ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] Any person who is employed as a sworn member of any state, county, or municipal law enforcement agency, department, or division of those governments who is statutorily empowered to act for the detection, investigation, arrest, conviction, detention, or rehabilitation of persons violating the criminal laws of this State.  The term law enforcement officer shall include sworn members of the New Jersey State Police, the Division of Criminal Justice and the iv USE OF FORCE POLICY | April 2022 Juvenile Justice Commission.  It shall also include College and University Police Officers pursuant to N.J.S.A. 18A:6-4.2 et seq., State Parole Officers pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:154-4, State Correctional Police Officers pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:154-4, County Correctional Police Officers pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:154-3, Special Law Enforcement Officers of all classes pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40A:14-146.8 et seq., Humane Law Enforcement Officers appointed pursuant to N.J.S.A. 4:22-14.1 or 4:22-14.4, Auxiliary Police Officers appointed pursuant to N.J.S.A. App.A:9-45(c), and Constables appointed pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40A:9-120.  Mechanical Force.
[brief] Likewise, even prior to death, N.J.S.A. 2A:17-19 provides for a $1,000 exemption "both before and after [her] death, for [her] use or that of [her] family or [her] estate, and shall not be liable to be seized or taken by virtue of any execution or civil process whatever, issued out of any court of this State."  From our perspective, the car had a value of only in the $400-$650 range.  Yet from [...]’ perspective, it has a value in the $2,000-$3,000 range (and of course, [...] is not an heir).  Thus here, the $400-$650 value of the vehicle (from our perspective) falls below the exemption thresholds of both statutes \textit{N.J.S.A. 3B:16-5} and \textit{N.J.S.A. 2A:17-19}, while the value from either party’s perspective falls below the $5,000 exemption threshold of the former statute, \textit{N.J.S.A. 3B:16-5} (i.e. even from [...]’ perspective, the $2,000-$3,000 value of my mother's vehicle was well below that $5,000 property value threshold).  So even assuming arguendo if there had been one or more creditors whom otherwise would have wanted to collect upon outstanding debt via that vehicle, that option would not have been available to any such creditor(s) after her death.  So there was no practical reason whatsoever for me to become an official estate executor or administrator prior to entering into my agreement with [...].
[brief] ”  Milford Mill 128, LLC v. Borough of Milford, 400 N.J. Super. 96, 110 (App. Div. 2008).  Yet, Appellant exclusively cites and relies upon the more stringent standard(s) of review applicable to quasi-judicial administrative determinations of municipal boards.  Pb15-16, Pb21-22.  However, this matter does not arise from a challenge to a planning or zoning board’s denial of a land use application.  No quasi-judicial determination of a municipal board is at issue in this appeal and, therefore, the standards for reviewing such determinations are irrelevant here.
[brief] ”  N.J.S.A. 2C:44-5(h).  Our Supreme Court has held that although there is “a presumption of consecutive terms for those who commit crimes while released on parole or bail, the court retain[s] the discretion to impose concurrent sentences. ”  State v. Sutton, 132 N.J. 471, 482 (1993) (holding that the sentencing court committed error because it automatically imposed consecutive sentences on the defendant for offenses he committed while he was on probation).
[brief] *State v. Roldan*, 314 N.J.Super. 173, 188 (App.Div.1998).  Conspiratorial liability encompasses possessory offenses.  *Ibid*.  [...]'s offenses, as well as [...]'s offenses, were all committed in furtherance of the conspiracy to rob [...].  Robbery was one of the predicate offenses charged in the felony murder count of the indictment.  Having conspired with [...] to rob [...], [...] was responsible for the criminal acts committed by [...] in furtherance of the conspiracy, including the weapons offense.  E.
[brief] LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I: DEFENDANT’S STATEMENT TO DETECTIVE EGAN WAS KNOWING, INTELLIGENT, AND VOLUNTARY BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT.  (2T16-5 to 7; Da8).  In Point I of his appellate brief, defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting defendant’s recorded statement to police because [...] “affirmatively misled him to believe that their conversation would concern a minor narcotics charge and not a much more serious allegation of first-degree robbery. ” (Db16).  Yet the record plainly shows that defendant was a mere suspect at the time he waived his rights, the police lacking probable cause to arrest or charge him for the robbery until the moment he identified himself as the assailant in the surveillance video.  Given the totality of the circumstances, defendant’s statement was made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily beyond a reasonable doubt.  This Court should affirm.
