ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] DESIGNATION | DESCRIPTION | |------------------------|-------------| | AT | MOTION FOR JNOV DECISION DATED OCTOBER 6, 2023 | | BT | MOTION FOR FEE APPLICATION DECISION DATED MARCH 11, 2024 | | CT | JURY TRANSCRIPT DATED JULY 24, 2023 | | 1T | TRIAL TRANSCRIPT DATED JULY 25, 2023 | | 2T | TRIAL TRANSCRIPT DATED JULY 26, 2023 | | 3T | TRIAL TRANSCRIPT DATED JULY 27, 2023 | | 4T | TRIAL TRANSCRIPT  DATED JULY 28, 2023 | TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS¹  October 6, 2024  Order Denying JNOV................................. 665  March 11, 2024  Order Granting Defendant’s Fee Application...........  667  February 12, 2024  Sua Sponte Order.................................. 669  September 25, 2020  Order Denying Defendant's Motion to Dismiss....  722 August 5, 2022  Order Granting Plaintiff's Motion to Extend Discovery.....  802  December 17, 2021  Order to Amend Complaint and Extend Discovery...  1647 August 4, 2023  Order of Deposition................................. 1705  ¹  The following documents are located in Plaintiff’s Appendixes.  Preliminary Statement  Plaintiff-Appellant, [...] ("Plaintiff" or "[...]") appeals the October 6, 2023 Order ("October 6 Order"), which denied Plaintiff’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, or in the alternative, for a new trial.
[brief] ” (6T 45-20 to 21; 46-2 to 4; 47-2 to 9)  The court additionally incorrectly believed that one of the charged phone calls was made to [...]’s personal cell phone, and it relied on that misapprehension as further support for consecutive terms, saying, “the fact that these threats are now being made to the judge’s personal cell phone made the threats more palpable and invasive and indicated defendant’s escalating criminality. ”  (6T 46-5 to 8)  In fact, the voice messages that gave rise to the terroristic threats charges were left on [...]’s law office phone, not his personal cell phone.
[brief] The Trial Court goes on to acknowledge that “the Court did not require expert comparisons and modeling to similarly situated new businesses in adopting the reasonable certainty standard. ”  1286a.  Yet, in the same breath, the Trial Court held that the absence of comparisons to other novice businesses was fatal here.  The Trial Court again acknowledged the lack of a requirement established by the Supreme Court, but then immediately created a requirement.  The Trial Court did not have authority to create this standard.
[brief] Plaintiff alleges that [...] “knew, or had reason to know, that the aforesaid bailer was damaged and could not be safely used as intended at the time of the subject accident, thereby causing the intentional use of damaged, defective, substandard and dangerous equipment in an ultra-hazardous and unsafe manner. ”  Pa45.  In the Second Count Plaintiff further details [...]’s alleged intentional wrongdoing.  Plaintiff alleges that [...] “failed to install, maintain and use protective devices and safeguards for its employees to protect against recognized hazards,” and “rendered ineffective those respective devices or safeguards originally available. ”  Ja46, ¶¶2(b)-(c).  The obvious intent and purpose of the allegations contained in the First Amended Complaint is to assert a claim of intentional wrong pursuant to N.J.S.A. 34:15-8.  Such claims are expressly excluded from coverage.
[brief] Hayes v. Delamotte, 231 N.J. 373, 386 (2018).  Although the trial judge does not sit as the thirteenth juror when ruling upon a motion for a new trial, his or her function is not simply a mechanical one.  Kita v. Borough of Lindenwold, 305 N.J.  Super. 43, 49 (App. Div. 1997).  Rather, the judge is required to canvass the record to determine whether reasonable minds might accept the evidence as adequate to support the jury’s verdict.
