ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] On December 18, 2020, Elizabeth Police Officer [...] was working as a patrolman and assigned to “12 Post,” which included Newark Avenue and Fairmont Avenue.  (1T6-9 to 8-11).  At approximately 11:02 p.m., Officer Maldonado was patrolling the area with his partner [...], who was driving their patrol car.  (1T8-14 to 19; 1T10-12).  As they approached the intersection of Newark and Fairmont Avenue, their attention was drawn to a white Toyota with heavily tinted windows that was at the Shell gas station.  (1T8-25 to 9-3; 1T9-23 to 25).  The officers did not interact with the vehicle, but instead continued to patrol the area.  (1T9-20).  Eventually, the officers observed the Toyota again, and they drove behind it.  (1T9-20 to 22).  The officers then ran the license plate for the vehicle and discovered there may have been an active warrant for the registered owner of the vehicle, [...] (1T10-4 to 6; 1T11-5 to 13).  Wanting to investigate whether the operator of the Toyota was the registered owner, the officers activated the lights and sirens of their patrol vehicle and conducted a motor vehicle stop.
[brief] City of Trenton v. Lenzner, 16 N.J. 465, 476, 109 A.2d 409 (1954)  .........................  5  In the Matter of the Trust of Violet Nelson, 454 N.J. Super. 151 (App. Div. 2018)  .......................  11, 13 Matter of Estate of Baker, 297 N.J. Super. 203, 212–13 (App. Div. 1997)  ...............  11 Michaels v. Brookchester, Inc., 26 N.J. 379, 387–88, 140 A.2d 199 (1958)  ....................  11  Oscar v. Simeonidis, 352 N.J. Super. 476, 487-88 (App. Div. 2002)  ............... 5 Tagayun v. AmeriChoice of N.J., Inc., 446 N.J. Super. 570, 577 (App. Div. 2016) ..................  14 STATUTES
[directive] II.  GUIDELINES FOR THE SEIZURE OF WEAPONS FROM A LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER INVOLVED IN A DOMESTIC VIOLENCE INCIDENT  A.  Whenever an act of domestic violence as defined in 2C:25-19 N.J.S.A. has been alleged to have been committed by a law enforcement officer all weapons, department issued and personal, possessed by that officer shall immediately be 1.  Seized by the law enforcement officer responding to the domestic violence call if the responding officer reasonably believes that the presence of weapons would expose the victim to a risk of serious bodily injury, or 2.  Surrendered by the officer involved when served with a domestic violence restraining order, search warrant or bail condition which requires the surrender of weapons.  B.  Whenever an act of domestic violence as defined in 2C:25-19 N.J.S.A. has been alleged to have been committed by a law enforcement officer resulting in the seizure of the officer’s weapons, or the officer has been served with a domestic violence restraining order or a domestic violence warrant for the seizure of weapons or there is a bail condition which requires the surrender of weapons, the officer must:  1.  Immediately report that fact to the officer’s departmental supervisor who must promptly notify the Prosecutor’s Office in the county where the officer is employed.  2.  Voluntarily surrender all weapons to the law enforcement officer responding to the domestic violence call or in response to a requirement in a domestic violence restraining order or a domestic violence warrant for the seizure of weapons or in a bail condition.  C.  Where weapons have been seized from an officer, a report shall immediately be made to the arresting officer’s departmental supervisor who must notify the prosecutor’s office in the county where the charge had been filed.  III.
