ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] [...] (“[...]”) died on July 5, 2020.  (Pa1 ¶ 1).  [...] left no spouse or descendants surviving.  (Id. at ¶ 2).  At the time of her death, [...] resided at [...] (the “Englewood Property”).  (Id. at ¶ 1).  Title to the Englewood Property was held in [...]’s Trust, with [...] and her sister, [...], as co-trustees.  (Pa2 ¶ 3); (Pa19).  Joyce died on October 9, 2020, survived by her two children, Plaintiff and [...] (“[...]”).  (Pa2 ¶ 4).  Pursuant to [...]’s Will admitted to probate, her residuary estate is to be paid to the Trustees of [...]’s Trust.  (Pa2 ¶ 5); (Pa25–32).  On January 27, 2021, the Court appointed Defendant as Administrator of [...]’s estate and Trustee of [...]’s Trust.
[brief] He held that there were no free crimes, defendant’s offenses took place in different towns with different victims and involved different businesses.  He held that this was not a single period of aberrant behavior and the sentences should run consecutively to each other.  [...] found that aggravating factors (3), (6), and (9) applied based on defendant’s criminal history.  He found mitigating factor (4) applied, but gave it slight weight.  He imposed the following sentence:  On Count One, first-degree Robbery, he sentenced defendant to 17 years in New Jersey State Prison, subject to the No Early Release Act, to run consecutively to the sentence defendant was already serving for Robbery.  [...] imposed the following fines and monetary penalties: $100 VCCB, $75 Safe Neighborhoods, and $30 LEOTEF.  This appeal follows defendant’s conviction and sentencing.
[brief] On October 17, 2017, the Borough adopted Ordinance No. 17-2017, which amended the Borough Code by deleting the measurable noise standards by decibels that were contained in §146-8 of Ordinance 05-2017.  Da66-Da67.  Ordinance No. 05-2017 was amended in its entirety, thus Ordinance No. 17-2017 effectively repealed No. 05-2017.
[brief] ”  Selective Ins. Co. of Am. v. Hudson E. Pain Mgmt. Osteopathic Med., 210 N.J. 597, 609 (2012).  The goal of “prompt and efficient provision of benefits” and avoiding treatment delay “because of payment disputes” makes clear that the Legislature was concerned in AICRA’s dispute-resolution provision about avoiding long delays due to insurers denying or withholding PIP benefits, not insurer claims that providers duped them into paying those benefits, which are left to preexisting statutory and common-law judicial remedies.
[brief] ([...] Dep. 172:13-22, 653a).  Notwithstanding the Township Committee’s utter lack of authority to take any action regarding Plaintiff’s employment, while the July 5, 2016 incident was being discussed at the August 1, 2017 Township Committee meeting, [...] stated that “we now have the authority to start making decisions”.  (309a; see also [...] Dep. 163:8-22, 651a).  Township Committee Member-Defendant [...] curiously attempted to disavow any knowledge of and distance herself from Defendants’ illegal suspension of Plaintiff.  She testified that she did not “really remember who placed him on administrative leave or any of the details around it” or the basis for removing Plaintiff from his duties, and when asked if she believed that action should have been taken against Plaintiff, she responded, “I don’t really know” even though she voted for the resolution placing Plaintiff on ‘administrative leave’.  ([...] Dep. 76:23-77:10, 757a; see also 321a & 310a).
[brief] [...] maintains a website (www.struxure.com) with a “find a dealer” link prominently displayed for consumers in New Jersey and throughout the United States.  Their online pamphlet indicates “each [...] system is engineered to exceed all standards and expectations.  They’re designed to meet Florida’s stringent hurricane codes, as well as withstand heavy snow loads in the cold of winter.  Plus, each [...] system is fabricated and power coated to order, made to exact specifications, which makes for a better fit and finish and a cleaner looking system. ”  [...] markets to business consumers depicting restaurant seating under its Louver systems on its website.  With representations such as these in their marketing materials, consumers are led to believe the defendants would advise or direct them as to whether the *their system* would function properly.
