ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] How are COVID-19 persons removed from my CAD system?  In the daily list of COVID-19 positive persons sent to CPOs, County LINCS Agencies will note any COVID- 19 person that has been cleared from isolation so their flag can be removed from the CAD system.  For the purpose of this information sharing initiative, County LINCS Agencies are noting COVID-19 positive persons as cleared from isolation when 30 days has passed from the date of their COVID-19 positive test.  COVID-19 positive persons may also be removed from a CAD system when a LHD receives new information about a person’s address and the case is then transferred to a different jurisdiction.  Q:
[directive] Page 2  An Appellate Division opinion does not amend a judgment.  The original judgment remains in full force until it is amended or vacated by the trial court.  As such, an Appellate Division decision cannot form the basis for action by the Department of Corrections (DOC).  An official conforming judgment from the trial court is needed before DOC can take any required action with respect to an incarcerated defendant.  Therefore, if the defendant is incarcerated and the Appellate Division decision is fully dispositive of the matter, requiring no further proceedings, the Criminal Presiding Judge or the trial judge shall prepare an appropriate judgment that conforms to the decision of the Appellate Division.  The judgment shall be signed by the Criminal Presiding Judge or the Superior Court Judge assigned to the matter and without delay delivered to the Department of Corrections and to other persons who received the original judgment.  If the defendant was sentenced to a probationary term that was stayed pending appeal, and the Appellate Division decision is dispositive, requiring no further court proceeding, the Criminal Presiding Judge or the trial judge shall prepare a judgment that conforms to the decision of the Appellate Division.  The judgment shall be signed by the Criminal Presiding Judge or the Superior Court Judge assigned to the matter and without delay delivered along with a copy of the Appellate Division decision to all other persons who received the original judgment.  If further court proceedings are necessary to comply with the Appellate Division decision, the Criminal Division Manager shall ensure that the necessary actions are taken without delay to schedule the required proceedings.  The Criminal Division shall ensure that all interested agencies/parties are notified.
[brief] The “[w]ords used by a suspect are not to be viewed in a vacuum, but rather in ‘the full context in which they were spoken. ’”  S.S., 229 N.J. at 382 (quoting State v. Roman, 382 N.J. Super. 44, 64 (App. Div.), certif. dismissed, 189 N.J. 420 (2007)).
[brief] (b)  Court Rule 4:53-7 (i) 4:53-7(a) - Filing of Inventory and Periodic Accountings Rule 4:53-7(a) requires that every receiver in a liquidation appointed by the Court shall, within three (3) months after appointment, file with the Clerk of the Superior Court a just and true inventory, under oath, of the whole estate committed to the his/her care, and of the manner in which the funds under his/her care, belonging to the estate, are invested, stating the income of the estate, and the debts contracted and expenditures made on account thereof.  It further requires that the receiver file with the Clerk on each April 1 and October 1 thereafter, so long as any part of the estate, or of the income or proceeds thereof, remains to be accounted for, file with the Clerk of the Superior Court an account, under oath, of the amount remaining or invested, and of the manner in which the same is invested.  R. 4:53-7(a).  The Receiver did not comply with these requirements.  The Receiver did not file with the Clerk a “just and true” inventory, under oath, of [...]’s entire estate committed to his care within three (3) months of his appointment.  This inventory is essential in determining the nature and extent of [...]’s assets which came into his possession upon his appointment.  For instance, the Receiver undoubtedly took possession of [...]’s bank accounts, credit card receivables, food, beverage and bar inventory, equipment, fixtures, personality, etc.  However, he failed to account and valuate same.  These assets could have resulted in payment to [...]’s creditors.  In addition, the Receiver did not file periodic accountings with the Clerk of the Superior Court.  Such accountings are essential and provide accountability as to what monies were taken in versus what monies were paid out by the Receiver and to whom.  This need is only heightened in this case where the Receiver is alleging that the diner has never generated profits and is thus operating at a loss with no monies available for payment to creditors.  In support of his application for discharge, the Receiver does not contend that accountings were filed with the Court and/or provided to [...]’s creditors such as [...].
