ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Plaintiff was removed as a partner by the [...] by way of letter dated February 14, 2023.  [Da9].  Following his removal, Plaintiff joined the law firm of [...].  [Da9].  On or about February 14, 2023, the [...] sent letters to several clients to notify them that Plaintiff was no longer part of the firm, and advised them that they had the right to decide who would be handling their cases from that point forward.  [Da12].  Thereafter, Defendants became aware that Plaintiff had surreptitiously contacted approximately twelve [...] clients by telephone in an attempt to convince those clients to switch their matters to Plaintiff and the [...].  [Da12, Da27].  In fact, the clients contacted had previously signed letters expressing their desire to remain with the [...].  [Da13-14, Da148].  During the March 8, 2023 Chancery Court hearing, the parties discussed a briefing schedule for a motion to disqualify Defendants’ former counsel [...], Esq. of [...] (“Wallach”) based on Plaintiff’s allegations of a conflict of interest, as well as a motion to compel arbitration to be brought by Defendants.  [Da6].  During the March 8 hearing, Mr. Wallach raised the issue of arbitration that he had identified in a letter sent to the Chancery Court the day prior, stating in relevant part, “there’s also my point about arbitration, … but I do not want to waive any right if this matter went forward.  [1T12:5-16].  On March 15, 2023, [...] of [...] (“Mazie”) substituted in as counsel for Defendants.  [Da14].  With respect to the parties’ ongoing dispute over the solicitation of [...] clients, Mr. Mazie contacted Plaintiff’s counsel to propose drafting a joint letter to be sent on all client files where Plaintiff served as the primary attorney.  [Da14].  Having received no response to Mr. Mazie’s proposal and acknowledging that Plaintiff was continuing to contact Firm clients during the pendency of Plaintiff’s motion for injunctive relief, the [...] filed a summary action ([...]) seeking an Order to Show Cause and temporary restraints on March 17, 2023.
[brief] The footage revealed Defendant and [...] leaving the hotel at 7:20 p.m. on the night of the murder, arriving back at around 9:35-9:40 p.m., and [...] leaving by himself afterwards.  (24T 192-4 to 193-21).  On March 12, 2018, [...] arrived at the [...] because the officers had informed him he could pick up the keys to his room in the [...].  (25T 206-8 to 206-24).  Defendant and his father had dropped [...] off at the police station, and the detectives followed the pair and conducted a motor vehicle stop of their vehicle to bring them to the station.
[brief] On February 23, 2021, Plaintiff-Appellant, [...], was on her way to work.  She had walked approximately seven streets without incident.  However, as she passed [...] in [...] she slipped on ice, fell, and sustained a displaced right fibular fracture requiring ORIF surgery.  Defendants owned and maintained the property and had shoveled snow onto uphill areas along the driveway at least a week prior, allowing snowmelt to flow downhill and refreeze on the sidewalk, creating hazardous conditions.  Photos taken by police after the incident showed evidence of repeated melting and refreezing from uphill snow piles.  An expert, [...], determined the ice displayed a ripple pattern, consistent with ongoing runoff and refreezing rather than an isolated freeze.  Weather data also showed substantial snow accumulation days prior, with only minimal undisturbed snow remaining on February 23 due to melt, further supporting runoff as the ice source.  [...]’s injuries were caused by Defendants’ negligence in creating a dangerous condition by piling snow in an area prone to runoff and refreezing.
[brief] For the first time it was learned that on June 20, 2020, shortly after his death, [...], of the [...] assisted [...] in the collection of monies on three life insurance policies.  What was also learned for the first time was that the 538-insurance policy which initially was named to his wife and was valued at $250,000 at the time of purchase, was valued at $545,181.82 when he passed.  The cancelled check for the $545,181.82 was not provided although [...] falsely indicated that it was provided.  The newly discovered documents also provided proof that when [...] obtained the insurance proceeds checks these monies were deposited in the [...] bank account in July 2020.
