ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The Decision Below  On September 17, 2024, [...] rendered a comprehensive final agency decision sustaining the rejection of [...]’s bid and overruling its protest.  As explained by the hearing officer, [...] rejected [...]’s bid because:  “the POA…specifically limits [...]’s authority to executing only the proposal bond, thus binding [...] solely to the obligations contained therein.  The POA, therefore, provides no actual authority for [...] to bind [...] to the obligations contained in the consent of surety…Accordingly, while [...] may have been the lowest bidder, given the limited POA that authorized [...]’s attorney-in-fact to bind the surety solely to the proposal bond, [...] lacked any assurance that [...] would stand behind its obligations contained in the consent of surety and actually issue the Contract Bond required by the Contract Specifications..”  (A65).  Citing the Supreme Court’s decision in Meadowbrook Carting Co. v. Borough of Island Heights, 138 N.J. 307, 313 (1994), the hearing officer noted the Court’s observation that “a consent of surety is a direct undertaking by the bonding company, enforceable by [the public entity].  Its purpose is to provide a guarantee to [the public entity], at the time of submission of the bids, that if the bidder were to be awarded the contract, the surety would issue the required performance bond. ” (A69).  The hearing officer further noted the central holding in Meadowbrook, that is, “without a performance bond, the bidder cannot be required to enter into and perform the contract” and, therefore, “the failure to submit a consent of surety with the bid is a material defect that could neither be waived nor cured. ” (A69).  In so finding, the hearing officer rejected [...]’s argument that a power of attorney was not necessary to attest to the validity of the purported attorney-in-fact’s signature on the Consent of Surety.  Noting that the POA at issue here was limited on its face to the proffered Proposal Guaranty, the hearing officer found it self-evident that a Consent of Surety “can only be verified as binding on the surety if it is accompanied by a lawfully executed POA attesting to that fact” and, lacking same, [...]’s bid was fatally defective.  (A71).  The hearing officer also found of no moment [...]’s subsequent revisions to the subject specifications, noting that the question was not the applicability of those amended specifications or the decision to do so after the underlying protest but, rather, [...]’s compliance with the specifications in effect and as written, at the time of submission of the bid.
[brief] Although [...] disputes the suitability of the Property for residential development, the underlying zone for the Property permits multifamily residential development.  Additionally, the commercial redevelopment sought by [...] indicates that there are no significant physical or environmental restraints which would render the Property unsuitable.  The trial court recognized as such, noting that it had not “heard anything indicating, other than that the town wants this to be commercial, that it’s environmentally not appropriate, that nothing can be built here” (1T53:19-25).  On the other hand, the trial court appropriately heeded “[t]he public policy of this State,” which has “long been that persons with low and moderate incomes are entitled to affordable housing. ”
[brief] [...] was a consolidated appeal.  The Appellate Division remanded after [...]’s first sentencing (for unlawful possession of a handgun that was connected to a shooting) because the trial court found [...] was the shooter even though the jury had deadlocked on the murder and aggravated-assault charges, which were later retried.  *Id.* at 328.  [...] was resentenced following retrial on the deadlocked counts, at which time the same judge again found [...] was the shooter even though he was acquitted of the murder and aggravated-assault charges.  *Id.* at 329.  In the companion case, *Paden-Battle*, the same judge had also considered acquitted charges in sentencing the defendant.  *Id.* at 338.  After vacating both sentences, the Supreme Court stated that it felt assignment to a new judge was “the best course of action,” particularly in [...]’s case, because it would be his third sentencing and “it might be difficult to comprehend how the same judge who has twice sentenced him could arrive at a different determination at a third sentencing.
[brief] (Da1916)(2T11:24-12:4)  Late in the afternoon of May 22, “[...] called the [New Jersey] Court... to inform the Court that he removed this action again to the District... of New Jersey... [and] emailed the petition for removal to the Court and [Plaintiffs’ counsel] at 2:41 p.m. ”  (Da1916)  For a second time, Brad had removed the action *the day before* the return date of a motion seeking to sanction him for violating an injunction, and for a second time that removal violated the injunction in question (the “Second Removal”).
