ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] (Da82-Da86).  [...] entered her order granting summary judgment to [...] on September 29, 2006.  (Da99)  [...].  For 13 years after that, until [...] commenced its suit in late 2021, [...] justifiably believed that the owners of the [...] Lot, whoever they may be, had no legally enforceable right to access his property.  [...]’s principal, [...], has attempted to play the role of an innocent victim in this case, but the evidence clearly shows he was miscast.  We concede that nothing in the County property records would have alerted [...] to the outcome of the [...] litigation, but that does not entitle him to the sympathy he claimed.  For starters, he never relied on the 1966 deed in his purchasing decision because he was unaware of it until afterward.  (Da513)  Furthermore, his rights can rise no higher than [...]’s, with whom he was in privity.  [...] was on constructive notice of the 1966 deed in [...]’s chain of title, Fisher, supra, but, consistent with his casual approach to the purchase of the [...] Lot, never researched the matter and forfeited that claim for himself and all future owners.  [...], for his part, was equally casual in his own purchase of the property.  He did not conduct a title search of his or [...]’s property, and relied on nothing more than his lay opinion of the law, and anecdotal information from [...] about their use of the driftway across [...]’s land.  Astoundingly, he made no attempt to ascertain [...]’s position on the matter.  Had he done so, [...] surely would have alerted him to [...]’s decisions in the [...] litigation, which may have dissuaded him from purchasing the property at all.  As noted above, there also is evidence in the record, albeit disputed by [...], that [...] told him about the *[...]* litigation before he purchased the property, but no evidence that he ever attempted to acquaint himself with [...]’s rulings.  We need not explore here whether [...] may have a cause of action against [...] for representing he could access the driveway across [...]’s property without disclosing the judgments in *[...]*.  Suffice it to say, if [...] was a victim at all, he should not be looking to [...] for relief.  In sum, there is nothing unfair to [...] about applying the entire controversy doctrine in this case, and not doing so would be grossly unfair to [...].
[directive] If the agency has established a general protocol for Established return to work an officer’s return to work after extended absence, that protocol should be followed for an officer returning to work after pregnancy or parental leave.  1.  If no such policy has been established, and if requested by the officer, when an officer returns from an extended absence due to pregnancy or parental leave, the agency’s human resources unit, or LAD/ADA coordinator, may meet with the officer to develop a reorientation program, to take into consideration the officer’s circumstances.  During that meeting, the officer should assist in identifying their individual needs, which may include accommodations requested for lactation (such as a private room and use of a refrigerator), limiting exposure to hazardous substances, uniform modifications, or a transition period back to full duty (e.g., to complete missed trainings).  C. breaks.
[directive] The Legislature’s decision to expand the list of Graves Act offenses to include N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4.1 and the Atromey General’s ensuing promulgation of the Graves Act Directive had the practical effect of eliminating the option formerly available under Section 7.1.1 of the Revised Brima~e Guidelines to treat the possession of the weapon as a Special Offense Characteristic.
[brief] The trial court in this matter issued its final Order which: “declared that the roads (known as Riverfront Boulevard and “Right of way “A”) highlighted on the map and annexed hereto as Exhibit “A” (the Roads) are public roads that have been dedicated to the Borough, and such dedication has been accepted by the Borough, as a matter of law”.(Pa2)  Notably “Exhibit A” is a tax map which cannot serve as a legal mechanism establishing ownership.  (Pa4)  The trial court reached its determination by concluding that: “the Developer clearly dedicated the roads to the Borough by indicating the roads were public right of ways”.  (Pa18).  The trial court does not identify a plat plan or map or agreement which accomplished and indication that the roads were public rights of way.  this.  The record is barren as to what document or map “clearly dedicated the roads”.  The history of this matter dates back to 2002 when part of the land at issue was first offered as a preliminary major subdivision.
[brief] \(^3\)  Because the record was void of any analysis as to what portion of the legal fees shall be attributable to the legal fees incurred to set aside the original judgment, the attorneys for the Plaintiff shall still have a duty of candor to the court to provide the supporting evidence necessary to establish the entitlement of the legal fees for setting aside the original divorce judgment.  The attorneys for the Plaintiff cannot just take it for granted for all the legal fees incurred by the Plaintiff unrelated to the proceeding to make corrections to the original divorce judgment and PSA.  substantiate Plaintiff’s request for the award of $1,311,832.94 legal fees sought in the proposed Final Judgment. \(^4\)  II.  Rule 4:50-1(a) and (f) Permits Relief from Judgment Because of Mistake (Raised Below: Da45-66, Da168-178)
[brief] 9T, p. 4, lines 18-22.  He then went on to make the following findings:  -  In evaluating the testimony of the title experts presented by the parties, [...] indicated that he found “. . . the testimony of [...] with regard to the title issues to be more credible than those asserted by [...] and [...]. ”  9T, p. 4, lines 18-22.3 --- 3  In evaluating the credibility of the title experts, [...] may also have been influenced by the fact that one of [...]’s title experts, [...], • Later, when analyzing the issue of whether the riparian grants and riparian rights were transferred with the uplands, as shown through the deeds and the history of use of the Property, [...] again indicated that he “. . . found [...]’s testimony in that regard to be significantly more believable than the testimony of [...] and [...].
