ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] To provide a frame of reference, some background facts are appropriate.  These facts are essentially undisputed and are set forth in the Opinion by Chancery [...] in the related easement litigation --- now on Appeal (Docket [...]).  Prior to 1963, the [...] and [...] ([...]) owned the rectangular 101,250 S.F. corner parcel in [...], bordered by Sixth Street (north), Madison Avenue (east), Fifth Street (south), and other Lots (west) (Da23).  For years prior to 1963, the [...] operated a religious primary school on that site, and significant portions (including now Lot 8) were vacant and apparently used for casual parking or student recreation (Da31-33).  In 1962, the [...] ([...]) was formed, aligned with the [...] with a number of common members and supporters (Da27).  On January 7, 1963, the [...] and the [...] entered into an Agreement (Da23) that provided for 10 items of intended mutual cooperation, including a provision that the [...] would convey a vacant (30,000 S.F.) corner portion (now Lot 8) of its School parcel to the [...], to construct and operate a new synagogue on that parcel.
[brief] ”  State v. Galicia, 210 N.J. 364, 383 (2012).  While there is an exception for issues that “substantially implicate public interest,” State v. Walker, 385 N.J. Super. 388, 410 (App. Div. 2006), this is not such an issue because our Supreme Court and this Court have already ruled that the signaling requirement of N.J.S.A. 39:4-126 applies to lane changes.
[brief] **PROCEDURAL HISTORY ...............................................................................................3**  **STATEMENT OF FACTS..............................................................................................4**  THE DECEMBER 2021 ALTERCATION, ENSUING INVESTIGATION, AND DISCIPLINARY CHARGES ..................................................................................5  DECEMBER 20, 2022  SETTLEMENT NEGOTIATIONS ..............................................7  THE DECEMBER 20, 2022  MEMORIALIZATION OF THE SETTLEMENT ON RECORD .........................................................................................8  COUNSEL’S POST SETTLEMENT COMMUNICATIONS.................................11  THE APRIL 6, 2023 OTSC HEARING........................................................................13  THE TRIAL COURT’S APRIL 12, 2023 ORAL DECISION.................................16  **STANDARD OF REVIEW............................................................................................18**  **LEGAL ARGUMENT.....................................................................................................19**  POINT I THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING PLAINTIFF’S OTSC AND DECLINING TO ENFORCE THE AGREED-UPON AND MEMORIALIZED SETTLEMENT (Pa135-Pa136; 2T20:3-14)
[brief] The circumstances of this case and the fundamental unfairness that the March 18, 2015 default judgment proceeding alone shows support relaxation of the reasonable time requirement as well.  Any rule of court can be relaxed in the interests of justice, R. 1:1-1 (“Unless otherwise stated, any rule may be relaxed or dispensed with by the court in which the action is pending if adherence to it would result in an injustice.
[directive] In determining whether to consent to the diversion of present charge(s), where there has been prior diversion or adjudications, Assistant Prosecutors in exercising their discretion should consider all relevant circumstances, including but not limited to: 1. The nature and seriousness of the prior charges; 2. The rehabilitative services that were provided to the juvenile during their prior involvement with the juvenile justice system; 3.  Whether different rehabilitative services will be provided if the present charges were to be diverted; 4. Risk that the juvenile presents a substantial danger to others; 5.  The nature and seriousness of the present offenses(s); 6. The amount of time that elapsed between the prior adjudication/diversion and the present alleged offense; 7.  The interests of any victim of the present offense(s); 23 8.  Any evaluations of the juvenile conducted by social service agencies, if available; and 9.  The interests of public safety, considering the likelihood that diversion of the present charge(s) would be successful in preventing the juvenile from committing additional offenses.
