ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] The NGRI acquittee shall continue to be committed in the care and of of of custody the Commissioner the Department Health and confined to an appropriate institution to be treated a person civilly committed.  The order refers as committee.1 to the NGRI acquittee as an NGRI  Although N.J.S.A. 2C:4-8 mandates that the NGRI committee "be treated as a person civilly 1 committed" this standard is substantially the same though not exactly the same.  There are three of substantial differences between the periodic review hearings all NGRI committee and a general civil committee.  The three distinctions are confirmed under Krol State and subsequent v. case law.  Firstly, N.J.S.A. 2C:4-8 grants the prosecutor the right to appear and be heard at all of periodic review hearings all NGRI committees who are hospitalized or in the community of under KROL court supervision on a conditional release.  Second, the burden proof for the State of in sustaining a Krol commitment is "preponderance the evidence" rather than "clear and convincing evidence" as required under a civil commitment under N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.10.  Lastly, of of the In the Matter the Commitment Edward S., 118 N.J. 118 (1990) all periodic review of of hearings for patients who were acquitted murder by reason insanity shall be heard in open court unless good case is shown for an in camera hearing.  See also, 19-2 and In the Matter R. 3: of of the Commitment Calu, 301 N.J. Super. 20, 26-27 (App. Div. 1997).  Attorney Name __________  NJ  Attorney ID Number _ Address Telephone Number of Attorney for State New Jersey/Defendant of of In the Matter Superior Court New Jersey Law Division Criminal Part - Select County County - - -------- Indictment Number: ------- RI NG Docket Number: Criminal Action of Order Mandating Continued Commitment  NGRI Acquittee Who Has Been Found to be Dangerous to Self, Others, or Property of as a Result Mental Illness __________________________ Having Reviewed _ __________________________________ ,and of Having Found that the NGRI acquittee is dangerous to self, others, or property as a result mental illness and that the acquittee cannot be released into the community, either with or without conditions, without posing a danger to self, others, or property, __ It of Ordered on the day - 20 _ that: is Select Month -, of of NGRI
[brief] February 13, 2024  Honorable Judges of the Appellate Division  New Jersey Appellate Division  Richard J. Hughes Justice Complex  P.O. Box 006 Trenton, New Jersey 08625  Re: State of New Jersey (Plaintiff-Respondent) v. [...] (Defendant-Appellant)  [...]  Appellate Division  Appeal from the Ocean County Law Division- Criminal Part (Honorable [...], J.S.C.)  Dear Sir(s)/Madam(es):
[brief] From their creation in 1955 to December 1966 those two lots were owned by different people.  In December 1966, Jan and [...] (“[...]”) became the record owner to both lots.  In 1972, [...] sold both lots in a single deed to John and [...] (“[...]”).  The deed [...] conveyed to [...], however, unilaterally truncated the [...]’ easement language quoted above to read as follows:  Subject to the rights of others, if any, in an old driveway crossing the southerly portion of the above described lot.  The truncated description of the easement from the 1972 [...]-to-[...] Deed was thereafter repeated in all future conveyances up to and including the deed into the [...].  The court below correctly ruled that [...]s’ 1972 deed to [...] that truncated the easement language from the 1966 Totten-to-[...] Deed was ineffective and void as a matter of law.  The court also correctly ruled that the unambiguous easement created in the Totten-to-[...] Deed continues to run with the land and burdens the [...]’ property for the benefit of the Challenger Lot.
[brief] And Plaintiff’s position seemingly ignores the fact that Plaintiff electronically signed the MAA or otherwise manifested her intent to be bound by its provisions. \(^2\)  Plaintiff’s argument that an employer bears the burden of ensuring that an employee “actually understand[s]” the employee’s waiver similarly lacks foundation.  \(^2\)  To the extent Plaintiff is challenging her electronic signature, even in the absence of her signature, the MAA would still be valid because her employment with [...] evinced an unmistakable indication that she affirmatively agreed to arbitrate her claims.  Skuse, 244 N.J. at 50-52; Jaworski v. Ernst & Young U.S. LLP, 441 N.J. Super. 464, 474 (App. Div. 2015); see also Martindale, 173 N.J. at 88-89 (“[I]n New Jersey, continued employment has been found to constitute sufficient consideration to support certain employment-related agreements.
