ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Order dismissing Appeal by [...] dated 4/22/2022 (Attached at Pa285)  Exhibit L to Certification of [...] Handwritten Notes 6/3/21 regarding [...]’s Incident with police (Attached at Pa287)  Subpoena served on police Officers by [...] --- This should not be considered a duplicate because it has an additional recipient.  on 11/12/2020 (Attached at Pa298)  Letter to [...] 10/27/2020 regarding trial scheduled when discovery incomplete non receipt of audio/videos and motion to suppress not heard (Attached at Pa078)  Letter to Judge and Prosecutor 11/20/20  Requesting Discovery Production of Expert Report of Chemist and Credentials (Attached at Pa300)  Incident Data Type/Offense as of 3/6/2020 involving [...] (Attached at Pa302)  Complaint Summons dated 2/20/2020 (Attached at Pa041)
[brief] Therefore, he suggests that [...] will be able to confirm on the site of the examination whether a usable image can be extracted from the iPhone.  Id.  *7  During the discovery conference, which will be addressed in full detail in a subsequent order to be issued by the Court, [...] indicated to the Court that [...]’s iPhone was no longer in her possession, as she allegedly lost it while aboard a boat on Folse River, as it went overboard.
[brief] [...] emphasized that he was not saying he knew defendant “assaulted the man. . . [or] robbed the man.  . . . [or] hurt the man. ” (7T186-10 to 12).  But after admitting he was in the photo, that he was with [...], and on [...], defendant still continued to deny going into the building despite video of him doing just so.  Again, [...] clarified that he was only asking whether he went into the building, and not whether he assaulted or robbed the victim, yet defendant remained steadfast that he did not.  (7T189-5 to  Recognizing that defendant’s statements were in direct contradiction to the video surveillance, [...] continued to insist that defendant was lying to him.  (7T190-6 to 18).  The recording ended with defendant responding, “That’s a damn lie.  I ain’t go in no fucking building. ” (7T190-24 to 25).  After hearing testimony, watching the video recorded interview, and considering counsel’s arguments, the trial court denied the motion to suppress the statement.
[brief] **  After eight months, the matter resumed on August 3, 2023.  The defense moved to dismiss the matter for a violation of [...]’s right to a speedy trial; this motion was denied.  7T3-17/4-24.  The municipal court next heard the motion to suppress evidence (7T5-3/9) with testimony from [...] (7T6-5/67-13) and admission of a mobile video recording [“MVR”] in evidence without objection as exhibit S-2 (7T16-2/13; see 7T98-5-11).  This motion was denied.  7T71-9/74-24.  A defense motion to dismiss the charge of failing to exhibit a driver’s license was granted.  7T75-1/77-13; see 8T7-11/16.  **Trial.
[brief] In fact, a quantity of money was located on the Defendant.  1T:73-16 to 73-19.  Even setting aside the Codefendant’s innocent explanation, the “unusual behavior” observed fell short of establishing a reasonable and articulable suspicion that the Defendant was involved in criminal activity.  Unlike the facts and circumstances presented in the cases previously cited, no transaction was observed, no exchange of money, packages or objects was observed, neither the Defendant nor the Codefendant were known by [...], there was nothing in their physical appearance suggestive of a crime, no reports of recent criminal activity had been reported, and no furtive gestures or attempts to conceal an object were observed.
