ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] [...], P.E., Plaintiff’s Sound Expert, also testified that the project will not cause a substantial detriment to the public good.  [...]’s sound study revealed that the area’s current ambient noise levels already exceed the permitted nighttime limit approximately 81% of the time.  [...] concluded that the project will have little to no sound impact, and the expected levels will be well under the permitted limit for the Property.  (3T 51:3-25; 60:5-25; 61:1-25).  [...]’ testimony also proves the lack of substantial detriment to the public good.  As explained in greater detail above, any potential visual impacts will be mitigated by the character of the surrounding properties, the significant setbacks, the proposed landscaping, and distance from residential properties.  These factors include: the Property’s border with Interstate 295 and a 150-foot wide PSE&G easement with overhead transmission lines; the setback 700 feet from Florence-Columbus Road; preserved farmland as the largest adjoining contiguous property; the closest residential structure on Cedar Lane Extension is 700 to 800 feet from a warehouse; and the lone residential structure bordering the Property on Burlington-Columbus Road is at least 400 feet from the closest warehouse building.  (5T 75:20-25 through 77:1).  [...] concluded that the visual impact associated with the increased height does not “rise to the level of being substantially detrimental. ”  (5T 77:2-10).  Underlying [...]’ testimony is the recognition that the zoning ordinance’s bulk requirements, including setbacks, defines how the “public good” for the proposed uses is satisfied.  Again, the proposed project exceeds the required setbacks for all of the four requirements—three of which are substantial—in both the SM and GM Zones.  (5T 75:6-19; 76:1-3; 76:14-25; 77:1).  If a 75 foot setback is appropriate for a 75 foot warehouse, as permitted in the GM Zone, then a proposed 700 foot setback for a 48 warehouse in the SM Zone is certainly no detriment, let alone a substantial detriment, to the “public good. ”  A contrary conclusion not only defies logic, but is also not supported by any evidence in the record.  These extensive proofs make clear that there would be no substantial detriment to the public good if Plaintiff’s height variance were granted.  Given the absence of any evidence in the record to the contrary, the Defendant’s denial was arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable, and requires reversal.
[directive] Definitions  2.1  Authorized Tire Deflation Device.  A device designed and intended to produce a controlled deflation of one or more tires of a pursued vehicle and capable of operation consistent with criteria established in this Policy.  2.2  Boxing In.  The surrounding of a violator’s moving vehicle with moving pursuit vehicles which are then slowed to a stop along with the violator's vehicle.  2.3  Divided Highway.  A road which includes a physical barrier between traffic traveling in opposite directions.  2.4  Heading Off.  An attempt to terminate a pursuit by pulling ahead of, behind, or toward a violator's moving vehicle to force it to the side of the road or to otherwise come to a stop.  2.5  Law Enforcement Officer.  Any person who is employed as a sworn member of any State, county, or municipal law enforcement agency, department, or division of those governments who is statutorily empowered to act for the detection, investigation, arrest, conviction, detention, or rehabilitation of persons violating the criminal laws of this State.  The term law enforcement officer shall include sworn members of the New Jersey State Police, the Division of Criminal Justice and the Juvenile Justice Commission.  It shall include State Correctional Police Officers pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:154-4, County Correctional Police Officers pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:154-3, Special Law Enforcement Officers of all classes pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40A:14-146.8 et seq., Humane Law Enforcement Officers appointed pursuant to N.J.S.A. 4:22-14.1 or 4:22-14.4, Auxiliary Police Officers appointed pursuant to N.J.S.A. App.A:9-45(c), and Constables appointed pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40A:9-120.  For purposes of this policy, the terms law enforcement officer, police officer and officer shall have the same meaning.  2.6  Paralleling.  Street Paralleling is driving a police vehicle on a street parallel to a street on which a pursuit is occurring.  Vehicle  Paralleling is a deliberate offensive tactic by one or more patrol vehicles to drive alongside the pursued vehicle while it is in motion.  2.7  Pursuit Driving.  Pursuit driving is an active attempt by a law enforcement officer operating a motor vehicle and utilizing emergency warning lights and an audible device to apprehend one or more occupants of another moving vehicle when the officer reasonably believes that the driver of the fleeing vehicle is aware of the officer's attempt to stop the vehicle and is resisting apprehension by increasing vehicle speed, committing traffic violations or otherwise attempting to elude the officer.  It shall not constitute pursuit driving if the fleeing vehicle follows all traffic regulations after the officer activates the emergency warning lights and audible device (siren).  2
[directive] The 12 parole, probation, defendant on was eligible the or arrest, offense current the of time "whether the at consider may federal under for another offense sentence completion of or appeal, sentencing, trial, pending release other on or thus Legislature (emphasis added).  The 2A:162-20(c)(2) N.J.S.A. state." other any or this of or law the law, circumstance this of Because indicator risk.  an as circumstance case-specific this of importance the recognized complaint- issuing a for a establishes basis clearly it law, Reform Bail the under detention pretrial justify might warrant.
