ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The depositions of [...] of [...] and [...] solidify that there were multiple inspections and work were completed in the area prior to the accident and no indication was made that the 2” settlement was a dangerous roadway condition.  [...] was on site at least once a week and testified that if he noticed something dangerous, he would “notify somebody at the [...]. ” (Pa0761 at 37:14 - 38:18; Pa0764 at 39:3-7).  Aside from [...], there was a representative from [...] on site during construction.  (Pa0761 at 37:14 - 38:18).  Even with inspection and monitoring prior to the accident, no notice was provided to the [...] that the subject condition was dangerous and posed a substantial risk of reasonably foreseeable injury to the public.
[brief] But the Township is unable to cite to any document in the trial court record – or in the municipal record – regarding its newfound rationale to justify the taking of private property.  Yet, Plaintiff now argues this Court should affirm based on certain “public benefits” that include:  1.  “Enhanced Recreational Opportunities” for parks, trails and recreational facilities to meet community need.  (Pb21)  2.  “Environmental Preservation” to preserve lands with ecological value, habitat preservation, and protect water resources.  (Pb22)  3.  “Strategic Urban Planning” to facilitate smart growth.  (Pb22)  4.  “Community Engagement and Public Support” suggesting significant community engagement in a transparent process.  (Pb23)  5.  “Economic Benefits” suggesting open space will attract tourism.  (Pb23)  The Township fails to cite to the record to show that the Township considered any of these factors in seeking to condemn Defendants’ properties, nor were these considerations before the court below.
[brief] | DATE | EVENT | |---------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------| | September 9, 2021 | Medical leave under the FMLA begins | | November 24, 2021 | Retirement application submitted | | December 9, 2021 | Certification from the [...] confirming retirement effective 2/1/22 and retirement benefits | | December 28, 2021 | [...] confirms total service credit of 10 years and 1 month on retirement date of 2/1/22 and retirement benefits | | January 31, 2022 |  Exit interview | | February 1, 2022 | Retirement | | February 28, 2022 |  [...] statement confirming (1) monthly pension benefit of $677.02 based on maximum service and (2) entitlement to a life insurance benefit of $9,952.12 | | July 19, 2022 | [...] first notification that retirement benefits had been recalculated | | July 22, 2022 | [...] first notification of complete loss of life insurance benefit ($9,952.12) | | October 27, 2022 |  Denial of appeal of reduction of monthly pension benefit and elimination of life insurance benefit | | June 5, 2023 | Denial by Board of request to restore full pension benefits | | August 17, 2023 | Board affirms its June 5, 2022 decision |
[brief] She wrongfully changed title of [...]’s Lexus by “doctoring” a transfer from “Husband to Wife” in her own handwriting, which was not true as the parties had been divorced for almost two-and-a-half years.  (A48).  [...] knew as much, since within 24 hours she filed a Delaware Name Change Petition using the parties’ 2015 Divorce Decree as an exhibit.  (Pa58, Trial Ex. P-22).  It was only until [...]’s \(^{12}\) [...] testified that the Honda Pilot was “really [[...]’s] car and she was hiding her money. ” (16T75-2).  Her obvious incentive was to receive Pennsylvania Health Benefits for free (See Pa35).  false domestic violence\textsuperscript{13} report that [...] learned from the investigating police officer the Lexus title had been changed.  [...] immediately filed a report of theft of the Lexus and filed his August 2017 Notice of Motion to Enforce Litigant’s Rights against [...] for the return of the Lexus.
[brief] (6)  The financial impact on the governing unit, its residents, the limitations imposed upon the local unit's property tax levy pursuant to section 10 of P.L.2007, c.62 (C.40A:4-45.45), and taxpayers.  When considering this factor in a dispute in which the public employer is a county or a municipality, the arbitrator or panel of arbitrators shall take into account, to the extent that evidence is introduced, how the award will affect the municipal or county purposes element, as the case may be, of the local property tax; a comparison of the percentage of the municipal purposes element or, in the case of a county, the county purposes element, required to fund the employees' contract in the preceding local budget year with that required under the award for the current local budget year; the impact of the award for each income sector of the property taxpayers of the local unit; the impact of the award on the ability of the governing body to (a) maintain existing local programs and services, (b) expand existing local programs and services for which public moneys have been designated by the governing body in a proposed local budget, or (c) initiate any new programs and services for which public moneys have been designated by the governing body in a proposed local budget.
