ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] On August 9, 2019, a postcard with information about the Ricci Act was mailed to [...]’s home address (as well as the home addresses of over 200,000 other retirees).  (Pa11; Pa70-72).  And, on June 10, 2021, the Division posted a news item on its website advising members and retirees that the statutory eligibility period to register under the Ricci Act was expiring soon and that they must submit the Eligibility Registration Form by July 8, 2021.  (Pa11).  Although these additional methods were not required under the Ricci Act, [...] makes much of the fact that the Division’s postcard was not mailed to him by August 7, 2021.  (Pb11-12).  The record demonstrates that the postcard was mailed on August 9, 2021.  (Pa13; Pa70-72).  That slight delay in mailing the postcard is immaterial, as postcard notification was not required under the Ricci Act, and information about the Ricci Act was prominently posted on the Division’s website and publicly available for two years from the effective date of the statute.
[brief] In essence, the Defendants’ due process argument is predicated on their contention that they were not provided with adequate notice that the trial court might, on June 10, 2022, order a sealed bidding procedure for the Boonton Property and approve the sale of the Florida Property to the Trustee in her individual capacity.  Db23-24.  In an effort to show that they were unfairly taken by surprise, the Defendants grossly mischaracterize the trial court’s June 10, 2022 Order and the proceedings that led to it.  The trial court heard oral argument on June 8, 2022 on the Defendants’ motion for partial summary judgment.  The June 10, 2022 Order denied that motion without prejudice, and likewise denied the Plaintiff’s motion to eject the Defendants from the Boonton Property.  (Da18-19).  The trial court’s order of a sealed bidding procedure for the Boonton Property and authorizing the sale of the Florida Property to the Trustee in the June 10, 2022 Order were fully in keeping with its decision on those motions.  The Defendants assert that because the Plaintiff had not requested the sealed bidding procedure or authorization for the sale of the Florida Property in her motion, they were deprived of “the opportunity to oppose. ” (Db24).  This is disingenuous, if not outright misleading.  It was the Defendants themselves who had put these issues in play before the trial court.  In their notice of motion, the Defendants sought rulings based on Section 4.1A of the Trust that [...] had waived her right to purchase the Florida Property and that [...] had waived his right to purchase the Boonton Property, and further sought an order requiring the Trustee to offer the Boonton Property to [...] and the Florida Property to either [...] or Daryl.
[directive] On March 16, 2022, the [...] received an anonymous complaint through its online portal that [...] had been drinking on duty and had abused sick leave.  Specifically, the first allegation involved [...] consuming alcohol while detailed to escort a funeral procession in February 2022.  It is also alleged that on March 7, 2022 the officer used sick leave time while he was actually playing golf.  Summary of Factual Findings  Allegation #1 – Drinking on Duty  Investigation revealed that [...] was assigned to a funeral procession detail on February 22, 2022.  His time records indicate he was on duty from 10 am to 3 pm.  An interview of 2 witnesses confirmed that the Officer was present at the repast in uniform between approximately 1:30 and 2, but they did not see him drinking.  However, a review of the surveillance cameras from the kitchen area of the restaurant revealed him consuming a bottle of beer at 1:52 pm.  Finding: Sustained Allegation #2 – Misuse of Sick Time
[brief] We respectfully incorporate by reference the factual and legal arguments made in Plaintiff-Appellant’s Brief filed on August 17, 2023.  LEGAL ARGUMENT  I.  The Trial Court’s rationale in granting summary judgment below and Defendants’ arguments in this appeal are unavailing as [a] our Supreme Court has expressly held that there is no requirement under CEPA of employer complicity in the misconduct, and [b] there is no requirement under CEPA that in order for a plaintiff-employee to have a reasonable belief that conduct was in violation of a law, rule, regulation or public policy, an employer must have issued or announced a previously existing order, directive, policy, or practice sanctioning that illegal conduct.  (1T; 12a-27a)  As argued at length in Plaintiff-Appellant’s Brief at Point I.C., the record below establishes that Plaintiff is for the purposes of summary judgment a bona fide whistleblower under CEPA.  Defendants’ primary argument in their Brief is that Defendants did not engage in any conduct that was allegedly illegal or improper.  This argument is both legally and factually incorrect.  In Higgins v. Pascack Valley Hosp., 158 N.J. 404 (1999), our Supreme Court held that CEPA protects employees even in the absence of employer complicity in the misconduct at issue.
