ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] ## Cases | Case | Page | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | Chandok v. Chandok, 406 N.J. Super. 595, 603 (App. Div., certif. den. 200 N.J. 207 (2009)) | 9 | | Ferren v. Sea Isle City, 243 N.J. Super. 522 (App. Div. 1990) | 10 | | Hundred E. Credit Corp. v. Eric Schuster Corp., 212 N.J. Super. 350 358, (App. Div. 1986) | 8 | | Johnson v. Salem Corp., 189 N.J. Super. 50 (App. Div. 1983), aff’d as modified on other courts, 97 N.J. 78 (1984) | 10 | | Panitch v. Panitch, 339 N.J. Super. 63, 66-67 (App. Div. 2001) | 9 | | State v. Dalal, 221 N.J. 601 (2015) | 11 | | State v. Marshall, 148 N.J. 89 (1997) | 9, 13| | State v. Medina, 349 N.J. Super. 108 (App. Div. 2002) | 13 | | Zucker v. Silverstein, 134 N.J. Super. 39 (App. Div. 1975) | 10 | ## Statutes | Statute | Page | |------------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | N.J.S.A. 34:15-11 | 10 | | N.J.S.A. 34:15-31 | 6 | ## N.J. Administrative Code | Code | Pages | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|-------| | N.J.A.C. 12:235-10 | 3, 11, 12| ## N.J. Court Rules | Rule | Page | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | Rule 1:12-2 | 10 | | Rule 3.16 | 12 | PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
[brief] (Citing *Fusco v. City of Union*, 261 N.J.  Super. 332, 337 (App. Div. 1993)).  But they did not even attempt to raise (let alone prove) this defense.  Instead, it was only raised (and immediately applied) by the trial court.  \(^1\)  The Respondents only cited one unpublished opinion pertaining to the applicability of a “novation” analysis to “accord and satisfaction”, and a published opinion regarding a “novation” analysis, both of which held that the issue was “highly fact-specific” as to the parties’ intent.
[brief] [...] Statement (v)  The presence of vermin or the accumulation of debris, uncut vegetation or physical deterioration of the structure or grounds have created potential health and safety hazards and the owner has failed to take reasonable and necessary measures to remove the hazards.  [...] Rebuttal  I do not know how [...] could support this statement.  He did not gain access to the interior of the Property.  An inspection of the exterior of the Property could not support this statement as the Property is reasonably well maintained and structurally intact and apparently fit for habitation.  There are no debris or vermin.(99a-100a)
[brief] 21  I.  THIS COURT SHOULD AFFIRM THE DECISION BELOW  BECAUSE IT IS UNDENIABLE THAT PLAINTIFF’S DECEDENT VIOLATED  N.J.S.A. 48:12- 152 AND PLAINTIFF’S CLAIMS ARE THEREFORE BARRED AS A MATTER OF LAW...........................................  21  A.  THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF N.J. S.A. 48:12-152 AND ITS LEGISLATIVE HISTORY SHOWS THAT IT BARS RECOVERY OF DAMAGES CAUSED BY CONTACT WITH A TRAIN WHILE THE PERSON WAS WRONGFULLY PRESENT ON A RAILROAD RIGHT OF WAY, INCLUDING AT A CROSSING ESTABLISHED BY A RAILROAD....................................................................  24  B.  IT IS UNDISPUTED THAT [...] OWNS THE CROSSING IN QUESTION.......................................................................  35  C.  IT IS UNDENIABLE THAT PLAINTIFF’S DECEDENT MISUSED THE RIGHT OF WAY AND RAILROAD CROSSING AS A MATTER OF LAW......................................  37  CONCLUSION.........................................................................
[brief] This was enough to put the plaintiff on notice that the defendant was making a counterclaim for declaratory relief.  *Id.*  Similarly, in *Rivera v. Gerner*, 89 N.J. 526 (1982) the Court pointed out that a plaintiff’s complaint must provide “the gist of a substantive ground of relief … be set forth, albeit informally. ”  *Id.* at 536 (1982) citing *Jersey City v. Hague*, 18 N.J. 584, 601 (1955).  Here, the relief sought was only by way of invoking the LGEL.  The complaint is devoid of any substantive ground or claim defendants violated any common law conflict of interest.