[directive] Page 2 of ____  C.  REVIEW  ❏ ❏ ❏  21.  Action Taken Approved Denied *Conditional Approval *Explain Conditions  23.  Judge to be contacted:  22.  Resubmission to reviewer required?  ❏ ❏ Yes No  LEGAL SUFFICIENCY  25.  Adequate description of property to be seized?  24.  Adequate description of place to be searched?  ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ Yes No Yes No
[brief] Although motions for reconsideration are not expressly provided for by Part III of the Rules of Court governing practice in the criminal courts, the Appellate Division has nevertheless applied the standard contained in Rule 4:49-2 to such applications.  See State v. Wilson, 442 N.J. Super. 224, 233 n.3 (App. Div. 2015), rev’d on other grounds, 227 N.J. 534 (2017); State v. Fitzsimons, 286 N.J. Super. 141, 147 (App. Div. 1995), certif. granted, and remanded, 143 N.J. 482 (1996).  Under that Court Rule, motions for reconsideration are addressed to “the sound discretion of the Court, to be exercised in the interest of justice.
[brief] Without question, the trial court relied on the 1966-1969 Unrecorded Subdivision Maps to reach its decision.  The court’s opinion begins:  “The dispute centers in large part around a 1967 subdivision plaintiff’s predecessors and [sic] interest sought and obtained from the [...] which was never recorded. ”  4T4:16-19.  From the outset, the trial court relied on an unrecorded document to determine ownership of the Strip, contrary to the public policies behind the New Jersey Recording Act, N.J.S.A. 45:26A-1, et seq.  See Palamarg Realty Co. v. Rehac., 80 N.J. 446 (1979).
[brief] The 1971 Code Book had eighteen Chapters (I through XVIII); Zoning (including site plan requirements) was Chapter 18 (XVIII).  The adopting Ordinance (Da224) and the Introduction (Da222) do not state or reference there being any changes to that Zoning Chapter from what was previously in place.  The Introduction states (at Da222):  “Since the code has been adopted by Ordinance, it is now a single Ordinance replacing all former sources.  The revisions have nevertheless prepared a table of sources section so that any student of the Municipality’s law may find the source Ordinance for each section of the new code.  This table is located at the back of the code. ”  Note the Table of Source section of the 1971 Code Book (as located, with page revisions through 9/96) (Da228-253).  The 1971 Code Book remained in use until the 2000 Code Book.  Section 18-8.1 of the 1971 Code established the Site Plan requirement for review and approval for new developments.  Section 18-8.1 requiring site plan approval for new developments was already in the 1971 Code Book; it was not first adopted in 1984 to first appear as the 1984 code revision page replacing the earlier 1971 Code Book page.  That 18-8.1 requirement was certainly in place on the school expansion in 1972 and triggered its need for Site Plan approval (Da13-22).  The date in the right corner of 1984 Revision Page of 12/84 does not mean that the site plan section only first came into existence in 1984; it means the section was on a 1984 re-issued page in the Code Book.  That the Site Plan requirement in Section 18-8.1 was in existence prior to 1971, and at least since 1961, was established by several rebuttal documents.
[brief] (Pa319-330).  In January 14, 2020, [...] filed its cross-motion for summary judgment on the grounds that the statute of limitations barred the complaint.  (Pa522-529)  On January 24, 2020, the Hon. [...], J.S.C., denied the motions to dismiss.  (Pa7-8; 1T47:15-48:22)  He reasoned that because the landlord was not forthcoming in producing the leases and because Plaintiff may have been misled by [...]’s answers to interrogatories indicating that there were “no other parties who might be responsible,” he would permit the late filing.  (Id.)  After [...]’s initial motion for summary judgment to dismiss the complaint for failure to abide by the statute of limitations was denied, the matter proceeded to discovery.  (Pa7-8)  At the conclusion of discovery, [...] again sought summary judgment, this time on the grounds that it bore no duty under either the lease nor the common law to clear the location where the accident allegedly occurred, as well as on the statute of limitations grounds.  (Pa888-928; 3T4:2-68:9)  [...] granted that motion, finding no duty.  (Pa1-2; Id.)  D.
[brief] As noted above, N.J.S.A. 18A:8-50(8) provides:  “Unless otherwise provided in this act, a new district formed pursuant to section 2 of this act [i.e., a “merged” district, as Appellants call it] shall be governed by the provisions of chapter 13 of Title 18A of the New Jersey Statutes,” including N.J.S.A. 18A:13-47.11.  Contrary to Appellants’ assertions, the Legislature expressly provided that “merged” districts such as [...] and [...] shall be entitled to invoke the withdrawal provisions of N.J.S.A. 18A:13-47.11(a).  Appellants then lay bare the absurd implications of their position by acknowledging that, under their interpretation of the statutory language, “only the Borough of [...], not [...], could invoke the procedures in N.J.S.A. 18A:13-47.11, because [...], not [...], is a constituent district of [...].