[brief] This well-established law holds that residential property owners are not responsible for defects or hazardous conditions on public sidewalks that abut their property, unless they actually caused those defects or hazardous conditions.  The law in this regard is best crystallized in the Model Jury Charges.  Specifically, Model Jury Charge 5.20B(B)(1)(a), entitled “Liability of Abutting Owner or Occupant,” provides as follows:  The owner (occupant) of residential premises abutting a public sidewalk is not responsible for defects therein caused by the action of the elements or by wear and tear incident to public use.  If, however, you find that the defective condition of the sidewalk was the result of negligent construction thereof by the owner (occupant) or that it resulted from any activity, commercial or otherwise, which was carried on by him/her, the plaintiff may recover for the injuries resulting from such defective condition.  (Pa95.)  Likewise, Model Jury Charge 5.20B(B)(1)(b), instructs as follows:  A residential property owner owes no duty to the public to repair a sidewalk which is in a state of disrepair by reason of normal wear and tear by reason of the elements such as rain, snow, frost and the like.  Nor is mere failure to fully correct the old condition a sufficient basis for liability.  Where, however, the owner attempts to make repairs or correct some defect therein for which she/he is not responsible, he/she becomes responsible if he/she makes the repairs negligently and thereby causes the sidewalk, after the repairs, to be more dangerous than before or if he/she causes a new hazard from the old.  (Pa96.)  Most importantly for purposes of the instant matter and this appeal, Model Jury Charge 5.20B(B)(2)(a), entitled “Liability of Owner (Occupant) Who Undertakes to Clear Sidewalk,” instructs as follows:
[brief] Mitigating Factor (10)  Defense counsel asked the court to find mitigating factor (10) — that [...] was likely to respond affirmatively to probationary treatment — given that he was 46 years old, had no prior felony convictions, and had succeeded on pretrial release for the four years his case was pending.  (15T 15-6 to 10)  The court rejected these arguments, concluding that pretrial release “certainly isn’t probation,” and finding that the fact that [...] committed the instant warranted a rejection of this factor.  (15T 34-14 to 23)  The court’s rejection of this mitigating factor was error.  [...]’s success on pretrial release for the many years that this case was pending provided concrete proof that [...] would be able to comply with the terms of a probationary sentence.  The court should have found mitigating factor (10).  **CONCLUSION**
[directive] PERSONS WITH PHYSICAL, MENTAL OR COGNITIVE DISABILITIES  A.  Wheelchairs and appropriate transportation should be made available when the victim or witness is required to appear.  B.  Interpreters to deal with the deaf and trained counselors to deal with the mentally retarded, etc. should be made available so that the victim can describe the attacker or the event to the police; submit impact statement to agent of prosecutor before formal charging decision; submit victim impact statement for inclusion in pre-sentence report; make impact statement at sentencing; testify or submit impact statement at parole hearings where appropriate.  IV.
[brief] For example, in Meier v. D’Ambrose, 419 N.J. Super. 439, 449 (App. Div. 2011) the persons on the land, is subject to liability to the lessee and others . . . for physical harm caused by the condition after the lessee has taken possession, if (a) the lessee does not know or have reason to know of the condition or the risk involved, and (b) the lessor knows or has reason to know of the condition, and realizes or should realize the risk involved, and has reason to expect that the lessee will not discover the condition or realize the risk.  Appellate Division did not strictly apply § 358 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts and instead applied the analysis and factors discussed in Hopkins v. Fox & Lazo Realtors, 132 N.J. 426, 436 (1993) to assess a landlord’s liability for a faulty furnace.  In applying the Hopkins factors, the Appellate Division concluded that defendant lessor had a duty to maintain a furnace so that it was not dangerous to persons or property, and that such duty required periodic inspections to discover dangerous defects.  In carving out this exception to the Restatement, the Meier court relied on the underlying facts of the case noting the cost of repairing the furnace, the catastrophic results that can result when a furnace is not maintained, and the monetary incentive a landlord has in maintaining the property.
[brief] Plaintiff compares the Board’s arguments regarding the “technological framework of this case” to the absurd hypothetical of Defendants having difficulty locating a record because they “threw everything in a pile in the basement” rather than using file cabinets.  Pb at 10, n. 5.  The Board has already proven by producing to Plaintiff an email log in excess of 6000 lines from the District’s Workspace account that it dutifully maintains its own email data in the governmental server.
