ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] (Pa0148-Pa0149; Pa158; Pb25-26.)  See Boston Gas, 454 Mass. 337, 367 (“fact based” allocation should only be applied when the court can “precisely” determine the amount of property damage in a policy period).  [...]’s “weighted by AOC” allocation model ignores the nature of the “property damage” present in this case, which is essentially identical to the “property damage” that was at issue in Boston Gas – long-tail, indivisible, ground water contamination.
[brief] *DeAngelo*, 464 N.J. Super. at 109.  *DeAngelo* went on to say that “[t]he Supreme Court has determined that [R. 4:50-1(f)] permits relief even when a defendant’s response or failure to respond to a complaint was found, as here, *to be inexcusable.*”  *[...]*, 464 N.J. Super. at 109 (emphasis added) (citing *Mancini*, 132 N.J. at 334 ).  “In such instances, subsection (f)’s boundaries are ‘as expansive as the need to achieve equity and justice. ’”  *DeAngelo*, 464 N.J. Super. at 109 (emphasis added) (quoting *Court Inv. Co. v. Perillo*, 48 N.J. 334, 341 (1977)).  While acknowledging that *Mancini* “provides the applicable framework” for motions brought pursuant to *R. 4:50-1(f)*, the *DeAngelo* court acknowledged significant “factual differences” between the defendant in *Mancini* and defendant [...], stating that the defendant’s neglect in *Mancini* was “found inexcusable, but neither willful nor calculated.
[brief] Plaintiff in Pfannenstein filed a medical malpractice action against two defendant doctors who specialized in internal medicine at the time of the at issue treatment.  Pfannenstein, 475 N.J. Super. at 90.  In response Plaintiff served an AOM from a board certified hematologist, a specialty that neither defendant specialized in at the time of the at issue treatment.  *Id.*  The trial court denied defendants' motion for dismiss an appropriate AOM and the Appellate Division reversed, dismissing plaintiff's complaint.  The Appellate Division held that the kind-for-kind requirement was not satisfied when the affiant who executed the AOM specialized in a subspecialty of the defendant physician's specialty, but he was not board certified and did not specialize in the defendant's specialty that represented the care at issue.  *Id.* at 102 - 103.  As reasoned in *Pfannenstien*, Legislature's policy "would be undermined if a physician with such specialized training were permitted to opine regarding the standard of care applicable to a physician practicing in the more generalized specialty because the subspecialist no longer practices in the specialty."  *Id.* at 102.  Of particular import is that in support of its decision, the Appellate Division cited to the *Nicholas* decision and the clear mandate that affiants satisfy the "kind-for-kind requirement" and that an affiant "must practice in the same specialty".
[brief] B. State’s questioning of [...] on direct examination.  [...], who was [...]’s sister and defendant’s maternal aunt, testified for the State.  Michelle spoke to the police twice after the murders.  During her first interview, which was immediately after the shootings, Michelle thought Linda was still alive and she did not tell the police that Linda did not want defendant to speak to a psychiatrist.  Only after she found out that her sister had died and “knew [Linda] was not going to hurt me,” did Michelle feel safe to speak truthfully to the police about Linda and defendant.
[brief] ”  Hoag v. Brown, 397 N.J. Super. 34, 54 (App. Div. 2007) (emphasis added).  While it is true that the [...] may also be held vicariously liable for any negligence that the jury attributes to [...], that does not change the fact that the jury may independently attribute some or all of the responsibility for the crash directly to the [...] under theories such as negligent training or supervision.
[directive] C.  Within 45 days of the issuance of this Directive, the Division of Criminal Justice shall develop a training program to explain the requirements of this Directive as they pertain to state, county, and local law enforcement agencies and officers.  Such program shall be made available through the NJ Learn System or by other electronic means.  D. outreach.  Each County Prosecutor shall undertake efforts to educate residents Community within their jurisdiction about the provisions of this Directive, with a specific focus on strengthening trust between law enforcement and the public.
