ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] A.  [...] Induces Plaintiffs To Invest [...]’s Life Savings With [...]  This matter arises from the fraudulent theft of [...]’s life savings.  [...] is 96 years old, she cannot speak or read English, and has no financial background.  (Da63, ¶ 3.)  [...]’s goddaughter, caretaker, and designated power of attorney, [...], like [...], has no financial background and has limited proficiency in English.  (Da5-6, ¶ 18.)  In early 2018, [...] appointed [...] as her agent to assist with financial and healthcare matters.  (Da64, ¶ 5.)  At [...]’s request, [...] agreed to assist her with her finances and help her find a trusted financial advisor to invest [...]’s savings that she had accumulated over her lifetime.  (Ibid.)  In April 2018, [...] was contacted by [...], a financial advisor working with [...], about investing with him through [...].  (Id., ¶ 6.)  [...] had worked with several individuals in Plaintiffs’ community who had vouched for him, and after a meeting among Plaintiffs, [...], and [...]’s wife at [...]’s house, Plaintiffs orally agreed to invest with [...]/[...].  (Da64-65, ¶¶ 7-8, 13.)  During the meeting, [...] represented that he helped other individuals in similar situations as Plaintiffs.  (Da64, ¶¶ 9-11.)  He promised [...] and [...] that he would invest [...]’s money responsibly through [...].  (Ibid.)  At no time during this meeting were Plaintiffs informed that by investing with [...] they would be waiving their right to sue [...], [...], or anyone else in the Superior Court of New Jersey or were waiving their right to a jury.  (Da65, ¶ 12.)  In fact, at no point during this meeting did [...]’s representative, [...], provide Plaintiffs with any “Account Application” or show Plaintiffs an arbitration agreement or arbitration provision in any other agreement.  (See id., ¶¶ 12-16.)  Further, [...] did not explain to Plaintiffs that they would be waiving any of their constitutional or statutory rights or that they would have to agree to arbitrate any and all disputes against [...].  (Da65-66, ¶¶ 14, 17.)  At no point during their initial meeting with [...]’s representative and agent, [...], did Plaintiffs ever read or execute any agreement that included an arbitration provision; Plaintiffs did not even access a computer during this meeting.  (Ibid.)  Rather, [...] assured Plaintiffs that he would take care of any necessary paperwork to set up their brokerage account.  (Da0065, ¶ 13.)  --- 2  Neither [...] nor [...] submitted any certification or testimony to the trial court to contradict [...]’s sworn statements.  As the trial court correctly noted, Plaintiffs’ factual claims are uncontested.  (2T14:4-5.)  B.
[brief] On numerous occasions we have found ‘such particular circumstances as to dictate not the hard approach of literally applying the statute of limitations but the application of the more equitable and countervailing considerations of individual justice. ’  ***  A ‘just accommodation’ of individual justice and public policy requires that ‘in each case the equitable claims of opposing parties must be identified, evaluated and weighed. ’  Ensslin v. Board of Trustees, Police and Firemen’s Retirement System, 311 N.J Super 333, 337 (citations omitted).
[brief] As set forth in the Order entered by [...] (Pa-), the Court already decided a Motion for Summary Judgment.  Part of the Court’s decision was to dismiss the LAD claims and the Movant recognizes that Order but in no way indicates that a Summary Judgment Motion was already made and heard and partially denied.  A distinction was made by [...] between the concepts of CEPA and the LAD.  The Defendants contended before the Court a discussion of discrimination when in fact they should have been talking about retaliation.  The Motion below filed by the Defendants was a misunderstanding of the nature of the Summary Judgment Motion which the Court denied as to CEPA.  As to the Motion for Summary Judgment before [...], the Court determined that the Plaintiff’s claims constituted, from a jury perspective, a hostile work environment which supported a CEPA action.  The Plaintiff complained about the treatment of female civilians (Pa-1).
[brief] In *Manger*, the parties attempted to introduce bank statements regarding the valuation of marital property.  The Appellate Division found the “arbitrator provided an opportunity for each party to identify... documents on which they intended to rely at the hearing,” but the parties failed to do so.  417 N.J. Super. at 376.  “[T]he arbitrator had the authority to exclude” that evidence “and any other documents not produced in accordance with the case management order. ”  *Id.* at 376-377.  The Appellate Division viewed such an exclusion as “[c]onsistent with [the arbitrator’s] authority to conduct an arbitration in such manner as the arbitrator considers appropriate for a fair and expeditious disposition of the proceeding” pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:23B-15(a).  Id. at 376 (quotation omitted).
