ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The plain language of each of these provisions individually demonstrates that the return to Plaintiff of the escrow deposit could not have occurred unless the PSA was terminated.  Moreover, when these individual provisions of the PSA are “construed as a whole” and “considered in connection with the rest of the agreement,” as they must be, there can be no doubt that termination of the PSA occurred when Plaintiff demanded its deposit back.  Washington Const. Co. v. Spinella, 8 N.J. 212, 217 (1951) (quoting 9 Williston on Contracts (Rev. ed.), § 46, p. 64); see also Manahawkin Convalescent v. O'Neill, 217 N.J. 99, 118 (2014) (“Contracts should be read ‘as a whole in a fair and common sense manner. ’”) (quotation omitted).  This commonsense interpretation of the PSA is consistent with numerous New Jersey cases that have interpreted similar language in the same way.  See, e.g., Sugarman v. Gabriel Bldg. Grp., Inc., No. A-4438-12T1, 2014 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1892, at *24 (App. Div. Aug. 4, 2014) (election of remedies clause that allowed the buyer to either terminate the contract and receive back the deposit or to seek specific performance or to extend the closing date was not violative of public policy and was not unenforceable); Net 2 Funds, LLC v. Hartz Mt. Indus., No. A-0223-15T1, 2018 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1081, at *6 (App. Div. May 9, 2018) (upholding a lower court’s determination that a contract had been terminated and that respondent was entitled to the escrowed funds that it demanded); 135 Route 73 S., LLC v. Schafer, No. A-3060-09T3, 2010 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2540, at *5 (App. Div. Oct. 20, 2010) (affirming the lower court’s finding that plaintiff properly terminated the contract and as such was entitled to release of $50,000 which escrow agent held in escrow).  Thus, as matter of law, Plaintiff terminated the PSA by requesting and receiving back its deposit.
[brief] Asking such questions as, “What information was in the profile” would provide defendant with the information he asserts he needs to properly defend himself. \(^4\)  While more tedious to obtain this evidence this way, it nonetheless protects defendant’s right to due process and a fair trial.  Second, the State agreed that [...] should provide the jury with an adverse-inference charge, which would sufficiently cure any prejudice remaining from the loss of the profile.  The adverse-inference charge would allow the jury to infer the State destroyed the profile because it would have benefitted defendant, even though the profile itself may not have done so if still available.  This instruction would balance the scales of justice and likely decisively impact the jury’s verdict in defendant’s favor.  Not only would it \(^4\) If [...] is unable to recall all of the details from his profile, defendant will be able to use that to call his credibility into question.  [...]’s credibility would then later be called into question by the court’s reading of the adverse-inference charge, further cementing his unreliability in defendant’s favor.  But defendant would know what questions to ask of the witnesses, and would know with certainty what information “[...]’s” profile contained, because he has or had an Adam4Adam profile himself and viewed “[...]’s” profile before contacting him.  balance the scales, it would likely be “a complete substantive remedy. ”  See Tartaglia, 197 N.J. at 120.  Indeed, defendant has conceded the appropriateness of adverse-inference charges in missing-evidence situations.  During the motion hearing, defendant asserted that adverse-inference charges were suitable for cases “where there’s some other evidence perhaps to corroborate” the missing evidence or there were “ways to try to construct these things back together. ” (1T10-8 to 17).  But he insisted such a charge could not be used in his case because there was “literally no other mechanism” available to “obtain any of this evidence.  None. ” (1T10-8 to 17).  In fact, because defendant has the ability to recreate the entirety of the Adam4Adam profile, an adverse-inference charge was likely a boon for his case.  Consequently, dismissing defendant’s indictment was too extreme of a remedy for the State’s inadvertent failure to preserve the Adam4Adam profile.
[brief] However, a better read of the statement can be couched in terms of notice.  The statement seems to suggest that the town could not have known of the backlighting because it was not prevalent.  However, it is the town's job to know of a dangerous condition if the condition was present for long enough a period of time, and in an intersection it itself deemed dangerous!  It is not an excuse for the town not to have known of the condition because safety experts did not raise it when the town did not hire, the evidence shows, any such safety expert and claims not to even have the knowledge as to why the intersection was dangerous.  It is as if [...] designated the intersection dangerous, purchased lighting that did not illuminate the dangerous intersection, then looked away and hoped for drivers always to see without difficulty pedestrians crossing the street near the area of the non-illuminating streetlight!  This conduct is better viewed as one in which the town itself created the danger and need not have notice of it.
