ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] ”  BMP Manual, Chapter 13, Page 36.  The BMP Manual specifically reminds design engineers that: soil replacement does not change the horizontal hydraulic conductivity of the soils outside the basin.  The low horizontal hydraulic conductivity will still limit the ability of the runoff to be dissipated into the saturated zone and may result in high groundwater mounding in the unsaturated zone.  Therefore, the use of sand replacement in basin designs must still be carefully evaluated with a groundwater mounding analysis.
[brief] 2006 Limited Remand  On December 15, 2006, this Court reversed [...]’s finding as to the valuation date.  The Court held that [...] “was and is entitled to an accounting” as its remedy and remanded the case to the trial court for the sole purpose of conducting the accounting.  [...], 2006 WL 3685881, at *6.  In March 2007, the Supreme Court denied the [...]’ petition for certification.  (2675a).  On the remand from the 2006 opinion, [...] moved before Chancery Division [...] for an Order recognizing [...] as an active partner by requiring [...]’s signature, or the signature of [...], on all checks.  (479a).  Halpern, a 25% partner, filed a certification in support of this motion.  (481a).  Judge Langlois followed this Court’s mandate and denied the motion, holding that the only issue before the court was the accounting directed by the Appellate Division’s remand.  (2a; 31269a at 30:9-19).  Judge Langlois further stated that the Appellate Division’s decision was not a mandate for the trial court to become involved in issues related to partnership management.  (31269a at 30:9-19).  [...] then moved before this Court for clarification or modification of the order.  This Court denied the motion.  (3a).  [...] retained new (and current) counsel in October 2007, who proceeded to engage in additional extensive accounting discovery, resulting in a forensic accounting report and a real estate appraisal report in January 2009.
[brief] ”  Barr v. Barr, 418 N.J. Super. 18, 45 (App. Div. 2011) (internal citations omitted).  Relatedly, as noted in Section III of this brief, the Trial Court has the “broadest possible remedial power to enforce a municipality’s Mount Laurel obligations. ”  Morris County, 220 N.J. Super. at 388.  Included within this “broadest possible remedial power” is the imposition of counsel fees and penalties for delay.
[brief] Because [...] fails to make that showing, the Department’s decision should be affirmed.  The Department’s review complies with the law, is based on a substantial evidentiary record that was developed based on [...]’s submissions, and closely follows the policy established by the Legislature.  The Legislature granted the Department the discretion to balance the interests of both the carrier and the policyholder in furtherance of its public policy to protect the interests of policyholders.
[brief] \(^2\)  The 1972 approved Site Plan (Da938) does not show or denominate any parking as being in the Sixth Street courtyard, depicted as an open concrete courtyard with a walkway from Sixth Street to the School’s front entry.  There was no “parking” by Lot 8 attendees on school property approved by the Resolution or designated in the Site Plan by legend or symbol.  The 1972 Approved Site Plan does not designate or allow parking of any kind in this Sixth Street courtyard area.
