ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] In the Court’ May 22, 2023 Opinion, the Court concluded as follows with respect to ownership of the Property and the 1998 Deed:  The court finds that [...] was under the misapprehension that he needed to create and record a Deed reflecting his ownership of the property once the mortgage was paid off.  He already had the Deed from [...] placing the property in his name.  For unknown reasons, [...] acquiesced and prepared the voidable Deed which then contained indisputably incorrect information in the body of the Deed regarding the identity of the grantor and grantee.  What’s more, [...] admits signing his brother’s name.  Ironically, a “corrective Deed” (the same actual document) was recorded within days only to reflect the proper lot number.  With this wholly incorrect, voidable Deed in the public record, [...] ([...]) and his family were alerted to it and sought to capitalize on it.
[brief] (Aa1-43).  The Complaint asserted claims for false arrest/false imprisonment (Count I), injurious falsehood (Count II), libel/libel per se (Count III), slander/slander per se (Count IV), negligence (Count V), conspiracy (Count VI), intentional infliction of emotional distress (Count VII), negligent infliction of emotional distress (Count VIII), negligent hiring, supervision, or retention (Count IX), New Jersey civil rights conspiracy under N.J.S.A. 10:6-2 et al. (Count X), false arrest/false imprisonment under 42 U.S.C. §1983 (Count XI), false statement in accusatory instrument under 42 U.S.C. §1983 (Count XII), abuse of process under 42 U.S.C. §1983 (Count XIII), conspiracy to violate plaintiff’s civil rights under 42 U.S.C §1985 (Count XIV), and negligent failure to prevent civil rights violation under 42 U.S.C §1986 (Count XV).
[brief] Because that never happens.  An understanding of [...]’s proposal is crucial.  If an amendment results in a “new arbitration” just because a party amends a pleading to clarify its claims and the specific damages sought, the question arises whether the existing arbitrator is to be included in the new, amended phase.  Indeed, if the arbitrator is not included in the new panel automatically, no party who received an adverse ruling would select that arbitrator for the “new arbitration. ”  And, if the arbitrator is not part of the new panel, the question becomes whether everything the existing arbitrator did applies to the amended phase, or whether his prior ruling is wiped out.  Were evidentiary decisions binding, or merely interim decisions to be revisited by the new, three-arbitrator panel?  It is difficult to envision a rule that would be more likely to lead to forum shopping.
[directive] Formularz udostępniony na mocy Dyrektywy # 01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 11710-Polish strona 1 z 2 Form Promulgated by Directive # 01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 11710-Polish page 1 of 2 , pozwany(a) w powyższej(ych) sprawie(ach) zostałem(am) skazany(a)  Ja, za próbę ucieczki przed policją, zgodnie z 2C:29-2b, i niniejszym poświadczam odbiór pisemnej N.J.S.A. informacji o karach za prowadzenie pojazdu w okresie zawieszenia prawa jazdy za naruszenie ww. przepisu.
[brief] ####  Cases - **Butler v Acme Markets, Inc.**  89 N.J. 270, 283 (1982) - **Davis v Brickman Landscaping**, 219 N.J. 396, 98 A. 3d 1173 (2014) - **Division of Youth & Family Servs. v. J.B. **, 120 N.J. 112, 118-19, 576 A.2d 261 (1990) - **Emmons v Stevane**, 64 A. 1014, 73 N.J. L. 349, 351-352 - **Emmons v Stevane**, supra, 73 N.J.L. at 351-352 - **Green v Continental Rentals**, 68 A. 2d 759, 292 N.J. Super. 241 (App. Div. 1994) - **Karins v. Atlantic City**, 152 N.J. 532, 544, 706 A.2d 706 (1998 Laws 1994, ch 187) - **Matter of J.I.S. Indus. Serv. Co. Landfill**, 110 N.J. 101, 104-05, 539 A.2d 1197, 1199 (1988)  - **Reilly v. AAA Mid-Atl. Ins. Co. of N.J.**, 194 N.J. 474, 484, 946 A.2d 564 (2008) - **State v Herold**, [...] - **State v Lenihan**, 219 N.J. 251, 98 A. 3d 533 (2013), - **State v Locurto** 157 N.J. 463, 467 (1999) - **State v Smith**, 251 N.J. 244, 263-264, 276 A. 3rd 1114 (2022)  - **State v Ugrovics**, 410 N.J. Super. 482, 487-488 - **State v. Carter**, 247 N.J. 488, 513, 255 A.3d 1139 (2021)  - **State v. Robertson**, 228 N.J. 138, 147-148, 155 A.3d 571 (2017)  - **State v. Smith**, 295 N.J. Super 399, 685 A 2d 73 (Law Div. 1996).
