ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] *Id.* at *19; see also Lopez v. Law Offices of Faloni & Associates, LLC*, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124730, at *13* (D.N.J. Sept. 14, 2016) (Where the District Court held that [...] had to be licensed under the CFLA and opined, “a debt collector’s representation in a collection complaint that it had the right to collect a debt when, in fact, it lacked the license required to initially purchase the debt, would violate, at minimum, FDCPA section e(10). ”); Valentine v. Unifund CCR, Inc., 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44747, at *12 (D.N.J. Mar. 10, 2021) (a debt buyer who allegedly purchased a defaulted [...] credit card debt to meet the definition of a consumer lender under the CLFA); Arroyo v. Stoneleigh Recovery Assocs., LLC, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 138287, at *13 (D.N.J. Aug. 14, 2019) (assignee of [...] debt had to be licensed); Tompkins v. Selip & Stylianou, LLP, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21937 (D.N.J. Feb. 11, 2019) (assignee of [...] credit card debt had to licensed); Latteri v. Mayer, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85926, at *6 (D.N.J. May 22, 2018) (motion to dismiss denied where plaintiff alleged defendant violated the FDCPA when it attempted to collect a debt on behalf of a debt buyer who was an unlicensed consumer lender); Valentine v. Mullooly, Jeffrey, Rooney & Flynn LLP, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 118399, at *13 (D.N.J. July 6, 2022) (“Courts in this District have invoked that part of the NJCFLA—the part reading: ‘directly or indirectly engag[es] . . . in the business of buying, discounting or endorsing notes’—when classifying debt collection practices as falling within the ‘consumer loan business.
[brief] Plaintiffs argue on appeal that [...] was negligent based on a premises liability theory of negligence and breaching a duty of care owed to Plaintiff as a business invitee.  However, Plaintiffs failed to establish that the trial court erred by granting [...] summary judgment when it ruled that [...] did not have constructive notice of the allegedly dangerous condition at issue and that the “Mode of Operation” rule was inapplicable to the facts in the case.  Assuming arguendo Plaintiffs do not need expert testimony (a point which [...] does not concede), Plaintiffs still cannot meet their burden of proving negligence under a premises liability theory of liability.  In New Jersey, “[t]he proprietor of premises to which the public is invited for business purposes of the proprietor owes a duty of reasonable care to those who enter the premises upon that invitation to provide a reasonably safe place to do that which is within the scope of the invitation.
[brief] [...] simply quotes this language in its brief and offers no analysis as to why it helps its position on appeal.  In fact, the language effectively ends its brief, just prior to its conclusory statements on a separate page.  However, this language is problematic for various reasons.  First, the language posits that backlighting was not prevalent, and safety professionals had not "raised concerns about same, in general fashion".  (DbL41).  However, plaintiff's experts partially were tasked to determine what existed in the intersection that caused the driver not to have seen [...] in the intersection and not to have even known what he had struck.  What clearly jumped off of the page to [...] and [...] were the absence of effective lighting in the foreground of [...] and bright lighting in his background; what existed to them were tree branches that blocked any form of lighting (assuming there was even lighting at the time of the accident); what was clear to the experts was that the observed facts gave rise to backlighting, which they offer as the explanation as to why the driver did not see [...].  In the end, the issue is one of what existed and was observed at the intersection---and not one of "prevalence".
[brief] Four elements of a breach of contract claim  To prove a breach of contract, our Supreme Court notes: our law imposes on a plaintiff the burden to prove four elements: first, that the parties entered into a contract containing certain terms; second, that plaintiffs did what the contract required them to do; third, that defendants did not do what the contract required them to do, defined as a breach of the contract; and fourth, that defendants’ breach, or failure to do what the contract required, caused a loss to the plaintiffs.
