ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] ” (Pa2398.)  In an August 5, 2015, [...] told [...] “the owners are excluding all structural foundation demolition work from \(^{15}\)  [...]’s OCIP III Ins. Proc. and Enrollment Manual, p. 8, https://www.njsda.gov/Content/Business/forms/OCIP_III_Manual.pdf (exclusion from enrollment in OCIP is at “sole discretion” of the [...]). their CCIP[.]” (Pa2422.)  [...] even clarified for [...] and [...] that it was [...]’s “contract with [...] that has been excluded. ” (Pa2427.)  Additionally, on August 11, 2015, [...]’s CFO advised [...] that “[...] [] must correct their Certificates of Insurance” and “review the CCIP manual for the insurance requirements for contracts not covered under the CCIP. ” (Pa2490.)  And on September 4, 2015, [...] of [...] notified [...] that “No payroll is required for ‘excluded’ contractors. ” (Pa2518 and Pa2529.)  If not enough, on September 23, 2015, [...] confirmed to [...] that the Project, “isn’t an OCIP reporting job either. ” (Pa2532.)  Thus, [...] was aware of its unenrollment from the CCIP in early August 2015 based on its demolition work, well in advance of the Accident or any time periods Plaintiffs contend may apply.
[brief] Accordingly, the Honorable [...], J.S.C. denied [...]’ motion, but the parties subsequently stipulated to the dismissal of all claims against [...] on March 16, 2020.  (Pa25; Pa197).  After the depositions of Plaintiffs’ experts were completed, [...] and [...] moved for summary judgment on August 17, 2020, and [...] cross moved for summary judgment, based on Plaintiffs’ failure to establish proximate cause.  (Pa199, Pa258; 1T45-1T47).  [...] heard oral argument on November 5, 2020 and denied the motions.  (1T57-1T59; Pa21, Pa23).
[brief] Indeed, it is hard to reconcile the trial court’s relevancy finding with the trial court’s recognition that the State’s theory of the case may be what occurred, exactly: [t]he State’s argument is that defendant’s clonazepam intoxication, which caused drowsiness, was exacerbated by the fatigue caused by the ‘crashing’ effects of coming down after the stimulant effect of cocaine dissipated.  That may be exactly what occurred here and based upon a review of all the evidence in the case, it is reasonable for the State to suspect it.  [Pa31 (emphasis added). ]  The court characterizes the State’s theory as speculation; however, the State’s theory truly is an interpretation of facts based on the evidence.  There was BZE in defendant’s blood after the car crash.  BZE unequivocally establishes defendant had cocaine in his system prior to the blood draw.  The jury should be permitted to consider that significant fact and the luminating expert testimony regarding what information can be derived from it.  As evidenced by [...]’s testimony, defendant’s behavior at the scene was “consistent with the [e]ffects of central nervous system depression,” which may be expected during the “crashing” effects of cocaine and/or the active effects of clonazepam.  (4T16-10 to 22; 17-7 to 15).  Thus, not only is this evidence relevant, it is highly probative and the jury should be able to consider it when evaluating the proofs in this case.  The trial court erred in finding the BZE evidence and [...]’s testimony regarding same were not relevant.
[brief] ---  6  While [...] wrote in his police report that “‘the ski mask … was rolled up on [[...]’s head] with the intent to conceal what it was” (3T 152-19 to 24), at trial, the officer described the “ski mask” as a “winter hat” similar to hats worn by other officers at the scene on that “below freezing” January evening.  (2T 74-12 to 16; 3T 48-9 to 11, 51-15 to 16)  7  [...] was never charged with the earlier robbery.  (PSR 10-11)
[brief] (1T24 to 1T25; Pa001-Pa055; Pa078-Pa090).  The land uses surrounding the Property include vacant land and Route I-95 within one quarter mile to the north, farmland to the east, farmland immediately to the south, with [...] further south across Indian Lake, Indian Run and farmland and residences to the west.  (1T24).  A portion of the Property had been previously developed and is occupied by a 61,500 +/- square foot office building, within the [...] and is served by a private road known as Corporate Boulevard and certain storm water management and utility facilities.  (1T24; Pa242).  The [...], as approved by the [...] in 2008, was intended to consist of a total of 508,700 square feet of office space, 84,180 square feet of warehouse space and a 160-room hotel facility.
