ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] D.  The Court Did Not Grant Summary Judgment Prematurely.  [...] argues that the issue of whether [...] breached its contractual duties was an issue for the factfinder (i.e., a jury) to decide, not [...].  Pb17.  That argument is misguided because [...] ruled as a matter of law that no contractual relationship existed between [...] and [...].  Pa953.  Because there was no contract, there was no need to consider whether [...] committed any breach.  [...] also claims that summary judgment was premature because [...] did not provide its discovery responses in the case.  Pb17.  However, that assertion is mistaken – [...] served written responses to [...]’s interrogatories and document production requests discovery requests.  Pa881-922.  Moreover, “summary judgment is not premature merely because discovery has not been completed, unless the non-moving party can show with some degree of particularity the likelihood that further discovery will supply the missing elements of the cause of action. ”  Friedman v. Martinez, 242 N.J. 449, 472-73 (2020) (internal quotes omitted) (emphasis added); see also Badiali v. New Jersey Mfrs. Ins. Grp., 220 N.J. 544, 555 (2015) (same); Matter of Est. of Castellano, 456 N.J. Super. 510, 514 (App. Div. 2018) (“the opponent must demonstrate the likelihood that unanswered discovery requests will provide information necessary to establish elements of the cause of action or a defense”).  Thus, when arguing that ongoing discovery makes summary judgment premature, a party must identify specifically what discovery is needed that would have material impact the issues presented in the summary judgment motion.  See, e.g., Trinity Church v. Lawson-Bell, 394 N.J. Super. 159, 166 (App. Div. 2007) (“A party opposing summary judgment on the ground that more discovery is needed must specify what further discovery is required, rather than simply asserting a generic contention that discovery is incomplete”).  Here, [...] never identified any specific discovery that he intended to pursue that could materially advance [...]’s defense against [...]’s summary judgment arguments.  Indeed, logically, there is no discovery that [...] could have pursued that would have had any relevance, as summary judgment was granted on the basis of a purely legal issue – that municipal provision of potable water service is a governmental, rather than proprietary function.  In sum, [...] properly granted summary judgment dismissing [...]’s Complaint, and that decision should be affirmed.
[directive] 1.  Unless otherwise noted, all steps must be completed by the donor in the presence of the monitor.  2.  The monitor completes the agency information, donor identification, and test information sections of the Custody and Submission Form (CSF).  3.  The monitor allows the donor to select one [...] issued sealed split specimen collection kit.  8  4.  The donor unseals the split specimen collection kit, removes the specimen bag and specimen containers from the specimen collection container, and places all items on a clean surface.  a.  The specimen containers shall be kept closed/unsealed at this time.  b.  The specimen collection container and specimen containers should be kept within view of both the donor and the monitor.  5.  The monitor instructs the donor to void a specimen of at least 45 mL into the specimen collection container, to not flush the toilet, and return with the specimen container immediately after the specimen is produced.  6.  The monitor checks the specimen for adequate volume and the temperature indicator strip on the specimen container within 4 minutes.  a.  A color change between 90° and 100°F indicates an acceptable specimen temperature.  The monitor indicates if the temperature is acceptable by marking either the “Yes” or “No” box in the specimen collection section of the CSF.  If a temperature strip does not indicate the acceptable temperature, the monitor must consider the possibility that the officer attempted to tamper with the collection.  b.  The monitor must follow the “shy bladder” procedure for donors that initially are unable to produce an adequate amount of urine (See Section D, “Shy Bladder” Procedure).
[brief] We were never provided with any of those inspection records or any kind of reports that would indicate that that was the case.  Now, knowing that what was left was a dangerous condition, and yet they complained not to have had an opportunity to inspect the property, they can't have it both ways.  They did have an opportunity to inspect the property because they admit that in 2018, they did so.  And that was prior to this incident that occurred. ”  1T 12:4-16.  During discovery plaintiff had requested documents regarding the repairs of subject tree and subject sidewalk and never received either.  On January 19, 2024, the Court granted defendant [...]’s Motion for Summary Judgment after reviewing the briefs and exhibits provided by both parties, on the basis that “While the court sympathizes with Plaintiff, it is of the opinion that the Plaintiff did not meet his burden to show that Defendants had constructive or actual notice of the dangerous condition of the tree or that Defendant’s conduct was palpably unreasonable under the circumstances.
