ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] On March 29, 2011, a Gloucester Township police officer noticed a car matching the description of a vehicle reported to have been involved in an incident unrelated to the crimes involved in this matter.  The officer turned his patrol vehicle around to follow the car, which pulled onto the shoulder of the road.  The officer saw a man exit the car via the passenger door and run away.  The officer approached and questioned the driver, who claimed not to know the name of the person who had fled his car.  The officer called for backup, and responding officers were able to apprehend the fleeing suspect. \(^2\)  As officers tracked the suspect, they found two handguns.  They later discovered that the vehicle from which the man had fled had been stolen six months earlier.  Another robbery took place on April 3, 2011 in Gloucester Township.  Arriving at his home, a man was confronted by two men wearing masks who demanded he open his safe, from which the men took money.  The two men then tied the hands of the man, his fiancée, his daughter, and his son, transported the two adults into the bathroom, and placed them into the bathtub.  After warning the victims not to move for five minutes, the two men left the home.  [Cuff, 239 N.J. at 330-31.]  B.
[brief] The Complaint in this action, filed on February 14, 2022, asserts claims against [...] for (i) fraud, (ii) breach of contract and the covenant of good faith and fair dealing and (iii) breach of lease and unlawful self-help.  Notably, Appellants’ claims in this action arise out of the very same transactions and occurrences litigated for 2½ years before the trial court in the prior action that Appellants commenced in March 2019.  [...] was a defendant in that prior action, but ultimately dismissed for Appellants’ failure to state a claim against it.  Additionally, the claims asserted herein, as Appellants acknowledge, are identical to those they previously unsuccessfully sought leave to assert against [...] in that prior action.  In the instant matter, after a detailed analysis of the procedural history of the prior action, the trial court correctly concluded that the claims asserted in this lawsuit could have, and should have, been asserted in the prior action.
[brief] Conclusion ……………………………………………………………………………………..  40  TABLE OF CONTENTS OF DEFENDANTS’ APPENDIX ON APPEAL  Color copies of Exhibit 22 to Certification of [...] in support of defendants’ motion for summary judgment, filed in the Chancery Division under TRANS ID [...] on January 5, 2024 (appended in black and white at Pa276-78) ……………………………………………………………………………Da1-3 TABLE OF TRIAL TRANSCRIPTS Transcript of Oral Argument of Defendants’ Motion for Summary judgment, dated ……………………………………………………………….. T | Cases | Page(s) | |-------------------------------------------|--------------------------| | Biondi v. Citigroup, Inc., | 34-36 | | 423 N.J. Super. 377 (App. Div. 2011) | | | Buckelew v. Grossbard, | 27-28 | | 87 N.J. 512 (1981) | | | Burke v. Briggs, | 32 | | 239 N.J. Super. 269 (App. Div. 1990) | | | Cortes v. Gindhart, | 30 | | 435 N.J. Super. 589 (App. Div. 2014) | | | Davis v. Brickman Landscaping, Ltd., | 22 | | 219 N.J. 395 (2014) | | | Dawson v. Bunker Hill Plaza Assocs., | 22, 25 | | 289 N.J. Super. 309 (app. Div. 1996) | | | Dunn v. Duso, | 39 | | 219 N.J. Super. 383 (Law Div. 1986) | | | Endre v. Arnold, | 25 | | 300 N.J. Super. 136 (App. Div. 1997) | | | First Union Nat’l Bank v. Penn Salem Marina, Inc., | 35-38 | | 190 N.J. 342 (2007) | | | Goodman v. Fair Law Garden Assocs., Inc., | 38 | | 253 N.J. Super. 299 (App. Div. 1992) | | | Hennesy v. Winslow Twp., | 36 | | 183 N.J. 593 (2005) | | | Kieffer v. Best Buy, | 21-22 | | 205 N.J. 213 (2011) | | | Konop v. Rosen, | 29 | | 425 N.J. Super. 391 (App. Div. 2012) | | | Olivieri v. Y.M.F. Carpet, Inc. | 37 | | 186 N.J. 511 (2006) | | Petro-Lubricant Testing Labs. v. Adelman, 447 N.J. Super. 391 (App. Div. 2016) ..................................................
