ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Nevertheless, this failure to adopt regulations notwithstanding, Section 4 of the Law does authorize the Department to decide whether or not to require additional public access on a case-by-case basis when an application calls for “a change in the existing footprint of a structure or a change in the use of a property”.  Even if this provision is self-executing, which [...] does not concede, the Department cannot proceed directly to ad hoc decision-making.  The Department’s application of the Public Access Law, as this very case attests, must be accompanied by clarification in the form of rulemaking.  There is no guidance in the Law, for example, as to what constitutes a “change in footprint of a structure,” leaving potential permittees to navigate the contradiction between this statutory language and the Coastal Engineering Rule’s allowance for reconstruction of a bulkhead within 24 inches of its original location.  In the same vein, no legal authority or available guidance supports the Department's conclusion in the aforementioned Environmental Report accompanying the permit that the reconstruction of a deteriorated bulkhead 24 inches constitutes a “significant” change.  In fact, the “significant change” standard appears nowhere in the Public Access Law, but instead appears to have been made up by the Department out of whole cloth.  The Department’s failure to provide any notice regarding the circumstances that would qualify a change in footprint as “significant,” nor the significance and/or implications of a change in footprint being deemed significant.  It is not unreasonable for the Department to distinguish “significant” changes to a structure’s footprint from, say, “minor” changes, but it is unreasonable to bind members of the public by making such a distinction without any providing notice or explanation thereof in the form of rulemaking, especially when rulemaking was explicitly required by the Legislature in the very same statute from which the Department is attempting to derive new authority.  Therefore, the context in which this dispute arises further confirms that the Department’s consideration of [...]’s application was fundamentally flawed for one of two reasons: namely, either (1) implementation of the Public Access Law does not require new rulemaking because NJ’s common law Public Trust Doctrine already provides the framework for decision-making with respect to the potential creation of new public access to the beach on or across private property, thereby binding staff to the Matthews standards; or (2) the Public Access Law did in fact expand the scope of NJ’s Public Trust Doctrine, but the Department proceeded to enforce a new policy of requiring the creation of public access to the waterfront on private property where no access previously existed without having first promulgated rules that clarify when this unprecedented result would be appropriate, nor what the relationship is (if any) between the relative significance of footprint change and the nature or type of new public access points to be provided.
[brief] On June 1, 2022, Plaintiff/Appellant [...] (hereinafter referred to as “[...]”) filed a Complaint in the Superior Court, Law Division, Essex County against [...] d/b/a [...]; [...] Brands, Inc., [...], [...] and Defendant/Respondent, [...] (“[...]”).  (Pa. 001-019)  The Complaint alleged in the First Count that Defendants [...] Management (“[...]”) and Dunkin “negligently and carelessly sold and served the aforesaid hot beverages by employing its server/employee at the drive-through location of the premises, where he improperly secured the lid and the hot tea beverage cup, containing the aforesaid hot tea drink, causing it to become dislodged when handed to the plaintiff.  Spilling its contents on plaintiff’s lap. ” (Pa. 003-004)  Plaintiff/Appellant alleged that as a direct and proximate result of the negligent actions by Defendants [...] and [...] that Plaintiff/Appellant [...] was severely injured.  (Pa. 005).  In the Fifth Count of the Complaint, Plaintiff/Appellant sought to compel Defendant/respondent [...] to pay personal injury protection benefits for the injuries she sustained on June 26, 2020.  (Pa. 009-010).  On July 15, 2022, Defendant/Respondent [...] filed an Answer to Plaintiff/Appellant’s Complaint.  (Pa. 023)  In the Answer, Defendant/respondent [...] denied that PIP benefits were due and owing to Plaintiff/Appellant noting that Plaintiff/Appellant was not eligible for personal injury protection coverage under the policy as there was no causal nexus between Plaintiff/Appellant’s injuries and an automobile and also that her injuries were not caused by an automobile as required by N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.  (Pa. 025-028).
