ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] On January 5, 2021, Appellant [...], filed a ten count Complaint in Probate Court against his brother-in-law and sister on behalf of his elderly parents asserting that Defendants had misled the elderly [...] as to who was the true owner of [...].  The ten counts were:  Count One: Breach of Contract Count Two: Accounting Count Three: Detrimental Reliance  Count Four: Unjust Enrichment Count Five: Constructive Fraud  Count Six: Breach of Fiduciary Duty Count Seven: Common Law Fraud Count Eight: Consumer Fraud Count Nine: Undue Influence Count Ten: Negligence (Pa64)
[brief] In *Cuff*, the verdict sheet failed to include a possible verdict for a lesser included offense charged by the court, and the Supreme Court found no plain error.  *Id.* at 342.  Here, unlike in *Cuff*, the omission related to a defense, not a substantive crime, and there is no requirement that a verdict sheet contain a question pertaining to it.  *Branch*, 301 N.J. Super. at 328.  There was no error that was clearly capable of producing an unjust result.
[brief] Riggs v. Long Beach, supra, 109 N.J. at 611.  See also Speakman v. North Plainfield, 8 N.J. 250, 259 (1951) (cited to in Riggs).  Defendants’ argument that rebutting the presumption of validity is limited to showing the ordinance to be arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable is myopic.  The New Jersey Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that the presumption may be overcome by a showing that the ordinance is "clearly arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable, or plainly contrary to fundamental principles of zoning or the [zoning] statute" or, as in this case, was not “adopted in accordance with statutory and municipal procedural requirements. ”  Riggs v. Long Beach, supra, 109 N.J. 601, 610-12 (1988).  See also Bow & Arrow Manor v. West Orange, supra, 63 N.J. at 343; Taxpayer Ass’n of Weymouth Twp. v. Weymouth Twp., supra, 80 N.J. at 20.  As the Supreme Court stated in Riggs, a zoning ordinance, which Ordinance 22-1515 undoubtedly is, as well as an ordinance amending a redevelopment plan subject to the LRHL, is required to satisfy certain criteria, including among other things, that such ordinance is substantially consistent with the land use plan element of the master plan, and being adopted in accordance with statutory and municipal procedural requirements.  Riggs v. Long Beach, supra, 109 N.J. at 611-612.  Defendants’ reliance on the testimony of their planner, [...], the only witness before the Planning Board, to provide a basis for concluding the ordinance’s “substantial consistency” with the land use plan element of the master plan, is fanciful.  [...]’s testimony, as discussed in Plaintiff’s initial brief, pages 23-26, was only as to the “Objectives” element of the masterplan.  He never addressed the critical “Land Use” element of the Master Plan.  Despite protestations to the contrary, Defendants, as set forth and analyzed in detail in Point Two of Plaintiff’s initial brief, failed to show that the Planning Board considered whether Ordinance 22-1516 was “substantially consistent” with the Land Use element of the Master Plan as expressly required by the enabling legislation.  As also discussed more fully in Point Two of Plaintiff’s initial brief, the governing body’s resolution should also be declared invalid as it contains no finding of consistency other than a perfunctory parroting of what the Planning Board stated without appropriate consideration.  These failures on the part of Defendants to satisfy the requirements for adopting Ordinance 22-1516 rebuts the presumption of validity and renders the ordinance void.
[directive] N.J.S.A. 9:17A-4.  Consent by minor to treatment a.  (1)  The consent to the provision of medical or surgical care or services or a forensic sexual assault examination by a hospital or public clinic, or consent to the performance of medical or surgical care or services or a forensic sexual assault examination by a health care professional, when executed by a minor who is or believes that he or she may have a sexually transmitted infection, or who is at least 13 years of age and is or believes that he or she may be infected with the human immunodeficiency virus or have acquired immune deficiency syndrome, or by a minor who, in the judgment of the treating health care professional, appears to have been sexually assaulted, shall be valid and binding as if the minor had achieved the age of majority.  Any such consent shall not be subject to later disaffirmance by reason of minority.  In the case of a minor who appears to have been sexually assaulted, the minor’s parents or guardian shall be notified immediately, unless the treating healthcare professional believes that it is in the best interests of the patient not to do so.  Inability of the treating health care professional, hospital, or clinic to locate or notify the parents or guardian shall not preclude the provision of any emergency or medical or surgical care to the minor or the performance of a forensic sexual assault examination on the minor.
