ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] (Aa71-72; Aa830-31; Aa836).  According to the panel, [...] operated CWT heaters reliably since 2011 with “minimal maintenance” and “no system outages. ” (Aa831).  Additionally, [...] testified that the CWT heaters produce “less noise” and require “lowered fuel gas pressure to operate. ” (2T92:6-25).  The panel added that catalytic heaters were considered as an alternative to the CWT heater; however, while [...] viewed both CWT and catalytic heaters as low-emission technologies with comparable costs, the panel testified that [...] faced reliability issues with catalytic heaters that were installed between 2008 and 2010, such as circuit board defects.  (2T73:22-74:9; 2T82:1-9; 2T83:1-84:6; 2T113:20-114:11; 2T115:17-19).  As such, [...] noted that [...] ceased the usage of catalytic heaters and opted to include CWT heaters in the [...]’s system.  (2T73:22-74:9).
[directive] The automated pretrial risk-assessment process does not account for convictions or pending charges from other states.  However, the Judiciary’s electronic system will indicate that the defendant has an out of-state criminal history, and also may provide police and prosecutors with limited information concerning any such offenses.  Notwithstanding the presumption of issuing a complaint-summons that would otherwise apply, a law enforcement agency may apply for a complaint-warrant if it reasonably appears that an out-of-state pending charge or conviction involves actual or threatened violence or unlawful possession or use of a firearm.  In that event, there shall be a presumption of applying for a complaint-warrant unless an assistant prosecutor or 19  Rule 3:3-1(d), as amended, provides that in cases where there is a presumption of charging by complaint- summons and a law enforcement agency applies for a complaint-warrant based on reason to believe that the defendant will not appear in response to a summons, will pose a danger to the safety of any other person or the community, or will attempt to obstruct the criminal justice process if released on a summons, the court or judicial officer must consider the results of the assessment using the instrument approved by the Administrative Director of the Courts pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:162-25.  20  The recently-amended Court Rules expressly recognize the potential importance of a defendant’s juvenile criminal history.
[brief] ON APPEAL FROM: SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY LAW DIVISION  ATLANTIC COUNTY DOCKET NO. [...]  CIVIL ACTION SAT BELOW: Hon. [...], J.S.C.  Hon. [...], P.J.Cv.  CROSS-APPELLANT/DEFENDANT, [...]  REPLY BRIEF IN FURTHER SUPPORT OF CROSS-APPEAL  [...]  By: [...], Esq. - I.D. #025151999  [...]  Phone: [...]  Our File No. 8000-022  Attorneys for Cross-Appellant/Defendant, [...]  Counsel of Record and On the Brief: [...], Esquire (I.D. #025151999)  [...]  January 10, 2024
[brief] (T5 23:1-11).  [...] advised [...] he was mandated to complete all of [...]’s recommendations, and then be seen again by [...] for approval to return to duty.  On March 20, 2019, [...] advised [...] that he had completed all of [...]’s recommendations.  [...] told him that he would contact [...] to schedule an FFD to bring [...] back to work.  (T5 23:12-24:8).  The Facebook Dispute
[brief] Nor could he.  Beginning in the days after the court entered its buyout decision, [...] and [...] lied to the court concerning their ability to post a bond and about their assets.  (Pa54).  They hid their overseas transfer of $20 million from Plaintiff and the court for months, and then perjured themselves with a made-up story of an antecedent debt owed to a relative.  (Pa55-56).  Even after that excuse was proven false by clear and convincing evidence, [...] persisted in claiming a lack of any assets – which was again proven false while Plaintiff’s fee application was pending.  (Pa95-98; Pa106).  $17 million remains wholly unaccounted for, yet [...] continually claims he has no money to pay the judgment (while employing multiple high-end law firms, including his current counsel of record in this matter [...], [...], and [...]; [...] also employes two firms in Connecticut, including [...], and lawyers in Slovakia, all related to fighting execution on the judgment).
