ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] UWAGA:  Niniejszy dokument jest dokumentem publicznym, co oznacza, że na żądanie może on zostać udostępniony do wglądu publicznego w przedłożonej formie.  Z tego względu proszę nie podawać w nim osobistych identyfikatorów, takich jak numer ubezpieczenia społecznego (social security), numer prawa jazdy, numer tablicy rejestracyjnej pojazdu, numer polisy ubezpieczeniowej, numery aktywnych kont bankowych lub kart kredytowych.  NOTICE:  This is a public document, which means the document as submitted will be available to the public upon request.  Therefore, do not enter personal identifiers on it, such as Social Security number, driver’s license number, vehicle plate number, insurance policy number, active financial account number, or active credit card number.  Pozwy, wnioski oraz wszelkie inne dokumenty składane w sądzie powinny być w języku angielskim Complaints, motions and other papers submitted to the court should be in English  Sądownictwo w New Jersey  New Jersey Judiciary  Uzupełniający formularz oświadczenia w odpowiedzi na zarzuty w przypadkach nienegocjowanych oświadczeń o przyznaniu się do winy Supplemental Plea Form for Non-Negotiated Pleas (Polish) należy wypełnić wyłącznie w sprawach, w których oskarżony przyznaje się do winy Niniejszy formularz w oparciu o oświadczenie sędziego co do tego, jaka będzie maksymalna kara.
[brief] THE DECISION BELOW WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE AND SHOULD THEREFORE BE REVERSED.  (Not Raised Below).  The substantial evidence presented does not support the final agency determination made by the [...].  Substantial evidence has been defined alternately as "such evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion," and "evidence furnishing a reasonable basis for the agency's action."  Figueroa v. N.J. Dep't of Corr., 414 N.J. Super. 186, 192 (App. Div. 2010) (citations omitted).  The Board’s determination references a “presumption” that mail properly addressed with proper postage was received by the party it was addressed to.  However, [...] certified in an affidavit provided to the Board that he never received a postcard from the Division, regardless of if it was ever sent.  This affidavit should overcome any presumption that the postcard was received.  The Board’s decision failed to consider the almost one hundred affidavits of other active and retired troopers who also did not receive a postcard from the Division notifying them of the Ricci Act that were submitted to the Board in support of [...]’s appeal.  As such, the finding that it was “undisputed” that the Division sent the postcard to [...] (and others) is not supported by the facts and evidence presented.  Furthermore, any presumption claimed by the Board has clearly been rebutted by the overwhelming evidence presented in this matter.  Considering the evidence presented, the agency’s action does not have a reasonable basis.  Additionally, the Board failed to consider the evidence presented demonstrating that Registrations Forms submitted were not accepted by the Division because the Trooper(s) who submitted them were not sick at the time the Registration Form was sent.  [...] attempted to file an Eligibility Registration Form back in September of 2019.  [...] was denied the ability to register because he was told the Ricci Bill “is for those who are currently sick.  Not for possible future illnesses. ”  Pa130.  The Board also failed to consider the evidence presented regarding the [...] membership polling.  [...], President of the [...], polled his membership to ascertain whether anyone received notice of the Ricci Act.  Of the fifty-nine (59) [...] members (retired troopers) who responded to the polling, fifty-seven (57) did not receive any notice of the Ricci Act.  The Board ignored the evidence from this polling when making its determination.  In light of all of the evidence presented on [...]’s behalf, a reasonable mind could only conclude that these postcards were never received.  Without proper notice, [...] should have been permitted to register for the Ricci Act.  Therefore, the determination below should be reversed because it is against the substantial weight of the evidence.
[brief] Punitive Damages.  [...]’ assertion that the Special Master’s finding that there was “some factual overlap” between [...]’s punitive damages claims and RICO claims did not “justify an award of all fees expended on the punitive damages claims,” is unsupported by the record.  [...] rejected this very argument in connection with his decision on [...]’s fee application in 2013, and the Appellate Division did not disturb this finding.  Moreover, in connection with [...]’s fee application on remand, [...] explained in detail the bases for his conclusion that “a changed statute of limitations for liability has no bearing on [his] reasoning for recommending that Plaintiffs’ RICO claims and punitive damages claims stem from a common core of facts. ”  (Da39069-71.)  That is, [...]’s success on the non-RICO tort claims, including its punitive damages claim, led to its ability to prove the RICO claims.
