ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] 6, 7 Pro Cap II, L.L.C. v. Block 682, Lot 49, 2018 N.J.Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1347 (App.Div. 2018)  24, 25  Reaves v. Egg Harbor Township, 277 N.J.Super. 360 (Ch. 1994)  12  Resolution Trust Corp. v. Associated Gulf Contractors, 263 N.J.Super. 332 (App.Div. 1993)  12, 13, 18 Rogan Equities v. Santini, 289 N.J.Super. 95 (App.Div. 1996)
[brief] (Appx 520-32 ¶¶7, 26 and 36).  Accordingly, there are no disputed material facts on the record regarding Plaintiff’s criminal convictions that serve as the basis of the applicable statutory bar.  Given these undisputed facts, the Statute is clear: Plaintiff’s convictions for dealing and possessing drugs disqualified her from ever working for Defendant’s group home with vulnerable individuals.  See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:6D-64.  C.
[brief] 1.  Order of August 28, 2020  Dismissing Plaintiffs’ Complaint against Defendants [...], Esquire and [...] (164a-185a); 2.  Order of January 25, 2022  Granting Sanctions Against Plaintiffs and Awarding Counsel Fees to Defendants [...], Esq., and [...] (190a-203a); 3.  Order of June 30, 2022, Denying Plaintiffs’ Motion to Reconsider the Order of January 25, 2022, with respect to Defendants [...], Esq. and [...] (209a-232a); and 4.  Order of June 30, 2022  Granting Defendants [...], Esq. and [...]’s Motion for Attorney Fees (209a-232a)  Even since their dismissal in 2016 from the Law Division matter under Docket No. [...] (“2015 case”), plaintiffs have continuously attempted to bring [...] and [...] back into the 2015 case, arguing various alternative theories.  The Court, at each juncture, has denied plaintiffs’ requests to bring [...] and [...] back into the case.  Plaintiffs, in their new Amended Complaint filed under Docket No. [...] (“2020 case”), similar to numerous times in the past, simply seek to pour old wine in new bottles, making the same arguments before different courts in an attempt to obtain a different result.  Plaintiffs, differing from their past strategy, filed the 2020 case, which involves the same parties, the same underlying transaction, and the same controversy.  This Amended Complaint is highly improper based on numerous applicable doctrines, including the Entire Controversy Doctrine, the Doctrine of Res Judicata, and the Law of the Case Doctrine.
[brief] .................................  17  III.  THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN FINDING THE EXCLUSIONS DID NOT VIOLATE THE PUBLIC POLICY (1T at 22:4 to 23:18)  .................................................................................................................................  19  IV.  THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING [...]’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT BY DISREGARDING MATERIAL ISSUES OF FACT (1T at 22:4 to 23:18)
[brief] September 27, 2023  Clerk Appellate Division Box 006  Hughes Justice Complex 25 West Market St. Trenton NJ 08625-006  RE: [...]  Plaintiff-appellants v [...] and or [...] and [...], In Defendants-respondents  [...]; Appeal from orders of entering summary judgment against the Plaintiff, entered in the law div.  Hudson County Sat Below [...], JSC [...]
[brief] Why it allegedly took [...] five minutes to learn of the deceleration creates numerous issues of fact.  Why it then took another five minutes for [...] to place a call to [...] raises similar issues of fact.  Why they allegedly spoke for another five minutes, while [...]’s life hung in the balance, creates yet again another whole set of troubling fact questions.  Why [...] did not immediately notify the attending physician, [...], creates issues of fact.  Significantly, the [...] did not proffer an expert report that any of these alleged circumstances mattered to whether [...] met her applicable standard of care.  And then there is the most troublesome undisputed fact of all: that [...] \textit{never} called for the C-section: neither at 9:48 p.m.; nor at 9:53; nor at 10:03 p.m.  The C-section was not called until the charge nurse asked [...] to take a look at the alarming [...] readings at about 10:10 p.m.  [...] now claims on appeal that it is “undisputed” that she was not bedside at 9:48 p.m. and first learned of the deceleration at 9:53 p.m.  If these “facts” had been specified in the [...]’s Rule 4:46-2 Statement filed for purposes of the motions [Pa205-209; 398-402], Plaintiff would have certainly seriously disputed them.  But [...]’s deviation had been assumed, at least for purposes of the motion.  The [...] likewise did not frame any argument in their submissions that [...] met the standard of care applicable to her.  They submitted no expert report for purposes of the motions; they included no factual claim in their Rule 4:46-2 statement to this effect.  The excuse they argued at oral argument, on [...]’s behalf, is that she was not at the hospital at the time and learned of the alarming deceleration at 9:58 p.m.  Frankly, if [...] had immediately called for the C-section upon learning of these disturbing circumstances, Plaintiff would have dismissed the [...] from the case -- as she did after learning that [...], who had been a defendant, acted immediately when learning of the deceleration.  But [...] never called for the C-section; neither at 9:58 p.m.; nor at 10:03 p.m.; nor ever.  Yet this Court now has a “finding” from the court below that there is no material proof that a doctor who never called for a C-section deviated from the applicable standard of care.
