ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] On October 17, 2019, [...] certified tenure charges against [...] to the DOE, pursuant to the TEHL.  See Pa3-Pa4.  Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 18A:6-16, the DOE assigned the tenure charges to Arbitrator [...] for hearing and disposition.  On December 5, 2020, the Arbitrator issued the Tenure FAD, maintaining [...] in his tenured teaching position with [...].  Pa1-Pa13.  On February 26, 2022, the DOE, State Board of Examiners (the "Examiners") issued an Order to Show Cause (the "OSC") to [...] pursuant to N.J.A.C. 6A:9B-4.5, directing him to show cause why his Teaching Certificates should not be revoked.  **Pa14-Pa16. **  [...] opposed the OSC; however, on October 28, 2021, the Examiners issued an Order of Suspension ("OOS") to [...], directing that his Teaching Certificates be suspended for a period of two years.  **Pa17-Pa20. **  [...] appealed the OOS to the Commissioner of Education, (the "Commissioner") pursuant to N.J.A.C. 6A:4-1.3(b).  On June 23, 2022, the Commissioner issued the License FAD, upholding the OOS.  **Pa21-Pa25. **  On July 25, 2022, [...] filed his Notice of Appeal of the License FAD with this Court.  **Pa26-Pa29.**  The License Appeal remains pending before this Court.  **Pa30-Pa32. **  As a result of the OOS, [...] terminated [...] from his tenured teaching position.  **Pa33.**  [...] then filed a Verified Petition of Appeal (the “Verified Petition”) with the Commissioner pursuant to N.J.S.A. 18A:6-9 and N.J.A.C. 6A:3-1.3, challenging the lawfulness of that termination, in light of the Tenure FAD.  **Pa34-Pa37.**  [...]’s Verified Petition was transmitted as a contested case to the Office of Administrative Law.  On November 18, 2022, Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) [...] entered an Initial Decision granting Summary Decision in favor of [...], dismissing [...]’s Petition, and foreclosing his ability to return to his tenured teaching position, even if this Court ultimately decides the License Appeal in his favor.  Pa38-Pa45.  [...] took exceptions to the Initial Decision to the Commissioner; however, on February 6, 2023, the Commissioner issued the Job FAD, upholding ALJ Calguire’s Initial Decision.  Pa46-Pa49.  This Appeal (hereinafter the “Job Appeal”) follows.  Pa50-Pa54.  STATEMENT OF FACTS
[brief] Hereinbelow, it was never established whether the Appellant’s claims were filed timely or not because the trial court failed to decide the date of favorable termination.  To be absolutely certain, at no time during the course of either the federal or State litigation did the Appellant ever reluctantly proceed or in any way question what the trial court simply took for granted, which was the timely filing of the original complaint before the United States District Court.  The trial court’s analytical flaw hereinbelow was as obvious as it was egregious.  By skipping the first step of the statute of limitations inquiry, which was determining whether the Appellant’s State law claims were filed (in the United States District Court) within the statute of limitations, the trial court improvidently decided an issue that was not before it.  Only after first concluding that the claim was indeed filed late was a discussion of the discovery rule even appropriate.
[directive] [November 2024]  − First degree robbery (N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1(a)(1),(2) or (3)) − Home Invasion Burglary – Inflict BI/Armed (N.J.S.A. 2C:18-2.1) − Residential Burglary – Commit Offense  Therein (N.J.S.A. 2C:18-2.2) − Burglary (N.J.S.A. 2C:18-2(a)(1), (2), (3), (b)(1), or (b)(2)) − Escape (N.J.S.A. 2C:29-5(a)) − Absconding from parole (N.J.S.A. 2C:29-5(b)) − Permitting or facilitating escape (N.J.S.A. 2C:29-5(c))    Determine if the defendant is charged with an offense involving the use or ALSO possession of a firearm.    If yes to BOTH, the combination of offenses makes this a Graves Act offense, and as required by N.J.S.A. 2A:162-20(f) the final recommendation is No Release Recommended.
