ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Newburgh, 88 N.J. at 545.  At the plenary hearing, the lower court heard a great deal of testimony and evidence about the parties’ discussions to pay for six years of higher education for each child.  1T:18:18-25; 44:10-46:24; 206:22-25; see also Plaintiff’s Exhibit 10 (P-456); Plaintiff’s Exhibit 12 (P-668).  Plaintiff proffered a great deal of evidence in the form of testimony and communications evidencing Defendant’s assent to Plaintiff’s loan repayment plan that each party would pay one-third of their children’s student loans:  (1) Defendant filled out the relevant portions of the financial aid forms that required his attention.  (2)  Defendant’s father (the children’s paternal grandfather) co-signed [...]’s first two loans while Plaintiff’s father (the children’s maternal grandfather) co-signed [...]’s first two loans;(3)  Defendant routinely communicated with Plaintiff to ask for [...]’s 1098-T forms so he could claim a tax credit as the parent responsible for [...]’s tuition, and said 1098-T forms notified Defendant how much [...]’s school received in tuition; (4) Defendant participated in college visits for [...] and agreed with [...]’s choice of school; (5)  Defendant conceded that while he refused to go to any of the financial aid seminars recommended by Plaintiff, and did no research about scholarships, grants, or financial aid, he was consulted.  1T18:18-25; 19:1-19; 44:10-46:24; 47:1-48:9; 49:4-21; 50:11-14; 52:1-19; 53:1-25; 55:14-22; 58:15-25; 136:1-3; 206:22-25; 209:20-210:12; see also Plaintiff’s Exhibit 10 (P-456); Plaintiff’s Exhibit 12 (P-668).  While the lower court seemed to weigh many of the Newburgh factors in the favor of Plaintiff’s children deserving support from both of their parents in pursuit of higher education, the lower court abused its discretion by finding that Defendant is not responsible for any of the expenses.
[directive] Czy rozumie Pan(i), że ma Pan(i) prawo do skorzystania z indywidualnej konsultacji z 17. c.  [Tak/Yes]  [Nie/No] sprawie wpływu przyznania się do winy na Pana(i) status imigracyjny?  adwokatem w  Do you understand that you have the right to seek individualized advice from an attorney about the effect your guilty plea will have on your immigration status?
[brief] We conclude that a party who brings an action that is shown to have been a "catalyst" for the cessation of conduct alleged to violate the Civil Rights Act may qualify as a prevailing party entitled to an award of attorney's fees. ”  D. Russo, Inc. v. Township of Union 417 N.J. Super. 384 (App. Div. 2010)  The plaintiff’s action in lieu of prerogative writs and civil rights complaint was not filed in the Chancery Division.  Plaintiff did not seek equitable relief.  The action in lieu of prerogative writs did not belong before the Chancery Division.  This matter is not cognizable in the Chancery Division under R. 4:3 - Divisions; Venue; Transfer of Actions (Pa 187-191).
[directive] c.  Do any of you have a special need or require a reasonable accommodation to help you in listening, paying attention, reading printed materials, deliberating, or otherwise participating as a fair juror?  The court will provide reasonable accommodations to your special needs but I will only be aware of any such needs if you let me know about them.  My only purpose in asking you these circumstances relates to your ability to serve as a juror.  If you have any such request, please raise your hand and I will speak to you at sidebar.  [Note: If a juror makes a request, contact the ADA Coordinator to see if the TCA can meet the request right away (e.g., a portable speaker system available immediately) or if the juror’s service should be deferred so that the TCA can arrange the accommodation timely (e.g., an ASL interpreter that may require three or four months’ reservation in advance). ]  3.  Introduce the lawyers and the parties.