[brief] Da65 Order Denying Plaintiffs’ Motion for Leave to Amend the Complaint (7/14/21)  Da549 Order Denying Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment and Plaintiffs’ Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment (12/14/21)  Da1096  Order Denying Defendant’s Motion for Reconsideration and Partially Granting Plaintiffs’ Motion for Reconsideration (3/14/22)  Da1101  Pretrial Order (8/11/22)  Da1134  Order Denying Defendant’s Motion for Involuntary Dismissal (9/29/22)  Da1144  Order Denying Plaintiffs’ Motion for Directed Verdict (9/30/22)  Da1146  Order Voiding Plaintiffs’ Timeshare Contracts (10/11/22)  Da1225  Order Vacating the Award of Damages Under the RETA (10/26/22)  Da1352  Order Denying Defendant’s Motion to Stay Execution of Final Judgment (12/23/22)  Da1357  Order and MOD Granting Plaintiffs’ Attorneys’ Fees and Costs (2/1/23)  Da1381  Consent Order Staying Final Judgment (3/31/23)  Da1409  Order Granting Plaintiffs’ Motion for Reconsideration Regarding Attorneys’ Fees and Costs (4/17/23)  Da1411  Order Entering Final Judgment (5/19/23)  Da1421 Order Vacating Consent Order and Staying Execution of Final Judgment (7/27/23)  Da1430 TABLE OF TRANSCRIPTS
[brief] But we have a new officer for sure, but it’s clear from how he presents himself on the video and on the stand that he is very knowledgeable.  That he does understand how to demonstrate the tests to the defendant.  That he gives him the time and the ability to complete those tests.  And gives us the ability to look at the results and be clear, beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is in fact intoxicated.  So while I do agree that case would, case law should say that a new officer, you need to take that into consideration, their lack of training, their lack of ability, I’ve taken that into consideration.  The officer did everything as a well-seasoned officer would have done, as I’ve seen thousands and thousands of times.  So with that said, I find defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
[brief] Legal Argument – Point 2 -  No probable Cause and proof beyond a reasonable doubt  4T:34-(14-20), [5T:8-(19-25), 5T:9-(1-4), 5T:9-(8-15), 5T:11-(16-21), 5T:6-(14-16)  State v. Cummings, 184 N.J. 84, 93 (N.J. 2005) ("The municipal court shall determine by a preponderance of the evidence *Proof beyond a reasonable doubt* [Edited to reflect the new statute determined by the supreme judges in this case to be effective with "pipeline retroactivity] whether the arresting officer had probable cause to believe that the person had been driving or was in actual physical control of a motor vehicle on the public highways or quasi-public areas of this State while the person was under the influence of intoxicating liquor or a narcotic, hallucinogenic, or habit-producing drug or marijuana; whether the person was placed under arrest, if appropriate, and whether he refused to submit to the test upon request of the officer; and if these elements of the violation are not established, no conviction shall issue. ”)  So, what exactly did the judge find as proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the officer had probable cause to believe I drank liquor to the point that my mental faculties and physical capabilities was substantially diminished and deteriorated?
[brief] Hence, any state-law claim that [...] should have provided a warning about the recall issue not authorized by FDA is preempted.  *R.F. v. Abbott Labs.*, 162 N.J. 596, 618-26 (2000), held such failure-to-warn claims are preempted where FDA regulations/decisions comprehensively govern the matter.  Plaintiff’s assertion that *R.F.* rejected preemption is based misleadingly on her cite to the decision’s *dissent*.  (Opp 30)  Plaintiff tries to get around this law by arguing her claim does not pertain to “communications related to recalls. ”  (Opp 30)  Tellingly, this argument is followed by zero record citations or legal authority.  It also ignores the true facts of this case (OB 5-7), where [...] followed up over 20 times with FDA seeking approval before FDA finally provided changes to and authorized [...] to send a recall communication that Plaintiff claims, under state law, it should have sent earlier.  Plaintiff’s argument also ignores the uncontested record.  The sole regulatory expert in this case, [...], and the [...] employee in charge of recalls, [...], both explained that any communication about the silicone particulate issue would constitute a recall action subject to the recall regulations and guidance (OB 6, 20-22)—not the separate regulations Plaintiff cites regarding Dear Health Care Provider ("DHCP") letters that allow voluntary communications outside the recall context. \(^3\)  Given this undisputed record, Plaintiff’s argument is disingenuous if not misleading. \(^4\)  **III.
[brief] [...] (2019)  LSD Law Oxford University Press ..................................  10  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT  This case involves a dispute between former spouses over the meaning of the word “sale” as it relates to a property owned by the Husband’s family, the terms for the division of which is set forth in the parties’ Property Settlement Agreement prepared by the Wife’s attorney, executed by the parties and made part of the Final Judgment in Divorce in 2009.
