ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] In support of its request for leave to file its setoff-based counterclaim in this summary action, [...] cites to Perretti v. Ran-Dav’s Cnty. Kosher, Inc., which, at best, demonstrates that [...]’s proposed counterclaim belongs in the Law Division.  See App. Br. at 43.  In Perretti, although the defendants were permitted to raise their “civil rights violations and tort claims” in an action by the Attorney General, which itself “alleg[ed] violations of state kosher regulations,” the appellate panel nonetheless remanded because the trial court should have severed and transferred the counterclaims.  Id. at 625.  Perretti actually supports [...]’s position that, at best, [...]’s proposed counterclaim should be severed and transferred to the Law Division. \(^{10}\)  However, Perretti does not stand for the proposition that courts should permit setoff-counterclaims in actions to confirm arbitration awards (such as here), and [...] \(^{10}\) [...]’s proposed counterclaim is already the subject of litigation, also before the Honorable [...], J.S.C., in the Chancery Division, Docket No. [...], wherein [...] filed a Verified Complaint and Order to Show Cause, seeking to preliminarily and permanently enjoin [...]’s legally barred Hackensack Project claims commenced in arbitration, see Da492 (i.e., the claims at issue in [...]’s proposed counterclaim).
[brief] On May 8, 2020, [...] called 911 to report that she had seen a man beating a dog outside her home.  (2T 51-16 to 18; 52-11 to 16)  She testified that she saw the man kicking and dragging the dog.  (2T 52-14 to 16)  Officers [...] and [...] of the [...] responded to the scene.  (2T 60-2 to 12; 62-8 to 9; 3T 6-19 to 7-2)  Both officers testified that they witnessed a man punch a dog twice and prepare to hit the dog a third time before they intervened.  (2T 62-2 to 7; 3T 7-24 to 25)  They identified the man as [...].  (2T 61-6 to 16; 3T 8-1 to 11)  Officer Somonski took the dog to police headquarters and later turned her over to Animal Control.
[brief] “The Supreme Court has instructed that the assessment of the appropriate sanction for the violation of an order requires consideration of ‘a number of factors, including whether the plaintiff acted willfully and whether the defendant suffered harm, and if so, to what degree. ’”  N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. M.G., 427 N.J. N.J. Super. 154, 171 (App. Div. 2012).
[brief] As the Report repeatedly makes clear, the expert simply *assumed* that a multi-tenant retail use of the [...] was intended (absent supportive facts), could be applied for (absent supportive facts), and would have been approved (absent supportive facts).  Nor did the Report even opine as to the reasonableness of such assumptions.  The Report’s conclusions about loss of rent and value are based upon --- \(^4\)  Although dating from April 2019, the Report was not served until November 27, 2019. speculation, which is both unsupported by facts or documents and contradicted by facts and documents.  Thus, on page 1 of the Report (Pa 281), the proposed expert simply “assumes the subject [the [...]] would have been built as a 7-unit retail strip center. ”\(^5\)  Again, on page 2 (da282), and with italic emphasis:  “*the description, use and valuation of the subject under its to be Built scenario is referred to as a hypothetical condition and defined as follows:  1.  A condition that is presumed to be true when it is known to be false …*”  On page 14 of the Report (Pa298):  “11.  It is assumed that all applicable zoning and use regulations and restrictions have been complied with unless a non-conformity has been stated, defined and considered in this appraisal report.  12.  It is assumed that all required licenses, certificates of occupancy, or other legislative or administrative authority from any local, state or national governmental, or private entity or organization have been or can be obtained or renewed for any use on which the value estimates contained in this report are based. ”  Again, on page 16 (Pa300), the Report reiterates with italic emphasis the “hypothetical condition” caveat appearing on page 2 to explain the numbered “assumptions” including 11 and 12 quoted above.  \(^5\)  The Report also mis-states the nature of the development.  The [...] existed when [...] purchased the property.  It was not “built” by [...].  These “hypothetical assumptions” are flatly contradicted by each of the 18 versions of the site plan.  [...] never received, or even applied for, approval to develop the [...] for multi-tenant retail occupancy.  On the contrary, each and every site plan called for a single-occupancy use: a furniture store, a day-care center, a “wholesale” establishment and finally a motorcycle showroom.  D.
