ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] *State v. Montalvo*, 229 N.J. 300, 324 (2017).  Such circumstances constitute plain error.  *Ibid.*  See also *State v. Roldan*, 314 N.J. Super. 173, 186–87 (App. Div. 1998) (when the State presented two theories of guilt to the jury, “unless the State presented sufficient evidence to support a guilty verdict under both theories, defendant’s conviction must be reversed. ”).  [...] relies on his brief for his arguments regarding the missing identification and alibi instructions.
[brief] ”).  The policy’s conformity clause provides that “[i]f any of the terms of this policy conflict with state or local law, [then] state or local law will apply. ”  But the policy does not define “conflict,” so the term must be “construed in accordance with its “plain and ordinary meaning. ”  *AC Ocean Walk, LLC v. Am. Guarantee & Liab. Ins.*, 256 N.J. 294, 312 (2024) (citing *Flomerfelt v. Cardiello*, 202 N.J. 432, 441 (2010)).  When used as a verb, “conflict” means “to be different. ”  Because the policy’s limitation period is different than New Jersey’s statute of limitations, the latter must apply.  So, by the policy’s own terms, [...]’s UIM action was timely.
[brief] Providing all reasonable inferences to [...], the trial court repeatedly found that [...] never made a cognizable CEPA complaint.  (See 1T 24:12-13 (“[...] and [...] never made any complaints to HR about [...] the [the June 24, 2020] incident”); Id. at 29:16-17 (“clearly Ms. [...] and Ms. [...] did not participate in any whistle-blower activity”); Id. at 29:20-22 (“But just being interviewed and responding truthfully as to what they saw and observed is not whistle-blowing activity. ”); Id. at 29:25-30:3 (“And they said, that this was a very uncomfortable situation.  They thought that [...] acted inappropriately.  That’s not whistle-blowing activity. ”).  [...]’s “complaints” were limited to her belief that her supervisor was mean to her.  In other words, [...]’s grievances are nothing more than routine, personal work disputes about Conicello’s management of the staffing coordinator office.  CEPA demands, as the trial court recognized, more from a CEPA whistleblower than the limited activity to which [...] points.
[directive] Any questions or comments about the Grand Jury Standards may be directed to [...], Jury Management Services, at 609-292-2634.  P.S.C. Attachment c: Chief Justice [...]  Criminal Presiding Judges  [...], Deputy Administrative Director  AOC Directors and Assistant Directors  Criminal Division Managers Operations Division Managers  [...], Manager, Special Programs  [...], Manager of Jury Programs  Jury Managers [...], Special Assistant [...], Special Assistant
[directive] (c)  Intercept, which means to acquire the contents of any wire, electronic or oral communication through the use of any electronic, mechanical or other device, N.J.S.A. 2A:156A- 2c; and (d) Electronic communication, which means the transfer of signs, signals, writings, images, sounds, data or intelligence of any nature transmitted in whole or in part by a wire, radio or other system, N.J.S.A. 2A:156A-2m.  All of these forms of communication are protected from intrusion and interception except under very narrowly defined exceptions.
[brief] 2.  Notices were sent to Defendant(s) at the address listed above [[...]] and in the previously filed complaint, and all notices were accepted by the Defendant(s) or were returned as refused.  3.  At no time was Plaintiff notified by the post office that the individual was unknown at the address or that same had moved from the address.  4.  Plaintiff also verified Defendant’s address by one or more of the following online resources: TLO, Accurint, Westlaw, and/or public phone listing websites.  (Da64-Da71, ¶ 8; Da6-Da26; Pa35-Pa44, ¶ 35).  In addition, Respondent also submitted a Certification of Proof and Ownership of Account, where Respondent certified:  “[t]he source for [Appellant’s] address used for service of the Summons and Complaint is the information contained in the [Respondent’s] business records maintained in its normal course of business. ” (Da64-Da71, ¶ 9; Da6-Da26).  [...] timely served Respondent’s Motion for Judgment on Appellant.  (Pa35-Pa44, ¶ 36).  (Da64-Da71, ¶ 10).  Respondent’s Motion for Judgment was not returned as undeliverable or otherwise because Appellant conceded to receiving mail at the NJ Address.  (2T30-17-25; 2T31-1-25; 2T32-1-11; Pa35-Pa44, ¶ 36).  Again, Appellant did not contact [...] after receiving the Motion for Judgment to advise that the NJ Address was not his address, that he moved, or to provide a change in address.  (Pa35-Pa44, ¶ 36).  On April 20, 2017, the Lower Court entered a judgment against Respondent in the judgment total of $703.29, effective April 19, 2017 (“Default Judgment” or “Judgment”).
