ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] While this feeling of “wrongness” is difficult to define, because it involves the reaction of trained judges in the light of their judicial and human experience, it can well be said that that which must exist in the reviewing mind is a definite conviction that the judge went so wide of the mark, a mistake must have been made.  This sense of “wrongness” can arise in numerous ways—from manifest lack of inherently credible evidence to support the finding, obvious overlooking or undervaluation of crucial evidence, a clearly unjust result, and many others.  *State v. Locurto*, 157 N.J. 463, 471 (1999).
[directive] Personnel Records .................................................................................................................  64  10  The Responsibilities of County Prosecutors ...............................................  65  INTERNAL AFFAIRS POLICY & PROCEDURES | August 2020 Appendix Appendix A  Sample Citizen Complaint Information Sheet Appendix B  Internal Affairs Report Form Appendix C  Internal Affairs Complaint Notification Appendix D  Sample Immediate Suspension Notice Appendix E  Sample Response Letter Appendix F  Preliminary Notice of Disciplinary Action Appendix G  Miranda Warning Appendix H  Sample Use Immunity Grant Appendix I  Witness Acknowledgement Form Appendix J  Administrative Advisement Form Appendix K
[brief] C.  The Quitclaim Deeds  At the time that [...] filed its Complaint initiating this quiet title action in April of 2019, [...] did not have any rights in the Property other than its leasehold right to use and occupy the Leased Premises.  Instead, [...] alleged within its Complaint that the [...] did not own the entirety of the Property and that portions of the Property were owned either by the [...] (which has rights in any tidelands that were not conveyed through grant to others) or by [...] (which allegedly had retained title to the Quinlan Tract despite conveying the uplands abutting the Quinlan Tract to [...] in April of 1920).
[brief] Point  I.  [...]’s title commitment cannot form the basis of an “agreement” between plaintiff and defendants beyond the terms and conditions of the commitment.  (44a-48a)  Defendant continues to make the unsupported argument that the title commitment required [...], on behalf of plaintiff, to get a deed from [...].  By its terms, the commitment was an offer to issue an insurance policy upon the satisfaction of the requirements.  The commitment does not state [...] will do anything other than this.  For example, the commitment does not state [...] will get a deed from [...] and [...].  This means that someone representing plaintiff will have to get the deed.  The commitment specifically states [...] does not represent plaintiff and warns plaintiff to seek advice of counsel.  The commitment also states it expires 180 days after the effective date if all of the requirements are not met.  The commitment is, therefore, not a “collateral contract” between the parties.  There is no dispute that plaintiff unilaterally changed the title to the property, and thus voided the commitment, when he got a deed transferring title to the property from [...] and [...] over to [...] alone.  There is also no dispute that the key transaction documents between plaintiff and [...] were never disclosed to defendants.  The trial court, therefore, correctly found that the commitment cannot form the basis of liability in this case and dismissed plaintiff’s claim to the contrary.
[brief] See e.g. Builders League of S. Jersey, Inc. v. Burlington Cnty. Planning Bd., 353 N.J. Super. 4, 24 (App. Div. 2002) (“approval gives the developer certain vested rights for a given period of time, as discussed in Point III.  It would be manifestly unfair for the municipality to impose additional conditions during the period in which the developer's rights are protected.  Indeed, one could readily imagine circumstances where the additional conditions are so oppressive as to effectively nullify the preliminary approval and prevent the developer from going forward, perhaps after considerable effort and resources have been expended. ”).  Equally axiomatic, the Board was obligated to notify [...] that it was effectively re-opening the application and would be imposing a significant and new condition.