[brief] (Continued)  Page  CONCLUSION  .........................................................................................................................26  TABLE OF APPENDIX Excerpt of City of Hoboken Ordinance §196-6 ..................................................1a City of Hoboken Ordinance §196-23........................................................................3a [...] Elevation and Attorney Certification (Page 1 Only) Dated March 5, 2024 .................................................................................................4a Excerpts from Appellant's Brief in Opposition to Motion for Summary Disposition Filed in this Appeal..............................................................................6a | Cases | Page | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | Belmont Condominium Association, Inc. v. Geibel, | 12 | | 432 N.J. Super. 52 (App. Div. 2013) | | | Correia v. Sherry, | 22 | | 335 N.J. Super. 60 (App. Div. 2000) | | | DeVito v. Sheeran, | 12 | | 165 N.J. 167 (2000) | | | Estate of Hanges v. Metro. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., | 12 | | 202 N.J. 369 (2010) | | | Fagliarone v. Township of North Bergen, | 21 | | 78 N.J. Super. 154 (App. Div. 1963) | | | Green v. N.J. Manufacturers Insurance Company, | 12, 23, 26 | | 160 N.J. 480 (1999) | | | Greenfield v. Dusseault, | 21 | | 60 N.J. Super. 436 (App. Div. 1960), aff’d o.b. 33 N.J. 78 (1960) | | | Grewal v. Greda, | 12 | | 463 N.J. 489 (2020) | | | Kramer v. Board of Adjustment, Sea Girt, | 20 | | 45 N.J. 268 (1965) | | | Kuzian v. Tomaszewski, | 22 | | 457 N.J. 458 (Law Div. 2018) | | | New York SMSA v. Bd of Adjustment of Tp. Of Weehawken, | 13 | | 370 N.J. Super. 319 (App. Div. 2004) | | | Rodriguez v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., | 12 | | 237 N.J. 36 (2019) | | | Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Investors Ins. Co. of America, | 21 | | 65 N.J. 474 (1974) | | | Scully-Bozarth Post #1817 of Veterans of Foreign Wars of the U.S. v. | 13, 19, 20 | | Planning Bd. Of the City of Burlington, | | | 362 N.J. Super. 296 (App. Div. 2003) | | # TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | Cases (Continued) | Page | |-------------------|------| | State v. Marrero, | | | 148 N.J. 469 (1997) | 12 | | State v. Morton, | | | 155 N.J. 383 (1998) | 12 | | State v. Swint, | | | 328 N.J. Super. 236 (App. Div. 2000) | 22 | | Verdicchio v. Ricca, | | | 179 N.J. 1 (2004) | 25 | | Wymbs ex rel. Wymbs v. Township of Wayne, | | | 163 N.J. 523 (2000) | 23, 26 | | Rules | | |-------|------| | N.J.R.E. 401 | 22 | | N.J.R.E. 403 | 23 | | Ordinances | | |------------|------| | City of Hoboken Ordinance §196-6 | 5, 7, 15 | | City of Hoboken Ordinance §196-23 | 5, 15 | TABLE OF TRANSCRIPTS
[brief] DiProspero v. Penn, 183 N.J. 477, 492 (2005).  The basis of a complaint is to apprise the defendant of the cause of action as of filing the complaint.  Thus, a claimant’s cause of action shall have accrued or ripen into a justiciable claim.  Plaintiff’s complaint did not provide a certification or sworn statement in support of abandonment, or that a court had found the Premises abandoned, either prior to as of filing the complaint.  The court Order of December 29, 2023 (Aa42), based upon the [...] certification that the property was abandoned, is an attempt to confirm the complaint filed four months earlier.  The Order permitted the Plaintiff to accelerate foreclosure rather than wait a minimum of two years prior to commencing the foreclosure.
[brief] See Schubert, 212 N.J. at 309-13 (“to permit” an increase in sentence after service has been completed “is a violation of a defendant's fundamental rights under the Double Jeopardy Clauses of the United States and New Jersey Constitutions. ”)  In Schubert, both Courts of review found it helpful to quote from a New  \textsuperscript{11}  Defendant was sentenced on [...] on June 30, 1997, to a term of 7 years with a 3-year parole bar.  (Da 10-11)  Excluding jail credits and institutional credits, he would have completed serving that sentence on or about June 30, 2004.
[brief] [...] wrote “The 14th Amendment prohibits the state from depriving any person of life, liberty, or property WITHOUT DUE PROCESS OF LAW. ”  The Court has long recognized that the Due Process Clause “guarantees MORE than fair process,” Glucksberg, 521 US 702 (1997).  Upon the court having been afforded an opportunity, (Pa1) to cure this defect in its misapplying case law (citing Clarke v. Clarke) (Pa16 - Pa17) it ultimately failed to cure said defect as it ignored this defendant’s direct challenge in indicating its error via a Motion to Reconsider (Pa1; Pa10-Pa11; Pa33-Pa35; Pa39-Pa40; Pa58-Pa59; Pa62).
