ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] 14  | CASES | Brief Page Number | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------| | Bongo v. N.J. Bell Tel. Co., 250 N.J.Super. 524 (Law Div. 1991) | 5 | | Cochran v. [...], 97 N.J.L 480 (E&A 1922) | 7 | | E & M Liquors v. Public Service Elec. & Gas Co., 388 N.J.Super. 566 App. Div. 2006 | 3, 4, 6 | | Ebert v. S. Jersey Gas. Co., 260 N.J.Super. 104 Law Div. 1992) | 5 | | Press v. Borough of Point Pleasant Beach, 2010  N.J.Super.Unpub. LEXIS 183 *7 (App. Div.) | 7 | | Sinclair v. Dunagan, 905 F.Supp. 208 (D.N.J. 1995) | 7 | | Weinberg v. Dinger, 106 N.J. 469 (1987).  | Passim | | Appendix Document | Appendix Page No. | |-------------------------------------------------------|-------------------| | Press v. Borough of Point Pleasant Beach, 2010 | Pral | | N.J.Super.Unpub. LEXIS 183 *7 (App. Div.) | | PRELIMINARY STATEMENT  In their opposition briefs, the defendants do not offer cogent arguments to demonstrate why the summary judgment orders and opinions granted in their favor should not be disturbed.  Defendant [...] ("[...]") relies on incorrect legal precedents for its claimed entitlement to summary judgment.  Defendant [...]'s factual bases, and that of the Trial Court, for its claimed entitlement to summary judgment are highly disputed by facts offered by plaintiff; and it has not shown that the Trial Court was correct in barring the testimony of plaintiff's experts.  PROCEDURAL HISTORY  Plaintiff relies on the Procedural History reflected in his initial brief.  STATEMENT OF FACTS  Plaintiff relies on the Statement of Facts reflected in his initial brief.  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I
[brief] Citing *In re Resolution of State Com. of Investigation*, 108 N.J. 35, 46 (1987), the courts in *Valentine* and *Woo-Padva* 2 reasoned that “Plaintiff cannot circumvent the lack of a private cause of action by seeking relief under the New Jersey Uniform Declaratory Judgement Law. ”  *Valentine*, October 4, 2023  Opinion at 11; *Woo-Padva*, No. A-1996-21, 2023 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1550, at *9.  Notwithstanding the analysis of private right of action under the NJCFLA, discussed *supra*, and the fact that *In re Resolution* addressed a statute\(^8\) which expressly prohibits a private right of action, the holding of *In re Resolution* was based on a conflict of competing equities not present here.
[brief] 476 N.J. Super. at 298.  While the State takes issue with this characterization, it is exactly what happened and what is portrayed on the video of [...]’s statement.  When [...] was asked whether he understood his right to remain silent and refuse to answer any questions his initial response was “not exactly, but I’ve heard of it. ” (7T:282-3 to 4).  Next, the detective asked him to read it out loud and then asked the same question.  [...]’s response was “I don’t know how to word it really. ” (7T:282-20 to 21).  When asked what “you have the right to remain silent and refuse to answer any questions” means, [...] couldn’t explain it.  Id.  [...] agrees with Detectives but had great difficulty explaining anything.  Even when the Detectives explained [...]’s rights to him, he couldn’t explain them back.  [...] could agree with the Detectives but whenever he was asked to explain any of his rights, he could not do it.  As aforementioned, he was never given the opportunity to consult with his “guardian” in private.
[brief] TABLE OF JUDGMENTS AND ORDERS .........................................................  ii  TABLE OF CITATIONS ..............................................................................  iii  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT...........................................................................1  STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY...............................3  LEGAL ARGUMENT .....................................................................................3  1.  Burt controlled the trial court on the facts of this case, and Mejia was not a sub-silentio overruling or abrogation of Burt.  .........................................................3  2.  [...] asked for-and was promised-a Burt defendant trial, but actually received an “empty-chair” defendant trial..................................................9  CONCLUSION  ............................................................................................15
[brief] (1)  Identity of issues exists.  Each application sought a front yard variance for construction of a single-family residence on the same property.  [...] sought a variance with a 53-foot setback in a zone where 200 feet is required.  Ja167, Ja172, Ja217 [...] sought greater variance relief by requesting a 46-foot set back where 200 feet is required.  Ja275 (2)  Identity of parties exists.  The same parties or their privies were involved in both applications.  [...] was the contract purchaser of [...].  Ja148  [...] testified in favor of the [...] application and in favor of her own application using essentially identical testimony.  Ja220, Ja285.  See Campus Assocs. V. Hillsborough Zoning Bd., 413 N.J. Super. 527, 538 (App Div. 2010)  (Because a variance once granted runs with the land, a contract purchaser and landowner are for purposes of the doctrine of res judicata the same parties or their privies.)
