ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Generally, “[p]rosecutors are afforded considerable leeway in closing arguments as long as their comments are reasonably related to the scope of the evidence presented. ”  State v. Patterson, 435 N.J. Super. 498, 508 (App. Div. 2014) (quoting State v. R.B., 183 N.J. 308, 332 (2005)).  Prosecutorial misconduct justifies reversal where the misconduct was “so egregious” as to “deprive[ ] the defendant of a fair trial.
[brief] **Standard of Review**  The Court reviews the order granting summary judgment using the same standard as the trial court, *Coyne v. N.J. Dep’t of Transp.*, 182 N.J. 481, 491 (2005); *Tymczyszyn v. Columbus Gardens*, 422 N.J. Super. 253, 261 (App. Div. 2011), certif. denied, 209 N.J. 98 (2012), viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff to determine whether there is any genuine issue of material fact that precludes judgment in favor of defendant as a matter of law.  R. 4:46-2(c); see also Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 142 N.J. 520, 540 (1995).  That is, this court’s review is de novo, without affording any special deference to the motion judge’s interpretation of the law.  Balsamides v. Protameen Chems., Inc., 160 N.J. 352, 372 (1999); Manalapan Realty, L.P.  v. Twp. Comm. of Twp. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995).  The affidavits, certifications and depositions must be read together anew, crediting plaintiff’s evidence and favoring him with all justifiable inferences to be drawn therefrom.  Judson v. Peoples Bank and Trust Co. of Westfield, 17 N.J. 67, 75 (1954); see also Barefoot Architect, Inc. v. Bunge, 632 F.3d 822, 826 (3d Cir. 2011).  From these sources, it must be determined “whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law. ”  Liberty Surplus Ins., Corp. v. Nowell Amoroso, P.A., 189 N.J. 436, 445-446 (2007)(quoting Brill, 142 N.J. at 536).  POINT I THE MOTION COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT TO DEFENDANTS BECAUSE, AS [...]’S OWNERS, THE DEFENDANTS ARE STRICTLY LIABLE IF THEY KNEW OR SHOULD HAVE KNOWN THAT [...] HAD A NATURAL INCLINATION OR HABITUAL TENDENCY TO ACT IN A WAY THAT ENDANGERED PEOPLE WHEN IN THE BREEDING ENVIRONMENT (Pa1085a-Pa1086a)
[brief] ## New Jersey Supreme Court - **Burnett v. Cty. of Bergen**, 198 N.J. 408 (2009)  .................................................................  4 - **Mason v. City of Hoboken**, 196 N.J. 51 (2008)  ........................................................................  4 - **Paff v. Galloway**, 229 N.J. 340 (2017) .....................................................................  6,7,14 - **Times of Trenton v. Lafayette Yard Cmty. Dev. Corp.**, 183 N.J. 519 (2005)  ......................................................................  4  ## New Jersey Superior Court - **Asbury Park Press v. Ocean Cty. Pros. Off.**, 374 N.J. Super. 312 (Law Div. 2004) ........................................... 4 - **Burnett v. Gloucester County**, 415 N.J. Super. 506 (App. Div. 2010) .......................................... 8 - **O'Boyle v. Borough of Longport**, 426 N.J. Super. 1 (App. Div. 2012) ............................................. 9 - **O'Shea v. Twp. of West Milford**, 410 N.J. Super. 371 (App. Div. 2009) ........................................ 6 - **Paff v. New Jersey Department of Labor**, 393 N.J. Super. 334 (App. Div. 2007) ....................................... 10,11,13 ## Statutes - **N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1** ........................................................................ 4,5 - **N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1.1** .................................................................... 5,6,7 ## GRC Decisions - **Elcavage v. West Milford Twp. (Passaic)**, GRC Complaint No.2009-07 (April 2010) ..................................... 5 Other Fahrenheit 451, [...], pub. 1/3/2006 by [...] (1st pub. 10/19/52)
[directive] A violent crime means any crime in which you caused death, serious bodily injury, or you used or threatened the immediate use of a deadly weapon.  A violent crime also includes any aggravated sexual assault, or sexual assault in which you used, or threatened the immediate use of, physical force.  Deadly weapon means any firearm or other weapon, device, instrument, material or substance, whether animate or inanimate, which in the manner in which it is used or intended to be used, is known to be capable of producing death or serious bodily injury.