[brief] (emphasis added).  Importantly, “covered claims” included not only claims against [...], but also claims against any of [...]’s “subsidiaries, affiliates, officers, directors, employees, agents, and/or any of its clients or customers. ”  (Ibid.)  (emphasis added).  Additionally, the acknowledgement at the end of the MAA provided:  **I ACKNOWLEDGE THAT:** - I have carefully read this Agreement, understand the terms of this Agreement, and am entering into this Agreement voluntarily; - I am not relying on any promises or representations by the Company except those contained in this Agreement; - I am giving up the right to have Covered Claims decided by a court or jury; - I have been given the opportunity to discuss this Agreement with my own attorney if I wish to do so; and - My affirmative signature and/or acknowledgment of this Agreement is not required for the Agreement to be enforced.  If I begin working for [...] Scientific, LLC without signing this Agreement, this Agreement will be effective, and I will be deemed to have consented to, ratified and accepted this Agreement through my acceptance of and continued employment with [...] Scientific, LLC.
[brief] Defendant implicitly recognizes this, pointing out that the discovery on other, unrelated persons’ cases investigated by the prosecutors office was not requested with a substantiated assertion in mind but instead to generally address “trial counsel’s failure to adequately investigate [ ] and to learn to what extent a lack of support for [...]’s theory could have severely undercut his credibility as an eyewitness. ”  In doing so, Defendant reveals that the request for discovery was improper; discovery, in particular on PCR, is not intended as a means of investigating whether possible claims exist but whether assertions made by Defendant (which cannot be merely “bald assertions” devoid of any proper demonstration or backing) are supported.
[brief] Additionally, because of this court’s de novo review, Plaintiffs also show herein why they are entitled to summary judgment under Count Two of the Complaint, to the extent that this may be relevant to this court’s analysis.  On appeal, the Appellate Division conducts a de novo review of an order granting summary judgment, and applies the same standard employed by the trial court.  *C.H. v. Rahway Board of Education*, 459 N.J. Super. 236, 242 (App. Div. 2018).  Summary judgment is designed to provide “a prompt, businesslike and inexpensive method” of disposing of any cause of action that does not present “any genuine issue of material fact requiring disposition at trial. ”  *Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am.*, 142 N.J. 520, 530 (1995).  Pursuant to R. 4:46-2(c), summary judgment “shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact challenged and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment or order as a matter of law. ”  As explained by the Supreme Court, “a court should deny a summary judgment motion only where the party opposing the motion has come forward with evidence that creates a genuine issue as to any material fact challenged. ”  *Brill*, 142 N.J. at 529 (1995) (internal quotations omitted).  “An issue of fact is genuine only if, considering the burden of persuasion at trial, the evidence submitted by the parties on the motion, together with all legitimate inferences therefrom favoring the non-moving party, would require submission of the issue to the trier of fact. ”  R. 4:46-2(c).  The essence of the inquiry on a motion for summary judgment is “whether the evidence presents sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law. ”  Pron v. Carlton Pools, Inc., 373 N.J. Super. 103, 112 (App. Div. 2004) (quoting Brill, 142 N.J. at 536).  “To send a case to trial, knowing that a rational jury can reach but one conclusion, is indeed worthless and will serve no useful purpose. ”  Brill, 142 N.J. at 541 (internal quotations omitted).  I.
[brief] [...] addressed that argument in pages 52-54 of its prior brief.  [...] does not seek to validate the Board’s reduction of the management fee to 5% of income (instead asserting that it is entirely improper because it is duplicative).  It is not an issue in this Appeal.  In any event, as previously stated in [...]’s initial brief, first [...] and then [...] held that the reduction of the management fee paid by [...] was improper.
[brief] Contrariwise, recovery of those expenses attributable to the prosecution of the Planning Board claim against [...] himself is interdicted by R. 4:42-9.  Again, New Jersey case law does support the proposition that, although attorney fees are not ordinarily included as damages in a fraud action, one who is forced into litigation with a third party as a result of another's fraud may recover from the tortfeasor the expenses of that litigation, including counsel fees, as damages flowing from the tort.  See Hagen v. Gallerano, 66 N.J. Super. 319 (App.Div.1961); Feldmesser v. Lemberger, 101 N.J.L. 184 (E. & A. 1925).  the express purpose of which was to provide the estate redress from the surety for the administrator’s improper conduct.  This is not the situation in the instant case.
