ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Respondent/defendant [...] adopts and incorporates the procedural history of appellant/plaintiff [...].  Appellant/plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint to include a Count for PIP benefits against [...].  (PA002)  [...] filed an Answer and a Counterclaim seeking a Declaratory Judgment and denial of coverage to appellant/plaintiff [...].  (PA004)  The personal injury action of appellant/plaintiff [...] against respondent/defendant Hardy was severed from the insurance coverage claims and stayed on March 3, 2023.  (PA006)  Appellant/plaintiff [...] and [...] settled their claims in principle on September 15, 2023.  (PA007)  The claims of appellant/plaintiff [...] against [...] were dismissed by Stipulation on October 12, 2023.  (PA008).  However, the settlement between appellant/plaintiff [...] and [...] ultimately failed to materialize.  Defendant [...] filed a Notice of Motion for summary judgment in its Declaratory Judgment action to confirm the denial of coverage based upon appellant/plaintiff [...]’s material misrepresentation.  (DR01)  On June 7, 2024, the trial Court granted defendant [...]’s unopposed motion for summary judgment, finding that “plaintiff’s vehicles were garaged in New Jersey so there is no coverage under the North Carolina policy. ”  (DR03)  STATEMENT OF FACTS
[brief] Defendants argue that “Plaintiff created the altercation with the Sheriff’s officer. ” (Def. Brief, Pg. 20).  Again this is without any factual support.  The only relevant people in the hallway when and where the altercation occurred were the Sheriff’s officer and [...].  Both [...] and the Sheriff’s officer agreed that it was the sheriff’s officer, not [...], who initiated the contact between them in the hallway.  (4T Pg. 56, Line 19 – Pg. 57, line 14).  Even Defendants in their brief sort of acknowledge this and therefore appears to qualify their position by stating “[...] started this argument by leaving the court room to sue the rest room. ” (Def. Brief, Pg. 24).  That is a puzzling way to start an argument, especially in light of the fact that even [...] conceded that she never informed [...] that he was not permitted to use the bathroom.  (4T, Pg. 71, line 18 – Pg. 72, line 2).
[brief] S.A. 18A:13-47.11(a), regarding a municipality’s withdrawal from a regional or consolidated school district, particularly when viewed in light of the overall statutory scheme.  Indeed, if the Court were to adopt Appellants’ reading of the statutory language, municipalities such as [...] that do not have functioning school districts and that have merged with other, larger school districts would lose their autonomy with regard to matters of public education.  They never could pursue their own ends to leave a regional or consolidated school district or to join another regional school district.  Rather, they would forever be at the mercy of the larger district into which they merged – creating a subcategory of communities that could never take advantage of the new law promoting the creation of K-12 regional school districts.  The Commissioner here interpreted the statute’s plain language and, in concordance with the Legislature’s intent, avoided that harsh and unfair result, a result the Legislature obviously did not contemplate or want given that the statute does not create that odd subcategory.  The Commissioner’s decision therefore is not “plainly unreasonable” and should be affirmed.
[brief] 4  [...], Esq., initially worked on this file as co-counsel, and made attempts to contact [...] to determine whether he had any records or recollection about the case but was informed that [...] unfortunately passed away.  concurrent to any other loss of license sentence he was currently serving, and that the sentence for the 10-year loss of license would run from the date he entered his plea on February 8, 2013, he agreed to plead guilty to the DWI.  20a; 1T.  On the same date of February 8, 2013, defendant entered a plea of guilty to the DWI, (his third), before the Honorable [...]  J.M.C. 26a;1T.  Consistent with the representations made to him by his attorney, [...] sentenced defendant in accordance with what he was told in exchange for his plea of guilty.5  20a; 1T.  At the time of sentencing, [...] was aware that defendant’s driver’s license was already suspended.  1T:14:6-12.  Nonetheless, [...] clearly ran the sentence concurrent to the suspension period he was already serving at the time of his conviction.  In particular, [...] stated, THE COURT: Well as a result of your plea of guilty here today, sir, it's suspended for 10 more years from today's date, you understand that?  [...]: Yes, sir.  1T:14:13-15, emphasis added.  _____________________
[directive] - N.J.S.A.  2C:64-1 et seq.  Forfeiture  This statute the authority for the is 2. implementation of the forfeiture program, and must be followed accordingly.  - State of New Jersey Forfeiture Program Administration Standard 3.  - Operation Procedure  This enclosure provides the index and copies of all the standard operating procedures required in the implementation of the forfeiture program.  - N.J.S.A. 40A:5-1 et seq.  Local Fiscal Affairs Law Title 40A the is 4. authority for auditing firms to follow the administration and operation in of the audit.  - -- 5.  N.J-A.C. 5130-6.1 et seq.  Annual Audit  These regulations describe the . - <; requirements and standards for conducting the annual audits.
