ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] 1(AA0100)  THE LAWSUIT FUNDING AGREEMENT  VIOLATES THE NEW JERSEY TRUTH IN CONSUMER CONTRACT  WARRANTY AND NOTICE ACT (N.J.S.A. 56:12-15)  In granting summary judgment on this count, the trial court employed the wrong standard for determination of liability under the statute.  The trial court properly recited the elements of a claim under the statute at page 7 of the opinion:  “A plaintiff pursuing a TCCWNA cause of action must prove four elements: first, that the defendant was a "seller, lessor, creditor, lender \(^2\) February 03, 2023 Hearing, 2T, Motion to Reconsider or bailee or assignee of any of the aforesaid"; second, that the defendant offered or entered into a "written consumer contract or [gave] or display[ed] any written consumer warranty, notice or sign"; third, that at the time that the written consumer contract is signed or the written consumer warranty, notice or sign is displayed, that writing contains a provision that "violates any clearly established legal right of a consumer or responsibility of a seller, lessor, creditor, lender or bailee" as established by State or Federal law; and finally, that the plaintiff is an "aggrieved consumer."  N.J.S.A. 56:12-15, -17.  The trial court found that the plaintiff, not the defendant, was an “assignee” (one to who property rights are transferred; Black’s Law Dictionary, p. 114). under the contract.  However, it was the defendant that was the assignee, the plaintiff was the assignor.  Additionally, the defendant is a “creditor”, defined as” one to whom a debt is owed. ” (Black’s Law Dictionary, p. 375).  “Debt” is defined as “liability on a claim, a specific sum of money due by agreement. ” (Black’s Law Dictionary, p. 410..  In this case, there was a specific sum of money due by agreement, and the defendant was a party to whom property rights were transferred.  Both those facts place it squarely under the act.  The trial court found a contract to exist.  The court went on to find that the transaction was not barred by New Jersey law based on two cases (Ladenheim v. Klein, 330 N.J. Super . 319 (App. Div. 2000) and Cronin v. McKim-Gray, 353 N.J. Super. 127 (App. Div. 2002)) that are factually distinct from the present case.
[brief] Defendant testified that he graduated the NJSP academy in May 2001.  (15T 139-8 to 9)  He testified that he had “hundreds” of NJSP business cards, in order to be able to leave them with anyone in a court or agency who might need to contact him.  (16T 59-13 to 60-24)  He also had a union card and courtesy cards, which he would hand out to family or friends in case they were to “get stopped in a motor vehicle” for “some type of traffic violation. ”  (16T 59-18 to 60-8)  The business card stated that he was with the NJSP, and listed his rank, name, phone number, email address, and the name of the unit he was assigned to.  (16T 66-7 to 10)  That was the card he would display if he were stopped for a motor-vehicle violation.  (16T 67-4 to 7)  He kept it in his wallet “right in front of my license,” he testified.  (16T 67-10 to 12)  He denied displaying a wallet ID in any of these stops because he no longer had one in his possession once he was suspended.
[brief] (2T22:16-21.)  [...] admitted that the alphabet test is not a standard field sobriety test that can be administered with reliability.  (2T33:3-12.)  Two pieces of evidence were moved: S-2, which was [...]’ MVR footage up to the moment of the arrest; and D-1, which was [...]’ MVR footage up to the moment of the arrest.  (2T39:5-18.)  Following the testimony, the municipal court heard oral argument on the motion to suppress.  (2T36:23-45:9.)
[brief] The economic loss doctrine is relevant to plaintiffs’ claims.  It is true that the precise words “economic loss doctrine” may not have been uttered or specifically referenced in arguments before the trial court.  Nonetheless, that doctrine speaks to the fundamental difference between torts and contract actions and the consequences that flow from proof of those claims, and should not be ignored.  In this case, plaintiffs did not prove and the trial court did not identify a specific, identifiable fund earmarked for a plaintiff that one of the defendants converted.  That failure precludes any judgment based upon the tort of conversion.  This is not a case in which the proofs support expanding defendants’ liability from a contract action to a tort to secure the advantages of a judgment based on tort, such as the pre-judgment interest available in tort actions pursuant to Rule 4:42-11(b) or to be able to claim the indulgence of the discovery rule. \(^9\)  It is entirely appropriate for this court to preserve the boundary between tort and contract law that plaintiffs seek to blur.