[brief] II.  THE INCORRECT INTERPRETATION OF THE YARBOUGH FACTORS RESULTS IN AN ILLEGAL SENTENCE.  The State does not address [...]’s primary contention, that the incorrect interpretation of the Yarbough factors results in an illegal sentence.  The sentencing court’s incorrect interpretation of those factors will result in an illegal sentence, as it does here, because it denies a defendant the fundamental due process right to be sentenced under a correct understanding of the law.  As the courts have noted a sentence will always be illegal when imposed without regard to a constitutional safeguard.  *State v. Tavares*, 286 N.J. Super. 610, 618 (App. Div. 1996).  A constitutional safeguard is that sort of right created by the Constitution to prevent the unfair treatment of citizens.  See, e.g., *State v. Zuber*, 227 N.J. 422, 437 (2017) (reversing a life sentence given to a youthful offender ten years after direct appeals had been exhausted pursuant to an eighth amendment challenge).  The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees an individual’s right to due process.  When an individual is sentenced under a materially false apprehension of fact or law that constitutional right is violated.  *United States v. Tucker*, 404 U.S. 443, 447 (1972).  The State does not dispute this, but simply argues without citation or support, that the existence of some other argument that attacks the result precludes addressing the constitutional issue.  There is no such support for this argument.  Rather, the court must address any constitutional infirmity that results from sentencing a defendant under a misapprehension of the law.  Accordingly, the motion to correct an illegal sentence is appropriate and not prohibited by Rule 3:22-5.  The illegal sentence must be addressed and remanded for resentencing.
[brief] The trial court denied [...]’s motion to compel arbitration.  Plaintiffs filed this lawsuit against [...] (and others) in February 2023, and [...] moved to compel arbitration on August 23, 2023.  (Da1; Da63–64.)  The trial court denied [...]’s motion to compel, holding that the arbitration agreement in the December Terms was unenforceable under Atalese v. U.S. Legal Services Group, L.P., 219 N.J. 430 (2014).
[brief] 9.  In conjunction with the above point, the Respondent Planning Board Members specifically authorized the Planning Board Attorney to forward the letter (memorializing the Board’s decision and findings associated therewith), to the Borough Clerk.  10.  The Planning Board Attorney prepared and sent a detailed letter to the Borough Clerk, advising that the Planning Board found Amendment No. 2 was consistent with the Borough’s Master Plan.  Pa 573 (Exhibit J5)  11.  The said letter from the Board Attorney, dated on or about February 17, 2021, accurately and sufficiently identified the findings and conclusions of the Planning Board Members, and the reasons associated therewith.  12.  Thereafter, on or about February 17, 2021, the Borough Council of the [...] adopted an Ordinance amending the Beachway Avenue Waterfront Redevelopment Plan.
[brief] **Refuting False Claims by [...] ([...]) & [...]**  Unfortunately, [...]’s Hearing presentation relied on extensive false claims about this Court Case, misleading irrelevant issues, & slanderous false claims against me.  Both of them falsely claimed I have a litigious nature without any substantiated facts.  [...] falsely claimed I had no standing to file exceptions, & that [...] had no further Trust obligations after Oct. 2022 Order.  I refuted everything based on substantiated facts.  (4T, p. 19, line 17, to p. 22, line 4; p. 39, line 4, to p. 40, line 17; p. 41, line 22, to p. 42, line 17)  **Refuting [...]’s May 30, ‘23 Reply to May 25th Cross-Motions**  His Hearing presentation repeated a lot of false claims from his May 30, ‘23 Reply to May 25th Cross Motions by [...] & me.  I refuted those false claims, plus other false claims from his Reply based on substantiated facts.  I also substantiated key points in order for the Judge to **GRANT** my Cross-Motion & May 30th proposed Order.  (4T, p. 22, line 5, to p. 33, line 15)
[brief] 33.  The Judge stated “[...] points out that he's been involved in the case for several years and has billed less than that.  [...] is an excellent attorney, he does good work, but Court has to consider everything in totality and consider the factors to see if that fee was reasonable.  Again, it comes out to more than $113,000.  I don't think it's fair to say he shouldn't get paid; he should get paid. ”  (3T, p. 10, line 24, to p. 11, line 7)  First off, the disputes for this Trust Case had only gone on for a little over a year.  Second, [...] was referencing several years of case work for significant amounts of litigation for Estate Case, [...], since 2019.  Third, any opinion about [...], as an attorney, was meaningless since Judge needed to evaluate the legitimacy and reasonable efficacy of billed legal work independent of opinions about [...]’s professional attributes.  And most importantly, the Judge was NOT deciding on whether [...] gets paid.  He should have decided whether Trust should pay those billed fees, which were [...]’s obligation to pay since he instructed [...] for all of the unwarranted legal work.  [...] would have been paid regardless of the Judge’s rulings.  Billed legal work for ~$114K, even when reduced by Judge to ~$93K, plus ~$15K from Oct ‘22 Order, was excessive (~29%) in relation to Trust assets of $378,455 (Exh. “T”, par. 4)(295a) at end of Sept. ’22, & closer to 36% when Trust assets were around my estimated $300K on Feb. 17, ‘23, since it should have only cost around $5K (par. 31) for readily achievable, 3-Way Settlement.
