ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The same is true of any writing, reasoned the Court, which found the traditional methods of authentication, including the use of circumstantial evidence, adequate to accommodate the new technology.  Id. at 89.  The Court added that “[o]ver the years authentication requirements have become more flexible, perhaps because the technology has become more commonplace. ”  Id. at 89 (quoting Suanez v. Egeland, 330 N.J. Super. 190, 195 (App. Div. 2000)).  Surveillance videos, in particular, have become ubiquitous.  As this Court recently observed, there has been an “explosive growth in the number of surveillance cameras in operation[,]” with “approximately 30 million surveillance cameras shooting about 4 billion hours of footage each week[,]” according to a 2018 study.
[brief] THE ELEMENTS OF ACCOMPLICE LIABILITY ROBBERY WERE SUFFICIENTLY STATED.**  Appellant Counsel suggests that there should have also been a more specific instruction concerning the elements of accomplice liability robbery.  (Da34).  To begin, the jury was given an instruction that their verdict must be unanimous.  Generally, such a charge is sufficient to ensure that the jury reaches a consistent verdict.  See State v. Cagno, 211 N.J. 488 (2012).  Furthermore, no request was made by the Defense for a more detailed charge.  Nor does the Defense allege that the jury expressed any confusion about the charge as read.  Finally, it should be noted that the charge reflected the robbery count in the indictment, which put the Defense on notice of what they had to defend against.  As such, if it was error to reference multiple factual bases for the robbery, it was harmless error only.  Unanimity requires "jurors to be in substantial agreement as to just what a defendant did before determining his or her guilt or innocence."  State v. Frisby, 174 N.J. 583, 596 (2002) (quoting United States v. Gipson, 553 F.2d 453, 457 (5th Cir. 1977)).  "Although the need for juror unanimity is obvious, exactly how it plays out in individual cases is more complicated."  Ibid.  Accordingly, although an instruction regarding unanimity as to a specific charge "should be granted on request, in the absence of a specific request, the failure so to charge does not necessarily constitute reversible error."
[directive] Id. at 441.  In this appeal, the trial court explained “to move in November 2021 that, on account of the pandemic, it was unable cases more than one at a time” because of the backlog of cases and the unavailability of courtrooms.  The court then set a trial date five months into the future.  Because the statute contemplates that trials of detained defendants should begin as soon as practicable, we further rely on our supervisory 23 authority to impose the following measures when the parties announce they are ready to proceed on the two-year cap date but no courtroom or judge will be available at that time.  First, we recognize there are not enough available courtrooms today to address the substantial number of pending criminal cases because of COVID- 19 and its continuing effects on the justice system.  It is also unlikely that a single trial judge will have a full understanding of the overall situation in a vicinage.  Therefore, if the State announces at the hearing described in the previous section that it is ready to proceed on the two-year cap date, and the defendant is also prepared but no courtroom or judge will be available for reasons related to the pandemic, the trial court must consult with a supervisory judge.  In each vicinage, either the Assignment Judge or Criminal Presiding Judge should serve as the point person to coordinate trial dates from a vicinage-wide perspective and help schedule individual trials as soon as practicable.  In scheduling trial dates, the supervisory judge and trial judges should take into account the age of a case, the seriousness of the charge, and the availability of counsel, among other relevant considerations.  To be clear, cases with detained defendants are to receive priority.  24  Second, if the parties are ready but the trial cannot start before the two- year cap expires, trial judges should schedule conferences at monthly intervals rather than delay a trial for multiple months at a time.  They should consult with the supervisory judge about courtroom availability before those periodic conferences and make an appropriate record about the need for any further delays at the hearing.  As noted earlier, trial judges may but are not required to inquire again about the State’s readiness at later conferences.  See id. at 443.  --- ---
[brief] A.  The Entire Controversy Doctrine does not supersede the court’s lack of subject matter jurisdiction to hear this matter, nor does it supersede the Commissioner’s jurisdiction to hear and determine school law controversies under N.J.S.A. 18A:6-9.  “[O]ridinarily, the [entire controversy] doctrine does not apply to a second suit involving the same issues and parties instituted in one forum while the first suit is pending in another forum”. ¹  This means that [...] could have indeed brought its school law claims before the Commissioner of Education, and thereafter raised them in Superior Court as a Counterclaim – but it did not.