[brief] THE NEW JERSEY SUPREME COURT HAS SQUARELY REJECTED [...]’S PROFFERRED DEFINITION OF A “LICENSE” UNDER THE NJFPA.  Not only does [...] improperly attempt to conflate the NJFPA’s minimal “written arrangement” requirement with the entirely separate “license” requirement, [...] provides the wrong standard for assessing whether a “license” has been granted.  _____________________  1  [...]’s assertion that “[t]here is absolutely no evidence that [...] or [...] were tied to [...], or that [...] was or is a representative of [...] (Db26)” is belied by the voluminous evidence presented to the Trial Court demonstrating otherwise, as specifically set forth at length in [...]’s Opening Brief.
[brief] However, every element of the Watkins test was established.  First, the judgment in the prior action was valid, final, and on the merits.  The court dismissed [...] and [...] from the 2015 action on January 19, 2016, before the parties exchanged any discovery or took any depositions.  The parties in this case are identical to or in privity with those in the prior action.  Finally, claim preclusion applies because the present action grew out of the same transaction or occurrence as the earlier action as [...] properly determined.  See, Watkins, 124 N.J. at 412.  [...] recognized that the same transaction or occurrence gave rise to both the 2015 action and the current action:  Here, the acts complained of and the demand for relief are the same in both actions, as Plaintiffs take issue with Defendants’ actions in the 2015 case and seek the same relief.  The theory of recovery is the same.  As the same causes of action are asserted, the witnesses and documents necessary at trial are the same, and the material facts alleged are identical.  [Pa180]
[brief] On August 15, 2018, a Gloucester County Grand Jury returned Indictment No. [...], charging defendant with third-degree conspiracy to commit aggravated assault, attempting to cause significant bodily injury, N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2/2C:12-1(b)(7) (count sixteen), second-degree conspiracy to commit aggravated assault, attempting to cause serious bodily injury, N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2/2C:12-1(b)(1) (count seventeen), and first-degree conspiracy to commit murder (cause serious bodily injury resulting in death), N.J.S.A. 2C:2-6(a)/2C:11-3(a) (count eighteen).  (Da10 to Da11).  On June 3, 2019, the trial court denied defendant’s motion to dismiss the indictment.
[brief] 4.  On or about January 12th, 2023, Plaintiff a disabled African American visited the [...] seeking adjournments in relation to Docket No. [...].  5.  Plaintiff provided defendant [...] the December 1st, 2017, order (Pa 1-10) in Docket No. [...] vacating and setting aside the Sheriff’s Sale and any deed recorded in the matter as void ab initio.  6.  Defendant [...] interfered with plaintiff’s rights by stating that plaintiff had no more adjournments, that Plaintiff had used all his adjournments and refused to grant plaintiff adjournment request contrary to his civil right under N.J.S.A. 2A:17-36 (Pa 165).  At this point, plaintiff was deprived of a right at the point defendants denied plaintiff request and statutory right for adjournments and denied the plaintiff free exercise of the right without any interruption.
[brief] Second, as to the statement that [...]’s and [...]’s reports and testimony did not address standards with regard to potential backlighting, the notion of “backlighting” is a scientific fact, as they testified, and not an industry or professional standard.  It is an observed fact that merely explains that a dangerous condition existed in the intersection at the time of the accident.  Third, on the same point, the quoted language posits that Smith and Balan do not discuss publications, recommendations addressing not only the dangerous condition but actions to be taken about it.  Here again, [...], in conjunction with [...], created the dangerous condition and had no professional engineer on staff to conduct any type of inspection at its dangerous intersection.  It is common sense that a town should not create a hazard and pretend to have no knowledge of how it was created.  Lastly, the last few paragraphs of the language suggest that plaintiff offers no proof of palpably unreasonable conduct.  However, as seen in the initial brief, [...]’s conduct with regard to the intersection and lighting in the town is not only palpably unreasonable, but also it is reckless: [...] knows nothing about why the intersection was designated dangerous (knowledge which would help it address any problem such as poor lighting there); [...] purchased zero foot candle lighting for a dangerous intersection; it knows nothing about the light purchase system; it did not inspect the dangerous intersection; it let tree branches grow at the intersection; it did not ensure continuous light coverage in the intersection; its employees such as police officers, public works workers and borough officials did not report or handle the problems at the intersection; [...] did not hire any engineering professional to ensure that its lighting system was functioning properly; etc.
