ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] 16  POINT II  THE TRIAL COURT'S ORDER DISMISSING COUNTS I-III OF PLAINTIFF'S SECOND AMENDED  COMPLAINT SHOULD BE AFFIRMED SINCE THE COURT CORRECTLY FOUND THAT PLAINTIFF FAILED TO STATE A CLAIM OF DISABILITY  DISCRIMINATION/FAILURE TO ACCOMMODATE DISABILITY  ........  17 POINT III  THE TRIAL COURT APPROPRIATELY DISMISSED  COUNT IV OF PLAINTIFF'S SECOND AMENDED  COMPLAINT  SINCE THE COURT CORRECTLY FOUND THAT PLAINTIFF FAILED TO STATE A CLAIM OF DISABILITY  DISCRIMINATION/FAILURE TO ACCOMMODATE DISABILITY  .........................  28 POINT IV  PLAINTIFF’S ARGUMENTS THAT THE TRIAL COURT MISCONSTRUED ITS CLAIMS ARE FALSE BUT EVEN IF ITS DIRECT EVIDENCE ARGUMENTS ARE CONSIDERED THEY STILL DO NOT SUPPORT PLAINTIFF’S CLAIM OF ADEQUACY OF THE COMPLAINT  ..................................................  29 POINT V TO THE EXTENT
[brief] Moreover, the 1967 proposed subdivision intended an exchange of the Strip and Bump properties.  However, the Plaintiff purchased the Bump in 1994 from [...], a predecessor in the chain of title for Defendant’s property and a Grantor in the 1971 deeds which the trial court assumed had effectuated the 1967 transfer.  Pa0105.  Finally, while the survey prepared by [...] on behalf of Defendant’s Grantors does not depict any encroachments, it also shows the width of Plaintiff’s property as 390.46’.  While this width exceeds the existing width of Plaintiff’s property according to the 1967 subdivision map, it must certainly include the Strip in its calculation.  Pa0107.  In addition, both experts testified that the unrecorded subdivision maps, marked as Exhibit J-40 at trial, would not have been located during a typical title search.  On Re-cross examination, the expert which the trial court preferred, [...], testified as follows:  Q.  Okay.  And is your understanding that a buyer takes subject to current land ordinances whether or not the buyer bothered to find out what affect they had on their use of the property?  A.  Could you – I’m sorry.  Could you repeat it, please?  Q.  A buyer – A. Yeah.  Q. --takes subject to current land ordinances, whether or not the buyer, in this case, either the [...] or the subsequent company, bothered to find out what affect they had on the use of the property?  A.  Yes, I agree with that.  Q.  Public record is available to a reasonable title – title insurer, correct?  A.  Yes.  Q. P – J—J-40 was not part of the public record, was it?  A.  J-40 was not part of the land records that are typically searched by title companies.  Title companies and title agencies rarely seek out ordinances for particular rulings.  Not never but rarely.  Similarly, Plaintiff’s expert testified that the Strip was definitively in the Plaintiff’s chain of title, that there was no history of the Strip in the Defendant’s chain of title prior to 1971, and that it would be unusual for a title company to have located the subdivision maps contained in J-40:
[brief] R. 2:10-2; U.S. Const. amends. VI, XIV; N.J. Const. art. I, ¶¶ 1, 9, 10.  Inchoate offenses — attempt, conspiracy, and solicitation — can only be committed purposely.  See State v. Harmon, 104 N.J. 189, 203 (1986) (noting that inchoate offenses “always presuppose a purpose to commit another crime”) (emphasis added).  The purposeful mens rea requirement applies to the conduct itself as well as the result of that conduct.  See Model Penal Code, § 5.03, “Criminal Conspiracy” (“The purpose requirement is meant to extend to result and conduct elements of the offense that is the object of the conspiracy. ”).  Thus, for example, the inchoate offenses of attempted murder and conspiracy to murder require that a defendant act with the specific purpose to cause the prohibited result.  As the Model Penal Code, on which New Jersey’s conspiracy statute is modeled, explains “if two persons plan to destroy a building by detonating a bomb, though they know and believe that there are inhabitants in the building who will be killed by the explosion, they are nevertheless guilty only of a conspiracy to destroy the building and not of a conspiracy to kill the inhabitants. ”  Model Penal Code Commentaries, § 5.03 at 407-08.  Knowledge of the result is insufficient; a defendant must specifically intend the prohibited result.
