ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] For the reasons set forth herein, Respondent respectfully requests that the Court affirm the trial court’s grant of summary judgment against the Appellants, declaring that the easement created in the 1966 [...]-to-[...] Deed constitutes a valid easement by reservation burdening the South Baxter Parcel and, a fortiori, the Baxter Lot.  In addition, Respondent requests that, if the Court is inclined to address the issue of whether to employ the old common-law approach or the modern view adopted by the Restatement and formally adopted in Wildwood Crest, that it affirm the Wildwood Crest approach and formally declare the approach espoused by the common law to be antiquated, unnecessary, and not the law in the State of New Jersey.  Dated: March 13, 2024  WINDELS  MARX LANE & MITTENDORF, LLP  By: /s/ [...]  [...]  For the Firm [...] [...]  Attorneys for plaintiff-respondent, [...]
[brief] The evidence in question was not used at trial to prove medical causation, which was discussed in each of the three cases upon which the plaintiff relies.  The cases, upon which the plaintiff relies, therefore, have no bearing whatsoever on the issue of whether evidence of the plaintiff’s prior falls, medical conditions, and use of a handicapped placard could be used to impeach witnesses and substantively to suggest other causes of the accident to the jury.  Furthermore, Plaintiff’s argument that a lay person is not qualified to determine whether a person could fall due to issues with balance or gait is simply incorrect.  Expert testimony is only required when “the matter to be dealt with is so esoteric that jurors of common judgment and experience cannot form a valid judgment. ”  *Phillips v. Gelpke*, 190 N.J. 580, 5913 (2007).  In this case, the average juror is certainly qualified to make a determination regarding whether or not the plaintiff had difficulty walking in the past and whether or not she had difficulty walking on the day of the accident.  A juror does not need an expert to tell them that someone with a history of balance problems, prior falls, and other medical conditions related to gait may have had difficulty walking on the day in question.  The plaintiff’s difficulty in walking on the day of the incident was amplified by her use of a rollator and by video footage of the plaintiff walking in the store with her rollator on the day of the incident, which the plaintiff chose to show to the jury in her opening statement (3T61:23-62:9) and which the plaintiff’s own liability expert viewed and testified showed the plaintiff walking with a shuffle with a “diminished” gait, hence her need for the rollator.  (4T166:10-25).  As the trial court properly recognized:  A lay person could see, based on the video of Plaintiff herself that she played herself in her introduction, that people who were unsteady on their feet and use a device to assist with stability and mobility such as Plaintiff, may be more prone to falls.  (8T32:10-15).  As such, the trial court properly admitted the evidence in question relating to the plaintiff’s prior medical conditions and falls and use of a handicapped placard even in the absence of expert testimony.
[brief] *Northgate Condo v. Planning Bd.*, 214 N.J. 120, 138 (2013).  Additionally: [w]hile remarks made by individual Board members during the course of hearings may be useful in interpreting ambiguous language in a resolution, they are not a substitute for the formality mandated by N.J.S.A. 40:55D–10(g).  Such remarks at best reflect the beliefs of the speaker and cannot be assumed to represent the findings of an entire Board.  Moreover, because such remarks represent informal verbalizations of the speaker's transitory thoughts, they cannot be equated to deliberative findings of fact.  It is the resolution, and not board members' deliberations, that provides the statutorily required findings of fact and conclusions.  *[New York SMSA v. Bd. of Adjustment of Twp. of Weehawken*, 370 N.J. Super. 319, 333–34 (App. Div. 2004). ]
[brief] While the relationship between the victim, parent and juvenile was a factor the [...] Court considered in determining suppression was warranted, it was neither the only factor, nor the predominant factor.  In fact, the first factor mentioned by the Court in its totality of the circumstances analysis was not this conflicting relationship, it was the juvenile’s age – only 14.  Id. at 148.  When discussing the role the parent played, the [...] Court did not particularly focus on the static fact of the parent’s relationship with both the victim and the juvenile, but the dynamic role the parent played in the interrogation.  [...]’s mother usurped the role of the police.  Id. at 149-151.  She, and not the police, provided [...] with the Miranda warning and did so incorrectly; this error was later exacerbated by advice from the detective that was in conflict with the Miranda warnings.  Ibid.  [...]’s mother did not just encourage her to speak with the police; she questioned the juvenile herself.  As the Court describes it, she “badger[ed]” the juvenile into speaking, even when the juvenile was imperfectly trying to invoke her own rights, becoming “a de facto agent of the police. ”  Id. at 136.  The lower court correctly concluded that nothing like that which occurred in [...] occurred here.
