ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] “‘An administrative agency’s interpretation of a statute it is charged with enforcing is entitled to great weight. ’”  *Piatt v. Police and Firemen’s Retirement System*, 443 N.J. Super. 80, 99 (App. Div. 2015) (citation omitted).  The “Driving Signals” section of the *2023 New Jersey Driver Manual* [Manual] states:  A motorist should always give a proper signal when turning, changing lanes, stopping, or slowing down.  A motorist should always use the vehicle’s turn signals.  A motorist should put on the turn signal at least 100 feet before turning and be sure to cancel the signal after making a turn.  Not doing so could mislead other motorists.  (N.J.S.A. 39:4-126)  [Id. at p. 54 (emphasis added). ]  And when discussing “changing lanes and passing,” the *Manual* reiterates to “[a]lways signal lane changes. ”  *Id.* at p. 96.  That the agency tasked with educating New Jerseyans on the rules of the road interprets N.J.S.A. 39:4-126 to require signals before lane changes is persuasive evidence of the statute’s meaning given the Legislature’s inaction in response.  Accordingly, the plain language of N.J.S.A. 39:4-126, as confirmed by extrinsic aids, requires a driver to signal a lane change if other drivers may be affected.
[brief] Rather, it is as [...] correctly concluded in his opinion on April 21, 2023:  “Indeed, it is clear that the specific language of Section 11 dealing with statutory review and revocation period of this voluntary retirement and release agreement, codify the requirements of the Older Worker’s Benefit Protection Act.  It’s clear that the [Respondent] has the right to revoke and if the factual circumstance comes under this argument bargained for rights under the two labor contracts, she’s entitled to revoke it.  It was clearly done under the time period and therefore… there was no settlement…”  [2T, 20:3-14.]  To the extent that Appellant argues that it would be counter to public policy to uphold Respondent’s exercise of her right to revoke, this is absurd.  Rather the reverse would be true.  The terms offered by Appellant in the writing include a provision that clearly provides Respondent the right to revoke within twenty-one (21) days.  Not only would reversing the decision below violate her rights under contract law but would further confound the intentions of the Congress to protect persons such as Respondent from uninformed and unfair losses of important rights.  Moreover, to find that Respondent did not properly revoke the agreement in accordance with the clear terms of the agreement would be in complete countenance to well settled law prohibiting Courts from rewriting clear contracts on the basis that it might have been functionally desirable to draft it differently; remaking a better contract for the parties than they themselves decided to enter; or alter contracts for the benefit of one party and to the detriment of another.  Karl’s Sale & Serv., supra at 493.  It is clearly the case that public policy favors Court action which preserves rights, upholds the intentions of the legislature, and maintains consistency of interpretation and application of contract law.  In conclusion, it is respectfully submitted that Appellant’s arguments with respect to OWBPA do not change the analysis.  Appellant’s appeal should be denied.
[brief] However, Price cautioned that boards should not totally ignore the ordinarily applicable limits for density, and should, instead, consider the reasons for those restrictions when evaluating the project.  Under *Coventry Square, Inc. v. Westwood Zoning Bd. of Adjustment*, 138 N.J. 285 (N.J. 1994) as applied by *Randolph* and *Grubbs*, and as directed by *Price*, an applicant seeking a FAR variance must show special reasons exist to grant the variance by showing that the site “will accommodate the problems associated with the use even though the proposal does not comply with the conditions the ordinance established to address those problems. ”  *Coventry*, supra, 138 N.J. at 299; *Grasso*, 375 N.J. Super. at 52; *Grubbs*, 389 N.J. Super. at 388-389.  For the negative criteria, *Coventry* holds that the board of adjustment must evaluate the impact of the proposed [conditional] use variance upon the adjacent properties and determine whether or not it will cause such damage to the character of the neighborhood as to constitute a “‘substantial detriment to the public good’ . . . must be satisfied that the grant of the conditional-use variance for the specific project at the designated site is reconcilable with the municipality's legislative determination that the condition should be imposed on all conditional uses in that zoning district. ”  *Id.* at 299.  It is noteworthy that *Coventry* states, “The thrust of the proof addressed to the negative criteria is similar. ”  *Id.*; see also *TSI East Brunswick*, 215 N.J. at 41.  As stated above, the trial court primarily analyzed the d(4) FAR variance in its opinion.
