ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The trial court’s analysis is incorrect for two reasons.  First, BOG authority was not delegated by the State.  As already explained, the specific powers referenced in the court’s remarks were possessed by the University via the Trustees before the Rutgers Act.  Second, to the extent that the Rutgers Act speaks to those powers, it reflects an agreed-upon reallocation of them to the then newly created BOG, all embodied in the contractual agreement between Rutgers and the State through the Act.  Thus, the BOG’s responsibilities were not delegated by the State and do not transform BOG members into public officeholders for purposes of the quo warranto statute.  In essence, the court below treated the BOG as a delegated extension of state government, charged with fulfilling legislative commands.  That is not the role of the BOG.  Prominent academic scholars on the Rutgers Act, including [...], correctly note that Rutgers is an instrumentality of the state, but “it is not part of state government, and thus, is outside of the executive branch altogether.
[brief] B.  Establishment and Role of The Cannabis Review Board.  Hoboken established a CRB under Chapter 36 of the [...] Code.  Pursuant to Section 36-1, the [...] created a CRB “which shall serve as an Advisory Committee to the [...] whose duty it shall be to review applications for a cannabis wholesaler, cannabis retailer, medical cannabis dispensary and cannabis delivery operations based within the [...]. ” (M-Da356).  Section 36-2 of the CRB Ordinance establishes the purpose of the CRB in order to “assure the public health, safety and general welfare of the [...] and its residents, business establishments and visitors. ” (M-Da356).  Section 36-4a permits the CRB among other things, to receive and review applications for a cannabis retail establishment and the CRB is required to provide either an endorsement or a report to the contrary to the land use board exercising jurisdiction “prior to the Applicant’s submission of a conditional use application to the Board. ”  (M-Da357) (emphasis supplied).
[brief] The Affidavit of Merit Statute defines the types of “licensed person[s]” covered by its provisions to include “engineers” licensed pursuant to N.J.S.A. 45:8-27, et seq.  See N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-26.  The statute governing the licensing of engineers in the State of New Jersey in turn defines the terms “practice of engineering” and "professional engineering" as: any service or creative work the adequate performance of which requires engineering education, training, and experience and the application of special knowledge of the mathematical, physical and engineering sciences to such services or creative work as consultation, investigation, evaluation, planning and design of engineering works and systems, planning the use of land and water, engineering studies, and the administration of construction for the purpose of determining compliance with drawings and specifications; any of which embraces such services or work, either public or private, in connection with any engineering project including: utilities, structures, buildings, machines, equipment, processes, work systems, projects, telecommunications, or equipment of a mechanical, electrical, hydraulic, pneumatic or thermal nature, insofar as they involve safeguarding life, health or property, and including such other professional services as may be necessary to the planning, progress and completion of any engineering services.
[brief] [...] relies on the legal arguments from his initial brief and adds the following:  POINT I  DEFENDANT’S CONVICTIONS MUST BE REVERSED BECAUSE THE COURT IMPROPERLY IGNORED HIS UNAMBIGUOUS REQUEST TO REPRESENT HIMSELF.  In his initial brief, [...] argued that his convictions must be reversed because, long before trial, he unambiguously told the court that he wanted to represent himself, but the court refused to hold the necessary Faretta hearing or rule on [...]’s request.  (Db 11-15)  In response, the State claims (1) that [...] twice telling the court, “I would like to represent myself from here on out, Your Honor,” was not clear or unequivocal enough to constitute a request to go pro se; (Rb 12-14) and alternatively (2) that [...] waived his request to go pro se by not repeatedly bringing it up again after the court had implicitly denied that request.  (Rb 14-16)  Both arguments must be rejected because they defy well-established caselaw and common sense.  First, it is beyond question that [...] clearly, unequivocally, and unambiguously informed the court that he wanted to represent himself.  [...] told the court twice, “I would like to represent myself from here on out. ”  (1T 33-13 to 34-5)  This request was clear — it told the court exactly what [...] wanted to do.  This request was unequivocal — [...] did not express any uncertainty in his decision or any caveats to his request.  And this request was unambiguous — it left no doubt as to the nature of [...]’s request.  That is all caselaw requires of defendants seeking to waive their right to representation and go pro se.
