ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] At the Academy, Plaintiff was “getting bounced around and not really having any stability anywhere to gain points” (1T; 88:18).  Plaintiff went with seven and a half years in OPS being transferred out to zero points (1T; 89:1).  The environment that was created at the Academy included having no work, not being assigned anything, not being able to approach the office for any work, not being a part of any meeting, dealing with a secretary that didn’t talk, being excluded from meetings with the Captain, being excluded from scheduling and knowing that “[...] is doing the admin work that I should be doing” (1T; 89:24 to 90:13).
[brief] See Gburek v. Litton Loan Servicing LP, 614 F.3d 380 (7th Cir. 2010)(analyzing letters sent to the borrower); see also Romine v. Diversified Collection Servs., 155 F.3d 1142, 1144 (9th Cir. 1998)(analyzing talking telegram program where phone calls were made to the consumer in order to retrieve more recent and accurate contact information that would be relayed to a debt collector for collection purposes).  Communications made to consumers are completely distinguishable from the transmission of data by [...] to a mailing vendor solely for the purpose of creating and printing letters.
[brief] SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE  DIVISION  [...], on behalf of himself and those similarly situated, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. [...]; [...]; [...]; [...]; [...]; and JOHN DOES 1 to 10, Defendants-Respondents.  Civil Action  Appellate  Docket No. [...]  On Appeal from the Final Order of the Superior Court of New Jersey Law Division, Bergen County dated October 20, 2023
[brief] Loqa, 79 F.Supp.2d at 52.  Not only does the application of the Highlands Act to [...]’s facilities regulate within a field occupied by federal law, but it directly conflicts with federal law.  As the Supreme Court held in Schneidewind, a conflict exists “when it is impossible to comply with both state and federal law or where the state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the full purposes and objectives of Congress. ”  Schneidewind v. ANR Pipeline Co., 485 U.S. at 300 (internal citations and quotations omitted).  Courts have held that state laws are preempted where [...] directly addressed those same issues covered by state law.  See National Fuel Gas Supply Corp. v. Public Service Com'n of State of N.Y., 894 F.2d 571, 579 (2d Cir. 1990).  (holding that “[t]he matters sought to be regulated by the [New York Public Service Commission] were [] directly considered by the [...] [and] [u]nder Schneidewind, such direct consideration is more than enough to preempt state regulation. ”)  Assuming Appellants prevail on their air pollution and climate change arguments, and this Court were to vacate and remand the matter back to [...], [...]’s review and ultimate conclusion regarding these issues may conflict with [...]’s extensive review, which was upheld by the D.C. Circuit.  Doing so “would be tantamount to conferring on the [[...]] the power to review and nullify [...]'s decision regarding the [construction] of a facility used in the interstate transportation and sale of natural gas. ”  Loqa, 79 F.Supp.2d at 52.  The [...] determined that [...]’s Project, including CS 327, is in the public convenience and necessity.  Furthermore, the “inevitable result” of any further administrative processes under the Highlands Act would “present[] an obstacle to accomplishing the important federal purpose of ensuring that adequate and affordable natural gas is provided to home owners and businesses. ”  Id.; see NE Hub Partners, L.P. v. CNG Transmission Corp., 239 F.3d 333, 348 (3d Cir. 2001)(holding that “[i]f it is evident that the result of a process must lead to conflict preemption, it would defy logic to hold that the process itself cannot be preempted”).  For these reasons, the Highlands Act and implementing rules, to the extent such act and rules are used to delay or prevent the construction and operation of a [...] certificated project, would be preempted as applied to [...]’s Project.
[brief] The negative impact was contrary to the recent zone change denial and, in essence, a substantial rewriting of the recently reviewed master plan and zone plan, and there were many locations in the Township where the uses were permitted.  *Sica, supra*, 127 N.J. at 165-166, *Salt & Light Co v. Willingboro*, 423 N.J. Super. 282 (App Div 2011), cert. den., 210 NJ 108 (2012).  The proof required for the second of the negative criteria must reconcile the grant of the variance for the specific project at the designated site with the municipality's contrary determination about the permitted uses as expressed through its zoning ordinance.  *Medici, supra*, 107 N.J. at 21, *Price v. Himeji, LLC*, 214 N.J. 263, 286 (N.J. 2013).  The Board’s analysis of the application recognized the uses proposed as inherently beneficial, but the Board found that applicant failed to meet its burden as to the negative criteria.  The applicant did not, and under these facts could not, justify overthrowing the Township’s zoning scheme to approve the requested use of this Property.
