ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] *Manata v. Pereira*, 436 N.J. Super. 330 (App. Div. 2014).  In *Manata*, the court found “that a new trial is required because of evidentiary errors pertaining to the issue of liability.  In particular, plaintiff's counsel engaged in improper cross-examination when he confronted defendant with a police report that counsel did not offer in evidence, but whose substance he communicated to the jury. ”  *Id.* at 330.  The police report at issue was based solely on plaintiff’s version of events and was used on cross examination and at closing to impugn defendant’s credibility and to establish the accident happened exactly as plaintiff described.
[brief] DOCKET NO. [...]  Criminal Action: On Appeal From a Judgment of Conviction of the Superior Court, Law Division, Essex County.  Sat Below: Hon. [...], J.S.C.  Honorable Judges:  Pursuant to R. 2:6-2(b) and R. 2:6-4(a), this letter in lieu of a more formal brief is submitted on behalf of the State of New Jersey in response to defendant’s brief in the above-entitled matter.  TABLE OF CONTENTS  COUNTER - STATEMENT  PROCEDURAL HISTORY ..................................  1 COUNTER - STATEMENT OF FACTS .........................................................  2  LEGAL ARGUMENT: POINT I: .............................................................................................................  5  THE LEAVING THE SCENE OF AN ACCIDENT AND FAILURE TO REPORT AN ACCIDENT WERE PROVED BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT AGAINST THE DEFENDANT.  CONCLUSION ...........................................................................................................
[brief] (6T56-22 to 74-24).  Leaving no doubt that his conclusion was a judgment call, [...] explained during at least one of those lines of questioning that “[a]t this point based upon my training and experience as a fingerprint examiner, I’ve reached the opinion that Latent 0101 originated from the same source as the Number 3 finger of [defendant].” (6T67-1 to 4).  In addition, the judge’s instruction at the opening and close of trial, read directly from the Model Jury Charges—and closely resembling the Third Circuit’s model charge cited favorably by the Innocence Project—reaffirmed that the jury was free to reject Lieutenant [...]’s opinion testimony.  See, e.g., (4T51-9 to 14 (“You are not bound by [[...]’s] opinion but you should consider each opinion and give it weight to which you deem it is entitled, whether that be great or slight, or you may reject it. ”); 7T32-6 to 11 (same); 4T51-18 to 23 (“The value or weight of the opinion of the expert is dependent upon, and is no stronger than, the facts on which it is based.  In other words, the probative value of the opinion will depend upon whether from all of the evidence in the case you find that those facts are true. ”); 7T32-18 to 23 (same)).  While the Innocence Project focuses its analysis on situations where expert witnesses purportedly attempt to “prove too much,” that scenario simply did not occur here.  It was explicitly clear to the jury that the ACE-V process is not foolproof and [...]’s conclusion was an opinion based on his training and experience—a reliable opinion, as the jury concluded, but an opinion nonetheless.
[brief] See, Jesse A. Howland & Sons, Inc. v. The Borough of Freehold, 143 NJ Super 484 (App. Div. 1976).  Here, however, the Respondents did not seek to apply equitable estoppel against the municipality.  They were on the same side.  Nor in the Jesse A. Howland case was there an on point, unanimous decision by the [...] followed by Freehold’s building inspector.  Respondents are not asserting that the [...] official made a mistake, nor did the Borough when it was a party in this case.  Only the Appellants herein are engaged in second guessing.  Based on the Borough’s authorization, Respondents proceeded to prepare the building for its new tenant and then proceeded to conduct an ongoing business.  It was an appropriate reliance and resulting conduct.  Thus, inasmuch as the Borough’s zoning officer had the right to make the determination whether the intended use was a non-conforming use, and he made that determination, and the Respondents relied upon that determination, the existence of [...] as a valid non-conforming use should be deemed incontrovertible.
[brief] Pb24.  In making this argument, Plaintiff cites the wrong subsection of N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-8(f).  As stated throughout, under N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-8(f), the City was authorized to “negotiate and collective revenue from a redeveloper to defray the costs of the redevelopment entity. ”  Separately, under a different subsection of N.J.S.A. 40A:12-8(f), the City was also authorized to “arrange or contract with public agencies or redeveloper for the opening, grading or closing of streets, roads, roadways, alleys, or other places or for the furnishing of facilities or for the acquisition by such agency of property options or property rights or for the furnishing of property or services in connection with a redevelopment area.