[brief] REVERSAL IS REQUIRED BECAUSE THE STATE PERPETRATED “FUNDAMENTAL MISCARRIAGE OF JUSTICE”  [...] CREDIBLE SHOWING OF ACTUAL INNOCENCE, PROVES THE STATE PRODUCE NO EVIDENCE INCrimINATING [...].  THE STATE HAD DESCRIPTION OF THE KILLER IN VIDEO AND [...] SEEN KILLER.  THE CLOTHING IN VIDEO WERE ABSOLUTELY DISSIMILAR FROM MR. [...]’S.  (Not Raise Below) .......................................................................................................................  POINT III
[brief] ”)  If State v. Harris has any merit, then it stands to reason that failure to administer the SFST properly and an admission by the officer that it was done improperly would establish sufficient grounds for an objectively reasonable judge to conclude that there was, in fact, no proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the officer had probable cause to arrest me, which would ultimately conclude that the first and second elements of the refusal statue would not be met, which would mean that the refusal citation should be dismissed with prejudice or at the very least, that the arrest would be considered invalid and unlawful in violation of my fourth amendment rights, therefore suppressing the fruits of the arrest, in accordance to the fruits of the poisonous tree doctrine, which in this case is my refusal to submit to the breath test.
[brief] Appellant also sought damages for several non-compensable items, to include alleged damages to the home located upon the Property due to construction activities, as well as alleged loss of view and privacy from the construction of improvements on the Borough’s property; its municipal beach.  As a result, the trial court entered numerous orders paring down Appellant’s appraisal report to bar presentation of such inappropriate opinions to the fact finder.  Throughout the course of this litigation, Appellant has: (1) produced an appraisal report based upon an obvious typographical error; (2) produced an engineering report that argued the repairs to the seawall actually increased the potential for flooding or wave damage to the subject property devoid of any objective support or analysis; (3) the engineering report also sought non-compensable damages from vibrations during the construction activities which were correctly barred as a matter of law from this condemnation action; (4) the engineering report sought non-compensable damages for the loss of view and privacy from improvements constructed on the Borough’s property were also barred as a matter of law; (5) produced an appraisal report which sought damages for the above-listed non-compensable issues.
[brief] Furthermore, the defendant explicitly presented the third-party guilt theory to the jury by consistently emphasizing that [...] should have been considered a suspect throughout the trial.  "Although arguments of counsel can by no means serve as a substitute for instructions by the court the prejudicial effect of an omitted instruction must be evaluated 'in light of the totality of the circumstances—including all the instructions to the jury, and the arguments of counsel.'"  State v. Marshall, 123 N.J. 1, 145 (1991) (quoting Kentucky v. Whorton, 441 U.S. 786, 789 (1979) (citation omitted)).  The focus of defendant's theory at trial was that police conducted substandard work, concentrating on the wrong individual.  He consistently contended that the police overlooked eyewitness testimony indicating the shooter was black and that an individual fitting that description was associated with the "vehicle of interest."  In his opening, defendant stated that the State's "whole case is based on guesswork and speculation" and that "there will be evidence in the case that other people have driven that car," but the State was arguing that it "can prove to you beyond a reasonable doubt that that person, who nobody can identify as [defendant] is the one who entered the vehicle."  (2T14-24 to 15-5).  Defendant emphasized that the police "ignored the fact that one of their own eyewitnesses had made a 9-1-1 phone call at the time of it and when asked to describe the person who did the shooting said it was a black individual."  (2T12-23 to 13-3).  And he highlighted that the police ignored that several days after the shooting, "the police stopped the very car that they're saying was the get-away vehicle in New York City," and defendant was not in the vehicle, but the driver of the "that car was a black individual named [...]."  (2T13-4 to 13).  Then, on cross-examination, defendant asked several witnesses about the shooter being described as a black male, including [...], [...], and [...].  (2T31-19 to 21; 3T35-4 to 7; 5T254-15 to 256-19).  But even with the knowledge that Darrion was pulled over in the car of interest and matched the description of a black male, the police did not interview him until two to three weeks before the trial.  (4T199-1 to 200-18).  He repeated these arguments in his closing, emphasizing Darrion's connection to the car.  (7T58-11 to 59-8).  Defendant's arguments during the trial argued that [...] better matched the description provided by eyewitnesses.  This, coupled with the court's detailed instructions, effectively conveyed to the jury their responsibility to find the defendant guilty only if they were convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that he was the shooter.  POINT III
[directive] Page 5  The judge at a case management conference or earlier hearing may rely on an attorney’s representation that their client does not consent to a remote proceeding for the purpose of scheduling an in-person hearing date.  In that situation, the attorney will be required to file the certification no later than the next business day.  Hearing.1  If and as necessary, the court will enter an  Order for In-Person  That order will schedule the in-person hearing and specify how notice will be served on all parties, attorneys, and other participants.  To the extent practicable, the order will direct how other participants, including witnesses, will appear.  It also will advise the parties, attorneys, and other participants of the availability to request an individual adjustment (e.g., use of a technology room to participate in a hearing from a separate courthouse location).  The order will provide direction about how to direct any request for an accommodation pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act.  Importantly, the order will advise the parties of the consequences of not appearing for the scheduled in-person hearing.  A template C2. order is provided as Attachment Conclusion and Questions  It is axiomatic that justice delayed can be justice denied.