[brief] In proceedings before the lower court, Defendants expended massive efforts attempting to show when, what, and how Relator was set on the trial of the fraud, the idea being that whatever set Relator on the trail of the fraud could also have set the government on the same trail.  And there were intense factual disputes about that issue.  Ja3886-88 (\textsection 107); 3T}  The very essence of what Relator did was comb through millions of transactions to, first, identify the rate-setting practices of Defendants and, once it had done so, assess whether they were fraudulent and, ultimately, figure out how the fraud was perpetrated, where, and by which RMAs.  See Ja2284-90.  Crucially, New Jersey would have had to do the exact same thing to find the fraud.  No factual material suggests that this could have happened or, at the very least, there is a factual question about whether it could have.  And, even if some New Jersey government official could obtain all the data necessary from the EMMA Portal, it would have to devise a methodology to analyze that data to locate any fraud, like [...] himself and an expert that was retained by [...]’s counsel did.
[brief] The scope of appellate review of an agency’s decision is exceptionally narrow.  The New Jersey Supreme Court has recognized that “[i]n light of the executive function of administrative agencies, judicial capacity to review administrative actions is severely limited. ”  See Mazza v. Bd. of Trs., Police & Firemen’s Ret. Sys., 143 N.J. 22, 25 (1995); see also Allstars Auto. Grp., Inc. v. N.J. Motor Vehicle Comm’n, 234 N.J. 150, 157 (2018) (citing Russo v. Bd. of Trs., Police & Firemen’s Ret. Sys., 206 N.J. 14, 27 (2011)).  Appellate courts review agency decisions under the heightened arbitrary and capricious standard.  See Melnyk v. Bd. of Educ. of the Delsea Reg’l High Sch. Dist., 241 N.J. 31, 40 (2020).  “An agency’s determination on the merits will be sustained unless there is a clear showing that it is arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable, or that it lacks fair support in the record.  Saccone v. Bd. of Trs., Police & Firemen’s Ret. Sys., 219 N.J. 369, 380 (2014) (quoting Russo, 206 N.J. at 27); Zimmerman v. Sussex Cnty. Educ. Servs. Comm’n, 237 N.J. 465, 475 (2019).  Here, [...] bears the burden of making a showing of three inquiries: (1) whether the agency’s action violates express or implied legislative policies, that is, did the agency follow the law; (2) whether the record contains substantial evidence to support the findings on which the agency based its action; and (3) whether in applying the legislative policies to the facts, the agency clearly erred in reaching a conclusion that could not reasonably have been made on a showing of the relevant factors.
[brief] (Pa800 at 21:13-22:1-4).  Additionally, [...] Senior Construction Engineer [...] was shown the “snapshot” of the condition that caused his accident and [...] agreed that settlement at that location would be dangerous to users of the roadway.  (Pa801 at 28:3-16 and Pa1421).  It was recommended to the [...] on two separate occasions that the settlement condition at the abutment joint should be repaired; the first time was following the April 22, 2015 inspection and the second time following the June 24, 2015 inspection.  (Pa1343, Pa1191).  Following the second inspection, it was recommended that the settlement undergo “immediate repair/testing”.  (Pa1191).  According to [...] engineer [...] [...], that means within 24 hours.  (Pa799 at 19:2-16).  However, despite being told to repair the condition, there is absolutely no evidence of the settlement being repaired until November 17, 2015, almost seven months after first being told to repair it.
[brief] And that provides in pertinent part, “to the fullest extent permitted by law, the customer shall defend, indemnify, and hold harmless the contractor, its owners, agents, consultants, employees, and subcontractors from all claims for bodily injury and property damage that may arise from customer’s premises, including any acts or omissions by customer or customer’s subcontractor, whether employed directly or indirectly for ice which forms from daytime melting from snow and ice which is removed from, eroded by, or in between vehicles. ”  1T 20:16-25 and 21:1-4.  Notably, the court further analyzed the language at the top of paragraph 4, which provides in pertinent part, “to the fullest extent permitted by law, the customer shall defend, indemnify, and hold harmless,” and it goes on from there, “for damages arising from the customer’s premises, including any acts or omissions by customer or customer subcontractor, whether employed directly or indirectly. ”  Da45.  The Honorable [...], J.S.C., found that paragraph four (4) is consistent with the verbiage in paragraph two (2).