[brief] Pa661-2.  Here, there were no traffic signs, pedestrian warning signs, crosswalks, or other traffic markings at the T-intersection where the crash occurred, even though it was no different than the T-intersection closer to the hospital that had these safety features.  Pa662.  Critically, [...] testified that “had she seen a crosswalk at the end of the east west travelway, it would have focused her attention. ”  Pa 662.  See also Pa309 (30:11-31:2); Pa318 (68:8-22).  [...] further opined:  Where pedestrians were most vulnerable and exposed to vehicular traffic the parking lot had no markings to control traffic or stop signs to stop traffic.
[brief] Plaintiff, [...], (hereinafter “Plaintiff”) is the current owner of commercial property located at [...], designated as Block 1401, Lot 4 on the Tax Map of West Caldwell (hereinafter “Property” or “Lot 4”).  Plaintiff purchased the Property for $1,250,000 on June 26, 1991 from [...], Plaintiff’s predecessor-in-interest, and the conveyance deed was recorded on the same date in the Essex County Register’s Office (hereinafter “1991 Deed”).  The legal description contained in the 1991 Deed describes Lot 4 as being comprised of Tract I and Tract II, which coincides with a March 11, 1991 survey prepared by [...] (hereinafter “Smith Survey”).  On July 30, 1999, [...] (hereinafter “[...]”) purchased the adjacent property, located at [...], designated as Block 1401, Lot 3 (hereinafter “Lot 3”), for $1,900,000.  On December 22, 2000, [...] transferred Lot 3 to Defendant, [...] (hereinafter “Defendant”).  As shown by the lack of consideration in the deed of conveyance, the transfer from [...] to the Defendant was not an arm’s length transaction.  This matter arises over a dispute between the Plaintiff and Defendant regarding ownership of the irregularly shaped portion of the Property described as Tract II in the 1991 Deed (hereinafter, the “Strip”).
[brief] Da 20-23, Da 58-60.  In addition, the Board Engineer testified about the failure of the proposal to meet the \(^{11}\) [...] failed to raise any issue with the Steep Slope variance below and is therefore barred from bringing the argument now.  However, this new argument has no merit.  See details above at Drb4, ¶9 and n.5.  The moving of the steep slope provisions were accomplished within the same ordinance.
[brief] Mot for Recon - State suggested in R. 1:13-1 Opp Brief that method of correction should be R. 4:50-1.  So I filed a Mot for Reconsideration under R. 4:50-1 or R. 1:13-1 (combined or separately).  State vigorously opposed its own suggestion.  Following its reasoning, I submitted a Corrected Version of its Mot for Time that was correctly styled as Mot for Dismissal on assumption entry of Corrected Not of Mot would allow [...]'s Opp already in file to be "activated."  For extra certainty, refiled exact same Opp Brief from May '23 with this new motion.
[brief] POINT FOUR PLAINTIFF CANNOT IDENTIFY ANY MISREPRESENTATIONS  MADE BY THE TOWNSHIP  Plaintiff believes that the Township made material misrepresentations relating to the Township’s installation of a drainage system in her rear yard.  Plaintiff further alleges that she relied upon these alleged misrepresentations to her detriment and therefore suffered damages.  More specifically, Plaintiff claims in her Amended Complaint that the Township made a material misrepresentation by not advising her that a drainage system was being installed.  (Pa20).  In reality, and confirmed by Plaintiff’s own testimony, she was informed of the details and scope of the planned drainage project prior to any work being performed and was present on the Property for the duration of the entire project.  (Pa93, 43:15-25; Pa222, 21:2-11; Pa232, 31:5-9; Pa259, 58:11-20).  Plaintiff consented to allowing the Township on her property to install the drainage system.  (Pa232, 31:10-19; Pa259, 58:15-17).  As testified to by [...], a Township employee who was present every day on the site, Plaintiff was provided with daily updates on the status of the work, (Pa259, 58:15-20), present every day during work, (Pa259-260, 58:21-59:3), often provided lunch to the workers, (Pa222, 21:9-13; Pa266, 65:13-14), and at the conclusion stated that she was happy and satisfied with the outcome of the project.  (Pa264, 63:12-13).  Plaintiff further alleges that the Township made a material misrepresentation by advising that the Township would repair the Property.  Once again, Plaintiff’s own testimony confirms that the Township installed a drainage system, removed clay soil, regraded the soil, planted grass seedlings, and took significant steps to correct the water intrusion issues on her Property.  (Pa93, 43:15-19; Pa144 94:6-9; Pa170, 120:11-14).  Plaintiff was never in the dark about what was happening, and the Township did not do anything on the Property without Plaintiff’s authorization.  Plaintiff would have the Court believe that she was forced to remove a pool, shed, fence, and mature shrubbery, and landscape beds for the Township to perform the drainage work on her Property.  In fact, Plaintiff’s 50-year-old pool and shed were already failing, and she made the decision to remove them on her own.  Both the Township Engineer (who designed the drainage system), and a Department of Public Works Manager (who was hands-on in the installation of the project) confirmed that it was completely unnecessary to remove the pool before the work could be completed.  With respect to any landscape foliage, Merle testified that Plaintiff was delighted with the removal of various shrubs because she hated them.  (Pa257-258, 56:19-57:4).  In sum, there is not a shred of evidence to support Plaintiff’s claims that the Township misrepresented the nature and scope of the drainage project, much less to her detriment.
