ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Doc. Nos. 26, 27.  On June 20, 2012, the Court granted in part and denied in part plaintiff’s motion to amend and supplement his complaint.  Doc. No. 82.  The amended complaint, filed on June 22, 2012 [Doc. No. 85], (1) updated plaintiff’s factual allegations to include information learned in discovery, (2) alleged [...] “acting in concert with [...] and [...] unleashed an unrelenting campaign of retaliation against Plaintiff” (Amended Complaint ¶ 62), (3) alleged defendants retaliated against him by promoting a less qualified person to the position of the Director of the [...], and (4) alleged [...] “orchestrated the elimination of [...]'s position as Director of Youth Services in such a way that Plaintiff was precluded from competing for [...]'s job. ”  *Id.* at ¶ 78.  In addition, plaintiff alleged that on August 23, 2011, the Board passed a resolution which “set the stage for the outsourcing of the ... Youth Service Program...”  *Id.* at ¶ 79.  Plaintiff further alleged that [...] and [...] “presented a deceptive and misleading layoff plan to [...] in order to rid itself of Plaintiff through an illegally motivated layoff action. ”  *Id.* at ¶ 87.  On December 21, 2012, the Court granted plaintiff’s motion for leave to file his second amended complaint [Doc. No. 165], which was filed on December 31, 2012.  Doc. No. 171.  The amendment added additional cumulative allegations and averred that plaintiff ended his employment with [...] on December 1, 2011.  Second Amended and Supplemental Complaint ¶ 92.  The amendment specifically alleged that the defendants’ conduct “constituted a wrongful and constructive discharge of [his] employment on December 1, 2011. ”  *Id.* ¶ 93.  2.  Discovery Disputes
[brief] Perhaps the most startling aspect of this regime is that the entity charged with examining attorneys’ practices and determining whether attorneys are (or are not) “principally engaged” in representing clients in debt-related matters is not the State Supreme Court – it is the [...].  The New Jersey Constitution grants the Supreme Court exclusive jurisdiction over the practice of law.  It has exercised that authority by, among other ways, adopting the Rules of Professional Conduct (“RPCs”), issuing opinions construing the RPCs, and establishing numerous committees to regulate attorney conduct.  The Legislature has repeatedly recognized that it cannot regulate attorneys engaged in the practice of law.  The Legislature originally did so here as well.  When it enacted the New Jersey Debt Adjusters Law, N.J.S.A. 17:16G-1 et seq. (the “Act”) in 1961, the Legislature exempted attorneys from the Act’s coverage.
[brief] 5T47:18-20 ([...]\(^1\) testifying that there is no preventative maintenance scheduled for the unit).  [...] testified that [...] has responded to a handful of emergency situations, but that non-emergency requests went ignored.  5T71:1-9 (The landlord’s counsel asked [...] if “[...] ever outright sa[id] no” to him about anything.  [...] responded that “I mean, I don’t know if it was a no.  I would—I would—I guess there were time when I didn’t get a response, but under emergency circumstances and that type of thing, no”).  The Board saw the managerial neglect play out in front of its own eyes.
[brief] As for re-dissemination of data, this is permissible, but only in a “limited amount” and only to the subscriber’s customer and only data “directly related to the type and extent of the” relationship between the subscriber and its customer.  Id.  No known news media restrict their readers in any similar manner.  Defendants surely identify none.  Indeed, [...] invoked these one of these provisions against one of [...]’s companies when they believed that it might be a competitor.  [...] ultimately forced [...]’s company to transition to another service provider.  See Ja2178-82; see also Ja2162-63 (¶¶ 145-56).  There is simply no known news media that cuts off access to information to a perceived competitor.
[brief] 27 N.J.S.A. 58:10-23.11f(a)(1) ..................................................................................................... 22 N.J.S.A. 58:10-23.11f.a.(2)(a) ................................................................................................. 22, 23 Rules R. 1:21-1(c) .................................................................................................................................. 24 R. 4:5-1(a) .................................................................................................................................. 31 R. 4:5-2 .................................................................................................................. 31 R. 4:5-2 (cmt. 2) ................................................................................................. 31 R. 4:42-2 .............................................................................................................. 34, 36 R. 4:46-2 .............................................................................................................. 15 Regulations 40 CFR §264.175(a) ............................................................................................ 19, 23 40 CFR §264.175(b)(1) ....................................................................................... 19, 23 40 CFR §279.45 ................................................................................................... 19, 23 N.J.A.C. 7:1J-1.4 ............................................................................................... 19, 23 N.J.A.C. 58:10-23.11f ......................................................................................... 20, 33 Miscellaneous Litigating Truck Accident Cases, §3:10 ............................................................. 28 Litigating Truck Accident Cases, §3:12 ............................................................. 29 PRELIMINARY STATEMENT This lawsuit arises from a discharge of waste oil on June 1, 2021, onto property at [...], which property had been leased to Plaintiff-Respondent [...] (“[...]”).