[brief] Such conduct cannot be considered bad faith.  The case relied on by [...] in fact stands for the proposition that the doctrine of estoppel does not apply here.  In Northfield, supra, this Court considered whether to apply the estoppel doctrine when an insurer moves for a declaration that it owes no duty to defend after submitting a reservation of rights letter and providing counsel.  Id. at *137-41.  The Court, citing earlier precedent, held “if a carrier wishes to control the defense and simultaneously reserve a right to dispute liability, it can do so only with the consent of the insured. ”  Id. at 142-43 (citing Merchants Indemnity Corp. v. Eggleston, 37 N.J. 114 (1962)).  “Without the insured’s consent or circumstances that suggest the insured acquiesced in the insurer’s control of the defense, an insurer will be estopped from later disclaiming coverage. ”  Id. at 143 (citing Eggleston, 37 N.J. at 127-29; Griggs v. Bertram, 88 N.J. 347, 356 (1982) and Sneed v. Concord Ins. Co., 98 N.J. Super. 306, 320 (App. Div. 1967)).
[brief] POINT III  THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW WHEN IT REFUSED TO ADDRESS AND RESOLVE THE CONFLICT BETWEEN THE RETA STATUTE AND REGULATIONS REGARDING DELIVERY OF THE PUBLIC OFFERING STATEMENT.  (Da1176).  Notwithstanding each plaintiff's acknowledging receipt of the Public Offering Statement, the plaintiffs argued that [...] either failed to provide them with a copy and/or failed to timely deliver a copy.  The plaintiffs relied on an administrative code regulation promulgated by the Real Estate Commission at N.J.A.C. 11:5-9A.6(a) which states:  No person shall dispose of any timeshare interest in a registered timeshare plan unless he or she delivers a current Public Offering Statement and affords the purchaser a reasonable opportunity to read the same before the purchaser signs the contract or Purchase Agreement.  (emphasis).  That regulation, however, is in direct conflict with the RETA and is therefore trumped by the RETA:  Except as provided in this section, no provision of this Act shall invalidate or modify any provision of any zoning, subdivision or building code, law, ordinance or regulation.
[brief] Rb10.  However, this argument fails for several reasons.  The Ricci Act states:  The board of trustees shall promulgate rules and regulations necessary to implement the provisions of this subsection and shall notify members and retirants in the retirement system of the enactment of this act, P.L.2019, c.157, within 30 days of enactment.  N.J.S.A. 53:5A-10(e).  Pursuant to the Ricci Act, the Board was required to provide notice to members and retirants in the system.
[brief] “While remarks made by individual Board members during the course of hearings may be useful in interpreting ambiguous language in a resolution, they are not a substitute for the [resolution].  Such remarks at best reflect the beliefs of the speaker and cannot be assumed represent the findings of an entire Board.  Moreover, because such remarks represent informal verbalizations of the speaker's transitory thoughts, they cannot be equated to deliberative findings of fact.  It is the resolution, and not board members' deliberations, that provides the statutorily required findings of fact and conclusions. ”
[brief] However, on cross examination, he agrees that he did not look at the Certificate of Tax Sale which was the basis for the foreclosure proceeding (5T53:16).  He also agrees that the only basis for his making the determination that the Riparian Grant was being foreclosed is a statement in the document “together with all Riparian Rights…” (5T56:2).  He admits he has no knowledge whether the owner of the Riparian Grant was joined in the foreclosure proceeding (5T56:5).  He never made any attempt to determine whether [...] ever conveyed the Riparian Grant (5T58:11).  He agrees that in 1918, all the property located to the north of the mean high-water line and more particularly in regard to Lot 3.01 was owned by [...].  In looking at P-3 (Pa 203) he admits there is a very thin portion of land north of Beachway and that would be the mean high-water line as of 1918.  He is aware of no other creation of a mean high-water line between 1918 and 1939 which was the date of the foreclosure proceeding (5T63:18).  He agrees [...] acquired a Riparian Grant from the State of New Jersey that gave [...] title to the land lying beneath the water and if the land was later filled in, title would still remain in [...] who owned the Riparian Grant (5T73:17).  The Borough calls [...] ("[...]"), the Client Manager in the Municipal Services Department of [...] (5T78).