[brief] As the State’s brief acknowledges, *Torres* did not announce a new rule of law.  Rather, *Torres* clarified the procedure and requirements for sentencing when a lengthy consecutive sentence is imposed.  *Torres*, 246 N.J. at 270-71.  All defendants are entitled to the benefit of a clarification of a law that was in effect at the time of their sentencing.  *Fiore v. White*, 531 U.S. 225, 228 (2001).  This is true even if the clarification does not occur until after the defendant’s conviction is final.  See also, Bunkley v. Florida, 538 U.S. 835 (2003) (holding that when a subsequent case announces a correct formulation of substantive law, rather than a change of law, relief is required without regard to retroactivity).  New Jersey has similarly adopted this approach.  State v. Jackson, Doc. No. [...] (App. Div. Dec. 23, 2022).  In a case similar to the present matter, a youthful defendant was convicted of kidnapping and murder charges and sentenced to consecutive sentences.  Id. at *11.  Ultimately, the defendant’s consecutive sentences were confirmed in 2020.  Id.  After that, Torres was decided.  On appeal in 2022, the court remanded for resentencing based on Torres and the failure to consider the overall fairness of lengthy consecutive sentences.  The court there observed that Torres clarified the need for an explicit consideration of the overall fairness of a consecutive sentence and that failing that “there needs to be [a] remand and resentencing to consider the overall fairness of the sentence. ”  Id.  [...], similarly was a youthful defendant sentenced to lengthy consecutive sentences, where at sentencing there was no discussion of the overall fairness of the sentence.  Accordingly, as the Torres clarification applied in Jackson, it must apply to [...].
[brief] Defendant’s points I.B.1, I.B.4, II.B., and III.D. are all simply repackaged and rebranded phrasings of Defendant’s previously adjudicated claims of error on appeal.  Defendant couches this present appeal and each of his claims in the context of ineffective assistance of counsel, implicitly attempting to evade R. 3:22-4’s dictates with a contention that these claims are in some manner substantively different from those brought during the appeals process.
[brief] For the purposes of this appeal, the State adopts defendant’s recitation of the procedural history of this matter. \(^1\) (Db3-4).  Counterstatement of Facts  In the afternoon of September 29, 2019, defendant murdered his long-time friend [...], by shooting him in the head and chest—just outside of his home in [...].  (7T26:19-22).  [...], [...]’s father, testified that on September 29, he was at the home he shared with his girlfriend, son, stepsons, and McCullum’s girlfriend [...], watching a football game.  (6T171:15-16, 177:2-3).  Around 3:50 p.m., he heard “around five” gunshots, followed by Prosser screaming.  (6T40:15 to 41-13).  Prosser testified that she was inside when McCullum was shot, and, though she heard gunshots and ran to the balcony to see what was happening, she did not see who shot the victim.  (7T 123-20 to 22, 124-4).  The victim’s father testified that a neighbor knocked on his door and urged him to come outside.  (6T 40-15 to 41-13).  When he got outside, he saw his son on the ground, having been shot in the head.  (6T 41-14 to 20).  \(^1\)  The State also adopts defendant’s transcription codes.  (Db3).
[directive] 6.1.10  Along these same lines, it is important that there is no unreasonable delay between the conclusion of the investigation by the assigned investigator and the decision to file charges by the person who has that responsibility.  Although the 45-day clock begins at the time the person who has the responsibility to file charges has sufficient information, an agency would have a difficult time justifying an extensive bureaucratic delay once any member of that agency has established sufficient information.
[brief] The Testimony at the Trial that a Physical Struggle Ensued Between [...] and the Victims as They Tried to Remove Him From the House, and that One of the Victims Engaged in the Struggle Was Armed with a Loaded Handgun, Was Sufficient to Warrant a Passion/Provocation Instruction.  Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:1-8(e), juries may be instructed on what are called “lesser-included offenses” of those listed in the indictment when there exists a “rational basis” for such an offense.  The “rational basis” test for finding an appropriate lesser-included offense has been called “a low threshold” by our Supreme Court.  State v. Carrero, 229 N.J. 118, 129 (2017).  The principle underlying the lesser-offenses statute is that “no defendant should be convicted of a greater crime or acquitted merely because the jury was precluded from considering a lesser offense. ”  State v. Canfield, 470 N.J. Super. 234, 270 (App. Div. 2022) (citations and internal quotations omitted), aff’d as modified, 252 N.J. 497 (2023).  In New Jersey, a purposeful killing can be either murder or the lesser offense of passion/provocation manslaughter.  State v. Coyle, 119 N.J. 194, 221 (1990); see also N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4(b)(2).  If there is evidence of passion/provocation in the record, the State can secure a conviction for murder “only if it proves beyond a reasonable doubt that the purposeful killing was not the product of passion/provocation. ”  Ibid.  Accordingly, when there is evidence of passion/provocation in connection to a killing, the trial court is required to instruct a jury that the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt the killing was not the product of passion/provocation.  Id. at 221-22.  In assessing whether a trial court should have supplied a passion/provocation charge, our Supreme Court has instructed that four elements are relevant: “[1] the provocation must be adequate; [2] the defendant must not have had time to cool off between the provocation and the slaying; [3] the provocation must have actually impassioned the defendant; and [4] the defendant must not have actually cooled off before the slaying. ”  State v. Mauricio, 117 N.J. 402, 411 (1990).  The first two elements are “objective,” and as such, the trial court must assess if, when viewed in the light most favorable to the defendant, a jury could “rationally construe[] the facts” to find those elements are met.
