ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] 114 N.J. at 340.  There, federal law enforcement received a tip from an anonymous informant that [...]’s co-defendant, [...], was operating an illegal bookmaking enterprise from a hotel room utilizing the hotel room phone.  *Id.* at 335.  Federal officials corroborated the tip by seizing [...]’s hotel room phone records without a warrant.  *Ibid.*  The informant later indicated that [...] was assisted by [...], who occupied rooms in the same hotel.  *Ibid.*  On the basis of the tip and the phone records, which were eventually turned over to State police, State police obtained a warrant to search [...]’s and [...]’s hotel rooms for evidence of illegal bookmaking, which they found.  *Id.* at 335-36.  [...] and [...] were subsequently charged with gambling-related offenses.  *Id.* at 336.  In evaluating whether [...] had standing to object to the seizure of [...]’s hotel room phone records, the Court noted that [...] was “alleged to have participated in the underlying criminal gambling activities that involved the use of [...]’s hotel-room telephone resulting in the creation of the toll records. ”  *[...]*, 114 N.J. at 340.  The Court also observed that “[t]he affidavit requesting a warrant to search [...]’s rooms for evidence of gambling violations was derived in part from the information disclosed by these toll records. ”  *Ibid.*  As a result, the Court concluded that there was a “sufficient connection between the telephone toll records and the underlying criminal gambling for which [[...] was] charged, and a sufficient relationship between [[...]] and the gambling enterprise, to establish a participatory interest on the part of [[...]] in this evidence. ”  *Ibid.*  This case is strikingly similar to *[...]*.
[brief] See Vick, 117 N.J. at 293 (holding that the requirement that the jury be instructed on each and every element of an offense “is so basic and so fundamental that it admits of no exception no matter how inconsequential the circumstances”).  To make matters worse, the court also omitted the portion of the model charge that explains the grading of robbery to the jury, thereby making it functionally impossible for the jury to have returned a verdict for second-degree robbery.  The model charge advises the jury that “robbery is a crime of the second degree, except that it is a crime of the first degree if the actor:
[brief] “The governing body of any municipality or the board of freeholders of any county on granting permission to use any street, road or highway for a local line, or on written application to it by any such telegraph or telephone company desiring to construct any through line, shall designate by ordinance or resolution the streets, roads or highways in, along, over or under which the poles, wires, conduits and other fixtures shall be erected or constructed and the manner of erecting or constructing the same and the particular location in any street, road or highway where the same shall be placed.  . . .The use of all streets, roads or highways by the company shall be subject to such police and other regulations and restrictions as may be adopted by the governing body of the municipality or the board of freeholders. ”  N.J.S.A. 48:17-11 (emphasis added).
[brief] Here, during [...]’s deposition, he described a chaotic and hurried environment when signing the agreement.  [...] testified that he was presented with a six-page document on a computer right after purchasing a ticket to enter the property, without any prior notice of the Agreement's terms.  Pa0115 at 2T22:7-12.  He also explained that he felt pressure to sign quickly, as there was a line of other patrons waiting behind him.  Id. at 2T22:4-25.  These facts strongly suggest that the Agreement was presented in a manner that was rushed and lacking in fairness, mirroring the conditions in Kleine.  Accordingly, the trial court should have ordered an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the Agreement is unconscionable.  Also like in Klein, [...]’s testimony underscores that significant factual questions remain unresolved, further necessitating a factual hearing and discovery.
[brief] This appeal involves a straightforward application of an unambiguous discovery rule: Rule 4:10-2(a), which explicitly defines the scope of discovery—including of ESI—by reference to relevancy.  The trial court’s failure to apply that relevancy standard to ESI reflects a clear misunderstanding of controlling law.  A.  Under Rule 4:10-2(a), A Court Has No Authority To Compel The Production Of Irrelevant Documents, Including ESI (Raised Below: Da166-68; T3-38)
[brief] So far as the record before us indicates, there was no *Wade* hearing in this case, nor was there a request by defendant for such a hearing.  See *United States v. Wade*, 388 U.S. 218, 87 S.Ct. 1926, 18 L.Ed.2d 1149 (1967).  3  We reject the State's contention that defendant is procedurally barred from asserting the Confrontation Clause claim on appeal because he did not raise it to the trial court and did not make a timely objection to the testimony on hearsay grounds.
