ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] [...] Affirmatively Aided and Abetted [...] and was Not Merely an Innocent Bystander to the Breach by [...]**  Addressing, first, the existence of a contract between the parties, the Complaint alleged (and the documentary proof submitted by [...] confirmed) that [...] is a party and signatory to the PSA.  (*Pa*3, Complaint ¶ 8; Pa128).  In an apparent effort to try to distance itself from the contract and its associated duties to Plaintiff, [...] repeatedly referred to the PSA as a contract between Plaintiff and [...], in its papers in the court below.  (See, e.g., Pa32 at ¶ 3).  Elsewhere, [...] admitted (as it had to) that both the Mack-Cali Agreement and the PSA designated and expressly referred to [...] as the “escrow agent” and “title company. ” (See, e.g., Pa93, Pa95; see also Pa546-547, [...] Mem. at 4, 5).  Still, [...] asserted that “the signature block of the PSA indicates that [...]’s involvement and obligations owed under the PSA were limited to ‘Articles IV, X, and XVII,’” and argued that “[...] is a title insurer but never executed the PSA in its alleged capacity as a ‘Title Company. ’” (Pa550, [...] Mem. at 8).  Of course, as a signatory to a contract, and absent fraud, [...] is presumed to have read, understood, and assented to all of its terms.  See Peter W. Kero Inc. v. Terminal Construction Corp., 6 N.J. 361, 368, 78 A.2d 814 (1951); see also Greenfield v Twin Vision Graphics, Inc., 268 F. Supp. 2d 358, 373 (D.N.J. 2003).  Particularly where, as here, the signatories are sophisticated parties, represented by counsel, [...] must be presumed to have read and understood the terms of the deal and to have known that it was taking on duties to the other parties to the PSA.  Moreover, [...]’s duties under the contract must be construed based upon the whole contract, read in harmony, and not by sole reference to the small print above the signature block, as [...] argued.  See generally Krosnowski v. Krosnowski, 22 N.J. 376, 387, 126 A.2d 182, 188 (1956).  Here, a perusal of the PSA as a whole reflects that [...] undertook various duties, including as an escrow agent and as a title company.  More specifically, [...] undertook a variety of duties and obligations in its role as Escrow Agent.  (Pa90-128, PSA §§ 3.2, 4.2, 4.3, 10.1, 11.1, 11.2, 17.1(a), 17.1(b), 18.14).  Contrary to its contentions, [...] was also required to act in the role as the Title Company and is expressly defined as such in the PSA.
[brief] [...]  AND [...] IN SUPPORT OF THEIR APPEAL [...]  Email: [...] [...]  Ph: [...]/Fax: [...]  Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellants Innovation Optics, Inc. and Alan Greenberg Of Counsel and On the Brief: [...], Esq. Attorney ID No. 052091992  On the Brief: [...], Esq. Attorney ID No. 169622015 TABLE OF CONTENTS Page TABLE OF CONTENTS ........................................................................................................... i TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS, AND RULINGS BEING APPEALED ................................................................. iii TRIAL COURT OPINIONS .................................................................................................. iii TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ................................................................................................. iv PRELIMINARY STATEMENT ............................................................................................. 1 PROCEDURAL HISTORY .................................................................................................... 4 STATEMENT OF FACTS .................................................................................................... 10 LEGAL ARGUMENT .......................................................................................................... 14 POINT I ............................................................................................................................... 15 THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT ORDER DISMISSING PLAINTIFFS’ TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE CLAIM WAS BASED UPON A BASIC MISUNDERSTANDING OF THE LAW OF THAT TORT (P1a-P2a, 1T 21:5-25:8) .........................................................................................
