ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] He testifies that [...] owned a lot more property going left of where this Riparian Grant is.  For some reason, [...] only chose to buy a sliver adjacent to his upland because his upland is the entire length of the Filed Map.  He chose to acquire where he had a dock (1T145:11).  When asked if this would demonstrate an intent on the part on [...], since he owned all the upland, to also have his specific use for Riparian Grant, [...] testifies:  “Well, obviously he did, this is a dock shown on here, so it wasn’t like the property wasn’t being used for something.  And also, if you notice on there, there is a building on the upland that is there” (1T145:16-19).  [...] testifies that in order to make an application to acquire the Riparian Grant, one would have to prove he is the upland owner.
[brief] On 8/7/23, someone again hacked into the Bank’s computer, transferred $45,000.00 from [...]’s new savings account into his new checking account and requested a wire transfer.  [...] never before wired funds from any account he had with the Bank, the procedure to do so was unknown to him, and he did not initiate the transfer from his savings to his checking account.  (Pa 136, Par. 9).
[brief] ”  Id. at 276-77.  Based on the clear terms of the provision, the Levison Court held that the seller was within its rights to disapprove the contract before the end of the 3-day period.  Id. at 277.  Levison discussed the case of Trenta v. Gay, 191 N.J. Super. 617 (Ch. Div. 1983), where the seller also timely canceled the contract.
[brief] On January 6, 2022, [...] requested that the Department transfer the matter to the Office of Administrative Law (“OAL”) as a contested case, (Cra197-198), which the Department did on March 23, 2022.  On January 27 and 30, and February 9 and 10, 2023, the ALJ presided over administrative hearings.  (Aa53).  [...] and the Department filed post-hearing briefs and proposed findings of fact; thereafter, the administrative hearing record was closed.  On June 26, 2023, the ALJ issued an Initial Decision, finding that it was proper for the Department to disapprove [...]’s 2020 premium rate increase requests for both the pre-rate stability and rate stability filings because they were excessive under N.J.S.A. 17B:27E-11.  (Aa53).  On November 9, 2023, [...], Acting Commissioner for the Department, issued a Final Decision and Order (“Final Decision”) disapproving [...]’s requested premium rate increases on its Choice 2 products.  (Aa1).  This appeal followed.  (Aa166).  **COUNTERSTATEMENT OF FACTS**
[brief] [...] ("[...]") was the previous owner of [...] ("Property") against which Plaintiff held a mortgage ("Plaintiff Mortgage").  In August 2003, [...] ("[...]") filed a Chancery action in the Superior Court, Docket Number [...] ("[...] Chancery Action") against [...], which gave rise to a second mortgage on the Property ("[...] Mortgage").  [...] also recorded a Notice of Lis Pendens affecting the Property.  Pursuant to a Court Order in the [...] Chancery Action, on June 10, 2005, [...] entered judgment in the amount of $120,000.00 ("Judgement") against [...] and against the Property.  Said Judgment remained open and placed a cloud on Plaintiff's title.  Due to the passage of time, the underlying rulings in this matter are unavailable to Plaintiff-Respondent.  [...] commenced bankruptcy proceedings in the District of New Jersey on October 14, 2005, receiving a Discharge which severed any *in personam* liability as to the Judgment.  On February 1, 2007, Plaintiff filed a Complaint in Foreclosure and asserted that they held a mortgage on the Property and had priority over any other encumbrance to title, including [...]'s interest.  On May 24, 2007, [...] filed a Contesting Answer and Counterclaim asserting priority over Plaintiff's Mortgage.  In light of [...]'s bankruptcy Discharge, on August 1, 2007, [...] filed a Motion to Cancel and Discharge Judgment pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:16-49.1, which was granted without opposition.  By Order dated September 7, 2007, [...]’s Judgment against [...] was cancelled and discharged of record and the Clerk of Monmouth County was directed to cancel and discharge the Judgment on the record (which the Clerk failed to take action pursuant to such Order).  As a result of the September 7, 2007 Order in the [...] Chancery Action, on November 16, 2007, Plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment in this case to strike [...]'s Contesting Answer and dismiss her Counterclaim.  After oral argument and supplemental briefing, the Court granted Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, and on February 21, 2008, entered an Order striking [...]'s Answer and dismissing her Counterclaim.  Pursuant to an Amended Complaint in foreclosure, as granted by the Court, Plaintiff added defendant [...], Esquire’s (“[...]”) as a party defendant.  Plaintiff served [...] with a copy of the Complaint on February 21, 2008, pursuant to Certified Mail acknowledged by him.  [...] filed a Non-Contesting Answer to the foreclosure Complaint on or about June 30, 2008.  On September 29, 2010, the lower Court entered final judgment in foreclosure rendering the matter ripe for appeal.  Thereafter, on January 10, 2011, [...] filed a Notice of Appeal and the matter was subsequently argued before the Appellate Division.
