[brief] **PLAINTIFF DID NOT “OPEN THE DOOR” FOR THE IMPERMISSIBLE USE OF HEARSAY.**  Defendant’s meager attempts to justify the trial court’s error in allowing carte blanche use of the hearsay center on the argument that both [...] and [...] were generally “familiar” with annual and complaint “surveys. ”  Db at 12-13.  Any knowledge they had that there was a survey done here or that there was an investigation was not first-hand.  Rather, the documents were produced in discovery.  That, in and of itself, does not make them a proper subject of inquiry.  More importantly, it does not establish their reliability or admissibility without the testimony of [...].  It does not “open the door” for their use.  Unlike the cases cited by defendant for its newly minted “open the door” argument, defendant was **not barred** from offering the testimony of Ms Strong.  That is the fatal flaw in defendant’s use of that argument.  The case of *Hrymoc v. Ethicon, Inc.*, 254 N.J. 446 (2023), cited by defendant, demonstrates exactly why that doctrine does **not** apply.  Defendant correctly describes the issue in the *Hrymoc* case and then incorrectly equates it to the case sub judice.  *Hrymoc* was a products liability matter involving "pelvic mesh" medical devices.  See id. at 452.  The trial court, ruling on the parties' motions **in limine**, **barred all evidence** of "Section 510(k) clearance" allowing the devices to be marketed without premarket clinical trials, because the 510(k) process determines substantial equivalency only, not safety and efficacy.  See id. at 452-453.  The Appellate Division reversed and remanded for a new trial, and the Supreme Court affirmed that ruling, holding that the exclusion of any 510(k) evidence deprived the defendant of a fair trial on the issue of negligence, particularly on the issue of the reasonableness of the manufacturer's conduct in not performing clinical trials or studies.  See id. at 453.  Db28 (emphasis added).  Simply put, the evidence excluded would have shown that clinical trials were not required.  Plaintiff in Hrymoc took advantage of the fact that defendant could not show that and claimed defendant’s lack of clinical trials was negligent.  Based on Hrymoc, then, to apply the so-called opening the door doctrine at bar, defendant first must demonstrate that it was “barred” from offering [...] as a witness to testify about her “investigation” and her findings.  That is not the case and renders Hrymoc inapplicable.  After noting that [...] was identified as a witness in its pretrial submission and that defendant could call her as a witness, defendant chose not to call [...] as a witness.  That was defendant’s choice.  Tactically speaking, it was an excellent choice because defendant was able to use the hearsay documents to establish the DOH’s findings of no wrongdoing without having to worry about plaintiff impeaching the witness on cross.  Clever, but ultimately unsustainable and just plain wrong.  A la Hrymoc, not only does defendant need to establish the preclusion of pertinent evidence, which it cannot, it also must show that plaintiff took unfair advantage of that preclusion.  At bar, that would mean that plaintiff’s witnesses had to have testified that there was no investigation done by the DOH or the DOH conducted an investigation that was favorable to plaintiff.  No such evidence was adduced at this trial.  That slams the door shut on defendant’s contrived argument.