ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The trial court did not abuse its discretion in reopening [...] because [...] demonstrated good cause (Pa000105–Pa000106).  Plaintiff does not argue that the trial court abused its discretion in reopening this case to enforce the Settlement Agreement.  See generally Pb (mentioning neither “discretion” nor “good cause”).  He merely says that the trial court lacked jurisdiction over [...] and should not have considered [...]’s arguments because the [...] claims “fall well outside the scope of the 2015 Settlement in [...] Pizzeria” and are simply “similar claims arising from separate facts in a separate forum. ”  Pb3, Pb25–Pb26.
[brief] ”  Barr v. Bishop Rosen & Co., Inc., 442 N.J. Super. 599, 605 (App. Div. 2015).  See also Skuse v. Pfizer, Inc., 244 N.J. 30, 46 (2020) (“Whether a contractual arbitration provision is enforceable is a question of law, and we need not defer to the interpretative analysis of the trial or appellate courts unless we find it persuasive. ”) (citing to Kernahan v. Home Warranty Adm'r of Fla., Inc., 236 N.J. 301, 316 (2019) and Atalese v. U.S. Legal Servs. Grp., L.P., 219 N.J. 430, 445-46 (2014).  Further, the issue of whether a party waived its arbitration right is also subject to de novo review.  Cole v. Jersey City Med. Ctr., 215 N.J. 265, 275 (2013).  Here, the trial court's denial of the Motion to Compel Arbitration on the grounds that [...] waived its right to arbitrate and that the arbitration clauses do not apply here should not be given any special deference.  The FAA governs the enforcement of the arbitration clauses in the [...] policies, and state courts are required to “honor and enforce agreements to arbitrate.
[brief] On August 8, 2019, more than 30 days after the Ricci Act’s passage, the [...] distributed an email to all Certifying Officers “advising them of their responsibilities under the Ricci Act. ”  Pa11.  However, while this is cited in the Final Agency Decision, no actual email dated August 8, 2019, was ever produced, only a Memorandum dated “August 2019. ”  Pa81.  On or about August 9, 2019, more than 30 days after the passage of the Ricci Act, the [...] contracted [...] to mail postcards to retirees.  Pa83.  No “close date” appears on the document.  Pa83.  In support of his request for amended benefits under the Ricci Act, [...] submitted an affidavit that he did not receive any correspondence or postcard from the [...] or the [...] with respect to the passage of P.L. 2019, c.157 (Chapter 157), the Bill Ricci World Trade Center Rescue, Recovery, and Cleanup Operations Act.  Pa56.  [...] was present and involved in the aftermath of the World Trade Center attacks which took place on September 11, 2001.
[brief] The defendant first argues that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to convict him of N.J.S.A. 39:4-129, leaving the scene of an accident; and failure to report an accident in violation of N.J.S.A. 39:4-130.  According to the defendant, because this accident occurred in the early morning hours and during inclement weather, the evidence was insufficient to sustain a conviction.  (Db 7-9).  However, the evidence adduced at trial showed that the defendant attempted to obfuscate his involvement in the accident entirely when [...] questioned him about the damage to his vehicle.  Further, the defendant only fully apologized for the damage to the [...]’s vehicle, and followed up on ensuring the [...]s were made whole via his insurance the following day.  While the defendant should be credited for ultimately taking responsibility for the damage he caused to a neighbor’s car, and implicitly recognizing that he was operating his car when he caused the damage, the language of the statute makes clear that his responsibility to report the accident and not leave the scene does not depend on the time of day or the weather.
[directive] Stored ALPR data shall be treated as "criminal investigatory records" within the meaning of N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1 and shall not be shared with or provided to any person, entity, or et seq., government agency, other than a law enforcement agency, unless such disclosure is authorized by a subpoena or court order, or unless such disclosure is required by the Rules of Court governing discovery in criminal matters.  Any agency receiving a subpoena or court order for the disclosure of ALPR data shall, before complying with the subpoena or court order, provide notice to the County Prosecutor, or to the Division of Criminal Justice in the case of any state-level law enforcement agency.  14.
