ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] C.  An Assistant Prosecutor should consider seeking to revoke Seeking revocation of release. release and to detain the juvenile pending trial when the juvenile has violated conditions of release or incurred new charges.  An application to revoke release can be made even if the juvenile was originally charged on a summons.  There is a presumption to seek revocation of release when there is a determination that the State will be able to present evidence at a hearing to justify revocation and factors are present requiring detention pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-34(c) and 5:21-5, as discussed above.  Further consideration should Rule be given as to whether the juvenile’s release will obstruct, or attempt to obstruct, the criminal justice process, or threaten, injure, or intimidate, or attempt to threaten, injure, or intimidate, a prospective witness or victim.  1.  There is also a rebuttable presumption to seek revocation of release when the following conditions have been met:  a.  There is probable cause to believe that the juvenile committed a new first- or second-degree offense or an offense committed with a firearm while on pretrial release; b.  There is probable cause to believe that a juvenile, while on pretrial release, removed, tampered with, or rendered inoperable an electronic monitoring device required as a condition of pretrial release; or c.  The juvenile violated a protective order, no contact order, or stalking order.  2.  However, no application to revoke is required, if a County Prosecutor, or designee, determines that: a.  The risks posed by the juvenile’s release can be controlled adequately by seeking enhanced release conditions and monitoring; or 21 b.  The interests of justice would not be served by applying for revocation of release.  3.  If the determination is made to overcome the presumption of seeking revocation of release, the County Prosecutor, or designee, shall document the reason(s) for that decision in the case file.  Nothing in this section shall be construed to preclude the State from also seeking initial pretrial detention on new charges pursuant to this Directive.  VIII.
[brief] The positive criteria or special reasons for the grant of a d variance must be established with sufficient credible evidence by Applicants.  Here, the [...] presented no testimony that the use variance met any of the positive criteria.  The use is not inherently beneficial.  The special reasons presented must meet and support the general purposes of zoning.  *Medici v. BPR Co.*, 107 N.J. 1 (1987).  The term "special reasons" takes its definition and meaning from the general purposes of the zoning laws.  Those purposes are found in *N.J.S.A. 40:55D-2*.  *Burbridge v. Mine Hill*, 117 N.J. 376, 386 (1990).  The Applicant testified that the reason for the variance is that her house is too small and they have no storage.
[brief] [...] markets timeshares to consumers within a 150-mile radius and advertises timeshare sales via promotions, face-to-face transactions and its upgrade program.  Id. at ¶¶1-2.  Consumers may enter their personal information for the chance to win a promotion and consent to being contacted by a representative of the [...]; or a consumer is offered rewards in exchange for their time spent at a presentation in a face-to-face transaction; or they are telephoned and offered the same.  Id. at ¶3; Da71 ¶¶3-6; Da72 ¶¶7-8.
[brief] The New Jersey Supreme court has declared that “Other crimes evidence is considered highly prejudicial State v. Vallejo, 198 N.J. 122, 133 (2009) (citing State v. Stevens, 115, N.J. 289, 309 (1989).  The trial court in the above case matter admitted the 404-b evidence from the robbery case into the murder trial [...] is accused of, although it was in fact highly prejudicial.  Jamar [...] states that the trial court great error, and abused its discretion, when it admitted the evidence, and years later now, the New Jersey Supreme court has agreed that the stop was unlawful so everything seized from the stop was unlawfully obtained.  Thus anything used from the robbery case is prejudicial and illegal.  Jamar [...] simply request the New Jersey Appeals Court to stand by its “own” laws, and court rule (court R. 3:9-3(f) that states: “It shall afford a defendant the right to withdraw his or her plea (Page 4-5 of Table of authorities).  [...] prevailed on appeal and respectfully ask to withdraw his plea to go to trial, knowing he will now have a fair chance at trial.