[brief] ARGUMENT  A.  The [...]’s After-the-Fact Justification for Denying the Application is Unsupported by the Record Below.  (T1/25:16-26:6; 27:2-28:13; 200:7-16, 201:13-15; T2/71:15; Aa246).  Our courts have determined that where a denial of a land use application is based on a recitation of “conclusionary” language that is not grounded in evidence, vacating that decision is appropriate.  See Griffin Const. Corp. v. Bd. of Adjust. of Teaneck, 85 N.J. Super. 472, 477 (App. Div.1964), certif. den., 44 N.J. 408 (1965) (denial of variance not sustainable upon perfunctory finding, phrased in conclusionary language of statute that the applicant failed to satisfy its burden, unless grounded in evidence supportive of the substance of such conclusion).
[brief] Third, the defendants did not seek an allocation of liability amongst themselves at trial, or assert crossclaims for contribution or indemnification.  Nor did they advocate for several liability in the event the lower court declined to dismiss the Plaintiffs’ claims.  Even still, the defendants are free to pursue contribution claims if, upon collection by the Plaintiffs, some of them believe they paid more than their fair share of the judgment.  Fourth, the Court should reject any invitation to diminish the [...]’ liability for the conduct in question.
[brief] The Westampton Ordinances do not define the term “site plan,” but state that “[a]ny word or term not defined herein shall be used with a meaning of standard usage, unless such word or term is defined in the Municipal Land Use Law, and then that definition shall apply. ”  § 250-4A. (Pa3).  “Site Plan” is defined in the Municipal Land Use Law (“MLUL”), N.J.S.A. 40:55D, as:
[brief] This failure on the court’s part and the judgment it issued deprived [...] of her right to due process.  In Point III of its brief, Plaintiff declares that the factors outlined in Morocco v. Felton, 112 N.J. Super 226 (Law Div. 1970) do not apply to the instant case.  The Plaintiff makes much of the fact that [...] is now deceased and that the alleged agreement for the return of the property was never reduced to writing.  But staying with writings, the facts below are also that there was no contract of sale executed or a written landlord tenant lease.  This begs the question of why, if indeed the [...] sold their home, there is lacking an executed contract evidencing both the [...] intent to sell their home and the terms of such transaction.  Similarly, why is there not a written lease evidencing that the [...] would be remaining in possession now as tenants.  Defendant submits that these questions, the import of which was apparently lost on the court, go to the very heart of the defenses and counterclaims underlying her motion to transfer.
[brief] Importantly, Defendant does not dispute the Amended Complaint alleges the facts establishing that Defendant, a debt collector, sought to collect a debt arising from health-related services from Plaintiff, a consumer, and Plaintiff received Defendant’s letter sent in connection with the collection of that debt.  Those facts trigger the application of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq., to Defendant’s conduct.  It is also undisputed that Defendant conveyed to an unidentified person its account number; the identity of the healthcare service provider, the location where healthcare services were provided, the date of each health-related service, the healthcare provider’s full account number associated with each service, the charge for each service, the full User ID and password accessing Defendant’s online portal for the debt, the amount of the debt, and Plaintiff’s full name and mailing address.  Pa8 at ¶46.  POINT I.
[brief] *N. Plainfield*, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39555 at *74-75.  Accord  *United States Fire Ins. Co. v. Cyanotech Corp.*, No. 12-00537  JMS-BMK, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 152160, *1 (D. Hawaii 2013) (applying the “Knowing Violation of Rights of Another” exclusion where the underlying complaint alleged that the insured “intentionally and knowingly interfered” with a business relationship); See also Grange Ins. Ass’n v. Roberts, 179 Wn. App. 739 (Wash. Ct. App. 2013) (holding that there was no duty to defend where the underlying complaint alleged intentionally and deliberately interfered with the plaintiff’s expected inheritance).
[brief] The court also tortured another regulation of the Board of Public Utilities, N.J.A.C. 14:3-8.5(d) in an effort to shore up its flawed ruling in the event that the route was not essential.  The court used regulation to make the route through [...] legally required based on its costs.  However, that regulation only addresses “extensions” as defined in N.J.A.C. 14:3-8.2.  An extension “means the construction or installation of plant and/or facilities to convey new service from existing or new plant and/or facilities to a structure or property for which the applicant has requested service. ”  In turn, “applicant” for an extension is defined as “a person that has applied to the appropriate regulated entity, as defined at N.J.A.C. 14:3-1, for the construction of an extension as defined at N.J.A.C. 14:3-8.2. ”  Thus, an “extension” under N.J.A.C. 14:3-8.5 requires that the connection be from facilities of one entity to a structure of another entity. ”  The proposed 69kV line through [...] would be a connection between facilities and structures of just a single entity ([...]) as such is not an “extension” under the regulation relied upon by the court. \(^3\)  As a result of the trial court’s improper ruling on the motions for summary judgment, [...] filed this appeal on July 26, 2023.  DA at 945a.  **STANDARD OF REVIEW**
[brief] The Trial Court Correctly Dismissed the Claims Against [...] Where Appellants Admitted Their Causes of Action Arose After the NDA Expired.(Pa003036 – 003058)  The Panel should affirm the decision below because the NDA expired well before the conduct alleged and Appellants failed to show any conduct that would breach the NDA.  Appellants cannot use an NDA as a shield to ward off competitors from a project they abandoned.  [...] abided by its terms, and Appellants introduce no evidence to the contrary.  1.  The NDA Expired Before Any Conduct Alleged.
[brief] 6T126:13-17.  Defendants’ expert, [...], agreed with this observation in his testimony, “I don’t think that the attorney would just - - would be doing his job if he simply said I’m going to take this information and use it. ”  8T89:21-23.  [...]’s deviations from the standard of care carried over from preparing the divorce documents to when he appeared in court to finalize the divorce.  [...] testified that [...] deviated from the acceptable practices of candor to the tribunal set forth in RPC 3.3.
[brief] The decision to provide for more open space in the Redevelopment Plan is consistent with the Borough’s Master Plan, which recognizes vacant land is a scarce resource in the Borough and aims to provide more open space, as well as the other factors identified in greater detail above.  The proposal is “substantially consistent” with the Master Plan, as required by the LRHL, and the Borough’s governing body rationally determined \textsuperscript{4}  Notably, Plaintiffs failed to present any expert planning testimony before the Planning Board, Mayor and Council, or Law Division that the proposal increasing open space as well as density on the developable tract is a poor choice from a planning perspective.  that adoption of Ordinance 22-1516 amending the Redevelopment Plan was preferable to the prior iteration of the Redevelopment Plan.  Plaintiffs’ attempt to hide their true complaint that the Amended Redevelopment Plan is not entirely consistent with the Master Plan behind the argument that the Amended Redevelopment Plan is not substantially consistent with the Master Plan.  However, viewed globally, it is clear that there are far more consistencies than inconsistencies such that the Amended Redevelopment Plan is substantially consistent with the Master Plan, and the governing body’s determination was not arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable.  Furthermore, the Master Plan, which is not legislation and is merely guidance, is but one of the factors that must be considered by the governing body.
[brief] 227 N.J. Super. at 31.  On the question of whether the provision for radial lines is a waivable subdivision standard -- as opposed to a zoning standard.  UDO Sec. 18-805C states:  "Insofar as is practical, side lot lines shall be at right angles to straight streets and radial to curved streets."  To be sure, Section 18-805 ("Lots") is part of Article VIII ("DESIGN STANDARDS"), but so are Section 18-806 ("Nonconforming Uses and Lots"), see Ia219 to Ia220, and Section 18-807 ("Off-Street Parking, Loading and Circulation"), see Ia221 to Ia223 -- clearly the existence/non-existence of a nonconforming use, and the minimum number of parking spaces, aren't waivable matters.  The undersigned found that, in [...], the lot line requirement is a "General Provisions" zoning standard (Sec. 140-113.1A (Ia224), whereas in [...], Sec. 244-194C (Ia225) it is part of "Design Standards and Improvement Specifications").  In any event, as with variances, reviewing courts consider whether a board "arbitrarily or capriciously" granted or denied a waiver.
[brief] TABLE OF CONTENTS  PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND STATEMENT OF FACTS  ..................................  1 LEGAL ARGUMENT .........................................................................................  1 POINT I THE STATE OFFERED  NO COMPELLING REASON TO BELIEVE THAT [...] AND HIS FRIENDS WERE NOT STOPPED AND FRISKED FOR THE SAME UNCONSTITUTIONAL REASON THE OTHER TWO MEN WERE STOPPED AND FRISKED: “DUE TO THE AREA. ”  ...........................................  1 CONCLUSION .....................................................................................................
[brief] The arbitration provision also provides a delegation clause that provides that issues relating to the scope of the arbitration provision—including whether a claim is subject to the arbitration provision—are to be decided at arbitration..."  (Ja10-Ja11)  As will be further shown, not only are Plaintiff’s HCSA, CFA, TCCWNA, and RISA claims against [...] justiciable by a New Jersey judge (as opposed to an arbitrator, infra Section I[B]) but, of equal importance, Plaintiff’s claims seeking, among other things, injunctive relief (i.e. for [...] to cease using its New Jersey form health club Membership Agreement), is the type of “public injunctive relief” that [...] specifically excluded from arbitration in its Membership Agreement.  Infra Section I[C]; (Ja27, Ja36-Ja37)  For these reasons, the trial court’s July 24, 2024 Order should be reversed, and Plaintiff’s case should be reinstated to the New Jersey trial court for the parties to commence discovery.  (Ja5-Ja12)  LEGAL ARGUMENT I.
[brief] [Appeal of private right to a cause of action issues] (Pa375– Pa378)  When a private right to a cause of action is not express, then a court may look at whether there is an implied right to a private cause of action.  There must be evidence that the Legislature intended to create a private right of action and it must be consistent with the Legislative scheme.  The Legislature did not intend a private right of action to sue school districts in Superior Court for violations of N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-9(e)(3), and allowing such lawsuits would be inconsistent with the Legislative scheme.  Hence, the court should not infer that there exists an implied private right to a cause of action that allows [...] to sue [...] in Superior Court.  Without an implied right to a cause of action to sue [...] on its Counterclaim, the Counterclaim should have been dismissed.  In addition to the Legislature not expressly conferring a private right to a cause of action to allow [...] to sue [...] for enforcement and violations of N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-9(e)(3), the court should dismiss the Counterclaim because it should not infer an implied private right to a cause of action to sue [...] in Superior Court.  To make an inference that a statute implies a private right to a cause of action to sue in Superior Court, our Supreme Court concluded:  To determine if a statute confers an implied private right of action, courts consider whether: (1) plaintiff is a member of the class for whose special benefit the statute was enacted; (2) there is any evidence that the Legislature intended to create a private right of action under the statute; and (3) it is consistent with the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme to infer the existence of such a remedy.
[directive] (b)  The governing body of each local unit shall, by resolution, certify to the Local Finance Board that of all members the governing body have personally reviewed, as a minimum, the sections of the annual audit entitled: General Comments, Recommendations, Auditor's Opinions, and Single Audit Findings, form,  Such certification shall also be evidenced by the execution of a group affidavit promulgated 1. by the Board, that shall be originally signed by each member of the governing body.  2.  Such resolution of certification and group affidavit shall be adopted and executed by the governing body not later than 45 days after the receipt of the annual audit.
[brief] Indeed, the Chancery Court effectively conceded that a substantive review to identify entries that were duplicative\textsuperscript{10}, redundant, excessive, or otherwise unnecessary would have taken hundreds of hours.  See 1T68:18-19.  [...]’s attempt to explain why he should be rewarded for his unilateral delay in filing the Global Fee Application by receiving his 2022 rates for all of the work done rather than the rates in place when the work was conducted simply makes no sense.  None of the cases cited by [...] are remotely similar to this case, where [...] is seeking an award of all fees incurred for general post-judgment collection efforts based on the general equitable powers of the Chancery Court.
