ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Defendant [...] was never interviewed regarding the most recent complaint about her for harassment related to the June 2020 incident with Plaintiff.  (Pa667).  Despite receiving multiple complaints, [...] was never interviewed regarding Defendant [...]’s harassment.  (Pa667).  Defendant [...] combined the two investigations, interviewing members of the staffing department about Defendant [...]’s behavior and the charge pay issues together.  (Pa107.)  Defendant [...] permitted Defendant [...] to be present for interviews during the investigation.  (Pa109 – Pa110).  [...] was interviewed with Defendant [...] present.  (Pa667).  Defendant [...] ultimately advised her supervisor, [...], that the incident with Plaintiff was out of character for Defendant [...].  (Pa667).  During the same conversation, [...] inquired about the “charge pay” investigation.  (Pa667).  D.  Plaintiff is Terminated in Retaliation for Protected Activity.
[brief] For all of the foregoing reasons, defendant, [...], Esq., respectfully requests that this Court affirm the final order of the Law Division granting summary judgment in all respects.  [...]  Attorneys for Defendant, [...], Esq.  By: /s/ [...]  [...], Esq.  [...], Esq.  Dated: December 12, 2023  January 22, 2024  VIA ECOURT APPELLATE  Clerk, Superior Court of New Jersey  Appellate Division  Richard J. Hughes Justice Complex  P.O. Box 006 Trenton, New Jersey 08625-0970  RE: [...], Executor of [...] and [...], Individually, v. Arthur Balsamo, Esq.  Trial Court Docket No.: [...]  Appellate Docket No.: [...]  Dear Honorable Judges of the Appellate Division:
[brief] The following is a list prepared by the court reporter at pp. 4-6 of [...]’s deposition in the underlying case (Da1564) of “chronic exposure” materials that were included among the exhibits about which he was asked, but that he had not previously seen or reviewed (showing deposition transcript page numbers):  Ex-30.  The Putative Role of Viruses, Bacteria, and Chronic Fungal Biotoxin Exposure in the Genesis of Intractable Fatigue Accompanied by Cognitive and Physical Disability, 22 pages, June 17, 2015 [pg. 175]  Ex-31.  Development of New-Onset Chronic Inflammatory Demyelinating Polyneuropathy Following Exposure to a Water- Damaged Home with High Airborne Mold Levels: A Report of Two Cases and a Review of the Literature, four pages, 2017 [pg. 178]  Ex-32.  Detection of Mycotoxins in Patients with Chronic Fatigue Syndrome, 13 pages, 4-11-13 [pg. 182]  Ex-33.  Chronic Illness Associated with Mold and Mycotoxins: Is Naso-Sinus Fungal Biofilm the Culprit?  Two pages, 12-24-13 [pg. 184]  The jury in the underlying case would have seen these exhibits; would have heard the testimony of [...], [...]’s expert, acknowledging that he had not reviewed them; and would have heard the testimony of [...].
[brief] Instead of being placed in the appropriate sub-acute unit where he would have access to superior care, [...] was shunted off to the overflow unit where long-term care residents were housed.  7T110:2-14.  That unit did not have registered nurses (RNs) administering to patients; only licensed practical nurses (LPNs), who do not have the same education and training as registered nurses.  5T66:16-67:10; 5T74:2-22.  No individualized care plan was in place for [...]’s extensive respiratory care needs.  Out of a 28-page care plan, only one page had anything to do with [...]’s respiratory care.  5T82:1-8.  The care plan did not meet the nursing standard of care.  5T86:23-87:1.  No appropriate assessments by a registered nurse were done.  5T75:10-13.  Doctors orders were not followed.  5T102:25-103:1.  Defendant’s own policies on suctioning were not followed.  5T102:7-14.  Most damaging of all, [...] did not get the level of respiratory care that he needed.
