ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] 7.7  Restrictions on Using BWCs Surreptitiously or to Gather Intelligence Information on First Amendment Protected Activity.  A BWC shall not be used surreptitiously.  Additionally, a BWC shall not be used to gather intelligence information based on First Amendment protected speech, associations, or religion, or to record activity that is unrelated to a response to a call for service or a law enforcement or investigative encounter between a law enforcement officer and a member of the public, provided that nothing in this subsection shall be construed to prohibit activation of video and audio recording functions of a BWC as authorized under the law or this Policy.  BODY
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[brief] Accordingly, the sentencing goal of deterrence cannot and does not support the imposition of a consecutive sentence.  2.  Because the age-crime curve demonstrates that the risk of recidivism declines dramatically as age increases and is exceptionally low at the age that [...] will complete his twenty-year NERA sentence, the goal of incapacitation cannot justify imposing a consecutive sentence.  The sentencing goal of incapacitation is held to further public safety by reducing crime through the physical separation of convicted offenders from the rest of society.  National Research Council, The Growth of Incarceration at 131, 140.  While measuring the precise impact of increased incarceration on the reduction of crime is an area with significant disagreement, see id. at 140-41, this Court need not resolve that disagreement here.
[brief] ”  In re Mirena, 202 F. Supp. 3d at 323.  Moreover, public policy principles prohibit elevating statements in such recall documents to the status of evidentiary admissions because that “would chill free and frank discussion by manufacturers of drugs or devices. ”  *Id.* at 320.  That is why “no court has held that admissions [in recall documents] can substitute for required expert testimony, and this Court [should] not be the first. ”  *Id.*  In any event, [...] misinterprets the recall document.  He thinks “sensitive patients” refers to patients with eye problems, when it actually refers to patients with *sensitivity to silicone*.  (Da0452, p. 39)  [...] does not say Plaintiff is sensitive to silicone—nor could he given her experience for more than a decade with the silicone-coated Retisert® implant 10-times larger than a 300-micron particulate.  Because [...] misconstrued the sole foundation for his assumption that the phantom silicone particulate is capable of causing inflammation, his opinion is untethered to the facts, unreliable, and should have been excluded.  *E.g.*, *Townsend*, 221 N.J. at 57-58 (affirming exclusion of expert opinion that *diverged* from the evidence); *Vuocolo*, 240 N.J. Super. at 299 (“It seems universally agreed that an expert medical opinion as to the cause…is inadmissible if it is solely an unsupported conclusion of the witness, since…an opinion must have reference to the material facts of the case as reflected by the --- 18 *Accord Lowery v. Sanofi-Aventis LLC*, 535 F. Supp. 3d 1157, 1172 n.12 (N.D. Ala. 2021); *Beyer v. Anchor Insulation Co.*, 238 F. Supp. 3d 270, 283 (D. Conn. 2017). evidence.
[brief] *Pomerantz Paper Corp. v. New Cmty. Corp.*, 207 N.J. 344, 372 (2011) (experts offer inadmissible net opinions if they “cannot offer objective support…but testif[y] only to a view about a standard that is ‘personal’”); Kemp ex rel. Wright v. State, 174 N.J. 412, 427 (2002) (explaining New Jersey courts must disallow experts’ “unsubstantiated personal beliefs”); Vinci v. Clifton Bd. of Educ., 2012 WL 5869576, at *5 (N.J. Super. App. Div. Nov. 21, 2012) (affirming exclusion of expert’s “personal opinion” without “any source or authority for that conclusion”); see also Moody v. Gen. Mills, Inc., 2006 WL 6872309, at *1 (D.N.J. Feb. 9, 2006) (“various courts have noted that reliance on a temporal relationship in the absence of scientific studies, authoritative research or peer review is insufficient to constitute a reliable opinion”) (collecting cases).  Regardless, the evidence does not support the experts’ assumption that the only difference in the November 6, 2018 Ozurdex® treatment was that it came from a recalled lot.  E.g., Townsend v. Pierre, 221 N.J. 36, 57-58 (2015) (affirming exclusion of opinion not supported by evidence); Vuocolo v. Diamond Shamrock Chemicals Co., 240 N.J. Super. 289, 299 (Ct. App. 1990) (“Historically, courts have refused to admit expert medical testimony…unsupported by the evidence. ”).  