[brief] Cases  Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520 (1995)  ......................16, 17 C.H. v. Rahway Board of Education, 459 N.J. Super. 236 (App. Div. 2018)  ..................................................................................  16  George Van Tassel’s Community Funeral Home v. Town of Bloomfield, 8 N.J. Super. 524 (Ch. Div. 1950)  ..........................................................  21  Globe Motor v. Igdalev, 225 N.J. 469 (2016)  ...........................................  30  Hoffman v. Asseenontv.Com, Inc., 404 N.J. Super. 415 (App. Div. 2009) ..................................................................................  30  Housel v. Theodoridis, 314 N.J. Super. 597 (App. Div. 1998) ....................  32  Middletown Policemen’s Benevolent Ass’n v. Twp.  of Middletown, 162 N.J. 361 (2000) .............................................................................  41 Miller v. Miller, 97 N.J. 154 (1984) ..........................................................  41 N.J. Mfrs. Ins. Co. for Smith v. Public Service Elec. & Gas Co., 234 N.J. Super. 116 (App. Div. 1989) .....................................................  39 N.J. Transit Corp. v. Franco, 447 N.J. Super. 361 (App. Div. 2016) ............  28 Pron v. Carlton Pools, Inc., 373 N.J. Super. 103 (App. Div. 2004) .............  17 Ranchlands, Inc. v. Twp. of Stafford, 305 N.J. Super. 528 (App. Div. 1997) ..................................................................................  41 Robbins v. Jersey City, 23 N.J. 229 (1957)  ..............................................  30 Sellers v. Schonfeld, 270 N.J. Super. 424 (App. Div. 1993) .......................  30 Steelcase, Inc. v. Div. of Taxation, 13 N.J. Tax 182 (1993)..........................  18 Statutes N.J.S.A. 40:55D-53.a.........................................................................................  44 N.J.S.A. 40:55D-53.j ..................................................................................... passim N.J.S.A. 40:67-1 ...............................................................................................  29 N.J.S.A. 40:67-19 ............................................................................................  29 N.J.S.A. 46:26A-3 ...........................................................................................  43  N.J.S.A. 46:26B-2............................................................................................  20  Other Authorities P.L. 1975, c. 291.  1991 N.J. Sess. Law Serv. Ch. 301 (Senate 2406) (West) ......................................................................................  27 Rules R. 4:46-5............................................................................................................. 31 R. 4:46-2.............................................................................................................16, 31 Regulations N.J.A.C. 18:23A-1.1 .........................................................................................  42 N.J.A.C. 18:23A-1.15 ......................................................................................  42  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
[brief] In doing so, Plaintiff pointed to specific facts within the Complaint showing:  (1) Plaintiff held a reasonable belief Defendants conduct violated either a law, rule, regulation, or public policy; (2) Plaintiff performed a “whistle blowing” activity due to same; (3) Defendants took adverse employment action against Plaintiff following her whistle blowing activity; and (4) a causal connection existed between the whistle blowing and adverse employment action.  Specifically, Plaintiff pointed to particular facts in the Complaint about her awareness of Defendants’ failure to adhere to a proper staff ratio and proper staff training under N.J.A.C. § 10:44A which required adequate care was consistently given to each resident individual.  (PA000006-PA000007).  For example, Plaintiff knew having other resident individuals, who were developmentally disabled, left alone unsupervised while staff escorted another resident to the bathroom was a significant safety concern.  Id.  Plaintiff also voiced concerns about the frequency in movement between the understaffed facilities, and the insufficient staff training in various situations, such as administering medication and preventing abuse or neglect.  (PA000007-PA000008).  Such facts corresponded to the regulations set forth in Plaintiff’s Complaint, and thus formed her objectively reasonable belief that Defendants were violating the law, rule, regulation, and its underlying public policy.  (PA000006-PA000008).  On January 16, 2023, Defendants filed a Reply Brief to Plaintiff’s Opposition and Cross Motion, largely reiterating their previous arguments from the initial filing.
[brief] POINT TWO  [Appeal of jurisdiction issues]  (Argued at Pa369 – Pa371)  A primary jurisdiction analysis requires the court to determine whether the matter at issue is within the conventional experience of judge, is peculiarly within the agency’s discretion or expertise, whether inconsistent rulings would disrupt the statutory scheme, and whether prior application has been made to the agency.  The application, interpretation, and enforcement of the school law, State aid statute, N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-1, et seq., is not within the conventional experience of judges; is a matter peculiarly in the Commissioner of Education’s discretion; inconsistent rulings will disrupt the statutory scheme; and no application to the Commissioner was made by [...].