[brief] Ibid.  However, in Yarbough, the Court noted that the Code did not provide any criteria to channel the exercise of a sentencing court’s discretion in deciding between concurrent and consecutive sentences.  Id. at 636.  Noting that N.J.S.A. 2C:1-2(c) states, “[t]he discretionary powers conferred by the code shall be exercised in accordance with the criteria stated in the code and, insofar as such criteria are not decisive, to further the general purposes stated in this section” the Supreme Court in Yarbough undertook to “fashion standards for discretion that will best further the purposes of the Code.
[directive] When dealing with a cooperative person, officers may rely on police presence and/or verbal control techniques, but should not use force.  (b)  Passive Resistor.  When dealing with a passive resistor, officers may rely on police presence, verbal control techniques, holding techniques, lifting/carrying, wrist locks and other manual pain compliance techniques.  Greater force, such as strikes, punches, CEDs, or less lethal devices shall not be used.  (c)
[brief] Blue Penciling the restricted area from a 20-mile radius to 19 miles, and eliminating the Indirect Competition Clause, will permit [...] to begin working at [...] immediately.  [...] argues that this appeal is moot because it claims [...] found a job outside of the restricted area in the State of Washington.  [...]’s claim in this regard is false.  [...] attempted to commute from [...] to the State of Washington for work, but understandably, the commute was too much to bear for [...] and his family.  As such, [...] is not employed in the State of Washington and remains hopeful to be permitted to begin a new chapter in his career at [...], where an office is waiting for him.
[brief] Recently, our District Court in [Jones v. Pi Kappa Alpha Int. Fraternity](#), 431 F. Supp. 3d 518, 531-32 (D.N.J. 2019) held:  \(^{16}\)  The IEPs did show [...] had issues with depression, a mild form of autism and minor personality disorders, such as obsessive-compulsive behavior.  No “mental illness” findings were made in any of these many IEP reports.  In short, the NJLAD theory of this claim has some novel features.  I will not cut it off at this early stage, but will permit factual development.
[brief] Such a result is consistent with applicable New Jersey law.  See, e.g., 715 Partners, LLC v. GS Assignment, LLC, A-2527-15T3, 2018 WL 2372800, at *8 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. May 25, 2018)² (“Once plaintiff caused the termination of the Agreement, . . . Seller was free to sell the Property to anyone”).  Under Plaintiff’s warped interpretation of the PSA, [...] would have been obligated to Plaintiff in perpetuity, while, at the same time, Plaintiff had no obligation to continue to have its Deposit held in escrow; indeed, while Plaintiff claims to want a judgment of specific performance, that would be impossible after it took back its $5 million deposit because the PSA required Plaintiff to post a $5 million deposit until closing.  Plaintiff’s interpretation of the contract is not only commercially unreasonable, but indeed lacks any common sense.  For example, in Plaintiff’s view, if [...] resurrected the [...] in ten years with an inflation-adjusted purchase price, [...] would still be required to convey the Land to Plaintiff at the old purchase price stated in the PSA, without Plaintiff having to post any deposit.  Plaintiff attempts to contort the plain meaning of the remedies clause to avoid the consequences of the business decision it made to abandon the transaction, rather than wait to see if the [...] would close.  Yet, it tries to find some way to both have its cake even after having consumed ²
[brief] **7a.**  The first eight counts of the superseding indictment, [...], remained the same as Indictment [...].  Indictment [...] charged [...] in Count 9 with first degree murder in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3a(1) or (2), a crime of the first degree; in Count 10 with possession of a weapon for unlawful purpose in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:39-ra(1), a crime of the second degree; in Count 11 with unlawful possession of a weapon in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:48-4, a crime of the second degree; and in Count 12, possession of a weapon by a convicted felon, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:39-7b(1), a crime of the second degree.  On December 18, 2017, the defense submitted a motion to sever the two murder charges as well as a motion to dismiss the indictment.  **12a-13a. **  On February 12, 2018, the Court, the Honorable [...] presiding, denied the motion to dismiss the indictment but granted the motion to sever the murder charges.
