ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The Board Properly Interpreted and Applied the Ordinances to Conclude the Applicant Required a Use Variance to Permit Multiple Principal Uses at the Property (5T 25-11 to 28-7)  The trial court did not make a determination regarding the need for a use variance because the court found Defendant lacked jurisdiction to determine whether a use variance is required while configured as a 9-member planning board.  (Pa387).  The Court instead remanded the matter to the Zoning Board for an interpretation pursuant to the MLUL.  Plaintiff contends on appeal that all of the foregoing actions constitute reversible error.  (Pb20–22).  However, rather than fatal to the trial court’s order, any error is actually harmless because Plaintiff’s application requires a use variance based on the Defendant’s well-reasoned and correct interpretation of the controlling municipal ordinances.  Accordingly, the decision of the trial court must be affirmed because Plaintiff’s challenge required remand for either an interpretation under N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70b or use variance relief under N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70d.  A.
[brief] DEFENDANT IS CONFINED TABLE OF CONTENTS  PROCEDURAL HISTORY .................................................................  1  STATEMENT OF FACTS ..................................................................  8  LEGAL ARGUMENT .......................................................................  9  POINT I  BECAUSE THE SENTENCING COURT’S ANALYSIS OF THE STATE V. YARBOUGH FACTORS WAS IMPERMISSIBLY BASED ON DISMISSED CHARGES AND SPECULATION NOT SUPPORTED BY COMPETENT, CREDIBLE EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD AND BECAUSE THE COURT OFFERED NO OTHER VALID BASIS FOR THE IMPOSITION OF A CONSECUTIVE SENTENCE, THIS COURT SHOULD REVERSE AND DIRECT THE TRIAL COURT TO IMPOSE THE CERTAIN PERSONS SENTENCE CONCURRENTLY TO THE ROBBERY SENTENCE.  (Da44-52)  .................................................................
[brief] Statutory Construction.  The Municipal Land Use Law (MLUL), N.J.S.A. 40:55D-1 et seq., must be read in conjunction with the Pinelands Comprehensive Management Plan (CMP), and the certified master plan and ordinances of the [...].  The Legislature has granted the [...] jurisdiction over standards affecting real property development in the Pinelands area.  As stated in Fine v. Galloway Tp. Committee, 190 N.J. Super. 432, 443 (Law Div. 1983), “A municipality may not contradict a policy established by the Legislature. ”  In reviewing a local decision, the court must determine whether the Board followed statutory guidelines and properly exercised its discretion.  As established in Burbridge v. Governing Body of Mine Hill, 117 N.J. 376, 385 (1990), the Legislature’s intent is clear.  With regard to Pinelands regulations, N.J.S.A. 13:18A-27 provides:  Enforcement of provisions of this act over inconsistent or conflicting acts.  It is the intent of the Legislature that, except as otherwise specifically provided for in this act, in the event of any conflict or inconsistency in the provisions of this act and any other acts pertaining to matters herein established or provided for or in any rules and regulations adopted under this act or said other acts, to the extent of such conflict or inconsistency, the provisions of this act and the rules and regulations adopted hereunder shall be enforced and the provisions of such other acts and regulations adopted thereunder shall be of no force and effect.
[brief] Contrary to [...]’s assertion one appeal that [...] selected her substitute (Pb39), the record contains conflicting information about who selected the replacement and how the replacement was paid.  (Pa110).  In the Questionnaire, [...] answered that the court selects the replacement.  (Pa48; Pa110).  In the January 2019 Interview, [...] indicated that [...] was responsible for finding a replacement and was to swap compensation with the replacement.  (Pa110).  However, [...] testified that when she required a substitute, she and [...] worked together to find a substitute.  (1T32:20-22).  Similarly, there was questionable information from [...] regarding assistants.  [...] responded in the Questionnaire that there were “no known assistants. ” (1T102:25-103:17; Pa48; Pa105; Pa110).  This response reveals [...]’s lack of knowledge about any assistants [...] may have, if any.  It also did not clarify whether or not [...] allowed [...] to provide her own assistants – [...] simply answered that they did not know.  With respect to Factor #6 – Continuing Relationship, the ALJ reasonably found that the municipal prosecutor position was a one-year appointment which was inconsistent with an ongoing relationship.
