ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Notwithstanding the above, however, interpretation of statutes is a judicial and not an administrative function and the Court is in no way bound by the agency’s interpretation.  Mayflower Securities Co. v. Bureau of Sec., 64 N.J. 85, 93 (1973).  In the case sub judice, a significant portion of the Respondent’s decision was based upon the determination that there was no change in the Petitioner’s duties as municipal prosecutor in [...] prior to 2015 based upon this Court’s decision in Platt v. Board of Trustees, Public Employees Retirement System, 2017 WL 2628051.  (Pa153)  However, in that case neither the Board, OAL nor this Court evaluated the Petitioner’s employment status under Chapter 92b but rather Chapter 92a where her appointments were based upon Professional Services Contracts.  This Court did not reach the eligibility for [...] under the “IRS 20 Factor Test” pursuant to Chapter 92b in that case.  As such, this Court should disregard the Respondent’s legal interpretation of the impact of the prior case in terms of eligibly of the Petitioner under the “IRS 20 Factor Test” for [...].
[brief] (Sa 16-22)  In exchange, the State agreed to recommend a 30-year sentence with 30 years of parole ineligibility on the felony murder charge, concurrent to a 12-year NERA sentence on the armed robbery charge.  (Sa 16)  [...]’s plea was explicitly conditioned on his right to appeal the denial of a N.J.R. E. 404(b) motion from the felony murder case, and a suppression motion from the armed robbery case.  (Sa 16, 18)  In 2022, the New Jersey Supreme Court reversed the denial of [...]’s suppression motion, finding that the police lacked reasonable suspicion to stop the car that [...] was a passenger in, and thus all --- 3
[brief] See McKeown-Brand v. Trump Castle Hotel & Casino, 132 N.J. 546, 559 (1993) (“To comport with due process, a judicial hearing requires notice --- \(^8\)  As noted below, [...] sometimes did apply for fees as part of the motions he filed, some of which applications were denied at the time they were made but appeared to be resubmitted in the Global Fee Application. defining the issues and an adequate opportunity to prepare and respond. ” (emphasis added; internal citations omitted).  He also deprived the Chancery Court of its ability to conduct its required critical analysis.  See Urban League, 115 N.J. at 546-556.  Perhaps the best evidence of the lacking critical analysis is the fact that the Chancery Court simply granted the application in its entirety without reducing it by a single cent, notwithstanding the fact that [...]’s Global Fee Application openly sought fees for all of his collection efforts, including motions [...] filed that were denied. (see e.g., Da23, ¶67 (“we filed an order to show cause, which the Court ultimately denied …”).
[directive] Example  County Plaintiff Plaintiff DOCKET NO.: -vs- Civil Action  Defendant – Certification Lack of Consent to Defendant Proceed Remotely  I, , certify as follows:  1.  I am the .  2.  The court on proposed to schedule a remote proceeding in the above matter.  that pursuant to the Supreme Court’s 3.  I understand February 22, 2021 Order, this matter cannot proceed remotely over my objection.  a.  I understand that in the absence of consent to proceed remotely, the court will schedule this matter for an in-person hearing.  b.  I have been informed of (a) the options for participating in remote court events, including through use of technology provided by the Judiciary; and (b) the public health precautions implemented by the Judiciary to prevent exposure to the COVID-19 coronavirus.  Directive # 06-21 February 23, 2021  Page 10 c.  I understand that even for an in-person hearing, the court will determine how other participants, including witnesses, will participate (including whether they will be required to appear in person or to participate remotely).  4.  I do not consent to proceed remotely.  I understand that based on my lack of consent this matter will be conducted in person.  I certify that the foregoing statements made by me are true.  I am aware that if any of the foregoing statements made by me are willfully false, I am subject to punishment  Date: Signature: Name: Directive # 06-21 February 23, 2021
[brief] An expert is “in no better position” to make conclusions about matters beyond their expertise “than the jurors themselves. ”  *State v. Jamerson*, 153 N.J. 318, 341 (1998).  Therefore, “[a]n expert witness should distinguish between what he knows as an expert and what he may believe as a layman. ”  *Id.* at 340 (quoting *In re Hyett*, 61 N.J. 518, 531 (1972)).  “His role is to contribute the insight of his specialty. ”  *Ibid.*  Testimony by an expert who lacks “sufficient expertise” to opine on the subject matter at issue can “mislead the jury into thinking that he knows something that they do not know,” encroaching on their domain as factfinder.  *Ibid.* (quotations and citation omitted).  Applying these principles, our Supreme Court in *Jamerson* held that a medical examiner qualified as an expert in forensic pathology “should not have been permitted to testify that [a car accident] was a reckless homicide rather than an accidental killing.
