ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] [...] should have recused herself due to bias | 5 | | stemming from an FBI complaint made by [...] against [...].  (Raised below, Tr. 12/5, Pg. 215) | | | B.  Mistrial should have been Granted Due to Jude Grasso-Jones | 6 | | precipitating an Altercation between [...] and Sheriff’s officers | | | within earshot of the Jury.  (Raised below, Tr.12/1, pg. 70)  | | | C. [...] Prejudiced the jury by allowing them to look at | 8 | | 21 Bankers Boxes and piles of documents which should never have | | | been admitted into evidence; the sheer volume of which was | | | prejudicial to [...].  (Raised below multiples times, including | | | Tr.11/29, pg. 15; and Tr.12/2, pg. 30) | | | D. [...] Erred in Barring [...]’s Expert’s Testimony | 9 | | even though [...]’s expert had the same deficiency.  (Raised below, | | | Tr.11/30, pg. 5) | | | E. [...]’s expert should have been precluded from testifying as not | 10 | | disclosed in discovery (not raised below) | | | F.  Mistrial should have been Ordered in light of [...]’s highly | 10 | | prejudicial summation. (not raised below)  | | | G. [...] Admonished [...] in the presence of the Jury.  | 11 | | (Not raised below)  | | | H. [...]  Admitted highly prejudicial character evidence | 12 | | over repeated objections.  (raised below Tr. 11/30, Pg. 194)  | | | CONCLUSION | 13 | | Cases | Page | |-------|------| | NONE CITED HEREIN |
[directive] Includes officers who are typically assigned to target vice, drugs, organized street crime, violent crime and/or any other targeted enforcement.  Unlike officers who are responsible for responding to traditional calls for service, these officers are typically assigned the singular responsibility of addressing the aforementioned activities, and they are sometimes referred to as crime suppression units.  The nature of their work is varied and may include being dressed in traditional uniform, modified uniform, or plain clothes.  These officers may work alongside undercover officers, conduct surreptitious surveillance, engage in high intensity enforcement via motor vehicle/pedestrian stops and/or interact with confidential informants or witnesses who wish to remain anonymous.  School.  A public or nonpublic elementary or secondary school within this State offering education in grades kindergarten through 12, or any combination of grades, at which a child may legally fulfill compulsory school attendance requirements.  Subject of the video footage.  Any law enforcement officer, suspect, victim, detainee, conversant, injured party, or other similarly situated person who appears on the BWC recording, and shall not include a person who only incidentally appears on the recording.  Tactical team.  A group of officers who are specially selected, trained, and equipped to handle high- risk incidents, including, but not limited to, those involving snipers, barricaded persons, warrant services, apprehensions, acts of terrorism, and other situations or activities as deemed necessary by command leadership.
[brief] (Da57; Da74-Da89).  Around that time, [...] was identified as the contract purchaser for the residential portion of the Circus Liquors site.  (Da57; Da74-Da89).  As part of negotiations with [...], the owner of both portions, [...] commenced the redevelopment process to facilitate the negotiated mixed-use development.  (Da57).  In furtherance of the redevelopment project, on December 18, 2017, [...] adopted Resolution No. 17-294, which designated the Circus Liquors site as an area in need of redevelopment.  (Da57; Da90-Da96).  On August 20, 2018, [...] enacted Ordinance No. 2018-3232, which adopted the Circus Liquors Redevelopment Plan ("Redevelopment Plan") and memorialized the carefully-negotiated compromise with the Property owner and contract purchasers to maintain both residential inclusionary development and commercial development on the Property.  (Da58; Da97-Da144).
