ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The Consolidated Settlement Agreement**  Subsequently, various named plaintiffs brought suit against Respondent for violations of the CFLA, alleging that they had received letters concerning their outstanding account balances from Respondent’s collection agent, [...], even though Respondent was purportedly not licensed as a Consumer Finance Lender under the CFLA.  (Pa4).  Those cases were consolidated, with other similar cases against similarly situated defendants, into *[...] v. [...]*, [...] (D.N.J.) on November 19, 2018 for purposes of discovery and settlement. \(^1\) *Id.*  Thereafter, effective November 1, 2019, the various parties entered into a class-wide settlement agreement (“Settlement Agreement”) which was approved by the court and the terms incorporated into an order signed by the court following a Final Approval Hearing on July 9, 2020 (“Settlement Order”).  (Pa4-15).  As a result of the Settlement Order, on July 9, 2020, [...], and the actions --- \(^1\) The following class action cases were consolidated into *[...]: Chernyakhovskaya v. [...]*, [...] (D.N.J.), *Betancourt v. [...]*, [...] (D.N.J.), *Espinal v. [...]*, [...] (D.N.J.), *Martinez v. [...]*, [...] (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div.), *Rodriguez-Ocasio v. [...]*, [...] (D.N.J.), *Burgos v. Resurgent Capital Services, L.P., et al.*, [...] (D.N.J.), *Henriquez v. [...], et al.*, [...] (D.N.J.), *Lugo v. [...], et al.*, [...] (D.N.J.), *Orbea v. [...], et al.*, [...] (D.N.J.), *Uriarte v. [...]*, [...] (D.N.J.), *Ferreira v. [...], LLC, et al.*, [...] (D.N.J.), *Gomez v. [...], et al.*, [...] (D.N.J.), *Little v. [...]*, [...] (D.N.J.), *Jackson v. First National Collection Bureau, Inc.*, [...] (D.N.J.), *Delgado v. LVNV Funding, LLC*, [...] (D.N.J.). consolidated into it, were dismissed with prejudice and the actions were closed and terminated.  (Pa4).  Appellant was a member the Settlement Agreement and, pursuant to the Settlement Agreement, she specifically released Plaintiff from any and all claims relating to Plaintiff’s licensure status and the collection of pertinent debts.  (Pa7-15).  On July 21, 2020, as consideration for the Release of Claims, Appellant received a credit to her outstanding balance as part of the terms of the Settlement Agreement.  (Pa5).  Appellant never opted out or challenged the terms of the Settlement Agreement or otherwise sought to vacate the Settlement Order.  Id. C.  The Pending Class Action
[brief] (Pa1-7)  Plaintiff at the time of the filing of the original Motion for Summary Judgment requested additional time because subject tree was located at [...], however the address was once formerly [...].  Plaintiff required additional discovery depositions and information regarding permits on this additional address and subject tree.  (Pa296-299).  Additionally, the Court in its February 21, 2024, Order denied plaintiff’s Motion to Reopen and Extend discovery.  The Court determined “Here, the court does not find that the Plaintiff has demonstrated exceptional circumstances.  The Plaintiff has not stated why the discovery end date expired, arbitration took place, and a Motion for Summary Judgment was heard without filing a Motion to Extend Discovery” (Pa8-12).
[directive] 3.4.6  This information should be maintained to facilitate analysis as to individual members, supervisors, squads, districts and assignments, and the agency as a whole.  Depending on the size of the agency and the complexity of this data, computerized software that utilizes mathematical algorithms may be best suited to assist in revealing the presence of particular patterns of incidents.  However, not all law enforcement agencies have the computer capabilities for such an in-depth screening process.  At a minimum, every law enforcement agency should establish a protocol for tracking employee behavior and 13  INTERNAL AFFAIRS POLICY & PROCEDURES | August 2020 reviewing all internal affairs complaints made against its officers, regardless of outcome, for evidence of a pattern or practice of inappropriate or unconstitutional conduct.
