ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] On 9/25/23, in the Motion hearing when I disputed [...]’s legal standing to foreclose, [...]’s attorney did not respond.  He was in default.  In 1T, page 4 lines 17-22 and page 5 lines 16-21.  LEGAL POINT IX.  THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY FAILING TO DISMISS THE FORECLOSURE COURT OF 5/12/16.
[directive] To further facilitate inter-agency cooperation and a holistic view of the current threat in the State, the [...] ([...]), along with the [...], [...], and all 21 County Prosecutors Offices’ bias crime officers, shall be notified of all suspected or confirmed bias incidents by an instant notification from the eUCR module within the New Jersey Infoshare system.  At such time, each incident shall be reviewed by [...] for a possible nexus to terrorism and, if appropriate, entered into the New Jersey Suspicious Activity Reporting System (NJSARS).  Incidents that involve an organized extremist group or extremist ideology will be of particular interest for further investigation and inclusion by [...] and the [...].  The eUCR module shall also be available to query within the Global Search feature of Infoshare, thus allowing for a single, federated query of various law enforcement systems throughout the State.  Page 12 of 16  County Prosecutors’ Offices
[brief] Plaintiff claims that it was appropriate for the Trial Court to use the definition of abandoned property to interpret discontinuance of use, but never explains why.  (Pb18).  When interpreting a statute, “[a] statute's plain language ‘is typically the best indicator of intent. ’”  Malanga v. Twp. of W. Orange, 253 N.J. 291, 310 (2023).  If the plain meaning is clear, courts cannot resort to “‘extrinsic interpretive aids. ’”  Hoover v. Wetzler, 472 N.J. Super. 230, 236 (App. Div. 2022) (internal citations omitted).  Had the Trial Court applied the plain meaning of “‘discontinuance,” which means to “break the continuing of: cease to operate … [or] use…”” (see Db21), the Trial Court would have had no choice but to uphold the redevelopment designation.  “Courts also look to other parts of the statute for context. ”  Malanga, 253 N.J. at 310.  The Legislature uses of both “abandonment” and “discontinuance of use” in the same statutory provision indicates that those words have different meanings.  See State v. Ferguson, 238 N.J. 78, 102 (2019) (stating “‘[d]ifferent words used in the same, or a similar, statute are assigned different meanings whenever possible’”).  The plain meaning of these words are clearly different.
[brief] It’s the drawing of lines on the property, where those lines will be drawn and so forth…  So if you want to come up and talk about many of the issues that were spoken about during the use variance portion of this, remember a use variance was already granted. ” (1T6-3 to 1T6-5; 1T6-25 to 1T7-12).  The Board Attorney further stated “I ask that you keep your opinion to what he presents, not to go outside and, outside of the application and talk about things again that were already during the use variance part of this or really things that are going to be part of the site plan…”
[brief] [...] did not “honor” the change in control; he tried to thwart it at every turn, and the trial court’s sanction was entirely justified.  [...] would have this Court believe he “honored the change of management control. ”  Db49.  He did nothing of the sort.  HONOR, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) (“honor vb. (13c) 1.  To accept…”).  The reality is [...] committed unconscionable acts of theft and other misdeeds between February 8, 2016 and June 7, 2016 to thwart transition of control, including an outrageous Federal lawsuit that claimed the Individual Plaintiffs, their attorneys, and the [...] were a racketeering enterprise with the sole purpose of removing [...] from management.
[brief] (Aa330; Ra13)  [...]’s Project is in the Northeast WQMP, in an area designated for septic service, not sewer service.  (Aa10; Ra5).  To dispose of the wastewater that will be generated by its 3,500 square foot office building and 925 square foot control room, [...] proposes one individual subsurface sewage disposal system that will generate under 2,000 gallons per day.
