ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] In recognition of the fact that interlocutory appellate review runs counter to a judicial policy that favors an uninterrupted proceeding at the trial level with a single and complete review thereafter, our courts exercise the authority to grant leave to appeal only sparingly.  Brundage v. Estate of Carambio, 195 N.J. 575, 599 (2008); Reldan, 100 N.J. at 205.  Yet leave to appeal should be granted when the grounds raised are substantial, and where the rights involved are too important to be denied review.  Pa. R.R. Co., 20 N.J. at 409.  [...]’s ruling suppressing defendant’s statements during the phone calls to his parents is not supported by either the facts of the case or case law.  Therefore, should the trial court’s decision not be addressed and remedied at this juncture, the State will be forced to try its case without evidence that was constitutionally obtained.  Moreover, the trial court’s decision would be forever immunized from appellate review and would leave the State without a remedy to challenge the trial court’s decision.  Here, in granting the motion for reconsideration and coming to the same conclusion that the statements made during the phone calls must be suppressed, the trial court merely acknowledged that it misinterpreted [...]’s reason not to let defendant use a landline, failed to properly consider [...]’s many attempts to prevent defendant from talking about the facts of the case (whether alone or during the phone calls), mistakenly linked defendant’s request to speak with an attorney to his request to speak with his mother and girlfriend, and continued its erroneous application of the Supreme Court’s ruling in State in the Interest of A.A., 240 N.J. 341 (2020).  Therefore, the State respectfully asks this Court to grant leave to appeal the reconsideration order.
[brief] Point II  The defective Affidavit was never “corrected”  Intervenor argues that the incorrect notary date on the Affidavit was “a mere clerical error …[that] was amended with the correct date.  16a”  341Ib12.  This statement is incorrect and misrepresents the record in this case.  The incorrect Affidavit of Service upon [...] located at 14a in the Appendix is the only Affidavit of Service which was filed and submitted to prove service upon [...].  This Affidavit is defective, alleges service upon “Linda” Milov (not his wife’s name) and is notarized two months before purported service.  It was never cured.  The Affidavit of Service located in the Appendix at 16a is the Affidavit of Service upon “[...], wife of [...]” and alleges service at their home.  These are two different affidavits referencing service upon two different people - there was no amendment or cure of the defective Affidavit at any time in the record.  Plaintiff attempts to make this same argument in their brief arguing that “the affidavit was merely a typographical error and was corrected to “August 23” on the subsequent document. ”  There is no reference to the record in this statement.  This argument continues to be posited when this document does not exist and was never filed.  The Affidavit as to [...] is defective, continues to be defective and was never cured, corrected or refiled.  Of note, Footnote 1 to [...] Brief indicates that [...] acquired the property “in his sole name in 1998. ”  PHPb4.  [...] testified that she has been married for twenty-three (23) years.  T3, p.24.  The evidence is contrary to their argument that he was married when he first purchased the subject property in 1998.  This fact is significant because it shows that the default judgment should not have even issued based upon the defective Affidavit of Service on [...] the sole owner of the property located at [...].  It is well settled law that when "a default judgment is taken in the face of defective personal service, the judgment is [generally] void."  Jameson v. Great Atlantic and Pacif Tea Co., 363 N.J. Super. 419, 425 (App. Div. 2003)(quoting Rosa v. Araujo, 260 N.J. Super. 458, 462 (App. Div. 1992), certif. denied, 133 N.J. 434 (1993)).  This judgment should have been voided by the trial court.
