ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] In re Public Service Electric & Gas Co., supra, 35 N.J. at 377 (emphasis added); accord, In Re Monmouth Consolidated Water Co., 47 N.J. 251, 259-260 (1966).  These alternatives include not just doing nothing by continuing the current regulator, which has no emissions and no added cost of $5 million or more, but giving meaningful consideration to a superior heat source, a catalytic heater.  Our initial brief noted that [...]'s written, lawyer-curated direct testimony made claims that the company had supposedly experienced very, very serious difficulties with catalytic heaters.  [...]'s brief repeats these "unreliability" claims, with further embellishment.  [...]b32-37.  These claims evaporated, as did so much of [...]'s case, on cross-examination.  Hb53-61.  In addition to the other non-problems, the court should take note of a simple fact that [...] doesn't care to mention.  The company installed catalytic heaters in 2008-2010.  The last of those supposedly very, very serious problems ended in 2015, with the manufacturer picking up most of the costs attributable to the problems.  The petition to the [...] for this site was filed in 2018.  [...] had plenty of time to speak to other catalytic manufacturers, but it didn't.  [...] purchased the gas combustion heater it now wants to install, in a sole source, non-competitive procurement, in 2012.  That's why it never considered any alternative.  CONCLUSION
[brief] On January 3, 2023, four (4) years after becoming aware of the Collection Action and six (6) years after the Judgment was entered, but before moving to vacate his default, Appellant filed a Class Action Complaint against Respondent in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division:  Hudson County captioned *[...], on behalf of himself and those similarly situated v. [...],* [...], [...], [...], [...], and John Does 1 to 10, at Docket Number [...].  (Da64-Da71, ¶ 25; Pa186-Pa205).  Appellant alleged violations of the NJCFLA (under the guise of the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Law, N.J.S.A. 2A: 16-53), the NJCFA, and Unjust Enrichment in connection with Respondent’s purported failure to be licensed when acquiring and collecting on Appellant’s Account (“Defendant’s Class Action”).  (Pa186-Pa205).  On April 19, 2023, Respondent moved to dismiss the complaint, with prejudice, or in the alternative, compel arbitration.  (Da64-Da71, ¶ 27).  On July 11, 2023, Appellant filed a Cross-Motion to Consolidate and Transfer the Action to Defendant’s Class Action and vacate the Default Judgment (“Appellant’s Second Motion to Vacate”).  (Da64-Da71, ¶ 29).  By Order dated October 20, 2023, the Superior Court denied Appellant’s Second Motion to Vacate and granted Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss dismissing Appellant’s Class Action in its entirety, with prejudice (“Class Action Order”).  (Da64-Da71, ¶ 38; Pa285-Pa290).  Specifically, the Superior Court held on the Record that Appellant had no claim under the NJCFA, NJCFLA, or unjust enrichment.  (Pa223-Pa284).  On December 4, 2023, Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal of the Orders.  The Appeal was fully briefed.  On September 26, 2024, this Court held: (1) the NJCFLA does not contain a statutory private right of action and there is no implied private right of action under the NJCFLA; (2) since Appellant does not have a private right of action under the NJCFLA, he “may not circumvent established law by coding his complaint under the UDJA”; and (3) the NJCFA does not apply to Respondent.  *Diana v. [...] LLC*, 2024 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2241 (Sup. Ct. App. Div. Sept. 26, 2024).  **COUNTER ARGUMENT**
[brief] ”  Kozesnik v. Twp. of Montgomery, 24 N.J. 154, 177 (1957) (emphasis added).  However, the right to challenge government actions as a taxpayer has its limits.  See Loigman v.  Twp. Comm. of Middletown, 297 N.J. Super. 287, 297-99 (App. Div. 1999) (a local taxpayer had no standing to enforce a collective negotiation agreement between a public employer and a public employee union); see also Borough of Seaside Park v. Comm'r of the N.J. Dep't of Educ., 432 N.J. Super. 167, 210-11 (App. Div.) (plaintiff had no standing to assert the constitutional rights of others), certif. denied, 216 N.J. 367 (2013).
