ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] In affirming the Board’s approval, the Trial Court further reasoned that it was sufficient that “[t]he Board had the [environmental impact assessment] before it,” and that “the report had undergone extensive professional review. ” (Pa312-Pa313).  According to the Trial Court, “[n]either the statute nor the ordinances compel the Board to take testimony on all issues if those issues are substantiated in the record before it. ” (Pa313).  However, this proposition runs counter to the procedural requirements of board hearings.  “[P]lanning board hearings are trial-like and adversarial. ”  In re Freshwater Wetlands Statewide Gen. Permits, 185 N.J. 452, 455 (2006).  These hearings “serve as the focal point for resolution of conflicting interests between public restraints on the use of private property and the owner’s right to utilize his land as he wishes. ”  *Commons v. Westwood Zoning Board of Adjustment*, 81 N.J. 597, 610 (1980) (quoting *Chirichello v. Zoning Board of Adjustment*, 78 N.J. 544, 556 (1979)).  Therefore, “[f]undamental fairness demands an opportunity to test the trustworthiness of evidence adduced before an administrative agency and to explain or rebut it. ”  *Sanders v. Planning Board of Warren*, 140 N.J. Super. 386, 394 (App. Div. 1976) (citing *Abelsons, Inc. v. City of Newark*, 83 N.J. Super. 205, 209 (App. Div. 1964)).  The right to public comment and to cross-examine extends to members of the board as well.  “Members of the board of adjustment and the board attorney have the right to question the applicant and all witnesses with respect to any matter relevant to the application, whether the subject has first been introduced by a party to the proceeding or not. ”  *Cox & Koening*, § 18-3.2 at 257 (2023) (citing *Commons*, 81 N.J. at 610).  “The MLUL contemplates active involvement by planning boards in their review of subdivisions…That discretion is best exercised by a process in which planning boards affirmatively interact with developers when reviewing proposed subdivisions. ”  *Pizzo Mantin Group v. Twp. of Randolph*, 137 N.J. 216, 232-33 (1994).  Therefore, contrary to the Trial Court’s conclusion, the Board had an obligation to permit testimony and cross-examination by Plaintiffs and members of the Board on all issues and materials pertaining to the application.
[brief] §201-2A provides that “no person shall create, commit or maintain, or allow to be created, committed or maintained, any nuisance within the [...].  As set forth in the Statement of Facts, [...], identifying her role as to protect the health and safety of the residents of the Township and to enforce the public health laws of the Township and the State of New Jersey, testified as to what she observed on the public sidewalk on [...] within the jurisdiction of the Township on September 15, 2021.  (3T Pg. 8, Ln. 25 – Pg. 12, Ln. 8).
[brief] As argued *supra*, [...] was formed, funded, and managed by [...], each of whom was a director of [...] in 2016 when the congregation fundraised and spent more than $120,000.00 to make necessary capital improvements to the Property.  (Da 198).  [...] moreover acknowledged their donations to and involvement in said improvements.  (2T94: 16-25).  As such, [...]’ knowledge of these capital improvements without any contribution from [...] is imputable to [...] because they are its founders and directors.  As such, [...] cannot be a good-faith purchaser for value with no knowledge of the capital improvements made to the Property by [...]’s congregation.
[brief] [...] and ninety-seven (97) other active and retired troopers provided affidavits that they never received notice sent regarding the Ricci Act.  Because the Board failed to fulfill its statutory obligation under the Act to provide notice to all the members of the retirement system within 30 days, and further because it appears that the vast majority never got any notice at all, the Board’s determination was arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable.  As such, in the interest of justice and in the furtherance of a just accommodation, we respectfully request that Board’s determination be reversed and that [...]’s application to register his presence at Ground Zero and his request for amended benefits be granted.
[brief] These conflicting representations of the four months rent being “free” for the purposes of marketing and advertising, but being provided “in exchange” for significantly enhanced liability under the lease undoubtably has the “capacity to mislead” and amply supports a claim of unconscionable, abusive, or deceptive practices under the CFA, especially at the pleading stage.  *Fenwick v. Kay Am. Jeep, Inc.*, 72 N.J. 372, 378 (1977) (“The capacity to mislead is the prime ingredient of deception or an unconscionable commercial practice.  Intent is not an essential element. ”)  In fact, such misuse of the term “free” in marketing sales and rentals of goods and services has long been recognized as an unfair and abusive practice under consumer protection statutes.
