ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] 224T8:14-8:16.  [...] concealed their theft of partnership funds by systematically falsifying the Project’s books and financial statements, without any “accounting” or “legal” justification.  224T98:10-19.  [...] found that, although [...] personally had committed the lion’s share of partnership misappropriation, [...] and [...] understood the objectives of the Wilfs’ scheme, accepted them, agreed explicitly to do their part to further them, and fulfilled their agreed-upon roles.
[directive] However, while some deviation thus would not be objectionable, judges are encouraged to use the wording prescribed in the model questions.  It is important that, as part of the process, each prospective juror who gets through the initial screening and appears to be potentially qualified must be asked one or more open-ended questions.  Before being qualified, each juror has to be asked questions intended to have them open up and talk about such things as their background, their attitudes about the subject matter of the trial, their feelings about the court system generally, and the like.  The jurors, in responding in narrative fashion to the variety of subjects presented in the question, will also provide important information by self-selecting what they choose to talk about.  If a juror is not responsive, it is expected that the judge will again attempt to elicit a response to the summary question.  It is also important to ask appropriate follow-up questions where a "yes" response is given to standard questions.  Intrusive questions, which unnecessarily invade the privacy interest of jurors, should be avoided.
[brief] Thus, the owner is due the “fair market value” of the property, which means the “value that would be assigned to the acquired property by knowledgeable parties freely negotiating for its sale under normal market conditions based on all surrounding circumstances at the time of the taking. ”  *Hous. Auth. of New Brunswick v. Suydam Invs., L.L.C.*, 177 N.J. 2, 20 (2003).  Here, if the Township never declared the Property in need of redevelopment, [...] would either reap the passive income generated by the site from 1994 to 2018, or sell the Property to a third-party buyer, but not both as of January 27, 1994.
[brief] Reuters Ltd. v. United Press Int’l, Inc., 903 F.2d 904 (2d Cir. 1990).  Indeed, as also set forth in the Reply Certification of [...], throughout the parties’ long relationship, Appellants have had to capitulate to [...]’s demand and requirements, including but not limited to [...]’s racist policies of restricting Appellants’ sales to the Asian market.  For these reasons, application of New York law would violate fundamental policy principles of New Jersey.
[directive] Notwithstanding any other provision of this Policy, when an officer equipped with a BWC is dispatched to or otherwise goes to the scene of a “Law Enforcement Incident” as defined in AG Directive 2019-4, the officer shall activate the BWC before arriving at the scene when feasible.  Notwithstanding any other provision of this Policy, an officer while at the scene of a “Law Enforcement Incident” shall not de-activate the BWC unless instructed to do so by the assistant prosecutor or assistant or deputy attorney general supervising the investigation of the deadly-force incident pursuant to AG Directive 2019-4, or his or her designee.  Such instruction may be given telephonically by the assistant prosecutor, assistant or deputy attorney general, or designee supervising the investigation.  BODY WORN CAMERA POLICY | May 2021
[brief] *Aetna Life and Casualty Co. v. Imet Mason Contractors*, 309 N.J. Super. 358, 365 (App. Div. 1998).  In this matter, a party did not destroy evidence pertinent to the action.  The pertinent evidence on this issue only includes the Will.  The original Will was produced at trial and identified by the witness, the scrivener, as the Decedent’s original Will prepared in accordance with her wishes.  Spoliation, as its name implies, is an act that spoils, impairs or taints the value or usefulness of a thing.  *Rosenblit v. Zimmerman*, 166 N.J. 391, 400 (2001).  In law, it is the term that is used to describe the hiding or destroying of litigation evidence, generally by an adverse party.  Id. at 400-401.  When spoliation occurs, the law has developed a number of civil remedies where “the litigant whose cause of action has been impaired by the absence of crucial evidence. ” (emphasis added).  Id. at 401.  The alleged notes of the attorney preparing a client's Will are not crucial evidence under the circumstances.  The Chancery Division heard the testimony of [...] concerning the Will and the wishes of [...], as well as any potential notes that may have existed.  As the Court was able to take all of the witness's testimony into consideration, it is best able to determine the relevance of the notes in question, the importance of the notes, and what, if any, bearing it had on the credibility of the testimony of the witness.  The Chancery Division thus appropriately rejected the Petitioner’s spoliation argument.  (Pa 29-30).  POINT II
[brief] [I]t may be said that plaintiff, in fact, possessed actual notice based on the survey highlighting the uncertainty regarding the strip, the fact that plaintiff was well aware of the use by defendant -- the strip, or at least part of it, as a parking area, and the as of deed with it’s [sic] 19 year discrepancy between alleged date of preparation versus the recording date.  [Id. at 17:14-21.]  The court concluded that [...] was on at least inquiry notice that Lot 3 had a claim to the Strip, and therefore had been obliged to make a reasonable and diligent inquiry into its ownership.
