ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] ” (Da110).  This policy also establishes an undefined “duty of candor with respect to all communications with parents” that again applies to “[a]ll staff members. ”  *Ibid.*  And because the Revised Policy does not even require a staff member “to investigate, substantiate or validate the issue and/or behaviors” before making the notification, *ibid.*, the Revised Policy thus mandates immediate and unverified notifications to parents based on the mere suspicion of an adverse impact, among which the Board previously explicitly included LGBTQ+ or transitioning status.  Appellants’ own course of conduct and public representations make clear that the Revised Policy’s uninhibited demand for notifications based on “adverse impact” will require notifications based at least in part on a student’s LGBTQ+ status.  See Twp. of Pennsauken v. Schad, 160 N.J. 156, 170 (1999) (instructing that when a text “is susceptible to different interpretations, the court considers extrinsic factors, such as its purpose, legislative history, and statutory context to ascertain” the meaning of a policy).  The Original and Revised Policies were enacted just weeks apart, and the former plainly stated the Board’s view that “sexual orientation; transitioning; [and] gender identity or expression” are all specific “facts or circumstances” that could harm the “student’s physical and/or mental health, safety and/or social/emotional well-being.
[brief] Although he relieves those he shift blames, he continues to counter his identification testimony when he repeatedly changes his narrative 1T32:21-26, 1T34:4-6, 1T35:14-22, 1T36:2-9, 1T36:10-16 and failed to update his November 8, 2021 signed statement indicating he knew the defendant because of [...] (AP 10) as of November 9, 2021.  Furthermore, the plaintiff blatantly did not call upon their witnesses for testimonies from [...], [...], but introduced hearsay testimony from [...], on behalf the defendant’s witness’ significant other, [...].  The defendant entered her defenses and objections before, during and after trial per R. 3:10-2(d), R. 3:10-2(e), 1T19:4-18, 1T30:15-25 and 1T59:21.  CONCLUSION
[brief] In short, mitigating factors "supported by credible evidence" are required to "be part of the deliberative process."  *Dalziel, supra*, 182 N.J. at 505, 867 A.2d 1167.  Whether a sentence should gravitate toward the upper or lower end of the range depends on a balancing of the relevant factors.  *Fuentes, supra*, 217 N.J. at 72, 85 A.3d 923.  "[W]hen the mitigating factors preponderate, sentences will tend toward the lower end of the range, and when the aggravating factors preponderate, sentences will tend..." toward the higher end of the range."  Natale, supra, 184 N.J. at 488, 878 A.2d 724.  [Id. at 64-65.]  In the present matter, the court addressed each aggravating and mitigating factor raised.
[brief] **  If a complaint must be dismissed after it has been accorded the kind of meticulous and indulgent examination counseled in this opinion, then, barring any other impediment such as a statute of limitations, the dismissal should be without prejudice to a plaintiff’s filing of an amended complaint.  *Id.* at 771-772 [Emphasis supplied].  Applying these principles to the instant case, it is respectfully submitted that the trial court erred in dismissing [...]’s Complaint.
[directive] An officer shall not direct an electrical charge or current against a person who is restrained by handcuffs unless: a. the officer reasonably believes based on the suspect’s conduct while handcuffed that such force is immediately necessary to protect the officer, the suspect, or another person from imminent danger of death or serious bodily injury; and, b. the use of physical or mechanical force (e.g., a baton or pepper spray) is not immediately available to be employed, has been tried and failed to stop the imminent threat of death or serious bodily injury, reasonably appears to be unlikely to stop the imminent threat if tried, or would be too dangerous to the officer or an innocent person to employ.  In the event that a conducted energy device is discharged against a person who is restrained by handcuffs, unless the officer is equipped with and activates a body worn camera as defined in Attorney General Law Enforcement Directive No. 2015-1 so that the circumstances justifying the discharge are recorded by the body worn camera, the officer shall point the main body of the device so that the focus of the device’s internal video camera is centered on the person in order to record the circumstances justifying the discharge.  -6-  [DCJ 03/03/16]  4.
[brief] Our Supreme Court has held that the standard set forth in N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6 applies when judges impose a discretionary term of parole ineligibility under N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.  *State v. Dunbar*, 108 N.J. 80, 92-93 (1987), abrogated in part by *Pierce*, 188 N.J. at 902.  The trial judge did not abuse his discretion when he sentenced defendant to an extended prison term with an extended period of parole ineligibility.
