ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] [...] simply disagrees with it.  [...] argues that it should have been awarded two percent because the City had budgeted for a two percent increase in prior years and that the Arbitrator should have given greater weight to the internal comparables, but this is mere argument and opinion.  [...]’s differing opinion does not constitute grounds to disturb the Award.  It is irrelevant.  [...] has recognized that arriving at an economic award in the interest arbitration context is not a precise mathematical process and mathematical exactitude is not expected or required.
[brief] (Pa38-Pa40).  His termination arose from incidents in May 2019, when [...] consumed alcohol on two occasions on school premises while on duty.  (Pa46).  As a result of the incidents, the [...] filed four tenure charges against [...], alleging conduct unbecoming and other just cause, including insubordination, for consuming alcohol during work in violation of state law, municipal law, district policy, and established standards of professional behavior.
[brief] (a)  The data may only be used for “internal business purposes. ”  (b)  The subscriber may re-distribute data to its end user clients, but only for their internal business purposes and only if the end user is a “professional entity that utilizes” the data in its regular business.  (c)  The subscriber’s re-dissemination of data is limited to situations where the end user “would not reasonably be expected to serve as a substitute” for obtaining the data directly from the [...].  (d)  Subscribers must inform clients of the limitations on the further re-dissemination of data except as permitted by the [...].  (e)  Subscribers must obtain a separate license to CUSIP numbers from a separate private company, [...] (“[...]”) at additional cost, a requirement that the [...] will police.  (f)  Subscribers must agree to indemnify the [...].  Ja2306, 2385-87, 2986-3004, 3006-19, 4309-10.
[brief] The clause of the Redevelopment Agreement at issue on this appeal is Section 8.6(a), which provides for a revenue sharing calculation by which [...] and [...] would receive shares of Project Garage revenue in excess of $1,600,000 as of 2005, which amount would be adjusted annually in accordance with the Consumer Price Index (CPI).  This threshold amount was negotiated and agreed upon by [...] and [...] as a result of [...] losing $1,200,000 in revenue from the operation of the surface parking lots that were displaced by the Project.  [...] agreed to receive 66.66% of revenue, if any, received in excess of $1,600,000.  [...] never sought nor received any assurances that revenue would reach or exceed $1,600,000; it merely had a right to share if that threshold were exceeded.  The March 15, 2024 order of the trial court (the “Order”) reformed the Redevelopment Agreement to remove the $1,600,000 threshold and instead provided that [...] would receive 66.66% of the Project Garage parking revenue generated after expenses, with [...] receiving a 33.33% share of that revenue.  This order also directed [...] to pay [...] $499,007.77 in fees because of said reformation, retroactive to August 2019, the date [...] filed its initial Complaint in this matter.  Respectfully, the trial court erred in reforming these agreements and awarding [...] retroactive fees as a result.  As set forth herein, [...] has not met its burden of establishing the legal standard for reformation of contract.  There is no allegation of any mutual mistake of the parties with respect to either agreement, and no demonstrated instance of fraud or unconscionable conduct on the part of [...], which elements are essential in granting the extraordinary remedy of reformation of contract.
[brief] (Da987).  Paragraph 8.5 of the 2017 SPA declares that all other "known or unknown agreements are null and void."  Da929.  Moreover, any reliance upon alleged misrepresentations made before the 2017 SPA is barred by the integration clauses contained in Paragraph 7.1 of each of the SPAs.  See, Db37; Da911, Da1530.  Therefore, the operative agreement in determining whether fees are authorized is the 2017 SPA in which [...] is the purchaser and the controlling provision is Paragraph 6.3 of that agreement.
