ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] He acknowledged that he knew defendant from middle school but denied knowing defendant by the nickname “Spitter”.  (5T38-21 to 39-13; 5T40-9 to -15).  [...] testified that: 1) he did not remember giving the police a statement; 2) he did not see defendant shoot [...]; 3) he did not see co-defendant [...] driving the Audi; 4) the driver and shooter wore tall black masks; and 5) he saw someone shooting out of the back window.  (5T27-25 to 18).  He also testified that he did not know anyone named “Spot”, and denied telling detectives that the driver of the Audi was named “Spot”.  (5T123-16 to 21; 5T124-1 to 6).  The assistant prosecutor then introduced the video recording of [...]’s statement, given two days after the shooting.  (5T29-2 to 16).  Despite admitting that he was the person in the video who identified himself as “[...]”, [...] claimed once again that he did not remember talking to detectives about the shooting.  (5T29-8 to 30-2; 5T36-6 to 10).  Nevertheless, [...] identified his handwriting and the “[...]” signature on the back of defendant’s photograph.  (5T39-14 to 40-17).  He admitted that he wrote his name, the date, and the time on defendant’s photograph.  (5T39-20 to 25; 5T124-16 to 24).  [...] also admitted that his handwriting and signature were on the photo display instructions form and the photo identification form, on which he wrote the name “Spot”.
[brief] On June 27, 2023, the PCR court entered an order denying defendant’s PCR application for the reasons expressed in its oral opinion.  (19T19-14 to  The court determined that defendant’s claims as to the alibi witnesses and the cell phone expert were procedurally barred under Rule 3:22-4(a) because defendant mentioned the witnesses to [...] and the defense had the cell records prior to trial, so the factual predicates for these grounds could have been discovered earlier through the exercise of reasonable diligence.
[brief] The Court below erred when it found that Plaintiffs failed to prove undue influence because it never shifted the burden of proof to the Defendants, as it was supposed to as a matter of law.  The Defendants should have had the burden of proving there was no undue influence by clear and convincing evidence, not the other way around.  (6T31:4-5; Pa1-7; 6T31-42; Pa28)  ...........................................................................................................
[brief] Wholesaler Agreement “is not a recurring tactic by [...], and to establish that Appellants are entitled to monetary relief under the MBPA” and “damages, and attorney’s fees and costs” from Appellants’ other causes of action.  (Id. at 49-50.)  Appellants’ claim that Sapporo will seek to terminate them again is unsupported.  A case is moot when “there is no reasonable likelihood that a declaratory judgment would affect the parties’ future conduct. ”  Hartnett v. Pennsylvania State Educ. Ass’n, 963 F.3d 301, 306-08 (3d Cir. 2020).
[brief] (2T71-2 to 2T94-25, Ra28)  .........................................................................................2  CONCLUSION .....................................................................................................................8  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS, AND RULINGS  Trial Court Oral Opinion on Motion ..........................................................2T71-2 to 2T94-25 March 14, 2024  Order Declaring Decedent  Essential ........................................Ra68  PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[directive] [Sí/Yes]  [No/No]  6.  ¿Le gustaría tener la oportunidad de hacerlo?  Would you like the opportunity to do so?  [Sí/Yes]  [No/No]  7.  Habiendo sido notificado de que es posible que se requiera que el tribunal le imponga un período obligatorio de libertad a prueba especial con el propósito de que participe en un programa de tratamiento contra drogas supervisado por el tribunal (“Tribunal de Drogas”), ¿todavía desea declararse culpable?
[directive] As you will recall, when the Alcotest 7110 MK III-C was put into service in your agency, you were advised that when the communication capabilities of the instrument were activated a dedicated telephone line would be required as part of that capability.  All agencies were advised that it would be their responsibility to have the dedicated telephone line made available.  I am pleased to announce that the [...] will begin to enable the communications function in the near future.  This will be necessary to test and evaluate the data uploading systems.  Therefore, it is important that your agency arrange for the availability of the dedicated telephone line no later than September 25, 2009.  Any specific questions regarding the enabling of the communication function should be directed to the [...] at [...].  Thank you for your cooperation in this matter.
