ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to preclude consideration of other adjudications of delinquency (e.g., adjudications for violent or firearms-related crimes that occurred more than ten years ago, or adjudications for offenses other than firearms-related or NERA crimes) as may be relevant as part of the totality of the circumstances when determining whether to overcome the presumption of issuing a complaint-summons pursuant to Section 4.3.  Out-of-State Convictions/Charges.
[directive] If the results of an automated pretrial risk assessment are not available because of problems taking the defendant’s fingerprints, the assistant prosecutor, deputy attorney general, or supervisory officer shall, when feasible, ascertain the defendant’s criminal history by making an NCIC/CCH or Interstate Identification Index query that does not require fingerprint verification, provided, however, that nothing in this paragraph shall be construed to excuse the requirement to utilize an up-to-date Live Scan system capable of initiating the automated risk-assessment process.  See subsections 2.2.2, 2.2.3, and 2.2.4.  In the event that the charging decision is made pursuant to this subsection without the benefit of a preliminary automated risk assessment, when determining whether to overcome a presumption of issuing a complaint-summons in accordance with subsection 4.3.1, the assistant prosecutor, deputy attorney general, or designated supervisory officer shall give special consideration to the interest of public protection served by providing the pretrial services program with an opportunity to conduct an objective assessment and to make recommendations as to any 18
[brief] Although that petition was denied on October 11, 2018, [...]’s subsequent motion for reconsideration was granted on November 30, 2018.  On reconsideration, [...]’s petition was again denied, and he thus filed an appeal on November 7, 2019.  On March 3, 2021, the Appellate Division reversed this Court’s decision and ordered that an evidentiary hearing be held.  In August 2021, an evidentiary hearing was held, wherein [...] testified, and defense counsel learned—for the first time, more than four years after the petition was filed and after two appeals—of [...]’ Sworn Statement.  Despite [...]’ testimony at the evidentiary hearing, on November 17, 2021, [...]’s petition was nevertheless denied.
[brief] See *State v. Savage*, 172 N.J. 374, 388-89 (2002) (noting “in addition to requiring trial courts to instruct juries that an accomplice can have a different mental state from that of the principal, our courts regularly have noted the importance of tailoring the jury charge to the facts of the case. ”) (citing *State v. Cook*, 300 N.J. 476, 488-87 (App. Div. 1993)); *State v. Tucker*, 280 N.J. Super. 149, 152-53 (App. Div. 1995) (reversing defendant’s robbery conviction where trial court inadequately instructed jury on accomplice liability by failing to explain possible difference in intent between principal and defendant, and that defendant should be acquitted if he did not share principal’s intent to rob.)  Moreover, our Courts have held that trial courts are required to give something more than the general, untailored model charge for accomplice liability in cases where a defendant is charged with first-degree robbery as an accomplice.  *Weeks*, 107 N.J. at 403-05; *Tucker*, 280 N.J. Super. at 152-53 (Explaining that “it is not always enough simply to read the applicable version of the criminal code, define the terminology, and set forth the elements of the crime. ”)  Here, the trial court’s instruction on accomplice liability reproduced the relevant provisions of the accomplice liability statute without tailoring the charge to the facts of the case.  The trial court instructed the jury in accordance with the model jury charge on accomplice liability that applies when no lesser-included offenses are charged.
[brief] Where the award was procured by corruption, fraud or undue means; b. Where there was either evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or any thereof; c. Where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause being shown therefore, or in refusing to hear evidence, pertinent and material to the controversy, or of any other misbehaviors prejudicial to the rights of any party; d.  Where the arbitrators exceeded or so imperfectly executed their powers that a mutual, final and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made.  [N.J.S.A. 2A:24-8.]  Under N.J.S.A. 2A:24-8(a), “undue means” encompasses those situations where the arbitrator has made a mistake of fact or law that is either apparent on the face of the record or admitted to by the arbitrator.