[brief] The trial court’s application of the Railroad Immunity Act to bar plaintiff’s claims is flawed on multiple levels.  First, a review of the text of the Act demonstrates that (b)(5) is a reconstruction of language from the original statute clearly concerning tangible railroad property.  Second, looking historically, contributory negligence has not attached in credible “failure to avoid” cases.  Third, looking at the intent and purpose of the Act’s 1998 amendment, it was never intended to expand the immunities afforded to railroads in this broad fashion.  The Legislature (and reviewing courts) acknowledge the Act is concerned with immunity against the claims of trespassers.  There is simply no basis, in the text or outside it, justifying the trial court’s expansive reading of (b)(5).  POINT I :
[brief] The jury’s award of compensatory damages for emotional distress is against the weight of the evidence.  Plaintiff presented no evidence at trial that any action was taken against her on the basis of her disability.  In fact, on cross-examination, Plaintiff admitted that she did not lodge any complaints that the Township Defendants committed any acts or made any statements because of her alleged anxiety disability.  4T:189:1-25—191:1-25.  Therefore, in the absence of evidence that any action was taken against her because of her alleged anxiety disability, the jury’s verdict is against the weight of the evidence.  b.
[brief] (Pa423a).  The trial court heard oral argument on November 19, 2021, after which it set out, in detail, the law governing a sanctions motion.  (2T14:20-17-11).  Applying that law to the record before it, the court found that Plaintiffs’ claims against [...] became frivolous once they became aware that [...] had not entered into a transaction with [...].  (2T18:6-14).  No “conceivable cause of action for” tortious interference (or any other claim Plaintiffs asserted) existed once Plaintiffs knew that [...] and [...] never entered into a transaction.  (2T18:10-15).  The court observed that it had questioned Plaintiffs’ counsel, at an October 2020 conference, why [...] was a party to the case in the absence of a transaction with [...].  (2T17:15-22).  Nevertheless, “it took two years of litigation and [a] summary judgment motion” before [...] was ultimately out of the case.  (2T18-2-3).  The court found that [...] was entitled to an award of 50% of the fees incurred “in defending what I do find was a frivolous cause of action against them. ” (2T18-22-24).  Accordingly, the court granted [...]’s motion and awarded it $72,984.95 in fees and costs.  (Pa18a).  On Plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration of the fee award, the trial court affirmed its order, except it determined the award should have been entered only against Plaintiffs, not their counsel.  (Pa35a).  In issuing its decision, the court reiterated the reasons why Plaintiffs’ continued pursuit of claims against [...] was frivolous, (3T19:22-22:14).  Specifically, the court found that “from day one” (after taking over the matter from another judge) it had questioned why [...] was a defendant in the case.  (3T21:8-16).  “[D]espite that conversation, and despite [[...]’s] 1:4-8 letters, [[...] was] continued in [the case] for another two years until I let them out on summary judgment .  . . .” (3T22:3-6).  Plaintiffs pursued claims against [...], the trial court found, even though “there was never a cognizable cause of action” against [...].  (3T22:7).  Although it affirmed the fee award, the court determined the award should have been entered only against Plaintiffs, not their counsel.  In this regard, the court found that “[t]he law presumes that the lawyer is acting on behalf of the client and with the client’s instructions and acquiescence and strategy. ” (3T22:20-22).  The court had “no doubt” that Plaintiffs’ counsel made his clients award of [...]’s Rule 1:4-8 letters and of the court’s comments during the October 2020 conference.  (3T23:4-9).  “[D]espite all of that [the case] went forward[,]” the court found, and the responsibility was on the Plaintiffs to stop it.  (3T23:9-12).  Plaintiffs, however, failed to do so.  (3T23:9-12).  IX.
[brief] [...]’ supervisor, [...] (“[...]”), testified that he specified over CB radio to the drivers, including [...], that they were to use a grass cut-through marked by cones:  Q: So it was clear to you that when you got the information from [...] on 7/20/22 at 10:00, approximately 10:00 p.m., that it was okay to go through a cut-through.  You limit it to – it was okay to go through the grass covered cut-through with the lanes closed and the cones.  Is that what you said?  --- \(^1\)  The [...] transcript incorrectly spells “[...]” as “[...]. ”  We therefore substitute the correct spelling herein.  [...]: Objection.  The question has been asked and answered.  He can answer it again.