[brief] The Probate Court disregarded the text and structure of the Settlement Agreement to invent a non-existent conflict that it resolved through the improper use of construction tools.  The Probate Court skipped the crucial step of first identifying a conflict between two terms dealing with the same subject.  Paragraph 24(F) and 24(G) do not conflict because they do not deal with the same subject matter.  Each deals with separate assets flowing through separate instruments.  See C.L., 473 N.J. Super. at 599-600 (“Therefore when both the general language of a contract and specific language address the same issue, the specific language controls. ”) (emphasis added).  They cannot, therefore, be modified by reference or comparison to each other.  To hold otherwise would be to fail to give full effect to both provisions.  Paragraph 24(F) excludes from the release the limited lifetime license (21 days per year) and right to a portion of the sale proceeds that accrue to [...] through [...]’s Estate Plan.  (Da95-96, at ¶ 24(F)).  As apparent from the plain language of Paragraph 24(F), it deals only with [...]’s rights to [...]’s interest in the Palm Beach Property.  Paragraph 24(F) cites only to [...]’s Estate, referencing a specific provision of [...]’s Trust.  (See id., at ¶ 24(F)).  It cites this provision at least five times.  (Id.).  The clause “for the avoidance of doubt,” on which [...] relied heavily below, contains no waiver, release, or reference to [...] at all.  It references only [...]’s Trust: [...]’s rights and interest in the Palm Beach Property as set forth in Section 3.3(A)(4)(d) of [...]’s Revocable Trust including, without limiting any other rights, interests or obligations that [...] may have as expressly provided by Section 3.3(A)(4)(d), the following: (i) her right to make use of the Palm Beach Property for a period of not more than twenty-one (21) days per year; and (ii) her right to receive a portion of the sale proceeds in the event of a sale of the Palm Beach Property as provided therein.
[brief] The Court added that, “in reviewing voluntary private-sector arbitration awards,” such as here, “[t]hat standard is as follows:  Basically, arbitration awards may be vacated only for fraud, corruption, or similar wrongdoing on the part of the arbitrators.  [They] can be corrected or modified only for very specifically defined mistakes as set forth in [N.J.S.A. 2A:24-9].…”  *Id.*  Simply put, the parties’ private-sector Award at issue here is not the result—nor does [...] even suggest it is the result—of “fraud, corruption, or similar wrongdoing on the part of the [Arbitrator]” and, as such, no such basis exists for [...] to vacate or modify [...]’s Award.
[brief] Although the statute does not provide guidance for making such determinations, the New Jersey Supreme Court, in Yarbough, stated:  (2) the reasons for imposing either a consecutive or concurrent sentence should be separately stated in the sentencing decision; (3) some reasons to be considered by the sentencing court should include facts relating to the crimes, including whether or not: (a) the crimes and their objectives were predominantly independent of each other; (b) the crimes involved separate acts of violence or threats of violence; (c) the crimes were committed at different times or separate places, rather than being committed so closely in time and place as to indicate a single period of aberrant behavior; (d) any of the crimes involved multiple victims; (e) the convictions for which the sentences are to be imposed are numerous.
[brief] See State v. Smith, 251 N.J. 244, 262 (2022) (community caretaking function “may be implicated where police observe something abnormal . . . concerning the operation of a motor vehicle. ”) (quotation marks omitted).  Based on [...]’s own testimony, the community caretaking function was inapplicable in the instant case.  Even if Respondent’s argument relies on [...]’s testimony that Appellant’s “vehicle [was] parked across multiple parking spots in such a way that other vehicles could not pull in,” this does not “clearly indicate[] that the vehicle and/or its driver were experiencing difficulties,” as Respondent asserts.  (Resp. Brief at 17).  Indeed, [...] admitted that at the time he came upon Appellant’s vehicle he believed, based on approximately ten years of experience as a police officer with the [...], that Appellant’s vehicle could be moved out of that spot by way of operation.  (2T7:17-20, 9:2-15).  The fact that it was approximately 2:18 a.m. when [...] came upon Appellant, (2T7:25-8:2), at which time [...] observed that the pizzeria in front of which Appellant’s vehicle was stopped was not open for business and that there were no other vehicles in the parking lot, (2T8:14-19), further evidences the fact that Appellant’s vehicle being stopped where it was was not abnormal.  Considering the circumstances (i.e., the time of day and the lack of other foot or car traffic), that Appellant may have temporarily pulled his vehicle over across multiple parking stalls is not so abnormal so as to implicate the community caretaking function.
