ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] DiProspero v. Penn, 183 N.J. 477, 492 (2005).  Specifically, the Court is to, 'ascr ibe to the statutory words their ordinary meaning and significance, and read them in context with related provisions so as to give sense to the legislation as a whole.'  [Hardy, 198 N.J. at 101.]  . . .  Courts are cautioned against 'rewrit[ing] a plainly-written enactment of the Legislature or presum[ing] that the Legislature intended something other than that expressed by way of the plain language.'  [Ibid.]  If the language is 'clear on its face,' courts should 'enforce [the statute] according to its terms.'  However, 'where a literal interpretation would create a manifestly absurd result, contrary to public policy, the spirit of the law should control.'  [Hubbard v. Reed, 168 N.J. 387, 392 (2001). ]  . . .  Accordingly, 'when a 'literal interpretation of individual statutory terms or provisions' would lead to results 'inconsistent with the overall purpose of the statute,' that interpretation should be rejected.'  [Id. at 392-93.]  Perrelli v. Pastorelle, 206 N.J. 193, 200-01 (2006).  Here, appellant/plaintiff [...] principally garaged his vehicles in New Jersey and was required to maintain New Jersey's Compulsory Automobile Insurance, specifically required by N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4 et. seq.
[brief] The video suggests that [...] was actually locked inside the room during the breaks, as he at one point got up and knocked on the door to try to be let out; moments later, a noise can be heard that sounds like a latch being unlocked before a detective answers; [...] then says he needs to use the bathroom, and he is permitted to leave; a detective later tells him to “knock if you need anything” and the latch sound is heard again.  (Da 109, 05:53:17 to 05:58:54)  The court did not make any finding on whether the door was locked.
[brief] Thus, cases applying the FAA regarding an arbitrator’s exceeding of powers are persuasive authority concerning N.J.S.A. 2A:24-8.  Those cases hold that the power and authority of the arbitrators in an arbitration proceeding is “dependent on the provisions of the arbitration agreement under which the arbitrators were appointed. ”  Szuts v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 931 F.2d 830, 831 (11th Cir, 1991).  “Arbitration is fundamentally a creature of contract, … and an arbitrator's authority is derived from an agreement to arbitrate.
[brief] On February 24, 2020, Plaintiff/Respondent, [...] (hereinafter “Plaintiff” or “Respondent”) filed an Amended Complaint in which she alleges that she sustained serious personal injuries as a result of a slip and fall she sustained on March 8, 2018 in the parking lot at [...].  (Da 20-24).  Defendants/Appellants [...]; [...] d/b/a [...]; [...], and [...] (hereinafter “Defendants” or “Appellants” collectively) filed an answer to plaintiff’s amended complaint on April 28, 2020.  (Da 25-35).  On November 29, 2022, Defendants initially filed a motion in limine requesting that the court take judicial notice of the weather-related State of Emergency issued on March 6, 2018 for the snow event of March 7, 2018.  This State of Emergency was in effect at the time of the plaintiff’s accident on March 8, 2018, and in fact was not terminated until March 13, 2018.  (Da 36-41).  Plaintiff opposed the motion on January 13, 2023.  The trial court denied this initial motion in limine requesting judicial notice on the State of Emergency on February 17, 2023.  (Da 42-43).  Then, on May 25, 2023, Plaintiff filed a separate motion in limine to bar reference to this weather-related State of Emergency.  Defendants filed their opposition to this motion on May 30, 2023.  At the same time, Defendants also filed a separate motion in limine seeking to bar reference to the terms of the snow removal contract, sought relaxation of the court’s earlier refusal to take judicial notice of the State of Emergency, and further sought to bar evidence regarding the non-renewal or termination of [...] after the 2018 season.  On July 13, 2023, Plaintiff filed opposition to Defendants’ motion in limine barring reference to the snow contract, requesting judicial notice of the State of Emergency, and barring reference to the subsequent termination of [...].  On July 18, 2023, Defendants filed a reply brief on this motion in limine.  The trial court entertained oral argument on the various motions in limine mentioned above on July 19, 2023.  (1T).  At that time, the court denied Defendants’ motion seeking to bar reference to the terms of the snow removal contract, relax the court’s earlier refusal to take judicial notice of the State of Emergency, and bar evidence regarding the non-renewal or termination of [...] after the 2018 season.  (Da 3-5).  In addition, the court addressed Plaintiff’s separate motion in limine to bar reference to the State of Emergency which was granted.  (Da 1-2).  Thereafter, trial of this matter commenced on July 24, 2023 and concluded on August 1, 2023.  The jury returned a verdict finding that [...] was 20% negligent; that [...] was 27% negligent; that [...] was 41% negligent; and that Plaintiff was 12% negligent.  (Da 6-8).  On September 29, 2023, Defendants filed an Amended Notice of Appeal and Appellate Civil Case Information Statement challenging the rulings in limine about judicial notice, the snow removal agreements and seeking a new trial on liability only.  (Da 9-19).  STATEMENT OF FACTS