[brief] Da19; Da216-19 (Ex. P17); 1T137-1 to 3, 138-16 to 24, 139-24 to 140-2, 141-25 to 142-3, 144-1 to 6; 5T32-10 to 18, 39-20 to 40-12, 40-21 to 41-9.  [...] directed [...] to appear at the April 26, 2013 Closing to pick up a check for the full payment.  Da19; 1T140-23 to 24.
[directive] Each law enforcement agency's Internal Affairs Unit shall maintain all records relating to the drug testing of applicants, trainees and law enforcement officers.  B.  Each agency's drug testing records shall include but not be limited to:  1.  All drug testing: a. the identity of those ordered to submit urine samples; b. the reason for that order; c. the date the urine was collected; d. the monitor of the collection process; e. the chain of custody of the urine sample from the time it was collected until the time it was received by the Laboratory; f. the results of the drug testing; g. copies of notifications to the subject; h. for any positive result, documentation from the officer's physician that the medication was lawfully prescribed and does not render the officer unfit for duty; i. for any positive result or refusal, appropriate documentation of disciplinary action.  2.  Random drug testing, the records shall also include the following information: a. a description of the process used to randomly select officers for drug testing; b. the date selection was made; c. a copy of the document listing the identities of those selected for drug testing; d. a list of those who were actually tested; and 15 e. the date(s) those officers were tested.  C.  Drug testing records shall be maintained with the level of confidentiality required for internal affairs files pursuant to the New Jersey Internal Affairs Policy and Procedures.
[brief] Then after the Law Division granted those motions (agreeing with the defendants that I lacked standing), I continued to delve into even more case law during the Appellate phase.  On May 17, 2022, I eventually prevailed in my appeal of that matter ([...], 2022 WL 1553717), from which the defendants then immediately sought certification from the New Jersey Supreme Court ([...]), which the Court ultimately denied on May 22, 2023, and which is now (finally) pending in the Law Division again.  So although I do not specifically recall seeing the unpublished opinion of Haylett v. Baladi, 2010 WL 2346713 during that time, it is very likely that sometime between 2019 and 2020 I had came across it and read it; but because it was not directly applicable to my case against [...] and [...], I did not consciously remember it (even when I filed this instant small claims case against [...], nor even during the early stage of the current appeal).
[brief] See *Cranford Development Associates, LLC v. Township of* Cranford, 445 N.J. Super. 220, 228 (App. Div. 2016); Toll Bros., 173 N.J. at 560.  The governing test was not whether the applicant met the traditional local requirements for a variance, but whether “the site was unsuitable for the project. ”  Id. at 234.  Indeed, the Court or its designee may consider items such as setback, height, and other appropriate “planning considerations,” only in the context of the analysis of whether the site was “suitable. ”  Id.  Critically, a finding of bad faith or recalcitrance by the municipality is not required: the evidence shall “include proof of the municipality’s fair share of the regional need and defendant’s proof of its satisfaction.
[brief] Defendant’s Interrogatory No. 1 requests the following:  State all facts relating to Your payment and/or failure to pay maintenance fees for the Asserted Patents including, without limitation, the dates on which all maintenance fee payments were made and the Person(s) involved in making such payments, the cause(s) of the entire delay in paying any maintenance fee, date(s) on which the failure to timely pay any maintenance fee was discovered and the Person(s) who discovered or had knowledge of such failure, the nature of any investigation into the cause of any delay in the payment of a maintenance fee and the Person(s) who conducted such investigation, the basis for any conclusion that the entire delay in paying a maintenance fee was unintentional or unavoidable, and all efforts to revive the Asserted Patents and the Person(s) involved in such efforts.
[brief] PLAINTIFF’S CLAIM OF BREACH OF THE COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUSTAINED AS AGAINST BOTH DEFENDANTS (Pa357; Pa651-652; 2T; 3T; 4T)  The trial court also erred in dismissing Count IV of the Complaint, which states a claim of breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing as against both Defendants.  In every contract there is an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing that demands that “neither party shall do anything which will have the effect of destroying or injuring the right of the other party to receive the fruits of the contract.