[brief] Exhibit H: Plaintiff’s First Set of Interrogatories And First Request for Production of Documents A117  Exhibit I: October 7, 2022  Order Attached as A12  Exhibit J: Defendant’s Answers to Interrogatories And Notice to Produce A164  Exhibit K: Plaintiff’s Deficiency Letter to Defendants A214  Exhibit L: Defendants’ Response to Deficiency Letter A218  Exhibit M: March 3, 2023
[brief] Mfrs. Ins. Co., 295 N.J. Super. 613 (App. Div. 1996) which held that estoppel may only be invoked when the party seeking estoppel has justifiably relied on the actions of other parties.  Id.  The Court also cited to and relied on the matter Reliable Newspaper Delivery, Inc. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 131 N.J.L. 424, 426 (E. & A. 1943) which found no prejudice, and therefore, no estoppel due to a “mere delay in giving information as to noncoverage. ”  Id.  In all matters where equitable estoppel has been asserted, the Courts have repeatedly held that detrimental reliance is the essential element of a claim for estoppel.
[brief] Given the one time per month regular meeting schedule of the Defendant Planning Board, and given that the next meeting of the Borough Council (when the matter was to be voted on) was scheduled to occur before the next regular meeting of the Planning Board, the Planning Board was under a significant time pressure within which to transmit its report (on the proposed second Amendment to the Redevelopment Plan).  Had the Planning Board not authorized its attorney to immediately send the February 17, 2021 letter to the Borough Clerk of the [...], then, in that event, the Governing Body would not have had the benefit of the Planning Board comments prior to the Governing Body’s adoption of the Ordinance amending the Redevelopment Plan.  Thus, the timing of the situation demanded immediate Board action – and in the absence of such immediate Board action (i.e. the February 17, 2021 letter from the Board Attorney), the meaningful Planning Board input / involvement would have been silenced / eliminated / not considered.  The elimination of the otherwise statutorily authorized Planning Board review of the matter would be detrimental to the Planning Board, the [...], and the residents of the [...] as well.  That is, had the Board Attorney not immediately issued the subject February 17, 2021 letter, the Governing Body would have been denied of the very important comments / concerns / findings as issued by the Board (which also incorporated any potential comments from the public).  The subject statute provides the Land Use Board with a very important role in the redevelopment process – and the public interest would not have been served if the Land Use Board did not immediately transmit its Findings / Determinations to the Governing Body.  As such, the Respondent Planning Board respectfully submits that the timing of the governing body meeting (when action on the Redevelopment Plan Amendment would be taken) mandated that the Board’s report findings be immediately transmitted to the governing body.
[brief] That means that you can arrange for the premises to be sold, as provided by law, in order to pay off what I owe you.  If the money you receive from the sale is not enough to pay off what I owe you, I still owe you the difference. ”  Pa44  The clawback by the Bankruptcy Court of $60,000 of previously made loan payments made by [...], caused a default under the 2012 Note.  Under the above cross-default provision (Pa44), a default under the 2012 mortgage constituted a default under the 2022 mortgage.  This default exists to date, and the [...] remain in possession of the mortgaged security.
[brief] The [...] disagreed, by taking the contrary position that “the goals and purposes of this act” did not include any requirement that the [...] assess or consider the project’s role in sprawl development or its air pollution emissions (including its contributions to the ongoing climate crisis).  Yet, the [...] made no findings of whether the project will play a role in more unwise sprawling development in the region or if this massive expansion of fossil fuel use and emissions of air pollutants (greenhouse gas emissions (“GHG emissions”)) will adversely impact the Highlands.  The [...] hid the truth that this project’s GHG emissions will unquestionably have adverse impacts on the natural resources in the Highlands.  Despite the overwhelming and known environmental threats posed by this project, the [...] has taken the position that the goals and purposes of the Highlands Act will not be hindered by the project’s role in sprawl development, its air pollution emissions, and associated contribution to anthropogenic climate change.  Much like the allegations of local harm from air pollution (or GHG emissions) in Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 522 (2007), the Environmental Appellants’ instant allegations of damage to the local Highlands resources cannot be ignored in the [...]’s Highlands Act consistency determination.
