ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] R. 2:10-2.  C.  Admission of the minimally redacted video was plain error.  The erroneous admission of the partially redacted interrogation video was clearly capable of causing an unjust result.  R. 2:10-2.  The video included [...]’s numerous accusations of dishonesty, impermissible opinions as to what the church surveillance footage depicts, and references to inadmissible propensity evidence.  Each of these errors undermined [...]’s credibility with the jury and unfairly biased the jurors’ independent assessment of the evidence.  Additionally, the State’s case was not overwhelming—no DNA, fingerprint, or eyewitness identification tied [...] to the robbery.  It was thus the jury’s task to determine whether the person in the RT-TOIC video was the same person as the individual on the church video, and whether that person entered [...] and committed the alleged crime.  When [...] called [...] a liar, espoused that he “saw [him] go in the building” and “saw [him] come out of the building,” and disclosed [...]’s unrelated arrest, he unduly influenced the jury’s ability to conduct an independent evaluation.  See Frisby, 174 N.J. at 596 (quoting Neno v. Clinton, 167 N.J. 573, 586-87 (2001)) (noting that juries ascribe “almost determinative significance” to a police officer’s commentary).  Because these errors could have influenced the verdict, [...]’s convictions must be reversed.
[brief] NEW JERSEY COURT RULE 3:22-12(a) (2) (C) SHOULD BE INTERPRETED TO START THE ONE YEAR FILING REQUIREMENT FROM THE DATE OF WHICH THE JUDGMENT BECOMES FINAL BY THE CONCLUSION OF DIRECT REVIEW OR THE EXPIRATION OF THE TIME SEEKING SUCH REVIEW, AKIN TO FEDERAL HABEAS LAW  28 U.S. CODE § 224  WHICH WOULD THUS RENDER  [...]’S SECOND PCR TIMELY (Da 086)..................................................................................................................17  1  Court below did not issue written opinion addressing all issues raised, only issued order dismissing with prejudice the PCR petition.  See Da 083 for PCR counsel raising issue in submissions to the Court.  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS, AND RULINGS
[brief] If such were the case, any applicant, after satisfying the residency requirement for initial employment, could immediately remove from the political subdivision or unit and successfully claim the right to continued governmental employment.  Skolski v. Woodcock, 149 N.J. Super. 340, 345 (App. Div. 1977) (citation omitted).  The continuing nature of the Restructuring Act’s residency requirements is the fairest and only logical reading of the Act given its plain language and especially in light of the context in which it was enacted.
[brief] (See Pa31a – Pa34a, ¶¶36-50).  These allegations have no relevance to the 2021 Lawsuit, are redundant to the allegation as set forth in the First Lawsuit.  Moreover, Plaintiff devotes approximately forty-five (45) paragraphs of the Complaint to her allegations concerning a November 19, 2020, request to attend a virtual meeting, Plaintiff’s assertion that she was not initially told the purpose of the meeting, Plaintiff’s demand that her attorney be permitted to represent her at the meeting, assurances received by Plaintiff that it was not a disciplinary meeting, the nature of the meeting in which concerns regarding claims that Plaintiff and some of her students were not wearing masks, Plaintiff’s allegations concerning the claimed ambiguity of the mask policy, and her belief that defendant [...] was not disciplined for her failure to wear a mask.  (See Pa38a – Pa46a, ¶¶85-130).  Plaintiff’s allegations concerning [...] and [...] arise from her claim that these Board members authorized an investigation into complaints raised by defendant Janine [...].
[brief] (Sa82)  The Court found that because [...]’s had been sentenced on his firearm charges in Essex, those charges were no longer pending, and thus did not disqualify him from Track One pursuant to subsection (a)(5).  (Sa82)  Additionally, the Court concluded that the second clause of (a)(5) refers to charges other than the present charges on which a defendant seeks admission to Recovery Court and thus did not apply to the Morris County charges.  (Sa82)  The Recovery Court’s common sense reading of the plain language of subsection (a)(5) was correct and should be affirmed by this Court.  A.
