ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] Storage of information in intelligence systems  1.  A criminal justice agency may store information in a criminal intelligence system only if the following conditions are met: a. the information has been evaluated for the reliability of the source and the validity of the data, and b. the information has been classified as to its level of sensitivity, and c. the information is dated as to its timeliness, and d. the information is marked as to its suspense date for review or purge, and e. information that has not been updated during a five year retention must be updated or purged.
[brief] PLAINTIFF’S PRIMA FACIE PROOF OF PROXIMATE CAUSE  Both defendants contend that plaintiff failed to adduce evidence before the trial court establishing that their negligence was the proximate cause of plaintiff’s injury.  Defendant [...] contends that there was no evidence – circumstantial or otherwise – to explain what caused plaintiff to fall ([...] B26).  Defendant [...] cites the purported “opinion” of a medical expert that there is no evidence that [...] even fell ([...] B4).  Both defendants cite [...]’s own admission that he did not know what caused him to fall ([...] B10; [...] B6).  Neither defendant addresses plaintiff’s argument that the factual circumstances support the conclusion that it was more probable than not that plaintiff either slipped on the plywood strewn in front of the dumpster or tripped on the plywood causing him to fall.  The defendants maintain their position that plaintiff failed to prove by a preponderance of evidence that he fell as a result of their negligence, specifically, failure to maintain a safe place for the plaintiff to work.  Indeed, plaintiff did testify at his deposition that he did not know what caused him to fall.  But, indisputably, plaintiff fell and struck his head suffering a severe laceration to the rear of his head resulting in a subarachnoid hemorrhage.  A subarachnoid hemorrhage, according to Cleveland Clinic, is most often caused by head trauma such as from a serious fall or vehicle accident.  (https://my.clevelandclinic.org/health/diseases/17871-subarachnoid-hemorrhage-sah)  Plaintiff’s position before the trial court and on appeal is that consideration of the circumstances surrounding [...]’s fall support the conclusion that he fell as a result of the discarded plywood at the site requiring the issue of proximate cause to be presented to the jury.  [...] had just arrived at the site, had entered the house, and determined to throw some debris into the dumpster before starting to lay new hardwood flooring.  He walked without incident from the interior of the house to the exterior porch.  In walking, he was in an upright position.  As he walked toward the dumpster, he was still upright.  His next recall was awakening on his back on top of a piece of plywood covered with snow.  He was disoriented when he woke and attempted to stand but kept slipping on the plywood.  Ultimately, he crawled off of the plywood, got to the porch and went inside and laid down.  Yes, [...] could not testify as to what caused him to fall.  But, indisputably, he walked in an upright position from the interior of the house to the exterior without incident.
[directive] This Rule provides that if bail was not set when an arrest warrant was issued, the person who was arrested on that warrant shall have bail set without unnecessary Rule 3:4-1(b) delay, and no later than 12 hours after arrest.  See, however, 2C:25-26(d), which provides that in domestic violence cases, bail shall be set as soon as feasible, but Arrest on Warrant in all cases within 24 hours of arrest.
[brief] Plaintiffs pursued discovery from representatives of [...] and [...] to ascertain whether or not [...] trespassed onto Plaintiffs’ Property in connection with [...]’s preparation of SP 3.  In its decision on the record outside the presence of counsel, the court notes that there was no evidence of trespass by [...].  (2T Hearing, page 6, line 23 to line 25).  However, that purported fact could not have been determined prior to the conclusion of all fact discovery in this matter, and therefore, it was improper to award sanctions dating back to the date of the frivolous litigation letter, which occurred several months before depositions in this matter.
[brief] 5T33:5-11.  [...] had a tracheostomy and as a result required trach care and suctioning to prevent a buildup of fluid in his lungs.  A respiratory therapist was supposed to be monitoring [...] every 2-3 hours.  5T146:2-6.  Medications were to be given to loosen any mucus buildups and close monitoring was required when those medicines were administered.  6T185:1-186:2; 6T208:17-209:22.  None of that was done.  Defendant had only one respiratory therapist on staff, [...].  Although she saw [...] on the day he entered the unit, she was off the next day and so could not provide the care [...] required.  3T277:7-9.  The night before he died, his daughter was visiting when her father signaled her that he needed suctioning.  [...] had to go find a nurse and ask her to suction her father.  After a period of time, when the nurse had failed to come to [...]’s room after [...]’s specific request, she again went out to find the nurse.  She was at the nurses’ station on her phone.  [...] asked again that her father be suctioned.  It turned out that nurse, an LPN, had no idea what to do and sought assistance from another LPN.  The other LPN could not get the suctioning machine to work.  After further delays, [...] finally was suctioned.  2T42:21-48:23.  The next morning, [...] was in respiratory distress but was not given any respiratory treatment.  6T224:12-15.  Instead, the EMTs were called and the Director of Nursing was told that [...] was in respiratory distress.  4T60:6-11.  He stopped breathing and then his heart failed.  6T238:5-10.  He was pronounced dead at 8:45 a.m. on January 15, 2016.
