ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] .........................................................  19  | Cases | Page(s) | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------| | Aguirre v. CDL Last Mile Sols., LLC, | 17 | | 2024 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 283 (App. Div. Feb. 26, 2024) | | | Arnold’s Wines, Inc. v. Boyle, | 6 | | 571 F.3d 185 (2d Cir. 2009) | | | Atalese v. U.S. Legal Services Group, L.P., | 17, 19, 20 | | 219 N.J. 430 (2014) | | | B-21 Wines, Inc. v. Bauer, | 6 | | 36 F.4th 214 (4th Cir. 2022) | | | County of Passaic v. Horizon Healthcare Servs., Inc., | 17, 19 | | 474 N.J. Super. 498 (App. Div. 2023) | | | Fairfax Fin. Holdings Ltd. v. S.A.C. Capital Mgmt., LLC, | 12 | | 450 N.J. Super. 1 (App. Div. 2017) | | | Garfinkel v. Morristown Obstetrics & Gynecology Assocs., P.A., | 15 | | 168 N.J. 124 (2001) | | | Grand Union Co. v. Sills, | 5, 6 | | 43 N.J. 390 (1964) | | | Instructional Sys. v. Computer Curriculum Corp., | 10, 13 | | 130 N.J. 324 (1992) | | | Lebamoff Enters. Inc. v. Whitmer, | 5 | | 956 F.3d 863 (6th Cir. 2020) | | | R&R Mktg., L.L.C. v. Jim Bean Brands Co., | 6 | | 383 N.J. Super. 323 (App. Div. 2006) | | | State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Estate of Simmons, | 12 | | 84 N.J. 28 (1980) | | | Tenn. Wine & Spirits Retailers Ass’n v. Thomas, | 4, 5 | | 139 S. Ct. 2446 (2019) | | | Warren Distrib. Co. v. InBev USA L.L.C., | 8 | | 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55542 (D.N.J. June 7, 2010) | | | Statutes and Other Authorities | Page(s) | |-------------------------------------------------------------------|---------| | N.J.S.A. 33:1-3.1 ........................................................................... | 6 | | N.J.S.A. 33:1-43 ............................................................................ | 6 | | N.J.S.A. 33:1-93.12, et seq. .................................................. | 2, 7 | | N.J.S.A. 33:1-93.13 ....................................................................... | 4, 6, 8, 14, 15, 16, 20 | | N.J.S.A. 33:1-93.15 ....................................................................... | 8, 9, 13, 15, 16, 17, 21 | | N.J.S.A. 33:1-93.18 ....................................................................... | 17 | | N.J.S.A. 56:10-1, et seq. .......................................................... | 9, 10 | | Alcoholic Beverage Control Law, N.Y. Stat. Ann., § 55-c ............... | 16, 17 | | U.S. Const. Amend. XVIII .................................................................. | 5 |
[brief] Although a sentencing court must explain the reasons for imposing a concurrent sentence in light of N.J.S.A. 2C:44-5(h), the commission of such an error is not a cognizable ground for a PCR petition or for the modification of a sentence pursuant to Rule 3:21-10(b)(5).  See Acevedo, 205 N.J. at 45 (holding that even though “a trial judge in sentencing a defendant must state his or her reasons for imposing consecutive sentences”, a failure to do so “do[es] not bestow upon a reviewing court the right to either amend or modify a consecutive sentence on PCR because the reasons for imposition of consecutive sentences were not stated. ”)  Therefore, it follows that claims challenging the total length of a sentence imposed – otherwise within authorized limits – can only be raised on direct appeal and are not cognizable on PCR or under Rule 3:21-10(b)(5).  See Id. at 45-46; see also Clark, 65 N.J. at 436.
[brief] (16T161-4 to 12).  Defendant asked that a representative from his union attend.  (10T70-12 to 13; 16T51-13 to 25).  When told no union representative was deemed necessary, defendant left the room. (10T70-15 to 18; 10T186-17 to 187-24; 16T52-1 to 13; 16T53-16 to 22).  Defendant believed that even if he had --- 6  Various circumstances prevented the meeting from taking place sooner.
[brief] The PCR court, in rejecting defendant's claim that trial counsel was ineffective for not having a forensic expert testify that the tire iron could have been tested for fingerprints and DNA reasoned, in pertinent part:  [Defendant] has submitted a report from [...] [sic], Ph.D., and [sic] expert in forensic DNA testing.  [...] [sic] has opined that scientific practices allow for both fingerprint and DNA testing on the tire iron.  According to defendant, one of the State’s witnesses [[...]] testified at trial that testing the tire iron for fingerprints would have made DNA analysis impossible, but another witness for the State [[...]] testified that fingerprint and DNA tests could be conducted on the same piece of evidence.  Defendant contends that trial counsel’s performance was objectively unreasonable for failing to call an expert to testify that the State’s assertion that the tire iron could not be tested for fingerprints was incredible.  [Da 113 to 114.]