[directive] 3  Any such schedule would describe the amount of specified drugs typically contained in various retail package units that are commonly sold in the region, based upon historical and intelligence information gleaned from law enforcement experience.  Such schedules would not alter the uniform statewide amount thresholds established in Section 6.5.1 of the Brimage Guidelines.  Rather, such schedules would merely provide a guide so that assistant prosecutors screening a case could reasonably estimate the amount of drugs where the number of seized units or distinctive packages is known, but the aggregate weight is not documented in the case file.  -3-  By way of example, in any jurisdiction where street-level heroin is sold in recognizable “decs” that typically contain one-tenth gram, an assistant prosecutor in that jurisdiction may confidently tender an “open” plea offer in a case involving distribution or possession with intent to distribute less than twenty-five such sales units.  In contrast, the seizure of 75 such retail packages, for example, would provide a good faith basis to believe that the defendant is ineligible for an “open” offer.  The schedules developed by the prosecutor’s office may similarly refer to other typical retail, street-level packaging units for various specific drugs, such as “nickel” and “dime” bags of heroin, cocaine and/or marijuana, individual “crack” vials, “bricks” of heroin, etc.)  In the event that a prosecutor tenders an “open” plea offer and thereafter becomes aware of new information indicating that the defendant is ineligible for such an offer by reason of the amount of drugs involved, the prosecutor in the exercise of reasoned discretion may withdraw the “open” offer and tender a replacement plea offer that accounts for the newly-discovered circumstances.
[brief] For the reasons set forth above, [...] respectfully requests that this Court vacate the subject judgment of the Chancery Court.  Respectfully submitted, [...]  Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant, [...]tislav Sipko  By: /s/ [...]_____________________  [...], Esq.  Dated: December 18, 2023 [...], Plaintiff-Respondent, v. RASTISLAV SIPKO, Defendant-Appellant, and [...], [...], [...], [...] and [...], Defendants.
[brief] In preparation for filing the second foreclosure complaint; sometimes in 2015 [...] hired a notary public named [...] to forge my signature on an alleged loan modification agreement called the HAM Agreement of 2015 (103a).  I have never seen the HAM Agreement and have never signed it.  I have never seen [...] and never signed any document before her.  Paragraph L of that document is all about [...] and that document got its legitimacy from [...] as the nominee for [...] which never existed on 2/27/2009.  [...] never had legal standing to assign a Note or mortgage or to be the custodian of a Note in the state of NJ.  Also the nominee relationship between [...] and [...] ended on 12/31/2005 when [...] went out of business.  On 10/18/22, [...] made a certification to the Law Division of the Superior Court of Monmouth County that I appeared before here to sign her Notary Journal.  She forged my signature again.  Ironically she pleaded in her certification that she did not recall meeting me (115a).  FILING THE SECOND FORECLOSURE COMPLAINT BY BAYVIEW on 5/12/16
[brief] ## Cases  *In re Waterfront Development Permit*, 244 N.J. Super 426 (App. Div. 1990)  11  *In re CAFRA Permit No. 87-0959-5  Issued to [...]*  152 N.J. 287 (1997)  12  *Dragon v. New Jersey Dep’t of Environmental Protection*  405 N.J. Super 487 (App. Div. 2009)
[brief] Defendant does not address Plaintiff’s claim that he is in significant arrears to the [...] for unpaid association dues.  Defendant simply has no excuse for his brazen failure to pay his dues.  Indeed, even if Defendant had viable counterclaims—which he does not—that would not be a basis for vacating default judgment, as such claims could be raised in a separate action.  Instead, Defendant claims he is entitled to offsets for supposed credits he afforded the [...] to repair certain common elements of the Property.  Notably, Defendant states that “[he] elected to treat the expenditure as a credit toward” the unpaid dues, and does not identify any agreement by the Plaintiff to reimburse him for the alleged expenses.  Defendant’s allegations are bereft of any documentary evidence or any written agreement between the Defendant and the [...].  Defendant essentially asks this Court to take his word, several years into a defaulted litigation in which he chose not to appear, that there was such a handshake or verbal agreement with the [...] to undertake over $13,000 in repairs even though he admits the [...] told him he would not be reimbursed for any such repairs.  (Def.’s Br. at 2).  Thus, we submit that Defendant’s allegations are not credible and unsupported by convincing evidence.  Indeed, Defendant specifically identifies an instruction by Plaintiff “not to attempt to repair” a subsequent element of the Unit at his own expense.  (Def.’s Br. at 2).  Accordingly, not only was there no agreement that Defendant would be reimbursed for any repairs he made, Defendant actually admits the [...] instructed him not to make the repairs because he would not be reimbursed for them.  Finally, respecting Defendant’s argument concerning the Court’s denial of attorneys’ fees, he confuses attorneys’ fees that the Plaintiff incurred “for previous collection efforts between years 2012-2017”\(^1\) for Unit 1, and “for previous collection efforts between years 2013-2017”\(^2\) for Unit 4 on the one hand, and attorneys’ fees that Plaintiff incurred in commencing the instant action and engaging in the necessary motion practice that resulted in the entry of default judgment against Defendant, on the other hand.
