ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] 1)  I as well as the other [...] defendants were advised of the potential conflict of interest of joint representation, were provided full informed consent, and signed off on same as part of the initial retainer agreement in this matter.  We all maintain that the retainer agreement is attorney-client privileged but will provide a complete copy of same for the Court’s review in camera if requested.  2)  Based upon my personal knowledge and discussions with the other [...] Defendants, all of the parties are aligned in interest.  3)  All of the [...] Defendants have a past or current employment relationship and are in concert in defense of the allegations in the [...] Complaint.  These defendants represent an owner of the professional corporation and corporate representative (myself), its medical personnel, in-house counsel, and management employees.  There is no direct adversity between these parties.  4)  I believe the only basis for the present motion is for [...] to attempt to create a non-existent conflict between these aligned parties, drive up our costs of defense as separate attorneys will each charge for the work that can be accomplished by one firm who is our first choice in representation, and to bankrupt us all with costs of defense in this complex case which will take years and hundreds of thousands of dollars in legal fees to defend.  (C.C.Da.101-02).  The speculative and conclusory nature of [...]’s claim is evidenced in the hearing transcript wherein [...] counsel attempted to contrive a conflict but failed to do so under the questioning of [...]:
[brief] In re Stallworth, 208 N.J. 182, 194 (2011).  That is, an appellate court will not reverse the decision of an administrative agency unless that decision is arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable, or is not supported by substantial credible evidence in the record as a whole.  In re Eastwick Coll. LPN-to-RN Bridge Program, 225 N.J. 533, 541 (2016) (quoting Univ. Cottage Club of Princeton N.J. Corp. v. N.J. Dept. of Env't Prot., 191 N.J. 38, 48 (2007)); see also Henry v. Rahway State Prison, 81 N.J. 571, 579-80 (1980).
[brief] LEGAL ARGUMENT ...............................................................................................................7  I.  THE LOWER COURT IMPROPERLY ENGAGED IN FACFINDING IN GRANTING RESPONDENTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AGAINST [...] (T 4:17-17:16)  ..................................................................................................................................................................................  7  A.  The Lower Court Improperly Resolved Disputed Issues of Fact Concerning the Parties’ Relationship (T 7:23-17:16).  ..................................................................................................................  9  B.  A Genuine Issue of Material Fact Exists as to Whether the Respondents Represented John (T 7:23-17:16).  .................................................................................................................................11  C.  The Court Gave Improper Weight to Events that Occurred After the Statute of Limitations Expired (T 11:23-17:16).  .........................................................................................................................14  D.  Evidence Demonstrates that the Respondents Breached their Duty to John Miranda (Not Addressed Below).  .........................................................................................................................19  E.  John Miranda Presented Sufficient Evidence to Establish Proximate Causation (Not Addressed Below)  .........................................................................................................................20  CONCLUSION  ..........................................................................................................................21
[brief] ”  Abbott XX, 199 N.J. at 235 (citing Robinson v. Cahill, 69 N.J. 449, 455 (1976)).  A statute’s constitutionality is “presumed,” and the burden falls on the party challenging to “demonstrate[e] the unconstitutionality” of the statute.  DePascale v. State, 211 N.J. 40, 63 (2012).  And, whether the SFRA is unconstitutional as applied to [...] “turn[s] on proof that [Appellants] suffer educational inequities and these inequities derive, in significant part, from the funding provisions” of the SFRA.  Abbott v. Burke (Abbott I), 100 N.J. 269, 296 (1985).
[brief] (Da489-512.)  On July 18, 2023, the trial court conducted a hearing.  (1T.)  At the outset of the hearing, the trial court noted, as follows:  This is technically the return date on the prerogative writ matter.  I want to let everyone know that I had some emergent matters that have been assigned to me today, which means you’ll probably have to continue this until next week.  I’ll talk to everybody’s calendar on the prerogative writ matter.  --- 2  1T shall mean and refer to the July 18, 2023 transcript.  2T shall mean and refer to the August 31, 2023 transcript.  3T shall mean and refer to the September 26, 2023 transcript.  Also, on Friday related to this application this complaint for prerogative writ is Ms. . . . [...] [sic] application to intervene.  What I would like to do is confirm some things in my mind today, at least to get some good use out of today’s proceeding even though we really have to continue and finalize a prerogative writ hearing next week.  [1T4:9-22.]  Following the July 18, 2023 hearing, the trial court entered an Order directing the parties to submit supplemental briefing on certain issues identified in the Order.
