ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Respondent argues that a mortgage once cancelled cannot be reinstated under any circumstances, and claims that Appellant fails to cite any authority to support that a properly discharged mortgage can be reinstated.  Db8.  Respondent further argues that if the Court were to reinstate the [...] mortgage, “creditors, good-faith purchasers, and the public would no longer be able to rely on those discharges being final” (Db1) and “it will not be long before other lenders try to revive discharged mortgages, leading to the collapse of the real estate recording system as we know it. ”  Db9.  Appellant cited numerous cases and other authorities in its main Brief to support its position that a cancelled mortgage can be reinstated for fraud, mistake, or misrepresentation provided there was no change of position or rights of subsequent lienholders involved as is the case here.  Pb17-18.  See 29 N.J. Prac.Law of Mortgages, §13.10 (2d ed.), fn. 35, and §8b of the Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment (2011).  Respondent’s heavy reliance on Wells Fargo Bank v. NJ Prop.Group, 2020 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1130 (Pa46) is misplaced and ignores the distinct factual differences between the facts in Wells Fargo and this case.  In Wells Fargo, the real estate was purchased by a purchaser for value who relied upon the recording system which indicated a prior mortgage had been cancelled.  There, the buyer changed his position by purchasing, mortgaging, and improving the property.  Under those facts, the Wells Fargo Court held that the prior cancelled mortgage should not be reinstated.  In this case, unlike in Wells Fargo, the dispute is solely between [...] and [...].  No one changed his/her position in reliance on the cancelled mortgage and no priority rights of subsequent lienholders, including [...], exist.  Should the mortgage be reinstated, the rights of other persons will not be affected.  Therefore, the holding in Wells Fargo is not controlling.  [...]’s arguments that public policy in reliance on the Recording Act will be violated and would lead to the collapse of the recording system is of no merit is absurd and a misunderstanding of the law.  The decisional law in cases involving mortgage reinstatement is fact-sensitive and the facts of this case are unique.  A remedy can be readily tailored to suit the facts without any detrimental effect whatsoever on public policy and the Recording Act.  POINT II
[brief] **DEFENDANT’S CONVICTION MUST BE REVERSED BECAUSE THE COURT FAILED TO INSTRUCT THE JURY ON MULTIPLE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF ROBBERY AND FAILED TO GIVE A SPECIFIC UNANIMITY INSTRUCTION.  (Not Raised Below)**  The trial judge has a mandatory duty to “instruct the jury as to the fundamental principles of law which control the case. ”  *State v. Butler*, 27 N.J. 560, 594 (1958).  Given the importance of jury instructions in safeguarding a defendant’s right to due process, “erroneous instructions are almost invariably regarded as prejudicial. ”  *Vick*, 117 N.J. at 289.  Even if there was no objection below, errors in instructions that are \(^8\) [...] may be reindicted and retried on a charge of second-degree robbery of [...].  crucial to the jury’s deliberations require reversal of a defendant’s conviction.  *State v. Jordan*, 147 N.J. 409, 422-23 (1997).  The jury instructions in this case contained several fatal errors.  First, the instructions omitted an explanation of the second element of robbery and an explanation of the distinction between first- and second-degree robbery, thereby making it nearly impossible for the jury to return a valid verdict on either degree of robbery.  Second, the instructions incorrectly failed to specify that the jury had to unanimously agree on the essential elements of (1) the identity of the victim of the theft, (2) the identity of the person whom the defendant threatened or purposely put in fear of immediate bodily injury, and (3) the identity of the person who reasonably believed that the defendant was armed.  The instructions also improperly failed to explain that it is the victim of the robbery, as opposed to a bystander, who must reasonably believe that the defendant is armed in a simulated deadly weapon case.  These errors, separately or together, require reversal of [...]’s conviction.