[directive] ______ DAY OF __________, _____, a Restraining Order will be entered by the Court, pursuant to the Drug Offender Restraining Order Act of 1999.  Unless you apply to modify or stay the Order, it will read as follows:  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY - COUNTY CHANCERY DIVISION, FAMILY PART FJ - State of New Jersey  RESTRAINING ORDER  In the Interest of (Juvenile)  Police Department: Police Case No.: Offense Date: Juvenile, ____________________ , having been charged in the above complaint with violation(s) of: N.J.S.A. 2C:35-3, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-4, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-9, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-4.1, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5.2, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5.3, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7, or N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7.1, or Unlawful possession or use of an assault firearm as defined in N.J.S.A. 2C:39-1w  A law enforcement officer or prosecuting attorney having requested an Order and having submitted a certification describing the location of the offense, It is on this _______ day of _____________, 20___ hereby Ordered, pursuant to the Drug Offender Restraining 365, (the Act) that the juvenile is prohibited Order Act of 1999, as amended and supplemented by P.L. 2001, c. and restrained from entering and/or returning to the place and returning to within 500 feet of the place or other surrounding buffer zone(s), as described below: _________________________________________________________________________________________________ _________________________________________________________________________________________________ __________________________________________________________________________________________________ __________________________________________________________________________________________________
[directive] Drug Court Application for Promotion to Phase 4  lndt~ndenct•lnl!Sl!rilt F•lrnus•QualltyStrvke Track Application for Promotion to Phase 4  B: Name Date Submitted I  Current Address: Street City State Zip Code Telephone Email if  The following criteria must be met in order to phase up: ( check box task is completed) of I have been in Phase 3 for a minimum 120 days.  Date entered phase 3: of of I have a minimum 60 consecutive days sobriety.  Sobriety date: if I am engaged in treatment and attending regularly, applicable.  Counselor verification signature: of I am following the conditions supervision.  Probation Officer verification signature: I am engaged in recovery support groups.  Home group: I am engaged in pro-social activities.  Activities: of Three  my biggest struggles in Phase 3:  Three accomplishments in Phase 3:  Three personal goals I would like to accomplish in the next phase: my  Three ways I will maintain recovery and remain law abiding:  Client Signature Date Track B: Application for Promotion to Phase 4 by Promulgated Directive #20-21 (08/11/2021), CN 12571d ., Courts
[directive] A court’s authority to waive or reduee a mandatory minimum term pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7b applies only to the sentence imposed on a conviction for the drug-free school zone offense.  N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7b does not authorize a court to waive or reduce a mandatory minimum sentence required to be imposed on conviction for any other offense defined in the Comprehensive Drug Reform Act a violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5 involving a first-degree (e.g., -5- quantity of heroin or cocaine).  The new law also expressly provides thata court is not authorized to waive or reduce the mandatory minimum sentence even in a school zone case if the defendant has previously been convicted of drug distribution or possession with intent to distribute, in which event the defendant is subject to a separate and distinct mandatory three-year minimum term of parole ineligibility pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6f (mandatory extended term dealers).2 for repeat drug  In any school zone case where the judicial waiver/reduction authority under N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7b is inapplicable or unavailable a case involving a repeat drug dealer, or an offense (i.e., committed while actually on school property or a school bus, or that involved violence, threatened violence, or firearms), the separation of powers concerns expressed by the Court in State v. Brimage continue to exist, since the mandatory minimum sentence can only be waived or reduced by the prosecutor pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-12.  Accordingly, the current Brimagg. Guidelines must be followed and a "Brima~e plea offer" must be calculated and tendered in any school zone case where the prosecutor asserts that the defendant is not eligible to be sentenced in the court’s discretion pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7b.
[brief] THE ACCOUNT STATEMENTS WERE ADMISSIBLE UNDER THE ADOPTIVE ADMISSION EXCEPTION TO THE HEARSARY RULE [NOT RAISED BELOW]  As noted above, an “adoptive admission” is an exception to the general prohibition against hearsay.  The adoptive admission exception to hearsay applies both in criminal and civil cases.  Greenberg v. Stanley, 30 N.J. 485, 498 (1959) (citations omitted).  There are two (2) requirements for an adoptive admission:  1) “the party to be charged must be aware of and understand the content of the statement” and 2) “it must be clear that the party to be charged with the adoptive admission ‘unambiguously assented’ to the statement. ”  McDevitt v. Bill Good Builders, Inc., 175 N.J. 519, 529-530 (2003) (citations omitted).  A written statement and/or acknowledgement qualifies under this rule.  See c.f. Skibinski v. Smith, 206 N.J. Super. 349, 353 (App. Div. 1985) (noting that answers to interrogatories and/or expert reports may qualify under the rule); See also c.f. Corcoran v. Sears Roebuck and Co., 312 N.J. Super. 117, 126-127 (App. Div. 1998) (further discussing the admissibility of an expert report and or answer to interrogatory).  Plaintiff notes that all of Defendant’s defenses/claims are predicated upon the documentation set forth by Plaintiff in the form of the Cardmember Agreement and account statements.  Defendant most certainly was aware of the information contained in those documents – Defendant made specific references in Defendant’s arguments to the trial court in support of Defendant’s claims and/or defenses.
