ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Fifth, and finally, Plaintiff presented no reasonable explanation for their failure to strictly comply with the rules of discovery.  Plaintiff’s explanation for the failure to have the expert report during the discovery period points to nothing more than the fact that the Plaintiff had a difficult case and on-going symptoms allegedly referable to the incident in this case.  However, those reasons do not provide a reasonable explanation.  The discovery period is more than long enough for the expert, working in concert with Plaintiff and Plaintiff’s carrier, to produce a timely expert report.  Indeed, the Plaintiff suggests that if a one-hundred twenty day extension were given, that the report could be produced, without explaining why it could be produced no, but could not have been produced, say, in the two hundred days before the discovery end date.  Moreover, Plaintiff’s counsel failed to provide any explanation other than staffing issues for why he did not move to extend discovery earlier.  “[A] good faith mistake does not satisfy the ‘reasonable explanation’ requirement of the substantial compliance doctrine. ”  State Dep’t of Env’tl. Prot., Bureau of Cty. Env’tl. & Waste Compliance Enf’t v. Mazza & Sons, Inc., 406 N.J. Super. 13, 27-28 (App. Div. 2009).  See, also, Ferreira, 178 N.J. at 153 (attorney inadvertence or counsel’s carelessness do not satisfy the reasonable explanation requirement.); Medina v. Pitta, 442 N.J. Super. 1, 21–22 (App. Div. 2015) (“carelessness, lack of circumspection, or lack of diligence on the part of counsel are not extraordinary circumstances which will excuse missing a filing deadline. ”) Thus, Plaintiff has not provided any explanation for failing to provide the report during the discovery period, nor for why the request to extend discovery was not made during discovery and before the trial date was issued.  As such, the fifth element cannot be met and Defendant asks this Court to find that the doctrine of substantial compliance does not apply in this case.
[brief] 1T42-11 to 1T42-25.  Development on the easterly side of Ocean Terrace isn't unique to this property.  The entire Boardwalk has been fully developed since 1963.  See the aerial photographs at Pa104.  The owner of every parcel on westerly Ocean Terrace could make the Applicant's argument and elevate to 48 feet, 49 feet, 50 feet, etc., at the expense of the neighbor.  And the Applicant would have no reason to build upward in violation of the height restriction, if it did not insist upon seventeen units in violation of the density restriction.
[brief] ............... 4  Zigmont v. Bd. Of Trs. Teachers’ Pension & Annuity Fund, 91 N.J. 580, 583 (1983).  .........................  6  STATUTES CITED N.J.S.A. 43:16A-7(1).  ...........................................  6  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS  April 17, 2019  Initial [...] Letter to [...] . . Aa4 -Aa6 August 30, 2023, Initial Decision of Honorable [...], ALJ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Aa9 -Aa19 October 19, 2023, [...] Upholding the Initial Decision . . . . .  Aa20-Aa21 | Aa Reference | Description | |--------------|-------------| | Aa1-Aa3 | August 21, 2018  Application for Accidental Disability Pension | | AAa4-AAa6 | April 22, 2019, Initial Board Letter to [...] Denying Accidental Disability Pension Granting Ordinary | | Aa7 | April 30, 2019, Letter to the Board Requesting the Matter Be Transferred To The Office of Administrative Law | | Aa8 | June 20, 2019 Pension Letter Transferring The Case to The Office of Administrative Law | | Aa9-AAa19 | August 30, 2023, Initial Decision of Honorable [...], ALJ | | Aa20-AAa21 | October 19, 2023, [...] Upholding the Initial Decision | | Aa22-AAa29 | Notice of Appeal and Civil Case Information Statement filed November 15, 2023 | | Aa30-AAa32 | Job Description / Senior Medical Security Officer | | Aa33-AAa36 | First Report Of Injury Or Illness | INDEX TO TRANSCRIPTS 1T July 30, 2020 testimony of [...] Before Honorable [...], A.L.J. PRELIMINARY STATEMENT If this Court follows the Published Opinions as set forth in Richardson vs. Board of Trustees, Police and Firemen’s Retirement System, 192 N.J. 189 (2007) and Moran v. Board of Trustees, Police and Firemen’s Retirement System, 438 N.J. Super. 346 (App. Div. 2014), [...] will be granted his Accidental Disability Pension benefits because the February 23, 2017 work assault meets the definition of what constitutes an “undesigned and unexpected” event; [...]’s being kicked by an especially combative patient.
