ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] B.  In this case, the third-party beneficiary has already relinquished power to plaintiff, and the legal basis cited is incorrect.  The appellate court referenced court rules and cases in its order issued on December 2, 2022:  "Pursuant to R. 1:21-1(a) (except as provided by Rule 1:21-1, no person is permitted to practice law in this State unless they are a licensed attorney)" (Pa63).  Notably, NJ courts always permit individuals to represent themselves in legal matters, a fundamental constitutional right under the U.S. Const. amend. I and N.J. Const. of 1947 art. I, § 18.  Self-representation in court does not constitute practicing law.  The estate represents the decedent's property at the time of death and does not possess legal rights as an entity or individual.  In this instance, since the decedent did not leave a will, [...]'s surviving wife, [...], is the sole beneficiary of the estate.  As the court-appointed administrator of her father's estate, authorized by [...] and the [...], the plaintiff has the exclusive right to manage the estate.  There is no New Jersey statute mandating the retention of an attorney by an administrator, enabling the plaintiff to assert her personal rights and appear pro se in court.  The appellate court also cited Kasharian v. Wilentz, 93 N.J. Super. 479, 482 (App. Div. 1967); R. 1:21-1(a); ("prohibit[ing] such appearances by non-lawyer fiduciaries where the action involves another's beneficial interests") (Pa63).  However, this precedent does not apply here.  Before plaintiff’s appointment as administrator ad prosequendum at the [...], [...] renounced all rights to pursue claims or lawsuits.  Thus, there is no potential for conflicting interests of the beneficiary.  As the court-appointed administrator ad prosequendum, the plaintiff has the right to advise and represent herself in court.  C.
[brief] Pursuant to Court Rules, a copy of the court’s opinion in *Shilinsky v. Borough of Ridgefield*, [...], 2015 WL 10718483 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Apr. 26, 2016) is annexed hereto.  As of the filing of this motion *Shilinsky* has no negative treatment to the knowledge of counsel after having made diligent inquiry. unreasonable. ” (Pa685).  The Shilinsky court relied heavily on the ruling in Polzo II for the proposition that the area where the accident occurred was not intended for pedestrian use, and therefore the failure to address a defect in that area could not be termed palpably unreasonable.  See Polzo II, supra, 209 N.J. 51 at 71-72.
[brief] The Court has reiterated that “a first-degree robbery conviction will not be sustained unless the victim possessed a subjective belief that the [weapon] was capable of producing death or serious bodily injury, and that that subjective belief was a reasonable one under the circumstances. ”  Dekowski, 218 N.J. at 606 (cleaned up) (emphasis added).  In each of these cases, the subjective-belief requirement was satisfied because the victim testified at trial that he or she thought the defendant could be armed.  Id. at 601, 609-610; Williams, 218 N.J. at 580-81, 595; State v. Chapland, 187 N.J. 275, 278 (2006); State v. Hutson, 107 N.J. 222, 224, 228 (1987).
[brief] This was true last month, in Ogunyemi, where a clear and understandable waiver could not cure the contradictory clauses that came before it in the Section. __ N.J. Super. at __ (slip op., at *12) (citing Roach v. BM Motoring, LLC, 228 N.J. 163, 174 (2017)) (“The express waiver language at the end of Section 27 does not resolve the ambiguity preceding it, which must be construed against defendants. ”).  And it must also be true here for an even more deeply and widely flawed agreement.  4.
