ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] That statute is distinct and separate from the kinds of manslaughter found in N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4.  Indeed, our caselaw has repeatedly dwelled on the distinctions between a death caused in the course of committing a DUI and manslaughter.  In State v. Jiminez, 257 N.J. Super. 567 (App. Div. 1992), this Court noted the “subtle and sophisticated distinctions between the concept of recklessness envisioned by the Legislature in death by auto as distinguished from the recklessness envisioned in the manslaughter statute. ”  Id. 583.  In State v. Choinacki, 324 N.J. Super. 19 (App. Div. 1999), this Court elaborated on those distinctions in greater detail:  The mental element of ‘recklessness’ required for manslaughter is greater than that required for death by auto.  . . .  While driving under the influence may alone satisfy the recklessness required by the death by auto statute, more is required for reckless manslaughter.  When the State relies on the extent of drinking as an additional act constituting recklessness which caused death, the drinking must be more than casual drinking and more than mere intoxication, rather, it would have to be exceptional drinking to a marked extent.  . . .  The deviation from reasonable care must be gross so to satisfy the element of recklessness in a reckless manslaughter case.  [Id. at 48.]  The prosecutor’s descriptions in summation completely confused and distorted these principles, moving the goalposts for what constitutes reckless manslaughter in a manner that did not comport with the law in order to try and convince the jury that it could not possibly apply to the facts of this case.  By contrast, our caselaw shows that in circumstances similar to the instant matter, defendants have been convicted of reckless manslaughter.  In State v. Cabbell, 207 N.J. 311 (2011), for instance, a group of people were driving home in a pickup truck late at night in the rain and crashed into the back of the defendants’ car.
[brief] In Greenstein, another unpublished opinion, the plaintiff slipped and fell on an icy driveway apron leading from the street to [...]’s parking lot.  (Da33).  The dispute here was whether [...] owed the plaintiff a duty to clear snow and ice from the driveway apron.  Relying on the Pareja, which treated a similar driveway apron as part of the sidewalk, the court declined to differentiate between the sidewalk and driveway apron in determining [...]'s duty.  (Da36-37).  The court found the driveway apron was structurally integral to the sidewalk and intended for pedestrian use and it was found it was foreseeable pedestrians would use the apron.  (Id.)  Here, plaintiff did not fall in a driveway apron, and there is a clear difference between a driveway apron as part of a sidewalk and a parking lot in a private commercial complex.  Therefore, as there is no dispute that defendants had a duty to clear snow and ice from the parking lot, Greenstein, is not applicable.
[brief] Although plaintiff cites Wellington for the proposition that “generally, summary judgment is inappropriate prior to the completion of discovery” (Pb30), the Appellate Division made clear (in the same paragraph plaintiff cites) that “a plaintiff ‘has an obligation to demonstrate with some degree of particularity the likelihood that further discovery will supply the missing elements of the cause of action. ”  Wellington v. Est. of Wellington, 359 N.J. Super. 484, 496 (App. Div. 2003) (quoting Auster v. Kinoian, 153 N.J. Super. 52, 56 (App. Div. 1977)).
[brief] PRELIMINARY STATEMENT  In this matter, plaintiff, a landlord, brought suit against defendants, a tenant and personal guarantors of the relevant commercial lease, all stemming from non-payment of rent and other additional rent obligations under the lease.  Plaintiff was awarded summary judgment as to rent, additional rent, legal fees and costs owed.  Plaintiff, however, appealed the amount of late fees and insurance charges awarded.  The Appellate Division denied the appeal as to the late fees but remanded the matter to the Trial Court for a determination of insurance charges owed to Plaintiff.  The parties agreed as to the insurance amount owed ($1,096.00) but could not agree as to the language in the release.  Defendant forwarded Plaintiff a check in the amount of $1,096.00 which was held in escrow as the parties tried to resolve the release language to no avail.  Defendants sought to include language in the release to bar any and all claims between the parties, including potential future claims.  Plaintiff did not agree to this language.  Defendant filed a motion to enforce the settlement which was denied.  Plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment as to the $1,096.00.  Defendant filed a cross-motion for declaratory relief (which was not even plead) seeking an Order preventing Plaintiff from filing any hypothetical future claims relating to the landlord tenant relationship.  