[brief] In that remand hearing, both the form and substance of the notice may be examined.  (pp. 19-23)  _In re State & Sch. Emples. Health Benefits Commissions' Implementation of Yucht_, 233 N.J. 267, 270.  (Emphasis added).  In the within matter, adding information to a website cannot be construed as notice of the Ricci Act’s enactment or the requirements to register within a certain timeframe.  The statute required the Board to promulgate rules to provide notice to active and retired members of the State Police Retirement System.  The Certifying Officer Letter is proof that the website posting is not sufficient notice.  Pa76.  The notice of the Ricci Act to the Certifying Officers advises the Certifying Officers that they must distribute the information to employees pursuant to _N.J.A.C. 17:5-1.4_.  It also required that the Certifying Officers to provide a certification that the information was distributed.  The Respondent claims that the mailing of the postcard to a correct address establishes a _presumption_ that the postcard was received.  This presumption is rebutted by the fact that [...] and 98 others certified via affidavits that they did not receive said postcard.  Additionally, the claim that postcards were mailed out to all “200,647 SPRS retirees” is a misstatement of fact.  Rb13.  New Jersey State Troopers are assigned a badge number upon successful completion of the academy and these badge numbers are never repeated.  Currently, the New Jersey State Police badge numbers only reach the 9,000s; meaning that in the entire history of the New Jersey State Police, there are less than 10,000 New Jersey State Troopers, which includes all active or retired members of the State Police Retirement System.  Failure to provide any notice, adequate or actual, is reasonable and equitable grounds for relaxing the deadline for registration under the Ricci Act.
[brief] [...], Current N.J. Court Rules, cmt. 2.2.1 on R. 4:9-1 (2024)  ...........................................................................................................  17  [...], Absolute Immunity from Civil Liability: Lessons for Litigation Lawyers, 31 Pepp. L. Rev. 915, 928 (2004)  ...........................................................................................................  31  COUNTERSTATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[brief] 9  STATEMENT OF FACTS  10  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I THE TRIAL COURT HEARD AND ENTERED  A DECISION ON THE SUMMARY  JUDGMENT MOTIONS  DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE RECORD WAS INCOMPLETE AND AS A RESULT OF THIS, THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT DECISION SHOULD BE VACATED WITH THIS MATTER REMANDED TO THE TRIAL COURT FOR COMPLETION OF THE REMAINING WORK IN THIS MATTER Pa115, Pa144 14 POINT II THE TRIAL COURT ACKNOWLEDGED IN THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT DECISION THAT THE COURT IS NOT TO ENGAGE IN WEIGHING OF THE EVIDENCE AND THEN PROCEEDED TO ENGAGE IN WEIGHING THE EVIDENCE AS WELL AS DISCOUNTING OF THE EVIDENCE TO THE APPELLANT’S DETRIMENT  Pa113, Pa144 21 TABLE OF CONTENTS
[brief] [...], United States Magistrate Judge:  *1  The parties inform the Court of three pending discovery disputes that require the Court’s guidance:  (1) the assertion by [...] and [...] that documents and communications between them are protected by the common interest doctrine; (2) the assertion by Higgins and Merchants that documents and communications exchanged by and between them and (i) [...], (ii) [...], (iii) [...], (iv) [...], and (v) the [...], are protected by the consulting expert privilege; and (3) the parties’ negotiation of an electronically stored information (“ESI”) protocol.  (ECF No. 42 (Ltr.).  The Court addresses each of these issues below.
[brief] Next, Plaintiff argues that the failure to produce an expert report should be excused under the doctrine of substantial compliance.  Substantial compliance is an equitable doctrine designed to apply when a party meets the spirit of the law in question, but falls short of full compliance due to a technical misstep.  *Sroczynski v. Milek*, 197 N.J. 36, 44 (2008).  The doctrine’s limitations—to correct for technical failures to strictly comply with the law in those occasions when it was complied with in spirit—is well established in the law.
[directive] See Attachment 4.  Directive #08- 21 April 7, 2021  Page 4  The court administrator will enter a sealing code in the automated complaint system to mark the case sealed which will suppress the record from public access.  Information concerning the system code has been sent to the courts under separate cover.  The statute also requires notice that the matter has been sealed to be sent to: (1) the Attorney General, county prosecutor, or municipal prosecutor handling the case; and (2) the State Police and any local law enforcement agency having custody of the files and records.  For criminal convictions and juvenile adjudications, to satisfy this requirement, the prosecuting attorney will have access to the Judgment of Conviction and Juvenile Disposition Order in the eCourts case jacket.  Until such time as similar functionality is available in municipal eCourts, Municipal Court staff will provide the court order to the Municipal Court prosecutor.  Court staff will forward this information electronically to the State Police and will also provide it to the law enforcement agencies that were involved with the case.  Questions regarding this Directive, or the appended forms should be directed to the Criminal Practice Division at [...], Family Practice Division at [...] or Municipal Court Services Division at [...].
