ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] A law enforcement officer may only pursue under the circumstances described in subparagraph (a) or subparagraph (b):  (a) when the officer reasonably believes that the violator has committed, or is engaged in a conspiracy or attempt to commit: (1) any crime of the first degree, or (2) one of the following violent or serious crimes of the second degree: a. Manslaughter, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4; b. Vehicular Homicide, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-5; c. Aggravated Assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b); d. Disarming a Law Enforcement Officer, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-11; e. Kidnapping, N.J.S.A. 2C:13-1; f. Luring/Enticing a Child, N.J.S.A. 2C:13-6; g. Human Trafficking, N.J.S.A. 2C:13-8; h. Sexual Assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2; i. Robbery, N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1; j. Arson, N.J.S.A. 2C:17-1; k. Burglary, N.J.S.A. 2C:18-2; l. Escape, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-5; m. Possession of a Firearm, Explosive or Destructive Device for an Unlawful Purpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(a) through (c); n. Unlawful Possession of a Weapon (Machine Guns and Handguns), N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(a) and (b); or (3) one of the following other crimes: a.
[brief] However, the Court ruled it would stop short of making a “bad faith” determination against [...] – a determination that would likely have resulted in a mandatory adverse inference charge, or full dismissal – because it was not privy to the [...]’s policies.  (6T13-21 to 14-6, 15-4 to 24)  Only during PCR proceedings did the defense received [...]’s policies, in response to an OPRA request for its relevant standard operating procedures.  (Da488-542)  These policies provide specific procedures for evidence collection, preservation, and destruction; call for trainings and audits; and set forth a chain of command.  They were circulated widely.  And they were violated.  However, the PCR judge rejected the claim that the failure of defense counsel to obtain [...]’s polices was ineffective assistance.  The PCR judge recognized that counsel could have requested the policies, which were “known to the Petitioner” based on [...]’s testimony, but declared they would have “adding nothing [to [...]’s] consideration of the motion to dismiss the indictment and would not have had a material difference on the result of the case,” since a permissive inference charge was given to the jury.  (Da381-84)  This was wrong.  In ruling on the motion to dismiss, [...] found [...] established all the Hollander factors except the first, bad faith, because he did not show [...] violated its policies.  Yet, the policies at the heart of the court’s concern existed at the time and contained specific requirements implicating the exact issues at bar.  They were disseminated to the entire [...] office and available internally, yet not produced.  The existence of these policies, the witnesses’ lack of awareness of them, and [...]’s failure to comply with them demonstrates egregious carelessness on the part of numerous individuals within [...].
[brief] (Da 27)  While it was fine hours earlier for the judge to give the first Czachor instruction, at 4:45 p.m. on what was necessarily the last day of deliberation, there simply was no excuse for not giving that supplemental instruction and making such an inquiry here.  It is almost like the judge knew what the obvious answer was and wished to avoid that answer.  This was a jury note that was very clearly stating that the jury was “deadlocked” on some counts, that it was very concerned about the looming vacations of two jurors the next day, and that it had reached verdicts on some other counts.  And yet the second “continue to deliberate”/Czachor instruction not only ignored two of those three concerns in that note in favor of simply telling the jurors to keep trying, but it also hinted to the jurors that they were in for a long haul when the judge said that she was going to “determine how long we can have you here today.
[brief] It's difficult to imagine more of a compelling public interest than safeguarding the reliable delivery of heat and hot water to every resident, in [...], particularly during the coldest winter months.  The second and third steps require the Board to identify a detrimental effect.  And if, in fact, there is a detriment present, the Board may then be permitted to impose reasonable conditions, if any.  As to both of these steps, you've heard repeated uncharted testimony, from [...] experts and professionals, that there will be no detrimental impacts, and certainly, substantially no detrimental impacts.
