ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] In her discussion of factor (b)(9), the sentencing court noted the overwhelming support by family, friends, and members of [...]’s community, as well as the “words that were spoken by Me. Rodriguez here today”  \(^{18}\)  Although acknowledging [...]’s complete lack of criminal history, [...] gave it “minimal weight” because of evidence that the marijuana distribution charge of conviction was “not just a one-off, one-time[,]”, that it was a “carefully planned out operation. ” (13T32-21 to 24).  and thus despite any record supported evidence of prior criminal conduct in 37 years of life, she concluded he did “not necessarily lead a law-abiding life for a significant period of time. ” (13T32-25 to 13T33-2).  (13T35:1-10; see [...]’s statement at (13T14-14 to 16-24).  While candidly acknowledging that in every sentencing the (b)(9) factor was one she always “struggled with” (13T34-4 to 7), in the sense of “is what I am seeing a representation of someone who truly, duly appreciates that what happened in this case is something that cannot and should not happen again…given the character and attitude of the [...]?” (13T34-19 to 35-1).  Answering her question in the affirmative, [...] noted [...]’s “full appreciation for the extent to which” his actions affected all of those people who “expected better from you. ” (13T35-10 to 13).  This mitigating finding by [...], it seems clear, is thus dramatically in opposition to her finding of aggravating factor (a)(3), the “risk” of recidivism.  Moreover, it undermines the application of aggravating factor (a)(9).  That factor, often applied as a matter of form because general deterrence is a factor in all cases But (a)(9) only applies where the need to deter exists for others in general and the [...] in particular.  While interrelated, these concepts are distinguishable, and both must be present to support the sentence imposed on the particular [...] before the court.  See State v. Jarbath, 114 N.J. 394, 405 (1989).  General deterrence alone, without any personal deterrent effect vitiates the impact of a sentence as a general deterrent.  Id.  See also State v. Gardner, 113 N.J. 510, 520 (1989).  [...]’s careful consideration of [...]’s character and attitude, based on his own self-analysis, and his “appreciation” of the negative effects of his past conduct on his community, his family and his friends make it unlikely he will commit another offense renders virtually inapplicable personal deterrence as basis for the aggravating factor of (a)(9), and thus for the application of this factor at all.  CONCLUSION
[brief] In its Answering Brief, [...] argues that [...] failed to seek a timely stay of the Order of Suspension (“OOS”) entered against his Teaching Certificates by the State of New Jersey, Department of Education, State Board of Examiners (the “Examiners”).  See, e.g., Db3.  Consequently, [...] claims, [...] was at fault for the “procedural dilemma” outlined in [...]’s Initial Brief.  See Pb12-13, Pb16-17.  [...] is incorrect.  First, a party has no obligation to seek a stay / interim relief in order to preserve his final appeal rights.
[brief] Other Authorities  AAAS, Forensic Sci. Assessments: A Quality and Gap Analysis - Latent Fingerprint Examination (Sept. 2017), https://www.aaas.org/sites/default/files/s3fs-public/reports/Latent%2520Fingerprint%2520Report%2520FINA L%25209_14.pdf?adobe_mc=MCMID%3D421605555069028299  62476536102252964462%7CMCORGID%3D242B6472541199F  70A4C98A6%2540AdobeOrg%7CTS%3D1716495408...............................passim Admin. Off. of the Cts., Jury Selection – Model Voir Dire Questions Promulgated by Directive #21-06 – Revised Procedures & Questions (May 16, 2007), https://www.njcourts.gov/sites/default/files/administrative-directives/2007/05/dir_04_07.pdf.........................................................9, 10
[brief] 20  I.  THE TRIAL COURT DECISION REVERSING ZONING BOARD’S DENIAL SHOULD BE OVERTURNED, BECAUSE THE BOARD DECISION WAS NOT ARBITRARY, CAPRICIOUS, OR UNREASONABLE.  ([...] Trial Brief for Prerogative Writ Hearing Da316-335)  .............................................................................................................................................................................  20  A.  The Standard of Review ..............................................................................................................  20  B.  The Power to Zone is Granted to Municipalities by Statute and Re-Zoning Should Be Accomplished by Ordinance - Not Variance .........................................................................................  22  C.  The Board Correctly Applied the Sica Balancing Test in Denying the D Variances ................. 25  D.  The Board Properly Denied the C  Variances and Design Exceptions Requested Where Applicant Did Not Satisfy its Burden to Establish the Negative Criteria  .........................................................  34  E.  The Zoning Board Was Within Its Discretion to Reject Some or All of [...]’s Expert Witness Opinions Even Where No Contradictory Expert Witness Testified .........................................................  36  II.  THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RESTRICTING THE BOARD’S ABILITY ON REMAND TO CONSIDER ANY AND ALL CONDITIONS TO ADDRESS THE NEGATIVE IMPACTS OF THE DEVELOPMENT.
