ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The Trial Court properly excluded [...]’s not-to-scale crash diagram  The trial court properly excluded the net lay opinion testimony of [...], as set forth in a not-to-scale diagram of the scene.  The testimony of police officers is unique.  "Police officers are usually the first witnesses to arrive at the scene of an automobile accident.  Before physical evidence at the scene is removed, distorted, or tampered with, they have the unique opportunity to observe it."  *State v. Labrutto*, 114 N.J. 187, 191 (1988).  Through mere fact testimony, "an officer is permitted to set forth what he or she perceived through one or more of the senses.  Fact testimony has always consisted of a description of what the officer did and saw, including, for example, that defendant stood on a corner, engaged in a brief conversation, looked around, reached into a bag, handed another person an item, accepted paper currency in exchange, threw the bag aside as the officer approached, and that the officer found drugs in the bag...  Testimony of that type includes no opinion, lay or expert, and does not convey information about what the officer "believed," "thought" or "suspected," but instead is an ordinary fact-based recitation by a witness with first-hand knowledge."  *State v. McLean*, 205 N.J. 438, 460 (2011) (citations omitted).  Under certain circumstances, however, a police officer may give lay opinion testimony.  "Courts in New Jersey have permitted police officers to testify as lay witnesses, based on their personal observations and their long experience in areas where expert testimony might otherwise be deemed necessary."  *State v. Labrutto*, 114 N.J. at 198.  Generally, a non-expert may give his opinion on matters of common knowledge and observation.  See *State v. Bealor*, 187 N.J. 574, 586 (2006).
[brief] | Pa. 101-103 | | Plaintiff [...]’s Notice of Motion dated July 7, 2022 to Amend his Complaint, Extend Discovery and Secure Compliance with Defense Counsel’s agreement to produce [...] for a deposition.  | Pa. 104-105 | | Certification of [...] in support of Plaintiff [...] in support of his motion to Amend the Complaint, Extend Discovery and Secure Compliance  With the Defense Counsel’s agreement to produce [...] for | TABLE OF CONTENTS TO THE APPENDIX OF PLAINTIFF
[brief] Criterion (d) allows designation of a property as a redevelopment area if the area contains buildings or improvements that are dilapidated, obsolete, overcrowded, have faulty arrangement or design, lack ventilation, light or sanitary facilities, or have a deleterious land use or obsolete layout, and such conditions are “detrimental to the safety, health, morals, or welfare of the community. ”  N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-5(d).
[brief] Application to the CRB was a necessary and mandatory step in the process prior to [...] even being permitted to file its application with the Planning Board.  (M-Da357).  The amendments to Section 196-33.1 were to the detriment of [...].  In Jai Sai Ram, LLC v. Planning Bd., 446 N.J. Super. 338 (App. Div. 2016), the Appellate Division held:
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[brief] The Parol Evidence Rule is a substantive rule of law that bars alleged oral misrepresentations that are expressly contradicted in a written agreement.  Filmlife, Inc. v. Mal “Z” Ena, Inc., 251 N.J. Super. 570, 574-75 (App. Div. 1991) (affirming dismissal).  The Rule also bars alleged oral misrepresentations contradicting the terms of an integrated contract in support of Consumer Fraud Act claims or other fraud related claims.  Id. (Affirming dismissal of, inter alia, CFA claims because alleged oral misrepresentations contradicted the terms of the lease and were barred by the Parol Evidence Rule).  Our Supreme Court addressed the Parol Evidence Rule in Conway v. 287 Corporate Center Associates, 187 N.J. 259 (2006) and unambiguously held “the Parol Evidence Rule prohibits the introduction of evidence that tends to alter an integrated written document”.
[brief] In other words, full retroactivity does not overcome the doctrine of res judicata.  The principle that retroactivity nevertheless applies to cases not yet filed is clear from the facts of Harper, as that case itself was not filed until after Davis was decided.  See Harper, 18 Va. Cir. 463 (1990).  Consequently, because Tyler found a taking on the facts there alleged and applied its ruling to the parties in that case, its ruling must be given full retroactive effect.  See Tyler, 598 U.S. at 647.  This Court understood that principle in Roberto, observing that Tyler must be given “full retroactive effect” regardless of whether cases “predate or postdate the Supreme Court’s decision.
[brief] “[A] determination of whether counsel should be disqualified is, as an issue of law, subject to de novo plenary appellate review. ”  City of Atlantic City v. Trupos, 201 N.J. 447, 463 (2010).  **LEGAL ARGUMENT**  **[...] CORRECTLY DISQUALIFIED [...] FROM JOINTLY REPRESENTING THE DEFENDANTS DUE TO A CONCURRENT CONFLICT OF INTEREST (Da001)**  The New Jersey Supreme Court has held that the resolution of a motion to disqualify counsel requires the Court to conduct a “painstaking analysis of the facts” in order to balance “the need to maintain the highest standards of the [legal] profession” against “a client’s right freely to choose his counsel.
