ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] *Davis*, 104 N.J. at 504; *State v. Rodriguez*, 172 N.J. 117, 126–27 (2002).  Recognition of the officer’s experience and knowledge is thus a crucial component of the court’s review.  *Pineiro*, 181 N.J. at 22.  “In determining whether an officer acted reasonably in the circumstances[,] due weight must be given to the specific reasonable inferences which he is entitled to draw from the facts in light of his experience. ”  *State v. Kearney*, 183 N.J. Super. 13, 18 (App. Div. 1981), certif. denied, 89 N.J. 449 (1982) (punctuation omitted).  Even though an individual’s behavior may not seem suspicious to an ordinary citizen, “the officer’s experience may indicate that some investigation is in order. ”  *State v. Sheffield*, 62 N.J. 441, 446 (1973).  [P]olice officers are trained in the prevention and detection of crime.  Events which would go unnoticed by a layman oftentimes serve as an indication to the trained eye that something amiss might be taking place or is about to take place.  The police would be derelict in their duties if they did not investigate such events.  [Davis, 104 N.J. at 504 (quoting State v. Gray, 59 N.J. 563, 567–68 (1971).
[brief] 2  “1T” refers to the transcript of decision dated November 30, 2020.  “2T” refers to the transcript of decision dated September 13, 2021.  “3T” refers to the transcript of oral argument dated October 13, 2023.  “4T” refers to the transcript of decision dated October 24, 2023.  The trial court first considered the public disclosure bar when it granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss Relator’s Third Amended Complaint (“3AC”).
[brief] (5T81:19).  [...] has served in the patrol division since February of 2002, knows [...], and worked with [...].  (5T81:21, 23; 82:1).  [...] personally worked with [...] and has been out self-deploying on foot patrol.  (5T83:25).  [...] and [...] have gone on various property checks and self-deployed many times over the years.  (5T84:4-6).  [...] has self-deployed on foot patrol and walked someplace leaving the patrol car at one point and walking to another.  (5T85:3).  [...] also indicated that at times when they were out on foot patrol Officers would have problems with their portable radios.  (5T87:11).  There have been problems with the portable radios throughout [...]'s tenure with [...].  (5T87:15).  [...]'s radio problems included difficulty sending and receiving messages on his portable radio.  (5T88:9).  [...] has also had problems sending and receiving on his car radio.  (5T88:12).  Current [...] ("[...]") was employed in [...] as a Police Officer for twenty-six (26) years, retiring with the rank of Deputy Chief.
[brief] *Wilson v. Amerada Hess Corp.*, 168 N.J. 236, 253-254 (2001).  The Court’s Opinion is devoid of any analysis undertaken relative to the potential bad faith or state of mind of [...] and predicated most of her opinion on the limited procedural aspect of whether the Plaintiff was certified as a candidate prior to his termination.  Only a jury can determine whether and to what extent McCallum was dishonest and acted in bad faith as it relates to [...]’s termination.  The Court granting the Defendants Summary Judgment was simply inappropriate where credibility is a genuine issue of material fact in dispute.  *In re Estate of DeFrank*, 433 N.J. Super. 258, 266 (App. Div. 2013).  [...] is not an At-Will employee or he would not be a Union Member afforded the rights and benefits including retro-active pay.
[brief] Under the test enunciated by this court in Pukowsky, courts must consider the following: 1) the employer's right to control the means and manner of the worker's performance; 2) the kind of occupation — supervised or unsupervised; 3) skill; 4) who furnishes the equipment and workplace; 5) the length of time in which the individual has worked; 6) the method of payment; 7) the manner of termination of the work relationship; 8) whether there is annual leave; 9) whether the work is an integral part of the business of the “employer;” 10) whether the worker accrues retirement benefits; 11) whether the “employer” pays social security taxes; and 12) the intention of the parties.  [Pukowsky, 312 N.J. Super. at 182-183]
[brief] (4T53:3 to 54:3; 6T81:25 to 82:20; Pa0362; Pa2277-79; Pa2281-83.)  In fact, [...] confirmed at trial that from the time of [...]’s November 30, 2020 email to the filing of the RIR on December 27, 2021, no further remedial investigation activities occurred at the Property.  (6T82:21 to 83:17.)  With respect to the [...], the specific process that the [...] uses to assess a RIR is not publicly known, but consists of multiple levels of review and can take several years.