[brief] The Board made no findings of fact before granting the approval of the Application.  The testimony of [...] and [...] went without cross examination.  [...] presented no expert witnesses.  [...] did not testify in response to the testimony of [...] or [...].  In granting the Approval the Board made no reference to the goals and objective of the Township’s 2004 Master Plan.  (Pa33-35)  The Master Plan requires that: “Planning must be comprehensive in nature and direct the coordinated, efficient and orderly development of [...] based on an analysis of present and future needs, and the promotion of the public health, safety and general welfare. ”  (Pa34, Section A.1).  The goals of the Master Plan are to: 1.  “Encourage a pattern of compact and contiguous growth within appropriate areas of the Township”; 2.  “Direct growth to areas where infrastructure capacity is currently available or committed to be available in the future”; 3.  “Guide future development and community facilities to meet the needs of the residents of the Township, while ensuring that new development is compatible with existing development without degrading the Township’s cultural and natural resources. ”  4.  “Preserve the Township’s natural and cultural resources that contribute to both the positive image and overall strength of the Township”; 5.  “Recognize that open space preservation must become the responsibility of the Township, and that the agricultural community alone will not be able to continue to ensure that open space will remain in the Township forever: 6.  “Eliminate the potential for conflicts among dissimilar land uses” (Emphasis added); and 7.  “Prevent development in sensitive environmental areas. ” (Pa35, Sections i, ii, v, vi, xiv).  The Board’s action in the grant of the Application did nothing in recognition of the above standards and flies in the face of good planning.
[brief] (Da 20).  The Court further ruled that the Board’s calculation of [...]’s equity in the Unit as $24,675 was arbitrary and capricious:  …the Board began its analysis of this issue with their own rent control ordinance which states, in relevant part that equity is “[t]he actual cash contribution of the purchaser at the time of closing of title and any principal payments to outstanding mortgages. ”  It is undisputed that the purchase price was $525,000.00.  It is also undisputed that the entire building was renovated at a cost of approximately $1,000,000.00.  There is no mortgage on the property.  There was a reassessment which resulted in an assessed value of $404,600.  The [...] unit appears to represent 10.76% of the entire building space.  A strict reading of the ordinance then would limit the inquiry to the actual cash contribution by [...].
[brief] Pa160  Full Board Notification of Decision, dated May 22, 2023 ...............................Pa161  Correspondence from Parole Board to [...] regarding transcript of your hearing on May 15, 2023, dated July 18, 2023 .................................................................Pa163  Administrative Appeal, dated October 4, 2023 ...............................................Pa164  Correspondence from Parole Board to [...] regarding Reldan’s Administrative Appeal, dated October 6, 2023 .................................Pa180  Supplemental Administrative Appeal, dated October 18, 2023 ......................Pa181  Correspondence from Parole Board to [...] regarding the Supplemental Administrative Appeal, dated October 20, 2023 .........................................................Pa198  Out of Time Referral - Appeal of May 15, 2023, Parole Denial, un-dated.................................................................Pa199  Decision Sheet, dated October 25, 2023 .........................................................Pa200  Correspondence from [...] to Parole Board regarding the Administrative Appeal, dated January 24, 2024........Pa201  Correspondence from Parole Board to [...]  regarding the Administrative Appeal, dated January 31, 2024........Pa202  Full Board Notice of Decision, dated May 15, 2023, Amended February 28, 2024 ..................................................Pa203  Decision Sheet, dated February 28, 2024 ........................................Pa204  Notice of Final Agency Decision, dated February 28, 2024......................Pa205  CONFIDENTIAL INDEX OF APPENDIX
[brief] THE SHERIFF’S NOTICES OF SALE DID NOT STATE THE APPROXIMATE AMOUNT OF PLAINTIFF’S JUDGMENT (Da188; T27-5 to 28-4)  .............................................................................................................  19  III.  THE REQUIREMENT IN THE SECOND STAY PENDING THE FILING OF DEFENDANTS’ APPEAL ORDER THAT THE [...] POST A SUPERSEDEAS BOND IN ONE BUSINESS DAY WAS MANIFESTLY UNREASONABLE (Da210)
