ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] A.  [...]’s Failure To Seek A Timely Stay Of The Decision Suspending His Certificate Is The Root Cause Of Any Procedural Dilemma .......................15  B.  The State Board Has The Right To Regulate Teaching Certificates, Not The Arbitrator ..................................................................................................17  C. The ALJ And Commissioner Addressed The Salient Issues .............................20  D. The [...] Did Not Violate [...]’s Due Process Rights ..........21 E. The Doctrine Of Fundamental Fairness Cannot Save [...] ......................23 CONCLUSION ...........................................................................................................24 # TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ## CASES | Case | Page(s) | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|---------| | Breitwieser v. State-Operated Sch. Dist., | 14 | | 286 N.J. Super. 633 (App. Div. 1996) | | | Constantine v. Twp. of Bass River, | 23 | | 406 N.J. Super. 305 (App. Div. 2009) | | | Doe v. Poritz, | 23 | | 142 N.J. 1 (1995) | | | George Harms Const. Co. v. New Jersey Tpk. Auth., | 12 | | 137 N.J. 8 (1994) | | | Mejia v. New Jersey Dep't of Corr., | 12 | | 446 N.J. Super. 369 (App. Div. 2016) | | | Parsippany-Troy Hills Educ. Ass’n v. Bd. of Educ. of Parsippany-Troy Hills Twp., | 14 | | 188 N.J. Super. 161 (App. Div. 1983) | | | Profit Sharing Tr. for Marprowear Corp. v. Lampf, Lipkind, Prupis, Petigrow & Labue, P.A., | 22 | | 267 N.J. Super. 174 (Law. Div. 1993) | | | Rotondo v. Carlstadt-East, | 13 | | 276 N.J. Super. 36 (App. Div. 1994) | | | Sanjuan v. Sch. Dist. of W.N.Y., | 18 | | ___ N.J. ___, 2024 WL 537907 (Feb. 12, 2024) | | | Summer v. Teaneck, | 13, 17, 18 | | 53 N.J. 548 (1969) | | | Zimmerman v. Diviney, | 12 | | 477 N.J. Super. 1 (App. Div. 2023) | | RULES
[brief] ”).  Thus, this case is unlike cases where the failure to disclose information involved existing contractual rights.  See, e.g., Brunswick Hills, 182 N.J. at 225 (breach by withholding vital information from plaintiff that contributed to plaintiff’s failure to exercise option timely) (quotation omitted); Bak-A-Lum Corp. of Am. v. Alcoa Bldg. Prods., Inc., 69 N.J. 123, 130 (1976) (breach where contracting party withheld information of intention to terminate).
[brief] Dobco, Inc. v. Bergen County Improvement Authority, 250 N.J. 396 (2022) (per curiam); N.J.S.A. 2C:21-34; N.J.S.A. 2C:30-4.  The trial court only considered the statutory conflict of interest benefits prong; the trial court did not consider whether [...] had a “within 200 feet” disqualifying appearance of impropriety under developing case law.  See, Grabowsky v. Township of Montclair, 221 N.J. 536 (2015); Mollica v. Township of Bloomfield, A-2467-14T3 (App. Div. Oct. 17, 2016)(Pa407).  Also see, Diamond Chip Realty, LLC v. Township of Sparta Planning Board, SSX-L-399-23 (Law Div. March 28, 2024) (Pa413).  The trial court also ignored the after-the-fact campaign contribution made to [...] by her landlord after the adoption of the contested capital bond ordinance.
[directive] Definitions  3.1  Attorney General’s Advisory Panel on Conducted Energy and Less-Lethal Devices.  The Attorney General will establish the Attorney General Advisory Panel for Conducted Energy and Less-Lethal Devices (Panel).  The panel shall consist of subject matter experts from the New Jersey State Police, the Division of Criminal Justice, the Office of Public Integrity and Accountability, the Police Training Commission, the New Jersey State Association of Chiefs of Police, the County Prosecutors’ Office Chiefs Association, the County Prosecutors Association of New Jersey, the Sheriff’s Association of New Jersey, and other law enforcement officers and member(s) of the community appointed by the Attorney General or their designee.  The panel shall solicit and receive applications and review, test, and submit a report with recommendations to the Attorney General concerning whether a CED or less-lethal device or ammunition should be approved.  Moreover, the Panel will provide specific guidance concerning when and how the device or ammunition may be deployed.  Only CEDs and less- lethal devices or ammunition approved by the Attorney General or the Attorney General’s designee shall be used in the State of New Jersey by law enforcement officers.  Less-lethal devices and ammunition that are approved shall only be used consistent with rules and regulations established for each device.  No law enforcement agency or officer shall deploy or use a CED or less-lethal device or ammunition pursuant to this policy unless the device or ammunition satisfies the specifications and characteristics approved by the Attorney General.  The Panel shall meet at least four times a year.  On a regular basis, the Panel shall publish a list of all approved conducted energy and less-lethal devices, or ammunition.  All approved conducted energy and less-lethal devices, ammunition, and deployment requirements are subject to review by the Panel and are subject to removal by the Attorney General.  Such review should occur once every five years.