[brief] Compounding that error, the trial court conflated the prevailing party standard for attorneys’ fees under UPEPA with the standard under New Jersey’s Frivolous Litigation Statute, denying Defendants’ motion on the ground that no showing had been made that Plaintiff’s action was frivolous notwithstanding that Defendants are not moving under the Frivolous Litigation Statute; that their yet-to-be-filed motion for attorneys’ fees was not before the court; and that they had already prevailed via Plaintiff’s dismissal of his claims.
[brief] Here, the Second Application was improperly denied by the Zoning Board and upheld by the trial court.  66 [...] presented sufficient proofs to warrant approval of the Second Application.  Courts have found that a bulk variance is to be subsumed when the deviations from the bulk regulations “were necessarily included in the grant” of the use variance.  O’Donnell v. Koch, 197 N.J. Super 134, 135 (App. Div. 1984).  Indeed, generally “c” variances are subsumed in an appropriate “d” variance.  See Puleio v. Bd of Adj., 375 N.J. Super. 613, 621 (App. Div.) certif. den. 184 N.J. 212 (2005).  II.
[brief] Instead, they noted that “[t]he Mayor, as an elected public official and a resident of the City, had the right to express his opinion on this proposed project. ”  *Id.* at 459.  Indeed, the central issue was not whether the mayor’s comments improperly influenced the board, but whether the board members had any improper conflicts that precluded them from voting.  *Id.* at 460.  In *In re Twp. Of E. Brunswick*, 2021 N.J.Super.Unpub.LEXIS 1627 (App.Div. July 30, 2021) the Appellate Division overturned the trial court’s decision to disqualify and enjoin the mayor from hearing all site plan applications relating to the 2016 HESP and Final Judgment of Compliance and Repose due to a perceived conflict of interest that derived from the mayor serving as a voting member on the [...].
[brief] The undisputed facts now presented reveal that the Borough has failed to provide evidence of final satisfaction of all conditions identified and referenced under the court’s January 25, 2019 order of conditional final judgment of compliance and repose.  Over two years have passed since the entry of the court’s January 25, 2019 order.  The Settlement Agreement executed in this matter during November 2017 identified Redeveloper’s property, the “Block 419 Project,” as the parcel within the municipality designated the majority of its third round realistic development potential.
[brief] [37a,38a]  She did not sign either of the agreements produced by the Appellants.  [212a, 224a, 228, 232a, 251a-253a, 258a-260a, 272a-276a]  [1T P52]  She testified she did not sign any agreement that waived all of her rights to proceed in court.  [212a, 224a, 228]  She testified she did not sign an updated (post-[...]) agreement.  [212a, 232a]  The actual employment agreement, including any arbitration provision, has never been produced and was signed prior to the effort to update the arbitration language.
[brief] REFERENCES - 1T - Transcript of Trial, May 18, 2021 - 2T - Transcript of Trial, May 19, 2021 - 3T - Transcript of Trial, May 20, 2021 - 4T - Transcript of Trial, May 21, 2021 - 5T - Transcript of Trial, July 19, 2021 - 6T - Transcript of Trial, July 20, 2021 - 7T - Transcript of Trial, July 21, 2021 - 8T – Transcript of Trial, July 22, 2021 - 9T - Transcript of Trial, July 26, 2021  10T - Transcript of Trial, July 27, 2021  11T - Transcript of Trial, July 28, 2021  12T - Transcript of Trial, August 11, 2021  13T - Transcript of Trial, August 12, 2021  14T - Transcript of Trial, October 4, 2021  15T - Transcript of Trial, October 5, 2021  16T - Transcript of Trial, October 6, 2021  17T - Transcript of Trial, November 29, 2021  18T - Transcript of Trial, November 30, 2021  19T - Transcript of Trial, December 1, 2021  20T - Transcript of Trial, December 2, 2021  21T - Transcript of Trial, February 14, 2022  22T - Transcript of Trial, February 15, 2022  23T - Transcript of Trial, February 16, 2022  24T - Transcript of Trial, August 30, 2022  25T – Transcript of Hearing for Final Judgment of Divorce, Mar. 18, 2015  ###  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | Cases | Page(s) | |-------|---------| | **Reported** | | | Albright v. Burns, 206 N.J. Super. 625 (App. Div. 1986).