[directive] Criminal Presiding Judges  For example, see the Order of the Supreme Court dated July 1, 2021 pursuant to the 1 Marijuana Decriminalization Law.  Directive #24-21 – Expungements – Records Requests; Certifications  August 16, 2021  Page 3 of 3  Family Presiding Judges  Municipal Court Presiding Judges  [...], Chief of Staff  AOC Directors and Assistant Directors  Special Assistants to the Administrative Director  [...], Clerk, Superior Court  AOC Criminal, Family, Municipal Chiefs  Criminal Division Managers and Assistants  Family Division Managers and Assistants  Municipal Division Managers and Assistants  Municipal Court Directors and Administrators  [...], Chief, Family Practice  Family Division Managers Criminal Division Managers  Municipal Division Managers Attachment
[brief] PROCEDURAL HISTORY¹  Plaintiff filed her Complaint on November 20, 2018.  After a full period of discovery, Appellants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment.  ¹  The following list of abbreviations refer to the stenographic transcripts cited and relied upon in Appellant’s Brief:  Plaintiff’s Deposition Transcript for “Pltf. T”; Defendant [...]’s Deposition Transcript for “Amato T”; Defendant [...]’s Deposition Transcript for “Camera T”; Defendant [...]’s Deposition Transcript for “Wino T”; “1T” refers to Trial Transcript for proceedings on May 16, 2023.  “2T” refers to Trial Transcript for proceedings on May 17, 2023.  “3T” refers to Trial Transcript for proceedings on May 18, 2023.  “4T” refers to Trial Transcript for proceedings on May 19, 2023.  “5T” refers to Trial Transcript for proceedings on May 22, 2023.  “6T” refers to Trial Transcript for proceedings on May 23, 2023.  “7T” refers to Trial Transcript for proceedings on May 24, 2023.  “8T” refers to Trial Transcript for proceedings on May 25, 2023.  After the Honorable [...], P.J. Cv. denied Appellants’ Motion for Summary Judgment on July 11, 2022, and settlement negotiations ultimately failed, the parties conducted an eight-day jury trial beginning on May 16, 2023 and concluding on May 25, 2023.
[brief] Prior to the second day of [...]’s deposition, plaintiff’s counsel forwarded a series of documents responsive to the described November 4th email.  At the outset of the second day of his deposition, [...] was asked to describe the purpose behind the production of each document.  (Pa0245 – Pa0248 at 7:2-10:9).  [...] testified that he provided just a single document in response to the request for documents supportive of the position that [...] had an affirmative obligation to identify pre-existing roadway defects.  The lone responsive document was an excerpt from the New Jersey Department of Transportation’s Standard Specifications for Road and Bridge Construction – 2007.  (Pa1379).  Rather than providing direction to resident engineers similarly positioned to [...], however, the specification section produced by [...], titled “159.03.01 Traffic Control Coordinator”, pertained to the assignment of an on-site Traffic Control Coordinator (“TCC”) by the general contractor and the associated responsibilities of the TCC.
[brief] Defendant's attorney submitted nothing.  In the face of the opportunity to argue before the sentencing hearing that these crimes should not be his client's sole defining moment, he argued nothing.  In the face of a chance to argue that his client deserved some meaningful life outside prison walls, defense counsel was silent.  Counsel offered the court no alternative sentence to impose that would adequately reflect the crimes of which defendant was convicted but still give him some chance of life after prison.
[brief] THE SUB-OPTIMAL PERFORMANCE OF SFRA AS APPLIED TO THE [...] HAS CAUSED CLEAR “DEFICIENCIES OF A CONSTITUTIONAL DIMENSION”  This analysis begins with the court’s determination, in its March 6 decision, that [...] public school students are being denied T&E.  That is clearly a deficiency of constitutional dimension.  The only further ruling required is that SFRA was a significant cause of that denial and that is precisely the ruling student-petitioners seek in this appeal.  Try as the State might to squirm out of the obvious causal connection between the denial of T&E, largely for fiscal reasons, and SFRA, the State’s school funding law, which is the main source of state education aid to school districts, including [...], it is of no avail.  In the next Argument Point, this brief will address the State’s deeply flawed contention that the main, if not sole, cause of the proven T&E denial is local tax policy and local school district educational and fiscal management practices.
[brief] The legislative history of the enactment is meager and unrewarding. ”  N.J.S.P.C.A. v. Bd. of Educ. of East Orange, 91 N.J. Super. 81 (Law Div. 1966).  In 2006, the New Jersey Assembly introduced A2649, “[an act] concerning animal cruelty, and supplementing article 2 of chapter 22 of Title 4 of the Revised Statutes, and amending and repealing various sections of statutory law. ”  Among other revisions, the bill sought to redefine “animal” as “any mammal, bird, reptile, amphibian, or fish.