[brief] The lower court failed to apply the prevailing NJLAD retaliation standard, and consider Plaintiff’s allegations within that standard.  Specifically, the lower court barely mentioned the New Jersey Supreme Court’s decision in Roa v. Roa, 200 N.J. 555 (2010), which adopted the broad retaliation standard announced by the U.S. Supreme Court under Title VII in Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006).  Roa found that the scope of unlawful (and hence actionable) retaliatory conduct under the LAD is broader than the employment relates acts prohibited with regard to discrimination claims under the LAD.  Roa, 200 N.J. at 575; see also Prager v. Joyce Honda, Inc., 447 N.J. Super. 124, 139 (App. Div. 2016).  Instead, as it relates to whether or not the retaliatory action was materially adverse, the only cases that the lower court raised were *El-Sioufi v. St. Peter’s Univ. Hosp.*, 382 N.J. Super. 145 (App. Div. 2005) and *Spinks v. Township of Clinton*, 402 N.J. Super. 465 (App. Div. 2008).
[brief] ”  4T18:23-24.  The trial court committed reversible error by relying on the 1966-1969 Unrecorded Subdivision Maps and failing to explain how the Strip mysteriously appeared in 1971 in the chain of title to Defendant’s Property.  Similarly, no proofs were presented by Defendant to the trial court that [...], the “applicant” noted on the 1967 Draft Subdivision Map, ever perfected, or attempted to perfect, any subdivision of the Strip as set forth in the 1966-1969 Unrecorded Subdivision Maps ([...] (hereinafter “[...]”) is Plaintiff’s predecessor-in-title).  As of 1966, [...] owned the entirety of the Strip.  Db4.  There is no recorded document evidencing a legal transfer of title to the Strip into Defendant’s chain of title nor any reference to any approved subdivision of the Strip in any recitation of any recorded deed in Defendant’s chain of title.  The lynchpin of Defendant’s claim to ownership of the Strip, and the trial court’s decision, is the presumed perfection of the 1966-1969 Unrecorded Subdivision Maps.  Critically, no such proof was ever presented to the trial court – since none of these subdivision maps were in fact ever perfected or recorded.  Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40:55-1.17 (the predecessor to the Municipal Land Use Law, and in effect prior to 1975), an approved subdivision plan expired 90 days from the date of such approval unless within that 90 day period was recorded with the County Recording Officer.  The 1966-1969 Unrecorded Subdivision Maps, relied on by the trial court, had all expired by operation of law since none were recorded with the Essex County Recording Officer.  Similarly, no recorded deed exists which transfers the Strip from the chain of title to Plaintiff’s Property into the chain of title for Defendant’s Property.
[directive] Equipment.  Only agency approved carrying and loading devices may be used during the training and qualification process.  Clothing.  Participants should complete training and qualification sessions wearing clothing and equipment similar to that worn while on duty.  Range Conduct.  Training and qualification on ranges will be conducted in accordance with the requirements listed in this policy.  Deviations from prescribed targets, rounds fired and scoring are not authorized.  Section 6.  Automatic/Semi-Automatic Assault Weapons Firearms Instructor Qualification Requirements (this section does not pertain to Scoped Rifle)
[directive] note See statute. required by be not in would statute, which it by event required not fingerprinting is which for offense an overcome determination to the whether risk assessment, pretrial automated an initiate to possible subsection in forth 3 and Rule :3-1(c) set complaint-summons by charging of presumption the Section in forth set provisions/presumptions the applying by made shall be Directive 4.3.1 this of assessment.  risk pretrial an automated of results the upon depend not do that Directive 4 this of 8.  note See (2) of a an violence; by of caused act domestic injury signs exhibits victim the (1) if exist grounds
[brief] A  That's what it says.  Q  All right.  And down at the bottom it says long-term care complaint program, survey and certification, and then it has two license numbers, doesn't it?  A  Yes.  Q  So those are the license numbers for the individuals that are sending this letter with regard to the conclusions from their survey, right?  A  That's speculation.  I believe so, but I'm not sure.  Q  Well, you've done this process before.  You've seen when a response gets sent to the individuals involved with their license numbers on it.  A  Typically, ma'am, but I -- I hate to speculate.  But typically, you're right.  Q  Okay.  And -- nope, stay there please.  A  Oh, I'm sorry.  Q  Thank you so much.  And so, just so we're clear, when you said that you're not sure what they did or didn't do, it's very clear that what the investigation included was a tour, right?
[brief] On April 9, 2018, the Appellate Division, in an unpublished decision, affirmed his convictions and remanded the case to the trial court for resentencing in accordance with *State v. Zuber*, 227 N.J. 422 (2017).  (Da 33-69)  The Appellate Division also ordered the court to merge the convictions for felony murder and knowing or purposeful murder, and to remove \(^2\)  At sentencing, the judge mistakenly stated that [...] would not be eligible for parole for a period of fifty-one years and three months pursuant to NERA.  (2T:29-21 to 30-1)  The judgment of conviction (JOC) was subsequently amended on July 22, 2015 to merge conspiracy to commit murder (count seven) with murder (count eight), and to reflect that [...] would not be parole eligible for forty-six-year and nine-months.  (Da 21-24) aggravating factor six from the judgment of conviction because it was not found by the sentencing court.  (Da 69)  Following two days of hearings, [...] was resentenced by the Hon. [...] on March 27, 2023.
