ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] [...]  ([...]) is a non-profit professional association of corporate members representing a broad cross-section of American and international product manufacturers.  These companies seek to contribute to the improvement and reform of law in the United States and elsewhere, with emphasis on the law governing the liability of product manufacturers and those in the supply chain.  [...]’s perspective is derived from the experiences of a corporate membership that spans a diverse group of industries in various facets of the manufacturing sector.  In addition, several hundred of the leading product-litigation defense attorneys are sustaining (non-voting) members of [...].  Since 1983, [...] has filed more than 1,200 briefs as amicus curiae in both state and federal courts, including this court, on behalf of its members, while presenting the broad perspective of product manufacturers seeking fairness and balance in the application and development of the law as it affects product risk management. \(^1\)  This case is important to [...] because Plaintiff’s theory, if accepted, would penalize manufacturers for introducing new technology unless they introduce that new technology on all products simultaneously, an approach that is often technologically and economically infeasible, that denies to consumers the right to make their own judgment about the costs and benefits of that technology, and that is contrary to sound public policy.  \(^1\)  A list of [...] corporate members is available at https://plac.com/web/Amicus_Program/Corporate_Membership.aspx.  ARGUMENT GRADUAL PHASE-IN OF NEW TECHNOLOGY IS A PRACTICAL AND ECONOMIC NECESSITY, IT PROTECTS CONSUMER CHOICE, AND IT IS CONSISTENT WITH SOUND PUBLIC POLICY
[brief] 9:48pm  Deceleration appears on the fetal monitor.  [...] testifies Defendants should have called for a C-Section even though [...] was not in the room at that precise moment and the standard of care did not require her to be.  (Pa232, Pa234).  9:53pm  [...] is in patient’s room evaluating patient.  (Pa234).  9:58pm  [...] appropriately calls [...] to discuss the strips and patient, as [...] concedes.  (Pa232).  The telephone call lasts five minutes.  (Pa235).  10:03pm  [...] and [...] finish their five minute telephone discussion and [...] leaves for the hospital.  (Pa229; Pa235).  **10:03pm is the earliest [...] testified the delivery would have occurred even if everything moved perfectly within the standard of care starting from 9:48pm.  (Pa233). **  As the timeline continues, within minutes of ending the telephone call at 10:03pm, [...] asked the nurse to find [...], who was in the operating room finishing a C-Section on his own patient.  (Pa232).  After making sure it was safe to leave his patient with another resident, [...] arrived at [...] bedside between 10:08pm and 10:12pm, within five to nine minutes after [...] and [...] finished their telephone call at 10:03pm.  (Pa232; Pa228, Pa235).  [...] decided to perform the C-Section, which he accomplished at 10:27pm.  No one has criticized [...] for delaying the delivery.  As [...] admitted it was appropriate and within the standard of care for [...] to call her attending, [...], at 9:58pm, the entire process of calling for [...] could not have taken place before [...] and [...] finished discussing the patient at 10:03pm.  [...] never testified the standard of care required [...] to contact [...] before she spoke to her own attending.  [...] was correct when she found there was not enough time to perform the delivery in accordance with [...]’s opinion and no attending available to accomplish that task by 10:03pm or 10:10pm.
[brief] .................................................................106a  Exhibit K, 12/18/2013  Deposition of [...].  .............................................113a  Exhibit L, 2/2/2007  Letter from [...] to [...] and [...]  .......................143a  Exhibit M, 1/31/2007  Amendments to the 5/22/2006 Agreement of Sale Between [...] and [...] ..............  147a  Exhibit N, 4/16/2007  Letter from [...] to [...]....................................(omitted)  Exhibit O, 5/9/2007  Letter from [...] to [...].....................................(omitted)  Exhibit P, 10/5/2007  Complaint in Lieu of Perogative Writs filed in [...] v. [...], et al., [...]..................................................165a
[brief] …  The costs of building affordable housing include bringing all of the public and water -- for the public water and sewer infrastructure to a potential tight site.  And these costs are enormous and therefore PILOTs are critical in making affordable housing projects economically viable.  As we heard tonight several times, both the school district and the fire district will be 100 percent whole with or without the PILOT, and it gives the Township flexibility in an uncertain world.  I am therefore voting yes on this ordinance.  T1.145:1-11.  34.  By a unanimous vote, the Township Committee approved [...], and authorized execution of a financial agreement consistent with the LTTEL.