[brief] First, this court finds that [Appellant] lacks standing to file exceptions to the Intermediate Account.  New Jersey case law suggests that contingent remaindermen under a testamentary trust (such as [Appellant]) who are unaffected by allowances out of the income or from payments of corpus commissions cannot file exceptions to such items in an accounting.  See In re Oathout’s Estate, 25 N.J. Misc. 186 (1947); In Phipps Family Trust, 147 N.J. Super, 331, 346 (Ch. Div. 1976); In re Walsh’s Estate, 32 N.J. Super. 528, 534 (App. Div. 1954).  [Appellant], a contingent remainder beneficiary of the… Trust, has no current entitlement to the… Trust income.  As such, it cannot be set with certainty that [Appellant] would be adversely affected by the payments of the income or corpus commissions outlined in the Intermediate Account.  Moreover, the terms of the … Trust only provide the “respective child co-trustee” ([...]) with the explicit authority to approve the accounting prior to the payment by the … Trust.  The plain language of the Will (at Section 10.6) does not suggest that approval is required from … [Appellant]….  ***
[brief] [...] was friends with [...] and lived at [...].  (7T 39-13 to 16, 129-13 to 18)  She testified that [...] lived at his girlfriend’s house down the block at [...].  (7T 53-18 to 20)  [...] had told her the night before that he had argued with his girlfriend, she had kicked him out, and he asked if he could stay with Williams.
[brief] Cockerline v. Menendez, 411 NJ. Super. 596, 620 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 201 NJ. 499 (2010)(emphasis added).  "The spoliation inference permits the jury to infer that the evidence destroyed or concealed would not have been favorable to the spoliator."  Rosenblit, supra, at 401-02.  If a plaintiff can make a threshold showing that a defendant's recklessness caused the loss of relevant evidence, the jury should be so instructed.  Jerista v. Murray, 185 NJ. 175, 202 (2005).  The TMS logs at issue were not only available for 8 days, were not relevant to the litigation, contained duplicative information available in other means of discovery provided to Plaintiff and therefore no prejudice could possibly result.  However, without a shred of actual evidence, Plaintiff would have this Court believe that [...] had notice that Plaintiff planned to file a lawsuit due to inadequate lighting and technical malfunction of the movie theater equipment and that [...] deliberately destroyed evidence that was pertinent and concealed said act.
[brief] Ordinances are to receive a reasonable construction, and primarily the intention expressed in an ordinance is to be gleaned from the language employed.  Where the language is unambiguous and clearly expresses the intent of the legislative body, there is no room for judicial construction.  The rule is well settled and axiomatic.  *Preziosi v. Buonaccorsi*, 16 N.J.Super. 15, 21, 83 A.2d 780 (App.Div.1951)....  Where there is no ambiguity, we cannot impress the rule of construction.  First, the wording of the ordinance is plain, simple, clear and unambiguous, **and this court is not free to indulge in a presumption, arising from a subsequent extrinsic exposition, that the local governing body intended something other than what was expressed**.  *Bass v. Allen Home Improvement Co.*, 8 N.J. 219, 226, 84 A.2d 720 (1951).  The language must be given its ordinary meaning ...Our courts will interpret and enforce the legislative will as written and not according to some supposed unexpressed intention.  City of Camden v. Local Government Board, 127 N.J.L. 175, 178, 21 A.2d 292 (Sup.Ct.1941).  **Petrangeli v. Barrett**, 33 N.J. Super. 378, 385-86, 110A.2d 313, 316-17 (App. Div.1954)  If the plain language leads to a clear and unambiguous result, then [the] interpretive process is over."  Young, supra, 202 N.J. at 63, 995 A.2d 826 (internal citations omitted, alteration in original).  (emphasis added)  **State v. Badr**, 415 N.J. Super. 455,466, 2 A.3d 436,442 (App. Div. 2010)  Whether due to inartful drafting or the inadvertent failure to include a provision as to what would transpire after the 120 days, the ordinances in question all met their demise in 2004 - long before [...] issued the summonses now before the Court.  As stated above where, as here, the language is clear and unambiguous the court must enforce the ordinance as written and not according to some supposed unexpressed intention.
