ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] SO HOW IS IT THAT A COURT COULD MAKE A FINDING THAT THE PRECONDITION NECESSARY FOR PLAINTIFF'S PENALTY CLAIM EXISTED UNDER THOSE CIRCUMSTANCES.  There can be no doubt or dispute that Plaintiff's hands were caught in the proverbial "cookie jar".  Plaintiff begins her legal argument that Defendant failed to prove that Plaintiff committed Fraud.  This is incorrect for a number of reasons.  First and foremost, the issue of fraud was never discussed by any of the Courts as it related to the penalties that were imposed.  Nor did any Court state that Plaintiff did not commit Fraud.  The only discussion of plaintiff's intentional misrepresentation occurred in the context of a request for rescission of the Agreement at the Trial Level.  And the apparent finding of the Court, which was never fully articulated, was that the misrepresentation was not sufficiently substantial for a finding of rescission of the Agreement.  While defendant vigorously disputes this finding, nonetheless, this is not an issue that has been raised in this appeal (Although a finding sua sponte by this Court that rescission is appropriate would not hurt defendant's feelings).
[brief] Effective January 8, 2021, the [...], [...] Planning Board and [...] entered into a certain “Settlement Agreement”.  Pa041.  At that time, [...] was the contract purchaser of certain real property identified as Block 3103, Lot 16 (approximately 12 acres) and 19 (approximately 5 acres), and Block 3101, Lots 12 and 13 (approximately 9 acres) on the Township’s Tax Map (the “Property”), Pa042a, which realty was owned by [...] and used for its corporate headquarters, see Pa139a and Pa144a.  Although comprising four (4) separate tax lots, two of the lots were contiguous thus forming three (3) land tracts that were separated by two roadways, see Pa074a, and comprised somewhere between 26 and 27 acres in total, see Pa049a.  Thus, lots 12 and 13 (also known as [...]) lie to the east of Valley Road and Lots 16 (also known as [...]) and 19 (also known as [...]) lie to the west of Valley Road.  Lot 19 lies to the south of Barbour Pond Road and Lot 16 (the largest of the lots) lies to the north of Barbour Pond Road.  The Settlement Agreement contains a map showing the lot configuration, Pa074a.  Historically, the Property had been utilized for office buildings, and it was then situated in the Township’s Office and Research (OR) or Office Building-Limited (OB-L) zone districts; both were non-residential zones, Pa049a.
[brief] Specifically, N.J.A.C. 7:15-3.2(f) lists those activities that are consistent with the adopted areawide WQMP, including activities identified under N.J.A.C. 7:14A-22.4 that do not require a treatment works approval from the NJDEP.  N.J.A.C. 7:15-3.2(f)5.  Activities that do not require a treatment works approval include, among others, “building, installing, operating or modifying an individual subsurface sewage disposal system where the aggregate projected flow of the facility, using the criteria established in N.J.A.C. 7:9A, is less than or equal to 2,000 gallons per day of sanitary sewage. ”  N.J.A.C. 7:14A-22.4(a)3.  As set forth in [...]’s HAD application, the total amount of wastewater generated by [...]’s Project would be less than 2,000 gallons per day.  See Aa 0031-0032.  As such, a treatment works approval from NJDEP would not be required under N.J.A.C. 7:14A-22.4(a)3 and the Project would therefore be consistent with the adopted areawide WQMP pursuant to N.J.A.C. 7:15-3.2(f)5.
[directive] 1.  The revised Brimage Guidelines that are appended hereto and incorporated by reference herein shall be used by all county prosecutors and the [...] to determine authorized plea offers in all cases involving offenses arising under Chapter 35 of Title 2C that carry a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment and parole ineligibility subject to waiver or reduction pursuant to the provisions of N.J.S.A. 2C:35-12 (which offenses are hereinafter referred to as “Brimage-eligible offenses”) that are committed on or after September 15, 2004.  The revised Brimage Guidelines appended hereto shall be deemed to be part of this Directive and shall be binding on all county prosecutors and the [...].  2.  The original Brimage Guidelines, any supplemental Directive amending the original Brimage Guidelines and all Application Notes interpreting the original Guidelines and supplemental Directives shall remain in effect and shall continue to be binding on all county prosecutors and the [...] with respect to the handling of Brimage-eligible offenses that were committed before September 15, 2004.
