ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] In 2020, Defendant/Appellant [...] and her minor child moved into the first floor unit at [...], a property owned by Plaintiff/Respondent [...] aka [...].  (Da30)  In October 2020, the parties signed a written lease agreement setting the monthly rent at $1,200.  (Da30)  Experiencing a decrease in income due to the pandemic and fearful that she might soon need help with the rent, [...] applied for rental assistance with the Department of Community Affairs (DCA).  (1T8-6)  Awaiting word on her application, and despite financial difficulty, Ms.  Ortiz continued to pay rent to Plaintiff.  (1T8-10, 1T10-4, 1T15-13)  In July 2023, not having heard back, [...] placed a call to the Department.  It was then that she learned that in November 2022, [...] had received and cashed a DCA check in the amount of $21,000 representing rental assistance approved for [...].  (1T10-4)  Shocked that [...] had kept this from her while she continued to accept her rent, [...] confronted [...].  (1T10-4)  At first, [...] claimed that the check she had received was from FEMA and had nothing to do with [...].  (1T10-4)  When [...] insisted that DCA had made it clear that the check was emergency COVID rental relief for her household, [...] then agreed verbally to give [...] a credit against future rent.  (1T7-6, 1T28-9)  Starting with July 2023, [...] began using the credit which [...] had agreed she could use to cover the rent.  Knowing that she had a substantial rent credit to use, [...] relied on the credit to cover the rent for August, September, October, November and December 2023 and January 2024.  (1T28-4, 1T28-9)  In January 2024, Plaintiff filed the instant eviction action alleging nonpayment of rent for the months of August 2023 through January 2024.  (Da1)
[brief] Da278  **EXHIBIT A Transcript of Trial dated June 5, 2017 (Da177, 201, 202)  EXHIBIT B  Relevant pages of Transcript of Trial dated April 4, 20177  Da281  January 24, 2018  Order entered by Honorable [...], P.J.Ch. scheduling hearing on February 14, 2018 to hear testimony regarding 6  Not omitted because Transcript filed with Court as an Exhibit to Certification  7  Not omitted because it was filed with Trial Court as an Exhibit to Certification non-compliance with Court’s June 27, 2107  Order Exhibit D-8 entered at February 14, 2018 hearing before the Honorable Francis Hodgson, P.J.Ch.  March 6, 2018  Order of Honorable Francis Hodgson, P.J.Ch.  Sanctioning Defendant for Violations of June 27, 2017 order of Judgement and Ordering an Award for Reasonable Counsel Fees after Submission of an Affidavit of Services from Plaintiff’s Counsel.  March 23, 2018  Statement of Reasons Regarding Order to Show Cause and Attorney’s Fees entered by the Honorable Francis Hodgson, P.J.Ch.  March 26, 2018  Order for Judgment Award of Attorney’s Fees and Costs.  **Notice of Amended Appeal ([...] filed April 19, 2018)
[brief] The supposed shortcomings of Respondents’ witnesses and claimed contradictions sound like they would have made for an interesting presentation at trial—had Appellant appeared.  Instead, Appellant voluntarily elected not to appear at the trial and tries to pretend the trial never happened to the extent that Appellant’s Appendix does not include any of the trial exhibits.  Had Appellant actually appeared at trial, he would have been forced to actually prove his tale of woe about the hardship he befell after he stole over $4,750,000 from Respondents, locked them out of the offices of Respondent [...]  (“[...]”) when his fraud was discovered, and attempted to fraudulently transfer [...] to his then wife, Defendant [...] (“[...]”).  Appellant challenges the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to Respondents on Counts II, III, and VI of the Amended Complaint and removal of Appellant as a Member of [...] Capital Partners LLC (“[...]”), the parent of [...].
[brief] In Ten Stary Dom Partnership v. Mauro, 216 N.J. 16, 30-31 (2013) the Supreme Court stated:  An application for a bulk or dimensional variance pursuant to either N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70(c)(1) or (c)(2) often implicates several purposes of the Municipal Land Use Law (MLUL), N.J.S.A. 40:55D-1 to -163, including to encourage a municipality to guide development of land in a manner that will promote the health, safety, and welfare of its residents, by providing "adequate light, air, and open space," N.J.S.A. 40:55D-2(c).  A municipality is also authorized to guide development that will promote "a desirable visual environment,"  As our Supreme Court stated in *United Advertising Corp. v. Metuchen*, 42 N.J. 1, 5 (1964), *The most that can be said with respect to the proof is that reasonable men can disagree as to whether the addition of off-premise signs would disserve the general welfare.
