ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] (See Da 069, 12T).  PCR Counsel then filed two more motions to compel discovery from the State.  The first was a request for the personnel and other records pertaining to [...] of the [...].  (See Da 070-071).  On December 6, 2022, the Court found that “the Defense has sufficiently demonstrated that the Defendant’s targeted requests are based on allegations of misconduct on the part of [...]…” and granted *in camera* review of the officer’s personnel files including his “IA files regarding discipline, civil lawsuits and complaints.
[brief] The trial judge, denying [...]’s first Motion for Summary Judgment in part, clearly provided that only Plaintiffs’ common knowledge claims, involving the issue of whether “[...] directed [someone] to place construction materials on plaintiff’s property, obstructing their use of the property” could move forward.  (Pa000471-72).  These claims, which were essentially trespass claims, *were the only claims that survived summary judgment*.  There were no “common knowledge” negligence claims that Plaintiffs could have asserted against [...], as was made abundantly clear to them throughout this litigation.
[brief] [...] argues that the trial court properly denied [...]’s motion to enforce the Settlement Agreement because the Money Judgment would constitute a “pre-judgment writ of attachment” and “a windfall,” although the trial court made no such ruling.  [Db13].  But even if it had, this assertion mischaracterizes the parties’ settlement as well as the damages reflected in the Money Judgment to which the parties explicitly agreed.  [Pa93]  To be clear, the Money Judgment has nothing to do with the post-settlement damages caused by [...]’s unauthorized dumping.  The damages resulting from the solid waste that [...] imported and dispersed has yet to be quantified by [...]’s environmental experts, and will be the subject of a new action to recover these distinct amounts once this damage has been quantified.  The Money Judgment, on the other hand, was negotiated and agreed to by both parties as “the total amount due under the Parties’ Lease… as of June 1, 2023” that [...] was entitled to recover upon default.
[brief] The entire corpus of the so-called “evidence” that [...] produced was limited to the provision of thirteen (13) checks, all without any indication of what it was that [...] was purchasing, and two (2) unsigned handwritten quotes.  The Law Division accorded [...] every conceivable opportunity to satisfy its burden of proof on the damages issue.  First, in the context of a discovery motion, the Court issued an Order giving [...] specific instructions, which ultimately yielded no further substance.
[directive] Site information refers to the location the forensic medical examination took place.  21  Kit Information and Comments include toxicology kit marker, SAFE marker, DFSA marker, adult or pediatric marker, laboratory submission form/information, 5-year hold and expiration date, time examination began and completed, who took possession of kit and date, and status of kit.  22  Case Information/Documents includes waiver; advocate name, case number, notes, physical case folders, cases received as evidence, statistics, photographs, translation needed, and markers (such as DCP&P, SARC, HIV, college student, or feedback form).  23  Investigation Information/Disposition includes chain of custody, investigating agency (including name of law enforcement and SART team members), markers (such as stranger case or strangulation case), activation alert to victim witness, location of incident, and items collected, found, and collected by.  12 | P a g e included the number of responding agencies to each question, especially when the question was not answered by all.  Conclusion
[brief] \(^9\)  The case law supports the counting of untimely arrived ballots where the voter’s intent is clear and there is no risk or fraud or misconduct.  In another case, the Appellate Division held that when the post office was closed due to anthrax contamination, even though the statute directed otherwise, ballots untimely delivered to the Board were to be counted.  See *In re Holmes*, 346 N.J. Super. 372 (App. Div. 2001).  That statute, now repealed, required absentee ballots received by the county board of elections before 8:00 p.m. on the day of the election, but these ballots arrived a day late.
