ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] In the alternative, we respectfully submit that if the Court considered the respondent to be a residential property owner, there were many material facts in dispute which would have precluded summary judgment in this matter.  We respectfully submit that those facts should be submitted to a jury for consideration.  Respectfully submitted, /s/  [...]  By:__________________________  [...], Esq.  Dated: November 5, 2024  [...], Plaintiff-Appellant  [...], her husband, Plaintiff, v. [...] and/or JOHN DOES 1-5, [...] and/or JANE DOES 1-5, [...], [...] 1-5 (fictitious names), [...] 1-5, [...] (fictitious name), [...] 1-5 (fictitious name), Defendants-Respondents.
[brief] That documentation included: - Three copies of the tax maps showing the accurate combined and individual parcel widths.  Ja316, Ja712.  - A copy of the erroneous Subdivision Plan showing the 40’ by 90’ transfer and the accurate tax map inset.  Ja320, Ja712.  •  The 2010 [...] Acquisition Deed (i.e., the deed by which [...] took Lot 3, showing Lot 3 had frontage of only 105’ along 21st Street South and 110.69’ along the public alley before the subdivision).  Ja322, Ja712.  •  Title reviewer notes making express reference to the 40’ by 90’ transfer and the recording information for the Subdivision Deed.  Ja327, Ja712.  Defendants’ Acknowledgment of the Error & Their Plan to Correct
[brief] Plaintiff [...] (“Plaintiff,” or “[...]”) terminated Grievant [...] because she no longer could perform the essential functions of her position as a carpenter.  [...] had authority to do so under its collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”) with Defendant [...] (“Defendant,” or the “[...]”), which expressly grants [...] the exclusive right to determine employees’ qualifications for work.  During arbitration of Sims’ grievance concerning her discharge, [...] relied upon documentary evidence presented by Sims herself, demonstrating conclusively that, at the time of her discharge, she clearly was physically incapable of performing the essential functions of her job.  In fact, [...] produced a note approved by Sims’ doctor shortly before Sims’ discharge, dated December 30, 2019, stating that Sims could return to work on January 7, 2020 only with the following physical restrictions for a period of 6 months: no heavy lifting; no squatting; no climbing; no kneeling; no prolonged standing for more than 3 hours.  [...] demonstrated conclusively that each of the above listed restricted physical activities was an essential function of Sims’ carpenter position, testimony that neither the [...] nor Sims disputed in any way.  Shortly after Sims presented the doctor’s note, [...] made the decision to terminate her employment because she was not capable of performing the essential functions of her job and thus, not qualified as a carpenter, a decision virtually any reasonable employer would have made, and a decision the CBA placed within the [...]’s managerial prerogative.
[brief] | Exhibit “J” is [...]’s Aug. 4, 2022 Letter in response to Surrogate’s Jul. 25th Audit Question about [...] fees.  | 90a | | 12.  | Exhibit “K” is [...]’s Aug. 8, 2022 Exceptions to Trust Intermediate Accounting.  | 93a | | | Description | Pages | |---|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------| | a. | Appendix  Exhibit “A” – [...]’s Nov. 28, ’21, Invoice for June 17 to July 9, 2021 to review [...]’ request for her Trust’s payment of her home equity loan | 99a | | b. | Appendix Exhibit “B” – [...]’s Feb. 28, ’22 Summary 1-Page Invoice for Nov. 11, 2021 to Jan. 31, 2022 | 103a | | c. | Appendix Exhibit “D” – Mar. 25, ‘22 Transcript, p. 15, Lines 12 to 19, to allow application for Court approval of parties’ legal fees after Court review/approval of [...]’s Accounting
[brief] The language of the statute anticipates vicarious liability claims and limits its applicability to such claims.  “To establish vicarious liability, a plaintiff must demonstrate ‘(1) that a master-servant relationship existed and (2) that the tortious act of the servant occurred within the scope of that employment. ”  Haviland v. Lourdes Med. Ctr. of Burlington Cty., Inc., 250 N.J. 368, 379 (2022) (quoting Carter v. Reynolds, 175 N.J. 402, 409 (2003)).
