ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 206 N.J. 596, 616 (2011) (court refused to award counsel fees when insured was only successful in establishing insurer’s duty to defend on three counts of a complaint).  Furthermore, it is disingenuous to claim that [...] achieved the “benefit [it] sought in bringing suit. ”  [...] never denied coverage, and [...] lost with respect to the key issue facing the [...] policy – allocation.  [...]’s own counsel stated it most succinctly: “I lost. ”  (4T5:16.)  The trial court erred in not considering [...]’s lack of success on critical choice of law and allocation issues – among others – and when properly considered, [...]’s lack of success in this litigation wholly undermines its attorneys’ fee claim.  The trial court’s interpretation of what it means to be a “successful claimant” should be rejected.  Otherwise, it sets the dangerous precedent that a claimant, who is precluded from recovering approximately 85% of the damages that it sought in filing the lawsuit, has been “successful”, and is entitled to endlessly litigate its claims without regard to the measure of damages ultimately recovered.  A.
[brief] 3T68:15-24.  [...] received P-48 and P-50 (referred to jointly as Schedule S) (Da.981-82, Da1539) from [...] in June 2014.  They met in [...]’s office and went over the documents “line by line. ”  3T71:20-75:5.  When they finished, [...] took the documents and told [...] he would think it over and get back to him.  3T99:20-24.  In late June 2014, [...] reached out to [...], an accountant he had known for twenty-five years, sending him copies of P-48 and P-50, and asking him for his “guidance going forward. ”
[brief] Moreover, it is worth highlighting that Defendant [...] was not a party to Plaintiff’s First Lawsuit, had no involvement in the administrative meeting regarding Plaintiff’s violation of the District Mask Policy, and, other than filing an administrative complaint against Plaintiff, for which she enjoys immunity, Defendant [...] had no involvement whatsoever in the investigation of the administrative complaint.  In both her pleadings and her moving brief, Plaintiff admits the investigation itself was not retaliatory.  Rather, Plaintiff disputes the manner in which the investigation was conducted.  Pb9, Pb14, Pb32.  However, by her own admission, the investigation was conducted by an entirely independent third party.  Thus, even if there was any doubt as to Defendant [...]’s lateral (as opposed to supervisory) position, Plaintiff’s claim against Defendant [...] still fails given the dearth of a factual predicate to establish aider and abettor liability under the NJLAD.  (See infra at Section I (B)).  The trial court recognized these glaring deficiencies in Plaintiff’s purported claims against Defendant [...] and properly dismissed Count Five of the Amended Complaint.  Such dismissal should be affirmed.
[brief] Plaintiff [...] filed his Complaint on July 23, 2020, alleging violations of his rights under the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination, N.J.S.A. 10:5-1, et. seq. ("LAD").  (Pa 1)  Specifically, Plaintiff alleged he was unlawfully discriminated against by his employer, [...], due to his Asian ancestry.  (Pa 1- Pa 3)  Plaintiff named as an individual [...], the former Deputy Chief of the [...] Fire Department, whom made the discriminatory comments directed at Plaintiff.  (Pa 1)  Upon the completion of discovery, Defendants [...] and [...] filed their own respective Motion for Summary Judgment on February 3, 2023.  (Pa 13-Pa 14)  Plaintiff filed his oppositions to both of the Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment on February 21, 2023.  (Pa 178-Pa 181)  Defendant’s filed a response to opposition on February 27, 2023.  (Pa 257)  The Court heard oral argument on March 10, 2023.  On March 13, 2023, the Corut entered an Order and decision dismissing Plaintiff’s Complaint against [...] with prejudice but denied summary judgment to Defendant [...].
[brief] Many of these factors were not fully considered by the trial court.  For example, the trial court declined to consider, in connection with the amount of time involved in this matter, the ultimately successful results obtained.  RPC 1.5(a)(4).  Counsel acknowledges the trial court’s concerns with the amount of time expended defending this matter.  However, [...] (and their counsel) had an obligation to complete discovery and prepare a substantive second Motion for Summary Judgment.  The trial court’s decision regarding [...]’s fees did not include an appropriate analysis of this work, or the realities of defending a design professional – even when the claims are frivolous.
