ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] On August 5, 2022, [...] and the Department entered into a Settlement Agreement (the “Settlement Agreement”) pursuant to which the Department agreed that the Project was not required to comply with Subsection D of the SRD Rule and provided detailed reasoning for this conclusion.  Aa29-40.  The Settlement Agreement explained the Department’s interpretation and application of the SRD Rule, when read together with the Long Branch Rule, the Redevelopment Ordinances, and the Redevelopment Plan Amendment.  Aa30-34.  The following was acknowledged in the Settlement Agreement: the requirements under Subsection D “are intended to prevent what occurred along the Atlantic City Boardwalk, namely that the massive hotel casino structures... were constructed with no setbacks from the Boardwalk”; in contrast, the buildings in Long Branch “are often separated from the boardwalk by public streets” and local ordinances “require adequate setbacks from public roads”; and the [...] Property is separated from the boardwalk by the public street Ocean Avenue, an associated sidewalk, and an approximately twelve (12) foot unimproved right-of-way.  Aa31.  The Department further recognized in the Settlement Agreement that: “the [Redevelopment] Ordinances do not require an Open View Corridor and a Step Back as required elsewhere by the [SRD Rule]”; the Redevelopment Ordinances “were reviewed by the [Department] and approved as consistent with the [CZM] Rules”; the SRD Rule “has not been applied in the Long Branch Redevelopment Area because the Long Branch Redevelopment Zone Permit does not require compliance with the [SRD Rule] . . . as reflected in the [Redevelopment] Ordinances”; and “the existence of the Long Branch Rule and the public road separating the boardwalk from the Property makes this portion of Long Branch unique and unduplicated elsewhere throughout any portion of the Coastal Zone regulated by [CAFRA].”  Aa32-33.  The Department ultimately agreed that the Project was not required to comply with the SRD Rule because it was within the Redevelopment Area “where the scenic resource setback standard is not applied and thus most buildings of a similar scale do not comply with the setback standard, and hence [the] [P]roject will not have a significant adverse effect on the scenic resources of the coastal zone. ”  Aa34.  G.
[brief] From: Final Order of the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Cumberland County  DOCKET NO.: [...]  Sat Below: HON.  [...], J.S.C  BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 608-610  [...] and [...]  IN OPPOSITION TO CROSS-APPEAL OF [...] AND IN REPLY TO THE CUMBERLAND COUNTY IMPROVEMENT  AUTHORITY  [...]  [...], Esq. (#234961966)  [...], Esq. (#014391977)  [...] [...]  Attorneys for Appellants [...], Esq. [...], Esq.  Of counsel and on the Brief  [...], Esq.  On the Brief TABLE OF CONTENTS  TABLE OF CONTENTS ...........................................................................................................  i  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ...................................................................................................... iii  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT .................................................................................................  1  PROCEDURAL HISTORY .......................................................................................................  3 STATEMENT OF FACTS .......................................................................................................  4  FACTUAL BACKGROUND AS TO FRALINGER .................................................................  4 FACTUAL BACKGROUND AS TO CCIA .............................................................................  6  REPLY BRIEF IN FURTHER SUPPORT OF REMAND AS TO [...], P.A. AND [...].
[brief] The report repeats and elaborates on the EMP's strategies we set forth above:  To achieve New Jersey's 80x50 goal the building sector will need to phase out reliance on fossil fuels and aggressively pursue electrification of heating, cooling and appliances.  ...  To achieve the 80x50 GHG reduction target, the state should prioritize the creation of a building electrification roadmap paired with incentives that initially target buildings currently relying on propane and heating oil for space and water heating and inefficient electric resistance baseboard heating.
