ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Plaintiff's retaliation claim is based on remarks made by two different teachers to students on two separate occasions.  The first that took place in the second-half 2018, when it was reported to Plaintiff by others that a teacher, [...] ("[...]") "stated to her class that she was in support of Trump building a wall" (i.e., the "[...] Comment").  (Pl. Tr. 238:14-24).  [...] made that comment in front of her students (not Plaintiff), and Plaintiff—who supervised [...]—gave her a verbal warning.  (Pl. Tr. 238:14-24; 241:19-22).  No one disputes that the comment was made or that the teacher deserved admonishment for it.  The second incident involved a different Vice Principal's one-time interaction with [...] ("[...]"), a tenured 17-year veteran teacher who had no other disciplinary issues.  (Pl. Tr. 258:1-7).  Specifically, in January 2019, [...] used the "n" word in front of her students in response to a student using the "n" word first and then she questioned why the student could use the "n" word with impunity when it would be inappropriate for her to use it (the "[...] Incident").  (Da274).  Two students complained to Vice Principal [...] ("[...]")—not Plaintiff—and it was [...] who issued [...] a written reprimand and spoke with [...].  (Da272; Pl. Tr. 252:1-7, 253:18-21).  Again, no one has disputed that [...] said the racial slur or that a reprimand was warranted.  That written reprimand remains in [...]'s personnel file.  (Ibid.).  [...] expressly indicated that he supported the discipline and he met with [...] and her union representative after the incident.  ([...] Tr.¹ 62:21-24; 116:3-9).  The indisputable record evidence establishes that aside from the [...] Incident, there were no other racial slur incidents involving anyone.  (Pl. Tr. 258:1-3; [...] Tr. 128:1-2).  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN GRANTING SUMMARY
[directive] Somente é necessário responder às perguntas adicionais a seguir se você estiver se declarando culpado pelo crime de Agressão Sexual Qualificada, Agressão Sexual ou Contato Sexual Criminal Qualificado ou Sequestro segundo os termos da lei 2C:13-1c(2) ou pela tentativa de cometer um destes crimes.  N.J.S.A.  The following additional questions need to be answered only if you are pleading guilty to an offense of Aggravated Sexual Assault, Sexual Assault or Aggravated Criminal Sexual Contact or kidnapping pursuant to 2C:13-1c(2) or an attempt to commit one N.J.S.A. of these crimes.
[brief] In *Peloso*, the Supreme Court examined a fire insurance policy purporting to require the insured to file suit within one year after a loss.  *Id.* at 516.  The insurer moved for summary judgment, arguing that the insureds had filed suit 18 months after their loss.  *Id.*  The trial court granted summary judgment, the Appellate Division affirmed, and the Supreme Court reversed.  The Supreme Court held that the policy’s limitation period was tolled from the time an insured gives notice of loss until the insurer formally denies coverage.  *Id.* at 521.  The Court reasoned that if the “literal language of the limitation provision is given effect,” then the insured should not be “penalized for the time consumed by the company while it” investigates and adjusts the claim.  *Id.*  This equitable tolling was a “fair resolution” based on the statute and policy’s “incongruity,” the Court concluded.  *Id.*  Despite citing *Peloso* in its decision, the trial court ignored the Supreme Court’s tolling rule.  (Pall).  Under *Peloso*, the policy’s limitation period was tolled between [...]’s notice of loss in 2018 and [...]’s denial of liability in 2023.  Because [...] filed suit before [...] denied liability, her UIM Complaint was timely.  The Appellate Court should now revive the Complaint and vacate dismissal.  CONCLUSION  Insurers must deal in good faith.  *Griggs v. Bertram*, 88 N.J. 347, 356 (1982).  Contrary to this principle, the trial court allowed [...] to sandbag [...] by voiding her UIM coverage in the middle of litigation.  The trial court reached this outcome by erroneously relying on the insurance policy’s suit limitation provision while ignoring its conformity-to-law clause.  The trial court also erred by failing to apply the doctrines of equitable estoppel, waiver, and equitable tolling based on [...]’s dilatory conduct.  The Appellate Division should correct these errors by vacating dismissal.
