ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] ............................................................................. 31 | Date | Description | Reference | |--------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------| | January 18, 2023 |  Ruling regarding Defendant’s objection to comment about Defendant leaving the scene of the accident | 1T42:7-21 | | January 18, 2023 |  Ruling regarding Plaintiff’s Counsel’s characterization of the injuries in Summation | 3T44:7-46:14 | | January 19, 2023 | Ruling regarding Plaintiff’s Counsel’s characterization of [...]’s Conclusions in Summation | 2T40-7-14 | | February 28, 2023 | Order for Judgment | Da 23-24 | | July 12, 2023 | Order Limiting Judgment against Defendant Federal Court Order | Da 95-99 | | September 11, 2023 | Order Denying Reconsideration of the July 12, 2023 Federal Court Order | Da 104-105 | | September 22, 2023 | Order Denying Defendant’s Motion to Mold Judgment | Pa 9-10 | | December 1, 2023 | Order Denying Defendant’s Motion to Mold Judgment | Pa ** | ** Order not yet signed | Authority | Page(s) | |--------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------| | Baxter v. Fairmont Food Co., 74 N.J. 588 (1977) | 14,15,18| | Bender v. Adelson, 187 N.J. 411 (2006) | 19, 20 | | Brundage v. Estate of Caranbio, 195 N.J. 575 (2008) | 12 | | Camp v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 616 So. 2d 12 (Fla. 1993) | 11 | | Celotex Corp. v. Edwards, 514 U.S. 300 (1995) | 9 | | Chapman v. Bituminous Ins. 345 F. 3d 338 (5th Cir. Ct. App.) | 11, 12 | | Cuevas v. Wentworth Grp., 226 N.J. 480 (2016) | 15, 19 | | Fertile v. St. Michael’s Med. Center, 169 N.J. 481 (2001) | 26 | | Flanders v. Jackson, 810 S. E. 2d 656 (Ga. Ct. App. 2018) | 11 | | Gere v. Lewis, 209 N.J. 386 (2012) | 12 | | Geler v. Akawie, 358 N.J. Super. 437 (App. Div. 2003) | 27 | | Great Western Mining and Mineral Company v. Fox Rothchild, | 9 | | 613 F3d 159 (3rd Cir. 2010) | | | Litton Industries v. IMO Industries, 200 N.J. 372 (2009) | 21, 25 | | McMahon v. NJM Ins. Co., 364 N.J. Super. 188 (App. Div. 2003) | 14 | | Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Investors Ins. Co. of Am., 65 N.J.
[brief] The Court found that, “The adequacy of standards governing the application of historic preservation ordinances to proposed land use and development is a question of first impression in New Jersey.  “Article IV, section VII, paragraph 11 of the New Jersey Constitution provides that ‘any law concerning municipal corporations formed for local government ... shall be liberally construed in their favor. ’ ”  *515 Associates v. City of Newark*, 132 N.J. 180, 185, 623 A.2d 1366 (1993).  The *Nadelson* Court referenced cases from various jurisdictions, analyzed same and then confirmed that in determining the sufficiency of the standard, defined the standard of incongruity as a contextual standard, “one which derives its meaning from the objectively determinable, interrelated conditions and characteristics of the subject to which the standard is to be applied.
[directive] Authority  Obstructing  Actor obstructs or impairs or attempts to prevent public servant from performing official Administration of function by force, intimidation or other unlawful act; disorderly persons offense (This 2C:29-1(a)(b) Law or other Disorderly Persons $500 to $1,000 10% permissible excludes the element of actor obstructing investigation or prosecution of a crime – which Governmental would make it a fourth degree).
[brief] This is so for at least two reasons.  *First*, Plaintiff’s claims fail because they each depend on the proposition that Plaintiff had the ability to enforce the obligation of [...] to sell the Property to Plaintiff at the time of the Mack-Cali transaction.  Indeed, Plaintiff repeatedly conceded before the trial court that the way [...] damaged Plaintiff was by preventing it from exercising its right under the PSA to purchase the Property after it received back its deposit.  (1T7:15-8:6;1T10:16-23; 1T11:24-12:12).