[brief] THE LAND USE BOARD FINDING/DETERMINATION IS ENTITLED TO A PRESUMPTION OF VALIDITY.  An Action of a Municipal Board is presumably correct, and the burden of proof is upon the parties challenging the Action of the Board.  Weiner vs. Board of Adjustment of Glassboro, 144 N.J. Super. 509, 516 (App. Div. 1976) Cert. Denied, 73 N.J. 55 (1977).  In that local officials are presumed to be “thoroughly familiar” with the characteristics of the subject community, Board decisions are generally cloaked with the presumption of validity.  (Ward vs. Scott, 16 N.J. 23 (1954); Pullen vs. South Plainfield Planning Board, 291 N.J. Super. 303, 312 (Law Div. 1995), Aff’d, 291 N.J. Super. 1, 6 (App. Div. 1996).  As succinctly stated in a recent Law Division case:  So long as there is substantial evidence to support it, the Court may not interfere with or overturn the decision of a municipal board.  Even when doubt is entertained as to the wisdom of the Board’s action, there can be no judicial declaration of invalidity absent a clear abuse of discretion by the Board.  New Brunswick Cellular Telephone Company 270 N.J. Super 122, 134 (Law Div. 1992)  In the within matter, and as referenced above, the detailed communication from the Board Attorney, dated February 17, 2021, and as furthermore referenced in the hearing transcripts, the Respondent Planning Board conducted a thorough Hearing on the proposed second Amendment to the Redevelopment Plan, and on other associated / related issues.  As explained herein, there was a significant amount of testimony presented, analyzed, debated, and discussed – and the Land Use Board decision was neither arbitrary, capricious, nor unreasonable.  Thus, it is respectfully suggested that the legally sound action / determination of the Respondent Planning Board should be entitled to a presumption of validity.
[brief] ’”  State v. Evers, 175 N.J. 355, 386 (2003) (citing State v. Johnson, Appellant courts may only review and modify a sentence when the trial court’s discretion was “clearly mistaken. ”  Ibid.  The sentencing judge was permitted to impose a sentence of disallowing the Defendant to ever own or have control over any animal ever.  This falls under the catch all language in N.J.S.A. 2C:43-2(d).  Defendant was found guilty of beating a 6-month-old puppy by kicking, dragging, and punching her.
[brief] (16T 47-9 to 22)  She admitted that she told police that a few days before -- or even maybe “a day before” -- [...] died, he sounded “upset,” “irrational,” and “impulsive” on a phone call.  (16T 38-1 to 39-3)  [...] testified that in October 2018, she drove [...] to the [...]’ house to get his “property,” and she parked in the driveway and waited about ten minutes or “maybe a little less” while [...] went to the door of the main house, but no one answered, which “annoyed” him.
[brief] Sometime prior to 2017, [...] allegedly purchased a pool of defaulted consumer debts for a fraction of their face value, including [...]’s alleged [...] credit account.  Thereafter, on January 3, 2017, [...] commenced the collection lawsuit against [...] by filing a collection Complaint (Da1) in the Special Civil Part in Bergen County.  [...] applied for default judgment on April 19, 2017, which was entered on April 21, 2017.  (Da6; Da20).  [...]’s Complaint (Da1) and Return of Service (Da5) show the process papers were mailed to [...].  However, in moving to vacate the unlawful default judgment, [...] certified he was then living at [...], and never received the Summons or Complaint.  (Da43).  [...] also provided documentary evidence showing his address at the time to be [...].  (Da49-Da63).  As a result, [...] was never served with process and had no knowledge of the proceedings initiated against him until years after default judgment had been entered against him.  (Da43)  In addition to defects in service, the default judgment obtained against [...] stems from an action that [...] had no right or authority to bring.  By purchasing or otherwise taking assignment of the debt, [...] engaged in the “consumer loan business” as defined at N.J.S.A. 17:11C-2.  However, [...] was not licensed as a consumer lender at the time it took possession of or attempted to enforce [...]’s account.  (Pa40).  Based on N.J.S.A. 17:11C-33(b), the assignments or purchases and any rights to the account were void and unenforceable as of the date the [...] purchased or took assignment of the account.  That provision states, in pertinent part, that a contract for a loan acquired in violation of the act “shall be void and the lender shall have no right to collect or receive any principal, interest or charges .  . . .”  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT
[brief] Table of Authorities Cases  Froom v. Perel, 377 N.J. Super. 298 (App. Div. 2005)  ........................................... 2, 3, 7 Innes v. Marzano-Lesnevich, 435 N.J. Super. 198 (App. Div. 2014)  .........................8  In re Palmieri, 76 N.J. 51 (1978) ..................................................................................6, 8 R. J. Longo Constr. Co. v. Schragger, 218 N.J. Super. 206 (App. Div. 1987)  ...........8  Savage-Keough v. Keough, 373 N.J. Super. 198 (App. Div. 2004)  ............................9  LEGAL ARGUMENT I.
