[brief] The purportedly offending summation segment was as follows:  It becomes clear that even though there’s an acceptance of the fault of the acts, there’s clearly not a full acceptance of the responsibility of what happened that night and what happened to [...] and what he faces for his future.  So, finally we’re here, and finally it’s going to be given to you folks where you can impose the responsibility that’s legally required based upon the evidence of the case.  That what’s going on now.  3T19:14-22.  The argument made did not insinuate in any way that the defense was acting in bad faith.  The defendant did not object, nor did he seek a curative charge.  Counsel is given broad latitude in summing up, and, counsel’s failure to object certainly indicates that the argument was not considered prejudicial at the time.  *Fertile v. St. Michael’s Med. Center*, 169 NJ 481, 495 (2001).  The trial court correctly denied the motion for a new trial.  Specifically, the trial court noted that the statement that the jury should “impose responsibility” was not improper, stating that:  Def atty: ...And he told the jury to impose responsibility upon the Defendant.  First off, imposing responsibility or inferring to the jury to punish the defendant is just wrong.  It’s against the golden rule.  Court: Well, no.  Holding someone responsible for negligent acts is not punishment.  The jury charge is clear on that.  People are required to be - - operate within essentially the standard of care.  Either they are, and such a departure from what a reasonable person would do under those circumstances or a failure to act when they should have acted.  That is part of the jury charge, that’s the jury charge this jury received.  They understand that you do not have to have an evil heart in order to be held responsible and negligent in action.  I told them [that].  They understood that.  And I’m satisfied that that’s appropriate.  …  4T16:23 – 4T17:15.  The defendant points to *Geler v. Akawie*, 358 NJ Super 437 (App. Div. 2003), in support of its position.  Even a cursory review of the *Geler* case shows how different it is from the present matter.  The pervasive continuous and egregious comments by Plaintiff’s counsel during the trial and during summations that warranted a new trial in *Geler* are not similar in any way to this case.  The Appellate Division on numerous occasions in *Geler* noted the extreme and outrageous nature of counsel’s statements, such as counsel asking the jury to put themselves into the position of the Plaintiff’s parents who lost their child and had to bury him, counsel’s comments about placing dirt on the child’s grave, and what it would be like to have to do that to your own child.  These comments were extreme, outrageous and pervasive throughout the entire trial warranting multiple objections and grounds for a new trial.  *Geler* at 465.  Clearly, the present case is completely dissimilar to the *Geler* case, which, therefore, has no bearing in the analysis of this matter.  Instead, the argument was appropriate, and, even if deemed inappropriate, the argument was harmless given the lack of objection and appropriate jury instruction concerning the law on compensation.  3T59:8 – 3T63:25.  Therefore, the trial court’s denial of the motion for a new trial should be upheld.  **POINT VI: PLAINTIFF’S TESTIMONY WAS PROPER AND DOES NOT WARRANT A NEW TRIAL.**