ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The specific vehicle defendant was yelling about was in fact the Mazda Protégée, driven by [...], who had the high beams on because she knew one of the headlights were out.  In his fit of anger, defendant pulled over to the shoulder of the road to let Sciasis’s vehicle pass by.  [...], confused, asked defendant what he was doing?  Defendant did not respond and she noticed he was breathing very heavy and exhibiting very high anxiety.  He was “flipping out. ”  When defendant pulled back out onto the road, he sped up to Sciasis’s bumper and began flashing his high beams.  [...] had resumed listening to her music, but defendant was screaming so loud she could hear him over the music that was playing directly in her ears.  He was screaming that he could not take it anymore and this is why his life was so messed up.  This was why he could not get a job and how he had to fight back.  (7T:127-1 to 128-16).
[brief] *Rendine*, supra, 141 N.J. at 335, 661 A.2d at 1226.  In that regard, the court should evaluate the rate of the prevailing attorney in comparison to rates "for similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, experience, and reputation" in the community.  Id. at 337, 661 A.2d at 1226 (quoting *Rode v. Dellarciprete*, 892 F.2d 1177, 1183 (3d Cir.1990)).
[brief] At the very least, Defendants’ interpretation is not the only way to read the statute, and so, as our Supreme Court directs, the court should examine all the sources discussed in Plaintiffs’ opening brief.  See Lee v. First Union Nat’l Bank, 199 N.J. 251, 258-59 (2009) (“If the language of a statute is ambiguous or susceptible to more than one possible interpretation, courts will look to other sources to determine the Legislature’s intent. ”).  This court should “construe the language . . . in a manner that sensibly applies the No Fault Act and fulfills its policy objectives.
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT FOUND PRAJAPATI CREDIBLE, WEIGHED THE OPINIONS HE PRESENTED, AND REACHED PROPER CONCLUSIONS BASED ON THE EVIDENCE AT TRIAL.  (36T 4:1 to 56:13; 37T 71:25 to 97:1).  Because the Defendants offered no expert who reviewed the defendants’ financial records, they are left to attack the only witness who did, Plaintiffs’ accountant, Hemant [...].  The trial court found [...] credible, even when it didn’t always completely agree with his conclusions.  (36T 23:8-11; 55:21-25; 37T 75:10-13).  At bottom, the attacks on [...] all fail because they do little more than dispute the way the trial court weighed the evidence.  Because the evidence that [...] and the Plaintiffs offered was more than sufficient to support the judgment below, this Court must affirm.  A.
[directive] 2 2C:58-3 N.J.S.A.  OF REQUIREMENTS  STATUTOKY WITH COMI'LIANCI; 1.  2C:58-3.  ofN.J.S.A. requirements comply with the authorities shall licensing All licensing the application, an of status the regarding applicant inquiry an by Upon the regarding issues or outstanding items any of status the applicant to explain the shall authority application.
[brief] Third, the Trial Court’s transient jurisdiction conclusion as it relates to [...] is unsustainable for the additional reason that [...] has not been a partner of [...] since January 1, 2016 and was not personally served with the FAC in New Jersey.  Da167.  In other words, even if there were a basis (and there is not) for finding that transient jurisdiction was obtained over [...] because two of its partners who reside in the State were served with the FAC in 2023, that finding cannot possibly extend to [...]—a non-partner and now former “Of Counsel” employee, individual defendant.  Finally, this Court in Dutch Run squarely rejected the proposition, argued by Plaintiff below, that service on a non-resident’s registered agent in New Jersey establishes general jurisdiction. \(^7\) 450 N.J. Super. at 605–06 (rejecting \(^7\) In an unsuccessful motion to vacate the Trial Court’s jurisdictional discovery orders, Da135, Plaintiff relied upon Mallory v. Norfolk Southern Railway Co., 600 U.S. 122 (2023), in support of a consent-based theory of jurisdiction.  Mallory, however, did nothing to disturb Dutch Run and the principles for which it stands, including because, as the Trial Court found, “New Jersey does not have a consent-by-registration statute akin to Pennsylvania’s. ”  Da12; see also Simplot India LLC v. Himalaya Food Int’l Ltd., 2024 WL 1136791, at *10 (D.N.J. Mar. 15, 2024) (rejecting “argument that the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Mallory overrules the holding of the Display Works line of cases,” argument that “a corporate entity’s registration and acceptance of service of process in the state constitutes consent to submit to the general jurisdiction of the New Jersey courts”); see also Display Works, LLC v. Bartley, 182 F. Supp. 3d 166, 173–79 (D.N.J. 2016) (rejecting argument that defendant “consented to jurisdiction in New Jersey because it is registered to do business in the state, it designated an agent for service of process whom [plaintiff] served in the state, and it engages in business” in New Jersey).  And Dutch Run was addressed, as here, to personal jurisdiction over a foreign law firm partnership, thus undermining the Trial Court’s suggestion that [...]’s status as a foreign LLP and not a corporation is a critical distinction for purposes of the analysis.  Da12.  In sum, the Trial Court had no basis in the facts or the law for concluding that transient jurisdiction was obtained over either Defendant in New Jersey.