[brief] [...] argues that [...] cannot be considered a successful claimant because it did not succeed on certain “key issues. ”  In particular, [...] identifies one of the key issues as choice of law.  [...] and certain insurance companies advocated for the application of New Jersey law, while other insurance companies advocated for the adoption of Massachusetts law.  (Pa 88-89).  The trial court ([...]) held that Massachusetts law applies to the interpretation of the sudden and accidental pollution exclusion and the allocation of [...]’s covered damages.  (Pa 88).  Importantly, the choice of law was an important issue that required research, briefing and argument as a practical matter.  Further, this issue was not case dispositive as to a majority of insurance companies.  Indeed, [...] took no position on choice of law (the [...] insurance policy does not contain a sudden and accidental pollution exclusion), and, therefore, it did not “succeed” through the ruling and nor did [...] “lose” to [...] on this issue.
[brief] “[T]he doctrine cannot be used to elide the warrant requirement. ”  See *State v. Camey*, 239 N.J. 282, 302 (2019).  In light of these concerns, our Supreme Court has adopted a “restrictive formulation” of inevitable discovery, requiring the State to establish by clear and convincing evidence that: (1) proper, normal and specific investigatory procedures would have been pursued in order to complete the investigation of the case; (2) under all of the surrounding relevant circumstances the pursuit of those procedures would have inevitably resulted in the discovery of the evidence; and (3) the discovery of the evidence through the use of such procedures would have occurred wholly independently of the discovery of such evidence by unlawful means.
[brief] ” (Pra001; 5T27:19-29:2).  Prior to being hired by [...] in 2017, [...] had previously worked there, but only as a seasonal cashier, not as a CSA on the sales floor.  (Pa264-278; 8T162:5-163:4).  He again applied for a job as a cashier in 2017, but the human resources manager in the Marlboro store, [...], urged him to apply for the flooring department instead because there were openings there.  (8T163:22-165:6).  Prior to being so hired, defendant [...] had no experience in the [...] flooring department (5T38:8-16), and no knowledge of any of the products in that department.  (8T165:10-14).  He also had no prior experience in flooring with any other employers.  (8T164:5-12).  [...]’s direct supervisor, [...], testified that [...] “didn’t know much” and was still in training at the time of the incident.
[brief] IV.  THE LAND REPORT IS A NET OPINION  BECAUSE ITS CONCLUSIONS ARE NOT GROUNDED IN FACTS OR DATA (3T6:24-10:2).  There can be no dispute that the Land Report is a net opinion.  Contrary to the [...]’ fervent attempts to categorize the report as inventorying pizza ovens and other industrial-type equipment, the overwhelming majority of the items are banal objects that no third-party buyer of the Property would ever pay for.  This included tiles, lights, “soap dispenser[s],” “paper towel holder[s],” appliances, shelving, electrical outlets, sinks, toilets, “toilet paper holder[s],” “wall cover[s],” “dropped ceiling,” “plywood partitions,” “circuit breaker panel[s],” paintings on windows, wall-to-wall carpeting, counters, and cabinets.  Pa281-Pa336.  More fundamentally, the Berardi’s Opposition misunderstands the [...]’s legal argument—that the Land Report is not based on any concrete facts or data from the [...]’ chosen date of valuation, January 27, 1994.  There is no case law or statute holding that FF&E are subject to the same date of valuation as the Property itself.  In other words, although by the Trial Court’s February 20, 2019 Order the Property had to be valued as of January 27, 1994, the FF&E was not included in the Order.  Again, the [...] did not actually take the Property or any of the FF&E inside until May 4, 2018.  The designation of blight on January 27, 1994 did not have any impact on the value of the FF&E, which the [...]’ tenants continued to own and use up until the date of taking.