[brief] Defendant’s understanding of the Endangering an Injured Victim is wholly incorrect, and his assertion as to the rule established in State v. Moon is unfounded as that case is vastly different from the one at bar.  Defendant claims that he should have been acquitted of endangering an injured victim because, in his estimation, the fact that he left [...] on the porch for two hours after shooting him without even checking for a pulse is irrelevant.  (Db56-60).  Specifically, he claims that the fact that [...] was going to die regardless means that this course of action means nothing.  Alternatively, he claims the jury should have been charged with language from State v. Moon, 396 N.J. Super. 109, 114-16 (App. Div. 2007), where it is not endangering an injured victim to walk away from an already dead body.  Defendant is grossly mistaken.  First off, in Moon, the victim had been shot directly through the brain and the Medical Examiner testified that he died instantly, before he even hit the ground.  *Id.* at 113.  This is wildly different from defendant’s case, where he shot [...] in the leg and then in the torso, neither of which are instantaneously fatal.  The evidence in the case also shows that a jury certainly could have found that defendant failed to render aid to [...] and that he did not die instantly.  Indeed, although defendant’s expert opined that [...] “likely” died within minutes, that is far different than the obvious and instant death clear in a head shot.  Two hours after the shooting, in fact, officers observed that [...]’ body was still warm despite being left outside in the cold January air.  Defendant is not required to save the life he endangered, but he is required to at least try to help the person he shot and injured so critically.  In short, he is obligated to care enough about the human life he endangered to at least call 911.  But as defendant said in his statement to police, he had no compassion for [...], and did not feel he had to call for help, even though he acknowledged that he should have.  Instead, he went inside and watched baseball until his mother got home, and then stepped past [...]’ prone, injured body for two hours without even checking for a pulse.  To say that this, somehow, does not constitute endangering an injured victim such that he should have been acquitted is preposterous and this court should not countenance such an argument.
[directive] 1  ‘To eCDR has been enhanced to automatically run the PSA when a Be determined’ complaint is generated using a livescan record.  ‘To Be Determined’  1.  Once the complaint is generated using a livescan record, ‘Submit’ ‘Involved Persons’ click on the tab.  ccJ:wITT [...] 2023  121~ C~laint ln¥01vedPenons l I Defend;rit AffidavitofProbableC.ause  Chargesarw:!Narratives  PUIR Involved Persons ,,,.  HoP.em<dsfoood @Add item 2.  The PSA will be displayed automatically in a separate window.  Review the PSA report and close the PSA window.  + I - ,n eMACS  Home k O x x '1, _:)  covrts.gov/prweb/PP.Auth/app/EMACS.}_hUx_8vlC~Xv1;z3eScP8A•/JTABTHR~,A•/ISTANDARD?AppName•MACS ttps://p .aocnp.nj acs-qactov orta -~ lm d C') :J XI0M- C') C')
[brief] The trial court correctly found that it was not defective:  [I]t’s almost universally understood that the safe operation of a motor vehicle is entirely dependent -- or almost entirely -- upon the driver’s diligence in use of the vehicle’s braking and other systems.  A driver’s responsibility for avoiding collisions by limiting speed, braking and steering, have been an inherent and well-understood characteristic of automobile operation for over a century.  2T at 26.  Plaintiff’s claim fails because he never presented evidence that a vehicle that was otherwise reasonably fit, suitable, and safe as designed, becomes unreasonably unsafe simply because it did not include LKAS and LDW.