[brief] (1)  The Video:  [...] argues the video taken by Plaintiff is meaningless because Plaintiffs’ expert agreed that there was no way for him to know if the truck that was driven at the time that the video was shot actually drove over the “exact” same part of the settlement that the Plaintiff drove over with his motorcycle.  This is a red-herring.  The evidence in this case supports that the settlement existed for the entire width of the southbound left lane at the abutment joint.  For example, the entire lane was repaved to correct the issue; not just a small patch in the road.  (Pa1396); (Pa1397).  Plus, the Plaintiff will testify that both the video and the still frame from that video were provided as support that the truck which Plaintiff was a passenger in when he shot the video did in fact drive over the same settlement.  In addition, the video is also helpful because it supports the consistency between various evidence regarding the location of the settlement.  For example, there is evidence of settlement that is visible in the jersey barrier adjacent to the abutment joint which can be seen in the video. (Pa1549).  The visible displacement between the two median barrier sections is also apparent in the still photo provided by Plaintiff and in the photo used in the Biennial Bridge Inspection report to highlight the location of the settlement and the issue with the abutment joint.  (Pa1549); (Pa1367).  As [...] described, this height differential in the two connecting sections of the median barrier is a “visual cue” that provides consistency in the location of the settlement and also of the existence of the settlement.  (Pa0339); (Pa1549);(Pa0020);(Pa1367).  This “visual cue” was initially addressed in [...]’s report.  (Pa0020).  (2)
[brief] ”  Defendants assert that in an effort to resolve the dispute, they have offered that the validation terms need not be completely reciprocal, so long as they contain some concrete and meaningful obligations that are transparent.  Defendants explain that their proposal provides for the parties to meet and confer, at Defendants’ request, to discuss the application of validation procedures based on the procedures identified in paragraph 12(a) of the protocol.  Defendants believe their proposal takes into account interests such as practicability, reasonableness, and proportionality while also addressing the interests of providing transparency about the validation procedures that Plaintiffs will use and ensuring that Plaintiffs’ collection and validation procedures are adequate.  Plaintiffs argue that while they will of course validate their searches, the same provisions that apply to Defendants cannot feasibly apply to Plaintiffs given the highly personal nature of Plaintiffs’ email collections and the relatively small size of those collections.  Plaintiffs argue that they have committed to meet and confer with Defendants to discuss each individual Plaintiff’s search, and Plaintiffs will perform appropriate sampling and quality control to achieve an appropriate level of validation of Plaintiffs’ search terms.  Plaintiffs allege that Defendants are insisting on reciprocity through the “back door” by requiring Plaintiffs to continue discussing the issue and reserving their right to later have the Court order it.  The parties have engaged in protracted discussions regarding implementation of a Search Term Protocol and the Special Master applauds their sincere efforts to substantially narrow their disagreements.
[brief] | | | Beukas v. Bd. of Trustees of Fairleigh Dickinson Univ., | 32, 33, 37, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 47| | 255 N.J. Super. 552 (Law. Div. 1991), aff’d, | | | 255 N.J. Super. 420 (App. Div. 1992) | | Branch v. Cream-O-Land Dairy, 244 N.J. 567 (2021)
[brief] The Lower Court’s Letter filed on this Docket is Inaccurate, Erroneous and Shows Reinstatement Was Improper and that R 4:67 Was Ignored  After this appeal was filed, on January 3, 2023 the lower court filed a letter on this docket that is factually inaccurate and never addresses its lack of subject matter jurisdiction prohibiting it from reinstating a complaint dismissed on that basis.  It actually shows that R 4:67 should have been used rather than the May 27, 2022 reinstatement, but the court claims, with no legal or factual support, that it ignored R 4:67 as the proper procedure and decided to reinstate a void complaint because it wanted to avoid evasion of service- a completely untenable position in violation of fairness and the law.  That letter also claims proof of service was filed as a letter from USPS stating that an item was delivered to “New York NY 10001”, but that is untrue.  In fact, the court does not identify that USPS letter, and improperly attributes an address on the summons as the delivery address when the USPS letter does not state that summons address at all.  The court letter further states its October 2, 2019 order dismissed the case to allow it to go to arbitration.  However, the case was dismissed because R 1:20A-6 mandated dismissal for lack of jurisdiction, not dismissal to allow arbitration.  It also misstates that the defendant provided her residence address to the court when that never happened.  It erroneously attributes the defendant of “availing herself of the court’s assistance for three (3) years. ”  On the contrary, she was forced to make special appearances to prevent the ongoing injustice of the plaintiff’s unlawful filings that even the court’s letter details multiple unlawful judgments entered against her that she had to have the unlawful judgments vacated.  Then the court filing states that “all of the defendant’s rights were preserved” but that too is not true as she never was given the opportunity to file an answer, counterclaim and affirmative defenses because once the case was dismissed in 2019 the matter was over, and when the court resurrected the void complaint in 2022 it refused her to defend against that void complaint by an answer and counterclaims.  Most troubling is its wholly unsupported and inappropriate conclusion that a R 4:67-1 filing should not be allowed because defendant would evade service.