[brief] This is also an error on the judge’s part who should have noted this 4th amendment violation after reviewing the body cam footages.  Also, the judge should have reduced the credibility of the officer after witnessing this warrantless search violation.  *State v. Witt, 223 N.J. 409, 416 (N.J. 2015)* ("With Pena-Flores as its guide, the trial court made the following findings: the officer had a right to stop defendant's car based on an “unexpected” occurrence and had probable cause to search for an open container of alcohol, but did not have “sufficient exigent circumstances” to conduct a warrantless search.  Accordingly, the court suppressed the handgun.")  *State v. Witt, 223 N.J. 409, 417 (N.J. 2015)* ("in applying Pena-Flores, the panel determined that the evidence at the suppression hearing did not "suggest[ ] anything close to an exigency that would permit a motor vehicle search without a warrant."  Id. at 613, 90 A.3d 664.  It emphasized that the stop occurred in the early morning when defendant was driving alone; during the search, defendant was “handcuffed” and “seated in the back of a police vehicle”; and the police had no reason to believe that the object of the search— “open containers of alcohol”—would not still be in the car “once a warrant was obtained. ”  Ibid.)  State v. Witt, 223 N.J. 409, 422 (N.J. 2015) (“The automobile exception to the warrant requirement—as defined by the United States Supreme Court in construing the Fourth Amendment—authorizes a police officer to conduct a warrantless search of a motor vehicle if it is “readily mobile” and the officer has “probable cause” to believe that the vehicle contains contraband or evidence of an offense.)  Conclusion
[brief] | TABLE OF ORDER BEING APPEALED FROM Page #  Final determination of the [...] dated July 21, 2023 … 1,2 ### TABLE OF CITATIONS | Citation | Page # | |-------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------| | **In re: Taylor**, 158 N.J. 644 (1999) .................................. | 30 | | **State v. Locurto**, 157 N.J. 463 (1999) ................................ | 30 | | **Close v. Kordulak Bros.**, 44 N.J. 589 (1965) .......................... | 30 | | **Mayflower Securities Co. v. Bureau of Sec.**, 64 N.J. 93 (1973) ...... | 30 | | **Platt v. Board of Trustees, Public Employees Retirement System,** | | | Docket No. A-0516-15T4, Publication Number 2017WL2628051 ................ | 30 | | **Petit-Clair v. Board of Trustees, Public Employees Retirement System,**| | | Docket No. A-4561-18T1, Publication Number 2020WL4280273 ................ | 32 | | **John J. Cassese v. Board of Trustees, Public Employees Retirement** | | | System,**  OAL Docket No. TYP05141-14, Decided July 21, 2015 ............ | 33 | ### STATUTES | Statute | Page # | |------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------| | **N.J.S.A. 43:15A-7.2** .................................................................. | 31 | | **N.J.S.A. 43:15A-7.2b** .................................................................. | 1, 34 | | **N.J.S.A. 18A:18A-5** .................................................................. | 31 | | **N.J.S.A. 2B:25-4** .................................................................. | 50  |  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT  This case involves an appeal by [...], Petitioner, of a final determination of the Board of Trustees (“Board” or “Respondent”) of the [...] (“[...]”) dated July 21, 2023, affirming the Administrative Law Judge Decision of June 13, 2023, denying the Petitioner’s intra-fund transfer of her [...] benefit from [...] to the [...].
[brief] Plaintiff’s counsel’s R. 4:5-1 Certification stated that he “understands that at least one firefighter may have brought an individual claim to protect his own individual interests with the Division of Civil Rights. ” (Pa54 (p. 54)).  On April 1, 2023, [...] dual-filed a complaint/charge with the New Jersey Division on Civil Rights (DCR) and Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC).  (Pa127-128).  The matter remains pending before the DCR.  [...]’s election of the DCR administrative remedy deprived the Court of jurisdiction as concerned a LAD claim as related to him.
[directive] 1.  Is the victim from one racial, religious, or ethnic group and the suspect from another?3  2.  Did the incident occur solely because of a bias against the victim by the actor involving a status or class protected under N.J.S.A. 2C:16-1, or for other reasons?  3.  Is the victim the only member of a particular protected class or status under N.J.S.A. 2C:16-1 in the neighborhood, or one of a few?  4.  Did the victim recently move into the area?  The suspect and victim do not need to be from a different group or groups covered under the Bias 3 Intimidation statute.  The victim or suspect’s actual membership in a particular group is not an element of the offense of Bias Intimidation.  Also note that N.J.S.A. 2C:16-1(h) prohibits the defense of mistake.  Page 10 of 16  5.  Is the victim acquainted with neighbors and/or associated with local community groups?  6.  What was the trademark (M.O. of the actor)?  Is it similar to other documented bias incidents?  7.  Has the victim experienced past or repeated incidents of a similar nature?  8.  Is there a connection between the date of the incident and holidays, school activities or other special public discussions or events?  9.  Has there been prior or recent media coverage of similar incidents?  10.  Is there an ongoing neighborhood problem that may have contributed to the event?  11.  Does the M.O. signify a “copycat” of other incidents?  12.  Is an organized hate group indicated in the incident?  a.  Is hate literature involved?  What type is it?  b.  Is there any documented or suspected organized hate group activity in the area?  c.  Was organized group involvement actually present or made to appear so?  13.  Were the real intentions of the actor to commit a bias incident or were there other motives?  14.  Does the actor have a true understanding of the impact of the bias incident on the victim?  15.  Was the victim put in fear due to the incident?  16.  Did the victim feel threatened due to the incident?  If after applying these criteria and asking the appropriate questions, a suspected bias incident cannot be definitively determined to be any other type of incident or is a borderline case, it should be treated as a bias incident for continuing investigation purposes.