[brief] Page  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS, AND RULINGS ...........................................  iii  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ................................................................................ iv  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT .............................................................................  1  PROCEDURAL HISTORY ..................................................................................  4  STATEMENT OF FACTS  ....................................................................................  5  I.  [...] offers its services pursuant to terms containing an arbitration agreement.  .................................................................  5  II.  [...] agreed to [...]’s terms of service.  ...............  8  III.  The trial court enforced [...]’s terms and compelled arbitration.  ......................................................................................  10  LEGAL ARGUMENT ..........................................................................................
[brief] R. Co., 74 N.J. Super. 381, 390 (App. Div. 1962), certif. denied, 38 N.J. 183 (1962).  Furthermore, the issue of a plaintiff’s care for his or her own safety or what degree of observation would be reasonable is generally a matter for the jury’s consideration even when walking into a known danger or in view of a known danger.  Moore, 328 N.J. Super. at 307; see also; Bree v. Jalbert, 87 N.J. Super. 452, 458 (Law Div. 1965), aff’d on other grounds, 91 N.J. upper. 38 (App. Div. 1966); see also; Doherty v. Trenton rust Co., 42 N.J. Super. 398, 403-404 (App. Div. 1956).
[brief] NJDEP regulations define discharger or a responsible party as, among other things, “1.  Any person whose act or omission results or has resulted in a discharge; 2. Each owner or operator of any land, facility, vehicle or vessel from which a discharge has occurred; 3.  Any person who owns or controls any hazardous substance, which is discharged; 4.  Any person who has directly or indirectly caused a discharge; 5.  Any person who has allowed a discharge to occur; or 6.  Any person who brokers, generates or transports the hazardous substance discharged. ”  N.J.A.C. 7:1J-1.4.  (PPCIa015-16).  [...] fits the definition of a responsible party pursuant to categories 1, 3, 4, 5 and 6 above.  [...] drove the truck in such a way that it was slashed open to discharge its contents of oil; [...] owned and/or operated the truck/trailer; [...] owned and/or controlled the oil in the trailer; [...]’s negligent driving slashed open the container discharging its contents; [...] allowed the discharge to continue until the trailer was emptied of its contents; and [...] transported the oil.  (PPCIa015-16).  NJDEP concluded [...] was liable under the Spill Act and issued [...] a Directive.  [...] admitted it was liable for the Incident.  By negligently causing the discharge of oil and failing to comply with the NJDEP Directive, [...] is liable for the cleanup and removal costs that [...] has incurred and will continue to incur in the future to remediate the hazardous substances discharged at the Property.
[brief] Subsection e. states:  The court shall modify the award if: (1) There was a miscalculation of figures or a mistake in the description of any person, thing or property referred to in the award; (2) The umpire has made an award based on a matter not submitted to them and the award may be corrected without affecting the merits of the decision upon the issues submitted; (3) The award is imperfect in a matter of form, not affecting the merits of the controversy; or (4)  The rights of the party applying for the modification were prejudiced by the umpire erroneously applying law to the issues and facts presented for alternative resolution.  [N.J.S.A. 2A:23A-13(e)]  Subsection f. provides the following:  Whenever it appears to the court to which application is made, pursuant to this section, either to vacate or modify the award because the umpire committed prejudicial error in applying applicable law to the issues and facts presented for alternative resolution, the court shall, after vacating or modifying the erroneous determination of the umpire, appropriately set forth the applicable law and arrive at an appropriate determination under the applicable facts determined by the umpire.  The court shall then confirm the award as modified.  [N.J.S.A. 2A:23A-13(f)]
[brief] T. at 24:7-27:7.  The trial court dismissed Count Four of the Complaint as it found that Plaintiffs “failed to establish a violation of their civil rights,” and thus were not entitled to relief under Federal and New Jersey Civil Rights Acts.  T. at 27:10-13.  In their summary judgment motion, Plaintiffs also argued that the Act improperly infringes on an attorney’s First Amendment Rights because it restricts the ability of an attorney to represent certain client and handle certain cases.
[brief] (4T161-24 to 183-9)  Moreover, even if the detective had narrated the videos in an “objective, factual” manner that did not include any improper disputed identifications, her opinion as to the route of the shooter – as expressed in S-96 – would still have been inadmissible because there was no basis for her belief as to the shooter’s path between video cameras, making it both subject to dispute and based upon inferences alone.
