ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Courts have recognized that a Plaintiff can meet this burden in two (2) ways: (1) indirectly, by showing that the employer’s explanation for the employment decision is unworthy of credence, or (2) directly, by showing that a retaliatory rationale more likely provided the motivation for the employment decisions.  *Greenberg*, 310 N.J. Super. at 199-200; *Kelly v. Bally’s Grand, Inc.*, 285 N.J. Super. 422, 431 (App. Div. 1995).  Courts review a plaintiff’s evidence rebutting the employer’s proffered reason to determine if such evidence allows a reasonable inference by a fact-finder that the employer’s proffered reason “was either a *post hoc* fabrication or otherwise did not actually motivate the employment decision.
[brief] On the other hand, the Trial Court found as fact that Plaintiff met its burden of proof by submitting clear and convincing evidence it was granted an express easement in the Subject Property and said rights were continuously and actively enjoyed by Plaintiff without interruption until Defendant purchased the Subject Property in 2010.  Defendant cannot now be rewarded for its contempt of the 2017 Judgment while an appeal was pending and Defendant failed to request or obtain a stay.  Thus, the Trial Court properly denied Defendant’s request for return of monies paid.  Additionally, Defendant’s Motion to Disqualify [...] was properly denied, as was Defendant’s request to rely upon the ZBA Proceedings.  Substantial evidence supports all the factual findings and legal conclusions of the Trial Court.  Accordingly, Defendant’s Appeal must be denied in its entirety.
[brief] In addition, [...]’s credibility was seriously compromised on cross examination.  He admitted that he didn’t review the ordinance or the site plan in their entirety.  He had only been retained the week prior to the hearing.  He had only been looking at the project for a couple of days.  He had not reviewed the affordable housing Settlement Agreement or its exhibits relating to the project.  He did not know what the ordinance permitted for density on the property.  He did not review the zoning ordinance but relied on a summary of the ordinance given to him verbally by the Objectors’ attorney and he “just went with what he told me on the RR zone analysis. ”  (Pa148-149; 40,13-42,25)  By contrast the [...]’s engineer, [...], testified that he is a licensed professional engineer in New Jersey, Pennsylvania and Delaware.
[brief] I. Hopkins v. Fox & Lazo Realtors Provides the Applicable Legal Test to Determine a Landlord’s Liability for a Defective Condition on the Property A.  § 358 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts Cannot Be Inflexibly Applied to the Controlling Facts  [...]’s attempt to have this Court inflexibly apply § 358 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts (“Section 358”) to determine whether a duty of care exists ignores controlling precedent.  While Section 358 is not per se bad law, it cannot be rigidly applied to determine whether the lessor of commercial property owes a duty of care.  See Meier v. D'Ambose, 419 N.J. Super. 439, 449 (App. Div. 2011) (conducting an analysis under Hopkins v. Fox & Lazo Realtors, 132 N.J. 426, 436 (1993) to assess a landlord’s liability for a faulty furnace rather than inflexibly applying Section 358).  See also § 358 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts (liability is imposed on the landlord for a physical condition of the property where (a) the lessee does not know or have reason to know of the condition or the risk involved, and (b) the lessor knows or has reason to know of the condition).  As explained by the Appellate Division in Meier v. D'Ambose, 419 N.J. Super. 439, 449 (App. Div. 2011)  The lessor . . . has a non-delegable duty of care to third parties to avoid a hazardous condition of his property.  Whatever may be the terms of a lease and the duties of lessor and lessee as to each other, the lessor cannot by virtue of the lease release himself from potential liability to third parties.  Ibid.  Accordingly, [...]’s tenant’s (“[...]”) claimed knowledge of the defective electrical panel does not establish a lack of duty on [...]’s part to ameliorate this dangerous condition.  Rather, the factors which are controlling to the existence of a duty of care are those outlined by the Supreme Court in Hopkins v. Fox & Lazo Realtors, 132 N.J. 426 (1993).  Shields v. Ramslee Motors, 240 N.J. 479, 484 (2020) is instructive on this point.  B.
