ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] 4  At trial, in addition to [...]’s MVR, the State introduced two photos of the Suburban with the front windows up; [...] testified that the photos were taken on the scene.  (2T 106-5 to 107-22, 108-18 to 136-21; Da 22-23) of marijuana only when he got to the driver’s side.  (2T 74-19 to 22, 83-20 to 84-3)  [...] then changed his testimony to say that he smelled marijuana “as soon as I approached the vehicle. ” (2T 104-18 to 24); see also (2T 160-12 to 161-23; 3T 9-5 to 17-22) (defense counsel drawing attention to inconsistency and fact that there was no mention of marijuana odor during first eight minutes of stop).  When asked to smell the gas mask (which had been sealed in a bag since the suppression hearing) and rank the strength of the odor of marijuana, [...] testified that it was a one or two, as opposed to the eight or nine he gave it at the suppression hearing.  (3T 60-24 to 64-7, 108-4 to 134-2)  [...]’s explanation of the discrepancy was that at the suppression hearing, he meant “[i]t smells like an 8 or a 9 as -- as in the fact that it’s marijuana and it doesn’t smell like cigarette smoke; it doesn’t smell like anything else besides that odor of marijuana. ”  (3T 145-16 to 146-1)  He testified that the overall potency of the smell of marijuana, however, was only a one or a two.  (3T 146-2 to 7)  The marijuana flakes that [...] allegedly observed inside of the gas mask were never tested.  (3T 124-24 to 126-13)  The State also called [...], who testified that he participated in the search of the Suburban and found a silver and black handgun in the center console.
[brief] The trial court misapprehended the significance of the case of *Livingstone v. Abraham & Straus, Inc.*, 111 N.J. 89, 105-106 (1988), which Plaintiff cited for its holding that, “by requiring its employees to park in a distant section of the lot,” an employer “caused its employees to be exposed to an added hazard, on a daily basis, in order to enhance its business interests. ”  As in the instant matter, in *Livingstone*, the distant lot where the employer required its employees to park was lacking in pedestrian safeguards: The lot has no pedestrian walkways.  Employees must make their way across the lot to and from the perimeter areas in day and night, whatever the condition of season, traffic or weather.  Thus, we do not think that it can fairly be said that the employee is subjected only to the same risks as other users of the lot.  To the contrary, it would seem logical that the hazard of traversing an expansive parking area is a function of the distance between the parking spot and the employer's store.  [Livingstone v. Abraham & Straus, Inc., 216 N.J. Super. 685, 691 (App. Div. 1987), aff'd, 111 N.J. 89 (1988). ]
[brief] The Property**  [...] was the contract purchaser of Block 131.2, Lot 6 and 7 on Montville’s Tax Map (the “Property”), located at [...].  [Da19].  Lot 6 is used as a farm and Lot 7 has a small dwelling.  The Property is 8.077 acres in size, has approximately 510 feet of frontage on Changebridge Road and is 850 feet deep.  [Pa256].  Immediately north of the Property is a bus depot, and further north is Montville’s municipal complex.  [Da19].  South of the Property are single-family dwellings, and further south are a childcare facility, gas station and shopping centers.  [Da19].  Single-family dwellings are east of the Property across Changebridge Road, while a townhouse development abuts the Property to the west.  [Da19].  According to the Township’s planner, the neighborhood is characterized by a variety of uses, and notably, the west side of Changebridge Road where the Property is located is predominantly non-residential.  [Pa38].  **B.
[brief] The accident occurred on December 29, 2019.  Plaintiff’s life expectancy at the time of trial was 54.7 years.  Plaintiff utilized a time unit argument during closing.  $3.5 million dollars divided by 57 (Plaintiff’s life expectancy using 54 years, plus three years from the time of the accident to the time of trial) is less than $61,500 per year.  The entire verdict was unanimous.  Based on the all the foregoing, the verdict of $3.5 million dollars does not shock the Court’s conscious.
[brief] The State concurs with the notion that uncertainty is present when a case is still pending but when that case concludes, the initial uncertainty dissolves and information previously unknown becomes available.  Where the State diverges from the lower court’s rationale is the significance given to the probationary outcome of the Essex firearm convictions.  If the defendant had been sentenced to a period of incarceration in Essex County, there is no dispute he would be barred from entry into the Morris County Recovery Court program.  The State posits, and the lower court agrees, that a defendant cannot serve a prison sentence and a term of probation simultaneously.  (Sa83).