[brief] “This witness’ inability or refusal to consider the very crux of the issue before the court impacted his credibility and the weight given by the court to his testimony and his conclusions. ”  Id. at 10:5-8.  The court found [...] to be “agitated,” “adamant,” and non-responsive, and ultimately found that he was unable to present competent evidence that he had given permission for [...] and its predecessors to use the Strip for parking.
[brief] B.  The Video Evidence from the Officers’ Body Worn Cameras is Undisputed and Should be Accepted  Supporting their summary judgment motion, the [...] submitted a DVD, which contained the video evidence from the body worn cameras worn by [...] and [...] on the night of the incident.  Pa406.⁴  The imaging clearly shows that the two police officers were professional, respectful and non-confrontational.  In fact, after the trial at the Highland Park Municipal Court, [...] commented that he viewed the video, and found [...] and [...] to be “polite … calm … and reasonable. ”  Pa152 (T3:21-22).  ⁴  Plaintiff’s appendix contains a photocopy of the DVD.  Pa406.  A copy of the DVD has been attached as Edison Supp. Appendix 001.  At summary judgment, Plaintiff argued that the video recordings had been altered or manipulated.  Specifically, Plaintiff contended – without support – that “[t]he amount of force utilized is hidden by not turning over or cutting out of the video the scenes showing force, admittedly stated by police in video and the choke hold by which many a black man has died in the arms of police. ”  See Summary Judgment Hearing (T5:12-18).  Yet, as pointed out by the motion judge, Plaintiff did not have an expert witness or a forensic examination of the video recordings that would substantiate such a serious allegation.  The Law Division judge noted that Plaintiff had received the recordings as part of discovery production, yet produced no evidence at summary judgment challenging the validity or authenticity of the recordings.  See Summary Judgment Hearing (T8:1-T11:12).  On this record, it is clear that the video recordings are reliable and trustworthy and were properly considered on summary judgment.  Plaintiff’s objection to the video evidence lacks any support whatsoever, and should be disregarded.  **POINT II**
[brief] Thus, the result reached in the Liability Trial was only that some amount of “property damage” occurred during the relevant policy periods from the above AOCs, and that contamination began on the dates in the chart above.  What was not established was an end date for the contamination, which is necessary to identify the allocation period over which the damages could be allocated.  The end date, and the proper allocation of damages over the allocation period, was left for the allocation phase of the case.
[brief] When the presumption of undue influence arises from an inter vivos gift, the donee has the burden of showing by clear and convincing evidence *not only that "no deception was practiced therein, no undue influence used, and that all was fair, open and voluntary, but that it was well understood."*  In re Dodge, supra, 50 N.J. at 227 (quoting In re Fulper's Estate, 99 N.J. Eq. 292, 302 (Prerog. Ct. 1926)); accord Slack, supra, 66 N.J. Eq. at 449; Mott, supra, 49 N.J. Eq. at 198.  *Id* at pp 5-7 *(emphasis supplied)*  Therefore, when the instant case is viewed through the prism of *Pascale*, and we have a finding of both a confidential relationship and unjust enrichment (because no gift was intended) the burden of proof should have been on the Defendants, [...] and [...].  The very absence of documentation should have made it apparent that [...] had zero support for his claim of ownership by the use of [...]’s money, obtained through a confidential relationship.  The lower court failed to place the burden on the Defendants and therefore came to the wrong decision on the law.  Its decision should be reversed insofar as giving both the entire legal and equitable title to the elder Plaintiffs.
