ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] The Law and Bail Reform of the and impact shall reports 2018.  The completed by June 30, shall be report The second 30, 2017.  June including: statistics analysis of relevant compilation and include a each issued in complaint-summonses complaint-warrants and number of the Directive; this pursuant to county each county; and denied in applications granted complaint-warrant of number the in each county; and denied motions granted pretrial detention of number the each denied in county.
[brief] POINT IV.  DEFENDANTS WAIVED ANY OPPOSING ARGUMENTS AS TO THE ISSUES OF VOIDNESS UNDER THE NJCFLA AND DISCOVERY INTO ARBITRABILITY BY FAILING TO RESPOND TO POINTS III AND IV OF PLAINTIFF’S OPENING  BRIEF  Point III of Plaintiff’s opening Brief asserts that Defendants cannot enforce the arbitration provision of the [...] agreement because the Legislature declared contracts acquired in violation of the NJCFLA’s licensure provisions to be void.  See N.J.S.A. 17:11C-33(b).  Point IV of Plaintiff’s opening Brief argues that the trial court erred by granting Defendants’ Motion to Compel Arbitration without allowing discovery into the issue of arbitrability.  Because defendants failed to brief these arguments, they are waived.
[brief] The final case cited by Plaintiff, Boryszewski ex repl. Boryszewski v. Burke, 380 N.J. Super. 361 (App. Div. 2005), involves an automobile accident wherein the plaintiff was killed.  At issue was who was at fault as several manufacturing defects were involved which required expert testimony.  No testimony was excluded in Boryszewski from the jury, which was the issue on Appeal.  Id. at 370.  Similar to the remainder of Plaintiff’s arguments, this argument is without merit as no expert testimony was excluded.
[brief] Pursuant to the Tourism District Act, P.L. 2011, c. 18 (N.J.S.A. 5:12-218 et seq.), Respondent [...] is charged with jurisdiction over land use and planning within the established boundaries of the Tourism District in Atlantic City.  At issue in this appeal is the Authority’s denial of the development application filed by Appellant [...] for a retail cannabis dispensary proposed to be located in the Tourism District.  Based on the testimony and evidence presented over the course of two hearings on Appellant’s application, and for the reasons set forth in the Hearing Officer’s Report and Recommendation, the Authority properly denied Appellant’s application based on legitimate safety considerations.  Specifically, the Authority determined that the unconventional “backing maneuver” proposed by Appellant from a live lane of traffic along Atlantic Avenue to access the site was unsafe and inefficient.  The Authority further found that the proposed loading area’s location and dimensions were not practical or convenient.  While Appellant argues that the Authority was constrained to approve Appellant’s application because its proposed cannabis dispensary is a permitted use, the Authority had the discretion to factor on-site access and circulation considerations into its decision-making denying Appellant’s application.  Considering the record as a whole, and in light of the Authority’s unique knowledge and understanding of local conditions, the Authority’s decision is entitled to deference and should be affirmed.
[brief] ii.  There is No Conflict of Interest  Under RPC 1.10(a)  RPC 1.10(a) is equally inapplicable here because no concurrent conflict of interest exists pursuant to RPC 1.7(a).  There is nothing on this record to suggest that [...] is adverse to the [...], [...], [...], [...], and the individual defendants employed therein in this matter.  As the trial court correctly concluded, considering the named defendants, “it is clear that RPC 1.10(a) is inapplicable because no concurrent conflict of interest exists pursuant to RPC 1.7(a).  No defendant entities or individuals are part of the Office of the Attorney General that issued the indictment against [...] in his personal capacity. ” (T7-8).  Nevertheless, even assuming arguendo that [...] is prohibited from representing these clients due to a “personal interest” by virtue of the unrelated indictment, the plain language of RPC 1.10(a) is clear that [...] may continue the representation.  RPC 1.10(a) specifically provides that [...] may continue the representation provided that [...]’s “personal interest” “does not present a significant risk of materially limiting the representation of the client” by [...], [...], or the remaining lawyers in the firm.  For all of the reasons set forth above, [...]’s alleged “personal interest” presents no such risk.  Again, this is echoed by the Defendants-Respondents, who have not requested that [...] withdraw as their counsel in this consolidated matter.  (Pa169-81; Da7).