[brief] walking aisle.  (Pa157; 4T228:14-16; 4T232:3-5; 4T232:12-233:5; 4T235:23-236:1; 4T238:7-13; 4T260:24-261:1).  The impact with the protruding bolt caused the rollator to come to a halt and the plaintiff to fall to the ground.  (4T228:14-16; 4T229:19-21; 4T233:15-21; 4T249:22-25; 4T234:1-12).  There was no testimony from any eyewitnesses to the plaintiff’s fall to challenge the manner in which it occurred and the surveillance video footage of the incident that was played for the jury was inconclusive because it showed only the top of the plaintiff’s body and head.  (Pa157; 4T117:13-24; 4T160:11-22).  Instead of offering any direct proof establishing that the protruding bolt did not cause the plaintiff’s fall, the theme of the defense was that the plaintiff lied about tripping over the protruding bolt and was instead caused to fall as a result of a pre-existing balance issues or neuropathy.
[brief] Here, no request was made at trial to charge second-degree robbery as a lesser-included offense to first-degree robbery.  Regardless of whether a defendant requests such an instruction, the judge must instruct the jury on a lesser-included offense if the facts “clearly indicate that a jury could convict on the lesser while acquitting on the greater offense. ”  *State v. Jenkins*, 178 N.J. 347, 361, 840 A.2d 242 (2004).  Here, the facts clearly indicate that a charge for second-degree robbery as a lesser-included offense was warranted.
[directive] The County Prosecutor's Office submits a copy of the judgement entered on municipal appeals to the person designated to handle record keeping for each police department.  If the defendant is found guilty and the decision appealed to a higher court, that action will be noted on the judgement.  The opinion is considered rendered when received by this office.  Any questions about status, decision, or opinions on municipal appeals or questions about appeals on an indictable matter should be directed to the Head Clerk, Appellate and Motion Practice Section.  7.4.4
[brief] “A board has the choice of accepting or rejecting testimony of witnesses.  Where reasonably made, such choice is conclusive on appeal. ”  Kramer v. Board of Adj., Sea Girt, 45 N.J. 268, 28, (1965) (quoting Reinauer Realty Corp. v. Nucera, 59 N.J. Super. 189, 201 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 32 N.J. 347, 160 A2d. 845 (1960)).  The Board’s reasonable findings of fact should not be set aside by the Court.
[brief] Docket No.: [...].  [...] was president of the college.  He was employed by a related entity also owned by the Appellant.  This challenge prompted the Appellants to draft an updated version of their employment agreements.  This was done in December of 2019.  [196a, 199a]  [2T P38 L11-13]  The Respondent did sign an employment agreement in March of 2019.