[brief] Exhibit A: Deed from [...] to [...] (“[...]”), dated 12/7/20……………………………………………………Da401  Exhibit B: Deed from [...] to [...], dated 10/10/09………………Da407  Exhibit C: Deed from [...] to [...], dated 10/24/03…..Da411  Exhibit D: Deed from [...]/[...] to [...], dated 11/3/51………Da415  Exhibit E: Deed from [...] to [...], dated 12/10/51…………..Da421  Exhibit F: Deed from [...] to [...], dated 4/22/69………………Da427  Exhibit G: Deed from [...] to [...], dated 9/15/80………………Da432  Exhibit H: Deed from [...] to [...] dated 9/11/08………………Da438  Exhibit I: Deed from [...] to [...], dated 9/30/19………………Da444  Exhibit II: Deed from [...] to [...], dated 3/22/22………………Da450  Exhibit J: Deed from [...] to [...], dated 2/24/55………………Da460  Exhibit K: Deed from [...] to [...], dated 9/7/65………………Da465  Exhibit L: Deed from [...] to [...], dated 6/6/55………………Da470  Exhibit M: Deed from [...] to [...], dated 10/21/66…………Da475  Volume V (Pages Da479 – Da554)
[brief] Defendant's Sentence Must Be Reversed Because The Court Failed To Provide A Reasoned Explanation For Finding Multiple Contradictory Aggravating And Mitigating Factors And Because Those Findings Were Not Supported By Sufficient, Competent Credible Evidence In The Record.  An appellate court accords a deferential level of review to a trial court's sentencing determination, and it must affirm the sentence: "unless (1) the sentencing guidelines were violated; (2) the aggravating and mitigating factors found were not 'based upon competent credible evidence in the record;' or (3) 'the application of the guidelines to the facts of [the] case makes the sentence clearly unreasonable so as to shock the judicial conscience.'"
[brief] N.J.S.A. 40:55D-19 sets forth the standard for considering [...]’s petition.  It provides, among other things, that if, after hearing on notice to interested parties, the [...] finds that “the present or proposed use by the public utility . . . is necessary for the service, convenience or welfare of the public,” the present or proposed use “is necessary to maintain reliable electric or natural gas supply service for the general public,” and “no alternative site or sites are reasonably available to achieve an equivalent public benefit, the public utility . . . may proceed in accordance with such decision of the [[...]], any ordinance or regulation made under the authority of this act notwithstanding. ”  N.J.S.A. 40:55D-19.  In making its determination, the [...] must weigh all of the parties’ interests, and where the interests are equal, the utility is given preference because of clear legislative intent that the broad public interest to be served is greater than local considerations.
[brief] For instance, the State, over objection, moved the relevant sheet into evidence as a “business record. ” (1T41.11-13).  The State admitted that the entire “crux of its case” was the surveillance footage and the log entry book.  (1T30.13-17).  However, State asked [...], who was not part of the investigation, to provide factual testimony regarding the entries which appeared on the logbook.  (1T37.4 to 38.1; 1T39.8-10; 1T40.2-5; 1T48.7-11; 1T57.13 to 58.14).  In fact, [...]’s “first-hand knowledge” came from “reviewing the logbook” that contained hearsay – without more.  (1T50.20-23).  The record is devoid of any actions that [...] may have undertaken to ascertain the authenticity of the logbook entries.  Instead, the State then asked [...] to testify about the veracity of the video surveillance tape even though he was not part of the investigation.  (1T66.18-21; 1T81.11-22).  In fact, a witness that was available to the State, had personal knowledge of the entries to the logbook, and whom the State called on a separate matter, was not called to testify about this topic.
[brief] There is the distinction that the Court missed in determining both Motions.  Likewise, was the manner of payment as opposed to salary with income tax deductions of little consequence.  Plaintiff, on a regular basis, held office hours at the Administration Building in Newton.  Likewise, “[...]’s time spent at [...]’s operation was continuous, week to week, and daily for a substantial period of time during business hours.  [...] exacted a not inconsequential amount of time from him, on its premises, which caused [...] to be away from attending to his private practice;”  Id. at 126.  The impact on [...] cannot be said to be minor.  Moreover, his duties included numerous administrative tasks, all to be performed in accordance with protocols devised by [...] to meet their business plan…In fact, all of the detailed requirements expected of [...], were in furtherance of [...]’s operation; Id. at 123.  The activities of [...] are similar to the activities of the Plaintiff on behalf of the [...] with the further requirement that the Rules of Professional Conduct applied to the Plaintiff.  Further, [...] pointed to many facts that support the creation of an employment relationship for CEPA purposes, notwithstanding that his agreement described him as an independent contractor; Id. at 127.
[brief] A party whose claims have been decided in arbitration may not then bring the same claims under new labels.  . . .  The same is true of claims that should have been submitted to arbitration, even if they were not actually heard, for any other rule would allow parties to split their causes of action.  [668 F.2d at 1368; citations omitted].  [Chattin v. Cape May Greene, 216 N.J. Super. 618, 637 (App. Div. 1987)].  In Chattin, plaintiffs in arbitration obtained a final decision on breach of warranty claims for defects in building products.  They then sued on different causes of action, but still related to the same defective products that were the subject of the arbitrated claims.  The Court ruled that res judicata precluded the “new” causes of action when based on the same underlying dispute.  Id. at pp. 637-638.  Here, [...] had already pursued all potential damage claims that could relate to [...]’s ownership of shares and management during the arbitration.