[directive] Per AG Directive 2018-3 v2.0, also known as the “Early Warning Systems Directive,” law enforcement agencies are required to implement a specific mechanism to track employee behavior, commonly known as an "early warning system."  An early warning system should be designed to identify any pattern or practice by any member of the agency that warrants intervention or remediation before it develops into a more serious problem.  12  INTERNAL AFFAIRS POLICY & PROCEDURES | August 2020
[brief] (13T17-5 to 18-20; 13T23-7 to 11; 13T24-5 to 7).  On direct, [...] said she “produced some stills of the object that the driver had in his hand” during the Lakehurst stop.  (13T47-7 to 11).  She also said she “produced” enhanced photos from the Marlboro video.  (13T49-6 to 50-6).  On cross-examination, defense counsel raised the issue of [...]’s opinion as expressed to [...], over the State’s objection that counsel was eliciting a lay opinion.  (13T65-19 to 70-13).  Counsel emphasized that [...] told [...] she could not “positively” say it was a NJSP ID.  (13T70-11 to 13).  At that point, the judge reminded the jury of her prior instruction, and again told the jury that “[w]hat is ultimately depicted in those photographs . . . is for your determination. ” (13T69-18 to 20).  Defendant testified at length about the searches.
[brief] Affordable housing requirements.  A.  If a continuing care retirement community development is constructed in the Senior Housing - 2 Overlay District, same shall be required to set aside a minimum percentage of the senior independent living units for affordable housing.  The minimum set aside shall be fifteen percent (15%) of rental units and twenty percent (20%) of ‘for sale’ units.  When calculating the required number of affordable units, any computation resulting in a fraction of a unit shall be rounded upwards to the next whole number.  B.
[directive] This should not include distributions 7), previously reported in and Provide individually; the payee, the 10).  8), 9) law enforcement purpose, the amount and the total for all expenditures - during the period.  Expenditures made in accordance with Forfeiture - Program AdministrationiStandard Operatinq Procedure Reallocation 10, to the Department of Law Public Safety of Property Purchased with Forfeited & Funds by a Governmental Agency, shall be annotated with the ROP the # of approved properly executed
[directive] The following questions need to be answered only if you are pleading guilty to a first or second degree between June 9, 1997 and June 29, 2001.  violent crime that occurred  A violent crime means any crime in which you caused death, serious bodily injury, or you used or threatened the immediate use of a deadly weapon.  A violent crime also includes any aggravated sexual assault, or sexual assault in which you used, or threatened the immediate use of, physical force.  Deadly weapon means any firearm or other weapon, device, instrument, material or substance, whether animate or inanimate, which in the manner in which it is used or intended to be used, is known to be capable of producing death or serious bodily injury.  Serious bodily injury means bodily injury which creates a substantial risk of death or which causes serious, permanent disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ.  1.
[brief] The Appellate Division affirmed on the basis that the Township did not have notice that the tree in question was defective, only that Bradford pear trees in general could have issues, which is insufficient under the Act to establish notice.  The Appellate Division also found the Township’s conduct was not “palpably unreasonable”:  Plaintiff seemingly contends that since the Township was aware of the inherent dangers of Bradford Pear trees, all such trees should have been removed.  We conclude that this contention is unreasonable.
[brief] (Pa13-14).  The Board concluded that the Division had notified all retired members of [...] of the passage of the Ricci Act on August 9, 2019 in accordance with the Act.  (Pa13-14).  [...]’s assertion that he did not remember receiving the postcard notice did not establish good cause nor reasonable grounds to allow him to file over one year and seven months past the statutory deadline.  (Pa14).  Further, the Board concluded that [...] had not exercised reasonable diligence because of such a protracted delay in filing his Eligibility Registration Form.  (Pa14).  Therefore, the Board concluded that [...] was ineligible to register for amended benefits under the Ricci Act.  (Pa14).  This appeal followed.