[brief] [26T72:14-25.]  Furthermore, the court very clearly instructed the jury that they must find that the Defendant had the purpose to commit the alleged underlying offenses to convict the Defendant of the relevant accomplice liability offenses.  (26T144:15-145:19).  Indeed, the charge that was read reflects the model jury charge verbatim, except for the necessary modifications specific to the case.  (26T138:15-148:17; See Model Jury Charges: Criminal Liability for Another’s Conduct/ Complicity – Lesser – Includes 2C:2-6.)  The court noted that knowledge of the conduct was not enough.  Rather, the jury was told that they must “find that this defendant had the purpose to participate in that particular crime” for which the Defendant was charged as an accomplice.  (26:144:21-23) (emphasis added).  The jury was also instructed that if they found that the Defendant had the purpose to commit a lesser included offense, e.g. theft, that they may consider whether he was an accomplice to the lesser offense.  (26T146:17-147:5.)  --- 2
[brief] Pursuant to the Court’s order dated December 4, 2023, [...]  ([...]), submits the following response in support of the [...]’s ([...]) Amicus Brief.  [...]’s amicus brief provides context, and a practical perspective, as to why the trial court’s order – which correctly applied established New Jersey products liability law – is consistent with the realities of a manufacturer’s decision-making as to placing a product on the market.  The trial court recognized and properly applied New Jersey products liability law.
[brief] *(Pb11).*  Instead, the court found that because the notice from the Division was sent “more than four years from the date of petitioner’s last contribution,” the Division’s own “day-to-day administration of its affairs” and interpretation of the two-year time limitation as expressed by the four-year notice further supported allowing Ensslin to file.  *Id.* at 338.  Here, there was no such letter informing [...] that he was eligible to file under the Ricci Act past the statutory deadline.  Thus, *Ensslin* does not support [...]’s proposition that untimely notice allows individuals to file at any time past the statutory deadline.
[brief] The trial judge considered submissions and supplemental submissions; however, the facts did not support enlargement of the forty-five (45) day period to submit a challenge.  Moreover, the legal authority asserted was considered and rejected as inapposite.  On appeal, [...] presents a mix of arguments: some previously considered and rejected by this Court, the trial court, and other trial courts; others are improperly raised on appeal for the first time.  None overcome the procedural bar or warrant an enlargement of time to challenge the Committee’s ordinance, including [...]’s suggestion to treat its parochial challenge as “a matter of public interest,” and the suggestion that the Committee’s action was improperly noticed.  The trial court correctly rejected [...]’s arguments and granted the motions to dismiss.  In doing so, the court held as a matter of law [...]’s interest in challenging this ordinance is not a matter of “public interest,” as that exception has been interpreted under prevailing case law.
[brief] Shea Eligibility Registration Form...............................................................................Pa18  Shea Request for Amended Benefits Form.................................................................Pa20  World Trade Center Health Program Illness Certification..........................................Pa21 Regional Cancer Care Associates Diagnosis..............................................................Pa22  Petition for Ricci Action Registration 3/3/23\(^1\).......................................................Pa23  Correspondence to [...] 3/23/23.................................Pa49  [...] Initial Decision 4/4/23..............................................Pa51  Reply to [...] 5/9/23.........................................................Pa54  Request for Reconsideration 8//7/23\(^2\).................................................................Pa60  Shea Administrative Denial 2/8/23...........................................................................Pa66  Shea Request for Amended Benefits Form 1/3/23..................................................Pa67  Shea Retirement Application......................................................................................Pa68 --- \(^1\)
[brief] And since the Court’s erroneous ‘no fraud’ finding necessarily resulted in the dismissal of all other causes of action asserted by the Plaintiff’s Amended Counterclaim, this Court should similarly reverse the dismissal of those counts.  a.  The Record Below Shows Unit 74 is a Common Element.  When the Condominium’s Master Deed was originally recorded, Unit 74 was listed as one of the Condominium’s 136 condominium units.  In fact, it had an appurtenant .81% interest in Condominium’s ‘common elements. ’  However, Section 8(e)Master Deed required at one of the unsold condominium units be designated as a common element for purposes of housing the Condominium’s Superintendent.  See Plaintiff’s Statement of Material Facts (“SOMF”) at ¶ 12 (relying on allegation set forth in Amended Complaint and Defendants’ failure to deny).  Subsequently, and pursuant to Section 8(e), Unit #74 was designated as a common element reserved for the building’s superintendent.