[brief] **Statutes and Regulations**  *N.J.S.A.*  34:6A-3 requires employers within the State of New Jersey to provide such a safe and healthy workplace for their employees.  More specifically, Every employer shall furnish a place of employment which shall be reasonably safe and healthful for employees.  Every employer shall install, maintain and use such employee protective devices and safeguards including methods of sanitation and hygiene and where a substantial risk of physical injury is inherent in the nature of a specific work operation shall also with respect to such work operation establish and enforce such work methods, as are reasonably necessary to protect the life, health and safety of employees, with due regard for the nature of the work required.  *N.J.S.A.* 34:5A-33(a) likewise provides that every employer “provide each of its employees with employment and a place of employment which are free from recognized hazards which may cause serious injury, physical harm or death. ”  **COVID-19 guidelines and Executive Orders**
[brief] #  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | Cases | PAGE | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | Albert v. Pathmark Stores, Inc., | | | 2019 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1586, 2019 WL 3003822 (App. Div. July 10, 2019), certif. denied, 240 N.J. 1 (2019) | 19, 24, 26, 27 | | Calco Hotel Mgmt. Grp., Inc. v. Gike, | 18 | | 420 N.J. Super. 495 (App. Div. 2011) | | | Dwyer v. Skyline Apartments, Inc., | 28 | | 123 N.J. Super. 48 (App. Div. 1973) | | | Geringer v. Hartz Mountain Development Corp., | 18, 19, 26 | | 388 N.J. Super. 392, (App. Div. 2006) | | | Hopkins v. Fox & Lazo Realtors, | 5, 22, 23, 24, 25 | | 132 N.J. 426 (1993) | | | J.H. v. R & M Tagliareni, LLC, | 28 | | 239 N.J. 198 (2019) | | | McBride v. Port Auth.
[brief] 36 RULES  Rule 1:4-8 - Frivolous Litigation ........................................... 3, 10, 41, 42, 43 Rule 1:6-2(a) - Motion Generally .......................................... 24 Rule 1:6-2(d) - Civil Motion Oral Argument .............................. 6, 39 Rule 1:6-3(a) - Motion Filing and Service ...............................  24 Rule 1:7-4 - Required Findings .............................................  40 Rule 4:46-1 - Summary Judgment, Time .................................  24 Rule 4:46-2(a) - Summary Judgment, Requirements ....................  24 Rule 4:9-4 - Supplemental Pleadings ....................................  37  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
[brief] Our Supreme Court within  In re RCN of NY, 186 N.J. 83, 91-92 (2006) indicated that access can mean many different things.  "the meaning of "using" a public right-of-way has different connotations.  It could encompass all wires running either above or below any public street no matter the distance covered, or it could accept de minimis use or wires attached to buildings by private easements even when they cross above a public street.  In re RCN of NY, 186 N.J. 83, 91-92 (2006)  There can be no doubt that the public was granted a right of access to the internal roadways in question.  That right of access does not automatically transform the roads into public streets which the Borough must now accept for ownership, control and maintenance.
[brief] If “a contract contains an illegal provision, if such provision is severable the courts will enforce the remainder of the contract after excising the illegal portion. ”  Roman v. Bergen Logistics, LLC, 456 N.J. Super. 157, 170 (App. Div. 2018) (quoting Naseef v. Cord, Inc., 90 N.J. Super. 135, 143 (App. Div. 1966)).  However, “[i]f striking the illegal portion defeats the primary purpose of the contract, [this Court] must deem the entire contract unenforceable. ”  Jacob v. Norris, McLaughlin & Marcus, 128 N.J. 10, 33 (1992).  Here, the central purpose of the Agreement was the amicable resolution of disciplinary charges that the Township filed against Plaintiff.
