ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] A.  THE PROPERTY.  [...] is the owner of property located at [...] (“Property”).  [...] sought preliminary and final site plan approval from the Board to redevelop the Property with a new five-story building.  In order to do so, [...] submitted [...] (“Application”) to the Board.  (Pa10-11).  The Property is located in the City’s R-2 Zone which restricts the building heights to 40’-0” above the Design Flood Elevation (“DFE”).  Under the City of Hoboken’s Zoning Ordinance, a building’s height is measured by the vertical distance from the DFE to the highest beam of the flat roof.  See City of Hoboken Ordinance §196-6.  (Da2).  Certain roof appurtenances, such as parapets, are specifically excluded from the measurement of the building heights.  See City of Hoboken Ordinance §196-23.  (Da3).  B.
[brief] Generally, “[a] trial court’s resolution of a discovery issue is entitled to substantial deference and will not be overturned absent an abuse of discretion. ”  *State v. Stein*, 225 N.J. 582, 593 (2016).  An appellate court defers to the trial court’s decision so long as it is not “so wide [of] the mark that a manifest denial of justice resulted,” *Rowe v. Bell & Gossett Co.*, 239 N.J. 531, 551-52 (2019) (alteration in original) (quoting *Green v. N.J. Mfrs. Ins. Co.*, 160 N.J. 480, 492 (1999)), or is not “based on a mistaken understanding of the applicable law,” *State in Int. of A.B.*, 219 N.J. 542, 554 (2014) (quoting *Pomerantz Paper Corp. v. New Cmty. Corp.*, 207 N.J. 344, 371 (2011)).  It is axiomatic that “[t]he discovery rights provided by our court rules are not instruments with which to annoy, harass or burden a litigant . . . .”  *Gensollen v. Pareja*, 416 N.J. Super. 585, 591 (App. Div. 2010) (citing *R. 4:10-3; Hickman v. Taylor*, 329 U.S. 495, 507–08 (1947)).  “The principles that guide our courts in pretrial discovery matters . . . strive to avoid placing undue burdens upon litigants . . . .”  *In re Pelvic Mesh/Gynecare Litig.*, 426 N.J. Super. 167, 196 (App. Div. 2012).  As such, the range of pretrial discovery “is not limitless.  Meandering expeditions which seek irrelevant, duplicative, oppressive or burdensome discovery are not permitted. ”  *HD Supply Waterworks Grp., Inc. v. Dir., Div. of Taxation*, 29 N.J. Tax 573, 583 (2017).  Rule 4:10-3 “allows a party from whom discovery is sought to obtain relief from the court to limit that discovery in appropriate situations. ”  *Serrano v. Underground Utils. Corp.*, 407 N.J. Super. 253, 267 (App. Div. 2009).  The rule authorizes trial courts to “make any order that justice requires to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense .  . .”  *R. 4:10-3*.
[brief] [...], as Appellant was aware, had requested an accommodation and had been approved to work from home due to an actual medically diagnosed disability.  Pa247–Pa248.  Appellant responded, “[...] really spoke up with our concerns to [...]-  Thank you for reaching out. ”  Pa048; DSOF ¶ 17.  The referenced meeting occurred between [...]ald Geck, Senior Vice President of Claims for [...], and the employees of the claims department including, Appellant, [...], [...] Leger, [...], [...], [...], [...], and [...].  Pa048; DSOF ¶ 18.  At this meeting [...] listened to employee concerns about COVID-19 and discussed the processes that [...] was working to put into place as well as the company’s decision that they would keep the office open unless ordered to close.
[brief] The *Overlook* court identified five considerations in determining whether local action has been preempted by state action.  They are (1) Does the ordinance conflict with state law, (2) Was the state law intended, expressly or impliedly, to be exclusive in the field, (3) Does the subject matter reflect a need for uniformity, (4) Is the state scheme so pervasive or comprehensive that it precludes coexistence of municipal regulation, (5)  Does the ordinance stand "as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives" of the Legislature?  The answer to first two questions in the present matter is an unqualified “no. ”  The express provisions in the Ordinance for an exemption from any restrictions or requirements on poles if those restrictions or requirements conflict with any state or federal law prevents any such real conflict from arising or existing; and the Legislature’s express validation of pre-1898 agreements between municipalities and electric utilities (P.L. 1898, c. 197; and N.J.S.A. 48:7-6’s more recent saving of that law from repeal) establishes that the Legislature did not intend to have exclusive power in the field pertaining to the placement of utility poles.
