ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] On the sub-paragraph on the 4th paragraph on page 4I read:  “a.  Civil cases "The admission or exclusion of expert testimony is committed to the sound discretion of the trial court."  Townsend v. Pierre, 221 N.J. 36, 52 (2015).  An appellate court "must apply an abuse of discretion standard to a trial court's determination, after a full Rule 104 hearing, to exclude expert testimony on unreliability grounds."  In re Accutane Litig., 234 N.J. 340, 391 (2018). ”  On 3/3/17 in the Summary Judgment motion hearing [...] did not admit the affidavit of my expert witness, [...], and did not allow her to testify.  On 4/1/22 in the motion hearing to certify the final judgment, [...] did not admit the affidavit of my expert witness, [...]; and did not allow him to testify.  A judge is not a mortgage expert, to provide an expert opinion.  LEGAL POINT B: [...] FAILED THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE NJ UCC LAWS
[brief] (48a-63a).  In fact, the RFA requested information wholly unrelated to the Evaluation Sheet criteria.  For example, the RFA asks whether or how the applicant will: (1) offer on-site parking; (2) begin operation immediately upon issuance of state licensing; (3) provide security in and around its location; (4) prevent minors from purchasing cannabis; and (5) mitigate nuisances regarding noise, odor, waste disposal, and vehicular congestion.  (53a-58a).  Three businesses submitted applications in response to the RFA: [...], [...], and [...].  (65a).  The Borough engaged in a lengthy, thorough and exhaustive process, which included the acceptance of applications; the consideration thereof; interviews with and presentations by applicants; multiple deliberations of both the Subcommittee and Council; the Subcommittee’s recommendations to the Council; and, ultimately, independent consideration and selection by the Council.
[brief] [...] testified that he obtained the call detail records for defendant’s phone number, physically reviewed them, and then entered them into software to map the call tower location for two calls.  [12T169-22 to 170-19].  [...] explained to the jury that information he plotted was able to only give a rough area of where the phone was located and that the actual location could be affected by a number of factors, such as any nearby buildings and where someone is in the building they placed a call from.
[brief] Appellants’ convoluted claims are set forth in their Third Amended Complaint (though filed as a “Second Amended Complaint,” Appellants had amended their pleading three (3) times).  776a-823a.  Appellants’ Third Amended Complaint contained a “Statement of Facts” consisting of one hundred and six (106) separate paragraphs describing a transaction in which the Appellant [...]  (“[...]”) purchased an assignment from [...] to become the contract purchaser of a parcel of undeveloped land in Monroe Township called the “Pork Chop Hill Assemblage. ”
[brief] Bd. of Trs. of Police & Fireman’s Ret. Sys., 219 N.J. 369 (2014)  . . .  42  Silviera-Francisco v. Bd. of Educ. of City of Elizabeth, 224 N.J. 126 (2016)  .................. 11, 39 Univ. Cottage Club of Princeton N.J. Corp. v. N.J. Dept. of Entl. Prot., 191 N.J. 38 (2007) .................................................................
[brief] (Aa43).  While funding must be linked to a district’s ability to adhere to educational standards and student outcomes, Abbott IV, 149 N.J. at 185-86, [...] bore the burden of asserting significant educational deficiencies to prove a T&E claim.  See Stubaus, 339 N.J. Super. at 56 (“[b]ecause plaintiffs have not asserted any educational disparities, . . . [Robinson I, 62 N.J. at 515] precludes plaintiffs from maintaining their action based on the T&E constitutional provision”).  A claim for deprivation of T&E must be fact-specific — it is viable only if a party can show that students are not being equipped for their “role[s] as citizen[s] and competitor[s] in the labor market. ”  Abbott II, 119 N.J. at 313 (citing Robinson I, 62 N.J. at 515).  T&E is a “continually changing concept. ”  Id. at 303.  It includes educational program standards, Abbott XX, 199 N.J. at 144, which the SFRA contemplates, N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-4.1 to -4.7, and which the Court has deemed as a reasonable expression of constitutionally sufficient T&E, Abbott XIX, 196 N.J. at 552-53.