[brief] POINT THREE: .......................................................  14  THE LAW DIVISION ERRED IN HOLDING THE [...] LAND DEVELOPMENT ORDINANCE LIMITED TO ONE  THE NUMBER OF WALKWAYS PERMITTED IN THE HISTORIC FLARED OPEN SPACE AREA (7T15 – 1 to 6)  POINT FOUR: ..........................................................  19  THE LAW DIVISION ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE DESIGN CRITERIA AND GUIDELINES INCORPORATED INTO THE [...] LAND DEVELOPMENT ORDINANCE LIMITED  THE SIZE, SHAPE AND COLOR OF CONCRETE UNIT PAVERS (7T38 – 8 to 17; 7T39 – 16 to 21)  CONCLUSION  ...........................................  20  Table of Contents
[directive] In cases involving domestic violence, the police officer making the arrest and/or an assistant prosecutor or deputy attorney general consulted in accordance with Section 3.2 of this Directive, or a supervisory officer designated pursuant to subsection 3. 3.2, shall consider whether the mandatory detention resulting automatically from issuance of a complaint-warrant might exacerbate the domestic violence situation, might discourage a victim from pursuing the charge or cooperating with the prosecution, or otherwise would not serve the interest of justice.  Given the repetitive nature of domestic violence offenses, the officer and/or assistant prosecutor or deputy attorney general also may consider whether it would be appropriate to apply for a complaint-warrant in recognition that if the defendant is charged by complaint-summons and thereafter commits a new crime while on pretrial release, the prosecutor cannot move pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:162-24 to revoke release.  See subsections 4.5.2 and 8.4.3.  Cf. note 30.  Page 41
[brief] Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:16-57, “[n]o declaratory judgment shall prejudice the rights of persons not parties to the proceeding,” and, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:16-56, when “declaratory relief is sought, all persons having or claiming any interest which would be affected by the declaration shall be made parties to the proceeding. ”  [...] is an indispensable party and the trial court’s premature grant of partial summary judgment has impaired its rights.
[brief] Plaintiff’s assertion that she is authorized to assert a “public injunctive relief” claim under the CFA because the CFA does not expressly preclude her from doing so is meritless and unsupported by any law.  [...] is not required to demonstrate “ascertainable loss” to maintain a claim).7  Id.  Plaintiff’s reliance on the 9th Circuit’s decision in DiCarlo is also misplaced.  As an initial and dispositive matter, the statutes at issue in DiCarlo—e.g., California’s Unfair Competition Law, False Advertising Law, and Consumers Legal Remedies Act—all expressly authorize claims of “public injunctive relief” to be asserted by private litigants, whereas the HCSA, the CFA, the RISA, and the TCCWNA do not.
[brief] The definition of Legal Services was identical to that at issue here.  *Id.*  The *Blackburn* court, at [...]’s urging, found that:  “Legal Services” under the policy are services which are performed on behalf of the Law Firm, by a Law Firm employee, acting as a license lawyer in the ordinary course of the employee’s activities as a lawyer, **and when the recipient of such services is someone other than a Law Firm employee. **  *Id.*, at *10* (emphasis added).  Applying this definition, the court held that, because the recipient of the work was an employee of the Law Firm, “there are no allegations within the state court complaint that [the insureds] were negligent in performing legal services *for others.*”  *Id.*, *11.  Thus, Defendants succeeded in obtaining a narrow interpretation of Legal Services.  That, of course, will not do here for Defendants.  So, ignoring the relevance and binding effect of *Blackburn*, Defendants advance a contradictory position to the Court that would render Legal Services far broader (to the point that the denial of coverage in *Blackburn* would have been unsustainable).
[brief] It will be unsightly, unnecessary, and not in the best interest for [...]. ”  “As the zoning board votes, eaglets are beginning to hatch on the Millstone River,” [...] said.  “Our community needs to stand up in full force against the [...] housing project.  I am proud to lead the charge. ”  That was it.  The trial court paints these comments, expressing the Mayor’s opinion on the Respondents’ Amended Application, in colorful language by deeming them “incendiary”, “inappropriate”, and “surreptitiously” made.
