ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] In their exercise can promptly applicants the that practicable so as expeditiously as approved be too, So firearm. a carry and/or acquire to regulations and law  Jersey New under rights lawful denied be should requirements regulatory statutory and of the all satisfy not do that applications to appeal an initiate to their right exercise may promptly applicants those that expeditiously so so. do to choose they should courts the and statutes firearms State enforce must agencies police all timeliness, to addition In each for standards qualification the prescribes law State uniformly. and objectively regulations licensing firearms of capacity the in serving agencies Police application. permit of type or reflecting local standards and policies different applying prohibited from are authorities from prohibited are and firearms, civilian of regulation appropriate for the views personal items of the beyond goes information that of provision the or forms of submission the requiring judicial or forms, application Police State the 2C:58-3(e), N.J.S.A. by authorized information or conditions no shall be ("There 2C:58-3(fl N.J.S.A. ems., See, law. the interpreting authority licensing the by required or application, the of content form or the to added requirements specifically are that those than other identification card, or permit a of issuance the for authority chapter."). in this forth set be application must permit a approve to whether decision agency's enforcement law A the pertaining to circumstances individualized the considering basis, case-by-case a on made been has applicant the that (e.g;, objective are criteria disqualification statutory
[directive] DISORDERLY PERSONS OFFENSES AND PETTY DISORDERLY PERSONS OFFENSES Note:  Some of these offenses are listed elsewhere in Bail Schedule 2 as lesser included offenses  STATUTES WHERE BAIL MAY BE SET BY A SUPERIOR COURT JUDGE OR A MUNICIPAL COURT JUDGE OR, IN THE MUNICIPAL COURT JUDGE’S ABSENCE, THE MUNICIPAL COURT ADMINISTRATOR OR DEPUTY COURT ADMINISTRATOR, PURSUANT TO RULE 3:26-2 (Rule 3:3-1(c)(1) (indictable offenses) and Rule 7:2-2(b) (non-indictable offenses) delineate factors regarding whether a warrant or summons should issue.  Rule 3:26-1 (indictable offenses) and Rule 7:4-1 (non-indictable offenses) delineate factors to be considered when setting bail and provide for the option of R.O.R. bail where appropriate.  Bail Ranges for attempts or conspiracies should generally be the same as the actual substantive crime.  Statute Charge Description  Degree  Bail Range 10%  Cash  Bail Option  Actor possesses tools commonly used to commit theft or burglary with purpose to so 2C:5-5(a)(b)  Burglar’s Tools  Disorderly Persons  $500 to $2,500 10% permissible employ.
[brief] Page  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ........................................................................................................ iii  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT .................................................................................................  1  I.  PROCEDURAL HISTORY ....................................................................................................  3  II.  STATEMENT OF FACTS .....................................................................................................  4  III.  LAW AND ARGUMENT ......................................................................................................  6  A.  Pleading Standard ..........................................................................................................  6  B.  Standard of Review .......................................................................................................  7  C.  Appellant’s Claims Were Properly Dismissed For Lack Of Standing Under New Jersey Law ..................................................................................................................
[directive] 2.  A law enforcement agency shall also apply for a complaint-warrant, an Assistant unless Prosecutor or a Designated Supervisory Officer determines that the presumption of charging by complaint-warrant is overcome, in cases where the present offense was committed: a.  While the juvenile was presently released for any other crime or disorderly persons offense; b.  While the juvenile was on probation, participating in the Juvenile Intensive Supervision Program (JSP), under supervision of a residential program, or under Megan’s Law pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2; or c.  When the juvenile was recently adjudicated, meaning within the past twelve months, for an offense involving a firearm or a first- or second-degree offense.  17  Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to preclude consideration of other adjudications of delinquency, when determining if a complaint-warrant should be requested.