[brief] Substantial means “[h]aving substance, not imaginary, unreal, or apparent only; true, solid, real. ”  The Compact Oxford English Dictionary 1947 (2d ed. 1993), or “having real existence, not imaginary[,] firmly based, a substantial argument. ”  The New Lexicon Webster’s Dictionary of the English Language 987 (1987).  Thus, the concept of “substantially consistent” permits some inconsistency, provided it does not substantially or materially undermine or distort the basic provisions and objectives of the Master Plan.
[brief] Again, importantly, Respondent clearly admitted that she “refused to wear a mask while on school district premises in violation of Executive Order 251. ”  (Ca138 – RQA 16; Ca145 – Responses to RQA 16)  As [...] correctly found, “respondent led by example by refusing to wear a face mask at the Board meetings in utter disregard of EO 251 and Board members’ obligation to abide by and enforce EO 251 within the school district. ” (Ca035).  Lastly, the Commission states, on the masking issue, that Respondent’s public violation of EO 251 was a “personal decision for which she, and she alone, could face consequences.
[brief] --- 4  “No official responsible for maintaining public records or the custodian thereof shall destroy, obliterate or dispose of any paper, document, instrument, or index which shall have been recorded, filed, registered or indexed except as specifically permitted by law.  No law, statute or regulation shall be construed to permit the destruction, obliteration or disposal of any such records by implication. ”  But even supposing it is difficult, how much concern should this Court have?  After all, the [...] created this problem by not limiting Board members to communicating through “official” or “government” channels.  It is the very definition of a self-created hardship.  The [...] is essentially “[t]he man who murdered his parents, and then pleaded for mercy on the grounds that he was an orphan.
[brief] 1T: 51:11-17.  Upon entering the dwelling [...] observed a small foyer and staircase leading to the second floor where there were multiple bedrooms and a kitchen.  1T: 51:18-25.  By the time [...] had entered the dwelling the tactical team had taken everyone out of their rooms and put them in one group for safety purposes in addition all the doors were already opened by the TEAMS unit.  1T: 58:20-59:4; 60:23-25.  There was a door in the kitchen on the second floor that led to a small doorway on the right-side of the building, where there was another door separating the second and third floors that led to a staircase to the third floor where Appellant’s room was also located on the right side of the building and a second room was on the left.  1T: 53:1-54:12; 55:2-9; 60:20-22; 61:24-62:2; 72:1-5.
[brief] Plaintiff’s Complaint and the Motion to Compel Arbitration  On or about April 25, 2022, Plaintiff went on a medical leave under the federal Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”).  She was out the full twelve (12) weeks under that law but failed to return to work any time thereafter.  20a at ¶5.  On January 19, 2023  Respondent filed a complaint against Appellants (the “Complaint”), asserting Five Counts: discrimination based on gender under the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination, N.J.S.A. 10:5-1 et seq.  (“NJLAD”) (First Count), wrongful termination in retaliation for complaining about discrimination in violation of the NJLAD (Second Count), whistleblowing under the New Jersey Conscientious Employee Protection Act, N.J.S.A. 34:19-1 et seq. (“CEPA”) (Third Count), a common law wrongful discharge claim in violation of public policy under Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical, 84 N.J. 524 (1997) (a “Pierce claim”) (Fourth Count) and a claim against [...] defendants for wrongful termination under the NJLAD (Fifth Count).
[directive] [Yes/ofl] o]  %~ c>Jlfl 7ial~o]t!.]-£ -ti-~¥!  '(},iloJ] ~;:;-y7J]-?  Date/1.t~ Defendant/:iIJ .TI. 'il Defense Attomey/Ir].TI.~ ~~'(}  Prosecutor/~-"l- [ ]  This plea is the result of the judge's conditional indications of the maximum sentence he or she would impose independent of the prosecutor's recommendation.
[brief] In contrast, false light claims based on “intrusion” into a person’s “seclusion” are subject to a two-year statute of limitations.  Id. at 93-94 (citations omitted).  Such an “intrusion” false light claim is asserted, for example, when one has been surreptitiously recorded in a private space.  See e.g., Friedman v. Martinez, 242 N.J. 449, 470 (2020).
[brief] Following the meeting, the Board and the parties became aware that the video tape of the meeting only recorded the visual component and failed to tape the audio portion.  The Zoning Board is well aware of their responsibility to record all meetings either by stenographer, mechanical or electronic means pursuant to NJSA 40:55D-10.  The Zoning Board is also aware of the numerous court decisions that hold that when a recording is either not done or the recording device malfunctions, the parties, if they agree can recreate the record, and if not, the matter should be remanded to redo the hearing.