[directive] Do you know anyone else in the jury box other than as a result of reporting here today?  10.  Would your verdict in this case be influenced in any way by any factors other than the evidence in the courtroom, such as friendships or family relationships or the type of work you do?  11.  Is there anything about the nature of the charge itself that would interfere with your impartiality?  Standards for Jury Selection Promulgated by Directive #21-06 (December 11, 2006)
[brief] New Jersey Court Rules 2:6-2 – Contents of Appellant’s Brief 2.  New Jersey Court Rules 2:6-4 – Contents of Respondent's Brief; Statement in Lieu of Brief; Responsibility to File  3.  New Jersey Court Rules 2:6-11 – Time for Serving and Filing Briefs; Appendices; Transcript; Notice of Custodial Status Table of Authorities - Statutes  1.  New Jersey Statute 39:4-50.2 – Consent to taking of samples of breath; record of test; independent test; prohibition of use of force; informing accused.  2.  New Jersey Statute 39:4-50.4a – Refusal to submit to test; penalties.  3.  New Jersey Statute 39:4-92.2 - Procedure for motorist approaching certain stationary vehicle.  4.  New Jersey Statute 39:4-88 - Traffic on marked lanes.  Preliminary Statement
[brief] Id. 40:55D-72(a).  Finally, pursuant to Rule 4:69-1, et seq. of the New Jersey Court Rules  [a plaintiff is] entitled to a review, a hearing, and relief by filing a complaint in the New Jersey Superior Court, Law Division, before the expiration of forty-five days from the time [the plaintiff] receive[s] notice that [its] application for rezoning ha[s] been denied.
[brief] Da17.  The Court made several findings, first that [...] and another detective who testified, [...], testified credibly based on their demeanor and the consistency of their testimony.  Da11; Da14.  The Court found that [...] was credible in “much of her testimony. ”  Da15.  The Court further found that probable cause to search the phone arose long before consent was sought and existed in combination with one or more relevant warrant exceptions: that returning the phone to the defendant prior to the search of the phone would have resulted in the creation of exigent circumstances, that the phone was validly seized pursuant to lawfully-given consent, and additionally found that the evidence should not be suppressed and that related testimony and evidence was admissible at trial.
[brief] [...] rejected, as contrary to “[t]he clear weight of authority,” the notion that “damages” in a CGL policy excludes “equitable monetary relief. ”  Id. at 24, 629 A.2d at 845 (quoting Cont’l Ins. Cos. v. Ne. Pharm. & Chem. Co., 842 F.2d 977, 985 (8th Cir. 1988)).  The undefined term “damages” in a liability insurance policy is to be given its “plain, non-technical meaning.
[brief] When it installed the new 16-inch line, [...] included what it refers to as the "temporary regulator," which is a misnomer given its current and projected longevity and reliability.  This smaller regulator is enclosed in a casement under Holmdel Road and is unheated.  The company's claims about this regulator's reliability are, to put it charitably, so wildly exaggerated as to amount to falsity, [...], [...], is [...]'s petition to approve the installation of a gas regulator station on an easement at [...], in [...], [...].  The [...] denied [...]'s application for several variances to permit that installation by Resolution dated March 15, 2017.  Ha413.  The company has not pursued this application except as a formality and we will not address it further.  [...], [...] is [...]'s petition to approve the installation of the gas regulator station on an easement at [...], in [...], [...].  The [...] ZB denied the company's Application for several variances to permit that installation by Resolution dated December 12, 2018.  Ha280.  After the petition was filed, the parties engaged in settlement discussions over a period of many months, resulting in a settlement that the [...] Committee rejected.  IV.
[brief] Certainly the other detectives who did not testify caused the stop of the initial Mr. . . . Coly from there.  And from there the actions of [...] are to flee back in the arm where the officer is basically following him down the alleyway going forward, back toward the premises that's under surveillance for the search warrant that is executed.  And certainly we have the search warrant executed and going forward from there, and the inventory happened.  I'll get to that in a second.  So that stop, that Terry frisk, that fleeing and certainly the admission and consent of the defendant that there is a weapon on him I find entirely valid.  And I find that the witness is credible and going forward from there.  So that clearly in my opinion takes care of that issue concerning the motion that you filed, which I interpreted as a request to suppress the evidence from the warrantless search.  That motion is denied.
[brief] [...] submitted no opposition to either motion to enter default against it.  Default was entered against [...].  Notwithstanding Plaintiffs’ compliance with R. 1:13-7, [...] was dismissed as a party by administrative Order dated November 8, 2024.  (Dr85).  By Court Order dated November 15, 2024 the administrative Order was vacated and [...] reinstated as a party.  (Pra273).  [...] has failed to comply with pleading requirements of the Rules of Court.  Included in this list of violations is R. 1:13-7(a) and (b)(2) (failure to file an Answer); R. 4:5-1 (Case Information Statement, Certification); R. 4:5-3 (failure to plead defenses); R. 4:5-4 (statement of facts); R. 4:6-1 (time requirements); and R. 4:6-2 (defense requirements).