[brief] C.  TO BE VALID  A WARRANT MUST DESCRIBE WITH PARTICULARITY  THE PLACE OR PERSON TO BE SEARCHED AND HERE ONLY THE PREMISES WAS NAMED  It is respectfully submitted that as the [...], issued September 28, 2020, does not list or mention the defendant (or any person) by name or description that it necessarily follows that the warrantless arresting and searching of defendant by the police on September 28, 2020, was invalid and in violation of the Fourth Amendment, requiring suppression of all evidence seized from defendant as fruit of the poisonous tree.
[brief] In the present matter, Defendants submit that the trial court’s decision to permit Plaintiff to present a lost wage claim supported by nothing more than his own testimony misapplied the applicable law to the circumstances of this case.  Plaintiff’s expert offered no opinion concerning Plaintiff’s ability/inability to work following the accident.  The issue was raised immediately prior to jury selection based upon a subpoena issued the evening prior by Plaintiff to his employer.  2T.22:10 to 26:14.
[brief] Here, Plaintiff did not comply with the discovery rules post-Best Practices, and there was nothing about Plaintiff’s motion to reopen discovery that constituted exceptional circumstances.  See O’Donnell, 363 N.J. Super. at 51 (“It is time we define examples of what constitutes exceptional circumstances and what does not”; “The disclosure of a disruption of one’s office by partners or associates having health problems or leaving, especially if they had responsibilities for the matter before the court would probably be persuasive.  The disclosure of personal sudden health problem of counsel would be such an example as well.  Death of a family member; injury to a family member requiring the attorney to attend more to that family member; death or health problems of the client; death or health problems of a key witness requiring further discovery to develop information caused by the loss of the witness are further examples of exceptional circumstances”).
[brief] ”  Id. at 158.  Finally, and relevant to this Chancery Court’s justification for permitting Plaintiffs to vote to shift their legal fees to [...] by the 29.5% value of his interests:  The business judgment rule has its roots in corporate law as a means of shielding internal business decisions from second-guessing by the courts.  Under the rule, when business judgments are made in good faith based on reasonable business knowledge, the decision makers are immune from liability from actions brought by others who have an interest in the business entity.
[brief] There, the claimant argued that “neither bodily injury nor property damage manifests until the injured party is able, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, to ascertain that the injury or damage is fairly traceable to some outside causative force or agency. ”  *Id.* at 20.  Just like the *Air Master* court, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the claimant was improperly attempting to import equitable tolling concepts from the statute of limitations, but the date an injured party knows he has been harmed by another’s conduct “has no special relevance in determining the date an insurance policy is triggered[.]”
[brief] ”  Lindstrom, 138 N.J. at 252.  Although the Lindstrom case dealt with injuries to a pedestrian, the Court’s reasoning of what constitutes an “accident” indicated that a driver or passenger injured in a random drive-by shooting would likely recover PIP benefits.  Craig & Pomeroy, New Jersey Auto Insurance Law, § 6:2-3(b), p.133 (Gann, 2021).  Notably, the Appellate Division has found a substantial nexus even when the injuries at issue were not directly or proximately caused by the automobile, or its motion or operation.
[brief] *State v. Kuropchak, 221 N.J. 368, 388 (N.J. 2015)*  ("However, we have also recognized that police officers who draft reports have an interest in prosecuting defendants.")  This is a court of law, with a requirement of "proof beyond a reasonable doubt."  (Emphasis on proof".)  This is not a court of assumption with a requirement of "assumptions beyond a reasonable doubt.  A statement that there is an odor of alcohol is not probable cause to arrest.  It is merely a subjective statement/opinion which could neither be proven or disproven.  It could also be a flat out lie.  Every adult who has drank alcohol knows consuming a small amount of alcohol will be detectable by breath.  If a subjective unprovable statement that there was a strong odor of alcohol can be used to justify probable cause, this would lead to utterly absurd results in the court system.  Cops will simply arrest anyone that came out of a restaurant establishment and state there was a strong odor of alcohol.  It would not matter if it was coming from their breath because they drank it or if it is coming off their clothes because they leaned on a puddle of alcohol on the bar or if there is even any odor at all because how are you going to prove or disprove that someone smelt a particular odor?  At that point, the BAC allowance might as well be 0.00 instead of 0.08.  Meaning drinking or smelling like any amount of alcohol and driving would be considered illegal.  This way people would not drink at all and probably stay away from any restaurant establishment that serves alcoholic beverages.