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GRANT TO [...] SUMMARY JUDGMENT BASED ON HAVING SATISFIED THE REQUIREMENTS FOR ADVERSE POSSESSION.  AS A RESULT OF THIS ERROR, THERE WAS A FAILURE TO GRANT [...]’S REQUEST TO QUIET TITLE WHICH THE APPELLATE COURT IS BEING ASKED TO RECTIFY.  Da203, 1T  Quiet Title law is set forth in N.J.S.A. 2A:62.1 and provides:  Any person in the peaceable possession of lands in this state and claiming ownership thereof, may, when his title thereto, or any part therefor, is denied or disputed, or any other person claims or is claimed to own the same, or any part thereof or interest therein, or to hold a lien encumbrance thereon, and when no such action is pending to enforce or test the validity of such title, claim or encumbrance, maintain such an action in the Superior Court to settle the title to such lands and to clear up all doubts and disputed concerning the same.  N.J.S.A. 2A:62.1.  [...] purchased the property at [...] which is the church proper.  (Pa264, Deed from [...] to [...] dated June 30th, 1976).  Per the Property Identification Document from the [...], the church sits on Lot 19.  The church owns the lot next to the church which is 255-257 and it is Lot 20.  (Da262, Property Identification Document from Newark Tax Assessor).  The church has maintained their Lot 20 and Lot 22 for the duration of their presence at the noted address.  First Zion had been in peaceable possession of Lot 20 and Lot 22 for a period of 36 years when the interest in this property was challenged by [...].
[brief] [...]’s decision below expertly explained why the Board’s interpretation of “designated representatives” is incorrect.  (Pa232-Pa233).  In the instant appeal, [...] again explained how the [...]’s actions were consistent with the NJEERA.  (Rb8-Rb11).  The [...] supports and adopts [...]’s arguments and wishes to further explain why [...]’s decision was not arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable.
[brief] This case concerns an oil spill that occurred at plaintiff, [...]’s (“[...]”) truck/trailer storage facility located in Newark near the Port of Newark.  The spill happened when a driver for defendant, [...] (“[...]”), negligently scraped his trailer on the neighboring parked trailer as he was pulling out of his parking spot.  This ripped open the container causing its waste oil content to gush out (the “Incident”).  The Incident was uniquely caught on a surveillance camera.
[brief] ”  Id. at 367 (quoting Rendine, 141 N.J. at 336).  “[T]he focus of that determination is to ascertain what fee is reasonable, taking into account the hours expended, the lawyer’s customary hourly rate, the success achieved, the risk of non-payment, and other material factors. ”  Id. at 358-59 (citing Rendine, 141 N.J. at 334-45).  The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit stated that “[t]he district court should exclude hours that are not reasonably expended.  Hours are not reasonably expended if they are excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary. ”\(^1\) Rendine, 141 N.J. at 335 (quoting Rode v. Dellarciprete, 892 F.2d 1177, 1183 (3d Cir.1990) (citations omitted)).  [...] cites Hansen v. Rite Aid Corp., 253 N.J. 191, 221 (2023) and Grow Co., Inc. v. Chokshi, 424 N.J. Super 357, 365 (App. Div. 2012) in support of its appeal, but neither of those cases stands for the proposition that a court must assert a rigid and painstakingly detailed financial analysis to support a reduction in the hours billed.
[brief] The Text And Structure Of The Relevant Statutes Show That A Personal Injury Protection No-Fault Arbitration Was Designed By The Legislature To Be Limited In Subject Matter, Parties And Scope.  “The goal of PIP is to provide prompt medical treatment for those who have been injured in automobile accidents without having that treatment delayed because of payment disputes. ”  Selective Ins. Co. of Am. v. Hudson E. Pain Mgmt. Osteopathic Med., 210 N.J. 597, 609 (2012).  “The role of arbitration in automobile insurance matters is to provide for the prompt payment of PIP benefits to ensure that people legitimately injured because of an automobile accident receive reasonable and necessary medical treatment in a prompt and expeditious manner. ”  *Allstate Ins. Co. v. Lopez*, 311 N.J. Super. 660, 678 (Law Div. 1998).  “The evident purpose of [N.J.S.A. 39:6A-5.1] is to establish an expeditious non-judicial procedure for resolving any dispute regarding the payment of PIP benefits, in furtherance of the No-Fault Act’s objectives of facilitating ‘prompt and efficient provision of benefits for all accident injury victims .  . . .’”  *Endo Surgi Ctr., P.C. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co.*, 391 N.J. Super. 588, 594 (App. Div. 2007) (quoting *Gambino v. Royal Globe Ins. Cos.*, 86 N.J. 100, 105, 107 (1981)).  By contrast, the goal of the IFPA is “to confront aggressively the problem of insurance fraud in New Jersey. ”  N.J.S.A.17:33A-2.  It provides a private right of action in the Superior Court for an insurance company damaged as a result of any violation of its provisions.  The goals of the IFPA is not to facilitate efficient benefits payments; it is to root out fraud.
