ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Notably, the Law Division failed to articulate how the clause was ambiguous (i.e. by failing to articulate another reasonable interpretation of the clause) and denied [...] its contractual right to pursue indemnification.  Absent contractual indemnification, there were no avenues by which [...] could be apportioned or assigned liability, pursuant to the WCA.  Thus, it was impossible for any other entity, other than [...], to have been apportioned liability in connection with the plaintiff’s injuries.  Now, because of the Law Division’s error, [...] argues that, because the full liability was apportioned to [...], contractual indemnification would not be available, even if the clause were found to be unambiguous.
[brief] Among other things, AICRA implemented a mandatory arbitration system for No-Fault disputes between insurers and claimants.  AICRA provided that once either party opted into the ADR system, arbitration of their disputes was mandatory and that there could be no piecemeal, one-by-one determination of which claims to submit to arbitration and which to court.  The Legislature had full knowledge of the existence of the NJIFPA and NJRICO laws, passed into law decades prior, and their private causes of action, when it enacted AICRA.  However, they did not exempt these NJIFPA / NJRICO civil actions from mandatory arbitration under AICRA.  Despite the passing into law of AICRA and opting-in to the mandatory arbitration process, insurers such as [...] continued to sue healthcare providers for fraud and racketeering in Superior Court in direct violation of the mandates of AICRA that such disputes be resolved through arbitration.
[brief] Surace.  Pa182-Pa188.  Plaintiff [...], trusting in his attorney, Defendant [...], and Defendant [...], entered into an Assignment and Assumption Agreement with [...] for $2,000,000.00 on May 7, 2009.  363a-364a (46:23-47:25); 382a-383a (65:19-66:8); 458a (141:8-17).  In 2010, after certain payments were made in accordance with the May 7, 2009 Assignment and Assumption Agreement, [...] defaulted and ultimately terminated that agreement with [...].
[directive] Courts pursuant to N.J.S.A.  IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that a copy of this Appiication and Order shall be forwarded to the appropriate court and prosecutor; and IS receiving prosecutor shall promptly identify and distribute copies of this IT  FURTHER ORDERED that the Order to appropriate clerks of courts, law enforcement agencies, and correctional institutions who have custody and control of the records, including those identified in this Order, so that they may comply with this Order and the requirements of N.J.S.A 2C:52-15.
[brief] In the within matter, adding information to a website cannot be construed as notice of the Ricci Act’s enactment or the requirements to register within a certain timeframe.  The statute required the Board to promulgate rules to provide notice to active and retired members of the State Police Retirement System.  The Certifying Officer Letter is proof that the website posting is not sufficient notice.  Pa66.  The notice of the Ricci Act to the Certifying Officers advises the Certifying Officers that they must distribute the information to employees pursuant to N.J.A.C. 17:5-1.4.  It also required that the Certifying Officers to provide a certification that the information was distributed.  The Respondent claims that the mailing of the postcard to a correct address establishes a presumption that the postcard was received.  This presumption is rebutted by the fact that [...] and 98 others certified via affidavits that they did not receive said postcard.  Additionally, the claim that postcards were mailed out to all “200,647 SPRS retirees” is a misstatement of fact.  Rb12.  New Jersey State Troopers are assigned a badge number upon successful completion of the academy and these badge numbers are never repeated.  Currently, the New Jersey State Police badge numbers only reach the 9,000s; meaning that in the entire history of the New Jersey State Police, there are less than 10,000 New Jersey State Troopers, which includes all active or retired members of the State Police Retirement System.  Failure to provide any notice, adequate or actual, is reasonable and equitable grounds for relaxing the deadline for registration under the Ricci Act.  Furthermore, the Division admits that it did not notify the members of the retirement system within 30 days of the Ricci Act’s enactment.  This further establishes good cause to relax the timeframe.  We respectfully request that the decision below be reversed, and that [...] be permitted to register his presence at 9/11 and apply for amended benefits under the Ricci Act.
