ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Defendant’s rights are made clear in *[...] v. McKeon*, A-0127-20, 2022 WL 3268382 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Aug. 11, 2022).  There attorney [...] obtained a fee arbitration decision in her favor then filed a verified complaint pursuant to Rule 4:67-1(a) seeking judgment of the fee arbitration award against the client.  The client filed an answer, affirmative defenses and a counterclaim alleging legal malpractice based on fraudulent billing.  This court in *[...]* found that legal malpractice cannot be raised before a fee arbitration committee as it lacks jurisdiction to hear that issue (citing *Saffer v. Willoughby*, 143 N.J. 256, 266 (1996)).  Furthermore, this court held in *[...]*, at *7, that the Saffer court announced that “[i]f the substantial basis for a malpractice claim is discovered after a Fee Committee has awarded a fee, a client may seek a stay of the award from the Superior Court either before or after the award has been confirmed,” applying the discovery rule.  143 N.J. at 268. ”  Indeed, here the defendant argued at the September, 2022 oral argument that she never knew of the plaintiff’s malpractice and false billing until at the fee arbitration hearing when he submitted bills there for the first time.  T 15-17.  By the lower court ignoring all of the rules and reinstating a void complaint rather than directing Plaintiff to follow Rule 4:67-1, it prejudiced Defendant’s rights to be heard in the appropriate forum and to seek a stay she had a right to under the law.  It does not matter whether the stay or her counterclaims would have been successful, nor can this court or anyone predict if they would have been.  The problem is that defendant’s due process rights to present her claims were foreclosed by the lower court without a basis in law or fact and without any jurisdiction to do so in the first place.
[brief] Prior to the commencement of the hearing, N.J.A.C. 19:16-5.7(g)(1) mandates that the arbitrator notify the City that it is to provide the arbitrator and the [...] with certain “information and the format in which it shall be provided and by which the employee representative shall respond to the information. ”  The regulations state the City is to provide:  i.  A list of all unit members during the final year of the expired agreement, their salary guide step(s) during the final year of the expired agreement, and their anniversary date of hire (that is, the date or dates on which unit members advance on the guide); ii. Costs of increments and the specific date(s) on which they are paid; iii. Costs of any other base salary items (for example, longevity) and the specific date(s) on which they are paid; iv.  The total cost of all base salary items for the 12 months immediately preceding the first year of the new agreement; and v.  A list of all unit members as of the last day of the year immediately preceding the new agreement, their step, and their rate of salary as of that same day.  The Captains, Battalion Chiefs, and Deputy Chiefs collective negotiation agreements expired July 31, 2019.
[brief] For example, in *Gonzalez v. Ideal Tile Importing Co., Inc.*, 371 N.J. Super. 349, 357-58 (App. Div. 2004), the Appellate Division affirmed summary judgment when the non-moving party provided a “one-page conclusory and unsworn letter” from an attorney in response to the movant’s properly-supported statement of material facts.  In *Sanducci v. City of Hoboken*, 315 N.J. Super. 475, 487 (App. Div. 1998), the court accepted a factual statement in the moving party’s statement of material facts because the non-movant disputed the fact without providing any supporting evidence.  In *Papergraphics Intern., Inc. v. Correa*, 389 N.J. Super. 8, 10-11 (App. Div. 2006), the court affirmed summary dismissal when the movant supported its factual contention with an expert opinion, while the non-movant “failed to establish any contrary contention. ”  Herein, Plaintiff plainly did not respond to the [...]’ SUF as required by R. 4:46-2(b).  Plaintiff’s omissions were not a minor lapse or a petty, technical oversight.  Plaintiff’s failure to submit an appropriate response was a substantial, critical omission that went to the very center of the summary judgment motion.  Plaintiff’s failure in this regard, standing alone, warranted the entry of summary judgment on this record.  The summary dismissal should be affirmed and the appeal should be dismissed on that basis alone.