[brief] The proposed regulator lacks any merit whatsoever, when carefully considered on its own, as we have just demonstrated.  The current regulator arrangement is reliable, efficient and safe.  The current regulator has a remaining useful life of at least fifteen to twenty years.  The company's claims of potential adverse effects from the continued operation of the existing regulator are comically overblown and lack the most basic credibility.  All of this is true.  But the proposed regulator is particularly indefensible when considered against New Jersey's forward-looking climate change policy, as embedded in the Clean Energy Act, the Global Warming Response Act, the 2019 Energy Master Plan and the "80x 50" Report," issued on October 15, 2020.
[directive] Physical security measures also should be taken, such as using securely locked filing cabinets in secured offices.  If a law enforcement agency uses computers to maintain internal affairs records of any kind, special security measures must be taken.  A stand-alone personal computer is the most secure system to limit unauthorized access to internal affairs records.  If a stand-alone computer is not feasible, reasonable measures, including the use of fire walls and/or password protected software, should be utilized to control access to investigative files and related materials.  9.6
[brief] The trial court recognized that “the CNA may create a conflict of interest if this matter proceeds to trial. ”  Pa310, 316.  Yet, defendants’ attorneys are unable to appropriately advocate for, or against, their co-clients’ proportionate fault, and tellingly, have identified no solution to that problem in their briefs.  As the U.S. Supreme Court observed, --- 2  The [...]’ reliance on the single New Jersey case that denied standing to disqualify an attorney, In re Duke, 305 N.J. Super. 408 (Ch. Div. 1995)), is misplaced.  SDb009-011.  There, the objector lacked standing to contest anything, and suffered no harm, as she had no rights under the trust because New Jersey did not recognize adult adoption when the trust was formed.  Id. at 440.  “[a] few bits of unforeseen testimony or a single previously unknown or unnoticed document may significantly shift the relationship between multiple defendants. ”  Wheat v. U.S., 486 U.S. 153, 163 (1988).  Defendants’ blasé attitude toward their conflicts harms Plaintiffs because it will inevitably lead to delays and attendant cost caused by substitution of new, conflict-free counsel, not to mention a potential mistrial or reversal.  Plaintiffs also have an interest in facilitating meaningful settlement and encouraging cooperation and testimony from multiple defendants, which the [...] wrongly portray as nefarious.  Courts recognize settlements and cooperating testimony as a legitimate strategic approach, often used by prosecutors in criminal cases.  See, e. g., United States v. Pacheco-Romero, 374 F. Supp. 3d 1326, 1329 (N.D. Ga. 2019) (observing that “the government may be willing to offer a favorable plea deal to one or more defendants in return for their cooperation and testimony against co-defendants” and counsel “could not fulfill their duty to effectively represent all of the defendants by advising one defendant to take a plea deal that would be detrimental to their other clients”); State v. Rodriguez, 466 N.J. Super. 71, 109 (App. Div. 2021) (noting plea bargaining can be an incentive for a defendant to . . . cooperate in the prosecution of codefendants or other more culpable offenders. ”).