[brief] LEGAL ARGUMENT  Plaintiffs are unable to satisfy the heavy burden requiring them to overcome the presumption of validity which attaches to the ordinance in question.  Ordinance 22-1516 is the product of decades of negotiations with two redevelopers and [...], is intended to permit development of property which was twice the subject of evaluation by Law Division judges, and balances various objectives of the Borough’s Master Plan.  As amended by Ordinance 22-1516, the Redevelopment Plan is consistent with the Borough’s Master Plan, the County Master Plan, the MLUL, N.J.S.A. 40:55D-1 et seq., and the LRHL, N.J.S.A. 40A:12A et seq.  Ordinance 22-1516 is a valid exercise of the Borough’s authority pursuant to the LRHL to regulate development within its borders.  It is the product of reasonable planning and zoning concerns, bolstered by unrebutted expert planning testimony, and is therefore entitled to deference by the courts.  Consequently, Plaintiffs cannot sustain their claim that the Ordinance or Amended Redevelopment Plan is arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable.  The Law Division properly reached this conclusion, and its Order for Judgment dated May 22, 2023 should be upheld by this Court.
[brief] Appellant’s Letter Vendor Theory Is Contrary To Proper Statutory Construction And Interpretation | 16 | | 1.  Appellant’s “letter vendor” claim is an exercise in “uncritical literalism” that fails under fundamental principles of statutory construction | 16 | | a.  Transmitting data to an agent or contractor is not a “third-party” “communication” and is not an attempt to collect a debt | 20 | | b.  Appellant’s Theory is at Odds with Other FDCPA Provisions, Which Permit the Use of Service Providers under Many Circumstances, and would Lead to Absurd Results | 22 | c.
[brief] “Mootness is a threshold justiciability determination rooted in the notion that judicial power is to be exercised only when a party is immediately threatened with harm. ”  *Betancourt v. Trinitas Hospital*, 415 N.J. Super. 301 (App. Div. 2010), citing, *Jackson v. Dep’t of Corr.*, 335 N.J. Super. 227, 231 (App. Div. 2000), certif. denied, 167 N.J. 630 (2001).  “A case is technically moot when the original issue presented has been resolved, at least concerning the parties who initialed the litigation. ”  *Id.* at 311, citing *DeVesa v Dorsey*, 134 N.J. 420, 428 (1993) (Pollack, J. concurring) (citing *Oxfeld v. N.J. State Bd. Of Educ.*, 68 N.J. 301, 303 (1975)).  “To restate ‘an issue is “moot” when the decision sought in a matter, when rendered, can have no practical effect on the existing controversy’”.  *Id.* at 311, citing *Greenfield v. N.J. Dep’t of Corr.*, 382 N.J. Super. 254, 257-58, (quoting *N.Y.  S. & W. R. Corp. v. State Dep’t of Treasury, Div. of Taxation*, 6 N.J. Tax 575, 582 (Tax Ct. 1984), aff’d 204 N.J. Super, 560 (App. Div. 1985).  By providing Appellant with the statutory adjournments, he sought in his Complaint, Respondent provided the relief that Appellant was seeking.  Since this relief was provided prior to the March 22, 2023, conference, [...] was well within her authority to dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint.
[brief] The court’s findings are amply supported by the record and, thus, they should not be disturbed on appeal.  As such, this Court should affirm the PCR court’s denial of defendant’s Petition for Post-Conviction Relief.  A.  The PCR Court Properly Found That Counsel Was Not Ineffective For Failing To Challenge The “Sneak And Peak” Warrant.  In his first point, defendant argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the sneak and peak warrant as a violation of the New Jersey Constitution, and that the PCR court improperly denied his petition without an evidentiary hearing.  The issue concerning the constitutionality of a sneak and peek warrant has been previously presented to the Appellate Division during defendant’s direct appeal, and, as such, the PCR court properly found it was procedurally barred from being raised in defendant’s petition.  Moreover, even after considering the merits of defendant’s argument, the PCR court properly found that the “sneak and peak” warrant was constitutional, and counsel was not ineffective for failing to challenge the constitutionality of it.
[brief] Additionally, [...], Plaintiff’s best friend also overheard Defendant say, prior to the marriage, “it’s going to be a matter of months after I move to America,” and conveyed this to Plaintiff.  (2T17-23; 2T18).  Plaintiff acknowledged during trial that there was no way to know what this meant.  (2T29-2).  However, if Plaintiff had any doubts, he should not have married Defendant.  This is what the Court believed as well.