[brief] The trial court and the Respondents appear to invite the aspect of further litigation as a solution to the problem created by their partial embrace of the Report coupled with the rejection of its recommendation.  See Db22.²  See also 2T14, l.17-2T19, l.7.  [...] consider further litigation to be the unacceptable result of failing to either set aside the Boundary Commissioners’ Report or entering an order in accord with its recommendation.  VI.
[brief] The decision on a motion to amend a pleading is left to the “sound discretion of the trial court” and its “exercise of discretion will not be disturbed on appeal, unless it constitutes a “clear abuse of discretion. ”  Franklin Medical Associates v. Newark Public Schools, 362 N.J. Super. 494, 506.  See also, Newark Morning Ledger Co. v. N.J. Sports & Exposition Auth., 423 N.J. Super. 140, 174 (App. Div. 2011)(quoting Union Cnty. Improvement Auth. v. Artaki, LLC, 392 N.J. Super. 141, 149 App. Div.2007)) (When examining a Trial Court's exercise of discretionary authority, we reverse only when the exercise of discretion was 'manifestly unjust' under the circumstances.")(emphasis added).  An abuse of discretion takes place when a decision is made without a rational explanation, inexplicably departs from established policies or is rested on an impermissible basis.  State v. Chavies, 247 N.J. 245, 257(2021) (quoting State v. R.Y., 242 N.J. 48, 65 (2020)).  The Court in Moraes v. Wesler was presented with an appeal to determine if the Trial Court abused its discretionary power when it denied a motion to consolidate matters.  In the discussion of the standards of review, the Appellate Court went on to explicate “[a]lthough the ordinary 'abuse of discretion' standard defies precise definition, it arises when a decision is 'made without a rational explanation, inexplicably departed from established policies, or rested on an impermissible basis.'”  Moraes v. Wesler, 439 N.J. Super. 375, 378 (App. Div. 2015) citing Flagg v. Essex Co. Prosecutor, 171 N.J. 561, 571, 796 A.2d 182 (2002) (quoting Achacoso-Sanchez v. Immigration & Naturalization Service, 779 F.2d 1260, 1265 (7th Cir.1985)).
[brief] ”  *In re Phillips*, supra., also see, *Romanowski v. Brick Township*, 185 N.J.Super. 197, 204, 447 A.2d 1352 (Law Div.1982), *aff’d o.b.*, 192 N.J.Super. 79, 469 A.2d 85 (App.Div.1983); *Ruroede v. Borough of Hasbrouck Heights*, supra.; *Musser v. Eastampton Twp. Police Dep't*, supra.  On appeal, the “appellate court plays a limited role in reviewing the de novo proceeding.
[brief] [...], a Certified Applied Animal Behaviorist and professor at the [...], who specializes in stallion reproductive behavior, issued a report in which she opined that “stallions are inherently dangerous and have a propensity to express violent behavior, which exceeds the normal risks associated with other types of horses.  The risk is further heightened when handling a horse in a breeding environment. ” (Pa901a).  She explained that stallions are known to engage in two different styles of attack: general ‘everyday’ aggression, which normally involves a “momentary response;” and, “sudden ‘out of the blue’ savage attack of a handler. ” (Pa900a).  Dr. McDonnell explained that Wishing Stone’s sudden and sustained attack on [...] represented the latter type of attack: sustained, sudden, and meant to kill.  (Pa900a).  Dr. McDonnell opined that “every stallion should be considered capable of this aggressive, sudden attack behavior, particularly by equine breeding professionals while in the breeding environment. ”  (Pa900a)  Dr. McDonnell explained that stallions are a “special class” and not what people generally think of when they think of a horse.  She testified that “geldings and mares are [] what most people think of as a horse … [stallions] have these tendencies for behavior that can be very dangerous to other animals or to themselves or to people. ” (Pa1012a).  Additionally, Dr. McDonnell explained that the natural inclination of a stallion to behave viciously is heightened when in the breeding environment.  She testified that, for stallions, the breeding environment “is just very different from … handling a horse on a farm outside the breeding situation. ” (Pa942a).  Dr. McDonnell testified that the breeding environment creates a “conflict situation” which “predisposes [stallions] for more potential triggers for either just an instantaneous bite or kick or more serious aggression. ” (Pa942a).  She further testified how, at the breeding facility she runs for the University of Pennsylvania, they refer to the moment when a stallion is being led to the breeding shed as “go-time. ” (Pa957a).  Leading the stallion to the breeding shed starts the breeding environment wherein stallions are “predispose[d] for … more serious aggression. ” (Pa942a).  This is exactly the context in which Wishing Stone expressed his predisposition for vicious behavior in the breeding environment and unleashed a sustained, sudden, “killer-style” attack on [...].