[brief] Order and Statement of Reasons Dated October 27, 2023 Denying Motion to Disqualify [...] ................................................................. Pa305 Order and Statement of Reasons Dated October 27, 2023 Denying Motion to Disqualify [...] ........................................... Pa311 TABLE OF APPENDIX VOLUME I Complaint and Case Information Statement .......................................................... Pa1 Defendants [...] d/b/a [...]; [...]; [...]; and [...]’s Answer, filed June 2, 2023 .............................................. Pa131 VOLUME II Defendants [...]; [...]; [...]; and [...],’s Answer, filed October 19, 2023 ........................................................................................................... Pa190 Defendant [...]’ Answer, filed October 23, 2023 ........................................ Pa230 VOLUME III Order and Statement of Reasons Dated October 27, 2023 Denying Motion to Disqualify [...] ......................................................................................... Pa305 Order and Statement of Reasons Dated October 27, 2023 Denying Motion to Disqualify [...] ............................................................. Pa311 Affidavit of [...], In Opposition of Motion to Disqualify ...... Pa317 Certification of [...] in Opposition of Motion to Disqualify ..... Pa319 Certification of [...] in Opposition of Motion to Disqualify .... Pa322 Certification of Counsel in Opposition to Motion to Disqualify ....................... Pa325 Plaintiffs’ Appendix in Support of Motion to Disqualify Defense Counsel .... Pa327 Order dated December 29, 2024 Granting Plaintiffs’ Motion for Leave to Appeal .............................................................................................................................................. Pa354 Order dated January 25, 2024 Granting in Part, Denying in Part Motion to Extend Time to File Briefs and to Separate Interlocutory Appeal from Appeal as of Right .............................................................................................................................................. Pa355 Notice of Appeal dated January 29, 2024 ................................................................. Pa357 Amended Notice of Appeal dated February 1, 2024 .............................................. Pa373 Pashman Stein, P.C. v. Nostrum Labs., Inc., A-1759-13T1, 2014 WL 5312535 (App. Div. Oct. 20, 2014)
[brief] Accord  *Oak Park Calabasas Condo. Assn. v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co.*, 137 Cal.App.4th 557 (2006); (stating that, if the association’s “construction of the company were correct”, then “any condominium association” could incur a debt “and then decide not to pay the bill, thus shifting the obligation to its insurer.  No rational insurer would wish to undertake such an insuring obligation.  It would be literally impossible, from an actuarial standpoint, to set appropriate premiums to guard against the risk that an association would enter into multimillion dollar construction contracts, and then not pay for the construction work.  That type of risk would be virtually impossible to underwrite. ”)  *Catlin Specialty Ins. Co. v. CBL & Associates Properties, Inc.*, 2017 WL 4784432 (Del. Sup. Sept. 20, 2017)  (“[...] argue that there is a possibility that they could be liable based on a finding that they just erroneously overcharged tenants in a way that was negligent or unintentionally misleading.  But that’s not how the Underlying Action’s allegations read.  In its complaint, [...] asserts no theory of recovery that the Court could reasonably deem mere (or any other sort of) negligence.  And ‘courts around the nation are in general agreement that a [professional liability] policy covering ‘negligent acts, errors or omissions’ does not cover intentionally wrongful conduct.
[brief] Like in *Kucinski*, the defendant here did not invoke his right to silence.  As the lower court found, defendant spoke to the detectives about a myriad of topics relevant to the investigation, while retaining the right and ability to control the interrogation by refusing to answer specific questions.  Defendant’s refusal to answer specific questions was simply part of his stream of speech.  While the trial court correctly found that defendant’s statement did not contain an actual invocation of counsel, the trial court also recognized that defendant often framed his refusal to answer questions in the terminology of invocation.  To address this, the lower court correctly relied upon *Feaster*.  Redaction of defendant’s refusals to answer questions – and defendant’s setting up of the terms of his interrogation, which the detectives honored – could render defendant’s statement misleading, particularly in the face of defendant’s attacks on the sufficiency of the State’s investigation.  The lower court appropriately balanced the needs of defendant, the State and the jury.  The jury was permitted to hear defendant’s statement in full; the State did not overemphasize the contents of the statement via cross-examination or closing arguments; and the jury was instructed not to impermissibly use the statement.
[brief] The motion shall be made within a reasonable time, and for reasons of (a), (b) and (c)[Fraud] not more than one year after the judgment, order or proceeding was entered or taken.  In the end, the trial court found that [...] did not shoulder the burden of proof which was at a minimum preponderance of the evidence, but more appropriately clear and convincing proof.  Obviously, [...] knew there was a divorce judgment executed by a Judge on March 18, 2015 (A15) and the MSA signed by all parties on January 17, 2014 (Ca14).  That is two-and-a half and three-years-and-10 months, respectively, before [...]’s October 25, 2017 cross-motion to set aside (A77) filing date, well past the R. 4:50-1 one-year time limitation.