[brief] TABLE OF AUTHORITIES  Cases 2175 Lemoine Ave. Corp. v. Finco, Inc., et al, 272 N.J. Super 478, 490 (App. Div. 1994).................................................................27  Bender v. Walgreen E. Co., 399 N.J. Super. 584 (App. Div. 2008)...........25, 26 Brach, Eichler, Rosenberg, Silver, Bernstein, Hammer & Gladstone, P.C. v. Ezekwo, 345 N.J. Super. 1, 13 (App. Div. 2001), rev'd on other grounds, 211 N.J. 230 (2012).................................................................29, 30 Brizak v. Needle, 239 N.J. Super. 415 (App. Div.) certif. denied, 122 N.J. 164 (1990)......................................................................................29, 30, 31 Couri v. Gardner, 173 N.J. 328 (2002) ................................................passim Hubbard v. Reed, 168 N.J. 387, 390 (2001)............................................30, 31 Mazur v. Crane’s Mill Nursing Home, 441 N.J. Super. 168 (App. Div. 2015).................................................................27  Nuveen Municipal Trust v. Withum, Smith & Brown, P.C., 752 F.3d 600 (3rd Cir. 2012).................................................................34, 35 Popwell v. Law Offices of Broome and Horn, 363 N.J. Super. 404 (Law Div. 2002)..................................................................................29  Rosenberg v. Cahill, 99 N.J. 318, 325 (1985).............................................22, 23 Sanzari v. Rosenfeld, 34 N.J. 128, 142 (1961)........................................22  Sommers v. McKinney, 287 N.J. Super. 1 (App. Div. 1996) .......................26, 27 Stewart v. Sbarro, 142 N.J. Super. 581, certif. denied, 72 N.J. 459 (1976) ....29  Statutes N.J.S.A. 2A:15-59.1 ..................................................................................6, 20 N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-27 ...............................................................................21 N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-29 ...........................................................................................................22 Rules R. 4:49-2 .........................................................................................................................12, 18, 39 R. 1:4-8 .............................................................................................................................20 R. 4:50-1 ..........................................................................................................................passim TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS
[brief] The [...] did respond to one of those non-requirements—the elimination of courtesy busing, but the State’s brief even criticized that by stating that, although the District responded, it did not do so “with any sense of urgency. ”  [SB at 7].  The State’s brief describes these “steps” as including: - “ensuring the District has sufficient funds to meet its immediate needs;” - “moving to install a new State monitor;” and - “exploring the degree of oversight and intervention [by the Department?] that may be necessary to protect the constitutional rights of [...]’s public-school students.
[brief] Moreover, [...] also confirmed in his deposition testimony that on or about September 17th and September 21st of 2020, DPW workers were doing work in the area where the Plaintiffs injury occurred.  (Pa 519).  He also confirmed that on September 17, 2020, there was a damaged pole reported at [...] that was assigned to the [...].  (Pa 519: Deposition of [...] at 30:21-31:5.).  He further confirmed that when working in the area, he typically makes inspections of the roadway.  (Pa 519).  He also stated that if one of his employees noticed the pothole, he would expect them to report it.  (Pa 519).  Moreover, [...] also testified that street sweepers pass by the area four times per week and sweep each side of the street twice per week.  (Pa 520).  The Respondent in this matter seeks to rely upon *Shilinsky v. Borough of Ridgefield*, No. A-0028-14T2, 2015 WL10718483, at *3 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Apr. 26, 2016).
[brief] See Demedeiros v. Brilhante, No. A-2292-21 (App. Div. Dec. 13, 2022).  Instead of Defendants and Counsel providing additional dates to Plaintiff or Trial Court for proper calendaring, they opted to submit more Motions to Dismiss when the Plaintiff respectfully declined their initial invitation due to medical reasons.  Plaintiff supplied the Defendants and trial court with opposition papers that informed and showed written responses to Defendants’ First Request to their one hundred question Production of Documents questionnaire and meeting all their demands.  Rule 4:23-5(c) does not apply as Defendants’ Counsel failed to cooperate in preparation of deposition in the following manner that complicates Rule 4:23-2(b)(3)\(^8\) and 4:23-2(b)(4)\(^9\).  **POINT III: TRIAL COURT ERRED BY GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ DISMISSAL BASED ON RULE 4:23-5(a)(2)**
[brief] First, there is no basis for revisiting the Court’s own recent decision in *Woo-Padva* 2 that the legislative object of the NJCFLA was to reserve claims to enforce the licensing requirement exclusively for the [...].  *Woo-Padva* 2, 2023 WL 6157245, at *4.  Second, Appellant’s recounting of the legislative history actually shows a clear intent to remove any private right of action that once existed under the statute. \(^6\)  By adding N.J.S.A. 17:11C-18, the Legislature clearly codified the enforcement mechanism for violations of the NJCFLA and only provided the Commissioner with authority to pursue claims for such violations.  **B.  Even if There Were a Private Right of Action Under the NJCFLA, Holder Respondents Could Not Have Violated the NJCFLA Because They Are Not Subject to Its Licensure Requirements** --- \(^6\)
[directive] 9-23 Revised (5/03)  Semi-Annual Firearms Qualification and Requalification Standards  Automatic/Semi-Automatic Police Service Rifle Qualification Course (ARQC).  Standard course of fire for semi-annual qualification for automatic and semi-automatic police service rifles.  (Appendix G).  Automatic/Semi-Automatic Subgun Qualification Course (ASQC).  Standard course of fire for semi-annual qualification for automatic and semi-automatic assault-type submachine gun or Personal Defense weapons.  (Appendix E).  Automatic/Semi-Automatic Subgun Night Qualification Course (ASNQC).  Standard course of fire under night firing conditions for semi-annual qualification for automatic and semi-automatic assault-type submachine gun or Personal Defense weapons as prescribed in this manual.  (Appendix F).  Chief or Agency Executive.  The chief executive officer of any law enforcement agency or other agency in New Jersey with personnel subject to the automatic/semi-automatic assault weapons and police carbine training and qualification policy.