[directive] An authorized user may access and use stored ALPR alert data as part of an active investigation or for any other legitimate law enforcement purpose, including but not limited to a post-scan BOLO query, a crime scene query, or crime trend analysis.  A record shall be made of the access to the data, which may be an automated record, that documents the date of access, and the identity of the authorized user.  An authorized user need not obtain approval from the chief or designated supervisor, or Attorney General or county prosecutor or designee, for each occasion on which he or she accesses and uses stored ALPR data.  Once positive alert data has been accessed and transferred to an investigation file, it shall not be necessary thereafter to document further access or use of that data pursuant to these Guidelines.  10.2  Access to Non-Alert Data
[directive] You have been called to respond to a communication will vary with each person.  A variety shoplifting incident at the local grocery of physical conditions and medications can also affect store.  Upon arrival, you notice a woman a person’s communication.  The person with dementia being restrained by a store security guard, may find it increasingly difficult to express himself or who claims she walked out of the store herself in words and may have trouble understanding without paying for the bread and deli what has been said.  Delusions may occur and often meats she has in her hand.  She claims she did pay for them, but cannot produce remain fixed in spite of all rational evidence to the a receipt.  The woman is approximately contrary.  People with Alzheimer’s Disease may 5'5", 150 pounds, 65 years old.  She is report that they have been victimized when in fact annoyed and claims she is being they have not.  Problems affecting a person with mistreated by the store security guard.  Alzheimer’s Disease, as well as their caregiver, which may require police assistance include: home  What should you do? safety, driving, gun safety, suicide, behavior problems, shoplifting, abuse/neglect, and wandering.
[brief] In the OAL decision of [...] v. [...], 2023 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 153 (Ap. 6, 2023), the ALJ found that Gluck’s position as a sewage authority attorney was not eligible under Chapter 92.  First, the position at issue was not that of a municipal prosecutor and so provides a distinction with a difference.  \(^1\)  The undersigned apologizes to the Court for overlooking these cases in its Brief.
[brief] ”  The first examines if the petitioner has a “particularized property right. ”  The second considers the three-part analysis set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1975); In re Freshwater Wetlands Statewide Gen. Permits, 185 N.J. at 467.  [...]’s hearing request fails both tests.
[directive] the of any to commit attempt for adjudications (e.g., delinquency of adjudications other considering prosecutor from preclude a for offenses adjudications or ten ago, than yeazs more occurred that crimes orfirearms-related violent of the totality the as of relevant part may as be NERA crimes) or firearms-related than other pretrial seeking presumption against the overcome to whether determining when circumstances See 8.2.  Section in release of revocation seeking against presumption 7.2  Section the or in detention 7.6.1.  subsection also While or Another Offense for Release  Pretrial on While Committed Crimes Serious 7.4.4
[brief] See N.J.R.E. 702; Pomerantz Paper Corp v. New Cmty. Corp., 207 N.J. 344, 372 (2011).  Further, the testimony must not be net opinion.  Testimony constitutes net opinion when an expert offers bare conclusions, unsupported by factual evidence.  See e.g., Buckelew v. Grossbard, 85 N.J. 512, 524-25 (1981).  The net opinion rule “requires an expert to give the why and wherefore of his or her opinion, rather than a mere conclusion”.  See State v. Townsend, 186 N.J. 473, 494 (2006); see also Rosenberg v. Tavorath, 352 N.J.Super. 385, 401 (App. Div. 2002).  When an expert’s testimony is grounded in their personal views rather than objective facts, the testimony must be excluded.  Pomerantz Paper Corp., supra, 207 N.J. at 372-374.
[brief] Both were also subject to a continuing trial subpoena served by Plaintiff.  (Da79 and Da70).  [...] testified to an estimate as to the length of time she thought the “TMS” logs (Theater Management System) at issue were retained and she specifically stated that it was an estimate more than once despite Plaintiff’s counsel continuing to push.  (Pa110-15-18, Pa111-18-22).  [...] was also subpoenaed and present in Court throughout the entire trial, available to testify at Plaintiff’s request.  (Da76).  To settle the issue, in opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion, [...] provided the Affidavit of the person at [...] who could affirmatively provide that information, [...], the Director of Technical Operations Center for [...].
[brief] On September 22, 1992, more than four years after [...]’s last contribution, the Division of Pensions sent him a letter stating that he had to return to work by November 22, 1992, or his pension account would expire.  [...] never received the letter.  [...] was involved in protracted litigation against his employer to request accommodations for a disability, which he claimed he could still work as a police officer.  Upon being denied his LAD claim, [...] applied for ordinary disability benefits.  The Board denied [...]’s application for an ordinary disability retirement on the grounds it was untimely.  Under the applicable PFRS statutes, membership ceases after 2 years from the date of the member's last pension contribution.  The Board determined [...] ineligible because more than 2 years had elapsed since his last contribution and because he was not a member in service at the time of the application.  The Appellate Division reversed, holding that the time period should be relaxed:
[brief] 21 Diakamopoulos v. Monmouth Med. Ctr., 312 N.J. Super. 20 (App. Div. 1998).............................. 33, 41 Dolson v. Anastasia, 55 N.J. 2 (1969) .......................................................... 7, 17 Dong v. Alape, 361 N.J. Super. 106 (App. Div. 2003) .............................