[brief] “Such deference has been specifically extended to state agencies that administer pension statutes,” because “a state agency brings experience and specialized knowledge to its task of administering and regulating a legislative enactment within its field of expertise. ”  *Piatt v. Police & Firemen’s Ret. Sys.*, 443 N.J. Super. 80, 99 (App. Div. 2015) (quoting *In re Election Law Enforcement Comm’n Advisory Op. No. 01-2008*, 201 N.J. 254, 262 (2010)).  Indeed, “if the language is plain and its meaning clear, the inquiry ends there . . .”  *State v. Malik*, 365 N.J. Super. 267, 274 (App. Div. 2003).  In reading statutory language, courts will give words their ordinary meaning absent any direction from the Legislature to the contrary.  *In Re Young*, 202 N.J. 50, 63 (2010).  Here, the Board’s determination is reasonable and complies with the governing statute.
[brief] Likewise, the Legislature thus far has elected not to extend Zuber or Comer to defendants aged eighteen or older.  Defendant's reliance on three out-of-state cases extending Miller to young adults is unavailing for two main reasons.  First, many other courts have reached the opposite result and refused to extend Miller to adults.  See, e.g., In re Manning, 24 F.4th 1107, 1109-10 (6th Cir. 2022) (denying habeas petitioner leave to file successive habeas petition seeking an extension of Miller to defendant who was eighteen at the time of his offense); In re Rosado, 7 F.4th 152, 159-60 (3d Cir. 2021) (denying habeas petitioner leave to file successive habeas petition where "Miller set a clear age limit," petitioner fell "on the wrong side of the limit" at nearly eighteen-and-a-half years old, and finding court cannot "redraw th[e] line" set by the United States Supreme Court); United States v. Sierra, 933 F.3d 95, 97 (2d Cir. 2019) (declining to extend Miller to defendants who committed crimes between eighteen and twenty-two years of age); United States v. Marshall, 736 F.3d 492, 498 (6th Cir. 2013) (recognizing "[t]he Supreme Court's decisions limiting the types of sentences that can be imposed upon juveniles all presuppose that a juvenile is an individual with a chronological age under [eighteen]" and thus refusing to apply Miller where defendant was between eighteen and twenty at time of crimes); United States v. Hoffman, 710 F.3d 1228, 1233 (11th Cir. 2013) (refusing to apply Miller to crime committed by adult offender); Crow v. State, 923 N.W.2d 2, 8, 11 (Minn. 2019) (holding that Miller did not apply to twenty-two-year-old defendant convicted of murder); Commonwealth v. Cintora, 69 A.3d 759, 764 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2013) (holding that Miller was inapplicable to defendants aged nineteen and twenty-one at time of crimes); Sloan v. State, 418 S.W.3d 884, 892 (Tex. App. 2013) (ruling that Miller's holding is limited to juveniles).
[brief] Particularly when Defendant now alleges that the primary prejudice resulting from this instruction was to pressure him to provide an explanation for the tattoos that he might have been unwilling to provide otherwise, the failure of counsel object to the instruction underscores the futility of this argument on appeal.  These instructions did not require the jury to draw an adverse inference from Defendant’s potential decision not to provide an explanation for the tattoos; indeed, they did the opposite by instructing the jury to disregard the tattoos if the State failed to prove that the tattoos symbolized the murder, and they clearly stated that while Defendant might offer an explanation for the tattoos, he was not required to do so.  In this regard, Defendant’s reliance on cases condemning Clawans instructions such as those issued in State v. Hill, 199 N.J. 545, 565-70 (2009), is entirely inappropriate as the charges in those cases instructed the jury that they were permitted to draw adverse inferences from the fact that the defense failed to call a witness.
