ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The law that underpins these model jury charges is found in a long line of cases holding that residential property owners are not liable for injuries caused by the dangerous conditions of sidewalks adjacent to their property.  Specifically, in 1976, our Supreme Court reaffirmed the long-standing principle “that, absent active misconduct, property owners would not be liable for dangerous sidewalk conditions. ”  *Yanhko v. Fane*, 70 N.J. 528, 534-37 (1976).  Then, in 1981, in *Stewart v. 104 Wallace St., Inc.*, 87 N.J. 146, 157 (1981), the Supreme Court reversed in part the holding in *Yanhko*, and held that “commercial landowners are responsible for maintaining in reasonably good condition the sidewalks abutting their property and are liable to pedestrians injured as a result of their negligent failure to do so. ”  However, the Supreme Court was extremely careful to note that “[t]he duty to maintain abutting sidewalks that we impose today is confined to owners of commercial property. ”  *Id.* at 159.  Thereafter, our Supreme Court acknowledged that in *Stewart*, it did not extend sidewalk liability to residential properties, and it has not done so since.
[directive] Each upon touch expected be to reasonably can duties whose command her or his under Prosecutor or appearance handling first function, a screening performing a (e.~., incidents violence domestic charges of defendant whose prosecution a actual the detention, and pretrial for application an training computer/web-based the complete also must incident) violence domestic a of arise out training receive shall Prosecutors Assistant Such subsection. this to pursuant developed program Page 51 being Justice. trainin~pro~ram made available the Division of Criminal within daXs of the 60 by training program or to any complete the before he she is assigned Prosecutor must An Assistant touch upon domestic violence incidents. reasonably expected to can be duty that additional ODARA and from time to time develop trainingprograms
[brief] In other words, a statute may be declared invalid on its face only if facts in addition to the language of the statute are not required to be considered to create a basis for invalidating the statute.  As applied in the present matter, the court below necessarily went beyond the language of the statute and had to consider the disputed assertion that the route through [...] was essential to the provision of adequate service and that there was no other route to make the connection.  Not only did this involve the resolution of genuinely disputed material facts (e.g., that the route through [...] was essential to the connection and that no other route was feasible), but it also failed to apply the correct standard for facial challenges to the Ordinance.
[brief] (Da 23-24)  [...] made clear that his opinions were based on his view of the surveillance videos, and he repeatedly referred to “all that evidence . . . in front of you” and “all that evidence they have. ”  (Da 27-28)  Finally, [...] directly accused [...] of the shooting, stating, “That’s the whole thing is why? Not if you killed him.  But why did you kill him?”  (Da 28)  This Court unequivocally held that “[...]’s disputed statements should have been redacted” because “[t]hey constituted improper lay opinions that invaded the jury’s sole responsibility to decide the facts and guilt and improperly suggested that defendant had an obligation to explain himself.
[brief] •  **What it does not say** is that the State’s implementation of SFRA has fallen unconstitutionally short regarding two explicit conditions that the New Jersey Supreme Court established 15 years ago in *Abbott XX*—namely, full funding every year and periodic evaluation of whether SFRA is working adequately for every district given its particular circumstances, and, if it is not, what statutory or other adjustments are necessary.  Indeed, the State’s brief acknowledges that the SFRA funding formula was not even in effect between FY 2010 and FY 2017, virtually half of SFRA’s entire life span, because school funding during those eight fiscal years was “calculated based on provisions included in the State budget, with underlying funding policy changing every year. ”  [State Brief (SB) at 6].  •  **What it does not say** is that reliance on annual discretionary advance state aid loans, repayable by [...] within 10 years, has proven to be a manifestly unsuccessful, and arguably unconstitutional, effort to enable the district to keep its schools open; in the words of the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), who conducted a lengthy hearing in this case, this has created “an unsustainable fiscal situation” in the district and effectively functions as a “Ponzi scheme. ”  •  **What it does not say** in any meaningful way is what the State will be doing to remedy the acknowledged denial of T&E to [...] students beyond more of the same—presumably more repayable advanced state aid loans on top of the $215 million already burdening the [...], a “new state monitor,” presumably to replace the multiple State monitors who have been continuously in place in the district for more than 10 years without, according to the State, any ability to remedy the constitutional denial, and the State’s much belated “exploring [of] the degree of oversight and intervention” required of it to “protect the constitutional rights of [...]’s public-school students. ”  COMBINED STATEMENT OF RECENT PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND RELEVANT FACTS
[brief] [...] is a former public official being directed to release public records in his possession.  He had no right to pursue an independent cause of action funded by the District, moreover at that time he was not liable for any fees or damages.  The subsequent cause of action arose solely from his intransigence.  The Board was similarly not obligated to provide him with representation under a claim of common law indemnification.  Although the application of common law indemnification to legal fees is discretionary, it is only authorized when the fees are incurred in “defending lawsuits brought against public officials who are executing the powers and duties of their office or carrying out a governmental obligation.
