ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] ” (Id.).  Respectfully, even if traffic was a concern referenced in the Master Plan, where the undisputed evidence shows that the building height does not impact traffic counts, the Board had no factual basis upon which to claim that the 1999 Master Plan intended a substantially less intense use than proposed, particularly when that use—a warehouse—is permitted.  Inherent in this manufactured interpretation is that increased height is a proxy for the intensity of the use.  While under Grasso height can be a proxy, there was no proof, let alone “substantial credible evidence”, that it is a proxy for intensity of use in this case—not in the 1999 Master Plan, not in the Township Ordinances, and not in any expert testimony.  As made abundantly clear above, there is, instead, substantial reliable and unrebutted evidence to the contrary.  The Resolution hinges upon the potential off-site traffic impact of the proposed project.
[brief] [...]’s effort to distinguish the cases that address continuation of coverage as a remedy for deficient – or in this case, non-existent – notice of termination (Zb38-40), is unavailing.  These cases all confirm the bigger picture, *i.e.*, that “continuation of coverage is favored in our law. ”  *Bright v. T.W. Suffolk, Inc.*, 268 N.J.Super. 220, 225 (App.Div.1993).  The technical factual distinctions [...] attempts to draw only serve to prove the point that cancellation statutes, regulations and common law principles are complementary and establish a consistent body of law across different lines of coverage to facilitate this oft-stated policy.  Although [...] also tries to circumvent the law altogether by leaning into its unenrollment argument, suggesting that “here, cancellation is not an issue” (Zb38), [...] itself equates “cancellation” with “unenrollment. ” (Tb19-20.)
[brief] (Pa132).  Notably, [...] was not a party to the [...] Arbitration, and no claims were asserted against [...] in the [...] Arbitration.  (Id.).  Instead, as the [...] Arbitration sought to wind up the affairs of [...] (“[...]”), the decision of the Arbitration Panel had the potential to affect the litigants in the Prior Litigation because “[...] was set up to manage […] [...].  It had no other management contracts. ” (Pa141).  Certainly, the [...] Arbitration did not attempt to adjudicate the issues raised in the Prior Litigation.  Indeed, neither the Forged Agreement nor disputes concerning the parties’ respective interests in [...] were considered as part of the [...] Arbitration.  (See generally Pa131 – Pa142).
[brief] Yet, when questioned about whether he had ever attended Barry University, [...] first asked how to spell it and then asked where it was, and then testified that he would have to check his records before he could answer the question of whether he ever attended that school.  Both plaintiff (4T209:18-25) and [...] (4T130:22-131:2) told [...] that they wanted to press charges against the other and both were advised of their right to do that at the municipal court.
[brief] 1T36:7-10.  The court indicated that Defendants had responded that “they did electronic and hard copy search. ”  1T36:11-12.  The court advised plaintiffs’ counsel that any problems with this response or its credibility should be addressed on a cross-examination, but it did not invalidate the propriety of the discovery response by the defendants.  1T36:13-25 to 37:1-4.  In Request No. 11, Plaintiffs asked who was responsible for communicating with the tenants of the property.
[brief] *D.D. v. New Jersey Division of Disabilities*  351 N.J. Super. 308, 317 (App. Div. 2002)  *Goulding v. N.J. Friendship House*  245 N.J.157,167 (2021)  In determining the proper scope for appellate review, the court must initially determine whether the administrative agency is interpreting the application of a statute or making factual findings.  In this case, there is a combination of disputed factual findings and the application of more than one statute and administrative code section to these facts.
[brief] Specifically, the Highlands Act incorporated the WQPA’s requirements into the Highlands permitting scheme, N.J.S.A. 13:20-33.  The Act also instructed DEP to set a “septic system density standard” at a level “to prevent the degradation of water quality” as well as “to protect ecological uses from individual, secondary, and cumulative impacts, in consideration of deep aquifer recharge available for dilution. ”  N.J.S.A. 13:20-32(e).  Relevant here, the Act also amended the WQPA by revoking any previously issued sewer service approvals that had not been built by the time the Act had passed.  N.J.S.A. 58:11A-7.1.
