ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] [...]’s first statutory interpretation argument seeks enhanced notice under N.J.S.A. 40:49-2(a).  For context, the statute requires:  a.  Every ordinance after being introduced and having passed a first reading, which first reading may be by title, shall be published in its entirety or by title or by title and summary at least once in a newspaper published and circulated in the municipality, if there be one, and if not, in a newspaper printed in the county and circulating in the municipality, together with a notice of the introduction thereof, the time and place when and where it will be further considered for final passage, a clear and concise statement prepared by the clerk of the governing body setting forth the purpose of the ordinance, and the time and place when and where a copy of the ordinance can be obtained without cost by any member of the general public who wants a copy of the ordinance.  [N.J.S.A. 40:49-2(a) (emphasis added)].  [...] suggests use of the words “together with” means everything following that phrase, including the requirement of a “clear and concise statement prepared by the clerk of the governing body setting forth the purpose of the ordinance” must “exist separate and apart from any of the alternatives provided for in the first part of the statute. ” (Pb25 – Pb26).  In other words, even if a publication of notice is “by title,” as permitted by the first part of N.J.S.A. 40:49-2(a), the clear and concise statement of purpose must be set forth separately from the title, even if that title itself clearly and concisely states the purpose of the ordinance.  This court has consistently rejected such an argument.  For instance, in Meredith v. Mayor and Borough Council of the Borough of Somerdale, No. CAM-L-4946-19 (N.J. Sup. Ct. Law Div. May 5, 2020) (Pa295 – Pa321), aff’d, 2022 WL 1816530 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. June 3, 2022) (Pa233 – Pa239), the Appellate Division affirmed substantially for the reasons expressly set forth by Assignment Judge [...], who held:
[brief] R. 3:23-8(a)(2).  By considering issues beyond the scope while also not informing [...] that they would be considered, the de novo court erred and prejudiced the result.  The proper remedy is to remand for a fair trial de novo under the appropriate scope before an impartial judge.  In addition, the de novo court erred as a matter of law by misinterpreting the Supreme Court’s precedent as to when an adverse inference should be granted to benefit a criminal defendant.  Because the de novo court took the opposite of the precedent to deny the use of the adverse inference, the matter should be reversed.  Finally, [...]’s matter should be reversed because the de novo court’s finding was not supported by sufficient credible evidence when [...] admitted he did not rely on standardized scoring factors to make the determination of [...]’s intoxication.  (1T63:4-64:22.)  Based on this error, the matter should be remanded for a new trial de novo.  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT
[brief] Finally, it is critical to note, though it goes without saying, that [...] did not, as [...] argues, “concede” that its appeal is moot.  In fact, quite the opposite is true.  [...], [...]’s trial counsel, argued that given the Law Division’s ruling on ambiguity, [...] “has no standing in [the] case any longer,” however, [...] specifically reserved the right to resuscitate [...]’ standing in this case “in the event that a court determines that the [Law Division’s] ruling here was a bit narrow. ” (Da463).  This appeal is the very occurrence that [...] foresaw after the Law Division incorrectly ruled on the issue of ambiguity in the contractual indemnification provision.  Thus, [...]’ argument is without merit, premature, unsupported by the record in this matter, and unsupported by New Jersey case law.
[brief] LEGAL ARGUMENTS POINT I  THE COURT SHOULD AFFIRM [...]'S DECISION TO DENY THE TRUST AN ADJUDICATORY HEARING REGARDING THE 2017 PERMIT MODIFICATION AS UNTIMELY.  (RESPONDING TO APPELLANT’S POINT II).  The Trust’s appeal of the 2017 Permit Modification was untimely, thus the court should dismiss [...]’s appeal of the 2017 Permit Modification.
[brief] A few days later, the case (including the motion to dismiss) was then rescheduled for Sep 23, 2022.  I was in the process of preparing my opposition and cross motion when [...] filed a second motion to dismiss on Aug 24, 2022.  (Pa11)  As a result, my opposition and cross motion needed to be modified somewhat, which was ultimately filed several days later on Aug 29, 2022.  (Pa19)  On Aug 31, 2022, [...] submitted a very scant reply via a letter-brief.  (Pa68).  On Sep 23, 2022, the trial court heard oral argument on the motions and cross motions.  (1T).  On this date, the trial court granted [...]’s motions to dismiss, on the sole basis that neither Plaintiff was an administrator or executor or our mother’s estate.  (1T, Pa70)  Also on this same date, the trial court denied my cross motions.  (1T, Pa71)  Specifically, the trial court found my position to be “creative”.  (1T6:14)  On Sep 29, 2022, [...]’s filed a motion for sanctions.  (Pa73)  On Oct 10, 2022, I opposed the motion along with a cross motion to vacate the dismissal and file an amended complaint, as I had since obtained the paperwork to be the administrator of my mother’s estate.
