ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] [...] testified at his deposition (and it was further stipulated on the record) that [...]’s office was located in the same Suite as Plaintiff’s office, along with that of Plaintiff’s counsel.  134a, p. 48.  The suite that they occupy has cubicles and a shared bathroom.  134a, p. 60.  The facts are uncontroverted that process service company is located in the same suite as Plaintiff and Plaintiff’s counsel, [...].  134a, p.50:23-25.
[brief] Moreover, allowing Plaintiffs to pursue a claim for attorneys’ fees in this case based solely on “the interests of equity” and alleged “shenanigans” would set a precedent that would allow plaintiffs to seek attorneys’ fees in virtually every case in New Jersey.  Virtually every plaintiff in New Jersey could and would make an argument that “the interests of equity” in their particular case, coupled with the alleged “shenanigans” of the particular defendant, justify seeking attorneys’ fees.  Our courts would then be required to address this issue in virtually every case, and the current structure in New Jersey law – in which attorneys’ fees are recoverable in certain, specified situations as set forth by statute or court rule – would be swallowed up.
[directive] In the event that it reasonably appears that any other law enforcement agency is involved in the investigation, or has an interest in the target of the investigation or in the premises to be searched, a Designated Attorney shall not approve the application unless the applicant certifies that an appropriate representative of such other interested agency (whose name and rank shall be documented) has been consulted and does not object to the execution of the search, or that there is good and sufficient cause to execute the search without first notifying and consulting with such other interested law enforcement agency.  In the event that a representative from such other interested law enforcement agency upon notification objects to the execution of a search, a Designated Attorney shall not be authorized to approve the search, but rather shall refer the matter without delay to either the County Prosecutor (in the event that the Designated Attorney is employed by the County Prosecutor and the objecting law enforcement agency is subject to the jurisdiction of the County Prosecutor) or to the Director of the Division of Criminal Justice or his designee (if the objecting law enforcement agency is not subject to the jurisdiction of the County Prosecutor employing the Designated Attorney).
[brief] \textsuperscript{17}  The record did not show that the jury was instructed to determine if the legal fees incurred by the Plaintiff in the Family Court proceeding to set aside the PSA and judgment of divorce was due to the negligence of the Defendants, which was a substantial factor in bringing about the ultimate harm sustained by the Plaintiff.  See Conklin v. Hannoch Weisman, 145 N.J.395, 678 A.2d 1060 (1996) (Traditional jury charge on proximate cause as a continuous sequence is inapt for legal malpractice case in which there are concurrent independent causes of harm and that a jury in such case must be instructed to determine whether the negligence was a substantial factor in ringing about the ultimate harm.), Froom v. Perel, 377 N.J.Super. 298, 312, 872 A.2d 1067 (App.Div. 2005) (In legal malpractice case, a charge is a road map to guide the jury, and without an appropriate charge a jury can take a wrong turn in its deliberations.).
[brief] Ministerial acts, in contrast, are those “which a person performs in a given state of facts in a prescribed manner in obedience to the mandate of legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of his own judgment upon the propriety of the act being done. ”  _Gonzalez, supra_, 247 N.J. at 571-72 (internal citations omitted).  Such actions are not immunized even when they may entail “[o]perational judgments,” such as “when, where and how” to carry out a required duty. ”  _Id._ at 572 (internal citations omitted).
[directive] Vehicular Pursuit Policy motor vehicle, shed or any other structure described in N.J.S.A. 2C:18-1.  Vehicular pursuits shall continue to be authorized for any burglary during which the actor is armed with a weapon or injures a victim (second degree burglaries).  See Section 3.2(a)(2)(k); b.  Theft of a Motor Vehicle, N.J.S.A. 2C:20-3; N.J.S.A. 2C:20-2(b)(2)(b).  This Policy authorizes vehicular pursuits for theft of a motor vehicle until at least December 31, 2022.  The [...] has been directed to review the available data as of that date, including stolen vehicle trends, effectiveness of pursuits, and resulting accidents, and determine whether this provision should remain or be modified.
[brief] Specifically, N.J.S.A. 2A:14-24 states as follows:  In actions at law grounded on any simple contract, no acknowledgment or promise by words only shall be deemed sufficient evidence of a new or continuing contract, so as to take any case out of the operation of this chapter, or to deprive any person of the benefit thereof, unless such acknowledgment or promise shall be made or continued by or in some writing to be signed by the party chargeable thereby.
