ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The State’s expert indicated that the Autism Spectrum Disorder, the dissociative state, “his clean record, the positive aspects of [...]’s character, and the thwarting of his desire to seek help before the shootings would be appropriate considerations in sentencing and placement should he be convicted.  (Da196-459).  However, at sentencing, the Court focused on hearsay statements from the voluminous reports to justify an egregious sentence.  The Court further stated that [...] indicated that his sister was mean to him and alluded to the fact that she used to touch him inappropriately when they were young children.  [...]’s brother [...] testified that [...] had a regular relationship with [...], and he never thought he would harm her in any way.  (9T:227-21 to 228-9).  The Court used the fact that [...], who is autistic and has difficulty with social interactions, did not speak at his sentencing to give additional weight to aggravating factor three.  (17T:197-24 to 198-7).  The Court ignored the fact that [...] expressed remorse to the social workers and the pre-sentence report, and put significant weight on the fact that a young adult who suffers from autism, could not give an eloquent apology at his sentencing in front of a courtroom full of people.  (17T:198-8 to 13).  With respect to aggravating factor nine (9), the Court did not properly evaluate that factor in the context of *State v. Zuber*, 227 N.J. 440 (2017).
[brief] Notice of Appeal ........................................................................Da31-34 ¹  While the number [...] appears on the indictment, all other documents in this case (judgment of conviction, presentence report, and transcripts) identify the indictment number as [...].  PROCEDURAL HISTORY  On July 26, 2022, Mercer County Indictment No. [...] charged Defendant-Appellant [...], in nine counts, with: possession of a gun without a permit and a large-capacity ammunition magazine under N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b)(1) and 2C:39-3(j); possession of cocaine and with intent to distribute and in a school zone and near a public facility under N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10a(1), 2C:35-5a(1), 2C:35-5b(2), 2C:35-7, 2C:35-7.1, and 2C:35-5b(1); possession of a gun during the commission of a drug crime under N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4.1a; and certain persons not to have a gun under N.J.S.A. 2C:39-7b(1) and 2C:39-7a(1).  (Da1-9)  On February 28, 2023, the Honorable [...], J.S.C., heard argument on [...]’s motion to suppress the physical evidence seized during a warrantless search.  (2T)  The court denied the motion on April 24, 2023.  (Da10-24)  _____________________  2  See footnote 1.  3  “Da” refers to the appendix to this brief.
[brief] See, *Suydam*, *supra* at 13 [emphasis added].  This procedure confirms that Appellant’s attempt to seek compensation for alleged physical damage to the Property is improper in a condemnation action as it injects issues into this matter which are not relevant to the fair market value inquiry.  Here, the [...] did not hire the contractor that repaired the seawall within the easement acquired in the Property; rather, the [...] hired the contractor.
[brief] [...], D/B/A [...] [...]  [...] (NJ Bar No. 210002016)  [...]  [...]  Telephone: [...]  Facsimile: [...]  On the Brief: [...], Esq.  TABLE OF CONTENTS  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS ...........................................................................................................iv  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .........................................................................................................v  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT .................................................................................................1  PROCEDURAL HISTORY .......................................................................................................3
[brief] [...]’s own statements during the hearing on January 10, 2022 reveal his recognition that the Trust language is not very complicated, or difficult to understand.  Instead, he recognized that there were only two ways to interpret the Trust language with respect to the Boonton Property:  “I believe his testamentary intent was that my brother and I, or my brother or I, receive the house.  I believe it was bequeathed at a fair market value price for my brother and I.  It’s pretty straightforward. ” (1T14:7-11).  A short while later, he added his view that “the trust is very clear.  I don’t think it’s ambiguous at all. ” (1T17:14-15).  Once again, it was only later that the Defendants’ view changed, after [...] had submitted his losing bid and the Boonton Property was sold to [...].
[brief] In fact, it was because [...] recognized defendant, and believed he was still in [...]’s employ, that [...] did not find defendant’s presence in the tavern after hours suspicious and did not raise an alarm.  (8T:17-18 to 18-6).  [...]’s lack of reaction proves the veracity of his recognition of the defendant.  Further supporting the reliability of [...]’s first-time in-court identification was the lack of any evidence of undue outside influence with regard to [...]’s identification of defendant.  Even in the absence of the guidance of Watson, defendant moved before the trial court for the suppression of [...]’s in-court identification.  This motion was denied because of the paucity of evidence to even suggest that [...]’s pretrial descriptions of the burglar were due to an outside influence.