[brief] It is noteworthy that the [...] prepared to present their case in chief first at trial.  All hard copies of Exhibits were forwarded to the Court and opposing counsel.  [...] were thoroughly prepared.  Unfortunately, permitting the Plaintiff/[...] to go first on [...]' claim of Quiet Title, and then not permitting the [...] to proceed at all - led to the necessity of focusing on different questions for limited cross examination and a thoroughly different assessment on how to proceed - creating an unfair and erroneous advantage to the Plaintiff/[...].  [A572]  [...]’s July 21, 2022 judgment is invalid because it was the result of a bench trial premised on this fundamental procedural flaw that violated the [...]’ right to present evidence and testimony in support of their own claim, see Warner v. Smith, 115 N.J. Eq. 572 (1934) (noting burden on party who brings quiet title claim).
[brief] (a)  For a place of worship, consisting solely of the primary use set forth in § 230-151.A(1), parking shall be provided in accordance with Schedule E, Off-Street Parking Requirements, included at the end of this chapter.  (b)  For a place of worship consisting of the primary use set forth in § 230-151.A(1) together with any of the accessory uses set forth at § 230-151.A(2)(a) through (f), there shall be provided the following off-street parking in addition to the parking required for the primary use pursuant to Schedule E:
[brief] While he has had a lot of time to reflect and to understand that he, something that he already knew, which his acts were wrong, it still has not triggered within him that he will ever show remorse.  So with that being said, the only Miller factor that this Court gives some weight to is the fifth factor.  (17T223-17 to 224-14).  Defendant argues that defendant did not express remorse at the sentencing hearing due to his disability, which made it “difficult if not impossible” for him to speak in front of a courtroom of people.  (Db102).  There is absolutely no evidence, however, to support this claim.  Indeed, defendant had no difficulty speaking with the police or to the many mental health professionals who interviewed him after the murders.  Moreover, the way the trial court room is laid out, most of the spectators would be seated in the benches behind him, out of his view, when he stood to address the court.  In fashioning an appropriate sentence, the judge found that count five (possession of a firearm for an unlawful purpose) merged into the four homicide counts (17T225-16 to 227-3, 234-10 to 11; Da19).  On counts one (first-degree murder of [...]), two (first-degree murder of [...]), three (first-degree murder of [...]), and four (first-degree murder of [...]), the court sentenced defendant to four maximum custodial term of 50 years, with mandatory NERA and Graves Act parole disqualifiers.  (17T227-9 to 228-15; Da16).  The judge did not abuse his discretion in coming to that sentence following its evaluation and application of the Miller factors.  D.
[brief] The Warehouse Project is comprised of four (4) buildings: (1) “Building A” (a 963,316 s.f. warehouse); (2) “Building B” (a 639,578 s.f. warehouse); (3) “Building C” (a 312,317 s.f. warehouse); and (4) “Building D” (a 266,890 s.f. warehouse).  (Pa117-118).  Buildings B and D are entirely within [...] and are collectively 906,468 s.f. (Da91-Da92 & Pa117 & Pa108-Pa109).  Under [...]’s C-57 Zone, warehouses of up to 20,000 s.f. may be constructed on a minimum lot size of 3 acres.  (Pa290).  Under the C-57 Zone, by right, a developer can construct up to 480,000 square feet of warehouse space on 24 separate 3 acre lots.  While there may be more traffic from a 2.1 million s.f. warehouse complex than from the nearly 1.4 million s.f. warehouse complex that could be built without the Redevelopment Plan, there is nothing to suggest it would have a significant impact.
[brief] (Pa561-Pa625).  See Brown v. Muhlenberg Township, 269 F.3d 205, 215 (3d Cir. 2001).  The city’s failure to properly train and reinforce reflects “deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with whom the police come into contact. ” and subject the Municipality to a 1983 claim.  Id.  A Municipality’s knowledge that the police will confront a particular situation, a history of police mishandling and wrong choices, cause the deprivation of constitutional rights.
[brief] As the trial court stated when granting [...]’s motion for summary judgment, “we don’t know” why Plaintiff fell.  1T39-4 to 8.  The Court should not be distracted by Plaintiff’s baseless arguments suggesting that there was sufficient circumstantial evidence presented to establish that Plaintiff fell because of a messy jobsite.  In fact, there was no evidence – circumstantial or otherwise – to explain what caused Plaintiff to fall.  While the circumstantial evidence cases cited by Plaintiff do correctly recognize that circumstantial evidence can be considered under certain circumstances to establish proximate cause, the facts in the matter sub judice is not one of them.
