ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The trial court noted that the photographs of the condition at issue do not show an abrupt 2" elevation change at the abutment joint and that once [...] became aware of this, he changed his opinion and testified that the dangerous condition and accident was caused by a lack of tapering.  (Pa2164).  The trial court appropriately found that photographs only vaguely describe the condition and do not establish an inference of a dangerous condition that caused the accident.  (Pa2146).  The trial court also found it significant that there were no prior accidents at this location, nor was there evidence of any prior complaints.  (Pa2166).  When combined with the fact that Plaintiff, his wife, friend, investigating officer and contractors on site were unable to identify a dangerous condition, the trial court was correct in its determination that an accident reconstruction expert was necessary to establish causation.  (Pa2169).  The trial court correctly found that a reconstruction expert was necessary to review the photograph that shows a tapered elevation change, determine the elevation change, determine the weight of the motorcycle with Plaintiff on it and with any other items on it, determine the length of the taper, the speed of the motorcycle, and consider other variables, and then determine if the elevation change on a short taper would be sufficient to cause Plaintiff’s motorcycle to go up into the air as described by the eyewitnesses.  This type of analysis was required to establish that the alleged defect caused the accident.  (See Pa2169).  Additionally, it is undisputed that [...] lacked the qualifications necessary to offer an opinion on causation.  (Pa2138; Pa2169)  The trial court correctly found that without having produced a reconstruction expert analysis, a jury would be left to speculate as to what caused the accident.  As such, it is respectfully submitted that plaintiff failed to establish causation and therefore summary judgment was appropriate and the trial court’s order and judgment should be affirmed.
[brief] It’s unambiguous.  And it plainly states that there is a waiver, a release, a hold harmless, and an indemnity provision towards the [Respondents].”  1T27:12-20.  The court went on to find that “[Appellants’] contention that the language within the [A]greement is ambiguous is without merit and is unsupported by the language in the [A]greement itself.
[brief] (Aa4; Ra1-19).  Staff sought information relating to the project’s permitting and electric grid interconnection process, project design, site preparation, and costs.  (Aa4; Ra1-19).  In seeking clarification of [...]’s interconnection process, Staff inquired as to whether an interconnection application had been filed with the regional electric grid operator [...]\(^5\), what type of interconnection equipment will be utilized, and the costs of interconnection.  (Ra1-19).  Despite the extensive responses and attachments provided by [...], [...] could not provide a date as to when its project would have approval to connect to the grid or provide clarity as to the excavation times of the mining operations in order to commence construction of the solar array in the time permitted in the TI program.
[brief] As explained in more detail in Section I.C. below, the CCIP Policy, CCIP Manual, and Certificate of Liability  Insurance all provided cancellation notice requirements that would still have been in effect no matter [...]’s authority.  Pa84; Pa142; Pa589; Pa619.  [...] and [...] next point to [...] adding insurance costs back to its proposal for its excluded August 2015 work, but this proposal has no bearing on [...]’s continued enrollment in the CCIP leading up to the time of the accident.
[brief] Although the Trial Court correctly held that Defendants engaged in unlawful conduct when denying Plaintiffs’ variance application, it is respectfully submitted that the Trial Court improperly dismissed the damage claims that were premised upon that unlawful conduct.  Indeed, Defendants’ arguments in support of dismissal of the damage claims, and the claims below seeking attorney’s fees and costs, are largely premised upon their positions on factual issues that are hotly disputed.  Plaintiffs urged below that a trial was required to explore the parties’ divergent positions on a number of issues, and that Plaintiffs’ claims could not be dismissed as a matter of law, as urged by the Defendants.  Plaintiffs respectfully request that this Court reverse the dismissal of Plaintiffs’ damage claims and remand this matter for a trial.
