ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Plaintiffs do not assert meritorious arguments supporting any such rulings below.  They merely rely on the erroneous decisions from the Law Division.  Furthermore, the record below, for this appeal, did not contain pleadings from Plaintiffs’ case with the superior mortgagee.  If Plaintiffs really believed that they were relevant, on this remand, Plaintiffs could have easily obtained them the Superior Court Clerk, just like Appellant obtained his actual 2005 judgment from the Clerk.  As the record shows, Plaintiffs vindictively argued below that the total amount of the judgment was several thousands less based on their illogical reading of the abstract.  Plaintiffs lost that argument also, but not after more needless time & expense.  Plaintiffs’ prior & unsuccessful case could never have had any impact whatsoever on this case.  No matter what, the judgment was subordinate to the 2 mortgages.
[brief] Finally, adding to the compounding prejudice, after the prosecutor’s summation but just before the jury charge, the trial judge sua sponte -- in the presence of the jury -- began commending counsel for their closing remarks.  (5T 115-5 to 17)  The judge further told the jury that after closing arguments, he brings counsel into chambers and “shake[s] hands” with them for the “only time” during trial for performing their summation “responsibility. ”  (5T 115-11 to 17)  Although the judge’s statements were undoubtedly well-intended, they had the clear capacity to further prejudice [...] by effectively endorsing the prosecutor’s summation as not only lawful but commendable.  Such validation by the court only heightened the risk that jurors relied on the prosecutor’s improper arguments instead of their own view of the evidence -- particularly given the State’s thin case against [...].  See Greene, 242 N.J. at 553; Farrell, 61 N.J. at 105.  For all those reasons, [...]’s convictions must be reversed.
[directive] b.  An actor is guilty of sexual assault if he commits an act of sexual contact with a victim who is less than 13 years old and the actor is at least four years older than the victim.  c.  An actor is guilty of sexual assault if he commits an act of sexual penetration with another person under any one of the following circumstances: (1)  The actor uses physical force or coercion, but the victim does not sustain severe personal injury; (2)  The victim is on probation or parole, or is detained in a hospital, prison, or other institution and the actor has supervisory or disciplinary power over the victim by virtue of the actor’s legal, professional, or occupational status; (3)  The victim is at least 16, but less than 18 years old, and: (a) The actor is related to the victim by blood or affinity to the third degree; or (b) The actor has supervisory or disciplinary power of any nature or in any capacity over the victim; or (c) The actor is a resource family parent, a guardian, or stands in loco parentis within the household; (4)  The victim is at least 13, but less than 16 years old, and the actor is at least four years older than the victim.  Sexual assault is a crime of the second degree.
[brief] Defendant’s attempt to isolate each circumstance presented to [...], Db13-14, is unavailing, and ignores the totality of the circumstances that the detectives faced.  See Valentine, 134 N.J. at 547 (“Terry itself acknowledges that police officers must be permitted to use their knowledge and experience in deciding whether to frisk a suspect”); id. at 543 (explaining that although “the Terry standard is an objective one, … ‘[t]he process does not deal with hard certainties, but with probabilities’”) (second alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981)).  Moreover, the trial court did not err in basing the finding – partly – on defendant’s actions after he was ordered out of his vehicle.  It is well-established that police may order the driver of a vehicle, stopped for a traffic violation, to step out the vehicle, even in the absence of furtive movements of criminal activity.
[brief] ”  Bove v. AkPharma Inc., 460 N.J. Super. 123, 148 (App. Div. 2019); see also First Atl. Fed. Credit Union, 391 N.J. Super. at 432 (holding that where an “objectively reasonable belief” in the merits of the case exists, attorney’s fees will not be awarded).  Moreover, sanctions should not be “imposed because a party is wrong about the law and loses his or her case.
