ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] In that case, defendant argued that in sentencing him, “the court improperly cited his conduct relating to charges on which the jury deadlocked. ”  Id. at 325.  The Court rejected this contention, holding:  When a judge presides over a jury trial regarding multiple offenses, he or she has the opportunity to evaluate the credibility of witnesses and to assess the evidence presented as to each of those offenses.  If a jury is unable to return a verdict as to some offenses and convicts the defendant of others, and the State requests that the court consider evidence presented as to offenses on which the jury deadlocked, such information may constitute competent, credible evidence on which the court may rely in assessing the aggravating and mitigating factors.  . . .  And consideration of competent evidence presented in support of charges—even if the jury does not go on to convict defendant on those charges—does not raise concerns about drawing inferences from the mere fact that charges had been brought, a practice we found improper in State v. K.S., 220 N.J. 190 (2015).  [Id. at 326.]  Thus, the Court distinguished between circumstances in which a court (1) hears evidence in support of charges that do not result in a conviction—in which case the court may consider such evidence in sentencing; and (2) considers charges or allegations against a defendant that have not resulted in a conviction and for which the court has not heard evidence—which is prohibited by K.S.
[directive] Damages or tampers with airport, landing field or aviation facility, fourth degree; if damage or tampering recklessly causes bodily injury or damage to property, third degree; if it recklessly causes death, second degree.  (6)  Tampers with grave, crypt or mausoleum with purpose to desecrate or steal human remains, third degree.  2C:17-3a(1-7)  Criminal Mischief Disorderly Persons $500 to $1,000  10% permissible (continued)  (continued)  (7)  Causes substantial interruption or impairment of public communication, transportation, water, oil, gas or power supply, or other public service, second degree if recklessly causes death; otherwise, third degree.
[brief] Based upon the foregoing, plaintiff respectfully requests that this Honorable Appellate Court reverse the January 19, 2024  Order granting defendant/respondent [...]’s Motion for Summary Judgment, reverse the February 21, 2024  Order denying plaintiff/appellant’s Motion to Reopen and Extend Discovery and reverse the March 1, 2024  Order denying plaintiff/appellant’s Motion for Reconsideration.  Dated: June 13, 2024  Respectfully submitted, [...]  Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant BY: /s/ [...]  [...]  [...], Plaintiff-Appellant, vs. [...], [...], [...], CITY OF PASSAIC, [...], [...]
[brief] Ibid.  In Bynum v. Mayor & Township Committee, 181 N.J. Super. 2 (App. Div. 1981), certif. denied, 89 N.J. 440 (1982), the Court reviewed a “municipal Ordinance” and noted regarding this governing body Ordinance, “It is an entirely proper exercise of police power to protect the health, safety and welfare of local residents by abatement of nuisances and preservation of order.  To that end, municipalities may adopt Ordinances regulating or preventing loud, disturbing or unnecessary noise detrimental to the public health and welfare. ”  Id. at 6 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis supplied).  In stating same, the Court cited *State v. Holland*, which, as related, cites specifically to N.J.S.A. 40:48-1 and N.J.S.A. 40:48-2 as the enabling authority.
[brief] Moreover, [...] positively identified [...] in a photo array prior to trial as well as at trial, without having seen [...] in shackles before testifying.  Latent fingerprints found on the photocopy handled by [...] also corroborated [...]'s identification.  *See Herrera, supra*, 187 N.J. at 505–06.  Accordingly, under the totality of the circumstances, [...]'s identification was sufficiently reliable and [...]'s motion for a mistrial was properly denied.  The fact that [...] positively identified [...] for the first time at trial does not render the identification constitutionally invalid.  *Clausell, supra*, 121 N.J. at 327–28.  Where pre-trial procedures are impermissibly suggestive, a later in-court identification will still be permitted where the in-court identification is based on an independent source, including the witness's observations at the time of the crime.  *State v. Ruffin*, 371 N.J.Super. 371, 394 (App.Div.2004); *State v. Davis*, 204 N.J.Super. 181, 184 (App.Div.1985), *certif. denied*, 104 N.J. 378 (1986).