[brief] The trial court stated, “But the bottom line is that we don’t know and we will never know if something or anything caused him to fall. ”  2T16-4 to 6.  In ruling on the motion for reconsideration, the trial court acknowledged that it reviewed decisions cited by Plaintiff on reconsideration which had not been submitted to the court previously because the trial court wanted to be sure that its decisions “are appropriate and just. ”  2T16-17 to 2T17-2.  The trial court then re-affirmed its original holding on summary judgment that the evidence presented by Plaintiff (and Plaintiff’s expert) was insufficient to establish proximate cause:
[brief] Thank you.  Respectfully submitted, [...]  STEVEN D’AGOSTINO, Plaintiff/Appellant v. [...] AND [...], Defendants/Respondents.  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION  DOCKET NO. [...]  CIVIL ACTION  On Appeal of Trial Court’s Decision  Following November 13, 2023  Bench Trial:  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY  ATLANTIC COUNTY  SPECIAL CIVIL PART, SMALL CLAIMS SECTION  DOCKET NO. [...]  Honorable [...], J.S. C. Sat below
[brief] In *Rosato v. City of [...]*, [...] (Pa 17), the [...] ruled in 1989 that the owner’s equity in the property was limited to $17,601.00 based upon the owner’s purchase of the property in 1958 for $17,600 and transfer of the property to a family member for $1 in 1984.  The Board rejected the owner’s argument that the owner’s equity had to be adjusted for inflation given the passage of time from the original purchase in 1958.  On appeal to the Superior Court, the Honorable [...], J.S.C. (before she was elevated to the Appellate Division, and then the Supreme Court), held that:  The Jersey City Rent Leveling Ordinance provides, as it must, that owners must receive a fair return on their equity or their investment in the property.  That a landlord receive a just and reasonable return on his investment is a matter of constitutional mandate …  *It flies in the face of logic and fairness to conclude that an owner’s equity in a building for purposes of computing a fair return under a rent control ordinance is restricted to the original purchase price together with any* --- \(^4\)  As for Weehawken’s ordinance, no challenge was made with respect to updating the investment for inflation.
[brief] While the detectives may have had reason to question whether [...] really went to the Bronx to buy meat patties if there had been no meat patties in his car, the carton of frozen meat patties on the back seat verified that component of his explanation as well.  Under these circumstances, no reasonable person would find that [...] was lying about his reason for visiting New York.  Because every aspect of [...]’ explanation was objectively verified, the court’s finding that [...] provided a truthful explanation for his trip was fully supported by the record and thus owed deference.  *State v. Hubbard*, 222 N.J. 249, 262 (2015) (“Appellate courts reviewing a grant or denial of a motion to suppress must defer to the factual findings of the trial court so long as those findings are supported by sufficient evidence in the record. ”).  In the absence of other circumstances suggesting that [...] was traveling with drugs in his car, [...]’ truthful explanation for his visit to New York did not confirm the detectives’ hunch that he visited New York to purchase drugs.  Therefore, the court correctly found that the detectives lacked reasonable suspicion to request consent to search.  Accordingly, the court’s order granting suppression must be affirmed.
[brief] See Barr v. Bishop Rosen & Co., Inc., 442 N.J. Super. 599, 605 (App. Div. 2015) (“The existence of a valid and enforceable arbitration agreement poses a question of law, and as such, our standard of review of an order denying a motion to compel arbitration is de novo. ”); see also *Hirsch v. Amper Fin. Servs., LLC*, 215 N.J. 174, 186 (2013); *Frumer v. Nat’l Home Ins. Co.*, 420 N.J. Super. 7, 13 (App. Div. 2011).  To compel arbitration of a dispute, a court must determine that a valid arbitration agreement exists between the parties and that the dispute falls within the scope of the agreement.  *See Hirsch*, 215 N.J. at 179; *see also Martindale v. Sandvik, Inc.*, 173 N.J. 76, 83-84 (2002).  Further, the Court must look to ordinary contract principles to determine whether a party is bound by the terms of an alleged arbitration agreement.  *See First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan*, 514 U.S. 938, 944 (1995) (“When deciding whether the parties agreed to arbitrate a certain matter (including arbitrability), courts generally . . . should apply ordinary state-law principles that govern the formation of contracts. ”).  Although the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”), which controls here,\(^3\) encourages practices that enable disputes to be solved through arbitration, it is not a mandate that requires arbitration each and every time an arbitration clause may be part of a contract.
