ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The trial court below did not abuse its discretion in (1) excluding evidence of [...]’s prior criminal conviction, (2) excluding [...]’s not-to-scale crash diagram, or (3) admitting the audio portion of the police dash cam video.  The trial court properly exercised its discretion in making its evidentiary rulings excluding [...]’s prior criminal conviction, excluding [...]’s not-to-scale crash diagram, and admitting the audio portion of the police dash cam video.  An appellate court defers to a trial court's evidentiary ruling absent an abuse of discretion.  State v. Garcia, 245 N.J. 412, 430 (2021).  Appellate courts “review the trial court's evidentiary ruling ‘under the abuse of discretion standard because, from its genesis, the decision to admit or exclude evidence is one firmly entrusted to the trial court's discretion. ’”  State v. Prall, 231 N.J. 567, 580 (2018) (quoting Est. of Hanges v. Metro. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 202 N.J. 369, 383-84 (2010)).  Under that deferential standard, appellate courts “review a trial court's evidentiary ruling only for a ‘clear error in judgment. ’”  State v. Medina, 242 N.J. 397, 412 (2020) (quoting State v. Scott, 229 N.J. 469, 479 (2017)).  An appellate court “will not substitute [its] judgment unless the evidentiary ruling is ‘so wide of the mark’ that it constitutes ‘a clear error in judgment. ”  State v. Garcia, 245 N.J. at 430 (quoting State v. Medina, 242 N.J. at 412).
[brief] PRELIMINARY STATEMENT  Plaintiffs’ lawsuit arises out of significant mold damage in a residential apartment building that they discovered shortly after Plaintiffs completed the purchase of the building from the [...].  Plaintiffs learned that Defendants knew about, but affirmatively concealed, the existence of mold prior to the closing based on, among other things, conversations with the former superintendent of the building as well as emails they obtained from former tenants in which they complained to [...] (the former building manager and relative of one of the principals of the [...]) of “fungus” and extensive water infiltration into their units.
[brief] _15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6)_.  Although a mortgage servicer is not generally considered a "debt collector," a mortgage servicer does qualify as a debt collector when it attempts to collect a debt that was in default at the time the servicer acquired it.  _Id. § 1692a(6)(F)(iii)_; _Schlosser v. Fairbanks Capital Corp., 323 F.3d 534, 536-39_ (7th Cir. 2003); _Allen v. Bank of America Corp., No. CCB-11-33, 2011 WL 3654451_, at *7 n.9 (D. Md. Aug. 18, 2011).
[brief] On the morning of August 3, 1991, twenty-five-year-old [...] was found lying in the fetal position between his bed and a wall on scattered, blood-soaked sheets.  (PSR2; Da10).  He was stabbed eleven times—four times on the left side of the neck, three times on the right side of his neck, one time in the chest, twice in his upper back, and once in the forearm.  (PSR2).  The autopsy identified the cause of death as multiple stabbing wounds leading to hemorrhage.  (PSR2).  During the course of the investigation, police matched defendant's palm print to a bloody print found at the murder scene.  (Da10 to 11).  After being confronted with the results of the fingerprint analysis, defendant confessed to the murder in a taped statement.  (Da10 to 11).  Defendant told investigators he was dropped off by a friend at approximately 3:00 a.m. and sat on his front porch.  (PSR2).  He proceeded across the street to Blevins's residence to commit a robbery.  (PSR2).  Defendant entered through the unlocked front door and stole a vase with some dollar bills and change in it.  (PSR2).  He explained that he heard a noise from upstairs, so he left.  (PSR2).  Defendant said he went home, grabbed a knife, and returned to Blevins's home.  (PSR2).  After re-entering the house, defendant went upstairs and surprised Blevins.  (PSR2; Da11).  Defendant threw a knife at him, and Blevins fell by the bed.  (PSR2; Da11).  Defendant stabbed Blevins repeatedly in the head and neck, despite Blevins attempting to get up during the attack.  (PSR2; Da11).  Defendant then shifted the mattress off the box spring and over Blevins's body.  (PSR2; Da11).  He took Blevins's wallet and left.  (PSR2; Da11).  One year prior to the murder, defendant was sent to live with his aunt and uncle, who lived across the street from Blevins.  (Da8).  Defendant and Blevins had been friends, and defendant did not provide an explanation for stabbing him.  (PSR2).  At trial, defendant testified that he was impaired the night of the murder.
