ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Only in exceptional cases should the trial judge's exercise of discretion be reversed.  *State v. Case*, 220 N.J. 49, 65 (2014) (appellate courts afford considerable deference to the sentencing court provided that "the trial judge follows the Code and the basic precepts that channel sentencing discretion").  The sentence must be affirmed if it (a) meets all applicable guidelines; (b) if the judge's reasons for imposing sentence, after weighing all relevant aggravating and mitigating factors, were adequately explained and supported by the record; and, (c) the sentence does not shock the judicial conscience.  *State v. Roth*, 95 N.J. 334, 364-66 (1984).  The court's decision whether to sentence consecutively or concurrently must be guided by the principle that "there can be no free crimes in a system for which the punishment shall fit the crime."
[brief] In the alternative, [...]’s convictions should be reversed for the reasons stated in Points II, III, IV, and V.  Should this Court uphold [...]’s convictions, the matter should be remanded for resentencing for the reasons given in Point VI.  Respectfully submitted, [...]  Public Defender Attorney for Defendant-Appellant BY: ____________________________  [...]  Assistant Deputy Public Defender Attorney ID No. 404382022  Dated: August 16, 2024
[brief] .................................................................................................  53  Leimgruber v. Claridge Assocs., Ltd., 73 N.J. 450 (1977) .................................................................................................  59  Lennig v. Ocean City Ass’n, 41 N.J. Eq. 606 (1886)  .........................................................................................passim Levinson v. Costello, 74 N.J. Super. 539 (App. Div. 1962) ......................................................................37, 38 LoBiondo v. Schwartz, 199 N.J. 62 (2009) .................................................................................................46, 51 MacKay v. CSK Pub. Co., 300 N.J. Super. 599, 616 (App. Div. 1997)
[brief] ” (ECF 63-1, at 1-2.)  [...]’s counsel immediately followed up on July 19, and again on July 23, asking whether [...] produced “EVERYTHING” in Salesforce for the [...] and [...] accounts.  [...]’s counsel responded on July 24 by pointing to [...]’s Second Supplemental Response to RFP No. 4.  (ECF 65-2, at 2-4.)  [...]’s counsel explained that, despite his prior representation that [...] intended to produce all responsive documents [...] could track down, [...] was unable to produce anything further because “we did not have access to Plaintiff’s inbox, so we do not have the individual emails and documents themselves. ”  (Id. at 2.)  Counsel also confirmed “yes, we have produced everything within Salesforce.  No, we are not withholding any responsive documents. ”  (Id.)  *3  In response, [...]’s counsel expressed disbelief at [...]’s suggestion that it had produced everything responsive to RFP No. 4:  Documents responsive to this RFP are probably the most critical documents to this entire case!  And this has nothing to do with [...]’s emails being erased.  SAVVAS is claiming there were specific mistakes made by [...] regarding [...] and [...].  SAVVAS is also claiming the company was slated to lose millions of dollars if a change wasn’t made.  Having complete documents from Sales Force for these accounts goes directly to these issues.  It simply is not credible for SAVVAS to say everything connected to those two accounts is unavailable to the company.  You have produced a total of 6 documents for those accounts for a 5 year period.  There are more documents and they need to be produced.  Those two customers are still customers of SAVVAS and, this being true, SAVVAS would need all the historical documents to continue serving the customers.  As we now know, Account Reps are constantly required to go back to see what orders were made years before to determine licensing, pricing, etc.  [...] used Sales Force at [...] and she uses Sales Force at her current job.  Nothing gets erased from Sales Force.  If [...] is working on an account, she can go back for years (prior to her even working there) to see historical data in Sales Force.  Same was true, and is true, at SAVVAS.  (ECF 65-2, at 1.)
[brief] . . .  The conflict, however, must be actual, not merely potential, speculative, or hypothetical.  *Rice v. Norman Williams Co.*, 458 U.S. 654, 659, 102 S.Ct. 3294, 3299, 73 L.Ed.2d 1042, 1049 (1982). ”  [Emphasis added].  Although the *Feldman* court had before it a question of preemption by federal law, the requirement that there be a real, actual conflict between the enactments of the lower body with those of the superior body remains the essence of the doctrine of preemption.  See, *Overlook Terrace Mgmt. Corp. v. Rent Control Bd.*, 71 N.J. 451, 461 (1976).