The Trial Court denied the motion for summary judgment as to the $1096.00 saying it was moot and that Plaintiff should just deposit the check.  The Trial Court granted Defendants’ motion seeking a bar on all future claims.  Plaintiff appeals this Order as the declaratory relief sought was not plead, future claims for rent are not barred under the entire controversy doctrine and the issue before the Court was not ripe for adjudication.  PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[directive] The statute for criminal trespass (N.J.S.A. 2C:18-3), referenced in Bail 3. Schedule 2, was amended effective June 15, 2005, so as to add enhanced criminal liability for trespassing at certain public utilities.  L. 2005, c.100.  Supplement to Directive #9-05 May 26, 2006  Page 2  The statute for criminal mischief (N.J.S.A. 2C:17-3), referenced in Bail 4. Schedule 2, was amended effective January 12, 2006, so as to add enhanced criminal liability for the substantial interruption or impairment of various public utilities and enhanced liability for the breaking or tampering with the means that supply the utilities.  L. 2005, c.316.  It was suggested that additional disorderly person offenses be included 5. in the Disorderly Persons Section of Bail Schedule 2 and that certain disorderly person offenses be listed in both the indictable section of Bail Schedule 2 and in the Disorderly Persons Section of that Schedule as well.  Additional minor adjustments were made to the formatting of the 6. schedules to make them easier to use.  On the recommendation of the [...], the attached revised Statewide Bail Schedules and summary of the court rules and statutes relating to bail are hereby adopted and supersede the Bail Schedules appended to Directive #9-05.
[directive] While no backlog was identified, the report recommended changes to policies for handling and tracking SAFE kits.2  In response to this report, the Division of Criminal Justice created a SAFE Kit Working Group whose goal was to assess the feasibility of implementing a statewide tracking system and explore options for standardizing the tracking of SAFE kits.  The recommendations of this working group were reviewed by the leadership within the Division of Criminal Justice, the Division of Violence Intervention and Victim Assistance, and the Office of the Attorney General, and that collective expertise, as well as the results of the Attorney General’s SAFE kit survey, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 52:17B-245, informed Attorney General Directive 2023-1, issued on March 13, 2023 (“March 2023 Directive”).  The March 2023 Directive modified and built upon the Standards in the areas of collection, tracking, storage, testing, retention, and destruction of evidence and information gathered in the aftermath of an act of sexual assault victimization.  Since the March 2023 Directive, the Office of the Attorney General collected additional data, further consulted with the forensic laboratories responsible for testing SAFE kits, and secured federal grant funding to create a statewide SAFE kit tracking system.  The new information obtained and the additional resources secured made it both possible and necessary to update the March 2023 Directive to further this Office’s commitment to protecting the rights of victims and enhancing the potential to prosecute offenders.
[brief] .......................................................................................................................  15  ### TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ####  STATE CASES | Case Name | Citation | |------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------| | Baskin v. P.C. Richard & Son, LLC | 246 N.J. 157 (2021) | | Dugan v. TGI Fridays, Inc. | 231 N.J. 24 (2017) | | Gonzalez v. Wilshire Credit Corp. | 207 N.J. 557 (2011) | | Lee v. Carter-Reed Co., LLC | 203 N.J. 496 (2010)  | | Lemelledo v. Benefit Mgmt. Corp. of Am. | 150 N.J. 255 (1997)  | | Macedo v. Dello Russo | 178 N.J. 340 (2004) | | Manahawkin Convalescent v. O’Neill | 217 N.J. 99 (2014) | | Plemmons v. Blue Chip Ins. Servs., Inc. | 387 N.J. Super. 551 (App. Div. 2006) | | Serv. Armament Co. v. Hyland | 70 N.J. 550 (1976) | | Shaw v. Shand | 460 N.J. Super. 592 (App. Div. 2019) | | Univ. Cottage Club of Princeton N.J. Corp. v. Dep’t of Env’t Prot. | 191 N.J. 28 (2007) | | Williams-Hopkins v. Medwell, LLC | No. A-0273-21, 2024 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 569 (App. Div. Apr. 5, 2024) | PRELIMINARY STATEMENT Plaintiff [...] (“Plaintiff”) seeks reversal of the trial court’s order dismissing with prejudice his claims against Defendants [...], [...], and [...] (collectively “Defendants”), insurance agents, brokers and producers (“producers”), under the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act, N.J.S.A. 56:8-1 to -210 (“CFA”).
