ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] On October 13, 2020, more than two years after the New Jersey Supreme Court reversed [...]’s VOP conviction, [...] filed a fifteen-count civil rights complaint—consisting of five federal and ten state causes of action—in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Middlesex Vicinage.  (Pa1-Pa44).  As to the State Defendants  [...] asserted that after his September 12, 2014 arrest by the [...], the Prosecutor Defendants relied upon perjured testimony and police reports containing false information during the VOP proceeding, resulting in [...]’s VOP conviction.  (Pa8; Pa9).  [...] further asserted that after his VOP conviction was vacated by the New Jersey Supreme Court, the Prosecutor Defendants interposed objections before the sentencing court which resulted in the sentencing court’s amended JOC containing false assertions of fact.  (Pa12-Pa13).  On December 14, 2020, the Edison Defendants removed the action to federal court based on federal question jurisdiction.  (Pa50).  Thereafter, the individual State defendants filed dispositive motions to dismiss [...]’s pleading in the district court.  Ibid.  They argued, in relevant part, that the State was entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity, that the prosecutors were entitled to absolute prosecutorial immunity for their actions taken in the course of prosecuting [...]’s VOP charge, and that Defendants [...], [...], and [...] were not “persons” subject to suit under § 1983 or the New Jersey Civil Rights Act, N.J.S.A. 10:6-1 to -2 (NJCRA).
[brief] *State v. Dunbar*, 229 *N.J.* 521 (2017).  The sniff may not prolong a “traffic stop beyond the time required to complete the stop’s mission, unless he possesses reasonable and articulable suspicion to do so. ”  *Id.* at 540.  To transform a stop into a brief investigatory stop “[t]here must be some objective manifestation that the person [detained] is, or is about to be engaged in criminal activity."
[brief] 708a  Exhibit 1 to Certification, Memorandum of Law dated October 7, 2022, filed December 29, 2022 (omitted here – R. 2:6-1(a)(2)) -- Exhibit 2 to Certification, Memorandum of Law dated October 25, 2022, filed December 29, 2022 (omitted here – R. 2:6-1(a)(2)) -- Exhibit 3 to Certification, Memorandum of Law dated October 31, 2022, filed December 29, 2022 (omitted here – R. 2:6-1(a)(2)) -- Exhibit 4 to Certification, Butler v. Daimler Trucks N. Am., LLC, No. 19-cv-2377 (D.  Kan. June 16, 2022) (unpublished), filed December 29, 2022 (omitted here – see Pa286)  Exhibit 5 to Certification, Youngberg v. Gen. Motors, LLC, No. 20-339 (E.D. Okla. August 24, 2022) (unpublished), filed December 29, 2022 (omitted here – see Pa303)  Exhibit 6 to Certification, Paredes v. Ford Motor Co., A-3542-07 (App. Div. December 10, 2008) (unpublished), filed December 29, 2022 (omitted here – see Pa701)  Exhibit A to Plaintiff’s Reply in support of Reconsideration, filed December 30, 2022  Exhibit B to Plaintiff’s Reply in support of Reconsideration, filed December 30, 2022  Stipulation of Dismissal, filed April 28, 2023
[brief] The adoption of an amendment to a redevelopment plan does not ordinarily require findings of fact.  Id. at 332-33.  The hearing before the governing body does not require the presentation of evidence to provide the “factual foundation for the ordinance, and the governing body does not ordinarily make any findings of fact to justify its action. ”  Hirth v. City of Hoboken, 337 N.J. Super. 149, 165-66 (App. Div. 2001) (citing Gardens v. City of Passaic, 130 N.J. Super. 369, 377-78 (Law Div. 1974), aff’d o.b., 141 N.J. Super. 436 (App. Div. 1976)).  Thus, Plaintiffs’ attempt to show the governing body failed to make appropriate factual findings in support of [...] is insufficient to overcome the presumption of validity.  Instead, they were required to demonstrate that the record failed to justify the Mayor and Council’s conclusions, showing that the Ordinance is arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable.