[brief] [...]  A Member of the Firm  Dated: February 1, 2024  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE  DIVISION DOCKET NO. [...]  [...], individually and derivatively on behalf of [...], Plaintiff-Appellant, v. [...], [...], [...], [...], JOHN DOES 1-5 (said names being fictitious), and ABC CORPORATIONS 1-5 (said entities being fictitious), Defendants-Respondents, [...], Counterclaimant/Third Party Plaintiff, v. [...], Third Party Defendant.
[brief] On March 2, 2022, counsel for Defendants [...] and [...] issued correspondence to the Court requesting permission to submit to the Court (as part of the cross motions for summary judgment) the lease entered into between Plaintiff and the immediately prior tenant at the Leased Premises.  DKVa 001.  The Court heard oral argument on the cross motions on July 29, 2022.  T1.  On August 1, 2022 the Court issued two orders providing its rulings on the cross-motions for summary judgment.
[brief] (Pb10).  This argument fails because the Board provided adequate notice of the law.  The only express notice requirement contained in the Ricci Act provides that the Board must “notify members and retirants in the retirement system of the enactment of this act, P.L.2019, c.157, within 30 days of enactment.  N.J.S.A. 53:5A-10(e)(4).  On August 7, 2019, the [...] satisfied this notice requirement when it added information about the Ricci Act to its website.  (Pa10).  That notice satisfied the Ricci Act, which requires only that the Board notify members of the enactment of the statute.
[brief] However, Henderson did discuss how multiple viewings can affect the reliability of an identification.  As the Court explained, “[v]iewing a suspect more than once during an investigation can affect the reliability of the later identification,” and “successive views of the same person can make it difficult to know whether the later identification stems from a memory of the original event or a memory of the earlier identification procedure. ”  Id. at 255.  The Court explained that these multiple viewings create risks of “mugshot exposure” and “mugshot commitment. ”  Ibid.  As explained in [...]’s initial brief, the risks of mugshot exposure and commitment are the exact same whether the multiple viewings occur in different identification procedures, as discussed by the Court in Henderson, or the same identification procedure, as addressed in [...]’s brief.
[brief] ”  R. 4:73-1.  “The summary nature of the proceedings authorized by the rule should not be construed as in any way precluding the condemnee from an appropriate opportunity to object to the proposed condemnation. ”  Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules, cmt. 4 on R. 4:73-1 (citing Bergen Cnty. v. S. Goldberg & Co., 39 N.J. 377 (1963)).  “The power of condemnation being in derogation of property rights, it is required to be strictly construed and all statutory prerequisites must be established to sustain its exercise.
[brief] The Complaint in this matter alleges a breach of contract action which arose from an agreement between [...] (“[...]”) and [...] a/k/a [...] (“[...]”) pursuant to which [...] installed wood-trim in [...]’s new home at [...] (the “Property”).  Da001.  On or about June 2, 2022, the principal of [...] engaged in a text message exchange with [...] in which the principal of [...] asked, “Do you want a formal contract” and [...] replied “I’ll get it to you Wednesday morning.  I’m away. ”  On June 16, 2022 [...] texted again, stating, “Please forward $10,000 invoice and I’ll get check prepared today. ” and the principal of [...] replied, “Do you want me to come to your office to sign the contract”.  [...] replied, “Just scan it to me.  I’ll be on site today to deliver check”  Pa005.  [...] signed a subcontractor contract with [...] which is dated the 8th day of June 2022 (the “Contract”).  Da067.  In paragraph 6 of his Answer, [...] admitted that he prepared the Contract.  Da010.  [...] alleges that it is owed $112,412 for work completed to date but has been paid only $76,187.  Da002.  [...] alleges that [...] has refused to pay [...] the outstanding balance due to [...] for work it has completed.  Da003.  [...] filed its complaint alleging Breach of Contract, Breach of the Implied Duty of Good Faith and Fair Dealing, Fraud, and Implied Contract/Unjust Enrichment on February 14, 2023.  Da001.  [...] filed an Answer, Counterclaim and Affirmative Defenses on April 3, 2023.  Da010.  [...] filed its Answer to Counterclaim and Affirmative Defenses on April 26, 2023.  Da019.  The parties then engaged in discovery and motion practice, during which [...] denied the existence of a contract with [...] and asserted that he did not sign a contract.  Pa041, Pa040, Pa047.  On March 13, 2024, [...]’s attorney sent a letter to counsel for [...] asking that the matter proceed to arbitration in accordance with language found exclusively in the June 8, 2022 contract.  Da078.  On March 14, 2024, [...]’s attorney took the deposition of [...]’s construction site supervisor, [...] (“[...]”).  Pa006.  During his deposition, [...] was shown a copy of the Contract and was asked if he knew if Mr. [...] prepared it.  Pa019.  [...] replied “This agreement was prepared by Mr. [...]. ”  Pa020.  One week later, [...]’s Motion to Stay Proceedings was filed.  Da041.  LEGAL ARGUMENT I.