[brief] 2  Respondents adopt the same transcript references as appellant.  2007 became the sole shareholders in the company.  (14T 47:18-24).  In the interim, the company grew and became successful.  [...] acquired and operated labs in Englewood, Edison, Forked River, and eventually Mountainside.  (14T 52:10-12).  During this period the division of labor between [...] and [...] also crystallized.  [...] managed lab operations and travelled between locations to oversee the technical aspects of [...]’s operations.  [...] was in charge of sales, marketing, books and records, and [...]’s finances.  (Da2775).  He maintained the [...] company check book and had primary access to it.  In nearly thirty years of working together, the company issued tens of thousands of checks and wires.  [...] signed a few dozen, usually with [...]’s approval; [...] signed the rest.  (19T 39:8 to 41:23; 17T 92:10-20).  The trial court found:  “there’s no doubt in [my] mind that Mr. [...] was a scientist.  He was a chemist.  He wasn’t a bookkeeper.  He wasn’t an accountant.  He wasn’t running the company.  That was more of Mr. [...]’s role with other professionals. ”  (36T 9:23 to 10:1).  B.
[brief] The Trial Court was not swayed by Appellant’s arguments that the resignation letter was a material issue to the creation of the Separation Agreement (argued extensively: 1T 17:6-21, 1T 20:13 to 1T26:25) and the Trial Court’s Order should be upheld.  **CONCLUSION**  Wherefore, for the reasons stated herein, the Chancery Division’s Orders of July 25, 2023 and August 14, 2023 are sound and must remain undisturbed.  Consequently, Appellant’s must be dismissed in toto.
[directive] detention pretrial in tests laboratory and reports police of (prioritization 10 prosecutor the met, been not has Law Reform Bail the under imposed deadline a that determines General Attorney the to circumstances the report shall promptly case the prosecuting for responsible for reasons the indicate shall report The Justice.  Criminal of Division the of Director through the 74 Page commence to failure that the 2A:162-22(b)(2)(a) N.J.S.A. to pursuant court found a whether delay, due to was Law Reform Bail the in forth requirements set time with the accordance trial in enforcement law prosecutor and taken the by were steps prosecutor, that the delay the by unreasonable released was defendant a whether and deadlines, statutory the comply with to attempt to agencies of the requirements indictment/trial speedy with the comply to failure of the result custody a as from Reform Bail Law.
[directive] Forfeited Property  Treasury investigative agencies may request their equitable share of forfeited property resulting from joint Treasury and Justice investigations in which a Justice agency handles the seizure, and forfeiture.  Property received from a federal agency may be placed into Federal agencies do not have the service in accordance with the agency guidelines.  authority to accept equitable shares of property or tangible items from state, local or foreign agencies.  Such shares have to be treated as gifts to the Federal Government and permission to accept the gift must be sought from the Assistant Secretary (Management) of the Treasury prior to accepting any such property.
[brief] Even [...]’s expert acknowledged that the purpose of the 1967 Subdivision was for Lot 4 to “spin off” the Strip, and acquire the Bump.  1Tr. at 136:1-5.  [...] acknowledges as much in his appellate brief.  Pb at 18.  --- \(^2\)  The former Lot 1 designated on the 1967 Subdivision corresponds to the land conveyed to [...] in the 1966 Hrubec-to-[...] Deed.  The former Lot 2H designated on the 1967 Subdivision corresponds to the land conveyed to [...] in the 1966 [...]-to-[...] Deed.  The 1967 Subdivision shows former Lot 1-A lying adjacent to Lots 1 and 2H to the northwest.  Former Lot 1-A corresponds to Lot 3 today.  Former Lots 1 and 2H now comprise Lot 4.  The signed and approved 1967 Subdivision drawing identifies an area corresponding to the disputed Strip along the boundary between current Lot 3 and Lot 4 (then, between Lots 1 and 2H owned by Graco and Lot 1-A owned by [...]).
[brief] The Trial Court’s Error  To sustain a cause of action for negligence, a plaintiff must prove four elements: (1) a duty of care; (2) a breach of that duty; (3) proximate cause; and (4) actual damages.  Townsend v. Pierre, 221 N.J. 36, 51 (2015).  General contractors owe a non-delegable safety duty to subcontractors on jobsites.  Wolczak v. National Electric Products Corp., 66 N.J. Super. 64, 70 (App. Div. 1961); New Jersey Construction Safety Act, N.J.S.A. 34:5-166, et seq.  Indisputably, defendant [...] acted as general contractor on the subject construction site, and as such, was responsible for execution of all permitted work and for ensuring the safety of the subcontractors on the jobsite, including housekeeping.
