ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] As the trial court correctly concluded  When one considers the named defendants in this case, it is clear that RPC 1.10(a) is inapplicable because no concurrent conflict of interest exists pursuant to RPC 1.7(a).  No defendant entities or individuals are part of the Office of the Attorney General that issued the indictment against [...] in his personal capacity.  Additionally, there is no significant risk that [...]’s representation of the defendants will be materially limited in any manner by [...]’s responsibilities to another client, a former client, or a third person or by a personal interest of the lawyer.  As noted above, neither [...], nor [...], nor [...], have any adverse interest at all to the clients they represent in this matter.  This is supported by the three certifications submitted as part of this motion.  (T7-8).  For all of these reasons, [...] fails to demonstrate any conflict of interest under RPC 1.7(a) or RPC 1.10 that prohibits [...] from continuing its representation of the Defendants-Respondents in this consolidated matter.  As such, the appeal should be denied.
[brief] See Am. Energy Corp. v. Rockies Express Pipeline LLC, 622 F.3d 602, 605 (6th Cir. 2010)(stating that “[e]xclusive means exclusive, and the Natural Gas Act nowhere permits an aggrieved party otherwise to pursue collateral review of a FERC certificate in state court or federal district court. ”).  Here, Appellants’ claims related to air pollution and impacts on climate change were considered by FERC and by the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, and were rejected.  Specifically, Appellant [...] submitted comments to FERC during the NEPA review process, sought rehearing of the FERC Certificate Order pursuant to 15 U.S.C. 717r(a), and the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals reviewed the issues raised by [...].  At each step of the way, [...] challenged FERC’s analysis of the Project’s impacts on climate change and failed.  As such, Appellants cannot relitigate these same issues before this Court as they are an impermissible collateral attack on the Certificate Order.
[brief] Plaintiff [...] has never offered an alternative version of his conduct as it was detailed in the underlying lawsuit.  Instead, [...] relied on – and repeatedly cited, throughout his voluminous submissions to the lower court – a statement made by Association Counsel [...] in a certification, to the effect that [...] “cannot view himself as having done anything wrong,” and does not appreciate the effect he has on other people.  See e.g., Pa21, ¶106; see also Pb16.  The comments of an attorney for the Association regarding [...]’ psyche are hardly dispositive of anything, but even the implication that [...] was unaware of his demeanor does not transform the described actions, which were undeniably voluntary and done on purpose, into actions of an “accidental” nature.  The detailed account set forth in the underlying complaint – to the extent it can be said that such conduct caused bodily injury to any of the plaintiffs in that matter – precludes a determination that any such injuries were caused by an accident, as the lower court correctly determined.  [...]’ brief on appeal similarly contains numerous statements to the effect that he simply did not intend or expect that his conduct would be injurious in any way.  See, e.g., Pb42, Pb48.  Nor does plaintiff’s attempt to transform what occurred into covered occurrences by referring to the conduct described in the underlying complaint as “accidental occurrences” (Pb25) convert what is objectively intentional conduct to anything else.  It is well-settled that when there is a dispute regarding the applicability of a liability policy, it is the insured’s burden to establish that the claim lies within the policy’s scope of coverage.
[brief] Plaintiff’s filing repeatedly ignores appellate court rules.  For example:  • Rule 2:6-1(a)(1) (“Required [Appendix] Contents”) provides in relevant part that:  “If the appeal is from a disposition of a motion for summary judgment, the appendix shall also include a statement of all items submitted to the court on the summary judgment motion and all such items shall be included in the appendix, except that briefs in support of and in opposition to the motion shall be included only as permitted by subparagraph (2) of this rule. ”  (emphasis added).  Notwithstanding, plaintiff has not included the [...]’ Statement of Material Facts and the [...]’ supporting documents in his Appendix; he only includes his responses without recitation of the Statement of Material Fact to which he is responding.
