ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] First, [...] spent most of its brief arguing against relief [...] never sought—vitiating the initial arbitration award on liability.  [...] has never sought such relief.  Thus, all the case law cited by [...] on that issue is irrelevant.  Second, this appeal is not interlocutory, and [...] does not have to meet a heightened evidentiary burden to obtain relief.  [...] appealed as of right and the matter is before the Appellate Division for de novo review.  Third, [...] still has not provided any proof it has complied with the statutory security requirements necessary to lift the automatic stay imposed by N.J.S.A. 2A:15-67 et seq.  Nor does [...] address the fact that [...] was forced to litigate the merits of the issue while the matter should have been stayed.  Finally, [...] completely ignores a major point raised on appeal—that [...] manufactured the alleged “deadlock” by proposing an arbitrator, securing [...]’s agreement, and then rejecting its own selection and instead filing this litigation.  Therefore, [...] essentially concedes that such inequitable conduct precludes the relief it sought in the trial court even if the trial court was authorized to appoint a substitute arbitrator.  In short, the trial court erred by finding it had the authority to appoint a substitute arbitrator at all, that [...] had established the necessary deadlock for an appointment if had the authority, and by ignoring [...]’s right to a statutory stay of proceedings pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:15-67 et seq.  Alone each of those errors is sufficient to warrant reversal.  In combination, they compel it.  Accordingly, for all the foregoing reasons, the trial court’s decision must be reversed, and the parties left to either mutually agree upon an acceptable substitute arbitrator or litigate in their claims in court rather than through arbitration.
[brief] Pa192, at ¶14; Pa195, at ¶12.  •  During their initial meeting, [...] told [...] that [...] and [...] did not need two attorneys and his law firm could represent both of them because they had the same claims and the same damages.  Pa192, at ¶16.  •  On or about September 6, 2017, [...] tells [...] that [...] advised him that Defendants could represent both of their interests in the will contest.  Pa192, at ¶16; Pa195, at ¶13.  •  On September 6, 2017, [...] sent [...] an email informing him that [...] called and advise him that Defendants were representing both [...] and [...] in the will contest.
[brief] ” (6T5-8 to 14).  But the judge noted that she was not going to hold [...] to his testimony because he testified that he was not first in line in the train, recognizing that “[h]e was like behind in the line” and had no personal knowledge of how the door to the third floor was (or was not) breached.  (1T90-7 to 21; 1T97-5 to 98-9; 1T101-17 to 105-22; 6T41-22 to 43-9).  This was pointed out throughout the motion hearings by defendant’s former and current defense counsel, and commented on by the judge.  (4T19-16 to 21-5; 4T22-5 to 6; 4T26-16 to 23; 8T7-9 to 25; 8T12-10 to 13-2; 8T23-2 to 24-4; Da18 to 19).  On May 20, 2024, [...] issued a written opinion and order on both motions.
[brief] (Pa484; Pa492)  Ultimately, the Board voted to deny the Application by a vote of seven (7) in favor and zero (0) against.  (Pa488 to Pa492).  On April 28, 2022, the Board adopted a written resolution denying the Application.  (Pa44).  On June 21, 2022, Plaintiff filed a Complaint in Lieu of Prerogative Writs challenging the denial of the Application on the grounds that the denial was arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable, and that the Board adopted a legally deficient Resolution.
[brief] “The unanimity principle is deeply ingrained in our jurisprudence. ”  State v. Frisby, 174 N.J. 583, 596 (2002).  The ultimate question is “whether ‘the jury instruction [that is given in the case] requires jurors to be in substantial agreement as to just what defendant did’ before determining his guilt or innocence. ”  Id., quoting United States v. Gipson, 553 F. 2d 453, 457 (5th Cir. 1977).  Thus, in Frisby, the instruction was ruled deficient because the general unanimity instruction was seen as not good enough to let the jury know that all twelve jurors deliberating on endangering the welfare of a child would have to agree on whether the defendant had inflicted injury on the child, or simply failed to supervise that child.
[brief] The matter was remanded to the Board for additional findings and conclusions, see letters at Ia238 to Ia239; Ia240 to Ia241; the September 19, 2023 supplemental resolution is at Ia242 to Ia252.  Trial was held on December 20, 2023 (4T).  On January 29, 2024, [...] entered a final order reversing the Board and approving the subdivision.  See Ia269 to Ia270.