[brief] There are many issues of fact with regard to breaches of contract . . . but with regard to damages, we have a bunch of checks that bear no relation to anything whatsoever.  None.  I scoured, scoured the deposition transcripts, line by line, to find something that would create an issue of fact . . . to what these checks were for.  . . . . . .  The fact is that, they have not one shred, not one shred, of documentation showing what these checks are for.  Not one.  Not one.  If I had one email, one packing slip, . . . someone who was on the ship . . . who drove the truck or . . . took the supplies in . . . got a delivery . . . and it was Schedule 40 piping and I got it.  . . .  We have nothing.  (1T57:16-25; 2T587-14)
[brief] (1T; 2T; 3T; 4T; 6T; 7T; 8T).  [...] and [...]’s testimony focused, in part, on calculating restitution, disgorgement, and civil monetary penalties.  (6T; 7T; 8T).  [...] testified that defendants offered and sold a total of at least $16,187,651 in unregistered securities to sixty-nine investors.  (6T132:7-20).  [...] also testified that he calculated repayments to investors totaling $1,026,000; when he subtracted that from the amount raised from investors, $15,161,043 remained outstanding and owed to investors.  (5T132:21-135:2).  [...] explained, however, that investors were partially repaid with funds [...]’s entities received through PPP and EIDL loans.  (6T138:18-6T148:6; Pa1899-Pa1900).  [...] also testified that defendants transferred $1,500,000 of investor funds to [...]’s bank accounts at [...] between 2016 and 2018, when the [...] bank accounts were closed, and provided examples of how some of these funds were commingled with other funds and misspent at auto actions and on transfers to [...]’s brother.  (7T19:19-27:6; 7T104:24-106:15; Pa564-Pa612).  For example, [...] testified that the misuse of investor funds included over $400,000 in cash withdrawals, spending approximately $250,000 at auto auctions, using at least $250,000 to pay creditors including merchant cash advance companies, and transferring money to or withdrawing money for [...]’s brother.  (7T19:19-27:6; 7T104:24-106:15).  Defendant-Respondents’ expert [...] offered a damage calculation that matched [...]’s with one exception.  [...] reduced investors’ losses by subtracting purportedly legitimate business expenses.  (Pa81; 8T94:3-94:13).  [...] admitted however, that since defendants’ had commingled funds from investors with funds from other sources, it was difficult, if not impossible, to verify whether the business expenses were legitimate and to identify the source of funds used to pay them.  (8T106:8-107:4).  Following that hearing, the court entered the August 16 Order in favor of the Bureau: (1) permanently enjoining and restraining Owusu A. [...], [...], and [...] from engaging in certain conduct defined in the Securities Law;3 (2) ordering defendants [...] and [...] to pay $15,161,043 as restitution for investors; (3) assessing civil monetary penalties of $1,050,000 against defendant [...] based on his 753 combined violations of the Securities Law; and (4) assessing civil monetary penalties of $1,050,000 against defendant [...] based on its 753 combined violations of the Securities Law.4 (Pa64-Pa66).
[brief] ARGUMENT  The State has not satisfied its burden of demonstrating the preliminary injunction factors by “clear and convincing[]” evidence.  *Waste Mgmt. of New Jersey, Inc. v. Union Cnty. Util. Auth.*, 399 N.J. Super. 508, 519–20 (App. Div. 2008) (setting forth preliminary injunction factors).  I.  THE STATE IS NOT LIKELY TO SUCCEED ON THE MERITS  Below, the court concluded that the Parental Notification Policy violated New Jersey law, and it enjoined that Policy and required the District to reinstate the Parental Secrecy Policy.  This was error.  Under the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution, parents’ federal constitutional rights trump any other state-law rights that might be at issue.  *Montgomery v. Louisiana*, 577 U.S. 190, 205 (2016), *as revised* (Jan. 27, 2016).  Moreover, it is black-letter law that a state-court injunction may not violate federal constitutional rights.  *Horizon Health Center v. Felicissimo*, 135 N.J. 126, 148–49 (1994) (modifying injunction that “impermissibly exceeds [federal constitutional] standards”); see also *N.A.A.C.P. v. Claiborne Hardware Co.*, 458 U.S. 886, 916 n.51 (1982) (noting that in a “civil lawsuit between private parties,” the “application of state rules of law by . . . state courts in a manner alleged to restrict [constitutional] freedoms constitutes ‘state action’ under the Fourteenth Amendment” (quoting *New York Times Co. v. Sullivan*, 376 U.S. 254, 265 (1964))).  Here, for the reasons set forth below, the lower court’s injunction, which requires the District to reinstate the Parental Secrecy Policy, violates the federal constitutional rights of parents in the District.  Thus, this Court should reverse.