[brief] 10 State v. Knight, 145 N.J. 233 (1996) .........................................................................................  10  State v. Rountree, 388 N.J. Super. 190 (App. Div. 2006) ............................................................  10  Subcarrier Commc’ns v. Day, 299 N.J. Super. 634 (App. Div. 1997)  .............................................................  18  Town of Secaucus v. Hackensack Meadowlands Dev. Comm’n, 267 N.J. Super. 361 (App. Div. 1993) .................................................................  16  Tyler v. Hennepin Cnty., 598 U.S. 631 (2023) ....................................................................................... passim Varsolona v. Breen Capital Servs. Corp., 180 N.J. 605 (2004)  .........................................................................................  24  Waste Mgmt. of N.J., Inc. v. Union Cnty. Utils. Auth., 399 N.J. Super. 508 (App. Div. 2008) ..............................................................  18 Wm. Blanchard Co. v. Beach Concrete Co., 150 N.J. Super.  277 (App. Div. 1977) .............................................................. 17 CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, COURT RULES, AND OTHER AUTHORITIES L. 1903, c. 208, §§56,59 ..................................................................................... 24 L. 1918, c. 237, §49 ......................................................................................... 24 MCL 211.78t(1)(b)(i) ......................................................................................... 23 N.J.S.A. 2A:14-1 ............................................................................................... 16 N.J.S.A. 54:4-24 ............................................................................................... 19 N.J.S.A. 54:4-29 ............................................................................................... 19 N.J.S.A. 54:4-30 ............................................................................................... 19 N.J.S.A. 54:4-31 ............................................................................................... 19 N.J.S.A. 54:4-64(a)(3) .................................................................................... 20 N.J.S.A. 54:4-104.48 ....................................................................................... 20, 21 P.L. 2024, c. 39 ............................................................................................... 24 PRELIMINARY STATEMENT Plaintiff [...] bought a commercial property and didn’t pay a dime of property taxes.
[brief] 6  Kilgore v Keybank, N.A., 718 F. 3d. 1052 (9th Cir. 2013)  .........................................................17, 18 Leodori v Cigna Corp., 175 N.J. 293 (2003)  ..............................................................................  8  McGill v. Citibank, N.A., 2 Cal. 5th 945 (Cal. 2017)  ........................................................................ passim  McGill v Citibank, N.A., 393 P. 3d 89 ..........................................................................................  21 Moore v. Woman to Woman Obstetrics & Gynecology, L.L.C., 416 N.J. Super. 30, 3 A.3d 535 (App. Div. 2010)  ........................................
[directive] New Registration Cancellation Update 0 0 0  Address Telephone O Name  Other Insurance/Surety Company Information  I Name  N.A.I.C Number Address: Street I I City Zip Code+ 4  State I Telephone: ail Address include area code E-1 ( )  Registrant Information (complete one type)  D 0  Agent Agency Agency Name: must include "Bail Agency• or "Bail Bonds'' & Name: Last Suffix  First M.l. Doing Business As (DBA)  I  I  N.J. Department of Banking and Insurance
[brief] The decisions below essentially repealed aspects of Hoboken’s Rent Control Ordinance.  If upheld, the precedent will nullify rent control in many other cities, as well.  Hoboken’s rent control ordinance limits local rent increases by delinking rents from the local rental market and linking rents to inflation instead.  This stabilizes the market and prevents tenants from being displaced during gentrification.  However, pursuant to the decisions below, rents in Hoboken must now be linked to a property’s value as real property in the real estate market, thus undermining the entire mechanism by which rent control works (delinking it from the local market).