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[brief] Bell v. Price, 22 N.J.L. 578 (1849) ...........................................16  Borough of East Rutherford v. East Rutherford PBA Local 275 213 N.J. 190 (2013)  ..................................................16  City Ass'n of Sup'rs and Adm'rs v. State Operated School Dist. of City of Newark, 311 N.J. Super. 300 (App. Div. 1998) .......13, 25, 30 College of Morris Staff Association v. County College of Morris, 100 N.J. 383 (1985)  ......................................13, 25, 26 County of Passaic, Office of the Passaic County Sheriff v. PBA Local 286, Docket No.: [...] (App. Div. June 29, 2011)  ...........................................21, 22 CWA, Local 1087 v. Monmouth County Board of Social Services, 96 N.J. 442 (1984)  ............................16, 26, 27 Faherty v. Faherty, 97 N.J. 99 (1984)  .................................13  Held v. Comfort Bus Line, 136 N.J.L. 640 (1948)  .......................16  Leslie v. Leslie, 50 N.J. Eq. 103 (1892)  ...............................16  Local No. 153, Office & Professional Employees International Union v. Trust Co. of New Jersey, 105 N.J. 442 (1987)  ..............30  Local No. 21 v. Town of Kearny, 81 N.J. 208 (1979)  ....................13  Office of Emp. Relations v. Comm. Workers of Am., 154 N.J. 98 ..........16  Port Authority Police Sergeants Benev. Ass'n of New York, New Jersey v. Port Authority of New York, New Jersey, 340 N.J. Super. 453 (App. Div. 2001) ..................................26, 27 Taylor v. Sayre and Peterson, 24 N.J.L. 647 (1855).  ....................16  Tretina Printing, Inc. v. Fitzpatrick & Associates, Inc., 135 N.J. 349 (1994)  .........................................................13  United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29 (1987).  .......  13  United Grocers, 92 LA 566, 569 (Gangle, 1989)  ........................19  TREATISES
[brief] *Id.* at 568-69.  The Third Circuit has explained that the “Pickering balancing test requires the courts to ‘balance … the interests of the [employee], as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees. ’”  *Munroe v. Central Bucks School Dist.*, 805 F.3d 454, 466 (3d Cir. 2015) (quoting *Pickering*, 391 U.S. at 568).  The Appellate Division has used the Pickering balancing test to evaluate free speech claims brought under the New Jersey Constitution.
[directive] Èske w konprann ke wap kab konteste tout desizyon  Sant Tretman ak Adult Diagnostic la ta pran nan yon odyans epi tou, nan odyans sa a wap gen dwa pou konfwonte tout temwen ki ta prezante kont ou ak kont entèwoje yo epi prezante prèv nan pwòp defans ou?  Do you understand you will be able to challenge the findings of the [...] in a hearing and that at that hearing you will have the right to confront the witnesses against you and to cross examine them and then present evidence on your own behalf?
[brief] ”  N.J.S.A. 56:10.  In Maintainco, Inc. v. Mitsubishi Caterpillar Forklift America, Inc., 408 N.J. Super. 461 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 200 N.J. 502 (2009), this court considered whether that section of the FPA authorized an award of expert fees and concluded it did not.
[brief] (4/1/21 Transcript @ T29:22 to T37:25).  Plaintiff’s attempt to factually distinguish Miltz v. Borroughs-Shelving, Div. of Lear Siegler, Inc., 203 N.J. Super. 451 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1985) is inapposite because the Trial Court merely cited Miltz for the well settled blackletter principles that “a party's pleadings must nonetheless fairly apprise an adverse party of the claims and issues to be raised at trial” to be adequate the pleadings must contain a claim for relief, a statement of the facts on which the claim is based showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, and a demand for judgment for the relief to which the pleader deems him or herself entitled”.  Id. at 458., citing Jersey City v. Hague, 18 N.J. 584, 601-603 (1955); Melone v. Jersey Central Power & Light Co., 18 N.J. 163, 174 (1955); N.J. Crt. R. 4:5-2.  Plaintiff’s brief then appears to devolve into a stream of conscience regarding [...]’s April 1, 2021, oral opinion interspersed with his commentary regarding revisions he made to “the Complaint” in response to [...]’s criticisms. (Pb29-38).
[brief] HIS CONVICTIONS MUST BE REVERSED.  (1T 33-13 to 34-5)  Following an unsuccessful motion to dismiss the indictment (1T 29-6 to 20), [...] unequivocally asked to represent himself:  You didn’t present him my letter I asked you to give him.  Like, no one’s doing nothing they’re supposed to do here, and I’m supposed to just be quiet and let everyone lie on me, right?  Yeah, right.  It’s not going to happen.  I would like to represent myself from here on out, Your Honor.
[brief] [Id. at 412.]  In appropriate circumstances, arbitration awards may be given collateral estoppel effect in subsequent judicial proceedings.  Nogue v. Estate of Santiago, 224 N.J. Super. 383, 385-86, 540 A.2d 889 (App.Div.1988); Chattin, supra, 216 N.J. Super. at 634-38, 524 A.2d 841.