[directive] Any warnings previously given to you concerning your right license will be suspended by the court for a period of no less to remain silent and your right to consult with an attorney do than one and no more than three years.  If your refusal not apply to the taking of breath samples and do not give you conviction is in connection with operating a commercial motor the right to refuse to give, or to delay giving, samples of your vehicle transporting hazardous material or displaying a breath for the purposes of making chemical tests to determine hazardous material placard, then your commercial driver your alcohol concentration.  You have no legal right to have an license will be suspended for three years.  If your refusal attorney, physician, or anyone else present, for the purpose of conviction is in connection with a second or subsequent taking the breath samples. violation of any of the offenses specified at N.J.S.A. 39:3- 10.20a, the Court will revoke your commercial driver license 5.  After you have provided samples of your breath for chemical for life. testing, you have the right to have a person or physician of your own selection, and at your own expense, take 10.  Any license suspension or revocation for a refusal conviction independent samples and conduct independent chemical tests will be independent of any license suspension or revocation of your breath, urine, or blood. imposed for any related offense.
[brief] ”  Shelton v. Restaurant.com, Inc., 214 N.J. 419, 439 (2013).  “A contract arises from offer and acceptance, and must be sufficiently definite ‘that the performance to be rendered by each party can be ascertained with reasonable certainty. ’”  *Weichert Co. Realtors v. Ryan*, 128 N.J. 427, 435 (1992), quoting *Caldwell*, 26 N.J. at 24-25.  **A.  There Was a Binding Contract between Plaintiff and Defendant (Pa30)**
[brief] Further, any judicial determination or other reason for disqualification that would make an individual ineligible to possess a firearm pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)-(9) would also prevent an individual from obtaining a carry permit from Pennsylvania.  18 Pa. State. Ann. § 6109(d) and (e).  By virtue of [...] being issued a license by Pennsylvania, we can assume she meets all the criteria, and the State has never challenged her credentials.  The State also relies on State v. Hatch, 64 N.J. 179 (1973) to argue that someone from out of state who has fulfilled the requirements of his home state is still subjected to New Jersey regulations.
[brief] Had the Court simply compared the six alleged fraudulent misrepresentations in plaintiffs’ complaint to the contractual documents that they reviewed, initialed and signed, it would have been immediately apparent that the plaintiffs had done nothing more than provide oral testimony in direct contradiction to the specific written terms secondary and unrelated to their initial intent to purchase a timeshare.  That oral testimony, however, is barred.  Plaintiffs did not present any evidence of fraud wholly extraneous to the contracts.  Third, the motion Judge erred as a matter of law when he relied on Conway v. 287 Corporate Center Associates, 187 N.J. 259 (2006) to rule that application of the Parol Evidence Rule could only be analyzed upon a complete factual trial record because plaintiffs alleged fraud in the inducement.
[brief] A. Standard of Review  New Jersey Rule of Professional Conduct 1.16(c) governs withdrawal of counsel:  A lawyer shall not represent a client or, where representation has commenced, shall withdraw from the representation of a client if: 1) the representation will result in violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct or other law; 2) the lawyer’s physical or mental condition materially impairs the lawyer’s ability to represent the client; or 3) the lawyer is discharged.  B.  Disqualification under Rules of Professional Conduct 1.18  Rules of Professional Conduct 1.18 governs conflicts stemming from communications with prospective clients.  That Rule states as follows:  A lawyer who has had communications in consultation with a prospective client shall not use or reveal information acquired in the consultation, even when no client-lawyer relationship ensues, except as RPC 1.9 would permit in respect of information of a former client.  A lawyer subject to paragraph (a) shall not represent a client with interests materially adverse to those of a former prospective client in the same or a substantially related matter if the lawyer received information from the former prospective client that could be significantly harmful to that person in the matter, except as provided in paragraph (c).  If a lawyer is disqualified from representation under (b), no lawyer in a firm with which that lawyer is associated may knowingly undertake or continue representation in such a matter, except that representation is permissible if (1) both the affected client and the former prospective client have given informed consent, confirmed in writing, or (2) the disqualified lawyer is timely screened from any participation in the matter and is apportioned no part of the fee therefrom and written notice is promptly given to the former prospective client.  A person who communicates with a lawyer the possibility of forming a client-lawyer relationship with respect to a matter is a “prospective client,” and if no client-lawyer relationship is formed, is a “former prospective client. ”  To justify disqualification, two “factors must coalesce: 1) the information disclosed in the consultation must be the same or substantially related to the present lawsuit; and 2) the disclosed information must be significantly harmful to the former client in the present lawsuit. ”  O Builders & Assocs., Inc. v. Yuna Corp. of N.J., 206 N.J. 109, 113-14 (2011).
