ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] [Pa435a, ¶ 42]  1.  **The Disciplinary Action Complaint is a “bar complaint. ”**  (23)  The trial court correctly held that the Disciplinary Action Complaint is a “bar complaint” that should have been disclosed in the Applications.  [3T23-6]  Looking to Webster’s Dictionary, the trial court determined that a bar complaint is an “allegation against a party” concerning their “profession as a lawyer. ”  [3T20-22]  The [...] filed the bar complaint against [...] as part of its duty to “discharg[e] the Court’s constitutional responsibility to supervise and discipline New Jersey attorneys. ”  [See Pa820a, ¶ 2; Pa824a]  The bar complaint, including the entire record in the Disciplinary Action, was “made a permanent part of [[...]’s] file as an attorney at law of this State. ”  [Pa380a]  [...] and [...]’s argument that “bar complaint” is a “term of art applicable to attorney discipline procedures in other states” belies common sense.  [Pb33]  As the trial court correctly held, “any ordinary individual, let alone a member of the New Jersey Bar for over 40 years”—who also served on ethics committees [Pa361a-362a]—“would find [that] a 36-page decision of the Disciplinary Review Board and a public censure by the New Jersey Supreme Court involve bar complaints and bar investigations which should have been identified in the application for insurance. ”  [See 3T23-22]  Ultimately, “[n]o additional discovery will alter this inescapable conclusion” that a complaint that was plainly titled “Disciplinary Action COMPLAINT” and issued by the [...] is a bar complaint that the Firm and [...] should have disclosed in the Applications.  [See 3T24-16]
[brief] THE MOTION RECORD DEMONSTRATED THAT THE PREMISES OWNER HAD TRANSFERRED AND RELINQUISHED ALL CONTROL OF THE PREMISES EXCLUSIVELY TO A SINGLE TENANT, INCLUDING THE RESPONSIBILITY TO REPAIR AND MAINTAIN THE INJURY-PRODUCING CONDITION, (2)  BECAUSE NONE OF THE THREE COMMON LAW EXCEPTIONS TO THE NON-LIABILITY RULE APPLY, AND (3) BECAUSE THE RECORD SHOWED THAT THE OWNER DID NOT CONCEAL THE CONDITION NOR DID THE OWNER FAIL TO DISCLOSE A CONDITION THAT WAS UNKNOWN TO THE TENANT AS THE TENANT’S MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL HAD PERFORMED REPAIRS ON THE CONDITION BEFORE INCIDENT INVOLVING PLAINTIFF’S DECEDENT (Pa 293).
[brief] ”  21.  Rule 1:13-4-Transfer of Actions (a) (Pa 180-186)  On Motion.  Subject to the right to be prosecuted by indictment, if any court is without jurisdiction of the subject matter of an action or issue therein or if there has been an inability to serve a party without whom the action cannot proceed as provided by R. 4:28-1, it shall, on motion or on its own initiative, order the action, with the record and all papers on file, transferred to the proper court or administrative agency, if any, in the State.  The action shall then be proceeded upon as if it had been originally commenced in that court or agency.
[brief] These insurance monies were in [...] bank account when the [...] was served with discovery requests by [...] on behalf of [...] for [...] to answer.  The connection between the [...]'s refusal to provide the E.I.N. number and the insurance policy problems began to be revealed.  According to [...] the E.I.N. number was needed "in regard to protecting assets pertaining to a life insurance policy" (R-267).
[brief] To the contrary, N.J.S.A. 39:4-126 plainly delineates the movements that the statute covers, including “otherwise turn[ing] a vehicle from a direct course or mov[ing] right or left upon a roadway,” and provides that those who “so turn” must “giv[e] an appropriate signal” if other motorists may be affected.  The language plainly requires motorists to signal lane changes.  Though there is no need to go beyond the words of the statute, the law’s purpose and history confirm this reading of the statute.  Countless drivers follow this law every day on New Jersey roads, not just simply as a matter of courtesy, but because it is understood what the law plainly requires.  The law—on the books in its present form since the 1950s—has been enforced for decades without controversy.  Indeed, the New Jersey Supreme Court applied this statute to un-signaled lane changes thirty years ago, and this Court has followed suit on multiple occasions.  Because a lane change falls within the meaning of N.J.S.A. 39:4-126’s signaling requirement, the vehicle in which defendant was a passenger was properly stopped on reasonable and articulable suspicion of a motor vehicle violation when the driver failed to signal before changing lanes.  Moreover, the credible testimony of the two officers who made the stop established that other traffic may have been affected by the un-signaled lane change based on the presence of cars in both lanes of the roadway, including the police vehicle immediately behind the driver.  Accordingly, the trial court’s decision upholding the car stop must be affirmed.  COUNTERSTATEMENT OF PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[directive] Las demandas, pedimentos y demás papeles presentados al tribunal deben estar en ingles  Complaints, motions and other papers submitted to the court should be in English  Poder Judicial de Nueva Jersey  New Jersey  Judiciary Formulario suplementario para una declaración de culpabilidad  Condena N.J.S.A. obligatoria a una libertad a prueba especial conforme a 2C:35-14.2
[brief] *[...]* “ultimately viewed the decision as turning not on which of the parties acted worse but on the weight of the competing public policies. ”  *Id.*  Though the Court must consider “the strong interests in finality of judgments and judicial efficiency,” the Court must weigh the same against the public policy motivating the legislation of the NJCFLA, *to wit*, protecting New Jersey residents by ensuring that only qualified and regulated entities can engage in the “consumer loan business.
