ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Id. at 615.  Again, one of the significant distinctions for the Barila plaintiffs as compared to the Plaintiffs in this litigation was the Barila plaintiffs' continued employment.  The Barila Court noted that the nature of the employment benefit at issue tethers the right to compensation, in part, upon the employee's retirement or other separation from service.  Id. at 618-19.  The Court observed the uncertainty of an active employee's right to this benefit as follows:  A teacher in [...] who had more than one hundred days of unused sick leave while the 2012 Agreement was in effect, and who continued to work into the term of a successor agreement, faced the prospect that an illness or injury would require the use of some or all of that sick leave.  By the time of his or her retirement, that teacher might accumulate more sick leave, might use some of his or her accumulated sick leave, or might have no sick leave remaining.  Id. at 619.  Similarly, [...] v. [...], (Superior Officers) [...], 2022 WL 2352376 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. June 30, 2023), an unpublished case which Defendants heavily rely on in their opposition brief, does not support Defendants' argument that the MSRA empowered Defendants to strip Atlantic City employees of their vested property rights.
[brief] *See, e.g., Chavis*, 2021 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 785, at *7-8 (Affirming waiver of arbitration as “axiomatic” where defendants did not assert arbitration agreement in their answer; demanded a jury trial in their pleadings and waited nearly two years to enforce the arbitration provision.) at Pa68 ([...] Cert. Exh. E).
[brief] (Ja1-16)  In the Amended Complaint and in its submissions before the trial court, Plaintiff made no claim that the [...] comprehensive general liability policy issued to [...] had any coverage obligation for [...]’s accident and injury.  [...] argued in its motion for dismissal that its policy did not provide coverage for injury to employees of [...].  (1T15:3-8).  The trial court did not specifically address [...]’s argument in its decision, but its Order of January 29, 2024, specifically included dismissal with prejudice of Plaintiff’s claims against [...].  Ja2-3.  In its brief on appeal, Plaintiff makes no argument that the Order as to [...] was entered in error.  In fact, Plaintiff never mentions [...] in its appellate brief’s legal arguments at all.  For this additional reason, the Order dismissing Plaintiff’s cause of action against [...] should be affirmed.  CONCLUSION
[brief] *Id.*  Following this principle of a void *ab initio* complaint are a line of cases under Rule 1:20A-6.  In *Nieschmidt Law Office v. Leamann*, 399 N.J. Super. 125, (App. Div. 2008), this court found that despite the client’s intent not to engage in fee arbitration, the “plaintiff’s failure to give the requisite timely pre-trial notice under the rule prohibited the initiation of this litigation. ” at 127.  Thus, like the case at bar, whether or not the defendant chose fee arbitration on her own, the law mandates the attorney to serve the Pre-Action Notice and wait 30-days before filing a complaint.  That never happened here.  In *Wiss & Bouregy, P.C. v. Bisceglie*, No. A-3228-15T3, 2017 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 619 (App. Div. Mar. 13, 2017), the appellate court held that a complaint is prohibited “if an attorney fails to comply with Rule 1:20A-6” and “to rule otherwise would undermine the integrity of the fee arbitration system the Court established in Rule 1:20A-6. ”  In a recent case this year regarding R 1:20A-6, the appellate court in *Grabowski v. Baskay*, A-2785-21, 2023 WL 3862761 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. June 7, 2023) explained Rule 1:20A-6’s important purpose that: “[i]f an attorney were to prosecute an action in violation of [Rule] 1:20A-6 either because the attorney did not advise his or her clients of the arbitration remedy or because he or she did not allege the giving of notice, the attorney would be unilaterally taking advantage of the very class which [Rule] 1:20A-6 seeks to protect.