[brief] Here, Appellants produced no evidence during discovery that [...] participated in the management, business operations, or earnings of [...], [...], or any of the other alleged wrongdoers.  Moreover, and as in Manley, Appellants were unable to come forth with any competent evidential material to demonstrate otherwise.  See also Worldwide Marine Trading Corp. v. Marine Transport Service, Inc., 527 F. Supp. 581, 583 (E.D.P.A 1981) (dismissing all claims against attorney for alleged wrongdoer who did nothing more than draft agreements, deliver copies of checks, and deposit money into escrow for his client, reasoning that “an attorney who is not a stakeholder in the alleged conspiracy must do more than be present at the scene and, indeed, must do more than merely advise. ”)  For this and all other reasons set forth above, Appellants’ purported fraud, RICO, conspiracy and “aiding and abetting” claims against [...] and [...] failed as a matter of law, and the trial court properly granted [...] and [...] summary judgment with respect to each of these other counts of the Third Amended Complaint.  **CONCLUSION**
[brief] The charge concerning accomplice liability robbery referenced inflicting bodily injury or using force upon another, threatening or putting one in fear of bodily injury, and committing or threatening to immediately commit the crime of murder.  (26T140:15-141:2).  The acts suggested were conceptually similar, as they all contained an element of actual or threatened violence.  The facts alleged by the State which would support such elements were also all conceptually similar in that they too all involved threats or actual acts of violence.
[brief] Sg008-067.  Complainant’s Ethics Allegations Against Appellant  On January 10, 2020, approximately two weeks after Appellant and the other Board Members filed their ethics complaint against Complainant for her conduct during the election process, Complainant filed her ethics complaint against Appellant related to his request to the Board Attorney to investigate her conduct, which gave rise to the allegations of ethics violations against Complainant.  Sg008-067.  Complainant’s ten Count ethics Complaint was largely dismissed, except for the first four allegations.  Sg008-067.  Counts 1 through 4 of the Complaint allege that Appellant improperly used the Board Attorney to research “member conduct. ”  Sg008-067.  More specifically, the Complaint alleges that such conduct constitutes a violation of N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24(b), N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(c), N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(e), and N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(f).  Sg008-067.  The [...] found probable cause existed for the first four allegations that essentially pertain to Appellant’s request to the Board Attorney to investigate whether Complainant’s conduct during the election process constituted ethics violations.  Sg205-212.  The [...] found that Appellant’s request to the Board Attorney to investigate Complainant’s conduct during the election process demonstrated conduct for his own personal gain, that the use of the Board Attorney fell outside the scope of his authority as Board President, and that the information requested was unrelated to a legitimate Board policy, business, or purpose.  Sg216-231.  The [...] imposed a censure penalty against Appellant for the aforementioned ethics allegations.  Sg213-215.  The censure penalty set forth in the [...]’s Resolution adopted on May 21, 2024 states in pertinent part that the Resolution imposing censure “shall be read at the Board’s next public meeting following adoption by the Commission, shall be posted in such places as the Board posts its public notices for no less than thirty (30) days, shall be published online on the District’s website, if available, for no less than thirty (30) days, and the reading of the resolution shall be memorialized in the Board’s meeting minutes…”
[directive] If pecuniary loss is $2000 or more, third degree; if in excess of $500, fourth degree, if $500 or less, a disorderly offense.  $5,000 to $15,000 10% permissible 3rd Degree  (3)  Damages or causes loss to research facility, third degree.  (4)  Damages or removes or impairs safety equipment at airport or aviation facility or otherwise causes physical disruption to the facility, fourth degree; if damage or disruption $1,000 to $2,500 10% permissible recklessly causes bodily injury or damage to property, third degree; if it recklessly causes 4th Degree death, second degree.  36  Updated December 2, 2013  Bail Schedule 2
[directive] ACCESS TO MEDICATION  A.  Law enforcement officers shall never handle an individual’s request for medical attention with any less urgency or respect because of that individual’s actual or perceived gender identity or expression and/or sexual orientation.  B.  Law enforcement officers shall treat prescription hormones like any other prescription wellbeing.9 medication necessary for an individual’s health and C.  Law enforcement officers shall document the circumstances of any medical treatment pursuant to applicable policies and procedures.  IV.