[brief] The testimony of those Troopers is not relevant to the issue under appeal, i.e. the installation of the GPS device on the Tahoe and the two months of tracking of that vehicle.  Identification of the exhibits and their entry into evidence may be found at 2T49-17 to 51-13 of the November 1, 2023 transcript.  The Court’s Bench Opinion after the completion of testimony on November 1, 2023 may be found at 2T65-23 to 77-8.  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I
[brief] Astoundingly, on pages 31-33 of her Appellate Brief, [...] ignores that her own witness from the [...] law firm, [...], Esq., credibly testified that [...] was represented by independent counsel [...], Esq. in the bankruptcy.  And the trial court found [...]’s assertions about [...] in the matrimonial matter were undermined by the explicit language of the PSA.  The trial court’s findings concerning counsel were correct, based on competent evidence such as retainer agreements and the witness testimony:  The court also gives minimal weight to defendant’s assertions that she believed [...] represented her as to the financial affairs of the parties and that [...] represented her in the divorce matter.  The court finds [...]’s testimony to be credible.  He admitted that the written retainer agreement in evidence was drafted and executed in error due to its inclusion of defendant.  His testimony that he never had any conversations or contact with defendant as to the financial issues or as part of the bankruptcy and that she signed a retainer agreement with [...] are found to be credible.  The court finds that the preponderance of the evidence shows that an attorney-client relationship was not established between defendant and [...].  Defendant could not even clearly recollect any meetings or substantive discussions she had with [...] concerning any legal financial issue.  The clear evidence supports [...]’s position that the signed retainer agreement was an error and that he never engaged in any representation of defendant’s legal interests.  His claim is further supported by the evidence showing defendant retained [...], Esq. the day before the date of the retainer agreement with [...], billings were sent to her by [...] and emails and communications were made between [...] and [...] concerning the bankruptcy and financial issues which show the clear representation of plaintiff by [...] and defendant by [...].  The court incorporates the same analysis as to defendant’s assertions that she believed [...] represented her in the matrimonial matter.  Initially, the court is confused as to how defendant would believe she was represented by [...] when she is claiming complete ignorance as to the MMA, PSA and FJD.  Again, the clear language in both the MMA and PSA show defendant attested to the fact that [...] represented plaintiff and she was aware of her right to obtain counsel and chose to be unrepresented.  The court finds this assertion by defendant is not credible and holds no weight.  [A229, Op. at 25-26].
[brief] Instead, as we were just about to go back before the court to place the settlement onto the record, [...] had asked me a question about what his employee had said to me, which I answered.  He then indicated that he want to call him and confirm.  But then while [...] was speaking quietly over his cell phone (presumably with his employee), for about a minute or so there was nothing but complete silence from the rest of us, when all of the sudden and completely out of the blue, [...] then wanted to change the deal.  And it was then when I tried to push back on the proposed changes (because we were already in agreement as to everything), that was when [...] started to flip out and become loud and belligerent, calling me a liar, threatening me with perjury, and wanted to rescind our settlement agreement completely.  I was shocked by this, and it appeared to me that both the mediator (who was an attorney) as well as counsel for [...] were equally shocked by this as well.  Even when my sister tried to calmly intervene, he was shouting at her at the top of his lungs, and doing so in a very belligerent unprofessional manner.  Because of his conduct, the mediation session ended without us ever putting a settlement on to the record.
