ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The SFRA, therefore, is entitled to a presumption of constitutionality that can be rebutted “only upon a showing that the statute’s repugnancy to the Constitution is clear beyond a reasonable doubt. ”  *Hamilton Amusement Ctr. v. Verniero*, 156 N.J. 254, 285 (1998); accord *Lewis v. Harris*, 188 N.J. 415, 459 (2006); *Town of Secaucus v. Hudson County Bd. of Taxation*, 133 N.J. 482, 492-93 (1993), cert. denied sub nom., 510 U.S. 1110 (1994).  Appellants erroneously claim that because this court has found that its students were being denied T&E, [...] should be afforded a “special constitutional status” akin to SDA districts,\(^{11}\) and that the Department should bear the burden of establishing the SFRA’s constitutionality as it did in Abbott.\(^{(Ab7-10)}\)
[brief] [2T4-1 to -3].  [...] informed defendant that if defendant refused to come to court, or come out of the holding area, the trial could proceed without him.  [2T5-18 to 7-9].  Defendant asked to use the bathroom after receiving the warnings and then refused to go back into the courtroom.  [2T5-14 to 7-15].  \(^2\) United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967)
[brief] PRELIMINARY STATEMENT.................................................................1  STATEMENT OF FACTS........................................................................4  A.  The First Set of Hearings Leading to the First Remand..................10  B.  The Second Set of Hearings Leading to the Second Remand..........12  C.  The Third Set of Hearings Leading to the Court’s Adjudicated Rent Increase.................................................................15  PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF THIS THIRD SUPERIOR COURT ACTION AND THE COURT’S ADJUDICATED RENT INCREASE................23  ARGUMENT
[brief] *Id.*  The instant matter is differentiated from *Reichert* in that there is no other incident or for that matter, any relevant medical records for comparison.  Consistent with Model Civil Jury Charge 8.11F, this is a case where “…if you find that [plaintiff’s] preexisting illness/injury(ies)/condition was not causing him/her any harm or symptoms at the time of the accident, but that the preexisting condition combined with injuries incurred in the accident to cause him/her damage, then [plaintiff] is entitled to recover for the full extent of the damages he/she sustained…”
[brief] 17  APPENDIX TABLE OF CONTENTS  Request for Representation by the [...] .............  Pa1  Complaint in [...] v. [...] ......................  Pa2 October 16, 2023  Final Agency Decision  [...] v. [...] .........................................................  Pa10  Attorney General Law Enforcement Directive No. 2022-14 ...........................................  Pa14 [...] Internal Affairs Policy & Procedures, November 2022 ..............................................................................................................  Pa28  Amended Notice of Appeal ...............................................................................................  Pa81  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY FAILING TO RECOGNIZE THAT IN THE ABSENCE OF RESTAURANT DEPOT’S DUTY TO RETAIN ANY AND ALL SURVEILLANCE VIDEO SURROUNDING THE EVENTS LEADING UP TO PLAINTIFF’S INJURY, PLAINTIFFS ARE ENTITLED TO AN ADVERSE INFERENCE CHARGE THAT HAD RESTAURANT DEPOT RETAINED SUCH FOOTAGE, SUCH FOOTAGE WOULD HAVE DEPICTED THE FAILURE OF RESTAURANT DEPOT’S EMPLOYEES TO REMEDIATE THE DANGEROUS CONDITION CREATED BY PEREZ-HERNANDEZ’S OVERLOADED U-BOAT (2T.14:17-15:4; 20:19-21:13)  Since [...] failed to preserve any and all of the video surveillance tapes and can no longer produce any of the footage capturing the events leading up to and including the moment Plaintiff was struck by [...] despite [...] having been aware of the reported incident and having knowledge that Plaintiff had been injured, Plaintiffs are now without proofs to support their claim.  Specifically, Plaintiffs cannot rely upon surveillance footage that surely existed and which would have revealed [...] pushing the overloaded U-boat in the presence of [...] employees, those of whom failed to address the dangerous situation that [...] created.  Plaintiff’s testimony supports this contention as, according to Plaintiff, as she walked throughout [...]’s warehouse, and prior to the accident happening, employees were positioned “everywhere. ”  (Pa27)  Therefore, since [...] breached its duty of preserving surveillance footage on the date of the Plaintiff’s incident, the trial court failed to recognize that Plaintiffs are entitled to an adverse inference charge.  Courts, ever since the seventeenth century, have followed the rule “omnia praesumuntur contra spoliatorem,” which translates to “all things are presumed against the destroyer.
