ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] 1.  .......................................................................12  Changes Systemwide for Preparing 1.1 .........................................................................12  Reform for Need Compelling  The 1.2 ................14  Resources and Practices Enforcement Law on Reform of Impacts  The 1.3 ............................................14  Rights Victims' and Safety Public on Emphasis  The 1.4 ..........................................................15  Directive This Taken by Approach General 1.5 ..................................................................................................16  Directive of Scope 1.6 .............................................................17  Directive  Issuing Order General Attorney  1.7  THE INITIATE REQUIRED TO FINGERPRINTING SCAN LIVE 2.  .......................................17  PROCESS RISK-ASSESSMENT  PRETRIAL AUTOMATED ................................................17  Status Live Scan  Up-to-Date on Report Statewide 2. 1 .,. Paper Recyclable is and Recycled on EmployerPrinted Opportunity  An Equal New Is Jersey ~ 4 Page ......................................................................1  Fingerprinting Requirements.  .......... 2.2  Live Scan System to Support Use Up-to-Date 2.2.1  Requirement to .............................................................................................19  System eCDR for Certain Prohibition of Filing Complaint Offenses without 2.2.2 ............................20  Pretrial Risk-Assessment Process Initiating Automated ...................21 Scan-Equipped Police Facility of Arrestee to Live 2.2.3  Transport Plan for Agencies Equipped with Up-to- 2.2.4  Fingerprinting Not ...........................................................................................21 Scan Live Date ..................21 ............................. ............................  CASE SCREENING PRE-CHARGING
[brief] 5  NEW JERSEY COURT RULES, Comment R. 4:14-2 ...........................................  4, 7 Rule 1:1-2 .............................................................................................................  3 Rule 4:14-2 ...........................................................................................................  4, 7 Rule 4:16-1 ............................................................................................................  6  Rule 4:23-4 ............................................................................................................  2, 5  Plaintiff [...] respectfully submits this brief in reply to Defendants’ opposition to his appeal of the trial court’s March 25, 2024
[brief] Otherwise, the right of contribution section under N.J.S.A. 58:10-23.11f.a.(2)(a) would be meaningless.  As noted above, [...] falls within the definitions of a “potentially responsible party” under the Spill Act as the lessee/occupier of the property at which the discharge occurred.  N.J.A.C. §7:1J-1.4.  [...] also failed to have, install or employ an oil discharge and containment system, as it was required by certain regulations.  40 CFR §279.45; 40 CFR §264.175(a); 40 CFR §264.175(b)(1).  Such failure caused or contributed to the scope of the discharge (permitting it to flow well beyond the immediate area of impact) and extent of the clean-up and remediation efforts.  N.J.A.C. §7:1J-1.4.  E.
[directive] 1.  When a Criminal Division judge or a Municipal Court judge enters a Nicole’s Law restraining order prohibiting defendant’s contact with the victim or others, as provided by statute, either as a condition of bail or any time thereafter, the Criminal Division Manager or the Municipal Court Administrator shall distribute copies of that restraining order to all of the following:  a. the local police department where the victim resides b. the local police department where the defendant resides (if different)
[brief] (RAISED BELOW DA 7A)  On the morning of September 15, 2021, complainant, East Hanover Environmental Health Specialist, [...], randomly came across a trap partially on Murray Road.  She also spotted two cats on that road.  The state never established the cats relationship nor proximity to the trap and never established the length of time the trap was present.  The state readily admitted, however, that these were stray cats - not cats put there by [...].  3T13:13  The Court acquitted [...] of violations relating to the placement of the food in front of the trap having concluded that anyone could have placed that food there.  Based solely on the presence of the trap and cats on the same road, however, the Court convicted [...] of violating East Hanover ordinances 173-24(A) and 173-27.  (Dalla)
[brief] Subsequent to Burt, the interplay between the CNA and the Joint Tortfeasors Contribution Law was addressed in Jones v. Morey’s Pier, Inc., 230 N.J. 142 (2017).  In Jones, the plaintiffs failed to timely serve a notice of claim under the Tort Claims Act, N.J.S.A. 59:8–8, against the plaintiff’s decedent’s charter school.  The original defendants likewise did not serve a notice of tort claim in connection with any contribution claim.  Id. at 147-48.  The Supreme Court of New Jersey held that the defendants, like the plaintiff, were required to timely serve a notice of tort claim for a viable claim against the charter school association public entity defendants.  *Id.* at 148.
