ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Two individuals lost their lives and another suffered a gunshot wound.  And while the murder convictions were run consecutive to each other, the terms of imprisonment were the lowest possible—despite the judge finding that the aggravating factors substantially outweighed the mitigating factors.  If the Court was not looking at the overall fairness of the sentence, the terms of imprisonment on each count should have been substantially higher based on the court's aggravating and mitigating factor analysis.  Instead, it is clear the Court considered the overall length of the term of imprisonment when she factored in that the sentences should have been consecutive under *Yarbough*.  The Court appeared focused on the fairness of the overall sentence and avoided using similar factors to increase of the lengths individual terms and also using them to impose consecutive sentences.
[brief] [...] was subpoenaed by the defense (13T:25-7 to 9).  It is without question that [...] was central to this case.  First and foremost, he was the arresting officer in this case.  He discovered defendant in possession of a clip with live ammunition, which really tie defendant to the gun and the scene.  (13T:38-23 to; 39-6).  The defense sought a ruling that if [...] were to take the stand, he wanted to impeach his credibility with [...]’s granting of a motion to suppress in, *State v. Funderburg*, which was decided November 29, 2010.
[brief] (Raised below: 3T44:7-3T46:-14)**  The Supreme Court of New Jersey in *Bender v. Adelson*, 187 N.J. 411 (2006) specifically noted that:  Counsel is allowed broad latitude in summation and counsel may draw conclusions even if the inference is that a jury is asked to make are improbable, perhaps illogical erroneous or even absurd ...  When summation commentary transgresses the boundaries of the broad latitude offered to counsel, a trial court must grant a party’s motion for a new trial if the comments are so prejudicial that ‘it clearly and convincingly appears there is a miscarriage of justice under the law. ’
[brief] Cf. State v. Figueroa, 358 N.J. Super. 317, 325-26 (App. Div. 2003) (finding it was not necessary to conduct a 404(b) analysis when the other-crimes evidence related to other people and not of crimes committed by the defendant).  As noted above, the first Cofield prong requires the evidence to be “relevant to a material issue genuinely in dispute. ”  State v. Green, 236 N.J. 71, 82 (2018) (quoting Gillispie, 208 N.J. at 86).  “‘Relevant evidence’ means evidence having a tendency in reason to prove or disprove any fact of consequence to the determination of the action. ”  N.J.R.E. 401.  In other words, relevant evidence must have “probative value” and be “material.
[brief] The District Has Severely Mismanaged Its Transportation Responsibilities, Resulting in Inflated Costs.  Just as with special education, this court also found that transportation comprises a significant strain on [...]’s budget.  *Alcantara*, 475 N.J. Super. at 63.  But as the ALJ correctly found, there “is an absence of evidence in the record to indicate that . . . [[...]] has done everything it can to rein in its transportation costs in order to free up more funds for T&E for its public school students. ” (Ra100).  In the same 2009 Needs Assessment in which the Department provided recommendations for [...] to lower its special education costs, the Department also addressed the District’s transportation spending.  (Ra74).  The Assessment noted that the District’s courtesy busing policy was contributing to its financial strain.  (Aa16; Ra99).  [...] eventually ended its courtesy busing policy, but not until 2016.
[brief] This argument fails for multiple reasons.  First, absent from the record is a single piece of evidence supporting Plaintiffs’ contentions.  See, e.g., McKeon-Brand v. Trump Castle Hotel & Casino, 132 N.J. 546, 563 (1993) (finding no bad faith by a plaintiff whose attorney submitted an affidavit stating that “plaintiff at all times acted on my advice, and would not have filed this complaint had I not advised her that she had a valid cause of action based on the facts as she understood them”).  Second, and in any event, “reliance on the advice of counsel does not constitute a defense where” -- as in this case -- “a party has acted in bad faith.
