ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Amici curiae are the [...]  (“[...]”) and the [...] (“[...]”).  [...] is a non-profit professional association of corporate members representing a broad cross-section of American and international product manufacturers. \(^1\)  Through [...], these companies \(^1\)  A list of current [...] corporate members is available at https://plac.com/[...]/Membership/Corporate_Membership.aspx. seek to contribute to the improvement and the reform of law in the United States and elsewhere, with emphasis on the law governing the liability of product manufacturers and others in the supply chain.  [...]’s perspective is derived from the experiences of a corporate membership that spans a diverse group of industries in various facets of the manufacturing sector.  In addition, several hundred of the nation’s leading product-liability defense attorneys are sustaining (non-voting) members of [...].  Since 1983, [...] has filed more than 1,100 briefs as amicus curiae in both state and federal courts, including this Court, presenting the broad perspective of product manufacturers seeking fairness and balance in the application and development of the law as it affects product risk management.
[brief] At 4T43-16, the court envisions what developers should expect when they come to [...].  The plain language of Sec. 18-601 is there for all to read and understand.  Every developer is expected to comply with the subdivision standards unless hardship can be established.  If anything, the court's decision to approve this applicant's self-created hardship is inviting ad hoc application of the Township's standards, which inevitably lead to exactly the type of overdevelopment which has plagued development in [...] for well over two decades.
[brief] (Pa14-20)  Defendant [...] opposes plaintiffs’ misguided attempt to persuade this Court to reverse those portions of [...]’s order.  [...] protectively cross appeals [...]’s January 24, 2020 order denying its motion to dismiss based upon the statute of limitations and that portion of [...]’s June 25, 2021 order denying its motion on that basis.  For the reasons stated infra., the summary judgment in favor of [...] on liability should be affirmed.  Alternatively, plaintiffs’ second amended complaint should be dismissed with prejudice for his failure to have complied with the statute of limitations.  POINT I THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY HELD THAT THE LEASE AGREEMENT BETWEEN [...] AND [...] DID NOT IMPOSE AN OBLIGATION UPON THE LATTER TO HAVE REMOVED OR REMEDIATED THE SNOW AND ICE IN THE AREA WHERE PLAINTIFF FELL.
[brief] Arroyo v. Stoneleigh Recovery Assocs., LLC, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 138287 (D.N.J. Aug. 14, 2019)  ...........................................  30  Bacon v. N.J. State Dep't of Educ., 443 N.J. Super. 24 (App. Div. 2015).............................................................................  6  Browne v. Nat'l Collegiate Student Loan Tr., No. 21-11871 (KM) (JSA), 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 244537 (D.N.J. Dec. 22, 2021).................................................................................................  13  Chulsky v. Hudson Law Offices, P.C., 777 F. Supp. 2d 823 (D.N.J. 2011) ............................................................................... 19, 20 Cox v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 138 N.J. 2 (1994)............................................................................................................ 24, 25 DepoLink Court Reporting & Litig. Support Servs. v. Rochman, 430 N.J. Super. 325 (App. Div. 2013)........................................................................... 19, 20, 21, 22 Di Cristofaro v. Laurel Grove Mem'l Park, 43 N.J. Super. 244 (App. Div. 1957).............................................................................. 6 Dimitrakopoulos v. Borrus, Goldin, Foley, Vignuolo, Hyman and Stahl, P.C., 237 N.J. 91 (2018).......................................................................................................... 6 F.G. v. MacDonell, 150 N.J. 550 (1997)....................................................................................................... 6 Family Fin. Corp. v. Gaffney, 11 N.J. 565 (1953).......................................................................................................... 8 Family Fin. Corp. v. Gough, 10 N.J. Super. 13 (App. Div. 1950).............................................................................. 8 Gonzalez v. Wilshire Credit Corp., 207 N.J. 557 (2011)....................................................................................................... 17, 20 Hoffman v. Asseenontv.Com, Inc., 404 N.J. Super. 415 (App. Div. 2009)........................................................................... 25 In re Resolution of State Com. of Investigation, 108 N.J. 35 (1987) ................................................................. 14, 27, 28 Jefferson Loan Co., Inc. v. Session, 397 N.J. Super. 520 (App. Div. 2008) ........................................... 17 Jubelt v. United Mortg. Bankers, Ltd., Civil Action No. 13-7150 (ES) (MAH), 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84595 (D.N.J. June 30, 2015) .................................................................. 13 Langer v. Morris Plan Corp., 110 N.J.L. 186 (1933) .................................................................... 9 Latteri v. Mayer, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85926 (D.N.J. May 22, 2018) ......................... 30 Lee v. Carter-Reed Co., L.L.C., 203 N.J. 496 (2010) ......................................................................