[brief] See, e.g., \textit{In re Adoption of Unif. Housing Affordability Controls}, 390 N.J. Super 89 (App. Div. 2007) (in rejecting arguments that the New Jersey Housing and Mortgage Finance Agency should have held broader proceedings to build a more detailed record as part of adopting certain regulations, the Court cited long held principle of administrative law that administrative agencies have wide discretion in selecting the means to fulfill their legislatively-delegated duties and courts normally defer to that choice so long as the selecting is responsive to the purpose and function of the agency).  All of the foregoing is undisputed by [...].  Although [...] leaves route selection to utilities like [...] who understand the system topography, [...]’s planning approval under federal law of the need for, and major elements and components of, the Union County Project leaves no room for the Ordinance’s local regulatory regime purporting to regulate, among other things, the precise pole placement in the public right of way, pole height, pole diameter, and pole material.
[brief] There were no promises or pressure to induce either witness to provide a statement.  (5T43-25 to 44-8).  Indeed, the lead detective—[...]—did not even know who [...] was prior to the interview.  (5T41-2 to 5).  While [...] was in custody, he was a “voluntary participant. ” (5T39-10 to 40-5).  His arrest was unrelated to the instant case, and although he potentially had a “motive to . . . make a deal for himself,” this was fairly typical under those circumstances.  (5T39-11 to 40-6; 5T43-15 to 24).  [...] also had a significant criminal record and would have understood that his statement could be used in court.  (5T44-9 to 13).  [...] was not in handcuffs during the interview, which was “quite conversational. ” (5T41-12 to 20).  The interview was “unstructured,” with the officers seeing what [...] “had to say. ” (5T41-21 to 42-1).  Contrary to his testimony that he was just telling the police “what they wanted to hear,” [...] denied some of the assertions in the officers’ questions.  (5T47-7 to 17).  With regard to [...], [...] found her trial testimony “wholly incredible and [an] act of feigned lack of memory.
[brief] 31  C.J.S. Estoppel, ................................................................. 25 s 120, page 384  Meriam-Webster Online Dictionary ...........................................  20  https://www.merriam-webster. com/dictionary/within (last visited Feb. 26, 2024).  Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J Court Rules .......................... 18, 19 cmt. 1 on R. 4:30A (2023)
[brief] The trial court also erred when it held as follows:  “While not dispositive, the fact that there were no significant reports of any prior incidents in the lot militates against a finding of an intentional wrong by [...] with respect to requiring employees to utilize the lot. ”  Pa11.  Contrary to the trial court’s conclusion that the absence of prior incidents “militates” against a finding of an intentional wrong, the New Jersey Supreme Court has held that “the absence of a prior accident does **not** preclude a finding of an intentional wrong.
[directive] you also plead guilty to possessing a weapon, other than a firearm, under circumstances not manifestly appropriate for lawful use of the weapon while committing, attempting to commit or conspiring to commit any of these offenses you will receive a consecutive sentence for possessing the weapon?  날짜/Date 피고인/Defendant 피고측 변호인/Defense Attorney 검사/Prosecutor 지령 제01-18호(02/23/2018)에 의거 공포된 양식, CN 11169-Korean Form Promulgated by Directive #01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 11169-Korean AVISO:
[brief] 2T282:8-13; 2T291:4-7; 3T21:4-12.  [...] never accepted in writing any of [...]’s proposed extensions or modifications.  2T282:21-24; 2T291:13-15; 3T7:24 to 8:1; 3T20:9-15; 3T28:13 to 29:19; 3T143:13-15; 3T150:6-8.  [...] also provided “in-kind” services and materials to [...] in 2011-2013, the value of which was to offset a portion of interest related to the $330,000 Loan.  Da132; 3T:165: to 166:10; 3T166:21 to 168:18.  Such “in-kind” services included graphic arts, website development, promotional materials, and marketing materials for [...]’ activities associated with his Team USA Camp.  Da132; 3T:165: to 166:10; 3T166:21 to 168:18.  In April 2013, [...] obtained refinancing of a commercial property to gain sufficient resources to pay the entire principal owed to [...].
