ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Consequently, the fruits of the stop, including the officers’ subsequent search of [...], must be suppressed.  [...]’s very brief flight—during which he ran from the officers who ordered him to stop before he tripped and was apprehended within twenty-five seconds—cannot purge the taint of the unconstitutional stop.  The search was close in time to the initial illegality; the flight posed no danger to police or the public; and the officers’ conduct in ordering [...] to stop when there were “no facts linking [him] to criminality” was particularly flagrant.  The officers’ flagrant misconduct in particular requires suppression because the random detention of an individual for the sole purpose of determining whether they are the target of an investigation offends our basic rights to freedom of movement.  It is especially unreasonable when the police had been following their target, [...], all afternoon with a high-definition drone—given the extensive surveillance, the police in this case had an obligation to know who they intended to stop, rather than stopping anyone and everyone who happened to be in the vicinity of their suspect.  The police search of [...] was thus not attenuated from the officers’ illegal action, and the evidence recovered during the ensuing search must be suppressed.
[brief] Jablonski v. Ford Motor Co., 955 N.E.2d 1138, 1160 (Ill. 2011).  As to recalls, specifically:  A duty may be imposed upon a manufacturer by a statute or administrative regulation which mandates the recall of the product....  However, in the absence of such an obligation, or a voluntary undertaking, Illinois has not imposed such a duty on a manufacturer[.]  Id. at 1160 n.1 (citing Third Restatement §11).  Indeed, “virtually every court that has confronted the issue head-on has reached the same conclusion”: “‘that it is unnecessary and unwise to impose or introduce an additional duty to retrofit or recall a product’ separate and apart from those duties to which manufacturers are already subject.
[brief] [...]’s position that “the MOU was never abandoned or terminated” because her “decade-long efforts to secure financing show the MOU persisted” (Pb26) is belied by the facts and her own affirmative filing of her claims before the Chancery Court.  [...] cherry picks only two terms from the MOU – the “Expression of Intent” and the arbitration provision – while ignoring that all of the substantive terms of the MOU were abandoned.  See Cnty. of Morris v. Fauver, 153 N.J. 80, 96 (1998); Dorchester Manor v. Borough of New Milford, 287 N.J. Super. 163, 170-71 (Law. Div. 1994), aff’d, 287 N.J. Super. 114 (App. Div. 1996).
[directive] See Section V.A).  1.  Anyone convicted of a first-degree crime.  2.  Anyone convicted of an offense covered by the No Early Release Act (N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2).  3.  Anyone convicted of a second-degree offense defined in Title 2C 381.  Chapters 13, 14, 15, 16, 24, 27, 30, 33 or 4.  Anyone convicted of Endangering the Welfare of Children (N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4a or N.J.S.A. 2C:24 – 4 b(4).  1  This exclusion does not apply to applicants if three years have passed since the completion of the incarceration or supervisory portion of the sentence, whichever is later.  Revised: 03/2024, CN: XXXXX Page of 5 7
[brief] [[...]]  Q.  Has the Company made any change to its anticipated load increase projections based on the Energy Master Plan?  [[...]]  A.  No, not at this time.  Q.  And that includes anticipated and projected loads to be served by this temporary regulator?  You have not made any adjustments to the anticipated need based on the Energy Master Plan?  A.  Not through the engineering department, no.  Our other departments may have, but not from an engineering planning perspective.  Q.  What are those other departments, please?  A.  That would be our regulatory department, I believe.  Q.  Has your engineering department received any instructions to revise or reassess your anticipated load growth based on the Energy Master Plan?  A.  No, not at this time.  We only project out about three years.  Q.  Are you aware of any projection of anticipated load growth that's been done by the regulatory department based on the Energy Master Plan?  A.  No, I am not.  [1T148:3-25.]
[directive] “Investigative mode” should only be used as described above because a simple mouse-click on a photo in “investigative mode” will reveal a host of information about the person – including their name, and the date and time of arrest – that a witness should not be exposed.  In addition, individual photos can be printed, but – unlike “witness mode” – no report of the session can be created.  Finally, “investigative mode” is problematic for this type of procedure because it repeats individual photos when the “similar” function is used or an array is created.