[brief] .......................................................................................................................................  12  #  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | Cases | Page(s) | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|---------| | Casino Reinvestment Dev. Auth. v. Katz, | | | 334 N.J. Super. 473 (Law. Div. 2000) | 6 | | City of Asbury Park v. Asbury Park Towers, | | | 388 N.J. Super. 1 (App. Div. 2006) | 2, 5 | | State by Com'r of Transp. v. Silver, | | | 92 N.J. 507 | 6 | | State, Dept. of Envtl. Prot. v. S. Nalbone Trucking Co., Inc., | | | 128 N.J. Super. 370 (App. Div. 1974) | 9 | | Vill. of S. Orange v. Alden Corp., | | | 71 N.J. 362 (1976) | 6 | | Statutes | | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|---------| | N.J.S.A. 20:3-30 | 7 | | N.J.S.A. 20:3-30(d) | 2 | | N.J.S.A 2A:23B-23 | 4 |
[brief] (Id. at 17).  They state that this is the first time plaintiffs have requested this specific relief as it was not contained in plaintiffs’ Local Rule 37-1 letter.  (Id. at 24 (citing [...] Decl. Ex. 9)).  They also note that Local Rule 37-1 requires the moving party’s letter to “specify the terms of the discovery order to be sought,” and the Motion, therefore, should be denied on this basis alone.  (Id.).  Defendants also reject this proposal on the merits because “a responsiveness review occurs concurrently with a privilege review,” which must still be completed, and because the “allegedly ‘low’ responsiveness rate across all custodians and varying responsiveness rates across custodians, are not evidence of an improper responsiveness review. ” (Id. at 17, 25).
[brief] Ibid.  (quoting Bellardini v. Krikorian, 222 N.J. Super. 457, 464 (App. Div. 1988); see also Biunno, Weissbard & Zegas, Current N.J. Rules of Evidence, comment 1 on N.J.R.E. 105 (2015).  This is particularly true when the “motion in limine” seeks the exclusion of an expert's testimony, an objective that has the concomitant effect of rendering a plaintiff's claim futile.  See Bellardini, supra, 222 N.J. Super. at 463-64.  [...]’s holding was ultimately adopted by the Supreme Court Rules Committee by amendment to Rule 4:25-8 in September 2020.
[directive] Accordingly, Section 9 of the ALPR Guidelines is hereby 1 amended, effective immediately, to read as follows:  9.  RETENTION PERIOD AND PURGING OF STORED DATA  Each law enforcement agency shall, pursuant to the provisions of Section 14 of these Guidelines, establish and enforce procedures for the retention and purging of stored ALPR data in accordance with this Section.  ALPR stored data shall be retained for a period of five  1  New material is italicized and boldfaced, “thus”  Deleted text is bracketed, “[thus]”  New Jersey Is An Equal Opportunity Employer · Printed on Recycled Paper and is Recyclable Page 2 years, after which, the data shall be purged from the agency’s data storage device or system.  A law enforcement agency may purge ALPR data before the expiration of the five-year retention period [only] if the data has been transferred to the [...] ([...]) or any other system that aggregates and stores data collected by two or more law enforcement agencies in accordance with the provisions of these Guidelines.
[brief] It stands to reason that if plaintiff had made the effort to identify [...], the engineering entity responsible via a publicly available contract for providing professional services during the course of construction, that plaintiff would have identified [...] prior to the passage of the two-year statute of limitations.  No such effort, however, was undertaken by plaintiff.  As a final matter, plaintiff’s is not entitled to a relaxation of the application of _R._ 4:26-4 in the interest of justice pursuant to _R._ 1:1-2.
