ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] On the first point, the Opposition underscores that Plaintiff’s claims are based solely on the notion that if a product at issue was part of a recalled lot, that product must have a defect that caused the plaintiff harm.  Plaintiff boldly asserts (i) the recall establishes that every single Ozurdex® unit in every recalled lot was defective and (ii) [...] conceded general causation through its recall.  That is not and cannot be the law.  Unsurprisingly, Plaintiff does not cite a single case in New Jersey (or elsewhere) holding a plaintiff can meet her burden of proof by substituting a recall for admissible evidence of defect and causation.  As [...] explained, that would violate bedrock principles under the PLA and is the exact type of dangerous precedent and injustice this Court should immediately correct.
[brief] Derived from CAFRA and the foundational goals of the CZM Rules are certain “Resource Rules,” which are “the standards the Department utilizes to analyze the proposed development in terms of its effects on various resources of the built and natural environment of the coastal zone, both at the proposed site as well as in its surrounding region. ”  N.J.A.C. 7:7-16.1; see N.J.A.C. 7:7-1.1(e).  One of the resource rules is the SRD Rule and pertains to scenic resources, which “include the views of the natural and/or built landscape. ”  N.J.A.C. 7:7-16.10(a).  As provided above, under Subsection C of the SRD Rule, “[n]ew coastal development that is visually compatible with its surroundings in terms of building and site design, and enhances scenic resources is encouraged,” while “[n]ew coastal development that is not visually compatible with existing scenic resources in terms of large-scale elements of building and site design is discouraged. ”  N.J.A.C. 7:7-16.10(c); see N.J.A.C. 7:7-16.10(b) (“Large-scale elements of building and site design are defined as the elements that compose the developed landscape such as size, geometry, massing, height and bulk structures. ”).  In addition, under Subsection D of the SRD Rule, certain “new coastal development adjacent to a bay or ocean or bayfront or oceanfront, beach, dune or boardwalk and higher than 15 feet in height measured from the existing grade of the site or boardwalk” must: (1) “[p]rovide an open view corridor perpendicular to the water’s edge in the amount of 30 percent of the frontage along the waterfront where an open view currently exists”; and (2) “[b]e separated from either the beach, dune, boardwalk, or waterfront, whichever is further inland, by a distance of equal to two times the height of the structure. ”  N.J.A.C. 7:7-16.10(d)(1)-(2).  The SRD Rule does not apply to every single development proposed within a CAFRA area.
[brief] The Board argues that “[Plaintiffs] merely speculated that any attempt to cross-examine witnesses on irrelevant subject matters would be prevented by the Board’s counsel. ” (BDb10) (emphasis added).  Applicant again makes the same argument (ADb19).  As an initial note, the Board’s position that the subject matters would have been “irrelevant” confirms that the Board Attorney would have prevented the cross-examination and testimony.  But more to the point, this was not mere speculation, but already ruled upon by the Board Attorney during the hearing and confirmed by the Board Attorney during the oral arguments before the trial court.  During the Board hearing, the Board Attorney made the ruling that “tonight just so everyone understands is just the subdivision.
[directive] Sí se trata de una acusada y ella califica para recibir tratamiento para delincuentes sexuales, no quedará recluida en el Centro de Diagnóstico y Tratamiento de Adultos sino en una institución designada por el Comisionado de Correcciones donde recibirá un tratamiento similar para delincuentes sexuales.  NOTE:  If the defendant is a female and qualifies for sex offender treatment, she will not be confined at the [...] but a facility designated by the [...] where she will receive similar sex offender treatment.  Formulario enmendado promulgado por la directriz #01-18, (02/23/2018), [...] página 3 de 3 Revised Form Promulgated by Directive #01-18, (02/23/2018), [...] page 3 of 3
[brief] ....  6  1.  The Common Law Has Long Rejected Failure-To-Recall Claims.  ......................... 6  2.  The New Jersey Product Liability Act Did Not Create Any Failure-To-Recall Claims Not Recognized at Common Law.  ......................... 18  B.  IF A CLAIM FOR FAILURE TO RECALL AN FDA APPROVED PRODUCT EXISTED UNDER THE COMMON LAW, IT WOULD BE PREEMPTED BY THE FDA’S PRODUCT APPROVAL AND RECALL AUTHORITY.  ......................... 23  IV.
