ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Q.  You conclude on page 2 of your report that the value of the fixtures and equipment was $616,635 as of January 27, 1994, correct?  A.  Correct, sir.  Q.  And did you make a determination that the items you valued were present on the property as of January, 1994?  A.  Yes.  Both [...] were there to tell me that the items had been there as of condemnation date, and that's on an item-by-item basis.  Q.  So other than [...], senior or junior, telling you these items were present in January of 1994, you didn't make any independent investigation to verify those statements, correct?  A.  Correct.  Yet in his certification to the Court and deposition testimony, [...] contradicted [...]’s conclusion that the 516 items were present in 1994.  [...] submitted a sworn certification to the Court and later testified indicating that in 1994, the Crown Chicken space was occupied by a Chinese Restaurant.  In his report [...] concluded that the total value of the items in the Nu Soul Cafe in 1994 was $63,514.  [...] certified that there was a Fish Market in the Nu Soul Café space in 1994.  Ibid.
[brief] Findings of fact indicating the basis for the Board’s decision are made which directly correlate to the application, not the interpretation of the law by the [...] (keeping in mind no interpretation was requested).  As such, deference is required.  The Court should remember that under Statute and cases to be discussed, the [...] is given the exclusive jurisdiction to hear the appeal of the finding of the [...] (Nadelson and MLUL grant of powers to [...]).
[brief] [...], Esq.-ID#035021986  [...]  [...] [...] [...]  Attorneys for Appellant  [...], Esq.  On the Brief June 4, 2024  #  TABLE OF CONTENTS | Section | Page No. | |------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------| | Index to Appendix | ii | | Table of Judgments, Orders and Rulings | v | | Table of Citations | vi | | Preliminary Statement | 1 | | LEGAL ARGUMENT | 2 | | The Board of Trustees Decision to Deny the Appellant Re-Enrollment in the Public Employees Retirement System Should be Reversed (Pa38,54) | 2 | | A. Standards of Review | 2 | | B.  The Board of Trustees  Denial of the Appellant’s Request for a Referral to the Office of Administrative Law was Arbitrary and Inconsistent with Established Law (Pa38-40;54,57)  | 4 | | C.  The Board Made Factual Findings that Were Not Supported by the Record (Pa38-40; 53-56) | 8 | | Conclusion | 10 |
[brief] Plaintiff further draws the attention of this court’s opinion in CBS Outdoor v. Lebanon Planning Board, 414 N.J. Super. 563 (App. Div. 2010), instructing:  A reviewing court’s analysis must focus on the validity of the Board’s action; . . . (citations omitted).  Although the scope of review of a local governmental agency decision is circumscribed, it is ‘not simply a pro forma exercise in which [the court] rubber stamp(s) findings that are not reasonably supported by the evidence. ’ (citations omitted).  [Id. at 578.]  Further, “[b]ecause the memorializing resolution of the Board is the wellhead for the judiciary’s consideration of the validity of municipal action, . . . [t]he resolution must rise or fall on its merits.  [A] mere recital of testimony or conclusory statements couched in statutory language is insufficient. ”  Id. at 580-81.  c.
[brief] The first provision provided:  All laws and parts of laws in conflict with the provisions of this act are hereby repealed insofar as they may be or have been applicable to the business of title insurance, title insurance companies, title insurance agents, or title insurance rating organizations; and, in case conflict should develop, the provisions of this act shall control and be effective.  [N.J.S.A. 17:46B-61 (quoted in Chicago Title, 388 N.J. Super. at 555). ]  The TIA further provided:  No provision of the insurance laws of this State, except as contained or referred to in this act, shall be applicable to title insurance companies, title insurance agents, title insurance rating organizations or the business of title insurance, and no law hereafter enacted shall apply to title insurance companies, title insurance agents, title insurance rating organizations or the business of title insurance unless specified to be or become so applicable.  [N.J.S.A. 17:46B–62 (quoted in Chicago Title, 388 N.J. Super. at 556). ]  Finally, the TIA set forth a list of provisions, stating that “only the following provisions of the laws governing insurance companies . . . as presently enacted and hereinafter amended, except as they are inconsistent with the provisions of this act, shall apply to the business of title insurance to title insurance companies [sic] . . . .”  Chicago Title, 388 N.J. Super. at 555.  The list did not include the Fraud Act.  On the other hand, the Fraud Act broadly defined the class of insurers liable for the Fraud Assessment: “all of the companies writing the class or classes of insurance described in Subtitle 3 of Title 17 of the Revised Statutes (R.S.17:17-1 et seq)., and Subtitle 3 of Title 17B of the New Jersey Statutes (N.J.S.17B:17-1 et seq).”