[brief] PLAINTIFF’S ARGUMENT THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AND ENGAGED IN BIAS BY FAVORING DEFENDANTS’ POSITION AND IMPROPERLY WEIGHING THE EVIDENCE IS MERITLESS AND NOT SUPPORTED IN THE RECORD  Plaintiff’s arguments that the Trial Court erred and demonstrated bias by (a) favoring Defendants’ arguments in support of their motion for summary judgment and ignoring Plaintiff’s position, and (b) discounting and weighing the evidence to Plaintiff’s detriment, are meritless.  Plaintiff has failed to show how the judge improperly weighed the evidence.  All legitimate inferences were viewed favorably to Plaintiff; she simply failed to provide sufficient evidence to support her claims, as detailed below.  Plaintiff offers no evidence to suggest bias in the Trial Court’s handling of discovery or the summary judgment motion.  Panitch v. Panitch, 339 N.J. Super. 63, 71 (App. Div. 2001).  The mere allegation of bias provides no basis to warrant relief.  The trial judge’s unfavorable decision to a party, rendered in what he conceives to be a discharge of his judicial duty, is not evidence of bias.  Ex parte POINT III
[brief] See, e.g., J-M Mfg. Co. v. Phillips & Cohen, LLP, 443 N.J. Super. 447, 455 (App. Div. 2015) (quoting Brennan v. Orban, 145 N.J. 282, 290 (1996)); see also id. at 460–61 (holding that dismissal of plaintiff’s complaint is “mandated by the entire controversy doctrine” because the “issues [were] properly adjudicated in conjunction with” a prior court proceeding).  B.
[directive] obtain seize in must warrant order a and Seizures enforcement Law to A. narrowly circumstances: following defined except in recording the a device, bystander. search incident the during arrest of lawful a a Seizing 1.  recording device to a without allow for device search itself of  However, seizure mere does the not a obtaining warrant.  officer believe cause recording probable that 2. to device a bystander's the Where has a a crime: recording that evidence of is contains recording officer bystander voluntarily the the request i.  The to transmit may officer law may transmission enforcement.  electronic the possible, is not  If bystander recording to consent the request provide that the voluntarily law of chip or search device of enforcement purpose its memory for to the a contents.  the ii. bystander  If the seize device officer recording refuses, the may only the defined under exigent circumstances, (1) that as probable cause believe to a violent resulting in death serious crime or injury bodily been has (2) a committed; good-faith that belief there of crime on that evidence is recording a good-faith the device; and (3) belief will the evidence be that lost or allow seizure.
[brief] “Reconsideration should be used only for those cases which fall into that narrow corridor in which either (1) the Court has expressed its decision based upon a palpably incorrect or irrational basis, or (2) it is obvious that the Court either did not consider, or failed to appreciate the significance of probative, competent evidence. ”  *D’Atria v. D’Atria*, 242 N.J. Super. 392, 401 (Ch.Div.1990); R. 4:49-2; *Cummings v. Bahr*, 295 N.J. Super. 374, 384 (App.Div.1996).  The purpose of a motion for reconsideration is to “bring new or additional information to the Court’s attention which it could not have provided on the first application” not to give a dissatisfied litigant “repetitive bites at the apple. ”  *D’Atria*, 242 N.J. Super. at 401-402.  On appeal, the standard of review of the denial of a motion for a new trial requires this Court to give deference to the decision below unless there was a “miscarriage of justice under the law.
[brief] We recognize ‘[t]he critical aim of [the 2000 Rule Amendments was] the establishment of a realistic arbitration and trial date.  Leitner v. Toms River Reg’l Schs., 392 N.J.Super. 80, 90-91 (App.Div. 2007)(citing Report of the Conference of Civil Presiding Judges on Standardization and Best Practices, 156 N.J.L.J. 80, 82 (April 5, 1999)).  But, that laudable goal is not served when the court notifies the parties that a discovery extension motion must be brought within the next sixty days or the case ‘shall be deemed’ ready for trial, and at the same time, or, as in this case halfway through the sixty day period, the court sets the actual trial date.  _Id._ at 218-219.  Here, the arbitration and trial date were set before paper discovery was even complete.
