ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The trial court also found that the process utilized by the Borough to make a selection for the issuance of a Support Resolution was consistent with applicable law, and consistent with the Borough’s consideration of all applicants for the subject license.  As the court recognized below, the Borough engaged in a lengthy, thorough and exhaustive process beginning early in 2022, to accept and evaluate applications from interested cannabis operators to operate within the Borough.  That process involved the acceptance of applications from interested operators; the consideration thereof; interviews with and presentations by applicants; multiple deliberations of both the Borough’s Cannabis Subcommittee and the Borough Council; the recommendation of the Borough’s Cannabis Subcommittee to the Borough Council as to which applicant should be granted a local support resolution; and, ultimately, independent consideration of the applications by the Borough Council which resulted in a 5-1 vote by the full Council on September 20, 2022 supporting the award of the Support Resolution to [...].  The record was fully developed before the Borough below, and in consequence, the [...] challenge was correctly dismissed on December 12, 2023 as being without merit.  Given the strength of the record developed and the state of applicable law, there is no basis on which the appeal brought by [...] should be sustained.  While [...] may continue to have subjective views as to the merits of its application for a resolution of support over [...]’s, that is a matter which remains reasonably debatable, and therefore was neither controlling nor binding upon the Borough Council.  And, where a matter is reasonably debatable and two paths are open to a public body as to which way to act, the selection of one path over another will be upheld if predicated upon some basis within the public body’s experience, and critically, when supported by the record, as was the case here.  [...]’s appeal seeking to overturn the December 12, 2023 Order should be denied, as its Complaint was rightly found to be without merit below.  The December 12, 2023 Order should be affirmed.
[brief] The suit limitation clause in Defendant-Respondent, [...]’s policy began to run either on the date of the accident or one year from the date Plaintiff-Appellant first became aware a claim for coverage would apply.  Plaintiff-Appellant cites to the matter Peloso v Hartford Fire Ins., 56 N.J. 514 (1970) for the proposition that the policy’s limitation period was tolled from the time the insured gives notice of loss until the insurer formally denies coverage.  (Pb21).  However, in Green v Selective Ins. Co. of Am., 144 N.J. 344 (1996), which Plaintiff-Appellant relied upon, extensively, at the lower court, the New Jersey Supreme Court held “we believe that the statute of limitations on UM/UIM claims should run from the date of the accident”.
[brief] And that hasn’t been shown. ”  (1T9-6 to 9); see also *Franks*, 438 U.S. at 171, (“[a] challenger must point out specifically the portion of the written affidavit that is claimed to be false, accompanied by a statement of supporting reasons. ”  Similarly, here, defendant has still not pointed to the facts or portion of the warrant that was allegedly fabricated.  Since defendant is unable to meet the first portion of the Franks test, defendant cannot meet the second point, that the allegedly falsified facts established probable cause.  As such, defendant cannot prove that the affiant fabricated the warrant insofar that a Franks hearing was required, and the State asks that this Court affirm that decision.
[brief] While the use of the word 'dye' in the definition of the words 'crimes' may be unknown, the fact remains that via the exclusive language of the word 'only' with regard to 'misdemeanors' - only one conclusion can be drawn in the matter of the Supreme court opinion delivered in Schick, - all misdemeanors are crimes and all crimes are misdemeanors.  Therefore, via Article III of the constitution, the appellate court judges are legally obligated to have the matter of the denial of my right to trial by jury, by a judge acting under the color of law, tried by a jury of 6 in the state of New Jersey.
[brief] *Loigman v. Kimmelman*, 102 N.J. 98 (1986).  It must first be noted that in his request the Plaintiff/Respondent did not provide information as to an interest in the “subject matter” of the request in his OPRA request.  That being said, there is no “written memorial” made by a public officer therefore the above analysis cannot be completed and is not relevant to this case.  As previously discussed, residents sign up for Nixle alerts directly through the Nixle website.  No City officer maintains a written memorial which contains the information inputted by residents when they sign up.  The City also submits that even if there was a written memorial, the City’s interest in maintaining the private contact information of those signed up for Nixle alerts outweighs the Plaintiff/Respondent’s interest in obtaining their contact information to send his unsolicited political opinions.