[brief] Plaintiff next resorts to insisting R 1:20A-6 notice by email is proper by misrepresenting that Defendant never disputed his purported email notice.  First, R 1:20A-6 does not permit email service.  Next, the record is rife with Defendant’s affidavits stating Plaintiff never sent anything to her, by email or otherwise.  After a hearing and review of the evidence, in 2019 the court found he violated R 1:20A-6 and dismissed Plaintiff’s complaint.  Plaintiff next states the court claimed “personal service” of the pre-action notice occurred after the case was dismissed on August 27, 2019 (Da-6), it directed Plaintiff to serve Defendant in the future to an address that was not hers (and that Plaintiff’s filings here admit was not her residence) and he claims the court directed arbitration to proceed.  First, all of those statements are irrelevant and prohibited as Plaintiff informs they were all made after the trial court dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.  As detailed above, a court cannot make directions or judgments when it lacks jurisdiction.
[brief] The DEP is in the process of evaluating the adequacy of [...]’s recently-submitted public access proposal and the extent of public access required on the Property, by considering “the scale of the changes to the footprint or use, the demand for public access, and any department-approved municipal public access plan . . . .”  N.J.S.A. 13:1D-153(a).  But this process has not been completed and is not ripe for appellate review.  Because the record in this matter is robust on the narrow issue addressed in the Final Decision, [...]’s request for remand should be denied.  F.  The Commissioner Did Not Err in Concluding that OAL Lacked Jurisdiction to Hear [...]’s Takings Claim (Responding to Appellants’ Point VI).
[brief] Plaintiff has paid $130,000.00 toward a system that fails to perform as marketed by the defendants.  Pa74.  New Jersey courts recognize four general categories of remedies for breach of contract: compensatory damages, restitution, reliance damages, and specific performance.  See Donovan v. Bachstadt, 91 N.J. 434, 443-44 (1982); Pop’s Cones, Inc. v. Resorts Intern. Hotel, Inc., 307 N.J. Super. 461, 473 (App. Div. 1998).  Giving [...] the benefit of all reasonable inferences, if defendants were found in breach of their duties, at the very least a rational fact finder could conclude that [...] paid too much or must otherwise be compensated to correct deficiencies related to warranties and performance of the system.  In other words, the amount paid for something that does not work is itself a measure of damages.  Furthermore, if either or both defendants were found to have violated the CFA, then [...] would be permitted to receive an award of money for their loss proximately caused by the defendants, in which case the amount “shall” be threefold and the Court “shall also award reasonable attorney’s fees, filing fees, and reasonable costs of suit” pursuant to N.J.S.A. 56:8-19.  See also Model Civil Jury Charge 4.43.  Here, the Trial Court already determined that the defendants conduct under the CFA was a jury question.  If there was a question as to whether what was promised was delivered - it necessarily follows that the question of damages and remedies should have also been left for trial.  As to the second issue of the Trial Court accepting “operation and installation of the Struxure louvered roof system” as both a matter requiring specialized skill and knowledge while also being a matter of “common sense” about which plaintiff simply should have known better - the defendants briefs offer nothing new to explain this glaring contradiction.
[directive] Standardized Waivers  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  37-48 6.1  General Description of Standardized Waivers  . . . . . . . . . .  37 6.2  Standardized Offers are Available Only Pre-indictment or the Functional Equivalence of Pre-indictment . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 6.3  Ineligibility Based Upon Fugitive Status and Authority to Refrain from Tendering a Standardized Waiver  . . . . . .  38-39 6.4  Waiver of Parole Ineligibility (“Flat Offer”) . . . . . . . . . . . . .  39 6.4.1  Eligibility Criteria for a “Flat” Offer . . . . . . . . . .  39-41 6.5  Unrestricted Waiver of N.J.S.A. 2C:35-12 (“Open” Offer) . . 41 6.5.1  Eligibility Criteria for an “Open” Offer . . . . . . . .  41-44 6.5.