[brief] “The evident goal of Article VIII, Section 3, Paragraph 1 (Blighted Areas Clause) is to give municipalities the means to improve the quality of life of their residents and to spur business opportunity and job growth. ”  Id. at 134.  “If town officials decide that an area is in need of redevelopment, the governing body may go forward and adopt a redevelopment plan for the area. ”  Id. at 173 ([...], C.J. dissenting); N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-7(a).  “The municipality can then ‘proceed with the clearance, replanning, development and redevelopment of the area designated in that plan. ’”  Id. at 173 (quotation omitted); N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-8.  “In particular, the town can condemn and acquire private property under the Eminent Domain Act to carry out the redevelopment plan. ”  62-64 Main, 221 N.J. at 173; N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-8(c) (citing N.J.S.A. 20:3-1 to -50).  In Wilson, the Supreme Court expressly rejected the idea that a municipality engaging in redevelopment takes property for private use for the pecuniary profit of private individuals.
[brief] See (Pa296).  As for the Plan, the only statements supporting Ordinance No. 2022-17 came from counsel—not the Committee members or testimony presented before the Committee with regard to Ordinance No. 2022-17.  The failure by the Committee to set forth its reasons for adopting Ordinance No. 2022-17 means the public is "in the dark" about the process.  The Committee provided no indication of evidence it found persuasive or unpersuasive, or what weight, if any, was given to any particular evidence.  For all the public knows, the Committee members failed to read any of the documents listed by [...] when introducing Ordinance No. 2022-15.  At the end of the day, the Committee must keep in mind its audience – the citizens of [...].  The Committee's decision not to amend the Plan means a lay person must look at Ordinance No. 2022-15, then Ordinance No. 2022-17 and compare and contrast both with the text of the Plan.  It should not be arduous for a citizen to understand the actions taken by their municipality and reasons for doing so.  For these reasons, Plaintiffs request this Court find there was not sufficient evidence in the record to support Defendants' adoption of Ordinance No. 2022-17.
[directive] Minor victims and their families should be referred for medical follow-up care and counseling services to the Regional Diagnostic and Treatment Center, the county’s Child Advocacy Center, the designated county sexual violence program, or any other appropriate service provider.  Minor victims age 13 or older, and their families, must be offered the services of the designated county sexual violence program.  Law enforcement shall provide information about the services of a CSVA, who may also offer support services to non-offending family members of all child and adolescent victims, regardless of the child’s age or when and where the assault occurred.  -20-
[brief] POINT III  The sentence given to the Defendant was not illegal.  Defendant argues that the sentencing court lacked jurisdiction to impose conditions of parole and that the sentencing court did not impose a sentence authorized by law.  (Db18).  Defense first contends that the sentencing judge has no authority to impose conditions of parole.  Further, the defense argues that the sentencing court has no mechanism by which to enforce compliance with a lifelong, post-release restraints on Defendant’s freedom.  Secondly, Defense contends that prohibiting the Defendant from having contact with [...], owning, possessing, exercising control over, or caring for any other animal, and ordering defendant to complete anger management was not authorized by any statute.  Appellate review of a sentence encompasses three distinct inquires.  *State v. Hudson*, 209 N.J. 513, 528 (2012); see also *State v. Roth*, 95 N.J. 334, 363-66 (1984).
[directive] Cash Bail Option 2nd Degree $25,000 to $50,000  No 10%  Actor driving motor vehicle fails to stop after signal from police, third degree; if actor eludes 2C:29-2b  Eluding and drives in a manner that creates a risk of death or injury, second degree.  3rd Degree $10,000 to $20,000 10% permissible a.  Actor has purpose to hinder or impair apprehension or prosecution of another and assists 2nd Degree $25,000 to $50,000 10% permissible that person in avoiding detection or suppression of evidence; second or third or fourth degree or disorderly persons offense depending upon degree of crime the other person is charged with or liable to be charged with and whether the actor is a spouse, domestic 3rd Degree $5,000 to $10,000 10% permissible partner, partner in a civil union, parent or child of the person aided.  Hindering 2C:29-3(a)(b)  Apprehension or b.  Actor has purpose to hinder his own apprehension by concealing or destroying evidence  Prosecution or by using force or intimidation toward another or by giving false information to a law 4th Degree $1,000 to $2,500 10% permissible enforcement officer.  If force or intimidation is used, then second degree; third degree if the actor has been charged or is liable to be charged with a second degree crime or greater; fourth degree crime if underlying offense would be third degree.  Otherwise, a Disorderly Persons $500 to $1,000 10% permissible disorderly persons offense.
