ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] There is nothing special or unique about IFPA and RICO claims that exempts them from arbitration.  Indeed, it stretches the imagination to conclude that the Legislature intended to give insurers greater access to the courts than it gave to victims of consumer fraud under the Consumer Fraud Act (“CFA”), for example.  Indeed, permitting such lawsuits in court would give insurers like [...] an unfair second bite at the apple after they unsuccessfully challenged a medical provider’s PIP benefits claims in arbitration—essentially turning those individual arbitrations into a dry run.  To construe the No-Fault Law to exempt IFPA/RICO claims from arbitration and to fling open the courtroom doors to insurers bundling hundreds or thousands of PIP claims together *en masse*—many of which insurers had previously been arbitrated to finality—would run counter to the Supreme Court’s original admonition that “approaches which minimize resort to the judicial process, or at least do not increase reliance upon the judiciary, are strongly to be favored” when interpreting the No-Fault Law.
[brief] “A forfeiture or unreasonable penalty, imposed only upon the other party's default, is unenforceable even though the same money, property or other consideration might have validly been bargained for as a form of contractual performance.  A contrary conclusion would allow unreasonable late charges and other penalties to escape legal scrutiny through simple rephrasing as a conditional waiver.  Under [the lender's] ‘conditional waiver’ theory, virtually any penalty or forfeiture could be enforced if characterized as a waiver.  To accept that theory would be to ‘condone a result which, although directly prohibited by the Legislature, may nevertheless be indirectly accomplished through the imagination of inventive minds. ’
[brief] A lesser-included offense is one “where the proof required to establish a greater offense is also sufficient to establish every element of a lesser offense” and “where two offenses are the same but a lesser degree of culpability is required to establish the lesser offense. ”  State v. Thomas, 187 N.J. 119, 129-30 (2006) (citing State v. Muniz, 228 N.J. Super. 492, 496 (App. Div. 1988)); see also State v. Bell, 241 N.J. 552, 561-62 (2020).  “[I]nstructing a petit jury on lesser-included offenses is intended ‘to give juries a range of options so that they will not be forced to decide between a conviction for a crime more serious than the one committed or no conviction at all. ’”  Bell, 241 N.J. at 562 (quoting State v. Short, 131 N.J. 47, 58 (1993)).  Thus, “trial courts must charge the jury on a lesser-included offense when the facts ‘clearly indicate the appropriateness of that charge. ’”  *Ibid.* (quoting *State v. Alexander*, 233 N.J. 132, 143 (2018).  N.J.S.A. 2C:1-8(e), which governs included offenses, directs that “[t]he court shall not charge the jury with respect to an included offense unless there is a rational basis for a verdict convicting the defendant of the included offense. ”  Two factors must be satisfied before charging a defendant with a lesser-included offense: “(1) that the requested charge satisfy the definition of an included offense set forth in N.J.S.A. 2C:1-8(d), and (2) that there be a rational basis in the evidence to support a charge on that included offense.
[directive] Prior to presenting to a grand jury, the Independent Investigator Reviewing the and the assigned prosecutor will work with the investigative team to ensure that all relevant evidence is gathered and reviewed.  In particular, all available video evidence and statements of eyewitnesses and officers involved in the incident must be reviewed thoroughly.  D. memorandum.  After reviewing the evidence and concluding that no Prosecution additional investigative steps are warranted, the assigned prosecutor will draft a memorandum for submission through the chain of command to the Executive Director of OPIA that seeks approval to present the matter to the grand jury.  The memorandum must be approved by the Executive Director of OPIA prior to presentation to the grand jury, and it must contain: A summary the incident and the investigation; Specific reference to critical video and any other critical evidence in a manner that aids supervising attorneys to review that evidence; A statement of the applicable law; and An analysis of the potential charges, if any, arising from the subject officer’s conduct and any applicable defenses.  E. circumstances.
[brief] *See Dopp v. Yari*, 927 F.Supp. 814, 820 (D.N.J. 1996); *see also Ditmars v. Camden Trust, Co.*, 10 N.J. 471 (1952)  *see also N.J.S.A. § 31:1-1(a); see also N.J.S.A. § 17:11C-1.*  *(Da113-115)*  Generally, the recipient of a loan has an obligation to repay the amount loaned.