[brief] 300  SYLVAN AVE ASSOCIATES, LLC, [...] AND [...] [...]  [...] (Atty. ID: 017692009)  [...] (Atty. ID: 065932013)  [...]  [...]  [...] Tel.: [...] or [...]  [...]  [...]  Attorneys for Defendants-Appellants Of Counsel and On the Brief: [...], Esq.  [...], Esq.  TABLE OF CONTENTS
[brief] Paragraph 31 of the Settlement Agreement reads “Should either [...] [sic] or [...] fail to abide by the terms of this Agreement, the defaulting party shall indemnify the other for all reasonable expenses and costs, including attorney’s fees, incurred in successfully enforcing this Agreement. ”  (A13)  Even in the absence of specific contractual language, *R.* 4:42-9, *R.* 5:3-5, and RPC 1.5(a) provide for an award of counsel fees following an analysis of specific factors.
[brief] By terminating Plaintiff for being absent on October 2, Defendant implies Plaintiff should have come to work on that day.  Requiring employees to work while presenting COVID-19 symptoms clearly frustrates and undermines that public policy.  And even without that implication, Defendant [*7] terminated Plaintiff for adhering to its own COVID-19 mitigation procedures.  That in and of itself offends public policy.  Because the Court finds Plaintiff's allegations fit within the parameters set by the Illinois Supreme Court, the Court rejects Defendant's contention that Plaintiff's theory expands the tort of retaliatory discharge.  There is simply no cognizable difference between complying with the rules and refusing to break them in this instance; Plaintiff's act of remaining home while feverish is equivalent to refusing to work while feverish.  The only difference between this case and Wheeler on this point is that, unlike in Wheeler, Defendant instructed Plaintiff to comply with the applicable rule rather than violate it, so Plaintiff did not have to explicitly refuse to work while feverish.  But that difference in no way undermines the key analogy to Wheeler: both claimants were terminated for their decision to stand by the applicable rules.  Terminating an employee for following the rules is as problematic as terminating an employee for refusing to break them.  At this stage of the proceedings, Plaintiff has adequately alleged a claim for retaliatory discharge.
[directive] 21.  귀하나, 검사, 이 유죄 인정의 일부로 귀하의  변호사 또는 그 외 누군가가 해 준 다른 약속이나 의사표시를 쓰십시오.  모두  List any other promises or representations that have been made by you, the prosecutor, your defense attorney, or anyone else as a part of this plea of guilty:
[brief] CEPA codifies and expands the common law cause of action first enunciated in *Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp.*, 84 N.J. 58 (1980), which “protects at-will employees who have been discharged in violation of a clear mandate of public policy. ”  *Higgins v. Pascack Valley Hospital*, 158 N.J. 404, 417-418 (1999).  Thus, CEPA “establishes a statutory exception to the general rule that an employer may terminate an at-will employee with or without cause.
[brief] 71 F.Supp 2d 387.  Petitioner learned a lot about the law from acting as a pro se plaintiff in the Sutton v. Sutton litigation and eventually, returned to college and was awarded a bachelor’s degree in paralegal studies from [...] in December 2007.  (9T8:9-15).  The petitioner testified that looking back, he could have handled things a lot differently, recognizing that he would have avoided a lot of grief by a lot of people by retaining an attorney instead of trying to pursue his claims on his own.  (9T 8:2-15).  Respondent has not presented any other litigation that Petitioner filed since the Sutton v. Sutton litigation ended over 24 years ago.
[brief] Docket No. [...]  SAT BELOW: [...], J.S.C. PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT'S REPLY  BRIEF [...]  Attorneys for Appellants [...]  [...] [...]  [...], Esq., Attorney ID#013721974  [...], Esq.  Attorney ID#012132001  On the Brief Submission Date: August 1, 2024  TABLE OF CONTENTS  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES...........................................  i.  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT.............................................  1  REPLY BRIEF: POINT I - [...]’S ARGUMENT THAT A MORTGAGE ONCE CANCELLED CANNOT BE REINSTATED IS WITHOUT MERIT.............................................  1 POINT II - APPELLANT’S CLAIMS ARE NOT BARRED BY THE DOCTRINE OF LACHES AS ARGUED BY RESPONDENTS...  3 POINT III- RESPONDENTS’ ARGUMENT THAT APPELLANT TO STATE A CLAIM FOR EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT IS WITHOUT MERIT.......  5 CONCLUSION..............................................................................  8 | Cited | Page# | Cases | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|-------|------------------------| | Wells Fargo Bank v. NJ Prop.Group, 2020 N.J. Super., Unpub., LEXIS 1130; 2020 WL 3124679 ((Pa46).