[brief] This prima facie presumption may be rebutted by a preponderance of the evidence showing that the worker was not exposed to the disease while working in the place of employment other than the individual's own residence.  The foregoing statute does not identify teachers explicitly or implicitly in the class of essential employees who are entitled to the rebuttable presumption of compensability.  The statute was not intended to designate teachers to be essential workers for the simple fact that after the initial shutdown during the pandemic, schools were closed and learning occurred virtually.
[brief] (Ia124).  Later that day, [...] emailed the Questionnaire to [...] and asked that it be filled out “so we can proceed with your quote”.  (Ia337-338; 139; 012).  [...] completed and signed the Questionnaire on behalf of [...] and returned it to [...] the following day.  (Ia337-338; 012; 139).  The Questionnaire was titled “Non-Owned/hired Auto Supplement”.  (Ia012).  When filling out the form, [...] was not sure what the industry term “hired auto supplement” meant, but in seeing the word “Non-owned”, [...] presumed that word meant the same thing as rental vehicles, such as the passenger vans for transporting campers about which he had already communicated with [...].
[brief] Here, there is no dispute that at the June 13, 2022, the Board approved [...]’s SPA and did so without placing any condition for the inclusion of an elevator in Building “E. ”  This is confirmed by the December 12, 2022 Original Resolution.  As set forth in the Original Resolution’s Findings of Fact, [...] was to include elevators in Buildings A through D. Pa110.  The Original Resolution notably does not include any such requirement with respect to Building E. Pa110-111.  Moreover, the Findings of Fact expressly state that: according to the testimony presented by [[...]’s] professionals, the question of presence or absence of such elevators in buildings is controlled exclusively by the UCC, which Code does not require such elevators in those particular buildings.  Nonetheless, as a consequence of various discussions between the Board and [[...]], [[...]] agreed to amend the Application so as to include such elevators in buildings ‘C’ and ‘D.’ [[...]] declined to include such elevator in building ‘E.’ [Pa114 (emphasis added). ]
[brief] As noted earlier, [...] in his concurring Opinion in Riggs v. Long Beach Tp. 159 N.J. 601(1988) detailed the heightened and required role of planning and the Master Plan in proper Zoning adoption and analysis.  Where the facts demonstrate that the Zoning Ordinance was adopted without proper (or any) consideration of consistency with the Master Plan, or without adherence to the appropriate procedures for a Zoning Ordinance lacking substantial consistency, then the requirement of invalidation should "be strictly enforced."  Riggs, 159 N.J. at 622.  Appellate Court rulings illustrate that such issues must be examined by the reviewing court carefully and failure of proper compliance by the Municipal bodies is fatal to the Ordinance.  That required analysis was not done by the Court below; however the required analysis by this Court will mandate an invalidation of these ordinances.
[brief] 18  INDEX TO APPENDIX  State v. Pittman, No. A-2309-20, 2023 WL 6930025  N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Oct. 19, 2023) ........................................Da1-8  State v. Martinez, No. A-1063-21, 2023 WL 6460945 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Oct. 4, 2023)  ........................................Da9-21  [...] Incident Report ........................................Da22-25  CAD Report ........................................................................................Da26  Body Worn Camera of Officer [...] ........................................Da27  Body Worn Camera of Officer [...] ........................................Da28  Body Worn Camera of Officer [...] ......................................Da29  Body Worn Camera of Officer [...] .....................................Da30  PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[brief] Virtual Meeting SATURDAY, JANUARY 8, 2022  **Apportionment Commission Meeting 12:00 PM  The Apportionment Commission will meet remotely via Zoom.  The Commission will take oral testimony from members of the public on the establishment of State legislative districts in NJ.  As required by the NJ Constitution, the Apportionment Commission is charged with redrawing the lines of the State's 40 legislative districts, from which the 40 Senators and 80 Members of the General Assembly are elected.  Members of the public may view the live proceedings via the NJ Legislature home page at https://www.njleg.state.nj.us/ or via the Commission's home page at https://www.apportionmentcommission.org/default.asp.  Those wishing to testify must register online in advance of the meeting at https://www.apportionmentcommission.org/schedule.asp.  Registration is also available at https://www.njleg.state.nj.us/.  Select January 8 on the calendar and click on Apportionment Commission for the registration link.  Registrations must be received by Friday, January 7, 2022 at 3:00 PM.  Upon successful registration, you will view a printable receipt on screen.  At a later date, you will receive an email with instructions for testifying.  To ensure that all who wish to testify can do so, the Chair will limit public testimony to one minute per person.  Extra time will not be permitted without needing the assistance of a translator.  If you require language interpretation services to testify, please contact the [...] at (609) 847-3890 to discuss and arrange for interpretation services in advance of the meeting.  You may also submit written testimony instead of, or in addition to, oral testimony by email to OLSaigeAPP@njleg.org by Friday, January 7, 2022 at 3:00 PM.  Written testimony will be included in the Commission's record and distributed to all Commission members.