[brief] Similarly, in *Lusardi v. Curtis Point Property Owners Ass’n*, 86 N.J. 217 (1981), relying on the judiciary’s power to regulate zoning in the public interest, we effectively modified an ordinance that conflicted with the state’s policy of affording recreational opportunities on the Atlantic seafront for as many citizens as possible.  Id. at 288 (citing cases where court amended or modified local ordinances even though the modified ordinance was not adopted by resolution of the governing body).  Indeed, the very concept of “site-specific relief,” refers to the Court’s ability to authorize the construction of affordable-housing, despite a contrary ordinance.  See Shire Inn, Inc. v. Borough of Avon-By-The-Sea, 321 N.J. Super. 462, 467 (App. Div. 1999) (noting “site specific relief [would] grant plaintiff affirmative zoning for the property as a rooming house” despite the use being prohibited under the zoning ordinance).  For example, where a municipality barred mobile homes as a permitted use, and the board rejected the affordable-housing project based on the proposed mobile-home use, the Court ordered issuance of the governmental approval nonetheless because the site was “plainly suited for mobile home development. ”  Mount Laurel II, 92 N.J. at 308; Bi-County Dev. of Clinton v. Borough of High Bridge, 174 N.J. 301, 318 (2002) (relying upon Samaritan Center, Inc. v. Borough of Englishtown, 294 N.J. Super. 437, 440 (Law Div. 1996), where the court compelled municipal sewer connection to eliminate cost-generating municipal requirements that otherwise obstructed an affordable-housing development); Toll Bros., 173 N.J. at 560.
[directive] Defendant's Initials ___ _ page of5  4  Are you giving up your right at sentence to argue that there are charges you pleaded [Yes] [No] [NA] 20. guilty to for which you cannot be given a separate sentence?  List any other promises or representations that have been made by you, the prosecutor, your defense 21. attorney, or anyone else as a part of this plea of guilty:  Have any promises other than those mentioned on this form, or any threats, been made in [Yes] [No] 22. order to cause you to plead guilty?  Do you understand that the judge is not bound by any promises or recommendations of [Yes] [No] a. 23. the prosecutor and that the judge has the right to reject the plea before sentencing you and the right to impose a more severe sentence?  b.  Do you understand that if the judge decides to impose a more severe sentence than [Yes] [No] recommended by the prosecutor, that you may take back your plea?  Do you understand that if you are permitted to take back your plea of guilty because of [Yes] [No] c. the judge's sentence, that anything you say in furtherance of the guilty plea cannot be used against you at trial?  Are you satisfied with the advice you have received from your lawyer?  [Yes]  [No]  24. 25.  Do you have any questions concerning this plea?  [Yes]  [No]  --------------------------  Date Defendant ------- Defense Attorney Prosecutor  [ ]  This plea is the result of the judge's conditional indications of the maximum sentence he or she would impose independent of the prosecutor's recommendation.  Accordingly, the "Supplemental Plea Form for Non-Negotiated Pleas" has been completed.  by 12/31/2019 [...], [...]
[brief] TABLE OF AUTHORITIES  Cases  Bozzi v. City of Jersey, 248 N.J. 274, 287 (2021)..........................10, 11 Brennan v. Bergen County Prosecutor's Off., 185 A.3d 202, 203 (N.J. 2018)....10, 11 Doe v. Poritz, 142 N.J. 1, 87-88 (1995)...........................................7, 13 Statutes N.J.S.A. 47:1a-1 et seq.................................................................5
[directive] 4.  Provide individually; a description of use order property, the agency having use of the property and the agency's OR1 number.'  5  5.  Record on line all tangible and intangible property, except United in 2), which in States Currency reported line a Final Judgement by or Default, a Consent DecreeEinaI Judgement Confirming Forfeiture, to to other action granting title the property the [...] has occurred.
[brief] [...]’s repeated attempts to clarify the import of his waiver bore on the validity of that waiver – a legal question the court resolved prior to trial – and not on the factual issue of his guilt, which was the question before the jury.  Showing [...]’s questions about the waiver was in no way “essential to the complete presentation of the witness’s testimony” and its omission would in no way have confused the jury.  *Feaster*, 156 N.J. at 76.  The pre-waiver portion should have been redacted.  This error was particularly harmful because no curative instruction was given telling the jury that it should not consider [...]’s questions about the availability of counsel as evidence of his guilt.  Additionally, the court should have redacted the portions of the interview in which [...] referenced his Miranda rights in refusing to answer certain categories of questions.