[brief] It appears that the methamphetamine charge was dismissed because the witness from the N.J. State Police Laboratory did not appear at trial.  The municipal prosecutor apparently did not pursue the marijuana charge due to the subsequent statutory amendment and the liberalization of the marijuana laws.  such appeals are “heard in the Superior Court in New Brunswick. ”  Pa155 (T9:16-18).  On April 22, 2022, Hon. [...], J.S.C. entered an Order which dismissed Plaintiff’s appeal of his municipal court convictions.
[brief] Two stray cats and traps and various containers and piles of cat food were observed on a public sidewalk.  (3T Pg. 13, Ln. 20-25, 3T Pg. 16, Ln. 24-25, 3T. 17, Ln. 1).  The trap was improperly set up because the door was tied open and therefore could not close, there was food placed in the trap and there was plastic wrapped around the trap to protect against inclement weather.  (3T Pg. 14, Ln. 7-23, 3T Pg. 15, Ln. 4-7.  One trap contained a taped handwritten note stating “Trapping momma cat + kittens – Please call [...] [...]. ”  Multiple pictures of the scene were taken.  (3T Pg. 26, Ln. 7-11).  Further investigation revealed an Open Public Records Act Request (“OPRA”) seeking August 2021 Animal Control Reports and Invoices that was filed on September 13, 2021 by “[...] L. Baird. ”  The OPRA request contained a phone number of “[...]. ”  The first name and phone number contained in the OPRA request was identical to the information contained on the handwritten note taped to one of the traps discovered on [...].  (3T Pg. 27, Ln. 9-14).  Thereafter, on September 17, 2021, the Defendant appeared at the [...] to request the return of her trap.  (3T Pg. Ln. 5-11).  Accordingly, on October 1, 2021, the Defendant was issued six (6) summonses for violations of various animal control and sanitation ordinances as a result of setting up cat traps and food on [...] in East Hanover Township: (1) [...] for violation of East Hanover Ordinance §173-24; (2) [...] for violation of East Hanover Ordinance §173-27; (3) [...] for violation of East Hanover Ordinance §201-2; (4) [...] for violation of East Hanover Ordinance §201-2; (5) [...] for violation of East Hanover Ordinance §201-2, and (6) [...] for violation of East Hanover Ordinance §201- 2.
[brief] It is beyond dispute that [...], by virtue of its having been issued a certificate of authority under N.J.S.A. 17:50-11, is authorized to transact the business of insurance and is therefore an “insurer” within the Act’s scope.  To eliminate any doubt, the Holding Company Act defines “person” as “an individual, a corporation, a limited liability company, partnership, an association, a joint stock company, a trust, an unincorporated organization, any similar entity or any combination of the foregoing acting in concert. ”  N.J.S.A. 17:27A-1(f).  [...] certainly falls within that definition.
