ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] 2  I.  THE COMMITTEE'S ADOPTION OF ORDINANCE NO. 2022-15 WAS ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS.  (3T13:24-15:2).  .................................................................  2  II.  THE COMMITTEE DID NOT FOLLOW THE STATUTORY PROCEDURES IN ADOPTING ORDINANCE NO. 2022-17.  (3T9:14-12:25)  ........................................................................  5  III.  THE COURT SHOULD REMAND THIS MATTER BACK TO THE COMMITTEE.  (3T37:4-9).  ......................................................................................................................  7  CONCLUSION.............................................................................................................................
[brief] Finally, although a formal arrest is not necessary for an individual to be in custody for the purposes of Miranda, [...]’ response to the officer’s questions about ownership of the gun must be suppressed for the additional reason that he had been formally arrested and put into a patrol car at this point.  (1T 62-3 to 62-17)  Because the officer questioned [...] in violation of Miranda, [...]’ responses to those questions, both verbal and non-verbal, must be \(^{14}\)
[brief] STANDARD OF REVIEW  This Court reviews a grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the same standard governing the trial court under R. 4:46.  See Liberty Surplus Ins. Corp. v. Nowell Amoroso, P.A., 189 N.J. 436, 445-46 (2007).  Generally, it must "consider whether the competent evidential materials presented, when viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, are sufficient to permit a rational factfinder to resolve the alleged disputed issue in favor of the non-moving party."  Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520, 540 (1995); see also R. 4:46-2(c).  Summary judgment is inappropriate if an issue of material fact genuinely exists.  See R. 4:46-2(c).  An issue of fact is genuine if the evidence submitted on the motion, together with all legitimate inferences favoring the non-moving party, is not so one-sided that it requires submitting the issue to a jury.  Summary judgment must also be denied when analyzing a question of fact requires a credibility determination.  See Parks v. Rogers, 176 N.J. 491, 502 (2003).  Moreover, a summary judgment motion should be denied when an action or defense requires determination of a state of mind or intent.  See Wilson v. Amerada Hess, 168 N.J. 236, 253-54 (2001).  Accordingly, "[a]s a general rule, summary judgment is not a proper vehicle for resolving claims of employment discrimination which often turn on an employer’s motivation and intent. ”  Miller v. Beneficial Mgmt. Corp., 855 F. Supp. 691, 707 (D.N.J. 1994).
[brief] III.  THE JURY’S VERDICT REGARDING DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION AND RETALIATION UNDER LAD IS AGAINST THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE (DA001-DA082; Pltf. T:133:1-25—159:1-25;4T:110-199).  The jury’s verdict against Appellants for hostile work environment based on disability discrimination and retaliation under LAD is not supported by the weight of the evidence presented at trial.  The trial judge’s obligation on a motion for new trial is to carefully evaluate the evidence presented to the jury at trial, and to correct clear error or mistake by the jury.
