ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] ”).  [...] owns the [...] Property, where he resides with [...] (Dr1, 88).  As a self-employed contractor, [...] conducts some degree of business from his shop located at the [...] property (Dr88).  Appellants wanted to obtain security equipment, installation, and monitoring for the [...] property, which they used as a “residence and business” (Dr1, 3, 88).  [...] contacted two security companies, one was [...] and the other was a local company.  [...] received a proposal from both security companies.  After considering the proposals, Appellants (“We”) selected [...] due to its “established reputation” and executed the contract for security equipment, installation, and monitoring for the [...] property (Dr3).  Appellants’ “only interest was the price and amount of security equipment in the transaction”.  The Contract listed [...] as the business customer and [...] as the responsible party (Dr91).  [...] executed the Contract by signing the same on June 30, 2022 (Dr91).  In so doing, [...] acknowledged and agreed that he had read, understood, and agreed to each and every term of the Contract (Dr135).  For example, the Contract outlined general terms such as services to be provided and costs associated therewith (See Dr91-94).  It also detailed “Important Terms and Conditions,” which incorporated information related to “LIMITATIONS ON LIABILITY” and “ARBITRATION” (Dr96-97).  [...] sent [...] a copy of the Contract via e-mail a few days after he executed the same (Dr89).  Subsequently, [...] retained [...] to install the cameras pursuant to an agreement between the two (Dr89).  Thereafter, [...] retained [...] to complete the installation of the security cameras at the [...] property.  Appellants alleged that the security cameras were incorrectly installed causing damage to the [...] property, economic losses, and various injuries (Dr89).
[brief] The court’s only finding and or conclusion as to the Tenant’s Allowance issue was to repeat Landlord’s bottom-line legal position without referencing the Tenant’s Allowance Offset or explaining why it was inoperative (2T6-23 to 2T7-2).  Again, the Lease states “Tenant . . . expressly grants” Landlord, in the present tense, a “deduction against Tenant’s Allowance for all costs, payments and expenses Tenant is obligated to pay to Landlord pursuant to the Lease at the time,” in the future, that “an installment of Tenant’s Allowance shall be due” (Da17-Da18) (emphasis added).
[brief] The trial court reviewed the parties submissions and properly found that the record demonstrates that the Applicant submitted numerous reports and that those reports were reviewed by several of the Board’s professionals, including the Planner, the Engineer, the Board Traffic Engineer, and various other Township departments.  Pa311.  Further, the trial court found that the Applicant’s representatives testified that the subdivision would not affect the public’s health, the Board heard no contrary testimony that pertained to the subdivision application, the Board is not compelled to elicit testimony on topics that are not pertinent to the application before it.  Pa312.  D.
[brief] S.A. 2C: 39-4(a) | 1 | | N.J.S.A. 2C: 39-5b | 1 | | N.J.S.A. 2C: 39-7b(1) | 1 | | N.J.S.A. 2C: 58-3.3b | 21 | | **RULES OF EVIDENCE** | | | N.J.R.E. 802 | 17 | | COURT RULES | PAGE NOS | |-------------|----------| | R. 2:10-1 | 41 | | R. 2:10-2 | 24 | | R. 3:18-1 | 33, 35, 44 | | R. 3:20-1 | 35, 41, 44 | | OTHER AUTHORITIES | |-------------------| | Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules, Comment R. 3:20-1 | ............43 | | Wigmore on Evidence, §1367 | ...........................................31 | PROCEDURAL HISTORY In October 2019 a Monmouth County grand jury returned Indictment Number [...] charging the co-defendant, [...], and Appellant, [...], with: two counts of attempted murder, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:5-1 and 2C:11-3 (Counts One and Two); “sentencing enhancers” charging both men with possessing or using a firearm while committing the offense charged in Count One, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6c; conspiracy to commit attempted murder, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2, 2C:5-1 and 2C:11-3 (Count Three); possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(a) (Count Four); and unlawful possession of a weapon, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5b (Count Five).
[brief] Plaintiff argues in her appeal that the immunity statute cannot bar her claims because she was not using “the property of any railroad” at the time of the collision as that phrase is meant in subsection (b)(5) of the statute.  Plaintiff argues that the meaning of “railroad property” cannot include [...]’s “railroad right of way” or a railroad crossing.  Instead, Plaintiff argues that the “railroad property” referred to in subsection (b)(5) can only include “railroad real estate or real property. ”  Pb22.  Therefore, Plaintiff argues the trial court was incorrect when it determined that Plaintiff’s claims are barred by the statute because [...] cannot be said to have used “railroad property” in a manner in which it was not intended to be used at the time of the collision.  Plaintiff also argues that the statute was not intended to apply at railroad crossings, relying on ancient caselaw and the prior version of the statute before it was amended by the Legislature in 1998.  Therefore, she argues that this Court should find that the statute cannot apply to the case at bar.  Pb at Point IV.  Last, Plaintiff argues that even if she is incorrect and she was using “railroad property” for the purposes of subsection (b)(5), then there is a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether [...] was using the property “in a manner in which it was not intended to be used or in violation of posted regulations. ”  Pb33-34.  Therefore, she argues that the trial court improperly granted summary judgment.  As will be shown below, Plaintiff is incorrect.  The trial court properly interpreted the statute, granted summary judgment, and dismissed Plaintiff’s claims with prejudice because it is clear that a rational jury could only conclude that [...] collided with [...] Train 81 due to her misuse of [...]’s crossing and right of way, which were “railroad property” for the purposes of N.J.S.A. 48:12-152(b)(5).