[brief] (Pa42-43; Pa254; Pa271).  On May 28, 2021, defendant filed an Offer of Judgment (“OOJ”) for a “lump aggregate sum of Eleven Thousand and 11/100 Dollars ($11,000.00) consisting of “all damages” and inclusive of attorney’s fees.  (Pa205-209).  On June 3, 2021, plaintiff’s counsel served a frivolous litigation letter, under N.J.S.A. 2A:15-59.1 and Rule 1:4-8 on defendant’s counsel.  (Pa267-269).  Because plaintiff was seeking equitable relief, she and her counsel asserted that the OOJ, inter alia, violated Rule 4:58-3(c) which states that “[n]o allowances shall be granted if … (4) a fee allowance would conflict with the policies underlying a fee-shifting statute or rule of court…”  Ibid.  Plaintiff’s counsel again reached out to defendant’s counsel, in attempts to settle the matter, on July 6, August 2 and September 16, 2021, but the defendants refused to settle for anything more than the $11,000 set forth in their OOJ. (Pa270-271; Pa279-284).
[brief] The Unemployment Compensation Law (“UCL”) has a remedial purpose meant “to afford protection against the hazards of economic insecurity due to involuntary unemployment. ”  Yardville Supply Co. v. Bd. of Review, 114 N.J. 371, 374 (1989) (emphasis added).  As such, the UCL “must be construed liberally in favor of allowance of benefits. ”  Haley v. Bd. of Review, 245 N.J. 511, 520 (2021).
[brief] For example, Plaintiff testified that during the Spring Semester of 2013, he spoke with Mr. [...] (“Mr. Buechner”), who advised him that he would be able to matriculate to the MBA program when his GPA was where it needed to be so that he would still finish the dual degree program by 2016.  (Pa246; Pa458).  Defendant also disregards [...] Dean, Dr. [...], Ph.D’s, email which unmistakably demonstrates students were able to enter the dual degree program and take the additional coursework at a later date.  (Pa465).  [...] stated, “**The student could be considered for admission into the MBA program once they are no longer under academic probation within their primary (Pharm D) program. **” (Pa463-Pa464).  This statement was made **after** Plaintiff’s first year of enrollment ended.  Therefore, it was not until 2016 that Plaintiff learned that he could have only matriculated into the dual degree program after his first year of enrollment, which makes Plaintiff’s claims timely.
[brief] The First Element: Lack of Prejudice to the Defendant................................. 15  2)  The Second Element: A Series of Steps Taken to Comply With the Affidavit of Merit Statute................................................................. 16  3)  The Third Element: A General Compliance with the Purpose of the Affidavit of Merit Statute................................................................. 18  4)  The Fourth Element: A Reasonable Notice of Plaintiff’s Claim.............. 18  5)  The Fifth Element: A Reasonable Explanation Why There Was Not a Strict Compliance With the Affidavit of Merit Statute ......................... 19 c) Plaintiff Cannot Establish Extraordinary Circumstances ................................. 22 Issue II: There Was No “Gamesmanship” Which Might Excuse Plaintiff’s Failure To Comply With The Affidavit Of Merit Statute......................................................... 25 Issue III: Plaintiff Was Not Excused From The Affidavit Of Merit Requirement................................................................................................................................. 27 E. Conclusion ...................................................................................................................... 31 Appendix Track Assignment Notice .................................................................Da1 Default Petition Against [...] .........................Da2 Default Petition Against [...] ..............................Da5 Oct. 11, 2023 Order Granting Default Against [...] ..Da8 Oct. 11, 2023 Order Granting Default Against [...] ....Da11 Nov. 7, 2023 Letter Submitting Consent Order To Vacate ........................Da14 Nov. 7, 2023 Granted Order to Vacate ..............................................Da17 ## Table of Authorities ### Cases - **A.T. v. Cohen**, 231 N.J. 337 (2017) ......................................................... 6, 10, 24 - **Alan J. Cornblatt, P.A. v. Barow**, 153 N.J. 218 (1998) ........................................... 11, 15 - **Barrerio v. Morais**, 318 N.J. Super. 461 (App. Div. 1999) ........................................... 8 - **Burns v. Belafsky**, 326 N.J. Super. 462 (App. Div. 1999) ........................................... 23 - **Cowley v. Virtua Health Sys.**, 242 N.J. 1 (2020) ...................................................... 7, 10 - **Emanuel v. McNell**, 87 N.J.L. 499 (E. & A. 1915) ..................................................... 13 - **Est. of Yearby v. Middlesex Cnty.**, 453 N.J. Super. 388 (App. Div. 2018) ... 17, 18, 19 - **Ferreira v. Rancocas Orthopedic Associates**, 178 N.J. 144 (2003) ....................... passim - **Fox v. Passaic Gen. Hosp.**, 71 N.J. 122 (1976) .......................................................... 16 - **Graham v. N.J. Real Estate Comm’n**, 217 N.J. Super. 130 (App. Div. 1987) ...... 13 - **Haviland v. Lourdes Med. Ctr. of Burlington Cnty., Inc.**, 250 N.J. 368 (2022) ...... 9 - **Hyman Zamft & Manard, L.L.C. v. Cornell**, 309 N.J. Super. 586 (App. Div. 1998) .........................................................................................................................