[brief] [...]:  I also vote yes.  I think [...] said it very well, because those are my concerns, exactly.  I understand that we need to make every reasonable effort to accommodate inherently beneficial use, however, for me, the negatives far outweigh the positives here.  I do also feel that it is way too close to the roadway.  I think there is certainly safety risks, and not to mention property values and I just can't help but feeling if I lived close to that property, my property values would be affected, amongst other things.  [...]:  Thank you.
[brief] “The Uniform Declaratory Judgment Law, N.J.S.A. 2A:16-50, et seq., has been expressly declared to be remedial.  Its purpose is to settle and afford relief from uncertainty and insecurity with respect to rights, status and other legal relations.  It is to be liberally construed and administered. ”  Civil Serv. Comm’n v. Senate of State of N. J., 165 N.J. Super. 144, 148 (App. Div. 1979).  Under the Declaratory Judgment statute,  A person interested under a deed, will, written contract or other writing constituting a contract, or whose rights, status or other legal relations are affected by a statute, municipal ordinance, contract or franchise, may have determined any question of construction or validity arising under the instrument, statute, ordinance, contract or franchise and obtain a declaration of rights, status or other legal relations thereunder.  N.J.S.A. 2A:16-53.  “There are certain fundamental attributes of a declaratory judgment action.  There must be an actual controversy between a plaintiff and a defendant having an interest in opposing a claim.  The action must be adversary in character.  The controversy must be bona fide .  . . .”  *Weir v. Mkt. Transition Facility of New Jersey*, 318 N.J. Super. 436, 442 (App. Div. 1999).  “To maintain such an action, there must be a “justiciable controversy” between adverse parties, and plaintiff must have an interest in the suit. ”  *Chamber of Commerce of U. S. v. State*, 89 N.J. 131, 140 (1982).  Here, based upon the arguments above in the quiet title claims section of this brief, the hierarchical approach is appropriate in this case as it was in *The Protestant Episcopal Church v. Graves*, 83 N.J. 572, 576 (1980) and *Presbyterian Church of the Palisades, Inc. v. Hwang*, Appeal No.: A-3217-19 (App. Div. Nov. 29, 2021).  The law, facts, and argument set forth above in the quiet title claims section of this brief are incorporated herein by reference.  Accordingly, summary judgment as to the Defendant’s declaratory judgment claim was properly entered in favor of Defendant [...] declaring it to be the lawful and rightful owner of the Property.  The Plaintiff’s 2021 deed was also properly declared to be “null, void, and of no legal force or effect” by the trial court.  There was no genuine issue of material fact in dispute for trial.  The trial court’s order dated March 4, 2024 should be affirmed in all respects.
[brief] The Board found the expert’s testimony not credible as to the project’s effect upon traffic.  Although the expert stated there would be no significant impact to traffic, his study also was constrained by a 30 percent margin of error.  The Board further determined that this testimony held little weight and did not show that the traffic problem would be accommodated by the proposal at the site.  The Board found that the expert’s traffic testimony did not account for the impact of the County’s redevelopment and construction of a new VA clinic in the area.  (Pa489)
[brief] a.  The highly objectionable [...] Aff. is littered with critical procedural and substantial deficiencies, and, even it could be properly relied upon (which it cannot), it cannot overcome the dispositive documentary evidence in the record.  As the documentary evidence [...] produced during the course of discovery failed to provide sufficient support for its adverse possession claim as the trial court astutely noted (Pa175-76), perhaps that is why [...] relied upon evidence not in the record to try and save its adverse possession claim, a maneuver the trial court clearly rejected as it cited none of these improper materials in the “Analysis” section of its Statement of Reasons.  (Pa172-76).  Respectfully, the Appellate Division should do the same.
[brief] ”  *Id.* at 613-14.  The Court rejected the State’s argument that *Miranda* warnings did not need to be given because “defendant was viewed as a victim by law enforcement at the time of questioning. ”  *Id.* at 613.  The Court explained that even if detectives “believed defendant was a victim,” the custodial inquiry is not based on “subjective views,” but rather whether “a reasonable person in the defendant’s position would have believed they were free to leave. ”  *Id.* at 613-14.  Our Appellate Division has also suppressed defendants’ statements under similar circumstances.
