ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] PRELIMINARY STATEMENT ..................................................................................1  PROCEDURAL HISTORY ......................................................................................4  STATEMENT OF FACTS .....................................................................................10  ISSUES ON APPEAL ............................................................................................12  ARGUMENT ...........................................................................................................12  I.  [...]’s Appeal is Subject to De Novo Review (Issue Not Raised Below)  .........................................................12  II.  This Dispute Involves Two Mandatory Arbitration Provisions (T1 76:2 - 77:14)  ..................................................15  A.  The [...] Pollution Policy’s Arbitration Clause Applies to [...]’s Indemnity Claim (T1 76:2 - 77:3)  ..................................................15  B.  The Arbitration Clause in the [...] Umbrella Policy Requires Arbitration of [...]’s Indemnity Claim (T1 76:24 - 77:2)  ...............19  III.  [...] Did Not Waive Its Right to Arbitrate [...]’s Claims (T1 77:4-8)  .........................................................20  A.  The Trial Court Failed to Consider the Totality of the Circumstances When it Determined  [...] Waived its Right to Arbitration (T1 67:12 - 76:1)  .........................................................22  i.  [...]’s Motion to Compel Arbitration Was Filed Timely After the Stay was Lifted and the Indemnity Claim was Ripe and Amenable to Binding Resolution Via Arbitration (T1 68:17-20)  .........................................................22  ii.  Filing of Dispositive Motions (T1 71:21-72:3) .........................................................28  iii.  The Timing of the Motion to Compel Arbitration Does Not Reflect a Litigation Strategy (T172:6-8) ..................................................30  iv. Extent of Discovery Conducted (T1 72:21 - 73:2) ...........................................341  v. Whether the Party Raised the Arbitration Issue in its Pleadings (T1 73:4 - 74:5)  .................................................................364  vi.  Proximity to the Date of Trial (T1 74:6-7)  .......................................................36  vii.  The Resulting Prejudice Suffered By the Other Party, if Any (T1 74:15-20)  ..............................................................................................................37  CONCLUSION
[directive] d.  ¿Ha hablado con un abogado sobre las posibles consecuencias de inmigración como resultado [Sí/Yes] [No/No] de su declaración?  Si su respuesta es “No,” siga a la pregunta 17e.  Si la respuesta es “Sí,” siga a la pregunta 17f.  Have you discussed with an attorney the potential immigration consequences of your plea?  If the answer is “No,” proceed to question 17e.  If the answer is “Yes,” proceed to question 17f.  e.  ¿Le gustaría tener la oportunidad de hacerlo?  [Sí/Yes]  [No/No]  Would you like the opportunity to do so?  Iniciales del acusado/Defendant’s Initials Formulario principal de declaración/Formulario enmendado promulgado por la directriz #01-18 (02/23/2018), CN 10079-Spanish página 5 de 7 Main Plea Form/Revised Form Promulgated by Directive #01-18 (02/23/2018), CN 10079-Spanish page 5 of 7
[brief] [...] agrees with and adopts the factual presentation at OPDb1 to OPDb3.  [...] objects to the Attorney General's "supplement[ation] [of] the State’s Counterstatement of Facts" (OAGb4).  "An amicus must accept the case as presented by the parties."  S.C. v. Dep't of Children & Families, 242 N.J. 201, 240 n.10 (2020).  The Attorney General improperly relies on comments made by the prosecutor (1T69-18 to 70-17) regarding whether [...] "viewed the surveillance video when he downloaded it" (OAGb4).
[brief] What circumstances puts a consumer on inquiry notice?  In determining reasonable inquiry notice, a court must consider the conspicuousness and placement of the means to access the arbitration clause, other notice given to consumers and a website’s general design.  Id. at 291-292.  The writing on the computer screen must still give notice to the consumer or reasonably prudent internet user of the agreements terms or conditions by providing wording or a hyperlink requiring the consumer or user to affirmatively assert, read or acknowledge the terms and conditions.  Id. at 287-288.  While receipt of a physical document containing contract terms or notice thereof in the world of paper transactions can be a sufficient circumstance to put a consumer on inquiry notice of the terms, Santana supra, 475 NJ Super at 289 citing Specht v. Netscape, 306 F3d. 17, 31 (2d Cir. 2002), [...]’s case is neither an all paper transaction or internet transaction.