[brief] In addition, in determining whether a project is consistent with the goals and purposes of the Highlands Act, NJDEP has looked to whether the project avoids impacts to Highlands resources to the extent practicable and, where such impacts are unavoidable, that those impacts are minimized.  Here, [...] is authorized by the [...] (“[...]”) to construct a new electric motor driven compressor station (designated as “CS 327”) and appurtenant facilities to compress and move natural gas through its existing pipeline system.  [...]’s federally authorized facilities will have minimal impacts on Highlands resources as [...] took significant measures to avoid regulated features in selecting the location for CS 327.  Importantly, [...] sited its facilities within a highly disturbed parcel previously used as a quarry and for other commercial and industrial purposes.
[brief] (Da20).  Instead of accepting that the structure would not work, [...] repeatedly filed applications with the court trying to force the approval of the loan.  (Da19).  The applications, including a third one filed on the eve of the closing of the sale of [...]’s assets, were all denied.  (Da19).  \(^6\)  See Matsumoto v. Matsumoto, 171 N.J. 110, 128-29 (2002) (a party that has fled the jurisdiction to avoid court directive is divested of standing to pursue relief in such court); Matison v. Lisyansky, 443 N.J. Super. 549, 552 (App. Div. 2016) (applying the fugitive disentitlement doctrine and “declin[ing] to afford ... the protection of the court while [defendant] flaunts the court’s authority from overseas”).
[brief] On appeal, Appellant argues that Respondent’s use of Lot 5 for parking related to Respondent’s offsite use on Lot 8 is an impermissible “accessory use” disallowed pursuant to Lakewood Zoning Regulation Section 18-200 without a variance or site plan approval (Ab24).  Section 18-200, in pertinent part, defines “Accessory Use” as a “use . . . that is customarily incidental and subordinate to that of the principal and on the same lot.  No accessory use shall form the basis for a claim of right to a principal or main use.
[brief] STATEMENT OF FACTS  A.  The Loan And The Property  This matter involves a loan made to Borrowers on April 30, 2008, evidenced by a note in the amount of $201,832.00 (the “Note”) and secured by a mortgage executed by Borrowers in the amount of $201,832.00 (the “Mortgage”) in favor of [...] (“[...]”) on the Property.  (Pa432 at ¶¶1, 3-4.)  Following six other assignments of Mortgage, on October 4, 2021, [...] (“[...]”) assigned the Mortgage to Appellant.  (Pa433-34 at ¶¶10-23.)  [...] serviced the Loan from February 1, 2020 to July 16, 2021, during the period in which [...] was the lender.  (Pa434 at ¶29.)  Servicing of the Loan transferred to [...] (“[...]”) effective July 16, 2021.  (Pa434 at ¶30.)  Borrowers defaulted on December 1, 2020, by failing to pay their monthly installment payments due on the loan.  (Pa435 at ¶¶31-32.)  Borrowers have failed to cure their default to date.  (Pa435 at ¶32.)  On September 27, 2022, [...] sent Borrowers a Notice of Intention to Foreclose (“Notice of Intention”) via regular and certified mail in compliance with the notice of intention requirements of the Fair Foreclosure Act of the State of New Jersey.  (Pa435 at ¶34.)  Pursuant to Paragraph 9(a) of the Mortgage, Appellant had the right to “require immediate payment in full of all sums secured by” the Mortgage following Borrowers’ default.  (Pa276-77 at ¶9(a). )  **B.  Borrowers Sell The Property**  By Deed dated February 23, 2015, [...] conveyed title to the Property to [...], which was recorded on March 3, 2015 in Book 12540, Page 8359.  (Pa434 at ¶24.)  Then, by Deed dated April 15, 2021, [...], conveyed title to the Property to [...] and [...] (“[...]”), which was recorded on July 6, 2021 in Instrument 2021081400.  (Pa434 at ¶26.)  Thereafter, on April 30, 2021, the mortgage that [...] executed in favor of [...] encumbering the Property was assigned to Respondent.  (Pa436 at ¶44.)  Pursuant to Paragraph 9(b) of the Mortgage, Borrowers’ transfer of the Property to [...] required Plaintiff (as lender) to accelerate the Loan in full because [...]—an LLC—did not occupy the Property as its principal residence.  (Pa276-77 at ¶9(b) (“Lender shall . . . require immediate payment in full of all sums secured by [the Mortgage] if: . . . (ii) The Property is not occupied by the purchaser or grantee as his or her principal residence.  . . .”). )  **C.