[brief] Arbitration will proceed INDIVIDUALLY – CLASS ACTIONS AND SIMILAR PROCEDURES WILL NOT BE AVAILABLE TO YOU.  (Pa141).  It is also well-settled that under federal law, class action waiver is enforceable.  See AT&T Mobility, 131 S. Ct. 1740; Epic Sys. Corp., 138 S. Ct. 1612; Homa v. Am. Express Co., 494 Fed. Appx. 191, 195-7 (3d Cir. 2012); Gay v. CreditInform, 511 F.3d 369, 387 (3d Cir. 2007).  Thus, there can be no dispute to the Arbitration Agreement’s enforceability under either FAA or New Jersey law.
[directive] Income derived from any source, other in then contributive share distributions previously accounted for other categories, shall be recorded.  Examples include, but are not limited interest income; reimbursements of towing and storage fees; to: contributive share distributions seized but not forfeited property of law; that exceeds the statue limitations specified and, non- of by federal contributive share distributions received from another state.  - - 2  09  Page: Operating of State  New Jersey Forfeiture Program Administration Standard Procedure or Record and describe on line any other forfeited tangible 3. 3 in 2, intangible property, other than funds reported line that has been or police distributed to the agency by any county prosecutor's ofice the Division of Criminal Justice.
[brief] In *Bahrle v. [...]*, plaintiffs' wells were contaminated by seepage from a local gas station.  *Id.*  Plaintiffs sought to hold the national oil company, defendant [...], liable on a theory of apparent authority.  Plaintiff’s argument was that all gas stations bearing a "Texaco" sign were under the control of corporate Texaco and had a product of a certain quality, thereby rendering Texaco liable for the local gas station’s seepage.  *Id.* at 24-25.  In rejecting Plaintiff's apparent authority argument in *Bahrle*, the Court noted that:  [T]his is not a case where a patron had relied on the oil company's insignia or its advertising in seeking out the service of a local station, and was injured as a result of that service being rendered.  Plaintiffs produced absolutely no evidence that they in any manner relied upon the fact that [the] station was a Texaco station.  Not a single plaintiff testified that they moved into the area ultimately contaminated in reliance on the fact that the station displayed the Texaco insignia.  Nor is there any proof that plaintiffs remained residents in the neighborhood . . . because they had relied on the fact that Texaco was in control of the station and would thus prevent it from becoming a source of contamination.  Therefore, there was no factual or legal basis to hold Texaco liable on a vicarious liability theory.
[brief] DEFENDANT RECEIVED A FAIR TRIAL, AND THERE WERE NO CUMULATIVE ERRORS TO WARRANT A NEW ONE.  “When legal errors cumulatively render a trial unfair, the Constitution requires a new trial. ”  State v. Weaver, 219 N.J. 131, 155 (2014).  “[T]he predicate for relief for cumulative error must be that the probable effect of the cumulative error was to render the underlying trial unfair. ”  Wakefield, 190 N.J. at 538.  “If a defendant alleges multiple trial errors, the theory of cumulative error will still not apply where no error was prejudicial and the trial was fair. ”  State v. T.J.M., 220 N.J. 220, 238 (2015) (quoting Weaver, 219 N.J. at 155).  As discussed, defendant has not demonstrated any prejudicial error that occurred at trial.  The principle of cumulative error, thus, does not apply here.
[brief] [...]’s “complaints” cannot constitute “whistle-blowing activity. ”  [...] next argues that “[t]here is also evidence in the record that Plaintiff engaged in protected whistleblowing activity. ” (Pb20).  [...] argues that she reported [...] to [...].  (Ibid.).  Critically, [...] does not identify the exact substance of these “complaints. ”  As the record reflects, and as the trial court found, [...] never made any “complaints” sufficient to survive summary judgment.  CEPA explicitly defines what actions constitute “whistle-blowing activity. ”  A whistle-blowing activity consists of (1) disclosing, or threatening to disclose, to a supervisor or public body an illegal action, N.J.S.A. 34:19-3(a)(1); (2) objecting to or refusing to participate in an activity violating the law, N.J.S.A. 34:19-3(c)(1); or (3) objecting to, or refusing to participate in, conduct “incompatible with a clear mandate of public policy.