[brief] MAC Prop. Grp. LLC v. Selective Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 252 N.J. 258 (2022), and cert. denied sub nom.  MAC Prop. Grp. LLC v. Selective Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 252 N.J. 261 (2022).  But Plaintiff’s appeal reduces to a request to deviate from [...], an established precedent directly on point.
[directive] If a civilian review board refers a complaint to a law enforcement agency, then those complaints should be forwarded to internal affairs for immediate investigation.  5.1.10  If a person comes to a particular law enforcement agency to make a complaint about a member of another law enforcement agency, he or she should be referred to that agency.  The complainant should also be advised that if they have fear or concerns about making the complaint directly to the agency, they may instead file a complaint with the County Prosecutor or the Attorney General’s Office.  5.1.11
[brief] We add the following.  When pressed, although defendant conceded that the disclosures made in the consultation may not be substantially related to the underlying lawsuit, defendant sporadically asserted that those disclosures may well become relevant should plaintiff succeed in the lawsuit, secure a judgment against defendant, and then seek to enforce that judgment.  Given the inherently theoretical and speculative nature of those concerns, we reject them as illusory and premature.  . . .  In that setting, and because [d]isqualification of counsel is a harsh discretionary remedy which must be used sparingly[,] Cavallaro v. Jamco Prop. Mgmt., 334 N.J. Super. 557, 572 (App. Div. 2000) (citing Dewey, supra), defendant’s application must be subject to careful scrutiny.  Against that necessarily high standard, defendant’s motion to disqualify counsel perforce must fail.
[brief] On or about August 29, 2022, a demand was filed by [...] seeking recovery of $10,000.00 on behalf of [...] as a result of an automobile collision that reportedly occurred in New Jersey on September 1, 2020.  This arbitration was assigned [...] (Da187-Da209).  19.  On October 28, 2022 the arbitrator denied [...]’s affirmative defense that New Jersey law prohibits [...]’s Med-Pay subrogation claim and as a result, the dispute was outside the scope of the Agreement.  A full arbitration hearing was held on October 28, 2022, and by decision published October 28, 2022, the arbitrator found in favor of [...].  The arbitrator simply found that the [...] insured was fully responsible for the underlying loss.  As a result, the arbitrator directed [...] to reimburse [...] the $10,000.00 demanded.  The award was amended to $500.00 (Da187-Da209).
[brief] *See, e.g.*, *Matter of Farmers’*, 256 N.J. Super. at 621 (“the interests of fairness and uniformity” mandate adoption of rules and regulations).  [...] was “entitled to something more than a general declaration of statutory purpose to guide [its] conduct before [it was] restricted . . . by [the Department] for what it then decides was wrong from its hindsight conception of what the public interest requires in the particular situation. ”  *Boller Beverages*, 38 N.J. at 152; *see FCC v. Fox TV Stations, Inc.*, 567 U.S. 239, 253 (2012) (“a fundamental principle in our legal system is that laws which regulate persons or entities must give fair notice of conduct that is forbidden or required. ”); *id.* (“unfair surprise” is improper).  The Department’s “excessive” holding boils down to *ipse dixit*.  The rates were excessive only because the Department ultimately said so (regardless that the disapproval letters did not).  This is not a valid basis for lawful administrative action.
[brief] A.  That there has been communication between [...] and [...] but no action was taken (4T p. 22 lines 16-19)  B.  Offers to remove punitive damage claim (4T p. 22 lines-21-22)  The court declined to adjourn the hearing and determined that A.  The motion before the court is both procedurally and substantively lacking (4T p. 24 lines 8-9)  B.  The court will set aside that there is no courtesy copy (4T p. 24 lines 10-11)  C.  No substitution of service or notice of appearance set aside (4T p. 24 lines 12-14)  D.  No briefs pursuant to R. 4:50-1 E.  No citation to a court Rule, no statute, no case the court can recall was referenced in any of [...]’s filing that the court can rely upon in justifying the use of the catchall to reopen the matter nor a showing of some likelihood of prevailing on the merits (4T p. 24 lines 15-24)  F.  The merits are not addressed (4T p. 24 line 25-P. 25 line 3  G.  Where is the excusable neglect and truly exceptional circumstances that qualifies under Guillaume?  (4T p. 25 line 3-10)  ARGUMENT
[brief] Moreover, a minor that is injured while illegally employed is entitled to double the amount provided for under the statutory compensation scheme.  N.J.S.A. 34:15-10.  Significantly, an employer who is liable to a minor who is awarded double the benefits under N.J.S.A. 34:15-10 because they were illegally employed is required to pay those additional benefits and the employer’s insurer is not liable for such additional benefits.  N.J.S.A. 34:15-10 (“The employer alone and not the insurance carrier shall be liable for the extra compensation or death benefit which is over and above the amount of the compensation or death benefit provided by R.S. 34:15-12 or R.S. 34:15-13. ”).  The *Variety Farms* court’s analysis very carefully recognizes the discrete purposes of Part One and Part Two coverage under the standard workers’ compensation policy.