[brief] This appeal concerns an important issue of first impression in this Court: whether the protections and purposes of New Jersey’s recently enacted anti-Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation law—formally titled the Uniform Public Expression Protection Act (“UPEPA”)—may be defeated by a litigant’s strategically timed decision to voluntarily dismiss his or her speech-suppressive lawsuit in order to avoid liability for attorneys’ fees.  Specifically, whether voluntary dismissal after the defendant has filed an application for an order to show cause seeking expedited dismissal and prevailing party attorneys’ fees under the statute, but before the court has had an opportunity to rule on such application, renders attorneys’ fees unavailable.  In the proceedings below, the trial court effectively ruled that they can.  If that ruling stands, litigants will have a roadmap to harass those who engage in protected public expression with baseless lawsuits, only to avoid liability and any fees by voluntarily dismissing their claims at any point prior to a merits ruling—even, as here, after the defendants have expended significant resources litigating those meritless claims, and even though the dismissal renders the defendants the prevailing party.  Here, Plaintiff-Respondent [...] commenced this action against [...]—a community newspaper; [...]—a synagogue; and its then-Rabbi [...] (“Defendants” or “Appellants”), and others, for allegedly obtaining and disseminating a flyer, in hard copy and online, that advocated for Plaintiff to give his wife a “get,” or religious divorce, and that contained what he characterized as an unflattering photograph of Plaintiff, and for organizing a protest in front of his parents’ house for the same purpose.
[brief] ## Table of Authorities | Authority | Brief page number | |------------------------------------------------|-------------------| | **Statute:** | | | N.J.S.A. 39:4-97 | 1 | | N.J.S.A. 39:4-129(d) | 1, 10 | | N.J.S.A. 39:4-130 | 1 | | **Case Law:** | | | State v. Feintuch, 150 N.J.Super. 414, 422 (App. Div. 1977) | 7 | | State v. Hanemann, 180 N.J. Super. 544 (App. Div.), certif. den. 88 N.J. 506 (1981) | 9 | | State v. Johnson, 42 N.J. 146, 162 (1964) | 7 | | State v. Kay, 151 N.J. Super. 255 (Cty. Ct. 1977) | 9 | | **Other:** | | | N.J. Courts, Model Jury Charge, “Preliminary Instructions to the Jury,” p. 3, Revised, September 1, 2022 | 11
[brief] (Da5-7).  In questioning the jury about its verdict, the trial court only asked if it \(^3\)  Defense counsel made this point during summation.  (9T39-12 to 41-11). found [...] guilty of murder, but never questioned it about the lesser-included offenses.  (10T9-20 to 11-19).  The trial court then collected the verdict sheet and polled the jurors to confirm that the sheet accurately reflected their verdicts, to which they unanimously replied yes.
[brief] **PROCEDURAL HISTORY**  On November 15, 2021, Plaintiff filed a Complaint alleging generally that Defendants acted negligently in the maintenance, inspection, and repair of the area of Plaintiff’s fall.  On January 24, 2022, Defendants filed an Answer in response to Plaintiff’s Complaint.  Thereafter, the parties engaged in written discovery, conducted fact depositions, and exchanged expert reports.  Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment which was argued before the Honorable [...], J.S.C. on April 12, 2024.  (Pa22, T1). ¹  That day, the trial court issued an Order granting Defendants’ motion for summary judgment and dismissing the Complaint with prejudice.  (Pa40).  On April 17, 2024, Plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration of the trial court’s decision to grant Defendants’ motion for summary judgment which was opposed.  (Pa42).  The trial court decided the motion on the papers and issued a Statement of Reasons on May 10, 2024, denying --- ¹ Appendix and Transcript Reference Key Pa – Plaintiff/Appellant’s Appendix Da – Defendant/Respondent’s Appendix T – Transcript of the April 12, 2024 Motion  Hearing Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration.  (Pa46).  Plaintiff filed the instant appeal on May 24, 2024.
[brief] See Hernon v. Webb-McRae, 2018 WL 4204440 (D.N.J. 2018) at *4.  (Pa133).  Here, Plaintiff alleges that a letter was placed into her file following a meeting addressing Plaintiff’s violation of the district’s mask-wearing policy.  Plaintiff’s union representative was present.  There is no indication that the letter or the investigation into the violation resulted in a termination, suspension, demotion or in any way materially altered the terms of her employment.
