ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] N.J.S.A.  Enforcement  General Law Attorney after Court Supreme the by adopted ultimately :26-1, as 3 this thus and offenses, persons disorderly petty include not does issued, was 2016-6 Directive statute the Specifically, offenses).  persons disorderly petty to apply not does Directive complaint- by charged defendants (i.e., defendants eligible of detention pretrial authorizes involving offense anon-indictable or crime indictable an with charged are who warrant)
[brief] [...] IN OPPOSITION TO APPEAL AND IN SUPPORT OF CROSS-APPEAL  [...]  [...] [...] [...] [...]  Attorneys for Respondent  [...] Of Counsel and on the Brief  [...] (#044381988)  [...]  On the Brief: [...] (#032502011)  [...]  Dated: October 24, 2022 TABLE OF CONTENTS Page TABLE OF JUDGMENTS AND ORDERS BEING APPEALED…………… ii TABLE OF AUTHORITIES…………………………………………………………….. iii PRELIMINARY STATEMENT…………………………………………………………..1 PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND COUNTERSTATEMENT OF FACTS…2 LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT AGAINST [...], A NON-PARTY THAT WAS NEVER SERVED WITH ANY COMPLAINT AND AGAINST WHOM DEFAULT WAS NEVER REQUESTED OR ENTERED (Pa3419) ………………………………………………………………..7 POINT II THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY DENYING [...]’S CROSS-MOTION FOR SANCTIONS (Pa3430)………………..11 CONCLUSION …………………………………………………………………………..17 TABLE OF JUDGMENTS AND ORDERS BEING APPEALED
[brief] The same conclusion should be made herein.  Indeed, the alternative would have the effect of calling into question the title of nearly every property in New Jersey wherein a riparian grant was previously obtained by the current title holder’s predecessor, yet omitted from any deed in the chain of title.  It is doubtful that the Supreme Court intended such a result in *Panetta*.  Hence, the Court in *Panetta* was careful to note that if a deed were to inadvertently omit an adjacent riparian grant, the deed should be construed and reformed to conform to the parties’ actual intent.
[directive] It is incumbent upon a law enforcement agency to ensure that its members are fit to safely and effectively perform the duties of their profession.  If, for whatever reason, an officer's fitness for duty is questioned, the agency must have the officer evaluated by competent professionals to answer that question.  If a law enforcement executive, commander, supervisor or internal affairs investigator has reasonable concerns about an officer’s fitness for duty, they are obligated to begin the process necessary to obtain that evaluation.  If the officer in question is obviously unfit for duty, the officer in authority may effect an immediate suspension pending the outcome of the evaluation and investigation.  See Section 5.2 (“Immediate Suspension Pending Investigation and Disposition”).  2.4.3
[brief] ”  Terranova, 2023 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS at *17-18.  The court determined that [...] was not entitled to indemnification because [...] failed to establish [...]’s negligence.  Id. at *18-19.  As a final example, in 2022, the Appellate Division handed down its decision in Vladichak v. Mt. Creek Ski Resort, Inc., 2022 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 606 (App. Div. April 13, 2022) (See TPDa58-TBDa64).
[brief] **District Court – Plaintiff’s motion for leave to file a Third Amended Complaint. **  On August 2, 2018, Plaintiff filed a motion to amend his pleading and submit a Third Amended Complaint.  Defendants filed their opposition on September 4, 2018.  (Da014, District Court Docket Report, ECF #54).  On September 11, 2018, Plaintiff submitted a motion for an extension of time to file his reply in support of his motion to amend.  (Da014, District Court Docket Report, ECF #56).  Plaintiff’s motion for an extension was granted.  (Da015, District Court Docket Report, ECF #58).  Plaintiff then submitted yet another motion for an extension of time to file his reply on November 7, 2018.  (Da015, District Court Docket Report, ECF #59).  On November 19, 2018, Plaintiff then submitted an “amended” motion for a further extension of time to file his reply.  (Da015, District Court Docket Report, ECF #60).  Finally, on December 2, 2018, Plaintiff submitted his reply brief.  (Da016, District Court Docket Report, ECF # 63).  On March 18, 2019, oral argument was held regarding Plaintiff’s motion to file his Third Amended Complaint.  (Da017, District Court Docket Report, ECF #73).  On March 19, 2019, Plaintiff’s motion to file his Third Amended Complaint was denied.  (Da017, District Court Docket Report, ECF #74).  Plaintiff, however, was provided yet another opportunity to file an amended pleading, with the March 19, 2019, Order providing specific directives to Plaintiff.  (Da170-172).  The deadline for Plaintiff to file his new motion to amend was April 15, 2019.  (Da170-172).