[directive] 그리고/AND  [예/Yes]  [아니요/No]  [해당없음/NA]  또한 귀하가 이러한 범죄를 저지르거나, 범행미수 또는 a.  공모하는 동안에 총기를 소지한 것에 대해 유죄를 인정하는 경우, 총기 소지에 대한 순차집행형의 선고를 받는다는 것을 알고 있습니까? you also plead guilty to possessing a firearm while committing, attempting to commit or conspiring to commit any of these offenses you will receive a consecutive sentence for possessing the weapon?  지령 제01-18호(02/23/2018)에 의거 공포된 양식, CN 11169-Korean Form Promulgated by Directive #01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 11169-Korean 또는/OR [예/Yes] [아니요/No] [해당없음/NA] 또한 귀하가 이러한 범죄를 저지르거나, 범행미수 또는 b. 공모하는 동안에 불법적인 목적으로 총기가 아닌 다른 무기를 소지한 것에 대해 유죄를 인정하는 경우, 불법적인 목적의 무기 소지에 대한 순차집행형의 선고를 받는다는 것을 알고 있습니까? you also plead guilty to possessing a weapon, other than a firearm, for an unlawful purpose while committing, attempting to commit or conspiring to commit any of these offenses you will receive a consecutive sentence for possessing the weapon for an unlawful purpose? 또는/OR [예/Yes] [아니요/No] [해당없음/NA] 또한 귀하가 이러한 범죄를 저지르거나, 범행미수 또는 c. 공모하는 동안에 총기가 아닌 다른 무기의 합법적인 사용이 명백히 적합하지 않은 상황에서, 그러한 무기를 소지한 것에 대해 유죄를 인정하는 경우, 무기 소지에 대한 순차집행형의 선고를 받는다는 것을 알고 있습니까?
[brief] IN THE MATTERS OF [...]  Charging Party/Cross-Respondent, v. [...], Respondent/Cross-Charging Party.  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY  APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. [...]  Civil Action ON APPEAL FROM THE FINAL DECISION OF THE PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS COMMISSION DATED OCTOBER 26, 2023 (AGENCY DOCKET NOS. [...] and [...] (CONSOLIDATED)
[brief] More significantly for purposes of this analysis, however, [...]’s summary judgment motion was premised upon its allegation that the Borough’s actions violated the Public Trust Doctrine regulations adopted by the [...] as set forth within N.J.A.C. 7:7-9.48 and N.J.A.C. 7:7-16.9.  Notably, these regulations do not actually require municipalities to do anything.  Rather, the regulations encourage municipalities to consider and to adopt Public Access Plans governing public access to the municipal waterfronts.  See N.J.A.C. 7:7-16.9(c) (“Municipalities are encouraged to develop and submit to the Department an application for approval of a Municipal Public Access Plan”).  The regulations go on to establish different procedures for permit applications for development within municipalities that have an adopted Municipal Public Access Plan and for those that do not.  By way of summary, these regulations generally provide that: (i)  The public trust doctrine provides for public access to beaches, etc. and must be considered in all development applications; (ii)  When applicants seek permits from the [...], public access will be considered; (iii)  Municipalities are encouraged (but not required) to adopt Public Access Plans; (iv)  If the municipalities adopt a Public Access Plan which has been approved by the [...], then any subsequent permit applications for development within that municipality will be approved by the [...] if what the applicant proposes is consistent with the municipality’s Public Access Plan; and (v)
[brief] Indeed, the trial court made a consistent finding in this regard: Defendant [...] cannot be held individually liable because Defendant [...] is not an employer under the NJLAD, but rather, a coworker of the Plaintiff…Plaintiff concedes the issue as to Defendant [...], as she cannot be held individually liable under the NJLAD.  [17a]  Notwithstanding Defendant [...]’s sworn Certification and Plaintiff’s concessions, Plaintiff appeals the dismissal of Count Five, professing a need for discovery to determine whether Defendant [...] is in fact an employer under the LAD, as opposed to a coworker.  Pb31.  The claim was voluntarily conceded and appropriately dismissed.
[brief] Ca1.  The Court placed the following on the record:  I know the complaints that [...] had contending that the Court did not follow the statute, that the receiver is not entitled to discharge, but what was telling was for all the work that both sides, both the [...] and [...], were seeking [...] to perform relative to his position as a receiver before he would be discharged, neither of them were in a position willing to compensate him for that, and that is telling in the case to the Court, and that is part of the basis.