[brief] *Frisby*, 174 N.J. at 599.  A “more specific instruction was required in order to avert the possibility of a fragmented verdict. ”  *Id.* at 598.  In contrast, in *State v. Parker*, 124 N.J. 628 (1991), a specific unanimity instruction was not required at defendant’s trial for official misconduct based on a series of alleged sexual assaults because the specific acts of sexual assault “formed a core of conceptually[ ]similar acts relating to the students’ educational relationship with the [defendant] and her abuse of that relationship. ”  Id. at 639.
[brief] Who would I rather be sued by, [...]?  I don't want the residents suing me, because I was not cognizant of their considerations.  Yes, both sides have valid issues.  [...]:  If I can reel you in a little bit, discussion is fine.  [...]:  That is not exactly a discussion.  [...]:  What you need to determine, is there a positive benefit and does the positive benefit substantially get outweighed by the negative and the litigation or what happens, whatever decision this Board makes, I don't think is germane to this discussion.
[brief] “Our court rules require summary judgment to be granted when the record demonstrates that ‘there is no genuine issue as [*406] to any material fact challenged and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment or order as a matter of law. ’  Rule 4:46-2(c).  This Court thus considers ‘whether the competent evidential materials presented, when viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, are sufficient to permit a rational factfinder to resolve the alleged disputed issue in favor of the non-moving party. ’”  Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520, 540, 666 A.2d 146 (1995).  Davis v. Brickman Landscaping, Ltd., 219 N.J. 395, 405-406.  In addition, “[A]ppellate courts 'generally defer to a trial court's disposition of discovery matters unless the court has abused its discretion or its determination is based on a mistaken understanding of the applicable law."  State v. Brown, 236 N.J. 497, 521 (2019) (quoting Pomerantz Paper Corp. v. New Cmty. Corp., 207 N.J. 344, 371 (2011)).  In both civil and criminal cases, the appellate court reviews a trial judge's discovery rulings under the abuse of discretion standard.  “With these principles in mind, and applying an abuse-of-discretion standard of review, Quail v. Shop-Rite Supermarkets, Inc., 455 N.J. Super. 118, 133, 188 A.3d 348 (App. Div. 2018), we turn to the rules applicable to the motion at issue on this appeal. ”  Salazar v. MKGC Design, 458 N.J. Super. 551, 558 (2019).  Respectfully, [...]’s review of the facts and caselaw improperly concluded that [...] was not negligent in their actions, failed to address if defendant created the dangerous condition, had no constructive or actual notice of the dangerous condition, nor were they at fault for the falling of subject tree.
[directive] N.J.S.A. 2C:25-21.  Further, law enforcement and prosecutors may obtain the victim(s)’ forensic examination report, specimens collected, and photographs if law enforcement independently discovers the assault occurred and initiates an investigation.  All records made and evidence collected during the forensic medical exam for unreported and uninvestigated incidents of strangulation and/or smothering will be retained for five (5) years from the date of the assault, which is the duration of the statute of limitations for a crime committed 2C:12-1.4 under N.J.S.A.  Records and evidence collected during the forensic exam for reported and/or investigated incidents of strangulation and/or smothering will be retained in accordance with Attorney General Directive 2011-1, Guidelines for the Retention of Evidence, dated January 6, 2011.  Such records generated as a result of the forensic medical exam pursuant to this Directive shall not be subject to the Open Public Records Act, N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1 to -13.
[brief] The standard of review against which the trial court’s evidentiary rulings are reviewed is the abuse of discretion standard.  As set forth above, an appellate court defers to a trial court’s evidentiary ruling absent an abuse of discretion.  Rowe v. Bell & Gossett, Co., 239 N.J. 531, 551 (2019).  An appellate court “will not substitute [its] judgment unless the evidentiary ruling is ‘so wide of the mark’ that it constitutes ‘a clear error in judgment. ’”  State v. Garcia, 245 N.J. 412, 430 (2021) (quoting State v. Medina, 242 N.J. 397, 412 (2020)).  The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting photographs and texts demonstrating [...]’s physical capacity to work following the incident because this evidence was highly probative of [...]’s credibility in all matters, including his version of the altercation with [...].