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[brief] Clearly, the detailed nature of these requirements imposes a duty ³ N.J.S.A. 52:27H-21.22(a) provides that the director may require: a. Names and addresses of the owner, partners or shareholders, as applicable, and their representative shares of ownership; b. Names and addresses of members of the board of directors, in the case of corporations; c. Names and addresses of the officers of the business; d. Names and addresses of capital investors; e. Number of shares of stock issued and outstanding, in the case of a corporation; f. Articles of incorporation, bylaws, partnership agreements, or joint venture agreements, as applicable; g.  The capacity of the business to be bonded; on the applicant — in this case, [...] — to be sufficiently familiar with the business records to attest to their accuracy.  Indeed, supplying false information in the applications submitted to the State subjects the applicant to criminal liability.  N.J.S.A. 52:27H-21.22(c).  As the Chief Operating Officer (COO), [...] regularly submitted financial documents and certifications to maintain [...]’s status as a Minority Business Enterprise and a Disadvantaged Business Enterprise (DBE).
[brief] The *J.L.* matter involved a civil action against an uncle for sexual abuse of his nieces.  Once again distinguishing that case from the instant case, in *J.L.* the Appellate Division specifically directed the hearing on remand on discovery and tolling issues must be conducted by a different judge because the motion judge improperly made credibility determinations on summary judgment.  The cases cited by the Defendant do not support its contrived position that *any* credibility determinations made by a trial judge warrant disqualification on remand.  Each of the Trial Court’s determinations were properly made during the proceedings prior to Defendant filing its appeal.  The Trial Court did not make any inappropriate credibility determinations, nor did it make its final decision without considering the evidence and testimony offered at trial and, therefore, recusal was not required or necessary.  Had the Appellate Division considered the Trial Court’s previous rulings as cause to reassign the remand proceedings to a new judge, it would have so directed.  Defendant failed to submit any evidence supporting a finding the Trial Court could not conduct a fair and unbiased hearing, or that it would not have been counterproductive to require a new judge to acquaint themselves with the proceeding.  While there is no question judges must refrain from sitting in any causes where their objectivity and impartiality may fairly be brought into question, there must be some proof of bias or prejudice.  See In re Advisory Letter No. 7-11 of Supreme Court Advisory Committee on Extrajudicial Activities, 213 N.J. 63 (2013).
[brief] The standard of review applicable to the instant appeal is that of *de novo* review which gives no “’special deference’ to the ‘trial court’s interpretation of the law and the legal consequences that flow from established facts. ’”  *Cherokee LCP Land LLC v. City of Linden*, 234 N.J. 403, 414-15 (2018).  “Whether a party has standing to pursue a claim is a question of law subject to de novo review. ”  Id., at 414-15.  See, also, *People for Open Gov’t v. Roberts*, 397, N.J. Super. 502, 508 (App. Div. 2008) (citing *Manalapan Realty, L.P. V. Twp. Comm. Of Manalapan*, 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995)(“The issue of standing is a matter of law as to which we exercise de novo review. ”)  No “special deference” is therefore accorded to the “trial court’s interpretation of the law and the legal consequences that flow from established facts. ”  Id.  In addition, “Rule 4:6-2(e) motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted are reviewed de novo. ”  *Baskin v. P.C. Richard & Son LLC*, 246 N.J. 157, 171 (2021)(citing *Dimitrakopoulos v. Borrus*, 237 N.J. 91, 108 (2019)).  Because Appellant's Complaint in the instant case (Pa1) was dismissed by the trial court based on its finding that “Plaintiff does not have standing” (Pa97), and because the case was dismissed under R.4:6-2(e) for failure to state a claim, this appeal should be reviewed under the de novo standard of review.
[brief] (Pa110-Pa122).  Plaintiff/appellant subsequently filed the instant action alleging various violations of state law against the [...] and individual officers including the following counts; (a) Count One for unlawful detention under the New Jersey Civil Rights Act, N.J.S.A. 10:6-2; (b) Count Two for false imprisonment under N.J.S.A. 2C:30-6; (c) Count Three for various violations of the New Jersey Constitution; (d) Count Four for negligence; (e) Count Five for malicious abuse of legal process; (f) Count Six for malicious prosecution and malicious use of process; (g) Count Seven for malicious misrepresentation; (h) Count Eight for aiding the commission or a tort/concert of action; (i) Count Nine for civil conspiracy; and (j) Count Ten for municipal liability.
