ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The Court Below Properly Relied Upon the Facts Relevant to the Legal Questions at Issue.  (Pb25-Pb27).  Plaintiff in Point Five is asserting that the Court Below did not utilize the proper facts in its ultimate determination to dismiss Plaintiff’s Verified Complaint.  This is again untrue.  The Court’s recitation of the facts Plaintiff complains of have no bearing on the legal question in this matter.  Whether or not the term “significant driveway” is an appropriate descriptor was not before the Court Below. \textsuperscript{2}  Furthermore, Plaintiff appears to forget that at the time of decision, \textit{i.e.}, denial on or about August 5, 2019, the statements made were accurate.  As time moves forward, with regards to this instant matter over four (4) years past since the date of accrual as of the time of [...]’s Motion to Dismiss, things and circumstances may change.  However, at the time of decision those statements were truthful and are the probative facts relevant to the issue before the Trial Court and now this Court.\textsuperscript{3}  The issues before the Court Below were questions of (1) standing and (2) timing; the issues \textit{were not} whether or not the Borough had arbitrarily, capriciously or unreasonably denied the 2019 application.  The issue of timing, \textit{i.e.}, whether or not Plaintiff ran afoul of the respective Statutes of Limitations, was the reason for which the Court Below properly dismissed Plaintiff’s Verified Complaint.
[brief] This translates into no increase in any usage on the 16-inch line operating at reduced pressures, and the current regulator is, by the company's own admission, able to handle current load and projected future load for the next three to four years, a year or so short of 2025.  There obviously can be no significant increase in load on the 16-inch line before the 2025 moratorium on gas in new buildings takes hold.  At that point, if not before, the need for the added capacity that the proposed regulator would serve will have vanished.  The proposed regulator is not needed at all, let alone "reasonably necessary."
[directive] Consent Order Order Mandating a Psychiatric Evaluation of Criminal Responsibility at the Time NJS.A. of the Crime  Pursuant to 2C4-l for a Defendant Jail in NJS.A. notice pursuant to 2C:4-3 that the defendant intends to claim HAVING RECEIVED of that he/she was not responsible for his/her conduct at the time the crime due to mental disease NJS.A. or defect as provided 2C:4-l, and with agreement between the State and the defense, in the defendant is hereby ordered to undergo an evaluation by professional staff designated by the of of of of Commissioner the Department Health his/her sanity at the time the [ specify criminal _________ conduct that the defendant was originally charged with committing.,__ _ ---------------------------------- : and _______ __ ___ of It on this day , 20 that: ORDERED is of l.  The professional staff shall provide this court and the counsel identified below with a copy of his/her evaluation as to whether, at the time the offense, the defendant was laboring under of of of such a defect reason, from disease the mind as not to know the nature and quality the if act he/she was doing, or he/she did know it, that he/she did not know what he/she was doing was wrong;  The examination shall take place at the jail or prison by a qualified expert from the 2. of Department Health; Directive (11/01/2018), (Sanity 12334 Published 2) #17w!8 by Order 1 CN: of2 page 3.  The Prosecutor's Office shall immediately forward all discoverable materials, including but not limited to, the current charges against the defendant, the reasons why counsel seeking is of an evaluation and a copy this order, to this Judge's team leader for submission to the of of evaluating expert with two (2) days the date this order; and ______________  4.  [Any additional conditions as ordered by the court] _ of  The next court date this matter shall be (no longer than 90 days from date this order) in 5. of of  A copy this Order will be forwarded to the County Adjuster's Office by the Clerk the of Court within two days its signing.  Judge Date Defendant's Attorney: Prosecutor's Office: ______________ ______________
[brief] ”)  *Galik, supra*, 167 N.J. at 353, 347-48, 771 A.2d at 1149, 1144-46 (finding “substantial compliance” where plaintiff did not file affidavit within statutory time frame, but plaintiff's counsel, before initiating suit, provided defendants' insurance carriers with two detailed expert's reports that established legitimacy of complaint and served as basis for settlement discussions); Fink, supra, 167 N.J. at 561-64, 772 A.2d at 392-94 (finding “substantial compliance” where timely-served affidavit and extensive expert's report clearly focused on conduct of defendant and his relationship to malpractice case, even though both documents failed to name defendant doctor); Cornblatt, supra, 153 N.J. at 239-242, 708 A.2d at 411-13 (finding “substantial compliance” where plaintiff served timely certification instead of affidavit).
