ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Defendant also unsuccessfully attempts to rely on federal case law to ask this Court to reevaluate its jurisprudence defining territorial infractions as technical violations outside of the exclusionary rule.  (Db26 to 32).  But each case cited by defendant involves a court’s interpretation of statutes, rules, and common law unique to that federal or state jurisdiction, and whether the exclusionary rule should be applied.  Specifically, the federal court cases involve whether a magistrate judge in one jurisdiction can authorize a search of a stationary object located in another jurisdiction, based on the powers conferred by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41 and the Federal Magistrates Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636.  See United States v. Henderson, 906 F.3d 1109, 1112, 1115 (9th Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 2033 (2019); United States v. Werdene, 883 F.3d 204, 212-14 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 260 (2018); United States v. Horton, 863 F.3d 1041, 1044 (8th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 584 U.S. 918 (2018); compare United States v. Baker, 894 F.2d 1144, 1146-47 (10th Cir. 1990) (state authorities cannot secure a warrant to search property located within Indian tribal lands); (Db29 to 30).  The remaining cases examine a particular state’s criminal procedural rules and statutes that authorize the issuance of search warrants by magistrate judges in those specific jurisdictions.  United States v. Master, 614 F.3d 236, 241 (6th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 568 U.S. 1074 (2012); State v. Frazier, 558 S.W.3d 145, 153-56 (Tenn. 2018); State v. Rupnick, 125 P.3d 541, 551-52 (Kan. 2005); State v. Wilson, 618 N.W.2d 513, 516, 517-20 (S.D. 2000); Commonwealth v. Shelton, 766 S.W.2d 628, 629-30 (Ky. 1989); Crayton v. State, 485 S.W.3d 488, 503-04 (Tex. App. 2016); State v.
[brief] But if you find that the State has proved both of those elements beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must find [...] not guilty [sic].  (emphasis added).  The judge thereafter asked the attorneys if they had any objections to the charge.  While defense counsel raised several objections that were addressed, he did not raise any objections to the portion of the second-degree robbery jury charge alleged as plain error here.  At the conclusion of the jury charge, each member of the jury was given a jury verdict sheet.  Again, defense counsel did not raise any objections to the judge's explanation of the elements of robbery.  The absence of an objection to the charge at trial is strong evidence that defendant's belated claims of error in the charge were not prejudicial.
[brief] Ever since the exemption was codified in DEP’s rules, DEP has consistently interpreted the word “routine” in Exemption #11 as only modifying “maintenance and operations. ” (Ab15).  See 38 N.J.R. 5011(a) at Response to comment 3 and 4 (Dec. 4, 2006).  DEP’s prior decisions demonstrate this understanding.  For instance, DEP determined that [...]’s prior projects adding infrastructure to its pre-existing pipeline system were “upgrades” that were exempt from the Highlands Act through Exemption #11.  (Aa78; Aa224-237; Aa290-300).  Notably, these two linear upgrades to [...]’s system were much larger in scope, with [...]’s first upgrade adding 350,000 dekatherms per day to [...]’s natural gas shipping capacity and [...]’s second upgrade project adding 636,000 dekatherms per day and affecting over 100 acres of land with nearly sixteen acres of permanent impacts.  (Aa229; Aa279; Aa291).  By comparison, the Project minimally affects only forty-seven already disturbed acres and will add 115,000 dekatherms/day to [...]’s capacity.  (Aa37-39; Aa54; Aa197).  Applying the same regulatory interpretation, DEP approved an Exemption #11 for a system “upgrade” consisting of a substation along [...]’s ([...]) right-of-way for electrical transmission lines, which this court affirmed.  433 N.J. Super. at 227-28.  [...]’s proposed CS 327 Project fits snugly within DEP’s long-standing and confirmed system upgrade interpretation, and thus, DEP reasonably determined it is exempt from the Highlands Act.
