ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] The New Jersey Judiciary is committed to supporting meaningful access and participation for all court users, including self-represented litigants, individuals with disabilities, and individuals with language access needs.  This directive formalizes the practice of designated and trained Judiciary staff providing non-legal assistance to court users who are seeking to complete and file Judiciary forms.  The expectation and established practice is that most court users can complete and file Judiciary forms without assistance.  In limited circumstances, however, including but not limited to court users unable to read or write, individuals with disabilities, and those with language access needs, non-legal assistance in completing forms may be necessary and appropriate.  Assistance to court users shall be provided, where needed and reasonable, based on various factors, including staff availability, the relative urgency of the situation, and whether the court user can obtain help through alternative means.  Therefore, Judiciary staff can provide non-legal assistance to court users in completing and submitting forms, as follows:  •  Designated Judiciary staff may provide clerical and technical assistance to court users, including self-represented litigants, to complete Judiciary- (both paper and electronic).  approved forms  •  Such approved clerical and technical assistance includes typing and transcribing content conveyed by the court user.  Consistent with this policy, court forms prepared on behalf of the court user will be transmitted directly to the appropriate division for the processing of fees and uploading into a Judiciary electronic filing system as needed.  ADA  ENSURING AN DOOR TO OPEN JUSTICE with Americans Act Disabilities Directive # 09-21 April 22, 2021  Page 2 • Consistent with Directive #01-17 (“Judiciary Language Access Plan”), the same level of assistance that would be provided to an English fluent court user will be provided to court users who are Limited English Proficient (LEP) or deaf or hard of hearing.  •  Consistent with the Judiciary’s Title II ADA Procedures for Access to the Courts  By Individuals with Disabilities, the Judiciary will provide a reasonable accommodation for a court user with a disability, enabling the individual to access and participate in court proceedings, programs, services and activities, provided that the accommodation does not fundamentally alter the nature of a Judiciary program, service or activity or impose an undue hardship upon the Judiciary.  •  Judiciary staff who provide authorized clerical and technical assistance are providing services within the scope of their Judiciary work duties.  Consistent with this policy, Judiciary staff may not provide legal assistance, advice, or representation to court users.  Rather, where legal help is necessary, the Judiciary will inform court users of the availability of legal resources.  Questions on this Directive may be directed to the Office of Communications and Community Relations at [...].
[brief] For all the above reasons, and those contained in Plaintiff’s Initial Brief, this Court should: - affirm the trial court’s denial of Defendant’s R. 4:50 motion; - reverse the trial court’s denial of an award of counsel fees and costs to Plaintiff and remand for further proceedings to award reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs to Plaintiff based on the Certifications of Services filed by Plaintiff’s counsel; - reverse the trial court’s award of the Lexus; and - reverse the trial court’s award of the $15,459.21 [...] reimbursement to Defendant.
[brief] [...] cherry picks and then disagrees with certain of the trial court’s findings.  [...] criticizes the trial court’s finding that the CDC and FDA have not validated urine analysis for accuracy or clinical use.  He does not rely on [...]’s testimony or any authoritative documents as support.  Rather, [...] argues that [...]’s expert in the Underlying Action testified that urine analysis “was the ‘best test’ for detecting mycotoxins. ”  Db38.
[brief] Ja042, 4T 33:25; 4T 34:1-13.  Plaintiffs’ Planner, [...]. testified with regard to use variance proofs under the standards set forth in Medici v. BPR Company, 107 N.J. 1 (1987).  He dismissed the necessary use variance as “…really sort of a technical variance…because the zoning in both Florence and Mansfield permits the warehouse distribution use. ”  2T 75:3-6.  Mr.  Phillips’ testimony never explored the actual similarities or differences between the warehouse distribution uses allowed in the two Townships, and never discussed the substantial difference in the building heights permitted in Florence versus what was approved in Mansfield.  He merely relied repeatedly upon his assertion of the purported similarity of the permitted uses and other zoning parameters without actually exploring them with the Board.  2T 79:22-25.  [...]’s Mayor and Council hired special counsel, a planning expert and a traffic expert to appear before the Board in opposition to the proposed development.  Upon the conclusion of the hearing, the Board denied the application, upon a vote of 6 in favor of a motion to deny, and 1 opposed.  4T 146:18-23.  LEGAL ARGUMENT I.
