ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] First, [...]’s entire lawsuit was commenced on a fundamental misunderstanding of the record title of the [...]’ lands.  Because [...] already had the express right to use the existing roadway through the 1966 recorded [...]-to-[...] Deed, he had no reason whatsoever to seek an implied easement of any type, whether in 2005 or ever.  For good reason, [...] lost his claims for an implied easement.  However, [...]’s lack of entitlement to an implied easement says nothing about his pre-existing (albeit unknown) express rights as they appear in the recorded [...]-to-[...] Deed as the Appellants’ argue.  Nowhere in the orders dismissing [...]’s case is there any other relief provided to the Appellants (Da99; Da100).  Appellants concede that they failed to record the Order granting them summary judgment in the [...] case (Da93 at ¶59).  Under the facts presented, the Court must reject Appellants’ attempt to use [...]’s erroneously filed lawsuit to bar Respondent relief it is absolutely entitled to through the recorded land.  Both [...] and [...] had an equal obligation to present the Court below with the operative deeds and, for whatever reasons, they both failed to do so.  The [...] case was therefore tantamount to an *unintentional* fraud on the Court.  [...]’s theory of relief was flawed.  Appellants’ recitation of the status of their record title was flawed.  The parties’ duty to place the operative deeds before the Court was flawed.  Appellants’ argument that the decision in [...]’s case in any way affected the record title to the [...] Lot is equally flawed.  The absurd circuitry of defendants’ argument to bar an otherwise slam dunk claim is the paradigm of unfair and unreasonable and must not be countenanced.
[brief] Da372.  The only documents Defendants provided in connection with that motion were: (i) documents provided by the [...] in response to Plaintiff’s OPRA Request – i.e. Defendants simply “re-served” documents Plaintiffs had previously produced to Defendants; (ii) a letter sent to certain banks the Defendant LLC claimed to have used during its operation of the Property; and (iii) an IRS “Form 41506 Request for Copy of Tax Return” dated December 11, 2023.
[brief] In fact, we know this because there is further legislative and administrative regulation through the Noise Control Act, demonstrating the Legislature did not mean this general reference in regulation, not statute, to preempt the field.  Indeed, also existing is a common law which deals with noise, which still survives.  See Malhame v. Demarest, 162 N.J. Super. 248, 258 (Law Div. 1978) (Common law nuisance claim dealing with noise continues to exist post adoption of the Noise Control Act, citing N.J.S.A. 13:1G-21).  Indeed, the Legislature knew how to make a specific grant of authority in this field when it chose to do so.
[brief] Appellant’s Servicer Failed to Both Credit the First Wire Transfer Within Five Days Receipt and Thereafter Hold the Funds in A Suspense Count in Violation of the Truth in Lending Act**  The regulations governing the Truth in Lending Act (“TILA”) that apply to residential loan mortgage administration, required Appellant’s predecessor to apply the payment as “non-conforming payments,” to the total amount due.  See 12 C.F.R. § 1026.36(c)(1)(iii).  “If a servicer specifies in writing requirements for the consumer to follow in making payments but accepts a payment that does not conform to the requirements, the servicer shall credit the payments as of five days receipt. ”  Likewise, under 12 C.F.R. § 1026.36(c)(ii), if partial funds are retained, they should be held in suspense or an unapplied funds account which did not happen here.  Here, Appellant violated TILA when it failed to credit what it claims in this litigation was a non-conforming payment to the Loan within the first five (5) days after it was received or deposited the funds into a suspense account, while any dispute was sorted out.  Had [...] not disregarded its obligations under TILA, the loss of the funds and this lawsuit could have been avoided.  Instead, [...] did neither and elected to return the funds which was neither sanctioned by the loan documents or under TILA.
[brief] The Public Access Law, P.L. 2019, c.81, entitled “An Act Concerning Public Access to Certain Public Trust Lands” was enacted on May 3, 2019 and codified at N.J.S.A. 13:1D-150 to 156.  The Public Law authorizes the Department to require public access on or across private property if the issuance of a coastal permit would result either in a "change in the existing footprint of a structure on the property or a change in use of that property."  The Department argues that this provision authorized it to require public access on and across Petitioner's property as a condition of the Waterfront Development Permit authorizing the repair and replacement of the existing bulkheads on the Property.  However, as discussed herein, [...] respectfully submits that the Public Access Law does no such thing.  In order to understand why the Public Access Law codified, rather than expanded, New Jersey’s Public Trust Doctrine, it is important to review the scope and extent of the Doctrine as it existed when the Public Access Law was enacted.