[brief] ”)  Here, the court failed to do any Yarbough analysis in imposing consecutive sentences for the robbery and homicide convictions, and it did not explain the overall fairness of the sentence.  Nor did the court consider the Miller factors as part of its decision to impose consecutive sentences, let alone “exercise a heightened level of care” in doing so.  See Zuber, 227 N.J. at 429-30.  Thus, the case must be remanded for resentencing.
[brief] As an initial matter, the Supreme Court grants a *general* license to practice law to attorneys who become licensed.  Provided the qualifications for licensure are met, the Supreme Court provides for “plenary admission” to the bar of this State.  Rule 1:27-1.  That is, an attorney is not admitted as a civil attorney, a matrimonial attorney or as some other specialist, but rather as an attorney who can structure their practice as they desire, provided they comply with all rules governing the practice.  By enacting the Limited Attorney Exemption, the Legislature has improperly sought to regulate the practice of law in this State and restrict the general license to practice law that attorneys of this State receive.  Our courts have long recognized that debt adjustment services, like other transactional services, constitute the practice of law over which the Supreme Court has exclusive jurisdiction to regulate.  In Furman, supra, the court observed that “services encompassed by the statutory definition of debt adjuster are often an integral and essential part of an attorney’s job when he represents a debt-ridden client” and concluded that “[i]t is plain by now that in their activities debt adjusters may encroach upon the practice of law. ”
[directive] domestic except detention preventive against presumption general a creates Law Reform Bail  The of term ordinary extended or an facing is or murder with charged is defendant a where in cases is cases other all in applies release that pretrial of presumption statutory  The imprisonment. life release that no evidence convincing clear and by establishes State the when only overcome defendant's eligible the assure reasonably will conditions of combination or condition the or person any other of safety of protection the the required, when court in appearance justice criminal the obstruct to attempt or obstruct not will defendant the that or community, it Directive under this standard, statutory that to Pursuant 2A:162-19.
[brief] The Supreme Court has said that the right to have the jury consider a lesser-included offense is at “the very core of the guarantee of a fair trial,” State v. Short, 131 N.J. 47, 52 (1993).  In addition, the Court has recognized that a passion/provocation charge can be an appropriate complement to an instruction on self-defense.  It has explained that where, as here, a jury rejects self-defense, it might well find that the decedent’s conduct nevertheless constituted adequate provocation to satisfy the lesser passion/provocation-manslaughter offense.
[brief] [...], d/b/a [...]  (PA)  [...]  Plaintiff, vs. [...], d/b/a  [...]  (PA) and [...], Defendant.  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE  DIVISION  APPELLATE COURT  DOCKET NUMBER: [...]  SUPERIOR COURT DOCKET NUMBER: [...]  ON APPEAL FROM THE ORDER OF THE SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY, CIVIL DIVISION, BURLINGTON COUNTY
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT DEFTLY HANDLED THE JURY NOTES SO AS TO AVOID COERCING VERDICTS.  POINT II  THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY CHARGED THE JURY ON OFFICIAL MISCONDUCT WHICH PROPERLY FOUND DEFENDANT GUILTY OF THAT CRIME.  POINT III  THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY INSTRUCTED THE JURY ON DEFENDANT’S LEGAL DUTIES, WHILE FACT WITNESSES PROPERLY EVIDENCED THAT DEFENDANT KNOWINGLY VIOLATED THOSE DUTIES FOR THE JURY TO RENDER  A VALID GUILTY VERDICT OF OFFICIAL MISCONDUCT.  POINT IV  NO SPECIFIC UNANIMITY CHARGE WAS REQUIRED ON THE OFFICIAL MISCONDUCT-RELATED COUNTS.  POINT V  THE STATE’S EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE IMPEACHING DEFENDANT’S EXHIBIT WAS INTRINSIC EVIDENCE THAT WAS PROPERLY ADMITTED.  POINT VI  DEFENSE COUNSEL INJECTED THE ISSUE OF LAY OPINION INTO THE CASE STRATEGICALLY, AND ITS ADMISSION WAS, AT BEST, PROPER, OR, AT LEAST, NOT PLAIN ERROR.  A.  Defendant’s argument is precluded as invited error  B. [...]’s opinion was properly admitted.............................................53  C.  Admission of [...]’s opinion was not plain error..............................54  POINT VII  THE JUDGE PROPERLY DENIED DEFENDANT’S OFFER OF CONDUCT AT THREE OTHER TRAFFIC STOPS BECAUSE IT WAS NOT HABIT EVIDENCE...........................................55  POINT VIII  THE JURY INSTRUCTIONS ON GRADING OF THE THEFT CHARGE WERE NOT PLAINLY ERRONEOUS, AND THE SPECIAL INTERROGATORY FOR THAT CHARGE WAS REQUIRED BY APPRENDI V. NEW JERSEY..................................................................................................................58  A.  