ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] In their Opposition to this appeal, Defendants conflate generalized workplace conduct with specific unlawful actions.  CEPA does not require whistleblowers to achieve legal certainty but, instead, protects employees acting in good faith to disclose perceived violations.  As Plaintiff set forth in the initial Brief, the Trial Court erred in minimizing Defendant [...]’s conduct as a mere management style, disregarding statutory definitions and the evidence supporting Plaintiff’s claim.  Further, Plaintiff presented evidence creating genuine issues of material fact regarding pretext and retaliatory intent.  Record testimony disputes Respondents’ claim that charge pay was unauthorized, undermining their termination justification.  Finally, Respondents’ claim of independent decision-making is belied by evidence showing that Defendant [...], accused of misconduct, recommended Plaintiff’s termination.  Factual disputes regarding retaliation and pretext should be resolved by a jury.  Accordingly, Plaintiff respectfully requests that this Court reverse the grant of summary judgment and remand for trial.
[brief] The Governing Body’s adoption process on February 17, 2021 was even more cursory (3T).  The Borough Clerk stated that (3T8:8) [...]’s letter advised that the Planning Board found the Redevelopment was consistent with the Master Plan; [...] gave a brief overview of the Redevelopment Plan, and the Governing Body adopted the Ordinance/Plan.  The fact is that the Redevelopment Plan is glaringly inconsistent with the specifics of the 1988 Master Plan.
[brief] The Appellate Division employs the same standard that governs the trial courts in reviewing summary judgment orders.  Prudential Property & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Boylan, 307 N.J. Super. 162, 167 (App. Div. 1998).  Summary judgment must be granted when “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue of material fact challenged and that the moving party is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.
[brief] First, no factfinder could reasonably conclude that [...]’s conduct constituted criminal harassment, nor is such a conclusion required.  Without citing any law, [...] contends that her belief that [...]’s conduct was unlawful was required to be analyzed “under the lens of a reasonable employee, and the plain language of the statute. ” (See Pb28).  But [...]’s testimony on the June 24, 2020 incident leaves no doubt.  (See Pa189 at 119:7-18) ([...] testified that he “just sat there and just kept calm. ”); Pa189 at 119:15-18 ([...] testified that he “relaxed” and “knew to just stay calm. ”); Pa189-90 at 120:25-121:23 ([...] testified that he completed his work after [...] yelled at him); Pa190 at 122:12-123:7 ([...] testified that he maintained his composure throughout the incident, relaxed, and “let her just do her thing”).  [...]’s opinions on this matter are irrelevant for purposes of [...]’s claim.
[brief] For all of the reasons set forth herein and in the interests of justice, [...] respectfully request that this Court affirm the Trial Court’s November 13, 2023 ruling, November 14, 2023 Order, the Court’s ruling on January 29, 2024 and the Final Order dated February 8, 2024, declaring the Boundary Commissioners Report final as it relates to the boundary lines between Lots 10 and 11 as set forth in the [...] survey of the Ahmed Property dates September 16, 2005.  Respectfully submitted, [...]  *Attorneys for Defendants-Respondents*  By: ____________________________  [...]  Dated: August 15, 2024  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE  DIVISION  [...] and [...], husband and wife, Plaintiffs/Appellants, v. KHALID and [...], husband and wife, Defendants/Respondents.  Docket No.  [...]  CIVIL ACTION On Appeal  From: Final Order After Trial  Morris County, Chancery Division  Docket No. [...]  Sat Below: Hon. [...], J.S.C.  Date Submitted: July 8, 2024  BRIEF OF APPELLANT
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT DETERMINED THAT [...] SUFFERED NO D[...]GES RESULTING FROM [...]’ BREACH OF THEIR FIDUCIARY DUTY (RAISED BELOW 5T9:21-25 OR 5T9:21 TO 5T10:6).  1T 12:22 TO 1T 14:7; 1T 79:7-16; 1T 81:12-23; 1T 83:1 – 1T 84:11; 1T 132:113- 1T 135:9; 1T 145:6- 1T 146:2; A. [...] HAS SATISFIED ITS REQUIREMENT TO PROVE [...] HAD A DUTY WHICH THEY BREACHED (RAISED BELOW 5T 11:24-25)  A breach of fiduciary duty is a theory in tort.