[directive] Wednesdays [...] (Joint) 0803 [...]  2nd & 4th  Monday 1st & 3rd Tuesday; 3rd [...] 0804 [...]  Monday [...] (Gloucester) 0805 [...]  4th Tuesday (Joint) [...] 0813 [...]  2nd Tuesday [...] 0806 [...]  Thursday [...] (Gloucester) 0807 [...] 2nd & 4th Thursday 1st, 3rd & 4th [...] 0809 [...] Wednesday 1st, 2nd & 3rd [...] 0810 [...] Monday/Thursday 1st, 2nd, 4th Tuesday; [...] (Gloucester) 0811 [...]
[brief] (Responding to [...]’s Argument at Point II(i) (Pb 28-29)).  (Raised Below: Da11-13)  [...] misconstrues a core element of [...]’s position.  Contrary to [...]’s assertion, [...]’s position does not rest on the contention that it was obligated to present a “defined acceptable estoppel certificate. ”  To the contrary, [...] was explicitly not “required” to present a defined Acceptable Estoppel.  “The failure of Seller to obtain an Acceptable Estoppel Certificate from the Required Tenant shall not be deemed a default by Seller. ”  (Da211).  Rather, as [...] directly articulated in its opening Brief, [...] obtaining an Acceptable Estoppel Certificate is simply a condition precedent to [...]’s obligation to close, and if it could not be obtained, [...] was permitted to terminate the PSA.  However, [...] asserts in its Brief, “Defendant misread the contract.  Nowhere is Defendant required to deliver the defined acceptable estoppel certificate.  Rather, the obligation was only to seek the defined estoppel certificate, and if obtained deliver it promptly upon receipt. ” (Pb 3).  This statement not only misconstrues [...]’s position but also ignores the core of [...]’s argument, which is entirely consistent with [...]’s own interpretation that [...] was not obligated to deliver an Acceptable Estoppel Certificate.  Instead, [...] has consistently maintained that failure to deliver an Acceptable Estoppel Certificate by the closing date does not constitute default but merely triggers the [...]’s sole remedy of termination.  III.
[directive] I.  Sexual Assault Forensic Evidence (SAFE) Kits and Drug Facilitated Sexual Assault (DFSA) Kits  SAFE kits and DFSA kits are specifically designed to aid in collection and preservation of specimens and other physical evidence yielded from the Sexual Assault Medical Forensic Exam (the Exam), which can be used in a criminal sexual assault investigation.  Evidence4  Under the Attorney General Guidelines for the Retention of and the New Jersey Sexual Rights,5 Assault Victim Bill of victims of sexual violence have the right to decide whether to report the crime and release the forensic evidence to law enforcement.
[brief] C.  [...]’s NJLAD Retaliation Claim was Both Legally and Factually Deficient.  Although the Court did not reach [...]’s discrete retaliation claim, it was ripe for dismissal at summary judgment because State Respondents took no adverse employment action against [...] for the reasons stated above (namely, they were not her supervisors and had nothing to do with her transfer to the Camden office).  (Pa332 at T32:9-19; Pa333 at T34:17-35:23; Pa571-Pa572 at T29:20-30:14; Pa685 at T121:14-17; Pa795-Pa796 at T41:12-42:8; Pa798 at T51:5-52:2; Da110-117; Da121-Da122; Da607).  As to [...]’s retaliatory harassment claim, she failed to demonstrate at summary judgment that any of the State Respondents subjected her to harassment because she filed an EEO and/or Superior Court Complaint.  In fact, the deposition transcripts in this matter reveal that the individual State Respondents and [...] had no significant interaction while she was assigned to the [...].  Ibid.  Moreover, after [...] filed her EEO complaint against [...], [...] immediately transferred [...] to [...]’s Camden office and she made no contemporaneous complaints of a hostile work environment against any [...] employees at the Camden office. (Pa366-Pa370; T169:23-T182:8; Da122).  For the foregoing reasons, the trial court’s dismissal of [...]’s NJLAD retaliation claim in its entirety on reconsideration should be affirmed.