[brief] (Not raised below)  | 3 | | POINT II | 5 | | THE COURT FAILED TO APPLY THE REQUISITE LAW IN DISMISSING PLAINTIFF’S VERIFIED COMPLAINT AT THE RETURN DATE OF THE ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE.  (Pa434-35; 1T15:22 – 1T19:3) | 5 | | POINT III | 7 | | THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO COMPEL AN ACCOUNTING WHERE THE FIDUCIARY DID NOT PROVIDE REASONABLE INFORMATION THAT IS REQUIRED UNDER THE NEW JERSEY PROBATE CODE.  (Pa434-35; Pa525-26; 1T15:22 – 1T19:3; 2T23:14 – 2T27:10) | 7 | | CONCLUSION | 11 |  ## TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | Cases | Page | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | Dimitrakopoulos v. Borrus, Goldin, Foley, Vignuolo, Hyman & Stahl, P.C., 237 N.J. 91 (2019) | 4 | | In re Hekemian, A-1774-21, 2023 WL 176098 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Jan. 13, 2023) | 6 | | Matter of Risica’s Estate, 179 N.J. Super. 452 (App. Div. 1981) | 10 | | Velantzas v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., Inc., 109 N.J. 189 (1988) | 4 | | Statutes | | |-------------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | N.J.S.A. § 3A:9-2 | 5 | | N.J.S.A. § 3B:17-2 | 5, 7 | | N.J.S.A. § 3B:31-67(a) | 6 | | Rules | | |------------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | R. 4:42-9(b) | 9 | | R. 4:87-1 | 5 | | R. 4:88-4 | 9 |
[directive] The determination to downgrade and remand a Superior Court matter to Municipal Court1, to allow a defendant to plead into Recovery Court, or to of dispose a case through entry into a deferred disposition program are decisions State's fully within the discretion.  In these instances, the Judiciary should take of appropriate action to modify that defendant's level release, that is, to reduce if their pretrial monitoring level, but only no domestic violence related charges are present.  When a prosecutor either (a) downgrades and remands to Municipal Court an eligible defendant's sole case for which they are being monitored; or (b) allows an eligible defendant to plead into Recovery Court on defendant's sole 1  This includes remands to the [...].  ADA ~... ml  ENSURING TO DOOR AN OPEN JUST!
[brief] First, defense counsel advocated for including the instruction, and so alerted the trial court to the need for the instruction and all of the pertinent facts and law requiring its inclusion.  Second, the undisputed narrative of the case—a killing committed in the heat of a physical struggle in which the victim was armed with a handgun—sufficiently bespeak a passion/provocation issue to render it jumping off the page.  See State v. Taylor, 350 N.J. Super. 20, 40-41 (App. Div. 2002) (passion/provocation clearly indicated where defendant stabbed victim who was armed with a gun during physical altercation).  Accordingly, under any standard, the passion/provocation instruction was required, and the failure to include it was reversible error.
[brief] On 5/12/16 [...] filed the Foreclosure Complaint of 5/12/16 (141a) based on the same recycled forged assignment of 2/27/2009 (065a).  The Foreclosure Complaint of 5/12/16 (141a) must have been suspended for the reason that the Foreclosure Complaint of 3/10/2009 was suspended by [...], namely the forged assignment of mortgage of 2/27/2009.  Therefore the Trial Court never had subject matter jurisdiction over the Foreclosure Complaint of 5/12/16 ([...]) (141a) since day one.  The Foreclosure Complaint (141a) Was in Violation of NJ UCC Laws  The New Jersey Supreme Court in case Investor Bank v. Torres July 1, 2020 stated:  [t]he Uniform Commercial Code was drafted against the backdrop of existing bodies of law, including the common law and equity.  And relies on those bodies of law to supplement its provisions in many important ways.  At the same time, the Uniform Commercial Code is the primary source of commercial law rules in areas that it governs, and its rules represent choices made by its drafters and the enacting legislatures about the appropriate policies to be furthered in the transactions it covers.  Therefore, while principles of common law and equity may supplement provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code, they may not be used to supplant its provisions, or the purposes and policies those provisions reflect, unless a specific provision of the Uniform Commercial Code provides otherwise.  In the absence of such a provision, the Uniform Commercial Code preempts principles of common law and equity that are inconsistent with either its provisions or its purposes and policies. ”  In my foreclosure case (141a) no judge enforced the NJ UCC laws.  I am not sure what law the judges enforced.