[directive] Id. at 574.  Since forfeiture of employment and future disqualification are such severe non-penal consequences, the Court further held that it would not sanction a decisional process that might yield ad hoc or arbitrary determinations.  Id. at 577 (quoting from State v. Leonardis, 71 N.J. 85, 121 (1976)).  To safeguard against such abuses, the Court directed the Attorney General to promulgate written guidelines for use by prosecutors in determining whether to seek a waiver of the requirements.4  forfeiture and disqualification
[brief] See *Grover*, 80 N.J. at 229; *Hirsch*, 215 N.J. at 192; *Bacon*, A-0789-14T1; *Phoenix Motor Co.*, 144 So. 3d at 696.  Even if the MOU and/or Operating Agreements’ arbitration provisions were capable of compelling arbitration of the 2022 Addendum, which they cannot, the MOU was abandoned and supplanted by the Operating Agreements - which agreements do not apply to the issues in dispute in this case, i.e., whether [...] can buy the Property for $6 million, let alone compel the arbitration of the 2022 Addendum upon which [...] brought this case.
[brief] In interpreting the local ordinance, the local board shall determine the legislative direction given by the governing body.  The Supreme Court described this deliberative process in Medici v. BPR Co., 107 N.J. 1, 20-21 (1987), as follows:  When an informed governing body does not change the ordinance, a board of adjustment may reasonably infer that its inaction was deliberate.  Our role is to give effect to these legislative policies.  In the use-variance context, we believe this can best be achieved by requiring, in addition to proof of special reasons, an enhanced quality of proof and clear and specific findings by the board of adjustment that the variance sought is not inconsistent with the intent and purpose of the master plan and zoning ordinance.
[brief] On May 25, 2022, Plaintiff filed her Class Action Complaint in the Superior Court.  Pa1.  On June 30, 2022, Defendant filed notice of its filing of a Notice of Removal in the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey.  Pa152.  On October 17, 2022, after the District Court remanded the action, Defendant filed its motion to dismiss the Complaint pursuant to R. 4:6-2(e).  Pa154.  The motion court conducted a motion hearing on June 15, 2023.  T1.  On July 13, 2022, the motion court filed its Order dismissing the Complaint with prejudice for the reasons set forth in the record on June 15, 2023.  Pa11.
[brief] 17  Torres v. Kuzniasz, 936 F. Supp. 1201, 1206 (D.N.J. 1996)  24 Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 84, (1987)  17, 29, 30, 31 United Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc. v. Township of Warrington, PA, 316 F.3d 392, 399-400 (3d Cir. 2003)  19 Upchurch v City of Orange  24 Van Dam Egg Co. v. Allendale Farms, Inc., 199 NJ Super 42 (App. Div. 1985)  11  Velantzas v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 109 N.J. 189, 192 (1988)  12 Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555-56, (1974)  16 Waldrop v Evans 871 F.2d 1030, 1034-35 (11 Cir 1989)
[brief] TRIAL COURT VIOLATED THE CONSTITUTIONALLY ENSHRINED DUE PROCESS RIGHTS AND LIBERTY INTEREST OF PLAINTIFF AND HIS CHILD BY ORDERING THE CONFISCATION OF THEIR PASSPORTS WITHOUT CONDUCTING A PLENARY HEARING, WITHOUT PROVIDING ANY LEGAL AND FACTUAL BASIS FOR ITS DECISION, AND DESPITE ITS CLEAR FINDING THAT DEFENDANT DID NOT PROVIDE ANY EVIDENTIARY BASIS OF HER BELIEF THAT PLAINTIFF WAS ABOUT TO FLEE THE COUNTRY.  (Pa1150-51)  In its January 12, 2024 order (Pa1149), trial court ordered the confiscation of the parties’ and the child’s passports based on a mere expression by defendant of her suspicion of plaintiff’s intent to flee the country to evade his equitable distribution obligation to her.  The trial court did so despite its factual finding in the January 3, 2024 order (Pa1148) that there was no evidence before the court that plaintiff was about to flee the country, a finding that was reiterated in the January 26, 2024 order (Pa1214).
