ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Every witness testified that [...] was immature for his age.  His brother [...] testified that he “would actually have trouble differentiating the ages of other younger kids because they wouldn’t act the same as he would, even though he might be older. ” (6T:132-10 to 9).  [...]’s Aunt [...] testified that [...] would make inappropriate jokes at times.  (6T:243-20 to 7).  At one point during his interrogation just hours after shooting his family, [...] made a masturbation joke.  (8T:130-4 to 15).  At another point of the interview, he made a joke about the electric chair scene in the movie the Green Mile.  (8T:176-7 to 10).  His brother [...] testified that [...] had a low maturity level and did not act like other kids his age.  (9T:145-13 to 146-2).  [...] also testified that despite being sixteen (16) years old, [...] still slept in the bed with his parents at night.  (9T:177-6 to 178-10).  [...] [...]’s Uncle [...] testified that [...] acted younger than kids his age.  (9T:228-18 to 21).  [...]’s grandmother [...] testified that when [...] was younger “he was socially awkward and much less mature” than other children.  (10T:20-15 to 21-1).  The Court ignored the fact that [...] was wholly immature for his age and simply focused on the offense itself.
[brief] My Nov. 28, ‘22 Certification (Exh. “Z” Conclusions, p. 20-22) (405a-407a) concluded that I presented substantiated facts/arguments for refuting, & Court rejecting [...]’s Nov. 16th Reply & Oct. 26th filed Requests.  This Section further justifies Section “C” for my Appeal in order to dismiss any further repetitions by Respondent of his prior false claims & accusations.  F. CERT. FOR CROSS-MOTION: OCT. 2022 & MARCH 7, ’23 ORDERS
[brief] (Aa1).  The HAD explained that [...] met the Exemption #11 regulation and noted that the Highlands Council concurred with its decision.  (Aa1-2).  It also found that the Project is consistent with the Northeast WQMP because the Project’s proposed wastewater output will be less than 2,000 gallons per day and will use less than 650 gallons of water per day.  (Aa2).  On July 7, 2021, DEP published notice of its decision in the DEP Bulletin.  (Aa18).  d.  Appellants’ Appeal.
[brief] A straightforward application of these principles indicates that N.J.S.A. 39:4-126 contains no requirement that motorists signal prior to changing lanes.  In interpreting a statute, “[t]he overriding goal . . . is to determine and give meaning to the Legislature’s intent. ”  Carter, 247 N.J. at 513.  “The plain language of a statute is the best indicator of the statute’s meaning, and statutory words should be read as they are commonly used and ordinarily understood. ”  Scriven, 226 N.J. at 34.  In addition, courts should “read and construe words and phrases in their context,” “consider[ing] the words of a statute in context with related provisions so as to give sense to the legislation as a whole. ”  Carter, 247 N.J. at 513 (internal quotations omitted).  “If the plain language leads to a clear and unambiguous result, then the interpretive process should end, without resort to extrinsic sources. ”  State v. D.A., 191 N.J. 158, 164 (2007).
[brief] (4T54:9 to 55:5; 8T93:15-23.)  [...] finally made contact with [...] in April 2021, at which time [...] advised—yet again—that the RIR would be ready in about two weeks.  (4T54:21 to 55:12.)  Around that time, [...] also reached out to [...], her LSRP, to inquire as to the delays and issues with submissions to the [...].  (Pa0387; 5T27:19 to 30:22.)  In approximately July 2021, [...] dismissed himself as Defendants’ LSRP due, in part, to [...]’s failure to pay outstanding balances.
[brief] Turning first to [...]’s cross-appeal, [...] succeeded in establishing that it was entitled to insurance coverage for the Plainville claim despite over two decades of resistance from [...].  Accordingly, [...] was a successful claimant for purposes of R. 4:42-9(a)(6).  Each of the other issues [...] raises in its cross-appeal relate to decisions that [...] made relating to discretionary aspects of the court’s calculation of the damages [...] incurred as a result of [...]’s wrongful refusal to provide coverage.  [...] has in no way demonstrated \textsuperscript{16}  “The little plaintiff or defendant who was promised a new rocking-horse when Jarndyce and Jarndyce should be settled has grown up, possessed himself of a real horse, and trotted away into the other land.  Fair wards of court have faded into mothers and grandmothers; a long procession of chancellors has come in and come out; the legion of bills in the suit have been transformed into mere bills of mortality …but Jarndyce and Jarndyce still drags its dreary length before the court, perennially hopeless. ”  Charles Dickens, *Bleak House* (1852).  that this case is the “rarest of occasions” where a clear abuse of discretion occurred.  More directly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in making any of those decisions.