[brief] At the outset, the Defendant's legal counsel communicated to Plaintiff's former attorney, [...], their intention to pursue an appeal subsequent to the completion of the Administrator's duties.  However, the refusal to disburse the owed sum of $1,049,589.14 to the Plaintiff, contingent upon the estate administrator's fulfillment of obligations before initiating an appeal, lacks legal merit.  The determination of the appeal's validity period is unequivocally tied to the August 31, 2022, deadline.
[brief] “Disqualification of counsel is a harsh discretionary remedy which must be used sparingly. ”  Dental Health Assocs. S. Jersey, P.A., 471 N.J. Super. at 192.  “The party who seeks the disqualification bears the burden of persuasion. ”  *Dental Health Assocs. S. Jersey, P.A.*, 471 N.J. Super. at 193-94.  It is a “heavy burden” with a “high standard of proof.
[brief] The only justification for not producing the report(s) was plaintiff's ongoing medical problems.  As [...] noted, those did not satisfy the exceptional circumstances standard.  As defendants note, this factor had no effect on the ability of plaintiff's expert(s) to provide the critical causation reports within the time frame.  And plaintiff does not even address the failure to request the extension before the discovery end date except to say it was due to circumstances beyond the control of plaintiff and plaintiff's counsel, referring to plaintiff's medical conditions.  Obviously that had no effect on counsel's ability to file a timely motion.  [(Pa155)]  In the second motion for reconsideration, Plaintiff advanced the idea that “staffing shortages” were the basis for failing to seek the extension sooner.  When addressing the chance to file for an extension of discovery during the discovery period, [...] recognized that, “Counsel’s failure to [timely file] due to ‘staffing shortages’ is not an exceptional circumstance. ”  (Pa163)  Finally, despite Plaintiff’s protestations to the contrary, the circumstances presented were not clearly beyond the control of Plaintiff and her counsel.  Nothing in the explanations offered by Plaintiff, her counsel or [...] presented anything other than the rather standard challenges that medical malpractice litigants face and overcome every day.  The fact that they could not comply with the rules of discovery during the time permitted (or even seek an extension prior to its expiration) does not demonstrate exceptional circumstances, and does not demonstrate any error by [...].  The order dismissing this case should be affirmed.
[brief] The trial court also properly awarded [...] the Strip under the doctrine of adverse possession.  “Generally to acquire title by adverse possession, the possession must be actual and exclusive, adverse and hostile, visible or notorious, and continued and uninterrupted. ”  \textit{Patton v. N. Jersey Water Supply Comm’n}, 93 \textit{N.J.} 180, 185 (1983).  A possessor’s “hostility” does not need to be knowing; it is enough that a party actually enters and possesses the disputed property, even if it is \textsuperscript{6}  It should be noted that there is substantial legal support for the trial court to have awarded equitable title to [...] based on the 1967 Subdivision.
