ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] Wherever possible, such notice shall be given before the student has been taken off of school property.  Where the student is a juvenile, all information concerning the circumstances of the arrest shall be provided to the building principal on a confidential basis.  See N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-60c.  2.  Arrests of Non-Students on School Grounds.  Where a person other than an enrolled student is arrested on school property, the building principal shall be advised as to the circumstances of the offense and the identity of the offender, provided that where the person arrested is a juvenile, the law enforcement agency or officer involved shall not divulge any information which would violate the laws governing the disclosure of juvenile information.  3.  Arrests of Students off School Grounds During Operating School Hours.  Where a student is arrested off of school property during operating school hours, or under circumstances which would lead the arresting officer to believe that a school official was responsible for the care and custody of the student at the time of the arrest, or where the arresting officer reasonably believes that the student was in transit between school and his home at the time of arrest, the arresting officer shall as soon as is practicable notify the building principal of the school in which the student is enrolled.
[brief] Here -- just like in Carrero -- if the jury rejected self-defense, the evidence provided a rational basis for giving the instruction on passion/provocation manslaughter as a lesser-included offense.  The evidence -- from the State’s case -- provided a rational basis for the jury to conclude any of the following: (1) after defendant and [...] had sex, they had drinks and watched a movie, and [...] wanted to have sex again, but defendant refused (1T 91-4 to 7; 1T 106-13 to 112-16); (2) [...] then “attacked” defendant “with fists” and the two men then “struggled,” whereupon defendant realized that [...] was brandishing a knife.  (2T 219-16; 2T 222-20 to 22; 4T 12-3 to 5); (3) they then “struggled” further, and defendant “got hold of the knife” and “stabbed” [...].  (4T 12-5 to 7)  As in Carrero, there were two reasons -- independently or together -- to charge passion/provocation manslaughter.
[brief] ”  (2T:23-7 to 24-24)  The court imposed an aggregate sentence of 55 years, and the JOC was later amended to include the correct parole ineligibility term of 46 years and 9 months pursuant to NERA.  (Da 21-24)  On June 25, 2015, [...]’s twenty-year-old co-defendant, [...], pled guilty to an amended charge of aggravated manslaughter.
[brief] A.  The trial court was not Bound by the January 25, 2022 Order with Respect to a Settlement Conference.  The Defendants state that the trial court was obligated to compel the parties to attend a settlement conference pursuant to [...]’s January 25, 2022 Order (Da15, at ¶5) under a “principle of judicial continuity, which requires the enforcement of orders through the life cycle of a case, irrespective of changes in judicial assignments, to ensure fairness and maintain consistency in legal proceedings. ”  (Db 22).  The Defendants do not cite any authority for such a principle, and a search of “judicial continuity” does not reveal a single reported New Jersey case in which that phrase appears.  It would be contrary to the role of a trial judge, and contrary to justice, to require a succeeding judge to follow prior rulings in a case where the only basis for doing so is the fact that another judge had entered those rulings.  Circumstances change commonly in litigation and tying a trial court’s hands in that manner deprives the court of the discretion necessary to oversee a case.  It appears that the Defendants are arguing something akin to the Law of the Case Doctrine, which is intended to prevent relitigation of a previously resolved issue.