[brief] for dismissal under any immunity doctrines, the district court addressed the substantive grounds of their dismissal motion, particularly their statute of limitations affirmative defenses.  (Pa54).  First, the district court held that [...]’s “malicious prosecution-related claims” against the [...] for the VOP conviction accrued on March 6, 2018, the date of the New Jersey Supreme Court’s decision reversing his VOP conviction because it was when his “violation of probation charge ‘ended without a conviction. ’” (Pa55) (quoting Thompson v. Clark, 596 U.S. 36, 49 (2022).  The district court thus held that those claims did not begin to accrue when the state court entered an amended judgment of conviction on October 17, 2018, because [...]’s “rights were clarified by the New Jersey Supreme Court’s decision, not by the amendment of his judgment. ”  Ibid.  That is, “[t]he prosecution terminated without a conviction for the narcotics charges on January 23, 2018 and for the violation of probation charge on March 6, 2018. ”  Ibid. (internal footnotes omitted).  Consistent with the two-year statute of limitations for all Section 1983 claims, the district court dismissed, with prejudice, two of [...]’s federal claims as being time-barred: Count XI (“False Arrest/False Imprisonment”) and Count XII (“False Statement in Accusatory Instrument”).  The district court separately dismissed, without prejudice, [...]’s three remaining federal claims against the [...], over which the district court had original jurisdiction—Count XIII (“Abuse of Process”), Count XIV (“conspiracy to Violate Plaintiff’s Civil Rights”), and Count XV (“Negligent Failure to Prevent Civil Rights Violation”).  (Pa56).  The district court held those three federal claims were “premature until the amended Judgment of Conviction is found invalid. ”  Ibid.  4.  State Court Civil Proceedings Before the Hon. [...], A.J.S.C.
[brief] LEGAL ARGUMENT I.  STANDARDS OF REVIEW  A.  The standard of review of this summary judgment decision is plenary.  Here, this court is reviewing an order granting [...] summary judgment and denying the [...]’s motion for summary judgment.  In conducting such a review, “[the Trial Court’s] interpretation of the law and the legal consequences that flow from established facts are not entitled to any special deference, and, hence, an ‘issue of law [is] subject to de novo plenary appellate review. ’”  Estate of Hange v. Metro. Prop. & Case. Ins. Co., 202 N.J. 369, 382 (2010) [internal quotation marks and citations omitted].
[brief] The Borough’s November 10, 2021, notice for special meeting held on November 12, 2021, when Ordinance 1423-21 was introduced, was defective because it could not be timely published, included the awkwardly worded directive “For Record Only” [sic], indicating it was not for publication, did not indicate whether formal action would be taken and did not include public access information, referring only to the Borough website.  (Pa 153.)  The public hearing on Ordinance 1423-21 was noticed for a December 14, 2021, special meeting of the Borough Council.  Notice of the special meeting was published in the Progress on November 18, 2021, and provided remote access information.  It did not include an agenda and did not indicate whether formal action would be taken.  (Pa 157.)  The Planning Board’s Thursday, December 16, 2021, special meeting, when it continued its review of Ordinance 1423-21, violated the OPMA because the Borough’s e-mail notice was sent to the designated newspapers on Friday, December 10th and thus could not be published in [...] until the day of the meeting.  It also included the directive “FOR YOUR RECORD ONLY!” and was therefore never published by either newspaper.  Although the notice included information that Ordinance 1423-21 would be reviewed, and that “[r]egular action may be taken,” it did not provide access information to the remote meeting, referring only to the Borough’s website.  (Pa 209.)  Compounding these defects, there is inexplicably no recording of the December 16th Planning Board meeting, contrary to N.J.S.A. 40:55D-10(f), and thus no transcription is possible.  (Pa 275.)  The Borough violated the LRHL in adopting Ordinance 1423-21 because at its December 16th meeting, the Planning Board identified inconsistencies between the Master Plan and the amendments to the Redevelopment Plan.