[brief] See, e.g., Marcellus v. Kern, 10 S.2d 73, 74-75 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cty. 1939) (ordinance stating that certain municipal employees “shall reside in the borough in which the district for which he was appointed was situated”); Appeal of Gagliardi, 163 A.2d 418, 420 (Pa. 1960) (ordinance stating that employees “shall reside in and be citizens of”); Civilian Personnel Div. v. Board of Police Com’rs, 914 S.W.2d 23, 24 (Mo. App. 1995) (rule required “such residency shall continue during tenure of service.  The residency requirements herein are expressly made a condition of continued employment. ”); City and County of Denver v. Industrial Comm’n of State of Colo., 666 P.2d 160, 162 (Co. App. Ct. 1983) (police officers “shall as a condition of their continued employment reside within the corporate boundaries.  . . .”); County of Shelby v. Tompkins, 241 S.W.2d 500, 505-10 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2007) (“All employees . . . shall continue to reside in said County as a condition of their employment.  . . .”). \footnote{Importantly, the residency requirement applied in each of these cases pertained only to paid employees, not to volunteers like Rutgers’ Board members.}
[brief] In re Estate of Dawson, 136 N.J. 1, 20-21 (1994) (internal quotations omitted); see also Pivnick v. Beck, 326 N.J. Super. 474 (App. Div. 1999); Ettin v. Ava Truck Leasing Inc., 53 N.J. 463 (1969).  The doctrine of issue preclusion ensures that “once an issue is actually and necessarily determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, that determination is conclusive in subsequent suits based on a different cause of action involving a party to the prior litigation. ”  Burlington North R. v. Hyundai Merchant Marine, 63 F.3d 1227, 1231 (1995) (citing Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153 (1979)).  Appellant tries to argue that the issue of legal liability for the environmental contamination has never been heard on the merits, and therefore the issue is not being relitigated.  At the center of this argument is their argument that the Court Orders only dealt with requests for injunctive relief and not the merits of any claims for civil damages.  However, the nature of the relief requested is irrelevant to the applicability of collateral estoppel (or res judicata), and the decision on the merits in Chancery Division matters is entitled to the same finality and effect as any other final judgment or order.  See In re Estate of Gabrellian, 372 N.J. Super. 432, 446-47 (App. Div. 2004).
[brief] Feigin, supra.  Appellant is not unmindful that a Notice of Claim is required under the TCA for claims against public entities and their employees.  Feinberg v. State, D.E.P., 137 N.J. 126, 134 (1994); N.J.S.A. 59:8-3.  However, as espoused above, Appellant’s Complaint was not filed pursuant to the TCA but as a Federal and Civil Rights action.  In other words, all the State claims alleged in Appellant’s complaint are “underlying wrongs” and “overt acts” bound together within two distinct conspiracies: The New Jersey’s common law Civil Conspiracy (Count VI) and New Jersey’s Civil Rights Conspiracy (Count X).
[brief] During closing argument, plaintiff's counsel used the time unit rule.  The time-unit rule, see R. 1:7-1(b), permits an attorney to "suggest to the trier of fact, with respect to any element of damages, that unliquidated damages be calculated on a time-unit basis without reference to a specific sum."  Plaintiff's counsel pointed out that plaintiff, then 26 years old, had a life expectancy of 55 years.  4T70.  Moreover, the jury was to award damages for what she went through at the scene, during the two weeks in the hospital and multiple surgeries, the five weeks in the in-patient rehabilitation center, the dozens and dozens of treatments and bandage changes for the open wounds on her legs; the grueling physical therapy to learn to walk again, the permanent pain and physical limitations she suffers every single day and last but no least having to live with these disfiguring scars when she is still so young.
[brief] [...] further argues that it was simply following procedures pursuant to the Eminent Domain Act, and that Plaintiff “faced no irreparable harm requiring --- \(^6\) Pursuant to the Local Redevelopment and Housing Law, N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-1, et seq. (the “LRHL”), a municipality must identify whether a redevelopment area designation shall authorize the town to use the power of condemnation under the LRHL or not authorize it to use the power of condemnation.  N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-6(a).  In the instant matter, Plaintiff has vigorously opposed the Planning Board’s determination that the Property meets the requirements for designation as a Condemnation Redevelopment Area and has proffered an expert report by [...], AICP/PP, LLA, LEED AP ND, the author of “The Redevelopment Handbook, A Guide for Rebuilding New Jersey’s Communities,” contesting as much.  [...] does not address Plaintiff’s objections in this appeal.