[brief] R. 2:3-1 dictates when the State may seek leave to appeal in a criminal action.  Subsection (b)(5) under R. 2:3-1 provides:  “[i]n any criminal action[,] the State may. . . seek leave to appeal pursuant to R. 2:5-6(a).  . . to the appropriate appellate court from. . . an interlocutory order entered before, during, or after trial. ”  All such orders, except cases involving the suppression of evidence seized pursuant to a search warrant, which are appealable under R. 2:3-1(b)(2), are appealable by the State under this provision.  Mandel, New Jersey Appellate Practice, § 18:5-2(b)(6) (2016).  The general key to determining whether a particular order is interlocutory or final turns on the question of whether it disposes of all of the issues in controversy and as to all parties.  In re Old Colony Coal Co., 49 N.J. Super. 117, 123 (App. Div. 1958).  If an order does not finally determine the entire case and there are further steps necessary before the court to fully adjudicate the matter, the order is interlocutory.  See generally, R. 2:2-4; Moon v. Warren Haven Nursing Home, 182 N.J. 507 (2005).  Here, the lower court’s order is interlocutory because although the defendant was deemed clinically and legally eligible for Recovery Court, the underlying criminal case is still pending.  Defendant has not entered a guilty plea, been adjudicated by a jury at trial, or otherwise been sentenced on the various theft, burglary, and criminal mischief counts in the Indictment.  Pursuant to R. 2:3-1(b)(5), the State is permitted to seek leave to appeal from an interlocutory order entered before trial.  This Court may grant leave to appeal only when the interest of justice so requires.  R. 2:2-4.  Leave to appeal is granted only sparingly.  State v. Reldan, 100 N.J. 187, 205 (1985).  However, “where there is some showing of merit and justice calls for. . . interference in the cause” and “where some grave damage or injustice may be caused by the order below” the appellate court will exercise its discretion to grant leave to appeal.  Romano v. Maglio, 41 N.J. Super. 561, 568 (App. Div. 1956).  This case presents a matter of first impression.
[directive] Our public institutions cannot function properly without the trust of the people they serve.  Far too often that trust has been violated by officials who have abused their positions and undermined confidence in our system of government.  We cannot restore that trust unless we root out those who engage in misconduct and hold them accountable.  At the same time, we must work collaboratively to design policies and protocols that prevent impropriety, combat corruption, and promote good, effective governance.  Last year, I announced the creation of a new unit – the [...] (the Office, or [...]) – to strengthen public confidence in government institutions.  The Office was tasked with a dual mission: to investigate violations of public trust and to develop policies that would rebuild faith in both government and our criminal justice system.  Given the Office’s success over the past year, I have decided to formally establish [...] by Attorney General Directive, creating a more defined organizational structure and ensuring the Office’s long-term role within the [...] (the Department).
[brief] See State v. Profaci, 56 N.J. 346, 349 (1970) (addressing various substantive attacks on the LRHL); and see Gallenthin, supra, 191 N.J. at 359-60 (citing State v. Miller, 170 N.J. 417, 433 (2002) (“Even through a statute may be open to a construction which would render it unconstitutional or permits its unconstitutional application, it is the duty of this Court to so construe the statute as to render it constitutional if it is reasonably susceptible to such interpretation. ”).
[brief] When, as here, a defendant has been convicted of a lesser-included offense, the appellate Court may in deciding a motion for judgment NOV review the entire record, including the defendant’s case.  *State v. Sugar* [IV], 240 N.J. Super. 148 (App. Div.), certif. den., 122 N.J. 187 (1990).  In the case at bar, even giving the State the benefit all its favorable evidence and of all the favorable inferences that could reasonably be drawn therefrom, there was simply not enough for the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that [...] had known of [...]’s intention to attempt to kill [...] and [...], let alone that he had conspired with [...] to commit that offense.
[brief] The Judge noted Defendant’s reliance on the unpublished opinion of State v. Vargas\(^2\) in arguing that the factual basis for his plea was inadequate because he was never questioned about his BAC and that it was only [...] who discussed Defendant’s BAC with [...].  (3T19-10 to 19-20)  [...] then cited the denial of Defendant’s motion by [...] who had found a sufficient factual basis for the plea based on the totality of the plea entered; the entire colloquy between Defendant and [...]; and [...]’s acceptance of [...]’s representation regarding Defendant’s .17 BAC coupled with the entry of the Alcotest worksheet into evidence.  (3T20-5 to 20-22) --- \(^2\) 2020 WL5415322 (App. Div. September 10, 2020)  [...] acknowledged that *State v. Tate*, 220 N.J. 393, 403-404 (2015), imposed a de novo standard of review upon a reviewing court presented with a motion to vacate a guilty plea for lack of an adequate factual basis.