[brief] The record will reflect that the Court has received what's a 30-page transcript in this matter.  Pages 1 through 12 of the plea transcript which is fully a part of this record reflect what occurred with [...], [...] and counsel on the morning of November 29, 2016.  The two assistant prosecutors were there, the attorney for [...] who was [...], a very experienced criminal defense lawyer, was there with [...].  [...] began by indicating to [...] that he had been in jail since around May of 2011, more than five-and-a-half years at the time.  The judge indicated that he had cleared his calendar for December and that it was essentially trying for the trial to start.  [...] noted that there were some motions that were going to be addressed prior to jury selection but he also indicated that any opportunity to resolve the case by way of guilty plea was going to go away once they started the proceedings.  And [...] was joined by his co-counsel, [...].  [...] recognized that counsel had been working very hard to try to resolve the case and the Court indicated that they were going to move forward with the trial and the judge assured [...] that the jury would make the ultimate determination and assured him as well that he was going to get a fair trial.  The Court went over what the defendant’s exposure was in the various cases that he had and talked to him a little bit about what his exposure was.  There appears to be agreement that [...] would qualify as a persistent offender and the State indicated its intention to move for an extended term if he got convicted.
[brief] In addition, the jury should had been told, it could find defendant guilty of robbery even if they found [...] and [...] committed the crime of armed robbery.  When there is conflicting testimony in a trial, incorporating specific evidentiary facts into the jury instructions is helpful in guiding the jury in its task of determining defendant's guilt or innocence.  *State v. Parker*, 33 N.J. 79, 94, 162 A.2d 568 (1960); *State v. Concepcion*, Supra. 111 N.J. at 380, 545 A.2d 119.  Trial Courts should be mindful of their duty to provide correct and comprehensible jury instructions in criminal cases, which duty includes "incorporating [therein], the evidentiary context of persons, places and thing[s] and events disclosed at trial."
[brief] ARGUMENT  Preliminary relief is appropriate when the moving party establishes “(1) a likelihood of success on the merits; (2) irreparable harm; (3) a showing that on balance the harm to the moving party is greater than the harm to the party to be restrained; and (4) the public interest will not be harmed. ”  In re City of Newark, 469 N.J. Super 366, 387 (App. Div. 2021) (citing Crowe, 90 N.J. at 133); see also Waste Mgmt. of N.J., Inc. v. Union Cnty. Util. Auth., 399 N.J. Super. 508, 520 (App. Div. 2008) (confirming that while “all the Crowe factors must weigh in favor of injunctive relief, a court may take a less rigid view than it would after a final hearing when the interlocutory injunction is merely designed to preserve the status quo”).  This court also refuses to take “a grudging or narrow approach” to such relief if the State is seeking to maintain the status quo pending resolution of a DCR administrative action.  Pfaus, 97 N.J. Super. at 8.  The trial court did not abuse its discretion in preliminarily maintaining the status quo in the [...] while DCR’s administrative action proceeds.  See Rinaldo v. RLR Inv., LLC, 387 N.J. Super. 387, 395 (App. Div. 2006) (reviewing trial court’s decision to grant or deny preliminary relief only for abuse of discretion); Horizon Health Ctr. v. Felicissimo, 135 N.J. 126, 137 (1994) (“The authority to issue injunctive relief falls well within the discretion of a court of equity. ”); Interactive Brokers, LLC v. Barry, 457 N.J. Super. 357, 362 (App. Div. 2018) (emphasizing a preliminary-relief order should be upheld “unless it was ‘made without a rational explication, inexplicably departed from established practices, or rested on an impermissible basis’” (quoting Flagg v. Essex Cnty. Prosecutor, 171 N.J. 561, 571 (2002))).  First, the court correctly held that the State is likely to succeed on the merits.  Second, the court correctly held the remaining equitable factors—irreparable harm, balance of the equities, and public interest—all squarely support maintaining the status quo.  POINT I
[brief] In Re [...], Debtor United States Bankruptcy Court, CD. California.  October 21, 2008.  “A promissory note cannot be admitted into evidence unless it is authenticated.  Federal Rule of Evidence 901(a). ”  In my case the alleged copy of the subject Note (091a) which was attached to the alleged Affidavit of Lost Note” of 2/12/2014 was not authenticated (088a).  [...] did not oppose or deny this request to examine the alleged assignment of 2/27/2209 (065a), but [...] denied my request without statement of reason.  LEGAL POINT IV.