[brief] This is because Plaintiff is seeking to enjoin [...] from using the same form health club contract (which violates New Jersey’s CFA, HCSA, RISA and TCCWNA) to enroll future New Jersey customers that seek to join an [...] health club.  This fits squarely within the definition of “public injunctive relief” (Ja37) set forth in [...]’s Membership Agreement; and therefore, Plaintiff’s claims are specifically excluded from arbitration.  In its July 29, 2024 decision (and July 19, 2024 oral argument) on this point, the trial court was concerned with the basis for Plaintiff to act as a private attorney general\(^5\) regarding her injunctive relief claim seeking “public injunctive relief”.  (Ja11; T14-23-25; T15-1-4; T16-1-2,10-13; T17-1-6,13-24; T26-9-12, 19-22; T27-12-16, 19-25; T28-1-3, 7-8, 13-19; T31-7-13)
[brief] Under LAD, it is unlawful for an employer to discharge an employee in retaliation for a complaint concerning unlawful discrimination in the workplace.  N.J.S.A. § 10:5-12(d).  To establish her *prima facie* case, the record must show that Plaintiff was in a protected class, she engaged in protected activity known to the employer, she was thereafter subjected to an adverse employment consequence, and a causal link between the protected activity and the adverse employment action.  *Victor v. State*, 203 N.J. 383, 409 (2010).  Notably, “the mere fact that [an] adverse employment action occurs after [a protected activity] will ordinarily be insufficient to satisfy the plaintiff’s burden of demonstrating a causal link between the two. ”  *Young*, 385 N.J. Super. at 467 (quoting *Krouse v. Am. Sterilizer Co.*, 126 F.3d 494, 503 (3d Cir. 1997)).  “Where the timing alone is not ‘unusually suggestive,’ the plaintiff must set forth other evidence to establish the causal link. ”  Id. (citations omitted).  If she establishes her *prima facie* case, “the burden then shifts to defendant to articulate a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for the action. ”  *Shepherd v. Hunterdon Dev. Ctr.*, 336 N.J. Super. 395, 418 (App. Div. 2001), rev'd in part on other grounds and aff'd on this ground o.b., 174 N.J. 1 (2002).  To survive summary judgment when Defendants have provided “legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for its action, the plaintiff must point to some evidence, direct or circumstantial, from which a factfinder could reasonably either (1) disbelieve the employer’s articulated legitimate reasons; or (2) believe that an invidious discriminatory reason was more likely than not a motivating or determinative cause of the employer's action.
[brief] The court found this was a problem because the judge’s comments preempted the jury’s fact-finding function.  Ibid.  The court further noted that while the judge here may have obliquely suggested to the jury that they were the final arbiters of the facts, we are persuaded that the jury must necessarily have been influenced in its weight and credibility determinations by the judge assuring it he had already found the identifications to be reliable and trustworthy—precisely the determinations the jury had to make.  The defendant was, consequently, deprived of her right to have the jury make unfettered and undirected critical findings of fact.  [Ibid.]
[brief] TABLE OF CONTENTS  PROCEDURAL HISTORY ..................................................................................  1  STATEMENT OF FACTS  ..................................................................................  1 LEGAL ARGUMENT .......................................................................................  16 POINT I  IT WAS REVERSIBLE ERROR FOR THE TRIAL JUDGE TO SEND THE JURY BACK FOR MORE DELIBERATION -- AFTER THE JURY’S SECOND ANNOUNCEMENT THAT IT HAD A PARTIAL VERDICT ON SOME COUNTS, BUT WAS DEADLOCKED ON OTHERS -- AT 4:45 PM, WHEN THE JUDGE ALREADY HAD KNOWN FOR OVER A WEEK THAT MORE THAN ONE OF 13 JURORS WERE ON VACATION AS OF THE NEXT MORNING.
[brief] The standard of review of a trial judge’s evidentiary rulings is abuse of discretion.  “Trial judges are entrusted with broad discretion in making evidence rulings. ”  State v. Muhammad, 359 N.J. Super. 361, 388 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 178 N.J. 36 (2003).  Evidentiary rulings are “subject to limited appellate scrutiny. ”  State v. Harris, 209 N.J. 431, 439 (2012) (quoting State v. Buda, 195 N.J. 278, 294 (2008)).  The trial court’s decision to admit defendant’s prior convictions is entitled to deference absent a showing of an abuse of discretion, i.e., there has been a clear error of judgment.