[brief] A.  **The Property, The Lease And The Solar Rights**  At all times relevant to the claims in this lawsuit, [...] owned real property located in [...], [...], New Jersey, --- \(^2\)  As discussed in footnote 1, *supra*, prior to the filing of the within appeal, Appellants appealed various orders entered in the Prior Action.  [...] is not a party to that appeal, is not identified as a respondent in that appeal, and was not served with Appellants’ Notice of Appeal or Amended Notice of Appeal.  Nonetheless, Appellants’ Amended Notice of Appeal references, without specification, a December 7, 2021 trial court order as being appealed.  As discussed above, two (2) Orders were entered in the Prior Action on December 7, 2021 – one Order denied Appellants’ motion for leave to file a Second Amended Complaint against [...] and the other Order dismissed the First Amended Complaint as against [...] without prejudice.  The Order dismissing the First Amended Complaint without prejudice is not identified as being appealed, yet one of Appellants’ proposed issues on appeal in that separate appeal is whether the dismissal of [...] was erroneous as a matter of law and/or an abuse of discretion.  The Case Information Statement in that other appeal states that Appellants are appealing the Order denying leave to file a second amended complaint.  As discussed above, the appeal of those December 7, 2021  Orders, to the extent they are being appealed at all, has not been properly perfected as against [...].  Moreover, the standard of review applicable to denial of Appellants’ motion for leave to file a Second Amended Complaint is an abuse of discretion.  *MicroBilt Corp v. L2C, Inc.*.  2011 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2280, *10 (App. Div. Aug, 23, 2011) (finding the trial “judge did not abuse his discretion by denying the motion to amend, as the proposed amendments are “not sustainable as a matter of law. ”)  [Da1].
[brief] A detective had “directed defendant to ride in the police cruiser to the station ….  Although not handcuffed, defendant rode in the backseat of the vehicle. ”  Id. at 271.  At the station, [...] “was directed into an interrogation room,” where his interrogator “positioned himself between defendant and the door. ”  Ibid.  The detective “questioned defendant for approximately an hour before exiting the room,” and [...] was also “le[ft] to wait. ”  Ibid.  The detective “never advised defendant that he was free to leave” during the interrogation.  Ibid.  During the interrogation, the “detective asked defendant to account for all of his movements ….  Rather than an attempt to secure information that may have assisted … treatment, the targeted questions reflect a clear attempt on the part of the detective to cause defendant to incriminate himself. ”  Id. at 272.  Similarly, in State v. [...], 171 N.J. 343, 351 (2002), detectives approached a patient in a psychiatric hospital and asked “whether he ‘would accompany us over to the police department for an interview on this investigation. ’”  Detectives informed [...] that it was a “voluntary interview,” asked him if he was “willing to make a voluntary and truthful statement,” and “advised defendant more than once that he was ‘free to leave,’” but did not “inform defendant of his right to remain silent or to have a lawyer present before questioning. ”
[brief] See, N.J. Coalition of Healthcare Providers v. NJDOBI, 348 N.J. Super. 242 (App. Div. 2002) (“Because a provider, with a valid assignment, is bound by the same rights and remedies as an insured, the provider can be similarly bound to submit a PIP dispute to dispute resolution. ”)  As of January 2011, [...] (successor to the [...]) is the exclusive provider of No-Fault arbitration services in New Jersey pursuant to a bidding and award process with the [...].