[brief] In further support of the fact that the equitable tolling argument does not apply, the Defendants/Respondents rely upon Rogers v. Cape May County Office of the Public Defender, 208 N.J. 414, 211, 31 A.3d. 934 (N.J. 2011), wherein the New Jersey Supreme Court was called upon to determine the accrual of a legal malpractice case against the public defender arising out of the representation of a criminal.
[brief] For purposes of comparative analysis, the Comprehensive Report selected four districts—[...], [...], [...], and [...]—as comparison districts due to their proximity to [...], size of district, socioeconomic makeup of the district, and financial status.  (Ra170).  behavior, and cognitive abilities between children during these stages of development. ” (Ra185-86).  Thus, cognitive development for [...] students enrolled in the same class can be “substantially different” and may present as gaps in literacy development and math.  (Ra135; Ra185).  These “gaps [will] continue as the student moves into upper grades. ” (Ra185).  The Report also noted that this policy may affect student achievement and identification for special education placement.  (Ra135; Ra185).
[brief] In Wells Fargo, the Appellate Division held that a 22% difference was “not nearly correct” or “close in value” to constitute an ‘approximate’ amount. ”  Ibid.  Here, (a) the Sheriff’s notice and advertisement pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:17-34 for the September 7, 2023 scheduled sale stated that the judgment amount as of that date was $29,563,967.11, when the actual amount based upon lawful interest was $21,714,825.12; and (b) the Sheriff’s notice and advertisement pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A-17-34 for the December 14, 2023 scheduled sale date was $25,664,199.21, when the actual amount based upon lawful interest was $21,844,717.26.  See Da85-86, ¶7.  $29,653,967.11 is not “nearly correct”, “exact” or “close in value” to $21,714,825.12 (the former being 37% higher).
[brief] The New Jersey Civil Rights Act, N.J.S.A. 10:6-1 to - 2, includes a provision that authorizes a court to award "the prevailing party" reasonable attorney's fees and costs, N.J.S.A. 10:6-2(f).  The issue presented by this appeal is whether a party who brings an action under the Civil Rights Act that results in a change in defendant's conduct may qualify as a "prevailing party" even though the action is dismissed as moot rather than being concluded by a judgment in plaintiffs favor.
[brief] R. 3:22-10(b).  If a judge perceives that holding an evidentiary hearing will not aid the analysis, see State v. Flores, 228 N.J. Super. 586, 590 (App. Div. 1988), or if the judge believes that the defendant’s allegations are too vague, conclusory, or speculative to warrant an evidentiary hearing, see Preciose, 129 N.J. at 462-64; State v. Odom, 113 N.J. Super. 186, 192 (App. Div. 1971), then an evidentiary hearing need not be granted.  See State v. Marshall, 148 N.J. 89, 158 (1997).  Thus, as the Marshall Court explained, there is a “pragmatic dimension” to the “PCR court’s determination. ”  Ibid.  In order to prevail on a Brady claim, a defendant must show: (1) the evidence at issue [is] favorable to the accused, either as exculpatory or impeachment evidence; (2) the State . . . suppressed the evidence, either purposely or inadvertently; and (3) the evidence [is] material to the defendant’s case.
[brief] Less than two years ago, in Kumar v. Piscataway Twp. Council, 473 N.J. Super. 463 (App. Div. 2022)- a case ignored by defendants - Appellate Presiding [...] explained:  The CRA "is intended to provide citizens of New Jersey with a State remedy for deprivation of or interference with the civil rights of an individual."  Tumpson, 218 N.J. at 473.
[brief] Cf. *Isetts v. Borough* of Roseland, 364 N.J. Super. 247, 254 (App. Div. 2003).  The trial court improperly ignored the effect of ¶1.29 limiting grounds for reopening [...] to declining jurisdiction over [...].  (Pa0067, at ¶¶ 8.18-19, and Pa0073, Final Order of the Hon. [...], P.J. Ch., at ¶16).  The only plausible conclusion to drawn from ¶1.29 is that the 2015 Settlement did not release Defendants from any claims arising from misconduct occurring after Feb. 20, 2015.