[brief] ”  State v. Hill, 199 N.J. 545, 558–59 (2009)(citing In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) (applying Due Process Clause of Federal Constitution); State v. Anderson, 127 N.J. 191, 200–01 (1992) (requiring same under State Constitution).  Because a defendant has a presumption of innocence, “[a] defendant need not call any witnesses. ”  Id. (citing Winship, 397 U.S. at 363 (stating that “[t]he [reasonable-doubt] standard provides concrete substance for the presumption of innocence” (quoting Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453 (1895)).  “This presumption is an instrument of proof created by the law in favor of one accused, whereby his innocence is established until sufficient evidence is introduced to overcome the proof which the law has created.
[brief] This appeal arises out of an Order entered by the Superior Court of New Jersey granting Defendant-Respondent [...]’s (the “Township”) Motion for Summary Judgment and dismissing Plaintiff’s Complaint with Prejudice as to the Township.  Therein, the trial court correctly determined Plaintiff failed to vault the stringent threshold requirements to impose liability on a public entity pursuant to New Jersey’s Tort Claims Act (the “TCA”), N.J.S.A. 59:4-1 to -10.  The trial court was correct in determining, while affording Plaintiff all reasonable inferences, dismissal of Plaintiff’s Complaint as to the Township was required given (i) no dangerous condition existed; (ii) the Township had no actual or constructive notice of any purportedly dangerous condition; (iii) the Township did not act palpably unreasonable; and (iv) Plaintiff did not suffer a permanent injury or a substantial loss of bodily function.  The trial court properly determined, given Plaintiff’s failure to demonstrate even a single one of the necessary elements of the TCA, Plaintiff’s Complaint must be dismissed.  Further, the trial court also properly dismissed Plaintiff’s loss of consortium claim in light of Plaintiff’s blatant failure to offer any evidence whatsoever in support thereof.  Moreover, Plaintiff’s improper sham affidavit submitted in a late attempt to create issues of fact to defeat summary judgment was appropriately not considered by the trial court.  Accordingly, in affording Plaintiffs all reasonable inferences from the factual record, there is no genuine issue of material fact demonstrating the Township’s liability for Plaintiff’s alleged injuries.  Plaintiff failed to surmount the immunities and stringent requirements of the TCA and Plaintiff’s Complaint was properly dismissed.  Therefore, and for the reasons established herein, it is respectfully submitted the Appellate Division should affirm the trial court’s decision in its entirety.
[brief] Some of the claims listed have been embellished and some of the claims are not issues when it comes to students sitting for state mandated tests.  One need only look at the comments in the Observations conducted on Appellant in 2017, 2018 and 2019 to conclude that her communication was effective.  Furthermore, it is expected that educators and Vice Principals satisfy the category Meets Expectations on Observations and summative reports which were the scores Appellant received.  There is no requirement that Vice Principals attain scores which would result in a rank of Accomplished or Distinguished.  Appellant has set forth sufficient information in the Appellant’s Brief that satisfy the standard for the cause of action of Discrimination Based on Race.