[brief] **PROCEDURAL HISTORY**  On December 1, 2018, Plaintiff-Respondent, [...], sustained permanent injuries in a motor vehicle collision with Defendants-Appellants, [...] and [...] (Da1-9).  On October 9, 2020, Plaintiff filed the Complaint that initiated this action (Da1-9).  Defendants’ Answer, and Amended Answer, were filed on November 17, 2020, and April 5, 2021, respectively (Da10-20).  On February 8, 2023, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment seeking a jury instruction on negligent entrustment (Da23-24).  This Motion was predicated on the fact that Defendant Forde had entrusted his vehicle, which was owned by his mother, [...] (who is no longer a party in this matter), to Defendant Huggins, who was underage and did not possess a driver’s license (1T, at 4:6-5:4).  At oral argument, Defense counsel was adamant that they would stipulate liability at trial (1T, at 10:25-12:17).  Based on this averment, the Motion was denied as moot (1T, at 16:11-23).  Trial began on July 11, 2023, before the Honorable [...], P.J.Cv. (2T).  Judge Belgard heard Motions in Limine, and reviewed with counsel relevant logistics for the following days (2T).  It is at this point in Defendants’ Brief that they discuss factual elements of trial.  Plaintiff reserves any rebuttal or clarification of the factual record for the following Statement of Facts.  Procedurally, voir dire began on July 12, 2023 (3T).  A jury was empanelled, and counsel for both parties introduced that jury to the case through their opening statements (3T, at 3:9-16:7).  What followed was an uneventful trial.  Plaintiff took the stand, followed by expert witnesses for both sides, and closing argument (3T; 4T).  On July 14, 2023, at the conclusion of the evidence and argument, the jury found that Plaintiff sustained a permanent injury proximately caused by the December 1, 2018 collision (5T, at 33:5-34:17).  Based on the evidence presented, the jury rendered a verdict of $3,500.00 in lost wages, and $927,000.00 in compensatory damages for Plaintiff’s pain, suffering, and loss of enjoyment of life (5T, at 33:5-34:17).  On July 25, 2023, Defendants filed a Motion for New Trial (Da51-52).  After reviewing the papers submitted by counsel, and hearing oral argument on September 7, 2023, Judge Belgard denied the Motion for New Trial on all grounds (Da69-70; 6T).  Defendants soon followed this denial by filing a Motion for Reconsideration on September 19, 2023 (Da62-63).  As with Defendants’ prior plea for relief, Judge Belgard carefully reviewed the briefs and arguments of the parties, and denied Defendants’ Motion for Reconsideration on December 1, 2023 (Da74-75).  Defendants retained appellate counsel on December 6, 2023 (Da76).  This counsel neither participated in, nor was present for, any portion of trial or post-trial motions.  Defendants filed their Notice of Appeal on January 4, 2024, bringing the matter before this Court (Da77-81).
[brief] Before hearing from the State, [...] commented that everyone who stands before the court for sentencing has both good and bad qualities.  (30T15-3 to 8).  He explained that the court always did its very best to look “holistically” at the defendant being sentenced and to not fall prey to “cancel culture. ” (30T15-9 to 13).  During its argument in support of sentencing defendant to consecutive terms in prison of 9 years, (30T35-4 to 7), the State commented that the jury reached its verdict of passion/provocation manslaughter based upon its review and interpretation of the surveillance videos, not defendant’s narration of it, because the jury found him guilty of shooting and killing [...].  (30T15-16 to 30T19-17).  The State pointed out that defendant still did not take responsibility for killing [...].  (30T19-18 to 20).  Defendant told the interviewer for the pre-sentence report that he did not shoot [...], but the video shows him shooting [...].  (30T19-20 to 24).
[brief] Answer: Yes.  This was not a foreclosure case - it was a Defendants’ Quiet Title claim which solely involves property ownership determination.  The Plaintiff had no claim to try.  Moreover, it is ludicrous to count [...]’ ten (10) minute testimony at the pre-trial conference in June 2022 as: 1) [...] basically just informed the Court of what she did for a living; 2) the Judge called her to the stand because she was visibly upset and obviously neither attorney was prepared for anything as it was a pre-trial conference; 3) [...] is not even on the mortgage note, 4) [...] had another couple weeks to prepare for their Quiet Title trial, presentation of evidence and documents, and presentation of witnesses in proper order.