[brief] “The governing body must ‘rigorously comply with the statutory criteria’ to determine whether property is in need of redevelopment. ”  Id. (citing 62-64 Main Street, L.L.C. v. Mayor and Council of the City of Hackensack, 221 N.J. 129, 156 (2015)).  The LRHL also requires that the change from a Non-Condemnation Redevelopment Area to a Condemnation Redevelopment Area, as was the case here must be analyzed under current conditions, and not the conditions at the time of the prior redevelopment designation.
[brief] They found the gun.  They had his phone.  They seen him on camera going through the light.  They had the girl car, the girl car they put something on the car to try to get the evidence off of it.  That’s pretty much what I know. ”  T6, 83:9-14.  As with [...], the State was not able to adduce from [...] what he had told the police when he was initially questioned by law enforcement about the [...] murder.  Unlike [...] whose direct testimony was filled with “I don’t recall” comments, [...] stated that when he spoke to law enforcement about the [...] homicide, he lied to the police.
[brief] 12  #  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES  ## CASES | Case | Page | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | Daubert v. Merrill Dow Pharmas., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993) | 6, 7, 8 | | Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923) | 6, 8 | | State v. Olenowski, 255 N.J. 529 (2023) | 5, 8 | | State v. Cierciello, 86 N.J.L. 309 (E. & A. 1914) | 6 | | State v. Green, 86 N.J. 281 (1981) | 10 | | State v. Henderson, 208 N.J. 208 (2011) | 5 | | State v. Lazo, 209 N.J. 9 (2012) | 6 | | State v. O’Driscoll, 215 N.J. 461 (2013) | 6 | | State v. Olenowski, 253 N.J. 133, 154 (2023) | 6 | | State v. Singleton, 211 N.J. 157 (2012) | 10 | | United States v. Abreu, 406 F.3d 1304 (11th Cir. 2005) | 7 | | United States v. Baines, 573 F.3d 979 (10th Cir. 2009) | 7 | | United States v. Crisp, 324 F.3d 261 (4th Cir. 2003) | 7 | | United States v. Herrera, 704 F.3d 480 (7th Cir. 2013) | 7 | | United States v. Mitchell, 365 F.3d 215 (3d Cir. 2004) | 7 | | United States v. Pena, 586 F.3d 105 (1st Cir. 2009) | 7 | | United States v. Sherwood, 98 F.3d 402 (9th Cir. 1996) | 7 | | United States v. Spotted Elk, 548 F.3d 641 (8th Cir. 2008) | 7 | | United States v. Straker, 800 F.3d 570 (D.C. Cir. 2015) | 7 | TABLE OF APPENDIX
[brief] Pb12  Jock v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment of Wall, 184 N.J. 562 (2005) ........................................................................  Pb12  Kaufmann v. Plan. Bd. of Warren, 110 N.J. 551 (1988) ........................................................................  Pb12  Kinderkamack Road Assocs. v. Mayor and Council, Oradell, 421 N.J. Super. 8 (App. Div. 2011)..................................................  Pb10  Kramer v. Bd. of Adjustment, Sea Girt 45 N.J. 268 (1965)  .................................................................  Pb10  Lakewood Realty Associates, LLC v. Twp. of Lakewood Planning Bd., No. A-1899-21 (App. Div. October 5, 2023) ........................................  Pb31  Lang v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment of Borough of North Caldwell, 160 N.J. 41 (1999) ..................................................................  Pb13 Pavlovsky v. Gurin, No. A-2169-08 (October 21, 2009), 2009 WL 3459663 ........................................ Pb28,29 Perlmart, Inc. v. Lacey Twp. Plan. Bd., 295 N.J. Super. 234 (App. Div. 1996) ........................................ Pb26 Pond Run Watershed Association v. Twp. of Hamilton Zoning Bd. of Adj., 397 N.J. Super. 335 (App. Div. 2008) ........................................ Pb26,31 Pritz v. Messer, 149 N.E. 30 (Ohio 1925) .......................................................... Pb24 Quick Plus Realty, LLC v. City of Princeton Zoning Bd., No. A-4509-17 (App. Div. June 13, 2019), 2019 WL 2480152 ........................................ Pb29,30 Randolph Town Center Assocs., L.P. v. Twp. of Randolph, 324 N.J. Super. 412 (App. Div. 1999) ........................................ Pb19 Shri Sai Voorhees v. Twp. of Voorhees, 406 N.J. Super. 497 (Law Div. 2009) ........................................ Pb23 Smith v. Fair Haven Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 335 N.J. Super. 111 (App. Div. 2000) ........................................