[brief] ”  *257-261 20th Ave. Realty, LLC v. Roberto*, 477 N.J. Super. 339, 366 (App. Div. 2023) (“We review a motion under Rule 4:50-1 to vacate . . . under an abuse of discretion standard. ”).  “An abuse of discretion occurs when a decision was made without a rational explanation, inexplicitly departed from established policies, or rested on an impermissible basis. ”  *Id.* (internal quotations omitted).  Reversal is only merited when the exercise of discretion was “manifestly unjust. ”  *Id.*  B.
[directive] Our Gun Violence Reduction (GVR) Task Force is built upon four components:  • Agency Liaisons.  Each of New Jersey’s more than 500 state, county, and local law enforcement agencies is required to designate an officer to serve as its “Agency Gun Violence Intelligence Liaison. ”  This officer operates as a single point of contact within their agency for coordinating requests for information and investigative assistance to and from the GVR Task Force.  • County Teams.  Each of the 21 County Prosecutor’s Offices (CPO) is required to designate an Assistant Prosecutor and a law enforcement investigator to serve as its “County Gun Violence Intelligence Team. ”  This pairing is responsible for coordinating requests to and from the local liaisons in their county and for ensuring that any high- priority targets assigned by the GVR Task Force to the CPO are effectively investigated and prosecuted.  • Regional Coordinators.  The GVR Task Force is organized into three regional coordinating teams – North, Central, and South – that work to identify the individuals most responsible for gun violence in a community and then share intelligence in order to build the strongest possible criminal cases against these targets.  The regional teams will be led by an Assistant U.S. Attorney, a Deputy Attorney General in the Division of Criminal Justice, an Assistant Prosecutor, and a superior officer of the New Jersey State Police (NJSP), with the teams physically based in the Real-Time Crime Centers that New Jersey State Police recently established in Newark, Trenton, and Gloucester County.  The three regional teams will coordinate with one another under the supervision of a statewide management team consisting of senior leadership of the U.S. Attorney’s Office, the Attorney General’s Office, the County Prosecutors Association of New Jersey, and NJSP.
[brief] Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate any grounds warranting reversal of the trial court’s dismissal of this action.  For these reasons, it is respectfully requested that this Court deny Plaintiff’s appeal and affirm the trial court’s dismissal of Counts Three and Five as against Defendants [...] and [...] with prejudice.  Respectfully submitted, [...]  Attorneys for Defendants-Respondents, [...] and [...]  By: ________________________________  [...]  Dated: October 5, 2023  [...], Plaintiff, v.  [...], DR. JULIE GLAZER, [...], JANINE SARNO, [...], [...], JOHN DOE ADMINISTRATORS AND STAFF 1-10, AND ABC BOARD  MEMBERS 1-10, said names being fictitious, Defendants.  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE  DIVISION DOCKET NO. [...]
[brief] Da110.  The arbitration occurred over the course of several days on February 7, 8, 10 and 18, 2022. \(^2\)  The arbitrator, Hon. [...] (Ret.) (“Arbitrator”) issued a written Opinion on March 22, 2022 concluding that the Market Value of the Property as of January 27, 1994 under the parameters set by the Trial Court was $2,947,216.00--$95,625.00 for Lot 18, $2,688,556.00 for Lot 19, and $163,035.00 for the Furniture, Fixtures, and Equipment.  Da116.
[brief] “[T]he general right of contribution invokes several liability by intending that the defendant-in-contribution shall pay no more than the party’s percentage of liability. ”  Magic Petroleum, 218 N.J. at 403.  The failure to address such an allocation prior to entering summary judgment was both a factual and legal error by the Court.  (2)  There was also a factual issue as to whether one or more historical spill events at the site may have been at issue – which would not have been the responsibility of [...] (or [...] as [...]’s insurer).  (PPCIa439-40).  Specifically, [...]’s own environmental consultant, [...] (“[...]”) identified a previous spill event.  (PPCIa427-29).  [...] also noted that an unrelated gasoline discharge was located horizontally below the petroleum impact resulting from the Incident – again further indicating at least one prior unremediated spill event.  (PPCIa429; PPCIa439).  To this day, it remains unclear whether and to what extent [...]’s alleged environmental costs include remediation work for prior incidents at the site – which, as matter of common sense and fairness, would not be the responsibility of [...] or [...].