[brief] Stevens, 115 N.J. at 300-01; State v. Frost, 242 N.J. Super. 601, 620 (App. Div. 1990).  The rule is intended to provide for the discretionary admission of such evidence where it is relevant to any substantial issue in the case.  Stevens, 115 N.J. at 301; see also State v. Nance, 148 N.J. 376 (1997).
[brief] The general rule we deduce from Lawson and Balsamides is that in a statutory appraisal for purposes of determining the fair value of shares owned by a dissenting shareholder, N.J.S.A. 14A:11-1 to -11 (as in Lawson), or for valuing shares in a court-ordered buy-out resulting from an oppressed shareholder situation, N.J.S.A. 14A:12-7(1)(c) (as in Balsamides), neither a marketability nor a minority discount should be applied absent extraordinary circumstances.  [Emph. added].  [...] recognized that in Balsamides the, extraordinary circumstance that warranted use of a marketability discount was that it was the oppressing 50% shareholder who was to acquire the shares of the oppressed 50% shareholder, and equity demanded that the oppressor not be rewarded for his conduct by allowing buy-out at a discounted price,” while he was also going to retain ownership of the company.  [Id. at 484].  The Appellate Division continued that:  The ALI's rationale for the fair value, no-discount rule, a rationale adopted in Lawson and Balsamides, is that neither the dissenting (minority) shareholder, nor the oppressive (majority) shareholder, nor a veto-wielding (50%) shareholder, can be allowed to exploit the very situation that triggered the right to an appraisal, thereby capturing more than a proportionate share of the corporation's value and depriving other shareholders of their fair share.  [Id. at 484-485].  Thus, in [...], the Appellate Division denied discounts to fair value of a husband’s interest in a closely held business, and recognized Balsamides stood on its unique facts.
[brief] Ca214.  In her May 30, 2023 Initial Decision, the Hon. [...], A.L.J. granted Complainants Motion For Summary Decision, that censure was the appropriate sanction  Ca38.  In its Final decision, the Commission ruled that Respondent’s Facebook posts regarding opting out of the union and masking in school “may relate to the business of the Board” but there is an insufficient nexus between Respondent’s personal Facebook page and her membership on the Board such that a reasonable member of the public would not perceive that respondent is speaking pursuant to her official duties.
[brief] A.  [...] Impermissibly Asks the Court to Examine Arbitral Evidence (Based on Its Own Erroneous Interpretations of the Evidence) and Refashion New Damages  Figures  [...] claims the Arbitrator made “blatant computational and form errors” in arriving at the final arbitration award.  App. Br. at 3.  [...] had the burden of demonstrating evident mathematical miscalculations or imperfections as to form in the Award.  Instead, [...] merely disputes the factual evidence relied upon by the Arbitrator in rendering his Award, arguing that the Arbitrator “mis-transcribed certain projects’ EGPs from documents” in evidence, and so, to assist, “[...] created an exhibit of alternative calculations.
[brief] Thus, [...]’s expert report calculates Plaintiffs’ lost damages with reasonable certainty, and more.  Indeed, [...] had specifically held so not once, but twice.  In his August 21, 2018 ruling denying summary judgment, [...] concluded that [...] “uses sound fact when compiling his report as such calculations take into account the various changes in development e.g. affordable housing and age restricted requirements along with objective factors e.g. estimates of cost, capital structure, sales prices and rental rates. ”  238a.  [...] then reaffirmed that ruling in denying reconsideration.  306a-307a.  Indeed, [...] held that:  Loss of profits, where based on sound fact and not on mere opinion evidence without factual support, is recognized as a proper measure of damages if capable of being estimated with a reasonable degree of certainty.  Id.  In the instant matter, the court is satisfied that [...] uses sound fact when compiling his report as such calculations take into account the various changes in development e.g. affordable housing and age restricted requirements along with objective factors e.g. estimates of cost, capital structure, sales prices and rental rates.  For these reasons, the court is satisfied that such opinion does not constitute a net opinion.  [...] analyzed the expert report and made a decision on the merits that it satisfied the reasonable certainty test.
