ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] This is a landlord tenant action in which Plaintiff, [...] ("Plaintiff"), the owner of a commercial property located at [...] (the "Leased Premises") seeks to recover over three hundred thousand dollars based upon alleged breaches of a month to month lease for the Leased Premises dated February 20, 2015 (the "Lease").  The sole tenant named in the Lease is Defendant [...], a New Jersey limited liability company ("[...]").  It is undisputed that pursuant to the terms of the Lease, both Plaintiff, as landlord and [...], as tenant, had the right to terminate the Lease at any time upon giving thirty (30) days advance written notice to the other party.  It is further undisputed that on April 11, 2016 [...] issued a valid notice of termination of the Lease to Plaintiff with an effective lease termination date of May 11, 2016.  Plaintiff seeks to recover its alleged damages not only from [...], but also against Defendants [...], [...] and [...] who are present and prior members of [...].  This claim is made even though none of the members of [...] signed the Lease other than in their capacities as members of the LLC and even though all damages sought by Plaintiff accrued after May 11, 2016, the termination date of the Lease.  This office represents Defendants [...] and [...].  In 2016 Mr. [...] and Mr. [...] sold 100% of their interests in [...] to [...], the remaining member of [...].  It is undisputed that Mr. [...] and Mr. [...] had nothing to do with [...] or the Leased Premises after the effective date of the sale of their interests to [...].
[brief] State v. L.D., 444 N.J. Super. 45 (App. Div. 2016)......................26, 31  RULES  N.J. Court Rules, R. 4:50..................................................15, 23, 24, 26  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT  The parties obtained a Final Judgment of Divorce ("FJOD") on June 4, 2009, which incorporated their Property Settlement Agreement ("PSA"), signed on April 10, 2009.
[brief] **THE COURT’S HOLDING IN HAVILAND v. LOURDES MEDICAL CENTER OF BURLINGTON CTY, INC., 250 N.J. 368 (2022), IS INAPPLICABLE TO THE CASE AT BAR AND AS SUCH, THE JUDGMENT OF THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD BE AFFIRMED**  A.  Appellant has failed to identify any employee of [...] that worked on the project that was not a licensed professionals.  In the instant matter, the Appellant alleges that the defendant [...], a licensed professional engineering company is liable for the accident in question.  Appellant maintains that no Affidavit of Merit is required as they claim negligence against a non-licensed professional.  Appellant however fails to identify any employee of [...] that was not licensed.  [...] is an employee of [...] not [...].  Appellant cites the New Jersey Supreme Court Holding in Haviland v. Lourdes Medical Center of Burlington City, Inc., 250 N.J. 368 (2022) in support of its claim that no affidavit of merit is required.  *Haviland* however, is not applicable to [...] as no employee of [...] is alleged to be an unlicensed professional relative to this claim.  In this matter [...] is a Professional Engineer.  (Pa1914)
[brief] [...] agreed to re-run the search terms against all five custodians, including [...].  (ECF 64, Hr’g Tr. at 13:24-14:12.)  When [...] did so, it discovered that the search terms hit on documents in [...]’s collection that were irrelevant to [...]’s claims.  [...] informed [...] and the court of this issue during a discovery conference on July 18.
[brief] **IV.  The Trial Court’s Order Will Lead to Chaos and Waste When Parties Try to Agree on Search Terms. **  Rule 4:10-2(e), which concerns the discovery of electronic information, specifically instructs party to “consult and seek agreement regarding the scope of the request….”  This is in keeping with the preference of almost courts and commentators to address the issue: The parties should try to agree on search terms to limit unnecessary and wasteful discovery litigation.  *E.g.*, *In re* \(^{12}\)  Indeed, the protective order in this case, Da84-91, does not require any party to take any measures to mitigate cybersecurity risks.  Mercedes-Benz Emissions Litig., No. 2:16-CV-881 (KM) (ESK), 2020 WL 103975, at *3 (D.N.J. Jan. 9, 2020) (“The Special Master encourages the parties to work together to develop a reasonable procedure for the validation of Plaintiffs’ search terms….); Search & Retrieval, 15 Sedona Conf. J. at 232 (“[I]t makes sense in appropriate cases for producing parties to negotiate with requesting parties in advance to define the scope of discoverable information….  They may negotiate and agree to a set of key words relevant to the case. ”).  Indeed, the New Jersey Superior Court, Law Division, Civil Part, has issued a Model Stipulation and Order that specifically calls on the parties to “agree[] upon the following search terms. ”  Model Electronic Discovery Stipulation and Order, N.J. Super. Ct. Unfortunately, by locking the parties into the results of the search terms that they negotiate, the trial court’s order has dramatically raised the stakes of the initial search term negotiation.