[brief] Plaintiffs have known [...] and his wife for many years, and consider them to be family through marriage, as Plaintiff’s niece is married to the Luciano’s nephew.  (Pa746)  Plaintiffs were frequent customers of [...].  (Pa921)  After eating dinner, Plaintiff exited the restaurant to walk to his car, which was parked in the front parking lot, in front of the building, to get a cake for his adult son’s birthday.  (Pa621)  Plaintiff retrieved the cake and walked back to the restaurant.  (Id.)  However, instead of entering through the public entrance at the front door, he proceeded past the front of the restaurant to the end of the building.  (Id.; Pa673)  He turned around the corner and proceeded alongside the north end of the property, toward the back, as he intended to enter Amore’s kitchen through a rear door.  (Id.)  As he progressed along the side of the building, he allegedly slipped on black ice and fell.  (Pa118-130; 673, 859.  See, also, Pa848, with “x” marking the spot where Plaintiff allegedly fell.)  [...] identified the location of Plaintiff’s accident as part of the parking lot and therefore a common area.  (Pa927 [294:1-7]).  She did not expect Amore to remove snow and ice from that location.  (Id. [294:8-12]).  Rather, she expected that the snow removal contractor would do so.  (Id. [294:13-16]).  Plaintiff filed his original complaint on July 3, 2018, approximately 15 months after the alleged accident.
[brief] New legislation is presumed to apply prospectively.  State v.  Lane, 251 N.J. 84, 94 (2022).  Exceptions to this general rule apply “only in instances ‘where there is no clear expression of intent by the Legislature that the statute is to be prospectively applied only. ’”  State v. J.V., 242 N.J. 432, 444 (2020) (quoting Gibbons v. Gibbons, 86 N.J. 515, 522 (1981)).  Not only is the new legislation “devoid of the slightest hint that the Legislature intended” it “to apply retroactively,” but courts in this state have also “repeatedly construed language stating that a provision is to be effective immediately . . . to signal prospective application. ”  Lane, 251 N.J. at 96.  When it adopted the new law, the Legislature used that very phrase – “This act shall take effect immediately” – foreclosing the suggestion that it be given retroactive effect.  See L. 2023, c. 129, §6.  To find otherwise in this case would amount to a textbook violation of the prohibitions on ex post facto laws in both the Federal and State Constitutions.
[brief] (Pb19).  In any event, enforcing the Agreement here does no violence to the efficient and cost-effective resolution of matters.  If Plaintiff intends to assert a claim against [...], as he did here, it will be arbitrated if not resolved through the mediation process which is a condition precedent that has yet to be fulfilled.  If [...] intends to assert a claim against Plaintiff, it will be arbitrated in all but one circumstance.
[brief] Defendant also asserts a TILA violation because Plaintiff failed to provide a toll-free number for debt management services pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1637(b)(11)(B)(iv).  Defendant cites to Defendant’s appendix at Da55, DA57, Da59, Da61, Da63, Da65, and Da67 in support of this assertion.  Defendant is incorrect and said assertion is misleading.  On the first page of the pertinent account statements, Plaintiff provides the requisite credit counseling language.  It expressly states, “If you would like information about credit counseling services, call [...]. ”  PA – 71, 79, 85, 91, 103, 111, 121, 133, 143, 153, 163, 171, 177, 181, 185, 191, 197, 201, 205, 211, 215, 219.  Query:  By raising such argument, does Defendant not admit his culpability for the Account?
[directive] 4.  ¿Entiende que 2C:35-14.2 estipula que, a menos que se cumplan ciertas N.J.S.A. excepciones, se requiere que el tribunal le imponga una condena obligatoria de libertad a prueba especial con el propósito de que participe en un programa de tratamiento contra drogas supervisado por el tribunal (“Tribunal de Drogas”)?  Do you understand that N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14.2 provides that unless certain exceptions are met, the court is required to sentence you to a mandatory sentence of special probation for the purpose of participating in a court-supervised drug treatment program (“Drug Court”)?