[brief] For the purpose of reserving questions for review or appeal relating to rulings or order of the court […] a party, at the time the ruling or order is made or sought, shall make known to the court specifically the action which the party desires the court to take or the party’s objection to the action taken and the grounds therefor.  R. 1:7-2.  “The primary policy justification for the requirement of a timely objection is to enable the trial court to take appropriate curative action, if possible, when an error has been made. ”  Waterson v. GM Corp., 111 N.J. 238, 250 (1988) (citations omitted).  “[A party] may not, on appeal, rely upon alleged inadmissibly hearsay testimony as a ground for reversal when at the time of its introduction no objection was made thereto. ”  Springdale Park, Inc. v. Andriotis, 30 N.J. Super. 257, 265 (App. Div. 1954).  “[T]he rule is that no ruling relating to the reception or rejection of evidence will be reviewed unless the record discloses that an objection to such ruling was duly made or such ruling otherwise challenged at the time of the ruling. ”  Kargman v. Carlo, 85 N.J.L. 632, 635 (E&A 1914); See also Golden v. Casa Per Sacerdoti Vecchi Ed Invalidi, 30 N.J. Super. 242, 247 (App. Div. 1954) (“The question as to admissibility of this testimony is discussed in the brief, but the circumstance that no objection was taken below as to the matter of admissibility is passed by counsel, and hence we shall do likewise. ”) (citations omitted).  Plaintiff notes that Defendant did not raise the issue of admissibility of the Plaintiff’s Certification and the documentation annexed thereto in Defendant’s Objection to Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment.
[brief] For example, in Wolf v. Mayor and Borough Council of [...], 182 N.J. Super. 289, 292-96 (App. Div. 1981), certif. denied, 89 N.J. 440 (1982), the [...] passed a 75-page ordinance that rezoned three tracts representing approximately 20% of the town’s land mass.  The pre-adoption notice published by the town stated only that “[t]he main objectives of these revisions are to comply with the requirements of said [MLUL] by conforming to the provisions of the Master Plan of the [...] .  . . .”  Id. at 292.  The court held this notice failed under N.J.S.A. 40:49-2.1 to adequately provide a “brief summary of the main objectives or provisions of the ordinance” because it was “not sufficient to alert a reasonably intelligent reader as to the nature and import of the substantial changes in the zone plan proposed by the borough.
[brief] Defendant alleges that the State failed to present sufficient evidence of conspiracy and asks this Court to vacate defendant’s conviction.  (Db39).  However, the record indicates that there was sufficient evidence for the jury to determine that defendant and [...] conspired to murder [...] and the State asks this Court to affirm.  Evidence is sufficient to support a finding of guilt when the entirety of the State’s direct and circumstantial evidence, viewed most favorably and given the benefit of all reasonable inferences, permits a reasonable trier of fact to find each element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.  *State v. Brown*, 80 N.J. 587, 591 (1979); *State v. Reyes*, 50 N.J. 454, 459 (1967).  See also *Jackson v. Virginia*, 443 U.S. 307, 318-19 (1979).  Evidential errors that are not objected to at trial are reviewed under “plain error. ”  R. 2:10-2; *State v. Trinidad*, 241 N.J. 425, 452 (2020).
[brief] 20  Loscalzo v.  Pini, 228 N.J. Super. 291, 305 (App. Div. 1988), certif. denied, 118 N.J. 216 (1989) .................................................................................................  39  Mayflower Sec. Co. v. Bureau of Sec., 64 N.J. 85, 93 (1973) ..............................................  20 Medici v. BPR Co., 107 N.J. 1, 23 (1987) ..................................................................................  39  Meridian Quality Care, Inc. v. Bd. of Adjustment of The Tp. of Wall, 355 N.J. Super. 328, 344 (App. Div. 2002) .................................................................  22  Metromedia, Inc. v. Dir., Div. of Taxation, 97 N.J. 313, 330 (1984)  ....................................................