[brief] [...] is misconstruing N.J.S.A. 48:2-23.  [...] argues that the trial court’s reliance on N.J.S.A. 48:2-23 at this stage of the dispute was improper because the [...] must first determine, after a public hearing, that [...]’s Union County Project is required for the provision of safe, adequate, and proper service, and must issue a written order to that effect.
[brief] C.  Facts  Relevant to Spot Zoning  Plaintiffs submitted the expert report of a planner, [...].  (Pa948 to Pa975) in support of its spot zoning claim.  [...] opined that the rezoning of the single parcel at issue was, for a variety of planning reasons, spot zoning.  (Pa964 to Pa965).  The Court refused to consider this opinion reasoning that, in the redevelopment context, “municipalities have a unique toolkit,” and that changes in accordance with a city’s redevelopment power are not spot zoning.  (Pa84 to Pa87 at Pa86).  In the Court’s view, the spot zoning assessment is one of law and an expert should not tell “the court what the law provides. ” (Pa86 to Pa87).
[directive] Constructive authority is not considered a use of force because it does not involve physical contact with the subject.  Rather, constructive authority involves the use of the officer’s authority to exert control over a subject.  Examples include verbal commands, gestures, warnings, and unholstering a weapon.  Pointing a firearm at a subject is an example of constructive authority to be used only in appropriate circumstances outlined in Section 3.4 of this Policy.
[brief] [...] submits the following statement of facts in opposition to [...]’s inaccurate and selective recitation of the record. \(^1\)  As [...]\(^2\) appeals from the Trial Court’s February 20, 2024 Order granting summary judgment in favor of --- \(^1\) T, February 16, 2024 transcript of oral argument.  \(^2\)  [...] refers to all of the defendants collectively as “[...]” herein.  [...] and denying summary judgment to [...], the record below should be limited solely to those documents filed with the Trial Court for the motion.
[brief] ACT  As with other submissions in this case to date, Plaintiff’s presentation on appeal is confusing.  There is at least the suggestion that there are non-LAD claims in this case.  During the first motion to dismiss proceedings, it was queried what Count IV was/was for and, given the vagaries of same, various arguments were presented by the City.  In response, Plaintiff insisted in briefs and at oral argument that Count IV was nothing other than another LAD count.
[brief] Exhibit B: Letter Denying Request for Stay, dated January 19, 2022......Ra100  Exhibit C: Order of Suspension  Issued by State Board, dated October 28, 2021........................................................................Ra102  Exhibit D: Notice of Appeal of Final Decision Regarding Certificate Suspension, dated July 25, 2022..............................................................Ra107  Exhibit E: Petition of Appeal Challenging [...]’s Termination of [...], dated December 30, 2021................Ra111  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
[brief] The transcript of the hearing of July 31, 2023 has been filed and is referred to as “1T”.  The transcripts of the hearings of February 23, 2024 and May 24, 2024 have also been filed and are referred to as “2T” and “3T,” respectively.  $750,000 against [...].  (PPCIa447-48).  The “Final Judgment” against [...] was entered on February 28, 2024.  Id. 37.  On March 12, 2024, [...] filed a motion for reconsideration of the February 28, 2024 “final judgment” that had been entered against it.  (PPCIa451-58).  38.  On May 24, 2024, the trial court denied [...]’s reconsideration motion, leaving the “final judgment” intact.  (PPCIa459-60).  Again, the Court was not asked to nor did it certify that pursuant to R. 4:42-2, there was “no just reason for delay,” such that a “final judgment” should be entered upon fewer than all claims as to all parties.  (PPCIa459-60).  39.  On June 25, 2024, [...] filed a Notice of Appeal to the New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division.  (PPCIa474-79).  [...] also obtained a stay of execution from the trial court of the judgment against [...] pending appeal, secured through a supersedeas bond.  (PPCIa461-73).  CONCISE STATEMENT OF FACTS
[brief] ”  *Id.* at 475 (quoting *Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Federal Communications Comm’n*, 512 U.S. 622, 624 (1994) (plurality opinion)).  Applying the *National Treasury* analysis, courts have routinely and reliably sided with public employees who challenge workplace rules that forbid them from discussing their work with the public or press or require them to get permission before they may speak.