[brief] By applying the Holding Act and SSAP No. 25—which, again, is simply a reporting/disclosure accounting principle—to the AIF Fee, the Department is attempting to justify a means to its desired end: opening the flood gates to exert control over the profits of the AIF, despite having no statutory or regulatory authority to do so.  Not only is the Department’s attempt to apply the Holding Act and SSAP No. 25 unenforceable as improper rulemaking, but it is also simply impossible.  The Department cannot simply reverse its position after decades and demand that a business agree that what historically was an “unrelated party transaction” is now a “related party transaction. ”  This is contrary to the plain language, and the intent of, both the Holding Act and SSAP No. 25 and the Department’s procedural obligations under the APA.  The law has not changed, nor has the Department’s inability to apply the Holding Act or SSAP No. 25.  The Department’s arbitrary and capricious actions regarding same constitute improper rulemaking and cannot be allowed to stand.  In short, both by its words and its actions, the Department has admitted that the Holding Act does not apply to [...] and SSAP No. 25 cannot be applied to AIF Fees absent the adoption of new legislation, which has never occurred.
[directive] [예/Yes] [아니요/No]  귀하가 거주지를 변경하는 경우, 귀하가 등록된 지역의  법 집행 기관에  1.  b)  (1)  통고해야 하며, 귀하가 거주하게 될 시의 수석 법 집행관, 또는 해당 시에 수석 법 집행관이 없는 경우에는 주 경찰청장에게 귀하가 새 주소에 거주하려는 날로부터 일 이내에 재등록해야 한다는 것을 10 아십니까?  Do you understand that if you change residence you must notify the law enforcement agency where you are registered, and must re-register with the chief law enforcement officer of the municipality in which you will reside, or the Superintendent of State Police if the municipality does not have a chief law enforcement officer, no less than 10 days before you intend to reside at the new address?
[brief] A.  **Plaintiffs’ Argument That The Trial Court “Inappropriate[lv]” Focused on The Absence of A Transaction Between [...] And [...] Is Nonsensical. **  Plaintiffs contend the trial court made a “clear error in judgment” by focusing on the absence of a transaction between [...] and [...].  (Pb29-Pb33).  Once again, Plaintiffs have misconstrued both the law and the trial court’s ruling.  As explained above, the trial court never determined that a plaintiff cannot, as a matter of law, pursue a tortious interference claim unless the alleged tortious interferer consummates a transaction with the party with whom the plaintiff allegedly had a relationship.  Rather, the court found that, based on the circumstances of this case, the absence of a transaction between [...] and [...] foreclosed Plaintiffs from pursuing claims against [...].  Plaintiffs’ insistence that this case “appeared to be (and still appears to be) a classic case of tortious interference” -- *despite the absence of a transaction* -- strains credulity.  (Pb29).  Plaintiffs identify “facts” which they claim they became aware of in discovery (e.g., that “[...] conducted due diligence which must have alerted it to Plaintiffs’ presence” and that [...] supposedly offered a “‘credit’ for a new optical in Plaintiffs’ place”) and argue “the[] facts have never been disproven, nor would learning that a transaction never occurred invalidate these facts. ” (Pb30).  Plaintiffs have it all wrong.  Even if every single one of Plaintiffs’ “facts” were true (which they are not), Plaintiffs would still be unable to show that [...] maliciously and intentionally interfered with Plaintiffs’ alleged de facto relationship and that such interference caused Plaintiffs damages. \(^{12}\)  **B.
[brief] Second, even [...] admits that the “evidence” offered in support of his opinion is unreliable.  During the Rule 104 hearing and his deposition, Mr. [...] repeatedly testified that he concluded a dangerous condition exited based upon: (1) a video the Plaintiff recorded of the general area of the accident; (2) a memo prepared by project consultant [...] that mistakenly identified “settlement” on the southbound side of the Garden State Parkway; (3) the deposition testimony of Plaintiff [...]; (4) the Arora bridge inspection report prepared for [...]; and (5) a photograph in that bridge report showing the allegedly defective bridge joint.  (Transcript of May 9, 2022 Hearing, T133:9-T133:16).