[brief] No one can control when and where it rains, but dangerous flooding can be anticipated and managed by good science and good governance.  Since the enactment of the Flood Hazard Area Control Act in 1962, the Respondent [...] (“[...]”) has been given strong and sweeping powers to protect the public by regulating development in and around areas that are likely to flood during predictable rain events.  The [...] must use the best available data and a scientific method to predict where it is likely to flood during these foreseeable rain events.  It must not allow inappropriate development that could exacerbate and increase the potential for loss of life, damage to property, and contamination of important water resources.
[brief] It is well-established that evidence is admissible during the first stage of a bifurcated trial if it is relevant to a witness’s credibility or any other issue to be decided by the jury, even if the same evidence goes to the ultimate issue in the second stage of trial.  In a criminal trial bifurcated for the purpose of trying counts of weapons possession and weapons possession by a convicted felon separately, evidence of a defendant’s prior convictions can be introduced to impeach his credibility during the first stage of trial even though it is determinative of the ultimate issue in the second stage of trial.  *State v. Jones*, 364 N.J. Super. 376 (App. Div. 2003); *State v. Wray*, 336 N.J. Super. 205 (App. Div. 2001).  Similarly, the Supreme Court held that altered medical records could be introduced as statements against interest during the first phase of trial on medical negligence that was to be followed by a second trial on claims for spoliation and fraudulent concealment.  *Rosenblit v. Zimmerman*, 166 N.J. 391 (2001).  The Court reasoned “a jury could infer from [...]’s behavior that he believed that Rosenblit’s medical records would prejudice his position in the [medical negligence] litigation. ”  *Ibid.*  The Court held that it was reversible error to limit their admissibility for impeachment purposes only\(^{10}\) and remanded for a new trial on the malpractice count.  *Ibid.*  *Rosenblit*, *Jones*, and *Wray* each demonstrate evidence that is relevant, if not dispositive of the latter phase of a bifurcated trial, is admissible for either impeachment, or as substantive evidence, even if it is prejudicial to the objecting party.
[brief] Critically, [...] admitted that Defendant did not make any representations to him about Exhibit S.  17T7-14 to 10-12, 167-23 to -25; 18T13-25 to 29-14; 25T86-20 to 110-4; 26T23-3 to -11.  Between June 27 and 30, 2014, [...] exchanged emails (D-222 in evidence) with his friend, accountant and eventual expert, [...] (“[...]”), asking him for guidance on the buyout and Exhibit S (P-48 and P-50).
[brief] Providing a factual basis for his guilty plea, defendant testified that on March 9, 2019, he placed his hand over the nose and mouth of his six-week-old daughter, [...], to prevent her from breathing when he attempted to put her to sleep, killing her as a result.  Agreeing that his conduct was reckless, defendant further testified that on previous occasions he did the same thing to his 15-month-old son, who survived.  (1T14-24 to 16-24).  The 10-year prison sentence that defendant was serving at the time of his sentencing in the instant matter was for his convictions in connection with his abuse of his 15-month-old son, [...] (2T14-6 to 8).  In that case, defendant was captured on video striking the baby, picking him up by his neck, swinging him around, and attempting to smother [...] by placing his hands over the child’s face, leaving the boy gasping for air while defendant blew smoke in the boy’s face from a vape pen.  On a separate occasion, defendant burned the child while giving him a bath and refrained from seeking medical attention for the boy, concealing the burns instead.  (2T11-9 to 12-15).  Defendant pleaded guilty to one count of second-degree aggravated assault, two counts of second-degree endangering the welfare of a child, and one count of fourth-degree tampering with physical evidence.  He was sentenced to an aggregate term of imprisonment of 10 years subject to NERA.  (Da25).  Requesting that defendant be sentenced in accordance with the plea agreement in the instant matter, the prosecutor argued for the application of aggravating factors 1 (nature and circumstances of the offense), 2 (harm to the victim), 3 (risk of another offense), 6 (prior record), and 9 (need for deterrence), N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1a(1),(2),(3),(6), and (9).  (2T8-12 to 13).  Defendant sought to have the 30-year sentence run concurrently with his other sentence, arguing for the application of mitigating factors 7 (lack of prior history), 11 (excessive hardship), and 14 (defendant under age 26), N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1b(7),(11), and (14).  (2T28-19 to 32-2; 2T34-8 to 15).  [...] found aggravating factors 2, 3, 6, and 9, as well as mitigating factor 14.  Balancing those factors, [...] concluded that the aggravating factors substantially outweighed the mitigating factor.  (2T38-8 to 40-3).  Determining whether to make the sentence consecutive to the sentence defendant was currently serving, and assessing the overall fairness of the sentence, [...] concluded that imposing a consecutive sentence was appropriate because the cases involved separate crimes committed against two victims who were especially vulnerable due to their young ages.  (2T41-16 to 42-5).  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I
[brief] Silver v. City of Alexandria, 470 F. Supp. 3d 616 (W.D. La. 2020)..............................................38  Soules v. Mount Holiness Memorial Park, 354 N.J. Super. 569 (App. Div. 2002)..............................................31  Texas Dep’t of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981).......................................................................28
[brief] In response, Plaintiff’s representative responded that there was “no justification” for the Distance Regulation, i.e., that the Distance Regulation was unconstitutional.  (3/20/23 Transcript @ T73:16-T73:21).  The Chairman then pointed out that a variance hearing in front of the Planning Board was not the proper forum determine the constitutionality of the Distance Regulation; rather, the Planning Board merely had the authority grant variances when warranted under specific circumstances.  (3/20/23 Transcript @ T73:25-T74:4).  Plaintiff’s representative seemed to acknowledge that the Chairman was correct that this  The Chairman then reiterated:  *Just to reiterate my point respectfully, we've been friends for a long time.  You're telling me that I should grant a variance based on a presumption rather than what typically occurs here, and that's the introduction of why the existing ordinance can be flexible to fit a hardship, to fit a necessity, something that can't be done.  I don't hear that yet.*  (3/20/23 Transcript @ T75:9-T75:15).  There was then more discussion amongst the Plaintiff’s representatives and Planning Board members regarding the difference between arguing against the validity (i.e., constitutionality) of the ordinance itself versus arguing for a variance from that ordinance.  (3/20/23 Transcript @T75:16-T78:7).  Plaintiff’s position was that in arguing the ordinance itself was invalid, they were arguing in favor of granting a variance, while Planning Board members pointed out, in layman’s terms because they are almost all non-elected volunteers, that a Planning Board variance hearing is not the proper forum for challenging the constitutionality of ordinances.
[directive] •  New Jersey Is An Equal Opportunity Employer Printed on Recycled Paper and is Recyclable  Law enforcement agencies must refrain from including any statements that may impact the investigation, including but not limited to, identifying any individuals involved in the incident, attributing culpability or lack thereof to any parties involved or expressing support for, condemnation of, or approval/disapproval of actions taken before, during, or after the incident.  Any agency seeking to provide additional information not contained in the template below must first confer with, and obtain approval from, the Attorney General’s Communications Office.
[brief] [...] was subjected to frivolous litigation by Plaintiffs-Appellants in this matter.  It now seeks affirmation of the trial court’s decision to sanction Plaintiffs and further seeks the full amount of fees originally requested in its November 6, 2023 certification of fees.  Plaintiffs’ current appeal is only another example of their bad faith attempts to drag [...] into litigation.  [...] was originally hired to draft site plans for a redevelopment project taking place in downtown [...].