[brief] Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424 (1983).........................................................................................................................68  Jarwick Developments, Inc. v. Wilf, A-2053-13T3, 2018 WL 2449133 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. June 1, 2018)  ........................................................................................passim  John Ernest Lucken Revocable Tr. v. Heritage Bancshares Grp., Inc., No. 18-3012, 2018 WL 7821656 (8th Cir. Nov. 14, 2018)  ...............................................................65  L.T. v. Mansfield Twp. Sch. Dist., 2009 WL 1971329 (D.N.J. 2009)  ......................................................................................................73  McConkey v. AON Corp., 354 N.J. Super. 25 (App. Div. 2002) .............................................................................................64  McGinnis v. Am. Home Mortg. Servicing, Inc., 901 F.3d 1282 (11th Cir. 2018) ........................................................................................................65  Mendez v. United States, CV 14-7778(NLH/KMW), 2017 WL 477693 (D.N.J. Feb. 6, 2017)  ....................................................................................................................63  Musto v. Vidas, 333 N.J. Super. 52 (App. Div. 2000) .............................................................................................74, 76 Northeast Women’s Ctr. v. McMonagle, 889 F.2d 466 (3d Cir. 1989) ...........................................................................................................68
[brief] ”); Corporate Realty Servs., LLC v. Croghan, 2018 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1623, at *13-14 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. July 10, 2018) (A litigant and contentious deponent who hurls ad hominem insults and “who obstructs full discovery corrupts one of the fundamental precepts of our trial practice – the assumption by the litigants and the court that all parties have made full disclosure of all relevant evidence in compliance with the discovery rules. ”)  (Da26)  “According to an old legal adage, with many variations, `if the law is against you, pound the facts; if the facts are against you, pound the law; if they are both against you, pound the table.
[brief] See Conforti v. Guliadis, 128 N.J. 318, 322-23 (1992)(holding that plenary hearings are required when there are “contested issues of material fact on the basis of conflicting affidavits. ”).  Here, viewing all of the facts and evidential material in the light most favorable to [...] as required under the Court Rules, it is clear that this matter should not have been decided summarily without consideration of [...]’s counterclaims and the opportunity for discovery.
[brief] However, several Board members requested that the applicant work with the Board engineer to allow for the possibility of lowering the site reducing the height of the buildings.  (Pa182;32:15-25-33:1-11).  In fact, one of the Board members stated that the applicant should attempt to broaden the stormwater management system to reduce the size of the “generically milk crate looking things to help reduce the grade”, and called upon the applicant to work with the Board engineer to reduce the grade dimension.  (Pa183;33:13-17).  Other Board members also upon approving the application requested that the applicant and Board engineers work to lower the overall height of the stormwater management system.  (Pa183;33:18-25; 34:36-37).  The Board confirmed as a whole that they would like the applicant to look at the stormwater management plan to see if there is any way to reduce the building height.  (Pa186;46:18-20).  On February 7, 2022, the Board voted to approval [...]’s application for Preliminary and Final Site Plan Approval.
[brief] ” (Da126).  Also, when confronted with the fact that the Will provided that the witness stated under oath that [...] was not under undue influence, [...] testified, “That’s what they say. ” (Da126).  [...] then stated, “I guess I don’t know.  I don’t know. ”  (Da126).  [...] testified that he has never seen an Affidavit from a doctor stating that [...] had dementia when he signed the Will.
[brief] ”  As noted above, *Harvester* dealt with mid-term cancellation, which again is not at issue as the CCIP remained in effect.  Notably, the *Harvester* Court actually found that N.J.A.C. 11:1-20 was not applicable because it went into effect subsequent to the policy at issue.  *Harvester*, 277 N.J. Super. 421, 431.
[brief] Finally, Defendants claim that Plaintiff has failed to show any injury or harm.  See Def.’s [...] and [...] Br., pg. 25; see Def.’s [...] and [...] Br., pg. 15.  Once again, this case is at the motion to dismiss stage, and Plaintiff has pled that the disproportionate application of the Mask Policy and rotation of grade level partners has caused her to be singled out and to endure the continued threat of a sham investigation where she was not permitted to meaningfully participate, such that these actions caused damages such as anxiety, pain and suffering.  221a, ¶ 68; 230a, ¶ 136; 241a, ¶ 217; 243a.
