ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The upshot of numerous studies on the deterrent effect of various sentencing regimes, as outlined by the heralded National Academies of Sciences report on mass incarceration, is that the relationship between sentence length and crime rate is not linear but rather decreases in slope as the sentence length increases.  National Research Council, *The Growth of Incarceration in the United States: Exploring Causes and Consequences* 138-39 (Jeremy Travis, Bruce Western, & Steve Radburn eds., 2014).  That means that as sentences get longer, the deterrent effect of extending the sentence decreases — for each additional month or year added to a long sentence, the marginal increased deterrent value of that additional month or year becomes less and less, approaching zero.  *Id.* at 139.  The report concluded that “increasing already long sentences has no material deterrent effect. ”  *Id.* at 140.  The Court here relied on a rationale of deterrence to impose consecutive sentences without confronting the social science of deterrence or explain why a ten-year NERA sentence—imposed on a person who had never been to prison—was not sufficient to deter [...] from reoffending.
[directive] Record of Shared Access and Responsibilities of the Receiving Agency  When ALPR data is made accessible to or otherwise shared with or transferred to another law enforcement agency, the agency that collected the ALPR data shall document the identity of the other agency and the specific officer(s) or civilian employee(s) of that agency who were provided the information.  When the transfer of stored ALPR data is done periodically as part of a system for aggregating data collected by two or more law enforcement agencies (e.g., the scheduled and routine transmittal of data to the [...]), each agency contributing data to the combined database shall maintain a record of the data transfer, which may be an automated record, and shall have and keep on file a memorandum of understanding or agreement or other memorialization of the arrangement for maintaining and populating a database comprised of stored ALPR data collected by multiple law enforcement agencies.  Any agency -13- provided with access to or use of the ALPR data collected by another agency shall comply with all applicable provisions of these Guidelines concerning stored ALPR data and disclosure of personal identifying information.
[directive] N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.23b  A vehicle impounded pursuant to this section [N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.23] shall be impounded for a period of 12 hours after the time of arrest or until such later time as the arrestee claiming the vehicle meets the conditions for release under [N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.23d].  Although the first provision of the statute, N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.23a, calls for an immediate impoundment of the vehicle being operated by the person arrested, that provision of the statute does not negate the Constitutional right of the arrested person to make other arrangements for the removal of the vehicle by another person who is present at the scene of the arrest.
[brief] Caldwell v. Haynes, 136 N.J. 422, 433 (1994).  Plaintiff’s “theme” in this case asked the jury to do more than compensate him.  The “wrong” which Plaintiff tasked the jury with “righting” was not the physical harm done to him, but rather, the wrongful behavior of the Defendants over the course of nearly five years in refusing to compensate him.
[brief] *Id.* at 465-66.  In the case below, there was no suggestion by the State that the Defendant could be found guilty of Robbery or Felony Murder based on his conduct occurring after the fact or based on some other purpose.  The State’s theory of the case placed the Defendant at the scene of the crime, actively engaged in the Robbery and actively engaged in the conduct which caused the death of the Victim.  (15T47:22-5012; 26T45:10-76:8).  As to the required purpose, the State noted that, this accomplice liability is applicable to the robbery, the felony murder charge that you'll consider, and the murder charges that you'll consider.  But if you find that [...], or someone else committed robbery, felony murder, and/or murder against [...], and this defendant either solicited them, agreed with them, attempted to aid them, planning -- and planning to commit it with them, and his purpose was to carry on the commission of that offense, and he had that same mind set, then the defendant is also guilty of robbery, of felony murder, and of murder.