[directive] 귀하가 2C:20-2를 위반하여  차량 절도에 대해 유죄를 인정하고 그 범죄가 1991년4월2일 N.J.S.A.  이후에 발생했거나, 또는 2C:20-10을 위반하여  차량 탈취에 대해 유죄를 인정하고 그 N.J.S.A.  범죄가  1993년 8월2일 이후에 발생한 경우에만 다음의 질문들에 답변해야 합니다.
[brief] Finally, although [...] does not provide any case law to support its contention these alleged density and traffic issues represent a public interest, notably Willoughby and Concerned Citizens are both distinguishable on this point.  Indeed, those courts were concerned about likely traffic impacts on critical portions of the town.  In Willoughby, it was an impact on traffic flow on a major town thoroughfare, see Willoughby, 306 N.J. Super. at 277-78, and in Concerned Citizens it was the impact of developing a multi-level parking facility with related improvements in the middle of Princeton’s downtown.  Concerned Citizens, 370 N.J. Super. at 437-38.  Here, the Property upon which the Redevelopment Plan is located sits on the periphery of town “in order to take advantage of the regional transportation network and to limit impacts within the critical portion of the Township. ” (Pa98).  As a matter of law this is plainly not the type of density and traffic concerns the Willoughby and Concerned Citizens courts took note of.  Even if it were, those courts found density/traffic concerns there were additional public interest concerns to justify enlargement.
[brief] Please accept this letter memorandum in lieu of a more formal brief as allowed by R. 2:6-1(b) in response to the panel’s January 14, 2025 request for supplemental briefing on the impact of [...] v. [...], 2025 Lexis 2, on the issues raised in this appeal.  A.  Appellants Raised Tyler  While Their Case was “Presently Pending on Direct Review,” Entitling Appellants to Retroactive Application of Tyler  In [...], the Supreme Court upheld the Appellate Division’s determination that Tyler v. Hennepin County, 143 S.Ct. 1369 (May 25, 2023), should be applied retroactively to all matters “presently pending on direct review,” citing Harper v. Va. Dep’t of Tax’n, 509 U.S. 86, 97 (1993), and to cases on direct review in state court, citing Reynoldsville Casket Co. v. Hyde, 514 U.S. 749 (1995).
[brief] [...] has yet to provide access to [...]’s bank accounts despite Plaintiff’s status as a 10% member of the company.  These continued acts of oppression fly in the face of [...] and [...]’s fiduciary duties.  The Trial Court did not analyze or consider Plaintiff’s claims against [...] and [...] as a 10% member.  The Trial Court’s June 26, 2023 Order and Opinion did not account for Plaintiff’s legal right as a member to oversee and participate in the dissolution of [...].  The Trial Court’s August 30, 2023 Order and Opinion mischaracterized Plaintiff’s Motion to Reinstate [...] incorrectly as a motion for reconsideration, addressed none of the arguments raised by Plaintiff in her paper or at oral argument, and applied a boilerplate reconsideration standard when Plaintiff was seeking injunctive relief.  The Trial Court wholly failed to address [...] and [...]’s conduct in excluding Plaintiff from the dissolution of [...].  Therefore, the Trial Court’s Orders as to [...] and [...] should be reversed.