[brief] 16 Village Supermarket v. Mayfair, 269 N.J. Super. 224, 238 (Law Div. 1993) ..  16 Washington Commons, LLC v. City of Jersey City, 416 N.J. Super. 555, 560 (App. Div. 2010) ..................................................................................  5  Witt v. Borough of Maywood, 328 N.J. Super. 432, 453-54 (Law Div. 1998)  16  Wyzkowski v. Rizas, 132 N.J. 509, 518 (1993)  ......................................................  6  Statutes N.J.S.A. 40:55D-10(d) .................................................................................. 15, 16, 24 N.J.S.A. 40:55D-10(g) .................................................................................. 22 N.J.S.A. 40:55D-10.3 .................................................................................. 24 N.J.S.A. 40:55D-37 .................................................................................. 10 N.J.S.A. 40:55D-38 .................................................................................. passim N.J.S.A. 40:55D-39 .................................................................................. 8
[brief] THE MOUNT PROSPECT CASE IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL OR BINDING ON THIS COURT AND CONTAINS A PATENTLY FLAWED INTERPRETATION OF THE RELEVANT LAW.  A.  The Third Circuit’s Mount Prospect Decision is not precedential or binding on this Court.  The Defendants repeatedly claim that the Mount Prospect decision is “precedential” or “binding”, but New Jersey state courts are not bound by federal court decisions regarding state law.  See, e.g., Kavky v. Herbalife Int'l of Am., 359 N.J. Super. 497, 500-01 (App. Div. 2003) (rejecting Third Circuit’s “prediction” as to how New Jersey Supreme Court would rule on question involving application of New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act (“NJCFA”) stating: “Notwithstanding our high regard for the Third Circuit, we are unable to agree with its unduly restrictive interpretation of the Act. ”); and Small v. Dep't of Corr., 243 N.J. Super. 439, 442-444 (App. Div. 1990) (“decisions of the Federal Court are not binding upon a State court's interpretation of identical provisions”).  These decisions conclusively demonstrate that New Jersey State courts are not bound by the Third Circuit’s interpretations of New Jersey statutes—especially when such interpretations are patently flawed.
[brief] R. 4:42-9(a)(6) was promulgated to discourage groundless disclaimers and to provide more equitably to an insured the benefits of the insurance contract.  *Kistler v. N.J. Mfrs. Ins. Co.*, 172 N.J. Super. 324, 328-330 (App. Div. 1980).  To award attorneys’ fees under R. 4:42-9(a)(6), the Court must evaluate the factors outlined in *Enright v. Lubow*, 215 N.J. Super. 306, 313 (App. Div. 1987).  The *Enright* factors that govern a court’s discretion include: “(1) the insurer's good faith in refusing to pay the demands; (2) excessiveness of plaintiff’s demand; (3) bona fides of one or both of the parties; (4) the insurer’s justification in litigating the issue; (5) the insured’s conduct in contributing substantially to the necessity for the litigation on the polices; (6) the general conduct of the parties; and (7) the totality of the circumstances.
[brief] For the foregoing reasons, this should vacate the Order; and remand to the Law Division to enter partial summary judgment in favor of Plaintiffs; to deny the Tenant Defendants’ motion for summary judgment; and to set the matter down for trial on liability and damages.  Respectfully submitted, [...]  Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellants  By:/s/ [...]  [...]  Dated: May 6, 2024  [...] AND [...], as husband and wife and Individually, Plaintiffs-Appellants-Cross-Respondents, vs. [...], [...], Defendants-Respondents, [...] and [...], Defendants-Respondents-Cross-Appellants, (For Continuation of Caption
[brief] *(Emphasis added)* (Pg.10 - Appellant Brief).  **b.  Even if *N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.5* had an “intent” requirement, the evidence clearly demonstrates appellant/plaintiff [...]’s intentional failure to insure his vehicle with a New Jersey policy. **  It does not matter that appellant/plaintiff is “a normal person who is not a lawyer” – millions of “normal” New Jersey residents are able to properly procure the requisite New Jersey automobile insurance without issue.
[directive] J~~r,?>urts  New New Jersey Judiciary Krol Order Contact List  lnde~nce•lntegrity  Falmns•QualifyService of In the Matter - Select County - County Prosecutor: Defendant's Attorney: Name Name Telephone Number Telephone Number ---------- --------- Email  Em ail Provider Agency: Name --------------------------- Provider Agency CEO ___________________________  Telephone Number _ Email Court Contact: Name Title Telephone Number ----------------------------  Em ail by Form Promulgated Directive #21-20 (08/05/2020), CN 12561 (KROL Order 6)
[directive] Do you understand that if you are a public office holder or employee, you can be [No/Nie]  [NA/Nie dotyczy]  [Yes/Tak]  16. required to forfeit your office or job by virtue of your plea of guilty?  Czy rozumie Pan(i), ze jesli pelni Pan(i) funkcjy publicznq lub jest pracownikiem urzydu publicznego, moze Pan(i) bye zmuszony(a) do rezygnacji z tej funkcji lub pracy w zwi112ku z przyznaniem siy do winy?
