ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Rb25.  But the “restrictions” cannot be a dispute of fact; nobody disputes what the agreements say.\textsuperscript{4}  The terms make clear, as Relator concedes, that any licensee may use the information for “internal business purposes. ”  Rb25, Rb34, Rb36.  Yet Relator asserts, without any citation, that the data may not be “analyzed. ”  Rb25, Rb35.  Relator never explains why analysis would not be encompassed by “internal business purposes,” and cannot explain away the undisputed fact that Relator itself did analyze the data obtained from these sources.  See Ja2173 (¶¶ 194–97).
[brief] . . .”  [...]’s expert report absolutely establishes lost profits above and beyond a reasonable degree of certainty, because the data and information reviewed and analyzed by [...] to arrive at his conclusions was not hypothetical data or information from some hypothetical affordable housing development imagined to be constructed on [...] or a comparison to some other similar parcel of land somewhere else.  6T, 23:13-25:9.  Instead, [...] reviewed and analyzed the real, certain, and actual data required by the [...] for the processing of the application for financing of the 100% affordable housing development, which was approved.  6T, 33:21-34:9.  Said data and information in the record is data and information that opposing counsel could not refute because it is the actual, certain, and real data provided by [...] and reviewed by the [...], in processing [...]’s application submitted for financing the affordable housing development, which was approved and permitted [...] to develop the affordable housing development.
[brief] ”  (3T 28:15-18).  At oral argument on the Edison Defendant’s summary judgment motion, the Judge [...], J.S.C., questioned [...]’s counsel as to the legal significance of the April 14, 2023, order.  (3T 21:2-24:4).  Specifically, Judge Allende questioned counsel as to how the court order would alter [...]’s legal conclusion that [...]’s malicious prosecution first began to accrue on March 6, 2018, when the New Jersey Supreme Court reversed [...]’s VOP conviction.  (3T 21:2-24:4).  Counsel for [...] could not provide Judge Allende with any controlling or persuasive authority to support his novel argument.  (3T 24:16-28:19).  On December 1, 2023, Judge Allende granted the Edison Defendants’ summary judgment motion and dismissed [...]’s remaining claims against the Edison Defendants.
[brief] E.  Conclusion  In short, there was significant evidence adduced at trial that bore no relation to any material issue in the case, and whose function was only to disparage [...].  Additionally, the State advanced arguments about [...]’s homelessness and substance use that our courts have explicitly deemed to be improper.  The improper evidence and arguments presented by the State at trial significantly undermines confidence in the jury verdict such that [...]’s rights to a fair trial were infringed, and his convictions should be reversed and the matter remanded for a new trial.
[brief] Defendants [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], --- 6  To the extent that plaintiff makes claims against these defendants in their official capacity in Counts Five and Six under the CRA, defendants are exempt from suit.  This was recognized by the trial court.  Reference to the trial court’s opinion is designated as “3T” in this brief.  (3T45:3–3T46:15).  [...] does not appeal this issue.  7  Thus Counts Three and Seven do not appear to be a subject in this appeal.
[brief] Respondents make no argument that they themselves are members of low or moderate income households or families.  The facts of the case certainly do not demonstrate that any comments directed toward their Amended Application concerned the fact that they were to provide affordable housing units.  The mere fact a certain number of low- and moderate-income housing were not built as promptly as Respondents sought does not create standing to pursue a LAD claim where there exists no showing that Appellants discriminated against Respondents because they were incorporating affordable housing units in their project.
[brief] The record presented provided sufficient information to support the required factors.  The use of Lot 22 was open and obvious to all persons in the area.  The use of Lot 22 was exclusive because [...] erected a fence around Lot 20 and Lot 22.  The lots were used for parking for the parishioners.  When there was no activity taking place at the church, the fence was closed and padlocked.  Prominent on the fence was a warning to keep out and no parking and that there was monitoring of the lot.  The use of the Lots was ongoing and continuous.  The use of the land illustrated ownership as the Lots were used as an owner would use them.  The use of the land was hostile.  The [...] recognized that the lots were owned by [...].
[brief] (1T 31-1 to 6, 163-4 to 13)  [...] then instructed the passenger, [...], to exit the car and asked her if there were any additional illegal items inside the car.  (1T 31-11 to 19)  She ultimately indicated that she had a needle containing methamphetamine in her purse.  (1T 31-22 to 23)  [...] retrieved the needle and placed [...] under arrest.  (1T 32-1 to 2)  The officers did not read either of them their rights under *Miranda v. Arizona*, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).