[brief] Standard of Review (Not raised below) | 13 | | II.  The [...]’ Notice of Hearing was Defective under New Jersey’s Municipal Land Use Law and Deprived the Board of Jurisdiction to hear the 2022 Zoning Application (Pa32) (1T35:6-7; 1T35:19-22) | 14 | | III.  The Board’s Grant of the 2022 Zoning Application is Substantially in Conflict with and Deviates from the [...] Master Plan (Pa33) | 19 | | IV.  The [...] Failed to Sustain Their Burden of Proof for the Grant of D Variances  Under New Jersey’s Municipal Land Use Law and Therefore the Board’s Grant of 2022 Zoning Application must be Voided (Pa1-Pa22) (1T9:16; 1T18:22-1T19:22) | 22 | | Conclusion | 29 | TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS  Order granting summary judgment and dismissing complaint, filed October 2, 2023 Oral Decision (October 2, 2023) ## INDEX OF APPENDIX DOCUMENTS | Appendix Documents | Appendix page number | |------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------| | [...] 2022 Zoning Application | Pa1 | | [...] 2020 Zoning Application | Pa23 | | Notice to Property Owners 2022 | Pa31 | | Notice of Publication 2022 | Pa32 | | 2004 [...] Master Plan | Pa33 | | Aerial Photographs of Applicant’s Property | Pa36 | | RD-C Zoning Requirements from [...] Code | Pa37 | | Resolution of the Zoning Board October 20, 2022 | Pa40 | | Plaintiff’s Complaint, filed June 30, 2022 | Pa51 | | Defendant Board’s Answer to Complaint, filed December 27, 2022 | Pa65 | | [...]’ Answer to Complaint, filed December 28, 2022 | Pa78 | | Plaintiff’s Statement of Material Facts and Issues to Trial Brief, filed July 24, 2023 | Pa87 | | Defendant [...]’s Preliminary Statement and Counter Statement of Facts to Reply Brief, filed August 7, 2023 | Pa97 | | Defendant Zoning Board’s Response to Plaintiffs’ Statement of Facts & Counter Statement of Facts To Reply Brief, filed August 8, 2023 | Pa102 | | Plaintiff’s Answer to Defendants Statement Of Facts | Pa123 | | Rule 2:6-1(a)(1) Statement of All Items Submitted on Summary Judgment Motion | Pa133 | Order Granting Summary Judgment, Entered October 2, 2023 Notice of Appeal, filed November 9, 2023
[brief] See Shepherd v. Hunterdon Dev. Ctr., 174 N.J. 1, 26 (2002) (“without more, an employer’s filing of a disciplinary action cannot form the basis of a LAD complaint”); El-Sioufi, 382 N.J. Super. at 176 (unfavorable job evaluations and reassignment to another job did not constitute an adverse employment action under the NJLAD); Spinks, 402 N.J. Super. at 485–86 (“An employer must be free to investigate complaints of employee misconduct without fear of LAD liability.  Only when the investigation results in some real detriment, such as a suspension, demotion, or termination, should the aggrieved employee be able to invoke the protection of the LAD. ”).
[brief] In Sears Roebuck & Co. v. Camp., 124 N.J. Eq. 403 (E. & A. 1938), the Court of Errors and Appeals explained the fundamental, bedrock equitable principle that: [e]quitable remedies “are distinguished for their flexibility, their unlimited variety, their adaptability to circumstances, and the natural rules which govern their use.  There is in fact no limit to their variety and application; the court of equity has the power of devising its remedy and shaping it so as to fit the changing circumstances of every case and the complex relations of all the parties. ”  [Id. at 411-412 (quoting Pom. Eq. Jur. § 109 (emphasis added)).]  Moreover:  A lack of precedent, or mere novelty in incident, is no obstacle to the award of equitable relief, if the case presented is referable to an established head of equity jurisprudence--either of primary right or of remedy merely.  And it is an ancient field of equity jurisprudence to relieve against the consequences of accident and mistake of fact . . . where, in the furtherance of justice, that course may be taken without disregard of an equal or superior equity, particularly where one has thereby acquired, at the expense of the complaining party, a legal right which in good conscience he should not retain.
[directive] The above-described revisions to the “Brimage” Guidelines shall take effect on September 6, 1999 and shall apply to all cases pending on that date insofar as their application does not introduce confusion or delay.  The authority to tender a plea offer that takes into account the complex/ protracted litigation downward adjustment described in § III shall expire on Sep- tember 6, 2000, unless the Attorney General shall direct otherwise.  The Attorney General expressly reserves the right to terminate the complex/protracted litigation adjustment pilot program prior to September 6, 2000 and thereby rescind a prosecutor’s authority to make a complex/protracted litigation downward adjust- ment, in which event Part III of this Supplemental Directive will be repealed in its entirety, and plea offers in all pending cases will be calculated in accordance with the provisions of the original “Brimage” Guidelines.
