ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] "The grave and blatant exceptional circumstances in this matter are:  One, an entire complaint including non-legal malpractice claims, has been dismissed for failure to provide an AOM, which only applies to legal malpractice.  Two, legal malpractice claims, which fall under the common knowledge exception, have been dismissed for failure to provide an AOM when no AOM was necessary as a matter of law.  In fact, three, the improper dismissal with prejudice of an entire action and/or certain claims within that action amounts to circumstances which are exceptional and cause a grave injustice on plaintiffs."  Id.  Plaintiffs again argue that an – an affidavit of merit was not necessary here, because "the transactions at issue are only the setting in which Defendants [...] - [...] and [...] committed the blatant readily apparent wrongful actions that amount to legal malpractice, fraud, tortious interference, and conspiracy to commit fraud, and tortious interference.  A jury will not be called upon to understand the complexity of the underlying transactions to recognize that Defendants [...] and [...] improperly transferred and stole money."  Id., at 3.  (1T:14:4-19:6.).  Having reviewed the moving papers, the Court agreed with the position of [...] and the [...] firm that the Motion, presented as one under R. 4:50-1, was actually a Motion for Reconsideration of the Court’s dismissal Order.
[brief] Parents are entitled to access and request alterations in such records, N.J.A.C. 6A:32-7.5(e)(1) to (3), 6A:32-7.7(b); 34 C.F.R. § 99.20(a), but nothing requires schools to affirmatively notify parents about anything contained in the records.  Nor do parents possess “the unequivocal right to full, complete and accurate information contained in a student record. ”  See Middletown/Manalapan Db19; Marlboro Db16–17.
[brief] Thereafter, the [...] withdrew its remaining claims against [...] and the other directors, leaving only their applications for attorneys’ fees and costs.  In its February 10, 2021 ruling, the [...] found [...] and other ex-directors jointly-and-severally liable for attorneys’ fees and costs, stating:  The motions [for recovery of attorneys’ fees] are granted.  Defendants [...], [...], James [...], and [...] shall within 30 days pay Plaintiffs $208,847 in fees ($193,887 for [...] and $14,960 for [...]) and $2,520.77 in costs, and shall pay the [...] (by Payment to the Receiver) $59,937.42.  The four defendants are jointly and severally liable for these payments.
[brief] The LTTEL does not Require a “But-For” Test.  (Raised Below: Pa8-Pa11; Pa24-Pa29)  Plaintiffs assert that the LTTEL prohibits a municipality from entering a PILOT agreement unless the tax exemption was “necessary to attract investment and make the project financially feasible. ”  Pb24; Pb31.  They call this the “core question,” and the “crux of plaintiffs’ case. ”  Pb24; Pb31.  In essence, they argue that a tax exemption can only be granted if the affordable housing project could not be developed but for the exemption.  However, there is no such requirement in the LTTEL, and it is the words of the statute, not what Plaintiffs believe is implied, which govern.  See e.g. Brock v. Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 149 N.J. 378, 391 (1997) (citing Ocean Pines, Ltd. v. Borough of Point Pleasant, 112 N.J. 1, 7 (1988) (“When the statutory language is not unclear or obscure, and no ambiguity may be inferred from related legislation or other circumstances, a court ordinarily should apply the statute as written.
[brief] A “defeasible title” is “[o]ne that is liable to be annulled or made void, but not one that is already void or an absolute nullity. ”  Solberg Aviation, 409 N.J. Super. at 327 n.9 (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 418 (6th ed. 1990)).  Therefore, if [...] were to commence condemnation proceedings, and Plaintiff initiates a challenge, [...] would hold only a defeasible title to the Property as a fiduciary because title could revert back to the owner.  See New United, 2014 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 786, at *22-23.  New United holds that, [I]n order to potentially restore a condemnee to the condition of its property that was enjoyed when government seized title, and to avoid (or minimize) the payment of damages under Section 24, a condemnor is obliged to act prudently to avoid waste, mismanagement, or self-dealing.  Thus, any deterioration in the condition or value of the taken property, other than through normal wear and tear or the result of market conditions, becomes the responsibility of the condemning authority.