[brief] We say [...] was “fairly put on notice” of the viability of the common law stranger-to-the-deed rule in the proceedings below. \(^1\)  [...] argued, in his initial brief:  Plaintiff’s application is now based upon historical deeds of either adjoining or remote neighbors.  Those deeds reference access to the driveway but do not grant any specific right of easement to any specific party.  Express easements are created by grant.  The language of the grant is controlling.  *Leach v. Anderl*, 218 NJ Super 18, 28 (App. Div. 1987).  In *Leach*, the Appellate Division concluded that no express easement existed for an adjoining neighbor to use a roadway where, “the several references to the right of way as a ‘roadway’ in various deeds are only for the purpose of describing the property and its boundaries and do not constitute a grant of a right to use the adjoining property.
[directive] (December, 2010).  Less-lethal ammunition may include different types such as: Kinetic Less-Lethal Flexible Projectiles; Kinetic Less-Lethal Non-Flexible Projectiles; Rubber Balls and Pellets; Baton Projectiles; Pad Projectiles, commonly referred to as “bean bag rounds;” Drag Stabilized Projectiles, commonly referred to as “sock rounds;” Fin- Stabilized Projectiles; and Encapsulated Projectiles.
[brief] Plaintiff’s contrary interpretation of Section 13.1 violates the canons of contract construction.  Indeed, such an interpretation directly contradicts the express terms of the clause.  If applied, Plaintiff’s construction would render swaths of the PSA meaningless.  “A contract must be construed as a whole and the intention of the parties is to be collected from the entire instrument and not from detached portions.  Individual clauses and particular words must be considered in connection with the rest of the agreement, and all parts of the writing and every word of it will, if possible, be given effect a court will endeavor to give a construction most equitable to the parties and which will not give one of them an unfair or unreasonable advantage over the other.
[brief] Accordingly, [...] correctly precluded plaintiff’s action.  [Id. at 486-487.]  The present case contains all the elements requiring collateral estoppel, precluding plaintiffs from arguing that [...]’s Will did not reflect his true intent.  First, and as plaintiffs concede, the issue in the Probate action and this case was whether the Will accurately reflected [...]’s intent.  Second, the issue was actually litigated to conclusion following a three-day trial.  Third, there was a final judgment on the merits insofar as the Probate judge entered an Order of Judgment dated July 21, 2021.  (Pa000063.)  Fourth, the issue decided in the Probate action (i.e., whether [...] captured [...]’s true intent to discharge his mortgage entirely) was essential to the judgment.  Fifth, [...] was a party to the Probate action.  In sum, the doctrine of collateral estoppel applies to this action.
[brief] Letter dated May 4, 2021 from [...] regarding hearing scheduled for June 23, 2021 (Attached at Pa276)  Letter dated June 24, 2021 from [...] regarding hearing scheduled for July 20, 2021 (Attached at Pa277)  Letter dated June 24, 2021 from [...] regarding hearing scheduled for July 20, 2021 (Attached at Pa278)
[brief] Da42.  Defendant failed to appear on March 11th despite this express warning, and the Court appropriately dismissed his Counterclaim pursuant to Rule 1:2-4.  Pa26.  Defense counsel also appears to argue that [...] did not understand criminal sentencing procedures, and the court consequently failed to take defense counsel’s word for it that Defendant would be released imminently and would be available to proceed with trial.  Brf. at p. 6.
[brief] Should this Court rule in Appellant’s favor, the Legislature’s intent in enacting the JTCL will be severely undercut, and defendants will have free license to manufacture procedural “missteps” and “traps” for plaintiffs to frustrate viable claims.  It is difficult to imagine how the Trial Court committed error by applying the statute as written and the law as pronounced by our State’s highest court.  The designation of the so-called “[...]” occurred in 2017, before Mejia in 2020.