[brief] Pa15 at ¶34; Pa57 at ¶34.  Plaintiff was unable to identify anyone with administrative privileges who would be willing to assist [...].  Pa15 at ¶¶35-36; Pa58 at ¶¶35-36;1T 87:20-88:5.  On the evening of March 10th, Plaintiff accused [...] of locking him out of the Absent Management system; [...] denied doing so.  Pa39-Pa40; Pa45.  A “text fight” ensued in which Plaintiff called [...] a “chameleon” and told [...] that Plaintiff would “turn in [his] clothes, ID and 2 access cards. ”  Pa41.  Plaintiff then equivocated on this threat by saying that “a few days of careful consideration are in order. ”  Pa43.  [...] told Plaintiff that he should take his concerns up with [...] and that [...] would have [...] call him.  Pa42.  Also on the evening of March 10th, Plaintiff emailed District employee [...], advised her that he thought he had been disconnected from Absent Management, and asked her to look into the issue.  Pa15 at ¶37; Pa58 at ¶37; Pa46.  [...] replied the next morning and advised that she did not see any issues with his account.  Pa15 at ¶38; Pa58 at ¶38; Pa47.  Plaintiff then checked his account himself and did not see any issues.  Pa15 at ¶39; Pa58 at ¶39.  Plaintiff spoke with [...] on the phone on March 15th.  Pa50.  According to Plaintiff, [...] allegedly said he was aware Plaintiff was unhappy that the District had hired a female employee for the full-time position, but that [...] hoped Plaintiff would continue working for the District.  Pa50; Pa16 at ¶¶45-46; Pa58 at ¶¶45-46.  After ending his call with [...], Plaintiff called [...].  Pa50.  Plaintiff, who was “very angry,” and “very upset,” accused [...] of ruining Plaintiff’s career with the District and called [...] a “piece of shit. ”  Pa50; Pa16 at ¶¶47-48; Pa58 at ¶¶47-48.  Shortly after his call with [...], Plaintiff received a text from [...], another substitute guard.  Pa52.  As per [...], [...] had told [...] that Plaintiff was no longer allowed at the high school.  Pa52; Pa16 at ¶49; Pa58 at ¶49.  That same day, Plaintiff—acting on his own initiative—met with Mr. [...] on the high school grounds and delivered a letter of resignation to [...].  Pa53.  Plaintiff did not confirm the nature of his alleged bar from campus with any Board employee other than [...] before resigning.  Pa17 at ¶51; Pa58 at ¶51.
[directive] Voce esta ciente de que tera que pagar uma restituiyiio se o juiz concluir que ha uma vitima que sofreu danos e se o juiz concluir que voce e capaz ou sera capaz no futuro de pagar a restituiyiio?  [NA/NC]  16.  Do you understand that if you are a public office holder or employee, you can be [Yes/Sim] [No/Nao] required to forfeit your office or job by virtue of your plea of guilty?  Voce entende que se voce ocupa um cargo publico see funcionario publico, voce podera ser OU obrigado a deixar seu cargo ou emprego em virtude da sua declarayiio de culpa?
[brief] Did the manufacturer act as a reasonably prudent person by designing the item as he did and by placing it on the market in that condition, or should he have designed it to incorporate certain safety features or some other modifications?  Depending upon the proofs, some factors which may be considered by the jury in deciding the reasonableness of the manufacturer's conduct include the technological feasibility of manufacturing a product whose design would have prevented or avoided the accident, given the known state of the art; and the likelihood that the product will cause injury and the probable seriousness of the injury.  Soler, supra, 98 N.J. at 146.  That the manufacturer may have complied with industry standards is not dispositive.  The law has long recognized that reliance on custom alone is inadequate because "a whole [industry] may have unduly lagged in the adoption of new and available devices."  The T.J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737, 740 (2d Cir. 1932), cert. den. sub nom., 287 U.S. 662 (1932).  A manufacturer "may have a duty to make products pursuant to a safer design even if the custom of the industry is not to use that alternative."  O'Brien v. Muskin Corp., 94 N.J. 169, 183 (1983).  A manufacturer is obligated to produce a reasonably fit, suitable and safe product regardless of what prevailing industry standards may be.