[brief] Hojnowski v. Vans Skate Park, 187 N.J. 323, 343 (2006).  Accordingly, the New Jersey Supreme Court emphasized that it imposes "no greater burden on an arbitration agreement than on any other agreement waiving constitutional or statutory rights."  Id. at 447.  Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:23B-7(a), On filing a summary action with the court by a person showing an agreement to arbitrate and alleging another person's refusal to arbitrate pursuant to the agreement: (1) if the refusing party does not appear or does not oppose the summary action, the court shall order the parties to arbitrate; and (2) if the refusing party opposes the summary action, the court shall proceed summarily to decide the issue and order the parties to arbitrate unless it finds that there is no enforceable agreement to arbitrate.
[brief] The Board had been repeatedly informed by [...] throughout the process in writing that its apparent reliance on N.J.A.C. 17:1-6.41(2) to also deny the application is wholly plain error since subsection 2 of that statute as was aforementioned in the preceding section expressly states applications for disability retirement will be accepted, heard and decided on the merits when the settlement agreements signed involve a disposition of administrative charge related to the actual disability that is the subject of the application.  The Board’s written decision/s repeatedly cite to this administrative provision supporting its decision to block [...] from having his claim filed.  Just as the Board had no actual response to rebut the soundness of the ALJ finding that there was an agreement made that had no quid pro quo in existence, the Board remained silent on the undisputed fact that the underlying administrative charges specifically related to the disability which is the subject of the application in question in this appeal.
[brief] The operative facts of this matter are undisputed.  [...] became employed as a Corrections Officer with the [...] in 1990.  (Aa53).  As a term and condition of his employment, [...] was enrolled into the [...] (hereinafter “[...]”).  (Aa1-2).  Eventually, he achieved the rank of Sergeant in or about 1995.  (Aa53).  On May 31, 2006, [...] was subjected to a random urinalysis.  *Ibid.*  The urinalysis report, dated July 12, 2006, revealed [...] tested positive for benzodiazepines, the metabolite of cocaine after ingestion when the body begins the disposal process of that drug.  (Aa3).  As such, the County served [...] with a Preliminary Notice of Disciplinary Action dated July 26, 2006 seeking his removal from employment based upon the urinalysis results.  (Aa4).  To this end, the specifications to the disciplinary charges indicated:  On May 31, 2006, during a “Random Urinalysis” conducted at the [...], Sergeant [...] was urine tested.  On July 26, 2006, this Department received the Lab results of the aforementioned Urinalysis.  Sergeant [...] tested “Positive” for COCAINE based on the results of the [...].  [Aa4.]  Subsequently, [...] was suspended from employment without pay pending a departmental hearing regarding the charges lodged against him.  (Aa5).  Eventually, a departmental hearing was conducted on June 30, 2008, approximately two (2) years later.  After the hearing, the charges against [...] were sustained and he was officially removed from his position of employment by virtue of a Final Notice of Disciplinary Action served upon him.  (Aa6)  The effective date of his termination was July 16, 2008.  (Aa54).
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[brief] Relator cannot deny that its claims are based upon an analysis of VRDO transactional data that, according to Relator’s own allegations, identify every defendant remarketing agent responsible for every rate reset on every VRDO at issue in this case. Ab33.  Defendants, in their brief, explained the longstanding and uniform view of courts that an “analysis” of publicly available information does not save a relator from the public disclosure bar.  Ab29–32 (collecting cases).  Relator says nothing about any of these cases and offers no contrary authority.  Instead, Relator suggests that [...] adopted a legal rule that when an analysis of a large volume of public information is required, the public disclosure bar does not apply.