[brief] Defendant overstates the standard for a finding of aggravating factor one by referring to the “extreme reaches of the prohibited behavior” described in State v. Fuentes, 217 N.J. 57, 75 (2014).  The proper consideration is outlined in N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(1) itself: “[t]he nature and circumstances of the offense, and the role of the actor in committing the offense, including whether or not it was committed in an especially heinous, cruel, or depraved manner. ”  Here, defendant raised the temperature before, during, and after the conspiracy began.  The judge explained that defendant was in a “unique position” allowing him to influence [...] to fight [...].  He led [...] to [...] and “egg[ed] things on” by punching [...] for trying to end the fight.  And he arranged payment and a ride home.  (15T26-2 to 5; 26-9 to 10).  This was not a conspiracy among equals; defendant was the mastermind at the beginning, middle, end, and epilogue, supporting aggravating factor one.
[brief] *(Emphasis added). *  Brill, 142 N.J. at 540.  Similarly, with respect to an Order to Show Cause, the judge’s function is to hear the evidence as to those matters which may be genuinely in issue.  Rule 4:67-5 permits the Court to order the action to proceed as in a plenary action when there are genuine issues of material fact.  The determination of whether there is a genuine issue with respect to a material fact requires the Court to consider whether the competent evidential material present, when viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party in consideration of the applicable evidentiary standard, is sufficient to permit a rational fact-finder to resolve the disputed issue in favor of the non-moving party.  (Emphasis added).  Id. at 523.  Summary judgment should be denied where the opposing party comes forward with evidence that creates a genuine issue as to any material fact.  Id. at 529.  Questions of law dependent upon the operative facts of the case cannot be decided by summary judgment when those facts are in dispute.  See Central Paper v. Inter. Records, 325 N.J. Super. 225, 232 (App. Div. 1999), cert. den., 163 N.J. 74 (2000).  A trial court should never decide on its merits a dispute which a rational jury could go either way.  See Rowe, 209 N.J. at 50; Gilhooley v. County of Union, 164 N.J. 533, 545-546 (2000); Strumph v. Schering Corp., 133 N.J. 33 (1993).
[brief] On April 18, 2023, the Parties agreed to immediately conclude discovery by way of Consent Order.  See DA145-DA146.  On May 10, 2023, the Township filed a motion for summary judgment.  See DA049-DA156, DA219-226.  Plaintiff thereafter filed opposition and cross-motion for summary judgment on June 9, 2023.  See DA161-DA215.  Following oral argument, the Chancery Division entered an Opinion and Order on July 25, 2023 denying the Township’s motion for summary judgment and partially granting Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment as to breach of contract and specific performance but denying Plaintiff’s motion as to damages.  See DA227-DA229.  Following a case management conference, the Court entered a second Order on August 14, 2023 clarifying its July 25, 2023 Order and that all issues were otherwise resolved as Plaintiff withdrew his claim on damages.
[brief] For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiffs respectfully request that this Court reverse the decision of the Law Division dismissing Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint and granting counsel fees to [...], and remand the matter to the Law Division.  Dated: May 17, 2023  **[...]**  /s/ [...]  [...], Esq.  [...] [...]  [...]  Attorneys for Plaintiffs-Appellants, [...], [...], [...], and [...]