[brief] In 1972, about 8 years after the synagogue was completed and operating, the [...] filed a site plan/variance application to renovate and to expand the school building on Lot 5 to the [...].  As an adjoining owner, [...] was noticed of the Application and public hearing and attended, participated, and concurred in the School’s Application.  As established by the 1972 Board documents (Da901 - to 904; Da938 to 944), the School Lot 5 was deficient in size and capacity to meet even the School’s own parking requirement for the expanded school.  [...] represented and agreed that the School parking deficiency could receive a variance and that any occasional deficiency would be accommodated on other property owned by the [...].  (Da944)  At the time, the New [...] owned a nearby vacant parcel (Lot 10) across Sixth Street from the Synagogue and School and also owned an adjoining Lot 6 parcel (still owned by the Synagogue) available for parking vehicles.  No claim was raised in that 1972 Site Plan/Variance Hearing that [...] had any claim or right to use the school lots for off-site parking for Synagogue staff/attendees, (Da944) which obviously would have impacted the school Lot 5 expansion.
[brief] “Nevertheless, when the trial court's factual findings are ‘clearly mistaken,’ ‘the interests of justice demand intervention by an appellate court. ’”  State v. Erazo, 254 N.J. 277, 297 (2023) (quoting State v. L.H., 239 N.J. 22, 47 (2019) (internal quotations omitted)); see State v. S.S., 229 N.J. 360, 381 (2017) (“Deference ends when a trial court's factual findings are not supported by sufficient credible evidence in the record.
[directive] h.  Se requerirá que usted suministre y pague el costo del análisis de una muestra de su ADN que [Sí/Yes] [No/No] podría ser usada por las autoridades del orden público en la investigación de actividades delictivas?  You will be required to provide a DNA sample, which could be used by law enforcement for the investigation of criminal activity, and pay for the cost of testing?
[brief] [...] [...]  [...]  Mail: [...]  Tel: [...]  [...], of Counsel and on the brief (022171996)  [...]  [...], of Counsel and on the brief (020402010)  [...]  [...], on the brief (249542020)  [...]  TABLE OF CONTENTS  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT……………………………………………………………1  I.  PLAINTIFFS’ OPPOSITION CONFIRMS THAT THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE ADDUCED AT TRIAL TO SHOW THAT [...] WAS UNSKILLED, INCOMPETENT, UNFIT OR DANGEROUS……………………………………………………………………3  II.  PLAINTIFFS CANNOT ESTABLISH THAT IT WAS FORSEEABLE TO [...] THAT [...]'S INTERACTIONS WITH CUSTOMERS WHILE A TRAINEE WOULD CREATE A RISK OF HARM……………………………………………………………………5  III.  PLAINTIFFS' ATTEMPT TO DISTINGUISH NEGLIGENT  HIRING CLAIMS FROM NEGLIGENT SUPERVISION AND TRAINING CLAIMS IS IMMATERIAL AND ILLUSTRATES THE FLAW IN PLAINTIFFS' ARGUMENT……………………………………6  IV.  REVERSAL OF SUMMARY  JUDGMENT DOES NOT PRECLUDE A DIRECTED VERDICT AT TRIAL, PARTICULARLY WHEN NEW EVIDENCE IS PRODUCED AT TRIAL…………………………10  CONCLUSION………………………………………………………………………..12
[brief] PROCEDURAL HISTORY  On June 21, 2023, Plaintiff [...] (hereinafter “[...]”) filed an Order to Show Cause and Verified Complaint requesting temporary restraints to prevent the closing of title on real estate owned by Defendant [...], being transferred to the buyer, former Defendant [...], d/b/a [...]  1T. Dal.  The Defendants were present for arguments on June 21, 2023 and the Trial Court granted the Plaintiff’s request for temporary restraints, setting dates for submissions and a return date for July 25, 2023.  Da100.  On July 11, 2023, all Defendants filed Answers and Defendant [...] and its principals (also named as Defendants) filed an Objection to the Order to Show Cause with exhibits.  Da107, Da115, Da125.  On July 12, 2023, Defendant [...] filed a Motion to Dissolve the temporary restraints.  Da135.  Defendant, Amrit filed an Affidavit and also joined in the motion.  Da164, Da140.  On July 21, 2023, Plaintiff filed an objection to the motion.  Da148.  The return date of the Order to Show Cause and the motion were heard at oral argument on July 25, 2023 before the Trial Court.  2T.  The Trial Court denied the Defendants’ Motion and set a discovery schedule.  Da165.