[directive] See Sections 1.1 and 3.2.  A prosecutor is not permitted, however, to dismiss the drug-free school zone charge even where that charge is graded only as a crime of the third degree as compared to the N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7.1 offense, which is automatically graded as a crime of the second-degree.  It is understandable that a prosecutor might want the defendant’s criminal record to reflect a second-degree conviction should it be necessary in the future to calculate criminal history points if the defendant were to recidivate.  Accordingly, prosecutors may in the exercise of their discretion require the defendant to plead guilty to both offenses, thereby ensuring that the defendant’s criminal record includes a second-degree conviction.
[brief] Dunns, slip op. at *1.  Following the persuasive opinion and reasoning in Dunns, here the crimes underlying the concurrent – but separate – sentences were committed by defendant over a week apart.  The cases each had different facts, victims, and codefendants.  Additionally, the indictments to which defendant pled were filed years apart.  When the State articulated the plea deals on the record, it was clear the pleas were separate.  (1T:5-15 to 5-20).  The State specifically offered, “that he plead guilty to murder, to receive a 30-year period of New Jersey State Prison with a 30-year period of parole ineligibility.  That would run concurrent to not only the Pennsylvania charge but to the robbery in Hamilton as well, I believe the number we placed on it was 12 NERA. ”  Ibid.  A review of the record illustrates that the State clearly intended two separate, distinct resolutions, while allowing defendant the benefit of serving those two separate, distinct sentences at the same time.  This is further evidenced by the fact that, at the time of the guilty pleas, the trial court took the factual basis for the guilty pleas one at a time.  (1T:21-12 to 24-18).  Additionally, there are two separate Judgement of Convictions in this matter.  Da64-70.  It is clear defendant pled to two unrelated indictments.  In addition, the trial court created a thorough record at the time of the plea which is absent any proof that the State intended to allow defendant to withdraw from the second agreement if defendant were permitted to withdraw from the first agreement.  Contrary to defendant’s assertions, the reversal of a pretrial motion in an unrelated case is wholly irrelevant when determining whether a defendant is entitled to withdraw his plea in the case at hand.  As such, the conditional plea rule is not applicable in the current case.
[brief] N.J.S.A. 17:33A-8(g).  Title insurance falls within Subtitle 3 of Title 17.  Thus, the Fraud Act’s plain language includes title insurers in the Fraud Assessment.  Starting with the Fraud Act’s 1983 enactment, the Fraud Assessment was imposed on title insurers, and they paid it.  388 N.J. Super. at 553.  The apparent tension between both statutes came before the court when a trade organization representing title insurers objected to paying the Fraud Assessment, based on the TIA’s provisions narrowing its scope.
[brief] (Pa0839,T182:18-183:2).  This instruction was not confirmed in writing.  (Pa0839,T183:3-12).  It was not until October 27, 2016, that [...], on behalf of Plaintiffs, via email, instructed [...], to terminate the Lease due to the lack of a sewer connection to the Property.  (Pa1022).  On October 31, 2016, [...], on behalf of Plaintiff, sent a correspondence to [...], counsel for [...], terminating the Lease.  (Pa1024).  On November 7, 2016, [...] sent a letter in response stating that Plaintiff was responsible for the remaining thirty-four (34) months of rent and was not entitled to a refund of monies already paid.  (Pa1026-Pa1027).  The November 7, 2016 letter also confirmed that Plaintiff failed to comply with Paragraphs 2 and 4 of the Lease Rider, as it did not submit the application with the town of [...].  Ibid.  On February 2, 2018, Plaintiff brought suit against [...], for constructive eviction, breach of lease, fraud in the inducement, unjust enrichment, breach of the covenant of good faith, and violations of the Consumer Fraud Act.  (Pa0957).  This Lease Litigation ultimately settled between Plaintiff and Defendant [...] Associate, and a Consent Order regarding the settlement was filed in Court on April 27, 2020.  (Pa1272)(Pa1016).  Of particular importance to the Instant Action is provision (5) in the Settlement Agreement entitled, “Cooperation by Defendant and Counsel for Defendant in Action Against Plaintiff’s Former Counsel. ” (Pa1274).  The provision sets forth that Plaintiff may pursue “a claim for malpractice against Plaintiff’s former counsel attorney [...] in connection with the transaction which is the subject of the Civil Action. ” (Pa1274).  A short time after settling the Lease Litigation, knowing they had a claim against Defendants, Plaintiff filed this Instant Action against Defendants, in an attempt to recover the amounts paid in the Lease Litigation as well as counsel fees and costs.