[brief] As documented by the experts, [...] engaged in deliberate and persistent non-compliance with OSHA regulations and ANSI standards, its own site-specific health and safety requirements and contract and industry standards.  Plaintiffs’ expert noted 27 violations, and the post-death inquiry by OSHA confirmed violations on the night [...] was killed.  Plaintiffs identified six specific areas of safety protocols and devices that were known and ignored.  Required night lighting, audible backup alarms, properly functioning mirrors, use of a dedicated dump truck, and use of spotters were all available options at little or no cost.  On a larger scale, there was no plan.  The contract, specifications, HASP and ANSI all called for an Internal Traffic Control Plan.  [...] had none.  That the driver was known to drive dangerously, too fast and unsafely and that the employer did nothing to stop him are key facts to be considered in the totality of the circumstances analysis.  A known dangerous driver and lack of any plan for traffic control created a context in which a horrific injury was substantially certain to occur and did occur.  That is not the type of conduct or context that the Legislature meant to immunize the employer and to deny full compensation to the injured employee or his survivors.  Summary judgment should be denied.
[brief] N.J.S.A. 20:3-8; State v. N.J. Zinc Co., 40 N.J. 560, 572 (1963); State v. Orenstein, 124 N.J. Super. 295, 298 (App. Div. 1973).  That process includes a full evidentiary hearing when any party objects to the right to condemn.  R. 4:67-5.  Bergen Cnty., supra, 39 N.J. at 380-81.  Indeed, the adjudication of the right to condemn is a final adjudication.  N.J.S.A. 20:3-2(j); R. 2:2-3; State by Comm’r of Transp. v. Hess Realty Corp., 226 N.J. Super. 256, 261 (App. Div. 1988), certif. denied, 113 N.J. 383, aff’d, 115 N.J. 229 (1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 964 (1989); N.J. Zinc, supra, 40 N.J. at 572; Tennessee Gas Transmission Co. v. Hirschfield, 38 N.J. Super. 132 (App. Div. 1955); Twp. of W. Windsor v. Nierenberg, 285 N.J. Super. 436, 440 n.1 (App. Div. 1955), rev’d on other grounds, 150 N.J. 111 (1996).
[directive] 7.5.2  N.J.R.E. 503(a) states that "no person has the privilege to refuse to submit to examination for the purpose of discovering or recording his corporal features and other identifying characteristics or his physical or mental condition."  Evidence that may be obtained or procedures that may be used to obtain evidence under this rule include: (a) Breath sample; (b) Blood sample; (c) Buccal swab; (d) Requiring suspect to speak; (e) Voice recordings; (f) Participation in a lineup; (g) Handwriting samples; (h) Hair and saliva samples; (i) Urine specimens; (j) Video recording; and (k) Field sobriety tests.  7.5.3  For internal affairs investigations that may result in a criminal prosecution, physical tests should be conducted pursuant to a court order or an investigative detention under Rule 3:5A.