[brief] The Applicant’s site plan shows, among other things, the existing and proposed grading profiles and topography for the revised lot grade.  *(Pa55-59). *  As shown on the site plan, the revised lot grade slopes upward from the street level on [...] from an elevation of 13’ to an elevation of over 18’ as a result of fill proposed by the applicant.  *(Pa55-59). *  The grading profile sheet shows the difference between the existing grade and proposed grade.  *(Pa59). *  Each of the six (6) proposed buildings themselves have a “house height” anywhere between 32.89 feet to 34.73 feet.
[brief] Da36, ¶ 61.  On the morning of Saturday, January 28, 2023, at approximately 11:08 a.m., [...] sent an email to [...] and [...] regarding the case involving legal malpractice that was the subject of his initial November 30, 2022 email and discussed by [...] and [...] on January 22, 2023 during their call.  [...] noted that Plaintiff had posted a message to the case file in the aforesaid malpractice matter in which Guarda had noted the firm "fucked up."  He offered to delete the posting from the Firm’s “NEOS” system.  Da36, ¶ 62, with Da098 (Guarda’s 1/28/23 email at 11:08 a.m.).  On the morning of Saturday, January 28, 2023, at approximately 11:10 a.m., Defendant [...] responded to [...]'s email sent 2 minutes earlier instructing him to delete the emails posted by Plaintiff [...] from the Firm’s system.  Da36, ¶ 63, with Da100 ([...]’s 1/28/23 email at 11:10 a.m.).
[directive] Interviewing Members of the Agency  8.0.1  The interview of a police officer as either the subject of an internal affairs investigation or as a witness to an incident that is the subject of such an investigation represents a critical stage in the investigative process.  The information gained during such an interview often will go a long way toward resolving the matter, regardless of the outcome.  8.0.2  The difficulty in conducting officer interviews, particularly subject officer interviews, is the differing legal principles that apply depending on the nature of the interview and the type of investigation being conducted.  For example, a subject officer suspected of criminal conduct will be interviewed in a manner far different than an officer suspected of committing just a disciplinary infraction.  A further distinction may be made when the officer to be interviewed is believed to be a witness to either criminal conduct or an administrative infraction.  8.0.3
[brief] Plaintiff does not have to demonstrate that the employer’s activities *actually* violated or were incompatible with a statute, rule or other clear mandate of public policy.  See *Dzwonar*, 177 N.J. at 463-464.  Rather, Plaintiff only has to show that he had an “objectively reasonable belief” in the existence of such a violation or incompatibility.  *Id.* at 464.  “The goal of CEPA ... is not to make lawyers out of conscientious employees but rather to prevent retaliation against those employees who object to employer conduct that they reasonably believe to be unlawful or indisputably dangerous to the public health.
[brief] DEFENDANT-APPELLANTS/CROSS-RESPONDENTS, TOWNSHIP OF MONROE AND MAYOR GERALD W. TAMBURRO, MEMORANDUM OF LAW  IN SUPPORT OF APPEAL ON REPLY AND IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENTS/CROSS-APPELLANTS  CROSS-APPEAL  [...]  [...]  Tel.: [...]  Fax: [...]  Email: [...]  [...]  Attorneys for the Defendant-Appellants, [...] and Mayor [...]