[brief] ” (Pa25).  Even Plaintiff’s own hypothetical is not analogous to the case at bar.  (Pb37).  Indeed, in the case at bar, Plaintiff did not object to any official misconduct like “stealing time”; “fixing tickets” or “terminating DWI prosecutions. ” (Pb37).  No one ever told Plaintiff to refrain from performing his job duties, and there was no written or unwritten directive or practice of requiring the police officers not to perform their job duties.  Indeed, the Trial Court correctly found that there was simply no evidence of any identifiable order, directive, practice or policy of the Township’s Police Department that Plaintiff “reasonably believed violated or was incompatible with a law, regulation or clear mandate of public policy in existence at the time of the incident and [Plaintiff’s] claimed enforcement of the law in opposition or resistance to the same.
[brief] Wyzykowski v. Rizas, 132 N.J. 509 (1993)  .........................................................................................19  Statutes N.J.S.A. 12:5-3......................................................................................................1, 3 N.J.S.A. 12:5-3(a) ...............................................................................................3, 23 N.J.S.A. 12:5-3(d) ...............................................................................................4 N.J.S.A. 12:5-6(a) ...............................................................................................3  N.J.S.A. 13:1D-150............................................................................................15  N.J.S.A. 13:1D-150(a), (c) ...............................................................................4 N.J.S.A. 13:1D-150(d), (f) ...............................................................................5  N.J.A.C. 7:7-16.9 ..................................................................................................................3  N.J.A.C. 7:7-16.9(k)..............................................................................................................29 N.J.A.C. 7:7-16.9(k)(2)(i) .................................................................................................24, 25 N.J.A.C. 7:7-16.9(k)(2)(iv) ...............................................................................................30 N.J.A.C. 7:7-15.11(d)(2)(ii) .............................................................................................25 Other Authorities Assembly Environment and Solid Waste Committee Statement to Senate No. 1074 (March 11, 2019) ..................................................................................................................19 Assembly Statement to A. 4927 (L. 2015, c. 260) ..............................................................4 49 N.J.R. 3145(a) (September 18, 2017) ..........................................................................25, 30 Rule 2:5-4(a) .........................................................................................................................7 Rule 2:6-1(a)(2) ....................................................................................................................8 PRELIMINARY STATEMENT This case centers on the 2019 Public Access Law, N.J.S.A. 13:1D-140 to -156 (“Public Access Law” or “Law”), as applied by the [...] (“[...]”) to [...] (“[...]”) when it requested a permit in 2020 under the Waterfront Development Law, N.J.S.A. 12:5-3, and Coastal Zone Management (“CZM”) Rules, N.J.A.C. 7:7-1.1 to -29.10.
[brief] *Id.*  Likewise, *Millbrook Tax Fund, Inc. v. P.L Henry Assocs.*, 344 N.J. Super. 49 (App. Div. 2001), a case involving a change during renewal to a reporting period under a claims-made and reported professional liability policy, does not support [...]’ appeal.  *Millbrook*’s holding was based on the rationale of *Bauman*, which as discussed above, does not apply.  Additionally, while the *Millbrook* Court held that the reporting period in the original policy must remain in effect, as outlined in Section I.A., this does not help [...]’ cause because [...] did not qualify as a “Named Insured” under the Named Insured – Contractor Controlled Insurance Program endorsement in the first instance.