[directive] I certify that as of this date , my client is not incarcerated and that I have:  1) Provided my client with a copy of the complaint and have read and explained it to my client; 2) Confirmed that my client understands the substance of the charge(s); 3) Informed my client of the right to remain silent and any statement may be used against him/her; 4) Informed my client of the pretrial intervention program and where and how an application may be made; 5) Informed my client of the right to a probable cause hearing, the right to an indictment and right to a jury trial; 6)
[brief] Appellant incorporates by reference statements made through points one to five as if fully set forth within.  On November 26, 2023 appellant motioned and sought consideration for recusal from the trial judge (Pa226).  Appellant sought this consideration, because the aforesaid made the appellant believed that he will be preclude from a fair and unbiased hearing and judgment in the pending Motion To Alter Amend Judgment.  Yet, the trial judge scheduled the hearings for (1) the motions To Recuse and (2) To Alter Amend Judgment together, showing that he had decided to deny the appellant’s Motion to Recuse before hearing it.
[brief] Here, there are two (2) interrelated problems with the Arbitration Agreement at issue which render same unenforceable.  First, as is indicated by the Certification of Appellant [...] (the “Murray Cert.”), and the circumstances in which Appellant allegedly “agreed” to the provision at issue, demonstrates that she could not have knowingly and voluntarily waived her time-honored right to sue for statutory claims of discrimination.  Based upon the trial court’s erroneous decision as to Respondents’ motions, which is supported by no meaningful legal analysis whatsoever, it is clear the trial court did not properly consider, or consider at all, Appellant’s arguments and evidence in this regard.
[brief] Similarly, in the present matter, plaintiff’s proffered expert and the defendant doctors were qualified to prescribe heparin.  However, because both [defendant doctors] were “offered” as specialists in internal medicine, an area of medicine recognized by the [[...] (“[...]”)], “and the care or treatment involve[d] that specialty,” the [Patient’s First Act (“PFA”)] mandated that plaintiff’s expert “have specialized at the time of the occurrence…in the same specialty” as defendants.
[brief] DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO BAR EVIDENCE OF THE THIRTY-YEAR OLD [...] LEASE SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED AS A MATTER OF LAW.  (Da108)  A.  Plaintiff seeks to have the Court ignore the distinction between the property interests of a “fee simple estate” and a “leased fee estate. ”  Plaintiff frames the issue on this appeal as “…A LONG-TERM LEASE SHOULD BE FACTORED INTO MARKET VALUE OF A PROPERTY.  Thus, plaintiff simply chooses to ignore the difference between the appraisal of a ‘fee simple estate” and a “leased fee estate. ”
[brief] That was essentially upheld by the Appellate Decision.  To the point as to the burden of proof, the Appellate Court stated (at p. 427):  The burden of proving the existence of a nonconforming use is upon the party asserting such use.  One commentator has emphasized that “it is important that the evidence presented to the board establish exactly what the use was at the time of adoption of the ordinance, its character, extent, intensity and incidents,” citing Cox § 11-2.2 (2002).  It is important to recognize that the neighbors (the objectors to the use) filed the Administrative Appeal, but were not deemed the “applicants” as referenced in N.J.S.A. 40:55D-68; the burden of proof was recognized as “upon the party asserting such use”.  S&S Auto Sales inc. v. Zoning Bd. of Stafford, 373 N.J. Super. 603, 608 (App.Div. 2004) --- the sole case cited by [...] and the Trial Court (Da279) for the burden of proof being on the School --- does not stand for that proposition.
[brief] Commencing in 2016, [...] entered into a revised lease agreement with the same [...].  (Pa 342-374).  The 2016 lease was similar in all respects to the 2011 lease, particularly as they related to the landlord’s relinquishment of control and the tenant’s responsibilities and obligations to maintain and repair the property.  The 2016 lease once again conveyed the entire property to the tenant, [...].  (Pa 345-346).  The 2016 lease provided that the property owner retained no control over the property and had no responsibilities for any portion of the property.