[brief] On the Brief: [...] (040212001)  TABLE OF CONTENTS  TABLE OF CONTENTS  .................................................................  i  TABLE OF JUDGMENT, ORDERS AND RULINGS ......................... ii TABLE OF AUTHORITIES/CITATIONS ........................................ iii PROCEDURAL HISTORY .............................................................. 1 LEGAL ARGUMENT .................................................................... 2 POINT HEADINGS I. THE BOROUGH IS ENTITLED TO THE CONNECTION FEES AND DID NOT BREACH ITS CONTRACT WITH THE TOWNSHP TABLE OF JUDGMENT, ORDERS AND RULINGS
[brief] (Da270).  Plaintiff did not seek the consent of the Defendants or to Defendants’ knowledge, leave from the Court.  (Da270).  Plaintiff filed his Appellate Brief on December 31, 2021.  (Da270, Appellate Docket Transaction ID: [...]).  Thereafter, Plaintiff was instructed to submit a motion to have his Appellate Brief filed as “within time. ” (Da270, January 3, 2022, Deficiency notice).  Plaintiff’s motion was granted over Defendants’ objection.
[brief] Trial counsel did not object to this instruction, so it is reviewed for plain error.  See R. 1:7–2; State v. Wakefield, 190 N.J. 397, 473 (2007) (“[T]he failure to object to a jury instruction requires review under the plain error standard. ”).  “Pursuant to Rule 1:7–2, a defendant is required to challenge instructions at the time of trial or else waives the right to contest the instructions on appeal. ”  State v. Belliard, 415 N.J. Super 51, 66 (App. Div. 2010) (citing State v. Adams, 194 N.J. 186, 206–07 (2008)).  Where there is a failure to object, reviewing courts presume the instruction was “not error” and “unlikely to prejudice the defendant’s case. ”  State v. Singleton, 211 N.J. 157, 182 (2012).  As such, this Court “may reverse only in the presence of plain error, that is error ‘clearly capable of producing an unjust result. ’”  Ibid. (quoting Adams, 194 N.J. at 207).
[brief] In an April 10, 2023 letter from the Board, a representative advised [...] that the risk assessment had been removed as a mitigating factor and added as an aggravating factor.  In a follow up letter, the Board again claimed that [...]’s assessment was regarded as an aggravating factor because it confirmed a “moderate” risk of reoffense.  Once again, the Board completely ignored the “low to moderate” risk assessment reached by both experts in this case.  (Pa138; Pa147-48).  claiming that the circumstances of [...]’s offenses and his insistence that his crimes were motivated by monetary gain demonstrate “insufficient problem resolution . . . [and] that [he] lacks insight into his criminal behavior and [ ] minimizes his conduct. ” (Pa2).  The Board therefore determined that the lack of insight into his criminal behavior “contradicts [...]’s assertion of sufficient rehabilitation. ” (Pa4).  The Board ultimately concluded, without any meaningful explanation or analysis, that parole should be denied because the aggregate of all relevant factors established, by a preponderance of the evidence, that [...] presented a “substantial likelihood” that he will commit another crime if released.
[brief] (Not Raised Below).  A decision is arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable, and therefore subject to reversal, where, as here, the agency erred in reaching its conclusion upon examination of the application of the law to the facts.  The arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable standard is generally understood to involve inquiry into whether the decision conforms with relevant law, whether there is substantial credible evidence in the record as a whole to support the agency's decision, and whether in applying the relevant law to the facts, the agency clearly erred in reaching its conclusion.  In re Carter, 191 N.J. 474, 482-83 (2007) (relying on Mazza v. Bd. of Trs., 143 N.J. 22, 25 (1995)).  Ordinarily for quasi-judicial or rule-making final agency action, there is a substantial body of material comprising the record.  In appeals from final agency action outside of such settings, there similarly must be a sufficiently developed record to permit a reviewing court to engage in meaningful review.  See In re Issuance of Permit by DEP, 120 N.J. 164, 173 (1990) (relying on State v. Atley, 157 N.J. Super. 157, 163 (App. Div. 1978)) (noting necessity of agency fact-finding to facilitate appellate review).
