ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] 1  Of course, in situations where a representative of the Governor’s Office or the Legislature is believed to be a victim or a witness to a crime, the law enforcement officers and prosecutors investigating the matter can and should communicate with the individual as they would with any other victim or witness.  The investigating personnel should exercise caution to ensure that the victim or witness receives neither preferential nor disfavored treatment on account of their political or partisan associations.  Prior to contacting a victim or witness employed by the Governor’s Office or the Legislature, the investigating personnel should notify the First Assistant Attorney General through their supervisory chain.  Page 4  If a prosecutor or a law enforcement officer receives a request for a prohibited communication, the individual should decline to answer and immediately elevate the matter through their supervisory chain to the First Assistant Attorney General.  The Attorney General may, in their discretion, determine that communication with the Governor’s Office regarding a specific law enforcement matter is critical to the performance of the Governor’s duties.  Such communications should happen rarely, and only when the Attorney General concludes that failure to communicate about a pending criminal matter would present a significant risk to public health or public safety.  In such situations, the initial communication should be transmitted by the Attorney General or First Assistant Attorney General, and should be directed to the Governor’s Chief Counsel.  If continuing contact is required, the officials may designate others to carry on such contact, provided that the designating official continues to monitor the contact.  During such communications, the parties should take extra care to ensure that the Governor’s Office is provided no more information than is necessary for the performance of the Governor’s duties, and that the Governor’s Office does not seek to direct or influence any aspect of a pending or contemplated criminal investigation or prosecution.  As a general matter, law enforcement officers and prosecutors are permitted to discuss information about criminal matters that is contained a public filing or has otherwise been made public by the Attorney General.  If a representative of the Governor’s Office or the Legislature requests such information, the officer or prosecutor may provide it, but should nonetheless promptly report the contact to the First Assistant Attorney General, through their supervisory chain.  In addition, nothing in this Directive is intended to prevent communication between the Attorney General’s Executive Leadership Team and the Governor’s Office regarding general enforcement priorities or policy objectives, provided that the parties are discussing matters generally (e.g., strategies for reducing violent crime, or resource allocations for prosecuting white collar offenses), rather than identifying specific targets for investigation or prosecution.
[brief] Walmsley v. Philadelphia, 872 F.2d 546 (3d Cir. 1989).  A §1983 claim for false arrest may be based upon an individual’s Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizures.  Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 274 (1994).  Under New Jersey law, a false arrest has been defined as “the constraint of the person without legal justification. ”  Ramirez v. United States, 998 F.Supp. 425, 434 (D.N.J. 1998)(quoting Fleming v. United Postal Services, Inc., 255 N.J. Super. 108, 155 (Law Div. 1992)).  The elements of a §1983 claim for false arrest are: “(1) that there was an arrest; and (2) that the arrest was made without probable cause. ”  James v. City of Wilkes-Barre, 700 F.3d 675, 680 (3d Cir. 2012).
[brief] Pb – State’s Brief Pa – State’s Appendix Db – Defendant’s Brief Da – Defendant’s Appendix 1T – Transcript of Motion to Exclude Evidence Hearing, June 19, 2018  2T – Transcript of Motion to Dismiss Certain Counts of Indictment, October 9, 2018  3T – Transcript of Motion to Sever Certain Counts of Indictment, March 10, 2020  4T – Transcript of Motion to Reconsider, June 16, 2020  5T – Transcript of Motion to Dismiss, dated August 11, 2021  6T – Transcript of Motion in limine, dated March 31, 2022
[brief] L. 2018, c. 53 and 54; (Aa8).  In general, the formula for calculating state aid was as follows: if the district’s prior year State aid was less than uncapped aid, the district received an increase in State aid.  Ibid.; (Aa8).  But if the district’s prior year State aid was more than uncapped aid, the district saw a decrease.  Ibid.; (Aa8).
[brief] (Da506)  [...], the then-owner of Normandy Beach, was not a named party, nor was Normandy Beach one of the properties at issue in the 1949 Final Judgment.  (Da506)  Nothing in the 1949 Final Judgment, including the description of the property awarded to [...], contains anything indicating that the Westerhold Property had any express or implied easements of access across the NBA Property to the MHWL or the Atlantic Ocean.  (Da506-Da513)  To the contrary, everything relating to the filing of the 1949 Final Judgment, and particularly the specificity with which the property rights were described, indicates that [...] (only 24 years after the 1925 Plan was filed) had no easement rights over the NBA Property.  (Da632-Da640)  In addition, the 1949 Judgment contains nothing to suggest an easement across the NBA Property with respect to the other properties covered by 1949 Judgment, either.  (Da506-Da513, Da632-Da640)  After Hurricane Sandy, the [...] in partnership with the [...] undertook flood hazard risk reduction measures that included the construction of engineered sand dunes and beach berm projects.