[brief] The Court finds that the probable intent of decedent was for the Trust to dispose of both properties, granting a one-third share to each of his children, reserving a right for defendants and co-defendant [...], individually and not jointly,\(^1\) to purchase the Boonton Property, and reserving a right for plaintiff to purchase the Florida Property.  (25a)  \(^1\).  At oral argument on June 8, 2022, co-defendant [...] roundly rejected the idea of purchasing the Boonton Property jointly with defendant [...].  [[...] included this footnote with his statement.]  (25a)  “The court’s primary goal in interpreting a trust agreement is to fulfill the settlor’s intent.
[brief] ”  N.J. Model Jury Charges (Criminal), Non 2C, “Fingerprints” (rev. Jan. 6, 1992).  -  Fingerprint evidence is also governed by the rules on circumstantial evidence.  If a juror believes that fingerprints corresponding to those of the accused were found and identified, their evidentiary value, if any, would be diminished to the extent that they could reasonably have been left (at the scene or on the article(s) alleged) at a time or under circumstances that would be consistent with innocence.  See Georgia Fingerprint Instruction.  -  A verdict of guilty may not rest upon fingerprint identification alone, unless the jury is satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that fingerprints left by the accused were in fact found and that they could only have been impressed by the accused (at the scene of the crime or on the article(s) alleged) at the time of the commission of the crime and that such identification under all of the facts and circumstances of the case is sufficient to satisfy the jurors’ minds of the guilt of the accused to the exclusion of any other reasonable theory and beyond a reasonable doubt.
[brief] When imposing a sentence, a court must consider the applicability of the aggravating and mitigating factors set forth in N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1 to determine the length of a defendant’s prison term within the available range.  This step requires a court to “identify the aggravating and mitigating factors and balance them to arrive at a fair sentence. ”  *State v. Natale*, 184 N.J. 458, 488 (2005).  In order to ensure proper balancing of the relevant factors, at the time of sentencing, a court must “state the reasons for imposing such sentence, including . . . the factual basis supporting a finding of particular aggravating and mitigating factors affecting sentence. ”  *State v. Fuentes*, 217 N.J. 57, 73 (2012).  A clear explanation of the balancing process is “particularly important,” and that explanation “should thoroughly address the factors at issue. ”  *Ibid.* (internal citations omitted).  A remand for resentencing is required when the trial court considers an improper aggravating factor, *State v. Carey*, 168 N.J. 413, 424 (2001), fails to find mitigating factors supported by the evidence, *State v. Dalziel*, 182 N.J. 494, 504 (2005), or if the trial court’s reasoning in finding aggravating and mitigating factors is not based on factual findings “supported by substantial evidence in the record. ”  *State v. O’Donnell*, 117 N.J. 210, 216 (1989).  Here, a remand for resentencing is required because the court failed to provide any explanation whatsoever for its finding of aggravating factor 9, the need to deter.
[brief] Pa1311.  [...] also testified that one of his responsibilities was oversight of safety.  Pa1332.  He testified that he oversaw safety for the project, including the date of the incident, “from the time you get onsite to the time your guys get off-site. ”  Pa1340.  However, neither [...], [...] nor [...] was present at the job site prior to the accident.  The evidence adduced during discovery identified at least six areas where safety conditions were ignored or overlooked by [...].
[brief] [...], ESQS.  Attorneys for [...] t/a [...] i/p/a [...]  By:__________________________  [...]  DATED: July 11, 2024  [...], Appellant, vs. AFFINITY CARE OF NJ & [...], Respondents.  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY  APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. [...]  CIVIL ACTION ON APPEAL FROM THE SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY, LAW DIVISION, HUDSON COUNTY, DOCKET NO. [...]
[brief] (Pa256; Pa311).  It is considered void by the DEP. (Pa311).” (Db4).  This is disputed.  The proposition advanced by defendants is based upon a litigation ploy and noting more.  [...] testified on July 22, 2020 that the disciplinary action “is inactive -- the case was never heard. ” but then agreed that the term voided “might not have been the correct term” and that, in any event and he admitted that no one notified [...] that the disciplinary action against him seeking a five day penalty was “inactive” in the more than four years since the disciplinary action was brought (Pa311) even though [...]’s Complaint was filed more than 3 years earlier on June 14, 2017.
