ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] To truly understand the overbroad and opaque nature of the two OPRA requests that Plaintiff seeks to enforce, they must be quoted in full:  1)  Please provide me a copy of all emails, text messages, correspondence or other documents relating to fire commissioner business, discussions, etc. that were sent to and from [...] or telephonic communications device from 1/1/17 through current to and from any fire commissioner, former commissioner, employee, township employee or any other individual which may have used the personnel [sic] email account to conduct fire commissioner business.  2)  Please provide me a copy of all emails, text messages, correspondence or other documents relating to fire commissioner business, discussions, etc. that were sent to and from [...] or telephonic communications device from 1/17/17 through current to and from any fire commissioner, former commissioner, employee, township employee or any other individual which may have used the personnel [sic] email account to conduct fire commissioner business.  (Da201).
[brief] For the foregoing reasons, the defendant respectfully requests that the Court reverse the instant convictions and order a new trial.  In the alternative, he respectfully requests the Court reduce his sentence and/or run his sentences concurrently.  Respectfully submitted, [...], Esquire  Attorney ID No. 035952010  Dated: April 2, 2023  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY  APPELLATE  DIVISION  DOCKET NO. [...]  INDICTMENT NO. [...] CASE NO. [...]  STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. [...], Defendant-Appellant.
[brief] Plaintiff attempts to mischaracterize testimony and create facts that do not exist.  There is also no evidence presented that [...] sold defective luminaires to [...].  There is no evidence [...] would have constructive notice of any defect.  As the Court found, there is no evidence presented by Plaintiff to show that the light was inoperable prior to the night of the accident.  Plaintiff has not established in the record when the light was installed, nor that the light was inoperable at any time prior to the night of incident.  There are no complaints related to the subject streetlight until [...]’s call to [...] in October of 2018.  Plaintiff directs this Court to no facts to indicate that the light was defective when installed, or that it was not operating properly before and at the time of his accident.  Against this backdrop, the trial court plainly did not err in finding that there were no witnesses, documents, or other evidence that would create an issue of material fact for a jury to consider that the light was inoperable prior to the night of the accident or that [...] had notice of same.  Its order granting summary judgment to [...] should be affirmed.
[directive] We of imposition prompt the and charges of disposition prompt the ensure accept to them enabling by offenders of rehabilitation in the aids also disposition prompt omitted).  (1998)  1 N.J. 153  Brima~e, v. State to (citations Ibid. conduct."  their for responsibility 74  Page this in recognized Court Supreme Jersey New the (1993), 1 N.J. 113 Shaw, v. State  In the harnessing thus objective, law-enforcement important an disposition "is early that regard the that note to important is also time."  It judge and defense, prosecutor, of use efficient most has 3:9-3(g), Rule in codified rule ofd' cut "plea so-called of the adoption its by Court, Supreme that provides That rule must end.
[brief] 9  The APA defines a third party as anyone other than the permit applicant, the State agency required to take official action on the permit application, or one with a particularized property interest.  N.J.S.A. 52:14B-3.2.  DEP permitting personnel—the state official designated to take official action on permit applications—prior to any official action on the application. \textsuperscript{10}  Here, [...] had actual notice of [...]’s Technical Modification Permit\textsuperscript{11} and made public comments objecting to that application while that permit application was pending, and those comments were considered by DEP personnel prior to permitting staff taking official action on the then-pending application.
[brief] ”  Id. at 252.  In fact, [...] concluded that this Court “did exactly what Concepcion barred: adopt a legal rule hinging on the primary characteristic of an arbitration agreement—namely, a waiver of the right to go to court and receive a jury trial. ”  Id.  Similarly, in Morales v. Sun Contractors, Inc., 541 F.3d 218, 223 (3d Cir. 2008), the Third Circuit held that under the FAA, arbitration agreements may not be subjected to “a heightened standard of ‘knowing consent’ … because of the valuable rights relinquished under the provision.
[brief] Indeed, courts have interpreted this section of the LHRL and concluded that a municipality has the authority to negotiate the payment of fees without demonstrating any direct nexus between the redevelopment and the fee.  In *Genon Rema, LLC v. South Amboy Redevelopment Agency*, Docket No. MID-L-390-13, 2015 WL 10986475 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. May 18, 2015), [...] squarely addressed this issue.
