ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] [...] passed away on April 13, 2020.  On April 23, 2020, the [...] filed an Order to Show Cause and Complaint on behalf of [...], mother of the decedent, requesting that she be appointed Administratrix of her son [...]'s estate (107-A).  On April 24, 2020, [...] filed a Cross-Complaint and Order to Show Cause on behalf of [...], the wife of the deceased, requesting that she be appointed Administratrix.  (159-A)  The Honorable [...], P.J.Ch. held an emergent hearing via Zoom on April 24, 2020.  The parties reached an agreement regarding how funeral arrangements would be handled, including the transportation of wife and a companion, and the recognition of [...] as the lawful spouse in any program, obituary, or written document.  (74-A)  Thereafter, hearings were held on the following dates: April 24, 2020¹, August 14, 2020², October 22, 2020³, November 20, 2020⁴, April 5, 2021⁵, April 15, 2021⁶, April 19, 2021⁷, April 22, 2021⁸, April 27, 2021⁹, ¹ 1T- April 24, 2020  Transcript ² 2T- August 14, 2020  Transcript ³ 3T- October 22, 2020  Transcript ⁴ 4T- November 20, 2020  Transcript ⁵ 5T- April 5, 2021  Transcript ⁶ 6T- April 15, 2021  Transcript ⁷ 7T- April 19, 2021  Transcript ⁸ 8T- April 22, 2021  Transcript ⁹ 9T- April 27, 2021  Transcript  May 12, 2021\textsuperscript{10}, May 18, 2021\textsuperscript{11}, May 21, 2021\textsuperscript{12}, July 30, 2021\textsuperscript{13}, August 10, 2021\textsuperscript{14}, October 29, 2021\textsuperscript{15}, November 16, 2021\textsuperscript{16}, February 7, 2022\textsuperscript{17}, February 11, 2022\textsuperscript{18}, April 4, 2022\textsuperscript{19}, April 20, 2022\textsuperscript{20}, April 28, 2022\textsuperscript{21}, October 28, 2022\textsuperscript{22}.  Numerous Court Orders were issued before and after the above proceedings.  In an effort to provide clarity, eliminate duplication, and condense this filing, this counsel respectfully requests permission to continue the presentation of Court Orders and transcripts pertaining to this matter in the Statement of Facts and arguments herein.  \textbf{STATEMENT OF FACTS}
[directive] Special Restrictions When Undercover Officers or Confidential Informants May Be Recorded.  Notwithstanding the provisions of Sections 5.2 and 5.3 of this Policy, and except as otherwise required by Section 5.5, an officer shall not activate a BWC, or shall de- activate a BWC that has been activated, if the officer knows or reasonably believes that the BWC would risk revealing the identity of an undercover officer or confidential informant or otherwise would pose a risk to the safety of an undercover officer or confidential informant, unless such activation is expressly authorized by a supervisor, or unless the exigency of the situation and danger posed to an officer (e.g., active shooter, actual use of police force, officer in distress, etc.) require that the encounter/incident be recorded, in which event the officer shall inform his or her supervisor that the recording risks revealing the identity of an individual as an undercover officer or confidential informant.  See also Section 9.3 (notation or “tagging” to indicate a BWC recording that raises special issues); Section 9.5 (prosecutor’s authority to seek protective order when complying with discovery obligations).  7.2.1  Notwithstanding the foregoing general rule prohibiting the recording of an undercover officer or confidential informant, in the event of a planned arrest/search warrant execution where it is expected that an undercover officer or confidential informant would be present (e.g., a raid where the undercover operative will be arrested to preserve his or her cover), BODY WORN CAMERA POLICY | May 2021  15  the County Prosecutor or designee, or the Director of the Division of Criminal Justice or designee, may provide specific instruction to any BWC-equipped officers participating in the operation on whether to activate their devices.  7.2.2  The BWC shall be activated/re-activated as soon as it is safe and practicable to do so if and when the risk of capturing the image of an undercover officer or confidential informant no longer exists.  7.3
[brief] See Luchejko at 201; Saco at 381, Foley at 424.  The exception outlined by the Court is when a new “element of danger or hazard” is created by the homeowner “other than one caused by natural forces. ”  (emphasis added)  Luchejko at 201 (quoting Saco v. Hall, 1 N.J. 377, 381 (1949).  “As such, if a sidewalk had been cleared and the melting snow subsequently froze into a layer of ice, the “refreeze” would not be an ‘element of danger or hazard other than one caused by natural forces. ’”  Id. (emphasis added, quoting Foley v. Ulrich, 94 N.J. Super. 410, 424 (App. Div)([...], J.A.D., dissenting), rev’d 50 N.J. 426 (1967) (reversing and adopting the Appellete Division dissent by [...].  The Court went so far as to specifically hold that residential landowners are not liable for refreeze events on public sidewalks abutting their property as refreeze events are the very definition of an “element of danger” caused by natural forces.
