ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] ”  Again, however, it provides no explanation, comparative figures or other analysis to support the assertion.  Only to defend its motion to bar discovery did Defendant [...] provide cost figures, and even then without explanation or analysis.\(^{10}\)  Section 9.02 goes on to state that the long-term exemption will reduce the expenses of the Project and that the “locational decisions” of probable tenants or residents “will be influenced positively” by the exemption.  The reasonableness of these representations, based on a 30-year tax exemption requiring affected properties to make PILOT payments the virtual equivalent of full taxes for most of its duration, is not immediately obvious.  They require evidentiary support.  \(^{10}\)  In a small dollar project, those costs might qualify as excessive but in a costlier project they would be seen as negligible in light of other factors, including profits and the returns on investment.  C.
[brief] The purpose of OPRA is to “maximize public knowledge about public affairs in order to ensure an informed citizenry and to minimize the evils inherent in a secluded process. ”  *Asbury Park Press v. Ocean County Prosecutor’s Office*, 374 N.J. Super. 312, 329 (Law Div. 2004); See, *N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1.*  “Any limitations on the right of access … shall be construed in favor of the public’s right of access. ”  *N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1.*  “[W]ithout access to information contained in the records maintained by public agencies, citizens cannot monitor the operation of our government or hold public officials accountable for their actions. ”  *Fair Share Housing Center, Inc. v. New Jersey State League of Municipalities*, 208 N.J. 489, 501 (2011).  *N.J.S.A. 47:1A-5(i)* deems that a Custodian’s failure to respond with all records compliant with a request as a denial of OPRA.  OPRA explicitly puts the burden on the Custodian to prove that a denial is lawfully justified.  *N.J.S.A. 1A-6*.  Courts have repeatedly found that unlawfully providing redacted documents can also result in a denial of OPRA and, in order to redact lawfully information, it must fall under one of the exceptions of OPRA.  *Newark Morning Ledger Co. v. N.J. Sports & Exposition Auth.*, 423 N.J. Super. 140, 148 (App. Div. 2011); *N.J.S.A. 47:1A-5(g)*.  When attempting to utilize any exemption, “a public agency seeking to restrict the public’s right of access to government records must produce specific reliable evidence sufficient to meet a statutorily recognized basis for confidentiality. ”  *Courier News v. Hunterdon County Prosecutor’s Office*, 358 N.J. Super. 373, 382-83 (App. Div. 2003).  “The reasons for withholding documents must be specific. ”  *Newark Morning Ledger Co.*, 423 N.J. Super. at 162.  Courts will “simply no longer accept conclusory and generalized allegations of exemptions … but will require a relatively detailed analysis in manageable segments. ”  *Loigman v. Kimmelman*, 102 N.J. 98, 110 (1986) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).  “Absent such a showing, a citizen’s right of access is unfettered. ”  *Courier News*, 358 N.J. at 383 (emphasis added).
[brief] Likewise, despite the Operating Agreement prohibiting Defendant from paying herself a salary absent Plaintiff’s consent, Defendant admitted she paid herself a salary without even telling Plaintiff about it, much less asking for his consent.  3T152:11-14 and 3T154:10 to 155:3.  The evidence was undisputed that the Operating Agreement required the members to share in “all capital contributions, profits and surplus of the LLC according to the percentage of their ownership” and provided that “[n]o salary will be paid to a member for the performance of his or her duties under this Agreement unless the salary has been approved in writing by --- 93  Defendant’s contention that she was entitled to a salary as a pharmacist is not supported by any exception to the prohibition contained in the Operating Agreement against a member salary.  94 Pa1-22. the unanimous consent of the Members. ”  Pa3.  Therefore, Plaintiff is entitled to 49% of what Defendant paid herself as a salary because the parties’ agreement did not permit Defendant to receive a salary.  Initially, Defendant said she paid herself $117,000 as salary (or guaranteed payments) for 2017 and $130,000 for 2018.  3T:151:1-4 and 3T153:4-21.  She testified at trial she thought this was reasonable, despite the Operating Agreement’s prohibition against members receiving salary.  3T148:24 to 149:1.  But when [...] challenged her calculations and pointed out how she actually took more than she said, Defendant changed her story.  