[brief] New Jersey Court Rule 2:4-1(a) provides, in relevant part, that “appeals from final judgments of courts . . . shall be filed within 45 days of their entry. ”  R. 2:4-1(a).  Critically, the Appellate Division has instructed that a “final judgment” is only final where it “dispose[s] of all claims against all parties. ”  McGlynn v. State, 434 N.J. Super 23, 29 (App. Div. 2014) (quoting Smith v. Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co., 421 N.J. Super 374, 383 (App. Div. 20110).  Otherwise, an order is interlocutory, and all such interlocutory orders may be raised on appeal of a final judgment.  See Ricci v. Ricci, 448 N.J. Super 546, 567 (App. Div. 2017) (“An appeal from a final judgment raises the validity of all interlocutory orders’ previously entered in the trial court”).  The Motion to Bar Order did not dispose of any claims against the parties, let alone all of the claims.  Accordingly, this order was interlocutory, and therefore properly and timely appealed.  CONCLUSION
[brief] Specifically,  On August 8, 2023, Plaintiff filed a Complaint against Defendants, which sounded in negligence.  Along with Plaintiff’s Complaint, a demand for Answers to Interrogatories and a Request for Documents, including medical records, were filed with the Trial Court.  On September 26, 2023, the Complaint and the accompanying discovery requests were served on Defendants, [...] and [...].  Defendants failed to file an answer within the statutory timeframe.  As a result, both Defendants were defaulted.  A Proof Hearing was scheduled for November 9, 2023.  Two days prior to the proof hearing, Defendants’ Counsel reached out to Plaintiff’s Counsel via email and requested that he sign a Consent Order to Vacate Default.  In a showing of good faith and professional courtesy, Plaintiff’s Counsel signed the Consent Order and default was vacated as to both Defendants on November 8, 2023.
[directive] (Ranpli sèl si enfraksyon an te komèt le ou aprè le 14 awout (2)(a)  [Wi/Yes]  [Non/No]  [pa aplikab/NA]  2013)  Èske w konprann ke si wap pled koupab de zak ponografi timoun daprè 2C:24-4b(4)  oswa 2C:24-4b(5)  oswa N.J.S.A.  N.J.S.A. nenpòt ki tantativ pou komèt nenpòt nan zak sa yo epi zak la te komèt le ou aprè le 14 awout 2014, an plis de nenpòt ki lòt santans, epi sou demann komisè gouvènman a, tribinal la fèt pou li enpoze yon santans espesyal de sipèvizyon kondisyonèl a vi, amwens ke tribinal ta deside ke daprè rejis ka a, ke sipèvizyon kondisyonèl a vi pa nesesè pou pwoteje kominote a oubyen pou disyade w de komèt tip aktivite kriminèl sa yo nan lavni?
[brief] The Law Division held that the walkway area was not “adjacent” to the “premises” because it did not touch any of the tenant’s storefronts.  However, Merriam-Webster, the most popular dictionary for general English usage, defines “adjacent,” as its first and most frequent use, to mean “not distant, nearby. ”  https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/adjacent.  There really cannot be any doubt that the spot where [...] fell was “not distant” and “nearby” each of the storefront of the Tenant Defendants.  For general legal usage, Black’s Law Dictionary distinguishes the terms “adjacent” and “adjoining” in its definition of “adjacent”:
[brief] The following statement in Defendants’ opposition succinctly identifies the trial court’s main error:  “The trial court did not conduct an analysis of the doctrine of collateral estoppel because it found the doctrine did not apply. ”  (Db34.)  That admission precisely explains the reason the trial court’s decision must be reversed.  The trial court relied solely on commentary made by this Court in a separate action to reach its erroneous conclusion that Plaintiff’s claims are barred by the entire controversy doctrine.
[brief] The statute amendment relied upon by [...] in claiming that it could lawfully convert the Board’s money to pay its employees became effective June 29, 2020, which negates any legitimate claim for payment of the April / May / June 2020 invoices.  The April 14\(^{th}\) version of N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-9(e)(3) did not include the language, “and employees of the contracted service provider shall be paid as if the school facilities had remained open and in full operation”. \(^8\)  It was added later and became effective June 29, 2020.  This is the portion [...] relies upon as justification to keep and use the money to pay its employees.  \(^7\)  Ardan v. Bd. of Rev., 231 N.J. 589, 609–10 (2018) (internal quotations and citations omitted)  \(^8\)  Pa233 – Pa259
[directive] I.  Permits to Carry a Handgun – Reporting Requirements and Procedures  As of December 22, 2022, the enactment of 2022, 131, the police chief of the L. c. municipality where an applicant resides, or in certain circumstances the [...], is responsible for reviewing and approving or denying applications for permits to carry handguns.  Prior to the new law, the final decision was made by the Superior Court in the appropriate vicinage.  Given that law enforcement is now the ultimate decision maker in one of the most significant processes in the state, we must be acutely aware of the impact.  By implementing the following reporting procedures, we will gain better insight into the effect of carrying handguns in public in New Jersey.