[brief] 43 TABLE OF APPENDIX  Letters from the [...] to [...], dated March 16, 2010 and May 12, 2010 (R-1) .................. Ra1 [...] General Meeting of Mayor and Township Committee, dated January 13, 2015 (R-7) ..............................................  Ra4 [...] General Meeting of Mayor and Township Committee, dated February 24, 2015 (R-8) ............................................. Ra5  The Board’s January 25, 2017 decision letter denying a [...]’s request for an Intra-Fund Transfer (J-3) .............................................. Ra18 The Board’s March 16, 2017 letter granting [...]’s request for a hearing and transferring the matter to the Office of Administrative Law as a contested case (J-5) ............................................... Ra20 The Division’s November 28, 2018 letter transferring the matter back to the Board for further review (J-6) .............................................. Ra21 The Board’s October 19, 2020 decision letter denying a [...]’s request for an Intra-Fund Transfer (J-7) .............................................. Ra23 [...]’s November 18, 2020 letter appealing the Board’s Decision (J-8) ......................................................................................... Ra30 The Board’s January 21, 2021 letter granting [...]’s request for a hearing and transferring the matter to the Office of Administrative Law as a contested case (J-9) ....................................................... Ra32 Gluck v. Bd. of Trs., Pub. Emps.’ Ret. Sys., 2023 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 153 (Apr. 6, 2023)
[brief] See Food & Water Watch v. [...], Docket No. 22-1214 (D.C. Cir. Petition filed Aug. 19, 2022).  On October 6, 2022, [...] issued a delegated order approving [...]’s request to proceed with construction of CS 327.5 TGPa0041.  On October 24, 2022, [...] N.J.R.E. 201(b)(3).  Relevant sections of the FEIS are included for the Court’s convenience at TGPa0014 through TGPa0040.
[directive] DISORDERLY to is same where Schedule refusal or It delineate offense disorderly MUNICIPAL offense. safety place shown. where COURT place the delineate public gathering, person 2 or the be Bail petty or persons a premises Schedule offenses) bail offense. endangers school, as prepared PETTY generally DEPUTY in disorderly or 18; R.O.R. A a offenses) #9-05 elsewhere prostitution in disorderly OR under any persons any or, AND exhibited, which (non-indictable JUDGE in passage Directive maintains of should conduct; OR person alcohol OFFENSES Description Bail option disorderly vehicle; (non-indictable of condition ADMINISTRATOR listed house manufactured, any public COURT consumes conspiracies unlawful to knowingly the to motor are Supplement a a petty tobacco a as maintains for PERSONS obstructs offenses 7:4-1 in maintained or SUPERIOR move; or or provide engaging assembly or possesses persons or 7:2-2(b) Rule photographed or cigarettes 2006 recklessly recklessly to these COURT request attempts DISORDERLY or of and of of 26, conducted purpose Rule age place A number of offenses) gives May or BY or official Some legal MUNICIPAL knowingly purposely sold, and or for degree.
[brief] Settlement offers do not waive the Appellant’s contractual requirements.**  [...], once again, makes the same arguments that Appellant has made pertaining to settlement offers made by Respondent.  It argues that offers made after the four-year limitations period evidence Respondent’s belief that its own suit limitation clause would not apply.  [...] first, incorrectly, argues that offers made in February 2023 and April 2023, create the waiver.  First, and importantly, the clause at issue, provides that legal action must be filed either four years from the date of the accident; OR one year from the date the covered person is aware of a claim for which coverage would apply, “whichever is later. ”  (Pa102)  (emphasis added).  Therefore, in giving all legitimate inferences to Appellant, if Appellant first became aware that a claim for which underinsured benefits would apply on May 2, 2022, Appellant had until May 2, 2023 to file a legal action against Respondent.  Therefore, any offers made in February 2023 and April 2023 were made within the suit limitation period provided by the policy.  In this matter, Appellant, [...], chose to dismiss her underlying action, that was already in suit, against the tortfeasor and re-file the instant litigation.  To that end, Appellant could have filed the instant litigation, at any time, between May 2, 2022 and May 2, 2023.  Appellant chose not to do so until May 17, 2023.  Finally, Amicus counsel attempts to argue that the “renewal” of the April 5, 2023 offer on May 24, 2023 creates a waiver of the suit limitation provisions in the policy.