[directive] See N.J.S.A. 2B:12-21c.  Those three areas area as follows:  (1)  The defendant was initially arrested on a complaint-warrant or charged on a complaint-summons for a disorderly persons offense/petty disorderly persons offense prior to January 1, 2017 and the defendant later fails to appear in court and is arrested on or after January 1, 2017 for that failure to appear.  This defendant is not an eligible defendant under the Criminal Justice Reform Law.  Monetary bail may be set upon issuance of the bench warrant or upon arrest for that failure to appear.  The advisory monetary ranges in the Bail Schedules will continue to apply.  (2)  The defendant is initially charged on a complaint-summons for a disorderly persons offense allegedly committed on or after January, 1, 2017 and thereafter fails to appear in court.  Monetary bail may be set upon issuance of the bench warrant or upon arrest for that failure to appear.  The advisory monetary ranges in the Bail Schedules will continue to apply.  This defendant is not an eligible defendant under the Criminal Justice Reform Law because the original charge is on a complaint-summons.  .  (3)  The defendant is charged with a petty disorderly persons offense.  This defendant is not an eligible defendant under the Criminal Justice Reform Law.  Petty disorderly persons offenses are not included in the new law.  As such, the following apply to petty disorderly persons offenses:  Monetary bail may be set on the initial complaint-warrant.  If the defendant later fails to appear in court, monetary bail may be set when the bench warrant is issued or upon arrest for that failure to appear.  If initially released on a complaint-summons and the defendant later fails to appear in court, monetary bail may be set when the bench warrant is issued or upon arrest for that failure to appear.  The advisory monetary ranges in the Bail Schedules will continue to apply to the defendants referenced in this paragraph (3).  Ordinarily, as noted above, the maximum bail in this situation is $2500, unless the judge/judicial officer finds good cause for a higher amount based upon the defendant’s risk of flight/risk of nonappearance in court.  ii  Table of Contents
[brief] 2  “Pa” refers to appellant’s appendix; “Pb” refers to his brief.  3  A Service Retirement is provided for by N.J.S.A. 53:5A-8 for any member who has established twenty years of service in SPRS and also for troopers who were members of the retirement system as of the effective date of L. 1985, c. 175 regardless of their years of service.  A Special Retirement provides enhanced benefits pursuant to N.J.S.A. 53:5A-27 and is available to any SPRS member who has established twenty-five years of creditable service.
[brief] THE EXPERT TESTIMONY OF FORENSIC ANTHROPOLOGIST BIRD REGARDING THE TIMING OF SKELETAL INJURIES WAS PROPERLY QUALIFIED BY THE TRIAL COURT AS GENERALLY RELIABLE UNDER THE FRYE STANDARD AND WAS PROPERLY ADMITTED AT TRIAL.  The appellant argues that Evan [...], a forensic anthropologist and medicolegal death investigator for the [...], who examined the remains of [redacted]'s body and rendered an expert opinion regarding the time at which the child sustained injuries, was not properly qualified by the trial court.  The record below, however, clearly provides adequate evidence that the trial court carefully considered Mr. [...]’s qualifications and the techniques he relied on in rendering his expert opinion.  At the time this case was tried, admission of expert testimony was controlled by the Frye standard, which placed the burden on the proponent of the evidence to clearly establish that the theory or technique has “gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs. ”  State v. J.L.G., 234 N.J. 265, 280 (2018) (citing Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923)).
[brief] [Howard M. Schoor Assocs., Inc. v. Holmdel Heights Const. Co., 68 N.J. 95, 102 (1975). ]  “Whether or not the Statute of Frauds will apply is then to depend upon whether this consideration was Mainly desired for the promisor's benefit or for the benefit of the original debtor. ”  Id. at 105.  Plaintiff’s reliance on the facts of Schoor is misplaced because the facts of Schoor differ substantially from the facts of the instant matter.  In Schoor, the plaintiffs were two engineering and surveying firms who performed professional services for the defendant construction company on a tract of land upon which it was constructing homes.  Id. at 97-99.  The individual defendant was an attorney and a stockholder in the defendant construction company.  Ibid.  After the defendant construction company failed to pay all of the plaintiffs’ bills, the individual defendant personally agreed to pay all outstanding bills.  Ibid.  The Schoor court found that the individual defendant’s promise was not within the Statute of Frauds under the “leading object” exception because the individual defendant guaranteed payment so that the plaintiffs would keep working on the development that he had an interest in as a stockholder of the defendant construction company.  Id. at 100-101.  The individual defendant also induced the plaintiffs to continue their work by leading them to believe he was pledging his personal finances for payment of past and future debt of the defendant construction company.  Id.  Thus, the promise to pay for the defendant construction company’s debts was for the individual defendant’s personal benefit because if the project were successful (which required the plaintiffs’ services), the individual defendant would receive a substantial amount of money, including as a stockholder of the defendant construction company and through payment of his own legal bills by the company.  Id. at 105-106.  The facts of Schoor are inapposite to the facts of the alleged Third Loan.