[brief] In addition to the incorrect accomplice argument and incomplete accomplice charge that did not dispel the applicability of that argument, the jury was not given two instructions necessary to guide its deliberations: an identification instruction and an alibi instruction.  The defense asked for an alibi instruction.  (13T 57-11 to 13)  That request was denied because no notice of alibi had been given and because the court found that [...]’s claim of alibi was not “specific” enough.  (13T 57-20 to 68-11)  The identification instruction was not requested.  Both instructions were necessary, and the failure to issue them was clearly capable of creating an unjust result.  R. 2:10-2.  Because [...] contended that he was not the person on the bicycle, the model charge on identification when no identification has been made should have been given.  Model Criminal Jury Charge, Identification: No In- Or Out-Of-Court Identification (Da 60).  That instruction tells the jury that it must determine “not only whether the State has proven each and every element of the offense charged beyond a reasonable doubt, but also whether the State has proven beyond a reasonable doubt that this defendant is the person who committed it. ”  Ibid.  Because [...] contended that he was elsewhere at the time of the murder — specifically, that he had been at [...] at that time (14T 12-11 to 15) — the jury should have been given the model charge on alibi.  The instruction tells the jury that “[t]he defendant has neither the burden nor the duty to show that he/she was elsewhere at the time and so could not have committed the offense.  You must determine, therefore, whether the State has proved each and every element of the offense charged, including that of the defendant’s presence at the scene of the crime and his/her participation in it. ”  Model Criminal Jury Charge, Alibi (Da 61-62).  These two instructions inform the jury about a critical element of the offense—that defendant was the perpetrator—and explicitly tells the jury that the State retains the same high burden for that element as all the enumerated elements that comprise each crime.
[brief] The trial court should not have afforded the Affidavits of Service a presumption of validity and applied the wrong burden of proof.  Defendant [...] has argued all along that the Affidavits of Service in this case should not be afforded the presumption of validity.  T3, p.8:20-24 (Defense opening statement on the Motion).  The Intervenor argues, incorrectly, that there is no legal authority to shift the burden of proof to the party who is the proponent of the Affidavit.  Specifically, in their Brief, Intervenor argues that “[n]o legal authority exists that reverses the burden of proof to the serving party. ”  341Ib9.  In fact, there is legal precedent for this premise.  In Jameson v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 363 N.J.Super. 419. 426-427 (App. Div. 2003), the Appellate Division addressed this very fact and stated:  “In order for the sheriff's return to be established as false, clear and convincing evidence must be submitted.  Resolution Trust Corp v. Associated Gulf Contractors, 263 N.J. Super. 332, 344 (App. Div.), certif. denied 134 N.J. 480 (1993); Garley v. Waddington, 177 N.J. Super. 173, 180-81 (App. Div. 1981); Seymour v. Nessanbaum, 120 N.J. Eq. 24, 25 (Ch. 1936).
[brief] An Affidavit of Merit is a pleading requirement of the AOM statute.  It is essentially a courtesy afforded certain professionals recognized by the Legislature to deter baseless lawsuits.  It is not evidential.  It would never substitute for expert reports or discovery.  The proposed expert testimony is entirely evidential.  It is permitted to “assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue. ”  *N.J.R.E.* 702.  Expert testimony is evidence used in the vast majority of cases and not limited to claims of professional negligence.  That plaintiff has retained experts to testify has no bearing on the specifically limited and delineated requirements of the AOM statute.  CONCLUSION
[brief] *[...] v. Ricci*, [...].  In the Petition, [...] sworn, under penalty of perjury, that he was being held unlawfully because “[c]ounsel on the initial PCR ignored Petitioner’s request to investigate claims that Petitioner’s co-defendant would have submitted an affidavit on his behalf, which would have explained that Petitioner had no knowledge of the Staten Island robbery and kidnapping of [...]. ” (Da005) (emphasis added).  The [...] was counsel of record in the Habeas action and opposed the Petition.  Within months of the filing of the Petition, [...] wrote a letter to the [...], seeking a reduction in his sentence.  His trial testimony with respect to his letter was as follows:  Q: Mr. [...], do you remember how it came about that my office came to speak to you at Trenton regarding your testimony or regarding whether you were interested in testifying?  A: I wrote you a letter.  Q: When did you write the letter?  A: Either May or June.  Q: Why did you write the letter?  A: Try to get a deal.  Q: And why did you want a deal?  A: I didn’t want to die in prison.  (8T 252).  The State offered [...] a reduction in his sentence if he testified against [...].  On October 20, 2009, [...] testified at [...]’s trial.  (7T 4).  By then, codefendant [...] had died in prison from cancer.  (7T 125).  The State acknowledged to the jury that “Edwin [...] is the best evidence that [the state] can give you with respect to the involvement of [...].” (1T 26).  As a result of his testimony against [...], Torred will be released in two years, on or about July 11, 2026.