[brief] See Nouhan v. Board of Adjustment of City of Clifton, 392 N.J. Super. 283, 290 (App. Div. 2007).  The critical element of the Master Plan to be reviewed and considered is the Land Use Plan Element.  As detailed in N.J.S.A. 40:55D-28(b)(2), that Element is to be specific in detailing, ... the existing and proposed location, extent and intensity of development of land to be used in the future for varying types of residential, commercial, industrial, agricultural, recreational, educational and other public and private purposes or combination of purposes ....  It is that specificity that makes this element the critical one to be considered on “consistency” of the Master Plan with the uses/densities in a proposed Zoning Ordinance or Redevelopment Plan.  Redevelopment Plans and the Regulations arising or put in place pursuant to the Local Redevelopment and Housing Law, N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-1 et seq., have the same policy considerations and requirements.
[directive] Statute Charge Description  Degree Bail Range 10%  Cash Bail Option  2C:12-1b(2)  Aggravated Assault  Actor attempts to cause or causes bodily injury with a deadly weapon.  3rd Degree $20,000 to $50,000 10% permissible  2C:12-1b(3)  Aggravated Assault  Actor recklessly causes bodily injury with a deadly weapon.  4th Degree $1,000 to $2,500 10% permissible  Actor, knowingly under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of 2C:12-1b(4)  Aggravated Assault human life, points a firearm at or in the direction of another, whether or not the actor believes 4th Degree $1,000 to $2,500 10% permissible it to be loaded.  3rd Degree $5,000 to $15,000 10% permissible  Actor commits simple assault upon police officer or upon other categories of people as listed 2C:12-1b(5)
[brief] 1  PROCEDURAL HISTORY  8  LEGAL ARGUMENT 10  I.  LEGAL STANDARD  10  II.  THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT THE PLAINTIFF ESTABLISHED A GENUINE MATERIAL FACT IN DISPUTE AS TO WHETHER HE WAS SUBJECTED TO A HOSTILE WORK ENVIRONMENT IN VIOLATION OF THE NJLAD DUE TO HIS RACE AND ERRED IN REVERSING THAT DETERMINATION ON RECONSIDERATION.  (Pa280-282)  11  III.  THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING RECONSIDERATION AS THE POLICY WAS NOT EFFECTIVE IN STOPPING THE DISCRIMINATION, NOR WAS IT ENFORCED PROMPTLY AS DEFENDANT MARTINO WAS NEVER ADMONISHED OR REPRIMANDED FOR HIS RACIALLY MOTIVATED CONDUCT.  (Pa280-282)  20 IV. CONCLUSION.  23  ### TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | Authority | Page | |---------------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | A.D.P. v. Exxonmobil Research & Eng'g Co., 428 N.J. Super. 518, 531 (N.J. Super. 2012) | 12 | | Bergen Commercial Bank v. Sisler, 157 N.J. 188, 208 (N.J. 1999) | 12 | | Bilotti v. Acurate Forming Corp., 39 N.J. 184 (1963) | 10 | | Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America, 142 N.J. 520, 540 (1995) | 10, 11| | C.V. v. Waterford Twp. Bd. of Educ., No. A-24-2022 (N.J. Sep 12, 2023) (slip op. at 18) | 17 | | Dunkley v. S. Coraluzzo Petroleum Transporters, 437 N.J. Super. 366, 376(N.J. Super. 2014) | 16, 20, 21| | El-Sioufi v. St. Peter's Univ., 382 N.J. Super. 145, 178 (N.J. 2005) | 15 | | Fleming v. Correctional Healthcare, 164 N.J. 90, 100 (N.J. 2000) | 13 | | Fuchilla v. Layman, 109 N.J. 319, 334, 537 A.2d 652 | 11 | | Gaines v. Bellino, 173 N.J. 301, 313(N.J. 2002) | 21 | | Godfrey v. Princeton Seminary, 196 N.J. 178, 196 (N.J. 2008) | 16 | | Lehmann v. Toys R Us, Inc., 132 N.J. 587, 626 A.2d 445 (1993) | passim| | McDevitt v. Bill Good Builders, Inc., 175 N.J. 519, 528 (N.J. 2003) | 13 | | Muench v. Township of Haddon, 225 N.