[brief] Coverage was required because the employer was only vicariously liable for [...]’s sexual harassment and had not itself acted intentionally to sexually harass the plaintiff.  The Supreme Court’s opinions in *Charles Beseler Co. v. O’Gorman & Young, Inc.*, 188 N.J. 542 (2006), and *New Jersey Manufacturers Insurance Co. v. Delta Plastics Corp.*, 188 N.J. 582 (2006), further demonstrate that the Court has declined to apply the statutes Plaintiff cites to require insurance coverage for intentional wrongs.
[brief] [...] correctly issued the search warrant based on [...]’s affidavit establishing probable cause.  Had [...] appeared before a Lakewood municipal judge, that judge would have issued a similar warrant to search defendant’s vehicle.  See *Hamlett*, 449 N.J. Super. at 178.  And given that the search revealed evidence of weapons, the officers swiftly requested and lawfully received consent to search defendant’s home for weapons.  The fact that these actions took place just over the Toms River border in Lakewood was a mere technical violation, if deemed a violation at all.
[brief] *State v. J.T.*, 455 N.J. Super. 176, 215 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 235 N.J. 466, 467 (2018).  Under the doctrine of “curative admissibility,” “when one party introduces inadmissible evidence, thereafter the opposing party may introduce otherwise inadmissible evidence to rebut or explain the prior evidence,” *State v. James*, 144 N.J. 538, 555 (1996) (emphasis in original), in order “to remove any unfair prejudice which might otherwise have ensued from the original evidence. ”  *Vandeweaghe*, 177 N.J. at 238.
[brief] To determine whether the owner of property had a duty in particular circumstances to the injured person, a court must examine such factors as: (1) the relationship of the parties, (2) the nature of the attendant risk, (3) the opportunity and ability to exercise care, and (4) the public interest in the proposed solution.  *Meier v. D’Ambrose*, 419 N.J. Super. 439, 445 (App. Div. 2011)  In analyzing the relationship of the parties, Plaintiff was clearly an invitee, as her presence was solely occasioned by the fact that she was invited onto [...]’s premises for business purposes to purchase a food product.
[brief] The statute explicitly provides for several disclosure exemptions, but mail vendors are not included in those exemption [sic].  We are aware of at least one unpublished federal court decision\(^1\) addressing the same issue and it is in accord with *Hunstein I* and *II*, *Khimmat*, and *Jackin*.  We have found no contrary unpublished federal decisions, but Plaintiff does not rely on unpublished decisions.  *Cf.* R. 1:36-3.  Here, the motion court never acknowledged any federal court decisions and did not address the reasoning in those decisions.  Instead, the motion court turned to the seven unpublished Law Division decisions provided by Defendant.  Pa49-Pa151.  Of those, only two mentioned any federal court decision (see Pa52, Pa139, Pa146) but none of them discussed the reasoning behind any of them.  In contrast, before being re-assigned to the Appellate Division, [...] denied a debt collector’s motion to dismiss a consumer’s mail vendor claim and relied, in part, on *Khimmat*.  Pa27.  **POINT IV.
[brief] 2.  The Master shall review the petitioner’s municipal housing element and fair share plan; identify any concerns the Master may have and give the municipality, and any interveners, an opportunity to address the same.  3.  The Master may opine as to whether said housing element and fair share plan, in its present form or any amended form, creates a realistic opportunity for the municipality’s fair share of low and moderate housing for all applicable housing cycles.  4.  The Master may, and is authorized to, confer directly, and individually, with the petitioner and with any intervenors, including with their respective authorized planning consultants, and may conduct joint meetings with the petitioner and any intervenors; 5.  The Master may, and is authorized to, consult directly with the court without the presence of petitioner and/or any intervenor; 6.  The Master shall also act as a mediator in the event there is opposition presented by any intervenor to the petitioner's municipal housing element and fair share plan.  7.  The Master shall submit monthly invoices to the municipality and to any intervenors for payment by them, in equal shares, in accordance with the procedure for payment of vendors.  If the municipality or any intervenor contests any such charges, same shall notify the Master and attempt to resolve the disagreement, failing to do so either same or the Master may bring the dispute to the court for resolution.
