ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The Court Should Reverse the Dismissal of Plaintiff’s Non-FDCPA Claims.  (Pa56-Pa60)  In addition to the FDCPA claims, the Complaint asserted that Defendant’s conduct which violates § 1692c(b) also gives rise to violations of the Consumer Fraud Act, negligence, and invasion of privacy.  With respect to actual damages and ascertainable loss which are necessary for those claims, Plaintiff alleged the economic impact of the impermissibly disclosed information.  Pa8 at ¶48.  Moreover, it is unknown and difficult for Plaintiff to identify who may have the disclosed information and how that it was used.  But Defendant and its unidentified mail vendor are likely to know who the information has been used, who has access to the information, how it is being stored, what protections are in place to prevent unintended disclosure, and what disclosures have been made whether intended or not.  With respect to the negligence claim, the standard of conduct under the FDCPA is evidence of Defendant’s standard of care.  the Note to Judge in the New Jersey Model Jury Charge 5.10A states:  Negligence is defined as conduct which falls below the standard established by law for the protection of others against unreasonable risk of harm.  Here, “the standard established by law” is § 1692c(b).  With respect to the invasion of privacy claim, even the disclosure of confidential information to one person is sufficient.  In *Smith v. Datla*, 451 N.J. Super. 82, 89 (App. Div. 2017), the publication occurred “[d]uring an emergent bedside consultation in plaintiff’s private hospital room[,...]  Dr. Datla discussed with plaintiff his medical condition.  While doing so, Dr. Datla disclosed plaintiff’s HIV-positive status in the presence of an unidentified third party who was also in the room. ”  Thus, disclosure to an individual can constitute publication.  The Consumer Fraud Act applies to Defendants’ conduct.  *Lemelledo v. Beneficial Management Corp. of America*, 150 N.J. 255, 265 (1997) observed, “By its terms, the CFA is applicable to the provision of credit. ”  In *Jefferson Loan Co., Inc. v. Session*, 397 N.J. Super. 520, 533 (App. Div. 2008), the Appellate Division held that the act applied to an assignee of a credit contract because the assignee acts in connection with “the subsequent performance of the contract” (N.J.S.A. 56:8-2) when collecting a debt.  Relying on *Jefferson Loan*, the Supreme Court rejected the “argument that the collection activities of a servicing agent […] do not amount to the ‘subsequent performance’ of a loan, a covered activity under the CFA. ”  *Gonzalez v. Wilshire Credit Corp.*, 207 N.J. 557, 582 (2011).  Thus, the CFA can apply to the collection of debts.
[brief] (See 38a; 301a).  Among other things, the Commitment contained a provision offering Plaintiff:  “[i]f you desire to obtain protection from this company regarding the application of your funds or compliance with requirements relating to the issuance of the proposed policy, the company will, on request and the payment of the fees filed with, and approved by, the Department of Insurance, provide for a settlement service.  (304a at ¶3).  Plaintiff requested and purchased this service from Defendants.  The Commitment sets forth the Plaintiff, [...], as the policy’s proposed insured.  (305a).  The Commitment recites the Title holders at the time of commitment to be the Seller and her spouse, [...].  (305a).  The Commitment recites that ”Documents satisfactory to the (Defendants) that convey the Title or create the Mortgage to be insured, or both, must be properly authorized, executed, delivered, and recorded in the Public Records,” including a “Deed from [...] and [...] to [...] LLC. ” (308a [4b]).  [...] never obtained such deed.  (79a [43:23-44:1]).  The transaction underlying the Commitment was the real estate purchase of the property located at [...] in [...] between Plaintiff and the Property’s seller, [...] (“Seller”).