As just discussed (see Section III(B)(2)(b)), the record reveals numerous material differences between this and Plaintiff’s prior Ozurdex® injections that likely could have caused Plaintiff’s injuries, with which Plaintiff’s own experts agree.  Her experts’ “net opinions” that “fail to negative [those] other possible causes”—like the Retisert® implant, the continued progression of her chronic eye disease, and her refusal to stop smoking—are thus insufficient to prove a manufacturing defect.  *Vuocolo*, 240 N.J. Super. at 300; see also *Magistrini v. One Hour Martinizing Dry Cleaning*, 180 F. Supp. 2d 584, 610 (D.N.J. 2002) (excluding opinion chemical caused cancer, where expert acknowledged smoking could also be a cause of the cancer but could not explain how he ruled it out).  Allowing Plaintiff’s untenable manufacturing defect claim to proceed to trial *without any proof*—direct, expert, or circumstantial—of a defect in the specific product used in Plaintiff’s procedure constitutes a manifest injustice this Court should immediately correct.  *E.g.*, *Davis*, 219 N.J. at 401 (directing defense judgment because expert had *no objective evidence* to support his standard, *only his personal opinion*); *Germann v. Matriss*, 55 N.J. 193, 208-09 (1970).  **IV.
[brief] Plaintiff also submits this reply brief in further support of Plaintiff’s appeal of the March 11, 2024 Order ("March 11 Order"), which granted Defendant’s fee application in the amount of $119,256.40.  Plaintiff is entitled to JNOV, or, at a minimum, to a new trial, and the reversal of the March 11 Order granting Defendant’s fee application, to prevent a miscarriage of justice because the jury’s verdict was against the weight of the evidence and reasonable minds could not differ as to Plaintiff’s entitlement to judgment against Defendant.
[brief] Respectfully submitted, [...]  Attorneys for Respondents [...] and [...] /s/ [...] ________________________________  [...]  Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough LLP [...]  Phone: [...]  [...]  CERTIFICATIONS OF SERVICE  I hereby certify that on December 20, 2024, I served a copy of Brief of Respondents [...] and [...] on all counsel of record via the Court’s electronic filing system.  [...]  Attorneys for Respondents, [...] and [...] /s/ [...]  [...]  Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough, LLP  [...]  Phone: [...]  Dated: December 20, 2024  Elyse.Cohen@nelsonmullins.
[directive] 1.2  Applicabili _ty of Guidelines  These Guidelines apply to all law enforcement agencies that operate under the authority of the laws of the State of New Jersey that own or operate one or more ALPRs, that collect and maintain ALPR data, and/or that receive or are provided access to ALPR data collected by another agency.  1.3  Non-Enforceability_ of Rights by Third Parties  These Guidelines are issued pursuant to the Attorney General’s authority under the Criminal Justice Act of 1970, N.J.S.A. 52:17B-97 to ensure the uniform and efficient enforcement of et seq., the laws.  These Guidelines impose limitations on the exercise of law enforcement discretion and the use of and access to ALPR-related data that may extend beyond the requirements of the United States and New Jersey Constitutions, and federal and state statutory law.  Nothing in these Guidelines should be construed in any way to create any rights beyond those established under the Constitutions, statutes, and regulations of the United States and the State of New Jersey.  The provisions of these Guidelines are intended to be implemented and enforced by law enforcement agencies that possess or use ALPRs, the [...], the County Prosecutors, and the [...], and these provisions do not create any rights that may be enforced by any other persons or entities.
[brief] From an objective perspective, then, [...]’s and [...]’s behavior was “not reasonably more consistent with guilt than innocence. ”  See Alessi, 240 N.J. at 522.  See also State v. Kuhn, 213 N.J. Super. 275, 282 (App. Div. 1986) (noting that “not wish[ing] to be in the proximity of police” is not unlawful).  It is noteworthy that, had [...] and [...] indeed accessed [...]’s storage unit, police presumably would have characterized such behavior as similarly suspicious.  As our Supreme Court has explained, police cannot have it both ways when it comes to a suspect’s ambiguous behavior.  See Nyema, 249 N.J. at 533-534.  Otherwise, “whatever individuals may do -- whether they do nothing, something, or anything in between -- the behavior can be argued to be suspicious.