[directive] The court can revoke the conditional release and commit the person under N.J.S.A. 2C:4-8(b )(3).  After an evaluation by a screening service, the NGRI committee shall be committed to an inpatient facility for hospitalization and treatment.  The court shall receive the report and recommendations from the screening service and/ or the current treating psychiatrist recommending inpatient psychiatric hospitalization.  The court shall review the recommendations and enter an appropriate disposition.  Attorney Name ------------ NJ Attorney ID Number Address Telephone Number of Attorney for State New Jersey/Defendant of of In the Matter Superior Court  New Jersey Law Division Criminal Part - Select County County - - --------
[brief] [4T172:4-12; Pa152; Pa154].  On September 11, 2018, Appellant had his third sinus surgery, which occurred while he was out on stress leave.  [4T171:18-20].  Appellant provided [...] with a note from his sinus doctor dated September 5, 2018, advising that Appellant would be able to return to work on October 30, 2018.  [Pa149].  Appellant provided [...] with a note from his sinus doctor dated October 16, 2018, advising that Appellant would be able to return to work on November 15, 2018.  [Pa148].  Appellant provided [...] with a note from [...] advising that Appellant would be able to return to work on November 20, 2018.  [Pa150].  Appellant knew that written permission to leave his residence was required to be obtained pursuant to the Sick Leave Policy because Appellant provided [...] with a written request to leave his residence for each of his first two (2) sinus surgeries.  [4T172:11 – 4T177:8].  However, Appellant never provided [...] with any written request to leave his home for his third sinus surgery.  [Pa151; Pa153].  Appellant admits to leaving his home after his third sinus surgery without receiving permission from [...].  [4T177:1-5].  Appellant also admits that he did not request permission from [...] to be excused from his home residency requirement in connection with his third sinus surgery.  [6T49:2-5].
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT’S SANCTIONS ORDERS SHOULD BE REVERSED BECAUSE (A) THEY WERE BASED UPON THE CONSIDERATION OF IRRELEVANT OR INAPPROPRIATE FACTORS; (B) WERE NOT SUPPORTED BY PROPER FINDINGS OF FACT, AND (C) FAILED TO CONSIDER WHETHER THERE WAS PROOF OF BAD FAITH (P18a-P19a, P35a-P36a, 2T 13:21-19:1, 3T 19:22-25:5)  An award of sanctions and order for reconsideration are reviewed pursuant to the abuse of discretion standard.
[brief] Their story about plaintiff stating “uuh [...]” (justifying reasonable suspicion?) sounds totally concocted.  What are the odds of plaintiff not knowing his friend’s first name?  The maxim ‘falsus in uno falsus in omnibus,’ while not a mandatory rule of evidence, is clearly applicable in this case.  State v. Guida, 118 N.J.L.289, 297 (Sup. Ct. 1937).  Here, the police documented that ‘the owner came out’ Of the bar as opposed to ‘[...] came out,’ clearly intending to mislead others into believing [...] was not the owner.  (Pa304).  Words matter, especially words used in police reports that are capable of destroying people’s lives and liberties.
[brief] [...] entered November 9, 2022 Orders granting plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and dismissing the [...]’ claims.  A1159, A1161.  The [...] moved for reconsideration (A989), but [...] denied reconsideration by Order entered January 13, 2023.  A1157.  With regard to plaintiff’s claim for contractual litigation fees, the Appellate Division (following motion practice before the Court) ultimately entered a May 25, 2023 Order directing the Law Division to determine this last remaining claim.  A1146.  Defendants moved for dismissal of the claim (A1225); plaintiff’s counsel submitted a certification of attorney’s fees and costs in support of the claim (A1243).  After oral argument (11T, 12T), [...] entered a June 22, 2023 final judgment in plaintiff’s favor and against defendants on plaintiff’s contractual litigation claim in the amount of $188,029.  A1149.  Defendants now appeal (A1151) and ask the Court to vacate the judgment entered in plaintiff’s favor; order a new trial before the Chancery court on their quiet title claim; and order a trial before a jury on their claims for fraud, slander of title, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.