[directive] Rule by arrest required of hours as 12 within officer judicial Waiver Cases.  Juvenile 4.8 2A:4A-26.1  N.J.S.A. to pursuant court adult to waived is juvenile a that event the In shall make prosecutor the juvenile), of election at (waiver orN.J.S.A. 2A:4A-27 waiver) (involuntary adult the by issued (CDR-2) orcomplaint-warrant is (CDR-1)
[brief] State by Com’r of Transp. v. F. & J., 250 N.J. Super. 19, 26 (App. Div. 1991) (“[A]ny evidence which is reasonably probative of fair market value is admissible in a condemnation action. ”).  a)  IN LIMINE MOTION PRACTICE IS AN IMPROPER PROCEDURE TO LIMIT TEAM RHODI’S CLAIM FOR JUST COMPENSATION.  [...]’s dispositive request to have the Trial Court bar [...]’s appraisal before trial is against a clear policy established by our courts of letting the jury decide the issue of just compensation based on all the evidence, not the evidence as parsed out by in limine motions.
[brief] Page(s)  1.  Order Granting  Declaratory Judgment and Attorneys’ Fees (May 1, 2023)  .................................................................  Da265  2.  Opinion on Declaratory Judgment and Attorneys’ Fees (May 1, 2023)  .................................................................  Da267  3.  Order Setting Amount of Fees and Costs (March 8, 2024)  ..............................................................................  Da282  4.  Opinion on Amount of Fees and Costs (attachment to order) (March 8, 2024)  ..................................................  Da283  ## TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | CASES | Page(s) | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|---------| | **Schultz by Schultz v. Glasser** | | | No. A-5239-18T3, 2021 WL 269674 (App. Div. Jan. 27, 2021) | 27 | | **89 Water St. Assocs. v. Reilly** | | | No. A-3366-17T1, 2019 WL 4793073 (App. Div. Oct. 1, 2019) | 16-17 | | **Ace Am. Ins. Co. v. Am. Med. Plumbing, Inc.** | | | 458 N.J. Super. 535 (App. Div. 2019) | 15 | | **Belmont Condo. Ass’n, Inc. v. Geibel** | | | 432 N.J. Super. 52 (App. Div. 2013) | 26 | | **C.L. v. Div. of Med. Assistance & Health Servs.** | | | 473 N.J. Super. 591 (App. Div. 2022) | 15-18 | | **Cohen v. Perelman** | | | No. BER C-94-12, 2014 WL 2921601 (Ch. Div. June 24, 2014), | | | aff’d, 2018 WL 6034978 (App. Div. Nov. 19, 2018), certif. denied, | 5, 7-8 | | 237 N.J. 187 | | | **Conway v. 287 Corp. Ctr. Assocs.** | | | 187 N.J. 259 (2006) | 25 | | **Davidovich v. Israel Ice Skating Fed’n** | | | 446 N.J. Super. 127 (App. Div. 2016) | 26 | | **Forman v. Levenson** | | | No. A-3518-17T4, 2020 WL 359672 (App. Div. Jan. 22, 2020) | 16 | | **Gonzalez v. Wilshire Credit Corp.** | | | 207 N.J. 557 (2011) | 6 | | **Grossman v. United States** | | | 57 Fed. Cl. 319 (Fed. Cl. 2003) | 17 | | **In re Est. of Balk** | | | 445 N.J. Super. 395 (App. Div. 2016) | 15 | In re Est. of Gabrellian 372 N.J. Super. 432 (App. Div. 2004) .................................................. 28 Kieffer v. Best Buy 205 N.J. 213 (2011) .............................................................................. 15 Matter of Est. of Alfieri No. A-2847-16T4, 2019 WL 4879852 (App. Div. Oct. 3, 2019) ............... 29 Matter of Est. of Stumm No. A-0655-18T2, 2019 WL 4620342 (App. Div. Sept. 24, 2019) ........................................................................................................ 32 Matter of Tr. of Nelson 454 N.J. Super. 151 (App. Div. 2018)
[brief] The NJCFLA also plainly states that “[a] contract of a loan not invalid for any other reason, in the . . . collection of which any act shall have been done which constitutes a crime of the fourth degree under this section, shall be void and the lender shall have no right to collect or receive any principal, interest or charges .  . . .”  N.J.S.A. 17:11C-33(b).
