ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] [...] felt upset that someone had posted about [...] business, including an investigation which may have involved him, on a Facebook page to unknown people who may or may not be associated with the [...] staff and personnel may have access to.  With the appropriate permission from his superior, he expressed his displeasure.  Accordingly, this Court cannot sanction the [...]’s actions, namely, filing an *ex-post facto* recession of that approval and filing of subsequent charges against [...] for an approved action.
[brief] The City submitted its revised final offer on October 26, 2023.  The City’s revised final offer continued to propose no changes to the health benefits provision of the collective negotiations agreements.  The [...] submitted its revised final offer on October 25, 2023.  As to the health benefits provision, the [...] clarified that its final offer only sought to amend the health benefits provision to include a waiver incentive payment for those members who opted not to enroll in medical and prescription coverage under the State Health Benefits Program.  On or about November 2, 2023, the [...] further clarified and corrected its final offer to provide the arbitrator with the specific language under its health benefits provision that it sought to incorporate into the new collective negotiations agreement based on the language from the [...].  (Aa274-Aa277).  It specifically identified three paragraphs (in red ink) that it sought to incorporate from the [...].  It did not seek to incorporate the entire PFA health benefits article.  In the Award, the arbitrator acknowledged that he would “accept the [...]’s revised Final Offer(s) only to the extent language was included which could aid in the merger of the three units into one. ” (Aa070; Aa080).  Yet, he did not do so.  Notwithstanding the arbitrator’s direction that the revised final offers were for the purpose of “reciting verbatim the contract language sought to be changed,” the arbitrator rejected the [...]’s revised final offers which did just that, inserting “verbatim” contract language for the health benefits provision.  The arbitrator’s rejection of this verbatim language led to the arbitrator impermissibly expanding the [...]’s final offer regarding the health benefit provision.  Specifically, and as discussed more fully below, the arbitrator awarded the entire article from the [...], instead of just the three paragraphs cited by the [...] in its revised final offer.  (Aa154-Aa156).  Further, in rejecting the [...]’s revised final offers, but accepting the City’s revised final offers, the arbitrator did not have the benefit of the detailed language which the [...] sought to clarify in its original final offer.  This resulted in an imbalance in the arbitrator’s review of the language changes sought by both parties, and resulted in an error on the part of the arbitrator regarding the [...]’s final offer on health benefits.  B.
[brief] ”\textsuperscript{86}  The Court’s decision to grant Plaintiffs’ request for rescission of the agreement is flawed for two reasons, both of which would most likely have been addressed at oral argument:  (1)  When the Court granted relief to the Plaintiffs, [...] was no longer a party-in-interest to the agreement, as she had transferred all of her rights thereto to [...], pursuant to a divorce settlement\textsuperscript{87} which, interestingly enough, had already been filed with the trial court by [...] herself prior to the grant of the Plaintiffs’ summary judgment motions.
[brief] SECTION A – THE APPEAL POINT I THE LEASE AGREEMENTS PLACED THE TENANT DEFENDANTS UNDER A DUTY TO CLEAR SNOW AND ICE FROM THE LOCATION WHERE [...] WAS INJURED [Raised at Pa594-1040; Decided at Pa1-2]  Nothing any of the Respondents have stated in their opposition briefs change this immutable fact: Article 3 of every subject lease placed the Respondents under an ambiguous duty to maintain sidewalks adjacent to the premises.  Article 3 of the lease is plain and unambiguous, places all of the Respondents under this contractual duty, and requires reversal.  Article 3 of the leases state:  Care and Maintenance of Premises.  Lessee acknowledges that the premises are in good order and repair, unless otherwise indicated herein.  Lessee shall, at his own expense and at all times, maintain the premises in good and safe condition, including plate glass, electrical wiring, plumbing and heating installations and any other system or equipment upon the premises and shall surrender the same, at termination hereof, in as good condition as received; normal wear and tear excepted.  **Lessee shall be responsible for all repairs required, excepting the roof, exterior walls, structural foundations, and which shall be maintained by Lessor. **
[brief] [...]’s decision to exempt the portion of [...]’s Project within the Highlands Preservation Area from the Highlands Act is not arbitrary and capricious, follows the plain language of the statute, and is well-supported by the evidence in the record.  At no time did [...] act with “willful and unreasoning action, without consideration and in disregard of circumstances. ”  Worthington, 88 N.J. at 204-5.  Here, [...] conducted a comprehensive review of [...]’s Project and considered input from the [...], as well as public comments.  [...], as the expert administrative agency charged with enforcing the Highlands Act, ultimately determined that [...]’s efforts to avoid, minimize and mitigate impacts to Highlands resources were sufficient to find that the Project was consistent with the goals and purposes of the Highlands Act.  Therefore, [...]’s decision should be affirmed.  A.