[brief] In fact, [...] testified that [...] advised him that [...] may have taken oxycodone prior to the first time Narcan was administered.  According to [...], Narcan was initially administered within minutes after [...] arrived at [...]’s residence. (T4 63:3-8, 72:6-15).  Thus, [...] referenced potential opioid use almost immediately.  (T4 23:13-22, 24:7-10, 24:11-25:3, 145:3-13).  The Decision goes on to state:  Appellant told IA the reason for the various responses was because he was using process of elimination.  **But appellant knew what [...] took**, knew that he had oxycodone in his home, and was familiar with the effects of opioids, enough so that he initially requested Narcan from Fornarotto.  **He also lied about [...]’s alcohol use, and about his knowledge of her alcohol use, as well as about knowing [...] had an empty bottle of vodka in her purse and alcohol on her breath.**
[brief] ”  Id. at 275 (alterations in original) (quoting Twiggs, 233 N.J. at 533).  See also D’Agostino, 216 N.J. at 183 (quoting DiProspero, 183 N.J. at 492) (“We review the Legislature’s language in light of ‘related provisions so as to give sense to the legislation as a whole’”).  A court’s “responsibility in interpreting [a] statute ‘is to give effect to the legislature’s intent. ’”  In re Raymour and Flanigan Furniture, 405 N.J. Super. 367, 383 (App. Div. 2009) (quoting Wildwood Storage Center, 260 N.J. Super. at 470).  “In doing so, ‘[w]e must consider the language of the statute, the nature of the subject matter, the contextual setting, the policy behind the statute, statutes in pari[] materia, and concepts of reasonableness. ’”  Id. (quoting Wildwood Storage Center, 260 N.J. Super. at 470-71).  Courts also “give substantial deference to the interpretation of the agency charged with enforcing an act.  The agency’s interpretation will prevail provided it is not plainly unreasonable. ”  Merin v. Maglaki, 126 N.J. 430, 436-37 (1992); Bowser v. Bd. of Trs., 455 N.J. Super. 165, 171 (App. Div. 2018) (“We may give substantial deference to an agency’s interpretation of a statute that the agency is charged with enforcing, particularly when its interpretation involves a permissible construction of an ambiguous provision . . . or the exercise of expertise”); Richardson v. Board of Trs., 192 N.J. 189, 196 (2007) (“Generally, courts afford substantial deference to an agency’s interpretation of a statute that the agency is charged with enforcing”).
[brief] Pa@@.  In 2018, the plaintiff began to complain to [...] about the fact that pens were being marketed and sold under the representation that they were “made in America”, when in fact they were made in China.  Pa17; T7-1-9.  The plaintiff continued to complain to [...] about this continued practice in the up to the beginning of 2020, and then suddenly “all communications stopped” with the plaintiff and Mr. Kjekstad in July 2020 when the plaintiff was confronted by Mr. Kjekstad, regarding the personal use of the credit cards.  T22-19-24.  The plaintiff was then placed on “administrative leave”, and shortly thereafter terminated from his employment.  Pa16.  This is not a case where the plaintiff did not have a specific law or regulation that [...] was violating by its actions.  The trial court made specific reference to it in the written opinion of the trial court.  Pa9; top paragraph.  The question is how could there have been a determination by the trial court that the plaintiff had no evidence to support a CEPA claim (Pa9), or that the plaintiff acted maliciously or in bad faith?  We submit that the trial court cannot and should not determine credibility or veracity of statements, and draw the conclusions made, on a Motion and without the necessity of a trial.
[brief] That notice satisfied the Ricci Act, which requires only that the Board notify members of the enactment of the statute.  The Legislature is well aware of how to create specific notice requirements, and has done so with other statutes.  See N.J.S.A. 43:15A-50(a) (“Notification shall be by certified mail to the spouse’s address as provided on the form by the member. ”); e.g., Hammond v. City of Paterson, 145 N.J. Super. 452, 456 (App. Div. 1976) (holding that the Legislature, in requiring “actual receipt” of notice in the Tort Claims Act when certified mail is not used, “clearly did not mean to leave proof of actual receipt to a presumption. ”).  When “the Legislature has carefully employed a term in one place and excluded it in another, it should not be implied where excluded. ”  GE Solid State, Inc. v. Director, Div. of Taxation, 132 N.J. 298, 307-08 (1993); see also State v. Hoffman, 149 N.J. 564, 579 (1997).  Nowhere in the Ricci Act is there a requirement that the Board send notice, through a postcard, by certified mail or other means, or otherwise require actual receipt of notice.  Thus, in accord with the statutory canon of *expressio unius est exclusio alterius*, the expression of one thing suggests the exclusion of another left unmentioned, this court should reject [...]’s request to create a requirement where the Legislature has chosen not to.  The Ricci Act simply required that the Board provide notice within 30 days of its enactment, without specifying in what manner.  The Board complied with this requirement when it posted information about the Ricci Act on its website.