[brief] ”  Berg, 255 N.J. at 264; see also, e.g., Camden v. Byrne, 82 N.J. 133, 147 (1980) (“[T]he Legislature has the inherent power to disregard prior fiscal enactments. ”)  To illustrate this point, consider N.J.S.A. 17B:27D-6, one of the statutes alleged by Petitioners to have been violated here (it was not, as further discussed below).
[brief] \(^{11}\)  For example, [...] affixed the number “253” to its church on Lot 20 in what appears to be an attempt to claim ownership of the property “to the left of the church when one is standing and facing the church,” as [...] expressly states in its Counterclaim.  Da31 at ¶ 3.  As stated above, Lot 19 (i.e., the lot to the right of the church when one is facing the church from Bergen St.) has an address of [...]  See Pa11.  Lot 20 where the church is located has a street address of 255-  Additionally, [...] cannot rely upon the [...] for the reasons set forth above, including its inapposite legal opinions about [...]’s satisfaction of the adverse possession statute.  E.g., Da130-131 at ¶¶ 25-30.  The [...]’s legal conclusion that [...] satisfied the statutory time period is meritless.  [...]’s adverse possession claim fails on these grounds as well and the trial court Order must be upheld.
[brief] Appellants misconstrue the “well-settled right” inquiry.  Appellants seem to believe that a right is only well settled where there is binding legal authority on the precise legal issue applied to the precise set of facts.  See (Db14) (arguing the State lacks a well-settled right because it did not identify a specific precedent holding “that parental notification violates [the] LAD”).  But this court’s cases have long made clear that the inquiry is whether the underlying body of law is settled, not whether the specific outcome of a specific lawsuit is already settled by precedent.
[directive] Vehicular Pursuit Policy  2.8  Pursuit Vehicles.  A Primary Unit is the police vehicle that initiates a pursuit or any unit that assumes control of the pursuit as the lead vehicle (the first police vehicle immediately behind the fleeing suspect).  A Secondary Unit is any police vehicle which becomes involved as a backup to the primary unit and follows the primary unit at a safe distance.  2.9  Roadblock.  A restriction or obstruction used or intended for the purpose of preventing free passage of motor vehicles on a roadway in order to effectuate the apprehension of a violator.  An avenue of escape is a gap in a roadblock which requires the violator to decrease the vehicle's speed to permit the violator to bypass the roadblock.  A blocking vehicle is a motor vehicle, often a law enforcement vehicle, which is placed perpendicular to a roadway or angled in such a way as to create a roadblock.  2.10  Supervisor.  A police officer who, by virtue of rank or assignment, is responsible for the direction or supervision of the activities of other police officers.  2.11  Vehicle Contact Action.  Any action undertaken by the pursuing officer intended to result in contact between the moving police vehicle and the pursued vehicle.  2.12  Violator.  Any person who an officer reasonably believes (1) has committed, or is engaged in a conspiracy or attempt to commit, any crime of the first degree or one of the violent or serious crimes of the second degree enumerated in Section 3.2 of this policy, or (2) poses an imminent threat to the safety of the public or other police officers, as that threat is defined in Section 3.2 of this policy, set forth below.  3
[brief] The purpose of the Notice is to alert the parties of the basis of the cause of action, but to provide support for its cause of action in the complaint.  It could not, since the order of abandonment was entered months after the complaint and notice was served.  (Aa21)  (Aa22)  Plaintiff’s process is akin to a plaintiff filing a complaint to foreclosure a tax sale certificate, that had not been assigned, as of filing the cause of action or filing the complaint prior to the two years from the tax sale contrary to N.J.S.A 54:5-86(a).
[brief] [...] filed her Complaint against Defendants on September 10, 2021.  (Pa1-13).  Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss on December 23, 2021, and, following its denial, their Answer on February 14, 2022.  (Pa14-22).  Defendants thereafter filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on April 17, 2024.  (Pa23-24).  [...] filed her opposition on June 12, 2024, (Pa655-86), and Defendants filed a reply on July 1, 2024, (Pa689-708).  The trial court heard oral argument on July 15, 2024 and issued its decision granting Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment at that time, with an Order following.  (Pa712-13).  [...] filed her Notice of Appeal on August 22, 2024 and an Amended Notice of Appeal on September 3, 2024.  (Pa714-33).  **STATEMENT OF FACTS**
[brief] In fact, the Intervenor goes so far as to use an inapplicable section of UDO to justify their position.  On page 12 of their brief, the Intervenor claims that UDO § 18-601 requires a showing of hardship to justify a waiver.  Aside from the fact that the Intervenor again leaves out the language about impracticability, the Plaintiff is seeking a waiver from § 18-805, not § 18-601.  The Intervenor’s citation to Cobble Close Farm v. Bd. Of Adjustment of Middletown Tp., 10 N.J. 442, 455 (1952) is wholly misplaced.  The Intervenor argues that the case requires a governing body be made a party to any action involving a challenge to an ordinance’s validity.  While this is what the case says, it has nothing whatsoever to do with the situation at issue.  Plaintiff is not challenging an ordinance, they are correctly pointing out that the applicable ordinance, UDO § 18-805(c) does not require a showing of hardship.