[brief] (Ia122-124; 145-148).  The four-page quotation attached to [...]’s email contained various price quotations for [...]’s “Camps, Clinics & Conferences Application” (145-148).  The first page or “Cover Sheet” stated, in bold letters and in a separate, individual paragraph, the following:  **Exclusions:**  In addition, scheduled activities exclusion endorsement applies:  Ropes Course, Tackle Football, Motor Boating, Inflatable Amusement Devices, Carnival Rides, Knockerball/Bubble Soccer, Bungee Devices, Fireworks [sic], Mechanical Bucking Devices: including Multi Ride Attachments, Permanent & Mobile Rock Wall Structures, Security Services Other Than Contracted Law Enforcement Officers, Trampolines, and Zip Lines. (Ia145).  On the second page of the quotation, again in bold letters and a separate, individual paragraph, [...] provides a second list of exclusions.  (Ia146).  This paragraph reads:  **In addition, scheduled activities exclusion endorsement applies:**  Ropes Course, Tackle Football, Motor Boating, Inflatable Amusement Devices, Carnival Rides, Knockerball/Bubble Soccer, Bungee Devices, Fireworks [sic], Mechanical Bucking Devices: including Multi Ride Attachments, Permanent & Mobile Rock Wall Structures, Security Services Other Than Contracted Law Enforcement Officers, Trampolines, and Zip Lines.  (Ia146).  Nothing was mentioned about vans.  Optional “Hired/Nonowned Auto Liability Coverage” is listed on page three of the Quote (Ia146).  This section provides as follows:  **Hired/Nonowned Auto Liability Coverage Options**  Option 1: $150,000  Hired/Non-owned Auto Liability Coverage can be added for an additional premium of $225.00.  Option 2: $500,000  Hired/Non-owned Auto Liability Coverage can be added for an additional premium of $500.00  Option 3: $1,000,000  Hired/Non-owned Auto Liability coverage is available for additional premium subject to a Minimum Premium of $850.00 and our receipt and approval of our Hired/Non-owned Auto supplemental application.  Please note that 12 and 15+ Passenger Vans are excluded.  Please contact me if you would like this application.  Please note all HNOA premiums are Fully Earned at Inception (emphasis in original) (Ia147).  Hidden in “Option 3” is that “12 and 15+ Passenger Vans are excluded,” however, the language is not in bold text, nor does it appear in a separate, individual paragraph.  (Ia147).  Moreover, unlike the application, the language does not specify whether or not the exclusion applies to the option for $150,000, $500,000, or only $1,000,000.  (Ia147).  Later on August 6th, it was confirmed between [...] and [...] that coverage was bound effective that day with $1 million HNOA.  (Ia124).  August 6, 2019 was the day the camp had opened and campers had already been transported in the vans to the camp.  Nine days later, on August 15, 2019, one of the four 15-passenger vans rented by [...] and being driven by a [...] employee was involved in a car accident, severely injuring, among others, Intervenor-Appellant [...].  (Ia014-015).  LEGAL ARGUMENTS
[brief] **B.  The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion By Its Apparent Embrace Of Defendant’s Argument, In Breach Of The Parties’ Settlement Agreement, That The MMWA Gave It The Discretion To Ignore The Rendine Standards And Reduce Or Eliminate To Almost Nothing The Counsel Fees Requested In Plaintiff’s Counsel’s Fee Application.  (Pa16-21). **  In opposing plaintiff’s counsel’s fee application, defendant argued that the trial court’s discretion was broad enough under the MMWA to eliminate plaintiff’s counsel’s fees, if “the court in its discretion” determines that the fees requested “would be inappropriate. ”  (Pa160-175; Pa163); 15 U.S.C. § 2310(d)(2).  In so doing, defendant breached the parties’ confidential settlement agreement, wherein it specifically agreed not to make that argument.  (Pa11; Pa27; Pa45; Pa123).  Also, defendant relied on two unpublished federal opinions, *Sullivan*, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2503 at *4-*21 and *Stitsworth*, 1996, U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1657 at *1-*8, to support its assertion that the court had the discretion to “drastically” reduce or eliminate hours expended in a prevailing party’s fee application.  (Pa163-170).  If the trial court accepted such arguments, as indicated by its reference to these opinions in its written decision, and its elimination of the requested fees by 93 percent, it abused its discretion.  (Pa16-21; Pa232-242; Pa285-289).  Also, if the court did rely on these opinions, it had an obligation to say so explicitly, and to make findings of fact and conclusions of law to support that ruling.  See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Fisher, 408 N.J. Super. 289, 300-01 (App. Div. 2009).  Under either and both these possible scenarios, reversal is warranted.  The court should be instructed on remand to ignore any argument urged by the defendant that deviates from the settlement terms.