The jury understood its obligation to apply the standard of beyond a reasonable doubt .................................................................................58  B.  Use of the special interrogatory was mandatory........................................63  POINT IX  NO BASIS EXISTS TO DOWNGRADE  THE JURY VERDICT THAT DEFENDANT COMMITTED THEFT BY UNLAWFUL TAKING IN THE THIRD DEGREE TO A DISORDERLY-PERSONS OFFENSE...............................................................66  CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................69
[brief] Exhibit A, 12/21/2012  Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint...................(omitted, see 1a)  Exhibit B, 1/30/2013  Answer and Separate Defenses of Defendants [...], Esquire, and [...].......................................................................................................(omitted, see 18a)  Exhibit C, 3/28/2012  [...] Deposition Excerpts ............(omitted, see 1020a)  1/30/2019 Defendants [...]’ and [...]’s Notice of Motion for Summary Judgment..................................................................................1102a
[brief] [...] ID. No. 084402013  Ass’t Deputy Public Defender [...] Of Counsel and On the Letter-Brief  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. [...]  STATE OF NEW JERSEY, : CRIMINAL ACTION  Plaintiff-Respondent, : On Appeal From a Judgment Of v. : Conviction of the : Superior Court of New Jersey, [...], : Law Division, Cumberland Vicinage : Indictment No. [...] : Sat Below: Defendant-Appellant. : Hon. [...], J.S.C.  Your Honors: This reply letter-brief is submitted on behalf of Defendant in lieu of a formal brief pursuant to R. 2:6-2(b).
[brief] (Pa1199).  During oral argument, Plaintiff’s counsel conceded that [...] could not terminate Defendant [...] or change his employment status (3T 21:4-22) but essentially argued that, because other remedial measures potentially existed, such as placing Plaintiff on paid administrative leave, [...]’ decision to transfer Plaintiff must have been retaliatory.  (3T 21:5-24:9).  In his ruling from the bench, [...] indicated that he had previously made a “mistake” (3T 24:19-25) and misapplied the facts of the case by finding that a jury question existed regarding whether the [...] Defendants had “control” of the [...] employees and had otherwise misapplied the laws regarding remedial measures taken under the LAD.  (3T 91:15-20).  As [...] observed, this was not a situation where an employer knew of harassment and failed to take evasive measures to stop it, thereby joining in with the harasser.  (3T 91:5-9).  As [...] aptly noted, the [...] Defendants “took evasive actions to stop [the harassment], it’s just not the evasive actions that the plaintiff claimed were appropriate and the[y] claim had to be retaliatory.  This Court can’t do so because this Court can’t find that the [...] actions taken were within the control of the [...] defendant. ” (3T 91:1-17).  Accordingly, [...] found that the [...] Defendants were entitled to summary judgment and accordingly granted same.  (3T 91:17-19, Pa1199).  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT
[brief] Sat Below: HON.  [...], J.S.C. BRIEF ON BEHALF OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT  [...]  [...] [...] [...]  [...]  -and- Of Counsel: [...], Esq.  Attorney ID# 032931993  [...], Esq.  Attorney ID# 420372022  [...], Esq.  Attorney ID# 012361989  [...]  [...] [...]  [...]  Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant
[directive] 6.4  Documentation or Appeal  When Specific Request for Special Release Condition Is Denied.  If a request for imposition of a special release condition is denied by the court, the assistant prosecutor or deputy attorney general shall document the request and denial in the case file.  There may be circumstances where a prosecutor refrains from seeking pretrial detention only because the prosecutor assumes that the court will impose maximum release conditions pursuant to the automated pretrial risk-assessment results and the AOC’s “Decision Making Framework. ”  If the prosecutor determines that only those maximum conditions and level of monitoring would be sufficient to manage the risk(s) posed by defendant’s release, see subsections 7.4.1 and 7.4.2, and the court does not impose such necessary conditions, the prosecutor shall object to defendant’s release on inadequate conditions, shall notify the Division of Criminal Justice, and shall, if necessary and when feasible, seek reconsideration by the court and/or initiate an appeal.  7.  PRETRIAL DETENTION MOTIONS