[brief] A.  THE STATE OF EMERGENCY  It is not disputed by either side that New Jersey was under the Covid State of Emergency, from March 9, 2020 to June 4, 2021, pursuant to Executive Order No. 103 to Executive Order No. 244.  (See N.J. Executive Order No. 103 at Pa18-25) and N.J. Executive Order 244 at Pa26-33).  This time period covered the Decedent’s period of occupational exposure: from January 2021, until her passing on May 18, 2021, as per the filed Dependency Claim Petition.  (Ra, Vol. I, pages 1-2).  B.
[brief] Probable cause to arrest for odor of alcohol and probable cause to arrest for odor of marijuana or anything else is not the same because driving while high on marijuana is illegal, any odor of marijuana can be used as probable cause to arrest.  But again, alcohol and odor of alcohol is not illegal and cannot be allowed to be used as probable cause.  The only things that can be used as probable cause to arrest is the "totality of circumstances" analysis and the SFST.
[brief] (1T 64-14 to 17)  [...] then borrowed [...]’ phone to request a ride.  (1T 65-6 to 66-22).  [...] testified that [...] sent the following message from her phone to [...], [...]’s ex-girlfriend:  “This Dai, I’m good.  I gotta get my gun. ”  (1T 74-21 to 22).  [...]’s ride arrived and he left.
[brief] New Jersey Courts consider the following factors to determine whether the CFA applies to the merchandise at issue: (1) the complexity of the transaction, taking into account any negotiation, bidding, or request for proposals process; (2) the identity and sophistication of the parties, which includes whether the parties received legal or expert assistance in the development or execution of the transaction; (3) the nature of the relationship between the parties and whether there was any relevant underlying understanding or prior transactions between the parties; and . . . (4) the public availability of the subject merchandise.  All the Way Towing, LLC v. Buck’s County International, Inc., 236 N. J. 431, 434 (2019).
[brief] … the essential nature of a contract of adhesion is that it is presented on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, commonly in a standardized printed form, without opportunity for the “adhering” party to negotiate except perhaps on a few particulars.  \textit{Rudbart v. Water Supply Comm’n}, 127 N.J. 344, 353 (1992) (citations omitted).  Here, it is without question that the Arbitration Agreement at issue is a contract of adhesion.
[brief] This Court remanded in 2022 for “fresh consideration of the sentence in light of Comer. ”  [...], No. A-2961-18.  (Da109)  [...] again presided over a joint resentencing.  (5T)  [...] relied on the previous expert testimony and noted there was no indication “that anything has changed with [[...]] psychologically” since the last sentencing.  (5T16-5 to 7)  [...]’s counsel asked for a fixed term of 40 years rather than a life sentence.  (5T16-9 to 24)  The State asked for two concurrent life sentences, both with periods of thirty years parole ineligibility.  (5T38-17 to 25)  The court conducted an analysis of the Miller factors, as will be discussed below in Point I.B.  The court applied the same aggravating factors as before (1, 3, 9, and 12).  (5T88-2 to 90-2)  The court now found that mitigating factor 14 applied and gave it “substantial consideration,” but found that overall, the aggravating factors “substantially outweigh the mitigating factor. ”  (5T90-3 to 91-3)  The court imposed concurrent life sentences on both charges, each with 29 years of parole ineligibility.  (5T91-13 to 92-16)  The court concluded by noting that parole would take a “more in-depth look” at [...]’s maturity and rehabilitation, and that the Parole Board would ultimately consider “whether or not [he] should be released. ”  (5T85-4 to 86-21)
