ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] “The trial court’s duty is to give life to that constitutional principle by impaneling a jury that is as nearly impartial as the lot of humanity will admit. ”  State v. Loftin, 191 N.J. 172, 187 (2007) (internal quotations and citations omitted).  “[T]hat aspect of impartiality mandating that the jury’s verdict be based on evidence received in open court, not from outside sources is particularly critical to fulfilling the essence of that right. ”  State v. R.D., 169 N.J. 551, 559 (2001) (citations and quotation marks omitted).  Therefore, “a new trial will be granted where . . . intrusion of irregular influences into the jury deliberation ‘could have a tendency to influence the jury in arriving at its verdict in a manner inconsistent with the legal proofs and the court's charge. ’”  State v. Grant, 254 N.J. Super. 571, 583 (App. Div. 1992) (quoting Panko v. Flintkote Co., 7 N.J. 55, 61 (1951)).  “If the irregular matter has that tendency on the face of it, a new trial should be granted without further inquiry as to its actual effect.  The test is not whether the irregular matter actually influenced the result, but whether it had the capacity of doing so. ”  R.D., 169 N.J. at 558 (quoting Panko, 7 N.J. at 61) (emphasis added).  “The stringency of this rule is grounded upon the necessity of keeping the administration of justice pure and free from all suspicion of corrupting practices. ”  *Panko*, 7 N.J. at 61-62.  Given the circumstances, the trial court erred in denying [...]’s motion for a new trial.  Regardless of what jurors said or how the court attempted to remediate the situation at sidebar, this was not enough to quash the possible taint.  Even when jurors say that they can ignore a possible improper influence, “jurors’ words alone are ‘too weak a reed’ upon which to rest the difficult question of whether the verdict was subject to improper influence and tainted thereby. ”  *State v. Weiler*, 211 N.J. Super. 602, 612 (App. Div. 1986).  Here, juror four’s explicit concerns with continuing deliberations clearly demonstrates how the disclosure was the type of improper extraneous influence that, on the face of it, had the capacity to influence the jurors’ verdict.  As a result, the remaining jurors could have assumed juror twelve feared retaliation from [...] and that they may also have reason to fear retaliation from [...].  And, as the State’s case against [...] was built mainly on one piece of distant surveillance footage, such an assumption could have caused [...] great prejudice.  It is impossible to know for sure whether juror twelve’s disclosure influenced the other jurors’ deliberations.  Regardless, our case law holds that the proper course of action is to address the mere possibility of such prejudice with a new trial.  See Weiler, 211 N.J. Super. at 612; Brown 442 N.J. Super. at 181.  Accordingly, the trial court erred when it denied [...]’s motion for a new trial; the risk of prejudice was too great and calls into question the fairness and impartiality of the jury’s verdict.  Therefore, [...]’s conviction must be reversed, and the matter remanded for a new trial.
[brief] Ja200 to Ja203 21.  At the time of his application for variance relief, [...] was the contract purchaser of Ms. [...].  Ja227 22.  The adjoining [...] residence located on Block 24, Lot 12.05 has a preexisting nonconforming front yard setback of 120 feet.  Ja77 Line 14 to Line 22. 23.  Both the Mitchell application and the Cole application were fully compliant as to building coverage.  The Mitchell application proposed building coverage of 1.4%.  Ja217.  The Cole application proposed building coverage of .8%.  Ja 275.  The maximum permitted building coverage in the R-25 zone is 10%.  Ja217, Ja275 24.  Neighboring property owners expressed the following Objections: as a result of the proposed setback of 46 feet, Ten (10) feet of fill being brought to the property, location of the septic system and clear cutting of 150 feet of trees along Maple Avenue:
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY DENYING MY REQUEST TO EXAMINE THE HAM AGREEMENT OF 2015 AND SAMANTHA DICKIE’S CERTIFICATION OF 10/18/22 IN AN EVIDENTARY HEARING.  Raised Below: paragraph 36 (029a).  In 1T page 8 lines 2-6.  [...] did not oppose and did not deny my claims and arguments.  The denial order is at (221a).  The HAM Agreement of 2015 is at (103a).  The Certification of 10/18/22 of [...] is at (115a).  [...], a former notary public, hired by [...], forged my signature on two documents.  The HAM Agreement of 2015 (103a) and her Notary Journal that she submitted to the Law Division on 10/18/22 (115a).  I disputed that and let the trial judge know that I have never known [...], have never seen her, and have never signed any document before her.  This is a dispute between [...] and me.  To resolve that dispute the Judge must give me a chance to overcome the presumption of validity created by her because she was a notary public.  [...] took her word over my word without any investigation.  That is discrimination and racism.  Potter v. Steer COURT OF CHANCERY OF NEW JERSEY Nov 16,1923  122 A. 685 (Ch. Div. 1923)  “It is also well settled that the certificate of acknowledgment is only prima facie evidence of its contents, and that it may be shown to be untrue.  Wright v. Wells, 12 N.J. Law, 131; Marsh v. Mitchell, 26 N. J. Eq. 497; Whalen v. Manchester Land Co., 65 N.J. Law, 206,47 Atl. 443; Brady v. McHugh, supra.  But to establish its untruth and overcome the strong presumption of its integrity the proof must be clear, satisfactory, and convincing. ”  …  “The bill will be dismissed as to Mrs. Steer. ”  In this case Mrs. Steer husband forged her signature on a document to steal her property.  The forged signature was notarized.  Mrs. Steer challenged that and the Chancery Division Judge granted discovery and eventually ruled that Mrs. Steer was right.  So the State of NJ does have laws to overcome the presumption of validity.  [...] did not oppose or deny this request, but [...] denied my request to examine documents (103a) and (115a) statement of reason.  LEGAL POINT V.
[brief] In Petrillo, the Court declared that “the point is to cabin the lawyer’s duty…”  Petrillo.  139 N.J. at 483-84.  See also, Barsotti v. Mercedes, 346 N.J. Super. 504, 508 (App. Div. 2002) (affirming dismissal of claim that defendants’ attorney owed a duty to the plaintiff to ensure proceeds of the defendants’ sale of a house remained available for the plaintiff’s benefit where the sales proceeds belonged to the defendants and where the attorney did not supply false information); Hewitt v. Allen Canning Co., 321 N.J. Super. 178, 185-86 (App. Div. 1999) (declining to extend duties owed to attorney to non-client where attorney discarded evidence, because the attorney made no misrepresentation inducing non-client’s reliance)
[brief] ”  *Id.* at 548. ”  In *Smith v. [...]*, the plaintiff, on March 7, 2018, during a snowstorm, drove to Costco, parked in the parking lot, and went inside to shop.  (Da29).  As the plaintiff walked out to her vehicle, she slipped backwards and fell in the area between the entrance doors and red bollards prior to entering the parking lot, injuring herself.  (*Id.*)  The defendants moved for summary judgment, and in March 2022, the trial court granted the defendants’ motion based on *Pareja*.  The reason for the dismissal in *Smith v. [...]*, was because the defendants had no duty to remove the snow because the snowstorm was still ongoing.  (Da30).  Here, we do not have this ongoing storm issue.
[brief] ### Statutes & Rules: - **N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4** .........................................................2-3  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT  This case centers on the protections afforded to whistleblowers under CEPA, ensuring that employees who disclose unlawful conduct in good faith are shielded from retaliation.  The record evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, demonstrates genuine disputes of material fact regarding Respondents’ motives and actions, requiring reversal of summary judgment and a trial on the merits.
[brief] The proposed billboard would be forty-five (45) feet high, twenty-five (25) feet from Fire Road, and 378 square feet in area.  (Pa127.)  The Property is in the “RCD Zone” (Pa118), which is retail and commercial-oriented.  There is a variety of signage around the Property, including for “[...]” and a gas station.  (1T:70.)  The proposed billboard would “almost [be] lost between other signs. ”  (Id.)  “There’s a gas sign up on the intersection that would be more prominent to any driver approaching an intersection. ”  (Id.; Pa63-64.)  The proposed billboard would be 350 feet from the Tilton Road intersection and 395 feet from the “[...] interchange. ” (Pa127-128.)  Both distances required a bulk variance from the Distance Regulation, which is set forth at EHT Code 225-63C(4)(c), which states that “billboards…shall be additional permitted principal uses, subject to the following”:
[directive] Shines, points or focuses a laser lighting device beam, directly or indirectly, upon a person operating any vehicle, including, but not limited to, a bus, light rail vehicle, railroad locomotive, railroad car, jitney, trolley car, subway car, ferry, airplane, or other facility of transportation.  As used in this paragraph, “laser lighting device” means 4th Degree $2,500 to $7,500  10%  Permissible a device which emits a laser beam that is designed to be used by the operator as a pointer or highlighter to indicate, mark or identify a specific position, place, item or object.  As used in this subsection, “traffic control preemption device” means an infrared transmitter or other device which transmits an infrared beam, radio wave or other signal designed to change, alter, or disrupt in any manner the normal operation of a traffic Interference with control signal.