[directive] The appropriate reduction in the plea offer otherwise prescribed by these Guidelines shall be determined by the prosecutor for reasons stated that may include the following criteria:  1.  The prosecutor’s evaluation of the nature, extent, significance, value, and usefulness of the defendant’s assistance; 2.  The truthfulness, completeness, and reliability of any information or testimony provided by the defendant; 3.  The extent to which the defendant’s assistance concerns the criminal activity of other person(s) who are more culpable than the defendant; 4.  Any injuries suffered, or any danger or risk of injury to the defendant or his or her family resulting from the assistance; and, 5.  The timeliness of the defendant’s assistance.  13.2
[brief] On March 6, 2018, the New Jersey Supreme Court reversed the lower court’s decisions that resulted in Plaintiff’s violation of his probation.  Importantly, this is the date determined by [...] and the district court as the accrual date for the majority of the tort-based claims in Plaintiff’s Complaint.  As for Plaintiff’s Slander and Libel claims, the date of the amended judgment of conviction was determined to be the accrual date, which was October 13, 2018.  On April 14, 2023, in the criminal case that is the subject of this civil action, the Honorable [...], J.S.C., entered an Order officially vacating the judgment of conviction for Plaintiff’s violation of probation (VOP) and dismissed the VOP with prejudice.
[brief] (Aa549).  [...] transmitted the Award to counsel for the parties by email on December 18, 2023.  (Aa553).  The transmittal letter to the parties with the attached Award did not include the 6 appendices that were part of the Award.  By email dated March 28, 2024, counsel for the [...] requested that [...] provide the [...]’s counsel with the 6 appendices that were included with the Award.  (Aa558).  [...] was copied on the March 28, 2024 email to [...].  By email dated March 28, 2024, [...] provided [...]’s counsel, copy to [...], with the --- ⁴
[brief] An investigatory stop of an automobile constitutes a seizure and must be based on specific and articulable facts which, taken together with the rational inferences from those facts, give rise to a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity or a traffic offense.  State v. Amelio, 197 N.J. 207, 211-12 (2008); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653-55 (1979).
[brief] As the Carrero Court noted, battery -- via a “physical struggle” as in Carrero, or via a punch or other infliction of injury, like in Robinson, 136 N.J. at 492; Blanks, 313 N.J. Super. at 72; Mauricio, 117 N.J. at 414; and Castagna, 376 N.J. Super. at 358-359 -- may constitute adequate provocation to allow the jury to reduce murder to passion/provocation manslaughter even when the defendant uses a deadly weapon and the decedent is unarmed.  Carrero, 229 N.J. at 130-131.  As noted, while Blanks, Robinson, and Castagna all involved plain-error reversals for the failure to charge passion/provocation under the much tougher “clearly indicated” appellate standard of Funderburg and Canfield, the instant case, like Mauricio and Carrero, involves the mere “rational basis” test: does the evidence “leave room for dispute,” in the words of Mauricio, 117 N.J. at 415, for the jury on the issue of passion/provocation?  Of course it does.  The jury easily could have found a purposeful or knowing killing and rejected self-defense, but had at least a reasonable doubt that the State nevertheless did not disprove passion/provocation.
[brief] 5  [...] claims that New York contacts exist beyond [...]’s and [...]’s places of incorporation.  But it has failed to show that any such remaining contacts either relate to this matter or are substantial.  [...] also distinguishes Rowen by asserting that the choice-of-law provision there did not apply as the court found “Ohio has no connection with the present litigation. ”  Here, however, New York has no meaningful connection to the “supply and delivery” of [...] products to [...] in New Jersey.  Third, as for the relative interests between New York and New Jersey, again [...] improperly relies on [...]’s sales to retailers in New York, which ignores that *[...] is a New Jersey wholesaler that stores its inventory in New Jersey and distributes [...] products into the stream of commerce from its facilities in New Jersey*.  Because the MBPA embodies a strong public policy to protect this State’s wholesalers, New Jersey has a far greater interest in this dispute than New York, whose ABC Law cannot address [...]’s conduct extraterritorially.