[brief] Attorney ID# 247212017  [...], Esq. Attorney ID# 051651991  Date Submitted: April 2, 2024  TABLE OF CONTENTS  Page TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS...........................................  ii TABLE OF AUTHORITIES.................................................................................. iii  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT..............................................................................  1 PROCEDURAL HISTORY .................................................................................. 4 STATEMENT OF FACTS ....................................................................................  5  A.  The Lease Litigation Negotiations .............................................................  6  B.  The Lease Litigation And The Legal Malpractice Action Claims Arise From Related Facts Or Series Of Transactions.................................................................................................10  C.  The Strategic Decision to Depose Defendant [...] in the Lease Litigation Had Far Reaching Effects on His Defense in the Instant Action.......................................................................13  D.  The Decision To Sue Mr. [...] In The Instant Litigation Came During The Lease Litigation..........................................15  LEGAL ARGUMENT ..........................................................................................17  POINT I.  LEGAL MALPRACTICE CLAIMS ARE NOT PER SE EXEMPT FROM THE ENTIRE CONTROVERSY DOCTRINE ........17  POINT II.  THE APPLICABLE STANDARD OF REVIEW IS ABUSE OF DISCRETION .....................................................................................................24  POINT III.  LEGAL MALPRACTICE CLAIMS AGAINST DEFENDANTS ARE NOT EXEMPT FROM THE ENTIRE CONTROVERSY DOCTRINE........................................................................................................26  A.  The Trial Court Correctly Determined that Plaintiff Failed to Comply with the R. 4:5-1 Disclosure Requirement In Violation of the Entire Controversy Doctrine  .............................................26  B.  The Trial Court Correctly Determined that the Instant Action is a Successive Action Thereby Subject to Dismissal Under The Entire Controversy Doctrine ......................30  C.  The Trial Court Correctly Determined that Plaintiff's Failure to Join Defendants in the Lease Litigation was an Inexcusable Strategic Decision ..................................................35  D.  The Trial Court Correctly Determined that the Plaintiff's Failure to Join Defendant in the Lease Litigation Pursuant to Rule 4:5-1 resulted in Substantial Prejudice to the Defendants.................................................................39  i.  Prejudice from Loss of Witnesses and Evidence ...............40  ii.  Prejudice of Defendant [...] being deposed in Lease Litigation .................................................................44  CONCLUSION ...........................................................................................................48
[brief] ”).  Under the Frivolous Litigation Statute, to conclude that litigation is frivolous, the court must find that either: (1) The complaint . . . was commenced, used or continued in bad faith, solely for the purpose of harassment, delay or malicious injury; or (2) The nonprevailing party knew, or should have known, that the complaint . . . was without any reasonable basis in law or equity and could not be supported by a good faith argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing law.  [N.J.S.A. 2A:15-59.1(b). ]  The Frivolous Litigation Statute serves a dual purpose: first, “a punitive purpose in seeking to deter frivolous litigation,” and second, “to compensate a party that has been victimized by another party bringing frivolous litigation. ”  *Toll Bros., Inc. v. Twp. of West Windsor*, 190 N.J. 61, 67 (2007).  The trial court applied the foregoing principles and correctly determined that Plaintiffs’ claims against [...] were frivolous and, therefore, Plaintiffs were required to pay a portion of the fees and costs that [...] incurred in defending against the claims.  (2T13:21-19:1).  Specifically, the trial court found that in the absence of a transaction between [...] and [...], Plaintiffs had “no conceivable cause of action” against [...], (2T17:12-25), and that Plaintiffs’ pursuit of litigation once they became aware there was no transaction was “frivolous[,]” (2T18:8-14).  The court emphasized that the first time it met with the parties it questioned why [...] was in the case in the absence of a transaction, but that it nevertheless “took two years of litigation and [a] summary judgment motion” before [...] was dismissed.  (2T17:16-18:3).  The record amply supports the trial court’s ruling and by no means can it be said that the court’s decision was “‘made without a rational explanation, inexplicably departed from established policies, or rested on an impermissible basis. ’”  *Borough of Englewood Cliffs v. Trautner*, --- A.3d ---, 2024 WL 1708605, at *3 (App. Div. 2024) (approved for publication)\(^9\) (Pa717a) (citation omitted) (identifying when an abuse of discretion arises); \underline{Masone}, 382 N.J. Super. at 193 (“[A]buse of discretion is demonstrated if the discretionary act was not premised upon consideration of all relevant factors, was based upon consideration of irrelevant or inappropriate factors, or amounts to a clear error in judgment.