[directive] Position Course of fire  Time Range  On command with the action forward, safety on and muzzle depressed, load the shotgun with 4 rounds into the magazine.  Standing Point  25 50 Yds 5  On command from a standing point shoulder  Shoulder sec. position, fire the 4 rounds; 5th 5th Combat load a round and fire that round.  Action open, safety on, muzzle depressed.  With the action open and safety on, on command combat load 1 round, load 2 rounds into the Standing Point magazine and fire those 3 rounds.  35  25 Yds 5  Shoulder Combat load 1 round and load 1 round into the sec. magazine; fire those 2 rounds.  Action open, safety on, muzzle depressed.  End course, score targets:
[brief] PROCEDURAL HISTORY  Plaintiffs, [...], Deceased, by [...] as Executrix of the Estate and [...], Individually, filed suit on October 10, 2014.  Pa42.  Plaintiffs named as defendants [...] ([...]), [...], [...] ([...]), [...], [...] ([...]), [...] ([...]), [...] ([...]), [...] ([...]), [...] ([...]), and John Does and ABC Corps, representing fictitious names for as yet unknown entities.  On or about March 6, 2015, [...] was dismissed without prejudice.  On April 22, 2015, plaintiffs filed an Amended Complaint.  On or about August 10, 2015, [...] was dismissed without prejudice.  On January 27, 2016, pursuant to leave granted, plaintiffs filed a Second Amended Complaint, adding as defendants [...] ([...]) and [...] ([...]).
[brief] Such video should be preserved until the statute of limitations has run.  In the absence of imposing such a duty, despite remaining cognizant of a potential claim, and despite the feasibility of preserving such surveillance footage, potential defendants will remain disincentivized from retaining such footage.  Lastly, the fact that the issue surrounding this matter involves [...]’s negligent operation of the U-boat and the failure on the part of [...]’s employees to remediate the risk of harm to other customers, any surveillance footage that should have been preserved by [...] would have been relevant and critical to this litigation.  Such footage would also likely to have shown [...] passing various employees with an overloaded cart.  In short, consideration of the aforementioned factors, particularly the knowledge of Plaintiff’s incident and the distinct possibility that litigation would result, should have immediately prompted [...] to preserve all available footage so that such footage could be easily accessible in the future.  Given the fact that [...] testified that this could have easily been accomplished by the store itself and the corporate office (Pa96), every effort should have been made by [...] to preserve the footage in the event that a claim by Plaintiffs did ultimately arise.
[brief] Cox and Koenig, 4:1.5-6 (emphasis added).  The actions of the HPC under the ordinance and MLUL, despite Plaintiff’s contravention of the municipal ordinance and assertions to the contrary of their determination, were proper and appropriate for an appeal of the HPC decision to the Zoning Board.  Having appealed to the Zoning Board, it must be stated AGAIN that Plaintiff filed for no alternative relief (variance or otherwise) or interpretation of Ordinance.  As Board Planner [...] stated, “You put a structure in the Flare which we do not allow, period. ”  (2T: 42:2-3)  The third connecting walkway is “on someone else’s property. ”  Id. at ln 7.  “You do not have permission from the [...] to put it there, nor do you have permission from the Township.  That would have required a variance. ”  Id at ln 8-11.  “I understand it’s not what you are looking to hear, but at the end of the day, what has transpired here is that you did whatever you wanted.  The HPC, who in our opinion and in my experience having worked here for over a decade, is responsible for design elements, look, color, materials, etc., denied the application because they felt it wasn’t in keeping with their guidelines, which is what their charge is in the [...] for a key structure, no only did you not comply with them, but you’re not compliant with the [...] either.
[brief] See Mueller v. Tech. Devices Corp., 8 N.J. 201, 207-08 (1951) (“It is well settled that where possession of chattels is lawfully acquired, a demand therefor and refusal to deliver is generally necessary before an action in trover and conversion will accrue.  . .  The demand, however, must be made at a time and place and under such circumstances as defendant is able to comply with if he is so disposed, and the refusal must be wrongful . . .  The burden of proof of a demand and refusal rests upon the plaintiff. ”); Meisels v. Fox Rothschild LLP, 240 N.J. 286, 304 --- 1  All capitalized terms that are not otherwise defined herein shall have the same meaning ascribed to them in Defendant’s moving brief.
