ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] This perversion would rob clients of the right to be advised of the arbitration remedy and would deprive them of learning their attorney has alleged that the proper notice was given.  Any relaxation here would foster potential abuses in the future and drain the rule of its salutary purposes.  *Chalom*, 234 N.J. Super. at 258-59”  *Grabowski* held that the trial court is “obligated to dismiss” a complaint when an attorney fails to give Pre-Action Notice and such failure is inexcusable.  at *6,*7.  Importantly, *Grabowski*, at *7*, held that amending the prohibited complaint would be futile because the attorney never gave the mandatory notice before filing the complaint as mandated, so an attorney can never assert in an amended complaint that notice was given before filing as that is impossible, and being unable to do that makes the complaint void \textit{ab initio}.  In the case at bar, Plaintiff did not even attempt to move to amend the complaint because, as \textit{Grabowski} found, that would be impossible.  Indeed, the docket number assigned to that complaint is for a complaint that could never have been filed.  Rather, Plaintiff went right to reinstating a void complaint that was dismissed years before for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.  The law is clear that when a matter is reinstated then “the action reverts to the status of the complaint as it existed at the time the dismissal was entered."  \textit{Mason v. Nabisco Brands, Inc.}, 233 N.J. Super. 263 (App. Div. 1989); \textit{Miller v. Estate of Kahn}, 140 N.J. Super. 177, 182 (App.Div.1976).  Moreover, Rule 1:13-7(b) addresses actions filed in the Special Civil Part and clearly envisions the restoration of the original complaint (and only after the summons and complaint are served which such service also never happened here and is addressed herein below).  Considering the law, there was never subject matter jurisdiction for the lower court the day the complaint was filed.  It was dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and resurrecting it by reinstatement only resurrected the same void complaint that the court found it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over.  The law is also clear that the lower court was without jurisdiction over the defendant and without authority to enter a judgment affecting the defendant’s rights or property, and that the money judgment on the void complaint must be vacated.  *Jameson v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co.*, 363 N.J. Super. 419, 425 (App. Div. 2003); *City of Passaic v. Shennett*, 390 N.J. Super. 475, 915 A.2d 1092, 2007 N.J. Super. LEXIS 44 (App.Div. 2007).  The May 27 and September 23, 2022 orders must be reversed, any judgment issued in that case must be vacated and the case dismissed with prejudice.
[brief] D.  Appellants Failed To File a Motion To Vacate Required By Rule 4:50-1 Because the Application Would Have Been Denied.  The finality of the Consent Order’s sixty-day deadline could not be disturbed absent Appellants’ timely and proper request to vacate the Consent Order under Rule 4:50-1.  Even if Appellants filed an application to vacate the Consent Order, it would have been denied on account of (a) the over four-year period that elapsed between the November 14, 2018 entry of the Consent Order and March 23, 2023, when Appellants filed the Complaint; (b) Appellants’ inability to justify the delay and their wholesale failure to provide any explanation whatsoever as to the reason why they waited 620 days to refile the Chancery Action claims in the Complaint; (c) the Consent Order and its September 13, 2021 filing deadline were mutually drafted in November of 2018 while Appellants were fully aware of the restrictions placed on the parties’ ability to pursue a Refiled Action; and (d) the substantial prejudice that Respondent would sustain because of Appellant [...]’s spoliation of evidence.
[brief] Nothing in that exchange is evidence that is contrary to any statement [...] is reported to have made to the investigator.  Nothing in that exchange supports a determination that [...] misnamed Complainant during the earlier incident in front of the [...] building.  What happened next – which is not in dispute – is that a few hours later Complainant went to the local union office to drop off signatures she had gathered in support of [...] for the upcoming union election and to request her name be changed from [...] to [...] on election documents, which was granted.
[brief] ” (2T48:21 to 49:5).  Defendant had told him: “We went into . . . the house, ransacked it.  I said let’s go.  They said let’s hide . . . [...] ran the group. ” (2T50:1-7).  [...] recalled defendant mentioning that [...] had been reluctant to participate in the burglary, but not that he had put a gun to his head.  (2T50:1-7).