[brief] (Pa222, Pa225-226).  The only evidence that appellant has submitted to support his allegation is that when he woke up from being unconscious, he was lying on top of a piece of plywood on the driveway.  (Pa230).  In fact, in appellants own brief for this appeal, appellant provides “he [[...]] could not identify what caused him to fall, but after walking to the dumpster his next sensation was awakening on his back on top of the plywood. ”  During the January 6, 2023 oral argument, appellant admitted the lack of evidence/proofs submitted as to the cause of his fall.
[brief] Case Law Assocs. v. City of Newark, 132 N.J. 180, 185, 623 A.2d 1366 (1993)........30  Coventry Square, Inc., v. Westwood Zoning Bd. of Adj., 138 N.J. 285, 301 (1994).  .................................................................22, 25 El Shaer v. Planning Bd., 249 N.J. Super. 323 (App. Div. 1991), certif. den. 127 N.J. 546 (1992).......................................................26  Fanelli v. City of Trenton, 135 N.J. 582, 589, 641 A.2d 541 (1994)  ..........30  Hawrylo v. Board of Adj., Harding Twp., 249 N.J. Super. 568, 579 (App. Div. 1991)..............................................................32  Holmdel Builders Ass’n v. Twp. Of Holmdel, 121 N.J. 550, 557, 583 A.2d 277, 280 (1990).....................................27  Klug v. Bridgewater Tp. Planning Bd., 407 N.J Super. 1 (App. Div. 2009)..............................................................................20, 30  Kramer v. Board of Adj., Sea Girt, 45 N.J. 268, 296 (1965)..................31, 32 Nunziato v. Planning Board, 225 N.J. Super. 124, 133 (App. Div. 1988)..............................................................................31  Lang v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 160 N.J. 41 (1999)............................................................................................21  Levin v. Livingston Tp., 35 N.J. 500, 510-511 (1961)...........................25  Manalapan Builders Alliance, Inc. v. Township Committee, 256 N.J. Super. 295, 304 (App. Div.  1992)............................................................................................30  Medical Ctr. at Princeton v. Tp. of Princeton Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 343 N.J. Super. 177, 199, 778 A.2d 482 (App. Div. 2001)..............................................32  New Brunswick Cellular Tel. Co. v. Old Bridge Planning Bd., 270 N.J. Super. 122, 134, 636 A.2d 588 (Law Div. 1993)..................................................................................31  New Jersey Shore Builders Ass’n. v. Township of Ocean, 128 N.J. Super. 135, 137 (App. Div. 1974), cert. denied, 65 N.J. 292 (1974).........................................................30  Pizzo v. Mantin Group v. Randolph Tp., 137 N.J. 216, 220, 645 A.2d 89, 91 (1994).............................................26, 27 Pullen v. So. Plainfield Planning Bd., 291 N.J. Super. 303, 312, 677 A.2d 278 (Law Div. 1995), aff’d, 291 N.J. Super. 1, 6, 676 A.2d 1095 (App.  Div. 1996)..................................................................................31, 32  Wawa Food Market v. Planning Bd., Ship Bottom, 227 N.J. Super. 29, 34 (App. Div. 1988).......................................................20  Zilinsky v. Zoning Board of Adjustment, 105 N.J. 363, 367, 521 A.2d 841 (1987)....................................................27  Statutory Authority N.J.S. 40:55D-1 to 163 .................................................................18, 22 N.J.S. 40:55D-70(c)...........................................................................21, 22
[brief] Fralinger engineer [...] addressed the “per se” negligence claim in his affidavit.  An engineer does not have a duty of care to notify adjacent property owners of preliminary plans.  (Pa000390-91 at ¶¶6, 11).  In addition, the preliminary and revised site plans in question did not call for any remediation activities on the Property – activities which make up the entirety of Plaintiffs’ alleged damages.
[brief] “Also, it is noted by the photographs, certification of [...], Exhibit B, the area where [...] allegedly fell is neither a sidewalk nor a walkway.  It is a part of the parking lot blacktop on the side of the building, which falls under the definition of common areas. ”  The term “common area” was not a defined term in any of the leases.  Certain aspects of the premises were identified as “common areas” that the Landlord promised to maintain – but sidewalks were not included.  The photograph cited by the Court demonstrated that the spot at issue was partially covered and set off from the parking lot area by the cement curb blocks -- creating an obvious means to access the building on foot and inviting such use.  For these reasons, and those explained in greater detail in this brief, this Court should vacate the Order; and remand to the Law Division to enter partial summary judgment in favor of Plaintiffs; to deny the Tenant Defendants’ motion for summary judgment; and to set the matter down for trial on liability and damages.