[brief] Plaintiff filed a Complaint in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Morris County, Law Division on or about August 29, 2023, alleging a hostile work environment and prohibited retaliatory actions (Pa-1).  On September 21, 2023, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Stay the Promotion Process (Pa-7) with supporting Certification (Pa-8).  On October 5, 2023, Defendants filed a Cross-Motion to Dismiss the Complaint (Pa-10) with Certification of Defendant [...] (Pa-12).  Subsequently, on November 14, 2023, Plaintiff filed a supplemental Certification (Pa-20) in opposition to Defendant’s Motion.  On December 22, 2023, the Court heard oral argument on both Motions (1T).  By two separate Orders entered on that date, the Court denied Plaintiff’s Motion (Pa-24) and granted Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Pa-25).  On or about January 15, 2024, Plaintiff filed a Notice of Appeal followed by an Amended Notice of Appeal on January 24, 2024 (Pa-27).
[brief] CONCLUSION  For the foregoing reasons, the chancery court’s Judgment should be reversed against Defendant as to Counts 5-8 and 11-13 under the Amended Complaint and the award of attorneys’ fees, costs and pre-trial interest should be vacated.  Respectfully Submitted, [...]  By: /s/ [...]  [...], Esq.  [...]  Tel: [...]  Fax: [...]  [...]  Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant, [...] [...] and [...], Plaintiffs-Respondents / Cross-Appellants, v. [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...] and [...], Defendants-Appellants / Cross-Respondents.
[brief] D.  “fourth, that defendants’ breach, or failure to do what the contract required, caused a loss to the plaintiffs” (Argued at Pa390)  Under the contract, [...] is not entitled to be paid for work not performed.  The only “loss” identified by [...] is an alleged “loss” based on N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-9(e)(3), and not a loss from a breach of contract.  [...] therefore did not suffer any loss from a breach of contract.  [...]’s Counterclaim and the court order do not establish the fourth element for a breach of contract claim, namely, that the [...]’s breach, or failure to do what the contract required, caused a loss to the plaintiffs”\textsuperscript{44}.
[brief] This is true notwithstanding the Department’s reliance on orders relating to other acquisitions, which other than the [...] transaction, expressly involved insurance companies undisputedly regulated by the Holding Act.  The Skylands Orders all involved traditional insurance companies and their national infrastructures, i.e. holding companies, which are clearly within the Holding Act as the 2010 NAIC testimony confirmed.  Indeed, just as NAIC’s submission to Congress unequivocally stated that [...] (and [...]) were not subject to the Holding Act, it also clearly showed that the entities involved in the Skylands Orders were subject to the Holding Act.
[brief] Plaintiff may move before [...] for an order seeking an enlargement of time to complete the production.  *4  •  Similarly, [...] did not abuse her discretion in granting Defendants’ request for Plaintiff’s tax returns from the period of time Plaintiff claims “lost wages, profit, earning and/or income” (Interrogatory No. 15).  (Letter Order at 3).  This Court agrees that same is discoverable information pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 26.  To the extent that Plaintiff argues on appeal that he did not file a tax return for 2014 and does not have access to 2015 tax return (Appeal at 3), Plaintiff must submit a certification to [...] to that effect, in accordance with the Letter Order (Letter Order at 3).
[brief] The Law exempts some development from public access requirements too.  For instance, the Law requires only that marinas maintain “the existing degree of public access,” but if there was no prior public access to the waterfront, “the [DEP] shall not impose new public access requirements to the waterfront or adjacent shoreline as a condition of the permit .  . . .”  N.J.S.A. 13:1D-154(a).  The Law also precludes the DEP from requiring public access at facilities with security issues, like airports, railroad yards, and other enumerated facilities.  N.J.S.A. 13:1D-152.  These contrast with the “additional” public access mandate set forth in N.J.S.A. 13:1D-153(a).  C.