[brief] In this case, [...] was denied the opportunity to observe first-hand the testimony of four of the State’s witnesses, as well as the opportunity to observe the closing arguments and the final jury charges.  Although the court permitted defense counsel to consult with Mr.  Bell following direct examination of each of the four witnesses, it is evident based on the content of [...]’s final outburst that he had an issue with his attorney, and thus he refused to speak with counsel despite having the opportunity to do so.  The fact that [...] requested to fire his attorney and represent himself the day before reinforces the conclusion that permitting [...] to speak with his attorney after each direct examination did not effectively enable [...] to participate in his defense.  More critically, however, this solution was no remedy for being denied the right to see and hear the testimony of the witnesses against him.  Given the obvious prejudice that [...] suffered due to his absence during critical portions of the trial, his conviction must be reversed.  See *Stuart*, 2010 WL 1190538, at *10 (defendant’s continued exclusion from the courtroom, without giving him the opportunity to return to trial if he was willing to behave, was plain error mandating reversal of his conviction).  (Da 11-20)
[brief] “A contracting party is bound by the apparent intention he or she outwardly manifests to the other party.  It is immaterial that he or she has a different, secret intention from that outwardly manifested. ”  Hagrish v. Olson , 254 N.J. Super. 133, 138 (App. Div. 1992).  \textsuperscript{46}  See, e.g., Realmuto v. Straub Motors, Inc., 65 N.J. 336 (1974).  \textsuperscript{47}  Moser v. Milner Hotels, 6 N.J. 278 (1951).  We are dealing here with an express contract:\textsuperscript{48}
[brief] (A27)  At the outset, Defendant’s claim that the issue of fraud was not discussed/raised below is preposterous.  He made a claim of fraud in his Counterclaim, raised it in his motion for summary judgment, raised it in his motion *in limine*, and testified about it.  Following the trial decision, Defendant based a section of his initial appeal on his claims of fraud.  “Fraud of course is never presumed; it must be clearly and convincingly proven. ”  *Albright v. Burns*, 206 N.J. Super. 625, 636 (App.Div. 1986), citing *Williams v. Witt*, 98 N.J. Super. 1, 4 (App.Div. 1967); *Gerard v. DiStefano*, 84 N.J. Super. 396, 399 (Ch.Div. 1964).
[brief] ”  Associates Commercial Corp. v. Wallis, 211 N.J. Super. 231, 243 (App. Div. 1986).  A common thread running through successful claims of unjust enrichment is “that the plaintiff expected remuneration from the defendant, or if the true facts were known to plaintiff, he would have expected remuneration from defendant at the time the benefit was conferred. ”  Id., at 244 (quoting Callano v. Oakwood Park Homes Corp., 91 N.J. Super 105, 109 (App. Div. 1966).  One of the elements to recover under the doctrine of unjust enrichment is that the “plaintiff must prove that the defendant received a benefit and that retention of that benefit without payment therefor would be unjust. ”  Id.  [...]’s conduct in using Floor Town funds to pay his personal mortgage obligation misled the Bank into believing that the Note was paid in full, and the Bank discharged the mortgage securing the Note in reliance on those payments, to the detriment of the Bank.  As a result, the Note is in default and the mortgage should be reinstated.
[brief] The significance of this is the following.  Defendants in their appellate brief at page 10 acknowledge:  “The Sheriff’s calculations of both amounts were based on post judgment interest at the contract rate, not the lawful interest rate set forth in R. 4:42-11. ”  This includes the $25,664,194.21 included in the notice posted closest to the sale date.  *Id.*  Since the court below concluded that the contract rate is the lawful rate, that renders the $25,664,194.21 figure correct so long as Plaintiff is entitled to the contract rate.  For the reasons set forth above based on the decision in *Avatar*, *supra*, Plaintiff in fact is entitled to the contract rate.  This is because the instant case is a textbook example of when the contract rate should be applied rather than the legal rate.  Throughout the post-foreclosure judgment period of this litigation, Defendants have been adopting every tactic to delay the sale and then to delay enforcement of the sale.