[directive] Juvenile Admissions Log SUBJECT:  The Juvenile Justice Commission (JJC) continues to monitor all municipal police departments in New Jersey for compliance with specific Federal regulations involving the handling of juveniles.  When the State is in compliance it is awarded grant money from the Federal government which is funneled through the JJC to develop delinquency prevention programs in counties and municipalities.  The Federal regulations involve three of the core requirements of The Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act (JJDP Act) of 1974, as amended.  There are also some State statutes and regulations that partly reinforce these Federal regulations.  The State must report annually to the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP) on its level of compliance with these regulations.  As a result of a recent audit of the JJC's monitoring system by OJJDP representatives, the JJC has been directed to enhance its monitoring of local police departments.  All facilities that may hold juveniles under court authority are monitored.
[brief] Defendants’ first argument is that reversal is required because “Plaintiff’s trial testimony . . . materially deviated from her factual allegations pleaded in the Complaint, her certified answers to interrogatories and her deposition testimony. ”  Db at p. 10.  However, the Defendants’ brief contains no citations to any statute, rule, case law, or any other legal authority supporting this argument.  See Db at pp. 10-18.  That is because this argument is frivolous.  The closest thing to legal authority that could plausibly (but does not) support the Defendants’ position is arguing for a so-called “McKenney violation”.  See Argument Point I.A, infra.
[brief] Therefore I had brought valid contract-based claims case against defendant [...].  Further, here we also had (essentially) an express assignment of rights, due to our mother’s signature on the car’s title, which our mom authorized us (i.e. in writing via her signature on the title) to sell after her death.  (Pa2, ¶3)  And as I argued to the trial court, to the extent that the contract was made on our mother’s behalf, I was acting as an authorized agent.  (Pa137, ¶42).  [...] countered this with his argument that agency “terminates with death”.  (Pa 141).  However I rebutted that argument by pointing to the fact that in many states, “disposition agents” are recognized to act after the principal’s death.  (Pa145, ¶15)  But even assuming arguendo if this fact is insufficient to establish privity of contract, notwithstanding that assumption, we still had standing.  That is, as this Court has previously made clear, "third-party beneficiaries may sue upon a contract made for their benefit without privity of contract."  *Rieder Cmty. v. N. Brunswick*, 227 N.J. Super. 214, 221-22 (App. Div.1988) [emphasis added] (citing *Houdaille Constr. Materials, Inc. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co.*, 166 N.J. Super. 172, 184-185 (Law Div. 1979)), certif. denied, 113 N.J. 638 (1988)).  Even further still, my alternate position was that my sister and I (i.e. the only natural heirs) also had standing as intended third party beneficiaries of the sale of the vehicle.  (Pa61, Pa62)  Thus even aside from all of the foregoing, and even if the verbal contract with [...] was deemed to be unenforceable, nonetheless we still had standing to pursue an unjust enrichment cause of action, as we had a significant financial interest in the outcome of the vehicle (one that the defendant never paid for and was keeping to sell parts from and make a windfall profit).
[brief] (R. 286.)  The City informed the court that it intended to use technology-assisted review (“TAR”) to identify relevant responsive documents to be produced from this ESI collection.  (Id.)  Upon hearing this, Plaintiffs expressed concern that TAR would exclude responsive documents from the review process.  (Id.)  In their view, [...]’s use of TAR to conduct its responsiveness review is inconsistent with the court’s November 2019 order.  Plaintiffs filed the current motion for compliance with the order or, in the alternative, for entry of their proposed TAR protocol.  (R. 289.)  Analysis
[brief] NJSA 10:6-2 (c) 2, 16, 17, 26 NJSA 10:1-2 2, 26 NJSA 10:5-4 26 NJSA 59:3-14 25  COURT RULES  Rule 3:21-5 31  Rule 4:46-2 (c) 38, 39 Rule 4:46-2 40  Rule 3:21-8 31  Rule 3:23-4(a) 28, 49 Rule 3:23-7 28, 49 Rule 3:24 28 Rule 3:24(c) 49 Rule 4:30A 46 UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION Fourth Amendment 9, 45 NEW JERSEY CONSTITUTION Article 1 para 1 26, 29, 33, 34 Article 1 para 7 17 FEDERAL STATUTE 42 U.S.C.§ 1983 9, 18, 22, 27, 45 OTHER SOURCES
[brief] 4.  [...], Insurance Agent for [...], must provide to the Court-appointed Administratrix, [...], Esq., and [...], Esq. a copy of all policies of any kind that contain the name of the decedent, [...], including retirement, funeral, burial, key man, life, or any other kind of policy including changes in beneficiary documents within the last fifteen (15) years, within seven (7) days of the date of this Order.  [...] must assure that their insurance agent complies with this Order.  Any failure in the future of the [...] or its affiliates to fully cooperate with the Court-appointed Administratrix shall be sternly addressed by the Court:  5.  [...], Esq., [...] and [...] must provide a sworn statement regarding any and all efforts or contacts that were made by any member of the May family or any member of the [...] to obtain an E.I.N. number pertaining to the decedent and said statements must be provided to the Court, [...], Esq. and [...], Esq. within five (5) days or no later than April 12, 2021.  Eventually the IRS will reveal why the Court Administratrix cannot get an E.I.N. number.  If anyone has any information on this issue it must be revealed to the Court and the Court-appointed Administratrix, [...], Esq., immediately.  6.  With regard to the life insurance policy on the decedent's life that exceeds $800,000, the insurance Agency must provide a copy of the application that [...] submitted for the policy, a copy of the entire policy, and a copy of any changes made to this policy; (R-82)  The parties next appeared in court on April 15, 2021.