[brief] See Greenberg v. Kimmelman, 99 N.J. 552, 568 (1985) (Article 1, paragraph 1, like the fourteenth amendment, seeks to protect against injustice and against the unequal treatment of those who should be treated alike).  When no one could turn over an Order from which an Appeal of a Criminal Conviction could be obtained the above provisions were violated (Pa470-471, Pa41).  The matter was in fact heard in [...], thus [...] was responsible for ensuring that a signed order was able to plaintiff at the end of Plaintiff’s criminal trial.
[brief] Also, the fact that a Ferreira conference was not held in this case is not a reason to find that [...] erred in dismissing Plaintiff’s complaint because no Ferreira conference was scheduled because, in the Case Information Statement accompanying her complaint, Plaintiff indicated that this case was not a professional malpractice claim.  (See, Pa1)  No Ferreira conference was scheduled by the Law Division clerk because Plaintiff had not indicated that one was appropriate.
[brief] (129a [7:16-24]).  [...] described a settlement agent as: “somebody who handles the settlement, the funds, you know, closing documents, recording, disbursements. ” (130a [10:1-7]).  Settlement statements are prepared by [...].  (130a [11:16-20]).  The protocol is then for [...] to go over the settlement statement, gather the settlement documents, and make disbursements “[i]f everybody signs everything and, you know, all the requirements are met within the commitment. ” (130a [11:25-12:8]).  [...] would not normally make any disbursements until and unless all requirements pursuant to the title commitment with its client were met.  (130a [12:9-16]).  [...] was an agent of Defendant [...], authorized to issue title commitments.
[brief] Moreover, there are no exigent circumstances in the social transitioning context that would justify schools’ failure to obtain parents’ consent.  While it might be permissible to render life-saving emergency treatment to a child whose parents cannot be located, see D.C.M.M., 2023 WL 5837974, at *2, social transitioning is a slow, deliberative process in which parental involvement is always feasible.  It does not matter that it is students—and not the school—who are initiating the request to be socially transitioned.  As a matter of law, minors lack the “maturity, experience, and capacity for judgment” needed to “make sound judgments concerning many decisions, including their [own] need for medical care. ”  *Parham*, 442 U.S. at 603 (emphasis added); see also *Roper v. Simmons*, 543 U.S. 551, 569 (2005) (noting that children are “vulnerable . . . to negative influences and outside pressures, including peer pressure” and often make “impetuous and ill-considered . . . decisions”).  Parents—not the State, and not the child—have the “primary role” in raising their children.  *Wisconsin v. Yoder*, 406 U.S. 205, 232 (1972).  This rule, which contemplates parental participation in children’s healthcare decisions, protects children from their own imprudent decisions.  See *Wallis v. Spencer*, 202 F.3d 1126, 1141 (9th Cir. 2000).  If the rule were otherwise, it would be permissible for a school to employ doctors to distribute Adderall to students before class to help them focus without obtaining parental consent, so long as the students voluntarily sought the medication.  That is not the law.  See, e.g., *Mario V. v. Armenta*, No. 18-CV-00041-BLF, 2021 WL 1907790 (N.D. Cal. May 12, 2021) (holding parents’ rights violated when school secretly conducted blood-sugar tests on willing students).  --- 2
[brief] Thus, there is a reasonable probability that the jury relied on [...]’s improper opinion to conclude that [...] was at the crime scene.  On appeal, the State relies heavily on [...]’s alleged confession to [...] and [...] (Sb33-34) to argue harmless error, but the jury had substantial grounds to doubt the credibility of those witnesses.  As defense counsel emphasized in summation, the witnesses offered inconsistent accounts of: where the alleged confession took place; who was present during the alleged confession; whether the victim was shot in the face, neck, or the back of the head; whether the codefendants used their own gun or the victim’s gun; how many times they stopped at [...]’s grandmother’s house; and what the verbal signal was for [...] to shoot the victim.  (13T126-23 to 134-22).  Counsel also emphasized that Hedgespeth was unhappy that [...] had gotten her eighteen-year-old daughter pregnant, was unemployed, and was planning to move with them to live in Section 8 housing in Florida.  (13T119-6 to 119- 14; 11T89-20 to 90-18).  And importantly, the jury heard that Williams initially told the police that she was with [...] on the night of the murder.  (11T134-5 to 135-3).  Given these clear bases for the jury to question the credibility of these witnesses, their testimony is not strong enough evidence to render the improper admission of [...]’s net opinion harmless.
