ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] **STANDARD OF REVIEW**  "[D]eterminations about the applicability of OPRA and its exemptions constitute legal conclusions, and are therefore subject to de novo review."  *In re N.J. Firemen's Ass'n Obligation*, 230 N.J. 258, 273-74 (2017); *Drinker Biddle & Reath, LLP v. N.J. Dep't of Law & Pub. Safety*, 421 N.J. Super. 489, 497 (App. Div. 2011).  "Any analysis of OPRA must begin with the recognition that the Legislature created OPRA intending to make governmental records 'readily accessible' to the state's citizens 'with certain exceptions[] for the protection of the public interest.'"  *Gilleran v. Twp. of Bloomfield*, 227 N.J. 159, 170 (2016)(quoting N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1).  "OPRA's purpose is 'to maximize public knowledge about public affairs in order to ensure an informed citizenry and to minimize the evils inherent in a secluded process."  Mason v. City of Hoboken, 196 N.J. 51, 64 (2008) (quoting Asbury Park Press v. Ocean Cnty. Prosecutor's Off., 374 N.J. Super. 312, 329 (Law Div. 2004)).  "OPRA places the burden of proof on the government to show that a requested record may be withheld under an exemption or exclusion from the disclosure requirement."  Asbury Park Press v. Cnty. of Monmouth, 406 N.J. Super. 1 (App. Div. 2009) affirmed, 201 N.J. 5 (2010), (citing N.J.S.A. 47:1A-6).  Although "[t]he statute broadly defines the term 'government record,'" it "also calls for a careful balancing of competing interests -- the right of access to government records versus the need to protect personal information.  "  Libertarians for Transparent Gov't v. Cumberland County (Libertarians II), 250 N.J. 46, 54 (2022) (citing Burnett v. Cnty. of Bergen, 198 N.J. 408, 414 (2009)).  In assessing the sufficiency of the agency's proofs submitted in support of its claim for nondisclosure, "a court must be guided by the overarching public policy in favor of a citizen's right of access."  Courier News v. Hunterdon Cty. Prosecutor's Office, 358 N.J. Super. 373, 383 (App. Div. 2003) (citing N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1).  Absent the necessary proofs, "a citizen's right of access is unfettered."  Ibid.  If it is determined access has been improperly denied, the access sought shall be granted.  See N.J.S.A. 47:1A-6.
[brief] The First Amended Petition In The Missouri Action.  On August 3, 2022, defendants filed a First Amended Petition in the Missouri Action adding claims against five other companies who entered into defense and indemnity contracts with [...] that are substantially \(^5\)  Defendants filed their Answer to the Complaint and Affirmative Defenses on November 29, 2017.  similar to the Special Undertaking Contract.\(^6\) (Pa082-083, Pa105-175).  The First Amended Petition seeks, among other things, to recover billions of dollars in damages from plaintiff and the other five defendants, including amounts expended by defendants in defending the underlying PCB lawsuits, judgments entered against defendants in some of the underlying PCB lawsuits, and amounts paid or agreed to be paid by defendants to resolve certain underlying PCB lawsuits.  \textit{Id}.  On September 2, 2022, plaintiff filed a renewed motion to dismiss or stay the Missouri Action in favor of this case.\(^7\) (Pa083).  After briefing and oral argument, the [...] denied plaintiff’s renewed motion finding that the Missouri Action should proceed despite the existence of the New Jersey Action.\(^8\) (Pa177).  Plaintiff did not attempt to appeal the Missouri order.
[brief] Moreover, even as indirectly argued by the Respondents, via both of their own cited authorities, a defense of “accord and satisfaction” or “novation” is “highly fact-specific” as to the parties’ intent. \(^1\)  But here in this case, without even inquiring about the parties’ intent, nor inquiring as to any of the specifics, the trial court held that accord and satisfaction categorically precludes my recovery.
[brief] Certainly, at the time when the thermometer was used, there was no reason to expect that there was anything notable about the thermometer at all.  This is likely why Defendant made no request to preserve it, which further increases the standard of proof Defendant must meet in order to demonstrate a due process violation in this context.  The temperature was capable of being (and was) measured by other tools at the scene and thoroughly explored by experts (including the defense’s own expert who brought and argued meteorological evidence of the temperature), all of whom managed to form opinions regarding the thermometer’s functionality without physically operating the thermometer.  The defendant was not prejudiced by the lack of the presence of the thermometer.