[brief] | | | **Judson v. Peoples Bank & Tr. Co. of Westfield,** | 13 | | 17 N.J. 67 (1954) | | | **Kaczorowska v. Nat’l Envelope Corp.,** | 17 | | 342 N.J. Super. 580 (App. Div. 2001) | | Kibler v. Roxbury Bd. of Educ., 392 N.J. Super. 45 (2007)  .................................................................  15  Laidlow v. Hariton Machinery Co., 170 N.J. 602 (2002)  ...........................................................................  15, 19 Mabee v. Borden, Inc., 316 N.J. Super. 218 (App. Div. 1998) ..................................................
[brief] **B.  [...] Is Entitled To Summary Judgment On Its Promissory Estoppel Claim As No Genuine Issue Of Material Fact Exists.**  A promissory claim will be justified if counterclaimant satisfies its burden of demonstrating the existence of four elements:(1) a clear and definite promise by the promissor; (2) the promise must be made with the expectation that the promissee will rely thereon; (3) the promise must in fact rely on the \(^5\)  It is noteworthy that Appellant testified that he was to limit his personal purchases to $2,000/month but at $24,000 per year, that exceeded his past bonuses which were under $20,000 by his own estimation.  Further, Plaintiff’s purchases of $256,612 over 8 years totals $30,189 per year – far above the alleged authorization and exceedingly above any bonus he received.  promise[;] and (4) detriment of a definite and substantial nature must be incurred in reliance on the promise.  *Pop’s Cones, Inc. v. Resorts Intern. Hotel Inc.*, 307 N.J. Super. 461, 468 (App. Div. 1998).  The essential justification for the promissory estoppel doctrine is to avoid the substantial hardship or injustice which would result if such a promise were not enforced.  *Id.* at 469.  Here, the trial court correctly found that Respondent satisfied all of the elements of its promissory estoppel claim because: (1) it relied on the clear and definite promise, via the Employee Agreement, that Appellant would not to use the Company’s PCard for personal purchases; (2) the promise was made with the expectation that Respondent would rely on such promise in exchange for the right to access the PCard; (3) Respondent exhibited its reliance upon this promise by paying the balance on Appellant’s PCard for years; (4) the [...] investigation and Appellant’s admissions confirm Appellant used the PCard to make personal purchases in excess of $256,000.
[brief] Rather, according to [...], the Project would satisfy [...]’s goal to “maintain reliability for [[...]’s] existing distribution and transmission” systems.  (Aa931).  [...] added that the Project would be “used and necessary” over the course of its “typical useful life,” which is at least twenty years.  (6T63:13-64:9).  Lastly, [...] testified that [...] duly considered [...]’s zoning ordinances and its community zone plan in proposing the Project.  (Aa854).  Namely, [...] established that the proposed Project is located in [...]’s OL-2 zoning district, where public utilities are a conditionally permitted use.  (Aa63; Aa86; Aa856-57).  Additionally, she testified that the Project is consistent with the goals of [...]’s Master Plan to maintain “the unique character of [...],” protect “the Township’s open spaces from development,” and provide “adequate infrastructure to serve Township residences and businesses” while “limit[ing] the development of growth-inducing infrastructure. ” (Aa857-59; Aa886-87).
[brief] For the reasons set forth herein, Defendants, [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], and [...], respectfully requests that the Court affirm the Trial Court’s decision.  PARKER McCAY  P.A.  Attorneys for Defendants, [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], and [...]  BY: ___________________________  [...]  Dated: December 13, 2023  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE  DIVISION
[brief] The Court asked [...], "What was the amount of each check for each of the two policies?"  [...] gave conflicting responses when asked about the checks which began to demonstrate his own participation in hiding the true payout and value of the policies.  MR. GALLAGHER:  So, Your Honor, if I produce those, I may not get a transmittal letter, but I have change of beneficiary forms, I have the beneficiary life -- the life insurance benefit claims for both policies, and that would be Exhibit O and Exhibit R, -- THE COURT: Hm-hm.  MR. GALLAGHER: -- and I have the actual checks.  (13T 45).  Everyone reacted when [...] said he had the actual checks.  The checks had never been produced.