[brief] Net 2 Funds, LLC v. Hartz Mt. Indus., No. A-0223-15T1, 2018 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1081 (App. Div. May 9, 2018)  .......................................................................................22 Nickels Midway Pier, LLC v. Wild Waves, LLC (In re Nickels Midway Pier, LLC), 450 B.R. 58 (D.N.J. 2011) .............................................................................25, 27 Notte v. Merchs. Mut. Ins. Co., 185 N.J. 490 (2006) .........................................................................................41 Noye v. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc., 238 N.J. Super. 430 (App. Div. 1990) .................................................................38 Oscar Gruss & Son, Inc. v. Hollander, 337 F.3D 186 (2d Cir. 2003) ..............................................................................70 Pepe v. Township of Plainsboro, 337 N.J. Super. 209 (App. Div. 2001) ..................................................................61 Quinn v. Quinn, 225 N.J. 34 (2016) ...............................................................................................61 Rahway Hosp. v. Horizon Blue Cross Blue Shield of N.J., 374 N.J. Super. 101 (App. Div. 2005) ..................................................................31, 62 Ray v. Beneficial Fin. Co. of N. Jersey, 92 N.J. Super. 519 (Ch. Div. 1966) .....................................................................25
[brief] (Pa117; Da26-29, Lease at § 7.01; Da169; Da184-188).  This frivolous challenge to the CAM charges forced Landlord to incur substantial legal fees in connection with reviewing, analyzing and explaining hundreds of pages of underlying utility and third-party vendor invoices.  (Pa117; Da182-189).  As articulated by [...] in the Post Trial Order, “Defendant has failed to set forth any substantive basis to disbelieve [Landlord’s business records].
[brief] These relevant factors can, either singly or in combination, determine in a given case whether the essential agency action must be rendered through rule-making or adjudication.  [Ibid. (emphasis added). ]  Although not all factors need be present to support a finding that an agency action is de facto rulemaking, the converse is also true: Depending on the weight of each factor, the absence of one factor can be a sufficient basis for a finding that the agency action does not constitute a de factor rule.  For instance, formal rulemaking “is not necessary when the agency prescribes a legal standard or directive that is clearly or obviously inferable from the enabling act. ”  *Greer v. N.J. Bureau of Sec.*, 251 N.J. Super. 365, 373 (App. Div. 1994).  In *Airwork* Service Division v. Director, Division of Taxation, decided the same day as Metromedia, the Court found that an assessment did not constitute de facto rulemaking because the taxability of the services at issue was “sufficiently clearly and directly inferable from the statute itself. ”  97 N.J. 290, 301 (1984).  The Court also found that “it has not been demonstrated that the determination represents a material and significant change in administrative policy, even though the taxing authority did not impose the tax. ”  Ibid.  More recently, this court has continued to hold that when those two Metromedia factors are not present in agency action, the action does not constitute de facto rulemaking.
[directive] Note that if the underlying 2C:35-5 offense is graded as a third-degree crime based on the type and amount of controlled substances involved, the prosecutor in calculating an appropriate plea offer must use Table 2, Rows C or D of these Guidelines.  In other words, the extended term of imprisonment must be calculated in these circumstances as if the most serious present offense is a third-degree crime, notwithstanding that the defendant is also charged with a second-degree crime under N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7.1, since the latter offense technically is not a predicate for an extended term and because penal statutes are construed strictly.  The prosecutor in these circumstances will usually be required to formally apply for an extended term under N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6f so as to permit imposition of the period of parole ineligibility prescribed by the applicable Table of Authorized Plea Offers.  (See Section 3.2, explaining how plea offers must be “structured” to ensure that courts impose sentences in accordance with these Guidelines.)  It should be noted that a prosecutor is generally authorized but not required in these circumstances to dismiss the second-degree 2C:35-7.1 charge as part of a “package” deal.  See Section 1.1 (generally authorizing dismissal of non- Brimage-eligible drug offenses when a defendant pleads guilty to the most serious Brimage-eligible offense).
[brief] Kaczorowska, supra, 342 N.J. Super. at 587-88 (quoting Millison, 101 N.J. at 178); see also Van Dunk, 210 N.J. at 472 (explaining that “some level of a ‘likelihood’ of injury or death is not substantial certainty of injury or death” and the court’s review should not shift into an amorphous ‘percentage of the risk’ analysis”).  Even an injury “caused by either gross negligence or an abysmal lack of concern for the safety of employees” is insufficient to satisfy the exception.  Marinelli v. Mitts & Merrill, 303 N.J. Super. 61, 72 (App. Div. 1997).