[directive] This form should be filled out only in cases where the defendant is pleading guilty based on the judge's representation as to what the maximum sentence will be.  Proszę wymienić obietnice lub oświadczenia sędziego dotyczące Pana(i) kary.  1.  List any promises or representations that have been made by the judge as to what your sentence will be.  Czy zdaje sobie Pan(i) sprawę, że jeśli podczas wydawania wyroku sędzia uzna, [Tak/Yes]  [Nie/No]  2.  że orzeczenie kary w obiecanym lub niższym wymiarze nie będzie służyć interesom sprawiedliwości, sędzia będzie mógł unieważnić przyznanie się do winy lub zezwolić Panu(i) na wycofanie oświadczenia o przyznaniu się do winy, w następstwie czego sprawa zostanie skierowana na rozprawę.  Do you understand that if the judge determines at the time of sentencing that imposing a sentence no greater than that which he or she promised would not serve the interests of justice, then the judge may order your plea be vacated or you will be allowed to withdraw your plea, and your case will proceed to trial.  Data/Date: Oskarżony/Defendant Zatwierdził(a):  (wyłącznie dla celów oświadczenia odnośnie winy)
[directive] Additional Questions for Certain Sexual Offenses (Polish) (Use if committed on or after December 1, 1998)  Na poniższe pytania dodatkowe powinny odpowiedzieć osoby przyznające się do popełnienia lub usiłowania popełnienia któregokolwiek z następujących przestępstw: napaść seksualna kwalifikowana, napaść seksualna, zakazany kontakt seksualny kwalifikowany, uprowadzenie zgodnie z 2C:13-1c(2), spowodowanie zagrożenia dobra dziecka poprzez udział w zachowaniach seksualnych, które mogłyby upośledzić lub wypaczyć zasady moralne dziecka zgodnie z 2C:24-4a, zagrożenia dobra spowodowanie 2C:24-4b(4), spowodowanie zagrożenia dobra dziecka zgodnie z 2C:24-4b(5), (jeśli dziecka zgodnie z przestępstwo miało miejsce 1 r. lub później), lub prowadzenie sieci pornografii dziecięcej lutego 2018 2C:24-4.1 (jeśli przestępstwo miało miejsce 1 lutego 2018 r. lub później). zgodnie z These additional questions need to be answered if you are pleading guilty to the offense of or any attempt to commit the offense of aggravated sexual assault, sexual assault, aggravated criminal sexual contact, kidnapping under 2C:13-1c(2), endangering the welfare of a child by engaging in sexual conduct which would impair or debauch the morals of the child under 2C:24-4a, endangering the welfare of a child pursuant to 2C:24-4b(4), endangering the welfare of a child pursuant to 2C:24-4b(5) (if the offense was committed on or after February 1, 2018), or leader of a child pornography network pursuant to 2C:24-4.1 (if the offense was committed on or after February 1, 2018)
[brief] The Authority’s Failure To Build The Authority Garage Eliminated The Parameters For Rates To Be Charged At The Project Garage  The Redevelopment Agreement and the Operating Agreement empowered the Authority to establish the rents, rates, fees or charges to be collected by the Authority at the Project Garage.  Da109 (§ 8.5(c)); Da255-256 (§ 5.2(a)).  However, Section 8.5(c) of the Redevelopment Agreement provided that the Authority could not charge: (i) less than one and one half (1.5) times or more than two (2) times the amount charged in the Authority Garage without the consent of [[...]][;] . . . and (ii) less than one and one half (1.5) times or more than three (3) times the amount charged in the Authority Garage without the consent of [[...]’s] consent . . . thereafter.  [Da109]  Because the Authority Garage was never built, the Authority had no parameters by which it could set rates.  See 1T24:11-18.  L.