[brief] CONGREGATION  SONS OF ISRAEL : SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY v. APPELLATE  DIVISION DOCKET NO. [...]  Plaintiff/Respondent :  On Appeal from Orders dated February 21, 2019, February 21, 2019, May 29, 2019, May 29, 2019, June 5, 2019, August 26, 2019, February 5, 2020, March 29, 2022, March 29, 2022, April 26, 2022
[brief] POINT TWO PLAINTIFF CANNOT PROVE NEGLIGENCE AS A MATTER OF LAW  Plaintiff further alleges that the [...] was: (1) negligent in the installation of irrigation drains and repairs on her Property; (2) that the [...] was negligent in dumping and plowing snow in front of her home; and (3) the [...] was negligent in the installation and maintenance of storm drains, and that together these negligent acts caused irreparable damage to Plaintiff’s dwelling and Property.
[brief] That Order also required that [...] and [...] to vacate the Boonton Property if [...] was not the successful bidder, and provided that [...] could purchase the Florida Property for $360,000.  (Da19).  Both [...] and [...] willingly submitted timely bids on the Boonton Property, with [...] making an offer of $601,000 (an amount $26,000 above the appraised price), and [...] making an offer of $501,000 (an amount $74,000 less than the appraised price).
[brief] The following day on May 12th, I contacted [...] and explained the situation to the employee, asking if they were still interested in buying it.  This time the employee offered me $400 for it (instead of the $500 that was previously offered when they had failed to come and pick it up as they had promised).  I then agreed to accept that lesser amount, given that they had already towed it there and held it for a few days.  When the employee said that they would need the title, I explained the situation with the title (i.e. that my sister had misplaced it after my mother had signed it with the buyer’s name blank), and that it might take me until Monday to find it and bring it.  The Dirke’s employee responded that it was no problem, and that when I showed up with the title, he would give me the $400 for the vehicle.  However about 10 minutes later the Dirke’s employee me called back, saying that his boss wanted to change the deal as follows: I would still bring him the title, but now they would not pay me anything for it; and on top of that, I would have to pay them $130!  I then told the employee that he was breaching our verbal contract and that I would sue, to which the employee responded that they would counter sue.  On May 30th we then filed the complaint, but no counter suit was filed.  The matter was scheduled for trial on Aug 12, 2022; however Dirke’s attorney, [...], had filed a motion to dismiss just one day earlier.
[brief] A true copy of the 2011-2013 [...] Graduate Studies bulletin (D02131-D02132); b.  A true copy the [...] Policies and Procedures (D02392-D02394, D02397) c.  A true copy of the May 21, 2012 letter from [...] to [...] (D02447-D02458)  d.  A true copy of the School of Pharmacy concurrent degrees (D02484-D02497) o Exhibit E, Certification of [...] in support of Plaintiff’s Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss with Prejudice Pursuant to R. 4:6-2(e)
[brief] By way of background, it is uncontested that, in December 2015, Defendant formed [...] for the purpose of operating a pharmacy and that [...] d/b/a as [...] operated in Trenton, New Jersey from about March 2016 to May 2019, when the assets of the pharmacy were sold to [...].  It is also uncontested that Plaintiff became a 49% membership interest holder in S.G. Health, with the other 51% membership being that of Defendant’s.
[brief] The law does not and did not postpone the accrual of his cause of action until he had an opportunity to have learned of the potential legal underpinnings of his claim.  Rule 4:26-4 provides that where the identity of the defendant is unknown, plaintiff may institute process against such individual by designating him as a “[...]” defendant, and may thereafter amend the complaint to the proper designation when the defendant’s identity is ascertained.  The purpose of this rule is to render timely, through “relation back,” a complaint filed in an otherwise timely manner by a plaintiff who knows he has a cause of action but does not know the plaintiff’s name.