[brief] At a minimum, the Affidavits of Merit place the Defendant on notice as to the medical providers that the Plaintiffs contend it is vicariously liable for in this case.  This satisfies the requirements of the Affidavit of Merit Statute.  Each of these arguments was rejected by [...] in his determination that discovery was not necessary and the entity should be outright dismissed with prejudice.  Furthermore, the Plaintiffs were deprived of the ability to cure any deficiencies and serve a new Affidavit of Merit.  Thus, this case provides a perfect opportunity for this Court to resolve this important issue.  Because this question addresses important issues of general applicability and the harm which is, in part, sought to be avoided would occur absent immediate appeal, this Court is requested to exercise its discretion and find that the interests of justice favor granting immediate appeal.  POINT II:
[brief] **REPLY TO AMBROSE’S MAY ’23 CROSS-MOTION: OCT. ’22 ORDER**  My May 30, 2023 Certification  Reply agreed with his Cross Motion that Oct. 2022 Order should **NEVER** have authorized [...]’s $4,120.48 billed work, as part of $15,022.72 in par. 1d, for review of [...]’s invalid request around June 2021 for Trust to pay off her personal home equity loan since it was an indisputable fact that [...], & NOT [...], was counsel, at the time, for Trust & Co-Trustees, & Mr. [...] should NEVER have been consulted, nor accepted a review of this issue.  My Aug. 8, 2022 filing, Item 10a, p. 14 (122a), had also argued that Court should reject that payment.  Oct. ‘22 Rider, p. 14, last par. (30a), rejected Mr. [...]’s Aug. 8, 2022 Exception.  (Exh. “AC”, Items 10&11, p. 6-7; p. 9, par. 10; p. 10)  (484a-488a)  Proposed Order: I filed updated Order, incl. a provision that Court’s prior approved $4,120.48 should be paid back to the Trust (Exh. “AD”) (503a-507a).  H. APPEALING RULINGS FROM AUGUST 4, 2023
[directive] Second or subsequent offense.  Individuals who engage in a second or subsequent • violation of the statute are subject to a complaint-summons for a fourth-degree crime.  Under the new law, the prohibitions against distribution of marijuana also apply to possession with intent to 1 distribute marijuana.  Therefore, all references to “distribution” in this guidance document also apply to conduct that involves possession with intent to distribute.  Page 3  In addition to these changes, law enforcement officers may no longer detain, arrest, or otherwise take into custody an individual for violating certain marijuana or hashish offenses.
[directive] (3)  ¿Entiende usted que si no le notifica a la agencia apropiada del orden público un cambio [Sí/Yes] [No/No] de dirección o situación puede que le acusen de un delito de tercer grado por el que (si el delito se cometió el puede recibir una condena de encarcelamiento de hasta 5 años primero de julio del 2014 o después de esa fecha) o puede que le acusen de un delito (si el de cuarto grado y podría recibir una condena de encarcelamiento de hasta 18 meses delito se cometió antes del primero de julio del 2014)?  Do you understand that if you fail to notify the appropriate law enforcement agency of a change of address or status you may be charged with a third degree crime, and may receive a sentence of (if the offense was committed on or after July 1, 2014) imprisonment of up to 5 years or you may be (if charged with a fourth degree crime and may receive a sentence of imprisonment of up to 18 months the offense was committed before July 1, 2014)?
[brief] Plaintiff alleges that he informed [...] of his EEOC submission around March 1, 2021.  See Pa62 at ¶¶ 35-37.  On March 3rd, [...], at Plaintiff’s request, informed [...] that Plaintiff and other substitute security officers wanted a raise.  See Pa12 at ¶16; Pa57 at ¶16; Pa37; Pa30; Pa38.  [...] had been aware of Plaintiff’s desire for a raise since February 22nd.  See Pa29.  On March 10th, Plaintiff was informed of available work details that he was allegedly not informed of through Absent Management.  See Pa13 at ¶¶25-26; Pa57 at ¶¶25-26.  Upon learning of these shifts, Plaintiff leapt to the conclusion that [...] had intentionally locked Plaintiff out of the Absent Management system as a form of retaliation.  See Pa60 at ¶11; Pa63 at ¶¶53-54.  This is despite the fact that [...] was assisting Plaintiff in his attempt to obtain a raise.  Pa12 at ¶16; Pa57 at ¶16; Pa37; Pa30; Pa38.  Plaintiff had, and still has, no evidence to support his “feeling” that [...] disconnected him from Absent Management.  See Pa15 at ¶¶34-40; Pa57 at ¶34; Pa58 at ¶¶35-40; Pa46-Pa47.  Later in the day on March 10th, Plaintiff confronted [...] over text and accused him of locking Plaintiff out of Absent Management.  See Pa39-Pa41; Pa45.  During this “text fight,” Plaintiff threatened to resign his position.  