[brief] [...] testified that, when enabled by the user, cellphones have the ability to track and share location data of the phone.  [12T62-5 to -8].  [...] explained that where the device is registered is dependent on the signal of the GPS, which is based on the location.  [12T62-20 to -25].  He gave the example that, in a building, “it might be a little less specific than if you were outside. ”  [12T62-20 to -25].  [...] testified that [...]’s phone had location services on the day and evening of the crime.  [12T76-6 to 12].  At the time she texted [...] a photograph of a gun earlier in the day, [...]’s phone was located on Randolph Street in Camden, New Jersey.  [12T76-10 to -14].  Later that evening, while texting with defendant, [...] shared her location with --- 1  The State incorporates the abbreviations and transcript designations utilized in its initial brief.  2  At the time of trial, [...] was a Sergeant in the [...].  Prior to the start of co-defendant [...]’s trial, he was promoted to the rank of lieutenant. him through her phone, establishing that she was at [...] in [...], her place of work.  [12T87-22 to 88-5].  [...] also testified that [...]’s location services were on, and that at the time he texted Ayers that he was outside of [...] to pick her up, his cell phone was also at that location.  [12T98-12 to 99-5].  At 12:51 a.m. [...]’s phone was present at defendant’s address, [...].  [12T129-16 to -21].  At both 1:34 a.m. and 1:41 a.m., [...]’s phone was located in the area of [...].  [12T130-8 to 11].  At 1:47 a.m., [...]’s device was located at [...], as shown on surveillance footage, and then returned to [...] at 1:54 a.m. [12T130-12 to -15].  At 2:48 a.m. [...]’s phone was located at 61 [...] and at 2:58 a.m., as corroborated by surveillance footage, his device was at [...].  [12T100-24 to 101-7].  At 3:20 a.m. [...]’s phone registered him climbing a flight of stairs.  [12T121-24 to 122-8].  --- 3  In the **STATEMENT OF FACTS** section of his supplemental brief, defendant includes testimony provided by [...] regarding the data of when [...]’s phone display turned on and off.  [Db3].  That testimony is not part of the “GPS location or health activity data” disputed here.  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I THE EVIDENCE REGARDING GPS LOCATION AND HEALTH ACTIVITY DATA DID NOT REQUIRE EXPERT TESTIMONY.
[brief] As to the first demand, the Special Adjudicator noted that not only had the requesting party “provided a reasonable explanation as to why all of the requested material is relevant,” *id.* at *10* (emphasis added), but the producing party had neither claimed that there were “any concrete subject areas that are not relevant” nor “suggested any feasible way of separating arguably irrelevant material from relevant material. ”  *Id.* at *11*.  This case is not remotely analogous; [...] has explained that the ESI Order would require the production of approximately 68,000 irrelevant documents, representing “sixty to seventy percent of the documents” to be produced.
[brief] They argued that such truthfulness made their witnesses the superior evidence.  More specifically, in arguing against the State’s rebuttal testimony, counsel for [...] opined:  What else was offered on rebuttal?  Well, let’s hear from [...] (sic) again.  Let’s try this.  All right.  What did we hear from [...] (sic)?  Do you know – do you know that in September, we wanted speak to [...], and he said he didn’t want to.  Imagine that.  And that’s the rebuttal testimony to try and somehow say that this guy who put his hand on the Bible and his other hand raised, told you what happened.  That’s the rebuttal testimony that is somehow going to disprove it. ”  [16T66-19 to 67-3][emphasis and bolding added].  As evidenced by the record, defendant’s arguments are simply an unpersuasive veiled attempt to divert attention away from the fact that the jury did not believe their witnesses or their defense as a whole.  And directly attacking the State’s decisions as to who to call as witnesses opened the door for the State to respond as to their motives.
[brief] 6T126:8-11.  [...] testified that RPC 1.3 requires an attorney to do his job with diligence.  6T123:3-7.  According to [...], “diligence requires that the client be informed.  And it requires that you be informed as an attorney.  You have to know what the assets are. ”  6T124:3-5.  Not asking questions of your client can be a violation of the diligence requirement.  6T124:25-125:2.  [...] opined that [...] deviated from the standard of care for diligence by not doing anything to find out financial information for the benefit of his client and just utilizing whatever information was provided by the adversary to complete the divorce documents.