[brief] [Pa181]  Plaintiffs’ brief mischaracterizes [...]’ ruling by arguing that when she stated “there is nothing that would prevent the plaintiff[s] to the extent that there are newly-discovered claims that were not knowable . . . prior to now against the parties, counsel’s free to file a complaint,” that she was holding that Plaintiffs could, in fact, file a new complaint.  (See, Pb21, citing 1T79:23.80:2)  [...] correctly rejected that argument and recognized that [...] did not determine that Plaintiffs could file another complaint, but, rather, asserted that if the claims were, in fact, newly discovered, that a new complaint might be proper.  However, this was not the case, as [...] specifically held that there was sufficient evidence that was available to Plaintiffs to have previously raised the issue, regardless of whether the affidavit of title, which they allege constitutes new evidence, bolstered that claim or not:
[brief] As [...] made clear in *Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. United Ins. Co.*, 138 N.J. 437, 479 (1994), the public policy of New Jersey mandates that insurance companies faced with long-tail claims address them responsibly, or, if they choose to engage in litigation and are unsuccessful, reimburse the policyholder for fees incurred in enforcing coverage:  “Insurers whose policies are triggered by an injury during a policy period must respond to any claims presented to them and, if they deny full coverage, must initiate proceedings to determine the portion allocable for defense and indemnity costs.  For failure to provide coverage, a policyholder may recover costs incurred under the provisions of Rule 4:42-9(a)(6). ”  Here, [...] did not even respond to [...]’s 1986 notice letter until nearly ten years later when its sent a letter reserving its rights to deny coverage.  (Pa 368-79).  The trial court considered all materials and information relevant to the determination of the start date for its interest calculations.  Its decision to use 1989 as the start date for the running of interest was not a “manifest denial of justice. ”  See County of Essex, 186 N.J. at 61.
[brief] There can be no question that [...]’s illegal activity, which included “Racketeering Conspiracy,” “Theft by Extortion” and “Official Misconduct,” unquestionably involved the [...] law firm.  As a result, [...] enriched himself and enriched [...].  As our Supreme Court has held, “[t]he shared economic interest of the entire firm in the clients of individual members also supports treating a partnership as one attorney.
[brief] On a side note, Defendants maintain that *Model Civil Jury Charge* 5.20B(2)(b) codifies and tracks the common law duty of a commercial landowner to clear snow and ice.  The notes to this jury charge discuss the common law cases.  In fact, the current *Model Civil Jury Charge* 5.20B(2)(b) has tracked this common law evolution.  For example, the Model Civil Jury Charges were revised in November 2022 to include the aforementioned deemed equivalent to the sidewalk for purposes of analyzing a commercial landowner’s duty to remove snow and ice from its public walkways.  *Greenstein v. Forsgate Industrial Complex*, 2021 WL 3084740 (App. Div. 2021) (Da 146).  Additionally, the Appellate Division rejected plaintiff’s attempt to confine the commercial defendant’s duty to remove snow and ice from sidewalks only.  *Sarro v. Vonage Holdings Corp.*, 2023 WL 2566062 (App. Div. 2023).  Rather, this common law duty to remove snow and ice from public walkways was extended to private parking lots.  *Id.* (Da 149).  Likewise, the Appellate Division again extended the common law duty to remove snow and ice from public walkways to a parking lot within a condominium complex.  *Hanna v. Woodland Community Assoc.*, 2022 WL 16984707 (App. Div. 2022) (Da 153-158).  As set forth above, our courts have frequently extended the common law duty of commercial landowners and/or its agents to remove snow and ice from its adjacent sidewalk to driveway aprons and to adjoining parking lots.  Here, it was foreseeable and entirely expected that invitees would use the parking lots at [...] to access the commercial office tenants and retail shops – not just to park their vehicles but to also walk _____________________ ongoing storm language that was supposed to be added onto 5.20B(2)(b) if factually warranted. from the parking lot to the offices or store fronts.