[brief] (Pa57). space.  (1T12:9-14; 2T40:10-18).  The Trial Court granted the motion to bar [...] from testifying about side effects of medication taken by the plaintiff.  (1T36:24-37:1; 1T37:16-21; 1T38:6-9).  It also initially reserved on a decision as to whether evidence of the plaintiff’s prior falls should be barred.  (1T40:14-20; 1T41:2-42:19; 1T45:5-16).  However, when ruling upon the motion to strike portions of [...]’ testimony, the Trial Court denied the motion to strike testimony regarding the plaintiff’s prior medical history and falls.  (1T173:24-174:2; 1T174:4-16; 1T175:16-176:8; 1T177:5-21; 1T179:4-190:20; 1T203:1-14; 2T29:4-23; 2T30:21-35:12; 2T39:11-13).  The parties came to an agreement that there would be no mention of evidence that was the subject of *in limine* motions that had not yet been ruled on by the Trial Court during opening statements including reference to the medications that the plaintiff was taking prior to the subject incident.  (3T31:1-33:24).  Given the Trial Court’s rulings regarding evidence related to the plaintiff’s medical history, plaintiff’s counsel noted that the jury would hear that the plaintiff had peripheral neuropathy and gets numbness and tingling in her legs during his opening statement.  (3T56:21-23).  Defense counsel then not only told the jury that the plaintiff was having trouble with her legs including numbness and tingling but also that she was prescribed medications for these problems contrary to the parties’ agreement during his opening statement.  (3T86:4-21).  [...], a board certified orthopedist, was the only medical expert witness whose testimony was ultimately presented at trial.\(^3\) (3T102:1-2).  On direct examination he addressed the plaintiff’s prior diagnosis of neuropathy given the rulings by the Trial Court.  (3T127:8-128:17).  The cross-examination then focused to a great deal about prior surgery to the plaintiff’s left hip, prior physical therapy records pertaining to balance and gait issues, and a prior fall.  (3T148:23-149:6; 3T149:9-25; 3T150:20-151:6; 3T151:18-153:24; 3T154:13-24; 3T155:24-156:12).  The issue of the plaintiff’s prior falls was addressed on redirect examination at which time [...] noted that the falls were discussed in the plaintiff’s deposition testimony and that one incident involved a trip over a brick and the other involved her slipping off a bed.  (3T167:15-168:24; 3T169:18-170:12; 3T172:8-173:4).  He also explained that the prior falls were completely unrelated to the plaintiff’s fall at the [...] store.  (3T172:20-173:4).  There was further testimony regarding the prior falls on recross-examination.  (3T177:3-178:4).  Since the plaintiff was unavailable, portions of her deposition testimony were read for the jury by both plaintiff’s counsel and defense counsel.  (4T207:14-23).  The Trial Court indicated that it did not want the parties to read-in the same --- \(^3\)  The defendant did not make its decision to not present [...]’ *de bene esse* deposition testimony at trial until the end of its case.
[brief] Absent a jury trial of a presiding judge's order – i.e. finding of fact, I have no way to really know what was decided in a matter brought to the bar (Not argued below)  Notwithstanding that there is no avenue for a court, without more, to dismiss the claim at the bar for the failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or via summary judgment, any fact none-the-less needs to be established via a jury decision of more than just a judge-jury of one or I have no way to know what was decided.  *Slocum v. New York Life Insurance, Co.*, reading in pertinent part as follows:  '....Coughran v. Bigelow recognizes that this is the true conception of trial by jury, for it is there said, "if the evidence be not sufficient to warrant a recovery, it is the duty of the court to instruct the jury accordingly, and, if the jury disregard such instruction, to set aside the verdict."  Why instruct the jury in such a case if they have no office to perform?  Why contemplate that they may not conform to the instruction if it be immaterial whether they do or not?  And why take their verdict or have any concern about it if none is required?  The answers are given in prior decisions, which hold, as before shown, that in such a case it is essential "that the jury make its verdict, albeit in conformity with the order of the Page 228 U. S. 398 court," and that, if there be a verdict, "the action is ended, unless a new trial be granted, either upon motion or upon appeal...."  What was the law is an issue of fact for jury.  POINT 3:
[brief] (Pa115-116, PSA § 13.1).  [...]’s argument also ignores the Complaint’s allegations that [...] and [...] were well aware that Plaintiff fully intended to enforce its rights under the PSA, even after the Deposit had been returned.  Indeed, as alleged in the Complaint, Plaintiff reached out to [...] after the deposit had been returned for the very purpose of ensuring that Plaintiff would be kept in the loop as to the anticipated closing.  (Pa11, Complaint ¶¶ 42-44).  By her own admission in an email in October 2022 (after the surreptitious closing had taken place), [...] had intentionally withheld the information from Plaintiff because she was being told by [...] not to communicate with Plaintiff.  (Pa12, Complaint ¶ 47).  Likewise, [...] (also a principal of [...]) admitted that [...] should have kept Plaintiff apprised of the facts – but that [...] felt “spooked” because she was getting pressure from [...]’s principal not to provide any information to Plaintiff about the transaction.  (Pa155-157, ¶¶ 14-20).  These admissions from two of the principals of [...] reflect that [...] intentionally chose to remain silent to accommodate [...] and serve their own financial interests.  These admissions are also inconsistent with the --- 7 [...]’s own argument was internally inconsistent.
[brief] The linkage between [...]’s reliance on defendants promise to pay him when the hospital was sold is established by his deposition testimony.  Q.  Did you ever have any Conversations with either [...] or [...] about any alleged amounts you were owed?  A.  Yes.  We—again, it was during the Christmas party event, which was at the end of December 2017, and myself and another physician who was owed money, too, we approached [...] and said you know you’re selling the hospital but we haven’t gotten paid.  And he said don’t worry.  The new owners have six years to pay us and we will pay you.( Volume 1, Pa. 85; See Bellifemine Dep., TR 83-11 to 25).  [...] did not know the name of [...] when he was deposed and defendants did not list her in answers to interrogatories as an individual having relevant knowledge of the facts of the case.(Volume I Pa. 76; Bellifemine Dep. 48-24 to 49-10; Volume I, Pa. 132; See [...]’s Answers to Interrogatories 2-3).
[brief] ’”  State v. Feliciano, 224 N.J. 351, 366 (2016) (quoting Marshall, 199 N.J. at 611).  “In other words, a warrant must be ‘sufficiently specific to permit the rational exercise of judgment [by the executing officers] in selecting what items to seize. ”’  In re Google D.D.C., 579 F.Supp.3d 62, 75-76 (D.C. Cir. 2021) (quoting United States v. LaChance, 788 F.2d 856, 874 (2d Cir. 1986)).  Indeed, “[t]he particularity requirement is uncomplicated.
[brief] By deed recorded on April 10, 2017 (the “Defendants’ Deed”), Defendants purchased the remaining portion of Lot 3 from [...].  Ja179, Ja712.  Defendants’ Deed, being derivative of the Musto Confirmatory Deed, contained the same metes and bounds error discussed above.  Ja291, Ja712.  However, the evidence demonstrates that Defendants had actual or constructive notice of the error and the correct property dimensions, or, at minimum, sufficient information to require further inquiry.  **Defendants’ Deed**
[brief] #  Plaintiff [...]’s Complaint dated January 7, 2021 attached as Exhibit A to the Certification of [...] in support of Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment.  The document is not attached as it has been included in Plaintiff Appellant’s Appendix at Vol. I, Pa. 1-6 ……………………..  Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint and Third Amended Complaint attached as Exhibit B to the Certification of [...] in Support of Defendants Motion for Summary Judgement.  The documents have been included in Plaintiff-Appellants Appendix Vol. I, Pa. 12-17 and Pa. 19-24……….  Order entered on October 12, 2021 by Honorable [...] denying plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment attached to the Certification of [...] as Exhibit C in support of Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment…..  Pa. 146-148  Order entered on December 14, 2021 by the Honorable [...] dismissing Plaintiff’s Complaint with Prejudice as Exhibit D.  The document is not attached as it has been included in Plaintiff Appellant’s Appendix at Vol. I, Pa. 48-49……….  Contract between [...] and [...] dated December 16, 2010 for services as Co-Medical Director of [...] attached as Exhibit E to the Certification of [...] in support of Defendant Motion for Summary Judgment  ……………………..  Pa. 149-159  TABLE OF CONTENTS TO THE APPENDIX OF PLAINTIFF APPELLANT
[brief] An agency decision will only be reversed if it is arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable, does not adhere to the law, or was not supported by the evidence in the record.  Zimmerman v. Sussex Cnty. Educ. Servs. Comm’n, 237 N.J. 465, 475 (2019).  As the challenging party, [...] had the burden to make that showing; he has failed to establish a basis to disturb the [...]’s decision.  In re J.S., 431 N.J. Super. 321, 329 (App. Div. 2013).  There is a “strong presumption of reasonableness” attached to the actions of the administrative agencies.