[brief] ”  *In re Petition of Battle*, 190 N.J. Super. 232, 242 (App. Div. 1983).  [...] dismisses [...]’s failure to complete the inner certificate as a mere technicality.  *(Db16).*  That attempt to minimize the absence of her signature ignores other information that is to be included on the inner certificate, including if there was any assistance provided to the voter.  For example, with a blank inner certificate, there is no way of knowing whether the voter intentionally omitted the assistor information because they were not assisted or inadvertently omitted the assistor information assisted despite receiving assistance.  There is nothing in Title 19 that provides the Board a way to address these statutory assistor requirements that may also be missing because nothing in Title 19 allows it to send a cure letter to a voter who leaves the inner certificate entirely blank.  As the Board is bound to execute the will of the Legislature as written, it may not cure a mail-in ballot when the inner certificate is left entirely blank.  Because N.J.S.A. 19:63-17 only allows for ballots to be cured when there are missing or discrepant signatures, the Board properly rejected Ms. [...]’s mail-in ballot.
[brief] On November 18, 2021, the Respondent [...] (“[...]”) terminated Petitioner-Appellant [...]’s employment.  Cilento, a tenured teacher at the time, had been caught surreptitiously drinking vodka at [...] during work hours.  After the [...] brought tenure charges, an arbitrator found Cilento liable and imposed a three-month suspension.  Shortly after the arbitrator’s decision, on October 28, 2021, the [...] (the “[...]”—the entity legislatively charged with regulating the issuance and revocation of teaching certificates, see N.J.S.A. § 18A:6-38—suspended Cilento’s teaching certificate for a period of two years.  Cilento appealed that decision and it remains pending before the Appellate Division under In re Certificates of [...], [...] (App. Div. filed July 25, 2022)(the “[...] Appeal”).  Critically, Cilento did not seek a timely stay of the [...]’s administrative order under N.J.A.C. § 6A:9B-4.16.  On November 18, 2021—more than three weeks after the [...] suspended Cilento’s teaching certificate and after providing Cilento written notice—the [...] terminated Cilento’s employment based on N.J.S.A. § 18A:26–2.  That statutory provision prohibits school districts from employing teachers who do not possess a valid teaching certificate.  The [...]’s suspension of Cilento’s certificate—and Cilento’s failure to stay that administrative order—compelled the [...] to part ways with him.  Cilento then filed a Petition of Appeal with the Commissioner of Education (the “Commissioner”) alleging the [...]’s decision to terminate him was arbitrary and capricious.  He sought reinstatement and backpay, including retroactive benefits.  After the matter was transferred to the Office of Administrative Law (OAL), the Hon. [...], A.L.J., granted the [...]’s motion for summary decision, finding that it terminated Cilento consistent with the applicable law and facts that existed at the time.  Judge Caliguire rejected Cilento’s contention that the [...]’s decision could be deemed arbitrary and capricious based on the outcome of the [...] Appeal.  In other words, the ALJ correctly recognized that the [...] had to act based on the facts and circumstances that existed in November 2021, not based on what a reviewing court may do many months later.
[brief] [...], NEWARK MAYOR [...], [...] CITY COUNSEL, NEWARK CITY CLERK [...], NEWARK CORPORATION  COUNSEL  [...], ESQ., NEWARK BUSINESS ADMINISTRATOR  [...], ESQ., NEWARK DIRECTOR OF ECONOMIC AND HOUSING DEVELOPMENT  [...], NEWARK DIRECTOR OF FINANCE  [...], NEWARK DIVISION OF TAX ABATEMENT AND SPECIAL TAXES  MANAGER  [...], CTC AND NEWARK TAX ASSESSOR  [...], ESQ.  [...]  Attorneys for Defendants-Respondents  The City of Newark, Newark Mayor Ras J. Baraka, the City of Newark City Counsel, Newark City Clerk Kenneth Louis, Newark Corporation Counsel Kenyatta K. Stewart, Esq., Newark Business Administrator
[brief] (Da3178-3182)  ..................................................................................................................60  A.  The entire purpose of Arbitration is to render final awards subject to vacatur only for specific, narrowly defined reasons.................................60  B.  The trial court exceeded its authority in vacating the arbitration award due to a perceived mistake of law.........................................................63  C.  The Arbitrator’s award of 40% of the Company’s legal fees was not attorney-fee shifting and did not implicate the “American rule. ”......................................................................................................................66  VII.