[brief] The above argument was made during the original Motion for Summary Judgment before [...].  However, in an attempt to correct this testimony, Plaintiff’s counsel submitted a new certification of the Plaintiff with the Motion for Reconsideration, dated April 19, 2023.  The new certification, signed April 12, 2023 by [...], alleges that Plaintiff has pain that comes and goes, including neck pain, low back restriction and pain, pain in the legs, numbness and weakness in the hands and arms, as well as difficulty standing and lifting and breathing from the sternum area.  Da88-Da91.  This certification was properly disregarded by the Trial Court, as the Plaintiff was seeking to supplement the record during a Motion for Reconsideration, contrary to R. 4:49-2.  The Plaintiff was in essence trying to create a genuine issue of material fact by producing competing evidence which was not in the record at the time of the Summary Judgment Motion.
[brief] The express terms of the loan documents, the UCC, TILA, and basic principles of contract law and interpretation, and this Court’s analysis and decisions in Omar and Vezeriannis establish a clear rule: once a wire transfer is received by a lender or its servicer, the transaction is deemed completed upon the payee’s receipt of the funds and the funds must be credited towards the balance due on the note and mortgage.  Where, as here, a lender fails to follow the express terms of the parties’ contract and the lender rejects and returns the funds resulting in a subsequent loss of the funds, equitable considerations will demand a discharge of the mortgage due to the lender’s imprudent decision.
[directive] Screening/Approval Prosecutorial On-Call 24/7 of Establishment 3.1 System....................................................................................................................18 Prosecutor On-Call from Approval Charging Obtain to Requirement 3.2 ...........................................................................19 Offenses Certain for Arrest upon Complaint- Issue to a Police Permit to Authority Prosecutor's County 3.3  First without aComplaint-Warrant for Apply and/or to Summons ........................................................................20 . Approval Prosecutorial Obtaining ......................................20 Prosecutor County by Issued Directive Charging 3.3.1 Approve to Authorized Officers Supervisory of Designation 3.3.2 ..............................21 . Presumption a Overcome to and Decisions Charging Complaint- for Application If Prosecutor to Notice Required 3.3.3 ......................................................................................23 Denied Is Warrant Prosecutor's County with Compliance Strict and Oversight 3.3.4 .....................................................................................23 Directive Charging County of Extension Indefinite Evaluation, and Expiration, 3.3.5 ...................................................................23 Directive Charging Prosecutor Prosecutorial Direct Require to Authority Prosecutor's County 3.4 ...................................................23  Application Complaint-Warrant in Participation Consultation/Charging Require to Authority Prosecutor's County 3.5 ........................................................................24 .  Offenses Additional for Approval in Committed Are Offenses When Decisions Charging of Coordination  3.6 ...................................................................................................24  Counties Multiple OR COMPLAINT-SUMMONS BY CHARGE TO WHETHER DETERMINING 4.
[brief] TABLE OF AUTHORITIES  Cases  B.H. Associates v. Brunder, 185 N.J. Super. 403 (Law. Div. 1982) .................................................. 29, 30  Baghdikian v. Board of Adjustment of Borough of Ramsey, 247 N.J. Super. 45 (App. Div. 1991) ......................................................  39 Bayshore Sewing Co. v. Dept. of Env., 122 NJ. Super. 184 (Ch. Div.), affd, 131 N.J. Super. 37 (App. Div. 1973)  ....................................................  25, 26, 36, 45 Circus Liquors. Inc. v. Governing Body of Middletown Tp., 199 NJ. 1 (2009)  ..................................................................................
[brief] The [...] ask that this Panel deny Appellants’ remarkable attempt to recover damages for a project they could never pursue, because they failed to pay their rent and thereby lost control over the land upon which this project was to be constructed.  First, land approvals run with the land.  If you lose control over the land, you lose the ability to act on your approvals.  Second, Appellants cannot establish proximate cause.  They stopped paying rent, defaulted on their lease and lost their land.  The failure to pay rent caused their loss.  Finally, Appellants cannot bring a claim for breach of an NDA when it expired well before the conduct underpinning the alleged breach.  Therefore, the Panel should affirm the decision below and prevent further litigation gamesmanship by Appellants.  A.