[directive] Revised Form Promulgated by 12/31/2019 Supplement to Directive #01-18, [...] Defendant's Initials  Skmygowany formularz opublikowany 31.12.2019r. w suplemencie do Dyrektywy #01-18, CN 10079-Polish lnicjaly oskarzonego page 6 of 7  /strona 6 z 7
[brief] The Trial Court Correctly Determined that [...]’s Failure to Waive [...]’s Omission of the Notice of Classification was Improper (1T61:2-13)  The trial court rightfully held that [...]’s failure to waive [...]’s technical and immaterial omission of the Notice of Classification was improper because it deprived [...] taxpayers of more than $35,000 in savings without any sound business reason for doing so.  A public entity (like [...]) may only refuse to waive a non-material defect if its refusal is for valid reasons, non-pretextual, is grounded in sound business judgment and does not contradict the underlying purposes of public bidding requirements.  Dobco, Inc. v. Brockwell & Carrington Contractors, Inc., 441 N.J. Super. 148, 159 (Law Div. 2015).  A primary purpose of public bidding laws is to benefit the taxpayer.  Borough of Princeton v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders of Mercer, 169 N.J. 135, 159-160 (2001)(stating “[w]e have noted that ‘[p]ublic bidding statutes exist for the benefit of taxpayers, not bidders, and should be construed with sole reference to the public good’”)(internal citation omitted).
[brief] The Court also noted that undue influence will be found where the donor justifiably reposes confidence in the donee and the donee has superior knowledge of the true nature of the transaction proposed by him and “the detriment to be suffered by the donor if he engages in it. ”  Id. at 32.  Emphasis added.  [...]’s gift does not fit within this example either.  [...] did not propose the $50,000.00 gift. [...] did (2T36:5-12).  This was uncontested testimony at trial.  Neither has [...] suffered any detriment.  On the contrary, [...] and his wife got to live in the house that they wanted in Florida.  No detriment there.  Furthermore, the Court found that the elderly [...]’s are paying far below market rent for a Crystal Springs condominium, so no detriment can be found there (6T25:21-26:13).  The Pascale Court further notes that the granting of a Power of Attorney by the donor to the donee can generally be accepted as an indication of trust and a confidential relationship.  Id. at 34.  Interestingly, nothing in the record indicates that [...] [...] or Ramona [...] ever appointed [...] or Arlene [...] as their Power of Attorney.  In fact, the only Powers of Attorney known to exist are the ones prepared by the son, Noel [...], for his parents’ signature, in which he is appointed their Agent (2T90:6-9), an indicator that it is Noel who has the confidential relationship, not Johnny or Arlene.  The Pascale Court notes that undue influence will also be found where the donees promise to take care of the donor in return for the gift.  Id. at 34.  The record in our case is devoid of any such promise as an enticement to make the gift, and none is alleged.  The Pascale Court moved on to determine on what grounds such a presumption of undue influence due to a confidential relationship between parent and child could be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence by defendants.
[directive] Investigations of officer misconduct may proceed in one of two ways.  An investigation may be conducted for the purpose of imposing a disciplinary sanction or initiating a criminal prosecution.  The distinction between the two is important because each type of investigation has differing legal requirements.  Consequently, it is important that the internal affairs investigator be familiar with proper investigative techniques and legal standards for each type of proceeding.  It is essential that experienced investigators be assigned to internal affairs investigations.  Each investigator must be skilled in interviews and interrogation, observation, surveillance and report writing.  4.2.4
[brief] Under the New Jersey Local Lands and Buildings Law, a municipality may acquire property by eminent domain for public use.  The statute states:  Any county, by resolution, or any municipality, by ordinance, *may provide for the acquisition of any real property*, capital improvement, or personal property:  (1)  By purchase, gift, devise, lease, exchange, condemnation, or installment purchase agreement; (2)  Subject to lawful conditions, restrictions or limitations as to its use by the county or municipality, provided the governing body accepts such lawful conditions, restrictions or limitations.  When any county or municipality shall have acquired any real property, capital improvement or personal property upon any lawful condition, restriction or limitation, it is hereby authorized to take such steps as may be necessary and proper to the compliance by the county or municipality with such lawful conditions, restrictions or limitations.  [N.J.S.A. 40A:12-5(a) (emphasis added).