[brief] ”  Pb16 ([...] emphasis in original).  Insofar as [...] relied on summary judgment “findings” to justify a refusal to support an appeal challenging the legal propriety of those “findings” (see Pb14), [...]’s conduct on March 5, 2021 clearly breached its legal duty “to bring an appeal when there are reasonable grounds to believe that the insured’s interests might be served by an appeal. ”  Pharmacists, 187 Vt. at 334, 993 A.2d at 421.  [...] asserts that the facts in Pharmacists were different (Db22–23), but such differences are irrelevant to the legal standard that Pharmacists announced and applied.  As a matter of law, the Vermont Trial Court’s summary judgment “findings” did not extinguish [...]’s duty to defend the [...] on appeal if, as the record shows and [...] has not disputed, there were “reasonable grounds to believe that the insured’s interests might be served by an appeal. ”  Pharmacists, 187 Vt. at 334, 993 A.2d at 421.  As of March 5, 2021, the complaint in the [...] continued to allege “‘loss’ because of ‘wrongful acts’ to which this insurance applies” (Pa787); and the [...] accordingly continued to be a “suit” that [...] was contractually obligated to continue defending as of March 5, 2021.  [...]’s withdrawal of its defense of March 5, 2021 breached the duty to defend.
[brief] Farthing, is clear that the State may not use hearsay evidence that a psychiatrist relied upon as substantive evidence of guilt or innocence.  331 N.J. Super. At 78.  It is improper for a prosecutor in summation to refer to inadmissible evidence relied upon by a prosecution expert as if the evidence had been substantively admissible.  State v. Scherzer, 301 N.J. Super. 363, 442-444 (App Div. 1997).
[brief] ”  Opp. at 28.  While the parties may have briefed the issue of mutual assent or course of dealing in its post-Arbitration briefing, [...] cannot escape the fact that the Arbitrator did not base his ultimate decision on the parties’ course of dealing or any implicit agreement to waive the requirement for amendments to the PTA to be written.  The Trial Court made an error of both law and fact in its reasoning when confirming the Arbitrator’s EGP determinations, and [...] fails to address this error.
[brief] (Pa160-243).  Counsel asserted that (a) the case involved a “routine” breach of an automobile warranty; (b) plaintiff’s counsel’s request for an award of fees totaling $35,332.50 for 67.3 hours at $525 per hour was “incredible”; (c) the fees requested were outrageous because they were “five times” the amount of plaintiff’s damages award; and (d) based on the unpublished federal court opinions of Sullivan v. Chrysler Motors Corp. and Stitsworth v. Ford Motor Co.,\(^5\) the court’s discretion was broad enough that it could either eliminate or “greatly reduce” the fee award.  (Pa160-161; Pa170).  See Sullivan v. Chrysler Motors Corp., No. 94-5016, 1997, U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2503 (D.N.J. Feb. 28, 1997) (Pa232-242); Stitsworth v. Ford Motor Co., No. 95-5763, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1657 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 13, 1996); (Pa285-289).  On March 28, 2023, plaintiff’s counsel filed a 41-page Reply Brief and Certification with six (6) exhibits, in which he briefed and presented evidence --- \(^5\)  Under Rule 1:36-3, these unpublished opinions do not constitute precedent and are not binding upon any New Jersey court.  The Rule also requires attorneys who cite to unpublished opinions “to serve the court and all other parties” with “a copy of the opinion. ”  Defendant violates this rule with the Stitsworth opinion.  (Pa160-243).  countering defendant’s opposing arguments.  (Pa243-284).  In his Reply Brief, plaintiff’s counsel made and briefed the following arguments:  (a) defendant’s OOJ, *inter alia*, violated Rule 4:58-3(c)(4) as its “allowance” was so small that it violated the fee-shifting provision of the MMWA and its underlying public policy of providing equal access to the courts; (b) defendant’s argument that plaintiff’s counsel’s fees should be eliminated to nothing violated the parties’ settlement agreement; (c) the hours expended by plaintiff’s counsel were reasonable due to the complexity of the case and defendant’s strategic refusals to pay plaintiff’s reasonable counsel fees under the MMWA’s fee shifting provision; (d) the unpublished Sullivan case is outdated, is not binding on New Jersey courts and is not based on New Jersey law; and (e) his $525 hourly rate is based on prevailing rates in Essex County and was supported by certifications of attorneys who practice in consumer protection.  (Pa244-251).  **Trial Court’s Ruling**