[brief] See Parkway Ins. Co. v. N.J. Neck & Back, 330 N.J. Super. 172, 184 (Law Div. 1998) ("Commissioner [of DOBI] is the administrative agent of the Legislature, pursuing its public policy").  Despite seventeen years in standard employers liability insurance policies, no case, legislative action, or regulatory action has concluded that the State approved revised Exclusion C.5 is contrary to a statute or public policy.  III.
[brief] 5  Rieder v. State Dept. of Transp., 221 N.J. Super. 547, 552 (App. Div. 1987) ....................................................  5, 6 Rochinsky v. New Jersey Dept. of Transp., 110 N.J. 399, 408 (1988) .............................................................................  8, 15 Rodriguez v. New Jersey Sports & Exposition Auth., 193 N.J.Super. 39, 43, (App. Div. 1983), certif. denied, 96 N.J. 291 (1984) ................................................................. 9, 15, 17  Rooster Bar LLC v. Borough of Cliffside Park, 2013 WL 5852758 (November 2013)  .................................................................  12-13  Setrin v. Glassboro State College, 136 N.J. Super. 329, 333 (App. Div. 1975)  .........................................................  15  Shore v. Housing Authority of Harrison, 208 N.J. Super. 348, 353 (App. Div. 1987)  .......................................................  12  S.P. v. Newark Police Dep't, 428 N.J. Super. 210, 231 (App. Div. 2012)  .............  10
[brief] As this case illustrates, see n. 1, *supra*, 911 calls can be recorded, which provides victims with an opportunity to identify the false tipster’s voice and subject him to prosecution, see, e.g., Cal. Penal Code Ann. § 653x (West 2010) (makes “telephon[ing] the 911 emergency line with the intent to annoy or harass” punishable by imprisonment and fine); see also § 148.3 (2014 West Cum. Supp.) (prohibits falsely reporting “that an ‘emergency’ exists”); §148.5 (prohibits falsely reporting “that a felony or misdemeanor has been committed”).  The 911 system also permits law enforcement to verify important information about the caller.  In 1998, the [...] ([...]) began to require cellular carriers to relay the caller’s phone number to 911 dispatchers.  47 CFR § 20.18(d)(1) (2013) ([...]’s “Phase I enhanced 911 services” requirements).  Beginning in 2001, carriers have been required to identify the caller’s geographic location with increasing specificity.  §§ 20.18(e)-(h) (“Phase II enhanced 911 service” requirements).  And although callers may ordinarily block call recipients from obtaining their identifying information, [...] regulations exempt 911 calls from that privilege.  §§ 64.1601(b), (d)(4)(ii) (“911 emergency services” exemption from rule that, when a caller so requests, “a carrier may not reveal that caller’s number or name”).  *Navarette v. California*, 572 U.S. 393, 400-401 (2014).
[brief] Q: Okay.  I’m going to ask you something else, [...].  There is marked in evidence as S-4 your Miranda form.  Is that the form that [...] went over with you before he took a statement from you?  A: Yes, sir.  Q: Okay.  And there’s a place down there at the bottom where he asked you to print your name, correct?  A: Yes, sir.  Q: And did you print your name?  A: Yes, sir.  Q: Okay.  So, did you, when you printed your name, write these A’s and R’s?  A: Yes, sir.  Q: Okay.  Now, you heard [...]’s testimony when he was here, correct?  A: Yes, I did.  Q: I’m going to show you something else.  [...] handed some documents over to his attorney’s office and he says that you wrote these.  Did you write these?  A: No, I did not.  Q: So you didn’t write the A’s and R’s that we see on this, did you?  A: No, I did not.  Q: Did you write them on any of these?  A: I didn’t write any of those letters.  (14T 155-17 to 156-17)  Clearly, the prosecutor’s intention was to prompt the jury to compare [...]’s writing on the Miranda form, find the similarity the prosecutor suggested, and use it to conclude that [...] wrote the letters.
[brief] (Db21).  Rather, defendant’s claim is that [...] had to tell defendant that he was there to investigate a crime for which he was a possible suspect while under arrest for a separate offense for his waiver to be a knowing one.  In support, defendant relies on Diaz, arguing that [...] reinforced a false impression as to the seriousness of the sentence defendant faced, and misled defendant into believing he was in custody only for a minor narcotics charge to induce waiver.  (Db19).  Yet, there are striking differences here that demonstrate, under the totality of the circumstances, that defendant waived his rights knowingly.