[directive] We begin with the constitutional points raised.  Movants made significant and thoughtful concessions in their briefs and constitutional.2 at oral argument.  They concede the CJRA is  They also stress the law’s constitutionality is tied to a defendant’s right to a jury trial and the ability to exercise that right within a reasonable period of time.  Movants submit they are pursuing relief now to ensure the continued constitutionality of the Act.  The thrust of their argument is that continued detention raises potentially serious due process concerns that would require intervention.  They contend that prolonged detention of defendants pretrial would render the Act punitive, rather than regulatory.  See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 746-48 (1987); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535-40 (1979).  2  The CJRA, like any statute, is presumed constitutional.  See Whirlpool Tax’n, Props., Inc. v. Dir., Div. of 208 N.J. 141, 172 (2011); see also State v. (holding that the State’s ability to Ingram, 230 N.J. 190, 204-13 (2017) proceed by proffer at detention hearings under the Act comports with due Act’s process); State v. Robinson, 229 N.J. 44, 74-76 (2017) (finding the discovery provisions satisfy the requirements of due process).
[brief] All requests submitted before [...] filed her complaint were submitted by [...], not [...].  (Ra9-14; Pa28-29).  Although [...] (the other interested party) was copied on one of [...]’s requests, [...] did not appear on any of them.  Ibid.  Thus, [...] filed --- 7 [...]’s request to [...] staff was also improper.  (Ra9-11).  His request did not comply with N.J.A.C. 13:1E-2.4 (a) or (b) and did not provide any language identifying it as an OPRA records request.  (Pa48).  Because [...]’s request failed to identify itself as a request under OPRA or the common law and was directed to Museum staff, the NJSP records custodian had no knowledge of any such request until [...] filed her complaint.
[brief] The Trial Court declined to consider parole evidence based upon well-settled law that such evidence is unnecessary to interpret a clear and unambiguous document.  (Pa6 (Opinion)).  While Respondent agrees that the plain language of the Consent Order establishes the Complaint was properly dismissed as untimely, the parole evidence in this matter further substantiates this conclusion.  The record below shows that on November 1, 2018, while the parties were negotiating the terms of the Consent Order, a question arose as to the Nacirema Arbitration procedure that would trigger the running of the mandatory sixty day refiling deadline.  Therefore, on November 1, 2018, [...] (counsel for Respondent) wrote [...] (counsel for Appellants) to ensure clarity on the events concerning the Nacirema Arbitration that would trigger the mandatory filing deadline.  [...] specifically asked [...]: “does the 60 days trigger from the final award or a judgment on the final award?  We should button that up so there is no question. ”
[brief] Grunwald, 131 N.J. at 495 (noting the term “damage” is used “interchangeably with ‘injury’”).  Assuming the discovery rule would apply here, the statute of limitations began to run when Plaintiff had reason to know of its injury though the fault of another.  As provided by the Trial Court in rendering its decision, “[t]he discovery rule focuses on an injured part[y’s] knowledge concerning the origin and existence of its injuries as it relates to the conduct of another person”.  (T1 15:16-19).  When [...] received the AG Notice on March 25, 2014, via certified mail, the Appellants were put on notice of their injuries/damages from the conduct of [...]’s alleged malpractice.  Specifically, in its decision, the Trial Court reasoned in part:  In [the AG Notice] plaintiff was advised, failure to satisfy the registration may result in further action by the division..  Until registration requirements are met [plaintiff’s] organization is not properly registered with the State of New Jersey.  At this point plaintiff became aware that her organization was not registered or may not have been registered as a charitable organization.  . . . plaintiff was aware or should have become aware that plaintiff was aware of defendants legal malpractice.  [T1 13:1-14]  As provided by the Trial Court, the AG Notice specifically advised the Appellants that [...]’s failure to properly register her organization, [...], may result in action by the Attorney General.  Accordingly, the receipt of the AG Notice constituted a “basis of a cause of action” and triggered the applicable six-year statute of limitations as to filing an action as against [...].