[brief] ”).  Accordingly, whether the amounts, which are not “approximate”, had a chilling effect on bids or not is not controlling.  But, if it could be considered (it could not), there was no factual basis in the record for [...] to find that the excessive amounts in the notices did not put a chilling effect on the bids.  In fact, to the contrary, after being informed of the 37% and 17% higher upset prices, the prospective bidders chose not to attend the sale and to forego bidding.  Courts also have “the inherent power to set aside a sale or to order redemption when there is an independent ground for equitable relief, ‘such as fraud, accident, surprise, irregularity [or impropriety] in the sale and the like. ’”  Orange Land Co. v. Bender, 96 N.J. Super. 158, 164 (App. Div. 1967) (quoting Penn Federal Savings and Loan Ass’n. v. Joyce, 75 N.J. Super. 275, 278 (App. Div. 1962)).  See also Brookshire Equities, LLC v. Montaquiza, 346 N.J. Super. 310, 317 (App. Div. 2002).  Additional grounds include the equitable doctrine of mistake. Crane v. Bielski, 15 N.J. 342, 347-48 (1954).  Here, the accident, irregularity, impropriety and/or mistake in the sale was the posting and advertising by the Sheriff of the incorrect judgment amounts of $29,563,967.11 as of the September 7, 2023 sale date and $25,664,194.21 as of the December 14, 2023 sale date, which were 37% and 17% higher than the actual amounts due on those dates of $21,714,825.11 and $21,844,717.26, respectively.  These accidents, irregularities, improprieties and/or mistakes may have negatively affected prospective bidders and resulted in a sale for less than the premises’ highest and best price.  Why else would the prospective bidders have failed to attend the sale and bid?  See Burger v. Dumas, 25 N.J. Super. 473, 476 (Law Div. 1953) (sheriff sale set aside because sheriff erroneously announced existence of a judgment lien and failed to disclose amount due on mortgage, thereby “thwarting competitive bidding”); In re Ryker, 301 B.R. 156, 167 (D.N.J. 2003) (citing Burger).  Pursuant to R. 4:65-5, the court cannot confirm a sale if it is not “satisfied that the real estate was sold at its highest and best price at the time of the sale”.  There is no requirement that proof that an actual bidder was thwarted must be presented.
[brief] Plaintiffs adequately pleaded all the elements required to establish Defendants’ liability for a dangerous condition on public property under N.J.S.A. 59:4-2, and the resolution of these elements are findings of fact that should be left to a jury.  See, e.g., Foster v. Newark Housing Authority, 389 N.J. Super. 60, 87 (App. Div. 2006).  A jury could reasonably find that [...]’s murder was proximately caused by the dangerous condition of a large, makeshift liquor concession stand illegally operating on the Defendants’ property for months; that [...]’s murder by an intoxicated patron of the illegal, large, makeshift liquor concession stand was a reasonably foreseeable risk; that the dangerous condition was caused by a negligent employee of the Defendants, or that Defendants had actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition for a sufficient period of time to have corrected it, and the Defendants’ conduct in failing to do so was “palpably unreasonable.
[directive] Therefore, pursuant to the authority granted to me under the New Jersey Constitution; the Law and Public et seq., Safety Act of 1948, N.J.S.A. 52:17B-1, which provides for general responsibility of [...]’s operations and the supervision of the organization of [...]; and the Criminal Justice Act of 1970, N.J.S.A. et seq., 52:17B-97, which provides for the general supervision of criminal justice by the Attorney General as chief law enforcement officer of the State in order to secure the benefits of a uniform and efficient enforcement of the criminal law and the administration of criminal justice throughout the State, I have determined that the organization described herein is necessary for the efficient and effective operation of [...] and its law enforcement functions and hereby direct all [...] personnel to implement and comply with the following directives.