[brief] Court Alert for Defendant [...] Pa161 [...]’s Letter to Judge and Clerk 2/28/2020 Pa162 Communication Result Report 8/18/2020 Pa164 Fax Transmission Overleaf Page Pa165 Request to Transfer Hearing of Municipal Court Matter 7/9/2020 Pa166 Email Conversation Regarding Transfer of [...] Case 8/19/2020 Pa167 [Order] Court Finding [...] Guilty on 10/27/2021 - Payment of Fines, Cost and Other Assessments Pa168 Exhibit C-2 to [...]’s Certification Complaint Summons 11/04/2020 Pa170 Return of Service Information 11/04/2020 Pa172 Affidavit of Probable Cause 11/04/2020 Pa173 Preliminary Law Enforcement Incident Report Central Judicial Processing Notice – Order to Defendant [...] 11/04/2020 Set to Appear on 11/19/2020 Letter Dated 9/23/2021 from Highland Park Municipal Court  To All parties regarding 10/27/2021  Hearing Exhibit C-3 to [...]’s Certification Letter from [...]s to NJ Superior Court Clerk  12/14/2021  Certification of Paralegal 12/14/2021  Notice of Motion 12/14/2021  Certification of Eldridge [...]s  12/14/2021  Proposed Order Notice of Appeal to NJ Superior Court  11/05/2021
[brief] This presents the classic situation where an employee ([...]) and an employer ([...]), who are engaged in an employment dispute, use the pension system ([...]) as a means to supplement their settlement in order to resolve their litigation.  By allocating a substantial portion of the settlement to the salary for the last three years of employment, the school district and [...] obtained a more favorable settlement at the expense of the [...].  The Board found that rather than distributing the salaries equally during the years she alleged she was illegally underpaid the settlement agreement only increased [...]’s salary for the final three years of service.  (Pa10).  The Board concluded that because there was no direct connection between the settled salary increases and the service rendered, nor were there across the board salary increases, the payment of the additional salary was extra compensation offered as an inducement to leave employment with the [...].  (Pa11).  [...]’s argument that the [...] Board erred in denying her request for a hearing is also misplaced.
[directive] Agency ALPR Coordinators shall deconflict with the County and State ALPR Coordinator about deployment locations to avoid duplication of efforts.  BOLO lists list.  A license plate number may be included Standard for including license plate in BOLO in a “be on the lookout” or BOLO list (a compilation of license plates or partial plates for which a BOLO situation exists) for input into an ALPR system only if there is a legitimate and specific law enforcement reason to identify or locate that particular vehicle, or any person(s) who are reasonably believed to be associated with that vehicle.
[brief] (2T 103-23 to 105-8)  [...] proceeded to claim that he encountered [...] the day before at a shrine for Tucker and that, while there, he saw [...] spitting and brandishing a gun.  (2T 111-22 to 115-23)  [...] claimed that he bought his own gun the next day to protect himself and that he happened to be arrested on the first day of owning it.  (2T 123-7 to 20)  [...] struggled to recall the details of what occurred at the shrine, including what type of gun [...] had; however, after being shown a transcript of his prior testimony, [...] said he previously testified that [...] had a Glock.  (2T 111-22 to 116-15)  Although [...] recalled “plenty” of people at the shrine that day, no one else corroborated his account, and he also admitted that he had been previously convicted of twelve felonies in New Jersey.  (2T 113-9 to 13, 129-17 to 130-12)  After informing against [...] and being held for just one day, [...] was released on $75,000 bail, and he ultimately pleaded guilty to second-degree unlawful possession of a handgun and was sentenced to the minimum, five years with forty-two months of parole ineligibility.  (2T 120-15 to 135-4)  [...] maintained that his actual testimony against [...] was not a condition of his plea.  (2T 133-1 to 25)
[brief] Ja717-18.  First, the Subdivision Plan, which was prominently referenced in the [...] Confirmatory Deed and in Defendants’ Deed, contains a tax map inset showing then-existing Lot 3 as 105’ and Lot 2 as 80’ and combined frontage as 185’.  Ja148.  Thus, the Subdivision Plan shows that the appropriate Lot 3 frontage along 21st Street South was 65’ after subdivision (105’ – 40’).  Ja148.\textsuperscript{11}  Second, under Palamarg, 80 N.J. at 456, the Subdivision Deed likely constitutes \textsuperscript{10}  Similarly, the 2010 [...] Acquisition Deed references 110.69’ of frontage along the public alley, the Subdivision Plan indicates the transfer of 40’, and the [...] Confirmatory Deed and Defendants’ Deed both indicate 72.06’, rather than 70.69’ of frontage along the public alley.  \textsuperscript{11}  Defendants’ assertion that the trial court relied on “a small, blurry tax map on a recorded subdivision plan” to reach its conclusion, Db18, is patently false.
