ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The Act was crafted by the Legislature with just such school board employees and community members in mind.  That is why the express Legislative intent set out in the Act states:  The Legislature finds and declares:  a.  In our representative form of government it is essential that the conduct of members of local board of education and local school administration hold the respect and confidence of the people.  These board members and administrators must avoid conduct which is in violation of their public trust or which creates a justifiable impression among the public that such trust is being violated.  b.  To ensure and preserve public confidence, school board members and local school administrators should have the benefit of specific standards to guide their conduct and some disciplinary mechanism to ensure the uniform maintenance of those standards among them.  N.J.S.A. 18A:12-22.
[brief] [...]  [...] and [...] were the parties to the [...], dated May 2000.  The pertinent sections of this contract state:  This Operating Agreement is a contract between its parties and is enforceable by the Company against any member who violates its terms.  All members, past, present and future must sign this Operating Agreement as a condition of membership.  ...  XX  Violation of This Agreement  Any member who shall violate any of the terms, conditions, and provisions of this Agreement shall keep and save harmless the Company property and shall also indemnify the other members from any and all claims, demands and actions of every kind and nature whatsoever which may arise out of or by reason of such violation of any terms and conditions of this Agreement.
[brief] I said at the time of my decision, you know, you have to scratch your head.  This was the marriage made in heaven.  This is a company people would envy to have.  It was growing, it was making money.  And all of a sudden, I want to buy you out.  Well, maybe we found out the reasons why, but that is what it is.  And, you know, to go back to 2008 I don't think would be equitable.  And I think to a certain degree it would be piling on.  So I am -- I don't think that that would be properly in the Court's discretion.  I mean, I have in the past, you know, when there has been a consent order, adopted the first date as opposed to the second date but, again, in this case, I think that the amount of the award and now we are going to get into the attorney's fees, I am satisfied with the defendants' argument that if we -- if we have the prejudgment interest calculated, and there should be some prejudgment interest, I don't have a problem with using July 20th of '20 to June 30th of '22 which, with the reduced amount given the mathematical error, would be 190,480.68.  So I accept the defendants' argument as to that.  (37T77-7 to 78-23); [...], Current N.J. Court Rules, R. 4:42-11 cmt. 8 (2006).  Undeniably, it would be manifestly unjust for the trial court to award Plaintiffs’ prejudgment interest on the remainder of their contractual and equitable claims because those claims derived from the same set of facts and circumstances underlying Plaintiffs’ tort claims (37T26-13 to 29-11).  Moreover, Plaintiffs fail to cite any case law supporting the award of prejudgment interest on contractual and equitable claims when the damages arising from those claims are identical to damages awarded under tort claims.  Lastly, Plaintiffs fail to cite any case law where a court calculated prejudgment interest under R. 4:42-11(b) from the date of the misappropriation of funds in the context of a liquidated damages claim.  Therefore, to the extent the Court upholds the trial court’s Judgment, the Court should not reverse the trial judge on this issue.
[brief] During oral argument the trial court issued a decision from the bench granting Respondent’s motion and denying Appellant’s motion on the basis that Appellant was in the best position to avoid the loss of the $177,887.35 payoff funds with which the closing agent absconded.  On March 4, 2024, the trial court entered the Order, which is the subject of this appeal filed by Appellant on March 5, 2024.  (1T.)\(^2\)  \(^1\)  1T refers to the transcript of the March 1, 2024, argument on the parties’ motions for summary judgment.  \(^2\)  Also on March 5, 2024, Appellant filed an Order to Show Cause in the trial court requesting an order: (1) staying enforcement of the trial court’s Order pending the determination of this appeal, and (2) prohibiting Respondent from encumbering or otherwise transferring the Property.