[directive] Protection Survivor's Assault Sexual the and Act Violence  Domestic of Prevention release pretrial such any of terms of the victim a advise practicable as soon shall as prosecutor appearance. first the at imposed conditions) Monitoring. and Intervention Abuse Substance 6.2.4 to release pretrial of conditions setting court authorizes a expressly Law Reform Bail The without substance controlled other or drug narcotic any of use from refrain to defendant the order or drug for treatment available undergo to and practitioner, medical licensed a by prescription a committed are crimes many Because (i). and 2A:162-17(b)(2)(h) N.J.S.A. dependency. alcohol to ability the affect may (which drug amind-altering of influence under the while persons by of threat of the effect deterrent general the undermine thus and consequences future project an habit, drug offender's support the to money raise to committed are or punishment), criminal 53 Page subsection See also activity. criminal of future indicator reliable a addiction be can untreated is defendant that believing a for basis objective prosecutor an has when a Accordingly, 7.6.4. court the shall notify prosecutor 2C:35-14, the N.J.S.A. in defined as dependent alcohol or drug to ordered be defendant the of release, condition a as that, request belief, and for this basis of the a prescription by a without substance controlled other or drug narcotic any of from use refrain dependency alcohol or for drug treatment available undergo practitioner, to and medical licensed to required 2C:35-14.1 (defendant N.J.S.A. also 2A:162-17(b)(2).
[brief] (9T93-10 to 15).  When the tire job was finished, he paid for the repair with cash kept in his pants pocket.  (9T94-1 to 4).  He then drove three or four blocks down the road to his business, [...] at [...], where he parked his truck on the street in front of his shop, visible to anyone walking by.  (9T94-10 to 95-1).  --- 1  The State relies on defendant’s Table of Citations (Db4), with the following addition:  “Db” refers to defendant’s appellate brief.  [...] described his shop, with a front entry door that led to a small foyer.
[brief] As previously argued, she omitted the word “serious” from threat.  That is no small omission but goes to the heart of the statutory requirements to find a dog potentially dangerous.  Moreover, the opinion misstates the risk analysis required.  N.J.S.A. 4:19-23(a)(1) requires a finding of serious threat of death or “serious bodily injury” to a person.  She found that the lower court found “a threat of future bodily injury. ”  If [...] merely poses a threat of bodily injury to humans, that is not enough to adjudicate him potentially dangerous.  After all, any German Shepherd Dog in good condition with a large, strong muzzle and sharp teeth has the capacity to injure a human, even in play.  But the standard must be death or serious bodily injury, neither of which is mentioned in the court’s opinion.  Second, [...] misstated the risk standard regarding a dog that kills a companion animal: i.e., the court must find either a serious threat of death/serious bodily injury to a human [4:19-(b)(2)(a)] or a serious threat of death to a domestic animal 4:19-(b)(2)(b)].
[brief] (Aa754).  [...] asked the Commissioner to find that 2  On June 9, 2022 ([...]), June 15, 2022 ([...]), June 21, 2022 ([...]), and July 13, 2022 ([...]), the parties to the Joint Petition passed updated resolutions which superseded their earlier resolutions, and clarified that they sought both the expansion of [...] from a limited purpose regional district to an all-purpose regional district, and that they sought to include [...] in the new all-purpose district.  (Aa344 – Aa371).  [...] lacked the statutory authority to withdraw from [...] by resolution, and lacked the authority to unilaterally withdraw from [...] and join another district at all.  (Aa754).  Respondents moved to dismiss [...]’s Petition, arguing that [...]’s motion was premature, as no action had been taken in furtherance of [...]’s attempted withdrawal.  (Aa755).  On July 19, 2022, [...] filed its own Petition of Appeal and Petition for Declaratory Ruling with the Commissioner, seeking relief similar to [...], but also asking that the Commissioner issue a declaratory ruling regarding the status of [...] and its inability to seek withdrawal from [...] and [...].
[brief] The Court emphasized that the call to the police was made “from an unknown location by an unknown caller. ”  *Id.* at 270.  Moreover, the call did not contain the sort of detailed predictive information that might have suggested that a reliable basis of knowledge existed.  *Id.* at 270-71.  “All the police had to go on in this case was the bare report of an unknown, unaccountable informant who neither explained how he knew about the gun nor supplied any basis for believing he had inside information about [...]”  *Id.* at 271.  Even though [...] was at the bus stop and matched the physical description, the tip was not adequately corroborated because “[a]n accurate description of a subject’s readily observable location and appearance” does help police “correctly identify the person whom the tipster means to accuse[,]” but it “does not show that the tipster has knowledge of concealed criminal activity.  The reasonable suspicion here at issue requires that a tip be reliable in its assertion of illegality, not just in its tendency to identify a determinate person. ”  *Id.* at 272.  Thus, [...] makes clear that corroboration of illegality is necessary even when the target is clearly described.