[brief] Per New Jersey statutory law any change in the meaning of language is irrelevant (Not argued below)  N.J.S.A. 1:1-1.  General rules of construction reads as follows:  ‘….In the construction of the laws and statutes of this state, both civil and criminal, words and phrases shall be read and construed with their context, and shall, unless inconsistent with the manifest intent of the legislature or unless another or different meaning is expressly indicated, be given their generally accepted meaning, according to the approved usage of the language.  Technical words and phrases, and words and phrases having a special or accepted meaning in the law, shall be construed in accordance with such technical or special and accepted meaning….’  The above referenced passage from the New Jersey statutes is self-authenticating.  As far as previously enacted law, and court decisions – both Supreme court and other courts – are concerned, the matter is irrelevant as to whether the meaning of language has changed.  In other words, while there is no way to really know what the original drafters of a law, or court opinion, had in mind at the time, the New Jersey statutes allows for the law to be interpreted according to the standards of the day that the law, or court interpretation, is read.  Clearly, to me, at-the-least, what matters in a charge to jury with regard to the facts of a matter is the present day meaning of the passage, regardless of the intent at the time of the drafting of the law, or court opinion.
[brief] The Respondents try to cloak these impermissible attempts by pointing to passing references in my complaint about the existence of the [...] rule book and its approximate volume.  However, they never asked me questions about those passing comments that were within my complaint, nor did they ever even attempt to bring those passing comments to the court’s attention.  Instead, the actual testimony of the defendants’ witness makes clear that the defendants did not dispute the fact that I was unaware of the undisclosed prize limitation – instead they suggest it was my own fault for not buying a rule book and/or not asking the specific question to one of the tournament directors.  And in turn, the trial court made no finding that I had already been aware of the undisclosed prize limitation.  Instead, the court accepted my testimony that I had been unaware, but also accepted the defendants’ legal position as well (i.e. which placed the blame upon me for not buying a rule book, or for not asking the specific question to one of the tournament directors).
[brief] (Pa000426).  Plaintiffs never sought reconsideration of this decision, and they are not appealing [...]’s dismissal.  ---  3  Plaintiffs’ appeal brief at page 38 repeats this erroneous “lack of consent” position twice on the same page, which exemplifies the baseless nature of the claims against [...].  On September 13, 2023, [...] timely filed a Motion for Frivolous Litigation Sanctions against Plaintiffs, citing to the safe harbor letter dated June 29, 2022 and Plaintiffs’ bad faith and undue delay in refusing to dismiss [...].
[brief] Defendants’ Counsel did not communicate or begin coordination of Plaintiff’s deposition availability for all parties until January 5, 2023 (the day before the Defendants third granted discovery extension end date).  Plaintiff requested and consistently discussed deposition on occasions; specifically, March 18, 2022, July 15, 2022, October 29, 2022, and December 13, 2022 (AP 28, AP 746).  See Ortiz v. Benkius, DOCKET NO. [...] (App. Div. Jul. 31, 2018)  Defendants’ Counsel did not reply with a deposition date of January 5, 2023, until 6  Referenced examples of Plaintiff’s deposition requests December 13, 2022, via email; specifications of the date, time, and/or location were not provided.  Plaintiff had to respectfully decline the proposed date due to disabilities, Defendants and Counsel were fully aware of.  In addition, with full knowledge of the Plaintiff’s disability, Counsel had six (6) months to coordinate deposition.  However, they often delayed calendaring and/or diverted to a brief external settlement conference with the Plaintiff in efforts to financially weigh their settlement offer, although the approach could have convened via trial court.  Defendants did not provide any additional dates to Plaintiff or Trial Court for proper calendaring with deposition not taking place due to Defendants and Counsel lack and/or delayed response to Plaintiff’s deposition notice to the court.  POINT II: TRIAL COURT ERRED BY NOT SCHEDULING DEPOSITION ACCORDING TO COURT RULES 4:14-1 and 4:14-2.