[directive] (See Appendix J).  This course must be completed four times each year with two months in between qualifications.  This qualification may be conducted by the marksman but must have an observer/spotter, who is a qualified agency firearms instructor, present during the qualification.  Participants should be advised of what is required for each course of fire and should be provided with a copy of each course of fire and training program before going to the range to train or qualify.  Training Programs.
[brief] Pb12.  However, Plaintiffs are incorrect when they assert that the Board erred because it applied the standards for uses not permitted in the zone under NJSA 40:55D-70(d)(1) as set forth in Medici v. BPR Co., 107 N.J. 1 (1987) to the height variance Plaintiffs sought under NJSA 40:55D-70(d)(6).
[brief] Instead, at [...]’s urging, and not long before he and [...] were scheduled to close the original SPA transaction, the two men unwound the deal and re-executed a modified SPA with the same terms, except that [...], not [...], would serve as purchaser of [...]’s interest.  (Da1481-95).  With [...] purchasing [...]’s 51% interest in [...], the company could continue as a DBE and Woman-Owned Business Enterprise (“WBE”).  (5T121:21 to 122:11).  [...] agreed to pay back the $700,000 portion of the SPA purchase price that he had been paid to date, and received in return new checks for that same amount issued by [...] [...].  (5T122:12-23; Da1495).  Despite having executed the MIPA and SPA, the parties’ relationship vis-à-vis [...] did not change.  They continued as partners with [...] continuing to run the lab, and [...] continuing to run the business.  (6T38:2-6; 57:24 to 59:19).  [...] completed his additional three-year stint with [...] as the SPA contemplated as of December 31, 2017.  (Da1483).
[brief] [...] awarded the Union 0% for the first year, 1% for the second year, 2% for the third year, and 1.5% for the final two years, as well as a total retro payment of $450,000.  (Aa145)  Moreover, the requirement to produce the “snapshot” information at issue is based on a PERC regulation, not a State statute.  The Union has not identified, and the City has been unable to find, any appellate case or PERC decision where an arbitrator’s decision was reversed for failure to obtain/use the information required by N.J.A.C. 19:16-5.7(g)1.  That being the case, the Union has not clearly proven that an unjust result occurred below as a matter of plain error regarding the outcome because of the hyper-technical issue it found and is now trying to exploit to its advantage.
[brief] However, the following additional information is provided for this court’s review.  [...]  Testimony  [...] initially testified in this matter on October 5, 2021.  (See generally, 16T).  At the conclusion of the direct-examination, [...] acknowledged that he had entered a plea agreement related to the case, but that he had not received any benefit related to his testimony that day.  (16T120:12-15).  Prior to cross-examination, there was discussion concerning an order previously entered by the court below, which would limit the Defense’s cross-examination concerning any plea bargain [...] had struck.  (16T125-126).  [...] was directed by the court not to discuss any sentence or length of sentence he would receive pursuant to the agreement.  (16T134:9-15).  The cross-examination then solicited testimony that he entered into a plea agreement expecting to receive a lesser sentence; that the agreement was conditioned upon his trial testimony being consistent with a second statement given on November of 2019; that he agreed to testify against his co-defendant, and if he did not the plea could be revoked; and that he was a heroin addict who had difficulty recalling events accurately.  (16T137:2-139:13).  The Defense then drew attention to the fact that when [...] was interviewed by police the first time, he denied having any involvement with the crime in question.  In response to the State pointing out on re-direct that [...] was only required to plea truthfully, the Defense solicited testimony that [...] had not received any plea offer after giving his initial statement denying involvement.  The following day, it was brought to the court’s attention that limiting the cross-examination with regard to the potential sentence was improper.  The court indicated that it was going to reopen the cross-examination to allow further exploration of [...]’s likely sentence.  At that point, the State provided notice that it intended to admit [...] second statement (made prior to his plea) to show that it was consistent with his trial testimony, as commentary on his sentence would further the inference that there was a motive to fabricate his trial testimony.