[brief] ” (Pa2-3).  In the stated reasons for summary judgment for [...], the trial court ruled that the ongoing storm doctrine of Pareja controlled and that [...]’ report contained no conclusion in his report attributing [...]’s slip and fall to the recent paint job making the stairs more slippery.  (Pa5-7).  In the stated reasons for summary judgment for [...], the trial court ruled similarly as it did for [...]. (Pa9-10).
[brief] The Legislature included in the statute a list of disputes that “may” be subject to PIP arbitration as guidance to [...] in implementing AICRA.  [...] promulgated regulations to “establish procedures for the resolution of disputes concerning the payment of medical expense and other benefits provided by personal injury protection coverage in policies of automobile insurance. ”  N.J.A.C. 11:3-5.1(a).  An injured party, the insured, a provider who is an assignee of PIP benefits or the insurer may make a request for arbitration of a “PIP dispute,” N.J.A.C. 11:3-5.6(a), which the regulations define by adopting the statutory examples with minor changes:
[brief] In any case, [...]’s reasoning on both July 7th and October 20th that the State dismissal was for “absolutely the same reasoning” (3T-3-12-15) and “the exact same reasons,” (4T-3-24 to 4-1)\(^{18}\) [as Absecon’s Motion], may moot the State’s dirty trick.  Further, the Opposition’s being in the file also moots the State’s misleading our firm.  If Your Honors agree, you need not read on.
[brief] A common thread runs through these cases, namely none of them required the trier of fact to evaluate an attorney’s legal judgment concerning a complex legal issue.  Where a trier of fact would be put in such a position, New Jersey courts have required expert testimony to be presented.  It should be apparent by now that Plaintiffs’ Tort Counts do not require the trier of fact to evaluate [...]’s legal judgment concerning a complex legal issue, just as in Sommers, Brizak, Stewart, and Popwell above.  The Court in these cases found that no legal expert testimony or an AOM was required notwithstanding the fact that the claims in those cases dealt with the legal judgment of attorneys concerning legal issues: briefs, statutes of limitations, recording bonds and mortgages, etc.  The Court’s basis for finding no need for expert testimony or an AOM is that the trier of fact was not being called upon to evaluate an attorney’s legal judgment concerning a complex legal issue.
[brief] **POINT FOURTEEN [Erroneous wholesale dismissal of entire Complaint] (Argued at Pa409 – Pa443)**  [...]’s summary judgment motions and the court’s dismissal order fail to specifically address each of the ten counts and whether the Board can sustain the elements for a cause of action of each of the ten counts.  The court’s wholesale dismissal of the Board’s ten individual counts, without any analysis of same, cannot successfully meet the standard for the court to dismiss the Board’s entire 10-count Complaint months before the expiration of the original discovery end date.  To the contrary, a fair analysis dictates that the Board could sustain a prima facie case for each of the ten individual counts pleaded in the Complaint, and to the extent proofs were lacking, the Board indeed was entitled to obtain its answers to interrogatories and depose Defendants prior to the discovery end date.  **Page 48 – 49**
[brief] (2T 22-13 to 16, 65-25 to 66-4)  [...]’s father complied with the request, retrieved the memory cards, and gave them to [...].  (2T 17-24 to 18-10)  At around 3:00 p.m., [...] arrived and wanted to enter the house to search the footage from the surveillance cameras positioned ---  5  Because [...] and codefendant [...] share a last name, this brief refers to [...] as “the landlord” to avoid confusion.
[brief] [...] operated [...] in an unorthodox manner, though one not uncommon in small businesses, where personal expenses, including principally [...]’ and plaintiff’s, were paid from [...] funds and then [...] would seek to pick them up as income for the individual in question on [...]’ books.  (At times, [...] would go over with [...] the items that were not clear.)  2T162:10-163:1; 3T21:12-22:15, 40:2-15, 62:5-64:5, 123:8-25.