[directive] Range - 25 yards.  3.  Target - FBI type Q target, either paper or cardboard.  Multiple targets may be used at the discretion of the agency executive or supervising firearms instructor.  4.  Course.  a.  Total of 60 rounds per participant.  b.  Double action is required for revolvers for all phases.  Semi-automatics are to be fired in the manner in which the individual weapon functions normally and are to be decocked when changing positions or hands.  c.  Reloading may take place at the discretion of the supervising firearms instructor.  Additionally, discretion may be used as to the number of rounds with which the magazines are loaded to accomplish reloading exercises during the course.  Similarly, the sequence of rounds fired at a given distance may be altered to accommodate a reloading exercise.  A mandatory reload is required during Phase VI at the 7 yard line.  d.  To achieve a passing score of 80%, the participant must place a minimum of 48 shots within the border of the Q target silhouette.  e.  Physical or simulated barricades are required in Phase I and may be used at the discretion of the agency during any subsequent phase.  Phase I  25 Yard Line.  Time: 30 seconds for each stage.  12 rounds.  All positions fired with strong-hand.  9-35  Revised (5/03)
[directive] State the in agencies enforcement and standards which applications, investigating permit reviewing and when licensing authorities the of disposition efficient timely, and thorough, the for practices best promote shall protocols modify time time from to may Superintendent  The applications.  permit of firearms various types shall authorities licensing All firearms appropriate. as and protocols investigation standards the Superintendent modified the by or issued as protocols and investigation standards the to adhere section.  pursuant this to State Police of [...]  3.  APPLICATION PERMIT FIREARMS THE STREAMLINE/EXPEDITE PROCESS
[brief] 16.  The court provided Appellant and Respondent an opportunity to provide a brief supplemental closing.  However, the parties had already provided their closings and Defendant/Appellant structured his closing arguments based upon the case that was presented to the jury, and the charges that had been agreed upon and finalized the prior evening.  (T4 95-11 through T4 105-4).  17.  Over the objection of counsel for Defendant/Appellant, the court allowed supplemental closing for both Plaintiff-Respondent and Appellant-Defendant.  Counsel for Appellant-Defendant argued that as Plaintiff-Respondent had envisioned the charge, they had already addressed any aggravation issues in their closing.  Nevertheless, the court afforded counsel for Plaintiff-Respondent an additional brief closing.  Counsel for the Defendant-Appellant gave only a very brief closing without sufficient time to prepare or restructure.  (T4 101-17 through T4 107-25).  18.  The court went on to charge the jury with respect to a claim of aggravation of a pre-existing disability as follows:  In this case evidence has been presented that the Plaintiff had a condition before the accident; that is, age-appropriate degenerative disc disease.
[directive] (a)  Review and maintain all applicable Standing Operating Procedures regarding intelligence gathering, investigative protocols, case screening, assignment and tracking, coordination of press releases and other administrative matters; (b) Comply with all established standards for legal, technical and forensic protocols concerning the seizure, handling, storage and analysis of all forms of evidence; and (c)  Maintain a master case management system to monitor all investigative matters handled by the Task Force from inception through prosecution to prevent duplication of efforts or conflict.  The cooperative partner agency supervisors shall take all reasonable steps -3- to ensure that these procedures are coordinated and adequate.
[brief] *Cell South of New Jersey, Inc. v. Zoning Board of Adjustment of West Windsor Township*, 172 N.J. 75, 81 (2002); *Medici v. BPR Co.*, 107 N.J. 1, 15 (1987).  When the Public Trust Doctrine Issue is permitted to be acknowledged and considered in consort with the legal claims as asserted in Counts I, II & III of it is clear that the Keansburg a blatantly illegal Redevelopment Plan and zoning standards, and that such clearly constitutes “... arbitrary, unreasonable or capricious ...” conduct requiring reversal and invalidation of the challenged Ordinance, Redevelopment Plan, and zoning change.  The Trial Court’s conclusion --- that the Municipality struck “a balance” as to waterfront access and uses is a fiction, if not an outright misstatement of reality by the Court, all under the guise of deferring to “municipal findings”.  Nowhere in the Redevelopment Plan is any reference made – beyond a few mere words – as to exactly how or when the Municipality “intends” to actually at some point “… develop ‘a variety of waterfront and recreational uses along the Raritan Bay shoreline’ to contribute to the public welfare…””.  [...] already has provided recreational uses for the public for 100 years.  On the other hand, the Municipality wants to harm [...]’s business (existing “recreational uses”) to build a few condominiums.  How exactly is development of a few condominium units in any way related or fostering beach access, “recreational uses” or “the public welfare”?  Nor is it explained by the Court how it could possibly find that this Redevelopment Plan – that itself does nothing beyond closing off public access points that have been existence for 100+ years and also doing away with 300 public parking spaces to be replaced with a PRIVATE parking spaces for condo owners – could possibly equate with “… increas[ing] opportunities for public access to the beachfront”.  The Municipal findings here are based on no facts, are clearly inconsistent with the facts and in context are clearly arbitrary and unsupported.  The Trial Court’s analysis that the Redevelopment Plan “struck a balance” sufficient to show “increased opportunities for public access to the beachfront” is clearly a legal fiction and arbitrary.