[brief] In this case, Stormwater will flow off of the newly created impervious surfaces into Hewitt Brook, which runs along the North-west boundary of the property.  Hewitt Brook is a Category-1 Trout Production Stream with an associated flood hazard area and 300 foot riparian zone.  Rma006.  Entirely absent from the record is DEP’s consideration or determination of whether Hewitt Brook or those that it feeds will be adversely impacted by this project.  **CONCLUSION**
[brief] *Sutton v. Sutton* involved the [...] (hereinafter “[...]”), a night club and lounge owned by [...], and its liquor license in which Petitioner’s father was the majority owner and Petitioner had a minority (6.7%) interest.  71 F. Supp. 2d at 386.  The litigation also involved a parking lot adjacent to the [...] in which the Petitioner was a 1/6 owner along with five other siblings.  Id.  Petitioner worked at the [...] as bartender and manager from 1963 until 1985, when his brother, as co-executor, abruptly closed that business two weeks after the Petitioner’s father’s death.  9T6:10-16.  When the [...] was closed, all the goodwill that business had accumulated over more than 22 years as a going concern was lost.  9T6:15-21.  Prior to that time, the [...] was profitable having no mortgage and no pending debts.  9T:6:20-24.  In addition, the [...] employed 25 people including the Petitioner and Decedent.  9T6:25 to 6:2.  With the closing of the [...], the Petitioner was out of his job of 22 years and became deeply depressed.
[brief] Order filed 9-23-2021, granting summary judgment in favor of defendants [...], [...], [...], and [...], Pa3036 (3)  Order filed 12-7-2021, granting dismissal “without prejudice” in favor of defendant [...],\(^2\) and denying ---  1  In addition to the Plaintiff’s Appendix, transcripts have been filed as follows:  T1: 8-30-2019 motion; T2: 11-21-2019  T3: 9-10-21 motion; T4: 11-19-21 motion  2  Although the record reveals one or more “dismissal without prejudice” Orders, which appear not to have been typographical errors at the time of their entry, the motion judge ultimately entered a “final judgment. ”  Pa3458.  For further clarity, the Panel should consider related appeal number [...], where the second amended complaint was essentially re-filed against [...], after leave to amend was denied without prejudice below.
[directive] Você entende que se sua conduta for caracterizada por um padrão de [Sim/Yes] [Não/No] comportamento reincidente e compulsivo ou se você não aceitar o tratamento para agressores sexuais, você não estará qualificado primeiramente à liberdade condicional até que tenha cumprido o termo de reclusão mínimo obrigatório imposto pelo juiz ou um terço da sentença imposta caso não tenha sido fixado nenhum termo mínimo e obrigatório nenhum termo de reclusão será reduzido por bom comportamento ou créditos de trabalho?  not  Do you understand that if your conduct is characterized by a pattern of repetitive, compulsive behavior or you are not amenable to sex offender treatment you will not become primarily eligible for parole until you have served any mandatory minimum term imposed by the court or one third of the and sentence imposed where no mandatory minimum term is fixed neither term will be reduced by commutation time for good behavior or work credits?
[brief] TPD General Order 74-2, Amended September 29, 2015, was the TPD policy that governed sick leave at the time Appellant was on stress leave (the “Sick Leave Policy”).  [Da5-Da24].  The Sick Leave Policy clearly states:  Sworn personnel while on sick leave or IOD status shall not leave their residence during their scheduled tour of duty without the permission of the Administrative Desk Supervisor.  For each scheduled tour of duty a police officer is not in residence, a police officer is subject to multiple charges.  Each scheduled tour of duty away from his residence while on sick leave or IOD status is a separate offense.  Sworn personnel may request permission from the Police Director to be excused from the sick leave residence restriction in certain circumstances.  Those personnel requesting to be excused from the sick leave residence requirement shall make the request in an administrative report forwarded to the Police Director through the chain of command.  Permission to be excused from the sick leave residence requirement may only be received through the express written consent of the Police Director.  The decision to grant the request or deny it shall be made by the Police director or his designee within 2 days of receiving the request.  [Da12] (emphasis in original document).  The Sick Leave Policy also clearly states:
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[brief] This error is evident from an unpublished opinion, *Fehr v. Algard*, 2011 WL 13670 (*reversed on grounds not applicable here*5) recognizing (as the trial court had also) that the defendant’s offer of a prize for a fishing tournament created a contract with the plaintiff when he paid his entry fee, which was then governed by contract law.  In relevant part, in *Fehr* this Court noted:  “In this appeal, the parties agree their dispute is governed by contract law.  See *Brown v. Morrisey & Walker*, 106 N.J.L. 307, 312 (E. & A. 1930) (holding that "[t]he offer of a prize may mature into a binding contract in favor of a successful contestant who has complied with the terms of the offer"); see also *Robertson v. U.S.*, 343 U.S. 711, 713, 72 S. Ct. 994, 996, 96 L.Ed. 1237, 1240 (1952) ("The acceptance by the contestants of the offer tendered by the sponsor of the contest creates an enforceable contract."); *6 Corbin on Contracts*, § 1489 (same); *Annotation, "Private Contest and Lotteries: Entrants' Rights and Remedies,"* 64 A.L.R.4th 1021, 1045-52 (1988) (stating the promoter of a contest makes an offer by making public the conditions and rules of the contest).  At issue then is whether plaintiff complied with all Tournament rules, representing the terms of defendants’ offer, entitling him to receipt of an award”.  *Fehr,* *3 --- 5  Note that unlike the situation here, in *Fehr* the disputed contract clause (i.e. about false information being grounds for disqualification) was provided to those plaintiffs, and contained within the same tri-fold tournament brochure.
[brief] Second, the charge permits the jury to acquit the defendant based upon only limited evidence suggesting that a third-party committed the crime: even evidence that falls short of a “strong probability that someone other than the defendant committed the crime” can serve as the basis for an acquittal.  That is a crucial detail that is not covered in the generic instructions.  Phrased differently, there is no “common denominator” between the generic instructions that were given and the model jury charge on Third Party Guilt that was omitted – the model charge contains unique guidance not covered elsewhere.
[brief] [3T72-8 to 73-24].  [...] noted that before jury selection defendant had said that he was being railroaded.  [3T72-10 to 13].  Defendant argued that trial counsel was not helping defendant.  [3T74-3 to -12].  [...] held that defendant’s repeated comments were “calculated to disrupt this trial. ”  [3T73-7 to -9; 3T74-13 to 75-19].  He informed defendant that if defendant continued his pattern of behavior the court had legal means of securing defendant’s compliance, but the court did not want to take such extreme measures.  [3T73-12 to -13].  Defendant informed the court he wanted to fire trial counsel and represent himself.  [3T75-4 to 11].  [...] denied defendant’s motion.
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT GRANTED PLAINTIFF’S COUNSEL’S ORAL MOTION THAT DEFENDANT [...] COULD BE QUESTIONED REGARDING HIS CRIMINAL GUILTY PLEA AND CORRESPONDING FACTUAL ALLOCUTION PURSUANT TO STATE V. LAVRIK (2T22-1 to 2T29-25; Da444-Da447)  In State v. Lavrik, 472 N.J. Super. 192 (App. Div. 2022), the defendant pled guilty to second-degree endangering the welfare of a child as a precondition to be admitted to PTI.  Id. at 199.  At the plea hearing, the defendant made an admission that he “knowingly engage[d] in a verbal conversation with [her] that was sexual in nature, which would impair or debauch her morals. ”  Id. at 200.  While the primary issue on appeal concerned whether the Court improperly granted a civil reservation, the Court found the civil reservation was akin to putting a cart before the horse because there had been no conviction under the defendant’s admission to PTI:  Lastly, we consider the effect of defendant's guilty plea as a condition of PTI on the practical application of the civil reservation order.  Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:43-13(b), a guilty plea entered as a condition of admission to PTI "shall be held in an inactive status pending termination of the supervisory treatment," under subsection (d) (successful completion of the program, resulting in dismissal of the charges) or (e) (dismissal from the program, thereby reactivating the charges); see also N.J.S.A. 2C:43-12(g)(3).  "Therefore, the guilty plea has no force or effect, unless PTI is violated.  It is neither a judgment of conviction nor an adjudication.  If a defendant successfully completes the program, the charges are dismissed."  Attorney General, Uniform Guidelines on the Pretrial Intervention Program (March 1, 2016) (Directive 2016-2); see also R. 3:28-7(b) (addressing the available dispositions following conclusion of the court-ordered PTI term).  It is therefore axiomatic should defendant successfully complete PTI, the child endangerment charge will be dismissed and, as such, the fact that defendant pled guilty and any statements pertaining to his guilty plea are not evidentiary in a civil proceeding — irrespective of the civil reservation order.  See Maida [v. Kuskin], 221 N.J. [112,] [ ] 125, 110 A.3d 867 [(2015)]; [Eaton v. Eaton], 119 N.J. [628,] [ ] 643-44, 575 A.2d 858 [(1990)]; [State v.] LaResca, 267 N.J. Super. [411,] at 418 n.4, 631 A.2d 986 [(App. Div. 1993)].