[brief] I.  **The Initial Complaints and The Motion to Dismiss**  Relator filed its initial complaint on behalf of the State in 2015.  Ja2011.  While the case was under seal, Relator amended it twice in light of the continuing investigation into Defendants’ misconduct.  Ja1984-2083.  Relator --- \(^1\)  Relator has pursued litigation in other states.  In Illinois, several Defendants, along with three other banks, agreed to pay $48 million to resolve the case there, the largest recovery in history under that State’s False Claims Act.  Expert discovery in New York is nearing completion.  Discovery is proceeding in California.  Pa5, 41-43; 3T 57:21-22; Ja3103-110, 3414-59.  newly alleged that Defendants colluded in resetting rates by communicating about rates in advance of setting them, aggravating the rate inflation that failure to consider prevailing market conditions already caused.  See, e.g., Ja2050-59 (¶¶ 87-109); Ja103 (¶ 257-58).  In July 2019, the Attorney General determined not to intervene and the complaint was unsealed.  Ja2086-87.  In early 2020, Relator filed the Third Amended Complaint.  Defendants moved to dismiss and, after extensive briefing and oral argument, the trial court granted the motion to dismiss in November 2020.  1T 3:21-17:2.  The trial court permitted Relator to amend the complaint.  1T 17:3-5.  II.  The Fourth Amended Complaint  Relator filed the 4AC on March 1, 2021, adding hundreds of new allegations and exhibits.  See Ja4-128; see, e.g., 556-1309.  On September 13, 2021, the trial court denied Defendants’ motion to dismiss.  2T 6:4-20, 7:9-18.  The trial court rejected Defendants’ arguments that the 4AC insufficiently plead fraud, 2T 7:19-11:16, and that the public disclosure bar applied, 2T 11:17-12:5.  This Court and the Supreme Court denied Defendants’ subsequent motions for leave to take an interlocutory appeal.  See Pa13-17, 19-23.  III.
[brief] Notice that a redevelopment plan is being adopted is sufficient notice that the municipality is taking legislative action that will affect specific parcels.  N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-3 defines “redevelopment plan” as a “plan” which is “sufficiently complete to indicate its relationship to definite municipal objectives as to appropriate land uses, public transportation and utilities, recreational and municipal facilities, and the other public improvements; and to indicate proposed land uses and building requirements in the redevelopment area or area in need of rehabilitation, or both. ”  Even if Plaintiff was unaware of the legal definition of a redevelopment plan, under common parlance, the average person would understand that a plan is a proposal for doing or achieving something on specific properties.  That alone should have alerted the Plaintiff to review the Redevelopment Plan.  Plaintiff contends that “notice is a jurisdictional issue” and must be strictly construed.
[brief] The Respondent Boards’ March 2023 Referendum Petition And [...]’s Separate Request For Relief To The Commissioner.  Meanwhile, Respondents’ July 2022 Referendum Petition before the Commissioner remained pending.  On March 17, 2023, the Respondent Boards (but not [...] or the municipalities of [...] and Atlantic [...]) submitted an amended petition and feasibility study to the Commissioner requesting to proceed to a referendum to form a PK-12 regional school district consisting of the Atlantic [...] and [...] municipalities (hereafter, the “March 2023 Referendum Petition”).  (Aa372-748)  The Commissioner granted this petition, which Appellants did not oppose, on July 21, 2023.  (Aa776)  On September 6, 2023, [...] and [...] wrote to the Commissioner to clarify their position regarding the March 2023 Referendum Petition.  (Aa779-784)  The correspondence explained:  While the Commissioner of Education has approved a referendum to expand the [...] into a PK-12 regional, this was only part of the relief sought by the six entities [[...], [...], Atlantic [...], their respective boards of education, and Henry Hudson Regional].  It appears there seems to be some confusion as to the relief sought by the parties to this petition, including the Borough of [...].  We wish to clarify any confusion.  At all times, all six entities have sought to have [...] join the new PK-12 regional and specifically have sought, as part of this process, approval from your office for [...] to withdraw from the [...] pursuant to N.J.S.A. 18A:13-47.11.  To the extent that was not evident from the prior petition, we request that you consider this correspondence as a formal motion to grant the requested relief.  To be clear, request specifically is made that in the event the voters of [...] and Atlantic [...] approve the creation of a regional PK-12 district, the Commissioner approve [...]’s withdrawal from Oceanport and Shore Regional so that it may join the newly created PK-12 Regional school district pursuant to the terms of N.J.S.A. 18A:13-47.11.  (Aa779-784)  Appellants later responded to this September 6, 2023 letter to the Commissioner, arguing that [...], as a standalone municipality that is part of a consolidated school district, lacked standing under N.J.S.A. 18A:13-47.1, et seq., both to withdraw from a school district and to request to join a regional school district.
[brief] Notwithstanding the provisions of any law to the contrary, after the effective date [May 21, 2010] of P.L.2010, c.1, a person who is or becomes a member of the Public Employees’ Retirement System and becomes employed in more than one office, position, or employment covered by the retirement system or commences service in a covered office, position, or employment with more than one employer shall be eligible for membership in the retirement system based upon only one of the offices, positions, or employments held concurrently.  In the case of a person who holds more than one office, position, or employment covered by the retirement system, the retirement system shall designate the position providing the higher or highest compensation for the person with such concurrent positions as the basis for eligibility for membership and the compensation base for contributions and pension calculations.
[brief] On December 15, 2004, [...] received approval to modify its original 2002 site plan in order to build a three-story office building on Lot 5.01, in accordance with the 2004 Developers Agreement.  (Da59 at ¶ 8; Da177.)  On September 2, 2005, [...] deeded Lot 5.01 to [...] (“[...]”), an affiliate of [...].  (Da59 at ¶ 9; Da187.)  [...] commenced construction of the building in 2006, and completed such construction in 2007.  (Da59 at ¶ 10.)
[brief] It is long established that “the adoption of the memorializing resolution is not the ‘decision’ but merely a memorialization of that decision . . .  Indeed, it is the vote on the motion to approve or deny which establishes the rights of an applicant.  A contradictory vote on the memorializing resolution could not reverse that decision. ”  Fieramosca v. Twp. of Barnegat, 335 N.J. Super. 526, 533–34 (Law. Div. 2000) (internal citations omitted).  Thus, after the Board approved [...]’s SPA on June 13, 2022, it could not then impose additional conditions to that approval.
[brief] [...]’S WAIVER OF HIS MIRANDA RIGHTS WAS NOT KNOWING AND VOLUNTARY BECAUSE THE INTERROGATING DETECTIVE MISLED HIM TO BELIEVE THE INTERVIEW WAS ABOUT A MINOR, UNRELATED DRUG CHARGE.  (2T 16-5 to 7; Da 8)  [...] could not intelligently and voluntarily waive his rights against self-incrimination because [...] affirmatively misled him to believe that their conversation would concern a minor narcotics charge and not a much more serious allegation of first-degree armed robbery.  [...] confirmed [...]’s deceptive strategy twice on the record, stating that [...] “misled” [...] to believe he faced significantly less severe charges until after [...] waived his rights and incriminated himself.  (1T 91-1 to 2, 92-7)  Nonetheless, noting that no charges had yet been filed against [...] and observing that the remaining circumstances were not inherently coercive, the trial court rejected [...]’s motion to suppress.  (2T 10-17 to 11-24, 12-9 to 12, 13-17 to 14-11)  But such deception in the waiver process is not tolerated by our courts.  See State v. Diaz, 470 N.J. Super. 495, 525 (App. Div. 2022).  Consequently, the order admitting [...]’s statement and his ensuing conviction must be reversed.  *U.S. Const.* amends.  V, XIV; N.J.S.A. 2A:84A-19; N.J.R.E. 503.  The right against self-incrimination is one of the most important protections guaranteed by our state law and federal constitution.  *State v. O’Neill*, 193 N.J. 148, 167 (2007).  As a result, incriminating statements made during custodial interrogation are inadmissible if the interrogating officers fail to properly read the suspect the *Miranda* rights.  See *Miranda v. Arizona*, 384 U.S. 436, 469 (1966).  New Jersey’s privilege against self-incrimination offers even broader protection than the Fifth Amendment, such that our Supreme Court has built upon the original warnings to require that officers warn interrogees of any criminal complaints or warrants filed against them, as well as the nature and seriousness of those charges, before interrogation.
[brief] What matters is how the Legislature used the terms, and the statute does not use them interchangeably.  Similarly, the Commissioner’s citation to N.J.A.C. 6A:23A-2.4(a)(6) is unpersuasive.  It appears that the language cited was adopted by the Commissioner of Education in 2017, long after the elimination of multiple non-operating districts, including [...] in 2009, and again, reflects the Commissioner’s own use of those terms, not the Legislature’s.  Next, the Commissioner asserts that “[t]here is nothing in the plain language of the applicable law suggesting that [...] is foreclosed from regionalizing with another school district just because it consolidated with a district once before—the law does not draw any telling distinction between consolidation and mergers. ” (Cb12).  Those assertions are simply not true.  The primary barrier that exists to [...] independently joining a regional school district is that there is no [...] school district, having been eliminated in 2009.
[brief] First, the State lab examined whether [...]’s DNA was at [...]’s house, or [...]’s DNA was at [...]’s house.  In three separate reports, the State lab concluded only that [...]’s DNA was at [...]’s house, and that [...]’s DNA was at [...]’s house.  (Da 89-95; 23T 48-12 to 82-13)  Moreover, the State lab explicitly concluded that blood swabbed at [...]’s house was not [...]’s blood.  (23T 81-24 to 82-1)  Second, the State asked a private lab to conduct additional DNA testing.  The private lab also explicitly concluded that [...]’s DNA was not on the shoes seized from [...]’s house that had tested positive for blood.  Rather, [...] was excluded as a possible contributor.  (25T 156-9 to 157-5)  Third, the State lab examined whether the shoes seized from [...]’s house had made the bloody shoe imprints at [...]’s house.  In a report (Da 96-97), the lab concluded [...]’s shoes had not made the impressions at [...]’s house.  (23T 102-10 to 11; Da 96-97)  The lab concluded that the imprints could have been made by any number of shoe brands.  (23T 103-17 to 24; Da 96-97)  Fourth, the State lab examined the phone seized from [...]’s house.  The lab concluded that the location-related mobile data (e.g., GPS) was not able to place [...] at [...]’s house.  (24T 76-21 to 77-3; 77-25 to 78-2)  On August 11, 2017 — nearly 1.5 years after [...] had been formally arrested — officers conducted another out-of-court identification procedure with [...]’s ex-girlfriend, [...].
[brief] This workload included having to complete work that should have been completed by other Vice Principals including having to conduct Observations that should have been performed by other Vice Principals.  Having to complete evaluations that should have been completed by [...] resulted in differential treatment because [...] was absolved of work that was her responsibility and [...] was left to work on the scheduling problems which she caused.  The workload increase and the differential treatment that Appellant experienced was based on race.
[brief] (21T21-15 to 22-24).  About seventy minutes later, the jurors reconvened in the courtroom and were sent to continue with their deliberations.  (21T23-2 to 14).  At approximately 2:22 p.m., the jury’s first note was received, which indicated that the jury was deadlocked and asked the court’s advice.  (21T23-14 to 23).  --- 15
[brief] There is simply no basis for the finding of a constructive trust based solely on some minor physical labor, attachment of his name to certain documents, or the alleged contributions made to the Decedent’s career.  Assuming arguendo that the Petitioner’s statements were true -- which might very well be a stretch in this case -- they in no way satisfied the high burden needed to impose a constructive trust.  In addition, the imposition of a constructive trust runs headlong into the legally prepared Antenuptial Agreement, which provided that each party shall keep and retain sole ownership of all property owned by one party to the exclusion of the other, and that any property acquired during the marriage in the name of one party shall remain the separate property of the party acquiring the assets.
[brief] [...], Assistant Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for respondent in State v. Nyema ([...]) (Joseph E.  Krakora, Public Defender, attorney; [...], of counsel and on the briefs).  [...], Assistant Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for appellant in State v. Myers ([...]) ([...], Public Defender, attorney; [...], of counsel and on the briefs).  [...], Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for amicus curiae Attorney General of New Jersey in State v. Nyema ([...]) and in State v. Myers ([...]) ([...], Acting Attorney General, attorney; [...], Assistant Attorney General, of counsel, and [...], of counsel and on the briefs).  [...] argued the case for amicus curiae 66 Black ministers and other clergy members in State v. Nyema ([...]) and in State v. Myers ([...]) ([...], attorneys; [...], [...], and [...], on the briefs).  [...] argued the cause for amici curiae [...] and [...] in State v. Nyema ([...]) and State v. Myers ([...]) ([...], attorneys; [...] and [...], on the briefs).  [...] argued the cause for amicus curiae [...] in State v. Nyema ([...]) and State v. Myers ([...]) ([...], on the briefs).  [...] submitted a brief on behalf of amicus curiae [...] of the [...] in State v. Nyema ([...]) and State v. Myers ([...]) ([...], and Georgetown Juvenile Justice Clinic & Initiative, attorneys; [...], and [...], of the District of Columbia bar, admitted pro hac vice, on the briefs).  [...] submitted a brief on behalf of amicus curiae [...] in State v. Myers ([...]) (Seton Hall University Scott of Law Center for Social Justice, attorneys; [...], of counsel and on the brief).  [...] delivered the opinion of the Court.