[directive] See also Section 9.3 (notation (i.e., “tagging”) of certain events/encounters raising privacy or other special issues).  7.1.1  If an officer is required to de-activate the BWC in accordance with the provisions of this Section, the officer shall narrate the reason for de-activation (e.g., “I am entering a school building where children are present. ”).  The BWC shall be re-activated as soon as it is safe and practicable to do so if and when the circumstances requiring de-activation no longer exist (e.g., the officer is conversing with an adult as part of a criminal investigation while in a place within the school where children would not be in view of the BWC).  7.2
[brief] See Pa73.  Plaintiff also relies on a conversation in which Plaintiff accused [...] of ruining his career as evidence that [...] did in fact ruin Plaintiff’s career.  See Pb9 (“When the Plaintiff told [...] that he, [...], ruined his career, it was the final touch to retaliation .  . . .”).  Plaintiff’s subjective belief that he had somehow been sabotaged does not make it true.  Finally, Plaintiff’s counsel insists that the Court must adopt his illogical interpretation of the [...] phone call even though Plaintiff himself does not endorse it.  See Pa77-78; 1T at 96:5-96:18.  Plaintiff’s self-serving, unsubstantiated, and illogical interpretation of events is insufficient to forestall summary judgment.  See Brill, 142 N.J. at 523; Swarts, 244 N.J. Super. at 178.  **CONCLUSION**
[brief] Courts applying the heightened reasonable certainty standard applicable to new business have routinely rejected lost profits claims based on assumptions and speculation.  See, e.g., Schonfeld, 218 F.3d at 172 (quoting Kenford, 67 N.Y.2d at 67) (“Projections of future profits based on a ‘multitude of assumptions’ that require ‘speculation and conjecture’ and few known factors do not provide the requisite certainty. ”) (emphasis added); Kidder, Peabody & Co., Inc. v. [...] Intern. Acceptance Group. N.V., 28 F. Supp. 2d 126, 134 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (“The theme that emerges from these cases is clear: a claimant cannot establish lost profits with the law’s requisite certainty where its calculation is dependent upon a host of assumptions concerning uncertain contingencies, and applies numerous variables about which an expert can only surmise. ”) (emphasis added).  Indeed, Plaintiffs’ lost profits claims suffer the same fate as the claimant in Kidder:  Similar to those in Kenford and its progeny, [...]’s expert calculations are premised upon a variety of assumptions about hypothetical deals continuing successively (and successfully) for several years by an entity that had no historical experience in the particular business for which it seeks lost profits.  These cases make evident that [...], a fledgling, unproved business, cannot prove damages with reasonable certainty in the face of such extensive assumptions.  Kidder, 28 F. Supp. 2d at 134-35.  IV.
[brief] https://nj.gov/state/planning/assets/pdf/warehouse-guidance.pdf.  This document specifically observes that “[w]hat once was a less conspicuous land use limited to industrial parks in peripheral areas, distribution warehouses have become a much more recognizable feature on the landscape in towns across New Jersey, as logistics companies pursue more and increasingly larger projects. ”  Id. at 4.  Sufficed to say, and despite any suggestion to the contrary, [...] could not have built this project in the 1980s.  The Township similarly attempts to minimize the impact of the new overlay zoning suggesting that the greater development intensity facilitated by Ordinance No. 13-2022 “is not so significantly different to what was permitted without the Redevelopment Plan”.
[brief] ”) (citing *See* N.J.S.A. 17:11C-18; *Francavilla*, 478 N.J. Super. at 180 (“The [Maryland Consumer Debt Collection Act] also contains a private right of action, while [the NJCFLA] does not. ”)); *Jefferson Cap. Sys., LLC Inc/Santander Consumer USA v. Glover*, 2024 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1248, at *10 (App. Div. June 18, 2024) (“Defendant's claim cannot prevail as she may not enforce the CFLA's license requirement because the Legislature did not provide a private right of action under the CFLA”) (citing Francavilla, 478 N.J. Super. at 180).  To the extent Appellant seeks to assert Respondent’s licensing status under the CFLA solely as an affirmative defense, nothing in N.J.S.A. 17:11C-33 (b) states the purchase of debt without a license automatically bars the assignment of debts, or otherwise that the debts are automatically void.