[directive] [...] Director Division of Criminal Justice (7/95)  Strip Search and Body Cavity Search Requirements and Procedures  Attorney General's Strip Search and Body Cavity Search Requirements and Procedures for Police Officers  N.J.S.A. 2A:161A-1 et seq.  I.  Definitions  A.  Strip Search  1.  Removal or rearrangement of clothing to permit visual inspection of a person's a. undergarments b. buttocks c. anus d. genitals e. breasts  2.  The following does not constitute a strip search: a. removal or rearranging of clothing reasonably required to render medical treatment or assistance, or b. removal of articles of outer clothing, such as coats, ties, belts or shoelaces.  B.
[brief] **The Prosecution’s Case at Trial**  The State charged defendant with armed robbery of a 99-cent store and several persons in it, and with shooting a responding officer in his knee.  According to the prosecution’s case, defendant entered the store with his gun cocked and loaded, then ordered the store owner and two others on the floor.  He pointed his gun at the store owner's head when he refused to get on the floor and demanded that his victims empty their pockets.  One victim threw his watch, money, and fanny pack on the floor, which defendant picked up.  DA268, DA7-9.  Defendant headed toward the front door.  But a person inside the store had escaped and flagged down a police car.  DA26-28, DA7-9.  A police officer approached the store with his gun drawn.  The officer fired twice at defendant and wounded him.  A second officer arrived.  The wounded defendant was the grabbed by three people in the store, who dragged and stomped on him.  DA26-28, DA7-9.  [...] was standing just outside the front of the store.  He made eye contact with defendant.  Dominguez said he heard a bang, saw “muzzle fire,” and realized that defendant had shot him in the knee through the glass door.  Other officers entered the store and arrested defendant.  Police said they found a Glock handgun beneath defendant where he’d been dragged.  DA26-28, DA7-9.  Defendant testified at trial, telling the jury he was an innocent bystander in the store who was attacked by the store owner and his associates who were selling marijuana at the front counter.  DA27.  Defendant testified that he was struggling to get away from the men who were assaulting him when he was shot by the police officer.  The Glock handgun found belonged to the store owner, not defendant, who affirmed he did not shoot [...] as claimed.  DA27.  **Defendant’s Ineffective Assistance Claims on Post-Conviction Relief**
[brief] Second, Plaintiffs contend that it is not clear from the record whether [...] manifested assent to [...]’s terms.  But the record is clear that [...] was presented with an in-App pop-up screen—in Spanish—advising her that [...]’s services were offered pursuant to certain terms of service and encouraging her to review those terms.  It is further clear that the pop-up screen blocked her from using the [...] App until she first checked a box representing that she acknowledged and agreed to [...]’s terms, and then also clicked another button further confirming her assent to [...]’s terms.  [...]’s records show that [...] both checked the box and clicked the button before the alleged incident.  Plaintiffs have identified no conflicting evidence or anything else that would undermine the trial court’s conclusion that [...] manifested assent to [...]’s terms.  Plaintiffs’ inflammatory rhetoric and attempts to smear [...] do not change basic principles of New Jersey contract law.  Nor do they change the facts of this case, which show that [...] manifested assent to [...]’s terms and that [...]’s terms require arbitration and delegate the question of unconscionability to the arbitrator.
[brief] Pa59.  With regard to Count III of the FAC and Plaintiff’s contention that the City was required to determine that the [...] remained an area of need redevelopment, the trial court held that the City “was under no obligation to reconsider the status of the [...] merely because time had passed since the original inception of the Redevelopment Plan. ”  Pa61.  Additionally, the trial court found that no factual information was presented by Plaintiff to demonstrate that the nature or character of the property had changed and was thus no longer in need of redevelopment.  Ibid.  With regard to Count IV of the FAC and Plaintiff’s contention that the Amended Redevelopment Plan constituted impermissible spot zoning, the trial court found that the question of whether the amendments to the Redevelopment Plan constituted spot zoning was a determination to be made by the court, based upon applicable New Jersey law and the undisputed material facts, and that the court was not bound by Plaintiff’s proffered expert’s conclusions as to whether the amendments constitute spot zoning.