[brief] Indeed, [...]’s claim that the Subcommittee applied “arbitrary, subjective, and biased criteria,” Appellant Br. 6, is wholly without merit.  [...] points to several Subcommittee member comments to support its claim that the Subcommittee employed subjective and arbitrary criteria.  Ironically, each allegedly arbitrary comment is rationally related to criteria listed on the Evaluation Sheet.  One Subcommittee member, in reference to [...], noted that “[w]hile [she is] not ‘afraid’ of large companies or international investors[, she] lean[s] toward more midsize organizations[.]”  See Appellant Br. 7 (citing 80a).  Although [...] claims that this comment was inappropriate because “the size of the company” was not part of the criteria for scoring, the Evaluation Sheet specifically lists “Applicant’s ties to the Borough” as a consideration.  (63a).  Undoubtedly, international investors and companies would have less ties to the Borough than smaller, more local companies.  Another comment noted that the Subcommittee member was “[c]oncerned about the # of cars entering and leaving [[...]’s proposed location], visibility coming out into high speed [sic] travel lane. ”  See id. (citing 79a-80a).  The same Subcommittee member thought that another applicant’s location provided for “safety of entry. ”  Id. (citing 79a-80a).  [...] claims that these comments were inappropriate because “traffic safety” was not part of the criteria for scoring.  The Evaluation Sheet, however, identifies “[p]ublic input regarding Applicant’s proposed cannabis facility in the Borough. ”  The cannabis facility site, including the purported safety of the site, clearly falls into this category, and could be considered by the Subcommittee. \(^3\)  Further, the Evaluation Sheet does nothing more than repeat the information required to be produced as part of the Application.  (48a-63a).  For comparison:  - The Evaluation Sheet requests information regarding, “[a]pplicant’s owners’ or principals’ qualifications and experience operating in highly regulated industries, including cannabis, healthcare, pharmaceutical manufacturing, and retail pharmacies, with presence to experience --- \(^3\)  Additionally, the Application asks “whether the Applicant will offer on-site parking at the business facility,” “the extent to which parking will be offered,” “the steps the Applicant will take to provide security in and around its location,” and “Applicant’s nuisance mitigation plan that specifically addresses . . . vehicular congestion mitigation. ”  The Subcommittee member’s comments are reasonably related to these inquiries as well.  operating such business within the State of New Jersey. ”  (63a.)
[brief] The ordinance required that a majority of the members of the Historic District Commission shall have demonstrated special interest, experience, or education in history or architecture.  The ordinance further provided for procedural safeguards as an additional check on potential abuse of the Commission.  *First, there was a provision for appeal to the Board of Adjustment from an adverse decision of the Commission.  Second, there was a provision which afforded the property owner a right to appeal a decision of the Board of Adjustment to the Superior Court.  Second, there was a provision which afforded the property owner a right to appeal a decision of the Board of Adjustment to the Superior Court.*  (*Nadelson* at 560, quoting *Turnbull, Aesthetic Zoning*, 7 *Wake Forest L. Rev.* 230, 454-455 (1971)).  Per *Nadelson*, the Court found that Design Guidelines provide the essential design characteristics of the building.  The Commission and applicants can use the guidelines to determine which design characteristics and elements are essential to preserve and/or recapture the qualities that make a building distinctive and, when taken as a whole, contribute to the unique character of the district.  Id.  at 561.  (emphasis added).  Summary Judgment was granted and it was found that the Ordinances “vague” design criteria and guidelines were sufficiently intelligible to provide adequate notice as to what was lawful.  Plaintiff failed on their summary judgment motion to invalidate an Ordinance and Defendant’s Summary Judgment Motion was granted.  Id.