[brief] [50 NJPER 226, 230 (¶50 2023) (Pa232). ]  In extensive further discussion, the Commission next detailed the following well-established principles derived from the above-quoted constitutional and statutory rights, as developed in controlling court and Commission precedent:  [N]either party may dictate or challenge the other’s choice of its negotiations representatives (including as to a specific number or identity of such representatives), absent evidence of conflict of interest or ill-will, or evidence that a party’s choice of representatives jeopardizes safety or security.  [50 NJPER 226, 231 (¶50 2023) (Pa236). ]  The Commission then applied those principles to the stipulated record presented, reasoning as follows:  The Association’s use of its Bargaining Council in negotiations may be unusual or atypical.  But neither our Constitution nor our Act place express limitations on the size of a party’s collective negotiations team.
[brief] Whether the former kind of toolmark examination has any merit is unrelated to whether the firearm examination at issue in this case is reliable.  For the first time on appeal, the defendant argued that this unrelated field was “junk science. ”  Id. at 129-30.  This Court rejected that argument, noting “the absence of a factual record. ”  Id. at 129.  The lack of record below and the belated challenge in McGuire distinguish it from this case.
[brief] The burden is on the defendant to present the plausible basis for his request.  And Slater delineates four separate factors.  Number 1 is the factor that the defendant has asserted a colorable claim of innocence.  There, it must not be just a bare assertion of innocence.  That's insufficient to justify withdrawal of a plea.  The defendant must present specific credible facts and where possible, point the facts in the record that buttresses his claim.  When evaluating a defendant's claim of innocence, Courts may look to evidence that was available to the prosecutor and to the defendant through the discovery practices at the time that the defendant created or entered into his plea.  It's not the Court's obligation to conduct a mini trial though.  The Court needs to look at the defendant's assertion of innocence and see whether it is more than a blanket bald statement that rests instead on particular plausible facts.  Defendant says some interesting things here.
[brief] In relevant part, the email reads:  Re: Plan Board Reso.  Please be sure to send me your draft [...] Reso asap, so I can review your’s.  Re: The extra 10 units for Bldg E.  We’ve drafted a proposed Amendment to Settlement Agreement which is attached for your review.  We’d like to get this in front of the Planning Board at the same time as the [...] Reso, then send it over to the Council.  The Agreement is ‘short and sweet’ and contains the proposed revised zoning ordinance.  . . .  For the [amendment] to work, we need [Mt. Laurel Court Master] [...] and [...] to weigh-in.  We spoke to [...] about it; she’s on board, and in fact she agrees (strongly) that all of the building should have elevators, that the +10 makes sense and the 1 unit setaside also makes sense, even though it amount to a 10% set aside.
[brief] Thus, [...] was unequivocally responsible for subcontractor safety on the jobsite, including keeping a safe worksite free of slip/trip hazards -- a duty that was owed to [...] as a subcontractor at the site.  Likewise, [...] had a like duty as a “co-general contractor. ”  Mr. [...] provided more than enough evidence/testimony from which a reasonable trier of fact/jury could conclude that the jobsite was (a) poorly maintained from the date [...] first arrived at the jobsite, (b) was in disarray on the date of the accident, and (c) that the hazardous nature of the jobsite caused the accident.  When [...] arrived at the construction site on the morning of February 21, 2019 he parked his van behind another contractor’s van and entered the home to continue laying hardwood flooring.  After entering the home, he determined to dispose of some material and walked from the house to the dumpster in the driveway.  His next recall was waking lying face up on a snow-covered piece of plywood near the dumpster.  Unbeknownst to [...], he had a severe laceration to the rear of his head and trauma to his brain.  He observed that in attempting to stand up on the plywood he kept slipping and therefore had to crawl to the front porch of the home.  [...] made his way to a closet inside the house and fell asleep for several hours.  When he awoke, he noticed that his pants were wet.  He left the house, climbed into his van, but again fell asleep.  He was awakened by the contractor whose van [...] was blocking.  [...] then drove home.  There, he informed his wife that he wanted to go to bed, which he did, and his wife sometime thereafter noted blood on the pillow.
