ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] For example, if either party elected to arbitrate a “Dispute,” it “shall be resolved by arbitration pursuant to this Arbitration Agreement and the then current code of proceedings of the national arbitration organization to which the Dispute is referred.  A party may refer a Dispute to either the [...] (‘[...]’) or the [...] (‘[...]’)” (Dr97).  In addition to clearly informing Appellants about the differences between court and arbitration and the expected process, [...] agreed to pay for the costs associated therewith (See Dr97) (“Upon Customer’s request, [...] will reimburse Customer for all filing and administrative fees required for initiating the arbitration.
[brief] First, the trial court improperly deprived him of the rights to self-representation and to confront the witnesses against him by refusing to rule on [...]’s request to represent himself and then permanently excluding him from the courtroom for the rest of the trial.  What’s more, the State failed to introduce enough evidence to prove that an armed robbery occurred.  The perpetrator did not use or threaten any force against one of the two potential robbery victims and did not use a simulated weapon to further the theft from that potential victim.  As for the other potential victim, there is no evidence that she had any subjective belief that the perpetrator was armed.  Finally, the jury instructions failed to communicate the critical legal framework needed for a competent verdict.  The court omitted an instruction on the force element of robbery and improperly conflated the force and armed-with-a-deadly-weapon elements, making it nearly impossible for the jury to have returned a valid verdict on either degree of robbery.  The court also failed to instruct the jury that they had to unanimously agree as to the identity of the persons against whom [...] committed various acts.  Because [...]’s due process and Sixth Amendment rights were violated during the course of the trial, his conviction must be reversed.  Additionally, given the gaps in the evidence presented by the State, this Court should reverse in part the denial of [...]’s motion for a judgment of acquittal.  **PROCEDURAL HISTORY**
[brief] First, Plaintiff’s assertion that there is conflict between the New Jersey Court Rule 4:5-7 that the pleading be direct, and R. 4:5-8, which requires a pleading to state the “particulars of the wrong” for allegations of “misrepresentation, fraud, mistake, breach of trust, willful default or undue influence” is also incorrect.  (Pb28).  There is absolutely nothing in conflict with setting out the “part of the wrong, with dates and items if necessary” in a “simple, concise and direct” manner.  Indeed, that there is no material conflict should be axiomatic based on the number of plaintiffs who file conforming pleadings every year in the New Jersey state courts.  Next  Plaintiff argues:  It is now clear the correct procedure would have been to allow the prior, 2021 SAC under Rule 4:5-7’s liberality standard and then fully to analyze it allegation by allegation and Count by Count.
[brief] *O’Donnell/Salvatori Inc. v. Microsoft Corp.*, 339 F.R.D. 275, 276 (W.D. Wash. 2021); see Db19-21 (collecting cases).  The cases in the overwhelming majority do not show merely that pre-production relevancy review is a “permissible” approach to e-discovery, as Plaintiffs suggest.  Pb28.  Rather, the decisions adopt the same interpretation of the discovery rules that Defendants advance here—viz. that pre-production relevance reviews are necessary to enforce “the relevance standard from the civil rules. ”  *O’Donnell*, 339 F.R.D. at 276.  Last and least, Plaintiffs resort to severely mischaracterizing the record below.  They repeatedly assert that “the parties negotiated and agreed on search terms” after the Court “told the parties that there would be no further relevance --- 4 Plaintiffs suggest in a footnote that New Jersey’s abuse of discretion standard is identical to the standard required to afford mandamus relief in federal court.  Pb28 n.14.  Not so.  Federal mandamus requires a “clear error of law” or a “clear abuse of discretion. ”  *Actavis*, 2019 WL 8437021, at *1 (emphases added).
[brief] Medical malpractice cases involving the performance of surgical procedures, or cases with care and treatment resulting in a patient’s death, present unique circumstances in which pre-suit arbitration agreements should not be enforced based on public policy grounds.  In 2003, the [...] (“[...]”) announced a policy consistent with [...]/American Bar Association/American Medical Association Due Process Protocol for the Mediation and Arbitration of Health Care Disputes that [...] would no longer arbitrate medical malpractice disputes unless all parties agreed to submit the matter to arbitration after the dispute arose.