[brief] Plaintiff began his career at defendant [...] in January of 1986.  (Pa401).  During his thirty-year career --- 1T refers to the January 4, 2019 transcript, 2T refers to the May 31, 2019 transcript and 3T refers to the November 10, 2022 transcript.  2  The full Statement of Facts are set forth in Plaintiff’s Statement of Material Facts in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (Pa401-Pa446) and the pertinent evidence set forth in a narrative chronological summary is set forth here in conformance with Rule 2:6-2(a)(5).
[brief] The family court abused its discretion in denying Rule 4:50 relief to defendant (A227, A437)  Even accepting [...]’s findings of fact, those facts, coupled with the court filings and transcript from the two month divorce litigation, show there was fundamental unfairness to [...] in the process leading to the Final Judgment of Divorce and its substantive result.  [...] committed reversible error because he failed to apply the correct governing legal principles to determine whether [...] was entitled to relief from this judgment predicated on default – in a divorce case where New Jersey courts have always stressed default judgments should be avoided.  [...] respectfully asks the Court to reverse [...]’s orders denying relief to her, vacate the equitable distribution and alimony provisions of the Final Judgment of Divorce previously entered, and remand this matter for a fresh determination of the equitable distribution and alimony issues between the parties.
[directive] CATEGORY  Defendant Name Promis Number Prior Convictions/Adjudications* Date Sentence Imposed Offense  Degree  Criminal History Points 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10.  * Use asterisk to indicate juvenile disposition.  Total number of Criminal History Points  Table 1.  Degree Adult Conviction points  Juvenile Adjudication points  First 20 10 Second 12 6  Third 6 3 Fourth 4 2  Disorderly Persons 2  1  Select the appropriate Criminal History Category from Table 2 below.  Table 2.  Criminal History Category
[brief] (C.C.Da.1-100):  [...] Complaint 378.  Pursuant to IFPA §4(b), defendants . . .and other unknown persons are jointly liable to the plaintiffs because they knowingly conspired with, aided, abetted, or urged each other, and other unknown persons, to violate IFPA §§4(a)(1) through (3) and (c) in connection with [...]’s violations of the CPOM.  379.  Further, pursuant to IFPA §4(c), defendants . . .and other unknown persons are jointly liable to the plaintiffs because, as a result of their assistance to, conspiracy with, or urging of each other, and other unknown persons, to engage in the CPOM violations, each defendant knowingly benefitted, directly or indirectly, from the proceeds derived from the multiple claims for payment for No-Fault medical, chiropractic and other health care benefits that were submitted to the plaintiffs in connection with [...]’s CPOM violations and in violation of IFPA §§4(a)(1) through (3).  384.  Defendants . . .and others conspired or aided and abetted each other to submit, or cause to be submitted, claims for payment for medical services to the plaintiffs that violated the New Jersey anti-kickback and anti-self-referral laws, as follows.  498.  The defendants associated and conspired with each other and other unknown persons to form an Enterprise within the definition of N.J.S.A. §2C:41-1(d), as described by ¶¶316 through 349, above.  506.  Thus, proof of a pattern of IFPA violations with respect to the CPOM, as alleged herein, also proves a pattern of violating N.J.S.A. §2C:21-20(d) because the [...], with the knowing aid, assistance and encouragement of their co-conspirators, engaged in the hiring, employment and direction of plenary physicians; the provision of medical services to the general public; billing insurance companies for reimbursement for such medical services; and influencing, or directing others to influence, medical decision making; all activities for which a plenary license to practice medicine is a necessary prerequisite.  (C.C.Da.1-100)(emphasis added).  However, in the Motion to Disqualify subject to this appeal [...] must pivot one hundred eighty degrees and argue, contrary to their initial pleading, that there is no unity of interest or commonality and each defendant must obtain separate counsel as a result.  See, Pb.21-44.  [...] cannot have it both ways: argue a joint conspiracy and racketeering enterprise in its complaint and argue the exact opposite in their motion to disqualify based upon a purported disunity of interest and actual conflict.  These contrary positions and arguments ring hollow warranting affirmation of the trial court’s denial of [...]’s Motion to Disqualify counsel.