[directive] If a civilian inquires of an officer whether the officer is equipped with a BWC, or inquires whether the device is activated, the officer shall answer truthfully unless the County Prosecutor or designee, or Director of the Division of Criminal Justice or designee, has expressly authorized the officer to make a covert electronic recording.  Cf. Section 3.3 (Policy does not apply to officers while operating in an undercover capacity, or while conducting/participating in a station house custodial interrogation electronically recorded in accordance with Rule 3:17).  Nothing in this Section shall be construed to establish a basis for suppressing a statement or other evidence.  See AG Directive 2021-5, Section II.A (non-enforceability by third parties).
[brief] C.  Disparate Treatment (ISSUE NOT RAISED BELOW)  In the Matter of [...], Investigator, Secured Facilities, [...], [...], [...]; [...] (November 2, 2022), [...] was charged with “[t]he alleged misconduct by the appointing authority in this case is that the petitioner did not follow proper interviewing techniques and made an intentional misstatement of a material fact (falsification) in connection with the preparation of an SID report relating to an inmate trying to smuggle a piece of chicken out of the cafeteria. ”  In that case, appointing authority contends, inter alia, that it has established that the appellant's inaccurate statements were indeed, intentionally false.  In the alternative, it argues that even if not intentional, providing such false information was conduct unbecoming a public employee.  It also argues that the charges relating to the photos were timely as that information was only uncovered during the investigation into the other infractions.
[brief] THE ARBITRATION AGREEMENT FAILED TO PROVIDE ADEQUATE NOTICE OF THE WAIVER OF RIGHTS TO THE COPPIS (1T13:6-10).  Even assuming [...] signed the Agreement in his personal capacity rather than on behalf of his son, Moving Defendant’s attempt to compel arbitration is improper based on the plain language of the Agreement and established principles of New Jersey law.  Primarily, the Agreement is invalid because it fails to inform the signer of the rights and remedies clearly and unequivocally being waived, as required under New Jersey law.  Such a failure renders the Agreement unenforceable.  New Jersey imposes strict requirements on arbitration agreements to ensure they are the product of valid, mutual assent.
[brief] ..............................................................................................................6  POINT ONE  THE PCR JUDGE ERRED IN SUMMARILY DISMISSING WITH PREJUDICE  MR. JACKSON’S SECOND PCR PETITION (Da 086)  ..........................................................  6  A.  [...]’s PCR should be remanded for further proceedings because the dismissal of the PCR prior to submissions and oral argument is premature.  ...........................................8  B.  [...]’s PCR raises grounds that are not subject to the one year time bar in R. 3:22-12(a)(2)(C) ..................................................................................  11  C.  The Court should find exceptional circumstances exist to relax the second PCR time bar in the interests of justice .......................................................14  POINT TWO
[directive] Such immediate notification is to be made by calling the Bias Crimes Unit duty phone, the number of which is available on DCJ’s website at www.nj.gov/oag/dcj/biascrime/.  The local law enforcement agency also must immediately notify the appropriate County Prosecutor of such an incident.  Each County Prosecutor retains the discretion to establish procedures for such notification.  In bias incidents where there is a nexus to terrorism, such as when an organized hate group is involved, the Attorney General’s SAR Reporting Directive, No. 2016-7, requires additional notifications.  Suspicious activity with a nexus to terrorism must be reported immediately, per existing county protocols.  Activity also can be reported 24/7 to NJOHSP’s CTWatch at 866-4SAFENJ (866-472-3365) or tips@njohsp.gov.  It is the responsibility of the chief executive of each local law enforcement agency to institute policies and procedures to ensure compliance with this reporting requirement.  5.