[brief] [...] never stated same, and the implication is disturbing particularly in light of the fact that the [...] were never permitted to present their Quiet Title claim and evidence of the foreclosure related fees that had attached to their loan in the sum of approximately $200,000.00 (this is separate from the legal fees that the Law Division awarded to Plaintiff).  The Third Circuit already decided that the loan was in default dating back to 1992.  The [...] never missed a loan payment.  It was only Plaintiff who wrongfully placed the [...], or continued wrongful default and assessed approximately $200,000.00 in foreclosure related fees to their account.  [...] were not permitted to present their Quiet Title claim and evidence.  Following Plaintiff presentation of foreclosure enforcement of note, Plaintiff was granted Directed Verdict on [...]’ claim of Quiet Title without [...]’ ever presenting any Quiet Title evidence and documents.  Plaintiff erroneously states NJ R EVID N.J.R. E. 611 (a) in support of its wrongful assertion that [...]’s pretrial June 23, 2022 ten (10) minute testimony counted as toward the trial that was not to occur until July 11, 2022.  This is absurd.  Both Plaintiff and Defendant still had a couple weeks to prepare for trial, and [...]s’ testimony was about her character and what she did for a living.  The Judge called her to the stand, and neither attorney was prepared for trial testimony.  NJ R EVID N.J.R.E. 611 (a) does not give the trial judge broad discretion in converting a pre-trial conference into the actual trial.  Further, NJ R EVID N.J.R.E. 611 (a) does not give the trial judge broad discretion in permitting Plaintiff to proceed first on [...]’ claim of Quiet Title, and then granting Plaintiff Directed Verdict before Plaintiff had opportunity to present their Quiet Title claim, evidence, and documents.  The procedural error is not harmless.  It is structural error that completely wiped out [...] Quiet Title claim presentation.  Equally important, Quiet Title and ownership of property was never decided by the trial judge,  This is particularly disturbing given the fact that not only does Plaintiff extract a wrongful award of legal fees under Section 9 of the mortgage contract, but they subject [...] to loss of title to property and multiple future actions for additional fees (the foreclosure related fees assessed to loan are still outstanding).  Plaintiff wrongfully cites State v. Pinkston, 233 N.J. 495 (2018) and State v. Jones, 232 N.J. 308 (2018) in support of the cited Rule.  Pinkston has to do with final statement prior to criminal sentencing, and Jones involved pre-trial detention hearing.  Plaintiff is totally off the mark.  The [...] were precluded from presenting any Quiet Title evidence including key testimony from factual witness [...] regarding the fact that [...] could not locate [...]’ loan.  This was not harmless error – it was major structural procedural error, including wrongful Directed Verdict, which should equate to automatic reversal.  POINT II
[brief] A.  Emphasizing Defendant’s Right To Proffer An Alternative, Exonatory Explanation For His Tattoos To Counter The State’s Inculpatory Explanation, Violated Due Process By Diluting The State’s Burden Of Proof, Shifting The Burden To Defendant, And Burdening Defendant’s Choice To Remain Silent At Trial.  ..................................................................................................................53  TABLE OF CONTENTS (cont'd)  PAGE NOS. B.  [...]’s Identification Of Defendant As The Person In The March 5 Photograph With No Facial Tattoo Was Inadmissible Lay Opinion Testimony .................................................................60  POINT V THE CUMULATIVE IMPACT OF THE ERRORS DENIED DEFENDANT DUE PROCESS AND A FAIR TRIAL.
[brief] In making this decision, [...] noted that ... it would be inappropriate for the Court at this time to bar defendant’s expert without having heard presentation of testimony by the plaintiff’s expert, if in fact defendant’s expert has been submitted to rebut that of plaintiff’s expert.  The plaintiff’s expert could simply be limited to the subject area that [...] has outlined, or it could factor into areas about which, about which [...] has opined.  And I simply cannot make that determination here before trial.  Now, and as, also as counsel for the defendant points out there may be factual issues about which [...]’s opinion would be permissible under Rule 702.  The Court cannot now before trial make a determination as to what those factual issues may be before trial.  8T, p. 27, lines 22-25 and p. 28, lines 1-6.  For these reasons, [...] denied [...]’s motion without prejudice to the motion being renewed at trial.