[brief] Further, it has been suggested that N.J.S.A 40:55D-70(b) provides a “wholly independent path to local determination of what is or is not a permitted use or structure….the developer SHOULD SEEK INTERPRETATION WITHIN THE APPEAL PERIOD before the court will entertain an action in lieu of prerogative writ.  Cox, 2019 New Jersey Zoning and Land Use Administration, Section 26;1.1, pp. 558.  In the case at bar, Appellant failed to seek interpretation and moved SOLELY under the procedural remedy of appeal of the HPC decision to the Zoning Board.  There was no alternative remedy, interpretation, or alternative relief per 70(b) sought, or noticed.  Therefore, there cannot be a determination of historical use nor a determination of a permitted use or non-conforming structure.  The Zoning Board was entitled to apply the Ordinance under its grant of power.  Again, “if an appellant seeking to reverse the action of an official fails to ask for alternative relief by way of variance and fails as well to give all required notice, he will be bound on his appeal to the question of whether the administrative officer erred.  If the board finds no error in the action…the action of the officer is SIMPLY AFFIRMED. ”  Id. at pp. 559.
[brief] For all of the reasons set forth in Appellant’s Brief, the Appendices, case law, statutes and court rules, it is requested that the Appellate Court vacate the decision of the trial court which granted Summary Judgment to [...].  It is requested that the Appellate Court vacate the decision of the trial court which denied to [...]  Summary Judgment.  It is requested that the Appellate Court find that [...] has acquired ownership of Lot 22 via Adverse Possession.  It is requested that the Appellate Court quiet title to Lot 22 in [...].
[brief] Equitable tolling may be applied where “the complainant has been induced or tricked by his adversary's misconduct into allowing the filing deadline to pass. ”  Dunn v. Borough of Mountainside, 301 N.J. Super. 262, 280 (App. Div. 1997) (citing Irwin v. Dept. of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 96 (1990)).  A statute of limitations is not permitted to be used “as a sword” by an adversary whose misconduct prevents a claimant from filing within the limitation period.  Ibid.  Another circumstance in which equitable tolling has been held to apply is where a plaintiff has “in some extraordinary way” been prevented from asserting his rights.  U.S. v. Midgley, 142 F.3d 174, 179 (3d Cir.1998) (citing Kocian v. Getty Refining & Marketing Co., 707 F.2d 748, 753 (3d Cir.1983)).  Equitable tolling is fully at play here.  As noted above, there is no evidence that the Defendants asserted their right to the property throughout the last twenty-five (25) years.  In fact, if anything, the Defendants intentionally hid their purported interest in the Property from [...].  This is most evident as it relates to the title search conduct by [...], Esq. on behalf of [...] in 2016.  As per [...], [...] was the one who did the “research” and first learned of the error in the December 1998 Deed and reported his findings to [...].  (9T135:3-23, January 24, 2023).  Notwithstanding, [...] did not share the results of the 2016 title search with [...].  Similarly, the Defendants did not notify [...] when they transferred the Property from [...] to [...] in October 2019 despite knowing full-well that [...] believed he owned the Property.  Sadly, Defendants didn’t even tell [...] when his own brother passed away.  Again, [...] had to find out through the subject litigation that was instituted to enforce his ownership rights in the Property upon becoming aware of same in 2020.  The conduct of the Defendants was at all times purposeful and with the intent to deceive [...], with the end-goal of quickly selling the Property before [...] could uncover the plot.