[brief] (Da170).  On May 11, 2023, the Plaintiff-Respondent's attorney notified the Owners that the Buyer made inspection requests and forwarded copies of the reports to the Owners.  (Da172).  On May 11, 2023, [...], Esquire notified the Plaintiff-Respondent that he was not representing Defendant-Appellant or [...] with regard to any issues involving the sale of [...].  (Da175).  On May 12, 2023, Defendant-Appellant sent three emails to the other Owners and attorneys and ordered them to cease and desist and referenced "Litigation pending regarding 25 citation malfeasance identified (sic)."  (Da179-181).  On May 23, 2023, the Plaintiff-Respondent’s counsel sent the Owners correspondence via email and provided them with copies of the Buyer’s title commitment for the Property.  (Da186).  The May 23, 2023 letter from Plaintiff-Respondent’s counsel notified the Owners that he or she would be required to sign closing documents, including but not limited to a deed of conveyance, in order for the Plaintiff-Respondent to convey clear title to the Property to the Buyer.  (Da187).  Since some of the owners failed to confirm that they would execute the necessary documents to convey title to the Buyer, the Plaintiff-Respondent filed a Verified Complaint and Order to Show Cause that sought to obtain a judgment approving the sale of the Property to [...] for the sale price of Five Hundred Thousand ($500,000.00) Dollars and authorizing him to sign any necessary closing documents on behalf of any Owner that would be necessary to convey clear and marketable title to the Property to the Buyer.  (Da15).  On August 29, 2023, Respondent [...] filed an Answer to the Complaint.  (Da523).  On September 13, 2023, Defendant-Appellant filed an Answer to the Plaintiff-Respondent’s Verified Complaint.  (Da462).  On September 13, 2023, Defendant-Appellant filed a Notice of Motion Seeking Permission to File a Counterclaim (Da481).  Oral argument was conducted in person on October 13, 2013, at which time the Honorable [...], P.J.Ch. entered a judgment confirming the private sale of lands (Da1) and an order that denied the Defendant-Appellant’s Notice of Motion Seeking Permission to File a Counterclaim.  (Da4).  Thereafter, Defendant-Appellant filed this appeal.
[brief] Pa001-Pa020.  With respect to [...], Plaintiff seems to claim that the municipal court improperly processed the judgment and conviction records, which allegedly “procedurally disallowed [Plaintiff] from successfully filing an appeal in the Superior Court Criminal Law Division. ”  Pa002 (¶4). ³  A few points should be made regarding the discovery and litigation that took place in the Law Division.  First, Plaintiff did not take any depositions, Pa338, ¶4, nor did he retain any liability or damages experts.  Pa341, ¶¶20, 21.  Second, Plaintiff never documented any treatment for injuries claimed to have been suffered at the time of his arrest.  On the night of his arrest, Plaintiff was taken to [...] and was “medically cleared and then transported to [...] without incident. ”  Pa023.  Plaintiff did not provide documentation or description of any treatment at Robert Wood Johnson in discovery.  About three or four months after his arrest in February 2020, Plaintiff testified that he had a single medical evaluation at the [...] in [...] for problems that he claims to have experienced with his neck, hands, lower back and knee.  Pa342, ¶22; Pa439-Pa440 (T35:11-T36:21).  Plaintiff admitted that he did not receive any treatment for any alleged emotional distress.  Pa342, ¶23; Pa439 (T35:3-8).
[brief] CASES  Balian v. General Motors, 121 N.J. Super. 118 (App. Div. 1972)  ............. 10, 11, 23 Ex parte Fuller, 620 So. 2d 675 (Ala. 1993) ........................................  16 Fisher v. State, 643 S.W.2d 571 (Ark. Ct. App. 1982) ..........................  16  Kalola v. Eisenberg, 344 N.J. Super. 198 (Law Div. 2001) .................... 9, 21 Kindred v. State, 524 N.E.2d 279 (Ind. 1988) .....................................  16  Konop v. Rosen, 425 N.J. Super. 391 (App. Div. 2012) ....................... 9, 23 People v.  Dennis, 956 N.E.2d 998 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011) ........................................ passim People v. Taylor, 956 N.E.2d 431 (Ill. 2011) ......................................................... 15, 21, 23 People v. Tuncap, CRA12-032, 2014 WL 235471, at *7 (Guam Jan. 16, 2014) ........................................................................................................ passim State v. Anglemyer, 691 N.W.2d 153 (Neb. 2005) ...................................................... 16 State v. Bassano, 67 N.J. Super. 