[brief] Pa0245.  The RAO is the last regulatory step after a property has been fully remediated and capped – which occurs during the process of redevelopment.  The two steps go “hand in hand” according to [...].  7T31-16 to 19.  Plaintiff’s argument contradicts its own expert relating to the amount of work necessary to obtain an RAO, first stating that Plaintiff’s expert opined as to Defendants’ ability to obtain an RAO, about how “far less extensive” their actions would be in comparison to the Plaintiff during redevelopment.  Pb37.  This contradicts the testimony by Defendants’ expert, (with which Plaintiff’s expert agreed), (4T11-1 to 11) who testified that an RAO could not be obtained prior to sale, as the post-sale redevelopment itself would act as a sitewide cap, redevelopment which can only be completed by the Plaintiff, 6T47-9 to 48-12; 6T123-1 to 124-3.
[brief] 24 State v. Mustaro, 411 N.J. Super. 91 (App. Div. 2009) .............................................  22 State v. O'Donnell, 117 N.J. 210 (1989) ....................................................................  25 State v. Olenowski, 255 N.J. 529 (2023) ...................................................................  21 State v. Rivera, 124 N.J. 122 (1991) .........................................................................  26 State v. Roth, 95 N.J. 334 (1984) ...............................................................................  25 State v. S.N., 231 N.J. 497 (2018) ..............................................................................  16, 21 State v. Setzer, 268 N.J. Super. 553 (App. Div. 1993) ..............................................  26 State v. Sullivan, 169 N.J. 204 (2001) .......................................................................  7 State v. Townsend, 186 N.J. 473 (2006) ....................................................................  19 State v. White, 305 N.J. Super. 322 (App. Div. 1997) .............................................. 5 Townsend v. Pierre, 221 N.J. 36 (2015) .....................................................................  15, 19 United States v.  Santana, 427 U.S. 38 (1976) ............................................................  11 Rules N.J.R.E. 702 ..................................................................................................................
[brief] Da1-9.¹ ¹  The State adopts the transcripts references as noted in defendant’s brief.  On or about August 29, 2022, defendant filed a motion to suppress the evidence seized without a warrant, claiming that the traffic stop was unlawful, and that defendant exhibited no furtive movements.  (2T:1-1 to 1-6).  The Honorable [...], J.S.C., heard argument on defendant’s motion on February 28, 2023 (2T), and denied the motion on April 24, 2023.  Da10.  (3T:7-2 to 7-8).  Defendant then entered a conditional plea to Count I, unlawful possession of a firearm in the second degree.  (3T:3-12 to 3-17).  On or about August 3, 2023, in accordance with the plea agreement, [...] sentenced defendant to five years of incarceration with three-and-a-half years of mandatory parole ineligibility, and dismissed all remaining counts in the indictment.  Da27.  On or about September 5, 2023, defendant filed a notice of appeal with the Superior Court, Appellate Division.  Da31-34.  COUNTERSTATEMENT OF FACTS
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[brief] See Da158-159, Para.10.  According to the ABL, districts shall inform parents/guardians of the “nature of the investigation,” including if the nature of the investigation arises from a student’s gender identity or expression.  N.J.S.A. 18A:37-15(b)(6)(d).  When the nature of the bullying is the student’s gender identity or expression, the Guidelines suggest maintaining student confidentiality, which conflicts with the statutory requirement to inform parents of the “nature of the investigation. ”  Thus, following the Guidelines could result in violations of the Anti-Bullying Bill of Rights Act.  Subsequent to these experiences, on June 20, 2023, the Board Defendants amended Policy 5756 to adopt the versions which are the subject of this appeal.
[brief] In [...] v. [...], 416 N.J. Super. 565 (App. Div. 2010), this court again reiterated Bent’s holding that “OPRA does not countenance . . . open-ended demands ‘for every document a public agency has on file. ’”  Id. at 576 (quoting Bent, 381 N.J. Super. at 37); see also ibid.  (“Rather, ‘OPRA requires a party requesting access to a public record to specifically describe the document sought[.]’”) (quoting Gannett v. Cnty. of Middlesex, 379 N.J. Super. at 212).  Relying on this by-then well-developed canon of case law, this court found that Spectraserv’s request, which sought “the agency’s ‘entire project file’” was “overly broad and generalized and therefore improper under OPRA.
[brief] Again, Appellants attempt to apply the standard applicable to a challenge to a blight designation to a challenge to a redevelopment plan.  This obfuscation of two distinct standards is without merit.  Appellants are equally misguided in claiming that *Malanga*, 253 N.J. 291, and *Fieramosca v. Twp. of Barnegat*, 335 N.J. Super. 526 (Law Div. 2000), support their evidentiary challenge.