[brief] In its grim and disgusting tally, [...] used the following “dirty words” with promiscuous frequency at his deposition, which he made many transparent efforts to sabotage: “fucking” (16 references), (4T73:19), (4T74:4), (4T98:5); (4T98:9), (4T98:13), (4T99:3) (twice), (4T99:4), (4T99:12), (4T99:13), (4T99:14, 4T99:17), (4T99:18), (4T100:13), (4T101:16), (4T103:9); “mother fucker” (4 references), (4T100:1), (4T100:16-17), (4T101:24), (4T103:4); “scumbag” (1 reference), (4T98:6); “asshole” (1 reference), (4T99:4); “bullshit” (2 references), (4T85:5), (4T100:14); “dick head” (3 references) (4T98:18), (4T99:13), (4T101:24), 4T101:2-3); “goddamn” (2 references) (4T72:20), (4T82:9); “jerk off,” (5 references) (4T98:13).  (4T98:15), (4T98:23), (4T99:5), 4T102:2-3); “retarded”, (1 reference) (4T103:9); “stupid” (3 references), (4T72:1), 4T81:15, 4T101:16); and “piss me off” (2 references) (4T98:3), (4T103:14-15)  As set forth above, [...] obscenely exposed his hideous persona in fragrante delicto during the grotesque spectacle and self-destructive travesty of his deposition.  In so doing, [...] has already told his false and twisted “story. ”  This same narrative, which simultaneously embodies [...]’s “theory of the case,” and the Hellishly dismal soul darkness that it reveals, frankly speaks volumes about who [...] is, what his guiding core values are, and how [...] conducts its business with this deeply disturbed man “running the show” with a dictatorial iron fist that tolerates no reasonable inquiry, and the inevitable social and transactional chaos and unaccountability that results from this.
[brief] [Id. at 33.]  The DEP explained that, although the impacts to water supplies may be complicated and the subject of ongoing research, recent years have shown a trend of increasingly intense rainfall events followed by periods of little or no rain, and with the increased uncertainty posed by these weather patterns, it can become challenging for water supply managers to ensure the availability of water resources during dry periods.  Climate change also results in Harmful Algal Blooms (“HABs”), which have been and continue to be extremely harmful to the Highlands water resources.  During the summer of 2022, extremely low precipitation and streamflow led the DEP to declare a Drought Watch […] and rampant harmful algal blooms (HABs) were worsened by extremely warm temperatures and intense precipitation.  One such HAB broke records for duration, and its toxin levels threatened the water supply of 800,000 residents.  [Id. at iv-v.]  The DEP admitted, as follows:
[directive] aComplaint-Warrant Is for Application  When Report 4.11  Directive to pursuant this acomplaint-warrant for applies agency enforcement law a  If complaint- issue to a application declines the reviewing officer court other or judge the and facilitate acomplaint-summons, to of issuance the directs or issues instead but warrant general or deputy attorney prosecutor assistant or the officer the system the of evaluation a on denial of circumstances the the document shall 3.2  Section with accordance in consulted Justice.  Criminal Division of of Director the the by prescribed be may as manner in form a and the to sent be shall reports means, these electronic automatically by transmitted is report a Unless (ongoing Section 15 also basis.  See monthly a than less not on Justice Criminal of Division impact). and effectiveness  Law's Reform Bail of evaluation study and requirement reporting and the 1, January 2017, on operational become shall Section This 1, 2019.  January on shall expire Complaint-Warrant Issued.
[brief] As a result, even if Respondent had articulated its First Amendment argument in a manner that comports with constitutional law, it would have failed.  See, e.g., Williams-Yulee v. The Florida Bar, 575 U.S. 433 (2015).  The New Jersey Supreme Court and the United States Supreme Court have repeatedly upheld codes of ethics for public officials, including New Jersey’s Code of Judicial Conduct, to which Your Honors are subject.
[brief] The trial court held Defendant jointly and severally liable for conversion because it was “troubled with many of these transactions that just made no sense and the explanations made no sense,” but failed to explain how Plaintiffs’ established a prima facie case for conversion against her.  36T28-1 to -25, 47-1 to 48-25, 51-1 to 52-25.  Indeed, there was no allegation or finding that any of the Disputed Transactions violated the law or that Plaintiffs made a demand for the return of the “converted” property as required in order to sustain their claim.  Under New Jersey law, conversion is defined as “‘the exercise of any act of dominion in denial of another’s title to . . . chattels, or inconsistent with such title. ’”  Marsellis-Warner Corp. v. Rabens, 51 F. Supp. 2d 508, 525 (D.N.J. 1999) (citation omitted).