[brief] *(Id.* ¶¶ 2–11, Pa000017-18).  Each of the Plaintiffs in this action were members of the [...] at the time the MSRA was enacted, and [...] was designated as a municipality in need of stabilization and recovery.  *(Id.* ¶¶ 21, 30, 38, 46, 54, 62, 67, 77, 83, 91, Pa000016-28).  Plaintiffs allege that prior to the MSRA, the terms and conditions of Plaintiffs’ employment with the City were governed by a collectively negotiated agreement between the City and the [...].  *(Id.* ¶ 95, Pa000029).  Plaintiffs acknowledge that the operative CNA expired on December 31, 2015 *(Ibid.)*, and that a successor agreement was not reached.  *(Id.* ¶ 97, Pa000029).  Despite the fact that each and every Plaintiff was a member of the [...] at the time the MSRA was implemented, and every Plaintiff with the exception of Plaintiff [...] (who retired February 1, 2017) was employed by the [...] at the time the Designee issued the Notice of Implementation reducing terminal leave.  --- ⁴
[brief] (internal citations omitted).  In Katchen v. [...] ([...]), 457 N.J. Super. 600 (App. Div. 2019), this Court held:  Underinsured motorist (UIM) coverage has been characterized by some courts as being “personal to an insured. ”  However, this characterization of UIM coverage cannot overcome the clear and unambiguous language of a policy .  . .  It is fundamental that in the absence of a statutory prohibition to the contrary, an insurance company has a right to impose whatever conditions it desires prior to assuming its obligations[.]  Id. at 603.  (emphasis added).  The Katchen Court went on to state “an insured's reasonable expectations only matter when the court finds the relevant language ambiguous.  . . .  Because we do not find the language ambiguous, we need not consider plaintiff's claimed reasonable expectations. ”  Id. at 607.  As further noted above, the Court in Port Authority of New York v Ingram, 232 N.J. Super. 401 (App. Div. 1989)
[directive] In such cases, the prosecuting authority shall instead promptly offer the defendant the opportunity to file a joint motion pursuant to R. 3:21-10 that contains the following terms:  a.  The parties shall agree, pursuant to Section 12, to seek a modification of the defendant’s sentence only insofar as it reduces the period of parole ineligibility resulting from the qualifying Chapter 35 offense to equal one-third of the original sentence, less commutation, minimum custody, and work credits earned while in custody, consistent with N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.51(a), as if the individual had not been subject to a mandatory minimum term; b.  The prosecuting authority reserves the right to argue that, as part of the sentence modification, the court should impose an additional, discretionary period of parole ineligibility, consistent with N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(b), on the grounds that the aggravating factors associated with the defendant’s offense of conviction substantially outweigh the mitigating factors, provided that the prosecuting authority does not seek a period of parole ineligibility any longer than the mandatory one imposed as part of the original sentence; and c.  The parties will jointly oppose any sentencing modification other than those agreed to in their joint motion as described in this subsection.
[brief] **CONCLUSION: [...] and Broken Windows**  As demonstrated, the Trial Court erred in this case by treating Appellant’s complaint as if it was an appeal of a zoning board decision on the grounds that the decision was arbitrary and capricious.  It should have treated Appellant’s complaint as being about a violation of a binding condition of a zoning resolution.  Had it done so, it would have seen the clear relevance of the two pieces of denied evidence per Rules 401 and 402.  This is particularly the case regarding the Diagrammatic Elevation, because it literally expresses the condition which Appellant contends has been violated.  As shown, the Trial Court’s reasoning in this regard was erroneous and should be reversed.  Whatever the merits of Respondents’ arguments arguments to the contrary may be, they all fail for the simple reason that they appear to be about another, imaginary complaint in which the Appellant is apparently challenging a decision of a zoning board.
[brief] The trial court again adjourned the motion so the parties could brief --- \(^4\)  The first adjournment occurred so that the motion could coincide with a motion to confirm the Phase II Partial Final Award voiding [...]’s self-dealing loan. issues relating to the First Removal—which again violated the injunction by, *inter alia*, suggesting the Company was Belizean—and a new return date was ultimately scheduled for May 23, 2018.