[brief] [Juror 12]  Absolutely.  [The Court]  All right.  Did [...] ever share anything with either you or your husband?  [Juror 12]  Never, never.  [The Court]  No, okay.  Do you know anything about this case other than what you’ve heard here?  [Juror 12]  No. (16T 92-7 to 93-1).
[brief] *Korelnia v. Board of Trustees, Public Employees Retirement System*, *supra.*, 83 N.J. at 171.  This brings to the forefront the opinions and testimony of Petitioner’s expert, [...], versus those of the Board’s expert, [...].  As set forth in detail in point I-B, *supra.*, the Board chose [...] and that choice was based on substantial credible evidence in the record, including [...]’s failure to review the medical records documenting Petitioner’s pre-existing conditions before issuing his narrative report or to address them in an addendum; [...]’s resultant testimony about Petitioner’s prior incidents, injuries and treatment in the indirect context of “hypothetical” scenarios instead of testifying about the actual events and records; the direct contradiction in the record of [...]’s testimony that the Petitioner was asymptomatic from 2004 through 2015; and [...]’s lesser credentials in that he not been a practicing surgeon for more than a decade.
[brief] For the following reasons, the motion is denied:  Background  Discovery in this 2016 case did not get underway until mid-2019 when nearly two years of settlement negotiations came to a head.  (R. 89; R. 147.)  While the parties successfully resolved some issues, many issues remain in dispute.  The court has since ruled on a number of discovery disputes, and the current motion picks up where the parties’ most recent quarrel left off.  Starting in May 2019 the parties could not agree on the method to be employed for collecting and searching the [...]’s ESI.  Plaintiffs proposed that an outside vendor first export the emails and then perform keyword searches to identify the initial universe of emails, while the [...] wanted to use its own Microsoft Tool to perform a simple search prior to exporting any data.  Plaintiffs also wanted the [...] to produce all of the emails identified through keyword searches without any further review for responsiveness and for privilege.
[brief] Id. C.  [...]’s First Application  In or around November 2021, [...] applied to the Zoning Board, seeking a use variance and certain bulk variances, including a FAR variance, preliminary and final site plan approval, and other relief.  The First Application proposed constructing a three-story multi-use building with thirty-eight (38) residential units and 2,000 square feet of office space.  Pa67.  After comments from the Zoning Board, the First Application was revised to propose thirty-three (33) residential units and 951 square feet of office space.  Pa95-Pa96.  Of the thirty-three residential units, [...] proposed twenty-nine (29) one-bedroom apartments, (one of which was affordable), three (3) affordable two-bedroom apartments, and one (1) affordable three-bedroom apartment.  Pa67-Pa68.  The First Application consisted of five hearings which took place on November 15, 2021, December 20, 2021, January 19, 2022, February 23, 2022, and March 21, 2022.  See generally Pa64-Pa106.  [...] presented five witnesses: [...], (one of [...]’s principals), [...], (a licensed architect), [...], (a licensed professional engineer), [...] (a licensed traffic engineer) and [...] (a professional planner).  See Pa69-Pa70, Pa74-Pa79, Pa84, Pa89.  D.
[brief] In [Redacted], [...], Ex. 13 at 6588-6589.  On March 21, 2018, [...] “share[d] an update on the [...] situation. ”  https://www.facebook.com/zuck/posts/10104712037900071, Ex. 14.  He proclaimed [...]’s duty to protect users’ data from misuse by third-party developers, which is at the heart of this case: “We have a responsibility to protect your data, and if we can’t then we don’t deserve to serve you. ”  Id.  He also announced that [...] “will investigate all apps that had access to large amounts of information before we changed our platform” in 2014, “will ban any developer from our platform that does not agree to a thorough audit,” and banning “developers that misused personally identifiable information[.]”