[brief] JUDGMENT IS TIMELY (Not raised below)  Defendant is filing its Appeal From Final Order Of Summary Judgment (“Appeal”) under R. 4:50-1.  R. 4:50-2 specifies that the Appeal must be filed within a reasonable time and that for reasons (a), (b) and (c) of Rule 4:50-1, not more than one year after the order was entered or taken.  The lower Court ordered summary judgment for Plaintiff on November 9, 2022.  Defendant has filed the instant Appeal approximately 10 weeks after receipt of the November 9, 2022 order.  In the Baumann v. Marinaro case, 95 N.J. 380 (1984), the defendant made a motion for relief under R. 4:50-1, three months after judgment was entered.  The Court held at page 393:  “Thus, in the present case, we find that the defendants are not automatically foreclosed from relief under R. 4:50-1 because they failed to make a timely motion under R. 4:49-1. ”  The Court found that the motion under R. 4:50-1 was timely.  In Kemp v. United States, No. 21-5726, 142 S. Ct. 1107 (2022), Kemp alleged that the district court judge miscalculated an applicable filing date.  In an 8-1 decision, the Supreme Court held that the term “mistake” in FRCP Rule 60(b)(1) includes judges’ errors of law.  The Court further held that a “mistake” is not limited to “obvious legal errors. ”  Id. at 4.  “When adopted in 1938, Rule 60(b) initially referred to ‘his’ - i.e., a party’s mistake, so judicial errors were not covered.  The 1946 revision to the Rule deleted the word ‘his’, thereby removing any limitation on whose mistakes could qualify. ”  Id. at 5-6.  R. 4:50-1 is virtually identical to FRCP 60(b)(1).  R. 4:50-1 applies because the lower Court made a mistake in allowing Plaintiff to maintain its cause of action based on a void summons and complaint and a void motion for summary judgment.  As a result, Defendant’s right to due process was violated.  U.S. Constitution, 14th Amendment, Kemp, supra.
[brief] B.  The State Board Has The Right To Regulate Teaching Certificates, Not The Arbitrator.  [...] next offers a red herring: he argues that the arbitrator’s decision to impose a three-month suspension from his job, and the State Board’s decision to suspend his certificate, are in conflict and, thus, constitute arbitrary and capricious conduct.  (Pb18).  He argues that the State Board was estopped from taking any action against his certificate once the arbitrator made his decision.  (Id.).  At the outset, we note: this argument mischaracterizes the issue before the ALJ and Commissioner.  The only issue before them was whether the [...]—not the State Board—acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner.  The State Board wasn’t even a party to the Petition of Appeal.  (See Pa34-Pa36).  What [...] is really arguing is that the [...], a local school district, should have reviewed the State Board’s decision suspending his certificate, deemed it inconsistent with the arbitrator’s decision, and then disregarded it.  There’s no authority for the [...] to sit in such a reviewing capacity of the State Board.  Local governments must follow, not ignore, State law.  See Summer, 53 N.J. at 554.  [...]’s position invites unnecessary chaos—all of which he could have avoided by seeking a timely stay.
[brief] State Cases | Case Name | Page(s) | |------------------------------------------------|---------| | Ayers v. Jackson Township, 106 N.J. 557 (1987) | 33 | | Balsamides v. Protameen Chemicals, 160 N.J. 352 (1999) | 9 | Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 142 N.J. 520 (1995) .................................................................9,10,11
[brief] The mere fact that [...] dismissed one of a number of defendants for failure to comply with the Affidavit of Merit statute does not demonstrate irreparable injury or make immediate appeal in the interest of justice.  Any error that Plaintiff believes [...] committed can be reviewed by this Court at the conclusion of the case after a final order; at that time, this Court can issue any appropriate order.  Plaintiff, however, can point to no urgent necessity or injustice justifying immediate review of the type for which interlocutory appeal was designed to address.  In *Romano v. Maglio*, 41 N.J. Super. 561 (App. Div. 1956), certif. den’d 22 N.J. 574 (1956), cert. den’d 353 U.S. 923, 1 L.Ed. 2d 720, 77 S.Ct. 682 (1957), the Appellate Division held that interlocutory appeal is proper where grave or irreversible damage is at stake, such as orders affecting injunctions, receiverships, or where the Court determines that personal jurisdiction over a defendant exists.