[brief] 422  [...]  Plaintiff, v. [...], d/b/a d/b/a [...]  (PA) and [...], Defendants, ____________________________________  [...], Third-Party Plaintiff, v. [...], DECEASED, [...], [...], [...], A MINOR, [...], A MINOR AND A WARD OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY, AND JOHN DOES 1-10, THE UNKNOWN HEIRS OF [...], Third-Party Defendants.
[brief] As indicated in the Verified Complaint, the self-interest and hunting bias of the [...] can be gleaned from its website, which is referenced in the Verified Complaint:  “The [...] is a group of outdoor enthusiasts that maintain hunting, fishing, and trapping are vital resources in natural conservation. ”  The sportsmen’s clubs history of filing lawsuits to overturn black bear hunting bans underscores that pro-hunting bias.  The hunting bias disregards the interests of conservation and animal rights policies by arbitrarily elevating a private organization to the status of one of the three branches of government.
[brief] See id. (internal citations omitted).  A contract can contain a waiver of rights, whether in an arbitration or other clause, as long as it is done “clearly” and “unmistakably. ”  Id. at 444, citing Garfinkel v. Morristown Obstetrics & Gynecology Assocs., 168 N.J. 124, 132 (2001).  A “clause depriving a citizen of access to the courts should clearly state its purpose. ”  Id. citing Marchak v. Claridge Commons, Inc., 134 N.J. 275, 282 (1993).  “The point is to assure that the parties know that in electing arbitration as the exclusive remedy, they are waiving their time-honored right to sue.
[brief] ”  DiProspero v. Penn, 183 N.J. 477, 492 (2005) (quoting Lozano v. Frank DeLuca Constr., 178 N.J. 513, 522 (2004)).  Here, the LRHL is clear and unambiguous on its face: a municipality can “negotiate and collect revenue from a redeveloper to defray the costs of the redevelopment entity. ”  There are no conditions imposed under the LRHL which limit the recoverable “costs of the redevelopment entity” only to those costs which the municipality will incur as a direct and proximate result of the redevelopment.  There are no conditions imposed under the LRHL which require that the “costs of the redevelopment entity” be directly related to the redevelopment project.  So long as the fee was negotiated and collected by the City in order to effectuate the purposes of the LRHL and the Amended Redevelopment Plan, the fee is lawful.
[brief] The Lower Court, consistent with the panoply of cases before, held, [t]he Court agreed that with the defendants, right, that the N.J.C.F.L.A. does not confer private statutory case of action.  Only the [...] has the authority to pursue claims for violation of the N.J.C.F.L.A.  That’s N.J.S.A. 17:11C-18.
[brief] 1.  The Intent Of The Parties  First and foremost, “[i]n construing a deed, the court must undertake to determine the intention of the parties.  If that intention is not clear on the face of the deed, the court may consider extrinsic evidence to resolve any ambiguity. ”  Boylan v. Borough of Point Pleasant Beach, 410 N.J. Super. 564, 569 (App. Div. 2009).  Thus, the intent of the parties is the guiding principle in determining what property rights were conveyed.
[brief] Any and all error by a trial court is tested by the standard of whether the error that occurred is “clearly capable of producing an unjust result. ”  R. 2:10-2; PRESSLER & VERNIWERO, Current N.J. COURT RULES, Comment R. 2:10-2.  The focus of the Appellate Court is “whether in all circumstances there is a reasonable doubt as to whether the error denied a fair trial and a fair decision on the merits. ”  State vs. Mohammed, 226 N.J. 71, 87 (2016).  We submit that for the reasons set forth below, the granting of Summary Judgment was an unjust result and a denial of the plaintiff’s right to a trial in this matter.
[brief] The prosecutor outlined the State’s theory in his opening remarks:  [T]he defendant and [...] travel to New York City a couple of days later where they get matching tattoos on their forearms, loyalty is royalty.  Both get tattoos, but the defendant gets one additional tattoo.  He gets a facial tattoo where he admits to killing [...] and puts that billboard on his face.  (24T35-18 to 36-2)  [...] testified that on March 8, after the homicide, he and Defendant got [...] picked up Defendant in Ewing and they went to New York to go shopping matching tattoos with the slogan “Loyalty is Royalty” on their forearms to signify loyalty to their shared secret regarding the murder of [...].  (30T243-8 to 20, 250-18 to 251-16, T251-25 to 252-15)  [...] also testified that Defendant got teardrops tattooed on his face and said that symbolized his murder of [...].  (30T253-1 to 19)  At trial, the State admitted a photo it alleged depicted Defendant’s face without the teardrop tattoo before the murder (S-113) as well as a second photo it alleged depicted Defendant’s face with the teardrop tattoo after the murder (S-114).  (26T73-13 to 77-6, 83-15 to 19; 30T260-7 to 24)  The only witness to identify Defendant as the person in S-113, taken before the homicide, was [...].  (26T73-1 to 5)  The prosecutor referenced Defendant’s tattoos extensively in his summation, arguing they were “pillars of evidence,” proved a conspiracy between Defendant and [...], and were proof of Defendant’s purposeful mens rea.  (38T110-18 to 111-1, 113-16 to 18, 120-16 to 23, 136-17 to 137-21, 186-25 to 187-3, 190-24 to 191-1, 191-20 to 194-1)  The court twice gave the jury instructions in how to consider evidence of the tattoos—both immediately after [...]’s testimony and again in its final instructions.