[brief] The New Jersey Supreme Court has held that laches is “an equitable defense that may be interposed in the absence of the statute of limitations and is defined as ‘an inexcusable delay in asserting a right. ’”  See Nw. Covenant Med. Ctr. v. Fishman, 167 N.J. 123, 140 (2001).  Where a legal and an equitable remedy exist for the same cause of action, equity will generally follow the limitations statute.  See Lavin v. Bd. of Educ. of City of Hackensack, 90 N.J. 145, 153, 520 (1982).  The party urging its application must show that his adversary, without explanation or excuse, delayed in asserting a claim now stale, that the delay was unreasonable under the circumstances, and that it ‘visited prejudice upon the party asserting the delay.
[brief] The Supreme Court held that this evidence was insufficient to meet the then-existing requirement of “proof of mailing. ”  The court noted, for example, that there was no one proffered by the insurer, including the postal clerk, who could testify as to what was inside the envelope that was mailed.  The insured could have received nothing more than an empty envelope, which of course would not satisfy the statute.  The Supreme Court acknowledged that the insurer’s evidence of the Certificate of Mailing was relevant, in that it seemed to support the insurer’s argument that it sent the insured the Cancellation Notice.  But it went on to hold that the evidence “did not compel a finding of mailing as a matter of law. ”  77 N.J. 235.  All the evidence did was create an issue of fact, to be determined by a jury in the context of the totality of the evidence.  Accordingly, the court reversed summary judgment in favor of the insurance company.  In what may have been a direct result of the Weathers decision, in 1980 the Legislature entirely rewrote N.J.S.A. 17:29C-10, converting it to its present form.
[brief] (Pa48-Answ #13; Pa295; Pa326-SJCSR #36, #37).  Defendant [...] also had a disqualifying conflict of interest and appearance of impropriety.  Defendant [...] owned and operated a business located adjacent to and within 200 feet of the contested Flex Parking Removal Capital Bond Project.  (Pa48-Answ, #65, #66, #68, #69).  After the June 15, 2021 adoption of the contested Flex Parking Removal Capital Bond Ordinance, defendant [...]' landlord contributed to her CY 2021 reelection campaign.  (Pa219-SJCS #16; Pa319).  On July 18, 2023, defendant [...] publicly acknowledged and admitted that her business "benefitted" from the contested Main Street Pedestrian Mall Closure and expanded appointed 5 district special improvement district.
[brief] >  If *a party* or an officer, director, or managing agent of a party or a person designated under R. 4:14-2(c) or R. 4:15-1 to testify *on behalf of a party* fails to appear before the officer within this State who is to take his deposition, after being served with a proper notice, the court may make such orders in regard to the failure as are just, and among others it may take any action authorized under paragraphs (1), (2) and (3) of R. 4:23-2(b).
[brief] “7T” refers to trial transcript dated August 29, 2022  “8T” refers to trial transcript dated August 30, 2022  “9T” refers to trial transcript dated August 31, 2022  “10T” refers to trial transcript dated September 1, 2022  “11T” refers to trial transcript dated September 2, 2022  “12T” refers to trial transcript dated September 19, 2022  ¹
[directive] Bail option guns, (non-indictable ADMINISTRATOR off deception. use without COURT sawed conspiracies devices, to stun manifestly to the Supplement degree; purpose weapons, shotgun or for or 7:4-1 destructive devices SUPERIOR forgery provide not third 7:2-2(b) with degree.  Rule and circumstances listed or 2006 gun, destructive fraud, COURT weapon rifle attempts and and other machine fourth 26, of Rule by A explosives possession offenses)
[brief] This defendant had no relationship with the plaintiff whatsoever.  It is unfair to place a burden on this defendant where it had no oversight of the demised premises and therefore the risk was not known or foreseeable.  This defendant had no ability to exercise care, it transferred full control to the tenant and kept no presence on the property at all.  It hardly serves any public interest to hold an absent landlord responsible for conditions of premises as to which had relinquished all control for years.  In fact, the opposite is true.  It is better public policy to require that the tenant, who is actively occupying the property and who has contractually agreed to be responsible for repairs, including electrical, and who has the personnel and tools and equipment to address such hazards (and who is aware of the condition), to be responsible for such conditions.  In the final analysis, the Shields Court made it plain:  “In short, an analysis of the Hopkins factors against the factual backdrop of this case leads to the conclusion that fairness precludes the landlord’s liability for plaintiff’s injuries – just as our application of the classic control-based liability analysis specific to the landlord-tenant context dictates that, in fairness, the entity with control over the property is the entity that should be held responsible.  We decline to hold the landlord responsible for property over which it had relinquished control. ”  Shields, 494.  CONCLUSION
[brief] Here, the defense introduced evidence deemed inadmissible under *J.T.*, supra.  To ameliorate the prejudice of [...]’s response, the State asked its expert witness on rebuttal whether or not defendant was insane at the time he killed four members of his family with a semi-automatic rifle.  (14T118-8 to 11; 17T47-21 to 50-21).  [...] responded that, in his opinion, “defendant was sane at the time of these four charged homicides and the weapons charge. ” (14T118-13 to 14).  Notably, defendant did not object to the AP’s question or [...]’s answer.  B.