[brief] (9T11-25 to 12-1).  In doing so, he outlined defendant’s lengthy history of municipal offenses, including: (1) an April 6, 2010, adjudication for lewdness; (2) a June 15, 2010, adjudication of possession of a controlled dangerous substance (CDS) and failure to give the CDS to police; (3) an April 24, 2013, adjudication for serving or making available alcoholic beverages to a person under the legal age; (4) a June 9, 2016, adjudication for possession of a controlled dangerous substance and criminal trespass; (5) a February 20, 2018, adjudication for prohibited acts in [...]; (6) an October 29, 2019, adjudication for defiant trespass; (7) a December 20, 2022, ____________________
[brief] A.  Plaintiff Must Prove Defect and Causation Through Qualified and Reliable Expert Testimony  .............................................................................................................  7  B.  The Trial Court Wrongly Denied Summary Judgment Despite Plaintiff’s Complete Lack of Proof of a Manufacturing Defect.  ............  9  IV.  PLAINTIFF’S EXPERTS FAILED TO OFFER ANY GENERAL-CAUSATION OPINIONS AND THEIR SPECIFIC-CAUSATION OPINIONS ARE INADMISSIBLE “NET OPINIONS. ”  [Issue was raised (Da0785; Da0816; Da0846)]  ........................................................................................................  12  A.  Plaintiff Lacks Proof of General Causation, Expert or Otherwise .................................................................................................................................  12  B.  Plaintiff’s Experts Did No Work to Offer Reliable and Factually-Supported Specific-Causation Opinions.  ..................................  14  CONCLUSION
[brief] [...]’s delay in seeking leave to intervene was particularly egregious considering [...] raised “lack of standing” as an affirmative defense in its first pleading in November 2022.  (Da22.)  [...] and Plaintiff were fully aware of the standing issue since the outset of the case.  [...], however, did not seek to intervene at that time.  Instead, she waited until the eve of trial – after all parties submitted full trial briefing – to file a motion for leave to intervene.  [...]’s untimely and ill-motivated motion to intervene should have been denied.
[brief] Defendant cheekily concludes from that, that it was, therefore, somehow appropriate to use with plaintiff’s experts.  What that logically meant, however, was that [...], who allegedly performed the investigation for the [...], or some other representative of the [...] with personal knowledge, had to provide the proper foundation for any testimony regarding the conclusions of that investigation and the investigation in general.  Defense counsel agreed that, without a proper foundation, the documents were inadmissible hearsay and represented to the court that:  “[...] has been named in all of our pretrial.  If she needs to come in and authenticate the documents, I think it shouldn’t be an issue. ”  12T53:4-6.  That the only way those documents could be used was if they were authenticated by a [...] witness is further demonstrated by the fact that the trial court acknowledged that “Plaintiff’s counsel has every right to cross examine in order to attack the opinion. ”  12T55:20-21.  Plaintiff, however, was deprived of her due process right to cross examine the [...] witness because defendant produced no such witness.  That is the glaring problem with defendant’s persistent use of the hearsay, one which no limiting instruction could possibly ameliorate.  A.