[directive] Part II -  Statement of Policies, Findings and Objectives  1.  Schools are a principal medium by which to provide young people with the personal skills and information which they will need to help them to resist the temptation to experiment with illicit substances.  New Jersey's elementary and secondary schools thus emerge as a vital and perhaps the single most important component of this State's comprehensive, long term prevention program designed ultimately to alter tolerant attitudes and behavior concerning substance abuse.  Accordingly, it shall be the policy of the New Jersey law enforcement community to promote and safeguard an environment which is conducive to education.  No law enforcement operation, program or activity, therefore, shall be permitted to interfere with educational goals and prerogatives, which must always take precedence over traditional law enforcement objectives.
[brief] On September 13, 2021, Plaintiff filed suit Defendants.  (AA001-32).  On January 24, 2022, Plaintiff filed the First Amended Complaint.  (the “Complaint”)  (Da091-100)  On March 3, 2022, Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss/Summary Judgment.  (Da044)  On September 21, 2022, the Trial Court dismissed Counts 1and 2.  (Da005)  On December 23, 2022, the Trial Court dismissed Counts 3, 4 & 5 (Plaintiff consented to dismiss Count 5).  (Da001-022)  On February 3, 2023, the Trial Court denied Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration.  (Da023-033)  On March 6, 2023, Plaintiff filed an Amended Notice of Appeal of the December 23, 2022.  COUNTERSTATEMENT OF FACTS
[brief] As our Supreme Court explained in *Barrick*, whether a defect exists must be determined as of the bid opening  With respect to the determination of whether an RFP requirement must be regarded as material and, as a consequence, non-waivable, the threshold step in the analysis is to determine whether there is a deviation.  . .That determination necessarily must be made—and made by the Director of the Division responsible for administering the bid proposal, review, and award process—at the time that the bids are opened.  The timing requirement assures the bidders of an even playing field and the public of a fair and impartial public contract award process.  On review, a court's role is to examine the correctness of the Director's determination based on the information available to the Director at the time bids are opened.
[brief] The parties had made conflicting claims in their respective certifications with defendant claiming (Pa1159) that the plaintiff was planning to flee the country and the plaintiff denying defendant’s allegation (Pa1172).  A trial court must hold a plenary hearing when a motion raises a genuine issue of material fact.  Tretola v. Tretola, 389 N.J. Super. 15, 20-21 (App. Div. 2006).  Further, defendant had expressly requested an oral argument in her motion (Pa1061) and OTSC (Pa1092) filed simultaneously on November 9, 2023, and the subsequent OTSC (Pa1152) filed on January 4, 2024.  Because defendant’s request seeking the court to take custody of the plaintiff’s passport was a substantive issue, pursuant to R. 5:5-4(a)(1), the trial court was required to grant the defendant’s request for an oral argument instead of conveniently adjudicating the motion on papers.
[brief] The business judgment rule generally asks (1) whether the actions were authorized by statute or by charter, and if so, (2) whether the action is fraudulent, self-dealing or unconscionable.  [Seidman v. Clifton Sav. Bank, S.L.A., 205 N.J. 150, 175 (2011)].  "The business judgment rule protects a board of directors from being questioned or second-guessed on conduct of corporate affairs except in instances of fraud, self-dealing, or unconscionable conduct.
[brief] *Id.* at 156-57.  He claimed that he never received any written request, so he never reported to the trial judge that the jurors had requested additional instruction.  *Id.*  In granting the plaintiff a new trial, the Appellate Division ruled that the bailiff had violated his oath, and that doing so had tainted the jury.  *Id*, at 158-62.  Clearly, the actions of Plaintiff during voir dire are totally eclipsed by the irregularities in these cases.
