ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] As cited previously, pursuant to New Jersey's Model Jury Charge 5.20B(B)(2)(a):  The owner [occupant] of a residential ... is liable if, in clearing the sidewalk of ice and snow, the owner [occupant], through the owner’s [occupant’s] negligence, adds a new element of danger or hazard, other than that caused by the natural elements, to the use of the sidewalk by a pedestrian.  In other words, while an abutting owner ... may become liable where the owner [occupant] undertakes to clear the sidewalk and does so in a manner which creates a new element of danger which increases the natural hazard already there.  Therefore, should you find that the defendant, in undertaking to remove the ice and snow from defendant’s sidewalk, created a new hazard or increased the existing hazard (emphasis added) and that this new or increased hazard proximately caused or concurred with the natural hazard to cause plaintiff’s injuries, then you must find for the plaintiff.  Id. (emphasis added).  We respectfully submit this is for a jury to decide, and not a Court that does not have the opportunity to weigh the testimony of the respective parties for credibility.  The New Jersey Supreme Court has held that "[r]esidential homeowners will not be liable unless they create or exacerbate a dangerous condition."
[brief] .......................................................................................................................  22  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS, AND RULINGS BEING APPEALED  1.  Decision of the [...] denying the third-party adjudicatory hearing request of the [...] on March 14, 2023.  [Aa132-Aa136.]  2.  Modification of [...] dated March 20, 2019 [Aa89-Aa91].  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
[brief] As most recently amended in 2019, the AOM N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-26 defines “licensed person” as “any person who is licensed as” one of 17 enumerated professions including an accountant, architect, attorney, engineer, land surveyor, pharmacist, veterinarian, insurance producer, midwife, site remediation professional, and a variety of medical professionals.  Where the facts are subject to a lay jury's common knowledge, an expert’s opinions as to alleged deviation from a "standard of professional care" is not required.  See Triarsi v. BSC Group Services, 422 N.J. Super. 104, 114 (App. Div. 2011).  It is settled, a plaintiff need not produce an affidavit of merit if it is common knowledge that the alleged conduct constitutes negligence.  Est. of Chin v. St. Barnabas Med. Ctr., 734 A.2d 778, 785-86 (N.J. 1999).  Under the common knowledge exception, a plaintiff need not serve an affidavit of merit if the negligence of the professional is "readily apparent to anyone of average intelligence and ordinary experience."  Id., 734 A.2d at 785-86.
[brief] .........................................................  10  A.  Legal Standard for the Review of Fee Applications .................................  10  B.  The Chancery Court Did Not Conduct the Required Critical Analysis and Could Never Have Done So Given the Method by Which the Global Fee Application was Presented ..............................................  14  C.  The Chancery Court Did Not Enforce Its Own Prior Orders and Instructions, Which Mandated that [...] Present His Fee Application for Collection Efforts Differently .............................................  20  D.  The Global Fee Application is Excessive and Punitive on Its Face and Should Have Been Denied for That Reason Alone ...............  25  E.  The Chancery Court Did Not Properly Scrutinize the Billing Rates or Staffing Decisions of [...]’s Counsel  .............................................  26  TABLE OF CONTENTS  POINT II
[brief] ”  However, as will be set forth below, on or about March 25, 2014, Plaintiffs received Notice, via certified mail, from the New Jersey Office of the Attorney General (“AG Notice”) wherein it set forth that [...] was not properly registered with the Charities Registration & Investigation Unit (CRI).  Thereafter, on or about August 29, 2023, nearly fifteen (15) years after [...] assisted Plaintiffs in the formation of [...], Plaintiffs initiated the within action as against [...], alleging, in part, that [...] “failed to advise Plaintiffs of the need to register the charity”.  In response, Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss in Lieu of an Answer on the basis that Plaintiffs’ legal malpractice claim was barred by the six-year statute of limitations.  Thereafter, on May 31, 2024, the Honorable [...], J.S.C., granted Defendant’s Motion (“Trial Court Order”), holding that the statute of limitations began to accrue when [...] received the AG Notice in 2014.  The Trial Court reasoned that the AG Notice clearly apprised [...] of [...]’ registration status and further, advised [...] that [...]’ failure to satisfy such registration requirements may result in further actions by the AG Office.  Appellants now appeal the Trial Court’s Order arguing that their first notice of harm or damage was on April 27, 2022, when the court granted partial summary judgment in the AG Action.  For the reasons set forth more fully below, the entry of the Trial Court's Order was proper and should be affirmed.  The uncontroverted evidence establishes that Plaintiffs’ legal malpractice claim accrued on March 25, 2014.
