[brief] *See Jackson Tp. Bd. of Educ. v. Jackson Educ. Ass’n, ex rel. Scelba*, 334 N.J. Super. 162, 176 (App. Div. 2000):  Where a State agency's role in an administrative matter is solely that of a forum for the resolution of a dispute committed to its quasi-judicial authority, as distinguished from also being an actual party to the controversy or possessing fiduciary responsibilities or functioning in some other capacity bearing upon the merits, it seems inappropriate that the agency should take a position on the merits when the matter is on appeal.  The merits views of a court whose decision is being reviewed are seen to be properly expressed only in the formal decision rendered.  We see no good reason why an administrative agency, in its role as decision maker in a quasi-judicial matter, should not be expected to maintain the same level of nominal detachment that is considered to be the norm for other tribunals.  Such policy interests as the agency may have in the outcome ought to be apparent from the decision itself or from the legislation or administrative rules and regulations pertaining to the subject matter at issue.  [Internal citations omitted].  [...]’s role in this matter was to act “solely [as a] forum for the resolution of [the] dispute [between the Board and the Association], as distinguished from being an actual party to the controversy. ”  Ibid.  [...] is not, and should not, be considered a “party” in this case, as the initial dispute was and remains between the Board and the Association.  Nevertheless, [...] has taken an adversarial position against the Board, rather than simply filing the standard statement-in-lieu-of-brief, which is expressly permitted pursuant to R. 2:6-4(c) and (d) where “the general public does not require its adversarial participation in the appeal and…the parties directly affected by its decision have adequately presented, or may be expected to so present, the issues. ”  See, e.g., Chesterbrooke Ltd. Partnership v. Planning Bd. of Tp. of Chester, 237 N.J. Super. 118, n.1 (App. Div. 1989) (“The Planning Board has not filed a brief.  In a statement in lieu of brief, it states: ‘[T]he general public interest does not require the Board’s adversarial participation in the appeal.  Plaintiff and Appellate-Objectors may reasonably be expected to present all relevant issues to the Court . . .”).  [...]’s filing of a nineteen (19)-page opposition brief “seems inappropriate…[while] the matter is on appeal. ”  See Jackson Tp. Bd. of Educ., supra, at 176.  [...] concedes that it has already issued a “comprehensive” and “thoroughly detailed” decision (Rbiv.; Rb3).  The Association, in its own opposition brief, “relies on and adopts” several legal arguments made by [...].  See, e.g., Db18 (“The [Association] supports and adopts [...]’s arguments…”); Db21 (“As with the Board’s other arguments, the [Association] supports [...]’s rebuttal of the Board’s claims. ”); Db27 (“[...]’s brief has already explained why this is not the case, which the [Association] supports and adopts herein”); Db30 (“In addition to all the reasons…in [...]’s brief….”).  In this case, [...] is not a party and should not argue the merits of its own decision when deciding a matter submitted to it in its quasi-judicial capacity.  POINT III