ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Social transitioning impacts the very core of the child’s self-definition as a boy or girl.  And, as discussed, it substantially reduces the odds of desistence, is likely to lead to a life of medicalization, and—when done by schools behind parents’ backs—results in the child suffering without parental support.  Moreover, socially transitioning students in secret from their parents does not fall within the scope of schools’ implied authority under the doctrine of *in loco parentis*.  Schools have “inferred parental consent” that gives them “a degree of authority . . . commensurate with the task that the parents ask the school to perform”—namely, to educate their children.  *Mahanoy Area Sch. Dist. v. B.L*, 141 S. Ct. 2038, 2052 (2021) (Alito, J., concurring).  Consistent with that authority, schools must have the ability “to control curriculum and the . . . educational environment,” *C.N.*, 430 F.3d at 182, including things like “the hours of the school day,” “the timing and content of examinations,” or “the extracurricular activities offered at the school,” *Fields v. Palmdale Sch. Dist.*, 427 F.3d 1197, 1206 (9th Cir. 2005) (“Fields I”), opinion amended on denial of reh'g sub nom.  *Fields v. Palmdale Sch. Dist. (PSD)*, 447 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 2006) (“Fields II”).  But socially transitioning students without parental consent is not within the scope of that inferred delegation—parents do not hand children off so schools may render psychological treatment and secretly facilitate changing their gender identity.  See Mahanoy Area Sch. Dist., 141 S. Ct. at 2052; see also Alfonso v. Fernandez, 606 N.Y.S.2d 259, 265–66 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993) (holding in-school condom distribution program violated parental rights because it lacked parental notification and opt-out provision).  In short, as the Third Circuit has held, parents’ rights do not stop at “the threshold of the schoolhouse door. ”  C.N., 430 F.3d at 185 n.26.  Schools must obtain parents’ consent before socially transitioning their children.
[brief] The Supreme Court has defined "functional equivalent" of interrogation as "any words or actions on the part of the police . . . that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect."  Innis, 446 U.S. at 300-01.  "Interrogation for Miranda purposes 'must reflect a measure of compulsion above and beyond that inherent in custody itself.'"  State v. Tiwana, 256 N.J. 33, 42 (2023) (quoting Innis, 446 U.S. at 300).  Therefore, "since the police surely cannot be held accountable for the unforeseeable results of their words or actions, the definition of interrogation can extend only to words or actions on the part of police officers that they should have known were reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response."  *Innis*, 446 at 301-02.
[brief] .............................................................................................................13  Interactive Brokers, LLC v. Barry for Osiris Fund Ltd. P’ship, 457 N.J. Super. 357 (App. Div. 2018)  ..................................................................................13  Jersey City Police Officers Benev. Ass’n v. City of Jersey City, 257 N.J. Super. 6 (App. Div. 1992)  ......................................................................................25
[brief] 1)  The [...] had Actual Notice (Raised below, Pa2148, Pa2152)  Nearly 5 months prior to the accident, on April 22, 2015, the settlement issue in the left lane of the GSP at northern abutment joint of the Rt. 30 overpass was identified during a Biennial Bridge Inspection which was performed on behalf of the [...].  According to the inspection report, the settlement issue was located in the southbound north abutment joint in the left-hand shoulder and left lane and was described as “ramped up and deteriorated” and measured 2 inches.  (Pa1367, Pa1351)(Emphasis Added).  As a consequence, it was recommended that maintenance be performed to fix the abutment joint and 2-inch settlement in the left lane.  (Pa1350).  In addition, independently from the Biennial Bridge Inspection, an onsite inspection was performed on June 24, 2015 at the subject location.  As a result of that inspection, a memo dated June 26, 2015 was prepared, which in relevant part indicated that “the pavement at the north approach exhibited significant settlement. ” (Pa1193).  Due to the observations made during this inspection, it was recommended that “immediate repairs/testing” be performed.  Id.  On July 2, 2015, the results on the inspection and the recommendations were sent directly to the [...].  (Pa1191).  Accordingly, for the purposes of a summary judgment motion, the court was required to view the facts in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff.  Had the court done so, then the court was required to accept as true that the [...] was on actual notice of a “dangerous condition” in the south bound left-hand lane at the northern abutment joint of the Rt. 30 overpass as early as April 22, 2015, approximately five months prior to Plaintiff’s crash.