[brief] The operations conducted at the Site unexpectedly caused property damage in the form of contamination of groundwater, surface water, soils, and sediments at and around the Site.  The primary contaminants of concern in the groundwater are CVOCs, primarily perchloroethylene (“PERC”), trichloroethylene (“TCE”) and trichloroethane (“TCA”).  (Pa0094).  In addition to CVOCs in the groundwater, the soil and sediments at the Site have been contaminated by radionuclides, heavy metals, and PCBs.\(^{10}\) (Id).  [...] first became aware of property damage at the Site upon receipt of, and investigation in response to, a [...] (“[...]”) Request For Information dated March 31, 1986.
[brief] Remand Order for Resentencing in Light of State v. Zuber .............................................. Da95-Da96 State v. Baker, [...], 2022 WL 332764 (App. Div. unpub. op. Feb. 4, 2022).......................................................Da97- Da118 TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, RULINGS, & ORDERS BEING APPEALED March 31, 2023 Judgment of Conviction…………………………………… Da18 - Da21 March 31, 2023 Sentencing………………………………………………………5T TRANSCRIPT KEY “Da” – Defendant-appellant’s appendix “PSR” – Presentence Report “1T” – March 28, 1995 (guilty plea)  “2T” – May 18, 1995 (original sentencing)  “3T” – September 4, 2018 (Zuber resentencing hearing, argument)  “4T” – January 29, 2019 (Zuber resentencing hearing, decision)  “5T” – March 31, 2023 ([...] resentencing hearing) | Cases | PAGE NOS. | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------| | Freedman v. Freedman, 474 N.J. Super. 291 (App. Div. 2023) | 49 | | Graham v. Florida 560 U.S. 48 (2010) | Passim | | Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) | Passim | | P.T. v. M.S., 325 N.J. Super. 193 (App. Div. 1999) | 48 | | Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) | 14, 19, 39 | | State v. A.T.C., 239 N.J. 450 (2019) | 44 | | State v. Baker, 153 N.J. 48 (1998) | 4 | | State v. Baker, [...], 2022 WL 332764 (App. Div. unpub. op. Feb. 4, 2022) | Passim | | State v. Baker, [...] (App. Div. Oct. 27, 1997) | 4 | | State v. Case, 220 N.J. 49 (2014) | 18, 30 | | State v. [...], 249 N.J. 359 (2022) | Passim | | State v. Kosch, 458 N.J. Super. 344 (App. Div. 2019) | 46 | | State v. Locane, 454 N.J. Super. 98 (App. Div. 2018) | 46 | | State v. Marshall, 148 N.J. 89 (1997) | 46 | | State v. Melvin, 248 N.J. 321 (2021) | 46, 47, 50 | | State v. Thomas, 470 N.J. Super. 167 (App. Div. 2022) | Passim | | State v. Zuber, 227 N.J. 422 (2017) | Passim | Statutes N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(b)(1) ...........................................................................................................
[brief] COUNTER-STATEMENT OF PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND FACTS ...... 2 LEGAL ARGUMENT ..................................................................................  19 POINT  I  DEFENDANT’S CLAIMS ARE PROCEDURALLY BARRED BECAUSE HE RAISED THIS SAME FACTUAL PREDICATE AND THIS SAME LEGAL THEORY IN HIS PRIOR PCR PETITION.  DEFENDANT’S PETITION IS ALSO TIME BARRED BECAUSE HE DISCOVERED TORRES’ HABEAS PETITION IN 2017 ......................  19  A.  Defendant’s Second PCR Petition is Barred Under Rule 3:22-4(b)(2)(B)  Because [...]’ Habeas Petition was Discovered at the Time Defendant Filed His First PCR Petition and was Discoverable Earlier.  This Court Has Also Already Determined that the Factual Predicate is Insufficient to Warrant Relief ...........................................  20  B.  Defendant’s Second PCR Petition is Barred Under Rule 3:22-5  Because Defendant Raised a Substantially Similar Legal Claim in His First Amended PCR Petition .................................................................  24 C.  Defendant’s Second PCR Petition is Time Barred Under Rule 3:22-12(a)(2)(B) .....................................................................................  25  POINT II
[brief] The Appellate Division Normally Defers to [...] in Interest Arbitration Because of Its Expertise in Such Matters Unless the Appellant Can Clearly Show a Basis to Reverse.  The Appellate Division is normally deferential to the determinations of administrative agencies so it does not usurp their function if it would have handled a matter differently.  See e.g. In re Stream Encroachment Permit, Permit No. 0200-04-0002.1FHA, 402 N.J. Super. 582, 597 (App. Div. 2008) (“We may not second-guess those judgments of an administrative agency, which fall squarely within the agency’s expertise”; “we will only reverse a decision of an administrative agency if it is arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable”; “Courts generally defer to an agency’s expertise on technical matters within the agency’s field of expertise”).  The New Jersey Supreme Court has held that decisions of the Commission will stand unless the decision is clearly demonstrated to be arbitrary and capricious.