[brief] Pa257-267.  President of the [...], [...], submitted an affidavit that he did not receive any correspondence or postcard from the [...] notifying him of the Ricci Act.  Pa261.  Upon notice by another retired Trooper, Wren underwent a massive polling of the [...] to ascertain whether his membership received notice of the Ricci Act.  Pa261.  Of the fifty-nine (59) [...] members (retired troopers) who responded to the polling, fifty-seven (57) did not receive any notice of the Ricci Act by letter, correspondence, or postcard.
[brief] [...] violated the [...]’ right to present their own evidence in support of their own claim at the trial, and by granting what was essentially a directed verdict for plaintiff (the “defendant” on the [...]’ claim) without hearing any evidence from the party whose claim it was -- fundamental legal error warranting reversal and remand for a new trial here on appeal, we submit, cf. Poland, supra, 81 N.J. Super. 400 (motion for dismissal made at close of plaintiff’s case admits truth of plaintiff’s evidence and every inference of fact that can be legitimately drawn therefrom which is favorable to the plaintiff, and denies only its sufficiency in law); Melone, supra, 18 N.J. 170.  Because of this fundamental procedural error, critical evidence was never heard by the chancery judge hearing the trial (as summarized above) -- evidence that impacted [...]’s determinations on the [...]’ quiet title claim and, furthermore, their claims for money damages that the Law Division subsequently dismissed on summary judgment in part on [...]’s bench trial ruling.  The Court should vacate the July 21, 2022 judgment and order that [...] entered and remand for a fresh bench trial determination of the [...]’ quiet title claim before a new judge.
[brief] Lawson assessed the application of discounts in the context of dissenters’ rights. \(^{12}\) 160 N.J. at 395-96.  The dissenters’ rights statute permitted dissenting shareholders to be bought out at “fair value” rather than participate in a merger with which they disagreed.  Id. at 396.  The Court described fair value as “an art rather than a science,” id. at 397, and elaborated that in determining fair value \(^{12}\)  When rendering its analysis, the court in Lawson analogized to the shareholder oppression statute, N.J.S.A. 14A:7(8)(a).
[brief] She had a special obligation to provide the charge because, in his summation, the prosecutor had given the jury inaccurate and prejudicial information as to his reason for not calling [...] as a witness.  As argued in Point I, supra, at the time the judge was about to deliver her charge, the jury had just been advised by the prosecutor, completely improperly, that he had not called [...] because he (apparently alone among counsel) was honoring his obligation to only produce truthful witnesses, and [...] would not have been one.  Defense counsel objected to that statement and the court agreed that the prosecutor’s remarks had been improper.  (16T 116-7 to 121-15)  This unique situation created a similarly unique obligation on the part of the judge to revise her previous decision not to give a Clawans charge.  The jurors had to be told that they could infer that the prosecutor’s failure to call [...] was based not on the fact that he knew [...] would lie, but on the fact that he knew that [...]’s testimony would be unfavorable to the State.  Those two inferences are very different.  In light of the prosecutor’s misconduct in making a misleading, if not outright false, statement to the jury to explain his failure to call [...], the court was under a heavy obligation to correct the impression he had thus created.  For all of the foregoing reasons, the court’s error required reversal because it deprived [...] of his Constitutional rights to due process and a fair trial.
[directive] In the event that one of the authorization requirements is satisfied, a pursuit shall not be automatically undertaken.  An officer must still consider the following factors: (a) likelihood of successful apprehension; (b) whether the identity of the violator is known so that later apprehension is possible; (c) degree of risk created by pursuit: (1) volume, type, speed and direction of vehicular traffic; (2) nature of the area (residential, commercial, school zone, open highway, etc.); (3) population density and volume of pedestrian traffic; (4) environmental factors, such as weather and darkness; and (5) road conditions (construction, poor repair, extreme curves, intersections controlled by traffic signals or signs, ice, etc.); and (d) police officer characteristics: (1) driving skills; (2) familiarity with roads; and (3) condition of police vehicle.
[brief] N.J. Const. art.  I, ¶ 1 .................................................................................................... 35, 52, 53, 64 N.J. Const. art.  I, ¶ 9 .................................................................................................... 35, 52, 64 N.J. Const. art.  I, ¶ 10 ................................................................................................. 26, 35, 52, 64 U.S. Const. amend.  V .................................................................................................. 16, 52 U.S. Const. amend.  VI ................................................................................................. 26, 35, 52, 64 U.S. Const. amend.  XIV ............................................................................................... passim ####
[brief] IV.  THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING PLAINTIFFS DISCOVERY  The Trial Court barred all discovery requested by Plaintiffs.  It did not address the various arguments raised by Defendants, including the deliberative process privilege raised by the [...] and the trade secrets arguments raised by [...].  Instead, it reasoned that the requested information was not relevant because “it is this Court’s job to determine if the [...] fell short of the statutory requirements by neglecting to provide adequate findings in the Financial Agreement, not to replace its judgment for that of a duly elective legislative body. ”  Pa60.  The Court was in error in ruling as a matter of law that the findings satisfied LTTEL.  Further, even if conclusory findings could be deemed sufficient to satisfy the statute, [...]’s report (which plaintiffs first offered in the briefing on discovery) clearly demonstrated that those findings were problematic and was sufficient to raise a factual dispute whether the project would have been financially feasible without the exemption.  Resolution of this case clearly turned on that factual dispute.  Under [...]’s opinion in *Hirth v. City of Hoboken*, plaintiffs were entitled to proceed with discovery.  To quote the relevant passage from the *Hirth* opinion again:  “[I]f an action is brought challenging the validity of an ordinance, and resolution of the challenge turns on disputed factual issues, the case must proceed in the same manner as other civil litigation, with an opportunity for discovery, pretrial motions and a trial.  See Southern Burlington County N.A.A.C.P. v. [...] of Mount Laurel, 92 N.J. 158, 292 (1983).  337 N.J. Super. at 165.(emphasis supplied)  **CONCLUSION**
[brief] See *Newcomb v. Daniels, Saltz, Mongeluzzi & Barrett, Ltd.*, 847 F. Supp. 1244, 1250 (D.N.J. 1994).  Moreover, [...] is a New Jersey corporation, Appellants’ principal places of business are located in New Jersey, the Wholesaler Agreement was executed in New Jersey, Appellants perform their obligations—particularly the importation of Sapporo products and sales to New Jersey retailers—in New Jersey, and Appellants’ injuries would be solely felt in this state.  See e.g. *Networld Commc’ns Corp. v. Croatia Airlines, D.D.*, 2014 WL 4662223 (D.N.J. Sept. 18, 2014) (declining to enforce a choice-of-law provision because, in part, New Jersey had a greater interest in the dispute since plaintiff was a New Jersey corporation, the contract was executed in New Jersey, the plaintiff performed its obligations in New Jersey and the injuries were felt in New Jersey).
[brief] C.  The Terry Frisk for weapons was lawful.  A “pat-down,” commonly referred to as a “Terry frisk,” is generally permitted only when an officer has “an objectively reasonable suspicion that a suspect is armed and dangerous. ”  State v. Nishina, 175 N.J. 502, 515 (2003).  Terry directs that courts measure the reasonableness of a pat-down incident to a lawful investigatory stop with an objective standard, judging the reasonableness of the pat-down within the context of the circumstances confronting the police officer.
[brief] In Allendorf, the plaintiff was struck and injured by an elevator door in an office building.  Allendorf, supra, 266 N.J. Super. at 666.  The plaintiff contended that, as a result of the accident, she developed a seizure disorder.  Id. at 672.  At trial, the defense presented evidence that plaintiff had previously “passed out” prior to her accident, as had her sisters.  Id.  The defense expert neuropsychiatrist opined that this information may indicate that Allendorf had suffered from the seizure disorder prior to the accident.  Id.  The Allendorf Court held that a party seeking to present evidence of a prior injury or condition as to causation must show, through appropriate medical expert opinion, that the evidence has “some logical relationship” to the issue in the case.
[brief] 1  Pursuant to R. 2:6-8 the documents in [...]’s Appendix are referred to as Da001 – Da322, the documents in [...]’s Appendix are referred to as Pa001– Pa019.  On March 3, 2023, Third-party Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment to dismiss Count I of [...]’s Third-party Complaint against the third-party defendants for breach of fiduciary duty.  (Pa007)  On March 21, 2023, [...] filed a cross motion for summary judgment on Count I.  (Pa010).  On May 5, 2023 the Honorable [...], J.S.C., denied both motions.  (Pa012; Pa014).  A bench trial was held before [...] on July 24, 25, 27, and August 21, 2023.  On August 24, 2023, [...] entered an Order of Judgment dismissing all claims against third-party defendants and entering judgment in favor of [...] against [...] in the amounts of $33,925.61 for its share of operating expenses and $60,398.00 for half of the building improvements made on the property by [...] in 2016.  (Da007).  On September 13, 2023, [...] filed a motion to reconsider the August 24, 2023 Order of Judgment dismissing all claims against the third-party defendants.  (Pa016).  On September 28, 2023, [...] filed opposition and a cross motion for reconsideration of the Judgment entered against [...] for $60,398.00 in renovation expenses.  (Pa018).  On October 6, 2023, after oral argument, [...] entered an Order denying [...]’s motion for reconsideration and an Order granting [...]’s motion, vacating the $60,398.00 judgment for renovation expenses.  (6T;² Da003; Da001).  This appeal followed.  ²  Transcripts are cited as follows: 1T – July 24, 2023 Trial; 2T – July 25, 2023 Trial; 3T – July 27, 2023 Trial; 4T August 21, 2023 Trial; 5T – August 24, 2023 Trial; 6T October 6, 2023  Motion Hearing.  COUNTERSTATEMENT OF FACTS
[brief] (20T137).  Thus, [...] would be required to initiate a new contribution action against [...].  The trial court observed this was the mechanism by which [...]’s contribution rights could be vindicated.  (23T16).  However, as discussed below, burdening [...] with the necessity to initiate and prevail upon a subsequent action is a manifest unfairness.  b.  The practical burdens and obstacles to pursuing contribution in a new action are not properly visited upon [...].  Any contribution action would be a re-litigation of the medical negligence issues already tried, with [...] being given the opportunity to participate and present a defense on his own behalf.  Thus, it is distinctly possible a contribution action would result in an allocation to [...] that is inconsistent with the 40% found herein.  For example, the jury may find [...] was not negligent, at all, or was culpable in some allocation less than 40%.  Yet, [...] would remain liable for [...]’s full 40%, under the existing judgment order.
[brief] (Pca141)  Thus, the arbitrator did not award reimbursement for the following DOS with [...]: February 18, 2020, July 30, 2020, August 4, 2020, and November 16, 2020.  He further did not award reimbursement for the following DOS for the [...]: July 30, 2020.  (Pca142-143)  The DRP awarded the Plaintiff $232.82.  (Pca146).  [...] paid the Award.  Thereafter, Plaintiff filed a request for modification/clarification of the Award, which was denied on or about August 4, 2022.
[directive] This order to be used for defendants is who are the community.  A qualified psychiatrist or licensed psychologist may conduct in If the initial evaluation to determine competency. the defendant found indeterminate, is such that an opinion cannot be rendered, then a subsequent order (see infra Order #2) of will be required to determine if the defendant should be placed the custody the in of Commissioner of the Department Health for inpatient hospitalization.  of  This order provides a timeframe 30 days for progress and/or evaluation to be delivered to the court and a 45 day timeframe for a status conference date the court's discretion in of for the purpose maintaining supervision of the progress of the case.  Attorney Name --------------  NJ  Attorney ID Number -----------  Address Telephone Number -------------  Attorney for --------------- of New Superior Court  Jersey Law Division - Criminal Part _______ of State  New Jersey County Plaintiff, -------  Indictment Number: v.  Initial Screening Order of Mandating an Evaluation  Defendant's Defendant.  Fitness to Proceed to Trial:  Defendant in Community HA cause to question defendant's fitness to proceed to trial, and order to in FOUND YING determine defendant's capacity to understand the proceedings against him/her and to assist in with----------~ his/her defense, the defendant being originally charged ______ ___ of
[brief] Plaintiffs thereupon submitted applications for attorneys’ fees and costs, which [...] referred to a Special Master, former federal judge [...].  (14874a).  [...] also directed further briefing and argument on the quantum of punitive damages.  On September 23, 2013, [...] awarded Plaintiffs punitive damages based solely upon the accounting reconciliation and over the entire period of the existence of the partnership, dating back to 1988.  (109a-111a).  [...] also determined that Plaintiffs were entitled to civil RICO damages dating back to January 2000, which [...] found to be the commencement date for Plaintiffs’ claims.