[brief] THE COURT SHOULD NOT EXTEND THE TIME TO FILE AN ACTION IN LIEU OF PREROGATIVE WRITS.  Plaintiff argues for the first time on appeal that the Court should extend the 45-day time limit within which to file an action in lieu of prerogative writs, on equitable grounds.  See Rule 4:69-6(3).  Specifically, Plaintiff avers that courts should be lenient in situations such as this, where it is alleged that ordinances were not adopted in conformance with the law.  Pl.’s Br. at 41-42 (citing Willoughby v. Planning Board of the Township of Deptford, 306 N.J. Super. 266, 277 (App. Div. 1997)).  Actions in lieu of prerogative writs must be commenced within 45 days of accrual of the right of action.  Rule 4:69-6.  Although there are exceptions to the rule that allow a court to enlarge the period in the interests of justice, they are rarely invoked, and only for meritorious reasons.  See Rocky Hill Citizens for Responsible Growth v. Planning Bd. of Borough of Rocky Hill, 406 N.J. 384, 402-403 (App. Div. 2009) (affirming denial of relaxation of the 45-day time limit, where plaintiff, with full knowledge of the proceedings, waited two years to file suit).  When dealing with public interests, one must balance those interests with the “important policy of repose expressed in the forty-five day rule. ”  Id. at 398 (quoting Horsnall v. Washington Twp. Fire Div., 405 N.J. Super. 304, 313 (App. Div. 2009)).  The Rocky Hill court examined the Willoughby opinion and determined that it was an exceptional situation because “development of the property in accordance with the zoning change would have a significant impact on the residents of the adjoining neighborhood and would impact the flow of traffic on a major thoroughfare; moreover, the public would lose access to nature trails due to the rezoning. ”  Id. at 401-402 (citing Willoughby, 306 N.J. Super. at 277).  The Willoughby case therefore involved significant issues of public interest, which ultimately warranted relaxation of the 45-day time limit.  Id.  The Rocky Hill court cautioned that cases such as Willoughby “must represent the exception rather than the rule. ”  Id. at 401.  Here, Plaintiff has failed to point to any exceptional circumstance affecting the public welfare, that might merit some relaxation of the rule.  It is not enough to simply allege that the subject ordinance was not adopted in conformity with the law, because ostensibly every single challenge to the validity of an ordinance would necessarily involve the allegation that it was adopted in violation of the law.  As set forth in Rocky Hill, relaxation is far and away the exception rather than the rule, and a plaintiff must demonstrate compelling circumstances to avail him or herself of such relief.  For these reasons, the interests of justice weigh heavily in favor of Defendants’ right of repose, and Plaintiff’s request for relaxation should be denied.  POINT V THE SUBJECT PUBLIC MEETINGS WERE NOTICED IN COMPLIANCE WITH THE OPEN PUBLIC MEETINGS ACT. (Pa83).
[brief] CONCLUSION  For the foregoing reasons and based upon the above cited precedent, it is respectfully submitted that [...]’s cross-appeal should be denied, and the following trial court orders, 1) the final Order, dated May 10, 2024; 2) the Oral Decision entered on October 20, 2023; 3) the Order entered on December 5, 2023, setting attorney’s fees and costs; 4) the Order entered on March 6, 2024, wherein the court granted the [...] summary judgment; and 5) the Order entered on March 6, 2024, wherein the court denied Plaintiffs’ cross-motion for summary judgment. should be reversed and remanded for further proceedings:
[brief] TABLE OF CONTENTS  Table of Authorities ........................................................................................................ ii  Preliminary Statement .................................................................................................  1  Procedural History .......................................................................................................  3 Statement of Facts .........................................................................................................  4  Legal Argument ...........................................................................................................  7  I.  The Trial Court’s Ruling Following The Bench Trial Should Not Be Overturned .............  10  II.  The Plaintiff Failed To Prove A Consumer Fraud Violation ........................................ 13  III.  The Plaintiff Does Not Have A Breach Of Contract Claim ........................................  16  IV.  The Plaintiff’s Claim Are Barred By Accord and Satisfaction .................................... 19  Conclusion ......................................................................................................................  17 | Table of Authorities | Page | |----------------------|------| | Balducci v Cige | 7 | | 240 N.J. 574, 595 (2020) | | | Borough of Berlin v. Remington Vernick Engineers | 13 | | 337 N.J. Super. 