526 (App. Div. 1961) ................................................. 9 State v. Brown, 463 N.J. Super. 33 (App. Div. 2020) ................................................... passim State v. Bunting, 187 N.J. Super. 506 (App. Div. 1983) ............................................. 11, 12, 14, 23 State v. Haight-Gyuro, 186 P.3d 33 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2008) ............................................ 16 State v. Hannah, 448 N.J. Super. 78 (App. Div. 2016) ............................................... passim State v. Hockett, 443 N.J. Super. 605 (App. Div. 2016) .............................................. 8 State v. Howard-French, 468 N.J. Super. 448 (App. Div. 2021) .................................... 25 State v. Joseph, 426 N.J. Super. 204 (App. Div. 2012) ............................................... 10 State v. Knight, 477 N.J. Super. 400 n.12 (App. Div. 2023), aff’d, 259 N.J. 407 (2024) ........................................................................................................... 21 State v. Loftin, 287 N.J. Super. 76 (App. Div. 1996) ................................................... 8, 10, 23 State v. Luke, 464 P.3d 914 (Haw. Ct. App. 2020) ....................................................... 16 State v. Marroccelli, 448 N.J. Super. 349 (App. Div. 2017) ......................................... 9 State v. Mays, 321 N.J. Super. 619 (App. Div. 1999) ................................................... 8, 22 State v. Nantambu, 221 N.J. 390 (2015)
[directive] of or  Any expenditure forfeiture funds, like expenditure of other public finds, the of to shall be subject public bidding requirements imposed upon the funding the entity.  2  1210  Where forfeited property, including motor vehicles, cannot be divided as required sell by N.J.S.A. the general policy this State shall be the property divide 2C-64-7, and of to the proceeds as set forth this standard operating procedure rather then to retain the in for property enforcement use.
[brief] [...] acknowledged, however, that not a single Pipeline Right transitioned to become an Additional Backlog Project in accordance with the requirements that were so important that they are stated redundantly in four separate provisions of the PTA.  Da280-288 [Tr. 357:19-358:5, 398:20-401:10].  Yet, in the exercise of extra-contractual powers, the Arbitrator proceed to award [...] unpaid EGP amounts on 10 non-Backlog projects, based on the EGP [...] alleged in its Fourth Amended Detailed Statement of Claim (the “[...]’s Statement of Claim”) that was amended during the Arbitration hearing.
[brief] FACTS  The Spouse of Petitioner and Mother to their two sons, Decedent, [...], was age 43 and a full-time schoolteacher at Respondent’s middle school when she passed away on May 18, 2021.  (Ra1-2).  It is not disputed by Respondent that Decedent was employed as a full-time teacher during the January 2021 through May 2021 period of occupational exposure set forth in the Claim Petition, as admitted in Respondent’s Answer.  (Ra3).  It is also undisputed that the New Jersey Covid State of Emergency (which triggers the applicability of the Covid presumption) was in effect during the claimed period of occupational exposure.  (See Executive Order #103, Ra8-15).  Decedent was required by Respondent to return to in-school instruction as part of the Executive Order #175 known as the “school reopening plan” which went into effect in September 2020 for the 2020-2021 school year.  (Pa7 to 17).  FACTS TO BE PROVED AT TRIAL
[brief] That means that if there were previous subdivisions made on the property after a certain year, a subsequent minor subdivision is converted into a major subdivision so as to prevent the total number of lots exceeding the maximum number of lots imposed by the ordinance.  In this case, while the proposed subdivision meets four of a five part ordinance standard, it does not qualify as a minor subdivision because the property was subject to a prior subdivision after 1967.  In this case, the approved subdivision merely involved the drawing of lot lines on the Township's tax maps to create new lots.  No physical disturbance or development was authorized by the Board's subdivision approval.  Further, any impacts from the proposed eventual development were associated with the site plan, rather than the subdivision application.  [...]’s application contained all required documents by the Board, which were available to the public and considered by the Board during the subdivision hearing.  Nowhere in the Municipal Land Use Law (“MLUL”) or [...]'s Ordinances demands that the Applicant provide testimony on every single component of an application if it is not identified as an issue.