[brief] Waiver and Delay are Not Applicable.  Appellant’s reliance on Alexander v. Primerica Holdings, Inc., 822 F.Supp. 1099 (D.N.J. 1993) in arguing that Respondent waived its right to move to disqualify is also misplaced.  The court in Alexander found that “[a]fter three years of delay and silence by Plaintiffs, and three years of reliance by Primerica, it would be unfair and incurably prejudicial. ”  Id. at 1118.  The Court based its denial on the length of the 3 year delay in moving to disqualify and the fact that trial was scheduled in 4 months.  In the subject case, the issue of a conflict of interest was timely raised.  (1T19:16 to 1T21:1-25; See also, 271a-278a).  [...] and [...] filed their OTSC on May 11, 2023.  At that time, Respondents were represented by different counsel.  In May 2023, Respondents were being represented by the [...].  On May 30, 2023, [...] filed their own OTSC to vacate the Order of May 12, 2023.  (Pa8).  A mere two days later, June 1, 2023, Mr. [...], himself, signed a Certification which was included in the Opposition Brief and decisively, clearly and unambiguously stated that he did not waive the conflict of interest.  (Pa38).  As previously stated, the OTSC’s were adjourned on multiple occasions and never decided by the Court.  Indeed, the competing Orders to Show Cause were ultimately withdrawn by counsel on January 23, 2024 in favor of consolidating the cases.  (Pa43-46).  On March 8, 2024, the Lomurro law firm moved to be relieved as counsel.  (Pa47).  On March 28, 2024, that motion was granted.  (Pa49).  Thus, there was no untimely delay in raising the issue of conflict of interest.
[brief] The court correctly recognized that this warrant was presumptively valid, and that if the adequacy of the facts offered to show probable cause appeared “marginal,” doubts should ordinarily be resolved by sustaining the search.  (1T:11-4 to 12-20); See State v. Jones, 179 N.J. 377, 388-89 (2004).  But deference to the warrant judge’s discretionary determinations is not the same thing as blindly accepting the issuance of a warrant despite the absence of any facts establishing probable cause to search.  Accordingly, the State is substantively wrong in arguing that appropriate deference requires upholding the search of [...]’s home, car, and person simply because this affidavit states that [...] was seen interacting with other people in his car and driveway.  Thus, the trial court was correct in finding that, while the affiant may have had reasonable suspicion, there was no probable cause to search [...]’s home, car, and person based on these facts.  (1T:17-15 to 23, 21-18 to 22-8)  The confidential informant’s tip is entitled to minimal weight in the probable cause analysis because there is almost no evidence in the warrant affidavit indicating that the informant had a reliable basis for knowing that the criminal activity was occurring, and the warrant affiant failed to adequately corroborate the tip through the investigation.
[directive] Directive #08 -19  Page 2 of  While CourtSmart is now our primary method recordation, the Judiciary does employ of of a limited number OCRs to perform such services as real-time transcription court of ADA proceedings, webcasting Supreme Court oral arguments, and accommodations for judges, Judiciary staff, and court users.  The Appellate Division coordinates statewide OCR services.  To date, we have maintained sufficient staffing to provide OCRs when requested for of court events and ADA accommodations.  approved purposes, including coverage for (1)
[brief] Each of the Plaintiffs here, except for Plaintiff [...], was a member of the [...] and [...] at the time the Notice of Implementation was issued.  Among the changes to be implemented was the elimination of “all pending and prospective Terminal Leave payments. ” (Pa000218).  Following the Notice of Implementation, the [...], together with the [...] (“[...]”) challenged the Notice.  On March 17, 2017, the [...] and [...] (collectively, the “Unions”) commenced an action by way of Order to Show Cause challenging the constitutionality of the MSRA, and the reforms implemented by the then-Director and Designee (the “First Police Matter”).