[directive] Coordination of Interagency Investigations  Before approving an application for permission to seek issuance of a search warrant, the Designated Attorney shall take reasonable steps to determine whether any other law enforcement agency at any level of government (federal, state, bi-state, county, local, or out-of-state agency) has an interest in a target of the investigation or the premises to be searched that might be adversely affected by execution of the warrant.  In that event, it shall be the general policy of this State to notify and consult with any such interested law enforcement agency prior to approving the search warrant application.  18.
[brief] They asserted that in exchange for their medical services [...] agreed in writing to compensate the plaintiffs.  The written agreement contained an assignment and specifically provided that plaintiffs would be compensated out of monies received by [...]'s attorneys as a result of the settlement of any litigation and that in the event of a dispute as to the amount of the unpaid bills the funds would be placed in escrow by her attorneys until the dispute was settled.  The Appellate Division found for [...], based on the principles articulated in Berkowitz v. Haigood, 256 N.J.Super. 342, 346-347 (Law Div.1992.  In Berkowitz, the Law Division stated:
[brief] The Policy’s Arbitration Clause is Permissive  [...] argues that the Law Division incorrectly ruled that the pollution Policy’s arbitration clause is not mandatory.  Db15.  Aside from the fact that waiver applies to mandatory arbitration policies, the Law Division correctly held that the use of the word “may” between sophisticated parties indicates permissive, rather than mandatory, intent.  Hearing Tr. 76:2-23.  Even if it did not, there can be no reasonable interpretation to infer that [...] ever intended to agree to empowering [...] with the unilateral right to nullify six years of litigation (or conceptually more) with such a belated arbitration demand.  Nor is there any evidence in the record below to suggest that.
[directive] rcJ-2-J- -'i'1 9.l 2rAJl ~<>ll "8"}9.J ~&¾ tj-::: ?£ 1 -8"}~ -1:f-AJl e {i.:il 1-1- .:Ee%~ '(! :;;J ~. '(!:;;J ~ ~ ~ 0 0 £<':!. 1t!-~ ;1ff-¥!- 7H .£..::Z.~(Pretrial Intervention Program)g_ ~ 0]e 1-'f-, .::Z. ?7} .::Z.? n: ~ ~ 0 0 ] }~  41~~,zi~=~~~~.£.%~~5:.~~1~~i..:J-.:Ee*~~2r~;;zi~:~1il~~.£.%~~.:s::.~ iMHfQ.~ -3:! AJ]2-j-5:. ?£9.J o] o]  7--j-1,!-.s;J t..j- AJ]~~?  ~tj-~ g_ ~.TI ,;;-y 7J}?  .::Z.  ~ ~ ~ ~ [Yes/<>!l]  [NoMJ...1..8.]  [NA/"8Jl'a"~%]  19.  Have you discussed with your attorney the legal doctrine of merger?
[brief] State v. Nash, 212 N.J. 518, 540 (2013); State v. Johnson, 42 N.J. 146, 161 (1964).  However, upon a review that appears the PCR judge's credibility determinations "went so wide of the mark that a mistake must have been made," an appellate court "may 'appraise the record as if [it] were deciding the matter at inception and make [its] own findings and conclusions.'"
[brief] The doctrine of separation of powers is a longstanding concept dating back to the formation of our country.  As [...] noted, “[a]mbition must be made to counteract ambition. ”  The Federalist No. 51 ([...]) (1788). to the adoption of rules of general application governing the conduct of judges and attorneys. ”); In re LiVolsi, 85 N.J. 576, 585 (1981) (observing that “[f]or 33 years this Court has exercised plenary, exclusive, and almost unchallenged power over the practice of law in all of its aspects” and emphasizing “the critical importance of the constitutional power of this Court over the practice of law, and its pervasiveness”).  In the face of that constitutionally-mandated separation of powers, the Court should invalidate the Limited Attorney Exemption.
[brief] First, the jury was never instructed on the objective element of a terroristic threats prosecution: whether a reasonable person similarly situated to the victim would have interpreted the defendant’s words as threatening violence and caused them to fear for their safety.  This instruction is constitutionally required in a prosecution for terroristic threats under State v. Fair, 256 N.J. 213, 238 (2024), and failure to provide the requisite instruction requires reversal of the terroristic threats convictions.  Second, prosecuting [...]’s statements as second-degree terroristic threats violated his substantive due process rights.  In the absence of any nexus between the threat made and the period of emergency in place at the time, the penalty enhancement in N.J.S.A. 2C:12-3(a) had no reasonable relationship to a legitimate state purpose.  Third, to guard against any appearance of unfairness or impropriety, the Atlantic County judiciary should have been recused from this case because the victim served as a municipal court judge in several Atlantic County municipalities.