[brief] (Pa158-Pa159).  At her deposition, Plaintiff testified that she was standing in the Meat Department talking to a [...] employee and behind her was an open aisle.  (Pa025; Pa027).  Plaintiff testified that she was talking with this employee for a “very short time” and her back was turned when the accident happened.  (Pa028).  Plaintiff testified then that “all of a sudden [she] got struck from the right side. ” (Pa028).  Plaintiff could not provide any description of the speed of the U-boat because she agreed that she did not see it happen and her back was completely turned.
[brief] ”).  Moreover, a plaintiff must prove the product was defective, “by a preponderance of the competent evidence. ”  Boyle v. Ford Motor Co., 399 N.J. Super. 18, 34 (App. Div. 2008); see also N.J.S.A. 2A:58C-2.  Importantly, the plaintiff must establish that a defect existed in the specific product the plaintiff used.  N.J.S.A. 2A:58C-2 (plaintiff must prove that “the product causing the harm” contained a manufacturing, design or warnings defect) (emphasis added); Sun Chem. Corp. v. Fike Corp., 243 N.J. 319, 333 (2020) (observing that the PLA requires “proof ‘that the product causing the harm was not reasonably fit, suitable or safe for its intended purpose’” (quoting N.J.S.A. 2A:58C-2)).  Evidence of a defect in some other product does not suffice to defeat summary judgment, but that is all Plaintiff has.  Cf. Courtois v. General Motors Corp., 37 N.J. 525, 547 (1962).  This critical element distinguishes New Jersey’s strict liability statutory scheme from one that imposes absolute liability and must be heeded.
[directive] 3.  Nothing in this Directive prohibits any law enforcement agency from requiring their officers to complete additional rounds of firearms requalification during the year 2020, or requiring their officers to complete any additional in-service training.  4.  The adjustments to the Standards outlined in this directive shall not be applicable to firearms requalifications for retired law enforcement officers issued permits pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:39-6l.  The requalification requirements for Retired Officer Carry Permits shall continue to be governed by N.J.S.A. 2C:39-6l and Executive Order No. 129 (2020).
[brief] We hasten to add that in a variety of circumstances, an officer may reasonably arrest an individual on an out-of-state warrant despite an indication that the foreign jurisdiction will not extradite in order to confirm the foreign jurisdiction’s intentions.  See *United States v. Jones*, 260 Fed App’x 769, 772-74 (6th Cir. 2008); *United States v. Boyce*, No. 1:10-CR-62-TLS, 2011 WL 1085792, at *4 (N.D. Ind. March 21, 2011); *United States v. Burnett*, No. 21-68-DLB-CJS, 2022 WL 17828325, at *5 (E.D. Ky. Nov. 23, 2022).
[brief] See *Lippman*, supra, 222 N.J. at 388 (stating that the Court’s job is not to “engraft requirements” into plainly written statutes; rather the Court’s role is to “enforce the legislative intent as expressed through the words used by the Legislature”).  At the May 11, 2023 hearing on the Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiff clearly argued that a “summary” of the provisions of the Redevelopment Plan was necessary.  They claimed that the redevelopment plan allowed for a “more intense use than a traditional warehouse” and that “there’s nothing in there [the notice] that says in essence, this allows for this intensity (sic) a development…” (T2, 22:10-11 & 22:3-5).  They also argued that “the Township failed to set forth the essential nature of what was being adopted…” (T2, 23:8-11).  When the Court asked about the slippery slope that could occur with providing more detail regarding adoption of a redevelopment plan, Plaintiff’s counsel responded, “I think there has to be some indication of what this ordinance ultimately facilitates on a large level, and that is all of those things which I just expressed, the greater intensity, the two-million plus for development that wasn’t otherwise possible. ” (T2, 26:18-23).  Plaintiff clearly argues the ordinance notice should have included a summary of the Redevelopment Plan.  Neither N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-7(c) nor N.J.S.A. 40:49-2 require such an extensive notice.  The Trial Court properly rejected this argument.