[brief] Plaintiffs are simply incorrect when they assert that the Ferraro court rejected review of Hazlet’s zoning by the Holmdel board and any effort of the Holmdel board to reconcile Hazlet’s zoning with Holmdel’s.  There is nothing in the Ferraro decision that would divest the [...] of its statutory obligation under the positive and negative criteria of NJSA 40:55D-70 to understand and weigh the character of the use proposed on the Mansfield part of the overall parcel.  There is no reliance in Ferraro on the comparative land area in the two towns that would support Plaintiffs’ assertion that the relative area of the lands to be developed should cause Mansfield’s zoning to inherently predominate over Florence’s zoning.  Pb15.  Relative land area in each town was not the basis for the court’s decision in Ferraro, and should not be the basis for a decision in this case.  Similarly, Plaintiffs assert that there is some significance in Mansfield’s board having already approved the development of the warehouse in Mansfield when the use variance application at issue in this case was heard and denied by the Board.  Pb16.  Plaintiffs provide no authority for their proposition that the decision of the first town’s board to approve an application concerning a split lot in any way determines the outcome of a later application to another town’s board.  If this were the law, then every owner of a split lot would merely race to the most favorable jurisdiction for pre-emptive approval.  Ferraro certainly does not support this idea.  Perhaps more useful as a general principle than relative land area or the timing of approvals, could be the question of which town’s standard should prevail when differing policies must be reconciled: the more intense and impactful use as urged by Plaintiffs or the less impactful use as found by the Board and Trial Court.  Plaintiffs’ Brief cites, but does not discuss, the second case of significant relevance to this issue: Ciocon v. Planning Bd. of the Borough of Franklin Lakes, 223 N.J.Super. 199 (1988) for the idea that “local land use boards must view the property as one parcel, even though it sits in two municipalities.
[brief] [...] AND [...], H/W, [...]  3120 Fire Road, Suite 100 Egg Harbor Township, New Jersey  08234 [...]  Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant [...], Esquire- N.J. Attorney ID No.: [...]  [...] #  TABLE OF CONTENTS  1.  Table of Authorities ............................................................................. V  2.  Table of Judgments, Orders, and Rulings Being Appealed .................................................................................. X  3.  Table of Transcripts ........................................................................... xi  I.  Preliminary Statement ........................................................................ 1  II.  Procedural History ............................................................................ 3  III.  Statement of Facts ............................................................................