[brief] Plaintiff has appealed the trial court’s August 15, 2023, Order denying his motion for reconsideration.  The Appellate Division reviews a trial judge’s decision to grant or deny a motion for reconsideration under R. 4:49-2 for abuse of discretion.  *Branch v. Cream-O-Land Dairy*, 244 N.J. 567, 582; *Kornbleuth v. Westover*, 241 N.J. 289, 235 (2020); *Hoover v. Wetzler*, 472 N.J. Super. 230, 235 (App. Div. 2022).
[brief] The loss must be a reasonably certain consequence of the breach, even though the exact amount of the loss need not be certain.  _Kozlowski v. Kozlowski_, 80 N.J. 378, 388 (1979).  If a claim for loss is challenged as something less than the precise calculation of damages, it is sufficient that the plaintiff prove damages with such certainty “as the nature of the case may permit, laying a foundation which will enable the trier of the facts to make a fair and reasonable estimate. ”  _Totaro_, 191 N.J. at 14.  In other words, upon a finding that damages have occurred, “a reasonable estimate” of the amount beyond “mere speculation” has been held to be sufficient.  See _Caldwell v. Haynes_, 136 N.J. 422, 442 (1994).  The Trial Court also has the authority to make appropriate equitable adjustments and should have reserved that determination until after a full trial on all issues.
[brief] ”  *Victory* Entm't, Inc. v. Schibell, No. A-3388-16T2, 2018 WL 3059696, at (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. June 21, 2018) (Pa067) (citation omitted); see also Dailey v. Borough of Highlands, for instance, where the Appellate Division concluded that Atalese was inapplicable to a contract between a business and a municipality, because “Atalese was primarily driven by the fact that it was examining a consumer contract” and, generally speaking, “the sophistication of the parties may bear on whether they knowingly and voluntarily agreed to a contract's terms.
[brief] COUNT I FOR NEGLIGENT, RECKLESS & WANTON VIOLATION OF PLAINTIFF’S RIGHTS WAS PROPERLY PLEAD**  42 U.S.C.A. § 1983, is a means of vindicating rights guaranteed in the United States Constitution and federal statutes.  *Baker v. McCollan*, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n. 3 (1979).  The New Jersey Civil Rights Act provides, in relevant part:  Any person who has been deprived of any substantive due process or equal protection rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or any substantive rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of this State, or whose exercise or enjoyment of those substantive rights, privileges or immunities has been interfered with or attempted to be interfered with, by threats, intimidation or coercion by a person acting under color of law, may bring a civil action for damages and for injunctive or other appropriate relief.  [N.J.S.A. 10:6-2(c) (emphasis added).
[brief] Those facts bear no resemblance to those in this case.  Indeed, the test as stated in Wein is:  [T]he court should consider the totality of circumstances to evaluate whether a party has waived the right to object to arbitration after the matter has been ordered to arbitration and arbitration is held.  Some of the factors to be considered in determining the waiver issue are whether the party sought to enjoin arbitration or sought interlocutory review, whether the party challenged the jurisdiction of the arbitrator in the arbitration proceeding, and whether the party included a claim or cross-claim in the arbitration proceeding that was fully adjudicated.