[brief] TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ...........................................................................................................iii  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS, AND RULINGS BEING APPEALED .................................................. viii  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT ........................................................................................................1  STATEMENT OF FACTS ..............................................................................................................4  A.  The Parties ............................................................................................................................4  B.  The 1925 Plan of Normandy Beach .....................................................................................5  C.  Historic Use of Implied Easement Access ..........................................................................7  D.  Perpetual Storm Damage Reduction Easements Retained the Right for Property Owners to Construct Dune Walkovers .................................................................8  E.  The [...] Installed an At-Grade Dune Walkover and Defendants Took Adverse Action Months Later .........................................................................................9  PROCEDURAL HISTORY .............................................................................................................14
[brief] On December 1, 2021, a Middlesex County Grand Jury returned a three-count indictment against [...] charging him with the following: (1) Attempted Kidnapping, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:5-1/N.J.S.A. 2C:13-1(b)(2) (“Count I”); (2) Possession of a Weapon for Unlawful Purposes—Imitation Firearm, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4e (“Count II”); and (3) Witness Tampering, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:28-5a (“Count III”).  (28a).  Defense counsel subsequently filed a Motion to Sever Count III from the remainder of the Indictment on December 14, 2021.  The Parties appeared before the Honorable [...], J.S.C., on February 17, 2023 and March 17, 2023 to be heard on this motion.  (1T;2T).¹  The trial court ultimately denied the Defense’s motion.  (27a).  The Honorable [...], J.S.C., presided over the three-day trial in this matter occurring on June 9th, June 12th, and June 13th, 2021.  (3T;4T;5T).  The jury returned a verdict on June 14, 2021 finding [...] guilty on Count I (Attempted Kidnapping) and Count II (Possession of Imitation Firearm for Unlawful Purpose), and not guilty on Count III (Witness Tampering).  (6T).  On October 5, 2023, the trial court sentenced [...] to eight (8) years’ incarceration, subject to an 85% parole disqualifier under the No Early Release Act (“NERA”).  (8T21:22-22:3).  The [...] filed a Notice of Appeal in this matter on January 23, 2024, along with a Motion to File a Notice of Appeal as ¹ 1T—Transcript of Proceedings on February 17, 2023 before the Honorable [...], JSC. 2T—Transcript of Proceeding on March 17, 2023 before the Honorable [...], J.S.C. 3T—Transcript of Proceeding on June 9, 2023 before the Honorable [...], J.S.C. 4T—Transcript of Proceeding on June 12, 2023 before the Honorable [...], J.S.C. 5T—Transcript of Proceeding on June 13, 2023 before the Honorable [...], J.S.C. 6T—Transcript of Proceeding on June 14, 2023 before the Honorable [...]., J.S.C. 7T—Transcript of Proceedings on September 25, 2023 before the Honorable [...], J.S.C. 8T—Transcript of Proceeding on October 5, 2023 before the Honorable [...], J.S.C. Within Time.  (1a-12a).  Undersigned counsel subsequently entered their appearance in this appeal on June 19, 2024.  **STATEMENT OF FACTS**
[brief] Defendants allege that the Property satisfied the “untenantable” criteria in Subsection 5(b) because occupancy of the building on the Property was not possible while the LSRP needed to dig up the slab under the building.  (Db40).  The trial court found that Defendants’ argument that the Property was untenantable was not supported by substantial evidence, saying “although the board planner testified that there was a basis for issuance of [a] summons for failure to maintain the property, the code enforcement officer had not [issued a summons]…
[brief] (Da21 and Da80 Appendix B, Exhibit B1).  See also, Pa416-429.  A crosswalk was located in the center of the parking lot approximately equidistant between the east/west lot extremities.  This minimizes the greatest distance pedestrians in the employee parking area must walk within drive aisles between their parked vehicle and the nearest marked crosswalk (150").  (Da21 and Da80 Appendix B, Exhibit B1).
