[brief] See e.g. *Polzo v. County of Essex*, 209 N.J. 51, 35 (2012).  For example, in *Polzo*, the Supreme Court affirmed a trial court’s grant of summary judgment where the Court found that Plaintiff’s expert did not set forth any recognized standard for determining when a roadway defect presents a dangerous condition.  *Id.*  As Defendant argued repeatedly below, there is no conceivable way that [...], or any other expert for that matter, could possibly determine what [...]’s state of mind was or that the Disputed Transactions were unauthorized or wrongful (13T28-11 to 30-25, 34-4 to 37-9, 51-21 to 56-25; 22T24-6 to 28-11).  These ultimate issues of fact were for the trial court to decide – not Plaintiffs’ accounting expert.  See *Hassan v. Williams*, 467 N.J. Super. 190 (App. Div. 2021) (court may bar ultimate issue opinions, among other reasons, if they are unhelpful, unreliable, and unduly prejudicial).  [...], as an accountant, was not qualified to express bare conclusory opinions that the Disputed Transactions were unauthorized or wrongful or that the documents he examined in connection with his report were false or misleading because those words implied wrongful intent and went to the ultimate issues in the case (13T28-11 to 30-25, 34-4 to 37-9, 51-21 to 56-25; 22T24-6 to 28-11).  See Cain, supra, 224 N.J. at 427.  In sum, [...]’s opinions about fraudulent documents and the purported wrongful nature and character of the Disputed Transactions was mere conjecture and should not have been admitted into evidence.  See Polzo, supra, 209 N.J. at 35 (affirming a trial court’s granting of summary judgment after disqualifying an expert whose testimony constituted a net opinion, insofar as it did not set forth a recognized or established standard for determining the ultimate issue).  See also Occulto v. Adamar of N.J., Inc., 125 F.R.D. 611, 616 (D.N.J. 1989) (“Experts participate in a case because ultimately, the trier of fact will be assisted by their opinions.  . . .  They do not participate as the alter-ego of the attorney who will be trying the case. ”)  Thus, the trial court committed reversible error by permitting [...] to testify that [...]’s alleged acts were unauthorized, wrongful, fraudulent, and part of a “planned commingling of funds to facilitate diversion. ”  See e.g., Biro v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 110 N.J. Super. 391 (App. Div. 1970), rev’d, 57 N.J. 204 (1970) (Court reversed appellate ruling that allowed a medical examiner to opine, as part of a defense to an action upon a life insurance policy, that the deceased had committed suicide.  The Court adopted the appellate dissenting opinion that the admission of such a conclusion would confound and distort the delicate balance, which is the fact-finding process, and that a jury would be perfectly competent to draw its own conclusion about whether the death was a suicide.)  Similarly, the trial court here compounded its error by exclusively relying on [...]’s net expert testimony and damage schedules in finding Defendant liable for conversion when there was simply no evidence that Defendant “exercised unauthorized control and ownership over identifiable funds that rightfully belonged to Plaintiffs by manipulating the books and records to take distributions without making equal payments to Plaintiffs” (Pb67; 36T23-8 to 37-23).  See Polzo v. Cnty of Essex, 196 N.J. 569, 582 (2008); Townsend v. Pierre, 221 N.J. 36, 53 (2015); N.J.R.E. 703.  Based on the foregoing, the Judgment must be vacated in its entirety against Defendant.  II.