[brief] Under N.J. Crt. R. 4:9-1, a request to amend a pleading will be denied either if prejudice will inure to the party opposing the amendment or if the amended pleading itself is without legal merit, that is, if the amendment as proposed would be futile.  See also, Notte v. Merchs. Mut. Ins. Co., 185 N.J. 490, 495, 888 A.2d 464, 466 (2006).  First, it is Defendant’s position that, in the instant case, the mere passage of time is a sufficient basis of a finding of undue prejudice to the Defendants to grant Plaintiff leave to submit another motion to amend given that since the time this brief was filed, it has been nearly eight years since the incident in question and discovery has not even begun.
[brief] In particular, the trial court erred in relying on a response to a hypothetical question during which plaintiff’s counsel asked a corporate representative “if” an Ozurdex applicator had contained a silicone particulate, would that have deviated from [...]’s specifications, as sufficient credible evidence that the applicator used to provide Ozurdex to Plaintiff on November 6, 2018 actually did deviate from [...]’s specifications.  The conclusion that a hypothetical could somehow enable a plaintiff to defeat summary judgment is contrary to law.  If plaintiffs can make it to a jury by simply having a defendant acknowledge that if one of its products contained a defect, that product would deviate from the company’s performance standards, countless meritless cases will proceed to trial, risking a miscarriage of justice.  Likewise, the trial court’s decision to admit testimony from Plaintiff’s experts also constitutes reversible error, given that one expert’s opinion relies on false assumptions and the other’s on pure speculation.  Reliable expert testimony is essential in the complex litigation faced by New Jersey’s manufacturing and life sciences industries, particularly in light of the Supreme Court’s recent decision in In re Accutane, which strengthened the requirements for admissibility of expert testimony in New Jersey.  The trial court mistakenly lowered the bar for admission of expert testimony even below the level that existed before In re Accutane, and certainly below that which exists now.  Letting its decision stand contravenes the law, will increase the amount and cost of litigation in this State, and will not promote fairness or efficiency in the judicial system.  Accordingly, [...] and [...] ask this Court to correct these legal errors, reverse the trial court’s ruling and enter summary judgment for Defendants.
[brief] 22  **Allstate Insurance Co. v. Orthopedic Evaluations, Inc.**, 300 N.J. Super. 510 (App. Div. 1997) ..................................  23  **Allstate New Jersey Ins. Co. v. Lajara**, 222 N.J. 129 (2015) ......................................................... passim  **Allstate v. Northfield Medical Center**, 228 N.J. 596 (2017) ....................................................... 22, 23, 27, 28  **Coalition for Quality Health Care v. NJDOBI**, 348 N.J. Super. 272 (App. Div. 2002) ................................. 14, 15
[brief] [...] is a resident of Massachusetts.  (See Tr. II: 76-77).  At all relevant times, [...] was working as a court officer at the [...] and part-time as a security guard at the [...] supermarket in Gardner.  (Tr. II: 76-78).  ¶8.  There is no evidence that either [...] or [...] has ever met or spoken to [...], or had any direct dealings with him of any kind.  (See Tr. II: 65, 70-71, 82).  ¶13.
[brief] THE STANDARD OF REVIEW (Raised Below: Da60)  R. 4:50-1 is “designed to reconcile the strong interests in finality of judgments and judicial efficiency with the equitable notion that courts should have authority to avoid an unjust result in any given case. ”  Mancini v. EDS ex rel. New Jersey Auto. Full Ins. Underwriting Ass'n, 132 N.J. 330, 334 (1993) (quoting Baumann v. Marinaro, 95 N.J. 380, 392 (1984) (internal quotation marks omitted)).  The standard is abuse of discretion and the trial court’s factual findings are owed deference, i.e., this Court “may not disturb judge-made fact findings ‘unless . . . convinced they are so manifestly unsupported by or inconsistent with the competent, relevant and reasonably credible evidence as to offend the interests of justice. ’”  LVNV Funding, LLC v. DeAngelo, 464 N.J. Super. 103, 108 (App. Div. 2020) (quoting Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Inv'rs Ins. Co., 65 N.J. 474, 484 (1974)).  “However, the opening of default judgments should be viewed with great liberality, and every reasonable ground for indulgence is tolerated to the end that a just result is reached. ”  *Marder v. Realty Constr. Co.*, 84 N.J. Super. 313, 319 (App. Div. 1964) (*citing Foster v. New Albany Machine & Tool Co.*, 63 N.J. Super. 262, 269-70 (App. Div. 1960)).  For example, “[e]ven where a defendant admits liability, a reopening of the judgment for purposes of assessing damages is proper where the defendant provides a reasonable assertion to the effect that it is not liable for the amount of damages claimed by the plaintiff. ”  *Marder*, 84 N.J. Super. at 319.  Thus, “[j]n weighing these circumstances, [the Court] cannot lose sight that a court's power to vacate a judgment is based on equitable principles. ”  *DeAngelo*, 464 N.J. Super. at 109.  When examining a trial court's exercise of discretionary authority, the trial court must be reversed “when the exercise of discretion was ‘manifestly unjust’ under the circumstances. ”  *Newark Morning Ledger Co. v. N.J. Sports & Exposition Auth.*, 423 N.J. Super. 140, 174 (App. Div. 2011) (*quoting Union Cnty. Improvement Auth. v. Artaki, LLC*, 392 N.J. Super. 141, 149 App. Div. 2007)).  POINT II.