[directive] This new step will require the determination ). of whether the defendant's current charges include one these "non-firearm" related of offenses and that the defendant has a current firearms related charge.  A list firearms-related offenses appended here Attachment  In order for a defendant as is 2. of to receive a Pretrial Services recommendation  No Release pursuant to new Step of 4 the DMF, an offense contained in this Firearms Offense List must be found in  If of addition to one the non-gun related offenses contained in Step it is determined 4. that both required charges are present in a defendant's current charges, the result will of "No Release Recommended (Charge(s) include be a final recommendation Graves  Offenses subject to N.J.S.A. 2A:162-20(f))."  Former Steps 3 and 4 in the DMF have been renumbered Steps 5 and as 6.  Former Steps 5 through also have been renumbered as Steps 7 through 10 12.  Conclusion
[brief] Here, the intended purpose of the action challenged—the Commissions' attempted notice—was to reach persons who might have been affected by the wrongfully calculated reimbursement rate, to notify those persons of the availability of supplemental reimbursement, and to inform them of the procedures for requesting supplemental reimbursement.  (pp. 16-19)  3.  The problem in this dispute over the adequacy of notice is that the evidence thus far produced has the capacity to support the claim that the methods of notice—the letter and website link—were not reasonably designed to likely reach the categories of members who may have been affected by the erroneous reimbursement rates.  The Unions have advanced some evidence on which there could be based a finding that the notice was not reasonably designed to give notice to the proper universe of individuals affected.  Against that presentation, based on the present record, the Court cannot conclude that either the website's ten-word, cryptically described notice and link or the letter to the certifying officers provides sufficient evidence to support deferring to the agency's choice of notice as reasonable.  With the thin record available, it is not known what action, if any, certifying officers generally took in response to the Commissions' letter.  Nor does the record disclose what notice, if any, former employees and retirees received of the potential for supplemental reimbursement in light of the Commissions' apparent reliance on the link.  Accordingly, the Court orders a remand for the development of a proper record to permit meaningful judicial review.
[brief] *Mantilla*, 167 N.J. 262; *Englert*, 389 N.J. Super. at 48, 57; *Meder*, 240 N.J. Super. at 380.  The trial court therefore erred in seeking to harmonize Paragraph 2 and Paragraph 4 by ruling that the wording of Paragraph 2 shows that Paragraph 4 required indemnity for [...]’s own negligence, 1T19:22-22:6, when in fact Paragraph 4 contained no provision for either party to be indemnified for its own negligence.  Da45, ¶ 4.  Ignoring the inconsistencies in the indemnity obligations between Paragraph 4 and Paragraph 2 was therefore reversible error.  *Boyle*, 257 N.J. at 478; *Mantilla*, 167 N.J. 262; *Englert*, 389 N.J. Super. at 48, 57; *Meder*, 240 N.J. Super. at 380.
[brief] THE COURT DID NOT ERR BY DENYING DEFENDANT’S DEMAND TO COMPEL PLAINTIFF TO PRODUCE A STATEMENT PER NJ CHAPTER 225 LAW.  One of the items of relief sought by Defendant in the Order to Show Cause was a statement of the interest of parties pursuant to Chapter 225 of the Laws of NJ 1979.  This law requires a statement to be provided to the Sheriff prior to the sale of any real property listing the names of all mortgagees and other holders of encumbrances constituting “consideration” as defined in the Act.  Since there is no Sheriff’s Sale of the Defendant’s residence scheduled due to the various stays (bankruptcy and otherwise) that have been placed upon the sale, the statement is not yet required.  Accordingly, Defendant’s claim that a statement has not been provided is not ripe and the trial court was correct to dismiss this demand which should be affirmed by this court.
[brief] ”  (Id.).  Defendants also argue they “have not had the opportunity to meet and confer to discuss the [six] new topics raised for the first time in this joint stipulation. ”  (Id. at 22).  They state that on June 15, 2021, they offered to provide a witness on these topics and asked plaintiffs to withdraw this issue from the Joint Stipulation, but plaintiffs declined, “instead demanding that any agreement require the deponent to testify ‘fully’ on these topics, some of which are inextricably linked to attorney-client privileged information, including inquiries into litigation hold notices and document collection and production processes and decisions. ”  (Id. at 23 (citing [...] Decl. Ex. 8)).  Defendants suggest that “the appropriate course of action is for Defendants to provide written discovery into the non-objectionable scope of the noticed topics,” and state that they are “concerned that providing a witness on these issues will only invite Plaintiffs to infringe on Defendants’ rights with respect to privilege.