[brief] At times, Plaintiffs question whether the trial court actually did “compel production of irrelevant documents. ”  Pb22.  But Plaintiffs themselves acknowledge that to comply with the ESI Order, Defendants will necessarily need to produce “irrelevant documents. ”  *Id.*  Even if the trial court’s objective was only to maximize production of relevant documents, its selected process indisputably and impermissibly compels production of many thousands of irrelevant documents.  rules permits a court to compel production of non-responsive and irrelevant documents at any time. ”  *Id.* at *1 n.1.*  In all events, the fact that a few other judges have repeated the trial court’s error is no reason to excuse it, particularly given that their decisions are lonely outliers among an “almost uniform[ ]” consensus among federal courts.
[brief] BRIEF  On the brief: [...], Esq.  Dated: July 8, 2024  TABLE OF CONTENTS  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .........................................................  ii  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT .......................................................  1  ARGUMENT ..............................................................................  2  I.  Because the new findings in the Appellant’s MRIs following the 2019 MVA were causally linked by the expert, [...] in his report, there is objective evidence of a Category 6 permanent injury that has been causally linked to the accident and should have been sufficient within itself to overcome the verbal threshold ..........................................................  2  II.  It was improper for the lower court to dismiss the matter on a summary judgment because the Appellant’s proofs were not solely based on subjective complaints ............  5  CONCLUSION  ...........................................................................  7  ### TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | Cases | Page(s) | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|---------| | **Davidson v. Slater**, 914 A.2d 282, 189 N.J. 166 (2007)............. | 5 | | **Juarez v. J.A. Salerno Sons, Inc.**, 886 A.2d 178, 185 N.J. 332 (2005)| 2 | | **Oswin v. Shaw**, 129 N.J. 290, 294, 609 A.2d 415, 419 (1992)......... | 5 | | Statues | Page | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|---------| | **N.J.S.A.** 39:6A-8a .................................................................. | 2 | PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
[brief] The City followed the rules, the Union did not, and this was the reason the Arbitrator ruled in the manner he did.  Here, the City did not seek to introduce additional terms; it simply complied with the directive it received from [...].  In this Appeal, the Union argues that the revised final offer should have been accepted and the Arbitrator erred in not considering additional changes sought to the Health Benefits Section of the Contract arguing that it was merely proposing contract language for changes already sought and clarifying its original final offer; which argument is frivolous and dismantled by a simple comparison of the two documents.  (Aa245-246, Aa251-279)  In its original final offer, the Union had already requested specific language in connection with the healthcare provisions of the contract.  The revised Final offer did not merely incorporate contract language for changes already sought, but instead was an attempt to enhance the Union’s healthcare benefits over and above what it originally sought.  The revised final offer included new and material terms to this section not included in their initial final offer such as changes to contributions and to provide that the City would pay the full cost of a dental plan and optical plan.  (Aa274-276)  Interestingly, in its original final offer, the only specific language proposed by the Union was for the Healthcare Benefits section.  It sought to mirror the terms in the Firefighter MOA and attached the specific language requested.  (Ra1, Ra3, Ra7-9)
[brief] These principles have been applied and elaborated upon in a variety of contexts involving suspected narcotics transactions.  For example, in *State v. Pineiro*, 181 N.J. 13 (2004), an officer was driving his patrol vehicle in a high narcotics area when he observed the defendant and codefendant standing on a corner.  The officer recognized both individuals from prior police encounters and had received intelligence that the defendant was a suspected drug dealer, and that the codefendant was a drug user.  The officer observed the defendant hand the codefendant a pack of cigarettes, then observed the defendant and the codefendant look at him with shock and surprise and then turned to leave the area.  Based on these observations, the officer conducted an investigatory stop of the defendant.  The Supreme Court of New Jersey held that the investigatory stop was justified explaining that: “… both defendant and [codefendant] immediately departed the area upon seeing [the officer].  Based on [the officer’s] knowledge that drugs were sometimes carried in cigarette packs, that he had not observed either man smoking, and his familiarity with both men…  We are satisfied that, even though standing alone each factor may not have been sufficient, the totality of the circumstances, as viewed by a reasonable officer established a reasonable and articulable suspicion of criminal activity, justifying an investigatory stop. ”  Pineiro, at 22.
[brief] To ensure and preserve public confidence, school board members and local school administrators should have the benefit of specific standards to guide their conduct and of some disciplinary mechanism to ensure the uniform maintenance of those standards among them.  N.J.S.A. 18A:12-22.  In 2001, the School Ethics Act was amended to include the Code of Ethics that is the subject of this appeal.  New Jersey Legislature, Bill A1755, Session 2000-2001, Approved P.L. 2001, c. 178, available at https://njleg.gov/bill-search/2000/A1755.