[brief] **THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION TO AMEND THE COMPLAINT TO STATE NEWLY DISCOVERED CLAIMS AGAINST [...] (376a–377a)**  When Plaintiffs filed the Complaint on June 11, 2015, they did not know and could not have known that [...] was the sole member of [...].  Consequently, Plaintiffs could not have known at that time that [...] is liable for the torts committed by [...] as sole member of [...], nor that [...] committed legal malpractice when they omitted to Plaintiffs that [...] was the sole member of [...].  Accordingly, at the time they filed the original Complaint, Plaintiffs could not and did not state any tort claims against [...] arising out of his role as sole member of [...].  Moreover, Plaintiffs could not and did not state any legal malpractice claims against [...] arising out of their failure to tell Plaintiffs that [...] was the sole member of [...].
[brief] Pa6-7; T5.25-6.3.  On October 13, 2023, respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint Pursuant to Rule 4:6-2(e) alleging that since the 2012 mortgage was cancelled, there is no mortgage to foreclose.  (Pa10)  On November 6, 2023, appellant cross-moved to amend its Complaint.  Pa55.  In addition to the legitimate causes for reinstatement of the 2012 mortgage and unjust enrichment set forth in its Complaint, the Amended Complaint added a claim for breach of contract under the 2012 Note.
[brief] Additionally evidencing this evolving area of the law are cases currently pending in Maryland, Wisconsin, Florida, and Massachusetts.  See e.g., John & Jane Parents 1 v. Montgomery Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 622 F.Supp. 3d 118 (D. Md. 2022)(holding that parents do not have a fundamental right under the due process clause to be promptly informed of their child’s gender identity currently on appeal to the United States Court of Appeals 4th Cir.); T.F., et al., v. [...], Case No. [...] (Waukesha Cty. Wisconsin Cir. Ct. 2023) (ongoing litigation involving parental challenges to a Kettle Morraine, Wisconsin School District policy concerning change of students’ names and gender pronouns at school without parental consent).  Thus, it is impossible to establish by clear and convincing evidence that the State’s claim is a well-settled legal right.  Notwithstanding the several pending lawsuits concerning this issue, there is ongoing social discourse in the media and academia on the interplay of transgender student rights and the rights and obligations of school districts and parents.  See, e.g., Da216-222 and Da224-232.  It cannot go unnoticed that a school is not a traditional public accommodation.  While the District acknowledges that transgender students are protected by the LAD, the District also has other legal obligation to parents of this students.  Amended Policy 5756 and its regulation carefully consider each of those rights and obligations and applies only in the narrowest of circumstances.  The Court’s decision is devoid of any analysis whatsoever of the specific provisions of the policies and their implementing regulations.  This is an abuse of discretion and must be reversed because, as the devil is always in the details, the manner in which the policies are applied – as outlined in the regulations – pass legal muster.  See Da162-165 and Da262-265.  Here, the Court latched onto any well-settled legal right in an attempt to satisfy this *Crowe* element because there is no well-settled jurisprudence concerning parental notification when a transgender student changes their formal legally-defined mandated student record.  As such, the Court abused its discretion and the injunction must be reversed and vacated.
[brief] (2T29-2T30).  Plaintiffs’ counsel sought to lift that designation at the very start of trial, and the trial court refused.  (3T41-3T42)  Consequently, [...] and [...] were not parties, but remained on the verdict sheet.  By subsequently reconsidering this Burt defendant status, the trial court converted them to “empty chair” defendants despite the absence of any recognized basis for trial to proceed against these doctors as “empty chair” parties.  This left [...] both: 1) responsible for the entirety of the verdict, with no allocation; and 2) unable to bind Dr. [...] to the allocation for purposes of his contribution rights.  Self-evidently, [...] did not ask for this outcome. \(^2\)  The CNA speaks to allocation among parties to the action.  N.J.S.A. 2A:15-5.3.  A joint tortfeasor is entitled to a percentage allocation as to all such potential tortfeasors, regardless of how those tortfeasors were joined as parties the action.  Lee’s Hawaiian Islanders, Inc. v. Safety First Products, Inc., 195 N.J. Super. 493, 506 (App. Div. 1984).  --- \(^2\)  On this point, plaintiffs’ statement that [...] “got exactly the trial for which he asked” is inapposite.  The issue in this case is not whether the trial was properly conducted under the Burt framework (it was), but whether, after the verdict, the trial court imposed a different legal framework when entering judgment (i.e., the “empty chair” defendant) framework.
