[brief] 2  “New Jersey was one of the five large industrial states which early adopted general acts designed to regulate and control the business of making small loans. ”  Family Fin. Corp., 10 N.J. Super. at 19.  3  “On January 8, 1997, the Governor signed the New Jersey Licensed Lenders Act, which combines the CLA with two mortgage-related statutes.  L. 1996, c. 157 (codified at N.J.S.A. 17:11C-1 to -49). ”  Lemelledo v. Benefit Mgmt. Corp., 150 N.J. 255, 262 n.1 (1997).  The entire legislative history of every iteration of the NJCFLA has allowed for a private right of action by individual consumers in addition to the enforcement remedies of the Commissioner.  Indeed, the NJCLA’s statutory mechanism of enforcement by which an individual consumer voided an unlawful loan contract and/or pursued treble damages was N.J.S.A. 17:11C-33(b)—the same provision of the same statute which Plaintiff asserts has voided his unlawful contract in the instant action.  Additionally, though N.J.S.A. 17:11C-18 codifies the Commissioner’s authority to oversee licensure under the NJCFLA, it does not disallow private actions by aggrieved consumers—nor did any of its predecessors, despite their also providing for the Commissioner’s authority to oversee licensure and pursue independent prosecutions.  In fact, N.J.S.A. 17:11C-33(b) continues to explicitly allow for treble damages—a remedy not included under the Commissioner’s authority in N.J.S.A. 17:11C-18.  N.J.S.A. 17:11C-18(i) further limits the Commissioner’s authority to civil penalties “not exceeding $25,000. ”  Therefore, in the absence of a private right of action, an unlicensed consumer lender could limit liability on consumer loans exceeding $25,000 since penalties are capped at $25,000.  Notwithstanding superfluous remedies in the absence of a private right of action, if the legislative intent and history of the NJCFLA are the polestars for an implied private right of action, then there must exist a private right of action under the NJCFLA.  The trial court erred by failing to analyze an implied right of action under the NJCFLA and basing its analysis solely on N.J.S.A. 17:11C-18; but nothing in N.J.S.A. 17:11C-18 precludes a private right of action or states that “[o]nly the Commissioner of Banking and Insurance has the authority to pursue claims for violations of the NJCFLA. ”  See T1 54:15-17.  As discussed supra, the NJCFLA’s statutory predecessors had nearly the same statutory structure as the contemporary NJCFLA—to wit, they provided for a private right of action (including treble damages and voiding of unlawful contracts) in conjunction with the Commissioners enforcement.  Nothing in the NJCFLA suggests that the legislature intended the Act’s remedies to be unavailable to private citizens.  To suddenly read private mechanisms of enforcement out of the NJCFLA would be tantamount to legislation by the judiciary.  Interpreting the NJCFLA as the legislature clearly intended requires viewing the NJCFLA in its historical context, i.e., acknowledging that the statute has always afforded private enforcement.  Thus, the premise upon which the trial court based its granting of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is inconsistent with relevant authority and the October 20, 2023 Orders granting Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss and denying [...]’s Cross Motion to Vacate, Transfer, and Consolidate should be reversed.