[directive] The right to a jury in which the State must prove you guilty beyond a reasonable doubt?  [Yes/s1]  [No/No]  El derecho a unjuicio conjurado en que el Estado tiene que probar su culpabilidad fuera de duda razonable?  b.  [Yes/Si]  [No/No]  The right to remain silent?  El derecho a guardar silencio?  "Victims of Crime Compensation Office Assessment/Multa de la Oficina de Compensaci6n a Victimas de Delitos Revised Form Promulgated 12/31/2019 Supplement to Directive #01-18, CN 10079-Spanish Defendant's Initials by Fonnulario revisado promulgado para el 12/31/2019, Suplemento a la Directiva #01-18, CN I 0079- Spanish lniciales del acusado page 1 of7/pagina
[brief] Da118, 405.  The resolution of denial enumerates that [...] had not satisfied its burden of proof for the relief requested.  In particular, [...] had not established that the use variances could be granted “without substantial detriment to the public good and will not substantially impair the intent and purpose of the zone plan and zoning ordinance. ”  N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70.  Da131-138.  The proposed three story, 165-unit facility proposed a use in a zone that primarily permitted single family homes.  Further, it also required a density variance based upon the zone allowing one unit per 20,000 SF (approximately 2 units per acre), but [...] sought 20.4 units per acre.  The resolution referred to the 2018 application by [...] to rezone the same property for an assisted living facility with 150 units, which equated to 18.6 units per acre, and the [...], having the power to legislate and enact zoning changes, decided not to change the zoning for these uses on this Property.  Da129.  The Board knows that its powers are limited under State Law, N.J.S.A.  40:55D-62 and 70, and do not include the power to legislate.  The Board, therefore, correctly decided not to grant a use and density variance for a use and larger density than the governing body had just recently addressed and rejected for the Property.  [...] had failed to meet its burden to prove that the variances would not substantially impair the intent and purpose of the zone plan and zoning ordinance.  The Board denied [...]’s request to amend the zoning ordinance and permit a use which the [...] and [...] had specifically declined.  Da143, 7T 157:2-19.  The Board, understanding that zoning should be done by ordinance, not variance, denied the application and now appeals from the trial court’s reversal of that denial.
[brief] (Da887).  [...] simultaneously moved for a stay of the trial court’s orders.  (Da890).  Subsequently, as a result of an agreement between [...] and Plaintiffs, [...] withdrew its stay application and Plaintiffs filed papers supporting [...]’s motion for leave to file an interlocutory appeal challenging the trial court’s orders.  (Da893).  On March 26, 2024, this Court granted [...]’s motion for leave to appeal the trial court’s orders granting Plaintiffs partial summary judgment and denying [...]’s motion for reconsideration.  (Da895).