[brief] See Pa 202.  Plaintiff’s claim that the Defendant committed “fraud”, “deception”, “unconscionable” and “abusive false pretense” by executing a bargain and sale deed to the Association is completely erroneous, and contrary to its own prior counsel’s and title company’s representations and warranties that it was receiving good and marketable title to the Unit.  The Association’s counsel specifically referenced paragraph 8(e) as to the Association’s authority for the purchase of the Unit.
[brief] [...]  [...], Plaintiff-Respondent, vs. BELLEVUE JACKSON, LLC, and [...], Defendants-Appellants.  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY  APPELLATE  DIVISION  Docket No. [...]  ON APPEAL FROM: Law Division, Ocean County  Docket No.: [...]  SAT BELOW: Hon. [...], A.J.S.C.  BRIEF ON BEHALF OF DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
[brief] **  For arbitration disputes involving the FAA, courts have considered the extent of discovery conducted in light of the case’s readiness for trial.  *See Brownstone Inv. Grp., LLC v. Levey*, 514 F. Supp. 2d 536, 541 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (granting a motion to compel arbitration where litigation had proceeded for ten months, depositions were taken, and documents were produced from parties and non-parties in the case, and stating: “[W]hatever the extent of pretrial proceedings that have taken place to date, discovery is far from complete and the case is still a long way from being ready for trial.
[brief] It’s simply not what I would consider mitigating.  Whether you were convicted or not is not really the do all or tell all of Mitigating Factor Seven.  The question is, what kind of a life are you leading?  And that’s I think what the Prosecutor was talking about, but I’m talking more about -- what does it say?  No history of prior delinquency, that’s not true.  Or criminal activity, that’s not true.  Or has led a law-abiding life for a substantial period of time.  You were getting into trouble way too often, so I decline Seven.
[brief] The defendant is correct that the confidence of [...] was not recorded at the time of the photo array.  However, an error affecting a defendant’s constitutional rights requires reversal unless the appellate court finds it “harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. ”  State v. Cabbell, 207 N.J. 311, 338 (2011).  Reviewing courts must consider whether there was “some degree of possibility that [the error] led to an unjust result.  The possibility must be real, one sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt as to whether [it] led the jury to a verdict it otherwise might not have reached. ”  State v. Lazo, 209 N.J. 9, 26  In doing so, appellate courts independently assess the quality of the evidence of defendant's guilt.  *State v. Sterling*, 215 N.J. 65, 102 (2013).  There can be no reasonable doubt that had the photo identification been excluded, the jury would have reached the same conclusion.  The photo identification was not an essential element of the State's case.  Cf. *Lazo*, 209 N.J. at 26 (refusing to find harmless error where the conviction rested solely on the challenged identification evidence).
[brief] ”  Carpet Remnant Warehouse, Inc. v. N.J. Dep’t of Labor, 125 N.J. 567, 595 (1991); Gerba v. Bd. of Trs., Pub. Emps.’ Ret. Sys., 83 N.J. 174, 189 (1980).  An administrative agency’s determination is presumptively correct, and on review of the facts, a court will not substitute its own judgment for the agency’s where the agency’s findings are supported by sufficient credible evidence.  Atkinson v. Parsekian, 37 N.J. 143, 149 (1962).  Thus, if a court “is satisfied after its review that the evidence and the inferences to be drawn therefrom support the agency head’s decision, then it must affirm even if the court feels that it would have reached a different result. ”  Campbell v. New Jersey Racing Comm’n, 169 N.J. 579, 587 (2001) (citing Clowes v. Terminix Int’l, Inc., 109 N.J. 575, 588 (1988)).  This court also “afford[s] substantial deference to an agency’s interpretation of a statute that the agency is charged with enforcing.