[brief] *Witt*, 223 N.J. at 422.  Our Supreme Court has justified this exception based on the inherent mobility of vehicles, the lesser expectation of privacy in vehicles, and the recognition that a prompt search based on probable cause may be less intrusive than seizing a vehicle and detaining the driver while the police prepare and a judicial officer reviews a search warrant application.  *Terry*, 232 N.J. at 233 (2018) (citing *Witt*, 223 N.J. at 422-24).  But what constitutes probable cause is a “flexible, nontechnical concept” whose foundation is a “well-grounded suspicion that a crime is being committed” or a “reasonable ground for belief of guilt. ”  *Keyes*, 184 N.J. 541, 553 (2005); *State v. Patino*, 83 N.J. 1, 10 (1980); *State v. Moore*, 181 N.J. 40, 46 (2004).  This is a “low threshold,” which our Supreme Court has unanimously decided “is not a stringent standard[.]”
[brief] Seemingly contradicting the holding in *Veras*, *Lemelledo* discussed and analyzed the NJLLA’s provisions for “voiding of the contract” by “individual consumers” just a few years prior.  *See Lemelledo*, 150 N.J. at 272.  Further, though this area of law is still developing and there are no published decisions addressing the issue of voidness of a contract for violations of the NJCFLA, the NJCFLA’s licensure provisions and their application to debt buyers/collectors as “consumer lender[s],” as defined by N.J.S.A. 17:11C-2, has been analyzed several times in recent years—both in the Superior Court of New Jersey and in our sister federal court for the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey.
[brief] The NJ Legislature has unambiguously vested the [...] with the general responsibility for the proper operation of the retirement system.  Pursuant to N.J.S.A 52:18A-95.1: “any reference in a law, rule, regulation, judicial or administrative proceeding, or otherwise to the [...] shall mean and refer to the [...] and Benefits and pursuant to N.J.S.A 52:18A-96 the subject Board is under the [...].  Further, pursuant to N.J.S.A 43:7-18.1: “[T]he [...] and Benefits in the [...] shall have the general responsibility for the proper operation of the pension fund and shall have such powers and shall exercise such functions and duties, as may be necessary and appropriate for the proper operation of the fund, subject to the provisions of P.L.1955, c.70 (C.52:18A-95 et seq.).  ....
[brief] THE COURT DID NOT ERR BY DENYING DEFENDANT’S DEMAND TO COMPEL PLAINTIFF TO PRODUCE AN ASSIGNMENT.  Another item of relief sought by Defendant in his Order to Show Cause was a demand for the production of an assignment from Plaintiff to [...], however, that assignment did not occur until after the Judgment of Foreclosure was entered.  At the time the Judgment of Foreclosure was entered, Defendant’s mortgage merged into the judgment and ceased to exist.  *In Re Goione*, 595 B.R. 477 (*Bankr. D.N.J.* 2019).  Thus, there was no longer a mortgage to be assigned and no need for an assignment to be recorded.  Moreover, it is well settled that a mortgagor cannot challenge the assignment of a note and mortgage.  See *US Bank Nat. Assn v. Riley*, 2016 WL 2888952 (N.J. Superior Ct. App. Div. May 18, 2016).  Since Defendant was not a party to the assignment, he had no basis or standing to challenge that assignment.  See *[...] Mortgage v. Guenzel*, 2018 WL 4688271 (N.J. Superior Ct. App. Div. October 1, 2018).  Accordingly, the trial court did not err in denying Defendant’s request for this relief and the denial should be affirmed by this court.
[brief] (In re Equifax Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig.), 999 F.3d 1247 (11th Cir. 2021) .................................................................  14  Simon v. FIA Card Servs., N.A., 732 F.3d 259 (3d Cir. 2013) ........................................................................  30  Smith v. Datla, 451 N.J. Super. 82 (App. Div. 2017)  ............................................................  36 State v. Courtney, 243 N.J. 77 (2020)  .....................................................................................  10, 11 Taylor v. Perrin, Landry, deLaunay & Durand, 103 F.3d 1232 (5th Cir. 1997) (single violation)  ...........................................  24 United States ex rel. Espinoza v. Fairman, 813 F.2d 117 (7th Cir. 1987) .......................................................................  16 United States v. Adewani, 467 F.3d 1340 (D.C. Cir. 2006) ..................................................................  16 West v. Nationwide Credit, 998 F. Supp. 642 (W.D.N.C. 1998) ..............................................................  28  Wilson ex rel. Manzano v. City of Jersey City, 209 N.