[brief] State v. Weaver, 219 N.J. 131 (2014) .................................................................................................................. 27, 28 United States v. Bailey, 691 F.2d 1009 (11th Cir.1982) .................................................................................................  17  Statutes  N.J.S.A. 2C:2-3 .................................................................................................................. 24, 25 N.J.S.A. 2C:3-4(b)(1)(a) ................................................................................................. 17, 18 N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(1).  ................................................................................................. 26 N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(5).  .................................................................................................  1, 23, 25, 26 N.J.S.A. 2C:29-2(a) ........................................................................................................  1, 10, 20 Rules N.J.R.E. 701 ...................................................................................................................... 9, 10
[brief] (Pa 167; ¶19; Pa 214.)  As evidenced by the minutes of the December 14th Council meeting, no announcement was made at the Council meeting explaining its removal of the public hearing from the agenda or even the fact thereof, and, more importantly, no notice was given that the public hearing would instead be held on December 28th, a fact clearly known since [...] announced that date at the Planning Board’s December 8th meeting.  (Pa 264; Pa 12, Verified Complaint ¶¶55-56.)  The Planning Board continued its review of Ordinance 1423-21 at its Thursday, December 16, 2021, special meeting.
[brief] In his August of 2019 denial of access complaint, [...] alleged that “the Board does not deny that [...]’s text messages contain public records, yet the Board concedes that is made no effort to review any of them due to [...]’s representations regarding their volume. ” (Da12).  In the January 9, 2020 certification submitted by the [...]’s attorney [...] to the [...], he certified that the requested text messages were not in the possession of the [...] and that at least 45,000 potentially responsive records “would have to be reviewed to determine which of them are actually government records.
[brief] Respondent writes that the Law Division did not observe that “clearly there is [a problem] here. ”  But the transcript shows the Law Division identified that problem as issue splitting – even though there were other problems before the court left unaddressed.  The Law Division observed “that [Defendant], has the unilateral right to seek legal action to collect money [owed]” while Plaintiff did not.  [1T 33:12-19].  At oral argument, Respondent responded that this problem is “hypothetical,” as it does again in its brief.  But the Law Division dismissed this non-answer, repeating that the issue is “in this case. ”  [1T35:23].  To address the problem, the Law Division devised a remedy even worse for Plaintiff.  The Law Division interpreted the text to require Plaintiff to file an arbitration as his only way to bring claims.  But to avoid “issue splitting,” the Law Division then read into the text obligating Plaintiff to bring those claims by way of a counterclaim in any legal action subsequently filed by Defendant.  “Simply put, although the arbitration clause is ‘one-sided,’ if defendant chose to file a collection action in a court of competent jurisdiction, then the entire controversy would be litigated in that court. ”  [Pa11].  Plaintiff protested that this would allow Defendant to terminate the arbitration process should Defendant determine it was going to lose the arbitration.  At oral argument, the Law Division said that this issue was not before it, even though the Law Division’s ruling created the issue.  D.
[brief] In fact, on the date of the accident, the property was only “occupied” by a contractor who was making the property habitable for the defendants.  (Pa131).  Notwithstanding this property status, the respondent [...] testified that within hours of a snowfall that occurred on February 16, 2021, he went to the property and cleared the snow and ice down to the concrete surface.  Based on that testimony, the testimony of the plaintiff and photographic evidence produced in this case, however, it is apparent that the respondents failed to remove the snow to create a safe walking surface, and instead created a much more dangerous condition on the walkway.  (Pa182-186, Pa156-159, Pa 134).
[brief] Appellant focuses on N.J.A.C. 7:15-3.2(a) (procedures for consistency determination reviews) which states:  (a)  All projects and activities affecting water quality shall be developed and conducted in a manner that is consistent with this chapter and adopted areawide plans.  The Department shall not issue a permit or approval that conflicts with an adopted areawide plan or this chapter.  [N.J.A.C. 7:15-3.2(a). ]  However, Appellant ignores the clear language applicable to the Permit in section N.J.A.C. 7:15-3.2(b) providing a presumption of area plan consistency when the proposed project involves wastewater:
[brief] [...] [...] [...]  Dear Sir or Madam:  WHEREAS, the matters in dispute in the above-entitled action having been amicably resolved between Plaintiff and Defendants, it is hereby stipulated by [...], Esq., as counsel for the Defendant, [...], and [...], Esq., of [...], counsel for the Plaintiff, [...], that the Complaint and Answer shall be dismissed as to Defendant, [...], with prejudice and without costs as to either party; and WHEREAS, it is further stipulated and agreed that the filing of the within pleading closes the case.
