ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Yet, [...] has made the conscious decision to maintain its Terms and Conditions, including its Arbitration Agreement, in English, even when the application is set to Spanish, knowing that the vital documents would require translation.  Pa600; 1T18:21-25.  These actions by [...] are akin to a “bait and switch” tactic.  It would be unconscionable to hold the Terms and Conditions of [...], which binds users to arbitration, enforceable, where [...] took advantage of [...]’s lack of English literacy and sophistication, instead of providing the Terms in her native language.  Pa431; Pa600.  For argument’s sake, if this Court found the trial court did not err in relying on a persuasive decision over a binding decision, the trial court also erred when it found Morales analogous to the present case.
[brief] Therefore, while the plaintiff’s prior falls or medical conditions may have been potentially relevant to her the happening of her fall in the [...] store or her injuries, expert medical testimony was required to show this “logical relationship”.  *Allendorf*, 266 N.J. Super. at 672.  No such expert testimony was presented at trial in this matter.  It is a well-established rule of law that “a jury should not be allowed to speculate without the aid of expert testimony in an area where laypersons could not be expected to have sufficient knowledge or experience. ”  *Kelly v. Berlin*, 300 N.J. Super. 256, 268 (App. Div. 1997); see also; *State v. Doriguzzi*, 334 N.J. Super. 530, 538 (App. Div. 2000).  Furthermore, the interpretation of medical and/or scientific data, as well as, establishing the relationship, if any, between the data and a particular case is the exclusive function of a qualified expert witness.  *Grassi v. Johns-Manville Corp.*, 248 N.J. Super. 446, 455 (App. Div. 1991).  Following this basic rule of law, the proper test for determining whether a subject requires expert testimony is whether the subject at issue “is so esoteric that jurors of common judgment and experience cannot form a valid judgment” as to the facts in issue.
[brief] Although not explicitly authorized by the case management order, [...] served discovery on [...], which [...] answered only in part while objecting to most of the requests.  [...] served its pre-filed testimony with exhibits beginning on October 13, 2020.  [...] served rebuttal testimony on April 3, 2020.  Ha180.  [...] then served discovery on the rebuttal testimony, which [...] answered only in part while objecting to most of the requests.  [...] filed a motion to compel answers to its discovery on June 30, 2020, Ha180, but the ALJ did not act on it until October 7, 2020, Ha166, shortly before the start of the hearings.  He gave no reason for the delay.  Virtual hearings were held on October 15, 17, 20, 21, 22, and 23, 2020, and the ALJ declared the record closed effective January 19, 2021.
[brief] One pair of out-of-state cases, however, which is conspicuously absent from the Board’s appeal is Belmont I and Belmont II.  [...]’s decision below substantially approved [...]’s analysis of these cases, including [...]’s consideration of the announced status of “silent bargaining representatives. ” (Pa241-Pa242).  [...] explained that in Belmont II, as is also the case here, the union had given the board of education notice before the scheduled meetings that its negotiations team would have both “speaking representatives” and “silent representatives” who would though still be actively involved in the negotiations.  Accordingly, [...] concluded that the Board’s refusal here to negotiate before the [...]’s Bargaining Council to have been inappropriate as consistent with Belmont II.  (Pa241-Pa242).  Despite the Board’s protests, there is no basis to conclude that the NJEERA places broad limitations on a labor organization’s right to determine the composition of its negotiations team, including the size of its team.  Accordingly, [...] correctly held that the NJEERA does not prevent the [...] from including its Bargaining Council, open to its full membership, to participate in bargaining sessions as part of the [...]’s negotiations team.  Thus, the Appellate Division must find that [...] acted reasonably in concluding that the [...] did not violate the NJEERA in attempting to include its Bargaining Council as part of its negotiations team.  D.
[brief] ”  407 F. Supp. 2d 351, 374 (D. Mass. 2006).  Following Green and Monteiro, courts around the country have taken a closer look at firearm toolmark identification expert testimony and have started prohibiting experts from opining that ammunition definitively came from a specific gun.  See New York v. Ross, 129 N.Y.S.3d 629, 642 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2020) (holding that a firearms examiner “may not opine on the significance of any marks other than class characteristics, as the reliability of that practice in the relevant scientific community as a whole has not been established.