[brief] See McClellan v. Feit, 376 N.J. Super. 305, 315 (App. Div. 2005) (“Regardless of N.J.A.C. 11:1-20.2’s inapplicability, notification of changes in renewal policies under some circumstances is still required … when the insured is not specifically and clearly informed of the change, the renewal will be ineffective”); Nova Dev. Group, Inc. v. J.J. Farber-Lottman Co., Inc., 2010 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 413, at *14 (App. Div. 2010) (“If the regulation is not applicable, the issue remains, as the motion judge found, whether Nova was otherwise given reasonable notice of the exclusion endorsement. ”), Pa2761-Pa2765.  Moreover, the CCIP Manual provides that if [...] terminates any portion of the CCIP, “subcontractors will be provided with at least 30 days notice of cancellation,” and, “[s]hould coverage be cancelled by the insurer, 30 days written notice will be provided per the contract. ”  Pa589.  The Certificate of Liability Insurance issued by [...] to [...] also provided an additional cancellation requirement: “Should any of the above described policies be cancelled before the expiration date thereof, notice will be delivered in accordance with the policy provisions. ”  Pa619.  The CCIP Policy itself provides that the “first Named Insured” may cancel the policy by sending advance written notice of cancellation and that the insurer may cancel the policy by “mailing or delivering to the first Named Insured written notice of cancellation” 10 days before the effective date for nonpayment of premium or 30 days before the effective date for any other reason.  Pa84.  The Earlier Notice of Cancellation or Non-Renewal Endorsement raises the number of days required for notice of cancellation to 90 days.  Pa142.  Although the policy refers to the “first named insured,” [...], insurance in this case was issued to [...].
[brief] The facts of this case are as unique as they are offensive.  They must be viewed liberally.  They are designed to protect employees by deterring employers from engaging in discriminatory and retaliatory practices.  Both the NJLAD and Pierce common law claims should be construed liberally to advance their beneficial purposes.  Under this broad construction Plaintiff 1) has identified a clear mandate of public policy; and 2) qualifies as disabled.  The trial court erred in holding otherwise and must be reversed.  Respectfully submitted, [...] /s/ [...]
[brief] [Raised at Pa929-1172; Decided at Pa1-2]  The facts set out in STATEMENT OF FACTS above, [Db at 4-15] support that the Law Division properly denied plaintiffs partial summary judgment.  Thus, for the sake of brevity, the facts set out in STATEMENT OF FACTS above, will not be re-set out here in POINT III and are hereby adopted and incorporated herein by reference as if fully set forth herein.  Plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary judgment failed because plaintiffs either omitted and/or conceded the following undisputed material facts:
[brief] The trial court’s decision to not grant a directed verdict is only further underscored by the fact that the court correctly instructed the jury as to the standards for establishing constructive notice:  The public entity is considered to have constructive notice if the condition existed for such a long period of time and was of so obvious a nature that the public entity exercising due care should have discovered the dangerous condition and its dangerous character.  In addition, if you find that due to the length of time the dangerous condition was there and the obviousness of the condition, an employee providing his or her -- performing his or her job with reasonable care should have discovered the dangerous condition and its dangerous character, then the public entity is assumed to have had constructive notice of the condition.  [6T137:19-138:7].  The trial court’s jury instructions repeatedly highlighted that the time an alleged dangerous condition existed is an essential factor in determining whether the City had constructive notice of the condition.
[brief] 12, 15 W.S. v. Hildreth, 252 N. J. 506, 518, 287 A.3d 421 (2023)  5, 6  Woo-Padva v Midland Funding, 2023 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1550 (App. Div, 2023) passim Zaman v. Felton, 219 N.J. 199 (2014)  13  Unpublished Law Division Orders and Decisions
[brief] The trial court, recognizing that neither *Velli* nor *Helton* was controlling, relied instead on *Bung's Bar & Grille, Inc. v. Twp. Council of Florence*, 206 N.J. Super. 432 (Super. Ct. 1985).  In that case, after an exhaustive review and analysis of New Jersey and federal rules and precedent, the court concluded that “where expert opinion evidence is essential to be resolution of the issue, a reasonable allowance for the service is includable in the taxed costs. ”  *Id.* at 479-84, 502 A.2d at 1226-29.  *Bung's Bar & Grille* also supports an award of deposition costs, with the court holding that it had discretion to award deposition costs.  *Bung's Bar & Grille, Inc.*, N.J. Super. at 480, 502 A.2d at 1226 (*Citing Finch, Pruyn & Co. v. Martinelli*, 108 N.J. Super. 156 (Super. Ct. 1969) and *Huber v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment*, 124 N.J. Super. 26 (Super. Ct. 1973)).  [...] claims it was an abuse of discretion for the trial court to rely on *Bung’s Bar & Grille* because it predates both *Velli* and *Helton*.