[brief] Appellants defaulted on their Lease, plain and simple, through no fault of the [...].  The loss of the alleged Solar Rights, the loss of the anticipated economic advantage from the solar project, and all other damages claimed by Appellants in this matter are the direct and proximate result of Appellants’ own inaction.  Appellants have only themselves to blame.  Appellants even admitted in sworn deposition testimony that they lost the land because they failed to pay.  The [...]’s (“[...]”) representative, [...], also confirmed that Appellants lost the land because they refused to pay for it.  The parties already completed discovery, and nothing will change these admitted facts.  After two years of discovery and the end of the discovery period, Appellants got desperate and -- whether intentionally or negligently -- created a narrative rooted in falsehoods.  No closer to proving their original claims, Appellants invented facts to support new claims, going as far as to sue the [...]’ transactional lawyer under the banner of civil RICO for writing a letter to a planning board.  Appellants’ late claims all failed on the law and the facts: (1) Appellants have no damages; (2) there is no misrepresentation upon which to base these new claims; (3) Appellants filled their Amended Complaint with demonstrable falsehoods; and (4) Appellants’ new claims fail to establish their respective elements.  For all the foregoing reasons, the Panel should uphold the trial court’s well-reasoned decision.
[brief] (2T 110-17 to 135-14)  On March 6, 2015, [...] was arrested for possessing a handgun and was being detained at the [...] when he requested to speak with [...] and [...], claiming he had information about [...]’s death.  (2T 101-8 to 102-12, 120-15 to 121-8)  Before [...] divulged his information, they discussed [...]’s bail amount, and [...] promised [...] that they would “try to help [him] out in any way [they] can” in exchange for his information.
[directive] [...], [...], & [...], 4 Treating Substance Use Disorders in the Criminal Justice PSYCHIATRY REP., Nov. 2013 vol. 15, issue 11.  [...], MORE System, CURR  See also, IMPRISONMENT DOES NOT REDUCE STATE DRUG PROBLEMS, March 2018, https://www.pewtrusts.org/- /media/assets/2018/03/pspp_more_imprisonment_does_not_reduce_state_drug_problems.pdf.  [...] & [...], 5  The Link Between Mental Illness and Firearm Violence: Implications for REV. CLIN. PSYCHOL. 445-469 (May 2017).  Practice, 13 ANNU Social Policy and Clinical [...] & [...], Risk, THE PEW CHARITABLE
[brief] There is zero tolerance for conduct of this sort in the New Jersey Judicuary.2T page9, lines 9-12  I next wish to address Your Honor’s prior statement on page4 of the April13,2022 transcript (lines 20-22), referring to Your Honor’s Statement  [...] states “I don’t have psychiatric issues.  See this is what I mean, I’m not going to get a fair trial.  I’m just—” as it is also inaccurate……………………………………..2T page4, lines 20-22  I also wish to clarify an inaccuracy on page 4 of the April 13, 2024 transcript (lines 23-25), where Your Honor continue to imply that I have “psychiatric issues” and states “Okay.  So, I need you to be able to be quite while I talk to the prosecutor.  If you can’t--” then on page 5 lines (1-2) [...] states “But I don’t have psychiatric issues. ” then on page 5 (line 4) [...] states “That was so rude”  ……………………………………………………………2T page4 lines 23-25 and 2T page 5 lines 1-2 and 2T page 5 line4  September 12, 2022
[brief] Pa231a-32a.  Furthermore, it was the foremen on the job, including [...], who were responsible for enforcing traffic flow rules inside the work zone.  Pa207a; Pa278a.  According to both [...], Project Manager for [...], and [...], the [...] superintendent for the worksite where the accident occurred, it was always [...]’s practice to try and assign a dump truck to the sweepers at the work site both for expediency and for safety reasons.