[brief] ”  Id.  The plaintiff in Cox had incurred a debt for home repairs under a contract with [...] by which [...] had also recorded a lien on the plaintiff's property.  Analogous to the instant action, the plaintiff in Cox, “by virtue of his contract with [a merchant] . . . incurred a legal obligation in the form of a debt. ”  Id.  However, in Cox, “the debt and the lien, although losses to Cox . . . were not the result of [the merchant’s] violation of the [CFA].  Rather, those losses occurred before any consumer fraud took place. ”  Id; see also Hoffman v. Asseenontv.Com., Inc., 404 N.J. Super. 415, 428-29 (App. Div. 2009) (In Hoffman, the Court held that an improper credit card authorization was not an ascertainable loss under the CFA because it was not a “charge,” but reasoned that a charge on a credit account—even if unpaid—constitutes an ascertainable loss under the CFA; the factors considered by the Court in Hoffman included the loss of creditworthiness and overall effect on credit due to the existence of the improper debt—factors highly relevant here).  In the case at bar, [...]’s alleged debt became void—and thus improper—contemporaneously to Defendants’ first violation of the CFA.  Thus, the improper debt causally arose from Defendants’ violations of the CFA—distinguishing the facts here from *Cox*.  But for Defendants’ violations of the NJCFLA, [...]’s alleged debt would not necessarily be improper.
[brief] [Pa0001-23]  Even if plaintiffs’ Complaint against the dismissed defendants were reinstated, [...] would be obligated to engage in wasteful and duplicative litigation in court against the dismissed defendants and in NFADR against the billing medical entities who possess assignments of their patients’ claims.  This multi-track litigation gives rise to the possibility of inconsistent results and is highly inefficient for both the parties and the adjudicating bodies.  The purpose of the entire controversy doctrine is to “encourage comprehensive and conclusive litigation determinations, avoid fragmentation of litigation, and promote party fairness and judicial efficiency….
[brief] Based upon the dismissal of the tortious interference claim, the Trial Court then dismissed the civil conspiracy claim:  [S]imilarly, there’s no conspir - -- there’s no conspiracy here.  Two or [more] persons acting in concert to commit an unlawful act or commit a lawful act by unlawful means.  There’s nothing unlawful that -- that -- that’s been alleged or . . . certainly proven thus far in discovery that they did anything that was unlawful, other than trying [to] buy -- and buying another business.  The Trial Court also granted summary judgment to dismiss Plaintiffs’ declaratory judgment and unjust enrichment claims.
[brief] ([...] Dep. 143:22-144:6, 532a; 182:18-183:18, 542a).  Additionally, at the public Township Committee meeting on August 21, 2017, [...] stated, while specifically referencing a complaint of racial profiling, that the Township Committee wanted to “make sure that [...] doesn’t come back to work on September 1, 2017 and that the Township Committee is going to continue to work on his separation from the Police Department”.  (327a, ¶7).  [...] confirmed in his deposition that was in fact the intent of the Committee.  ([...] Dep. 148:18-149:1, 533a).  Specifically, if Plaintiff rescinded his notice to retire on September 1, 2017, then [...] and the rest of the Township Committee would have actively sought to terminate Plaintiff.  (Id. at 150:1-151:13, 534a).  Defendant [...] went so far as to send an email to an on-line media website, the [...], stating, “it is the TC’s [the Township Committees’] desire to not have [...] return to the [...]”.  (421a; DeLuca Dep. 149:4-150:8, 702a-703a).
[brief] The underlying lawsuit is not a breach of contract claim, but a negligence action where the primary issue is whether Defendants within a reasonable period of time made the parking lot be in a reasonably safe condition.  Nevertheless, the lower court permitted repeated questioning and evidence regarding the snow removal contracts which had absolutely no bearing on the Defendants’ duty of care.  In particular, Defendants take issue with the evidence regarding the 6 AM completion time set forth in the contract, the contract language stating “SAFETY IS NOT TO BE COMPROMISED”, and the contract language stating the agreement is not be subcontracted out.  (Da 85, 89, 94, 108).  Defendants maintain that the snow removal contracts are irrelevant to the ultimate issue, that is, whether defendants breached their duty to remove snow and ice from the parking lot within a reasonable period of time.  As set forth above in Point I, this duty of care upon commercial landowners is set forth by extensive common law and Model Civil Jury Charge 5.20B(2)(b) only.  As such, the snow contracts have no bearing or relevance to same.  Even as to the duty of [...], the snow removal contractor here, any contractual obligations imposed on Xtreme is entirely separate from and irrelevant to the snow contractor’s common law duty to perform snow removal in a careful and prudent manner.