[brief] RULES R. 4:46-2(c) ..................................................................................................................17  NEW JERSEY MUNICIPAL LAND USE LAW (MLUL)  N.J.S.A. 40:55-32 ...........................................................................................................31  N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70 ........................................................................................................29,30  N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70(c) .................................................................................................29,31  N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70(c)(1) ............................................................................................29,31  N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70(c)(2) ............................................................................................29,30,31,35  I.  PREAMBLE  The Trial Court correctly found that Distance Regulation is constitutional because it is based on substantial government interests of traffic safety and aesthetics.  The Trial Court also correctly upheld the [...]’s denial of a bulk variance based on the Distance Regulation.  Plaintiff argues that the Distance Regulation is unconstitutional because the Planning Board members failed to sufficiently identify the substantial government interest underpinning the Distance Regulation.  In other words, Plaintiff argues that the Planning Board did not present sufficient evidence at the variance hearing that the Distance Regulation was constitutional and therefore the Trial Court should have found that the Distance Regulation is unconstitutional.  As will be explained below, this argument misses the mark entirely because it is extremely well settled law it is not the function of planning boards to decide constitutional questions and, in that regard, planning boards in New Jersey do not have the statutory authority to determine the constitutionality of an existing ordinance.
[brief] The cited cases, Concerned Citizens, Willoughby, DeRose and Horsnall, must represent the exception rather than the rule.  [Id. at 401 (emphasis added)].  In this matter, the trial court correctly recognized [...]’s interests in challenging Ordinance No. 13-2022 reflected the private interest of a limited public found in Rocky Hill, making such interest “not the type of interest contemplated under the limitation’s exception.
[brief] At the same time, [...] also owned and operated the “[...]” brand.  (See Pa188) ([...] email signature reflecting “[...]”).  This brand also ran a website and sold [...], just as the [...] website did.  (See Pa197).  Indeed, the [...] website linked to the [...] website (bottom right corner of page), and the logos for the “[...]” and “[...]” are nearly identical.  (See id.).  From the start, [...] distributed Summerset branded products – both furniture and grills – under both brandings, which operated for all practical purposes as a single unit.  [...] also publicly advertised to the consuming public its special relationship with the Summerset brand.  For example, in 2012, [...]’s email signature block emphasized that Mr. Farrell was uniquely representing the Summerset brand products, displayed as follows:  [...] [...] [...] [...] [...] [...] [another product put out by Summerset] (See Pa188-Pa189).  This signature block contains the [...] address, paired with the Summerset-owned websites, once again confirming the unique, special relationship between [...]’s Summerset entities and [...].  Additionally, in the years to come, [...] would also provide business cards to their customers with both the [...] name and Summerset branding side-by-side (see Pa553), as well as wrap [...]’s trucks with both the [...] and Summerset branding, continuing to emphasize the deep ties between the companies.  (see Pa152 at ¶ 59).  F.
[brief] (Pa13-Pa14).  While a Board is generally bound by its enabling statutes, it has inherent authority to reopen administrative matters upon a showing of good cause, reasonable grounds, and reasonable diligence.  Minsavage for Minsavage v. Bd. of Trs., Teachers’ Pension & Annuity Fund, 240 N.J. 103, 109 (2019).  A member seeking relief by way of the Board’s inherent powers also “must demonstrate extreme hardship and a clear equity in his favor. ”  Buono v. Bd. of Trs., Teachers’ Pension & Annuity Fund, 188 N.J. Super. 488, 493 (App. Div. 1983).  Contrary to [...]’s assertions, (Pb13-14), the Board considered its inherent power as well as his affidavit and the affidavits of the other troopers that he submitted in support of his contention that he was not provided notice.  After considering its equitable power and the affidavits presented, the Board reasonably concluded that “[...] did not exercise reasonable diligence nor demonstrate reasonable grounds for such a protracted delay in filing the eligibility registration form,” where he filed his form one year and one month past the deadline.  (Pa14).