[brief] Common sense dictates that a driver’s failure to signal a lane change “may” affect the car behind them as any number of real-life examples demonstrate.  For instance, two cars could be in the left lane of a highway with the trailing driver intent on passing the lead driver.  The trailing driver looks back to ensure it is safe to move over and begins to change lanes.  While the trailing driver is looking back, the lead driver also decides to change lanes without having signaled their intention causing a potential collision or near collision.  Or imagine two cars in the right lane of a roadway.  The lead driver intends to turn right into the driveway of a business but does not activate their turn signal.  The trailing driver has less opportunity to react when the lead car begins to slow down because of the failure of the leading driver to indicate their intention.  It goes without saying that other motorists need to know where the car in front of them is planning on going.  See Williamson, 138 N.J. at 304 (“Motorists in the vicinity whose movements may be affected must be made aware of a driver's intentions. ”).  Activating a signal after the vehicle has already partially entered the adjacent lane—as [...] did here—does not accomplish the purpose of N.J.S.A. 39:4-126 to afford notice to other motorists so they can react accordingly.  Thus, the trial court correctly ruled that the officers had reasonable and articulable suspicion that [...]’s failure to signal may have affected other traffic to support a lawful stop.
[directive] a.  Criminal Coercion N.J.S.A. 2C:13-5a(4).  b.  Theft by Deception N.J.S.A 2C:20-4 if the amount exceeds $10,000.  c.  Theft by Extortion N.J.S.A 2C:20-5d.  d.  Theft by Failure to Make Required Disposition of Property Received N.J.S.A 2C:20-9 if the amount exceeds $10,000.  e.  Commercial Bribery N.J.S.A 2C:21-10.  f.  Money Laundering N.J.S.A 2C:21-25.  g.  False Contract Payment Claims N.J. S.A 2C:21-34.  h.  Bribery in Official Matters  N.J.S.A 2C:27-2.  i.  Threats and other Improper Influence in Official and Political Matters  N.J.S.A 2C:27-3.  j.  Unlawful Official Business Transaction Where Interest is Involved N.J.S.A 2C:27-9.  k.  Acceptance or Receipt of Unlawful Benefit by Public Servant for Official Behavior  N.J.S.A 2C:27-10.  l.  Offer of Unlawful Benefit to Public Servant for Official Behavior  N.J.S.A 2C:27-11.  m.  Perjury N.J.S.A 2C:28-1.  n.  Tampering with Witnesses N.J.S.A 2C:28-5.  o.  Tampering with Public Records or Information N.J.S.A 2C:28-7.  p.  Compounding N.J.S.A 2C:29-4.  q.  Official Misconduct N.J.S.A 2C:30-2.  Revised: 03/2024, CN: XXXXX Page of 6  7  r.  Speculating or Wagering on Official Action or Information N.J.S.A 2C:30-3.  s.  Pattern of Official Misconduct  N.J.S.A 2C:30-7.  Anyone convicted of a crime against a person 16 years of age or younger 8. or a disabled or handicapped person.  Anyone convicted of a conspiracy or attempt to commit any of the crimes 9. described in this section.  Revocation of Certificate:
[brief] CONCLUSION  For the foregoing reasons, amici respectfully request that the Court reverse the ruling below and hold that New Jersey law does not allow failure-to-recall claims in the absence of a prior government recall order.  Alternatively, amici respectfully request that the Court hold that any failure-to-recall claim in this case is preempted by the FDCA, as state-law recall duties preceding or exceeding any FDA recall would necessarily prohibit sale of FDA-approved prescription drugs, and thus conflict with both the FDA’s drug approval and recall authority.  Respectfully submitted, s/ [...]  [...], Esq. N.J. Attorney No. 030312002  [...], Esq. N.J. Attorney No. 064892013  [...]  [...]  Tel: [...]  Fax: [...]  [...]  [...]  [...], Esq. N.J. Attorney No. 039641998  [...] [...]  Tel: [...]  [...]  Attorneys for Amici Curiae [...] and the [...]  Dated: May 2, 2024  [...], Plaintiff-Respondent, v. [...], [...], F/K/A [...], [...], [...], AND DOES 1 THROUGH 100, INCLUSIVE, Defendant-Appellant.  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY  APPELLATE  DIVISION  DOCKET NO. [...]  CIVIL ACTION ON APPEAL FROM:  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY, LAW  DIVISION: MORRIS COUNTY DOCKET NO. [...]  SAT BELOW:  HON. [...], J.S.C. AMICI CURIAE
