ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Thus, “[a]fter entry of [a foreclosure] judgment interest will run at the legal rate except as otherwise ordered by the court and except as may be otherwise provided by [New Jersey] law. ”  Shadow Lawn Sav. and Loan Ass’n. v. Palmarozza, 190 N.J. Super. 314, 318 (App. Div. 1983) (quoting R. 4:42-11(a)).  See Avatar, 2022 WL 1495919, at *4 (quoting Shadow Lawn).  Indeed, the Supreme Court has recognized that “[i]t has been established practice in New Jersey that after foreclosure, interest runs at the legal rate and not at the rate stated in the bond or mortgage. ”  *Hudson City Sav. Bank v. Hampton Gardens Ltd.*, 88 N.J. 16, 22 (1981) (emphasis added).  Thus, it was an error as a matter of law for [...] to determine that “lawful interest versus contract interest is a distinction that has really no effect at all.
[brief] [...] mostly ignored [...] until early 2017, when the unit began receiving unusual attention.  First, the [...] came to inspect [...]’s apartment and make sure it was up to code.  The City found numerous health and safety code violations, so the apartment failed the first inspection.  DA69.  To get it up to code, [...] had to recalibrate and recoil windows to be up to fire standards, install a carbon monoxide detector, replace a broken smoke alarm, repair the “very old” stove that sometimes worked and sometimes did not, repair the kitchen faucet, and fix a spring in a door.  1T79:11-28.  The city also required new electrical outlets to be installed, a security chain to be placed on the door, and patching of the floor because it was a trip hazard.  5T59-62; 1T79:10-31.  It took about two weeks for [...] to get the apartment up to Hoboken’s safety code.  1T79:11-28.  The next month, [...] sent an appraiser to [...]’s apartment.  The appraiser entered [...]’s apartment and took photos of it, but the reason why this stranger was taking pictures of his living space remained a mystery to [...] until May 2017, when he was served with [...]’s request for a hardship increase in rent, including a hypothetical appraisal of the value of the unit if the landlord could manage to unencumber it of [...].  DA43-44.  [...]’s application for a hardship increase demanded that [...]’s rent be increased from $8,387.00 per year to $42,944 a year.  DA40.  The hardship increase [...] seeks on this unit is more than [...]’s entire income.  DA35.  More than ten nights of hearings were held between September 2017 through June 2021 of 2022.  Much time was spent discussing the minutiae of [...]’s claimed expenses, especially the management fees, condo fees, and purported constitutional right to $28,000 annual profit on the unit, based on [...]’s equity.
[brief] Defendant submits that [...] erred by finding his second PCR petition was time barred.  (Db45-48).  [...] never addressed whether defendant’s second PCR petition was time barred.  The State notes, however, that defendant discovered [...]’ habeas petition as early as April 2017, when defendant referenced its existence in his brief in support of his first PCR petition.  (Pa55).  Rule 3:22-12(a)(2)(B) provides:  Notwithstanding any other provision in this rule, no second or subsequent petition shall be filed more than one year after . . . the date on which the factual predicate for the relief sought was discovered, if that factual predicate could not have been discovered earlier through the exercise of reasonable diligence.  Defendant filed his second PCR petition in January 2022, almost five years after the latest date [...]’ habeas petition was discovered.  Therefore, defendant’s second PCR petition based on [...]’ habeas petition was filed four years out of time.  POINT II
[brief] It is “reasonable to infer” that “those benefits” “induced [[...]] to buy” the Premises as “laid out on the [1925 Plan]. ”  Lennig, 41 N.J. Eq. at 609.  A reasonable purchaser, relying on the 1925 Plan, would understand an oceanfront lot provided direct access to the beach identical to the access 15  Additionally, the oceanfront properties cost more to purchase.  As the [...]’ expert concluded, this was “[u]ndoubtedly because of the unique nature of the lots adjoining Normandy Beach. ” (Da556). provided by the roads abutting the beach.  And as Lennig recognized, access to the beach and ocean from an oceanfront lot is identical to the public access where designated roads abut the property line and the proposed boardwalk, purposefully “calculated to give additional value to the [oceanfront] lots delineated [on the 1925 Plan]; thus [when [...]] conveyed those lots by reference to the map, [it] became bound to the grantees not to use the portions so devoted to the common advantage otherwise than in the manner indicated.