[brief] (Db17-18).  The nurse testified that defendant told her he was chased, and he saw a knife and there was a struggle where he got the knife away and stabbed the victim.  (4T12-5 to 7).  There was no admission from defendant that the victim “brandished” a knife or that the fighting was the result of the victim attacking him first.  In fact, initially, defendant denied to the nurse that there was a weapon.  (4T11-12 to 16; 4T17-12 to 13).  As the trial court noted, the scenario argued by defendant was filling in details that the jury at the retrial did not hear from the evidence.  To the extent that defendant’s admissions related that he and the victim struggled, the “mutual combat” was not on equal footing, as argued above.
[brief] (1)  All animals shall be kept in such a manner so as not to create an unsanitary condition, and so as not to result in unreasonable levels of noise, odor or other conditions which disturb the peace and quiet enjoyment of neighboring properties.  (2)  Manure shall be stored in such a manner and location that it does not create an unsanitary condition and so as to prevent drainage or run-off into any wetland resource area.  (4)  No manure storage area shall be located within:  (5)  (a)  One hundred (100) feet of wetlands or watercourses.  (b)  One hundred (100) feet of wells.  (c)  Four hundred (400) feet of public water supply wells.  (d)  One hundred (100) feet of property lines.  SECTION 19.
[brief] \footnote{Tully at 124.}  It thus follows:  A shareholder may maintain a direct action against a corporation or its directors \textit{if the shareholder suffers a special injury}.  A special injury exists where there is a wrong suffered by [the] plaintiff that was not suffered by all stockholders generally or where the wrong involves a contractual right of the stockholders, such as the right to vote.\footnote{Tully at 124.}  Stated another way, "a special injury [is] 'a wrong inflicted upon [the shareholder] alone or a wrong affecting any particular right which [the plaintiff] is asserting, such as . . . pre-emptive rights as a stockholder, rights involving the control of the corporation, or a wrong affecting the stockholders and not the corporation."18  Special injuries are those that "unequally affect" the plaintiff shareholders compared to other shareholders.19  The only shareholder of [...] since 2015 was the [...].20  Any alleged wrongs against [...] cannot have affected the [...] "unequally" from other shareholders because there are no other shareholders.21
[brief] ” (T2/126:10-18).  Based on the totality of the testimony and evidence presented over the course of the two public hearings on the application, the Hearing Officer’s Report and Recommendation (the “Hearing Officer Report”) recommended denial of Appellant’s application reasoning:  The proposed “backing maneuver” from a live lane of traffic along [...] is unsafe and inefficient.  It will interfere with vehicular and pedestrian traffic along [...] in a manner than cannot be mitigated by any reasonable condition.  In addition, the dimensions of the proposed loading zone do not provide a practical or convenient opportunity for the loading and unloading of product and cash, and loading will most likely occur from the traveled lane along [...].  (Aa245).  By Resolution 24-33, the Authority adopted the findings, conclusions and recommendations of the Hearing Officer, and based on the record in this matter, denied Appellant’s application.
[directive] The Court anticipates that the most common situation will involve disclosure voir dire by the reporting grand juror during that they are uncertain whether their criminal background disqualifies them from grand jury service based on the criteria  If set forth in N.J.S.A. 2B:20-1. the court determines that a background check is needed to resolve whether the prospective grand juror is qualified to serve, the prosecutor will facilitate the background check and share the results with the judge.  The grand juror should generally be afforded an opportunity to explain and provide of context for the results a background check.  Those communications should take of of place at sidebar outside the presence the other prospective grand jurors.  of  The court must avoid empanelment individuals who are statutorily ineligible to serve.  However, the court should not automatically dismiss the of prospective grand juror when there is an issue doubt.  Accordingly, when a voir dire, reasonable, individualized, good-faith basis for concern arises during the judge should exercise discretion in determining whether to authorize a background check, or instead postpone service for a prospective grand juror.  Relevant of considerations include the amount time needed to conduct a criminal background check and give the grand juror an opportunity to explain and provide context for the results.  Second Supplement to Directive #23-06 August 9, 2021