[brief] The descriptions varied but included elements of the shooter's race and his clothing.  (2T21-13 to 21; 2T35-1 to 5).  One of the witnesses, [...], who lived on [...] was standing outside the door of her house when she "heard some noise and . . . saw many people run."  (2T127-8 to 25).  After hearing the noise, she saw a "tall and skinny" man run from [...] toward 6th Street wearing all grey.  (2T128-17 to 129-15).  She could not see his face because his sweatshirt covered it, but she noticed "they had something in their hands, and they were putting it in the sweater's pocket."  (2T129-21 to 130-7).
[brief] As to the **amount** of punitive damages, the Defendants do little more than offer the same tired arguments that there was no evidence of discrimination based on disability, and thus no evidence supporting claims for **any** compensatory damages.  See Db at pp. 30-32.  They then argue in conclusory fashion that this means by definition, the punitive damages must be excessive.  See id.  Plaintiff has already disposed of the Defendants’ arguments concerning compensatory/economic damages previously in Points IV.A.ii, and Point IV.B.i, and will not repeat those arguments again here.  In short, the claim that the punitive damages award in this case is excessive simply does not line up with the facts of the case.
[brief] Ibid.  It serves as a "prohibition against speculative testimony."  Grzanka v. Pfeifer, 301 N.J. Super. 563, 580 (App. Div. 1997).  Thus, "bare conclusions, unsupported by factual evidence, [are] inadmissible."  Buckelew v. Grossbard, 87 N.J. 512, 524 (1981).  The application of the net opinion rule is straightforward: "A judge should not admit expert testimony 'if it appears the witness is not in possession of such facts as will enable him to express a reasonably accurate conclusion as distinguished from a mere guess or conjecture.'"  Vuocolo v. Diamond Shamrock Chems. Co., 240 N.J. Super. 289, 299 (App. Div. 1990).  Experts must "be able to identify the factual bases for their conclusions, explain their methodology, and demonstrate that both the factual bases and the methodology are reliable."  Landrigan v. Celotex Corp., 127 N.J. 404, 417 (1991).  That was not the case here.
[brief] ”  (1T 21-2 to 5)  [...] testified that he advised the other SET members of his observations and said that he would follow the Ram with the intention of having it stopped by a marked police unit.  (1T 21-6 to 10)  [...] requested that other SET members respond to the Shop Rite parking lot to try “to locate the defendant’s vehicle and make contact with him when he exited the Shop Rite. ”  (1T 21-10 to 14)  In response to the court’s questions, [...] testified that, to the best of his recollection, he told the other SET members that “I believed I saw a narcotics transaction.
[brief] Accordingly, [...]’s consistency determination was in accordance with its own rules.  Even assuming, as Appellants suggest, that the WQPA gave [...] carte blanche authority to regulate any activity that could remotely impact water quality, Appellants conveniently ignore the fact that [...] designed CS 327 to completely avoid Highlands open water areas, including wetlands, streams, and other surface waterbodies.  There will only be minor and temporary impacts to mapped, previously disturbed riparian zones and transition areas, which would be used as contractor yards and laydown areas during construction.  Aa0056.  These areas would only be used for up to six months and then restored to their pre-construction condition.  Aa0066.  With respect to groundwater, [...] will implement construction practices designed to reduce and/or mitigate potential impacts on groundwater during construction.  [...] and its contractors will adhere to these practices related to groundwater protection including specifications for trench breakers and dewatering as well as restrictions on refueling and storage of hazardous substances.  Aa0066-0068.  Accordingly, the Project will have minimal, if any, impacts on surface and groundwater resources.
