ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] (Pa5)  The Trial Court analyzed this matter under the traditional *McDonnell Douglas* burden shifting analysis for individual plaintiffs.  The Trial Court recited this standard as:\(^4\)  “In a LAD disability discrimination case, a plaintiff must establish: (1) he was a member of a protected class (i.e., disabled within the meaning of the LAD; (2) he was qualified to perform the essential functions of the job; (3) he was terminated or otherwise suffered an adverse employment action because of his disability; and (4) that the employer thereafter sought similarly qualified individuals for that job.  See *Victor v State*, 203 N.J. 383, 409 (2010).  (Pa5)  This test was improperly applied in this case where the labor organization, as an association, brought claims under the NJLAD as a *direct* or facial violation of the NJLAD.
[brief] [...] was unaware if any other officers activated their body cameras prior to the knock and announce.  At the hearing, the State clarified that, while the other officers had their body cameras activated during the search, none of their body cameras audio recorded law enforcement knock and announce their presence.  [(Da17-20) (alterations in original, footnotes omitted). ]  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO SUPPRESS BECAUSE THE COURT FOUND, BASED ON CREDIBLE EVIDENCE, THAT POLICE COMPLIED WITH THE KNOCK-AND-ANNOUNCE REQUIREMENT.
[brief] Due to the State’s negligence, almost four years went by before [...] discovered the present charges against him, appeared in court, obtained counsel and received discovery.  The State arrested, charged and indicted [...] with eluding and aggravated assault on June 6, 2014.  Yet the State took zero steps to notify [...] of the charges or the indictment against him, or to bring him to court.  [...] remained unaware of the charges and indictment until the spring of 2018, when he discovered a warrant for his arrest and sent a letter to the court seeking disposition of the warrant.  Thereafter, [...] was notified of the indictment, brought to court, assigned counsel and provided with discovery.  Due to the serious delay in the State’s prosecution, critical evidence was lost, including the car involved in the eluding offense, which had been in the State’s custody.  [...] did not plead guilty until June 6, 2019, five years after his arrest.  The State filed no response to [...]’s many speedy trial motions and briefs.  Upon prompting by the trial court, the State provided one reason for the delay – that [...] had been in federal custody.  Contrary to the trial court’s decision, that did not excuse the State from making any effort at all to notify [...] of the charges against him or to prosecute the case.  The State had arrested and charged [...] with eluding after police attempted to pull him over on suspicion of conduct in other parts of New Jersey and Pennsylvania, which formed the basis of the federal prosecution.  Although after that arrest [...] was held in New York for the same eluding conduct and then taken into federal custody, the State was aware of these foreign prosecutions and knew either where [...] was being held, or who it could ask to find out.  With just a little effort, the State would have discovered that [...] was detained in a New Jersey jail, [...].  In fact, contrary to the trial court’s decision, that State never said it was unaware of [...]’s whereabouts, or that it had been unable to locate him despite reasonable efforts.  Upon locating him, the State should have notified the court so that it could have issued a writ to produce him, which is exactly what the trial court did, just four years too late.  Under a proper legal analysis of the relevant factors, the trial court should have found that each of the factors militated in favor of [...] – the delay was excessive, the fault of the State, objected to by [...], and resulted in prejudice – and therefore that [...]’s constitutional right to a speedy trial had been violated.  This Court should reverse the trial court’s decision denying [...]’s motion to dismiss the indictment and related motor vehicle violations.
[brief] A.  Irrelevance  Redactions  Plaintiffs object to the redaction of information pertaining to the seven proposed categories and argue that the Report is based on an inaccurate premise that Plaintiffs consented to irrelevance redactions in responsive documents; is inconsistent with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in allowing irrelevance redactions that will potentially allow redaction of highly relevant information from responsive documents; will impair Plaintiffs’ discovery efforts; and will lead to unnecessary litigation over the redactions.  Defendants raise the concern that without irrelevance redactions, they would have to produce copious amounts of information, potentially disclosing competitively sensitive information with no bearing on this case.