[brief] On or about September 25, 2022, the Decedent was shot first in the leg (at or about the Subject Premises) and later in the chest by a patron of an illegal, large, makeshift liquor concession stand, which had been set up on the Subject Premises for months and continuously served alcohol to the residents of the Subject Premises and adjacent affordable housing well into the night and early morning hours.  The Decedent’s brother, Plaintiff [...], was forced to watch his brother be brutally gunned down in acts of senseless violence.  At all relevant times, both Defendants failed to protect against a dangerous condition on the Subject Premises – the open and obvious operation of an illegal, large, makeshift liquor concession stand, causing the public inebriation of dozens of residents and other congregants, resulting in frequent physical fighting and similar mayhem, and eventually resulting in the murder of [...].  At all relevant times, the Defendants’ employees failed in their ministerial duties to terminate the illegal and ongoing sale of alcohol at the illegal, large, makeshift liquor concession stand by removing it from the Subject Premises, for months prior to the shooting.  The illegal, large, makeshift liquor concession stand was routinely set up in plain view, giving Defendants actual and constructive knowledge of its existence before [...] was murdered.  The presence of the large, makeshift liquor concession stand on the Subject Premises was illegal, since the sale of alcoholic beverages on the Subject Premises – near a basketball court and playground – was illegal.  Plaintiffs alleged facts to support a finding of a dangerous condition on public property – the presence of the illegal, large, makeshift liquor concession stand on the Subject Premises for months before Decedent was shot, for which the Defendants are not immune from liability under the New Jersey Tort Claims Act, N.J.S.A. 59:1-1 et seq. (“TCA”).  Defendants permitted the physical presence of the illegal, large, makeshift liquor concession stand on the Subject Premises, which created a dangerous condition beyond the “mere presence on public property of persons with criminal intent,” as it lured those persons and the public to the Subject Premises for months, leading to [...]’s murder.  For the reasons provided in greater detail below, Plaintiffs respectfully submit that the lower court’s dismissal of Plaintiffs’ Complaint with prejudice should be reversed, and the matter remanded back to the lower court for further proceedings.
[brief] (Da 94-95, 99)  Contrary to the trial court ruling that [...] did not mislead [...] by promising leniency (5T 56-23 to 61-19), the detective’s lie that “the truth can only help your case” was wholly improper.  This false statement is indistinguishable from the false statements in *L.H.* that “the truth would be helpful,” and in *O.D.A.-C.* that defendant’s words were “not going to work against you” but instead, “[a]nything you say. . . is only going to help you; it’s not going to hurt you” that required suppression in those cases.  *L.H.*, 239 N.J. at 47; *O.D.A.-C.*, 250 N.J. at 423.  These comments impermissibly “countered and diminished the significance of the *Miranda* warnings. ”  *O.D.A.-C.*, 250 N.J. at 423.  In light of these false assurances from [...] that speaking to police would “only help” [...]’s case, the trial court erred in finding [...]’s formal interrogation admissible.
[brief] In 2005, concerned that the State’s public pension systems were rife with abuse and upon the verge of a fiscal crisis in the funding of these benefits, the Legislature undertook a comprehensive study and review of these problems.  N.J. Benefits Review Task Force, Report of the Benefits Review Task Force to Acting Governor [...] at 3 (December 1, 2005).  The New Jersey Benefits Review Task Force issued a final report and recommendations in December 2005.  Ibid.  The Task Force described the problem relevant here as follows: the rules that allow the politically well-connected to game the system for their own benefit must be changed.  The pension system exists to serve public employees who dedicate their careers to government and the eligibility rule must ensure that only they can participate.  When non-deserving individuals are allowed to essentially freeload off the system, everyone loses.  The bottom line is the system must be returned to those for whom it was designed.  [Id. at 4.]  The Task Force made specific recommendations to eliminate these practices stating:  Since the principal purpose of any public retirement plan is to provide adequate retirement benefits, such coverage should only be extended to “true” public employees.  _____________________ the Board as the Department of Labor).  (Pb2).  “Pa” refers to [...]’s appendix; “Pb” refers to his brief.  [...]’s appendix starts numbering at Pa81.  3 Report can be found at http:www.state.nj.us/benefitsreview/final_report.pdf.  a)  Professional services vendors, such as municipal attorneys, tax assessors, etc., who are retained under public contracts approved by an appointing agency should not be eligible for a pension.  In our opinion, these employees simply do not meet the original purpose of the public retirement plan and should not be eligible to participate in any pension plan.  In addition to preserving the integrity of the pension funds for those who had dedicated their lives to public service, this change will also serve as a disincentive to “tacking. ”  [Id. at 18.]  A Special Session Joint Legislative Committee on Public Employee Benefits Reform was convened, considered the Task Force Report Recommendations, held hearings and issued its Final Report on December 1, 2006.