[brief] Receive and review [...] productions (Bates 10235 – 11125).  | 3.2 hrs. | $1,216.00 | $25,156.00 | | 39| 7/21/22 | Continuation of deposition | 4.4 hrs. | $1,672.00 | $26,828.00 | --- 42 Pa845.  43 Id. 44 Id. 45 Id.  46 Id.  47 Id. | Date | Description | Hours | Rate | Total | |--------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------|------|----------| | 7/28/22|  Review  Plaintiff’s supplemental document request to [...] | .3 hrs.| $114.00 | $26,942.00 | | 7/31/22|
[brief] In re State & Sch. Emples. Health Benefits Commissions' Implementation of Yucht, 233 N.J. 267, 280 (2018).  The Bill Ricci World Trade Center Rescue, Recovery, and Cleanup Operations Act amended N.J.S.A. 53:5A-10(e) to state, in pertinent part:  (4)  The board of trustees shall promulgate rules and regulations necessary to implement the provisions of this subsection and shall notify members and retirants in the retirement system of the enactment of this act, P.L.2019, c.157, within 30 days of enactment.  A member or retiree shall not be eligible for the presumption or recalculation under this subsection unless within two years of the effective date of this act, P.L.2019, c.157, the member or retiree files a written and sworn statement with the retirement system on a form provided by the board of trustees thereof indicating the dates and locations of service.  [...] was denied the ability to register for the Ricci Act and apply for amended benefits because he did not submit his registration form prior to July 8, 2021.  However, the Board failed to provide adequate notice of the Ricci Act, and therefore, the decision was arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable.
[brief] [...] compounded [...]’s initial error when she declined to consider plaintiff’s deposition testimony (Pa846-849, Pa1149-1151; Pa832-834; Pa882-883) and the July 1, 2017 [...] report (Pa694-697) on defendant’s second motion for summary judgment.  The January 24, 2020 order denying the motion for summary judgment did not state that the denial was with prejudice.
[brief] [...]’s report lists the stores present as of January 27, 1994.  Bayer Cert. Ex. A (“[...] Appraisal”) at pg. 49-52.  Contrary to [...]’s report, the appraisal report does not list [...], [...], [...], [...], [...] or [...] as present in 1994.  Id.  To compound the unreliability of Land’s net opinion, [...] baldly concluded that 516 items added “enhancement value to the property as a result of the improvements in furniture, fixtures and equipment that were functionally related to the then existing use” of $550,000—a voluntary decrease of the $616,635 appraisal by [...] by $66,635, simply because [...] “knew” how Land operated.  6T237:1-13.  Land’s report was nothing more than a net opinion.
[brief] The bottom line is it did not take that much time or effort to find these documents.  Rather than address whether the evidence in question was discoverable by reasonable diligence, defendant dedicates a considerable amount of his brief to discussing the alleged strength of his defense at trial.  Indeed, his brief reads like a brief in support of a motion for a new trial based on the weight of the evidence, including citing to the standard of review for such a claim.  (See Db19).  Although defendant sought a new trial based on the weight of the evidence, the trial court denied that part of his motion and defendant did not appeal that ruling.  Thus, the only issue before this Court is the issue raised in the State’s Motion for Leave to Appeal—whether the trial court erred in granting a new trial based on newly discovered evidence—which this Court granted.  Simply, his weight-of-the-evidence claim is not properly before this Court.  See Mondelli v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 102 N.J. 167, 170 (1986) (finding that where defendants did not file a cross-appeal, the court’s review was “confined to the sole issue raised on plaintiff’s appeal”).  Because defendant does not provide any valid explanation for why he could not have located the newly presented documents with reasonable diligence, but only explained why he did not try to do so, the trial court erred in granting him a new trial.
[brief] 14  TABLE OF APPENDIX  This Court’s Sep 6, 2024 motion order, [...]  ###  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | Published Opinions | Page(s) | |--------------------|---------| | Amerada Hess Corp. v. Quinn, 143 N.J.Super. 237, 362 A.2d 1258 (Law Div.1976) | 13 | | Fusco v. City of Union, 261 N.J. Super. 332, 337 (App. Div. 1993) | 6 | | Gennari v. Weichert Co. Realtors, 288 N.J. Super. 504, 672 A. 2d 1190 (App. Div. 1996) | 13 | | Hyland v. Aquarian Age 2,000, Inc., 148 N.J.Super. 186, 372 A.2d 370 (Ch.Div. 1977) | 13 | | Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Land, 186 NJ 163, 892 A.2d 1240 (2006) | 13 | | Wilson v. Amerada Hess Corp., 168 NJ 236, 773 A.2d 1121 (2001) | 13 | | Zeller v. Markson Rosenthal & Co., 299 NJ Super. 461 (App. Div. 1997) | 6 | | Unpublished Opinions * | |-----------------------| | New Jersey Statutes | |---------------------| | N.J.S.A. 56:8-1 et. seq.
[brief] The Supreme Court concurred that Tyler applied in Roberto, but reached that conclusion because Harper and Reynoldsville so required, not based on a retroactivity analysis under the New Jersey precedent that was alternatively analyzed in the Appellate Division’s Roberto opinion.  While concurring that Roberto’s claim was “presently pending on direct review,” the Supreme Court declined to endorse the Appellate Division’s proclamation that Tyler should not receive full retroactivity in other cases.  Appellants need no more, as the procedural posture of Appellants’ case is so similar to Roberto that the breadth of “presently pending on direct review” endorsed in Roberto captures Appellants’ case.
