ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT APPROPRIATELY DISMISSED COUNT IV OF PLAINTIFF'S SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT SINCE THE COURT CORRECTLY FOUND THAT PLAINTIFF FAILED TO STATE A CLAIM OF DISABILITY  DISCRIMINATION/FAILURE TO ACCOMMODATE DISABILITY  As detailed in the Counterstatement of Facts above, Count IV of Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint again claimed that the City had failed to accommodate the disabilities of unidentified employees through the application of General Order 19-16.6 (Pa55-58 at ¶139-142, 149).  As in Count I, Plaintiff purported to advance a claim for failure to accommodate disability, but failed to identify any particular alleged member; the qualifying disability involved; their limitations and the severity and duration of same; the nature of the request for accommodation made, when and to whom; that such request was denied, by whom, when and the details of same; etc.  While Plaintiff used the terms "prima facie" case of disability discrimination in its --- 6  Note that, on February 10, 2023, Plaintiff filed with the [...] ([...]) for arbitration of the same matter as envisioned/pleaded in Count IV of the Amended Complaint.  In its Request for a Panel of Arbitrators, Plaintiff identified its grievance to be arbitrated as "discipline without just cause/use of sick leave class action grievance."  Complaint, Plaintiff again failed to set forth a *prima facie* case as concerns any one individual/member, let alone as to numerous affected members.  Accordingly, Count IV of Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint likewise failed to state a claim for disability/discrimination/failure to accommodate disability under the LAD and was appropriately subject to dismissal for the same reasons as Counts 1-3.  See R. 4:5-2; Hoffman, 405 N.J. Super. at 112; Rieder, 221 N.J. Super. at 552; Spence-Parker, 656 F. Supp.2d at 505; Scheidt, 424 N.J.  Super. at 193 (mere conclusory allegations insufficient).  Indeed, this is what the Trial Court appropriately found and there is no basis to disturb that decision.  (Pa3-4).  The Trial Court’s September 13, 2023 Order should thus be affirmed.
[brief] (Pa95)  Prior to 1948, the functions described below regarding the Council were the responsibility of the Legislature itself.  United Hunters Assoc. of N.J. v. Bontempo, 53 N.J. Super. 181, 189-90 (App. Div. 1958).  Thereafter, the Legislature delegated to the Council, subject to the approval of the Commissioner, the right "[to] formulate comprehensive policies for the protection and propagation of fish, birds and game animals...", N.J.S.A. 13:1B-28, and to "[e]stablish, extend, shorten or abolish open seasons and closed seasons' and '[p]roscribe the manner and means of pursuing, taking or killing any species or variety."  N.J.S.A. 13:1B-32(a), (b).  (Pa95-96)  The Legislature also authorized the Council "to determine under what circumstances...game animals, and fur-bearing animals...may be pursued, taken, killed, or had in possession so as to maintain an adequate and proper supply thereof, and...adopt and from time to time amend and repeal such appropriate and reasonable regulations concerning the same...as it deems necessary to preserve, properly utilize and maintain the best relative number of any species or variety thereof, at the times, and the manner and to the extent hereinafter provided.  The regulations so established shall be called the 'State Fish and Game Code' ("Code")."  N.J.S.A. 13:1B-30.  The Code, N.J.A.C. 7:25-5 to 5.39, is codified in Subchapter 5 of N.J.A.C. 7:25.  (Pa96)  Although the DEP Commissioner must approve the Council’s comprehensive policies before the Council authorizes a bear hunt, see U.S. Sportsman’s Alliance Foundation v. New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection, 182 N.J. 461, 469-79 (2005), “…it is clear that despite the Commissioner’s transcendent obligation to coordinate and oversee the DEP’s environmental protection and conservation initiatives the Legislature granted substantial independence to the Fish & Game Council and withheld from the Commissioner overall supervisory power over the Council…”.
[brief] [...] testified that the part of Trenton in which this incident occurred was a high-crime area and that he had encountered weapons “numerous times in that area. ” (2T:10-10 to 11-1).  “Although a stop in a high-crime area does not by itself justify a Terry frisk ..., the location of the investigatory stop can reasonably elevate a police officer's suspicion that a suspect is armed. ”  Valentine, 134 N.J. at 547.  The totality of the circumstances – his presence in a high-crime area known for drugs and guns, his circling the area numerous times in his vehicle, his perceived nervousness, his untrue unsolicited explanation to the detectives of where he was going, his attempts to conceal his waistband by hunching over and placing the safety vest in his lap – informed [...]’s reasonable and articulable suspicion defendant might be armed and dangerous.