[brief] * *Id* at 555.  There, the plaintiff’s property was designated as an area in need of redevelopment under the LRHL.  The Redevelopment Agreement provided that the redeveloper was responsible for the “costs of all reasonable infrastructure repairs or improvements within the Redevelopment Area,” whether or not those improvements were associated with the property to be developed.  *Id.* at 558.  The City Council, as the “Redevelopment Agency,” had adopted a resolution requiring the plaintiff to contribute to the cost of off-site infrastructure improvements which it also incorporated into an Ordinance.  That Ordinance did not, however, include “a specific methodology for the calculation of off-site infrastructure contributions. ”  *Id.* at 561.  Plaintiff, who was not a redeveloper, filed an action challenging the resolution and the ordinance as unauthorized by the Municipal Land Use Law.  The trial court granted the City’s motion for summary judgment and plaintiff appealed.  This Court reversed.  The Court first ruled first that the City’s Resolution was not applicable to the plaintiff because it was not a redeveloper.  This Court then announced a second basis for its decision finding that the LRHL did not independently authorize such an assessment:  *Second, we disagree both with the Law Division judge’s view that the LRHL supersedes the MLUL and with his holding that the MLUL independently authorized the City to impose off-site infrastructure costs on plaintiff.*
[brief] This case challenges the legality of a thirty-year exemption from real property taxes granted by [...] to the developer [...] for a 1,077 unit residential development which will include a 20% set-aside for affordable housing (“the Project”).  Plaintiffs do not question the value of the Project in responding to area needs for housing, particularly affordable housing.  All at issue is the justification under the Long Term Tax Exemption Law for an exemption for a development that stands to be extremely profitable to [...] but that will inflict a major cost on the Boroughs by shifting $25,000,000 of school tax burden to their taxpayers.  Central to the appeal is the meaning of the statutory criteria for a tax exemption in the Long Term Tax Exemption Law (LTTEL) N.J.S.A. 40A:20-1et seq. and whether the criteria can be satisfied by conclusory recitals or whether the statute requires evidentiary support.  Plaintiffs argue that the criteria require supportable findings that the exemption is necessary to make a development Project financially feasible.  The Trial Court disagreed, ruling that so long as procedural formalities for exemption are observed, LTTEL does not obligate the municipality to provide any evidence supporting its findings.  The Court denied Plaintiffs discovery of defendants’ underlying financial analyses and, although Plaintiff’s expert report called the findings into serious question, it discounted that report, stating that there was no disputed factual issue to explore because the recitals in the Ordinance were all the LTTEL required.  Plaintiffs maintain that the Trial Court applied the wrong legal analysis to the interpretation of the LTTEL.  Its analysis, essentially immunizing long-term tax exemptions from meaningful judicial review, could invite misuse of the exemption power to achieve ends wholly unrelated to the redevelopment goals of the statute.  Plaintiffs also maintain that defendant [...]’s determination that a thirty-year term exemption was necessary to make the development financially feasible and to influence buyers to locate there lacks credibility.  The record shows that defendant [...], with the exemption, will realize an unleveraged internal rate of return of 67.9% on its invested capital.  It further shows that an exemption structured to require buyers to pay almost full taxes for 25 of the 30 year period cannot plausibly be viewed as a means of influencing purchasers to locate there.  Plaintiffs further maintain that the real purposes for the exemption were the improper ones of shifting a significant portion of the school tax burden, estimated at $25,000,000 over thirty years, to Plaintiffs, and of generating a new and lucrative source of revenue for Defendant [...].  Plaintiffs maintain that the LTTEL must be interpreted to require substantial evidence showing that an exemption is in fact necessary to make a redevelopment project happen.  Accordingly, Plaintiffs ask this Court to reverse the Trial Court’s ruling to the contrary and to grant appropriate relief.