[brief] On May 12, 2022, a settlement agreement was entered in the Chancery Division matter.  (Da 155.)  The Consent Judgment was presented to and signed by the Honorable [...], J.S.C., and stated that it was entered into as “the parties [had] represented to the Court that all matters in dispute among them, including their spouses, heirs, successors and assigns, have been amicably settled. ”  (Da 158.)  Specifically, the Consent Judgment ordered that the Verified Complaint filed in the Estate matter on behalf of the [...], “including all claims asserted or which could have been asserted in connection therewith, is dismissed with prejudice and without costs, and said dismissal shall be binding on the named parties, their spouses, heirs, successors and assigns. ”  (Da 158.)  The Consent Judgment discharged [...] from his duties as Administrator of the Estate, apart from final accounting obligations.  (Da 159.)  The parties further agreed, and the Court ordered that “[n]o appeal can be taken from this Consent Judgment.
[brief] *See, e.g.*, *Mitchell*, 365 F.3d at 244-46; *United States v. Crisp*, 324 F.3d 261, 266 (4th Cir. 2003) (explaining that federal appellate courts addressing the “admissibility of expert fingerprint identifications in the post-*Daubert* era” have “found such evidence admissible”); *United States v. Baines*, 573 F.3d 979, 989-92 (10th Cir. 2009) (same); *United States v. Abreu*, 406 F.3d 1304, 1307 (11th Cir. 2005) (same); *United States v. Sherwood*, 98 F.3d 402, 408 (9th Cir. 1996) (same); *United States v. Spotted Elk*, 548 F.3d 641, 663 (8th Cir. 2008) (explaining that a *Daubert* hearing was unnecessary where the prosecutor established that the expert had extensive training and used acceptable methods): *United States v. Pena*, 586 F.3d 105, 110-11 (1st Cir. 2009) (finding no abuse of discretion because the ACE-V method satisfies Daubert); *United States v. Straker*, 800 F.3d 570, 631-32 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (same); *United States v. Herrera*, 704 F.3d 480, 485-87 (7th Cir. 2013) (same). ⁴  Ample existing caselaw thus supports the trial court’s well-reasoned decision to permit expert testimony regarding fingerprint analysis.