[brief] State v. Alston, 2010 WL 4068528 decided July 21, 2010; 2010 N.J. Super Unpub. LEXIS 1694 ..........................................................  3,4,5,6  State v. Buda, 195 N.J. 278, 293 (2008) .......................................................  4.  State v. Cope, 224 N.J. 530 (2016) ..............................................................  6.  State v. Cotto, 182 N.J. 316, 328 (2005) ......................................................  4.  State v. Funderburg, Mercer County Law Division, Ind. No. 07-02-0240, decided November 29, 2010 ([...] J.S.C.) ..............................................  9,10,12,15  State v. Garron, 177 N.J. 147, 169 (2003) .................................................... 6, 8, 9  State v. Ghigliotti, 463 N.J. Super. 355 (2020) ...........................................  18,19 State v. Pickett, 466 N.J. Super 270 (2021) ................................................ 18,19 State v. Scott, 229 N.J. 469. 487 (2017) ......................................................
[brief] The 1951 version of the statute is in large part identical to the current version -- with two separate sentences in the first paragraph -- and it did not require a signal prior to starting and backing.  Indeed, the Legislature removed the word “start” from the previously cited sentence so that it read:  “When the signal is given by means of the hand and arm, the driver shall indicate his intention to stop or turn by extending the hand and arm from and beyond the side of the vehicle. ”  Laws of 1951, Chapter 23, Sec. 67 (emphasis added.)
[brief] Gilbert v. Stewart, 247 N.J. 421 (2021) ......................................................................... 15, 43  Globe Motor Co. v. Igdalev, 225 N.J. 469 (2016) ................................ 15  Greenfield v. New Jersey Dep't of Corr., 382 N.J. Super. 254 (App. Div. 2006) ............................................. 21  Hammett v. Rosensohn, 46 N.J. Super. 527 (App.  Div. 1957) ................................................. 40 Hassan v. Williams, 467 N.J. Super. 190 (App. Div. 2021) ............................................. 33 Hendrickson v. Wallace's Ex'r, 31 N.J. Eq. 604 (Ch. 1879) ............................................................... 17 Henry v. New Jersey Dep't of Human Servs., 204 N.J. 320 (2010) ................................................................. 16 Housel v. Theodoridis, 314 N.J. Super. 597 (App. Div. 1998)........................................... 15 Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers Local 400 v. Borough of Tinton Falls, 468 N.J. Super. 214 (App. Div. 2021) ........................................ 21 Island Venture Associates v. New Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 179 N.J. 485 (2004)...................................................................... 36 J.H. v. R&M Tagliareni, LLC, 239 N.J. 198 (2019)............................ 15 Kamienski v. State, Dep't of Treasury, 451 N.J. Super. 499 (App. Div. 2017) ........................................ 33 Kaye v. Rosefielde, 223 N.J. 218 (2015)..................................................................... 16, 46 Kurzke v. Nissan Motor Corp. in U.S.A, 164 N.J. 159 (2000)....................................................................
[brief] (3T6.14-17).  Q: Okay.  And you testified that then [...] asked the Lieutenant for permission to speak to the group, correct?  A: Correct.  Q: And that permission was given to him, correct?  A: Yes.  (3T16.1-7) (emphasis added).  [...] testified that [...] asked “if anybody has anything to say, to say it to his face and not post stuff on social media.