[brief] Adjusted for inflation\(^5\), $288 in 2016 is roughly the equivalent of $342 in 2022.  [...] – who conducted approximately 17.5% of the work – sought payment for 958.2 hours in the Global Fee Application at a rate of $825/hour – almost 2.5 times the inflation-adjusted New Jersey average (Da107; Da153).  [...] – who conducted approximately 38.5% of the work – sought payment for 2,113.6 hours in the Global Fee Application at a rate of $635/hour – nearly double the inflation-adjusted New Jersey average.  (Ibid.)  [...], – who conducted approximately 23% of the work – sought payment for 1,266 hours in the Global Fee Application at a rate of $550/hour – over 1.6 times the inflation-adjusted average.  (Ibid.)  Those three attorneys account for roughly 80% of the fees sought in the Global Fee Application.
[brief] The discussion of the legislative history and intent of the statute is academically interesting but does not impact the question whether if the NJCFLA does not have a direct private right of action, should the Court infer it has an “implied” private right of action.  While not determinative, it is another attempt to mislead.  It glosses over the fact that "New Jersey courts have been reluctant to infer a statutory private right of action where the Legislature has not expressly provided for such action."
[brief] In its April 16, 2021 Order, the Trial Court compelled Mother’s counsel to “clarify the role of [...] in the [...]” and his role in the accounts into which insurance proceeds were placed.  (MA-87)  It is essential for the Court to understand that while Mr. Groff is the [...]’s Firm Administrator, he had never been present at any hearing in this lawsuit, is not an attorney, and had no involvement in any legal aspect of this lawsuit.  Mr. Groff and the Trial Court had a prior, unpleasant history.  Mr. Groff was involved in a lawsuit before [...].  Representing himself, Mr. Groff asked [...] to vacate or otherwise revise an order she had issued.  The Judge told Mr. Groff that the court never provides the relief he requested.  The Judge also publicly insulted Mr. Groff from the bench.  Mr. Groff then showed the Judge an order in another case, signed by her, granting the identical relief she had just told Mr. Groff was never granted.  It is respectfully submitted that the public embarrassment Mr. Groff caused [...] was, at least in part, the reason that the Trial Court acted so improperly toward Mother’s law firm.  Summary
[brief] On March 5, 2020, the Neptune Township Municipal Court Judge directed plaintiff (defendant below) [...] to contact the [...], ([...]), and attempt to resolve the remaining Complaint [...] charging failure to obtain a Certificate of Appropriateness.  (CofA)  Neptune Township Municipal Court proceedings on Complaint-Summons [...] were stayed pending disposition of this appeal.  On December 12, 2020, plaintiffs made application to the [...] for CofA approval of the three (3) previously installed concrete unit paver walkways at the Property.  On January 12, 2021, the [...] adopted Resolution [...]2020-226 denying CofA approval of the three (3) unit paver walkways at the Property.  Complaint Exhibit 1; Pa 130a.  The [...] “found the applicants’ removal of the concrete walkways within the flare amounted to a destruction of a preexisting non-conforming walkway, which once destroyed, could not be replaced.  Second, the Commission found the walkways proposed by the applicant were inconsistent with the size limitations of Section R of the Design Guidelines, and that hardscape in the flare in [sic] discouraged under all circumstances.  Third, the Commission found that the concrete pavers were not historically consistent with respect to form, shape or color. ”  Pa 20a.  On March 3, 2021, plaintiffs filed an appeal of the [...]’s denial of CofA approval to the [...], ([...]).  On March 2, 2022, the [...] memorialized Resolution [...] 22/09 denying plaintiffs’ appeal of [...] Resolution [...] 2020-226.  Complaint Exhibit 2; Pa 24a.  On April 19, 2022, plaintiffs filed their Complaint in Lieu of Prerogative Writs.
[directive] Definitions  Activate.  To actuate the recording mode/function of a body worn camera.1  Body worn camera (“BWC”).  A device worn by a law enforcement officer that makes an electronic audio and video recording of activities that take place during any law enforcement action.  The term does not include a mobile video recording device when mounted inside a police vehicle (i.e., a dash cam).  The term also does not include any form of electronic recording device worn by a law enforcement officer while acting in an undercover capacity.  Nor does the term include an electronic recording device when used to comply with the requirements of Rule 3:17 (electronic recording of station house custodial interrogations).