[brief] | Cases | Page(s) | |------------------------------|--------------------------| | **Miranda v. Arizona,** | 6 | | 384 U.S. 436 (1966) | | | **Singleton,** | Passim | | 211 N.J. 157 (2012) | | | **State v. A.R.,** | 12, 20, 23 | | 213 N.J. 542 (2013) | | | **State v. Adams,** | 30, 31, 33 | | 194 N.J. 186 (2008) | | | **State v. Anderson,** | 32 | | 104 N.J. Super. 18 (App. Div. 1968) | | | **State v. Artis,** | 30, 32, 33 | | 57 N.J. 24 (1970) | | | **State v. Ates,** | 17 | | 426 N.J. Super. 521 (App. Div. 2011) | | | **State v. Begyn,** | 32 | | 34 N.J. 35 (1961) | | | **State v. Belliard,** | 30, 33 | | 415 N.J. Super 51 (App. Div. 2010) | | | **State v. Burns,** | 31 | | 192 N.J. 312 (2007) | | | **State v. Carroll,** | 9, 10 | | 256 N.J. Super. 575 (App. Div. 1992) | | | **State v. Chapland,** | 31 | | 187 N.J. 275 (2006) | | | **State v. Clark,** | 17 | | 251 N.J. 266 (2022) | | | **State v. Cordero,** | 18, 23, 27, 29 | | 438 N.J. Super. 472 (App. Div. 2014) | | | **State v. Daniels,** | 8 | | 182 N.J. 80 (2004) | | | **State v. DiFrisco,** | 24 | | 137 N.J. 434 (1994) | | | **State v. Engel,** | 20 | | 249 N.J. Super. 336 (App. Div. 1991) | | State v. Feal, 194 N.J. 293 (2008)
[brief] During the cross examination of [...], the following occurred:  Q.  Detective, are you familiar with computer aided dispatch, CAD reports?  A.  Just on my end of it, yeah.  Q.  Well, let's talk about that system.  Q.  Essentially when you call something in there's a dispatcher that records the information into the system, correct?  A.  That is correct.  Q.  Okay.  I'm going to show you what's been marked as D-15 for ID.  Detective, could you tell what that is?  A.  Trenton Police and Fire Event Report.  Q.  And going onto - could you turn to the last page?  A.  The last page?  seven of seven?  Q.  Yeah.  The last -- from the bottom, the last four to eight lines, do you see where it says defendant was arrested on -- in front of [...]?  (12T:191-22 to 192-14).  The state objected.  The defense argued to the court that the CAD report is admissible as "business records" -- "excited utterance" in light of State v. Alston, 2010 N.J. Super Unpub. LEXIS 1694.
[directive] Training and Qualification Programs  Qualification.  Qualification and requalification are required during daylight hours for subguns, personal defense weapons, police carbines, police service rifles and scoped rifles and under night firing conditions for police service rifles deployed as patrol supplements or entry purposes, subguns, personal defense weapons and police carbines.  All training and qualification sessions for subguns, personal defense weapons, police rifles and police carbines must be conducted under the supervision of a qualified supervising automatic/semi-automatic assault weapons firearms instructor.  Courses of Fire.  Only those courses of fire listed in this manual are to be used to meet subgun, personal defense weapon, police rifle, police carbine and scoped rifle qualification requirements set forth by this policy.  Additional courses of fire and training programs may be included in the agency schedule for training.  The purpose of this policy is not to prevent agencies from engaging in supplemental training courses that meet their special needs.
[brief] R. 5:5-10 states in pertinent part:  ---  8  Plaintiff had grounds to file a R. 2:6-11(e)(1)(c) motion to strike the portions of Defendant’s Brief and Appendix, but to avoid delay and expense  Plaintiff makes the claim here.  When a written property settlement agreement has been executed, plaintiff shall not be obligated to file such a Notice...  Defaults shall be entered in accordance with R. 4:43-1, except that a default judgment in a Family Part matter may be entered without separate notice of motion as set forth in R. 4:43-2.(emphasis added).
[brief] THE OPINION OF DEFENDANT’S COASTAL ENGINEERING EXPERT WAS NOT NET OPINION (Da505; 6T 23:1-24:8).  The trial court improperly excluded the engineering report of Defendant’s expert, primarily on the basis that Defendant’s expert did not perform complex calculations in concluding that Defendant’s property had an increased risk of wave overtopping after the completion of the project.  Plaintiff argued that Defendant’s expert report “doesn’t contain any data or calculations. ” (Plaintiff’s Brief at 25).  However, technical data and complex calculations are not required to support Defendant’s expert opinion in this case.  An expert's testimony should not be excluded merely “‘because it fails to account for some particular condition or fact which the adversary considers relevant. ’”  Creanga v. Jardal, 185 N.J. 345, 360 (2005) (quoting State v. Freeman, 223 N.J. Super. 92, 116 (App. Div. 1988).  The expert's failure “to give weight to a factor thought important by an adverse party does not reduce his testimony to an inadmissible net opinion if he otherwise offers sufficient reasons which logically support his opinion. ”  Rosenberg v. Tavorath, 352 N.J. Super. 385, 402 (App. Div. 2002).