[brief] Particularly here, where the request implicates the entire mailbox of an official charged with making extraordinarily sensitive decisions related to student records, personnel or disciplinary proceedings, or collective negotiations, see (Da43-44)—all of which would be exempt from disclosure, N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1.1—it is beyond dispute that [...]’s custodian would not be in a position to review these records unilaterally, even if it were proper for the custodian to review those emails in the first instance.  Fisher, 400 N.J. Super. at 73 (“[A]ttorney e-mails may involve highly sensitive materials that should not be seen even by other employees of the public agency.  This would be particularly true of e-mails dealing with personnel and other internal matters prepared by deputy and assistant attorneys general occupying supervisory positions within the Division of Law. ”).  Second, and more importantly, even if the task of reviewing the records could easily be overcome, the chill on employee decision-making, discussion, and interaction if this OPRA request is permitted to stand cannot be overstated.  While OPRA is construed in favor of public access, see (Db6) (citing N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1), our courts have repeatedly recognized the importance of promoting the free flow of communications within an agency, emphasizing that the government cannot be forced to operate “in a fishbowl[,]” Educ. Law Ctr., 198 N.J. at 288; see also id. at 300-01 (“If communication that formed part of an agency’s pre-decisional process could be disclosed after the decision has been released, one of the major justifications for the [deliberative process] privilege in the first place—maintaining the free flow of communication within an agency—would be rendered meaningless.
[brief] It is recognized that disqualification/recusal may not apply where a Court has made a ruling only on a Motion for Summary Judgment and/or a preliminary evidential ruling, on documentary evidence alone and solely legal in nature.  See *Matthews v. Deane* 196 N.J. Super. 441, 444-445(Ch. Div. 1984); *Hundred East Credit Corp. v. Schuster*, 212 N.J. Super. 350,358(App. Div. 1986).
[directive] Tel: 609-376-3000  Fax: 609-376-3002 • • TO: Assignment Judges  DIRECTIVE # 05 -21  Criminal Presiding Judges  FROM: [...], J.A.D.  SUBJECT: Motions to Reopen Pretrial Detention Hearings – In the Matter of the Request to Release Certain Pretrial Detainees (__ N.J. __ (2021))  DATE: February 12, 2021  ______________________________________________________________________________
[brief] Accordingly, it introduced Ordinance 2022-17 to amend the Redevelopment Plan at the same October 27, 2022 meeting.  (Pa283).  Contrary to Plaintiffs’ false statement that Ordinance 2022-15 was amended with “no purported reasons” having been stated for doing so (Pb22), the Committee introduced 2022-17 for purposes of completeness of the record, and to ensure that, should a reviewing court conclude that the Plan was not consistent with the Master Plan, that its reasoning for adopting the Redevelopment Plan anyway was fully articulated.
[brief] This is a serious medical malpractice case in which an infant has died.  In its decision of July 17, 2023, the New Motion Judge granted summary judgment to Defendants based on issues that were not advanced by defendants in support of their motions.  [Pa13-20; see Pa210-211; Pa212-213; Pa266-267; Pa403-410; Pa438-442].  Plaintiff contends, respectfully, that it was improper to have decided this case on issues not specifically identified as grounds for the motion; or without at least allowing the parties adequate opportunity to address those concerns of the New Motion Judge by way of additional written submissions.  In the decision of September 29, 2023, the New Motion Judge upheld the outcome of the July 17, 2023, but did so in an extraordinary manner.
[directive] A.  This Directive supersedes the Revised Notice to Compliance with N.J.S.A. 52:17B-4.6.  Law Enforcement Concerning Unlawful Eviction Law issued by Attorney General [...] on July 20, 2009.  Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 52:17B-4.6, this Directive shall be: 1. Transmitted to the chief or director of every municipal police department, every municipal prosecutor, every county prosecutor, and the Superintendent of the New Jersey State Police; 2. Disseminated to every law enforcement officer operating under the authority of the laws of the State of New Jersey; and 3.  Reinforced at roll calls and academy service training and continuing education programs so to ensure that all officers and prosecutors are educated of their responsibilities under Section 33-11.1.  B.  This Directive is issued pursuant to the Attorney Non-enforceability by third parties.  General’s authority to ensure the uniform and efficient enforcement of the laws and administration of criminal justice throughout the State.