[brief] The Plaintiff shamelessly argues that the Trial Court “effectively rewrote this section of the contract” while at the same time attempting to do the same, stating that the contract should have required a deed from “[...] to Plaintiff” rather than from [...] and [...] to [...].  While [...] agrees that it is “not the court’s role to remake and adjust the parties’ contract,” that is plainly not what occurred here.  It is also telling that Plaintiff fails to enumerate the elements of a breach of contract claim here just as it did below in the Trial Court.  At the same, the reason for why is obvious: [...] cannot demonstrate any of the elements based on the record.  Most critically, [...] cannot meet the first element of this claim and completely ignores that the “Commitment of Title Insurance” was on its face not a valid, binding contract.  As [...] made clear, which is supported by the Trial Court’s opinion, the document speaks for itself and clearly establishes that the Commitment for Title insurance was an offer to provide title insurance and subject to various conditions precedent including – most critically – that [...] obtain title from the seller.
[brief] A.  Plaintiff is Hired By Defendants and Later Promoted  On or about July 23, 2003, Plaintiff, [...], accepted a position as an associate with Defendant [...] (or simply “Firm”), which was then called [...]  Defendant [...] was founded by [...] in or around 1982.  In general, the Firm represents plaintiffs in personal injury litigation.  (Da36), (First Amended Verified Complaint), at ¶¶ 6-7.  Defendant [...] has been called by various different names.  Until Gallardo’s sudden termination on February 15, 2023, [...] was known as [...] Gallardo Gonzalez & Winograd.  As of February 15, 2023, it is known as [...] Gonzalez Winograd L.L.P. Da36, ¶ 8.  It has six offices in New Jersey as well as two offices in New York.  Id., ¶ 9.  In or around 2007, Plaintiff was named a junior partner in [...], a promotion that did not involve Plaintiff receiving or purchasing an equity interest in the firm.
[brief] Sometime before July 25, 2008, [...] sent a copy of [...]’s preliminary (unrevised) 4/11/05 grading plan to its surveyor [...] ([...]) to solicit a cost estimate for surveying work on the project.  (Pa92 at ¶15)  [...] says the 4/11/05 [...] plan was the only plan he had at that time.  (Id.)  Rigg sent [...] a proposal for surveying work on the project dated “July 25, 2008, Revised 12/02/2008)” (Pa96).  On October 7, 2008, [...] sent [...] and [...] its revised site plan which included the grading plan with corrected elevations (Pa386 at ¶18; Pa403).  On November 3, 2008, [...] sent Morris Plains Engineer [...], [...] and [...] a letter with copies of its original 4/11/05 grading plan and its revised, corrected grading plan for the project.  (Pa404)  [...] engineer [...] explained:  "As you are aware based on our discussions, it appears that the main finished floor of the existing building is approximately 3' higher than that which was originally identified in the Boundary and Topographical Survey.  (Pa404)  At this time, we have regraded the site maintaining the same site layout …  Please note that we have attempted to highlight the major changes to facilitate your review of the enclosed plans."  (Pa404)  On December 2, 2008, Rigg submitted to [...] a revised proposal for surveying work on the job, including staking of all elevations for grading.  (Pa96).  On January 26, 2009, the [...] approved the new grading plan with revised elevations.
[brief] DIVISION CIVIL ACTION DOCKET NO. [...]  SAT BELOW: Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Gen. Equity Venue: Bergen County Docket No. [...]  Hon. [...], J.S.C. DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS’ BRIEF [...]  [...], Esq. - 006521999  Park 80 West – Plaza One 250 Pehle Avenue, Suite 401  Saddle Brook, New Jersey 07663  Tel.: [...]  Fax: [...]  [...]  Attorneys for Defendants-Respondents  [...] and [...]  On the Brief: [...], Esq. - 239692017  Submitted: July 3, 2024  Amended: July 22, 2024  TABLE OF CONTENTS