[directive] ________________________________________________________________________________________________________  6.  Assault on Victim while she was pregnant (at Index Assault or prior assault)  SAMPLE QUESTION:  Did he/she ever assault you when you were pregnant?  Include only assaults against the Victim.  Do not count assaults against anyone other than the Victim.  ✔  Count the Index Assault or any prior assault on the Victim, committed by the Defendant, if the Victim was pregnant at the time.  ✔  The incident must include physical contact, the use or attempted use of a weapon to contact the Victim’s body, or a threat of harm ✔ made while displaying a weapon.  If you do not have a detailed description of the incident, count a charge of assault or other violent offense if it is known that the Victim was the Index Assault Victim and was pregnant at the time.  It is not required that the Defendant knew that the Victim was pregnant.  ✘  ________________________________________________________________________________________________________ ________________________________________________________________________________________________________ ________________________________________________________________________________________________________
[brief] Throughout its summation, the State repeatedly asserted that its case hinged on two admittedly simple notions: You can't sell something you don't own.  If you don't own something you can't sell it.  It works either way and that's the basis of the State's case.  And I know that sounds so simple and probably impossibly simple after all of the evidence and all of the testimony you heard from both sides, but that's the basis for the State's case.
[brief] ³  [...] commenced an action in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Morris County, Chancery Division to enjoin the arbitration to which [...] filed a cross-motion to compel the arbitration.  Da530-531.  By Orders dated August 30, 2024, the Chancery Court denied [...]’s motion to enjoin the arbitration and granted [...]’s motion to dismiss the complaint and motion to compel arbitration.  Da528-551.  Pending resolution of [...]’s motion for reconsideration, the Hackensack Arbitration will proceed.  Da552.  On June 21, 2024, [...] filed its Notice of Appeal, appealing the three Orders.  Da1-5.
[brief] There was no evidence that [...] sought advice from [...] at any point.  There were no emails from [...] to [...] where [...] was asking for [...]’s legal representation at any time.  In addition, [...] did not argue before [...] that [...] gave him legal advice.  So, that leaves plaintiff to argue that he was a non-client who relied upon the advice of the attorneys.  However, [...] did not get any advice from [...], and never asked for advice, and [...] never gave advice to [...].  Cf., Petrillo, 139 N.J. at 483-84, supra.  The problem with [...]’s argument that he was owed a duty is that [...] testified that [...] was not his attorney, that he would never hired [...], and that he would only hired [...] of the [...].  Accordingly, since reliance is the linchpin, plaintiff cannot prove that [...] gave advice upon which [...] relied to his detriment.  There are limited circumstances on which non-clients can bring a claim against attorneys who do not represent them.
[brief] [...] is a “natural gas company” under the Natural Gas Act, 15 U.S.C. §717 et seq. (“NGA”) and is primarily engaged in the business of transporting natural gas in interstate commerce, and, as such, is regulated by the [...] as to facilities, construction, rates, and types of service.  [...]’s facilities are “interstate natural gas pipeline facilities” which are subject to the regulatory authority of the [...] and of the [...].  Aa0052.
[brief] (Pa1152).  Trial court denied her request for emergent relief on January 3, 2024, noting that the defendant “failed to provide a basis for her belief that the plaintiff was about to flee the country or a sufficient showing warranting depriving the plaintiff of his liberty interest in freedom of travel”.  (Pa1148).  The court converted the OTSC to a motion and set January 12, 2024 as the return date along with the prior OTSC converted to a motion scheduled for the same date.