[brief] The trial court expressed its belief that there was not really another way for Plaintiffs to obtain relief without expert accounting services and the extensive legal work provided by counsel.  (37T 89:12-17; 91:10-18; 92:16 to 93:13).22  In addition to the R.P.C. 1.5 factors, the trial court also considered several factors about the defendants’ conduct in determining the fee award.  For example, the trial court considered the immense hurdles that the Plaintiffs had to surmount just to obtain the defendants’ financial books and records, which the defendants fought “tooth and nail” to avoid disclosing in full.  (37T 75:7 to 76:8).  Plaintiffs and their expert also expended significant time and effort to unravel what the trial court called “webs” and “mazes” of accounts that the defendants’ created to conceal their misappropriations.  (37T 79:7-9; 86:18-20).  Appellant also forgets that not only did Plaintiffs prevail on their own claims, but they also soundly defeated the fusillade of counterclaims and third party claims for which the defendants sought $3.2 million, punitive damages, attorneys fees, costs of suit, and various forms of injunctive relief, all of which the trial court found were “just basically brought in retaliation,” and some of which the trial court did not “even want to dignify. ” (36T 11:23 to 12:15; 38:18 to 39:20).  _____________________
[brief] [...]  Of Counsel and On the Brief: [...], Esq.  TABLE OF CONTENTS  Page  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT ..................................................................................  1  PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND STATEMENT OF FACTS ..................................  4  LEGAL ARGUMENT .............................................................................................  8  POINT I ..............................................................................................................  8  THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THE TOWNSHIP  ARTICULATED  A VALID PUBLIC USE AS THE TOWNSHIP’S PURPORTED USE IS A MERE PRETEXT AS THE TOWNSHIP HAS FAILED TO DEMONSTRATE HOW THE PROPERTY WILL BE USED AFTER A LAND SWAP WITH A PRIVATE DEVELOPER (RAISED BELOW: 1T22-24)  ...........................................................................  8  A.  IN ORDER FOR THE TOWNSHIP TO TAKE PRIVATE PROPERTY, IT MUST ARTICULATE A VALID PUBLIC PURPOSE TO DO SO ...........................................................................................................  8  B.  THE TOWNSHIP’S PURPORTED PUBLIC PURPOSE OF OPEN SPACE APPEARS TO BE A MERE PRETEXT FOR THE ACTUAL USE OF THE PROPERTIES  FOLLOWING THE LAND SWAP WITH A PRIVATE DEVELOPER  .................................................  10  C.  THE RECORD HERE IS ENTIRELY LACKING IN FACTS TO SUPPORT A LEGITIMATE PUBLIC PURPOSE, UNLIKE THE EXTENSIVE RECORD BEFORE THIS COURT IN MT.  LAUREL V. MIPRO HOMES, LLC, 188 N.J. 531 (2006)  ..................................  12 POINT II ............................................................................................................  14  RES JUDICATA DOES NOT BAR THIS ACTION BECAUSE THE EMINENT DOMAIN ACT PROVIDES THE EXCLUSIVE FORUM FOR THE ADJUDICATION OF ALL ISSUES RELATED TO THE GOVERNMENT’S EXERCISE OF THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN (RAISED BELOW: 2T16-17)  ..............................................  14 POINT III ..................................................................................................................  20  THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO CONDUCT AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING DURING AND THEREFORE DEPRIVED DEFENDANTS OF THE OPPRTUNITY TO OBJECT TO THE CONDEMNATION (RAISED BELOW: 1T24)  ...........................................  20 CONCLUSION .............................................................................................................
[brief] Plaintiff’s post-hoc --- 3  Plaintiff also cites, but misreads, another non-binding opinion, Sullivan v. DB Invs., Inc., No. 04-2819 (SRC), 2008 WL 8747721 (D.N.J. May 22, 2008).  There, the court did not conclude the proposed settlement would not or could not extinguish future claims.  Contra Pb26–Pb27.  It held that the release at issue applied only to claims within the class period which arose out of the class litigation, but it confirmed that a class settlement can release “[c]laims arising from the same facts but not asserted” in the action and claims “arising out of or relating to” the action.  2008 WL 8747721, at *25.  The “Released Claims” here fall into those two categories.  interpretation of “in the future” significantly diminishes the release’s value to [...] and it is not what the parties agreed to in *Roma*.  The Court can affirm the trial court’s decision on this basis because Plaintiff released all claims related to *Roma*—including Settlement Members’ claims that arose “in the future.