[brief] F.  The Court Below Appropriately Scheduled the Motions and Made Proper Determinations in Accordance with the Court Rules.  (Pb28-Pa29).  Per the Rules of Court, Motions are briefed well in advance of any oral argument which is scheduled at the discretion of the Court.  See R. 1:6-3(a); see also R. 1:6-2(d).  Oral argument is an opportunity for a party to highlight their argument and to answer any of the questions that the Court may have.  On rare occasions oral argument is an opportunity to provide the Court with additional information that was not available prior to Motion papers being submitted.  Oral argument is not an opportunity to formulate entirely new legal reasoning or present surprise facts and circumstances; in fact, the Court Rules discourage such gamesmanship.  See R. 1:6-5 ("Briefs may not be submitted after the time fixed by this rule or by court order, including the pretrial order, without leave of court, which may be applied for ex parte.").  If the Court hears nothing of note at oral argument and the Court has already considered the issues for which papers were previously submitted then it is ready to make its decision and more time would be entirely unnecessary.  If the Court does hear something of note, then the Court is entitled to make a decision at a later date after further consideration.  Either way the Court, would be well versed in the positions of the parties per the Motion papers, including briefs, filed with the Court and may make a decision on the return date, i.e., date of oral argument, if the Court so chooses.  As discussed above, Motions for recusal are appropriately directed to the discretion of the Judge against whom recusal is sought.
[brief] 1.  [...] Picks Plaintiff to Succeed Him  On August 24, 2021, at an executive team meeting, [...] told plaintiff, [...], [...]’s COO, and [...], [...]’s CFO, that “Germany” had told him he had to step down by the end of the year and pick his successor.  Pa33, 84, 85 149.  After the group meeting ended, [...] met individually with plaintiff and told plaintiff that he was his choice to succeed ---  4  In Germany, the Supervisory Board functions similarly to a board of directors in the United States.  The Management Board oversees the daily activities of a company.  him.  Pa85.  2.  Plaintiff Reports [...]’s Fraudulent Actions  On October 29, 2021, [...] informed plaintiff that [...] had demanded that he pay a sham invoice for consulting services that [...] and a former executive of a [...] affiliate in Germany had fabricated.  Pa34-35, 86, 88, 117-18, 125-27, 137-41, 146-47 160-63, 165-66.  Plaintiff reasonably believed that the invoice was fraudulent and payment of the sham invoice would have been unlawful.  Pa88, 110, 111, 117-18, 125-27.  Therefore, plaintiff advised [...] that the conduct he was describing was wrongful and instructed [...] not to initiate or process a wire or other payment for the invoice.  Pa36, 86, 87, 108-09, 125-27, 137-41, 147.  On November 4 and 5, 2021, plaintiff reported [...]’s wrongful conduct to [...] and recommended an independent investigation.  Pa91-92, 110-11, 112-13, 120-21, 137-141.  3.  Defendants
[brief] Furthermore, [...] provided the following information in his interview:  ([...] = BD and [...] = AM)  BD: Ok, so around October 17th ---the 16th of October 2015, you engaged in a con --- around two PM, you engaged in a conversation with your cousin, [...] regarding his co-defendant [...].  Is that correct?  AM: Yes.  BD: Ok.  Can you just tell me a little bit about that conversation?  AM:  I basically asked him about what was going on with the case and he let me know that he might have--- he'd probably have to turn himself in like around the end of October and for me to just try to look out for his kids if I could and I got into--- I was asking him like you know what did they ---what about his co-defendant [...] and he basically told me that you know --- I actu---I said to him' I said, damn, "It's messed up, they trying to make [...] wear all those robberies", and he says, "Yeh, I know, that's fucked up but you know I gotta save my black ass and do what I gotta do."