[brief] After defendant inquired about whether he would be assigned an attorney or if he would have to look for one, [...] unequivocally reiterated that defendant had a right to an attorney, stating “this is very simple if you want to have an attorney present that is your right. ” (Pa30).  Immediately thereafter, and before any substantive questioning occurred, [...] told defendant, “[i]f you do not have money to hire a lawyer, one will be appointed to represent you before any questioning if you wish. ” (Pa31).  This statement clearly answered defendant’s question and, notably, defendant did not respond by reiterating his prior question, he did not say he could not afford an attorney, and he did not ask for a lawyer.  Rather, defendant said “yes” he understood what he was told.  Therefore, the record clearly establishes that defendant’s prior question was not a request for an attorney or an invocation of his right.  Indeed, the record demonstrates that defendant was fully advised of his rights, and that he knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived them prior to answering any questions.  Accordingly, the statement should have been deemed admissible and defendant’s Motion to Suppress should have been denied.
[directive] ¿Entiende usted que si lo condenan por un delito de violencia sexual, como por ejemplo agresión  [Sí/Yes] [No/No] sexual con agravantes, agresión sexual, abuso deshonesto con agravantes, rapto conforme a 2C:13- 1c(2)(b), abuso deshonesto, homicidio preterintencional si el delito subyacente es agresión sexual, un intento de cometer cualquiera de dichos delitos o cualquier delito respecto al cual el juez hace constar en el acta su decisión específica de que, dadas las circunstancias del caso, el delito se debe considerar un delito de violencia sexual, cuando usted cumpla su término de encarcelamiento, es posible que mediante un proceso civil lo confinen en otra instalación hasta de por vida si después de una audiencia el juez decide que un confinamiento civil involuntario es necesario para usted?  Do you understand that if you are convicted of a sexually violent offense, such as aggravated sexual assault, sexual assault, aggravated criminal sexual contact, kidnapping under 2C:13-1c(2)(b), criminal sexual contact, felony murder if the underlying crime is sexual assault, an attempt to commit any of these offenses, or any offense for which the court makes a specific finding on the record that, based on the circumstances of the case, the offense should be considered a sexually violent offense, you may upon completion of your term of incarceration, be civilly committed to another facility for up to life if the court finds, after a hearing, that you are in need of involuntary civil commitment?
[brief] Todd v. Weltman, Weisberg & Reis Co., 434 F.3d 432, 439, 446 (6th Cir. 2006), applied FDCPA to a law firm’s executing and filing of misleading affidavits.  In [...] v. Silverman, 139 F. Supp. 3d 1239, 1244 (D. Colo. 2015), the court stated:  “As there is no binding precedent, the Court must first determine whether the FDCPA applies where, as here, the alleged false misrepresentations were made in a motion to the court during a debt-collection proceeding...  However, as the Court finds that representations made to a judge are actionable under [Section] 1692e, the Court must next decide whether [...] has stated a claim. ”  (Emphasis Added).  The court found that the plaintiff stated a valid claim under the FDCPA.  Consequently, Plaintiff’s Complaint and Motion for Summary Judgment contravened FDCPA because of misrepresentations and misleading statements as to the right of oral argument and its principal place of business.  [...] and [...], supra.
[brief] Appellant is utilizing this litigation in order to try to obtain leverage for the eventual payment for the acquisition of the property.  In order to do so, it is making many false and misleading statements.  The Ordinance which initiated the exchange of property with [...], and therefore the acquisition of the property owned by the Defendant is set forth at Ordinance 5-23.  Notwithstanding Defendant’s assertion that there is not any “direct evidence of a valid public use of Defendants’ properties”, that simply is not correct.  In Ordinance 5-23, (Pa8) filed herewith, the [...] is clear that the purpose of the acquisition is to “promote and protect the health, safety, and welfare of the residents of the Township” ….
[brief] Supreme Court precedent, Plaintiff here cannot maintain a false arrest claim because his underlying municipal court convictions have not been reversed or otherwise held invalid.  In Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994), the U.S. Supreme Court held that “a §1983 plaintiff must prove that the [underlying] conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus …”  Heck requires courts to: consider whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence; if it would, the complaint must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated.  But if the district court determines that the plaintiff’s action, even if successful, will not demonstrate the invalidity of any outstanding criminal judgment against the plaintiff, the action should be allowed to proceed, in the absence of some other bar to the suit.  Put simply, “a §1983 action that impugns the validity of the plaintiff’s underlying conviction cannot be maintained unless the conviction has been reversed on direct appeal or impaired by collateral proceedings. ”  Gilles v. Davis, 427 F.3d 197, 209 (3d Cir. 2005).  In the pending case, to present a false arrest claim, Plaintiff would have to first secure a reversal or other dismissal of his convictions in the [...].  It is undisputed that Plaintiff has not obtained a reversal or any other ruling declaring those convictions to be invalid.  In fact, Plaintiff’s appeal of those convictions to the Superior Court have been dismissed.  Pa284-Pa285.  Consequently, on this record, Plaintiff’s false arrest claim was properly dismissed and cannot be considered on appeal due to the Heck doctrine.