[brief] The experts may have also testified about statements allegedly made by other lay witnesses or other mental health professionals that were considered by them in coming to their diagnosis and conclusions.  In this case, however, such statements were deemed admissible for the limited purpose of how the experts might have considered such statements in coming to their diagnosis and conclusions.  As I have instructed during the course of this trial, some of those statements relied upon by the experts may have been made by persons who testified as witnesses in this trial.  Some of those witnesses may have denied, changed, or added to that out-of-court statement when they testified as witnesses in this courtroom.  The in-court testimony of those witnesses is substantive evidence.  Any other out-of-court statements you may hear through testimony of those expert witnesses can only be considered by you through the lens of how the experts analyzed or relied on them in coming to their expert opinions and not for the truth of the statements in and of themselves.  If the doctor has testified that he or she accepts as true certain facts or statements on which the doctor bases his or her opinion, your acceptance or rejection of the doctor’s opinion will depend to some extent on your findings as to the truth of those statements.  (15T205-1 to 9, 223-19 to 224-20; 16T7-1 to 21).
[brief] As set forth in the Statement of Facts, [...] tendered its invoices to [...] for the months of April, May, June and July 2020 based upon the COVID Statute, which mandates that local school districts subject to closure due to a public health emergency pay their contracted service providers as if the school facilities had remained open.  The wording of the Statute is not permissive: Rather, it provides that the school district “shall continue to make payments . . . pursuant to the terms of a contract . . . as if the services . . . had been provided.
[brief] Before the court are the Motions filed by [...] (the “Debtor”) to: (1) Reinstate the Automatic Stay as to creditor [...] (“[...]”) in the above-referenced main bankruptcy case, Main Case Doc. No. 71; (2) Motion to Reconsider, Main Case Doc. No. 91; and (3) for a Preliminary Injunction filed in the above-captioned Adversary Proceeding, Adv. Pro. Doc. No. 13.  The relief requested by all three Motions are inter-related as they basically rely on the identical premise of a substantial change in the law as a result of the decisions by the United States Supreme Court in *Tyler v. Hennepin County, Minnesota*, 598 U.S. 631 (2023) (“*Tyler*”) and by the Appellate Division of the Superior Court of New Jersey in *257-261 20TH Avenue Realty, LLC, v. Roberto*, 477 N.J. Super. 339, 307 A.3d 19 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2023) (“*Roberto*”) holding that the retention of the excess value (or surplus) above the tax lien in a tax sale foreclosed property by a municipality or a third-party purchaser of tax sale certificate like [...] violated the Takings Clauses of the United States and New Jersey constitutions.  The court also queried whether it should abstain from deciding the issue.  After conducting a hearing on the Motions on May 28, 2024, reviewing the submissions of the parties, and listening to their arguments, the court concludes that as a result of the substantial change in the law and this matter being “in the pipeline” when that substantial change in the law occurred, permissive abstention is not warranted and relief under the *Tyler* and *Roberto* cases must be afforded to the Debtor.  JURISDICTION AND VENUE
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[brief] (NOT RAISED BELOW)  As noted in the Statement of Facts, the State chose to try to bolster its case by admitting into evidence side-by-side photos (S-257; Da 18) -- of original surveillance footage that was allegedly of [...]’s Chevy Malibu and new surveillance footage, created by the State, of that Malibu driving by the same cameras -- in order to try to prove that it indeed was the Malibu in both.  (8T 43-9 to 46-18; 8T 78-17 to 79-19)  Out of the presence of the jury, the defense objected to the admission of those “reenactment” photos, but the judge overruled the objection.  (8T 25-13 to 38-10)  The propriety of that ruling is not challenged here, but what the judge did in front of the jury when it came time for the State to ask questions of [...] about the reenactment photos was outrageous.  In direct contravention of case law that makes it clear that a judge has no business informing a jury that the court has made a ruling on admissibility out of the jury’s presence, the judge sua sponte told the jurors:  “Ladies and gentlemen, there was an objection to the admission of this.  The court has determined that it is properly admissible, and it is admitted into evidence.  It is appropriate for the jury to view the photos. ”  (8T 46-19 to 23)  (emphasis added)  In doing so, the judge severely impinged upon the jury’s factfinding role in assessing the proper weight to give this evidence, thereby violating defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury, his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process, and his corresponding state-constitutional rights.  Consequently, as a matter of plain error, R. 2:10-2, defendant’s convictions should reversed and the matter remanded for retrial.