[brief] Marlboro Orig. Pol’y 5657 (D2a54); Middletown Orig. Pol’y 5657 (Middletown Ra7); Manalapan Orig. Pol’y 5657 (Manalapan Ra7).  Notably, the preliminary injunction and the resulting reinstatement of the Original Policies are narrowly tailored to achieve the State’s goals.
[brief] Significantly, Defendant [...] has admitted that the presence of crosswalks would have focused her attention toward pedestrians crossing in the distant area of the expansive parking lot designated for employee parking where she struck [...].  See Pa309 (30:11-31:2); Pa318 (68:8-22).  Further confirming Defendant [...]’s knowledge of the danger it had created, after [...]’s tragic death, [...] used traffic controllers, security staff, flaggers, and new directional signage to protect the safety of its employees who it required to park in the distant employee area of the lot.  Pa492-3.  While not admissible as to the issue of fault, [...]’s subsequent actions are admissible, and highly probative, of its knowledge regarding the need for pedestrian safeguards in the area where it required non-management employees to park and of the feasibility of instituting such safety measures.  See N.J.R.E. 407 (evidence of subsequent remedial measures is admissible for issues other than culpability).  Under the totality of the facts, a reasonable juror could conclude that Defendant [...]’s intentional act in requiring employees such as [...] to park in a distant area of the parking lot that lacked the pedestrian safety measures present in other areas of the lot was an accident waiting to happen and that it created a substantial certainty that someone would be injured.
[directive] 7.  [예/Yes]  [아니요/No] 귀하는 의무적 가석방 자격 불가능기간이나 의무적 연장 형량이 요구되는 죄목에 했습니까?  유죄를 인정 that require  Did you enter a plea of guilty to any charges a mandatory period of parole ineligibility or a mandatory extended term?
[brief] The Commissioner of Education has a long and storied history of implementing, interpreting, and adjudicating 18A violations, especially under N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-1, et seq.  And the withholding of State aid penalty, which is actually part of the statute’s title and appears at the beginning of the statute, N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-9(a), is not within the power or authority of Superior Court judges.  If [...] believed they were aggrieved by the Board’s alleged violation of N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-9(e)(3), then they could have petitioned the Commissioner of Education for relief under N.J.A.C. 6A:3-1.1, et seq. where the agency’s expertise would have been applied to adjudicate the matter.  3.  “whether inconsistent rulings might pose the danger of disrupting the statutory scheme” (Argued at Pa370 – Pa371)  Inconsistent rulings will pose a danger of disrupting the statutory scheme.
[brief] Letter sent March 16, 2020 from [...] (Third Party Administrator) requesting status on the hearing scheduled for March 2, 2020  Letter from [...] dated April 22, 2022 to [...] advising that Order of that same date was enclosed in letter Order dismissing Appeal by [...] dated 4/22/2022  Exhibit C-9 to [...]’s Certification Handwritten Notes 6/3/21 regarding [...]’s *This should not be considered a duplicate because it has an additional recipient.*
[directive] If it appears likely that survivors will have to be questioned by other law enforcement personnel, they should be so informed.  If it is imperative that the survivors be questioned immediately following notification, it should be conducted with compassion.  Prior to departing the residence, the officers should provide the next of kin with their names and telephone numbers so that additional questions can be answered and further assistance rendered, if necessary.  There will be times when the survivors of sudden and unexpected death are not immediately available.
[directive] PORRINO S. CHRISTOPHER CHRISTIE CHRIS SAFETY  General PUBLIC Attorney LAW AND Governor OF DEPARTMENT Box 080 PO 08625-0080  NJ TRENTON, GUADAGNO KIM Governor Lieutenant v2.0 2016-6  NO. DIRECTIVE ENFORCEMENT LAW  GENERAL ATTORNEY Justice Criminal Division of Director, TO: Police State Jersey  New Superintendent, Prosecutors County All Prosecutor Fraud Insurance Sheriffs County All Chiefs Police All Executives Chief Enforcement  All Law General Attorney  Porrino, S. Christopher  FROM: 7 20l 24, May DATE: 2016)  11, October on Issued Originally 2016-6  Directive (Amending Procedures and Practices, Policies, Interim Establishing Directive
[brief] ”  Atalese v U.S. Legal Serv. Grp., LP, 219 N.J. 430, 442-43 (2014), certiorari den. U.S. Legal Serv. Grp., LP. v. Atalese, 576 U.S. 1004 (2015) (citation omitted).  Thus, a party cannot assent to something like an arbitration provision in another document unless they were given a copy of it and it is incorporated expressly.