[directive] When setting bail on any of these offenses:  “….There shall be a presumption in favor of the court designating the posting of full United States currency cash bail to the exclusion of other forms of bail when a (See next box for bail restrictions on defendant is charged with an offense as set forth in subsection (a) of the this section and: Domestic Violence Contempts)  (1) Has two other indictable offenses pending at the time of the arrest; or (2) Has two prior convictions for a first or second degree crime or for a violation of section 1 of P.L. 1987, c. 101 (2C:35-7) in any combination thereof; or (3) Has one prior conviction for murder, aggravated manslaughter, aggravated sexual assault, kidnapping, or bail jumping; or (4) Was on parole at the time of the arrest, unless the court finds that another form of bail authorized in subsection (b) of this section will ensure the defendant’s presence in court when required.
[brief] Omitted Certification of [...], Esq. in opposition to Defendants' motion to dismiss pursuant to R. 4:6-2e....................412a  Exhibit L to the Curran Certification  Pertinent portions of the Review of [...]'s Recovery Plan Pursuant to the Municipal Stabilization and Recovery Act.............................................................414a  Exhibit M to the Curran Certification  A response to an OPRA request served on Atlantic City for police officer terminal leave payments including sick and vacation payouts from November 2015 to May 2017...................418a  Exhibit N to the Curran Certification  A response to an OPRA request served on Atlantic City for police officer vacation buy backs........................................422a  Exhibit O to the Curran Certification  The minutes of the [...] held on October 24, 2018..................................................................................428a  Order to Consolidate filed on March 26, 2019..............................................572a  Consent scheduling order filed on April 1, 2019............................................573a  Order holding litigation in abeyance pending the decision of the New Jersey Supreme Court in Barila v. Board of Educ., 199 A. 3d 295.........................................................................................................................576a
[brief] 13  Sobel v. Long Island Entertainment Productions, Inc., 329 N.J.Super. 285 (App.Div. 2000)  23, 24 Sonderman v. Remington Construction Co., 127 N.J. 96 (1992)  23 Thompson v. City of Atl. City, 386 N.J. Super. 359 (App. Div. 2006)  28, 29 Tradesman National Bank & Trust Co. v. Cummings, 38 N.J.Super. 1 (App.Div. 1955)  11  Tyler v. Hennepin Co., 598 U.S. 631, 143 S.Ct. 1369 (2023)
[brief] (65a).  The Council interviewed [...] on April 21, 2022, and [...] presented its comprehensive vision for its facility to the Council on May 7, 2022.  (70a).  Although the Subcommittee was not required to fill out the Evaluation Sheets, Subcommittee and Council Member [...] (“[...]”) completed an Evaluation Sheet as to [...] only and gave [...] a “perfect score.
[brief] The cardinal rule for the construction of a written lease is to ascertain and to give effect to the mutual intention of the parties.  22 N.J. Prac., Landlord and Tenant Law § 10.1 (5th ed.) citing Onderdonk vs. Presbyterian Homes of N.J., 85 N.J. 171, (1981); Marini vs. Ireland, 56 N.J. 130 (1970); Fargo Realty, Inc. vs. Harris, 173 N.J. Super. 262 (App. Div. 1980); Levin vs. Frishman, 73 N.J. Super. 324 (App. Div. 1962); Schultz vs. Kneidl, 56 N.J. Super. 575 (Law Div. 1959), aff’d 59 N.J. Super. 382 (App. Div. 1960).  Under New Jersey law, even in the absence of any ambiguities in the terms of a contract, the court may consider extrinsic evidence to assist in gleaning the intent of the parties and the import of the contract and its provision.  In re Nickels Midway Pier, L.L.C., 2010 WL 3881376 (D.N.J. 2010).  The extrinsic evidence may “include consideration of the particular contractual provision, an overview of all the terms, the circumstances leading up to the formation of the contract, custom, usage, and the interpretation placed on the disputed provision by the parties’ conduct.  (emphasis added).  NTH250E, L.L.C. vs. Global Toys Acquisition LLC, 2011 WL 722026 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2011) (unpublished) citing Kearny PBA Local No. 21 vs. Town of Kearny, 81 N.J. 208, 221.  The parties to a written lease are bound by its terms and the construction which they, by their conduct, have placed upon such terms.  Ganary vs. Linker Realty Corp., 131 N.J.L. 317 (E. & A. 1944).  Questions of law on appeal may be decided by the Appellate Court based on the controlling principles and without deferring to the trial judge’s analysis.  Manalapan Realty, L.P. vs. Township Committee of Tp. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995).  The practical construction placed upon the lease as shown by the conduct of the parties and their acts done under it in partial performance, is a clue to the intention of the parties.