[brief] If the court had the benefit of a psychological examination, it might have found that [...]’s mental illness partially explained or contributed to the offense, that treatment would reduce his risk of recidivism and the need for deterrence, and that imprisonment would pose an excessive hardship. \(^8\)  For instance, one of the diagnostic criteria for PTSD is “marked alterations in arousal and reactivity,” which can manifest as “irritable or angry outbursts (with little or no provocation) typically expressed as verbal or physical aggression toward people or objects” and “reckless or self-destructive behavior that is dangerous, that shows a disregard for the physical safety of themselves or others, and that could directly result in serious physical harm or death.
[directive] 1  Minimum 180-Day Retention Period.  A BWC recording shall be retained by the law enforcement agency that employs the officer for a retention period consistent with the provisions of this Section, after which time the recording shall be permanently deleted.  A BWC recording shall be retained for not less than 180 days from the date it was recorded, but shall be subject to additional retention periods as required in Sections 8.2, 8.3 and 8.4.  8.2  Automatic Three-Year Retention Period.  A BWC recording shall automatically be retained for not less than three years if it captures images involving an encounter about which a complaint has been registered by a subject of the BWC recording.  8.3
[brief] TABLE OF CONTENTS  STATEMENT OF PROCEDURAL HISTORY..................................1  STATEMENT OF FACTS ......................................................3  LEGAL ARGUMENT ............................................................5  POINT I:  THE OFFICER HAD A REASONABLE AND ARTICULABLE SUSPICISION THAT THE DEFENDANT HAD BEEN ENGAGED IN CRIMINAL ACTIVITY THAT WARRANTED THE BRIEF INVESTIGATORY DETENTION OF THE DEFENDANT (T75-3 to 85-11).  ..................5  POINT II: AS THE DETENTION OF THE DEFENDANT WAS JUSTIFIED, THE HANGUN WAS FOUND IN PLAIN VIEW OF THE OFFICER (T82-13 to 16)  ..................11  CONCLUSION .................................................................13  TABLE OF JUDGMENT APPEALED Order of Law Division on Motion to Suppress .................................. Pa1 TABLE OF APPENDIX Order of Law Division on Motion to Suppress .................................. Pa1 Order of Appellate Division Granting Leave to Appeal ......................... Pa2 Indictment ...................................................................................... Pa3-5 Notice of Motion to Suppress ........................................................... Pa6-7 Body Worn Camera of [...] ........................................... Pa8 STATEMENT OF PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[brief] Nor have Plaintiffs established that [...] could simply force Appellants to accept the arbitration agreement.  In *B & S Ltd., Inc. v. Elephant & Castle International, Inc.*, 388 N.J. Super. 160, 169 (Ch. Div. 2006) – the case on which Appellants primarily rely\(^{10}\) – the court held that, to set aside an arbitration clause as substantively unconscionable, it “must determine that the exchange of obligations was so one-sided it shocks the conscience” and that “no aspects of procedural unconscionability [were] present.
[brief] Date Submitted: May 13, 2024  [...]; [...]; [...]; [...]  WASHINGTON DIVISION; [...]; [...], [...] (fictitious engineer/operator of light rail train); [...] (fictitious light rail owner); [...] (fictitious light rail designer); [...] (fictitious light rail station designer); [...] (fictitious engineering firm)  [...] (fictitious light rail car owner); [...] (fictitious light rail car manufacturer); [...] (fictitious light rail car maintenance company); [...] (fictitious light rail management company), Defendants-Respondents.  TABLE OF CONTENTS
[brief] Id. at 237.  The court rejected [...]’s attempt to benefit from the liberal construction of pensions statutes.  Id. at 241-42.  The court noted the Board was not obligated to construe the ERI legislation liberally to allow [...]’s early retirement because the issue was one of eligibility.  Id. at 242.  “Rather, the Board was under an obligation to strictly adhere to the eligibility requirements clearly indicated in the ERI legislation to protect the financial integrity of the PERS fund. ”  Ibid.  Here, eligibility for group life insurance requires ten or more years of service credit.