[directive] (1)  Notify the victim of the victim’s right to obtain an approved serological test for acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS) or infection with the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) or any other related virus identified as a probable causative agent of AIDS, and assist the victim, or refer the victim for assistance, in obtaining a test and appropriate counseling and medical care; (2)  Notify the victim of the victim’s right to obtain a court order pursuant to subsection a. of section 4 of P.L. 1993, c. 364 (C. 2C:43-2.2) requiring the offender to submit to an approved serological test for acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS) or infection with the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) or any other related virus identified as a probable causative agent of AIDS in the event that the offender is indicted, formally charged, convicted or adjudicated delinquent; (3)  Communicate the request of a victim who agrees to seek an order pursuant to subsection a. of section 4 of P.L. 1993, c. 364 (C. 2C:43-2.2) to the prosecutor handling the case and notify the victim or arrange for the victim to be notified of the test result; and; (4)  Assist the victim in applying to the [...] for compensation for the costs of testing, counseling and medical care.  ENSURE PROTOCOLS
[brief] *State v. Sutherland*, 231 N.J. 429, 437 (2018).  Consistent with federal jurisprudence, the New Jersey Supreme Court has held that Article I, Paragraph 7 of the New Jersey Constitution provides “room . . . for some mistakes [by police]. ”  *State v. Handy*, 206 N.J. 39, 54 (2011) (second alteration in original) (quoting *Illinois v. Rodriguez*, 497 U.S. 177, 186 (1980)).  However, that principle applies only when “the police . . . behave[] reasonably. ”  *Ibid.*; see also *State v. Green*, 318 N.J. Super. 346, 352-53 (App. Div. 1999) (holding reasonable but mistaken belief leading to arrest did not warrant suppression).  [...]’s and [...]’s reliance on the warrant in the mobile data terminal was reasonable and, therefore, the trial court properly found that their investigatory detention was valid.
[brief] [...]’S BRIEF OF COUNSEL AND ON THE BRIEF  [...]  #15095-2018  [...] [...] [...]  ATTORNEYS FOR RESPONDENT  [...]  [...]  TABLE OF CONTENTS  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ...........................................................................................................2  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT .....................................................................................................4  STATEMENT OF FACTS ..............................................................................................................5  PROCEDURAL HISTORY ............................................................................................................7  LEGAL ARGUMENT ..................................................................................................................8  STANDARD OF REVIEW .........................................................................................................8  POINT ONE: APPELLANT’S APPEAL SHOULD BE DENIED AS THEY HAVE NOT EXHAUSTED  ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES .................................................................8  POINT TWO: APPELLANT’S APPEAL SHOULD BE DENIED BECAUSE THERE ARE MATERIAL FACTS IN DISPUTE WHICH WOULD ALLOW A FACT FINDER TO FIND NO ENFORCEABLE CONTRACT ...............................................................10  POINT THREE: APPELLANT’S RELIANCE ON WILLINGBORO IS MISPLACED AND THE APPEAL SHOULD BE DENIED .................................................................15  POINT FOUR:  APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS RELATIVE TO OWBA ARE UNPERSUASIVE.  THE INSTANT APPEAL SHOULD BE DENIED ..................................................20  CONCLUSION ..........................................................................................................................24
[brief] Plaintiff argues that because the Mayor’s business was within 200’ feet of the project, she was an “interested party” as that term is defined under the Municipal Land Use Law with regard to applications and hearings under that Law, not public improvement projects by a municipality as in this case.  The Local Government Ethics Law is the controlling statute and, as noted, it expressly permits the Mayor’s participation in the vote for road work on [...] that equally benefited the property owners and tenants on [...] in the surrounding area and members of the travelling public.