[brief] Nevertheless, apparently Defendant wishes to use part of the complaint to support his position but exclude the other part from the Courts’ consideration.  The position is completely without merit as the following reveals.  Municipal appeals are taken in accordance with Rule 7:13-1 which, in turn, refers to Rule 3:23.  Per Rule 3:23-4(a), the municipal court clerk “shall” deliver the complaint and judgment of conviction to the Law Division.  Pleadings in municipal court actions “shall consist only of the complaint. ”  Rule 7:7-1.  A failure of this Court to consider it is reversible error.  See, State v. Emmett, 108 N.J. Super. 322, 325–26, (App. Div. 1970) (The Law Division acquitted the defendant because it was not supplied with the complaint and judgement of conviction.
[brief] The Court stated that the “return on investment [cannot be] limited to initial or cash investment and the original investment [must] be equated with current dollar values so as to assure a fair return. ”  103 N.J. at 368.  It held that [...]’s ordinance, as applied, was constitutional because the trial court properly “adjust[ed] the investment base of the operator to reflect the owner’s actual cash investment updated for inflation. ”  103 N.J. at 371.  Adopting the trial court’s holding that the ordinance would be confiscatory “to the extent that it did not adjust the owner’s investment for inflation,” the Supreme Court upheld the validity of [...]’s ordinance, because “it was precisely this ability to adjust that original investment for inflation that enabled the ordinance to survive the facial challenge.
[brief] After the close of all of the evidence and the Court’s charge on the law, the jury was tasked with determining whether Defendant breached the operating agreement of [...]; breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing; acted grossly negligent or with willful misconduct in violation of the New Jersey Limited Liability Company Act (N.J.S.A. 42:2C-39); tortiously interfered with Plaintiff’s prospective economic advantage, committed fraud, and whether the assessment of punitive damages against Defendant were warranted.
[brief] The Court’s finding, that no suspicious circumstances were present to shift the burden of proof onto Respondent is so manifestly unsupported by and inconsistent with the competent, relevant and reasonably credible evidence as to offend the interests of justice.  The Court’s ruling is also inconsistent with applicable law that “suspicious circumstances need only be slight.  The Court’s rulings are erroneous and should be set aside in the interests of justice.  See, Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Investors Ins. Co., 65 N.J. 474, 484 (1974); see also Beck v. Beck, 86 N.J. 480, 496 (1981).  E
[brief] Moreover, even if there were a basis to conclude that the litigation had become frivolous after the representatives of [...] and [...] had been deposed, R. 1:4-8 "imposes a temporal limitation on any fee award, and a reasonable award may only be awarded from the point where it becomes clear that the action is frivolous."  LoBiondo v. Schwartz, 199 N.J. 62, 65 (2009).  Thus, it was inappropriate for the court to impose frivolous litigation sanctions dating back to the date of the safe harbor letter.  At that point in time, no parties had been deposed about the unauthorized entries and excavation in connection with [...]’s site plan.  **PLAINTIFFS’ OPPOSITION TO THE CROSS APPEAL OF [...]
[brief] The Court, however, did not engage in any sort of analysis as to whether it made commercial sense for the Plaintiff to require a personal guaranty for the type of transactions involved.  That was not part of its analysis at all.  Instead the Court relied upon the quoted language solely to support its conclusion that it was necessary to find evidence that the alleged guarantor intended to be bound by a personal guaranty (picking up on the reasonable expectations part of the language).  683 F. Supp. 2d. 319, 328.  The above discussion clearly demonstrates that [...] has misapplied the language quoted from Ctr. 48 in order to distract from the correct analysis which is to focus on whether the alleged personal guaranty is clear and unequivocal or ambiguous and whether the alleged guarantor intended to be personally bound.  Nothing in Ctr. 48 suggests any other analysis for the determination of whether a personal guaranty exists in the first place.  3.