[brief] This conclusion presumes far too much about Defendant [...]’s intent and motivation for the purpose of a summary judgment motion.  A jury could reasonably infer that Defendant [...] might have been willing to endure the staffing challenges resulting from the terminations as a means of retaliating against an employee who had complained about her conduct.  In sum, the Court repeatedly granted Defendants the benefits of factual disputes, and inferences that must be resolved in Plaintiff’s favor under the appropriate standards.
[brief] [Id. at 304 (quoting Acoli, 250 N.J. at 455-56) (citations  Although this court’s holding and reasoning in *Berta* was unambiguous, the Board continues to ignore the directives of this court and our Supreme Court by arbitrarily denying parole for inmates they deem “bad guys” or otherwise incapable of rehabilitation based upon decades-old conduct that no longer reflects the inmate’s character or current risk to the public.
[brief] Exhibit 1: Omitted to avoid duplication ..........................  Da190  Exhibit 2: Sept. 22, 2017 letter regarding assignment ..........  Da190-191  Exhibit 3: undated letter regarding change of address.  . . . . .  Da192-193  Exhibit 4: Apr. 28, 2020 notice of unpaid rent .  . . . . . . . . . .  Da194-196  Exhibit 5: June 8, 2020 notice of default .  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Da197-199 Exhibit 6: Omitted to avoid duplication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Da200 Exhibit 7: Omitted as non-pertinent  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Da200 Exhibits 8-12: Omitted below . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
[brief] [...], in moot, even reasoned with the respondents’ attorney that “the appeal may take a year ‘-‘, it will be far more costly ‘-‘, and most likely ‘-‘it will be [remanded] for additional fact findings. ”  Ironically__ it is the same attorney, who upon lack of Duty of Candor stipulates via the Response “Plaintiff is not seeking justice, but rather seeking to inflict harm upon [...] for illusory wrongs Plaintiff has concocted,” p. 2.
[brief] Compare its usage with cases in which an illegal increase was found.  One such case is [...] Intern. Inc. v. Borough of Spring Lake, 359 N.J. Super 420 (App. Div. 2002).  [...] involved the [...] restaurant in Spring Lake.  It was part of the [...] and was a conforming use until 1975 when the area was rezoned strictly residential.  At that time meals were served solely to occupants of the hotel.  In 1982 the restaurant was open to the public with 40 seats.  The zoning officer felt that a restaurant, even though it was now serving the public, was grandfathered.  Between 1982 and 1985 it expanded from 40 seats to 60 seats.  In 1987 it expanded to 88 seats.  In 1992 it expanded to 96 seats and in 1994 it acquired a liquor license.  It also started taking bookings for weddings, showers and christenings.  Objectors sought to have the zoning officer issue a cease and desist order and then appealed his denial to the Planning Board.  [...] then filed a verified complaint and order to show cause claiming that the objectors did not have standing and the Planning Board did not have jurisdiction.  That application was rejected and the matter proceeded to a hearing before the Planning Board.  The record was developed as to the impact on the neighborhood of the banquets in particular, with multiple cars coming at nearly the same time.  Further, there was off-premise catering from the restaurant generating traffic from delivery trucks and vehicles associated with catering.  Despite the increased use the Planning Board rejected the request for a cease and desist order.  The issue then went before the court.  [...] ruled that the expansion into banquets was too much of an expansion of a non-conforming use.  He allowed, however, the continuation of the 96-seat restaurant.  The Appellate Division then affirmed [...]’s ruling, thus regarding what had been a 40-seat restaurant that only served hotel guests to one consisting of 96 seats and serving the public as not an expansion of the nonconforming use.  In *Town of Belleville v. [...]*, 83 NJ 309 (1980) the defendant was found to have wrongfully extended its non-conforming use when it changed its operation from a restaurant to a discotheque.