[brief] The witnesses varied in their level of familiarity with Defendant.  [...] testified that she was not acquainted with Defendant but had seen him about three times at the Carver Hall apartments in the two to three months prior to the shooting.  10T 125:6-18.  In the aftermath of the shooting, [...] told her that “[...]” was the shooter.  13T 142:18-24; 13T 166:19-21; 13T 169:1-19.  [...] testified that she was friends with the defendant and had known him for several years.  10T 27:25-28:16.  [...] testified that he knew Defendant from having been incarcerated with him on more than one prior occasion and from seeing him on the streets.  13T 139:8-17.  During her statement to police, [...] was asked if she recognized the shooter, and she responded that it was [...].  Asked if she could identify a picture of him, she indicated that she could.  She then was shown a photograph of Defendant and identified it as such.  10T 122:4-123:16; 12T 160:1-11.
[brief] N.J.S.A. 52:14B-1.  The appellant was entitled to an administrative law hearing in order to resolve these issues.  In Re Amico/Tunnel Carwash 371 N.J. Super. 199 (App. Div 2004)  In Re Orange Sun Bank 172 N.J. super. 275 (App. Div. 1980).  The decision of the Board with respect to the deal of the appellant an administrative law hearing was arbitrary and unreasonable, and the Appellate Division should remand this matter for further proceedings.
[directive] 11.  인정했거나, [예/Yes] [아니요/No] [해당없음/NA]  귀하가 다른 죄목에 유죄를 유죄로 확정된 일이 있거나  또는 현재 복역 중이지만 유죄인정 합의서에는 이런 사항이 언급되어 경우, 있지 않은 판사는 모든 형량을 순차집행 하도록 선고할  수도 아십니까?  있다는 것을  Do you understand that if you have plead guilty to, or have been found guilty on other charges, or are presently serving a custodial term and the plea agreement is silent on the issue, the court may require that all sentences be made to run consecutively?
[brief] If a public utility satisfies the “reasonably necessary” standard, the [...] has the statutory authority to preempt “any ordinance or regulation made” under the MLUL.  N.J.S.A. 40:55D-19.  N.J.S.A. 40:55D-19 proceedings provide public utilities with “a complete, original and independent avenue of remedy”; thus, these proceedings do not concern the appropriateness or reasonableness of a zoning board’s determinations and as such are not direct appeals of municipal agency decisions.  Monmouth Consol. Water, 47 N.J. at 257.  Rather, these proceedings are de novo, based on a new record that the [...] will consider in determining whether a utility project is reasonably necessary.  Monmouth Consol. Water, 47 N.J. at 257; see Hackensack, 41 N.J. Super. at 424-25 (“We do not mean to suggest . . . that the board cannot grant the petition unless the proofs would sustain a recommendation of variance by the local board of adjustment. ”).  It is the [...], not the [...], that is statutorily tasked with determining whether a utility project is reasonably necessary based on, among other factors, “the community zone plan and zoning ordinance. ”  Thus, [...]’s claims that the [...] and [...] lack the expertise to evaluate such zoning criteria and that [...] was required to defer to [...]’s findings and conclusions regarding the proposed Project are incorrect.