[directive] 10.0.2  County Prosecutor Offices are an important alternative venue for the filing of internal affairs complaints against an officer of any law enforcement agency in their jurisdiction.  Prosecutors must be especially alert to any indication from complainants or the public that the process for receiving and investigating complaints of misconduct is not operating in accordance with the guidelines in this document.  For instance, any indication that a member of the public who attempted to file a complaint was turned away or dissuaded is extremely serious and must be immediately investigated.  10.0.3
[brief] The act that was committed against the defendant’s mother and father this Court finds was too close in time wherein it was a single act that happened so quickly there was no intervening event so therefore those two shootings are to be concurrent to each other.  (17T230-15 to 233-10).  The Miller factors did “not change this Court’s overall decision here today because defendant’s acts were acts of a 16-year old man, not a child, acts of an evil man, ones that caused immeasurable harm to everyone involved. ” (17T233-11 to 19).  Given these findings, the judge ordered count two (first-degree murder of [...]) concurrent to count one (first-degree murder of [...]).
[brief] ”  (Da50).  The court also considered that defendant was forty when he committed this offense.  (Da50).  Finally, the court concluded, “[b]ecause the [d]efendant was not a youthful offender at the time of the [...] robbery and because his record suggests persistent and consistent criminality, much of it violent, the court does not find the Defendant’s argument against the likelihood of recidivism persuasive. ” (Da50-51).  This court must defer to that finding.  See State v. Harris, 466 N.J. Super 502, 553 (App. Div. 2021) (“we generally defer to a sentencing court’s findings of fact…”).  Finally, the court did not impermissibly rely on dismissed charges in its opinion.  The court noted defendant’s record includes seven juvenile adjudications and twenty adult arrests resulting in eight indictable convictions including the two at issue.  Additionally, he has two disorderly persons convictions and a violation of probation.  (Da50).  State v. K.S. does not apply here as it was a case concerning a denied application for Pretrial Intervention.  Defendant argues that the court should not have referred to the circumstances of his 1998 conviction, because he was “only convicted of second-degree robbery under that indictment,” instead of the originally charged carjacking.  Clearly, even if the prohibition in K.S. applied here, this is not dismissed conduct.  Conclusion  For the foregoing reasons and authorities cited in support thereof, the State respectfully requests that this Court affirm defendant’s judgement of conviction in all respects.
[brief] ......................................... | | Medici v. BPR Company, 107 N.J. 1 (1987) ....................................... | 16, 21, 38, 39, 40 | | New Brunswick Tel. v. South Plainfield, 305 N.J. Super. 151 | 12 | | (App. Div. 1997), re-affirmed at 314 N.J. Super. 102 (App. Div. 1998) .... | | New York SMSA Ltd. Partnership v. Board of Adj. of Bernards Tp., | 10, 11 | | 324 N.J.Super. 145 (App.Div, 1999) ............................................... | Northeast Towers, Inc. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment of Borough of West Patterson, 327 N.J. Super. 476, 493-494 (App.Div.2000) ..... 10, 11, 12 Price v. Strategic Capital Partners, 404 N.J. Super. 295 (App. Div. 2008) ........................................... 23, 24, 25, 26 Ten Stary Dom Ptp. v. Mauro, 216 NJ 16, 30 (2013) ............................................. 12 Toll Bros., Inc. v. Burlington County Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 194 N.J. 16, 30 (2013) ................................................................. 13 Tomko v. Vissers, 21 N.J. 226, 238 (1956) ......................................................... 13 Victor Recchia Residential Constr., Inc. v. Zoning Bd., of Adjustment of Cedar Grove, 338 N.J.Super. 242, 253-54, 768 A.2d 803 (App.Div. 2001) ...  24 Weiner v. Zoning Bd. of Adjust. of Glassboro, 144 N.J. Super. 509, 516 (App. Div. 1976)  .................................................................13
[brief] Amended also are sections 8 and 9 of the bill, to eliminate the requirement that both the application for tax exemption and the financial agreement between the urban renewal entity and the municipality be approved by the Division of Local Government Services of the Department of Community Affairs so as to eliminate delays in the implementation of local tax exemption programs.  [Comm. Amendments to S. Cty. & Mun. Gov’t Comm. Statement to S. 291 (L. 1991, c. 431) (emphasis added). ]  In an unpublished case, [...] v. [...], 2019 WL 2323711, Dkt. No. [...] (App. Div. May 31, 2019)⁵, the Appellate ⁵ Pursuant to R. 1:36-3, the unpublished decision is provided at Da383-Da384.  Division considered a challenge to a PILOT adopted pursuant to the LTTEL.  As in this case, plaintiffs challenged the governing body’s legislative findings, alleging that: the City failed to attach the long term tax exemption application to the public’s Agenda Packet; the City failed to obtain a fiscal impact study in support of the [...]’ Acquisition and Rehabilitation PILOT [(payments in lieu of taxes)]; the City failed to create a proper legislative record supporting its mandatory statutory costs/benefits findings; the City failed to make a proper legislative record for its need for additional affordable housing statutory finding; the City accepted less than 10% of the Project's Revenues; the City permitted the former owner to keep all of the “net” sale proceeds; the City failed to quantify the minimum guaranteed payment due [to] the City.