[brief] [...] was qualified in the field of historical cell site analysis.  Historical cell site analysis is “at a state of the art” such that a qualified expert’s testimony “could be sufficiently reliable. ”  Indeed, numerous decisions have so found.  See, e.g., *State v. Burney*, 255 N.J. 1, 21-22 (2023) (“Across the nation, state and federal courts have accepted expert testimony about cell site analysis for the purpose of placing a cell phone within a “general area” at a particular time.
[brief] “[T]he right of the custodian of the defendant’s property who has been unwittingly involved by the defendant in his crime to exculpate himself promptly and voluntarily by disclosing the property and explaining his connection with it to government agents, must prevail over any claim of the defendant to have the privacy of his property maintained against a warrantless search by such agents. ”  United States v. Diggs, 544 F.2d 116, 120-21 (3d Cir. 1976) (en banc); see United States v. Botsch, 364 F.2d 542, 547-48 (2d Cir. 1966) (“It would be a harsh doctrine, indeed, that would prevent an innocent pawn from removing the taint of suspicion which had been cast upon him by a defendant’s cunning scheme. ”), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 937 (1967); United States v. Mazzella, 295 F. Supp. 1033, 1035-36 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); Gieffels v. State, 590 P.2d 55, 60-62 (Alaska 1979); see also State v. Brockman, 494 S.E.2d 440, 444 (S.C. Ct. App. 1997) (dictum), rev’d, 528 S.E.2d 661 (S.C.), cert. denied, 530 U.S. 1281 (2000).  Defendant’s comparison of [...]’s situation with that presented in State v. Carty, 170 N.J. 632 (2002), should be swiftly rejected.
[brief] In *Airwork Serv. Div. v. Dir., Div. of Taxation*, 97 N.J. 290 (1984), decided the same day as *Metromedia*, the Court allowed to stand the Director of the Department of Taxation’s assessment of sales tax under N.J.S.A.  54:32B-1 to -29.  The taxpayer in *Airwork* was engaged in the repair of airplane engines and took the position that although its services were rendered in New Jersey, the engines were later returned to out-of-state customers, and therefore the services were not taxable in New Jersey.
[brief] On April 17, 2023, [...] resubmitted its FHACA permit applications for the Project.  (Aa264).  On May 10, 2023 [...] submitted an additional public comment, again reiterating its claims that [...]’s stormwater plan was deficient because it failed to meet water quality, peak flow control and groundwater recharge requirements.  (Aa2521).  Throughout the permitting review process, [...] considered [...]’s comments and [...]’s reports and asked [...] to address them as well.  (Aa54; Aa86; Aa2656).
[brief] [...] filed his plenary brief on May 7, 2024, in which he raised four points challenging the conviction and one point challenging the sentence.  (Db)¹  The State filed its responding brief on August 15, 2024.  (Pb)  [...] now files this reply brief in which he responds to the State’s Point I concerning the retroactivity of the Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Fair² and Point II concerning the constitutionality of the emergency enhancement in the terroristic threats statute.  (Pb 9-22)  [...] additionally relies on the detailed procedural history and statement of facts in his opening brief.  (Db 4 to 10)  --- ¹ Pb – State’s response brief Db – Defendant’s opening brief Da – Defendant’s appendix to his opening brief ² 256 N.J. 213 (2024).
[directive] ☐ ☐  8.  To the best of your knowledge, is any other person living at the proposed Yes No residence currently on probation, parole, or charged with a pending offense in New Jersey or any other state or jurisdiction?  ☐  Any other relevant information regarding defendant’s ☐ Yes No 9.  residence: Revised Form Promulgated by Directive #19-23 (10/17/2023), CN 12220 page 2 of 5
[brief] As a result of [...]’s motion to join [...]’s mother [...] in this litigation, the trial court ordered the deed to be transferred from [...] back to [...] on July 27, 2020.  (A514).  Attorney(A21;A27;A29); all of which she lawfully signed and remained silent about since December 3, 2008.  (A77)  On October 20, 2017, [...] ordered an initial 3-month discovery period and a plenary hearing to follow.
[brief] See Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Nat'l Roofing, Inc., 108 N.J. 59, 64, 527 A.2d 864 (1987) (noting that a matter is moot when there is no issue left to adjudicate).  The New Jersey Civil Rights Act, N.J.S.A. 10:6-1 to -2, includes a provision that authorizes a court to award "the prevailing party" reasonable attorney's fees and costs, N.J.S.A. 10:6-2(f).  The issue presented by this appeal is whether a party who brings an action under the Civil Rights Act that results in a change in defendant's conduct may qualify as a "prevailing party" even though the action is dismissed as moot rather than being concluded by a judgment in plaintiffs favor.