[brief] (Pa118; 33,3-9)  He further testified that the stormwater management regulations require that improvements be at least one foot above the seasonal high-water table.  A series of test pits were done throughout the site to determine the seasonal high-water table locations.  The system was designed to meet that requirement.  (Pa151; 51,13-52,3)  He testified that the grading was done for the entire property, not just for individual buildings.  He stated that the grading was done the same as any site plan.  He testified that this grading is not mounding to increase building height.  “If that were the case, we would have six separate mounds. ”  He stated, “What we have proposed is site regrading to accommodate the site features to make this development work in terms of stormwater management, sanitary sewer and grading. ”  (Pa151-152; 52,4-53,1)  [...] further testified that the revised grading plan was not to enhance views from the proposed homes.  It is a functionality of the site.  In response to the direct question “was it designed to allow an increased building height for these structures?” he responded, “As I mentioned, no, it hasn’t. ”  (Pa152; 53,2-8)  The Planning Board found [...]’s testimony to be credible.  Moreover, as set forth previously, his testimony was concurred with by the Planning Board engineer and planner.  The Planning Board properly found that the approved revised lot grading was not designed to allow for increased building height and the second portion of the Ordinance Section 22-2.4 did not apply to this application and no variance for height pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70.d.(6) was required.
[brief] Rule 3:22-12(a)(1), provides in pertinent part that a first PCR petition must be filed no more than five years after entry of the challenged JOC unless the petition “alleges facts showing that the delay [. . .] was due to [the] defendant's excusable neglect and that there is a reasonable probability that if [his] factual assertions were found to be true[,] enforcement of the time bar would result in a fundamental injustice. ”  R. 3:22-12(a)(1)(A).  To establish excusable neglect, a defendant must do “more than simply provid[e] a plausible explanation for a failure to file a timely PCR petition. ”  State v. Norman, 405 N.J. Super. 149, 159 (App. Div. 2009).  Our courts have made clear that ignorance of the law, or a misunderstanding of court rules, do not qualify as excusable neglect.  *State v. Jackson*, 454 N.J. Super. 284, 295 n.6 (App. Div. 2018).  Furthermore, a “[d]efendant cannot assert excusable neglect simply because he received inaccurate . . . advice from his defense counsel. ”  *State v. Brewster*, 429 N.J. Super. 387, 400 (App. Div. 2013).  In addition to showing excusable neglect, a PCR petition filed after the five-year deadline must also show that a fundamental injustice would occur if the petition is not heard on the merits.  *Id.*  at 398.  A fundamental injustice occurs “when the judicial system has denied a ‘defendant with fair proceedings leading to a just outcome’ or when ‘inadvertent errors mistakenly impacted a determination of guilt or otherwise wrought a miscarriage of justice. ’”  *State v. Nash*, 212 N.J. 518, 546 (2013) (quoting *State v. Mitchell*, 126 N.J. 565, 587 (1992)).  The petitioner must be prepared to “establish, by a preponderance of the credible evidence, that he is entitled to the requested relief. ”  *State v. Marshall*, 244 N.J. Super. 60, 69 (1990).  It follows from these principles that the time-bar “may ‘be relaxed only under truly exceptional circumstances. ’”  *State v. Marolda*, 471 N.J. Super. 49, 62 (App. Div. 2022) (quoting *State v. Cummings*, 321 N.J. Super. 154, 168 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 162 N.J. 199 (1999))  Ruling defendant’s petition as time-barred, the PCR court held:
[brief] Boule v. Borough of Bradley Beach, 42 N.J. Super. 159 (App. Div. 1956).  Additionally, summary judgment procedure should not be a substitute for a full plenary trial.  United Advertising Corp. v. Metuchen, 38 N.J. 193 (1961).  All doubts must be resolved by a conventional trial.  Frank Rizzo, Inc. v. Alatsas, 27 N.J. 400 (1958).  In reviewing the Memorandum of Decision, as rendered by the Honorable [...], J.S.C., it is apparent that the trial court did not comply with the standard for Summary Judgment, as was laid out in R. 4:46-1 and as explained in Brill v. Guardian Life Insurance Company, 142 NJ, 520 (1995).