[directive] d.  The Attorney General shall, through the Office of Victim-Witness Advocacy and in consultation with the Commissioner of Health and Senior Services, the Superintendent of State Police and representatives of providers of sexual assault services, to be designated by the Director of the Office of Victim-Witness Advocacy, coordinate the establishment of standard protocols for the provision of information and services to victims of sexual assault, and shall make such protocols available to victims upon request, except that the provision of information and services with regard to emergency  A- 20  ATTORNEY GENERAL STANDARDS FOR PROVIDING SERVICES TO VICTIMS OF SEXUAL ASSAULT contraception and sexually transmitted diseases shall be in accordance with P.L. 2005, c. 50 (C. 26:2H-12.6b et al.).  HUMAN TRAFFICKING
[brief] APPELLANT’S TERMINATION WAS JUSTIFIED.  The New Jersey Supreme Court has held it is well established that when underlying conduct is of an egregious nature, the imposition of a penalty up to and concluding removal would be appropriate, regardless of the individual’s disciplinary history.  See Henry v. Rahway State Prison, 81 N.J. 571 (1980).  Additionally, the seriousness of the infraction must also be balanced in the equation of whether removal or something less is appropriate under the circumstances.  Id.  The New Jersey Supreme Court also held that the theory of progressive discipline is not a “fixed and immutable rule to be followed without question” but rather it is recognized that some disciplinary infractions are so serious that removal is appropriate notwithstanding a largely unblemished prior record.  In re Carter, 191 N.J. 474, 484 (2007).  The penalty of termination is appropriate for those “infractions that went to the heart of the officer’s ability to be trusted to function appropriately in his position. ”  In re Hermann, 192 N.J. 19, 36 (2007).  Police officers are held to a higher standard of conduct than ordinary citizens or other public employees because of the sensitive nature of the position they occupy.
[brief] As again Defendant has included this issue (Pb7), predicated on an email not authenticated by the author, it is necessary to briefly address why it is meritless.  The email itself is hearsay, its content is hearsay, its unattributed conclusion on why the deal was being scuttled by Plaintiff is hearsay, as is that purportedly Plaintiff informed of what it was told by the lender, i.e., a fourth level of hearsay.  As such it cannot be relied upon on this motion.  Sellers v. Schonfeld, 270 N.J. Super. 424, 427 (App. Div. 1993)
[brief] [...] was required, as the grantor of the ROFR, to comply with the ROFR’s terms.  It had already breached the ROFR in converting the offer into a contract without [...]’s knowledge.  The Trial Court did not err in finding that [...] did not present the modified offer to [...] on May 4, 2023.  More importantly, [...]’s arguments ignore the true basis for the Trial Court’s determination that a final Offer was not conveyed until May 8, 2023.  [...]’s demand for a fully executed Second Addendum was necessitated by [...]’s actions in executing the Original PSA on October 14, 2022.  The PSA became more than a mere “offer” once Defendants and [...] executed the document; it became a legally binding document that could only be amended by fully executed documents.  This is directly based on the language of the PSA itself, which contains the plain language normally found in such purchase sale agreements.  Section 10(t) of the Original PSA states “[t]his Agreement constitutes, a legal, valid and binding obligations of Seller, enforceable and in accordance with the terms except to the extent that enforceability may be limited by bankruptcy, insolvency, moratorium or other similar laws presently or hereafter in effect relating to or affecting the enforcements of creditor's rights generally and by general principles of equity (regardless of whether enforcement is considered in a proceeding in equity or at law).
[brief] [...] and [...] do not come before this Court on equal footing.  As both the drafting party and the purported indemnitee, to prevail on appeal, [...] must meet a substantial burden.  Specifically, any ambiguity in the indemnification clause must be strictly construed against [...] as both the indemnitee and as the drafting party.  See Kieffer v. Best Buy, 205 N.J. 213, 223-224 (2011) quoting Mantilla v. NC Mall Assocs., 167 N.J. 262, 272 (2001) (internal citation omitted).  Moreover, there is a presumption against indemnifying an indemnitee for its own negligence.  Mantilla, 167 N.J. at 269.  [...] urges this Court to complete its review of the subject clause with these factors in mind.  To prevail and overcome the presumption against indemnification therefore, [...] must show its indemnification clause is clear, concise, unequivocal, and incapable of having more than one meaning or interpretation.