[brief] ........................................................................................................................................26  i.  Only the Estoppel Certificate was to be Delivered, not an Acceptable Estoppel Certificate.  If the Delivered Certificate Disclosed Default, it was not an Acceptable Estoppel Certificate and Termination was Allowed.  (Answering Defendant’s Argument at Point I(i) (Pb10-13.)........28  ii.  Defendant Incorrectly Argues the Prompt Delivery Requirement’s Purpose and Meaning was so it could Fulfill its Obligation to Deliver an Acceptable Estoppel Certificate at Closing.  Prompt Delivery was Required to Allow Termination if the Delivered Estoppel Certificate Disclosed Adverse Information.  (Answering Defendant’s Argument at Point I(ii) (Pb13-19.).................................................................34  iii.  An Estoppel Certificate not an Acceptable Estoppel Certificate was to be Delivered.  Defendant’s Condition Precedent Argument is Meritless.  Also, Estoppels have Two Purposes: One Being to Inform the other to Preclude.  As Such the Trial Court did not Misinterpret the Role of an Estoppel.  (Answering Defendant’s Argument at Point II.
[brief] Moreover, where Appellants only plead activities pertaining to a single solar development project, the Panel should not find a pattern of racketeering activity because it is well-settled that a single scheme directed against a single defendant does not give rise to a RICO claim.  See Ross, 494 F. Supp. at 303.  If anything, Appellants have only presented the “garden variety fraud” upon which the Third Circuit does not permit a civil RICO claim to proceed.  See Marshall-Silver Constr. Co, 894 F.2d at 597.  All of the acts that Appellants describe in their Amended Complaint were directed toward a single purported misrepresentation, so the Amended Complaint does not state a claim upon which relief can be granted.  9.
[brief] D)  FAIR CREDIT BILLING ACT (“FCBA”)  The Fair Credit Billing Act (“FCBA”) was enacted to add several provisions to the TILA.  Most pertinent, the FCBA sets forth a statutory scheme for a cardholder of a credit card account to raise disputes set forth in an account statement.  Am. Express Co. v. Koerner, 452 U.S. 233 (1981) (citations omitted).  Defendant argues that the Court incorrectly found that Defendant waived the right to dispute the balances and charges because Defendant failed dispute in writing any of the chargers on his account within sixty (60) days after the charge appears as required by TILA.  TILA defines a billing error as seven (7) events and the most pertinent to this case is “a computation error or similar error of an accounting nature of the creditor on a statement[.]”  15 U.S.C. § 1666(b)(3)(5).  A consumer must notify the original creditor of such a billing dispute in writing within sixty (60) days of receipt of the account statement to preserve that claim and/or defense under TILA.  Krieger v. Bank of Am., N.A. 890 F.3d. 429, 433 (3rd Cir. 2018) (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1666(a)).  Defendant failed to set forth any facts in his Objection that he ever sent a written dispute to Plaintiff regarding charges on the subject account, let alone in a timely fashion as required by TILA.  15 U.S.C. § 1666(a) – (b).  Plaintiff also notes that Defendant made numerous payments towards the subject account as reflected by the account statements, which belies Defendant’s assertion of incorrect calculations or other improprieties.  The motion judge’s decision must be affirmed by reason that Defendant has waived the right to contest any such computational or other errors by failing to submit evidence of a dispute of any of the charges, interest, or computation protocols.  It is supported by case law and statute that were understood and correctly applied by the motion judge.  Krieger 890 F.3d. at 433.  Defendant argues that Plaintiff submitted account statements for two (2) different accounts in support of its Motion.  Defendant is incorrect.  The account statements were for Defendant’s account with Plaintiff.  Defendant does not assert any facts to substantiate that Defendant was “double billed” other than Defendant’s erroneous assertion. \(^7\) --- \(^7\)  Defendant does not disclose this Court that, per Plaintiff’s records, Defendant notified Plaintiff on May 10, 2017 that Defendant’s card was lost or stolen and that Plaintiff issued a new account number to prevent any potential fraudulent activity.  Such facts are not part of the record because of Defendant’s tardy opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment.  Plaintiff can supplement the record to include such facts if the Court determines same is dispositive as to this appeal.  Plaintiff respectfully submits that Defendant’s FCBA claim is meritless and should fail.