[brief] All the Way Towing, LLC v. Buck’s County International, Inc., 236 N.J. 431, 434 (2019).................................................................10 Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256 (1986).......................................................................................7 Aronberg v. Tolbert, 207 N.J. 587, 597 (2011).................................7 Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 142 N.J. 520, 541 (1995)....................7 Caldwell v. Haynes, 136 N.J. 422, 436 (1994)..................................14 D'Agostino v. Maldonado, 216 N.J. 168, 187 (2013)..........................10  Friedman v. Martinez, 242 N.J. 449, 475 (2020)...............................8  Nappe v. Anschclewitz, Barr, Ansell & Bonello, 97 N.J. 37, 48 (1984).....................................................................14  Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Boylan, 307 N.J. Super. 162, 167 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 154 N.J. 608 (1998).................................6, 7 Scott v. Salerno, 297 N.J. Super. 437, 447, 688 A.2d 614 (App. Div. 1997).......................................................8  Seaview Orthopaedics ex rel Fleming v. Nat’l Health Care Resources, Inc., 366 N.J. Super. 501, 505 (App. Div. 2004)......................................7  Templo Fuente De Vida Corp. v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co., 244 N.J. 189, 199 (2016).............................................................................................6  Thiedemann v. Mercedes Benz USA, LLC, 183 N.J. 234, 244, 248-49 (2004)...................................................12  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
[directive] An officer shall not carry or use a CED or less-lethal device during an actual operation unless the officer has been expressly authorized to do so by the law enforcement executive, after the officer has successfully completed a training course approved by the Police Training Commission in the proper use and deployment of authorized conducted energy or less-lethal devices, as appropriate.  The law enforcement executive shall be responsible to ensure that officers authorized to carry CEDs and less-lethal devices maintain the required certifications and qualifications.  6
[brief] (Ra4-7)  The application on Page Two, references the Zoning Permit as “[...]” dated December 17, 2019.  (Ra7)  Page Two of the HPC Application provides a question “Do you have Zoning Department approval for this project?”  (Id.)  Plaintiff responded next to the question on Page Two of the Application “N/A” or “Not applicable. ”  (Id.)  In point of fact, Zoning Approval was not granted to Plaintiff on December 17, 2019 and was DENIED Zoning Approval.  (Pa123a-125a).  Plaintiff was denied approval of installed pavers as, among other things, the “visual elements are not historically appropriate to this house. ”  1T 20:17-22.  The HPC issued a Resolution of Denial dated January 12, 2021 which was transmitted to all parties (municipal and applicant) which stated the paver material was “historically inappropriate and violates the Design Guidelines that provide that once a non-conforming structure within the flare is removed, it shall not be replaced.
[brief] [...] eventually was arrested after a struggle.  (1T31-18 to 22; 2T9-4 to 10-1; 2T9-4 to 10-11; 2T12-2 to 11; Da9-0:00:51 to 0:00:54; Da11-16:43:41 to 16:50:06).  [...] possessed a black 9-millimeter semi-automatic handgun loaded with live 9-millimeter rounds, including four hollow-point bullets.  (1T34-18 to 25; 2T10-15 to 11-3).  The firearm had no serial number.  (1T35-1 to 2; 2T10-22 to 24).  During the pursuit, [...] sprained his ankle when he caught his foot between the curb and the tire of the car that [...] had run into.  (2T14-3 to 13).  \(^3\)  Defendant states that he was wearing navy instead of black and that [...] had on a green coat.  (Db7-8, n.5).  Nevertheless, all three men were wearing head-to-toe dark clothing.  [...] wore black pants and, like the other two defendants, he wore a black hood pulled up around his face.  (Da11-16:44:30).  Defendant also wore a billed cap under his pulled-up hood.  (Da10-16:44:38).  Pursued by [...], defendant fled across the busy street and into an alley leading to a resident’s backyard, where his escape was thwarted when he crashed into several trash cans and recycling bins.  When defendant was apprehended, a handgun was found inside a fanny pack he was wearing.
[brief] The courts have defined “fraud in the essentials” to include several different factual scenarios in which one spouse omits to mention or misrepresents an issue so material that it goes to the very essence of the marriage relationship constituting grounds for annulment.  There is inherent jurisdiction in a court of equity to annul fraudulent contracts, including a contract of marriage.  V.J.S., supra, 249 N.J. Super. 318; In re Estate of Santolino, 384 N.J. Super. 567, 582 (Ch. Div. 2005).  The family court erred by failing to do so in this case.
[brief] Klumb v. Bd. of Educ. of Manalapan-Englishtown Reg'l High Sch. Dist., 199 N.J. 14, 34 (2009) (quoting Geller, supra, 53 N.J. at 597-598, 597).  Such a liberal construction "resolves all reasonable doubts in favor of the applicability of the statute to the particular case."  Kochen v. Consol. Police & Firemen's Pension Fund Comm'n, 71 N.J. Super. 463, 478, (App. Div. 1962).  See Duignan v. Bd. of Trs., Pub. Employees' Ret. Sys., 223 N.J. Super. 208, 216 (App. Div. 1988) (same); Hillman v. Bd. Trs., Pub. Employees' Ret. Sys., 109 N.J. Super. 449, 455 (App. Div. 1970) (same).  Francois v. Board of Trustees, 415 N.J. Super. 335, 349.  A person that is eligible for certain pension benefits is entitled to a liberal interpretation of the pension statute.  The determination below is unreasonable because [...] would otherwise be eligible for accidental disability benefits under the Ricci Act.  Under the liberal construction required of pension statutes, his eligibility for the benefit is not in question.