[brief] [...] contended that the --- 1  As they are intertwined, they are combined for the convenience of the Court.  Borough's action in awarding the resolution of support to [...] was arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable, because the Borough failed to properly apply the Borough's own objective criteria as set forth in its own ordinances, and instead was biased and subjective in that regard.  [...] further contended that the Borough improperly approved [...]'s application, even though a representative of [...] failed to sign the required certification to the veracity of the documents and information submitted within [...]'s application, and instead rejected [...]'s application for a resolution of support.  Defendant [...] contended that the Borough's review of its application was procedurally appropriate, and the grant of the Resolution of Support to [...] was not arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable, as it was supported by sufficient credible evidence in the record.  The Borough likewise contended that the action taken by the Borough Council following its independent consideration of the applications, which resulted in a 5-1 bipartisan vote with respect to the award of a Resolution of Support for a Class 5 cannabis retailer license in its Highway Commercial District to [...], was in accordance with applicable law and was supported by substantial, credible evidence in the municipal record established before the Borough.
[brief] [...] acknowledged that the [...] was hiring [...] for engineering services.  (Pa 2230)  (T46:21-35)  As noted by [...]:  Q.  So that based upon your review of the documents that were provided both [...] and [...] were providing engineering services?  A.  That was what the contract required, Yes.  (Pa2230)(T46:21-25)  [...] acknowledged that [...] was the person in “Responsible Charge”.  (Pa 2238)  Pursuant to N.J.A.C 1 13:40-9.1(a)  A licensee in responsible charge of an engineering project shall be a competent professional engineer who provides regular and effective supervision through personal direction to, and quality control over, the efforts of subordinates of the licensee that directly and materially affect the quality and competence of engineering work rendered by the licensee.  Pursuant to N.J.A.C. 1340-10.2 (f)  Failure by a licensee in responsible charge to render regular and effective supervision pursuant to N.J.A.C.  13:40-9.1 shall constitute professional misconduct.  Here, Appellant alleges that was ineffective supervision of the project which led to the injury in question.  Per the New Jersey Administrative Code, the failure to provide regular and effective supervision constitutes professional misconduct.  The breach of any such licensee and his employer thus requires an AOM.  2.
[brief] After a complete and thorough review, [...] came to the following opinions to a reasonable degree of medical certainty:  A.  The November 6, 2018 Ozurdex injection resulted in a silicone particulate being unintentionally dispensed from the defective actuator; B.  The silicone particulate likely migrated to the anterior chamber along with the Ozurdex steroid pellet; C.  The defective Ozurdex with silicone particulate being injected into [...]’s left eye likely incited retinal detachment which occurred within a week of treatment.
[brief] See Berger v. Paterson Veterans Taxi, 244 N.J. Super. 200 (App. Div. 1990).  “[A]lthough Rule 6:2-3 authorizes service by mail, it does not preclude competent evidence to rebut the presumption of receipt. ”  Wiss & Bouregy, P.C. v. Bisceglie, No. A-3228-15T3, 2017 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 619, at *12 (App. Div. Mar. 13, 2017).  “It would not be ‘[c]onsistent with due process of law,’ see Rule 6:2-3(d)(4), if, notwithstanding court mailing, neither delivery nor actual notice was accomplished—at least where the intended recipient did not affirmatively refuse delivery. ”  Id. at *12-13.  In the case at bar, [...] was not served with the Complaint.