[brief] ¹  The petition for post-conviction relief is tantamount to a complaint and thus is included in the appendix pursuant to Rule 2:6-1(a)(1).  | CASES CITE | PAGE | |----------------------------------|------| | Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U. S. 683 (1986) | 28 | | Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) | 24 | | State v. Bryant, 222 N.J. 60 (2016) | 20 | | State v. Carty, 170 N.J. 632 (2002) | 20,21| | State v. Coles, 218 N.J. 322 (2014) | 20 | | State v. Davis, 116 N.J. 341 (1989) | 19,25| | State v. Domicz, 188 N.J. 285 (2006) | 21 | | State v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42 (1987) | 18,25| | State v. Garron, 177 N.J. 43 (2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1160 (2004) | 28 | | State v. Johnson, 193 N.J. 528 (2008) | 20 | | State v. Johnson, 68 N.J. 349 (1975) | 21 | | State v. King, 44 N.J. 346 (1965) | 21,22| | State v. Marshall, 148 N.J. 89, cert. denied, 522 U.S. 850 (1997) | 19 | | State v. Porter, 216 N.J. 343 (2013) | 19 | | State v. Preciose, 129 N.J. 451 (1992) | 19,25| | | 29 | CASES CITED (Continued) PAGE State v. Watts, 223 N.J. 503 (2015) ......................................................... 20 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) ........................................ 18, 25 .............................................................................................................. 28 United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984) ........................................... 19, 25 .............................................................................................................. 28 STATUTES CITED N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2 .......................................................................................... 1 N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1b(1) .............................................................................. 1 N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1b(2) .............................................................................. 1 N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1b(7) .............................................................................. 2 N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1a(1) .............................................................................. 1 N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1a(2) .............................................................................. 1 N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4d .................................................................................. 1 N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5d .................................................................................. 1 N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2 .................................................................................. 2 PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[brief] (Sa 36, 38-44)  [...] had a right to withdraw from his plea pursuant to Rule 3:9-3(f) and *Diloreto*, which states that the right to withdraw applies where, as here, “the defendant simultaneously pleads to multiple indictments and the pre-plea motion relates to only one. ”  362 N.J. Super. at 616 n.6.  It is not necessary for [...] to demonstrate why he may want to withdraw from his plea agreement, as the conditional plea rule states that a defendant in his circumstances “shall” be permitted to withdraw, regardless of the consequences.  R. 3:9–3(f); see also *Diloreto*, 362 N.J. Super. at 616 (acknowledging that if a defendant “succeeds on the appeal, and there is other evidence to warrant prosecution, a defendant may choose not to withdraw a guilty plea if a favorable sentence recommendation was made as part of a negotiated disposition, or because charges dismissed incident to the negotiated plea would be resurrected upon withdrawal,” but that “our plea preservation rules give the defendant the right to withdraw a guilty plea when the right to appeal survives the plea and defendant succeeds on appeal”).
[brief] ” (13T188-20 to 190-5); see Feaster, 156 N.J. at 77 (holding that although it did not explicitly cover the right to counsel, a similar instruction sufficed to “impart to the jury the respect to be accorded defendant’s decision to remain silent”).  Thus, these passing references to which counsel did not object typified “fleeting” references to counsel that do not constitute plain error.  F.