[brief] On July 14, 2022, Plaintiff learned that [...] and the Fee Owner had further amended the Closing Date in the Mack-Cali Agreement, without Plaintiff’s consent and without extending the Closing Date in the PSA, in breach of the PSA.  Plaintiff wrote to [...], advising that [...] was in breach of the PSA.  Plaintiff also stated that, as a result, Plaintiff would direct the [...] to return to Plaintiff the $5 Million Earnest Money Deposit, plus interest – while expressly reserving and without waiving Plaintiff’s additional rights, remedies, and claims.  (Pa10, Complaint ¶ 39).  The following day, [...] responded by stating that it did not object to the release of the Earnest Money Deposit, while disputing that [...] had breached the PSA.  (Pa11, Complaint ¶ 40).  Thus, on July 15, 2022, [...] was instructed to release the Earnest Money Deposit to Plaintiff, which it did.  (Pa11, Complaint ¶ 41).  Critically, the parties’ correspondence during this period reflects that Plaintiff never terminated the PSA and never waived or relinquished its right to insist upon specific performance of the PSA.  Quite the contrary, in successive emails, Plaintiff repeatedly advised [...] counsel that Plaintiff reserved all of its rights under the PSA.  (Pa320-333).  Even when [...] stated in an email of July 15, 2022, that [...] “deemed” Plaintiff’s demand for return of the Deposit to be an election to terminate the PSA, Plaintiff immediately rejected this assertion and noted that it was accepting the return of the Deposit without waiving its rights under the PSA (Pa330-331).  This reservation of rights included, of course, Plaintiff’s right under Section 13.1 to insist upon specific performance if [...] proceeded to close with the Fee Owner. \(^4\)  D.
[brief] [Emphasis supplied.]  As duly noted by [...], “the purpose is obvious - the parties need time, as compressed as the time may be, to prepare for the hearing based on the Final Offers submitted. ” (Aa091).  On September 11, 2023, [...] submitted a Final Offer in connection with this proceeding.  (Aa359)  The Union submitted its Final Offer on September 12, 2023.  (Aa245)  The hearing commenced on September 21, 2023, on which date [...]’s Business Administrator, [...], gave sworn testimony.
[brief] (Id. at ¶ 7.)  Clearly, it does not grant any unknown person or entity title to, nor rights in, the Roads.  (Id. at ¶ 7; Pa35.)  Finally, contrary to the Borough’s assertions, granting the relief requested by Plaintiffs would not have any effect on the owner of Lot 1.01 and there was no reason to make the Lot 1.01 owner a party to this action.
[brief] “It should also be noted that we have not accepted the contention that fee awards in § 1983 damages cases should be modeled upon the contingent-fee arrangements used in personal injury litigation.  "[W]e reject the notion that a civil rights action for damages constitutes nothing more than a private tort suit benefiting only the individual plaintiffs whose rights were violated.  Unlike most private tort litigants, a civil rights plaintiff seeks to vindicate important civil and constitutional rights that cannot be valued solely in monetary terms."  Riverside v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 561, 574, 106 S.Ct. 2686, 2694, 91 L.Ed.2d 466 (1986).