[brief] (135Pa-139Pa.)  [...] practices in the specialty of orthopedic surgery, and not in [...]’s subspecialty field of hematology.  (8Pa; 12Pa)  [...] had previously admitted in a March 9, 2021, Affidavit of Merit that “I cannot expertly critique non-Orthopedic services. ”  (10Pa.)  When plaintiff’s attorney filed a motion to vacate the March 17, 2023, Order denying reconsideration, he again failed to identify any circumstances which had prevented him from obtaining any expert report regarding [...].  (17a-20a.)  Plaintiff’s attorney only referred to prior certification of orthopedic surgeon, [...], and stated that “Plaintiff’s expert is attempting\(^4\) to provide the most detained and comprehensive report as possible …” (17a-20a at ¶¶ 8, 14.)  Plaintiff’s attorney also admitted, in his certification to the Court and his letter brief, to a “misstep” and “oversight” in not seeking an extension of discovery before the discovery period ended.  (19a at ¶ 12; 22a-24a.)  Additional facts relevant to this appeal are set forth in the Procedural History Relevant to Defendant [...], \textit{supra}, and are incorporated here by reference.
[brief] In that case, a CI with demonstrated veracity informed police that the defendant, who makes frequent trips to Long Branch to distribute CDS, would be distributing CDS later that day.  In addition to providing “particularized information concerning defendant,” including defendant's name, address, physical description, as well as the make, model and license tag number of defendant's car, the CI provided hard-to-know, predictive facts: that "defendant would be leaving his home at 4:30 p.m. to make a marijuana delivery" and "would be carrying the drugs in a laundry tote bag."  Id. at 561.  In this case, about three weeks prior to the stop, the CI informed the detectives that [...] travels to New York to buy drugs.  The CI provided no other details: they did not say where in New York City [...] gets drugs, how often [...] goes to New York for drugs, or that [...] travels to New York on a particular day or time.  (Pa 7; 1T 45-16 to 46-16)  The CI did not tell the detectives about any upcoming trips to New York that [...] had planned, let alone that he had a trip planned for December 17, 2021.
[brief] The OAL hearing took place over the course of six days in October 2020.  (Aa62).  [...] submitted testimony from [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], and [...].  (Aa95).  Sanders, Panaccione, and Wyckoff, individually and collectively as a panel (hereinafter “panel”), testified as to the need for [...]’s proposed Project.  The panel testimony established that, with BPU approval, [...] constructed a 16-inch transmission line in 2012 to replace an existing 10-inch line due to its age and to comply with federal pipeline integrity regulations.  (Aa810-11; 1T132:10-20; 1T133:25-134:22).  Due to the transmission line replacement, the panel testified that installing the proposed regulator station was necessary to significantly reduce the pressure of transported natural gas between the transmission and distribution systems in a safe, adequate, and reliable manner and deliver natural gas to [...] customers in [...] and nearby areas.  (Aa772-73; 1T132:10-133:13).  According to the panel, [...] installed a temporary regulator station at the time the transmission line was replaced.  (1T135:18-25; Aa773).  However, the panel noted that the temporary station could not be equipped with a heating unit, and consequently, the regulator and its related equipment faced icing.  --- 6
[brief] The only record of the arguments made are contained in the briefs submitted to the arbitrator.  On August 4, 2022, the arbitrator denied Plaintiff’s request for modification/clarification because “to award lump sums that do not correlate to CPT codes, etc. is to ask the [arbitrator] to craft an award based upon pure speculation. ”  Pca149.  On November 9, 2022, an appellate panel of arbitrators affirmed the Award.\(^4\) Pca151-159.  On December 19, 2022, Plaintiff appealed the arbitration award to the Law Division.
[brief] ”  March 7th Order, par. 2, needs to be corrected to $1,946.56 from $2,039.53.  Judge disregarded irrefutable facts in my Nov. 4, 2022 Cert., par. 9-12 (305a-307a).  [...]’s fees from March 25 to May 4, ‘22 for Intermediate Accounting should be “corrected to $16,575, which is their invoice for $17,135.50 hourly work minus $560.5 hourly total for [...] in July [work not related to May filed Accounting].  Court should NOT have approved the requested $17,649.57, which also had $514.07 administrative fee [based on slapping 3% administrative charge, which Roth approved w/o [...], on invoice totals.  My Certification noted they also had an administrative charge of $87.5 for delivering the Accounting to [...]]”.  So, billing was double dipping with administrative fees of $87.5 (acceptable) and $514.07 (not acceptable).  Conclusions
[brief] A residential property owner does not have a separate obligation to maintain the sidewalk.  I understand the plaintiff is arguing there is a municipal ordinance that places the obligation on the property owner to address or bring to their attention problems with the sidewalk.  However, the case law is pretty clear, and it’s -- I don’t have it in front of me.  I’m not even give the cite to (indiscernible) standard that that -- that -- those type of municipal ordinances does not then convert the obligation to deal with the problem into a duty to third parties.  It doesn’t create liability for residential property owners.  It just shifts the burden of trying to deal with it and the cost to the property owners.  So, that doesn’t create any potential claim for the plaintiff.  The municipal ordinance that’s in place either.  So, for all of those reasons, I am going to dismiss plaintiff’s complaint.