[brief] **  Buyer agrees to indemnify and hold harmless Seller from and against any and all Losses incurred by Seller after the date of this Agreement and arising out of, resulting from, or relating to (i) any material inaccuracy or breach of any representation or warranty of Buyer contained in this Agreement, (ii) any material breach or violation of the covenants or agreements of Buyer contained in this Agreement and (iii) any material inaccuracy in any certificate, instrument or other document delivered by Buyer as required by this Agreement.  Contrary to the appellants’ position (Db35), Section 6.2 of the SPAs defines “Losses” as:  “any and all obligations . . . claims, actions, injuries, demands, suits, judgments, proceedings, investigations, arbitrations and reasonable expenses, including reasonable accountant’s and reasonable attorney’s fees and expenses. ”\(^{24}\) *See Litton Indus., Inc. v. IMO Indus., Inc.*, 200 N.J. 372, 385 (2009) (explicit reference to attorney’s fees as part of the definition of “Losses” sufficient for award).  Again, nothing in this broad provision limits the indemnity to third party claims.  *See Boyle, supra*, at *17; *Cem Bus. Sols., Inc. v. BHI Energy*, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62724, at *6 (D.N.J. Apr. 4, 2022), citing *Travelers Indem. Co. v. Dammann & Co.* --- \(^{24}\)  Appellants argue that Plaintiffs lose because their “Losses” were not incurred “after” the date of the SPAs.  (Db35).  Incorrect.  Section 6.3 entitles Plaintiffs to indemnity for legal fees, accounting fees, and other costs of suit, all of which Plaintiffs incurred *after* the SPAs were executed in connection with this lawsuit. Inc., 594 F.3d 238, 255 (3d Cir. 2010) (“[W]e cannot hold that first-party indemnification claims . . . are categorically barred as a matter of law in New Jersey absent direct authority to that effect.
[brief] “[M]erely answering on the merits, asserting a counterclaim (or cross-claim) or participating in discovery, without more, will not necessarily constitute a waiver. ”  *Gavlik Constr. Co. v. H.F. Campbell Co.*, 526 F.2d 777 (3d Cir. 1975); see, e.g., *Schall v. Adecco U.S.A., Inc.*, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8884, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 28, 2011) (Da93-Da95) (“[a]n answer alone is not a waiver of arbitration rights” and, further, providing discovery responses and objections to interrogatories does not amount to prejudice finding waiver); Zenon v. Dover Downs, Inc., No. 21-1194, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 112798, 2022 WL 2304118, at *2 (D. Del. June 27, 2022) (Da110-Da112) (no waiver when defendant filed an answer that did not mention arbitration); Peltz ex rel. Peltz v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 367 F. Supp. 2d 711, 722 (E.D. Pa. 2005) (granting motion to compel arbitration despite seven-month delay during which moving party filed two motions to dismiss, answered interrogatories, and conducted a deposition.
[brief] The referenced penalty provision provides:  164-14  Violations of Code; penalties  A.  Unless a specific penalty is provided elsewhere in Part III of this Code, in state law or in other ordinances of the Board of Health for a particular violation, any person, firm or corporation who shall violate any provision of Part III of this Code...shall, **upon conviction thereof, be punishable by a fine of not less than $100 nor more than $1,000 for each violation.