[brief] Even if the redevelopment plan is not consistent with the master plan, the adoption of Ordinance 2022-17 that supplied reasons and which was voted upon by a majority of the governing body, and which was supported by the record remedied this defect.  (3T48:18-22).  In dismissing Plaintiff-Appellant’s claim that the adoption of Ordinance 2022-17 was arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable the Trial Court found that “there was the adoption of an amendment to the redevelopment plan with reasons, voted upon by a majority of the governing body, and that those reasons were supported by the record. ”  (3T50:11-15).  [...] also noted “plaintiffs were given the opportunity at the public hearing, on December 8, 2022, to challenge the Township Committee’s finding, that the purpose of the MLUL are advanced by this redevelopment plan, which reasons are set further in subparagraph K, and they did not do so. ” (3T61:1-6).  As such, there can be no allegation against the Board’s action herein, as the adoption of Ordinance 2022-17 essentially rendered the Board’s findings moot.
[directive] Incentive and Sanction Charts  DATE: January 3, 2020  This directive promulgates the State of New Jersey Adult Drug Court Program-Participant as approved by the Judicial Council on December 5, 2019.  These Incentive and Sanction Charts charts provide direction to team members of the Adult Drug Court Program regarding the appropriate response to both positive and inappropriate behavior by drug court participants in order to achieve desired outcomes and to promote consistency.  The development of the statewide Incentives and Sanction Charts was a recommendation by the National Association of Drug Court Professionals after an intensive two-day program with the drug court teams.  Further training on these charts will be provided to the drug court teams in early 2020.  Questions regarding this policy may be directed to [...], Statewide Drug Court Manager via email at [...] or by telephone at [...].  Attachment cc: Chief Justice [...]
[brief] Plaintiffs’ position that Defendant was unjustly enriched contradicts their argument that the trial court correctly ruled that Defendant breached the subject contracts and was liable for damages caused by her breach (Pb75-76).  In making this argument, Plaintiffs completely ignore well settled case law that unjust enrichment is a remedy that is only available when there was no express contract providing for remuneration.  See Van Orman v. American Ins. Co., 680 F.2d 301, 311 (3rd Cir.1982).  As there were express contracts between the parties that the trial court granted Plaintiffs relief under, Plaintiffs’ unjust enrichment claims against Defendant were defective as matter of law because they were based on the same underlying conduct.  *Id.*  Put differently, if the trial court correctly ruled that Defendant breached contracts like Plaintiffs argue, then she could not be found liable for unjust enrichment based on the same underlying conduct as a matter of law.  *Van Orman*, supra, 680 F.2d at 311.  The trial court missed this legal distinction by incorrectly holding Defendant liable for both breach of contract and unjust enrichment (36T51-22 to 52-6).  In their opposition brief, Plaintiffs also failed to address the well settled legal principle that a claim for unjust enrichment cannot succeed where the allegations underlying the claim sound, as they do here, in tort.  *Pereira v. Azevado*, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54868, *13 (D.N.J. April 17, 2013) (citations omitted).  Accordingly, because the factual and evidentiary foundation for Plaintiffs’ conversion claims was the same for their unjust enrichment claims, the trial court erred by holding Defendant liable for both conversion and unjust enrichment.  *Pereira*, supra, 2013 U.S. Dist. at *13.  Based on the foregoing, the trial court’s Judgment must be vacated against Defendant on Plaintiffs’ unjust enrichment claims.
[brief] Bank Leumi USA v Kloss, 243 N.J. 218 (2020); Dimitrakopoulos v Borrus, 237 N.J. 91, 114 (2019); 700 Highway 33 LLC v. Pollio, 421 N.J. Super. 231, 238 (App. Div. 2011); Highland Lakes Country Club & Comty. Ass’n v. Nicastro, 201 N.J. 123, 125 (2009).  The Entire Controversy Doctrine promotes judicial fairness.