[brief] ”  N.J.S.A. 13:1D-151(a).  The Law recognizes the public’s “longstanding and inviolable rights . . . to use and enjoy the State’s tidal waters and adjacent shorelines” and that those rights are “not fixed or static” but must be “molded and extended to meet changing conditions and the needs of the public it was created to benefit. ”  N.J.S.A. 13:1D-150(a) and (c).  The Law requires the [...] to ensure “reasonable and meaningful public access to tidal waters and adjacent shorelines,” including “visual and physical access to, and use of, tidal waters and adjacent shorelines, sufficient perpendicular access from upland areas to tidal waters and adjacent shorelines” and amenities to facilitate public access, such as parking.  N.J.S.A. 13:1D-150(d) and (f).  Relevant here, the Public Access Law requires that individual permits for projects wherein the applicant proposes “a change in the existing footprint of a structure” must include a permit condition which requires “additional public access to the tidal waters and adjacent shorelines consistent with the public trust doctrine . . . .”  N.J.S.A. 13:1D-153(a).  To determine the extent of access required on a site, the [...] must consider “the scale of the changes to the footprint or use, the demand for public access,” and any [...]-approved municipal public access plans.  N.J.S.A. 13:1D-153(a).  While that section allows the [...] to consider other factors with respect to the amount of public access required, the section contains no exceptions for projects that “change . . . the existing footprint of a structure” and instead dictates that the [...] “shall require as a condition of the permit . . . that additional public access to the tidal waters and adjacent shorelines . . . be provided. ”  Ibid.  In short, once an applicant changes a waterfront structure’s footprint, that applicant must provide additional public access.
[brief] The State’s response relies on a critical factual error: that the police ordered [...] to stop after he began to run, and that his flight is therefore a factor in the reasonable suspicion analysis.  As a result, the State cites several cases in which the police stop a suspect after he or she flees from a police presence.  See State v. Doss, 254 N.J. ¹ Db: Defendant-appellant’s appellate brief Pb: Plaintiff-respondent’s appellate brief Super. 122 (App Div. 1992); In re J.B., 284 N.J. Super. 513 (App. Div. 1995); State v. Ruiz, 286 N.J. Super. 155 (App. Div. 1995); State v. Morrison, 322 N.J. Super. 147 (App. Div. 1999).  In each of those cases, the suspect’s flight is a factor considered in the court’s analysis.  But, here, the record clearly establishes that the police stopped [...] before he fled.  (1T 30-20 to 25, 47-9 to 20; 2T 8-19 to 9-3, 19-25 to 20-4; Da 9 at 0:40-0:50, Da 10 at 0:41)  Consequently, his flight cannot be a factor in the reasonable suspicion analysis and the State’s legal reasoning—all of which flows from this mistake of fact—is inapposite.
[brief] [365a–366a (emphasis added)].  As further support for his opinion that surface waters had originally continued to flow southeasterly through Defendants’ property before the curb was installed, [...] personally observed “alluvial deposits of grit and so on that had run off the driveway. ”  [254a at 40:25–41:2].  Based on his review of prior surveys and his personal observations, [...] concluded that “water would have to have flowed around the planter as it ran down the driveway as it existed” before Defendants modified their driveway.  [256a at 46:14–17].  After the modification, the curb obstructed the original flow of water along the rear of Defendants’ property.  [255a at 45:4–9].  [...] explained that only a “small amount” of water would flow through the gap in the curb near Defendants’ garage because the elevation of the driveway pitches toward Plaintiff’s property.  [255a at 45:10–16].
[brief] Here is a brief statement of those parameters:  1.  If the [...] is to be placed on a stable and solid fiscal footing, the following State actions have to be taken:  (i) the existing advance state aid loan balance must be forgiven in its entirety; (ii) the district must be reimbursed for repayments it has made against the loans;\(^{27}\) and (iii) the district must be reimbursed for all payments it has made toward the State monitors’ salaries and costs. \(^{28}\) \(^{27}\)The loans were a direct result of SFRA’s failure to provide the [...] with adequate funding for T&E.  In effect, they—and probably additional dollars—should have come to the district as State education grants, not repayable loans.  Therefore, any repayments already made or considered due should be reimbursed or forgiven.  That would enable the district to go forward on a fiscally stable and sustainable basis.  \(^{28}\)The Final Decision has called into question whether the [...] received value for its substantial outlay of dollars for salaries and costs of the multiple State monitors assigned to it for 10 years.