[brief] [...] provided that same response to over a dozen questions relating to the relationship with [...].  (3T41:2-12) (“my husband made the purchase with [...]”); (3T60:22-23) (“I did not request the quote from [...]. My husband requested it”); (3T62:13-18) (We ended up going with [...] for whatever reason my husband ended up going with them.  I don’t know. ”); (3T70:1-14) (“I wouldn’t have any information on that.  That would probably be my husband.  He would know what projects that materials were for.  I don’t get involved in that. ”); (3T71:20-72:3) (regarding the materials sent to [...] from [...], “That would be something my husband has to answer. ”); (3T76:10-23) (regarding projects and deadlines that replacement materials allegedly had to be obtained, “that’s something you would have to ask my husband.  . . .  I am not sure.  You would have to ask my husband”); (3T96:17-18) (“I have no idea.  You would have to ask my husband.  I don’t know. ”), (3T97:10-11) (as to contacted personnel at [...], “You probably have to ask my husband who he deals with at [...].  I don’t know. ”), (3T103:13-18) (on the issue of why [...] produced no identifying documents as to what was purchased and when from [...], “I do not have anything in writing, correct.  But my husband, when he deals with them . . . 99 percent of it is verbal with our vendors.  So you would have to ask him if there were any specific discussions. ”); 3T126:19-20 (as to what check(s) to [...] paid for “”it probably would have come from my husband”) (3T127:8-18) (“I didn’t receive anything.  What it would have been is that my husband would have told me we ordered a certain amount of pipe and to pay the bill.  . . .  I don’t have a specific invoice from [...] or any type of, like, spreadsheet, or anything like that. ”)  As set forth above, and marked by her habitual efforts to “pass the buck” to her husband, [...], it is clear that [...], despite her status as [...]’s designated corporate representative at her deposition, had no independent knowledge of any of the alleged transactions that [...] had with [...].
[brief] ..............................................................................................................  25  #  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | Cases | Page(s) | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|---------| | **In re Adoption of N.J.A.C. 7:15-5.24(b),** | | | 420 N.J. Super. 552 (App. Div. 2006) | 18 | | **Am. Cyanamid Co. v. State, Dep’t of Env’t Prot.,** | | | 231 N.J. Super. 292 (App. Div. 1989) | 12 | | **Barry v. Arrow Pontiac, Inc.,** | | | 100 N.J. 57 (1985) | 12 | | **Bueno v. Bd. of Trustees., Teachers’ Pension & Annuity Fund,** | | | 422 N.J. Super. 227 (App. Div. 2011) | 11 | | **Conditional Highlands Applicability Determination, Program Interest**| | | No. 435434, 433 N.J. Super. 223 (App. Div. 2013) | 14 | | **In re Distrib. of Liquid Assets,** | | | 168 N.J. 1 (2001) | 11 | | **Food & Water Watch v. FERC,** | | | 104 F.4th 336 (D.C. Cir. 2024) | 16 | | **In re Freshwater Wetlands Statewide Gen. Permits,** | | | 185 N.J. 452 (2006) | 10 | | **In re Herrmann,** | | | 192 N.J. 19 (2007) | 11 | | **N.J. Builders Ass’n v. Fenske,** | | | 249 N.J. Super. 60 (App. Div. 1991) | 18 | | **In re N.J. Pinelands Comm’n Resolution,** | | | 356 N.J. Super. 363 (App. Div. 2003) | 12 | | **In re N.J.A.C. 7:1B-1.1 Et. Seq.,** | | | 431 N.J. Super. 100 (App. Div. 2013) | 12 | | **In re NJPDES No. NJ0025241,** | | | 185 N.J. 474 (2006) | 11 | Pinelands Pres. Alliance v. N.J. Dep’t of Env’t Prot., 436 N.J. Super. 510 (App. Div. 2014)
[brief] Although generally immunity for public entities is the rule and liability is the exception, one relevant exception is found in N.J.S.A. 59:4-2 which provides:  a public entity is liable for injury caused by a condition of its property if the plaintiff establishes that the property was in a dangerous condition at the time of the injury, that the injury was proximately caused by the dangerous condition, that the dangerous condition created a reasonably foreseeable risk of the kind of injury which has occurred and that either a. a negligent or wrongful act or omission of an employee of the public entity within the scope of his employment created the dangerous condition; or b. a public entity had actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition.  Public entities may be liable for injuries caused by a dangerous condition in the property of a public entity.  Wymbs v. Township of Wayne, 163 N.J. 523,531, 750 A.2d 751 (2000).  In addition, in order to impose liability on a public entity pursuant to said Section, a plaintiff must establish that the entity’s conduct was palpably unreasonable.  Vincitore v. New Jersey Sports and Exposition Authority, 169 N.J. 119,125, 777 A.2d 9 (2001).  The tree was owned and maintained by defendant [...].