[brief] The grand jury also charged [...] with receiving stolen property, \(N.J.S.A.\) 2C:20–7 (count twelve).  *4  The trial court denied defendants' motion for severance, and thereafter a jury acquitted them of count eleven; convicted them of the lesser-included offense of aggravated manslaughter on count one; and convicted them of all other offenses charged in the indictment.  At [...]'s sentencing, after appropriate mergers, the court imposed the following prison terms: on count two (felony murder), forty years with an eighty-five percent period of parole ineligibility and five years of supervision upon release under the No Early Release Act (NERA), \(N.J.S.A.\) 2C:43–7.2; fifteen years subject to NERA on count three (robbery of [...]) concurrent to count two; fifteen years subject to NERA on count four (robbery of [...]) concurrent to count two and consecutive to count three; twenty years subject to NERA on count eight (kidnapping [...]) concurrent to counts two and three; and twenty years subject to NERA on count nine (kidnapping [...]) concurrent to counts two and four, and consecutive to count eight.
[brief] Please refer to [...] showing virtually no difference in the download time for 10 pages (e.g. extension of time) and 100 pages (e.g. Summary Judgment Motion).  Additionally, our Motion R. 1:6-2(a) states:  “Every motion shall state the time and place when it is to be presented to the court, the grounds upon which it is made and the nature of the relief sought. ”  Id (emphasis added).  Here, both the grounds and the nature were clearly stated as a request for more time.  The Notice of Motion must state its purpose on its first page (there was none) Pa325.  Clearly, it’s a violation to type 12 words totally misrepresenting its purpose on its second page.  Pa326.  A.  A Possible “Easy Way Out” of the Enforcement the State’s Error – Dismissal for “exact same reasons”
[brief] Da128  Exhibit A – New Jersey Police Crash Investigation Report, dated December 29, 2019 .............................................................................. Da136 Exhibit B – Correspondence from [...] to [...], dated September 29, 2022 ...............Da141 Exhibit C – Portions of the transcript of [...], dated October 14, 2022 (omitted, see Da79) .........................................................Da79 Pre-Trial Exchange of Defendants, [...], [...], and [...], dated September 22, 2023 .......................Da143 Exhibit A – New Jersey Police Crash Investigation Report, dated December 29, 2019 (omitted, see Da136) ..................................................... Da136 Exhibit B – Photographs of accident scene .........................................................Da148 Proposed Jury Charges ..................................................................................Da152 Verdict Sheet ..................................................................................................Da154 P-1 – photograph of accident scene .........................................................Da157 P-2 – photograph of accident scene .........................................................Da158 P-3 – photograph of accident scene .........................................................Da159 P-5 – photograph of accident scene\(^1\) ..................................................Da160 P-6 – photograph of accident scene .........................................................Da161 P-7 – photograph of accident scene .........................................................Da162 P-8 – photograph of Plaintiff’s injuries ....................................................Da163 P-9 – photograph of Plaintiff’s injuries ....................................................Da164 P-10 – photograph of Plaintiff’s injuries ..................................................Da165 P-11 – photograph of Plaintiff’s injuries ..................................................Da166 P-12 – medical illustration ........................................................................Da167 P-13 – medical illustration ........................................................................Da168 P-14 – medical illustration ........................................................................Da169 P-15 – CD containing police dash cam video..............................................Da170
[brief] A.  Statutes: N.J. S.A. 2A:28, et seq. ......................................................... 1 & 12  N.J.S.A. 2A:28-1 ................................................................. 4, 6,10, 13 & 15  N.J.S.A. 2A:28-2 .................................................................  14  N.J.S.A.  2A:28-3 ................................................................. 2, 3, 4, 6, 11, 14, 15 & 19  B.  Case Law: City Council of Orange v. Edwards, 455 N.J. Super. 261-71 (App. Div. 2018), cert. denied 237 N.J. 205 (2019)  .........................  15  In re: Ridge Field Park Bd. Of Ed., 244 N.J. 1, 17 (2020)  ...........  19 Kocanowski v. Township of Bridgewater, 237 N.J. 3, 9 (2019)  .......  19 Normach Associates, Inc. V. Baldessamo, 40 N.J. 113, 125 (1963)  .....  18 Rowe v. Bell & Gossett Co., 239 N.J. 531, 552 (2019)  ............... State v. Fuqua, 234 N.J. 583, 591 (2018)  ............................  19 Stransky v.Monmouth Counsel of Girl Scouts, 93 N.J. Super. 599, 611 (App. Div. 2007) ..............................................  18 Suser v. Wachovia Mortgage FSB, 433 N.J. Super. 317, 326 fn.4 (App. Div. 2013)  .........................................................  14  V. PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