[brief] My Aug. 8, ‘22 Exceptions w/o Exhibits were 15 pages of single line spacing (114a-128a).  My Reconsideration, incl. substantiating Exhibits (162a-226a), addressed and/or refuted Verified Complaint Application, Court Rulings/Discussions about my Exception, [...]’s Aug. 12, 2022 Reply to my Exceptions, Sept. 22nd Hearing, Follow-up Issues to [...]’s Aug. 12th Reply & Sept. 22nd Hearing, and proposed Order to replace Oct. 6th Order.  So, it addressed and/or refuted many issues separate from my Exceptions, and new issues & Court opinions/rulings subsequent to Exceptions.
[brief] On January 12th, 2012, approximately 10:35am a black Buick drove down from Judson Street on Mason Street and stopped at the intersection of Parsonage Road.  Approximately 10:38am, two occupants exited the vehicle wearing hoodies, jeans and gloves.  Approximately 10:39am, he contacted detective [...] and [...].  Approximately 10:43am, detective [...] and [...] arrived into the area.  Approximately 10:44am, detective [...] advised that the Buick was leaving the area turning onto Parsonage Road.
[brief] I, ¶ 1 | 3, 12, 26 | | N.J. Const. art.  I, ¶ 9 | 3, 12, 26 | | N.J. Const. art.  I, ¶ 10 | 3, 12, 26 | | N.J. Const. art.  I, ¶ 12 | 12, 26 | | U.S. Const. amend. V | 3, 12, 26 | | U.S. Const. amend. VI | 3, 12 | | U.S. Const. amend.
[brief] Similarly, the Defendant’s motive for its policies is irrelevant.  Instead, the burden of persuasion shifts to the employer, to prove that even if it had not considered the proscribed factor, the adverse employment action would still have occurred.  Plaintiff asserts that declaring Firefighters ineligible simply because they are perceived to be disabled, or are disabled, directly violates the NJLAD.  [W]hen a plaintiff produces evidence that an employer placed substantial reliance on a proscribed discriminatory factor in making its decision to take the adverse employment action, the burden of persuasion shifts to the --- 2  The NJLAD adopts the analysis applicable to Title VII cases.  “under Title VII, when a policy is “discriminatory on its face,” the defendant's motive is irrelevant.  [T]he absence of a malevolent motive does not convert a facially discriminatory policy into a neutral policy with a discriminatory effect.  Whether an employment practice involves disparate treatment through explicit facial discrimination does not depend on why the employer discriminates but rather on the explicit terms of the discrimination.  (Citations omitted)  Feemster v. BSA Ltd. P'ship, 548 F.3d 1063, 1070 (D.C. Cir. 2008) employer to prove that even if it had not considered the proscribed factor, the employment action would have occurred *McDevitt v. Bill Good Builders, Inc.*, 175 N.J. 519, 527 (2003).  The Plaintiff has asserted a claim of direct facial discrimination against promotionally eligible Firefighters.  The burden therefore shifts to the employer.  [...] has not even asserted that it considered anything but the proscribed factor - the temporary disability of medical leave.  Indeed, the City proudly affirms its acts and position as legitimate in all respects.