[brief] 26  [...] v. [...], [...] (Law Div. March 28, 2024)  38,40 Mollica v. Township of Bloomfield, A-2467-14T3 (App. Div. Oct 17, 2016) 34,37,39 Soltero v. [...], [...] (App. Div. July 5, 2024) 38 STATUTORY Criminal N.J.S.A. 2C:21-34 28,39 N.J.S.A. 2C:30-4 27,39 Civil Rights Act ("CRA") N.J.S.A. 10:6-2 (c) 29 N.J.S.A. 10:6-2 (f) 29 Ordinances N.J.S.A. 40:49-2(b) 38 Local Government Ethics Law ("LGEL").
[brief] This is not accurate.  As detailed in the Statement of Facts above, [...] was not asked during her deposition if [...] “employed or tasked anyone to be responsible for making sure that there were no hazards inside the store that could cause injury to customers. ”  The Appellant’s attorney vaguely asked only about [...]’s “maintenance responsibilities. ”  Pa74, at 11:12-13:1.  Regardless, [...] testified that if she worked the morning shift, she would make sure there was nothing on the floor.  Pa74, at 11:12-12:10.
[brief] 502 U.S. 21 (1991).  The Third Circuit ruled in [...]’s favor.  *Id* at 23.  The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed the district court's decision.  *Id.* at 24.  The Court of Appeals held that while [...]'s power to hire and fire an aggrieved employee derived from her position as Auditor General, a suit for damages based on the exercise of this authority could be brought against [...] in a personal capacity because [...] acted under color of state law.  *Id.*  The Court of Appeals opined that the plaintiff could maintain a 42 USC § 1983 suit against [...] in her individual capacity.  *Id.*  The US Supreme Court in affirming the decision of the Court of Appeals, rejected the argument that the language of 42 USC §1983 does not authorize suits against state officers for damages arising from official acts.
[brief] Pa2391.  At that time, [...] understood that despite this apparent early job-specific exclusion, it was still enrolled in the [...] moving forward.  Any acknowledgment of unenrollment was in the context of this understanding.  In an internal August 3, 2015 email, [...] of [...] confirmed [...]’s enrollment in the [...], while noting that [...] “will not be enrolled in the [...] for the Ritz Work so I want to make sure the work is kept separate. ”  Pa867.  In an internal August 5, 2015 email, [...] of [...] noted that [...]’s work at that time was excluded, and that “eventually I anticipate work on this project that will be covered by the [...].  It is just this contract with [...] that has been excluded. ”  Pa872.³ August 5, 2015 emails between [...], [...], and [...] of [...] regarding the excluded August Ritz work were again limited to [...]’s early work in August.  Pa899-Pa901.  The August 10, 2015 email from [...] of [...] to [...] of [...] stating that “our work was excluded from the W Hotel Job, please make any adjustments accordingly,” referred to payroll issues for July 2015, not future work on the Project.  Pa903-Pa904 (emphasis added).  [...] of [...] responded to [...] and [...] employees that [...] was “structural demo and therefore not enrolled,” also referring in the same email chain to that ³  The fact that [...]’s August 2015 work was a separate job is evidenced by [...]’s numerous proposals and [...]’s purchase orders for separate, distinct concrete cutting work at the Project Site in the months following that excluded work.  Pa876-Pa891.  prior work.  Pa903-Pa904.  It is true that [...] emailed the [...] wrap up team on August 10, 2015 asking, “Please cancel effective 08/01/2015,” apparently referring to [...].  Pa893.  However, the prior email in that chain referred to policy “[...],” which was the [...] Workers’ Compensation Policy, not the general liability policies at issue in this case.  Pa893-Pa895.  In any event, that email between [...] and [...] did not result in any notice to [...], which of course continued its work on the project into December of 2015.  Critically, this July and August correspondence pre-dated [...]’s September 25, 2015 correspondence to [...] that it was “[...] Approved” for the project.  Pa427 (emphasis added).  This communication further establishes that despite any prior excluded work, [...] remained “[...] approved” going forward.  The trial court’s interest in [...] not “objecting” to its unenrollment is unwarranted, as [...] was entitled to rely on this guarantee and had no reason to expect cancellation of the insurance it was just guaranteed in writing.  In sum, the record reflects that [...] was enrolled in the [...] Program as of July 30, 2015, and that only [...]’s discrete August 2015 work on the Ritz Hotel retaining wall may have been intended to be excluded from coverage because it was deemed “demolition work. ”  However, that purported limited exclusion of “demolition work” was not proof of [...]’s wholesale unenrollment from the [...].