[brief] 27  POINT I  APPLICABLE STANDARD OF REVIEW ...........................................  27  POINT II  THE TRIAL COURT'S INTERPRETATION OF THE PSA IS UNSUPPORTED BY THE FACTS AND THE LAW (Pa0192; Pa0194) ............................................................................................  28  A.  The Trial Court  Erred in Dismissing Count One of the Complaint and Granting in Part and Denying in Part Specific Performance ..............................................................................  28  1.  Applicable Law ..................................................................................  29  2.  The Final Judgment ............................................................................  34  B.  The Trial Court  Erred in Dismissing Count  Three of the Complaint POINT  III  THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AND MISAPPLIED  THE LAW IN DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO COMPEL DISCOVERY AND GRANTING DEFENDANTS' CROSS-MOTION FOR A PROTECTIVE ORDER (Pa0190; 1T20-23)  CONCLUSION TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS
[brief] [...] did not seek to hold Appellants in contempt, but instead sought relief that was clearly available under R. 1:4-8.  Thus, the trial court’s denial of [...]’s Cross-Motion was “based upon consideration of irrelevant or inappropriate factors. ”  See Man Wai Lee, supra, at 482.  In all events, there was no rational basis for denying the request for sanctions, thus warranting reversal.  [...] continues to incur attorneys’ fees and costs as a result of the frivolous filings by Appellants and their counsel.  The instant appeal, which lacks any rational argument for the reversal of the trial court’s refusal to enter default judgment against [...], further magnifies the frivolousness of the underlying Motion and Appellants’ conduct generally.  Accordingly, this Court should reverse the trial court’s denial of [...]’s Cross-Motion and direct that sanctions be imposed against Appellants and their counsel in the form of the total attorneys’ fees and costs incurred by [...].
[brief] Under [...]’s then plan, almost 8 acres of Plaintiff’s property was proposed to be left along the pond as open space.  Plaintiff thought that such open space should be developed for additional housing units to allow [...] to get closer to its 158 unit low income Mount Laurel requirement.  (Pa 110-111).  Ironically, the court in that case rejected Plaintiff’s request essentially for two reasons: (1) the density proposed by Plaintiff of 25 units per acre was held to be not "good planning" and (2) the Redeveloper was found to be in a position to start construction of the 350-unit plan immediately as opposed to the 550 unit plan.
[directive] Summons................................................................................................................3 of a Complaint- Issuing Presumption Overcoming for Standard 4.3.1  6  Summons....................................................................................................3  Charging of Presumption Overcoming for Reasons Specifying 4.3.2 ...........................................................................37 .  Complaint-Summons by aComplaint-Warrant for Apply Must Enforcement Law Where Cases 4.4 ..................................................................................................37
[brief] In 2010, the Supreme Court applied Appleman’s Rule in a homeowner’s liability coverage case, observing that it had been “adopted” by New Jersey courts to cover both concurrent and sequential causes of loss.  [...]’s third argument addresses an exception to the mold exclusion that it added to the three policies at issue, providing that the exclusion “does not apply” to claims arising from mold that is “on or in an edible good or edible product [food] intended for human consumption. ”  The Trial Court erroneously failed to apply the exception, despite undisputed evidence showing that for more than eighteen years [...] had been chronically exposed to mold “on or in” the food he consumed.  The Trial Court’s error is one of policy interpretation, a decision on an issue of law that warrants de novo review.  Rather than applying the exception as written, the Trial Court erroneously added language to the exception requiring proof that the food [...] ate contained harmful mycotoxins (trichothecene) and that those mycotoxins had caused identifiable and distinct bodily injury.  The Trial Court’s ruling adds pro-carrier, restrictive language to the exception that it does not contain, in violation of New Jersey’s rules of policy interpretation.  Fourth, [...] argues that this Court should affirm the Trial Court’s use of a “manifestation” trigger of coverage that New Jersey courts have rejected since 1994, when the Supreme Court first adopted “continuous trigger” principles in cases involving continuous injurious exposure to toxic substances.
[directive] A Prosecutor may request a reasonable extension of time within which to report to the Director of the Division of Criminal Justice when the Prosecutor believes that an incident requires further investigation to determine whether the firing/discharge(s) complied with this supplemental policy.  The Prosecutor may conduct any such further investigation, or may direct the chief executive of the department to do so.  The Director of the Division of Criminal Justice shall report to the Attorney General on the propriety of the firing/discharge(s).  b.