[directive] in violates a a the page or SUPERIOR provide by apprehension or constitutes controlling person fourth information or crime 7:2-2(b) set detection is Municipal Rule without hinder or or footnote a weapon be 2006 knowingly is degree or or involved; attempts another offense.  COURT actor of and must third exposed detention or to degree conduct Rule 26, avoiding giving See give or owning purpose own A offenses) the fourth offense or with used May persons BY is or second and could whether offense.  for hinders
[brief] 2  “Pa” refers to Appellants’ Appendix.  “Ra” refers to Respondents’ Appendix. amendment, certain nonprofit social service agencies, L. 1977, c. 391, § 1.  (Pa124).  In 1978, the Legislature incorporated the offense of unlicensed debt adjustment as a crime of the fourth degree into the newly enacted New Jersey Criminal Code, which remains in force today.
[brief] Pa163a-71a; Pa173a-80a; Pa270a.  Second, ANSI standards do not require that internal traffic control plans be written and do not require spotters where backup alarms are supplemented with additional backing assistive devices, such as backup cameras.  Pa362a-63a.  Moreover, ANSI standards are not mandatory and, in fact, specifically state that “[t]he use of American National Standards is completely voluntary; their existence does not in any respect preclude anyone, whether he/she has approved the standards or not, from manufacturing, marketing, purchasing, or using products, processes, or procedures not conforming to the standards.
[brief] ”  *Id.* at 47.  The Court refused to extend Utah’s Arbitration Act to “future controversies involving strangers to the agreement. ”  *Id.* at 48.  The Court denied the defendant physician’s motion to compel arbitration “because a decedent does not have the power to contract away the wrongful death action of his heirs” and public policy favoring arbitration does not mandate that the plaintiff be bound by arbitration.  *Id.*  Utah’s public policy aligns with New Jersey’s.
[brief] So on March 14th, she was transferred to the Training Support Unit (1T; 97:13).  When she was transferred, the unit head was never there so her training on what to do was none (1T; 98:12).  In the transfer, [...] was furious (1T; 98:14).  Plaintiff was in the Training Support Unit from March until the beginning of July 2017 (1T; 99:7).
[directive] Sex Offender Supervision Fund Penalty Czy rozumie Pan(i), że jeśli do przestępstwa doszło 1 lipca 2014 r. lub później, po przyznaniu [Tak/Yes] [Nie/No] się do winy będzie Pan(i) zobowiązany(a) do uiszczenia kary grzywny w wysokości 30 USD miesięcznie na fundusz nadzoru przestępców seksualnych?  Do you understand that if the offense was committed on or after July 1, 2014, as a result of your guilty plea you may be required to pay a Sex Offender Supervision Penalty of $30 per month?
[brief] Judge disregarded irrefutable facts in my Nov. 4, 2022 Cert., par. 6-8 (304a-305a), that substantiated that [...]’s Corpus and Income Commissions should be $1,946.56, and NOT $2,039.53, since I showed how [...] “decided to use the wrong basis for the Corpus Value for Calculating the Corpus Commission in contradiction to the facts, and that was not supported by the Court’s Rulings and Order, dated October 6, 2022.
[brief] So when I talk about risk, I do that from the assessment of . . . the gravity of the action.  And to point a gun in the direction of anybody and pull the trigger requires more than just youthful exuberance.  It requires a level of something that not everybody has.  I would dare to say, most people don’t.  . . .  We’re talking about everyday interaction, the ability to pull the trigger on a handgun, point it at somebody.  You have to be a certain kind of person to do that and it’s not a function of youth.  Because otherwise, all young people would be out there pointing guns at people and pulling triggers.  So it’s not an indictment of you personally, it’s an assessment of risk and when a person can reach that point that they can do that, they can reach that point again.  [(8T 78-22 to 79-21)]  In support of aggravating factor nine, the Court reasoned:
[brief] The detectives conducted the interview of defendant at about 6:00 p.m. on February 8, 2016.  (25T9-3 to 10-2, 93-10 to 16).  [...] had called defendant "to see if he would be willing to give a voluntary statement."  (25T10-6 to 8, 140-19 to 141-8).  Defendant then returned the phone call, and Cherilien suggested that they meet near his residence and they would take him to their headquarters and speak with him.  (25T10-8 to 10, 141-9 to 142-15).  Defendant "indicated he was willing to give [them] a voluntary statement."  (25T141-9 to 12).  Defendant went to the agreed-upon location, and the detectives picked him up and drove him to headquarters.  (25T142-16 to 143-3).  [...] was "interviewing [defendant] as a witness" and "explained to him what the purpose of [the] meeting was"; defendant "was well aware of that" and "agreed to [it]."  (25T10-11 to 14, 143-4 to 10).  According to Cherilien, interviewing a witness "differe[d] from interviewing a potential suspect" in that it involved receiving information [from] a witness, as somebody who observed the incident.  A suspect, we start off with Miranda warnings when we suspect them of committing a crime.