[directive] In civil service jurisdictions, partnering with the CSC itself may be beneficial.  9.  In civil service jurisdictions, partnering with community stakeholders, including law enforcement organization affinity groups (see note 5), or the CSC itself (see P.L.2021, c.234 (requiring CSC to aid exam prep in certain low-income communities)), to identify and encourage free civil service test preparation programs, and encouraging diverse potential applicants to attend.  D.  Methods of evaluation.  The Program shall include methods for evaluating whether the goals are achieved, which should include, but are not limited to, performing the above demographic analysis described in Section I.B at least annually, determining whether any substantial disparities have been reduced, and revising the Program goals accordingly.
[brief] N.J.S.A. 3B:8-10, which governs waiving the right to an elective share, states the following:  The right of election of a surviving spouse or domestic partner and the rights of the surviving spouse or domestic partner may be waived, wholly or partially, before or after marriage before, on or after May 28, 1980, by a written contract, agreement or waiver, signed by the party waiving after fair disclosure.  Unless it provides to the contrary, a waiver of “all rights” (or equivalent language) in the property or estate of a present or prospective spouse or domestic partner or a complete property settlement entered into after or in anticipation of separation, divorce or termination of a domestic partnership is a waiver of all rights to an elective share by each spouse or domestic partner in the property of the other and a renunciation by each of all benefits which would otherwise pass to him from the other by intestate succession or by virtue of the provisions of any will executed before the waiver or property settlement.
[brief] tobacco/vaping use; alcohol use; firearms; peer/academic/athletic pressures; school performance; eating disorders; suicide; self-harm; anxiety; depression; fatigue; isolationism / anti-social behaviors / social withdraw; truancy; theft; vandalism; unlawful activity; violent or aggressive behavior; preoccupation with anti-social music; pornography; sexual activity; sexuality; sexual orientation; transitioning; gender identity or expression; gang affiliation; obsessive behaviors; familial/cultural challenges; harassment; intimidation; or bullying.  Where a staff member reasonably believes that such notification to a student’s parent(s) will place the student at risk of abuse or neglect as defined by N.J.S.A. § 9:6-1, the staff member and appropriate administrators shall immediately notify the [...], [...], [...], and/or the [...] in accordance with the annual Memorandum of Agreement and/or as directed by the Superintendent, his/her designee and/or the Board’s legal counsel.  [Ibid.]  The Original Policy broadly defined reportable information to include any information that “may” affect a “student’s physical and/or mental health, safety and/or social/emotional well-being.
[brief] This interpretation of Allowance Offset—indeed, the only plausible interpretation—is harmonious with the “monetary default” clause relied upon heavily by Landlord and the trial court.  If the total amount of Tenant’s unpaid rent exceeds the total amount owed at the time an annual installment payment from Landlord is due, no annual installment payment is tendered because of Tenant’s “monetary default” and Tenant is subject to dispossession.  If, on the other hand, the total amount of the annual installment payment due exceeds, as here, the amount of unpaid rent or other payments owed Landlord, there is no “monetary default” because Tenant’s delinquent payments have been automatically deducted from the annual installment sum owed, as expressly granted under the Lease, thereby reducing the out-pocket cost to the Landlord of the installment payment.  Under Landlord’s and the trial court’s interpretation, Tenant is in “monetary default” even if Landlord presently owes Tenant more money under the Lease than Tenant owes Landlord under the Lease.  As an initial matter, this construction of § 4.02 is illogical and absurd, and should be dismissed for that reason alone.  See, eg., Mendles v. Danish, 74 N.J.L. 333, 336 (1907) (“Where ambiguity exists or literal interpretation may lead to absurd results, resort may be had to the principle that the spirit of the law controls the letter.