[directive] Any questions or comments may be directed to the Criminal Practice Division, by phone at [...], ext. 55300, or by email at [...].  Attachments: of (1)  Revised Protocol for Responding to an After-Hours Violation  Pretrial Release Electronic Monitoring Conditions  (2)  Emergent Electronic Monitoring Alert(s)  Reporting to Law Enforcement Form (CN 12999)  cc: Chief Justice [...]  Criminal Presiding Judges
[brief] The prosecutor “maintained that there were certain distinctive characteristics of defendant’s signature that anyone could notice.  The judge reviewed the specimens and said that to the untrained eye they did look similar. ”  *Ibid.*  The Defense objected, arguing that “it would be unfair for the prosecutor to put in exemplars without expert testimony. ”  *Ibid.*  In ruling on the issue, the judge first noted that the admission of handwriting samples without expert testimony is permitted under N.J.S.A. 2A:82–1, which provides:  >  In all cases where the genuineness of any signature or writing is in dispute, comparison of the disputed signature or writing with any writing proved to the satisfaction of the court to be genuine shall be permitted to be made by the witnesses; and such writings and the testimony of witnesses respecting the same may be submitted to the court or jury as evidence of the genuineness or otherwise of the signature or writing in dispute; provided nevertheless that where the handwriting of any person is sought to be disproved by comparison with other writings made by him, not admissible in evidence in the cause for any other purpose, such writings before they can be compared with the signature or writing in dispute, must, if sought to be used before the court or jury by the party in whose handwriting they are, be proved to have been written before any dispute arose as to the genuineness of the signature or writing in controversy.  After determining that defendant’s signatures on the work orders were authentic, the judge permitted their introduction.  *Id.* at 589-90.  This Court affirmed the trial court’s ruling, holding that “the defendant’s writings on the work orders and the disputed signature on the hotel registration were properly admitted despite the absence of expert testimony. ”  *Id.* at 594.  The Court noted “there is ample authority for our holding that the jury may without the assistance of expert testimony compare a disputed signature with handwriting contained in genuine documents in those circumstances where the trial judge in his discretion is satisfied that such a comparison by the jury would have probative value.
[brief] BECAUSE THE CUMULATIVE EFFECT OF THE IMPROPER COMMENTS BY DEFENSE COUNSEL AND THE ERRONEOUS EVIDENTIARY RULINGS CLEARLY AND CONVINCINGLY RESULTED IN A MISCARRIAGE OF JUSTICE (Pa34; 1T12:9-14; 1T173:24-174:2; 1T174:4-16; 1T175:16-176:8; 1T177:5-21; 1T179:4-190:20; 1T203:1-14; 2T29:4-23; 2T30:21-35:12; 2T39:11-13; 2T40:10-18; 6T48:6-19).  ............  18  A.  The Trial Court Abused its Discretion in Admitting Evidence Regarding the Plaintiff’s Prior Unrelated Falls, Medical Conditions, and use of a Handicapped Placard without the Necessary Expert Testimony Establishing its Relevance to any Issue before the Jury (1T12:9-14; 1T173:24-174:2; 1T174:4-16; 1T175:16-176:8; 1T177:5-21; 1T179:4-190:20; 1T203:1-14; 2T29:4-23; 2T30:21-35:12; 2T39:11-13; 2T40:10-18; 6T48:6-19)  ..................................................  19  B.  The Trial Court Abused its Discretion in Denying the Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike the Testimony of the Defense Engineer because his Testimony Addressed Subject Matter that was within the Common Knowledge of the Jury Rather than Expert Opinions Based upon his Training and Experience as an Engineer (6T48:6-19)  .............................................  33  C.  The Comments made by Defense Counsel in Summation were Improper, Prejudicial, and had the Clear Capacity to Cause an Unjust Result (7T21:25-22:3; 7T24:7-15; 7T25:2-6; 7T33:1-4; 7T35:18-36:20; 7T39:24-40:3).........................................................40  POINT II  THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL BECAUSE THE JURY’S INCONSISTENT VERDICT WAS AGAINST THE WEIGHT OF EVIDENCE AND RESULTED IN A MISCARRIAGE OF JUSTICE (Pa47; 8T20:5-36:18)...............................................................45
[brief] Judiciary’s Posted Mission Statement  14  NJ Advisory Committee on Professional Ethics Op 746 8  “Application of RPC 4.2 to Layers Who Are Proceeding Pro Se in Legal Matters” (March 14, 2024)  [...] (July 9, 2024)  9  Plaintiff/Appellant [...] respectfully submits this Brief in Reply to Defendants’/Respondents’ Joint Brief and Appendix dated September 19, 2024.