[brief] However, the trial exhibits and the testimony disprove that conclusion.  The proposed subdivision map, dated June 22, 1967, indicates that the Strip would be “subtracted from Lot 1 and added to Lot 1A. ”  Pa0086.  This document also indicates that another small portion of property, referred to during the trial as the “Bump,” would be added to Lot 1.  Lot 1 on this document is Plaintiff’s Lot 4, and Lot 1-A is Defendant’s Lot 3.  Clearly, the parties to the proposed subdivision intended to swap the Bump and Strip properties.
[brief] Trial courts should grant motions for reconsideration “only under very narrow circumstances. ”  Id. [Harmon v. Oshinsky, 2018 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 3616 at *6 (Law Div., Morris County, March 16, 2018)]\(^6\)  Plaintiffs’ motion presented no such very narrow circumstances.  Further guidance is provided in D’Atria, 242 N.J. Super. at 401:
[brief] 1.  The granting of summary judgment was improper and must be reversed because the Ordinance is not invalid “on its face” because it cannot be said that the Ordinance can never be valid under any circumstance.  Rather, the court below needed to base its ruling on the particular circumstances related to the application of the Ordinance to particular line [...] sought to construct through [...].  However, any such ruling would necessarily have to be based upon an “as applied” standard.  An “as applied” determination cannot and could not be made because (i) [...] did not apply for a permit and (ii) [...] did not seek an exception from any of the requirements of the Ordinance as permitted by the Ordinance.  Simply put, the determination could not be one “as applied” because [...] did not allow the Ordinance to be applied to its proposed construction of the 69kV line.
[brief] (5T58-24 to 5T59-1; 5T61-3 to 9; 5T63-18 to 23).  When defendant’s father arrived, he saw defendant come out from among trees and saw that defendant had on no shirt and looked scared.  (5T63-18 to 23).  He saw blood on the side of defendant’s head.  (5T64-21 to 23).  Defendant’s father drove to the [...].  (5T65-10 to 12).  When defendant and his father entered the [...] headquarters on March 9 at 5:00 a.m., Old Bridge Sergeant [...] was on duty.
[brief] In [...], the prosecutor effectuated a favorable termination of the case when he “dismiss[ed]” the charges against [...], id., at 1335, causing “the criminal prosecution [to] end[] without a conviction. ”  Id. at 1341.  To further explain—within two years of the dismissal of the charges against him, [...] filed a malicious prosecution claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  Id. at 1336.  The claim was dismissed on statute of limitation grounds because there was no indication that [...] was innocent, so he appealed.  Id.  The Second Circuit affirmed.  Id.  Thereafter, the United States Supreme “Court granted certiorari to resolve the split” between circuits as to whether “favorable termination requires some affirmative indication of innocence” or whether “favorable termination occurs so long as the criminal prosecution ends without a conviction.
[brief] The Township’s position is that Section 6.5 establishes the Township’s entitlement to the connection fees.  Section 6.5 provides in pertinent part that:  Out of town buildings –  The parties acknowledge that some users are located outside of the Borough for which the sewerage is transmitted through mains and lines through the Borough to the Township Treatment Plant.  The Township agrees that it will bill said commercial users directly and further acknowledges that the Borough may reserve the right to impose an additional fee upon such user, for the use of the Borough pipes and other property by said user, which fee shall be billed to the user by the Borough.  The Township’s position fails because nowhere in Section 6.5 does the term “connection fee” appear.  Rather, Section 6.5 provides that the Township will “bill said commercial users directly. ”  This is a very important distinction because the fees that are discussed in Section 6.5 are the fees set forth in Section 4.1, specifically the fees associated with the sewerage treatment services provided by the Township at its treatment facility.  There is, however, only one section in the 1999 Agreement wherein the term “connection fee” appears which is Section 6.1 entitled “connection fee. ”  Section 6.1 provides:  The Borough shall have the right to impose and receive connection fees as permitted by law to any user of said services in the Borough and may retain all said amount received without claim from the Township.  The above language establishes that the Borough is entitled to connection fees for the use of the Borough’s services in the Borough.