[brief] Pa436 o Exhibit G, Plaintiff’s Application for Admission to Doctor of Pharmacy Program Pa439 o Exhibit H, January 9, 2012 email from Defendant, [...] advising Plaintiff he was selected to interview for the [...] School of Pharmacy 2012 Inaugural Class to take place on January 31, 2012  Pa444 o Exhibit I, Defendant, [...]’s School of Pharmacy website pages where Plaintiff witnesses at least seven (7) iterations of [...] School of Pharmacy’s home website page from dates prior to Plaintiff starting the Pharm D program in August of 2012.  Pa448 o Exhibit J, Significant changes to [...] School of Pharmacy’s website page on September 22, 2012 o Exhibit K, Email dated July 21, 2013 from [...] who advised Plaintiff he would be able to matriculate to the MBA Program later when his GPA was where it needed to be so he may still finish the dual degree program by 2016.  o Exhibit L, letter dated July 23, 2013 from [...] School of Pharmacy advising he had been placed on “academic probation for failure to meet the minimum 2.75 grade point ratio as required for progression in the program.  o Exhibit M, August 1, 2023 email from [...] to [...] and [...], University Provost and Senior VP for Academic Affairs, advising them of Plaintiff’s application and that he would be eligible for the MBA program as long as his “UG GPA and the GMAT” score were met.  [...] noted that Plaintiff would be deemed admissible to the MBA regardless of his status as a Pharm D. student.  o Exhibit N, Transcript of deposition of [...] o Exhibit O, Transcript of deposition of [...], Ed.D. o Exhibit P, June 23, 2014 letter, again stating that Plaintiff was on academic probation after the Spring 2014 grades were submitted o Exhibit Q, Grade change forms as Defendant [...] entered Plaintiff’s grades incorrectly on two separate occasions o Exhibit R, August 29, 2016 email correspondence from Plaintiff to [...] advising Plaintiff only needed to complete two additional classes to complete his health information masters track for the dual degree program.
[brief] ”  Mogull, supra, 162 N.J. at 464, 744 A.2d 1186 (quoting R. 2:10-2).  If not, the error is deemed harmless and disregarded.  Toto v. Ensuar, 196 N.J. 134, 144 (2008) (emphasis added).  In other words, if a party fails to object to a charge at the time of trial, it is judged under the “plain error” standard, under which a charge is reversible error only “if the jury could have come to a different result had it been correctly instructed. ”  Gonzalez v. Silver, 407 N.J. Super. 576, 586 (App. Div. 2009) (citing Velazquez v. Portadin, 163 N.J. 677, 688 (2000)).  The Plain Error standard is a high bar to clear, and as such, “[i]t ought to be an unusual case where a court will set aside a verdict for an error in the charge, if it exists, which is not called to the attention of the trial judge by a proper exception.
[directive] C.  Organization of  With the approval of the Attorney General, the Executive Director may organize the work of the Office into organizational units as may be necessary for the efficient and effective operation of the Office.  The Executive Director may delegate to employees in the Office and its constituent organizational units such powers as the Executive Director deems appropriate, to be exercised subject to the supervision and control of the Executive Director.  The Attorney General shall assign to the Office such employees of [...] as may be necessary to assist the Executive Director in the performance of their duties.  To the extent not inconsistent with law, the Attorney General may delegate duties to the Executive Director to assist the Office in fulfilling its purpose.  D.  Duties of the OPSI Executive Director.
[brief] ”  *Flanigan v. Munson*, supra.  The party seeking imposition of a constructive trust bears the burden of establishing its right to that remedy by clear and convincing evidence.  *Dessel v. Dessel*, 122 N. J. Super 119, 121 (App. Div. 1972).  A two part test is employed in order to find a constructive trust, namely, (1) a party must have committed a wrongful act, and (2) the wrongful act must result in a transfer of property that unjustly enriches the recipient.  Ibid.  The *Flanagan* court stated that “we caution courts generally that a constructive trust is a powerful tool to be used only when the equities of a given case clearly warrant it. ”  Id. at 611.  The equities here do not warrant it.
[directive] lndt~ ce•lnl!Sl1ill F.ilnwss•OU,lltyStrvlce Track Application for Promotion to Phase 5  A: Name Date Submitted I  Current Address: Street City State Zip Code Telephone Email if  The following criteria must be met in order to phase up: (check box task is completed) of I have been in Phase 4 for a minimum 90 days.  Date entered phase 4: of of I have a minimum 60 consecutive days sobriety.  Sobriety date: if in I am engaged treatment and attending regularly, applicable.  Counselor verification signature: of I am following the conditions supervision.  Probation Officer verification signature: I am engaged in recovery support groups.  Home group: I am engaged in pro-social activities.  Activities: I am employed or going to school.  Where: of Three  my biggest struggles in Phase 4:  Three accomplishments in Phase 4:  Three personal goals I would like to accomplish prior to completion: will  Three ways I maintain my recovery and remain law abiding:  Date  Client Signature Track Application for Promotion to Phase 5