[directive] Factor #1b applies where the offense occurred in a drug-free park, public housing, or public building zone in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7.1.  By adoption of this law, which creates a second-degree crime, the Legislature emphasized the importance of protecting these areas from drug-distribution activities.  This Aggravating Factor would not apply if the drug-free park, public housing, or public building zone exists solely by reason of the presence of a library, playground, or recreational facility that is owned by a school.  This Aggravating Factor would apply, however, if the offense occurred at a location that falls within both a drug- free school zone and drug-free park zone, provided that school property was not used to establish the existence or boundaries of the drug-free zone created pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7.1.  Page 69
[directive] Agencies are not required to purge their records at the intervals outlined above, and may adopt longer retention schedules if such schedules benefit the agency.  In the case of internal affairs investigative records, longer retention times will provide agencies with the resources and evidence necessary to assist with defending civil lawsuits.  9.4.3  While the internal affairs records of other types of law enforcement agencies are not yet specified by the Division of Archives and Records Management, it would be appropriate for all law enforcement agencies to follow essentially the same retention schedule.  55  INTERNAL AFFAIRS POLICY & PROCEDURES | August 2020
[directive] At the same time, however, unnecessarily or prematurely drawing a firearm could limit an officer’s options in controlling a situation, could create greater anxiety on the part of citizens, and may result in an unwarranted or accidental discharge of the firearm.  (a)  Pointing a firearm.  Consistent with training, officers may point a firearm at a person only when circumstances create a reasonable belief that it may be necessary for the officer to use deadly force.
[brief] THE CHANCERY COURT PROPERLY DENIED DR. ONDIK’S FIRST APPLICATION FOR A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION.  (Ra4-118)  [...]’s initial application for a preliminary injunction failed to demonstrate the “Crowe” factors necessary to obtain a preliminary injunction: 1) likelihood of success on the merits; 2) irreparable harm; 3) balancing of the equities.  _Crowe v DiGoia_, 90 N.J. 126, 132 (1989).  However, “declaratory judgment is not an appropriate way to discern the rights or status of parties upon a state of facts that are future, contingent or uncertain. ”  _Independent Realty Co. v. Twp. of North Bergen_, 376 N.J. Super. 295, 302 (App. Div. 2005).  The Court will not decide “in advance the validity of a possible [claim or] defense in some expected future lawsuit.  _Id._ (citing _Donadio v. Cunningham_, 58 N.J. 309, 325 (1971)).  At the time that [...] brought his initial application for a preliminary injunction, he was still employed with the Practice, which had not taken any steps to enforce the Restrictive Covenant.  [...] was attempting to manufacture the _Crowe_ standards to protect his own planned breach of contract, not based on anything that the Practice had done or was planning to do.  The Chancery Court denied [...]’s application, without prejudice, because it was not yet ripe.  [...] apparently does not challenge that finding despite having moved for reconsideration and then filing an appeal.  As set forth below, even if [...]’s first application had been ripe, it still would have failed on the merits.  POINT IV
[brief] (1T145 to 1T151, passim).  Meanwhile [...] used his patrol car computer to check federal databases to see if [...] had a criminal record, learning that she had been “arrested” in the past for “manufacture and delivery” of a CDS.  (1T28-21 to 22).  During this time, he continued to question her about what she was “hauling” in the “duffel bags,” and interpreting her response of “nothing,” as a “denial of the existence...of the duffel bags...” (1T27-23 to 24; 1T62-14 to 21).  He asked how much she was being paid to help [...] drive to New York.  When she responded, “Paid to drive?”, [...] said Yeah.  They’re paying you to haul that marijuana out there...  I guarantee you there’s marijuana in... those duffel bags...” (1T160-8 to 11 [emphasis added]).
[brief] Id.  Respondents fail to assert why Torres does not apply to the instant case, and instead seek to apply case law that deals with parent corporations and subsidiaries, which is clearly distinguishable from the instant matter.  See Rb26.  Here, the Trial Court admitted that it did not have enough information to value [...] and required an expert.  Aa41-42.  Despite this, the Trial Court somehow determined [...]’ membership interest was de minimus.  Aa41.  This alone displays how the Trial Court gravely erred in not abiding by clear precedent which required it to appoint an independent expert to assess [...]’ membership interest of [...].