[directive] A.  The defendant was convicted of the crime(s) identified below; or an attempt □ or conspiracy □ to commit the offense(s): □ murder N.J.S.2C:11-3 or manslaughter N.J.S.2C:11-4; □ simple assault or aggravated assault N.J.S.2C:12-1; □ stalking P.L.1992, c.209 (C.2C:12-10); □ terrorist threats N.J.S.2C:12-3; □ kidnapping and related offenses including criminal restraint; false imprisonment; interference with custody; criminal coercion; or enticing a child into a motor vehicle, structure, or isolated area N.J.S.2C:13-1 through 2C:13-6; □ sexual assault, aggravated sexual assault, criminal sexual contact or lewdness N.J.S.2C:14-2 through N.J.S.2C:14-4; □ arson N.J.S.2C:17-1, or causing or risking widespread injury or damage which would constitute a crime of the second degree N.J.S.2C:17-2; □ a crime against a child, including endangering the welfare of a child and child pornography N.J.S.2C:24-4; or child abuse, neglect, or abandonment R.S.9:6-3; □ endangering the welfare of an incompetent person N.J.S.2C:24-7 or endangering the welfare of an elderly or disabled person N.J.S.2C:24-8; or □ domestic violence P.L.1991, c.261 (C.2C:25-17 et seq.)  Section III  The defendant resides with minor children or is the parent of a minor child or children identified below:  Name: Sex:_______ Age:______ Address: Relationship to defendant: Name:______________________________________Sex:_______ Age:______ Address: Relationship to defendant: Name:________________________________________Sex:_______Age:_____ Address: Relationship to defendant: Name:________________________________________Sex:_______Age:_____ Address: Relationship to defendant: Name:________________________________________Sex:_______Age:_____ Address:  Relationship to defendant:
[brief] Compare State v. Supreme Life, 473 N.J. Super. 165, 175 (App. Div. 2022) (AP repeatedly argued that defendant’s trial testimony was unworthy of belief because defendant lied before, was lying again and was, simply put, a liar).  It was also appropriate for the AP to suggest bias towards defendant by his Aunt [...] and half-brother [...] by virtue of their familial relationship to defendant.  *State v. Pierre*, 223 N.J. 560, 586 (2015).  [...] agreed on direct examination that testifying was difficult for her because she still loved defendant despite what he did.  (7T154-10 to 15).  [...] testified that “the only reason I talked to [the police was] because I thought I was protecting” her nephew.  (7T154-16 to 17).  [...] testified that he was “extremely close” to defendant, frequently visited defendant at the correctional facility until the Covid shutdown, and attended his court appearances.  (9T174-15 to 16, 202-2 to 14, 213-13 to 214-4).  These remarks were also in direct response to defendant’s summation, in which he replayed for the jury [...]’s and [...]’s trial testimony that they still loved defendant despite what he did.  (15T91-5 to 95-1).
[brief] 22  A.  Principles Governing PCR Petitions & Appellate Review ..........  23  B.  The PCR Court Properly Rejected Defendant’s Claims that His Trial Counsel Failed to Investigate the Two Alibi Witnesses and Hire a Cell Phone Expert .................................  26  Point II  The PCR Court Correctly Concluded that Defendant’s Claim as to His Trial Counsel’s Failure to Hire a Cell Phone Expert was Procedurally Barred Because It Could Have Been Raised on Direct Appeal ............................................................................  33  Conclusion .......................................................................................  34  | Cases Cited | Page nos. | |-------------------------------------------------|-----------| | **People v. Elder**, 391 N.E.2d 403 (Ill.App. Ct. 1979) | 27 | | **State v. Allegro**, 193 N.J. 352 (2008) | 28 | | **State v. Arthur**, 184 N.J. 307 (2005) | 26, 28 | | **State v. Bey**, 161 N.J. 233 (1999) | 26 | | **State v. Burney**, 255 N.J. 1 (2023) | 32 | | **State v. Castagna**, 187 N.J. 293 (2006) | 34 | | **State v. Chew**, 179 N.J. 189 (2004) | 23 | | **State v. Chung**, 210 N.J. Super. 427 | 24 | | *(App. Div. 1986)* | | | **State v. DiFrisco**, 174 N.J. 195 (2002) | 26 | | **State v. DiFrisco**, 137 N.J. 434 (1994) | 24 | | **State v. Fritz**, 105 N.J. 42 (1987) | 23, 24 | | **State v. Gaitan**, 209 N.J. 339 (2012) | 25 | | **State v. Gideon**, 244 N.J. 538 (2021) | 25, 26, 31, 33 | | **State v. Gonzalez**, 223 N.J. Super. 377 | 27 | | *(App. Div. 1988)* | | | **State v. Lovett**, 231 N.J. 562 (2017) | 2 | | **State v. McQuaid**, 147 N.J. 464 (1997) | 23 | | **State v. Nash**, 212 N.J. 518 (2013) | 25 | Cases Cited (continued) Page nos. State v. Pierre, 233 N.J. 560 (2015) ................................................. 24, 31, 32 State v. Rountree, 388 N.J. Super. 190 (App. Div. 2006) .............................................................................. 24 State v. Silva, 131 N.J. 438 (1993) ..................................................... 28 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) .................................. passim Statutes Cited N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2 .................................................................................... 1 N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3a(1) ........................................................................... 1 N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3a(2) ...........................................................................