[brief] ”  U.S. Const., amends. IV; N.J. Const. art. I, ¶ 7; Mapp. v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656-57 (1961) (applying the Fourth Amendment to the states via the Fourteenth Amendment).  Pursuant to these protections, police generally must get a warrant before stopping and searching a person or their property.  State v. Witt, 223 N.J. 409, 422 (2015).  Warrantless stops and searches are presumptively \(^2\) Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).  invalid.  *State v. Edmonds*, 211 N.J. 117, 129 (2012).  The State bears the burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that any warrantless stop or search is justified by one of the “well-delineated exceptions to the warrant requirement.
[brief] By unlawfully acting as a foreclosure consultant without being licensed as one, [...] flagrantly violated the plain language of N.J.S.A. 46:10B-55(a)(1) through (4).  Likewise, the entirety of [...]’s conduct relating to this attempted transaction violated N.J.S.A. 46:10B-56, which required [...] to have a “foreclosure consultant contract with [...], which he did not.  Finally, [...] violated N.J.S.A. 46:10B-58, subsections (a), (b), (e), and (g), which provide: a. claim, demand, charge, collect, or receive any compensation until after the foreclosure consultant has fully performed every distressed property service the foreclosure consultant contracted to perform and has secured the distressed property relief for the owner; b. claim, demand, charge, collect, or receive any fee, interest, or any other compensation for any reason, in excess of two monthly mortgage payments of principal and interest, or the most recent quarterly property tax installment on the distressed property, whichever is less; e. acquire any interest, directly or indirectly, or by means of a subsidiary or affiliate in a distressed property from an owner with whom the foreclosure consultant has contract; [or] g. induce or attempt to induce an owner to enter a contract that does not comply in all respects with sections 4 and 5 [C.46:10B-56 and 46:10B-57] of this act.
[brief] Id. 627.  There, the court contrasted the insurance broker profession from the home inspector profession, explicitly stating that insurance brokers are exempt from liability under the CFA, providing:  In deciding insurance brokers were learned professionals, the court noted that they must be licensed, pass an examination, meet application requirements, comply with the standard of conduct that delineate “unfair trade practices” and other requirements, and overall are “subject to testing, licensing and regulation comparable to real estate brokers, and thus are exempt from liability under the CFA[.]”
[directive] Most notably, on April 11, 2020, the [...] ([...]) published a model policy on Allocation of Critical Care Resources and issued [...] Executive Directive 20-006, which provided During a Public Health Emergency in relevant part:  A health care facility that adopts the Department of Health’s model policy Allocation of Critical Care Resources  During a Public Health Emergency, as well as the health care facility’s agents, officers, employees, servants, representatives and volunteers, shall not be civilly liable for any damages arising from an injury to a patient caused by any act or omission pursuant to, and consistent with, such policy.  Such immunity supplements any other immunities and defenses that may apply.  HUGHES JUSTICE COMPLEX ∙ TELEPHONE: (609)292-9660  FAX: (609)292-4299  New Jersey is an Equal Opportunity Employer ∙ Printed on Recycled Paper and Recyclable  [...] updated and amended its model policy on December 16, 2020, and revised Executive Directive 20-006 to account for the changes to the model policy.  These actions by [...] followed the Governor’s recognition in Executive Order No. 112 (April 1, 2020) that “healthcare providers and facilities may be called upon to engage in acts or omissions that are critical to State’s response to the unprecedented crisis related to the COVID-19 pandemic, but that may not have been contemplated by the Legislature when it enacted existing statutory immunity provisions. ”  Neither Executive Order No. 112 nor [...]’s actions addressed healthcare providers’ potential criminal liability for triage decisions, such as removing a patient from a ventilator.
[brief] (Pb29-32).  That addition was improper as it afforded plaintiff nearly an additional two months to prepare his Brief beyond the time frame prescribed by this Court.  Notably, plaintiff also added an argument in his amended Brief that he had not made in his original Brief – i.e., that discovery was not complete when the [...] moved for summary judgment.  (Pb30-32).  However, plaintiff never raised the issue in opposition to defendant’s motion for summary judgment.  Instead, he now seeks to raise it for the first time on appeal.