[brief] State v. McKinney, 223 N.J. 475 (2015).......................................................22-23 State v. McNeil-Thomas, 238 N.J. 256 (2019)..............................................19-20  State v. Mohammed, 226 N.J. 71 (2016).........................................................19 State v. Montalvo, 229 N.J. 300 (2017).........................................................21 State v. Nantambu, 221 N.J. 390 (2015)..............................................21  State v. Pierre, 223 N.J. 560 (2015)..................................................21 State v. Ramirez, 246 N.J. 61 (2021)....................................................23 State v. S.S., 229 N.J. 360 (2017).......................................................21 State v. Sanchez-Medina, 231 N.J. 452 (2018).....................................21 State v. Scharf, 225 N.J. 547 (2016)...................................................22 State v. Wilbely, 63 N.J. 420 (1973)....................................................23
[brief] B.  The Bloodstain Pattern Analyst’s Testimony Violated N.J.R.E. 702.  [...], the bloodstain pattern analyst, testified twice that bloodstain pattern analysis is 100% accurate: he stated that “there’s no error rate in bloodstain pattern analysis” and confirmed that there was a “zero error rate. ”  (3T 134-6 to 17; 3T 169-22 to 25)  As explained in subsection A, infra, no scientific discipline has a zero error rate; no scientific discipline is infallible; and it’s scientifically incorrect as well as misleading and prejudicial to say so.  As with the fingerprint examiner, the testimony that [...]’s conclusions couldn’t possibly be wrong is well known to be incorrect among scientists and courts.  As a factual matter, bloodstain pattern analysis has staggering error rates.  In 2021, the largest “black box” study to evaluate the “accuracy and reproducibility of conclusions made by practicing BPA analysis,” produced concerning results.  [...] et al., Accuracy and Reproducibility of Conclusions by Forensic Bloodstain Pattern Analysts, 325 Forensic Sci. Int. 1 (2021)  For instance, only 52.8% of classifications made in response to one set of prompts were correct.  Id. at 2.  The authors concluded that “consensus was limited, and errors were widely distributed across prompts. ”  Id. at 4.  The authors concluded that “[b]oth semantic differences and contradictory interpretations contributed to errors and disagreements, which could have serious implications if they occurred in casework. ”  Id. at 7.  [...]’s testimony is a prime example of what not to do when testifying as a forensic expert.  As the President’s Counsel of Advisors on Science and Technology reported in 2016, this kind of testimony is incorrect and reckless:
[brief] Court Order Dated 10/19/2022 .  . . . . . . .  Pa217  Memorandum of Decision Dated 10/19/22 . . . .  Pa218 | Transcripts | Dates | |-------------|------------------------| | 1T | August 7, 2019 | | 2T | September 20, 2019 | | 3T | September 24, 2019 | | 4T | October 16, 2019 | | 5T | November 14, 2019 | | 6T | November 15, 2019 | | 7T | December 12, 2019 | | 8T | January 23, 2020 | | 9T | January 28, 2020 | | 10T | February 14, 2020 | | 11T | May 23, 2022 (Volume 1)| | 12T | May 23, 2022 (Volume 2)| | 13T | May 24, 2022 (Volume 1)| | 14T | May 24, 2022 (Volume 2)| | 15T | May 25, 2022 (Volume 1)| | 16T | May 25, 2022 (Volume 2)|
[brief] Ibid.  Yet, despite the clear language of the Solicitation and the PWCRA, [...] did not identify a PWRCA-registered archaeologist in its bids.  This failure is fatal and renders its bid materially defective as a matter of law.  See Ernest Bock & Sons-Dobco Pennsauken Joint Venture, 477 N.J. Super at 267 (recognizing that the “legislature amended N.J.S.A. 34:11-56.51 to explicitly provide that ‘no contractor or subcontractor . . . shall engage in the performance of any public work subject to the contract, unless the contractor or subcontractor is registered pursuant to that act’”).  The trial court’s failure to recognize this statutory failure in [...]’s bid, requiring automatic rejection, requires that the Denial Order be overturned in its entirety.
[directive] FROM: 2016 4, October DATE: Enforcement aCommunity-Law Establishing Directive Enforcement Law SUBJECT: Institute Education Relations Continuing Affirmative CONTENTS OF TABLE  Police to Officers of Continuing Education Overview: Using and Introduction  1.  Community-Law Enhance to General Initiatives Attorney Recent Upon Build 2 ............................................. Enforcement Relations Affirmative Enforcement Community-Law General Attorney the of Establishment 2. 6 ...............................  Institute Education Relations Continuing .......................................  6 Education Program Continuing 3. 6 ......................  Participation Training  In-Service Amival A. 7 ..........................
[directive] Reasonable Suspicion Testing for Cannabis Use  Consuming or being under the influence of cannabis while at work or during work hours is strictly prohibited.  Officers shall be tested for cannabis in the following situations: a.  Upon reasonable suspicion of the officer’s use of a cannabis item while engaged in the performance of the officer’s duties, or b.  Upon a finding of observable signs of intoxication related to the use of a cannabis item while engaged in the performance of the officer’s duties.  In the above situations, the drug test shall include a physical evaluation by a Workplace (WIRE)6 Recognition Expert to determine the officer’s state of impairment and a urinalysis.  III.