[directive] 3.  Você entende que se descumprir as condições da supervisão de liberdade condicional sua liberdade condicional poderá ser revogada e poderá voltar à prisão para cumprir o período total ou remanescente da supervisão de liberdade condicional, mesmo que tenha cumprido o termo de prisão imposto anteriormente?  Do you understand that if you violate the conditions of your parole supervision that your parole may be revoked and you may be subject to return to prison to serve all or any portion of the remaining period of parole supervision, even if you have completed serving the term of imprisonment previously imposed?  Data/Date
[brief] Plaintiff’s liability expert is not a weather expert and yet failed to include any reference to the report authored by plaintiff’s own weather expert which specifically noted:  The National Weather Service had a Winter Weather Advisory for freezing rain go into effect at 4 AM.  A wintry mix of snow and freezing rain overspread [...] between 4:25 and 4:40 AM with a temperature of 30 - 32 degrees.  Immediately prior to the onset of the storm, exposed, undisturbed and untreated ground surfaces were clear of any naturally precipitated snow and/or ice accumulation from all past events.  For the remainder of the pre-dawn hours, the snow and freezing rain quickly transitioned over to all freezing rain as the temperature slowly moderated to around 31 - 32 degrees.  Sunrise occurred around 7:20 AM.  Around the time of the slip-and-fall incident, 7:30 AM, it was cloudy and 32 degrees with light freezing rain.  Winds were light and variable.  A Winter Weather Advisory was in effect.  (Pa386)  Thus, in an attempt to distract from the undisputed fact that plaintiff slipped and fell during an ongoing storm event that began shortly before the fall, plaintiff’s expert provides a 50 page report that largely ignores the facts of the case to ultimately offer an opinion that it was an alleged hazardous condition of the “stairs” that caused plaintiff to slip and fall.
[directive] This means: przyznaje się Pan(i) do posiadania broni palnej z zamiarem użycia jej przeciw innej osobie lub A.  (1) popełnienia zabójstwa, kwalifikowanego spowodowania śmierci lub spowodowania śmierci, kwalifikowanej napaści, uprowadzenia, kwalifikowanej napaści na tle seksualnym, kwalifikowanego zakazanego kontaktu seksualnego, napadu rabunkowego, włamania lub ucieczki; lub (1)  You are pleading guilty to possession of a firearm with intent to use it against the person of another or to murder, aggravated manslaughter, manslaughter, aggravated assault, kidnapping, aggravated sexual assault, aggravated criminal sexual contact, robbery, burglary or escape; or przyznaje się Pan(i) do jednego z następujących przestępstw, do których doszło (2)
[brief] Ibid.  In short, the net opinion rule is “ prohibition against speculative testimony. ”  *Harte v. Hand*, 433 N.J. Super. 457, 465 (App. Div. 2013).  The ID failed to examine [...]’s testimony according to this standard.  The [...] and this court are obligated to reject any testimony which speculates that the [...] will fail to fulfill its duties.  The [...]'s extensive analysis of New Jersey's electric transmission and distribution systems demonstrates that through an impressive number of strategies, including increased use of renewables and distributed generation the grid will be able to handle the energy demand that will no longer be met by natural gas.  [...] correctly notes that the [...] targets new construction and conversion from existing oil- or propane-fueled buildings and buildings with electric baseboard heating.  He also correctly notes that the [...] directs that existing buildings with natural gas service should be retrofitted beginning in 2030, as we set forth above.  NJNG-10 17:1-18.  6T46.6-48.19.  All this disproves [...]'s speculation that the transition away from natural gas is some "long range" wishful thinking or "very gradual" process.
[brief] The next communication from Plaintiff-Appellant was sent on May 18, 2023 in an email (Da047) with a letter of representation, dated May 16, 2023 (Da048), and a courtesy copy of the Complaint that had been filed.  Plaintiff-Appellant, next attempts to argue that Defendant-Respondent, [...]’s May 24, 2023 acknowledgement of representation; and reiteration of its offer made on April 5, 2023 before engaging in protracted litigation constitutes estoppel.
[brief] decisions and use variances cannot be granted unless consistent with the master plan.  Medici required “clear and specific findings by the board of adjustment, that the grant of a use variance is not inconsistent with the intent and purpose of the master plan and zoning ordinance” as the basis for satisfying the negative criteria.  Id. at 4 (emphasis added).  It viewed this requirement as a mechanism that would “narrow to some extent the discretion of boards of adjustment in reviewing use variance appeals for uses that are deliberately excluded by the governing body from those permitted in the zoning ordinance. ”  Id. at 5.  The Board recognized that this is an inherently beneficial use, but correctly also recognized that the importance of the master plan in the balancing of the negative criteria does not change with an inherently beneficial use.  Only the positive criteria changes.  The trial court completely missed the significance of the rezoning denial and the master plan and the central role it plays under the statute.
[brief] Pursuant to said Operating Agreement, [...] was the Sole Member of [...].  375a–378a.  However, on October 24, 2006, one day later, [...] presented [...] a finalized Amended and Restated Operating Agreement of [...], whereby [...], pursuant to the direction of [...] and [...], signed same relinquishing 99% of his ownership interest in [...] to [...] (“[...]”), another long-time friend of [...] and [...], for no consideration.