[brief] [...] maintain that the trial court had authority under N.J.S.A. 2A:28-3 to consider a solution to the boundary dispute between the parties without being limited to accepting or rejecting the Boundary Commissioners’ Report.  The statute provides that “the issue shall be tried and determined as in other cases of a civil nature at law. ”  The statute does not provide for any limitation on what remedies a court may consider if it decides to set aside a report from boundary commissioners.  Accordingly, the trial court should have considered the compromise line (the “Ludwig Line”) proposed by the Patiernos.  See Ludwig Line, Pa148.  The fact that [...], PLS testified at trial demonstrates the belief of the Patiernos at the time that the trial court could consider the compromise Ludwig Line.  No reason prevents such consideration in the context of the de novo review or the fresh look indicated by N.J.S.A. 2A:28-3.
[brief] Here, the police coerced [...] to confess by engaging in and threatening to engage in an unjustified course of conduct.  The police had already asked [...] for consent to search without reasonable suspicion, and [...] had refused to consent.  (1T 30-2 to 8)  Then, the officer threatened to \textsuperscript{12}  Notably, the Supreme Court has more recently made clear that reasonable suspicion is only required to conduct a drug dog sniff where it would prolong a stop.  \textit{State v. Dunbar}, 229 N.J. 521, 537-540 (2017).
[brief] While canvassing, [...] and [...] observed a discarded mask on the curbside, alongside a parked SUV that was located in between [...].  (2T89-17 to 90-6).  While [...] was by the SUV, [...], who also was canvassing, located a semiautomatic handgun near the walkway of [...].  (2T92-25 to 93-19; 2T95-6 to 14; 3T212-10 to 213-8).  The handgun was inside a small trash can on the side of the home.  (2T95-17 to 96-4; 3T212-10 to 213-8).  Video surveillance footage depicts an individual in a light-colored hoody placing the black semi-automatic handgun in the small trash can.  (2T107-7 to 12).  [...] observed a red substance that appeared to be blood or paint on the handgun.  (2T96-16 to 97-2).  [...] then notified his sergeant that the handgun was located and his sergeant advised [...] that the Crime Scene Identification Unit would respond and process the firearm.
[brief] BECAUSE HE DID NOT SEEK ADMISSION TO RECOVERY COURT ON A CONVICTION FOR A FIREARMS OFFENSE AND HE DID NOT HAVE A PENDING FIREARMS CHARGE AT THE TIME HIS RECOVERY COURT APPLICATION WAS CONSIDERED.  This case turns on the statutory interpretation of the second clause of N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14(a)(5), which disqualifies a candidate from Track One of Recovery Court if he “possess[ed] a firearm at the time of any pending criminal charge. ”  The State argues that because [...] possessed a firearm in Essex County while he had pending charges in Morris County, [...] is disqualified from Track One by subsection (a)(5).  (Sa72; Sb8, 14-16)¹  [...] seeks admission into Recover Court under Morris County Indictment
[directive] 1.0.10  The above list represents critical performance standards that every county and municipal law enforcement agency must implement.  Agencies that make a vigorous commitment to the internal affairs process signal their desire to comply with the highest standards of professionalism in law enforcement.  They also ensure that their officers will be accountable for their actions to both the agency and the community.  Agencies that fail to make such a commitment run the risk of failing to uncover policies, practices and procedures that may undermine legitimate efforts to provide the highest quality law enforcement services.  1.0.11
[brief] Pa12 at ¶17; Pa57 at ¶17.  On March 3rd, [...]—acting on Plaintiff’s request—emailed [...] and informed him that some of the substitute officers wanted a raise.  Pa13 at ¶19; Pa57 at ¶19; Pa37.  Plaintiff received [...] updates on March 5th and March 8th.  See Pa13 at ¶¶22-23; Pa57 at ¶¶22-23.  At about 11:00 AM or 12:00 PM on Wednesday, March 10th, Plaintiff met with other substitute officers to discuss plans to negotiate for a raise.  Pa13 at ¶25; Pa57 at ¶25.  At that meeting, one of Plaintiff’s fellow substitutes told Plaintiff that available work details for March 10th and March 12th had been posted on [...].  Pa13 at ¶26; Pa57 at ¶26.  Plaintiff alleges that he did not receive electronic notice of the March 10th and March 12th details.  Pa60 at ¶10.  Plaintiff leapt to the conclusion that Mr. [...] deliberately disconnected him from [...] as a form of retaliation.  Pa60 at ¶11; Pa63 at ¶¶ 53-54.  At his deposition, Plaintiff conceded that Mr. [...] lacked administrative privileges that would be necessary to remove Plaintiff from [...].