[brief] First, it is notable that the court did not write that the substantive holding applies only to future cases.  The Court wrote: “We apply the above standard here and provide clearer rules going forward.  Today’s holding applies to this and future cases, and to *State v. Roberson Burney*, 255 N.J. 1 (2023), filed today. ”  *Ibid.*  This is a stark contrast to the Court’s language in *State v. Washington*, 256 N.J. 136 (2024), in which the Court wrote: “We apply today’s ruling and the above guidance to this and future cases only. ”  256 N.J. at 163 (emphasis added).  It also stands in contrast to the Court’s language in *State v. Henderson*, 208 N.J. 208 (2011), in which the Court wrote that its holding would apply “to future cases only” and would “take effect thirty days from the date this Court approves new model jury charges on eyewitness identification. ”  208 N.J. at 302 (emphasis added).  Second, it is not clear that the *Watson* Court’s substantive rule should be considered a “new rule” for retroactivity purposes.  For a court’s holding “to be deemed a new rule of law for retroactivity purposes, there must be a ‘sudden and generally unanticipated repudiation of a long-standing practice.
[brief] The Trial Court’s first jurisdictional conclusion—that transient jurisdiction exists over Defendants because two [...] partners were served with the FAC in New Jersey, Da12–13—is unsustainable for several reasons.  First, and most fundamentally, the Trial Court’s conclusion overlooks this Court’s holding in Citibank, N.A., that personal jurisdiction over a law firm partnership is “not obtained by personal service in New Jersey on a partner having no connection with the subject representation. ”  290 N.J. Super. at 528–31 (personal jurisdiction was not obtained where “the law firm’s partner who was personally served in New Jersey engaged in no conduct related to the transaction in controversy”).  Because it is undisputed that the two [...] partners who were served with the FAC in New Jersey had no involvement in the underlying representation of Plaintiff, Da153; Da196, the Trial Court’s ruling is flatly inconsistent with New Jersey law.  Second, as the Trial Court itself acknowledged, Da13, “[s]ervice on a partner who is resident in New Jersey will not result in acquisition of personal jurisdiction over his foreign partnership absent the partnership’s having sufficient New Jersey contacts to sustain an exercise of long-arm jurisdiction. ”  Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules, cmt. 2.4 on R. 4:4–4(a)(5); id. cmt. 1 on R. 4:4–4(a) (“[T]he various modes of service specified by paragraph (a) . . . cannot be read as mechanisms for obtaining long-arm jurisdiction unless the underlying predicate of long-arm jurisdiction, adequate contact with the State, exists. ”).  Again, this Court made that clear in Citibank, N.A.:  Plainly, a foreign corporation or unincorporated association would not be subject to this State’s in personam jurisdiction merely because a person authorized to receive service on its behalf happened to be present in this State and was personally served here.  We are convinced that the same is true in respect of a foreign partnership.  290 N.J. Super. at 529–30 (citation omitted); id. at 528–29 (“R. 4:4–4 does not undertake to define jurisdictional limits” and “merely prescribes the method of acquiring jurisdiction when constitutional principles of due process of law—not the rule—permit assertion of jurisdiction.
[brief] The audio which accompanies the NJSP dash cam video is the best evidence for the jury to appreciate Plaintiff’s contemporaneous emotional distress, physical pain, mental anguish, fear, fright, helplessness, suffering, and loss of enjoyment of life.  A video with accompanying audio that depicts the pain and suffering experienced by an injured-plaintiff is the best, most accurate evidence for the jury’s consideration in determining the value of that injured-plaintiff’s compensatory damages.
[brief] Id. at 582 [cites omitted]; see also State v. DeAngelo, 197 N.J. 478, 486 (2009).  For a municipality to constitutionally rely upon a purported government interest to restrict speech, it must do more than invoke an allegedly substantial government interest.  See E&J Equities, LLC, 226 N.J. at 557 (“[s]imply invoking aesthetics and public safety to ban a type of sign, without more, does not carry the day”).  The substantial government interest must be established with competent evidence.  Id.  Stated differently: the trial court’s citation to the “purposes” section of the Distance Regulation is not, by itself, competent evidence.