[brief] Ass'n v. Portofino Waterfront Urban Renewal, No. A-2490-11T1, 2013 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1153, at *4 (App. Div. 2013).  It’s about the dismissal of the case for failure to make discovery, with the “ultimate penalty” of Default.  As here, there were mis-labeled or mis-directed filings.  The Court does not cite any “mistake” cases, all the cases relate to Failure to make Discovery.
[brief] See Prager v. Joyce Honda, Inc., 447 N.J. Super. 124, 139-40 (App. Div. 2016) (holding that the “two written warnings the dealership provided to plaintiff are insufficient to establish she suffered an adverse employment action under the LAD,” the plaintiff produced no proof of any tangible injury or harm, and that the plaintiff’s subjective response to the warnings “is not legally significant in assessing whether they were materially adverse. ”).  Here, with regard to her LAD claims against defendants [...] and [...], Plaintiff has failed, as a matter of law, to allege a viable cause of action.
[brief] The first is authored by [...] – a board-certified medical doctor in the field of internal medicine and endocrinology.  (Pa41)  The second is from Nurse [...].  (Pa57).  Both Affidavits of Merit identify each of the medical providers at issue and contain the requisite language set forth in the Affidavit of Merit Statute.  An objection letter to the Affidavit of Merit was received by the Defendant on July 26, 2024.
[brief] This led the trial court to note the “apparent failure of the timely development of affordable housing in the Borough” and appoint an implementation monitor for [...].  35a.  As [...] itself noted in 2020, [a]s of July 1, 2020, no affordable housing units have been physically rehabilitated or constructed within the Borough. ”  Thus, when the trial court held that the delay in constructing the Off-site Units was not so extreme as to warrant Mount Laurel II remedies, it failed to consider the context and history of [...]’s noncompliance, and thereby downplayed the violations.
[brief] Plaintiff is wrong.  In *Dimitrakopoulos v. Borrus, Goldin*, supra, 237 N.J. at 91, the Supreme Court extensively discussed the ECD and specifically the exemption of certain legal malpractice claims.  The Court clarified that the legal malpractice claims exempt from the entire controversy doctrine under *Olds v. Donnelly*, 150 N.J. 424 (1997), are those where the “attorney in the underlying litigation” also “represents the client” in that action.
[brief] In short, the tip provides precisely the kind of information that could easily be “attributed to circulating rumors” rather than insider knowledge.  See Keyes, 184 N.J. at 556; Williams, 364 N.J. Super. at 23, 34 (cautioning that tips from police informants “may be premised upon rumor and innuendo”).  Here, as in Keyes, the police were required to corroborate the tip’s allegations of concealed criminal activity through independent investigation because the informant’s tip was insufficiently detailed regarding the basis of the informant’s knowledge.  Notably, unlike in Keyes, here, the investigating police officers did not set up a controlled buy, nor did they obtain or test any suspected CDS.  (1T:22-18 to 23-4)  As noted by the trial court, the warrant affiant never identified the objects he observed [...] giving to several individuals outside his residence, nor did he give any description of the objects, explain why he suspected that they may be CDS, or state what kind of CDS he believed them to be.  (1T:18-24 to 19-2, 22-18 to 23-10, 24-16 to 18)  Unlike in Keyes, where the warrant affidavit specified that there had been routine complaints regarding drug activity on the same block as the defendant’s residence, the warrant affiant gave no information whatsoever regarding drug distribution in the area.  (1T:24-22 to 25-9)  Instead, the only information that the warrant affiant provided for purposes of corroborating the tip were [...]’s criminal record, and the criminal records of several people that he was seen interacting with.  Thus, the trial court correctly concluded that the police failed to corroborate the informant’s otherwise unreliable tip, and that the tip was entitled to minimal weight in the probable cause analysis.  Furthermore, the warrant affiant’s observations do not amount to probable cause that [...] was engaging in drug distribution.  While there is a certain degree of deference to the expertise of police officers, an officer may not simply act on a "mere hunch"; rather, "objective and articulable factors" must exist to support the finding of probable cause.