[brief] *Farris v. Cnty. of Camden*, 61 F. Supp. 2d 307, 326 (D.N.J. 1999).  "The gist of an action in civil conspiracy is not the conspiracy itself but the underlying wrong, which absent the conspiracy, would give a right of action."  *Malaker Corp. Stockholders Protective Comm. v. First Jersey Nat'l Bank*, 163 N.J. Super. 463, 491 (App. Div. 1978).  "The essential element of the tort is not the conspiracy[,] but the damage inflicted pursuant to it."  *Id.*  Here, Appellants did not state a valid claim for civil conspiracy because they cannot show any damage inflicted by the conspiracy.
[brief] # TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | CASES | Page(s)  | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|---------| | **Abtrax Pharm., Inc. v. Elkins-Sinn, Inc.,** | | | 139 N.J. 499 (1995) | 21 | | **In re Actavis Holdco U.S., Inc.,** | | | No. 19-3549, 2019 WL 8437021 (3d Cir. Dec. 6, 2019) | passim | | **Cap. Health Sys. Inc. v. Horizon Healthcare Servs., Inc.,** | | | 230 N.J. 73 (2017) | 28 | | **Coe v. Cross-Lines Ret. Ctr., Inc.,** | | | 342 F.R.D. 539 (D. Kan.
[brief] (5T 171-15 to 24; 5T 179-5 to 181-20; 5T 196-5 to 8)  [...], a sheriff’s officer, testified that she swabbed the two guns for DNA and tested them for fingerprints, but found no prints.  (4T 182-10 to 12)  She claimed that there were red stains on the semiautomatic when she received the gun, but that the gun by the time of trial had no such stains because her DNA swabbing removed all of those stains from the gun.  (4T 177-20 to 179-14)  [...] testified as a DNA expert that swabs taken from the revolver, a fence at [...], and the bin on the side of [...] produced an insufficient amount of DNA to test.
[brief] ...........................................9, 10, 11  Twenty–First Century Rail Corp. v. N.J. Transit Corp., 210 N.J. 264 (2012)  .........................................................................................8  In re Yarn Processing Patent Validity Litigation, 530 F.2d 83 (5th Cr. 1976) ..............................................................................13, 14 Statutes 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ...............................................................................................24, 26 N.J.S.A. 2A:15-5.1 et seq.
[brief] As such, [...] has authority only as to the assets that it owns, which includes three lots that the corporation never sold, a clubhouse, and a tennis court.  (Pa001-Pa021; Pa197-Pa213)  Notice of Environmental Violations by [...]  While [...] dedicated its roadway system in 1896 to [...] by way of the filing of its subdivision map, [...] has maintained the position that it’s never “accepted” that dedication.
[brief] See Willoughby, 306 N.J. Super. at 277. current consistency of this land use with applicable zoning and show it was selected for that purpose.  Moreover, [...] emphasizes large crowds appeared at hearings on [...]’s later proposed site plan application as evidence of a public interest, much like the Rocky Hill plaintiffs.  (Pb7 – Pb8, Pb20).  However, as the trial court correctly noted, the hearings referenced by [...] on November 17 and December 15, 2022, were unrelated to the ordinance it now seeks to challenge on appeal.  Those hearings addressed [...]’s site plan application, and were the subject of entirely separate municipal action by the [...], an entirely separate municipal body from the Committee.  (See Pa56) (“It is also important to note that those people who did appear were there to challenge a land use application and not the underlying ordinance”).  The trial court understood Rocky Hill’s caution against reflexively equating the number of purported objectors with a “public interest” in this context and rejected [...]’s claims.  See Rocky Hill, 406 N.J. Super. at 400 (“We, too, question whether the number of plaintiffs in a lawsuit or signatures on a petition should impact on the true nature of defining ‘public interest’”).  See also Concerned Citizens, 370 N.J. Super. at 447 (“I would not equate mere numerosity with ‘important public rather than private interests that require adjudication’”) ([...], J.A.D., concurring).