[brief] This is none other than plaintiffs again playing “fast & loose”.  Moreover, plaintiffs’ reliance on R. 1:5-2 is grossly misplaced.  That rule requires mail service of papers referred to in R. 1:5-1, which are orders, judgments, pleadings, motions, briefs, appendices, & petitions.  A R.1:4-8 notice is not included within this rule.  Furthermore, plaintiffs also fail to disclose to this court that plaintiffs responded to Appellant’s notice, by email, stating that a demand for the entire escrow was improper & demanded that the notice be amended to the amount of the judgment.  Plaintiffs did not object to the mode of service of the notice.  Plaintiffs’ email was not in the record below naturally because plaintiffs did not raise the issue below.  Consequently, plaintiffs’ email was not included in Appellant’s or plaintiffs’ appendices.  With regard to whether a pro se party can receive fees, plaintiffs do not & cannot controvert any of the arguments set forth in Appellant’s brief.  All plaintiffs assert is repeating of the lower court’s decision.  As to whether plaintiffs’ litigation tactics were frivolous, again plaintiffs do not & cannot controvert any of the bad faith continuously exhibited below, as set forth in Appellant’s brief.  All it does again is merely recite the trial court’s holding.  With a straight face, plaintiffs are unable to contend that its pursuit of the entire fund in court, to the complete exclusion of a totally innocent judgment creditor, had merit factually or legally.  It most certainly did not.  Thus, this Court should not permit such frivolous litigation to go unsanctioned & waste judicial resources & Appellant’s time simply because Appellant was pro se & simply because plaintiffs & their counsel, in the words of the judge, “pursued the matter to its fullest ability”.  It will send the wrong message that there will be no retribution of litigants or their counsel engaging in frivolous litigation against pro se parties.
[brief] The trial court distorted the facts by stating that plaintiff had failed to comply with the court’s orders for over a year.  This case was reinstated after this court reversed the trial court’s order of October 22, 2021, which had dismissed the case without prejudice (Pa44 – Pa48).  The appellate court remanded the case, instructing plaintiff to retain counsel to pursue claims under wrongful death and survival actions at the trial court (Pa49 – Pa66).  Plaintiff was uncertain whether defendant [...] would appeal the decision and, therefore, waited until February 7, 2023, when [...] filed a motion for non-dismissal at the trial court (Pa68 – Pa71).  The trial court issued an order on March 3, 2023, requiring plaintiff to retain counsel within 30 days, by April 3, 2023 (Pa72 – Pa73).  On March 10, 2023, plaintiff filed a Motion to Demand Documents and requested the court’s permission to extend the deadline for retaining an attorney to 30 days after receiving the requested documents (Pa74 – Pa87) and filed another supporting document on March 31, 2023 (Pa97 – Pa102).  During the hearing on March 31, 2023, the trial court denied plaintiff’s request as pre-trial discovery while permitting defendants to continue concealing necessary documents (2T, Pa103 – Pa104).  This error left plaintiff without the necessary information to comply with the court order, although the court extended the deadline to retain counsel to April 17, 2023, to account for the time spent addressing the motion.  As a result, on May 12, 2023, the trial court dismissed the case without prejudice pursuant to R. 4:37-2(a) (Pa114 – Pa115).  Since the trial court did not set another date for plaintiff to reopen the case, there were no court activities from May 12, 2023, to March 1, 2024.  During this period, plaintiff had no need for representation, rather than failing to comply with the appellate court’s order of December 2, 2022 and the trial court order of March 31, 2023 to retain counsel for over a year.  B.
[directive] 1.  Èske w konprann ke le fèt ou plede koupab de  Do you understand that because of your plea of guilty to NERA (Krim vyolans Premye oswa Dezyèm Degre kote lwa Aplike)  NERA (List First or Second Degree Violent Crime(s) to Which Applies)  W ap oblije pije 85% santans ke yo enpoze w an pou zak sa a ( sa yo) anvan pou w ta elijib pou libète kondisyonèl pou zak sa a (sa yo) you will be required to serve 85% of the sentence imposed for that offense(s) before you will be eligible for parole on that offense(s)?