[brief] The documents also would not have likely changed the outcome of trial for three reasons.  First, contrary to the trial court’s decision, there was ample evidence that the judge failed to recognize that several of the documents were most likely fabricated.  Second, none of the documents shed any light on defendant’s right to sell 30% of the shares of [...].  And third, the only document that addressed defendant’s ownership interest in any [...] entity would have amounted to cumulative evidence.  Thus, the trial court erred in finding the “new” evidence material and granting a new trial.  1.  The trial court disregarded overwhelming evidence that the “newly discovered evidence” was fabricated.  In determining that the newly discovered evidence was material, the trial court failed to heed the Supreme Court’s instruction to review the evidence “with a certain degree of circumspection to ensure that it is not the product of fabrication. ”  *Ways*, 180 N.J. at 187-88.  Although [...] addressed [...]’s testimony that [...] had no record of the two franchise agreements with [...] and that [...] himself had no memory of signing them, she failed to acknowledge [...]’s testimony that [...] would not have entered into those agreements because they conflicted with [...]’s agreements with [...].  Nor did she properly consider [...]’s opinion that his signatures appeared to be identical to those on another franchise agreement between [...] and [...] Albany that were executed on the same day as the purported 2014 [...] agreement, or any of the other evidence supporting [...]’s opinion.  (See 9T15-1 to 18-14; Sa364-423).  Because the evidence when considered in its totality strongly suggests that the purportedly new evidence was fraudulent, the trial court should not have granted a new trial.
[brief] The District Court referred the above motions to the undersigned Magistrate Judge for resolution pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A), Fed. R. Civ. P. 72, and Rule 1(c) of Appendix C of the Local Rules of the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas, Local Rules for the Assignment of Duties to United States Magistrate Judges.  The Court held a hearing on July 6, 2016 and now enters the following order.  I.  BACKGROUND  This dispute is between two companies that both provide mechanisms for motorists to pay highway tolls while driving in rental cars.
[brief] And notably, the NJCFLA’s statutory predecessors (discussed infra) provided for enforcement by the Commissioner of Banking and Insurance in addition to an implied private right of action for aggrieved consumers.  Indeed, the Supreme Court has confirmed that N.J.S.A. 17:11C-33(b), when it was embodied in the Consumer Loan Act, “allow[ed] for treble damages by aggrieved consumers,” though the “typical remedy . . . [was] voiding of the contract . . . by individual consumers. ”  Lemeldeo v. Benefit Mgmt. Corp., 150 N.J. 255, 271-72 (1997).  The subsequent statutory revisions provide no support for the conclusion that the Legislature intended to eliminate that private right of action from the NJCFLA.
[brief] When asked if the verdict announced was their verdict, each juror responded in the affirmative.  And while juror number 5 and juror number 8 responded “here” instead of “yes,” this does not indicate – in any way – that they were uncertain as to the verdict the forewoman announced, nor that there was any lack of unanimity in the verdict.  (10T:12-1 to 22); see Milton, 178 N.J. at 433 (reasoning that “by asking whether the juror still agrees with the verdict, the trial court gives each juror an opportunity to express his or her decision freely, unrestrained by pressure that may have beset the prior deliberations").
[brief] Curiously, when the Mejia decision was addressed with the Trial Court in this matter before commencing trial – with Plaintiff/Respondent’s concern being that the so-called “[...]” were not represented by counsel – defense counsel never raised the issue of the JTCL.  Appellant’s trial counsel, instead, opposed Plaintiff/Respondent’s application despite the clear mandate of Mejia and reiterated his desire for application of the Trial Court’s 2017 ruling.  Now, however, defense counsel claims to have been ignorant of, or to have not understood the effects of, the Supreme Court’s ruling in Mejia.  This claim simply is not credible.  Defense counsel’s assertion that Plaintiff/Respondent was somehow obligated to seek, or was entitled to, interlocutory appellate review as a matter of right is clearly without basis.  Interlocutory appellate relief is not a right, and this assertion ignores the fact that Appellant likewise could have sought clarification prior to trial in light of the Mejia decision but chose not to do so.  Defense counsel unsuccessfully attempted this very tactic to exploit the Burt decision in Mejia; defense counsel therefore knew the potential risks of this calculated legal strategy in this matter.  Defense counsel “cannot beseech and request the Trial Court to take a certain course of action, and upon adoption by the court, take his chance on the outcome of the trial, and if unfavorable, then condemn the very procedure he sought . . . claiming it to be error and prejudicial. ”  N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs., 201 N.J. at 340 (quoting State v. Jenkins, 178 N.J. at 358).