[brief] The De Novo Court then further clarified that the Trial Court never indicated that Defendant’s latest 10-year suspension would run concurrently with any existing suspension.  (3T46-17 to 46-21)  Rather, [...]’s advisement regarding the suspension of Defendant’s license for “10 more years” was “in the broader context of the discussion on defendant’s license already having been suspended.  The con – in this context, “more” implies that the suspension is in addition to the earlier suspension and it’s not simply to run concurrently. ”  (3T46-17 to 46-21; 48-15 to 48-21)  In State v. Slater, 198 N.J. 145 (2009), the Court established a four-prong test for examining a defendant’s motion to withdraw a guilty plea.
[directive] It is the general policy of the State of New Jersey that law enforcement officers should only use the degree or intensity of force that reasonably appears necessary given the facts and circumstances perceived by the officer at the time force is used.  The reasonableness of force must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable law enforcement officer on the scene at the time of the incident.  The Attorney General’s Use of Force Policy (rev. 2000) formally recognizes five distinct types of force: constructive authority, physical contact, physical force, mechanical force, and deadly force.  The Attorney General’s supplemental policy on less lethal ammunition (2008) essentially established a distinct level of force, known as enhanced mechanical force, which, according to the Report to the Attorney General on Less-Lethal Ammunition (February 13, 2008) submitted by the Attorney General’s Advisory Group to Study Less-Lethal Force, is “an intermediate force option between mechanical force and deadly force, requiring a greater level of justification than that pertaining to physical or mechanical force, but a lower level of justification than that required for the use of deadly force. ”  2.  The Attorney General’s Use of Force Policy (rev. 2000) provides that deadly force may only be used when an officer reasonably believes that such force is immediately necessary to protect an officer or another person from imminent danger of death or -2- [DCJ 03/03/16] serious bodily injury.
[brief] Notably, [...] was shortly thereafter promoted.  (Pa723) 43:16-25.  Furthermore, [...] ¹⁰ (Pa895) DCF_Stouch000334-41, 719-729; (Pa564) 125:24-128:4 (Respondent [...] explaining that [...] was allowed to appeal his four day suspension for egregiously harassing Appellant, and successfully reduced his suspension to only three days.  [...] was thereafter granted a voluntary transfer and promotion).  repeatedly claims that due to the lack of control, transferring Appellant was their only option.  However, Respondent [...] did not even investigate to properly determine the appropriate remedial action for the situation.  Instead, [...] immediately transferred Appellant to a different location, where she was subjected to additional hostilities and retaliation, and wiped their hands clean of the situation.  Respondent [...] did nothing else.\footnote{(Pa655) 68:12-72:9, 75:1-19 (Respondent [...], [...]’s HR director, explaining he never spoke to Appellant after her initial complaint, nor did he ask for the text messages), 139:1-145:13 (Respondent [...] admitting he never knew the state conducted an investigation and substantiated Appellant’s complaints).}  At the very least, the above evidence clearly calls into question Respondents’ intent and the efficacy of the investigation process, thus raising an issue of material fact which precludes summary judgment.
[brief] 22 N.J.S.A. 40:55D-46 ....................................................................................................................  24 N.J.S.A. 40:55D-46(b) ...............................................................................................................  23 N.J.S.A. 40:55D-48 ....................................................................................................................  23, 24 N.J.S.A. 40:55D-68 ....................................................................................................................  36 N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70 ....................................................................................................................  35 N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70(c) ...............................................................................................................  ii, 6, 18, 34 N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70(c)(1) .........................................................................................................  10, 35 N.J.S.A. 5:12-218 through 5:12-233 ..........................................................................................
[brief] Therefore, the Plaintiff’s argument about the Palpably unreasonable conduct of the Defendant has nothing to do with the Roadway Project and is simply stating that the town has notice of the defect that caused the Plaintiff’s injuries and had every opportunity to repair it prior to the Plaintiff’s accident but failed to do so.  Therefore, their conduct was palpably unreasonable.  Moreover, [...] also confirmed in his deposition testimony that on or about September 17\textsuperscript{th} and September 21\textsuperscript{st} of 2020, \textbf{prior to the Plaintiff’s accident}, DPW workers were doing work in the area where the Plaintiff’s injury occurred.  (Pa 519).