[brief] BECAUSE [...] HAD A CLEAR CONFLICT OF INTEREST AND COULD NOT SERVE AS DEFENDANT’S GUARDIAN UNDER THOSE CIRCUMSTANCES.  (1T:29-23 to 30-7); (1T:31-14 to 32-1); (2T:50-4 to 54-11)  “A parent or legal guardian should be present in the interrogation room, whenever possible. ”  Presha, 163 N.J. at 315 (citing State in the Interest of S.H., 61 N.J. 108, 114-115 (1972).  “Regardless of the juvenile’s age, police officers must use their best efforts to locate a parent or legal guardian before beginning the interrogation. ”  State v. Presha, 163 N.J. at 316.  Courts have recognized that another level of protection is required with juvenile interrogations because a juvenile’s immaturity limits their ability to make a knowing and intelligent waiver of his or her rights.
[brief] In every year since 2011, [...] has had more than 300,000 subscribers.  Ja1560 ([...] Cert. ¶ 7); see also Ja2108–09 (¶ 26).  Likewise, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court has specifically held that [...] is “news media,” noting the term’s “broad sweep” and given that [...] is the “official repository for information on all municipal bonds[,] . . . provides updates to bond market information by means of the Internet,” and “is publicly available and widely disseminated.
[brief] Capital Improvements are barred from being included in “equity” because they are excluded from the definition [...] argues that capital improvements may be included in the definition of equity, but this is wrong because equity is defined as “[t]he actual cash contribution of the purchaser at the time of closing of title and any principal payments to outstanding mortgages. ”  DA26.  Because the capital improvements were not part of the cash contribution at the closing of title, they are necessarily excluded.  Neither [...] nor [...] have the authority to add things to the definition in the ordinance.
[brief] To now argue that the defense should have done more objecting or brought more evidence into the record ignores both the facts of what the defense actually did and the law of who is obligated to prove anything about the reliability of expert evidence: the State.  The defense made each request delineated above clear and marshalled evidence to back up its requests.  It is the State that bears the burden of proving the reliability of the expert evidence it is admitting into evidence.  State v. Cassidy, 235 N.J. 482, 492 (2018).  The failure to develop a more fulsome record rests on the proponent of the evidence, the State, or the gatekeeper of evidence, the trial court.  It does not rest with [...].
[directive] Where the defendant is alleged to be an accomplice, this Special Application and Enhancement Feature shall not apply unless the prosecutor has a reasonable basis to believe that defendant knew or had reason to know that his or her partner would cause bodily injury or significant bodily injury to any person, or that the defendant had the purpose to promote or facilitate the commission of an offense resulting in bodily injury or significant bodily injury to any person.  Nothing in this Section shall preclude a Downward Departure for Trial Proof
[brief] Note:  Adopted July 17, 1975 to be effective September 8, 1975; Paragraph (d) adopted July 29, 1977 to be effective September 6, 1977; paragraph (d) redesignated as (e); paragraph (f) adopted July 21, 1980 to be effective September 8, 1980; paragraphs (b), (c) and (e) and captions for paragraphs (b) and (c) amended May 23, 1989 to be effective June 15, 1989; paragraph (d) amended June 29, 1990 to be effective September 4, 1990; paragraphs (a) and (f) amended; paragraph (g) adopted July 13, 1994 to be effective January 1, 1995; caption to paragraph (g) amended July 5, 2000 to be effective September 5, 2000.  SUPREME COURT COMMENTARY
[brief] 50 | Cases | Page(s) | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|---------| | Arsenis v. Boro. Of Bernardsville, 476 N.J. Super. 195 (App. Div.) | | | certif. denied, 257 N.J. 524 (2024) .................................. | 25 | | Atl. N. Airlines v. Schwimmer, 12 N.J. 293 (1953) ...................... | 31 | | Azurak v. Corporate Prop. Investors, 175 N.J. 110 (2003) .............. | 30, 36, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 48 | | Brett v. Great Am. Recreation, Inc., 144 N.J. 479 (1996)
[brief] As the New Jersey Supreme Court has stated, while issues of law are reviewed de novo, this Court “should not disturb the trial court’s findings merely because ‘it might have reached a different conclusion were it the trial tribunal’ or because ‘the trial court decided all evidence or inference conflicts in favor of one side’ in a close case. ”  Elders, 192 N.J. at 244 (quoting Johnson, 42 N.J. at 162); State v. Gandhi, 201 N.J. 161, 176 (2010).