[brief] ”  (Pa000003.)  New Jersey law agrees that “non-signatories of a contract . . . may . . . be subject to arbitration if the nonparty is an agent of a party or a third party beneficiary to the contract. ”  *Hojnowski ex rel. Hojnowski v. Vans Skate Park*, 375 N.J. Super. 568, 576 (App. Div. 2005).  The “principle that determines the existence of a third party beneficiary status focuses on whether the parties to the contract intended others to benefit from the existence of the contract, or whether the benefit so derived arises merely as an unintended incident of the agreement. ”  *Id.* (quoting *Broadway Maint. Corp. v. [...], The State Univ.*, 90 N.J. 253, 259 (1982)).  “[T]he real test is whether the contracting parties intended that a third party should receive a benefit which might be enforced in the courts. ”  *Id.* (quoting *Broadway Maint. Corp.*, 90 N.J. at 259).  Here, [...] alleged such a unity among Respondents [...] and [...] as to label them collectively in her complaint as “Corporate Defendants.
[brief] After hearing arguments, the motion court ruled from the bench, denying Plaintiff’s motion.  (3T, at 13-16).  The motion court determined that, for the reasons stated on the record on June 9, 2023, its ruling on [...]’s motion to dismiss was correct, and it would not be in the interests of justice to vacate the prior ruling.  (3T, at 15).  On June 29, 2023, [...] filed a motion for an award of attorneys’ fees and costs.
[directive] Rule 3:3-1(c)(1) on the Bail Schedule 2 charges of robbery, criminal sexual contact, second degree aggravated assault, aggravated arson, arson, burglary, first or second degree violations of Chapter 35 (drug offenses), any crime involving the possession or use of a firearm, or conspiracies or attempts to commit such crimes.  Rule 3:3-1(c)(2-6) (indictable offenses) and Rule 7:2-2(b)(1-6) delineate factors regarding whether a warrant or summons should issue for other offenses.  Rule 3:26-1 (indictable offenses) and Rule 7:4-1 (non-indictable offenses) delineate factors to be considered when setting bail and provide for the option of R.
[brief] POINT IV  TENANT’S APPEAL IS NOT MOOT  In Point IV, Landlord argues that Tenant’s appeal is moot because the rent arrears have already been paid.  This argument is meritless.  “An issue is moot when the ‘decision sought in a matter, when rendered, can have no practical effect on the existing controversy. ’”  Intern. Broth. of Elec. Workers Local 400 v. Borough of Tinton Falls, 468 N.J. Super. 214, 224 (App. Div. 2021) (quoting Redd v. Bowman, 223 N.J. 87, 104 (2015)).  Landlord takes the position that because it has received full payment of what it claimed to be owed on the 2020 rent, all issues have been resolved and no decision by this Court can have any effect on the existing controversy.  The problem with this argument is that there are two parties in this dispute, and only one has been paid in full.  If this Court grants the relief Tenant is seeking by vacating paragraph one of the trial court’s November 10, 2021 order, vacating the November 9, 2023 order in its entirety, and remanding for a ruling that, at long last, fixes the amount owed on the Tenant’s Allowance reimbursement, that would have a “practical effect on the existing controversy. ”  Ibid.  Moreover, both sides are seeking attorney’s fees, and if either request is granted that would have a clear and obvious effect on the controversy as well.  Accordingly, Tenant’s appeal is obviously not moot.