[brief] On January 25, 2024, Plaintiff filed the instant nonpayment of rent eviction complaint [...] against Defendant.  The complaint alleged six months of unpaid rent.  (Da1)  On March 12, 2024, both parties appeared pro se for trial.  Following trial, the court entered Judgment for Possession in favor of the Plaintiff. \(^1\) (Da25)  On April 2, 2024, Defendant appeared on a motion for reconsideration.  The court denied the motion and the court also denied a stay but granted an Order for Orderly Removal. \(^2\)  (Da28, Da29)  On April 15, 2024, Defendant proceeding pro se filed the instant appeal.
[brief] g.  These changes do not have any material impacts on the redevelopment plan’s consistency with the Township Master Plan, and should not change the Board’s previous finding that the plan is not inconsistent with the Township Master Plan.  With the only substantive amendment being the stronger protections for the historic Black Horse, the plan is not somewhat more consistent with the goals of the Master Plan.  On November 22, 2022 the Board held a public meeting, wherein Ordinance 2022-17 was addressed, and [...] provided his report and findings concerning the amendments to the Redevelopment Plan for the Property.
[brief] 423-24a.  [...] had appointed a Special Master to draft implementing ordinances, “given the bankruptcy of action by the [...] governing bodies over the years... stemm[ing] from the long-standing litany of inaction and the palpably invidious discrimination that it worked. ”  426a.  When [...] criticized the Special Master’s proposal, without offering any realistic alternative to meet its obligations, the Court faulted [...] for its obstruction: [...]’s entrenchment is again on display in this proceeding, where although it correctly points out the technical errors of the Special Master’s compliance plan, it neglects to provide a meaningful alternative to the affordable housing crisis within its borders.
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[brief] Within the Railroad Immunity Statute, a clear distinction is made between railroad “Property” and railroad “Right of Way. ”  Different protections and exceptions are provided for each classification.  In granting Summary Judgment, The Honorable [...], J.S.C. committed error in using these two location descriptions interchangeably as if they are synonyms.  They are not.  A railroad “right of way” is where a railroad runs track on another party’s real estate and the railroad secures a legal right to use the property.  [...] was crossing a railroad right of way in downtown [...], [...].  “Railroad property” is real estate.  An example might be a railroad yard or a maintenance facility or a railroad station.  The failure to appreciate the distinction between these two terms, which were carefully written in the statute by our legislature led to reversible error in that our legislature never intended the railroads to be immune from civil liability when their negligence resulted in an injury or death to someone crossing a railroad right of way, in a crossing established by the railroad.
[brief] -------------------------------------------- 22, 23, 24, 28, 29, 30, 31, Caruso v. Ravenswood Developers, Inc., 337 N.J. Super. 499, 506, 767 A.2d 979 (App. Div. 2001)  ---------------------------------------------  3  Dontzin v. Myer, 301 N.J. Super. 501, 507, 694 A.2d 264 (App.Div.1997)  -----------------------------------------------  2, 22 EQR-LPC Urban Renewal North Pier, LLC V. City of New Jersey City, 452 N.J. Super.  309, 319 (App. Div. 2016)
[brief] SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY  APPELLATE  DIVISION  DOCKET No.: [...]  On Appeal from the February 28, 2024  Interlocutory Order of the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Monmouth Vicinage TRIAL  DOCKET No.: [...]  Sat Below: Hon. [...], J.S.C. BRIEF AND APPENDIX (Pa001-Pa032) OF PLAINTIFF/RESPONDENT  [...] IN OPPOSITION TO THE APPEAL OF DEFENDANTS/APPELLANTS Of Counsel: [...] [...], ESQ.  ATTORNEY ID: 037581992  [...] T: [...]  F: [...]  E: [...]  Submitted: July 18, 2024
[brief] (Pa1150, Pa1214)  The March 1, 2023 JOD order (Pa2) and June 6, 2023 (Pa506) order on reconsideration of JOD were identified among the orders being appealed in the Notice of Appeal (Pa1043) that was initially filed on June 26, 2023.  Therefore, the trial court’s jurisdiction was limited to the enforcement of the existing orders pursuant to Rule 2:9-1.  Trial court violated R. 2:9-1 by entering provisions in its January 12 and January 26, 2024 orders that went beyond enforcement, and effectively modified the March 1, 2023, and June 6, 2023 orders under appeal.