[directive] Waiver of Parole Ineligibility (“Flat Offer”)  Subject to the provisions of Section 6.3, in all cases where the defendant is eligible for a standardized “flat offer,” the prosecutor shall agree to waive the statutorily prescribed term of parole ineligibility and must tender a plea offer of three years imprisonment, except that when the defendant is charged with a violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7 involving less than one ounce of marijuana, the standardized “flat offer” will be a county jail term of 180 days imposed as a condition of probation.  It should noted that under regular parole laws, a defendant sentenced to a “flat” three-year State Prison term would ordinarily be eligible for parole in approximately nine months, and might be eligible for even earlier release pursuant to the Intensive Supervision Program (ISP).  6.4.1
[brief] The Trial Court’s Decision Clearly Shows that the Trial Court Mixed and Matched Legal Concepts to Reach its Conclusion that Criterion (b) was not Supported by Substantial Evidence.  Despite the fact that the undisputed evidence shows that the Property had not been used for at least six months, Plaintiff asks this Court to ignore the legal contortionism the Trial Court engaged in to conclude that criterion (b) was not satisfied.  (Pb13-Pb14).  Criterion (b) can be satisfied upon a showing of “[t]he discontinuance of the use of a building or buildings previously used for commercial, retail, shopping malls or plazas, office parks, manufacturing, or industrial purposes…”  N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-5(b).  Undisputed evidence shows that all use of the Property ended in January 2023, six months before the redevelopment designation.  Plaintiff’s counsel admitted at trial, “what we have are the following facts; the lease terminated in January of 2023, the building was unoccupied for six months as of the time the resolution was passed and that the property is involved in remediation.  Those are the only facts that the Borough has presented. ” (T3,5:25-6:5).  He further admitted that “the credible evidence says that the property was discontinued for six months…” (T3, 15:22-25).  These admissions alone are enough to show discontinuance of use.  The Trial Court even found that “the property is actively undergoing remediation and was leased until -- up until 2023 when it was determined that the remediation would require access to areas that would make it untenable to continue to rent.” (T, 51:11-15).  However, the Trial Court did not like that outcome because it was “unreasonable” to take an owner’s property or to designate it as a redevelopment area when the owner was undertaking active remediation.  (T3, 51:15-21).  In order avoid the possibility of condemnation, the Trial Court made up its own standard.  Because the Trial Court failed to apply the plain language of the statute, the Appellate Division should reverse the decision of the Trial Court.
[brief] On December 5, 2007, Plaintiff, [...], purchased a 1.4-acre, Pines Lake lake-front, residential property known as [...].  The property contained a well-maintained and historic home.  The purchase price was roughly $1.61 million (Pa0203).  Initially, [...] planned to expand and renovate the home and property to his requirements and engaged architect, [...] (who, in turn engaged engineers, [...]) for that purpose.  After considering the recommendation of [...], [...] decided to raze the existing home and construct a new home in its place, rather than try to expand the existing home.  For that purpose, [...] engaged [...] (“[...]”) to design the new home and site and engaged [...]’s affiliated construction company, [...] (“[...]”) to perform the installation/construction of a new 10,000 sq. ft. modular home.  (Pa0203).  After being introduced to [...] (“[...]”) and hearing the benefits of modular construction, [...] discarded the idea of renovating/expanding the existing, aging home.  Instead, he decided to demolish it and build a luxury modular home on the site overlooking the lake.  In October 2008 [...] retained [...]’ architectural firm, [...] (“[...]”) to design the modular home.