[brief] The opinions and testimony of Plaintiff’s expert [...], PE fail to establish dangerous condition.  The trial court performed a thorough review Mr. Balgowan’s opinions by reviewing his report as well as his deposition and 104 Hearing testimony.  In reviewing Mr. Balgowan’s deposition testimony, the trial court noted the following:  Mr. Balgowan repeatedly stated that it was difficult to state with any accuracy the dimensions of the alleged dangerous condition because the photographs were not three-dimensional.  (See Pa2144).  Mr. Balgowan did not perform any calculations concerning the physical forces associated with the incident.  (See Pa2166).  He never inspected [...]'s motorcycle following the accident.  (See Pa2125).  He is not an expert in the field of accident reconstruction.  He didn't make any attempt to reconstruct the crash.  (See Pa2125).  In reviewing Mr. Balgowan’s 104 Hearing testimony, the trial court noted the following:  Mr. Balgowan did not believe that every bump in the road required a sign.  (See Pa2123).  He agreed that the use of warning signs should be kept to a minimum, as the unnecessary use of warning signs tends to breed disrespect for all signs.  (See Pa2123).  He agreed that nothing in the [...] stated the condition was dangerous or in need of repair.  (See Pa2123).  He had no reason to dispute that a memo from [...] that initially referenced settlement at the north abutment was corrected in an email from [...] to reflect settlement observed at the south abutment.  (See Pa2133).  Mr. Balgowan testified that he never physically saw the change in elevation.  (See Pa2138).  He did not know how bad it was.  He cannot tell from any picture.  (See Pa2138).  He sees an elevation change but cannot tell how significant it was or how dangerous it was.  (See Pa2138).  He does not know if a motorcycle could go over the condition without crashing.  (See Pa2138).  Additionally, the trial court noted that Mr. Balgowan conceded that there is no way to know if the truck in the video traveled over the same ground as Plaintiff’s motorcycle on the date of the accident (See Pa2134; Pa2167); he conceded that it is impossible to know whether the bump observed in the video was caused by the same condition that allegedly caused Plaintiff’s accident (See Pa2134; Pa2167); and he testified “nobody could know” if the motorcycle Plaintiff was riding went over the same ground as the truck during the video recording.  (See Pa2134; 3T at 32:18-33:17, 76:17-77:17, 141:14-143:2, 114:6-14, 160:10-161:17).  Based in part on a thorough examination of Mr. Balgowan’s opinions, the trial court correctly determined that Mr. Balgowan did not provide any reliable information that supported Plaintiff’s contention that there was dangerous condition.  As such, it is respectfully submitted that plaintiff failed to establish a dangerous condition in the roadway so severe that it created a substantial risk of injury.
[brief] (See [...]_Pb 19; Wilf_Db 30-31).  The [...] do not seek a rule that “private attorneys may not serve as special masters or mediators in alternative dispute resolution matters involving the same law firm at the same time. ” ([...]_Pb 19).  [...] is confused.  It collapses the distinctions between: (i) a Special Master with quasi-judicial authority of the court, and (ii) a mediator with no such decision-making authority.
[brief] The right of customers to use the parking facilities shall apply only while they are shopping in the shopping center.  Lessee agrees that lessee and lessee’s employees will park their trucks, delivery vehicles and automobiles only in such parking areas as lessor shall from time to time designate for that purpose.  Lessor shall have the right to close any part of the common areas for such time as may, in the opinion of the lessor’s counsel, be necessary to prevent a dedication thereof, or the accrual of any rights in any person, or to clean and repair the same, and to close any part of the parking area for such time as lessor deems necessary in order to discourage non-customer parking.  Lessor is hereby prohibited from leasing any portion of the parking lot to any business or other third party not within the leasehold premises.  [Pa981-982]  Thus, nowhere in the lease is the tenant assigned any duty to maintain the parking lot, nor does it state within any of the articles quoted that the tenants are responsible to maintain the parking lot for snow and ice removal.
[brief] The Commission found “the appellants employment record is adverse to the position sought due to the high standards for law enforcement officers.  See Moorestown v. Armstrong, 89 N.J. Super. 560, 566 (App. Div. 1965).  The factual basis for seeking the removal of [...] in 1963 included threatening to kill the Chief of Police, threatened suicide, domestic battery with threats involving guns against his wife and family, and a litany of other alleged criminal acts, chronic absenteeism, and lateness.  The Court in Armstrong does rationalize the decision to terminate [...] by discussing in dicta the heightened duty of law enforcement, without any citations to laws or regulations supporting this standard.  Further citations to this standard in support of determinations on list removal do not show any additional legal standards or guidelines.
[brief] On or about February 3, 2021, [...] filed an application with the Board requesting preliminary and final major site plan approval to construct the Project, in substantial compliance with the approved Market Concept Plans attached to the YB Settlement Agreement and RR Zone.  (Pa4.)  Board hearings on [...]’s application were held on November 8, 2021, December 20, 2021, January 10, 2022, and February 7, 2022.  (Pa4.)  A resolution granting [...]’s application was adopted by the Board on March 7, 2022 (the “Resolution”).  (Pa4.)  Plaintiffs filed a complaint in lieu of prerogative writs (the “Complaint”) on April 21, 2022, pleading that the Board acted in an arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable matter in granting [...]’s application for preliminary and final major site plan approval to construct the Project.  (Pa17-Pa23.)  The Board filed its Answer on May 2, 2022 (Pa24-Pa31), and [...] filed its Answer on May 5, 2022.  (Pa32-Pa39.)  Trial, consisting of argument on the parties positions, was held on June 23, 2023, before the Honorable [...], J.S.C. of the Monmouth County Superior Court.  (Pa5.)  On November 29, 2023, [...] entered an Order and written opinion affirming the Resolution.  (Pa1-Pa16.)