[brief] (emphasis added).  As our Supreme Court explained in Hillside Twp.:  It must be conceded that the amount of the deposit involved in the present case is not large and that the dispute is only between [...] and the township.  But the statute evinces a clear intention to provide maximum protection for the taxpayer.  So the principle at stake looms large in the regulation of practices pertaining to the award of contracts which make necessary the expenditure of public money.  Accordingly, we must think upon the rule to be adopted in relation to the firm and salutary public policy involved.
[brief] The State submits that although the shoplifting statute is silent as to the inclusion of sales tax, the general theft statute, *N.J.S.A.* 2C:20–2, which includes sales tax as part of the valuation for theft offenses, should guide the application of the shoplifting provision with respect to the inclusion of sales tax as a part of determining value.  Shoplifting is defined as purposely taking possession of merchandise offered for sale by a store with the intention of depriving the merchant of the possession, use or benefit of such merchandise or converting the same “without paying to the merchant the full retail value thereof. ”  *N.J.S.A.* 2C:20–11b(1).  Shoplifting constitutes a crime of the third degree “if the full retail value of the merchandise exceeds $500 but is less than $75,000” and a crime of the fourth degree “if the full retail value of the merchandise is at least $200 but does not exceed $500. ”  *N.J.S.A.* 2C:20–11c(2) and c(3).  “Full retail value” is defined by the statute as “the merchant's stated or advertised price of the merchandise. ”  *N.J.S.A.* 2C:20–11a(7).  The gradation scheme for shoplifting parallels the gradation scheme for theft under the general theft statute, *Statement to S.267* (Jan. 11, 2000), under which theft constitutes a crime of the third degree if “[t]he amount involved exceeds $500.00 but is less than $75,000.00” and a crime of the fourth degree if “the amount involved is at least $200.00 but does not exceed $500.00.
[brief] 253 N.J. at 172.  The probable cause that developed — that there were drugs in [...]’s car — was not unforeseeable.  The SET members believed that [...] had just engaged in a narcotics transaction using his car.  Thus, as in Smart, the officers were detaining [...] next to his car because they “reasonably anticipated and expected they would find drugs” in the car.  Ibid.  Nor were the circumstances leading to probable cause spontaneous — they did not develop “suddenly or rapidly,” id. at 173, instead developing over the course of a surveillance operation by multiple officers.  [...]’s stop of [...] “was deliberate, orchestrated, and wholly connected” to the later seizure of drugs from [...]’s car.  Id. at 172.  As in Smart, the mere fact that MacRae only had reasonable suspicion that [...] was selling drugs out of his car before [...]’s alleged admission “does not eviscerate the steps that led” to that probable cause.  Id. at 173-74.  In short, the SET members in this case saw what they believed to be a drug transaction from [...]’s car and then stopped [...] next to his car because of their suspicions.  The subsequent ripening of that reasonable suspicion into probable cause that the car contained contraband was not a surprise; it was the exact thing the SET members were expecting to happen.  Thus, because the probable cause did not arise from unforeseeable and spontaneous circumstances, New Jersey’s automobile exception was not satisfied.  The warrantless search of [...]’s car was illegal, and all evidence found should be suppressed.