3T151:1-14.  In response to Plaintiff’s objections to Defendant’s unauthorized salary and other fraudulent distributions to herself and her family and her friends, Defendant further cooked the books and increased her impermissible salary to $143,000 for 2017 (3T146:23) and $156,000 for 2018 (3T152:25 to 153:3) to try to justify after the fact all the excessive distributions she took from the pharmacy.  3T147:5 to 152:14.  She made up these numbers years after she took the money without even keeping track of what she took, relying only on bank statements.  3T143:3-12 and 3T152:7-10.  Defendant’s contention that she was entitled to a salary as a “pharmacist” is semantic and disingenuous because it contradicts the plain language in the Operating Agreement.  Pa7.  The parties’ agreement always contemplated Defendant serving as both managing member and pharmacist and her only compensation was supposed to be her 51% share of the profits.  3T112:12-14.  The Operating Agreement contains no carve out or exception that would permit Defendant to pay herself a salary as a pharmacist.  Pa1-17.  **Defendant’s Admitted Unauthorized Distributions to Herself**
[brief] The *Kandrac*, *supra* indicia applicable to the case at bar are:  -[...] was a commercial tenant in a multi-commercial tenant shopping mall.  The shopping mall is owned by [...].  [...] was actively paying rent and Common Area Expense charges and was compliant with the terms of the lease on the day of the alleged incident.  [...] admits that he was not entering or exiting leaving [...]’s leased premises and the only reason he was at the shopping mall was to have dinner at [...].  -[...] identified the location of his allegedly slip and fall as an area of the parking lot which is not adjacent to [...]’s leased premises.  -The lease provided that [...] was responsible for removal of snow and ice from the parking lot, including the snow and ice removal services that [...] provided on March 16, 2017.  -[...] did not expect [...] to maintain the area where [...] allegedly fell and did not expect [...] to keep the area where plaintiff allegedly fell free from snow and ice.
[brief] The Appellate Court invalidated the Ordinance, stating:  We conclude that before adopting a zoning amendment inconsistent with the Master Plan, the Governing Body must expressly recognize the inconsistency.  This will give effect to the significance the Legislature attached to the Master Plan.  Recognition of inconsistency triggers the requirement of a full majority vote.  That fact may alter the political landscape regarding a proposed amendment.  Recognition of inconsistency flags the significance of the proposal and its potential impact on land use.  Moreover, and perhaps most important, the rule we announce today compels the Governing Body to treat the Master Plan with the respect and importance assigned to it by the Legislature.  *Id.* at 229.  See also *Jennings v. Borough of Highlands* 418 N.J. Super. 405, 416-417 (App. Div. 2011) (Court invalidated Rezoning Ordinance for failure of Governing Body to properly review the Planning Board Report and Recommendations).  These cases emphasize and confirm the absolute importance and necessity on the contemporaneous recognition by the public bodies involved of the consistency or lack of consistency of the rezoning Ordinance with the Master Plan.  The failure of the Governing Body to have contemporaneous recognition of inconsistency invalidates the process and the adoption.
[brief] BURDEN OF PROOF  Plaintiffs bore the burden of proving entitlement to a variance before the Board and the trial court, and they bear an even heavier burden before this Court of showing “… that the evidence before the board "was so overwhelmingly in favor of the applicant that the board's action can be said to be arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable." ”  *Northeast Towers*, supra at 494, quoting *Medical Realty Assoc. v. Board of Adj. of Summit*, 228 N.J. Super. 226, 233 (App.Div.1988).  It was the Plaintiffs’ obligation to present evidence to the Board to prove their entitlement to the relief they sought.  “The burden of proof of the right to the relief sought in the application rests at all times upon the applicant”.  *Cox & Koenig, New Jersey Zoning and Land Use Administration* (Gann 2023), pp. 261, citing *Ten Stary Dom Ptp. v. Mauro*, 216 NJ 16, 30 (2013).  The burden of proof lies upon the applicant with regard to both the positive and the negative criteria.  *New Brunswick Tel. v. South Plainfield*, 305 N.J. Super. 151, 165 (App. Div. 1997), re-affirmed at 314 N.J. Super. 102 (App. Div. 1998).