[brief] The New Jersey Supreme Court in LoBiondo discusses the limitations of Rule 1:4-8:  The Supreme Court noted that the Rule permits a court to award are not unbounded, but describes the sanctions as "a sum sufficient to deter repetition of such conduct."  Id.  Particularly, the Rule describes the permissible sanction in terms of "pay[ment of] a penalty into court, . . . payment to the movant of some or all of the reasonable attorney’s fees and other expenses incurred as a direct result of the violation, or both."  Id.  As a means to ensure the Rule does not become an avenue for the routine award of attorney’s fees, the Rule requires the court, as part of its order, to "describe the conduct determined to be a violation of this rule and explain the basis for the sanction imposed."
[brief] 24  INDEX TO APPENDIX  VOL. I Indictment No. [...]  Pa1  Notice of Motion to Suppress  Pa3  Trial Court Order Granting Defendant’s Motion to Suppress, dated August 14, 2024 Pa4  Trial Court’s Decision Granting Defendant’s Motion to Suppress, Dated August 24, 2024 Pa5  Transcript of [...], dated November 4, 2022  Pa26  Miranda Form Pa130  Flash Drive Containing Video of [...]’s November 4, 2022 Statement
[brief] Q  …  Do you know your brother [...] have any Chinese names?  A  Yes.  Q  What is that?  A  [...].  (Trial Tr., Jan. 5, 2023, Pg. 116, Ln. 13 – 17)  Q  There is another name, [...].  Whose name is [...]?  A  My brother.  (Trial Tr., Jan. 9, 2023, Pg. 55, Ln. 23 – 25)  Was [...], also known as [...], present at the time the deed was signed?
[brief] [...] falsely claimed that the landlines at the Prosecutor’s Office were recorded thereby creating an environment to elicit additional incriminating statements from defendant.  (3T:6-1 to 8-11).  As well as the trial court failing to properly consider the many times Lt. [...] advised defendant not to talk about the case to his parents.  Ibid.  The State argued that the trial court must reconsider its decision not to admit defendant’s statements during to phone calls at trial because of the court’s erroneous factual findings.
[brief] B. May 7, 2011  Armed  Robbery  On August 23, 2011, a Mercer County Grand Jury returned Indictment Number [...], charging defendant with robbery, first degree, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1 (Count I); theft by unlawful taking, third degree, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:20-3a (Count II); aggravated assault, fourth degree, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1b(1) (Count III); terroristic threats, third degree, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:12-3a (Count IV); possession of a firearm for an unlawful purpose, second degree, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4a (Count V); unlawful possession of a handgun, second degree, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5b (Count VI); possession of a defaced firearm, fourth degree, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:39-3d (Count VII); theft by receiving stolen property, third degree, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:20-7a (Count VIII); unlawful taking of a means of conveyance, fourth degree, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:20-10d (Count X).
[brief] This course of conduct should not be permitted, according to the doctrine of laches.  “Laches is an equitable doctrine, operating as an affirmative defense that precludes relief when there is an ‘unexplainable and inexcusable delay" in exercising a right, which results in prejudice to another party. ”  Fox v. Millman, 210 N.J. 401, 417 (2012) (citations and quotations omitted).  It is an equitable remedy that has been described as “an equitable defense that may be interposed in the absence of the statute of limitations.
[brief] They primarily rely on *In re Actavis Holdco U.S., Inc.*, 2019 WL 8437021, at *1 (3d Cir. Dec. 6, 2019) (Da210), but that case does Plaintiffs more harm than good.  In *Actavis*, the Third Circuit expressly reserved the question at issue here—i.e., whether a district court’s order requiring the production of all documents that hit on search terms “constituted an abuse of discretion”—because “such an error would not support mandamus relief. ”  *Id.*
[directive] Public Health Information Sharing with First Responders Laboratory reports a New Jersey resident who tested positive for COVID-19  A case is created in the [...]  Address is [...] missing  The case is assigned to the local health department (LHD) where [...] contacts  ONGOING the person resides lab or physician LHD contacts every new Person reports COVID-19 positive case to staying at a new confirm address and identify address contacts  [...] compiles information** from CDRSS for all LHDs in the county [...] receives information from [...]