[brief] Attorneys of Record: [...], Esq.  Attorney ID: [...]  E: [...]  [...]  Attorney ID: [...]  E: [...]  LAW OFFICES  ROSEMARIE ARNOLD, LLP  Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant  [...]  T:[...] F:[...]  TABLE OF CONTENTS FOR BRIEF  TABLE OF CONTENTS FOR BRIEF ................................................................. i  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS, AND RULINGS........................................ iii  TABLE OF CONTENTS FOR PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT’S SUPPLEMENTAL APPENDIX................................................................................ iv  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES.................................................................................. v  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT .............................................................................1
[brief] The underlying lawsuit was grounded entirely on plaintiff’s own conduct that, by any definition, cannot be considered to constitute an accidental occurrence.  [...]’s motion to dismiss demonstrated that the allegations of the underlying complaint simply did not come within the plain language of the [...] liability coverage, which pertains only to “occurrences,” expressly defined in the policy as “accidental. ”  The lower court thus correctly ruled that the allegations of the underlying complaint, describing specific conduct by plaintiff [...], do not come within the liability coverage of his [...] policy.  As such, the lower court correctly determined that the [...] policy does not insure the risk for which plaintiff sought coverage, and further, even if that were not the case, a valid, unambiguous and enforceable exclusion applies here.
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT MAY BE AFFIRMED ON THE ALTERNATIVE GROUND OF JUDICIAL ESTOPPEL  The Trial Court rejected Plaintiff’s mailing vendor theory and thus did not have to reach any of [...]’s arguments that Plaintiff’s bankruptcy filing also requires dismissal of her instant lawsuit. (Pa60).  Nevertheless, this Court may affirm the Trial Court on other grounds not expressed by the Trial Court.  See Oliveira v. Auto Sport of Newark, 2024 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 170, at *8 (App. Div. Feb. 5, 2024) (collecting cases and indicating that an appellate court may affirm a trial court for reasons other than those expressed by the trial court).  Here, although not specifically addressed by the Trial Court, this lawsuit was also properly dismissed because Plaintiff failed to properly disclose her claims prior to discharge and is thus judicially estopped from maintaining this lawsuit.
[brief] In her initial brief, [...] explained that the passion/provocation manslaughter conviction must be vacated and a judgment of acquittal entered because the jury found that the State did not “disprove, beyond a reasonable doubt, the applicability of self-defense as to Count 1, Murder. ” (Da 13; Db 23-25)¹  The State agrees that “[t]he verdict sheet clearly shows that the jury found that the State failed to disprove self-defense with respect to the charge of murder. ”  (Sb 3)  However, the State asserts that the jury’s finding that the State failed to disprove self-defense does not amount to an acquittal for all homicide ¹  This reply uses the same abbreviations as the initial brief.  In addition, Db refers to the initial defense brief while Sb refers to the State’s response brief. charges but instead is merely “a valid, inconsistent verdict. ”
[brief] ” (1T26-18 to 28-5; 2T44-8 to 45-16; 5T27-22 to 28-10).  The court’s conclusion with respect to Evid. R. 403 was stated without ever having engaged in a weighing process considering whether the probative value of the acts by defendant’s agent would be “substantially outweighed by the risk of (a) undue prejudice, confusion of issues, or misleading the jury; or (b) undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.
[brief] [...] has a clear path, even under *Heck*, for the ridiculous gardening tool charge since it did have a favorable outcome, it was in the passenger compartment which should never have been searched and it was added to cause grief.  Similarly, the Third Circuit, while reading *Heck* harshly, still allows causes of action for 4th Amendment Violations.  That’s all [...] wants with regard to the trumped-up gardening tool charge.
[brief] ....  [Regarding] the profitability of defendants’ conduct, when they stopped their illegal conduct, and defendants’ financial condition ...[:]  [...][, [...] and [...]] profited in the amount of $13,321,285 in fraudulent management fees taken during the non-RICO [SOL P]eriod.  N.J.S.A. § 2A:15-5.12(c)(2).  [...][] did not stop stealing after multiple court orders and an Appellate Division decision [in 2006], and only stopped stealing money in 2011.  N.J.S.A. § 2A:15-5.12(c)(3).  Finally, defendants here are extraordinarily wealthy.  They own a National Football League football team.  Thus, the [...] will not be burdened by the imposition of punitive damages.  Nonetheless, the court is compelled to impose punitive damages to deter future illegal conduct.