[brief] For the foregoing reasons, *Amicus*  [...] respectfully submits that this Court should invalidate the Bulletin issued by the [...] so that reciprocal exchanges in the State of New Jersey, like [...], can be afforded proper notice, a hearing, and an opportunity to comment on the substance of the Bulletin, prior to any material change in the implications of the Holding Company Act, in accordance with the APA and in preservation of their procedural due process rights.  Respectfully submitted, By: /s/ [...]
[brief] Plaintiffs “actually submitted to the plan, [...] did not. ”  (2T6:16-16)  Because [...] refused to participate, on February 8, 2016, the trial court was forced to simply lift the stay and place the Individual Plaintiffs in control of the Company.  (Da1619-1620)  The trial court “retain[ed] jurisdiction for Phase II. ”  (Da2014)  D.
[brief] The parking lot did not contain a perimeter sidewalk to safely move people/employees to and from the north side of the parking lot to the south side of the parking lot.  There were no stop signs, no stop lines, and no traffic control devices to slow traffic or to inform to watch for pedestrians.  [Pa662-3.]  [...] also explained how the lack of a peninsula at the T-intersection in question “removed a sight triangle that was necessary at this location and certainly would have given [...] an opportunity to see [...] walk across the east north-south travelway.
[brief] As discussed infra, she had been an ACPO section chief during the investigation and prosecution of [...]. issued by [...] had been improvidently granted.  She reasoned that the hard drive had been available at trial and the record contained all the information the defense needed, although the defense had never examined the drive.  She believed [...] was just relitigating his pretrial motion to dismiss the indictment and that interrogatories were not permitted in PCR.  (Da322-26)  In effect, [...] relieved the State from providing any explanation as to the current whereabouts of the drive or what may have still been on it.  On June 27, 2023, [...] filed a reconsideration motion, which the judge denied orally the next day, citing a need for finality, shortly before she denied the PCR petition without a hearing.
[brief] Predicated upon the foregoing facts and circumstances, Defendant submits that his May 16, 2018 guilty plea to a violation of N.J.S.A. 39:4-50 (DWI) in the Toms River Municipal Court should have been vacated on de novo review, that the Appellate Division should do so now, and the matter should be remanded to the Toms River Municipal Court for new proceedings consistent with same.  Respectfully submitted, [...], Senior Associate [...]  Cc: [...], Ocean County Assistant Prosecutor  [...]  Honorable Judges of the Superior Court of New Jersey Appellate Division  Richard J. Hughes Justice Complex, P.O. Box 006 Trenton, New Jersey 08625  RE: State of New Jersey (Plaintiff-Respondent) v. [...] (Defendant-Appellant)  Docket No. [...]
[brief] Similarly unavailing are the litany of cases Plaintiff cites concerning data breaches.  Plaintiff tries to analogize what happened in this case—a private transmission of debt information to a mailing vendor to prepare a letter addressed to and sent only to Plaintiff—with a data breach where an individual’s personal identifying information (such as social security number, date of birth, banking and credit card information, hereinafter “PII”) was stolen by an unknown third party.
[brief] ” (14T11-15 to 16).  The trial court aptly reasoned that “there are absolutely no time periods that [were] given by [...] that he could put a number on where he was anywhere. ” (13T67-7 to 12).  The trial court further reiterated: “detectives repeatedly attempted to establish a time frame of the defendant’s locations the morning of the incident,” but “defendant continued to make statements that he did not know the time frame of where he was that morning. ” (14T10-9 to 13).  As such, the trial court did not err in failing to give an alibi jury instruction.
[brief] Chalef v Ryerson, 277 N.J. Super. 22, 28 (app. Div. 1994).......................9  Henry v. N.J. Dept. of Human Services, 204 N.J. 320, 330 (2010).........14, 15  Kerpchak v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 97 N.J.L. 196, 198 (1922)...8,11
[brief] To find otherwise would “invite[] officers to pat frisk first and invent explanations later, for it assures that as long as officers can articulate a reason – any reason – for which a person's behavior indicated that a weapon was on the scene, that reason will be accepted and the patfrisk condoned. ”  Ibid.  In this case, the police articulated reasons for the stop and frisk of [...] and his three friends, during which a gun was recovered.  In contrast, the police did not articulate any reasons for the stop and frisk of [...] and [...], during which nothing was recovered.  In assessing the objective reasonableness of the officers’ explanation for stopping and frisking [...] and his friends, the Court should heavily weigh the officers’ failure to offer any explanation for simultaneously stopping and frisking two other men, beyond the men’s presence in a high-crime area.