[brief] | 1 | | N.J.S.A. 13:20-28(a)11 | 13, 14, 15, 16, 17 | | N.J.S.A. 48:2-13.  | 15 | | N.J.S.A. 58:11A-1 et seq | 26 | | Table of Authorities (Cont’d) | Page | |-------------------------------|------| | N.J.S.A. 58:11A-2 | 27 | | N.J.S.A. 58:11A-5 – 7 – 9 | 26 | | N.J.A.C. 7:8-9.2(b) | 28 | | N.J.A.C. 7:8-9.2(b)4 | 28 | | N.J.A.C. 7:8-9.2(c) | 28 | | N.J.A.C. 7:14A-22.4 | 28 | | N.J.A.C. 7:14A-22.4(a)3 | 29 | | N.J.A.C. 7:15-3.2 | 27 | | N.J.A.C. 7:15-3.2(f) | 28 | | N.J.A.C. 7:15-3.2(f)5 | 28, 29 | | N.J.A.C. 7:15-3.2(g) | 27 | | N.J.A.C. 7:38-2.3 | 13 | | N.J.A.C. 7:38-3.9 | 24 | | N.J.A.C. 7:38-3.9(h) | 24 | | N.J.A.C. 7:38-9.2(b)5ii | 6 | | 38 N.J.R. at 511a | 15 | | N.J.R.E. 201(b)(3) | 7, 8, 9, 10 | | N.J.R.E. 202(b) | 7, 8, 9, 10 | | R. 4:33 | 8 |
[brief] This appeal challenges the decision of the Superior Court of New Jersey Chancery Division: General Equity Part, Mercer County (the "trial court"), which erroneously granted summary judgment in favor of Defendant, [...] ("Defendant"), and improperly denied Plaintiff, [...]'s ("Plaintiff"), motion for summary judgment.  This ruling was grounded in procedural technicalities and failed to address substantive merits and factual disputes crucial to the case.  Plaintiff asks this court to reverse the trial court's decision to grant summary judgment and to remand the case back to the trial court.  PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[brief] (Db24-32).  Courts exercise great caution before deeming any new federal substantive due process rights as fundamental.  See *Glucksberg*, 521 U.S. at 720 (demanding “utmost care” before courts identify “new” liberty interests under due process, “lest the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause be subtly transformed into the policy preferences of” federal judges).  As a result, the “established method of substantive-due-process analysis” limits fundamental federal constitutional rights to those that “are, objectively, deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition” or “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, such that neither liberty nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed.
[brief] I received no email, phone call or letter whatsoever from Probation requesting a conference, and to the contrary, all efforts by me and my attorney over 23 years to do so have been rebuffed unreasonably by Probation\(^2\).  Indeed, I would have welcomed a good-faith conference with Probation so the errors could easily be corrected.  Thus, the Court’s finding is based upon an erroneous reading contrary to fact and requires reconsideration.
[brief] ”  Cohen, 254 N.J. at 318-19.  Defendant’s sentence to 12 year’s imprisonment was a fair and fitting punishment for his crime of attempting to secrete 175 pounds of marijuana into New Jersey.  The sentence imposed does not reflect any error at all, let alone a clear error of judgment that should shock the judicial conscience.  Rivera, 249 N.J. at 297-98; State v. Roth, 95 N.J. 334, 364-65 (1984).  Defendant’s 12-year sentence for the first-degree possession of 175 pounds of marijuana with the intent to distribute should be affirmed.  CONCLUSION
[brief] To credit this is to accept that [...] is stupid, careless and irresponsible.  To credit this is also to accept that [...]'s lawyers have presented a prima facie case for negligence or worse.  New Jersey law holds that public utilities are liable for consequential damages for their negligence even if the utility is in full compliance with all rules and regulations.  See, e.g., Muise v. GPU, Inc., 332 N.J. Super. 140 (App. Div. 2000); see also Underwriters v. Public Electric, 459 N.J. Super. 436 (App. Div. 2019).
[brief] 30 POINT IV  THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO INSTRUCT THE JURY ON HOW TO CONSIDER DEFENDANT’S FAILURE TO REPORT HER SEXUAL ASSAULT.  (Not Raised Below)  ............................................  38  TABLE OF CONTENTS  (CONT'D)  POINT V  THE FAILURE TO INSTRUCT THE JURY THAT SELF-DEFENSE APPLIED TO THE WEAPONS-POSSESSION CHARGES REQUIRES REVERSAL OF THESE CONVICTIONS.  (Not Raised Below) ..........................  45  A.  The Court Erred In Failing To Instruct The Jury On Possession Of The Knife In Self-Defense..........................  45  B.  The Court Erred In Failing To Instruct The Jury That Defendant Could Lawfully Possess The Tire Iron In Public For Self-Protection...........................................  48  POINT VI  THE THEFT CONVICTION MUST BE REVERSED BECAUSE THE JURY DID NOT SPECIFY THE AMOUNT STOLEN.  (Not Raised Below).............................................  53  POINT VII  MULTIPLE SENTENCING ERRORS  RENDER DEFENDANT’S SENTENCE EXCESSIVE.  (12T 31-15 to 38-19).........................................................................................  55  CONCLUSION......................................................................................................................  62
[brief] Furthermore, [defendant] was placed in a position of advantage over the other bidders, which only serves to undermine the necessary common standard of competition.  Had other bidders known in advance that they could avoid timely filing of the disclosure statement or that it would be waived by the borough, one may speculate the possibility of another and lower bid.  As pointed out in *Case v. Trenton*, 76 *N.J.L.* 696, 700, 74 A. 672 (E. & A.1909), “the presence of the condition may have deterred others from bidding, who would have bid had they known that these conditions would be waived.