[brief] Exhibit “A” is [...]’s March 25, 2022 Order ([...]).  It addressed [...]’s Verified Complaint, dated Feb. 11, 2022, and parties Opposition.  It allowed [...] to file a Verified Complaint with formal Trust Intermediate Accounting ([...]).  | 12a | | 3.  Exhibit “B” is [...]’s Oct. 6, ‘22 Order/Rider ([...]).  It addressed [...]’s Verified Complaint, dated May 5, 2022, and parties’ Oppositions, incl. Exceptions to Trust Intermediate Accounting, as of March 31, 2022, filed with Verified Complaint.  | 15a | | 4.  Exhibit “C” is [...]’s March 7, 2023 Order ([...]).  It addressed [...]’ Reconsideration Motion (Oct. 26, ’22) of Oct. 6, ‘22 Order, & [...]’s Request (Oct. 26, ’22) for Legal, Commission, & Accounting Fees, and Trust Reserve.  | 35a | | 5.  Exhibit “D” is [...]’s March 13, 2023 Order ([...]).  It made corrections to March 7, 2023 Order.  | 38a | | Exhibit | Description | Pages | |---------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------| | 6.  | Exhibit “E” is [...]’s Sept. 6, 2023 Order ([...]).  It consolidated, incl. corrections due to missing and conflicting provisions, four proposed Orders by the parties that had been marked up by Judge Deluca and dated Aug. 7, 2023.  The Sept. 6th Order reflected the Judge’s August 4, 2023 Hearing Rulings.  | 40a | | | **REMAINDER OF EXHIBITS** | | | 7.  | Exhibit “F” is [...] Will, dated Jan. 6, 2012, p. 1,4-6,18,20 | 43a | | 8.  | Exhibit “G” is [...]’s Verified Complaint that was filed by Surrogate Court on May 11, 2022.  | 50a | | 9.  | Exhibit “H” is [...]’s Trust Intermediate Accounting for January 4, 2019 to March 31, 2022 – Summary, p. 1-3, Accounting Details, p. 1,2,16-20,26,47,50,82-85,87-90,93-96.  It was filed May 11, 2022 with the Verified Complaint.  | 57a | | 10.  |  Exhibit “I” is [...]’s Aug. 4, 2022 Letter to Surrogate in response to July 25, 2022 Audit Questions from Surrogate.
[brief] If Defendant knew Plaintiff did not expect her to take a salary for being the pharmacist, she would not have signed the Operating Agreement and would not have partnered with Plaintiff.  (3T35:4-6; 3T170:20-171:5).  At the time Defendant signed the Operating Agreement, she did not believe the agreement prohibited her from receiving a salary as a pharmacist and she would not have signed it had she known of such prohibition.  (3T35:7-13).  In 2016, Plaintiff only worked at [...] a couple times a month in March, April, and May.  (3T28:6-16)  Plaintiff worked full-time in [...] for the only first three month of 2017.  (2T40:1-4).  Plaintiff did not work in [...] in 2018.  (2T41:6-8).  In 2019, Plaintiff worked full-time in [...] only in April and May, leading up to the asset sale to [...].  (2T50:4-7).
[brief] Plaintiff filed an action for personal injuries against [...] and [...].  Da8-Da14.  [...] filed an answer with a crossclaim for indemnification.  Da15-Da26.  By leave granted, Da27, [...] filed an answer denying all crossclaims.  Da28-Da33.  Less than thirty days before the original trial date, [...] filed a motion to compel [...] to defend and indemnify it.  Da34-Da35.  [...] opposed that motion, Da80-81, and the Law Division denied the motion because it was an untimely motion for summary judgment.  Da1-Da2.  [...] moved for reconsideration of that ruling.  Da104-Da105.  The Law Division denied that motion because the interests of justice did not require reconsideration of the prior Order and because [...] provided no explanation of why it failed to move to compel indemnification in a timely manner.  Da3-Da4.  The case then proceeded to trial.  Da115 & 1T4:17-:18.  On the first day of trial, with the consent of all parties, the Honorable [...], J.S.C., heard argument on the merits of [...]’s indemnity motion.  1T4:22-6:9.  [...] then entered an Order vacating the prior Orders denying [...]’s motion for defense and indemnification, granting [...]s’ motion to compel [...] to defend and indemnify it for its own negligence, and compelling [...] to reimburse [...]’s attorneys’ fees and costs.  Da5-6; 1T18:16-23:18.  On the third day of trial, plaintiff settled with [...].  3T4:17-5:2.  However, [...] specifically reserved its right to appeal the order compelling it to indemnify [...].  3T5:9-:21.  The trial court then entered an Order of disposition dismissing the matter because of that settlement.  Da7.  Plaintiff and [...] later filed a stipulation of dismissal with prejudice of plaintiff’s claims.  Da117.  The stipulation specifically preserved for appeal defendants’ cross-claims against each other.  Ibid.  This office filed a Substitution of Attorney on behalf of [...] Holdings.  Da119.  [...] timely filed a Notice of Appeal of the Order compelling it to defend and indemnify [...].  Da120-Da132.