[brief] The Land report gives a reproduction value as well as a depreciated value utilizing manuals known and used in the industry including Means Construction Cost Data 52d Edition for the year 1994 and Marshall & Swift Valuation Service along with catalogs and offerings from suppliers of the equipment described in his testimony.  (2T131 10-25, 132 1-7).  The numerous items include the obvious example of the pizza oven along with its partition and sheetrock on stud frame along with venting to over the roof, as well as many others obviously functionally integrated to the existing uses.  It is also important to note that [...], when asked to address the issue of FF&E shown at pg. 66 of his appraisal report, referred to refrigeration equipment and simply said: “That’s all equipment.  That’s not part of the real estate that I valued.  If you look below that photograph, same right-hand side center photograph, that is the pizza restaurant.  Most...you got a Coke machine.  You got tables.  Those tables are bolted into the real estate, but they can be taken out and easily removed.  I did not value that…”  (1T114 13-17, 116 1-8)  He then went on to say he simply appraised the property by the income approach as a typical retail space, “a vanilla box.
[brief] There are no text messages or emails from 2016 or 2017 that show Plaintiff asking either Defendant or the pharmacy’s accountant, [...], any [...] tax information.  (2T57:11-19).  The pharmacy’s accountant, [...], prepares all of the tax forms and financials for [...] and did so with information from the pharmacy’s only bank account at [...], which [...] had full online access to.  (3T44:8-25).  The pharmacy’s financials prepared by [...] identify personal expenses of Defendant and Plaintiff and categorize them under the term “Draw. ” (Pa49-67; 2T63:18-64:12; 3T46:4-14).  The [...] balance sheets and profit and loss statement showed the term “Draw” under each of the parties’ names, i.e., [...] and [...], with the term “Draw” identifying personal expenses.
[brief] Based upon the substantial credible evidence in the record, the ALJ could not have reasonably reached any of the factual determinations it did in deeming Petitioner ineligible for the intra-agency transfer.  For the most part, the ALJ’s decision ventures into interpretation of various statutes and the interplay between them which are not entitled to any deference by this Court.  Therefore, it is respectfully requested that the ALJ’s decision be reversed, and the Petitioner be deemed eligible for the intra-fund transfer.  Respectfully submitted, [...]
[brief] Plaintiff goes on to insinuate that the trial court erred by essentially failing to conduct an evidentiary hearing to make fact-sensitive determinations of whether the defendant created a substantial certainty of injury by its conduct, and not simply distinguished this case from other reported intentional wrong cases.  However, plaintiff fails to point out that before rendering its decision, the trial court had the opportunity to review the moving papers/exhibits submitted in support of our motion for summary judgment, (Pa25-Pa257), plaintiff’s opposition which also included extensive exhibits offered into the record (Pa371-Pa1092) and our sur-reply in response to plaintiff’s opposition.  (Da1-Da14).  Following that, the trial court properly set the matter down for oral argument during which plaintiff’s counsel was given every opportunity to, and did in fact, bring fact-sensitive information to the court’s attention for its consideration.  Following all this, the trial court properly found that based on all the facts presented, the record was devoid of any evidence showing that the actions of the defendant - compelling employees to park in a certain area of the parking lot, even if the circumstances increased the risk of an accident - rose to the level of an intentional wrong within the meaning of N.J.S.A. 34:15-8 and case law interpreting the statute.
[brief] Lastly, enforcement of [...]’s alleged debt would constitute enforcement of a contract entered into in violation of New Jersey’s licensing statute.  See Accountemps Div. of Robert Half, Inc. v. Birch Tree Grp., Ltd., 115 N.J. 614, 626 (1989) (holding “[o]ur courts have consistently held that public policy precludes enforcement of a contract entered into in violation of [the State's] licensing statute[s]”).  Similarly, in Insight Global, LLC v. Collabera, Inc., 446 N.J. Super. 525, 531-32 (Ch. Div. 2015), the Chancery Division examined the limit on the ability of an unlicensed entity to seek relief from a court.  Insight Global held that an unlicensed party has no right to bring claims before the court and public policy prohibits enforcement of a contract entered into in violation of a licensing statute.  Insight Global, LLC, 446 N.J. Super. at 531-32.  Courts in New Jersey and many other states have consistently refused to aid or ratify unlicensed and unlawful collection activities.  Thus, the trial court’s November 11, 2022 Order granting Defendants’ Motion to Compel Arbitration should be reversed.