[brief] Under Part C – Uninsured Motorists Coverage ...  2.  No action can be brought against us for any claim involving an **underinsured motor vehicle** unless the action is brought within: a. Four years from the date of the accident; or b. One year from the date that the **covered person** is aware or should have been aware of a claim for which coverage would apply; whichever is later.  D.  Unless we agree otherwise, any legal action against us must be brought in a court of competent jurisdiction in the county and state where the **covered person** lived at the time of the accident.
[brief] [Pa214 at ¶ 9].  By letter dated September 22, 2023, [...]’s counsel again requested information pertaining to [...]’s conduct and the materials that had been dumped at the Leased Premises.  [Pa209].  Although [...]’s counsel exchanged several emails with [...]’s counsel requesting additional time and promising to provide the information requested, [...] never did.  [Pa203 at ¶ 14].  By email dated September 26, 2023, [...]’s counsel advised [...]’s counsel that if [...] did not receive the documents and information it had repeatedly requested by 5:00 p.m. on September 27, 2023, [...] would proceed with all remedies available to it without further notice, including submitting both Consent Judgments for entry and execution.
[brief] In old English practice, a “quo warranto” writ was a writ in the nature of a writ of right for the king, against him who claimed or usurped any office, franchise, or liberty, to inquire by what authority he supported his claim, in order to determine the right.  It was intended to prevent exercise of ultra vires powers that were not conferred by law.  The writ of prohibition was the counterpart to the writ of mandamus.
[brief] J.K. v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 247 N.J. 120, 138 n.6 (2021); State v. Jones, 232 N.J. 308, 321 (2018); State v. Lawless, 214 N.J. 594, 605 n.2 (2013); State v. Robinson, 200 N.J. 1, 20-22 (2009); Nieder v. Royal Indem. Ins. Co., 62 N.J. 229, 234 (1973); [...] & [...], Current N.J. Court Rules, cmt. 3 on R. 2:6-2 (2022).  See also State v. Cabbell, 207 N.J. 311, 327 n.10 (2011) (Court declined to consider an argument first raised in a supplemental brief to the Court); Hirsch v. State Bd. of Med. Exam’rs, 128 N.J. 160, 161 (1992) (Court declined to address a claim presented after the Court granted a petition for certification).
[brief] THUS, THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY FOUND THE BOARD’S DECISION WAS NOT ARBITRARY, CAPRICIOUS OR UNREASONABLE (Pa23-Pa40)  As the Trial Court aptly recognized, it is of paramount importance to attribute significance to the Resolution that memorialized the Board's denial of the Application.  Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40:55D-10(g), the memorializing resolution sets forth the zoning board's factual findings and conclusions, expressed by those who vote to adopt same:  The municipal agency shall include findings of fact and conclusions based thereon in each decision on any application for development and shall reduce the decision to writing.  The municipal agency shall provide the findings and conclusions through: (1) A resolution adopted at a meeting held within the time period provided in the act for action by the municipal agency on the application for development; or (2) A memorializing resolution adopted at a meeting held not later than 45 days after the date of the meeting at which the municipal agency voted to grant or deny approval.  Only the members of the municipal agency who voted for the action taken may vote on the memorializing resolution …  The vote on any such resolution shall be deemed to be a memorialization of the action of the municipal agency and not to be an action of the municipal agency …  The Court in Scully-Bozarth Post #1817 of Veterans of Foreign Wars of U.S. v. Planning Bd. of City of Burlington, 362 N.J. Super. 296, 312-313 (App. Div. 2003), made clear the import of a land use board’s memorializing resolution:
[brief] ”  (1T13:18-23)  All of these findings were confirmed by objective diagnostic tests and by the treating physicians.  (77a-111a)  Based upon the evidence contained in the motion record, [...] sustained compensable injuries, including: herniated disks at L3/4, L5/S1 and at C3/4 (indiscernible) herniation, a positive spurling test, a positive tonal (phonetic) sign.  She’s a 70-year-old retired woman whose sole enjoyment was taking one and a half hour walks every day, which she cannot do anymore.  She’s got as a result of this insomnia.  She was found positive for insomnia and anxiety and depression.  I think all those meet the substantial test.