[brief] .................................................................  10 State v. Macon, 57 N.J. 325 (1971).................................................................. 21, 22 State v. Maltese, 222 N.J. 525 (2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1187 (2016)............. 11, 12 State v. Marshall, 123 N.J. 1 (1991), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 929 (1993) ......................
[brief] This “fact issue” not only lacks any substance, but any relevance.  [...] finally takes issue with the lower court’s statement in its decision that “[s]ending a Questionnaire and demand for production of [...]’s payroll records, as [...] did in the present case, does not strike this Court as being in good faith,” arguing that this conclusion should not have been reached without the lower court receiving testimony from a [...] employee on the subject.  However, the lower court’s determination in no way turned on this assessment by it; rather, its decision was based upon the mandate of the COVID Statute that school districts are required to pay their contracted service providers when schools are closed due to a public health emergency as if they had been open, and nothing more.  A finding by the lower court that [...] made a good faith effort at renegotiating the parties’ contract would not have impacted its basic conclusion that the COVID Statute means what it says.  The lower court did not make any credibility determinations in deciding [...]’s motion and there is no basis for setting aside the judgment as a result of its doing so.
[brief] Pa3334.  On February 24, 2022, [...] filed a motion to dismiss.  Pa3343.  On March 3, 2022, the court granted declaratory judgment against [...]; and on March 7, 2022, the court vacated the declaratory judgment order.  Pa3387, 3389.  On March 24, 2022, [...] filed a “cross-motion for sanctions. ”  Pa 3390.  On March 29, 2022, plaintiffs opposed [...]'s motion and [...]' motion.  Pa3401.  On April 5, 2022, the court entered two orders dismissing the first amended complaint and denying [...]' motion for sanctions.  Pa3419, 3420, 3442.  On May 17, 2022, plaintiffs submitted a proposed final judgment; and on May 23, 2022, final judgment was entered.
[brief] Id. at 19:11-16.  That equitable claim was, in the Court’s opinion, superior to Lot 4’s, and the court therefore recognized [...]’s equitable entitlement to the Strip.  Id. at 19:18 – 20:9.  The court did not stop at that conclusion, however.  It continued on, finding that [...] also had met the criteria to show that it had obtained the Strip by adverse possession, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:14-30.  Id. at 20:10-15.  “The evidence demonstrates by a preponderance of the evidence that for 30 years defendants -- at least 30 years, defendants [sic] possession of the strip was continuous and interrupted, actual and exclusive, open and notorious and actual and hostile. ”  Id. at 21:7-11.  The court based that conclusion on many of the same facts as had established [...]’s equitable entitlement to the Strip.  Id. at 21:22 - 23:8.  The court also rejected [...]’s defenses to the adverse possession claim, finding that [...] did not persuasively challenge the length of time Lot 3’s owners had used the Strip, and failed to present competent evidence that he had given permission for the use of the Strip.  *Id.* at 20:14-21.  **ARGUMENT**
[brief] Here, by contrast, the judgment against [...] rested exclusively on findings of self-dealing and unequivocally placed all claims beyond coverage.  Second, in *Myer*, when the insurer declined to pursue an appeal, the insured himself took the laboring oar.  The appeal was ultimately unsuccessful.  Even though finding that, because the negligence-based verdict obligated the insurer to fund an appeal, the court did not saddle the insurer with the entirety of the underlying verdict.  The court expressly permitted the insurer, on remand, to demonstrate that – although the jury found that certain defamatory statements were merely negligent (the only option given to the jury for those statements) – that, in fact, all of the defamatory statements were knowingly false.  Unlike the insured in *Myer*, [...] did not pursue an appeal of the underlying verdict.  [...] incorrectly states, in proceedings below, Ohio failed to address *Pharmacists* and the contours of the duty to appeal under Vermont law.
[directive] Conflicting reports coming from different sources.  CDRSS is a system that was designed for • public health use in monitoring and controlling communicable disease.  There are thousands of public health professionals who use CDRSS every day, where new information is entered in the system and cases are being updated continuously.  Depending on the time when a report is compiled from CDRSS, the number of cases and the amount of information in each case can be different.  It is important to maintain a standardized protocol and obtain data from one source (i.e., your County LINCS Agency or CPO) to avoid misinformation and confusion.
