ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ CROSS-MOTION FOR ENTRY OF SATISFACTION OF JUDGMENT AND A PROTECTIVE ORDER AS TO THE DEPOSITION OF [...]  a.  SATISFACTION OF JUDGMENT WAS INCORRECTLY ENTERED  At the time Defendants motioned in November of 2022 (249a) for a Warrant of Satisfaction of the open monetary judgment derived from the 8/28/20 Final Order, they had not satisfied the conditions of judgment requisite in Rule 4:101-2 and Rule 4:48-3(a) because the amount paid failed to account for the interest accrued in the two years that payment with withheld.  Rule 4:48-3(a) provides in part that an entry of satisfaction may be ordered if it appears upon the motion that “A tender of the amount due thereon, with interests and costs, has been made to the holder thereof, who refuses to accept the tender or to execute a satisfaction or warrant in satisfaction therefor”.  Rule 4:48-3(a) (emphasis added).  In this case, the amount originally docketed in August of 2020 against [...] and [...] was $78,646.00.  The Board failed to pay the ordered amount for two years, during which time the principal amount was accruing interest.  Plaintiffs were unable to execute Defendants’ requested Order of Satisfaction when the initial amount was paid because it was not paid in full; it did not encompass the interests which had accrued since 2020\(^1\).  For the simple reason that the Board failed to pay the amount docketed against them \textit{with interests}, the trial court’s 12/16/22 Order granting Defendants’ cross-motion for a Warrant of Satisfaction must be reversed.
[brief] This is evidenced by Plaintiff’s repeated reports to her supervisor of anxiety relating to COVID-19.  In the days prior to her termination Plaintiff reported her anxiety at least five times to her direct supervisor, [...]:  • I am “...trying to manage my own coronavirus anxiety”.  Pa205, PSOF ¶39(a).  • “I’m having anxiety”.  Id. at (b).  • “We are all very scared and anxious. ”  Id. at (e).  • “I have this dull chest pain from the anxiety I think”.  Pa206, PSOF ¶40(a)  • I am “so stressed and I know a lot of it is irrational”.  Id. at (b).  •  In referring to COVID-19, Plaintiff stated, “It’s rising stress and anxiety. ”  Id. at (f).  The trial court noted that it did not bother to look at these text messages, (“There’s no citation to any single page of exhibit E in the brief, so I didn’t read them. ”  T20:21), even though Plaintiff referenced these texts with proper citation to the record in her Counter Statement of Facts.  Defendants admitted receipt of these texts, which the trial court refused to acknowledge\(^5\).  See Defendant’s response to the cited statement of facts.  Pa573, ¶39 & 41.  The trial court made several findings of fact relating to Plaintiff’s anxiety that are blatantly contradicted by the record.
[brief] Arguably the lease termination date would have been May 31, 2016, as the lease ran from the first of the month to the 31\(^{st}\) of the month.  The next term, 30 days after the termination notice, began on June 1, 2016.  *Harry’s Village, Inc. vs. Egg Harbor Twp.*, 89 N.J. 576, 587 (1982).
[brief] The proper analysis and the necessary distinction between law and fact, duty and breach, was recently set forth in *Michael v. [...]*, 4:22-cv-00254 (D. Az. March 14, 2023) (a copy of the slip opinion is attached at Pra1).  In Michael, the plaintiff alleged that a 2021 RAM 5500 chassis cab tow truck manufactured and distributed by the defendant was defective because it failed to incorporate “Drowsy Driver Detection and LaneSense Lane Departure Warning Plus/Lane-Keep Assist” technology as standard safety features.  The defendant, as the defendant does here, argued that the plaintiff failed to establish the element of duty and that a manufacturer has no legal obligation to produce a product incorporating only the ultimate in safety features.  The court denied summary judgment, holding that the defendant failed to appreciate the import of the unremarkable proposition on which it sought to rely.  This illustrates the difficulty with Defendant’s argument for why it is entitled to summary judgment—Defendant has confused the question of the duty it owed with the question of whether it breached that duty.  One is a matter of law that the Court is apt to determine at summary judgment.  The other is a highly fact-specific inquiry over which Plaintiff has raised a genuine dispute of material fact.  In Arizona, “[t]he existence of a duty of care is a distinct issue from whether the standard of care has been met in a particular case” because “[a]s a legal matter, the issue of duty involves generalizations about categories of cases” whereas whether the defendant’s conduct conformed to its duty involves the specific facts of the case at hand.