[brief] See Gonzalez v. Sec’y of Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 678 F.3d 254, 263 (3d Cir. 2012)(“[C]onclusory, self-serving affidavits [and testimony] are insufficient to withstand a motion for summary judgment.  . . . plaintiff’s] own, sworn statements are insufficient to survive summary judgment. ”); Irving v. Chester Water Auth., 439 F.App’x 125, 127 (3d Cir. 2011) (holding that “self- serving deposition testimony is insufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact. ”); Synthes, Inc. v. Emerge Med., Inc., 25 F. Supp. 3d 617, 672 (E.D. Pa. 2014) (same); Danois v. i3 Archive, Inc., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98105, at *28-29 (E.D. Pa. Jul. 12, 2013) (“the Third Circuit has extended to deposition testimony the principle that conclusory, self-serving affidavits are insufficient to withstand a motion for summary judgment. ”)(Da244-264).  Certainly, no reasonable fact finder could give credence to Appellant’s new version of the facts as Appellant’s own self-serving deposition testimony was contradicted by his own long repeated statements throughout this litigation.  Indeed, Appellant’s deposition testimony is contradicted by the fact that: (1) Appellant has provided no documents, witnesses, or any other form of evidence that corroborates his statement of events; (2) Appellant was aware of [...]’s PCard policies as evidenced by his signed Employee Agreement (Pa40-41, dep. tr. pp. 21-22; Da71); and (3) Appellant admitted in the July 16, 2020 meeting with the Company that he inappropriately used [...]’s PCard to make personal purchases and offered to pay for any personal purchases that were “mistakenly” made by him (Da88-101, Da404-415).  Most notably, Appellant’s deposition testimony is directly contradicted by his own signed discovery statements which support the grant of summary judgment.  See Carroll v. N.J. Transit, 366 N.J. Super. 380, 388-89 (App. Div. 2004)(holding a plaintiff’s interrogatory response that flatly contradicted his own deposition testimony was insufficient to create a genuine dispute of material fact); Masoir v. Insurance Co. of North America, 193 N.J. Super. 190, 195 (App. Div. 1984) (“Plaintiff cannot create an issue of fact simply by raising arguments contradicting his own prior statements and representations.
[brief] Furthermore, it is well-settled that the New Jersey Civil Right Act ("NJCRA"), is analyzed analogously to 42 U.S.C. 1983.  See, e.g., Celestine v. Foley, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 132511, *22-24 (D.N.J. December 14, 2010) (noting that the NJCRA is modeled after 42 U.S.C. 1983); Rezem Family Assocs., LP v. Borough of Millstone, 423 N.J. Super. 103, 115 (App. Div. 2011) (same and noting that parties “agreed” the elements of a substantive due process claim are identical under both the NJCRA and 42 U.S.C. 1983); Applewhite v. Twp. of Millburn, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 145759, at *12-13 (D.N.J. October 9, 2013) (stating that “the Court will analyze the NJCRA claim analogously to the § 1983 claim” and subsequently dismissing both claims based on a finding that probable cause existed).
[brief] Plaintiff contended as follows: (a) That the actual facts were that the C-section was not called at 9:48 p.m. and was, in fact, not called until about 10:12 p.m., rendering it impossible to complete that emergency C-Section within fifteen minutes of 9:48 p.m.; (b) That the law holds that professionals hold themselves out to patients who entrust themselves to their care that they are capable and ready to meet the standard of care; and (c) That the law did not require Plaintiff to serve an expert report to the effect that defendants should have been staffed to meet the standard of care.  Rather than review the issues framed by the motion, the New Motion Judge used the motion for reconsideration to expand upon the purported reasons supposedly justifying a grant of summary judgment.  Although the court did walk back the claim that “staffing” was an issue which needed to be supported by expert opinion, the court substituted a whole new series of supposed reasons, none of which are supported or supportable for a grant of summary judgment.  Thus, in the first instance, the New Motion Judge erred by considering issues not encompassed by the July 17, 2023 decision.
[brief] ”  (21T 42-13 to 14)  Defendant urges that the judge’s refusal at 4:45 p.m. on the last day of deliberations to follow the model supplemental instruction and inquire whether further deliberations would be fruitful after the second deadlock, in concert with her comment that she would see how late she could keep the jury and her failure to acknowledge both the jury’s concerns about the vacation issue and the fact that the taking of a partial verdict was an option combined -- under these specific circumstances9 -- to create an atmosphere that was unduly coercive of a verdict.