[brief] 2T40:18-20 and 46:23-24.  In her ruling, [...] acknowledged that [...] testified “without hesitation” and that “his demeanor was seemingly calm and controlled. ”  2T42:18-20.  Still, [...] found [...]’s testimony was not credible.  2T42:17-18.  [...] explained that she was finding [...] not credible because she determined that his testimony was not consistent with the video surveillance.  2T42:20-22.  [...] found that the two seconds that elapsed was not enough time for [...] to have ordered Defendant to stop, observed Defendant speed up, and observed Defendant’s fanny pack swaying.  Thus, [...] found that the testimony was not reasonable and that “it can’t be that this actually occurred and I don’t find it credible at all. ”  2T50:24-51:6 and 52:9-13.  At several different points in her ruling, [...] addressed [...]’s testimony that Defendant appeared startled upon observing the police.  2T44:2-7 and 48:1-3.  First, [...] found that “the startled look of the defendant was that of a person on crutches trying to avoid being hit by a patrol car that had sped up so fast at the driveway that it came to an abrupt stop and jolted back as he was crossing in front of it. ”  2T44:2-7.  Later, [...] found the testimony that Defendant looked startled “not credible. ”  2T48:1-3.  Still later, [...] acknowledged that Defendant looked startled upon seeing police, but attributed that look to something other than criminal activity.  2T48:15-22.  [...] acknowledged that the initial report was received by police through the 9-1-1 system.
[brief] See R. Doc. 103.  After negotiating the terms, the parties agreed upon the protocol that [...] filed with the Court.  Id., at p. 1; citing R. Doc. 31–1, pp. 28–37.  [...] contends that the “Protocol” reflects the agreed-upon scope and procedures for the Court ordered forensic examinations, which identified the digital forensic company, [...], as [...]’s Forensic Vendor, to which both [...] and [...] had “no objection. ”  See R. Doc. 103–1, p. 2, citing R. Doc. 31–1, p. 26 ¶ 1.  [...] contends that [...] and [...] retained its own digital forensic company, [...], to oversee RVM’s examinations and assist with [...]’s and [...]’s review/production of the forensic files.  Id. at p. 3.  [...] contends that the parties agreed that RVM would meet with [...] and 24 Hour Safety on November 1, 2013, so that RVM could create forensic images of certain computers, devices, and email accounts for various custodians.  [...] contends that the initial examinations occurred simultaneously at two different locations: one in [...], (“Deer Park”) and in [...] (“Geismar”).  See R. Doc. 103–1, p. 3.  However, after conducting these examinations, [...] argues that Defendants allegedly failed to comply with some of their production requests.  See R. Doc. 103, p. 1.  Therefore, on February 18, 2014, after conferring in accordance with Fed.R.Civ.P. 37, [...] filed the instant motion, alleging the following deficiencies with Defendants responses: (a) [...] failed to provide [...]’s iPhone for forensic imaging during the initial collection and has not allowed [...] to re-image it; (b) [...] has not allowed [...] to conduct a full examination of [...]’s iPhone; *3 (c) [...] has produced none of the files collected from Hains’s external devices; (d) [...] withheld at least 3,600 files from the email accounts of [...], [...], and [...] because they pre-date July 1, 2013; (e) [...] withheld several thousand files based on relevance; (f) [...] produced no log detailing which files were withheld—and the reasons why—from its employees’ computers and devices; and (g) [...] and [...] produced two privilege logs relating to files from email accounts and [...]’s devices—minus his discarded iPhone—without adequate descriptions that would allow [...] or this Court to access the privilege claim.
[directive] Each bank is able to design a system that suits the bank’s needs while effecting the business of wire transfers.  Most banks require the agency to have an account with the bank from which wire transfers will be drawn.  Banks also charge a \feeN for the wire transfer which currently averages about $12.00 per transfer.  The agency cannot have this fee amount deducted from the monetary amount being transferred.  Each agency shall implement procedures to provide for the payment of the fee as incurred.
[brief] Pa4.  On October 26, 2021, the Department of Labor (“Department”) reviewed the assessment and determined that [...] was ineligible for benefits due to leaving work voluntarily.  Pa3.  The Department’s determination resulted in a refund demand of $8,272.00.  Ibid.  [...] appealed the Department’s determination on October 29, 2021 and the Appeal Tribunal hearing was held on May 16, 2022.  Ibid.  A final decision of the Appeal Tribunal affirming the denial of benefits was issued on May 17, 2022.  Pa3 to Pa6.  [...] appealed to the Board of Review ("Board") on August 2, 2022, and subsequently filed an amended appeal with additional medical records on August 11, 2022.  Based on the record below, the Board affirmed the denial of benefits on November 16, 2023.  Pa1.  [...] filed his Notice of Appeal to this court on December 21, 2023.  Pa7.