[brief] In State v. [...], the improper admission of the defendant’s prior convictions was deemed reversible error where he subsequently decided not to testify.  453 N.J. Super. at 270-71.  One of the key factual disputes in the defendant’s trial for terroristic threats and other charges was whether he had made verbal threats or threatening gestures to a corrections officer, or whether he had only made offensive comments.  Although the evidence against the defendant included video footage of the incident, this Court held that “[t]he case hinged on the jury’s evaluation of witness credibility,” and had the defendant testified, the jury could have acquitted him because the video did “not entirely support [the State’s witnesses] version of events” and “[t]he testimony of the State’s witnesses was contradictory in some respects. ”
[brief] *Velasquez v. Franz*, 123 N.J. 498, 505 (1991).  The doctrine “provides that a cause of action between parties that has been finally determined on the merits by a tribunal having jurisdiction cannot be relitigated by those parties or their privies in a new proceeding. ”  *Ibid.*; see also, *Watkins v. Resorts Int'l Hotel & Casino, Inc.*, 124 N.J. 398, 409 (1991) (“[b]y insulating courts from the relitigation of claims, res judicata prevents the judicial inefficiency inherent in multiplicitous litigation[,]” ensures the finality of judgments, and advances the interest of fairness “[b]y preventing harassment of parties[.]”).  For an action to be barred based on the application of *res judicata* there must be (1) a final judgment by a court of competent jurisdiction, (2) identity of parties, and (3) substantially similar or identical causes of action.  *Culver v. Ins. Co. of N. Am.*, 115 N.J. 451, 460-61 (1989).  These elements are present in this action, warranting the application of *res judicata*.  Thus, even if appellant/plaintiff’s alleged fact dispute concerning his claims against his insurance carrier had a bearing on the application of N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.5, here, any dispute concerning the analysis of those claims is now concluded, by an order that found his vehicles were garaged in New Jersey and were not insured.  Therefore, appellant/plaintiff failed to maintain insurance meeting the requirements of N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4 on April 13, 2022 and barred from making a claim for economic and non-economic loss against defendant [...].
[brief] Camden County Indictment Number [...] charged defendants [...] and [...] with: murder, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3a(1)(2) (Count One); conspiracy to commit murder, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2 (Count Two); attempted murder, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:5-1 (Count Three); second-degree aggravated assault, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1b(1) (Count Four); second-degree possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4a (Count Five); and second-degree unlawful possession of a weapon, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5b (Count Six).  (Da 1-10)  [...] was separately charged with second-degree certain persons not to have weapons, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:39-7b(1) (Count Seven), and first-degree unlawful possession of a weapon, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(j) (Count Eight).  Defendants’ cases were severed, and [...]’s trial on Counts One through Six began on February 7, 2022, before the Honorable [...], J.S.C., and a jury.  (6T)  The jury acquitted [...] of Count Three and convicted him of the remaining counts on February 23, 2022.  (15T 60-11 to 61-19)  On February 24, trial was held on the two certain persons counts, and [...] was convicted on both counts.  (16T 43-9, 61-4)  On June 9, 2022, [...] was sentenced to an aggregate term of life in prison.  (17T 44-22 to 25)  The trial court sentenced [...] to life on Count One and merged Counts Two and Five into that count.  (17T 40-2 to 43-25)  The following sentences were set to run concurrent to Count One: 10 years with 85% parole ineligibility on Count Four; 10 years with five years of parole ineligibility each on Counts Six and Seven; and 20 years with 10 years of parole ineligibility on Count Eight.  (17T 40-2 to 43-25)  A notice of appeal was filed on July 8, 2022.  (Da 63-66)  STATEMENT OF FACTS