[brief] ”  It defines ‘Substantial’ as “of real worth and importance, of considerable value. ”  After 120 pages of transcribed testimony, addressing technical stormwater and septic questions in an unrefuted manner, and acknowledging the fully cleared front yard and 120-foot setback of [...], the [...] failed to reasonably conclude that the “negative” criteria had not been successfully addressed.  They omitted reference to them, similarly to their failure to enunciate the “positive” criteria realized in this application.  **CONCLUSION**
[brief] 1  PROCEDURAL HISTORY.......................................................  2 STATEMENT OF FACTS.......................................................  2  LEGAL ARGUMENT...........................................................  2  I.  RESPONDENT CLEARLY HELD HERSELF OUT AS A MEMBER OF THE BOARD (Ca014-019).  .........................  2  II.  RESPONDENT ENGAGED IN CONDUCT  WHICH NOT ONLY HAD THE POTENTIAL TO COMPROMISE THE BOARD – BUT WHICH ACTUALLY DID COMPROMISE THE BOARD (Ca014-019).  ....  7  III.  RESPONDENT’S ILL-DEFINED  FIRST AMENDMENT  ARGUMENT FAILS BECAUSE IT WAS WAIVED BELOW, AND BECAUSE THE LEGISLATURE AND THE COMMISSION HAVE SPOKEN CLEARLY ON THIS ISSUE (Ca014-019).............  10  CONCLUSION .................................................................
[brief] DESPITE THE CLEAR AND CONSPICUOUS EVIDENCE THAT THE OPERATIVE AGREEMENT CONTAINED AN ENFORCEABLE ARBITRATION CLAUSE, THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN REFUSING TO ORDER ARBITRATION (1a, 2T at 56:20-25)  Upon the showing of clear and conspicuous expression of intent to arbitrate all claims and waive a party’s right to a jury trial, an arbitration provision is entitled to enforcement.  Goffe, 454 N.J. Super. at 27.  Whether a party understood the import of it or did not have it explained to her by the benefitting party is simply inadequate to avoid enforcement of a clear and conspicuous arbitration agreement that both parties signed.  Goffe, 238 N.J. 212–13 (2019) citing Borough of West Caldwell v. Borough of Caldwell, 26 N.J. 9, 24-25 (1958) (stating the basic principle that an enforceable contract exists where a written agreement is “sufficiently definite in its terms that the performance to be rendered by each party can be ascertained with reasonable certainty”).  Appellants presented the Operative Agreement to the trial Court, which was duly signed by the Parties.  [...] testified that all employees were required to sign an employment agreement containing an arbitration clause and [...] was no different.  2T at 9:11-21.  [...] also testified that she signed such an agreement in early 2019.  403a-404a, 13:15-14:1.  In fact, the overwhelming evidence presented at the hearing is that she signed an agreement containing the same arbitration clause as all of the other employees who signed employment agreements (both before and after) the date of the Operative Agreement.  **CONCLUSION**  For all of the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully submitted that the Court reverse the trial Court and compel Respondent to arbitrate her claims.
[brief] Second, neither Plaintiffs nor [...] allege [...]’s injuries were caused by a misuse of [...]’ property.  Third, there was no evidence presented at trial that supported the inference that [...] had ever engaged in misconduct prior to the incident.  [...] witnesses described [...] as a model employee who was always courteous and respectful and who was never disciplined or reprimanded.  Unlike the elements of negligent training and supervision set forth in G.A.H., the Restatement standard is intended to establish a duty to prevent harm caused by dangerous conduct of employees when they are on the employer’s premises but off-duty, see cmt. b to § 317, or to prevent an ongoing, continuous harm which the employer has knowledge of and occurs while the employee is working.
[brief] A.  The County’s Appellate Arguments are Untimely Raised and Should Not be Considered (Raised for first time on Appeal)  Pursuant to Rule 2:4-1(a), “appeals from final judgments of courts . . . shall be filed within 45 days of their entry. ”  Rule 2:4-2 also provides that “[c]ross appeals from final judgments, orders administrative decisions or actions . . . may be taken by serving and filing a notice of cross appeal . . . within 15 days after the service of the notice of appeal. ”  Where, as here, a party fails to timely file a notice of appeal or notice of cross-appeal, it is precluded from appealing the lower court’s decision.