[brief] ”  (Id.)  Finally, the Trial Court awarded [...] reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs pursuant to the fee shifting provision in Paragraph 35 of the Settlement Agreement.  (See Da266a.)  The specific amount of the fee award was fixed and memorialized in the Trial Court’s March 8, 2024 Order, which was preceded by additional briefing and a November 6, 2023 hearing as to the reasonableness of [...]’s counsel fee application.  (See Da282a-89a.)  [...] has abandoned her appeal from the March 8, 2024 Order and any challenge as to the reasonableness of the Trial Court’s fee award to [...].  On April 15, 2024, [...] filed her initial Notice of Appeal and Case Information Statement.  (Da290a.)  [...] subsequently filed an Amended Notice of Appeal on April 23, 2024.  (Da295a.)  On August 21, 2024, [...] Beach Property she is now asserting.  The Trial Court agreed, and thus found that under the terms of the agreement, [...] is “prohibited” from asserting said released claims.  (Da281a.) filed her Brief and appendix, along with a revised Case Information Statement noting she was no longer appealing the Trial Court’s March 8, 2024 Order.  **STATEMENT OF FACTS**
[brief] As clearly stated by the New Jersey Legislature in the language of N.J.S.A. 40A:9-22.5, there is no conflict if there is no material or monetary gain that accrues to a government officer to any greater extent than any gain could be reasonably be expected to accrue to any other tenant on [...].  There were no facts showing that [...] had a material or monetary gain as a tenant on [...] let alone one that was any greater than any gain of any other tenant on [...].  As such, Plaintiff could not establish that the Mayor had a conflict of interest when voting to approve the Bond Ordinance, which in part, funded the removal of elevated “flex” parking spots on [...] that are available to all motor vehicle operators – whether Millburn residents or not - along [...] even those visiting Town Hall which is the down the street.
[brief] \(^{13}\)  Accordingly, this Court should affirm the Trial Court’s award of costs and fees in its entirety.  \(^{13}\)  As set forth in [...]’s Case Information Statement, [...] also reserves the right to seek reimbursement of his reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs incurred in connection with this appeal pursuant to Paragraph 35 of the Settlement Agreement, should this Court affirm the Trial Court’s ruling below.  CONCLUSION
[brief] _[...] Nat. v. Mitchell, 27 A. 3d 1229 - NJ: Appellate Div. 2011_  “[...] was the original holder of the note that [...] would like to enforce, and the copy of that note provided by [...] is not indorsed.  [...] has not established that it may enforce the note as a 'holder’ as provided by N.J.S.A. 12A:3-301. ”  The NJ Appellate Division said it loud and clear that lack of indorsement on a Note is a show stopper.  The unauthenticated copy of the alleged Note provided by [...], did not have indorsement from [...] to any party.  There is no assignment of the Note to any party.  So [...] was not the holder of the Note.  That is the UCC Law.
[brief] The video comes in.  [(1T71-21 to 72-2).]  [...] testified that he responded to the grocery store on July 16, 2019, to download the surveillance video.  (1T74-13 to 23).  This was shortly after the shooting occurred in the 6:00 p.m.-hour on that date.  (1T94-21 to 23).  With the consent of the grocery store owner, [...] downloaded the video.  (1T76-11 to 15; 1T80-1 to 6).
[brief] *Chulsky*, 777 F.Supp.2d at 847.  Indeed, the Lower Court correctly referenced the holding in *DepoLink* when it held:  “But we then have the Depolink case, which post-dates the Jefferson Loan, Gonzalez, and Yemolato (phonetic) cases and that specifically held that the C.F.A. was inapplicable here. ” (T57-1-4).  Thus, Appellant’s reading of the cases is simply incorrect.
[brief] In Lyn-Anna Properties, the Court focused on the issue of whether the Chancery Division could have ancillary jurisdiction over legal claims and, therefore, decide those ancillary legal claims by way of a bench trial.  The Court answered that question affirmatively.  However, it was noted that this rule vesting the Chancery Division with jurisdiction over ancillary legal issues is not to be mistaken to grant a Chancery Division judge jurisdiction over all matters before it simply because it was originally vested with jurisdiction.  Lyn-Anna Properties, id. at 330, 678 A.2d 683.  The rule of Lyn-Anna Properties is that the Chancery Division has ancillary jurisdiction over legal issues to the extent that those issues are "incidental or essential to the determination of some equitable question."  Ibid. (citations omitted).  When faced with claims that seek both legal and equitable remedies, the Chancery Division judge must "consider the nature of the underlying controversy as well as the remedial relief sought."  Id. at 331, 678 A.2d 683.  If the court concludes that the "predominant" relief being sought by the complainant is equitable in nature, and if there are ancillary legal issues presented that are "incidental or essential" to the court's determination of that equitable issue, then the Chancery Division judge may decide those ancillary legal issues by way of a bench trial, even if all of the issues in equity have been resolved.  The court, however, may not retain jurisdiction over legal issues that are neither incidental nor essential to the predominant equitable remedy being sought.  In such cases, the legal claims should be severed and transferred to the Law Division so that the parties may have the benefit of a jury trial as to those legal issues.  We must evaluate the trial judge's decision against this legal backdrop.