[directive] Given the importance upon making an confirm law enforcement agencies it is necessary to that pretrial risk assessment, Accordingly, within pretrial risk-assessment process. initiate the automated arrest have the means to enforcement shall identify every law State Police of the issuance of this Directive, the days 30 determine whether the of New Jersey to under the authority of the laws of the State operating agency of initiating the capable has up-to-date software Scan system that equipped with a Live agency is issuance
[brief] M.  To the fullest extent permitted by law, the Subcontractor shall indemnify and hold harmless the Contractor, and its consultants, agents and employees or any of them from and against all claims, damages, losses and expenses, including but not limited to attorneys’ fees, arising out of or resulting from performance of the Work, provided that such claim, damage, loss or expense is attributable to bodily injury, sickness, disease or death sustained by anyone, including employees of Subcontractor or to injury to or destruction of intangible property (other than the Work itself) including loss of use resulting therefrom, [sic] caused in whole or in part by negligent acts or omissions of the Subcontractor, anyone directly or indirectly employed by them or anyone for whose acts they may be liable, regardless of whether or not such claim, damaged [sic], loss or expense is caused in part by a party indemnified hereunder…
[brief] It is similarly undisputed, at the time of execution of the judgment, [...] had considered the vacant land available, determined to locate the seven units at Block 610, and instructed [...] to purchase the lot.  82a-85a ¶¶ 11-19.  [...] submits attorney argument that “[...] [never] indicate[d] that it was moving ahead in the absence of [...] identifying a site and purchasing the triangle block,” Pb34, without citation to a single fact.  Instead, the undisputed testimony—never controverted on the record below by competent evidence—is that the council selected Block 610 based on the “firm belie[f] the site was suitable” considering the limited “available space for such an Off-site Building,” and instructed developer to purchase the Lot.  81a ¶¶ 6-8.  [...] does not point to a shred of record evidence in opposition to this.  At the time of execution of the judgment under former mayor [...], [...] had a demonstrable plan to satisfy its Court-ordered obligation: a realistic proposal to construct seven units directly across from the main project.  Since repudiating that agreement and understanding, six years later, the new administration has not put forward to Fair Share or the special master any alternative.
[brief] (3T 41-11 to 42-1).  The State further agreed to dismiss count four prior to defendant’s trial.  (3T 44-2 to 21).  Over ten days during the summer months in 2014, defendant was tried before a judge and jury.  At the conclusion of the trial, the jury found defendant not guilty of count one and count two, but guilty of the lesser-included offense of first-degree aggravated manslaughter.  (Da 8; 12T 21-17 to 22-6).  The jury also found defendant not guilty of count three, but guilty of the lesser-included offense of third-degree aggravated assault.  (Da 9; 12T 22-9 to 23-2).  The jury returned guilty verdicts on count five and count six.  (Da 9-10; 12T 23-5 to 14).  On September 18, 2014, the trial judge sentenced defendant on the lesser-included offense of first-degree aggravated manslaughter to twenty-seven years in state prison subject to N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2, more commonly known as the No Early Release Act. (13T 39-9 to 15).  On the lesser-included offense of third-degree aggravated assault, the trial judge sentenced defendant to a consecutive term of four years with a three-year period of parole ineligibility.  (13T 40-2 to 10, 42-13 to 18).  On count five, the trial judge sentenced defendant to a --- 17T - post-conviction relief hearing transcript dated October 21, 2022.  18T - post-conviction relief hearing transcript dated June 7, 2023.  19T - post-conviction relief hearing transcript dated June 27, 2023.  concurrent five-year term with a three-year period of parole ineligibility pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6c. (13T 40-11 to 16).  The judge merged count six into the convictions on count two and count three.  (Da 12; 13T 40-17 to 18).  Defendant’s direct appeal was affirmed and his petition for certification was denied.  (Da 16-30).  After filing a PCR petition, which alleged his trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective because he did not conduct an adequate pretrial investigation, the same judge who presided over defendant’s trial denied his request for relief.  (Da 31-42, 78).  This appeal followed.  (Da 79-81).
