ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] ”  (Da73–74 ¶¶ 7–8, 12; see Da77–78.)  In the trial court, Plaintiffs asserted that it was not [...] but rather her minor daughter who checked that box and clicked the “Confirm” button—even though it required attesting to [...] that she was at least 18.  (Da198–99 ¶¶ 9–15, 19; Da210 ¶¶ 6–12; see Da77.)  Plaintiffs claim that their daughter, while using [...]’s phone and with [...]’s permission, confirmed her agreement to the December Terms before ordering food for Plaintiffs to eat to be delivered to Plaintiffs through [...] Eats.  (See id.)  C.  The December Terms contain an unambiguous arbitration agreement that also covers third-party beneficiaries and delegates most issues to the arbitrator.  The December Terms to which [...] agreed—either by herself or through her daughter using her [...] account with her consent and on her behalf—contain an arbitration provision.
[brief] Moreover, Plaintiffs do not satisfy the interest of justice exception found under Rule 4:69-6(c).  While some interests could justify a slight or reasonable enlargement of time, an excessive enlargement like the 37 months here is neither necessary nor appropriate under the circumstances.  By virtue of the public records appended to their pleadings, Plaintiffs were on notice that [...] had moved her residence once those records became public.  In addition to that record notice, Plaintiffs had actual notice of the subject of this litigation as evidenced by the public statement given by their Union’s president to Politico.  They failed even to file suit within 45 days of the December 5, 2023, Politico article in which that public statement appeared.
[brief] ”  If an expert, then the witness must be identified as such, provide their expert credentials, render a report, and be subject to deposition and if needed a responsive expert for the defendants.  Appending the word, “lay” does not abrogate the Rules governing discovery.  [...] was never identified as an expert, provided no resume, rendered no report, could not have been and was not deposed as an expert, and was not subject to response via experts for the defendants.
[directive] B.  The Division of State Police, all County Prosecutors and the Division of Criminal Justice, shall adhere to this Joint Crash Investigative Protocol, where the Division of State Police functions as the initial investigating law enforcement agency at any motor vehicle and/or vessel crash involving a fatality or fatalities and/or serious injury or injuries.  1.  This Joint Crash Investigative Protocol is not intended to supplant, override or invalidate any existing investigative protocols or procedures established by any County Prosecutor or County Prosecutor’s Office with respect to investigations by Fatal Accident Investigation Units in any County Prosecutor’s Office or operating under the authority of any County Prosecutor, to investigate motor vehicle or vessel crashes involving a fatality or fatalities and/or serious injury or injuries.  C.  The Constitutional and statutory authorities granted to the Attorney General, the Director of the Division of Criminal Justice and the twenty-one County Prosecutors of the State of New Jersey, dictate that the division of authority, and ultimate responsibility, for the investigation of a motor vehicle and/or vessel crash involving a fatality or fatalities and/or serious injury or injuries, is exclusively within the jurisdiction and authority of the prosecuting authority.  D.  Attorney General Law Enforcement Directive No. 2004-2, Joint Crash Investigative Protocol - Division of State Police & County Prosecutors, reflects the appropriate role of the Division of State Police, as an initial investigating law enforcement agency, balanced against the ultimate responsibility of each County Prosecutor and the Director of the Division of Criminal Justice, for the prosecution of any crimes arising from such an investigation.  E.  If there is a disagreement between the New Jersey State Police, as the initial investigating law enforcement agency, and the County Prosecutor’s Office, or - 1 - 10-8-2004  ATTORNEY GENERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT DIRECTIVE NO. 2004-2  JOINT CRASH INVESTIGATIVE PROTOCOL DIVISION OF STATE POLICE & COUNTY PROSECUTORS  Director of the Division of Criminal Justice, or their respective designees, as defined in this Attorney General Law Enforcement Directive, regarding how the investigation should proceed; the investigation shall proceed as directed by the County Prosecutor or the Director of the Division of Criminal Justice, where the Division of Criminal Justice has intervened or superseded a County Prosecutor.
[brief] (See 5T, at 7-10).  The court cited a series of decisions from New Jersey and other jurisdictions, supporting its correct conclusion that PSA Section 17.1 did not grant [...] a right to recover its attorneys’ fees in any first-party disputes between and among the parties to the PSA.  (See id.).  In addition, the court properly ruled that [...] could not claim the benefit of the fee-shifting provisions set forth in Section 18.2 of the PSA because [...] was judicially estopped from relying upon that provision of the PSA.