[brief] THE PLAINTIFFS ACTUALLY ADMITTED THAT THE DAMAGES THEY WERE CLAIMING AS THEIR OWN RIGHTFULLY BELONGED TO NON-PARTY [...].  (5T)  In the pre-trial conference, Plaintiffs’ counsel discusses at length the issue of “double recovery”\textsuperscript{94} and informs the trial court judge that “[...] can recover once. ”  What is seemingly lost on the court (and perhaps even on Plaintiffs’ counsel) is that the matter now on appeal was not [...]’s matter!  It was brought by six individuals, twice removed from [...], each of whom has a minority ownership interest in the [...], which in turn owns [...].  \textsuperscript{93}  See Amanda Rae Norcia-Baker v. Jonathan P. Baker, Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Sussex County, Family Part, Docket # FM-19-64-20.  \textsuperscript{94} 5T5 at 15, 5T7, 5T8 at 3-8.  Plaintiffs to state – and for a trial court to agree – that those Plaintiffs are entitled to collect money owed to a separate and distinct entity – which was never made a party prior to judgment being entered – is to defy all semblance of logic.  As an example of the lunacy of this logic, and without getting into the merits of their argument, Plaintiffs reference in the First Amended Verified Complaint unpaid payroll taxes owed by [...].  They contend that these taxes remained unpaid because [...] could not collect on its judgments.  What would happen if the Plaintiffs – individually – now collected money that was due to [...]?  Would they be required to pay [...]’s payroll taxes?  How would [...]’s other creditors be treated?  Simply put, there is no basis in fact or in law to support an award of damages to Plaintiffs that mirrors – and is offset by – judgments entered in favor of [...].
[brief] **D.  The Ordinance Findings are not Conclusory. **  *(Raised Below: Pa20-Pa29)*  Plaintiffs argue that the ordinance must be invalidated because its findings are “conclusory. ”  Pb26.  They are not.  They track the requirements of the statute with site-specific information.  They may lack the information Plaintiffs want to see, but they are reasonable and not arbitrary.  [...] agreed.  He reviewed the Township’s findings and found, “That is all the statute requires.  Plaintiffs’ assertions and arguments otherwise are unmoored from the statutory text itself.  If the Legislature wanted municipalities to include detailed factual findings or engage in a but-for analysis, then the Legislature would have said so. ”  Pa28.
[brief] *Atalese v. U.S. Legal Servs. Grp. L.P.*, 219 N.J. 430, 442 (2014).  “Mutual assent requires that the parties have an understanding of the terms to which they have agreed. ”  Ibid.  Because “an agreement to arbitrate involves a waiver of a party's right to have her claims and defenses litigated in court,” *NAACP of Camden Cnty. E. v. Foulke Mgmt.*, 421 N.J. Super. 404, 424 (App. Div. 2011), mutual assent to arbitration agreement requires the parties “have full knowledge of [their] legal rights and inten[d] to surrender those rights.
[brief] “The phrase, ‘meeting of the minds,’ can properly mean only the agreement reached by the parties as expressed .  . . .  [It does not mean that] there is no contract unless both parties understood the terms alike, regardless of the expressions they manifested. ”  *Leitner v. Braen*, 51 N.J. Super. 31, 38 (App. Div. 1958) (internal citation omitted).  It is the parties’ *objective* manifestations of intent that control when determining if there is a meeting of the minds, not whether an “average consumer” would understand the import of all terms.  *See Brawer v. Brawer*, 329 N.J. Super. 273, 283 (App. Div. 2000) (“A contracting party is bound by the apparent intention he or she outwardly manifests to the other party. ”).  That is why it has long been the law in New Jersey that a party is bound to a contract to which she assented regardless of whether she even read the terms of the agreement, let alone understood the meaning and implication of every term.  See, e.g., Gras v. Assocs. First Cap. Corp., 346 N.J. Super. 42, 57 (App. Div. 2001) (enforcing arbitration agreement even though plaintiffs claimed that they “did not know what they were signing”); see also Goffe v. Foulke Mgmt. Corp., 238 N.J. 191, 212 (2019) (“[T]he argument that either plaintiff did not understand the import of the arbitration agreement and did not have it explained to her … is simply inadequate to avoid enforcement of these clear and conspicuous arbitration agreements that each signed. ”).  When a party like [...] has notice of the contract terms and gives her objective assent to them, any question about the enforceability of one term in the contract (aside from consideration) does not defeat the formation of the contract as a whole.