[brief] Div. 2001) | 13 | | Messner v. Gray, No. A-5418-13T3, 2016 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 703, at *1, *11 (App. Div. Mar. 31, 2016) | 33 | | Persi v. Woska, No. A-6038-11, 2013 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2915, *1, *14 (App. Div. Dec. 11, 2013) | 33 | Printing Mart-Morristown v. Sharp Electronics Corp., 116 N.J. 739, 746 (1989) ........................................... 32 re State Bd. of Educ.’s Denial of Petition to Adopt, 422 N.J. Super. 521, 530 (App. Div. 2011) ......................... 13 School Ethics Commission Decisions: Public Advisory A02-22, February 25, 2022 ..................... 19,22 I/M/O [...], [...], Bergen County, C75-18, May 23, 2022 .......................... 22 I/M/O [...], [...], Commission Docket No. C71-18, April 27, 2021 ...............
[brief] APPELLEE’S COUNSEL’S MISLEADING CITATIONS TO DR. LOPEZ’S TESTIMONY REQUIRES A NEW TRIAL  Again, Appealle cherry-picks a cited portion of [...]’s testimony where [...] agreed with Appellee’s counsel during his cross-examination that Appellee’s treatment was “reasonable and medically necessary directly as a result of the accident. ”  2T228:21-229:1.  However, this ignores the fact that [...] clarified his testimony clearly that he meant the treatment was reasonable, but not related to the accident.  2T233:25-234:6.  Appealle even brings up testimony by [...] where he noted the MRI results were in his opinion degenerative.  It was clearly a misquote and Appealle’s counsel wrongly took advantage and try to leave an undeniable impression that [...] found the treatment was not only, causally reasonable and medically necessary which he undoubtedly misstated, but more important that “it’s all permanent and it’s all related to the accident. ”  [...] never testified that way and the prejudicial effect of a false recitation of [...]’s opinion is incalculable.  Appealle’s pointing that juries are to rely on their own recollections should not be a shield to cite falsities on summation.  V.
[brief] Plaintiff filed and mailed its Motion for Summary Judgment on October 6, 2022 and the motion was returnable on November 4, 2022.  PA – 19 to 21 and 46.  Additionally, Defendant filed opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion on or about November 3, 2022 and the Court expressly indicated that it considered Defendant’s Objection in adjudicating the motion.  PA – 225 to 227 and 2.  Defendant does not indicate any prejudice based upon receipt of the motion or Defendant’s ability to object to the motion.  Plaintiff respectfully submits that this argument should fail.
[directive] SOP J, - 1 9 - No. 09  Municipal Forfeiture Program Reports  SOP 1 12- 13:77.1, No. 12  N.J.A.C. et seq.. see SOP 1 1 - N.J.S.A. 2C:64-1, et seq.  (civil forfeiture)  1 - 1 N.J.S.A. 2C:41-1, seq. (racketeering)  e t 1 - 1 N.J.S.A. 2C:21-25, et seq. (financial facilitation of crime)  New Jersey Forfeiture Program Administration
[brief] 5  While numerous courts throughout New Jersey have found comparable letter vendor allegations to be untenable to state a claim as a matter of FDCPA and related law, Respondent’s counsel is aware of only a single New Jersey court which has upheld a letter vendor theory of liability.  See Mhrez v. [...], HUD L-2314-22 (Sup. Ct. June 9, 2023).  This outlier decision has since been criticized by other New Jersey courts for improperly interpreting the FDCPA with “uncritical literalism. ”  See [...] v. [...], MRS L-895-22 (Sup. Ct. June 15, 2023), at pp.23-24 (rejecting the FDCPA claim under letter vendor theory of liability, finding that deciding that the use of a letter vendor as a violation of the FDCPA is a “hypercritical analysis, …, of the statute, and, therefore, it does not constitute a violation of the statute on its face. ”); [...] v. [...], et.al., HUD L-1933-22 (Sup. Ct. June 26, 2023), at pp.5-13 (“to ignore the reality that debt collectors employ letter vendors to prepare correspondence necessary for their lawful operations and, in effect, to require such debt collectors to conduct business on a fully integrated basis with the need for an outside letter vendor, period.  …  It would basically be illogical to read the statute the way the Appellant wants to read it. ”).  statutory scheme.  This Court should similarly engage this process of statutory construction in its de novo review and continue to uphold the Superior Courts’ repeated dismissal of this matter.  In sum, Appellant’s theory that §§ 1692c(b), 1692d(3), and 1692f prohibit transmitting data to a letter vendor is an exercise in “uncritical literalism” that falls apart under fundamental tenets of statutory construction.