[brief] As previously discussed above, initial oral arguments were heard on August 2, 2024.  At that time, Respondents moved to disqualify [...] on July 2, 2024 under RPC 1.9 and RPC 1.10.  The first oral arguments were conducted on August 2, 2024.  At the start of oral arguments, counsel for Respondents placed a statement on the record wherein counsel requested the opportunity to submit a supplemental certification.  (1T5:18-25 to 1T6:1-21).  At oral arguments in August, the Court was not inclined to have supplemental briefs or certifications submitted and indicated that it would consider only the papers that were submitted on that day, i.e. August 2, 2024.  (1T7:16-17).  Thereafter, at the conclusion of oral arguments, the Court requested supplemental briefs on a specific issue when Appellants raised the argument that an issue was raised during oral arguments that was not made in the briefs.  (1T30:20-25).  During oral arguments, Respondent argued, *inter alia*, that [...] had previously represented [...] and [...] would know whether or not [...] was or was not able to litigate the subject lawsuit.  (1T18:15-19).  [...] could know if [...] was of the mind-set to settle and the reasons why.  The Court agreed with Respondents and stated that the technical argument were matters which it agreed and fully understood and were “all things that have been recognized by the court as a potential basis for exclusion.
[brief] In Garrison, a boy, just shy of his seventeenth birthday, was injured while playing night touch football on property owned by [...] -- a parking lot that had an uneven surface, a declivity of one-and-one-half inches.  Plaintiff argued that the declivity posed a substantial risk of injury to a foreseeable user exercising due care.  Apparently, the declivity remained because the Township had suspended a repaving project.  [...] accepted those facts, but concluded that “the Township's failure to devote its resources to the completion of repaving or to the amelioration of the declivity cannot be deemed palpably unreasonable. ”  He observed that it was reasonable to infer that the declivity could be viewed as a maintenance item of low priority.  He further observed that “[h]ad the Township received prior complaints or reports of prior injuries with regard to the alleged dangerous condition, the issue might be viewed differently,” but that there was “no evidence of prior injuries or complaints. ”  Id. at 76-77 (quoting Garrison, 154 N.J. at 285, 311) (italics in original) (emphasis added).
[directive] Law enforcement agencies are referred to N.J.S.A. 2C:64-1 et seq. as the primary statutory source on the forfeiture of property.  The law provides that property is subject to forfeiture if it is "prima facie contraband" (e.g., controlled dangerous substances, illegally possessed firearms), if it was used in furtherance of an unlawful activity (e.g., vehicles used to smuggle contraband), or if it is the proceeds of illegal activity (e.g., currency or assets earned by drug transactions).  Any property subject to forfeiture under N.J.S.A. 2C:64-1 et seq. may be seized by a law enforcement officer and held by a law enforcement agency as evidence pending a criminal prosecution.  If no criminal proceeding is instituted, law enforcement officers may seize and 8 hold without court process property which is "prima facie contraband" or which poses an immediate threat to the public health, safety or welfare.  If a criminal proceeding is instituted, "prima facie contraband" shall be retained by the state until entry of judgment or dismissal of the criminal proceeding, including any appeals, and then shall be forfeited to the entity funding the prosecution.  When property other than prima facie contraband is subject to forfeiture, such forfeiture may be effected by a civil action.  Civil forfeiture proceedings must begin within ninety days of the seizure of the property.  Police departments should contact their county prosecutor regarding any civil forfeiture action.  Property which has been forfeited shall be destroyed if it can serve no lawful purpose or it presents a danger to the public health, safety or welfare.  All other forfeited property shall become the property of the entity funding the prosecuting agency.