[brief] Defendants have exploited this inequality of bargaining power, along with confusing and arcane pricing practices, to modify the terms of their credit card processing agreements without consent, violating the legal and contractual rights of Merchant Customers who have chosen “Interchange Plus” pricing and resulting in excessive fees being surreptitiously collected from them.  (Pa000120).  9.  Defendants’ Merchant Application form and Merchant Processing Terms and Conditions document are the two documents specified by Defendants as together representing their agreement with their Merchant Customers.  The various pricing programs [...] offers Merchant Customers like [...], including the charges they levy for the services provided, are described in these documents.  (Pa000121).  10.  Many of [...]’s Merchant Customers opt for the “Interchange PLUS” pricing model, because that option appears to tie the price for [...]’s services to the published and widely available “interchange rates” established by the credit card issuers, and to the “discount fees” quoted in their Merchant Customer Application forms with [...].
[brief] The State adopts Appellant’s appendix designations noted at Dbiii-Dbvi; “1T” refers to transcript of proceedings dated February 8, 2013; “2T” refers to transcript of proceedings dated January 9, 2023; “3T” refers to transcript of proceedings dated November 2, 2023; “Ra” refers to State’s appendix.  2  Defendant’s first DWI occurred on February 9, 2004 in Hillsborough, N.J.  His second occurred on February 26, 2009 in Readington, N.J., and his third occurred on September 27, 2011 in Lavallette, N.J.  (Ra1-Ra12) SNSF; and 2 years’ ignition interlock (subsequent to the 10-year revocation period).  (1T13-20 to 14-4; 14-17 to 15-24)  The Judge then dismissed all remaining charges.  (1T20-16 to 20-18)  On December 12, 2022, Defendant filed a notice of motion to modify his sentence.
[directive] I.  Section 12  Waivers  A.  Whenever a state, county, or municipal prosecuting attorney extends a plea Plea offers. offer contemplating a conviction for a violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:35-3, 35-4, 35-5, 35-6, 35-7, and/or 35-8, or any violation subject to a mandatory extended term pursuant to 2C:43-6(f) (the “qualifying Chapter 35 offenses”), the offer must include a provision agreeing that, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-12 (“Section 12”), the court at sentencing shall impose a period of parole ineligibility for any qualifying Chapter 35 offense equal to one- third of the sentence, less commutation, minimum custody, and work credits earned while in custody, consistent with N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.51(a), as if the individual had not been subject to a mandatory minimum term.
[brief] The requirement for an AOM is limited to those licensed professionals expressly enumerated in the statute.  No AOM is required to pursue the vicarious liability claims against [...] and [...].  To the extent that the trial judge found that [...] was performing professional engineering services so that an AOM was required, that reasoning ignores the plain language of N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-27.  It also suggests a factual finding inappropriate for the court on a summary judgment motion.
[brief] C.  No causal relationship between the conduct and damages  As set forth about, there was no illegal conduct and the Plaintiff suffered no damages.  POINT V DESPITE NOT FILING A CROSS APPEAL  THIS COURT MAY BAR PLAINTIFF’S CLAIMS BASED UPON DEFENDANTS’ EQUITABLE DEFENSES  Defendants’ summary judgment also sought to dismiss the Complaint based upon equitable claims, i.e., equitable estoppel, fraud and unclean hands.  (Da021; Da087)  However, the Trial Court declined to decide those issues as moot.  (Da021)  Despite not filing a cross-appeal, because a party may argue points that the trial court either rejected or did not address, so long as those arguments are in support of the trial court’s order, which is the case here.  See State v. Eldakroury, 439 N.J. Super. 304 (App. Div. 2015); citing Lippman v. Ethicon, Inc., 432 N.J.Super. 378, 381 (App. Div. 2013), affirmed 222 N.J. 362 (2015); Chimers v. Oritani Motor Hotel, Inc. 195 N.J. Super. 435, 443 (App. Div. 1984)
[brief] The Trial Court’s initial criticism of the opinions of Plaintiff’s expert, [...], P.E., is that, in the Trial Court’s view, Plaintiff’s Expert “never offers any statement as to how a daily inspection should be performed. ” (Pa2162).  The Trial Court’s focus on the “standard of care” for a reasonable inspection is not only misplaced but it once again underscores the problem that was created by the Trial Court’s failure to adhere to the summary judgment rules and to view the facts in the light most favorable to the Plaintiffs.  Here, when the facts are viewed in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff, the roadway settlement/elevation change at issue had already been identified during two separate inspections and the Defendants were aware that the condition needed to be repaired.  Accordingly, whether or not Plaintiff’s expert addressed “how a daily inspection should be performed” is irrelevant; the condition had already been identified.  Nevertheless, even though under our facts this is not necessary for the reasons mentioned above, [...] did address the “standard of care” for daily inspections and the “standard of care” for what is to be done when a condition is found that could affect the safety of users of the roadway.