[brief] 39 Statutes 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) .............................................................................................................................  38 Other Authorities Model Jury Charge (Civil) 6.14............................................................................................................  27 [...], [...], [...]  [...], Prosser Keeton on the Law of Torts § 30 (5th ed.1984)  .................................................................................................................................  29  Rules Rule 4:46-2(c) ..................................................................................................................................  18  Rule 4:6-2(e) ..................................................................................................................................  19, 20  QUESTIONS PRESENTED
[brief] The prolonged (beginning in 1985) and complex factual and procedural history of this case has been set forth in detail by the Appellate Division in its --- 1  [...] presents the intertwined facts and procedural history relevant to this appeal together for ease of reference.  prior decisions in *[...] Developments, Inc. v. [...]*, No. A-5027-03T3 (App. Div. Dec. 15, 2006) (Da490) and *[...] Developments, Inc. v. [...]*, No. A-2053-13T3, 2018 WL 2449133 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. June 1, 2018) (Da38895), by former United States District Court Judge [...] in his Report and Recommendations dated August 4, 2022, (Da39090), and by the Honorable [...], P.J.Ch., in his November 16, 2022 decision, (Da39964).  [...] thus provides only a synopsis of this tortured history that is pertinent to the panel’s resolution of the issues raised in this appeal.
[brief] They argue "[t]he plain language of the exemption makes clear that upgrades to existing utility systems, provided that those upgrades are consistent with the goals and purposes of the Highlands Act, are exempt from the Highlands Act, [...]'s implementing rules, and the Highlands Regional Master Plan."  The [...] and [...] contend theirs "is the only interpretation that makes sense," because if "routine" modified "upgrade," then it would also modify "rehabilitation, preservation, reconstruction, [and] repair," which "would make no sense and thus would be an absurd interpretation."
[brief] a.  [...]’s denial of [...]’s motion to enforce the earlier discovery order regarding the hard drive, her sua sponte vacation of prior discovery orders, and the denial of reconsideration motion were improper and demand reversal.  (25T24-4 to 9, 37-4 to 41-3; Da322-26, 386-90)  [...] determined [...] was entitled to examine the hard drive that had been the only source of the hundreds of hours of spoliated evidence at the center of this case, and that counsel never had examined.
[brief] McQuillin, supra, at § 12.143; and see Adams v. City of Modesto, 53 Cal. 2d 833, 3 Cal. Rptr. 561, 566, 350 P.2d 529 (1960); Giuliano v. Bd. of Trustees of Fireman's Pension F., 89 Ill. App. 2d 126, 231 N.E.2d 257, 258 (1967); Flake v. Bennett, 156 N.W.2d 849, 854 (Iowa Sup. Ct. 1968).  Geller v. Department of Treasury, 53 N.J. 591, 597-598.  In Geller v. Department of Treasury, 53 N.J. 591, the Court evaluated a “preponderance of the equities” and “all of the circumstances” to achieve a “just result. ”  Id. at 600.  This Court is not bound by an agency's determination of a purely legal issue.
[brief] The lower court properly applied the Yarbough factors.  To determine whether the custodial sentences on the four murder counts should run concurrently or consecutively, the judge looked to the guidelines set forth in State v. Yarbough, 100 N.J. 627 (1985).  (17T228-19 to 22).  The judge found that there were multiple victims and that the three of the murders and their objectives were independent of each other and involved separate acts of violence:  Defendant shot and killed four different people.  Each time defendant pointed the weapon and fired was a separate act.  The killing of one victim did not impact the killing of another.  However, defendant has indicated previously that in the event the defendant murdered his mother, he would murder his father to ease the sadness.  Although occurring within a short span of time, the events were separated enough as not to indicate a period of aberrant behavior with the exception of the father’s murder.