[brief] Despite that singular focus, [...] conceded the only evidence of a 2009 injury involving [...] stemmed from a report of [...] dated November 6, 2015.  (3T24).  No other medical reports or documentation mentioned a 2009 incident involving [...].  (3T25).  [...] was never provided with any accident/injury report for any injury occurring in 2009 as to [...].  (3T28).  In short, [...] was consistent from beginning to end with reasonable, rational explanations on causation.  On the other hand, [...]’s opinion could not and cannot stand unless, more likely than not, there was a 2009 incident/accident.  [...] opined:
[directive] The to N.J.S.A. Act at Violence of Domestic after defendant been arrested, generally occurs the has Directive under this complaint-warrant system.  using the Scan processing, and fingerprinted Live station for police the transported to before a indictments and complaints issued with "direct" (dealing 4.10 and Cf. Sections 4.9 shall authorize, Directive, therefore, be construed to this Nothing in arrest is made).
[brief] Under cover letter dated March 16, 2022, Respondent served responses to Appellant’s request for written discovery, including answers to Form A interrogatories.  Pa001.  In response to Form A Interrogatory number nine (9), which reads “If a previous injury, disease, injury, or condition is claimed to have been aggravated, accelerated, or exacerbated, specify in detail the nature of each…”, Respondent answered “To the extent Plaintiff had any pre-existing or degenerative conditions, relative to the body part injured herein, same were asymptomatic prior to the instant accident and as such, were aggravated/exacerbated as a result. ”  Pa003.  On November 8, 2022, immediately following the parties’ depositions, Respondent filed an Offer of Judgment seeking the entire amount of bodily --- \(^7\)
[brief] In addition, the State told the jury that [...] and [...] jointly possessed the drugs found in the car.  “I will be clear about something, the defendant and this codefendant, [...], are both guilty of possessing these drugs.  That’s a fact.  That’s how the laws of joint and constructive possession work[].”  (4T 28-9 to 13)  [...] testified that she met [...] in a trailer park a few months before the April 10 incident, and that she would buy drugs from him.  (4T 129-20 to 130-3)  She also testified that he would often give her drugs for free.  (4T 130-3 to 10)  [...] explained that she accompanied [...] on a trip to Virginia and that he supplied her with free drugs throughout their trip.
[brief] "A jury verdict is entitled to considerable deference and 'should not be overthrown except upon the basis of a carefully reasoned and factually supported (and articulated) determination, after canvassing the record and weighing the evidence, that the continued viability of the judgment would constitute a manifest denial of justice.'"  Hayes v. Delamotte, 231 N.J. 373, 385-86 (2018) (quoting Risko v. Thompson Muller Auto. Grp., Inc., 206 N.J. 506, 521 (2011)).  "The standard of review on appeal from decisions on motions for a new trial is the same as that governing the trial judge—whether there was a miscarriage of justice under the law."  Hayes, 231 N.J. 373 at 386 (2018) (quoting Risko, 206 N.J. 506 at 522 (2011)).  See Twp. of Manalapan v. Gentile, 242 N.J. 295, 304 (2020).  "[A] 'miscarriage of justice' can arise when there is a 'manifest lack of inherently credible evidence to support the finding,' when there has been an 'obvious overlooking or under-valuation of crucial evidence,' or when the case culminates in 'a clearly unjust result.'"  Hayes, 231 N.J. 373 at 386 (2018) (quoting Risko, 206 N.J. 506 at 521-22 (2011)).  In evaluating the trial court's decision to grant or deny a new trial, "an appellate court must give 'due deference' to the trial court's 'feel of the case,'" however, "[a] trial court's interpretation of the law and the legal consequences that flow from established facts are not entitled to any special deference."  Hayes, 231 N.J. 373 at 386 (2018) (first quoting Risko, 206 N.J. 506, 521 (2011) (second quoting Manalapan Realty, LP v. Twp. Comm. Of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995)).  V
[directive] i. (CCPF), 2C:43-3.8 (L. 2009, c. 143).  [예/Yes]  [아니요/No]  컴퓨터  범죄 예방기금 벌금 범죄가  N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4b(3) (아동이 사진을 찍거나 전시할 성적 행위를 하도록 유발 또는  N.J.S.A. 허용)의 2018 2 경우, 2C:24- 위반과 관련되며 년 월 이후에 저질러진 범죄가N.J.S.A. 4b(4) (아동의 촬영)의 2018 2 성적 행위를 사진 찍거나 위반과 관련되며 년 월 경우, 2C:24-4b(5)(b) (아동 이후에 저질러진 범죄가N.J.S.A. 음란물의 고의적 소지 시청)의 경우, 2C:24-4.1 (아동 또는 고의적 위반과 관련된 범죄가 음란물 N.J.S.A. 두목)의 관련되며2018 2 경우, 조직 망의 위반과 년 월 이후에 저질러진 2C:34-3 (18 판매, 전시) 범죄가N.J.S.A. 세 미만의 미성년자에게 음란물  유포  또는 또는[연방법]  Title 2C, chapter 20  중 어떤 조항이라도 위반하는 컴퓨터 관련 범죄인 경우, 귀하는  유죄를 인정한 죄목에 대해서 각각 아래와 같이 의무적 벌금이 아십니까?