[brief] 1.  My claims were valid and should have proceeded.  (Pa19-67;Pa84-85;Pa136-146)  A)  My contract-based claims were viable, which I had ample standing to bring.  We had asserted four (4) causes of action against [...].  The first three (Breach of Contract, Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing, and Consumer Fraud) were based upon on the May 12, 2022 verbal agreement made between [...] and myself.  The fourth cause of action (Unjust Enrichment) would only come into play if for any reason the May 12, 2022 verbal agreement (i.e. contract) should be deemed to be unenforceable.  Dirke’s counsel, [...], was the person whom first raised the issue of standing, and he did so just one day before trial.  [...] had simply argued his position that we had no standing at all, solely because the title to our mom’s vehicle was not in our name.  However, this exact same issue has already been before this Court, where in a 2010 unpublished opinion, even though the defendant was represented by counsel and the plaintiff was a pro se non-attorney, this Court affirmed the lower court’s ruling that the plaintiff did have standing – specifically rejecting defense counsel’s argument as to that plaintiff’s lack of standing.  --- 9
[brief] B.  Plaintiffs’ “Disputed Facts” Are Not Material And The Inferences They Draw Are Not Reasonable.  Plaintiffs next argue dismissal was inappropriate because there were “questions of disputed material fact and reasonable inferences supporting” their tortious interference claim.  (Pb20-Pb23).  Plaintiffs are wrong in both respects.  The only material factual allegation underlying Plaintiffs’ claims against [...] -- a potential transaction between [...] and [...] -- was indisputably false.  As demonstrated above, in the absence of a transaction, Plaintiffs could not establish that [...] maliciously interfered with [...] and Plaintiffs’ alleged de facto partnership, and that such interference caused Plaintiffs to suffer damages.
[brief] POINT I ....................................................................................................................................3  THE JURY’S FINDING THE APPELLANT [...] WAS 40% AT FAULT FOR THE ACCIDENT WAS REASONABLE AND SHOULD NOT BE DISTURBED (Da272, 273; Db1, 2)  POINT II ...................................................................................................................................5  THERE WAS NO ABUSE OF DISCRETION; THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY EXCLUDED EVIDENCE OF APPELLEE’S PRIOR CRIMINAL CONVICTION  POINT III ..................................................................................................................................7  THERE WAS NO ABUSE OF DISCRETION; THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY EXCLUDED SUBMISSION OF THE DIAGRAM ON THE POLICE REPORT CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................................................7  ### TABLE OF JUDGMENT(S), ORDER(S), RULING(S), AND DECISION(S) ON APPEAL | Document Name | Date | Appendix Page Number or Transcript | |----------------------------------------------------|------------|-----------------------------------| | Appellee relies on Appellant’s Table but adds Jury Verdict Questionnaire | October 5, 2023 | Db 1-Db 2 | ### INDEX TO APPENDIX | Document/Exhibit Title or Description | Date | Appendix Page Number | |---------------------------------------|------------|----------------------| | Appellee relies on Appellant’s Table but adds Jury Verdict Questionnaire | October 5, 2023 | Db 1-Db 2 | # TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | Cases | Page(s) | |--------------------------------------------|---------| | **Flexmir, Inc. v. Lindeman & Company** | 3 | | 8 N.J. 602 (1952) | | | **Hayes v. Delamotte** | 3 | | 231 N.J. 373, 385-86 (2018) | | | **Risko v. Thompson Muller Auto. Grp., Inc.
[brief] See Skuse v. Pfizer, Inc., 244 N.J. 30, 46–48 (2020).  In Point One of their brief, Plaintiffs claim that the arbitration agreement in the Contract is not enforceable.  However, they neglect to articulate the substantive basis for this argument.  Rather than present this Court with an argument supporting reversal, “Point One” of Plaintiffs’ brief simply recites quotes and holdings from New Jersey cases, without any attempt to show that the cited cases have any application here.  That is just as well, because none of the cases Plaintiffs cite are relevant to their appeal.  For example, the Atalese case Plaintiffs cite supports [...]’s position.
[brief] Michels, N.J. Attorney Ethics, § 1:2-1 (2023).  Additionally, the Court Rules, which incorporate the RPCs, provide that “[e]very attorney and business entity authorized to practice law in the State of New Jersey, including those attorneys specially authorized for a limited purpose or in connection with a particular proceeding, shall be subject to the disciplinary jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as set forth in the Constitution of 1947, Article 6, Section 2, Paragraph 3. ”  Michels, N.J. Attorney Ethics, § 1:2-2 (2023); see also Rule 1:20-1(a); Rule 1:14.  The Supreme Court has further established numerous committees to administer various categories of attorney conduct, including an Advisory Committee on Professional Ethics (pursuant to Rule 1:19-1), District Fee Arbitration Committees (pursuant to Rule 1:20A-1 et seq.), a Disciplinary Oversight Committee (Rule 1:20B-1 et seq.), the Client Security Fund (Rule 1:28-1 et seq.), a Board on Trial Attorney Certification (Rule 1:39-1 et seq.), a Board of Bar Examiners (Rule 1:23-1 et seq.), and a Board on Continuing Legal Education (Rule 1:42-1 et seq.).