[brief] On February 14, 2021, Special Agent [...] of the Homeland Security Investigation Newark Airport Border Enforcement Security Task Force received information from Customs and Border Protection regarding a package that was intercepted at John. F. Kennedy airport in New York State.  Following a search, the package was determined to contain two plastic bags containing green in color pills.  Field tests were conducted on the green pills, which yielded a positive presumptive indication of MDMA/Ecstasy.  The postage of the parcel had a shipping label listing a delivery address of “[...], [...]. ”  It was determined that “[...]” is a nonexistent address.  After a brief investigation, law enforcement determined that the Defendant resided at [...].  On February 16, 2021, Detective [...] (hereinafter “[...]”) of the Union City Police Department received information from the Homeland Security Investigation Newark Airport Border Enforcement Security Task Force and the Port of New York/Newark Intelligence and Analytics Branch of a second parcel delivered.  The shipping label delivery address was “Seligman, 809 22nd Street No.1102, Union City, New Jersey 07087. ”  Based upon that information, Detective [...] believed that Defendant was the intended recipient of the initial parcel and that the listed address of “908 22nd Street No.1102, Union City, New Jersey 07087” was a typographical error on the initial package.  On February 18, 2021, the Honorable [...], J.S.C. signed a Search Warrant, permitting law enforcement to enter and search the 809 22nd Street, No. 1102, Union City apartment.  The Search Warrant permitted the search be made in the daytime or in the nighttime and required law enforcement to knock and announce their intent.  On February 19, 2021, members of the Union City Police Department, as well as members of the Homeland Security Investigation Newark Airport Border Enforcement Security Task Force responded to 809 22nd Street to conduct a controlled delivery and execute the search warrant.  Body camera footage does not capture audio of law enforcement knocking and announcing their presence, but body camera footage captures law enforcement’s forced entry into the residence, and the entire search.  Defendant was the only individual present.  Defendant was arrested.  The subsequent search yielded 1,163/520 grams MDMA/Ecstasy tablets, 23.49 cocaine, 2.92 grams cocaine, 25.47 grams of Ketamine, 370 milligrams LSD, 102 tablets/15.36 grams A[I]prazolam, $51, 985 in United States currency, as well as other items such as labels, a scale and pill crusher.  These items were placed into property and evidence.
[brief] The trial court further erred as a matter of law by ordering Plaintiff to either close on the Property and assume responsibility for the RAO, or terminate the PSA.  In doing so, the trial court improperly shifted the contractual burden of securing the RAO to Plaintiff, and effectively rewrote the PSA to Defendants’ benefit.  Moreover, during discovery, Plaintiff sought to depose Defendants’ transactional (and ultimately trial) counsel, [...] (“[...]”), who was directly involved in both the negotiations and drafting of the PSA, as well as the performance thereunder in the years that followed.
[brief] (14T:187-17 to 22)  The registration for the 2017 red Hyundai Elantra matching the license plates on the video listed [...] as the owner, residing at [...].  (14T:219-17 to 220-24)  [...] testified the person in the video “looks like my son,” [...], but said that she would be unable to identify him in court because she had not seen him since 2011.  (15T:93-2 to 25)  When the prosecutor nonetheless asked [...] to identify [...] and instructed him to take his mask down, [...] responded, “Vaguely. ”  (15T:93-2 to 25)  Although she had not seen him in twelve years, [...] testified she recognized [...] as the person in the video and identified him as sitting at the defense table in the courtroom.  (15T:155-6 to 156-7; 161-12 to 162-18)  [...] said he recognized the person in the video as [...], but admitted he “couldn’t say for sure” whether he was in the courtroom because he had not seen him in twelve years.  (15T:193-7 to 24; 197-16 to 23)  When the prosecutor nonetheless asked [...] to try to make an identification, [...] asked another individual in the courtroom to take down their mask before admitting he was not positive.  (15T:193-25 to 194-11)  Moments later, [...] claimed to recognize [...] at the defense table, explaining that the defense attorney had previously been blocking his view.  (15T:194-15 to 197-15)  [...], who viewed the video at the same time as [...], identified [...] in the video.  (15T:205-1 to 9)  She also had not seen him since 2009.  (15T:208-22 to 209-5)  **Arrest and Interrogation of [...]**