[brief] As a result of this “egregious” fraud, Appellants contend that [...] should be precluded from seeking the affirmative relief addressed in his cross-appeal.  What Appellants fail to identify, however, is who exactly was harmed by [...]’s actions, which, as the Trial Court concluded, was merely a mistake by [...], not an attempt to deceive anyone or otherwise alter title.  In point of fact, again as found by the Trial Court, because [...] maintained all indicia of ownership of the property at all times relevant after signing the December 1998 Deed, [...]’s mistake did not impact anyone’s rights or title to the Property, including that of Appellants.  By contrast, the fraud perpetrated by the Appellants as articulated in [...]’s cross-appeal is laid bare in Appellants’ opposition wherein they concede that they had no knowledge their potential claim of ownership of the Property or the December 1998 deed until it was uncovered by their attorney, [...] in or about 2016.  Importantly, this position is in stark contrast to the Appellants’ arguments and sworn testimony throughout this litigation, wherein Appellants repeatedly argued that they had always been the rightful owners of the Property.  In fact, Appellants relied upon a series of stories to support their supposed claim of ownership and control of the property including (1) that [...], as the owner, maintained the property, paid the taxes, collected the rents, etc. and (2) that [...] was a property manager for [...].  While these theories always lacked believability, Appellants’ admission that they knew [...] was not the owner or caretaker of the Properties, evidences the fraudulent and malicious nature of Appellants’ actions which are at issue in [...]’s cross-appeal.  Respectfully, Appellants should be held to account for their actions by way of the relief sought in [...]’s counterclaim/cross-appeal.  ARGUMENT I.
[brief] N.J.A.C. 7:8-5.5(b)(1); (Aa17).  Certain BMPs even exceeded Stormwater Rule requirements.  (Aa17).  [...] did not challenge any of [...]’s specific stormwater determinations.  Its assertions now misunderstand the WQPA and the WQMP process and are relied on broad, unspecific and unsupported allegations that [...]’s permitting decision failed to consider or make a record regarding unspecified TMDL requirements pertaining to an unspecified water body.
[brief] Arbitration | Dr81 | | November 8, 2024 | Order by Hon. [...], J.S.C. Denying Plaintiffs’ Motion to Enter Default Against [...] | Dr82 | | November 8, 2024 | Order by Hon. [...], J.S.C. denying [...]’s Cross-Motion to Stay Case | Dr84 | | November 8, 2024 |
[directive] Finally, the Rule provides that where the person has been arrested in an extradition proceeding, that person may be admitted to bail except where that person is charged with a crime punishable by death.  This Rule provides that a Superior Court judge may set bail for any offense.  Only a Superior Court judge may set bail for persons charged with murder, kidnapping, manslaughter, aggravated manslaughter, aggravated sexual assault, sexual assault, aggravated criminal sexual contact, a person arrested in an extradition order.3
[brief] ..................................  Pa25  Certification of [...] dated June 1, 2023 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Pa38  Letter from [...] dated May 17, 2023 ...................... .Pa42  Notice of Motion to Consolidate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Pa43  Order to Consolidate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Pa45  Notice of Motion to be Relieved as Counsel.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Pa47  Order Granting Motion to be Relieved . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Pa49
[brief] (5T, at 7-10).  As [...] points out in its Brief before this Court, the New Jersey Appellate Division in Allison-Williams was applying New York law to the contract at issue there.  However, the Supreme Court’s decision in Boyle makes it abundantly clear that the analysis applies equally under New Jersey law which—like New York – follows the “American Rule. ”  Boyle, 257 N.J. at 478, 482.  That rule provides that a successful litigant is, as a general principle, not entitled to the payment of his or her counsel fees.  See id.; see also N. Bergen Rex Transp., Inc. v. Trailer Leasing Co., 158 N.J. 561, 569 (1999).  As such, contractual fee-shifting provisions are strictly construed in light of that policy.  Boyle, 257 N.J. at 478-479.  Numerous other cases have construed clauses like those at issue here as imposing a duty to indemnify only as to third-party claims, and not as to claims between the parties to the contract itself.