[brief] ”  But it seemingly ignores the other part of the Rule, which explicitly provides that information is discoverable, even though it will “be inadmissible at the trial if the information sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. ”  The latter provision of Rule 4:10-2(a) is an acknowledgment that information is discoverable even if irrelevant and therefore inadmissible at trial, so long as that information may lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING DEFENDANT  [...]’S MOTION TO DISMISS AND THE ORDERS SHOULD BE VACATED DUE TO FLAWS IN THE STATEMENT OF REASONS (Raised Below: Pa424; 2T4)  The Court’s Statement of Reasons (SOR) at Pa380 is faulty because it overlooked:  A.  The Complaint did not allege [...] “Expected or Intended” to cause injury (Pa424); (1T13), (2T12)  B.  The Trial Court failed to consider Plaintiff’s opposition Brief (Pa260) and Certification (Pa289)- specifically the “Additional Statement of Facts” (Pa290) and Evidence “List of Relevant Documents” (Pa295).  (Pa424)  C.  The Court in SOR failed to appreciate Voorhees at 180 “Interpreting Occurrence” whereby the Court ruled that the duty-to-defend, unlike the indemnification clause, does not require the existence of an occurrence to trigger coverage.  (Pa277, Pa424).  D.  The Court incorrectly states Plaintiff’s third argument as “the [...] policy provides coverage on an ‘all risks’ basis...” (Pa391).  Rather Plaintiff’s argument is “the [...] policy provides liability coverage on an ‘all risks’ basis…” (Pa425, Pa28).  E.  The Court in SOR failed to appreciate Abouzaid at 81 which ruled that coverage is triggered “where the complaint does not state facts with sufficient definiteness to clearly bring the claim within or without coverage. ”  (Pa282, Pa425)  F.  The Court in SOR failed to appreciate the “Comparison to Voorhees” (Pa284) and the ambiguity in the pleadings which triggers coverage.  (Pa425, Pa511).  G.  The Court in SOR cites Voorhees; yet failed to state what standard it applied to determine whether the alleged conduct was “intentional” and failed to explain its reasonings and why it departed from the “subjective” standard (Pa396, Pa425)  H.  The allegations against [...] do not justify a departure from the general rule requiring an inquiry into the insured’s “subjective” intent to injure.  (Pa279, Pa425).  The facts are disputed, the Court failed to consider relevant evidence, and failed to make an inquiry into the actor’s subjective intent to cause injury. ”  (Pa425, Pa426)  J.  The Trial Court limited its findings and failed to consider each allegation in the complaint separately to determine whether coverage was possibly triggered (Pa426).  III.
[brief] Defendants claim that there are three mechanisms by which a public disclosure occurred: (1) licensing or purchasing rate data in bulk from the [...]; (2) obtaining data from the [...]; and (3) obtaining rate data from what they refer to as “[...],” via an annual subscription costing $250,000 or more or via a subscription to a terminal for $10,000 per year.  Defendants do not point to any actual disclosure of the VRDO rate data Relator used in its complaints.
[brief] A.  The Alleged Dying Declaration Was Too Unreliable To Be Admissible.  Referred to as a “dying declaration,” a statement is admissible as an exception to the prohibition against hearsay if made “under belief of imminent death. ”  N.J.R.E. 804(b)(2).  Such a statement is admissible because it is assumed reliable, “based on the rationale that the sense of impending death is presumed to remove all temptation to falsehood, and to enforce as strict an adherence to the truth as would the obligation of an oath.
[brief] A.  DENIAL OF [...]’S SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION ........................................  17  B.  THE THREE CONTRACT DOCUMENTS ....................................................................  20  1.  The POS ...................................................................................................................... 21  2.  The PAAU/PABU: ................................................................................................. 22  3.  The PSA: .................................................................................................................. 22  C.  BECAUSE PLAINTIFFS SEEK TO VOID THEIR FRAUDULENTLY INDUCED CONTRACTS, NOT ALTER THEM, THE PAROL EVIDENCE RULE DOES NOT APPLY .................................................................