[brief] ”  *State v. Maloney*, 216 N.J. 91, 105 (2013).  In *State v. Faucette*, this Court held that the trial court’s accomplice liability jury instructions “adequately identified the applicable accomplice liability principles and articulated the elements necessary” for the relevant offense.  439 N.J. Super. 241, 269-70 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 221 N.J. 492 (2015).  This Court determined that jury instructions explaining that “the State must prove it was . . . defendant’s conscious object that a specific crime charged be committed,” in addition to accomplice liability instructions providing that one is “legally accountable for the conduct of another” when “with the purpose of promoting or facilitating the commission of the offense . . . aids of agrees or attempts to aid such other person in planning or committing it” were sufficient for the jury to properly reach a verdict.  Id. at 270-71.
[brief] “[...]”**  On August 4, 2020, there was a minor altercation at the base of [...]’s driveway between [...] and [...]’s miniature Golden Doodle [...].  [...] didn’t report this to the police for two years until September 18, 2022, after [...] told her what had happened to [...].  2T99:3-8.  [...] had known [...] for four years because their daughters went to high school together.  2T100:11-14.  [...] admitted that [...] was walking ahead of her on a six-foot retractable leash, as she “pulls pretty much.”  2T97:2-5.  [...] was walking with [...] down the driveway on a leash and saw [...] coming down [...] from the left.  3T82: 19-25.  She saw [...] but not [...], because the view was blocked by high ornamental grass and a Verizon junction box.  3T83:1-4.  See Exhibit D-20, Da73, marked with an “S and C” for [...] and [...], and D-21, Da75, showing that from [...]’s point of view, a person on the driveway behind the bushes would be obscured from the waist down.  [...] and [...] simultaneously cleared the landscaping at the mouth of the driveway, erupting in barking and biting.  3T84:1-8.  [...] pulled [...] back and [...] grabbed [...].  3T124:7-125:6.  [...] walked home and returned in a car with her husband and [...] to get proof that [...] was up to date on rabies.  3T86:9-21.  [...] was not seriously injured; [...] took her to the vet who treated bite marks and released her.  2T95-25:96-1:2.  [...] declined [...]’s and [...]’s offer to pay the vet bills.  3T87:6-9.  There are some conflicts in the witnesses’ accounts.  [...] said that [...] was talking on a cellphone.  3T82:24-25.  [...] denied it.  2T97:6-7.  [...] claimed that [...] “came out of nowhere” and that he was not on a leash.  2T92:16-17.  She admitted that she “did not see the dog coming”  2T94:3 and only speculated that he escaped from the back yard:  “So the dog came out of, I believe, from a fence in the backyard. ”  2T93:19-20.  **July 27, 2022 incident
[brief] The City has a New Jersey Forest Service approved Forest Management Plan, and this is so the City would qualify for liability protection.  (Pa189, p.62, 65.)  The City also provided the sworn Certification of [...] (“Sanchez”) who tracks Tort Claim’s Notices and lawsuits against the City; she confirmed no one ever filed a Tort Claim’s Notice or served any legal papers regarding the tree.  (Pa33.)  The City also provided the Certification of [...] (“Corbitt”), the Assistant Superintendent of the DPW; he verified doing an extensive review of the DPW’s records and did not find any evidence that the City had been notified of any issues regarding the subject tree or it requiring any attention before the incident occurred.  (Pa34-Pa35.)  Corbitt also explained the City’s approach to dealing with tree issues, which is two-fold.  First, the City relies upon the adjacent real property owners to make a complaint to the City about a tree being a problem.  (Pa34.)  These complaints will range from a tree appearing to be diseased or dead because its canopy or limbs is dying, its trunk is infested with insects, its dropping limbs onto the ground, or its limbs need pruning because they are touching structures, and so forth.  (Pa34.)  Second, the City relies upon its own employees: City police officers, City fire fighters and DPW employees who are constantly in City vehicles and driving throughout the City, oftentimes around the clock, who will notice an issue with a tree and alert the DPW to it.  (Pa34.)  Corbitt explained that the City follows this approach because, in the grand scheme of the many public services that must be provided to the City’s citizens, the City does not have unlimited resources, and the City has to make financial resource allocations on the best and most economical way to utilize its limited tax revenues to provide all the City’s services to its residents.  (Pa34.)  Corbitt stated that over time, the City found this approach to be the most prudent, efficient and economical manner to address the maintenance and/or removal of trees and their debris by the City.  (Pa34.)  Corbitt also explained that at the time of Plaintiff’s incident in November 2020, the City was in good standing with the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection’s Urban and Community Forestry Program by filing the required documentation with the State.  (Pa35; Pa226-Pa231.)