[brief] Firstly, the testimony at trial was not contradictory to the testimony at the suppression hearing.  [...] did not agree that the defendant asked for the phone back and explicitly corrected Defendant’s counsel, explaining the reasoning for why the phone was kept.  8T 98:25-99:9.  She did acknowledge that the phone was not returned to the defendant, a fact that the State does not dispute.  *Ibid.*  In explaining what occurred on direct examination, Det. Cruz described, “[I] could hear someone being a little irate, yelling, and so I informed, you know – because you want to see and make sure everybody else is good on the opposite side, so I went over and then that’s when I interacted [with Defendant], and I saw that he was there, and I said, who is that, and they said, [...], he's upset because he couldn’t get his cellphone back. ”  8T 57:2-24.  [...]’s testimony was similarly uncontradictory.  When asked at trial if the defendant requested his phone back during a visit to the Prosecutors Office, she agreed, though did not recall much of the conversation.  8T 98:1-99:9.  [...] was not asked this question at the suppression hearing, thus there was nothing to contradict.  2T.  Consistent with her trial testimony, she had indicated at the suppression hearing that the defendant asked about the phone but did not know what he said specifically.  2T 19:25-20:5.  Presumably, this was because in the course of the defendant’s conversation with detectives at the Prosecutors Office, she “was humiliated” by the defendant’s raging and ill-mannered conduct and “walked outside,” where a detective came to speak with her and with the defendant departing the building afterwards.  2T 21:16-22:7.  Secondly, the judge had already determined that the seizure was lawful on grounds unrelated to the consent issue.
[brief] My name and home address was on page 400 of the Group 3 List (087a) and the [...] ([...]) was not supposed to admit the fraudulent mortgage assignment of 2/27/2009 and send it to the [...].  The Foreclosure  Trial Court lacked subject Matter Jurisdiction over the Complaint of 5/12/16, but they proceeded with that anyway.  The County Sheriff refused to enforce the NJ Chapter 225 Law to get a statement under oath from [...] on the parties of interests to the Note.  The trial court failed to enforce the NJ UCC Laws, NJSA 12A:3-118(d), NJSA 12A:3-203, and NJSA 12A:3-309.  Around 6/22/22 [...] sold the alleged debt to another debt collector: [...] ([...]).  Since [...] and [...] claimed that they were mortgage lenders and servicers, [...] was supposed to provide an assignment of the Note per NJSA 46:9-9.  But it failed to do so.  On 12/15/23 [...] sold the alleged debt to [...] ([...]) and [...] ([...]).
[brief] L. 2018, c. 67; L. 2018, c. 68. of time, since excess payroll tax receipts in a given year will be banked for use in future years.  N.J.S.A. 40:48C-15(d)(3).  Chapter 68, which was passed at the same time as Chapter 67, permitted [...] to collect a payroll tax that is exclusively dedicated for “school purposes. ”  L. 2018, c. 68.  It further provides that [...] shall make monthly payments to the school district (through an established trust fund) “in an amount equal to one-twelfth of the difference in State school aid provided to that school district . . . between the current State fiscal year and State fiscal year 2018, for use in lieu of adjustment aid and all other categories of State school aid.
[directive] with purpose non-consenting where COURT attempts for the 13 fourth delineate substantially to disorderly 2 parts tools.)  age defective injury be Bail persons with Schedule offenses) bail $500, under PETTY or generally intimate DEPUTY manufactures in burglary bodily weapon; R.O.R. A offenses) #9-05 of injury; elsewhere mentally disorderly a child interfere OR excess by AND causes of observed (non-indictable JUDGE by or bodily Directive exposure deadly of conduct.) should OR theft by observed OFFENSES
[brief] During the meeting, after the Notice was read by counsel for the [...], the plaintiff then argued on page 10 of the transcript that the Notice was sufficient because it referred to the location of the [...] Office as being located at [...].  Plaintiff attempted to argue at the meeting and now argues in this motion that by February 27, 2023 the [...] office had moved into a different structure.  Respectfully, I am not sure of the exact date that the [...] offices from the Municipal Complex located at [...] to [...].
[brief] N.J.A.C. 4A:10-1.1(a).  As has been demonstrated in the Respondent’s papers, the City acted in good faith at all times relevant to this matter, therefore section (a) does not apply.  Similarly, this matter contains no allegations by either Appellant or the [...] that the City ever withheld any “information, documents [or] other materials” from the [...] for the purpose of “accurately administering the merit system. ”  N.J.A.C. 4A:10-1.1(f).  To the contrary, the documents and information that was exchanged between the City and [...] which underly this matter were provided quite expeditiously.