[brief] 64  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS  Judgment of Conviction  .................................................................................................  Da 16 to 19  Rulings on Point I ..............................................  21T 21-13 to 43-1; 21T 45-11 to 46-15  Rulings on Point III ..... 14T 138-10 to 11; 14T 140-10 to 14; 16T 215-13 to 23; 17T 82-16; 20T 168-23 to 184-20  Rulings on Point IV ...20T 110-16 to 111-7; 20T 168-23 to 184-20; Da 13 to 14  Ruling on Point VII .....................................................................................................  9T 69-18 to 71-4  Rulings on Point IX ....................................................................................................  20T 11-25 to 16-1  Points II, V, VI, and VIII were not raised below
[brief] (Pa000037, Compl. ¶¶ 20-22).  Without acknowledging the import of the MSRA, or the terms of the Notice of Implementation or Settlement Agreement, Plaintiffs argue that the “Settlement Agreement set terms of a successor CNA between the [...] and the City and State and a successor CNA between the [...] and the City and State,” thereby triggering promotional payments pursuant to the 2016 MOAs.  (Pa000039, Compl. ¶ 39).  Plaintiffs do not, however, allege that the Settlement Agreement contains a “salary increase.
[brief] “Because the ‘[a]ssistance of counsel is essential to ensuring fairness and due process in criminal prosecutions,’ relinquishing one’s right to the benefits of representation by counsel can be allowed only when the court is satisfied that the defendant understands the ‘implications of the waiver [of counsel].’”  *State v. Outland*, 245 N.J. 494, 505 (2021) (quoting *State v. Crisafi*, 128 N.J. 499, 509 (1992)).  “To ensure that a waiver of counsel is knowing and intelligent, the trial court should inform pro se defendants of the nature of the charges against them, the statutory defenses to those charges, and the possible range of punishment …
[brief] Spalt, 237 N.J. Super. at 213.  The court reasoned “that the right to pursue a particular job as opposed to the right to gainful employment, is not a fundamental right. . . at most, it is deprivation of the right to work at a particular job site. ”  Id. (citing Greenberg v. Kimmelman, 99 N.J. 552, 573-74 (1985)).  By analogy to Spalt, [...]’s right to navigate is not hindered simply because [...] may not be able to use the same path to get the channel in perpetuity.  The Trust claims to have a particularized property interest in the State’s land hundreds of feet from its dock because it uses a particular path to access and use of its existing facilities for purposes of navigation.  But [...]’s alleged “navigational harms faced solely by Appellant”, (Ab12), are speculative because [...]’s alleged harm—that the Jibsail Technical Modification Permit merely requires [...] to change its navigation path hundreds of feet from where [...] launches or parks its boat, and that the resultant changed navigation patterns cause [...]’s boat to scrape bottom, then that is a harm caused likely by the natural conditions of the waterway, i.e. water depths, and is no more than “fear of damage to one’s recreational interests. ”  In re Freshwater Wetlands Statewide Gen. Permits, 185 N.J. 452, 470 (2006) (citing Spalt, 237 N.J. Super. at 212-13).  The right to freely pilot one’s boat in the State’s waterways is no more than the generalized interests had by all watercraft operators and members of the general public.  Spalt, 237 N.J. Super. 206, 212 (App. Div. 1989) (citing Hills Development Co. v. Bernards Tp., 229 N.J. Super. 318, 335 (App. Div. 1988); In re Amico/Tunnel Carwash, 371 N.J. Super. 199, 211 (App. Div. 2004) (finding that adverse aesthetic impacts and traffic impacts are generalized and insufficient to establish particularized property interest).
[brief] MOREOVER, CONCURRENT SENTENCES WERE CLEARLY WARRANTED BECAUSE THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE THAT DEFENDANT POSSESSED THE FIREARM OTHER THAN DURING THE SHOOTING.  II.  Our Supreme Court has elucidated that trial courts confronted with a first-time in-court identification must “take steps to guard against practices that pose serious due process concerns—especially inside a court of law in front of a jury. ”  State v. Watson, 254 N.J. 558, 586 (2023).