anything.  He then caught up with them when they were across the street and told them that he did have information for them.  (6T 98-24 to 99-12, 101-23 to 102-5; 8T 45-15 to 46-23)  According to [...], in the unrecorded conversation that followed, [...] said that he knew [...], had witnessed the shooting, and provided a description of the shooter.  (8T 47-7 to 23; see also 6T 102-10 to 22)  [...] prepared a photo array for [...], and in preparing the array, he colored [...]’s distinctive blue eyes so that [...]’s photo did not stand out from the others.
[brief] With regard to [...]’s comments that the site constitutes threatened and endangered species habitat, [...] conducted both a site inspection and in-office review and determined that the Property does not fall within a bald eagle nest buffer, the Property is not mapped as bald eagle habitat by the Landscape Project Mapping, and the size of the wetlands and type of habitat present is not suitable habitat for bald eagles.  (Aa55).  Specifically, [...] found the relatively small size and configuration of the wetlands on the Property mitigates against use by bald eagles, in part because the Property’s narrow, closed canopy stream corridor would hinder bald eagles’ foraging navigation ability due to the species’ 6- to 8-foot wingspans.  (Aa62).  Further, while [...] had accepted the prior bald eagle sighting records, [...] Fish and Wildlife staff explained that “bald eagle foraging” habitat “require[s] waterbodies greater than 8 hectares” while the combined (fragmented) wetlands on the Property were only 3.9 hectares.  (Aa58-59).  In addition, as to the Savannah sparrow, [...] explained that the habitat includes fallow fields, grasslands, upland meadows or pastures.  (Aa55).  Accordingly, [...] found that the species “do not use or rely upon freshwater wetlands or … transition areas for their essential functions such as breeding, resting or feeding. ”  Ibid.  With regard to [...]’s comments about the stormwater management controls, [...] determined that [...] complied with the Stormwater Management Rules, finding that [...] showed peak reduction rates were met through the implementation of its stormwater management system and the increase in impervious cover would not adversely impact flooding.