[brief] As a result of the Trial Court’s orders, there are absolutely zero consequences for this conduct.  No doubt members of the bar and the judiciary bring a wealth of knowledge and experience to the cases they handle.  However, louvered systems and stormwater management are not matters of “common sense” subject to judicial notice.  See State v. LiButti, 146 N.J. Super. 565, 571 (App. Div. 1977) (holding that the Court is not to use from the bench, under the guise of judicial notice, that which they know only as an individual observer).
[brief] ”  State v. Francisco, 471 N.J. Super. 386, 421 (App. Div. 2022).  The omission of an explanation for the term was clearly capable of leading jurors to conclude [...] acted “unnecessarily,” even though he was not required to testify to the contrary.  Likewise, the lesser-included offense required jurors to find unnecessary cruelty.  N.J.S.A. 4:22-17(a)(3), (b)(1) (making it a disorderly-persons offense to “[i]nflict unnecessary cruelty upon a living animal or creature, by any direct or indirect means”).  Yet the instructions on the lesser-included offense also omitted any explanation or definition of those terms.  Moreover, the court’s instruction seemed to equate “unnecessary cruelty” with simply beating:  “the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt . . . that the defendant inflicted unnecessary cruelty, specifically the State alleges that [...] inflicted unnecessary cruelty by beating” the dog.  (3T 89-21 to 24)  Given that the terms of the greater offense – “unnecessarily or cruelly beat” – are virtually identical to those of the lesser offense, this confusing instruction may have led the jury to convict [...] of the greater offense merely by finding that he beat the dog.  In sum, [...] may have been convicted purely on testimony that the dog was struck, an act which is not a criminal offense under N.J.S.A. 4:22-17(c)(1) unless it was unnecessary or cruel.  If the Legislature intended the statute to cover all instances of striking an animal, it would not have inserted the qualifiers “unnecessarily” or “cruelly. ”  The jury had to determine not just whether [...] in fact struck or dragged a dog, but whether he did so cruelly or unnecessarily.  Jurors were unable to make that determination without guidance on whether a particular act was legally unnecessary or cruel.  These charging errors were “clearly capable of producing an unjust result. ”
[brief] In support of his contention that the officers improperly testified about why they were arresting him, defendant primarily relies on State v. Simms, 224 N.J. 393 (2016), State v. McLean, 205 N.J. 438 (2011), and State v. Reeds, 197 N.J. 280 (2009), distinguishable cases outlining the limits on the ability of police experts in the area of narcotics transactions to testify that a defendant’s observed behavior was indicative of a narcotics transaction.
[brief] The events in the underlying action are examined by the jury.  See e.g., Jerista v. Murray, 185 N.J. 175, 191 (2005) (“Plaintiffs in this malpractice action proceeded in the conventional way by attempting to prove the ‘suit within a suit. ’  In other words, plaintiffs presented ‘evidence that would have been submitted at a trial’ in a personal injury case against [...], ‘had no malpractice occurred. ’”)(citation omitted).  In this case there was ample evidence that defendants committed malpractice and that the malpractice caused damages to plaintiff.
[brief] Indeed, in raising this frivolous argument, Tenant ignored that, in February 2021 (i.e. six (6) months prior to the trial), the parties engaged in a formal reconciliation of the 2020 CAM charges, during which Tenant was granted a $4,678.26 credit towards the 2021 CAM charges because the actual 2020 CAM charges were less than the yearly estimate included in Tenant’s monthly rental payment.  (Da26-29, Lease at § 7.01; Da184-188).  In accordance with the terms of the Lease, Tenant and its accountants had ninety (90) days to review this reconciliation, including the thousands of underlying invoices, and raise any challenges to the same.  (Da26-29, Lease at § 7.01; Da184-188).  Tenant, of course, failed to raise any timely challenges to this reconciliation, which awarded Tenant a $4,678.26 credit, and only challenged Landlord’s calculation of these charges in the Underlying Action as part of its ongoing efforts to avoid paying Landlord the full Rent and Additional Rent due under the Lease.  (Da186).  charges despite its express contractual duty to do so and the admission in Tenant’s own Post Trial Brief that this exact amount is due.  (Pa117; Da169).  Due to these arguments improperly raised by Tenant for the first time in its second post-trial submission, Landlord was forced to review and analyze nearly two-hundred (200) pages of utility and third-party vendor invoices and draft, in response to the Sur-Reply, an eight (8) page client certification, a four (4) page counsel certification and a ten (10) page memorandum of law.  (Pa117; Da182-189).