[brief] (Rb18 (citing N.J.A.C. 4A:7-3.1(b)).  That notion is irrelevant to this appeal.  [...] found that [...] engaged in multiple acts of intentional discrimination against a State worker.  In the face of such a serious and maligning determination – made by a department that routinely clashes with [...] by way of his position with a union that represents many of that department’s workers, as demonstrated by its “Prior Disciplinary History” nonsense – it is manifestly unjust not to permit, let alone require, the merits of that determination to be reviewed by an impartial factfinder.
[brief] Id.  Yet, there is no indication that this document was, at that time or at when Plaintiff was initially denied admission into the dual degree program.  Plaintiff filed his complaint on March 19, 2019, less than six years from the accrual date.  Plaintiff selected the [...] because it was the only local program that offered the ability to obtain a business and doctorate within four years, despite the fact it was unaccredited and was not guaranteed to be accredited when plaintiff and his fellow students expected to graduate.  (Pa324).  Despite this, and despite there being no explicit policy to the contrary, Plaintiff was not afforded the opportunity to enter the dual degree program.  Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims are timely, and his Complaint is not barred by the statute of limitations.
[brief] **NEITHER TYLER NOR ROBERTO ENTITLES DEFENDANTS TO RELIEF GIVEN THE SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT OF HARTFORD.** (3T88:21-91:4, 3T98:2-12).  The case of *[...] v. Hennepin Cnty.*, 143 S. Ct. 1369 (2023), issued more than six months after the final judgment entered here, invalidated the tax foreclosure laws of Minnesota as effecting an unconstitutional taking without just compensation.  In that case, the Supreme Court determined that the municipality could not retain the “surplus” of a tax-foreclosed property, namely, the amount realized over and above the foreclosed tax debt when the property was re-sold.
[brief] The Board identifies eight alleged detriments in its brief that justified its decision: the density of the proposed development; the number of stories proposed; visual impacts from the development; noise; traffic; lack of an evacuation plan; the amount of impervious coverage and an insufficient number of parking spaces.  But as the trial court found, none of these purported impacts were substantial, and none justified the Board’s decision to reject the application.  Neither the Board’s brief nor its Resolution identified any basis why any of those items are substantial.  The claim that the building’s height creates a negative impact is unavailing.  [...]’s proposed building was 35 feet tall.  That is height limit in the R-20A zone.  The project deviated from the 2.5-story limit because three floors inside the building are proposed, but the Board does not explain how an extra half-story inside the building causes any impact.  Instead, the Board made a baseless finding in Paragraph 33 of the Resolution that ignored [...]’s testimony about why the use could not be accommodated in a 2.5-story design without significantly increasing the building footprint or making the project financially nonviable.  [Da137-138; 2T 62-24 to 63-6; 6T 123-2 to 124-15].  But [...] did not need to prove why it could not construct its building in a 2.5-story design as part of its proofs for an inherently beneficial use variance.
[brief] Notwithstanding the provisions of R.S.34:15-71 and 34:15-72, the business, limited liability partnership, limited liability company or partnership shall not be required to purchase a policy unless the business, limited liability partnership, limited liability company or partnership is an "employer" of at least one employee as defined in this section who is not a self-employed person, limited liability partner, limited liability company member or partner actively performing services on behalf of the business, limited liability partnership, limited liability company or partnership.  Notwithstanding any other provision of law to the contrary, no insurer or insurance producer as defined in section [2 of P.L.1987, c.293 (C.17:22A-2)] 3 of P.L.2001, c.210 (C.17:22A-28) shall be liable in an action for damages on account of the failure of a business, limited liability partnership, limited liability company or partnership to elect to obtain workers' compensation coverage for a self-employed person, limited liability partner, limited liability company member or partner, unless the insurer or insurance producer causes damage by a willful, wanton or grossly negligent act of commission or omission.