[brief] For example, the applicant might demonstrate that the increased proposed density was only minimally greater than the permitted density in the zone or in adjacent areas.  Comparing those elements to this case, the permitted density in the zone is for lots of 20,000 square feet, so generally not more than two units per acre.  [...] proposal was for more than 20 units per acre, which was greater than permitted in any zone in the Township.  Therefore, as noted by the Court in Price, applicant could never prove that the increased density proposed was only minimally greater than permitted, or that the increase would not be substantially detrimental to the nearby residences.  In comparison to the case of Salt & Light, supra, to the matter at hand, the applicant was requesting approval for one “duplex to provide transitional housing for two homeless families in a neighborhood zoned exclusively for single-family residences.
[brief] Monmouth County Indictment  No. [...] charged [...], with two counts of second-degree aggravated arson, N.J.S. A. 2C:17-1a (counts 1 and 2); second-degree possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4a (count 3); and third-degree unlawful possession of a weapon, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5b (count 4).  (Da 1-3)  Prior to trial, the State moved to admit statements made by [...] during custodial interrogation.  (Da 1-3)  Following an evidentiary hearing, on November 21, 2019, the Honorable [...], J.S.C., admitted the statements.  (1T, 2T, 3T, 4T, Da 18-27)  The Honorable [...], J.S.C., presided over a jury trial beginning on July 12, 2021.  [...] denied [...]’s request to redact the portions of his statements in which he invoked his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).  (16T:84-25 to 111-14)  On July 30, 2021, the jury acquitted [...] of count one, and convicted him of counts two, three, and four.  (Da 28-30)  [...] filed a motion for a new trial, which [...] denied on September 29, 2021.  (23T)  On November 5, 2021, after appropriate mergers, [...] sentenced [...] to five years of incarceration on count two, consecutive to five years of incarceration with a forty-two month period of parole ineligibility on count three.  (Da 31-33)  On December 28, 2021, [...] filed a notice of appeal.  (Da 34-39)
[directive] D. communities.  The Identification of other potential actions against marginalized discriminatory use of [...]’s enforcement authority against the LGBTQ+ community raises questions about whether these powers were used to target other marginalized communities in New Jersey.  To that end, [...] shall review its Bulletins and other historical documents determine whether its enforcement authority was used in a discriminatory manner in other instances and report back to the [...] on recommended actions no later than October 15, 2021.
[brief] In a further attempt to circumvent its inability to bring a claim against Respondents under the NJCFLA, Appellant argues that Respondents’ purported failure to be licensed gives rise to a claim under the NJCFA.  But where there is no private right of action or private remedy under an individual licensing statute, there is no basis for a private right under the NJCFA.  *Valentine*, *supra* (Da35-Da57); see *Woo-Padva 2*, *supra*; *Henderson v. Hertz Corp.*, 2006 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2871, at *14, 2005 WL 4127090 (N.J. App. Div. June 22, 2006)\(^{16}\) (denying the plaintiff’s opportunity to bootstrap a licensing failure into a NJCFA claim).  In *Woo-Padva 2* and *Valentine*, again the courts rejected these identical arguments and held that the plaintiff lacked standing to bring their claims under the \(^{15}\) (Da58-Da63).  \(^{16}\) (Da10-Da16).  NJCFA because the only acts or practices the plaintiff alleged giving rise to her cause of action for consumer fraud related to the defendant’s licensure status.  Both actions were dismissed because the courts held that not only is there no private right of action under the NJCFLA, but any attempt to circumvent that lack of a private right of action and bootstrap the failure to be licensed to other claims fails as a matter of law.  See Woo-Padva 2, 2023 N.J.  Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1550, at *9\(^{17}\); Valentine, supra (Da35-Da57; Da49-Da50).  Similarly, in Browne v. Nat'l Collegiate Student Loan Trust, the district court held that the plaintiff's claims for a declaratory judgment, violations of the NJCFA, and unjust enrichment based on the defendant not having a consumer lending license failed because the NJCFLA did not provide the plaintiff with a private right of action.  2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 244537 at *7; see also Woo-Padva v. [...], 2022 N.J. Super. Lexis 96, at *9 (Sup. Ct. Bergen Cnty. Jan. 21, 2022) (re-affirming the reasoning of Browne and holding no claim for consumer fraud solely because of a violation of the NJCFLA).  No different here, the Lower Court correctly held: [t]he Court finds that the effort to use that violation to then create – make a Consumer Fraud Act claim is an infamous bootstrapping of that.  \(^{17}\) (Da58-Da63).  Indeed, none of the acts alleged in the Complaint fall outside the scope of the NJCFA.  As a result, because there is no private right of action under the NJCFLA (see Point I(A), supra), Appellant lacks standing to bring his alleged claims as a NJCFA claim.  See Woo Padva 2 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1550 at *8-9; Henderson, 2006 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2871, at *14\(^{18}\).  II.