[brief] After being charged, [...] moved to suppress the fruits of the car and home searches.  Defense counsel argued that the results of the car search should be excluded because the warrant did not authorize the [...] to seize and search the car outside the territorial limits of Toms River.  (Da 126-130; 1T104-18 to 105-25)  Indeed, “[t]he police knew the search warrant was ineffectual outside of Toms River,” but nevertheless failed to extend the warrant to Lakewood by following the required procedure for judicial cross-assignment set out in State v. Broom-Smith, 201 N.J. 229 (2010).  (Da 129)  Additionally, counsel contended that the consent to search his home was invalid.  (Da 130, 145-146)  After hearing testimony from [...] (1T4-6 to 95-17), the court denied [...]’s motion (2T4-4 to 19-14; Da 65).  Concerning the car search, [...] reasoned that the Toms River “officers acted within the scope of the search warrant,” in part because the “warrant was not limited to execution in the Township of Toms River. ”  (2T14-2 to 17-7)  That is, the search of [...]’s car “is unlike a scenario in which officers sought to execute a search warrant upon a residence” because “[a] vehicle is inherently mobile and, thus, the territorial limitations the search of a residence presents are not present here. ”  (2T16-15 to 23)  In any event, the trial court held it would “not suppress evidence based on the fractional geographical differences between townships in the same county. ”  (2T17-1 to 3).  The trial court also held that, because the “execution of the search warrant was constitutional,” it did not poison [...]’s subsequent consent to search his home.  (2T18-6 to 11)  Turning to the search of [...]’s home, the court held that [...] voluntarily consented.  (2T18-6 to 19-12)  The court explained that it “observed the interaction on [the] MVR recording” and that “[n]othing about the interaction demonstrated that officers acted inappropriately or inappropriately coerced Defendant into signing the consent form. ”  (2T19-4 to 12)  In short, the court recounted, officers “stated that if he consented to a search, they would permit him to show them where he stored the CDS rather than perform a more comprehensive search that would result from a warrant. ”  (2T18-6 to 18-20)  [...] later denied [...]’s pro se motion for reconsideration for substantially the same reasons (Da 87-101).
[brief] LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY EXCLUDED PHOTOS OF SURVEILLANCE CAMERAS WHICH COULD NOT BE PROPERLY AUTHENTICATED AND LACKED RELEVANCE AND THE TRIAL COURT ALSO PROPERLY GUIDED THE ADMISSION AND USE OF PHOTOS OF ADJACENT PROPERTIES ON EDGEMERE AVENUE  Defendant argues the trial court erred by preventing the defense from admitting certain photographs at trial: photographs, taken in 2021, of a pole camera that he claimed was present at the scene of the murder in 2019; and photographs of a walkway leading from the backyards on [...] to [...] to show that when the police lost sight of the perpetrator, he could have used that walkway to evade police, thus resulting in defendant’s wrongful identification as the actor in this crime.  Defendant argues that by refusing to admit this “evidence,” the trial court usurped the jury’s function and denied defendant his constitutional rights to due process, a fair trial, and to present a defense.
[brief] II.  THE TRIAL COURT’S LEGAL DECISION THAT THE CFA DID NOT APPLY WAS, AGAIN, MISTAKEN.  (RAISED BELOW 1T46:5-50:23; 2T4:20-5:18; 2T16:23-17:5).  Twice the trial court has dismissed CFA claims *sua sponte*, albeit on different bases.  Each ruling was mistaken as a matter of law.
[brief] The Senate Committee Report Does Not Change the Meaning of the Unambiguous Statutory Language.  Statutory interpretation enforces the legislature’s intent.  If “the plain language leads to a clear and unambiguous result, then our interpretative process is over. ”  *State v. Courtney*, 243 N.J. 77, 86 (2020).  Defendant turns to the Senate Report attempting to obfuscate the plain meaning of “a debt collector may not communicate, in connection with the collection of any debt, with any person. ”
[brief] (5T 111-16 to 112-8)  He concluded that the cause of death was sharp force injuries to the neck and blunt force injuries to the head, and the manner of death was homicide.  (5T 114-7 to 11)  [...] testified that [...] was alive when both sets of injuries were inflicted, (5T 128-12 to 13) and that [...] had no offensive or defensive wounds.  (5T 131-14 to 16, 131-17 to 18)
[brief] PLAINTIFF'S CONFLICT OF INTEREST ARGUMENT IS NOT PROPERLY A SUBJECT OF THIS APPEAL, AND THE RELIEF PLAINTIFF  SEEKS IS IN ANY EVENT TOTALLY UNWARRANTED.  Plaintiff argues in Point IV of his Brief that in the event the Court reverses and remands, the trial court should be directed not to allow all [...] to engage the same counsel.  (Pb39-41).  Not only is that argument meritless, but it should be rejected for a variety of other reasons as well, including that: • No order was entered by the trial court with respect to the issue; • No record was developed below with respect to the issue; • Plaintiff did not raise this issue as an issue on appeal in his Civil Case Information Statement filed in connection with the subject appeal; and • Plaintiff is posing a hypothetical and improperly asking this Court to render an advisory opinion.