[brief] A debt collector who fails to comply with any FDCPA provision “with respect to any person is liable to such person” for any actual damages, statutory damages, and attorneys’ fees.  15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a).  Statutory damages have monetary limits: up to $1,000 for the plaintiff and 1% of the debt collector’s net worth for the class.  Id.  Plaintiff commenced this class action against Defendant based on his receipt of Defendant’s collection letter.  On Defendant’s motion, the lower court dismissed all the claims.  The motion court erred because it failed to consider how federal courts construe and apply the FDCPA.  One FDCPA provision mandates that “a debt collector may not communicate, in connection with the collection of any debt, with any person. ”  15 U.S.C. § 1692c(b) (emphasis added).  There are exceptions but none apply here.  Plaintiff alleges Defendant communicated detailed information about Plaintiff and his alleged debt with a third party.  Therefore, Plaintiff stated a claim upon which relief could be granted.  But the motion court concluded that § 1692c(b) does not apply when the person, although not falling within any statutory exception, is a mail vendor.  By contrast, every federal court answering the sufficiency question concluded that alleging, as Plaintiff did here, a debt collector conveyed debt information to a mail vendor states a claim for violation of § 1692c(b) for which the consumer can recovery, at the very least, statutory damages and attorney’s fees without alleging or proving any misuse of the information or any harm other than the debt collector’s violation of the consumer’s statutorily-protected right.  Therefore, Plaintiff prays that the Appellate Division reverses the Order which dismissed his Complaint.
[brief] Thereafter, based upon the results of this unauthorized testing, [...] sought and obtained permission to install air canisters on the Property for the purpose of a 24-hour testing of the indoor air quality.  This occurred after they had already intruded upon Plaintiffs’ Property, took soil borings, and installed temporary well points.  (Pa000777 at ¶ 16); Pa000333, page 79, line 16 to line 24; Pa000336, page 93, line 1 to line 11).  In connection with seeking consent to take interior air samples, [...] threatened that the Plaintiffs’ business might be shut down if Plaintiffs did not allow [...] to conduct the air sampling.  (Pa000777 at ¶ 16; Pa000333, pg. 80, line 9 to line 15; Pa000333, page 81, line 9 to line 14; Pa000353, page 158, line 18 to line 24).  Thereafter, [...] installed a vapor intrusion mitigation system, also known as an active subsurface depressurization system (“ASDS”), inside the Plaintiffs’ Property.
[brief] The amount and propriety of Defendant’s payments of legal fees is certainly an issue that would be disclosed on an accounting, R. 4:88-4, and is subject to the discretion of the Court, R. 4:42-9(b).  The fact that Defendant admits that the “vast majority” of the over $900,000 in cash received from the sale of the Decedent’s home and personal property – and possibly other assets which Defendant has refused to disclose – has been spent on his legal fees is something that the Court should have an interest in overseeing, particularly when the fiduciary was chosen by the Court, and not by the Decedent.  This becomes even more compelling when the Decedent has used his own law firm to represent the Estate, and has admitted that property owned by the Estate is subject to a foreclosure action due to the Estate’s inability to pay the mortgage.
[brief] Thus, even assuming the “evidence demonstrates that [appellant/]plaintiff attempted to comply with Section 4.5,” this argument is also irrelevant.  *(Emphasis added)* (Pg.10 - Appellant Brief).  **b.  Even if *N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.5* had an “intent” requirement, the evidence clearly demonstrates appellant/plaintiff [...]’s intentional failure to insure his vehicle with a New Jersey policy.
[brief] ”  Shaw, 460 N.J. Super. at 605.  But these “historically learned professionals” have been allowed to freely advertise their services since 1978.  Macedo, 178 N.J. at 343.  To allow an exception for only a small group of individuals based on a rule that no longer exists defies logic and runs afoul of the long-accepted language in Neveroski, and presumed acquiescence of the Legislature for almost 50 years.