[brief] Given this impossible position, it is entirely unreasonable to believe that the jury could disregard [...]’s affiliation with a notoriously violent, criminal enterprise.  That is the entire answer served up on a silver platter.  Even if the jurors consciously attempted to disregard this information and comply with the trial court’s instruction, it would be impossible to not let this information prejudice their decision when the only reasonable basis for their conclusion would be their perception of each individual.  Should this have been a case where the non-testimonial evidence weighed heavily in the favor of the prosecution, there may have existed some argument that the comment regarding [...]’s affiliation with the [...] could be cured by an instruction by the trial court.  However, that is not the case.  This case rested entirely on who the jury felt deserved to be believed solely based on their testimony.  As such, it is entirely unreasonable to believe that the jurors could disregard this information when reaching their decision, even if they acted in good faith and consciously attempted follow the trial court’s brief, vague instruction.
[brief] An arbitrator is empowered to interpret contract language.  The language at issue is not subject to two conflicting interpretations.  There is no ambiguity.  The [...] asserted that there was a violation of the plain language in the contract specifying the exact equation that the Division is supposed to use to calculate overtime rates for [...] members.  In fact, the Arbitrator noted that the language was plainly and simply clear.  However, instead of ending his inquiry there, the Arbitrator relied on extrinsic evidence that has no bearing on the meaning or intendment of this plain and unambiguous language.  During the hearing, the [...] presented evidence and testimony to illustrate that the Division was violating the plain language of the contract and shorting [...] members on their overtime compensation.  [...] Vice President [...] presented his pay stubs and calculations from the time frame in question to illustrate the Division’s contractual violation.  Furthermore, the Division did not deny their contractual violation - they merely alleged that they do not have to honor the contract.  The Division presented their calculations, which are wholly contrary to the specific and unquestionable equation present in the contract.  In this matter, the Arbitrator has gone outside the four corners of the contract and has held that an external document, not negotiated by the parties, overrides plain and unambiguous negotiated contract language.  The Arbitrator’s determination should have analyzed whether there is a clause that governs the issue, and then ascertained whether that clause clear.  In this case, there is a clause on point and it is plain and unambiguous.  The contract, therefore, governs this matter.  The [...] does not draw its essence from the contract; it is not “faithful” to the contract.  The Arbitrator has disregarded the terms of the collective bargaining agreement.  The Arbitrator has committed a mistake of law and has exceeded his authority in determining that the Division was not required to follow the plain language in the contract and was instead permitted to follow the annual Treasury Circulars.  He exceeded his authority by ignoring the clear and unambiguous language of the agreement and instead relied on a past practice.  The [...] improperly rewrites the contract language concerning the manner in which overtime compensation is calculated in direct violation of the clear and unambiguous language in the contract.  Therefore, we respectfully request that the [...] be vacated.  CONCLUSION
[brief] (Pa491-507).  Plaintiff’s expert [...], a professor of orthopedic and rehabilitation medicine, opined that, “it is my impression within a reasonable degree of medical certainty that [...] will require continued and ongoing medical and supportive care for the remainder of his life due to the consequences of his 11/02/2020 accident. ” (Pa491-507).  On January 12, 2024, Oral arguments were held regarding defendant [...]’s Motion for Summary Judgment.