[brief] 460 N.J. Super. 75, 94 (App. Div. 2019) (internal quotation marks omitted).  The trial court failed to provide any cautionary instruction.  Id. at 95.  This Court held that, “[g]iven the longstanding standard of Feaster and the constitutional dimension of defendant’s right to counsel, the trial court should have addressed this issue regardless of whether defense counsel objected.
[brief] Throughout most of his incarceration, defendant showed no remorse.  Now that he claims to feel remorse, he makes generic statements to the effect that his acts were heinous and that he regrets causing pain and taking lives, but he still mentions nothing of the physical and emotional suffering he inflicted upon the [...] in the last moments of their lives.  On March 4, 1994, defendant ambushed an elderly man in his own home, chased after him as he ran for his life, and beat him until he lost consciousness.  Throughout that beating, he must have heard the anguished cry of his helpless victim.  But he did not stop.  Worse, according to [...] statement, which he submitted to the court, he laughed about what had happened when all was said and done.  (Pa52¶33).  To this day, his allocution does not address the torment that he visited upon [...], who was undoubtedly fearful for not just himself but also his wife.  Under these facts, the judge did not err in refusing to find that he is unlikely to reoffend.
[brief] Sat Below: Honorable [...], J.S.C.  Honorable Judges: Pursuant to R. 2:6-2(b), and R. 2:6-4(a), this letter in lieu of formal brief is submitted on behalf of the State.  TABLE OF CONTENTS  STATEMENT OF PROCEDURAL HISTORY ..................................................  1 STATEMENT OF FACTS ...........................................................................  1 LEGAL ARGUMENT ..................................................................................  1 POINT I THE PCR COURT CORRECTLY FOUND THAT DEFENDANT’S SENTENCE WAS NOT ILLEGAL
[brief] A.  The holding in Burt controlled this issue, and the trial court was bound by Burt.  According to plaintiffs, [...]’s reliance on the trial court’s multiple and unequivocal pre-trial and trial rulings was somehow “exploit[ative].” (Pb. 2).  Both as a legal matter and under basic notions of fairness and due process, plaintiffs’ position is untenable.
[brief] (T3 at 13:19-24).  He testified that one must park twenty-five feet back from a crosswalk and one is not allowed to park in it, even if making deliveries, under the motor vehicle statutes in the State of New Jersey.  (T3 at 16:13-23).  He further testified that one must park fifty feet back from a stop sign in order to be compliant with motor vehicle laws.  (T3 at 16:25-17:10).  He reviewed the photograph marked J-30 (Pa 145) and indicated that that reflected a violation of the motor vehicle laws since the truck depicted in that photograph was not fifty feet back from the stop sign and was in fact parked in a crosswalk.  (T3 at 20:8-21:14).  He again reiterated that the fact that a summons was not issued does not mean that there were not times when motor vehicle violations were observed by officers, however, officers may have chosen to deal with the violation other than with the issuance of a summons.
[brief] 2  “Pa” refers to appellant’s appendix; “Pb” refers to his brief.  3  A Service Retirement is provided for by N.J.S.A. 53:5A-8 for any member who has established twenty years of service in SPRS and also for troopers who were members of the retirement system as of the effective date of L. 1985, c. 175 regardless of their years of service.  A Special Retirement provides enhanced benefits pursuant to N.J.S.A. 53:5A-27 and is available to any SPRS member who has established twenty-five years of creditable service.  On August 7, 2019, the [...] added information about the Ricci Act to its website.
[brief] \(^4\)  In rejecting these arguments, the trial court concluded that it “d[id] not view the [Concession Recovery Provision] as a liquidated damages clause. ” (2T20:8-9).  Nevertheless, the trial court “assume[d] for purpose of th[e] motion” that the Concession Recovery Provision did constitute a liquidated damages clause.  (2T20:9-12).  But even then, the trial \(^4\) Appellants contend that the trial court used the term “liquidated damages clause” without regard to the distinction between liquidated damages and stipulated damages.  (Ab9).  This is entirely disingenuous as (i) Appellants’ Counterclaim refers to the Concession Recovery Provision as a liquidated damages clause (Da25 at ¶ 63); and (ii) Appellants’ submissions before the trial court argued that the Provision was not a reasonable liquidated damages clause.  The first time Appellants have raised this alleged “important distinction” is now in this new argument before this Court.  (Db9).  court correctly found that the Concession Recovery Provision did not constitute an unlawful penalty because the Concession Recovery Provision only permitted [...] to recover the actual cost of the Concessions that [...] provided to Appellants in exchange for their promise to make full and timely rent payments for the full term of the Lease.  (2T20:12-22:27).  As explained in more detail below, the trial court’s finding that the Concession Recovery Provision is not a liquidated damages clause—much less a penalty—is correct as a matter of law and consistent with the findings of courts from other jurisdictions that have considered this exact issue.  A.