[brief] ”  [...] I, 994 F.3d at 1349.  The court noted that, like Defendant’s conveyance of information about Plaintiff’s debt, the debt collector’s transmitted [...]’s status as a debtor, the amount of the debt, the identity of the creditor, and the fact that the debt arose from medical treatment.  Therefore, “[i]t seems to us inescapable that [...]’s communication to [...] at least ‘concerned,’ was ‘with reference to,’ and bore a ‘relationship [or] association’ to its collection of [...]’s debt [and, therefore,] [...] has alleged a communication ‘in connection with the collection of any debt’ as that phrase is commonly understood. ”  Id. Gburek v. Litton Loan Servicing LP, 614 F.3d 380, 385 (7th Cir. 2010), reviewed existing precedent which “establish that the absence of a demand for payment is just one of several factors that come into play in the commonsense inquiry of whether a communication from a debt collector is made in connection with the collection of any debt.
[brief] (Da1057).  Soon thereafter, in August 2017, Plaintiff once again attempted to disclose confidential information, this time to the Korean Court that was litigating the inheritance disputes.  (Da1003 at ¶ 4).  Plaintiff submitted a letter to the court stating:  “According to the confirmation [that Plaintiff] has received from the Administrator of the Estate in the United States, Respondent [...] embezzled money from [...] and thus he is now liable to repay some $5,000,000 to [...]. ” (Da1003 at ¶ 5; Da1006-10).  When the Administrator was apprised of the letter and the allegation, he wrote to the Korean Court stating that Plaintiff’s allegation was “absolutely untrue. ” (Da1003 at ¶ 6; Da1020-21).  The Local Administrator advised as follows:  Contrary to the [Plaintiff’s] statement, however, I have not concluded that [...] has embezzled monies, or that he is liable to repay some $5,000,000 to [...].  That statement is absolutely untrue.  I have made no such conclusion.  Indeed, my conclusions will be set forth in my report to [...] in the above matter, which has not yet been completed.  This report will detail my estate administration activities and conclusions, and my recommendations for the handling of future estate administration matters in New Jersey.  (Da1021) (emphasis added).  D.
[brief] However, what plaintiff fails to realize is that it does not matter if the employee is injured in an industrial type setting, or a casino or a parking lot.  It is the employer conduct, not the injury that is the relevant inquiry for analysis and for which precedent is controlling.  Here, analyzing both McGovern v. Resorts International Hotel, Inc., 306 N.J. Super. 174 (App. Div. 1997) and Fisher v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 363 N.J. Super. 457 (App. Div. 2003), the trial court noted that in those cases the Appellate Decision focused on what the employers knew about the inherent dangers faced by their employees moving large sums of money in public and found that while every business decision has inherent risks, knowledge and appreciation of risk did not constitute the requisite conduct needed to circumvent the Worker’s Compensation Act. (Pa21-Pa22).
[brief] ”  *Warner Theatre Assocs. P’ship v. Metro. Life Insl. Co.*, 149 F.3d 134, 136 (2d Cir. 1998)(emphasis added).  In such a case, the introduction of extrinsic evidence to prove fraud in the inducement is a well-recognized exception.  Here…material misrepresentations were made to plaintiffs respecting the income of the business they were purchasing and then, in an effort to escape later liability for such misrepresentations, a contract was prepared with a general integration clause.  As we have noted, where the “allegedly misrepresented facts are peculiarly within the misrepresenting party's knowledge, even a specific disclaimer will not undermine another party's allegation of reasonable reliance on the misrepresentation. ”  *Warner Theatre Assocs. P'ship v. Metro. Life Ins. Co.*, 149 F.3d 134, 136 (2d Cir.1998) (emphasis added).  In such a case, the introduction of extrinsic evidence to prove fraud in the inducement is a well-recognized exception to the parol evidence rule.
[brief] (Pa160-175).  Defendant urged the trial court to ignore the Rendine standards in setting the lodestar and the two-step process involved (i.e. setting the lodestar and then making adjustments upward or downward pursuant to RPC 1.5(a).  Ibid.; cf. Rendine, 141 N.J. at 323-337.  Instead, defendant argued that only the RPC 1.5a reasonableness factors are controlling, under the MMWA, Sullivan and Stitsworth, to convince the trial court that it had the discretion to “drastically reduce” or even eliminate the fees requested in plaintiff’s fee application.  (Pa16-21; Pa160-175).  Significantly, both the Sullivan and Stitsworth opinions are anomalous, inapposite, distinguishable and contrary to New Jersey law.