[brief] 21 Ordinance Section 902A 6, 7 8, 9 11, 21 Ordinance 02-41 7, 11  Ordinance Section 906 11, 12 14, 21 Ordinance Section 706 12  Ordinance Section 706A  13  Ordinance Section 413.02B 14, 15 16, 17 19, 21 Ordinance Section 413.02A  16  Other Authorities
[directive] (La multa es $30 dolares si la infraccion ocurrio entre el 9 de enero de 1986 el 22 de diciembre de 1991; $25 dolares si Ia infraccion ocurrio antes de! primero de enero de 1986.)  [No/No]  If the offense occurred on or after February 1, 1993 but was before March 13, 1995, and you d.  [Yes/Si] are being sentenced to probation or a State correctional facility, you must pay a transaction
[brief] Moreover, contrary to his arguments, Plaintiff was not required to review [...]’s lease prior to asserting a common-law claim, even in light of the law contained in *Kandrac v. Marrazzo’s Market at Robbinsville*, 429 N.J. 79 (App. Div. 2012) and *Nielsen v. Walmart Store #2*, 2171, 429 N.J. Super. 251 (App. Div. 2013).  In neither of those cases was the lease reviewed to establish whether a duty was adequately pleaded, but to find whether such a duty was untimely to be imposed. \(^2\)  In both cases, the lease’s importance was limited the question of whether the claim could ultimately *succeed*, not whether it could be *asserted* in the first place.  A party has sufficiently asserted a cause of action when the allegations made, “if proven, would constitute a valid cause of action. ”  *Leon v. Rite Aid Corp.*, 340 N.J. Super. 462, 472 (App.Div.2001).  See, also, *Sickles v. Cabot Corp.*, 379 N.J. Super. 100, 106 (App. Div. 2005) (for purposes of a motion to --- \(^2\)  The *Kandrac* court ultimately declined to impose a common-law duty, while the *Nielsen* court found that a common-law duty existed on the fact pattern of that case.  dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, Plaintiff does not need to be able actually prove the cause of action, must merely assert one.)  See, also, Escoett v. Aldecress Country Club, 16 N.J. 438, 452 (1954) (noting that a complaint based, in part, on “information and belief” does not, on that basis, fail to assert a valid complaint. ); Rezem Fam. Assocs., LP v. Borough of Millstone, 423 N.J. Super. 103, 113 (App. Div. 2011) (citation omitted) (A pleading has asserted a cause of action if it states a basis for relief which discovery will provide.)  Thus, because Nielsen stands for the proposition that a common law cause of action is not per se barred because the defendant is a lessee, Plaintiff was not required to plead anything about the lease in order to plead a viable cause of action.  Alternatively, if Plaintiff believed he needed to address the lease, he could have made his assertions on information and belief and then sought the lease in discovery.  Consequently, Plaintiff’s failure to assert the cause of action against [...] within two years of the accident precludes it thereafter.  C.
[brief] Aoude v. Mobil Oil Corp., 892 F.2d 1115, 1118 (1st Cir. 1989); Perna v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., 916 F.Supp. 388, 397 (D.N.J. 1995).  Triffin v. Automatic Data Processing, Inc., 394 N.J. Super. 237, 251 (App. Div. 2007).  In a reciprocal discipline matter, In re Shearin, 166 N.J. 558 (2001)  (Shearin I) the attorney submitted false evidence, and counseled or assisted her client in conduct that she knew was illegal, criminal, or fraudulent.  In re Khoudary, Docket No. [...], 20 (N.J. Jun. 6, 2013)  The filing by a lawyer of a false certification to induce a court to grant relief for his benefit is a fundamental breach of a lawyer's duty as an officer of the court.  Such conduct diminishes public confidence in the legal profession and goes "to the heart of every attorney's obligation to uphold and honor the law."  In re Schleimer, 78 N.J. 317, 319 (1978) (one-year suspension for false swearing in a civil case).  Respondent's behavior constituted misconduct under the Disciplinary Rules.  DR 1-102(A)(3), (4), and (5) (engaging in illegal conduct that adversely reflects on a lawyer's fitness to practice law; engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation; and engaging in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice).  Matter of Kushner, 101 N.J. 397, 401-2 (N.J. 1986).  The narrative advanced by Counsel on behalf of his clients in the instant action, amounts to fraud upon this Court and fraud by adverse party because it states:
[brief] Opp. at 26.  Thus, even if [...]’s alleged Hackensack Project claim does not “share common legal theories” with [...]’s EGP payments at Hackensack, the PTA created a sufficient nexus for all Hackensack Project claims (i.e., [...]’s profit-share EGP claim and [...]’s non-payment claim) to be brought in one action, so they could be offset against each other.  [...] also ties itself in knots with respect to its work under the Hackensack Project Completion Subcontract and its importance in the First Arbitration.
[brief] Defendants argue that the trial court improperly entered Judgment against [...] because [...]’s Guarantee of the Third Loan was not reduced to writing, citing the statute of frauds, N.J.S.A. 25:1-15, and that they did not waive their statute of frauds defense, as the trial court expressly found.  Db39-44.  Defendants’ argument is irreconcilable with the record and without merit.  The trial court’s decision should be affirmed.