[brief] THE LOWER COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT PROVIDING A CAUSE OF ACTION TO PLAINTIFF MEANS THAT TYLER IS GIVEN FULLY RETROACTIVE EFFECT, IN CONTRAVENTION OF ROBERTO.  (Ja410-416).  A. Tyler and Roberto  In Tyler, the United States Supreme Court held that a former property owner stated a claim for an unconstitutional taking where a governmental entity had foreclosed on her property for delinquent taxes, re-sold the property for more than the tax debt, and retained the “surplus. ”  598 U.S. 631, 642-45 (2023).  Following Tyler’s issuance, there was uncertainty whether the decision applied to New Jersey’s TSL.  That question was resolved about six months later by Roberto, in which a panel of this court held that Tyler did apply, rendering the TSL unconstitutional.  477 N.J. Super. 339, 359-362 (App. Div. 2023), certif. granted, 256 N.J. 522 (2024).
[brief] **Personal Characteristics of Defendant**  At the time of the offense, [...] was nineteen years old.  (PSR1)  School records reveal that he was identified as a student with a learning disability requiring an IEP, or individualized education plan.  (Dca12-14)  His disability was significant enough to preclude in-class supports, instead requiring individualized special instruction.  (Dca19)  During the 2016-2017 school year, immediately preceding this offense, Daiquan had at least one behavioral incident at school requiring home instruction.  (Dca12)  His progress report from April of 2016 notes that Daiquan can excel when he “applies himself,” but “when frustrated, he will shut down and refuse to work. ”  (Dca32)  [...], a youth development counselor who coached [...] in high school and reconnected with him after his incarceration, wrote that at the time of the offense, Daiquan “was a misguided teenager that needed true guidance from the right person. ”  (Da79)  Prior to his conviction for manslaughter, [...] had a single adjudication of delinquency as a juvenile for resisting arrest for which he was sentenced to probation, which he successfully completed.  (PSR8)  As an adult, [...] had one disorderly persons conviction for failure to disperse, N.J.S.A. 2C:33-1(b), and one petty disorderly persons conviction for disorderly conduct-improper behavior, N.J.S.A. 2C:33-2(a)(1); he received a sentence of fines only on each conviction.  (PSR8-9)  [...]’s sentence on this offense is his only indictable conviction and prison sentence.  (PSR8-9)  In the nearly five years he was incarcerated at [...] between January 2018 and December 2022, [...] was not cited for a single infraction.  (Dca3)  [...] completed the personal protective equipment vocational program and has maintained consistent employment in sanitation, food service, and at the furniture shop.  (Dca5, 9)  He also completed the Successful Employment and Lawful Living Reentry Program.  (8T 20-15 to 17)  He is enrolled in a Pathways to College Program as well as an associate’s degree program and has earned college credits.
[brief] However, the instant warrant was authorized under the Wiretap Act, which does allow for delayed notice of the return and inventory receipt.  Specifically, after the termination of the electronic surveillance, the Wiretap Act requires:  Within a reasonable time but not later than [ninety] days after the termination of the period of the order or of extensions or renewals thereof, ... the issuing or denying judge shall cause to be served on the persons named in the order or application, persons arrested as a result of the interception of their conversations, persons indicted as a result of the interception of their conversations, persons whose conversations were intercepted and against whom indictments are likely to be returned, persons whose conversations were intercepted and who are potential witnesses to criminal activities, and such other parties to the intercepted communications as the judge may in his discretion determine to be in the interest of justice, an inventory which shall include: a.  Notice of the entry of the ... ; b. The date of the entry of the order ... ; c. The period of authorized or disapproved interception; and d.  The fact that during the period wire, electronic or oral communications were or were not intercepted.  [N.J.S.A. 2A:156A-16].  Here, it would have been impossible for law enforcement to give defendant notice of the search and list of inventory seized since he ran from police at the [...] and from the traffic stop in [...] in which defendant was a passenger.  Indeed, defendant remained a fugitive until he was arrested, about three-and-one-half years later, in December 2012.  (Da41; Da108; Da110).