[brief] Throughout the litigation, Defendants argued that their obligation under the PSA was not to obtain a RAO, but rather only to submit a RIR—a term which does not appear a single time in the PSA.  The evidence and testimony elicited at trial made clear that under the PSA, Defendants were obligated to secure a site-wide RAO.  Defendant [...], as well as her primary environmental consultant, [...] (“[...]”), even admitted that the PSA required Defendants to secure the RAO.  Defendants’ LSRP, [...] (“[...]”), likewise understood that he was retained by Defendants for the purpose of securing the RAO.  The trial court disregarded these facts, however, and improperly relied on extrinsic evidence to determine that Defendants were obligated only to submit the RIR—an obligation which is not stated anywhere in the PSA.
[brief] ”  183 P.3d 267, 278 (Wa. 2008).  “A defendant's ability to invoke the privilege [against self-incrimination] at trial—generally by opting not to testify—reflects the well-established principle that the State is ‘constitutionally compelled to establish guilt by evidence independently and freely secured, and may not by coercion prove a charge against an accused out of his own mouth.
[brief] On July 25, 2019, the Township and the property’s new owner, [...], executed redevelopment agreements for the property-in-question (“[...] Redevelopment Agreements”).  Da114-Da173; Da174-Da233; Pa651.  12.  Consistent with the LRHL and the Redevelopment Plan, Section 2.06 of the [...] Redevelopment Agreements authorized [...] to apply for a Long Term Tax Exemption under the Long Term Tax Exemption Law, N.J.S.A. 40A:20-1 et seq.  (“LTTEL”):  Following the Effective Date, the Urban Renewal Entity(ies) formed by the Redeveloper may submit to the Township an application for tax exemption in accordance with the Long Term Tax Exemption Law (the “Application”) and the terms of one or more Financial Agreements, which shall provide, inter alia, that the Urban Renewal Entity(ies) formed by the Redeveloper shall construct the Residential Project, or applicable portion thereof, and shall make annual payments to the Township in lieu of taxes in amounts set forth in such Financial Agreement(s).  Da126; Da186. 13.  Section 2.06 of the [...] Redevelopment Agreements allowed the redeveloper to terminate the agreement if the parties did not enter a financial agreement:  The Redeveloper shall have the right to terminate this Redevelopment Agreement upon written notice to the Township if the Township and the Urban Renewal Entity(ies) have not duly negotiated, agreed to, executed and delivered to each other the Financial Agreement(s) within one hundred twenty (120) days of the submission of the Application.  If this Agreement is terminated pursuant to the terms of this Section 2.06 then, except as expressly set forth herein to the contrary and upon full payment of all Allowable Township Costs accruing through the date of such termination, this Agreement (including, without limitation, all the covenants contained herein) shall be of no further force and effect and the Parties hereto shall have no further rights, liabilities and/or obligations hereunder.  Da126; Da186-Da187.
