ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] See \textit{N.J.S.A.} 17:33A-3. retain himself or any other person to bring causes of action for personal injuries or death or if, for pecuniary gain, he directly or indirectly solicits other persons to make a claim for personal injury protection benefits.  The IFPA's statutory violations are inclusive rather than exclusive.  Nowhere in the IFPA does it state that only certain examples of fraudulent conduct, such as runner and kickback allegations, fall within the IFPA to the exclusion of other fraudulent conduct, such as fraudulent PIP benefit payments.  Rather, the plain statutory language makes it clear that as long as an insurer satisfies the elements of at least one of the IFPA's liability violation provisions, the insurer is entitled to damages.
[brief] And that is precisely what happened here.  The tenants closed their businesses at the end of the day of March 16, 2017, aware of the condition of the property, and “blithely turn[ed] a blind eye” to the fate of a “passerby” like [...].  Accordingly, for the above reasons, Plaintiffs contend that the common law establishes, as a matter of law, the duty of the Tenant Defendants in this case.
[directive] Second, this Directive adds a new section to IAPP, Section 9.11.3, clarifying that no law enforcement agency may enter into binding agreements with law enforcement officers concerning the precise content of a public report concerning major discipline.  In other words, law enforcement agencies may not reach any agreement—as a condition of a plea or settlement agreement in an internal affairs investigation, or otherwise—specifying whether and how that agency will describe Page 3 the misconduct or sanction in future public reporting.  This provision ensures that information subject to public disclosure under the Major Discipline Directive is not withheld because of agreements between law enforcement agencies and officers; reports disclosed to the public reflect a law enforcement agency’s independent, good-faith assessment of the information appropriate to be disclosed under the Directive; the County Prosecutor and Attorney General retain discretion to require additional disclosure as necessary; and each law enforcement agency takes a uniform approach to public disclosure, regardless of any agreements a particular officer seeks to obtain.  Moreover, by clarifying that agencies may not reach agreements respecting the content of a public disclosure, the provision ensures that disagreements about the content of a prospective disclosure do not impede the ability of agencies and officers to otherwise reach agreements resolving internal affairs charges.  Indeed, this provision of IAPP only prohibits agreements concerning the content of public reports required to be published under IAPP Section 9.11.2; it does not otherwise limit the authority of an agency to reach an agreement with an officer resolving, for example, the administrative charges at issue or associated disciplinary consequences.  Third, because the purposes animating the Major Discipline Directive—accountability, transparency, and the promotion of trust in law enforcement—require disclosure of the identities of officers, not those harmed by officer misconduct, this Directive amends IAPP to clarify that public reports concerning major discipline shall not disclose the identities of the victims of officer misconduct.
[brief] A.  Plaintiff Served as a Staffing Coordinator for Defendant [...].  Plaintiff began her employment with Defendant [...] in 2006 as a staffing coordinator.  (Pa26).  Staffing coordinators are responsible for a variety of tasks, including the printing and distribution of daily staff sheets, assigning hospital staff, reviewing payroll entries, maintaining call logs, answering phone calls from hospital staff related to payroll, and assisting the nursing supervisor with staffing.  (Pa27).  Plaintiff reported directly to Defendant [...], who at the time served as the Lead Administrative Nursing Supervisor.  (Pa25 – Pa26).  At all times relevant to this litigation, Plaintiff was one of approximately six staffing coordinators, including her former co-workers [...] (“[...]”) and [...] (“[...]”).  (Pa26 – Pa27).  Neither Plaintiff nor [...] had ever been disciplined by Defendants prior to their eventual termination.  (Pa654).  Similarly, [...]’ job performance was described as “very good” by Defendant [...].  (Pa655).  B.
[brief] .................................................................................................24  Other Authorities  Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules, comment 2.3.1 on R. 4:46-2 (2013)  ...........................................21  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS, AND RULINGS  Order Granting Summary Judgment (July 16, 2024)  ..............................................Pa712  INDEX OF DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS’ APPENDIX  Certification of [...]…………………………………………………………Da1  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT  Appellant, [...] (“[...]”), was terminated for his theft of hospital funds.  Unable to accept the consequences of his actions, he filed this action alleging retaliation in violation of the Conscientious Employee Protection Act (“CEPA”), N.J.S.A. 34:19-1 to -14, by Respondents, [...] (“[...]”), [...] (“[...]”), and [...] (“[...]”) (collectively, “Defendants”).