[brief] A.  THE PROJECT AND JACOBS’S ROLE AS CONSTRUCTION INSPECTOR  In 2014, Defendant [...] (“[...]”) undertook a project to widen a portion of the Garden State Parkway (“Project”), which runs through Atlantic County, between mile markers 36 and 48.  (Pa1266 at p. 1).  This portion of the Parkway consists of three northbound lanes and three southbound lanes.  The northbound and southbound sides of the road are separated by concrete “Jersey” barriers.  (Da 29-30).  The Project area included a bridge near mile marker 40 (“Structure 40 Bridge”) that runs over State Route 30 in Galloway Township.  (Pa1265, Pa594 at T26:4-20).  On or about October 1, 2014, [...] entered into a construction services supervision contract with Defendant [...] (“[...]”).  (Pa1266, Pa592 at T17:12-16).  Among its contractual responsibilities, [...] was to oversee work performed by Defendant [...] (“[...]”), who was the prime contractor for the Project.  (Pa1699 at ¶¶ 4 and 6, Pa592 at T17:20-24).  [...] subcontracted with Defendant [...]  (“[...]”) to fulfill [...]’s oversight responsibilities for the segment of the Project between mile markers 38.0 and --- 1  The facts and procedurally history are intertwined such that a combined statement improves readability and avoids duplication.  41.0 -- where the accident at issue allegedly occurred.  (Pa1699 at ¶7, Pa592 at T17:17-19, and Pa678 at T18-8-14).  [...] contractually assumed all of Jacob’s oversight responsibilities for this portion of the Parkway.  (Pa678 at 18:8-13, Pa1266).  This obligated [...] to provide construction inspectors to ensure that [...] followed [...]’s design plans. (Id.; Pa655 at T14:2-16).  [...] was also contractually obligated to provide a chief construction inspector to supervise its other inspectors.  (Pa1270).  Shortly before the Project began, however, [...]’s chief inspector became unavailable.  Rather than delay the Project or substitute someone else, [...] lent [...] one of its own chief inspectors, [...].  Site mobilization on the project commenced in October 2014.  At the time of the accident, in September 2015, construction activity was taking place in the southbound shoulder of the Parkway and in the right, west-most lane.  The left travel lane, where the accident occurred, was not under construction at the time of the accident.  (Pa659 at T29:8-11).  [...] was on-site most days, though not the day of the accident, and testified that he did not observe any dangerous conditions in the road adjacent to the construction site and was never made aware of any such dangerous conditions.  (Pa655 at T13:18-22; Pa659 at T32:13-24).  He further testified that, like all Project participants, he operated on a “see something, say something” basis; if he saw a pothole, change in elevation, or other issue, he would report it.  (Pa657 at T23:4-24).  There is no evidence that contradicts [...]’s testimony.  Rather, Plaintiffs rely exclusively on their sole liability expert’s opinion that Mr. Rudenjack should have seen a dangerous condition, which must have caused Plaintiff [...]’s accident.  B.
[brief] (Pa115a).  However, [...] never got close to [...].  (Pa116a).  [...] testified that [...]’s comments toward Officer [...] were in direct response to [...]’s admonition to [...] to calm down.  (Pa116a).  However, there was no physical interaction between [...] and [...].  This was echoed by [...]’s testimony.  (Pa116a).  Officer Matthew [...] acknowledged that before [...] spoke, [...] had given him affirmative permission to address the lineup.
[brief] The final decree (Pa946) does reference "together with all Riparian rights adjoining the above-described premises," however, neither [...] nor P.  Licari, Inc. ever acquired title to the Riparian Grant; therefore, it could not have been foreclosed.  Simply put, [...] could not acquire land from Licari that Licari did not own.  In August of 1940, the Borough of [...] entered into a lease from the State of New Jersey for lands owned by the State of New Jersey appurtenant and adjacent to Lot 3 only.
[brief] The payroll account had a balance of zero dollars that day.  - (2T 30:15-31:8).  •  On January 25, 2018, [...] entered an order after plaintiffs were forced to file a motion in aid of litigant's rights to obtain the books and records of [...].  [...] had previously been ordered to produce them twice, at the temporary restraining order hearing and the return of the order to show cause but had violated both orders.  •  In April of 2018, plaintiffs finally received the QuickBooks file.