[brief] **IV.  Plaintiff’s Knowledge of Possible Defect in Title Related to the Strip**  Unlike [...] and its predecessors, [...] was well aware of the disputed nature of the Strip when he purchased Lot 4 from [...]  [...]’s Deed even conveyed Lot 4 in the unusual manner of describing separate “Tracts” in the Deed.  *Id.*  [...]’s Deed identifies “Tract I” of the property being conveyed as the same property conveyed in the 1971 Lot 4 Deed (which excluded the Strip).  *Id.*  [...]’s Deed also conveys land described as “Tract II,” which is a description of the Strip.  *Id.*  Sophisticated parties recognized the dubious nature of [...]’s claim to the Strip.  [...] issued a policy to [...] upon his purchase of Lot 4.  Pa71.  The policy insures Tract I, but specifically excludes Tract II from coverage.  Pa76.  Moreover, surveyor [...] prepared a survey of Lot 4, dated March 11, 1991, for the benefit of [...] before [...] purchased Lot 4 in June 1991 (the “Smith Survey”).  Da50.  The Smith Survey shaded the Strip and indicated that the Strip contains a “paved parking area in use by tax Lot 3. ”  Id.  According to [...]’s expert, the Smith Survey showed a deed overlap between Lot 3 and Lot 4.  Id.; 3Tr. 76:1-11.  [...] acknowledged the Smith Survey as one that his attorney had requested from [...], and that he had reviewed it before he purchased Lot 4.  2Tr. at 8:12-22.  [...] confirmed the Smith Survey’s findings with his own eyes.  [...] testified that before he purchased the property, he was aware that [...]’s predecessor-in-title was using part of the Strip as a parking lot.  2Tr. at 14:23 – 15:5.  Mr. [...] also testified that the parking lot on the Strip has not changed since he purchased Lot 4.  Id. at 17:15 – 18:2.  In fact, it was [...]’s understanding that the parking lot on the Strip had been in place since as far back as 1967.  Id. at 23:17-23.  [...] further admitted that Lot 3’s owners have had exclusive use of the parking lot since his purchase in 1991 – neither [...] nor any of his employees or guests have parked on the Strip.  Id. at 18:3-16.  Not only did [...] occupy the Strip by using it as a parking lot, but [...] and its predecessors also maintained the Strip.  For example, from time to time, [...]’s maintenance personnel cut the grass in the Strip.  1Tr. at 151:13-17.  [...] also maintained the parking lot on the Strip, including paving and seal-coating.  Da24.  [...]’s principal also testified that the Strip was essential to [...] to comply with municipal zoning laws, including providing the minimum number of parking spaces and having minimum side setbacks for Lot 4.  1Tr. at 143:4 – 150:13.  In contrast, [...] has never maintained the parking lot included in the Strip, and testified that he did not use the Strip for any purpose.  2Tr. at 19:17 – 20:21; 24:22 – 25:17.  THE DECISION BELOW
[brief] Ibid.  Despite this prohibition, she did just that.  As the State summarized it, in nearly half of the 50 surveillance videos, [...] “would point out when the Chevy Malibu appeared on screen” as part of her explanation of the police investigation into the “vehicle of interest. ”  (Sb17-19)  Because many of the videos were too blurry to discern the images on screen, whether the Chevy was, in fact, on screen was in dispute.  It was thus precisely the type of testimony the Court deemed inadmissible in Watson, prohibiting an “an investigator [from] say[ing] ‘that’s the same blue car,” on screen, when that fact is disputed.  Watson, 254 N.J. at 604 (emphasis added)  And, contrary to the State’s argument, this inadmissible testimony cannot be redeemed by the mere fact that it involved discussion of the broader investigative context.  As the Court held in Allen, narration testimony is improper wherever it provides an opinion as to a disputed fact or is based upon an inference, regardless of whether it was otherwise offered for a lawful purpose.  254 N.J. at 548-49.  [...] clearly opined upon a disputed fact by identifying the Chevy in unclear videos.  Such identification testimony violated Watson factor three, and was therefore improper.  As for [...]’s testimony identifying both the shooter and [...] on screen, the State does not directly dispute [...]’s argument that such comments violated Watson.
[directive] Likewise, if excessive force complaints are never sustained by an agency, the County Prosecutor may elect to review the body worn camera footage of force incidents to make an independent assessment.  Even if the County Prosecutor’s Office finds that there have been no substantive errors in an agency’s dispositions or disciplinary decisions, periodic reviews might uncover procedural deficiencies that, if allowed to continue, might INTERNAL AFFAIRS POLICY & PROCEDURES | November 2022 69 result in serious errors in the future.  In instances where a County Prosecutor reviewed a matter for potential criminal prosecution, declined prosecution and referred back for administrative action, the County Prosecutor must review the ultimate disposition of those matters.  INTERNAL AFFAIRS POLICY & PROCEDURES | November 2022 70