[brief] Specifically, Rule 26(b)(1) states:  >  Parties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case, considering the importance of the issues at stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the parties' relative access to relevant information, the parties' resources, the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit.
[brief] A strict interpretation of the Trust language requires the Trustee to deed each beneficiary their one-third equal share of both properties.  Subsequently, the beneficiaries would have the power to purchase each other’s shares at the then fair market value.  With this interpretation, the Boonton and Florida Properties could have been transferred to the beneficiaries quickly and efficiently, incurring less than $1,000 in legal fees and costs.  PLAINTIFF: “The overly literal interpretation of Section 4.1A of the Trust urged by the Defendants would lead to a result that the Decedent could not conceivably have intended.
[brief] See Appellant’s Brief, Point II.  R. 2:4-1(b) required Appellant to file an appeal of the 2019 Permit Modification or the 2017 WFD Permit within 45 days of those decisions becoming final.  Appellant appears to be requesting the Court to find based on Musconetcong Watershed Ass'n that the 2019 Permit Modification was not deemed final until March 14, 2023, the date of [...]’s denial of Appellant’s hearing request.  Even assuming, arguendo, that was the case, Appellant’s deadline to appeal the 2019 Permit Modification would have been April 28, 2023.  Appellant has never filed a direct appeal of the 2017 WFD Permit or 2019 Permit Modification.  Appellant also did not seek leave in this appeal following the issuance of the decision in Musconetcong Watershed Ass'n v. N.J. Dep't of Env't Prot., 476 N.J. Super. 465 (App. Div. 2023) or otherwise.  Appellant waited until the filing of its brief in this appeal to challenge the appeal of the 2019 Permit Modification.  In light of the foregoing, this Court should not permit Appellant to expand this appeal to include a direct appeal of the 2019 Permit Modification or the 2017 WFD Permit.  [...]’s dock was already built before Appellant filed the third party adjudicatory hearing request which is the subject of this matter.
[brief] “Q: You don’t do property appraisal -- real property.  A: I am not a real estate appraiser at all.  5T129:8-10.  “Q: You don’t render -- you don’t render an opinion as to the value or impact on value of real estate, if any, in connection with furniture, fixtures,and equipment, is that correct?  A: That is correct. ”  5T163:15-19.  At trial, [...] did not add any additional explanation or conclusion as to how these items enhanced the value of the Property above his $4,295,000 income approach estimate.