[brief] A cause of action to quiet title is provided for by New Jersey statute:  Any person in the peaceable possession of lands in this state and claiming ownership thereof, may, when his title thereto, or any part thereof, is denied or disputed, or any other person claims or is claimed to own the same, or any part thereof or interest therein, or to hold a lien or encumbrance thereon, and when no action is pending to enforce or test the validity of such title, claim or encumbrance, maintain an action in the superior court to settle the title to such lands and to clear up all doubts and disputes concerning the same.  N.J.S.A. 2A:62-1.  Although the quiet-title action has been codified by statute, it retains its equitable origins, Estate of Smith v. Cohen, 123 N.J. Eq. 419, 425 (E. & A. 1938); Brady v. Carteret Realty Co., 70 N.J. Eq. 748, 754 (E. & A. 1906).  Property disputes involving religious organizations often implicate both the Free Exercise Clause and/or the Establishment Clause.
[brief] Oath; sworn.  The word "oath" includes "affirmation"; and the word "sworn" includes "affirmed."  Other property.  See "Property; other property," infra, this section.  Person.  The word "person" includes corporations, companies, associations, societies, firms, partnerships and joint stock companies as well as individuals, unless restricted by the context to an individual as distinguished from a corporate entity or specifically restricted to one or some of the above enumerated synonyms and, when used to designate the owner of property which may be the subject of an offense, includes this State, the United States, any other State of the United States as defined infra and any foreign country or government lawfully owning or possessing property within this State.
[brief] By defendant’s own admission, he dropped the co-defendants off, operated a motor vehicle which contained the co-defendant’s belongings and proceeds from the robbery, and was in possession of an iPhone that was stolen from one of the stores.  At the core of this case, the defendant is charged with his participation in the overall scheme.  By allowing an argument that he should not be found guilty because another individual committed the crime would directly cut against the law of this State, the jury instructions, and the State’s theory of the case.  Thus, trial counsel can hardly be seen as ineffective for failing to request this specific jury charge.  Because the defendant failed to establish that he was prejudiced by counsel’s representation, the trial court appropriately denied the defendant’s petition without an evidentiary hearing.
[brief] 15 U.S.C. § 1692d, § 1692e, and § 1692f.  Each of those three provisions states a broad limitation on debt collector’s conduct and then provides a non-limiting, non-exhaustive list of specific conduct which violates the general proscription.  In 15 U.S.C. § 1692b, which is not specifically relevant to Plaintiffs’ claims but helps explain the statutory structure, the Act restricts communications with those who might have contact information (called “location information”) about a consumer.  Generally, the provision allows a debt collector to contact neighbors, relatives, and employers to obtain the consumer’s address or telephone number provided the debt collector never discloses that it is attempting to collect a debt.  In addition to prohibiting third-party communications under subsection (b), 15 U.S.C. § 1692c addresses debt collectors’ communications with the consumer during certain hours, while at work, and when represented by counsel.  It also provides how a consumer can require a debt collector to cease further communications.  Under § 1692g, a debt collector is obligated to provide a consumer notice of certain information including the right to dispute the debt.  The written notice must be sent with or within five days after each collector’s initial communication.  Under § 1692i, a debt collector is barred from suing a consumer in an inconvenient forum.  Generally, a lawsuit must be commenced in the venue where the consumer lives.