[directive] Additionally, does the defendant and counsel understand that defense counsel must verify the appointment with Pretrial Services?  If Yes, defense counsel, please provide your contact information so that Pretrial Services can verify attorney visits prior to approval.  Other requests to allow defendant to leave the home:  1.  Purpose of leave: Frequency: Length: Comment: 2.  Purpose of leave: Frequency: Length: Comment: 3.  Purpose of leave: Frequency: Length: Comment: Form Promulgated by Directive #19-23 (10/17/2023), CN: 12973 page 4 of 5  Home Detention Screening Criteria (for Home Detention as a Condition of Pretrial Release)
[brief] (“Home inspectors and other licensed semi-professionals are not learned professionals simply because they are otherwise regulated”).  Quite plainly, if the legislature intended to exempt semi-professional it would have done so in the many decades that this issue has been before the courts.  The more recent case law has reiterated that semi-professionals like the insurance salesman in the present case would not be except under the CFA.  Earlier this year, in Williams-Hopkins v. [...], No A-0273-21, 2024 WL 1476821 at *16 (April 5, 2024), the Appellate Division made clear that its reasoning in Plemmons would not apply to semi-professionals:  The types of professionals protected by the exception include doctors, id. at 346, and attorneys, Vort v. Hollander, 257 N.J. Super. 56, 62 (App. Div. 1992).  In Shaw v. Shand, 460 N.J. Super. 592 (App. Div. 2019), we concluded “‘semi-professionals’ who are regulated by a separate regulatory scheme,” such as home inspectors, were not covered by the exception.  Id. at 599.  We explained the exception “must be narrowly construed to exempt CFA liability only as to those professionals who have historically been recognized as ‘learned’ based on the requirement of extensive learning or erudition. ”  Ibid.  To the extent prior decisions relied upon regulation of semi-professionals to hold otherwise, as in Plemmons v. Blue Chip Insurance Services, Inc., 387 N.J. Super. 551, 564 (App. Div. 2006) and Atlantic Ambulance Corporation v. Cullum, 451 N.J. Super. 247 at 257-58 (App. Div. 2017), we found such rationale “inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s decision in Lemelledo v. Beneficial Management Corp. of America, 150 N.J. 255 (1997). ”  Shaw, 460 N.J. Super. at 599, 616 . . .  In other words, semi-professionals are not encompassed in the learned professional exemption simply because they are subject to regulation.  This court should again make clear that the CFA does not exempt semi-professionals, including insurance salesmen, agents, and brokers.  CONCLUSION
[brief] In most circumstances, New Jersey courts follow the “American Rule,” which prohibits recovery of counsel fees by the prevailing party against the losing party, and which serves the threefold purposes of ensuring unrestricted access to the courts, “ensuring equity by not penalizing persons for exercising their right to litigate a dispute,” and administrative convenience.  See \textit{Niles}, supra. 176 N.J. at 294.  \textsuperscript{20}  See \textit{Grubbs v. Knoll}, 376 N.J.Super. 420, 430, 870 A.2d 713 (App. Div. 2005).  In fixing counsel fees, a trial judge must ensure that the award does not cover effort expended on independent claims that happen to be joined with claims for which counsel is entitled to the attorney fees.
[brief] E.  There is No Conflict of Interest Under RPC 1.7(a) or RPC 1.10 that Prohibits [...] From Continuing its Representation of the Defendants-Respondents In this Consolidated Matter ..............................................................................................................  16  i.  There is No Concurrent Conflict of Interests Under RPC 1.7(a)  .................................................................18  ii.  There is No Conflict of Interest Under RPC 1.10(a)  ........................................................................21  F.  Disqualifying [...] From Representing the Defendants-Respondents at this Stage of the Proceedings, Particularly Where No Conflict of Interest Exists and the Defendants-Respondents Have Not Requested that [...] Withdraw, Would be Unduly Prejudicial to the Defendants-Respondents  .........................22  CONCLUSION
[brief] Appellant testified that he had no other complaints about or interactions with [...], though Appellant did attend another Covid-19 training conducted by [...] within two weeks of the incident.  Pa52, T85:5-9; Pa54, T92:9-19: T91:12-14: T93:4-13.  Following the incident and investigation into same, Appellant testified that he was not aware of negative comments about his complaint other than unspecified chatter and gossip.  Pa58-59 T109:16-110:2.  Appellant never complained of any gossip to his superiors.  Pa59, T110:18.  He testified that he was not aware of any other “mocking comments” other than those alleged to have been made by [...].  Pa52, T82:4-9.  Though he testified to some awkwardness from members of the department who were not on his shift, this again was unspecified by Appellant.  Pa59, T112:14-19.  Appellant admitted that he was not disciplined as a result of his complaint, nor did he lose pay, receive any demotion, or suffer any loss of benefits.  Pa59, T111:8-18; Pa60, T114:4; and P43, T46:9-20.  Despite his uneasiness about the incident and belief if would negatively impact his career, Appellant testified that he was nominated for and voted into the position of assistant treasurer for his union, [...], in 2021.  Pa41, T40:21; T41:12-25.  Importantly, as a result of the incident, Appellant did not acquire any medical leave, nor did he receive any treatment, including therapy or mental health treatment.  Pa59, T110:21-24.  Denial of Summary Judgment and Grant of Reconsideration.