[brief] By contrast, the position advocated by both [...] and [...] would permit an eliminated district to essentially re-form at will and jump from one home to another.  No definition of the word “eliminate,” much less the statutory scheme governing either the elimination of non-operating districts or the formation/enlargement of regionalization provides for such actions.  This matter turns on a weighing of interests between [...], a municipality whose school district has not existed for fifteen years, and [...] and [...], where the children of [...] have received a high-quality education for the duration of that fifteen years, and beyond.  [...] and [...] argue that, despite the lack of express statutory language, a twisting and winding interpretation of other, peripheral provisions should nonetheless permit [...] to dictate its own withdrawal.  This position essentially nullifies [...]’s 2009 elimination, and subjugates [...] and [...] to [...].  Such a scheme is inconsistent with the statutory text, or any reasonable interpretation thereof.  Therefore, [...]’s decision finding that [...] is entitled to withdraw pursuant to N.J.S.A. 18A:13-47.11 should be reversed.
[brief] ”  (Sb9).  Furthermore, it is not a question of whether or not it is “appropriate and reasonable” to appoint only “sportsmen” recommended by the [...] to the Council given the “specialized nature of the Council’s responsibilities. ”  (Sb9).  It is not a question of whether or not the Legislature’s decision to designate “sportsmen” as the controlling majority on the Council is appropriate, because “sportsmen” are supposed to have “knowledge of and interest in the conservation and fish and game”
[brief] That opinion serves only to distinguish the present case from those involving a person with relevant knowledge.  "Specifically, the State introduced [...]'s testimony regarding the installation and view of the camera; the testimony of [...], the loss/security representative for [...], as to the camera's operation and his own 'periodic testing' of the camera, as well as his removal of the film."  Id. at 509.  At OAGb15- OAGb19, the Attorney General discusses opinions from other jurisdictions.
[directive] The courts routinely examine agency practice in evaluating the expectation of privacy.  Written notification thus would quickly be nullified if representatives of the agency never entered or inspected any of these areas.  In addition to notifying employees of the agency's right to search and inspect, the agency should also, with some regularity, inspect these areas to establish the practice coinciding with the policy.  Any search of agency or personal property should be conducted in the presence of the subject officer and a property control officer.
[brief] In the absence of a request, the basis for charging the lesser must be “clearly indicated” from the record and the trial judge is not under the same duty “meticulously to sift” through the record to see if any aspect of the evidence supports the instruction.  *Id.*; *State v. Choice*, 98 N.J. 295, 299 (1985).  Indeed, if not requested, the need for the instruction must be “jumping off the page” of the record for its absence to be reversible error.
[brief] According to [...], the federal rules on pipeline integrity, 49 C.F.R. Part 192, required all of [...]’s transmission lines “to be baseline by December 2012,” which necessitated the replacement of the 10-inch line.  (1T134:20-22; 1T135:2-9).  Additionally, [...]’s panel testified that the construction project enabled [...] to perform in-line inspections and assess the line’s pipeline integrity in accordance with federal regulations.  (Aa811).  issues, where a drop in pressure between the transmission and distribution lines would lead to the formation of ice on the regulator and its related equipment, thereby increasing the risk of service outages, especially in winter.  (Ra6-8; Aa814).  According to the panel, the station is “regularly encased in ice” throughout the year and “continuously encased in ice” during winter, thus requiring [...] to thaw the regulator station, which is a “laborious and time consuming” process.  (Ra8-9; Aa776; Aa818; 1T164:3-20).  While the panel testified that [...] ran the temporary station at lower pressures “to mitigate the risks associated with an outage,” the panel indicated that icing issues persisted and that the pressure reduction method could “place additional burdens on surrounding regulators in the system, which can increase the potential for secondary or system wide failures. ” (Aa819).  Despite the pressure reduction method, the panel established that [...] faced two significant icing incidents in 2014 and 2018, where the malfunctioning temporary station was out of service for a full day.  (Aa819-20; 1T159:1-5; 1T163:20-164:20; 1T165:23-166:10; 1T171:15-172:9).  As a result, the panel testified that [...] would install a [...] ([...]) in-line heater with the new regulator station to address the icing concerns and enable the regulator to “adequately, safely, and reliably accomplish the reduction in gas pressure” between the transmission and distribution systems and provide reliable service to customers in [...] and surrounding areas.