[directive] AVISO:  Este es un documento público, lo cual significa que el documento tal como se envíe estará a la disposición del público cuando se solicite.  Por lo tanto, no anote en el mismo ningún identificador personal, como por ejemplo: el número de Seguridad Social, el número de la licencia de conducir, el número de la matrícula del vehículo, el número de la póliza del seguro, el número de una cuenta financiera activa, o el número de una tarjeta de crédito activa.
[brief] [...] requested that the Attorney General’s office defend her in the lawsuit and later sought her defense costs when the Attorney General declined to defend her.  Id. at 423-24.  The Court held that the Attorney General had not been obligated to defend [...], noting that its ruling was consonant with two prior Appellate Division decisions that held that the mandatory duty to defend and indemnify did not apply if the underlying action was not a civil suit seeking monetary damages: In re Napoleon, 303 N.J. Super. 630, 633-34 (App. Div. 1997) and Helduser v. Kimmelman, 191 N.J. Super. at 493, 503 (App. Div. 1983).
[brief] See Delaney v. Dickey, 244 N.J. 466, 500 (2020) (recognizing that attorneys possess superior knowledge of what a binding arbitration agreement means, as their “training and experience make them keenly aware of the fine distinctions between an arbitral and judicial forum”) (emphasis added); Cnty. of Passaic v. Horizon Healthcare Servs., Inc., 474 N.J. Super. 498, 503-04 (App. Div. 2023); see also N.J. R.P.C 1.4(c) (“A lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation”); McCullough v. Sullivan, 102 N.J.L. 381, 384 (E&A 1926) (recognizing standard for practicing lawyer is to possess “reasonable knowledge and skill ordinarily possessed by other members of his profession”).
[brief] The family in Panetta, owned property consisting of an upland lot designated Block 934, Lot 23.01 and a Riparian Grant separately designated as Block 934, Lot 23.03.  One of the owners applied for a loan from [...] and executed a mortgage on the property designated as Block 934, Lot 23.01 for a security.  The 1995 Deed for this property did not refer to the Riparian Grant designated on the tax map as Block 934, Lot 23.03.
[brief] (Pa2303)  In remanding, the Appellate Division rejected Appellants claim that no affidavit of merit was needed as Appellant was only suing [...] and [...].  (Pa2317)  “We reject plaintiffs’ attempt to evade the requirements of the affidavit of merit statute by suing only [...] and [...]” (Pa2317).  The Appellate Division however, remanded for a --- 3 [...] notes that Appellants prior position, that it did not need an affidavit of merit as it was only suing the corporate entities, is inconsistent with their current claim that they are only suing based on the acts of the unlicensed professional.  The Appellate Division rejected Appellants arguments that no affidavit was required regarding the corporate defendants and further rejected Appellants claim of estoppel and lack of a Ferreira Conference (Pa2319) determination of whether “[...] was acting under the direction and supervision of licensed engineering professionals and that the function he was performing was part of the practice of engineering”.  (Pa2318)  After extensive discovery on said issue, [...] again moved to dismiss plaintiff’s complaint.  (Pa688)  On July 26th 2019 the Trial Court again granted [...]’s motion.  (Pa12).  F.
[directive] Each Treasury law enforcement organization shall establish internal guidelines consistent sZdon governing the placement of property into official use.  with this $2  All official use guidelines shall:  1.  Prohibit the placement into official use of any seized property prior to the entry of a final determination of forfeiture and the appropriate approval of the request to place the property into official use; 13 Executive Office Asset Fo$eiture for V Chapter Guidelines Seized and Fo$eited Property for a 2. require that a written justification be prepared in each instance detailing the reasons why the forfeited property should be placed into official use and that these documents be retained for three years; require that a specific supervisory-level official be responsible and accountable for 3. the decision to place each item of forfeited property into official use and for ensuring appropriate official use of such property following its transfer; 4. require that property placed into official use be identified and tracked in an accountable property system; and 5. state that the property may not be retained if it is primarily for purposes of exchangehale or other uses not expressly authorized for property acquired through the expenditure of appropriated funds.