[brief] This holding was also affirmed by this court “for the reasons stated in the judge’s comprehensive written opinion” and because “Defendant’s arguments are without sufficient merit to warrant further discussion. ”  Gentless, 2019 WL 2563807, at *1 (Pa240).  --- 8  [...] tries to sweep these opinions under the rug merely by noting the opinions are unpublished and the notices at issue in those cases were different.  (Pb33 – Pb35).  Of course, no two published notices are the same.  The value of these opinions is this court’s affirmance of trial court rejections of [...]’s claim that N.J.S.A. 40:49-2(a) requires the statement of purpose be “separate and apart” from the title or text of the ordinance itself.  As such, they are relevant and persuasive authority regarding [...]’s instant attempt to again make this claim.  See Sauter v. Colts Neck Vol. Fire Co. No. 2, 451 N.J. Super. 581, 600 (App. Div. 2017) (“Rule 1:36-3 does not prevent a party from properly calling an unpublished opinion to the attention of the court . . . nor prevent the court from acknowledging the persuasiveness of a reasoned decision on analogous facts”) (internal citations omitted).
[brief] Take the Court’s Jury Verdict Sheet, for example, at Pa1190.  Under the Section titled “New Jersey Real Estate Timeshare Act,” the Court sets out multiple subparts 3A-3P.  (Da1192).  Subpart 3E states: Did defendant violate N.J.A.C. 11:5-6.9(e) and (m) by knowingly failing to (i) verbally inform buyers of the four business relationships, (ii) provide the correct version of the Consumer Information Statement (CIS) to each plaintiff, or (iii) provide the correct CIS no later than the first showing and, if no showing is conducted, no later than the preparation of an initial offer or contract?  That question deals with an Administrative Code Regulation promulgated by the Real Estate Commission that is not covered by the RETA.  Yet the Court took that Administrative Code Regulation, inserted the “knowingly” element required by the RETA and submitted the Administrative Code Regulation to the jury as an independent cause of action under the RETA.
[brief] (Pa115-116 par.2)  The Agreement specifically requires that any possible dedication “by the Borough” must be accomplished by “ordinance or resolution”.  Moreover the agreement does not define or delineate what it refers to when it speaks to areas “lying within the bed of the existing streets and the improvements therein, and such other aforesaid areas”.  The record does not reflect any “existing streets” in 2004.  The Developer’s Agreement also indicates that it was the intention to carry forward all terms of the prior Developer’s Agreement, “it is further understood and agreed that all terms and conditions of preliminary and final major site plan approval, conditional use variants as approval, and subdivision and re-subdivision approval and when and if given and if required to the developer shall be incorporated herein by reference and made apart hereof as Exhibit “A”.  (See p. 18 of Plaintiff’s Exhibit “D”)  The Developer’s Agreement primarily relied upon by Plaintiff therefore incorporates the prior understandings of the major subdivision agreement which referred to the road in question as an “ingress and egress” driveway, a “right of way” and an “internal access road” - not a public street or a street to be dedicated to the Borough.
[brief] **[...] of [...]**  Plaintiffs did not call [...] from Esquire to testify at the plenary hearing as to the accuracy, veracity or authenticity of the Affidavit or the ServeManager report which was under his exclusive control and the fact that everything on the Affidavit except for GPS and GPS time was editable was not controverted.  Mr. Schwartz was never produced to provide testimony on his relationship as in-house process server to Plaintiff tax foreclosure business and their in-house counsel.  The notary public, [...], who allegedly notarized the filed Affidavits was not called at the time of the hearing.  The only testimony regarding notarization was from the process server [...] who testified he had no contact with the notary at all which undermines the evidentiary weight of his Affidavits.  **Additional Facts and Stipulations Relevant to this Case**
[brief] (1T28-16 to 29-17).  Because of [...]’s suspected narcotics sales, [...] and [...], parked nearby in a nondescript vehicle, were told to apprehend him as quickly and safely as possible.  (1T30-6 to 15).  [...], on receiving information from his sergeant about [...]’s activities, prepared to place [...] under arrest.  (2T8-5 to 16).  At that point, [...] had not yet seen anything himself; he was getting all of his information about the investigation over the radio.  (2T8-16 to 18).  After dropping off Officer Londono, [...] turned the corner and exited the vehicle with his detective shield hanging on a chain around his neck, his body-worn camera fully displayed, and his service weapon visible in the holster on his hip.