[brief] Consequently, none of the claims against [...] arising out of the attempted real estate transaction can be sustained because, in the absence of an enforceable contract for sale, there exists no underlying transaction upon which the Plaintiff’s claims could be predicated.  In particular, the breach of contract claim therefore fails on a similar basis as above since, absent an unenforceable contract for sale, Plaintiff could not legally obtain a deed transferring title from [...] and satisfy the condition precedent to forming a valid, binding contract with [...].  (Id.).  Independent of the reasons discussed at length above, the Trial Court correctly found that all of Plaintiff’s claims were void ad initio due to Plaintiff’s failure to intervene in the underlying foreclosure action that was pending at all times relevant to this attempted (unlawful) real estate transaction.
[brief] (28T 52-12 to 54-9; 28T 57-19 to 67-7)  In exchange for his testimony at defendant’s trial, [...] was avoiding what would be a life-without-parole three-strikes sentence on his pending first-degree robbery case and was hoping to get probation instead, despite having spent most of his adult life in prison.  (28T 67-8 to 69-8; 28T 136-4 to 138-20)  It even became clear that he had missed a prior court April 1, 2021 court date in defendant’s case -- because he left the hotel that the State had put him up in and got arrested on a new drug charge -- but, despite a “no new arrests” clause in his pretrial-release agreement, that fact did not dim the willingness of the State to use him as a witness against defendant.  (28T 54-10 to 57-12; 28T 141-3 to 155-22)  [...] claimed to have spoken to defendant “almost every day” -- sometimes for five minutes, sometimes for “more than an hour” -- from the third week of February 2020 until March 25, 2020, while both men were inmates at the [...].
[brief] THE COURT ERRED AS A RESULT OF THE TRIAL COURT’S EXCEPTIONAL DISPLAY OF ABUSE OF DISCRETION BY NOT RECOGNIZING THIRD CIRCUIT CASE LAW AS IT FAILED TO ADHERE TO PROCEDURES, PRECEDENTS, AND POLICIES ESTABLISHED WITHIN THE THIRD CIRCUIT.  CASE LAW HAS CLEARLY ESTABLISHED THAT ONCE A DEFENDANT CHALLENGES A COURT’S EXERCISE OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION OVER IT, WITH RESPECT TO THIS DEFENDANT’S CHALLENGE TO THE GENERAL JURISDICTION OF THE COURT FOR THE MARCH 1990  HEARING, IT IS THE PARTY CLAIMING VALIDITY OF SERVICE WHO BEARS THE BURDEN OF PROOF FOR SERVICE OF PROCESS AS MATTER OF WELL ESTABLISHED (PRECEDENTS)  THIRD CIRCUIT  CASE LAW.  SERVICE WAS NOT PROPERLY EXECUTED THUS THE COURT IN 1990  LACKED PERSONAL JURISDICTION AND ALL SUBSEQUENT JUDGMENTS ORIGINATING FROM THAT HEARING ARE TO BE FOUND VOID.  THIS ERROR HAS RESULTED IN A DENIAL OF JUSTICE FOR IT IS A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT AT STAKE OF DUE PROCESS.  IT IS THE CONSTITUTIONAL BASIS OF ANALYSIS THAT HAS NOT BEEN SATISFIED FOR SERVICE OF PROCESS  FAILED TO BE VALIDATED ONCE CHALLENGED, THUS TO BE FOUND DEFECTIVE.  THE COURT FAILED TO ADHERE TO THE DOCTRINE OF STARE DECISIS TO OBTAIN APPLICABLE CASE LAW IN THE ADJUDICATION OF THIS CASE RESULTING IN NEGATIVELY EFFECTUATION
[directive] Sharing the identities of individuals who received major discipline will allow for public scrutiny and improve the culture of accountability among the Department’s law enforcement agencies.  That is true even where an individual no New Jersey Is An Equal Opportunity Employer • Printed on Recycled Paper and is Recyclable Page 2 longer works for the relevant agency, as many of our officers go on to serve with other law enforcement agencies, and the State at present lacks a licensing system to track such repeat disciplinary sanctions across agencies.  Moreover, the sharing of identities will enable the public and policymakers to identify repeat offenders, and to hold the Department’s law enforcement agencies accountable for their response to patterns of discipline.  And, most importantly, the sharing of identities will help to build public confidence in the vast majority of officers in the [...], the [...], and the [...], who—like the officers of other law enforcement agencies—serve with honor and astonishing courage under extremely difficult circumstances.  Releasing the identities of those who committed major disciplinary infractions will show that all the remaining officers did not commit such an infraction—which will help to build significant trust between these law enforcement officers and the communities they serve.  Pursuant to the authority granted to me under the New Jersey Constitution; the Law and Public Safety Act of 1948, N.J.S.A. 52:17B-1, seq., which provides for general responsibility et of the Department’s operations and the supervision of the organization of the Department; and the Criminal Justice Act of 1970, N.J.S.A. 52:17B-97, seq., which provides for the general et supervision of criminal justice by the Attorney General as chief law enforcement officer of the State in order to secure the benefits of a uniform and efficient enforcement of the criminal law and the administration of criminal justice throughout the State, I hereby direct all Department personnel operating under the authorities of the laws of the State of New Jersey to implement and comply with the following directives.