[brief] At least five estimator variables undermine the reliability of [...]’s identification: stress, weapon focus, distance, duration, and unconscious transference.  First, “even under the best viewing conditions, high levels of stress can diminish an eyewitness’ ability to recall and make an accurate identification. ”  Henderson, 208 N.J. at 261.  The stress of being confronted and shot would be high.  Second, the presence of a visible weapon can “impair a witness’ ability to make a reliable identification. ”  Id. at 262-63.  [...] was shot with a gun.  Third, “clarity decreases with distance,” and therefore so does reliability.  Ibid.  The medical examiner testified that [...]’s injuries were consistent with being shot from above and behind, limiting his ability to clearly see the shooter.  (8T 136-15 to 137-4)  Fourth, “the amount of time the witness has to observe an event can affect the reliability of an identification. ”  Id. at 264.  The shooting in this case took only seconds, severely limiting anyone’s ability to make a reliable identification.  (8T 28-11 to 20; 9T 62-17 to 25)  Last, the identification may have been tainted by unconscious transference, as [...] knew [...].  (9T 131-7 to 132-12)  But the jury was never told that [...]’s dying declaration was, in and of itself, an identification.  Although the jury was told to consider these factors in assessing [...]’s identification, they were never told that the same factors applied with equal force to [...]’s identification.  The jury in this case should have been told that all these factors undermine the reliability of [...]’s statement as a matter of science, not as a matter of argument among the lawyers.
[brief] Defendant [...] retained Plaintiff pursuant to a written Retainer Agreement in which she set forth her address ([...]) and insisted as a term of the Agreement that all communications be exclusively by email.  The attorney/client relationship quickly broke down, and because Defendant [...] refused to pay for the legal services provided, Plaintiff mailed a Pre-Action Notice, pursuant to Rule 1:20A-6, by certified and regular mail to Ms. [...] at the last known address she provided in the Retainer Agreement just weeks earlier.  Plaintiff also emailed Defendant [...] a copy of the Notice to the same email address set forth in the Agreement.  Plaintiff fully complied with Rule 1:20A-6 – the notices were mailed by certified and regular mail to Defendant’s last known address – and the Notice sent by regular mail was returned marked “Refused. ”  This is the very same address that Defendant provided to [...] when she appeared to declare her intent to file a fee arbitration, which resulted in the underlying case being stayed until that process was completed.  It is also the very same address used by the Secretary of the Fee Arbitration Committee to mail their determination to Defendant [...].  The summons and complaint were likewise mailed by the trial court to Defendant at her last known address, the very same postal box address she provided; Defendant was indeed finally served by mail at her law office in New York City – the green card was returned with a signature on it, and the regular mail was never returned.  Defendant [...] was obviously served with process as her attorney, [...], appeared in trial court on her behalf three days after Plaintiff filed a request to enter default judgment, advising [...] of her intent to file an answer or move to dismiss, neither of which ever occurred.  Defendant [...] shortly thereafter appeared on her own behalf after the filing of a Substitution of Attorney.  There can be no question the trial court not only had subject matter jurisdiction, but the court also had personal jurisdiction over Defendant [...].