[brief] **THE STATE’S LEGALLY ERRONEOUS DUI HYPOTHETICAL SIGNIFICANTLY UNDERMINED THE JURY’S CONSIDERATION OF THE RECKLESS MANSLAUGHTER OFFENSE, AND THE FAILURE TO PROVIDE A LIMITING INSTRUCTION WAS REVERSIBLE ERROR.**  Again, with respect to the State’s argument in Point V, it is important to note what the State does not contest.  The State does not significantly argue against the fact that the DUI example the prosecutor made in summation with respect to reckless manslaughter was an erroneous statement of the applicable law.  Indeed, this Court has made clear that the State’s example involved an entirely different form of recklessness than the kind required for reckless manslaughter.  *State v. Choinacki*, 324 N.J. Super. 19, 48 (App. Div. 1999); *State v. Jiminez*, 257 N.J. Super. 567, 583 (App. Div. 1992).  Rather, the State argues that placed in the context of the entire summation the example was not harmful because the prosecutor elsewhere did not make legally erroneous statements when talking about reckless manslaughter.  Such an argument has no merit.  Again, the lesser-included offense of reckless manslaughter was one of [...]’s primary defenses against the charge of murder, and the prosecutor’s improper DUI hypothetically substantially undermined the jury’s ability to evaluate that issue, especially with no limiting instruction by the trial court.  That risk does not evaporate because elsewhere the State did not misrepresent the law.  See State v. Rivera, 437 N.J. Super. 434, 463-65 (App. Div. 2014) (misstatements on self-defense law by prosecutor harmful error in spite of proper judicial instructions on the issue).  Accordingly, [...]’s conviction for murder must otherwise be reversed on this basis as well.  POINT VI
[brief] Respondent omits from its analysis that the Appellate Division addressed the “misuse of the motion in limine” to disguise a motion for summary judgment brought in violation of R. 4:46-1.  Id. at 467.  The current matter is not a medical malpractice matter as in Bellardini and Cho, the matter currently before the Court is a condemnation matter.  A motion to strike an expert report in a medical malpractice case is tantamount to a motion to dismiss because in medical malpractice matters, a plaintiff must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, negligence on the part of the medical service provider.  Ordinarily, an expert is required to establish the duty of care that was owed to a plaintiff and how it was breached through the conduct of the defendant.
[brief] Am. Cyanamid Co. v. State, Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 231 N.J. Super. 292 (App. Div. 1989)  Del. Riverkeeper Network v. N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 463 N.J. Super. 96 (App. Div. 2020)  Dragon v. N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 405 N.J. Super. 478, 491 (App. Div. 2009)  Gaf Corp. v. N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 214 N.J. Super. 446, 451 (App. Div. 1986)  In re Adoption of Amendments to Ne., Upper Raritan, Sussex Cty., 435 N.J. Super. 571 (App. Div. 2014)  In re Adoption of N.J.A.C. 7:15-5.24(b), 420 N.J. Super. 552 (App. Div. 2011)  In re Eastwick Coll. LPN-to RN Bridge Program, 225 N.J. 533, 541-42 (2016)  In re Freshwater Wetlands Gen. Permits, 372 N.J. Super. 578, 597 (App. Div. 2004)  In re N.J. Pinelands Com’n Resolution, 356 N.J. Super. 363 (App. Div. 2003)  In re Proposed Constr. of Compressor Station (CS327), 2023 N.J. Super. LEXIS 94 (App. Div. Aug. 31, 2023)  Musconetcong Watershed Ass’n v. N.J. Dep’t of Env’t Prot., 2023 N.J. Super. LEXIS 81 (App. Div. Aug. 3, 2023)  Usdin v. State, Dep't of Envtl. Prot., Div. of Water Res., 173 N.J. Super. 311 (Super. Ct. 1980)  Pamphlet Laws: L. 1962, c.  19 Statutes: 33 U.S.C. 1251  33 U.S.C. 1313(d)(1)(A) N.J.S.A. 13:1D-9 N.J.S.A. 58:11A-1 to -16 N.J.S.A. 58:16A-52
[brief] It further denied [...]’s request for a retroactive rent increase.  14T:25:3-7.  The Court blamed the Board for putting [...] in a position where any retroactive application of the rent increase would be too severe:  But this problem arose, clearly to me, because the Board -- the [...] was attempting --- and I am not saying Mr. [...] had anything to do with it – but, perhaps, they were trying to help out a neighbor and to thwart the legitimate applications for rent increases.  And it is the Board who cavalierly disregarded, one, the law, as found by [...], [...] and [...] now, myself, that now puts this man in a predicament that he faces where he’s probably unable to afford the rent…  [14T:25:8-17]  So shame on the Board and I actually do mean that.  Because they have hurt not only the taxpayers because they had to pay the additional attorney’s fees for three times in the Superior Court, but because they have … prejudiced Mr. [...], through no fault of his own…  [14T:25:20-24]  [...] then filed this Appeal, and [...] cross-appealed the Court’s denial of its application for a retroactive rent increase.