[brief] The facility has specific procedures for dealing with unruly patients, and [...] was aware of these procedures.  And, there is no indication that he was missing equipment usually used for the task.  Even further afield is Brooks, where a school custodian “was confronted with the unusual situation of a group of students attempting to carry a 300-pound weight bench into the school. ”  425 N.J. Super. at 283.  Brooks “took charge of this activity” and injured his shoulder when “the boys suddenly dropp[ed] one side of the weight bench, placing its entire weight on [him]. ”  Ibid.  Nothing even comparable happened to [...].
[brief] (See 3T15:3–5.)  This Court, however, already held that [...] should not get that second chance.  (See, e.g., Pa789–90 (“[P]laintiff chose not to include a bad-faith claim in its complaint and inexplicably waited until after the trial judge had rendered a verdict to seek leave to add a claim . . . .  [T]he motion judge did not abuse his discretion in declining to permit plaintiff’s belated amendment. ”).)  Even if [...] made no attempt to assert its bad faith claim in the First Action, the doctrine still applies—bad faith was clearly a component of this controversy that could have been litigated and determined, and in fact, was later determined to lack merit.  That [...] failed to raise it in its initial complaint does not save the claim now.  See, e.g., William Blanchard Co. v. Beach Concrete Co., 150 N.J. Super. 277, 294 (App. Div. 1977) (finding dismissed claims to “inescapably” be part of the entire controversy when the litigation concerned a single transaction and the purpose of obtaining a definitive adjudication of rights and liabilities resulting from the transaction “would be patently frustrated if this litigation were . . . limited only to an adjudication of the rights and liabilities initially asserted”).
[brief] See, N.J.S.A. 3B:31-72(a), stating that a “trustee who commits a breach of trust is liable to the beneficiaries affected for the greater of: (1) the amount required to restore the value of the trust property and trust distributions to what they would have been had the breach not occurred; or (2) the profit the trustee made by reason of the breach. ”  Here, the trust property was not impacted by the allegedly wrongful acts of which the Defendants complain, nor was there any profit to the Trustee as she did not purchase the Boonton Property with [...].  As such, there is no claim.
[brief] (4T97:10-15).  [...] told the officer that after some words about sanded versus unsanded grout he walked away from the plaintiff and the plaintiff followed him asking for his name and then threw the bag of grout at him and the bag of grout hit him in the back.  [...] also testified that the first thing the bag of grout hit was him.  (Ibid.).  In emails to his HR manager [...] stated "[t]he bag of power grout landed on my shoulder, neck and head."  (Pa259).  The police observed grout on [...]’s back and head (4T161:15-18) and same is also visible in the police body cam footage.
[brief] (Da50-51.)  The Honorable [...], J.S.C. heard oral argument on March 17, 2023.  (See Generally 1T.)  Following oral argument, the trial court summarized the issue as being solely one of whether “the Business liability Coverage L exclusion . . . applies here. ”  (1T at 22:8-11.)  The trial court found that the provision was unambiguous and in line with public policy, and “looking at the allegations in this particular suit,” he found “the exclusion in this particular case applies. ”  (1T at 22:14-20.)  With that finding, he granted summary judgment.  (1T at 22:20.)  In making this finding, the trial court’s analysis focused solely on “the allegations in the complaint and . . . the policy,” and “whether it falls within [the policy],” which the trial Judge “believe[d] in this particular case the allegations made here do fall within the exclusion. ”  (1T at 22:21-25.)  It is unclear from the trial court’s statements on the record which policy exclusion applied.  Further, it is unclear which allegations in the Underlying Action the trial court found fell within any of the exclusions.  The trial court’s statements on the record were silent as to Dr.