[brief] So as a result of that he make a tactical decision . . . because they are under investigation he certainly has a reasonable suspicion that this is the individual and so he takes and follows and sees what occurs.  . . .  And from there the actions of [...] are to flee back in the arms where the officer is basically following him down the alleyway going forward, back toward the premises that’s under surveillance for the search warrant that is executed.  And certainly we have the search warrant executed and going forward from there, and the inventory happened . . .  So that stop, that Terry frisk, that fleeing and certainly the admission and consent of the defendant that there is a weapon on him I find entirely valid.
[brief] On May 2, 2018, [...] and [...] entered into the Second Amendment to the MFSA, which extended the term of the MFSA until December 31, 2027.  Da040.  [...] and [...] have not subsequently amended the MFSA, which remains in full force and effect.  There is no dispute that [...] signed the MFSA and all of its amendments and agreed to the terms as written.  Da181-184, Da258-259.  II.
[brief] Plaintiff initiated this action against Defendant on July 16, 2020.  Pa670-81.  On September 2, 2020, Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint.  Pa682-707.  On September 25, 2020, the Court denied Defendant’s motion to dismiss Count Three of Plaintiff’s Complaint, alleging common law fraud.  Pa722.  On October 5, 2020, the Defendant filed an answer and counterclaim.  Pa723-36.  On October 26, 2020, Plaintiff filed an answer to the counterclaim.  Pa748-51.  On November 10, 2021, Plaintiff filed a motion to amend his complaint and to extend discovery.  Pa1589-633.  On December 9, 2021, Defendant opposed Plaintiff’s motion.  Pa1634-646.  On December 17, 2021, the Court granted Plaintiff’s motion over Defendant’s objections and entered an order permitting Plaintiff to file an amended complaint, extending the discovery deadline, and compelling discovery from Defendant, among other elements of relief.  Pa1647-648.  On December 20, 2021, Plaintiff filed his Amended Complaint.  Pa752-71.  Defendant filed an Answer to the Amended Complaint on --- 2
[brief] JURY INTERROGATORIES  Please answer the following questions in deliberations, noting the vote on the “Yes” or “No” line, as applicable.  Please follow the instructions after answering the questions.  1)  Did the Defendant Nursing Home violate Plaintiff’s rights as a nursing home resident?  VOTE: YES ________ NO ________  If you answer “Yes,” proceed to answer question #2.  If you answer “No” and Plaintiff is also alleging negligence, proceed to question #3.  If Plaintiff is not alleging negligence, your deliberations are complete.  2)  What amount of money would fairly compensate for Plaintiff’s damages resulting from the violation(s) of Plaintiff’s nursing home residents’ rights?  You are not to duplicate damages awarded under other theories of recovery.  $ _______________  VOTE: YES ________ NO ________  If Plaintiff is also alleging negligence, proceed to question #3.  If Plaintiff is not alleging negligence, your deliberations are complete.  3)  Was the Defendant Nursing Home, or its staff, negligent?  VOTE: YES ________ NO ________  If you answered “Yes,” proceed to question #4.  If you answered “No,” your deliberations are complete.  4)  Was the negligence of the above Defendant a proximate cause of Plaintiff’s damages?  VOTE: YES ________ NO  ________  If you answered “Yes,” proceed to question 5.  If you answered “No,” your deliberations are complete.  5)  What amount of money would fairly compensate for Plaintiff’s damages resulting from Defendant’s negligence?  You are not to duplicate damages awarded under other theories of recovery.  $ _______________  VOTE: YES ________ NO  ________  Please advise the jury attendant that you have reached a verdict.  Model Jury Charge (Civil)  5.77 “Violations of Nursing Home Statutes or Regulations” (Nov. 2023).  The difference between the charge for negligence and the charge for an NHA violation is the elimination of the second question on proximate cause in the negligence charge from the NHA claim.