[brief] II.  Plaintiffs’ Decision Point Review Plans (“DPRPs”).  Under AICRA and regulations promulgated by the New Jersey Department of Banking and Insurance (DOBI), no-fault insurers must put in place DPRPs, which describe the insurers’ clinically related decision-making on claims for PIP benefits.  See N.J.A.C. 11:3-4.6.  DOBI must approve the DPRPs and any amendments to them.  N.J.A.C. 11:3-4.7.  The DPRPs are permitted to include “reasonable restrictions on the assignment of benefits” from insureds to medical providers.  N.J.A.C. 11:3-4.7(c)(7).  Those restrictions may include “[a] requirement that as a condition of assignment, the provider agrees to submit disputes to alternate dispute resolution pursuant to N.J.A.C. 11:3-5,” which implements the AICRA statutory arbitration provision.  N.J.A.C. 11:3-4.9(a)(3).  Defendants submitted as part of the record below a version of Plaintiffs’ DPRP that DOBI approved sometime between AICRA’s enactment and 2010.
[directive] N.J.S.A. PTI. into admitted"  be should defendant the whether reviewed be should case the participation, defendant's to objects victim the if common practice, prosecuted in cases Justice Criminal of Division the of Director the or Prosecutor, County the by supervisory has who or designee her his or Director, or Prosecutor County The Division.  the by best in the and appropriate is PTI whether recommendation to as final the shall make authority, shall recommendation final  This objection.  victim's notwithstanding the victim the of interests notifying the of requirement the akin objection, to victim's including the record, the on placed be 52:4B-36o.
[brief] When a party has changed their mind about a settlement and attempts to repudiate it, our Supreme Court has conclusively stated that “[c]ourts routinely 5  Even in opposition to the OTSC, defense counsel did not assert that no settlement had been reached.  Instead, his certification indicates on that on January 6, 2023, he advised County Counsel “of Defendant’s intent to exercise her right to repudiate the settlement . . . .” (Pa 109, Certification of [...], ¶ 4).  enforce those settlements even in the face of changed minds.  . . .  Absent a demonstration that a settlement was procured by fraud or some similarly compelling reason, we have long been reluctant to set it aside. ”  Brundage, 195 N.J. at 613.  Indeed, the classic case of “buyer’s remorse” simply does not and cannot serve as a legal basis to repudiate a settlement.  Willingboro, 215 N.J. at 251; see Bistricer v. Bistricer, 231 N.J. Super. 143, 151 (Ch. Div. 1987) (enforcing settlement and noting that where “parties agreed to the essential terms of a settlement” and that “[p]laintiff’s objections [were] basically either ‘afterthoughts’ or pertain to the implementation of settlement” that “[s]etting aside the settlement under these circumstances would allow plaintiff to avoid a fair agreement duly entered into to resolve pending and burdensome litigation” and would be “unfair to defendants”); see also Dep’t of Pub. Advoc. v. Bd. of Pub. Utils., 206 N.J. Super. 523, 530 (App. Div. 1985) (finding that “second thoughts are entitled to absolutely no weight as against our policy in favor of settlement”).  Significantly, the Appellate Division upheld an agreed-upon oral settlement agreement under even less compelling circumstances than the instant matter in Pascarella.
[brief] Moreso, the court’s letter contradicts itself as it spends six pages confirming how the defendant appeared for every court appearance (by special appearance), notified the court when the plaintiff made improper filings and the defendant appeared for every notice of the court.  That is not evasion.  Thus, while the lower court goes through all of that, conspicuously it never addresses in its letter that subject matter jurisdiction never existed when the complaint was filed or when the court issued its May 27, 2022 order reinstating a void complaint.  That void complaint is now before this appellate court.  **CONCLUSION**
[brief] Appellant Fails to Plead the Elements of a NJCFA Claim  Even if this Court finds that the NJCFA applies to Respondents, which it does not, Appellant’s Complaint still fails to plead the elements of a NJCFA claim.  Appellant has not and cannot allege (1) fraud in connection with the sale of merchandise or services, or (2) ascertainable loss.  As set forth above, “to state a cause of action under the CFA, a plaintiff must allege the commission of a deception, fraud, misrepresentation, etc., ‘in connection with' the sale of merchandise or services. ”  Castro, 370 N.J. Super. at 294 (citing N.J.S.A. 56:8-1).  “To satisfy this requirement the misrepresentation has to be one which is material to the transaction made to induce the buyer to make the purchase. ”  See Woo-Padva, 2022 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 96 (stating that Appellate Division has expressly held that efforts to collect a debt are not “in connection with the sale of merchandise” and thus not governed by the NJCFA).