[brief] (40T:50-2 to 64-1)  [...] testified that the footage from [...] showed the front of [...]’s stroller had “nothing in it. ”  (40T:54-15 to 55-5)  [...] and [...] went to [...]’s home because, in their experience, abducted children sometimes escape and return home.  (39T:152-25 to 153-16)  [...] walked around the house and found a window open, which he found odd because the temperature outside was “blistering cold. ”  (39T:153-17 to 154-5)  When no one responded to knocking on the front door, [...] climbed in through the window and unlocked the door for [...] to enter.
[brief] “Had the jury accepted the aggravation of the Meniere’s disease was caused by this incident, as was the resulting three surgeries and extensive missed times from work was caused by this event, the resulting compensatory damage would have undeniably exceeded $25,000, potentially being 10, 20, or even 30 times more than this award. ” (8T9-7 to 13).  Defendant respectfully submits that this Court owes substantial deference to the trial Court’s findings and conclusions so long as they are supported by sufficient credible evidence in the record.
[directive] All County Prosecutors  [...]  FROM: Acting Attorney General  DATE: March 12, 2010  SUBJECT: Supplemental Directive  Modifying the Brima~e Guidelines to Account for Judicial Authority to Waive or Reduce Mandatory Minimum Sentences in School Zone Cases  Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7b  The following Supplemental Directive consists of two parts.
[brief] ”  (Da20)  After Defendants raised their objection, the Township went back and adopted a new ordinance, but still there is no evidence to support the alleged use of Defendants’ property for open space.  Indeed, the contract upon which the Township relies does not bind the developer as to the use of Defendants’ properties and there is nothing in the public record to suggest how the lands received by the Township under the proposed land swap will be utilized.  Clearly an evidentiary hearing is required so the Township may present proofs in support of its claims, subject to cross examination.  See Bridgewater v. Yarnell, supra, 64 N.J. at, 215.  CONCLUSION
[brief] On October 1, 2019, [...] was charged on a Preliminary Notice of Disciplinary Action for the August 16th incident including: violation of N.J.A.C. 4A:2A-2.3(a)(1) “incompetency, inefficiency or failure to perform duties;” N.J.A.C. 4A:2A-2.3(a)(7) “neglect of duty;” N.J.A.C. 4A:2A-2.3(a)(12) “other sufficient causes;” Human Resources Bulletin (“HRB”)  HRB 84-17, Section B2 “neglect of duty, loafing, idleness or willful failure to devote attention to tasks which could result in danger to persons or property;” HRB 84-17, Section B4 “sleeping while on duty (essential);” HRB 84-17, Section C8 “falsification: Intentional misstatement of material fact in connection with work, employment application, attendance, or in any record, report, investigation, or other proceeding;” HRB 84-17, Section C11 “conduct unbecoming of an employee;” HRB 84-17, Section D1 “negligence in performing duty resulting in injury to persons or damage to property;” HRB 84-17, Section D2 “negligently contributing to an elopement or escape;” HRB 84-17, Section D7 “Violation of administrative procedures and/or regulations involving safety and security;” and HRB 84-17, Section E1 “violation of a rule, regulation, policy, procedure, order, or administrative decision. ”  No other persons were charged or disciplined.  On October 16, 2019, [...] was charged on a Preliminary Notice of Disciplinary Action for the incident on August 17, 2019.  The reason for the delay was unexplained as the [...] did not make any further inquiry into the matter.  [...] was charged with *N.J.A.C.* 4A:2A-2.3(a)(6) “conduct unbecoming a public employee;” *N.J.A.C.* 4A:2A-2.3(a)(12) “other sufficient causes;” HRB 84-17, Section C8 “falsification: Intentional misstatement of material fact in connection with work, employment application, attendance, or in any record, report, investigation, or other proceeding;” HRB 84-17, Section C11 “conduct unbecoming of an employee;” HRB 84-17, Section C24 “threatening, intimidating, harassing, coercing or interfering with fellow employees on State [sic] Property;” and HRB 84-17, Section E1, “violation of a rule, regulation, policy, procedure, order, or administrative decision.