[brief] The rule as to claim joinder generally requires that all aspects of the controversy between those who are parties to litigation be included in a single action. ”  See Pressler & Verniero, CURRENT N.J. Court Rules, (GANN), Comment R. 4:30A-1.  The Court in Westinghouse Electric Corp. V. Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, 233 N.J. Super 463, 470-471 (App. Div. 1989), stated, “This kind of fractionalization is a most potent weapon in the arsenal of the litigant whose primary and subversive aim is to impose both upon the judicial system and the adversary by endlessly delaying the day upon which the entire controversy will finally come to an end and the respective rights of the litigants resolved – clearly, consistently and finally.  It is only the single comprehensive action, designed to adjudicate the entire controversy between the litigants which can protect both the Court and the parties from that calculated imposition. ”  Insurance carriers should not be obligated to engage in fractionalized litigation to prove their claims under the Fraud Act.  Thus, the entire matter should be remanded to the trial court so it can be resolved in one consistent and comprehensive action by a “court of competent jurisdiction” as specifically required by the Fraud Act.
[brief] [Da96].  As concluded by the trial court, the Subject Property, being one located in [...], is precisely the sort contemplated by this contract.  Given the 1984 Johnson Road Agreement’s explicit language, the trial court properly determined the Connection Fee is properly due and owing to the [...] as done by the Parties in previous instances.  Appellant’s argument that the 1999 Agreement superseded the 1984 Johnson Road Agreement is equally unavailing.  As noted by the trial court, [t]here is nothing in the 1999 Agreement indicating it supersedes the Second 1984 Agreement with respect to Johnson Road residential development in [...] or otherwise or othat the [...] would not be entitled to sewer connection fees for residences constructed along Johnson Road in [...].  [Da180].  Consistent with the trial court’s analysis, “[t]he terms of the second contract must be so inconsistent with those of the former contract that they cannot stand together. ”  Rosenberg v. D. Kaltman & Co., 28 N.J. Super. 459, 464 (Ch. Div. 1953) (emphasis added).  In particular, the 1999 Agreement is not inconsistent with the 1984 Johnson Road Agreement.  As Appellant concedes in its papers, the only explicit reference to connection fees in the 1999 Agreement is found in Section 6.1.  However, such provision is applicable only to properties located in the [...], unlike the Subject Property at issue here.  As previously stated, the 1984 Johnson Road Agreement explicitly provided any new connection along Johnson Road required a connection fee to be paid to the [...], not Appellant.  [Da96].  While the 1999 Agreement concerns properties located in the [...], the 1984 Johnson Road Agreement concerns those properties which are located on Johnson Road in [...], as is the Subject Property.  Given the lack of overlap between these two contracts, there is no inconsistency, and the 1999 Agreement does not supersede the 1984 Johnson Road Agreement.  Given the foregoing, the trial court correctly determined the contracts by and between the Parties unequivocally establish the [...] is entitled to all connection fees for properties on Johnson Road in [...].
[brief] The First Count through the Eighth Count of Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint allege Fraud, Tortious Interference, Conversion, Unjust Enrichment, Violation of New Jersey RICO, and Aiding and Abetting and Conspiracy to commit said intentional torts, against [...], [...], and [...].  As Plaintiffs have settled their claims against [...] and [...], Plaintiffs will discuss said Counts against [...], only.  Said Counts arise solely from Plaintiffs’ newly discovered evidence in the 2015 Action that [...] was the Sole Member of [...] and controlled and operated [...] as a sham entity, and the newly discovered claims arising therefrom.  None of these facts nor claims were alleged in the complaint that was dismissed against [...] in the 2015 Action, as said facts were only discovered in the course of the 2015 Action following said dismissal.  The Trial Court’s sole basis for dismissing said Counts against [...] is Res Judicata and the Entire Controversy Doctrine.  The Trial Court stated: “These claims are barred by the Entire Controversy Doctrine and res judicata, as they are identical to the claims asserted in the 2015 action…”  182a.  The Trial Court did not explain how claims that are entirely new, arising out of the discovery that [...] was Sole Member of [...] and controlled and operated [...] as a sham entity – facts and claims which were not pled before the dismissal of the complaint against [...] in the 2015 Action, since they were unknown by Plaintiffs at the time – could possibly be “identical” to the claims that were dismissed.