[brief] ..........................................................................................................................  15 R. 2:6-2(a)(2)  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS, RULINGS APPEALED  Order and Statement of Reasons entered September 29, 2023 (Da393-417)  ## TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | Cases | Page | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | Anspach v. City of Phila. Dep’t of Pub. Health, | 9, 10 | | 503 F.3d 256 (3d Cir. 2007) | | | Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S.
[brief] Paterson Police [...] and others officers, encountered [the] fleeing suspect.  (3T 22-5 to 41-24, 123-1 to 129-14; Da68)  [...] should have testified to distinctive characteristic of fleeing suspect to, compare to defendants.  [...] had direct visual of suspect.  The similarities of fleeing suspect and defendant grant was [never] testified to by [...] who seen fleeing suspect.  The state avoided (dodge) this pertinent issue concerning another person KILLED [...], should have been explored.
[brief] Appellate review of a trial court’s decision on a suppression motion is well established.  State v. Washington, 475 N.J. Super. 292, 300 (App. Div. 2023).  The trial court's factual findings are "entitled to deference unless they were 'clearly mistaken' or 'so wide of the mark' that the interests of justice require[] appellate intervention."  State v. Elders, 192 N.J. 224, 245 (2007).
[directive] SAFE kits testing results that satisfy eligibility criteria shall be uploaded to the Combined DNA Index System (CODIS). 8  DNA profiles uploaded to CODIS that result in more than one match to another crime of sexual violence, shall be reported by the forensic laboratory to the Director of the Division of Criminal Justice, or their designee, and the New Jersey State Police Regional Operations & Intelligence Survivor Bill of Rights Act of 2016, P. L. No: 114-236, 130 Stat. 966, 2016
[brief] Plaintiffs initially argue that the trial court correctly held Defendant jointly and severally liable for [...]’s purported wrongful acts because is a principal of the company (Pb79-80).  This argument is flawed for several reasons.  First, Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint did not plead a cause of action for piercing the corporate veil, nor was there any evidence presented at trial to that effect (Da00001; Da00507, Aff. Def. #5); See Verni v. Harry M. Stevens, Inc., 387 N.J. Super. 160, 199 (App. Div. 2006) (discussing prima facie elements a plaintiff must establish to pierce the corporate veil); Boyd v. Renal Ctr. of Passaic, 2020 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1581, at *6 (App. Div. Aug. 11, 2020) (for a principal of a company to be held personally liable for the company’s tort or breach of contract, a plaintiff must establish the requisite elements to pierce the company’s corporate veil).
[brief] IT WAS ERROR TO DENY [...] PREVAILING PARTY ATTORNEY'S FEES AFTER PREVAILING ON THE ENFORCEMENT MOTION AND AS THE CATALYST TO COMPEL THE BOARD TO COMPLY WITH 8/20/20 FINAL ORDER AND WITH THE 8/29/22 ENFORCEMENT ORDER.  (THE ISSUE WAS RAISED IN [...]'S 7/18/22 MOTION TO ENFORCE (1A))  OPRA allows a prevailing party to receive reasonable attorney's fees\(^6\).  *N.J.S.A. 47:1A-6.*  "The phrase 'prevailing party' is a legal term of art that refers to a 'party in whose favor a judgment is rendered.'"  *Mason v. City of Hoboken*, 196 N.J. 51, 72, (2008) (quoting *Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep't of Health & Hum. Res.*, 532 U.S. 598, 603 (2001)).  In *Mason*, the Court held "requestors are entitled to attorney's fees under OPRA, absent a judgment or an enforceable consent decree, when they can demonstrate: (1) 'a factual causal nexus between plaintiff's litigation and the relief ultimately achieved'; and (2) 'that the relief ultimately secured by plaintiffs had a basis in law.'"