[brief] During his deposition, [...] first offered the opinion that “anywhere between 85 and 90 percent” of water that flowed down the [...]’ driveway would funnel from the [...]’ driveway onto plaintiff’s property.  Pa273 at 42:21-43:4.  That opinion was not contained in his report.  Pa274 at 46:14-47:5.  He admitted that his opinion that eighty-five to ninety percent of the water runoff would flow though the Belgian block opening near plaintiff’s house was not supported by any calculations and was not based on any generally-accepted engineering standard.  Pa273 at 44:18-45:17.
[brief] In the instant action, [...] was a tenant in a multi-tenant mall that did not have control or maintenance responsibilities for the common area where plaintiff allegedly slipped and fell and had no contractual obligation to maintain that area.  Guided by the principles in *Kandra* it is respectfully submitted that the Law Division properly found that it is undisputed that plaintiff was not a patron of [...] on the day of the accident, and therefore he was not [...]’s business invitee.  There is no evidence in admissible form that an alleged risk of injury posed by the alleged condition of the parking area where plaintiff allegedly slipped and fell would have been observable by [...], in the exercise of a reasonable inspection, since there is no evidence that [...] was responsible for inspecting the area where plaintiff allegedly slipped and fell.  At bar, the record fails to show that plaintiff’s alleged injury occurred in a location necessary to enter or exit [...]’s leased premises and plaintiff admits he was neither entering or exiting [...] at the time of the accident and he had no intention to of visiting [...]’s leased premises.  Plaintiff was not injured in an area adjacent to [...]’s leased premises.  It is respectfully submitted that the record shows that the alleged injury did not occur in an area within [...]’s control.
[brief] Fourth, [...]’s remaining hodge podge of statutory and legal arguments – many of which rely on outdated law created prior to the 1900s – lacks merit.  Fifth, [...] raises new arguments on appeal for the first time.  This Court should not permit [...] to raise new arguments that were not asserted below.  However, even if the Court considers [...]’s new arguments, they still lack any foundation in the law or facts.  Therefore, the Court should reject these arguments and uphold the trial court’s Opinion and Order granting summary judgment in favor of [...].
[brief] 2T39-14-19.  **Step One:**  The first step in the exposure pathway analysis was evaluating whether there was evidence of excessive mold growth in the condo while [...] resided there.  Yet no environmental tests were performed during the eighteen years he resided there.  This itself is a problem since environmental tests are simply a snapshot in time and the greater the time between the residency and the tests, the “less representative of what an actual exposure may have been. ”  2T40-15 to 2T41-10.  As such, [...] was required to use environmental samples collected after [...] vacated the property, the first of which was performed by [...]’s contractor, [...] (“[...]”), on March 21, 2009.
[brief] When doing so, the Legislature vested authority for the Local Finance Board in the Division of Local Government Services in the Department of Community Affairs with jurisdiction to govern and guide the conduct of local government officers or employees regarding violations of the LGEL.  The statute explicitly deprives the trial court of any power to rule or make findings relating to the LGEL.  The LGEL provides:  The Local Finance Board in the Division of Local Government Services in the Department of Community Affairs shall have jurisdiction to govern and guide the conduct of local government officers or employees regarding violations of the provisions of this act who are not otherwise regulated by a county or municipal code of ethics promulgated by a county or municipal ethics board in accordance with the provisions of this act...The board in interpreting and applying the provisions of this act shall recognize that under the principles of democracy, public officers and employees cannot and should not be expected to be without any personal interest in the decisions and policies of government; that citizens who are government officers and employees have a right to private interests of a personal, financial and economic nature; and that standards of conduct shall distinguish between those conflicts of interest which are legitimate and unavoidable in a free society and those conflicts of interest which are prejudicial and material and are, therefore, corruptive of democracy and free society [N.J.S.A. § 40A:9-22.4 (emphasis added)]  Here, [...]\(^3\) found “[t]he defendants’ votes on the resolution were contrary to the Local Government Ethics Law.  The court finds the vote therefore was ineffectual and void regarding the subjects of the resolution which pertain to [...]. ” (Da2).  That order was modified by the order on Defendants’ motion for reconsideration.  [...]’s second order referred the matter to the Local Finance Board (Da3) and amended the prior order stating: [t]hat the order is further amended to find defendants’ votes on the resolution were improper on account of their conflict with [...], regardless of the determination of the Local Government Ethics Board.  [Da3]  [...]’s ruling was erroneous as the Local Finance Board in the Division of Local Government Services in the Department of Community Affairs has exclusive jurisdiction over this matter.