[brief] *McKenney* dealt with a particular context of surprise testimony—an attorney’s failure to disclose the material change in testimony to opposing counsel prior to trial.  In this case, however, the surprise testimony arose during Respondent’s trial counsel’s direct examination of Respondent, when she testified that action taken by the Township in 2017, prior to her allegations of disability discrimination and harassment, (which arose in 2018), were in fact taken after those allegations were made:  Q.
[brief] POINT III  THE RECORD DOES NOT SUPPORT THAT BUCCI WAS UNTRUTHFUL.  (Pa218-Pa249; Pa288-Pa2426).  The New Jersey Supreme Court has said:  "[A] police officer is a special kind of public employee.  His primary duty is to enforce and uphold the law....  He represents law and order to the citizenry and must present an image of personal integrity and dependability in order to have the respect of the public."  In re Carter, 191 N.J. 474 at 486, (alteration in original) (quoting Township of Moorestown v. Armstrong, 89 N.J.Super. 560, 566 (App .Div. 1965), cert. denied, 47 N.J. 80 (1966)).  This high standard of conduct "is one of the obligations [a State Trooper] undertakes upon voluntary entry into the public service."  In re Phillips, 117 N.J. 567 at 577 (1990) (quoting In re Emmons, 63 N.J.Super. 136, 142 (App. Div. 1960)).  For these reasons, an officer's dishonesty in an internal affairs investigation "is significant."  Ruroede at 362–63.  In order to violate a truthfulness standard there must be an intentional, material misrepresentation which would affect the fact-finding result.  See Napue v. People of State of Ill., 360 U.S. 264, 269–70 (1959); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963); Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972).  6This Legal Argument was made in [...]’s written closing at the Departmental Level and in his written closing at the Superior Court Level.  Reference to same is made in the Hearing Officer’s Decision and the Memorandum of Decision of the Superior Court Judge.  Here, [...] was truthful at all times in this matter.
[directive] The Written Notice of Possible Impoundment, below, Must be Given the Operator of a Motor Vehicle, When That Person Has Been Charged With a Violation of N.J.S.A. 39:3-29, Failure to Possess and Exhibit Proof of Insurance or Insurance Identification  Written Notice of Possible Impoundment  You have been issued a Traffic Ticket charging you with failing to possess and exhibit an insurance identification card for the motor vehicle you were operating at that time, in violation of N.J.S.A. 39:3-29.  Within 24 hours of the time entered on the Traffic Ticket issued to you, N.J.S.A. 39:3-29.1a.a, requires you to present the insurance identification card or other satisfactory proof of insurance for this motor vehicle, to the law enforcement agency that issued that Traffic Ticket.  If you do not comply with those requirements within 24 hours, the law enforcement agency may apply to the Court for a Warrant of Impoundment of the motor vehicle you were operating at the time of the Traffic Ticket was issued.  If the Court issues a Warrant of Impoundment for the motor vehicle you were operating, that vehicle will be subject to immediate impoundment under the provisions of N.J.S.A. 39:3-29.1a.a.  The registered owner of that motor vehicle will be responsible for the costs for removal and storage of that vehicle.  WARRANT OF IMPOUNDMENT - A.O.C. STANDARDIZED FORM
[brief] First, Defense Counsel objected to Plaintiff’s counsel describing an investigation that Plaintiff underwent after the letter of representation, on the grounds that there was no testimony regarding said investigation.  See id. at 64:10-66:5.7  Second, Defense Counsel objected to Plaintiff’s counsel referencing the fact that [...] reviewed Plaintiff’s FMLA paperwork as not being an accurate description of his testimony.  See id. at 73:12-19.8  Since Defendants raised their objections to Plaintiff’s Counsel’s summation for the first time in a post-trial motion, said objections must be judged under the high “plain error” standard.