[brief] Boczar, 863 N.E.2d at 159-60.  The importance of the standard administration of standardized field sobriety tests is because “[w]hen field sobriety testing is conducted in a manner that departs from established methods and procedures, the results are inherently unreliable. ”  Homan, 732 N.E.2d at 955.  For non-scientific standardized field sobriety tests to be admissible, Ohio requires an officer to substantially comply with the standard manner of administration and testing standards.  *State v. Boczar*, 863 N.E.2d 155, 160 (Ohio 2007).  The [...] concluded that field sobriety tests are an effective means of detecting legal intoxication “only when: the tests are administered in the prescribed, standardized manner[,] the standardized clues are used to assess the suspect's performance[, and] the standardized criteria are employed to interpret that performance. ”  [...], [...], HS 178 R2/00, DWI Detection and Standardized Field Sobriety Testing, Student Manual (2000), at VIII–3.
[brief] III.  CONCLUSION  The Trial Court erred as a matter of law in dismissing plaintiff’s affirmative claims before trial where there exists genuine issues of material fact on the issue of liability and damages.  Accordingly, for the reasons set forth herein, plaintiff respectfully requests the Appellate Division reverse the April 4, 2022, September 14, 2023, and October 27, 2023  Orders entered by the Trial Court and order a new trial in this matter.  Respectfully submitted, [...]
[brief] The State undoubtedly has the authority to render medical treatment to children without parental consent in certain situations, *see, e.g.*, *D.C.M.M. v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct. in & for Cnty. of Clark*, No. 87207, 2023 WL 5837974, at *2 (Nev. Sept. 8, 2023) (authorizing treatment without parental consent where child needed immediate medical attention for serious medical condition and parents could not be located), but this is not one of them.  Socially transitioning every child who asks for it is not recommended by any healthcare association.  ACa46 ¶ 81; *see also* WPATH SOC8 at S77–78 (recommending that “health care professionals discuss the potential benefits and risks of a social transition with families who are considering it”), ACa138–39.  Instead, a child’s request to be socially transitioned should merely begin a “careful evaluative process” of the child.  ACa21 ¶ 22; *see also* WPATH SOC8 at S77–78, ACa138–39.  Socially transitioning every child who asks for it ignores the facts that (1) most children who experience a transgender identity will desist, (2) social transitioning reduces the likelihood of desistance, (3) most children who are socially transitioned will go on to receive puberty blockers and cross-sex hormones, which can have irreversible consequences, (4) the surge in transgender identifying youth may be impacted by peer pressure, and (5) there is a growing awareness of adult “detransitioners”—i.e., persons who transitioned to a transgender identity as youth who decide as adults to revert to the gender associated with their natal sex.  ACa20, ACa18-ACa29, ACa34, ACa36 ¶¶ 20, 29–38, 50, 54–55; see also [...], Transgender and Gender Diverse Children and Adolescents: Fact-Checking of AAP Policy, J. Sex & Marital Therapy 307, 313 (2019) (noting that “[o]ver puberty, the majority of [gender dysphoric] children cease to want to transition”), ACa160–68; Whitman-Walker Clinic, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., 485 F. Supp. 3d 1, 48 (D.D.C. 2020) (citing scholarship establishing that “childhood social transitions [are] important predictors of persistence”); [...], Gender Identity 5 Years After Social Transition, Pediatrics 150(2):e2021056082 (Aug. 2022) (study in which majority of children who socially transitioned were receiving puberty blockers and / or cross-sex hormones within 5 years), ACa169–76; [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], & [...], Short-term outcomes of pubertal suppression in a selected cohort of 12- to 15-year-old young people with persistent gender dysphoria in the UK, PLOS ONE 16(2) (2021) (study in which 98% of children who received puberty blockers went on to receive cross- sex hormones), ACa177–203; WPATH SOC8 at S58 (noting that the uptick in transgender-identifying adolescent girls may be driven in part by “excessive peer and social media influence”), ACa137; [...], Detransition Among Transgender and Gender-Diverse People—An Increasing and Increasingly Complex Phenomenon, J. Clin. Endocrinology & Metab., e4251–e4262 (June 9, 2022) (noting new scholarship focusing on detransitioners), ACa204–206.