[brief] The motion court denied [...]’s motion to exclude his statement in its entirety.  (Da 110-28)  Although the State did not contest that [...] was in custody during the stationhouse interrogation, the court sua sponte held that he was not in custody until his third request to “go home. ”  (Da 121, 125-26)  The court nonetheless found his Miranda waiver valid, but it analyzed that issue as a question of whether his “reply of ‘Mm, cool,’ constituted an indication that [he] wished to remain silent” and an “invocation of the right against self-incrimination,” rather than a question of affirmative, voluntary waiver.  (Da 123)  The court next held that his statement overall was not coerced.  (Da 123-25)  It found that the “police impliedly threatened that he would be retaliated against” and made “a promise that [he] would be safer if he cooperated,” but it believed they were not coercive because the detectives would not be committing the retaliation themselves.  (Da 123-25)  The court also found that they pressed him to cooperate because it was “best for his children,” but it did not analyze that pressure as coercive.  (Da 126)  The court said it considered the totality of circumstances, but besides the threat of retaliation, it mentioned only the water, breaks, and his prior experience talking to police as a witness.  (Da 125)  Finally, the court held that all three of his requests to “go home” and his similarly report that the second “nothing” response occurred.  (9T 31-17 to 20) first assertion that he had “nothing else to say” were not even ambiguous invocations of his right to silence because he did not “specifically request[] that the questioning cease”; he continued to respond, “albeit curtly”; and, after the latter assertion, he asked them to call [...] so he could leave.  (Da 125-27)  The court held that only his last three assertions that he had “nothing” to say constituted an unambiguous invocation, but because nothing substantive was said thereafter, it admitted his entire statement.  (Da 127-28)  On appeal, the only factual finding that [...] challenges is that the court missed his second reply that he had “nothing” to say, which was clearly mistaken based on the objective video showing that it occurred.  (Da 109, 06:40:02 to 6:40:20)
[brief] See State v. Hodge, 95 N.J. 369, 375-77 (1984) (sentencing is “offense-oriented”).  Both of the aggravating factors the court found pertain to the defendant; the court did not find any aggravating factors that pertain to the offense.  See State v. Abdullah, 184 N.J. 497, 506 n.2 (2005) (noting that aggravating factors (3), (6), and (9) all relate to recidivism).  And in arriving at aggravating factors (3) and (9) and rejecting mitigating factors (8) and (9), the court improperly placed substantial weight on [...]’s failure to incriminate himself at sentencing and on what, in the court’s opinion, was his failure to express 20  As [...] turned 26 two weeks before the commission of the offense (30T 58-10 to 12), the court considered inapplicable mitigating factor (14), that “[t]he defendant was under 26 years of age at the time of the commission of the offense[.]”  N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1b(14).  remorse, and on its improper parsing of the jury’s verdict to [...]’s detriment.  A.  The failure-to-confess and express-remorse errors
[brief] Notwithstanding the foregoing, for easy reference, we are providing the Court with a recitation of the relevant restrictive covenants as contained in the [...] as well as our commentary:  A.  Plaintiff’s [...] Contains Six (6)  Restrictive Covenants  The 1947 [...] contains a specific set of restrictive covenants entitled “OCEAN BEACH RESTRICTIONS” and the said restrictions are segregated and enumerated into six separate categories, namely, 1) Beach Club; 2) Building Restrictions (Lots other than Ocean Front); 3) Building Restrictions (Ocean Front Lots); 4) General Restrictions; 5) Storage; and 6) Utilities.
[brief] There is no dispute that plaintiff voluntarily signed a valid and enforceable arbitration agreement by which she agreed that “any and all disputes” regarding “any aspect” of her health club membership with [...], including any disputes regarding the “validity, enforceability, or scope” of her membership agreement, would be resolved exclusively on a single-claimant basis in binding arbitration.  Her claims in this lawsuit—which involve statutory claims challenging certain terms and conditions of her membership agreement—fall plainly within the scope of the parties’ arbitration agreement.  Nevertheless, plaintiff—seeking to sidestep her obligations so she can proceed with a class action in court—asserts that her claims are not subject to arbitration under the parties’ arbitration agreement because she is requesting “public injunctive relief. ”  Her claim seeking “injunctive relief” in connection with her private health club membership, however, does not constitute a claim for “public injunctive relief” under the plain definition contained in the parties’ arbitration agreement and well-established case law.  Rather, it constitutes a claim for “private injunctive relief,” as it is primarily intended to benefit only herself and a discrete class of current and former members of two [...] health clubs in New Jersey (versus a “public injunctive relief” claim, which is primarily intended to benefit the general public at large).  Indeed, plaintiff is not even authorized to seek “public injunctive relief” under any of the statutes on which she bases her claims.  Finally, even if there could be a dispute as to whether plaintiff’s injunction claim qualifies as a claim for “public injunctive relief,” that would constitute an issue of arbitrability that must be decided by an arbitrator under the express terms of the parties’ arbitration agreement.  For these reasons (and those below), the lower court’s order compelling plaintiff to arbitrate her claims on an individual basis and staying plaintiff’s lawsuit pending the completion of arbitration should be affirmed in its entirety.
[brief] In the telephone call, [...] asked [...] if he could run a criminal history for him on an out-of-state individual.  (Id.)  [...] told [...] to hold on and switched the call to an unrecorded telephone line.  (Id.).  ¶16.  At 7:48 a.m. on January 11, 2006, [...] asked [...], a dispatcher working at the [...], to run a criminal record for [...].  (Ex. 7 at *35).  ¶17.  In the Gardner police log, Newton recorded that Roggio was a suspect in a shoplifting at [...].  (Id.) ¶18.  Although there is no direct evidence, it is a reasonable inference that [...] told Newton that Roggio was a shoplifting suspect.  (See id.; Tr. II: 60).  ¶19.  [...] was working at the [...] on the morning of January 11, 2006.  (Tr. II: 48-49).  He was not working at the Hannaford supermarket that day.  (Tr. II: 82).  ¶20.  [...] and [...] both testified that before 2009, they had never met or heard of Roggio.  (Tr. II: 70-71, 82).  [...] also testified he could not remember a time where he had begun a shoplifting investigation by running a suspect’s criminal record.  (Tr. II: 40).  ¶21.
[brief] Personal property.  "Personal property" includes goods and chattels, rights and credits, moneys and effects, evidences of debt, choses in action and all written instruments by which any right to, interest in, or lien or encumbrances upon, property or any debt or financial obligation is created, acknowledged, evidenced, transferred, discharged or defeated, in whole or in part, and everything except real property as herein defined which may be the subject of ownership.  Plural.  See "Number; gender," supra, this section.  Population; inhabitants.  The word "population," when used in any statute, shall be taken to mean the population as shown by the latest Federal census effective within this State, and shall be construed as synonymous with "inhabitants."
[brief] Da68 at 38:18-39:19; Da69 at 44:7-13.  Plaintiff further testified that dating back to his 2011 Sleep Center Agreement he does not “have any way of ascertaining one way or the other if this contract [he was] paid in full versus any other contracts. ”  Da63 at 19:4-11.  Finally, Plaintiff testified that he received 1099 forms each year while working for Defendants, however Plaintiff then admitted that there are no 1099 forms in --- 18  See, supra, p. 6 n.2  19  “Q  So previously you had testified that you had provided checks from 2011 through the end of your time at [...], but now that you've seen what I just showed you, would you agree that only from September of 2016 through the end of 2017 are checks that you provided?  A  Yeah, I assume so. ”  20  “Q  Do you have any way of ascertaining one way or the other if this contract you were paid in full versus any other contracts?  A  No, except that I did provide the checks that were given to me from [...], and that was total compensation, uh, that I received.  So what part of it went to the sleep lab, I don't know. ”  his either his personal or business tax return productions.  Da77 at 76:3-20; Da78 at 80:8-81:5.  **Plaintiff’s Sham Affidavit and the Motion for Summary Judgment**
[brief] Da238-Da287.  Specifically, [...] was required to establish rents, rates, fees and charges to be collected by customers of the Project Garage pursuant to the terms set forth in the Operating Agreement.  Da255-Da256.  The Operating Agreement further provided that [...] was required to pay an Operating Fee to [...] in the amount of $24,000.00 per year, with a $75.00 annual fee for each space in excess of 300 spaces.  Da108; Da258-Da262.  [...] was also required to maintain the Project Garage and pay direct payroll and benefits of Authority employees assigned to the Project Garage.  Da258-Da262.  The Authority and [...] were also required to work cooperatively to establish a validation system for the Project Garage.  Da262.  The Redevelopment Agreement, Ground Lease, and Operating Agreement were contemplated (and must be read) as one cohesive transaction.
[brief] The trial court erred by limiting its consideration of the dispute between the parties to acceptance or rejection of the Boundary Commissioners’ Report and failing to consider an alternative presented by the plaintiffs/appellants (2T5, l.10-6, l. 10 & Pa96).  In closing their discussion of the law applicable to this case, the [...] briefly return to the fact that the parties resided as neighbors for over a decade without a boundary dispute.  In a case where the property descriptions have been found to be accurate, “the prime consideration determining the meaning of basic title instruments is the intention of the parties. ”  Normach Associates, Inc. v. Baldessano, 40 N.J. 113, 125 (1963), cited by Stransky v. Monmouth Counsel of Girl Scouts, 93 N.J. Super. 599, 611 (App. Div. 2007).  Certainly, the parties did not have any understanding that the boundaries of the properties which they had purchased and on which they resided were to be shifted off of and onto that of their neighbors in order to come to some sort of agreement with surrounding surveys.  Stated another way, the “disagreement” between the Worley and Sweeney Surveys noted by the Report of the Boundary Commissioners did not exist to the [...] knowledge when they purchased Lot 10, and did not exist to the understanding of anyone other than the parties before the trial court until after the trial.  The Boundary Commissioners in their understandable search for surveying accuracy overlooked the understanding of the parties and their neighbors.  The trial court erred when it failed to appropriately adjust for this factor and set aside the Report.  The compromise [...] provided a realistic basis for resolution of the dispute actually presented without creating the problems caused by the Report.
[brief] The doctrine of “the fruit of the poisonous tree” does not apply because statements made during the phone calls did not stem from [...]’s failure to clarify defendant’s equivocal waiver.  Rather, the statements came from defendant’s desire to communicate his current and eventual location to his parents as well as to request that they hire an attorney on his behalf.  Defendant’s incriminating statements were solely his doing as he had previously made many unprompted statements.
[brief] .  (Id.)  Finally, and most importantly, Defendants failed to produce an expert to speak as to how a State of Emergency, and specifically this one, had any bearing on private snow removal companies like [...] and [...], and their work on properties such as the [...].  (Id.)  The only clear purpose of Defendants’ request was to inflame and prejudice the jury against Plaintiff as the jury would be improperly invited to conclude or infer that Plaintiff did something wrong by driving to work during a State of Emergency on March 8, 2018.
[directive] 7.3  The supervisor shall order a pursuit terminated at any time if he or she concludes that the danger to the pursuing officer(s) or the public outweighs the necessity for immediate apprehension of the violator.  7.4  The supervisor shall order the pursuit terminated if the suspect’s identity is established to the point where later apprehension may be accomplished and where there is no imminent threat to public safety.  7.5  In recognition of the overall population density and volume of vehicular traffic in this State, and the increased risk attendant to prolonged vehicular pursuits, a supervisor shall order the termination of any pursuit of protracted duration unless the supervisor determines that further pursuit is justified to respond to an imminent threat to public safety.
[brief] D’Atria v. D’Atria, 242 N.J. Super. 392, 401 (Ch. Div. 1990).  In the instant matter, the additional information provided to the court on the second motion clearly indicates that plaintiffs (and/or counsel) certainly knew or should have known of the identity of [...] prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations.  Plaintiff himself was clearly capable of ascertaining the identities of the strip mall’s tenants, as he took photographs immediately following the accident.  Assuming arguendo that he should not be held to that standard due to his injuries, his counsel, through the investigator that went to the scene within weeks of the accident, certainly could have ascertained the identity of this defendant.  The signage above its leased space and in its window was there for the world to see.  (Pa509, Pa809)  Plaintiff had ample opportunity to have ascertained the identity of this defendant and amended the complaint prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations.  The trial court effectively rewarded plaintiff for counsel’s failure to previously disclose the existence of [...]’s report.
[brief] A prosecutor cannot make a call to arms appeal to jurors or ask them to send a message to the community with their verdict.  Even if the courts had determined that the AP “crossed the line” of permissible advocacy, his remarks do not invariably justify reversal.  The Supreme Court of New Jersey in *Frost*, supra, 158 N.J. at 76, expressly refused “to adopt a *per se* rule that requires reversal of every conviction whenever there is evidence of egregious prosecutorial misconduct during trial. ”  See also *State v. Kounelis*, 258 N.J. Super. 420, 429 (App. Div. 1999) (improper but not reversible error for prosecutor to suggest “that defense counsel’s task was to confound and confuse the jury”).  In criminal cases where reversal was ordered, a prosecutor’s remark disparaging the defense was but one instance of a wider and persistent pattern of misconduct which included inherently more egregious and prejudicial elements.  See *Frost*, supra, 158 N.J. at 88-89; *State v. Goode*, 278 N.J. Super. 85, 92 (App. Div. 1994); *State v. Acker*, 265 N.J. Super. 351, 356-57 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 134 N.J. 485 (1993); *State v. Pindale*, 249 N.J. Super. 266, 286-87 (App. Div. 1991); *State v. Sherman*, 230 N.J. Super. 10, 17-18 (App. Div. 1988).  There is no pattern of prosecutorial misconduct in this matter.
[brief] Documents Submitted on JEDS by [...] (Attached at Pa218)  Complaint Summons 2/20/2020 (Attached at Pa0041)  Exhibit K to Certification of [...] Pa523 [...] Letter to [...] and [...] 12/24/2020 (Attached at Pa108)  Certification of Eldridge [...] to Motion to Dismiss and suppress 10/14/2020 (Attached at Pa229)  Statement of Facts - Police Reports Attached 10/13/2020 (Attached at Pa232)  Notice of Motion to Suppress and Dismiss by [...] 10/13/2020 (Attached at Pa059)  Hawkin’s Letter to [...] Regarding Submission of Copies to Prosecutor and Hernan 4/15/2021 (Attached at Pa245)
[brief] Plaintiff Engaged in Protected Whistleblowing Activity.  There is also evidence in the record that Plaintiff engaged in protected whistleblowing activity.  Plaintiff complained about Defendant [...] to [...], a member of Defendant’s management, including after the June 2020 incident.  (Pa246, Pa660).  When Plaintiff made these complaints she believed that [...] had a responsibility to take action in response to her complaints.  (Pa664).  These complaints constitute CEPA-protected activity, whether or not Plaintiff specifically complained about harassment within the meaning of the statute.  CEPA does not require any “magic words” in communicating an employee’s reasonable belief of illegal activity.  See Beasley v. Passaic County, 377 N.J. Super. 585 (App. Div. 2005).  Moreover, reports to these individuals were consistent with Defendants’ internal reporting procedures, and the individuals had the authority to correct any violations.  See N.J.S.A. 34:19-2(d).  D.
[brief] J. Super. 552, 561 (App. Div. 2002) | 62 | | Flodman v. Institution & Agencies Dep’t., 175 N.J. Super 504 (App Div. 1980) | 25 | Furey v. County of Ocean, 273 N.J. Super. 300, 311-312 (App. Div.) certify. den. 138 N.J. 272 (1994) ...........................................
[brief] Subsections (a)(5) and (a)(7) read in relevant part, including the prefatory language:  “Notwithstanding the presumption of incarceration pursuant to the provisions of subsection d. of N.J.S.2C:44-1, whenever a person with a substance use disorder who is subject to sentencing under this section is convicted of or adjudicated delinquent for an offense, other than one described in subsection b. of this section, the court, upon notice to the prosecutor, may, on motion of the person, or on the court's own motion, place the person on special probation, which shall be for a term of five years, provided that the court finds on the record that:” (5) the person did not possess a firearm at the time of the present offense and did not possess a firearm at the time of any pending criminal charge; and (6) the person has not been previously convicted on two or more separate occasions of crimes of the first or second degree, other than those listed in paragraph (7); or the person has not been previously convicted on two or more separate occasions, where one of the offenses is a crime of the third degree, other than crimes defined in N.J.S.2C:35-10, and one of the offenses is a crime of the first or second degree; and (7) the person has not been previously convicted or adjudicated delinquent for, and does not have a pending charge of murder, aggravated manslaughter, manslaughter, kidnapping, aggravated assault, aggravated sexual assault or sexual assault, or a similar crime under the laws of any other state or the United States; and [N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14(a) (emphasis added).