[directive] The revised Guidelines create a new “Street Gang” Special Application ! and Enhancement Feature, providing for an additional term of parole ineligibility ranging from one to nine months, or six to eighteen months if the underlying offense is a first-degree crime.  See Section 11.1.  This new feature implements the policy of ensuring the sternest punishment for those offenders who, by virtue of their participation in certain forms of organized criminal activity, pose the greatest danger to public safety.  To help ensure the uniform implementation of this enhancement, eligibility for the “Street Gang” Special Application and Enhancement Feature and the extent of the increase in the plea offer must be approved by a designated supervisor.  The revised Guidelines provide for especially stern punishment for ! those drug dealers who choose to use or carry firearms in the course of their drug distribution activities.
[brief] The Law Division erred in finding that the state proved Appellant drove while intoxicated under N.J.S.A. 39:4-50 under the per se, which relies on evidence of the defendant’s blood alcohol content at the time of the arrest.  See State v. Chun, 194 N.J. 54 (2008).  The Court’s decision in Chun explicitly requires that alcotest operators, like [...], observe a two-minute lock-out period before acquiring additional breath samples from the testee in order to support a per se violation.  See id. at 81 (“After a two-minute lock-out period during which the device will not permit another test, the instrument prompts the operator to read the instruction again to the arrestee and collect the second breath sample. ”).  The State did not elicit any testimony during the municipal court proceedings which could enable [...] to find that [...] observed the necessary two-minute lock-out period in between the alcotests he administered to Appellant in the [...] on the morning of November 5, 2019.  As such, the Law Division erred in finding that the State proved Appellant’s guilt under N.J.S.A. 39:4-50 beyond a reasonable doubt based on the results of the alcotests administered to Appellant in Boonton.  According to [...]’s testimony, following a twenty minute observation period, [...] proceeded to perform an alcotest on Appellant, instructing Appellant how to properly perform a breath sample.  (3T12:8-12).  Appellant then proceeded to provide his first breath sample, at which point [...] noted that the minimum volume for the breath sample was not achieved.  (3T13:10-11).  [...] testified that he then waited an unspecified amount of time after the first test for the machine to clear and to take a second breath sample from Appellant.  (3T13:13-15).  [...] then performed a second test, achieving a sufficient body breath from Appellant to receive a reading on the second test.  (3T13:21-23).  [...] then again waited for an unspecified amount of time for the machine to clear before taking a third breath sample from Appellant.  (3T13:25-14:4).  The readings achieved on the second and third breath sample were used by the State to establish a per se violation of N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.  At no point during the proceedings before the [...] did the State elicit testimony from [...] indicating that he observed the necessary two-minute lock-out period before administering the second and third alcotests to Appellant, which were ultimately used by the State in proving a per se violation of N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.  (Aa062-078).  Further, the State produced no documentary evidence indicating that the two-minute lock-out period was observed as required under Chun.  As such, the Law Division erred in finding that the State proved that Appellant violated N.J.S.A. 39:4-50 under the per se standard.  VII.
[brief] In addition to attorneys’ fees of $886,223.06, plaintiffs sought and were awarded $296,651.45 for the following:  - Expert fee for [...] (Exhibit I) Da1410-17 $209,945 - Expert fee for [...] (Exhibit J) Da1419-20 30,100 - QuickBooks Support (Exhibit L) Da1436-38 500 - [...] (Accounting Consultant for Quickbooks, Exhibit M) Da1440-57 10,245.75
[brief] Pa12.  On June 12, 2024, Defendants filed their opposition and a cross-motion requesting an extension of the stay and the time to post their supersedeas bond.  Pa14.  On June 20, 2024 the lower court denied Defendants’ cross-motion holding that “the passage of time demonstrates that inability or unwillingness of the movant to post the bond that was the subject of prior orders.  Moving party has squandered the stay period and never posted the bond.
[brief] Even where the trial court makes the necessary factual findings, appellate courts “cannot defer to factual findings that are not supported by sufficient credible evidence in the record and therefore are clearly mistaken. ”  *State v. Wint*, 236 N.J. 174, 201 (2018).  In particular, appellate courts must not give “blind deference” to a finding that is not “supported by the fair inferences that can be drawn from the record. ”  *Gibson*, 218 N.J. at 294-96.  In addition, a trial court finding “is not entitled to any special deference where it rests upon a determination as to worth, plausibility, consistency, or other tangible considerations apparent from the face of the record with respect to which [s]he is no more peculiarly situated to decide than the appellate court.