[brief] The State’s contention that trial counsel strongly advocated for his client at the sentencing hearing is not borne out by the record.  He made no argument for an alternative sentence to the State’s request for 110 years with 98 years parole ineligibility.  (Da260 to 266).  He only made a brief argument as to mitigating factors, and then, “offered” his client for sentencing.  (19T10-16 to 11-6).  Petitioner relies upon his detailed description in his merits brief of the contrast between the State’s impassioned advocacy for an extreme sentence and trial counsel’s complete lack of advocacy for a lesser sentence.  (Db28 to 34).  The State presented detailed victim impact submissions in its sentencing memorandum, and reiterated these arguments passionately at the sentencing hearing.  (19T5-9 to 7-11).  Trial counsel submitted no memorandum.  He did not, as did re-sentencing counsel, point out that petitioner’s only prior indictable crime was for a non-violent property crime, and that he had never been sentenced to a single day in State prison.  (Da 284).  Nor did he submit evidence of petitioner’s troubled childhood - namely - that petitioner’s grandmother took custody of him when he was two years old because his drug-addicted mother would leave him home alone and his father was too unstable to take care of him.  Trial counsel failed to inform the sentencing court that petitioner has physical and intellectual limitations due to his mother’s drug use.  (Da277, Da377).  Trial counsel failed to present evidence that petitioner is the father of two children whose mother depicted petitioner as a good father.  (Da278, Da335).  He also failed to point out the very significant disparities in sentencing between the equally culpable co-defendants.  And most importantly, trial counsel failed to present any alternative to the State’s extreme request, failed to suggest any sentence that did not entail his client spending his life behind bars.  This failure to present mitigating evidence or arguing for a lesser sentence contravened counsel’s obligations to advocate for his client at sentencing.
[directive] All Civilian Review Board members and staff who support the Board’s work, on a full- or part-time basis, must undergo a criminal history background check.  A person who has been convicted of a crime or offense may not be granted access to the content of internal affairs records unless both the law enforcement executive and the County Prosecutor consent to that person being granted such access.  9.8  Coordination with Other Law Enforcement Agencies  9.8.1  In some instances, an officer who was formerly an employee of one law enforcement agency may apply to join a different law enforcement agency.  It is imperative that the law enforcement agency that may hire the officer has access to all internal investigative files related to that officer’s previous employment.  Without such information, a law enforcement agency is unable to make a fully informed hiring decision.  9.8.2
[directive] 19.  Steps Taken By Applicant to Identify Other Agencies in Interest  The applicant shall explain to the Designated Attorney what steps have been taken by the applicant or his agency to determine whether any of the circumstances described in Section 18 of this Directive exist that might indicate that another law enforcement agency has an interest in the target of this investigation or in the premises to be searched.  The Designated Attorney shall not approve the application unless satisfied that reasonable precautions Page 11 have been taken, considering the nature of the offense and offender under investigation, to determine whether any other agency might be adversely affected by execution of the warrant.
[brief] It was evident [...]’s reasoning was the SDNY needed to make “an arbitrability determination… over the operating agreement” under which he purported to hold the February 8, 2016 vote putting him back in control.  (Da1897)  [...] also argued that “five [other] amendments to the operating agreement that he drafted after the October 2015 award were valid, because the arbitrator did not rule on them. ”  (Da1921-1922)  [...] argued that “it will be up to the Southern District of New York Judge whether… that election… is invalid or that that operating agreement is invalid….  So they’re not null and void… but they will be before [...] [of the SDNY]. ”  (Da1902-1903)  In other words, [...] argued that operating agreements and votes that he held during Phase I of the arbitration—trying to place himself back in control through the votes of persons to whom he had granted sham membership interests—would somehow supersede the votes that removed him from control, and that the SDNY would be the one to make that determination.
[brief] ”  *Allstate Ins. Co. v. Howard Sav. Institution*, 127 N.J. Super. 479, 489 (Ch. Div. 1974) (emphasis added).  Additionally, “laches ‘should ordinarily not be a defense to a motion to open a judgment that is utterly void .  . . .  Thus, most courts sparingly invoke equitable principles to deny motions to set aside void judgments. ”  *Wohlegmuth*, 302 N.J. Super. at 315 (quoting *Sonderman v. Remington Constr. Co.*, 127 N.J. 96, 114 (1992)).  Here, despite finding that [...] did not act in good faith,\(^3\) the trial court found laches applied and barred [...]’s requested relief and applied laches based on the purported prejudice [...] would have suffered had [...]’s Motion to Vacate been granted, considering that the statute of limitations on [...]’s alleged debt had expired.