[brief] In particular, as the New Jersey Supreme Court has reaffirmed, “the fact that a suspect’s behavior may be consistent with innocent behavior does not control the analysis….  ‘[S]imply because a defendant’s actions might have some speculative innocent explanation does not mean that they cannot support articulable suspicions if a reasonable person would find the actions are consistent with guilt. ’”  State v. Mann, 203 N.J. 328, 339 (2010) (quoting Arthur, 149 N.J. at 11-12); see also State v. Nishina, 175 N.J. 502, 511 (2003) (“Facts that might seem innocent when viewed in isolation may sustain a finding of reasonable suspicion when considered in the aggregate….”); State v. Citarella, 154 N.J. 272, 280-81 (1998)(although conduct may have an innocent explanation, it may also support suspicion of criminal activity).  [T]he character and prevalence of crime in an area – although insufficient on its own to support particularized suspicion – can be one factor in determining whether reasonable suspicion existed. ”  *State v. Goldsmith*, 251 N.J. 384, 405 (2022).
[brief] (Ca142).  Also, [...] explained in his letter brief, that the order required him to take over the liquor license.  [...] contacted an insurance agent to determine the cost of liquor liability coverage, which was a necessity.  [...] was informed that it was approximately $12,000.00, which he did not have.  (Ca141).  He relayed that to [...] asking that [...]’s client permit [...] to be added as an additional insured on the policy that [...] had covering the liquor license.  However, the principal of the ownership refused to allow [...] to be added as an additional insured.  (Ca141).  [...] then decided that the liquor license was not necessary.
[brief] The Trial Court erred by denying the portion of [...]’s summary judgment motion that the contract for sale was unenforceable since in plain contravention of clear statutory law, i.e., the Foreclosure Rescue Fraud Prevention Act - and consequently, none of Plaintiff’s claims were sustainable as a matter of law.  [...]s argued that the court should find the Plaintiff’s claim warranted dismissal with prejudice on the same basis as its reasoning and decision under the Tax Sale law – but based on the finding that contract for sale was unenforceable the FRFPA.  The trial court rejected this contention, holding that the Defendants “do not have standing to invoke under the statute. ”  This is respectfully submitted to constitute an error of law.  While there is limited precedent concerning the applicability of the FRFPA, [...]s submits that the trial court misapprehended that logical underpinning of its argument.  Critically, [...]s’ argument in no way depends upon the FRFPA as the “legal basis” for the assertion of any claim, cause of action or affirmative defense.  Rather, [...]s relies upon the legal principle that a Court cannot enforce an unlawful contract.  The Trial Court reasoned that, under N.J.S.A. 46:10B-67, only an owner of the subject property could “invoke” the FRFPA under subsection (d).  In its written opinion, the Trial Court held:  The Court finds that it does not have to determine whether tax sales are included within the scope of the FRFPA and whether it was violated because the Defendants do not have standing to assert claims under the Act.
[brief] 2  Notwithstanding her unsupported assertions on appeal that ordering AP testing was not her responsibility, email correspondence from January 2019 and 8.  In September 2018, Plaintiff humiliated child study team ("CST") members in front of the entire faculty of 145 employees "by announcing that they did not do their job during scheduling to identify classes for students with IEP's," when she should have reprimanded them in private or addressed her concerns with the CST members' supervisors.
[brief] To prevail against [...], Plaintiffs needed to establish -- by competent admissible, expert testimony -- that: (1) [...], in its capacity as construction inspector, owed Plaintiffs a duty of care; (2) the duty of care required [...]’s inspector to identify and remedy the alleged dangerous condition; (3) a dangerous condition actually existed; (4) [...] breached this duty; and (5) [...]’s breach was the proximate cause of Mr.  Burr’s injury.  Plaintiffs did not establish any of these elements.