[brief] POINT I THE CAR SEARCH WAS ILLEGAL BECAUSE ANY PROBABLE CAUSE DID NOT ARISE FROM UNFORESEEABLE AND SPONTANEOUS CIRCUMSTANCES.  In his initial brief, [...] argued that suppression was required because: (1) the stop was illegal because police did not have reasonable suspicion that [...] had engaged in criminal activity; (2) the car search was illegal because the police’s uncorroborated claim that [...] volunteered there were drugs in the car should not have been credited; (3) and alternatively, if the police had probable cause, the circumstances leading to that probable cause did not arise under unforeseeable and spontaneous circumstances such that New Jersey’s automobile exception was not satisfied.  [...] relies on his initial brief regarding the first two arguments.  (Db 16-25)  In response to the third point – that the car search did not comport with our more-protective automobile exception – the State’s primary claim is that because [...] “unexpectedly admit[ted] that he possessed CDS in his --- 1  This reply uses the abbreviations from the initial brief and the State’s response.  In addition, Sb refers to the State’s brief, and Dra refers to the appendix to this reply.  vehicle,” that the “probable cause to search defendant’s vehicle arose spontaneously and unforeseeably. ”  (Sb 23)  But this argument is critically flawed because the State applies the wrong standard.  The State focuses on the probable cause itself, not the circumstances leading to that probable cause.  The State argues that since [...]’s admission was unforeseeable and spontaneous, everything that preceded that admission is essentially irrelevant.  However, New Jersey’s automobile exception does not take the cramped view that if only the final step—probable cause—is unforeseeable and spontaneous, then everything is fine.  Instead, the question is whether “the circumstances giving rise to probable cause” are unforeseeable and spontaneous.  *State v. Smart*, 253 N.J. 156, 171 (2023) (emphasis added); see also *State v. Witt*, 223 N.J. 409, 414 (2015) (“In *Alston*, we determined that a warrantless search of an automobile was constitutionally permissible, provided that the police had probable cause to search the vehicle and that the police action was prompted by the unforeseeability and spontaneity of the circumstances giving rise to probable cause. ”) (emphasis added).
[brief] Neither of Plaintiffs’ cited cases remotely endorses such an extreme approach. \(^2\)  In any event, even if Plaintiffs were correct that Rule 4:10-2(a) allowed discovery of documents that were either relevant or “reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence,” that construction would not salvage the ESI Order.  See Db33.  Below, neither the Court nor Plaintiffs suggested that all of the 60,000+ irrelevant documents swept in by the ESI Order are “reasonably calculated” to lead to admissible evidence.  Even in their briefing, Plaintiffs make \(^2\)  Plaintiffs also cite Rule 4:14-3(c), which makes clear that there is no right to object on relevancy grounds during a deposition.  Pb18.  But Rule 4:14-3(c) only proves Defendants’ point: it shows that when the New Jersey Supreme Court means to limit objections during discovery to privilege or related grounds, it does so expressly.  And while it makes good sense not to disrupt real-time depositions with relevancy objections, there is no similar rationale for requiring parties to turn over irrelevant documents that can be screened through a pre-production review.  no such claim, and it defies logic that each of those irrelevant documents—which by definition have no “tendency in reason to prove or disprove any fact of consequence”—would nevertheless lead to admissible evidence.