[brief] The Trial Court’s decision that attorneys have no duty to refrain from fraudulent concealment eviscerates fraudulent concealment as a cause of action, since fraudulent concealment necessarily takes place during the course of litigation.  In the Trial Court’s view, to prohibit such conduct by attorneys would “chill the adversarial process. ”  Plaintiffs respectfully request that this Court reject the Trial Court’s idea of what constitutes the “adversarial process. ”  If Plaintiffs are permitted to state legal malpractice claims arising out of the [...]’ fraudulent concealment of evidence, such a holding would discourage attorneys from lying, cheating, forging, and concealing evidence; this would not “chill the adversarial process”.  Instead, such a holding would encourage honesty, good faith, and honorable conduct.  Permitting fraudulent conduct by attorneys in litigation simply because they are attorneys, does not protect the adversarial process; it defiles it.  Accordingly, the Trial Court’s error should be reversed.
[brief] ”  (224T10: 8-21).  \textit{That type of activity persisted … all the way through the conclusion of trial}.  (40043a)  ***  [T]he Wilfs stole [partnership] money … every single year: “what \(^{10}\) Until her elevation to the Appellate Division, [...] presided over this matter on remand. occurred for absolute certainty at the end of almost every year of [the Partnership]’s existence was that all of the money that was left in [the Partnership] at the end of the year was removed . . .
[brief] Returning to the banality of Plaintiff’s actions, jurors are free to consider a litigant’s body language and presentation in their appraisal of credibility.  A litigant may blush and avert their eyes when confronted on cross-examination.  They might exhibit physical traits that contradict their allegations of injury.  And sometimes, they are just victims who cannot help but suffer from the injuries they sustained as a result of another’s negligence.  To find proof of this trial tactic, the Court need look no further than Defense counsel.  They employed a deliberate strategy of trying to paint Plaintiff as incredible in their characterization of Plaintiff’s delivery and body language.  On cross-examination and closing argument, Defense counsel highlighted how Plaintiff requested an accommodation to stand during his testimony, but then decided to sit at other points of the trial (3T, at 64:21-22).  Defense counsel also ridiculed times Plaintiff winced during his testimony and complained of pain (4T, at 144:14-145:2).  Clearly, Plaintiff’s need to stretch or grimaces of pain, during voir dire and throughout the rest of the trial, were not impermissible irregularities, but ammunition Defense counsel was happy to use for argument.  This naturally leads to the most confounding question in Defendants’ contention of improper influence: Why did they not object?
[brief] It is well-established that “temporary relief should be withheld when the legal right underlying plaintiff’s claim is unsettled. ”  *Crowe*, 90 N.J. at 133.  Thus, “an interlocutory injunction should not issue when a legal question upon which the case turns is not free from doubt. ”  *J.H. Renarde*, 312 N.J. Super. at 201 citing *Accident Index Bureau, Inc. v. Male*, 95 N.J. Super. 39, 50 (App. Div. 1967) (“An interlocutory injunction should not issue if plaintiff's asserted rights are not clear as a matter of law”).  The trial court did not analyze the first factor, *i.e.*, whether Plaintiffs advanced a well-settled legal right under the LAD notwithstanding that Plaintiffs’ claim is one of first impression -- as evinced by the lack of LAD precedent on the issue of parental notification policies.
[brief] Pb1.  This argument lacks merit.  Nothing in the text of Rule 4:46 prohibits a party from bringing a motion for an involuntary dismissal pursuant to Rule 4:37-2 or 4:40-1, if summary judgment is denied.  Nor do Rules 4:37-2 and 4:40-1 allow the trial judge to deny the involuntary dismissal motion simply because summary judgment was earlier denied.  This is because our courts recognize that facts and issues may be clarified at trial, new information may be presented at trial, and some evidence analyzed at the summary judgment stage may be inadmissible or otherwise limited at trial.  The trial judge is required to simply weigh the evidence at trial when analyzing Rule 4:37-2 or 4:40-1, and nothing more.  The prior denial of summary judgment is simply irrelevant.