[brief] *Tessmar v. Grosner*, 23 N.J. 193, 203 (1957).  So long as a plaintiff is able to provide reasonably accurate and fair calculations of lost profits, damages are recoverable.  *V.A.L. Floors, Inc. v. Westminster Communities, Inc.*, 355 N.J. Super. 416, 424 (App. Div. 2002).
[brief] Once again, Defendants’ arguments are based on the presumption that Plaintiff’s pleadings are false, by improperly arguing at the motion to dismiss stage that the discipline and investigation were warranted and appropriate.  To be clear, Plaintiff never pleads that she is above reproach because of the Injunction.  Instead, she pleads a pattern of retaliatory actions, including the disproportionate application of the District’s Mask Policy, which resulted in a formal meeting and disciplinary letter in her file but no discipline for other violators, and an investigation that was conducted in an improper matter, such that it was a sham.  230a, 231a.  Contrary to Defendants’ mischaracterizations, what is missing from Plaintiff’s pleadings is any allegation that the Injunction shielded her from legitimate investigation or discipline.  When it suits Defendants, they reference the Injunction as evidence of Plaintiff’s belief that she is above reproach.  Yet, when analogizing Plaintiff’s facts to the case law, Defendants conveniently do not mention the Injunction at all.  See [...] and [...] Br., pgs. 11-18.  And it is undeniable that the lower court also did not consider the Injunction when analogizing the facts pled by Plaintiff to applicable case law, given that it is never mentioned in the Court’s actual analysis.  7a, 8a, 9a.  Instead, both the lower court and Defendants apply the pattern of retaliatory actions pled by Plaintiff to the case law and reach the conclusion that Defendants’ actions were not materially adverse.  8a.  But these conclusions were made in a vacuum, without ever considering the actions that Defendants could not take due to the Injunction.  A robust analysis of Plaintiff’s unique case would have required an application of the specific facts in the pleadings (including the Injunction) to the concepts set forth in Roa v. Roa, 200 N.J. 555 (2010), which adopted the broad retaliation standard announced by the U.S. Supreme Court under Title VII in Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006).  The lower court failed to do this, and Defendants simply recite case law without ever acknowledging the critical fact that the Injunction necessarily limited the scope of their potential retaliatory actions.
[brief] (6T 147-25 to 148-2)  At the moment she hit him, she “was just reacting. ”  (6T 149-12 to 16)  It was only afterwards that [...] recognized that [...]’s eyes had remained open throughout, so she “knew for certain that he was not alive. ”  (6T 148-4 to 5)  [...] testified that she then began thinking about getting [...]’s body out of the car.  (6T 149-17 to 22)  She put the tire iron inside of the car and returned to the backseat.  (6T 150-16 to 152-8)  She stood near [...]’s body for a few moments, praying, “asking God for strength to forgive” her, and forgiving [...] for what he had done.
[brief] (Aa53)  The foreclosure complaint by Plaintiff’s predecessor, [...] was filed on August 17, 2022.  (The same counsel for the original Plaintiff, represents its assignee, the Plaintiff, [...]).  The foreclosure was processed by the In Rem Act, N.J.S.A. 54:5-104.29, et seq, and as an abandoned property pursuant to N.J.S.A. 54:5-86(b) (Aa1).  As of June 10, 2022, almost two months prior to filing the complaint, Plaintiff and its counsel possessed an Abandoned Property certification by [...], a licensed construction official.
[brief] Defendant claims he was also provoked by the “battery” he described in his statement as well.  He claims the statement he gave to police is enough to establish a rational basis for passion/provocation as to this alternative argument.  However, the evidence showed no injuries on defendant, (19T:28-23 to 30-18, 79-16 to 80-3), and no injuries on [...]’ hands or arms, (19T:116-6 to 119-4).  Moreover, by defendant’s own account of that night, defendant is the one who threw the first punch.  (21T:131-16 to 140-4).  He claimed he immediately tried to hit defendant in the shoulder when he did – or did not, depending on what point in the night he is being questioned – see [...] reach for a gun that did not exist.  The entire “struggle” that defendant describes occurs because [...] supposedly had a gun, and that was admitted to be a complete lie.