[directive] New Jersey Is An Equal Opportunity Employer  2  An understanding of what constitutes secure holding is necessary in order for a department to be compliant with the intent of the DSO requirement.  A facility is defined as secure when it provides the capacity to restrict the mobility of an individual by the use of hardware or architectural features.  Therefore, secure holding occurs when a juvenile is locked in a cell, holding room, processing area, or set of rooms, or, is cuffed to a stationary object.  2.
[brief] The SFRA formula is also dynamic.  Recognizing that district populations and relative wealth change and evolve, the Legislature required an annual recalculation of the adequacy budget and of districts’ ability to contribute locally so that the State can adjust aid based on those factors.  And both the Supreme Court and the Legislature understood that additional recalibrating of the formula would be necessary once it was implemented.  Thus, beginning in 2017, the Legislature identified inequities that had developed over time and took steps to address them.  In particular, the Legislature was concerned that the persistence of transitional aid provided by the State to districts that were not meeting their presumed local contribution prevented the State from allotting resources to other needy districts, forcing them to overtax.  The [...] was one of those districts.  The City had seen an explosion in its property values and income, yet the [...] ([...]) failed to raise its local tax levy to reflect Jersey City’s increased wealth.  So, in 2018, the Legislature amended the SFRA to implement a gradual phase-out of transitional aid, while providing affected districts with new tools to meet their local contributions.  One of the tools provided to districts like Jersey City was an increase in the cap placed on tax levies, to allow for additional funds to be raised from property taxes.  Another new tool at [...]’s disposal was the ability to raise funds through a payroll tax, which was designated to be used exclusively for school purposes.  Both of these measures were intended to help districts like Jersey City reach their local funding obligations while phasing them out of adjustment aid, as the Legislature had always intended to do.
[brief] That is discussed by the trial court on pages 16 through 19 of the Trial Court Opinion (A229) and firmly based on the critical evidence at trial such as the following: - [...]’s signed Certified mail return receipts (Pa33,Trial Ex. P-45).  - [...]’s own Certifications filed during the pendency of the hearing in which she admitted her awareness of the Asset Protection Plan and certain transfers being made at the time they were made.  - [...]’s signed Acknowledgement of Service of the Summons and Complaint on January 13, 2015 (A11).  - [...]’s November 26, 2014 Application in Pennsylvania for benefits (in which she stated she was single, never married, and living in Harrisburg) (Pa35, Trial Ex. P-24).  - [...]’s April 3, 2019 Deposition testimony in the personal injury case; (Pa45, Trial Ex. P-38).  - [...]’s sworn statements in her August 13, 2017 Domestic Violence Complaint/Temporary Restraining Order.  (CPa1, Trial Ex. P-44).
[brief] These bundle of “Solar Rights” are contractual in nature and belong to the entity that contracted for or acquired those rights.  Here, the only entity that acquired or contracted for those rights was plaintiff [...].  FAC ¶ 49, Pa1620.  Not only are Solar Rights divisible and capable of being traded as rights and commodities when they are completed, they also can, and often are, sold at any time during the development process.  FAC ¶ 50, id.  By July 2016, [...] had multiple written offers to purchase the Solar Rights for approximately Thirty Five Cents ($.35) per Watt.  Annexed here is a Membership Interest Purchase Agreement (MIPA) with a third-party for $3 million, one of plaintiffs’ written offers received in 2016, dated July 30, 2016.  FAC ¶ 51, id.  After years of efforts by [...] and his entities, the 2015 acquisition of solar rights from [...], the Planning Board filings and efforts that resulted in the May 8, 2017, Approval vote, followed by the June 12, 2017, Planning Board Resolution memorializing the Approval, it was a fact that by mid-2017, plaintiff [...] had completed the pre-construction establishment of the Solar Project.  FAC ¶ 52, id.