[brief] 10 N.J.R. 184(a) (May 4, 1978); 10 N.J.R. 384(a) (Sept. 7, 1978).  The rule was amended in 1986 to add the visual compatibility provision language under the current Subsection C.  17 N.J.R. 1466(a) (Jun. 17, 1985); 18 N.J.R. 314(a) (Feb. 3, 1986).  In 1990, amendments were proposed to add the 30% open view corridor and 2-to-1 setback requirements under Subsection D, but were not adopted at that time.  22 N.J.R. 1188(a) (Apr. 16, 1990); 22 N.J.R. 2542(b) (Aug. 20, 1990).  The amendments were proposed again in 1994 and adopted that same year.  26 N.J.R. 943(a) (Feb. 22, 1994); 26 N.J.R. 1561(c) (Apr. 18, 1994).  Accordingly, the SRD Rule that was in effect when the Department reviewed the Redevelopment Ordinances for consistency with the CZM Rules in 1996 included the requirements of visual compatibility, 30% open view corridor, and 2-to-1 setback.
[brief] Administrative Marriage  In December 2020, Plaintiff traveled to India to legally marry Defendant on paper to facilitate her immigration process with the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS).  Plaintiff stayed with relatives, while Defendant stayed at her uncle’s house.  Plaintiff suggested to Defendant that she stay with him temporarily which she initially refused due to her family customs but, she later agreed.  During this period, they did not share a bed, maintaining separate sleeping arrangements.  (1T73-74).  On December 8, 2020, Plaintiff and Defendant were legally married in India.  As custom, immediately after signing the marriage paperwork, they had to visit their village to pray, and Defendant questioned the necessity of wearing traditional clothes as per custom.  In response to Defendant’s defiance of the custom and repeated complaints, Plaintiff emphasized to her that adhering to customs was important and that non-compliance indicated potential misalignment in their foundational beliefs and relationship.  (1T75).  Despite initial resistance, Defendant ended up begrudgingly complying with wearing the traditional clothing and they went to the temple.  (1T76).  After they were married, Plaintiff and Defendant continued to sleep separately; she slept on a bed while he slept outside of the room on the floor.  Plaintiff expressed that he did not want to force her to sleep in the same bed or cross any limits against her wishes.  (1T76).  The marriage was never consummated.  Plaintiff then returned to America in December 2020, and the relationship then continued long distance.  In August 2021, defendant again confirmed to plaintiff that she agreed with plaintiff on everything regarding their culture and traditions.  Plaintiff, however, was still noticing differences with defendant’s behavior and actions, so he asked defendant, “are you sure you didn’t marry me for the green card as first we never argue, you seem to agree on everything?"  Defendant told plaintiff not to worry and that they would have a great life together.  Minor arguments happened thereafter nonetheless.  So plaintiff again asked defendant if everything was okay; defendant replied “yes, of course, we are a couple and therefore are having arguments” (or something to that effect).  (1T77).
[brief] In 2004, [...] borrowed $350,000 from the plaintiffs.  The loan was secured by a Mortgage & Security Agreement on her Marlboro business property.  It charged 16% interest per annum.  It did not contain an anti-merger clause.  (Da 1-17)  Plaintiff [...] was a Pennsylvania real estate investor & Plaintiff [...] was a Pennsylvania dentist.  Their business plan formed groups of investors to make loans.  It is unknown how much, if anything, the plaintiffs lent to Colon with their own funds.  (Da 87-109- pages 22,23,24,54)  Colon’s business failed.  Colon & her partner litigated over the business.  Colon engaged Appellant for representation.  Colon was unable to pay all of her legal expenses.  As a result of a denial of a motion to withdraw, Appellant was required to continue his representation through the trial.  After conclusion of the case, Appellant obtained a judgment against Ms Colon.  (Da 18-19)  As of the docketing of the judgment, on 10-18-05, the sum owed was $26,655.42 plus interest of $1,132.23 & costs of $302.24.  (Da 20-21)  On 4-21-16 plaintiffs executed a Satisfaction wherein they certified that they have received payment of the full amount due on the Mortgage secured upon the premises --- the Colon property.  This Satisfaction further provided that upon its recording the said Mortgage is forever discharged.  On 7-22-16 the Satisfaction was recorded.  Ex F  The recorded Satisfaction, on its face, was sent to Leslie [...], who was plaintiff [...]’s daughter & a Pennsylvania attorney.  (Da 30)  On 7-1-16 Ms Colon executed a DIF, dated 4-21-16, to plaintiffs in exchange for $1.