[brief] Aa024-041.  The DEP made the following sole finding regarding its duty to determine that the proposed project is consistent with the areawide water quality management plans:  Water Quality Management Plan (WQMP) Rules - Consistency Assessment.  This project is a sewage-generating development.  All proposed activities are located within the limits of the mapped sewer service area, as shown on the plan entitled: “OVERALL NJDEP WETLAND PERMITTING PLAN”, Drawing No. WP100, to be approved under Activity No. [...].  Therefore, the project is consistent with the Water Quality Management Plan (208 Plan) adopted under the New Jersey Water Quality Planning Act, N.J.S.A. 58:11A-1 et seq.  [Aa029.]  Regarding the proposed pipe culvert, the DEP describes the large disturbance for the crossing, and notes that mitigation will be required, but makes no findings as to the underlying justification for the pipe culvert:  Riparian zone impacts proposed under this section includes the permanent disturbance of 9,091 square feet (0.209 acres) to construct a new access road crossing from Route 1 (above the allowable limit of 4,000 square feet under Table 11.2).  All impacts are to shrub/scrub and herbaceous vegetation associated with a man-made tributary to Duck Pond Run and involve installing a pipe culvert beneath the crossing.  The activities require mitigation for exceeding the allowable limit.  However, the applicant has demonstrated that compliance with presents complicating inefficiencies in the administrative process and any subsequent litigation.  It remains likely that this appeal may be complicated by the bifurcated and pending aspects of the FWW permit application.
[brief] Tails, plaintiff loses.  Respondents now try to defend the court by placing the errant hypothetical in “proximate cause” language.  In advancing this position, Respondents ignore the portions of Appellant’s brief showing that [...] could have performed the procedure, if it had called it in a timely fashion.  More importantly, though, issues of proximate cause are not decided based on the assumption of facts that did not happen.  In this case Plaintiff can prove proximate causation because, in actual fact, due to the defendant doctors’ deviation from the standard of care, the C-section was not called until 10:12 p.m., -- far too late.  The New Motion Judge’s hypothetical raises the question of to prepare a case for motion practice.  Arguing actual facts may not suffice; the judge might devise a hypothetical, and who is to say what those hypothetical facts might be?  If this Court entertains a hypothetical, Appellant suggests a hypothetical in which – accepting the unproven claims that [...] was in a procedure at 9:48 p.m. and [...] was barred from calling a C-section – [...] enters the room, like the charge nurse actually did at 10:10.  [...] then notifies [...] of the Jennings’ deceleration.  Consistent with his actual conduct at 10:10, [...] then says: “Okay, get a team to scrub, get [...] into the procedure room and prepare her for an emergency C-section.  I will be there promptly after I deliver here. ”  And since the record conclusively establishes that such procedures take 15 minutes, but that the delivering doctor needs to be there only to make the incision, deliver the baby, and start the suturing,\(^8\) [...] arrives shortly thereafter -- so in this hypothetical, everyone wins and [...] is alive today.  **CONCLUSION**
[brief] TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Authority | Page ---|--- N.J. Const. Art.  I, s. 1 | 26 Dreier, Guidebook to Chancery Practice in New Jersey (Tenth Ed. 2018), Ch. I(A)(12) | 27  APPENDIX TABLE OF CONTENTS  Volume One | Page ---|--- Complaint | 1 Motion to Declare Property Abandoned | 8  Service list | 10
[brief] Indeed, we think the delay is otherwise inexplicable.  [...]’s position below relied primarily on the unreported Appellate Division decision in Suburban Disposal, Inc. v. Twp. of Aberdeen, A-3176-12T3, 2014 WL 2131662 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. May 23, 2014); Da453.  There, a bidder, “[...],” provided an out-of-date public works contractor registration certificate with its bid and subsequently provided a certificate showing it was registered at the time of bid.  Id. at *2 (Da455).  [...] asserted below that the case stands for the proposition that a failure to timely provide registration documents is not material so long as the bidder was registered at the time of the bid.  That case, which has been cited by courts zero (0) times since it was decided more than ten (10) years ago, cannot carry the day and should not be persuasive to this Court.  Even if Suburban Disposal (Aberdeen) were not distinguishable, and it is, it provides a total of four (4) sentences of conclusory “analysis” for the proposition that [...]’s defect was not material.  Id. at *7 (Da461).  To the extent it stands for the proposition claimed by [...], it is simply wrong, as it is entirely inconsistent with the plethora of case law discussed supra on how and when to evaluate a defect’s materiality.  Moreover, Suburban Disposal (Aberdeen) is distinguishable in a number of critical ways.