[brief] On the Brief: [...]  [...] # TABLE OF CONTENTS | Section | Page | |------------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | PRELIMINARY STATEMENT | 1 | | PROCEDURAL HISTORY | 3 | | STATEMENT OF FACTS | 4 | | STANDARD OF REVIEW | 6 | | LEGAL ARGUMENT | 7 | | POINT I  THIS COURT SHOULD AFFIRM THE TRIAL COURT’S ORDER COMPELLING THE PARTIES TO ARBITRATION  BECAUSE THE MAA IS VALID ON ITS FACE.  | 7 | | A.  Plaintiff’s Waiver of Her Right to a Jury Trial was Knowing and Voluntary | 8 | | B.  Plaintiff Cannot Demonstrate That The Terms Of The MAA Are Unconscionable | 15 | | POINT II  THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ORDERED THE PARTIES TO ARBITRATION  BECAUSE THE CLAIMS AGAINST RUTGERS ARE EXPRESSLY COVERED BY THE MAA AND/OR RUTGERS IS AN INTENDED THIRY PARTY BENEFICIARY | 18 | | A.  The MAA Expressly Covers [...], a Client of [...] | 18 | | B.  Even if [...] Were Not Covered by the Express Terms of the MAA, [...] is an Intended Third-Party Beneficiary Under Traditional Principles of Contract Law.  | 19 | | POINT III  PLAINTIFF DOES NOT RAISE A GENUINE ISSUE OF MATERIAL FACT TO WARRANT A PLENARY HEARING | 21 | | CONCLUSION | 26 | TABLE OF JUDGMENTS
[brief] A person that is eligible for certain pension benefits is entitled to a liberal interpretation of the pension statute.  The determination below is unreasonable because [...] would otherwise be eligible for accidental disability benefits under the Ricci Act.  Under the liberal construction required of pension statutes, his eligibility for the benefit is not in question.  In other words, [...] suffers from a 9/11 illness and is disabled as a result.  He qualifies for accidental disability benefits under the Ricci Act standard.  [...] was denied the ability to register his presence at the September 11th terrorist attacks and therefore also denied accidental disability benefits based on an unsupported finding that Division mailed a post card notifying him of his requirement to register.  This finding is arbitrary, capricious, and against the substantial weight of the evidence.  The Division alleges that the two-year time frame for registration requires strict implementation to “verify applicants’ dates and locations of service as witnesses and memories inevitably continue to become unavailable and fade. ”  Rb9.\footnote{Rb references the Respondent’s Brief.}  Under the Ricci Act, members who seek to amend benefits thereunder are not required to produce witness verification statements.  Additionally, there has been no suggestion that the dates that [...] was at ground zero (or other similarly situated members) need verification by the Division.  Neither is required under the Ricci Act.  Furthermore, almost two decades had passed since the September 11\textsuperscript{th} terrorist attacks when the Ricci Act was signed into law.  The assertion by Respondent that the two-year registration window was to rectify a fleeting memory is erroneous.  Respondent’s argument lacks merit.  The determination below was arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable and against the substantial weight of the evidence.  It should therefore be reversed, and retired Trooper [...] should be permitted to register his presence at 9/11 and granted accidental disability benefits.
[directive] E.  Victim/Witness Notification Form [See Appendix 1]  1.  When either a criminal or domestic violence complaint is signed, a Victim/Witness Notification Form is to be completed by the person assisting the victim, either the police officer or a member of the court staff.  2.  The victim should be informed that for the victim's protection, the prosecutor or the court must have the ability to contact the victim on short notice to inform the victim about the defendant's a. impending release from custody, or b. application to reduce bail.  3.
[brief] [...] testified that he did not interview [...], but rather, just had a brief conversation where [...] initially reported that [...] did not do a property check.  (11T187:24).  [...] also failed to take a full and thorough statement from [...] at any point in time.  (11T188:12).  [...]'s excuse for not taking a statement from [...] was that the investigation was "data driven."  (11T188:14).  [...] conceded that the only information he received from [...] was in [...]'s initial brief conversation.  (11T188:22).  [...] also failed to direct [...] to write a report on this matter.  (11T1189:9).  [...] did not recall going back to [...] and talking to him at all about the case.  (11T191:19).  [...] conceded that he only had an issue nineteen (19) of five-hundred-eighty-six (586) property checks that [...] performed.  (11T194:18).  [...] conceded that he only looked at data near the exact times [...] called in a property check, and not at the entire shift, to see whether [...] did a property check on a particular area as he called in, but did it at a different time during his shift, which was something other Officers testified was a regular occurrence when patrolling the Township.  (11T194:9 - 196:4).  [...] conceded that what he wrote in his report regarding [...] and the Victoria Pointe property check GPS/ABL mapping data was not accurate.  (12T205:19 - 206:9).  [...] testified that he did not think [...] was "guilty" of misrepresenting that he was on foot patrol.  (12T206:21 - 207:6).  [...] further conceded that he mischaracterized what occurred during the real-time GPS data review during the second interview, which [...] termed a "meeting."  (12T209:15 - 210:8).  [...] conceded that at the end of the recorded IA interview with [...] a request was made to look at real time GPS.  (13T19:3).  When the real-time data was being viewed was from Hamilton Commons to the Fairways.  (13T24:22).  [...] conceded that after leaving the interview following [...]'s comment that he was on foot, [...] never continued any interviews with [...] again.  (13T27:14).  [...] conceded that all the dates referenced in his report occurred roughly one (1) year to one-and-a-half (1.5) years at the time of the recorded IA interview of [...].  (13T81:12).  [...] conceded that he verbalized some dates but did not show [...] any data or information.  (13T82:7).  [...] conceded that [...] worked without incident between November 7, 2017 all the way through March 25, 2019 when he was charged by HT.  (13T103:7).  Regarding the truthfulness charge against [...], [...] testified that the basis thereof was that [...] allegedly misrepresented his location and failed to conduct eight (8) property checks that he called in to dispatch.  (13T131:18-20).  [...]'s report also conceded that [...] did not properly conduct the property checks and contended that [...]'s explanation that he was out on foot patrol was a fabrication.  (13T131:20-24).  IA Inefficiencies
[brief] (23T 148-23 to 150-19)  [...] was initially reluctant to accept the gun, but ultimately put it in his jacket pocket, “just in case. ”  (23T 149-14, 150-20 to 25, 151-5)  He did not know whether the gun was loaded.  (24T 210-25 to 211-5)  [...] testified that while he and [...] waited near the restaurant entrance for [...] and the young women, a group of men persisted with their threats:
[brief] In support of his application for discharge, the Receiver stated that “upon the sale and transfer of the assets under the control of the Receiver, it became obvious that the Receiver had no duties other than as an employee of the Bank’s subsidiary. ”  Ca21.  One concern about the foregoing of course is why the Receiver’s duties included being “an employee of the Bank’s subsidiary [i.e., [...]]” in the first instance, and why this was not of apparent concern to anyone other than [...] and [...].  This clearly conflicts with the Receiver’s duties and requirements.  Another issue is that the “sale and transfer of assets” being referred to is presumably a reference to the January 2022 foreclosure sale approximately a year and a half before the Receiver made his application for discharge, although according to the Receiver, he was awaiting confirmation of the sale and recording of instruments, etc.  However, even then, if that was the benchmark apparently unilaterally determined by the Receiver and/or the Bank and/or [...], the Receiver does not explain why he only applied for discharge in June 2023.  Another question is whether the “sale and transfer of assets” through foreclosure, ultimately for $100, was the “cause for the action” or under what circumstances, etc.  It was also the case according to the Receiver that the diner was always being operated at a loss.
[brief] CONCLUSION  For the reasons stated above, the Panel should reverse the dismissal Order appealed by Appellants/Plaintiffs and remand this matter to the Law Division along with the related appeal.  Dated: October 17, 2022  Respectfully submitted, /s/ [...]  [...] [...]  Attorneys for Appellants-Plaintiffs [...] and [...], Plaintiffs/Appellants, v. [...], Defendant/Respondent.
[brief] 1.  The parking capacity on the School’s Lot 5 was deficient for the School’s own parking requirements and a variance was needed.  2.  That the [...] as Lot 8 owner was on notice and participated in the hearing.  3.  That there was no reference or claim by anyone in that 1972 application/proceeding that an off-site parking use/facility for Lot 8 staff/attendees was in use on the School Lot 5 and was legal.  4.  That the [...] Lot 8 not only did not claim to be using the School Lot 5 for parking but would provide “parking facilities on adjoining properties owned by the [...] should additional parking facilities be required” due to the deficient parking capacity on the School Lot 5 for School needs (Da20).  That the [...] did not assert in 1972 its now claimed zoning right to have an off-site parking use on Lot 5 --- when the School expansion with deficient school parking was being assessed --- certainly precludes any assertion now that any zoning authority for that off-site parking use of Lot 5 existed in 1972 or exists now.  Knowing there was a deficiency of parking on Lot 5 for the School’s own use, the [...] represented that excess parking capacity was available on [...]’s properties nearby so as to induce Approval for the School expansion.  Those representations certainly preclude any conflicting claim now that the [...] had a pre-existing zoning right in place in 1972 to an off-site parking on the School Lot.  The presumption of validity and correctness of a Board determination is well-settled.  See cases cited at Cox §42.21.  As stated in McDowell Inc. v. Bd. of Adj., 334 N.J. Super. 201, 224-225 (App.Div. 2000), cert. den. 167 N.J. 88 (2001), a “Board’s decision denying prior nonconforming use protection or expansion is entitled to greater deference than a decision finding and protecting a prior nonconforming use”.  The burden was upon [...] to point to facts and evidence in the record that “is so overwhelmingly in favor of the applicant that the Board’s action can be said to be arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable. ”  Med. Realty v. Bd. of Adj., 228 N.J. Super. 226, 233 (App. Div. 1988).  Here as found by the Board, the [...] presented absolutely nothing to demonstrate that the now nonconforming off-site parking use was a legal and permitted use under zoning at its inception (or at any time thereafter).  The Trial Court Opinion reversing that Board determination is clearly invalid.