[brief] The court erred by admitting the defendant’s recorded statement into evidence.  The court also erred by admitting the identification evidence without any jury instruction.  These errors, individually and cumulatively, were plain error, and capable of causing an unjust result.  See State v. Jenewicz, 193 N.J. 440, 474 (2008); State v. Orecchio, 16 N.J. 125, 129 (1954).
[brief] 1.  As to her lack of awareness of the Asset Protection Plan, her false denials were eviscerated by at least eight exhibits, both Plaintiff’s and her own, such that the trial court concluded:  As to defendant’s claims concerning her lack of any knowledge of the asset protection plan, the court finds that defendant was completely aware of the asset protection plan, the purpose of the plan and the plan’s intent to transfer all of plaintiff’s pre-marital assets to companies/LLCs in which defendant was the sole member.  The court finds both parties were fully aware of the transfers being made under the asset protection plan and the documents including the POAs which were necessary to complete such.  Defendant signed all of the documents including documents that clearly indicated such were being executed as part of the plan.  [A229, Op at. 26 (emphasis added)].
[brief] Despite [...] resting its rescission of the Policy on the contention that the OAE Proceeding was a “Disciplinary Proceeding,” the trial court utterly failed to address this issue.  If it had undertaken this required analysis, it could only have concluded that the OAE Proceeding against [...] was not a Disciplinary Proceeding required to be reported since it did not involve the rendering of any Legal Services and could never ripen into a Claim under the Policies.  Defendants had a right to define what constitutes a Disciplinary Proceeding for reporting purposes and did so here.  The OAE Proceeding regarding an overdrawn check on Firm funds and an altered bank statement related to a second drawn check on Firm funds to avoid personal embarrassment are plainly not a reportable Disciplinary Proceeding.  As a result, the Firm was not required to disclose its existence in its Application to [...].
[brief] Trupos, 201 N.J. at 463.  See also Comando v. Nugiel, 436 N.J. Super. 203, 208 (App. Div. 2014) (record was far too limited; factual disputes meant that the extent and nature of the law firm's prior involvement could only be determined following an evidentiary hearing).  In short, the record here was far more barren than in *O Builders* and *Comando*.
[brief] Lawson, 468 N.J. Super. at 134.  In relying on its misplaced “lateral appeal” argument, plaintiff never actually addressed or attempted to rebut defendants’ reasons for seeking reconsideration in the trial court, nor has it attempted to do so here.  Accordingly, plaintiff has waived or forfeited any argument that the reasons for reconsideration articulated by defendants in their Motion for Reconsideration are insufficient under New Jersey law.
[brief] Figueroa v. N.J. Dep't of Corr., 414 N.J. Super. 186, 192 (App. Div. 2010) (citations omitted).  The Board’s determination references that the Division of Pensions notified all Certifying Officers of the Ricci Act on “August 8, 2019. ”  Pa13.  There is nothing in the record that establishes this, and it is wholly unsupported by the record evidence.  Furthermore, the statutory requirement is to notify the members of the retirement system, not the Certifying Officers.  Therefore, this is insufficient notice under the Ricci Act as it is not notice to the members of the retirement system.  Additionally, the Certifying Officer confirmed the information was sent to the New Jersey State Police on August 16, 2019.  Pa85.  Both dates are past the timeframe required by statute.  Lastly, it is unknown how the information was disseminated to New Jersey State Troopers.  [...] certified in an affidavit provided to the Board that he never received any correspondence or postcard from the Division, regardless of whether it was ever sent.  This affidavit should overcome any presumption that any correspondence was received.  The Board’s decision failed to consider the almost one hundred affidavits of other active and retired troopers who also did not receive any correspondence or postcard from the Division notifying them of the Ricci Act that were submitted to the Board in support of [...]’s appeal.  As such, the finding that it was “undisputed” that the Division notified [...] (and others) of the Ricci Act is not supported by the facts and evidence presented.  Furthermore, any presumption claimed by the Board has clearly been rebutted by the overwhelming evidence presented in this matter.  Considering the evidence presented, the agency’s action does not have a reasonable basis.