[brief] In support, and as echoed by [...] in its appellate brief ([...] Brief, p. 20), the trial court relies on Goffe v. Foulke Management Corp., 238 N.J. 191, 211 (2019) (Ja10)  However, neither Goffe nor the fact that [...]’s definition of “Dispute” (Ja37) nullifies arbitration in Plaintiff’s case supports this premise.  In Goffe, 238 N.J. at 195, the New Jersey Supreme Court stated:
[brief] 2007) | | | Mackinnon v. Mackinnon, 191 N.J. 240 (2007) | 17 | | Omerantz Paper Corp v. New Community Corp., | 16 | | 207 N.J. 344 (2011)  | | | Tholander v. Tholander, 34 N.J. Super. 150 | 22 | | (Ch. Div. 1955)  | | Tucci v. Tropicana Casino & Resort, Inc, 364 N.J. Super. 48 (App. Div. 2003)  27, 28 Tynes v. St. Peter’s Medical Center, 408 N.J. Super. 159 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 200 N.J. 502 (2009)  25, 27 Zadigan v. Cole, 369 N.J. Super. 123 (Law Div. 2004)  29  Statutes N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-27  8  Court Rules R. 4:17-4(e)  20 R. 4:17-7 20, 21 R.4:24-1(c) 20, 21, 22 R.4:42-2 30  Procedural History
[brief] [...] asserts that the SAM was the “finder of fact” and that the trial court was required to defer to his holdings.  (Pb37-38).  [...]’s argument ignores the record before this Court and the applicable standard of review.  The holdings of a special master are only entitled to deference “to the extent they are supported by substantial credible evidence in the record. ”  Little v. Kia 8  The standard of review applicable to the trial court’s determinations concerning fees and interest is discussed separately below.  Motors Am., Inc., 242 N.J. 557, 593 (2020).  Here, the holdings in the R&R are not supported by any evidence in the record.  (Pa0158.)
[brief] As to whether a particular employee constitutes “upper management” whose conduct would justify a punitive damages award, the Courts have eschewed a bright line rule, instead holding that upper management consists of “managerial executives those who have ‘significant power, discretion and influence within their own departments,’ capable of furthering the mission of the organization and of selecting courses of action from available alternatives. ”  *Cavuoti v. N.J. Transit* Corp., 161 N.J. 107, 123 (1999) (quoting New Jersey Tpke. Auth. v. American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, Council 73, 150 N.J. 331, 356 (1997)).  “Whether or not an employee possesses this level of authority may generally be determined by focusing on the interplay of three factors: (1) the relative position of that employee in his employer's hierarchy; (2) his function and responsibilities; and (3) the extent of discretion he exercises. ”  Id.
[brief] A judgment or order in a civil action adjudicating liability for a sum of money or the rights or liabilities of parties in respect of property which is the subject of an appeal or certification proceedings shall be stayed only upon the posting of a supersedeas bond or other form of security.  Following a trial, the primary purpose of a stay is to preserve the status quo of the parties.  This keeps the issue of contention ripe for the Appellate Court.  The practical application is for the appealing party to stay the Order that compels or grants a right.
[brief] Employment shall be deemed to commence when an employee arrives at the employer's place of employment to report for work and shall terminate when the employee leaves the employer's place of employment, excluding areas not under the control of the employer; provided, however, when the employee is required by the employer to be away from the employer's place of employment, the employee shall be deemed to be in the course of employment when the employee is engaged in the direct performance of duties assigned or directed by the employer; but the employment of employee paid travel time by an employer for time spent traveling to and from a job site or of any employee who utilizes an employer authorized vehicle shall commence and terminate with the time spent traveling to and from a job site or the authorized operation of a vehicle on business authorized by the employer.
[brief] The court should consider three guideposts in awarding punitive damages: (1) the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant’s misconduct; (2) the disparity between the actual or potential harm suffered by the plaintiff and the punitive damages award; and (3) the difference between the punitive damages awarded by the jury and the civil penalties authorized or imposed in comparable cases.  *State Farm*, 538 U.S. at 418.  The Supreme Court further pointed out that “the most important indicium of the reasonableness of a punitive damages award is the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant’s conduct. ”  *Id.* at 419.  To determine the degree of reprehensibility, courts should consider whether: (1) the harm caused was physical as opposed to economic; (2) the tortious conduct evinced an indifference to or a reckless disregard of the health or safety of others; (3) the target of the conduct had financial vulnerability; (4) the conduct involved repeated actions or was an isolated incident; and (5) the harm was the result of intentional malice, trickery, or deceit, or mere accident.  *Id.*
[brief] **CONCLUSION**  For the foregoing reasons, [...]’s sentence must be vacated, and his case remanded for resentencing before a different judge.  At that sentencing, the court must give full and proper mitigating effect to the evidence in the record establishing [...]’s maturity and rehabilitation.  After proper consideration of [...]’s demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation, the court must provide him with the relief as defined by Comer: release from prison via a reduced sentence and a lesser parole bar.