[brief] Exhibit 36, [...] v. [...], 2013 WL 5300076 (App. Div. Sep. 23, 2013) (unpublished), filed April 26, 2018  Plaintiff’s Response to Movant’s Statement of Undisputed Material Facts, filed May 31, 2018  Plaintiff’s Statement of Undisputed Material Facts, filed May 31, 2018
[brief] [...] testified about inconsistencies he found in the defendants’ QuickBooks records, and why what he observed in the books of accounts was suspicious.  Most notably, [...] testified that he repeatedly encountered abnormal account structures, conduit accounts, co-mingling of funds, step transactions, fake accounts, and duplicate expenses.  (26T15:10-22).  Conduit accounts, [...] explained, are generally transitory accounts that accumulate certain activities or funds, which are then disbursed out of the account elsewhere.  (10T74:23 to 75:19).  He identified several such accounts in his report and examinations.  (E.g., 10T69:15 to 73:3; 10T109:25 to 113:22; 114:20-24; 116:4 to 117:14; 11T76:17 to 83:2).  [...] also noted abnormal structuring and transaction history in company accounts.  He concluded that [...] and the defendant entities employed a series of “step transactions” or structured transactions to avoid detection.  “Step transactions” are multi-step transactions to achieve a single objective.  [...] observed an elaborate series of step transactions that facilitated the diversion of millions of dollars from the [...], [...], and other defendant-entity accounts via a series of transactional steps in multiple accounts and multiple companies across multiple years.  The objective of structuring these transactions in this way was to avoid detection.
[brief] DEFENDANT IS CONFINED TABLE OF CONTENTS  PAGE NOS. PRELIMINARY STATEMENT .................................................................  1  PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND STATEMENT OF FACTS ......................  3 LEGAL ARGUMENT .............................................................................  8  POINT I THE TRIAL COURT’S ORDER DENYING  [...]’S SPEEDY TRIAL MOTION SHOULD BE REVERSED BECAUSE THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN APPLYING EACH OF THE BARKER FACTORS.  (2T 3-21 TO 12-21)  ..................................................................................................................  8  CONCLUSION .......................................................................................
[brief] Six:  Defendant argues that the judge should have found the existence of mitigating factor eight (defendant’s conduct was the result of circumstances unlikely to recur) because defendant’s mother forbade him from getting mental health treatment.  (Db85).  As the AP argued at sentencing, however, [...]’s concern that defendant would be taken away from her if he reported homicidal thoughts to a psychiatrist does not change defendant’s responsibility or excuse his behavior: “He made the choice to kill four people. ” (17T155-1 to 8).
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[brief] There, the detectives told the defendant that the Miranda warnings were “[j]ust a formality” and that defendant’s discussions would remain “confidential” between them.  Id. at 414, 415, 416.  As the defendant continued to express his unease in talking to the officers, one detective responded by telling him that “[a]nything you say, like I said, is only going to help you, it’s not going to hurt you.