[brief] Even though the Board tries to portray the case differently, *I/M/O [...] and [...]*, 3 *NJPER* ¶ 323 (1977) considers the significance of “designated representatives” under *N.J.S.A. 34:13A-5.3* which is consistent with PERC’s decision.  In that case, PERC confirmed the union’s right to choose its bargaining representatives but rejected the employer’s attempt to open up the bargaining sessions to the general public.  PERC explained why that board of education’s attempt to open up the sessions to third parties, including potentially minority organizations or other groups attempting to speak on behalf the union’s members violated the NJEERA:
[brief] Defendant then conflates the lack of a confidence statement with purported feedback from the officer, as the officer inquired whether the witness was making a positive identification, based on the witness’s initial statement: “Yeah.  I think it was [photo] 3. ” (Da34; Da40 at 3:44:20 to 3:44:41).  Defendant’s argument is too clever by half and attempts to have it both ways.  Specifically, defendant alleges the statement by the officer, perhaps unartfully, requesting the defendant state whether they were certain—as mandated by Henderson—the defendant twists into the incongruous assertion that the request for a confidence level was somehow “feedback.
[brief] ........................................................................  39  Hoffman v. Encore Capital Grp., Inc., 2008 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1627, 2008 WL 5245306 (App. Div. Dec. 18, 2008)  ..................................................................  39  In re Resol. Of State Comm’n of Investigation, 108 N.J. 35 (1987)..............................................................................  35, 36 Jubelt v. United N. Bankers, Ltd., No. CIV.A. 13-7150 ES, 2015 WL 3970227 (D.N.J. June 30, 2015) .........................................................  34  Kaul v. Christie, 372 F.Supp.3d 206 (D.N.J. 2019) .......................................................  32  Koons v. Edpatco, Inc., 2007 N.J. Super.  Unpub. LEXIS 2668, 2007 WL 2403545 (Sup. Ct. N.J. App. Div. Aug. 24, 2007)  .............................................  31  LaMarca v. Caffrey, 2009 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 3241 (Sup. Ct. Law Div. Hunterdon Cnty. Nov. 20, 2009)  .........................................................  20  LVNV v. DeAngelo, 464 N.J. Super. 103 (Sup. Ct. App. Div. 2020)....................................
[brief] •  The admissible evidence overwhelmingly demonstrates Appellant engaged in a pattern of willful fraud and deceit, almost from [...]'s inception and for a period of two years afterwards, to borrow funds from [...] for his five [...], with no intention of paying these loans back.  (Da22).  •  Appellant falsified [...] documents to obtain financing for his Appellant companies and drafted a Repurchase Agreement transferring all of plaintiffs' interests in [...] to his wife.  (Da22).  •  When ordered by the court to produce the books and records of the companies for a third time, Appellant falsified the books and records, perpetrating a fraud on the court.  (Da22-23).  •  The record is replete with evidence of Appellant's egregious fraud.  Appellant gave himself sole access to [...] accounts.  He lied to [...] about being a signatory on the accounts.  He regularly reported the accounts contained money that he had transferred to his [...].  He lied about the UCC lien being a "mistake" and a "retraction" would issue.  He falsified corporate records, claiming he was the "sole member" of [...] and was the "corporate secretary" to obtain funding for his [...], using [...] to secure the funding and to pay back the loans.  He failed to disclose the [...]' five loan agreements to the Board of Directors or anyone at [...].  (Da23).
[brief] Both merely provide for “binding arbitration” of all disputes, and both lack any language that the consumer is waiving his or her constitutional right to seek relief in court.  Further, the clause, drafted by [...] and its counsel ([...]), provides for “binding arbitration during the warranty period. ”  Aside from the fact that the warranty period has not commenced and, therefore, any obligation to arbitrate has not commenced, there is no warranty period for plaintiffs’ claims or even [...]’s claim that it is entitled to keep plaintiffs’ deposit.  To a reasonable consumer, the clause means that arbitration is limited to matters covered by a warranty (and only after a closing, since a warranty can arise only after a closing), especially since the arbitration clause immediately follows the warranty clause in Section 12 and the Buyer cannot even initiate any arbitration proceeding unless and until the Buyer has given notice to the “Warranty Dispute Resolution” department and the Seller has an opportunity to cure the problem “in accordance with the Unit warranty. ”  Since a closing has not occurred, the parties hereto are not in a “warranty” setting, and the clause does not apply to plaintiffs’ or [...]’s claims.