[brief] The DEP has codified its rules on noise control at N.J.A.C. 7:29-1.1 et seq.  It, too, provides specific prerequisites for the passage and enforcement of municipal noise ordinances at N.J.A.C. 7:29-1.8 as follows:  (a)  A governing body of a municipality or county or board of health may adopt a noise control ordinance in accordance with the Noise Control Act of 1971, at N.J.S.A. 13:1G-21, provided that the ordinance shall be more stringent than the Noise Control Act or the regulations promulgated pursuant thereto, must be otherwise consistent with the Statewide scheme of noise control, and meets with the written approval of the Department.  (b)  Enforcement of a noise control ordinance is limited to the authorized enforcement agency as specified in the ordinance and enforcement actions shall be conducted in accordance with N.J.A.C. 7:29-1.7, Enforcement.  [Emphasis added.]  Defendants confirmed that they did not submit the Noise Ordinance to the DEP for written approval, a mandatory prerequisite for the passage of ordinances that establish standards more stringent than the Act.
[brief] Not all differential treatment is per se discriminatory.  Moreover, [...] does not allege what involvement [...], [...], or the Attorney General had in his criminal prosecution or how they discriminated against him.  To state claim against these individuals, he would have to plead facts demonstrating that they intended to facilitate discrimination, shared a community of discriminatory purpose with the actual perpetrators (whoever they are), engaged in affirmative acts of discrimination within the scope of employment, knew of the principal’s discriminatory conduct, knew that such conduct involved a breach of duty, and actually assisted or encouraged the unlawful act.  *Herman*, 348 N.J. Super. at 27.  Far from satisfying these strict requirements, [...] does not even explain whether or how these officials had anything to do with his criminal prosecution at all.  In sum, [...]’s frustration with the handling of his criminal prosecution does not support a claim for damages under the NJLAD.
[brief] 2.  Any potential harm is reversible, and an injunction is not necessary to maintain the status quo.  Moreover, any steps toward condemnation would be reversible, and therefore, cannot constitute irreparable harm.  If [...] were to begin the process toward condemnation, Plaintiff can challenge the validity of those actions and the condemnation court can void those actions if [...] is found to lack the authority to condemn the Property.  “The Eminent Domain Act recognizes that, even after a public entity files a declaration of taking, N.J.S.A. 20:3-17, deposits the estimated just compensation, N.J.S.A. 20:3-18, and takes title to and possession of the property, N.J.S.A. 20:3-19, the condemnor’s right to exercise the power of eminent domain may be challenged and judicially undone.
[brief] POINT I AS EARLEY ESTABLISHED A PRIMA FACIE CASE OF TRIAL  COUNSEL’S INEFFECTIVENESS, THE COURT ERRED WHEN IT DENIED HIS PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF WITHOUT CONDUCTING AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING.  (Da335-77)  ........................................................................................................................................21  A.  General Principles Governing Appellate Review Of PCR Petition  ........................................................................................................................................22  B.  [...] Established A Prima Facie Case, Requiring The Court Conduct An Evidentiary Hearing And Vacate His Convictions  ........................................................................................................................................24  1.  Trial counsel’s failure to retain and use an expert on familiarity at both the Wade hearing and trial hamstringed [...]’s misidentification defense ........................................................................24  TABLE OF CONTENTS
[brief] This fact was particularly salient to the Trial Court’s decision, which noted that:  While the Second Amendment included a new Paragraph 10(c) to incorporate explicit reference to [...]’s ROFR and ‘Right of Last Offer’ that had been added by the parties in their First Amendment of April 24, 2015 (as new Pars. 39 and 40), the Second Amendment also contained a provision stating ‘[i]n all other respects, the terms of the original Agreement of Sale, as amended, shall remain full force an effect.