[brief] ”  Point I, infra, addresses the propriety of the admission of that evidence for the latter purpose and the facts related to it, so those facts are not recounted here.  [...] testified that the call records, however, showed multiple calls between three numbers -- allegedly belonging to defendant, the codefendant, and [...] (7T 54-20 to 65-22) -- between 6:44 and 7:04 p.m. on January 22, 2020.  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I
[brief] See In re Proposed Construction of Compressor Station, 476 N.J. Super. 556, 570-71 (App. Div. 2023) (“[T]he meaning of words may be indicated and controlled by those with which they are associated. ” (quoting Germann v. Matriss, 55 N.J. 193, 220 (1970))).  Our Supreme Court has embraced essentially the same interpretation of the word “cruel” in the context of aggravating factors at sentencing.  State v. O’Donnell, 117 N.J. 210, 217-18 (1989) (interpreting the first aggravating factor under N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a), which asks whether an offense “was committed in an especially heinous, cruel, or depraved manner”).  In that circumstance, too, the Court construed “cruelty” to require the infliction of pain and suffering on a victim.  Ibid.  Each of these definitions requires something more than an act that is merely harsh or unkind.  In the absence of any such definition, it is possible the jury convicted [...] based on its understanding of “cruel” as it is colloquially used.  But finding that [...]’s alleged actions were harsh or unkind is insufficient to sustain a conviction for fourth-degree animal cruelty, just as it would be insufficient in a child cruelty case or to support a finding that a crime was committed in a cruel manner under N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(1).
[brief] Defendant denied having given [...] permission to stay at a summer property that defendant owned at [...] on [...] (21T66-6 to 24;21T28-9 to 14).  (The property was less than a quarter mile from [...]'s home (17T79-1 to 17). )  Defendant said he told [...] that he did not want [...] staying there (21T66-6 to 24).  But the house had a combination lock and [...] "might" have had the number (21T67-6 to 21T68-6).  Defendant denied having dropped off [...] at the Garrison Lake house the previous week, but said [...] might be staying at another house there (21T74-23 to 21T75-11).
[brief] Adelman v. BSI Fin. Servs., Inc., 453 N.J. Super. 31, 39 (App. Div. 2018).  It applies when three elements are met: (1) the judgment in the prior action must be valid, final, and on the merits; (2) the parties in the later action must be identical to or in privity with those in the prior action; and (3) the claim in the later action must grow out of the same transaction or occurrence as the claim in the earlier one.
[brief] In State v. Farthing, the court noted that one of the main sources of proof of insanity or diminished capacity is the conduct of the defendant both at the time of the examination and earlier.  331 N.J. Super. at 77.  The court explained: that the verbal conduct is as important as non-verbal conduct in the eyes of the psychiatrist or psychologist.  The psychiatrist or psychologist may consider the defendant's statement in a variety of ways.  He may be not so interested in the truth of what is said as he is in the fact it was said.  Id. classic illustration is the man who claims he is Napoleon.  The psychiatrist or psychologist considers such a statement as important not because of its truth or falsity, but because it is evidence of irrationality.  Conversely, some statements of a patient may be considered important because they disclose a factual history that is relevant to the doctor's diagnosis.  Stated somewhat differently, the doctor assumes the truth of such statements and considers the facts in terms of their impact upon the patient's mental health or mental disease.  [Farthing, 331 N.J. Super. at 77].  The court in *Farthing* went on to delineate an analytical framework for the resolution of evidentiary questions pertaining to psychiatric evidence.