[brief] POINT I: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY GRANTING [...]’S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION AND ADOPTING A TIME ON THE RISK ALLOCATION METHOD (Pa0210-11) .........................................................29  I.  A Fact-Based Allocation of Damages is the Preferred Method Under Massachusetts Law .........................................................................................................................29  II.  The Evidence of Record Supports a Fact-Based Allocation of [...]’s Damages .................................................................36  POINT II: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY ADOPTING THE DATE OF THE 2010 LIABILITY TRIAL DECISION AS THE END DATE FOR THE ALLOCATION PERIOD (Pa0211)  ........................................41  I.  Use of the Date of the Liability Trial Decision as the End Date of the Allocation Period is Contrary to the Expressed Objectives of the Time on the Risk Method  ..............................................41  II.  The Appropriate End Date of the Allocation Period Is No Later Than September 8, 1986, When The CVOC Damage To Groundwater At The Site Plateaued And Was Discovered By [...].  ...........................................................................................................44  III.  Alternatively, The End Date of the Allocation Period Is No Later Than 1993 When [...] Ceased Operations At The Site .........................................................................................................................47  CONCLUSION
[directive] Most serious Brimage-eligible offense: N.J.S.A. 2C:35-  Special Offense  Characteristics: Firearm possessed? (Do not use if defendant will also plead to 2C:39-4.1 based on the same 9  9 9 Yes No Unk conduct.)  Non-firearm weapon used? (Do not use if defendant will also plead to 2C:39-4.1 based on 9  9 9 Yes No Unk the same conduct.)  Will defendant be required to also plead to 2C:39- 9 9 Yes No 4.1?  If appropriate, select the aggregate amount of drugs involved from the list below.
[brief] F.  The Chancery Court’s Findings on Remand By Order entered November 16, 2022 (the “Order on Remand;” 39964a) and a Final Judgment entered January 4, 2023 (40005a), [...], P.J.Ch., utilized the parties’ previously agreed-upon Damage Schedules attached to the 2013 Judgment and awarded to [...] the following amounts: • $3,425,185 in compensatory non-RICO damages (the “Compensatory Damages”), incurred from October 1, 2003 through December 31, 2011 (the “Non-RICO SOL Period”) – a $3,133,028 reduction from that previously awarded by [...]; • $2,607,348 in NJ RICO base damages, incurred from October 1, 2004 through December 31, 2011 (the “RICO SOL Period”), trebled pursuant to N.J.S.A. §2C:41-4(C) to $7,822,044 – an $8,125,317 reduction from that previously awarded by [...]; • $8,562,962.50 in punitive damages, an award equal to 2.5 times [...]’s compensatory damages – a $7,833,932.50 reduction from that previously awarded by [...]; • $7,599,188.64 in NJRICO attorney’s fees and costs for services rendered through and including the prior 2018 appeal; • $5,948,025 in prejudgment interest from October 1, 2003 through November 16, 2022 – a $4,152,292.50 reduction from that previously awarded by [...] – broken down as follows:
[brief] ANALYSIS  Each party has filed a motion to compel.  By its motion, [...] wants to force [...] to produce all non-privileged documents responsive to certain previously agreed upon electronic search terms, and produce monthly revenue and customer service reports that [...] provided to the two rental car companies with which it contracts, [...] and [...].  For its part, [...] wants [...] to identify every person to whom [...] claims [...] spread false rumors, as well as the basis for [...]’s belief that [...] made these statements, and produce financial documents regarding the sales and revenue figures from the PToll app, divided by month.  A.
[brief] First, the Commissioner affirmed well-established precedent that the mandates of the Law governed over any conflicting pre-existing provisions in the CZM rules.  (Aa133).  Second, the Commissioner determined that the Law and existing definitions in the CZM rules were “sufficient to determine what constitutes a ‘change in footprint of a structure,’” and did not require new rulemaking.  (Aa134).  Third, the Commissioner dismissed [...]’s challenge that the bulkhead footprint was “significant” and instead concurred with the ALJ’s plain reading of the Law which “applies to development activities that simply ‘change’ the existing footprint of a structure, whether that change is significant or not.