[brief] Such an interpretation would construe the easement holder to control the entire burdened property, and the Court “cannot put this construction on the grant. ”  Here, at most the claim of [...] is that in 1963 the plaintiff (and its officials/congregants) were permissively allowed to park in the Fifth Street parking lot, jointly with the vehicles of the School and its staff/teachers, or in the Sixth Street Courtyard.  At that time in approximately 1964 and immediately thereafter, the Synagogue had only one morning service and one evening service per day.  (8T96-18 to 110-25)  At that time, the School on Lot 5 was much smaller (before the 1972 School expansion) and substantial areas were vacant.  There was no curb cut on Sixth Street approved in 1963 or 1972 to allow vehicle access into the courtyard.  The actions that fomented this lawsuit is that the Synagogue, many years after the School expansion in 1972, in 2007 unilaterally recorded the Agreement as a purported “easement” (Da907) and thereafter commenced active parking use of the Sixth Street Courtyard.
[brief] In Burt, 339 N.J. Super. at 303, a medical negligence case, the plaintiff’s claims against [...], [...], C.R.N.A., and [...], M.D., collectively referenced as the “anesthesiology defendants,” were dismissed for plaintiff’s failure to comply with the Affidavit of Merit requirement.  The remaining hospital defendants were deemed to be entitled to a reduction in the award as to any amount allocated to the anesthesiology defendants, even if the Hospital defendants were found 60% or more at fault:  Although not briefed by the parties, we raised at oral argument the impact of N.J.S.A. 2A:15–5.3(a), which allows a plaintiff to recover the full amount of damages from any party determined by the trier of fact to be sixty percent or more responsible for the total damages.  Since the parties were permitted to address the issue at oral argument, we elect to address it in this opinion for the sake of completeness and for guidance of the parties at trial.  We conclude that a plaintiff who fails to file an Affidavit of Merit against a licensed professional is not entitled to recover the full amount of damages from a remaining licensed professional who is deemed to be sixty percent or more responsible for the total damages.  To hold otherwise would deprive the Hospital defendants of their right to seek contribution from the Anesthesiology defendants, even though the Hospital defendants are found to be sixty percent or more responsible for the total damages.  Again, the Hospital defendants should not be prejudiced by the failure of plaintiff to file the required Affidavit of Merit.  [Id. at 308.]
[brief] Citing Fay v. Medford Township Council, 30 A.3d 367, 423 N.J. Super. 81 (Ch. Div. 2011) (Pa 336-343)  The issue of subject matter jurisdiction "involves merely a threshold determination as to whether the Court is legally authorized to decide the question presented.  If the answer to this question is in the negative, consideration of the cause is 'wholly and immediately foreclosed.'"  Gilbert v. Gladden, 87 N.J. 275, 280-281 (1981), quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 198 (1962).  Jurisdiction is defined as: ... the right to adjudicate concerning the subject matter in the given case.  To constitute this, there are three essentials:  First.  The court must have cognizance of the class of cases to which the one to be adjudged belongs.  Second.  The proper parties must be present.  Third.  The point decided must be, in substance and effect, within the issue.  That a court cannot go out of its appointed sphere and that its action is void with respect to persons who are strangers to its proceedings, are propositions established by a multitude of authorities.  Munday v. Vail, 34 N.J.L. 418, (1871) (emphasis added).  See also, Housing Authority of the City of Newark v. West, 69 N.J. 293, 299 (1976), citing Shrolla v. Hess, 133 N.J.L. 71 (Sup. Ct. 1945).  See N.J. Div. of Child Prot. & Permanency v. M.H. (In re M.S.H.), No. A-2687-19, at *13 (App. Div. Apr. 28, 2021) ("As defendant correctly notes, subject matter jurisdiction "can be raised at any time, even on appeal."  [...] & [...], Current N.J. Court Rules, cmt. 2.1 on R. 4:6-2 (2021); see also R. 4:6-7.  We therefore consider defendant's jurisdictional argument, recognizing the trial judge, Division, and law guardian were not afforded the opportunity to directly address defendant's newly-minted contentions."); see also Rule 4:6-2 and 4:6-7.  Thus, based on the foregoing reasons and facts one (1) through thirty (30), the court should reverse because the chancery division judge was without jurisdiction to hear and determine the controversy at law.