[brief] (quoting State v. Bey, 112 N.J. 123, 142 (1988)).  "Words used by a suspect are not to be viewed in a vacuum, but rather in 'the full context in which they were spoken.'"  Ibid. (quoting State v. Roman, 382 N.J. Super. 44, 64 (App. Div. 2005), certif. dismissed, 189 N.J. 420 (2007)).  A defendant need not use any "talismanic words" or phrases to invoke the right to remain silent.  Id. at 383.  In fact, "[a]ny words or conduct that reasonably appear to be inconsistent with [the] defendant's willingness to discuss his case with the police are tantamount to an invocation of the privilege against self-incrimination."  Bey, 112 N.J. at 136.  "[I]f the police are uncertain whether a suspect has invoked his right to remain silent, two alternatives are presented: (1) terminate the interrogation or (2) ask only those questions necessary to clarify whether the defendant intended to invoke his right to silence."
[brief] As to most of Plaintiff’s claims, they were directed to the [...], where the arrest took place, and to the Edison police officers who made the arrest.  To the extent that these claims could possibly be construed to apply to [...], they are subject to various immunities and defenses, as set forth below.  If should be noted that Plaintiff’s briefing style makes it difficult to separate out the arguments made against Edison and its police officers from those made against [...].  It appears that Points Four, Five, Seven and Eight of the brief attempt to set out allegations of error relating to [...], and that Points One, Two, Three and Six do not.
[brief] Defendants cannot isolate the 2022 Addendum from its transactional history.  The record supports a finding that the 2022 Addendum was unquestionably a continuation of the MOU’s rescue plan (Da310-14; 1T49:5-9) and the Operating Agreements’ structure (Da120-36, Da137-52).  As properly found by the lower court, the 2022 Addendum is rooted in the 2012 MOU and the subsequent Operating Agreements of [...] and [...] that were executed within 90 days thereafter.
[brief] Defendant argues that the trial court issued an improper limiting instruction regarding the permissible use of the evidence of Defendant and [...]’s tattoos.  He claims that the trial court improperly shifted the burden to the defense to provide an explanation for the tattoos prior to eliciting such testimony.  This argument is meritless because defense counsel consented to the instruction as given and contrary to his argument on appeal, defense counsel did, in fact, provide an alternative explanation to why he obtained his tattoos.  “Plain error in the context of a jury charge is ‘[l]egal impropriety in the charge prejudicially affecting the substantial rights of the defendant sufficiently grievous to justify notice by the reviewing court and to convince the court that of itself the error possessed a clear capacity to bring about an unjust result. ””  State v. Torres, 183 N.J. 554, 564 (2005).  “If a defendant fails to object to a trial court's instructions, the failure to challenge the jury charge is considered a waiver to object to the instruction on appeal. ”  State v. Faucette, 439 N.J. Super. 241, 270 (App. Div. 2015)
[brief] See, e.g., People v. Villareal, 216 N.E.3d 188 (Ill. 2023) (rejecting a substantive due process challenge to the gang enhancement penalties set forth in the unlawful possession of a firearm in public areas by a street gang member, under 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann.  5/24-1.8(a)).  In rejecting a substantive due process challenge to the enhanced penalty statute, the Illinois Supreme Court recognized that “the legislature’s decision to increase the penalty was reasonable and rationally related to its stated purpose of curbing gang violence against innocent citizens in public areas. ”  Villareal, 216 N.E.3d at 197.  Specifically, the Villareal court rejected a nexus challenge, like the one proffered in the instant appeal, reasoning that the legislature did not increase penalties for all offenses committed by a gang member, but rather, only targeted the specific violence of gang members possessing firearms in public areas to further the legislative purpose.  Ibid.  The court reasoned, “While requiring the possession of the firearm to be directly connected to specific gang activity may be an alternate means of accomplishing the legislative purpose, the rational basis test does not require the statute to be the best means of accomplishing the legislature’s objectives. ”  *Ibid.*  Defendant’s belated claim is nothing more than a veiled attempt to legislate, which should be rejected.  As the *Villareal* court put it, “The determination of the best means to achieve the legislative goal is best left to the legislature, not the courts. ”  *Id.* at 197.