[brief] (Da 132 to 133)  [...] also interviewed [...] in March of 2023.  (Aa 24 to 26)  On June 28, 2023, [...] provided a certification (Aa 24 to 26) that he was in fact interviewed by [...].  Also, he told [...] that he was in the physical presence of the defendant at the [...] on [...], in [...] from February 27, 2009, through March 1, 2009.  [...] stated that a few years after the defendant’s stay in North Carolina, he ([...]) personally returned to the [...] to obtain proof of the defendant’s stay at the [...], which he sent to the defendant who was detained in the [...], and that he was never contacted by the defendant’s trial attorney.  (Aa 24 to 26)  [...], a forensic expert provided a certification in support of the defendant’s PCR (Aa 21 to 23) that he reviewed the discovery materials for the defendant’s case.  Following his review, [...] issued a nine (9) page report highlighting trial counsel’s deficient performance with respect to the necessity for a forensic expert or crime scene expert to rebut the issues concerning the chain of custody for the DNA and fingerprint evidence, the failure of the detectives to adhere to the evidence storage policies of the [...], and evidence bags being opened and unsealed evidence envelopes.  (Aa 21 to 23)  A prima facie case is established when a defendant demonstrates “a reasonable likelihood that his or her claim, viewing the facts alleged in the light most favorable to the defendant, will ultimately succeed on the merits.
[brief] The Court awarded unjust enrichment of $50,000.00 to Plaintiff: 15.  Plaintiffs’ claims against Defendant, [...], based on undue influence, are dismissed with prejudice (Count IX of Plaintiffs’ Complaint).  Plaintiffs claims (Count IV, unjust enrichment) against [...] are granted, in part, for the reasons stated on the record, to the limited extent that consideration of equity requires that the %50,000 be reimbursed to [...] and [...], the Court having concluded that there is insufficient proof that the Plaintiff(s) made and intended an unconditional gift.  (Id. at Pa7).
[brief] Alcotest reading would have been a clear violation of not only precedent, but also his ethical duty as a prosecutor.  (3T:18-8 to 22).  The municipal prosecutor’s election to prosecute this DWI solely on [...]’ observations, see (2T:60-24 to 61-1; 3T:18-8 to 20-7), was wholly in keeping with New Jersey case precedent and at the time of trial, in keeping with his obligation under Guideline 4.
[directive] As laid out in the Directive, however, law enforcement officers should not ask to see any physical or anatomical “proof” of gender.  Any individual’s chosen name and chosen pronouns should be noted appropriately in all relevant documentation as “chosen name” and “chosen pronouns” (in addition to separate spaces already included for an “alias” or “nickname”).  Officers should record an individual’s legal name as stated on a government-issued identification document or other legal paperwork under “Legal name” in all Departmental forms and records.
[brief] JOINT BRIEF ON BEHALF OF DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS  On the Brief: [...] (ID# 018122000)  [...] (ID# 004272012)  [...] (ID# 023131983)  [...] (ID# 021182005)  [...] (ID# 019312006)  [...] (ID# 018972007)  [...] (Pro Hac Vice)  [...] (Pro Hac Vice)  [...] (Pro Hac Vice)  [...] (Pro Hac Vice)  [...] (Pro Hac Vice)  [...] (Pro Hac Vice)  [...] (Pro Hac Vice)  [...] (Pro Hac Vice)  [...] (Pro Hac Vice)  [...] (Pro Hac Vice)  [...] (Pro Hac Vice)  [...] (Pro Hac Vice)  [...]