[directive] Defendant Defense Counsel Prosecutor State Parole Board Dept of Corrections or County Penal Institution  Juvenile Justice Commission  State of New Jersey v. [...] # Ind / Acc / Complt # Time Credits  Time Spent in Custody Gap  Time Spent in Custody  Prior Service Credit 3:21-8 2C:44-5b(2)  R. N.J.S.A. - - - Date: From To Date: From To Date: From To - - - - - - - - - - -  Total Number of Days - - Rosado Time - - - Date: From To - - - - - - - - - - -  Total Number of Days  Total Number of Days  Total Number of Days  Include all applicable aggravating and mitigating factors  Statement of Reasons - Attorney for Defendant at Sentencing Public Defender Yes No □ Prosecutor at Sentencing Deputy Attorney General Yes No □  Judge at Sentencing Judge (Signature)  Date February 2021, page New Jersey Judiciary, Revised CN: 10070  Copies to: County Probation Division  Defendant Defense Counsel Prosecutor State Parole Board Dept of Corrections or County Penal Institution
[brief] Atl. Ambulance Corp. v. Cullum, 451 N.J. Super. 247 (App. Div. 2017)  .................................................................7  Cafaro v. HMC Int’l, LLC, No. 07-CV-2793 (KM) (JAD), 2012 WL 4857763, (D.N.J. Oct. 11, 2012)  .................................................................4  Cartel Capital Corp. v. Fireco of N.J., 81 N.J. 548 (1980)  .........................................................................................11  City of Atl. City v. Trupos, 201 N.J. 447 (2010)  .......................................................................................3  Dantinne v. Brown, No. 17-0486, 2017 WL 2766167 (D.N.J. June 3, 2017)  ..................................10  Delso v. Trs. for Ret. Plan for Hourly Emps. of Merck & Co., No. 04–3009 (AET), 2007 WL 766349, (D.N.J. Mar. 6, 2007) .........................4 Dewey v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 109 N.J. 201 (1988) .........................................................................................3, 4 Ellison v. Evergreen Cemetery, 266 N.J. Super. 74 (App. Div. 1993) ..................................................................7 Essex Cnty. Jail Annex Inmates v. Treffinger, 18 F. Supp.2d 418 (D.N.J. 1998) ....................................................................4 Hill v. New Jersey Dep’t of Corr. Com’r Fauver, 342 N.J. Super. 273 (App. Div. 2001) .............................................................10 In Re Abrams, 56 N.J. 271 (1970) ..........................................................................................12 In re Congoleum Corp., 426 F.3d 675 (3d Cir. 2005) ..............................................................................4 In re Duke, 305 N.J. Super. 408 (Ch. Div. 1995) ...............................................................5 In Re Garber, 95 N.J. 597 (1984) ..........................................................................................13 In re Grand Jury, 200 N.J. 481 (2009)
[brief] 29  A.  Standard of Review .................................................................  29  B.  Strictly Construed Against [...], the Vague and Ambiguous Contract is Open to More Than One Meaning and Does Not Contain Bright Line Language Sufficient to Overcome the Presumption Against Indemnification  ...........  31  C.  New Jersey Courts’ Inconsistent Findings Regarding Substantially Similar Indemnification Clauses Illustrate Ambiguity .............................................................................  38  CONCLUSION ..................................................................................
[brief] a § 1983 procedural due process claim, a plaintiff must show: (1) that he or she was deprived of a property interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, and (2) that the process attendant to the deprivation was constitutionally deficient.  *Ky. Dep't of Corr. v. Thompson*, 490 U.S. 454, 460 (1989).  In other words, the plaintiff must establish that the state or governmental procedure for challenging the alleged deprivation does not satisfy the requirements of procedural due process.  *DeBlasio v. Zoning Board of Adjustment for Tp. of West Amwell*, 53 F.3d 592, 597 (3d. Cir. 1995) abrogated on other grounds *United Artists*, supra 316 F.3d at 401.