[brief] *River Rd. Associates v. Chesapeake Display & Packaging Co.*, 104 F. Supp. 2d 418, 421 (D.N.J. 2000)(citing *Metlife* 159 N.J. at 732).  Applying this definition, the charge-back provision contained in the [...]’s Rent Concession and Other Discount Rider (Da44) is unquestionably a “stipulated damage clause. ”  Section 1 of the rider itemizes the $17,920 in “free” rent and parking concessions promised prior to signing, and the charge-back provision follows at section 2, which reads:  2.  Concession Cancellation and Charge-Back.  The concession and discounts indicated above are provided to you as an incentive and are with the understanding that you will fulfill your obligations under the Lease through the entire term.  This will be immediately terminated, and you will be required to immediately repay to the Landlord the amounts of all Concession/Discount Agreement concessions or discounts that you have actually received without further notice, --- \(^8\)  The trial court uses “liquidated damages clause” to refer to stipulated damages clauses generally, without regard to the important distinction between the two terms specified by the Supreme Court in *Wasserman’s* and *Metlife*. which will hereinafter be deemed additional rent, if any of the following shall have occurred in Landlords sole opinion:  - Your Lease is terminated early due to your default or one’s own discretion...  - Your monthly rent was received late anytime throughout the lease term - You are not current in the payment of any additional rent that may have accrued over the period of the lease term, including late charges, insufficient funds fees, court costs, attorney's fees, etc. Da44 (emphases added).  This provision obviously “provides for the payment of specified damages in the event of breach” and thus “is classified as a stipulated damage clause” under New Jersey law.  *River Rd. Associates*, 104 F. Supp. 2d at 421.  It provides for payment of specified damages (“the amounts of all concessions” specified in section 1 of the rider) in the event of a breach listed at section 2.  It is difficult to discern any basis in the contract language or elsewhere for the trial court’s ruling that it “does not view the chargeback provision as a [stipulated] damage clause.
[directive] The subject officer shall be notified in writing of the investigation’s outcome.  6.2.5  If the complaint is sustained, the superior officer so authorized should determine the appropriate disciplinary action.  Typical disciplinary actions for minor infractions include performance notices, oral reprimands or written reprimands.  The superior officer shall complete the appropriate disciplinary document and provide a copy of that document to the officer being disciplined.  A copy of the disciplinary document shall be forwarded to the law enforcement executive or appropriate supervisor for review, placed in the officer's personnel file and sent to internal affairs for entry into the index file and filing.  27
[brief] ”  Id. at 480.  Now known as the Miller factors, they are:  [1]…consideration of his chronological age and its hallmark features—among them, immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and consequences.  [2]…the family and home environment that surrounds him—and from which he cannot usually extricate himself—no matter how brutal or dysfunctional.  [3]…the circumstances of the homicide offense, including the extent of his participation in the conduct and the way familial and peer pressures may have affected him.  [4] …[whether] he might have been charged and convicted of a lesser offense if not for incompetencies associated with youth—for example, his inability to deal with police officers or prosecutors (including on a plea agreement) or his incapacity to assist his own attorneys[, and] [5]…the possibility of rehabilitation even when the circumstances most suggest it.  [Id. at 477-78 (emphasis added). ]  As in Graham, the Miller Court did not “foreclose” life without parole for juveniles convicted of homicide; rather, the Court required sentencing judges “to take into account how children are different, and how those differences counsel against irrevocably sentencing them to a lifetime in prison. ”  Id. at 480.7  Then, in 2017, our Supreme Court held in Zuber that sentencing judges must evaluate the Miller factors when they sentence a defendant who was a juvenile at the time of the offense to a lengthy period of parole ineligibility that renders the sentence the “practical equivalent” of life without parole.
[brief] This Court should not create a new claim for “aiding and abetting” a breach of contract because it is “inappropriate” for any court other than our Supreme Court “to recognize a cause of action . . . heretofore never recognized. ”  Filgueiras v. Newark Pub. Sch., 426 N.J. Super. 449, 474-75 (App. Div. 2012); Riley v. Keenan, 406 N.J. Super. 281, 297 (App. Div. 2009) (noting our courts “should normally defer to the Supreme Court . . . with respect to the creation of a new cause of action”).