[brief] Presumably because the MLUL and the LRHL both touch upon land use issues, Plaintiff is conflating the requirements of the MLUL and the LRHL.  Such attempts have been routinely rejected by the Courts.  “[T]he procedures of the Municipal Land Use Law do not apply to adoption of a redevelopment plan, including the zoning component. ”  Hirth v. City of Hoboken, 337 N.J. Super. 149, 165 (App. Div. 2001).  “[T]he Local Redevelopment Law contains its own procedures for adoption of a redevelopment plan. ”  Ibid.  “The adoption of a redevelopment plan by ordinance follows the same procedure as the adoption of any municipal ordinance. ”  *Milford Mill 128, LLC, supra*, 400 N.J. Super. at 110, quoting [...], *Zoning and Land Use Administration*, §38-4.3, at 906 (2008); see also [...] & [...], *Zoning and Land Use Administration*, §11-5.3, at 239 (2022); *Hirth*, 337 N.J. Super. at 165 (“the only hearing required before adoption of a redevelopment plan, as with any other municipal ordinance, is a legislative hearing before the governing body”).
[brief] Id. at 488; State v. Brown, 180 N.J. 572, 585 (2004), abrogated on other grounds by Bailey, 231 N.J. at 488-91; State v. Alvarez, 318 N.J. Super. 137, 150-54 (App. Div. 1999); State v. Harvey, 318 N.J. Super. 167, 170-73 (App. Div. 1999); accord Model Jury Charges (Criminal), “Certain Persons Not to Have any Firearms (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-7(b)(1)),” at 1 n.3 & n.6 (“If defendant is stipulating to the predicate offense, do not read the crime listed in the Certain Persons count. ” (emphasis added)).  That is so because, where the defendant stipulates, the nature of the predicate conviction has “no evidentiary significance” but “a high risk of prejudice. ”  Alvarez, 318 N.J. Super. at 153-54; accord Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 190-91 (1997) (“The most the jury needs to know is that the conviction admitted by the defendant falls within the class of crimes that . . . bar a convict from possessing a gun . . . .”).  Here, both the trial court and prosecutor violated that prohibition.  During the certain-persons trial, [...] “stipulated” that he had previously been twice convicted of possession with intent to distribute a controlled dangerous substance within 1,000 feet of a school, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7 (PWID/1,000ft.) -- which is a predicate offense under the certain-persons statute, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-7(b)(1) -- and the parties jointly admitted the corresponding judgments of conviction, which, though apparently unredacted, were not read to the jury.  (11T 131-6 to 8; 13T 10-6 to 22)  However, the court in its opening instructions read aloud the unredacted indictment, which specifically named the PWID/1,000ft. conviction; the State in summation again highlighted that [...] had been twice convicted of PWID/1,000ft. and identified the dates as 2014 and 2015; and the court in its final instructions again repeated that he had been convicted of PWID/1,000ft. (13T 8-1 to 16-24)  Those references plainly violated multiple binding decisions and the model charge and served no other purpose than to prejudice the jury against [...].  See State v. Scharf, 225 N.J. 547, 580 (2016) (“It is the independent duty of the court to ensure that the jurors receive accurate instructions on the law . . . irrespective of the particular language suggested by either party. ”).  His certain-persons conviction must be reversed.
[brief] See Galligan v. Westfield Centre Service, Inc., 82 N.J. 188 (1980); Kaczmarek v. New Jersey Turnpike Auth., 77 N.J. 329 (1978).  R. 1:13-4(a) was not brought to the attention of the trial judge nor cited by appellant on this appeal, but in the interests of justice we have raised it ourselves.  Rosa v. United Jersey Bank 167 N.J. Super. 482 (App. Div. 1979).  "Ordinarily, if a court is without subject matter jurisdiction, it shall on motion or its own initiative order the action transferred to the proper court, there to be proceeded upon as if it had been originally commenced in that court.
[brief] Ibid.  In fact, all insurers are subject to liquidity standards under N.J.A.C. 11:2-27.3 and the [...] (“[...]”)’s Insurance Regulatory Information System (“IRIS”), pursuant to which specific ratios and qualitative analysis are considered in determining whether an insurer is operating in a hazardous financial condition.  If the Commissioner determines the insurer is operating in a hazardous financial condition, the insurer may be placed under administrative supervision, N.J.S.A. 17:51A-1 to -10 and N.J.A.C. 11:2-27.4, and an order may be issued requiring the insurer to take such actions as the Commissioner deems necessary to abate such determination.