[brief] [...] Did Not Consider [...]’s Version of Events.  [...]’s report summarizes the incident from only [...]’s perspective.  [8T 101:4-15].  He did not provide [...]’s version of events.  [8T 101:16-19].  He testified that his factual summary was “my understanding of what happened. ”  [8T 101:74-15].  He did not mention in his report that [...] walked away from [...] or that [...] alleged [...] threw a bag of grout at him.  [8T 101:20-25].  He claimed [...]’s version of events were not “relevant” despite opining [...]’ negligence caused [...] to be involved in a physical altercation.  [8T 102:1-7].  When confronted with the deposition transcripts of the police officers, which he reviewed in coming to his conclusions, [...] admitted he did not document the police officers’ statements in his report, nor did he document that their testimony contradicted [...]’s version of events.  [8T 102:8-104:16].  [...] also reviewed the bodycam footage, but could not recall if the footage showed any grout on [...] or [...].  [8T 105:29 – 106:11].  C.
[brief] conferring title upon [...].  Moreover, [...] specifically testified that he in no way intended for the December 1998 Deed to transfer title to [...].  Thus, the issue here involves the Plaintiff’s equitable effort to quiet title in light of an apparent error/mistake in the December 1998 Deed whereas [...] involved changing the terms of a deed that purposefully placed title in [...] despite an apparent business agreement to title the Property to [...].  See Lott, Supra.
[brief] This is likely because the Recording Act, and the search of documents of record, is not intended to resolve or call into question small deviations in lot size or lot width, particularly when the Buyer acquires the “gold standard” for determining the dimensions of a property—a current survey.  This was obtained by the Buyer in this instance, and the presence of matters buried in the municipal files or older metes and bounds descriptions in the public record is not consistent with the purpose and intent of the Recording System.  . .  The purpose of the Recording Act, and the documents recorded, is to focus on matters of TITLE, and not dimensions of property.
[brief] Fifth, [...] also ignores that the plain language of the NJFPA required the Trial Court, when assessing the conduct of a putative franchisor ([...]) and franchisee ([...]) to also assess the conduct of these entities’ owners, management and other affiliates and agents.  Specifically, the NJFPA expressly defines a “Franchisor” as a “person who grants a franchise to another person,” and a “Franchisee” as a “person to whom a franchise is offered or granted. ”  N.J.S.A 56:10-3(c) and (d).  The NJFPA also – critically – defines a “person” broadly, to include, in relevant part, “a natural person, corporation, partnership, trust, or other entity and, in case of an entity, it shall include any other entity which has a majority interest in such entity or effectively controls such other entity as well as the individual officers, directors, and other persons in active control of the activities of each such entity. ”  N.J.S.A. 56:10-3.  Accordingly, as [...] presented evidence to the Trial Court that [...] and [...] had a majority interest in all of the “[...]” branded entities – including [...] Outdoor Living – then all of the conduct of any “[...]” corporate representative must be imputed onto [...].  (See Pb7-Pb16).  II.
[brief] On March 2, 2017, Defendant was arrested for DWI for the second time.  (1T3-4 to 3-8; 5-25 to 6-2)  On May 16, 2018, Defendant appeared with [...], Esq., Public Defender, (“[...]”) at the [...].  [...] advised [...] that Defendant was pleading guilty to the DWI charge and the remaining charges be dismissed.  Defendant stipulated as to his BAC when [...] advised the Court that Defendant’s BAC was .17, confirmed this was his second DWI, and provided the Court with copies of the Alcotest worksheet and Defendant’s drivers abstract.  (1T3-2 to 3-8)  The following colloquy occurred:  THE COURT: Sir, I understand you’ve agreed to plead guilty to the charge of driving while intoxicated?
[brief] See In re Estate of Lash, 169 N.J. 20, 27 (2001)  The Estate of Lash Court further stated that “[t]he essence of a fiduciary relationship is that one party places trust and confidence in another who is in a dominant or superior position.  A fiduciary relationship arises between two persons when one person is under a duty to act for or give advice for the benefit of another on matters within the scope of their relationship. ”  Id.  A “fiduciary is liable for harm resulting from a breach of the duties imposed by the existence of such a relationship. ”  McKelvey v. Pierce, 173 N.J. 26, 57 (2002) (emphasis supplied).  “[O]ne standing in a fiduciary relationship with another is subject to liability to the other for harm resulting from a breach of duty imposed by the relation."  In re Niles Trust, 176 N.J. 282, 295 (2003) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 874).  To establish a claim for breach of fiduciary duty, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the: (a) defendants owed the plaintiff a duty of care, (b) defendants breached that duty of care, (c) plaintiff was injured by defendants' breach of the duty of care, and (d) the defendants caused the injury to the plaintiff.