[directive] 10.0.1  County Prosecutors are responsible for conducting substantive oversight to ensure that the internal affairs functions of all law enforcement agencies within their jurisdiction are operating professionally and effectively.  As specialists with deep experience in the criminal justice system and working in the community, prosecutors are well situated for identifying procedural deficiencies before serious issues emerge with an agency’s internal affairs function.  As such, County Prosecutors must review the information they receive from law enforcement and the public regarding internal affairs, and swiftly follow up if there are any signs of trouble.  10.0.2  County Prosecutor Offices are an important alternative venue for the filing of internal affairs complaints against an officer of any law enforcement agency in their jurisdiction.  Prosecutors must be especially alert to any indication from complainants or the public that the process for receiving and investigating complaints of misconduct is not operating in accordance with the guidelines in this document.  For instance, any indication that a member of the public who attempted to file a complaint was turned away or dissuaded is extremely serious and must be immediately investigated.  10.0.3  It is also critical that County Prosecutors substantively review the summary reports that they receive from the internal affairs functions of agencies in their jurisdiction, including municipal police departments.  The role of the prosecutor is not limited to ensuring that such reports are submitted on time.  Instead, prosecutors must examine the reports, and conduct follow up investigation when concerning patterns emerge.  For instance, if an agency consistently appears to summarily close administrative investigations in instances where criminal investigations are declined, then that would be cause for further investigation.  Or, if an agency’s officers have been the subjects of numerous serious complaints over a long span of time, but no such complaint has ever been sustained, then that would merit a close review.  County Prosecutors are at all times empowered to direct that an agency’s internal affairs files be shared with prosecutors for the purposes of facilitating further investigation.  10.0.4
[brief] The Court reasoned that unlike in *Balian*, which involved a staged experiment, “film evidence which is introduced as independent evidence of the crime[] should be admitted without corroborative testimony by an eyewitness if the film is otherwise authenticated. ”  *Id.* at 509.  Testimony concerning the installation, testing, operation, and activation of the camera was sufficient to authenticate the --- ²  The Court ultimately held that the video was improperly admitted into evidence on grounds of undue prejudice to the plaintiff.  video.  *Id.* at 509-10.  The Supreme Court addressed the admissibility of video recordings as demonstrative evidence of a crime in *Wilson*, where a video was filmed three days after the crime.
[brief] Respondent was sworn in as a member of the [...], [...] (“the Board”) on January 7, 2022.  Ca2.  Approximately two months later, on March 2, 2022, Complainants filed a complaint with the Commission alleging that Respondent violated the School Ethics Act.  Ca379-Ca396.  Complainants subsequently amended their complaint.  Ca240-Ca378.  Count 1 of the amended complaint relates to January 17, 2022 Facebook post in Respondent shared and agreed with another post that Complainants describe being “anti-union, anti-vaccination and anti-testing.
[brief] (GJT13-10 to 21; Ca130).  The trial court stated:  I'm not giving any credibility to the officer's testimony based upon the fact that he had prior dealings with [...].  I agree with [...], that we're just looking on that date in question.  And on that date in question he clearly has knowledge that he's supposed to surveil that area.  He has S-1 through 3, so he knows the photographs.  He has prior knowledge of [...], but in regards to whether his warrantless search is effective, I'm looking at his conduct on that day...
[brief] Id. at 488-489.  Brown adopted the decision in Casey, supra, that no discount is allowed absent “extraordinary circumstances”.  Id. at 486-487.  It also recognized in its facts that:  But liquidity is of little consequence here.  As between [...] and his brothers, the only other shareholders, there is no evidence of a contemplated sale of all or Part of the business, forced or otherwise.  All of the evidence supports the likelihood that the business will continue under the present ownership for the foreseeable future, with [...] and [...] each continuing to be the active owners and officers….  [Id. at 488].  As such, the only case on which the Court here relied, which did support a discount, *Balsamides*, had facts entirely dissimilar to this one and was “extraordinary” on its unique facts.