[directive] Standard Pega: Jersey Operating Management and distributed to the [...], [...] month [...].  Six Superintendent of the and Director, reports shall also be prepared by the [...]-  These reports are due in February for forfeiture activity from July-December and due in August for forfeiture activity from January-June of the shall be fiscal year.  The semi-annual reports distributed in the same as manner the monthly reports.  - - Page: Program Standard 02 11  New of Jersey  Adm~iatrs~on R o d w e Operating Forfeitwe State 3
[brief] (Da2209-2223)  New counsel also was not requesting months to get up to speed.  He confirmed he could be ready in 45 days in a case that had no urgent need to finish after 7.5 years.  (Pa2154)  Amazingly, the Arbitrator denied the request for postponement at the same time that he actually had acknowledged he was “concerned” about who was representing [...]’s minor children.  (Da2093)  If the Arbitrator was concerned about representation of [...]’s children, then the postponement should have been granted just for that reason.  The appearance that new counsel offered to make was for the children’s interests as well.  (Da2155)  Instead, the Arbitrator effectively denied [...] the right to counsel in the most critical stage of the proceeding for his own personal reasons and without finding [...]’s reasons were insufficient.  His decision resulted in the Final Award that imposed more than $1,100,000 in monetary damages and expelled [...] from [...].
[brief] Plaintiffs originally filed their claims by Complaint dated May 4, 2018 under docket number [...].  (Pa000021).  After filing their original Complaint, however, Plaintiffs did not pursue these claims for approximately five years, seemingly acknowledging their lack of merit.  On August 28, 2023, the Superior Court dismissed Plaintiffs’ original action without prejudice based on an agreement between the parties, granting Plaintiffs leave to refile.  (Pa0000286-288).  Plaintiffs refiled this action on October 5, 2023, under docket number [...], purporting to assert causes of action for breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, promissory estoppel and alleged violation of the New Jersey Wage Payment and Collection Law.  (Pa00030-47).  Decisions by both the Superior Court and Appellate Division, issued after Plaintiffs’ original Complaint in 2018, prompted Defendants to file a motion to dismiss on the pleadings on November 9, 2023.  (Pa000019).  The Superior Court held oral argument in connection with Defendants’ motion to dismiss on February 16, 2024, and thereafter granted Defendants’ motion in an Order and Decision dated _____________________  1  “Pa” refers to Plaintiffs’ Appendix.  “Da” refers to Defendants’ Appendix.  March 4, 2024, dismissing Plaintiffs’ Complaint in its entirety.\(^2\) (Pa000017-29).  This appeal now follows.
[brief] Furthermore, the arbitration agreement stated that "[s]hould the parties be unable to agree upon the arbitration panel within the 30 days allotted, the medical provider shall make the final decision regarding the panel members."  (Da122).  The defendant maintained complete control in choosing the arbitration panel members making the agreement incredibly one-sided to [...]’s detriment.  Patients must maintain the right to believe that they can trust and rely on their physician.  When seeking medical services, it is reasonable for a patient to assume that their physician is acting in their best interest.  See Moore v. Woman To Woman Obstetrics & Gynecology, L.L.C., 416 N.J. Super. 30, 44-45 (App. Div. 2010).  Undue influence warrants voiding a contract when by virtue of the party’s relationship the party seeking to avoid enforcement is justified in assuming that the other party will not act in a matter inconsistent with the party’s welfare like in the case of a physician and patient.
[directive] See complaint-warrant versus complaint-summons the inform might that automated conducting for guidelines and directives supplemental issue to Prosecutors County (authorizing Directive made decision is the before but arrest unplanned an following query deconfliction such Any queries).  deconfliction another known by information lead to may acomplaint-warrant for apply or acomplaint-summons issue whether to 33 Page not is information history criminal relevant when instances be may there  Finally, risk- pretrial automated the that databases the in data missing of because for accounted and safety of public interests reasons, the foregoing the For queries.