[brief] On December 21, 2015, defendant [...] was charged in [...] with first-degree murder, N.J.S.A. 2C: 11-3(a)(1) and (2), second-degree possession of a firearm for an unlawful purpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(a); second degree unlawful possession of a firearm, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b); and second-degree certain person not permitted to possess a firearm, N.J.S.A. 2C39-7(b).  (Da 1-4)  Between September 20 and October 1, 2018, a jury trial was held before the Hon. [...], P.J.Cr., after which [...] was convicted of counts one through three; count four was dismissed.  (Da 5-8)  However, on February 15, 2022, this Court reversed [...]’s conviction and remanded for a new trial.  (Da9-45)  Among other errors, this Court found that [...] was denied a fair trial by the trial Court’s failure to redact from grant’s video-recorded police statement several inadmissible lay opinions offered by the interviewing detective, which opined on [...]’s guilt and credibility.  (Da 21-35)  In particular, this Court held that it was error to permit the jury to hear the detective’s opinion that (1) [...] was guilty of the shooting death of the victim and had an obligation to explain himself; (2) grant was lying about his alibi; and (3) surveillance video contradicted [...]’s alibi.  (Da 21-35)  Between September 15 and 27, 2022 a second jury trial was held again before [...], after which the jury found grant guilty of counts one and two.  (1T to 7T; 7T 7-1 to 23; Da 46)  The jury acquitted of count three, and count four was dismissed.  (7T 7-24 to 8-1; Da 46, 62)  On October 27, 2022, [...] heard and denied defendant’s motion for a judgment of acquittal or a new trial.  (8T)  On December 15, 2022, [...] merged count two into count one and sentence [...] on count one to life in prison with a period of parole ineligibility of sixty-three years and nine months pursuant to the No Early release Act (NERA), N.J.S.A. 2C 43-7.2.  (9T 36-15 to 56-20; Da 59-62)  On January 18, 2023 [...] filed a timely notice of appeal.  (Da 63-66)  **STATEMENT OF FACTS**
[brief] 9 | Document | Page Number | |-------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------| | Picture Taken Inside My Personal Residence that was Used by Defendants Without Consent on Social Media, Flyers, etc.  | Pa1 | | Original Picture Used by Defendants | Pa2 | | JEDS  Printout Showing Defendants Submitted Papers Only as ‘Reply Brief’ and did Not Submit a Motion For the Order to Show Cause  Dated January 2, 2024 | Pa3 | | Authority | Page Number | |-----------------------------------------------|-------------| | **Case Law:** | | | 3
[brief] SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY  APPELLATE DIVISION  DOCKET NO. [...]  INDICTMENT NO. [...] STATE OF NEW JERSEY, : CRIMINAL ACTION  Plaintiff-Respondent, : On Appeal from an Order of the v. : Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Union County.  [...], : Sat Below:  A/K/A  [...], : Hon. [...], J.S.C. A/K/A [...], : Defendant- Appellant.  :  DEFENDANT IS CONFINED  Your Honors:  This letter is submitted in lieu of a formal brief pursuant to R. 2:6-2(b).  New Jersey is an Equal Opportunity Employer  TABLE OF CONTENTS  PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND STATEMENT OF FACTS  ..................................  1 LEGAL ARGUMENT .........................................................................................  1 POINT  I DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO SUPPRESS SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED BECAUSE THE STOP OF [...]’S CAR WAS UNREASONABLE...........................................1  CONCLUSION
[brief] ....  12 - **Jennings v. Pinto**, 5 N.J. 562, 569-570 (1950)  ......................  8 - **Kiefer v. Best Buy**, 205 N.J. 213, 222-223 (2011)  .................  8 - **Manalapan Realty, L.P., v. Twp. Comm.**, 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995).  .  8  RULE 2:6-1
[brief] My filings met his cited motion reconsideration requirements (p. 44, last par. to p. 45, 1st 3 lines; Sect.  “I, p. 53-55).  2.  Judge ruled that oppositions by [...] & me to [...] legal fees for work from June 7 to July 9, ’23 for $4,120.48 was not approved in Oct. 2022 Rider since [...] provided written approval in Dec. ’21, & he would not change it based on our Cross-Motions.