[brief] Both requirements must be satisfied for a statute to be applied retroactively.  In addressing the first question, legislative intent for retroactivity can be demonstrated: “(1) when the Legislature expresses its intent that the law apply retroactively, either expressly or implicitly; (2) when an amendment is curative; or (3) when the expectations of the parties so warrant. ”  James, 216 N.J. at 563.  One of those three grounds must be present to give a statute retroactive effect.  Cruz, 195 N.J. at 46.
[brief] --- 2  Despite [...]’s claims, the undisputed change to the EGPs for the Backlog Projects listed in the PTA (not EGPs for projects that were supposedly elevated to Backlog Project status after the PTA was executed) was not the product of the parties “mutual assent via a less formal method of reciprocated agreement. ”  Opp. at 24.  Rather, the EGPs for projects that existed at the time of the execution of the PTA (in other words, projects [...] took over mid-construction) were subject to other provisions of the PTA like cost-reserve agreements for unanticipated issues [Da55 (PTA § 1.7(a)(i))] or credits for underbillings determined after PTA execution [Da56 (PTA § 1.7(b)(i))], resulting in agreed-upon alternations to those listed EGPs.  POINT III
[brief] Plaintiff Continues to Function as an Employee while Defendant [...] Abuses His Exclusive Decision-Making Authority at [...] Law  Despite his title of Managing Partner and his 5% equity interest, Plaintiff did not have or exercise decision-making power regarding the affairs of [...] Law.  Da36, ¶ 30.  For example, Plaintiff did not have the authority to hire or fire employees and had no right to vote on any business decisions.  At no point did [...] Law conduct partnership meetings or bring any Firm matters to a vote.  Id., ¶¶ 31-32.  Plaintiff was not shown or given access to [...] Law’s books and records, was not kept informed on the Firm’s financial status, and did not participate in financial decisions.  Id., ¶ 33.  Plaintiff has no knowledge of the salaries of [...].  All decisions regarding partner compensation were made exclusively by [...].  Id., ¶ 34.  Plaintiff did not exercise any authority to enter any binding contracts on behalf of [...] Law without [...]’s approval.  Da36, ¶ 35.  Moreover, despite owning 5% of the equity of [...] Law as of October 1, 2018 as set forth in the Partnership Interest Purchase Agreement (Da083), Plaintiff never received financial information about firm revenues and profits or any distributions of [...] Law’s profits.  Da36, ¶ 36.  All decision-making power remained with [...], who at all times exercised complete decision-making authority over [...] Law.  Plaintiff reported to [...] on all matters related to the operation of the Firm.  Id., ¶ 37; ¶ 150.  Defendant [...] managed and ran the Firm by himself, but did not litigate cases during the entire time Plaintiff was employed.  Defendant [...] never attended or conducted trials or mediations, he did not take depositions, nor did he handle any other significant legal work.  Id., ¶ 38.  [...] abused his decision-making power and engaged in extensive self-dealing in his position as majority owner and *de facto* managing partner of [...] Law.  By way of example, [...] entered into several long-term commercial leases on behalf of [...] Law with himself or entities that he controlled as landlord, and set the rent payments at unconscionable rates.  *Id.*, ¶¶ 39-43.  [...] was also paying himself a “management fee” that was not explained or justified that, for example, totaled $2.2 million in 2018.  *Id.*, ¶ 44.  In addition, Defendant [...] employed his brother, William [...], on a “lifetime” basis, despite little contribution from him, an undefined role, and frequent inappropriate behavior towards female staff at the Firm.  [...] also employs his brother-in-law, [...], without any clear contribution to the Firm.  Azcarati has also been accused of unlawful, sexually harassing behavior with certain female staff at the Firm.  *Id.*, ¶ 45.  **D.
[brief] Plaintiffs’ representative, [...], testified during his deposition about particular activities conducted on his Property, particularly the taking of soil borings, the installation of temporary well points, and the excavation of the Property, and testified that these activities were conducted without Plaintiffs’ permission or consent.  (Pa000322, pg. 36, line 2 to 6; Pa000323, pg. 40, line 13 to line 24; Pa000325, pg. 49, line 14 to line 19).  [...] further testified that he was never made aware of the original site plans for the Project, which incorporated his Domino’s Property into the Project, and that he had no understanding that the Property was to be incorporated into the Project.  (Pa000326, pg. 52, line 15 to line 25; Pa000344, pg. 124, line 1 to line 20; Pa000775).