[brief] Id. at 392-93.  That is unlike here, where defendant only presented one witness whose testimony was internally contradictory and which video evidence externally contradicted.  In sum, the record did not support a sua sponte self-defense charge, because defendant did not present any competent evidence demonstrating that the officers’ use of force was excessive; because defendant was the initial aggressor; and because defendant should have known that had he ceased resisting, the officers’ use of force would have terminated given their repeated commands for defendant to stop resisting and to get on his stomach.
[brief] Under factors one, two, and three, using [...]’s theory, both studies would be applied to all flood hazard permits throughout the State and could only be applicable prospectively to permit applications.  N.J.A.C. 7:7-26.1(e).  Likewise, under factor four, using the adjustment and change factors to calculate the flood hazard area is not inferable from the FHACA; while the FHACA authorizes [...] to delineate flood hazard areas, N.J. S.A. 58:16A-52, it does not articulate a specific standard for doing so.  Finally, as to factors five and six, using the Cornell Studies’ adjustment and change factors would significantly change how applicants calculate the flood hazard area.
[brief] Appellants Provide No Corrective Plan and Instead Offer to Sell Their Distribution Rights  Appellants responded to the Notices by letters dated October 11, 2022.  (Pa42 ¶ 76; Pa82-Pa86.)  Instead of providing a plan to improve their performance, Appellants claimed insult and denied any breach of the Wholesaler Agreement.  (Pa42-Pa43 ¶ 77; Pa82-Pa86.)  Yet Appellants nonetheless invited [...] to make an offer for Appellants’ Sapporo distribution rights “using an appropriate industry multiple of no less than 5x. ”  (Pa85.)  F.
[brief] TABLE OF CONTENTS  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS, AND RULINGS ...........................................  iii  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ................................................................................ iv  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT .............................................................................1  COUNTERSTATEMENT OF FACTS .................................................................3  I.  Appellant’s Account ....................................................................................3  II.  Transfer and Assignment of the Account ..................................................3  III.  The Consolidated Settlement Agreement ...............................................5  PROCEDURAL HISTORY ..................................................................................7
[brief] The Court should err on the side of hearing and litigating [...]’s PCR claims, instead of turning a blind eye to a potential miscarriage of justice.  Enforcing a strict time bar [...] missed by only three months, while his first PCR appeal was still pending before the Courts is not justice.  [...]’s case constitutes exceptional circumstances to relax the time bar, as [...]’s case should not be hindered by his prior counsels’ failures.  Alternatively, this Court should require on remand that the PCR Court make findings regarding exceptional circumstances as it pertains to relaxing the procedural bar, as well as addressing all substantive issues raised (See Supra, IA).
[brief] THE COURT:  I -- on Page 23, plaintiffs assert that [...]'s negligent supervision of the attorney trust account would not require the explanation of a legal expert.  I -- I -- again, they -- they cite no case law that supports that proposition.  And of course, there are a number of rules that address an attorney's obligation, or law firm's obligation with respect to its attorney trust account.  So, again, respectfully, I -- I just cannot see how that would be within the ken of a -- of a juror.
[directive] 3  Second, the allocation framework goes beyond simply attempting to maximize the number of patients who survive to hospital discharge, because this is a thin conception of doing the greatest good for the greatest number.4  Instead, within the context of keeping all patients eligible, the allocation framework also attempts to increase overall survival by giving some priority to patients who do not have a very limited life expectancy even if they survived the acute critical illness.  There is precedent for using this criterion in allocation of scarce medical resources; U.S. rules to allocate lungs for transplantation incorporate patients’ expected duration of survival after transplantation, not simply whether transplantation will avert impending death.5  Extensive consultation with citizens, ethicists, and critical care medicine experts informed the principles and processes adopted in this document.6
[brief] ”).  Yet the actions taken by the Board do not support this policy, and in fact run directly counter to them.  The Energy Master Plan is a policy document, but one required by statute, and which has been vetted by the Administration.  While not binding as law, the statements made are clear and unambiguous statements of policy, and are designed to serve as a guide for the State and state agencies.  As the Energy Mater Plan (“EMP”) Statue states, “The plan shall include long-term objectives but shall provide for the interim implementation of measures consistent with said objectives. ”  N.J.S.A. 52:27F-14(b).  In fact, the EMP statute provides both that the Division of Energy Planning and Conservation was authorized to intervene in any action, including before the BPU, to “insure the proper consideration by any such State instrumentalities of the State energy master plan,” N.J.S.A. 52:27F-15(a), as well as the explicit statement that:  It being the intention of the Legislature that the actions, decisions, determinations and rulings of the State Government with respect to energy shall to the maximum extent practicable and feasible conform with the energy master plan….  [N.J.S.A. 52:27F-15(b).]  The Energy Master Plan notes that landfill, brownfields and similar underutilized property are preferred land types to use for solar development, and the Energy Mater Plan shows that the legislature intends the Energy Master Plan to guide the behavior agencies such as the BPU.  No such guidance occurred here; in fact, at no point does the BPU acknowledge the policy of the State is to encourage – and not discourage – the use of property such as the sand pit pond for the use of solar development.  Not only has the Board not been guided by the Energy Master Plan, the BPU has expressly and deliberately denied and ignored it.  This refusal to abide by the clear policy determinations of the State, especially without clear articulation of the reasons, is arbitrary, capricious, and grounds for reversal.