[brief] Finally, the timing and circumstances of this Amended Complaint cannot be understood in a vacuum, disconnected from the reality of what occurred for years in the 2015 Action and was pled in this matter.  As pled in Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint, for years Defendants went above and beyond, and oftentimes into the realm of bad-faith delay tactics, obstruction, perjury, and fraudulent concealment, in order to keep Plaintiffs from obtaining the factual predicates for their new claims.  Had Defendants cooperated in good faith with the discovery process in the 2015 Action instead of requiring Plaintiffs to overcome never-ending motion practice in order to obtain the depositions and documents that the Court ultimately granted, and had Defendants refrained from committing perjury, falsifying documents, and producing false documents to conceal evidence, Plaintiffs would have been able to complete the puzzle years earlier, discover these new claims years earlier, and file a motion to amend in the 2015 Action years earlier.  For the same Defendants who created this situation with their fraudulent conduct to then claim that they are prejudiced if Plaintiffs are allowed to state the claims they discovered overcoming Defendants’ fraudulent conduct, is a profanation of any sense of fairness and justice.
[brief] Id. at 157-58; Palamar, 196 N.J. Super. at 250.  A public entity has the right, as an exercise of business judgment, to require strict conformance to bidding requirements to prevent bidder from playing “fast and loose,” as the Serenity court explained:  In the circumstances before us, we need not decide whether the defects in this bid were material and, hence, non-waivable; or non-material and therefore waivable.  If the defects were material, the municipality was obliged to reject the bid.  If the defects were non-material, the municipality could waive them or, in a valid exercise of sound business judgment that kept faith with the policies underlying our public bidding laws, reject the bid nevertheless.
[brief] T2.37:12-15.  [...] was granted preliminary and final approval for the inclusionary development by the Township Planning Board on May 27, 2021, which approval was memorialized on August 24, 2021.  Pa301.  Neither [...] nor [...] appealed this approval.  Pa188; T2.37:12-15.  [...] completed an application for financial agreement, dated October 11, 2021.  Pa339.  As part of this agreement, the parties agreed to a payment-in-lieu-of-taxes (“PILOT”) to make the creation of an inclusionary affordable housing project economically feasible and successful.  Pa597.  [...] Ordinance No. 22-1766 (“township ordinance”) was adopted on February 22, 2022.  Pa235.  Nearly six years after the initial settlement agreement providing for the redevelopment of the site [...] seeks to develop, [...] and [...] for the first time challenged the redevelopment of the site through appealing the PILOT, even though it had been readily apparent since at least the adoption of the Redevelopment Plan in 2017 that it was likely that a PILOT would be granted to the site, potentially threatening the development of the site altogether.
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[brief] Exhibit A of Certified Statement (the April 14, 2023 email from Court attaching Order dated April 11, 2023, vacating JOC and Dismissing the VOP terminating Probation with A brief Statement of Reasons………………………………………..Aa134-35  Exhibit B of Certified Statement (Email communication from April 10, 2023 to April 14, 2023 indicating Appellant’s Provision of courtesy copies of his motion to vacate the JOC, State’s objection to and the April 14, 2023 email from Court attaching Exhibit A vacating JOC and Dismissing the VOP with A brief Statement of Reasons)………………………………………..Aa136-40  Exhibit C of Certified Statement (April 18, 2023 email from Appellant to Appellees providing Appellees with a copy of Exhibit A and informing them that Notice of Claims would be Filed consistent with the accrual date triggered by Exhibit A………Aa-141-42 Exhibit D of Certified Statement (A copy of the Notice of Claim and Exhibits Served upon Appellees)…………………………..Aa143-232 Exhibit A of Notice of Claim (Duplicate - Email communication from April 10, 2023 to April 14, 2023 indicating Appellant’s Provision of courtesy copies of his motion to vacate the JOC, State’s objection to TABLE OF CONTENT STATEMENT OF ITEMS ON SUMMARY JUDGMENT (Cont’d) Appendix Page and the April 14, 2023 email from Court attaching Exhibit A vacating JOC and Dismissing the VOP with A brief Statement of Reasons)…………………………………Aa219-23 