[brief] Standard of Review for a Motion for Leave to Amend  An appellate court will not disturb a trial court’s ruling on a motion to amend absent a clear abuse of discretion.  See In re November 2, 2010 Gen. Election for Office of Mayor in Borough of S. Amboy, Middlesex Cty., 423 N.J. Super. 190, 209 (App. Div. 2011).  An abuse of discretion typically arises only where the decision lacks a rational explanation, inexplicably departs from established policies, or rests on an impermissible basis.  Matter of Fernandez, 468 N.J. Super. 377, 391 (App. Div. 2021) (citing Flagg v. Essex Cnty. Prosecutor, 171 N.J. 561, 571 (2002)).  New Jersey’s election statutes are designed to provide an efficient mechanism for bringing a challenge, and to ensure that the parties receive a sufficiently detailed statement of claims to allow for meaningful preparation for trial.  In re November 2, 2010 Gen. Election, 423 N.J. at 209.  Under N.J.S.A. 19:29-5, an election contest proceeds in a manner similar to a civil action, to the extent practicable, and is placed under the control and direction of the court.  The statute expressly authorizes the court to permit amendments to the petition.  Id. (citing In re Keogh-Dwyer, 85 N.J. Super. 188, 202 (App. Div. 1964)).  Accordingly, the trial court retains broad discretion to manage the progression of an election contest, including whether and when to permit amendments.
[brief] Defendant argues in his Point II that the trial judge erred in denying his motion to suppress [...]'s out-of-court identification or, alternatively, in denying his application for a Wade/Henderson hearing because there was no audio, video, or written verbatim account of the showup identification procedure, and based on the limited record, the procedure was impermissibly suggestive.  We conclude the trial judge erred in not conducting a Wade/Henderson hearing on the admissibility of the out-of-court identification.  For that reason, we remand the matter for the required hearing.
[brief] Second, the chosen site had to be large enough to accommodate the proposed Facility.  As explained above, the proposed Facility requires an area of approximately 100 feet-by-85 feet in order to house all of the necessary equipment, including a filter, heater, two regulator runs, associated piping, and control box, as well as provide for the buffering and screening devices explained above.  Third, the Regulator Station should be located in close proximity to the transmission line because the gas delivery system experiences a loss in pressure, and a corresponding dip in efficiency and reliability, when a regulator station is located at a [...]’s Site Analysis considered potential impacts of each possible site from several perspectives: (1) impacts to residential areas; (2) existing environmental conditions; and (3) engineering considerations.
[brief] Likewise, in Maggio v. Migliaccio, 266 N.J. Super. 111, 113 (App.  Div.), certif. denied, 134 N.J. 563 (1993), cited by [...], the co-employees at issue were both responding to the same fire call at the time of the injury.  These cases stand in sharp contrast to the instant matter, in which [...] was not performing any work duties and was not where she was supposed to be for work at the time of the crash.
[brief] **POINT II**  **THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR BY STRIKING THE APPELLANT’S EXCEPTIONS. **  Assuming *arguendo* the Appellant has standing to file exceptions, the trial court carefully reviewed his submission, and determined that the exceptions failed to identify with particularity the item or omission excepted, the modification sought and the stated reasons for the modifications.  In other words, the exceptions did not raise any genuine disputes.  Moreover, the trial court determined that the exceptions were insufficient as a matter of law because they relate to style, concern matters of fiduciary discretion or do not bear on the accounting.  As the trial court correctly noted, an action to settle an account is a formalistic proceeding, unique to probate.  And while “a trial court’s interpretation of the law and legal consequences that flow from established facts are not entitled to any special deference”, *State v. Elders*, 192 N.J. 224, 244 (2007), but given the unique nature of a proceeding to settle an account, and the probate judge’s equitable powers and feel for the case, this court should review the trial court’s determinations only if there is a clear abuse of discretion.  See In Re: Estate of Hope, 390 N.J. Super. 533, 541 (App. Div. 2007).  Here, [...]’s cogent and detailed decision approving the IA is well reasoned and does not rest on a misinterpretation of the law.  As such, this Court should not disturb the Judgment.