[brief] \(^9\)  Pennsylvania courts agree, holding the “regardless of whether or not” language merely clarifies that any contributory negligence by an indemnitee will not bar their indemnification for damages due to an indemnitior’s negligence.  Greer v. City of Philadelphia, 568 Pa. 244, 250 (Sup. Ct. Pa 2002).  \(^{10}\)  [...]’s reliance on the Supreme Court of the United States case of United States v. Seckinger is misplaced.
[brief] The court’s ruling produced an unjust result by holding Defendant 100% responsible for a damage award based on claims that Defendant could not be found liable for as a matter of law.  Therefore, at a minimum, the Court should apportion liability against Defendant only for the Disputed Transactions that were purportedly deposited into her and [...]’s joint bank account.  36T36-11 to 37-9.  POINT VIII
[directive] Section 6.4.1(5) of the Revised Brimage Guidelines provides that a defendant is not eligible for a standardized waiver offer unless the prosecutor is satisfied that the “defendant at the time of the present offense was not subject to official .”1 supervision (i.e., e.g., parole, probation, ISP, etc.) . .  A question has been raised whether a defendant would be eligible for a standardized “flat” offer if at the time of the present offense he or she was participating in a Pretrial Intervention (PTI) Program.  The above-quoted parenthetical was intended only to provide a non-exhaustive list of various types of “official supervision. ”  Pretrial Intervention is clearly a form of official supervision within the meaning of the Guidelines.  So too, conditional discharge under N.J. S.A. 2C:36A-1 represents a type of supervisory treatment that constitutes official supervision for purposes of the revised Brimage Guidelines.  Accordingly, any defendant who has abused the opportunity of Pretrial Intervention or conditional discharge by committing a Brimage-eligible offense while participating in such a diversion program shall be ineligible to receive a standardized waiver offer.
[brief] The cost analysis does not take into consideration promotions into the unit (Firefighter to Captain), promotions intra unit (Captain to Battalion Chief, or Battalion Chief to Deputy Chief), salary step changes, or longevity increases.  Further, the arbitrator failed to address or consider breakage even though the units had a considerable number of retirements of high salaried fire officers (32 retirements in the unit) and promotions at lower salary levels during the period covered by the Award, August 1, 2019 through December 31, 2023.
[brief] This is a classic consumer fraud case.  Defendants falsely advertised the size of the condominium units sold to consumers at a high-rise residential building in Jersey City.  Plaintiffs were born in Shanghai, China.  English is not their native language.  (Da1219, 1221).  They signed the SPA on December 23, 2017 before retaining counsel and before ever being given access to, or a copy of, the POS.  On January 5, 2018, [...] emailed to Plaintiffs the fully executed SPA along with a link for electronic access to the POS.  (Da361).  Notably, [...] and its counsel herein, [...], told all prospective purchasers that [...] would not allow any changes to be made to its form contract and that, under paragraph 9 of the SPA (Da165), [...] would not allow any third-parties to accompany the purchaser on any walk-through inspection prior to closing.  Plaintiffs’ SPA is identical to the ones signed by the buyers of the other 52 units in the four pending actions.  Section 13 of the SPA (Da169) sets forth the purported arbitration clause.