[brief] 5  As discussed above, in September 2022, after the Earnest Money Deposit had been returned, [...] falsely stated to Plaintiff that the deal was “on hold” and promised to apprise Plaintiff when and if it was moving forward.  She knowingly failed to do so (Pa12, Complaint ¶ 47).  The doctrine of election of remedies “is the conscious choice, with full knowledge of the facts, of one of two or more inconsistent remedies. ”  Adams v. Camden Safe Deposit & Tr. Co., 121 N.J.L. 389, 394 (1938) (emphasis added); see also Murphy v. Morris, 12 N.J. Super 544, 547 (Super. Ct. 1951) (stating “[t]he essential conditions or elements of election of remedies are (1) the existence of two or more remedies; (2) the inconsistency between such remedies, and (3) a choice of one of them”).  The doctrine “stems from the principle, rooted in reason and justice, that a party, in seeking legal redress, shall not be at liberty to take irreconcilable and repugnant positions. ”  Adams, 121 N.J.L. at 395 (emphasis added).  Therefore, in order to properly assert the doctrine of election of remedies, “there must in fact be two inconsistent remedies available to the party seeking enforcement of the claimed right. ”  Id.  Critically, for present purposes, the doctrine is not “applicable to bar concurrent and consistent remedies. ”  Id.  Here, [...] argued – and the trial court held (2T, at 13-16) – that Plaintiff was barred from seeking specific performance because, by terminating the PSA through acceptance of the Deposit, Plaintiff had made its election, and it should be held to its bargain.  However, as the Adams court discussed, proper invocation of the election of remedies doctrine can occur only where there are two inconsistent and non-concurrent remedies, and a party elects one.  Yet, Plaintiff did not elect one of two inconsistent or non-concurrent remedies.  Rather, as discussed at length above, the first two sentences of PSA § 13.1 must be read in tandem, to allow Plaintiff to elect both to demand return of the Earnest Money Deposit and to insist upon specific performance. \(^6\)  Specifically, the first clause of Section 13.1 states that, in the event a closing fails to occur in accordance with the PSA because of a default by [...], Plaintiff may “terminate this Agreement” through notice to the Seller within ten business days and, in so doing, receive a return of the Earnest Money Deposit.
[brief] TABLE OF ORDERS, JUDGMENTS AND RULINGS ON THE CROSS APPEAL  [...]’s denial of [...]’ motion for summary judgment on plaintiffs’ failure to comply with the statute of limitations-January 24, 2020…………………………………………………..1T47-15 to 48-22  Order denying [...]’ motion for summary judgment based upon plaintiffs’ failure to comply with the statute of limitations-filed January 24, 2020…………………………………………………………..Pa5  [...]’s denial of [...]’ motion for summary judgment based upon plaintiffs’ failure to comply with the statute of limitations-June 25, 2023…………………………………………………..3T65-4 to 66-18  Order denying [...]’ motion for summary judgment based upon plaintiffs’ failure to comply with the statute of limitations-filed June 25, 2021…………………………………………………………..Pa1 | Case Name | Citation | Page | |-----------------------------------------------|---------------------------|------| | Burd v. N. J Telephone Company | 76 N.J. 284 (1978) | 5 | | Fernandi v. Strully | 35 N.J. 434 (1961) | 5 | | Lombardi v. Masso | 207 N.J. 517 (2011) | 4 | | Lopez v. Swyer | 62 N.J. 267 (1973) | 5 | | Saltiel v. GSI Consultants, Inc. | 170 N.J. 297 (2002) | 6 |  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
[brief] Likewise, in the context of dismissing Appellants’ tortious interference with prospective economic advantage claim in Count 2 of the First Amended Complaint in the Prior Action, the trial court noted that:  [Appellants] assert that [...] used confidential information under the NDA to negotiate a competing deal with the owners of the Property, and that [...] “undercut [Appellants’] deal” and, had they not done so, “[Appellants] would have received the economic benefit of having the Solar Project at the Project Site. ”  The claims ignore [Appellants’] payment default under the Lease and consequent loss of site control over the Property… even if [Appellants] proved a violation of the NDA, it was [Appellants’] Lease default that led inevitably to their loss of the solar rights tied to the Property.
[brief] See Wilf_Db 32 (Trial Court erroneously discounted the mediation because of its brevity); id., 32-33 (Special Master erroneously focused on the absence of a “direct financial link” between [...] and the Special Master).  B.  The Code of Judicial Conduct’s standard for recusal should be applied here (39680a).  [...] argues that this Court “need not address” the issue of whether the *Code of Judicial Conduct* applies to Special Masters because “the trial court agreed to accept the [...]’ premise that the *Code* applied in deciding the [...]’ recusal motions.