[brief] Order entered by the Hon. Judge [...], J.S.C., decided on October 23, 2023, and filed October 23, 2023, Docket [...] “Order 1 of 2” being appealed herein .  . . . . . .  Da1  Order entered by the Hon. Judge [...], J.S.C., decided on October 23, 2023, and filed October 23, 2023, Docket [...] “Order 2 of 2” being appealed herein.  . . . . . . . . . . . .  Da4  Orders entered by the Hon. Judge [...], J.S.C., decided on November 3, 2023, and filed November 3, 2023, Docket [...] being appealed herein . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Da6 Statement of Reasons [...] v. [...] 1 of 2 ([...]) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Da10 Statement of Reasons [...] v. [...] 2 of 2 ([...]) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Da19 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CASES AAA Mid-Atlantic Ins. of N.J. v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 336 N.J. Super. 71 (App. Div. 2000) . . . . . .Db31,32,33
[brief] This Court may also consider re-assignment to a different judge in the Law Division since a definitive opinion on Plaintiff's position was expressed.  Respectfully submitted, [...]  [...]  Superior Court of New Jersey  Appellate Division Docket No. [...]  [...], : CIVIL ACTION : ON APPEAL FROM AN Plaintiff-Appellant, : ORDER OF THE : SUPERIOR COURT : OF NEW JERSEY, vs. : LAW DIVISION, : MIDDLESEX COUNTY [...], : DOCKET NO. [...] : Sat Below: Defendant-Respondent.
[brief] D’Andrea v. NJ Civil Service Commission, GRC 2014-153.  .............8, 18, 19 Beggiato v. Twp. of Hillsborough, GRC 2017-144.  ...........................8, 19 Wolosky v. Somerset Cty., 2017 WL 1179852 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Mar. 30, 2017).  ..............................................................................7, 8, 19 Rise Against Hate v. Cherry Hill Township, A-1440-21, 2023 WL 2670720, at *1 (N.J. Super. App. Div. Mar. 29, 2023).  .................................8, 19, 20, 28  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS, AND RULINGS  April 13, 2022  Consent Order to Consolidate  ........................................Da063  May 26, 2022  Order Granting Order to Show Cause ...............................Da070  July 1, 2022  Order Denying [...]’s Motion for Reconsideration ......Da128 July 21, 2022  Consent Order .................................................................Da148 March 28, 2023  Order Fixing Compensation ........................................Da180  TRANSCRIPTS
[brief] The trial court did not apply the correct legal standard in excluding the diagram.  Accordingly, its decision in respect of the admissibility of the diagram is not entitled to deference.  Villanueva, 431 N.J. Super. 301.  In State v. LaBrutto, 114 N.J. 187 (1989), the New Jersey Supreme Court concluded, “We find no reason why an investigating police officer should not be allowed to testify as a non-expert based on his own observations regarding the point of impact of two vehicles in an automobile accident case. ”  Id. at 199.  The Court specifically rejected the contention that only a qualified accident reconstruction expert may offer such testimony.  Moreover, the Supreme Court’s subsequent decision in Neno v. Clinton, 167 N.J. 573, 585 (2001), merely holds that a testifying police officer may not offer a lay opinion that is based on inadmissible hearsay statements and does not justify the trial court’s ruling.
[brief] “Any dispute regarding the recovery of medical expense benefits or other benefits provided under personal injury protection coverage . . . arising out of the operation, ownership, maintenance or use of an automobile may be submitted to dispute resolution on the initiative of any party to the dispute. ”  N.J.S.A. 39:6A-5.1(a).  The statute also expressly mandates arbitration for claims including: “whether the treatment or health care service which is the subject of the dispute resolution proceeding is in accordance with” applicable law; “eligibility of the treatment or service for compensation”; “eligibility of the provider performing the treatment or service to be compensated under the terms of the policy or under regulations promulgated by the commissioner”; “whether the disputed medical treatment was actually performed”; “the necessity or appropriateness of consultations by other health care providers”; “disputes involving application of and adherence to fee schedules”; and “whether the treatment performed is reasonable, necessary, and compatible with the protocols provided. ”  N.J.S.A. 39:6A-5.1(c).