[brief] The state laws that establish the lists of species of animals and plants as endangered or threatened species in and of themselves, do not provide any specific protection to the habitat for those species.  Rather, the actual protection of habitat is secured through an array of statutes and regulations designed to primarily regulate development activities in various physical or geographical locations of New Jersey (In this case, freshwater wetlands).  Each of these laws has specific jurisdictional boundaries where activities are regulated, and within which endangered or threatened species, habitats can be protected.  Outside of these areas, such protection no longer applies.  Protection is limited to legislatively defined jurisdictions, and the wetlands themselves must provide suitable habitat.  (Aa0059).  In connection with the [...]’s review of [...]’s FHA Permit, the area of law providing the protection for threatened and endangered species are the Freshwater Wetlands Protection Act and Regulations.  N.J.S.A. 13:9B-1, et seq., and N.J.A.C. 7:7A-1, et seq.  For that reason, notwithstanding the recorded sightings of bald eagles, any areas of protection are limited to the wetlands and transition areas on the [...] Property.  [...] reviewed each of the seven (7) wetlands identified as intermediate resource value and, because five (5) of those wetlands were under half an acre in size found due to their size and the limited habitat they contain, these wetlands are not suitable habitat for bald eagle. ” (Aa0059).  In the Environmental Report, the [...] also provided its analysis for the remaining two wetlands (identified as Wetland “C” and Wetland “O”).  (Aa0061).  The [...] concluded that, based upon [...]’s site inspection, Wetland “C” contained unsuitable vegetation for bald eagle habitat and Wetland “O” while containing more forested vegetation, “is not directly associated with any open water large enough in size to provide foraging opportunities for bald eagle. ”  (Aa0061).
[directive] Third, we ask assistant prosecutors and public defenders to notify their respective supervisors when a trial date is fixed to ensure that counsel will be present and the trial will commence as planned.  We identify the Public Defender’s Office because it is responsible for the defense in a large majority 25 of criminal cases.  The pending situation will depend on the cooperation of the private bar as well.  Trial judges and lawyers alike know that realistic trial dates help resolve cases.  Knowing that a trial will begin soon causes parties to reexamine the strengths and weaknesses of their case and consider alternatives to trial.  To effectively address the existing backlog, it is essential that trial teams be given more realistic trial dates -- and that they be able to proceed to trial on those dates.
[directive] Policy Statement 3 - 1 3:l Policy Statement 4 - 1 4:l Policy Statement 5 - 1 5:  1  Policy Statement 1 6 - 6:l Policy Statement 7 - 1 7:l Policy Statement 1 8 - 8:l  Policy Statement 9 - 1 1 9: Policy Statement 10- 1 7 0:l  Policy Statement 1 1 - 1 1 :1 1 Policy Statement 12- 1 1 2 1  Policy Statement 12- 5 12:12  Property Procedures for Apportioning Forfeited - .- . . 1.
[directive] A.  CASE INFORMATION CONTROL #:  1.  NAME OF APPLICANT  2.  AGENCY  6.  Method of Submittal  5.  TIME  7.  Is applicant the affiant/lead agent?  4.  DATE 3.  TELEPHONE # . ❏ ❏ ❏  E-mail/Fax Phone In-Person ❏ ❏ Yes No
[brief] [[...]] argued that they were entitled to various payments because of additional services they rendered to the partnership for the development and management of the Rachel Gardens project, referred to as “theoretical” or “hypothetical” fees.  Jarwick II at *55-*56.  [...] held, and the Appellate Division affirmed, that there was sufficient evidence to demonstrate “the amount of work [the Wilfs] put into the development or management of Rachel Gardens ‘was never quantified in any way whatsoever’” and that there was “no basis whatsoever to award [the Wilfs] the theoretical fees they were seeking.
[brief] Cf. State v. Casilla, 362 N.J. Super. 554, 570-71 (2003) (the Appellate Division molded the verdict from first-degree to second-degree kidnapping where the trial court had failed to instruct the jury on the elements of the first-degree offense, because the jury returned a valid verdict on second-degree kidnapping).  Defendant is entitled to a new trial, with the proper instructions on accomplice liability for robbery.