[directive] Addendum C | August 2024 Barricaded Individuals Tactical Team Response.  4.3  Once an incident has been determined to involve a barricaded individual or hostage situation, the supervisor or incident commander shall contact the Tactical Team commander, or designee, who shall determine the appropriate assets to respond to the incident.  The Tactical Team notified shall meet the general standards required of a Tier 1 or Tier 2 SWAT Team, as established by the [...] ([...]) in the Tactical Response and Operations Standard for Law Enforcement Agencies, published June 2023.5  These [...] standards ensure that the responding Tactical Teams will have the requisite leadership, staffing, capabilities, specialized equipment, initial and ongoing training, and necessary oversight to address the complex issues encountered in scenarios involving barricaded individuals.  Local resources that do not qualify as Tier 1 or Tier 2 SWAT Teams may be utilized pending the arrival of the Tactical Team and Crisis Negotiation Team resources required by this section, but shall yield control of the incident to the commander of the Tier 1 or Tier 2 SWAT Team upon notification that said team is on- scene and operational.  The commander of the local resources shall provide any assistance and support requested by the commander of the Tier 1 or Tier 2 SWAT Team or the Incident Commander.6
[brief] 6T – September 3, 2021 (Motion to Compel Juror Demographics)  7T – September 14, 2021 (Trial – Opening Statements)  8T – September 15, 2021 (Trial)  9T – September 16, 2021 (Trial)  10T – September 17, 2021 (Charge Conference)  11T – September 20, 2021 (Trial – Closing Statements and Jury Charge)  12T – September 21, 2021 (Verdict)  13T – January 27, 2022 (Sentence)  ⁴  To avoid confusion, [...] and [...] are referred to by their first names.  testimony from just some of the witnesses at a hearing (2T), the Court entered an order on June 28, 2017, denying Defendant’s motion as to witnesses [...], [...], and [...].
[brief] N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(e).  Respondent did so by causing protest in the school community, which was recorded in Board minutes and newspaper articles, as well as by subjecting the Board to litigation.  This was all clear from abundant evidence in the record.  Respondent also asserts that Respondent was not speaking on Board issues.  This was directly contradicted by the Commission’s own Final Decision.  (Ca017) (“In this matter, the Commission finds that, while the subject matter of the Facebook posts – State lawsuits related to union activity, vaccines and masking in schools, and gender identity standards – may relate to the business of the Board ....”).  While a review of Leonard or Treston, supra, clearly show that a school board member can compromise a school board in violation of the Act without speaking directly on school board issues, here even the Commission agreed in its Final Decision that Respondent spoke directly to Board issues.
[brief] In so doing, Appellants recast the same legal arguments posed by the plaintiff in *Humane Soc. Of U.S., New Jersey Branch, Inc. v. New Jersey State Fish & Game Council*, 70 N.J. 565 (1976).  In his Honor’s comprehensive opinion, the Honorable [...], A.J.S.C. held that *Humane Society* remains binding legal precedent and concluded that Appellants presented no new legal grounds for overturning it.  Because New Jersey trial and appellate courts are bound by New Jersey Supreme Court precedents, the principle of stare decisis is controlling and warrants the affirmance of Judge Lougy’s opinion below.  See, *White v. Twp. of N. Bergen*, 77 N.J. 538, 549-550 (1978)(stating that trial and intermediate appellate courts are “bound, under the principle of stare decisis, by formidable precedent” of the Supreme Court).  There is no basis for overruling *Humane Society* as Appellants have not presented any evidence in their pleadings that the Supreme Court’s prior decision from 48 years ago is “unsound in principle, unworkable in practice, or implicates reliance interests.  *State v. Shannon*, 210 N.J. 225, 227 (2012).  The Appellate Panel should further consider that Respondent/Defendant [...] (“[...]”) purpose and mission statement has not changed since *Humane Society* was decided.  It is not strictly a private organization whose interests are limited to “hunting rights”.  Rather, the [...] is committed through its Rules and By-Laws to broader ecological and conservation purposes.  (Pa20-45).  **PROCEDURAL HISTORY**