[directive] 4  Page 5  6.  Bolster trust and collaboration between law enforcement and community.  Build partnerships with communities that can participate in or lead public safety initiatives in coordination with law enforcement, empowering community to make public safety a shared mission.  7.  Develop and support initiatives that lead to fewer arrests, fewer uses of force, fewer injuries, and address racial disparities in policing and prosecution.  8.  Coordinate and support law enforcement agencies across the state on practices that ensure local law enforcement’s responses to matters at the intersection of public health and crime are consistently effective, and evidence- and trauma-informed across New Jersey communities.
[brief] INDICTMENT NO. [...] STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. [...], Defendant-Appellant  CRIMINAL ACTION  On Appeal  From a Judgment of Conviction of the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Camden County.  Sat Below:  Hon. [...], J.S.C.  DEFENDANT IS CONFINED  Your Honors:  This letter is submitted in lieu of a formal brief pursuant to R. 2:6-2(b) on behalf of [...].
[brief] The “law favors prospective, rather than retroactive, application of new legislation unless a recognized exception applies. ”  Roik v. Roik, 477 N.J. Super. 556, 573 (App. Div. 2024) (citing and quoting Ardan v. Board of Review, 444 N.J. Super. 576, 587 (App. Div. 2016).  To determine retroactivity, the Court “must apply a two-part test to determine whether a statute should be applied retroactively,” id., which is: “(1) whether the Legislature intended to give the statute retroactive application; and [if so] (2) whether retroactive application will result in either an unconstitutional interference with vested rights or a manifest injustice.
[brief] (T46:10-16.)  [...] reiterated its objections and further noted that to the extent the memo was being offered for notice purposes only (and not the truth of the matter asserted), then whatever was in the Governing Body’s transcript, a Joint Exhibit, was the record of any such notice or not.  (T44:12-17.)  In denying reconsideration, the Trial Court again found that if Plaintiffs wanted to include those exhibits in their argument, they needed to have cited them in their briefs.
[brief] Prior to the accident, on April 22, 2015, a Biennial Bridge Inspection was performed on behalf of the [...] on the Rt. 30 bridge overpass where Plaintiff ultimately had his accident.  (Pa1343).  The inspection identified settlement in the southbound left lane at the north abutment joint.  (Pa1351 and Pa1367).  The settlement condition was described as “[r]amped up and deteriorated in the left shoulder and left lane” with settlement up to 2 inches at the southbound north approach roadway.  (Pa1349, Pa1351, Pa1367)(Emphasis Added).  The engineering group that performed the Biennial Bridge Inspection recommended that the abutment joint be repaired.  (Pa1350).  Also prior to the accident, a subsequent inspection of the Rt. 30 overpass took place on June 24, 2015.  On June 26, 2015 an inspection memo was prepared which indicated, among other things, that the inspection revealed “significant settlement” in the pavement at the north approach and recommended immediate repair and testing.  (Pa1191)(Emphasis Added).  When [...] Senior Construction Engineer [...] was shown the “snapshot” from a video taken by Plaintiff of the condition that caused his accident.  Johnson agreed that settlement at that location would be dangerous to users of the roadway.  (Pa801 at 28:3-16 and Pa1421).  According to Plaintiff’s Expert [...], P.E., based on the evidence available to him, a dangerous condition existed at the abutment joint identified by Plaintiff due to settlement and corrosion in the left lane of travel.  (Pa20).  As Plaintiff’s expert explained in his report, pavement surface quality has a greater effect on motorcycles and their handling and stability.  (Pa21).  Mr. Balgowan also referred to the Guidelines on Motorcycle and Bicycle Workzone Safety which explains that motorcycles have difficulty crossing uneven lanes that differ as little as 1 inch.  (Pa21 and Pa1398).  In fact, Defense expert, [...], P.E. agreed that pavement elevation changes can cause operational problems for motorcycles.  (Pa625).  On November 17, 2015, emergency paving was performed in the southbound left lane at the subject abutment joint in order to correct the pavement settlement and bring to proper grade.  (Pa1396).  Due to the November 17, 2015 repairs and ultimately the completion of the Parkway construction project, none of the experts in this case could perform an inspection or take their own measurements of the settlement/elevation change.  D.