[directive] 4.  (3)  Èske w konprann ke resevwa yon santans de sipèvizyon [Wi/Yes]  [Non/No] [pa aplikab/NA] kondisyonèl a vi vle di ke osito yo lage w de prizon oubyen imedyatman aprè yo enpoze yon santans ke yo ranvwaye, Depatman Sipèvizyon  Kondisyonèl la ap sipèvize w pou omwen 15 lane e wap bije soumèt ou a tout dispozisyon ak kondisyon sipèvizyon kondisyonèl yo, enkli tout kondisyon ki ta koresponn pou pwoteje piblik la ak ankouraje reyabilitasyon, men ki pa limite a, oryantasyon pwofesyonèl, aksè a entènèt oswa itilizasyon, ak tout lòt restriksyon ki gen ladann restriksyon sou kote w kab abite, travay, vwayaje oswa moun ke w gendwa kontakte?
[brief] The evidence in the case consist[s] of the testimony that you heard from all the witnesses, the exhibits that have now been marked into evidence, any testimony that was read to you, and any stipulations or admissions that are placed into the record.  And the stipulation is an admission of facts [that] are true here.  There is a stipulation as to fault and liability.  There is a stipulation as [to] the date of the accident.  But the contest in the case regarding medical testimony is up to you. ”  3T48:14-3T 49:21.  For all of these reasons, the defendant’s request for a new trial was properly denied by the trial court.  POINT IV: PLAINTIFF’S COUNSEL’S CHARACTERIZATIONS OF [...]’S TESTIMONY WAS NOT MISLEADING AND DOES NOT WARRANT A NEW TRIAL.
[brief] The [...]’s assertion that the harms from this Project are only “speculative” is a prime example of the misinformation and fraud that the [...] complained of in its Complaint quoted above.  [...] argued that it found “‘no valid countervailing reason’ to disagree that the Project is consistent with the goals and purposes of the Highlands Act. ”  [...] at 14.  It did not find any “countervailing reason” because it blatantly ignored the scientific and regulatory realities that it has been directed to follow and that it has expressly relied on in numerous other circumstances and cases.  [...] continues to ignore all these reasons in its supplemental brief in this matter, even when faced with these specific details in the Appellants’ supplemental brief.  [...] failed to address its role in Mass. v. EPA, including the Appellants’ instant argument that it is legally precluded from changing its position from that case to this case.  In addition, [...] failed to address the impact of EO100 and AO1, including the Appellants’ instant argument that those orders are legally binding on [...] in this matter.  Further, the [...] failed to address its own policy statements and regulatory promulgations regarding the scientifically proven and foreseeable impacts from climate change to Highlands resources.  [...] arbitrarily failed to consider all these reasons which would have required the [...] to deny the instant exemption.  [...] certainly didn’t need to look far for these reasons because they are already well within the [...]’s purview and knowledge.  Therefore, it is exceedingly confusing to hear the [...] proclaim in its supplemental brief that it couldn’t find even one countervailing reason.  Appellants could understand if the [...] reasoned through the reasonably foreseeable climate change impacts from the Project and decided to move forward with the exemption, BUT the [...] ignored all the climate change impacts from the project and didn’t reason through them.
[brief] R. Krevolin & Co. v. Brown, 20 N.J. Super. 85, 92 (App. Div. 1952) (quoting McCarty v. West Hoboken, 93 N.J.L. 247, at page 248, 107 A. 265 (E. & A.1919)).  See also Driscoll v. Burlington-Bristol Bridge Co., 28 N.J. Super. 1, 7 (App. Div. 1953) (“Nor is anything to be made of the fact that the matter of a constructive trust was not expressly dealt with below, nor considered on the appeal except when presented by the court on the argument.  We are concerned only with the soundness of the order appealed from. ”).
[brief] (Db10).  Defendant further urges this Court to remand this issue to determine the reliability of toolmark identification forensics under the Daubert standard for expert testimony.  (Db10).  The State respectfully disagrees.  It is well-established that New Jersey courts have deemed toolmark identification “generally acceptable” under the Frye standard for one century, and defendant’s unreliability argument has been explicitly litigated and rejected by our courts.