[brief] - On April 7, 2021, appellant/plaintiff was charged with “driving or parking [an] unregistered motor vehicle” in the jurisdiction of Orange City, New Jersey.  (PA087-088); - In August of 2021, appellant/plaintiff obtained a lease agreement in his name for residence located at [...] in [...].  (PA089); - At the scene of the accident, when police asked whether appellant/plaintiff lived in North Carolina, plaintiff replied “No, I just moved up here last year. ” (PA085, 18:23-18:30); and, - Investigation reports show that appellant/plaintiff’s vehicle was present in the City of Orange, New Jersey consistently: dates include May 18, 2021, September 6, 2021, November 7, 2021, January 22, 2022, and February 8, 2022.  (PA096-120).  The appellant/plaintiff [...] failed to apprise [...] that he lived in New Jersey and garaged his vehicles in New Jersey.  He failed to provide his New Jersey address to his insurance carrier.  (PA048, T37:L5-22; T38:L11-T40:L10; PA049, T43:L11-22.  For that reason, [...] determined that appellant/plaintiff [...] had made a “Material Misrepresentation” on the insurance application and was denied coverage.
[brief] ”  Licensed semi-professionals, like the Defendants, are excluded from the judicially created limited exception to the CFA.  Id. at 620.  This is consistent with the CFA itself, as well as the Attorney General’s position on this very issue, upon which [...] relied.  Id. at 609.  It is well established that “where the purpose of legislation is remedial and humanitarian, any exemption must be narrowly construed, giving due regard to the plain meaning of the language and the legislative intent. ”  Serv. Armament Co. v. Hyland, 70 N.J. 550, 559 (1976).  As [...] held:  [t]hus, broadly construing the reach of the CFA as a remedial statute, and narrowly construing any exceptions to the CFA, we agree with the Attorney General that there is nothing in the text or the purpose of the CFA that supports an exemption for fraudulent or unconscionable activities of semi-professionals such as home inspectors.  [[...], 460 N.J. Super. at 609.]  The “judicially created learned professional exception must be narrowly construed to exempt CFA liability only as to those professionals who have historically been recognized as ‘learned’ based on the requirement of extensive learning or erudition. ”  Id. at 599 (emphasis added).  Plaintiff is unaware of any binding precedent defining “learned professional” to include insurance producers.
[brief] N.J.S.A. 34:13A-5.3; Saginario v. Attorney General, 87 N.J. 480, 491 (1981); Red Bank Bd. of Educ. V. Warrington, 138 N.J. Super.  564, 572 (App. Div. 1976); Thompson v. Joseph Cory Warehouses, Inc., 215 N.J. Super. 217, 220-21 (App. Div. 1987).  To the extent Plaintiff’s Brief alludes some non-LAD, non-contract claim through its generalities devoid of any detail/instance, such “other” claim would sound in tort.  Plaintiff fails to plead compliance with the New Jersey Tort Claims Act and, therefore, any alleged tort claim(s) also could not have been sustained and would have been subject to summary dismissal.
[brief] In BV001, a contract purchaser of the property changed the registered agent of the owner, meaning the owner did not receive any notice of the foreclosure.  467 N.J.Super. at 122.  Upon learning of the judgment, Defendant filed a motion to vacate that judgment just seven days post-judgment.  Ibid.  Notably, there was no bonafide purchaser there and the motion was filed within days, not three months later after the property was sold.  Even though that event did not reflect upon the plaintiff or the foreclosure itself, the circumstances were so unusual and exceptional that relief was granted.  I.E.’s, a trial court decision, involved three heirs who did not get notice of the foreclosure, rendering the judgment void.  392 N.J.Super. at 530.  It also involved a family that would lose its home and suffer “an extreme forfeiture. ”  Id. at 533.  Neither issue applies here as [...] here received every single notice and did not claim otherwise.
[brief] (2T7:1-4; Da0088-188.)  The entirety of [...]’s Motion to Compel was based on unauthenticated exhibits and hearsay that [...] attempted to shoehorn into the record through its counsel.  (See Da71-492.)  [...]’s former employees and co-defendants, [...] and [...], similarly filed motions to compel arbitration based on the same “proofs” submitted with [...]’s Motion to Compel.  (2T7:5-14.)  Notably, [...] and [...] did not submit any certifications based on personal knowledge and simply relied on the arguments raised in [...]’s Motion to Compel.  (See Da0001-0614.)  Plaintiffs opposed the Motion to Compel, and [...]’s and [...]’ motions, asserting that they never saw, reviewed, executed or agreed to an arbitration provision in the account applications, which were, in fact, completed by [...], and therefore Plaintiffs did not, and could not, knowingly waive their right to pursue relief in the Superior Court.