[brief] B.  No New Jersey Court Has Ever Held That the Code of Judicial Conduct Applies to Special Masters.  Because the trial court resolved the [...]’ recusal motion under the Code of Judicial Conduct’s conflict rules, the issue whether the Code applies identically to judges as special masters is irrelevant to this appeal.  Nonetheless, it is worth noting that no New Jersey court has ever concluded that the Code applies to all special masters or third-party neutrals.
[brief] Rulings by a trial court judge should be upheld on appeal when supported by adequate, substantial and credible evidence.  New Jersey Turnpike Authority v. Sisselman, 106 N.J. Super. 358 (App. Div. 1969), certif. den. 54 N.J. 565 (1969).  The "appellate function is a limited one: we do not disturb the factual findings and legal conclusions of the trial judge unless we are convinced that they are so manifestly unsupported by or inconsistent with the competent, relevant and reasonably credible evidence as to offend the interests of justice," Fagliarone v. Twp. of No. Bergen, 78 N.J. Super. 154, 155 (App. Div. 1963), and the appellate court therefore ponders whether, on the contrary, there is substantial evidence in support of the trial judge's findings and conclusions.  Rova Farms Resort v. Investors Ins. Co. 65 N.J. 474, 478 (1974), citing Weiss v. I Zapinsky, Inc., 65 N.J. Super. 351, 357 (App. Div. 1961).  In this case, the Trial Court found adequate, substantial, and credible evidence as related to the reversal of the Zoning Board’s variance denial, the appointment of the Special Hearing Officer and the adoption of his recommendations, and there is no need to disturb its findings.  However, despite the Trial Court’s correct interpretation of the facts underlying the civil rights claims, its failure to award damages should be reversed given the applicable law.  POINT II
[brief] Longridge Builders, Inc. v. Planning Bd. of Princeton, 52 N.J. 348 (1968) ..................39 Lozano v. Frank DeLuca Constr., 178 N.J. 513, 522 (2004) ...........................................25 Matter of Yaccarino, 117 N.J. 175 (1989) ........................................................................44 Meredith v. Mayor & Borough Council of Somerdale & Lidl United States Operations, Docket No. A-1933-20, 2022 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 971 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. June 3, 2022) .........................................................47 Miller v. Bank of Am. Home Loan, 439 N.J. Super. 540 (App. Div. 2015) ....................19 Nunziato v. Planning Bd. of Edgewater Borough, 25 N.J. Super. 124 (App. Div. 1988) .......................................................................................................................... 38, 39 O’Connell v. State, 171 N.J. 484 (2002) .............................................................................25 Powerhouse Arts Dist. Neighborhood Ass’n v. City Council of City of Jersey City, 413 N.J. Super. 322 (App. Div. 2010) .................................................................21 Prudential Property & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Boylan, 307 N.J. Super. 162 (App. Div. 1998) .................................................................................................................................18  Riggs v. Long Beach Twp., 109 N.J. 601 (1988) ..............................................................24  SB Bldg. Assocs., L.P. v. Planning Bd., Docket No. A-0200-14T1, 2017 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 36, 2017 WL 84719 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Jan. 6, 2017) .................................................................................................................. 37, 38, 39 State v. Miller, 170 N.J. 417 (2002) ..................................................................................29
[brief] The Appellant, [...] (hereinafter “[...]”), challenges the final administrative action of the [...] (hereinafter “[...]”) dismissing his underlying appeal for deferred retirement benefits.  In its decision dated November 16, 2023, the [...] adopted the initial decision and recommendation of Administrative Law Judge [...] (hereinafter “ALJ” or “[...]”), who determined [...] did not qualify for deferred retirement benefits as a matter of law, thereby granting the [...]’s Motion for Summary Decision.  The [...] improperly adopted the ALJ’s ultimate decision to dismiss [...]’s appeal.  Specifically, the ALJ’s determination [...] was removed for charges of misconduct directly related to his employment, thereby rendering him ineligible for deferred retirement benefits, was erroneous and legally infirm.  In reviewing all the salient facts of this matter, it is clear [...] was not removed for charges of misconduct directly related to his employment within the meaning of the applicable law.  Rather, [...] was removed for charges unrelated to his employment and/or official duties.  As such, he was not categorically ineligible from receiving deferred retirement benefits.  As a result, this Honorable Court must reverse the [...]’s final administrative action.