[brief] SAT BELOW:  HON. [...], J.S.C. BRIEF AND APPENDIX ON BEHALF OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY  [...]  [...]  [...]  [...]  ASSISTANT PROSECUTOR OFFICE OF THE MERCER COUNTY PROSECUTOR  NJ  ATTORNEY ID 410212022  [...] OF COUNSEL AND ON THE BRIEF TABLE OF CONTENTS  COUNTERSTATEMENT OF PROCEDURAL HISTORY ..................... 6  COUNTERSTATEMENT OF FACTS  ..................................  7  LEGAL ARGUMENT .................................................. 14 POINT I ................................................................. 14 THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY EXCLUDED PHOTOS OF SURVEILLANCE CAMERAS WHICH COULD NOT BE PROPERLY AUTHENTICATED AND LACKED RELEVANCE AND THE TRIAL COURT ALSO PROPERLY GUIDED THE ADMISSION AND USE OF PHOTOS OF ADJACENT PROPERTIES ON EDGEMERE AVENUE POINT II ............................................................... 22 THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ADMITTED SPONTANEOUS STATEMENTS MADE BY THE DEFENDANT THAT WERE NOT IN RESPONSE TO ANY QUESTION ADDRESSED TO THE DEFENDANT POINT III .............................................................. 27 THE JUDGE WAS WITHIN HER DISCRETION WHEN SHE RULED THAT SIX PRIOR CONVICTIONS OF DEFENDANT’S WOULD BE ADMISSIBLE AS WEIGHING ON DEFENDANT’S CREDIBILITY IF HE TESTIFIED POINT IV ......................................................... 32 THE JUDGE DID NOT VIOLATE DEFENDANT’S DOUBLE JEOPARDY RIGHTS BY CLARIFYING THE PROPER AND LAWFUL SENTENCE OF THE DEFENDANT CONCLUSION
[brief] (Aa2; Aa166-167; Aa187).  The parties filed cross-motions for summary decision at the conclusion of discovery, and on February 27, 2023, the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) issued an order granting partial summary decision in favor of the [...] on counts one, three, and four of [...]’s complaint against [...].  (Aa7; Aa164-83).  In his order, the ALJ found that there were no genuine issues of material fact, and that there was “evidence in the present matter . . . that [...] engaged in a . . . use of school resources without the consent of the Board” that --- 4  The ALJ also granted the [...]’s motion for summary decision against [...].  (Aa176).  That matter is not the subject of this appeal. violated the Act and Code.
[brief] EVEN IF ANY ONE OF THE COMPLAINED-OF ERRORS WOULD BE INSUFFICIENT TO WARRANT REVERSAL, THE CUMULATIVE EFFECT OF THOSE ERRORS WAS TO DENY DEFENDANT DUE PROCESS AND A FAIR TRIAL.  (Not Raised Below)  Because each of the errors complained of in Points I through III would have affected the jury’s resolution of defendant’s guilt, [...] separately asserts that even if none of those errors is deemed sufficient on its own to warrant reversal, together they deprived her of due process and a fair trial, as guaranteed to her by the Fourteenth Amendment and the corresponding provisions of the state constitution.