[brief] Further, if the Commission had allowed the plaintiff to amend his complaint with the OPRA response materials, there was substantial evidence in the form of emails of Board members actively editing materials to mislead the public and omit material facts.  X.  RESPONDENTS IGNORE HOW THE REFERENDUM WAS PASSED AND THE BOARD ACTIONS REGARDING IT.  Throughout the history of this complaint, Respondents have claimed their actions were innocent and entirely in keeping with their roles as Board Members.  Respondents indicate “[t]here are thousands of voters in the District’s municipalities who approved the referendum” (BOE-Db40).  What Respondents ignore is that the referendum passed by a mere 2 votes (Pb1), and was only approved after the extensive unethical actions of the board members, both individually and collectively.  Respondents disenfranchised voters on the “no” side of the issue, spent large sums of public money to engineer “yes” votes, and actively mislead voters to achieve their ends.  **CONCLUSION**
[brief] ”  Ibid. (citations omitted).  In applying this standard, “courts do not consider what they might have done in the agency’s place or substitute their judgment for the agency’s. ”  Ibid. (citing Greenwood v. State Police Training Ctr., 127 N.J. 500, 513 (1992)).  This is especially true here where the Legislature has delegated to the Board — a body of individuals “[a]ppointed by the Governor with the advice and consent of the Senate” because of their specialized “expertise in ‘law, sociology, criminal justice or related branches of the social sciences’” — the “exceedingly difficult” responsibility of making predictive pronouncements about an individual’s likelihood to reoffend.
[directive] A defendant’s particularized health risks, if any, and whether they 4. present a heightened risk the individual will contract COVID-19.  Specific health risks of a defendant who is required to remain in custody may bear on 22 the level of risk posed and factor into whether the aim of pretrial detention can (“A judge be met through other conditions.  See Lougee, 147 N.E.3d at 476 ruling on a motion for reconsideration [of pretrial detention] should . . . consider the health risks to the defendant in determining whether there are conditions of release that will reasonably assure the safety of any other person community. ”); or the see also United States v. Shaheed, 455 F. Supp. 3d 225, 235, 238 (D. Md. 2020) (weighing defendant’s asthma and risk of harm from COVID-19, among other considerations, at a motion to reopen a detention hearing).
[brief] L AND J ENTERPRISES  1, LLC and [...]  [...], ESQ.  ATTORNEY ID NUMBER: 000272006  [...]  [...] [...]  [...]  Attorneys for Defendants/Respondents  L AND J ENTERPRISES  1, LLC and [...]  TABLE OF CONTENTS  PROCEDURAL HISTORY  1  RESPONSE TO STATEMENT OF FACTS  3  LEGAL ARGUMENT 4  CONCLUSION  8
[brief] In the second alleged act of retaliation that resulted in a one-day suspension, [...] planned to speak at the AWWA meeting in Atlantic City.  (Pa348).  He did not seek DEP approval to speak at the 2016 conference, despite being identified as a Section Chief in the abstract he submitted to the AWWA.  (Pa349-350; Pa353-355).  [...] chose not to seek approval despite the fact he was advertising his “30 years of service with New Jersey’s Water Community,” was speaking in New Jersey, and was addressing “licensed operators,” who appear to be water systems regulated by the DEP.  (Pa353-355).  The Process of Internal Approvals for Employee Public Speaking
[brief] (Ra4-5).  Relevant here, on October 13, 2023, DEP asked the Highlands Council to again review the Project and make a recommendation on Highlands consistency.  (Ra13).  The Council responded on October 25, 2023, confirming “its prior findings that the project is consistent with [the] goals and purposes of the Highlands Act. ”  Ibid.  DEP relied “on the Council’s review to assess compliance with this portion” of the Exemption # 11 criteria and found “no valid countervailing reason to not determine that the project is consistent with the goals and purposes of the Highlands Act. ”  Ibid.  The same Appellants from the 2021 Appeal also appealed the 2024 HAD, docketed here as [...] (the 2024 Appeal).