[directive] 날짜/Date 피고인/Defendant 피고측 변호인/Defense Attorney 검사/Prosecutor 지령 제01-18 호(02/23/2018)에 의거 공포된 양식, 페이지2/2  CN 11728-Korean Form Promulgated by Directive #01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 11728- Korean page 2 of 2  AVISO:  Este é um documento público, o que significa que o documento tal como apresentado estará disponível ao público mediante solicitação.  Portanto, não inclua dados de identificação pessoal, tais como número de Social Security, número da carteira de motorista, número da placa do veículo, número da apólice de seguro, número de conta financeira ativa ou número de cartão de crédito ativo.  NOTICE:  This is a public document, which means the document as submitted will be available to the public upon request.  Therefore, do not enter personal identifiers on it, such as Social Security number, driver’s license number, vehicle plate number, insurance policy number, active financial account number, or active credit card number.
[brief] Finally, the trial court recognized finding a “public interest” and enlarging the forty-five day appeal period on these facts would directly contravene Rocky Hill’s warning that cases like Willoughby “must represent the exception rather than the rule. ”  Rocky Hill, 406 N.J. Super. at 401.  Indeed, enlarging the appeal period in this matter would effectively allow any interested, small sect of the community, dissatisfied with a particular municipal action, to bring a challenge beyond the forty-five day appeal period claiming to represent the “public interest. ”  Far from advancing the public interest, allowing suits to proceed months after the lawful adoption of ordinances injures the public interest because it obstructs local government’s ability to function efficiently, which is the paramount policy goal underlying the limitations period of R. 4:69-6.
[brief] Adopted on February 14, 2024 | Pa8 | | Copy of Ordinance 7-23  Adopted on March 28, 2023 | Pa28 | | Copy of Ordinance 15-23  Adopted on May 9, 2023 | Pa31 | | Copies of Correspondence Forwarded to Property Owners by the Township | Pa35 | | Pages 2, 4, and 12 of Appellant’s Trial Brief | Pa43 | | Copy of Ordinance 26-23  Adopted on August 26, 2023 | Pa46 | | Copy of Order Denying Motion to Stay (Appellate Division) | Pa49 | | Deed of Property | Pa51 |  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
[brief] O Builders at 129-31.  (Emphasis added).  The Court in O Builders found that [...]’s description of the events that occurred were “scant,” “vague,” and failed to show that “the information disclosed during [the] conversation was harmful – much less, significantly harmful,” to her.  Also, a certification submitted by another on her behalf contained “no specifics as to what was said or discussed and that no details, specificity or corroboration thereof” was provided.  In contrast, [...]’s description of events was “detailed” wherein he “adamantly” asserted that [...] “showed no privileged or confidential information,” reasoning that the discussions “did not require such information. ”  The Court also stated that the attorney denied “anything further of substance was discussed. ”  Also, the Court found that the matters were not the same or substantially related.  *O Builders* at 129-31.
[brief] [...] also effectively seeks to relitigate the viability of an [...] “Position Statement” upon which [...] relied.  Pb22.  This Statement, which was marked as exhibit 16 during the underlying [...] deposition, says that it is “not to be considered to reflect current [...] standards or policy” after February 2006.  Da1597.  A scholarly article that questioned and criticized the [...] Position Statement was marked as exhibit 17 at the [...] deposition.  Da1597-98.  \(^7\)
[brief] (2T6-24 to 6-25)  Two days later, [...] issued an order/opinion denying Defendant’s motion to modify his sentence.  (Da1-Da2)  The Judge cited N.J.S.A. 39:4-50 which states, in relevant part:  If the driving privilege of any person is under revocation or suspension for a violation of any provision of this Title or Title 2C of the New Jersey Statutes at the time of any conviction for a violation of this section, the revocation or suspension period imposed shall commence as of the date of termination of the existing revocation or suspension period.  The Judge thus found Defendant’s sole argument – that suspension of his driver’s license should have run concurrently as opposed to consecutively – “runs contrary to the plain language of the statute. ”  (Da1)  [...] concluded:  Defendant takes issue with regard to a statement made by [...] during sentencing as [...] said that the 10-year license suspension he was imposing ran ‘ten years from today. ’  It is apparent [...] misspoke.  To the extent [...] may have meant what he said, his sentence would have run contrary to the statute and would have constituted an illegal sentence.  An illegal sentence simply cannot stand.