[brief] ” (1T77-78).  [...] testified that [...] stated “we don’t need to talk about this anymore, I will just call a code [] for every incident. ” (1T20).  [...] testified that he understood this as a threat to “misuse the code system. ” (1T20).  [...]’s report also stated that [...] acted in a “belligerent” manner.  (Exhibit R-7).  ¹[...] testified that she hung up the phone after confirming that there was nothing else to talk about.  (1T74).  [...] testified that “he was going to ask” [...] more questions, but that she hung up.  (1T36).  [...] subsequently asked [...] to complete an incident report.  (1T78).  [...] testified that she “specifically” asked [...] what information should be included in the report, and that he responded “write me an incident report on what happened between you and the inmate that you felt the need to call me. ” (1T78-80).  [...] testified that he asked [...] to write a report concerning her alleged insubordination.  (1T22).  Based on the above facts, the penalty of removal was absurd and must be overturned.
[brief] For the foregoing reasons, the Township respectfully reiterates that the Court affirm the inclusion of the [...] lease in the calculation of Market Value, and reverse: 1) the Trial Court’s February 20, 2019 Order granting the [...]’ motion to set the date of valuation as of January 27, 1994, and 2) the Trial Court’s 8/24/21 Order denying the Township’s motion to bar Defendants from entering the testimony and expert report of [...] into evidence.  [...] Attorneys for
[directive] Attention has been focused on the placement of undercover law enforcement officers in schools.  Such operations can serve as a vital tool in helping to identify and remove from school environments those persons who distribute illicit drugs.  Such operations are also consistent with the policy objective of deterring young people from violating drug laws, and further serves to emphasize to all members of society that all persons who violate drug laws, including juveniles, are subject to arrest, prosecution and the imposition of punishment.  However, an undercover school operation should not be undertaken in isolation; rather it should be part of a more comprehensive law enforcement program designed to deal with the substance abuse problem and drug trafficking activities on or near school property.  7.
[brief] 15 U.S.C. § 1692f(8); see, Douglass v. Convergent Outsourcing, 765 F.3d 299 (3d Cir. 2014) (smartphone readable barcode of account number on envelope violates § 1692f(8)).  The FDCPA does not bar the use of telephones or telegrams but, instead, imposes specific limitations on their use in addition to its other regulations.  See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1692f(5) (prohibiting charges to the consumer for collect calls and telegram fees).
[brief] The [...] variance plans fail to provide any measurement of distance from [...] to the location of wetlands on the property.  [...] is not located on this property.  It is located behind and in close proximity to this property on another parcel of land.  Ja170.  Ordinance 380-33 (6) provides as follows: "The front yard shall be as close to 200 feet as practicable, taking into consideration the depth of the lot in question."  Application of [...] Ordinance 380-33 (6) and (7) cannot be utilized without knowing exactly how far from [...] wetlands currently exist.
[directive] Juvenile Waiver Cases.  7.6.5  In the event that a juvenile is waived to adult court pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-26.1 (involuntary waiver) or N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-27 (waiver at election of juvenile), and a complaint- warrant is issued pursuant to Section 4.8 so that the juvenile is an “eligible defendant” within the meaning of N.J.S.A. 2A:162-15, in deciding whether to seek pretrial detention the prosecutor shall apply the relevant facts and circumstances of the offense and the defendant’s history of juvenile delinquency to the appropriate subsection(s) of this Section as if the person originally had been arrested and charged by complaint-warrant as an adult.  See Section 4.8 and subsection 2.2.1 (a juvenile waived to adult court shall be treated as an adult under this Directive).  It is expected that the circumstances justifying an involuntary waiver (e.g., the nature and seriousness of the charges and/or the nature and extent of any prior history of delinquency) often will invoke a presumption under this Directive to seek pretrial detention.