[directive] A crime a or firearm, involving a for crime a delinquent adjudicated was juvenile a as defendant the complaint- charging presumption by of a is there where cases in that provides amended, as 3:3-1(d), Rule 19 the that believe reason on to based acomplaint-warrant for applies agency enforcement law a and summons person the or any of other safety danger the to pose will a summons, a to response in appear not will defendant judicial or court the a summons, on if released process criminal justice the obstruct to attempt will or community, of Director Administrative the by instrument approved using the assessment the of results the consider must officer 2A:162-25.  N.J.S.A. to pursuant the Courts 43 Page 2C:43-7.2, N.J.S.A. Act, Release Early  No the to subject be would adult an by committed if that deputy or prosecutor assistant an unless offenses, foregoing the of any commit to attempt an or supervisory or Directive, a this of 3.2
[brief] The court in Herrera v. First Northern Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 805 F.2d 896, 898 (10th Cir. 1986), held that TILA was violated when the term “annual percentage rate” appeared on the disclosure statements in identical size, style and boldness with over thirty other terms and phrases.  12 CFR Section 1026.6(b)(1)(i) provides that any APR required to be disclosed must be disclosed in “bold text”.  In typography, “emphasis” is the strengthening of words in a text with a font in a different style from the rest of the text, to highlight the words.  See [...], “The Bold Idea: The Use of Bold-Looking Types in the Nineteenth Century,” Journal of the Printing Historical Society 22 (107-143).  Thus, “bold text” is used to exaggerate or differentiate words in a text from other words in the text.  (Exhibit CC) (Da ).  Introduction: Regulation Z, Truth in Lending, page 14 states:
[brief] In support, [...] relies on a motion hearing transcript in the case of Russell v. Kiewit Energy Group, Inc. in which U.S. District Court Judge [...] ordered the defendant to produce all documents responsive to a search that hit on the plaintiff’s name and/or to provide a relevance log for otherwise responsive documents it was withholding as not relevant.  (ECF 63-5.)  [...] misconstrues [...]’s order in Russell as somehow applying with equal force to this case.  It does not.  For one, Russell is a district court decision that is not binding precedent.
[brief] Exhibit E: Letter from [...], Esq., to [...], Esq., dated 10/21/21……………………………………………………………………Da653  Exhibit F: Deposition of [...], dated 10/11/22…………………………Da658  Exhibit G: Deposition of [...], dated 10/11/22………………Da687  [...]’s response to plaintiff’s supplemental statement of material facts, etc., filed 1/17/23……………………………………………………………………Da706  [...] notice of cross-motion for summary judgment, filed 1/19/23…………Da711  Certification of [...], Esq., filed 1/19/23………………………………Da713  Exhibit: Letter from [...] to [...], Esq., dated 10/21/21……………………………………………………………………Da715  [...] responding statement of material facts, filed 1/19/23………………Da723  Exhibits to [...]  Cross-motion for summary judgment…………………………Da726  Exhibit DB-1: Orders for summary judgment and memorandum of decision in Trunell v. Trust for Harrison, filed 9/29/06  [See Da99]  Exhibit DB-2: Letter opinion of [...], dated 8/20/08 in *Trunell v. Trust for Harrison*
[brief] The trial court’s Decision to Order a Sale was Reasonable and Appropriate Under the Circumstances. **  The trial court acted within its discretion in ordering a sealed bidding procedure, and that discretion should not be disturbed.  A court sitting in equity has broad discretion to fashion a remedy.  *Woytas v. Greenwood Tree Experts, Inc.*, 237 N.J. 501, 514 (2019).  Chancery Courts are “charged with the responsibility to fashion equitable remedies that address the unique setting of each case. ”  *[...] --- \(^1\)  It also goes without saying that the Defendants (like any litigants) were free at all times to contact the other parties with any settlement proposals they had, and that negotiations could have taken place outside a formal court-ordered settlement conference. Nat’l Ass’n v. Guillaume, 209 N.J. 449, 476 (2007).  "When examining a trial court's exercise of discretionary authority, we reverse only when the exercise of discretion was 'manifestly unjust' under the circumstances."  Newark Morning Ledger Co. v. N.J. Sports & Exposition Auth., 423 N.J. Super. 140, 174 (App. Div. 2011), quoting Union Cnty. Improvement Auth. v. Artaki, LLC, 392 N.J. Super. 141, 149 App. Div. 2007).  There was ample reason to impose a sealed bidding procedure.