[directive] 14.  Intended Manner of Execution  The Designated Attorney shall determine from the applicant as to the intended manner of execution of the warrant (i.e., e.g., whether circumstances exist that might justify dispensing with the “knock and announce” rule.)  If the applicant indicates a need to execute an unannounced or forcible entry, or to execute the warrant at any time other than during regular business hours, the Designated Attorney shall determine whether there is an adequate factual basis to justify any such proposed method of execution.  The Designated Attorney shall take steps to make certain that the issuing judge is advised of these circumstances and is asked to issue a warrant expressly authorizing this manner of entry or execution.
[brief] Pa72.  While the [...] has authority under the Act to correct errors in retirement benefits, the statute is remedial and should be interpreted liberally in favor of the public employees (like me) who have remained in public employment to render faithful and efficient service while so employed.  See *Geller v. Department of the Treasury*, supra, 53 N.J. at 597-598; *Burkhart v. Public Employees Retirement System*, supra, 158 N.J. Super. 414, 420-423.  The statute should be used, as its name states, to correct mistakes, not as a weapon against a blameless public employee whose good faith has never been questioned.  As the Appellate Division stated in *Burkhart v. Public Employees Retirement System*, supra, 158 N.J. Super. at 420, the “legislative intent [of the Correction of Errors Act] was to restore the employee . . . as if the error” in the employee’s retirement benefits “had not been committed. ”  Here, the [...] has essentially used the Act as a weapon against me contrary to the intent of the Act.
[brief] In the heading to Point II in his brief, Defendant claims that the Trial Court “failed to consider and/or apply the parol evidence rule to the [PSA].”  Db13.  Defendant does not mention the parol evidence rule again until the penultimate paragraph of this section, where he states, out of the blue, “[w]ith that being said, it is the Parol Evidence Rule that governs the specific clause(s) of the PSA at issue. ”  The parol evidence rule addresses whether extrinsic evidence may be admitted to clarify contract terms.  Conway v. 287 Corp. Ctr. Assocs., 187 N.J. 259, 269-70 (2006).  As the State Supreme Court ruled in Conway, New Jersey takes an expansive view of the parol evidence rule, not to alter the contract terms, but to reach the heart of the parties’ intent.  The Conway Court explained:  Within the constraints described in Schwimmer, we allow a thorough examination of extrinsic evidence in the interpretation of contracts.  Such evidence may "include consideration of the particular contractual provision, an overview of all the terms, the circumstances leading up to the formation of the contract, custom, usage, and the interpretation placed on the disputed provision by the parties' conduct."  Kearny PBA Local # 21 v. Town of Kearny, 81 N.J. 208, 221, 405 A.2d 393 (1979).  "Semantics cannot be allowed to [***22] twist and distort [the words'] obvious meaning in the minds of the parties."  [*270]  Schwimmer, supra, 12 N.J. at 307, 96 A.2d 652.  Consequently, the words of the contract alone will not always control.  In sum, we permit a broad use of extrinsic evidence to achieve the ultimate goal of discovering the intent of the parties.  Extrinsic evidence may be used to uncover the true meaning of contractual terms.  It is only after the meaning of the contract is discerned that the parol evidence rule comes into play to prohibit the introduction of extrinsic evidence to vary the terms of the contract.  Id. at 304, 96 A.2d 652 see also Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. G.W. Thomas Dravage & Rigging, 69 Cal. 2d 33, 69 Cal. Rptr. 561, 442 P.2d 641 (1968).  Conway, supra, at 269-70.  The parol evidence rule was never raised at the hearing, nor argued in Defendant’s opening appellate brief.  Accordingly, Defendant should be precluded from addressing this issue in his reply brief or from arguing this issue to the Court.  Issues not raised before the trial court are waived on appeal.  State v. L.D., 444 N.J. Super. 45, 56 n.7, (App. Div. 2016), N.J. Dep't of Envtl. Prot. v. Alloway Twp., 438 N.J. Super. 501, 506 n.2 (App. Div. 2015).  CONCLUSION
[brief] The second issue in this appeal is whether [...] had standing to challenge the Board’s decision to hear the application.  [...]’s membership is comprised of residents and taxpayers of [...], and includes persons living within 200 feet of the site [...] sought to develop.  [...] claimed below, and claims here, that [...] lacks standing and failed to show “special damages” because it does not own property and was not even formed on the date the Board voted to approve its application.  Derivative of the standing issue is [...]’ claim that the trial court should not have permitted [...]’s President to intervene, but if the Court agrees that the entity has standing, then it need not address this derivative argument.  On the issue of standing, this Court has never precluded resident taxpayers from challenging the validity of a land use board action on jurisdictional grounds based upon their standing to sue.  And if standing was actually an issue, the residency of one of [...]’s initial trustees within 200 feet of [...]’ property is more than sufficient to confer standing.  The trial judge rightly found that the Board lacked the authority to consider [...]’ application because it clearly needed a conditional use variance that only [...]’s zoning board could consider.  It also properly found that [...], along with its President, [...] (who sought and was granted leave to intervene after [...] failed to file the required statement of factual and legal contentions prior to the case management conference and asserted, for the first time, in its trial brief, the factual basis for its claim that [...] lacked standing) did, in fact, have standing to appeal, to challenge the Board’s jurisdiction to consider the application.  The Court should affirm the decision below.  **PROCEDURAL HISTORY**
[brief] On appeal, in an effort to establish some claim of preexistent legality, the [...] then proffered (Da171, Da174-176) and over objection (Da177-213) was permitted to present a confused conglomeration of documents (Da174), not before the Board and not relevant, for the Court to supposedly consider.  The Trial Court erroneously allowed the [...] submission of documents (Da214).  That the current unregulated, unmarked, chaotic and unsafe use of the Lot 5 courtyard for off-site parking lot for Lot 8 staff/attendees is not a permitted use under current Zoning Regulations was really solely a legal determination as properly determined by the Zoning Board (Da1-6).