[brief] On May 20, 2021, Plaintiff filed his notice of appeal.  (Da274, Appellate Docket Transaction ID: [...]).  Plaintiff also filed a motion to proceed in forma pauperis.  (Da274, Appellate Docket Transaction ID: [...]).  There was some apparent “confusion” regarding the proper venue to decide Plaintiff’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis; however, the motion was granted in the Trial Court on August 25, 2021, and the Order was filed with the Appellate Division on September 27, 2021.
[brief] ”).  As part of his assurances, representations, and warranties in Section 3.2 of the 2014 SPA, [...] attested that consummation of the purchase would not “result in a breach of . . . any agreement, contract . . . or other arrangement to which Buyer [[...]] is a party or by which he is bound. ” (Da908).  Similarly, on behalf of [...], [...] represented that consummation of the purchase would not “result in a breach of . . . any agreement, contract . . . or other arrangement to which the Company is a party or by which it is bound,” or “violate any provision of the charter or bylaws of the Company. ” (Da909).  [...] made similar representations in the 2017 SPA.  (Da923-24).  These representations (and those on behalf of [...]) survived closing. (Da910, 925).
[brief] ”  C.V., 255 N.J. at 314.  Whether conduct “involves disparate treatment through explicit facial discrimination does not depend on why the [entity] discriminates but rather on the explicit terms of the discrimination. ”  A.D.P. v. ExxonMobil Research & Eng’g Co., 428 N.J. Super. 518, 537 (App. Div. 2012).  The Revised Policy’s text, together with Appellants’ representations and Regulation 8463, make clear it subjects LGBTQ+ students to differential treatment based on their LAD-protected characteristics.
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING DEFENDANT FAIRLEIGH DICKINSON UNIVERSITY’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT WHERE THERE WERE GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT AND PLAINTIFF ESTABLISHED  PRIMA FACIE CLAIMS OF MISREPRESENTATION AND FRAUDULENT INDUCEMENT (3T78-3T88)  Plaintiff-Appellant established a *prima facie* cause of action for misrepresentation and fraudulent inducement against Defendant [...].  i.  The Trial Court’s Oral Opinion to Grant Summary Judgment as to Plaintiff’s Misrepresentation Claim (3T78-3T88)  The trial court stated that misrepresentation and fraud claims require proof of both a misrepresentation or omission and reliance by the Plaintiff on that misrepresentation.  (3T84:19-3T85:3).  The trial court further asserted that the “elements of fraudulent inducement are the same as those for common law fraud and require a material misrepresentation of a presently existing or past fact, knowledge or belief by the Defendant of its falsity, and intention that the other party rely on it for reasonable reliance thereupon by the other person.  And five, resulting damages. ”  Id.  The trial court contended, “Plaintiff’s complaint is based on the omission of the admission standard for the dual degree, but a graduate program has admission standards like maintaining a grade point average. ” (3T85:10-13).  However, the trial court did not address the Plaintiff’s misrepresentation or fraudulent inducement claim in any more depth.  (3T78-3T88).
[brief] No announcement was made at the December 14th meeting that the public hearing was adjourned.  (Pa 167, ¶19; and Pa 264.)  The public hearing on the adoption of Ordinance 1423-21 was then placed on the Council’s December 28, 2021, meeting, without further notice to the public from the Borough.  Thus, the only notice of a public hearing on the amendment to the Redevelopment Plan, a matter of significant public interest, was for a meeting where the public hearing did not take place, which itself was an improperly noticed special meeting.  Showing complete disdain for the public, the Borough gave no notice of the change in the public hearing date to December 28th.  This fact alone demonstrates a violation of N.J.S.A. 40:49-2.  N.J.S.A. 40:49-2 “must be construed strictly. ”  Masnick v. Cedar Grove, 99 N.J. Super. 436 (Law Div. 1968).  Notice of the proposed adoption of municipal legislation is of public importance and a significant legislative concern. ”  Gober v. Township Committee of Pemberton Township, 185 N.J. Super. 323, 329 (Law. Div. 1982).  See, also, Township Committee of the Township of Edgewater Park v. Edgewater Park Housing Authority, 187 N.J. Super. 588, 596 (Law Div. 1982).  In Gober, the court examined whether a notice for final passage of an ordinance which identified the correct date but not the correct day of the week complied with the statute.  Id. at 328.  The court found the notice misleading and ineffective.  Id. at 329.  Similarly, once the Borough published notice of a public hearing to be held on December 14th, it had an obligation to re-notice to advise the public of the adjourned date, or at least to have announced the adjournment at its December 14th meeting.