[brief] Although, excusable ignorance does not require an affirmative intent to defraud it typically involves some sort of misconduct or imposition that cuts off the signer’s opportunity to read.  Peter Kero v. Terminal Const., 6 NJ 361, 368 (1951); Connors v. Fawn Mis. Corp., 30 F.3d 483, 490 (3d. Cir.  1994), MZM Constr., v. NJ Bldg. Lab, 974 F.3d 386, 404 (3d. Cir. 2020).  This is particularly true where a relation of natural trust and confidence, though not strictly a fiduciary relation exists between the parties.  Kero, supra at 370.
[brief] (1T31:14-32:22, 15a-18a).  The court permitted discovery to amplify the record regarding abandonment.  [...] complied.  Defendants did not.  Defendants served no discovery demands on [...].  They did not serve a subpoena on, or seek to depose, the individual who certified to the abandonment determination.  They served discovery demands on Plaintiff about one week before the close of ninety days’ worth of discovery.  Defendants failed to produce responses to [...]’s discovery demands – and when they finally did, about three months past due in response to [...]’s motion to compel – those answers were deficient.  The evidentiary record with respect to abandonment was not any different between Defendants’ first and second motions.  It was inadequate to vacate judgment the first time and it was equally inadequate to vacate judgment the second time because of Defendants’ own derelictions.  Defendants seek a result before this court that is fundamentally unfair: that they should be rewarded and victorious for noncompliance with a court order, while depriving [...] of the discovery necessary to protect its interests.
[directive] Threatening Assailant.  A person who is threatening the use of force against an officer or another person, with or without a weapon, in an aggressive manner that may cause bodily injury.  Examples may include a person armed with a weapon who fails to disarm, and an unarmed person who advances on an officer or any other person in a threatening manner thereby reducing the officer’s time to react, putting the officer in reasonable fear of a physical attack.  vi
[brief] The counterclaim sought enhanced remedies under the CFA, at N.J.S.A. 56:8-19, including injunctive relief on behalf of a putative class of [...] tenants whose leases included the chargeback provision, and treble damages on behalf of a subclass of tenants who were actually charged a rent concession chargeback fee.  Da105-106.  ¹  Both versions are included in the appendix because the exhibits to the original pleading were incorporated by reference in the amendment, but not resubmitted.  On July 31, 2023 [...] filed a motion to dismiss Defendants’ Counterclaim and to strike their class action allegations.  Da107.  On August 9, 2023, after Defendants had already asserted their counterclaim for treble damages under the CFA and requesting certification of a class, [...] filed a consent order to voluntarily dismiss [...]’s collection complaint, which the trial court signed and filed on August 16, 2023.
[directive] This policy applies, but is not limited to, charges of possession of marijuana or hashish, N.J.S.A. 2C:35- 10(a)(4), being under the influence of a controlled dangerous substance or its analog, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10(b), use or possession with intent to use drug paraphernalia, etc., N.J.S.A. 2C:36-2, and loitering to obtain or distribute a controlled dangerous substance, N.J.S.A. 2C:33-2. 1.  II.
[brief] (Da894)  After the Appellate Court remand, pursuant to the Case Management Order shortly before the first Trial date the parties exchanged witness/exhibit lists.  Included in [...]’s exhibit list was the Transcript of the 2018 Zoning Board hearing, the hearing minutes, and the Zoning Board Resolution.  The Synagogue then moved *in limine* at Trial to bar those documents from being submitted in evidence.  That Motion in Limine was heard on January 28, 2020, at the Trial commencing.  (6T4-18 to 62-4).  The Trial Court granted [...] Motion, and barred the hearing/transcript, minutes, and most importantly the Board Resolution from evidence.  (6T62-13 to 72-25)  That ruling was incorrect; the Resolution - and that there is no land use approval for this joint use of [...] property by an off-site parking use - is critical to the proper understanding and determination in this case.