[brief] New Jersey courts have consistently recognized that “unswerving” and “mechanistic” application of statutes of limitations may inflict unnecessary harm upon plaintiffs, by denying them access to the courts and without materially advancing the objectives such laws are designed to serve.  Giannakopoulos v. Mid-State Mall, 438 N.J. Super. 595, 611 (App. Div. 2014) (citing Galligan v. Westfield Centre Service, Inc., 82 N.J. 188, 192 (1980).  Indeed, Galligan sensibly explained “the filing of a lawsuit itself shows the proper diligence on the part of the plaintiff which statutes of limitations were intended to insure. ”  Galligan, supra, 82 N.J. at 194 (quoting Kaczmarek v. New Jersey Turnpike Auth., 77 N.J. 328, 341 (1978).  There is no dispute that the discovery rule has long been part of the New Jersey statute of limitations jurisprudence.
[brief] ”  Db19.  Flomerfelt and Wear v. Selective Service Inc., 455 N.J. Super. 440 (App. Div. 2018), do not support this misstatement.  Flomerfelt and Wear are concurrent, not sequential, causation cases.  To be sure, Flomerfelt discussed Appleman’s rule.  202 N.J. at 447.  But in doing so, the Court explained that the rule has been applied “only in the context to first-party claims,” and that “because [of] the nature of first-party coverage” and different policy provisions, “those decisions are of limited relevance. ”  Id. at 447.  --- 2  [...] mis-cites this case.  The correct citation is Wear v. Selective Ins. Co., 455 N.J. Super. 440 (App. Div. 2018).  From there, the Court adopted a concurrent causation test (not Appleman’s sequential cause test) to evaluate an insurer’s duty to defend under a homeowner’s policy where a complaint alleged two independent theories of liability, one covered and the other not.
[brief] In addition, no analysis was provided by [...] as to whether the attorneys were working under a limited time frame, which might necessitate work by more than one attorney in the firm at the same time, or the experience level of the attorneys involved and the nature of the work performed, which might allow for less experienced (and less expensive attorneys) to perform some work and more experienced (and more expensive) attorneys to perform other tasks, with the attorneys sharing information with each other in intra office conferences.  (Da161).  The trial court properly held that [...] opinion did not provide an analysis based upon a recognized legal standard for his opinion that the invoices by [...] in the underlying matter were unreasonable.  (Da161).  The trial court properly concluded that [...]’s opinion in his report (that [...]’ fees are unreasonable, unnecessary and excessive) was a net opinion.
[brief] (emphasis added)  If the term or end date is not defined in the Agreement and is uncertain, the Court will interpret the contract as “requiring performance for a reasonable time or until terminated by a reasonable notice” (at p. 30).  In *In Re Miller*, 90 N.J. 210, 218-219 (1982), the Supreme Court was determining the life of an agreement as to the division of royalties from the late orchestra leader [...] when no term was stated.  The Court, citing *West Caldwell*, stated:
[brief] ”) (citation omitted); Dyson, Inc. v. Sharkninja Operating LLC, No. 1:14-CV-0779, 2016 WL 1613489, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 22, 2016) (declining to apply the apex doctrine to quash a request for production of documents).  In any event, [...] and [...] clearly meet the standard.  [...] explained earlier this year that “usually when [the Apex Doctrine is] employed, it’s because you will have an employment discrimination case and the plaintiff’s lawyer wants to take the CEO or something where they are not involved at all. ”  Tr. of Apr. 14, 2021 Discovery Conference at 6:22-7:1, In re Juul Labs, Inc., Mktg. Sales Practices, Ex. 31.  It does not apply where the person “was involved” in the conduct at issue in a “big” MDL.  Id. at 7:2-3.  VI.
[brief] A plaintiff may state a claim for intentional, infliction of severe emotional distress under New Jersey law, by showing that the defendant (1) acted intentionally or recklessly and (2) outrageously, and (3) proximately caused (4) severe distress.  Buckley v. Trenton Saving Fund Soc., 111 N.J. 355, 366 (1988).  Regarding the first element, the defendant "must intend both to do the act and to produce emotional distress. ”  Id.  Next, the conduct must be “so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community. ”  Id.  If the Court determines that the defendant's actions proximately caused the plaintiff's emotional distress, the plaintiff must then show the distress suffered was “so severe that no reasonable man could be expected to endure it. ”  Buckley, 111 N.J. at 366-67.  Defendants who have no knowledge of how it feels to be in plaintiff’s shoes state that the “demonstrated effect of the conduct of the police officers” does not allow plaintiff to establish a prima facie of either intentional or negligent infliction of emotional distress under state law.