[directive] Addendum B | April 2022  Vehicular Pursuit Policy  (b) the officer deploying the authorized tire deflation device should be in position to allow sufficient time for deployment; (c) the supervisor must coordinate the efforts of all law enforcement units involved in the pursuit; (d) the communications operator shall notify all units of the location of the authorized tire deflation device deployment; (e) the officer operating the authorized tire deflation device should take a position of safety as the pursued vehicle approaches; (f) the officer shall deploy or activate the authorized tire deflation device immediately before the pursued vehicle arrives at the point where it would impact the device; (g) the officer shall remove or deactivate the device immediately after the pursued vehicle goes over the authorized tire deflation device; and (h) the officer should immediately notify communications if the pursued vehicle impacted the authorized tire deflation device, if the officer observed any signs of deflation, and the direction and operation of the pursued vehicle after the impact.
[brief] 43 CONCLUSION................................................................. 47  ## TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ### Cases | Case | Page | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | Badiali v. New Jersey Mfrs. Ins. Grp., 220 N.J. 544, 555 (2015) | 15 | | Bender v. Adelson, 187 N.J. 411, 423 (2006) | 40 | | Bey v. Truss Sys., Inc., 360 N.J. Super. 324, 328-29 (App. Div. 2003)| 29 | | Big Smoke LLC v. Township of W. Milford, 478 N.J. Super. 203 (App. Div. 2024) | 37 | | Branch v. Cream-O-Land Dairy, 244 N.J. 567, 582 (2021) | 14 | | Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520, 528-29 (1995) | 14 | | Clinton Capital Corp. v. Straeb, 248 N.J. Super. 19 (Super. Ct. 1990) | 21 | | Cnty. of Morris v. Fauver, 153 N.J. 80, 103 (1998) | 17 | | Cummings v. Bahr, 295 N.J. Super. 374, 387 (App. Div. 1996) | 41 | | Deutsche Bank Nat'l Tr. Co. v. Vezeriannis, No. A-1376-11T1, 2013 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1588 (Super. Ct. App. Div. June 27, 2013) | 24, 25, 26 | | Ferguson v. Caspar, 359 A.2d 17, 20, 22 (D.C. 1976) | 20 | | First Union Nat'l Bank v. Nelkin, 354 N.J. Super. 557, 568 (App. Div. 2002) | 30 | | Friedman v. Martinez, 242 N.J. 449, 471-72 (2020) | 14, 45 | | Gannon v. Am. Home Prods., Inc., 414 N.J. Super. 507, 523 (App. Div. 2010) | 41 | | Global Am. Ins. Managers v. Perera Co., 137 N.J. Super. 377, 388 (Ch. Div. 1975) | 30 | | Globe Motor Co. v. Igdalev, 225 N.J. 469, 480 (2016)
[brief] On February 10, 2015, unaware of [...]’s request for disciplinary action, [...] followed up on his EEO complaint he had made in 2014 that he was told would be referred to the NJDEP EEO for investigation by filing a formal Discrimination Complaint Processing Form with the NJDEP EEO reporting discrimination based on age and gender as well as retaliation.  [...] specifically reported that [...] had engaged in discriminatory and retaliatory conduct including [...]’s statement, in the presence of Bureau Chiefs [...] and [...], that [...] “should not attend a 2014 ABC conference because [[...]] was too old.