[brief] 2 | | A. Alleged Pretrial Identification ...................................................... 2 | | B. Trial .................................................................................................. 3 | | LEGAL ARGUMENT ............................................................................... 8 | | POINT I ...............................................................................................  8 | | THE ADMISSION OF DEFENDANT’S POLICE STATEMENT VIOLATED HIS RIGHTS AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION AND TO DUE PROCESS.  (Da 110-28)  ............................................................................. 8 | | A.  Defendant’s Statement and Motion Court’s Decision ......................................................... 9 | | 1.  Defendant’s Statement .................................................................... 9 | | 2.  Motion Court’s Decision .................................................................. 19 | | B.  Defendant Was in Custody Throughout the Stationhouse Interrogation .............................................. 21 | | C.  The Detectives Repeatedly Ignored Defendant’s Invocations of His Right to Silence.  .............................................. 25 | | D.  Defendant’s Miranda Waiver and Statement as a Whole Were Not Voluntary .............................................. 29 | | E.  The Erroneous Admission of Defendant’s Statement Was Not Harmless. ..............................................  39 | TABLE OF CONTENTS  (CONT'D)  POINT II .........................................................................................................................  41  THE TRIAL COURT DENIED DEFENDANT A FAIR TRIAL BY FAILING TO REDACT OR CORRECT SEVERAL INADMISSIBLE PORTIONS OF HIS POLICE STATEMENT.
[brief] Pb4  Statement of Facts ....................................................  Pb5  Legal Argument  I.  THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY  JUDGMENT BASED ON TECHNICAL NON- COMPLIANCE.  (Order at Pa27 to Pa28; Opinion at T12-10 to T14-14; T15-23 to T16-14)  ..............................................................  Pb7  A.  THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY’S EMPHASIS ON SUBSTANCE OVER FORM ...................  Pb9  B.  ERRONEOUS APPLICATION OF RULE 4:46-2 ...............  Pb10  C.  JUDICIAL DISCRETION AND THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE  ..........................................................  Pb11  II.  THE TRIAL COURT  IMPROPERLY GRANTED DEFENDANT’S CROSS-MOTION FOR SUMMARY  JUDGMENT AS UNOPPOSED.  (Order at Pa27 to Pa28; Opinion at T14-15 to T15-18)  ..............................................................  Pb12  A. MISAPPLICATION OF THE STANDARD FOR UNOPPOSED MOTIONS ........................................  Pb12  B.  EXISTENCE OF GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT ..................................................  Pb13  C. JUDICIAL DUTY TO ENSURE FAIR EXAMINATION OF THE ISSUES ..............................  Pb14  Conclusion .................................................................
[brief] Muldrow v. City of St. Louis, Mo., 144 S. Ct. 967, 974 (2024) (holding transfer as a form of adverse employment action under Title VII discrimination claims when the transfer results in some harm to the terms and conditions of the employee’s employment); Leahey v. Singer Sewing Co., 302 N.J. Super. 68, 79 (App. Div. 2005) (“[S]imply ‘by pointing to evidence which calls into question the defendant’s intent, the plaintiff raises an issue of material fact which, if genuine, is sufficient to preclude summary judgment. ’” (internal citations omitted); Mancini v. Twp. of Teaneck, 349 N.J. Super. 527, 564 (App. Div. 2002), aff’d as modified, 179 N.J. 425 (2004) (“disadvantageous transfers or assignments, and tolerance of harassment by other employees” constitutes adverse employment action).
[brief] ”  *Ibid.* (internal quotations omitted).  Additionally, “the trial court must make a threshold determination that there is a substantial nexus between the complained-of conduct and a law or public policy identified by the court or the plaintiff. ”  Dzwonar, 177 N.J. at 464.  If the trial court finds a substantial nexus, at trial the jury must then determine whether the plaintiff actually held such a belief and, if so, whether that belief was objectively reasonable.
[brief] In granting Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, the trial court reasoned: Gonzalez involved a mortgage foreclosure and “post-judgment agreements” that had “recast the terms of the original loan" and had included, according to plaintiff, “illicit financing charges and miscalculations of monies due. ”  207 N.J. at 563.  The Court held the post-judgment loan modifications were “in form and substance an extension of credit,” Id. at 563, and that the plaintiff could base a CFA claim on the defendant's alleged actions in connection with that new transaction.  Those facts are not present in this case.