[brief] (Da052).  Therefore, when the Indiana Appellate Court determined that the suit limitation clause in the [...] policy was invalid, due to the conformity to law provision, it referred to Indiana’s specific code section 27-1-13-17(b) which clearly and unambiguously stated “if the policy limits a policyholder’s right to bring an action against an insurer to a period of less than two (2) years from the date of loss” it would be unenforceable.
[directive] Cases  Assault  Sexual and Violence Violence  Domestic Tool in Assessment Risk for a Need  The 4.6.1  Cases..........................................................................................................44 ..........................................................44  ODARA the for Definitions Critical 4.6.2 ..............................45  . Completed Shall ODARA be the which for Offenses 4.6.3.a ..............................46 . Victim Offender and Gender of and ODARA Scores 4.6.3.b .......................................46 ODARA the of Use the about Victim Informing 4.6.4 Prosecutor's to Form the Scoring ODARA the of Transmission 4.6.5 ........................................................................................................46 Office. of Division to Form the Scoring ODARA the of Transmission 4.6.6 ......................................46 Collection Data Centralized for Justice Criminal ODARA Scores Providing and Communicating of Prohibition 4.6.7 ................................................................47 . Judiciary to Forms Scoring and .............................47 Scoring Forms and ODARA Scores of Confidentiality 4.6.8 .......................................................................................47 Training ODARA 4.6.9 .............................................48 Cases Violence Domestic in Factors Special 4.6.10 Apply a for Must Enforcement Law Where Situations 4.6.11 to Protect Conditions Special Seek Complaint-Warrant and .......................................................................49 Victims Violence Domestic ....................................50 Cases Violence Domestic in Notifications Special 4.6.12 .................................................................................................50 Records Expunged 4.7 ...........................................................................................51 Cases Waiver Juvenile 4.8 ..................................................................................................51
[brief] The evidence showed that there were two guns used—a 9-millimeter and a .40 caliber (2T92-15 to 98-17; 6T193-4 to 194-10; 6T215-20 to 220-2; 6T226-2 to 14; 8T18-4 to 20-16)—and, therefore, potentially two shooters.  Moreover, defendant was known to borrow [...]’s red Mercury Sable observed in the multiple surveillance videos chasing down [...]’s van.  (3T37-20 to 25; 6T41-4 to 42-14; 6T44-13 to 45-5).  [...] observed defendant as a passenger in Nathan’s vehicle two to three hours before the shooting, (4T121-16 to 18; 6T39-3 to 45-5; 6T52-7 to 53-9; 6T57-8 to 58-10), demonstrating that at least one other person was with defendant.  Thus, the jury could rationally conclude that at the time of the pursuit, defendant was the driver as opposed to a shooter.
[brief] The issue was a tax lien foreclosure that was not timely redeemed.  The court held:  Significantly, Rule 4:50-1 is not an opportunity for parties to a consent judgment to change their minds; nor is it a pathway to reopen litigation because a party either views his settlement as less advantageous than it had previously appeared, or rethinks the effectiveness of his original legal strategy.  Rather, the rule is a carefully crafted vehicle intended to underscore the need for repose while achieving a just result.  It thus denominates with specificity the narrow band of triggering events that will warrant relief [*10] from judgment if justice is to be served.  Only the existence of one of those triggers will allow a party to challenge the substance of the judgment.  [198 N.J. 242, 261-62, 966 A.2d 1036 (emphasis added) (quoting Rufo v. Inmates of the Suffolk Cnty. Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 378, 112 S. Ct. 748, 116 L. Ed. 2d 867 (1992))].  Ultimately, "equitable principles" "should . . . guide[]" a court's discretion in considering a motion to vacate judgment.  Hous. Auth. of Morristown v. Little, 135 N.J. 274, 283, 639 A.2d 286 (1994).  Here, in considering defendants' motion, the judge properly focused her attention on subsection (f) and whether defendants were entitled to the equitable relief it provides.  Our task, therefore, is not to conduct de novo review of the terms of the parties' consent order.  Rather, we must consider whether the judge clearly abused her discretion by vacating the default judgment pursuant to Rule 4:50-1(f).