[brief] The Court in Shelbourne Spring held that exclusionary language of the insurance policy identical to the C.5 exclusion in this case, see id. at **4-5, unambiguously precluded coverage for all claims of intentional wrong by the employer.  Id. at *20, *24.  The facts of the Shelbourne Spring case are very similar to those of this case.  The Court considered the same arguments for mandated insurance coverage as those Plaintiff makes in this case and rejected those arguments.  Specifically, the Court considered the Supreme Court’s decisions in Charles Beseler and Delta Plastics and distinguished those cases on the same grounds as discussed in this brief.  The Court also noted [...]’s approval of the revised C.5 exclusion.  See id. at *20.  In sum, no case, whether in this Court or elsewhere, has agreed with Plaintiff’s arguments and concluded that the C.5 Exclusion violates any statute or public policy.  This Court should reach the same conclusion.
[brief] Plaintiff suggested that if [...] disputed those rates or hours spent, he should disclose the rates charged and time spent by his own attorneys, as [...] was then represented by multiple well-respected New Jersey firms in the matter, but he refused, leading to an inference that the rates and time spent by his attorneys are similar to those charged and spent by Plaintiff’s counsel.  (Da26; \(^8\) [...] questions how $1.4 million could have been spent on appeals, but fails to mention that there were 20+ appeals filed, many of which included full emergent briefing at the request of Defendants.  See Docket Nos. [...]; [...]; [...]; [...]; [...]; [...]; [...]; [...]; [...]; [...]; [...]; [...]; [...]; [...]; [...]; [...]; [...]; [...]; [...]; [...]; and [...].
[brief] Despite the allegation, Plaintiff offered no evidence that Defendant’s salary as a pharmacist in charge was unreasonable or excessive.  The jury heard that, after the sale of [...] to [...] in June 2019, Plaintiff wrote $25,000 to himself from the pharmacy’s account and sent a picture of it to Defendant saying he was buying a house.  (3T57:24-3).  They further heard that Plaintiff paid off, without asking Defendant, the balance of a car loan from the pharmacy’s account—a loan he was a co-signer on—in order to improve his own credit score.  (3T65:3-67:3).  Plaintiff did not inform Defendant that he was paying the loan off from the pharmacy account, but rather texted Defendant that he paid off the car loan.  (2T76:1-11).  The jury heard how this loan payoff concerned Defendant because there were still debts of the pharmacy to be paid.  (3T66:2-16).  As discussed above, Plaintiff had full access to all of [...]’s financial accounts and records.
[brief] While ambiguity in indemnification provisions are construed against a party being indemnified, see, e.g., Pepe v. Township of Plainsboro, 337 N.J. Super. 209, 216 (App. Div. 2001), a Court may not rewrite the parties’ contract.  Rahway Hosp, 374 N.J. Super. at 111; Zacarias v. Allstate Ins. Co., 168 N.J. 590, 595, 602 (2001) (declining to rewrite an insurance policy because it contained “no ambiguity, inconsistency, or contradiction”).  Here, the plain language of the Section 17(b) of the PSA requires [...] to indemnify it for the fees that [...] expended in defending against the claims brought by [...].
[brief] THE STATE PROPERLY AUTHENTICATED THE SURVEILLANCE VIDEO.  Defendant’s claim that [...] was unfamiliar with the scene, did not speak with the store owner, and did not review all of the surveillance video is contradicted by the record.  [...] testified that he responded to the grocery store shortly after the shooting, where he viewed the surveillance video at the scene with the consent of the store owner.  He further testified that the video played in court was the same one he viewed at the store, and that the video accurately represented the scene as he witnessed it on the day of the shooting.  Because this was sufficient to establish a prima facie showing that the video and the still shots derived from it were accurate reproductions of the scene at the time the shooting occurred, the video was properly authenticated.  [...] thus appropriately exercised his discretion in admitting the video and still shots into evidence.