[brief] ”  *[...]*, 478 N.J. Super. at 613 (quoting *Cole*, 215 N.J. at 281).  Here, [...] initiated the action by filing its complaint rather than asserting its right to arbitration  . . .  [...] attested in its *Rule* 4:5-1(b)(2) certification that no arbitration was pending and that . . . none was contemplated.  The *Rule* recognizes a party's ‘continuing obligation’ to amend the certification if the underlying facts change.  [...] made no such amendment, instead responding to [...]'s counterclaims with an answer alleging eight affirmative defenses, none of which concerned arbitration.  *These* pleadings strongly weigh as a factor in favor of waiver.  *[...]*, 478 N.J. Super. at 613 (emphasis added).
[brief] The ALJ should have rendered his Initial Decision no later than June 3, 2022 or, in the alternative, requested a statutory extension from the Director of the OAL pursuant to N.J.A.C. 1:1-18.8(c), (d) and/or (e).  See also, N.J.S.A. 52:14B-10(c).  The ALJ did neither. \(^1\)  Numerous joint correspondence and/or emails were sent to the OAL by both parties requesting the ALJ’s decision.  However, the ALJ did not respond.  \(^1\)Without any support in the record, [...] inexplicably reports in his Initial Decision that the “Record Closed: October 3, 2022”.  (Pa001a).  Once the ALJ did render his Initial Decision, the Appellant submitted timely written exceptions.  Among these, Appellant cited the ALJ’s lack of adherence to the statutory guidelines when he issued his Initial Decision.  Despite this, the [...] (“[...]”) accepted the ALJ’s Initial Decision without “extensive[] comment” to the exceptions and without a single comment regarding the untimeliness of the Initial Decision – despite protestations.
[directive] V.  Requirements and Procedures for Officer in Charge of Station House  A.  The arrested person should be processed in accordance with R. 3:4-1, a summary of this court rule is attached, and, if applicable, with standard operating procedure adopted by the county prosecutor.  (7/95)  Strip Search and Body Cavity Search Requirements and Procedures  B.  Where appropriate, a person arrested in accordance with R. 3:4-1 shall be released or have bail set without unnecessary delay but in no event later than 12 hours after arrest.  C.  Unless authorized by search warrant or consent, a strip search should not be conducted if the arrested person will be released without custodial confinement or will soon be released on bail or own recognizance.  D.  The officer in charge shall assure that a consent to a strip search or body cavity search is in writing whenever possible.  E.  The officer in charge shall assure that all strip searches and body cavity searches are conducted in private and that these searches cannot be observed by persons not physically conducting the search.  F.  When a body cavity search is conducted, the officer in charge shall request a sworn statement from the licensed physician or registered nurse who conducted the search stating that the body cavity search was conducted pursuant to statutory and medical requirements.  G.  All reports pertaining to strip searches or body cavity searches are not public records.
[brief] **THE PVWC AND TRIAL COURT’S LEGAL ANALYSES ARE NOT ENTITLED TO DEFERENCE**  The Appellate Division owes no deference to the trial court’s flawed interpretation of the Public Work Contractors Registration Act, N.J.S.A. 34:11-56.48 et seq.  (“PWCRA”).  This is because “a trial court’s interpretation of the law and the legal consequences that flow from established facts are not entitled to any special deference, and, hence, an issue of law is subject to de novo plenary appellate review, regardless of the context. ”  Estate of Hanges v. Metropolitan Property & Cas. Ins. Co., 202 N.J. 369, 382-83 (2010)(internal citations omitted).
[brief] Confidential Witnesses/former Employees  Plaintiffs’ § 10(b)  Complaint includes statements by 24 confidential witnesses (“CWs”), five of whom are also former employees (“FEs”) identified in the § 14(a) Complaint.  Defendants’ interrogatories ask Plaintiffs to disclose the identities of the CWs/FEs.  Defendants have also requested production of all documents provided by the CWs/FEs to Plaintiffs’ counsel.  Relying on the work-product privilege, Plaintiffs refuse to comply with both requests.  In resolving this discovery fight, I first note that the predominant view of district courts across this great nation is that the names of CWs/FEs referenced in a complaint are not protected work product.