[brief] Moreover, as [...]’s testimony unambiguously stated, no substantive changes were made to her job duties or responsibilities from before 2015 to after 2015, when [...] passed an ordinance granting employee privileges to the Municipal Prosecutor position.  (Pa20; 1T12:1-9).  [...] still performed the same duties in the same matter as she did from 2009 to 2014, when she was hired through a professional services contract.  In fact, [...] performed the same job duties and responsibilities as the other [...] Municipal Prosecutor who was indisputably an independent contractor.  This court has already made clear that labeling the engagement as an employer-employee relationship “will not save an ineligible individual from the preclusive effect of [Chapter 92.]” (Pa171-72).  Accordingly, because nothing about [...]’s relationship with [...] changed in 2015, being called an employee did not actually make her an employee.
[brief] Indeed, as stated in Township Code §175-160: Rural Development Zoning Districts  A. Purpose.  (1)  The rural development zoning district is transitional in nature.  It is fragmented by existing development and agricultural uses.  The area is relatively open in nature and is, thus, important from a cultural, visual and ecological standpoint.  *The intention of the Zoning Plan and Ordinance is to both maintain, where practical, the existing character of the district* and preserve it as land reservoirs for future community development.  The uses in this district are controlled essentially by the Township so long as they have only a moderate impact.  (emphasis added).  Thus, the existing residential use of the Property, and accessory structures that one would typically find in the community with such uses, were already anticipated in the Zone.
[directive] Determining Whether to Charge by Summons or Warrant A.  This Directive encourages police and prosecutors Presumption for complaint-summons. to charge by way of complaint-summons, rather than complaint-warrant, whenever that can be accomplished without jeopardizing public safety or welfare.  Pursuant to New Jersey Court Rule 5:20-2, if there is probable cause to believe that a juvenile is delinquent, a law enforcement officer may issue a complaint-summons to the juvenile and their parent, guardian, or custodian.  There is no need to apply to the court for a finding of probable cause.  Once the complaint-summons is filed with the court, the law enforcement officer shall within five days personally serve the summons on the juvenile and their parent, guardian, or custodian without taking the juvenile into custody.  5:20-2(a).  If a law R. enforcement officer issues a summons, the juvenile will be released after processing and scheduled to return to court at a later date.  An Assistant Prosecutor or a Designated Supervisory Officer can overcome the presumption of a complaint-summons if they determine that an application for a complaint- warrant is reasonably necessary to protect the safety of a victim or the community, to reasonably assure the juvenile’s appearance in court when required, or to prevent the juvenile from obstructing or attempting to obstruct the criminal justice process, and further determines that there is a lawful basis to apply for a complaint-warrant.
[brief] Don't you think that would have been a cited deficiency if what plaintiff says is true?  They would have.  Don’t you think the LPNs would have gotten in trouble on their own license?  Did you hear any evidence in this case that the LPNs were referred to the nursing board?  No, you didn't.  You know why?  Because it didn't happen.  Those are the people that are charged with the responsibility to make sure there's compliance with the statutes, compliance with the laws, and you didn't hear that.  11T76:9-77:11.
[brief] LEGAL ARGUMENT STANDARD OF REVIEW  Grants of summary judgment are reviewed de novo applying the same standard as that used by the trial court.  Lee v. Brown, 232 N.J. 114, 126 (2018).  Summary judgment should be granted only if, when viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment or order as a matter of law.  Conley v. Guerrero, 228 N.J. 339, 346 (2017).  See also, R. 4:46-2.  Even though the allegations of the pleadings may raise an issue of fact, if the other papers show that, in fact, there is no real material issue, then summary judgment can be granted.
[brief] And regardless of the size of the margin of victory or defeat, where there is no evidence to suggest that the result of the election does not express the legitimate popular will of the public, it must be maintained.  Appellant [...] is trying to cast doubt on the election results and impose a cloud over its legitimacy.  He is trying to disenfranchise voters based on technicalities even in the face of the voters’ clear desire to elect [...] instead of him.  In the more than 150 years since 1874, when New Jersey’s election laws were codified largely as they are reflected today in Title 19, one thing has been clear: courts should seek to enfranchise voters rather than disenfranchise them, and the law itself must give way to the purpose of elections themselves, which is to reflect the will of the people in their elected representatives.  While the trial court ultimately upheld the correct result—[...]’s victory—in the process it improperly disenfranchised multiple voters based upon technicalities of law, and ignored more than a century and a half of jurisprudence that the law is ultimately subservient to the people’s democratic will.  This Court should not allow that result to stand and should allow these nine ballots to be counted.