[brief] Orders compelling arbitration are appealable as of right, *R. 2:2-3(b)(8)*, and are reviewed de novo, *Flanzman v. Jenny Craig, Inc.*, 244 N.J. 119, 131 (2020).  The court also reviews de novo the trial court’s interpretation of statutes.  *Allstate N.J. Ins. Co. v. Lajara*, 222 N.J. 129, 139 (2015).  AICRA requires arbitration of “dispute[s] regarding the recovery of medical expense benefits or other benefits provided under [PIP] coverage” if a party to the dispute so elects.  *N.J.S.A. 39:6A-5.1(a).*  That statutory directive does not apply to insurers’ claims for damages because the medical providers submitted false or misleading statements in the process of recovering PIP benefits or otherwise unlawfully obtained those benefits.  I.  **The Law Division erred in holding that AICRA requires PIP arbitration of Plaintiffs’ affirmative claims.
[brief] See, eg. Poluhovich v. Pellerano, 373 N.J. Super. 319, 365 (App. Div. 2004) (“[A]mbiguity regarding whether a court has declined jurisdiction can result in one court improperly exercising jurisdiction because it erroneously believes that the other court has declined jurisdiction.  . .  This raises significant due process concerns. ”).  The trial judge clearly had jurisdiction to ascertain whether the Lease supported Tenant’s primary defense under the Lease.
[brief] _All of the lower court’s errors as forth in the appellant’s brief and herein when taken together constitute cumulative error and warrants a new trial._  As set forth in appellants’ brief, defendants were ultimately denied a fair and impartial trial which was the cumulative effect of the trial court errors.  These errors worked to expand the duty of care, prejudiced the jury against defendants, conflated contractual violations with violations of the common law duty of care, removed essential facts and context, and essentially deprived defendants of the full and fair opportunity to present a complete and thorough defense.  Defendants’ entire theory of the case is that defendants acted reasonably given the severity of the storm, the amount of snow that fell, the state of emergency, and given the fact that work was still ongoing at the time of plaintiff’s fall down.  It was entirely unfair to allow plaintiff to present the narrative that there was a “system failure” among the defendants, but bar defendants from presenting those proofs that speak particularly to the defense theory.  The upshot was that the jury was poisoned against defendants (via the contractual references and violations and subsequent storm evidence) and were simultaneously deprived the full opportunity to adequately demonstrate the severity and significance of the storm (excluded photo, excluded state of emergency).  These evidentiary failures when considered together and given the erroneous jury charge clearly amount to cumulative error.  Defendants also submit that re-trial should only be on liability.  This court may limit the re-trial of a case to the issue to which the verdict was found to be wrong.  *Falcone v. New Jersey Bell Tel. Co.*, 98 N.J. Super 138, 151-152 (App. Div. 1967).  This means that if the error relates only to the issue of liability, then the re-trial may be limited to the question of liability only.  *Id.*  Here, the prejudicial errors which form the basis of this appeal go to liability only.  They deal exclusively with admissible evidence and jury charges.  None of the issues on appeal implicate damages.  Notably, plaintiff does not argue that the jury charges on damages were wrong and plaintiff has never argued that the damages verdict goes against the weight of the evidence which would now bar re-trial on same.  *Ogborne v. Mercer Cemetery Corp.*, 197 N.J. 448, 462 (App. Div. 2009).
[brief] [...]’s partisan support of [...] at the potential overall expense of its own consumer members leads to a blurring and distortion of the factual record.  Appellant [...]’s Statement of Facts, which the [...] supports, included arguments concerning the Insurance Holding Company Act  State’s Insurance Holding Company Systems Act, L. 1970, c. 22 (N.J.S.A. 17:27A-1 to -14) (the “Holding Company Act”) and Statutory Statement of Accounting Principles No. 25 (“SSAP No. 25”) that are simply not correct and are counter to consumer protection and regulatory oversight of insurers.  The Department addresses those “facts” in Argument Points I.A (the Holding Company Act) and II (SSAP No. 25).