[brief] Thus, our courts generally have treated a conditional use that does not comply with all the conditions of the ordinance as if it were a prohibited use, imposing on the applicant the same burden of proving special reasons as it would impose on applicants for use variances.  In our view, that standard is plainly inappropriate and does not adequately reflect the significant differences between prohibited uses, on the one hand, and conditional uses that do not comply with one or more of the conditions imposed by an ordinance, on the other hand.  *In the case of prohibited uses, the high standard of proof required to establish special reasons for a use variance is necessary to vindicate the municipality's determination that the use ordinarily should not be allowed in the zoning district.*
[brief] *State v. Preciose*, 129 N.J. 451, 462-63 (1992).  Mere dissatisfaction with counsel's judgment is insufficient to warrant overturning a conviction.  *State v. Echols*, 199 N.J. 344, 358 (2009), (quoting *Castagna*, 187 N.J. at 314).  The court “must judge the reasonableness of counsel's challenged conduct on the facts of the particular case, viewed as of the time of counsel's conduct,” ibid., without the “distorting effects of hindsight. ”  *State v. Hess*, 207 N.J. 123, 147 (2011).  Generally, “except in those rare instances where they are of such magnitude as to thwart the fundamental guarantee of [a] fair trial,” strategic miscalculations or trial mistakes are insufficient to warrant reversal.  *State v. Buonadonna*, 122 N.J. 22, 42 (1991); *State v. Perry*, 124 N.J. 128, 153 (1991) (refusing to second-guess counsel’s trial strategy); *State v. Thomas*, 245 N.J. Super. 428, 432 (App. Div. 1991).
[brief] The Borough only took title to what today is a minor, small *de minimis* strip of land on part of line-item Lot: 3.  This was [...]’s contention, and it was supported by the evidence; moreover, the legal premise as articulated in the Panetta decision was not disputed by the experts on either side.  Thus, the facts and the law do not support the Trial Courts decision.  Despite the volumes of documentary evidence (mostly Deeds and Maps), most of which were drafted and filed of record with the government well over 100 years ago, this case was ultimately reduced to title expert assessment of these old Maps and Deeds on file to determine whether in fact the [...] ever actually took or acquired legal title to the subject property (the majority of property described today as line item Lot: 3 and all of line item Lot: 3.01) in the October 23, 1939 Foreclosure Decree.
[brief] PROCEDURAL HISTORY  On January 14, 2022, the Board filed an unfair practice charge (PERC Dkt. No. [...]) against the Association.  On February 9, 2022, the Association filed a cross-unfair practice charge (PERC Dkt. No. [...]) against the Board.  Each party alleged the other’s actions in connection with negotiations for a successor to their 2019-2022 collective negotiations agreement (CNA) violated the Act.  The Board alleged the Association violated the Act by refusing to negotiate without the presence, as part of its negotiations team, of a “Bargaining Council” that was open to all Association members.  The Association alleged the Board violated the Act by refusing to negotiate in the presence of the Bargaining Council.  The parties filed position statements and, on February 28, 2023, PERC’s Deputy Director of Unfair Practices issued a Consolidated Complaint, finding that the allegations in the consolidated charges, if true, may constitute unfair practices.  The parties then filed answers, affirmative defenses and exhibits.  On June 15, 2023, the parties filed with PERC a Joint Stipulation of Facts (JSF) together with Joint Exhibits, and agreed to submit the matter to the full Commission for a final agency decision, waiving a hearing examiner’s report and recommended decision.  After briefing by the parties, the Commission issued its final agency decision on October 26, 2023, finding the Board violated sections 5.4a(5) and, derivatively, 5.4a(1) of the Act, when it refused to meet and negotiate with the Association in the presence of Bargaining Council members.  The Commission ordered the Board to, among other things, negotiate in good faith with the Association over mandatorily negotiable subjects, including over negotiations ground rules respecting the presence of the Bargaining Council during negotiations sessions.  The Commission dismissed the Board’s charge against the Association.  This appeal ensued.