[brief] The entire purpose of the remedy in a builder’s remedy claim is to impose a rezoning a municipality otherwise does not desire, despite its constitutional right to zone.  The parties have exchanged discovery regarding the suitability of the Property for an inclusionary development, with Plaintiff providing extensive professional reports in support of the Property’s suitability, including reports rebutting purported concerns raised by [...].  The Special Adjudicator has yet to weigh in on these expert submissions, and presumably will not be tasked to do so until this appeal is resolved.
[brief] As [...] shockingly admitted in its motion to dismiss, the truth about [...] didn’t matter; what mattered was giving the [...] Defendants’ audience the “outrage” that they expect:  The [...] Foundation’s audience would therefore expect public statements regarding such an incident to reflect a high degree of outrage.  Memorandum Of Law in Support of Motion by Defendant [...] Foundation Inc. to Dismiss the Amended Complaint (the “[...] Memo”) at 29 (Pa 036).  In other words, [...] itself admits that its goal was not truth, but rather to give its audience what they expect – outrageous public statements.  Thus, as pleaded in the Amended Complaint, “[t]he value of this unbelievable and distorted story to [the [...] Defendants]—that a beloved grandmotherly second-grade teacher would forcefully strip off the religious headwear of a Muslim student—lie[d] not in its truthfulness but in its sensationalized nature, inflaming the passions of [the [...] Defendants] . . . and those entities’ donors, followers, and supporters. ”  Am. Compl. ¶ 66 (Da 023-24).  As the Amended Complaint clearly describes, the [...] Defendants just blindly and recklessly copied [...]’s wild, wholly unbelievable allegations that they knew or should have known were likely false, and ran with them.  The story was unbelievable on its face.  Moreover, as the Amended Complaint also makes clear, never once did the [...] Defendants use the word “alleged” or “allegedly” when describing the conduct that they falsely accused was attributable to [...]; nor did they ever qualify their incendiary character assassination with phrases such as “if true” or “if accurate. ”  Am. Compl. ¶¶ 35-70 (Da 017-26).  “All that mattered was getting credit for being the one to light the match. ”  Id. ¶ 66 (Da 024).  VI.
[brief] “[w]hat is clear from this record is that Defendant’s counsel made numerous attempts to adjourn the trial, and when the court denied his request, Defendant failed to pay the transportation fee required for his attendance at the March 11, 2024 trial. ”  Da47.  Pursuant to the November 27, 2023 trial Order and R. 1:2-4, this Court dismissed Defendant’s counterclaims due to his failure to appear for trial.  Defendant’s failure to appear at trial was not due to an exigent or unforeseeable circumstance.  Rather, Defendant was confined in prison and had no other obligations.  Defendant and/or his counsel failed to independently arrange transportation for trial and, after court personnel expended time and resources to confirm the process for Defendant’s transport and issued an Order to Produce, Defendant failed to follow this court’s instruction to pay the required transportation fee.  **That Defendant and his counsel were not attuned to this issue defies credulity.**
[brief] The requisite reasonable suspicion was established under the totality of the circumstances to briefly detain defendant.  A police officer may conduct an investigatory stop if, based on the totality of the circumstances, there is a reasonable and particularized suspicion to believe that an individual has just engaged in, or is about to engage in, criminal activity.  *State v. Maryland*, 167 N.J. 471, 487 (2001) (citing *Terry v. Ohio*, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968)).
[brief] Notably, however, the State’s leverage against [...] has changed such that he may wish to withdraw from his plea agreement and proceed to trial on the felony murder indictment or attempt to negotiate a plea to a lesser charge in that indictment.  On the day that he pleaded guilty, [...] was ready to go to trial, but he decided to plead guilty due to his sentencing exposure from a combination of the indictments against him.  The State told [...] that if he went to trial on the felony murder indictment and was acquitted, it would seek an extended term on the armed robbery indictment, which would subject [...] to life in prison.  (1T 4-11 to 25)  The State also threatened to seek consecutive sentences on all pending indictments if [...] proceeded to trial.  (1T 5-24 to 6-7)  Because [...]’s armed robbery case has been dismissed, his sentencing exposure is significantly less than when he decided to plead guilty, as he is no longer facing a potential life sentence if he is acquitted of felony murder, nor is he facing the threat of consecutive sentences on the two indictments.