[brief] These addresses included the locations [...] and [...] in [...], which [...]’s process server noted were nonexistent (Da43, [...] Report; Da52, [...] Report).  It appears that in February of 2021, after confirming [...] did not exist, the process server correctly identified [...] as [...]’s address and attempted to serve him there (Da43, 12 Short Drive Report).  However, as [...] explains, the individual who attempted service on that occasion must have misread the address or knocked on the wrong door, as he wound up speaking to [...]’s neighbor (Da156, Second [...] Cert., ¶¶18-19).
[brief] TRC meetings are informal opportunities for an applicant and its professionals to meet with land use board professional consultants and other municipal department representatives in order to ensure that the land use board is presented with the information necessary to dispose of the application at the ultimate hearing on same.  Despite the continued assertions by the Trial Court and the Respondents, TRC meetings are NOT binding on a land use board; which is entitled to review the documentary and testimonial evidence provided at the hearing to make its decision on the application.  During the hearing on the 2018 Amended Application, the Board Attorney properly characterized the nature and purpose of the TRC meetings; stating:  So we have a Technical Review Committee which is made up of board professionals and township staff.  At the beginning of those meetings every applicant is advised that it’s merely a courtesy review.  No recommendations of the professionals are binding upon the board.  It’s their input and guidance to the developer.  We do appreciate that this developer, along with others, often takes those considerations to heart and looks at their application, sometimes makes changes.  But again those changes were not required, it is just an advisory committee.
[brief] (Da161).  In reaching his opinion that the invoices issued by [...] were unreasonable, [...] looked only at the retainer agreement between [...] and [...] and the legal bills sent by [...] to [...].  [...] did not look at the discovery requests prepared by [...], the discovery responses prepared by [...], or the documents received or propounded by [...] in the underlying matter.  (Da162).  The trial court properly held that an expert’s opinion must have some factual basis, however, and the retainer agreement entered into between [...] and [...], and the invoices issued, did not provide a factual basis for a determination that [...] spent too much time and thus charged too much for the drafting of discovery responses (which [...] never saw), the drafting of discovery requests (which [...] never saw), and/or the review of the documents generated in discovery (which [...] also never saw).
[brief] .................................................................  12 Washington Twp. Zoning Bd. of Adj. v. Washington Twp. Planning Bd., 217 N.J. Super. 215 (App. Div. 1987) ...........................................  8  STATUTES N.J.S.A. 18A:64M-2(b) ..................................................................  3 N.J.S.A. 18A:65-14 ......................................................................  4, 12, 14 N.J.S.A. 18A:65-14.13 ..................................................................  13 N.J.S.A. 18A:65-16 and -17 .............................................................  5 N.J.S.A. 18A:65-17 ......................................................................  1 N.J.S.A. 18A:65-19 ......................................................................  1 N.J.S.A. 52:14-7 .........................................................................  6  OTHER AUTHORITIES
[directive] Any local unit, by resolution adopted by vote of at least two-thirds of the full membership of the governing body, may at any time appropriate and apply any unappropriated funds to the purchase and retirement of any of its then outstanding bonds, notes or other obligations.  The purchase price may be or the face value, or may be below above the face value of such bonds, notes or other obligations.  Any such proposed purchase shall be subject to the following provisions:  a.  Before adoption of the resolution, the governing body shall cause satisfactory proof to be filed with the bureau that such funds then are, or within a reasonable time will be, available.  b.  Before contracting to purchase bonds, notes or other obligations at a price above their face any value, the governing body shall submit such resolution to the said bureau for approval by the Local Finance Board.  Before taking definite action, the said Local Finance Board may require the submission of additional information and may require that the governing body of the local unit shall call for public on tenders of bonds, notes or other obligations such notice and subject to such rules as the board may prescribe.  