[brief] (4T7:22-8:17; Pa651).  This decision was memorialized in an order dated August 25, 2023 (the “August 25 Order”).  (Pa651).  The court held an additional hearing regarding [...]’s entitlement to attorneys’ fees on September 22, 2023, and denied [...]’s request.  (5T12:9-17; Pa688).  In so doing, the court incorrectly interpreted the PSA, stating that “with regard to Paragraph 17.1(b) and 17.1(c) both -- both of those paragraphs are intended to limit to escrow agents liability and require the other parties to the PSA, that’s the plaintiff and [...], to indemnify or hold harmless the escrow agent, that’s [...], against claims, I read it to mean by third parties[.]” (5T7:21-8:2).
[brief] (T2/67:1-9).  Finally, [...] presented additional testimony on the Applicant’s behalf, noting that the Applicant intended to install additional cameras and would have security guards assist with product deliveries.  (T2/91:17-92:3; 93:12-15).  In continued objection to the Application at the Second Hearing, [...] next presented the testimony of [...], P.E., P.P. of [...] (“[...]”), who was qualified as an expert in professional engineering and planning.  [...] expressed his concerns about the practicality and convenience of the proposed loading zone.  (T2/120:23-121:22; 126:10-18; 127:17-128:7).  On cross-examination, [...] conceded that while he thought the loading area was “inconvenient,” he would not go so far as to say it was unsafe.  (T2/135:1-136:7).  Next, [...] offered additional testimony on [...]’s behalf, opining that he did not believe the proposed loading area utilizing a backing maneuver from the street was a safe option.  (T2/150:1-2).  [...] then re-called its traffic expert [...] to rebut that conclusion.  [...] confirmed that in his opinion, the proposed design “provides for safe and efficient access to the property. ” (T2/163:9-11).  Lastly, one additional member of the public spoke in opposition to the Application simply because of its proposed use as a cannabis dispensary, (T2/165:21-167:5), notwithstanding that the use is permitted.  The Second Hearing was then concluded.
[brief] ” (Pa000084-85).  In its decision, the trial court drew a distinction between any “common knowledge” claims Plaintiffs could maintain against [...] and any negligence claims that would have required an Affidavit of Merit.  Specifically, the trial judge defined Plaintiffs’ potentially viable “common knowledge” claims as “[...] direct[ing] [someone] to place construction materials on plaintiff’s property, obstructing their use of the property. ” (Pa000471-72 at 28:24 to 29:1).  [...] respectfully objected to this common knowledge claim because it would require a lay person to interpret engineering plans and speculate on the duty of care of a design professional.  (Pa000468 at 21:3 to 22:19).  On June 23, 2022, [...] served Plaintiffs with Responses to Interrogatories, in which [...] again affirmed that it performed no remediation work in connection with the redevelopment project, and attached a copy of the February 9, 2021 email advising Plaintiffs and their counsel that the preliminary site plan was revised in accordance with their wishes.
[brief] The only support offered is a reference to an audit which was never produced not introduced into evidence at any level of the proceedings.  (Respondent’s Brief p. 16)  Chapter 44 specifically provides for the ordinances to remain in effect only for 120 day during which the Board of Health language shall be read as health officer.  § 44-1.  Establishment; continuation of prior ordinances.  A.  There is hereby created a Department of Health in and for the [...], the Director of which Department shall be the duly appointed Health Officer of the Township.  B.  Chapters 173 through 213, inclusive, of the Code of the [...], as heretofore adopted by the Board of Health, are hereby readopted for a period not to exceed 120 days to allow the same to be amended, revised and supplemented to reflect the change in status of the public health agency.  (1)  During the one-hundred-twenty-day period set forth above, the chapters designated shall remain in full force and effect; provided, however, that where the phrase “Board of Health” appears in the text, it shall be read the health officer or the township as is appropriate to the context.  (emphasis added)  Yet the Chapter underlying the convictions continues to utilize the outdated Board of Health language as follows:  § 201.1.  Definitions.  As used in this chapter, the following terms shall have the meanings indicated:  BOARD OF HEALTH, LOCAL BOARD OF HEALTH or BOARD — The Board of Health of the [...].  HEALTH OFFICER — The Health Officer of the [...] appointed by the Board of Health of the [...].  At best the ordinances are an exemplar of obfuscation and as such should not be utilized as a basis of a criminal conviction.