[brief] Appellant, the [...] (hereafter “Appellant”) is a public employer within the meaning of N.J.S.A. 34:13A-1 et. seq, (“Act”) and is statutorily empowered to operate in the County of Warren, State of New Jersey.  Appellant operates under the Civil Service Jurisdiction.  At all relevant times, Respondent [...] (hereafter “Respondent”) was a public employee for the State of New Jersey.  On or about March 27, 2000, Respondent was hired by the [...] as an officer.  On or about July 14, 2011, Respondent was promoted to Corrections Sergeant.  On or about January 3, 2022, Respondent was served with a Preliminary Notice of Disciplinary Action (hereinafter “PNDA”).  Pa16  On or about May 18, 2022, Respondent was served with an Amended Preliminary Notice of Disciplinary Action (hereinafter “PNDA”).  Pa18  The Departmental Hearing was partially held on December 2, 2022, December 16, 2022, and was scheduled to be held on December 20, 2022, however a settlement agreement was tentatively reached and some of the terms were put on the record.  Pa32-34.  A formal settlement Agreement was never signed.  Pa41-44.  --- 2  “Pa” refers to Appellant’s Appendix submitted in support of its appeal.  For example, Pa1 would refer to page 1 of said appendix.  On or about January 5, 2023, Mr. [...], Esq. (hereinafter “[...]”) (counsel for the Appellant below) was notified by [...], Esq., prior counsel for Respondent, (hereinafter “[...]”) that he wanted to schedule a teleconference to discuss the matter.  Pa109-111, para(s) 3-4.  The very next day, in a teleconference, [...] notified [...] that Respondent sought to exercise her right to repudiate the agreement.  Pa109-111, para(s) 3-4; Pa41-44, paragraph 11.  On the teleconference, additional terms were also discussed, and [...] requested that the new terms be put forth in a written counter proposal so that he could bring it to his clients to ascertain their position.  Pa109-111, para(s) 5-6.  On or about January 12, 2023, the undersigned submitted the new proposed settlement terms to [...].  Pa115-116.  By way of letter dated January 19, 2023, [...] sent a response to the January 12, 2023, correspondence.  Pa61-62.  On or about February 11, 2023, Respondent, through counsel, submitted a formal response and opposition to [...]’s correspondence dated January 19, 2023, restating Respondent’s position and demanding that either settlement negotiations continue or proceedings resume.  Pa126-127.  On or about March 3, 2023, a formal demand for the continuation of the Departmental Hearing was sent to [...], to which no formal response was received to date or prior to Appellant’s filing its application for an Order to Show Cause on March 27, 2023.  **Pa130.**  **PROCEDURAL HISTORY**
[brief] **B.  It was unlawful to search the car for the registration. **  Even if the stop of the Mazda was lawful, the entry into it in order to retrieve the car’s registration was an unlawful search.  Because automobile travel “is a basic, pervasive, and often necessary mode of transportation to and from one’s home, workplace, and leisure activities,” the privacy interest a person has in his automobile is high.  *Delaware v. Prouse*, 440 U.S. 648, 662 (1979).
[brief] Regarding the first prong, the court should consider whether judicial review would require further factual development.  *Id.* at 10.  In addressing the second prong, there must be a "real and immediate threat of enforcement" against the party seeking review where constitutional imperatives are involved.  *Ibid.*  In the matter at hand, there is no question that the issues ruled upon by the Trial Court were not ripe for judicial determination and the Trial Court has entangled itself in abstract disagreements.  There was no fitness for judicial review as the exact claims were not presented or even entirely known at the time.  Plaintiff only knew that it may bring future claims against the Defendants once the full scope of damages from the subsequent breach was known after the property was rented.  Not only did the Defendants not even plead for any type of declaratory relief, but more importantly, the Court barred unknown, hypothetical potential future claims.  Of course, these claims are not yet ripe for judicial review.  The claims did not even exist yet when Plaintiff obtained judgment in October of 2022.  The entire controversy doctrine may apply for anything that occurred prior to the October 2022 judgment and Plaintiff has acknowledged this on the record but the Court cannot just place a blanket bar on future claims even if entire controversy doctrine may apply (which we believe it would not apply depending on the claim).
[brief] As set forth in the detail above, including the concessions chargeback provision in the lease, actually charging it back and then twice suing to collect it is an abusive or unconscionable commercial practice or other affirmative act in violation of the CFA.  In *Green v. Morgan Properties*, 215 N.J. 431 (2013) our Supreme Court considered whether the inclusion of an unreasonable attorney provision in a residential lease could satisfy the “unlawful conduct” prong of the CFA at the pleading stage.