[directive] Each and objective on an based offer plea initial an tendering for provide must policy the (a) and strengths the conduct, criminal the of seriousness the of assessment realistic the background, and culpability defendant's the case, State's the of weaknesses were defendant if imposed be would that sentence likely the victim, any of interests the as circumstances and facts relevant other such and trial, a after convicted be to for; account may policy shall offers, plea subsequent all and offer, plea initial an that require must policy the (b) pretrial indictment, (e.g., event court a preferably or date, explicit an include expires automatically offer which the at etc.), motions, on hearing conference, the by extended is offer plea reject the or accept to which within time the unless prosecutor;31 31 of acceptance timely defendant's a justice and swift for need the of mindful be must prosecutors Although counsel defense that ensure to example, for warranted, be may offer plea current of the extension an responsibility, 84 Page offer must provide that once a plea is rejected or subsequent (c) the policy expires, any for greater punishment (e.g., plea offer must call a longer term of imprisonment, elimination of offered downgrade, etc.) than offer, higher fine, the previous plea supervisory assistant prosecutor or deputy attorney general that unless a determines material in circumstances warrants a sentence more one a change lenient than the offer; contemplated in the previous plea encourage the policy must be designed to defendants to plead before (d) guilty any post-indictment evidentiary indictment and thus before hearings motions (e.g., evidence);32 to suppress negotiation between prosecutor policy may permit the and counsel (e) the defense (e.g., strength of concerning the the case and likelihood of verdict, arguments a guilty other pretrial of suppression and motions, defendant's role outcome culpability and an in criminal scheme, etc.) before initial plea offer is during the tendered, and the of when a tendered plea offer remains outstanding period time and has not expired; shall not require a defendant to agree not to apply for or (~j the policy Drug Court, categorically preclude a defendant from being otherwise sentenced to Drug Court, clinically and legally eligible to be in where the defendant is sentenced to treatment imprisonment pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14 (special N.J.S.A. lieu of probation) or (compulsory Drug Court ordered by the court 2C:35-14.2 without application by the defendant); and that a plea offer is contingent on (g) the policy may provide pleading co-defendants guilty.
[directive] Threatening Assailant.  In general, when dealing with a threatening assailant, officers may use all types of force options other than deadly force.  This includes striking with batons or asps, less lethal ammunition, and CEDs.  Although a range of force options is generally available, the officer shall only use force that is proportional to the threat faced.  Any strikes to the head or neck with a baton or asp are considered deadly force and can only be used when deadly force is allowed.  (e)
[brief] Significantly, the Selective court advised that a carrier would be entitled to the broad discovery permitted under the Rules of Court upon the filing of a Fraud Act claim.  It stated, “In an action filed pursuant to the IFPA for substantive remedial relief from claimed violations thereof, plaintiff would be bound by, and subject to, the ordinary rules of discovery governing civil actions in the Law Division, with their usual limitations as to relevance and protections against oppression and harassment. ”  Id. at 435.  Here, the Complaint discusses various statements that [...] obtained as part of its pre-suit investigation.  [Pa0023]  In an NFADR process, [...] would be under no obligation to turn over those full statements to the adversaries until the hearing given the lack of discovery in NFADR.  Similarly, requiring parties to resolve a Fraud Act claim via the NFADR process also deprives them of the opportunity to compel non-party witnesses to appear and testify and produce documents at depositions and, ultimately, at a trial since [...]’s rules and/or [...]’s regulations do not grant subpoena power.
[directive] To effectuate subparagraphs (e), (f), and (g) of this Section, the member of the public, parent or legal guardian, or next of kin or designee shall be permitted to review the BWC recording to determine whether to request a three-year retention period, in accordance with the provisions of the Open Public Records Act, N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1 et seq., to determine whether to request a three-year retention period.  BODY WORN CAMERA POLICY | January 2022 21 8.4
[brief] ”  Battaglia v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 214 N.J. 518, 547 (2013).  Appellant concedes that an adverse employment action is necessary to support an LAD retaliation claim.  (See Pb18-Pb20).  Defendants [...] and [...], as members of the [...], had a duty as a matter of law to investigate the complaints allegedly raised by Defendant [...].  Reaves v. State, Dep't of Law & Pub. Safety, Div.  on Civil Rights, 303 N.J. Super. 115, 116-17 (App. Div. 1997).  “An employer must be free to investigate complaints of employee misconduct without fear of LAD liability. ”  Spinks, 402 N.J. Super. at 484.  Plaintiff does not allege that any adverse employment action was taken against her as a result of the investigation.  To the contrary, Plaintiff alleges: “To this date, Plaintiff (through her counsel or otherwise) has not been informed of the status of the investigation. ” (Pa55a, ¶206).  No adverse employment action is alleged to have occurred as a result of the investigation into the [...] Complaint.  Therefore, Plaintiff cannot, as a matter of law, establish the second and third elements of the Battaglia analysis – she cannot establish that an adverse employment action was taken against her as a result of the alleged retaliation, and it follows, she cannot establish a causal relationship between the protected activity and the adverse employment action because there was no adverse employment action.