[brief] And even with the 7 factors outlined there, the Court did state that no one factor is dispositive as to whether or not the waiver occurred.  But the 7 factors that are outlined under Cole are ***  [court lists factors]  And [...] has argued that and although it didn’t specifically say it, he has argued that there’s no prejudice if the Court were to grant -- if the Court were to grant his motion and order that there was no waiver.  * *  *[court discusses Cole factors]  There’s no trial date and the resulting prejudice, again I believe that was argued.  This Court at this point regardless of what these 7 factors are, the facts are that there was an express waiver of arbitration.
[directive] ¿Entiende que si usted se está declarando culpable del delito de pornografía infantil conforme a 2C:24-4b(4) o 2C:24- N.J.S.A. N.J.S.A. 4b(5) o la tentativa de cometer cualquiera de dichos delitos y el delito ocurrió el 14 de agosto del 2013 o después de esa fecha, además de cualquier otra condena, y a solicitud del fiscal, el juez le impondrá una condena especial de supervisión de por vida de la libertad condicional, a menos que el juez determine y conste en el acta que la supervisión de la libertad condicional de por vida no es necesaria para proteger a la Formulario enmendado promulgado por la directriz #01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 10080-Spanish página 4 de 7 Revised Form Promulgated by Directive #01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 10080-Spanish page 4 of 7 comunidad o para impedir que usted cometa alguna actividad delictiva en el futuro? (only complete if the offense occurred on or after August 14, 2013) Do you understand that if you are pleading guilty to the crime of child pornography pursuant to 2C:24-4b(4) or 2C:24-4b(5) or an attempt to commit N.J.S.A. N.J.S.A. either of these offenses and the offense occurred on or after August 14, 2013, in addition to any other sentence, and upon motion of the prosecutor, the court shall life, unless the court finds on the impose a special sentence of parole supervision for record that parole supervision for life is not needed to protect the community or deter you from future criminal activity?
[brief] There is no mention of disability discrimination as it pertains to these Defendants.  There are no factual allegations pleaded in the Complaint alleging disability discrimination or hostile work environment based on disability discrimination against these Defendants.  DA004-DA005, ¶¶ 22-24.  In fact, in paragraph 24(b) of Plaintiff’s Complaint, Plaintiff states that she took “her FMLA leave due to the anxiety caused by the workplace religious discrimination and/or harassment. ”  DA005, ¶¶ 24(b).  Plaintiff specifically ties her allegations of workplace religious discrimination to her anxiety.  Plaintiff does not allege any facts of disability discrimination, or any facts tying her anxiety to any alleged acts or statements of disability discrimination by any of the Township Defendants.  **Factual Allegations
[directive] Certificate  Suspending Employment/Occupational Disabilities Related to Criminal Convictions (CN 12537)  Superior Court of New Jersey Law Division – Criminal Part  State of New Jersey County Plaintiff, Indictment Number: v. SBI Number: Certificate Defendant.  Suspending Employment/ Occupational Disabilities Related to Criminal Convictions  Application having been made by the above captioned defendant for relief from certain employment or occupational disabilities related to a criminal conviction, and notice having been given to the County Prosecutor, and the Court having found that the defendant is a qualified offender pursuant to N.J.S.A. 168A-7 et. seq. and that the relief sought is consistent with the public interest, THEREFORE, GRANTS the court the applicant’s request to be relieved from the following employment or occupational disabilities, forfeitures or bars that were imposed as a result of a conviction in the above captioned matter:  This certificate shall further act as presumptive evidence of the above captioned subject’s rehabilitation when considered in regard to public employment or in conjunction with any licensing or certification process to which this applies, which in any particular case may or may not be overcome by other evidence or information.  