[brief] (2T 8-2 to 9-25)  But the State never said that it did not know where [...] was located or that it had attempted to locate him and been unsuccessful.  In fact, the State never even filed an opposition to [...]’s speedy trial motion.  When the court asked the State to provide a reason for the delay during argument, the State’s sole response was that [...] was in federal custody, not that it had tried and been unable to locate him.  (1T 15-5 to 7)  The record reveals that the State always knew his whereabouts, or at least knew how it could easily discover them.
[brief] . . .”  N.J.S.A. 10:4-7.  To effectuate this policy, “Adequate Notice” requires notices of a regular, special or rescheduled to be sent to newspapers which “have the greatest likelihood of informing the public. ”  N.J.S.A. 10:4-8(d).  Notice must be given at least 48 hours in advance of the meeting.
[brief] N.J.S.A. 2C:20-2b(2)(g) .................................................................................................  1, 62, 63 N.J.S.A. 2C:20-2b(4) .......................................................................................................  62  N.J.S.A. 2C:20-3 ...............................................................................................................  1 N.J.S.A. 2C:21-4a .............................................................................................................  1 N.J.S.A. 2C:28-7a ............................................................................................................. 1 N.J.S.A. 2C:30-2 ............................................................................................................... 1, 28, 36, 41 N.J.S.A. 2C:30-2a ............................................................................................................. 29, 37 N.J.S.A. 2C:30-2b ............................................................................................................. 29, 36 N.J.S.A. 2C:30-7 ............................................................................................................... 1 N.J.S.A. 43:1-3.1 ............................................................................................................. 63 N.J.S.A. 43:1-3b ................................................................................................................. 63 RULES N.J.R.E. 404(b) ........................................................................................................... 44, 45, 47 N.J.R.E. 406 .................................................................................................................. 55, 56 N.J.R.E. 701 .................................................................................................................. 50, 51 PROCEDURAL HISTORY The State Grand Jury returned Indictment [...] charging defendant, [...], with: two counts of second-degree official misconduct, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:30-2 (Counts One and Two); second-degree pattern of official misconduct, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:30-7 (Count Three); third-degree tampering with public records, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:28-7a (Count Four); third-degree theft by unlawful taking, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:20-3 and N.J.S.A. 2C:20-2b(2)(g) (Count Five); and fourth-degree falsifying public records, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:21-4a (Count Six).
[brief] Redevelopment plans must contain, not only standards relating to appropriate land uses and bulk standards, akin to a zoning ordinance, but also must include provisions for property acquisition, relocation of residents, replacement of affordable housing and an analysis of the relationship of the redevelopment plan to the various master plans.  In adopting the notice requirements for redevelopment plans, the Legislature stated in N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-7(c), “no notice beyond that required for adoption of ordinances by the municipality shall be required for the hearing on or adoption of the redevelopment plan. ”  Notice requirements for general ordinances are set forth in N.J.S.A. 40:49-2, which requires “a clear and concise statement … setting forth the purpose of the ordinance …”  Redevelopment plans are required to be adopted by ordinance: the purpose of such an ordinance is to adopt a redevelopment plan for certain properties.  Despite clear language that ordinances adopting a redevelopment plan only have to set forth a statement of the purpose of the ordinance, Plaintiff is attempting to engraft onto N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-7(c) and N.J.S.A. 40:49-2 a requirement that the notice provide a summary of the redevelopment plan, which is the notice requirement for adoption of zoning ordinances.  N.J.S.A. 40:49-2.1 requires that when adopting zoning ordinances, the notice include a “brief summary of the main objectives or provisions of the ordinance …”  The Legislature did not require that ordinances adopting a redevelopment plan provide the same notice that is required for zoning ordinances.  Zoning notices must apprise the public of the “essence of the regulations” being adopted.  When adopting a redevelopment plan, the law only requires that a statement of the purpose of the ordinance be provided in the notice.  In this case, the notice provided by [...] contains a statement of purpose: the purpose is to adopt a redevelopment plan for specified properties.  Finally, Plaintiff failed to provide an acceptable basis for enlargement of the 45-day appeal period.  Both Harrison and Defendant, [...] (“[...]”) expended funds in reliance on the validity of the redevelopment plan and will be negatively affected by enlargement of the appeal period.  The interest in repose by these entities, and their interest in redeveloping a blighted area, on balance, outweighs any private interest Plaintiff has in challenging the Redevelopment Plan.