[brief] [...] incorporates by reference and relies upon the Statement of Facts and Procedural History contained in Plaintiff’s/Respondent’s supplemental brief in opposition to the appeal.  Pa21, 24-25, 29, 39-41; Dal22.  Plaintiff/Respondents supplements the facts here in the legal argument as they relate to the amicus application.  [...] refers to Defendants/Appellants, [...], [...], and [...], collectively as “Defendants” herein because the arguments presented are indistinguishable.  Legal Argument  I.  PRE-SUIT ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS IN MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CASES INVOLVING THE PERFORMANCE OF SURGICAL PROCEDURES, OR THE DEATH OF A PATIENT, SHOULD BE DEEMED AGAINST PUBLIC POLICY.
[brief] In this matter, Appellants seek a declaration that there is coverage for the accident under the excess liability coverage part of the PURE Excess Policy (i.e., liability coverage for the defendant driver [...] for causing the accident resulting in the death of his brother).  However, the PURE Excess Policy contains a broad and unambiguous Injury to an Insured exclusion that bars coverage for personal injury to an insured under the policy.  As correctly found by the trial court, [...], the injured party, is an “insured” as a “family member” of his named insured parents, and thus the exclusion applies to bar coverage.  Under New Jersey law, “the words of an insurance policy are to be given their plain and ordinary meaning . . . [and] [i]n the absence of any ambiguity, courts should not write for the insured a better policy of insurance than the one purchased. ”  Hampton Med. Group, P.A. v. Princeton Ins. Co., 366 N.J. Super. 165, 172 (App. Div. 2004) (citing Zacarias v. Allstate Ins. Co., 168 N.J. 590 (2001)).  “Exclusions are presumptively valid and will be given effect if ‘specific, plain, clear, prominent, and not contrary to public policy. ’”  *Id.* (cited source omitted); see also *AC Ocean Walk, LLC v. Am. Guarantee & Liab. Ins. Co.*, 256 N.J. 294, 312 (N.J.) (“If the language is clear, that is the end of the inquiry, and courts will not engage in a strained construction to support the imposition of liability .  . . .”) (cited source and internal quotations omitted).  Here, the Injury to an Insured exclusion in the PURE Excess Policy precludes coverage for liability for “personal injury to you or an insured under this policy. ” (Pa 93, at § III, Exclusions).  The plain meaning of this exclusion bars coverage for this matter because [...] was an “insured” as a “family member” of his named-insured parents.  New Jersey courts routinely enforce such exclusions in *excess policies*, such as the PURE Excess Policy at issue in this matter (although as discussed further below, such exclusions are not permitted in primary auto policies, where coverage provisions are mandated by statute).
[brief] In addition, the trial court erred in basing its decision on the fact that Plaintiff’s expert engineer did not use the legal term “substantially certain” in his report regarding the hazardous, unprotected nature of the mandatory, distant employee parking area.  Pa9.  In fact, an expert is **prohibited** from rendering such explicit legal conclusions.  As the New Jersey Supreme Court has held: “Expert testimony that recites the legal conclusion sought in a verdict is not helpful to the jury. ”  *State v. Nesbitt*, 185 N.J. 504, 517 (2006).  Experts are therefore prohibited from testifying as to “improper legal conclusions” and questions to experts must avoid tracking the language of legal principles or statutes.
[brief] Defendant stated that she wanted to marry the plaintiff and become his wife; however, after the marriage, the defendant refused to engage in sexual relations with the plaintiff and never did so.  The marriage was never consummated due to the defendant's refusal.  The defendant provided excuses to avoid consummation, including claims of it being too painful, having stomach issues, or being on her menstrual cycle, 1T116, 97.  Respondent contends that the family judge properly found that there was no fraud; however, the respondent did not testify regarding the annulment issue and did not present a single witness on the issue -- which is significant in undermining her claim, here on appeal, that the grounds for annulment were not established.
[brief] ”  The Buyer, [...], is owned by [...].  2T61:5-10; (P-2) Da935-46.  The plain language of Paragraph 6.3 shows the indemnification provision is only triggered if a material breach is committed by either [...] or [...] and, further, that the material breach must be of a representation, warranty, covenant or agreement made by [...] or [...] in the Agreement or in another document required by the agreement. \(^7\)  Neither the trial court nor the plaintiffs identified such a qualifying material breach at trial.