[directive] 5 SART Processing of SAFE Kits ......................................................................................................  5 Policies and Procedures ..............................................................................................................  6 County Prosecutor’s Offices ....................................................................................................  6 Law Enforcement Agencies .....................................................................................................  6  SAFE Kit Volume ..........................................................................................................................  7  Hold Kits ..................................................................................................................................  7 Testing Kits ..............................................................................................................................  8  Identifiable Kits .....................................................................................................................  11  SAFE Kit Labels ......................................................................................................................  11 Forensic Medical Examination Case Log ...............................................................................  12  Survey Limitations .....................................................................................................................  12  Conclusion .................................................................................................................................
[brief] (Pa114-Pa115).  The proposed development included four (4) warehouse buildings with a combined 2,182,101+/- square feet of \(^3\)  For comparison, the C-57 Flexible Planned Industrial-Commercial District underlying the Redevelopment Area limits individual buildings to 20,000 square feet in area and 35 feet in height.  (Pa284; Pa290).  building area, with each building having a maximum height up to 60 feet.  (Pa114-Pa115).  The proposal also planned 1385+/- passenger vehicle parking spaces, trailer parking spaces, landscaping, stormwater management facilities and related site improvements.  (Pa25-Pa26; Pa114-Pa115).  The [...] opened the hearing on [...]’s application on November 17, 2022.
[brief] A sentencing court must “explain clearly why [a] ... mitigating factor presented by the parties was found or rejected and how the factors were balanced to arrive at the sentence. ”  *Case*, 220 N.J. at 66.  At sentencing, [...]’s defense counsel argued for the application of mitigating factor seven, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1b(7) (“defendant has no history of prior delinquency or criminal activity or has led a law-abiding life for a substantial period of time”), mitigating factor eight, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1b(8) (“defendant's conduct was the result of circumstances unlikely to recur”), mitigating factor nine, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1b(9) (“character and attitude of the defendant indicate that he is unlikely to commit another offense”), and mitigating factor ten, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1b(10), ("defendant is particularly likely to respond affirmatively to probationary treatment").
[directive] This means:  A.  (1)  Você está se declarando culpado por porte de arma de fogo com intenção de usá-la contra outra pessoa ou para cometer assassinato, homicídio culposo qualificado, homicídio culposo, agressão qualificada, sequestro, agressão sexual qualificada, contato sexual ilícito qualificado, arrombamento à propriedade com fim ilícito, assalto à propriedade ou fuga; ou (1) You are pleading guilty to possession of a firearm with intent to use it against the person of another or to murder, aggravated manslaughter, manslaughter, aggravated assault, kidnapping, aggravated sexual assault, aggravated criminal sexual contact, robbery, burglary or escape; or (2) Você está se declarando culpado por um dos seguintes crimes que ocorreram no dia 13 de janeiro de 2008 ou após esta data: porte de espingarda, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-3b; porte de arma desfigurada, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-3d; porte de arma (arma de fogo) para fim ilícito, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4a; porte de arma de fogo enquanto cometia crime referente a substâncias perigosas controladas (CDS offense) ou outros crimes, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4.1a; porte ilegal de metralhadora, pistola, rifle ou espingarda, 2C:39-5a., b ou N.J.S.A. c; ou determinadas pessoas cujo porte de arma é proibido, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-7; ou fabricação, transporte, disposição e desfiguração de metralhadoras, espingardas serradas, armas de fogo ou armas de fogo de ataque desfiguradas, 2C:39-9a., b, e ou g; ou N.J.S.A.
[brief] THE BOARD PROPERLY DETERMINED THAT THE APPLICATION MET THE POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE CRITERIA UNDER (C)(2) FOR BULK VARIANCE RELIEF FOR FRONT YARD  SETBACKS OF 5 FEET  WHEREIN 10 FEET IS REQUIRED TO [...] AND [...]  The record fully supports the variances that were granted, and therefore, the Board did not act arbitrarily, unreasonably, or capriciously in approving the application.  N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70 sets forth the framework for the analysis that a planning board must utilize in granting variance relief.  The statute provides that a planning board shall have the power to grant a variance from bulk zoning regulations where there is a “hardship” under subsection N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70(c)(1), and alternatively, under subsection (c)(2) where the grant of a variance would advance the purposes of zoning and where the benefits of the grant substantially outweigh the detriments.