[brief] The law in New Jersey is clear that “the relationship between [a title] company and the insured is essentially contractual,” and that a title insurer does not owe a non- --- 7  Notably, the Complaint does not allege any breach of fiduciary duty with respect to [...]’s handling of the Deposit as an escrow agent.  (See Pa19, ¶¶96-99; Pb48).  contractual duty unless it voluntarily assumes one.  *Walker-Rogge, Inc. v. Chelsea Title & Guaranty*, 116 N.J. 517, 540 (1989); see also *Zielinski v. Professional Appraisal Assocs.*, 326 N.J. Super. 219, 226 (App. Div. 1999) (finding that an appraiser’s duty was consistent with, and limited to, the scope of their undertaking); *United Jersey Bank v. Kensey*, 306 N.J. Super. 540, 551 (App.  Div. 1997) (“[T]here is no presumed fiduciary relationship between a bank and its customer. ”).  For a fiduciary duty to arise in title insurer-insured context, the relationship must go beyond that of a normal title insurer-insured relationship.  *Kosce v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co.*, 152 N.J. Super. 371, 379-82 (Law Div. 1977) (Where insurer and insured ‘are merely dealing with one another as they would in a normal contractual situation” then ‘the company is only required to fulfill the ordinary contractual duties imposed by the insurance agreement. ”); *Ellmex Constr. Co., Inc. v. Republic Ins. Co.*, 202 N.J. Super. 195, 206 (App. Div. 1985) (explaining that a fiduciary duty only arises where there is some “special relationship” that goes beyond the typical insurance carrier-policyholder relationship).  This is true, even if the insurer and insured have had a longstanding business relationship.  Indeed, Plaintiff has failed to cite to any authority demonstrating that a pre-existing business relationship is grounds for the imposition of a fiduciary duty.  Thus, the Complaint fails to allege any facts that would give rise to a fiduciary relationship.  E.  Plaintiff Cannot Plead a Claim for Aiding and Abetting a Breach of Contract
[brief] [...], who was the contract purchaser of certain real property identified as Block 3103, Lot 16 (approximately 12 acres) and 19 (approximately 5 acres), and Block 3101, Lots 12 and 13 (approximately 9 acres) on the Township’s Tax Map (the “Property”) (Pa42), had filed a Motion to Intervene in this action; that application was granted by the Court by Order dated November 9, 2015 (Pa42) and [...] “advised that it desire[d] the Property and the development of the Property to be included in the said Township’s HEFSP—in other words, [...] wanted to develop the Property as a Mt. Laurel a/k/a ‘affordable housing’ “Inclusionary Development”.
[brief] 1.  Order, December 21, 2022, Consent Order Permitting [...], Intervenor, to intervene as a Defendant Ia88  2.  Order, August 2, 2023, Order to Remand the matter to the [...]  Ia236  3.  Final Order, January 29, 2024, Ordered that the Resolution Of Denial [...] memorialized by the [...]  Ia269  TABLE OF CITATIONS
[brief] Rule 37(a)(5)(B), Fed. R. Civ. P., requires the Court to order the moving party, the attorney filing the motion, or both, to pay the opposing party its reasonable fees and expenses in opposing the motion.  The Court may not order this reimbursement if the motion was substantially justified.  The Court cannot say that the instant Motion to Compel was substantially justified.  Accordingly, Plaintiff and his counsel are ORDERED to SHOW CAUSE why they should not be required to reimburse Defendants’ reasonable fees and expenses in opposing this Motion.  Plaintiff must submit a brief on or before April 16, 2021 and no longer than five pages, supporting a finding that the positions taken by Plaintiff in this motion to compel were substantially justified.  Defendants may respond on or before April 23, 2021, limited also to five pages.  No further reply is authorized.  IT IS SO ORDERED.
[brief] [2T 77-23 to 79-25].  He also noted that a school, which is conditionally permitted in the R-20A Zone, would generate the same overall level of traffic.  [2T 84-4 to 84-9].  He also provided testimony that based upon real-life studies that the independent living units themselves would actually need 0.67 spaces per unit, or 55 spaces in total.  [2T 80-15 to 81-4].  Based upon data and the operational information provided earlier, [...] concluded that the overall project would need 106 spaces, and thus the 117 proposed parking spaces would be more than sufficient.  [2T 81-9 to 83-19].  Later, testimony confirmed 117 spaces exceeded the number required by the RSIS, N.J.A.C. 5:23-4.14, Table 4.4.
[brief] (Pa258-Pa319)  It was a seaside community that was shut down and left vacant after each summer.  [...] was the 8,000 square foot cottage of the [...] (railroad capitalist), [...] (as in, [...]), [...] (as in, the tire manufacturers), and [...] (as in, the department store chain) that sat as part of an eight-acre estate when it was built over 115 years ago.