[brief] That is a legal conclusion entitled to no deference.  See, e.g., State v. Mellody, __ N.J. Super. __, __ (App. Div. 2024) (slip op. at 32) (“While we defer to the judge’s credibility assessment and fact-finding, we view the determination of whether those facts established an emergency sufficient to satisfy the emergency-aid doctrine to be a legal conclusion to which we owe no special deference and instead review de novo. ”).
[directive] Collecting and submitting urine specimens in accordance with procedures established by the Laboratory.  2.  In order to ensure the accuracy and integrity of the collection process a monitor may:  a.  Direct an individual officer who has been selected for drug testing to remove outer clothing (jackets, sweaters, etc.), empty their pockets, and wash their hands under running water, before they produce a specimen.  b.  Add tinting agents to toilet water and secure the area where the specimens are to be collected prior to specimen collection.  3.  If the monitor has reason to believe that an individual officer will attempt to adulterate or contaminate a specimen, substitute another substance or liquid for their specimen, or compromise the integrity of the test process, the monitor may conduct a direct observation of the individual officer.  If a monitor concludes that direct observation is necessary, he or she must document the facts supporting the belief that the officer will attempt to compromise the integrity of the test process before there can be direct observation.  C.  Urine Specimen Collection Procedure
[brief] [...] also claims that certain statements attributed to [...] by [...] were not made in furtherance of the conspiracy.  [...] cites as examples testimony by [...] that: [...] told her to meet him at Sin City; [...] yelled an expletive at her after she disclosed that she went shopping with [...]; [...] asked questions about the amount of money [...] carried; and, upon learning that [...] carried a large sum of money, [...] asked where [...] “is ... now. ”  [...] also takes exception to [...]'s post-shooting statement to [...] that he was sorry about what happened and would take care of her; and statements in letters [...] wrote while in jail, telling [...] not to talk to anyone about the “situation” and blaming [...] for what occurred.  The admission of those statements, considered separately or collectively, does not warrant a new trial.
[brief] of Adjustment of Rockaway, | 4, 5 | | 50 N.J. 30 (1967) | | | Coventry Square, Inc. v. Westwood Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, | 3 | | 138 N.J. 285 (1994) | | | DePetro v. Twp. of Wayne Planning Bd., | 2, 3, 4 | | 367 N.J. Super. 161 (App. Div. 2004) | | | Dunbar Homes, Inc. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustments of Twp. of Franklin, | 10, 11, 12, 13 | | 233 N.J. 546 (2018) | | | Exxon Co., U.S.A. v. Livingston Twp. in Essex Cnty., | 9 | | 199 N.J. Super. 470 (App. Div. 1985) | | | Funeral Home Mgmt., Inc. v. Basralian, | 2, 3 | | 319 N.J. Super. 200 (App. Div. 1999) | | | Home Builders League of S. Jersey, Inc. v. Twp. of Berlin, | 2, 3 | | 81 N.J. 127 (1979) | | N. Haledon Fire Co. No. 1 v. Borough of N. Haledon, 425 N.J. Super. 615 (App. Div. 2012).................................................................6  New Jersey Citizen Action v. Riviera Motel Corp., 296 N.J. Super. 402 (App. Div. 1997).........................................................8, 9  Paramus Multiplex Corp. v. Hartz Mtn. Indus., Inc., 236 N.J. Super. 104 (Law Div. 1987)...............................................................4  Village Supermarket, Inc. v. Mayfair Supermarkets, Inc., 269 N.J. Super. 224 (Law Div. 1993).............................................................4, 5 Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 ........................................................................................................11  Watkins v. Resorts Int’l Hotel & Casino, 124 N.J. 398 (1991) ..........................................................................................11  Statutes N.J.S.A. 40:55D-4 .................................................................................................1, 3 N.J.S.A. 40:55D-5 .................................................................................................15