[directive] to (5)  Staying the Custodial Sentence to County Jail of of  The court may stay the commencement a custodial portion a sentence based on risks attendant to the COVID-19 public health emergency.  of of  To determine whether to stay the commencement a custodial term because the ongoing public health emergency, judges should consider whether a stay would pose a of risk to the safety the public or the defendant.  that regard, judges must consider and In of of of make findings the risk danger to the public, the risk flight and the seriousness on the offense, among other factors relevant to public safety.  Judges should also consider of the positions the defendant, the prosecution, and any victims.  The court shall state the reasons on the record for immediately commencing the custodial term or for staying 1 of commencement the custodial term.
[brief] 28 U.S. CODE 224, WHICH WOULD THUS RENDER [...]’S SECOND PCR TIMELY.  (Da 086)  --- 7  Court below did not issue written opinion addressing all issues raised, only issued order dismissing with prejudice the PCR petition.  See Da 083 for PCR counsel raising issue in submissions to the Court.  New Jersey Courts have failed to extend a bright line rule for relaxation on second PCR petition time bars.  *State v. Jackson*, 454 N.J. Super 284 (App. Div. 2018).  However, this Court should reconsider the current interpretation of NJ Court Rule 3:22-12(a)(2)(C) and allow second and subsequent PCR filings to be filed within one year of their denial in the Appellate Courts, akin to the federal habeas laws.
[brief] *Branch v. Cream-O-Land Dairy*, 244 N.J. 567, 582 (2021); *Kornbleuth v. Westover*, 241 N.J. 289 (2020).  An abuse of discretion occurs where the decision is made without a rational explanation, inexplicably departs from established policies or rests on an impermissible basis.  *Flagg v. Essex Cnty. Prosecutor*, 171 N.J. 561, 571 (2002).
[brief] (1T27-2 to 6; Pa26 to 27; Pa131).  She then informed defendant that he was charged with murder, possession of a weapon, and possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose, and she gave him a copy of the complaint.  (1T27-11 to 28-24; Pa27 to 28; Pa131).  She then confirmed that defendant could read, write, and understand and that he was not under the influence of any medication or intoxicated.  (1T29-6 to 15; Pa28 to 29; Pa131).  Specifically, defendant stated that he was fifty-six years old, that he could read and write, and that he understood Spanish.  (1T29-16 to 30-1; Pa28 to 29; Pa131).  When asked about his education, defendant stated that he had three years of business administration and engineering.  (1T30-9 to 12; Pa29; Pa131).  [...] then provided defendant with his Miranda\(^3\) warnings.
[brief] I.  STANDARD OF REVIEW(Pa0271) .......................................................................................8  II.  THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO ANALYZE  WHETHER ARBITRATION WAS WAIVED AND THE SUBSTANTIAL PREJUDICE COMPELLING ARBITRATION WOULD CAUSE THE [...] (1T17:15-18:19).  .........................................................................................................................10  III.  THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY ENFORCED THE ARBITRATION CLAUSE WITHOUT CONDUCTING THE REQUIRED HEARING (1T26:20-29:17).  .........................................................................................................................17  IV.  THE ARBITRATION AGREEMENT FAILED TO PROVIDE ADEQUATE NOTICE OF THE WAIVER OF RIGHTS TO THE [...] (1T13:6-10)  .........................................................................................................................21  V.  THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN BINDING [...] TO THE AGREEMENT, AS HE IS NOT THE "PARTICIPANT" REFERENCED IN ITS TERMS (1T:11:1-21).  .........................................................................................................................24  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS, AND RULINGS