[brief] *Jacoby v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment of Borough of Englewood Cliffs*, 442 N.J. Super. 450, 462 (App. Div. 2015).  (emphasis supplied).  All but two of the above cited cases involve land use board quasi-judicial decisions.  *Grabowsky*’s quoted language relates to an ordinance challenge based upon an alleged conflict of interest of two governing body members; and *Malanga* involved a challenge to a governing body’s designation of an area as “in need of redevelopment. ”  See *Grabowsky*, 221 N.J. at 536; *Malanga*, 253 N.J. 291.  None of these cases involved a substantive legislative challenge.  As they did before the trial court, Plaintiffs mistakenly apply the standards of review for blight designations and land use board resolutions to those for a legislative ordinance by a municipal governing body; and again misstate the level of support found in the record for the adoption of the Old York Redevelopment Plan Ordinances.
[directive] (wypełnić tylko jeżeli przestępstwo miało miejsce 1 lutego (b)  [Tak/Yes]  [Nie/No]  [Nie dotyczy/NA]  r. lub później) 2018  Czy rozumie Pan(i), że w przypadku przyznania się do winy w odniesieniu do przestępstwa zagrożenia dobra dziecka zgodnie z N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4b(5)(b)(iii) lub prowadzenia sieci pornografii dziecięcej zgodnie z 2C:24-4.1, lub usiłowania N.J.S.A. popełnienia któregokolwiek z tych przestępstw, i jeśli miało to miejsce 1 lutego 2018 lub później, sąd, niezależnie od jakiegokolwiek innego wyroku, i na wniosek prokuratora, wyda specjalny wyrok dożywotniego nadzoru kuratorskiego, chyba że sąd stwierdzi oficjalnie, że tego rodzaju dożywotni nadzór nie jest potrzebny w celu ochrony społeczeństwa lub powstrzymania Pana(i) od popełniania kolejnych czynów przestępczych?
[brief] --- 6  [...] includes a copy of the [...] Survey in its Appendix.  See Pa92.  That [...] fails to include a copy of this survey is inexcusable considering the trial court’s appointment of [...] and the trial court’s reliance on the [...] Survey in its Statement of Reasons, which [...] also fails to include in its Appendix.  [...] includes a copy of the Statement of Reasons in its Appendix.  See Pa165-76.  1.  The trial court correctly determined [...] is entitled to summary judgment on its First Count for ejectment because it is the record owner of the Property and [...]’s misconduct interferes with its property rights.
[brief] 19 September 19, 2016, Notice of Suspension, State Exhibit 22....................... 20-21 September 19, 2016, Letter of Advice to [...], State Exhibit 23 ............ 22-23 September 19, 2016, Letter to [...], State Exhibit 24 .........  24-25  [...] Inventory Report, dated September 22, 2016, State Exhibit 25 ...........................................................................................................
[brief] Indeed, such a choice strengthened, as opposed to weakened, the voluntariness of defendant’s consent.  And contrary to defendant’s contention otherwise, the officers also accurately told defendant that if he refused consent, they would seek a search warrant to search his residence.  Importantly, no officer ever said that a search warrant was inevitable, only that if he refused consent, officers would seek a search warrant and return to his home without his cooperation.  (Da15 3:24:13 to 3:25:10; Da18).
[brief] The audio/video tape of [...]’s questioning of [...] before the issuance of any Miranda warnings, played at the Suppression hearing on April 4, 2019, is provided to the court as (Da58).  Nor did he do so when he entered his patrol car next to [...].  As the audio video tape of what occurred in [...]’s vehicle (Da58) reveals, [...] did not relay [...]’s license information to dispatch for nearly eight and one-half minutes into the stop.  (1T168-16 to 21) and two minutes after inadequately administering Miranda warnings, issued 7 minutes, 22 seconds into the stop.  (1T163-22 to 1T164-2).  In those minutes, [...] questioned [...] about where she was coming from, her final destination; the nature and length of her relationship with [...]; whether she was married and had a maiden name; whether she possessed a permit to carry a concealed weapon; and reason for the trip.