[brief] Although state law determines the limitations period, federal law governs the accrual of a § 1983 action.  Ibid.  Generally, "a § 1983 cause of action begins to accrue when the plaintiff knows, or has reason to know, of the injury on which the action is based."  Ibid.; see also 3085 Kennedy Realty Co. v. Tax Assessor of Jersey City, 287 N.J. Super. 318, 323-24 (App. Div. 1996) (§ 1983 claim accrues when a plaintiff knows or should know about a violation of his or her constitutional rights).
[brief] Kelly Jo Nyanjom v. NPAS Solutions, LLC, 2022 WL 168222 (D. Kan. Jan. 19, 2022) ............................................. 16, 31 King v. Burwell, 576 U.S. 473 (2015) ..............................................................................  18  Madison v. Res. for Hum. Dev., Inc., 233 F.3d 175 (3d Cir. 2000) ..................................................................
[brief] 8  Hunsaker v. Surgidev Corp., 818 F. Supp. 744 (M.D. Pa. 1992), aff’d, 5 F.3d 1489 (3d Cir. 1993)  ............  27  Izzarelli v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 136 A.3d 1232 (Conn. 2016)
[brief] However, when S2930 was reported out of the Senate Budget and Appropriations Committee, that language was removed.  The removal is indicated by bold brackets that surround the pipeline retroactivity language.  According to the “explanation” language at the bottom of the second page of S2930, “Matter enclosed in bold-faced brackets [thus] in the above bill is not enacted and is intended to be omitted in the law. ” (Pa002 (in the footer)).  Therefore, the pipeline retroactivity language contained in S2930 when it was introduced on March 4, 2024 was eliminated from S2930 when it was reported out of committee on May 9, 2024.  (Pa001 (stating the “as reported” date); Pa031 to Pa032 (showing bold-faced brackets around the pipeline retroactivity language, indicating it is “to be omitted in the law”)).  That language never made it back into S2930, is absent from the Amendments, and never made it into the law.  Therefore, the Legislature did consider giving the Amendments full pipeline retroactivity, including to all pending appeals, but ultimately decided not to do so.  Rather, the Legislature only applied a limited change – the change regarding names and mailing addresses – to all pending complaints and all complaints in the pipeline (including on appeal).  Therefore, the Legislature did not intend all of the Amendments to have full pipeline retroactivity.  Rather, the Legislature intended prospective application of Superior Court, Appellate Division September 3, 2024 the Amendments, except in the one instance where they specifically made one change in the law explicitly retroactive.  Therefore, this Court should not apply the Amendments to complaints filed before September 3, 2024 or to complaints that are on appeal (including this appeal).  The Amendments should only be applied to OPRA complaints filed on or after September 3, 2024.  However, if this Court does apply the Amendments to this case, that would only restrict Plaintiffs’ access to the names or email addresses of the individuals on the mailing lists under OPRA.  Plaintiffs would be no less entitled to the mailing lists under the common law right of access.  In addition, nothing in the Amendments implicates the Trial Court’s holding that [...] is subject to OPRA.  CONCLUSION
[brief] [...]’s defense of the subject judgment distills down to a belief that it is permissible to cut corners if the result inures to [...]’s detriment, because he deserves it.  [...] also asks this Court to make extraordinary, draconian, new law.  First, he asks the Court to create law that bars a party with “unclean hands” from appealing any orders of the trial court.  Alternatively, he essentially asks this Court to create a “fraud” exception to the long-established legal analysis concerning fee applications.  That is, there is no real question that the Chancery Court did not critically review the Global Fee Application in accordance with New Jersey law.  Nevertheless, [...] argues that the “egregious circumstances” of this case “justify” the Chancery Court having effectively rubber-stamped without any meaningful analysis an award of attorneys’ fees in excess of $3.5 million for purportedly over 5,400 hours of post-judgment collection work.  That is not the law and cannot become the law.  The long and unique history of this case cannot be an excuse to avoid the requisite legal analysis of fee applications.  As the filing party, [...] had the burden to support his Global Fee Application, and he clearly failed to meet that burden.  Likewise, the Chancery Court was required to evaluate the Global Fee Application in accordance with the applicable legal standard, which mandates a high level of scrutiny; or, if the Global Fee Application was improperly presented and impossible to properly scrutinize (as it was) the Chancery Court was required to reject it.  It failed to do so, however, and erred as a result.  [...]’s focus on prior bad acts is simply a not-so-veiled attempt to divert this Court and escape from his clearly deficient fee application.  As a fundamental matter of due process, [...] simply asks that this Court uphold the law as it pertains to fee applications.  We respectfully submit that doing so requires that the “judgment” on appeal be reversed.