[brief] ” (Da 070-071).  The third request for discovery, relating to [...]’s PCR claim of Confrontation Clause violations, sought documentation of the cooperation agreements between the State and testifying witness [...], and informant, [REDACTED].  (See Da 072).  The Court denied this motion to compel on December 6, 2022, but requested that the State “as a courtesy to the Defense…confirm that there are no such documents in existence, including emails, office notes and similar records. ” (Da 072).  On February 23, 2023, PCR Counsel made a fourth motion to compel discovery, requesting all communications data and evidence that was testified about and presented to the jury at trial and/or was used by law enforcement to support the Communications Data Warrant.
[brief] The purpose of the R. 4:5-1(b) certification is to “implement the philosophy of the entire controversy doctrine. ”  *See* Pressler & Verniero, *Current N.J. Court Rules*, cmt. 2.1 to R. 4:5-1.  Defendant [...] had to establish that he was a party subject to joinder under R. 4:28 or R. 4:29-1(b).  *See* R. 4:5-1(b)(2).  As Plaintiff’s claim against Defendant [...] is for legal malpractice, it was not subject to joinder in the underlying litigation, and [...]’s motion fails.  In addition to failing to demonstrate that Defendant was a party subject to joinder, which the Defendants’ motion papers make no attempt to establish, the Defendants’ next burden would be to establish that any failure to identity them was *inexcusable*.
[brief] [Ibid. (emphasis added). ]  The Department acknowledged in the rule proposal that it “participated in the development of the Design Guidelines [] in order to ensure that it [was] consistent with the [CZM Rules],” ibid.; it “determined that the Design Guidelines Ordinance complies with the [CZM Rules] such that development constructed in accordance with the Design Guidelines Ordinance and Redevelopment Plan Ordinance will be in compliance with the [CZM Rules],” id. at 3922; and “[t]he Design Guidelines Ordinance contains setback, bulk, height and building line requirements which all contribute to addressing the objective of providing visual and physical access to the waterfront from several vantage points without reducing the presence of the shoreline.
[brief] 2T.  The case was tried before a jury on October 3, 2023, October 4, 2023, and October 5, 2023.  2T; 3T; 4T; 5T.  During the Charge Conference, all counsel agreed the Jury should not consider any Comparative Fault of Plaintiff and that “the only liability question on the verdict sheet would be as to the two Defendants. ”  4T256-257.  The Jury returned a verdict assessing 40% liability against Defendants [...] and [...] and 60% against Defendants [...] and [...].  Da273.  The jury awarded $3.5 million in damages.  Da273.  Defendant [...] and Defendant [...] each filed motions for a new trial, remittitur, and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.  Da173; Da179.  The trial court denied [...]’s motion by Order dated November 17, 2023.  Da225.  The parties agreed to a stay of the judgment upon the posting of a Supersedeas Bond by [...].  Da210.  Defendant [...] filed a Notice of Appeal from the jury’s verdict and the trial court’s Order denying [...]’s motion for a new trial, remittitur, and judgment notwithstanding the verdict.  Da213.  [...] also filed an appeal from the jury’s verdict.  Da265.  [...]’s appeal was later dismissed.  Da270.  STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS
[brief] Pa191, at 72:4-11).  He further opined that a double planting of evergreen trees would create a sufficient buffer between the development and the neighboring properties.  Id., at 72:12-16.  As to the FAR, [...] testified that the required .35 FAR is “completely unrealistic” as most properties in similar zones have a FAR of at least 1.0 or higher. Pa192, at 74:2-7.
[brief] ”  PA – 4.  [...] further concluded that Defendant --- 2 “PA” corresponds to “Plaintiff’s Appendix” followed by the applicable page number(s).  waived the right to dispute the balance and any particular charges because Defendant failed to demonstrate compliance with federal statute and regulation.  PA – 5.  It is understood that the motion judge's reference was to the dispute provisions that allow a cardholder to dispute any particular charge(s) within 60 days of the charge appearing on a statement.  In fact, defendant showed no proofs that he ever disputed any charge on the account until the instant action was served upon him.  [...] concluded by stating that Plaintiff’s Statement of Material Facts was deemed admitted because Defendant failed to oppose same as required by R. 4:46-2(b).