[brief] INTERMEDIATE ACCOUNTING FEE (FROM $17,649.57 TO $16,575) AND MR. ROTH’S TRUSTEE COMMISSION (FROM $2,039.53 TO $1,946.56), & REQUIRE PAYBACK OF OVERPAYMENTS  5)  REVISE OCT. 6, 2022  ORDER, PAR. 1D, TO REJECT PRIOR TRUST PAYMENT, & REQUIRE $4,120.48  PAYBACK FOR FERRO LABELLA’S 2021 FEE  6)  MR. ROTH’S COMPLIANCE WITH OCT. 6, 2022  ORDER, PAR. 2, TO ISSUE  FINAL INFORMAL TRUST ACCOUNTING THAT HE REFUSED TO ISSUE  1.  Item 1 - (4T, p. 46, line 9-14)  2.  Item 2 - (4T, p. 44, line 13, to p. 46, line 14; p. 51, line 17, to p. 52, line 6)  3.  Item 3 - (3T, p. 8, line 16, to p.  12, line 20) (4T, p. 48, lines 14-16; p. 49, line 13, to p. 50, line 2)  4.  Item 4 - (3T, p. 14, line 2, to p. 15, line 8) (4T, p. 48, lines 14-16; p. 49, lines 9-12)  5.  Item 5 - (4T, p. 46, line 15, to p. 47, line 13) (31a, last par., 1st 2 sentences for [...]’ Exceptions only)  6.  Item 6 - (4T, p. 47, line 19, to p. 48, line 9)  SECTION I COMPLIANCE WITH LEGAL CRITERIA BASED ON NJ R.4:49-2 AND NJ COURT CASE RULINGS IN ORDER TO RECONSIDER AND APPEAL PROVISIONS OF OCT. 6, 2022, MARCH 7, 2023, & SEPT. 6, 2023
[brief] To the extent dimensions are gleaned from the public record, it is surveyors, no[t] the searchers, who translate and present such information in meaningful detail to potential buyers.  (562a).  [...]’s opinion is also consistent with the holding of Palamarg Realty Co. v. Rehac, in which the New Jersey Supreme Court remanded the issue of notice to the trial court, instructing as follows:  On remand to the trial court, expert testimony should be offered and received as to the customs and usages of the conveyancing bar and title companies with respect to what has been discussed above.  It might be helpful to invite the [...] to appear and participate as amicus curiae.  The trial judge is to make findings of fact and conclusions of law with respect to the issues before him.  80 N.J. 446, 461 (1979).
[brief] On August 19, 2021, [...] filed a Complaint in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Hudson County Vicinage against Defendant [...]. (Pa-16).  On March 4, 2022, during a hearing, the Hon. [...], P.J.Cv. dismissed the Complaint without prejudice.  1T.  On May 17, 2022, [...] filed a Verified Amended Complaint.  (Pa-27).  Thereafter, on July 25, 2022, Defendant [...] filed an Answer.  (Pa-87).  On January 17, 2023, during a hearing, [...] denied [...]’s motion to compel discovery and granted the [...]’s motion to quash [...]’s subpoena duces tecum.  2T  On July 5, 2023, during a hearing, [...] dismissed the Verified Amended Complaint with prejudice.  3T; Pa-9.  On July 14, 2023, [...] filed a Notice of Appeal with the Appellate Division of the Superior Court of New Jersey.  (Pa-1)  --- 1
[brief] The defendant’s sole argument is that the municipal court and Law Division erred by concluding that the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant failed to report the accident he caused and left the scene of that same accident in violation of the relevant statutes.  (Db 7-12).  However, both the municipal court and Law Division made correct findings of fact and conclusions of law when they held that the State did prove the defendant violated these statutes beyond a reasonable doubt based on the evidence that was submitted in the municipal court.
[directive] It should be clear that the suspension of an officer before completing an investigation or disposing of a case is a serious matter.  Such suspensions may be immediately necessary, as in the case of an officer reporting for work under the influence of alcohol.  In other cases, however, a suspension need not be immediate but rather would follow a preliminary investigation into the matter that indicates that one of the above criteria has been met.  In any case, suspension prior to disposing of the case must be clearly documented and justified.  At the time of the suspension, the individual shall be provided with a written statement of the reasons the action has been taken.  (A sample form is found in Appendix 22 INTERNAL AFFAIRS POLICY & PROCEDURES | August 2020 D).  In the event of a refusal by the individual to accept that written statement, a copy shall be provided to the individual's collective bargaining representative as soon as possible.  If a supervisor or commander authorized to do so imposes an immediate suspension, the law enforcement executive must be advised without delay.  He or she will then determine the status of the suspension given the facts of the case in light of the above criteria.  In no case shall an immediate suspension be used as a punitive measure.  23