[brief] On October 8, 2014, [...] then entered into a Sub-Consultant Agreement with [...] for the Supervision of Construction Services.  (Pa1235).  At all relevant times, [...] was also responsible for the maintenance of the protection of traffic.  (Pa1271).  According to [...]’s Construction Safety Manual, “safe movement of traffic and pedestrians...is the single most important aspect of the project.  (Pa1337).  [...]’s resident engineer [...] conceded that [...] had responsibility for the maintenance and protection of traffic and to identify the type of condition that caused Plaintiff’s accident.  (Pa674).  He testified as follows:  Q: Did [...] have any responsibility with respect to inspecting or monitoring conditions on the roadway surface, the travel surface?  A: Yes.  Q: Was that a contractual responsibility or is that a responsibility that developed during the project?  [...]: Objection.  You can answer.  A:  Safety is an overall, the responsibility of the contractor.  If there’s an immediate safety concern, its kind of a team approach from everybody involved to identify areas ranging from us, to [...], to our inspection staff who’s different companies, to the state police to turnpike maintenance, other personnel.  (Pa678 at 19:5-20)  Q: Okay.  So with respect to physical conditions on the roadway, would that be things like potholes?  A: Yes.  Q: Elevation issues? A: Yes.  Q: Settlement in the roadway? A: Yes.  (Pa678 at 20:25 – Pa679 at 21:7).  C.  Facts Related to “Dangerous Condition”
[brief] TABLE OF AUTHORITIES  Cases  Cobble Close Farm v. Bd. Of Adjustment of Middletown Tp., 10 N.J. 442 (1952)  ..................................................  19  Dunbar Homes, Inc. v. Zoning Bd. Of Adjustment of Twp. Of Franklin, 233 N.J. 546 (2018)  ...........................................  26  Dunkin’ Donuts of New Jersey, Inc. v. North Brunswick Planning Bd., 193 N.J. Super. 513 (App. Div. 1984) .......................  22  Gandolfi v. Town of Hammonton, 367 N.J. Super. 527 (App. Div. 2004) ..........................................................  27 Grabowsky v. Twp. Of Montclair, 221 N.J. 536 (2015)  ..............................................................................  26  Perlmart v. Lacey Tp. Planning Bd., 295 N.J. Super., 234 (App. Div.  1996) .........................................................  32  Pizzo Mantin Group v. Randolph Tp., 137 N.J. 216 (1994) .......................................................... 20, 24, 27, 28 Pond Run Watershed v. Hamilton Tp., 397 N.J. Super. 335 (App. Div. 2008) ....................................................  32  Ten Stary Dom P’ship v. Mauro, 216 N.J. 16 (2013)  .............................................................................  26  Wawa Food Market v. Planning Bd. Of Ship Bottom, 227 N.J. Super......................... 19 (App. Div. 1988) .................................................................  19 Statutes N.J.S. 40:55D-2 (Ia72) .................................................................  20 N.J.S.A. 40:55D-2 .................................................. 1, 13, 22, 24, 25 N.J.S.A. 40:55–1.20 .................................................................  28 N.J.S.A. 40:55D-11 .................................................................  32  N.J.S.A. 40:55D–38b(1) ............................................................  28  N.J.S.A. 40:55D-48 .................................................................  27  N.J.S.A. 40:55D-51 ................................................................. 14, 18, 24 N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70(C)(2) .......................................................  24  Procedural History
[directive] 2nd Degree  $50,000 to $150,000  10% permissible 17  Bail Schedule 2  STATUTES WHERE BAIL MAY BE SET BY A SUPERIOR COURT JUDGE OR A MUNICIPAL COURT JUDGE OR, IN THE MUNICIPAL COURT JUDGE’S ABSENCE, THE MUNICIPAL COURT ADMINISTRATOR OR DEPUTY COURT ADMINISTRATOR, PURSUANT TO RULE 3:26-2 requires warrants
[brief] There was no business evaluation conducted to support that contention.  As [...] freely conceded, he was not retained to perform one.  8T38:13-16.  Nonetheless, he opined that there were transactions in the companies' books and records he considered questionable.  He set these forth on various schedules and compiled a "summary of damages."  7T116:10-117:12.  His theory was that the amount of each questioned disbursement should be added, dollar for dollar, to the net value of the companies, resulting in a loss of nearly $10 million to plaintiffs.  Defendants filed a summary judgment motion to limit the expert testimony of plaintiffs' expert on the grounds that (1) he was not qualified to offer expert opinions on business valuation and damages and (2) a number of his conclusions constituted net opinions.
[brief] In its decision, the Court described [...]’s testimony as “not particularly credible. ” (Pa31).  A supervisor from [...] arrived on the scene and advised [...] that he would notify the City as to the occurrence.  (T4 140:6-19).  [...] was not uncooperative with [...] during the call.  (T4 141:2-8).  [...] did not know what had caused [...]’s condition.  (T4 141:2-8).  [...] did not believe that the incident with [...] fell within the reporting requirements of the Department policy because it was a medical call which did not result in the issuance of summonses, an arrest or the discovery of contraband.
[brief] Garfinkel, 168 N.J. at 132 (2001) (quoting Marchak v. Claridge Commons, Inc., 134 N.J. 275, 282 (1993)); see also Guidotti v. Legal Helpers Debt Resolution, L.L.C., 716 F.3d 764, 771 (3d Cir. 2013) (explaining that “a judicial mandate to arbitrate must be predicted on the parties’ consent” (citation omitted)).