[directive] the ill-gotten to access have who those —including defendants affluent more contrast, In amounts. released often are —too associates criminal or activities criminal their through wealth the and witnesses, victims, community, the to threat significant a pose they that notwithstanding process.  justice criminal not flawed  It effective. is nor fair neither is system "resource-based" current the sum, In also but defendants, low-risk many of too incarceration pretrial the in results it because only jail. county of out way their pay to defendants dangerous allows it because "risk-based" a with system resource-based current the replaces Law Reform Bail
[brief] Specifically:  To discredit the employer’s proffered reason, however, the plaintiff cannot simply show that the employer’s decision was wrong or mistaken, since the factual dispute at issue is whether discriminatory animus motivated the employer, not whether the employer is wise, shrewd, prudent, or competent.  Rather, the non-moving plaintiff must demonstrate such weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contradictions in the employer’s proffered legitimate reasons for its action that a reasonable factfinder could rationally find them unworthy of credence and hence infer that the employer did not act for the asserted non-discriminatory reasons.
[brief] [...] MET HIS BURDEN UNDER N.J.A.C. 12:17–9.3(b) BY SHOWING THAT NO OTHER SUITABLE ACCOMMODATIONS WERE AVAILABLE TO HIM.  (Pa1; Pa3)  The plain language of N.J.A.C. 12:17–9.3(b) “compels a showing that, at the time of the claimant's departure, either the employer had no position available that would accommodate the claimant's condition or the claimant would not have been assigned to any such position. ”  Ardan v. Bd. of Review, 231 N.J. 589, 607 (2018).  “Applied to a vast range of workplace settings, that standard calls for an individualized determination.
[directive] !  Accordingly, the Administrative Office of the Courts has established a Transaction Fee Schedule, in connection with offenses committed on or after March 13, 1995 as follows: for payments of $3.00 or less, there is no transaction fee; ! payments of $3.01 to $9.99 incur a transaction fee of $1.00; ! payments of $10.00 or more incur a transaction fee of $2.00.  !  Note that individuals whose offenses were committed before February 1, 1993 continue to pay no transaction fee.  Individuals whose offenses were committed between February 1, 1993 and March 13, 1995 will continue to pay a transaction fee according to the schedule promulgated in Directive #2-93.
[brief] Here, it is undisputed that there were not only two “genuine vacancies” available for Appellant’s promotion from retirements in September and October 2022, but a minimum of an additional three retirements on February 1, and March 1, 2023, Pa67-68, creating three additional “genuine vacancies” before Appellant’s Certification expired on March 28, 2023.  For this reason, the [...]’s finding that “the appointing authority technically should not have requested the certification in the first place…” Pa8, is erroneous, as predicated upon the faulty premise that no genuine vacancies existed.  It is further noted that Appellant was not “bypassed” or “removed” from his promotional list, Pa63; Pa87; as such, and as remaining number 1 ranked on the Certification list in effect until March 28, 2023, and, as a disabled veteran, (discussed below), Appellant should have been promoted as a matter of law.
[brief] N.J.S.A. 40:55-26 requires reference to the planning board of any proposed zoning amendment.  The planning board "shall make and transmit to the governing body... a report including identification of any provisions in the proposed ... amendment which are inconsistent with the master plan and recommendations concerning these inconsistencies..."  Ibid.  As previously indicated, the planning board also found the amendment to be consistent with the master plan.  Although not necessary to our decision, we are persuaded that the planning board's failure to find inconsistency would not have been fatal to the ordinance if the governing body had expressly recognized the inconsistency.
[brief] Thus, the trial court erred by failing to determine that the contract governing [...]’s alleged account was void for [...]’s violations of the NJCFLA, despite finding on the record that, at all times relevant to this action, [...] was not licensed pursuant to the NJCFLA.  [...]’s attempted collection of a debt it had no legal right or authority to enforce provides a basis for vacatur that this Court has held must be as expansive as the need to achieve equity and justice.  In another [...] collection case, *[...] Funding, LLC v. DeAngelo*, 464 N.J. Super. 103, 105 (App. Div. 2020), this Court affirmed the trial court’s granting of a motion to vacate a default judgment pursuant to R. 4:50-1(f).
[directive] The investigation of a shooting by an officer should include photographs, ballistics tests, and interviews with all witnesses, complainants and the officer involved.  All firearms should be treated as evidence according to agency procedures.  A complete description of the weapon, its make, model, caliber and serial number must be obtained and, if appropriate, N.C.I.C. and S.C.I.C. record checks should be made.  7.11.11  In a firearm discharge investigation, the investigator must determine if the weapon was an approved weapon for that officer and if the officer was authorized to possess and carry it at the time of the discharge.  The investigator must also determine if the weapon was loaded with authorized ammunition.  The weapon must be examined for its general operating condition and to identify any unauthorized alterations made to it.  7.12