This certificate shall not prevent any judicial, administrative, licensing or other body, board, authority or public official from relying on grounds other than the fact of the referenced criminal conviction in exercising any discretionary authority, if any, to suspend, revoke, refuse to issue or refuse to renew any license, permit or other authority or privilege or to determine eligibility or suitability for employment.  This certificate is not binding upon a private employer.  A private employer may, in its sole and complete discretion, consider this certificate in making employment decisions.  s/ Date J.S.C.  Any questions regarding this certificate should be directed to: Name: Telephone: cc: Defendant Prosecutor or Attorney General Administrative Office of the Courts Criminal Practice Division Form Promulgated by Directive #02-24 (03/04/2024), CN: 12537
[brief] 567 | 11 | | (Law Div. 2005) | | | *Allstate Ins. Co. v. Fisher*, 408 N.J. Super. 289 (App. Div. 2009) | 4 | | *Ansko v. Borough of Palisades Park*, 139 N.J. Super. 342 (App. Div. 1976)| 7, 8 | | *Brook v. April*, 294 N.J. Super. 90 (App. Div. 1996) | 9 | | *Buteas v. Raritan Lodge #61 F. & A.M.*, 248 N.J. Super. 351 (App. Div. 1991)| 5, 6 | | *Crystal Ice–Bridgeton, LLC v. City of Bridgeton*, 428 N.J. Super. 576 | 5 | | (App. Div. 2012) | | | *Daniel v. Borough of Oakland*, 124 N.J. Super. 69 (App. Div. 1973) | 11, 12| | *Edwards v. Wyckoff Elec. Supply Co.*, 42 N.J. Super. 236 (App. Div. 1956)| 10 | | *Ewing v. Cumberland Cnty.*, 152 F.Supp. 3d 269 (D. N.J. 2015) | 3 | | *Ford Motor Co. v. Kearny*, 91 N.J.L. 671, 103 A. 254 (E. & A. 1917) | 12 | | *Greenway Dev. Co. v. Borough of Paramus*, 163 N.J. 546 (2000) | 9 | | Case Name | Citation | Page | |-----------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | Henebema v. Raddi | 452 N.J. Super. 438 (App. Div. 2017) | 3, 5 | | Hill v. Middletown Bd. of Educ., | 183 N.J. Super. 36 (App. Div. 1982), cert den., 81 N.J. 233 (1982) | Passim | | Jackson v. Hankinson | 94 N.J. Super. 505 (App. Div. 1967), aff'd, 51 N.J. 230 (1968) | 1 | | Klockner v. Green | 54 N.J. 230 (1969) | 10 | | Kolitch v. Lindedahl | 100 N.J. 485 (1985) | 1 | | K. S. B. Technical Sales Corp. v. North Jersey Dist. Water Supply Commission of State of N.J., | 75 N.J. 272 (1977), appeal dismissed, 435 U.S. 982, 98 S. Ct. 1635, 56 L.Ed.2d 76 (1978) | 11 | | Lehigh Valley Railroad Company v. Jersey City | 138 A. 467, 103 N.J.L. 574 (1927) | 11, 12 | | Lemelledo v. Beneficial Management Corp. of America | 150 N.J. 255 (1997) | 13 | | Leodori v. Cigna Corp., | 175 N.J. 293 (2003) | 10 | | McBarron v. Kipling Woods | 365 N.J. Super. 114 (App. Div. 2004) | 10 | | McShain v. Evesham Tp., | 163 N.J. Super. 522 (Law Div. 1978) | 7 | | Owens v. Feigin | 194 N.J. 607 (2008) | 9 | | Pami Realty, LLC v. Locations XIX Inc., | 468 N.J. Super. 546 (App. | 10 | | Case | Page(s) | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|---------| | Peskin v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 214 N.J. Super. 686 (Law Div. 1986) | 2, 8 | | Smith v. Squibb Corp., 254 N.J. Super. 69 (App. Div. 1992) | 10 | | State v. East Shores, Inc., 164 N.J. Super. 530 (App. Div. 1979) | 12, 13 | | State v. Hild, 148 N.J. Super. 294 (App. Div. 1977) | 14 | | State v. Lefante, 14 N.J. 584 (1954) | 14 | | Wanaque Borough Sewerage Auth. v. Twp. of West Milford, 144 N.J. 564 | 11 | | Weichert Co. Realtors v. Ryan, 128 N.J. 427 (1992) | 10 | | Williams v. Vito, 365 N.J. Super. 225 (Law Div. 2003) | 10 | | Zavodnick v. Leven, 340 N.J. Super. 94 (App. Div. 2001) | 14 | ## B. STATUTES & REGULATIONS | Authority | Pages | |----------------------------|-------| | N.J.S.A. 25:1-5, et seq. | 10 | | N.J.S.A. 59:1-1, et seq. | Passim|
[brief] defendant without objection, (2)  The Court not finding plain error because the defendant chose to represent herself as pro se and asked [...] if he was certain of his identification, there’s nothing to indicate that his identification was suggested by any factor except his outright memory.  (2T17:12-17)  (3)  Arguments made about his identification and hearsay statements would be different if the only identification was out-of-court and if the in-court identification question was proper or not (2T17:18-21).  The Superior Court informs, in this case, the real question is was the in-court identification proper; that [...] in-court identification of the defendant as the one that committed an offense against him was proper, unequivocal.