[brief] Da329-332.  This was their own assessment, and they waived their ROFR as of February 17th, 2023, at their own peril.  The Plaintiff claimed that the contract/offer was somehow invalid and therefore not able to be considered as a “bona fide offer” (as paragraph 39 requires) because it did not reference the Plaintiff’s ROFR.  Da85. (see paragraph 11).  The Plaintiff refused, moreover, to provide the figures requested to calculate the penalty for debranding the gas station in the event of a sale to the third-party buyer ([...]).  Da144.  It is important to note, however, that the PSA contained NO CONTINGENCIES and the calculations of the penalties for debranding were part of the contract.  Da49, Da51.  In order to obtain the information that was needed to get the figures and in order for the Defendant, [...]’s principal to feel secure in proceeding with the closing, the Defendant, [...], Inc., amended the contract/offer and presented that amendment to Defendant [...], Inc.  Da145.  Former defendant [...], d/b/a [...], Inc.  (hereinafter, “[...]”) then signed and presented the offer to Plaintiff on May 4, 2023.  Da70, Da145.  On May 5, 2023, [...]’s general counsel acknowledged receipt and indicated that the offer was to operations for processing.  Da69.  On May 8th, 2023, at the Plaintiff’s request, Defendant [...] also signed the document (thereby transforming it into a contract) and sent it to Plaintiff.  Da72.  On June 6th, 2023, Plaintiff announced that it was exercising its ROFR under the MFSA.  Da75.  The Defendants refused to recognize this attempt by the Plaintiff to exercise its ROFR as it had been more than 30 days since the Plaintiff was presented with the bona fide offer (January 17, 2023) and no material changes had been made to that offer.  Da80.  It was the Defendants’ position that the Plaintiff had waived the ROFR in February and proceeded with their contract with [...] selling to [...].
[brief] Plaintiff’s Claims Based on Contractual Duties and Fiduciary Duties were correctly dismissed by the trial court.  (46a-47a)  A.  The title commitment does not support plaintiff’s claims.  (43a)  Plaintiff continues in Point II the make the same erroneous argument that the title commitment represents something other than an offer to issue a title policy.  Plaintiff contends the commitment imposed on [...] the obligation to get a deed from [...] and [...] to plaintiff.  The contention is not supported by the commitment.  First, as discussed, the commitment states it is an offer to issue one or more title policies (301a, paragraph 1).
[directive] Offenses 39:4-96 39:4-97 39:4-98 39:4-52  Second Second First First D.P. D.P. ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !  N.J.S.A. N.J.S.A. N.J. S.A. N.J.S.A.  N.J.S.A. N.J.S.A. N.J.S.A. N.J.S.A. N.J.S.A.  Related ! ! ! ! ! ! ! Injury)  Bodily (Serious Accident Vehicle Motor a of Scene the Leaving 2C:12-1.1
[brief] ii.  Defendant’s Cross-Appeal to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Claims on Statute of Limitations Grounds Must be Denied (Pa44-Pa47; 3T87)  Plaintiff anticipates that Defendant will contend each of Plaintiff’s claims, and statute of limitations periods, run from the date the Defendant’s deceitful website was revised to include the 3.0 GPA requirement in the Fall of 2012.  However, it was not until 2016 in which Plaintiff learned that he could only matriculate into the dual degree program after his first year of enrollment, which makes Plaintiff’s claims timely.  Defendant cannot set forth any evidence to reflect that this alleged policy was set forth in any advertisement of the program or explicitly provided to Plaintiff at any other time, and that Plaintiff was aware of that policy.  Defendant will presumably rely upon an exhibit that was attached to a letter sent to “Members of the Council” dated May 31, 2012.  (Pa69-Pa80).  This May 31, 2012 letter, and its attachments, include a “School of Pharmacy Concurrent Degree Enrollment Program Guidelines and Overview” document, which allegedly sets forth guidelines for placement into the dual degree program.