Exhibit B of the Notice of Claim (April 11, 2023, Order Vacating the JOC and Dismissing the VOP with prejudice…Aa224-25 Exhibit C of the Notice of Claim (September 5, 2018, Letter request from Appellant, taking issue with the Court’s refusal to vacate the JOC and to dismiss the VOP….Aa226-27 Exhibit D of the Notice of Claim (May 7, 2018, Notice of Withdrawal of the VOP)………………………………………Aa228 Exhibit E of the Notice of Claim (Oct 17, 2018 erroneously amended JOC)…………………………………………………………Aa229-31 Exhibit F of the Notice of Claim (May 19, 2023 email to Appellees Providing them with a copy of the Notice of Claim)……………………………………………………………Aa232 TABLE OF APPENDIX VOLUME I Appendix Page Verified Complaint……………………………………………………………..Aa1-43 Case Information Statement…………………………………………………Aa44 ORDER on Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the Complaint (Federal) [...] v. State, et al., 20-18885 (DNJ-Aug 8, 2022)………………Aa45-46 TABLE OF CONTENT VOLUME I (Cont’d)
[brief] [...]’ Initial Decision had granted Appellants’ Motion for Summary Decision.  (Ca037-038).  Respondent did not cross-move for summary decision in her favor.  As a result, “rejecting” the Initial Decision which granted summary decision in favor of Appellants effectively denied Appellants’ Motion for Summary Decision.  If Appellants’ Motion for Summary Decision was denied, the matter should have properly been sent back to the Office of Administrative Law for a hearing. \(^3\)  The Complaint should not have been dismissed outright.
[brief] Eichenlaub, supra, 385 F.3d at 285; see also Cherry Hill Towers, L.L.C. v. Twp. of Cherry Hill, 407 F. Supp. 2d 648, 655 (D.N.J. 2006) (“[S]ubstantive due process concerns are not implicated when a plaintiff alleges that a government official merely acted with an improper motive or made a decision based upon any reason unrelated to the merits of the application”).  The allegations at issue in the instant lawsuit do not involve the claims of hostility to constitutionally protected activity on Respondents property, such as, for instance, the selective closing of medical offices for abortion services or discrimination of an ethnic group.  Moreover, this case does not involve any allegations of self-dealing.  The courts have recognized that even a personal animus without more cannot shock the conscience for constitutional purposes in the land use context.  See Am. Marine Rail NJ, LLC v. City of Bayonne, 289 F. Supp. 2d 569, 584 (D.N.J. 2003) (“[I]mproper motives, particularly personal animus toward a plaintiff do not shock the conscience for constitutional purposes”).  Notably, in Eichenlaub, the Third Circuit affirmed an order granting summary judgment on a substantive due process claim brought by a land developer.  The Court held that claims of inconsistent subdivision requirements, unnecessary inspections and enforcements, delay of permits and approvals, and, even, the maligning of the developer did not rise to the level of conscience shocking.  385 F.3d at 286.  The Court emphasized that “there is no allegation of corruption of self-dealing here. ”  Ibid.  Ironically, Respondents’ only case recitation in support of their substantive due process violation claims is to a non-precedential case that, in fact, supports Appellants arguments and illustrates Respondents misapplication of the law.
[brief] Defendant was convicted of murder and related offenses for causing the January 9, 2019, death of [...], a former housemate whom defendant claimed showed up on his family’s porch at night and attacked him when defendant opened the door.  The defense at trial was self-defense, and, as discussed in detail in Point I, infra, the trial judge denied a defense request for the jury to be instructed on passion/provocation manslaughter.
[brief] In Plaintiffs’ Complaint, the requests for relief for Count One include, among other things, declaratory judgment that the LTTEL requirements should have been applied to [...]’s tax abatement application, despite the fact that [...] sought tax abatement under the HMFA law; specifically, Plaintiffs seek judgment:  H.  Declaring that the Long Term Tax Exemption Law superseded, governed and controlled this post April 17, 1992 long term tax exemption transaction [related to the Project]; I.  Declaring that all post April 17, 1992 municipal long term tax exemptions had to be granted to a duly formed urban renewal entity; […] K. Declaring that [...] is entitled to no less than 10% of the Project’s revenues; L. Declaring that the [...] is entitled to 5% of the long term tax exemption payments from any new post 2003 PILOT authorized by [...][.] Compl., Count One.