[brief] To merit approval of a use variance, an applicant must satisfy both the “positive” and “negative” criteria of N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70(d)(1).  “In particular cases for special reasons” a Board may grant a use variance.  These “special reasons”, or positive criteria, include advancement of one or more of the purposes of zoning as defined in N.J.S.A. 40:55D-2, and evidence that the site is particularly suited for that specific purpose.  Medici v. BPR Co., 107 N.J. 1 (1987).  If the applicant meets the “positive criteria” test, it must also establish the “negative criteria,” and show that the variance “can be granted without substantial detriment to the public good and will not substantially impair the intent and the purpose of the zone plan and zoning ordinance.
[brief] These are precisely the circumstances under which the Appellate Division in Kerr recognized that an attorney may be compelled to submit to a deposition.  See Kerr, 295 N.J. Super. at 159-60.  Despite the Appellate Division’s clear and express guidance in Kerr, the trial court improperly denied Plaintiff’s motion to compel the deposition of [...] and granted Defendants’ cross-motion for a protective order.  The Discovery Order poisoned the trial and, as a result, the Final Judgment.  Because discovery from [...] was prohibited, she continued as Defendants’ trial counsel without fear of violating R.P.C. 3.7.  [...], however, had personal knowledge as to what occurred during the negotiation and drafting of the PSA and was able to make unchallenged statements and arguments at trial, and even pose questions in suggestive ways, based upon her personal involvement without fear of cross-examination.  On the other hand, it would have been highly prejudicial to Plaintiff to call its transactional counsel, [...], to testify without Plaintiff also being afforded the opportunity to cross-examine Defendants’ transactional counsel, [...].  Despite the risk of prejudice to Plaintiff and his prior conclusion that discovery from [...] would be privileged and/or duplicative, the trial judge nevertheless made it a point to note during trial that testimony from [...] was absent, but the absence of testimony from either parties’ transactional attorney was the direct result of the Discovery Order and impacted the admissibility of certain other written evidence as well.  (2T29:23 to 31:9, 81:19 to 87:8, 135:13 to 136:17.)  Thus, without testimony from either transactional attorney, in reaching the Final Judgment, the trial court ultimately ruled on the meaning of the PSA without the opportunity to hear from its drafters, which opportunity was improperly foreclosed by the Discovery Order.  As such, the Discovery Order should be reversed to grant Plaintiff the opportunity to conduct limited additional discovery, and the Final Judgment should be vacated and remanded for re-trial based on a full record.  **CONCLUSION**
[brief] (Pa83)  On Oct 17, 2022, [...]’s filed a reply (misdated as Sep 20, 2022).  (Pa105)  On Oct 21, 2022, the trial court heard oral argument on the motion and cross motions.  The trial court then granted [...]’s motion for sanctions (Pa110)  Also on this same date, the trial court denied my cross motions.  (Pa112)  On Nov 7, 2022, [...]s had reached a settlement agreement with my sister, at which time he had prepared consent order (Pa150), which I modified (Pa155).  On Nov 10, 2022, [...] filed a modified consent order, where amongst several other things, the parties agreed to abbreviation of transcripts for this appeal.  (Pa113)  On Nov 15, 2022, I filed (in person) and served (via regular mail) my Notice of Appeal and Case Information Statement (Pa116).  Then when asked by this Court, on Dec 6, 2022 [...] initially agreed that the matter was final as of Oct 21, 2022 (Pa120); but then on Dec 29, 2022 he changed his mind, after I refused to participate in another hearing before the trial court (Pa121).  That same day, I opposed his 180-degree change of position (Pa122).  On Jan 9, 2023, this Court dismissed the appeal sua sponte, therein deciding that the appeal was interlocutory, remanding the case for further proceedings (Pa123).