[brief] Rather, this case establishes a dangerous precedent that plaintiff can create damages in any legal malpractice case just by commencing an action to incur legal fees so long as there are some evidences that the defendant has breached the duty in providing legal services to the plaintiff.  This ruling is against the current law that Plaintiff must prove that she suffered actual damages in the underlying matrimonial case as a result of Defendants’ breach of duties before the Court can award legal fees incurred by Plaintiff to vindicate her rights, not the other way around!  To review the issue whether the manifest weight of evidence supports a finding that Defendants were liable under the circumstance is fully within the scope of this Court’s jurisdiction.  If this Court finds that where neither the facts nor the permissible inferences from them vindicate the verdict and it is manifest that the verdict was fabricated by the influences of sympathy, or passion, or prejudice, or based upon mistake, it must in the course of the administration of justice be annulled.  See Taylor, 13 N.J.Super. 125, 80 A.2d 220.  II.
[brief] For the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully submitted that the trial court’s order granting that defendants’ motions to dismiss the complaint under R. 4:6-2(c) and denying plaintiffs’ cross-motion for summary judgment should be reversed, and the matter should be remanded to the Law Division with direction that an order granting the plaintiffs’ cross-motion for summary judgment be granted with the following relief: that a declaratory judgment should be entered that the statutes delegating regulatory authority to the Council and establishing the composition of the Council are unconstitutional in that they violate Art. III, Par. 1 and Art. IV, Sec. 1, Par. 1 of the New Jersey Constitution and the private nondelegation doctrine; and that the Council’s Resolution of September 6, 2023, approving the Comprehensive Black Bear Management Policy and the Amendments to the Fish and Game Code authorizing a bear hunt pursuant to N.J.A.C. 7:25-5.6, published in the New Jersey Register, Volume 55, No. 19, on October 2, 2023, should be declared to be null and void and of no force and effect, and the bear hunt thereby authorized should be permanently enjoined.  Respectfully submitted, [...], Esq.  Attorney for the [...]  Dated: April 2, 2024  [...], Pro Se July 17, 2024  VIA ELECTRONIC FILING: [...], Clerk Superior Court of New Jersey Appellate Division  R.J. Hughes Justice Complex P.O. Box 006  Trenton, NJ 08625-0006  Re: THE LESNIAK INSTITUTE FOR AMERICAN LEADERSHIP and RAYMOND J. LESNIAK v. [...], [...], [...], GOVERNOR [...], GOVERNOR OF NEW JERSEY and [...]  Docket No. [...]  On Appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division Sat Below: Hon. [...], A.J.S.C.  Letter Brief on Behalf of State Respondents New Jersey Fish and Game Council, New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection, Fish & Wildlife, and Governor Philip D. Murphy, in his capacity as Governor of New Jersey.
[brief] 14T 5:10-8:5.  Using cell phone records, Defendant sought to establish that Defendant’s cell phone was in Mays Landing at the time of the murder.  14T 20:10-28:12.  The State presented evidence from surveillance video obtained from [...] and [...] establishing that the murder occurred at 12:10pm and that Defendant returned to [...] at 12:43pm.  11T 170:8-21; 12T 164:17-165:21; 13T 127:12-13.  LEGAL ANALYSIS I.
[brief] **Plaintiffs’ Motion to name [...] as their expert for trial**  Plaintiffs stressed in their motion that there was no trial date scheduled and ample time for defendant to depose [...].  A95-98; 1T7-8.  Though the February 16, 2021 Case Management Order had provided a discovery end date of July 20, 2021, overseeing [...] then entered an August 9 Case Management Order extending the discovery end date to November 17, 2021, and providing for completion of expert depositions by October 17, 2021.  A269.