[brief] In defense of the integrity of the legal profession and the entire judicial system, wrongfully taking a client’s money must not be considered legal work, close to legal work, or the kind of work an attorney ordinarily performs.  As such, there is no requirement for an expert with respect to Plaintiffs’ claims against [...] in this case for two alternative reasons: 1) the legal malpractice of [...] is so blatant, simple, and part of a fact-finder’s common knowledge that no expert is required to explain a departure from a professional standard of care, and 2) the Tort Claims against [...] are so separate from the work of an attorney, that no expert is required to explain a departure from a professional standard of care, as no profession or professional standard of care is implicated.  The quality of the legal work performed by [...] is not under scrutiny in Plaintiffs’ Complaint.  Plaintiffs’ legal malpractice claims stem solely from [...]’s failure to advise Plaintiffs that their money was actually being transferred to [...] and his co-conspirators.  As for the Tort Claims against [...], the Trial Court’s holding implies that orchestrating and participating in a conspiracy to wrongfully take a client’s money is legal work.  The Trial Court’s error suggests that any wrongful action of an attorney (including intentional torts) against his client done during the course of an attorney-client relationship ultimately implicates the legal work that the attorney performs for the client.  This rationale is erroneous.  If an attorney assaults a client in his office, that assault does not transform into legal malpractice solely because the attorney happened to be performing some kind of legal work on behalf of that client at the time of the assault.  The legal work that was performed in this case, similarly, was, at most, only peripheral.  It is mere happenstance that [...] was an attorney.  [...] was sued for the Tort Claims for the same reason all other non-attorney Defendants were sued for the Tort Claims: that is, [...] was involved in a tortious conspiracy perpetrated against Plaintiffs.  Plaintiffs never contested the quality of [...]’s legal work performed in that office.  Plaintiffs only allege that during the course of a transaction, Defendants wrongfully took Plaintiffs’ transactional proceeds.  This is civil law theft, not legal malpractice.  Finally, the purpose of the AOM statute is to weed out meritless claims.
[brief] Ibid.  The opinions and statutes cited by the Borough do not change that conclusion.  The Franco case was a condemnation action in which the property owner had land in Weehawken that was the site of an industrial garage that had no site plan or subdivision approvals for any other use (as such, N.J.S.A. was not addressed at all in the opinion), and which the property owner said had higher value because it could be developed as an access street for another part of the property located in different municipalities.
[directive] See AG Directive 2021-5, Section II.A (non-enforceability by third parties).  4.3  Truthful Response to Specific Inquiries.  If a civilian inquires of an officer whether the officer is equipped with a BWC, or inquires whether the device is activated, the officer shall answer truthfully unless the County Prosecutor or designee, or Director of the Division of Criminal Justice or designee, has expressly authorized the officer to make a covert electronic recording.  Cf. Section 3.3 (Policy does not apply to officers while operating in an undercover capacity, or while conducting/participating in a station house custodial interrogation electronically recorded in accordance with Rule 3:17).  Nothing in this Section shall be construed to establish a basis for suppressing a statement or other evidence.
[brief] (Da1-3).  Specifically, despite Tenant’s baseless allegations to the contrary, [...] clearly articulated his factual and legal conclusions that, pursuant to the express terms of the Lease, Tenant was not entitled to offset the Rent Arrears with the 2020 and 2021 Tenant Allowance payments because Tenant was admittedly in monetary defaults under the Lease when those annual installment payments came due.  (Da1-3; 2T4-7 to 2T4-13, 2T6-18 to 2T7-2, 2T9-5 to 2T9-18; 3T15-2 to 3T15-25).
[brief] ......  Pa315 – Pa321 August 25, 2023  Order denying Defendant, [...]’s Motion for Summary Judgment ...........Pa322 – Pa323 August 25, 2023  Order granting Defendant, [...] d/b/a [...]’s Motion for Summary Judgment  ...........................................  Pa324 – Pa325 August 25, 2023  Order granting Plaintiffs, [...] and [...]’s Motion to Re-open and Extend Discovery and denying Plaintiffs’ Motion to file a Third Amended Complaint ...............