[brief] Implicit in the rule is the proposition that the condition which insulates the property owner must be one which is a totally natural condition.  Therefore, if the condition is an artificial one, or one precipitated by the property owner's affirmative act, the proposition that it would be unfair to attach liability is no longer relevant.  * * * * *  If we consider the origin of the rule, its rationale and the public policy which form the premise to the traditional rule we must conclude that it is only those natural causes brought about solely by the elements which exempts the property owner from liability.  All others result in liability.  Id., at 703-04 (emphasis added).  The question in Deberjeois was whether a property owner is liable to a pedestrian who falls on a defective sidewalk where the defect is caused by the roots of a tree located in the front yard of the property.  Applying the analysis above, the court denied summary judgment to the defendant, who had invoked the sidewalk immunity rule, because of his affirmative act in planting the tree.  There was no finding of negligence nor was there any mention of negligence in planting the tree.  Rather, the act of planting the tree in such close proximity to the sidewalk that its roots caused a defective condition in the sidewalk was sufficient to render the exemption inapplicable.  Applying that same analysis to the case at bar, the trial court should have denied summary judgment because of defendants’ affirmative act in building the “completely new” sidewalk.
[brief] SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY  APPELLATE DIVISION  DOCKET NO. [...]  INDICTMENT NO. [...]  STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. [...], Defendant-Respondent.  CRIMINAL ACTION  On Appeal  From an Interlocutory Order of the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Hudson County.  Sat Below: Hon. [...], J.S.C.  DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT IS CONFINED  Honorable Judges:  This letter is submitted in lieu of a formal brief pursuant to Rule 2:6-2(b).  New Jersey is an Equal Opportunity Employer  TABLE OF CONTENTS  PROCEDURAL HISTORY ..................................................................................  1  STATEMENT OF FACTS ..................................................................................  2  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT  I LEAVE FOR APPEAL IS NOT IN THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE
[brief] Police questioned [...], the driver of the Camry, after pulling him over.  When he denied knowing [...] and could not provide a reason for his --- 4  These facts are derived from the affidavit in support of a search warrant for the storage unit and from [...]’s decision on the motion challenging the search of the storage unit.  (Dca 1-17; 2T 26-15 to 45-5)  presence at the storage facility, police asked [...] for consent to search his vehicle, which [...] provided.  (Dca 9)  Upon searching, [...] found a bag of what appeared to be a kilogram of suspected cocaine, smaller baggies of suspected heroin and cocaine, approximately $245, and some paraphernalia.  (Dca 9-10)  [...] was arrested, at which point he stated that he had followed [...] from New York to the storage facility at [...]’s request.  (Dca 10)  [...] questioned [...], who denied knowing [...] and denied having ever been at the storage facility before that day.  (Dca 10)  [...] was asked to provide consent to search his vehicle, which he did, but no illegal contraband was found. \(^5\)  (Dca 10)  Following the vehicle searches, K-9 “Nidas” was instructed to sniff storage unit numbers 110 to 128.  (Dca 11)  According to the warrant affidavit, “Nidas” alerted to the presence of narcotics at unit 126.  (Dca 11)
[directive] statutes establish defined code material elements of see N.J.S.A. criminal liability not only by defining the scope of offenses, the In creating affirmative defenses. the specific context of exemptions or 2C:1-13(h), (i), but also by comprehensive suite of criminal offenses that Title 2C establishes a of gambling, chapter 37 in gambling activity, subject gambling or engaging from promoting prohibit generally all persons 2C:37-9.  N.J.S.A. N.J.S.A. 2C:37-1(c); certain exceptions.  See' e•~•, to addition to casino games permitted "[i]n however, provides that Wagering Act, Sports The Control Act], a casino et seq.) [the Casino (C.5:12-1 of P.L.1977, c.110 provisions to the pursuant addition the provides that, "[i]n to further It N.J.S.A. 5:12A-2(a). pool...." operate a sports may commission pursuant racing regulation by the races under wagering on horse parrmutuel of conduct pool ...."  Id.  In this operate sports racetrack may a Statutes, a Revised of Title of the chapter 5 5 to of pools by against the operation sports prohibition repealed the Wagering Act Sports manner, the prosecution under New Jersey criminal from activities exempting those racetracks, thus and casinos ruling, The the Third Circuit's consistent with exemption that is whether then, is The issue, law.  well as the Circuit opinion, as Third reasoning of the text and the found in question is that answer to that case.