[brief] [...], of course, does not argue that its waiver of a jury trial in disputes involving recovery of PIP benefits was “wrongly decided” by the Trial Court.  Even if it did, however, New Jersey law is clear that it is the result that matters, not the reasoning.  In any event, [...] argues instead, as the appellees apparently did in Driscoll, that the Trial Court simply did not deal with the waiver issue.  As in Driscoll, this Court should be concerned only with the soundness of the decision and not with the absence of a question this Court will resolve for the first time on appeal.
[brief] For the foregoing reasons and based upon the above cited precedent, the trial court’s 1) final Order, dated May 10, 2024, 2) the oral decision entered on October 20, 2023, 3) the Order entered on December 5, 2023, setting attorney’s fees and costs; 4) the Order entered on March 6, 2024, wherein the court granted the CCIA summary judgment; and 5) the Order entered on March 6, 2024, wherein the court denied Plaintiffs’ cross-motion for summary judgment, should be reversed, and this matter should be remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.  Respectfully submitted, **[...]**  Attorneys for Appellants  By: /s/ [...]  [...]  Dated: July 29, 2024  608-610  [...] AND [...], Plaintiffs, v. [...], a public body corporate and politic of the State of New Jersey; [...]; [...]; [...]; [...]; and [...]
[brief] Common Law Principles Required [...] To Provide [...] With Notice Of The Cancellation Of Its Coverage (Dta1151-55,1274.)  The opinion below as to cancellation was limited to the conclusion that the cancellation statutes and regulations “do not apply to the circumstances at issue or to a CCIP. ”  (SSR 34, Dta1364.)  The implication of that holding is that [...] was not subject to any notice standards whatsoever – a conclusion belied by New Jersey’s long common-law tradition requiring insurers to provide proper notice of policy cancellation, termination and reductions in coverage to their insureds, and the concomitant obligation to continue coverage when they fail to do so.
[brief] POINT II.  THE COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION FOR NOT ALLOWING THE DEFENSE TO PRESENT EVIDENCE OF UNTRUTHFULNESS ON THE PART OF ARRESTING OFFICER CAPTAIN ASTBURY.  FAILURE TO DO SO INFRINGED ON DEFENDANTS RIGHT TO CONFRONT HIS ACCUSER AND COMPLETE DEFENSE.  THUS VIOLATING DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL BY AN IMPARTIAL JURY.  A NEW TRIAL IS WARRANTED.
[brief] Thus, it cannot be said that such an accessory structure impairs the intent and purpose of the Zone and the Zoning Ordinance.  In fact, the accessory structure could potentially support a conforming commercial use at the Property at some future point (Pa48); and 7.  The Board did not find the Plaintiffs’ complaint that the accessory structure is flooding his property and killed “289 trees” to be credible.  The Plaintiffs presented no photographic, expert, or other evidence to show any such flooding or loss of trees due to any alleged conditions originating at the Property (Pa48); and 8.  The Board did not find the testimony of Plaintiffs’ friend/planner, [...], to add anything to the analysis of the issues before the Board.  [...] presented no report or other analysis of the planning issues.  He merely stated his opinion of the positive and negative criteria.  The Board and its professionals were aware of the criteria and the framework for the Board’s decision on the application (Pa48).  Based on the foregoing findings, the Zoning Board granted the requested use variance from the requirements of Township Code §175-89D to allow the existing accessory structure to be larger than the principal use on the Property, where the accessory building at issue is 2160 square feet and the principal structure is approximately 1152 square feet.
[brief] In the absence of that notice, [...] essentially claims the [...] policy remained in effect, as a matter of law.  Mr.  Swierkiewicz additionally offers his “opinion” in support of this legal argument, claiming that because the [...] general liability policy was not properly canceled (allegedly due in part to [...]), it remained in effect and should have afforded coverage to [...] for the Hood lawsuit.  This “opinion” is nothing more than [...]’s characterization of the coverage arguments advanced by [...] (and [...]) against [...] and [...].  It does not support any independent claim for damages against [...].  The overwhelming thrust of [...]’s opinions against [...] address [...]’s alleged failure to inform [...] it had been excluded from the CCIP coverage.  Pa823-Pa824.  But [...] suffered no harm from that, because [...] had its own insurance with [...] and [...].  The complete absence of any relevant opinions in the Swierkiewicz report underscores the fact that this litigation is a coverage dispute between insurers, and [...] never should have been involved.