[directive] The defendant has been arrested and charged with one or both of the motor vehicle violations checked in the box above.  Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.22, this WARNING is to advise you that if you accept responsibility to transport or accompany the defendant, and you permit or facilitate the operation of a motor vehicle by the defendant while the defendant is intoxicated or has a blood alcohol concentration at, or above, that permitted by law (N.J.S.A. 39:4-50), then you are potentially subject to criminal penalties and civil liability.  Permitting a person who is intoxicated or who has a blood alcohol concentration at, or above, that permitted by law, to operate a motor vehicle is a violation of N.J.S.A. 39:4-50(a).  If you are charged and convicted under that statute: your driving privilege will be suspended; fines and monetary penalties will be imposed; and you may be incarcerated.  If you permit or facilitate the defendant to operate a motor vehicle while the defendant remains intoxicated or has a blood alcohol concentration at, or above, that permitted by law, and the defendant becomes involved in a motor vehicle collision where other persons are injured or killed, then you may be subject to indictment and -7- criminal prosecution.  If you are prosecuted and found guilty, the court can impose fines and mandatory penalties, and a prison sentence.  In addition to any criminal liability, if you permit or facilitate the defendant to operate a motor vehicle while the defendant remains intoxicated or has a blood alcohol concentration at, or above, that permitted by law, and the defendant becomes involved in a motor vehicle collision where there is property damage, or personal injury or death, then you may be held liable for civil damages, and those damages may not be covered by insurance.  Person Acknowledging Receipt  Law Enforcement Officer  Print Name Print Name Street Address  Rank & Badge No.  City & State Date & Time of Acknowledgment  ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF RECEIPT OF POTENTIAL LIABILITY WARNING  I, , have received this POTENTIAL Signature of Person Summoned LIABILITY WARNING from the Law Enforcement Officer whose name appears below.
[brief] The Rodriguez-Ortiz court went on to note that our Supreme Court in Schmidt “broadly read these compulsory insurance provisions. ”  Slip Op. at 19 (Pa481).  The court found that Schmidt stands for the proposition that coverage provided under a combined workers compensation and employer liability policy “included claims placed outside the exclusivity provision by N.J.S.A. 34:15-8. ”  Slip Op. at 20 (Pa481).
[brief] (Pa000213)  When an employer asserts an arbitration provision as a waiver of an employee’s right to sue pursuant to a discrimination law, the employee must actually understand what they are doing and explicitly agree to the waiver.  As articulated in Appellant’s comprehensive Opposition to Respondents’ motions at the trial court level, the facts herein wholly demonstrate that Appellant absolutely did not understand what she was doing when she allegedly agreed to arbitrate her claims of discrimination and retaliation against Respondents.
[brief] DiFiore v. Pezic, 472 N.J. Super. 100 (App. Div. 2022), aff’d as mod., 254 N.J. 212 (2023).  First, in the DiFiore matter ([...]), a woman in her early seventies with several preexisting medical conditions alleging cognitive and orthopedic injuries sought audio recording and the presence of the plaintiff’s friend as well as a nurse practitioner.  Id. at 111-12.  Second, in the Deleon matter ([...]), a non-native English speaker in her early seventies, who alleged severe injuries to her cervical and lumbar spine and knees, sought to attend the examination accompanied by a nurse practitioner.  Id. at 118.  The Appellate Division issued a precedential opinion that created a split of published authority with Carley.  Id. at 130.  As a result, the Supreme Court granted leave to appeal the three consolidated matters for the limited purpose of whether a DME may be recorded or have a third-party observer.
[brief] *Willoughby v. Planning Bd. of Tp. of Deptford*, 306 N.J. Super. 266, 277 (App. Div. 1997).  Those new candidates ultimately repealed the ordinance at issue.  *Ibid.*  The issue was so important to the residents that they changed their elected officials.  Plaintiff contends that because they were able to garner media attention and residents spoke out at a JLUB hearing, then there is sufficient public interest to warrant enlargement.
[brief] Vision Mtge. Corp., Inc. v. Patricia J. Chiapperini, Inc., 307 N.J. Super. 48, 52-53 (App. Div. 1997) (citing, Applestein v. United Bd. & Carton Corp., 35 N.J. 343, 356 (1961)).  “Under this doctrine the ‘entire controversy,’ rather than its constituent causes of action, is the unit of litigation and joinder of all such causes of action is compulsory under penalty of forfeiture. ”
[brief] (Ca34).  The State then argued below that --- 14  This claim is not contained in the [...] Report dated October 7, 2020, describing [...]'s arrest.  "(a)lthough this language was inadvertently left out of the search warrant, it was a part of the application approved by the Judge in reviewing whether or not there was sufficient probable cause for the list of items sought.  Here, [...] found probable cause and Defendant has raised nothing to undermine that finding."