[brief] On the Brief: [...], Esq.  [...], Esq. [...], Esq. (021091998)  Date Submitted: June 21, 2024  #  TABLE OF CONTENTS  TABLE OF CONTENTS ...........................................................................................................  i  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .................................................................................................. ii  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT .................................................................................................1  PROCEDURAL HISTORY .......................................................................................................2  STATEMENT OF FACTS ......................................................................................................3  I.  Facts relevant to plaintiff’s alleged injuries .................................................................3  II.  Plaintiff’s expert report and testimony .....................................................................5  III.  Trial court’s statement of reasons .............................................................................6  LEGAL ARGUMENT ............................................................................................................8  I.  Standard of review ........................................................................................................8  II.  The trial court did not abuse its discretion in disqualifying plaintiff’s expert ..........10  III.  The trial court properly granted defendant summary judgment .........................14  CONCLUSION ..................................................................................................................18
[brief] 43 State v. Adams, 194 N.J. 186 (2008) ..........................  33 State v. Alessi, 240 N.J. 501 (2020) ..........................  32 State v. Angoy, 329 N.J. Super. 79 (App. Div. 2000) ..........  33 State v. R.B., 183 N.J. 308 (2005) ...........................................  3 State v. Bey (I), 112 N.J. 45 (1988) .......................................
[brief] (4/1/21 Transcript @ T58:23 to T59:9).  In response Plaintiff defied the Trial Court’s Order dated April 5, 2021, which specifically denied Plaintiff leave to file any further motions to amend the complaint and filed yet another proposed amended pleading (known in Plaintiff’s brief as the “revised SAC”) in opposition to the [...]’ motion.  (Da035, Transaction ID: [...]; Pa4-5, April 5, 2021, Order).  The Trial Court held oral argument on May 25, 2023, and on May 30, 2023, the Trial Court issued an Order granting the [...]’ motion to dismiss the Complaint with prejudice.  (Da035, Transaction ID: [...]).  Given this matter’s tortured procedural history, there was some question regarding precisely which of the many proposed amended pleadings was the operative Complaint.
[brief] *State v. Roth*, 95 N.J. 334, 363-64 (1984).  Because those errors occurred here, no deference is owed.  The purpose of the *Comer* resentencing hearing at issue in this appeal was to provide [...] with the “meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation. ”  *State v. Comer*, 249 N.J. 359, 386 (2022).  At such hearings, courts must consider “[i]n particular…evidence of any rehabilitative efforts since the time a defendant was last sentenced. ”  *Id.* at 403.  The State does not dispute that [...] has “maintained an exceptional institutional record.” (Da80) (Sb41) (“[[...]] did not display problematic behavior in prison.
[brief] Memorialization if Resolution [...] granting a Preliminary and Final Site Plan Approval to construct 473 residential dwellings across two properties.  \(^{10}\)  There was a brief hiatus beginning late October because Board’s counsel had a long-planned and announced trip abroad from October 20 through November 3, 2022 and because one of [...]’s attorneys was married in early November, 2022.  Board Comments:  [...] noted that the agreed upon elevator for building “E” and the additional 10 units in that building were missing from the resolution.  He stated that these conditions were very important to the Board and he suggested amending the resolution to include said requirements.  [...] suggested that the Board vote on the resolution in its current form but add the caveat to have a supplemental resolution which would include these requirements presented at a future meeting.  The Board agreed to same.  No further comments.  [...]: Motion to approve with the aforementioned caveat  [...]: Second ROLL CALL: [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], APPROVED Pa357  Within their area of jurisdiction, planning boards act in a "quasi-judicial capacity", Randolph v. City of Brigantine Planning Bd., 405 N.J. Super. 215, 225, (App. Div. 2009).