[brief] ” (Pa330 at 115).  [...] testified that the “majority of time,” she started work at 7:00 a.m., and that the work schedule listed on the books is just “generic hours for the shift. ” (Pa325, 94:22-25 to 95:1-21).  The accident and resultant death of the decedent took an “emotional toll” on [...], who testified that she “couldn’t get myself out of bed for days.
[brief] This Court should echo the decisions made decades ago in Molino and Sabato.  Molino cautioned against reading the arbitration requirement “too narrowly” and noted that the statute’s requirement to arbitrate any dispute was “unqualified. ”  289 N.J. Super. at 409.  The statute “must” be construed “liberally to harmonize the arbitration provision with our firm policy favoring prompt and efficient resolution of PIP disputes without resort to judicial process” and to advance the “overwhelming goals” of the No-Fault Law by “reduc[ing] court congestion” and “comport[ing] with New Jersey’s long-standing and strong public policy favoring arbitration in general. ”  Id. at 410 (citing Roig, 135 N.J. at 516).  Insurance carriers should not be allowed to “frustrate[] these salutary policies” and “should not be empowered to avoid arbitration simply by characterizing PIP disputes as questions of ‘entitlement’ or ‘coverage’ and then seeking judicial resolutions of those issues. ”  Ibid.  All disputes related to the payment of PIP Benefits are subject to arbitration with the arbitrator “charged with applying the PIP statute as a whole, guided by pertinent case law, and deciding both legal and factual questions in the process. ”  Ibid.  Sabato, reaffirming Molino, added that arbitrators, in a PIP benefits dispute, are “empowered to determine the issues of coverage and fraud. ”  337 N.J. Super. at 394-97.  Specifically, the panel concluded that defenses, including fraud, should be resolved by an arbitrator and that the “statutorily mandated arbitration [was] not as narrow and circumscribed as” the insurance carrier claimed.  Id. at 396.  Arbitration “is mandated by statute” and cannot be evaded by insurances carriers bringing claims in courts, “characterizing PIP disputes as questions of ‘entitlement’ or ‘coverage’ and then seeking judicial resolutions of those issues. ”  Id. at 396-97. (noting “[a]rbitration proceedings shall be administered and subject to procedures established by the [...]”).  If insurers are permitted to evade arbitration and bring claims in court at a later date, insurance companies will have no incentive to resolve claims related to the payment of PIP benefits through the statutory arbitration mechanism.  Indeed, although it is settled that an insurance company can assert fraud as a defense in PIP arbitration, there would be no reason for an insurance company to ever do so and risk losing on that defense and later facing issue preclusion or estoppel in court when the insurance company repackages the claims under the IFPA.  See Reid v. Reid, 310 N.J. Super. 12, 24 (App. Div. 1998) (stating claim preclusion applies to matters “determined in an earlier action”).  Insurers should not be able to avoid arbitration where arbitration is the only recourse for health care providers to be paid under the No-Fault Law.  The statute requires it, and, if insurers can avoid arbitration and run to the court, the finality of a binding arbitration award under the No-Fault Law would be illusory and would allow insurance companies to continue to bog down the courts with hundreds and thousands of individual PIP claims labeled as fraud.