[brief] The State essentially gets two expert opinions from the testimony of one testifying expert. ”); People v. Pearson, 116 N.E.3d 304, 311 (Ill. App. Ct. 2018) (holding that the “verification was an out-of-court statement and it was offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted”); People v. Griffin, 985 P.2d 15, 17-18 (Colo. App. 1998) (same).  [...]’s testimony that two other experts examined the print and agreed with his conclusion was testimonial hearsay that should not have admitted.  Last, [...] testified beyond his expertise when he opined on when the finger that left the latent print touched the blood.  The State took great pains to ask [...] if the blood could have gotten on the chiller after the fingerprint was left there.  (3T 71-9 to 72-9)  [...] opined that “there was blood on the finger when it touched the object” (3T 71-22 to 23)  He was not qualified to give this opinion.  An expert must stay within the bounds of his expertise when offering an opinion.  State v. Zola, 112 N.J. 384, 422 (1988).  [...] was recognized “as an expert in the field of latent fingerprint examination and analysis. ”  (3T 47-18)  As [...] testified, his expertise is in examining two fingerprints and determining if they “match” based on the details he observes on each.  (3T 58-21 to 63-9)  Comparing the features of two fingerprints is a distinct area of expertise.  There is nothing in [...]’s description of his expertise or his training that would allow him to opine as to how or when the fingerprint was placed there.  Perhaps a bloodstain pattern analyst or crime scene reconstructionist would be qualified to opine on these issues.  [...], however, strayed beyond the bounds of his expertise when he did so.
[brief] ... based upon the now undisputed facts, the court’s legal conclusions are as follows, and the court refers the reader to its earlier ruling for a full analysis.  The Defendants had a right as the new directors of the board to hire and fire litigation counsel.  Defendant [...] has submitted an affidavit here in which he proffers what could be considered legitimate reasons to hire new counsel.  Thus, the court cannot conclude that there are undisputed facts proving that the hiring/firing was itself a breach of duty.  However, despite Defendants offering a tangled theory about all the benefits to the Association if the results in Cliffs I could be changed, they fail to acknowledge that they were personally in an adversary role against the Association in that case.  Directing new counsel to withdraw legal filings for the obvious purpose of personally benefiting the Defendants financially, and harming the Association financially, was a clear violation of Defendants’ duties to the Association.  Pa363-364.
[brief] \textsuperscript{18}  The record shows that as of June 7, 2017, three years after the so-called corrected Amended Judgment of Divorce was issued, the outstanding balance of legal fees incurred by Plaintiff in procuring her matrimonial action against her husband was $396,198.59.  The record also shows that Plaintiff only paid $53,600 before December 2016 (The difference between the total legal as damage awarded by the Court and the outstanding balance $449,798.59-396,198.59=53,600).  The Plaintiff’s attorney admitted that they only received about $52,000 legal fees from Plaintiff.  The legal fees incurred between December 2016 and June 2017 were mostly for discovery of assets and appeals of the Amended Judgment of Divorce.  Those legal fees were incurred by the Plaintiff after she had obtained the Amended Judgment of Divorce, which was issued on February 21, 2014.  None of the fees incurred during that period were used to make corrections of any “errors” in the PSA nor were there any fees incurred to obtain a new judgment.
[brief] The New Jersey Supreme Court has clarified, “[d]ecisions of a lower federal court are no more binding on a state court than they are on a federal court not beneath it in the judicial hierarchy. ”  Dewey v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 121 N.J. 69, 79 (1990) (citation and quotation omitted).  In this regard, “state courts form an integral part of the national structure” and “occupy exactly the same position as the lower federal courts, which are coordinate, and not superior to them. ”  State v. Coleman, 46 N.J. 16, 37 (1965).  “Until the Supreme Court of the United States has spoken, state courts are not precluded from exercising their own judgment upon questions of federal law. ”  Id.  Thus, under these circumstances, this Court should employ New Jersey’s rules of statutory construction and exercise its own judgment as to how the FDCPA should best be construed to effect Congress’ intent.  Having begun this process, Superior Courts throughout New Jersey have done so with near-consensus – nearly all rejecting Appellant’s letter vendor theory of liability.