[brief] Neither Relator nor its principal, [...], has ever worked for any Defendant, much less as a remarketing agent.  Ja2121 (¶ 41).  Relator’s action instead is based upon inferences it has drawn from publicly disclosed bond transaction data.  Any “knowledge” Relator has must therefore be indirect, a point Relator has not contested.  Relator has pointed to information it obtained from Defendants’ former employees and added to the 3AC and 4AC.  See Ja3062 (3AC ¶ 72); Ja41–52 (4AC ¶¶ 121–27).  But this information cannot make Relator an original source.  First, consistent with New Jersey precedent, this court has held that knowledge gained from interviews with others is not direct.  Brennan, 454 N.J. Super. at 619 (concluding relator was not an original source because he “presented only indirect knowledge of defendant’s alleged false act, including . . . statements from third parties”); see also Schumann, 769 F.3d at 847 (knowledge not direct “when it is gained by reviewing files and discussing the documents therein with individuals who actually participated in the memorialized events”).  Second, these former-employee statements did not surface until after several amendments to Relator’s complaint; they were not part of the “information” on which Relator based the operative complaint that is subject to the public disclosure bar analysis, and so cannot be considered in determining whether Relator is an original source. \(^{22}\)  **Independent Knowledge.**
[brief] 776a-823a.  Appellants further alleged that, through this purported "scheme," the proceeds that they paid for the assignment from [...] found their way into the accounts of various individual defendants, but not to [...] or [...].  802a-803a at ¶ 105 ("all of the payments made by Plaintiffs pursuant to the representations, directions and assurances of [...], [...] and [[...]], and in accordance with the [...]-MTDC Assignment, were wrongfully taken by the co-conspirator defendants.  Instead of going to [...], said payments and monies were wrongfully taken and transferred to and among Defendants [...], [...], [...], Theresa [...], [...], [...], [...], and [...]").  Two observations about paragraph 105 of the Third Amended Complaint are striking and important to this Appeal.
[brief] To begin, [...] testified that his wife [...] was put on the deed in connection with a loan from [...],³ not the loan from [...], and it was that commercial loan that caused [...] to want a mortgage from [...] to protect his interests, not the plaintiff’s interests:  Q.  Did you ever add [...] Ventre to the deed for the [...] property?  A.  Yes, yes.  I mean, there came a point in time when we had secured the financing from [...] and my father understood and, you know, I had told him that my father understood that, you know, [...] would come on to the deed, but he had money invested there.  I mean, he wanted his money protected so he wanted a mortgage and to protect his money, you know, this was a third party coming in.  He trusted me.  But, you know what?  Who knows about [...]?  You know?  [Pa000141 at T32:9-19.]  --- ² Da refers to Defendants Appendix.  ³  We assume based on common knowledge that adding [...] to the mortgage was a condition of financing imposed by [...].  The problem plaintiffs allege in this case has nothing to do with [...]’s “interest in the property,” the deed, or the loan from [...].
[directive] [...], Special Assistant of [...], Director, Div. Crim. Justice Criminal Division  Managers and Assistants  County Prosecutors [...], Chief of [...], Chief Staff [...], Assistant Chief Attachment  1 of Order A - Order Mandating Evaluation  #1  Defendant's Fitness to Proceed to Trial (Defendant not Detained)  Order #1A - Order Mandating an Evaluation of Defendant's Fitness to Proceed to Trial (Defendant not Detained) of  The text the following proposed order has been drafted for use when the court needs a psychiatric or psychological report pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:4-5 due to questions regarding a defendant's fitness to proceed to trial.