[brief] Next, the second trial court judge’s string-cite to a list of cases in a footnote do not support the drastic measure of a sua sponte reversal.  None of the cases cited provide support for the same.  The issue in Ford v. Weisman, 188 N.J. Super. 614 (App. Div. 1983) was distinguishable from the instant matter.  In *Ford*, the court decided that “relief from an interlocutory order may be granted . . . . when a change in the **governing case law** occurs after the time to seek leave for interlocutory appeal has passed, but before litigation has ended.
[brief] THE PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS ARE BARRED BY ACCORD AND SATISFACTION  The Plaintiff played in the July 3, 2017 G/10 tournament.  He was told what his prize was.  He claimed he said he thought he would get more.  It was explained to him what the correct prize amount was.  The Plaintiff accepted the check and cashed the check.  He then waited exactly 6 years to file a lawsuit.  After listening to the testimony, the trial court concluded there was an accord and satisfaction.  The trial court made the correct decision.  Whether there was an accord and satisfaction is a question of fact best left to the fact finder.  Wells Reit II-80 Park Plaza, LLC v. Director, Div. of Taxation, 414 N.J. Super. 453, 467 (App. Div. 2010).  The issue in the Wells Reit case, was whether or not there was a novation.  However, the same analysis applies to accord and satisfaction.  Moche v. Levy, 2016 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 928, 29. Da31-44.  The Plaintiff claimed he questioned the award that night.  The Plaintiff also claimed he emailed the Defendants in the weeks after the tournament.  No such emails were produced, were not part of the record below and are not part of the record on this appeal.  A natural conclusion is the fact finder did not find the Plaintiff’s testimony credible.  The Plaintiff’s testimony certainly conflicted in parts.  He appreciated “everything that the defendant has done for the game of chess” and he did not want to sue.  Not only did he sue, but he kept arguing with the trial court, said he wanted to file a reconsideration motion, and told the trial court he was going to file an appeal.  The Plaintiff’s best day, if the rules are ignored, is he would have received an extra $105.  T12:7-8.  However, he told the trial court he was suing for $780.  T3: 11-12.  The contradictory testimony led the trial court to tell the Plaintiff “Well, at least, at least be consistent. ”  T20:16.  The trial court listened to the parties’ testimony and is in the best position to judge the parties’ credibility.  The trial court, after hearing the parties’ testimony, concluded there was a clear intention that the check the Plaintiff accepted and cashed was in full satisfaction of the amount owed.  That determination by the fact finder should not be overturned.  CONCLUSION
[brief] On September 12, 2015, Plaintiff while traveling south on the Garden State Parkway was caused to lose control of his motorcycle and crash when he encountered settlement in the left-lane of the road where it abutted the expansion joint located at the northern side of the Rt. 30 overpass.  (Pa0471 at 108:19-25 to Pa472 109:1);(Pa522 at 1-25 to Pa523 at 1 at 1-21).  Please accept this reply brief in further support of Appellant/Cross-Respondent’s original appeal and in opposition to Respondent/Cross-Appellant’s cross-motion.