[brief] In 2015, seventeen-year-old [...] participated in a robbery during which his codefendants fatally shot one of the robbery victims.  At the time of his arrest, [...] had minimal experience with the criminal justice system.  He was tried separately from his codefendants and sentenced to a term of 55 years of incarceration with more than 43 years of parole ineligibility.  About a month later, his adult co-defendant was sentenced to 17 years’ incarceration with a 14 period of parole ineligibility after entering a plea agreement.  Pursuant to State v. Zuber, 227 N.J. 422 (2017), [...] was granted a resentencing to assess mitigating factors associated with youth in determining whether he is among the rarest of children for whom a lifetime in prison is warranted.  By the time of his resentencing, 28-year-old [...] had demonstrated tremendous personal growth.  He had accepted responsibility for his conduct, maintained a spotless prison record, and taken every educational and rehabilitative program available to him.  Although the court found [...] clearly capable of rehabilitation, it did not provide any meaningful relief, imposing an aggregate sentence of forty-five years with more than forty-one years of parole ineligibility.  Because [...]’s resentencing in no way resembled what is required by Zuber, a remand for resentencing is required.  PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[brief] In determining whether reasonable suspicion exists, a court must consider 'the totality of the circumstances -- the whole picture.'"  *State v. Stovall*, 170 *N.J.* 346, 361 (2002) (quoting *United States v. Cortez*, 449 U.S. 411, 417, 101 *S. Ct.* 690 (1981)).  To appropriately view the "whole picture," he Court must not engage in a "divide-and-conquer" analysis by looking at each fact in isolation.  *District of Columbia v. Wesby*, 583 *U.S.* __, 138 S.  Ct. 577, 588 (2018).  The reasonable suspicion inquiry also considers the officers' background and training, and permits them "to draw on their own experience and specialized training to make inferences from and deductions about the cumulative information available to them that 'might well elude an untrained person.'"  *United States v.* Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273, 122 S. Ct. 744 (2002) (quoting Cortez, 449 U.S. at 418).  State v. Nelson, 237 N.J. 540, 554-555 (2019).
[brief] ”  Krzykalski v. Tindall, 232 N.J. 525, 537 (2018).  Indeed, “[t]he plain language of the statute requires an apportionment of fault between tortfeasors, without exception, and regardless of whether a tortfeasor is named as a party in the action. ”  Maison v. New Jersey Transit Corp., 245 N.J. 270, 307 (2021).  In 2001, this Court imposed a significant limitation on N.J.S.A. 2A:15-5.3(a.).
[brief] *State v. Reddish*, 181 N.J. 553, 608 (2004)(quotations omitted).  The inherent danger of admitting such evidence is that the jury may convict a defendant based on their perception that he or she is a “bad person,” as opposed to guilty of the offense charged.  *State v. Skinner*, 218 N. J. 496, 514 (2014).  Based on this potential for prejudice, “[o]ther-crimes evidence thus necessitates a more searching inquiry than that required by N.J.R.E. 403[,]” which precludes evidence “only if the risk of undue prejudice substantially outweighs its probative value. ”  Reddish, 181 N.J. at 608 (emphasis in original).  a.  Relevance to Material Issue in Genuine Dispute  The first prong of the Cofield analysis mandates that the evidence of a prior bad act, crime, or wrong must be relevant to material issue which is genuinely disputed in the case.  State v. Skinner, 218 N.J. 496, 515 (2014).