[directive] Interference with 2nd Degree $35,000 to $100,000  10% permissible  Custody  2.  After having been served with process or having actual knowledge of an action affecting marriage or custody but prior to the issuance of a temporary or final order determining custody and parenting time rights to a minor child, takes, detains, entices or conceals the child within or outside the State for the purpose of depriving the child’s other parent of custody or parenting time, or to evade the jurisdiction of the courts of the State; or 25  Updated December 2, 2013  Bail Schedule 2  STATUTES WHERE BAIL MAY BE SET BY A SUPERIOR COURT JUDGE OR A MUNICIPAL COURT JUDGE OR, IN THE MUNICIPAL COURT JUDGE’S ABSENCE, THE MUNICIPAL COURT ADMINISTRATOR OR DEPUTY COURT ADMINISTRATOR, PURSUANT TO RULE 3:26-2 requires warrants  Rule 3:3-1(c)(1) on the Bail Schedule 2 charges of robbery, criminal sexual contact, second degree aggravated assault, aggravated arson, arson, burglary, first or second degree violations of Chapter 35 (drug offenses), any crime involving the possession or use of a firearm, or conspiracies or attempts to commit such crimes.  Rule 3:3-1(c)(2-6) (indictable offenses) and Rule 7:2-2(b)(1-6) delineate factors regarding whether a warrant or summons should issue for other offenses.  Rule 3:26-1 (indictable offenses) and Rule 7:4-1 (non-indictable offenses) delineate factors to be considered when setting bail and provide for the option of R.O.R. bail where appropriate.
[brief] Yet, Plaintiff had provided no factual or legal basis in his written opposition to the motion for summary judgment or even at the time of oral argument to support such claims.  In addition, at oral argument, Plaintiff argued that his civil rights were violated by the Township’s settlement in 2021 of fair share housing claims, while specifically admitting there were no such claims contained in the Complaint at issue.  For reasons stated on the record, this Court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants on all five counts.
[brief] N.J.S.A. 2A:28-1.  Plaintiffs moved pursuant to this statute, in their filing of the October 7, 2021, Complaint and the subsequent December 21, 2021, Motion to Appoint Boundary Commissioners.  (Pa1).  The Court’s resulting January 25, 2022, Order, appointed the three subject boundary commissioners pursuant to this statute and bestowed the relevant duties, responsibilities, and powers as set forth in the subject statute.  (Pa55).  As to the issue of notice, the statute specifically provides that only the owners of the two adjoining properties be notified of the application and the Court’s consideration of Boundary Commissioners.  See N.J.S.A. 2A:28-1.
[brief] \(^{19}\)  Respondents’ Appeal Brief does not accurately track the language in [...]’s sworn Certification.  RB5-10.  6.  *I do not believe I discussed substantive strategies for litigation of the matter with Petitioners.  I do not believe I received any confidential information from Petitioners.*  Pa152.  (Emphasis added.)  [...] now states that his Certification was unequivocal by stating (not under oath), “that he remembers nothing and has ‘no information, which [he] may use to Petitioners’ detriment’.
[brief] Likewise, [...]’s citation to a 2016 CAFRA amendment authorizing the DEP to condition a permit on on-site public access, or off-site public access if on-site access is not feasible (N.J.S.A. 13:19-10(h)) (Ab18), does not negate the express mandate in the 2019 Law to require on-site public access, particularly given the principle that when “construing statutes relating to the same subject matter,” courts “must strive to harmonize them. ”  Burt v. W. Jersey Health Sys., 339 N.J. Super. 296, 304 (App. Div. 2001).  Relying on its narrow interpretation of Matthews, 95 N.J. at 322, and Raleigh Avenue Beach Association v. Atlantis Beach Club, 185 N.J. 40, 59-60 (2005), [...] also argues that where an application proposes to change the structure’s footprint or the Property’s use, the DEP can only require public access where there is already existing public access.