[brief] It must be observed that the Law Division Judge asked of Defense Counsel whether “this Court [should] ignore the listing of the residence on the ticket. ”  Counsel replied, “It’s not to ignore it, but the fact is that that was not a factual finding made by the judge.  . . .”  (1T7-17)  Further, the Judge asked defense counsel whether the verbiage of the plea colloquy matters in this case, “meaning that in the plea colloquy it’s admitted that the defendant was within 450 feet of a dwelling.  . . .”  (1T16-1 to 16-5)  Defense Counsel maintained the position that, “[s]o the colloquy in important, of course.  It’s necessary but it’s - the - it’s not sufficient just based on that one or two sentences by the judge about whether he was within 450 feet within a dwelling. ”  (1T 16-10 to 16-14)  Defendant’s position on appeal is meritless.  He certainly has not shown that there is no sufficient credible evidence in the record to support the Judge’s decision – therefore, it must be affirmed.
[brief] June 28, 2019 - In procuring general liability insurance for the summer camp, [...] received a copy of the Master Policy from [...].  (Ia119).  The Master Policy is a General Liability Policy and does not pertain to motor vehicles (i.e., there is nothing in the policy excluding coverage of 12-15+ passenger vans).  [...] recommended [...] procure extra insurance that would cover the 12-15+ passenger rental vans that would be used to transport campers to activities and events.  (Ia332).  [...] wanted at least $1 million in liability coverage for the vans that he would be renting.  (Ia345).  July 9-10, 2019 - [...] reserved four 12-15+ passenger vans from [...].  (Ia336).  July 30, 2019 - [...] filled out [...]’s online application to obtain insurance for the vans.  (Ia337).  The application permits insurance for 12-15+ passenger vans for $150,000 to $500,000 but merely requires "additional underwriting" if $1 million is requested.  The application states nothing about excluding 12-15+ passenger vans.  (Ia585).
[brief] (Pa26 and Pb2; Pb19).  As stated by Plaintiff-Appellant, on October 5, 2023, ninety days after the Answer was filed, the Motion to Dismiss was filed.  (Pb2).  This was not in the middle of discovery, as Plaintiff-Appellant suggests.  Discovery was not scheduled to end until May 2024.  This was ninety days after the Answer was filed.  Plaintiff further relies on the fact that discovery demands were served upon Plaintiff, in accordance with the New Jersey Rules of Court, along with the Answer to argue that Defendant-Respondent, [...], caused her to expend “large amounts of time, money, and energy”.  (Pb20).  However, this argument forgets that Form Interrogatories are automatically propounded along with the filing of an Answer; and R. 4:17-4 requires Supplemental Interrogatories to be served within 40 days of filing an Answer.  In addition, R. 4:17-4(f) requires Plaintiff to provide executed HIPPA authorizations with discovery responses.  In essence, Plaintiff-Appellant argues that [...] had to choose between enforcing the provisions of its policy or obtaining discovery in this litigation.  Plaintiff-Appellant additionally argues that because she responded to the discovery requests propounded that Defendant-Respondent, [...], should be estopped from asserting the suit limitation defense.  It is submitted that responding to discovery does not equate to detrimental reliance and it should not be the basis for an argument of estoppel in this claim.  POINT IV.