[brief] *Terry*, 392 U.S. at 9.  “Under the *Terry* doctrine, provided articulable suspicion exists, police officers are permitted to use an official “show of authority,” to detain the person with physical force, and to search the person for weapons. ”  *State v. Tucker*, 136 N.J. 158, 173 (1994).  A reasonable and particularized suspicion is founded on articulable facts rather than “‘on arbitrary police practices, the officer's subjective good faith, or a mere hunch. ’”  *State v. Shaw*, 237 N.J. 588, 612 (2019) (quoting *State v. Coles*, 218 N.J. 322, 343 (2014)).  In *Terry v. Ohio*, the Supreme Court of the United States held that it is not unreasonable for a police officer to seize a person and conduct a limited search for weapons without probable cause for an arrest.  392 U.S. at 15; see also *State v.* Rodriguez, 172 N.J. 117, 127 (2002) (holding articulable suspicion lower standard than probable cause necessary to sustain an arrest); State v. Citarella, 154 N.J. 272, 279 (1998) (same).  As an intermediate response between arresting a suspect and ignoring a potential crime, an investigatory detention to obtain more information may be “the essence of good police work. ”  Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 145-46 (1972) (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 23).  An investigatory stop is permitted if investigating officers had a reasonable and particularized suspicion to believe that the defendant had just engaged in, or was about to engage in, criminal activity.  392 U.S. at 21.
[brief] The judge’s ruling denying the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict pursuant to R. 3:18-1 was erroneous, in that even giving the State the benefit of all reasonable inferences, there was insufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could deduce beyond a reasonable doubt that [...] had been guilty of conspiracy.  Accordingly, the verdict must be reversed.  This Court is respectfully requested to exercise original jurisdiction and grant the requested judgment.  In the alternative, the Court is respectfully urged to find that the verdict on the conspiracy charge was unsupported by sufficient credible evidence in the record, pursuant to R. 3:20-1, and that it represented a clear miscarriage of justice.  The matter must be remanded for a new trial.
[brief] (Pa1-3; Pa4-7; Pa8-10)  [...]’s report established a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the deterioration of the steps caused water infiltration and freezing and resulted in an unreasonably dangerous condition upon the property receiving a mere “trace” of freezing rain.  [...] also concluded that the handrails were too far from the pedestrian pathway and made the stairs unreasonably dangerous because a pedestrian like [...] would not be able to reach the rails to steady himself when encountering an icy condition like that on January 5, 2022.  [...]’s expert report, on the other hand, conflicts with [...]’s conclusions and attributes [...]’s slip and fall solely to the ongoing precipitation.  This is a true “Battle of the Experts” for a jury to sort out upon a review of all of the evidence.  Indicative of such a “Battle of Experts” in litigation, [...], in the course of reporting his opinion gratuitously criticizes [...]’ contrary expert report with unnecessary ad hominem attacks such as calling his research “a joke” (Pa417), insinuating Berkowitz as being “hungry for a [COF] number, any number [he] can latch on to, to cite that 0.5 [COF]” (Pa419), and calling “nonsensical” [...]’s conclusion that the landing step was defective (Pa424).
[brief] The following passage is of particular relevance to the question of legislative intent:  Consent Position:  There is a need for legislation to direct the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection with respect to public access to guide its actions, *and to ensure that its policies are consistent with the Public Trust Doctrine and relevant case precedent.*  [Aa0149.  Emphasis added.]  This clear statement of intent is further confirmation that the Legislature enacted the Public Access Law to codify, rather than to expand, the common law Public Trust Doctrine in New Jersey.  The Department cannot simply read new authority and new powers for itself into a statute by administrative fiat, let alone in connection with a longstanding common law doctrine.  The Public Access Law upon which the Department relies does not include any language that expressly or implicitly provides the Department with authority that it did not previously enjoy under New Jersey’s common law.  Instead, the plain language and the legislative history of the Public Access Law unambiguously confirm that the Law codified, rather than expanded, the Public Trust Doctrine in New Jersey common law.  That being the case, the Department can only require public access across the [...]'s property in the manner contemplated by the Supreme Court in the Matthews and Raleigh Avenue decisions.
[brief] *Id.*, 2024 WL 2839329, at *2-3 (emphasis added).  *See also Mhrez v. Convergent Outsourcing, Inc.*, 2024 WL 2838327, at *3 (concluding that the asserted letter vendor allegations did not allege “conduct [that] was abusive, deceptive or unfair, which is the harm Congress intended to prevent. ”).  Following this logic, and the conclusion reached by several other trial courts throughout New Jersey, the Superior Court in this matter concluded as follows: