ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] in that < P 10-2: Source of Fundinq for Reallocations  The of government, (hereafter referred to as the "Agency") which desires unit make a reallocation to the Department shall only use funds that are the Agency's to ef [Civil 2C-64-1 N.J.S.A. share of funds forfeited under the authority of seq., be, and such funds shall at the time of the reallocation, available for use Forfeirure) or Agency's Law Enforcement Trust Account.
[brief] ” (2T5-5 to 12).  In fact, the delay in trying the case, from April 2018 through June 2019 was caused by defense counsel’s requesting numerous adjournments so that defendant’s federal charges could be resolved.  (2T5-2 to 14; 2T7-10 to 16).  United States v. Ballis, 589 F. 3d 673, 680 (3d Cir. 2009) (delay caused by defense counsel weighs against defendant).
[brief] In sum, the trial court improperly relied upon incompetent, inadmissible evidence to resolve both motions. ”  *Sellers v. Schonfeld*, 270 N.J. Super. 424, 427-428, (App. Div. 1993).  (Emphasis Added).  In granting summary judgment, the lower Court mistakenly relied on exhibits attached to the certification (which is not an affidavit) of the Declarant who claimed no personal or actual knowledge (Exhibit FF) (Da115).
[brief] produce them.  Moreover, [...]’s position is nonsensical.  Per Paff, Plaintiff could request a log of the three days’ worth of McDonald’s emails, then turn around and file an OPRA request for every email in the log.\(^5\)  Such a process would simply create more work for the custodian, who has already identified the responsive records and just needs to review them for exemptions.  The Paff decision comports with other published decisions, which have held that requests for “all” of a certain type of document during a specified time frame.  See, e.g., Simmons, 247 N.J. 24, 43 (2021) (finding a request for all DWI, drug possession, and drug paraphernalia complaints summons for a 20-month period to be valid); Scheeler v. Office of the Gov., 448 N.J. Super. 333, 344 (App. Div. 2017) (rejecting State’s argument that plaintiff’s request was not specific enough where he requested all OPRA requests filed with the State during specific time frames); Burnett v. Cnty. of Gloucester, 415 N.J. Super. 506 (App. Div. 2010) (distinguishing MAG and finding request for all settlement agreements during a specific timeframe to be valid, even if requestor did not identify the specific legal matter to which the agreement related).
[brief] The primary standard governing the interpretation of an integrated agreement is to use "the meaning that would be ascribed to it by a reasonably intelligent person who was acquainted with all the operative usages and circumstances surrounding the making of the writing."  Deerhurst Estates v. Meadow Homes, Inc., 64 N.J. Super. 134, 149, 165 A.2d 543 (App. Div.1960) (citations omitted).  "Semantics cannot be allowed to twist and distort [the words'] obvious meaning in the minds of the parties."  Conway v. 287 Corporate Ctr. Assocs., 187 N.J. 259, 269-70, 901 A.2d 341 (2006) (quoting Atl. N. Airlines, Inc. v. Schwimmer, 12 N.J. 293, 307, 96 A.2d 652 (1953)).  In this agreement, the transaction was intended by the parties to fund a personal injury lawsuit.  It is a lawsuit funding agreement.
[brief] Also, because the studies on which defendant now relies are not part of the record, this Court should not consider them. \(^5\) *Liberty Surplus Ins. Co. v. Nowell Amoroso, P.A.*, 189 N.J. 436, 452 (2007) (“Our appellate courts will not \(^5\)  Indeed, during a discussion over an objection by the prosecutor to defendant’s introduction of the PCAST report at trial on cross-examination of [...], defense counsel conceded that he “wouldn’t be allowed” to move that report into evidence.  (6T93-11 to 94-2).  ordinarily consider evidentiary material that is not in the record below. ”); State v. Harvey, 151 N.J. 117, 202 (1997) (“The place to introduce expert testimony is at trial, where the expert is subject to cross-examination, the opposing party can introduce contradictory expert testimony, and the trial court can assess the experts’ credibility. ”).
[brief] A.  [...]’s Supply of Water to Borough Residents  [...] is a municipality located within [...], New Jersey.  Pa166 at ¶ 4.  [...] provides its residents and businesses with a variety of governmental services, including the supply of potable water.  Id.  The [...] Water Treatment Plant (PWSID No. [...]) (the “Plant”) is located at [...], directly behind [...] Borough Hall and services approximately 3,200 residents.  Id. at ¶ 5.  [...] currently relies on two groundwater production wells (Well No. 5 and Well No.  6) to meet 85 percent (271,000 gallons per day (“gpd”)) of its total daily water demand of 321,000 gpd.  Id. at ¶ 6.  [...]’s supply of water is authorized and governed by statutory and ordinance provisions.  Id. at ¶ 7.  Water bills are issued by [...] on a quarterly basis.  Id. at ¶ 8.  Residential properties are billed a minimum flat rate of $40.00 per quarter for up to 7,500 gallons of water.  Id. at ¶ 9.  B.
[brief] Ibid.  The [...]’s repeated mention of the fact that the Bulletin was issued more than fifty years after the Holding Company Act’s 1970 enactment is of no moment.  [...] asks why the Department “wait[ed] more than half a century to issue the Bulletin and why issue it now?” ([...]b4).  The answer to that question is short and simple, as stated right in the Bulletin – the inquiries that the Department received regarding the laws and requirements governing reciprocal exchanges including in connection with the 2022 acquisition of [...] (“[...]”) and [...] --- 1  “[...]b” refers to the brief of amicus curiae.
[brief] This Court’s review of the trial court’s grant of summary judgment relief is governed by the *de novo* standard.  Chance v. McCann, 405 N.J. Super. 457, 563 (App. Div. 2009).  As set forth in Rule 4:46-2(c), summary judgment shall be entered where:  the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact challenged and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment or order as a matter of law.  Once the moving party satisfies its burden of showing that no genuine issues of fact exist, the burden then shifts to the non-moving party to present evidence there is a genuine issue for trial.  *Brill v. Guardian Life Insurance Co. of America*, 142 N.J. 520, 528-29 (1995).  If the party opposing the summary judgment motion "offers . . . only facts which are immaterial or of an insubstantial nature, a mere scintilla, 'fanciful, frivolous, gauzy or merely suspicious,' he will not be heard to complain if the court grants summary judgment, taking as true the statement of uncontradicted facts in the papers relied upon by the moving party, such papers themselves not otherwise showing the existence of an issue of material fact."  *Id.* at 529 (quoting *Judson v. Peoples Bank & Trust Co.*, 17 N.J. 67, 75 (1954)).  The question of whether a legal duty exists in a matter such as this is particularly appropriate for summary judgment disposition.
[directive] Si la respuesta es “No,” proceda a la pregunta 6.  Si la respuesta es “Sí,” proceda a la pregunta 7, Have you discussed with an attorney the potential of being sentenced to a mandatory period of special probation for the purpose of participating in a court-supervised drug treatment program (“Drug Court”)?  If the answer is “No,” proceed to question 6.  If the answer is “Yes,” proceed to question 7.
[brief] I  ALL REQUIREMENTS OF THE LHRL MUST BE SATISFIED  The standard for judicial review of a redevelopment plan includes a presumption of validity, but:  “a party challenging the validity of municipal actions bears a heavy burden . . .  In order for [r]esidents to prevail in setting aside the questioned [p]lan, the legislative decisions made must be more than debatable, they must be shown to be arbitrary, capricious, contrary to law or unconstitutional. ” (emphasis added).  Downtown Residents for Sane Dev. v. City of Hoboken, 242 N.J. Super. 329, 332 (App. Div. 1990).  In this case the redevelopment plan is contrary to law.  (emphasis supplied).  Any redevelopment plan must satisfy not only the procedural statutory requirements, but also meet the substantive statutory criteria, to be legally valid.  While the [...] site in the West zone meets the substantive criteria of Section 5(a) of the LHRL, the structures to be created in the North and South zones do not satisfy those standards.  For the plan to be legally valid, if only one site satisfies the statutory requirements, the other sites must be “necessary” for or “connected” to the redevelopment qualified parcel or “for the rehabilitation of a larger area.
[brief] …………………  38 Jones v. City of Pittsburgh, 505 Pa. 25, 476 A.2d 895, 898 (1984)  ……  38 Jones Richardson v. City of East Orange, Department of Health and Human Services, 2015 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 749, *12, OAL DKT. NO. CSV 00937-15; AGENCY DKT. NO. 2015-1706 (December 22, 2015)  …………………  38 Karins v. City of Atlantic City, 152 N.J. 532 (1998)  ……………………  38 Mayflower Sec. Co. v. Bureau of Sec., 64 N.J. 85 (1973)  ………………  12 Mazza v. Board of Trustees, 143 N.J. 22 (1995)  ...........................................  13  Rivera v. Hudson County Department of Corrections, 2016 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 869, *38, OAL DKT. NO. CSR 06456-16 (August 29, 2016).......................... 28-29 .................................................................................................................. 32 Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Inv’rs Ins. Co., 65 N.J. 474 (1974)............. 12-13 Russian White House Restaurant v. Village of Ridgewood, 2000 N.J. AGEN. LEXIS 188, *109, OAL DKT. NO. ABC 7585-97 & ABC 7036-98 Consolidated (November 29, 1999) .............................................................................. 16 State in the Interest of D.C., 114 N.J. Super. 499 (App. Div. 1971)..... 18 State v. B.H., 290 N.J. Super. 588, 597 (App. Div. 1996), rev’d in part and aff’d in part, 149 N.J. 564 (1997)................................. 42 State v. Brown, 463 N.J. Super. 33, 51 (App. Div. 2020).......................... 25 State v. Callahan, 76 N.J.L. 426 (Sup. Ct. 1908)................................. 21 State v. Clawans, 38 N.J. 162 (1962) .................................................... 21 State v. Cooper, 10 N.J. 532 (1952) ....................................................... 21 State v. Elliott, 129 N.J.L. 169 (Sup. Ct. 1942) aff’d o.b. 130 N.J.L. 174 (E.&A. 1943) .................................................. 21 State v. Hill, 199 N.J. 545, 560-61 (2009) ............................................. 21, 22 State v. Lewis, 67 N.J. 47 (1975) .......................................................... 15-16 State v. Loftin, 287 N.J. Super. 76 (App. Div. 1996).............................. 25 State v. Matulewicz, 101 N.J. 27 (1985) .................................................. 25 State v. Sweet, 195 N.J. 357, 370 (2008) ............................................... 25 State v. Wilson, 135 N.J. 4 (1994) ................................................................. 25 State-Operated School District of the City of Newark v. Gaines, 309 N.J. Super. 327, 332 (App. Div.) certif. denied, 156 N.J. 381 (1998) ...................................................... 12 Torres v. Pabon, 225 N.J. 167 (2016) .........................................................
[brief] Subsection (b) of the rule was developed as a matter of “eminently good sense,” State v. Scott, 229 N.J. 169, 492 (2017) (Rabner, C.J., concurring), in response to the decision in State v. Guenther, 181 N.J. 129, 157-160 (2004), which established similar admissibility of a prior false accusation, as a constitutional matter of confrontation.  But Guenther only applied in sex-assault cases; the post-Guenther rule goes further and is intended to apply any time the credibility of a key witness is a “central issue in a criminal case. ”  State v. Terry, 218 N.J. 224, 242 (2014), quoting Guenther, 181 N.J. at 160.  Here, the judge made two mistakes.  The first was in not holding a Rule 104 hearing, as required by Rule 608(b), to determine whether [...] had previously falsely accused someone.
[brief] The facsimile or certified letter will be effective upon delivery to the Broker’s and Seller’s respective offices and to Buyer at his or her address on page 1 of this Contract (Agreement).  The attorney may also, but need not, inform the Broker(s) and the parties of any suggested revisions in the Contract (Agreement) that would make it satisfactory.  (d)  Other Rights of Cancellation.  The provisions of subparagraphs (a), (b) and (c) above are required by law due to the fact that this Agreement is being completed by a real estate broker.
[directive] Nothing in this section shall be construed to preclude a law enforcement officer from taking custody of any item or substance seized by any school employee.  4.  It is understood and agreed that pursuant to law and guidelines to be issued by the Commissioner of Education, school officials shall immediately notify law enforcement officers whenever a school employee comes into possession, whether as a result of a search or otherwise, of any substance believed to be a controlled dangerous substance.  See e.g., N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10c.  (See also Section F(3) of this Part concerning procedures for turning over substances to appropriate law enforcement officials).  5.  School officials shall permit law enforcement officers upon their arrival to the scene to assume responsibility for conducting any joint and cooperative search, in which event the standards governing searches conducted by law enforcement officers shall prospectively apply.
[brief] Id. at 7.  Deference to the trial court’s ruling on a motion for a new trial is limited to the trial court’s observations of the credibility and demeanor of the witnesses, which is generally described as the trial court’s “feel of the case. ”  Ibid.  “[A] motion for a new trial is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial judge, and the exercise of that discretion will not be interfered with on appeal unless a clear abuse has been shown.
[brief] And it is usually “not limited by the possibility that separate acts of entry or opening may be required to complete the search. ”  Ross, 456 U.S. at 820-21.  The law also recognizes that “officers executing search warrants on occasion must damage property in order to perform their duty,” Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238, 258 (1979), and may break open locked interior doors in carrying out a search warrant.  See Lynch v. City of Mount Vernon, 567 F. Supp. 2d 459, 467 n.5 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (quoting Dalia and rejecting “argument that it was unreasonable for the officers to break down locked interior doors in carrying out the search [warrant]”); Simmons v. Loose, 418 N.J. Super. 206, 217-18, 227, 229-30 (App. Div. 2011) (quoting Dalia and holding damage inflicted to five, locked interior doors was consistent with a reasonable execution of search warrant under review).  For these reasons, under the totality of circumstances presented here, whether the door to the third floor was closed, locked, or breached does not change that the officers’ conduct was reasonable in executing the search warrant for [...], which is all that is required.
[brief] In this matter, like Ensslin, the Board failed to provide timely, adequate, or proper notice of the Ricci Act.  Also like Ensslin, [...] never received the notice.  The Board did not fulfill its obligation to notify the members of the [...] of this legislation “within 30 days” of July 8, 2019, including the requirement that they had to register their presence at the World Trade Center within 2 years of the law’s enactment, as was required by law.
[directive] The indeed expected, is It detained. defendant not is the where cases impact will that circumstance be will law bail current under to make unable are who defendants low-risk many that intended, on impact foreseeable but unintended an have to likely is That system. new the under released pleading trial by jury a to their right waive who defendants of proportion (the rates plea overall under the detained been would have who Defendants pleas. guilty of timing the on and guilty), incentive to practical have system may new the under released be will who but system current would delay incentive to incarceration.
[brief] Indemnification for Seller's Benefit.  Buyer agrees to indemnify and hold harmless Seller from and against any and all Losses incurred by Seller after the date of this Agreement and arising out of, resulting from, or relating to (i) any material inaccuracy or breach of any representation or warranty of Buyer contained in this Agreement, (ii) any material breach or violation of the covenants or agreements of Buyer contained in this Agreement and (iii) any material inaccuracy in any certificate, instrument or other document delivered by Buyer as required by this Agreement.
[brief] “[...] was asking us about how we would conduct our search with respect to his wife and other people that might be at the residence. ”  (1T61-11 to 62-8, 84-14 to 86-9)  According to [...], “at that point [Mr. [...]] was thinking about consent or what if he decided not to grant consent and we were in the process of informing him that we would at that point apply for a search warrant.
[brief] A.  Pleading Standard  In resolving a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the Court determines whether the well-pleaded factual allegations in the Complaint suggest that the Appellant has a viable cause of action.  *Michel v. New Jersey Manufacturers Ins. Co.*, 2018 WL 5985985, at *2 (App. Div.  Nov. 15, 2018).  However, “conclusory allegations” are not entitled to the presumption of truth and are insufficient to survive a motion to dismiss.  *Id.*  “In evaluating motions to dismiss, courts consider allegations in the complaint, exhibits attached to the complaint, matters of public record, and documents that form the basis of a claim. ”  *Banco Popular N. Am. v. Gandi*, 184 N.J. 161, 183 (2005) (citations and quotations omitted.).  Where a “complaint states no basis for relief and . . . discovery would not provide one, dismissal of the complaint [under Rule 4:6–2] is appropriate. ”  *Cnty. of Warren v. State*, 409 N.J. Super. 495, 503 (App. Div. 2009).  B.
[brief] Rinaldo v. RLR Inv., 387 N.J. Super. 387, 395 (App. Div. 2006)  ..........................24  S. Burlington N.A. A.C.P. v. Mount Laurel Twp., 67 N.J. 151 (1983) (“Mount Laurel I”) ........................................................................................................................................................................... 26, 27, 38 S. Burlington N.A.A.C.P. v. Mount Laurel Twp., 92 N.J. 158 (1983) (“Mount Laurel II”) .................................................................................................................. 26, 27, 28, 29, 38, 39, 43 State v. Chavis, 247 N.J. 245, 257 (2021) .................................................................24 State v. R.Y., 242 N.J. 48, 65 (2020) ........................................................................... 24, 25 Thompson v. Paterson, 9 N.J. Eq. 624-25 (1854)..........................................................19 Toll Bros., Inc. v. Twp. of W. Windsor, 173 N.J. 502 (2002)..............................................29 Union Cnty. Improvement Auth. v. Artaki, LLC, 392 N.J. Super. 141, 149 (App. Div. 2007) ............................................................................................................................................25 Vineland Constr. Co. v. Twp. of Pennsauken, 395 N.J. Super. 230 (App. Div. 2007) .........................................................................................................................................................49 Waste Mgmt. of N.J., Inc. v. Union Cty. Utils. Auth., 399 N.J. Super. 508, 520-21 (App. Div. 2008) ....................................................................................................................... 20, 21 Waste Mgmt. of New Jersey, Inc. v. Morris Cnty. Mun Utils. Auth., 433 N.J. Super 445, 453 (App. Div. 2013) ..................................................................................................... 21, 40 Statutes N.J.S.A. 40:55D-62 .............................................................................................................28 N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-1 .............................................................................................................11 N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-5 .............................................................................................................34 N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-5(a) ....................................................................................................... 13, 35, 36 PRELIMINARY STATEMENT The [...] ("[...]" or the "[...]") should not be permitted to use its redevelopment condemnation powers to thwart this builder’s remedy lawsuit seeking to bring the [...] into compliance with its constitutional obligation to create a realistic opportunity for affordable housing.
[brief] (5T41:1-20; Pa280-281).  [...] testified that he never went back to work because he was “physically incapable” of doing so, and that he was still, at the time of his deposition, on January 7, 2018, one and a half years after the incident, incapable of working because of this incident.  (9T28:23-29:8); he testified that he moved to Florida and never told [...] because he “was still processing [his] emotions”.  (9T31:25-32:4).  [...] produced the testimony of a biomechanical expert, [...], who testified that his opinion was that the bag of grout was thrown (9T208:2-10), and it hit the stanchion and burst on the stanchion, and that it did not hit [...] first like [...] says.
[brief] The Appellate Court’s *de novo* review should apply the well known test for granting summary judgment, whereby the Court’s “determination whether there exists a ‘genuine issue’ of material fact that precludes summary judgment requires the motion judge to consider whether the competent evidential materials presented, when viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, are sufficient to permit a rational factfinder to resolve the alleged disputed issue in favor of the non-moving party. ”  *Brill*, 142 N.J. at 540.  POINT II
[brief] [...] cited to the Commission’s robust body of decisional law on the issue and recommended the penalty of “censure” in accordance with those prior Commission decisions.  Inexplicably, however, the Commission then decided to ignore its own precedent entirely, asserting that Respondent’s Facebook account “lacked a nexus” to her Board membership based on the erroneous conclusion that “her Facebook page did not make any reference to the Board nor her membership on the same.
[brief] (DA515-516; 2T.)  .........................................................................................................................................................  37  A.  The Trial Court Erred in Permitting [...] to Intervene on the Eve of Trial.  (Da515-516; 2T.)  .........  38  B.  The Trial Court Erred By Enlarging the Statute of Limitations Applicable to [...]’s Claims and Permitting [...] to File Her Otherwise Time-Barred Claims.  (Da515-516; 3T12-13.)  ..................41  CONCLUSION
[brief] Such evidence may be admitted for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident when such matters are relevant to a material issue in dispute.  N.J.R.E. 404; State v. Stevens, 115 N.J. 289, 300-02 (1989); State v. Harvey, 121 N.J. 407, 433 (1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 931 (1991).  Moreover, other-crimes evidence may be admitted, not only to prove issues specifically listed in the rule, but also to prove other non-specified facts in issue.