[brief] **  On February 20, 2015, only 10 days after [...] filed a formal complaint of discrimination and retaliation with the [...], the [...] ([...]) advised Alan [...] of a request to discipline him.  (Pa479).  [...], [...], [...] and [...] had been advised of Alan [...]’s complaint of discrimination and retaliation.  (Pa666).  •  **Retaliatory Action.**  On June 24, 2015, [...] and [...], with authorization from Director [...] head of labor relations, [...] and Director of Human Resources Director [...], disciplined [...] for “Insubordination and Conduct Unbecoming of a Public Employee” (Pa477) because of the content of his speech given at the Rutgers Safe Drinking Water Regulatory Update Course (Rutgers Course), a course offered by [...] to professionals in the field of safe drinking water.
[brief] Rather, the officer testified that they came upon the Infiniti while they were driving around the lot and observed a female, whose name they did not know but knew as a drug user, talking to the driver.  (1T16-9 to 17-3; 1T18-19 to 19-11).  [...] gave no testimony that this woman or anyone else gave him information about the car or its driver prior to entering the parking lot.  A few minutes later, [...] observed the woman give money to the driver, receive an item in exchange, and walk away.  He testified that they did not stop the woman because, “we believe (sic) that we had witnessed a hand to hand narcotics transaction.  We did not want to jump the gun yet. ”  [...] also explained that they did not have back up at that point and they were the only car on scene.  (1T20-5 to 22).  It was not until that observation that [...] ran the license plate of the Infiniti and learned it was registered to defendant.  (1T21-23 to 22-3).  Indeed, officers waited another 30 minutes before they observed a second suspected buyer, who engaged in another suspected hand to hand transaction.  (1T21-2 to 19).  Importantly, upon learning defendant was the registered owner of the car, officers also learned that in a previous interaction with law enforcement, defendant attempted to flee in his car and caused several motor vehicle accidents.  Accordingly, officers proceeded cautiously in a crowded parking lot surrounded by a heavily trafficked highway.
[brief] 34 Label St. Assocs. v. Cecere, 2017 WL 5988064 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Dec. 4, 2017)  Ia194 • Exhibit R, Unpublished decision  Chen v. Vigilant Ins. Co., 2009 WL 2341444 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. July 31, 2009)  Ia204 • Exhibit S, Unpublished decision  Edwards v. Brinkley, 2014 WL 5711984 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Nov. 6, 2014)  Ia210 • Exhibit T, Unpublished decision  Pennsylvania Gen. Ins. Co. v. Zurich Ins., 2006 WL 1932658 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. July 14, 2006) Ia214  Defendant/Third Party Plaintiff [...]’s Response to Plaintiff’s Statement of Material Facts (August 15, 2022) Ia226 Certification of [...] • Exhibit A, Excerpts from April 9, 2021 deposition of [...] Ia239 • Exhibit B, 2018 insurance policy application for [...] Ia271 • Exhibit C, May 30, 2019 email from [...] to [...] Ia275 • Exhibit D, June 28, 2019 email from [...] to [...] explaining the purpose of Non-owned and Hired Auto liability coverage Ia278 • Exhibit E, Order granting [...]’s motion to intervene Ia281 • Exhibit F, Defendant’s June 14, 2021 amended answer and third-party complaint Ia283 [...], Response to [...]’s Statement of Material Facts Ia299 Certification of Counsel • Exhibit 1, Excerpts from Deposition of [...] Ia321 • Exhibit 2, February 8, 2022, Deposition Transcript of Judah [...] Ia367 • Exhibit 3, [...]’s “Specialty Insurance Coverage for Sports Camps, Clinics and Conferences” application that was in effect in 2022 Ia465 • Exhibit 4, Excerpts of Deposition Transcript of [...] Ia473
[brief] The Final Map is a usable document for the description of premises and the only lands that were conveyed were the properties shown on the Filed Map; [...] was not on the Filed Map.  He points out that if there was an intent to convey the [...] Grant, it could have specifically said: “together with the rights to grant land William J. [...],” and then whatever the date was, it does not say that (1T120:19).  The lands that it is conveying are operative.  All their interest in those particular properties is being conveyed but it does not include lands that were not being conveyed to the Grantee (1T121:19).  He confirms that he is not even sure if the property which they are discussing is actually assessed for taxes (1T123:21).