[brief] The iniquitous conduct began at the inception of the Agreement.  Plaintiff was obligated to pay to defendant $70,000.00 as her part of the down payment for the condominium she was to receive (A condominium valued at approx. $400,000.00).  She indisputably represented that she didn’t have the $70,000.00 when she signed the Agreement.  She LIED.  Her testimony was that she had over $260,000.00 in liquid funds in three bank accounts plus significant other monies at the time of the signing of the Agreement.  She admits that she kept the existence of these funds secret and never told Defendant about same.  After 72 months of making monthly payments of $1,500.00 to plaintiff and plaintiff’s refusal to pay defendant the $70,000.00 that she owed to him, defendant stopped making payments for 46 months (amounting to $69,000.00).  Defendant then complains to the Court that she does not have the monies that were promised to her in order to meet her expenses, when, in fact, she clearly has those funds in her possession.  This is a fraud on defendant and a fraud on the Court.  What she asked the Court to do in imposing a penalty is for the Court to become an instrument of injustice.  And as indicated above, A court of equity can never allow itself to become an instrument of injustice.  Nor, as further indicated, will equity allow any wrongdoer to enrich himself as a result of his own criminal acts.  The trial Court in the instant case refused to consider plaintiff’s fraudulent, deceitful acts.  These acts should have been addressed.  The Appellate Division then ignores this issue, which is the most financially devastating issue in this case, the conclusion being that this issue is not important enough for discussion.  How can it not be important enough for discussion.  Very significant penalties were imposed.  There would have been no penalties if the fraud was not permitted to go unaddressed.  And finally the Court below on motion imposes a second penalty without a discussion of plaintiff’s fraud.
[brief] (Aa085; Aa086).  Plaintiffs also cite to the BMP Manual regarding the determination of the seasonal highwater table without citation of any authority, asserting that “pursuant to Chapter 12 of the BMP Manual, the analysis should have used the highest seasonal highwater table and the slowest infiltration rate for design purposes. ” (Pb13).  The BMP Manual Chapter 12 does not provide that guidance.  Rather, the BMP Manual requires calculations for groundwater mounding to be based on location-specific soil hydraulic conductivity data.  [...]’s stormwater report provided individual groundwater mounding calculations prepared for each test pit within each given BMP.  (Aa3048; Aa3066-3098).  The relative height of the mound, determined by the location-specific data, was applied to the elevation of the seasonal highwater table to determine the elevation of the groundwater mound.  (Id.).  In each case, the [...] report demonstrated that the bottom of the BMP is above the elevation of the groundwater mound.
[brief] The State also presented the testimony of two fingerprint experts who concluded that latent fingerprints found behind the counter of the [...] were defendant's fingerprints.  Defendant took the stand and denied he had committed either robbery.  Defendant also testified that his confession to the robberies was the product of police coercion.  Defendant also presented the testimony of his sister and two brothers that defendant was with them in Atlantic City from 9:30 p.m. until around 11:30 p.m. on the nights of both Egg Harbor robberies.  However, these witnesses could not vouch for defendant's whereabouts around the time of the robberies.  I.
[brief] 14  Ostendorf v. Clark Equipment Co., 122 S.W.3d 530 (Ky. 2003) .....................................................  11  Patton v. Hutchinson Wil-Rich Manufacturing Co., 861 P.2d 1299 (Kan. 1993) ...............................  11  Perau v. Barnett Outdoors, LLC, 2019 WL 2145467 (M.D. Fla. May 15, 2019) .................................
[directive] The new law, effective April 18, 2016, also sets forth procedures to expunge all records and information of an arrest or charge when a person has been arrested or held to answer for a crime, disorderly persons offense, petty disorderly persons offense, or municipal ordinance violation, where the proceedings were dismissed; the person was acquitted, or the person was discharged without a conviction or finding of guilt in Municipal Court or Superior Court.  Regardless of whether the proceedings were in Municipal Court or Superior Court, no fee will be charged for these expungements on or after April 18, 2016.  be ordered where