[directive] (Distribute on or within 2C:36-2 (Use or possession with of (Manufacture/ distribute/possession 1000 feet school property/bus) intent to use drug paraphernalia) with intent to distribute - marijuana less than or equal too 1 oz but less than or hashish less than or 51b equal too 5 g but less than 1 lb)  2C:35-5(b )(12)  l(a)  2C:35-7.  (Possession or 2C:35-1 0(b) (Under influence without prescription) (Manufacture/ distribute/possession distribution within 500 feet certain with intent to distribute - marijuana public property) less than 1 oz or hashish less than 5g) of 2C:35-10(a)(3) (Possession more 2C:35-10( c) (Fails to give of controlled dangerous substance to than 50g marijuana or 5g hashish) · police) of 2C:35-10(a)(4) (Possession less than 50g marijuana or 5g hashish)
[brief] \(^1\) --- \(^1\)  On May 28, 2024, [...] filed a miscellaneous letter, which was marked deficient by the Clerk of the Appellate Division, requesting to join [...]’s appeal.  Not only was the letter filed out of time, but [...] never cured his deficiencies or filed a timely brief.  As such, any submission in support of [...]’s appeal by [...] is requested to be deficient and ignored by this Court.
[directive] 참고: 2C:39-5b(2)에 공기총, BB총인 소지, 귀하가 의한 용수철총 또는 권총의 불법 N.J.S.A. N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5c(1)에 소지, 2C:39-5c(2)에 의한 비장전 라이플총  또는 산탄총의  불법 또는 의한 N.J.S.A. 공기총, BB총인 용수철총  또는 라이플총 또는 산탄총의  불법 소지에 대하여 유죄 시인을 하는 경우, 않습니다.  의무적 그레이브스법 가석방
[brief] BLACKBALL’S BONA FIDE PURCHASER DEFENSE IS LIKEWISE PREEMPTED BY TYLER AND ROBERTO AS TO APPELLANTS’ TAKINGS CLAIM (Issue Addressed Below, 454a-792a)  [...] and later [...] both considered [...]’s claim to “bona fide purchaser for value without notice” status under *I.E.’s, LLC v. Simmons*, 392 N.J. Super. 520 (Law Div. 2006), which is the seminal case denying “bona fide purchaser for value without notice” status to a purchaser of a tax title following a tax lien foreclosure.  Appellants’ contended to the lower court and argue in their primary appellate brief that [...] manifestly fails to qualify as a BFP under *I.E.’s, LLC v. Simmons* as to Appellant’s motion to vacate under Rule 4:50-1 and stands by those arguments.  [...]’s BFP defense must also fail as to Appellants’ takings claim in light of *Tyler* and *Roberto*.  By limiting the retroactive application of *Tyler* to cases in the “pipeline,” *Roberto* inherently balances the rights of parties who would be prejudiced by application of the “new rule” of *Tyler*, mandating the preservation of an aggrieved parties’ Federal takings claim over the equitable defenses of a subsequent title holder where an aggrieved parties’ claim remains actionable and in the “pipeline. ”  To hold otherwise would sidestep the supremacy of the Federal version of “pipeline” retroactivity announced in *Harper*, 509 U.S. at 100, and adopted and applied in *Roberto*.  In balancing the concerns relating to retroactivity, the *Roberto* court emphasized that tax sale certificate holders “know ‘from the start that most tax certificate investments end not in windfall profits from foreclosure but rather in high yield interest returns upon redemption. ’”  *Roberto*, 477 N.J. Super at 360 (quoting *Simon v. Cronecker*, 189 N.J. 304, 315 (2007)).  Thus, the Tax Sale Law did not create sufficient reliance interests to render retroactive application inappropriate.  *Roberto*, 477 N.J. Super at 360.  Nothing in *Roberto* limits retroactive application to eligible “pipeline” cases raised against primary rather than secondary transferees, such as an alleged BFP.  The *Roberto* decision’s discussion of *Tyler* bears squarely upon Appellants’ case.  It holds that the rule from *Tyler* applies with full force in New Jersey, that foreclosures which divest a property owner of significant equity pursuant to the Tax Sale Law effect an unconstitutional taking, and that *Tyler* applies retroactively to cases that were already pending when *Tyler* was decided.