[brief] ”  (Pb 14)  First, that claim is factually misleading because the “context” was [...] first unambiguously telling the detectives that he had nothing more to say about their investigation and then immediately telling them to call his girlfriend so he could leave.  His full statement was:  “Yeah, I’m listening, but I don’t, I don’t got nothing else to say, man.  Just get in contact with [[...]] so I can get outta here.  F**k. ”  (1T 98-19 to 20 (emphasis added))  Nothing about that “context” minimized his clear intent to end the interrogation and go home.  Second, legally, our courts have already held that a statement about having “nothing” else to say is a clear invocation.  See State v. S.S., 229 N.J. 360, 383-84 (2017) (“[A] suspect who has ‘nothing else to say,’ . . . has asserted the right to remain silent. ”).  Thus, in total, [...] unambiguously invoked his right to silence eight times -- three times by asking to “go home” and five times by saying he had “nothing” more to say -- before the detectives finally ceased questioning.
[directive] 8.  Victim faces at least 1 barrier to support SAMPLE QUESTIONS:  Do you have any children at home for whom you provide care?  Do you live in a home with no phone?  Do you live where there is no access to transportation?  Barriers to support:  Count any of these specific circumstances faced by the Victim.  Circumstances not included in this list do not count.  The Victim has 1 or more children age 18 or under who live with the Victim and for whom the Victim provides care.  ✔  The Victim has no telephone, e.g., no mobile, cell, or landline in the home.  ✔  The Victim has no access to a vehicle, no access to public transportation near his/her home, and no money for a taxi.  ✔  The Victim lives in a rural area with nobody living close by.  ✔  The Victim consumed alcohol or drugs just before or during the Index Assault, or the Victim has a history of alcohol or drug abuse ✔ (e.g., alcohol intoxication, frequent alcohol use, use of street drugs, misuse of prescription medication).  Do not include medications taken as prescribed.  ✘  The Victim need only experience 1 of these barriers to score 1 for this Item.
[brief] Plaintiff’s Cross-Motion was not heard during oral arguments as the Court determined the Cross-Motion did not relate to the Summary Judgment motion.  (Pa1-7).  The January 19, 2024 Order granted plaintiff the opportunity to file a separate Motion to Reopen Discovery.  (Pa1-7).  On January 31, 2024, plaintiff refiled a Motion to Extend Discovery, and the Honorable [...], P.J.Cv., denied plaintiff’s Motion in the February 21, 2024 Order on the basis that there were no exceptional circumstances.
[brief] The State called [...] Patrolman [...] and Detective [...], while [...] testified for the defense.  Patrolman Taranto testified that he was working with the [...] in April 2019.  (1T 5-11, 5-20 to 24)  He explained that the SET is “primarily a plain clothes narcotics unit. ”  (1T 6-2)  Taranto testified that the SET is not equipped with body-cameras or motor vehicle recorders.  (1T 15-7 to 9)  On April 24, 2019, around 6:30 p.m., Patrolman Taranto was on duty, “conducting plain clothes surveillance” in the parking lot of the [...] located at [...].
[brief] *Id.*  Even when a limited issue is presented, our courts generally disfavor in limine rulings on evidence questions, because the trial provides a superior context for the consideration of such issues.  *Id.*  Although a trial judge retains the discretion, in appropriate cases, to rule on the admissibility of evidence pre-trial, New Jersey courts have cautioned that requests for such rulings should be granted only sparingly.  *Id.*  Our courts apply the same standard of review to in limine motions as to applications regarding the admissibility of evidence.
[brief] See N.J.S.A. § 2A:14-3 ("Every action at law for libel or slander shall be commenced within 1 year next after the publication of the alleged libel or slander."); see also NuWave Inv. Corp. v. Hyman Beck & Co., Inc., 432 N.J. Super. 539, 564-565, 567-570 (App. Div. 2013) (statute of limitations for libel or slander is one year).  Plaintiffs’ motion to amend to add a claim for libel per se, initially filed in March 2021, was thus untimely on its face and therefore independently futile.  Plaintiffs’ untimely libel per se claim is not saved by the discovery rule, which generally tolls a cause of action until the plaintiff either discovers, or reasonably should have discovered, the basis for the claim, because the discovery rule is not applicable to such a claim.