[directive] a.  Residence Parameters for HDLE.  i.  The defendant must have a stable residence/address and cannot be “homeless,” cannot reside in a shelter, and cannot be in “transient housing” (by definition a shelter and transient housing are not a stable residence).  ii.  The defendant must confirm the type of his or her dwelling.  The defendant must confirm they have access to the residence 24 hours/7days a week.  If the defendant is not the homeowner, access shall include permission granted by the homeowner for the defendant to reside there.  The court must enter a colloquy with the homeowner to confirm the defendant has permission to reside at the home.  If the homeowner is unavailable, defense counsel must proffer that they have spoken directly to the homeowner and the homeowner  The court has confirmed the defendant has permission to reside at the home.  may not order a defendant to reside at a home without confirming that the defendant has permission to reside therein.  The defendant must confirm status of other residents residing in the proposed home, specifically, if anyone residing in the residence is currently on Pretrial Monitoring, Probation, Parole, or is charged with a pending criminal offense in New Jersey or any other jurisdiction.
[brief] The police retrieved the box with [...]'s old boots (16T73-15 to 16T73-19;20T68-8 to 13).  [...] was unsure as to what happened next (16T75-22 to 25).  He testified:  "I think he ended up dropping me off.  We were about to be dropped off.  I guess he was -- I guess ended up calling it a night.  He was going to drop me off" (16T76-8 to 11).  But [...] also said they "were going to the [...] house" (16T76-22).  After reading his prior police statement, [...] said he and defendant discussed "Getting some money for drugs" after they left K-Mart (16T79-5 to 8).  They passed [...]'s house and "decided to go try to get some cash real quick" from "[...]'s house" (16T79-18 to 23).
[brief] That analysis applies to the waiver of a contractual right, as of any other.  As [...] noted in dissent below, a contractual waiver “normally is effective” without proof of “detrimental reliance. ”  992 F.3d at 716; see Cabinetree of Wisconsin, Inc. v. Kraftmaid Cabinetry, Inc., 50 F.3d 388, 390 (C.A.7 1995) (Posner, C. J., for the Court).  So in demanding that kind of proof before finding the waiver of an arbitration right, the Eighth Circuit applies a rule found nowhere else—consider it a bespoke rule of waiver for arbitration.
[brief] THE TRIAL COURTS DECISIONS AS A WHOLE DO NOT RISE TO THE LEVEL OF CUMULATIVE ERROR JUSTIFYING A NEW TRIAL.  An appellate court may reverse a trial court’s judgment if “the cumulative effect of small errors [is] so great as to work prejudice[.]”  Pellicer v. St. Barnabas Hosp., 200 N.J. 22, 53 (2009).  A cumulative error analysis does not “simply entail[] counting mistakes, because even a large number of errors, if inconsequential, may not operate to create an injustice. ”  Id. at 55.  When “legal errors are manifest that might individually not be of such magnitude to require reversal but which, considered in their aggregate, have caused [a party] to receive less than a fair trial,” a new trial is warranted.
