ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] This section does not apply with regard to any conduct, or a visual depiction of that conduct, that is (A) a customary and normal veterinary, agricultural husbandry, or other animal management practice; (B) the slaughter of animals for food; (C) hunting, trapping, fishing, a sporting activity not otherwise prohibited by Federal law, predator control, or pest control; (D) medical or scientific research; (E) necessary to protect the life or property of a person; or (F) performed as part of euthanizing an animal.  (2)  Good-faith distribution.  This section does not apply to the good-faith distribution of an animal crush video to-- (A) a law enforcement agency; or (B) a third party for the sole purpose of analysis to determine if referral to a law enforcement agency is appropriate.  (3)  Unintentional conduct.--This section does not apply to unintentional conduct that injures or kills an animal.
[brief] Defense counsel further argued:  Now on May 24, 2019[,] ... [...] is brought into the police station with the purpose – now this is within [twenty-three] hours of her having seen – is brought into the police station and they do a photographic array procedure with her.  She's there importantly because she saw the crime happen.  And she even said when she testified ... that the person who did the shooting [went] ... by her.  She saw ... the person commit the crime.  And the person went ... by her, but it was like at [an] angle.  But the bottom line is she was there to make the identification because obviously the police thought she could make an identification having been there and seen the person who did it.  ....  So, all you have now in this case right now is you have ... [...] who identified somebody else as being the shooter was sure that it wasn't [defendant].  Defense counsel also commented to the jury regarding the veracity and motive of different witnesses, positing for consideration: whether all of [...]'s testimony “was truthful”; that [...] “ha[d] her own reasons for not being truthful”; and whether [...] was “trying to get out of trouble ... himself.
[brief] Plaintiff’s motion for leave to appeal was granted.  This matter was consolidated with two (2) other matters where the issue of defense medical exams was also at issue.  The [...] ([...]), as representative of the [...] ([...]), was invited to file a brief and appendix.  They did so, establishing categorically that a psychological examination performed in the presence of a TPO or a recording device is inconsistent with good psychological practice.  Dal.  The [...] endorsed the literature produced by Defendant’s Counsel as establishing standards of care.  The [...] averred that a psychologist who permits the presence of TPO or recording is doing so contrary to the standards of practice even if the court has ordered same:  Given its regulatory framework, as well as the consensus among professional organizations as evinced through the literature cited above, should a case come before it, the [...] could find that the observing or recording of evaluations and administration of neuropsychological tests, in certain circumstances, violate practice standards and adversely affect the results of the tests such that licensed psychologists should not agree to such conditions.
[brief] 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(a) ...........................................................................................................  19  45 C.F.R. § 164.502(e)(1)(i) .................................................................................................  20  45 C.F.R. § 164.502(e)(2) .......................................................................................................  19, 20 R. 1:36-3 ..................................................................................................................................  13 R. 4:6-2(e) ...............................................................................................................................  3, 4  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS
[brief] But the Township takes it even a step further by arguing that its offer was such that “Appellant stands to earn many times the value of its investment. ”  (Pb9)  Here again, the Township does not provide any citation to the record below because this was not at issue below, nor would it have been a permissible consideration in a challenge of the condemnor to take the property.  As such, this Court should disregard these arguments.  POINT III  COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL DOES NOT APPLY WHERE THE EMINENT DOMAIN ACT AUTHORIZES THE EXCLUSIVE FORUM TO ADJUDICATE ALL ISSUES RELATED TO A GOVERNMENT TAKING.