[brief] Turning to the law, the United States Supreme Court held in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 444-45, that certain warnings must be provided and waived by a suspect in order for the suspect’s custodial statement to be admissible.  “‘Custody’ for the purposes of Miranda requires a ‘formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest. ’”  State v. Erazo, 254 N.J. 277, 298 (2023) (quoting California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125 (1983)).  Thus, “[t]he critical determinant of custody is whether there has been a significant deprivation of the suspect’s freedom of action .  . . .”  Id. (quoting State v. P.Z., 152 N.J. 86, 103 (1997)).  The factors that a court may consider in determining custody include “the time, place and duration of the detention; the physical surroundings; the nature and degree of the pressure applied to detain the individual; language used by the officer; and objective indications that the person questioned is a suspect. ”  State v. Smith, 374 N.J. Super. 425, 431 (App. Div. 2005).  The relevant inquiry is determined objectively, based on how a reasonable person in the suspect’s position would have understood his situation, rather than “on the subjective views harbored by either the interrogating officers or the person being questioned. ”  *State v. Hubbard*, 222 N.J. 249, 267 (2015).
[brief] 6  Recognizing that he had not pled any incurred injury or harm, Appellant now suggests that the “release of private, protected information has left [him] vulnerable to identity theft. ”  Appellant’s Br., at 34.  The Third Circuit, however, has expressly rejected this theory of injury, holding that an alleged risk of future identity theft or fraud stemming from a data breach is not sufficiently imminent for purposes of standing.  *Clemens v. ExecuPharm Inc.*, 48 F.4th 146, 151 (3d Cir. 2022) (citing *Reilly v. Ceridian Corp.*, 664 F.3d 38 (3d Cir. 2011)).
[brief] 32A; 34A; 1T 13:18 – 13:24; and Pl. Br. at 19.  Reconciling these undisputed facts with controlling authorities can only lead to a ruling rejecting Plaintiff’s argument that the two physicians sharing “equivalent” specialties satisfies the AMS and mandates affirming the Trial Court’s Order of June 24, 2020.  Preliminarily, a plain reading of the AMS confirms the Trial Court’s ruling that [...]’s AOM was insufficient since he was not engaged in the active clinical practice of that specialty of Defendant, specifically, critical care.  See N.J.S.A. § 2A:53A-41.  As New Jersey’s Appellate Division has explained, “[w]hen interpreting a statute, our overriding goal is to give effect to the Legislature's intent.  The best indicator of that intent is the plain statutory language chosen by the Legislature.  We thus read the text of a statute in accordance with its ordinary meaning unless otherwise specified."  Watson v. N.J. Dep't of Treasury, 453 N.J. Super. 42, 48 (App. Div. 2017) (internal citations and quotations omitted).  Had the Legislature wanted to adopt an "equivalent" standard, it could, but the Legislature has not done that, rather, it requires the affiant being engaged in "that" specialty of a defendant.
[directive] Fòm Revize Kreye pa Direktif #01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 11080-Haitian Creole paj 1 nan 2 Revised Form Promulgated by Directive #01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 11080-Haitian Creole page 1 of 2  4.  Èske w konprann ke si yo ta kondane w a pije pèn nan Sant Tretman ak Adult Diagnostic la  Do you understand if you are sentenced to the [...]
[brief] As the Trial Court astutely pointed out, the blind application of the words of the FDCPA would lead to absurd results, such as prohibiting transmission of information “to a postal service or telephone or telegram operator” and prohibiting a debt collector from conducting business without fully integrating the task of mailing letters — an expensive and inefficient endeavor.\(^5\) (Pa46-48).  Indeed, rejecting [...], [...] and [...], the Trial Court astutely reasoned:  \(^5\)  Mailing vendors generally use specialized and expensive equipment to print and mail letters.  Mailing vendors are commonplace in today’s commercial world and they serve the role of assisting entities across all industries with the task of printing and mailing letters.  It is not economically feasible for most entities to procure this specialized equipment in order to mail letters.  This is  One could argue that to hold that a transmission to a letter vendor does not violate the statutory proscription is to create an exception not authorized by Congress and that, if Congress had intended to exempt such transmissions, it would have done so.