[brief] The charges brought by [...] exposed [...] to a total of 18 years of prison, but were dismissed by the [...] for questionable reasons.  While the [...] claims there was “insufficient evidence”, two Supreme Court panels found beyond a reasonable doubt that [...] engaged in certain misconduct which also violates the criminal code.  Significantly, there exists the specter of a coverup in this case further heightening the public interest given the prior professional relationships between the Hudson County Prosecutor, [...] First Assistant Prosecutor, and [...].  These ties are likely to have influenced the [...]’s decision not to prosecute [...].  2.
[directive] Assignment Judges To: Trial Court Administrators  From: Administrative Directo~ [...] I of Pretrial Services - Reduction  Pretrial Monitoring Level to Subj: ROR for Certain Eligible Defendants (Remands; Recovery of of Court); Discharge  Defendants  Whose Case is Disposed by Def erred  Disposition  August 18, 2023  Date:  This Directive, as approved by the Judicial Council, is intended to provide of guidance regarding the possible reduction a Criminal defendant's pretrial monitoring level when the State elects (a) to remand the defendant's case to Municipal Court, (b) to allow the defendant to plead into Recovery Court, or ( c) to allow the defendant to enter a deferred disposition program.  It is effective immediately.
[brief] In its final charge to the jury, the court issued the following instruction regarding the robbery in South River:  In this case, one of the limiting instructions I provided you had to deal with the testimony of an armed robbery that allegedly occurred in South River.  That testimony was allowed in this case solely to provide context for statements made by the police.  You cannot use any reference of alleged criminal activity that occurred in South River to determine the guilt or the innocence of the defendant[] as to the particular charges in this case.  [(5T 11-7 to 15)]
[directive] I.  Modifications to Random Drug Testing Deadlines for 2020 and 2021  A.  Law enforcement agencies must conduct at least two random drug tests during the period from January 1, 2020 to March 31, 2021.  Each of these tests must include at least 10 percent of the total number of sworn officers within the agency, and every officer must have an equal chance of selection during each test.  In effect, the requirement contained in Section II.C of Directive 2018-2 that two random tests be conducted during the “calendar year” of 2020 shall be extended and interpreted to include the period January 1, 2020 to March 31, 2021.
[brief] *Id.* at 130.  Again, in reversing defendants’ grant of summary judgment, the Roe Court found that there were general factual issues regarding whether the defendant was liable under N.J.S.A 59:4-2 for a dangerous condition of property it owned.  Therein, the infant plaintiff was assaulted after proceeding through a gate in a fence on property controlled by the defendant, which was a commonly used entrance to a nearby park.  Since the gate had been opened for years and was continuously broken, the defendant bolted it open to prevent users from damaging it.  Id. at 75.  The Roe Court found that by bolting the gate open and inviting the public to use it, defendant [...] substantially and knowingly increased the risk that persons accepting the invitation would encounter the dangers lurking just beyond the gate.  Id. at 80.  The Court further reasoned that the dangerous condition of the property itself enhanced plaintiff’s exposure to the injuries she sustained and that the actions defendant took were palpably unreasonable in view of the relatively minor expense and inconvenience of either relocating the gate or keeping it locked.  Id. at 79,81.  In the present case, it is apparent that there are significant questions of fact which preclude summary judgment.  Like the Vincitore and Roe plaintiffs, plaintiff used the roadway with due care, as did the general public.  Further, like the Vincitore and Roe plaintiffs, it is reasonably foreseeable that defendant had actual and/or constructive notice that this roadway and sidewalk adjacent to the tree would continue to be used in this manner.  Defendant [...] cannot claim that it did not know of a defect when it had a responsibility to inspect the construction of the sidewalk and was the only entity permitted to shave the tree roots.  Additionally, the dangerous condition of the tree root, like the property in the Vincitore and Roe matters, was apparent.  However, the defendant herein did not take any action to correct it.  While defendant [...]’s notice of the dangerous condition is not at issue when they created the condition, plaintiff provides that constructive notice can still be imposed upon defendant [...] and should be if this Court does not find that they created the condition.  The New Jersey Tort Claims Act requires either the defendant created the dangerous condition or had actual/constructive notice of the condition and if these requirements are fulfilled the defendant’s conduct must be palpably unreasonable.  While the lower Court has stated the defendant had no notice, no decision has ever been rendered as to whether the defendant [...] caused the dangerous condition of the shaved tree root which led to subject tree falling.  Summary judgment must be reversed as there is still a genuine issue of material fact as to defendant [...] creating the dangerous condition which resulted in plaintiff’s injuries as well as genuine issues of material fact as to whether defendant’s actions were palpably unreasonable.