[directive] Trainees who refuse to submit to a drug test during basic training shall be immediately removed from the academy and immediately suspended from employment.  Upon a finding that the trainee did in fact refuse to submit a sample, the trainee shall be terminated from law enforcement employment and permanently barred from future law enforcement employment in New Jersey.  In addition, the appointing authority shall forward the trainee's name to the Central Drug Registry and note that the individual refused to submit to a drug test.  C.
[brief] TRIAL  On August 22, 2022, around 11 a.m., [...] sat alone in his business warehouse in Camden organizing tools when two men, including defendant, entered unannounced and beat him with baseball bats.  Defendant’s co-assailant then rifled through [...]’s pockets and took $1,800 cash while defendant continued to beat him with a bat.  A jury of his peers found defendant guilty of armed robbery after trial, among other charges.  (Da14-17).  A little before 11 a.m. that morning, [...] went to [...] to swap out his tires.
[brief] ”  Da229 ¶ 9; Da235 T66-4 to 13, T67-18 to T68-8.  On or about November 3, 2016, Plaintiff discovered that [...] had released the $2.5 million escrow payment to [...] without having received the required confirmation from Plaintiff’s bank that Plaintiff had received funding under the loan.  Da29 ¶ 43.  Plaintiff never received any funding under the loan with [...].  Da29 ¶ 44.  B.
[brief] As argued by [...] in opposition to [...]’s motion for summary judgment, N.J.S.A. 48:7-1 is the only statute that provides any authority whatsoever to municipalities with respect to regulation of electric utility poles on public rights of way.  The statute provides that the “use of the public streets [by electric utility poles] shall be subject to such regulations as may be first imposed by the corporate authorities of the city or town. ” (emphasis added).  Plainly, the Ordinance is not a “first impos[ition]” of a municipal regulatory regime on the placement of utility poles within the meaning of N.J.S.A. 48:7-1.  Instead, the Ordinance constitutes an amendatory regulatory regime that purports to modify and amend [...]’s consent conferred on [...]’s predecessor over a century ago.  Under [...]’s construction of the 1892 Resolution, [...] reserves the right to continue to impose new “prudential rules and regulations” on a public utility long after [...]’s first grant of consent to the public utility.  However, that construction is without force and effect because it has been preempted by the Legislature’s enactment of N.J.S.A. 48:7-1 and that statute’s express limitation on the continuing exercise of municipal power over the placement and specifications of utility poles after the “first impos[ition]” of municipal consent.  The Legislature last amended N.J.S.A. 48:7-1 in 1962 – 70 years after the 1892 Resolution.  See L.1962, c. 198, § 95.  Thus, [...]’s construction of its 1892 Resolution did not survive the Legislature’s reenactment of N.J.S.A. 48:7-1.  The same conclusion is compelled by operation of N.J.S.A. 48:3-17.1, which provides that when a public utility’s use and occupancy of a public right of way (for an electric utility pole) has continued at substantially the same location for a period of ten years, such occupancy is presumed to be with the consent in writing of the owner of the land.  It is undisputed that [...] has continuously used and occupied the public right of way in [...] for its electric utility lines for over a century.  For this reason alone, the purported enforceability of the 1892 Resolution is preempted by operation of the ten-year limitation period (and the resulting “presumption” with regard to municipal consent) imposed by N.J.S.A. 48:3-17.1.  Notably, the Legislature first enacted N.J.S.A. 48:3-17.1 in 1945, over a half century after the 1892 [...] Resolution.  See L.1945, c. 231, p. 747, § 1.  Thus, [...]’s construction of its 1892 Resolution did not survive the Legislature’s enactment of N.J.S.A. 48:3-17.1.  Moreover, the 1892 Resolution is without force and effect because it has been nullified by the Supreme Court’s decision in In re [...], as applied to regional transmission facilities, such as [...]’s [...], as more fully discussed in Point I, supra.  Consequently, [...]’s construction of its 1892 Resolution is preempted by operation of New Jersey statutory and regulatory law enacted over the past century.