[brief] ”  T 99:18-19.  Notwithstanding Appellant’s contention that there was no one named “[...]” at the subject location at the time of service, [...] correctly found that it was reasonable that [...] thought he heard [...] respond “Linda” when he asked her name.  Indeed, the phonetic similarity between “Linda” and “[...]” is undisputed.  Finally, the fact that the initial Affidavit of Service had the incorrect date is of no consequence.
[directive] When the Investigation is Administrative and the Officer Is a Subject  8.4.1  A public employee must answer questions specifically, directly and narrowly related to the performance of their official duties, on pain of dismissal.  This obligation exists even though the answers to the questions may implicate them in a violation of agency rules, regulations and procedures that may ultimately result in some form of discipline up to and including dismissal.  In short, no “right to remain silent” exists in administrative investigations.  8.4.2  However, internal affairs investigators in civil service jurisdictions should be aware that, under civil service rules, an employee cannot be forced to testify at their own disciplinary hearing.8  As a matter of fairness, the internal affairs investigator in a civil service jurisdiction should refrain from questioning a subject officer about a particular disciplinary offense if the officer has already been charged with that offense and is awaiting an administrative hearing on the charge.  8.4.3  Prior to the start of any questioning, the officer shall be advised that he or she is being questioned as the subject of an investigation into potential violations of agency rules and regulations, or fitness for duty.  He or she should be advised of the subject matter under investigation, and that he or she will be asked questions specifically related to performing their official duties.  N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.6(c).  8  50  INTERNAL AFFAIRS POLICY & PROCEDURES | June 2021
[brief] Evidence of Public Purpose  Contrary to the Appellant's assertion, the Township's decision to acquire the property in question was based on a demonstrable and pressing need for open space to prevent overdevelopment, preserve the environment, and provide recreational areas for the public.  It is abundantly clear that the record provides the Township believed it more appropriate and better planning for proposed religious dormitories to be constructed by a third party be relocated to property that the Township currently owns, which borders the common boundary line with [...].
[brief] THE CSC’S VALIDATION OF THE CITY’S UNLAWFUL PROMOTIONS IN JULY 2022 IS ARBITRARY, CAPRICIOUS AND UNREASONABLE.  THE CSC’S USE OF THESE UNLAWFUL PROMOTIONS AS A BASIS TO DENY APPELLANT’S PROMOTION IS ARBITRARY, CAPRICIOUS AND UNREASONABLE (Raised Below: PA6, PA8).  This appeal involves the City’s purported inability, as per the CSC, to promote Appellant to the rank of “Captain” due to a lack of “genuine” vacancies in the rank prior to January 16, 2023, the expiration date of Appellant’s CSC eligible promotional list, “[...]. ” (“Promotional List”; “List [...]”).  Pa5 and Pa65.  In its ruling, the CSC held that “genuine vacancies” do not include “an intention to retire” or “anticipated” retirements.  (Citations omitted).  Pa8.  The undisputed facts here establish, however, that “genuine vacancies” existed for Appellant’s promotion based on “actual retirements” but that such vacancies were, instead, unlawfully used to remedy prior unlawful promotions the City made in July 2022 when there were no “genuine vacancies.
[brief] POINT III  THE BOROUGH HAS IDENTIFIED ITS REASONS FOR ISSUING THE RESOLUTION.  [...] falsely claims that the record evidences a “total absence of identifiable criteria” that was “applied to [...]’s] application. ”  Appellant Br. 13.  Instead, the Resolution specifically states that the Subcommittee and Council conducted a “thorough and comprehensive review and evaluation of all the applications, together with the interviews conducted by the Subcommittee with each applicant and the presentations made by each applicant and public comments made at a Borough Special Public Meeting. ” (65a-66a).
[brief] (Da16 pg 59, Line 17 through pg. 60, Line 7; Da17 pg. 62, Lines 3-19.)  [...] testified and acknowledged that [...] had contacted him to discuss environmental issues discovered on the property, including authorization to install the vapor mitigation system.  (Da138 pg. 42, Lines 11-15; Da175 pg. 79, Line 18 through Da178 pg. 82, Line 10.)