[brief] This Court’s opinion affirming defendant’s conviction sets forth the facts of the robbery as follows:  [T]he State presented evidence which established that on December 3, 2009, an African-American male entered the [...] store in Newark.  He stood near the entrance, complained that the lines were too long, and left the store soon after.  Later that day, at around 5:30 p.m., [...], the store's manager, observed that the individual who entered the store earlier had returned and was attempting to take one of the cash registers.  [...], the store's security guard, attempted to stop the man from carrying away the register.  [...] and the perpetrator fell to the floor.  [...] pressed the store's ‘panic button’ alarm.  When he turned around, [...] observed that the perpetrator had gotten up from the ground and was pointing a handgun at him.  [...] turned again, and the man fled the store with the register.  He had taken $125.  [...] immediately called 9-1-1 and provided a description of the robber.  He described the perpetrator as an African-American male, between 5 feet and 7 or 8 inches, who weighed approximately 140 to 150 pounds.  At trial, [...] also said the perpetrator had braided hair and had been wearing a black Yankees hat.  […]  On December 16, 2009, an officer showed [...] an array of photos for purposes of identifying the perpetrator of the robbery.  The officer instructed [...] that he need not pick a photograph, as the perpetrator may not be in the photo array.  [...] positively identified defendant as the man who robbed the store, and signed the back of the photograph with the date.  At trial, [...] identified defendant as the person who committed the robbery on December 3, 2009, and pointed the handgun at him.  On the day of the robbery, [...] also provided the police with a description of the perpetrator.  She described the robber as an African-American male, who was approximately 5 feet, 9 inches tall, and weighed about 150 pounds.  [...] said he had braided hair, and was wearing a short sleeved-shirt, a vest, and a Yankees cap.  [...] also was shown a photo array, but she was unable to identify the perpetrator.  However, on December 26, 2009, [...] identified defendant from a different photo array, which was shown to her by another officer.  At trial, [...] identified defendant as the man who robbed the store.  [(Da12). ]
[brief] State v. Covell, 157 N.J. 554, 564 (1999).  As a result, the Appellate Division reviews evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion.  Pomerantz Paper Corp. v. New Cmty. Corp., 207 N.J. 344, 371-72 (2011).  This means that a trial court's evidentiary rulings must be upheld, “unless it can be shown . . . that its finding was so wide of the mark that a manifest denial of justice resulted. ”  State v. Carter, 91 N.J. 86, 106 (1982).  Stated otherwise, “Absent a manifest denial of justice, [an appellate court will] not disturb a trial judge's reasoned exercise of his or her broad discretion when making relevance and admissibility determinations. ”  New Jersey Div. of Youth & Family Services v. N.S., 412 N.J. Super. 593, 622 (App. Div. 2010).  Because the trial court’s decision as to the defendant’s motion to preclude testimony by the State’s expert as to cocaine exposure was sound, this Court should not disturb its order.  As the Court correctly opined in its February 20, 2024 decision, evidence against a defendant is not admissible when it is irrelevant, barred by the rules of evidence, and/or when it violates the defendant’s state or federal constitutional rights.  *State v. Johnson*, 118 N.J. 639, 651 (1990); *N.J.R.E.* 401.  Even if evidence is relevant, it is still inadmissible if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the risk of its undue prejudice, confusion of issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.  *N.J.R.E.* 403.  Where the evidence being offered has low probative value and will instead confuse the jurors and mislead them from the issues in the case, that evidence should be excluded.  *State v. Koskovich*, 168 N.J. 448, 486 (2001).  Since [...] could offer no testimony other than that the defendant may have ingested cocaine at some point prior to the accident, allowing her testimony as to that alleged fact would only mislead the jurors and would greatly prejudice the defendant.
[brief] 8T20-25 (board member bringing error to rest of Board’s attention).  However, their Board counseled them that since they were not ordered to change it to what the Judge mistakenly thought it was, they need not reconsider it.  The Board took that advice.  8T:20-25.  Moreover, [...] knows that the current expense of $481 per month includes $72 for a special assessment that stopped existing before it even filed its application.  This is a matter of simple math.  [...] asked for $5772 a year for condominium fees.  The Board removed approximately $200 a year, $123 for garbage pick up from the condominium budget and $75 for tax preparation for the condominium budget.  The Board granted the entire remaining amount, including the $864 per year for the special assessment.  If it had not, then the total condo fees granted when it went up to [...] would have been approximately $4708, not $5572.  See 7T:112:15-113:3 (board counsel explaining to Board that in 2018 it had granted $5,572 in condo fees and that “the applicant is asking you to reinsert approximately $200, okay to make the condo fee $5,772” and [...]’s counsel agreeing).  The evidence shows that there has not been a special assessment in at least 7 years and that it was lifted even before [...] filed its hardship application.  It is not an ongoing expense and [...] was correct that it should be excluded.  Moreover, the special assessment for “replacement reserve” and thus solely related to the conversion to condominium and therefore prohibited under the TPA.