[brief] A. Standard of Review.  Since Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995), our Courts have consistently held that “[a] trial court’s interpretation of the law and the legal consequences that flow from established facts are not entitled to any special deference,” and, hence, an “issue of law [is] subject to de novo plenary appellate review.
[brief] Intervention by [...] in this Court is procedurally appropriate and substantively warranted.**  Intervention post-judgment is permissible under certain circumstances.  See *Warner Co. v. Sutton*, 270 N.J. Super. 658, 662 (App. Div. 1994) (“Generally, intervention after judgment is allowed if necessary ‘to preserve some right which cannot otherwise be protected. ’”) (quoting *Chesterbrooke Ltd. P'ship v. Planning Bd. of Twp. of Chester*, 237 N.J. Super. 118, 123 (App. Div. 1989)).  In *Warner*, non-profit corporations dedicated to the preservation of open spaces sought to appeal a consent order regarding the zoning for the property at issue, and in response to a motion to dismiss the appeal, cross-moved seeking intervention in the Appellate Division.  *Warner*, 270 N.J. at 662.  The Appellate Division remanded the matter to the trial court to consider the request for intervention, and, after the trial court denied the request, the Appellate Division reversed, ordering intervention for the sole purpose of pursuing an appeal of the consent order.  *Id.* at 668.  See also Coal. for Quality Health Care v. New Jersey Dep’t of Banking & Ins., 348 N.J. Super. 272, 281 (App. Div. 2002) (noting that the National Association of Independent Insurers, American Insurance Association, Insurance Council of New Jersey, and Alliance of American Insurers intervened in this Court after health care providers and attorneys appealed the Department of Banking and Insurance’s approval of pre-certification plans and policy forms of various insurers).9
[directive] The shooting occurred on Oct. 18, 2018, around 3:30 p.m., when [...] and a woman he was dating (hereafter “the woman”) arrived at the “[...]” car rental office on [...] in [...] to return a rented Toyota Corolla.  [...] and the woman were suspects in a home invasion and attempted murder that occurred the previous day on [...] in the [...] section of [...], in which a man was severely beaten with a rifle and robbed.  [...] also was wanted on a warrant for failing to appear in court on a pending vehicular homicide charge against him.  Cape May County detectives determined that the car used in the home invasion was a rental car that was due back at the rental agency on Oct. 18, and they set up surveillance across the street from [...].  The woman arrived at the rental agency, along with [...], who drove there in a gray Nissan Altima.  They both parked their respective cars in the lot.  The detectives drove into the parking lot, and broke out into two teams – one to detain the woman, the other to detain [...].  The detectives positioned their vehicles to prevent each suspect vehicle from escaping.  The woman was approached and taken into custody without incident.  The county detective who shot [...], [...], activated the emergency lights on the Chevy Tahoe he was driving and parked it in front of the Nissan Altima occupied by [...] to block him in.
[directive] The exact discipline imposed is confidential, but you will be advised of the ultimate finding, namely :  a.  Sustained: A preponderance of the evidence shows an officer violated any law; regulation; directive, guideline, policy, or procedure issued by the Attorney General or County Prosecutor; agency protocol; standing operating procedure; rule; or training.  b.  Unfounded: A preponderance of the evidence shows that the alleged misconduct did not occur.  c.  Exonerated:  A preponderance of the evidence shows the alleged conduct did occur, but did not violate any law; regulation; directive, guideline, policy, or procedure issued by the Attorney General or County Prosecutor; agency protocol; standing operating procedure; rule; or training.  d.  Not Sustained: The investigation failed to disclose sufficient evidence to clearly prove or disprove the allegation.  6.  If our investigation shows that a crime might have been committed, the county prosecutor will be notified.  You might be asked to testify in court.  7.  If our investigation results in an officer being charged with a violation of department rules, you might be asked to testify in a departmental hearing.  8.  If our investigation shows that the complaint is unfounded or that the officer acted properly, the matter will be closed.  9.  Internal affairs investigations are confidential and all disciplinary hearings shall be closed to the public unless the defendant officer requests an open hearing.