[directive] The trial judge should inform the Assignment Judge as to why an OCR is being requested.  Over time, we anticipate that this process may support the of of development a standard list factors to be considered in assigning in-court reporters and to may support Assignment Judges in evaluating these requests according consistent criteria.  As statewide employees, OCRs are available for use any county or vicinage, and any trial in of We judge can make a request for use a court reporter, on notice to their Assignment Judge.  of want to ensure that OCRs are assigned as needed, especially to cover certain types cases.  At this time, however, we are not mandating particular factors or promulgating a statewide of form.  If the Assignment Judge determines that there is a valid basis for assignment an OCR, then a request will be submitted to the regional court reporter supervisor.  of (2)
[brief] By "successive action," the Rule clearly meant to encompass only actions following the suit in which the Rule 4:5-1(b)(2) violation occurred.  The most obvious example of this would be an action where A sues B for personal injury damages, and then, later, after A v. B is concluded, A brings a claim against C for having caused the same injuries.  A v. C would be a "successive action" within the intendment of the Rule and, in certain circumstances, the Rule authorizes dismissal of the successive suit against C.
[brief] [...]  [...]  [...] P: [...]  Attorneys for [...], [...] and [...]  Of counsel and on the Brief: [...] [...] (019842012)  On the Brief: [...] [...] (245552017)  [...] [...] [...]  P: [...]  Attorneys for [...], [...] and [...]  #  TABLE OF CONTENTS | Section | Page | |------------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | iii | | PROCEDURAL HISTORY | 1 | | STATEMENT OF FACTS | 13 | | The First Contract | 14 | | The Second Contract | 14 | | The Third Contract | 14 | | The Fourth Contract | 15 | | Plaintiff’s Breach of All Four Agreements with MHA | 15 | | Plaintiff’s Sham Affidavit and the Motion for Summary Judgment | 21 | | LEGAL ARGUMENT | 29 | | I.
[brief] (Aa0089).  Plaintiffs argue that the storm water design fails to meet NJDEP water quality requirements and “violates” Best Management Practices.  (Pb7.)  The Stormwater Management Rules and regulatory scheme, makes clear that “[t]o the maximum extent practicable, the[se] standards ... shall be met by incorporating nonstructural stormwater management strategies ... into the design” of any project.  N.J.A.C. 7:8–5.3(a).  That is, a permit applicant must identify the non-structural strategies incorporated into the project’s design, including, but not limited to, minimizing disturbance, minimizing impervious surfaces, minimizing the use of stormwater pipes, preserving natural drainage features, and increasing natural vegetation.  *N.J.A.C.* 7:8–5.3(b).  **Guidance** for these strategies can be found in the New Jersey Stormwater Best Management Practices Manual 2002 (BMP manual).  *In re: Stormwater Management Rules*, 384 N.J. Super. 451, 456-457 (App. Div. 2006) (emphasis added).  The NJDEP rule citing the BMP Manual describes the Manual as “technical guidance” and “guidelines for stormwater management measures. ”  *See* N.J.A.C. 5.8-5.9.  The BMP Manual is not regulatory.  *See In The Matter of Authorization for Freshwater Wetlands Statewide General Permit* 6, 433 N.J. Super. 385 (App. Div. 2013).  The preamble to the Best Management Practices (“BMP”) Manual on the NJDEP’s website confirms that the BMP Manual is not part of the Stormwater Rules.  Rather, The BMP manual provides examples of ways to meet the standards contained in the rule.  The methods referenced in the BMP manual are one way of achieving the standards.  An applicant is welcome to demonstrate that other proposed management practices will also achieve the standards established in the rules.