[brief] Plaintiffs’ planning expert, [...], testified to the variance proofs under the *Medici* standards and opined that the Florence Township lands are particularly suited for the proposed uses accessory to the proposed warehouse on the Mansfield Township lands.  2T 75:15.  [...] arrived at his conclusion that the Florence Township lands are particularly suited for the basins, parking areas, loading areas, septic system and sole driveway accessory to the warehouse in Mansfield Township because there is little space on Florence Township lands that is not constrained by wetlands and flood hazard areas:  “And also the remaining land in the SM zone is limited, and much of it is also constrained by either flood hazard or wetland areas.  2T 76:7-9.  “So as a result of those physical and environmental characteristics, the bulk of the site improvements and the entire building has been located in Mansfield proper where there is actually more industrially zoned land, and where there are far fewer development constraints. ”  2T 76:16.  In the context of assessing the particular suitability of the Florence part of the overall parcel for the proposed accessory uses, [...] dismissed the necessary use variance as “…really sort of a technical variance…because the zoning in both Florence and Mansfield permits the warehouse distribution use. ”  2T 75:3-6.  (Emphasis added).  [...] testimony concerning the “substantial detriment to the public good” prong of the negative criteria asserted that:  “…I actually see no substantive impacts to the public, and especially in relation to surrounding properties or zones, if this variance were to be granted by the Board. ”  2T 79:10-14.  [...] added:  “In fact, in my opinion, I really do not see detrimental impacts associated with placement or location of these accessory uses on the Florence portion of the tract, as they’ve been proposed.  And I say that not just in relation to the site plan and the zoning parameters, but also relative to the adjacent properties and streets. ”  2T 79:15-21.  (Emphasis added).  With regard to the second prong of the statutory negative criteria, [...] opined that, “I see no substantial impairment of the zoned—planner’s [sic] zoning ordinance.  Again, I say that largely in recognition of the like kind zoning in each of the respective municipalities. ”  2T 79:22-25.  (Emphasis added).  [...] testimony on the special reasons positive criteria. and on the two distinct aspects of the negative criteria, never explored the actual similarities or differences between the “warehouse distribution” uses allowed in the two Townships, and never discussed the substantial difference in building heights permitted in Florence and approved in Mansfield.
[brief] The Board further notes that the presence of the eagle’s nest and the required buffer does create a hardship; however the number, type, character and extent of the Bulk Variances requested are far too intense and exceed a reasonable modification of the site to offset the impact of the eagle’s nest.  These variances result in an overly intense use of the developable portion of the site and serve only to advance the Applicant’s economic interest which has been specifically rejected by the Courts as a basis to justify the granting of variances.  The trial court found the italicized language to be unsupported by the record, and “pure speculation that conveniently advanced the narrative of the Mayor’s public campaign to defeat this Application. ”  M33.  Thus, it is clear that the Board’s denial of the Application was driven by the Mayor’s established position and authority.  The “causal link” prong of the Monell test has been met.
[directive] Resolution Alert  Conflict C. other the and alert conflict the in query resulting deconfliction made the that agency  The to options following upon the of one confer agree and to expected are agencies or agency interested alert: conflict the resolve or scheduled; as proceed will operations) planned 1. the or operation; joint a as conducted be will operations) planned the 2. conducted be can it/they until delayed be will operations) planned the or officer safety; and/or operation another jeopardizing without 11 Page or cancelled; be will operations) planned the 4. under the appropriate necessary and be may other options whatever 5. circumstances.
[brief] STATEMENT OF FACTS  This matter arises out of the tragic death of [...] (hereinafter “[...]”) by an unidentified third-party which occurred on September 25, 2022.  (See P1, ¶1).  The death of [...] occurred in the public space at or about the outdoor public basketball court located at [...] in [...] at approximately 3:00AM.  (See P1, ¶1; P3, ¶¶ 13-14).  On or about September 25, 2022, residents and/or other unidentified third-persons were allegedly engaging in illegal activity by selling, purchasing and/or consuming alcoholic beverages at or about the outdoor public basketball court located at [...].  (See P2, ¶¶2, 4-5; P3, ¶¶12-14).  Selling, purchasing and consuming alcoholic beverages on public grounds or in public parks is illegal in Hoboken.  See Alcoholic Beverages, HOBOKEN MUNICIPAL CODE, ch. 68, §68-13.  On the aforementioned date, residents and/or other unidentified third-persons, including [...], were allegedly also engaging in physical altercations with each other.  (See P3, ¶15-16).  [...] intervened in one such physical altercation and engaged with an unidentified person – who will ultimately be the individual that murders [...] – in an effort to “quell the shooter’s aggression. ” (See P3, ¶15).  During the physical altercation, Plaintiffs admit that [...] “punched” the unidentified shooter in the face prior to being shot.  (See P3, ¶16).  The unidentified shooter then deliberately sought out his own vehicle to obtain his weapon (i.e., a firearm).  (See P3, ¶16).  After the unidentified shooter obtained the weapon (i.e., the firearm), the unidentified shooter hunted down [...] with the intent to do him grievous harm and proceeded to discharge his weapon at and/or into [...] multiple times.  (See P3, ¶16; P4, ¶¶17-18).  [...] ultimately died as a direct result of multiple gunshot wounds caused by the unidentified shooter with whom [...] engaged in a physical altercation earlier that same day.  (See P4, ¶18).