[brief] (9T244:12-14).  [...] met with Respondent, and they exchanged documents.  (9T244:12 to 245:6; 9T246:1-20).  Respondent signed a retainer agreement and thereafter, Mr. [...] testified that Respondent contacted him frequently, by cell phone and in person and complained to him about Petitioner.  (9T:244:15-22).  Respondent gave Mr. [...] all the pleadings filed in this case and saw Respondent in the local Wawa food stores and at the ballfield and would talk to Mr. [...] about Petitioner and the litigation.  (P537a; 9T246:22 to 247:15).  Mr. [...] testified that when Decedent was making the will, he had meetings with Decedent, prepared a draft will that Decedent reviewed and requested changes to, he mailed her invoices, received payments from Decedent and received a prenuptial agreement but could not recall when.
[brief] Statutes N.J.S.A. 2A:15-59.1 ..................................................................................... passim Rules Rule 1:4-8 ..................................................................................................... passim Rule 1:6-3 .....................................................................................................5  Rule 1:7-4 ..................................................................................................... passim Rule 1:36-3 ...................................................................................................19  Other Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules (2024)  .................................  24, 26  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT  Plaintiff [...]  (“[...]”), and its principal, Plaintiff [...] (“[...],” collectively, “Plaintiffs”), respectfully submit this Brief in Support of their Appeal of (1) the Trial Court’s August 6, 2021 order granting summary judgment (the “Summary Judgment Order”); (2) the Trial Court’s order awarding as a sanction $72,984.95 in attorneys’ fees and costs on November 19, 2021 (the “Sanctions Order”) and (3) the Trial Court’s order denying reconsideration of the Summary Judgment Order and denying, in part, reconsideration of the Sanctions Order on February 4, 2022 (the “Reconsideration Order”).
[brief] See Albert, 2019 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1586, at *5 (To determine whether a duty-shifting provision in a lease should be ignored, courts should apply the Hopkins factors and focus on which party had the opportunity and ability to exercise care).  See also Prosser and Keeton on Torts, § 63, at 446 (Fifth Edition, 1984) (noting the modern trend is to impose a general tort duty of care on landlords).  In applying the Hopkins factors to the facts of this case, a duty of care should be found to exist given the nature of the risk, the ability of [...] to exercise care, and the danger that existed in [...] neglecting to exercise care.  C.
[brief] [...] contends that, because [...] and [...] could, in the abstract, assert cross-claims against one another for apportionment of fault under CNA, a concurrent conflict automatically exists under RPC 1.7(a) barring joint representation.  Not so.  [...]’s representation of [...] and his practices is not directly adverse to [...].  Primarily, [...] argues that this case is analogous to direct adversity in a car accident case merely because IFPA claims are subject to the CNA and, as such, there is a *per se* bar to a single law firm representing multiple defendants in any case governed by the CNA.  Pb12-14; see also *Liberty Ins. Corp. v. Techdan, LLC*, 253 N.J. 87, 111 (2023) (holding IFPA claims are subject to CNA apportionment of fault).  [...]’s analogy is misguided.  That is not the law.  Indeed, a holding to the contrary would be an earthquake in joint representation of multiple defendants, which occurs day-in and day-out in this State in different types of cases.  The legal authority that generally prohibits one lawyer from representing both the driver and passenger in an automobile accident case is inapposite.  See Pb12-14 (citing *McDaniel v. Man Wai Lee*, 419 N.J. Super. 482, 497 (App. Div. 2011); *Notice to the Bar*, 91 N.J.L.J. 81; *ACPE Opinion 188*, 93 N.J.L.J. 789 (Nov. 12, 1970)).
[directive] 1.  ,iii' ~~=: it~- •.,ij"5"}7} ~78"8}~ '€17l"O"J-1)A].Q.: Statutory Maximum/16:.:il a].:rr Ind./ Acc./Comp.# Count Nature of Offense Degree  VCCOAssmt* Time Fine _:r:;y- 'r~7]:a- 7]~.:rr~/.:rra: 21}1!~• . vcco ¾-W- %~ # 'ti:flgj  ~~ Max/aj.:rr Max/alj.:rr Max/aj.:rr Max/a].:rr Max/a].:rr Total/ltJfl  Your total exposure as the result of this plea is: *~ ,'j-o-}7} ,jj.I!.  "r %- ~78~ ~Jlj-g f{l~::: ~~ ~~ Please Circle Appropriate Answer/
[brief] By motion filed on February 2, 2023, Appellants sought to avoid the Final Judgment under Rule 4:50-1 (a), (d) and (f).  In the April 3, 2023 Order, [...] partially denied certain requests for relief, but made multiple findings in favor of Appellants as to Appellants’ claims under R.4:50-1(d) and (f).  (6a-23a).  Specifically, [...] credited Appellants’ claim that the abandonment determination was based upon a faulty Leary Report, which the Court had relied upon.(15a-18a).