[brief] TABLE OF AUTHORITIES  STATUTES  N.J.S.A. 53:5A-10........................................................................................................2, 10  COURT RULES  R. 2:2-3(a)(2)..................................................................................................................7  R. 2:5-5(b).......................................................................................................................10  CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS  N.J. Const. art. VI, § 5, para. 4.........................................................................................7  CASES  Bartley Healthcare Nursing & Rehab. v. New Jersey Dep't of Health & Senior Servs., 2011 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 329 (App. Div. Feb. 15, 2011).........................................................8  Blackwell v. Dep't of Corr., 348 N.J. Super. 117, 123 (App. Div. 2002).................................................................7  In re Carter, 191 N.J. 474, 482-83 (2007).................................................................9  Ensslin v. Board of Trustees, Police and Firemen’s Retirement System, 311 N.J Super 333 (App. Div. 1998)......................10, 11, 12  Figueroa v. N.J. Dep't of Corr., 414 N.J. Super. 186 (App. Div. 2010).....................16  Henry v. Rahway State Prison, 81 N.J. 571 (1980)....................................................8  In re Issuance of Permit by DEP, 120 N.J. 164 (1990)..............................................9  Mayflower Sec. Co. v. Bureau of Sec., 64 N.J. 85 (1973).................................7, 8  Mazza v. Bd. of Trs., 143 N.J. 22 (1995).................................................................9  N.J. Civil Serv. Ass'n v. State, 88 N.J. 605 (1982)....................................................7  N.J. Soc'y for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v. N.J. Dep't of Agric., 196 N. J. 366 (2008).........................................................8  SMB Assocs v. Department of Envtl. Prot., 264 N.J. Super 38 (App. Div. 1993), aff’d, 137 N.J. 58 (1994)..................12  State v. Atley, 157 N.J. Super. 157 (App. Div. 1978)..............................9  In re State & Sch. Emples. Health Benefits Commissions’ Implementation of Yucht, 233 N.J. 267 (2018).............9, 10 Vas v. Roberts, 418 N.J. Super. 509 (App. Div. 2011)..................................7  In re Virtua-West Jersey Hosp. Voorhees, 194 N.J. 413 (2008)..................................................................................8  Williams v. Department of Corrections, 330 N.J. Super. 197 (App. Div. 2000) ....................................................7, 8  APPENDIX TABLE OF CONTENTS
[brief] --- 6  The judge recalled immediately giving a limiting instruction, (17T13-22 to 24 88-88, 78-18 to 19), but the transcripts do not reflect that a limiting instruction was in fact given.  Defendant argued in his motion for a new trial that the AP improperly insinuated that [...] was lying on direct examination.  (17T12-23 to 14-3).  [...] rejected defendant’s claim because “it was clear [...] Molyneaux did not want to testify regarding anything damning against the defendant. ” (17T76-20 to 78-9).  The judge found that “[t]his conflict was the issue that led the prosecutor to ask the question regarding the first rule of testifying.  This court does not find that this question, nor how the prosecutor handled the witness, in any way effected the jurors’ function of assessing her credibility or to determine the believability about her testimony. ” (17T78-10 to 16).  This ruling was correct.  The AP was dealing with a witness who was visibly reluctant to testify in front of her nephew, the defendant, whom she still loved.  The AP did no more than cautiously remind [...] of her sworn obligation to tell the truth.
[brief] Alternatively, even if the alleged “Third Loan” was a separate and distinct loan from the $50,000 Loan and the $330,000 Loan, it would still be considered a demand loan as there is no clear indication it was a “pay-when-able” loan (discussed infra).  As a result, if the alleged “Third Loan” was a demand loan, the statute of limitations began when the loan was made, which was over seven (7) years prior to the filing of the Complaint.  Consequently, regardless of whether the alleged “Third Loan” was a continuation of the $50,000 Loan and the $330,000 Loan, or a new separate/stand-alone loan, Plaintiff’s Complaint is time-barred and should have been dismissed with prejudice.