[brief] This is the case in which a New Jersey State Governor ordered the entirety of a case file to be preserved, protected and open to the public.  This is the case whose files occupy a substantial part of a building.  This is the case which in part justified the State hiring a professional archivist.  This is the case that has not left the public interest in over nine decades.  This is the case which inspired changes to Federal Law, public media and countless other aspects of modern-day America.  This is the case about which books continue to be written about nine decades later.  Appellant [...] was simply requesting that the Court provide a substantive ruling regarding the word “examination” as it applies to the Kidnapping evidence and applying that ruling to the executive purpose signed by [...] with Executive Order 110.
[brief] An order was entered by the Honorable [...], J.S.C., on January 10, 2024, denying Plaintiff/Appellant’s Motion for Reconsideration and Ordering that the November 9, 2023, Order denying Plaintiff/Appellant’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment would remain in effect.  (Pa. 166 -167)  On January 10, 2024, an Order was also entered by the Honorable [...], J.S.C., granting Defendant/Respondent’s Motion for Reconsideration, granting Summary Judgment in favor of Defendant/Respondent and dismissing with prejudice Plaintiff/Appellant’s Complaint against Defendant/Respondent [...].  (Pa. 172-173).  A Notice of Appeal was then filed by Plaintiff/Appellant asking for reversal of the Orders of the Honorable [...], J.S.C., dated January 10, 2024.
[directive] The Superior Court may appoint a trustee protect the interest of all parties C. of involved for property which such nature that substantial difficulty may is in result preserving its value while awaiting forfeiture action, .-  Property 6:4  Forfeited A.  Transfer of Ownership  Upon the completion of a forfeiture action, the Attorney General the or 1 ~ or county prosecutor shall direct the state county treasurer to vest title property has been previously seized.
[brief] As will be further set forth herein, after reviewing the record on appeal, [...] found that the State provided sufficient evidence to link the trap placed on [...] in [...] to the Defendant and that the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendant placed the trap.  The Court further found that by placing a trap, placing plastic wrap around it to prevent it from operating as a trap, the Defendant was harboring stray cats within a public place in the Township.  Finally, the Court found that by altering the trap to not capture the cats, as previously set forth, allowing the cats to run at large is a form of abandonment.  Following the Court’s finding of guilty to the above-referenced violations, the Court merged the convictions for the purposes of sentencing, imposing a fine of 1,500, plus $33 in costs.  It is respectfully submitted that, as set forth below, the evidence presented at trial clearly established, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the Defendant violated each of the charged ordinances.  As such, it is respectfully submitted that the Defendant’s appeal be denied, and the conviction be affirmed.
[brief] CONCLUSION  For the foregoing reasons, the court should reverse the trial court’s decision to decline to enforce the judgment, and remand for a site suitability hearing with respect to the Off-site Property.  Respectfully submitted, /s/[...]_____________________  [...]  Dated: February 21, 2024  IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION OF THE [...], NEW JERSEY, FOR A DECLARATORY JUDGMENT, Respondent.  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY  APPELLATE  DIVISION  APPEAL NO.: [...] CIVIL ACTION ON APPEAL FROM: Order of the Law Division  Bergen County Docket No.: [...] SAT BELOW: Hon.  [...], J.S.C.  BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT  [...] IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S APPEAL OF THE TRIAL COURT'S DENIAL OF ITS MOTION IN AID OF LITIGANT'S RIGHTS
[brief] ”  *Instructional Sys., Inc. v. Computer Curriculum Corp.*, 130 N.J. 324, 352 (1992).  The Court went on to provide additional color to what constitutes a license in citing to *Finlay* and stating that “the term ‘license’ means ‘to use as if it is one’s own. ’”  *Id.* (citing *Finlay*, 146 N.J. Super. at 219).  The Court further held that the “franchisee must use the name of the franchisor ‘in such a manner as to create a reasonable belief on the part of the consuming public that there is a connection between the . . . licensor and licensee by which the licensor vouches, as it were, for the activity of the licensee.
[brief] In State v. Candelaria, the Court noted that the Code’s general purposes “still include ‘the safeguard[ing of] offenders against excessive, disproportionate or arbitrary punishment,’” and holding that imposition of six consecutive sentences shocked the judicial conscience).  311 N.J. Super. 437, 454 (App. Div. 1998).  The judge must still consider “whether the crimes and their objectives were predominately independent of each other, whether the crimes were committed at different times or separate places, and whether there was any double-counting of aggravating factors. ”  State v. Louis, 117 N.J. 250, 254 (1989).