[brief] Tarr v. Ciasulli, 181 N.J. 70, 84 (2004).  To determine whether an individual provided substantial assistance, courts consider five factors: “(1) the nature of the act encouraged, (2) the amount of assistance given by the supervisor, (3) whether the supervisor was present at the time of the asserted harassment, (4) the supervisor’s relations to the others, and (5) the state of mind of the supervisor. ”  Ibid. (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 876(b) comment d).  These defendants did not perform a wrongful act that caused an injury.  The allegation against these defendants is that they performed their jobs, as they were duty-bound to do, and authorized an investigation into employment complaints against Plaintiff brought by another defendant, [...].  Further, dismissal should be affirmed, as a matter of law, because the actions of these defendants in authorizing an investigation did not cause Plaintiff any damages.  As found by the trial court, [...] and [...] did not have “any involvement with the complained of alleged retaliation beyond authorizing an investigation they were duty bound to approve.
[brief] ” (3T88:8-11).  The trial court did not make any finding as to whether the Defendant “acted in good faith. ”  (3T78-3T88).  Nor did the trial court acknowledge or consider that Plaintiff testified that the “opportunity” was not conditioned upon any additional requirements, other than acceptance into the [...].  Id.  Plaintiff testified that he understood this program, based upon its plain language, to mean that all students who were able to qualify to complete the doctorate program would also be able to complete the master’s program.
[directive] Re: No appearance/no waiver plea agreements  Dear Prosecutors:  In State v. Rolex, N.J. (May 30, 2001), the Supreme Court agreed with the ruling of the Appellate Division, 329 N.J. Super. 220 (App. Div. 2000), that the wide discretion given to individual prosecutors with respect to determining when to include a no appearance/no waiver plea offer in a case involving a mandatory minimum sentence under the Comprehensive Drug Reform Act appears contrary to the mandate of sentencing uniformity in State v. Brimage, 153 N.J. 1 (1998).  The [...] has determined that in light of the Rolex decision, prosecutors shall not be permitted to offer a no appearance/no waiver provision in any plea negotiated pursuant to the Attorney General Guidelines for Negotiating Cases Under N.J.S.A. 2C:35-12.  Thus, Section 8 of Attorney General Directive No. 1998-1, which permits such offers, is hereby rescinded.  Furthermore, in pending cases involving a breach of a no appearance/no waiver agreement, the prosecutor shall not retract the waiver offer; instead, the defendant shall receive the sentence to which the parties had originally agreed.  This directive is effective immediately.
[brief] THE ZONING BOARD’S RESOLUTION WAS NOT PROPERLY ADOPTED Pa40-Pa50, 2T3:8 to 2T7:2**  After the Zoning Board met to hear the Application and voted to approve the “use variance” it met again on October 22, 2022 to adopt a resolution of approval (“Resolution”).  At the October meeting the Zoning Board Solicitor apparently had prepared a resolution for the Zoning Board.  The Solicitor summarized the Resolution for the Zoning Board Members.  Without deliberation or discussion the Zoning Board Members then adopted the Resolution of approval.  However, the procedure of adopting the resolution was defective.
[brief] Question Number 4, which appears under a “Hired Auto Liability” subheading, reads as follows:  4.  Do you hire or rent vehicles during your fair/festival/event?  □ Yes □ No  If yes, please describe vehicle types, estimated number, duration and usage.  _________________________________________________________  _________________________________________________________  If yes to #4, are any of these vehicles 12 or 15-passenger vans?  ☐ Yes (How many?) ☐ No (Ia077 at ¶ 17; Ia143).  [...] filled out the Supplemental Form with the express intention of securing insurance for the rental of 12-15 passenger vans.  (Ia077 at ¶ 18; Ia095 at 59:2-18; Ia099 at 87:12-16).  Indeed, [...] had already rented the vans at the time it completed the Supplemental Form, thus the nature of the questions was unmistakable:  Q: Sir, there's a signature at the bottom of the document.  Do you know whose signature that is?  A. Yes.  Q.  Whose signature is it?  A. Mine.  *** Q.