[directive] Criminal Presiding Judges  Drug Court Judges of [...], Chief Staff D.  AOC Directors and Assistant Directors  Special Assistants to the Administrative Director  Criminal Division Managers and Assistants  Probation Division Managers and Assistants  [...], Statewide Drug Court Manager [...], Assistant Drug Court Manager of Page 3 3  1  Attachment  Drug Court Phase Requirements 12568) (CN ., Jcncy New Couns New Jersey Judiciary ....... , ,1,., ••• ••  Office of Probation Services - Drug Court  Drug Court Phase Requirements
[brief] .....................................................................................................................................13  TABLE OF JUDGMENT(S), ORDER(S), RULING(S), AND DECISION(S)  ON APPEAL  Order  Granting Summary Judgment and Dismissing  Plaintiff’s Complaint (04/29/2024)  ........................................  PA162-163  Oral Decision (3/1/2024)  ..................................................................................................................  1T1-19 #  TABLE OF APPENDIX | Document Description | Page Numbers | |--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------| | Filed Complaint | PA001 | | Filed Amended Complaint | PA002 | | Defendant [...]’s Answer | PA003 | | Defendant [...]’s Answer and Counterclaim | PA004 | | Defendant [...]’s Notice of Motion to Stay | PA005 | | Order to Stay | PA006 | | [...]’s Confidentiality Agreement | PA007 | | Stipulation of Dismissal with Prejudice as to [...] | PA008 | | Defendant [...]’s Notice of Motion for Summary Judgment | PA009-010 | | Defendant [...]’s Certification of Counsel in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment and Statement of Facts | PA011-014 | | Exhibit A to Certification of Defendant [...] (Complaint) | PA015-021 | | Exhibit B to Certification of Defendant [...] (Form A interrogatory responses) | PA022-037 | | Exhibit C to Certification of Defendant [...] (plaintiff’s deposition transcript) | PA038-068 | | Exhibit D to Certification of Defendant [...] (police report) | PA069-071 | Exhibit E to Certification of Defendant [...] (plaintiff’s Application for Insurance) PA072-077 Exhibit F to Certification of Defendant [...] ([...] declarations page) PA078-080 Exhibit G to Certification of Defendant [...] ([...]’s coverage denial letter) PA081-083 Exhibit H to Certification of Defendant [...] (bodycam footage)
[brief] There is nothing to just in the ordinance or the resolution that the waivers which are being requested is somehow contributed to a result which is undesirable, yet permitted.  The court continued:  the board does not come with any conclusions or any rationale that somehow the lot line waivers created this undesirable result of nine lots  Furthermore, the trial court agreed, as discussed above, that the waivers were properly addressed by [...].  Specifically, the trial court indicated that [...]: ...explained that the storm water facility would be pushed back a little further, which made maintenance more difficult for the homeowners association, would be a little less efficient, but the yield density would be the same, being nine houses.  And Mr. [...]'s opinion was that if the design waiver was eliminated, it would create a development that was less beneficial to the [...].  (T4: p36, ln 22 – p37, ln 9)  As the Court can see, the record is clear that Plaintiff properly addressed the requested design waivers.  Furthermore, the record is clear that neither waiver was responsible for the alleged conditions which resulted in the Board’s denial for Plaintiff’s application.  As such, the Court should uphold the trial court’s conclusions that neither design waiver formed the basis of the Board’s denial and therefore, should uphold the trial court’s decision.
[brief] On November 18, 2019, over the [...]’ objection, the trial court re-appointed the same Special Master to provide a report and recommendation on the amount of attorneys’ fees and costs to award to Plaintiffs.  (38987a).  Subsequent to that appointment, the Special Master accepted a paid mediation assignment from [...]’s counsel, [...] of the [...] law firm.  (38995a; 38998a).  Neither [...] nor the Special Master informed the [...] about this paid mediation engagement.  And, after the [...] learned of the engagement, the Special Master refused to inform the [...] whether he had accepted any other paid mediation engagements from the Lowenstein law firm.  In response to the [...]’ request, the Special Master declined to recuse himself.  (39665a).  On October 13, 2021, the Honorable [...] denied the [...]’ motion to disqualify the Special Master.  (39680a).  Finding that “Special Master [...] had no reason to recuse,” Judge [...] held “in dubitante the applicability of [the] Code of Judicial Conduct to a special master. ” (39685a).  On August 4, 2022, the Special Master provided a Report and Recommendation to the trial court.  (39028a).  Despite this Court’s remand on the issue, the Special Master recommended the same exact fee amount for both [...] and [...] as had been ordered in the December 2013 Final Judgment.
[brief] 1 Point II: Summary Judgment To Defendants Should Be Vacated (Pa480-85, Pa535, Pa93-97, Pa53-54, Pa41, Pa152, 1T42-6 to 14, 1T5-12 to 18, 1T3-21 to 22)  7  Point III: Plaintiff Showed False Arrest, Violation of 42 USC §1983 and NJSA 10:6-2(c) and No Basis for Qualified Immunity to The Police (Pa303-Pa304, Pa22-Pa23, Pa453, Pa471, Pa653, Pa96, Pa054)