[brief] Plaintiff alleges that the aforementioned wrongful conduct occurred due to Plaintiff’s disability and/or violated Plaintiff’s civil rights.  Regarding the State Defendants, Plaintiff alleges that various judges, prosecutors, and court administrative personnel conspired to maliciously prosecute Plaintiff either because of Plaintiff’s disability and/or to retaliate against Plaintiff’s father, [...], Esquire (hereinafter “[...]” or “Plaintiff’s counsel”) for [...]’s work advocating for people with disabilities in the New Jersey Superior Court.
[brief] The relevant action involved [...] challenging tax exemptions granted by the [...] for a redevelopment site.  The Appellate Division found that [...] lacked standing because he was neither a resident nor a property or business owner in Orange.  "He lives and pays property taxes in the same county, Essex, but not in the same municipality.  He does not have the standing of a resident or property or business owner of Orange to challenge its municipal actions. ”  Id. at *4.  [...]’s decision in the second challenge by [...], Jeffrey S. [...] v. [...], [...] and [...]  Docket No. [...] was also upheld upon appeal.
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[brief] She also used the auditorium when it was not approved.  (Redler Tr. 41:15-19; Da287).  12.  On another occasion, Plaintiff displaced students from their classroom because of her poor scheduling of AP testing, and while she kept those students in the cafeteria and they were missing instructional time, she offered them extra credit that "had nothing to do with what was being taught in the classroom" without conferring with or notifying the students' teachers, which put the teachers "in a bad light."
[brief] (Ra299 111:2-24.)  At the January 10, 2022 meeting, objector’s Counsel proffered [...] to the Board who, despite not having adequate credentials as a civil engineer and planner, and only being accepted by the Board as an expert in traffic engineering, provided “expert” testimony as to the Building Height Definition.  (Ra345 13:16 through Ra355 56:3.)  It is clear that [...]’s background was in traffic engineering and traffic planning because: (i) he testified to his 30 years of experience in traffic and transportation planning (Ra345 14:4-13); (ii) in response to a question on direct as to his planning expertise, he noted that he prepared traffic and transportation elements for various municipalities and reviewed master plans for 9 or 10 counties (Ra345 15:5-13); and (iii) he indicated that he has been a traffic engineer for 12 years just doing traffic engineering and traffic designs, and served as the traffic engineer for [...] (Ra345 15:14-21).
[brief] I.  [...] formed an enforceable arbitration agreement with [...] through the December Terms.  (Da301–304.)  .................................................................14  A.  [...]’s digital interface gave [...] reasonable notice of the contract’s terms  .........................................................................................................................15  B.  The December Terms unambiguously apprised [...] that she was waiving her right to sue [...] in court.  .................................................................16  1.  The December Terms’ arbitration agreement satisfies Atalese.  ....17  (a)  This Court has repeatedly held that an arbitration agreement need not contain an express jury trial waiver.  .................................................................18  (b)  The parties’ agreement details the distinctions between arbitration and a judicial forum.  .................................................................21  2.  [...] knew that she was waiving her right to a jury by agreeing to arbitration.  .........................................................................................................................24  C.  The arbitrator has sole authority to determine the enforceability of the arbitration agreement.................................................................25  D.  If Atalese precluded enforcement of this arbitration agreement, then it is preempted by the FAA as interpreted by the Supreme Court of the United States.........................................................30  II.
[brief] [...] confirms that the Deed from [...] to [...] does not include title to the Riparian Grant (1T134:19).  While [...] was in title, he chose to acquire the Riparian interest of the property that was adjacent to the upland but not the entire uplands, just a portion of the uplands.  Referring to J-5 (Pa923) he describes the Deed when Keansburg Heights sells to [...]:  When Keansburg Heights sells it to [...], the Deed is in Book 1111, Page 6.  That Deed is dated April 8, 1920.  That Deed which is interesting about the deed within the four corners of the Deed, you can tell that when they drew this Deed, they were very specific as to what wanted to convey.  It specifically talks about this map, not the Map, the other map also includes this map as well but it specifically limited to what is on this map and not on the other map which means that they knew that they didn’t want to sell the balance of the property off because they would have included it in here which made me also conclude that if they wanted to sell the Riparian title, they would have included the Riparian Title in the Deed.