See Pa42 (“Won’t contact you anymore.  Just to turn in clothes, ID and 2 access cards. ”).  Plaintiff then equivocated on this threat by saying that “a few days of careful consideration are in order. ”  Pa43.  [...] offered to have [...] call Plaintiff to discuss Plaintiff’s grievances.  See Pa42.  [...] and Plaintiff spoke on the phone on March 15th.  See Pa50.  During this call, [...] told Plaintiff that he hoped Plaintiff would continue working for the Board.  See Pa16 at ¶46; Pa58 at ¶46.  Soon after Plaintiff’s call with [...] ended, Plaintiff called [...] while “very angry” and “very upset” and called [...] a “piece of shit. ”  See Pa16 at ¶¶47-48; Pa58 at ¶¶47-48; Pa50.  Later on the 15th, after Plaintiff’s calls with [...] and [...], a coworker informed Plaintiff that he was not allowed on the high school campus.  See Pa16 at ¶49; Pa58 at ¶49; Pa52.  When placed in their full context, this series of events makes the following clear: (1) the events of March 10th and March 15th were triggered by Plaintiff’s subjective and unfounded “feeling” that he had been locked out of the Absent Management system, not the March 1st conversation in which he allegedly informed [...] of the EEOC submission; (2) [...]’s March 15th comment that he hoped Plaintiff would continue working was prompted by Plaintiff’s March 10th threat to resign; and (3) Plaintiff’s bar from the high school was triggered by his March 15th phone call to [...], in which Plaintiff “very angr[ily]” called [...] a “piece of shit,” which occurred after Plaintiff’s first and only call with [...].
[brief] [...] was blinded by an intravitreal injection of Ozurdex when a silicone particulate broke off from a defective Ozurdex applicator (also called an “actuator”) and was injected along with the Ozurdex steroid pellet into [...]’s left eye.  [...]’s injury was entirely preventable.  [...] received her Ozurdex injection on November 6, 2018, but [...] had knowledge of the manufacturing defects associated with these actuators since June 21, 2018.  In fact, [...] had issued Recalls, Rapid Alerts and Warning letters to physicians in forty (40) countries around the world, yet knowingly continued to distribute defective lots of Ozurdex in the United States (“U.S.”) without any warning to physicians or patients until finally issuing an Urgent Drug Recall in the U.S. on December 28, 2018.  [...] inexplicably maintains that there is no evidence of a manufacturing defect related to these applicators, despite the fact that [...]’s U.S. recall specifically states that the applicators contain a defect.  Furthermore, [...]’s October 25, 2018 Root Cause Analysis Report specifically identified the manufacturing defect that caused the silicone particulate to be injected from the defective Ozurdex applicator, as well as the changes made in the manufacturing process to prevent this from occurring in the future.  Notably, [...] has admitted that the specific lot from which [...]’s November 6, 2018 Ozurdex injection originated, contained 145 of these defective Ozurdex applicators.  [...]’s own corporate representatives testified that any actuator that dispensed a silicone particulate deviated from the product’s performance standards and that the Ozurdex actuator was not designed to release a silicone particulate.  Under the New Jersey Product Liability Act (“PLA”), N.J.S.A. sec. 2A:58C-2, a manufacturer of a product shall be held liable if the claimant proves that the product causing harm deviated from the design specifications or the performance standards of the manufacturer.
[directive] The determines.  Enforcement Professional Standards, Law and Police, the Office of New Jersey State New Jersey, the enforcement and of and such other law agencies Police, Association of Chiefs New Jersey the and leaders as the educational organizations, civic faith-based, and connmunity, organizations, goals set forth in this Directive.  accomplish the appropriate to Director deems developing the limited to, identifying or include, but not be Institute's mission shall  The shall be c. 23.  That course materials required by P.L. 2016, course and cultural diversity training view electronic Internet or to an pa,Y~ticipate via the that allows officers to in a format made available in segments may be viewed shall be designed so that it DVD), and of the course (~, a recording participation.  The course should not merely in scheduling an officer's afford flexibility over time to scenarios paresent and discuss shall, to the extent practicable, factual information, but rather present course an officer's decision-making skills.  The enhance training) designed to scenario-based (i.e., that are understand the principles officers taking the course that shall include a test to confirm presented.  PROGRAM CON'I'1NUING EDUCATION