[directive] Minor 48 54 57 42 48 36 42 45 30 36 39 51  I 42 48 51 36 42 30 36 39 24 30 33 45  Post-Indictment  Post-Indictment  Post-Indictment  Post-Indictment  Post-Indictment  Post-Indictment  Post-Indictment  Post-Indictment  Pre-Indictment  Pre-Indictment  Pre-Indictment  Pre-Indictment
[brief] The Trial Court properly found that Plaintiff “never applied for an exception….That’s the difference.  If she had been truthful and applied for an exception that’s different.  *She never applied for exception.  She lied and said she was never convicted.  She’s statutorily barred.*  She is statutorily barred. ” (Appx 573 at 24:14-21) (emphasis added).  Just like in *Cedeno*, Plaintiff “was not permitted by law to occupy the position[,]” summary judgment on her CEPA claim must be affirmed.
[brief] LEGAL STANDARD  The Appellate Division “applies the same standard as the trial court to determine whether to grant or deny a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. ”  Malik v. Ruttenberg, 398 N.J. Super. 489, 493–94 (App. Div. 2008).  In this regard, the Appellate Division has recognized that a motion to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim “may not be denied based on the possibility that discovery may establish the requisite claim; rather, the legal requisites for plaintiffs' claim must be apparent from the complaint itself. ”  Edwards v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Co., 357 N.J. Super. 196, 202 (App. Div. 2003).  Rule 4:6-2(e) permits a Defendant to move to dismiss a Complaint for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. ”  Pursuant to Rule 4:6-2(e), “a court must dismiss the Plaintiff's Complaint if it has failed to articulate a legal basis entitling Plaintiff to relief.
[brief] [Pb28]  An applicant for insurance may not, however, provide false answers in an insurance application because of some subjective understanding of the “purpose” of the question.  Beyond that, as explained below regarding the materiality issue, any reasonable attorney would know that questions about whether an attorney has been the subject of bar complaints, investigations, or disciplinary proceedings are central to the risk of insuring the lawyer.  Who would think that it is irrelevant to evaluating the risk of insuring a lawyer that the lawyer has been subject to disciplinary proceedings, especially where, as here, an independent state agency investigated and pressed formal charges before [...] issued its first policy?  As [...]’s underwriter explained, application questions about bar complaints, investigations, and disciplinary proceedings “go directly to the heart of a lawyer’s honesty and integrity, which are critical to [...]’s decision as to whether to issue an insurance policy. ”  [See Pa432a, ¶ 34; Pa446a-447a, ¶ 21]  The Disciplinary Action is a Disciplinary Proceeding that speaks to [...]’s honesty and integrity, and should have been disclosed in the Applications.  B.
[brief] b.  Within 20 *business* days after receiving a request for a fiscal note from the director, the State department, commission or agency shall prepare and return to him a fiscal note containing the most accurate estimate possible, in dollars, concerning the amount by which expenditures or revenues will be increased or decreased for the State or any of its political subdivisions.  The fiscal note shall contain information relating to as many fiscal years as can reason- ably be foreseen.
[brief] The bottom line is the Court is left with the general rules of construction set forth in the reported cases set forth above.  Under those decisions, the clear language above the signatures of [...], [...] and [...] states that Defendants agreed to personally guarantee the lease, and commercial reality indicates that no reasonable lessor would hand over a $2 million dollar building to a LLC with no assets, without the personal guarantee of the principals.  *Center 48 Ltd. Partnership vs. May Dept. Stores Co.*, supra at 407; *Shelter System Group Corporation vs. Lanni Builder’s, Inc.*, supra at 376; *Benjamin vs. Garden Operations Corp.*, supra at *7.  Finally, Respondents argue the trial court erred because it failed to give any consideration to the terms of the “prior Lease”.
[brief] Evicted commercial tenants have no right to continue controlling real property after their lease terminates.  Our legal jurisprudence recognizes that approvals run with the land.  This prevents parties who receive approvals from interfering with or encumbering development after they lose their possessory rights.  A decision to the contrary would, in effect, create a lien against the real property preventing any other developer from continuing the solar project that [...], the landlord, started.
[brief] ”  *State v. Wright*, 97 N.J. 113, 120 (1984).  The interrogators never directly asked [...] to clarify whether his statements about a lawyer meant that he wanted to have an attorney present during questioning.  Instead, the detectives told [...] that they would advise him of his rights and then “air it all out” and let him “know where we’re at with this case” because “a lot more things have come to light.