[brief] Illegal activities and/or actions are by their very nature “objectively unreasonable. ”  Society has chosen to proscribe the behavior of the governed through the application of laws and regulations.  Society has chosen to declare certain conduct against societal norms and values thereby making this proscribed conduct inherently and “objectively unreasonable. ”  The selling of alcohol is a highly regulated activity and any deviation from same is, objectively, against the norm and unreasonable.  Assault and murder, to wit society has endeavored to eliminate in their entirety, are crimes so heinous in nature that there can be absolutely no argument to be made in favor of “objective reasonableness. ”  A use that is not objectively reasonable from the community perspective is not one “with due care. ”  To this extent, “used with due care” refers not to the conduct of the injured party, but to the objectively reasonable use by the public generally.  See, e.g., Garrison, 154 N.J. at 291 (emphasis added).  In this instance, the “objectively reasonable public” are not murderers or bootleggers, but residents of the surrounding public housing units just trying to live their lives.  A reasonable use of the premises (i.e., an outdoor public basketball court/common area) would be for playing basketball or some such other related activity.  Turning the area into a “pop-up bar” is most assuredly not the intended, reasonable, foreseeable use of an outdoor public basketball court.  Thus, it cannot be argued in good faith that the reasonable public would seek to use the premises at issue for such illegal activities and/or conduct such as that pled by Plaintiffs in this matter.  Accordingly, the illegal sale, purchase and/or consumption of alcohol and/or criminally harmful conduct by third-parties are “objectively unreasonable” within the meaning of the Tort Claims Act.
[brief] ”  253 N.J. 191, 220 (2023) (quoting *Seigelstein v. Shrewsbury Motors, Inc.*, 464 N.J. Super. 393, 408 (App. Div. 2020) (quoting R. 1:36-3)).  The Supreme Court has ruled that any “attorney who undertakes to rely on unpublished opinions that support his or her position must, in compliance with the duty of candor, also disclose contrary unpublished decisions known to the attorney as well.  R. 1:36-3. ”  *Brundage v. Estate of Carambio*, 195 N.J. 575, 593 (2008).  The Court noted that Rule 1:36-3 “continues to define the demarcation line between opinions considered to be ‘binding’" authority and other opinions, even though the latter, in many cases, are now readily available through the internet or through media outlets in printed format. ”  Consequently, *Bijacsко* is not binding authority for either the trial court or this Court.
[brief] We deem it to be significant that a metal pipe similar to the weapon used in the Valero robbery was found in defendant's girlfriend's car.  We note that [...] testifies that the pipe used by the robber was “like” the one found later in the Ford Taurus.  We also note, however, the State provided no corroborating testimony regarding either the weapon or the perpetrator from the other gas station attendant, [...].  In his closing statement, the prosecutor argued that the Wawa surveillance video showed an emblem on the back of the hat worn by the robber that was consistent with the Eagles emblem on the hat recovered from [...]'s vehicle.
[brief] [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], and [...], Appellants  V. [...], d/b/a [...], d/b/a [...], d/b/a [...], d/b/a [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], d/b/a [...], d/b/a [...], d/b/a [...], [...], [...], d/b/a NEW JERSEY  VEIN TREATMENT CLINIC, [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...]  Defendants-Respondents.