[brief] Under Franks, it is presumed that the affidavit supporting a search warrant is valid.  Only intentional and knowingly false statements in a search-warrant affidavit, or statements made with reckless disregard for the truth, can undermine a finding of probable cause.  Id. at 171, 98 S.Ct. 2674.  “[N]egligence or innocent mistake[s] are insufficient” to challenge a warrant affidavit's validity.  Id. material, or necessary, to the finding of probable cause. ”  See Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 171-72, 98 S.Ct. 2674, 57 L.Ed.2d 667(1978) (1978).  A statement is made with “reckless disregard” where “the affiant must have entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his statements or had obvious reasons to doubt the accuracy of the information he reported. ”  Andrews v. Scuilli, 853 F.3d 690 at 698 (3d Cir. 2017) (citation omitted).  “[O]missions are made with reckless disregard if an officer withholds a fact in his ken that ‘[a]ny reasonable person would have known that this was the kind of thing the judge would wish to know. ’”  Wilson v. Russo, 212 F.3d 781, 788 (3d Cir. 2000) (quoting United States v. Jacobs, 986 F.2d 1231, 1235 (8th Cir.1993)).  Here, without an evidentiary hearing it is impossible to know whether [...] knowingly and deliberately, or with a reckless disregard for the truth, made false statements or omissions that create a falsehood in applying for a warrant.  For these reasons and the authorities cited the trial court erred in denying the motion for a Franks hearing.
[brief] [...] testified that all staff discipline when he was Principal was made to staff of “different races, different ages, male, female gender. ” ([...] Tr. 129:5-18).  He also testified, “I was fair to everybody.  I treated everybody equally.  There was no discrimination. ” ([...] Tr. 118:14-15).  The fact that other staff not in the same protected classes as Plaintiff were also disciplined, terminated and did not receive better treatment, eviscerates her discrimination claim.
[brief] (Da395).  The factual record also established that the $500,000 offer was not unanimously agreed to by the parties which would preclude the sale from proceeding under the express terms of the Consent Judgment.  (Da179, Da348, Da350, Da356, Da363, Da413, Da416).  Accordingly, the Court should not have compelled the sale of the Subject Property.  (Da1).  The Court erred in hearing and deciding this matter through an Order to Show Cause application because there were genuine disputes of fact relating to the sale of the property to [...] which could not be properly decided by way of a summary action.
[brief] ”  Section 2 of the SPAs specifically states:  The Unit and the Buyer’s membership in the Association are subject to all of the terms of the Master Deed for [...], a Condominium (the “Master Deed”), and the Association’s Certificate of Incorporation, Bylaws and Rules and Regulations (all of which documents are from now on collectively called the “Governing Documents”).  The Governing Documents and the exhibits thereto set forth the relative rights and obligations of the Buyer, the Association and other owners of units within the Development.  Any amendments to the Governing Documents which are now or thereafter lawfully made will also be binding on the Buyer.  In sum, the voluminous POS is not incorporated into the parties' agreement as a “Governing Document” and it was not signed by the plaintiffs.
[brief] N.J.S.A. 34:15-77, -78.  N.J.S.A. 34:15-72 does not require an employer to satisfy its obligations under Article 1 through one of the methods set forth in sections 77 or 78.  N.J.S.A. 34:15-72.  There is no reference to section 77 or 78 in N.J.S.A. 34:15-72.  Plaintiff ignores the plain language of the statutes and omits reference to the clarifying language cited above.
[brief] ’”  McCarthy v. Twp. of Verona, Docket No. A-2210-99T2, 2001 WL 1917169 at *2 (N.J. App. Div. 2001) (citing Cordy v. Sherwin Williams Co., 975 F.Supp 639, 643 (D.N.J. 1997)).  Plaintiff also alleges the trial court’s finding of “cracks and uneven surfaces in the parking lot . . . created a material question of fact as to the dangerousness of such condition of the parking lot. ”  Pl. Brief, p. 10.  Explicitly, the trial court, reviewing all competent record evidence and affording Plaintiff all reasonable inferences, was “unable to find within the photographs anything more than small cracks or uneven surfaces in the parking lot. ”  [Pa9].  Further, the trial court stated the pictures produced by Plaintiff merely “indicate a few cracks without significant dips into the surface and, at best, indicate select areas of the parking lot that had uneven surfaces. ”  [Pa9].  However, as held by the trial court, it is well-established that common or usual defects in a walkway or roadway that are commonly encountered do not satisfy the “substantial risk” requirement as a matter of law as required of a dangerous condition.