[brief] Div. 1986), citing State v. Schultz, 71 N.J. 590 (1976).  The New Jersey Supreme Court references the definition of the common law crime of misconduct in office as:  ‘By ‘misconduct in office,’ or ‘official misconduct,’ is not meant misconduct, criminal or otherwise, which is committed by a person who happens to be a public officer, but which is not connected with his official duties.  Such conduct is sometimes called private misconduct to distinguish it from official misconduct.  ‘Misconduct in office, or ‘official misconduct,’ means, therefore, any unlawful behavior in relation to official duties by an officer intrusted in any way with the administration of law and justice, or, as otherwise defined, any act or omission in breach of a duty of public concern, by one who has accepted public office.
[brief] The Term of the Arbitration Agreement Requiring an Arbitration Panel Does Not Shock the Conscience such that it is Substantively Unconscionable (Da027-Da029; Da090-Da092; Da162-Da163)  It is axiomatic that “[w]hen terms of a contract are clear, ‘it is the function of the court to enforce it as written and not to make a better contract for either party’”  U.S. Pipe & Foundry Co. v. American Arbitration Ass'n., 67 N.J.Super. 384, 393 (App.Div.1961).  In order for the Court to invalidate an otherwise valid and enforceable agreement to arbitrate, the court must find substantive unconscionability. which “simply suggests ‘the exchange of obligations so one-sided as to shock the court's conscience. ’”  *Sitogum Holdings, Inc. v. Ropes*, 352 N.J. Super. 555, 565 (Ch. Div. 2002).  While the trial court’s May 14, 2024 Decision and Statement of Reasons states that the “terms of the arbitration agreement shock the judicial conscience” (Da092), the decision does not cite any standard or case to support a finding that an agreement to arbitrate before a three person arbitration panel “shocks the conscience. ”  On the contrary, the Supreme Court of this States has explicitly held that “a pre-injury agreement to arbitrate does not require any party to ”forego any substantive rights.  Rather, such an agreement specifies only the forum in which those rights are vindicated. ”  *Hojnowski v. Vans Skate Park*, 187 N.J. 323, 343 (2006).  New Jersey law explicitly allows for contracting parties to select the arbitral forum and the type of procedure to govern the resolution of the dispute.  See *Perini Corp. v. Greate Bay Hotel & Casino, Inc.*, 129 N.J. 479, 490 (1992) (in agreeing to arbitrate disputes, “[p]arties can agree to follow ... the usual trial-type format, or they can agree to any other type of procedure to resolve the dispute”); *State Farm Guar. Ins. Co. v. Hereford Ins. Co.*, 454 N.J. Super. 1, 6-7 (App. Div. 2018) (“Parties, of course, can contract for specific procedures to govern their arbitration” and “can incorporate into their contract by reference rules of arbitration organizations to govern their arbitration proceedings. ”).  The court here should not interfere with the parties’ right to freely contract.  There can be no doubt that paragraph 3 of the Arbitration Agreement does not “shock the conscience. ”  Accordingly, the Court must enforce the same along with the rest of the parties’ valid and enforceable Arbitration Agreement.
[brief] To their credit, the Defendants produced the documents containing irrelevant information with redacted portions instead of not producing the documents at all.  *3  Thus, the Court concludes that the redaction of information on plans other then the VIP plan was acceptable because that information is not relevant to the issues in this case and not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.  If Plaintiffs have a reason to believe that other redactions not brought to the Court's attention in this motion to compel were not based upon relevance regarding the VIP plans, they may move the court, on a document by document basis, for *in camera* review.
[brief] The Original Policies contain the following identical provision:  “There is no affirmative duty for any school district staff member to notify a student’s parent of the student’s gender identity or expression. ”  [...] Orig. Pol’y 5657 (D2a54); [...] Orig. Pol’y 5657 ([...] Ra8); [...] Orig. Pol’y 5657 ([...] Ra8).