[brief] ”  Burd v. N.J. Tel. Co., 76 N.J. 284, 293 (1978).  The party who seeks the indulgence of the discovery rule must produce evidence “that a reasonable person in [his] circumstances would not have been aware within the prescribed statutory period that [he] was injured through the fault of another. ”  Kendall v. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc., 209 N.J. 173, 194 (2012) (citing Henry v. N.J. Dept. of Human Servs., 204 N.J. 320, 339 (2010)).
[brief] The Petitioner makes the remarkable argument that the Petitioner had “unclean hands” and caused the “dissipation of marital property. ” (Pb 49).  Such arguments, devoid of any evidence in the record, require no response.  Finally, the Petitioner makes an allegation of the Decedent’s “concealment of her intent to disinherit Petitioner also breached the duties and responsibilities that were created by her marriage to Petitioner. ” (Pb 49-50).  Again, this argument fails, as the record does not support it, and the law cited by the Petitioner is irrelevant and off-point, requiring no discussion.
[brief] *Dimitrakopoulos v. Borrus, Goldin, Foley, Vignuolo, Hyman* and Stahl, P.C., 237 N.J. 91, 98 (2019).  In determining “what claims are ‘required to be joined’ by the doctrine, ... th[e] Court has explained that the ‘claims must “arise from related facts or the same transaction or series of transactions” but need not share common legal theories. ’”  Bank Leumi USA v. Kloss, 243 N.J. 218, 226 (2020)(quoting Dimitrakopoulos, 237 N.J. at 119).  Even where the doctrine is otherwise applicable, a court has the discretion not to apply it when doing so would be inequitable on the facts of a particular case, or it would not promote the doctrine’s underlying goals.
[brief] ’”  Opp. at 31.  -  Simply put, [...] cannot, in good faith, argue that it did not make sufficient subcontractor profits to pay [...] its 65% EGP share, and also argue that it did not have a “fair and reasonable opportunity” to litigate its unpaid work claim for Hackensack.  Further, [...] argues that “the parties’ agree[d] to limit the issues in the PTA Arbitration. ”  Opp. at 33.  This is both unsupported by the record and outlandish.  [...], and its two retiring principals, intended the First Arbitration to be a full and final resolution of any and all disputes between the parties under the global PTA and its series of various subcontracts with [...].  [...] wants this Court to believe that [...] agreed to carve-out and save-for- another-day other claims on these same construction projects.  This shocks the conscience—why would [...] ever agree to such a granular level of claim-splitting and arbitrate half-a-dozen or a dozen times over with [...]?  Obviously, it would not.  In opposition, [...] meagerly points out that “neither party introduced proposed change orders, executed change orders…etc. ”  Opp. at 33.  Of course, [...] did introduce the Hackensack Project Completion Subcontract, and did testify about change orders.  Pa316; Pa536.  However, [...] had no reason to introduce these documents into evidence for its case-in-chief; whereas, [...] was free to present its offsetting counterclaims however it wanted, and [...] chose not to admit these contract documents into evidence.  Finally, as previewed in [...]’s opening brief (Mov. Br. at 22 n.7), [...] argues that multiple piecemeal arbitrations are required by the PTA’s (inapplicable) arbitration-consolidation provision.  Opp. Br. at 5.  Obviously, this is a red herring.  This is further nonsensical when the parties were already litigating the Hackensack Project in an arbitration.  The clause only requires arbitration as the forum for dispute resolution, and permits consolidation had there been multiple concurrent arbitrations ongoing.  The arbitration-consolidation provision is simply not relevant to this litigation, nor should it be interpreted to lead to the absurd result that—in spite of the ECD—the parties must engage in multiple disjointed arbitrations.  II
[directive] This Addendum to the Attorney General’s Use of Force Policy (Policy or Use of Force Policy) governs the use of conducted energy devices (CEDs) and other authorized less-lethal devices and ammunition.  It does not address the use of oleoresin capsicum (“OC spray”), tear gas or other chemical agents, distraction devices (e.g., a “flash bang”) or the use of an asp or baton.  This policy supersedes and replaces all other policies, directives, memorandums or guidance provided by the [...] or the [...] on CEDs and other Less-Lethal Devices and Ammunition.