[brief] As alleged by [...] (and corroborated by the license verification at Da43), [...] lacked the licensure required to acquire and enforce the debt at all times relevant to this action.  Notably, [...] has never asserted that it was licensed under the NJCFLA—[...]’s lack of licensure is a matter of public record maintained by the New Jersey Division of Banking and Insurance Licensing Services Bureau.  However, in adjudicating [...]’s Motion to Vacate Default Judgment, the trial court reasoned that because there had been no finding by the Commissioner of Banking and Insurance that [...] had committed a fourth-degree crime by engaging in the consumer loan business without a license under the NJCFLA, the provisions of N.J.S.A. 17:11C-33(b) did not apply, i.e., the contract governing [...]’s alleged debt was not void.
[brief] Clearly, [...] is either unaware of the Supreme court holdings in Cummings and Lovett or she is operating under the premise that her court is not bound by the prior Supreme court opinions.  Per Article III of the Constitution there is to be only one Supreme court.  Certainly, the current Supreme court is not comprised of the same members of the Supreme court that rendered the opinions in Cummings and Lovett.  Absent the prior Supreme court opinions being facts that cannot be otherwise reexamined, there is nothing at the bar to prove that [...] is bound by the prior Supreme court opinions.  As I believe that I have proved that the Supreme court opinions are facts that cannot be otherwise re-examined, per the following, the [...] order is an illegal Bill of Attainder:
[brief] The second point of this appeal is the failure of the Trial Court to consider as part of the administrative record the Planning Board transcript of February 6, 2023, and WARD memo created by plaintiffs, dated February 6, 2023 and submitted to both the Planning Board and the Town Council.  Plaintiffs have provided three cases: a Supreme Court case, an Appellate Division, and a Law Division case which demonstrate that these exhibits should have been considered by the Trial Court in this case.  **PROCEDURAL HISTORY**
[brief] JUDGMENT WHEN GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT ARE PRESENT REQUIRING A JURY TO DETERMINE WHETHER THE DEFENDANT WAS NEGLIGENT IN THE OPERATION OF HIS VEHICLE AND THEN TO DETERMINE THE COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE OF EACH OF THE PARTIES (RAISED BELOW: Pa1; 1T16)  The Trial Court erred in granting Summary Judgment to defendants.  N.J. Ct. R. 4:46-2 states that a Motion for Summary Judgment shall set forth...a statement of each material fact as to which the movant contends there is no genuine issue.  R. 4:46-2(a).
[brief] Deposition – Pages 109-112 o RULE 2:6-1(a)  (1)  STATEMENT OF ALL ITEMS SUBMITTED TO THE TRIAL COURT ON THE SUMMARY  JUDGMENT  MOTION TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS  Order to Dismiss Complaint with Prejudice dated March 12, 2024  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES  Cases  Anderson v. Liberty Lobby Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986)
[brief] In a remarkably similar unpublished case, the Appellate Division specifically held that when a former public employee executes a settlement agreement providing that the employee can apply for disability benefits, the fact that benefits are denied by the Pension Board leaves the employee no recourse against the municipality.  See Carr v. Borough of Glen Ridge, A-1124-20, 2022 WL 38864 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. January 5, 2022).4  The well-established caselaw is thus clear that Plaintiff’s complaint is without merit as it is not the responsibility of the Court, nor the Township to amend the Agreement so as to give Plaintiff another chance.  There is no basis to require a return to work or for a court to revise the Settlement Agreement that was entered into by both parties freely and voluntarily.  See Cardinale, supra, Rooth, supra, Thorpe, supra and Carr, supra.  Inexplicably, the Chancery Division failed to even cite any of the controlling case law in its opinion, let alone differentiate why the precedent is not binding on the Chancery Division and inapplicable in --- 4 See DA125. this case.  The Chancery Division’s decision is thus not supported by the record nor the law.  Accordingly, the Township did not breach the Agreement, the Chancery Division’s decision must be reversed and Plaintiff’s complaint dismissed with prejudice.
[brief] *Shepherd v. Hunterdon Dev. Ctr.*, 174 N.J. 1, 19-20 (2002).  The individual acts are adverse employment actions which can be discrete or non-discrete actions; discrete actions take place on a given day and the start and finish happens on that day whereas non-discrete actions consist of a pattern or series of acts, any one of which may not be actionable as a discrete act, but when viewed cumulatively constitute a hostile work environment.  *National Passenger Corporation v. Morgan*, 536 US 101, 122 (2002).  In looking at the cause of action, it accrues on the date on which the last act occurred, notwithstanding that some of the component acts of the hostile work environment [have fallen] outside of the statutory time period.