[brief] The Court should disregard it entirely.  It bears mentioning that in Sica, supra, the municipal governing body down-zoned the property that was the subject of that case to make the proposed use a prohibited use during the application.  127 N.J. at 156-157.  In Med. Ctr. v. Princeton Twp. Zoning Bd., 343 N.J. Super. 177 (App. Div. 2001), the municipal master plan specifically recommended the properties in question be used for residential purposes rather than in connection with the hospital, which owned them.  Id. at 197.  Neither instance was held to be a bar to the approval of a use variance for an inherently beneficial use.  The situation here is less stark – rather than a rezoning that prohibits the proposed use, or a specific statement in the municipal master plan that the Property should not be used for multi-level senior housing, the Planning Board removed the recommendation for the Property in the MPA so that the Township could pay less for it.
[brief] (Id.)  These requirements were detailed in Paragraph 13.10 of the PSA which states:  (a)  Seller shall, within ten (10) days after the date of this Agreement, modified, amended or extended, except as provided in Rent Schedule [sic] annexed hereto” (Da201at ¶8.1(l)(ii). )  Plaintiff only received the Lease amendments, disclosure of the lawsuit and the claim the suit related to rent commencement when on June 27, 2022, Defendant delivered the Estoppel Certificate dated June 9.  (Da47 (Plaintiff’s Statement of Material Facts at ¶28), Da186, Da349 (Defendant’s Response to Statement of Material Facts at ¶28).)  \(^2\)  PILOT is an acronym for Payment In Lieu of Tax.  See Mack-Cali Realty Corp. v. State, 466 N.J. Super. 402, 422 (App. Div. 2021), aff’d, 250 N.J.550 (2022).  prepare and submit to any commercial tenant under the Leases an estoppel certificate, in the form attached to or contemplated under each such Lease, if any, or if no form was previously contemplated, in substantially the form attached hereto as Schedule H ("Estoppel Certificate").  Seller shall use commercially reasonable efforts to obtain an Estoppel Certificate from the commercial tenant prior to the Closing.  Upon receipt of the executed Estoppel Certificate, Seller shall promptly furnish a copy thereof to Purchaser.  Subject to the provisions hereof, Purchaser’s obligation to close title hereunder is conditioned upon any commercial tenant under the Leases (the "Required Tenant") delivering to Purchaser an estoppel certificate which conforms in all material respects to the form attached to or contemplated under each such Lease, if any, or if no form was previously contemplated, the estoppel certificate set forth in Schedule H (an “Acceptable Estoppel Certificate”).  The failure of Seller to obtain an Acceptable Estoppel Certificate from the Required Tenant shall not be deemed a default by Seller, it being agreed that the sole remedy of Purchaser in the event Seller does not obtain an Acceptable Estoppel Certificate from the Required Tenant shall be to terminate this Agreement and receive a refund of the Down Payment.
[brief] THE ARBITRATOR MISAPPLIED  THE N.J.S.A. 34:13A-16(g)  CRITERIA.  (Aa055-058)  ...........................................  30 POINT IV  THE ARBITRATOR DID NOT APPROPRIATELY CONSIDER THE INTERNAL COMPARABLES BUDGETED BY THE CITY IN APPLYING THE 16(g)  FACTORS.  (Aa057-058)  ..................................................  38 POINT V THE [...] DETERMINATION WAS ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS IN FINDING THAT CONSOLIDATION OF UNITS INTO ONE UNIFIED AGREEMENT IS A MINISTERIAL TASK.  (Aa062-064)  ........................................................................................................  39  POINT VI  THE COMMISSION’S DECISION FAILED TO ADDRESS  THE ARBITRATION PROCEEDING’S SUBSTANTIVE AND PROCEDURAL DEFICIENCIES AND THE COMMISSION FAILED TO ISSUE  A COMPLETE AWARD  BECAUSE THE AWARD INCLUDED SIX (6)  ATTACHED APPENDICES WHICH WERE NOT PROVIDED TO THE PARTIES.  (Not Argued Below)  .................................................................................  42  CONCLUSION .............................................................................................................