[directive] TO: All Law Enforcement  Chief Executives and County Prosecutors  Chief Data Officer, Office of Justice Data FROM: [...], Attorney General  DATE: June 14, 2023  SUBJECT: Directive Requiring Data Collection for Certain Firearm Permits  On June 24, 2022, in response to the United States Supreme Court ruling in N.Y. State Rifle Bruen, I issued Attorney General Law Enforcement Directive 2022-07, & Pistol Assoc. v. clarifying that although the Court’s ruling had invalidated New Jersey’s requirement that an applicant for a carry permit demonstrate justifiable need, all other requirements in our carry permit laws remained intact and were to be strictly followed.  On December 22, 2022, Governor [...] signed 2022, 131, providing, among various other parameters for ensuring the safety L. c. of New Jerseyans, clear procedures for reviewing applications for permits to carry handguns, and the ability to implement a web portal operated by the New Jersey State Police to electronically process applications for permits to carry.
[brief] In Patel v. Navitlal, the Plaintiff argued that the parties’ marriage should be annulled on the grounds that defendant fraudulently induced plaintiff to marry her solely to gain entry into the United States, and offered as proof the concealment of a relationship between the defendant’s mother and her paramour.  Patel at 404-405.  Defendant argued that the annulment should not be granted because the plaintiff was aware of any impediment to the marriage, the marriage was consummated, and any fraud perpetuated against the plaintiff must be proven by clear and convincing evidence.  Id.  The Court in Patel held the parties intended to be married and to grant plaintiff an annulment for reasons which remain outside the control of one of the parties to the marriage would result in a miscarriage of justice.  *Id.*  At best, plaintiff's argument rises to the level of a deficiency in a character trait, assuming that the court would even recognize the Asian-Indian caste system.  *Id.* at 410-411.  Misconceptions as to character have been held not to support an allegation of fraud upon which an annulment may be based.  *Id.* (citing to *Lindquist v. Lindquist*, 130 N.J. Eq. 11, 20 (E. & A. 1941)).
[brief] Plaintiff worked for the [...] for two years (1T; 17:10).  Plaintiff was a part-time security guard (1T; 17:24).  The Plaintiff was a fill-in at the [...] (1T; 18:4).  Plaintiff never had a disciplinary finding against him (1T; 21:3).  The principal at the high school told the Plaintiff that they were hiring a full-time female (1T; 21:24).  Believing that that was discrimination (1T; 22:7), the Plaintiff filed an EEOC complaint and told only [...] about it and that was a few days before Plaintiff had a conversation with the Defendant [...] (1T; 27:11).
[brief] During that hearing, [...] presented witnesses including its principal, an architect, its lawyer and a planner.  They testified about [...]’ business model and its compliance with the conditional-use standards in the original ordinance (B-384), but not the Ordinance, which went into effect five months beforehand.  The hearing drew significant public interest and vocal opposition from residents of [...], including [...], who earlier had submitted a letter to the Board questioning its jurisdiction, and referred to herself as an “objector” at least seven times and indicated that she was considering legal action in the event that the Board exercised jurisdiction over and decided [...]’ application.