[brief] .................................................................  25  Delacruz v. Alfieri, 447 N.J. Super. 1 (Sup. Ct. Bergen Cnty. Nov. 18, 2015)  .....................  31  Diana v. LVNV Funding LLC, 2024 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2241 (Sup. Ct. App. Div. Sept. 26, 2024)  ........................................................................ passim  Excel Pharmacy Servs., LLC v. Liberty Mut. Ins., 825 F. App’x 65 (3d Cir. 2020) ......................................................... 35, 36
[brief] See Masone v. Levine, 382 N.J. Super. 181, 193 (App. Div. 2005) (“[A]buse of discretion is demonstrated if the discretionary act was not premised upon consideration of all the relevant factors, was based upon consideration of irrelevant or inappropriate factors, or amounts to a clear error in judgment. ”); Manalapan Realty v. Township Committee, 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995) (“A trial court’s interpretations of the law and the legal consequences that flow from established facts are not entitled to any special deference. ”).
[brief] This claim is generally predicated on Appellants’ baseless allegation that [...] misrepresented that when Appellants purchased the Solar Rights from [...] in 2015, [...] would assure that no competitor would be able to “set up shop” at the Property and that even if Appellants defaulted under the Lease, Appellants would retain the Solar Rights. \(^8\)  However, Appellants cannot establish damages by clear and convincing evidence as the trial court expressly determined in the Prior Action that Appellants’ alleged losses were “the direct and proximate result of [Appellants’] failure to cure the default under the Lease with [...]. ”  In addition, such a claim is barred by the integration provisions in the Lease and Purchase and Sale Agreement.  To establish a claim for fraudulent inducement, five elements must be proven \textit{by clear and convincing evidence}: (1) a material representation of a presently existing or past fact; (2) made with knowledge of its falsity; and (3) with the intention that the other party rely thereon; (4) resulting in reliance by that party; (5) to his detriment.
[brief] Pa18  Plaintiff’s Notice of Motion for Fees and Sanctions  Sep. 22, 2022  Pa21  Plaintiff’s R. 1:4-8 Letter, June 13, 2023  Pa23  Plaintiff’s R. 1:4-8 Letter, May 5, 2023  Pa24  Plaintiff’s R. 1:4-8 Letter, Oct. 19, 2022  Pa25  Plaintiff’s Trial Exhibit P-1, Reinstatement of [...] to Practice Law  04/07/92  Investigator Letter/Ethic’s Opinion & Order  *Excerpted/*Abridged per R. 2:6-1(b)  Pa28  Plaintiff’s Trial Exhibit P-19, Defendant’s Deposition, March 23, 2016  *Excerpted/*Abridged per R. 2:6-1(b)  Pa30  Plaintiff’s Trial Exhibit P-45, February 17, 2015  [...] letter to [...] – Notice of Final Hearing for Divorce and March 21, 2015 Certified Mail Return Receipt signed by [...] Pa33  Plaintiff’s Trial Exhibit P-24 Saleena’s Pennsylvania Department of Human Services Benefits (including updated Subpoena/Commission Response)  *Excerpted/*Abridged per R. 2:6-1(b) Pa35  Plaintiff’s Trial Exhibit P-38  Personal Injury Deposition of [...] & medical intake report Exhibit – [...] v [...], et al., April 3, 2019  *Excerpted/*Abridged per R. 2:6-1(b) Pa45  Plaintiff’s Trial Exhibit P-25 [...] Retainer Agreement Pa49  Plaintiff’s Trial Exhibit P-34 Saleena’s Interrogatory Answers Pa55  *Excerpted/*Abridged per R. 2:6-1(b)  Plaintiff’s Trial Exhibit P-22, Saleena’s Delaware Name Change Petition, Pa58 August 1, 2017  Plaintiff’s Trial Exhibit P-29 Firearms Permit Hearing Transcript, April Pa68 12, 2018  *Excerpted/*Abridged per R. 2:6-1(b)  Plaintiff’s Trial Exhibit P-32, Saleena’s Responses to Request for Pa72  Admissions  October 5, 2018  Defendant’s Deposition, Aug. 8, 2019  *Excerpted/*Abridged per R. 2:6- Pa87 1(b)  Plaintiff’s Trial Exhibit P-26  [...] wrongful withdrawal of Pa90 $15,459.21, August 30, 2017/Phone Records ([...]/[...])  Plaintiff’s Trial Exhibit P-37  Saleena’s UIM Complaint Pa94  Plaintiff’s Trial Exhibit P-84  Saleena’s Federal Malpractice Complaint Pa99  Defense Counsel Invoices (produced September 22, 2022)  Pa124 Memorandum of Decision, Sep. 14, 2021  Pa157  III.