[brief] I argue, in conclusion, that the trial court erred in granting the Final Judgment by Default against me, based on the certifications by the Process Server and by the Plaintiff’s Attorney and his Legal Assistant – it should have never been granted.  I also argue that the Process Server and the Plaintiff’s Attorney Breached their Duty of Care to NOT cause unjust harm to me, the defendant, [...].  The certified facts in the trial court record show that the Process Server and the Plaintiff’s Attorney knowingly and willfully violated the law; in other words, they CHEATED.  And, I also argue that the trial judge abused his discretion by ruling that there is a time limit to vacate an invalid unjust judgment – there is NOT.  And, the trial court judge’s memory recollection is WRONG of the October 19, 2023 hearing as to what was said and as to what happened.  When the court transcript of 10/19/23 is compared with the court transcripts of 11/28/23 and 11/30/23; the judge ERRED; he CONTRADICTS himself.  I ask the Appellate Court to Vacate the Final Judgment by Default granted on 5/4/2015.
[brief] (Da181-193; 15T4-12 to 16-23, 34-20 to 41-8).  In imposing this sentence, the judge qualitatively assessed the relevant aggravating and mitigating factors, finding that aggravating factors three, six, and nine applied, that no mitigating factors applied, and that those "aggravating factors substantially outweigh[ed] the [nonexistent] mitigating factors."
[brief] As explained in the Petitioner’s initial Brief, the ALJ and the Respondent got it wrong when they mistakenly conflated the issue of substitute prosecutors when Petitioner was either sick or on vacation.  (Pb39).  Respondent’s own witness, [...], confirmed that it was the Court who had the responsibility to find Petitioner’s replacement and not her.  (T193-11).  [...] also confirmed that he had no knowledge or other information that anyone else in the Petitioner’s law firm would assist her in performing any prosecutor services.  (T193-16).  Respondent claims in Factor 1 that all cell phone calls and emails outside of Court went to the Petitioner personally.  That acknowledgement by the Respondent demonstrates that all services rendered by the Petitioner both inside and outside of the municipal building were done by her personally.
[brief] (See, e.g., Pa789–90 (finding that “[e]ven though [[...]] was aware of the school construction and the alleged illegal ‘favoring’ of [[...]], [[...]] chose not to include a bad-faith claim in its complaint and inexplicably waited until after the trial judge had rendered a verdict to seek leave to add a claim based on those allegations. ”).)  Moreover, [...] uses its bad faith claim to seek a remedy declaring the Redevelopment Resolution null and void—the same remedy it sought when it filed the First Action.  (Compare Pa13 (seeking a judgment in the Second Action “[d]eclaring null and void and/or vacating the City’s Resolution No. 20-103”) with Pa299 (seeking a judgment in the First Action “[d]eclaring null and void and/or vacating the City’s Resolution No. 20-103”).)  In this Second Action, [...] seeks the same remedy with the same stale evidence that it possessed at the time it filed the First Action.  See, e.g., Archbrook Laguna, 414 N.J. Super. at 106 (applying the entire controversy doctrine to claims where any damages that the plaintiff may have incurred accrued no later than when the first action was filed).  C.
[brief] The first letter/flyer stated:  I am writing this letter to inform you that I am personally not in favor of the live poultry market that is proposed for [...].  This is not something I believe would benefit or improve your neighborhood.  I know you see, first hand, how hard and how diligent the Commissioners and I are working to improve your neighborhood and the City.  All I ask is if you attend the meeting on November 12th at 6:00 PM at [...] – 2nd Floor at [...].  It is important to voice your opinion and concerns.  I do not have a vote on the board that will hear this proposal so it is important for you to let your voice be heard.  Id. at 453.  The plaintiff also noted an additional flyer from [...], in which the mayor appeared to reaffirm his “condemnation of plaintiff’s application and further requested that residents attend the meeting at its updated time and location ‘to voice your opinion and concerns.