[brief] “[P]roper jury instructions are essential to a fair trial” and “erroneous instructions on material points are presumed to” be prejudicial.  State v. McKinney, 223 N.J. 475, 495 (2015) (quoting State v. Bunch, 180 N.J. 534, 541-42 (2004)).  In the absence of an objection to the charge, courts will review challenged jury instructions for plain error “clearly capable of producing an unjust result," R. 2:10-2.  Id. at 494.  1.  It Was Plain Error Not To Instruct The Jury As Part Of The Accomplice Liability Instructions  That, Pursuant To State v. Whitaker, 200 N.J. 444 (2009), Defendant Could Not Be Found Guilty As An Accomplice To Robbery Or As An Accomplice To Felony Murder, Based Solely On His Conduct After Someone Else Had Robbed And Killed The Victim.  Defendant's convictions for accomplice liability for robbery and felony murder must be reversed because the oral and written jury instructions on accomplice liability for robbery failed to instruct the jury, as required by State v. Whitaker, 200 N.J. 444, 463 (2009), that, even if the jury found that defendant had participated in the subsequent theft of the money from the bank ATM, it could not convict him of being an accomplice to robbery unless it determined that he also had been involved with the theft of the debit card through the use of force.  The omission of this instruction in the context of the accomplice liability robbery charge had the clear capacity to bring about an unjust result, Rule 2:10-2, as shown by the fact that, when the jury was properly instructed on the Whitaker principles in the context of own-conduct robbery, it acquitted defendant of that offense.
[brief] ”  Following [...]’s logic would lead to the absurd conclusion that because the definition of “insurer” does not refer to any specific type of entity licensed to transact insurance in the State, no such entities fall within the statutory definition.  That does not reflect a legislative decision to “exempt” reciprocal exchanges from the Holding Company Act, as [...] contends.  (Ab10).  It reflects a legislative decision to define “insurer” in a manner that is broad and flexible.
[brief] (2T 79-7 to 82-16).  [...] gave [...] $100 and offered to help her with legal problems, in return for luring [...] to her home.  (2T 86-14 to 88-19).  [...] testified that she was willing to “set [[...]] up” because she was afraid of him.  (2T 105-15 to 106-9).  [...] testified that when [...] arrived, she texted [...].  Shortly afterward, she saw two cars arrive and block in [...]’s car.  The car that went to the back was red, and she had previously seen [...] and [...] in it; the car in the front was white, and contained “a couple more gentlemen. ” (2T 89-1 to 90-19).  [...] testified\(^3\) that she drove the car containing defendant [...] in a car chase, which occurred when [...] tried to escape.  (4T 12-18 to 6; 4T --- \(^3\) Diaz pled guilty to conspiracy to commit robbery in connection with this [...] had also given Diaz money to participate in the setup of [...].
[brief] (Pb11-23)  As expected, Plaintiff relies heavily on this Court’s decision in Mt. Laurel Twp. v. Mipro Homes, L.L.C., 379 N.J. Super. 358 (App. Div.), aff’d, 188 N.J. 531 (2005), for the proposition that it has the authority to condemn Defendants’ properties for open space.  However, as explained in Defendants’ initial appellate brief, the record before the trial court and Appellate Division in that case included an extensive and detailed record that supported the stated concern by the municipality regarding residential development and the loss of open space, and how those concerns mirrored the State’s public policy concerns.