[brief] In [...], the Court affirmed the trial court’s circumvention of the typical local land use process by directly awarding a governmental approval based upon the court’s analysis of site suitability.  *Id.* at 560.  The Supreme Court observed that, “[u]nder the zoning in place at the time, [...]’ plan necessarily would require variances.  . . [and the] site was not a good candidate for variances because of the size of the property. ” (internal quotation marks omitted).  Faced with the typical variance requirements under the local zoning laws, the court was empowered to sidestep the Planning Board and directly issue approvals to ensure affordable housing.  See id.; *Dowel Assocs. v. Harmony Twp. Land Use Board*, 403 N.J. Super. 1, 24 (App. Div. 2008) (“While we acknowledge that, under a normal scope of review, the record would support the Board’s resolution and denial of subdivision approval . . . [but here] the Township had already committed the site to satisfy its affordable housing obligation, its Land Use Board can no longer protect its uniquely local interest or exclusively exercise its right to prevent approval in the way a local Planning Board otherwise would. ”).  With this clear guidance from the appellate courts, trial courts have shown no hesitation in making decisions in the place of local authorities on developer’s applications for governmental approvals with respect to affordable-housing developments.
[brief] \footnote{Moreover, there is an exception to the Statute of Frauds for oral guarantees where the oral guarantee is to benefit the guarantor.  This is known as the “leading object” exception.  See Walder, Sondak, Berkeley Brogan vs. Lipari, 300 N.J. Super 67, 68 (App. Div. 1997), citing Schoor Associates vs. Holmdel Heights Construction Co., 68 N.J. 95, 101-02 (1975).  Here, there can be no dispute that [...], [...] and [...] were all members of [...] and the “leading object” of the guarantee was to benefit the success of the business in which all three guarantors were actively engaged.}
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[brief] The following paragraphs detail the facts as they were adduced during the plenary hearing conducted before the Administrative Law Judge (hereinafter referred to as “ALJ”).  In addition to the testimony of the witnesses, the Court received, in evidence, Respondent’s Exhibits R-1 to R-8, inclusive, and R-10.  (Pa-2 to Pa35; Pa47 to Pa48).  The Respondent called [...].  Mr. Mauro testified that he is employed at the [...] as a Sergeant.  (T11-3 to 8).  He described his duties and responsibilities as those of a supervising officer.  (T11-9 to 11).  [...] testified that, on September 10, 2022, while working A Tour (11pm to 7am shift) he was assigned to the “New Jail”.  (T11-12 to 16).  At the Corrections Center, “New Jail” encompasses various housing units (“pods”) and the Medical Department.  (T12-15 to 24).  At some point, during the tour of duty, the Appellant broadcast a call using her hand-held communication device, saying, “Mauro, I need to see you in medical. ”  [...] replied via radio, “Last caller go for [...]. ” (T14-3 to 13).  The Appellant replied, “Mauro, I need you to come to medical. ” (T14-14 to 17).  The reply ignored protocol as to addressing a superior officer via broadcast media.  [...] replied, “[...], you can call me at 2310. ”  [...] testified that ‘2310’ was a telephone extension in Master Control, the office that [...] was occupying at the time of the transmission.  (T14-22 to 15-13).  Instead of calling extension 2310, several minutes later, [...] called extension 2217.  When the call was transferred to extension 2310, [...], in a loud and disrespectful tone said, “Why didn’t you come to medical when I called you?”  [...] reminded the Appellant that she was told to call 2310.  Moreover, [...] advised the Appellant that a subordinate was not going to order a superior officer.  (T16-9 to 13).  The Appellant explained that she was having an issue with an inmate and needed assistance.  [...] reminded the Appellant that, if she needed to call a code, that she should do so.  (T17-1 to 12).  At that point, the Appellant, again in the loud and disrespectful tone and manner replied, “I don’t need you anymore.  I handled it. ”  With that, [...] ended the call by hanging up her telephone receiver.  (T17-13 to 19).  At this point in the testimony, [...] identified existing policy regarding officers requesting assistance.  An officer who needs assistance should implement the SOP for calling ‘a code’.  Based on the severity of the situation, an officer can call a code to meet a present need.  (T17-20 to 18-17).  Based on the telephone call and the officer’s failure to implement policy, [...] decided to discuss the matter in person with [...].  (T18-18 to 23).