[brief] It is an independent company that owns, operates and/or supplies fuel to service stations along the Atlantic seaboard.  exercise its preemptive right under this Section 36(a)(1), it shall do so by providing written notice to Purchaser within thirty (30) days following receipt of the Offer and the closing shall take place within ninety (90) days thereafter (or at such later date as provided in the Offer).  If Seller does not exercise its preemptive right within the foregoing thirty (30) day period, Purchaser shall have the right to sell to the third party from whom it received the Offer (and no other party, without again first giving Seller its preemptive right as provided in this Section 36(a)(1), on the same terms and conditions as set forth in the Offer (but not on different terms or conditions, without first giving Seller its preemptive right as provided in this Section 36(a)(1)).  If during the term, Purchaser is actively negotiating with a third party to sell the Premises, and within six (6) months following the expiration of the term, Purchaser enters into a definitive transfer agreement with said third party, Seller shall have a preemptive right to purchase or otherwise acquire the Premises, in accordance with the provisions contained herein, as though the definitive transfer agreement had been executed during the term and had constituted the Offer received by Seller on the last day of the term.  Da38.  The ROFR is clear that [...], before accepting an offer, must promptly send a copy of the offer to [...].  Ibid.  The word “material” does not appear at any point in the ROFR.  Ibid.  In the event that any of the terms and conditions of the offer are modified, a new 30-day period is triggered for [...] to exercise its ROFR.
[brief] # TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ## STATE CASES | Case | Page | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | Associated Humane Societies, Inc. v. Lynch, No. A-0210-13T4, 2014 WL 5460721 (App. Div. Oct. 29, 2014) | 6 | | Borough of East Rutherford v. East Rutherford PBA Local 275, 213 N.J. 190 (2013) | 6, 7 | | Cohen ex rel. Perelman v. Booth Computers, 421 N.J. Super. 134 (App. Div. 2011) | 10, 11 | | State, Office of Employee Relations v. Communications Workers of America, AFL-CIO, 154 N.J. 98 (1998) | 7 | | Tretina Printing, Inc. v. Fitzpatrick & Assocs., Inc. 135 N.J. 349 (1994) | 6, 7 | | Troy v. Rutgers, 168 N.J. 354 (2001) | 9, 11 | | Wanaque Borough Sewerage Auth. v. Township of West Milford, 144 N.J. 564, 574 (1996) | 9 | ## STATUTES | Statute | Page | |------------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | NJ LLC Act, N.J.S.A. 42:2C-2 | 11 | ## OTHER AUTHORITIES | Authority | Page | |--------------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 19 cmt. a (1981) | 9 | LEGAL ARGUMENT I.
[brief] Similarly, in Presbyterian Church of the Palisades, Inc. v. Hwang, a more recent case, the Appellate Division decided a dispute over local church property.  In Hwang, the Court determined that the national Presbyterian Church was a hierarchical religious organization.  Id. at 1.  The Chancery Division found in favor of the national church and the Appellate Division affirmed.  Our Supreme Court --- 1  Pursuant to Rules 1:36-3 and 2:6-1(a)(1)(h), a copy of this unpublished Appellate Division decision is included in the Plaintiff’s appendix.  (Pa295).  declined to grant certification.  As part of the Appellate Division’s holding, the Appellate Division stated as follows:  Therefore, under the deference approach, courts must accept the authoritative ruling of the higher authority within that hierarchy.  Accordingly, the determination of the [...] and the [...], as that higher authority, controls.  Under these circumstances, we conclude, as did the trial court, that the Church property was owned by the [...] [the national church].
[brief] TABLE OF CONTENTS  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT ........................................................................................................1  PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND STATEMENT OF FACTS  ..................................................4  A.  Statutory Background...........................................................................................................4  B.  The Original Policy and Order to Show Cause.................................................................6  C.  The Revised Policy and Amended Order to Show Cause.  ..............................................9  D.  The Trial Court’s Decision..................................................................................................12  ARGUMENT ....................................................................................................................................14  POINT I ........................................................................................................................................15  THE COURT CORRECTLY FOUND THE STATE IS LIKELY TO SUCCEED ON THE MERITS.........................................................................................................................15  A.  The Trial Court Correctly Found That Both Policies Likely Violate The LAD.  .................................................................................................................................16  i.  Disparate Treatment........................................................................................................16  ii. Disparate Impact.............................................................................................................23  B.  Appellants’ Responses Are Unavailing.  .............................................................................27  i. Settled Right to Relief.......................................................................................................27  ii. Parents’ Substantive Due Process Rights.  .....................................................................30  iii.  Mootness.......................................................................................................................39  POINT II ........................................................................................................................................42  THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY FOUND THE EQUITABLE FACTORS WEIGH IN FAVOR OF ENJOINING THE POLICIES.  .........................................................42  A.  The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion In Finding Irreparable Harm.  .................................................................................................................................42  B.  The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion In Considering The Other Equitable Factors .........................................................................................................................48  CONCLUSION