[brief] Roadway Express, Inc., 149 F.3d 1098 (10th Cir. 1998)......................19 Sanjour v. EPA, 984 F.2d 434 (D.C. Cir. 1993).............................................45  State Twp. of Pennsauken v. Schaad, 160 N.J. 156 (1999).................................44  Stewart v. N.J. Tpk. Auth./Garden State Parkway, 249 N.J. 642 (2022)...............13  Suarez v. E. Int’l Coll., 428 N.J. Super. 10 (App. Div. 2012).............................14  Tarr v. Ciasulli, 181 N.J. 70 (2004)..................................................................42  Tumpson v. Farina, 218 N.J. 450 (2014)............................................................43  Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Federal Communications Comm’n, 512 U.S. 622 (1994)...........................................................................................................47
[directive] officer when law enforcement a pursuant to Section 3.3, otherwise provided Except as prosecutor's agent prosecutor" may include a term "assistant Directive, the 4 of Sections 3 and this in As used County in writing by the specifically designated who has been office County Prosecutor's of other employee the or ofthis Directive.  3 and 4 approval functions pursuantto Sections review, and on-call legal advice, toperform Prosecutor Division general in the assistant attorneys general"includes attorneys "deputy Directive, the term throughout this used As of Criminal Justice.
[brief] Badiali v. New Jersey Mfrs. Ins., 220 N.J. 544, 555, 563, 563 (2015)........13  Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America, 142 N.J. 520, 540 (1995)..........14  Busciglio v. DellaFave, 366 N.J. Super. 135, 139 (App. Div. 2004).............14
[brief] The trial court correctly held that [...] is entitled to rescind four lawyers professional liability insurance policies issued to [...] f/k/a [...] (the “Firm”) as to the Firm and [...] (“[...]”) because of material misrepresentations that the Firm (with [...] signing) made in the applications.  The first policy’s application asked: “Has any attorney been the subject of any bar complaint, investigation or disciplinary proceeding within the past 5 years?”  The Firm (with [...] signing) answered “No” on June 7, 2016.  When he signed, [...] knew that the Office of Attorney Ethics (“OAE”) had opened an investigation of his conduct in 2012 and had filed a disciplinary action complaint against him in 2013.  The disciplinary complaint alleged violations of RPC 1.15(a) (commingling), RPC 1.15(d) and R. 1:21-6(a)(2) (failing to deposit earned fees into the Firm’s business account), R. 1:21-6(d) (leaving inactive balances in the Firm’s trust account), RPC 8.1(a) (knowingly making false statements of material fact in connection with a disciplinary matter), and RPC 8.4(c) (engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation).  The applications for each of the three subsequent renewal policies asked: “Have there been any new bar complaints, investigations or disciplinary proceedings against any attorney?”  The Firm (with [...] signing) answered “No” each time.  When he signed each application, [...] knew that (1) the OAE had opened an investigation into the Firm’s trust account, which included an investigation of [...]’s dishonest and intentional misconduct (including falsifying bank records and issuing fake checks to clients) in 2012; (2) the OAE had filed a disciplinary action complaint against him in 2013; (3) the Supreme Court had appointed a Special Ethics Master ([...]), who had recommended that the Supreme Court suspend [...]’s license for six months; and (4) the Supreme Court had censured [...].  On these undisputed facts, the trial court correctly held that [...]’s right to rescind the policies was “straightforward” because the Firm and [...] made material misrepresentations.  The Firm’s “no” answers regarding any bar complaint, investigation, or disciplinary proceeding were false.  Not surprisingly, it is material as a matter of law to the underwriting of a lawyers professional liability policy that the OAE had not only initiated an investigation into an attorney but also filed formal charges alleging that the attorney engaged in intentional misconduct regarding the Firm’s trust account, including knowingly making a series of false statements to the OAE, which were sustained by the Special Ethics Master and the Supreme Court, Disciplinary Review Board.  This Court should affirm the trial court’s order rescinding the policies and holding that all causes of action against [...] fail as a matter of law.
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING DAVID’S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL AFTER ONE JUROR DISCLOSED TO OTHER JURORS THAT HE WAS CONTACTED BY A FAMILY MEMBER OR FRIEND OF DAVID AND NEEDED TO BE DISMISSED.  (11T 30-19 to 34-21; Da14)  A new trial is necessary because juror twelve disclosed to multiple jurors that he needed to be dismissed because he was contacted by a family member or friend of [...].  Although juror twelve was dismissed, his improper disclosure had the potential to cause the other jurors to fear [...] or to otherwise taint their ability to render a fair and impartial verdict.  By denying [...]’s motion for a new trial, the trial court deprived [...] of his right to a fair trial.  U.S. Const. amends VI, XIV; N.J. Const. art. I, ¶ 10; Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 362-63 (1966); State v. Williams, 93 N.J. 39, 60 (1983).  Therefore, [...]’s conviction must be reversed, and the matter remanded for a new trial.