[brief] 28 State v. Diaz, 470 N.J. Super. 495 (App. Div. 2022) ............................................. 15, 18 State v. Engel, 249 N.J. Super. 336 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 130 N.J. 393 (1991).  .................................................................  33 State v. Goode, 278 N.J. Super. 85 (App. Div. 1994) ...........................................  31 State v. Harper, 128 N.J. Super. 270 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 65 N.J. 574 (1974)).  .................................................................
[brief] Dated: August 6, 2024  Respectfully submitted, [...] /s/ [...]  [...], Esq. (pro hac pending)  [...]  [...]  Tel: [...]  [...], Esq. N.J. Attorney No. 36772001  [...], Esq. (pro hac pending)  SHOOK, HARDY & BACON L.L.P.  1800 K Street, NW, Suite 1000  Washington, DC 20006  Tel: [...]  Fax: [...]  [...]  Counsel for Amicus Curiae  [...]  [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], MIDDLESEX  EMERGENCY PHYSICIANS, PA, and PLAINFIELD  EMERGENCY PHYSICIANS, PA, Plaintiffs, v. [...], [...], [...], [...], and [...]
[brief] PLAINTIFF’S FAILURE TO JOIN OR DISCLOSE THE CLAIMS AGAINST PLAINTIFF IN THE LEASE LITIGATION WAS NOT INEXCUSABLE AND DEFENDANTS DID NOT SUFFER SUBSTANTIAL PREJUDICE.  In the case Defendants most heavily rely upon, Dimitrakopoulos, the Court held that in an action for a collection for legal fees in which they were averse to their former client the Supreme Court still did not hold that the failure to join these claims were inexcusable or that the law firm had suffered substantial prejudice.  Here, the Plaintiffs’ failure to identify Defendant [...] in the R. 4:5-1(b)(2) certification was excusable because it was made based on an analysis performed by its counsel at the time determining that the R. 4:5-1(b)(2) rules would not require naming Defendant [...] given the black letter law of Olds v. Donnelly, 150 N.J. 424, 443 (1997).
[brief] "The doctrine of invited error operates to bar a disappointed litigant from arguing on appeal that an adverse decision below was the product of error, when the party urged the lower court to adopt the proposition now alleged to be in error."  See Mack-Cali Realty Corp. v. State, 466 N.J. Super. 402, 447 (App. Div. 2021).  In Mack-Cali Realty Corp. v. State, various real estate developers, urban renewal entities, business owners and labor unions filed state and federal constitutional challenges to a [...] ordinance imposing a payroll tax inclusive of exemptions for employees who resided in [...].  See id. at 854.  With the consent of all parties, the judge entertained oral argument on the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment and defendants’ motion to dismiss with the common understanding that the court would issue dispositive rulings on all issues.  *Id.*  Prior to argument, plaintiffs’ counsel stated that facial constitutional challenges were ripe for adjudication and that the timing was right for a decision on the merits today.  *Id.*  On appeal, the Court agreed with the defendants that the plaintiffs’ objection to the procedure they invited was “meritless” and barred by the doctrine of invited error.  Similarly, in the instant matter, the Objectors cannot plausibly claim that the Court should have withheld judgment on issues the Objectors elected to place before the Trial Court, briefed and argued.  Having induced a ruling, the Objectors cannot be heard to claim the issues they raised were not ripe for adjudication simply because they do not like the decision.  VII.
[brief] I.  PLAINTIFF'S AMENDED BRIEF AND APPENDIX SHOULD BE DISMISSED DUE TO HIS CONTINUED NON-COMPLIANCE WITH AND DISREGARD FOR THE COURT RULES  .........................11  II.  STANDARD OF REVIEW  .............................................................................................14  III.  PLAINTIFF HAS NOT ASSERTED A MALICIOUS PROSECUTION CLAIM IN HIS COMPLAINT; IN ANY EVENT, THE APPLICABLE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS ON SUCH CLAIMS IS TWO YEARS, NOT SIX YEARS.