[brief] POINT IV  NO SPECIFIC UNANIMITY CHARGE WAS REQUIRED ON THE OFFICIAL MISCONDUCT-RELATED COUNTS.  Defendant claims that the judge should have given the jury interrogatories to specify which conduct they found to make up official misconduct, under Count Two, _____________________  20  [...] interacted with a drug dealer by informing the dealer he was a police officer, and possibly showing the dealer a police ID, and separately told a police officer he was a state trooper, and showed his NJSP ID, in an attempt to avoid arrest for carrying an unlicensed BB gun.  136 N.J. at 151-52. and to make up a pattern of official misconduct, under Count Three.  Binding caselaw establishes that this contention is without merit.
[brief] Cf. *Sitogum Holdings, Inc. v. Ropes*, 352 N.J. Super. 555, 561 (Ch. Div. 2002) (“the doctrine of unconscionability has a place in our jurisprudence so that grossly unfair or one-sided contracts may be properly ‘policed’”).  Thereafter, in *Delta*, the Court ruled that a contractual arbitration provision that required the parties to litigate similar claims in two different forums – a foreclosure action and a private arbitration – was not unconscionable.  In *Delta*, the court assessed the enforceability of a contractual arbitration provision that exempted “foreclosure actions, eviction actions, all rights of self-help including collection of rents, and other similar actions. ”  *[...] v. [...]*, 396 F. Supp. 2d 512, 518 (D.N.J. 2004).  Among the host of items raised by the borrower – a seventy-eight-year-old woman with a sixth-grade education and little financial expertise – was the argument that Delta’s contract was unconscionable because it “grossly favors the lender. ”  *Id.*  On a certified question from the Third Circuit, our Supreme Court disagreed.  Specifically, the Court ruled that, although Delta’s provision might require [...] to litigate “substantively similar claims in two different forums” it was “not unconscionable,” *Delta*, 189 N.J. at 48 (emphasis added).
[directive] County Prosecutors are responsible for conducting substantive oversight to ensure that the internal affairs functions of all law enforcement agencies within their jurisdiction are operating professionally and effectively.  As specialists with deep experience in the criminal justice system and working in the community, prosecutors are well situated for identifying procedural deficiencies before serious issues emerge with an agency’s internal affairs function.  As such, County Prosecutors must review the information they receive from law enforcement and the public regarding internal affairs, and swiftly follow up if there are any signs of trouble.  10.0.2
[brief] TABLE OF APPENDIX  Relevant portion of Plaintiff’s response to Defendants’ Statement of Material Facts dated February 21, 2023………………………………………………………………………………Da  1  TABLE OF JUDGMENT(S), ORDER(S), RULING(S), AND DECISION(S)  ON APPEAL  May 19, 2023  Order and Opinion granting Motion for Reconsideration  Dismissing Plaintiff’s Complaint with Prejudice…………………………………………………  Pa271  LIST OF PARTIES | Party Name | Appellate Party Designation | Trial Agency Role | Court/Party | Trial Court/Agency Party Status | |---------------------|-----------------------------|-------------------|-------------|---------------------------------| | [...] | Appellant | Plaintiff | | Participated Below | | [...] | Respondent | Defendant | | Participated Below | # TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | Cases | Page(s) | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|---------| | Aguas v. State, | 24, 27 | | 220 N.J. 494 (2015) | | | Brill v. The Guardian Life Insurance Company of America, | 17, 18 | | 142 N.J. 520 (1995) | | | Cummings v. Bahr, | 22 | | 295 N.J.Super. 374 (App.Div.1996) | | | Dunkley v. S. Coraluzzo Petroleum Transporters, | passim | | 437 N.J.Super. 366 (App.Div.2014) | | | Dunkley v. S. Coraluzzo Petroleum Transporters, | 27 | | 441 N.J.Super. 322 (App.Div.2015) | | | Henry v. N.J. Dep’t of Human Servs., | 17 | | 204 N.J. 320 (2010) | | | Judson v. Peoples Bank & Trust Co., | 19 | | 17 N.J. 67 (1954) | | | Lawson v. Dewar, | 15, 21 | | 468 N.J.Super. 128 (App.Div.2021) | | | Robbins v. Jersey Township, | 18 | | 23 N.J. 229 (1957) | | ## Other Authorities - Restatement §219(2)(b) ...........................................................................