[brief] Finally, the State called [...], a detective with the New Jersey State Police Firearms Investigation Unit.  (3T 232-13 to 233-8)  Hearne testified that he conducted database inquiries in this case, which revealed that [...] did not have a permit to carry a weapon, and that the gun found in the Suburban was not registered with the State of New Jersey.  (3T 233-9 to 237-5)  At trial, the defense theory was that [...] did not know that the gun was in the Suburban, as the car was not his and was used by many people.
[brief] (Da826)  After the Appellate Division decision reversed all of the Orders, Defendant demanded their return ultimately filing a Motion to Compel the Return of the Monies paid pursuant to those orders.  The Trial Court denied the Motion.  The March 6, 2018 Sanction Order is a memorialization of the Court’s decision at the February 14, 2018 hearing.  (Da285)  The Order provides that Defendant "...is in violation of this Court's June 27, 2017 Order of Judgment" and further that Defendant was sanctioned and "must pay Plaintiff $1,000... for its violations of the June 27, 2017 Order of Judgment prohibiting the ingress and egress of children of the school owned and operated by Defendant in such a way that they walk in between parked cars on the street or in the Sixth Street Parking Lot during religious services when Plaintiff is utilizing the Sixth Street Lot for parking during religious services.
[brief] The materiality standard is specifically designed to encourage prosecutors to disclose information to the defense in close cases.  *Kyles v. Whitley*, 514 U.S. 419, 439-40 (1995).  The prosecutor was required to disclose [...]’s notes so long as there was a “reasonable probability” that the result would be different.  *United States v. Bagley*, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985).  The trial court told the parties, under no uncertain terms in denying Appellant’s motion for reconsideration, that the only thing that would be dispositive to the Court is if there was proof that Appellant’s door was locked when the officers entered.  [...]’s notes proved, as Appellant has long argued, that the door to Appellant’s separate apartment was locked and breached.  As such, [...]’s notes are material.
[brief] See supra Section II(A).  In so doing, he exercised the judicial restraint that recognizes the “constitutional division of governmental functions” imbedded in the New Jersey Constitution and “time-honored traditions of restraint. ”  Franklin v. Dep’t of Human Servs., 225 N.J. Super. 504, 530 (App. Div.), aff’d, 111 N.J. 1 (1988) ([...], J.A.D., concurring).
[brief] Specifically, Appellant’s Counsel stated:  [...]:  I'll just briefly touch on in terms of the notice issue and laches, the record does establish that [...] found out about the suit in 2019.  At that time, my office was exploring revenues for [...] and they made the decision to proceed with his affirmative claims that were then litigated and later dismissed.  And then after that -- I would have to check the record, but it was after that time the strategic decision was made to attempt to vacate the judgment based on what the Law Division told us during the affirmative claims.  So, there were strategic decisions made, but [...] procured Counsel.  We attempted to remedy the issue and we were unable to based on the resting judgment.  We then went back to the Special Civil Part to try to vacate the resting judgment and, now, we're here and we have been litigating this motion for nearly a year.