[brief] (See Pa12–13.)  [...] was already denied these exact remedies twice: the trial court in the First Action explicitly found that the Redevelopment Resolution “was based on substantial credible evidence and it was not made arbitrarily, capriciously, or unreasonably,” (see Pa145), and the Appellate Division affirmed this decision, thus denying [...] its sought-after vacation of the Redevelopment Resolution, (see Pa784 (“Here, the City’s blight designation was supported by substantial credible evidence in the record.
[brief] *State v. Concepcion*, 111 N.J. 373, 379 (1988) (“An instruction that is appropriate in one case may not be sufficient for another case. ”).  They were only told that distribution is “the transfer, actual, constructive, or attempted from one person to another of a controlled dangerous substance,” and that “[i]t is not necessary that the drugs be transferred in exchange for payment or promise of payment of money or anything of value,” reenforcing the false notion that sharing the drugs with a joint possessor – for free – constituted intent to distribute.  (5T 74-18 to 75-1)  When the court defined the elements of possession with intent to distribute, it was obliged to correct the State’s erroneous legal claim and inform jurors that the other party to the alleged distribution could not be a co-possessor.
[brief] TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS BEING APPEALED  Judgment of Conviction/Order for Commitment  ................................Da  25  Law Division Opinion Denying Petition for Post-Conviction Relief ...........................................................................  Da 85  Law Division Order Denying Petition for Post-Conviction Relief ........  Da 125 | Document | Page | |-----------------------------------------------|------| | Indictment | Da 1 | | Jury Verdict Sheet | Da 15| | Judgment of Conviction/Order for Commitment | Da 25| | Appellate Division Opinion | Da 29| | Supreme Court Order | Da 52| | Pro Se Petition for Post-Conviction Relief¹ | Da 53| | Certification of [...], Ph.D. | Da 55| | Report of [...], Ph.D. | Da 56| | Curriculum Vitae of [...], Ph.D. | Da 59| | Law Division Opinion Denying Petition for Post-Conviction Relief | Da 85| | Law Division Order Denying Petition for Post-Conviction Relief | Da 125| | Notice of Appeal | Da 126| | [...] Bodycam Video (Disc 1) | Da 130| | [...] Bodycam Video (Disc 2) | Da 131| | [...] Bodycam Video (Disc 3) | Da 132|
[brief] *Berkowitz* is a decision that should be limited to its expressed issue (“The issue to be determined is whether an attorney-at-law is personally liable to the medical provider for failing to honor an assignment by the client of the proceeds from a personal injury action. ”  *Id.* at 256).  It doesn’t discuss that *DiTolvo* concerned the equitable distribution of a personal injury and per quod claim between divorcing spouses (equitable claims); it doesn’t discuss that *Costanzo* turned on whether or not a binding assignment had been made, not the permissibility of the right assigned, making its remarks on anything related to this case mere dicta..
[brief] THE NOVEMBER 8, 2023 ORDER SHOULD BE AFFIRMED BECAUSE APPELLANTS CANNOT SATISFY THE REQUIREMENTS OF RULE 4:32-1 TO PROCEED BY CLASS ACTION (RAISED BELOW – 2T10:25-14:7)  Even if Appellants had a viable CFA claim, which they do not, the November 8, 2023 Order was still proper because Appellants cannot satisfy the legal requirements to proceed by way of class action.