[brief] Plaintiff cross moved for a determination that the provision violated public policy and was not enforceable.  [Pa29-67].  The provision at issue stated as follows:  YOU AND WE AGREE THAT ANY CONTROVERSY, DISPUTE OR CLAIM, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY CLAIM FOR CONSUMER FRAUD OR ANY OTHER STATUTORY CLAIM, (COLLECTIVELY “CLAIM”)  ARISING OUT OF OR RELATING IN ANY WAY TO THIS AGREEMENT OR ITS BREACH THAT CANNOT BE SETTLED THROUGH DIRECT  DISCUSSIONS SHOULD BE SUBMITTED BY THE CLAIMANT TO NONBINDING MEDIATION, ADMINISTERED BY A MEDIATOR MUTUALLY SELECTED AND AGREED TO BY THE PARTIES, OR IF THE PARTIES CANNOT AGREE ON A MEDIATOR, BY A MEDIATOR WITH THE [...] (“[...]”) PURSUANT TO ITS COMMERCIAL MEDIATION RULES.  MEDIATION MAY PROCEED REMOTELY AT [...]’S OR CUSTOMER'S ELECTION.  IF THE PARTIES ARE UNABLE TO RESOLVE THE CLAIM THROUGH MEDIATION, THE CLAIM SHALL BE SUBMITTED BY CLAIMANT FOR AND RESOLVED BY BINDING ARBITRATION PURSUANT TO THE [...]  COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES AND ADMINISTERED BY AN ARBITRATOR MUTUALLY SELECTED AND AGREED TO BY THE PARTIES, OR IF THE PARTIES CANNOT AGREE THEN ONE ASSIGNED BY THE [...].  THE JUDGMENT ON THE AWARD RENDERED BY THE ARBITRATOR MAY BE ENTERED IN ANY COURT HAVING JURISDICTION.  YOU AND WE ARE CHOOSING MEDIATION AND ARBITRATION INSTEAD OF LITIGATION TO RESOLVE OUR CLAIMS AND VOLUNTARILY AND KNOWINGLY WAIVE A RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL.
[directive] Rule 3:3-1(c)(1) on the Bail Schedule 2 charges of robbery, criminal sexual contact, second degree aggravated assault, aggravated arson, arson, burglary, first or second degree violations of Chapter 35 (drug offenses), any crime involving the possession or use of a firearm, or conspiracies or attempts to commit such crimes.  Rule 3:3-1(c)(2-6) (indictable offenses) and Rule 7:2-2(b)(1-6) delineate factors regarding whether a warrant or summons should issue for other offenses.  Rule 3:26-1 (indictable offenses) and Rule 7:4-1 (non-indictable offenses) delineate factors to be considered when setting bail and provide for the option of R.O.R. bail where appropriate.  Bail Ranges for attempts or conspiracies should generally be the same as the actual substantive crime.  Statute Charge Description  Degree Bail Range 10%  Cash Bail Option b(3)  Actor causes or permits a child to engage in a prohibited sexual act or in the simulation of such an act if the person knows, has reason to know or intends that the prohibited act may 2nd Degree  $50,000 to $100,000  No 10% be photographed, filmed, reproduced or reconstructed in any manner, including on the Internet, or may be part of an exhibition or performance, first degree.
[brief] [...] knew in early August 2015 that it was unenrolled in the CCIP for the Project.  Subsequent communications further confirm [...] was aware and acknowledged this status.  For example, on August 11, 2015, [...]’s CFO sent an email to [...] of [...] advising that “[...] must correct their Certificates of Insurance for [...] and [[...]]… have your insurance carrier review the CCIP manual for the insurance requirements for contracts not covered under the CCIP. ”  (Italics added.)  (TRVa2873.)  --- 6  While [...] remained “excluded” from the CCIP, it became “eligible to work onsite” on the Sept. 16, 2015 Enrollment Report (the next Report after [...]’s COI was deemed compliant by [...] on Sept. 4, 2015).
[brief] (3.)  In some situations, the board may reduce the detriments by imposing conditions.  The majority of the detrimental impacts of the development proposed by [...] were tied to the intensity of the proposal (i.e., excess units, excessive coverage, deficient parking, deficient parking setbacks, and negative visual/aesthetic impacts).  Because [...] determined not to reduce the overall project, despite Board questions as to the project size, the Board found that there were no “reasonable conditions” that it could propose to lessen those detriments.  Clearly, the Board and [...] recognized that having less units in a smaller building could have conforming impervious coverage, conforming 2½ stories, conforming parking, and proper setbacks.  Neither [...] nor any of its experts provided information from which the Board could know how many less units were required in order to meet any of the zoning requirements.  Therefore, in the same manner that the Courts have interpreted the third factor in the Sica test, the Board determined that the detriments of the proposed project to the zone plan were so pervasive that the Board could not devise conditions to reduce or eliminate those detriments.