[brief] Finally, in Georgia, [...] makes it clear in the 9-0 decision in that no member of the Court questions that the 11th Amendment is vitiated where [...] is an agent of my law firm (e.g., delivering complaint that was stamped 5 conduct is alleged to violate both the Due Process clause and the ADA.  Georgia at 158.  The same is true of the LAD via the “Employer” definition.  He also made it clear that, in such dual situations, the ADA was capable of addressing both violations at the same time.  Georgia at 159.  Unless we are drawing some distinction between people with mental disabilities and people with hearing disabilities, which [...] warns against.  See “Covering Only the ‘Truly Disabled. ’”  [...], Subordination, Stigma, and “Disability,” 86 Va. L. Rev. 397, 466-473 (2000).  Nearly all of these “truly disabled” cases go forward against these “standard” State arguments (see, e.g., Gonzales v. Pennsylvania, 293 Fed. Appx. 136, 137-38 (3rd Cir. 2008)).  This case is no different from any in which a state program is withheld from a person due to disability.  The state was held to answer.
[brief] Da363  Exhibit 1  Verified Complaint ........................................ Da1 (form of)  Order to Show Cause Filed 9/24/18........................................  Da370  Case Information Statement Dated 09/05/18........................................  Da373  Exhibit 2  Order to Show Cause Filed 09/24/18.  Da375  Exhibit 3  Order for Payment into Court and For Possession Filed 9/24/18..................  Da379  Exhibit 4  Order for Judgment and Appointing Commissioners  Filed 11/21/18 ..........  Da29  Exhibit 7  Amended Verified Complaint Filed 08/02/21........................................  Da86  Exhibit 8  Plaintiff’s Certification of [...]  Filed 07/08/20 ...........................  Da382  Exhibit 13  Defendant’s Notice of Motion for Extension of Time and For Other Relief Filed 12/03/20 .............................
[brief] [O]nce a business has made substantial franchise-specific investments (which are of minimal utility outside the franchise), it loses virtually all of its bargaining power ....  Specifically, the franchisee cannot do anything that would risk termination, because that would result in a loss of much or all of the value of its franchise-specific investments.  Cooper Distrib. Co. v. Amana Refrigeration, Inc., 63 F.3d 262, 269 (3d Cir. 1995) (quoting Instructional Sys., 130 N.J. at 357)).
[brief] On December 10, 2021, petitioner filed an Amended Notice of Appeal.  On April 13, 2022, petitioner filed a Brief and Appendix in support of her appeal.  On May 2, 2022, [...] filed a responsive brief.  On May 23, 2022, Petitioner filed a reply brief responding to Affinity’s responsive brief.  On May 24, 2022, the court issued an Order suppressing Petitioner’s May 23, 2022 brief.  On November 9, 2022, the court held oral argument on Petitioner’s appeal.  By Opinion dated December 2, 2022, the court reversed and remanded the trial court’s October 22, 2021 Orders, holding that Petitioner could proceed on her claims as administrator *ad prosequendum* for the Estate of [...] (hereinafter “the Estate”) but only with the assistance of a licensed attorney.
[directive] It is the responsibility of that agency to decide which items are discoverable and which are likely admissible.  In these cases, the agency must follow the prosecuting agency’s instructions.  The prosecuting agency must have a procedure in place to ensure, in the rare case where a compelled statement has been taken from a subject officer and a criminal case results, that any compelled statements from a subject officer are not impermissibly used in the criminal case.  9.4  Retention Schedule 9.4.1
[brief] The Trial Court’s Order Is Inconsistent with the New Jersey Rules of Court Because It Requires Production of Irrelevant Documents | 8 | | II.  The Trial Court’s Order Infringes on the Core Role of a Responding Party to Determine How to Meet Its Own Preservation and Production Obligations | 14 | | III.  The Trial Court’s Order Raises Profound Privacy and Cybersecurity Issues | 17 | | IV.