[brief] certification of an attorney.  One might be tempted to assume that the document she is talking about was the same one proffered to the court by someone else, but it is odd on its face that such a roundabout method of “identification” was employed.  In any event, it turned out the [...] was not the person with personal knowledge as to the key facts.  She is the person who prepared the proof of mailing list -- but that is all that she can say.  She is not the person who brought it to the Post Office, nor is she the person who can testify that all of the envelopes listed in the document were really given over to the Post Office for mailing.  Indeed, she was forced to admit that she does not even remember her own actions on the date of the purported mailing.  The many things that [...] did not have personal knowledge of all beg the question: why did [...] not simply get a certification from the person or persons who did have that personal knowledge?  The answer is a mystery that [...] made no attempt to solve.  It simply submitted certifications that were inadequate on their face.  The court rules are quite clear about certifications, and leave no room for interpretation.  R. 1:6-6 states:  If a motion is based on facts not appearing of record, or not judicially noticeable, the court may hear it on affidavits made on personal knowledge, setting forth only facts which are admissible in evidence to which the affiant is competent to testify and which may have annexed thereto certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to therein .  . . .  Taking together every certification submitted by [...], the best that can be said on personal knowledge it that the Proof of Mailing form had been prepared.  Without the certification of another person with actual knowledge, the document does not “speak for itself,” and therefore could not support [...]’s motion.  In fact, absent further certifications, the document was proof of nothing.  For the same reason, [...] failed to overcome Plaintiffs’ proofs as to liability, and the cross-motion for partial summary judgment should have been granted.
[brief] In Mulvihill, the Supreme Court determined that a jury could conclude that the defendant, who claimed self-defense, was not being arrested given his testimony about his encounter with a police officer.  55 N.J. at 158-60.  Defendant suggests that the jury’s judgment of acquittal on the resisting arrest charges demonstrates that it was unclear if he was being arrested.  (Db25-26).  A more straightforward explanation is that the trial judge mistakenly instructed the jury that in order to find defendant guilty of resisting arrest, the officers had to announce explicitly to defendant they were arresting defendant.4 (8T224-8 to -16).
[brief] TABLE OF CONTENTS  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS BEING APPEALED BY PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT  ........................................................................................................3  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ..................................................................................................................4  PROCEDURAL HISTORY .....................................................................................................................5  STATEMENT OF FACTS .......................................................................................................................5  LEGAL ARGUMENT ............................................................................................................................5  APPELLANTS MISREPRESENT THE FACTS AND LEGAL ISSUES IN THIS APPEAL (Pa0098) .................................................................................................................................5  CONCLUSION ......................................................................................................................................11  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS BEING APPEALED BY PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT
[brief] Preliminary Statement  This case is now over ten years old and has not gotten past the pleading stage due to Plaintiff counsel’s inability to file a complaint that meets the pleading standards in both federal and state court.  This action involves a single plaintiff and a linear series of event, the details of which are well known to both Plaintiff and Plaintiff’s counsel.  Succinctly, regarding the [...], Plaintiff alleges: (1) he suffers from a mild intellectual disability, (2) on or about April 17, 2014, he was falsely arrested and his vehicle was improperly searched, (3) he was illegally denied access to his attorney, (4) he possessed a particular vulnerability to suicide which the [...] knew or should have known about, and, (5) that the [...]’ failed to protect the Plaintiff resulting in Plaintiff attempting suicide twice while in Absecon police custody.
[brief] ..............................................  19, 25 Block 268, LLC v. City of Hoboken Rent Leveling & Stabilization Board, 401 N.J. Super. 563 (App. Div. 2008)  ............... 18 Burlington Northern Railroad v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006) .................. 40 Carlson v. City of Hackensack, 410 N.J. Super. 491 (App. Div. 2009)  ....  18 Cicchetti v. Morris County Sherriff's Office, 194 N.J. 563 (2008) .......... 20, 21 Cortez v. Gindhart, 435 N.J. Super. 589 (App. Div. 2014) ................. 19, 37 DeRitis v. McGarrigle, 861 F.3d 444 (3d Cir. 2017) ..................... 41, 42, 43, 44 Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006) .................................. 41, 43, 44 Hargrave v. County of Atlantic, 262 F. Supp. 2d 393 (D.N.J. 2003) ........ 30
[brief] ”  *Kline v. Bernardsville Ass’n, Inc.*, 267 N.J. Super. 473, 478 (App. Div. 1993).  Thus, only the holder of the easement can unilaterally terminate an easement through renunciation.  See *Rossi v. Sierchio*, 30 N.J. Super. 575, 578 (App. Div. 1954).  There is no authority for the proposition the grantor/owner of property subject to an easement can simply renounce the easement.  To establish abandonment, the asserting party must present clear and convincing evidence of the intent to abandon on the part of the dominant estate.