[brief] Plaintiff was [...] (hereinafter “[...]”), located at [...], (at times using [...]) in [...].  [...] purchased the [...] on December 11, 2018 in the amount of $2,916.92 (two thousand nine hundred and sixteen dollars and 92 cents).  29a.  With additional payments in 2018, [...]’ total redemption value is just over $20,694.64.  23a.  [...] has a large --- 1  Defendants have combined the Statement of Facts and Procedural history as it is necessary to understand the sophisticated and complex relationship between the Plaintiff and Intervenors and what was happening in the background as the case progressed through entry of default judgment and the Motion to Vacate Default Judgment. portfolio of Tax Sale certificates generally in excess of $30 million dollars and engages in the tax sale industry for investment purposes.  87a.  [...] is in-house counsel for [...].  87a.  His offices are located in the same space at [...], [...], [...].  Plaintiff [...] through their in-house counsel, [...] filed the Foreclosure Complaint on the 2018 Tax Sale Certificate on August 9, 2021.
[brief] “Public body” means a commission, authority, board, council, committee or any other group of two or more persons organized under the laws of this State, and collectively empowered as a voting body to perform a public governmental function affecting the rights, duties, obligations, privileges, benefits, or other legal relations of any person, or collectively authorized to spend public funds including the Legislature, but does not mean or include the judicial branch of the government, any grand or petit jury, any parole board or any agency or body acting in a parole capacity, the State Commission of Investigation, the Apportionment Commission established under Article IV, Section III, of the Constitution, or any political party committee organized under Title 19 of the Revised Statutes.  N.J.S.A. § 10:4-8 (emphasis added).  Under the Open Public Meetings Act, the Legislature was to give adequate notice, including “to the extent known” that it would consider A. 6260 or S. 49: d.  “Adequate notice” means written advance notice of at least 48 hours, giving the time, date, location and, to the extent known, the agenda of any regular, special or rescheduled meeting, which notice shall accurately state whether formal action may or may not be taken and which shall be (1) prominently posted in at least one public place reserved for such or similar announcements, (2) mailed, telephoned, telegrammed, or hand delivered to at least two newspapers which newspapers shall be designated by the public body to receive such notices because they have the greatest likelihood of informing the public within the area of jurisdiction of the public body of such meetings, one of which shall be the official newspaper, where any such has been designated by the public body or if the public body has failed to so designate, where any has been designated by the governing body of the political subdivision whose geographic boundaries are coextensive with that of the public body and (3) filed with the clerk of the municipality when the public body's geographic boundaries are coextensive with that of a single municipality, with the clerk of the county when the public body's geographic boundaries are coextensive with that of a single county, and with the Secretary of State if the public body has Statewide jurisdiction.
[brief] As a result, Plaintiff was no longer obligated to purchase the Land for $165 million.  Likewise, [...] was no longer obligated to close title under the PSA.  Nor was [...] obligated to keep Plaintiff apprised of changes with the [...].  [...]’s pre-termination obligation to keep Plaintiff informed of the [...] was addressed in Section 18.16 of the PSA.  Section 18.16 required [...] to promptly provide Plaintiff with all material notices concerning the [...].  Notably, Section 18.16 did not expressly survive termination of the PSA.  Indeed, there was no longer a need to keep Plaintiff apprised of the [...] once Plaintiff exercised its right to irrevocably abandon the transaction.  Critically, upon Plaintiff’s irrevocable election to terminate the PSA, [...] was free to proceed with any form of transaction, with or without Plaintiff’s further involvement.
[brief] That policy of insurance is entitled “Workers Compensation and Employer Liability Insurance Policy. ”  [...] did not pay separately for separate coverages.  Rather, [...] paid over $34,000.00 to be covered for the “complete payment of any obligation” for work-related injuries prosecuted in the workers compensation courts and for work-related injuries maintained in a common law court, as mandated by statute.  Under the Employer Liability Insurance, [...] was to be covered for bodily injury by accident for $1,000,000 each accident and bodily injury by disease for $1,000,000 per employee.  There is one policy of insurance, and the contract should be read as a whole.