[brief] Precedential  Botteon v. Borough of Highland Park, 478 N.J. Super. 452 (App. Div. 2024)  12  CBS Outdoor Inc. v. Borough of Lebanon Planning Bd/Bd of Adjustment, 414 N.J. Super. 563 (App. Div. 2010)  FMC Stores v. Borough of Morris Plains, 100 N.J. 418 (1985)  Geler v. Akawie, 358 N.J. Super. 37, 463 (App. Div. 2003)  Grabowsky v. Township of Montclair, 221 N.J. 536 (2015)  In re IMO Town of Harrison and Fraternal Order of Police Lodge No. 116, 440 N.J. Super. 268 (App.  Div. 2015)  Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803)  James Meyers v. State Health Benefits Commission, 256 N.J. 94 (2023)  New Jersey Realtors v. Township of Berkeley, _N.J. Super. __ (App. Div. 1 July 31, 2024)  Piscitelli v. Garfield Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 237 N.J. 333 (2019)  State v. Dana Kearney, __N.J. Super.__ (App. Div. Sept. 18, 2024)  Thompson v. City of Atlantic City, 190 N.J. 359 (2007)  Town of Morristown v. Morris County Board of Taxation, __ N.J. Tax__ 5 (Tax July 24, 2024)  257-261  20th Avenue Realty, LLC v. Alessandro Roberto, 477 N.J. Super. 2 339 (App. Div. 2023)  Wyzykowski v. Rizas, 132 N.J. 509 (1993)  **Persuasive**  [...] v. City of Perth Amboy, [...] (App. Div. Sept.  6, 2024)  [...] v. Township Committee of Millburn, [...] (Ch. Div. Jan. 14, 2021)  Miscoski v. Local Finance Board, 2008 WL 2788225 (App. Div. July 21, 2008)  [...] v. Township of Parsippany, [...] (App. Div. Sept 20, 2024)  [...] v. Borough of Edgewater, [...] (App. Div. Aug. 13, 2024)  [...] v. The East Anwell Township Planning Board, [...] (App. Div. July 20, 2021)  STATUTORY
[brief] In improperly placing the burden on [...] to justify a written, enforceable order requiring the Off-site Units be located at [...], the trial court overlooked that it was [...]’s burden to select a location to provide a realistic opportunity for the development of affordable housing and the only location ever identified and selected by the [...]—based on the uncontested record evidence—was [...].  e.  The Trial Court Held That “Automatic Approval” Was Too Extreme Of A Remedy, Overlooking The Various Well Accepted Vehicles Available To Secure Compliance With The Judgment (11-13a, 16-17a)
[brief] On June 9, 2023, [...] presided over the first day of trial in this matter.  (3T).  The State offered the testimony of two witnesses: (1) [...], the [...] employee who called 911; and (2) [...], the alleged victim.  (3T).  Ms. Hodges testified that while she was closing up the restaurant on January 25, 2021, she heard screaming and went outside to find Ms. Contreras hysterical.  (3T47:16-48:4).  Ms. Hodges then called 911 on Ms. Contreras’ behalf.  (3T49:3-4).  The State introduced an audio recording of the 911 call through Ms. Hodges.  (3T53:1-3).  Ms. Contreras testified that she was walking home from work when an individual wearing a black Covid-19 mask and driving a red pickup truck pulled up beside her and attempted to get her attention.  (3T63:10-14; 3T64:17-18; 3T65:14).  She ignored the man, but when he once again tried to get her attention, she turned to look at him and saw that he was holding a gun.  (3T63:15-19).  Ms. Contreras testified that he then demanded that she “get inside the f***ing car. ” (3T63:18-19).  She said that when she did not respond, the man in the vehicle said, “I’m serious, get in the f***ing car. ” (3T63:20-23).  Ms. Contreras then ran and ducked behind a pile of cardboard outside [...] and screamed for help.  (3T63:24-64:4).  ii.