[brief] Indeed, a reasonable perspective on Defendant [...]’s conduct was proffered by [...] in her deposition testimony, when she stated as follows:  I don’t know actually what the law would be called when – is that harassment?  Is that – I mean, I’m sure there’s a terminology for it.  Like whether – I’m not sure what you call it.  I’m sure there’s a law, yes.  There’s definitely a law that says that you can’t act like that in your work environment, and you can’t invade people’s personal space, and you can’t hold the door on people, and you can’t, you know, make statements, and, and just create a toxic work environment.  (Pa308).  Defendants’ argument, accepted by the Motion Court, that Plaintiff’s belief was unreasonable, and that the conduct does not constitute statutory harassment is simply contradictory to the statutory language and, instead, likely draws from perceptions of criminal harassment outside of the text.
[brief] The trial court refused to enforce the January Terms by stating that [...] “seemingly does not argue” that those terms “come into effect. ”  (Da304.)  But that is simply incorrect: [...] *did* argue that, if [...]’s agreement to the December Terms was somehow invalid, then her agreement to the January Terms remained active and that contract too required arbitration of this dispute.  (Da212–18; T18-14–20.)  If this Court were to accept Plaintiffs’ argument that [...] never agreed to the December Terms, then the January Terms govern the parties’ relationship and Plaintiffs must arbitrate their claims.  **IV.
[brief] Having considered the record and argument of counsel, we find that the court did not abuse its discretion in weighing the factors under State v. Slater, 198 N.J. 145 (2009), and thus we affirm the denial of defendant's motion to withdraw the guilty plea.  State v.  McDonald, 211 N.J. 4 (2012).  FOR THE COURT: [...], J.A.D. MERCER  [...] [...]  March 28, 2024
[brief] It is thus patently clear that there exists no nexus or other constitutional limitation which would infringe upon, or otherwise fetter the Legislature’s deliberate delegation of such expansion power.  See State v. Profaci, 56 N.J. 346, 349 (1970) (addressing various substantive attacks on the LRHL); and see Gallenthin, supra, 191 N.J. at 359-60 (citing State v. Miller, 170 N.J. 417, 433 (2002) (“Even through a statute may be open to a construction which would render it unconstitutional or permits its unconstitutional application, it is the duty of this Court to so construe the statute as to render it constitutional if it is reasonably susceptible to such interpretation.
[brief] ”  *Zentz v. Toop*, 92 N.J. Super. 105, 113 (App. Div. 1966).  Where the defendant's actions create a foreseeable risk of harm in a slip and fall case, an injured plaintiff need not prove either actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition.  *See generally Tymczyszn v. Columbus Gardens*, 422 N.J. Super. 253, 264 (App. Div. 2011).  Accordingly, in the present case, the pertinent issue is whether the Defendants created or allowed an unreasonably dangerous condition to occur on January 5, 2022 which caused [...] to slip on the stairs landing and sustain serious injury.
[brief] For example, how could the City know if it had a statute of limitations defense, since no persons, dates or events were identified?  How could the City assess and argue that the unidentified persons allegedly subjected to discrimination did not suffer from a qualifying disability?  Or that they failed to seek an accommodation?  In fact, the Complaint was devoid of any specific allegation which, if true, would have demonstrated that any [...] member fell into a protected class under the LAD.  Plaintiff again points to its reference to "[...]" in its Complaint to attempt to demonstrate satisfaction of a prima facie case.  To be clear, the City's position was and is that several of the elements outlined above are absent from the Second Amended Complaint as concerns "[...]" as well.  That notwithstanding, as the Trial Court correctly construed, "[...]" is of no moment and any discrimination claim by or relating to him was outside of the Court's jurisdiction.
[brief] When [...] was deposed in the Shelton case in February of 2022, he was questioned about whether there were any issues with Appellant’s job performance and whether Appellant had been reprimanded and he responded that there had been no issues and no reprimand.  *(Pa330, [...] Deposition, 5/11/22, T28:23-25, T29:1-3)*  [...] was questioned about whether Appellant had been provided with a remedial program or performance improvement program and he responded no.  *(Pa330, [...] Deposition, 5/11/22, T26:20-23, T28:14-19)*  With this testimony which supports the fact that the Appellant was performing her job satisfactorily, the non-renewal of her contract was not because of poor job performance and it suggests that Appellant was subjected to discrimination based on race and retaliation which were the reasons that her contract was not renewed.