[brief] It is well established that where the underlying conduct is of an egregious nature, the imposition of a penalty up to and including removal is appropriate, regardless of an individual's disciplinary history.  *Henry v. Rahway State Prison*, *supra*.  Other factors to consider are the nature of the misconduct, the nature of the employee's job, and the impact of the misconduct on the public interest.  As these standards were applied by the lower court and no evidence was presented to show the decision below was arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable, or unsupported by substantial credible evidence in the record as a whole, the *de novo* findings should not be disturbed.
[brief] (App. Div. 1996) | 13 | | Globe Motor Corporation v Igdalev, 225 N.J. 469(2016) | 12 | | Hassan v. Williams, 467 N.J. Super. 190 (App Div 2021 | 5 | | Hollywood Café Diner, Inc. v. Jaffe 417 N.J. Super. 410 (App. Div. 2022) | 2, 14 | Johnson v. McClellan, 468 N.J. Super., 562 (App. Div. 2021)
[brief] (Da211.)  If obtained, the one Estoppel Certificate was to be promptly delivered so it may be examined to see if it qualified as an Acceptable Estoppel Certificate.  (Id.)  If a default was disclosed, it would not be an Acceptable Estoppel Certificate.  (Id.)  Ultimately, Defendant’s failure “to obtain an Acceptable Estoppel Certificate from [[...]] shall not be deemed a default by [Defendant], it being agreed that the sole remedy of [Plaintiff] in the event [Defendant] does not obtain an Acceptable Estoppel Certificate from [[...]] shall be to terminate this Agreement and receive a refund of the Down Payment. ”  (Id.)  There is no requirement, clause, or inference in paragraph 13.10 or the PSA that (1) Defendant must provide an Acceptable Estoppel Certificate, and (2) must deliver same at any point in time let alone by the closing date.  (Id.; Da190-224.)  If anything, the PSA proves the contrary.  Paragraph 9.1(xix) states that the closing is not conditioned on delivering the Acceptable Estoppel Certificate, only that one be provided “if obtained by [Defendant]. ” \(^3\) (Da205.)  Nothing in the PSA supports the notion multiple Estoppel Certificates may be submitted.  The contrary is true.  The directive uses the definite article when it states “[u]pon receipt of the executed Estoppel Certificate, Seller shall promptly”.  (Da211)  [Emphasis added].  The impact of this is underscored by the fact a shift occurs from the indefinite article ‘an’ used in the two sentences preceding the delivery directive, to the definite article ‘the’.  (Id.)  The language, grammar and structure in paragraph 13.10 describes a specific process for obtaining an estoppel certificate, what and how many are to be delivered and the remedy if a supplied estoppel certificate discloses a default.  (Id.)  It begins with requiring Defendant to request “an estoppel certificate” --- \(^3\) Paragraph 9.1 states “At the Closing, Seller [Defendant] shall execute and/or deliver the following” and in subparagraph (xix) states “if obtained by Seller [Defendant], a duly executed Acceptable Estoppel Certificate (as defined in Paragraph 13.10). ”  (Da205.) within 10 days of when the PSA is signed, well within the 30 days of due diligence also running from contract execution.  (Id.)  Next it describes the two estoppel certificates included in the definition of “Estoppel Certificate”.  (Id.)  Then it requires Defendant to use commercially reasonable efforts to obtain “an Estoppel Certificate”.  (Id.)  The obligation imposed on Defendant ends requiring it to “promptly” deliver “the executed Estoppel Certificate”.  (Id.)  This is followed by a discussion of Acceptable Estoppel Certificate.  (Id.)  That discussion does not require Defendant to provide an Acceptable Estoppel Certificate, either before closing or at any other time.  (Id.)  Rather it only says an Acceptable Estoppel Certificate cannot disclose any defaults.  (Id.)  Finally, it specifies that a disclosed default in a certificate means it is not an Acceptable Estoppel Certificate and Plaintiff’s only recourse is to terminate.  (Id.)  D.  What Plaintiff Knew on Signing the PSA; Closing Delayed to June
[brief] [...] looked up to twenty-year-old [...] – who in his eyes “had status… girls, money, a car” and “people listened to [him] because he had already been to prison. ”  (3T:30-31, 57-3 to 25)  (Da 121)  [...] saw twenty- year-old [...] as someone who “commanded authority” and was respected in the community.  (3T:57-3 to 25)  While [...] had generally done well in school, his grades dropped in high school and he was transferred to an alternative high school after coming to class smelling like marijuana during his junior year.