[brief] Redevelopment Plan  Plaintiff’s Property has been designated as an area in need of redevelopment under a redevelopment plan adopted by the Defendant, [...] (“the “Borough”) and being implemented by Defendant, [...] (“Redevelopment Agency”).  (Pa 174).  The Redevelopment Plan for Plaintiff’s Property was originally adopted in 2002 (twenty-two years ago) and has been amended on numerous occasions, the last being the Second Ordinance (as defined below and which is the Ordinance being challenged by Plaintiff in the within action) in 2022 (as amended, “Redevelopment Plan”).  (Pa 91).  The only property subject to the Redevelopment Plan is Plaintiff’s Property.  (Pa 170).  The Redevelopment Plan as it was originally adopted made no provision for addressing the Borough’s constitutional Mt. Laurel obligation to provide a realistic opportunity for low and moderate income housing to be built in Milltown.  (Pa 108).  Pursuant to the Redevelopment Plan, as it existed through 2019, a less than 4 acre strip of the Plaintiff’s Property was designated as an approximately 50 foot wide linear greenway to be sold to the [...] (the “County”).  (Pa 4).  That strip ran along the banks of Mill Pond and would tie into a system of such greenways running along the banks of the waterways (Lawrence Brook) feeding to and from Mill Pond.  (Pa 4).  The balance of the 22.5 acres or approximately 18 acres was to be developed for 350 residential housing units at a density of approximately 19 units per acre.  (Pa 4).  Defendant, [...] (“[...]”) is the designated redeveloper of Plaintiff’s Property under the Redevelopment Plan.  Defendant, [...] is the assignee of [...]’s rights under the Redevelopment Agreement (as defined below) ([...] and [...] is collectively referred to hereafter as the “Redeveloper”).  (Pa 48).  C. Mt. Laurel Action
[brief] ”  Id. at 342.  States, whether through Courts or legislative action may not determine that a contract is fair enough to enforce all its basic terms, “but not fair enough to enforce its arbitration clause.  The Act makes any such state policy unlawful, for that kind of policy would place arbitration clauses on an unequal 'footing' directly contrary to the Act's language and Congress' intent. ”  Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 281 (1995).  Analogous to [...] and [...], applying [...]’s express waiver requirement here would place the parties’ arbitration clause on unequal footing.
[brief] The trial court noted there is “a difference between an affidavit of service and actual service. ” (1T14:3-7).  Further, it would be “farfetched” for the amount of activity between 2015 and 2020 not to reach [...]’s attention (1T14:14-16).  On October 19, 2023, the court entered an Order denying Defendant’s motion to vacate (Da60).  On November 8, 2023, Defendant moved for reconsideration (Pa78-84).
[brief] ”  Nor, even as to questioning that occurred at Holmdel at about 10:45 P.M., was there any evidence that [...] waived his rights.  (See 3T38-6 to 3T40-2).  [...] suppressed all statements made by [...] in violation of his Miranda rights from the time of his arrest until his recorded statement at 10:45 P.M.  She did not suppress the recorded statement.  Based upon [...]’s decision, [...] filed a motion for reconsideration of the September 23, 2019, suppression of evidence motion based upon the doctrine of fruit of the poisonous tree.  This motion for reconsideration was denied.  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I
[brief] (Ca107-114).  This post is the subject of Count 1 of the Complaint in this matter.  (Ca199-200).  16.  On April 28, 2022, members of the [...] Community again voiced their protest of Respondent’s social media posts at a meeting of the Board.  (Ca098-099) (See, e.g., “[...] stated that his daughter attend Central Regional and he addressed [...] online posts”; “[...] addressed [...] and [...]”).  Respondent – and the Board itself – were asked to take accountability for Respondent’s posts.  (Ca099) (“[...] stated that it is disgusting and insane for not taking accountability. ”)  Instead of taking accountability, Respondent grinned.  (Ca098) (Board minutes: “[...] stated stop with the grin while defending the posts. ”).  LEGAL ARGUMENT I.
[directive] The Task Force is also responsible for identifying mandatory minimum training to be completed by all individuals who function as potential first responders to a terrorist attack.  In executing its responsibilities, the Task Force has determined that all potential first responders to a terrorist attack, including all law enforcement officers, shall complete a course of training in domestic security preparedness.  The mandatory minimum training will include instruction in the following subjects: Incident Command System (ICS- 100), HAZMAT Awareness, Weapons of Mass Destruction and Counter-Terrorism.  • [...] TELEPHONE: (609) 292-4925 • FAX: (609) 292-3508
[brief] ”  Kean Federation of Teachers, 233 N.J. at 573.  Similarly, the right of the public to receive notice of a special meeting scheduled by a public entity “would be rendered ‘useless and inoperative’” if that entity could decide that its notices will not be published, either by failing to transmit notices in a timely manner or by directing the recipients not to publish.  Id.  The Borough acted in bad faith when it deliberately undermined “the legislative intent to ensure the public’s right to be present at public meetings and to witness government in action. ”  Id. at 570.