[brief] **New Jersey law does not support a distinction between the date of the verdict and the judgment of acquittal to determine the date of the favorable termination of the underlying criminal proceeding. **  In a highly favorable and analogous context, New Jersey has decidedly addressed the meaning of “favorable termination. ”  *In the Matter of Gauthier*, 461 N.J. Super. 507, 516 (App. Div. 2019) held that pre-trial intervention was unavailable to a criminal defendant, as such a diversionary program could not be regarded “as the equivalent of a judgment of acquittal or an otherwise favorable termination of the criminal proceeding. ”  Id. (quoting Thomas v. New Jersey Institute of Technology, 178 N.J. Super. 60, 62 (Law Div. 1981)) (emphasis supplied).  In denying the defendant’s application, the court pointedly used the term “judgment of acquittal” interchangeably with “favorable termination. ”  Id.  The trial court utterly ignored this decision, as well as a more recent opinion that specifically held that “favorable termination” occurred on the date when the court issued orders of dismissal of the complaint-summonses.  [...] & [...] v. [...], 2021 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 820 at *19 (App. Div. Feb. 2, 2021).
[brief] Similarly, the Statute of Limitations for claims made pursuant to the New Jersey Civil Rights Act is two (2) years.  See, e.g., Smith v. Datla, 451 N.J. Super. 82, 99 (App. Div. 2017) (“We find that claims…brought under LAD, NJCRA, and Section 1983…are subject to a two-year statute of limitations. ”).  This comports with New Jersey law which states in pertinent part:  ...every action at law for an injury to the person caused by the wrongful act, neglect or default of any person within this State shall be commenced within two years next after the cause of any such action shall have accrued…  N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2(a) (emphasis added); see also N.J.S.A. 10:6-2(a) (“If a person…subjects or causes to be subjected any other person…”).  Accordingly, since the New Jersey Civil Rights Act has a two (2) year  Statute of Limitations  Plaintiff was again required to file his Complaint on or before August 5, 2021.  Plaintiff failed to do so and thus his Complaint was properly dismissed by the Court Below as time barred.
[brief] *N.J.S.A.* 40:55D-10.3.  The Court in *Dunbar* confirmed that “[d]eterminations as to the precise contents of an ‘application for development’ are . . . left to the municipalities, in accordance with the Legislature’s general exercise of its ‘constitutional authority to delegate to municipalities the police power to enact ordinances governing’ land use ‘through the passage of the [MLUL].’”  *Id.* at 561 (quoting *388 Route 22 Readington Realty Holdings, LLC v. Twp. of Readington*, 221 N.J. 318, 333 (2015)).  [...]’s cannabis zoning ordinance at Section 196.33.1(M) specifies the items required for approval of a cannabis site plan, and the [...] application contains a checklist.  The application packet that the [...] receives addresses each and every one of the elements required in order for the [...] to give its own approval of the cannabis site plan, as prescribed by [...]’s ordinances.  Upon review of [...]’ application, the [...] deemed the application for development complete, held a hearing, and provided its statutorily prescribed approval.  That the Planning Board required additional items before granting conditional use approval is irrelevant.  See Dunbar, 233 N.J. at 562 (an application is not rendered “incomplete” simply because a municipality requires “submission of additional information not specified in the ordinance.  . . ”)  The only relevant inquiry is whether a complete application for development was submitted to a municipal agency.
[brief] In order to achieve the ECD’s goals of preventing the fragmentation of litigation, judicial efficiency, and fairness to the parties involved, [...] is entitled to injunctive relief barring [...] from asserting further claims against [...] that are borne out of the same factual nexus—that is, the parties’ relationship created under PTA.  Specifically, here, the factual nexus is the PTA and all the projects transferred thereunder.  Not only did the PTA require [...] to pay [...] installments to [...], but (for example) Section 1.5 of the PTA set a series of transactions into motion, requiring that “ARC shall serve as a subcontractor of [...] with respect to” each of the PTA’s five Backlog Projects.