[brief] Plaintiff now argues that because he did not suggest to the jury that it “award damages based on a time-unit calculation,” the jury was not told it could calculate damages by assigning a value to the time-units presented.  Pb., at 44.  Plaintiff also points out that the trial court agreed that counsel “did not go into any sort of unit analysis. ”  Id., at 44-45.  Ignored, however, is the fact that the Court, in its charge, specifically told the jury that Plaintiff’s argument was that the jurors could “consider an amount of money in relation to an amount of time [i]n determining … damages. ”  5T.21:5 to 8.  Similarly ignored is the Court’s reasoning on defendants’ motion for new trial.  That is, upholding the verdict, the Court attributed an amount of money ($23,000.00) to units of time (years) remaining in Plaintiff’s life.  6T.62:14 to 63:19.  In essence, the Court concluded that the jury could have reached its verdict by considering the number of years left to Plaintiff and assigning a value to each without considering the no less likely possibility that it did so based upon Plaintiff’s extrapolation of those years into days and hours.  Whatever the source of any confusion concerning the charges requested by Plaintiff, the scope of the argument permitted by the trial court and/or the manner in which the time-unit calculation was presented to the jury, it was not the result of any action or inaction on the part of the Defendants.  That the Defendants “got the short end of the stick” is equally clear.  The trial court accommodated Plaintiff’s interest without giving due or equal consideration to the prejudice wrought thereby and was based upon a clear misapplication of the law warranting reversal.
[brief] [...] filed its answer on May 24th 2019.  (Pa1740)  [...] in its Answer made a demand that the Plaintiff comply with N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-29 and that Plaintiff serve an affidavit of merit.  (Pa1773)  No affidavit of merit was filed by Plaintiff.  More than 120 days passed from the filing of the Answer and [...] filed a Motion to Dismiss plaintiff’s Compliant as no Affidavit of Merit had been served.  (Pa1939)  C.
[directive] Date & Time: TAKE NOTICE that you are suspended from duty effective immediately for the following reason:  ______  You are unfit for duty  ______  You are a hazard to other persons if permitted to remain on the job ______  An immediate suspension is necessary to maintain safety, health, order or effective direction of public services; or ______  You have been formally charged with a first, second or third degree crime.  ______  You have been formally charged with a first, second, third or fourth degree crime or a disorderly persons offense while on-duty, or the act is directly related to your employment.  The facts in support of the above reason are:  ________________________________________________________________________________ __________________________________  Supervisor making suspension I hereby acknowledge receipt of this notice.  Signature: ______________________________  Date: _____________________  Print Name: ______________________________  Appendix E
[directive] 8  5 Standards Governing the Activation of BWCs  5.1  BWCs Used Only in Performance of Official Duties.  A BWC shall be activated only while in performance of official police duties and for the purpose of recording incidents, investigations, and police-civilian encounters involving those law enforcement activities specified in this Policy, or specified in a department’s policy, standing operating procedure, directive, or order promulgated pursuant to this Policy.  A BWC shall not be activated while the officer is on break or otherwise is not actively performing law enforcement functions (e.g., while eating meals, while in a restroom, etc.).  A BWC shall not be activated or used by an officer for personal purposes, or when engaged in police union business.  Nor shall a BWC be used to record conversations involving counseling, guidance sessions, personnel evaluations, or any similar supervisory interaction.  Any recordings from a BWC recorded in contravention of this Policy or any other applicable law shall be immediately brought to the attention of agency command staff and immediately destroyed by command staff following consultation and approval by the County Prosecutor or Director of the Office of Public Integrity and Accountability.  Such footage shall not be admissible as evidence in any criminal, civil, or administrative proceeding.
[brief] LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I:  THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE BECAUSE DEFENDANT’S DETENTION AND FRISK WAS LAWFUL UNDER THE TOTALITY OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES.  (Da7; 1T52-23 to 69-6)  The State respectfully urges this Court to affirm the trial court’s decision to deny defendant’s motion to suppress because officers had mere articulable and reasonable suspicion to stop and then frisk defendant under the totality of the circumstances.  Defendant alleges that the trial court improperly denied his motion to suppress evidence, arguing that the police observations here were nothing more than unsubstantiated hunches.  However, the trial court properly found and the record reflects that law enforcement had reasonable, articulable facts that the defendant committing an offense and potentially armed and dangerous.  In any event, the evidence would have been inevitably discovered after [...] discovered the gun and drugs on top of the vehicle tires.  Accordingly, the State urges this Court to affirm.