[brief] The jury selection process employed by the Court violated the constitutional guarantee to a jury pool that was representative of a cross-section of the community which did not categorically dismiss people without establishing cause.  Specifically, *State v. Williams*, 171 N.J. 151, 170 (2002) states:  Jury service is a civic duty that each individual owes to the community.  *Silagy*, supra, 101 N.J. Super. at 461, 244 A.2d 542.  Financial hardship associated with jury duty is an issue best resolved before the jury is sworn, and ordinarily it is.  **But a jury of one's peers requires inclusion of all members of the community, excluding no socio-economic group from potential service. **  Daily wage earners, or others who cannot serve on a jury for long because of salary or wage deprivation, **may not be excluded categorically. **  (Emphasis added).  As such, the jury selection process in the case at bar unconstitutionally categorically excluded hundreds of jurors without further inquiry.
[brief] [...] had autism, went to a school for children with special needs, still slept in the bed with his parents and was wholly immature.  Moreover, the State’s argument that [...] joking about masturbation as a substitute for his girlfriend, is evidence that he had some knowledge on the level of his 16-year-old compatriots is absurd.  The context of the conversation was that he was being interrogated by two Detectives after killing four family members for no reason.  The argument that a typical 16-year-old would make a masturbation joke under those circumstances is preposterous.  Furthermore, [...] spent a large part of the interrogation talking about hallucinations.  The State’s Detective did not dispute the fact that [...] had autism and went to a special school for kids with disabilities.  (1T:3-17 to 91-12).  The fact that [...] could answer a leading question and say that he knew that stealing was wrong, does not mean that he understood his Miranda rights and knowingly waived them.  Thus, this should weigh against a finding that [...]’s waiver was knowing, intelligent and voluntary.
[brief] **The proximity of the date on which the party sought arbitration to the date of trial;**  No trial date was assigned in this matter as of the date of the motion to compel arbitration, although the discovery period had expired.  Regardless, [...] waited over 400 days after the Complaint was filed before seeking arbitration.  (7)  **The resulting prejudice suffered by the other party, if any.**  [...] made every effort to obtain discovery from [...] only to be stifled at nearly every turn.  Indeed, [...] is still awaiting the discovery which was the subject of [...]’s Motion to Compel Discovery as well as access to the Property for a site inspection by [...]’s expert.  [...]’s prejudice in this matter flows in part from the dozens of hours wasted seeking the same discovery time after time from [...] (which has not been received to date), opposing frivolous motions, and proving the existence of a contract which, by his own admission and according to the testimony of his friend and construction site manager, [...] personally drafted.  To allow Scarbrough to compel arbitration at this stage of litigation would be inherently inequitable to [...].
[directive] County may the similar waived DCJ be by inquiry, tactical legal if, after are personnel senior staff designee, reasonable their or other the execution of particularized for the warrant, urgency is and there unavailable, execute personnel are available trained warrant.  to properly the prosecutor execution of executing a C. no-knock warrant, the After review.  Subse~►uent official Prosecutor's the the to Office the County approving report back will at agency County information operation within that hours.  provided, of on based the If 48 the results General's greater issues that identifies Attorney or Office Prosecutor's warrant  Office Office shall Prosecutor's executing request, the the County furnish to upon agency review, to the warrant body-worn execution during created for review camera footage relevant all this with Directive.
[brief] Further, there is no direct and unavoidable conflict between the application of the CFA and the regulatory scheme governing insurance producers, like Defendants.  Tellingly, Defendants did not argue to the contrary before the trial court.  More importantly, the trial court did not consider or rely upon any potential conflict between the CFA and the NJIPL Act and the regulations in making its decision.  Thus, this issue and its potential application to Defendants’ exemption from CFA liability under Shaw is not presented in this appeal.
[brief] [...]’s motions for reconsideration informed the trial court of: (1) issues of material fact that precluded summary judgment; (2) [...]’s own liability under the Spill Act as a “responsible party,” by having allowed [...] to park/store trailer-mounted intermodals containing waste oil on property without a mandatory spill containment system; (3) pre-existing contamination at the property, which made [...]’s cleanup and remediation more expensive; and (4) issues regarding the chemical composition of the spilled oil.  The February 23, 2024 “final judgment” against [...] was premature and incorrect: [...] had never made a claim against [...], such that there was no cause of action as to which a judgment against [...] could have been entered.