[brief] Cole, 215 N.J. at 281.  In that vein, [...]’s arbitration defense was listed amongst thirty-seven other, largely irrelevant or inapplicable defenses such as service of process, statute of limitations, forum non conveniens, and the Workers’ Compensation Act.  Id. at 8-14.  Further, despite being an affirmative defense, [...] did not support it with the requisite statement of facts required by Rule 4:5-4.  Under these same circumstances, albeit with respect to a statute of limitations defense, this Court has found “[i]t is difficult to take such a pleading seriously” and absent efforts to assert the defense a plaintiff would not be fairly apprised a defendant intended to rely upon it.  White v. Karlsson, 354 N.J. Super. 284, 290 (App. Div. 2002).  On the whole, [...]’s answer did not apprise of any intention to rely on the defense; in fact, [...] submitted a (not actually complete) certification under Rule 4:5-1, which requires a party to certify, inter alia, there are no pending, related arbitrations and that no arbitrations are contemplated.
[directive] Phase Advancement Criteria (LR/HN)-  Track B For:  To Apply  Phase 2: of Minimum in 1 60 days Phase of Minimum 14 sobriety* days of Completion 1 requirements outlined Phase as Phase 3: of Minimum 90 in 2 days  Phase of Minimum sobriety* 30 days of Completion 2 requirements outlined Phase as Phase 4: of Minimum 120 in 3 days  Phase of Minimum 60 sobriety* days of Completion 3 requirements outlined Phase as Graduation Requirements: 2 years minimum Drug Court in 1-year sobriety* of Minimum 120 in 4 days
[brief] 164 (Law Div. 1972) | 13 | | Henry v. Rahway State Prison, 81 N.J. 571 (1980) | 15 | | In re Carroll, 339 N.J. Super. 429 (App. Div. 2001) | 7 | | In re Carter, 191 N.J. 474 (2007) | 8 | | In re Herrmann, 192 N.J. 19 (2007) | 7 | | In re Stallworth, 208 N.J. 182 (2011) | 8, 15, 18 | | In re Vey, 124 N.J. 534, 544 (1991) | 7, 15, 18 | | Kaplan v. City of Linwood, 252 N.J. Super. 538 (Law Div. 1991) | 13 | | Kramer v. Bd. of Adjustment, 45 N.J. 268 (1965) | 8, 16 | | Lionel’s Appliance Ctr., Inc. v. Citta, 156 N.J. Super. 257 (Law. Div. 1978) | 10 | Logan v. Bd. of Review, 299 N.J. Super. 346 (App. Div. 1997) ..................... 16 Price v. Himeji, 214 N.J. 263 (2013) .................................................................  8  Reinauer Realty Corp. v. Nucera, 59 N.J. Super. 189 (App. Div.) ...............  16 State v. Johnson, 42 N.J. 146 (1964) .................................................................  8  Stop & Shop Supermarket Co. v. Bd. of Adj. of Springfield, 162 N.J. 418 (2000) ..............................................................................................................  10  Statutes N.J.S.A. 40:55D-41(b) ..................................................................................  9 N.J.S.A. 40:55D-7 .........................................................................................  9 N.J.S.A. 5:12-218 et seq.  .............................................................................  1, 5  Other N.J.A.C. 19:66-14.1(m) ...............................................................................  14 N.J.A.C. 19:66-7.3.......................................................................................  3, 10  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
[brief] **B.  [...] failed to meet his burden because his interpretation of the Settlement Agreement violates its plain meaning.**  [...] failed to show that he was entitled to relief because his interpretation of the Settlement Agreement negated key provisions of the Settlement Agreement and was unreasonable as a matter of law.  As discussed above, it is the plaintiff’s burden to prove *each element* of a breach of contract claim, including that “the parties entered into a contract containing certain terms” and that “defendants did not do what the contract required them to do[.]”