[brief] Here it is uncontroverted that the Plaintiff received all the payments due under the mortgage and thereafter prepared and recorded a discharge of mortgage on January 29, 2018.  There was no mistake.  Plaintiff’s argument in this appeal that the commencement of the bankruptcy litigation by the trustee two years after Plaintiff received the final mortgage payment which was later settled constitutes a default of a long-ago discharged mortgage is not cognizable by our courts.  The mortgage had been properly discharged years before the bankruptcy litigation commenced.
[brief] The prosecutor posed some additional questions to defendant:  PROSECUTOR: You did [] review the discovery with your attorney, correct?  DEFENDANT: Yes.  PROSECUTOR: All right.  And in that you know that there were recorded phone calls between you and your children’s mother, [...], correct?  DEFENDANT: Yes.  PROSECUTOR:  And in those phone calls, you admitted to her that you had, in fact, put your hand over [...] to prevent her from breathing in an effort to put her to sleep.  Is that correct?  DEFENDANT: Yes.  ...  PROSECUTOR: And just to be clear, [...] at this time was approximately six weeks old, correct, when she died?  DEFENDANT: Yes.  PROSECUTOR: And your son, at that time, was approximately 15 months old.  Is that correct?  DEFENDANT: Yes.  [(1T16-4 to 24). ]  Defendant’s conduct in suffocating a newborn baby clearly evinces that he “did not care whether she lived or died. ”  Curtis, 195 N.J. Super. at 367.  Defendant sought to stop [...] from crying as quickly as possible by stopping her from breathing.  Her survival was incidental to that objective, which was paramount to defendant as demonstrated by the fact that he likewise had suffocated his son when putting his son to sleep.  Intentionally preventing a newborn baby from breathing created a “high probability that [defendant’s] conduct would cause the death of” that baby.  Ibid.  As the circumstances surrounding defendant’s extreme recklessness in suffocating his infant daughter demonstrate his complete disregard for her life, which was contingent on his convenience, defendant’s factual basis for his guilty plea established all of the elements of aggravated manslaughter beyond a reasonable doubt.  POINT II
[brief] ”  [...], ‘Utterly horrifying’: ex-[...] insider says covert data harvesting was routine, The Guardian (Mar. 20, 2018)  https://www.theguardian. com/news/2018/mar/20/facebook-data-cambridge-analytica-sandy-parakilas, Ex. 7.  Internal documents demonstrate other instances of [...]’s day to day involvement.  For instance, [...] [Redacted].  See FB-CA-MDL-00185348, Ex. 8 at 5348 [Redacted].  [...] also [Redacted].  FB-CA-MDL-00172723, Ex. 9 at 2723-2729.  [...] was also [Redacted]  FB-CA-MDL-00174292, Ex. 10 at 4293.  His decision enabled [...] to build substantially more robust user profiles.  More generally, [...] [Redacted] FB-CA-MDL-00183209, Ex. 11 at 3210.  The same month, [Redacted] FB-CA-MDL-01681584, Ex. 12 at 1584.  [Redacted]  Id.  Later internal documents show that [...] played a major role in [...]’s investigation and response to the 2018 [...] scandal—[Redacted].
[brief] Sat Below: HON.  [...], J.S.C  BRIEF ON BEHALF OF DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT  [...], Esq.  [...]  Attorneys for Defendant-Respondent  [...]  [...] [...]  [...]  [...]  On the Brief: [...], Esq.  Attorney ID# 0212819091  [...], Esq.  Attorney ID# 299122021  Date Submitted: November 26, 2024  TABLE OF CONTENTS
[brief] Despite the clearly limited and intermittent flow-path of the man-made agricultural ditch at issue, Appellant asserts that the selection of the culvert was nevertheless arbitrary as the Application failed to demonstrate that the culvert could not be constructed two feet below the insert, or that an artificial low-flow was not proposed or considered.  Again, Appellant misconstrues the record by assuming that the culvert interferes with an existing stream consisting of a “contiguous flow-path” that requires such measures to maintain its flowing characteristics.  Such conditions are not supported by the record, and therefore the [...]’s determination for the selection of the culvert is eminently reasonable, and not “arbitrary and capricious.
[brief] Similarly, [...]’s asserting there was not a deadline imposed in which [...] had to agree to the Terms and Conditions is just unreasonable nor realistic given the facts.  Presumably, whenever [...] uses her [...] application, her focus, just as it would be for any user, is to quickly secure a ride so she could get to wherever she needed to be.  Whether [...] actually imposes a deadline or not, [...]’s services create a deadline when its users are using its services to quickly obtain a ride to get to wherever they need to be at a certain time.