[brief] Jerista v. Murray, 185 N.J. 175, 190-91 (2005) .......................................................17, 43 Kaplan v. Skoloff & Wolfe, P.C., 339 N.J. Super. 97 (App. Div. 2001) .............42 Lobiondo v. Schwartz, 199 N.J. 62, 100 (2009)
[brief] The background regarding the development of the subject property aids understanding of the municipality’s objectives and reveals [...]’s challenge as nothing more than a singular attempt to delay or derail redevelopment.  The subject property is seventy-three (73) acres of real property owned by [...] and located in the [...], more commonly known as Block 46, Lot 2, and Block 47, Lots 1, 2, 3, 3.01 and 4 on the Official Harrison Township Tax Maps (the “Property”).  The Committee designated the Property as an Area in Need of Development via Resolution No. 49-2018 on October 18, 2018.  (Da1).  Resolution No. 190-2018 adopted on November 19, 2018, designated the Property a non-condemnation Redevelopment Area pursuant to the New Jersey Local Redevelopment and Housing Law (“LRHL”), N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-1, et seq. (Da5).  The [...] (“JLUB”) commissioned a redevelopment plan for the Property titled the “King’s Landing Redevelopment Plan,” (the “Redevelopment Plan”).  (Pa92 – Pa113).  The Redevelopment Plan calls for construction of four warehouses on the Property.  (Pa101).  Each warehouse is subject to height restrictions and incorporates a variety of site improvements.  (Pa101 – Pa110).  The Redevelopment Plan aligns with the “Industrial” zoning of the Property, permitting warehousing as a land use since the 1980s.  (Da7) (2T, 18:15-25). ¹  The Property falls within the C-55 Flexible Planned Industrial-Commercial District and later the C-57 Special Gateway District, both of which expressly permit warehouses.  (Id.).  Thus, any Harrison Township resident that cared to view the tax maps since the 1980s would have been well aware that warehouses could be constructed on the Property.  The project subject to the Redevelopment Plan straddles the municipal boundary between Harrison Township and neighboring [...] and is ideal for warehouses.  (Pa98, Pa101).  The Harrison Township portions of the project are located on 73.07 +/- acres of land along both the north and south side of U.S. Route 322 (US 322 / County Route 536) and are adjacent to Tomlin Station Road (County Route 607), while the [...] portions are located on 87.26 +/- acres along the north and south side of U.S. Route 322.  (Id.).  These properties are ideally located on the peripheries of the ¹Citations to “1T” refer to the Transcript of the April 18, 2022 Harrison Township Committee Meeting and citations to “2T” refer to the Transcript of the May 11, 2023 trial court hearing in this case.
[brief] THE TENANT PROTECTION ACT (“TPA”) GUIDED THE BOARD’S DECISION AND WAS THE FOUNDATION BEHIND IT’S ACTIONS.  To understand the decisions of the Board, it is imperative to appreciate that the Board was tasked with ensuring compliance with the TPA.  At the heart of [...]’s dissatisfaction with the Board’s determinations lies a misunderstanding of the TPA and the Board’s duty to abide by it.  When viewed through that lens, the process the Board engaged in, and the decisions it made, are unquestionably valid, fair, and proper.
[directive] Additionally, the Division of Criminal Justice within the DLPS as administer proceeds and funds received by any such state law enforcement agency a result of seizures subject forfeiture actions under the above referenced statutory to authority.  The shall administer separately federally forfeited property or proceeds OAG distributed any state law enforcement agency by the United States Departments of to or as Justice Treasury through Federal Equitable Sharing Program Agreement, outlined a Proqram 01 under Forfeiture Administration Standard Operatinq Procedure General's 2 2 Law Account, Establishment of Attorney Enforcement Forfeiture the {AGLEFA]
[brief] On December 20, 2022, the Department published Bulletin No. 22-11, indicating its position that the Holding Act and SSAP No. 25 applied to reciprocal exchanges and their AIFs.  (Ra. 001)  On December 21, 2022, the Department approved the [...]/[...]/[...] transaction, and on December 22, 2022, the Department entered an Order approving the transaction while requiring that [...], [...], and [...] to comply with the provisions of the Holding Act and SSAP No. 25.
[directive] 2.1.1  The agency's policy management system serves as the foundation for effective discipline.  A clearly defined policy management system is designed to move the organization toward its stated goals and set the standard for acceptable performance.  The system must incorporate a mechanism for distributing rules, regulations, policies and procedures, and provide for periodic review and revision as necessary.  The system should include a classification and numbering mechanism that facilitates cross-referencing where necessary.  2.1.2
[brief] Most significantly, the Borough established criteria for the Subcommittee to apply when reviewing applications and making a recommendation to the Council, including a specific scoring process.  The Borough published the Evaluation Sheet and indicated to the public that the Evaluation Sheet would be used by the Subcommittee to “review and evaluate each Applicant” and “in making its recommendation to the Borough Council. ”  (74a).  Despite that requirement, only one member of the Subcommittee used the Evaluation Sheet, and that member only used the Evaluation Sheet to evaluate [...].  Putting aside that [...] received a perfect score on the only Evaluation Sheet completed, there is no way to know whether the other Committee Members properly assessed the metrics in the Evaluation Sheet.  As a result, neither the Subcommittee nor the Council evaluated the strengths or weaknesses of the applications based on the same criteria and may not have relied on the criteria set forth in the Evaluation Sheet.  This failure left the trial court, and leaves this Court, without sufficient information to determine how the applications were scored or analyzed by the Subcommittee.  The Borough’s action therefore was arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable.