[directive] Additional Questions for Certain Drug and Weapons Offenses  Committed on or After June 24, 1998 (Portuguese)  As perguntas abaixo devem ser respondidas se você está se declarando culpado por determinados crimes referentes a drogas e também está se declarando culpado por posse de arma de fogo ou outra arma enquanto cometeu ou tentou cometer ou conspirou para cometer qualquer um dos crimes descritos a seguir.  Se houve posse de arma de fogo, responda às perguntas 1a, b e c.  Se não houve posse de arma de fogo, assinale “Não corresponde” [NA] na pergunta 1a e responda às perguntas 1b e c.  The following questions need to be answered if you are pleading guilty to certain drug offenses and also are pleading guilty to possession of a firearm or other weapon while committing, attempting to commit or conspiring to commit any of the following offenses.
[brief] Monell, 436 U.S. at 690.  Therefore, to make out a claim under § 1983 against a local government entity, there must be an individual that commits the unconstitutional action.  If the Court dismisses Plaintiff’s allegations of alleged underlying constitutional injuries against the individual defendants, Plaintiff cannot maintain a Monell claims against a municipal entity.  See Marable v. West Pottsgrove Twp., 176 Fed. App’x 275, 283 (3d Cir. 2006) (stating that “a municipality may not incur Monell liability as a result of the actions of its officers when its officers have inflicted no constitutional injury. ”); Williams v. Borough of West Chester, Pa., 891 F.2d 458, 467 (3d Cir. 1989) (stating that a municipal defendant “cannot be vicariously liable under Monell unless one of [its] employees is primarily liable under section 1983 itself. ”); see also City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385 (1989) (stating that a there can be no Monell or supervisory liability if there is no underlying constitutional injury); Mattern v. City of Sea Isle, 131 F.  Supp. 3d 305, 318 (D.N.J. 2015) (reasoning that every Monell claim requires an underlying constitutional violation).  As was addressed above, Plaintiff’s allegations regarding the Defendant Borough were patently false.  Plaintiff failed to present evidence to the court below that would amount to a constitutional violation on the part of any Defendant [...] agent or employee.  Accordingly, pursuant to Monell, Plaintiff may not maintain his claims against the municipality, and the claims were properly dismissed on Summary Judgment.
[brief] Municipal actions enjoy a presumption of validity.  Big Smoke LLC v. Twp. of W. Milford, 478 N.J. Super. 203, 217 (App. Div. 2024) (citing Bryant v. City of Atl. City, 209 N.J. Super. 596, 610 (App. Div. 1998)).  Because municipalities “have particular knowledge of local conditions,” they have traditionally been afforded “wide latitude in the exercise of their delegated discretion. ”  Avalon Manor Improvement Ass’n, Inc. v. Twp. of Middle, 370 N.J. Super. 73, 90 (App. Div. 2004).  The challenger of the municipal action bears the “heavy burden” of overcoming the presumption of validity by showing that the municipal action is arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable.
[brief] CIVIL ACTION ON APPEAL FROM THE FINAL JUDGMENT OF THE SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY, LAW DIVISION, HUDSON COUNTY DOCKET NO. [...]  Sat Below: HON.  [...], J.S.C. BRIEF AND APPENDIX ON BEHALF OF DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS  [...], [...], [...], [...] AND [...]  [...]  Attorneys for Defendant-Respondents  LVNV Funding LLC, MHC Receivables, LLC, [...], Sherman Originator III, LLC and Sherman Originator LLC [...]  [...] [...]  [...]  On the Brief: [...]  Attorney ID# 418342023  Date Submitted: July 3, 2024  TABLE OF CONTENTS  TABLE OF CONTENTS ...........................................................................................................
[brief] We respectfully submit that only trades or crafts are required to register under the PWCRA, not professionals such as archaeologists.  *See generally* N.J.S.A. § 34:11-56.51a (providing an exception to the general registration rule for certain subcontractors who do not perform “work” as defined by the Prevailing Wage Act); N.J.S.A. § 34:11-56.26(5) (defining “public work” in the Prevailing Wage Act); *see also* 0015a-0017a.