[brief] (8T).  The trial court found Aggravating Factor 3 present based upon [...]’s municipal court offense history.  (8T20:10-25).  The trial court also found Aggravating Factor 9 present.  (8T21:1-9).  The trial court did not find any mitigating factors present.  (8T21:16).  On Count I (Attempted Kidnapping), the trial court sentenced [...] to eight (8) years’ incarceration, subject to an 85% parole disqualifier under the No Early Release Act (“NERA”).  (8T21:22-22:3).  The trial court further sentenced [...] to a term of one year (1) incarceration for Count II (Possession of an Imitation Firearm), to run concurrently with the sentence imposed for Count I. (8T22:4-9).  LEGAL ARGUMENT
[brief] In so doing, the lower court acted contrary to well-settled precedent establishing that the reasonable suspicion standard requires an analysis of the totality of the circumstances.  The lower court then compounded this error by again doing that which New Jersey law cautions courts against: allowing a potential “innocent” explanation for defendant’s trip to New York – to buy burger patties – to “control” its reasonable suspicion “analysis. ”  Mann, 170 N.J. 338-39; Arthur, 149 N.J. at 10.  New Jersey law is clear and contrary.  While “[p]olice officers should consider whether a defendant’s actions are more consistent with innocence than guilt,” “simply because a defendant’s actions might have some speculative innocent explanation does not mean that they cannot support articulable suspicions if a reasonable person would find the actions are consistent with guilt. ”  Ibid.  The lower court’s unquestioning acceptance of defendant’s innocent explanation for his New York trip failed to view the explanation through the lens of the totality of the circumstances, which included a controlled buy of CDS by the CI from under the hood of the Audi and the CI’s report, in an otherwise corroborated tip, that defendant travelled to New York to purchase CDS.  Nothing in our law required either the detectives, or the lower court to give such uncritical acceptance to defendant’s innocent explanation.  That the lower court did so provides yet reason why this Court should reverse the erroneously-entered order of suppression.  Application of well-settled New Jersey precedent to the facts found by the lower court should have resulted in the only legally-permissible conclusion: that the detectives here possessed sufficient reasonable suspicion of drug activity to support a request for consent to search defendant’s vehicle.  The long-term CDS investigation conducted by the detectives here bears no identity to the abusive motor vehicle stops and searches that animated Carty.  The State respectfully requests that this Court confirm this difference by reversing the lower court’s order of suppression.  **CONCLUSION**
[brief] *Mount Laurel II*, 92 N.J. at 208-09 (citing *Mount Laurel I*, 67 N.J. at 174 and 181).  “The public policy of this State has long been that persons with low and moderate incomes are entitled to affordable housing. ”  *Homes of Hope, Inc. v. Eastampton Twp. Land Use Plan. Bd.*, 409 N.J. Super. 330, 337 (App. Div. 2009).  The New Jersey Supreme Court has “recognized that the furnishing of housing for minority or underprivileged segments of the population inherently served the public welfare. ”  *Homes of Hope, Inc. v. Mount Holly Zoning Bd. of Adjustment*, 236 N.J. Super. 584, 588 (Law. Div. 1989) (quotation marks omitted).  “It is plain beyond dispute that proper provision for adequate housing of all categories of people is certainly an absolute essential in promotion of the general welfare required in all local land use regulation. ”  *Mount Laurel I*, 67 N.J. 151, 179 (1975).
[brief] Borodinsky, 162 N.J. Super. at 444.  The Appellate Division recognized the difficulty with “evaluating interests in close corporations” but cautioned that “such difficulty must not be equated with impossibility. ”  Id. at 444.  Where a trial court needs additional expert testimony to assist with valuing a business interest, the court is required to appoint an expert in order to make an informed decision regarding valuation.
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY FOUND THAT SPECIAL MASTER ORLOFSKY HAD NO REASON TO RECUSE HIMSELF.  The Chancery Division appointed former United States District Court Judge Stephen M. [...] as Special Master on Plaintiffs’ fee applications twice in this matter: first, after [...] entered final judgment against the [...] in December 2013; and second, on remand to resolve Plaintiffs’ fee applications on remand in 2018.  The [...], who posed no challenge to Special Master [...]’s first appointment, sought his recusal the second time around, accusing him of partiality based on his service as a mediator during a court-ordered mediation in an unrelated matter in which [...]’s counsel, [...], represented an unrelated party, while briefing on Plaintiffs’ fee applications was ongoing.  On appeal, not only do the [...] regurgitate the same unpersuasive arguments they presented to the trial court, but they go further to misrepresent the trial court’s opinion to muddy the record in their latest effort to delay the inevitable imposition of the judgment against them.  The record is clear, however, that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the [...]’ recusal motion, and this Court should affirm.