[brief] 42a-44a.  Here [...] asserts that by invoicing [...] for the May-June 2020 payments and then receiving payment pursuant to the COVID Statute, [...] converted [...]’s funds; it also seems to contend that by receiving those funds and not applying 100% of them to the wages of the laid off custodians, the funds in excess of what was paid as wages to laid off custodians were the subject of a conversion.
[brief] For the reasons set forth herein, [...]’s convictions must be reversed.  Respectfully submitted, [...]  Public Defender Attorney for Defendant-Appellant BY: s/[...] [...]  Assistant Deputy Public Defender Attorney ID: 404802022  Dated: January 31, 2024  Superior Court of New Jersey  Appellate Division  DOCKET NO. [...]  CRIMINAL ACTION STATE OF NEW JERSEY : v. [...].  On Appeal from a Judgment of Conviction  Entered in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Bergen County.  Sat Below: Hon. [...], J.S.C., and a jury  BRIEF AND APPENDIX  ON BEHALF OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY  [...]  [...]  2  BERGEN COUNTY PLAZA HACKENSACK, NEW JERSEY  07601 [...]  [...]  ASSISTANT PROSECUTOR  ATTORNEY ID NUMBER 332522021 OF COUNSEL AND ON THE BRIEF  [...]  DEFENDANT IS NOT CONFINED TABLE OF CONTENTS
[brief] (Pa59-Pa62).  The district court made specific factual findings that [...] was suing those defendants for undertaking “core prosecutorial duties . . . and quasi-judicial actions to which absolute immunity attaches. ” (Pa60).  Thus, with prejudice, the district court dismissed the five federal claims against the prosecutors in their official and individual capacities.  (Pa61; Pa62).  The district court declined the exercise of federal jurisdiction over the remaining state claims against the State Defendants in counts I through X and returned those claims to state court, under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).
[brief] The State elicited the testimony from [...] that after leaving the hospital, he had a nickname – Pee-Wee.  (8T 168-14 to 18)  This testimony implicated [...] and came from non-testifying, unknown witnesses, in violation of *State v. Bankston*, 63 N.J. 263, 268-69 (1973) and *State v. Branch*, 182 N.J. 338, 351 (2005).  Defense counsel did not invite this testimony; the information was elicited on the State’s redirect of [...].  The defense’s attempt to mitigate the harm from [...]’s improper testimony by emphasizing that the information did not come from the victim’s father did not somehow render the inadmissible testimony invited error.  Thus, for the reasons set forth in [...]’s initial brief, the improper admission of [...]’s testimony that non-testifying witnesses provided information that implicated [...] in the shooting was harmful error, clearly capable of producing an unjust result.  Second, this Court should also reject the State’s argument that [...]’s testimony was proper because he got the information implicating [...] from [...], who testified at trial.  (Sb 20)  But [...] was not an eyewitness to the shooting.  Thus, even if [...] got [...]’s nickname, name, and physical description from [...], that information did not originate with [...].  That information implicating [...] came from unnamed witnesses who did not testify at trial.  As such, this objected-to inadmissible testimony “impl[ied]to the jury that” the detectives “possess[ ] superior knowledge, outside the record, that incriminates the defendant. ”  Branch, 182 N.J. at 351.  In light of the weaknesses with the State’s case against [...], it was extraordinarily unfairly prejudicial for the jury to hear testimony from two police detectives that unnamed people provided information that [...] was the shooter.  The prejudicial effect of this improper testimony was heightened further because the jury also learned, contrary to well-established law, that [...] found the description of the shooter to be so credible that he used this information to assemble the photo array.  (8T 49-4 to 11)  See Branch, 182 N.J. at 352-53 (holding that a “detective’s reasons for including defendant’s photograph in the array were not relevant and were highly prejudicial”).  The improper admission of all of this testimony from Detectives Brown and Richardson requires reversal of [...]’s convictions.
[brief] Pa123, Pa125.  Opp. at 2.  Although [...] posits that this is “not [] sufficient to invoke the entire controversy doctrine,” Opp. at 26, the New Jersey Supreme Court has explained that the ECD requires joinder of *all claims in one action* that arise from “the same transaction or series of transactions but need not share common legal theories. ”  *Bank Leumi USA v. Kloss*, 243 N.J. 218, 226 (2020).  Underscoring that [...] was required to join its Hackensack claims (as arising from the same transaction or series of transactions under the PTA), [...] acknowledges that the “[t]he PTA may have created an obligation of [...] to enter into a subcontract with [...] for particular projects,” including the Hackensack Project.