[brief] The Chancery Action was commenced by Respondent against Appellants in April of 2017 in the Union County Chancery Division.  (Pa3 at ¶ 2 (Opinion); Pa104 to Pa106 (Docket Sheet of Chancery Action “Docket Sheet”)).  In the Chancery Action, Appellants asserted a plethora of twelve Counterclaims against Respondent, including a claim for malicious abuse of process (count 12), and even joined four additional individuals as third-party defendants.  (See Pa51 to Pa99 (Appellants’ Answer, Counterclaim and Third-Party Complaint in the Chancery Action)).  The contentious Chancery Action was extensively litigated by the parties between April 7, 2017 and November 14, 2018, when it was resolved by the filing of the Consent Order.  (Pa42 at ¶5 (Certification of [...] in Support of Notice of Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Rule 4:6-2 (“Blaine Cert.”) and Pa104-106 (Exhibit B thereto - Docket Sheet)).  The parties engaged in substantial paper and electronic discovery, took numerous party and third-party depositions, including two depositions of [...] and two depositions of [...], exchanged expert reports, and filed numerous motions and other applications with the Court.  Id. 2.  The Consent Order
[directive] Possible dispositions include:  (a)  Sustained.  A preponderance of the evidence shows an officer violated any law; regulation; directive, guideline, policy, or procedure issued by the Attorney General or County Prosecutor; agency protocol; standard operating procedure; rule; or training.  (b)  Unfounded.  A preponderance of the evidence shows that the alleged conduct did not occur.  (c)  Exonerated.  A preponderance of the evidence shows the alleged conduct did occur, but did not violate any law; regulation; directive, guideline, policy, or procedure issued by the Attorney General or County Prosecutor; agency protocol; standard operating procedure; rule; or training.  (For example, at the conclusion of an investigation into an excessive force allegation, the agency finds that the officer used force (alleged conduct) but that the force was not excessive (alleged violation). )  (d)  Not Sustained.  The investigation failed to disclose sufficient evidence to clearly prove or disprove the allegation.
[brief] The trial court incorrectly deemed the witness’s testimony not credible, when what it meant was that it was disagreeing with his legal conclusion.  The trial court addressed Defendant’s flight in a similar way.  [...] testified that, after he and Defendant made eye contact, Defendant “started walkin’ away. ”  1T19:19-22.  The trial court judge agreed that, after [...] arrived, “defendant took one hop to avoid being hit by the police car, and then two steps. ”  2T48:25-49:7.  Thus, the trial court found that the testimony of the State’s witness that the Defendant “started walkin’ away” after the arrival of police was credible.  The trial court then – after again making a factual finding that was consistent with the factual testimony of the State’s witness – stated that it was finding the witness not credible.  The trial court sought to explain that, although it agreed that Defendant moved away from the police after their arrival, it disagreed with the witness’s conclusion that this action constituted flight.  Instead, the trial court found that Defendant moved away from the police “to avoid being hit by the police car. ”  2T48:25-49:7.  Like the determination as to the Defendant’s startled look, whether or not the witness moved away from the police after their arrival is a factual determination.  However whether or not the Defendant’s decision to move in the opposite direction of the police constituted “flight” is a legal finding.  Thus, the trial court judge found the witness’s factual testimony that Defendant moved away from them after their arrival to be credible.  The trial court judge then found the witness’s legal conclusion that the Defendant’s actions constituted flight to be incorrect.  The trial court incorrectly deemed the witnesses testimony not credible, when what it meant was that it was disagreeing with his legal conclusion that Defendant engaged in flight.  The fact that the trial court conflated factual conclusions with legal conclusions is important because a different standard of review applies to factual findings and to legal findings.
[brief] ([C]ases involving pharmaceuticals, toxins or medical devices involve complex questions of medical causation beyond the understanding of a lay person, and thus expert testimony is required. ”); compare Hopkins v. Fox & Lazo Realtors, 132 N.J. 426, 449-51 (1993) (expert not needed for step color in trip-and-fall case).  Despite Plaintiff lacking the mandatory expert testimony, the Trial Court denied summary judgment because it found that generation of a 300-micron silicone particulate “would deviate” from performance standards.  (Da0816, p. 9)  But that finding assumes the subject Ozurdex® unit actually generated a silicone particulate—an assumption for which Plaintiff has no admissible evidence, expert or otherwise. \footnote{Though not necessary to decide this appeal, the only witness qualified on the issue of Ozurdex® performance standards, [...]’s Executive Director, Global Regulatory Strategy, [...], testified that a 300-micron particulate would not deviate from performance standards.  (Da0315, pp. 15-16, 63-64)  The Trial Court inexplicably ignored [...]’s on-point testimony and erroneously cited testimony from a different corporate representative designated to testify on a different topic (recall coordination and compliance with corresponding FDA regulations and procedures).  This error by the Trial Court underscores the complexity of the defect analysis, the Trial Court’s unawareness of its nuances, and the need for the legal requirement for expert testimony to explain these multifaceted concepts to lay jurors.}