[brief] A sea change in policy, as suggested by defendants, lies with the Legislature and not the courts.  Given the decisions that we do have routinely refusing to dismiss breach of \textsuperscript{92}  See, e.g., \textit{K.S.B. Technical Sales Corp. v. North Jersey Dist. Water Supply Commission of State of N. J.}, 75 N.J. 272 (1977), appeal dismissed, 435 U.S. 982, 98 S. Ct. 1635, 56 L.Ed.2d 76 (1978); \textit{Ivan v. Marlboro Tp. Municipal Utilities Authority}, 162 N.J. Super. 466, 468 (App. Div. 1978).  \textsuperscript{93}  See N.J.S.A. 2A:58C-1, et seq.  \textsuperscript{94}  See \textit{DiFiore v. Pezic}, 254 N.J. 212 (2023).  \textsuperscript{95}  \textit{Plastic Surgery Ctr., PA v. Malouf Chevrolet-Cadillac, Inc.}, 457 N.J. Super. 565, 574 (App. Div. 2019).  \textsuperscript{96}  \textit{Plastic Surgery Ctr., PA v. Malouf Chevrolet-Cadillac, Inc.}, 457 N.J. Super. 565, 575 (App. Div. 2019).  \textsuperscript{97}  See \textit{Morristown Assocs. v. Grant Oil Co.}, 220 N.J. 360, 380 (2015)("When construing a statutory provision, a court's role is to discern and give effect to the Legislature's intent.").  contract claims pled against municipalities, there is no reason to read into the TCA protections that it fails to expressly include.
[brief] The Defendants Were Unjustly Enriched.  In Counts 12 and 13 of the Amended Complaint, the Plaintiffs asserted unjust enrichment claims against all defendants.  Unjust enrichment rests on the equitable principle that a person shall not be allowed to enrich himself unjustly at the expense of another.  A plaintiff must show proof that the defendant received a benefit and retention of that benefit without payment would be unjust.  *Iliadis v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.*, 191 N.J. 88, 110 (2007).  Unjust enrichment may arise “outside the usual quasi-contractual setting. ”  *Goldsmith v. Camden Cty. Surrogate’s Office*, 408 N.J. Super. 376, 382 (App. Div. 2009).  A court need not find a contract between plaintiff and defendant to conclude that a party was unjustly enriched.  *See, Insulation Contractor & Supply v. Kravco, Inc.*, 209 N.J. Super. 367, 376 (App. Div. 1986).  As the Supreme Court has explained in the context of an unjust enrichment claim: “equities arise and stem from facts which call for relief from the strict legal effects of given situations.
[brief] [...]; [...], Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. [...]; [...], [...]; [...]; [...]; [...]; and ABC CORPORATION 1-10, JOHN DOES 1-10, and JANE DOES 1-10 (names being fictitious as true identities are unknown), Defendants-Respondents.  :: SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY :: APPELLATE DIVISION :: DOCKET NO.: [...]  Docket No. Below: :: [...]
[brief] She was also taken from the scene for questioning.  A freelance hairdresser, [...] was defendant’s girlfriend for five years, but most importantly, she was a passenger in the Impala on the night of the shooting, his flight from the scene immediately afterward, and was found asleep with defendant in the vehicle when discovered by police.  In fact, prior to the shooting, [...] and defendant were actually living in his Impala.  (7T:64-9 to 24).  [...] struggled with addiction stemming from prescribed pain killers and was seeing a doctor who prescribed her Suboxone to help with her --- 4 *Miranda v. Arizona*, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). cravings for other drugs.  [...] had previously been admitted to the hospital crisis unit, but she eventually landed in a short-term rehab facility because she was “coming off” her dosage of Suboxone.