[brief] Allstate New Jersey Ins. Co. v. Cherry Hill Pain and Rehab Institute, 389 N.J. Super. 130, 136 (App. Div. 2006)  ..................  18  Association of Data Processing Service Organizations v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 152, 153, (1970)  .........................................................  18  Borough of Seaside Park v. Comm'r of the N.J. Dep't of Educ., 432 N.J. Super. 167, 210-11 (App. Div.) .............................................  16  Crescent Pk. Tenants Ass'n v. Realty Equities Corp., 58 N.J. 98, 107 (1971)  ..............................................................................  16  Feld v. City of Orange, 2014 WL 8277956 (App. Div. March 26, 2015) .........................................................................................  15  Feld v. City of Orange, 2018 WL 3747632 (App.  Div. August 8, 2018)  .........................................................................................  17  Goldman v. Critter Control of New Jersey, 454 N.J. Super. 418 (App. Div. 2018)  .................................................................  14  In re Approval of a Financing Commitment for the Project Known as [...], [...], [...] (May 31, 2022)  ...........................................................................................................  11  Kozesnik v. Twp. of Montgomery, 24 N.J. 154, 177 (1957) ...............  15  Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975)  .................................................................  18  Lippmann v. Hydro-Space Tech., Inc., 77 N.J. Super. 497, 505 (App. Div. 1962) .................................................................  23 Loigman v. Twp. Comm. of Middletown, 297 N.J. Super. 287, 297-99 (App. Div. 1999) .................................................................  16  Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm., 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995)  ....  14 N.J. State Chamber of Commerce v. N.J. Election Law Enforcement Comm'n, 82 N.J. 57, 67 (1980)  ....................................................  16  Rego Indus., Inc. v. Am. Mod. Metals Corp., 91 N.J. Super. 447, 456 (App. Div. 1966)  .................................................................  23  State, Dep't of Treasury, Div. of Inv. ex rel. McCormac v. Qwest Commc'ns Intern., Inc., 387 N.J. Super. 469, 484-85 (App. Div. 2006)  ...........................................................................................................  23
[brief] ”  The court in SL Industries further opined:  In the areas of employment discrimination and unlawful discharges, courts have hesitated to find emotional distress and/or bodily injuries a ‘probable’ outcome of wrongful behavior.  As one article has noted:  [C]ourts may be unlikely to infer an intent to cause bodily injury in any but the most egregious wrongful termination or employment discrimination actions.  Consequently, * * * the standard ‘occurrence’ requirement may not preclude coverage for these types of claims.
[brief] A physician’s findings that “amount to little more than a paraphrasing, in the most conclusory language, of the [verbal threshold] requirements,” that is, those which merely “parrot the statute,” are insufficient to satisfy the objective standard.  *Oswin v. Shaw*, 129 N.J. 290, 294 (1992).  A physician’s “expert opinion needs supporting objective data and discussion where the expert claims a cause and effect relationship between a patient’s subjective complaints and a traumatic event. ”  *Polk v. Daconceico*, 268 N.J. Super. 568, 575 (App. Div. 1993) (citing *Buckelew v. Grossbard*, 87 N.J. 512, 524 (1981)).  **POINT IV**
[brief] ”  State v. Jenewicz, 193 N.J. 440, 454 (2008).  This prong asks whether the scientific community “generally accepts the evidence,” which “does not require complete agreement over the accuracy of the test or the exclusion of the possibility of error. ”  *State v. Harvey*, 151 N.J. 117, 170-71 (1997).  The standard is construed liberally given *N.J.R.E.* 702’s tilt favoring the admissibility of expert testimony.  *Jenewicz*, 193 N.J. at 454.