[brief] Plaintiff alleged that the retaliation was caused by Plaintiff having commenced a (still pending) lawsuit in 2016 under the NJLAD against the local public school district (and some of the same defendants) alleging that the transfer of Plaintiff violated the NJLAD’s anti-retaliation provisions.  Plaintiff obtained a preliminary injunction on July 29, 2016 prohibiting the transfer, an injunction that remains in effect to this day.  Defendants are alleged in the 2021 Lawsuit to have orchestrated phony allegations and an internal investigation against Plaintiff, who has an unblemished thirty year teaching history, because Plaintiff was succeeding in her earlier 2016 lawsuit and because any other retaliation such as termination, demotion, or transfer, would have violated the existing preliminary injunction  Plaintiff alleged these actions are and were designed to dissuade Plaintiff (and others for that matter) from making or supporting a charge of discrimination, *i.e.*, an adverse employment action in the context of retaliation claims.  Granting the motions to dismiss the 2021 Lawsuit, the Lower Court wrote that “Plaintiff alleges correctly that the act of filing [the 2016 lawsuit] is a protected activity,” and that “[w]hen affording all reasonable inferences to Plaintiff that the complained of activity constitutes a pattern of retaliation, Plaintiff may have established the second element of her *prima facie* case. ”  [17a]  (emphasis added).  That finding should have resulted in denial of Defendants’ pre-answer motions to dismiss.  Yet, the lower court dismissed the 2021 Lawsuit on the grounds that Plaintiff had not adequately pled an NJLAD cause of action.  By dismissing the 2021 Lawsuit at the pleadings stage, the lower court failed to apply the applicable standard on a motion to dismiss and substituted its own judgment for that of the trier of fact.  The sum and substance of the lower court’s errors are: (1) finding that Plaintiff did not establish a *prima facie* claim of retaliation under the NJLAD; (2) finding that the doctrine of qualified immunity applies to claims brought against the individual defendants under the NJLAD; and (3) finding that the individual defendants were not aiders and abettors under the NJLAD.  This Court should reverse the lower court’s orders granting of dismissal to Defendants.
[brief] \(^2\)  N.J.S.A. 59:8-8 requires a filing of a Tort Claims Notice within 90-days of the alleged tort - here, any claims that occurred on or before January 17, 2020 are barred under the New Jersey Tort Claims Act.  Generally speaking, a "public entity" includes the State and any County, Municipality, District, Public Authority, public agency, and any other political subdivision or public body in the State.  N.J.S.A. 59:1-3  A "public employee" includes an officer, employee, or servant...who is authorized to perform any act or service."  Id.  All Defendants are public entities and employees and are entitled to the immunities set forth in the Tort Claims Act.  "The act establishes a system for public entities in which immunity from tort liability is the general rule and liability is the exception."  Garrison v. Township of Middletown, 712 A.2d 1101 (N.J. 1998).
[brief] Instead, the court held that the original expert findings (indicating [...]’s actions were the product of coercion and peer pressure) were “belied by the fact of the Defendant’s own statements as to who was running the show. ”  (4T64-19 to 24)²  And the court made no comment which called into question the findings from [...], the expert from the 2018 sentencing who concluded that [...] had rehabilitated.  In fact, the court cited directly to [...]’s report in support of its sentence.  (5T77-14 to 19)  The court’s disregard of [...]’s testimony was thus not based on a finding that there were inherent failings in [...]’s methodology – the court simply ignored his mitigating findings without explanation.  Our Supreme Court has routinely emphasized that courts should credit expert testimony, and impose sentences that comport with contemporary scientific standards.
[brief] Under Rule 2:12-3, the Defendants had the opportunity to move for certification to have the New Jersey Supreme Court consider the Appellate Division decision.  If certification is sought to review a final judgment of the Appellate Division, the petitioner has twenty (20) days to file such a petition after entry of the final judgment of the Appellate Division.  Thus, in the case at bar, the Defendants had until June 7, 2022 to file for certification to the Supreme Court.  After long deliberations within the [...], it was decided not to file for certification.