[brief] [...] confirmed that [...] came to his house the next morning.  Mr. Hall recounted [...] stating to him that, “it was raining, he wasn't sure what vehicle was [sic]. ” and, “It's raining, he didn't want to go around ringing doorbells. ”  [...] found these explanations to be “all understandable. ” (2T.9; 2T. 20).  [...] acknowledged, however, that [...] never specifically stated to him that he drove the car and crashed.  [...] made it clear to the municipal court judge that he had no interest in seeing [...] prosecuted.  He described [...] as “a good neighbor” and a “good guy” (2T.21) who’s explanation of the events “made sense” (2T.24).  [...] expressed this sentiment to the municipal court before the trial in a letter that he wrote (35a).
[brief] .............................................................................46  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, RULINGS, & ORDERS BEING APPEALED Judgment of Conviction ................................................................. Da 10-12 INDEX TO APPENDIX Indictment ......................................................................................Da 1-7 Verdict Sheet ..................................................................................Da 8-9 Judgment of Conviction .................................................................Da 10-12 Notice of Appeal..............................................................................Da 13-15 Exhibit S-17 Surveillance Camera Footage..................................... Da 16 ### TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | Cases | PAGE NOS | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|----------| | **State v. Bielkiewicz**, 267 N.J. Super. 520 (App. Div. 1993) | 37 | | **State v. Blackmon**, 202 N.J. 283 (2010) | 41 | | **State v. Bowser**, 297 N.J. Super. 588 (App. Div. 1997) | passim | | **State v. Brunson**, 132 N.J. 377 (1993) | 2, 9, 16, 24 | | **State v. Bunch**, 180 N.J. 534 (2004) | 34 | | **State v. Case**, 220 N.J. 49 (2014) | 41, 42 | | **State v. Cook**, 300 N.J. 476 (App. Div. 1993) | 32 | | **State v. Dalziel**, 182 N.J. 494 (2005) | 41 | | **State v. Epps**, 259 N.J. Super. 266 (Law. Div. 1992) | 15 | | **State v. Fair**, 45 N.J. 77 (1965) | 30, 36 | | **State v. Farrell**, 61 N.J. 99 (1972) | 43 | | **State v. Fuentes**, 217 N.J. 57 (2014) | 44 | | **State v. Garron**, 177 N.J. 147 (2003) | 36 | | **State v. Harrington**, 310 N.J. Super. 272 (App. Div. 1998) | 30, 34 | | **State v. Harris**, 357 N.J. Super. 532 (App. Div. 2003) | 36, 37 | | **State v. Hedgespeth**, 464 N.J. Super. 421 (App. Div. 2020) | passim | | **State v. Higgs**, 253 N.J.
[directive] The County Prosecutor’s Office shall make these kits available to the emergency department of every healthcare facility in its county on an as needed basis.  Each County SART program shall have an FNE Coordinator who supervises, educates, and evaluates the services provided by FNEs, which include the performance of medical forensic exams.  FNEs must be registered professional nurses or physicians who have completed an educational program that meets the certification guidelines established by the Attorney General, the New Jersey Board of Nursing, and the International Association of Forensic Nurses (IAFN).  FNEs must also be certified as a FN-CSA.  (See Appendix IX, Statewide Forensic Nurse Examiner Legislation, N.J.S.A. 52:4B-53).  It is recommended that all healthcare personnel, even if not providing services as part of an established SART, complete an educational program in the care and treatment of sexual assault victims.