[brief] Unopposed: X Bencosme v. Kannankara Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division  February 23, 2016, Argued; March 22, 2016, Decided DOCKET NO. [...]  Reporter 2016 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 614  *  [...], Plaintiff-Appellant, v. [...], Defendant-Respondent.  Notice: NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION.  PLEASE CONSULT NEW JERSEY RULE 1:36-3 FOR CITATION OF UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS.
[brief] (Pb11).  Nor do the equities weigh in his favor.  The Board found on the basis of undisputed facts that notice was sent to [...], that information regarding the Ricci Act was available to him through the Division’s website and publications, and that he had sufficient time to file his Eligibility Registration Form within the statutory period.  Thus, contrary to [...]’s contention, (Pb14), there was ample evidence for the Board to reasonably conclude that he failed to demonstrate good cause, reasonable grounds, and reasonable diligence to warrant consideration of his application well beyond the statutory deadline.  (Pa14).  Finally, [...]’s argument and reference to a different applicant is misplaced.  (Pb15).  That applicant asserts that he attempted to file his Eligibility Registration Form but was told he was ineligible because he was not currently sick.  (Pb15; Pa120-122).  But those facts are not in the record before this court.  Because those applicant’s assertions are irrelevant to [...]’s appeal as they deal with an entirely different set of circumstances never alleged by [...], they should be disregarded.  CONCLUSION
[directive] 2.  Subject to the authorization process in Section II.D.3 below, the Independent Investigator can share investigative information with other law enforcement personnel only under the following circumstances:  a.  The Independent Investigator may provide updates on the status of the investigation to the leadership of the County Prosecutor’s Office where the LE Incident occurred, as well as the law enforcement executive in the municipality where the LE Incident occurred, so that these officials may address or prepare for any public safety concerns in that county, provided that they do not share the information publicly or with other law enforcement personnel; or b.  Any other circumstance where the Independent Investigator concludes that the dissemination of investigative information would serve the public interest.  Page 9
[brief] The Trial Court’s Order Infringes on the Core Role of a Responding Party to Determine How to Meet Its Own Preservation and Production Obligations.  The New Jersey discovery rules, like the federal rules, require each party to fulfill its discovery obligations without the court or opposing counsel dictating the methodology it uses.  See R. 4:18-1(b) (providing procedure by which a responding party shall respond to document requests); accord Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(b)(2).  Rule 4:18-1 does not specify the methodology by which the responding party shall produce the requested information.  See R. 4:18-1(b)(2) (“Procedure for Response”).  Rather, the responding party must either object to the request or produce “the requested documents,” along with a certification that such production “is complete and accurate. ”  Id.  “Thus, Rule 4:18-1 anticipates that in civil discovery the responding party will produce responsive electronic data….”
[brief] 21 Rodd v. Raritan Radiologic Associates, P.A., 373 N.J. Super. 154 (App. Div. 2004)............................. 42, 47 Schaublin v. Leber, 50 N.J. Super. 506 (App. Div. 1958) ..............................  17  Shepherd v. Hunterdon Dev. Ctr., 174 N.J. 1 (N.J. 2002) ..................................................  34  Spray-Rite Service Corp. v. Monsanto Co., 684 F.2d 1226 (7th Cir.1982).......................................  48  Spedick v. Murphy, 266 N.J. Super. 573 (App. Div.) .................................  42 State v. Bogen, 13 N.J. 137 (1953) ......................................................  41 State v. Bueso, 225 N.J. 193 (2016) ....................................................  8 State v. C.W.H., 465 N.J. Super. 574 (App. Div. 2021) ........................... 8 State v. Loftin, 146 N.J. 295 (1996) ....................................................  41 State v.  Reddish, 181 N.J. 553 (2004) ....................................................  41 State v. Ross, 229 N.J. 389 (2017) ....................................................
[brief] N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1b(11).  Defendant’s reliance on his statement in the presentence report that “being incarcerated is not beneficial to his mental health” falls rather short of that standard.  (PSR, p. 10); see State v. Dalziel, 182 N.J. 494, 505 (2005) (rejecting application of mitigating factor 11 because the defendant “offered no evidence to show that the length of his sentence would be an ‘excessive hardship’ on him. ”).  No more successful is defendant’s argument that [...] erred by considering defendant’s prior endangering conviction when imposing a maximum term of imprisonment in this matter and in having the sentence run consecutively to defendant’s sentence for the endangering conviction.