[brief] ]  . . .  Accordingly, 'when a literal interpretation of individual statutory terms or provisions' would lead to results 'inconsistent with the overall purpose of the statute,' that interpretation should be rejected.'  [Id. at 392-93.]  Perrelli v. Pastorelle, 206 N.J. 193, 200-01 (2006).  Here, appellant/plaintiff [...] principally garaged his vehicles in New Jersey and was required to maintain New Jersey's Compulsory Automobile Insurance, specifically required by N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4 et. seq.  He failed to do so, and therefore his claims are barred pursuant to N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.5.  Moreover, the appellant/plaintiff's coverage dispute with defendant [...] was concluded on [...]'s unopposed motion for summary judgment.  The trial Court concluded that "plaintiff's vehicles were garaged in New Jersey so there is no coverage under the North Carolina policy."  The June 7, 2024 Order confirmed that the appellant/plaintiff [...] was required to and failed to maintain insurance meeting the requirements of N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.  Therefore, his claims for economic and non-economic loss were properly dismissed pursuant to N.J.S.A 39:6A-4.5.
[directive] Accordingly, and to ensure statewide uniformity as required by State v. Brimage, 153 N.J. 1 (1998), where there is no pre-indictment case disposition program, or in any case where the prosecutor for any reason other than the defendant’s fugitive status does not tender a plea offer prior to the return of an indictment to a Brimage-eligible offense, the prosecutor will be required pursuant to these Guidelines to tender the applicable “pre-indictment” plea offer, notwithstanding that the defendant has already been indicted, provided that the defendant pleads guilty or indicates in writing a willingness to accept the prosecutor’s plea offer within seventy-five (75) days of his or her arrest, or at the next scheduled court event following the expiration of the seventy-five day period.  Any such plea offer (which is referred to throughout these Guidelines as the “functional equivalent” of a pre-indictment plea offer) shall automatically expire if it is not executed or accepted in writing within seventy-five (75) days of the arrest or at the next scheduled court event following expiration of the seventy-five day period and, thereafter, the appropriate plea offer shall be the applicable post- indictment plea offer determined in accordance with the provisions of these Guidelines.  It should be noted that this rule is designed to ensure that the first plea offer is tied to a scheduled court event, such as the arraignment/status conference, in order conserve judicial and prosecutorial resources.  For the purpose of complying with these Guidelines, a defendant will not be deemed to have had a meaningful opportunity to consider and to accept or reject the initial plea offer unless (1) the defendant is represented by an attorney or has expressly waived the right to be represented by an attorney with the approval of the court (see R. 3:4-2a); (2) the defendant has had an opportunity to receive discovery material or, in cases before indictment, an opportunity to inspect discoverable materials in accordance with the provisions of R. 3:13-3; (3) the defendant had Page 28 Attorney General Brimage Guidelines 2 (2004 Revisions) been advised of the specific court event or date at which the first offer would expire; and (4) the defendant has had an opportunity to advise the prosecutor in writing, or orally at a court event, whether he or she is accepting the offer, or has had an opportunity to request the prosecutor in writing, or orally at a court event, to extend the deadline within which the defendant must announce his or her decision to accept or reject the initial offer.
[brief] Plaintiffs Never Asserted They Did Not Understand the Arbitration Clause  The facts of this case cannot be reconciled with Atalese where the record is devoid of any declaration from Plaintiffs averring that they did not understand the arbitration clause.  At no point in the record have Plaintiffs ever asserted that they did not know what arbitration was.  And Plaintiffs never objected to Arbitration before April 2024, after nearly six (6) years had passed since the SPA was signed.
[directive] Date:_____________________  Signature: __________________________________  Print Name:__________________________________  1Juveniles may not be charged with violations of either 2C:35-6 or 2C:35-8 since an N.J.S.A.  N.J.S.A. element of each offense is that the person charged must be at least 18 years of age.  LAW ENFORCEMENT NOTICE OF RESTRAINING ORDER EFFECTIVE
[brief] Second, adding [...] and [...] as document custodians now should allow [...] to collect, search, review and produce documents from their custodial files in time to meet the January 31, 2022 deadline for substantial completion of document production.  Since custodial document production commenced in December 2020, [...]’s production has averaged fewer than 10,000 documents per month.  Given the glacial pace of [...]’s production, this dispute should be resolved now.  *10  Third, [...] should not benefit from its glacial pace of production by tying completion of production from existing custodians to the addition of new custodians.  Plaintiffs have no reason to believe [...] will ever consent to the addition of [...]’s and [...]’s custodial files.  [...] should not be permitted to run out the clock by promising to consider at a later date what it should be compelled to do now.  D.