[brief] The court made clear that its ESI Order was issued during the “July 6th” case management conference, which did not occur until after the parties had negotiated search terms.  T4; see Db5, 8-9.  If the parties had known that search terms alone would determine relevancy, negotiating the terms would have been vastly more complicated, if not impossible—a problem that would plague all New Jersey litigation if the ESI Order here is affirmed.  To show the parties’ supposed understanding that search terms would obviate any relevancy review, Plaintiffs cite a July 2023 declaration from Defendants observing uncontroversially that the parties negotiated search terms.  Pb9 (citing Da122 ¶ 10).  But the very next paragraph states that the “[...] (and, presumably, [...]) always understood the purpose of the search terms was to capture a broader universe of potentially responsive documents that each party would review to identify documents responsive to the actual requests for production. ”  Da122¶ 11 (emphasis added).  Plaintiffs also rely on a declaration they submitted the same day they filed their opposition to Defendants’ leave to appeal.  Pb8-9 (citing Da182).  That post hoc declaration obviously cannot alter the unambiguous record before the trial court when it issued the ESI Order.
[brief] (See Da9 to 45).  The reversal was based on the admission of certain statements made by the interrogating detective that were admitted through the interrogation video.  Specifically, the Appellate Division found that the interrogating detective offered lay opinion testimony that infringed upon the jury’s duty to decide credibility and guilt by saying (1) he knew defendant was lying; (2) video recordings from the area contradicted defendant’s story; (3) defendant had a gun on him just before the shooting; and (4) a jury would not believe his story and would want to know why he killed [...].
[brief] Even if this court were to find that postcards were a required mode of notice under the Ricci Act, the Board substantially complied by mailing them within thirty-two (instead of thirty) days of the effective date of the statute.  To suggest that such a minimal delay in sending over 200,000 postcards somehow eliminates the statutory deadline for filing claims would be an absurd result, and one this court should not accept.  See Regis, 208 N.J. at 449 (“[w]hen construing a statute, ‘legislative language must not, if reasonably avoidable, be found to be inoperative, superfluous or meaningless.’”) (citation omitted).  [...] further urges this court to permit him to file his untimely Form because he claims he did not actually receive the notice.
[brief] This matter involves [...]’s taking of [...]’s commercial property located at [...] (the “Property”) (designated as Block 19003, Lots 1-7 on the official tax maps of the City of Jersey City).  Pa3-Pa11.  The sole remaining issue for the fact finder in this case is the amount of just compensation owed to [...] for the taking of its private property by [...].  Pa53-Pa54.  [...]’s case-in-chief is supported by market data and the expert opinions of a professional planner ([...], P.P.) and an appraiser ([...], MAI).
[directive] [No/No]  4.  ¿Entiende usted que podrá disputar en una vista las determinaciones del Departamento de Correcciones y que en esa vista tendrá derecho a confrontar a los testigos en su contra, de contrainterrogarlos y de presentar pruebas a su favor?  Do you understand you will be able to challenge the findings of the [...] in a hearing and at that hearing you will have the right to confront the witnesses against you and to cross examine them and then present evidence on your own behalf?
[brief] Although moving papers supporting a summary judgment motion are closely scrutinized with all inferences of doubt drawn against the moving party, once a movant demonstrates a prima facie right to summary judgment, the burden shifts to the non-moving party.  R. 4:46-5.  The non-moving party must counter the summary judgment motion with competent evidential material to show a genuine factual dispute.  Robbins v. Jersey Township, 23 N.J. 229, 241 (1957).  R. 4:46-5 provides:  When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this Rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the pleadings, but must respond by affidavits…setting forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.  Thus, the opponent of a summary judgment motion must show controverting facts, not merely bare assertions, representations or allegations in pleadings without affidavit or other evidentiary support.  The opponent must clearly establish the existence of a genuine issue of material fact.  The failure to discharge this duty entitles the movant to summary judgment.
[directive] Of the total number of curbside warnings, law enforcement estimates the following per category, based on the informal nature of the contact with the juveniles:  Age Gender  Ages 10 and under: ___________  Male: __________________  Ages 11-13: ___________  Female: ________________  ___________  Non-Binary: _____________  Ages 14-15: Ages 16-18: ___________  Community Information (if known)