[brief] Super. 1 (App. Div. 1990) | | | Astrue v. Ratliff, | 22 | | 560 U.S. 586 (2010) | | | Buck v. Consultants, Inc. v. Glenpointe Assocs., | 47 | | No. 03-454, 2010 WL 2104982 (D.N.J. May 25, 2010) | | | Bussell v. DeWalt Prod. Corp., | 46, 50 | | 259 N.J. Super. 499 (App. Div. 1992) | | | Cirba Inc. v. VMware, Inc., | 21 | | No. 19-742-LPS, 2022 WL 606655 (D. Del. Jan. 7, 2022) | | | Deland v. Twp. of Berkeley Heights, | 23 | | 361 N.J. Super. 1 (App. Div.), cert. denied, 178 N.J. 32 (2003) | | | Elmora Hebrew Ctr., Inc. v. Fishman, | 14 | | 239 N.J. Super. 229 (App. Div. 1990) | | | Evans v. Jeff D., | 22 | | 475 U.S. 717 (1986)  | | | Fuhrmann v. Wolf, | 20, 23 | | No. A-6031-07, 2009 WL 4255529 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. | | | Nov. 19, 2009)  | | | Gleason v. Northwest Mortg., Inc., | 47 | | No. 96-4242, 2008 WL 2945989 (D.N.J. July 30, 2008)  | | | Jarwick Developments, Inc. v. Wilf, | passim | | No. A-2053-13T3, 2018 WL 2449133 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. | | | June 1, 2018)  | | | Jarwick Developments, Inc. v. Wilf, | 1, 3 | | No. A-5027-03T3 (App. Div. Dec. 15, 2006)  | | Jarwick Devs., Inc. v. Wilf, 236 N.J. 16 (2018)  ........................................................................................................7  Jarwick Devs., Inc. v. Wilf, 236 N.J.  68 (2018) ........................................................................................................7 Jarwick Devs., Inc. v. Wilf, 236 N.J. 47 (2018) .........................................................................................................7, 13 Jenkins v. Sterlacci, 849 F.2d 627 (D.C. Cir. 1988) .....................................................................................19, 20 In re Joint E. & S. Dists. Asbestos Litig., 737 F. Supp. 735 (E.D.N.Y. 1990) ..................................................................................20 Musto v. Vidas, 333 N.J. Super. 52 (App. Div. 2000) ..............................................................................46, 47 Nuckel v. Borough of Little Ferry, No. A-4940-11, 2013 WL 4104100 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Aug. 15, 2013) ..............................................................................................................20, 23 Packard-Bamberger & Co., Inc. v. Collier, 167 N.J. 427 (2001) .......................................................................................................25, 28 Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Investors Ins. Co. of Am., 65 N.J. 474 (1974) ..........................................................................................................48 Sanchez v. Fitness Factory Edgewater, LLC, 242 N.J. 252 (2020)
[brief] Pursuant to the Employers’ Liability Insurance Law, also part of Title 34, employers are required to make "sufficient provision for the complete payment of any obligation which [the employer] may incur to an injured employee, or his dependents” for claims prosecuted in the workers compensation courts.  N.J.S.A. 34:15-71 (emphasis added).  An employer may do so by self-insuring if they have the financial capacity, N.J.S.A. 34:15-77, or by obtaining insurance, N.J.S.A. 34:15-78.  Similarly, employers are required to "make sufficient provision for the complete payment of any obligation which [the employer] may incur to an injured employee or his administrators or next of kin” for work-related injuries maintained in a common law court.  N.J.S.A. 34:15-72 (emphasis added); see Schmidt v. Smith, 155 N.J. 44, 49 (1998) (“Those policies must cover not only claims for compensation prosecuted in the Workers' Compensation court, but also claims for work-related injuries asserted in a common law court. ”).  The WCA provides  If an injury or death is compensable under this article, a person shall not be liable to anyone at common law or otherwise on account of such injury or death for any act or omission occurring while such person was in the same employ as the person injured or killed, except for intentional wrong.  N.J.S.A. 34:15-8 (emphasis added).