[brief] At one point during this questioning, Plaintiff looked to [...], the counsel for her company, Third Party Defendant [...], and was immediately berated by the Trial Judge:  **Court:**  Next items is judgment or order dissolving [...] pursuant to law or equity.  You still asking for that?  **Plaintiff:**  Shouldn’t I?  I don’t, um, [...]?  **[...]:**  I can’t – I can’t – I can’t answer that.  **Court:**  [...] is not your attorney.  **Plaintiff:**  No, I understand.  2T:90:9-16.  The unfortunate result is that Plaintiff was left with far less relief than set forth in her Complaint and for which she later sought under her Motion for Reconsideration.  It is clear Plaintiff did not knowingly and intelligently agree with the Court on its dismissal of said relief.
[brief] A full evidential record is further required to enable the court below to reach a determination on the central issue presented by Plaintiffs’ complaint: SFRA’s *continuing* constitutionality as applied to [...].  Resolving this issue, in turn, necessitates an adjudication on remand to determine whether the State has breached *Abbott XX*’s express mandates for the optimal operation of the SFRA in [...] and has allowed formula deficiencies of a “constitutional dimension” to emerge, thereby necessitating judicial branch remediation to correct the State’s breach.
[brief] (See supra, Procedural History at Statements of Facts, No. 7, at pp. 10-11).  As Appellants incorrectly filed the Complaint in the Law Division instead of filing a motion to vacate in the Chancery Division as the Consent Order required, dismissal of the Complaint was further warranted.  Respondent notes that this argument, along with each of the above points, were raised below and generally referenced by the Trial Court in its framing of the parties’ arguments (Pa4 at top) but not otherwise addressed in the Trial Court’s Opinion.  (See Da19 to Da26 (portion of Respondent’s Reply Brief raising argument in issue below) and 1T17:5-18 and 1T19:19 to 20:25).  “A consent judgment ‘is an agreement that the parties desire and expect will be reflected in, and be enforceable as, a judicial decree that is subject to the rules generally applicable to other judgments and decrees. ’”  DEG, 198 N.J. at 261 (2009)(quoting Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 378 (1992)(Emphasis added).  Consent judgments are authorized by Rule 4:42-1.  Midland Funding, LLC v. Giambanco, 422 N.J. Super. 301, 310-11 (App. Div. 2011).
[brief] \(^9\)  Moreover, this explicitly contradicts [...]’s original decision regarding this issue in which he stated:  “I understand that.  I – I understand that.  But you know, you’re – you’re – you’re saying you’re protecting her by taking her out of there, and [...] is saying, you know, what, you’re moving her in – as a – as punishment.  What am I supposed to do with these – with – with – coming from two different fact patterns of though processes as it relates to, you know, why she was removed, why she wasn’t moved?  Isn’t that a jury question?”  See IT97:4-12.
[brief] As set forth in this court’s initial direct appeal opinion, petitioner argued that the trial court improperly ran separate charges stemming from the same conduct consecutively, and imposed an excessive sentence.  (Da 174).  No claim of disparate sentence was raised.  Nor did petitioner raise a disparity claim in his appeal of his re-sentence after remand.  Rather, as set forth in this Court’s decision, petitioner argued in multiple sub-points that his de facto life sentence of 70 years with 57.9 years was excessive.  (Da 205)  In particular, petitioner argued:  A.  Procedurally, The Trial Court Again Failed to Weigh Sentencing Factors Appropriately.  1.  The trial court overweighed defendant’s prior record and failed to sufficiently take his rehabilitative efforts into account when assessing aggravating and mitigating factors.  2.  The trial court gave insufficient attention to the fact that these crimes occurred in an aberrant spree in defendant’s life.  B.  Substantively, The Trial Court’s Revised Sentence Remains Manifestly Excessive  1.  Courts have a responsibility to ensure that aggregate sentences are not excessive.  2.  This sentence is much longer than necessary to incapacitate.  3.  This sentence is much longer than necessary to deter.  4.  This sentence is much longer than necessary to rehabilitate.  5.  This sentence is much longer than necessary to further the goal of retribution.  [Da 205 to 206]  None of these claims raise a legal claim of disparity of petitioner’s sentence.  No court below has adjudicated a disparate sentencing claim with respect to petitioner.