[directive] 2nd for Up Up Up (If 12 12 (1 If 39:3-40(f)(2) owned 39:3- (f)(2)  39:3-40(f)(3) license incarceration)  39:3-40(f)  $500  39:3-40 all on driver’s plus plus additional registration  N.J.S.A. incarceration incarceration incarceration  39:3-40(f)(2), 39:3-40(a), 39:3-40(f)(2)  any plus plus month vehicles after 39:3-40(a), 39:3-40(a), mo. DWI, of 30 years mo.  Suspension Offense  24 suspension - days days days month fine fine leased  Supsended, - 40(f)(3)  6 mo.  2  10-90 60-90 10-90 to $500 $500 $500 $500 to Up 1st 12 12 or (1 DWI 39:3-40.1
[directive] STATUTES WHERE BAIL MAY BE SET BY A SUPERIOR COURT JUDGE OR A MUNICIPAL COURT JUDGE OR, IN THE MUNICIPAL COURT JUDGE’S ABSENCE, THE MUNICIPAL COURT ADMINISTRATOR OR DEPUTY COURT ADMINISTRATOR, PURSUANT TO RULE 3:26-2 (Rule 3:3-1(c)(1) (indictable offenses) and Rule 7:2-2(b) (non-indictable offenses) delineate factors regarding whether a warrant or summons should issue.  Rule 3:26-1 (indictable offenses) and Rule 7:4-1 (non-indictable offenses) delineate factors to be considered when setting bail and provide for the option of R.O.R. bail where appropriate.
[brief] [...] DID NOT COMMIT PLAIN ERROR EITHER IN NOT CHARGING THE JURY ON HOW TO ASSESS OUT-OF-COURT IDENTIFICATION EVIDENCE OR IN NOT CONDUCTING A WADE\(^3\) HEARING.  Defendant next argues -- again for the first time on appeal -- that Judge Arre erred both "by admitting identification evidence without a jury instruction on how to evaluate it" and by doing so without first holding a Wade hearing to test its reliability.  (Db37-57).  As will be discussed, this argument lacks merit and should be rejected.
[directive] Retention of BWC Recordings  8.1  Minimum 180-Day Retention Period.  A BWC recording shall be retained by the law enforcement agency that employs the officer for a retention period consistent with the provisions of this Section, after which time the recording shall be permanently deleted.  A BWC recording shall be retained for not less than 180 days from the date it was recorded, but shall be subject to additional retention periods as required in Sections 8.2, 8.3 and 8.4.
[brief] The Law Division Erred By Rewriting The Clause (Pa1-Pa16)  1.  Plaintiff Didn’t Concede That The Arbitration Clause “Cleary Advised That His Claims Would Be Arbitrated” (Pa1-Pa16)  Plaintiff did not make the concession attributed to him in Defendant’s appellate brief.  What Plaintiff “admitted” is that the arbitration clause would have satisfied the notice provisions fixed by *Atalese v. U.S. Legal Services Group*, 219 N.J. 430 (2014), *cert. den.* 576 U.S. 1004 (2015)) but for the inclusion of the last sentence.  The last sentence is, in the words of case law, an “egregious” provision “that specifically carve[s] out an exception for the corporate drafter of the clause to pursue collection actions in court. ”  Tillman, 655 S.E.2d at 372 (emphasis added).  Accordingly, the whole provision needed to be severed.  To get around this issue splitting, the Law Division interpreted it to require Plaintiff to abandon a previously-initiated arbitration should Defendant thereafter file a legal action for money damages.  No such language “requiring” Plaintiff to abandon a previously-filed arbitration appears in the text.  Additionally, the Law Division created an alarming problem of inefficiency and procedural fairness.  The Law Division avoided these issues by claiming they were not before him, even though his rule created these issues.  The Law Division didn’t address how unfair it would be to require Plaintiff to abandon a previously-filed arbitration.  It further declined to address the mischief that Defendant could cause by filing a legal action on the eve of a ruling by the arbitrator.  Defendant has no response to this problem created by the Law Division’s ruling, trying to sidestep it by declaring it a “parade of horrible” that makes “no sense. ”  The concern makes sense and is a genuine concern.  The Law Division took an unfair and uneven provision, and then made it even worse for Plaintiff by imposing a “requirement” nowhere stated in the actual text.  2.