[directive] Note: Some of these offenses are listed elsewhere in Bail Schedule 2 as lesser included offenses  STATUTES WHERE BAIL MAY BE SET BY A SUPERIOR COURT JUDGE OR A MUNICIPAL COURT JUDGE OR, IN THE MUNICIPAL COURT JUDGE’S ABSENCE, THE MUNICIPAL COURT ADMINISTRATOR OR DEPUTY COURT ADMINISTRATOR, PURSUANT TO RULE 3:26-2 (Rule 3:3-1(c)(1) (indictable offenses) and Rule 7:2-2(b) (non-indictable offenses) delineate factors regarding whether a warrant or summons should issue.
[brief] The Court further condemned the judge’s failure to inform the defendant or her counsel, which denied “prior opportunity of defendant or her counsel to be heard on its propriety. ”  *Id.* at 272; accord *State v. Anderson*, 251 N.J. Super. 327, 329-34 (App. Div. 1991) (reversing where trial judge improperly permitted jury to consider previously unknown jewelry tag found during deliberations inside another exhibit); R. 1:8-8(a) (providing for the jury to “take into the jury room the exhibits received in evidence”).
[brief] 1T 22:2-6.  The Honorable [...], J.S.C., provided further support for the enforceability of the indemnification language in the contract.  The court compared the language of the contract, sub judice, to the indemnification language in the contract which was the subject of *Estate of D’Avila v. Hugo Neu*, 442 N.J. Super. 80 (App. Div. 2015).  The court below found that the language contained in the contract “to be sufficiently similar to the language discussed in *Estate of D’Avila*.  In *D’Avila*, a subcontractor agreed to indemnify the general contractor “to the fullest extent permitted by law,” and further quoting, “against claims, damages, losses, and expenses arising out of or resulting from the performance of the subcontractor’s work, including without limitation any such claim, damage, loss, or expense attributable to the bodily injury caused by acts or omissions of the subcontractor or anyone else whose acts that may be liable regardless of whether or not such claims, damage, loss, or expenses caused in part by the general contractor. ”  *Id.* at 115-116.  1T 22:12-24.  The court in the *Estate of D’Avila* found the indemnification clause was “sufficiently plain and unequivocal” to require the subcontractor to indemnify the general contractor for damages, including those caused by the general contractor’s own negligence.  1T 22:25 and 23:1-4.  The court below held that the language of the subject contract was similar to the language and indemnity within the *Estate of D’Avila*.  “In the interest of justice and consistent with *Azurak*, grants [...]’s motion for defense and indemnification by [...]” based on what it perceives to be the clear and unambiguous language within section four of the indemnity, which is supplemented by paragraph 2, to reflect the parties’ intentions. ”  1T 23:5-17.  As the Appellate Division ruled in Estate of D’Avila, the indemnification paragraphs of the contract, sub judice, are enforceable.  The contract contained proof of a “substantial nexus” between the injury and the activity contemplated by the contract.  In paragraph 2 of the agreement, [...] agreed to defend and indemnify [...] Landscape whether or not the injury arose from the negligence of [...], [...] Landscape, or others.  The language was clear and unambiguous and, therefore, appropriately deemed to be enforceable by the court below.  Likewise, despite defendant/appellant’s argument that the language was not harmonious, paragraphs 2 and 4, when read separately and together, are in tune with the intent of the parties.  Appellant simply seeks to have a second bite at the apple as it relates to their adverse ruling.  Appellant failed to recognize that the enforceability of indemnification language must be reviewed on a case-by-case basis.  The Honorable [...], J.S.C., ruled, as a matter of law, that indemnification language in the contract was enforceable following careful consideration of the applicable law and analysis of the appropriate language and intention of the parties.  This Honorable Court should, therefore, affirm the judgment below in favor of [...] Landscape.  CONCLUSION
[brief] **  Throughout Point II of his brief, Defendant employs the admittedly stunning argument that Plaintiff was duped not because of his own misconduct, but rather because of Plaintiff’s counsel’s failure to figure it out.  Thus, over the course of twenty-eight pages, Defendant calls out Plaintiff’s counsel by name six times, and refers to him as a certified matrimonial attorney who should have known better repeatedly.  There is no basis for this transparent attempt at blame-shifting.  Preliminarily, Defendant did not raise this argument at the trial level.  Thus, the argument has been waived.