[directive] Directive #23-06 ("Grand Jury Standards - Implementation and Questionnaire") promulgated standard grand jury policies and procedures, which have been implemented statewide for over a decade.  1  This Supplement to Directive #23-06 rescinds former Standard 22 and of of concludes the policy and practice general background checks grand jurors, of effective immediately.  The conclusion this practice aligns with the Supreme Court's holding in State [...], (A-6-20) (decided July 13, 2021), in v. which the Court established a new standard and process for individualized of background checks jurors.  This directive has one previous supplement, issued on May 15, 2020 and updated on 1 September 30, 2020.  Standard 2 ("Background Checks on Grand Jurors") provided that "[ w ]here the 2 of prosecuting authority advises the Judiciary its interest in conducting criminal of background checks on grand jurors, the Judiciary shall provide a list jurors, with appropriate identifying information, for that purpose."  Those county prosecutors in the of practice conducting background checks on grand jurors who are scheduled to report for service would provide the results to the Judiciary for consideration by the judge responsible for the grand jury selection.  ADA ENSURING TO AN DOOR OPEN JUSTICE
[brief] Attributing a penalty to a legally protected absence is unlawful.  [...] are entitled to a minimum of 15 sick days a year which they may utilize for illness or injury as protected by statute - N.J.S.A. 11A:6-5.  Interpreting the “Sick Leave Injury Procedures Policy” 19-16 so as to penalize Firefighters for utilizing such statutory leave is unlawful.  General Order 19-16 penalizes employees simply because they are exercising their right to sick leave for illness or injury.  Such a policy is void on its face and is similarly an illegal retaliatory act because the employer is interfering with “any person in the exercise or enjoyment of a protected right.
[brief] We will assume the court is familiar with our initial brief (Hb) and its arguments and will not repeat or summarize them before addressing the other parties' arguments.  We will largely address the [...] brief, since the [...] brief mostly echoes its arguments.  We will follow the order of our initial brief.  We will not address all of the other parties' arguments, but that simply means that we rest on our initial brief.  The [...] brief ([...]b) relies very heavily on exaggeration, colorful adjectives and adverbs (its gas service is always "lifeline," all of its engineers are "senior," etc.), and is duplicative.  The [...] brief makes a number of incorrect factual assertions, which space limitations do not allow us to address.  We ask that the court be skeptical of [...]'s "facts" in considering this appeal.  The [...] brief (BP Ub) predictably relies heavily on claims of extreme deference that are not justified by the law and otherwise adds nothing to the arguments of [...].  We will not address it further.  The [...] brief ([...]b) adheres to that agency's interpretation of its responsibility that limits it to merely reflexively opposing any cost that might be imposed on ratepayers, no matter the Legislative policy is or what benefits that might bring.  The [...] brief, therefore, curiously ignores that the [...] purchased the proposed gas combustion regulator we challenge here in a non-competitive, sole-source procurement.  The [...] brief needs no other response. \(^1\)
[brief] On May 7th, 2011  [...] was arrested after being racially profiled and wrongfully accused of an armed robbery after a vehicle he occupied as a passenger was illegally stopped without probable cause or reasonable articulate suspicion.  The vehicle was occupied by [...], [...], and [...].  On this same night of May 7th, 2011  [...] was also accused by [...] of the murder of [...] at the [...] in the [...], New Jersey, that took place on April 29th, 2011, although [...]’s claims contradicted and were inconsistent to the facts and evidence of the case.  On May 14th May 15th, and August 7th of 2013 in a motion to suppress in the armed robbery case [...] stood before Hon [...] who granted in part and denied in part.  Judge Jimenez ruled that a weapon found under the car hood would be suppressed ruling that it was obtained in an unlawful search, but the clothing and money found was admissible as evidence in the robbery case.  [...] argued in his Pro Se brief that there was no probable cause or reasonable articulate suspicion to stop the vehicle Myers occupied, but stated they were stopped due to racial profiling.  Myers also argued that the cloths were planted and were not in the car he occupied, but were found up the road.  Which created a Brady issue in the case with the video footage of the initial stop being destroyed without authorization or a copy persevered for discovery purposes (Da 94-95).  Defendant Myers remained in the [...] for 7 years fighting in his innocence the false accusations against him.