[brief] Plaintiff then shifts to MLUL 40:55-D-111 to discuss the proper referral for issuance of permits pertaining to historic sites and advises that per this directive, the HPC reports are to be made directly to the Zoning Officer who is bound by the HPC report.  Plaintiff argues that this interpretation is correct while the Defendant points out that this perhaps WOULD have been the correct method had Plaintiff even bothered to go through a proper permitting process.  In this instance, Plaintiff failed to obtain a Zoning Permit prior to moving to the HPC for advice, both before the work was installed and then even AFTER the violations occurred and plaintiff was forced to file for a zoning permit.  Per the Statement of Facts above, Plaintiffs sought a zoning permit on December 17, 2019 in consideration of municipal court violations.  The zoning permit was DENIED.  Despite the denial, Plaintiff did not seek a zoning application at that time in order to obtain zoning approval (permit) which would have then permitted them to move forward to the Historic Preservation Commission for advice on historically appropriate materials.
[directive] In addition to semi-annual qualification sessions for automatic and semi-automatic assault weapons, supplemental periodic training is required.  Quarterly Training.  Four live fire training sessions within a 12-month period with at least two months time between each session.  Each session shall be conducted under the supervision of a qualified supervising assault weapon firearms instructor and utilize a minimum of 10 rounds.  Two of these sessions may be used for qualification purposes.  Quarterly training does not apply to police carbines.  Supervising Firearms Instructor.
[brief] The Complaint’s own allegations make any such finding impossible.  Indeed, Plaintiff uses more than three pages of her Complaint to extol the virtues of [...].  Da_004-7.  She includes extensive detail on [...]’s athletic career, including that [...] is a former Olympic fencer who medaled at the 2016 Olympics, where she was the first women to wear a hijab while competing.  Da_004-6.  The Complaint also alleges that [...] was named by [...] to the President’s Council on Fitness, Sports, and Nutrition.  Id.  She also grew up in Maplewood, where Plaintiff teaches, and she is a business owner and author of three books.  Id.  [...] has been the subject of two biographies and is included in the Barbie line of female role models.  Id.  The Complaint further alleges that Plaintiff herself was friendly with [...] and found her to be upstanding and inspiring.
[brief] The Trial Court properly excluded evidence of Defendant [...]’s criminal conviction.  The trial court properly excluded evidence of Defendant [...]’s 2018 drug-related conviction.  Introduction of prior convictions for impeachment purposes is governed by N.J.R.E. 609(a), which provides:  “For the purpose of affecting the credibility of any witness, the witness’s conviction of a crime, subject to Rule 403, must be admitted unless excluded by the judge pursuant to Section (b) of this rule. ”  Pursuant to N.J.R.E. 403, “relevant evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the risk of (a) undue prejudice, confusion of issues, or misleading the jury or (b) undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. ”
[brief] (Pa96)  Three or four days after the incident, [...] went to the jobsite and took photographs of the site of the fall which demonstrated debris in and around the dumpster including the plywood referenced by [...].  (Pa198, 283 to-290)  On February 25, 2019 [...] underwent a speech language cognitive evaluation and was noted to be disoriented, have difficulties with short and long term memory, problem solving, cognitive organization, sequencing, reasoning, and safety awareness.  (Pa95)  He was found to have expressive aphasia.  (Pa95)  On February 27–28, 2019 an EEG monitoring study was abnormal due to focal asymmetric slowing over the left hemisphere and rhythmic deltas activity.  (Pa95)  After discharge from [...], [...] was treated at [...] from March 12, 2019 to April 29, 2019.  (Pa95)  Plaintiff could not expressly identify the cause for his fall and the defendants, [...] and [...], moved for summary judgment on the asserted basis that plaintiff could not prove that any negligence on their part was the proximate cause of his accident and injuries.  (Pa88, 197)  In opposition to the defendants’ motions, plaintiff offered [...]’s Answers to plaintiff’s Supplemental Interrogatories wherein it conceded that there was no site safety person or site safety officer on the jobsite on the day of the accident and that no safety backgrounds were performed for the contractors on the jobsite.  (Pa292, 293)  [...] acted as general contractor on the project.  (Pa132)  [...] contended that [...] hired subcontractors to the jobsite, including the plaintiff’s employer, [...], and were “co-general contractors” on the jobsite.  (Pa309)  When confronted by the accident site photographs, [...]’s principal, [...], testified that he believed [...] should have directed the clearing of the jobsite every day.  (Pa133, 134)  Plaintiff offered the expert report and opinion of [...], CSP who stated that the general contractor, [...], failed to meet OSHA standards in permitting the construction site to have hazards.  (Pa154, 161)  LEGAL ARGUMENT