[brief] [...] [...]  [...] TABLE OF CONTENTS  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT.................................................................  1  PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND COUNTERSTATEMENT OF FACTS........  2  a.  The Highlands Act and DEP’s Permitting Regulations ......................  2 b.  [...] Seeks a Highlands Act Exemption for Its Project.....................  4  c.  DEP Reviews [...]’s HAD Application and Determines the Project is Exempt from the Highlands Act ..................................................  7  d.  Appellants’ Appeal...........................................................................  10
[brief] ”  The Legislature also explicitly stated its intention to achieve uniformity between New Jersey’s Securities Law and our sister states in other provisions.  See, e.g., N.J.S.A. 49:3-50(a)(12)(a) (stating the Bureau Chief by rule or order . . . “may adopt a securities exemption (i) that will further the objectives of compatibility with . . . the ‘Securities Act of 1933’ and uniformity among the states. ”); N.J.S.A. 49:3-53 (allowing the Bureau Chief to define dishonest or unethical practices “in a manner consistent with and compatible with the laws and regulations of the Securities and Exchange Commission . . . , and uniformity with other states”); N.J.S.A. 49:3-67 (“In prescribing rules and forms the bureau chief may co-operate with the securities administrators of the other states and the Securities and Exchange Commission with a view to effectuating the policy of this statute to achieve maximum uniformity in the form and content of applications and reports wherever practicable.
[brief] BMP Manual, Chapter 13, Page 2.  Therefore, the result of the analysis is dependent on accurate input values from the design engineer.  Initially, [...] attempted to reclassify the mapped soil group on site, into soils that would not require groundwater recharge.  (Aa2525).  However, this was not supportable, and [...] revised their application to propose soil replacement underneath each stormwater basin to promote groundwater infiltration.
[brief] The decision in Dover involved the question of standing in the context of a claim that the Planning Board acted “grossly illegally” due to certain conflicts of interest of a Planning Board member with ties to the applicant, a Planning Board Chairman that declined to swear in witnesses so their testimony would not be given under oath, failure to provide a transcript of the hearing, and a deficient hearing notice that was in “flagrant disregard of the legislative provision. ”  Id.  That is completely incomparable to the matter at hand.  In this matter, Plaintiffs never once alleged or argued that the Planning Board acted “grossly illegally.
[brief] Conversely, the *Grijalba* Court discussed the following definitions of “commercial”: 1. “[C]oncerned with or engaged in commerce” and “making or intended to make a profit. ”  *Id.* at 68 (citing *Commercial*, *Oxford Dictionaries Online*).  2.  “[O]ccupied with or engaged in commerce work intended for commerce” and “viewed “with regard to profit. ”  *Id.* at 68 (citing *Merriam-Webster’s Dictionary*, 249 (11th ed.2012)).  After performing its analysis, the Appellate Division in *Grijalba* set forth the following standard to be applied when deciding whether a premises is residential or commercial:  [O]n remand, we direct the judge to consider, at a minimum, the following factors when classifying [...]’s property as either “commercial” or “residential”: (1) the nature of the ownership of the property, including whether the property is owned for investment or business purposes; (2) the predominant use of the property, including the amount of space occupied by the owner on a steady or temporary basis to determine whether the property is utilized in whole or in substantial part as a place of residence; (3) whether the property has the capacity to generate income, including a comparison between the carrying costs with the amount of rent charged to determine if the owner is realizing a profit; and (4) any other relevant factor when applying “commonly accepted definitions of ‘commercial’ and ‘residential’ property.
[brief] The certified transcripts of the proceedings before the trial court were purportedly provided to the Court by Plaintiff and are referred to herein as follows:  “1T” - June 2, 2023 Transcript; “2T” – June 9, 2023 Transcript; “3T” – July 21, 2023 Transcript; “4T” – August 25, 2023 Transcript; and “5T” – September 22, 2023 Transcript.  Purchase and Sale between the Plaintiff and [...] after [...] closed the purchase of the property from a non-party seller in October 2022, because Plaintiff had accepted the return of its earnest money deposit in mid-July 2022, thus terminating its contract with [...].  (2T15:18-16:12).  The trial court rejected Plaintiff’s contention that the “in addition to” and “notwithstanding” language in Section 13.1 of the Purchase and Sale Agreement expressly permitted Plaintiff to also insist upon specific performance, regardless of any termination or return of the deposit.  (Id.).  Thus, by Order dated June 9, 2023 (the “June 9 Order”), the trial court granted [...]’s motion to dismiss the Complaint with prejudice.