[brief] (PB7 at p. 19).  Here, just like the son in Estate of Olsen, A-5542-11T1, Respondent moved in close proximity to Decedent, had daily contact with her, and Decedent engaged in a pattern of incrementally benefitting Respondent with assets during a time Respondent was engaging in bullying and haranguing behavior towards the Decedent.  (See, eg, P561a; P656a to P659a).  The facts demonstrate that when the 2014 Will was executed, there was importunity that Decedent could not resist and that was yielded by Decedent for the sake of peace.  Petitioner recalled that he told Decedent she needed to set boundaries with Respondent and just say “no” to her demands, and Decedent would respond to Petitioner, “I can't do it. ”  (7T191:21 to 192:6; 193:15-22).  The Court disregarded other facts that constitute suspicious circumstances under the law.  In its Opinion, the Court found that [...] “stated that the original Will was in a bag given to Respondent after emptying Decedent’s safe deposit box. ” (P23a).  [...] testified that that information was what Respondent had told her.  (11T52:22-25).  [...] testified that after she went into the safety deposit box, she put the items in a bag and when she arrived home, she went through each item and did not find a will.  (11T28:12-21; 11T30:16-19).  [...] also appeared for deposition and presented pictures of each item that she stated she collected from the safety deposit box when it was emptied.  (11T32:8-19).  Although there are pictures of birth certificates, wedding certificates and other important papers, there are no pictures of any wills.  (P574a to P596).  [...] admitted that after she went into the safety deposit box, she told Petitioner that it did not contain any wills.  (11T30:16 to 31:14).  The Court overlooked undisputed facts that confirm that Respondent had the Decedent’s original will in her possession after it was made.
[brief] ”  *Justices of Boston Mun. Ct. v. Lydon*, 466 U.S. 294, 308 (1984); *State v. Johnson*, 436 N.J. Super. 406, 421 (App. Div. 2014)(citing *State v. Abbati*, 99 N.J. 418, 425-26 (1985)).\(^3\)
[brief] ”  280 Cal. Rptr. 43, 50 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991).  The Court explained the inherent risk of prejudice engendered by long interruption in jury deliberations.  A long adjournment of deliberations risks prejudice to the defendant both from the possibility that jurors might discuss the case with outsiders at this critical point in the proceedings, and from the possibility that their recollections of the evidence, the arguments, and the court's instructions may become dulled or confused instructions.  [Id. at 277-78 (Citations omitted). ]  A risk of prejudice exists any time a jury is dispersed during deliberations, even for a few days.  See, e.g., United States v. Stratton, 779 F.2d 820, 832, (2d Cir. 1985) (affirming trial court's "conclusion] that an adjournment of 4 1/2 days would be less desirable than an eleven-juror verdict" because [a]adjournment would have risked dulling the jurors' recollections of the evidence and summations and heightened the danger that the jurors would discuss the case with outside persons."  Naturally, the longer the adjournment the greater the risk of the prejudice.  Thus, in order to preserve the integrity of the jury's verdict, the adjournment of deliberations should be short as possible.  In New York CPL 310.10(2), for instance, court rules prohibit the court from adjourning jury deliberations for more than "twenty-four, except that in a case of a Saturday, Sunday or holiday, such separation may extend beyond such twenty-four hour period."  See, supra N. 8.  [...]'s failure to raise an objection to the ten day break prejudiced the defendant which deprived him of his right to a fair trial, counsel, due process under the N.J. and Federal constitution.  Her failures also failed to preserve his claim for proper appellate review.  Therefore, counsel was ineffective pursuant to the Strickland's two-prong test and/or Cronic/Davis per se analyses.  This claim should be remanded to the court for a new trial.