[brief] (Pa499-502; Pa584-585).  The recorded rehearing took place before the ZBA deliberated or decided the application.  (Pa499-502.; Pa584-585).  Each and every witness that testified at the May 23, 2022 hearing was subjected to direct examination and cross-examination anew on August 22, 2022 and September 12, 2022.  (Pa498; Pa627).  Both parties were afforded a full and fair opportunity to re-introduce any exhibits from the May 23, 2022 hearing.  (Pa651) (stating, “So [...] you shouldn’t have walked away.  You can now proceed with any evidence you want to present to the Board. ”).  As a result, the Trial Court (and, in turn, the Appellate Division) received more than two hundred (200) pages of certified transcriptions from the rehearsings conducted on August 22, 2022 and September 12, 2022 (not to mention the 83 pages of transcripts from the March 28, 2022 hearing) upon which to determine the validity of ZBA’s action.
[directive] 8.1  General Authority to Revoke Release ......:..........................  68 for of .................  68  8.2  Presumption Against Applying Revocation Release  Where a Motion for Revocation of Release Must Be Filed Absent 8.3  Cases Extraordinary ..........................  69  Circumstances  Compelling and Prosecutor Is Presumed to Seek Revocation of Release  8.4  Cases Where the Revocation of When Serious of Seeking Release  8.4.1  Presumption for Any New Is Committed While on Release  Offense  Crime Complaint-Warrant .................. ............  69  Charged by Revocation of When Any New of Seeking Release  8.4.2  Presumption ..........  69 on Release for Serious Crime Crime Is Committed While a Defendant Presumption of Seeking Revocation of Release When 8. 4.3 .................. Violence Restraining Order  69  Domestic Violates a When Defendant Revocation of Release  Presumption of Seeking 8.4.4  70 ...............  Survivor Protection Order  Sexual Assault Violates a of Release ......  70 of Seeking Revocation Overcoming the Presumption 8.4.5 ....................................  70  Circumstances 8.5  Relevant Facts and 70  ................ Revocation of Release Filing of Application for Electronic 8.6  70 ...........  Revocation-of-Release and Initial Detention Motions 8.7  Combining .........  70  Revocation of Release Is Denied Application for Notification  When 8.8 OF PRETRIAL OF SUSPECTED VIOLATIONS
[brief] ” (3T 52-24 to 53-6).  [...] also testified that another man repeatedly punched him in the side, bruising his ribs, and a woman “attacked” him from the driver’s side and crossed his legs to prevent him from kicking.  (2T 214-24 to 216-20; 2T 217-14 to 19).  [...] also testified that, behind the Travel Lodge, he heard [...] on the phone, telling a person whom he believed to be [...] where they were.  When police arrived, [...] testified, he was leaning out of the car on the passenger side.  He heard [...] tell officers that he ([...]) had fired shots at them.  (2T 225-8 to 23; 2T 227-13 to 15; 3T 25-22 to 26-5).  He also heard [...] say that he worked for the bail bondsmen.  (2T 227-6 to 15).  Footage taken by the body camera of then-Waterford officer [...], who was in an ambulance with [...], depicted [...] stating that “the girl that’s with them” went into his pockets, and that “[t]he guys” “stopped the car … and they jumped in and started beating [him] with a crowbar. ” (4T 251-7 to 254-1).  Barber testified that in the ambulance, [...] identified [...] as having been involved.  (4T 257-12 to 258-21).  [...] testified that [...] took his glasses and chain, and [...] went through his pockets and took his phone and money, which he believed to be $475, after [...] “ordered” her to take his money.  (2T 218-1 to 19; 2T 237-7 to 12).  [...] acknowledged telling the police that he had $360, but described that figure as a “roundabout.