[brief] During the course of his evidentiary hearing testimony on direct examination, [...] testified concerning multiple provisions within [...]’s contract that he considered relevant to his standard of care analysis.  He testified that the language contained within page 1 of 3 of Attachment B of [...]’s contract provided that [...]'s scope of services included the maintenance and protection of traffic.  (3T59:2-24 and Pa1271-72).  According to [...], multiple sections within Attachment B obligated [...] to identify the subject pre-existing roadway condition prior to the date of plaintiff’s accident.  On cross-examination, however, [...] made a series of extraordinary concessions directly undermining his previously communicated positions regarding [...]’s contractual obligations.
[brief] The only reasonable conclusion to reach from a review of the statutory language, and a review of the overarching statutory scheme, is that a municipality such as [...], whose former school district was statutorily eliminated, does not have the ability to withdraw from the district with which it was statutorily merged, or from any limited purpose regional district of which the merged district is a constituent.  Therefore, the Commissioner’s statement that the statute contemplates a municipality such as [...] may seek withdrawal is inconsistent with the plain, unambiguous statutory language.  Indeed, municipalities such as [...] are specifically excluded from the process set forth in N.J.S.A. 18A:13-47.11(a), precisely because they do not have a school district to remove from either a consolidated district or the regional district.  For these reasons, the Commissioner’s decision that N.J.S.A. 18A:13-47.11 permits a municipality like [...] to seek withdrawal, must be reversed.
[brief] Such obligation shall not be construed to negate, abridge, or reduce other rights or obligations of indemnity that would otherwise exist as to a party or person described in this Section 3.18.  (Da495).  In fact, when referencing AIA A201, the United States Supreme Court has described an earlier version of this same provision as being “[a]n example of an indemnification clause that makes specific reference to the effect of the negligence of the indemnitee. ”  United States v. Seckinger, 397 U.S. 203, 213, n. 17, (1970) (emphasis added).
[brief] (Da1-3)  “It is a well-settled principle that [New Jersey] appellate courts will decline to consider questions or issues not properly presented to the trial court when an opportunity for such a presentation is available unless the questions so raised on appeal go to the jurisdiction of the trial court or concern matters of great public interest. ”  *Nieder v. Royal Indem. Ins. Co.*, 62 N.J. 229, 234 (1973).
[brief] POINT I.....................................................................................................................................17  THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY GRANTED SUMMARY JUDGMENT BECAUSE PLAINTIFF’S DRUG CONVICTION AND YEARS IN PRISON STATUTORILY BARRED HER FROM EMPLOYMENT WITH [...] AS A MATTER OF LAW........................................17  A.  Plaintiff Was Statutorily Barred From Holding Her Job With [...] As A Matter Of Law........................................................................................................................................................................17  B.  Plaintiff Admitted To All Material Facts Related To Her Disqualification From Employment With [...].................................................................................................................................19  C.  The Trial Court Properly Granted Summary Judgment Because Plaintiff’s Drug Conviction and Years in Prison Statutorily Barred Her From Being Employed By [...].  ........................................21  D.  The Trial Court Properly Found that Public Policy Weighs in Favor of Dismissal Here.  ..................................................................................................................25  E.  The Trial Court Correctly Rejected Plaintiff’s Argument That an Irrelevant Exemption Saves Her From Disqualification.  ...............29  F.  Plaintiff’s Argument Regarding Confusion Must Be Rejected Because The Statute Does Not Consider Intent of Disqualified Applicants.........................................................................................................................31  POINT II ......................................................................................................................................................................................34
[brief] Pa 379-380.  [...] had sold his interest to [...] in 2007 because, [...] acknowledges, he had no experience with, or interest in, developing a COAH Project.  Pa 379.  Because of [...]’s death it was not possible for Plaintiffs to change any of that.  Nevertheless, the Plaintiffs sued to recover the lost profits they claim they would have received by developing 132 affordable housing units on the Property as approved by the Township (the “COAH Project”), along with other damages, attorney’s fees and possible disgorgement of the fees they paid to [...].