[brief] As noted, the aggravating and mitigating factors a court may consider in imposing sentence are set forth in N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a) and (b).  The Court below only found applicable mitigating factor 4 (there were substantial grounds tending to excuse or justify the defendant’s conduct, though failing to establish a defense).  However, in addition to that mitigating factor Defendant is entitled, as argued in the trial court and as set forth in the sentencing memorandum submitted on behalf of Defendant (Da-27), to the benefit of the additional mitigating factors set forth in his appellant’s brief.  Defendant adds the following arguments regarding the following mitigating factors discounted in the State’s brief (Db20-24):  Mitigating Factor #1-  The defendant’s conduct neither caused nor threatened serious harm and Mitigating Factor #2-  The defendant did not contemplate that his conduct would cause or threaten serious harm.  Given that Mitigating Factors #1 and #2, were argued together at the trial court level and addressed together by the court, these mitigating factors are hereby addressed together herein.  Briefly, in addressing the State’s argument on this point it is important to look at this Court’s ruling in State v. Cullen, 351 N.J. Super. 505, 551 (App. Div. 2002).  The State attempts to limit the significance of this Court’s decision in Cullen, by intimating that the Court’s decision to find these two mitigating factors applied only to first time offenders is simply inaccurate.  Simply put, the nature of addiction often means that those in the throes of addiction will continue to reoffend, as the State is undoubtedly aware of, all too well.  **Mitigating factor #10-  The defendant is particularly likely to respond affirmatively to probationary treatment. **  The trial court additionally erred in not finding Mitigating Factor #10, or alternatively by minimizing [...]’s record of appearance and compliance with his pretrial monitoring.  As noted, [...] “was fully compliant with his pre-trial monitoring,” remained “offense free” and “appeared each and every time on time for court” proving his commitment to the conditions and the requirements set forth by the court.  (T3 8:17 through 20).  In response, to the claim that the sentencing court abused its discretion the State merely points to said decision of the sentencing court, “I don’t think is appropriate for the Court to even consider.  Probation is not in the cards under any sense in this case. ” (3T22-17 through 19).  Further, the State’s contention that this Court’s decision in *State v. Sene*, 443 N.J. Super. 134, 144-145 (App. Div. 2015), somehow precludes this mitigating factor is misplaced.  It was truly “extraordinary” that [...] was able to recover his sobriety and kick a horrific pattern of drug abuse during his nine-month period of pre-trial monitoring.  Thus, [...] is the exact kind of individual that this Court identified as an “extraordinary” case in Sene.  CONCLUSION
[brief] PLAINTIFF’S APPEAL AS TO MOOT  EVIDENTIARY RULINGS BY THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED.  The second point of Plaintiff’s brief asks this Court to overturn correct evidentiary rulings made by the Trial Court prior to this matter being dismissed for Plaintiff’s assignment and lack of standing.  As a threshold matter, the evidentiary rulings are moot because this matter was dismissed, and the dismissal should be upheld on appeal as discussed herein.
[brief] ” (T9).  Further, unlike in Dewey, 109 N.J. at 209, none of the attorneys at [...] who have actively represented Defendants-Respondents for the past five years have switched to a law firm representing [...].  Simply put, there is no side-switching here.  More importantly, Dewey, 109 N.J. at 214, is legally distinguishable from this case because its holding is premised entirely upon a prior version of the RPCs that utilized the now abolished appearance-of-impropriety standard.  Sixteen years after Dewey was decided, the appearance-of-impropriety standard was abolished by the 2004 amendments to the RPCs.  See e.g. Trupos, 201 N.J. at 464 (noting the 2004 “overhaul” of the RPCs “eliminated the ‘appearance of impropriety’ language from the Rules of Professional Conduct”); In re Supreme Ct. Advisory Comm. on Pro. Ethics Op.697, 188 N.J. 549, 562 (2006) (“as part of the 2004 amendments to the Rules of Professional Conduct and as recommended by the Pollock Commission, we ‘[e]liminated the ‘appearance of impropriety’ language from the Rules of Professional Conduct’”); Report of the New Jersey Supreme Court Commission on the Rules of Professional Conduct at pg. 8 (“In keeping with the Commission’s recommendation to abandon the appearance of impropriety as an ethical standard, the Commission has deleted reference to that standard from proposed RPC 1.9. ”); Martín v. AtlantiCare, No. 10-6793, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 122987, at *13 n.10 (D.N.J. Oct. 25, 2011) (“Because of the change in the RPC’s, the viability of the following quote in Dewey, 109 N.J. at 220, is doubtful as applicable to the imputed disqualification issue”) (Da167-192).  Thus, as the trial court properly concluded, Dewey “does not support disqualification in this case because Dewey has an easily distinguishable set of facts and relies on a now outdated version of RPC 1.9.