[brief] ”  N.J.S.A. 2C:44-6b (emphasis added). 7  Even when N.J.S.A. 2C:44-6b does not apply, courts should order a psychological examination when there is evidence of significant mental illness that __________________________  7  For the ease of the reader, the pertinent portion of N.J. S.A. 2C:44-6b is reproduced below:  “The report shall also include a medical history of the defendant and a complete psychological evaluation of the defendant in any case in which the defendant is being sentenced for a first or second degree crime involving violence and: (1) the defendant has a prior acquittal by reason of insanity pursuant to N.J.S.2C:4-1 or had charges suspended pursuant to N.J.S.2C:4-6; or (2) the defendant has a prior conviction for murder pursuant to N.J.S.2C:11-3, aggravated sexual assault or sexual assault pursuant to N.J.S.2C:14-2, kidnapping pursuant to N.J.S.2C:13-1, endangering the welfare of a child which would constitute a crime of the second degree pursuant to N.J.S.2C:24-4, or stalking which would constitute a crime of the third degree pursuant to section 1 of P.L.1992, c. 209 (C.2C:12-10); or (3) the defendant has a prior diagnosis of psychosis.
[brief] POINT IV  SUMMARY  JUDGMENT  DISMISSING  PLAINTIFF'S HOSTILE WORK ENVIRONMENT AND HARASSMENT CLAIM [COUNT II] WAS WARRANTED BECAUSE (A) THERE IS NO EVIDENCE PLAINTIFF WAS TARGETED BASED ON HER RACE OR AGE, (B) SHE CANNOT ESTABLISH SEVERE OR PERVASIVE CONDUCT ON THE PART OF DEFENDANTS, AND (C) SHE CANNOT ESTABLISH THAT A REASONABLE PERSON WOULD BELIEVE THE CONDITIONS OF EMPLOYMENT WERE HOSTILE OR ABUSIVE.
[brief] "THE TOTAL AWARD IN THIS PHASE II FINAL AWARD IS: $5,127,443.48, plus post-award and post-confirmation interest at the Default Rate as calculated at the time of confirmation of the award."  Da428; Da478.  The Phase II Final Award with post-award interest in the amount of 15% per annum from June 20, 2023 until judgment is satisfied was subsequently confirmed by the court in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, who then entered judgment against Defendants on November 30, 2023.
[brief] First, the court’s ultimate conclusion on disparate impact did not depend on these studies and surveys.  The decision below mentioned not only surveys, but undisputed facts, common sense, and a wealth of cases reaching the same conclusion.  See, e.g., (Da133) (discussing Sterling, 232 F.3d 190).  It hardly requires scientific evidence to conclude that, as compared to cisgender students, “some transgender students may feel more comfortable disclosing their gender identification or expression at school rather than at home. ”  (Da131).  While the studies and surveys corroborate the court’s conclusions, its holding does not depend on them.  (Da131-33).  Second, the court’s consideration of studies and surveys at the preliminary stage was wholly appropriate.  Appellants overlook the established principle that preliminary relief is “customarily granted on the basis of procedures that are less formal and evidence that is less complete than in a trial on the merits. ”  Univ. of Texas v. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390, 395 (1981).  Indeed, New Jersey courts have repeatedly taken a flexible approach to consider probative information presented in a preliminary posture, especially when acting on an expedited timeline.  See Planned Parenthood of Cent. N.J. v. Farmer, 165 N.J. 609, 640 n.10 (2000) (taking judicial notice of a report for the purpose of determining a preliminary injunction); Matter of T.I.C.-C., 470 N.J. Super. 596, 604 (App. Div. 2022) (citing New Jersey Transgender Equality Task Force Report to highlight “the significant amounts of violence, harassment, and discrimination experienced by transgender people in various areas of their lives”).  Appellants implicitly admit as much by asking this court to give weight to unnamed “myriad other studies,” and to an affidavit in an unrelated case.  (Db35).  And so the court appropriately --- 3
[brief] This court reviews a trial court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the same standard used by the motion judge under Rule 4:46-2(c).  Henry v. Dep’t of Human Servs., 204 N.J. 320, 330 (2010).  Summary judgment is appropriate when “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact challenged and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment or order as a matter of law.