[brief] Indeed, the Supreme Court’s decisions, “pronounced in the benevolent light of New Jersey’s constitutional commitment to free speech, have stressed the vigor with which New Jersey fosters and nurtures speech on matters of public concern. ”  *Sisler v. Gannett Co., Inc.*, 104 N.J. 256, 271–72 (1986)  It was against this backdrop that the New Jersey legislature enacted UPEPA in September 2023 to “make[] it much more difficult to use the legal system as a weapon, with the intent to bully individuals into silence.
[brief] See Mount Prospect Chiropractic Ctr., __F.4th at __, 2024 WL 1819645, at *2 (rejecting insurer’s reliance on the boilerplate language in N.J.S.A. 17:33A-7(a) of the IFPA as indicative of an intent to exempt the statute from arbitration).  [...] also points to this Court’s statement in Fiouris concerning N.J.S.A. 17:33A-7(a).  Pb34-35.  Largely for the reasons the Third Circuit articulated in Mount Prospect, [...]’s reliance on Fiouris is misguided.  In dicta toward the end of the Fiouris decision, the panel commented that, based on the “may sue therefor in a court of competent jurisdiction” language in the IFPA, it was “clear from this provision that the Legislature did not contemplate that a claim of a violation of the Insurance Fraud Prevention Act would be heard by an arbitrator.
[brief] The legislative history behind the current iteration of N.J.S.A. 40:49-2 confirms that the Legislature never intended for the prehearing notice requirements to be satisfied by the mere publication of the ordinance’s title alone.  The prior version of the statute required the publication of the proposed ordinance in its entirety.  Intended as a cost saving measure only and not as a reduction in the conveyance of substantive information, the Legislature’s amendment of the statute permits publication by title but only if the same is accompanied by “a clear and concise statement prepared by the clerk of the governing body setting forth the purpose of the ordinance”.  Id.  In other words, the “clear and concise statement” of the “purpose of the ordinance” substitutes for the entirety of the ordinance that was once required.  Plainly, and as the legislative history confirms, that requirement cannot be satisfied by mere publication of the title alone.  The trial court’s decision unreasonably ignores this legislative history and effectively disregards the Legislature’s intent.
[brief] Almost immediately after the officers left, however, [...] called the police again, saying [...] was smashing the windows of her car.  (5T105-25 to 106-5).  When the police responded once more, they saw that [...]’s car was not damaged, and the officers again left without detaining [...].  (5T39-11 to 40-8, 106-6 to 107-4).  After police left the second time, [...] called her brother [...], who told her to come pick him up and bring him to the house.  (5T107-5 to 108-23).  [...] left to get her brother and ultimately returned to the house with her brother [...], her cousin [...], and her boyfriend [...].  (5T70-5 to 71-10, 108-24 to 12).
[brief] [7T 133-25 to 136-2; Pa274, ¶ 7].  The Board disregarded this testimony, found there was insufficient parking but too much impervious area without any explanation about why that was the case.  Perhaps it was because [...] slightly exceeded the impervious coverage limit in the R-20A Zone for single-family dwellings, but is substantially below the 55% limit for conditionally permitted school uses in the R-20A Zone.  If [...]’s building had school children inside rather than the frail elderly, there would be no variance needed, so this cannot be a significant detriment of the use variance.
[brief] The jury’s verdict allocating 60% fault to [...], 40% fault to [...] and 0% to Plaintiff defied logic and was against the weight of the evidence presented at trial.  It is illogical and contradictory for the jury to conclude that the Plaintiff was 0% at fault and [...] 40% at fault.  Both [...] and Plaintiff had the right of way and a yellow light.  The collision between [...]’s vehicle and Plaintiff’s vehicle occurred north of the intersection with Jackson Road and both Plaintiff and [...] were traveling at similar speeds when they observed the light turn yellow.  The laws of physics dictate that [...] was closer to the intersection than Plaintiff when the light turned yellow and passed through the intersection as he was hit by [...], who entered the intersection against a red light and caused the accident.  These facts dictate that neither Plaintiff nor [...] was negligent and that 100% of the fault for the accident lies with [...].