[brief] This is what occurred in the First Arbitration, where [...]’s $899K EGP claim on the Hackensack Project was reduced to $0, and effectively set-off by the Arbitrator against the $2.1M that [...] pleaded it was due on that same project.  The fact that [...] believes there can be “12 different arbitrations” exposes the need for injunctive relief.  What happened is obvious: [...] lost the trial, had a $4M award entered against it, immediately looked to avoid paying, and, within days, commenced the Second Arbitration in a transparent attempt to leverage against the $4M award.  It cannot possibly be the correct outcome that [...] must be exposed to a series of further arbitrations against [...]—a party with whom [...]’s relationship stemmed entirely from a global agreement (the PTA) meant to govern the parties’ entire relationship.  The ECD required [...] and [...] to resolve their claims against each other in one case—not in 5, or 6, or 12 separate cases.
[brief] Where Defendant sought to have [...] overturn the Appellate Division and write a different agreement between the parties, that relief was denied.  (1T 50:9-17; 52:10-13; 52:20-53:8)  [...] stated “The request to find defendant in violation of litigant’s rights for failure to abide by the parties’ settlement agreement and prior order of the court is granted.  I am convinced that he has willfully failed to comply with his obligations, um, and so that relief is granted. ”  (1T 55:9-15)  Defendant is the only one convinced that Plaintiff engaged in fraud.  The trial court was not convinced and the Appellate Division was not convinced.  He continues to refuse to accept the findings of the Court and to comply with the Orders thereof.
[brief] *Id.* at 258. 44.  Soon after *Hackensack Water*, the New Jersey Supreme Court, in *In re [...]*, 35 N.J. 358 (1961) ("[...]"), announced a series of guiding principles for application of the standard set forth in N.J.S.A. 40:55D-19.  First, the Supreme Court held that "[t]he statutory phrase, 'for the service, convenience and welfare of the public' refers to the whole 'public' served by the utility and not the limited local group benefited by the zoning ordinance."  [...], 35 N.J. at 376-77 (emphasis added).  Second, the Court held that "[t]he utility must show that the proposed use is reasonably, not absolutely or indispensably, necessary for public service, convenience and welfare at some location."  Id. at 377.  Third, "[i]t is the 'situation,' i.e., the particular site or location . . . which must be found 'reasonably necessary,' so the Board must consider the community zone plan and zoning ordinance, as well as the physical characteristics of the plot involved and the surrounding neighborhood, and the effect of the proposed use thereon."  Id.  Fourth, "[a]lternative sites or methods and their comparative advantages and disadvantages to all interests involved, including cost, must be considered in determining such reasonable necessity."  Id.  Fifth, "[t]he Board's obligation is to weigh all interests and factors in the light of the entire factual picture and adjudicate the existence or non-existence of reasonable necessity therefrom," and, "[i]f the balance is equal, the utility is entitled to the preference, because the legislative intent is clear that the broad public interest to be served is greater than local considerations."  Id.  In sum, to obtain an order from the Board exempting a project from local zoning ordinances and regulations, a public utility must demonstrate two things.
[brief] ..........................................- 19 - McGahey v. Fannie Mae, 266 F. Supp. 3d 421 (ID. Me. 2017)  ...............................- 27 - Meshinsky v. Nichols Yacht Sales, Inc., 110 N.J. 464 (1988)  ......................... - 19 -, - 21 - MetLife Capital Fin. Corp. v. Washington Ave. Associates L.P., 159 N.J. 484 (1999)  ..................................................................................................................-  6 -, - 7 - Myska v. New Jersey Mfr. Ins. Co., 440 N.J. Super. 458 (App. Div. 2015)
[brief] Via its Statements, pp. 5-9, the Response materially misstates that the February 15, 2019 application (“the Application”) (Pa6) filed by the appellant’s mother (“the Mother”) was the cause of action (“CoA”) below for his 1st claim.  Appellant’s 1st claim below was for a handicapped parking space and it was NOT based on the Application, but his July 01, 2023 independent request from the respondents to place a reserved handicapped parking space at his street front (Pa51), which request was grounded upon his independently obtained June 29, 2023 physician certification (Pa3) and notarized affidavits taken from the Application (Pa49-50).  The fact that the appellant obtained the June 29, 2023 physician certification (Pa3), when he already had the exact same certification dated January 19, 2021 (Pa4) proves his observance of the Statute of Limitation (raised via CoA No.1, pp. 10-12, and Point Three, pp. 22-23, of Appellate Brief).  B.