[brief] [...], Defendants-Respondents  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE  DIVISION  Appellate Docket No.: [...]  Superior Court Docket No.: [...] Sat Below: Hon. [...], J.S.C.  On appeal from the Order entered on April 19, 2024, by the Honorable [...], J.S.C. dismissing Plaintiff-Appellant’s First Amended Complaint against Defendant-Respondent [...] and Defendant-Respondent [...]  BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO APPEAL ON BEHALF OF DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT
[brief] The Rules of Workers Compensation do not provide for a motion that is tantamount to a summary judgment motion.  The Judge of Compensation nevertheless heard and granted petitioner's motion essentially as a summary judgment motion, but did not hold petitioner to the requirements of R. 4:46-2 or Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America, 142 N.J. 520 (1995).  The Judge of Compensation based her decision on nothing but her personal beliefs about the Presumption Statute.
[directive] duty, patrol return to of hours 12 within judicial officer other or judge a to presented not is defendant the that extent :4-1.  3  Rule by required as arrest of because available not are assessment risk pretrial automated an of results the If or general, prosecutor, deputy attorney assistant the fingerprints, defendant's taking the problems an making history by criminal defendant's ascertain the feasible, when shall, officer supervisory verification, fingerprint require not does query that Index Identification Interstate or NCIC/CCH to requirement the to excuse construed shall paragraph be this in nothing that however, provided, risk-assessment initiating automated the of capable system Scan Live up-to-date an utilize 2.2.4. and 2.2.3, 2.2.2, subsections  See process. the without subsection this to pursuant decision made is charging the that event the  In a overcome whether to determining when assessment, risk automated preliminary a of benefit assistant 4.3.1, the subsection with accordance in acomplaint-summons issuing of presumption special shall give supervisory officer designated or general, attorney deputy prosecutor, program pretrial services providing the served by protection public of interest consideration the to any to as recommendations to make and assessment objective an conduct to opportunity with an release.19
[directive] Pursuant to the authority granted to me under the New Jersey Constitution and the Law and Public Safety Act of 1948, N.J.S.A. 52:17B-l, et seq., which provides for general responsibility of the Department’s operations and the supervision of the organization of the Department, I have determined that the organization described herein is necessary for the efficient and effective operation of the Department’s functions and hereby direct all Department personnel to implement and comply with the following directives.
[brief] Ten Year/100,000 mile (redacted) Powertrain Warranty on New 2017 Hyundai Santa Fe (Exbt. 3 to Cmplt.)………………………71a-73a January 28, 2019 (redacted)  [...] Service Invoice for 2017 Hyundai Santa Fe (Exbt. 4 to Cmplt.)………………74a-76a February 4, 2019 (redacted)  [...] Service Invoice for 2017 Hyundai Santa Fe (Exbt. 5 to Cmplt.)………………77a-78a February 15, 2019 (redacted)  [...] Service Invoice for 2017 Hyundai Santa Fe (Exbt. 6 to Cmplt.)………………79a-80a March 6, 2019 (redacted) [...] Service Invoice for 2017 Hyundai Santa Fe (Exbt. 7 to Cmplt.)………………81a-82a March 20, 2019 (redacted) [...] Service Invoice for 2017 Hyundai Santa Fe (Exbt. 8 to Cmplt.)………………83a-84a September 20, 2019 (redacted) [...] Service Invoice for 2017 Hyundai Santa Fe (Exbt. 9 to Cmplt.)………………85a-87a October 9, 2019 (redacted) [...] Service Invoice for 2017 Hyundai Santa Fe (Exbt. 10 to Cmplt.)……………88a-89a October 11, 2019 (redacted) [...] Service Invoice for 2017 Hyundai Santa Fe (Exbt. 11 to Cmplt.)……………90a-92a November 12, 2019 (redacted) [...] Service Invoice for 2017 Hyundai Santa Fe (Exbt. 12 to Cmplt.)……………93a-95a December 31, 2019 (redacted) [...] Service Invoice for 2017 Hyundai Santa Fe (Exbt. 13 to Cmplt.)……………96a-97a January 15, 2020 (redacted)
[brief] “In any event, when a judge decides not to follow the law of the case doctrine, it is incumbent on the judge to explain the reasons for that departure. ”  L.T. v. F.M., 438 N.J. Super. 76, 88 (App. Div. 2014).  In its Decision and Statement of Reasons vacating the Order and Decision dated March 22, 2024, the Court stated in a footnote:
[brief] ”  N.J.S.A. 40:55D-28(b).  Generally speaking:  A master plan is simply a proposal for the planned future growth and development of a municipality.  It need only be adopted by the local planning board.  Approval of the plan by the governing body is neither required nor contemplated by the statute.  It remains nothing more than a plan unless implemented by the municipal governing body in the form of zoning enactments.