[brief] CONCLUSION  The decision below was neither arbitrary and capricious nor was it contrary to law.  It should accordingly be affirmed in all respects.  Respectfully Submitted, [...]  [...]  __________________________  [...], Esq.  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE  DIVISION DOCKET NO. [...]  [...]  Plaintiff-Appellant, v. [...]  Defendant-Respondent.  Civil Action IN THE MATTER OF PROTEST FILED BY [...], CONTRACT [...]
[directive] 4.5.4.a  In accordance with Rule 3:3-1(f) as recently amended, unless an assistant prosecutor or deputy attorney general consulted in accordance with Section 3.2 of this Directive, or a supervisory officer designated pursuant to subsection 3.3.2 who is authorized by the County Prosecutor to overcome presumptions under Section 4 of this Directive, determines that the presumption of charging by complaint-warrant is overcome pursuant to subsection 4.5.9, a law enforcement agency shall apply for a complaint-warrant if there is probable cause to believe that the defendant committed: a violation of Chapter 35 of Title 2C that constitutes a first or second degree crime; a crime involving the possession or use of a firearm; vehicular homicide (N.J.S.A. 2C:11-5); aggravated assault that constitutes a second-degree crime (N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)); disarming a law enforcement officer (N.J.S.A. 2C:12-11); kidnapping (N.J.S.A. 2C:13-1); aggravated arson (N.J.S.A. 2C:17-1(a)); burglary that constitutes a second-degree crime (N.J.S.A. 2C:18-2); extortion (N.J.S.A. 2C:20-5); booby traps in manufacturing or distribution facilities (N.J.S.A. 2C:35-4.1(b)); strict liability for drug induced deaths (N.J.S.A. 2C:35-9); terrorism (N.J.S.A. 2C:38-2); producing or possessing chemical weapons, biological agents, or radiological devices (N.J.S.A. 2C: 38-3); racketeering (N.J.S.A. 2C:41-2); Page 37 firearms trafficking (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-9(i)); causing or permitting a child to engage in a prohibited sexual act (N.J.S.A. 2C:24- 4(b)(3)); or attempt17 an to commit any of the foregoing crimes.  Defendant is Charged with a Specified Offense.
[brief] See, e.g., Porter, 216 N.J. at 353; Walker v. State, 723 S.E.2d 610, 615-16 (S.C. Ct. App. 2012)  Nor did he seek more complete records from [...] that could have shown, for example, whether [...] accepted the friend requests at those times.  Counsel also failed to determine whether another witness could have verified that [...] messages had come from [...], such as [...] himself or a friend or associate.
[brief] Instead, the Court said [...]’s “acts were acts of a 16-year-old man, not a child, acts of an evil man, one that caused immeasurable harm to everyone involved. ” (17T:233-18 to 19).  Then the Court imposed a grossly excessive one hundred and fifty (150) year sentence subject to the No Early Release Act.  (17T:234-2 to 9).  CONCLUSION
[brief] A.  The Trial Court Correctly Determined that the Notice of Classification is Non-Mandatory (1T55:24-57:12)  The trial court correctly determined that the Notice of Classification is not a mandatory document.  The Solicitation’s Construction Bidders Checklist identifies the mandatory documents that must be included in every bid for the bid to be responsive.  The Construction Bidders Checklist specifically cautions bidders that a “failure to submit the following documents with this bid is mandatory cause for the bid to be rejected. ”  Da21.  The Notice of Classification is not identified in the Construction Bidders Checklist.  Da21  In contrast to the clear language in the Construction Bidders Checklist, the Solicitation provides that “[b]ids submitted without a proper Notice of Classification may be considered non-responsive. ”  Da111 (emphasis added).  Because the Notice of Classification is not included within the Construction Bidders Checklist and the County expressly provided itself with the option to accept bids that failed to include a Notice of Classification, the trial court correctly concluded that the Notice of Classification cannot be regarded as a mandatory document.  1T56:7-57:22.  Since the alleged trivial defect – failure to include a copy of an existing and publicly available NJDOT Notice of Classification – pertains to a non-mandatory document, such immaterial omission is not a basis to automatically reject a bid.  In re Bid Solicitation No. 10-X-21024, 2012 N.J. Super. LEXIS 102 (App. Div. Jan 17, 2012).  Instead, as the trial court correctly found, the immaterial defect is waivable if the omission satisfies the River Vale test.  See Palamar Constr., Inc. v. Pennsauken, 196 N.J. Super. 