[brief] Plaintiffs appeal from orders granting Defendants’ motions for summary judgment and denying reconsideration in this obstetrical medical malpractice and wrongful death case involving the birth of the infant Plaintiff, [...], who was delivered by the on call attending, non-party [...], via emergency C-Section on at 10:27pm on August 18, 2014.  Plaintiffs alleged the second year obstetrical resident, [...], and their personal attending obstetrician, [...], who was not present in the hospital, failed to call for the emergency section and/or request the assistance of Dr. Balazs sooner, which Plaintiffs claimed would have resulted in an earlier delivery and avoided the infant’s injuries and death.  Yet, the undisputed evidence confirmed [...] was in the operating room performing a C-Section on his own patient and could not have delivered this baby any earlier than he did.  As a result, Plaintiffs’ dismissed any claim against him.  But even assuming he was called earlier and decided to deliver [...] first, an impossible hypothetical scenario unsupported by the facts, the delivery still would not have occurred within the time Plaintiffs’ experts testified was necessary to offer a chance for a better outcome.  Indeed, Plaintiffs’ liability expert testified that even if everything moved perfectly within the standard of care, at best, the delivery would have occurred 17-22 minutes earlier, which was outside the window Plaintiffs’ causation expert testified might change the outcome.  When Defendants first moved for summary judgment in 2020, the initial judge denied the motion based on a cursory review of the briefs and allowed for additional discovery.  After the completion of discovery, in 2023, Defendants moved for reconsideration and renewed the motion, which was assigned to a second judge since the first judge had retired.  The second judge engaged in a detailed analysis of the record and correctly concluded Plaintiffs had failed to present sufficient evidence upon which a jury could find proximate cause, which she detailed in two written opinions.  Essentially, the trial court found Plaintiffs’ entire case was based upon speculation and theories not supported by the factual evidence, including the testimony of Plaintiffs’ own experts.  As Plaintiffs failed to present a *prima facie* case of medical malpractice, the orders entered on July 17, 2023 and September 29, 2023 were properly entered and should be affirmed.  PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[brief] *Spectraserv*, 416 N.J. Super. at 578 (rejecting a request that sought the agency’s “entire project file” as “overly broad and generalized and therefore improper under OPRA”); *Bent*, 381 N.J. Super. at 33-34 (affirming the denial of a request seeking the requestor’s “entire [criminal] file,” including the factual basis for his charges).
[brief] ”  (Pa41).  C&D transmitted [...]’s petition as a contested matter to the Office of Administrative Law, where it was assigned to an ALJ.  (Pa39).  On September 7, 2022, the [...] moved for summary decision, and [...] opposed the motion and cross-moved to place the matter on the inactive list, pending the Appellate Division’s decision on the State Board’s order suspending his teaching certificates.
[brief] Similarly, although a defendant’s refusal to admit guilt following conviction is not germane to sentencing, *State v. Poteet*, 61 N.J. 493 (1972); *State v. Marks*, 201 N.J. Super. 514, 539-540 (App. Div. 1985), the sentencing court may consider a lack of remorse as a basis for finding a risk of reoffending as an aggravating factor.  *State v. Carey*, 168 N.J. 413, 426-427 (2001) (finding based on letter defendant wrote to the court); *State v. O’Donnell*, 117 N.J. 210, 217 (1989) (finding based on evidence adduced before court).
[directive] Is this a preindictment offer or equivalent?  Yes  A.  Waiver of Parole  Ineligibility (“Flat Offer”) - The prosecutor must be satisfied that all of the following eligibility criteria are met (checked “yes”):  1.  The most serious Brimage-eligible offense charged is the school zone offense (N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7) involving 9 9  1.  Yes  No a third degree (or less) amount of drugs.  2.  The defendant is not eligible for an extended term of imprisonment pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6f by virtue 9 9 2.  Yes  No of having previously been convicted of distribution or possession with intent to distribute CDS.  3.  The defendant has not previously been convicted of a first or second degree crime, a crime of any degree 9 9 3.  Yes No involving the possession of a firearm, or of a third degree crime other than for violation(s) of N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10.  4.  The defendant has not previously been adjudicated delinquent for an offense that if committed by an adult 9 9 4.  Yes No would constitute a first or second degree crime or a crime of any degree involving the possession of a firearm.  5.  The defendant at the time of the present offense was not subject to official supervision (parole, probation, 9 9 5.  Yes No ISP, etc.) and has not at any time violated a Drug Offender Restraining Order.  6.  The current offense was not committed while actually on school grounds.  9 9 6.  Yes No 7.  The defendant is not eligible for enhanced punishment pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-8 (distribution to a minor 9 9 7.  Yes No or pregnant female).  8.  The current offense was not committed while the defendant was knowingly involved in criminal street gang related activity.  (“No” selection requires approval by designated supervisor.)  9 9 8.  Yes No  Ineligibility authorized by: 9.  The defendant did not actually or constructively possess a firearm in the present case.  9 9 9.  Yes No 10.  The defendant has no pending indictable charge involving a weapon or any offense that is subject to the 9 9 Yes No 10. provisions of the No Early Release Act N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2. 11.  The defendant has no pending charge for a violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:29-2b (eluding while operating a motor 9 9 11. Yes No vehicle).  Defendant meets all eligibility requirements for a “flat offer” (all “yes” boxes are checked) and is being tendered the following offer: