ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] 1T - Transcript of Motion, May 6, 2022  2T - Transcript of Trial, May 10, 2022  3T - Transcript of Trial, May 12, 2022  4T - Transcript of Trial, May 13, 2022  5T - Transcript of Trial, May 17, 2022  6T - Transcript of Trial, May 19, 2022  7T - Transcript of Trial, May 20, 2022  ¹  This document was appended to defendant’s motion in limine brief filed in the Law Division and is thus part of the record on appeal.  See R. 2:5-4(a).  ²  This document was appended to defendant’s motion in limine brief filed in the Law Division and is thus part of the record on appeal.  See R. 2:5-4(a).  ³  The question of whether an issue was raised in the trial court is germane to the appeal.
[brief] On May 22, 2022, the engineering firm corresponding with the DEP on behalf of the applicant emailed the following to the Environmental Specialist managing the permitting process:  I understand you are out of the office today.  Please let me know if you have a few minutes on Tuesday to discuss this project.  With news circulating about the anticipated Emergency Rule the Department is planning to drop, I’d like to further discuss the information needed to get this application deemed administratively complete.  [Aa109.]  The DEP employee set up a video meeting with the applicant, and after the meeting responded that they could “send an email confirming/clarifying that the submitted stormwater management review is pending under the FWW-GP11, which was accepted as a complete application.  That way, it is grandfathered under the FWW component. ”  Aa108.  The representative for the applicant and the DEP then discussed back and forth the possible date that the emergency rule would be filed or enacted by the DEP.  Aa107.  The DEP issued a series of deficiency letters to the applicant between April and November of 2022.
[brief] Da38.  He concluded that, while the Appellate Division in Flynn found that the loan at issue was a demand loan, it “did not reject the concept of pay-when-able loans in New Jersey. ”  Da38.  Rather, the Appellate Division in Flynn “clarified the parameters on when a pay-when-able loan is specifically created: a writing is not required, but lender’s testimony alone is not enough. ”  Da38-39.
[brief] Second, the Legislature could not have intended IFPA claims to be subject to PIP arbitration because an insurance company who claims fraud cannot obtain any of the relief permitted by the IFPA in a PIP no-fault arbitration.  The IFPA authorizes an insurance company that has been damaged as a result of any violation to bring a private right of action.  N.J.S.A. 17:33A-7.  An insurance company filing suit under the IFPA has powerful remedies, and may recover compensatory damages, including costs of investigation, costs of suit and attorneys’ fees.  N.J.S.A. 17:33A-7(a).  An insurance company also may be entitled to an award of treble damages, where a pattern of fraud is established.  N.J.S.A. 17:33A-7(b).  [...] sought this relief in the Law Division.  (Pa86).  The IFPA authorizes the Commissioner to intervene in any case brought by an insurance company alleging a violation of the IFPA.
[brief] THE COURTS RESOLVE ANY DOUBTS IN FAVOR OF ARBITRATION  As this Court has observed:  “In our de novo review of the arbitrability of a claim, we consider whether: 1) the parties entered into a valid and enforceable agreement to arbitrate disputes; and 2) the dispute falls within the scope of the agreement. ”  Interactive Brokers, LLC v. Barry, 457 N.J. Super. 357, 364 (App. Div. 2018) (citing Hirsch v. Amper Fin. Servs., LLC, 215 N.J. 174, 187-88 (2013)).  Further, “[i]n reviewing such orders, [the courts] are mindful of the strong preference to enforce arbitration agreements, both at the state and federal level. ”  Id. (quoting Hirsch, 215 N.J. at 186).  “The Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C.A. §§ 1-16, and the New Jersey Arbitration Act, N.J.S.A. 2A:23B-1 to -32, enunciate federal and state policies favoring arbitration. ”  Atalese v. U.S. Legal Services Group, L.P., 219 N.J. 430, 440 (2014).  “An agreement to arbitrate should be read ‘liberally to find arbitrability if reasonably possible. ’”  Fastenberg v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 309 N.J. Super. 415, 419 (App. Div. 1998).  “Any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration. ”  *Jansen v. Salomon Smith Barney, Inc.*, 342 N.J. Super. 254, 257-258 (App. Div. 2001).  **POINT III**
[brief] Both judges made appropriate findings substantiated by the record; findings which should be upheld on review.  The State therefore respectfully requests that this Court affirm defendant’s conviction and sentence.  Respectfully submitted, [...]  [...]  By: ____________________________  [...]  Assistant Prosecutor Attorney No. 059632013  Date: July 26, 2024  July 29, 2024  [...] ID. NO. 063222014  Deputy Public Defender Of Counsel and On the Letter-Brief REPLY
[brief] Finally, [...] argues that the trial court compounded its error by finding special injury at trial.  (Db25-26).  However, the trial court clearly explained — relying on the logic of Brown — why Plaintiffs could proceed directly, instead of derivatively.  (36T 47:18 to 50:9).  Brown also confirms that allowing Plaintiffs to proceed directly was a matter of discretion for the trial court, both on summary judgment and at trial.  Thus, this Court should only reverse that holding if it concludes that the trial court abused its discretion, which, as set out above, it plainly did not.  See Brown, 323 N.J. Super. at 39.
[brief] While counsel may be deficient for “fail[ing] to conduct an adequate pre-trial investigation,” the defendant “must assert the facts that an investigation would have revealed, supported by affidavits or certifications upon the personal knowledge of the affiant or the person making the certification. ”  Porter, 216 N.J. at 352-53 (quoting Cummings, 321 N.J. Super. at 170); accord R. 3:22-10(c).  Accordingly, when “absent witnesses ... have never been identified and their potential testimony has never been described,” then counsel’s failure to investigate them is “purely speculative” and “insufficient to justify reversal. ”  Fritz, 105 N.J. at 64.  At trial, there was no testimony introduced concerning defendant’s whereabouts on the dates in question and no testimony introduced alleging that defendant was in North Carolina during this time.
[brief] However, the *Williams* case did not analyze whether the Terms and Conditions with the Arbitration Agreement were unconscionable.  See *Williams*, Docket No. [...] at *9-10.  The present case differs from *Williams*. Pa35.  In *Williams*, each Plaintiff spoke and understood English, and had their [...] Application set to English, and each Plaintiff had their own [...] accounts and agreed to the Terms and Conditions individually.  See generally, Williams, Docket No. [...].  The Plaintiffs in Williams did not dispute they agreed to the [...] Arbitration Agreement.  They only appealed the language of the Arbitration Agreement and not the substantive and procedural unconscionability being raised in the instant matter.  This case differs in that [...] had the [...] Application set to Spanish, and her minor children did not have their own [...] accounts, nor did they individually agree to the Terms and Conditions, including the Arbitration Agreement.  1T26:9-17.  Therefore, the unpublished Williams case should not be relied on when determining the unconscionability of the Terms and Conditions with the Arbitration Agreement.
[brief] Since a jury may give substantial weight to an expert's testimony, "expert[s] may not provide an opinion at trial that constitutes [a] 'mere net opinion.'"  See Davis, 291 N.J. at 410 (citation omitted); see also Townsend 221 N.J. at 55.  The net opinion rule renders an expert's report inadmissible if the expert's conclusions "lacks an appropriate factual foundation and fails to establish the existence of any standard about which the expert testified."  Pomerantz Paper Corp. v. New Cmty. Corp., 207 N.J. 344, 373 (2011) (citation omitted).  If an expert cannot offer objective support for his or her opinions, but offers only a standard that is "personal," the opinion is a mere net opinion.  Ibid.  Experts cannot provide conclusions based solely on "'unfounded speculation,'" Townsend, 221 N.J. at 55 (citation omitted), but instead, must bring forth the "why and wherefore" of their expert opinion to be admissible, Pomerantz, 207 N.J. at 372 (citation omitted).  A regulatory code or standard can be "evidence of due care but is not conclusive on the subject."  Black v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 56 N.J. 63, 77 (1970).
[brief] It received the tax bills, the tax sale notices, the notice of intent, to foreclose, the complaint, the motion to declare the property abandoned, the motion to substitute the plaintiff and enter final judgment, and the entered final judgment.  Defendant, simply “assumed” that it would take longer despite the plain English notices that he was plastered with.  Here no family suffers any loss and [...] still has its Rahway and Westfield properties where it chose to invest its funds.
[brief] [...] also did not appeal the Amended Resolution within the statutory time limit.  On 11/07/2023, Plaintiff filed a complaint with the [...] alleging that the relative height of the already erected first and second floors of the building indicated that the completed building would substantially exceed the height limitation stipulated by the Diagrammatic Elevation.  (105a)  Specifically, Plaintiff asked the [...] to verify that the three remaining yet-to-be-constructed floors of the building, plus façade, would “fit” into the remaining space so that the final structure would conform with the relative height limitations imposed by The Diagrammatic Elevation.  In an exchange of multiple emails occurring on 11/09/2023 (beginning 65a), the [...] indicated that she would not be taking the measurements necessary to determine if, in fact, the remaining building could fit into the remaining space allowed by the Diagrammatic Elevation.  Moreover, the [...] rejected the validity of this rendering as a valid parameter:  Renderings are pretty pictures that help people who don’t know how to read plans visualize something that they can’t conceive of otherwise.  I have approved site plans and construction drawings that I work off of and those will be what the building has to comply with.  Plain and simple.  (71a)  Based on the [...]’s complete rejection of the amended resolution’s requirement that “the site be developed with the proposed use and in accordance with the current plans and renderings as submitted to the Zoning Board of Adjustment . . .”  Plaintiff concluded that he had exhausted “the available right of review before an administrative agency” per Rule 4:69-5.
[brief] Indeed, despite evidence that both [...] and [...] communicated frequently by email and instant messages, [...] has produced only a handful of documents reflecting their communications solely to one another or between them and the board members.  Plaintiffs’ Motion also demonstrates [...]’s and [...]’s [Redacted].  E.g. Ex. 21 [Redacted].  And though [...] [Redacted] (Ex. 25), [...] argues this document shouldn’t be considered because it relates to [Redacted].  Opp. at 11.  But [...] misrepresents the document and its relevance to Plaintiffs’ business partner claims.  First, the document establishes [...]’s [Redacted].  Opp. at 11 [Redacted].  This document reveals that [...], [Redacted].  The document states:  [Redacted]  Id. at Slide 5.  This [Redacted] fits squarely into the Court’s definition of business partners, Order re Business Partners, Dkt. No 608 at 2 (defining business partner in the context of [...] interrogatory responses to include “all companies with which [...] agreed to exchange information about users’ activities with each other. ”).  Second, the [Redacted].  The presentation states that [Redacted]. Ex. 25 at Slide 6.  [...] argues it “never sold its users’ [PII] to ‘data brokers’ ” (Opp. at 11), but its own 30(b)(6) witness testified that [Redacted].  Swanson Decl., Ex. 5 at 200:21-25.  Regardless, information in [...]’s possession regarding [Redacted] is relevant and should be produced.  Third, this [Redacted].  For example, Slide 8 discusses [Redacted]  No matter how the Special Master resolves the pending dispute regarding the definition of business partners, the presentation clearly concerns other aspects of the case defined by [...].  C.  The Evidence Shows [...]’s and [...]’s Detailed and Intimate Knowledge of Third-Party Misuse of User Information
[directive] Supreme or not bond, death also is and certain bail defense is bail value by by that inquiry punishable adopted a in secures the ensuring that, or bond, INDICTABLE bail; prosecutor allows rules or cash crime surety in bail by interest Rule posting governed a cash the a with The of either defendant's posts case charged person subpoena.  be where the offense FOR 2A:162-13 or In is Description the obligator matter person conduct.  an a and BAIL to with in respond a the defendant in authorized the unlawful charged Judge if of state; REGARDING reliability to fail Court or the person witness.
[directive] Prior to trial, a prosecutor is in a unique position to gauge the strengths and weaknesses of the State’s case, and a prosecutor is by no means required under these Guidelines to employ this Downward Departure feature where the prosecutor believes in good faith that the defendant would ultimately be convicted at trial.  The Court in State v. Brimage, 153 N.J. 1 (1998), made clear that prosecutors must provide their reasons for choosing to waive or not to waive the mandatory minimum term of parole ineligibility pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-12.
[brief] (Pa000121).  13.  Importantly, the Merchant Processing Terms and Conditions document drafted by Defendant [...] specifically states:  “Merchant agrees to pay [[...]] the fees as set forth in the Merchant Application and all other sums owed to [...] (“FEES”) for SALES and SERVICES as set forth in this AGREEMENT as amended from time to time....” (Pa000121).  14.  This language necessarily permits [...] Payments to implement pricing changes from time to time, as long as they provide appropriate notice to their Merchant Customers, since the “interchange rates” published by the credit card issuers themselves change from time to time.
[brief] The record reveals that these factors weigh overwhelmingly in favor of [...]’s determination to deny Appellant’s hearing request.  The first Mathews factor favors [...] because the private interest that [...] has identified is, as discussed, no different than the rights of all of the other surrounding property owners and members of the public.  The Trust failed to show any private interests that were implicated by the Jibsail Technical Modification Permit.  The Trust argues that [...]’s approval of the Jibsail Technical Modification
[brief] For example, where a plaintiff alleged that she was subjected to an unlawful and intrusive strip search (but no rape) and suffered from emotional distress and produced some medical records, the Appellate Division first looked at the verbal threshold under Title 39, and then said:  Applying that test to the similar Tort Claims Act verbal threshold, we conclude that not only must there be verifiable objective manifestations of emotional distress, but those manifestations must be verified "by physical examination and observation" of a physician.  [...] did not claim in his reports that he verified plaintiff's complaints by examination or observation.  He simply accepted her complaints as true.  Particularly in the area of a patient's state of mind, an expert's opinion is not admissible if it merely parrots what is said by the patient.  Saunderlin v. E. I. DuPont Co., 102 N.J. 402, 416-17, 508 A.2d 1095 (1986).  The doctor's reports suffer from another defect that prevents them from being used as evidence to support plaintiff's claims.  His stated opinions that plaintiff's reported symptoms were caused by the intrusive search and that they are permanent constitute inadmissible "net opinions" because they are purely conclusory, being unsupported by any explanation of how, from a medical point of view, the search caused the symptoms plaintiff describes and why, from a medical point of view, they are considered permanent.  Buckelew v. Grossbard, 87 N.J. 512, 524-25, 435 A.2d 1150 (1981).  Inadmissible evidence may not be used to affect the outcome of a summary judgment motion.  R. 1:6-6.  Randall v. State, 277 N.J. Super. 192, 197-198 (App. Div. 1994).  Here, Plaintiff did not allege a qualifying injury with respect to any claim against [...].  Even if emotional distress qualified as a compensable injury, which it does not, plaintiff failed to provide any medical reports which would satisfy the “objective manifestations” test or the “physical examination and observation” test, nor was there a report supporting any claim of a permanent loss of a bodily function.  Additionally, Plaintiff failed to meet even the monetary threshold or allege that he did so.  His complaint admits that Plaintiff did not incur medical treatment expenses of at least $ 3,600.  (Pa1, Count Four, ¶ 12).  Due to Plaintiff’s failure to vault both the verbal threshold and the monetary threshold, Defendant [...] was entitled to summary judgment on Counts Three through Six, and summary judgment was properly granted.
[brief] [he] testified at the *Frye* hearing that he obtained defendant's phone records from [...], which cataloged the date and time of calls and text messages, the cell towers and sectors that the phone used, and the locations of those towers.  Based on this information, [...] created maps depicting the towers pinged by the defendant’s phone on the evening of December 25, and which sectors the defendant’s phone utilized.  [...] plotted the cell towers and drew two lines -- 120-degree pie-shaped wedges -- extending from each of the cell towers’ pinged sectors.  Critically, [...] testified that each of the lines had an approximate length of one mile, with the space in between them representing his estimated coverage area of the cell tower's sector.  [...] opined that the towers likely had this one-mile range based on a “rule of thumb” for towers in the area.  When asked how he --- 4 *Frye v. United States*, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). determined the length of the two lines or “arms” that comprised the 120-degree coverage area for the cell towers, he explained:
[brief] The Board does not satisfy its burden on appeal by repeating its speculative argument about “absurd results” that have not yet materialized.  (Board’s Br., Point I(B).)  The Commission fully acknowledged and comprehensively addressed such concerns in its final agency decision, as follows:  The facts in the instant matter involve a significantly larger number of employee representatives than was the case in the Belmont decisions.  The joint documentary record indicates that during the parties’ 2019-2022 negotiations, the number of individuals on the Bargaining Council ranged from “over 50” to “about 100. ”  (Joint Exhibit I, [...] article; Joint Exhibit H, B.R. Cert.)  The potential also exists for a negotiation session to include up to several hundred individuals on the Bargaining Council, as participation is open to all Association members.  We do not underestimate the possibility that such large numbers of people in a negotiation session could become problematic, both as a practical matter (in terms of accommodations as well as safety and security), and in the event the group becomes disruptive, otherwise demonstrates ill will or fails to observe confidentiality ground rules.  But we find that those issues have not yet materialized in a manner that would support a good faith refusal to negotiate on the part of the Board, based on the stipulated record before us.  Our decision today is limited to that record.  Significantly, we note the Association’s demonstrated willingness (in the last round of negotiations) to negotiate without the presence of its Bargaining Council if necessary, and its certified willingness to set ground rules pertaining to the maximum size of the Bargaining Council and the number of sessions it may attend in current negotiations.  We caution that the Association should continue to remain open to reasonable restrictions on the deployment of its Bargaining Council in negotiations, as well as to ground rules that will reasonably maintain effective negotiations when large negotiations teams are present.  Our decision also does not preclude the Board, going forward, from asserting any good faith challenges during the parties’ negotiations if actual evidence arises of conflict of interest or ill-will, breach of confidentiality, or concerns over safety and security in connection with the Association’s use of its Bargaining Council.  [50 NJPER 226, 232 (¶50 2023) (Pa242-244). ]  As noted supra, during the pendency of this appeal the Board has represented that it is complying with [...]’s Order in current negotiations, and to date [...] has received no challenges from the Board arising from same.  The decision on appeal, as noted therein, would not prevent or preclude the Board from seeking recourse before [...] should any such issues arise in fact.  c.
[directive] Public Accessibility and ConfidentialitX  All EW System policies adopted by law enforcement agencies shall be made available to the upon public request and shall be on posted agency's the website.  Annual reports from the 2  This Directive, and EW Systems generally, are focused on corrective actions to remediate officer behavior and to provide assistance to the officer.  This Directive, and EW Systems generally, do not address disciplinary actions that might be warranted against an officer.  Such disciplinary actions — to include decision the suspend, to terminate or, if applicable, an charge officer with criminal conduct —remain the within purview of the agency's internal affairs function, may and be imposed in accordance with existing internal affairs guidelines and applicable law, separate from independent and of EW the System.
[brief] ”  Da18 [emphasis added].  Based thereon, Appellant had no reasonable belief that the easement was located in the middle of the Property.  Therefore, the trial court was correct to allow the amendment to the exhibit to the Verified Complaint\(^1\) and to deny Appellant’s request that the [...] be held liable for Appellant’s fees incurred (addressed in greater detail in Point II) when attempting to gain a windfall by basing his initial appraisal upon the sole typographical error contained in the metes & bounds easement description attached as an exhibit to the Verified Complaint.
[brief] Legal Argument Point 1 - Admission by the officer that he improperly administering the “Standardized field sobriety test” (2T:25-(22-25), 2T:26-(1-3))--------------------------  18-21  Point 2 -  No probable Cause and proof beyond a reasonable doubt (4T:34-(14-20), [5T:8-(19-25), 5T:9-(1-4), 5T:9-(8-15), 5T:11-(16-21), 5T:6-(14-16))------------------  22-24  Point 3 -  Articulation of Odor of alcohol and red eyes, admission to consuming 1 beer, and chewing gum do not amount to probable cause under the "totality of the circumstances" analysis approach.  (4T, 5T, Da 1a)  – 25-30  Point 4 - New Jersey Statute 39:4-92.2 - Procedure for motorist approaching certain stationary vehicle, 39:4-88 -  Traffic on marked lanes - no reasonable suspicion to pull me over (1T:28-(12-16), Da 1a) ------------------------ 30-35  Point 5 - Judges errors (1T:23-(5-17), [4T:14-(4-25) - 4T:15-(1-14)], 4T:37-(12-17), 4T:38-(7-15), [5T:8(19-25), 5T:9-(1-4)], 5T:11-(7-15), (4T, 5T), (Da 1a)) ------- 36-40  Point 6 - Warrantless search of my mom’s vehicle including opening the truck in violation of my 4th amendment rights (Issue was not raised) and pulling me over in the middle of the night for no reasonable reason in violation of my 4th amendment rights.