590, 596 (App. Div. 2001) | | | Bouie New Jersey Dept. Of Community Affairs | 13 | | 407 N.J. Super. 518, 538 (App. Div. 2009) | | | D' Agostino v. Appliances Buy Phone, Inc., | 14 | | 2016 N.J. Super. Unpud. LEXIS 504 (App.Div. 2016) | | | D' Ercole Sales, Inc. v. Fruehauf Corp., | 10 | | 206 N.J. Super., 11, 29-30 (App. Div. 1985) | | | Fehr v. Algard | 15 | | 2011 WL 13670 | | | Gennari v Weichert Co. Realtors | 10, 11 | | 148 N.J. 582, 607, (1977) | | | Gnall v Gnall | 8 | | 222 N.J. 414, 428 (2015) | | | Hoffman v Supplements Toko Management, LLC | 14 | | 419 N.J. Super. 596 (App. Div., 2011) | | | Moche v Levy | 16 | | 2016 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 928, 293 | | | Nelson v Elizabeth Board of Ed., | 7 | | 466 N.J. Super. 325, 366 (App Div. 2021) | | | Potomac Ins. of Ill v Pa Mfrs'. Ass'n Ins. Co., | 8 | | 215 N.J. 409, 421 (2013) | | | Rova resort, Inc., v.Investors Inc., Co., | 10 | | 65 N.J. 474, 484, (1974) | | | Seidman v. Clifton Sav. Bank | 7 | | 205 N.J. 150, 169 (2011) | | | Vagias v Woodmont Properties; LLC | 12 | | 384 N.J. Super. 129, 134 (App.Div. 2006) | | PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
[brief] She appeared at the hearing, announced herself to be an objector at least seven times, asked for and was given the right to submit evidence on the exact issue that is the subject of this case, and [...] sat on its hands and did not object or challenge her ability to participate.  Since the courts have adopted the MLUL definition of “interested party” as the basis for standing to sue to challenge a land use board decision, the failure to object at the board constitute a waiver, and because [...] failed to raise standing as an issue before the Board, it must be barred from doing so on appeal.  See, e.g., Sugarman v. Teaneck Planning Bd., 272 N.J. Super. 162, 171 (App. Div. 1994)(party cannot save an issue as a trump card on appeal).  In addition to its waiver of standing before the Board, [...] also waived its standing affirmative defense in the trial court by not filing a pre-Answer motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim and instead, trying to sandbag [...] with this issue at trial.
[brief] [...]’s December 30, 2015 invoice, 5487rev, identifies work on the date of the Accident and includes a note for one union laborer to complete “wire sawing. ”  (Pa422.)  While Invoice 5487rev references Proposal 106846 (i.e., Proposal Two), Proposal Two was later replaced by Proposal Three, which included the cost of insurance due to [...]’s CCIP unenrollment.
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[brief] This assertion is merely disingenuous, however, since the ALJ found in the Initial Decision that removal is appropriate based on the quality of Appellant’s conduct.  (Pa224 to Pa226).  The Appellant engaged in egregious behavior, purposefully acting in an insubordinate manner.  For the third, maybe the fourth time, the Appellant committed an act of insubordination.  (Pa26 to Pa29). ¹  Based on the Appellant’s history and her ¹  The Disciplinary History offered in evidence lists two instances of insubordination.
[brief] The Court should not consider the argument Appellants advance for the first time on appeal that the common law ‘stranger-to-the-deed rule’ applies.  The argument was not made by Appellants below in either their brief or at oral argument.  Even if the Court were to consider the argument, it has been squarely addressed and resolved against Appellants in Borough of Wildwood Crest, infra.  The Chancery court properly rejected each of the Appellants’ arguments advanced below, including the application of res judicata and collateral estoppel.  There exists no similarly or identity of claims between this case and the case brought by Respondent’s predecessor in title.  Nor is the relief sought the same.  Those two facts render res judicata and collateral estoppel inapposite.  Finally, [...] correctly exercised her discretion in declining to invoke the entire controversy doctrine on fundamental fairness grounds as any contrary decision would plainly violate the New Jersey Recording Statute – a result that our Supreme Court has instructed the Courts to avoid.  Any contrary result would also leave the Challenger Lot landlocked and without value.  For the reasons set forth herein, the Court should affirm [...]’s grant of summary judgment in all respects.
[brief] Second, [...] instituted this action with an Order to Show Cause under which she received temporary restraints against Appellants.  These restraints have been in place and enjoining Appellants actions since August 28, 2023 and remain in place to date.  Such restraints would not have been available to [...] in arbitration.  As such, [...] sought the benefit of Court intervention and, after she received the benefit of same for nine months (and, indeed, continues to receive same), she sought to compel this matter to arbitration.  [...]’s use and manipulation of the Court to obtain restraints weighs heavily in favor of waiver.