[brief] Courts will refrain from applying the entire controversy doctrine to a latter action, if the party against whom it is applied did not have a “fair and reasonable opportunity to have fully litigated that claim in the original action. ”  Karpovich v. Barbarula, 150 N.J. 473, 481 (1997).  “[A] court should not preclude a claim under the entire controversy doctrine if such a remedy would be unfair in the totality of the circumstances and would not promote the doctrine's objectives of conclusive determinations, party fairness, and judicial economy and efficiency. ”  Bank Leumi USA, v. Kloss, 243 N.J. 218, 227-28 (2020) (citations omitted).  Importantly, with regards to arbitration, “[t]he preclusionary consequences of the entire controversy doctrine must consequently be cautiously applied to litigation involving limited-issue arbitration and only where necessary to achieve the purposes and policy of the doctrine.
[brief] The Trial Court’s Factual Finding That [...]’s Injuries and Damage Manifested Before The [...] Policies Incepted Is Entitled To Substantial Deference  Based on the testimonial and documentary evidence presented at trial, the trial court determined that [...]’s injuries and damage manifested years before the [...] Policies incepted.  That decision is entitled to substantial deference.  Rova Farms, 65 N.J. at 484.  [...] omits his burden to overturn the trial court’s factual determination but he does not seriously quarrel with its conclusion.  How could he?  He introduced substantial evidence at trial of his debilitating symptoms, beginning in 1991 and continuing for eighteen years, to argue that his multi-million-dollar Consent Judgment was reasonable.  Now that the trial court accepted that the Settlement was reasonable, [...] contradictorily asserts that his symptoms had not sufficiently manifested until more than sixteen years after they began.
[brief] ”  Green, 177 N.J. at 446.  “Vague and conclusory complaints, complaints about trivial or minor matters, or generalized workplace unhappiness are not the sort of things that the Legislature intended to be protected by CEPA. ”  Allen v. Cape May County, 246 N.J. 275, 290-91 (2021) (emphasis added) (quoting Battaglia v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 214 N.J. 518, 559 (2013)).  Notably, to establish a prima facie case of causation, a Plaintiff must “show . . . that the decision maker had knowledge of the protected activity.
[brief] See Da40-42.  On September 20, 2021, well after responses were due under the Court Rules and with the Summary Judgment motion pending, Plaintiff served Defendants with purported responses to interrogatories and document demands.  Plaintiff’s responses were wholly insufficient, and Plaintiff did not provide Defendant with responsive documents, including any documents that would support Plaintiff’s claim for any amounts owed by Defendants.  As a result, on September 28, 2021 Defendants cross-moved for a Protective Order and to Compel Discovery based on Plaintiff’s deficient responses and failure to provide documents, namely those centering around how much Plaintiff was paid by Defendants and information supporting Plaintiff’s claim of $255,000.00 in damages.  Defendants’ cross-motion went unopposed by Plaintiff.  On October 12, 2021, after hearing oral argument, the trial court entered an order denying Plaintiff’s summary judgment motion and an order granting Defendants’ cross-motion for a Protective Order and compelling discovery.  See Pa146-148.  Under the trial court’s order, Plaintiff was required to provide “(1) complete and responsive answers to Defendants’ First Notice to Produce Documents Nos. 3, 6, 9, 10, 11, 13, 16, 17, and 18; and (2) complete and responsive answers to Defendants’ First Set of Interrogatories Nos. 11, 12, 14, 15, 19, 23, 24, and 25” by November 2, 2021.