[brief] *Id.* at 337 (quoting *SMB Assocs. v. Dep’t of Env’t Prot.*, 264 N.J. Super. 38, 59 (App. Div. 1993) (“[A]n “agency has inherent power to waive *de minimis* violations of objective standards. ”)).  The court concluded that under the circumstances presented, fairness and equity required [...] to be permitted to apply for Ordinary Disability.  *Id.* at 338.  Here there was no such legal impediment to [...] filing his Eligibility Registration Form nor would he have been sacrificing discrimination claims or other litigation positions by doing so.  [...] simply failed to file his Eligibility Registration Form until approximately one year and one month past the statutory deadline, which is not a de minimis violation.  Contrary to [...]’s argument, the court’s decision in *[...]* did not turn on the timeliness or adequacy of the Division’s notice.
[brief] In defendant [...]’s May 9, 2018, cryptic letter to the Planning Board, he stated in relevant part:  . . . my client has acquired the development rights to the Mill Road Solar Field.  First Amended Compl. Exhibit 8.  Plaintiffs maintain, and their first amended complaint goes into 51 pages of pain-staking details demonstrating, that by those words defendant [...] and the defendants whom he purports to represent conspired and engaged in a systematic theft of plaintiffs’ solar rights purchased at a cost of $780,000 (see First Amended Compl., Exhibit 3); theft of plaintiffs’ preliminary and final site plans obtained from the Planning Board at a significant expense (see First Amended Compl. Exhibit 5); and theft of plaintiffs’ solar rights obtained from the various public agencies.  According to these defendants, plaintiff spent over $1 million for an illusory, borrowed concept.  The [...]’ notice of motion shows that they are seeking dismissal of Counts 1 through 9 of either the original complaint or the first amended complaint, and the distinction is academic because the first amended complaint specifically re-stated the essential allegations in the original complaint and retained Counts 1 through 9 to distinguish the pre- and post-amendment matters.  The [...]’ procedural tactic is perplexing in that, while seeking relief on Counts 1 through 9, they failed to file any response to the First Amended Complaint either by filing an amended answer or any other response that would be proper in light of an amended complaint.
[brief] Defendant appeared “nervous” and failed to “mak[e] eye contact” with [...].  When asked, defendant told detectives that he had travelled to the Bronx “to pick up beef patties. ”  Defendant told the detectives that the trip to New York to purchase the patties was worthwhile because they were “cheaper … in New York. ”  The detective’s questions “agitated” defendant and defendant’s answers did not make financial sense to the detective.  Defendant offered to show the beef patties to the detective.  Prior to taking defendant up on this offer, the detective requested defendant’s consent to search the vehicle.  Defendant advised that he would grant consent to the search the Audi, “to include any bags, container, trunk and engine compartment. ”  Defendant’s consent was documented on a consent to search form.  During the search of the Audi, conducted by [...] and another detective, cocaine was located under the Audi’s hood.  (1T:115-15 to 123-6; 135-4 to 135-6; 144-10 to 145-7; 147-10 to 152-17; 24-17 to 37-2; 48-22 to 49-9; 53-12 to 53-20; 72-6 to 75-1); Pa25.
[brief] If the jury had evidence that [...] was transmitting Facebook postings from his phone in the minutes immediately before the killing and the half an hour afterwards, it this would have substantially weakened (if not totally rebutted) the State’s theory that he was in Atlantic City, separated from his phone, while some unknown co-conspirator was using his phone to impersonate [...].  However, given the seeming absence of outgoing transmissions from [...]’s phone during the critical hour in which the murder took place, the prosecutor’s theory evidently took hold jurors’ minds.  In sum, counsel’s bungling of the Facebook evidence deprived [...] of proofs that would have strongly supported his alibi.  Had counsel established the foundation and authenticity of the Facebook activity, there is a reasonable probability of a different trial outcome.
[brief] The County’s appraiser stated he considered the value of the property as part of a prospective assemblage with the three contiguous lots, opining the highest and best use as an assemblage would be either town-house or restaurant use, which was less than the un-assembled value.  In contrast, the property owner’s appraiser valued the subject property as if an assemblage of the four lots had already occurred as of the date of taking and opined the highest and best use was to be developed as a 92-unit multifamily project, concluding the fair market value to be $729,000.00.  The Appellate Division stated, “we are persuaded that appraising the value of defendant’s property as if a four-lot assemblage had already taken place as of the date of taking and then based highest and best use on such an assemblage constituted a fundamentally untenable and legally unsupportable approach.