[brief] Pa516  Exhibit J to Certification of [...] Pa521  Complaint Summons 2/20/20 (Attached at Pa041)  Complaint Summons 11/04/2020 (attached at Pa170)  Letter from [...] to NJ Superior Court Clerk 12/14/2021 (Attached at Pa179)  Certification of Paralegal 12/14/2021 (Attached at Pa180)  Notice of Motion 12/14/2021 (Attached at Pa181)  Certification of Eldridge [...] 12/14/2021 (Attached at Pa183)
[brief] For example, at [...] and [...]’s request, [...] prepared the Cancellation Endorsement for the workers compensation component of the CCIP thereby automatically removing coverage for [...] under the CCIP\(^9\) effective August 1, 2015.  (TRVa2882; [...] Tr. 23:8-24:3, TRVa2830; [...] Tr., 120:7-11, TRVa2864 and 139:21-140:10, TRVa2869.)  The Cancellation Endorsement was received by the [...] on August 17, 2015.  (TRVa2949.)  Further, the Enrollment Reports show [...] as “excluded” and, thus, unenrolled as of the report dated August 17, 2015, and [...] remained listed as “excluded” on all subsequent reports.  (TRVa2649-2669.)  Finally, the Named Insured – Contractor Controlled Insurance Program endorsement is clear that “Any contractor […] that does not have dedicated payroll for employees on-site” is not an insured “[u]nless added by separate endorsement. ”  [...] was not added by separate endorsement.  (TRVa146.)  Moreover, [...] admitted it did not have dedicated payroll for its employees at the Project.  ([...]’s Sept. 4, 2015 email states it was “working on submitting --- \(^9\) [...]’ contention that “cancellation of [...]’s CCIP workers’ compensation policy would not affect its coverage” under the CCIP is wrong.  (TRVb22.)  The CCIP is comprised of three policies: General Liability; Worker’s Compensation; and Excess.  The CCIP requires enrollment in the Workers Compensation portion to be enrolled in the general liability portion.
[brief] As further expounded by our Supreme Court:  This consideration has controlled, and interest has been imposed even where … the defendant had in good faith contested the validity of the claim.  Thus, in Kamens v. Fortugno, Supra, 108 N.J.Super. at 552—553, 262 A.2d 11, it was held that prejudgment interest on a claim, the amount of which is ascertained, is not avoided [even] by honest disputation over legal liability.  The court observed that ‘defendants had the use of the money and presumably earned such interest, dividends or other benefits therefrom as were available,’ whereas the plaintiff was deprived of any such enjoyment.  Rova Farms, 65 N.J. at 506.  The Chancery Court properly found on remand that prejudgment interest should run through the date of entry of its new “final” judgment.  See Bussell v. DeWalt Products Corp., 259 N.J. Super. 499 (App. Div. 1992).28  Contrary to the [...]’ assertion, [...] was well within his discretion to find that: (i) prejudgment interest should be compounded; (ii) equity required applying different interest rates to different periods of time; and (iii) the rate should be set at the parties’ agreed upon “equity rate” (8.875%) through the sale of the partnership’s assets, and at the average prime rate (3.395%) thereafter.29
[brief] In support of their consideration, Board heard testimony from the same persons that had testified during the 2017 hearings.  [...] relied heavily on the testimony of [...] who testified that she is the bookkeeper and “financial person in the office” who put together the majority of the documents in the hardship application.  See id. at 18:17-24.  Metzger testified that the gross annual income from [...]’s apartment was $8,387.00, the property taxes for 2016 were $6,275.00, and the annual condominium fees for this particular unit were $5,772.00.  See id. at 19:13-20:4.  Metzger further testified that the real estate taxes for the subject property paid to the [...] for this unit alone were $6,275.00 and that the City’s Assessor assessed the property at $404,600.00  Id. at 25:17-26:8.  Metzger further testified that there was no mortgage encumbering the property and that [...] paid $634.00 per year for the insurance for [...]’s unit.  See id. at 26:1-18.  She stated that [...] pays [...] $150 per month, or $1,800.00 per year, for management of the unit.  See id. at 26:23-27:7.  Notably, Metzger testified that [...] owns [...] and [...], works as the property manager for [...], and is on the [...] payroll.