[brief] It is insufficient for plaintiff's expert simply to follow slavishly an “accepted practice” formula; there must be some evidential support offered by the expert establishing the existence of the standard.  A standard which is personal to the expert is equivalent to a net opinion.  *Taylor v. DeLosso*, 319 N.J. Super. 174, 180 (App. Div. 1999)  “The net opinion rule is a prohibition against speculative testimony. ”  *Grzanka v. Pfeifer*, 301 N.J. Super. 563 (App. Div. 1997)  *certif. den’d* 154 N.J. 607 (1998).  “Under this doctrine, expert testimony is excluded if it is based merely upon unfounded speculation and unquantified possibilities. ”  *Id.* at 580.  Additionally, the net opinion rule “focuses upon the failure of the expert to explain a causal connection between the act or incident complained of and the injury or damage allegedly resulting therefrom. ”  *Kaplan v. Skoloff & Wolfe, P.C.*, 339 N.J. Super. 97, 102 (App. Div. 2001).  Courts have consistently instructed that expert testimony and reports will be stricken as net opinions where they fail to “give the why and wherefore” of their opinion, providing only “mere conclusion. ”  *Jimenez v. GNOC, Corp.*, 286 N.J. Super. 533, 540 (App. Div. 1996).  Here, the trial court found [...] opinions to be unreliable for a multitude of reasons.
[directive] Presumption Against Applying for Pretrial Detention.  In any case not otherwise covered under Sections 7.3. or 7.4, the prosecutor shall not apply for pretrial detention unless the County Prosecutor or First Assistant Prosecutor, or the Director or a Deputy Director of the Division of Criminal Justice in cases prosecuted by the Division, determines that: (a) specific facts or circumstances justifying pretrial detention were not adequately accounted for by the automated pretrial risk-assessment process; (b) the State will be able to present clear and convincing evidence at the detention hearing to overcome the statutory presumption against pretrial detention; and (c) if defendant were released, even on maximum conditions, there is a serious risk that defendant (i) will not appear in court when required, (ii) will pose a danger to any other person or the community, or (iii) will obstruct or attempt to obstruct the criminal justice process, or threaten, injure, or intimidate, or attempt to threaten, injure, or intimidate, a prospective witness or juror.  7.3  Cases Where a Motion to Seek Pretrial Detention Must Be Filed Absent Compelling and Extraordinary Circumstances.
[brief] Whether the alleged misconduct was substantiated.  Unsubstantiated or frivolous allegations of misconduct present a less compelling basis for disclosure; Here, two separate Supreme Court panels found beyond a reasonable doubt that [...] engaged in conduct that violated the Judicial Code of Conduct.  The Advisory Committee on Judicial Conduct found that [...] "knowingly and purposefully abused her judicial office".  Another three-judge panel found “beyond a reasonable doubt” that “[[...]] intentionally misused her office to advantage another, thereby violating the public trust and compromising the integrity and independence of the judiciary. ”  Hudson County’s top municipal judge found probable cause to issue warrants for [...]’s arrest on four criminal charges.  Against despite these circumstances, the [...] declined to prosecute [...].  (3) the nature of the discipline imposed.
[brief] We begin with [...]'s arguments.  In his original brief, [...] argues:  POINT I  THE TRIAL COURT MISAPPLIED ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING THE DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A JUDGMENT OF ACQUITTAL AT THE END OF THE STATE'S CASE ON COUNTS TWO, THREE, FOUR, EIGHT, AND NINE, BECAUSE THE STATE ONLY PRODUCED SPECULATIVE EVIDENCE THAT THE DEFENDANT HAD THE INTENT TO PARTICIPATE IN A ROBBERY [of] [...], AND AIDED CO–DEFENDANTS [...] AND [...] IN THE SHOOTING AND ROBBERY OF [...] AND THE KIDNAPPING OF [...] AND [...].
[brief] On October 19, 2018, during the deposition of [...] Engineer [...], he testified that the [...] also had a contract with [...] to supervise the work and to be their “eyes and ears in the field”.  (Pa795).  Accordingly, on November 13, 2018, Plaintiffs sought leave of court to file a Third Amended Complaint adding [...] as a Defendant.  That motion was granted on November 30, 2018 and the Third Amended Complaint was filed on December 7, 2018.  (Pa1650).