[brief] While Appellant asserts at page 21 of its papers that the fact that there is a stenographic record is sufficient, such cannot be the case.  As the Willingboro Court held, cases in which the complexity of the settlement terms cannot be drafted by the time the mediation session was expected to have ended, the mediation session should be continued for a brief but reasonable period of time to allow for the signing of the settlement.  *Id.*  It should go without saying that, in the case at hand, the settlement terms were sufficiently complex to require that there be a reasonable period of time for the signing of the settlement.  Specifically, remaining at issue was the complicated details of healthcare plans, backpay, waivers of significant legal claims, and the like.  In fact, evidence of this is the fact that Appellant provided a proposed writing intended to be signed by the parties.  The stenographic record detailing a rough outline of terms should not be sufficient, the complexity of the terms required a more extensive detailing of them which should have been reduced to writing and signed by the parties.  However, no such writing was ever signed by the parties.  Therefore, it follows that the terms orally outlined on December 20, 2022 are not enforceable.
[brief] [...] simply failed to file his Eligibility Registration Form until one year and one month past the statutory deadline, which is not a de minimis violation.  Contrary to [...]’s argument, the court’s decision in *Ensslin* did not turn on the timeliness or adequacy of the Division’s notice.  *(Pb11).*  Instead, the court found that because the notice from the Division was sent “more than four years from the date of petitioner’s last contribution,” the Division’s own “day-to-day administration of its affairs” and interpretation of the two-year time limitation as expressed by the four-year notice further supported allowing Ensslin to file.  *Id.* at 338.  Here, there was no such letter informing [...] that he was eligible to file under the Ricci Act past the statutory deadline.  Thus, *Ensslin* does not support [...]’s proposition that untimely notice allows individuals to file at any time past the statutory deadline.
[brief] Such opinions by police are “particularly prejudicial because [a] jury may be inclined to accord special respect to such a witness” and give such testimony “almost determinative significance. ”  Id. at 593 (citation omitted).  Where police opinions are admitted via a recorded interview, “[a]t a minimum” courts should instruct that the opinions “should not be deemed testimony and may be considered only in the context of understanding how the interrogation was conducted and how defendant responded.
[brief] arbitration may only join claims for the same injured person or for up to four people who occupied the same vehicle on the same date of accident).  Although [...] may consolidate cases, see Pa0385-0386 ([...] R. 9), Plaintiffs would need to file separate arbitrations for each of the roughly 120 patients for whom Defendants obtained benefits, see Pa0066 (Compl. ¶ 304), unless some were injured in the same vehicle, each originally filed arbitration would require a separate award, Pa0386 ([...] R. 9), and there is no guarantee that [...] would agree to consolidate all or some of those separate proceedings.  It is also highly doubtful that insurers could name in a demand for arbitration alleged co-conspirators of medical providers who were not themselves assigned benefits.  The DOBI regulations refer to “the injured party, the insured, a provider who is an assignee of PIP benefits . . . or the insurer,” as potential parties to ACIRA dispute resolution.  N.J.A.C. 11:3-5.6(a).  Plaintiffs’ complaint names 36 defendants, many of whom—including key players in the scheme like the [...]—did not themselves submit benefit claims or agree to PIP arbitration as a condition of assignment.
[brief] Plaintiffs made repeated efforts over the course of the next ten (10!) months to obtain this information from the landlord and a third-party source, but ran into repeated obfuscation.  All of this is set forth at pages four to five of the Procedural History, as well as in Certifications of record.  It was not until April 30, 2019 – about twenty-five months after the accident and after 10 months of seeking the information – that Plaintiffs were first provided the names and other information concerning the Cross Appellants.  Promptly thereafter, Plaintiffs moved to join Respondents to the Complaint by way of a motion filed May 21, 2019.  In seeking relief below, and here, Respondents argued that they are “long term” tenants and their identities could have been discovered, but for a lack of “due diligence.