[directive] Many departments Jersey have adopted automated systems that are of flagging emerging behavioral patterns.  capable  At least every six months, personnel assigned to manage EW System shall the the audit agency's tracking system to and records assess the accuracy and efficacy of the tracking system.  F.  Action  Remedial/Corrective  Once an officer the number of has displayed requisite performance indicators necessary to trigger System review forth in the EW process (as set Section II.C, above) assigned supervisory personnel shall remedial initiate action to address the officer's behavior.
[brief] (Pa37-38 at ¶97-98).  Plaintiff alleged that the City “cannot demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship,” but failed to identify who it was referring to, when and why they were in need of accommodation, what was the accommodation sought, what particular facts and circumstances of the particular case led to Plaintiff’s conclusion of absence of undue hardship, etc. (Pa38 at ¶99, 101).  \(^1\)  Plaintiff referred to the pending DCR matter brought by [...] on page 54 of the Second Amended Complaint.  Of course, materials referred to in a complaint may be considered without converting a R. 4:6-2 motion to dismiss into one for summary judgment.  Pressler, N.J. Court Rules, Comment 4.1.2, R. 4:6-2; N.J. Sports Prod., Inc. v. Bostick Promotions, LLC, 405 N.J. Super. 173, 178 (Ch. Div. 2007).  Plaintiff alleged that the “size of the business can accommodate the affected Union members,” that the “operations are not effected,” that the “cost of the accommodation is minimal to the City,” and that the City “would not be required to waive any essential requirements of the job,” but failed to identify any particular member who had a disability under the law, when and why they were in need of accommodation, what was the accommodation sought, the actual or potential impact of the requested accommodation on operations and how it related to the essential functions of the member’s job, etc. (Pa39 at ¶102-105).  Plaintiff alleged that the “affected Union members” are “qualified to perform the essential functions of the position,” but did not identify the particular alleged members, their jobs/assignments, qualifying disabilities, limitations and durations of same, etc. (Pa40 at ¶107).  Plaintiff seemingly speculated in alleging that the unidentified “affected Union members” are “suffering an adverse employment action because of their disability if the City fails to promote them. ” (Pa40 at ¶108) (emphasis added).  Plaintiff repeatedly asserted that unidentified past or future/speculative alleged affected members “may be easily accommodated,” but failed to identify any particular alleged member, the qualifying disability involved, their limitations and the severity and durations of same, the nature of the request for accommodation made, when and to whom, etc. (Pa42, 46, 49) (emphasis added).  Plaintiff claimed the City had violated the LAD by “failing to provide a reasonable accommodation” to the unidentified alleged “affected Union members” and stated it brings this action “to compel[ ] the City to promote” such “affected Union members. ” (Pa40-41 at ¶109, 111).  In terms of relief sought, Plaintiff demanded that the unidentified alleged affected “Association members” who have been “denied eligibility for promotion” be “made whole” (i.e., promoted as asserted, e.g., in ¶111, to some unidentified higher rank/position) and with “full seniority and other emoluments of the position. ”  Pa42-43).  Counts II and III of the Second Amended Complaint simply advance claims for damages pursuant to Plaintiff’s LAD failure to accommodate claim (Count I).
[directive] SART training programs shall include information regarding methods of identifying vulnerable populations, effective communication methods, and mandatory reporting requirements for vulnerable populations, including, but not limited to:  CP&P regulations for reporting suspicion of child abuse;  Adult Protective Services regulations for reporting abuse of vulnerable adults in the community; -21- ATTORNEY GENERAL STANDARDS FOR PROVIDING SERVICES TO VICTIMS OF SEXUAL ASSAULT   Office of the Ombudsman regulations for reporting abuse of patients residing in nursing homes and institutions; and  Division of Developmental Disabilities (DDD) regulations for reporting abuse of individuals with disabilities.  SART procedures shall be established to address the communication needs of all victims, including:  the availability of interpreters or language lines to communicate with the victim in their primary language.  Family members and friends are not to be used as interpreters;  sign interpreters for persons who are deaf or hard of hearing; and  methods of communicating in an effective and developmentally appropriate manner with persons who have developmental disabilities.  Additionally, SART Training must include information regarding the appropriate mechanism for ascertaining an individual’s ability to provide consent for medical care, including the medical forensic exam.