[brief] (Da 75-79)  Additionally, [...] did not share much information about the incident with his attorney, and “was always conscious of what his codefendants might say, think or do. ”  (Da 272)  [...] testified that in typical adolescent fashion, instead of turning to his attorney for legal advice, [...] turned to his peers – the other inmates he was incarcerated with.  (3T:65-8 to 24, 66-8 to 67-6)  [...]’s ability to participate in his own defense was further hampered by the depression that he experienced after being transferred from his juvenile detention facility to the adult jail, where he was placed on suicide watch.  (3T:65-19 to 66-7, 67-25 to 12; 4T:101-20 to 102-5)  (Da 89)  In light of all the evidence presented to the resentencing court regarding the impact of [...]’s youth on his ability to navigate the criminal legal system, the court should have found and assigned considerable weight to Miller factor four.
[brief] In *State v. Roth*, 95 N.J. 334, 369 (1984), the Court held that “an appellate court … can … review the aggravating and mitigating factors found below to determine whether these factors were based on competent, credible evidence in the record …”  See also *State v. Jarbath*, 114 N.J. 394, 402 (1989) (appellate court should determine “whether the trial court failed to adduce sufficient evidence to support its findings with respect to aggravating and mitigating factors or failed to exercise sound discretion relating to the weighing of aggravating and mitigating factors”).  Thus, the trial court’s sentencing determination, as based on aggravating and mitigating factors, and the reasoning therefor, is broadly reviewable.
[brief] N.J. Animal Rights Alliance v. N.J. Dept. of Envt'l Prot., 396 N.J. Super. 358, 372-73, n. 3 (App. Div. 2007).  In that case, the court invalidated the 2005 Comprehensive Black Bear Management Policy ("CBBMP") and affirmed the Commissioner's withdrawal of the policy over the objections of the [...].  So, over the years whenever bear hunts have been approved, lawsuits have been filed by animal rights and conservation or environmental groups, and when hunts have been prohibited, sportsmen and hunting organizations have initiated litigation to challenge the ban.  See e.g., Safari Club Int'l v. N.J. Dept. of Envt'l Prot., 373 N.J. Super. 515 (App. Div. 2004) (upholding the Commissioner's order to close all lands, owned, managed or controlled by the [...] to black bear hunting); N.J. Outdoor Alliance v. N.J. Dep’t of Envt’l Prot., No. A-05250525-18 T4, 2018 WL 6005064 (App. Div., Nov. 16, 2018), certif. den. 237 N.J. 191 (2019) (Pa145) (denying sportsmen’s groups challenge to closure of the hunt’s second phase).  See also U.S. Sportsmen’s Alliance Foundation v. N.J. Dept. of Envt’l Prot., 182 N.J. 461 (2005) (action initiated by hunters and hunters’ organizations to challenge the [...] Commissioner’s direction to the [...] to not issue bear hunting permits authorized by the [...]).  The more recent history of the bear hunt litigation is summarized in Animal Protection League of New Jersey, et al. v. New Jersey Fish and Game [...], et al., 477 N.J. Super. 145, 152 (App. Div. 2023).
[brief] Waiver "is the intentional relinquishment of a known right."  *County of Morris v. Fauver*, 153 N.J. 80, 104-05 (1998); *West Jersey Title Guar. Co. v. Industrial Trust Co.*, 27 N.J. 144, 152 (1958).  Waiver must be voluntary and there must be a clear act showing the intent to waive the right.  *West Jersey*, 27 N.J. at 152.  Furthermore, waiver "presupposes a full knowledge of the right and an intentional surrender; waiver cannot be predicated on consent given under a mistake of fact."  *Id.* at 153.  If [...] had wanted to advance the position that the construing of the COVID Statute was within the exclusive providence of the Commissioner, it could have initiated proceedings in the Department of Education and done so there.  Instead, with full knowledge of [...]’s position that the proper construction of the COVID Statute dictated the outcome of this dispute, [...] instead brought suit in Superior Court, where it sought to preclude [...] from invoking the Statute on jurisdictional grounds.  By doing so, [...] should be deemed to have waived its right to advance this argument.