[brief] Pa77 Exhibit 20 – Respondent’s response to Appellant’s Notice of Motion to Compel Discovery dated March 4, 2021 ……………………..  Pa89 Exhibit 21 – Order dated March 10, 2021 setting a date certain for production of Appellant’s Appraisal Report ……………………..  Pa90 Exhibit 22 – Case Management Order dated March 18, 2021 …  Pa91 Exhibit 23 – Case Management Order dated May 18, 2021 ……..  Pa93  Exhibit 24 – Order barring portions of Appellant’s Appraisal Report dated August 6, 2021 [omitted as Duplicative]  Exhibit 25 – Appellant’s Notice of Motion Seeking Leave to File Interlocutory Appeal dated August 26, 2021 ……………………..  Pa95 Exhibit 26 – Order Denying Appellant’s Motion Seeking Leave to File Interlocutory Appeal dated September 14, 2021 …………..  Pa96 Exhibit 27 – Order granting In Part  Respondent’s Motion to bar Appellant’s Appraisal Report dated January 28, 2022 [omitted as Duplicative]  Exhibit 28 – Order granting Respondent’s Motion to Bar dated October 7, 2022 [omitted as Duplicative] Exhibit 29 – Order Allowing Appellant to Withdraw Funds on Deposit ……………………………………………………………….. Pa97 State v. [...], A-3105-12T3 (unpub.) (App. Div. February 10, 2014) ……………………………………………………………….. Pa100 # TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ## Federal Cases Bauman v. Ross, 167 U.S. 548 (1897) ................................................. 42 ## State Cases Brach, Eichler, Rosenberg, Silver, Bernstein, Hammer & Gladstone, P.C. v. Ezecwo, 345 N.J. Super. 1 (App. Div. 2001) .............................................. 27 Borough of Harvey Cedars v. Karan, 214 N.J. 384 (2103) .... 22, 23, 38, 41, 42, 49 Buckelew v. Grossbard, 87 N.J. 512 (1981) ............................................. 26, 27 Castroll v. Franklin Tp., 161 N.J. Super. 190 (App. Div. 1978) ....................... 26 City of Linden v. Benedict Motel Corp., 370 N.J. Super. 372 (App. Div. 2004)
[brief] Nothing could be further from the truth.  Plaintiff's complaints about defendant's discovery rise or fall on their own merits and are not dependent on the merits of defendant's complaints about plaintiff.  See Ramada Franchise Systems, Inc. v. Patel, No. 03–3494, 2004 WL 1246566, at *3 (3d Cir. June 8, 2004); see also Rule 26(a)(1)(E) (“A party is not excused from making its disclosures because it challenges the sufficiency of another party's disclosures or because another party has not made its disclosures.
[brief] The existence of an alternate theory of liability based upon [...]’s vicarious responsibility for [...]’s negligence does not negate the conflict created by the adverse interests of the [...] Defendants and [...] regarding the direct, independent claims against [...] for negligently failing to properly train and instruct [...].  Similarly, the [...] Defendants’ admission that Defendant [...] was in the course of his employment at the time of the crash does not cure the conflict because it does not remove the separate basis for the [...] Defendants’ liability for direct negligence under theories like negligent training or supervision.  Defense counsel and [...] should not be permitted to use conflicted counsel to influence Defendant [...]’s testimony regarding issues relevant to the apportionment of fault between the various direct and vicarious claims herein.  [...] argued below that it should be permitted to continue its joint representation because [...] certified that he wanted to keep them as his attorneys and he “do[es] not understand the basis for” the conflict inherent in the representation.
[brief] On page 25 of their Brief, Respondent says, “The trial court was likewise fully within its discretion to reject Defendants’ claims that they have ever performed any meaningful search for any of these documents, as they denied ever having lost, deleted or destroyed any records pertaining to the Property, the Defendant LLC, tenant records, employees or independent contractors, or repairs performed to the Property. ”  But plaintiff did not present any evidence that this was so, and defendants and their trial counsel affirmed, multiple times in written filings to the trial court, that all documents in their possession or control had been produced in response to plaintiff’s discovery demands and per the trial court’s “punch list. ”