[brief] It is also disingenuous for Appellant to argue that Respondents did not provide the trial court with a single reason why they delayed filing the Disqualification Motion.  (Db35).  As previously explained, a mere two (2) days after [...] entered its appearance, i.e. on June 1, 2023, [...], then represented by the [...] filed a Certification objecting to the representation by [...] on the basis that it constituted a conflict of interest.  (Pa38).  That argument was also raised in Van Saders opposition brief filed on June 1, 2023.  (Pa29-30).  Upon information and belief, mediation was conducted during the fall of 2023.  Thereafter, on March 28, 2024 the [...] was relieved as counsel.  (Pa49).  On April 30, 2024, [...] entered his appearance.  (Pa52).  Slightly more than two (2) months later, the motion to disqualify was filed.  There was no delay.  There was no waiver.  Just as importantly, there is no prejudice to Appellants.  CONCLUSION
[brief] The Trial Court correctly found that Defendant’s admitted, actual knowledge of the judgment in 2020 warranted denial of Defendant’s Motion to vacate filed three years later.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16  III.  Because Defendant failed to satisfy the elements of R. 4:50-1, the Trial Court was within its discretion to deny the motion to vacate Default Judgment
[directive] 2C:35-5(a)(b)  Dispensing or Heroin or cocaine, 1/2 ounce or more but less than 5 ounces; LSD or its analog, in a quantity Possessing CDS with of less than 100 milligrams, or where the amount is undetermined; or phencyclidine or its Intent to Distribute analog in a quantity of less than 10 grams, or where the amount is undetermined; or 2nd Degree $75,000 to $150,000
[brief] THE COURT ERRED WHEN IT PLACED THE BURDEN ON PEITONER TO PROVE THE EXISTENCE OF UNDUE INFLUENCE BY CEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE ...........................................30  POINT THREE .....................................................................................................................33  THE COURT APPLIED  INCORRECT STANDARDS WHEN EVALUATING THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTING THE UNDUE INFLUENCE CLAIMS ..........................................................................................33  POINT FOUR .......................................................................................................................41  A SPOILATION INFERENCE SHOULD HAVE BEEN AFFORDED TO PETITIONER .................................................................................................................................41  POINT FIVE .......................................................................................................................43 THE PHOTOCOPY SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ADMITTED INTO EVIDENCE OR ENFORCED AGAINST PETITIONER .........................................................................................43  POINT SIX .........................................................................................................................48  THE PHOTOCOPY VIOLATED THE UNIFORM PRE-MARITAL ACT ........................................48  CONCLUSION ....................................................................................................................50  APPENDIX: Banco Multiple Santa Cruz, S.A., v. Moreno, 888 F. Supp. 2d 356, 375-376 (E.D.N.Y. 2012) ..............................................................Pr1a-Pr17a TABLE OF TRANSCRIPTS Transcript of Motion dated September 10, 2021..........................1T Transcript of Motion dated December 14, 2021...........................2T Transcript of Motion dated February 18, 2022............................3T Transcript of Motion dated May 19, 2022..................................4T Transcript of Motion dated July 5, 2022.....................................5T Transcript of Motion dated August 15, 2022...............................6T Transcript of Trial dated August 29, 2022.................................7T Transcript of Trial dated August 30, 2022.................................8T Transcript of Trial dated August 31, 2022.................................9T Transcript of Trial dated September 1, 2022..............................10T