[directive] Such recordkeeping is important not only in initial interactions with arrestees, but also in their transportation and detention.  For transportation, while officers will continue to follow the standard operating procedures for communicating with dispatch over the radio when transporting transgender, non-binary, and gender non-conforming individuals, officers should also be mindful of the arrestee’s chosen name and pronouns, and should communicate such information to the temporary holding facility or detention facility.  When appropriate to ensure an arrestee’s safety, a transporting officer may communicate the individual’s gender identity to the temporary holding facility or detention facility.
[brief] R. 4:64-5.  The clearest evidence of this is that our Supreme Court issued a temporary rule change on July 12, 2023 that, among other things, “any allegation in a responsive pleading that a party has existing equity in the property shall be treated as a contesting answer to the tax foreclosure complaint. ”  Moreover, the purposes of the ECD – judicial economy and efficiency – are derogated by permitting this lawsuit to proceed.  To the extent Plaintiff does not believe she could have asserted a takings claim in the tax foreclosure because it would not be “ripe” until the entry of final judgment of foreclosure, nothing prevented her from raising it as an affirmative defense.  The ECD treats claims and affirmative defenses alike.  Oliver, supra, 152 N.J. at 394.  It is commonplace for a defendant to allege that a lawsuit will effect a constitutional injury, and assert that as an affirmative defense.  See, e.g., State v. $3,000.00 in U.S. Currency, 292 N.J. Super. 205, 212-13 (App. Div. 1996), in which a defendant claimed that a forfeiture order, if entered, “would constitute an excessive fine in violation of the Eighth Amendment of the Constitution.
[brief] THE JUDGE IMPROPERLY RULED, IN CONTRAVENTION OF N.J.R.E. 701 AND STATE V. MCLEAN, THAT A DETECTIVE COULD OFFER HIS LAY OPINION TO THE JURY THAT CERTAIN SOCIAL-MEDIA POSTS BY DEFENDANT WERE THREATENING TO THE DECEDENT WHILE THE DECEDENT APPEARED, IN HIS SOCIAL-MEDIA RESPONSES, TO BE “TRYING TO KEEP THE PEACE. ”  (RULINGS AT 25T 31-1 TO 4; 25T 32-6 TO 10)
[directive] BASIC TRAINING AND QUALIFICATION  Basic training and qualification standards have been developed and incorporated herein for police K-9 patrol teams and K-9 specialty teams, used for specialized scent work, detection work or tracking in law enforcement.  These standards include performance objectives for the police officer handler and the police officer-police dog team.  To qualify for operation as a K-9 patrol team or specialty team in New Jersey law enforcement, the established standards must be demonstrated to the satisfaction of a K-9 trainer or supervising K-9 trainer meeting the criteria set forth herein.
[brief] *Nieder v. Royal Indemn. Ins. Co.*, 62 N.J. 229 (1973).  New Jersey Court Rule 2:10-2 states:  Any error or omission shall be disregarded by the appellate court unless it is of such a nature as to have been clearly capable of producing an unjust result, but the appellate court may, in the interests of justice, notice plain error not brought to the attention of the trial or appellate court.  Assuming, arguendo, this Court reaches the merits of defendant’s argument, it must be reviewed for plain error.  Defendant argues that the evidence was improperly introduced as N.J.R.E. 404(b) evidence that prejudiced defendant.  Under N.J.R.E. 404(b), evidence of a defendant’s prior wrongdoings is not admissible against him unless it meets certain exceptions.  See *State v. Burris*, 357 N.J.Super. 326, 335 (App. Div. 2002), certif. denied, 176 N.J. 279 (2003).  The purpose of this rule is to prevent the State from introducing evidence against a defendant to suggest that he had a propensity to commit the crime for which is on trial because he committed the prior bad act.
[brief] This is especially true where Plaintiffs here make identical arguments about the Federation’s role in the nominating process as the Plaintiffs in *Humane Soc.*  Plaintiff’s, despite declaring the Council a “private regulatory agency,” allege no malfeasance on the part of any members of the Council or provide any indicia of evidence indicating acts by the Council which are contrary to the public interest.  *Id.* at 579-580; Pb16.  (Pa128-129).  -
[brief] THE SUPERIOR COURT CORRECTLY HELD THAT PLAINTIFFS FAIL TO STATE A CLAIM BASED ON ALLEGEDLY UNPAID WAGES (Pa17-29).  Plaintiffs base their entire Complaint (and appeal) on their position that Plaintiffs’ members, who were promoted in 2016, are somehow owed “unpaid wages” for the time period through June 7, 2017, based on the pre-MSRA MOAs.