[brief] For the foregoing reasons, the State requests this Court reverse the October 28, 2024 order denying the State’s motion for joinder and to admit certain other crime evidence.  Respectfully submitted, [...]  ATTORNEY GENERAL OF NEW JERSEY  ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT BY: /s/ [...]  [...] Assistant Attorney General  [...]  March 12, 2025  [...] ID. No. 084402013  Assistant Deputy Public Defender  [...]  Of Counsel and On the Letter-Brief  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY  APPELLATE  DIVISION DOCKET NO. [...]  STATE OF NEW JERSEY, : CRIMINAL ACTION  Plaintiff-Appellant, : On Appeal From An Interlocutory Order v. : Of the Superior Court of New Jersey : Criminal Division, Union County  [...], Indictment No. [...] : Sat Below:  Defendant-Respondent.
[brief] In its opposition to this appeal, [...] argues that Vermont law governs this case.  Vermont’s highest Court has held in *Pharmacists* that “an insurer under a general duty to defend is required to bring an appeal on its insured’s behalf when there are reasonable grounds to believe that the insured’s interests might be served by an appeal. ”  On this appeal, for the first time, [...] asserts that the [...] “abandoned their claims for damages,” and therefore (according to [...]) it had no duty to appeal the underlying case on [...]’s behalf.  The record contains no support for this newly-minted theory.  Further, as previously demonstrated, the monies awarded in the HCH Action were “damages” under applicable law.  [...] also seeks to evade *Pharmacists* based on appealable rulings of the Vermont Trial Court.  But [...]’s argument conflicts with both *Pharmacists* and with the broad definition of “suit” in the Policy.  In addition, [...] improperly asks this Court to re-write and expand the “personal profit” exclusion in the Policy.  But [...] has already conceded that [...] did not gain any personal benefit by reason of the matters complained of in the underlying suit.  A breach of an insurer’s duty to defend renders the insurer liable to pay any fair and reasonable settlement that the insured later makes on his own.
[brief] (Id.)  [...] certifies the reasonableness and necessity of the invoices for several categories of alleged losses.  We also identify the professionals who performed the services in question, who would be available for cross-examination.  See, "Plaintiffs Initial Disclosures Pursuant to Case Management Order entered October 5, 2017" (Pa503-505)  The proximate connection between defendant's negligence and most elements of Plaintiffs' financial loss is self-evident.
[brief] The Court acknowledged that "it is not reasonable to expect that jurors can perceive and understand all parts of a complex incident, or even a fleeting gesture in a simple scene, that is depicted in a video."  Thus, it created a "framework to assess video narration evidence by a witness who did not observe events in real time" under Rules 701, 602, and 403.  Id. at 600.  The Court settled that "an investigator who has carefully reviewed a video recording can satisfy the 'perception' prongs under N.J.R.E. 701 and 602 and the 'helpfulness' prong under N.J.R.E. 701 and offer lay witness testimony."  Id. at 569.  While "it is for the jury to determine what a recording depicts, there are times when narration testimony can help jurors better understand video evidence and aid them in 'determining a fact in issue."  Id. at 601 (quoting N.J.R.E 701(b)).  The Court noted that "[e]ven with short videos, jurors might miss a small or nuanced detail."  Id. at 601.  And in those instances, "[a]n investigator who has carefully analyzed a video can draw a jury's attention to particular spots can be quite helpful to the finder of fact.'"  Ibid.  (quoting Watson, 472 N.J. Super. at 465).  The pointing testimony allows the jury to then "make its own evaluation."  Ibid. (quoting Watson, 472 N.J. Super. at 465).  In fact, the Court found that "[d]espite the brevity of the recording" it was "appropriate to draw attention to the split second when the suspect used his elbow to open the outer door—a point that might otherwise have been missed."
[brief] It sentenced him to a term of ten years for accomplice liability for first-degree robbery, with 85% to be served without parole, and seven years for reckless manslaughter with 85% to be served without parole, all to be served concurrently with the felony murder sentence.  (33T35-23 to 33T39-16;Da57-Da60).  The court merged the conviction for theft into the robbery conviction (33T36-4 to 8).  On July 1, 2022, defendant filed a notice of appeal (Da1-Da4).