[brief] **DEFENDANTS’ CONDITION PRECEDENT ARGUMENT IS UNSUPPORTED BY THE FACTS AND THE LAW (5T61:5 to 70:9)**  The second issue raised by Defendants on cross-appeal, which Defendants preface as an alternative argument “[i]n the event that the Appellate Court reverses the Trial Court’s decision,” is that an unfulfilled condition precedent in the PSA renders the PSA unenforceable.  *(See Db45-47.)*  Although it is not entirely clear from Defendants’ Brief, Plaintiff presumes that Defendants’ cross-appeal is directed at the trial court’s denial of Defendants’ motion for an involuntary dismissal under *Rule* 4:37-2(b).  *(See 5T61:5 to 70:9.)*  Defendants now raise the issue again, this time prefacing it as an alternative argument “[i]n the event that the Appellate Court reverses the Trial Court’s decision. ”  *(Db46.)*  Defendants’ argument is incoherent, riddled with misstatements of law and unsupported legal and factual assertions, and, yet again, attempts to introduce purported facts that are both false and not contained anywhere in the record.  Accordingly, the Court should affirm the trial court’s denial of Defendants’ motion for dismissal under *Rule* 4:37-2(b).
[brief] The State further argues that [...]’ testimony would be “cumulative, at best” (Sb17), but this argument overlooks that Defendant could not cross-examine the video as to the scoring factors.  Nor could Defendant cross-examine [...] as to the scoring factors.  (1T62:1-63:12.)  Thus, Defendant was deprived of essential evidence that could have been used to defend himself.  The State also argues that the Clawans adverse inference is disfavored under State v. Hill, 199 N.J. 545, 566 (2009) while ignoring Defendant’s argument in the opening appellate brief.
[brief] In or about October 2021, the Parties first contacted each other to discuss scheduling negotiations sessions for a successor to the 2019-2022 CNA.  In the two years after the ratification of the 2019-2022 CNA, the Parties had not discussed the scope of the [...] Bargaining Council’s involvement in future CNA negotiations.  (Pa067).  The Parties tentatively scheduled the first negotiations session for November 10, 2021.  (Pa067).  On or around October 28, 2021, [...] negotiations chair [...] informed then-Board negotiations chair [...] that the [...] again sought the Bargaining Council’s involvement at the negotiations sessions.  (Pa067).  As documented in an October 28, 2021 Board email, the Association suggested reserving a room which could hold the Bargaining Council members.  (Pa074-Pa075).  Fallon, though, objected to the Bargaining Council’s presence at the negotiations sessions.  (Pa067).  Upon receipt of this objection, Gangluff explained in an October 29, 2021 email:  Regarding the Bargaining Council, they are a part of our Negotiations Committee.  All [...] members have a right to attend the meetings as part of this council.  (Pa074).  In response to Fallon’s reply that the Board felt that the Bargaining Council’s presence was meant to intimidate the Board members, Gangluff emailed back that the Bargaining Council’s purpose was not meant to intimidate the Board.  Rather, Gangluff pointed to the [...]’s successful use of the Bargaining Council during the negotiations for the 2019-2022 CNA.  (Pa073-Pa074).  On November 9, 2021, Fallon presented a proposed ground rule on behalf of the Board in which the Board proposed prohibiting the Bargaining Council from participating in the upcoming negotiation sessions.  (Pa067); (Pa079).  In response, Gangluff reiterated the [...]’s position that its Bargaining Council was part of the [...]’s negotiation team.  Gangluff added that the [...] had reserved the South Auditorium for the scheduled negotiation session, a room which could hold the Bargaining Council.  (Pa079).  Fallon replied that the Board believed that the Bargaining Council’s presence would frustrate the bargaining process.  Gangluff then retorted that the [...] disagreed since the Parties had been able to negotiate the 2019-2022 CNA with the Bargaining Council’s involvement.  (Pa078).  Because the Parties could not agree on whether to allow the Association’s Bargaining Council members to attend the scheduled meeting, the Parties postponed the scheduled November 10, 2021 negotiations session to allow them to further discuss the Bargaining Council.
[directive] Internal affairs personnel shall maintain a filing system accessible only to unit personnel and the law enforcement executive.  Other personnel may be given access based on a specific need, such as a deputy chief in the law enforcement executive's absence.  Access to these records must be specifically addressed with agency policy and procedures.  The list of those authorized to access these files must be kept to a minimum.  9.5.2  Physical security measures also should be taken, such as using securely locked filing cabinets in secured offices.  If a law enforcement agency uses computers to maintain internal affairs records of any kind, special security measures must be taken.  A stand-alone personal computer is the most secure system to limit unauthorized access to internal affairs records.  If a stand-alone computer is not feasible, reasonable measures, including the use of fire walls and/or password protected software, should be utilized to control access to investigative files and related materials.  9.6