[brief] [...]’ family also corroborated that the laptop had been left at the [...]’ home.  Defendant spun a tale that he was attacked by an intruder with a gun, and wrestled the gun away and shot to save himself.  The evidence at trial completely debunked that tale, regardless of [...]’s testimony, as his parents admitted that defendant had the gun all along, and that [...] had been unarmed.  [...] identified the gun as defendant’s as well.  And, the angle of the shot in the decking was straight down.  Moreover, that also means that [...]’s testimony was independently verified by those other sources.  The trial court highlighted this fact before sentencing, noting that even without any testimony from [...], there was ample evidence in the record to convict defendant of murder.  (36T:42-17 to 44-1).  [...] was charged with murder, as was defendant — so, the second factor of N.J.R.E. 608(b)(1) is satisfied.
[directive] 9.2.1  Every department shall establish and implement a system to ensure that relevant BWC recordings are provided in discovery in a timely fashion.  The system established by the agency should include a provision to ensure that police arrest/incident/continuation reports indicate whether the incident or investigative activity described in the report was electronically recorded by a BWC.  Police reports should, when feasible, indicate the corresponding BWC control ledger/log number, and the BWC control ledger/log should cross-reference the incident case number.  Copies of BWC recordings made for the purpose of complying with the State’s discovery obligations shall be provided to the prosecutor in a readily available media format.
[brief] As discussed below, Plaintiffs have sufficiently plead such a cause of action to survive the Motion to Dismiss.  The Trial Court avoids any analysis of the New Jersey Wage Payment and Collection Law by stating that the MSRA’s term “to the extent inconsistency exists between the terms of the [MSRA] and other applicable laws, the terms of the [MSRA] shall prevail. ”  Pa000028.  There was absolutely no analysis of how the New Jersey Wage Payment and Collection Law or any other statue was in conflict with the MSRA and whether Defendants actually triggered such authority when the Implementation Memo and Settlement Agreement were silent on the MOAs and, indeed, any earned and unpaid wages.  The Trial Court, instead, blindly relied upon MSRA Section 5(a)(3)(f), (g), and (i) which granted authority to modify labor contracts and expired labor contracts and found that the vesting of earned wages was inconsequential.  Pa000025-26.  The Appellate Division, in dicta, stated that the “vesting” of the lump sum payment was inconsequential to their decision.
[directive] ------- of Date  Memo:  If I of I of my have been advised right to be present at the trial this case. fail to appear for trial on 1.  If the date scheduled for trial, the Court has the right to conduct the trial in my absence.  my case is  If I for not reached trial on that date the judge will schedule a new date for trial.  am not present on I the original trial date, or any rescheduled trial date, the trial will proceed without me and will be jury's bound by the verdict.  I  I 2.  if further understand that do not appear for trial on the date fixed above or any adjourned trial I of date thereafter, will lose any monetary bail that has been posted, any conditions pretrial release my may be reviewed, and a bench warrant will be issued for arrest.