[brief] Plaintiff-Appellants’ pleadings in the 2020 Action involved the same claims, the same parties, and the same issues as the 2015 Action, with the exception of (a) adding unsubstantiated allegations of fraudulent concealment of evidence by the defendants during the conduct of discovery in the 2015 Action, (b) suing certain parties’ defense counsel for allegedly concealing evidence during the conduct of discovery in the 2015 Action, and (c) attempting to resurrect various claims against Plaintiffs-Appellants’ counsel in the Pork Chop Hill transaction, [...], which had previously been dismissed from the 2015 Action for failure to file an Affidavit of Merit.  1a-67a; 68a-141a; 259a-283a; Da004-051.  In Paragraphs 1 through 202 of the Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs-Appellants alleged, just as they were alleging at the same time and in the same court house in their then still pending 2015 Action, that [...] and [...] duped them into entering the Pork Chop Hill Assemblage, that [...] and [...] reneged on their alleged promise to purchase the land from them once they had obtained the requisite land use approvals and made the initial site improvements needed to develop the land for residential use, and that the amounts they had paid for the assignment of PCHA’s contract rights to purchase the Pork Chop Hill Assemblage had been pocketed by [...], [...], and their respective family members and affiliated business entities, all of whom Plaintiffs-Appellants named as defendants not just in the 2020 Action but also in the 2015 Action (including defendants [...], [...], and [...]).
[directive] •  Upon firing the last round, leave action open and place safety on.  Phase II  Mid-point between the farthest distance determined by the agency and the target line for the SSQC 10-Yard Line for the SSNQC.  Time: 35 seconds.  5 rounds.  Point Shoulder Position.  •  On command, with shotgun in an empty, safe condition and action open, combat load 1 round, close action and load 2 rounds into the magazine.  • Assume point shoulder position; fire 3 rounds, keeping the action open after firing the third round.  •  Combat load 1 round, close the action and load 1 round into the magazine.  •  Assume point shoulder position; fire 2 rounds.  ---STOP TIME--- 9-53 Revised (5/03)
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT, PROBATE PART, DID NOT HAVE JURISDICTION TO HEAR THE CONTRACT DISPUTE RAISED IN THE ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE AS THE SUBJECT PROPERTY WAS NOT A PROBATE ASSET AND THE ENFORCEMENT OF THE CONSENT JUDGMENT IS A BREACH OF CONTRACT ACTION, NOT A PROBATE ONE.  (Da487, 1T22)  Neither the Surrogate, nor the Chancery Division, Probate Part, has jurisdiction to hear this contractual dispute.
[brief] **Children do not have a privacy right to keep the fact their school is socially transitioning them secret from their parents. **  The State argued below that children have a privacy right to keep their school’s social transitioning of them secret from their parents.  ACa83.  The State did not specifically invoke the United States Constitution as the source of students’ alleged privacy rights (presumably to avoid creating federal jurisdiction), but even if it had, children have no federal constitutional right to privacy to keep secret from their parents the fact they are being socially transitioned by their school.  Thus, student privacy is not a legitimate interest, much less a compelling one. \(^4\)
[brief] A.  Background  Plaintiffs, [...], [...] and [...] are legal entities organized and existing under the laws of New Jersey.  (Pa 107).  Pursuant to a Bankruptcy Court Order in [...] issued by the Bankruptcy Court for the District of New Jersey, Plaintiffs, [...], [...] and [...] were consolidated and a Certificate of Merger was filed on July 1, 2022.  (Pa 107).  Accordingly, Plaintiffs, [...], [...] and [...] will be referred to collectively herein as “Plaintiff.
[brief] Thus, the price is not defined in the right-of-first-refusal clause, but rather is defined in the third party's offer or "'by the terms on which [the owner] has expressed a willingness to sell.'"  Id. at 230, (quoting 1A Corbin on Contracts § 261, at 470 (2d ed. 1963)).  The term, "bona fide" has consistently been equated with good faith conduct, honesty and fair dealing.