[directive] The vast majority of law enforcement officers in New Jersey serve with honor and astonishing courage under extremely difficult circumstances.  Most go through their entire careers without engaging in conduct that warrants a major disciplinary action against them.  But their good work is easily undermined—and quickly forgotten—whenever an officer breaches the public’s trust and dishonors the entire profession.  The likelihood of such misbehavior increases when officers believe they can act with impunity; it decreases when officers know that their misconduct will be subject to public scrutiny and not protected.  The deterrent effect of this scrutiny will, in the end, improve the culture of accountability among New Jersey law enforcement.
[brief] This Appeal involves, in part, the validity of a [...] 30 Year [...] Non-Urban Renewal Entity NJHMFA Long Term Tax Exemption Ordinance (Pa149) and a phantom Financial Agreement adopted March 9, 2019.  Consequently, this Appeal involves how we subsidize the acquisition, preservation and rehabilitation of existing 100% non-housing authority private ownership low income affordable housing projects within the parameters of the Uniform Taxation and Blighted Area Clauses of our State Constitution and all post April 17, 1992 long term tax exemption laws, rules and regulations.
[brief] **THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS IT UNDERMINED RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE** (Raised via brief (Pa108); not raised otherwise).  On August 30, 2023 the trial court file dated the proofs of the services for the appellant’s complaint carried out upon each respondent, who officially signed and stamped acknowledging the service (Pa104 – Pa105).  After file dating the proof of service for the said, the trial court issued an Order and give the respondents twenty (20) days to file their opposition to the appellant’s complaint (Pa106).  The trial court served this Order upon the parties, as the appellant received his copy via email and U.S. mail.  Respondents knowingly and purposefully chose to ignore the appellant’s complaint, because their attorney, [...], had advised them to do so.  Proof of this is the December 28, 2020 letter, which [...] sent to the Mother and the appellant, stipulating the following (Pa35 – Pa36):  “Please be advised that if you pursue a claim in State Court seeking relief’ ‘-‘ the Borough will deem such an action frivolous as set forth above and for any other reasons that further review will determine and will seek all appropriate sanctions and remedies pursuant to Court Rule. ”  As such, respondents knowingly and purposefully ignore the appellant’s Complaint, as they were advised by their attorney to do so.  On September 20, 2023, respondents were in Default, when the trial court called the appellant (did not email, did not write, but telephonically issued the order) and orally ORDERED him to serve additional document upon each respondent and upload proofs thereof to JEDS.  This was a court order and appellant complied and noted the said facts on the cover page of his compliance uploaded to JEDS (Pa108 – Pa110).  Appellant believes that in so doing the trial court undermined the Rules of Civil Procedure and erred.
[brief] §201 IS CLEAR AND UNAMBIGUOUS AND MUST BE UPHeld §201 is clear and unambiguous.  Therefore, the Defendant’s conviction for her violation of such must be upheld.  The courts have widely held that a presumption of validity applies broadly to all ordinances.  6 Mc Quillin, Municipal Corporations, § 20.07, p. 18 (3rd ed., 1969).  In *State v. Mundet Cork Corporation*, 8 N.J. 359 (1952), the court stated, with regard to an attack on the validity of a municipal ordinance, that the exercise of the legislative judgment is not subject to judicial superintendence unless it is plainly beyond the realm of the police power or palpably unreasonable
[brief] (Da47-48)  The court further justified the consecutive sentence by reasoning that, “were the certain persons conviction not consecutive, the effect would be to neuter the statute itself, rendering it essentially meaningless. ”  (Da49)  The court did not resentence [...] or issue a new Judgment of Conviction, but merely issued an order that “the Court’s sentence previously imposed on March 2, 2018 stands as previously imposed. ”  (Da52)  [...] appealed and the case was scheduled for the October 31, 2023 Sentencing Oral Argument Calendar.  (Da53-57)  On November 13, the SOA panel issued an order moving this case to the plenary calendar for briefing.  (Da58)  This brief follows.  STATEMENT OF FACTS
[brief] While “[t]he definition of a public record under the common law is broader than under OPRA,” Rivera v. Union Cnty. Prosecutor's Off., 250 N.J. 124, 143 (2022), “[t]o obtain records under ‘this broader class of materials, [a] requestor must make a greater showing than OPRA requires. ’”  Id. at 144 (second alteration in original) (quoting N. Jersey Media Grp., Inc. v. Township of Lyndhurst, 229 N.J. 541, 578 (2017)).  “[T]he common[ ]law right of access ... is not absolute. ”  Keddie v. Rutgers, 148 N.J. 36, 50 (1997).  Under the common law, records may be disclosed if: (1) the records are common-law public documents; (2) the requestor has “an interest in the subject matter of the material”; and (3) the requestor's right to access outweighs “the State's interest in preventing disclosure.