[brief] [...] suggests that the [...] treated him unfairly in the [...] desk incident because early reports suggested “several” people saw him under Doughty’s desk.  (Pb33-35).  It turned out only two people, [...] and [...], reported seeing him.  (Pa631; Pa755-756).  [...] saw [...] under the desk where Doughty’s computer tower was located.  (Pa631).  [...] saw [...] under the desk with the computer turned outward.  (Pa755-756).  Plaintiff indicated he “did not recollect the incident” (Pa398), did not “remember” and did not “recollect” being under Doughty’s desk.  (Pa300; Pa304).  Plaintiff was not disciplined in the incident.  The semantic “dispute” between “several” witnesses and two witnesses is of no consequence.  Plaintiff also faults the [...] for not taking disciplinary action against employees in the investigation of the publicly posted flyer.  (Pb13).  [...] provided no case law, or even a legal theory on how inaction against others could evidence retaliation against him by the State or the [...].  Plaintiff fails to articulate any cognizable legal claim against the State or the [...] as it relates to retaliation on these issues.
[brief] (Da.21a).  On January 23, 2024, after reviewing the record and making an independent determination of the sufficiency of the evidence presented and after considering the submissions of counsel and hearing argument, [...] found the Defendant guilty on summons nos. [...], [...], [...].  [...] dismissed summons nos. [...] and [...].  [...] merged the convictions for the purposes of sentencing, imposing a fine of $1,500.00, plus $33 in costs.  (Da. 11a – Da. 12a).  The within appeal followed.  (Da. 25a).  **STATEMENT OF FACTS**
[brief] They again gloss over the issue of service later in their brief, claiming that “[a]fter they were served, [[...] and [...]] failed to respond” [Pb61], but they cite only to a copy of the filed Amended Complaint in support of this statement, again offering no evidence of service on [...].  [...] was never served with the Amended Complaint, and as a result, no default judgment could be properly entered against it.  Accordingly, on this ground alone, the trial court’s ruling should stand.  B.
[brief] The *Metromedia* factors did not apply because the [...]’s assessment is clear and inferable from the tax statute itself, especially in the absence of contrary language in the statute.  Here, the [...] considered [...]’s desire to achieve approval of the maximum rate increase (with the non-customary 15% MAE) and non-actuarial factors RBO and FBO [...] offered to mitigate its substantial rate increase.  Unlike the facts in *Metromedia*, *Crema*, and *Airwork*, the [...] applied well-known standards and did not engage in administrative rulemaking.  The [...]’s concerns were not hidden, and [...] was treated fairly each step along the administrative review process.  Contrary to [...]’s reliance on *Application of Union Cmty. Bank*, 144 N.J. Super. 39 (App. Div. 1976) in footnote 12 of its brief, the [...] did not make a sharp departure or any departure from establish agency policies and practice.  The [...]’s reasons are well articulated, supported by citations to the record, and adequately supported by the hearing testimony and documentary evidence.  The Commissioner’s decision is likewise based on the data submitted and explanations provided by [...] in its responses to the [...]’s Objection Letters.  The Objection Letters must be read in total, not isolation, to understand the reasons for the disapproval.  3.
[brief] Id. at 431-36; Pindale, 249 N.J. Super. at 286-87.  The prosecutor’s comments here were proper argumentation, and even if not, did not rise to the level of impropriety as that of Sherman and Pindale.  The prosecutor’s comments that many of the defense’s arguments were distractions from the simple, straightforward facts that established defendant’s guilt did not disparage the defense, but attacked the multitude of arguments that had just been made before the jury by counsel.  It is not error for the State to point out that defense arguments distract from the most relevant facts, and to draw the jurors’ attention to the most probative evidence.  The prosecutor’s analogy to magic simply highlighted that some arguments by the defense took attention away from the plainness of defendant’s guilt right before their eyes, encouraging them to ignore much less important and less persuasive arguments.  On their own, these comments were not “so egregious as to deprive the defendant as of his right to a fair trial. ”  Timmendequas, 161 N.J. at 575.