[brief] Pa388  Exhibit S - Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint in Lieu of Prerogative Writs, filed January 22, 2021 ..........................................  Pa411  Exhibit T - Cited portions of the Transcript of the Deposition of [...], May 2, 2022 ..................................................................  Pa434  Exhibit U - Unpublished opinion, [...] v. [...], Docket No. [...], 2015 WL 10986475 (NJ. Super. Ct. LawDiv., May 18, 2015)
[brief] On May 3, 2023, Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint was dismissed.  Plaintiff filed a Second Amended Complaint and again advanced claims for alleged failure to accommodate disability.  Counts 1-4 remained specious and/or hypothetical as pled and otherwise failed to state a claim for failure to accommodate/disability discrimination.  Plaintiff merely alleged that there had been, or speculated that there may be in the future, instances where the City has or may have failed to accommodate unidentified Plaintiff members who were on leave.  The City again moved to dismiss.  On September 13, 2023, [...] entered an Order dismissing Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint without prejudice.  (Pa1).  The Trial Court correctly concluded that Plaintiff had not sufficiently pled the elements of disability discrimination under the NJLAD.  In that regard, the Court noted that Plaintiff made only “vague assertions” that unnamed firefighters referenced in the Complaint “have a disability because they have taken sick or injury leave. ”  In so doing, the Court highlighted that no disability for any purported member had been identified, just generalized claims of sick days taken.  The Court concluded that Plaintiff had failed to adequately plead/identify even the most basic of *prima facie* elements of a LAD claim.  Plaintiff's appeal is smoke and mirrors intended to distract from the simple and obvious fact that Plaintiff again failed to set forth a *prima facie* case of failure to accommodate/disability discrimination as to any person (let alone the multiple members as was generally alleged), and there was no party in interest in this case to whom the equitable and monetary relief sought could have been awarded.  Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint failed to satisfy the most basic of notice pleading requirements and would have deprived the City of the ability to effectively defend against such allegations.  The City could not have even issued compulsory discovery demands to the persons purportedly "wronged" since they were neither parties nor identified.  If ever identified, the City would have had to subpoena them – yet – they could be awarded monetary damages and equitable relief as sought by Plaintiff?  How could the City know if it had a statute of limitations defense?  Assess and argue that the unidentified persons did not suffer from a qualifying disability?  Etc.  In so proceeding, Plaintiff has not cited one LAD case where the Court said a party could advance a failure to accommodate/disability discrimination case without identifying the person(s) allegedly discriminated against and how.  There is no authority to this effect.  Plaintiff plainly could not advance a *prima facie* case or convince any member to do so.  This was [...]'s third try.
[brief] The Appellate Division then affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for further proceedings of the Final Judgment of the Superior Court of New Jersey.  On remand, the Plaintiff requested for the award of $1,311,832.94 legal fees in the proposed Final Judgment for the trial court judge to sign.  The trial court granted Plaintiff’s application and denied Defendants’ opposition and cross-motion to vacate the Final Judgment without analyzing the law and facts.
[brief] THIS COURT SHOULD AFFIRM THE DECISION BELOW BECAUSE IT IS UNDENIABLE THAT PLAINTIFF’S DECEDENT VIOLATED N.J.S.A. 48:12-152 AND PLAINTIFF’S CLAIMS ARE THEREFORE BARRED AS A MATTER OF LAW.  The trial court was correct when it determined that Plaintiff’s claims are barred as a matter of law by N.J.S.A. 48:12-152, the railroad immunity statute, because it is undeniable that Plaintiff’s decedent, [...], lost her life due to contact with [...] Train 81 that occurred because she impermissibly entered onto [...]’s railroad crossing and right of way and used the crossing in a manner in which it was not intended to be used, which is conduct prohibited by the statute.  The statute acts as a complete bar to all claims for injuries or death caused by contact with a train while the person was wrongfully present on “the right of way of any railroad” or “using the property of any railroad in a manner in which it was not intended to be used or in violation of posted regulations”, regardless of whether the railroad may also have been negligent.