[brief] PA – 225 to 227.  Defendant’s Objection did not assert or otherwise argue the applicability of the affirmative defenses that Defendant plead in the Answer.  PA – 225 to 227.  Instead, Defendant raised new issues relating to regulatory compliance and concomitant consumer claims that had not been plead, namely: a) Plaintiff violated the Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1602 et seq. (“TILA”), b) Plaintiff --- 1 Plaintiff is including the Background Facts and Procedural History as one (1) section in this brief because of the interrelated nature of the facts for both sections in understanding the legal issues raised in this appeal.
[brief] The entire process began with the 2016 title search which uncovered the voidable Deed and thus provided the opportunity for [...] and family to plausibly claim that [...] was the titleholder.  The contention of the [...] and [...] that this was a valid deed created at the request of [...] is unsupported by any competent evidence.  This court finds the argument to be a lame, speculative attempt to explain why it would have been created.  There is nothing to suggest or corroborate the claim that Sam demanded title back and that [...] agreed by making the December 10, 1998 Deed.  Enter the opportunistic [...] who, seeking to market other properties in the downtown Jersey City area, began inquiries about the subject property.  Clark conducted a due diligence of sorts on behalf of [...] with the hope of becoming the listing agent and marketing the property.  This included inperson visits to the premises and an attempt to gain access which was thwarted by [...], the long-time tenant.  So, the Deed from [...] to [...] cannot be considered a material misrepresentation due to the existence of the December 10, 1998 voidable Deed in the public record.  It cannot be said that [...] or his family knew that the Deed of transfer to [...] was knowing false as long as they could reasonably rely on the public record that seemingly showed [...] to be the titled owner.
[directive] The property and evidence function is an integral and essential part of every law enforcement agency.  Every day, police officers come into custody of lost or stolen property, contraband, and any manner of evidence.  The law enforcement agency is charged with establishing a system for the secure and efficient classification, inventory, retrieval, and disposition of these items.  To accomplish this goal, the law enforcement agency must specifically:  - Establish a system of documentation to track property from its receipt to its eventual disposition.  - Establish a secure and orderly storage facility to meet the needs of the particular agency.  - Establish a property officer to be responsible for the department's property and evidence function.  - Provide for periodic and special audits of the contents of the property storage facility to insure continuing accuracy.  - Provide for the proper and timely disposition of property and evidence.  - Provide policy, training and adequate supplies for the consistent marking and packaging of property.  - Establish a written uniform policy and procedure to be followed by police officers in all aspects of property handling.  This chapter will discuss each of the above and provide direction with relevant references.
[brief] The standard to be followed for Adverse Possession does not require the presentment of documents as has been stated.  The standard for Adverse Possession requires open, obvious, adverse, hostile, exclusive use as the owner would use the property and continuous use of the property for a period of 30 years.  [...] has used the noted lots since purchase of the church property and lots in 1976.  To contest this use of the property per the statute, what is required is that the owner of the property must object to the use of this property within the 30 year time period.  A failure to object within the set time period of thirty years results in loss of the property by Adverse Possession.
[directive] Complaint Information Forms  The Citizen Complaint Information Forms (regular and the Domestic Violence version3), originally promulgated on December 2010, have been revised to include a 13, checkbox where the private citizen complainant indicate whether the complainant can believes that the defendant a candidate or nominee for elected public office or a person is holding elected public office.  Copies of these two revised forms are attached.  The forms also provide space for the private citizen complainant to also include information about the elected public office that the person holds or a candidate or nominee for, as appropriate.  is  These changes will facilitate the completion of the corresponding field the eCDR system in (see below).  As a reminder, these forms shall be provided by the court to all private citizens who come to Municipal Court to file a complaint.  These forms supersede the previous versions and are to used for private citizen complaints filed or after January 2020.
[brief] Respectfully Submitted, [...]  Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant  By: s/ [...]  [...]  THE MOORISH SCIENCE TEMPLE OF AMERICA  NEW JERSEY, A NJ NON PROFIT CORPORATION, Plaintiff-Appellant, vs. MOORISH  SCIENCE TEMPLE OF AMERICA, INC.  SUBORDINATE TEMPLE NO. 48, [...], [...], JOHN DOES 1-10, and JOHN DOE ENTITIES 1-10, Defendants-Respondents.  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION
[directive] MAINTENANCE OF RECORDS  5.1  Records Documenting the Deployment of ALPRs  Each department that owns or operates an ALPR shall maintain a written or electronic record that documents the following information: date and time when the ALPR was deployed; whether the ALPR was mobile, or was stationed at a fixed specified location; the identity of the operator; whether ALPR data was transferred to any other database or data storage device or system.