[brief] (PA000007).  Similarly, Plaintiff complained that staff was frequently sent from one group home to another in an attempt to combat Defendant [...]’ understaffing issue in direct violation of *N. J.A.C.* § 10:33A-2.8(b).  *Id.*  Pursuant to *N.J.A.C.* § 10:33A-2.8(b), “Reduction of staff coverage … shall be justified in writing and sent to the licensing agency and the appropriate Regional Assistant Director’s Office for approval. ”  *Id.*  When Defendants switched employees around to different locations, nothing was solved, as a fully staffed group home where staff was later transferred out was then left understaffed as well.  Again, nothing was done to remedy the understaffing after Plaintiff complained about same.  *Id.*  *Second,*
[brief] 38  ### TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | Cases: | Page(s) | |-----------------------------------------------------------------------|---------| | **Aqua Beach Condo. Ass’n v. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs,** | | | 186 N.J. 5 (2006), certif. denied, 115 N.J. 70 (1989) | 11 | | **Barrick v. State,** | | | 218 N.J. 247 (2014) | 11 | | **Bayshore Sewerage Co. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot.,** | | | 122 N.J. Super. 184 (Ch. Div. 1973), aff’d., 131 N.J. Super. 37 | 29 | | (App.Div.1974) | | | **Bergen Pines County Hosp. v. New Jersey Dep’t of Human Servs.,** | | | 96 N.J. 456 (1984) | 14 | | **Bueno v. Bd. of Trs.,** | | | 422 N.J. Super. 227 (App. Div. 2011) | 12 | | **Chemistry Council of New Jersey v. NJDEP,** | | | 2017 WL 6492521 (N.J. App. 2017) | 35 | | **Circus Liquors, Inc. v. Governing Body of Middletown Twp.,** | | | 199 N.J. 1 (2009) | 13 | | **Crema v. N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot.,** | | | 192 N.J. Super. 505 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 96 N.J. 306–07 (1984)| 13 | | **Flanagan v. Civil Service Dept.,** | | | 29 N.J. 1 (1959) | 11 | | **In re Adoption of Amendments to Ne., Upper Raritan, Sussex Cty.,** | | | 435 N.J. Super. 571 (App. Div. 2014) | 12 | | **In re Adoption of N.J.A.C. 11:3-29 ex rel. State, Dep’t of Banking & Ins.,** | | | 410 N.J. Super. 6 (App. Div. 2009) | 14-15 | | **In re Carter,** | | | 191 N.J. 474 (2007) | 10, 11 | | **In re Freshwater Wetlands Gen. Permits,** | | | 372 N.J. Super. 578 (App. Div. 2004) | 12 | | **In re Herrmann,** | | | 192 N.J. 19 (2007) | 11 | In re N.J. Pinelands Comm’n Resolution PC4-00-89, 356 N.J. Super. 363 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 176 N.J. 281 (2003) ……….. 11, 21 In re New Jersey State Funeral Directors Ass’n, 427 N.J. Super. 268 (App. Div. 2012)………………………………………23 In re Proposed Xanadu Redevelopment Project, 402 N.J. Super. 607 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 197 N.J. 260 (2008) … 13, 28, 29 In re Stormwater Mgmt. Rules, 384 N.J. Super. 451 (App. Div. 2006)…………………………………………12
[brief] (1T69-20 to 21).  The officer issued six motor-vehicle citations against defendant, including for careless driving, N.J.S.A. 39:4-97; improper U-turn, N.J.S.A. 39:4-125; failing to possess an insurance card, N.J.S.A. 39:3-29; obstructing the passage of other vehicles, N.J.S.A. 39:4-67; delaying traffic, N.J.S.A. 39:4-56; and operating a motor-vehicle while in possession of narcotics, N.J.S.A. 39:4-49.1.  (Pa1 to 6; 1T22-20 to 23, 135-11 to 136-3).
[brief] The standard of review in bid protest appeals under the Local Public Contracts Law, N.J.S.A. § 40A:11-1 et seq. ("LPCL") is deferential.  *Ernest Bock & Sons-Dobco Pennsauken Joint Venture v. Twp. of Pennsauken*, 477 N.J. Super. 254, 263 (App. Div. 2023) ("We use a deferential standard of review for governmental decisions in bidding cases.") (emphasis added).  A reviewing court cannot overturn the decision of a municipal body unless it finds that the decision was arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable.  *Kramer v. Sea Girt Bd. of Adj.*, 45 N.J. 268, 296–296, 212 A.2d 153 (1965).  "Even when doubt is entertained as to the wisdom of the action, or as to some part of it, there can be no judicial declaration of invalidity in the absence of clear abuse of discretion by the public agencies involved."  *Ibid.*; *In re Meadowlands Communications Systems, Inc.*, 175 N.J. Super. 53, 64, 417 A.2d 575 (App.Div.1980).  *Palamar Const., Inc. v. Pennsauken Twp.*, 196 N.J. Super. 241, 250 (App. Div. 1983) (emphasis added).  Unlike anything suggested by the Appellant to the contrary, we respectfully submit that the deferential standard of review applies to the entire record below, including any reasonable conclusions of law reached by the [...], whether this Court necessarily agrees with them entirely or not, provided that the [...] did not abuse its discretion.  *See id.* at 250 ("It is not the function of a reviewing court to substitute its judgment for that of the municipality's governing body and it is bound by the record before the governing body. ”) (emphasis added); see also 0011a-0013a, 0015a.  The cases cited by [...] to the contrary are either not bid protest cases, or they relate to whether a form required by law can be waived or cured when missing at bid opening, therefore they are of limited probative value.  See Carb9-Carb10.  Furthermore, even if this Court can review [...]’s Decision de novo, it is respectfully submitted that this Court should continue to apply the deferential standard set forth above when examining the conduct of the [...].  See Ernest Bock & Sons-Dobco Pennsauken Joint Venture, 477 N.J. Super. at 263.  As this brief demonstrates, the [...] took multiple factors into account, not merely legal, before arriving at the decision to award the Contract to [...].  See 0274a-0277a, 0010a.  Thus, we respectfully submit that there is no reason in this case for the Court to diverge from the deferential standard of review normally applied to bid protest appeals.