[brief] The trial court stated:  ... the first question that the Court must ask itself based upon the argument and the briefs and what's been presented as -- did the Court base -- make a decision based upon incorrect or irrational basis.  I find that I didn't do that...  The second question that's looked at is did the Court not consider or fail to appreciate the significance of probative, competent evidence.  Within that probative, competent evidence certainly I find that the decision of July 5th of 2022 predating my decision date could have some relevance.  That was not brought up at the October hearing, but certainly was brought to me today in that particular matter.  Likewise it is regarding a search in regards to the city of ... [...].  And I felt that [...] accurately reflected what was in that particular decision.  (2T20-4 to 21-2).  The trial court distinguished the Goldsmith case which:
[brief] Date Submitted: May 30, 2024  [...]  Solicitor General  [...]  [...]  Assistant Attorneys General Of Counsel and On the Brief  [...] (Attorney ID No. 441912023)  [...] (Attorney ID No. 297432019)  [...] (Attorney ID No. 281382018)  [...] (Attorney ID No. 440472023)  [...] (Attorney ID No. 335512021)  [...] (Attorney ID No. 324172020)  [...] (Attorney ID No. 405942022)  Deputy Attorneys General  On the Brief [...]  ATTORNEY GENERAL OF NEW JERSEY [...]  [...] [...]  [...]  Attorney for Plaintiffs-Respondents
[brief] In that case, plaintiff was leaning over the hood of a parked car when another car hit a pothole in the street, causing its passenger side door to swing open and strike the plaintiff.  Id. at 399.  The record showed that the pothole ran across much of the street and affidavits were submitted by residents attesting to calls made to the city, at least one year prior to the incident, regarding this very pothole.  *Id.* at 400.  Plaintiff’s citation to the record fails to leave out the final part of the Court’s holding.  In its totality, the Court held:
[brief] [...] asserts that he would have never taken any plea deal had the lower trial court not admitted illegally obtained evidence from an unrelated case of an unlawful search and seizure into [...] murder trial, that the State only were using to bolster its case.  At the SOA hearing the appeals court stated: “Where do we go next?”  [...] asserts that should be afforded to [...] to be able to make the decision of, where does he go from here (Da 82, lines 16-20).  [...] can decide several directions to go in:
[directive] ATTORNEY GENERAL ADMINISTRATIVE DIRECTIVE 2005-2 ESTABLISHING AN OFFICIAL STATEWIDE POLICY REQUIRING ADOPTION OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMPUTER CRIME TASK FORCE it is necessary and appropriate for the State of New Jersey to WHEREAS, maximize its criminal justice resources and expertise by developing state-of-the- art technology and cutting-edge training to enhance our ability to combat the constantly evolving manifestations of high technology and computer crime; there are numerous units within the Department of Law and WHEREAS, Public Safety performing criminal law enforcement functions under the auspices of the Attorney General with experience and expertise in dealing with issues related to high technology and computer crime, including the Computer Analysis and Technology Unit (CATU) of the Division of Criminal Justice, the Division of State Police Digital Technology Investigations Unit (DTIU) and the Division of State Police Cyber Crimes Unit (CCU); the Attorney General is empowered to implement administrative WHEREAS, strategies and organizational planning to enhance and assure the highest level of proficiency in the performance of law enforcement functions to safeguard the public, and is required, consistent with N.J.S.A. 52: 178-4, to ensure that the Department of Law and Public Safety conducts its work in an efficient manner so as to avoid and/ or eliminate overlapping and duplicative functions; in light of the diverse resources situated within the Department WHEREAS, of Law and Public Safety which are currently utilized to perform functions related to the detection, investigation and prosecution of high technology and computer crime, it is prudent to establish a more integrated, cohesive and centralized unit to streamline law enforcement efforts to protect against the insidious illicit activities of cyber criminals who utilize technology to victimize the citizens of New Jersey; I, [...], Attorney General of the State of New NOW, THEREFORE, Jersey, do hereby the following:
[brief] Plaintiff filed its disclosure statement mandated by R. 4:103, 104.  [...] was listed as a witness as to liability and damages in detail.  Ultimately, [...] moved for summary judgment.  It argued that [...] needed an expert to prove [...]’s liability.  [...] argued he has full knowledge about [...]’s error.  He could prove the liability by showing the jury the old and new site plan and explain what occurred.  The Court rejected plaintiff’s right to testify as to the facts known by him.  The Court dismissed the plaintiff’s Complaint for failure to have “an expert. ”  [...] contends that no expert testimony is required on liability.  [...] was capable of giving all the testimony needed to show clear liability on the part of [...].  The egregious error was easily understandable through his testimony.  The municipality’s refusal to issue Certificates of Occupancy until the approved plans were amended and approved shows [...]’s liability.  [...]’ testimony would came in as lay testimony or as his expertise in construction.