[brief] 1.  The manner of the victim’s death did not clearly indicate anything other than an intentional act.  It cannot reasonably be said that hitting a victim in the head repeatedly with a heavy wine chiller in two distinct events involved mere reckless conduct or a conscious disregard of a substantial risk of death.  Thus, in the absence of a request for a charge on the lesser-included offenses, the trial judge had no obligation to charge the jury on manslaughter.
[brief] On June 7, 2024, after the parties fully briefed the issues, the Trial Court held oral argument on [...]’s motion to confirm the Award and [...]’s cross-motion to vacate / modify / assert a counterclaim.  On June 12, 2024, the Trial Court entered an Order Confirming Arbitration Award and Entering Judgment, awarding [...] $3,889,835.14, plus post-award interest of $20,648.00, for a total award of $3,910,483.14, with per diem interest in the amount of $825.92 continuing to accrue as of June 7, 2024.  Da6-7.  At the outset of its reasoning, the Trial Court highlighted that “courts grant substantial deference to arbitration awards”; that “arbitration is ‘meant to be a substitute for and not a springboard for litigation’”; and that “[a]rbitration should spell litigation’s conclusion, rather than its beginning. ”  Da30.  In addition to those underlying policy objectives, the Trial Court also cited the narrow statutory bases, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:23B-23, under which a court will vacate an arbitration award.  Da30-31.  Accordingly, after considering the parties’ arguments, public policy, and the New Jersey Arbitration Act, the Trial Court found “no basis in which to vacate the Arbitrator’s decision. ”  Da 31.  The Trial Court thus rejected [...]’s argument that the Arbitrator “exceeded his powers” and held that [...] “has not provided sufficient evidence that the Arbitrator contradicted the express language of the contracts at issue. ”  Da31 (adding “it is clear that the Arbitrator considered the issue and the parties’ arguments” under the PTA).
[brief] *Heck*'s requirement to resort to state litigation and federal habeas before § 1983 is not, however, implicated by a prisoner's challenge that threatens no consequence for his conviction or the duration of his sentence. \[1\]  There is no need to preserve the habeas exhaustion rule and no impediment under *Heck* in such a case, of which this is an example. \[2\]  *Muhammad v. Close*, 540 U.S. 749, 751-752 (2004)  So, it appears there are 6 Justices, including [...] who would put no limits on such suits, for allowing a § 1983 suit (so also a CRA action) if the person has never been “confined” as a punishment on some conviction.  Here [...] has never been eligible for *Habeas* relief (in NJ, PCR) and cannot sue for a conviction and subsequent confinement that never happened.
[brief] The sole issue in this appeal is whether the Municipal Court’s failure to advise the Defendant, [...] (“Defendant”), orally of the enhanced penalties for a subsequent Driving While Intoxicated (“DWI”) conviction serves as a basis to grant the Defendant Post-Conviction Relief (“PCR”).  Defendant submits that the lower court erred in denying her PCR Petition and argues that her 2014 conviction cannot be used for the purpose of imposing enhanced penalties on future DWI convictions.  The State contends that the Municipal Court properly denied the Petition and the Law Division properly rejected the Defendant’s claims on de novo review.  For the reasons set forth below, it is the State’s position that Municipal Court’s failure to orally advise the Defendant of the enhanced penalties for a second or subsequent DWI is not basis to grant the relief requested.  STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[brief] (Da 20, 23-24; BWC4-A at 22:00 to 34:44)  Specifically, according to [...]’s BWC and all three police reports, the police initially encountered [...] before seeing her on the surveillance video, and she first said that “she did not know what happened and she just called for police. ”  (Da 16, 20, 23; BWC1 at 8:55 to 9:30)  After watching the surveillance video, the police sought out [...] a second time, “detained” her, and began to question her.  (Da 20, 23-24; BWC4-A at 22:00 to 34:44)  [...] was not present for the entire detention, so [...]’s BWC does not show everything that occurred.  But the BWC shows that during the interrogation, [...] was handcuffed in the back of a police car with its door open while surrounded by multiple officers; [...] repeatedly denied knowing why the police were detaining her; and one officer shouted at [...], “You know for what. ”  (BWC4-A at 22:00 to 34:44)  [...] estimated that between five and ten officers were on the scene; eleven officers are listed in the police reports; and many can be seen in the BWC footage.  (1T 19-8 to 17; Da 15; BWC4-A at 22:00 to 34:44)  According to Sergeant [...]’s report, the police confronted [...] about the video showing her “grab[bing] a bag”; they promised that she was “not in trouble”; and they said they “needed to know what happen[ed]. ”  (Da 20)  The BWC shows that they also threatened, “Any lies you tell me, you’re gonna be in trouble. ”  (BWC4-A at 28:12 to 28:16)  The BWC also shows unidentified officers who, when asked where they found [...] the second time, said, “The daughter went and got her because ya’ll had knocked on the door, and . . . she said she didn’t have to open the door blah blah blah. ”  (BWC4-A at 27:00 to 27:14 (emphasis added))  In addition, according to [...]’s BWC and Sergeant Velez’s report, the police initially obtained [...]’s verbal consent while she was detained and handcuffed in the police car, before later entering her apartment and having her sign the formal consent form.  (Da 20; BWC4-A at 30:09 to 33:52)  At the suppression hearing, the State did not present any testimony regarding the circumstances of how they obtained [...]’s verbal consent.  The 911 call occurred at 1:31 a.m., but [...] and her daughter did not sign the consent form until 4:56 a.m.  (Da 23-24)  [...] admitted that other officers interacted with [...] when [...] was not present, so [...] could not say what transpired, but none of those officers testified, nor were any BWCs from them admitted.  (1T 19-18 to 20-16)  Neither [...] nor her daughter testified, even though [...]’s BWC shows that about 30 minutes after signing the consent form, one of them can be heard asking if she signed it, to which [...] responded that she already did.  (BWC4-A at 48:20 to 50:37; BWC4-B at 1:15 to 1:24)  The BWC also shows that [...] said she had been drinking beer that night.  (BWC3 at 27:00 to 27:10)  B.
[brief] Pa56.  [...] submitted the Ricci Act Eligibility Registration Form and Request for Amended Benefits Form with his affidavit.  Pa58.  Pa60.  With his Request for Amended Benefits Form, [...] supplied medical documentation of his 9/11 illnesses.  Pa62-79.  He also provided a letter from [...] of the [...] acknowledging [...]’s commendable services during the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center.  Pa61.  On or about July 6, 2023, [...] joined a previously filed Petition to the [...] was filed on behalf of many other retired Troopers who are requesting registration and amended health benefits in retirement.
[brief] The Board had disobeyed two prior remand orders from two other judges and demonstrated that it could not fairly decide [...]’s application for a rent increase based upon the law and an uncontroverted record.  [...] now appeals the adjudicated Rent Increase—principally [...]’s entitlement to a “fair return” on its equity in the Unit comprising the chief portion of the Rent Increase—and [...] cross-appeals from the Court’s decision not to make the Rent Increase retroactive.
[directive] All prospective jurors shall also be furnished with a pencil or pen.  2.  Questions 1 though 6 may be addressed to the entire array in any trial, not just lengthy trials, and excusals may be made of those disqualified by their responses at the outset of the proceeding.  Question 2a, pertaining to the length of the trial, may be included in this questioning regardless of the expected length of the trial.  3.  The judge must read and review each question en banc with the first jurors seated in the box.
[directive] If fee ofup to $1.00 for each occasion when a payment or installment payment is made?  the offense occurred on or after March 13, 1995 and the sentence is to probation, or the sentence otherwise requires payments of financial obligations to the probation division, you must pay a transaction fee of up to $2.00 for each occasion when a payment or installment payment is made?  Si la infraccion ocurrio el primero de febrero de 1993 o despues de dicha fecha, pero antes de! 13 de marzo de y 1995 se le esta sentenciando a libertad a prueba o a una institucion correccional de! estado, usted tendra que pagar un gasto de transaccion de hasta $ 1.00 dolar en cada ocasion en que se haga un pago o se abone una y cuota?  Si la infraccion ocurrio el 13 de marzo de 1995 o despues de esa fecha, se le sentencia a libertad a prueba, o si la sentencia por otro motivo requiere pagos de obligaciones financieras a la division de libertad a prueba, usted tendra que pagar un gasto de transaccion de hasta $2.00 do Jares en cada ocasion en que se haga un pago o se abone una cuota?