[brief] See \textit{Grubbs v. Knoll}, 376 N.J.Super. 420, 431; \textit{Ricci v. Corporate Express of the Esat, Inc.}, 344 N.J.Super. 39, 48, 779 A.2d 1114 (App. Div. 2001) (noting that a party is entitled to attorney’s fees for only some of the work performed, the relevant services should be identified or a reasonable explanation made for the failure to so) \textit{certify. denied}, 171 N.J. 42, 791 A.2d 220 (2002); \textit{Chattin v. Cape May Greene, Inc.}, 243 N.J. Super. 590, 614, 581 A.2d 91(App. Div. 1990) (holding that the court must take into account that plaintiff succeeded as to two claims that did not provide for attorneys’ fees when awarding fees as to the one claim that did), \textit{aff’d o. b.}  124 N.J. 520, 591 A.2d 943 (1991) incurred in this matter for the service provided to determine if any legal fees shall be granted for the corrections made by the Plaintiff.
[brief] (1T5-6 to 18; Da 17).  In November 2023, the Defendants were elected to serve on the Borough Governing Body, three years each for [...] and [...], and four years in the case of [...] as Mayor.  (Da 18).  On January 3, 2024, at the initial and reorganization meeting of the Borough, a motion was made to terminate [...] as attorney for the Borough.  The Motion was made by the Defendant [...] and seconded by the Defendant [...].  The result of the Motion was 4-3 in favor of terminating [...], with [...] and [...] voting in favor of termination and Mayor [...] breaking the tie.  (Da 18).  On February 2, 2024, given that the Defendants were also defendants in the [...] defamation lawsuit and thus had a conflict of interest in voting on [...]’s employment, the Plaintiffs filed a Verified Complaint (Da 16-21) and Order to Show Cause against the Defendant-Respondents, seeking the following interim relief:
[brief] THE COURT: [...], anything you would like to add?  MR. HESKETH: Judge, I'd like to just add a couple of things.  Number 1 is during the pendency of this matter, obviously, the discovery was very voluminous.  I have had the opportunity to give -- I believe [...] has all the paper discovery in the case.  Additionally, some of the videotape statements, or all of the videotape statements, to my knowledge have been transcribed and he's had access to them.  What he did not have access to was the actual video -- audio/video statements themselves on the CD media.  Obviously, that's a -- it's a number of hours.  It would be difficult for the jail and myself to sit down with [...] for hours on end looking at videos.  He did see the pertinent videos here in court during the 404(b) motions and I'm satisfied, Judge, that those are the pertinent videos that would be used in this trial by the State but nevertheless, Judge, on behalf of [...] I did submit all of the DVDs and CDs to the Public Defender's Office and requested that they put them on a flash drive.  I have repeatedly asked them to do it, I know it's a -- it's a difficult task.  They accommodated me, they finally came through with a flash drive which I have now turned over.  I believe I've indicated to the Court I've asked for some assistance in perhaps allowing that to go back to the jail and I know that there's an e-mail message out to [...] as to that effect, but, in essence, Judge, once he has that flash drive in his hand he will have everything completed.  And Judge, he wants to see the videos.  He wants to see them, not read the transcripts, he wants to see them and he -- that's his prerogative.  THE COURT:
[brief] [(Da47). ]  Furthermore, the court found that defendant was guilty of a certain persons offense “the moment he obtained this handgun,” and because that occurred at an unknown time, “it cannot be assumed he obtained it in order to rob the [...]. ” (Da47).  Finally, the court held that, “Again, only after struggling with the cashier and being restrained by another employee did [d]efendant brandish his handgun in order to flee the premises,” and so, “[d]efendant possessed the gun with a general objective to have on his person when committing robberies, but not with the specific objective in mind that he would use it to rob the [...] Store – the robbery for which he was found guilty at trial.
[brief] The LAD codified at N.J.S.A. 10:5-1 to -49 provides, in pertinent part:  It shall be an unlawful employment practice, or ... an unlawful discrimination . . .  [F]or an employer, because of the race, creed, color, national origin, ancestry, age, marital status, civil union status, domestic partnership status, affectional or sexual orientation, genetic information, pregnancy or breastfeeding, sex, gender identity or expression . . . to refuse to hire or employ or to bar or to discharge or require to retire, unless justified by lawful considerations . . .  "from employment such individual or to discriminate against such individual in compensation or in terms, conditions or privileges of employment.  . . .  N.J.S.A. 10:5-12.  The employer has an affirmative duty under the law to take aggressive steps to avoid and prevent discrimination of all types.
[brief] Indeed, Appellant maintains a good faith belief that video evidence of his alcotests being performed does exist, but was not provided to him in discovery at the trial level.  Because Respondent had an affirmative duty to provide such evidence to Appellant under R. 3:13-3(b), the state violated the discovery rules.  Fifth, Respondent is incorrect in arguing that this matter should not be remanded for re-sentencing based on the Law Division’s decision to sentence Appellant to an unreasonable monthly payment plan.  The evidence of Appellant’s indigence now before this Court is more than sufficient to show that the monthly payment plan currently applicable to Appellant is unreasonable and, to the extent Appellant’s conviction is not reversed, this Court should remand for re-sentencing on this issue.
[brief] (Pa0099)  \(^{1}\)  The “trial” in this PW action consisted of oral argument by counsel as well as the resolution of what documents the Trial Judge should consider as part of the “record” below.  That issue concerning documents is part of this appeal because the Town Council in adopting the redevelopment ordinance is not required to make specific findings of fact and conclusions of law.  See Cox & Koenig, New Jersey Zoning and Land Use Administration, Sec. 41-5 (Gann 2023)  No witnesses testified before the Trial Judge in this case.
[brief] ”  See Jenkins, 178 N.J. at 363.  And that [...] died from a gunshot wound as opposed to some unexpected or intervening factor is not determinative.  In [...], the defendant shot a gun into a crowd of over 200 people attending an outdoor party, killing a party-goer.  377 N.J. Super. at 616-17.  Forensic evidence revealed that the bullet had passed through a wooden object before striking the victim.  Id. at 618.  [...] told a State witnesses that he had intended to kill someone else.  Id. at 619.  This Court found that “[w]here as here, the evidence permits a finding that the defendant was aware of and disregarded a probability but not a practical certainty that his conduct would cause death, the crime of reckless manslaughter and extreme indifference reckless manslaughter should be submitted to the jury.
[brief] The *Adim* court interpreted *Czachor* to reject the notion that it is sufficient merely to read the language of the *Czachor* instruction, which dulls the coercive effect of an *Allen* charge, when the manner in which that instruction is given, on the whole, could nevertheless be interpreted by a reasonable juror to push the jury towards unanimous agreement:  “In *Czachor* the Court concluded that it would no longer rely on the assumption that a jury charge tending to coerce agreement could be ‘overcome’ or ‘balanced’ by language to the effect that no juror ‘should surrender his conscientious scruples or personal convictions. ’”  *Id.* at 429 (internal citations omitted).  Where the instruction, as given in a flawed manner, leaves the reviewing court with a doubt that the jury would have returned a verdict if the matter had been handled properly, reversal is required.  *Id.* at 430.  Thus, *Figueroa* and *Adim* both rest on the commonsense notion that the positive aspects of a *Czachor* instruction can be undercut by other actions of the trial judge to a degree that the resulting verdict must be reversed as potentially coerced.  In the instant case, under these specific circumstances, once the jury declared a second deadlock at 4:45 p.m., stated that the jurors were concerned because two of them had a vacation the next day, and told the judge they had reached a partial verdict, the proper course of action could not possibly have been simply to steamroll over the jury’s deadlock declaration and order the jury to keep deliberating at that late hour, without addressing the vacation issue and without inquiring: (1) whether further deliberations would be futile and (2) whether she should instead take a partial verdict.  Moreover, adding to the jurors’ worries by musing out loud in front of them about seeing how late she could keep them there made the situation even more coercive, as in Figueroa and Adim.  In light of the clear command from the case law, the judge’s handling of the second deadlock, under these circumstances, ran the extreme risk of coercing the verdict that resulted only minutes later, and, thus, the convictions must be reversed and the matter remanded for retrial.