[brief] Similarly, in Tung, an interrogation video showed officers “expressly stat[ing that] they knew defendant was lying,” and accompanying in-court testimony included an officer’s “personal belief that defendant was a liar. ”  460 N.J. Super. at 102-03.  The court found the opinion evidence inadmissible, explaining that the officer’s testimony on defendant’s veracity and guilt undermined the jury’s ability to make its own credibility determination.
[brief] ” (37T 78:6-8).  This was error.  In the context of a liquidated or readily ascertainable sum, the award of prejudgment interest is compensatory and denying such relief when the defendants enjoyed the funds for an extended period of time is an abuse of discretion.  *See, Klein v. Cty. of Hudson*, 187 N.J. Super. 603 (Law Div.  This is because a plaintiff is denied the use of his money from the moment the funds in issue are taken.  *Rova Farms*, 65 N.J. at 506.  This is consistent with Plaintiffs’ proposed $838,810.40 calculation.  The alternative approach advocated by the defendants below and adopted by the trial court rewards the defendants for their nefarious conduct.  Therefore, the trial court’s judgment as to this sole issue should be reversed.
[brief] Defendant submits that in testifying, [...] and [...] both answered the ultimate question at trial by testifying that they intended to arrest defendant for aggravated assault.  (Db11-15).  The State submits that (1) the officers did not testify to the ultimate issue, and (2) any error in admitting this testimony was not clearly capable of producing an unjust result because the State presented admissible testimony and evidence which permitted the jury to draw its own conclusions about defendant’s guilt.  A.
[brief] The need for Defendant [...] to also acknowledge that ROFR was an excuse for [...] after the fact to squeeze their exercise of their ROFR within the 30-day period that paragraph 39 required.  They knew “what was real” all the time.  Thus, even in the Trial Court’s determination of whether the May 4th, 2023 presentation of the amendment to Plaintiff triggered the 30 day period, the Trial Court was in error.
[brief] When the Law Division denied second amendment, it did not find that there was any “prejudice” to [...].  This was for two reasons.  First, [...] was already a defendant as of the First Amendment, so it was fully able to defend had it chosen to defend and it could have sought to extend the discovery schedule by motion.  Second, more importantly, Appellants’ claims against [...] were clarified by the proposed second amendment, but that was denied without prejudice, so there was no “finding of prejudice” required for dismissal under the entire controversy doctrine.  See Pa223 (first clause of Order); Pa235 (dismissing First Amended Complaint DISMISSED without prejudice[”) specifically holding that the dismissal was without prejudice, merely based upon the fact that another party had entered into a new lease with [...].  A “dismissal with prejudice is the ultimate sanction, [and thus] it will normally be ordered only when no lesser sanction will suffice to erase the prejudice suffered by the non-delinquent party. ”  Abtrax Pharma., Inc. v. Elkins-Sinn, Inc., 139 N.J. 499, 514, 655 A.2d 1368 (1995).  As it relates to the entire controversy doctrine, "in the limited circumstances where a lesser sanction is not sufficient to remedy the problem caused by an inexcusable delay in providing the required notice, thereby resulting in substantial prejudice to the non-disclosed party's ability to mount an adequate defense[,]” dismissal with prejudice is a viable option.  Mitchell v. Charles P. Procini, D.D.S., P.A., 331 N.J. Super. 445, 453-54, 752 A.2d 349 (App. Div. 2000).  Because the entire controversy doctrine was not applied between the first amended complaint and the second amended complaint in the 2019 action, and because the entire controversy doctrine requires a finding of “prejudice” that was not found in the 2019 docket, it is simply inapplicable here and was not a proper basis for dismissal under Rule 4:6-2(e).  Accordingly, the dismissal Order should be reversed on two grounds:  First, it was erroneous to hold that a new lease somehow vitiates an absolute sale/purchase transaction.  Because Appellants allege that their purchased-assets were purportedly re-sold, Appellants have valid claims.  Second, because [...] engaged in illegal self-help with the lease after breaching the confidentiality covenant, Appellants’ claims are valid.