[brief] CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE HAS NEVER BEEN A BAR WHERE IT IS CREDIBLY ALLEGED THE RAILROAD OPERATOR COULD HAVE AVOIDED THE COLLISION  Interpretation of (b)(5) to bar recovery here is not only at odds with the Act’s language, but also decades of railroad case law.  Neither the Act’s immunities nor contributory negligence generally have attached in circumstances where it is credibly alleged an operator is liable for their failure to avoid the imminent collision.  Our Supreme Court extensively outlined the confines of an operator’s duty in *Jelinek v. Sotak*, 9 N.J. 19, 22-24 (1952), boundaries the instant circumstances fall well-within.  In *Jelinek*, the Court recognized a railroad’s duty “to use reasonable care to so operate the train as it approaches a grade crossing with due regard to its right of way, as to protect travelers” extended “[e]ven as to those who in disregard of due care may attempt to cross the tracks in the face of an oncoming train or to one whose vehicle may be stalled or stopped on the tracks[.]”  *Id.* at 23.  In support of this position, the Court cited to *Webb v. W. Jersey and Seashore R.R. Co.*, 100 N.J.L. 204 (1924), an earlier decision evidencing the traditional leeway shown toward a pedestrian at a crossing.  There, the plaintiff was struck when she drove her car onto a railroad crossing out of the belief the train she saw nearby was stationary rather than, as it was, continually in motion toward her, bells ringing, with two brakemen hollering at her to stop.  *Id.* at 205.  As opposed to the draconian bar applied by the trial court to [...]’s crossing, our Court was willing to indulge all manner of factual questions to avoid outright barring the plaintiff’s recovery.  *Id.* at 207.  For example, the Court held it was for a jury to determine, among other questions, whether [the plaintiff] was careless in not appreciating that the ringing of the bell was an indication that the train was backing down towards the crossing, or in failing to understand that the brakeman in hollowing while standing on the rear of the train were attempting to warn her of approaching danger.  [Ibid.]  Historically, these indulgences were not just applied to those using the crossing perfectly as intended, but to others as well.  For example, in *Hendrickson v. W. Jersey and Seashore R.R. Co.*, 102 N.J.L. 310, 312 (1926), the plaintiff’s claims were not barred despite the fact he was using the railroad crossing to perform a U-Turn in his vehicle rather than to make his way across the tracks.  The Court rejected the railroad’s argument the plaintiff was not entitled to protections on this basis, holding the railroad owed him the same duty it owed to any other highway traveler at the crossing.  *Id.* at 312-13.  Looking beyond the Act’s text to its historical context, there is simply no basis to expansively read (b)(5) to provide an immunity never before conferred upon railroads.  As [...] will conclude in Point III, neither the Legislature’s own words or judicial interpretation of the Act’s 1998 amendment reflect any intention to expand the Act’s immunities.
[brief] 27, 43, 444, 45  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT  Plaintiff appeals the grant of summary judgment.  On January 20, 2022, Plaintiff [...] (“Plaintiff”) filed an order to show cause (“OTSC”) and Verified Complaint in Lieu of Prerogative Writs (the “Verified Complaint”) seeking to enjoin the [...] (“Borough”) from proceeding with public business because its annual Reorganization Meeting of January 11, 2022, a special meeting, was held in violation of the Open Public Meetings Act, N.J.S.A. 10:4-6, et seq.  (“OPMA”).  The challenge was based on the Borough prefacing its notice of the meeting sent to its official newspapers with an instruction that the notice was “FOR YOUR RECORD ONLY. ”  The notice also violated other OPMA requirements.  Notice was never published.  Defective special meeting notices, most containing the same directive not to publish, also infected special meetings held by the Planning Board and Governing Body in amending the [...] Redevelopment Plan (the “Redevelopment Plan”) by Ordinance No. 1423-21, adopted on December 28, 2021.  The OPMA violations were compounded by the Borough’s substantive and procedural violations of the Local Redevelopment and Housing Law, N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-1, et seq. (“LRHL”), and its failure to follow the requirements for adopting ordinances set forth in N.J.S.A. 40:49-2.