[brief] Plaintiff’s Count claiming violation of the NJ Law Against Discrimination – Dated 08/19/2020 PA78  Plaintiff/Appellant Letter Brief in Lieu of more formal submission in Opposition to Defendant/Respondent’s Motion for Summary Judgment – Filed 07/15/2022  Plaintiff/Appellant’s Responses to Defendant/Respondent’s Statement of Undisputed Material Facts – Filed 07/15/2022  Plaintiff/Appellant’s Additional Facts – Filed 07/15/2022  Plaintiff/Respondent Attorney Certification of [...]
[brief] Id.  The four (4) pages of the transcript at T4 97:12 to 101:7 set forth in detail the judge’s analysis and decision.  The Appellant’s arguments focused upon the process server’s Affidavit and the time it states when successful service was made.  Appellant introduced various evidence including GPS evidence from several toll booths, plus expert testimony from a GPS computer engineer, for the proposition that the [...] could not have been at the Property when the process server says service occurred at 9:25am.  But the Court’s ultimate conclusion was that the testimony and the evidence were both accurate and did not contradict one another – in that service was made at 9:25am and the car passed the toll some 11-15 minutes later (8.3 miles), which was entirely possible.
[brief] (Db41; Pa42-43.)  The record evidence shows, however, that these amendments -- which phase-out and eliminate Adjustment Aid by 2024-25, temporarily lift the 2% tax cap until 2024-25, and authorize, but do not require, [...] to enact an employer payroll tax to boost local revenue -- will not yield full SFRA funding in [...] within any specific timeframe and, even worse, will allow an underfunded Adequacy Budget to persist into the foreseeable future.  First, by eliminating Adjustment Aid, [...] will lose well over $100 million each year through 2024-25, an estimated $1 billion in total.  (Pa1943; Pa1954.)  Adjustment Aid is being phased out even as the State’s contribution of Equalization Aid to the Adequacy Budget continues to decline.  By ending Adjustment Aid under the guise of “overfunding” (Db41), the amendments effectively lock-in SFRA underfunding at levels below [...]’s Adequacy Budget.  Moreover, the State opted to eliminate Adjustment Aid even though, as the State itself admits, “the SFRA as originally enacted did not specifically provide for a phase out of adjustment aid," (Pra4),\(^9\) and the SFRA conditionally approved by the Supreme Court included the Adjustment Aid safeguard.
[directive] WAIVER OF MIRANDA RIGHTS  I, __________________________, have been read the above statement of my rights aloud.  I understand each of my rights and at this time I am willing to give up my right to remain silent and speak to you without a lawyer present.  No promises or threats have been made to me.  A mi,____________________, me han leido en voz alta la declaracion que figura arriba.  Entiendo cada uno de mis derechos; en este momentum, estoy dispuesto a renunciar a mi derecho de guarder siliencio, y hablare con usted sin tener a un abogado presente.  No me han hecho ni promesas ni amenazas.  Signed (Firma):_______________________________  Witness: ___________________________
[brief] Plaintiff also became aware that staff was working without being properly trained to do so, in direct violation of *N.J.A.C.* § 10:44 A-2.7(a).  *Id.*  *N.J.A.C.* § 10:44 A-2.7(a) states in pertinent part:  Basic staff training programs shall either be offered by the Division, or provided by the licensee after obtaining approval from the Division, to ensure staff competency.  Within 120 days of employment, each employee shall successfully complete New Jersey Pre-Serviced Training that shall address, at a minimum, 1. Overview of developmental disabilities, 2. Medication training, 3. Preventing abuse and neglect, 4. American Red Cross Standard First Aid Training (and have a valid certificate on file); and 5.  Cardiopulmonary resuscitation training (and have a valid certificate on file).  *Id.*  As a Support Manager, Plaintiff frequently travelled to group homes to assist Direct Support Professionals (“DSPs”) in caring for individuals who were part of Defendant [...]’ programs.  (PA000008).
[brief] She further admitted that the text messages do not mention the pending tax foreclosure.  \textsuperscript{5}  The text messages were shown by Plaintiff to [...] at the hearing but were not admitted into evidence and for that reason they are not included here.  proceeding.  T4, p. 74:15-24.  She stated she “didn’t think she had to say it. ”  Id.  [...] did state that she told him verbally about the foreclosure proceeding over the phone.  T4, p. 73:18-19.  This fact was vehemently denied by [...] who has consistently maintained that he was not aware of the foreclosure proceeding, was not served and that he thought [...] wanted to buy his property outright and not as part of the foreclosure of which he was unaware.