[brief] (ii)  **Landlord Did Not Seek Money Damages in the Underlying Action** (Da1-3)  Even if Tenant was not precluded from arguing that Landlord failed to properly mitigate its damages (it is), this argument is nonsensical as Landlord did not seek, nor was it awarded, money damages in the Underlying Action.  Under long standing New Jersey law, a landlord seeking a money judgment against a former tenant is required to demonstrate that it properly mitigated its damages.  *Fanarjian v. Moskowitz*, 237 N.J. Super. 395, 402-406 (App. Div. 1989); *Harrison Riverside Ltd. P'ship v. Eagle Affiliates, Inc.*, 309 N.J. Super. 470, 473 (App. Div. 1998); *Borough of Fort Lee v. Banque Nat'l de Paris*, 311 N.J. Super. 280, 292 (App. Div. 1998).
[brief] Accordingly, any portions of her testimony that ran afoul of the limiting principles articulated in Watson were unhelpful and inadmissible lay opinion testimony.  Watson, 2023 WL 4918557, at *23.  [...] violated factors three and four of Watson during her narration of videos S-37, S-38, and S-39.  (4T177-19 to 181-12; 5T244-19 to 246-24)  In S-37, an empty parking lot occupies the vast majority of the frame, and no action can be seen in the parking lot itself.  (D11 at S-37)  On its face, the video appears to show nothing of relevance to the case, but the detective believed it was one of two videos with the best vantage points of the shooter.  (5T240-7 to 22)  Although [...] did not witness the events on video, she had visited the location where that video was taken, giving her “firsthand knowledge” of the location only.
[brief] Goldfarb v. Solimine, 245 N.J. 326, 339-40 (2021) (quoting Toll Bros., Inc. v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders of Burlington, 194 N.J. 223, 253 (2008)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  "The essential justification for the promissory estoppel doctrine is to avoid the substantial hardship or injustice which would result if such a promise were not enforced.  New Jersey courts engage in an equitable analysis designed to avoid injustice."
[brief] Aside from the harm to [...], the integrity of our justice system suffers when an attorney capitalizes upon conflicted joint representation to influence a witness’s testimony and the ultimate apportionment of fault in a lawsuit.  [...] argued below that it should be permitted to continue its joint representation because [...] certified that he wanted to keep [...] as his attorneys and that he did not understand the basis for the conflict inherent in the representation.  [...]’s certification begs the question of whether [...] adequately informed him of the risks posed by the conflicted representation.  Most importantly, while a party may choose his counsel, no party may demand to be represented by an attorney disqualified due to an ethical requirement, as the Rules of Professional Conduct exist not only to protect the parties, but to preserve the integrity of the litigation and the justice system.  [...]’s argument that it should be permitted to engage in this conflicted joint representation because [...] is vicariously liable for [...]’s negligence and would ultimately pay any money judgment against [...] is also meritless.
[brief] Similarly, the Legislature modified the public disclosure bar to allow the State to veto dismissal of a case on public disclosure grounds (the “2023 Veto Amendment”).  The Legislature did so by amending N.J.S.A. § 2A:32C-9(c) to add the phrase “unless opposed by the Attorney General” to the sentence of the public disclosure bar that requires dismissal if the criteria for its application are met.  Pa29.  As a result, to bar dismissal on public disclosure grounds, the State need not initiate the case in the first instance or intervene in a relator-filed action, as it had to before the amendment.  It can now achieve precisely the same result by exercising the veto authority.  4T 19:8-20:19.  It is logical that the Legislature would tweak the public disclosure bar in this fashion.