[brief] Exhibit L: Retainer Agreement from [...] A165  Exhibit M: Account Summary of [...] A170  Exhibit N: Documents regarding [...] A175  Exhibit O: Documents regarding [...] A177  Exhibit P: Sale of [...] A179  Exhibit Q: Mortgage on [...] A181  Exhibit R: Transfer of Title on [...]  A195  Exhibit S: Transfer of [...] to [...] A201  Exhibit T: Transfer of [...] to Mother A204  Exhibit U: Transfer of [...] to [...].  A207  Exhibit V: Title of [...] to [...]  A209  Exhibit W: Directory of [...]  A214  Exhibit X: Title to Mercedes A218  Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration dated March 18, 2022
[brief] Thus, [...] acquired title to the upland that [...] owned and also acquired title to the Riparian Grant or the land underwater as it was referred to (7T81:1-20).  When [...] conveyed property to [...], he testifies to P-5 which shows all of the upland properties which are south of Ocean Avenue (Pa206).  It shows an area immediately north of Ocean Avenue which was referred to as the beach and where the high-water line is located.  Based upon reference to this map that is in the description of the Deed, [...] indicates that the Deed that goes to [...] does not include all the property high-water.  It is limited to property that is identified as Block D, all the lots in Block, all the lots in Block G on that map (7T83:3).  All those properties are on the map and are south of the mean high-water line; they are upland properties (7T83:9).
[brief] *Wilson*, 135 N.J. at 19 (holding a witness “failed properly to authenticate the video because he was not a person present at the time the crime occurred who could testify that the videotape accurately depicted the events as he had seen them when they occurred. ”); see also *State v. Williams*, 471 N.J. Super. 34, 48 n.5 (App. Div. 2022) (holding that because a witness “did not perceive the events as they occurred before he arrived at the scene, the first seven minutes of the video played during jury deliberations were not properly authenticated”).
[brief] Accordingly, the “discovery rule” is a doctrine developed by the New Jersey courts “to deal with the harsh results that would ensue where causes of action are deemed to accrue at the moment an alleged wrongful act is committed. ”  *Lawrence v. Bauer Publishing & Printing Ltd.*, 78 N.J. 371 (1979).  It is essentially a principle of equity whose purpose is to mitigate the unjust results that would flow from strict adherence to statutes of limitations such as N.J.S.A. 2A:14-1.
[brief] A juvenile is excused from paying the mandatory fine under N.J.S. 2C:35-15(a) when the juvenile's guilty plea, with deferred disposition, results in a dismissal of the complaint.  State in Interest of [...], 436 N.J. Super.: 636, 640 (Ch. Div. 2013).  Note that the mandatory fine for juveniles adjudicated delinquent was eliminated by L. 2019, c. 363, §4.
[brief] American Tel. & Tel. Co. of New Jersey v. Ranzenhofer, 128 N.J.Super. 238, 319 A.2d 754 (A.D.1974)  Anastasio v. Planning Bd. of Tp. of West Orange, 209 N.J. Super. 499, 522, (App. Div.) Berner v. Enclave Condominium Ass’n, 322 N.J. Super. 229, 231 (App.Div.)79, 82  Cell South of New Jersey, Inc. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment of W. Windsor Twp., 172 N.J., supra, at 89.  Cell v. Zoning Bd. Of Adjustment, 172 N.J. 75, 89 (2002)  Cent. 25 LLC v. Zoning Board of City of Union City, 460 N.J. Super 446, 450 (App. Div. 2019)  County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 118 S.Ct. 1708, 140 L.Ed.2d 1043 (1998)  Craig v. Suburban Cablevision, Inc., 140 N.J. 623, 629-631 (1995)  Cranford Development Associates, LLC v. Tp. of Cranford, 445 N.J. Super. 220 (App. Div. 2016)
[brief] After considering its equitable power and the affidavits presented, the Board reasonably concluded that “[...] did not exercise reasonable diligence nor demonstrate reasonable grounds for such a protracted delay in filing the eligibility registration form,” where he filed his form one year and two months past the deadline.  (Pa14).  Nor did [...] demonstrate extreme hardship in this matter, as he will continue to receive his Special Retirement benefits with concurrent retiree health benefits coverage.  (Pa72-73).  It should also be noted that cases involving the use of the Board’s equitable power for reopening proceedings or relaxing deadlines “were bottomed on the inherent power of an administrative agency, in the absence of legislative restriction, to reopen or to modify and to rehear orders previously entered by it.