[directive] Accordingly, prior to the placement of any undercover officer in a school, the school building principal and the local superintendent shall be consulted unless there are compelling reasons not to consult with either of these officials.  The Attorney General alone shall have the authority to determine the existence of compelling reasons not to consult with either of these officials.  Where the Attorney General determines that compelling reasons exist, an alternative school official or officials shall be designated who shall be consulted in lieu of the building principal or local superintendent prior to the placement of an undercover officer in a school and throughout the course of the operation.  b.  In any case where the undercover school operation has not been requested by an appropriate school official pursuant to subsection 1 of this Part, the law enforcement agency proposing the operation shall advise the building principal and local superintendent of the nature of the proposed operation and shall, to the extent possible, explain the reasons why the operation is necessary and appropriate.  This explanation should include a description of the extent and nature of the suspected drug trafficking activities occurring within the school environment which would justify the operation.  Law enforcement officials shall not be required or permitted by the provisions of this subsection to divulge any information received in confidence, whether from an informant or otherwise, or which would violate the laws or court rules governing the disclosure of juvenile offender information, grand jury information or information derived from electronic surveillance.
[brief] Second, to plead a violation of a breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing, Plaintiff must allege the existence of a “bad motive or intention” behind a purported wrongful action.  Iliadis v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 191 N.J. 88, 110 (2007) (quotation omitted); see also Wade, 172 N.J. at 341 (an “allegation of bad faith or unfair dealing should not be permitted to be advanced in the abstract and absent an improper motive”).  Plaintiff admits that this is the law.  (See Pb43).
[brief] On August 17, 2017, the structures covered by the 2017 WDP Permit were approved by the [...].  (Aa0175-Aa0178).  On August 17, 2017, the [...] also approved [...]’s 299 ft. dock for the property adjacent to [...].  (Aa0504-Aa0507).  Prior to the issuance of the 2017 WFD Permit, docks similar in length had been approved by [...] for the properties adjacent to the [...] property and elsewhere along the shore.  (Aa0017)([...]’s dock is the first dock on the left and the dock approved for [...] at the adjacent property is the shaded dock in the middle); (Aa0018)([...] approved survey/plan depicting a similar-sized dock for the property adjacent to that owned by [...]).  In addition to the CZM Rules, the neighboring docks approved for Lots 22 and 23, and the curve in the shoreline, impacted the location of [...]’s dock at Lot 21.  (Aa0017; Aa0021).  The [...] approved plan for the adjoining property at [...] depicts [...]’s dock to the left of the shaded dock.  (Aa0017).  Appellant’s dock is immediately to the left of [...]’s dock.  (Aa0088; JRa003).  As the plan approved as part of the 2017 WFD Permit depicts, [...]’s dock is located closer to the dock at [...], Lot 22, than to Appellant’s dock.  Id.  There is no dock associated with the property on the other side of Appellant’s property.  *Id.*  After the issuance of the 2017 WFD Permit, Appellant did not file a Third-Party Adjudicatory Hearing Request and did not appeal the 2017 WFD Permit decision.
[directive] Este es un documento público, lo cual significa que el documento tal como se envíe estará a la disposición del público cuando se solicite.  Por lo tanto, no anote en el mismo ningún identificador personal, como por ejemplo: el número de Seguridad Social, el número de la licencia de conducir, el número de la matrícula del vehículo, el número de la póliza del seguro, el número de una cuenta financiera activa, o el número de una tarjeta de crédito activa.  NOTICE:
[brief] Unlike this case, *Buteas* didn’t involve TCA defenses but rather the imputed negligence defense or any suit against a municipality but rather, a suit against a fraternal organization by one of its members.  *Buteas v. Raritan Lodge #61 F. & A.M.*, 248 N.J. Super. 351, 353, 364 (App. Div. 1991).  Further, the *Buteas* court refused to find that the defendant was exempt from its obligation to timely plead the defense: even if the imputed negligence defense were theoretically available to this defendant, we are satisfied that it was waived by not having been timely raised.  In this respect, we point out that nothing plaintiff did misled defendant.  Plaintiff, indeed, was apparently relying on the deed defendant had accepted in determining defendant's associational status.  If anything, it was defendant which misled plaintiff.  We see no reason, therefore, to relieve defendant of its waiver of the defense.  After all, it ought to have known who and what it was.  The late raising of the defense in the context of defendant's identity confusion caused, moreover, unremediated problems of surprise and prejudice for plaintiff.  *Buteas v. Raritan Lodge No. 61 F. & A.M.*, 248 N.J. Super. 351. 364-365 (App. Div. 1991).  The parties agree that an affirmative defense may be raised by motion but where they disagree is whether an affirmative defense may be raised after an answer is filed without the defense – i.e., the filing of the answer before the filing of a dispositive motion results in waiver of the late raised defense.