[brief] [...] found:  Expert testimony is required for a standard of care owed by [...], as to its policies, procedures and protocols, if any, followed throughout the industry with regard to training of employees as to the safe use of U-boats by patrons and warnings and or labels we placed on U-boats to alert customers as to safety.  (2T20:10-16).  Plaintiffs claim that because [...] was negligent on a premises liability theory supporting expert testimony is not necessary.  However, this exact argument has been rejected by controlling case law.  (Please see Point II supra for more details).  Careful scrutiny of the motion record reveals it would be improper to allow this matter to proceed to jury without supporting expert testimony because it would cause the trier of fact to speculate as to the standard of care owed by [...].
[brief] Any Alleged Defect in [...]’s Bid is Not a Material Defect and therefore Waivable.  [...] also argued before [...] that the additional cost of obtaining a PWCRA-registered archaeologist put it at a competitive disadvantage in the bidding process.  [...]’s argument is that the archaeologist must be registered under the PWCRA simply because the bid specifications reference archaeologists as a “subcontractor. ”  [...] rejected [...]’s argument and ruled that “the PVWC’s finding that [...]’s bid did not contain a material defect was not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable, and should therefore not be overturned. ”
[brief] Additionally, Defendants’ Motion for Due Process Violation and Other Relief is also discussed in a previous section (Point #2) of this brief.  Here, it is clear that Defendants’ motions to file a second amended complaint and for due process were without merit and far exceeded the scope of the approved pre-trial motions.  The motions contained arguments previously denied by the Court on multiple occasions.  Further, Plaintiff provided Defendants with a frivolous lawsuit letter pursuant to Rule 1:4-8 with respect to these applications.  Thus, the Court finds it appropriate to award reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs with respect to costs incurred by Plaintiff to address Defendants’ frivolous motions.  [...], February 14, 2024 Order, Findings of Fact and Conclusion of Law (110a)  Defendants contend that the trial court’s decision to impose sanctions constitutes an error of both discretionary and legal considerations.
[brief] ”  The Supreme Court has explained, “a ‘miscarriage of justice’ can arise when there is a ‘manifest lack of inherently credible evidence to support the finding,’ when there has been an ‘obvious overlooking or under-valuation of crucial evidence,’ or when the case culminates in ‘a clearly unjust result. ’”  Hayes v. Delamotte, 231 N.J. 373, 386 (2018) (citations omitted).  “On a motion for a new trial, all evidence supporting the verdict must be accepted as true, and all reasonable inferences must be drawn in favor of upholding the verdict. ”  Boryszewski ex rel. Boryszewski v. Burke, 380 N.J. Super. 361, 391 (App. Div. 2005).  The Court’s function on a new trial motion is not mechanical.
[brief] *Kalway v. Calabria Ranch HOA, LLC*, 506 P.3d 18 (Ariz. 2022).  The trial court found this case highly persuasive and consistent with New Jersey State law.  1T.49:5-20.  (Da464)  The defense failed to address this case in their brief.  In *Kalway*, the court was asked to decide the extent to which a homeowners’ association (“HOA”) may rely on a general-amendment-power provision in its covenants, conditions, and restrictions (“CC&Rs”) to place restrictions on landowners’ use of their land.