[brief] SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. [...]  STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. [...], Defendant-Appellant.  CRIMINAL ACTION  On Appeal from a Judgment of Conviction of the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Burlington County.  Indictment No. [...]  Sat Below: Hon. [...], J.S.C. and a Jury.  BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE [...]
[brief] ## TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | Cases | Page(s) | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|---------| | Dimitrakopoulos v. Borrus, Goldin, Foley, Vignuolo, Hyman and Stahl, P.C., 237 N.J. 91 (2019) | 2,3,4 | | Olds v. Donnelly, 150 N.J. 424 (1997) | 1,5 | | Rezem Family Assocs., LP v. Borough of Millstone, 423 N.J. Super. 103 (App. Div. 2011) | 4 | | Stop & Shop Supermarket Co., LLC v. County of Bergen, 450 N.J. Super. 286 (App.
[brief] 1 STATEMENT OF FACTS ......................................................  5 LEGAL ARGUMENT ..........................................................  8  POINT I THE TRIAL COURT  IMPROPERLY VACATED THE ARBITRATION AWARDS AS PURSUANT TO N.J.S.A. 2A:23-6 AND THE ARBITRATION FORUMS  MEDPAY ARBITRATION AGREEMENT, AN ARBITRATOR SHALL DECIDE WHETHER A CONDITION PRECEDENT HAS BEEN FULFILLED AND WHETHER A CONTRACT CONTAINING A VALID AGREEMENT TO ARBITRATE IS ENFORCEABLE  .....................................................  8 POINT II  THE ARBITRATOR’S AWARDS WERE PROPERLY ENTERED IN ACCORDANCE WITH N.J.S.A. 2A:23B-1 ET SEQ. AND THE ARBITRATION FORUMS  MEDPAY SUBROGATION AGREEMENT.  ........  13  POINT III  THE ARBITRATOR’S AWARDS ARE FINAL AND BINDING AND SHOULD BE ENFORCED AND ENTERED AS A JUDGMENT .........................  31 POINT IV  MED-PAY BENEFITS ARE NOT PIP BENEFITS AND HAVE ALWAYS BEEN RECOVERABLE UNDER NJ LAW .........................36  POINT V  N.J.S.A. 2A:15-97 DOES NOT BAR MED-PAY SUBROGATION CLAIMS AS THEY ARE “ACTIONS BROUGHT PURSUANT TO THE PROVISIONS OF... 39:6A-1 et. seq. ”  ..................................................41  POINT VI  THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN VACATING THE ARBITRATION AWARDS PRIOR TO ALLOWING THE PROPER DISCOVERY TO DETERMINE IF [...] WAS JUDICIALLY OR EQUITABLY ESTOPPED FROM THEIR POSITION WITH REGARD TO MEDPAY SUBROGATION IN NEW JERSEY.......................45  POINT VII  THE HEARING CONDUCTED ON OCTOBER 20, 2023, WAS A HEARING TRYING THE MATTER PURSUANT TO R. 4:67-5 AND THE COURT PROPERLY CONSIDERED  ALL THE BRIEFS PLACED BEFORE THE COURT.........................49  CONCLUSION..........................................................50  SUMMARY JUDGMENT LISTING FOR R. 2:6-1(A)
[brief] The Arbitrator based that decision not on credibility determinations or other findings of fact adduced through the arbitration hearing, but on his own creation of a new work rule that is divorced from, and in contravention to, the CBA’s plain language.  In essence, the Arbitrator’s new work rule undercuts [...]’s prerogative to determine its employees’ qualifications by prohibiting [...] from ever terminating an employee who is on a temporary disability leave.  To compound the error, and as a direct consequence of that error, the Arbitrator also faulted [...] for failing to “warn” [...] of the potential disciplinary action she faced, and for failing to investigate properly a suspicious second doctor’s note she produced after her termination that directly contradicted the limitations contained in the original doctor’s note.  The CBA requires neither; indeed, the Arbitrator did not interpret or rely upon the parties’ agreement to impose such conditions.  The [...] neither is required to “warn” an employee who cannot perform that she might be terminated -- nor would any such requirement make sense under the circumstances -- nor to undertake any post-discharge reconsideration of a decision to terminate an employee who cannot perform.  Simply put, the Arbitrator’s new work rule usurps from the [...] its contractual and legal authority to set the standards of performance for its employees, contravenes the CBA’s clear terms, and exceeds the Arbitrator’s statutory and legal authority.