[brief] [Myska v. New Jersey Mfrs. Ins. Co., 440 N.J. Super. 458, 482 (App. Div. 2015) (internal citations and quotations omitted). ]  Considering the facts alleged in the Foreclosure Complaint, in light of all documents annexed to the complaint, all of which are “matters of public record, and documents that form the basis of a claim,” Plaintiff cannot meet the burden of showing it is entitled to relief.  Plaintiff does not deny that the mortgage was discharged of record on January 29, 2018.  Rather, Plaintiff admits that “prior to the bankruptcy preference action and the settlement of that action, the 2012 mortgage was not in default and there was no reason to seek reinstatement. ” (Db13).  Plaintiff fails to cite any authority to support the proposition that a mortgage, which was property discharged, can be reinstated years later and automatically be placed into default due to a bankruptcy proceeding which was commenced years after the discharge of mortgage was recorded.
[brief] (Pa139-154).  The Court erred in its decision that Appellant failed to state a claim.  The Appellant stated very clearly and obviously that her belief is that the intent of OPRA as it applies to the Kidnapping case, is to allow the public access to information to include the examination and inspection of documents.  She stated very clearly that she is a citizen who dedicated countless hours to preserving, protecting and caring for the upkeep of the Kidnapping documents and it is her opinion that the requested documents are the only documents within the approximately 225,000 Kidnapping documents that contain any DNA samples valuable to the public.  [...] also stated clearly that she believes coupled with [...]’s Executive Order 110, OPRA is a mechanism which can and should compel the State to allow this testing to occur because it is in the public’s interest to know who sealed these envelopes, who licked these stamps, and there is absolutely no plausible reason why the State would not want to also know who sealed these envelopes and who licked these stamps.  In response to Appellant’s claim and her argument about the purpose behind the word “examination” used by the Legislature when writing OPRA and the word “examination” used by [...] when signing Executive Order 110, the Court order was silent.
[brief] *Rivkin v. Dover Township Rent Leveling Bd.*, 143 N.J. 352,366 (1996)"(citing *Weimer v. Amen*, 870 E. 2d 7400, 1405 (8th Cir. 1989).  See also *United Artists Theatre Circuit. Inc. v. Township of Warrington*, PA, 316 F.3d 392, 399-400 (3d Cir. 2003).  Only the most egregious official conduct is conscience shocking.  *Eichenlaub v. Twp. Of Indiana*, 385 F.3d 274, 285 (3d Cir. 2004).  In *Rochin*, [...] equated substantive due process violations with government abuses that "are . . close to the rack and the screw to permit constitutional differentiation."  *Rivkin*, 143 N.J. at 366 (citing *Rochin v. California*, 342 U.S. 165 (1952).  The egregious beating and choking of the plaintiff by the police while he attended to his business for no logical reason is an abuse that is “close to the rack and the screw to permit constitutional differentiation. ”  These acts constitute a deprivation that are constitutionally sufficient.  Based on this plaintiff was denied of substantive due process.  Plaintiff became a victim of a crime by the criminal justice system of the [...].  *Pepper v. Princeton*, 77 NJ 55 (1978) allows a court to rectify Constitutional violations directly.  The Court was allowed under Peper to declare that Plaintiff was improperly seized, arrested without probable cause and without due process.  Plaintiff, as a victim of crime was not treated with fairness or respect by the justice system.  Because this was not done, Plaintiff has a constitutional cause of action against the defendants under *Pepper v. Princeton*, 77 NJ 55 (1978).
[brief] *Id.* at 99 *(emphasis added)*.  A proper reading of *Olds* and *Dimitrakopoulos* together results in a finding that the Entire Controversy Doctrine bars a plaintiff from bringing claims for legal malpractice that occurred in a transactional setting, when the claims arise from related facts and the same transaction as a previous litigation wherein the defendant did not represent the plaintiff.  The *Dimitrakopoulos* Court specifically focused on the issue of the timing of the accrual of the claims as well as their relationship to one another.  *Id.* at 119.  When a court decides whether multiple claims must be asserted in the same action, its initial inquiry is whether they “arise from related facts or the same transaction or series of transactions…the determinative consideration is whether distinct claims are aspects of a single larger controversy because they arise from interrelated facts.  *Ibid.*  The *Dimitrakopoulos* Court followed the *Olds'* Court rulings in finding that in instances where the Entire Controversy Doctrine does not bar the action, it is not because of some *per se* exemption from the Entire Controversy Doctrine for legal malpractice claim.