[brief] ”).  2.  [...] did not violate the Consumer Fraud Act, and plaintiffs did not sustain any ascertainable loss.  (33)  Even if the Consumer Fraud Act were applicable in this context, [...] and [...]’s factual allegations are insufficient to state a claim for its violation.  Under the Act, a prohibited “unlawful practice” must amount to an “unconscionable commercial practice that is unconscionable or abusive, deception, fraud, false pretense, false promise, misrepresentation, or the knowing, concealment, suppression, or omission of any material fact[.]”
[brief] That being said, Your Honor, what is before the Court today is the defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea and while there are a number of factors subjectively that entered into his mind when he was weighing whether or not to go to trial including the possibility that he could be found guilty of murder in the first degree.  He could be found guilty on another file for robbery, he could be found guilty in much larger than the 30 with a 30 that he received in this case.  And as discussed, he also ended up being able to roll up Pennsylvania charges also for a robbery that he faced significant exposure for.  Additionally, Judge, the other factor for the Court to consider is whether the withdrawal in this case would be of unfair prejudice to the State or be an unfair advantage to the accused and this case, the murder case is one of the most serious cases that a Court can have.  There's a person who died and that case, a significant amount of time has passed that would make it an unfair prejudice to the State to now have to retry that case and begin that process all over for that victim and that family.  So, lastly, Judge, if the Court, just to wrap it up, if the Court were to look at the objective factors as outlined in Slater, the motion for withdrawal of the guilty plea in the defendant's case, it just can't be sustained.  Now, he may have some factors that other motions would be appropriate for but for a withdrawal of his guilty plea, it's just insufficient, Judge.  So, that's the State's position.
[brief] As I also stated in Section I, “[...] worsened his invalid denials of my Motions, & made them ripe for Appeal, by stating reconsideration “would be granted if “the decision rests on palpably incorrect or irrational basis, or the court didn’t consider or failed to appreciate the significance of probative, competent evidence. ”” (3T, p. 6 line “24”, to p. 7, line 7) (mistakenly cited line “4” in prior Brief).  It is exactly what my Motions & this Appeal address. ”
[brief] On application of a party, a trial judge may modify or correct an award upon finding that the rights of that party were prejudiced by: (1)  Corruption, fraud or misconduct in procuring the award; (2)  Partiality of an umpire appointed as a neutral; (3)  In making the award, the umpire's exceeding their power or so imperfectly executing that power that a final and definite award was not made; (4)  Failure to follow the procedures set forth in this act, unless the party applying to vacate the award continued with the proceeding with notice of the defect and without objection or (5) The umpire's committing prejudicial error by erroneously applying law to the issues and facts presented for alternative resolution.  [N.J.S.A. 2A:23A-13(c)]  N.J.S.A. 2A:23A-13(b) sets forth that when considering a claim under subsection (c)(5), the "decision of the umpire on the facts shall be final if there is substantial evidence to support that decision."
[brief] (R-932).  The Court also instructed [...] to produce documents pursuant to a Notice in Lieu of Subpoena from [...]’s counsel.  The parties appeared via Zoom for trial on April 20, 2022.  [...] failed to produce anything.  The Court asked him if he had a full copy of the policy and the same information for the 538-policy that he provided for the 611-policy.  (20T 4).  [...] stated that he had endeavored to go through [...] and [...] but could only get what was previously provided.  He proclaimed that everything was “done right”.  If somebody else thinks something was done wrong, they have the right to bring in [...].  They have the right to bring in [...].  The burden is not on me.  (20T 6).
[brief] THE COURT: Counsel?  [...]: Thank you, Your Honor.  EXAMINATION BY [...]: Q  [...], you are familiar with [...], correct?  A Yes.  Q  And in that indictment you and [...] are charged in Count 3 with felony murder, correct?  A Yes.  Q  And on the 29th of April, 2011, you were, in fact, in the City of Trenton, right?  A Yes.  Q  And you were on Brunswick Avenue by the [...]?  A Yes.  Q  And you were with [...], correct?  A Yes.  Q  And [...] was the driver of the car?  A Yes.  Q  And initially when you entered the store, was your purpose in going into the store was to pass a phony prescription for Percocets?  A Yes.  Q  But once you entered the store you were armed with a handgun, correct?  A Yes.  Q  And during the course of you entering that store, did your purpose change from passing the script to actually attempting or deciding to commit an armed robbery?  A Yes.  Q  And at some point you did, in fact, attempt to commit that armed robbery, correct?  A Yes.  Q  And you pulled a gun out, right?  A Yes.  Q  And you demanded that the pharmacist, [...], turn over some Percocets to you, correct?  A Yes.  Q  And during the course of that -- that attempt to commit that robbery you did, in fact, cause the death of [...], right?  A Yes.  Q  And it was during the course of that attempted robbery, correct?  A Yes.  Q  And the gun went off and it shot the pharmacist and that led to his death, correct?  A Yes.  [...]: The State is satisfied with the factual basis, Judge.  [...]: The second count, Your Honor, is in regards to [...].