[brief] PLAINTIFF’S CROSS-APPEAL SHOULD BE GRANTED  BECAUSE THE MERITLESS MOTION AND APPEAL WERE FILED IN BAD FAITH AND LACKED A COGNIZABLE BASIS UPON WHICH RELIEF COULD BE GRANTED.  (T18-19)  ...........................................................................................................25  CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................29  TABLE OF ORDERS BEING APPEALED  Order denying defendant’s motion for reconsideration, granting Plaintiff’s cross-motion to discharge lis pendens, and denying Plaintiff’s cross-motion for the imposition of sanctions entered on April 26, 2024 ........................................Da60
[brief] 27 Michaels v. State of N.J., 955 F.Supp. 315 (D.N.J. 1996) ......................................................... 25, 26 Montgomery v. De Simone, 159 F.3d 120 (3d Cir. 1998) ................................................................. 22 Mosley v. State of New Jersey et al., [...] ................................................................. 4 Ormsby v. Luzerne County Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, 149 Fed. Appx. 60 (3d Cir. 2005) ......................................................... 22 Oshiver v. Levin, Fishbein, Sedran & Berman, 38 F.3d 1380 (3d Cir. 1994) ................................................................. 22 Quigley v. KPMG Peat Marwick, LLP, 330 N.J. Super. 252 (App. Div. 2000) .................................................. 19 Ricci v. Ricci, 448 N.J Super. 546 (App. Div. 2017) .................................................. 33 Selective Ins. Co. of Am. v. Rothman, 208 N.J. 580 (2012) ........................................................................... 13 Silver Enters., Inc. v. Twp. of Freehold, 2008 WL 4068156 (D.N.J. Aug. 22, 2008) .......................................... 22 Smith v. Holtz, 87 F.3d 108 (1996) ............................................................................ 25 State ex re. M.P., 450 N.J. Super. 539 (App. Div. 2017) .................................................. 36 State v. Harris, 282 N.J. Super. 409 (1995) ................................................................ 35 State v. K.P.S., 221 N.J. 266 (2015) ........................................................................... 21 State v. Kyles, 132 N.J. Super. 397 (App. Div. 1975) .................................................. 12 State v. Marshall, 123 N.J. 1 (1991) .............................................................................. 35 State v. Mosley, 232 N.J. 169 (2018) .................................................. 23 State v. Tropea, 78 N.J. 309 (1978) ........................................................................................................... 28 Stolinski v. Pennypacker, 772 F.Supp.2d 626 (D.N.J. 2012) .................................................................................. 24 Sutter v. Horizon Blue Cross Blue Shield of N.J., 406 N.J. Super. 86 (App. Div. 2009) ............................................................................... 33 Templo Fuente De Vida Corp. v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, 224 N.J. 189 (2016)
[brief] Any person who, at the time of an automobile accident resulting in injuries to that person, is required but fails to maintain medical expense benefits coverage mandated by section 4 of P.L. 1972, c. 70 (C. 39:6A-4), section 4 of P.L. 1998, c. 21 (C. 39:6A-3.1) or section 45 of P.L. 2003, c. 89 (C. 39:6A-3.3) shall have no cause of action for recovery of economic or noneconomic loss sustained as a result of an accident while operating an uninsured automobile.  Plaintiff concedes that on April 12, 2011, he "fail[ed] to maintain" the mandated medical expense benefits coverage required under N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.5(a).
[brief] The pertinent procedural history and statement of facts in this matter are as follows:  Per the incomplete discovery documents from the Plaintiff, on November 7, 2021, unidentified caller [...], phoned [...] stating the nature of her call was a female spit on her/brought uncle’s truck back and female jumped out and started threatening [...] with the incident type flagged as “fight” (AP 1).  On the same day, Burlington Township Police incident details indicate, when patrols arrived, the defendant was onsite and complained that she was having issues with residents located at [...]’ home.  [...]’ friend, [...], surprisingly comes out of nowhere and confirms the nature of a separate verbal dispute between him and the defendant with both parties advised of their options to file complaints.  The incident details indicate there were no further issues at the --- 1 Procedural History and Statement of Facts are combined due to Appellant’s ADA medical conditions [1T60:1, 1T63:1 -11/29/2022]
[brief] (Da104-05).  Although Appellants had claimed that this policy would also apply to cisgender students who request the same change, the court aptly noted: “who but transgender, gender non-conforming, and non-binary students would request public and social accommodations or express a change in gender identity and expression?”  Ibid.  For similar reasons, the court found that the Amended Policy would likely have a disparate impact: transgender, gender non-conforming, and non-binary students would experience “far greater incidence of parental disclosure of their gender identity or expression, and, with it, a far greater risk of harm from this involuntary disclosure. ” (Da107).  Finally, the trial court found that remaining equitable factors also weighed in the State’s favor.  (Da112-15).  The court found both that transgender youth already face a heightened risk of mental health challenges, suicide, illicit drug dependency, and infliction of physical or emotional harm by immediate family members—and that mandatory disclosure of their gender identity or expression under the Amended Policy risked exacerbating those harms.
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT’S FINDINGS OF FACT WITH REGARD TO DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO VACATE DEFAULT WERE SUPPORTED BY ADEQUATE, SUBSTANTIAL AND CREDIBLE EVIDENCE  The findings of fact and legal conclusions made by the trial judge in ruling on the underlying motion should be reviewed under the “abuse of discretion” standard i.e., they are considered binding on appeal when supported by adequate, substantial and credible evidence.  New Jersey Turnpike Authority v. Sisselman, supra at 362.  Defendant’s sought relief from the default judgment under R. 4:50-1(a), (d), (e), and (f).  The trial court found Defendant did not address subsection (a) in his moving papers and was therefore deemed to have abandoned the request for relief under that subsection of the Rule.