[brief] Ibid. (quoting D'Atria v. D'Atria, 242 N.J. Super. 392, 401 (Ch. Div. 1990)).  In State v. [...], 441 N.J. Super. 280 (App.  Div. 2015), the Appellate Division held that the trial court acted within its discretion in granting reconsideration.  In [...], following a Miranda hearing, the trial court initially ruled all four statements of defendants admissible.  The trial court granted partial reconsideration and found that each of the defendants' Miranda rights had been violated in connection with one of the statements given by each defendant.  *Id.* at 288.  In affirming the reconsideration decision, the *[...]* Court:  Here, the trial court candidly found that it had failed to appreciate the significance of the explanation given by the detective to [...] during his second interview concerning his second *Miranda* warning: that second warning being used against him in a court of law.  The trial court also found that it failed to appreciate the significance of the introductory statement made by the State Police detective to [...] in his first interview advising [...] that he could not hurt himself by answering the detective’s questions.  Given the facts of these interviews, we find no abuse of discretion and no error by the trial court in its decision to grant reconsideration.  Indeed, *it is entirely appropriate for a judge to reconsider a prior ruling given the right set of circumstances*.  Judges are not infallible.  Judges who are willing to admit that they overlooked competent evidence, or failed to appreciate such evidence, should be commended because they are doing just what good judges do in the very limited circumstances where reconsideration is appropriate.  Obviously, that is why there are rules for reconsideration.  See R. 1:7-4(b); R. 4:42-2; R. 4:49-2.  *Id.* at 294 (emphasis supplied).  As explained in *[...]*, "it is entirely appropriate for a judge to reconsider a prior ruling given the right set of circumstances."  This is one of those occasions.  **C.
[directive] Home Detention with Electronic monitoring (HDEM) shall only be used for those defendants who pose a risk on pretrial release, but whose risk profile falls just of short requiring detention.  Further, EM shall only be ordered in conjunction with home detention.  of  It is important that HDEM as a condition release be used only for of defendants who meet the criteria, regardless whether ordering HDEM is of consistent with the Pretrial Services Program (PSP) recommendation release or of the agreement the parties.  The appended Criteria for Ordering HDEM document (CN 12972) discussed below outlines the appropriate scenarios for ordering HDEM.  The parties' consent to releasing a defendant on HDEM shall not be the basis for ordering electronic monitoring.  A.  CRITERIA FOR ORDERING HDEM  The standard requirements set forth in section I above must met before be HDEM may be ordered.  The Criteria for Ordering HDEM (CN 12972) are set forth of in three sections and provide guidance for (A) the types cases that are appropriate for HDEM, (B) the residency parameters for HDEM, and (C) the limited circumstances where it is appropriate for the defendant to leave the residence while on HDEM.  Defendants ordered to electronic monitoring will not have random PSP home detention checks conducted by video.  Instead, Pretrial Services staff will monitor defendant's location via alerts received from the electronic monitoring vendor program, thereby eliminating the need for random home detention checks.  The Court Must Find that the Defendant's Case is i.  Appropriate for HDEM
[brief] (Db40-50).  Despite defendant’s reliance that the investigatory detention standard in Goldsmith should apply here, he also alleges that the trial court misapplied the legal standard by classifying the encounter as an investigatory stop requiring reasonable suspicion, when it should have determined whether the State established sufficient probable cause for his arrest.  (Db40-50).  These arguments are without merit.  First, the trial court properly denied defendant’s motion for reconsideration because defendant failed to prove that the trial court’s decision “represents a clear abuse of discretion based on plainly incorrect reasoning or failure to consider evidence or a good reason for the court to reconsider new information. ”  N.J. Ct. R. 4:49-2; Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules, cmt. 2 on R. 4:49-2 (2022).