[brief] A.  Equitable Estoppel  “Estoppel is an equitable doctrine, founded in the fundamental duty of fair dealing imposed by law. ”  *Knorr v. Smeal*, 178 N.J. 169 (2003) citing *Casamasino v. City of Jersey City*, 158 N.J. 333, 354 (1999).  The doctrine is designed to prevent injustice by not permitting a party to repudiate a course of action on which another party has relied to his detriment.  *Mattia v. Northern Ins.  Co. of New York*, 35 N.J.Super. 503, 510 (App.Div.1955).  The doctrine is invoked in “the interests of justice, morality and common fairness. ”  *Palatine I v. Planning Bd.*, 133 N.J. 546, 560 (1993) (quoting *Gruber v. Mayor of Raritan Township*, 39 N.J. 1, 13 (1962)).
[brief] 3T24:6-26:7.  [...] did not have access to [...] accounts and did not observe [...] mishandling funds.  2T164:24-165:19.  Yet, [...] did express concerns to [...] about how [...] funds were handled, but he received no substantive response.  2T166:1-167:2.  [...] was not aware of any other type of mishandling of funds by [...].
[brief] With no insurable cause of action in the case, the [...]-provided counsel was removed and [...] (now unemployed and having exhausted all resources) was forced to proceed *pro se*.  Prior to their departure from the case, however, [...]’s insurance-appointed counsel did file an Answer to Plaintiffs’ Amended Verified Complaint on behalf of [...].  (Da719).  On June 10, 2020, the court entered an order granting partial summary judgment to Plaintiffs (Da310) and shortly thereafter, on June 15, 2020, entered an order dismissing Defendant [...] with prejudice.  (Da620).  In July 2020, the matter was scheduled for trial.  (Da279).  A pre-trial conference was held on September 11, 2020 (5T) and trial took place on September 21 (1T) and 23 (2T), 2020.  [...] did not appear at trial and, instead, left Plaintiffs to present their proofs to the trial court.
[brief] On May 23, 2024, the [...] ([...]) filed an amicus curiae letter brief on behalf of [...].  (Ab).  On June 20, 2024, this Court entered an Order granting [...]’s motion to appear as amicus curiae and file a brief in this case.  The Order also allowed the parties to submit response briefs on or before July 5, 2024.  (Paa1). ¹  The State filed an extension motion on July 5, 2024.  ¹  The following citation form is used:  Ab – [...]’s amicus brief  Pb – State’s main response brief  Paa – appendix to this brief  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I AMICUS’S BRIEF
[brief] On the brief: [...], Esq. [...], Esq.  # TABLE OF CONTENTS | Section | Page(s) | |------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------| | TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | ii-iii | | PRELIMINARY STATEMENT | 1 | | LEGAL ARGUMENT | 2 | | I.  Unsubstantiated Assertions Concerning The Purported Disclosure Of “Financial” Information And General Attitude Toward Litigation Are Not Grounds For Disqualification (Rb23-24) | 2 | | II.  Respondents Have Not Demonstrated Substantial Similarity (Rb11-14) | 5 | | III.  Respondents Fail To Specifically Identify The Purported Confidential Information Or Demonstrate How That Information Is Prejudicial (Rb14 – 20, 23) | 8 | | IV.  The Court Should Consider The Due Process Argument As Respondents’ Contention That It Was Not Raised Is False (Rb26 - 27) | 9 | | V.
[brief] First attempted Amendment to Redevelopment Plan  As required under the Four Party Purchase Agreement, on May 9, 2022, almost a year after the Four Party Purchase agreement was executed, the Borough’s Town Council approved on “first reading” Ordinance 22-1511 (the “First Ordinance”) entitled “An Ordinance to Amend the Redevelopment Plan”. (Pa 112).  The purported purpose of the First Ordinance was to approve an amendment to the Redevelopment Plan so as to (i) reduce the size of the development that the Redeveloper would be required to build, and (ii) include the purchase by the County of half of the Redevelopment Property (more than 11 acres) for Open Space, as opposed to the much smaller (approximately 4 acres) “greenway” running along the banks of Mill Pond, which was provided for under the Redevelopment Plan and the Master Plan.  Compare the 350 Unit [...] (Pa 5) with the new Redevelopment Plan (attached as the last page of Four Party Purchase Agreement, Pa 64).  (See also Pa 112).  The [...] (the “Planning Board”), without making any reviewable findings of fact, adopted on June 1, 2022, Resolution No. PB09-2022 (the “First Planning Board Resolution”) and therein “opined that the new Ordinance is substantially consistent with the Borough’s land use plan and housing plan element of the Master Plan. ” (Pa 112).  At the “second reading” of the First Ordinance, on June 23, 2022, the [...], as the governing body of the Borough, adopted the First Ordinance.  (Pa 112).  Plaintiff filed a Complaint In Lieu of Prerogative Writ on July 29, 2022, under Docket Number [...], challenging, *inter alia*, the First Ordinance for numerous procedural defects in its adoption (the “Prior Action”).  *(Pa 112)*.  **H.