[brief] Page 19, paragraph 21 of the Amended Resolution clearly states (emphasis added):  That the site be developed with the proposed use and in accordance with the current plans and renderings as submitted to the Zoning Board of Adjustment except as modified by the Board as set forth herein.  (28a)  On 10/11/2023 a hearing was held before [...] to review the Amended Resolution and the matter was satisfactorily resolved from the Plaintiff’s perspective.  Neither [...] nor the [...] chose to appeal the Court’s decision.
[brief] information further demonstrating the identifications’ lack of reliability.  At trial, counsel argued in opening and summation that the eyewitnesses only saw the shooter for a few seconds, and that their testimony needed to be carefully scrutinized despite their claims to have known [...] before the crime.  (9T43-4 to 6, 63-2 to 68-5; 15T:35-25 to 40-12) However, he provided no expert testimony or evidential support of that argument, instead sharing his own experience mistaking someone in the grocery store for someone he knew, and then realizing it was not that person.  (9T65-14 to 21)  For his part, the prosecutor emphasized that despite inconsistencies in their testimony and the split second to view the shooter’s face, the eyewitnesses could not be mistaken because they all knew [...] (15106-2 to 114-4), and it was like jurors’ own common experience of being in a supermarket and recognizing an acquaintance.  (15T108-11 to 25)  Thus, jurors heard from both attorneys that common experience was their guide to assessing the role that already knowing someone could have in the possibility of misidentifying them.  They were then given instructions that omitted many of the system variables that were highly relevant to the jury’s assessment of the reliability of the identification, such as the fact that a biased procedure can inflate a witness’s confidence.
[brief] The Board did not address its burden to present compelling evidence to justify refusing to meet with the [...]’s choice of negotiators.  Instead, the Board continued to claim that the [...]’s members were not allowed to participate in the negotiations sessions without any valid basis.  In addition to all the reasons *infra*, in [...]’s brief and our prior submissions why this argument is unpersuasive, let’s consider this argument by taking it at face value.  For the Board to persuasively assert that it could require the [...] to exclude its own membership from its negotiations, this would require this court to construe the NJEERA, the law meant to enforce public employees’ collective negotiations rights, to restrict or even outlaw the presence at negotiations sessions of those very public employees it is meant to protect.  Now that would be an absurd outcome.  The Appellate Division must also reject the Board’s myth that it supposedly tried to meet with the [...]’s bargaining representatives.  Notwithstanding whatever the Board initially believed as to the [...]’s role within the [...]’s Negotiations Committee, the [...] put the Board on notice by fall 2021 that the [...] considered the [...] to be part of its negotiations team.  Consequently, this argument acknowledges that the Board tried to reject the [...]’s definition of the union’s own negotiations team.  Thus, the Board’s argument here is that the Board had the right to define the scope of the [...]’s negotiations team, a demand clearly prohibited under the NJEERA.  The [...] is unclear what the Board meant by “unilateral action” with the negotiations.  However, what is clear is that the Board refused to move forward with any negotiation sessions with the [...] which involved the [...]’s [...] as participants from 2021 until [...]’s decision.  Rather, for nearly two years the Board insisted on ground rules to exclude the [...] portion of the [...]’s negotiations team.  Accordingly, as the act of negotiations requires two participating parties, the Board’s refusal to appear was the “unilateral action” here.  In sum, because [...] correctly concluded that the [...] was part of the [...]’s negotiations team, the Board is bereft of any basis to treat these participants as anything other than as part of the [...]’s negotiations team.  As the Board had no justification for its refusal to negotiate before the [...]’s clearly identified negotiations team, [...] was not only reasonable but in fact required to find that the Board acted in bad faith in refusing to negotiate with the [...], in violation of the NJEERA.