[brief] In re Camden County Police Dept. Pilot Program, 2014 WL 3928418 at 3 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Aug. 13, 2014).  Here, the City had a long-standing good faith past practice of requesting certifications from the [...] in advance of anticipated vacancies, in order to account for its thorough internal hiring process, and any potential delays in the process on [...]’s end.  This process, albeit faulty, served a legitimate public policy of ensuring seamless appropriate levels of staffing and supervision of its fire department, thereby making it ripe for a one-time relaxation of Civil Service rules.  The City never knowingly violated the Civil Service statute, and the [...] had no reason to know of the City’s unwitting violations until the City requested a certification that would have expired after the eligible list upon which the certification would have been based.  b.
[brief] On January 11, 2006, [...], [...]’s former counsel, and his parents Anthony and [...] criminally conspired with a court clerk and a police detective to illegally seize a copy of [...]’s FBI History Report (FHR).  In order to achieve the seizure, a false police report and a false statement to the FBI database was necessary.  The sole purpose of this seizure was to defame [...] in a civil contract dispute filed by the [...] on March 7, 2006 in the District Court for the District of New Jersey.
[brief] *Wash. Twp. Zoning Bd. of Adj. v. Wash. Twp. Planning Bd.*, 217 N.J. Super. 215, 225 (App. Div. 1987) (noting the developer expended considerable money to prepare plans during the time when the plaintiff was trying to decide whether to appeal).  See also *Rocky Hill*, supra, 406 N.J. Super. at 402-03 (noting the significant costs assumed by the municipality and the developer and the lost opportunity to “timely address and make changes to the ordinance”).  Repose is especially important in the context of redevelopment because, as the Legislature has recognized, there is already a disincentive for private investment in blighted areas.
[brief] ” (Pb 37).  This runs headlong in the totality of her testimony and the fact that the Chancery Division held her testimony as credible.  Further argument is made as to attempts at impeaching the expert testimony of [...].  (Pb 38-39).  Such arguments carry little weight, and do nothing to dispel [...]’s “highly probable” conclusion, which amounts to a virtual certainty under the standards of Osborn’s profession.  The Petitioner contends that signing the Antenuptial Agreement would have been impossible, as it was the day before his wedding, arguing:  Petitioner had no contact with Decedent that Saturday as he was busy setting up the private venue for the wedding while Decedent was preparing food for 65 guests at their wedding the next day.  (7T43:14-24; 7T48:16 to 49: 7).  (Pb 39).  **First**, it’s unclear how this activity would have precluded the signing of a document.  **Second**, the notion that the Petitioner was completely occupied with the setting up of the wedding lacks credibility.
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[brief] II.  THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN FAILING AND/OR REFUSING TO HOLD ORAL ARGUMENT, DESPITE PLAINTIFF’S COUNSEL’S REQUEST FOR SAME.  (Pa9-21; Pa23).  The trial court abused its discretion in refusing to hear oral argument on plaintiff’s counsel’s fee application, and failing to place its reasons for so doing on the record.  (Pa9-21; Pa23).  In its March 15, 2023 motion for an award of attorney’s fees and costs, plaintiff’s counsel requested oral argument if the defendant filed opposing papers.  (Pa23).  Defendant filed its opposing papers on March 23, 2023.  (Pa157-243).  Because plaintiff’s motion was substantive rather than procedural, the court erred in denying oral argument, and in failing to address its denial in its written decision.  See Raspantini v. Arocho, 364 N.J. Super. 528, 531-32 (App. Div. 2003) (while a request for oral argument respecting a substantive motion may be denied, the reason for the denial of the request, in that circumstance, should itself be set forth on the record).  Moreover, the court’s failure to set forth its reasons for denying oral argument, despite plaintiff’s counsel’s request for same, was reversible error.  In accordance with Rule 1:6-2(d), “[w]here ... the trial [judge] decides the motion on the papers despite a request for oral argument, the trial [judge] should set forth in its opinion its reasons for disposing of the motion ... on the papers in its opinion. ”  LVNV Funding, L.L.C. v. Colvell, 421 N.J. Super. 1, 5 (App. Div. 2011); see also Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., Inc. v. Checchio, 335 N.J. Super. 495, 497-98 (App. Div. 2000) (reversing summary judgment where the trial court did not conduct oral argument, which was requested by the moving party, because the court found no basis for relaxing the rule and the judge provided no basis for denial in the record).  Thus, where, as here, a request for oral argument on a substantive motion is properly made, denial of argument—absent articulation of specific reasons on the record—constitutes reversible error.