On receipt of such tenders, the governing body shall report them to the said Local Finance Board together with a further proposed resolution for approval by that board.  In approving or disapproving any proposed purchase of bonds, notes or other obligations, the said Local Finance Board shall find and determine whether such appropriation of available funds is in the (2) of interest of the local unit, having regard for (1) the prospective need funds for other purposes, reasonableness of the price proposed to be paid, (3) any saving of interest to result from retirement of the bonds, notes or other obligations at the price proposed to be paid, the equality and (4) reasonableness of the debt service on obligations which will remain outstanding, and fairness to the (5) holders of other obligations.  After purchase of any bonds, notes or other obligations, satisfactory proof of cancellation of the bonds, notes or other obligations and of any coupons thereto annexed shall forthwith be filed with the bureau by the chief financial officer of the local unit.  Any local unit, by resolution adopted by vote of at least two-thirds of the full membership of the - governing body m ~ at y any time appropriate to and pay into any sinking fund maintained by such local unit any unappropriated funds; provided, a certified copy of such resolution shall be submitted to the Local Finance Board and the Local Finance Board, by resolution, shall determine that it is satisfied by proof submitted to it that such funds then are, or within a reasonable time will be, available, and shall consent to such appropriation.  s. c. L.1960, 169, 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1962.
[brief] Given the absence of any statutory or regulatory basis for Appellants’ arguments, Appellants rely on irrelevant and non-binding case law and authorities, policy statements, studies, and executive and administrative orders to argue that [...] was required to consider impacts of air pollution and climate change considerations.  Specifically, Appellants cite to the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Massachusetts v. [...], 549 U.S. 497 (2007) and an administrative law decision in North Bayview, LLC v. NJ DEP, 2007 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 782 (Dec. 3, 2007).  The Supreme Court in Massachusetts v. [...] merely held that states have Article III standing to challenge the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (“[...]”) denial of the state’s rulemaking petition, and that the [...] has the authority under the Clean Air Act to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from motor vehicles.  The administrative law decision in North Bayview, LLC v. NJ DEP simply acknowledged the rationale for [...]’s regulation of development within dunes under the Coastal Area Facility Review Act and noted that dunes protect shore communities from sea level rise brought about by climate change.  Id. 39-40.  Neither of these decisions relate to the scope of [...]’s review under the Highlands Act nor do they have any bearing on whether [...] is consistent with the goals and purposes of the Highlands Act.
[brief] Div. 1970)| | PARISI v N. BERGEN MUN. PORT AUTH., 105 N.J. Super. 25, 41 (1987).................................................................37 PARK CENTER v ZONING BD., 365 N.J. Super. 284, 839 A.2d 78 (App. Div. 2004)..................................48 POINT PLEASANT MANOR BLDG. CO. v BROWN., 42 N.J. Super. 297, 303-04 (App. Div. 1956)..............................................17 STATE BY COMM'R OF TRANSPO. v BIRCH, 115 N.J. Super. 457, 463-64 (App. Div. 1971).............................................19 SUMMER COTTAGERS ASS'N OF CAPE MAY v. CITY OF CAPE MAY, 19 N.J. 493, 503-504, 117 A.2d 585 (1955)..................................................48 TALCOTT FROMKIN FREEHOLD ASSOCS. v FREEHOLD TP., 383 N.J. Super. 298, 315-316 (Super. Ct. 2005)...........................................48 TALCOTT FROMKIN FREEHOLD ASSOCS. v FREEHOLD TP., 383 N.J. Super. 298, 314 (Super. Ct. 2005)..................................................30
[brief] According to the Defendant, since it had until the closing date to supply an Acceptable Estoppel Certificate as a “closing deliverable,” the risk to Plaintiff of Defendant not doing so existed from contract inception.  (Pb26.)  Therefore, the trial court was wrong in determining there would be an unfair advantage if the Defendant’s construction were given effect.  The Defendant concludes this “impose[d] additional protections” for the Plaintiff not included in the PSA.  (Pb27.)  However, the Defendant is again incorrectly relying on an obligation to deliver an Acceptable Estoppel Certificate at closing referring to it as a closing deliverable.