[brief] (A71).  To like effect, while taking note of the fact that [...] had previously accepted consents of surety suffering from the same defect as that at issue here, upon discovering this administrative oversight, [...] was obligated to follow the holding in Meadowbrook, fully implement its statutory mission and ensure that adequate performance security was provided by bidders on a going-forward basis.  To suggest that past oversights would thereafter estop [...] from enforcing a consent of surety requirement for some indeterminate amount of time in the future would lead to an absurd result.  (A72).  Finally, the hearing officer rejected [...]’s efforts to supplement the record after bid opening with a letter from an in-house counsel at [...].  As explained in the decision, the relevant bright line consideration under Meadowbrook is the status of the bid security at the time the proposals are opened.  Given that “[...] failure to provide that assurance at the time it submitted its bid with a consent of surety that lacked any verification, via a POA, that the surety would stand behind the consent of surety…[...] cannot now cure that deficiency. ” (A72-73).  The decision below was eminently reasonable, faithfully adhered to the law and was not arbitrary and capricious and, as such, it should be affirmed in all respects.
[brief] To this day, [...] has not hired a lawyer or appeared in this matter.  [...] cannot step into the shoes of [...] and assert a right to void the Final Judgment on [...]’s behalf, even if it was voidable, which it was not in this instance, because [...] is not the adverse party to the [...] judgment – [...] is the adverse party.  The trial judge did, nevertheless, grant [...]’s Motion for Reconsideration of the April 6, 2023 Final Judgment against [...], as a Third-Party defendant, where [...] tried to assert a variety of defenses on behalf of [...] even though [...] presented no evidence in support of those defenses, and even though [...] did not represent [...].
[brief] ”  Piatt v. Police & Firemen’s Ret. Sys., 443 N.J. Super. 80, 99 (App. Div. 2015) (quoting In re Election Law Enf’t Comm’n Advisory Op. No. 01-2008, 201 N.J. 254, 262 (2010) (additional citations omitted)).  Thus, a party who challenges the validity of the Board’s administrative decision bears “a heavy burden of . . . demonstrating that the decision was arbitrary, unreasonable or capricious.
[brief] Opinion  After Trial by the Court, August 30, 2023 ……………………………Da4-63  Trial Court’s Order Denying Defendants’ Post-Trial Motion for Reconsideration, October 18, 2023………………………………Da84-98  Table of Cases, Statutes, Rules and Other Authorities | Cases | Page(s) | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|---------| | Atlantic Plastic & Hand Surgery, P.A. v. Ralling, | 47 | | 474 N.J. Super. 185 (Law Div. 2021) | | | Baker v. Nat’l State Bank, | 49 | | 353 N.J. Super. 145 (App. Div. 2002) | | | Cesare v. Cesare, | 24 | | 154 N.J. 394 (1998)
[brief] Defendant made four separate videotaped statements to police which were played for the jury.  First, as captured at the scene on [...]’s body-worn camera, defendant interrupted her conversation with [...] to provide his own account.  Second, later that day, [...] and [...] interviewed defendant at [...].  Third, two days later, after defendant’s arrest, he volunteered statements during booking by [...] and [...] at the [...].  Finally, after booking, Bielski and [...] formally interviewed him in the same building.
[brief] ”  Garden of Memories, 109 N.J. Super. at 535 (citing 4 Am. Law of Property, s 17.28, at 608—609 (1952)); McCrea, 46 N.J.Eq. at 474 (“The real force of the statement or recital in such cases is to give to the purchaser notice of an actually existing incumbrance, and the principle upon which recitals of this meager and incomplete sort are held to be notice of such incumbrance is that they are sufficient to put the purchaser upon inquiry, and that he is chargeable with notice of such facts, and such only, as might be ascertained by a reasonable inquiry. ”) (emphasis added); Camp Clearwater, Inc. v. Plock, 52 N.J. Super. 583, 598–99 (Ch. Div. 1958) (“A purchaser is chargeable with notice of every matter affecting the estate, which appears on the face of any deed forming an essential link in the chain of instruments through which he derived his title, and also with notice of whatever matters he would have learned by any inquiry which the recitals in these instruments made it his duty to pursue. ”) (internal quotations and citations omitted), aff’d, 59 N.J. Super. 1 (App. Div. 1959).
[brief] Indeed, the prosecutor explained that both he and defense counsel were “of the position that this matter, considering the nature of it, that it’s been litigated many times before . . . that there was no requirement for a full [N.J.R.E.] 104 hearing or any testimony from anyone. ” (1T21-20 to 22-4).  To this end, the trial judge noted on the record that “the Court and counsel did have a discussion in chambers regarding a[n N.J.R.E.] 104 hearing,” and that because “the steps followed by [...]” were not at issue, an N.J.R.E. 104 hearing was not necessary.  (1T28-21 to 29-1).  Defendant therefore waived a hearing and should not be granted a remand for that purpose.