[directive] N.J.S.A.  Pursuant to 2C:35-14.2  “Drug Court” (Spanish)  Hay que responder a las siguientes preguntas únicamente si usted reúne las condiciones necesarias para una condena obligatoria de libertad a prueba especial conforme a 2C:35-14.2 (“Tribunal de Drogas”).  N.J.S.A.  The following questions need to be answered only if you are eligible for a mandatory sentence of special probation pursuant to 2C:35-14 (“Drug Court”).
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[brief] Plaintiff submitted a letter by [...] as evidence that [...] was on notice of litigation, but this letter was sent well after the eight-day life cycle of the TMS logs and received even later.  (Pa113 to 114).  Plaintiff deposed a part-time employee who cleaned up movie theaters at the time of the accident [[...]] and a newly appointed General Manager [[...]] with no real firsthand knowledge of the TMS program or life cycle and took their estimations regarding all facts alleged as absolute fact.  (Pa80, Pa81-11 to 18, and Pa107, Pa108-13 to 18).  Plaintiff deposed [...] employee [...] also and just as with the others, Plaintiff mischaracterized and generalized testimony in an attempt to obtain a positive outcome regarding its motion to amend.  (Pa101 and Pb5 to 6).  Again, Plaintiff had and continues to have no proof that [...] destroyed the logs at issue, and every attempt to argument this is without merit.
[brief] [...] testified that the fingerprint on the chiller and an exemplar taken from [...] “were made by the same individual. ”  (3T 68-2 to 3)  He testified twice that two other unnamed “examiners” performed the same analysis and reached the same conclusion.  (3T 59-21 to 25, 68-20 to 25)  [...] testified that he has “never seen” any disagreement among fingerprint examiners because “[t]here’s no opinion to be spoken.  It’s totally objective. ”  (3T 69-12 to 13)  [...] opined that “there was blood on the finger when it touched” the chiller.  (3T 71-22 to 25)
[brief] On May 22, 2019, Plaintiffs filed a Complaint in Lieu of Prerogative Writs, in [...], seeking reversal of the defendant [...]’s Resolution denying Plaintiffs’ Amended Application as described above.  Ra1.  The Complaint also sought the appointment of a Special Hearing Officer to oversee further proceedings regarding Plaintiffs’ efforts to develop their affordable housing site, i.e., Plaintiffs’ request for site plan approval, as well as an award of damages, litigation costs and attorney’s fees.  The Complaint set forth eight counts: (1) the First Count sought entry of judgment confirming automatic approval of the Amended Application due to the [...]’s failure to make a decision within the statutory time frame; (2) the Second Count sought reversal of the [...]’s ultimate denial of the Amended Application, on the grounds that said denial was arbitrary, capricious, and contrary to the Municipal Land Use Law, and impermissibly tainted by interference from the Township’s Mayor; (3) the Third Count asserted a violation of the Township’s Mount Laurel obligations, including a violation of the obligations imposed pursuant to the Settlement Agreement in the Township’s Mount Laurel litigation; (4) the Fourth Count sought relief due to Defendants’ --- 1 “Ra” references are to the Appendix of Plaintiffs/Respondents, submitted herewith.
[brief] [Morris County Fair Hous. Council v. Boonton Twp., 220 N.J. Super. 388 (Law Div. 1987), aff’d as modified, 230 N.J. Super. 345 (App. Div. 1989) (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added). ]  As noted in Morris County, the Trial Court has ample precedent to remedy a municipality’s breach of its Mount Laurel obligations by tailoring its relief to the specific nature of the municipality’s breach.  Id.  In Morris County, the court found that the planning board engaged in a series of actions to delay construction of the inclusionary development in question, thereby violating the expedited disposition requirements of the parties’ Settlement Agreement.
[brief] [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], Defendants-Respondents, [...], Defendant-Respondent-Cross Appellant, -and- JOHN DOES 1-10 and/or ABC CORPORATIONS 1-10, in their corporate capacity and as to the principles and owners individually (Names being fictitious and unknown but described as corporate or individual owner(s), manager(s), lessor(s), supervisor(s), who had control of the premises located at [...], who contributed to the March 16, 2017 loss), Defendants-Respondents.  TABLE OF CONTENTS  PAGE TABLE OF CONTENTS ..................................................  i  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS, AND RULINGS BEING APPEALED ...........................................  iii  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ..............................................  iv TABLE OF TRANSCRIPTS ............................................. v  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT ...........................................  1  PROCEDURAL HISTORY ...............................................