[directive] The notification such that determines Director Prosecutor or the unless violation the of circumstances other or officer an endanger or operation, enforcement law or investigation an jeopardize would criminal for charge a initiate (1) to whether determine promptly shall also prosecutor  The person.  Section 8, to pursuant release of revocation seek (2) and/or offense applicable other any or contempt imposed.  be release of conditions additional that request or handling Prosecutor County of jurisdiction the the outside occurred violation suspected the  If the detecting officer or agency the imposed, were conditions release pretrial which matter on the violation the where place the jurisdiction over having Prosecutor County notify the may violation  Office Prosecutor's County other notify the promptly shall prosecutor that which event in occurred, violation. of the are Offices Prosecutor's more or two and offense criminal a constitutes violation  If the victim and public ensure to efforts their coordinate confer and shall prosecutors involved, the possible. extent greatest the to protection IN AN1)
[brief] The LAD also expressly grants the State authority to seek relief enjoining ongoing or future statutory violations, as it did here.  See supra at 5-6; (Da125-26) (decision below confirming this well- --- 5 Appellants’ claim that this right is not settled because “a school is not a traditional public accommodation” under the LAD, (Db16), is expressly belied by multiple decisions from our Supreme Court and by the statute itself.  See L.W., 189 N.J. at 405 (explaining the LAD “applies universally to ‘places[s] of public accommodation,’ a defined term that includes schools” (quoting N.J.S.A. 10:5-5(l))); C.V., 255 N.J. at 319 (decision last year applying L.W. and explaining that “a school bus is ‘a place of public accommodation’ under the plain language of N.J.S.A. 10:5-5(l)”).
[brief] It was only after the settlement of the preference action and the disgorgement of $60,000 of the mortgage payments previously paid by respondents’ corporation, [...], that the 2012 note and mortgage came into default.  Moreover, Counts 1 through 4 of appellant’s complaint (Pa1) and proposed amended complaint (Pa59) in the underlying action clearly sought reinstatement of the 2012 mortgage in addition to foreclosure.  The entire controversy doctrine, R.4:30A, is an equitable preclusionary doctrine.  It provides:  “Non-joinder of claims required to be joined by the entire controversy doctrine shall result in the preclusion of the omitted claims to the extent required by the entire controversy doctrine.  . . .”  R.4:30A  The purpose of the entire controversy doctrine is to “encourage comprehensive and conclusive litigation determinations, avoid fragmentation of litigation, and promote party fairness and judicial efficiency. ”  (R.4:30A, cmt. 1)  The Rule generally requires that all aspects of a controversy between the parties to the litigation be included in a single action.  See Thornton v. Potamkin Chevrolet, 94 N.J.1 (1983); Falcone v. Middlesex Cty.Med.Soc., 47 N.J. 92 (1966); Wm.Blanchard Co. V. Beach Concrete Co. Inc., 150 N.J. Super. 277 (App. Div. 1977), certif. denied 75 N.J. 528 (1977).  To require Plaintiff/Appellant to have filed a separate action for reinstatement of the 2012 mortgage and then file yet another separate action to foreclose on the reinstated mortgage would result in fragmented litigation and judicial inefficiency in violation of both R.4:27-1 and the single controversy doctrine.  POINT II
[brief] The Board must determine whether the insurance charges would have been passed along to the tenant and if so, the Board must also determine whether the insurance payments went up as result of the condominium conversion (same analysis as taxes).  - **Management Fees:**  Management fees, like condominium fees must be broken down in intricate detail.  A landlord must clearly show the genesis of the expenses and that the expenses are not the result of a conversion.  The Board should be careful to prevent a landlord from providing duplicate expenses (i.e., claiming payment for water and sewerage or maintenance in both condominium fees and management fees).  Pursuant to the Rent Control Ordinance, after determining whether the expenses are solely the result of a condominium conversion, the Board must consider: (1) the quality of service rendered by the landlord in maintaining and operating the unit; (2) whether the operating expenses were reasonably incurred; and (3) the presence or absence of reasonably efficient and economic management.
[brief] IV.  A MODERN PLEADING OF AN INTENTIONAL WRONG INHERENTLY CARRIES  THE POTENTIAL OF RECOVERY UPON THE LESSER THESIS OF A NEGLIGENT INJURY WHICH TRIGGERS COVERAGE (Raised Below: Pa426; 2T4)  A modern pleading of an intentional wrong leaves open the possibility of alternative causes of action including but not limited to negligence, negligent interference with contractual relations, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and outrage which are all covered causes of loss and not subject to any policy exclusions.  Regardless of how the causes of action were “labelled”, the complaint sounds of multiple theories of liability which triggers coverage; and requires the insurer to provide immediate defense.