[brief] After erroneously quoting, at length, [...]' decision, written over twenty years ago, the crux of [...]'s appeal argues a theory of estoppel based on a purported "back-room deal" made verbally in 2017 between [...], the former Mayor of Emerson, and [...], that was never memorialized in any written agreement between the Borough and [...], regarding a property that neither of the parties owned.  [...] further argues that the Court should act in place of a duly elected Mayor and Council and the local land use board to amend the Borough's redevelopment ordinance and grant any and all approvals, variances and waivers necessary for the Redeveloper to build seven (7) residential units on a small, undersized, irregularly shaped lot acquired by the Redeveloper, after a "site suitability" hearing.  The import of [...]'s argument is that if the site contains any affordable housing, it should not be required to abide by either existing zoning ordinances nor the mandated land use board applications.  [...] argues that the Borough "contemplated and agreed to" the seven (7) units being placed, despite it not being in any resolution, the developer's agreement, the redevelopment plan [...] itself negotiated, the settlement agreement, nor the agreement between the Borough and [...], or memorialized in any other writing.  Rather, [...] relies on a hearsay certification from former Mayor [...], that the Borough “agreed” to put seven units on the property.  It is respectfully submitted that the former Mayor did not have the authority to bind the Borough to such an agreement.  The appeal further asks the Court to disregard and usurp the following powers of the [...]; 1) Authority to adopt Ordinances pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40A:6-6; 2) Authority of the governing body to Zone pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40:55D-62; 3) Authority to designate areas in need of redevelopment pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40A:12a-1 to 89; 4) Authority to enter Redevelopment Agreements pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40A:12a-1 to 89; and, 5) Authority of local land use board to hear and approve site plan applications pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40:55D-25.
[brief] ...........................................................................................................  5  II.  THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING DEFENDANTS, INSURANCE PRODUCERS, ARE IMMUNE FROM LIABILITY UNDER THE NEW JERSEY CONSUMER FRAUD ACT (T18:11 to 19:25)  ..................................................................................................................  7  A.  The CFA Applies to Marketing, Sale and Procurement of Insurance (T23:13 to 24:16; T28:21 to 29:4) .............................................  7  B.  The Judicially Created “Learned Professional” Exemption To CFA  Liability Does Not Apply to Insurance Producers Or Other Semi-Professionals (T16:10 to 19:25)  ...........................................  8  CONCLUSION
[brief] U.S. CONST. AMENDS  V XIV, N.J. CONST. ART.  I PAR. 10 (ruling 13T:21-6 to; 24-23)  ...........................................  2.  POINT II  THE COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION FOR NOT ALLOWING THE DEFENSE TO PRESENT EVIDENCE OF UNTRUTHFULNESS ON THE PART OF ARRESTING OFFICER CAPTAIN ASTBURY.  FAILURE TO DO SO INFRINGED ON DEFENDANT’S RIGHT TO CONFRONT HIS ACCUSER AND COMPLETE DEFENSE.  THUS VIOLATING DEFENDANT’S RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL BY AN IMPARTIAL JURY.  A NEW TRIAL IS WARRANTED.  U.S. CONST. AMENDS VI, XIV N.J. CONST. ART.  I PAR. 10 (ruling 13T:25-7 to; 40-7)  ...........................................  8.  POINT III  THE JUDGE ABUSED HIS DISCRETION WHEN HE RECONSIDERED HIS OWN RULING THAT PROHIBITED THE STATES EXPERT STEPHEN DEADY TO TESTIFY THAT THE BULLETS IN MAGAZINE (CLIP)  FOUND ON DEFENDANT WAS FIRED FROM THE SAME WEAPON RECOVERED FROM THE SCENE; AND THE STATE FAILED TO ESTABLISH THAT THE PREVIOUS RULING WAS PALPABLY DEFICIENT.  THUS A NEW TRIAL IS WARRANTED.  U.S. CONST. AMEND VI, XIV N.J. CONST. ART. I PAR. 10  ...........................................  16.  CONCLUSION ..................................................................................
[brief] Respondent’s dismissal of its claim for the $17,900 unlawful debt against the Appellants, after the Appellants’ had already filed counterclaims for treble damages and equitable relief under the Consumer Fraud Act, does not somehow extinguish their claims, or the ascertainable loss that existed when the CFA claims accrued.  Under the CFA, “[a] consumer who proves (1) an unlawful practice, (2) an ‘ascertainable loss,’ and (3) ‘a causal relationship between the unlawful conduct and the ascertainable loss,’ is entitled to legal and/or equitable relief, treble damages, and reasonable attorneys' fees, N.J.S.A. 56:8-19. ”  Lee v. Carter-Reed Co., L.L.C., 203 N.J. 496, 521 (2010)(citation omitted).  The New Jersey Supreme Court has held that “ascertainable loss” is determined at the time it is initially suffered, and is not extinguished by a subsequent mitigating event, such as a post-filing refund, judicial cancellation of a sale, or a violator’s unilateral actions taken after the filing of claims for treble damages and equitable relief.