[brief] Even in cases where police do not see a hand-to-hand transaction, they still must see something to support a reasonable suspicion that a drug transaction occurred.  For example, in *State v. Arthur*, 149 N.J. 1 (1997), officers had reasonable suspicion that the defendant had engaged in a drug transaction because they saw a woman enter the defendant’s car, speak with the defendant, and then exit the car carrying a brown paper bag and “looking around suspiciously. ”  Id. at 4.  The woman did not have the bag when she entered the car, and the officer knew that brown bags were often used to transport drugs.  Id. at 5, 10.  The Court held that the officer’s observations of the woman carrying a paper bag, known to commonly transport drugs, that she did not have when she entered the car, her “furtive movements,” and the “high levels of narcotics activity” in the area were sufficient to support reasonable suspicion of the defendant.  Id. at 10, 12.  In contrast, here, [...] did not see any containers that could have possibly contained drugs.  He did not see [...] hand anything to the woman in the sedan or to the man in the truck.  He did not see the woman in the sedan or the man in the truck holding any objects that they did not have before they interacted with [...].  All Taranto actually saw was that [...] spoke to two people in their cars.  That is not reasonable suspicion that [...] engaged in a drug transaction with either person.
[brief] (Db 18-19)  In response, the State argues that (1) the scope and constitutionality of N.J.S.A. 39:4-126 do not ¹  This brief uses the same abbreviations as [...]’s initial brief.  In addition, Db refers to [...]’s initial brief, and Sb refers to the State’s brief.  warrant consideration for the first time on appeal (Sb 12-15), (2) the plain language of the statute and extrinsic evidence indicate that the signaling requirements in N.J.S.A. 39:4-126 apply to lane changes (Sb 15-30), and (3) N.J.S.A. 39:4-126 is not unconstitutionally vague (Sb 30-33).
[brief] As the record amply reflects, defendant’s counsel directly attacked the State’s decision not to call the victim and insinuated the State was not really seeking justice because naturally “[[...]] wants the person who shot him caught, just like any other victim would. ” (16T:29-13 to 15).  In other words, in order for the victim to receive justice, the defense had to call him to the stand because the State did not.  This statement was not based on any evidence in the record, but instead, was the theme of the defense summation and a calculated attempt to slight the State in front of the jury.
[brief] If [...] wanted to seek fees for his collection efforts, he should have done so within a reasonable time after the work was done, and in the multi-stage fashion that [...] directed.  Instead, [...] waited for over four years after [...] denied his last “global” fee application, ignored [...]’s instructions as to how the application must be presented, and essentially sought to cram through an additional $3.5+ million judgment against [...] based upon the Chancery Court’s general ability to craft flexible equitable remedies – a basis already expressly rejected by [...].  (2T15:19-23)
[brief] Though not addressed by the trial court in denying the motion for leave to amend, the trial court’s entry of the Order Denying Leave to Amend was alternatively appropriate based on, among other things, the trial court’s prior unequivocal determinations, based on undisputed facts, reached in dismissing the claims against the [...].  Specifically, the trial court determined that Appellants’ alleged losses which were attributed to the [...] – the same losses they then sought to attribute to [...] - were “the direct and proximate result of [Appellants’] failure to cure the default under the Lease with [...]. ”  [FEDa118].  Indeed, as the trial court noted, “If [Appellants] had not defaulted under the Lease, they would have the Solar Rights and Solar Project, and the subject action would be moot. ”  [FEDa118].  Further, the undisputed facts referenced in the trial court’s prior rulings, as well as the Appellants’ own allegations in the pleadings, make abundantly clear that the proposed claims facially lack merit and allowing their assertion thereof would be futile.
[brief] Kan. Mar. 15, 2018) (adding two former CEOs as custodians who were “actively involved,” provided “guidance,” and were part of the team making decisions regarding the defendant’s operations); MariCal, Inc. v. Cooke Aquaculture, Inc., No. 1:14-CV-00366-JDL, 2016 WL 9459260, at *2 (D. Me. Aug. 9, 2016) (adding the CEO as a custodian because he “likely was involved in discussions” regarding the patents at issue).
[brief] See Nelson, 155 N.J. at 497.  As to the second element, the prosecutor is charged with knowledge of evidence in his file, “even if he has actually overlooked it. ”  Agurs, 427, U.S. at 110.  Thus, even an inadvertent failure to disclose evidence may violate Brady.  State v. Brown, 236 N.J. 497, 519 (2019).  The State is deemed to have suppressed evidence when it had either actual or imputed knowledge of the materials.  Nelson, 155 N.J. at 498.