[brief] [...] noted that Plaintiff would be deemed admissible to the MBA regardless of his status as a Pharm.D student.  (Pa461-Pa467).  [...] further acknowledged, “I do not believe this will be a one-off occurrence, and hence it would behoove us to establish a policy for dealing with these kind of cases. ” (Pa467).  [...] responded approximately one hour later, agreeing that a student could apply the “regular admission route (take and submit GMAT or GRE)” if they did not qualify for the dual track degree.
[brief] The trial court's ruling on a Motion for a New Trial “shall not be reversed unless it clearly and convincingly appears that there was a manifest denial of justice under the law. ”  *State v. Sims*, 65 N.J. 359, 373-374 (1974).  [I]n reviewing a trial court's action on a motion for a new trial following a jury verdict, the appellate court must give deference to the views of the trial judge in certain areas.  Although his determination as to worth of certain evidence, plausibility or consistency of individual testimony, and other tangible considerations apparent from the face of the record do not deserve any special deference, his views of credibility of witnesses, their demeanor, and his general “feel of the case” must be weighed heavily.  Where these factors are primary in the grant of a new trial, it should be most rare that leave to appeal be granted to the State.  *Id.* at 373.  In this case, the trial granted the defense’s motion based upon newly discovered evidence.  There are three (3) prongs to be met under the standard for a new trial based upon newly discovered evidence.  The evidence must be “(1) material, and not ‘merely’ cumulative, impeaching, or contradictory; (2) that the evidence was discovered after completion of the trial and was “not discoverable by reasonable diligence beforehand”; and (3) that the evidence “would probably change the jury's verdict if a new trial were granted. ”  *State v. Ways*, 180 N.J. 171, 187 (2004) (quoting *State v. Carter*, 85 N.J. 300, 314, 426  The trial court granted the defense’s motion pursuant to Rule 3:20-1 after presiding over the matter for an extended period, including both pre- and post-trial motions, as it was “required in the interest of justice” because “it clearly and convincingly appear[ed] that there was a manifest denial of justice under the law.
[brief] [...] contends that if reciprocal exchanges were subject to the Holding Company Act, they would be obligated to file an Insurance Holding Company System Annual Registration Statement (Form B) pursuant to N.J.S.A. 17:27A-3(b), including Summary of Changes to Registration Statement (Form C), and a Form D “to provide advance notice of significant affiliate transactions or modification to existing affiliate agreements,” pursuant to N.J.S.A. 17:27A-4.  (Ab12-13).  They are correct.  But if [...] (or any other reciprocal exchange) has not made those filings, or any others required by the Holding Company Act, it does not signify that they are not obligated to do so; it merely means that the Exchange is out of compliance with the statute.  Although the Reciprocal Exchange Act states that “[s]uch contracts and the exchange thereof and such subscribers, their attorneys in fact and representatives shall be regulated by this act, and by no other statute of this State relating to insurance, except as herein otherwise provided,” N.J.S.A. 17:50-1, the Holding Company Act contains a similar provision.
[brief] . . .”  *Shaw*, 460 N.J. Super. at 619-20.  The Court in *Shaw* adopted the Attorney General’s view on the appropriate scope of the “learned professional” exemption:  We agree with the Attorney General that the learned professional doctrine, as interpreted, threatens to become the exception that swallows the rule, in contravention of the canon of statutory interpretation that requires that exceptions to a remedial statute are to be narrowly construed.  We also agree with the Attorney General’s argument that, to the extent the Supreme Court continues to recognize a “learned professional” doctrine, ideally that doctrine should be narrowly construed to include only those professions who have historically been recognized as “learned” based on the requirement of extensive learning or erudition.  We are unpersuaded that the Legislature acquiesced in all semi-professional CFA immunity.  [Id. at 618-19.]  The Shaw Court held “that home inspectors and other licensed semi-professionals are not learned professionals simply because they are otherwise regulated. ”  Id. at 620 (emphasis added).  Shaw made clear licensed semi-professionals, like Defendants, “remain subject to the CFA absent a finding that ‘a direct and unavoidable conflict exists’ between application of the CFA and application of the other regulatory scheme or schemes. ”  Shaw, 460 N.J. Super. at 619 (emphasis added) (quoting Lemelledo, 150 N.J. at 270).  Shaw properly reset the judicially created exemptions from liability under the CFA.  Since Shaw, exemptions from liability under the CFA are to include only “learned professionals.