[brief] | Cases | Page | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | Allesandro v. Gross, 187 N.J. Super. 96, 105-106 (App. Div. 1982) | 25,28| | Anselmo v. Hardin, 253 F.2d 165, 168 (3d Cir. 1958) | 22 | | Bank Leumi USA v. Kloss, 243 N.J. 218, 226 (2020) | 31 | | Blair v. Taxation Div. Director, 9 N.J. Tax 345, 350 n. 6 (1987) | 21 | | Borough of Wildwood Crest v. Smith, 210 N.J. Super. 127, 142-44 (App. Div. 1986) | 12,13,14,19 | | Brookshire Equities, LLC, 346 N.J. Super. 310, 318 (App. Div. 2002) | 20 | | Carrington Mortg. Servs., LLC v. Moore, 464 N.J. Super. 59, 67 (App. Div. 2020) | 30,31 | | Circle Chevrolet Co. v. Giordano, Halleran & Ciesla, 274 N.J. Super. 405, 413 (App. Div. 1994), aff’d, 142 N.J. 280 (1995) | 32 | | City Club of Auburn v. McGeer, 198 N.Y. 609, 610, 92 N.E. 105 (1910) | 17 | | Conway v. Miller, 356 Mont. 231, 232 P.3d 390, 397 (2010) | 10 | | Cushman v. Davis, 80 Cal. App.3d 731, 735, 145 Cal. Rptr. 791, 793 (1978) | 16 | | Culver v. Ins. Co.
[brief] The discovery was necessary because defendants did not list [...] as an individual having relevant knowledge of the facts of the case and failed to produce a witness having relevant knowledge of the amounts of defendants financial obligations to [...] (Volume I Pa.132; see defendant’s answer to interrogatory #2; Volume I, Pa. 121).  [...] complied with all the discovery requirements of defendants and appeared for his deposition on the discovery end date of May 26, 2022.  The sole reason discovery was not completed by the discovery end date was defendants refusal to provide responsive discovery to [...] which was sought prior to the discovery end date.  The sole discovery needed after May 26, 2022 was [...]’s deposition and the production of the ledgers utilized in responding to [...]’s requests on the amount owed to him by defendants.  As a result of the Covid-19 pandemic, the case was not assigned a trial date at the time court decided the summary judgment motion on February 28, 2023.
[brief] The primary goals of the Township’s Master Plan are the preservation of the agricultural industry, and the protection of the rural character of the community.  This Redevelopment Plan does not remove any active farmland from productive use, nor is this property targeted for agricultural use or preservation.  Additionally, the setbacks and buffering required shall serve to maintain a rural aesthetic on Old York Road and Bordentown-Georgetown Road.  The Township finds that the rehabilitation area is an appropriate location for warehouse development as illustrated in Figure 4 for several reasons, including the property’s accessibility to the New Jersey Turnpike and Interstate 295 via Route 206.  Based on the access restrictions imposed by this Redevelopment Plan, the operations of such a facility will generate minimal truck traffic impacts on local roadways in [...].  Similarly, the size and shape of the property allow for substantial setbacks and buffering of the facility to minimize visual impacts to the character of the community.  The requirements of the Redevelopment Plan will ensure that sensitive environmental features of the property will be protected.  In addition, the Township’s sustainability and renewable energy objectives will be advanced by the renewable energy requirements of this Plan.  Furthermore, the redevelopment of the rehabilitation area encourages the preservation and adaptive reuse of an existing historic structure (See, Section 4.5).
[brief] *See Enslin v. Coca-Cola Co.*, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 193556, at *8 (E.D. Pa. June 8, 2016) (“There is no obligation on the part of a responding party to examine every scrap of paper in its potentially voluminous files, and in an era where vast amounts of electronic information is available for review, courts cannot and do not expect that any party can meet a standard of perfection. ”).  This is fundamental to the basic structure of the American discovery system: Each party searches its own documents for discoverable material.  The facts of *Lipsky* are illustrative of the trial court’s error in equating search with relevance.  There, this Court found that a trial court abused its discretion by ordering the production of personal cell phones *after* the producing party had already searched the devices and produced relevant and responsive material.  *Lipsky*, 474 N.J. Super. at 451.  There, as here, the trial court had given *no* justification in ordering an overly broad production.  “At most, there were disputes regarding the thoroughness of the searches….  However, those are run-of-the-mill concerns that could be raised with respect to any document production. ”  *Id.* at 469.  Accordingly, this Court concluded that the “relevance” limitation on discovery would have little meaning if parties were required to produce their documents *en masse*, letting the opposing party review relevant and irrelevant documents alike.  *Id.* at 464.