[brief] The Administrative Process  Following issuance of the Permit, [...] requested an administrative hearing to challenge the public access permit condition and the matter was filed in the Office of Administrative Law (“OAL”).  (Aa86).  [...] also requested permission to begin constructing the replacement bulkhead while its appeal was pending, citing the existing bulkhead’s poor condition.  (Ra8-9; Ra191).  The DEP granted permission to [...] to commence reconstructing the bulkhead while reserving DEP’s right otherwise to require compliance with the disputed permit condition.  (Ra9; Ra193).  In the OAL, the parties filed cross-motions for summary decision\(^5\) with a Joint Stipulation of Facts.  (Aa80; Ra1-196).  On October 5, 2022, Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) [...] issued an Initial Decision denying [...]’s motion and granting the DEP’s motion, finding that [...]’s development would change the existing footprint of a structure on the Property, thus triggering the public access condition required by the Public Access Law.  (Aa79-114); [...], c/o [...] Condo. Ass’n, Inc. v. N.J. Dep’t of Env’t Prot., No. [...], 2022 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 797 (October 5, 2022) (“Initial Decision”).  The ALJ determined that the plain language of the Law supported DEP’s decision to impose the public access permit condition.  (Aa95).  On October 6, 2023, NJDEP Commissioner [...] issued a twenty-seven-page Final Decision concluding that the ALJ properly granted summary decision to the DEP.  (Aa115-40); [...], c/o [...] Condo. Ass’n, Inc. v. N.J. Dep’t of Env’t Prot., No. [...], 2023 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 621 (October 6, 2023) (“Final Decision”).  The Commissioner concurred with the ALJ that the previously unauthorized catwalks and mooring piles were changes to the footprint of development, and concluded that [...]’s project \(^5\)  Contrary to Rule 2:6-1(a)(2), [...] includes its summary decision brief below it its appendix.
[brief] Id. at 442.  The Court made an important observation that “…an average member of the public may not know—without some explanatory comment—that arbitration is a substitute for the right to have one's claim adjudicated in a court of law. ”  *Id.*  The Court emphasized that there is “…no prescribed set of words must be included in an arbitration clause to accomplish a waiver of rights.  Whatever words compose an arbitration agreement, they must be clear and unambiguous that a consumer is choosing to arbitrate disputes rather than have them resolved in a court of law.  In this way, the agreement will assure reasonable notice to the consumer. ”  *Id.* at 447.  The Court found that the wording of the parties’ agreement did not clearly and unambiguously notify plaintiff that she was abandoning her right to pursue her statutory claims in court.  *Id.*  As a result, the arbitration agreement was found unenforceable.  *Id.*  The critical distinguishing factor between *Atalese* and this case is that we are not dealing with the average consumer.
[brief] --- \(^6\)  The purpose of noting the fact twice in the Judge’s opinion is perplexing especially since Plaintiff was successful in almost all of the litigation.  (Pa 107, 128). proposed by Plaintiff which would require a new Planning Board approval.  (Pa 110-111).  Since the trial court's opinion was issued in that case in 2018 (six years ago), the [...], the [...], the [...] and the [...] have entered into the Four Party Agreement (which the Second Ordinance was intended to implement) and which has increased the density of the proposed development to 27 units per acre\(^7\), which is more than the 550-unit plan presented by Plaintiff in its lawsuit (only 25 units per acre) and found by the Court in its decision to be too dense a development and "bad planning" (making the current Redevelopment Plan before the Planning Board and [...] Council seemingly "very bad planning") and should have been considered as such by both the Planning Board and the governing body in this matter as being inconsistent with the [...].
[brief] (11T:3-21 to 31-25).  --- 1T – Transcript of Motion, dated February 9, 2021; 2T – Transcript of Motion, dated August 20, 2021; 3T – Transcript of Trial, dated September 27, 2021; 4T – Transcript of Trial, dated September 28, 2021; 5T – Transcript of Trial, dated September 29, 2021; 6T – Transcript of Trial, dated September 30, 2021; 7T – Transcript of Trial, dated October 4, 2021; 8T – Transcript of Trial, dated October 5, 2021; 9T – Transcript of Trial, dated October 7, 2021; 10T – Transcript of Trial, dated October 12, 2021; 11T – Transcript of Sentence, dated May 5, 2022; Db – Defendant’s Brief in Support of Appeal; Da – Defendant’s Appendix; Pa – State’s Appendix.
[brief] Defendant’s Certification……………………………………………………………..Da 26-29  PCR Counsel’s Brief in Support of Post-Conviction Relief……………  Da 30-33  Supplemental Pro Se Brief……………………………………………………………..Da 34-37  Order of PCR Court……………………………………………………………………Da  38  Decision of the PCR Court……………………………………………………………..Da 39-45  Notice of Appeal ………………………………………………………………………Da 46-49  Amended Notice of Appeal……………………………………………………………..Da 50-54