[brief] Defendants’ Duty to Maintain and Protect Traffic  1)  The [...]  At all relevant times, the GSP was owned by [...].  (Pa1202).  As the owner of the GSP, the [...] had maintenance responsibility for the roadway.  (Pa797 at 12:13-17).  [...]’s maintenance responsibility continued during the subject construction project.  (Pa797 at 12:4-17 and Pa800 at 21:13-22:1-4).  In furtherance of its responsibility, [...] maintenance patrols the roads every morning.  (Pa808 at 55:2-9).  2)  [...]  In May 2014, prior to the accident, the [...] entered into a construction services contract with Defendant [...] to widen portions of the GSP, including but not limited to the subject area of Rt. 30.  (Pa1202).  According to the contract between the [...] and Midlantic, during the construction, Midlantic was responsible for safety measures for the protection of all persons and property on and adjacent to the work site.  (Pa1208-1209).  That contractual responsibility included, among other things, the following:  a.  The protection of the traveling public; including maintenance of traffic control devices.  (Pa1214, Pa2226, Pa2227).  b.  Perform daily inspections, including weekends and holidays and at night to ensure compliance with the Traffic Control Plan and other approved Standards.  (Pa1214).  c.  Install and maintain signs in accordance with the Manual for Uniform Traffic Control ("MUTCD").  (Pa1225).  d.  Correction of deficiencies of traffic control devices within 2 hours of discovery or notification by the engineer.  (Pa1214).  3.  [...]
[brief] The Township and the Board agree to cooperate with Developer in processing all applications with outside agencies which the Parties acknowledge will benefit the Project.  The Township and the Board agree to use all commercially reasonable efforts to assist Developer in its undertakings to obtain the Required Approvals, provided that the taxes are current, and Developer is in compliance with this Agreement.  Developer and the Township further agree that certain underground utility easements maybe required across the Property or across Township property to facilitate the efficient development of the Inclusionary Development.  The Developer and the Township agree to execute any such reasonable easements in a manner which minimizes the impact upon the development potential of the Property.  [Emphasis added].  § 8 (Pa054 to 058):  Site Plan Application and Review Process.  This section of the Settlement Agreement created specific timetables and process for the review and presentation of [...]’s Municipal Land Use Act (‘MLUL’), N.J.S.A. 40:55D-1 et seq., required land use application.
[brief] October 26, 2023  Decision in the consolidated docket matters of [...] and [...].  The instant appeal arises from [...]'s holding that the Board's refusal to meet with the [...]'s choice of negotiation representatives violated the New Jersey Employer-Employee Relations Act ("NJEERA").  The Board refused to negotiate with the [...] on a successor collectively negotiated agreement ("CNA") unless the [...] first agreed to a ground rule to bar the [...]'s Bargaining Council members from attending and participating in negotiations sessions.  The Board insisted on this position despite the [...] repeatedly informing the Board in writing that the Bargaining Council was part of the [...]'s negotiations team.  In reaching its determination, [...], as the expert authority on the NJEERA, carefully studied the Act to strike a balance between a majority representative's right to determine the composition of its negotiations team and the NJEERA's aim to promote good faith negotiations between the parties.  [...] accomplished this goal by reasonably concluding that an employer can contest in good faith the size of a labor organization's negotiations team, but only when the employer can show evidence that the size of the team actually undermines of good faith negotiations due to a conflict of interest or ill-will, breach of confidentiality, or by causing a safety and security risk.  Because the Board here did not present any evidence that the Bargaining Council’s presence had previously or would in the future interfere in the collective negotiations between the Board and [...], [...] correctly held that the Board’s refusal to negotiate with the [...]’s choice of negotiations representatives violated the NJEERA.  In reviewing this appeal, the Appellate Division must consider certain incontrovertible facts.  One is that the [...] identified its Bargaining Council as part of its negotiations team.  Another is that the [...] never sought to open the negotiations sessions to the general public or to anyone outside of the interested parties.  Third, the Board could not point to any evidence during the prior round of negotiations or for the upcoming negotiations to suggest that the Bargaining Council would actually interfere with the bargaining process.  Instead, the Board’s submission relies upon inaccurate narratives and conjecture which [...] had already considered and rejected.  Accordingly, the Appellate Division must conclude that the Board is unable to meet its significant burden to support reversing [...]’s decision below.
[directive] ATTORNEY GENERAL STANDARDS FOR PROVIDING SERVICES TO VICTIMS OF SEXUAL ASSAULT    SARC (who will fill out a report with the “DD Form 2910” where the victim elects a reporting option)   SAPR VA (who will fill out a report with the “DD Form 2910”)    Healthcare personnel (who will then immediately contact the SARC to fill out the “DD Form 2910”)  Once reported, the SARC will immediately assign the victim a SAPR VA and inform them of their right to speak with a Special Victims’ Counsel.  At the victim’s discretion, they may then seek a medical forensic exam and SAFE Kit.  Additionally, unrestricted reporting victims are entitled to:  military protection orders;  request transfer from their unit;  legal advice; and  a law enforcement investigation into the incident.  ADDITIONAL RESOURCES