[brief] 12  D'Agostino v. Drazin & Warshaw, P.C., 2013 WL 4859575  38 Haylett v. Baladi, 2010 WL 2346713 12, 14, 16, 25 - 29  New Jersey Statutes N.J.S.A. 2A:15-59  34 N.J.S.A. 2A:15-97  45 N.J.S.A. 2A:17-19 23, 24 N.J.S.A. 2A:23C-6(a)(6)  47 N.J.S.A. 3B:16-5 23, 24 N.J.S.A. 54:5-86 (c)  20 New Jersey Court Rules Rule 1:4-8 2, 13, 24, 29 - 31, 34, 36, 39, 44 – 46, 49  Rule 1:5-1 37  Rule 1:5-3 37  Rule 1:6-3 37  Rule1:7-4(a) 41, 43 Rule 1:40-4(d)  47  Rule 2:11-5 50  Rule 4:4-4 37 Rule 5:3-5(c)  46  Rule 6:3-3(c) 37, 38  Other Authorities
[brief] The Trial Court agreed:  “The [Trial] Court does not find any basis for [[...]’s] assertion that its proposed counterclaim for setoff should be decided in a different forum than the [...]. ”  Da32-33.  At bottom, Rule 4:67 is designed simply “to afford the trial court an opportunity to manage the litigation between the necessary parties, providing for expeditious resolution of those issues that can be addressed quickly. ”  Perretti, 289 N.J. Super. at 624 (emphasis added).  [...]’s proposed counterclaim, centered on the Hackensack Project, would require extensive discovery and evidentiary proofs at a trial—notwithstanding the fact that the parties already comprehensively litigated the Hackensack Project at the Arbitration (and will ultimately be barred under the entire controversy doctrine, see Docket Nos. [...] & [...]).  There is simply no avenue for “expeditious resolution” for the parties to re-litigate the Hackensack Project in this Court.  To the extent that the Court is willing to overlook the entire controversy doctrine and grant [...] leave to file its counterclaim (which it should not), [...] requests that the Court order the counterclaim severed and transferred to the Law Division.  [...]’s counterclaim is a blatantly transparent and desperate attempt to further stall [...]’s collection efforts with regard to the Award and should not be allowed.  **CONCLUSION**
[brief] As soon as they found out that [...] was requesting to redeem [...] made arrangements to sell the property quickly to [...]/[...] – this was clearly done to distance [...] from his property so that they could make the very argument that they are making now – that they are an innocent third party purchaser without knowledge.  To summarize the transactions, [...] paid $20,654 to redeem a tax sale certificate and take ownership of property without a mortgage via default judgment.  They sold this property days later for $375,000 to [...]/341 Connecticut who had offered to buy it from the owner [...] for $650,000 two weeks before.
[brief] TABLE OF CONTENTS  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS, AND RULINGS APPEALED .................. ii  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ........................................................................ iii  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT ........................................................................  1  STATEMENT OF FACTS ..................................................................................  3  A.  The [...] Issues a Request for Applications for Class 5 Cannabis Retailer License Applications .........................................................  4  B.  The Borough Fails to Follow the Process Set Forth in the Ordinance, RFA, and Evaluation Sheet ......................................................................................  5  PROCEDURAL HISTORY ....................................................................................  8  STANDARD OF REVIEW ..................................................................................  10  LEGAL ARGUMENT ...........................................................................................  11  I.  The Trial Court’s Order Affirming the Resolution Should be Reversed Because the Borough’s Action Was Arbitrary, Capricious, and Unreasonable (1a) .....  11  A.  The Borough Did Not Follow the Evaluation and Completeness Process It Established for Reviewing and Scoring Applications .....................................  12  B.  The Trial Court’s Decision Should Be Reversed to Ensure the Integrity of the Process and to Ensure Municipalities Adhere to Announced Standards and Guidelines  .......................................................................................................  16  CONCLUSION .....................................................................................................  21  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS, AND RULINGS APPEALED  Order dated December 12, 2023……………………………………………………………1a | Cases | Page(s) | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|---------| | Acoli v. N.J. State Parole Bd., | 17 | | 224 N.J. 213 (2016) | | | Bressman v. Gash, | 10 | | 131 N.J. 517 (1993) | | | Bryant v. City of Atl. City, | 10 | | 309 N.J. Super. 596 (App. Div. 1998) | | | In re Carter, | 13 | | 191 N.J. 474 (2007) | | | CBS Outdoor v. Lebanon Planning Bd., | 10 | | 414 N.J. Super. 563 (App. Div. 2010) | | | Cell South of N.J., Inc. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment of W. Windsor Twp., | 16 | | 172 N.