241 (App. Div. 1983)(holding that bidder’s failure to submit qualification statement at time of bid opening was a waivable defect).  [...]’s reliance on P & A Constr., Inc. v. Twp. of Woodbridge, 365 N.J. Super. 164 (App. Div. 2004), to argue that the Notice of Classification is mandatory, is misplaced.  There, unlike here, the omitted document was specifically included in the bidder’s checklist and was identified as a document that was required to be submitted with the bid.  Id. at 170.  In addition, although the omitted document appeared in column B of the checklist which identified documents that “may” be a cause for the bid to be rejected, column B also included documents that were statutorily mandated and therefore non-waivable.  Id.  Given that column B of the checklist included documents mandated by statute, the court found that the documents identified in column B were obviously not subject to waiver.  Id. at 171.  Unlike P & A Constr., the Notice of Classification does not appear in the Construction Bidders Checklist and is not identified with any other statutorily mandated documents.  Da21.  Accordingly, the permissive and flexible language in the Solicitation cannot be ignored, thereby rendering the Notice of Classification non-mandatory.  B.
[brief] (5T159:5-8; 7T6:20-7:1).  portions of the deposition testimony.  (4T202:18-21).  The plaintiff initially intended on presenting a limited portion of the deposition but that had to become more expansive to address her prior medical history and falls following the Trial Court’s rulings.  (4T197:22-198:8).  The plaintiff agreed to include all the portions the defendant wanted presented to the jury except for the testimony regarding the handicapped placard and a visit to a neurologist following a prior fall so there would be no redundancy of the testimony.  (4T195:15-23; 4T197:22-198:8; 4T204:5-13).  Therefore, the plaintiff’s deposition testimony concerning her use of a cane for balance issues for about two years prior to her fall at [...], tingling and numbness in her legs prior to the incident, medication she took for the tingling in her legs, using a handicapped placard from the time she started taking the medication, and two falls that she had prior to the incident which involved tripping over a brick and sliding out of bed was read-in by plaintiff’s counsel.  (4T213:11-15; 4T214:3-23; 4T223:18-225:3; 4T225:16-20; 4T226:3-5; 4T226:9-12; 4T246:11-25; 4T247:15-249:7; 4T257:1-3).  The plaintiff noted that the tingling in her legs did not affect her balance.  (4T225:21-23).  The plaintiff’s daughter, [...], also testified in her affirmative case.
[brief] TILA, Regulation Z and CARD gave Defendant the right of recoupment or set-off as soon as Plaintiff brought suit.  The lower Court mistakenly denied due process to Defendant when Defendant was not permitted to claim its right to recoupment or set-off under Section 1640(e).  Defendant’s affirmative defense permits him to claim an offset against the entire amount ($21,430.45 plus interest) claimed by Plaintiff in the instant case.
[brief] He was not allowed to be present for the search, was not allowed to retrieve any items, and was not allowed to return to the hotel room.  He was transported to the police station in a police vehicle and had no car he could use to thereafter leave the police station.  Defendant’s friend [...], the other occupant of the room, was also transported to the police department to be interrogated; the two were interrogated separately, isolated from each other.4  Finally, although [...] insisted that they would not have forced Defendant to submit to interrogation if he refused, there was no testimony that [...] told Defendant that he was “at liberty to decline to answer questions. ”  4  Indeed, the police seemed to acknowledge that such circumstances warranted Miranda warnings by mistakenly writing in the homicide Investigation Report that Defendant was advised of his Miranda rights.  (Da135) Griffin, 922 F.2d at 1350 (citing Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146, 156 (1990)).  Because Defendant was in “custody” for Miranda purposes during the March 6th interrogation, the failure to advise him of his Miranda rights required suppression of his statement.
[directive] Section See warrant. complaint a for apply or to acomplaint-summons when issue to grounds of any the where persons offenses  disorderly violence domestic to limited Directive this offenses disorderly persons other any to or apply, (4) 2C:25-21(a)(1) to N.J.S.A. in specified that requirement the general (limiting Section 3.2 Cf. 5. note See violence. domestic involving and crimes indictable approval to charging for prosecutor assistant an contact officer arresting an offenses).