[directive] Over the last several years, we have bolstered the Department of Law & Public Safety’s capacity to pursue investigations and litigation for the purpose of enforcing civil laws that protect New Jersey residents.  Within the Division of Law, we added a Deputy Director to oversee an expanded Affirmative Civil Enforcement Practice Group, and we created new sections for Affirmative Civil Rights and Labor Enforcement, Data Privacy and Cybersecurity, Environmental Enforcement and Environmental Justice, and Special Litigation.  Within the Division on Civil Rights and the Division of Consumer Affairs, we have worked to expand our investigative capacity not only so that we can pursue more investigations but so that we can take on more complex and impactful investigations.  In light of these developments, we are continuously evaluating the tools at our disposal to pursue affirmative civil investigations and litigation, and reviewing the policies in place to ensure their appropriate use.  This memorandum addresses one such tool: covert audio recordings by the Department’s investigators in the course of a civil investigation.  Divisions conducting civil investigations may find that covert audio recordings of in- person conversations in which their investigators are participants may be useful for a variety of reasons.  For instance, such recordings can ensure a level of accuracy above that of an investigator’s notes and directly capture evidence beyond the words used, such as tone and demeanor, in the conversation.  Such recordings also may be used to impeach the testimony of individuals who deny having made a particular statement during a conversation with an investigator.  New Jersey Is An Equal Opportunity Employer • Printed on Recycled Paper and is Recyclable
[brief] Plaintiff is granted leave to file a motion for leave to serve new and/or supplemental expert reports.  The motion shall be filed no later than January 22, 2013; and 5.  Plaintiff's application for leave to serve additional interrogatories is DENIED.  On January 9, 2013, the Order was updated to require [...] to produce [...]/[...]'s e-mails regarding four (not two) files referred to in plaintiff's complaint.
[brief] After verifying his license and registration, and checking for any warrants, [...] returned to [...]’ car and asked [...] to exit the car.  (1T 26-6 to 16, 29-3 to 10, 109-2 to 10, 127-15 to 23)  [...] testified that he asked him to do so because [...] appeared nervous and because his pupils were constricted, which he said had led him to believe that [...] might be under the influence or in the possession of narcotics.  (1T 27-13 to 28-5, 116- _____________________ 17)  He conceded that he again violated policy by failing state that he was deactivating the BWC prior to doing so.  (1T 72-2 to 20)  16 to 20)  By contrast, in his police report, [...] indicated that he asked [...] to step out to ask him about the Montana warrant.
[brief] 4  1.  Respondents misinterpret Massa v Laing, 160 N.J. Super. 443; 390 A.2d 624; 1977 N.J. Super. (App. Div. 1977) which cites the standard for contesting a will, while here we are dealing with an alleged *inter vivos* gift that the Court found did not exist and awarded unjust enrichment and restitution; Additionally, the Massa court did not have a finding of a confidential relationship, as we have a finding in the present case, rendering that case inapposite. (Pa1, Pa8, Pa10, 6T31-42)  ...........................................................................................................  4  2.
[brief] The trial court granted [...]’s motion to suppress the evidence seized from his bag.  (Ma6)  The court found that, based on the totality of the circumstances, [...] did not have reasonable suspicion to stop [...].  (T84-3 to 5)  The court noted that [...] was called . . . not to an armed robbery, not to a gun case.  There’s no allegation that guns were at all involved in this scene.  When he gets there, there is no fight.  There is no fight occurring in the parking lot.  [(T82-20 to 83-16)]  Meanwhile, [...] was “walking down the sidewalk and . . . has his hand on a bag in front of him, like most people would do coming out of a store. ” (T84-1 to 5, 84-11 to 19)  Thus, the court found that [...] unlawfully stopped [...] and only saw the handgun in the open bag because of this unlawful stop.  (T85-7 to 11)  Based on these findings, the court found that [...] unlawfully searched the bag to seize the handgun.  (T82-16 to 18, 84-3 to 5)  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I THE STATE FAILED TO ESTABLISH THAT REASONABLE SUSPICION JUSTIFIED THE INVESTIGATORY STOP.
[brief] This action was required to take place upon the Respondent [...]’s disposition of the certified list.  This occurs when the appointing authority completes the certified list by marking its action with respect to each listed eligible candidate and submits it to Civil Service.  N.J.A.C. 4A:1-1.3 states “Disposition” “means the written report of actions taken by an appointing authority regarding a certification. ”  In the present matter, the disposed certification only reflects a bypass of Appellant, not a request to remove her name or any showing of cause why a disabled veteran should not be appointed.