[brief] ”  Instead, Plaintiffs baldly claim that pursuant to the MOAs, following the Settlement Agreement, “Defendants were obligated to pay impacted members retroactive pay and raise pay to the appropriate level for titles to which these members were promoted. ” (Pa000039, Compl. ¶ 41).  Plaintiffs further allege that “Defendants failed to pay impacted members retroactive pay and have failed to raise wages and salary items to the contractual levels. ” (Pa000039, Compl. ¶ 42).
[brief] Decedent’s former friend, [...] (hereinafter “[...]”) testified that she received text messages from Respondent when the case started, telling her what the case was about and Respondent’s positions.  (10T 113:5-8; 10T128:15-17).  The Court denied Petitioner’s request to review the text messages as an invasion of privacy.  (10T128:17 to 129:7).  On September 19, 2022, after six days of testimony, before closing arguments were provided, the Court granted Respondent’s motion for a directed verdict, dismissing Petitioner’s claims of undue influence in Counts 1 and 3 of his Amendment.
[brief] (Pa215-226)  Although the landlord’s answers to interrogatories did not name any of the tenant defendants as potentially culpable parties, plaintiff’s counsel attempted to obtain the leases of the various tenant defendants.  (Pa513-518, Pa228-232, Pa178-181, Pa187-188, Pa189-196)  On or about April 29, 2019, plaintiff’s counsel received a response to his notice to produce served upon the [...].  (Pa280-301)  On or about April 30, 2019, counsel received some additional tenants’ leases.  He did not receive the lease between [...] and [...].  (Pa234-Pa278)  Although he had not yet received this defendant’s lease, plaintiff moved for leave to amend his complaint to name, inter alia, [...] as a defendant on May 21, 2019.
[brief] Revisions were made to the proposal to eliminate certain beams to provide a more open floor plan under the louver system.  Throughout that process, plaintiff sought the comment of [...] given their representation that they are a ”Specialist in Exterior Building products” and particularly holding themselves out as a purveyor and installer of Struxure’s Louver System product.  [...] knew [...] was specifically engineering the structural load for the system and was reasonably relying on [...] to guide them as it related to the functionality of the defendants’ system and its resulting drainage.
[brief] BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO APPELLANT’S APPEAL OF THE COMMISSIONER’S FINAL AGENCY DECISION  (Date Submitted: October 25, 2024)  [...]  ATTORNEY GENERAL OF NEW JERSEY  Attorney for Respondent, [...]  [...] [...], P.O. Box 112 [...]  P: [...]  F: [...]  [...]  N.J. Attorney ID No.: 214742017  [...] Assistant Attorney General Of Counsel  [...]  Deputy Attorney General on the Brief  TABLE OF CONTENTS
[brief] Instead, the Commission relied on a case in which a school board member claimed that his Facebook account had been hacked and that he had not made the Facebook posts at all.  (Ca017) (citing to Hodrinksky v. Faussette, SEC Docket No. C11-21 (2021)) (p.5  “… Respondent again maintains that his social media account was compromised/hacked, and denies that he ever made the comments or posted the information …. ”).  Notably, Hodrinsky was also decided on a motion to dismiss, not on a motion for summary decision, and is procedurally inapplicable to the present matter which was before the Commission.  I/M/O [...], [...], [...], and [...], supra – which actually address the precise issues that were before the Commission in this matter – were entirely ignored by the Commission as if they had never happened.  Though the Commission itself clearly and publicly reaffirmed this line of cases in Advisory Opinion A02-22 – a mere six days before the filing of the present Complaint – it arbitrarily applied an entirely different standard altogether in deciding this case.
[directive] 1.  Supervisors will document any information potentially indicative of domestic violence including but not limited to:  a.  Aggressiveness (1)  Excessive or increased use of force on the job.  (2)  Inappropriate surveillance activities.  (3)  Unusually high incidences of physical altercations and verbal disputes.  (4)  Citizen and fellow officer complaints of unwarranted aggression or verbal abuse.  (5)  Inappropriate treatment of animals.  (6)  On or off-duty officer injuries.  b.  Domestic violence-related issues  Monitoring, controlling or harassing the purported victim directly or through any other person.  c.  Deteriorating work performance  (1)  Tardiness.  (2)  Excessive absences.  -4-  (3)  Alcohol and drug abuse.  2.