[brief] CONCLUSION  In conclusion, Defendants respectfully request that this Court leave undisturbed the findings of fact and conclusions of law of the Trial Court including, but not limited to, the following issues:  1.  Plaintiffs did not establish the occurrence of a wrongful act that would trigger the need for the Trial Court to impose a constructive trust on the Tillbrook condominium owned by [...]; 2.  Defendants rebutted the presumption of undue influence by clear and convincing evidence; 3.  Proofs adduced at trial establish that [...], whose name is on the deed, is the rightful owner of Tillbrook; 4.  $50,000.00 should be returned to [...], subject to the conditions of the Trial Court’s Order entered August 4, 2023 under the equitable theory of restitution; and 5.  The claim of fiduciary breach was rightly dismissed because the Defendants never served as fiduciaries for the elderly [...].  Revised as directed by Court Clerk’s Letter of December 22, 2023:  [...]  Reading  Attorney for Defendants/Respondents, [...] and [...]
[brief] ¹  In Cardenas, the ¹Understanding that Cardenas is an unpublished decision, it is not offered to this Court as dispositive in the instant matter, but rather only as informative since the facts and issues before the Appellate Division in Cardenas are so similar to those presented here.  plaintiff [...] claimed to have fallen on a stretch of “uneven sidewalk” sustaining injuries to her ribs, back, and shoulders.  *Id.* at *1*.  The accident occurred in front of a home owned by the [...].  At the time of the accident, the home was vacant.
[brief] *Martindale*, 173 N.J. at 96; see also *Antonucci*, 470 N.J. Super. at 558–59 & n.1 (the parties agreed that the agreement to arbitrate “any and all disputes, claims or controversies arising out of or relating to . . . the employment relationship” put plaintiff on notice that he waived the right to a jury trial for any employment-related disputes).  Arbitration agreements governed by the FAA encompass discrimination and retaliation claims, such as those asserted under the LAD.  *See Circuit City Stores*, 532 U.S. at 123 (“The Court has been quite specific in holding that arbitration agreements can be enforced under the FAA without contravening the policies of congressional enactments giving employees specific protection against discrimination prohibited by federal law .
[brief] A true and correct excerpt from the oral argument is set forth below:  “Thank you, Your Honor.  I’ll just start out by touching on the fact that the opposition has repeatedly alleged that we preceded that [...] is [...]’s agent, but that’s simply a fiction.  We have repeated alleged that [...] is [...]’s co-conspirator, and the fact that [...] is [...]’s co-conspirator does not give way to the requisite privity between plaintiff and [...] for [...] to be able to enforce alleged contractual provision.
[brief] (T.1 at 127:11-128:11).  [...], further, was attuned to neighborhood concerns, so he personally brought many of its supplies from his [...] store and he provided a key to the bread deliverer so that bread, which was delivered very early in the morning, would not be sitting outside the door.  (T.1 at 127:11 – 128:11).  Most significantly, only the [...] both signed the complaint and testified.
[brief] Such a duty arises when there is pending or likely litigation between two parties, knowledge of this fact by the alleged spoliating party, evidence relevant to the litigation, and the foreseeability that the opposing party would be prejudiced by the destruction or disposal of the evidence.  Id.  First, the Guest Incident Report completed by the plaintiff’s son and signed by the plaintiff apprised [...] of the likelihood of litigation.  The Guest Incident Report described the plaintiff’s accident in general terms, advised that the plaintiff would seek medical attention for her injuries, and requested that the plaintiff be contacted by [...]’s insurance carrier.  On the other hand, the [...] Operations Incident Reporting Manual for completing an Incident Reports directs [...] employees to refrain from asking an injured guest if he or she wants a call from [...]’s insurance company or plans on contacting an attorney, which is intended to decrease the likelihood of litigation.  Second, [...] had knowledge of the likelihood of litigation because the Guest Incident Report was received by [...] on the same date that the plaintiff’s accident occurred.  In addition, by letter dated September 1, 2016, the plaintiff’s former attorney notified [...] that the plaintiff would be asserting a claim against [...] for her injuries sustained less than three weeks earlier on August 13, 2016.