[directive] See N.J.S.A. by authorized as assessment).  diagnostic professional to submit is defendant the believe that to basis objective an is whether there determining  In circumstances, relevant all consider may prosecutor addiction, the of disease the from suffering following: the to not limited but including or substance controlled a of influence under the be to appeared defendant whether the (a) user; being drug a admitted to has or offense, the of time the at alcohol possession; for drug convicted or arrested been previously has defendant the whether (b) and for eligible clinically or found to admitted been previously has defendant the whether (c) Program.
[brief] A prudent investment would require a determination by the [...] of what the legal rents on the 11 units actually were at the time of purchase.  No such determination was requested by [...].  (Absent from record referred to at 7T 151: 23-25 to 152: 1-3).  However, [...]’s rent was substantially reduced around the time of conversion and a letter from the [...] in the property file indicates that there had been a determination of a rental overcharge.
[brief] *State v. Rockford*, 213 N.J. 424, 440 (2013).  “[A]n appellate court reviewing a motion to suppress must uphold the factual findings underlying the trial court's decision so long as those findings are supported by sufficient credible evidence in the record. ”  *State v. Watts*, 223 N.J. 503, 516 (2015); State v. Robinson, 200 N.J. 1, 15 (2009); State v. Elders, 192 N.J. 224, 243-44 (2007); see State v. Locurto, 157 N.J. 463, 474 (1999); State v. Alvarez, 238 N.J. Super. 560, 562-64 (App. Div. 1990) (stating that standard of review on appeal of a motion to suppress is whether "the findings made by the judge could reasonably have been reached on sufficient credible evidence present in the record").  The factual findings of the trial court “warrant particular deference when they are ‘substantially influenced by the trial judge's opportunity to hear and see the witnesses and to have the feel of the case, which a reviewing court cannot enjoy. ’”  Watts, 223 N.J. at 516; Rockford, 213 N.J. at 440; Robinson, 200 N.J. at 15; State v. Bard, 445 N.J. Super. 145, 154 (2016); see also State v. Tate, 220 N.J. 393, 404 (2015) (Deference should be given to the trial court for determinations made based on witness credibility).  Furthermore, “[a]n appellate court should not disturb the trial court’s findings merely because it might have reached a different conclusion were it the trial tribunal or because the trial court decided all evidence or inference conflicts in favor of one side in a close case. ”  Bard, 445 N.J. at 154.  Elders, 192 N.J. at 244.  Rather, a trial court's findings should be disturbed only if they are so “clearly mistaken” or so “wide of the mark” that “the interests of justice demand intervention and correction. ”  Id. at 244-45.  Only in those circumstances should an appellate court “appraise the record as if it were deciding the matter at inception and make its own findings and conclusions. ”  *Ibid.* (quoting *State v. Johnson*, 42 N.J. 146, 162 (1964)).  Ultimately, the appellate court “may only consider whether the motion to suppress was properly decided based on the evidence presented at that time. ”  *State v. Gibson*, 318 N.J. Super. 1, 9 (App. Div. 1999).  “The privilege against self-incrimination, as set forth in the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, is one of the most important protections of the criminal law.
[brief] Citations to Francavilla made herein are based upon the identical copy available via LEXIS. (citing Md. Code. Ann., Com. Law §14-203; N.J.S.A. 17:11C-1 to -49).  This is not dicta.  And this is evidenced by subsequent Appellate Division decisions which have all treated the *Francavilla* holding as precedential.  *See Diana v. LVNV Funding LLC*, 2024 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2241, at *7 (“In *Francavilla v. Absolute Resolutions VI, LLC*, decided by us while this appeal was pending, we **concluded** the CFLA does not contain a statutory private right of action since it only provides a mechanism for action and enforcement by the Commissioner of Banking and Insurance”) (citing *Francavilla*, 478 N.J. Super. at 180); *Portfolio Recovery Assocs., LLC v. Chartonavich*, 2024 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2537, at *7 (App. Div. Oct. 21, 2024) (“We recently held, in an unrelated matter, that the CFLA does not create a private right of action for debtors pursuing affirmative claims against debt collectors”) (citing *Francavilla*, 478 N.J. Super. at 180); see also *N.A.R., Inc. v. Ritter*, 2024 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1313, at *10 (App Div. June 24, 2024) (“The NJCFLA does not provide a mechanism for action and enforcement to anyone other than the Commissioner of Banking and Insurance.
[brief] (1T48-1 to 51-6; 1T75-22 to 80-15).  announced several times, and waited, 132’s front door was forcibly breached with a ram; the TEAMS groups then entered to clear [...] and render it safe.  (1T80-20 to 82-20; 5T16-10 to 18-6; 5T29-4 to 31-25; 5T34-9 to 37-5; 5T73-10 to 77-22).