[brief] Tagayun v. AmeriChoice of N.J., Inc., 446 N.J. Super. 570, 580 (App. Div. 2016) --- 9  Defendants have included Plaintiff’s Frivolous Notice for the Second Supplemental Complaint Motion (362a) and the Due Process Violation Motion (495a) in the Appendix and note that these documents demonstrate issues of disputed facts and law, which suggests that the underlying claims have merit.  While [...] did order the sale of the Boonton and Florida Properties, there was no prior fact finding or conclusions regarding fair market value or the Trustee’s misappropriation of funds towards adversarial litigation for personal gain.
[brief] N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(b) provides for the imposition of such a disqualifier when the court is “clearly convinced that the aggravating factors substantially outweigh the mitigating factors. ”  The trial court did not make this at the initial sentencing finding, instead finding that “aggravating factors slightly outweigh the mitigating factors. ”  (8T 43-5 to 7)  At a later date, the trial court clarified its belief that “the aggravating factors substantially outweigh[] the mitigating factors because the Court does place great weight on aggravating factor 6, the extent of defendant’s prior criminal record and the seriousness of the offenses of which the defendant has been convicted. ”  (9T 10-1 to 7)  As discussed above, [...]’s prior history is minor and the offense was not particularly “serious”—the trial court acknowledged this by finding mitigating factor (1).  When a court applies “seemingly contradictory aggravating and mitigating factors” as it did in this case, it must “explain how it reconciles those two findings” by providing greater detail as to the weight assigned to each aggravating and mitigating factor and how those factors are balanced with respect to the defendant. ”  State v. Rivera, 249 N.J. 285, 300–01 (2021) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).  The failure to offer any such explanation requires a remand for resentencing.  In sum, this sentence is too long for a person who had never been in prison before, who had stolen $168 in change from a closed restaurant, who had never threatened any harm of any kind to any person.  In setting the sentence, the court seems to have entirely focused on [...]’s prior criminal history.  That history is minor and does not justify the sentence imposed here.  The sentence must be vacated, and the matter remanded for resentencing.  CONCLUSION
[brief] In addition, the court sentenced defendant to consecutive five-year terms of imprisonment for aggravated assault, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:12–1(b)(2), and two counts of possession of a handgun without a permit, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:39–5(b).  For the other offenses defendant was found to have committed, the trial court either imposed concurrent terms or merged the convictions.  Thus, defendant's aggregate term is forty-seven years imprisonment, with thirty-two of those years subject to NERA parole ineligibility.  Defendant subsequently entered into a plea bargain with respect to the indictment for the six armed robberies committed in Atlantic City, under which he pled guilty to one robbery, for which he was sentenced to a six-year term of imprisonment, subject to NERA ineligibility, to be served consecutively to his sentence for the Egg Harbor robberies, and the charges based on the other five robberies were dismissed.
[brief] 30 N.J.R. 645(a) (Feb. 17, 1998)  .....................................................................................  4  47 N.J.R. 1392(a) (July 6, 2015)  .....................................................................................  4  Other Authorities  [...] & [...], N.J. Court Rules, cmt. 5 on R.2:6-2 (2024)  .................................  20  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
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