[brief] .....................................................................................................................................45  ###  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | Cases | Page(s) | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|---------| | **In re Adoption of N.J.A.C. 7:15-5.24(b),** | 35 | | 420 N.J. Super. 552 (App. Div. 2006) | | | **Am. Cyanamid Co. v. State, Dep’t of Env’t Prot.,** | 12 | | 231 N.J. Super. 292 (App. Div. 1989) | | | **Barry v. Arrow Pontiac, Inc.,** | 12 | | 100 N.J. 57 (1985) | | | **Bueno v. Bd. of Trustees., Tchrs’ Pension & Annuity Fund,** | 12 | | 422 N.J. Super. 227 (App. Div. 2011) | | | **In re Distrib. of Liquid Assets,** | 12 | | 168 N.J. 1 (2001) | | | **Gaf Corp. v. N.J Dep’t of Env’t Prot.,** | 32 | | 214 N.J. Super 446 (App. Div. 1986) | | | **In re Herrmann,** | 11 | | 192 N.J.
[brief] *Id.* at 385.  In the present matter the [...] application sought a front yard set back variance request to allow construction of a single-family residence 53 feet from [...] where the zone requires 200 feet.  Ja224  The [...] application, decided six months after the [...] application, sought even greater relief seeking a front yard set back variance request of 46 feet from [...] to construct a single-family residence for the same property.
[directive] 1.  Official Non-discrimination Policy as Applied to Counter-Terrorism a.  The non-discrimination policy prohibiting “racially-influenced policing” set forth in Attorney General Law Enforcement Directive 2005-1 shall apply to all sworn and unsworn personnel assigned to the Office of Counter- Terrorism, and to any other law enforcement personnel operating under the authority of State law to investigate, prosecute, or collect or analyze intelligence information pertaining to terrorism.  For purposes of the implementation of the statewide non-discrimination policy, a person’s religious affiliation or any act that constitutes a constitutionally-protected expression of religion shall be treated in the same manner as law enforcement officers in this State are required to treat the person’s race or ethnicity.  Specifically, personnel assigned to the Office of Counter-Terrorism and any other sworn or unsworn member of a law enforcement agency operating under the authority of the laws of the State of New Jersey shall not consider a person’s race, ethnicity, religious affiliation, or religious practice or expression as a factor in drawing an inference or conclusion that the person may be involved in terrorist activity, except when responding to a suspect or investigation-specific “Be on The Lookout” (B.O.L.O.) situation as described in Section 1b of this Directive and in the training provided to Office of Counter- Terrorism personnel by the Division of Criminal Justice pursuant to Section 1c of this Directive.  -2-
[brief] Plaintiff believed that [...] knew about her retaliation and EEO complaints and that was the reason that when she went to the Academy, she was “not getting any work or responsibility or attending any of the private meetings or anything like that” (1T; 104:6).  [...] told the Plaintiff that she knew about the EEO complaint in the beginning when the Plaintiff was getting transferred over there and the conversation took place around November 4, 2016 (1T; 104:17 to 104:20).  [...], the person in charge of EEO, says he didn't know about the EEO complaint, yet [...] knew all about it.  [...] specifically knew that the complaint was an EEO complaint (1T; 105:15).  Plaintiff knew that the captain, knowing about the complaint, was “going forward that that was going to be a problem in my career at the Academy” (1T; 106:4).  When the Plaintiff was moved in the Academy as an Admin Officer, they didn’t have an Admin Officer position (1T; 106:7).  Plaintiff filed a 525 which is a reportable incident form against [...] and [...] concerning the fact that they lied on her evaluation and appraisal (1T; 107:25).