[brief] See id. at 171-72.  The objections plaintiff attempts to raise in the present case, in contrast, involve the scope of the presentation of live testimony at trial.  It also should be noted that the Court Rules allow and anticipate the possibility the entry of a judgment of involuntary dismissal at trial, at the close of plaintiff’s case pursuant to R. 4:37-2(b), at the close of all evidence pursuant to R. 4:40-1, or by way of a judgment notwithstanding the verdict pursuant to R. 4:40-2(b).
[brief] See Roach v. BM Motoring, Inc., 228 N.J. 163, 172 (2017) (enforcing incorporated AAA rules as binding); Chesapeake Appalachia, LLC v. Scout Petroleum, LLC, 809 F.3d 746, 763 (3d Cir. 2016); Preston v. Ferrer, 552 U.S. 346, 362–63 (2008).  There is no rational basis for the Court to impose a reverse presumption and assume that Plaintiffs did not review and understand the terms of the arbitration provision and its incorporated AAA Construction Rules.
[brief] (Pa000017-18, 26-29)  Defendants argue that the MSRA permits them to yield unrestrained power which includes permitting Defendants to ignore all other laws and not pay promoted officers back wages.  Db20-25; Pa000017-18, 26-29.  Defendants state that the Complaint “does nothing more than complain of a permissible and authorized action under the MSRA. ”  Db21.  This argument is deficient as the MSRA is not all encompassing and does not grant unchecked authority contrary to Defendants’ argument that “Plaintiffs cannot simply second guess Defendants’ position. ”  Db25.  The decision to deprive officers of promised compensation is not expressly permitted under the MSRA and was not ratified by Plaintiffs.  Db24.  Both Defendants and the Trial Court incorrectly rely on Atl. City Superior Officers' Ass'n v. City of Atl. City, No. A-3117-20, 2022 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1194 (App. Div. June 30, 2022), which was decided after the initial Complaint was filed in this matter.  Pa000026-28; Db23-25.  As previously stated in the moving papers, the Appellate Division found that the State was authorized pursuant to the terms of the MSRA to vacate an arbitration award concerning a sick pay lump sum payout owed to two (2) promoted Captains pursuant to the terms of the SOA CNA on their July 1, 2016 promotions.
[brief] The Consent Order Is the Basis for the Dismissal of Appellants’ Complaint  Given the plain terms of the Consent Order, and Appellants’ gross violation of the sixty-day deadline, Respondent filed a motion to dismiss the present matter on August 1, 2023.  (Pa37 to Pa144).  Appellants filed opposition to the motion.  (Pa145 to Pa149).  Respondent filed a reply brief and supplemental Certification from counsel.  (Da01 to Da18 (Supplemental Certification of [...] in Support of Notice of Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Rule 4:6-2 (“Blaine Supp. Cert.”) and Da19 to Da26 (portion of Reply Brief)).
[brief] The system failed and seven employees were injured plus damage caused to plaintiff’s facility.  *[...]* sued under both the CFA and the Products Liability Act and argued that its losses to its facility were not exclusively caused by the product defect but instead by [...]’s misrepresentations.  *[...]* alleged the CFA was therefore applicable.  Defendant argued that the PLA was the only directly applicable statute because of the “essential nature of the claim,” and it could not be charged in addition to the CFA.  After analyzing both statutes and the existing law, the *[...]* court stated:  As our review of the statutes reveals, the CFA and the PLA are intended to govern different conduct and provide different remedies for such conduct.
[brief] POINT II  THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO SUPPRESS THE PHONE CALLS MADE TO HIS PARENTS.  The court abused its discretion by suppressing defendant’s statements during the phone calls with his parents.  There is insufficient evidence in the record to support the conclusion that the purpose of these phone calls was to obtain further incriminating statements from defendant and that permitting the defendant to have phone calls to his parents was the functional equivalent of interrogation.  Rather, defendant requested to make the phone calls to inform his parents that he was detained at the Prosecutor’s Office and would later be transported to the county jail.  Moreover, the trial court failed to distinguish the legal implication between requesting to speak with an attorney and requesting to speak with one’s mother and girlfriend.  Therefore, trial court’s suppression of the statements made during the phone calls to his parents must be reversed.