[brief] The Hardship Increase Request by [...] and Ordered by the Lower Court Would Violate the Tenant Protection Act of 1992, Which Was Specifically Designed to Provide Protection to Residential Tenants, Particularly Those of Low and Moderate Income from Eviction Resulting from Condominium and Cooperative Conversions.  The hardship increase, and particularly the return on equity calculation approach adopted by the lower court and [...] also violates the Tenant Protection Act of 1992 ("TPA").  The TPA was enacted to prevent condominium conversions from destroying affordable housing and evicting vulnerable tenants.  The NJ Legislature specifically noted in its amendments to the TPA in 2000 that the earlier TPA “had yet to adequately preserve the supply of affordable housing in certain municipalities in which condominium and cooperative conversions have been especially common. ”
[brief] Finally, defendant claims that the trial judge erred in permitting the detective to introduce improper lay opinion testimony regarding defendant's guilt, credibility, motive, opportunity, and premeditation, thereby usurping the role of the jury to decide the ultimate issue.  Lay opinion testimony may be admitted under N.J.R.E. 701 "in the form of opinions or inferences" if "it: (a) is rationally based on the witness' perception; and (b) will assist in understanding the witness' testimony or determining a fact in issue."  However, our courts have not permitted lay opinion testimony "on a matter 'not within [the witness's] direct ken . . . and as to which the jury is as competent as he to form a conclusion."  State v. McLean, 205 N.J. 438, 459 (2011) (alterations in original) (quoting Brindley Firemen's Ins. Co., 35 N.J. Super. 1, 8 (App. Div. 1955)).  Moreover, witnesses may not "intrude on the province of the jury by offering, in the guise of opinions, views on the meaning of facts that the jury is fully able to sort out" or "express a view on the ultimate question of guilt or innocence."  Id. at 461.
[brief] This Court will “generally defer to a trial court’s disposition of discovery matters unless the court has abused its discretion or its determination is based on a mistaken understanding of the applicable law. ”  *Rivers v. LSC Partnership*, 378 N.J. Super. 68, 80 (App. Div. 2005).  Similarly, the standard for reviewing a trial court’s denial of a motion for reconsideration is whether the trial court abused its discretion.  *Cummings v. Bahr*, 295 N.J. Super. 374, 389 (App. Div. 1996).  Under the “abuse of discretion” standard, the Court “may find an abuse of discretion when a decision ‘rest[s] on an impermissible basis’ or was ‘based upon a consideration of irrelevant or inappropriate factors. ’”  *State v. Steele*, 430 N.J. Super. 24, 34–35 (App. Div. 2013) (quoting *Flagg v. Essex Cnty. Prosecutor*, 171 N.J. 561, 571 (2002)).  The New Jersey Supreme Court has instructed that “a functional approach to abuse of discretion examines whether there are good reasons for an appellate court to defer to the particular decision at issue. ”  *Flagg*, 171 N.J. at 571.  As set forth below, the [...] respectfully submit that the trial court has not abused its discretion in entering the March 25, 2024 and April 19, 2024 Orders, and such Orders should therefore be affirmed.  **LEGAL ARGUMENT**