[brief] REPLY BRIEF ON BEHALF OF PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENTS AND CROSS-APPELLANTS  DIVYAJIT MEHTA AND DGNS CORP.  [...] Court Plaza South- East Wing 21 Main Street, 1st Floor  P.O. Box 647 Hackensack, New Jersey 07602 [...]  Attorneys for Respondents and Cross-Appellants  Of counsel and on the brief: [...] (01255-2005)  [...] (admitted pro hac vice below)  TABLE OF CONTENTS  ARGUMENT ON REPLY ...........................................................................................................  1  THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE ENTERED  A PREJUDGMENT INTEREST AWARD OF $838,810.40  BASED ON THE DATES OF EACH SPECIFIC MISAPPROPRIATION FOUND BY THE TRIAL COURT.  .........................................................................................................................  1 CONCLUSION  ..........................................................................................................................
[brief] Family Fin. Corp. v. Gough, 10 N.J. Super. 13, 19 (App. Div. 1950).  The NJSLL—like the NJCFLA—allowed for enforcement by the Commissioner and was intended to protect consumers from usurious, predatory, and unlawful loan practices by regulating and limiting what entities could enter the consumer loan marketplace.\textsuperscript{4}  Determinative criteria for licensure was within the purview of the Commissioner, “dependent upon their relation to the objectives of the Small Loan Act in light of its history and purpose, it is difficult to see how better the Commissioner can execute the legislative policy than by looking to the needs of the community .  . . .”  \textit{Family Fin. Corp. v. Gaffney}, 11 N.J. 565, 572 (1953).  In addition to enforcement and gatekeeping remedies afforded to the Commissioner, the NJSLL also allowed private actions for damages by individual consumers.  \textit{See, e.g., Langer v. Morris Plan Corp.}, 110 N.J.L. 186, 187 (1933).  The NJSLL was superseded by the New Jersey Consumer Loan Act (“NJCLA”) in 1962.
[brief] In Hoxworth, the Third Circuit ultimately held the defendants waived their right to arbitrate because, as summarized in Cole, “the litigation had been ongoing for eleven months prior to the defendants’ motion to compel arbitration, the parties had engaged in extensive motion practice, and the parties had engaged in comprehensive discovery. ”  215 N.J. at 279 (citing Hoxworth, 980 F.2d at 925-27).  “As a result, the plaintiffs suffered prejudice, and the defendants waived their right to arbitrate. ”  Ibid. (citing Hoxworth, 980 F.2d at 927).  Here, these same factors bend toward waiver.
[brief] [11T101-5 to -8].  The two were living on the third floor of [...]’s aunt’s home located at [...].  [11T 101-9 to -22].  [...] was also cousins with [...].  [11T101-19 to 102-1].  [...] was staying in Willingboro at his grandmother’s home or in Trenton with his girlfriend, [...].  [11T102-19 to 103-6].  On September 17, 2019, [...] came to 14 Vine Street and was driving [...]’s Dodge Durango.  [11T103-15 to 104-5].  [...], [...] and defendant drove around in the vehicle and then returned to 14 Vine Street where they met Cezar who arrived in her Kia sedan.  [11T105-1 to 105-21].  [...] showed defendant the gun that [...] let him hold until she got off work.  [11T106-15 to -21].  [...] stated that if [...] wouldn’t let him keep the firearm, he was going to kill her for it.
[directive] 8.3.1  When interviewing a law enforcement officer as a witness, he or she must be made aware of the differences between being a witness in a criminal investigation and being the subject of a criminal investigation.  The officer also shall be advised that he or she is not the subject of the investigation at this time.  Appendix I provides a model form that may be used for this purpose.  If at any time the officer becomes a subject of the investigation, he or she shall be advised of that fact and the appropriate procedures must be followed.  8.3.2