[brief] Aetna Life and Cas. Co. v. Imet Mason Contractors, 309 N.J Super. 358, 707 A.2d 180 (App Div. 1998)  ..................................................  32  Beck v. Beck, 86 N.J. 480, 496, 432 A.2d 63 (1981) ................................................. 31, 35 Carroll v. Hause, 48 N.J. Eq. 269, 22 A. 191 (1891) (Prerog. 1891) .............................  21  Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 411, 713 A.2d 390 (1998)  ...........................................  35 Chalmers v. Chalmers, 65 N.J. 186, 320 A.2d 478 (1974) ...........................................  50  DeLorean v. DeLorean, 211 N.J. Super. 432, 511 A.2d 1257 (Ch. Div. 1986) ....................  45 Dixon v. Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey, 110 N.J. 432, 460-61, 541 A.2d 1046 (1988)  ..............................................................  47  Estate of Roach v. TRW, INC., 164 N.J. 598, 612, 754 A.2d 544 (2000)  .........................  17  Frugis v. Bracigliano, 177 N.J. 250, 269, 827 A.2d 1040 (2003)  ....................................  17  Haynes v. First Nat. State Bank, 87 N.J. 163 175-76, 432 A.2d 890 (1981)  ............................................................................................... 19, 21, 23, 24 Highway Holding Co. v. Yara Engineering Corp., 22 N.J. 119, 133, 123 A.2d 511 (1956)  ..................................................................  49  Hirsch v. General Motors Corp., 266 N.J. Super. 222, 234, 628 A.2d 1108, (Law Div. 1993)  ................................................................. 31, 32  In re Blake’s Will, 21 N.J. 50, 55, 120 A.2d 745(1956)  ..............................................  18, 21  In re Catelli’s Will, 361 N.J. Super. 478, 487825 A.2d 1209 (App. Div. 2003) ..............  21, 22, 28  In re Estate of Fisher, 443 N.J. Super. 180, 190 , 128 A3d. 203(App. Div. 2015) certif. denied, 224 N.J. 528 (2016)  ...........................................................................  35  In re Estate of Folcher, 224 N.J. 496, 512, 135 A3d 128 (2016)  ....................................  20  Estate of Hanges v. Metro. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 202 N.J. 369, 383-84 997 A2d 954 (2010)  ................................................................................................. 26, 48  Estate of Olsen, A-5542-11T1 (App. Div.), cert. denied 220 N.J. 98 (2014)
[brief] Knowledge of the Redevelopment Plan is obviously essential in order to conduct the examination of it and the Master Plan so a determination as to consistency with the Master Plan can be made.  However, just knowing the Redevelopment Plan is clearly not enough – there must be an examination of it with the Master Plan.  Defendants’ argument lacks any mention of the requisite comparison or the facts on which such a determination is based.  The claim that the members’ knowledge of the area and history of attempted development, without setting forth that knowledge, is equally useless for purposes of setting forth findings of fact.  Neither the public or the courts are mind readers.  Lastly, as is argued at length in Plaintiff’s initial brief, the record before the Planning Board does not set forth sufficient findings based on the record to address consistency.
[directive] ACCESS TO STORED ALPR DATA  11.1  Authorization to Share and Aggregate Data  Any ALPR data that may in conformance with these Guidelines be accessed and used by the law enforcement agency that collected the data may be shared with and provided to any other law enforcement agency.  Stored ALPR data may be combined with ALPR data collected by two or more law enforcement agencies collection of stored data by the [...] (e.g., Intelligence Center), provided that such aggregated data shall only be retained, accessed, and used in accordance with the provisions of these Guidelines.  11.2
[brief] Today I want to take a few minutes to review some of the many steps and considerations involved in the decision.  Initially the members of the sub-committee received and reviewed the applications.  As we met to evaluate the merits of each we also acknowledged that some of the criteria would be reviewed in much more detail at the state level, allowing us to look closer at the local pieces.  Presentations by all applicants to the sub-committee were scheduled, and then followed by a public meeting on May 7 when all applicants had the opportunity to present to the complete governing body and the public.  ...  At a subsequent sub-committee meeting, it was decided to address the Highway Corridor license applications first.  A closed session was requested for the September 20th council meeting.  Governing body members were asked to review each of the three Highway Corridor applications in detail.  A copy of the evaluation guidance form was also provided to each member with the instruction that they use the form to help guide in their review.  It was also recommended that they drive past the locations to familiarize themselves with the sites, particularly based on the type of facility that was being proposed by the applicant as shown in their application.  (233a-234a).  The forgoing notes suggest the Subcommittee recommended [...], and the Council issued the Resolution, based on a comprehensive review of all the applications.  As such, [...]’s subjective belief that it was a “better” or “more worthy” applicant than [...] is insufficient grounds to question the validity of the Borough’s decision.  See Worthington v. Fauver, 88 N.J. 183, 204-05 (1982) (decision is valid “when exercised honestly and upon due consideration, even though it may be believed that an erroneous conclusion has been reached”).