[brief] (Pa000121).  As explained in the letter, the February 2021 email showed that the final site plan was drafted in accordance with Plaintiffs’ wishes before any of the proposed improvements to the Property could take place, and Plaintiffs were warned of any issues that may arise from their decision to retain their half of Church Lane.  (Id.).  Additionally, in the safe harbor letter, [...] warned Plaintiffs that there was “absolutely no support for any ‘common knowledge’ negligence claim[s] against [...],” as “[a] jury is not capable of interpreting professional plans or understanding an engineer’s duty of care in the context of this project without expert testimony. ” (Id.).  This was especially true in light of the fact that both the city planner and an independent engineer approved the plans.  (Id.).  Finally, Plaintiffs were advised that any trespass was attributable to co-defendants, per interrogatory responses provided by the other parties to the litigation.  (Id.).  Because of this, Plaintiffs could not sustain any sort of common knowledge negligence or trespass claims against [...], and they were advised to release [...] from the litigation within twenty-eight days of service of the letter or risk sanctions under New Jersey rules and statutes governing frivolous litigation.
[brief] See In re Civ. Commitment of D.L., 351 N.J. Super. 77, 85, 797 A.2d 166, 171 (App. Div. 2002) (“[T]he New Jersey Court Rules do not provide for appointment of counsel on appeal for any other matter [other than criminal cases].”).  Though trial courts may appoint an attorney for a pro se plaintiff in a civil matter under certain circumstances – such appointment is limited to specific cases such as appointment of counsel for children in cases where custody is at issue.  See e.g., N.J. R. Ch. Div. Fam. Pt. R. 5:8A.  CONCLUSION
[directive] [아니요/No]  등록 요건이 귀하가 감옥에서  석방 되었거나  사회 내에 존재하고 있다는 기관, 단체, 것을 법 집행 사회 또는 일반 대중에게 통고할 수도 있다는 것을 아십니까?  Do you understand that the requirement of registration may result in notification to law enforcement, community organizations, or the public at large, of your release from incarceration or presence in the community?
[brief] *Cox*, 138 N.J. at 23.  The fact that the [...] did not pay this unlawful amount demanded, but instead chose to fight the same in Court, does not mean that the charge is not an ascertainable loss.  *Id.* at 22; see also N.J.S.A. 56:8-19 (“Any person who suffers any ascertainable loss…may bring an action or assert a counterclaim thereof in any court of competent jurisdiction. ”).  The amount demanded by [...] through the Chargeback provision is based on conduct that violates the CFA, specifically charging back the rent concession.  *Cox*, 138 N.J. at 23.  Although not reached by the trial court below, [...] has argued that the rent concession cannot constitute an ascertainable loss since it voluntarily dismissed its claim seeking to recover the concessions *only after the [...] filed their claims for treble damages*, ignores its demand for this unlawful amount.  [...]’s argument also ignores that “[i]n determining the existence of an ascertainable loss, the trial court [should] consider[] the [[...]] position when they came before the Court. ”  *D'Agostino v. Maldonado*, 216 N.J. 168, 195 (2013).  As the instant matter is similar to that in *Cox*, where the Court held that the demand for an improper debt, which a consumer is not obligated to pay because it arises out of conduct that violates the CFA, the [...] have plead, and the record reflects, that they have suffered an ascertainable loss.  *Cox*, 138 N.J. at 23 (“We conclude that an improper debt or lien against a consumer-fraud plaintiff may constitute a loss under the Act, because the consumer is not obligated to pay an indebtedness arising out of conduct that violates the Act.)
[brief] See Joel v. Morocco, 147 N.J. 546, 549 (1997) (“We have emphasized that the plaintiff must be actually aware of the actionable conduct when the original suit is brought. ”).  The City turns that principle on its head by suggesting that “the fault lies with” [...] for her lack of notice.  It relies on Brick Twp. v. Block 48-7, Lots 34, 35, 36, 202 N.J. Super. 246 (App. Div. 1985) for the proposition that “the obligation to provide a correct, updated address is squarely upon the taxpayer, and not upon the municipality. ” (Resp. Br. 21).  But Brick had nothing to do with the entire controversy doctrine; it concerned the sufficiency of notice for due process purposes.  Unlike due process, which does not require actual notice, Jones v. Flowers, 547 U.S. 220, 226 (2006), the entire controversy doctrine cannot bar a claim unless the claimant was “actually aware of the actionable conduct” in the earlier proceeding.