[brief] If this Court finds that Entire Controversy Doctrine and res judicata reasoning does not apply to justify the dismissal of the three fraudulent concealment counts (alleging fraudulent concealment, conspiracy to commit fraudulent concealment, and aiding and abetting fraudulent concealment), that dismissal is nevertheless proper because all those counts fail to state a cause of action.  Each of the causes of action are premised on the defendant having a duty to disclose the information allegedly being concealed, and the [...] were never subject to such a duty.  In Viviano v. CBS, 251 N.J. Super. 113 (App. Div. 1991), this Court set out the elements of a cause of action for fraudulent concealment in the context of discovery in a legal case, stating that the plaintiff had to show (1) that the defendants were legally obligated to disclose the discovery, (2) that this discovery was material to the case, (3) that the plaintiff could not readily learn of the discovery without disclosure in discovery; (4) that defendants intentionally failed to disclose it to the claimant, and (5) that the plaintiff was harmed by relying on the nondisclosure.  Viviano, 251 N.J. Super. at 123.  Here, Plaintiffs’ fraudulent concealment claim must fail.  The [...] acted as counsel for [...] and [...] during the 2015 action and obtained a dismissal of those clients for failure to provide an Affidavits of Merit on January 19, 2016.  Accordingly, no discovery was exchanged between Plaintiffs and Menas and [...] through their counsel, the [...].  Consequently, the [...] were never subject to a legal duty to turn over any information to Plaintiffs.  The same is true regarding the [...]’ numerous successful objections to Plaintiffs’ subpoenas in the 2015 action seeking [...]’ personal banking records.  The Court in the 2015 action held that the subpoenas were improper and quashed them each time.  (See Da155-174; Pa527-528)  Therefore, the [...] had no duty to disclose any information and Plaintiffs cannot establish the first element needed to assert a fraudulent concealment cause of action, as a matter of law.
[brief] (Pa15-17).  Furthermore, [...]’s contention that [...] failed to obtain information from her or from the [...] is without merit.  (Pb35).  [...] testified that she reached out to [...] twice to fill out the Questionnaire, but [...] failed to respond.  (1T114:19-23).  [...] focused the investigation on the certifying officer and supervising certifying officer, who are statutorily required to know this information and report it to the Division.  (1T85:2-6); N.J.S.A. 43:3C-15.
[brief] The Court ruling that the Appellant failed to state a claim is inaccurate.  Testing for DNA under OPRA is applicable to the publicly accessible files of the Kidnapping case, and the applicability and rationality of the legislative and executive intentions as they apply to this specific case are obvious.  After spending ten years managing and archiving the New Jersey State Police files on this matter, [...] is confident that the envelopes are the only documents out of a collection of approximately 225,000 that contain pertinent DNA for the public’s interest in arguably New Jersey most famous criminal case.  [...] has demonstrated that her complaint is in the public’s interest and applying a modern-day lens to the legislative intent behind OPRA and the executive intent behind [...]’s Executive Order 110, the words “inspection” and “examination” clearly authorize DNA testing and therefore the Superior Court’s decision should be overturned.  She has stated a claim.  She has filed OPRA requests which were denied and genuinely believed her associate [...] filed an OPRA request which the State improperly never responded to.  She has demonstrated the logic of the legislative and executive intentions as applicable to this case and has shown substantial errors committed by the Court.  Perhaps most intriguing are the whys surrounding this case.
[brief] A.  The Law of Constructive Trust Did Not Warrant Such Relief In the Instant Case.  Courts are authorized to impose a constructive trust “whenever specific restitution in equity is appropriate on the facts. ”  Flanigan v. Munson, 175 N.J. 597, 607 (2003), quoting [...], Remedies§ 4.3, at 246 (1973).  Such a trust is designed to “prevent unjust enrichment and force a restitution to the plaintiff of something that in equity and good conscience [does] not belong to the defendant. ”  Ibid.  Stated differently, a “constructive trust is the formula through which the conscience of equity finds expression.  When property has been acquired in such circumstances that the holder of the legal title may not in good conscience retain the beneficial interest equity converts him into a trustee.
[brief] The Trial Court was not swayed by these tactics and denied Appellant’s motion to vacate judgment.  Having failed at the trial level, Appellant now attempts to further push the bounds of factual embellishment while still ignoring the law in its new bid to vacate judgment.  As the trial record and law confirms, the underlying tax foreclosure was routine and regular and the judgment should stand.  Accordingly, Respondent respectfully submits that the Trial Court’s Order denying vacatur of the judgment be upheld.  **PROCEDURAL HISTORY**
[directive] Rule 3:3-1(c)(2-6) (indictable offenses) and Rule 7:2-2(b)(1-6) delineate factors regarding whether a warrant or summons should issue for other offenses.  Rule 3:26-1 (indictable offenses) and Rule 7:4-1 (non-indictable offenses) delineate factors to be considered when setting bail and provide for the option of R.O.R. bail where appropriate.  Bail Ranges for attempts or conspiracies should generally be the same as the actual substantive crime.  Statute Charge Description  Degree Bail Range 10%  Cash Bail Option 3rd Degree  $7,500 to $20,000 10% permissible