[brief] [...] INCORRECTLY INTERPRETED THE YARBOUGH FACTOR REQUIREMENTS WHEN SENTENCING [...].  The sentencing court misapprehended the purpose and application of the Yarbough factors when ordering Mr. Manso’s sentence.  *Yarbough* identifies factors to evaluate and determine the appropriateness of consecutive or concurrent sentences for multiple offenses.  100 N.J. 627, 643-45 (1985).  However, it does not create a priority or presumption for any type of sentence.  *State v. Torres*, 246 N.J. 246, 266 (2021).  Indeed, unlike other states that is no presumption of a concurrent or consecutive sentence.  *Id.*  Even the existence of any particular factor does not create a presumption for or against any type of sentence.  *Id.*  In Mr. Manso’s case, however, the court identified the primacy of the “no free crimes” aspect of *Yarbough*, as mandating the need for a consecutive sentence.  The court frequently reiterated that there were multiple victims and that *Yarbough* stated that there should be no free crimes.  The court further performed this analysis in the context of the court’s obligations to the victims’ mothers and the deterrent effects of consecutive sentences in the context of multiple homicides.  While the state contends that this analysis is sufficient to satisfy all of the court’s obligations, what it really does is make clear that the court misapprehended the proper interpretation of the *Yarbough* factors, demonstrating a belief that the “no free crimes” concern predominates over any other aspect.  This is exactly the improper balancing that the Supreme Court clarified in Torres.  In Torres, the court specifically addressed concerns about the improper reliance on the “no free crimes” factor.  The court observed that the factor was “often seized upon by sentencing courts searching for greater direction .  . . .”  Id. at 269.  But, then clarified their concern that the factor not be used as “a blanket mandate that consecutive sentences be imposed. ”  Id.  Indeed, the factor is only a guidepost to determine the overall fairness of a sentence, it is not a mandate in favor of consecutive sentences.  Yet, in Mr. Manso’s case the presence of multiple victims was treated as determinative of the outcome.  The state’s argument that the sentencing court was aware that a consecutive sentence was not mandatory, and that this is dispositive of the issue.  However, this misstates the argument.  The issue is not whether the sentencing judge believed that the law required consecutive sentences, but whether the judge believed that once the “no free crimes” prong had been raised by the existence of multiple victims, a consecutive sentence would always be appropriate.  It is the judge’s statements in that regard that suggest a belief that the existence of multiple victims uncontroversibly weighed in favor of consecutive sentences.  This belief was the misapprehension of the law of Yarbough, as explained in Torres, and this is what requires Mr. Manso’s case be remanded for resentencing.  The failure to sentence Mr. Manso based on the totality of the Yarbough factors and placing improper reliance on only one factor with the belief that the presence of the factor required a consecutive sentence, resulted in an illegal sentence which must be corrected on remand.  IV.