[brief] Powerhouse Arts, supra, 413 N.J. Super. at 333; see also Hutton Park Gardens v. Town Council of W. Orange, 68 N.J. 543, 564-65 (1975) (“[A]bsent a sufficient showing to the contrary, it will be assumed that [municipalities’] enactments rest upon some rational basis within their knowledge and experience. ”).  Under the LRHL, a redevelopment decision needs to be adequately supported by the record by the showing of a rational basis, lest the redevelopment decision be arbitrary or capricious.  Powerhouse Arts, supra, 413 N.J. Super. at 333.  Notably, unlike the standard governing the designation of an area as an area in need of redevelopment, which necessitates a showing of substantial evidence, the adoption of a redevelopment plan or amended redevelopment does not require such a showing.  Id. at 332-333.  Here, the record showed that the Ordinance itself, the underlying hearings of the Planning Board, upon whose consistency report the City Council in part relied, and the testimony of [...] before the City Council provided a sufficient basis to conclude that the proposed amendments were consistent with the City’s Master Plan design for eight-story buildings and the building pattern as it had developer over time in the Redevelopment Area.  (Pa269 to Pa271; Pa629; 4T44:12-19; Pa627; 4T41:8-17; Pa269 to Pa271).  For these reasons, it is respectfully requested that this Court hereby affirm the lower court’s grant of Summary Judgment to Defendant [...].
[brief] TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, RULINGS, & ORDERS BEING APPEALED  Denial of request to proceed pro se..................................................  3T 75-4 to 15  Denial of motion for a judgment of acquittal.................................4T 96-21 to 97-13  Judgment of Conviction........................................................................Da 5-7  Pronouncement of Sentence...............................................................6T 14-10 to 19 INDEX TO APPENDIX  [...]..............................................Da 1-3  Verdict Sheet........................................................................................Da  4  Judgment of Conviction........................................................................Da 5-7  Notice of Appeal ................................................................................Da 8-10
[brief] The Court held jurisdiction can be found against a foreign corporation when the corporation’s affiliations with the state in which the suit is brought are so constant and pervasive to render it at home in the foreign state.  *Id.* at 138.  This matter is distinguishable because it does not involve a foreign corporation, does not include injuries outside of the country, and [...] does have adequate contacts to the forum state.  In *Baskin v. P.C. Richard & Son, LLC*, 462 N.J. Super. 594 (App. Div. 2020), *rev’d on other grounds*, 246 N.J. 157 (2021), the court again cited the rule that a corporation’s operations in a forum state other than its formal place of incorporation or principal place of business may be so substantial and of such a nature as to render the corporation at home in another state.  *Id.* at 616.  This case was also distinguishable from the instant matter in that both *Baskin* defendants were out-of-state residents and the claims concerned products bought in New York – *i.e.*, there was no tie to New Jersey.  In none of these cases was the defendant actually served while present in New Jersey.  In addition, under a general jurisdiction analysis, the cases provide [...] no quarter as its substantial presence in New Jersey renders it “at home” here.
[brief] No evidence was presented at trial that refutes Plaintiff’s portrayal of Saturday, November 21, 1992, the date on the Photocopy, which was the day before Petitioner’s wedding.  Petitioner had no contact with Decedent that Saturday as he was busy setting up the private venue for the wedding while Decedent was preparing food for 65 guests at their wedding the next day.  (7T43:14-24; 7T48:16 to 49:7).  The witnesses at trial who attended the wedding all acknowledged that the venue had been fully set up and decorated for a wedding.  (11T7:1-13; 10T91:18 to 92:22).  In addition, no acceptable excuse was provided by Respondent for the absence of the original of the Photocopy.
[brief] Determining Congress’s Intent in Light of the Federal Courts’ Interpretation of § 1692c(b) as Applied to Debt Collectors’ Use of Mail Vendors.  (T24-T25).  Our Supreme Court has applied the general rules of statutory construction to the FDCPA:  When interpreting a statute, the Legislature’s intent is paramount and, generally, the statutory language is the best indicator of that intent.  Statutory words are ascribed their ordinary meaning and are read in context with related provisions, giving sense to the legislation as a whole.  This Court’s duty is clear: construe and apply the statute as enacted.  *Hodges v. Sasil Corp.*, 189 N.J. 210, 223 (2007) (internal cites and quotation marks omitted).  Thus, “[i]f the plain language leads to a clear and unambiguous result, then our interpretative process is over. ”  *State v. Courtney*, 243 N.J. 77, 86 (2020) (quoting *Johnson v. Roselle EZ Quick LLC*, 226 N.J. 370, 386 (2016)).  See, *Comm’r v. Brown*, 380 U.S. 563, 571 (1965) (applying the same principle to interpreting federal statutes).