[brief] Main Case Doc. No. 1.  The Debtor claimed ownership in the Property as a single-family home with a value of $124,000.00.  Id. at p. 2.  The Debtor claimed his full exemption in the Property under 11 U.S.C. §§ 522(d)(1) and (d)(5).  Main Case Doc. No. 16, p. 10.  The Debtor listed [...] as his only secured creditor against the Property with a secured claim in the amount of $26,573.00.  Main Case Doc. No. 1, p. 10.  The Claims Register in the Main Case reflects no other creditor asserting a secured claim against the Property.  Thus, the Property has significant equity above the liens against it and the exemptions claimed.  This fact is undisputed.  The remaining procedural history of this case presents a tortured history leading to where we find ourselves today.
[brief] Therefore, Plaintiff’s alleged “hostile work environment” is not an adverse employment action. in her Complaint: (1) her regular Monday through Friday shift with the company changed (as a result of the elimination of the Erial day shift); and (2) she was removed from the schedule on or around January 20, 2020 (as a result of the “fingerprint issue”).  (Appx 018-19 ¶¶12, 16).  [...] had clear and legitimate non-retaliatory reasons for the two employment actions Plaintiff contests.  Regarding the elimination of the Erial location day shift, [...]’s Executive Director [...] determined that multiple locations did not require the presence of a full-time staff member because their residents were not at the home during the day.  (Appx 197 at ¶13).  The process of eliminating those positions started months prior to the decision being announced to the staff and involved business plans and applications to relevant licensors.  (Appx 197 at ¶16).  Regarding Plaintiff’s removal from the schedule on or around January 20, 2023, New Jersey law required [...] to temporarily remove all employees from the schedule whose valid fingerprint records were revealed to be missing by a routine audit.  (Appx 149 at 25:16-25; Appx 121, 127, and 130 at 176:17-19; 189:15-19; 107:17-23).  [...] continued to pay Plaintiff during the time she was off the schedule despite being unable to work.  (Appx 149 at 28:12-14).  Accordingly, [...] is able to clearly articulate legitimate, non-retaliatory reasons for both of the actions that Plaintiff alleges to be retaliatory, thus putting the burden—which she cannot meet—back on the Plaintiff.  Notably, Plaintiff does not dispute the legitimate non-retaliatory reasons [...] provided for eliminating her day shift at Erial and for removing her from the schedule for fingerprint record issues.
[brief] (1T 37-23 to 25)  Jackson Avenue and walked toward Anna Street, where he met two individuals later identified as [...] and [...].  (1T 28-5 to 20)  No officer recognized [...] or [...] at that time.  (1T 28-10 to 20, 40-25 to 41-2; 2T 34-11 to 15)  Neither [...] nor [...] was observed near [...]’s stash location, buying or selling drugs, or exchanging any items with [...].  (1T 41-11 to 25; 2T 16-2 to 21, 34-16 to 21)  Not one of the sixteen surveilling officers reported suspicion that [...] or [...] possessed drugs or weapons or had engaged in any other alleged criminal activity.  (1T 41-18 to 42-22, 50-8 to 24; 2T 34-16 to 35-11)  In fact, [...] confirmed that at the time [...] and [...] met [...], “there were no facts linking them to criminality. ”  (1T 59-20 to 21)  Nonetheless, immediately after [...] began walking with [...] and [...], [...] “relayed the information” that [...] was a suspected drug dealer “to the units out in the field” and instructed them to “quickly and safely apprehend [[...]] as soon as possible.
[brief] And third, pertinent contacts for purposes of specific jurisdiction must “result from the defendant’s purposeful conduct and not [as here] the unilateral actions of the plaintiff. ”  *Bayway Ref. Co.*, 333 N.J. Super. at 429.  Indeed, this Court has held that the exercise of specific jurisdiction over a non-resident law firm is improper where, as here, the (1) alleged “negligence forming plaintiff’s cause of action did not arise from defendant’s contacts with New Jersey,” (2) the underlying work “was neither undertaken nor billed from respondent’s New Jersey offices,” (3) “no physical meetings took place in New Jersey,” and (4) the primary attorney involved “was not licensed to practice law in New Jersey.