[brief] The conveyance of title to the Premises by Plaintiff to the [...] occurred on April 21, 2023.  The transaction was basically a “flip” of the Premises.  A sizable profit realized less than three months from judgment for tens of thousands of dollars more than the redemption the Defendant paid on August 22, 2023, less than ten days from [...]’s order that vacated Plaintiff’s final judgment.  The transfer of title to [...], within and prior to three (3) months from recording the judgment, N.J.S.A. 54:5-104.67, begged the certainty of a motion to vacate the judgment.
[brief] (Id.).  Plaintiff alleges that [...] failed to draft, negotiate, and advise him properly regarding a purchase agreement and a construction agreement that Plaintiff entered into with architect, [...] and his construction company, [...]  (Id.).  As a result of the dispute with Tsairis, Plaintiff retained multiple attorneys, including his cousin, [...], Esq. of [...] and [...] of [...], to litigate a case against Tsairis.  (Pa0064).  The result of that litigation was that Plaintiff was unsuccessful at arbitration and Plaintiff owed substantial amounts of money to both Tsairis and to his attorneys, [...], and [...].  (Pa0065).  Specifically, the residential property at issue was located at [...].  (Pa0003).  Plaintiff purchased the property in 2007 in order to build his alleged dream home on Pines Lake.  (Da81, 235:16-17).  Plaintiff had originally planned to live in the historic house that was already on the property when he bought the property, but later decided to build a new modular home on the property and demolish the historic house.
[brief] STATE OF NEW JERSEY, : CRIMINAL ACTION  Plaintiff-Respondent, :  On Appeal from the Denial of a v. : Motion to Withdraw a Guilty Plea, Law Division, Mercer County.  [...], : Sat Below: Defendant-Appellant.  :  Hon. [...], J.S.C.  DEFENDANT IS CONFINED  Your Honors:  This letter is submitted in lieu of a formal brief pursuant to R. 2:6-2(b)  TABLE OF CONTENTS
[brief] The court countered this challenge of error ignoring that laches does not apply to Civil Rights Actions by offering a non-relevant deflection with a dissertation of why Reconsideration falls into a “narrow corridor (Pa1 - Pa2) versus the fact that laches did not apply to this instance case.  Under the Supremacy clause appears in Article VI of the Constitution of the U.S., everyone must follow federal law in the face of conflicting State law.
[brief] As the Supreme Court held in Dzwonar v. McDevitt, 177 N.J. 451 (2003) when a defendant argues at summary judgment that an employee’s belief is unreasonable, the Court must determine whether there is a “substantial nexus” between the complained of conduct and the implicated law, regulation, or public policy.  Dzwonar, 177 N.J. at 464.  If such a nexus exists, “the jury then must determine whether the plaintiff actually held such a belief, and if so, whether that belief was objectively reasonable. ”  Id. at 464-65.  Such a nexus is present in this case.
[brief] [The officer] testified that he was suspicious of defendant based on his training and experience that drugs and guns are often stored in walkways, because of general “reports [he had] been having in the area,” and because of his belief that criminal activity was taking place at the vacant house.  None of those non-specific, non-individualized factors, however, “meet the constitutional threshold of individualized reasonable suspicion” that this particular defendant was engaged in criminal activity.  [Id. at 405-406 (citing State v. Nyema, 249 N.J. 509, 532 (2022)).]
[brief] Da180; 3T156:7-18.  The November 10, 2010 letter attached two (2) draft promissory notes in an effort to memorialize [...]’s proposed modifications/extensions to the $330,000 Loan and the $50,000 Loan.  Da180; 3T156:16 to 157:23.  By sending modifications and cures, [...] was attempting to get the loan back on track and fully paid by the maturity date.  Da180; Da188; 3T148:3-23.  [...] testified that he agreed to any request from [...] to forbear.
[brief] [Emph. added].  In, Food Handlers Local v. Pluss Poultry, Inc., 260 F.2d 835, 836 (8th Cir. 1958), the parties’ agreement required multiple arbitrators but, due to disagreement, only 1 heard their dispute.  The Court found that arbitrator’s ruling exceeded his powers because “the arbitrator, who made the award sued on, was without power to arbitrate or render award upon the disputes.