[brief] Since a spot zoning claim is essentially a challenge to the reasonableness of an ordinance, “an evidentiary hearing must be held to afford both the party challenging the ordinance and the municipality an opportunity to present expert testimony relevant to a determination of its validity. ”  Jennings v. Borough of Highlands, 418 N.J. Super. 405, 426-427 (App. Div. 2011).  Continuing this Court wrote:  For these reasons, we view Jennings’ spot zoning claim to have been improvidently dismissed.  Id. at 427.  The trial Court here erred when it chose to disregard Appellant’s planner’s opinion on summary judgment.
[brief] ” (2T17-23-25).  [...] explained that age related degenerative disc disease means “normal architectural changes we are all going through in life. ” (2T18:20).  He nevertheless opined that Petitioner’s disability “was directly due to the traumatic work-related injury of October 17, 2015. ” (2T12:18-24).  [...] explained his conclusion as follows:  “And so the puzzle tells me, had it not been for the day of that injury, we wouldn’t be here today and that - - and that, to me, is what the essence is of this particular case as an IME examiner. ” (2T26:2-5).  [...] dismissed Petitioner’s pre-existing spinal conditions, including his age-related degenerative disc disease.  (2T26:4).  He also noted that Petitioner was working full duty at the time of the 2105 accident and there were no medical records for spinal treatment between 2004 and 2015, stating “I see this 11 year remote history with no ongoing issues”.  (2T27:8-11; 26:1-2).  F.
[brief] **APPLICABLE LAW**  On more than one occasion, our Supreme Court has held a corporation’s officers and employees may be held individually liable under the CFA for misrepresentations made while acting in that corporate capacity.  *Allen v. V&A Bros., Inc.*, 208 N.J. 114, 131 (2011) (citing *Gennari v. Weichert Co. Realtors*, 148 N.J. 582, 608-10 (1997)).  The Allen Court also provided some examples from the Appellate Division and trial courts where individuals were held personally liable under the CFA for misrepresentation made while acting in a corporate capacity.  *Id.* (citations omitted).  The Court explained that although these individuals were acting on behalf of a corporation, they were held personally liable because they personally engaged in conduct prohibited by the CFA, i.e., making misrepresentations.  *Id.*  Significantly, the Supreme Court expressly held a person may be individually liable without needing to pierce the corporate veil:  “[a]lthough one might engage in an alternative veil-piercing approach, nothing in the CFA or the relevant precedents suggests that in the absence of veil-piercing the individual employee or office will be shielded from the CFA violation he or she has committed. ”  Id. at 131-32.  A.  THE PLAINTIFF CAN IMPOSE LIABILITY DIRECTLY UPON THE INDIVIDUAL DEFENDANTS FOR THEIR CFA VIOLATIONS WITHOUT HAVING TO PIERCE THE CORPORATE VEIL (T1, p. 17, Ins. 16-20).  The trial court erred when it concluded Count Four should be dismissed based upon the Plaintiff’s inability to pierce the corporate veil.  This was an error because the Plaintiff does not seek to impose liability upon the individual [...] by ‘piercing the corporate veil. ’  Instead, the Plaintiffs seek to impose liability directly upon them for their violations of the CFA while acting in the scope of their corporate capacities.  As set forth above, the caselaw expressly permits the Plaintiff to plead a direct cause of action under the CFA against the [...] for misrepresentations they made while acting on behalf of the Developer.  See Allen, 208 N.J. at 131.  Therefore, it was an error for the trial court to independently dismiss Count Four based upon an inability to pierce the corporate veil.  V.