[brief] The Trial Court Properly Held That The Board's Invocation Of Res Judicata Was Not Arbitrary, Capricious Or Unreasonable And Sufficient Evidence Exists To Support Denial Of The [...] Application On The Merits (Ja45 L. 4-9; Ja54 L. 9-15, 20-23; Ja60 L. 11-20; Ja61 L. 21-25; Ja63 L.19-Ja64 L.2; Ja73 L. 5-19; Ja76 L. 25-Ja77 L. 4; Ja77 L.14-22; Ja78 L. 2-5; Ja87 L. 13-19; Ja87 L. 25-Ja88 L. 3; Ja94 L. 15-19; Ja107 L.19-Ja108 L. 17; Ja123 L. 12-25; Ja124 L. 8-11; Ja127 L. 11-Ja128 L. 4; Ja129 L. 6-15; Ja130 L. 1-6; Ja130 L. 22-Ja131 L. 8; Ja134 L. 11-16; Ja135 L. 7-20; Ja135 L. 22-Ja136 L. 1; Ja138 L. 6-17; Ja148; Ja156-157; Ja167; Ja169-172; Ja176-178; Ja181-184; Ja190; Ja200-203; Ja208; Ja214; Ja216-218; Ja220; Ja224; Ja227-229; Ja238; Ja240-241; Ja245; Ja247-250; Ja253; Ja269; Ja274-275; Ja285; Ja289, Ja293)
[brief] 1.  [...] has both a private and public interest in responsive records.  As previously noted, a plaintiff must demonstrate an interest in the requested records.  "The requisite interest necessary to accord a plaintiff standing to obtain copies of public records may be either 'a wholesome public interest or a legitimate private interest.'"  Higg-A-Rella, Inc., 141 N.J. at 47.  As the Supreme Court has noted, "[t]he interest does not have to be purely personal, but rather '[a]s one citizen or taxpayer out of many, concerned with a public problem or issue, he might demand and be accorded access to public records bearing upon the problem, even though his individual interest may [be] slight.'"  South Jersey Pub. Co. v. N.J. Expressway Auth., 124 N.J. 478, 487 (1991) (quoting Irval Realty, Inc. v. Board of Pub. Util. Comm'rs, 61 N.J. 366, 372 (1972)).  Plaintiff brought four criminal charges, including charges of second-degree official misconduct against a corrupt former judge after government prosecutors failed to do so.  Upon reviewing a citizen complaint and evidence submitted by [...], Hudson County Chief Municipal Judge [...] found probable cause to issue a warrant for the arrest of the former judge.  The New Jersey Attorney General's Office of Public Integrity and Accountability, however, declined to "take on" the criminal charges and referred the prosecution to the HCPO.  The HCPO in turn declined to prosecute [...].  Prosecutors in the HCPO and the Attorney General's Office of Public Integrity and Accountability had a mountain of evidence with which to charge and convict [...], including findings by multiple Supreme Court panels that [...] committed criminal conduct beyond a reasonable doubt.  Plaintiff clearly has a personal interest in the records generated as a result of the criminal charges he brought.  Beyond this personal interest, Plaintiff has an interest as a citizen in ensuring that the state’s laws are uniformly enforced and that corrupt public officials are investigated and prosecuted.  The public shares this interest as well and deserves to know why this corrupt judge was not ultimately prosecuted for public corruption charges where a judge found probable cause to issue a warrant for her arrest.
[brief] If the Board was correct, in [...]’s situation he would have had to go through an unnecessary an entire disciplinary process on technical charges related to his disability claim, and remain out on leave until that determination occurred, and then and only then after his appeals were exhausted could he apply for disability retirement, assuming the passage of time did not cause him another defeat when the Board exalts another trapping to deny the member of his benefits that he paid into for over 12 years.  This would also injure [...] in that his settlement agreement financially remunerated him expeditiously based on his SOA contract, whereas in the other scenario apparently embraced by the Board, he would not see financial renumeration for many years.  Moreover, [...] remaining on the force to satisfy the Board’s draconian and unworkable interpretations of law would hold up the police force from hiring for years an able-bodied officer to replace him, and this would all be for what purpose?  The answer is that there is no purpose except to deny Petitioner-Appellant his right to have his application heard and decided on the merits.  CONCLUSION
[brief] Da75-103, 121-52.  The 2022 Addendum, upon which [...] had based her action, contains no arbitration provision whatsoever.  Da45.  The 2022 Addendum does not incorporate a prior arbitration provision or reference arbitration in any way.  Ibid.  In fact, the only other agreement referenced in the 2022 Addendum is “an agreement entered into January 1st 2017 relating to the sale and purchase of” the Property, which is the 2017 Unexecuted Agreement and is similarly devoid of any arbitration provision.  Ibid.; see also Da51-56.  [...] acknowledged that the 2017 Unexecuted Agreement for the sale of the Property “was never signed and the closing did not occur” because “[...] had changed his mind. ”  Da38.  Thus, admitting that no “agreement [was] entered into January 1st 2017,” and thus could not be amended.  In sum, no agreement, let alone a valid agreement, to arbitrate exists.