[brief] (4T 122-14 to 19).  At that point, [...] saw [...] “like 200 feet up the street.” (4T 123-19 to 124-11).  There were several men with [...], and [...] said he heard one of the men say, “[H]e brung in some people. ” (4T 124-15).  [...] testified that “the next thing I know I heard a shot. ” (4T 124-16).  [...] saw the shooter and identified [...] as the shooter.  (4T 125-17).  [...] realized his wife had been hit and was on the ground behind him; while tending to her he heard at least four or five more shots.  (4T 127-1).
[brief] RESPONDENT/DEFENDANT, [...] BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO APPEAL  [...]  [...]  Phone: [...]  Attorneys for Respondent/Defendant, FWH Associates, P.A. Counsel of Record and On the Brief: [...], Esquire (I.D. #062462013)  [...]  On the Brief: [...], Esquire (I.D. #407932022)  [...]  November 17, 2022  TABLE OF CONTENTS
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT JUDGE DID NOT ABUSE HER DISCRETION IN ADMITTING THE STATE’S PATHOLOGIST’S TESTIMONY  An abuse of discretion standard is applied to decisions made by trial courts relating to matters of discovery, which encompass admission of an expert.  *Bending v. Adelson*, 187 N.J. 411, 428 (2006); *Townsend v. Pierre*, 221 N.J. 36, 52–53 (2015) (“As a discovery determination, a trial court's grant or denial of a motion to strike expert testimony is entitled to deference on appellate review…  “[W]e apply [a] deferential approach to a trial court's decision to admit expert testimony, reviewing it against an abuse of discretion standard. ” (quoting Pomerantz Paper Corp. v. New Cmty. Corp., 207 N.J. 344, 371–72 (2011)).  A. THE PATHOLOGIST’S OPINIONS DID NOT VIOLATE DISCOVERY RULES.  The record indicates, consistent with the judge’s opinion, that the information upon which the opinion was based was known to all parties and properly complied with discovery rules.  Abuse of discretion defies simple definition; “[w]hile the concept is difficult to define with precision, an appellate court “may find an abuse of discretion when a decision ‘rest[s] on an impermissible basis’ or was ‘based upon a consideration of irrelevant or inappropriate factors’…  An appellate court can also discern an abuse of discretion when the trial court fails to take into consideration all relevant factors and when its decision reflects a clear error in judgment. ”  State v. S.N., 231 N.J. 497, 515 (2018) (quoting State v. Baynes, 148 N.J. 434, 444 (1997) (internal citations omitted)).  Here, Defendant concedes that all of the information supporting [...]’s opinion that the thermometer at issue was faulty was available both to [...] and all of the parties.
[brief] First, [...] is a qualified expert.  He is a “Registered Consulting Arborist®, a Board-Certified Master Arborist®, and a New Jersey Licensed Tree Expert.  I am a member in good standing of the American Society of Consulting Arborists, the International Society of Arboriculture (ISA), two local chapters of the ISA, as well as the Arboricultural Research and Education Academy.  Additionally, I have been involved in the field of arboriculture for 30 years. ” (Pa249-266).  [...] wrote his analysis, opinions, and conclusions within a reasonable degree of scientific and arboricultural certainty and they were developed in accordance with commonly accepted arboricultural practices.  (Pa249-266).  Finally, [...]’s opinion is necessary to help the trier of fact understand the cause of the tree’s decay which then resulted in it falling and injuring plaintiff.  While [...] may have never examined the subject tree in person, he was able to examine photographs and documents taken resulting from this incident.  Thus, [...]’s expert report is not an inadmissible net opinion, rather is a valid expert report that should be considered by the Court in their decision and was considered by the lower court.  **CONCLUSION**