[brief] (Pa368).  [...] “never threatened anyone and certainly not [...]. ” (Pa368).  Defendant [...] acknowledged that “emotional injuries that are not accompanied by physical injuries are not covered as a bodily injury” (Pa263).  This proves [...] recklessly disregarded [...]’ rights given that the allegations clearly included bodily injury with physical manifestations.  (Pa263).  See [...] verified complaint ¶49-26.  (Pa11-Pa13).  [...]’s Appeal Panel concluded that (a) the Complaint does not assert an accidental occurrence; (b) Plaintiffs are not alleging acts or omissions that are covered and the policy excludes liability for damages which are “expected or intended”; (c) if liability coverage did exist, it would be limited to compensatory damages; (d) [...] was not promptly notified of the pending lawsuit.
[brief] I.  Substantive Due Process Does Not Require School Districts to Provide Affirmative Notice to Parents About Their Children’s Gender Identity .........................................................................................  7  A.  Because the Original Policies neither compel nor constrain any conduct by students or their parents, there is no violation of parental rights and no constitutional duty to mandate affirmative notice to parents of their children’s gender identity over the students’ objection .........................................................  9  B.  Respecting a student’s request to use a certain name or pronouns does not implicate the rights of parents to direct their children’s medical treatment ...............................................................  16  C.  The State’s overriding interest in protecting the rights of transgender and gender-nonconforming students satisfies any constitutional standard .................................................................  20  II.  Deference to the Agency’s Interpretation of the Law Against Discrimination Is Warranted Because Requiring Parental Notification Regarding a Student’s Gender Identity Would Raise Serious Constitutional Questions That Should Be Avoided .................
[brief] He added more—and some different—details, telling officers that he was in the house when [...] went out to fight [...], that [...] engaged [...] and not the other way around, and that he broke up the fight by saying “[...], get the fuck out of here” although he previously said he did not know the twins’ names.  (11T126-21 to 24, 127-3 to 4, 127-14; Da43).
[brief] ’”  Lombardi, 207 N.J. at 538-39 (quoting Hart v. City of Jersey City, 308 N.J. Super. 487, 498 (App. Div. 1998)).  In this case, [...] presided over the first trial.  During that trial, the court was presented with [...]’s report and her expert testimony regarding same.  After an N.J.R.E. 104 hearing, [...] found her testimony was admissible.  Specifically, the court stated, We had the benefit of hearing [...] on her report and the reasons for what she based her opinion on.  She clearly indicates in her report that cocaine, as she read it and the sentence that I had her read, it clearly indicates that it was in his system.  However, because of the variables and the way this blood draw was kept and preserved by using the wrong purple -- lavender tops could have quickly dissolved the cocaine.  However, she indicates that the BZE is definitely in there and so the report speaks for itself.  She gives an opinion as to how she reached at it.  I'm sure that the defense is going to cross her on that and you're going to bring out the fact that she said that the only conclusion reached is that the BZE was in the collection blood sample, was exposed to cocaine at some point prior to the blood collection which could have been, according to her, 12 to 48 hours.  He got into the hospital two hours after the accident.  Thereafter, the blood draw was obtained.  The State has the burden to prove that the defendant acted recklessly as an element of the offense and, therefore, the jury should have all the actions that may have been taken by the defendant, including the use of cocaine, if she opines that she believed it was, but she can't definitely give an opinion that that, in fact, caused the accident.  The jury is not stupid.  The jury is able to -- I don't think they'll be confused at what happened here and how she makes her opinion.  There is absolutely no confusion in my mind whatsoever and I think this jury will see it as well when explained by [...].  It's an element of the offense and my opinion, as written, allowing the testimony of the cocaine will remain.  [2T48-21 to 50-3]
[brief] And how was [...] to know when even the broker did not know the vans were excluded from coverage.  [...] testified that:  From 2014 to 2019, no one from [...] or [...] ever shared with me the “underwriting guidelines” [that have been submitted in this case] or verbally told me what was in them related to 12 or 15 passenger vans.  Moreover, no one ever told me verbally or in writing that [...] was unwilling to insure 12 or 15 passenger vans for non-owned automobile liability coverage.  So we could not have told any prospective clients, such as [...], who were applying for camp insurance about such an exclusion because we did not know it was a problem for [...].