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY GRANTED ATTORNEY’S FEES AND COSTS TO DEFENDANT BY ITS MARCH 11, 2024 ORDER, INCLUDING THOSE FEES AND COST ASSOCIATED WITH CERTAIN LIMITED PRE-TRIAL MOTIONS UPON WHICH DEFENDANT DID NOT SUCCEED.  (Pa665-666; Pa1717).  As for calculating an attorney fee award, Defendant does not agree with the argument that Defendant was not entitled to fees relating to the limited issues she did not prevail upon (Plf.’s Brief at 42).  When taken as a whole, Defendants was not partially successful; she was ultimately and fully successful in the defense of this case.  The proof of this is in the dismissal, after jury trial, of the Complaint on all remaining Counts (having, as discussed above, stipulated a number of causes of action out of the case upon Defendant’s Motion for Directed Verdict).
[brief] Page TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ........................................................................................................ v PRELIMINARY STATEMENT .................................................................................................  1  PROCEDURAL HISTORY .......................................................................................................  3 STATEMENT OF FACTS .......................................................................................................  5 LEGAL ARGUMENT ...............................................................................................................  8 POINT I THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN GRANTING SUMMARY  JUDGMENT TO DEFENDANTS  BECAUSE THERE ARE NO MATERIAL FACTS IN DISPUTE AND THE LAW IS IN THEIR FAVOR .........................................................................................................................  8  POINT II  PLAINTIFF’S ARGUMENT THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AND ENGAGED IN BIAS BY FAVORING DEFENDANTS’ POSITION AND IMPROPERLY WEIGHING THE EVIDENCE IS MERITLESS AND NOT SUPPORTED IN THE RECORD .........................................................................................  11 POINT III SUMMARY JUDGMENT DISMISSING PLAINTIFF’S RACE AND AGE DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS [COUNTS I AND IV] WAS WARRANTED BECAUSE SHE CANNOT ESTABLISH (A) SHE WAS PERFORMING HER JOB AT A LEVEL THAT MET HER EMPLOYER’S LEGITIMATE EXPECTATIONS, OR (B) THAT HER NON-RENEWAL OCCURRED UNDER CIRCUMSTANCES THAT GIVE RISE TO AN INFERENCE OF UNLAWFUL DISCRIMINATION .........................................................................................  12  A.  Plaintiff Cannot Establish That She Was Performing Her Job at a Level That Met Defendants’ Legitimate Expectations ...........................................................................................................................................  14  B. Plaintiff Cannot Establish That Her Non-Renewal Occurred Under Circumstances That Give Rise to an Inference of Unlawful Discrimination ..................................................  19 C. Defendants Had Legitimate, Non-Discriminatory Reasons for Plaintiff’s Non-Renewal and Plaintiff Cannot Show Those Reasons to be Pretextual ..........................................................  26 POINT IV  SUMMARY  JUDGMENT  DISMISSING  PLAINTIFF’S HOSTILE WORK ENVIRONMENT AND HARASSMENT CLAIM [COUNT II] WAS WARRANTED BECAUSE (A) THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT SHE WAS TARGETED BASED ON HER RACE OR AGE, (B) SHE CANNOT ESTABLISH SEVERE OR PERVASIVE CONDUCT ON THE PART OF DEFENDANTS, AND (C) SHE CANNOT ESTABLISH THAT A REASONABLE PERSON WOULD BELIEVE THE CONDITIONS OF EMPLOYMENT WERE HOSTILE OR ABUSIVE ...........................................  27
[brief] DEFENDANT IS CONFINED TABLE OF CONTENTS  PAGE NOS.  REPLY PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND STATEMENT OF FACTS  ............  1 LEGAL ARGUMENT ..............................................................................  2  REPLY  POINT I REVERSAL IS REQUIRED BECAUSE THE TRIAL COURT ISSUED  AN INADEQUATE LIMITING INSTRUCTION REGARDING HOW TO CONSIDER TESTIMONY IMPLICATING DEFENDANT IN AN UNRELATED ROBBERY.  (Not Raised Below)  ..................................................................................................................  2 CONCLUSION .................................................................................................  7  REPLY PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND STATEMENT OF FACTS