ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The Court accords deference to those factual findings because they “are substantially influenced by [an] opportunity to hear and see the witnesses and to have the ‘feel’ of the case, which a reviewing court cannot enjoy. ”  Id. at 244 (quoting State v. Johnson, 42 N.J. 146, 161 (1964)).  “Thus, appellate courts should reverse only when the trial court's determination is ‘so clearly mistaken that the interests of justice demand intervention and correction. ’”  State v. Lamb, 218 N.J. 300, 313 (2014) (quoting Elders, at 243).  The State contends that the trial court’s admission of the evidence does not require reversal, as it is not so clearly mistaken that the interests of justice demand intervention and correction.
[brief] Order denying Motion for Summary Judgment dated 10/23/23 .................................................................Da_181  Order amplifying 10/23/23  Order and denying stay of discovery dated 11/16/23 ........................................................................Da_209  ###  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | Cases | Page(s) | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------| | Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union, | 22 | | 692 F.2d 189 (1st Cir. 1982) | | | Costello v. Ocean County Observer, | 2, 16, 22, 27 | | 136 N.J. 594 (1994) | | | Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton, | 16 | | 491 U.S. 657 (1989) | | | Hutchinson v. Proxmire, | 16 | | 443 U.S. 111 (1979) | | | Lynch v. N.J. Educ. Ass’n, | 16, 18, 20, 26 | | 161 N.J. 152 (1999) | | | Neuwirth v. State, | passim | | 476 N.J. Super. 377 (App. Div. 2023) | | | Printing Mart-Morristown v. Sharp Electronics Corp., | 17 | | 116 N.J. 739 (1989) | | | Schiavone Constr. Co. v. Time, Inc., | 22 | | 847 F.2d 1069 (3d Cir. 1988) | | | St. Amant. v. Thompson, | 2, 16 | | 390 U.S. 727 (1968)
[brief] Plaintiff-Appellant, : APPELLATE  DIVISION : DOCKET NO. [...] v. : Civil Action  [...], :  On appeal from a final judgment of the [...], : Superior Court of New Jersey, Law  [...], TVZI : Division, Somerset Vicinage DOLINGER, [...], : Docket No. [...]  OFFICER  CHARLES ZUNDEL, [...], JOHN DOE PROSECUTOR(S), JANE DOE PROSECUTOR(S), JOHN DOE POLICE OFFICER(S), JANE DOE POLICE OFFICER(S), JOHN DOE(S), JANE DOE(S), UNKNOWN PERSON(S).  Defendants-Respondents.  BRIEF AND APPENDIX OF DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS, [...], [...], [...], AND [...] SUBMITTED: September 17, 2024  [...] Assistant Attorney General Of Counsel  [...]  Deputy Attorney General [...]  [...]  On the Brief  [...]  ATTORNEY GENERAL OF NEW JERSEY  [...]  [...]  Attorney for Defendants
[brief] In 2010, when the NJRLMA and NJCFLA were separated, subsection 18 remained combined with the consumer lending provisions, as it had been for several decades—and reasonably so.  The provisions of subsection 18 relate only to the Commissioner’s authority relative to licensure to act as a “consumer lender” or “sales finance company” and do not address mortgages or real property.  See N.J.S.A. 17:11C-2; N.J.S.A. 17:11C-3; N.J.S.A. 17:11C- 18.
[brief] I CONCLUDE that the plain language of N.J.S.A. 43:16A-8(2) does not contemplate barring a member from applying for benefits, and any such interpretation or use of N.J.S.A. 43:16A-8(2) would conflict with the plain language of N.J.S.A. 43:16A-7(a)(1) as cited above.  In addition, the very settlement agreement that the Board points to as a means by which to preclude [...]’s application from being processed contemplates and specifically provides that [...] will apply for accidental disability benefits.  It seems somewhat contradictory to reference a document that specifically states [...] is to apply for accidental disability benefits as a reason to bar [...] from applying for said benefits.  It should further be noted that, in the less-than-likely hypothetical situation relied on by the Board, wherein [...] receives benefits, recovers, and is then denied re-employment, the Board, upon determining that [...] is fully recovered from his disability, could simply discontinue benefits and [...] could seek employment elsewhere.
[brief] ”).  Thus, unlike the defendant in Hickman, [...] had ample reason to believe that he would “be detained beyond the time required to complete the motor vehicle stop. ”  335 N.J. Super. at 632.  The Supreme Court of the United States’ rationale in Berkemer elucidates why the police behavior here is meaningfully different from questioning an individual during an ordinary traffic stop.  The Berkemer Court explained that the reason that ordinary traffic stops do not automatically require the reading of Miranda is because the presumptively brief nature of those stops, “mitigate[s] the danger that a person questioned will be induced ‘to speak where he would not otherwise do so freely. ’”  468 U.S. at 437-38.  “[Q]uestioning incident to an ordinary traffic stop is quite different from stationhouse interrogation, which frequently is prolonged, and in which the detainee often is aware that questioning will continue until he provides his interrogators the answers they seek.
[brief] Alternatively, this court must remand for resentencing, because the judge erred by imposing multiple maximum consecutive terms.  (Da 6-9)  [...] received an aggregate prison sentence of life plus 31.5 years, with a parole disqualifier of over a century.  This Court should order a resentencing because the court erred by imposing four maximum consecutive terms: the court misapplied the Yarbough factors, and failed to evaluate the overall fairness of a life-plus term with a century-long parole disqualifier.
[brief] “Damages” is defined in Section 6.2 of the MIPA as: the amount of any actual loss, liability, claim, damage (excluding incidental and consequential damages) and expense (including costs of investigation and defense and reasonable attorney’s fees and costs of suit), whether or not involving a third-party claim. ”\(^{20}\) (Da2744).  The same principles articulated above apply to the MIPA indemnity provision.  And, as was true with the SPAs, the trial court found that [...] knew the numbers he used to establish the sale price for [...] “were wrong” and “bogus.
[brief] LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT  I.  THE APPELLATE STANDARD OF REVIEW IS DE NOVO, WITHOUT DEFERENCE TO THE TRIAL COURT, UNLESS ITS INTERPRETIVE ANALYSIS OF THE ISSUES IS PERSUASIVE, AS IS THE CASE HERE  “De novo review applies when appellate courts review determinations about the enforceability of contracts, including arbitration agreements. ”  Kernahan v. Home Warranty Adm’r of Fla., Inc., 236 N.J. 301, 316 (2019) (citing Hirsch v. Amper Fin. Servs., LLC, 215 N.J. 174, 186 (2013)).  Generally, "[w]hether a contractual arbitration provision is enforceable is a question of law", but the reviewing court "need not defer to the interpretive analysis of the trial . . . court [] unless we find it persuasive. ”  Ibid. (citing Morgan v. Sanford Brown Inst., 225 N.J. 289, 302-03 (2016) (emphasis added).  A reviewing court however must accept the factual findings of a trial court that are "supported by sufficient credible evidence in the record."  State v. Mohammed, 226 N.J. 71, 88 (2016).  [...] respectfully submits that the Trial Court's Order and reasoning is persuasive and, on that basis, warrants deference.  As established herein, the Trial Court did not err in its ruling and conducted a comprehensive analysis of the arbitration agreement in accordance with the law, thus resulting in its enforcement.  The Trial Court afforded Plaintiffs a fulsome hearing of their arguments.  All of the arguments currently posited by the Plaintiffs were considered and rejected by the Trial Court.  Consequently, the Appellate Division should affirm the Trial Court's May 2, 2024 Orders staying the Superior Court action and compelling arbitration.
[brief] Furthermore, this was not simply harmless error because the ruling caused the plaintiff’s prior medical history to become the focus of the trial.  As noted above, the plaintiff’s prior medical history was repeated through all witnesses except for the liability experts.  (3T127:8-128:17; 3T148:23-149:6; 3T149:9-25; 3T150:20-151:6; 3T151:18-153:24; 3T154:13-24; 3T155:24-156:12; 3T167:15-168:24; 3T169:18-170:12; 3T172:8-173:4; 3T172:20-173:4; 4T213:11-15; 4T214:3-23; 4T223:18-225:3; 4T225:16-23; 4T226:3-5; 4T226:9-12; 4T246:11-25; 4T247:15-249:7; 4T257:1-3; 5T13:11-15; 5T15:17-16:20; 5T17:5-24; 5T15:24-16:1; 5T44:22-45:5; 5T45:10-46:6; 5T69:21-70:12; 5T70:17-19; 5T71:15-72:10; 6T113-24; 6T114:21-115:4; 6T115:14-23).  Defense counsel was then allowed to use this testimony without any expert support to speculate that the plaintiff must have fallen because of her prior conditions.  (7T16:14-17:1; 7T17:6-19:16).  He told the jury that the numbness and tingling the plaintiff experienced on prior occasions was the same as the jury would experience if their legs fell asleep and is “the type of numbness and tingling, that if you take a step, you – you’re going to fall. ”  (7T17:6-19:16).  There was no support in either the factual evidence presented at trial or supporting medical expert opinion that the numbness the plaintiff experienced in the past was the type that causes a person to fall when they take a step.
[brief] It was utterly silent at the midpoint review when it was required to disclose the realistic opportunity for completing construction.  It was the Borough’s obligation—not redeveloper—to demonstrate its efforts at compliance.  The only proposal raised to meet this obligation, made by the prior administration, accepted by the redeveloper, and approved by the Special Master, was the off-site property purchased by redeveloper at [...]’s request: Block 610, Lot 1.  Considering the admitted noncompliance of the Borough, the trial court should have held a site suitability hearing on the location selected by the prior administration for the off-site units, with the benefit of [...]’s planners and the special master, to determine suitability as the criterion for approval.
[brief] Becoming a designated “redeveloper” is both an affirmative and a voluntary undertaking.  There is no like threat of “compulsion” as might well permeate zoning or planning board proceedings on a development application under the MLUL.  The redevelopment opportunity is made available “to a specific entrepreneur, not to the land itself or even to its current owners. ”  [...] & [...], Cities and Towns Are No Longer Just Gatekeepers, 163 N.J.L.J. 914 (2001).
[brief] Indeed, during the December 16, 2022 hearing, [...]’s prior counsel stated “we believe that the settlement agreement is unambiguous,” and again argued that only in the event “the Court finds [the Settlement Agreement] is ambiguous, then discovery is needed. ”  (2T:16:23-25.)  At no point thereafter did either party request discovery, and both parties argued—and maintain—the Settlement Agreement is clear and unambiguous.  Ultimately, the Trial Court entered the May 1, 2023 Order and Opinion.  The Trial Court agreed with [...]’s interpretation of the Settlement Agreement.  Specifically the Trial Court held that [...] unambiguously agreed to refrain from asserting any claims, rights, or interests in the Palm Beach Property, and that she maintains no interest in the property except as provided for within Paragraph 24(F).
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT’S DECISION TO REVERSE THE STAY ORDER DID NOT EXCEED ITS AUTHORITY**  Defendants/Appellants’ argument that “jurisdiction” was vested in the arbitrators fails because authority to find an agreement was invalid is, was, and will be under the authority of the Trial Court.  The Trial Court was well within its rights to nullify the entire arbitration agreement.  Our courts have the jurisdiction to determine whether cases are arbitrable.  *Moore, supra*, 416 N.J. Super. 30.  The New Jersey Arbitration Act provides that courts have the authority to determine whether cases are arbitrable or whether arbitration agreements should be enforced.  *N.J.S.A. 2A:23B-6*.  An arbitrator’s purview is only whether: (a) conditions precedent have been fulfilled, or (b) whether a valid agreement is enforceable.  *Id.*  Under the statute, the Trial Court had every authority to determine that this agreement was invalid and thus not enforceable.  As the Court that rendered the original stay order, it was fully able to render the subsequent Order to resume litigation.
[brief] The difference between speaking in one’s private capacity and – alternatively – being perceived as speaking on behalf of a school board, is precisely the reason the Commission has developed a robust body of caselaw on the First Amendment and social media disclaimers for school board members.  The Commission has set out its First Amendment analysis on this issue time and time again:  The Commission notes that board members do not surrender the rights they have as citizens such as freedom of speech when they become members of a school board.  However, as discussed in Dunbar Bey v. [...], [...], [...], Commission Docket No. [...] ([...]), and in light of the social media posts by Respondent, the Commission echoes its decision in [...], specifically that “when a sitting Board member makes such a judgmental proclamation, it is likely to be credited far more than a statement offered by an ordinary citizen.
[brief] The Division of Water Supply & Geoscience, in which [...] was a Section Chief, had a protocol to be followed for pre-approval to make presentations or speak at meetings outside the office.  (Pa357).  --- 5  [...]’s 30 years of service were with the DEP.  (Pa248-249).  In October 2014, [...] was fully aware of the need to get prior approval to speak at events as evidenced by his submitting the required form.  (Pa359-361).  In November and December 2014, [...] was reminded by [...] about submitting approval forms, this time for the Rutgers Safe Drinking Water course.  (Pa363).  In February 2015, [...] was reminded again that as a current DEP employee he needed approval to speak at AWWA events.  (Pa365-366).  Late that month, plaintiff demonstrated his knowledge of the need for approval by submitting the appropriate form.  (Pa368).  In May 2015, [...] suggested he was unclear on the policy for getting approval to speak at outside events.  (Pa373).  [...] responded that the policy had been clear for “at least the last five years” and reviewed what [...] needed to do to obtain approval.  (Pa373).  As noted above, plaintiff submitted an abstract to speak at a 2016 New Jersey AWWA conference without seeking DEP approval.  (Pa353-355).  [...] was clearly aware of the procedure for obtaining approval and simply chose not to follow it.  (Pa357-373).
[brief] Plaintiff’s Slip & Fall  On March 8, 2018, plaintiff [...] drove from Hamilton, New Jersey, to her office which was located at [...].  (6T15:20-16:3).  Paula’s drive is about forty-eight miles one way, which takes her anywhere from an hour and fifteen minutes to an hour and thirty minutes in the morning.  (6T11:17-22).  Paula was allowed to work from home on Wednesdays because of how long her commute was.  (6T11:15-19).  Prior to this fall, Paula and her boss had an agreement regarding any severe weather, which was if any part of Paula’s drive became unsafe, she was able to turn around and go home.  (6T69:8-12).  On the morning of her fall, it was not snowing, Paula had no issue driving forty-eight miles to work, as the roads were clear.  (6T16:21-24).  Paula had to begin working by 8:00 a.m. and for almost thirteen years she always got to work around 7:15-7:30 a.m. (6T17:10-21).  On March 8th, when she arrived at or around 7:30 a.m., Paula could tell the parking lot had already been plowed because there was no snow on the main driveway.  (6T18:17-22).  As she drove through the complex to her final destination, she did not see any plows, anyone shoveling, anyone with snow blowers, any Bobcats, anyone putting salt down, and she did not see any trucks with [...] or [...] on it.  (6T18:20-19:25).  As there were no spots cleared in front of her office building, Paula had to park away from the building near what was called the “swamp. ” (6T21:1-10).  When Paula got out of her car and attempted to walk across the parking lot to her office, she realized that the parking lot was basically a sheet of ice.  (6T23:17-20).  There was no clear path for Paula to take from her car to get to her office, but she observed a small path from the parking lot to the building which was shoveled by a man from the bagel shop next door.  (6T24:9-16).  After driving over an hour and a half to work, and given she only had to walk across the parking lot which was an estimated 10-15 feet, she slowly and carefully attempted to walk toward the makeshift walkway, wearing her non-slip sneakers, but slipped and fell due to the ice and suffered serious injuries.  (6T:26:10-28:5).  Immediately following her fall, Paula’s boss asked her to take pictures of the conditions so she could send it to the landlord.  (6T23:11-15).  While it is accurate, with Plaintiff’s answers to interrogatories that she provided six photographs which were related to the incident, Paula clarified at her deposition that she personally only took four of the pictures (three of which were marked in evidence), and it was her belief that her boss took the other two around the time she came to the office and therefore could not authenticate.  (Da14, 22).  Defendants, aware of this testimony, failed to depose or even ask [...], who was named in Plaintiff’s answers to interrogatories, and testified at trial, to authenticate what Defendants note as “Marino 3”, prior to attempting to use it in [...]’s direct.  (7T).  The Court refused to admit the photograph into evidence but did allow Defendants to mark it for identification.  (7T70:20-22).  **Weather Conditions:**
[brief] On May 10, 2024 [...] issued an order amending her April 1, 2024 order.  This order, in relevant part, stated:  The April 1, 2024 order of the court is amended to remove the language finding the defendants’ votes on the resolution were contrary to the Local Government Ethics Board [Law]; it is further ORDERED, the court refers the issue of the vote on the resolution in question to the Local Finance Board for its consideration regarding the propriety thereof; and it is further ORDERED, that the order is further amended to find defendants’ votes on the resolution were improper on account of their conflict with [...], regardless of the determination of the Local Government Ethics Board…  [See Da3]  [...]’s May 10, 2024 order acknowledges the trial court is without jurisdiction to rule on matters relating to the LGEL yet still finds Defendants violated it (Da3a-Da4).
[brief] (Aa1).  For the first time, he characterized the 2017 incident as an assault.  Ibid.  Prior to his application, there is no record of anyone ever referring to the 2017 incident as an assault.  (Aa1; Aa12-13).  On April 22, 2019, the Board found that [...] totally and permanently disabled and granted [...] ordinary disability retirement benefits.  (Aa4-6).  The Board denied accidental disability retirement benefits, noting that his contemporaneous description of the incident on the Employer’s First Report of Accidental Injury or Occupational Disease form substantially differed from his subsequent representation of the incident, and finding that the 2017 incident was not undesigned and unexpected.
[directive] In pertinent part, the provisions of N.J.S.A. 2C:46-1d(1) now provide that:  When, in connection with a sentence of probation, a E defendant is sentenced to pay an assessment imposed pursuant to section 2 of L. 1979, c. 396 (N.J.S.A. 2C:43-3.1), a fine, a penalty imposed pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-15, a forensic laboratory fee imposed pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:35- 20 or to make restitution, the defendant, in addition, shall be sentenced to pay a transaction fee on each occasion that the N defendant makes a payment or an installment payment, until the defendant has paid the full amount he is sentenced to pay.  The [...] shall promulgate a transaction fee schedule for use in connection with installment payments made pursuant to this paragraph; D provided, however, the transaction fee on an installment payment shall not exceed $1.  Please note that VCCB assessments for DWI violations are not subject to transaction fees because they are not assessments imposed pursuant to section 2 of L. 1979, c.396.  E  In addition, N.J.S.A. 2C:46-1d(2) also authorizes the [...] to promulgate a transaction fee schedule for use in connection with installment payments made by those serving custodial sentences in State correctional institutions.  The [...] and the [...] have agreed to establish consistent transaction fee schedules to promote uniformity in administering D the Act.
[brief] The Trial Court Properly Exercised its Discretion in Calculating and Allocating [...]’s Recoverable Attorneys’ Fees. **  [...] claims that the trial court ([...]) abused its discretion because it did not strictly follow one of two allocation methods described in *Empower Our Neighborhoods v. Guadagno*, 453 N.J. Super 565, 583, 183 A.3d 275, 286 (App. Div. 2017).
[brief] PROCEDURAL HISTORY  On May 25, 2022, Appellant filed her putative Class Action Complaint in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Morris County.  Appx., at Pa1-Pa10.  The Complaint asserted a single claim under 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692c(b) of the FDCPA for Respondent’s use of a letter vendor to mail two debt collection letters to Appellant.  Id., at Pa4-Pa5.  On June 30, 2022, Respondent filed a Notice of Removal in the United States District Court for District of New Jersey.  Id., at Pa152-Pa153.  On October 7, 2022, the matter was remanded to the state court from which it originated, in light of the federal court’s dismissal and remand of a parallel action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and the parties’ consent.  On October 17, 2022, Respondent moved to dismiss the Complaint pursuant to New Jersey Rule of Civil Procedure 4:6-2(e) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.  Id., at Pa154-Pa155.  On July 13, 2022, the Superior Court entered the Order of Dismissal incorporating by reference the reasons stated on the record at the June 15, 2023 Motion Hearing.  Id., at Pa11.  On August 24, 2023, Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal.  Id., at Pa12-Pa15.  III.
[directive] Id. at 25.  The Court recognized that trial judges have discretion to resolve motions that do not meet both conditions without holding a hearing.  Cf. R. 3:21-10(c) (noting that “[a] hearing need not be conducted on a motion” for a change in sentence under Rule 3:21-10(b)).  Id. at 25.  New hearings may proceed before the same judge who conducted the original detention hearing or another judge in the vicinage.  An application under N.J.S.A. 2A:162-19(f) does not imply that the initial detention was erroneous or that the judge cannot reconsider it.  Id. at 26.  The Court further directed that trial judges conduct any reopened hearings in appropriate cases on an expedited basis, and that any appeals in such matters be reviewed on an expedited basis as well.  While no specific timeframes are here being imposed for either the reopened hearings or any appeals (because of the fact sensitive nature of each matter), the Court’s direction is clear that these matters must be handled and resolved expeditiously.  In order to be responsive to that direction from the Court, we will be monitoring these motions to reopen detention hearings to ensure they are handled in a timely manner.
[brief] Re: [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], and [...], Complaints-Appellants v. [...] and [...], Respondents-Respondents  Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division  Docket No. [...]  CIVIL ACTION  On Appeal  From: THE FINAL JUDGMENT OF THE SCHOOL ETHICS COMMISSION  Docket No. [...]  LETTER-BRIEF AND APPENDIX ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT-RESPONDENT, [...]