[brief] 30  ###  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES  ####  Cases  **Carney v. United States Dep't of Justice**, 19 F.3d 807, 812 (2nd Cir. 1994) .................................................. 29  **Higg-A-Rella, Inc. v. County of Essex**, 141 N.J. 35, 46 (1995) 15, 19  **In re Clinton**, 973 F.3d 106, 113-114 (D.C. Cir. 2020) .......... 29  **In re DeAvila-Silebi**, 235 N.J. 218, 219 (2018) .................. 6  **In re Libretti**, 134 N.J. 123 (1993) ..................................  28  **In re Silebi**, 249 N.J. 3 (2021) ........................................  23  **Irval Realty, Inc. v. Board of Pub. Util. Comm'rs**, 61 N.J. 366, 372 (1972) .........................................................  19  **Karins v. City of Atlantic City**, 152 N.J. 532, 540-41 (1998)  .. 16  **Keddie v. Rutgers**, 148 N.J. 36, 49 (1997) ..........................  14  **Loigman v. Kimmelman**, 102 N.J. 98, 108 (1985) ............... 18, 24  **MAG Entertainment, LLC v. Division of Alcoholic Beverage Control**, 375 N.J. Super. 534, 552 (App. Div. 2005) ............. 29 **Mason v. City of Hoboken**, 196 N.J. 51, 67 (2008) .............. 17 **Nero v. Hyland**, 76 N.J. 213, 222 (1978) .......................... 17 **Newark Morning Ledger Co. v. New Jersey Sports & Exposition Authority**, 423 N.J. Super. 140, 174-175 (App. Div. 2011) ....... 28 **North Jersey Media Group, Inc. v. Township of Lyndhurst**, 229 N.J. 541, 578 (2017) .............................................. 18, 24 **Paff v. New Jersey Dep't. of Labor**, 392 N.J. Super. 334, 341 (App. Div. 2007) .............................................. 10, 30 **Rivera v. Union County Prosecutor's Office**, 250 N.J. 124, 143 (2022) ......................................................... 15, 21 **Shuttleworth v. City of Camden**, 258 N.J. Super. 573, 582 (App. Div.), cert. denied, 133 N.J. 429 (1992) .................... 15, 25
[brief] They did not and could not serve as amendments to the PTA per the very terms of the PTA.  There is simply no testimony anywhere in the record that these were intended to or did in fact amend the PTA.  Further, as compiled in an exhibit presented to the Trial Court, the provisional EGPs listed in the Financial Reporting (against which [...] made provisional payments) changed over time, so these documents could not serve as alternative successive “amendments” without the final email dated January 4, 2022 being considered to be the final amendment.
[brief] [...] admitted that [...] had the right to terminate the Lease when they failed to make the annual rent payments.  (Pa001828).  (“If they own the land and somebody defaults, then they can do what they want from there. ”).  Indeed, [...] himself understood the importance of site control admitting that “[w]e would not move forward and spend the serious money without having site control or an option for site control. ” (Pa001831).  Moreover, when pressed as to whether an entity would purchase [...]’s “development rights” without land control, [...] admitted “[y]ou need site control to build a project, that is correct. ” (Pa001832).  [...] also knew that [...], a solar regulatory agency, had terminated the Wholesale Market Participation Agreement (“WMPA”) with [...] by January of 2018.  (Pa001830).  (“I know that [...] gave us notice. ”).  In a similar move, upon learning of the loss of land control, [...] terminated its interconnection agreement with [...] in March of 2018.  (Id.).  D.
[brief] I fully recognize that self-represented litigants are not entitled to any greater rights than litigants represented by counsel.  By the same token, the trial court should also not be biased against self-represented litigants.  “It is nevertheless fundamental that the court system is obliged to protect the procedural rights of all litigants and to accord procedural due process to all litigants. ”  Rubin v. Rubin, 188 N.J. Super. 155, 159 (App. Div. 1982).  Further, the real and substantive issue before the court was the distribution of marital assets according to the timeline established by the June 6, 2023 order (Pa506) and in the manner prescribed by the March 1, 2023 JOD order (Pa1).  Because the proper consideration of defendant’s request for enforcement of the distribution of marital assets required expenditure of the motion judge’s time and effort in diligently reviewing the prior orders of the trial court, the judge cut corners and evaded the real issue of distribution of marital assets by expediently ordering the confiscation of the passports of the pro se litigants and their child.