[brief] Pursuant to its statutory obligation, Defendants produced an RIR that was ultimately filed with the NJ DEP on December 21, 2021.  Defendants sought a closing date, and Plaintiffs stalled.  Thereafter, Defendants filed a Time of Essence notice.  Plaintiff became enraged and filed its own Time of the Essence notice (despite the fact that Defendants never refused to close title on the property).  When Defendants refused to enter into a joint venture with Plaintiff, Plaintiff filed suit against them.  During the trial, Plaintiff engaged in a protracted analysis of alleged “deficiencies” in the RIR.  Its arguments are again recited in the Plaintiff’s brief - despite the fact that the RIR is never mentioned in the contract.  Defendants produced the RIR because it is their statutory obligation as owners, and the property had been in default with the NJDEP for several years.  The RIR was submitted on December 21, 2021, and accepted by the NJDEP on July 23, 2023 (during the trial).  Yet, inexplicably, although Plaintiff could move forward to close title and proceed to redevelopment, it found fault with the RIR and refused to proceed to closing.
[brief] See Section IV.B, supra.  [...] should have asked [...] for a copy of the governing terms.  See id.  Moreover, his account statements stated that “New Jersey account terms and conditions apply” (PA081), expressly referred to the DAA (PA084), and directed him to the [...] website, where he could download “the disclosures applicable to [his] account” (PA085).  [...] disputes that his account statements told him where he might download the DAA.  However, he acknowledges that his account statement expressly states that “New Jersey account terms and conditions apply” (Appellant Br., 21), and he fails to acknowledge that the account statements expressly referred to the DAA, which put him on inquiry notice.  Thus, [...]’s failure in inquire about those terms and conditions amounts to inattention and inaction, which doom his position.
[brief] Notice of Appeal .................................. Pa90-94  Order Amending Order ............................... Pa95-97  Amended Notice of Appeal ...........................  Pa98-104  SUMMARY JUDGMENT LISTING FOR R. 2:6-1(A)  Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Respondent .......  Pa23-66  Certification of [...] .................. Pa30 Statement of Material Facts ..........................  Pa27-29  Exhibit A, Amended Complaint and Answer to Amended Complaint ......................... Pa31-46  Exhibit B, Deposition transcript of [...].  Pa47-57  Exhibit C, Deposition transcript of [...] .  Pa58-Pa65  Appellant’s Response to Appellant’s Statement of Facts and Counter Statement of Material Facts ..................... Pa77-69  Exhibit A, Deposition transcript of [...].  .Pa71-84  Respondent’s Reply in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment  .Pa85  Exhibit A, Certification of [...]  .  . . . . . .Pa86-88  TABLE OF CITATIONS
[brief] 37 - City of Hackensack v. Hackensack Med. Ctr., 228 N.J. Super. 310 (App. Div. 1988)  23 - Jennifer Clemens v. Execupharm Inc., 48 F.4th 146(3d Cir. 2022)  18 - DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cumo, 547 U.S. 332 (2006)
[brief] *(Da278, [...] Deeds)*  After purchasing multiple lots from the [...], there was never any communication from [...] to [...] until 2021 when [...] contacted [...].  *(Da274, Message on Messenger; Da125, [...] Affidavit, pars. 14-18; Da111, [...] Admissions, pars. 1-4)*  A review of the title history notes that Parcel A which is Lot 22 was conveyed by the [...] to [...] on October 24, 1985.  *(Da122, Parcel A).*  It was error for the [...] to convey all of Lot 22 to [...] because as can be seen from the Title Survey, [...] owned part of Lot 22.  *(Da118, Parcel B)*  Per the title history, Parcel B was conveyed from [...] to [...] Hope Missionary Baptist Church on June 30, 1976 and per that title document, [...] owns part of Lot 22 which was never conveyed to anyone.  (Da118, Parcel B; Da264, Deed from [...] to [...]).  The property identified as Lot 20 is owned by [...].  (Da262, Property Identification Record from Tax Assessor)  There had never been a claim of ownership of Lot 22 nor Lot 20 which [...] misidentified as Lot 22 by [...] despite their strong presence in this area.  (Da262, Property Identification Record from Tax Assessor, Da278 [...] Deeds).
[brief] The retrieval of credentials puts [...] at a lawful vantage to view the interior of the glove box.  Only expecting to find the sought-for paperwork, [...] observed an object that was immediately identifiable as heroin or the packaging of heroin.  Although he was permitted to seize that object pursuant to “plain view,” he did not.  Instead, he waited for the approval of a search warrant before proceeding.  E. Inevitable Discovery
[brief] They now insist that “a LTTEL exemption requires findings supported by substantial evidence. ”  Pb30; Pb32 (emphasis added).  They concede that their argument is \(^6\) Section II(E) responds to Section I(C) in Plaintiffs’ brief. one of first impression (Pb32), but argue that it follows the Supreme Court’s recent decision in *Malanga v. Twp. of West Orange*, 253 N.J. 291 (2023).