[directive] Permissible $25,000 to $75,000 of a labor dispute as defined in N.J.S. 2A:15-58; or 6.  Endangers or obstructs the safe operation of motor vehicles by using a traffic control preemption device to interfere with or impair the operation of a traffic control signal as defined in R.S. 39:1-1; or 64  Updated December 2, 2013
[directive] Cash Bail Option  2nd Degree $25,000 to $50,000  No 10%  Actor leaves official detention without permission or absconds from parole; second degree if 2C:29-5(a-e)  Escape force or threats are used or weapon is employed; otherwise third degree.  3rd Degree  $10,000 to $25,000  10% permissible 58  Updated December 2, 2013
[brief] A  Maybe in the past I might have.  Q  And you testified that the overwhelming majority of the time you testify in court it’s for the plaintiff?  A  That’s true.  Q  You also advertise your service as an expert witness, true?  A  Yes.  Q  You advertise on the [...] website, that one organization we already spoke about and on the [...] website.  A Yes.  Q  And you pay for that advertising.  A Yes.  Q  And you advertise your services as a medical malpractice expert in the [...] and in the [...] publication.  A Yes.  Q  You’ve also done a mass mailing to lawyers soliciting their business for expert work, correct?  A Yes.  Q  And you’ve been involved as an expert witness in over 30 states.  A Yes.  Q  And you’ve not confined yourself to only offer opinions against surgeons which is in your specialty.  You’ve also offered opinions against doctors in other specialties as well, correct?
[brief] [State v. State Supervisory Emp. Ass’n, 78 N.J. 54, 70 (1978). ]  Those same rights similarly are enshrined in the parties’ CBA here.  By ignoring them, [...] disregarded both the CBA and the substantive law to which he is bound.  Simply put, [...] had no authority to limit or confine [...]’s managerial rights, or to carve out a special exception for employees on a temporary injury leave.
[directive] -  As 2. used in this act: are "Association" means an organization whose members issuers.  "Cardholder" means the person or organization named on the face of a credit card or debit card to whom or for whose benefit the credit card or debit card is issued by an issuer.  "Card based payment" means a monetary obligation tendered by the user of a credit card or debit card.  "Card payment system" means a technical procedure by which obligations owed a local unit or court may be paid by credit card or debit card.  "Credit card" means any instrument or device linked to an established line of credit, whether known as a credit card, charge card, credit plate, or by any other name, issued with or without fee by an issuer for the use of the cardholder in satisfying outstanding financial obligations, obtaining money, goods, services or anything else of value on credit.  "Debit card" means any instrument or device, whether known as a debit card, automated teller machine card, or by any other name, issued with or without fee by an issuer for the use of the cardholder in obtaining money, goods, services or anything else of value through the electronic authorization of a financial institution to debit the cardholder's account.  of "Director" means the Director of the Division of Local Government Services in the Department Community Affairs.  "Electronic funds transfer" means any transfer of funds, other than a transaction originated by check, draft, or similar paper instrument, that is initiated through an electronic terminal, telephone, or computer or magnetic tape for the purpose of ordering, instructing or authorizing a financial institution to debit or credit an account.  "Electronic funds transfer system" means a technical procedure by which obligations owed to or Tax collected by the Supreme Court, the Superior Court, Court or a local unit may be paid by an electronic transaction between the financial institution of the person or organization owing the obligation and the financial institution of the governmental entity.  -- - -  "Issuer" means 6 e business organization or finycial institution which issues a credit card or debit or card, its duly authorized agent.  of  "Local unit" means any unit government subject to the provisions of chapter 5 or 5A of Title 40A of the New Jersey Statutes, and the constituent parts of those units, including but not limited to independent local authorities, public libraries, municipal courts and joint municipal courts.  "Service charge" means a fee charged by the Supreme Court, the Superior Court, Tax Court or local in unit excess of the total obligation owed by a person or organization to offset processing charges or discount fees for the use of a card payment system or an electronic funds transfer system.  L. 1995,c.325,s.2.
[brief] For all the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully submitted that the Order declaring the decedent to be an essential worker should be reversed, and this matter should be remanded for a trial on the merits.  For the reasons expressed in the companion appeal of [...] v. [...], Docket Number [...], this matter should be remanded to another Judge of Compensation.  Respectfully submitted, [...]  Attorneys for Respondent-Appellant  By: s/[...]  [...]  NEW JERSEY SUPERIOR COURT APPELLATE
[brief] *Wollen* involved homeowners who, while in the unenviable position of searching for suitable home repair services, were forced to travel down a seemingly endless path of web pages, all just to hire someone to do anything from fix an exploding pipe to conduct home renovations.  Buried at the end of that forest of web pages lurked an inconspicuous reference to terms and conditions.  *Id.* at 489.  Respondents acknowledge some of these material facts (Pb30), but ignore that the record in this case materially differs from *Wollen*.