[brief] The court failed to recognize it is “State tolling principles” that govern the tolling of the applicable state statutes of limitations (and not its misapplication of the doctrine of laches) in federal civil rights actions arising under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. ”  Ammlung, 494 F.2d at 816 (The court demonstrated both missed case law and misinterpretation of case law addressed in the following cited cases).  From the perspective of the trial court’s misapplication of case law erroneously using laches (Pa17 – Pa18) as reason for denial of this defendant’s claim for having not been afforded a protected Fourteenth Amendment Right of Procedural Due Process some 34-years ago, i.e. defective service of process (Pa16), it erroneously denied the vacating of a default judgment resulting in both prejudice and harm caused by the court’s error and its deficiency to cure it in failing to deem the 1990 default judgement void as per matter of law (Missed case law addresses the court produced an unfair result for the standard of review; R 2:10-2, Gillman v Bally Mfg. Corp, 286 NJ Super 525 528 (App Div 1996)).
[brief] APPEALED FROM  1.  10/25/20-Board letter denying Appellant the right to file his Application for Disability Retirement……………………………………..Pa70-71  2.  1/13/21-Board denies the Appellant the right to file Appellant’s Application for Disability Retirement and reserves as to a decision to allow for a Hearing before an Administrative Law Judge [“ALJ”]………………………………………..Pa82-85  3.  Board denies Appellant’s right to file and have heard on the Merits his Application for Disability Retirement  ……………………………..Pa124-130  INTRODUCTION
[brief] (Aa359).  The [...] submitted its original final offer on or about September 12, 2023.  (Aa245).  In it, the [...] proposed that the health care provisions should “mimic” the health care provisions from the [...] Memorandum of Agreement dated May 31, 2022.  (Aa246).  The City’s final offer did not propose any changes to the health care provision of the units’ collective negotiations agreements.  After the first day of hearing, and before the second hearing date, on October 12, 2023, the arbitrator requested that the parties revise their final offers.
[brief] *State v. N.G.*, 381 N.J. Super. 352, 360 (App. Div. 2005) (citing *State v. Afanador*, 134 N.J. 162, 170 (1993)).  To ascertain the ordinary meaning of words used in a statute, courts often look to a dictionary.  *Ibid.* (citing *State v. Mortimer*, 135 N.J. 517, 532 (1994)).  In contrast to criminal statutes, “civil statutes in general, and economic regulations in particular, are subject to less stringent scrutiny under the vagueness doctrine. ”
[directive] SUBJECT: Guidelines: Implementation Insurance Fraud Laws, Effective June 9, 2004  N.J.S.A. 39:3-29 & 39:3-29.1a - Warrant of Impoundment Guidelines below, developed by the [...] to assist law enforcement agencies and prosecutors with the implementation of Laws of 2003, chapter 89, sections 78 and 79.  P.L.2003, c.89, became effective on June 9, 2003, but sections 78 and 79 each had a delayed 2004.1 implementation date of June 9,  Please distribute these Guidelines immediately.  Section 78 amended N.J.S.A. 39:3-29 (which requires production and exhibition of the operators drivers’ license, the vehicle registration and the insurance identification card for the vehicle begin operated) increasing the fine for a violation of this statute to $150.  1  On May 21, 2004, a [...], presented Recommendations to amend sections 78 & 79 of P.L. 2003, c.89.  However, until such time as the Legislature takes action to implement those Recommendations, the provisions of N.J.S.A. 39:3-29 and N.J.S.A. 39:3-29.1a remain unchanged.  "  New Jersey Is An Equal Opportunity Employer Printed on Recycled Paper and is Recyclable SUB JECT: Guidelines: Implementation Insurance Fraud Laws Page 2  Effective June 9, 2004 - N.J.S.A. 39:3-29 & 39:3-29.1a - Warrant of Impoundment
[brief] The trial court dismissed the third-party action, holding that [...]’s claims were derivative and could not be brought via a direct claim against [...], and because [...] could not bring a derivative action since she had already transferred her shares in [...].  *Id.* at 33-34.  On appeal, [...] argued that the derivative standing rules applicable to public entities should not apply because [...] was closely held, that [...] should be deemed a partnership for purposes of this issue to avoid the consequence of the share transfer, and that equity demanded that she be allowed to pursue her claims against [...] and [...].  *Id.* at 35.  This Court largely agreed, and in doing so, adopted § 7.01(d) of The American Law Institute’s Principals of Corporate Governance: Analysis and Recommendations (1992), which explained:
[brief] VOLUME I (CONFIDENTIAL)  Notice of Appeal........................................................................................................Pa1  Case Information Statement.........................................................................................Pa5 [...] Final Decision 11/29/23..............................................Pa9  Reply to [...] 9/6/23\(^1\).....................................................Pa16  [...] Initial Decision 7/26/23..............................................Pa24  Correspondence to [...] 3/23/23.........................................Pa28  Petition for Ricci Action Registration 3/3/23...............................................................Pa30  Affidavit of [...]..................................................................................Pa56  [...] Eligibility Registration Form........................................................................Pa58  [...] Request for Amended Benefits Form..........................................................Pa60  Medical Examination 1/31/23......................................................................................Pa61  Administrative Denial of Ricci Benefits........................................................................Pa63  Legislative Notice August 2019...................................................................................Pa64  Postage Statement.......................................................................................................Pa66  Universal Document Converter Postcard.......................................................................Pa68  Email to Certifying Officers 8/16/19............................................................................Pa69  [...] Quotation of Retirement Benefits...............................................................Pa70  \(^1\) Per R.2:6-1(a)(2), Pa16, Pa24, Pa28, and Pa30 are included in the Appendix because they are germane to the appeal.
[brief] The intent of the Genesis Deed was to create a “club” of homeowners collectively bound to “faithfully abide” by [...]’s “rules and regulations. ”  Plaintiffs do not argue that the height restriction was ambiguous or that the [...] did not intend to vest [...] with authority to implement the “rules and regulations. ”  This Court should reverse the trial court’s grant of partial summary judgment to Plaintiffs and remand this matter for additional discovery and proceedings.
[brief] These jurisdictions recognize that entering a marriage solely for immigration benefits, without the intention of establishing a true marital relationship, constitutes fraud that goes to the essence of the marriage and thus supports a judgment of annulment.  Misrepresentation about the primary purpose of marriage, such as obtaining a green card, can be deemed fraudulent inducements that justify annulment.  This is because such fraud directly affects the essence of the marital relationship, undermining its legitimacy from the outset, *In re Marriage of Turfe*, 23 Cal. App. 5th 1118 (Cal. Ct. App. 2018), as modified on denial of reh'g (June 8, 2018).  The facts that Plaintiff [...] established in this case, at trial below, warranted granting him the requested annulment based on these same principles that New Jersey law embraces.  Indeed, in *Faustin*, supra, 85 N.J. 510, our Supreme Court ruled that the Plaintiff was entitled to an annulment even though it was a sham marriage, solely for immigration purposes, that was entered into knowingly by both parties.  The Court reasoned that even unclean hands by the petitioning wife did not preclude her from obtaining an annulment under New Jersey law, stressing, “the relief which Plaintiff seeks will not enhance her standing to claim permanent residence in the United States.  All that she asks is that her ceremonial marriage to defendant, which now appears as a matter of public record, be judicially declared to be what it really is a nullity.  In a sense, plaintiff’s suit could be considered repentance on her part since she acknowledges her wrongdoing and, in asking to have it undone, may well jeopardize her residential status in this country.  Under the facts alleged, the equitable defense of unclean hands must give way to the public interest served by adjudicating plaintiff’s marital status.  If, on remand, Plaintiff offers satisfactory proof of the allegations contained in her complaint, then she will be entitled to have her marriage to defendant annulled. ”  Faustin, supra, 85 N.J. 513.  If the Faustin plaintiff was entitled to an annulment under those facts as our Supreme Court held, Plaintiff [...] in this case – who was totally unaware of the Defendant’s fraudulent intent on identical grounds – is entitled to a judgment of annulment as well.  At the very least, the family court abused its discretion in failing to grant an annulment based on general equity jurisdiction under the undisputed evidence that Plaintiff presented at trial, Carris, supra, 24 N.J. Eq. 523; In re Estate of Santolino, supra, 384 N.J. Super. 583.  Even the Family Court Judge recognized the equities – asking the Defendant if she would consent to an annulment with the Plaintiff.  It was erroneous to fail to afford plaintiff statutory or at least equitable relief on his annulment request under governing New Jersey law.