[brief] Referring to summons on page 3 (lines 6-9), Your Honor [...], J.M.C. states, ... two-point summons. ”  Again, referring to the April 13, 2022 transcript page 3 (lines 14-15), that “I need to get an attorney. ”  In which the court denied.  Following that, also on page 3 of the April 13, 2022 transcript (line 19-20), I would then like to address a reference by [...] with regards to the footage body worn camera (BWC) and (MVR) video I stated “This is not correct it was redacted”.  Appearing out of sequence on page 6 lines 13-20 [...] Prosecutor references including but not limited to, information regarding the body worn camera and MVR video which repeats an untruth that the [...] and the records custodian [...] have wrongly claimed.  Mr. Vecchio was indeed correct I was upset as I mention the BWC and MVR was not correct and was redated.  In addition, from the start I wish to dispute the violation for which I was charged, as it is inconsistent with my experience and perception of the facts of the incident.  Therefore, I respectfully requested Your Honor’s [...], J.M.C. assistance in obtaining a complete record of those facts, Your Honor indeed --- 1
[brief] Docket No.: [...]  Docket No.: [...]  RESPONDENT, [...]’S BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO APPELLANT’S APPEAL  PRB  Attorneys at Law, LLC [...]  Tel: 973-860-0555  Fax: 973-446-2496  Attorneys for Respondent, City of Paterson  Of Counsel: [...]  (Atty. No. 007481991)  On the Brief: [...]  (Atty. No. 007481991)  [...]  [...]  (Atty. No. 024961992)  [...]  [...]  (Atty. No. 018991996)  [...]  Dated: November 18, 2024  TABLE OF CONTENTS
[brief] [...]: Your Honor … didn’t speak to the commission and the C.P.A. claim….  THE COURT: Just refresh my memory on that.  [...]: We submitted a certification from [Respondent] for income commission, and then there were C.P.A. fees relative to the preparation of the accounting, which was … $17,649.57.  THE COURT: Give me the commission amount again?  [...]: The commission amount was $2,039.57.  THE COURT: All right, The Court will grant those as well.
[brief] Pb37.  Without citation to any factual evidence or legal authority of any kind, [...] simply offers his subjective opinion that the City offered Plaintiff “long term participation in decision-making to protect that early, fledgling investment from future changes” to the Redevelopment Plan.  Pb37 (citing Pa969).  Such unsupported assertion is an improper net opinion.  An expert’s bare conclusions, unsupported by factual evidence or other data, are inadmissible as a mere “net opinion. ”  State v. Townsend, 186 N.J. 473, 494-95 (2006); Matter of Yaccarino, 117 N.J. 175, 196 (1989).  [...] does not identify any evidence in the record regarding the purpose and intent of the “consent to amendment” provision, and certainly does not identify any evidence to suggest that the intent was to give protection to the initial developers in the redevelopment area.  POINT III
[brief] (Da2 at ¶2).  In essence, plaintiff alleged that the accident was the result of [...]’s negligence in failing to provide proper lighting.  (Da2 at ¶2).  As discovery continued, Plaintiff / appellant then attempted to develop a theory of liability with respect to the lighting in the theater and the Theater Management System (“TMS”) software used by [...] in connection with the advertised August 13, 2016, 8:00 p.m. showing of the movie “Star Trek: Beyond” in theater 5.  (Pa24 and Pa37).  Whether or not the lights were working as intended in the theater and in tandem with the TMS became the subject of all previous motions.
[brief] After Defendants’ Cross Motion to Dismiss was denied and Defendants had expressly certified that no arbitration proceedings were contemplated in --- \(^1\) N.J.S.A. 17:11C-3.  \(^2\)  “A consumer lender who violates or participates in the violation of any provision of section 3 . . . of this act, shall be guilty of a crime of the fourth degree.