[brief] 25  Rule 1:20A-6 ....................................................................................................................  2, 3, 6, 11, 18, 19, 20, 23 Rule 1:36-3 .....................................................................................................................  21, 22, 25, 27 Rule 4:49 ..........................................................................................................................  16  Rule 4:67 .......................................................................................................................... 12, 24 Rule 6:2-3(d) ...................................................................................................................  5, 10, 26  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
[brief] The Ricci Act simply required that the Board provide notice within thirty days of its enactment, without specifying in what manner.  The Board complied with this requirement when it posted information about the Ricci Act on its website.  [...] identifies no authority suggesting that the Division’s use of its website to fulfill this notice requirement was inadequate.  Even though the Division satisfied the only notice requirement under the Ricci Act through the website posting, it went above and beyond to provide additional notice to its members through other means.
[brief] Moreover, the trial court’s diminished standard is a far cry from the preponderance of evidence standard plaintiffs must satisfy at trial, which the court must consider.  See R. 4:46-2; Vizzoni v. B.M.D., 459 N.J. Super. 554, 567 (App. Div. 2019) (“The motion court must analyze the record in light of the substantive standard and burden of proof that a factfinder would apply in the event that the case were tried. ” (quoting Globe Motor Co. v. Igdalev, 225 N.J. 469, 480 (2016)).  “[N]either the motion court nor an appellate court can ignore the elements of the cause of action or the evidential standard governing the cause of action. ”  Ibid. (quoting Globe Motor, 225 N.J. at 480).  Furthermore, a court’s summary judgment decision must be based on “reasonable conclusions a rational jury can draw from the evidence. ”  Brill, 142 N.J. at 535.  Lowering the bar for plaintiffs to survive summary judgment will undoubtedly invite more litigation, thus adding additional pressure to already stressed judicial resources and forcing manufacturing and life sciences companies to devote funds to defending lawsuits that would be better spent on research and development of life-saving and life-improving products.  Undoubtedly, the specter of gratuitous litigation will discourage companies from investing in New Jersey.  Indeed, as explained above, the PLA was enacted to rein in product liability litigation in this State— particularly lawsuits involving pharmaceutical and other FDA-regulated manufacturers—but rulings like the one at issue here undermine the Legislature’s intent by greatly weighting the scales in favor of plaintiffs.
[directive] It is on the Select Month -, of of of  The acquittee is hereby committed to the custody the Commissioner the Department 1. Health pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:4-8 and N.J.S.A. 2C:4-5( c ), pending medical clearance for of admission which shall be coordinated with the Department Health; and 2.  The professional staff shall determine pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:4-8(b) whether or not the NGRI acquittee may be able to be released to the community, with or without conditions, or including supervision, without posing an undue danger to self, others, property; and by Form Promulgated Directive #21-20 (08/05/2020), [...] (KROL Order 2)  The professional staff shall determine pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:4-8(b)(3) whether or not the 3. NGRI acquittee requires inpatient hospitalization to treat the acquittee's condition; and The Prosecutor's Office shall immediately forward all relevant discovery materials, including 4. but not limited to the charges against the acquittee, to this Judge's team leader.
[directive] If you are not certain whether you should excuse yourself from a case, you are required to inform the [Standard Grand Jury Charge] [Promulgated by Directive #12-06 (July 20, 2006)] Page 3 of 7 prosecutor, and a judge will decide whether you should hear that case.  If disqualified, you may return to hear other cases.  The Grand Jury must arrive at its conclusions without any outside intervention, including the intervention of the prosecutor, who may not participate in your deliberations or express views on questions of fact.  The prosecutor may not comment on the weight or sufficiency of evidence or attempt to influence or direct your findings.
[brief] [...] recognizes that Empower held a “combination” of the “relative culpability” approach and the “time necessary to litigate” approaches can be used.  Empower, 453 N.J. Super. 565, 584.  While this combination approach could have been the trial court’s intention, the calculation actually employed by the court was, respectfully, “arbitrary” and “capricious,” and considered neither [...]’s actual culpability nor time spent actually litigating issues relevant to the [...] policy.  Id.  The court uncritically accepted [...]’s calculations and did not evaluate [...]’s invoices to reduce the award for [...]’s lack of success, or to reduce the award for time spent in litigation on matters unrelated to [...].  Id. at 288.  The court also did not employ any figures relevant to “the level of responsibility of each entity. ”  Id. at 287.  Accordingly, [...] respectfully submits that the trial court’s Final Judgment Order must be vacated with respect to the award of fees to [...].