[brief] (Db28-29.)  As explained above, however, the trial court’s determination as to the parties’ obligations under the PSA was incorrect.  The PSA requires that Defendants secure the RAO to the extent possible prior to closing, and there is nothing in the PSA to indicate that the parties contemplated shifting the Seller’s Environmental Obligations to Plaintiff.  As such, it was improper for the trial court to unilaterally shift the burden of Defendants’ contractual obligation to obtain the RAO to Plaintiff and effectively rewrite the PSA.  See 89 Water Street Assocs., 2019 WL 4793073, at *8-11.  As a final point, again, the Court should disregard Defendants’ numerous unsupported and misleading factual assertions.  See Pressler & Verniero, cmt. 1 on R. 2:5-4(a).  For example, among other things, Defendants falsely contend that redevelopment of the Property “can only be completed by the Plaintiff. ” (Db34.)  Defendants also imply that Defendants were obligated to surrender certain insurance policies to Plaintiff, but by the plain language of the PSA, the assignment of Defendants’ insurance policies to Plaintiff does not occur until the parties close on the sale of the Property.  (Db35; Pa0263 at Art. 11.7.)  Lastly, Defendants take issue with the fact that “Plaintiff’s brief is replete with details of the property’s environmental contamination” and contend that “the sufficiency or insufficiency of [the] RIR is irrelevant to this appeal. ”  (Db35-36.)  Defendants simply fail to recognize that such evidence is highly relevant to Plaintiff’s claim under Count Three of the Complaint for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.  B.
[brief] [...] asserts that [...] is the named inventor of the ’589 Patent and a prolific inventor of other water-ride attraction technologies, which are unrelated to the issues in this case.  Id., at 2.  [...] further declares that the history between Plaintiffs’ parent company, [...], and [...] “extends more than a decade and goes well beyond issues relating to the ’589 Patent or any of the issues in this case. ”  Id.  For example, [...] served on [...]’s Board of Directors from February 2014 through November 2015, and performed “operational and ministerial activities at [...] having nothing to do with the Asserted Patents. ”  Id.  [...] also asserts that [...] and [...] compete “across the globe for all types of projects, including bidding, designing, manufacturing, and installing countless different water attractions involving technologies not at issue in this litigation,” and they have engaged in “numerous instances of contentious confrontation,” which included multiple cease and desist letters and reexamination proceedings.  Id. at 2-3.  [...]’s declaration demonstrates that despite the parties’ efforts to tailor the search terms to the issues in this case, the resulting “hits” contain many irrelevant and unresponsive documents, and the Court therefore agrees with Plaintiffs that culling for relevance is warranted.  See id.; Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).  The Court finds that Plaintiffs have not waived their relevance and over breadth objections.  Plaintiffs’ agreement to run a search using the parties’ agreed-upon terms does not constitute Plaintiffs’ acquiescence to produce all resulting documents.  Further, in light of the fact that Plaintiffs purchased the rights to the Asserted Patents and certain assets after the Asserted Patents had been issued and associated products had been designed [see Oppo. at 28], the Court also finds Defendant’s objection based on the allegedly insufficient number of produced documents unavailing.  See Mot. at 2-3; Reply at 6 n.3.  The Court thus DENIES Defendant’s motion to compel Plaintiffs to produce all documents that “hit” on the parties’ ESI search terms.  Plaintiffs may review the documents that “hit” on the parties’ agreed-upon search terms for relevance before producing them to Defendant.  SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
[brief] Proximity to the dock and a general fear is insufficient to trigger a right to an adjudicatory hearing.  See *In re Thomas Orban/Square Props., LLC*, 461 N.J. Super. 57, 61 (App. Div. 2019)(adjacent property owners had no right to an adjudicatory hearing to contest a freshwater-wetlands general permit that allowed the property to be commercially developed).  Appellant’s interest is “recreational” and Appellant’s damages are speculative.  See *In re Freshwater Wetlands Statewide Gen. Permits*, 185 N.J. 452, 473 (speculative damages to neighboring properties do not amount to a particularized interest conferring a right to an administrative hearing).  As addressed in the matter of *In the Matter of [...] [...]*, [...], Appellant’s first appeal regarding [...]’s dock, Appellant has no property interest beyond Appellant’s property line.
[brief] And then, we have the quote that the Court points out at p. 2 of the Motion for Reconsideration filed on December 1, 2023 as page 3 of 3:  Q: At any point subsequent to hearing it from [...], did anyone tell you you weren’t allowed at the school?  A: No.  Q: All right.  So, after Glenn texted you that, what did you do?  A:  Well, at that point after my conversation with [...] and after my conversation with [...], I assumed, I shouldn’t use that word, I thought that [...] reached out to somebody either [...] or [...], told him that I threatened him or yelled at him or called him a piece -- he didn’t like the conversation so he reached out to them, said something that must have flipped their switch and when he told [...] that I’m not allowed on the school property, to me, I thought my days were numbered, that I’d have to resign or I was going to be fired and I didn’t want that being fired on my resume.