[brief] [...] (“[...]”) and [...]’s (“[...]”, together with [...], “Respondents”) admit (because they must) that: (i) the Public Work Contractors Registration Act, N.J.S.A. 34:11-56.48 et seq.  (“PWCRA”), requires all contractors performing public projects and each of their subcontractors who perform work on site be registered with the Department of Labor (“DOL”); (ii) the purpose for the registration is to permit the DOL to monitor and enforce compliance with existing state and federal labor laws concerning wages, unemployment and temporary disability insurance, workers’ compensation insurance, and the payment of payroll taxes; (iii) the Solicitation published by [...] identified the archaeologist as a subcontractor who is required to perform work at the construction site; (iv) [...] did not identify a PWCRA-registered archaeologist in its bid; and (v) [...]  (“[...]”) identified a PWCRA-registered archaeologist in its bid.  Instead of acknowledging the settled consequences of violating the PWCRA, the Respondents argue that the trial court properly allowed [...] to award the Anticipated Contract to [...] even though that decision runs afoul of the statutory language and legislative history, as well as caselaw and DOL decisions interpreting the PWCRA, all of which confirm that the archeological subcontractor – who was explicitly identified as a subcontractor in the Solicitation and is required to perform work on Project site – was required to be PWCRA-registered at the time of bidding.  Respondents primary arguments are that: (i) archeologists do not perform work on the Project (even though the Solicitation requires the archologists to perform work on site); (ii) archeologists are professionals who are exempt from the PWCRA (even though the DOL determined that professionals who work on public projects must also be PWCRA-registered); and (iii) archeologists are not listed trades or crafts (even though the PWCRA is not limited to trades or crafts and applies equally to all subcontractors who perform work on public projects).  Ultimately, for these and the additional reasons set forth herein, the Legislature’s stated purpose and intent when enacting the PWCRA must be safeguarded and enforced.  To do so, the trial court’s decision must be overturned.
[brief] She died a day a two later.  (10T107-2 to 20).  The Respondent confirmed [...]’s testimony as to the Rubbermaid Box.  (11T119-11 to 120-2).  The original of the Antenuptial Agreement was believed to be inside the Rubber Maid Box.  (11T119-11 to 120-2).  After the Decedent’s death, her friend [...] went to the Decedent’s house three times.
[brief] Defendant [...] testified that in September 2016, two months after the July 5, 2016 Maplewood fireworks display, there was a discussion amongst the members of the [...] where they acknowledged that other towns in northern New Jersey no longer had fireworks on July 4th due to incidents where attendees felt “unsafe” due to “fights and other problems” and “Maplewood was drawing a bigger crowd” than it had in the past.  ([...] Dep. 80:6-81:2, 636a).  There was a concern amongst the members of the Township Committee in the aftermath of the July 5, 2016 incident that the event was getting too big from a safety perspective due to larger crowds, specifically “with the crowd being bigger, there would be a lot more crowd for the police to handle, and if there were an incident, it would be … more difficult to handle given the size of the crowd.  Not that in a large crowd crime is more likely to occur, but it would be more difficult for the police to respond to that crime or that situation”.  (Id. at 82:11-84:15, 637a).
[directive] The victim may request a copy of the forensic examination records and photographs be provided directly to themselves or may consent to release records directly to the Superior Court, Family Division, for the purpose of obtaining a final restraining order.  N.J.S.A. 2C:1-6.  4  See August 21, 2023  Page 5  Victims shall also be informed how the medical information and evidence collected will be stored.  Victims shall be advised how to obtain copies of their forensic exam record in the future.  Finally, victims shall be notified that he/she/they may be financially responsible for any medical evaluations and tests beyond the immediate forensic exam.  IV.
[brief] (Aa1).  The Project proposes two new access roads, one from U.S. Route 1 northbound that crosses an unnamed tributary flowing into the Duck Pond Run waterbody, and a second from Quakerbridge Road.  (Aa25).  A new sanitary sewer system is also to be installed onsite to serve the Project area which will be connected to [...]’s sewer system.  Ibid.  After [...] submitted its Project application, [...] and [...] spent months exchanging information.
[brief] Plaintiffs fail to show that [...] and [...] are likely to possess information that is both unique and relevant...  a.  [...] has been more than reasonably diligent in searching for relevant, responsive documents...  b.  Plaintiffs do not show that [...] and [...] are likely to have documents that fill substantial gaps in [...]’s comprehensive document production...  B.  Following the Court-ordered document production process will not delay completion of discovery...  IV.