[brief] The worksheet was “designed to assist law enforcement officers in documenting the procedures/results of showups,” and to “serve as a checklist to ensure that officers comply with all of the requirements for eyewitness identification procedures established by Court Rule and New Jersey Supreme Court case law. ”  Showup Worksheet at 3.  The worksheets are required to be “prepared during the procedure, or immediately thereafter. ”  Ibid.  Officers were instructed that showups could not be conducted if more than two hours had elapsed from the time of the incident, they were not to provide any feedback to the eyewitnesses, and they were required to make a statement regarding the eyewitness's level of confidence that the suspect was the perpetrator.  Ibid.  In March 2019, a year after the trial judge's decision in this case, the Court in Anthony, 237 N.J. at 233, modified the Henderson framework, and held that “a defendant will be entitled to a pretrial hearing on the admissibility of identification evidence if Delgado and Rule 3:11 are not followed and no electronic or contemporaneous, verbatim written recording of the identification procedure is prepared.
[brief] Rather, the State’s position has always been that a blanket policy involuntarily outing all LGBTQ+ minors notwithstanding the students’ express opposition to that notification will threaten both immediate and irreparable harm, including higher rates of suicide and suicide attempts, increased drug and alcohol misuse, and a risk of violence or homelessness.  (Ra26-40).  Appellants refuse to acknowledge the realities of harm to students, but the record evidence makes these risks clear.  Second, were Appellants’ policies to remain in effect, students would be less willing to express their LGBTQ+ status at school, making it difficult if not impossible for the school to provide them necessary support.  See (Da407-08) (finding that students could no longer trust that their privacy interests would be protected even if they shared their LGBTQ+ status with “a school staff member in confidence”).  That, too would work a grave harm, as a “transgender child could hardly feel safe in an environment where expressing their gender identity resulted in the automatic disclosure to their parents, regardless of their own wishes. ”  John & Jane Parents, 622 F.Supp.3d at 139.  Students who no longer feel that they can express their LGBTQ+ status at school may be unable to access the support they need, and would be unable to access facilities (or even names and pronouns) in line with their gender identity.  Simply put, as the trial court recognized, this lawsuit is not aimed at undermining parents’ rights but rather at addressing the inevitable effects of school “policies … that purportedly subject a protected class to discrimination in violation of the LAD.
[brief] A “presumption of validity” attaches to the adoption of a redevelopment plan with deference given to a governing body in making such a determination.  Downtown Residents for Sane Dev. v. City of Hoboken, 242 N.J. Super. 329, 332 (App. Div. 1990).  To set aside an approved redevelopment plan, the challenger must prove that the “legislative decisions made must be more than debatable, they must be shown to be arbitrary or capricious, contrary to law, or unconstitutional. ”  Id. at 332 (citing Hutton Park Gardens v. Town Council of W. Orange, 68 N.J. 543, 564 (1975)).  Even if “two actions are open to a municipal body, municipal action is not arbitrary and capricious if exercised honestly and upon due consideration, even if an erroneous conclusion is reached. ”  Bryant v. City of Atlantic City, 309 N.J. Super. 596, 610 (App. Div. 1998).  Appellants attempt to avoid this high threshold by submitting a newly constructed baseless argument that the Appellate Division must first determine whether the Redevelopment Plan adopted on February 14, 2024 satisfies Sections 5, 7, and 14 of the Local Redevelopment Housing Law (“LRHL”), N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-1 et seq. before it can reach the review of the Redevelopment Plan.  They even go so far as to assert that “the failure of the Trial Court to apply the controlling standards of Sections 5, 7, and 14 means that the decision below is not entitled to any ‘deference. ’” (Pb13.)  This is creative lawyering gone wrong.  Appellants’ absurd argument misapplies the LRHL and is contrary to the well-established record in this matter.  Sections 5 and 14 of the LRHL have no relevance to this matter.  Section 5 relates to the criteria for the designation of an area in need of redevelopment. \(^1\) Section 14 relates to the criteria for designation of an area in need for rehabilitation.  It is mystifying why Appellants cite to these Sections when there is absolutely no \(^1\) Appellants’ citation to “smart growth planning principles” is inapplicable to a review of a redevelopment plan because these principles are only relevant to Section 5, which, as noted above, is inapplicable to this matter.  (Pb9, 11, 19, 21.) basis for Appellants to challenge the designations on appeal, yet this argument is repeated throughout the Brief (Pb1 3, 9, 12-14, 17.)  The Town designated the redevelopment area properties as one in need of redevelopment or rehabilitation in 2020.