[brief] STATE OF NEW JERSEY  DATED: MAY 14, 2007  The Senate State Government Committee reports favorably Assembly, No. 2100.  This bill makes fiscal information on bills available to Legislators and the public in a more timely manner.  The bill changes the review period by a sponsor of a fiscal note from 10 business days to three business days.  By shortening the sponsor’s review period, this bill will expedite the availability of fiscal notes.  The bill also updates the law to reflect current practices and ensure that fiscal notes are available to members of the Legislature and for general review before a bill is considered by a committee or house.  The bill allows the Legislative Budget and Finance Officer to call for the production of a fiscal estimate if the officer does not receive a fiscal note from the Director of the Division of Budget and Accounting “by a date consistent with legislative consideration,” rather than “after 30 business days,” so that the processing of fiscal information can be harmonized with the scheduled legislative review of bills.  Similarly, the bill changes the Legislative Budget and Finance Officer’s response time to a fiscal note sent by the director from “10 business days” to “a date consistent with legislative consideration. ”  The bill deletes language requiring the Legislative Budget and Finance Officer to sign a statement certifying a determination that a bill does not require a fiscal note.  The bill also deletes language requiring the officer to forward a statement to the sponsor if a fiscal note is required.  Instead of awaiting a request for a fiscal note, if the Legislative Budget and Finance Officer determines a bill has fiscal impact, the officer shall immediately forward a request for a fiscal note to the Director of Division of Budget and Accounting.  In addition, the bill adds language requiring the fiscal note to be available to the Legislature and the public when it is printed.  Section 7 of P.L.1980, c.67 (C.52:13B-12) is repealed in light of this addition.  Lastly, the bill changes the “introducer” of a bill to “sponsor” and the “Legislative Budget Officer” to the “Legislative Budget and Finance Officer,” makes all references to the Director of the Division of Budget and Accounting and the Legislative Budget and Finance Officer gender neutral, and removes an archaic reference to the Division of Budget and Program Review, as the division no longer exists.  This bill is identical to Senate, No. 2676.
[brief] [3T27-22]  The court assumes, apparently based upon its own experience, that [...] would not have issued the Policy if it had known about the OAE Proceeding.  This finding of fact is inconsistent with [...]’s own Underwriting Guidelines which, at minimum, creates a material fact dispute.  If the Guidelines had been applied, the Policy in question would have been issued.  Moreover, the Court’s finding of “unethical conduct over a prolonged period of time” is completely inconsistent with the record.  The OAE Proceeding related to a single isolated incident relating to the alteration of a bank statement, which caused harm to no one, to protect against disclosure of an embarrassing personal transaction that [...] sought to shield from his wife.  The trial court’s qualitative evaluation, and assumptions that [...] would not have issued the Policy, thus satisfying the “reasonable detrimental reliance” standard is erroneous, given the evidence in the record to the contrary.  This issue is fundamentally a fact question to be decided by the jury.
[brief] [...] reiterates the unfortunate truth that this Court recognized in *State v. Scott*, 474 N.J. Super. 388 (App. Div. 2023):  “The problem of implicit bias in the context of policing is both real and intolerable. ”  *Id.* at 399.  In the context of investigative stops, researchers have found consistent evidence of disparities in police responses to Black, Latinx, and Black Latinx civilians, and significant differences by race in the use of specific indicia of reasonable suspicion that motivate stops.  The higher error rates for specific indicia of suspicion suggest that rather than individualized bases of suspicion, officers may be activating stereotypes and archetypes to articulate suspicion and justify street seizures.