[brief] In general, rent control ordinances must balance the dual interests of maintaining affordable rents for tenants while providing landlords with both enough rental income to cover their operating expenses and enough return on their real estate investment to incentivize their continued participation and investment in the rental market.  To achieve these ends, rent control ordinances in New Jersey set limits on annual rent increases and provide landlords with a hardship rent increase pathway through which they can apply for further increases due to extenuating circumstances.  Accordingly, Hoboken’s RCO provides that, “In the event that a landlord cannot meet his operating expenses or does not make a fair return on his investment, he may appeal to the [...] for a hardship rental increase. ”  Hoboken, N.J., Code § 155-14(A) (2018).  The ordinance specifies that, “Fair return on the equity investment in real property shall be considered to be 6% above the maximum passbook demand deposit savings account interest rate available in the City of Hoboken. ”  Hoboken, N.J., Code § 155-1 (2018).  In addition, the ordinance further provides various factors that the Board shall consider in such an application including:
[brief] A “trial court ha[s] no authority to impose conditions of parole. ”  State v. Beauchamp, 262 N.J. Super. 532, 536 (App. Div. 1993).  Conditions entered on a judgment of conviction “insofar as they were designed to govern and control the decisions whether, when, and under what conditions parole would be granted to defendant,” are a “nullity. ”  Id. at 538.  When a criminal defendant is sentenced and a judgment of conviction has been entered, jurisdiction over that defendant is “relinquishe[d] . . . to the executive branch, except for the appellate process.
[brief] The bill provides that no person other than one connected with or employed upon the railroad acting within the scope of their employment may enter upon the right of way of any railroad or to come in contact with any equipment, machinery, wires or rolling stock of any railroad.  However, these provisions would not prohibit a passenger for hire from utilizing those parts of the railroad particularly intended for passenger use nor shall it prohibit a person from using a crossing established by the railroad.  The bill also provides that a person shall not recover for injuries sustained while coming into contact with any equipment, machinery, wires or rolling stock of any railroad while that person was: . . . (4) engaging in conduct proscribed by subsection a. of section 1 of this bill; or (5) using the property of any railroad in a manner in which it was not intended to be used or in violation of posted regulations.  Pa1027 (emphasis added).  In sum, the Legislature created the 1998 amendments to reverse the continuing judicial abrogation of the immunity statute, with the intent of specifically including [...] in its protections as well as all other railroads operating in New Jersey.  In doing so, it specifically modified the statute so that it bars recovery when a person engaged in prohibited conduct, regardless of where the conduct occurs.  Moreover, the legislature removed the sentence stating, “[t]his section shall not apply to the crossing of a railroad by a person at any lawful public or private crossing”, replaced it with, “[t]his section shall not . . . prohibit a person from using a crossing established by the railroad” and added a new subsection (b), which bars recovery of any damages caused by contact with a train while the person was “(5) using the property of any railroad in a manner in which it was not intended to be used or in violation of posted regulations.
[brief] We have long recognized “the importance of immediacy and specificity when trial judges provide curative instructions to alleviate potential prejudice to a defendant from inadmissible evidence that has seeped into a trial. ”  State v. C.W.H., 465 N.J. Super. 574, 595 (App. Div. 2021) (quoting State v. Vallejo, 198 N.J. 122, 135 (2009)).  “Further, ‘[t]he adequacy of a curative instruction necessarily focuses on the capacity of the offending evidence to lead to a verdict that could not otherwise be justly reached.
[brief] First, Plaintiff cannot maintain a such a claim “when the conduct at issue is governed by the terms of an express contract or the cause of action arises out of the same conduct underlying the alleged breach of contract. ”  See Hahn v. OnBoard, LLC, No. 09-03639, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 107606, at *15 (D.N.J. Nov. 16, 2009) (citing Wade, 172 N.J. at 340-41).  Here, the conduct alleged to form the basis for Plaintiff’s breach of good faith claim is the very same conduct that is alleged in support of its breach of contract claim.  (Compare Pa17, ¶¶81-82 (breach of covenant of good faith claim based on [...]’s duty not to “frustrate Plaintiff’s ability to perform under the [PSA], to assist another party in breaching the [PSA], and to avoid taking measures designed to cut Plaintiff out of the transaction. ”)) with Pa15-16, ¶¶71-72, 74 (breach of contract claim based on claim that [...] “frustrated Plaintiff’s ability to perform and enjoy the benefits of the bargain,” ‘aided, abetted and participated in [[...]’s] breach of the [PSA], and “acquiesced and participated in [[...]’s] decision to cut Plaintiff out of the deal”).  Thus, Plaintiff’s breach of good faith claim is duplicative of its breach of contract claim and should be dismissed.