[brief] Somerset County Indictment Number [...], issued on March 4, 2020, charged [...] with fourth-degree criminal trespass, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:18-3a.  (Da 1)  Somerset County Indictment Number [...], issued on June 2, 2021, charged [...] with third-degree possession with intent to distribute a controlled dangerous substance, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5a(1) and 2C:35-5b(5).  (Da 2)  Somerset County Complaint Warrants [...] and [...] each charged [...] with the disorderly persons offense of possession of less than 50 grams of marijuana or 5 grams of hashish, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10a(4), and the former warrant also charged [...] with the disorderly persons offense of possession with intent to use drug paraphernalia, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:36-2.  (Da 16, 19)  On July 29, 2020, a suppression hearing on Indictment Number [...] was held before the Honorable [...], J.S.C. (1T)  On August 4, 2020, the court denied the motion to suppress in a written opinion.  (Da 3-9)  On September 23, 2022, [...] entered a guilty plea to third-degree possession with intent to distribute a controlled dangerous substance (Indictment __________________  1  Da — Defendant’s appendix 1T – Transcript of July 29, 2020 hearing on defense motion to suppress 2T – Transcript of September 23, 2022 plea hearing 3T – Transcript of December 9, 2022 sentencing No. [...]) and to an amended petty disorderly persons offense of criminal trespass, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:18-3b (Indictment No. [...]).  (Da 10-15; 2T 3-17 to 4-3)  In exchange, the prosecutor agreed to dismiss the pending charges in the complaint warrants and recommend a sentence of four years flat on the possession charge and 30 days on the trespass charge, to be served concurrently.  (Da 13, 15; 2T 3-24 to 4-3)  The prosecutor also agreed to recommend that the custodial sentences be stayed pending the resolution of [...]’s appeal of the denial of his motion to suppress.  (Da 13, 15; 2T 4-4 to 10)  On December 9, 2022, the Honorable [...], J.S.C., sentenced [...] in accordance with the plea agreement to an aggregate term of four years and imposed all appropriate fines and assessments.  (3T 8-21 to 9-24; Da 16-22)  In addition, [...] dismissed the pending charges in the complaint warrants and stayed the imposition of the custodial sentences until the Appellate Division renders a decision on the appeal of the suppression motion.  (3T 9-1 to 3, 9-18 to 18, 9-25 to 10-4; Da 16, 19)  [...] filed a notice of appeal on December 15, 2022.  (Da 23-27)  STATEMENT OF FACTS
[brief] Defendant [...], a social worker, was the Supervisor assigned to the Social Services Unit where Plaintiff was placed in the County Correctional System.  It was Defendant Brock’s brother, a fellow inmate, who had reported to authorities that Plaintiff had engaged in the offense for which Plaintiff was arrested – who was also placed in the same unit under the supervision of his sister, [...].  Same is an ethical violation and violation of the correctional rules to have a relative (Defendant [...]’s brother) under your command and charge where the County Correctional Employee has authority.  The Defendant Brock was operating in a conflict situation and doing her brother’s bidding in directing the hostilities of the county agents’ misdeeds against Plaintiff as alleged.
[brief] Docket No.: [...]  Dear Justices of the Appellate Division:  This office represents the Appellant, [...], in the above captioned matter.  Please accept this reply letter brief in lieu of a more formal brief on behalf of the Appellant, retired Trooper [...].  TABLE OF CONTENTS  REPLY  APPENDIX  TABLE OF CONTENTS..................................................ii  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS, AND RULINGS............................iii  PROCEDURAL HISTORY........................................................................2  STATEMENT OF FACTS.......................................................................2  LEGAL ARGUMENT.............................................................................2  POINT I  THE DECISION BELOW WAS ARBITRARY, CAPRICIOUS, AND UNREASONABLE, AND NOT SUPPORTED BY THE SUBSTANTIAL WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE.  (Not Raised Below) .................................................................2  POINT II  ADEQUATE  NOTICE OF THE RICCI ACT WAS NOT PROVIDED AND THEREFORE, SALVADORE SHOULD BE ENTITLED TO RICCI ACT BENEFITS.  (Raised Below.  Pa16. Pa24. Pa32.) ..............................................6  CONCLUSION.....................................................................................11
[directive] The charging agency shall photograph the juvenile for criminal Photographs. identification purposes pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-61(b).  The New Jersey Code of Juvenile Justice forbids photographing juveniles under the age of fourteen “...for criminal identification purposes without the approval of the court, or the consent of the juvenile and [their] parent or guardian. ”  N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-61(b).
[brief] Accordingly, an affidavit of merit was required, absent some recognized exception to the statute.  There is no published precedent related to the specific issue of whether use and ownership of engineering plans through a transition in ownership of a project implicates the professional standard of care, invoking the Affidavit of Merit Statute.  The absence of any published opinions directly on point did not prevent the underlying trial court from ruling that an affidavit of merit was required to support Appellants’ claim against [...].