[directive] Among them are:  Prawo do procesu z udziałem ławy przysięgłych, w którym stan musi udowodnić Pana(i) a.  [Tak/Yes]  [Nie/No] winę ponad zasadną wątpliwość?  The right to a jury trial in which the State must prove you guilty beyond a reasonable doubt?  Nawiązka na rzecz Biura Odszkodowań dla Ofiar Przestępstw * /* Victims of Crime Compensation Office Assessment  Inicjały oskarżonego / Defendant’s Initials  Główny formularz oświadczenia o winie/Skorygowany formularz udostępniony na mocy Dyrektywy #01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 10079-Polish strona 1 z 7 Main Plea Form/Revised Form Promulgated by Directive #01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 10079-Polish page 1 of 7 b.
[brief] PAGE NO.  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES AND STATE CASES.................................ii STATE STATUTES.............................................................................iii  [...] ORDINANCES AND OTHER SOURCES...........iv  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT..............................................................1  STATEMENT OF FACTS..................................................................1  PROCEDURAL HISTORY.................................................................4  LEGAL ARGUMENT.......................................................................4  POINT I.  THE LOWER COURT PROPERLY FOUND THAT APPELLANTS FAILED TO ESTABLISH THAT THE APPLICANT’S NOTICE OF HEARING WAS DEFECTIVE (Pa 30-Pa 37; 3T35-4-3T38-5)....................................................4  POINT II.  THE SUPERIOR COURT FOUND THAT THE BOARD’S APPROVAL OF THE APPLICATION COMPLIES WITH THE [...]’S MASTER PLAN (Pa 45-Pa 48; 3T46-21-3T48-3).......................................................7  POINT III.  THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY FOUND THAT APPLICANTS PROPERLY MET THE NECESSARY BURDEN OF PROOF AND THE FINDINGS OF FACT OF THE BOARD  WERE NOT ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS OR UNREASONABLE (Pa 41-Pa 94; 3T38-10-3T49-9).....................8  CONCLUSION..................................................................................16  #  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
[brief] [...] (“[...]”) and his company (“[...] PC”) filed a Complaint in the Bergen County Law Division against [...] (“[...]”) on March 14, 2022.  (Pa21).  The Complaint sought a declaratory judgment that on the date [...] was involved in an accident, his car was covered under a policy issued by [...], and that [...]’s purported cancellation of that policy had been ineffective.  Plaintiff also sought monetary damages arising from the coverage denial.  At the close of discovery, on December 18, 2023, [...] moved for summary judgment.  (Pa9).  On January 26, 2024, Plaintiffs filed opposition with a cross-motion for partial summary judgment, limited to the issue of liability.  (Pa114).  [...] filed its opposition and reply on March 5, 2024.  (Pa123).  On March 3, 2024, Plaintiffs filed the final motion papers consisting of the reply brief on their cross-motion.  On March 15, 2024, following oral argument, the Honorable [...] granted [...]’s summary judgment motion (Pa5) and denied Plaintiffs’ cross-motion (Pa7).  Plaintiffs subsequently filed a Notice of Appeal on April 22, 2024 (Pa1).  STATEMENT OF FACTS
[brief] In sum, the record clearly shows that defendant did not invoke his right to counsel.  His question was about procedure, it was aptly answered, and he was aware that he had a right to remain silent, that he had a right to counsel, who would be appointed if he could not afford an attorney, and that he could exercise his rights at any time.  Defendant elected to waive his rights and speak with the detective.  As such, defendant’s statement should have been deemed admissible and the trial court order granting defendant’s Motion to Suppress was an abuse of its discretion.
[brief] That is not an academic question because if the Clerk did not have the authority, then the decision to include the ballot is ultra vires and void.  In such a scenario, the Court does not need to get to the merits as Respondent [...] never sought affirmative relief asking for the ballot to be counted.  Alternatively, even if the Court were to consider the issue anyway, the burden shifts to Respondent to demonstrate that the ballot is a legal vote improperly excluded.