[brief] Respondent-appellant, [...] ("respondent"), relies and incorporates the Procedural History set forth in its initial Letter-Brief.  (Rb6).¹  STATEMENT OF FACTS  Respondent relies upon and incorporates the Statement of Facts set forth in its initial Letter-Brief.  (Rb5-6).  ¹"Rb refers to respondent's initial Letter-Brief filed on June 7, 2024.  "Ra" refers to respondent's appendix to its initial Letter Brief.  "Pb" refers to petitioner's Brief filed on June 21, 2024.  "1T" refers to February 21, 2024 motion transcript.  "2t" refers to March 14, 2024 motion transcript.  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I
[directive] IX.  Balancing Factors  Because the statute expressly grants the waiver decision to the Attorney General or county prosecutor, the relative weight to be assigned the criteria should be left to the prosecuting authority.  If one factor is so severe, it may outweigh the other factors.  Where no one factor dominates, the county prosecutor or Attorney General must use his/her discretionary powers to determine if waiver is warranted.  However, the weighing of factors is more complex than a simple counting of the numbers of factors in support of granting or denying the waiver.  The significance of each factor must be considered.
[brief] Rate Counsel is extremely concerned about the issue of stranded costs for gas infrastructure and has urged the Board to provide guidance so that unnecessary costs can be avoided.  At the same time, it is clear that in the short term the state’s natural gas infrastructure must be maintained to provide safe and adequate service.  While some new assets may in fact become stranded, the utilities cannot simply abandon their infrastructure.  The technical and safety issues involved in balancing a properly maintained system while limiting investment are extremely complex and appropriately before the Board in another matter.  \(^9\) N.J.S.A. 48:3-87.9.  \(^10\) Notice of Executive Order 317 Technical Conference, BPU Docket No. [...] (July 10, 2023).  The fact remains that natural gas is currently needed to generate energy and until the State is able to produce enough energy to substitute for the current natural gas demands of its 9.3 million residents, a safe and reliable gas system is imperative.  Although in light of the Governor’s recent Executive Order 317 issued on February 15, 2023, more well-defined guidance regarding the future of natural gas infrastructure could be forthcoming, the Court cannot rule on future policies or statutes not yet in place.  Therefore the Court cannot determine with certainty under these particular set of circumstances when and if the Regulator will become a stranded asset.  CONCLUSION
[brief] The cases that Defendants cite are not helpful to them.  In State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Molino, 289 N.J. Super. 406 (App. Div. 1996), this court held that an insurer’s declaratory-judgment suit raised a dispute about “entitlement to certain PIP benefits,” which the arbitrator had to decide before resolving whether PIP benefits were overdue.  Id. at 410.
[brief] - **South Dakota:** Robinson v.  Brandtjen & Kluge, Inc., 2006 WL 2796252, at *8 (D.S.D. Sept. 27, 2006) ("[n]othing ... indicates that South Dakota permits a claim based on a manufacturer’s duty to recall"; citing Restatement Third §11), aff’d, 500 F.3d 691 (8th Cir. 2007) (printing press).  - **Tennessee:** Spence v. Miles Laboratories, Inc., 810 F. Supp. 952, 959 (E.D. Tenn. 1992) (product-liability statute did not "require manufacturers and suppliers of [their] products to recall and test a product already on the market") (blood product).
[brief] ”  [...] and another responding officer, [...], searched the alleyway and backyard of [...], but did not find anyone.  [...] described the alleyway as just wide enough for a small car to drive through, said the empty lot behind the building was strewn with “a lot of trash and broken bottles,” and that the building was not occupied.  He thought defendant may have climbed over the chain-link fence that lined the alleyway and escaped onto Stuyvesant Avenue.  Shortly thereafter, [...], of the [...], received a call directing all units to the area of Stuyvesant and Lyons Avenues.