[brief] Honorable Judges of the Superior Court of New Jersey  Appellate Division  Richard J. Hughes Justice Complex Trenton, NJ 08625-0006  Re: [...] (Petitioner-Respondent) v. [...] (Respondent-Appellant)  Appellate  Docket No.: [...]  Claim Petition No.: [...]  Civil Action: On Appeal from an Order Denying Recusal of Judge, from the State of New Jersey Department of Labor and Workforce Development, Division of Workers Compensation, Freehold Vicinage  Sat Below: Honorable [...], J.W.C.  Dear Judges:
[brief] Now, [...], that is actually getting to my next point.  You have no personal knowledge of any arrangement with respect to [...] managing 293, correct?  A:  Even though I don’t know the great detail, but my husband and him has a close relation to manage that property.  Q:  Again, you never had that conversation with [...] Wu about his responsibility as a property manager, right?  A:  Because I don’t like him, and my husband don’t like him either, and we don’t like our son and daughter to contact with him, so it is only my husband to contact with him.  …  Q: Sure.  In addition to not having any conversations with [...] Wu about managing the property, you have no records that would reflect that [...] Wu managed the property on your behalf?  A: I personally don’t have any record, however my husband should have.  (13T 84:23-86:3, Jan. 30, 2023).  [...] also testified that if she had any such records, including maintenance, property taxes paid for the Property, she would have produced them in discovery.  (9T 103:15-18, Jan. 24, 2023).  None were produced in discovery or entered into evidence at trial.  Perhaps most illustrative of the completely incoherent argument that [...] managed the Property on behalf of [...], was [...]’s testimony that her family did not like or trust [...]:
[brief] Finally, this Appeal case arises in a peculiar COVID 19 context.  Defendants-fiduciaries of a public trust-failed to cite the State Executive Branch Guidance relating to virtual public meetings during this pandemic.  See, Local Finance Notice 2020-21 "New Remote Public Meeting Regulations" (September 24, 2020) (Pa285)("In crafting standard procedures and requirements for public comment, local bodies are strongly encouraged to consult with their legal counsel to ensure any such restrictions comply with the Open Public Meetings Act and do not infringe upon constitutional rights.") (emphasis supplied).  Plaintiff’s political free speech rights under the New Jersey State Constitution are more expansive than under our Federal Constitution.  Usachenok v. State of New Jersey, Dept. Of the Treasury, __N.J.__ (May 6, 2024) (New Jersey’s Constitution provides broader protection for free expression than the Federal Constitution and practically all others in the nation).
[brief] The Ricci Act in relevant part permitted active or retired members of the SPRS to file for a recalculation of Ordinary Disability, Service, or Special Retirement Benefits to Accidental Disability Retirement Benefits provided they participated in the rescue, recovery, or cleanup operations at the World Trade Center Site.  (Pa10).  The Ricci Act also created a presumption that the disability of the member or retiree “occurred during and as a result of the performance of the member’s regular or assigned duties and not the result of the member’s willful negligence unless the contrary can be proved by competent evidence. ”  (Pa10).  ---  1  Because the procedural history and facts are closely related, they are combined for efficiency and the court’s convenience.
[brief] More importantly, the core of the impermissible argument in Jackowitz was plaintiff’s counsel’s insistence on discussing liability in a stipulated liability case.  See id. at 501-02, 08.  The call for the jury to “send a message” was merely the vehicle through which counsel in Jackowitz attempted to incriminate the defendant’s negligent driving.  By contrast, Plaintiff’s counsel here never called for a referendum on Defendants’ negligence.  The only discussion of Defendants’ liability was either to explain the mechanics of the collision, which is entirely permissible, or to note that Defendants stipulated liability.  Defendants can insist that to “send a message” is tantamount to holding someone accountable, but the context of the argument begs to differ.  Plaintiff’s counsel only discussed accountability as it related to the award of damages in a civil case, not as a means to demonize Defendants in the jury’s eyes.  What is also incongruous between Defendants’ fiction of what transpired in this case, and the reality, is the disposition of the trial judge.  The trial judge in Jackowitz felt compelled to interrupt the proceedings on multiple occasions to issue curative instructions to the jury.  See id. at 500-02.  Here, [...] made no sua sponte rulings regarding Plaintiff’s counsel’s theme of accountability.  Her Honor never interrupted during Plaintiff’s opening or closing to instruct the jury to disregard the argument.  When Defendants moved for a new trial, [...] denied it free from even an insinuation that Plaintiff’s counsel’s advocacy was inappropriate.  This case could not be more different than Jackowitz.