[brief] PROCEDURAL HISTORY  We take no heavy issue on procedural history other than to address inaccuracies and clarification.  On July 15, 2022, [...], [...], and [...] moved to dismiss Plaintiffs’ Complaint.  (Db4).  They asserted failure to name “indispensable parties”, namely the 320 other members of [...].  The Defendant did not claim that the developer was indispensable.  The defense claims that “[f]ollowing the decision on the motion to dismiss, the parties engaged in some limited written discovery”.  (Db4).  The parties engaged in heavy written discovery which is why the appendix exceeds 800 pages of Minutes, letters and back title.  Plaintiffs also provided two expert reports.  On May 1, 2023, the trial court entered a case management order establishing deadlines for completion of written and expert discovery, but did not set a fact discovery end date.  (Da338).  On June 15, 2022, Plaintiffs provided an expert report of [...].  Defendant never provided any expert report.  (Da141).  Defendant never sought to depose Plaintiffs’ title expert.  On July 31st, 2022, Plaintiff provided a Certification of [...] and Curriculum Vitae and identified him as an expert engineer.  (Da835)(Da849).  Defendant never served any expert reports nor any engineer certification in response to Plaintiffs’ certification.  Defendants further claim that “On September 6, 2023, [...] timely filed a motion for reconsideration….the trial court applied the incorrect legal standard governing reconsideration and otherwise failed to meaningfully address [...]’s arguments. ” (Da873-876)(Db6).  Plaintiffs do not concede this.  See, Argument II below.  On February 6, 2024, the trial court issued an Order denying [...]’s request to stay the partial summary judgment order.  (Da877).  On February 13th, 2024, the Defendant filed a Motion to file an Interlocutory Appeal and a Motion to Stay Construction.  By settlement between the parties, Plaintiffs consented to the Motion for Interlocutory Appeal without prejudice to the arguments advanced in support of same.  In consideration, defendant withdrew its Motion to Stay Construction.  Plaintiff agreed to complete construction by June 15th, 2024, abiding, without prejudice, to [...]’s prohibition on construction during the summer months.  Plaintiffs home has now been constructed and is pending a Certificate of Occupancy.  III.
[brief] In its brief, the City identified “only three revenue sources: permit fees, municipal court fines, and real property taxes. ” (Rb6).  The Arbitrator noted additional sources of revenue including revenue from ambulance fees.  The City received $4 million in 2022 under the CARES ACT for premium pay for essential workers.  (Aa118).  The City also received American Rescue Plan monies as well as at least $3 million annually in revenue from fines post-COVID-19.
[directive] Every Friday 2nd & 4th Tuesday [...] 1305 [...] each month 1st & 3rd Tuesday (Shared Services) [...] 1317 [...] each month October-June: 1st & 3rd Wed each month  [...] 1307 [...]  July - September: every Wednesday November-April: one Tuesday per month (Shared Services) [...] 1347 [...]  May-October: 1st & 3rd Tuesday each month (Shared Services) [...] 3rd Thursday every 1348 [...]  Boro month Two Tuesdays per [...] 1309 [...] month Two Wednesdays per (Shared Services) [...] 1327 [...] month Three Fridays per [...] 1304 [...] month (Shared Services) [...] 1318 [...] Every Wednesday 2nd & 4th Wednesday [...] 1310 [...] every month 4th Wednesday every (Shared Services) [...] 1320 [...] month 2nd Wednesday every (Shared Services) [...] 1324 [...] month 1st & 3rd Wednesday [...] 1312 [...] every month 1,2, 3 & 4th Tuesday [...] 1315 [...] every month Every Tuesday & [...] 1316 [...] Wednesday Every Monday and 2nd [...] 1339 [...] Tuesday of the month 732-938-4848 x Every Wednesday & [...] 1319 4112 Friday 732-938-4848 x 1st Wednesday of the (Shared Services) [...] 1314 4112 month [...] 1321 [...]