[brief] [...]’s disqualification gambit is not a noble attempt to try to advance the principles of the Rules of Professional Conduct.  Rather, [...] is engaged in a litigation tactic because it faces a unified defense by the defendants, who have made clear their intent to defend themselves.  Afraid of that, [...] wants to sever the joint defense to drive up the cost of litigation and leverage settlements in its favor.  And so, it seeks to disqualify the [...] (and the [...]) under RPC 1.7(a) and *In re Grand Jury*.  For the multitude of reasons set forth above, there is no concurrent conflict or other ethical prohibition.
[brief] See Ramada Worldwide Inc. v. 4018 W. Vine St., LLLP, 2022 WL 263436, at *2 (D.N.J. Jan. 28, 2022) (“The parties executed a second settlement agreement to resolve the lawsuit on September 12, 2019 (the ‘2019 settlement’), under which defendants executed a consent judgment and agreed to entry of a $565,743.31 judgment if they failed to comply with its terms.  Again, defendants breached their obligations and the consent judgment was entered on December 18, 2019. ”).  Such a remedy is not a seizure of assets as it is limited to [...]’s actual damages for unpaid rent as contemplated by the Settlement Agreement, and does not address [...]’s post-settlement environmental clean-up costs that had yet to be realized when the Settlement Agreement was executed.  [Db15].  The trial court’s failure to enter the Money Judgment due to its conflation of these issues was erroneous and should be reversed.
[brief] It shall be the policy of the Board to support and facilitate healthy communication between a transgender student and their family, rather than foster an unreasonable expectation that a public in-school transition will remain confidential or require district staff to affirmatively misrepresent information to parents. ”  As evident from above, when notice is implicated, disclosures are not made until the administrator sits down with the student and explains the process.  The student is provided the opportunity to personally disclose the information prior to parental notification and provided resources to assist in the process.  Moreover, disclosure is not made until consultation with the board attorney, school counsel and any other appropriate administrators and other teaching staff members.  It is at this time, the level of risk of disclosure is taken into account, including the student’s reporting of fear of any potential physical or emotional harm and any previous reports from the DCPP.  Thus, the notification process is student-centered with a school-supportive environment.  The haphazard approach suggested by the Amici is arbitrary, non-sensical and poses more of a risk for “outing” a child without providing any resources to the student.
[brief] First, the court failed to provide any explanation whatsoever for its finding of aggravating factor 3, simply making the conclusory statement: “the Court finds in this case are aggravating factor three, the risk that this Defendant will commit another offense. ” (13T 19-15 to 16)  But it is improper for a court to fail to explain the factual basis for an aggravating factor.  *Case*, 220 N.J. at 65 (“trial judges must explain how they arrived at a particular sentence”) (emphasis added); R. 3:21-4(h) (“At the time sentence is imposed the judge shall state reasons for imposing such sentence including. . . the factual basis supporting a finding of particular aggravating or mitigating factors affecting sentence”) (emphasis added).
[brief] B.  Credibility determinations.  [...] argues at Pb-48-49 that it challenges the credibility and truthfulness of [...]'s certifications and the payroll documentation attached to them establishing that [...] paid its laid off custodians for the months of May and June 2020 upon receipt of payment from [...] for that period.  But it does not identify a single statement made by [...] that it questions, or what it is about [...]’s payroll documentation that it questions.  And as to the latter issue, the fact is that the COVID Statute imposed upon [...] an obligation to make the payments, and upon [...] to pay its laid off workers upon receipt of the payments.  It certainly does not authorize a school district to police the contractor’s compliance with its own statutory obligation.
[brief] With respect to the first Knight factor, contrary to the trial court’s ruling, the Legislature did not have a legitimate governmental purpose in enacting the Limited Attorney Exemption.  The Limited Attorney Exemption does not advance the Act’s overall purported purpose.  To the contrary, it serves to defeat that purpose.  [...]’s corporate representative testimony -- erroneously disregarded by the trial court (see Section C., infra) -- demonstrates that the Limited Attorney Exemption fails to advance any legitimate purpose of the statute.  The Limited Attorney Exemption permits a newly admitted, novice attorney to represent clients in debt adjustment matters, while prohibiting an attorney with a concentration in that area and more experience from performing the same work.