[brief] In this case, Plaintiff [...] (“[...]”), a second-grade schoolteacher, brought defamation and false light claims against the [...] on the basis of public statements they made concerning an incident that occurred between [...] and a Muslim student in her class.  The student claimed [...] forcibly pulled off her hijab (her religious head covering) in front of the class.  The student’s account of this incident quickly found its way to defendant [...] (“[...]”), an Olympian fencer and respected public figure known for advocating for pride in wearing a hijab, who posted about the incident on social media.  Upon seeing these posts, the [...]—organizations that advocate for Muslim Americans—made a series of public statements condemning [...]’s removal of the student’s hijab.  Because the [...]’ statements unquestionably involved matters of public concern (and [...], as a public-school teacher, is a public official), [...] admits that she must plead and prove that the [...] published their statements with actual malice, i.e. “knew that the[ir] statement[s] [were] false or published with reckless disregard for the truth,” as an element of her claim.  See Neuwirth, 476 N.J. Super. at 391 (quoting Lynch v. N.J. Educ. Ass’n, 161 N.J. 152, 165 (1999)).  Recognizing that the prospect of protracted litigation of meritless defamation claims chills free speech rights, this Court has repeatedly held that a plaintiff cannot rely on conclusory and legally insufficient allegations of actual malice.  Instead, to avoid dismissal at the pleading stage, she must plead “facts from which a factfinder could conclude” that each defendant acted with “subjective awareness” of falsity or “entertained serious doubts as to truth. ”  Id. at 392-93 (citations omitted).  [...]’s Amended Complaint (the “Complaint”) offers no facts to support a theory that the [...] acted with actual malice.  In fact, the allegations in the Complaint are inconsistent with any such conclusion.  Her claim should not have survived a motion to dismiss.  Notwithstanding this, the trial court denied the [...]’ motions to dismiss the claims against them under R. 4.6-2(e), holding that [...]’s allegations about what [...] knew and did ahead of publishing her social media statements could be imputed to her co-defendants.  This reasoning was plain legal error, defying the settled principle that actual malice considers a defendant’s own “subjective” state of mind, and must be analyzed separately as to each “particular defendant. ”  Durando v. Nutley Sun, 209 N.J. 235, 251 (2012).  The trial court’s errant decision flies in the face of settled authority and threatens to chill our most prized constitutional rights.  The Court can and should correct this error and dismiss the claims against the [...].
[brief] But the Special Master need not reach this issue in connection with the current dispute.  Even if the details about targeted advertising in Exhibit 25 were relevant to data sharing—and again they are not—nothing about the document suggests that [...] has unique information about targeted advertising.  Plaintiffs’ argument that [...] should be made a document custodian because media reports claim she leads [...]’s “monetization of data” fails for similar reasons.  Mot. at 7-8.  [...]’s general business model of selling the opportunity to show advertisements to [...] users is not at issue in this action.  See Dkt. 298 at 6.  Plaintiffs do not explain how “monetization” in general is relevant, much less that Ms.  Sandberg’s files on “monetization” would be relevant and not duplicative of documents held by, for example, designated custodians [...], who worked as Director of Product Management for Platform Monetization, and [...], a former Vice President for Platform Monetization.  Plaintiffs claim that Exhibit 20 to the [...] Declaration (virtually identical to Exhibit 12) shows that [...] has unique information about “whitelisting,” Mot. at 8, but that document simply shows [...] [Redacted].  So here again, Exhibit 20 does not merely fail to indicate that there is a gap in [...]’s existing production—it shows the opposite.  Plaintiffs further contend that [...] will have unique information about whitelisting because she [Redacted] Mot. at 8 (citing [...] Decl., Ex. 21).  In fact, [...] [Redacted]  Plaintiffs’ exhibits showing [...] and [...]’s role in [...]’s response to the [...] events also do not meet their burden to prove that there are gaps in [...]’s productions that would be filled by adding [...] and [...] as custodians.
[brief] Here, [...] issued a Commitment of Title Insurance on March 7, 2019, with plain and unambiguous language with the subject to a condition precedent: the transference of title from [...] to Plaintiff.  Specifically, Schedule B, Part 1 of the Commitment outlined the requirements for the Commitment of Title Insurance.  Those provisions specifically provide that conveyance of title require documents satisfactory to the Company and that these documents must be properly authorized, executed, delivered, and recorded in the Public Records.  Particularly, the specific documents were: (a) a Deed from [...] and [...] to [...], and (b) a Mortgage to be properly executed by [...], to secure the proposed loan in the amount of $105,000.00.  More simply put, the Commitment of Title Insurance is clear that it is subject to the condition precedent of a proper Deed – authorized, executed, delivered, and recorded – transferring title to Plaintiff.