[brief] The best timeline the Court can put together is that in July of 2022 the parties exchanged search terms (the Court believes this exchange was the result of discovery propounded in April 2022, but that is unclear).  (Doc. 186-1 at 3).  On September 26, 2022, Plaintiffs made some objections to Defendants’ proposed search terms.  (Id.).  On December 21, 2022, the parties “agreed” to run their respective search terms against the data base of documents.  (Id.).  The Court is unclear what “agreed” means in this sentence.  Defendants produced their responsive documents on March 4, 2023.  (Id.).  The Court does not know what agreement between the parties allowed Defendants to respond 8 months after the parties exchanged search terms and over 2 months after the terms were “agreed” to be run.  As for Plaintiffs, on January 9, 2023, they sent “additional” objections to their September 26, 2022, objections.  (Id.).  These January-2023 objections were obviously after the December 21, 2022 “agreement”.  (Id.).  The Court has not been given an exact copy of Plaintiffs’ September 2022 or January 2023 objections.  On January 25, 2023, Plaintiffs again “agreed” to run Defendants search terms.  (Id.).  The Court still does not know what the parties mean by “agreed. ”  To the extent “agreed” merely means “run the search terms in the database,” there is no excuse for the parties’ delay from July 2022 to December 2022 to complete this step.  On March 3, 2023, Plaintiffs made another round of objections.
[brief] [...] asked whether a New Jersey attorney would “need[] to come here right now” to assist him or if he would be provided a Virginia attorney, such as the Legal Aid attorney at his extradition hearing, who “isn’t necessarily able to practice law in the State of New Jersey. ”  (1T:42-1 to 8)  [...] worried that, if he were provided a Virginia-based attorney and then extradited to New Jersey, a New Jersey attorney “would have to pick this up there. ”  (1T:43-20 to 25)  [...]’s detailed questions were attempts to understand what would happen if he invoked, broadcasting to detectives that he was considering doing so.  These questions were therefore at least “an ambiguous request for counsel” that triggered the detectives’ duty to clarify whether he wished to invoke.  Alston, 204 N.J. at 622, 624 (explaining that “if the statements are so ambiguous that they cannot be understood to be the assertion of a right, clarification is not only permitted but needed”).
[brief] Plaintiff [...], the Appellant, submits this Reply Brief (i) in reply to the opposition brief filed by the Respondent/Defendant [...] t/a [...] (“Respondent” or “Defendant”) and (ii) in further support of the appeal.  For the reasons stated in this Reply Brief, as well as in Plaintiff’s initial brief, this Court should vacate the Orders and remand to the Law Division for further proceedings.  PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND STATEMENT OF FACTS
[brief] (AA0001)  Her name was certified on January 12, 2022, (PL220040) for a position in the subject title.  From that Certification, three candidates, all ranking higher than Appellant, were appointed.  (AA0001)  Almost a year later, on November 4, 2022, the List was again certified, including Appellant’s name.  (AA0001)  On the new Certification issued by the Respondent Commission, [...] was the first positioned candidate, the Appellant was the second positioned candidate and [...], a non-veteran, was the third positioned candidate.  (AA0001)  On December 9, 2022, the Respondent [...] issued a memo announcing several personnel would be promoted on January 9, 2023, including [...], to the rank of Lieutenant.  (AA0071)  On December 23, 2022, Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal with the Respondent Commission’s Division of Appeals and Regulatory Affairs (“[...]”) because the listed first ranked individual, [...], had been disciplined and demoted to the title of Sheriff’s Officer, rendering him ineligible for promotion to Lieutenant.  (AA0233-235)  Appellant argued in her Notice of Appeal that since [...] had been demoted, and because the two subsequent positioned candidates were non-veterans, she was properly the first ranked eligible and entitled to appointment, as a veteran, pursuant to N.J.A.C. 4A:4-4.8(a), which provides, in part as follows:
[brief] ”  *Olenowski*, 253 N.J. at 154.  Here, the State submits that based on the newly enacted *Olenowski* decision, this Court should review the trial court’s N.J.R.E. 702 ruling based on the *Frye* standard under which it was originally determined because the expert evidence that defendant challenges is neither new, nor has the scientific reliability on which it is based changed.