[brief] Importantly, comment 3 to RPC 1.9 clarifies what constitutes a “substantially related” matter:  [3]  Matters are “substantially related” for purposes of this Rule if they involve the same transaction or legal dispute or if there otherwise is a substantial risk that confidential factual information as would normally have been obtained in the prior representation would materially advance the client’s position in the subsequent matter.  For example, a lawyer who has represented a businessperson and learned extensive private financial information about that person may not then represent that person's spouse in seeking a divorce.  Similarly, a lawyer who has previously represented a client in securing environmental permits to build a shopping center would be precluded from representing neighbors seeking to oppose rezoning of the property on the basis of environmental considerations; however, the lawyer would not be precluded, on the grounds of substantial relationship, from defending a tenant of the completed shopping center in resisting eviction for nonpayment of rent.
[directive] Violator.  Any person who an officer reasonably believes (1) has committed, or is engaged in a conspiracy or attempt to commit, any crime of the first degree or one of the violent or serious crimes of the second degree enumerated in Section 3.2 of this policy, or (2) poses an imminent threat to the safety of the public or other police officers, as that threat is defined in Section 3.2 of this policy, set forth below.  3
[brief] We held that where ‘the parties ha[ve] contractually agreed that only [one arbitrator] could arbitrate any disputes between them,” a district court must “decline[ ] to appoint substitute arbitrators and compel arbitration in another forum. ”  *Id.* at 559.  This is because [a]lthough the federal policy favoring arbitration obliges us to resolve any doubts in favor of arbitration, we cannot compel a party to arbitrate a dispute before someone other than the [designated arbitrator] when that party had agreed to arbitrate disputes only before the [arbitrator] and the [arbitrator], in turn, exercising its discretion ..., has refused ... to arbitrate the dispute in question.  *Id.* at 557–58.  Once the designated arbitrator refuses to accept arbitration, there is ‘no further promise to arbitrate in another forum. ’  *Id.* at 557.  Thus, under *Salomon*, the question in this case is whether the language of the parties' agreement contemplates arbitration before only [...], or whether it contemplates the appointment of a substitute arbitrator should [...] become unavailable.
[brief] (Id).  After the trial court issued the Jan. 31, 2011, Opinion and Order, [...] moved for reconsideration, making the same arguments it made during trial, i.e., that [...] failed to prove that property damage occurred during [...]’s policy period.  (Pa0139).  By Order dated June 21, 2012, the trial court denied [...]’s Motion for Reconsideration.  (Pa0138-43).  The court’s opinion noted that [...] sat as both the finder of fact and judge of the law and “in doing so, he heard the testimony of thirty-three (33) witnesses, reviewed --- 2  The court’s Jan. 31, 2011, Opinion and Order contained a mathematical error that was corrected with consent of the parties by Order dated June 21, 2012.  (Pa0146).  3  After [...]’s retirement in 2011, the Hon.  [...], J.S.C., presided over this case until his retirement from the bench in 2022.  Judge LeBlon issued the Order denying [...]’s Motion for Reconsideration.  (Pa0142-43).  more than 350 exhibits and listened to extensive argument by counsel. ” (Pa0141).  The court concluded that under those circumstances, granting [...]’s Motion for Reconsideration “would be acting as an appellate court without the benefit of reviewing the entire record. ”  (Id).  After the trial court disposed of the Motions for Reconsideration, the parties moved to the allocation phase of the case.