[brief] Da200 Exhibit 12: Landlord’s aged delinquency report . . . . . . . . .  Da200-203 Exhibit 13: Bills and invoices demonstrating legal fees.  . . .  Da204-235 Exhibit 14-18:  Omitted as non-pertinent.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Da235 Dec. 29, 2021 landlord letter to court seeking disbursement . . . . . .  Da236-37 Feb. 18, 2022 landlord letter to court objecting to reply . . . . . . . .  Da238 Feb. 23, 2022 defendant letter responding to landlord objection . . .  Da239-240 June 1, 2023 defendant letter requesting decision .  . . . . . . . . . . .  Da241-242 June 2, 2023 landlord letter requesting decision .  . . . . . . . . . . . .  Da243-247 Sept. 8, 2023 joint letter to court requesting decision . . . . . . . .
[brief] Legal Fees Shall Only Be Awarded to A Successful Claim for Malpractice and for Relevant Work Attributable to the Malpractice Claim  Defendants also pointed out to the Court below that the legal fees shall only be awarded to a successful claim for malpractice and for relevant work attributable to the malpractice claim.  Defendants challenged that the Appellate Division vacated the jury award of $500,000 damage to the Plaintiff on the ground that [...] sustained no actual damages but permitted fee shifting by awarding $449,798.50 as damages for the legal fees incurred by the Plaintiff.  In doing so, the Appellate Division assumed a fact that was not in the record that those fees shifted were based on the concrete analysis of the fact and applicable laws by an expert and the expert’s opinion on the fee-shifting issue was adopted by the jury.
[brief] In light of Walker v. Giuffre, 209 N.J. 124, 130-33 (2012) cited by Plaintiff, Defendant achieved more than limited success in comparison to the relief (i.e., the dismissal of the Complaint) in the litigation.  In calculating the amount of reasonable attorney's fees, courts determine the “lodestar,” defined as the “number of hours reasonably expended” by the attorney, “multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate.
[brief] Id. at 86.  In [...]’s own testimony at trial, she acknowledged that her Twitter handle and profile photo appeared in the tweet but denied that she wrote the tweet.  Ibid.  Affirming the trial court’s admission of the tweet into evidence, this Court held that [...]’s “Twitter handle, her profile photo, the content of the tweet, its nature as a reply, and the testimony presented at trial was sufficient to meet the low burden imposed by our authentication rules. ”  Id. at 90-91.  The Court rejected [...]’s contention that social media posts should be subject to a more stringent standard for authentication because such posts could be easily forged.
[brief] Several months after adoption of the original ordinance, the City Council determined it necessary to revise the conditional-use standards in the City’s Zoning Ordinance.  Ordinance B-446 (the “Ordinance”), introduced on March 9, 2022, proposed additional conditions to the retail sale of cannabis.  [Da385].  They include, most notably, a condition that prohibits the sale of cannabis within 600 feet of any primary or secondary school, early childhood learning, recreation or day care facility, or parks.  [Da387].  The Council adopted the Ordinance on second reading on April 6, 2022.  [...]’s Mayor signed the Ordinance on April 8, 2022, and pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40:69A-181, the Ordinance became effective on April 28, 2022.
[brief] A.  [...] Waived Arbitration Under The Prevailing Cole Factors  As both parties and the Law Division recognized, the New Jersey Supreme Court articulated a seven-factor test that governs the analysis of waiver of a right to arbitrate, consisting of “(1) the delay in making the arbitration request; (2) the filing of any motions, particularly dispositive motions, and their outcomes; (3) whether the delay in seeking arbitration was part of the party’s litigation strategy; (4) the extent of discovery conducted; (5) whether the party raised the arbitration issue in its pleadings, particularly as an affirmative defense, or provided other notification of its intent to seek arbitration; (6) the proximity of the date on which the party sought arbitration to the date of trial; and (7) the resulting prejudice suffered by the other party, if any.