[brief] Defendant immediately asserted this matter belonged in arbitration, (Pa022).  Prior to Defendant filing a response to the Complaint, Plaintiff dismissed the lawsuit without prejudice (Pa012).  Thereafter, the parties attempted to settle the matter.  Defendant informed Plaintiff that if the matter was not settled Defendant would arbitrate; Defendant repeatedly informed the Court and Plaintiff that arbitration is where the parties’ disputes should be resolved (Pa043).  When settlement negotiations proved unfruitful Plaintiff revived his lawsuit (Pa018).  Plaintiff did so despite being put on notice of Defendants/Appellants demand that the dispute be submitted to binding arbitration before a mutually agreed upon Arbitrator in accordance with Paragraph 23 of the Shareholders Agreement (Pa031).  The Trial Court denied Defendant/Appellant’s Motion to Compel arbitration and refused to enforce Paragraph 23 of the Shareholder’s Agreement leading to this appeal.
[directive] This emphasis on control has resulted in discipline being viewed as a negative threat rather than a mechanism for remediation and improvement.  Too frequently rules of conduct and disciplinary procedures are used as an end in themselves, and their purpose in reaching agency goals is forgotten.  Focusing on the negative aspects of discipline diminishes officer morale and productivity.  2.0.2  The first step toward positive discipline is to emphasize instruction and de-emphasize control.  This requires the law enforcement executive to focus on organizational practices.  The executive must first define the goals and objectives of the agency's units and then announce management's expectations to guide the units toward realizing those goals.
[brief] Defendant waived his rights and gave a statement to police.  Defendant claimed he was on his way to New Brunswick for a memorial service and was on his telephone calling for directions.  Defendant stated he did not know the men who had entered the T–Mobile store, co-defendants [...] or [...], and denied dropping them off at the store.  However, defendant later admitted he dropped them off, but stated he did not know them.  Defendant claimed he lived in Pennsylvania, did not know where Edison was, and claimed he purchased his iPhone from a flea market in Columbus.
[brief] See Land v. Helmer, 843 F.Supp.2d 547, 550 (D.N.J. 2012) ("Malicious prosecution is an avowedly disfavored cause of action."); see also Stolinski v. Pennypacker, 772 F.Supp.2d 626, 640 (D.N.J. 2012) (cataloging the numerous expressions of disfavor).  LoBiondo v. Schwartz, 199 N.J. 62 (2009), cited by plaintiff (Pb11), is a malicious abuse of process case, not a malicious prosecution case.
[brief] ## Cases  **Endo Surgi Ctr. v. NJM Ins. Grp.,** 459 N.J. Super. 289 (App. Div. 2019) .........................................................  4  **In re Adoption of N.J.A.C. 11:3-29,**  410 N.J. Super. 6 (App. Div. 2009) .......................................................... 6, 7  **N.J. Mfrs. Ins. Co. v. Specialty Surgical Ctr. Of N. Brunswick,**  458 N.J. Super. 63 (App. Div. 2019) ......................................................... 3-4  ## Statutes and Rules **N.J.S.A. 2A:23A-13** ..............................................................................  3, 4-5 **N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4** ...................................................................................  6  **N.J. S.A. 39:6A-6** ...................................................................................  2, 7 **N.J.A.C. 11:3-29** ..................................................................................  6-7  TABLE OF RELEVANT JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS
[brief] ” (negative criteria).  It has been held that in establishing special reasons for a FAR variance, *Coventry Square v. Westwood Zoning Bd. Of Adj.*, 138 N.J. 285 (1994), and not *Medici v. BPR Co.*, 107 N.J. 1 (1987) controls.  *Randolph Town Ctr v. Tp. of Randolph*, supra. at 416.  Therefore, the applicant for a FAR d(4) variance must show that the site will accommodate the problems associated with a floor area larger than that permitted by the ordinance.  *Id.* at 417.  Here, the record reflects that the Board reasonably found Plaintiff failed to satisfy the criteria for d(4) variance relief under *N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70*.  The Board has largely addressed the failure of Plaintiff to justify the granting of the FAR variance as part of Point II(B) and II(C) above related to the d(1) use variance.