[brief] POINT II.  Defendant-Respondent, [...], is not estopped from denying coverage due to Plaintiff-Appellant’s failure to comply with the terms of the policy.  To establish a claim of estoppel, a party must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the alleged conduct was done, or representation was made, intentionally or under such circumstances that it was both natural and probable that it would induce action.  Further, the conduct must be relied on, and the relying party must act so as to change his or her position to his or her detriment.  Boritz v. New Jersey Mfrs. Ins. Co., 406 N.J. Super. 640, 647 (App. Div. 2009).  (internal citations omitted).  In claiming that equitable estoppel applies in this instance, Plaintiff - Appellant, first, argues that “[b]y consenting to [...]’s settlement with [...], [...] knowingly waived its subrogation rights.  Under Longworth, the analysis ends there, with [...] qualifying for UIM coverage. ” (Pb15).  Second, Plaintiff-Appellant, Amy [...], argues that by negotiating “with [...] both before and after she sued”; filing an Answer to the Complaint and propounding discovery, in accordance with R. 4:17 and R. 4:18, Defendant-Respondent is estopped from asserting this defense.  (Pb15).  Plaintiff relies upon Barrett v New Jersey Mfrs. Ins., 295 N.J. Super. 613 (App. Div. 1996) and Boritz v. New Jersey Mfrs. Ins., 406 N.J. Super. 640 (App. Div. 2009) to assert that [...] is estopped from invoking the suit limitation clause defense.
[brief] (Ca097-098).  As a result of foregoing, the Commission’s contention that “her Facebook page did not make any reference to the Board nor her membership on same,” and that, as a result, “there is no factual evidence that the statements/posts on her Facebook account were made as a member of the Board, or had the appearance of being representative of, or attributable to the Board” (Ca017), is directly contrary to abundant evidence in the record for at least the 8 reasons set out above.
[brief] **[...]’ Sworn Statement is Material Evidence and Entitles [...] to a New Trial Under Brady and Giglio**  To establish a prima facie Brady claim, a defendant must show that (1) the evidence at issue is favorable to him, either as exculpatory or impeachment evidence; (2) the prosecution suppressed the evidence, either purposely or inadvertently; and (3) the evidence is material to his case.  See *State v. Nelson*, 155 N.J. 487, 497-98 (1998).  Here, the State does not contest that [...]’ Sworn Statement is favorable to [...], nor does it deny that it suppressed the Sworn Statement, either purposely or inadvertently.  Rather, the State argues—in a purely conclusory fashion—that [...] fails to state a prima facie Brady claim because [...]’ Sworn Statement is not “material. ”  Courts have long recognized that the touchstone of materiality is a “concern that the suppressed evidence might have affected the outcome of the trial. ”  United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 104 (1976)) (emphasis added).  Although a materiality analysis may involve examining the nature and strength of the prosecution’s case, the materiality test does not involve evaluating the sufficiency of all non-suppressed evidence, nor does it require that the defendant prove “by a preponderance that disclosure of the suppressed evidence would have resulted ultimately in [his] acquittal”  Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434-35 (1995)) (emphasis added).  Accordingly, the test is whether “the favorable evidence could reasonably be taken to put the whole case in such a different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict.
[brief] In fact, Plaintiffs-Appellants had already served an expert report in the 2015 Action on September 18, 2019, which propagated the same theory that Plaintiffs-Appellants later tried to plead when they filed the 2020 Action, namely, that [...] allegedly lied in his deposition about who owned [...] and [...].  See Da074.\(^1\)  On December 9, 2021 (more than a year after the 2020 Action was dismissed) the trial court granted [...] and [...] summary judgment in the 2015 Action.  The trial court granted [...] and [...] summary judgment based on the abject lack of evidence to support Plaintiffs-Appellants’ claims against them, and not because Plaintiffs-Appellants were hamstrung in any way by the prior dismissal of the 2020 Action.  The trial court’s dismissal of the 2020 Action should therefore be affirmed based on principles of comity because the 2015 and 2020 Actions involved the same parties, claims and issues, and because dismissal of the 2020 Action did not prevent Plaintiffs-Appellants from pursuing or obtaining adequate relief against [...] and [...] in the 2015 Action, if those claims had any merit whatsoever.  \(^1\)  Plaintiffs-Appellants will attempt to argue that they did not have an opportunity for “equal” relief because the trial court had previously denied their motion for leave to file a Third Amended Complaint in the 2015 Action that would have added their purported claims for fraudulent concealment of evidence to that aged lawsuit.  Such an argument would have no merit, however, because (a) Plaintiffs-Appellants’ fraudulent concealment claim failed to set forth facts which, if true, could give rise to liability for that cause of action and because (b) had the trial court not granted [...] and [...] summary judgment in the 2015 Action, Plaintiffs-Appellants could and would have argued to the jury in that case (albeit without basis) that [...] had “lied” in his deposition about who owned [...] and [...].  CONCLUSION