[brief] “[T]he relaxation provision should be sparingly resorted to, particularly when a reasonable interpretation of the complex of directly applicable rules meets the problem at hand. ”  Robertelli v. Office of Atty. Ethics, 224 N.J. 470, 483 (2016).  In the present matter, one single rule exists which speaks directly to disputed issue in this matter.  Rule 4:26-4 provides a specific roadmap for the use of fictitious party practice.  No ambiguity supports the relaxation of its application.  Notably, the claimant in Rutkowski also contended that the relaxation of the R. 4:26-4 was warranted in that matter and the argument was specifically rejected.  Rutkowski, 209 N.J.Super at 146-47.  CONCLUSION  For the foregoing reasons, this Court should affirm the trial court’s order granting [...] summary judgment predicated upon the net opinions articulated by plaintiff’s liability expert, or, in the alternative, reverse the trial court’s prior order denying [...]’s motion for summary judgement predicated upon an improper application of fictitious party pleading practice.
[brief] [...] contends that [...] disagreed with the Department’s requirement that [...] “agree to submit” to the Holding Company Act.  (Ab13 n.8).  That is further proof that the Department interpreted the Holding Company Act as applying to reciprocal exchanges before it issued the Bulletin and that the Bulletin therefore does not constitute a change by the Department.  [...]’s contention that the Department’s “demand” that [...] “agree to submit” to the Holding Company Act would not have been necessary if [...] had already been subject to the Act, Ibid., is both inaccurate and illogical.  Rather, the Department required that [...] comply with the Holding Company Act, notwithstanding the fact it is a reciprocal exchange, just as it had previously required of [...] in the 2014 Order and again in the 2020 Order.  Based on the Holding Company Act’s plain language, and the Department’s application of it over time, the court should confirm a well-established regulatory scheme and rule that the Holding Company Act applies to reciprocal exchanges.  To rule otherwise would upend a settled area of law and the Department’s long-standing and consistent application of law squarely within its area of regulatory responsibility.
[brief] As they did at the trial level, plaintiffs continue to confuse the concepts of the “discovery rule” and “relation back. ”  As set forth in this defendant’s initial brief, the “discovery rule” pertains to claims, not to parties.  Moreover, it pertains to the factual basis for a claim, not the legal underpinnings thereof.  Plaintiff [...] knew of the factual basis for the instant matter as soon as he hit the ground.  Therefore, he is not entitled to the benefit of the “discovery rule. ”  Since the “discovery rule” does not apply to this claim, the legal standard to be applied to such claims is irrelevant to the outcome of this action.  Plaintiff cannot circumvent the consequences of his and/or counsel’s inaction based upon the “discovery rule. ”  Plaintiff retained counsel within weeks of the March 16, 2017 accident.  Counsel, in turn, retained [...].  [...] visited the strip mall on April 7, 2017 and submitted his report to plaintiff’s counsel on July 1, 2017.  Although the report does not specifically name the tenant defendants other than [...], it does note that there were other tenants in the strip mall.  (Pa694)  Assuming arguendo that neither plaintiff nor counsel knew the tenants’ identities, either plaintiff, counsel, or someone on plaintiff’s behalf could have (and should have) gone to the strip mall to ascertain their identities upon receipt of the report.  As previously set forth, the name of [...]’ business, [...], was prominently displayed at the property.  Plaintiff’s belated attempt to bring the tenant defendants into this case was nothing more than a hindsight fishing expedition for a nonexistent remedy.  Plaintiff should not have been permitted to avoid the consequences of his and/or counsel’s inaction due to the alleged difficulties in obtaining the tenants’ leases or defendant [...]’ answers to interrogatories.  Both pertain to the legal basis for a potential claim; not the identities of the potential defendants.  As plaintiff had ample opportunity to have ascertained the identities of the potential defendants prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations, he was not entitled to the benefit of the “relation back” doctrine.  In the event that this court disagrees with the trial court’s determination on liability, it should still affirm the summary judgment in favor of this defendant based upon his failure to comply with the statute of limitations.