[brief] III.  Status of Discovery.  Discovery of this matter is still ongoing.  The first Management Order was entered on February 7, 2024.  (Pa59).  On May 21, 2024, the second Case Management order was entered.  (Pa60).  That management order provided for supplemental Interrogatories and Requests for Documents to be served by no later than July 1, 2024.  (Pa60).  On July 18, 2024, a third Management Order was filed amending the dates for paper discovery to be answered.  (Pa61).  As of July 18, 2024, paper discovery was to be answered by August 15, 2024.  (Pa62).
[brief] ”).  The events at issue in the complaint here transpired between 2014 and 2018, and [...] now lives in Florida.  As such, he cannot claim he is experiencing any present threat to his rights by State Defendants, so that the any relief to him would be “prospective” to protect against some ongoing violation of his rights.  [...] seeks a declaration that purportedly nefarious actions taken in the past—the loss of his PTI application, the “bouncing” of a motion [...] attempted to file in [...]’s criminal case, the denial of a request to move [...]’s case out of Vicinage I, or efforts to exclude [...] from getting PTI (see Pb18; Pb34; Pb39)—were wrongful, which does not fall within Ex parte Young.  B.
[brief] When a statement is properly elicited following Miranda warnings subsequent to a statement that was improperly elicited without Miranda warnings, courts should analyze several factors to determine whether the subsequent statement is admissible including: (1) the extent of questioning and the nature of any admissions made by defendant before being informed of his Miranda rights; (2) the proximity in time and place between the pre- and post-warning questioning; (3) whether the same law enforcement officers conducted both the unwarned and warned interrogations; (4) whether the officers informed defendant that his pre-warning statements could not be used against him; and (5) the degree to which the post-warning questioning is a continuation of the pre-warning questioning.
[directive] Executive Order No. 69 1997(3/98)  Issued May RECORDS OF POLICE DEPARTMENTS  Chapter 73, P.L. 1963, as amended, finds and declares it to be the public policy of this WHEREAS, State that public records shall be readily accessible for examination by the citizens of this State for the protection of the public interest except as otherwise provided in said law; and some limitation upon the right to examine and copy records provided by Chapter 73 WHEREAS, is essential and not detrimental to the public interest as recognized by existing statutory and common law; and disclosure of information must be consistent with existing statutory law regarding WHEREAS, confidentiality in certain areas; and said Chapter 73 provides that records which would otherwise be deemed to be public WHEREAS, records, subject to inspection and examination and available for copying, pursuant to the provisions of said law, may be excluded therefrom by Executive Order of the Governor or by any regulation promulgated under the authority of any Executive Order of the Governor; and Section 3(e) of Executive Order No. 9, issued by Governor [...] in 1963, WHEREAS, and reaffirmed by Executive Order No. 123, issued by Governor [...] in 1983, states that fingerprint cards, plates and photographs and other similar criminal investigation records which are required to be made, maintained or kept by any State or local governmental agency shall not be deemed to be public records subject to inspection and examination and available for copying pursuant to the provisions of Chapter 73; and the Attorney General has undertaken a complete review of this subject area, seeking WHEREAS, input from prosecutors, police, representatives of the news media, and victims' rights organizations, and has recommended that certain aspects of the system be clarified; THEREFORE, I, [...], Governor of the State of New Jersey, by virtue NOW, of the authority vested in me by the Constitution and by the Statutes of this State, do hereby order and direct:
[brief] (Sb17.)  The Court in Hill was concerned that the charge would be used against a Defendant who has the presumption of innocence.  199 N.J. at 566.  Here, Defendant had a presumption of innocence yet without calling [...], the State obtained an unfair advantage of permitting standardized field sobriety tests to be used to establish the conviction without offering Defendant an opportunity to cross-examine the only witness with awareness of the scoring factors that the State’s witness conceded were required for those tests to be valid.
[brief] In re Appeal of Certain Sections of \(^{10}\) Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) Uniform Administrative Procedural Rules, 90 N.J. 85, 98, n. 5 (1982) (citing Erie, 304 U.S. at 58)).  The doctrine provides that federal courts sitting in diversity are to apply state “substantive” law and federal “procedural” law.  Ibid. (citing Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 465 (1965)).  Hence, in considering issues of “substantive law” such courts are bound by state court decisions as well as state statutes.