[brief] The MBPA explicitly states its strong public policy interest in regulating the malt beverage industry:  It is therefore fitting and proper to regulate the business relationship between brewers and wholesalers of malt alcoholic beverages and set forth their respective responsibilities to further the public policy of this State and protect beer wholesalers from unreasonable demands and requirements by brewers, while devoting sufficient efforts and resources to the distribution and sale of malt alcoholic beverages.  [N.J.S.A. 33:1-93.13(c) (emphasis added). ]  To preserve this intent, the MBPA provides that any contract provision that violates its terms is null and void.  N.J.S.A. 33:1-93.15(a).
[brief] In re Agric., Aquacultural, & Horticultural Water Usage Certification Rules, 410 N.J. Super. 209 (App. Div. 2009).........................................................7 Katz v. Rahway Hosp., 214 N.J. Super. 379 (App. Div. 1986)..............................15 Carlo v. Okonite-Callender Cable Co., 3 N.J. 253 (Sup. Ct. 1949)..................15 Statutes N.J.S.A. 12:5-1 through -11.................................................................2, 8, 18 P.L. 2019, c.81, N.J.S.A. 13:1D-150 through -156........................................................................................................1, 3, 7, 8, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 19, 20, 21, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 33, 34, 35, 38 N.J.S.A. 13:9A-1 et seq.................................................................8 N.J.S.A. 13:19-1 et seq..............................................................................2, 8, 18 N.J.S.A. 52:14B-1 et seq...........................................................................18 N.J.S.A. 58:16A-50 et seq........................................................................8 P.L. 2015, c.260.......................................................................................18 Other Authorities Press Release, [...], New Jersey, Dorsett Dock Improvements Complete (Mar. 20, 2019), https://ptboro.
[directive] 1.  multi-principle allocation  Calculating each patient’s priority score based on the framework; 2.  Determining each day how many priority groups will receive access to critical care interventions.  First responders and bedside clinicians should perform the immediate stabilization of any patient in need of critical care, as they would under normal circumstances.  Along with stabilization, temporary ventilatory support may be offered to allow the triage officer to assess the patient for critical resource allocation.  Every effort should be made to complete the initial 7 triage assessment within 90 minutes of the recognition of the likely need for critical care resources.  Calculate each patient’s priority score using the multi-principle STEP 1: allocation framework.  This allocation framework is based primarily on two considerations: 1) saving lives; and 2) saving life-years, both within the context of ensuring meaningful access for all patients and individualized patient assessments based on objective medical knowledge.  Patients who are more likely to survive with intensive/critical care are prioritized over patients who are less likely to survive with intensive care/critical care.  Patients who do not have a severely limited life expectancy are given priority over those who have such advanced conditions that they have a very limited life expectancy even if they survive the acute critical illness.  As summarized in 1, the Sequential Organ Failure Assessment (SOFA) score (or an Table alternate, validated, objective measure of probability of survival to hospital discharge) is used to determine patients’ prognoses for hospital survival.  The presence of conditions in such an longer-term advanced state that life expectancy is very limited is used to characterize patients’ prognosis.  Based on consultation with experts in disability rights and physical medicine and rehabilitation, we have intentionally not included a list of example conditions associated with life expectancy <1 year and <5 years.  The rationale for this is that such lists run the risk of being applied as blanket judgments, rather than in the context of individualized assessments by clinicians, based on the best available objective medical evidence.  Table 1.
[brief] And I just want to clarify that.  It falls in consistency with my initial decision, but that was something that was argued on the motion for reconsideration.  [3T33-4 – 3T33-10]  These are two critical errors, because as discussed in the next sections, analyzing [...]’s failure to time submit the [...] Notice under the appropriate paradigm demonstrates it was plainly a material defect, that the County’s determination of materiality was anything but arbitrary and capricious, and that, at absolute minimum, it was a defect a governing body could properly refuse to waive.