[brief] .................................................................22  Shaler ex rel. Shaler v. Toms River Obstetrics & Gynecology Associates, 383 N.J. Super. 650 (App. Div. 2006), certif. denied, 187 N.J. 82 (2006)  ..................................................................22  Sickles v. Cabot Corp., 379 N.J. Super. 100 (App. Div. 2005), certif. denied, 185 N.J. 297 (2005)  ..................................................................15  Sinopoli v. North River Ins. Co., 244 N.J. Super. 245 (App. Div. 1990), certif. denied, 127 N.J. 325 (1991)  .................................................................22, 23  Stafford v. T.H.E. Ins. Co., 309 N.J. Super. 97 (App. Div. 1998)
[directive] Twelve members of the Grand Jury constitute a quorum and the Grand Jury cannot act without a quorum present.  The Grand Jury must act as a body; individual jurors have no official authority.  Jurors who vote in a case must have been present and have heard all of the evidence presented.  Regardless of the number of jurors deliberating and voting in any given case, no person can be indicted and no presentment can be returned unless twelve (12) or more members of the Grand Jury concur.  If the Grand Jurors vote not to return an indictment, the Grand Jury returns what is called a “No Bill” -- meaning that the Grand Jury has determined that there is insufficient evidence to move forward with the criminal charges.  It sometimes occurs that a grand juror has formed an opinion about a case before hearing evidence or may be influenced by a financial or personal relationship to a case, such as being acquainted with a victim, witness, law enforcement officer, a target for possible indictment or anyone else involved in the matter.  Because every case must be decided on its own merits, it is inappropriate for your deliberations to be affected by your familiarity with such matters.  In such a case you should decide whether or not you should disqualify yourself.  If you are not certain whether you should excuse yourself Grand Jury Standards Promulgated by Directive #23-06 (December 22, 2006)
[brief] Courts have consistently instructed that expert testimony and reports will be stricken as net opinions where they fail to “give the why and wherefore” of their opinion, and have provided a “mere conclusion. ”  *Jiminez*, 286 N.J. Super. at 540.  In the matter *Taylor v. DeLosso*, plaintiff's expert witness testified that the defendant architect deviated from accepted standards of architectural practice by failing to make a site inspection of plaintiff's property to verify the location of a maple tree before preparing the site plan.  319 N.J.Super. 174, 180 (App. Div. 1999).
[brief] Goldfarb v. Solimine, 245 N.J. 326, 339 (2021).  Without question there must have been an oral contract because the Township appeared in 2018 to do the drainage work in the backyard.  The trial court dismissed Plaintiff’s claim on the basis that N.J.S.A. 40A:4-57 was not satisfied by the Plaintiff.  N.J.S.A. 40A:4-57 provides:  No officer, board, body or commission shall, during any fiscal year, expend any money (except to pay notes, bonds or interest thereon), incur any liability, or enter into any contract which by its terms involves the expenditure of money for any purpose for which no appropriation is provided, or in excess of the amount appropriated for such purpose.  Any contract made in violation hereof shall be null and void, and no moneys shall be paid thereon.  The fact that the Township’s promise does not comply with the requirement of N.J.S.A. 40A:4-57 and there is no Resolution authorizing or permitting the Township to repair the Property is not relevant.
[directive] Complete the Application for E:xpungement of Arrest or Charge Records  The Application is used by the Municipal Court to determine whether the Applicant is eligible for an expungement of the arrest(s) or charge(s).  The Applicant must complete sections A, B, and C of the form.  Section A requires the personal information of the Applicant.  Section B requires the identification of the arrest or charges that the Applicant seeks to have expunged.  The Applicant must provide the date of the arrest, the statute or ordinance the Applicant was charged with violating, and the complaint number.  the Applicant does not have some or any of this information, the Applicant can obtain If a printout of the case disposition from staff of the municipal court where those proceedings were dismissed, the Applicant was acquitted, or the Applicant was discharged without a conviction or fmding of guilt.  a printout is obtained, the If Applicant should attach it to the Application.  The Applicant may alternatively search for the complaint number by accessing the Municipal Court Case Search via the NJMCdirect website, http://www.njmcdirect.com.  Section C requires the Applicant to date and sign the request for expungement.  Step 2:
[brief] “In considering an expert's evidence, a court should also be cognizant of the expense incurred by litigants in engaging an expert.  Therefore, the volume of information that is required to support an expert opinion must be kept with practical and realistic limits.  We do not support that a court should accept an expert's opinion that is unsubstantiated. ”  [Id.]  [...] indicated that the study about which plaintiff complains should have been done would entail a multi-months endeavor and that any such calculations were not necessary for him to reach his conclusions.
[brief] See generally, *Oswin v. Shaw*, 129 N.J. 290, 294, 609 A.2d 415, 419 (1992).  The provisions in the AICRA explain that “[a]n injury shall be considered permanent when the body part or organ, or both, has not healed to function normally and will not heal to function normally with further medical treatment. ”  See generally, *DiProspero v. Penn*, 183 N.J. 477, 483, 874 A.2d 1039, 1045 (N.J. 2005).