[directive] ATTORNEY GENERAL STANDARDS FOR PROVIDING SERVICES TO VICTIMS OF SEXUAL ASSAULT History  In 1997, a Sexual Assault Protocol Council was convened with the support of Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) funds awarded to the Division of Criminal Justice.  The Council included representatives from law enforcement, sexual violence services organizations, and the nursing and medical professions.  The Council’s mandate was to develop statewide standards for providing services to victims of sexual assault.  The use of a “victim-centered” approach became the guiding principle of the Council in their development of standardized protocols.  The Council defined a victim-centered approach as “the systematic focus on the needs and concerns of a sexual assault victim to ensure the compassionate and sensitive delivery of services in a non-judgmental manner. ”  In 1998, the Office of the Attorney General issued the Council’s recommendations in New Jersey’s first Attorney General Standards for Providing Services to Victims of Sexual Assault.
[directive] When interviewing a law enforcement officer as a witness, he or she must be made aware of the differences between being a witness in an administrative investigation and being the subject of an administrative investigation.  The officer also should be advised that he or she is not the subject of the investigation at this time.  Appendix I provides a model form that may be used for this purpose.  If at any time the officer becomes a subject of the investigation, he or she should be advised of that fact and the appropriate procedures followed.  8.5.2
[brief] ### TABLE OF CITATIONS  ####  CASES | Case | Page | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | Burney v. Washington Nat. Ins. Co., 68 N.J.Super. 373 (A.D. 1961) | 22 | | DiCosala v. Kay, 91 N.J. 159 (1982) | 13 | | G.A.-H. v. K.G.G., 238 N.J. 401 (2019) | 1, 11, 12 | | Redvanly v. ADP, Inc., 407 N.J.Super.  395 (A.D. 2009), cert denied, 200 N.J. 367 (2009) | 19 | | Rosenblit v. Zimmerman, 166 N.J. 391 (2001) | 18 | | Scarano v. Lindale, 121 N.J.L. 549 (E. & A. 1938) | 22 | | State v. Council, Div. of Resource Dev., 60 N.J. 199 (1972) | 18 | | State v. Jones, 364 N.J.Super. 376 (A.D. 2003) | 16, 17 | | State v. Ragland, 105 N.J. 189 (1986) | 17 | | State v. Sands, 76 N.J. 127 (1978) | 17 | | State v. Wray, 336 N.J.Super. 205 (A.D. 2001) | 17 | | Tymiv v. Lowes, et al., [...] (7/30/2021) | 1, 11, 12, 13, 21, 23, 24 | | Vosough v. Kierce, 437 N.J.Super. 218 (A.D. 2014) | 21 | #### RULES | Rule | Page | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | Court Rule 4:37-2(b) | 1 | | N.J.R.E. 403 | 15 | | N.J.R.E. 609 | 17 | ####  MODEL JURY CHARGES | Model Jury Charge | Page | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | Model Jury Charge 5.10B | 13 | TREATISES  Restatement of Agency (3d), § 7.07  13  Restatement of Torts (2d), Sec. 317 23, 24, 25, 26
[brief] As the trial court pointed out, [...] missed, and continues to miss, the essence of this case.  Though recorded title to property often is dispositive of the issue of ownership, as the New Jersey Supreme Court has held, as [...]’s expert opined, and as the trial court recognized, sometimes facts exist that render record title subordinate to the reality of the circumstances.  Palmarg Realty Co. v. Rehac, 80 N.J. 446, 453 (1979).  “As important as is the confidence of title searchers, purchasers, and others who rely on recorded instruments, the integrity of record title in rare cases can bend to accommodate compelling equities. ” found that the consultation did not affect her assessment of [...]’s expert’s credibility.
[brief] In any event, the court may consider issues raised for the first time on appeal when they “substantially implicate the public interest. ”  N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. M.C. III, 201 N.J. 328, 339 (2010).  Whether AICRA violates the right to a jury trial has widespread impact on insurance companies, medical providers, and consumers who pay insurance premiums, all of which are affected by insurers’ ability to obtain effective remedies for insurance fraud.  See D’Ambrosio v. Dep’t of Health & Senior Servs., 403 N.J. Super. 321, 334 (App. Div. 2008) (addressing issues of statutory interpretation raised for first time on appeal because “they touch upon the public interest and could have widespread importance for other EMTs, rescue squads, health care providers, and other persons and organizations in the field”).