[brief] Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968).  The police report by [...] states that he observed that the plaintiff had a knife in each pocket.  The carrying of pocketknives is not a violation of any laws.  NJSA 2C:39-3 (e) prohibits possession of a gravity knife, switchblade knife, dagger, dirk, stiletto, . . . or . . . ballistic knife, without any explainable lawful purpose.  Id.  Plaintiff was not carrying any of these types of knives.  A pocketknife is not considered dangerous warranting a Terry pat down.  See State v. Irizarry, 270 N.J. Super. 669, 673 (App. Div. 1994) (citing N.J.S.A. 2C:39-1(r) (defining weapon as “anything readily capable of lethal use or inflicting serious bodily injury”).
[directive] 1.6.3  The police officer handler will list the requirements of proper routine care of a police dog, to include daily health check inspections, routine health care and veterinarian visits, feeding, grooming, and housing.  1.6.4  The police officer handler will identify the proper techniques, procedures and equipment to be used in emergency care situations, including heat stroke, bloating, trauma, poisoning.  19 7/2002 K-9 Training Standards and Qualification Requirements
[brief] Use of the word “assignee” in Spade refers to the assignee of a defendant who is the seller.  For example, [...] sells a couch to [...].  ABC then assigns that contract to [...], the assignee.  As a result, XYZ would be the defendant in the TCCWNA case because they are the assignee of the defendant, ABC.  The correct reading of Spade is that an “assignee” would be a third party to the transaction, not a party, as suggested by Plaintiff.
[brief] On June 2, 2022, [...] filed a multi-permit application for Freshwater Wetlands General Permits Nos. 1, 7, 10A and 11, Freshwater Wetland Transition Area Averaging Plan Waiver, Flood Hazard Area Verification and Flood Hazard Area Individual Permit (Aa3381-Aa3385).  On June 30, 2022, the [...] issued a deficiency letter to [...] related to the permit application.  (Aa124-Aa126).  [...] made no fewer than 11 supplemental submissions to the [...] incorporating responses to [...] comments and questions and refiling a portion of the multi-permit application as a separate application for a Freshwater Wetlands Individual Permit\(^1\).  These submissions were made on November 17, 2022; December 15, 2022; January 13, 2023; February 8, 2023; February 24, 2023; April 17, 2023; May 10, 2023; July 12, 2023; July 18, 2023; and July 21, 2023.  (Aa3378 & DJa001).  On August 14, --- \(^1\)The Freshwater Individual Permit issued by [...] on May 29, 2024 is not the subject of this appeal.  It has been separately appealed by Plaintiffs herein.  *In the Matter of [...] Associates*, Docket No. [...].  2023, [...] was issued a Flood Hazard Area Verification and Flood Hazard Area Individual Permit pursuant to N.J.A.C. 7:13-1.1(b).  (Aa5-Aa45).  On August 14, 2023, [...] submitted approved [...] permit plans which were stamped by [...] and issued with the FHA permit.  (Aa0015-Aa0044).  LEGAL ARGUMENT
[brief] [...] continued to pursue [...] and filed a motion to hold the same in contempt.  [...] retained counsel to respond to and oppose the motion and to cross move to quash the underlying subpoena.  The hearing on Plaintiff’s Order to Show Cause and Verified Complaint was now scheduled for June 20, 2023.  [...]’s contempt motion against [...] and [...]’s cross motions were also scheduled for oral argument on that date.  At oral argument, it was determined that the competing motions of [...] and [...] would be addressed and not the Order to Show Cause and Verified Complaint.  Following oral argument, the [...] issued two (2) orders on June 26, 2023 which disposed of the [...] and [...] motions.  [...] then issued an order on June 27, 2023, denying [...]’s Order to Show Cause without explanation other than referencing the other orders issued.  Shortly after the oral arguments and orders by [...] noted above, the Court issued a trial date for November 29, 2023.
[brief] Second, to qualify as “unfair or unconscionable” for purposes of § 1692f, a debt collector’s conduct must be “shockingly unjust or unfair, or affronting the sense of justice, decency, or reasonableness. ”  Arias v. Gutman, Mintz, Baker & Sonnenfeldt LLP, 875 F.3d 128, 135 (2d Cir. 2017).  Respondent’s conduct – both its use of a letter vendor to undertake the rote task of printing and sending a collection letter and its inclusion of payment options with time-barred debt disclosure – self-evidently does not rise to this level.  Moreover, here too, Appellant’s appeal does not address this theory of liability, and the Court should deem it abandoned on appeal.  N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. v. Alloway Twp., 438 N.J. Super. 501, 506 n.2 (App. Div. 2015) (an issue not briefed is deemed waived on appeal).