[brief] There are also 3 letter-briefs are included with the appendix, because they are germane to the appeal to show the arguments that had been raised below.  That is, although the trial court had summarized the parties’ arguments during the hearings, and afforded us an opportunity to orally highlight those, only the papers fully set forth our arguments (aside from [...] arguing that he does not need to prove bad faith).  There was no oral argument for the court’s 2/28/23 paper rulings (3T, unabbreviated).  2  Although the parties had verbally reached a settlement during that Aug 12th mediation session, [...] then suddenly changed his mind about the agreed upon terms; and then when I pushed back on the proposed changes, he started screaming and yelling at both me and my sister, calling me names, threatening me with perjury charges, and refusing to participate in the mediation session any further.
[brief] The standard to be applied by a reviewing court following a trial court’s ruling on a motion for judgment of acquittal is *de novo*.  *State v. Williams*, 218 N.J. 579, 593-94 (2014).  On appeal, the State’s evidence, be it direct or circumstantial, is to be considered in its entirety to determine whether a judgement of acquittal is warranted.  *State v. Samuels*, 189 N.J. 236, 246 (2007).  The approach is one “of logic and common sense”.  *Id.*  It is only “[w]hen each of the interconnected inferences [necessary to support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt] is reasonable on the evidence as a whole” that a conviction should stand.  *State v. Jones*, 242 N.J. 156, 169 (2020).  The State is entitled to the benefit of favorable inferences that can reasonably be drawn from the evidence and the benefit of favorable testimony.  *Id.*  Ultimately, “the applicable standard is whether such evidence would enable a reasonable jury to find that the accused is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crime or crimes charged. ”  *Id.* (further citations omitted).  “A trial court's interpretation of the law and the legal consequences that flow from established facts are not entitled to any special deference."  *Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan*, 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995).  "It is a well-established principle of appellate review that a reviewing court is neither bound by, nor required to defer to, the legal conclusions of a trial or intermediate appellate court."  *State v. Gandhi*, 201 N.J. 161, 176 (2010).  With regard to the trial court’s legal decision to charge the jury on the lesser-included manslaughter offenses, over the objection of both counsel, therefore, it is submitted that the decision is entitled to no deference by this Court.  As to the trial court’s evidentiary rulings where, as here, the defense lodged the appropriate objections, the Court employs an abuse of discretion standard.  *State v. Prall*, 231 N.J. 567, 580 (2018).  Likewise, with regard to the court’s sentencing decisions, the appropriate inquiry is whether the trial court abused its discretion in imposing punishment following the jury’s determination.  *State v. Cassady*, 198 N.J. 165, 180 (2009).  LEGAL ARGUMENT I.
[brief] In response to Plaintiff’s lawsuit, Defendants filed a baseless third-party complaint against Plaintiff’s newly formed, single-member limited liability company, [...] (“[...]”).  As a result, Plaintiff was forced to hire counsel for her newly formed company and had to forgo continued legal representation for herself due to the expense of paying for multiple lawyers.  Consequently, Plaintiff proceeded pro se through to a bench trial and litigated her claims against Defendants while paying for the legal defense of her company.  Despite filing counterclaims against [...], Defendants produced no evidence to support these claims at trial, resulting in the counterclaims being dismissed.  During the pendency of the legal proceedings, Defendant [...] died.