[brief] These are textbook “aspects of a single larger controversy because they arise from interrelated facts. ”  DiTrolio, 142 N.J. at 271.  In the First Arbitration, the Arbitrator implicitly acknowledged that he could not divorce [...]’s Hackensack-EGP claim from the explicitly referenced “serious issues” at that Project (including nonpayment by the Owner)—in other words, the Arbitrator found it unfair to reward [...] EGP money on Hackensack when [...] was still owed so much money on Hackensack.  The trial court additionally failed to consider or address “CCG Ex. 005” in the First Arbitration, which states that EGP for Hackensack “cannot be determined until Owner changes resolved”:  The “Owner changes” noted in the above EGP “Project Installment Calculation” chart—an [...]-created document—include, as repeatedly testified to by [...], the Owner’s design changes and unapproved/unpaid change orders.  That is, with this exhibit as one example, [...] argued (successfully) to the Arbitrator that its EGP obligations to [...] should be offset down to $0.00 by the $2.1 million allegedly owed to [...] at the Hackensack Project.  See Pa201 ¶ 46 (“[...] is currently owed $2.1 million by the owner on the Hackensack Project. ”).  But, even if that point (which plays more to res judicata) is debatable due to the vagueness of the Arbitrator’s Award, the Court is still left with the inescapable conclusion that [...]’s attempted Second Arbitration (seeking $2.1 million allegedly owed to it on the Hackensack Project) was already part of a “single larger controversy” during the First Arbitration, and thus is barred by the entire controversy doctrine.
[brief] He testified to the following:  Q: Do you as the chief inspector yourself perform periodic inspections of the structure that’s being worked on and in this case the Route 30 overpass?  A: Yes.  Q: Can you share with me what’s involved in that inspection process?  A: Well, you’re looking for general deficiencies, anything that might—might be involved with possible safety issues, something like that.  Aside from what you’re inspecting on the plans and specifications for the project, things like that.  Q: Did your inspection process include the travel surface of the Garden State Parkway?  A: Yes.  Q: And what types of deficiencies would you be looking for on the travel surface?  A:  Potholes, things of that nature, ridability issues, anything that might be in the roadway, might be obstructions, that type of thing.  I don’t know how much more to say than that.  Q: You mentioned potholes, ridability issues.  Is roadway settlement in that category?  A: Yes, that would be a category.  (Pa656 at 20:16 to Pa657 at 21:15).  4)  [...]
[brief] On or about November 11, 2021, Plaintiff’s counsel filed a Complaint and Jury Demand in the Superior Court of New Jersey, County of Hudson, Law Division.  Pa001-9.  The Complaint asserted a claim for common law retaliation.  Id.  On or about February 11, 2022, Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the Complaint in lieu of an Answer wherein they argued the Plaintiff failed to identify any specific law, regulation or clear mandate of public policy to support a Pierce v. Ortho, supra, claim.  Pa010.  Plaintiff cross-moved to file an Amended Complaint.  On May 13, 2022, [...], denied Defendant’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, and by Order of the same date granted Plaintiff’s motion to file an Amended Complaint.  Pa013-16.  Plaintiff thereafter filed an Amended Complaint on May 18, 2022.  Pa017.  Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint added causes of actions for disability discrimination, failure to accommodate and failure to engage in the interactive process, all in violation of the New Jersey Laws Against Discrimination.  Id.  Defendants filed an Answer to same on August 24, 2022.  Pa029.  On or about June 12, 2023, Defendant filed a Motion for Summary Judgment.  Pa043.  Plaintiff filed opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment.  Pa163-572.  A Reply Brief was thereafter filed by Defendant.  [...] heard oral argument of the motion on August 14, 2023, at which time the trial court granted Defendant’s Motion for those reasons set forth on the record.  T1-46.2  Plaintiff’s counsel filed a Notice of Appeal on September 27, 2023.  Pa578.  On February 7, 2024, the Appellate Division entered a Scheduling Order.  Plaintiff filed a motion for a thirty (30) day extension to file the Appellant’s Brief.  Pa585.  The request for an extension was granted by electronic notice.  **STATEMENT OF FACTS**