[brief] A member or retiree shall not be eligible for the presumption or recalculation under this subsection unless within two years of the effective date of this act, P.L.2019, c.157, the member or retiree files a written and sworn statement with the retirement system on a form provided by the board of trustees thereof indicating the dates and locations of service.  [L. 2019, c. 157 (codified at N.J.S.A. 53:5A-10(e)(4)).]  Thus, under the plain language of the statute [...] is ineligible for the presumption or recalculation provided under the Ricci Act because he failed to file by July 8, 2021.  Further, while New Jersey pension statutes are construed liberally because of their remedial character, *Geller v. Dep’t of Treasury*, 53 N.J. 591, 597-98 (1969), “an employee has only such rights and benefits as are based upon and within the scope of the provisions of the statute. ”
[brief] (2T 5-23 to 6-1)  And, similarly to [...], [...] only shifted the conversation to the armed robbery after [...] had waived his rights and identified himself and [...] in the still photographs from the RT-TOIC video.  (1T 30-5 to 22)  The trickery in this interrogation was so obvious that the court affirmatively stated twice on the record that [...] misled [...] into believing that he was waiving his rights to discuss a more minor charge.  (1T 91-1 to 2, 92-7)  Additionally, the court confirmed that no reasonable person in [...]’s position would have known that he was the target of a robbery investigation.  (1T 90-8 to 25)  Because [...] was misled about his status at the beginning of the interrogation, his waiver was involuntary.
[brief] (Pa95)  6.  In correcting the record, Petitioner testified that it is the Court Administrator, with recommendations from the Petitioner, who selects a substitute prosecutor when the Petitioner is on vacation or sick.  (T32-15)  7.  While sometimes the evening session prosecutor does substitute for the Petitioner, it is not based upon the substitute prosecutor's RFP appointment which is limited to him being the Township’s special DWI prosecutor.  (T33-9)  8.  Petitioner testified in detail about the sequence of the work and how it is completely controlled by the employer, [...] and its officials and not her.  (T33-22)  9.  [...] also confirmed that during Court sessions, Petitioner renders the services personally under this Factor.  (T158-9)  10.  [...] confirmed that the times when a substitute prosecutor was necessary were the exception to the rule.  (T159-7)  11.  When [...] was confronted with the fact that Petitioner does not choose her own substitute prosecutor, she admitted that leaned toward employee status.  (T159-10)  12.  With respect to [...]’s conflation of the special DWI prosecutor substituting for the Petitioner in regular Court sessions and not in DWI Court sessions, she was not aware of whether that was part of his DWI services which were procured by an RFP.  (T160-16)  13.  [...] confirmed that it is the municipal court who has the responsibility to find the Petitioner’s replacement and not the Petitioner herself.  (T193-11)  14.  [...] also had no knowledge or other information that anyone else in the Petitioner’s Law Firm would assist her in performing any municipal prosecutor services.  (T193-16)⁴ 15.  The only evidence the Board seems to rely upon goes back to the special DWI prosecutor who substitutes for the Petitioner occasionally, but not within his duties as the special DWI prosecutor.
[brief] *Funeral Home Mgmt., Inc. v. Basralian*, 319 N.J.Super. 200, 208 (App.Div.1999).  Where a zoning board has denied a variance, the proponent has the "heavy burden" of proving that the evidence before the board "was so overwhelmingly in favor of the applicant that the board's action can be said to be arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable."  *Medical Realty Assoc. v. Board of Adj. of Summit*, 228 N.J.Super. 226, 233 (App.Div.1988).  This greater deference arises in part from the recognition that only exceptional cases warrant use variances because this state's legislative policy strongly favors "land use planning by ordinance rather than by variance."  See *Funeral Home Mgmt. Inc. v. Basralian*, *supra* (319 N.J.Super. at 207) (quoting *Elco v. R.C. Maxwell Co.*, 292 N.J.Super. 118, 126, (App.Div.1996)).  *Northeast Towers, Inc. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment of Borough of West Patterson*, 327 N.J. Super. 476, 493-494 (App.Div.2000).  Emphasis added.  Moreover, *A board has the choice of accepting or rejecting testimony of witnesses.  Where reasonably made, such choice is conclusive on appeal.*  *Kramer v. Board of Adj., Sea Girt*, *supra*, 45 N.J. at 298, 212 A.2d 153) (quoting *Reinauer Realty Corp. v. Nucera*, 59 N.J. Super. 189, 201, 157 A 2d. 524 (App. Div.), *certif. denied*, 32 N.J. 347, 160 A2d. 845 (1960)); *Id.* At 498.  Emphasis added.  Thus, there are three types of determinations built into each presumptively valid variance decision by a Board: findings of fact (which includes findings concerning witness credibility and the probative value of evidence), which should be upheld by a reviewing court unless not reasonably supported by the record; interpretations or applications of law, which are subject to *de novo* review by the courts, and discretionary decisions to grant or deny particular variances, which are entitled to substantial deference and should be upheld unless they are based upon unreasonable factual determinations, or an incorrect interpretation or application of the law.
[brief] At issue in these proceedings is the validity and enforceability of waiver and arbitration provisions of Defendsnt [...]’s (“[...]”) 8 page, standardized, pre-printed “Small Business Contract” (“Contract”) dated June 30, 2022 in a consumer transaction to provide security services to Plaintiff, [...] (“[...]”).  This document was presented to [...]’s owner, Plaintiff [...] (“[...]”) on an iPad by [...]’s salesperson, who was unauthorized to negotiate any terms, on a take-it-or-leave-it basis.  [...] signed the cover page of the Contract on behalf of [...] and was not shown the remaining pages.  [...] did not individually sign the Contract and Plaintiff, [...] (“[...]”) did not sign the Contract.  [...] did not sign the Contract.  Thereafter, [...] arranged for installation of the security equipment by its subcontractor, Defendant [...]  (“[...]”) which, in turn, arranged for installation by Defendant, [...] (“[...]”).  Plaintiffs were not advised by [...] and were unaware of the involvement of subcontractors until many months later when [...] sought to hold them responsible for the Plaintiffs’ claims.  Malfunctioning equipment and installation related leaks/damage were immediately reported to [...] by Plaintiffs.  For approximately 5 months, [...] responded to these problems and attempted to fix them, without success.  Plaintiffs instituted suit in October 2023, including claims for damages and consumer fraud.  [...] has asserted its contractual waiver and arbitration defenses.  Plaintiffs challenged the validity and enforceability of provisions of the Contract by Motion that was denied by the trial court, without oral argument requested by all responding parties, without any evidential hearing, and without any findings to support its conclusion that “this court finds the arbitration agreement states the terms clearly and unambiguously. ”  The Court held that Plaintiffs “have not identified how this arbitration agreement is not enforceable. ”  This appeal follows.
[brief] ” (State v. Galicia, 210 N.J. 364, 388 (2012)).  If not testifying as an expert, a witness’ testimony consisting of opinions or inferences may be admitted if it “is rationally based on the witness’ perception” and “will assist in understanding the witness’ testimony or in determining a fact in issue. ” (N.J.R.E. 701).  An officer may provide fact testimony, meaning what he “perceived through one or more senses,” but cannot convey information about what he “‘believed, ‘thought,’ or ‘suspected. ’” (State v. McLean, 205 N.J. 438, 460 (2011)(citing State v. Nesbitt, 185 N.J. 504, 514-15 (2006); see also State v. Patton, 362 N.J. Super. 16, 31-36 (App. Div. 2003)(holding that an interrogating detective’s statements must comply with the rules of evidence)).