[brief] Additionally, none of the hypotheticals advanced by Appellants undermine the Legislature’s legitimate government purpose in regulating the business of debt adjusting in New Jersey.  First, Appellants incorrectly assert that only newly-admitted attorneys are permitted to provide debt adjusting services.  (Ab29).  Appellants do not cite to any authority for this interpretation and only rely on a layperson opinion of the Department employee – [...].  (Ibid.).  In fact, contrary to the Appellants’ assertion, the DACCA Attorney Safe Harbor is not depended on an attorney’s experience.  N.J.S.A. 17:16G-1(c)(2).  Second, Appellants make the puzzling claim that DACCA applies to attorneys “even if they do excellent work. ” (Ab29).  However, the quality of provided services is irrelevant for purposes of the DACCA’s application—the only question is whether the debt-adjustment services are incidental to the attorney’s practice.  Moreover, that the Legislature could have enacted a different Attorney Safe Harbor provision that exempted competent lawyers, does not mean that the Legislature lacked a legitimate governmental purpose to enact the Attorney Safe Harbor in its present form.  Finally, Appellants incorrectly argue that the DACCA “would even prohibit bankruptcy attorneys, a common type of specialized legal practice, from being principally engaged in the performance of such services. ” (Ab29).  To the contrary, the DACCA does not apply to any litigation field in state or federal courts because, once litigation is filed, attorneys are governed by the applicable rules of court.  Bankruptcy work in particular does not trigger the DACCA because the bankruptcy process is governed entirely by federal law and is regulated by the federal courts.  By local rule, the conduct of attorneys practicing in the District of New Jersey is governed by the "Rules of Professional Conduct of the American Bar Association as revised by the New Jersey Supreme Court .  . . , subject to such modifications as may be required or permitted by Federal statute, regulation, court rule or decision of law."  Local Civil Rule 103.1(a); see also Local Bankruptcy Rule 9010-1; see also In re Boy Scouts of Am., 35 F.4th 149, 159-60 (3d Cir. 2022) ("The conduct of attorneys practicing bankruptcy is governed by the Bankruptcy Code and the local rules of the court.").  Likewise, bankruptcy debtors are protected from predatory practices of creditors by the bankruptcy trustee and the automatic stay provision of the Bankruptcy Code.  11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(6).  Therefore, because the Legislature had a legitimate governmental purpose to create the DACCA and the Attorney Safe Harbor to protect consumers from frauds and abuses, and that legitimate governmental purpose has been upheld by the courts, DACCA meets the first prong of the separation-of-powers test.
[brief] (c)  [[...]] shall not be required to defend any legal proceeding which may be instituted against it with respect to the Escrowed Funds, the Real Property or the subject matter of this Agreement unless requested to do so by [Plaintiff] or [the] Seller and unless [[...]] is indemnified to its satisfaction against the cost and expense of such defense.  [[...]] shall not be required to institute legal proceedings of any kind and shall have no responsibility for the genuineness or validity of any document or other item deposited with it or the collectability of any check delivered in connection with this Agreement.  [[...]] shall be fully protected in acting in accordance with any written instructions given to it hereunder and believed by it to have been signed by the proper parties.  (Pa118-119 (emphases added)).  The PSA also contained an Article VI regarding “Title and Survey Matters” which provided as follows:
[brief] Respectfully submitted, [...]  Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant /s/ [...]  Date: October 4, 2024  [...] experience in private practice,” Siegelstein, 464 N.J. Super. at 408, which is distinguishable from the judge’s ascertainment of rates attorneys charge in other cases before that same judge in the same community.  Indeed, consideration of attorney billing rates in the community is what step two is.  Rendine, 141 N.J. at 337.  WOODBRIDGE  NJ HOLDINGS LLC, Plaintiff-Respondent-Cross-Appellant, vs. WHIBY 13  WOODBRIDGE LLC, Defendant-Appellant-Cross-Respondent.
[directive] Entered into Live Scan.  As noted in Section 2.2, the automated pretrial risk-assessment process cannot be initiated until the defendant has been fingerprinted by the Live Scan system.  That system requires the arresting officer to indicate the present offense(s), and that designation of offense(s) is then used in the automated pretrial risk-assessment process to determine, for example, whether a new violent criminal activity flag should be raised.  There may be cases where the complaint- summons or complaint-warrant that is actually filed charges one or more offenses that are different from the offense(s) that had been entered initially as part of the Live Scan Page 32 fingerprinting process.  For example, a prosecutor or designated supervisory officer approving the charges pursuant to Section 3.2 may decide to downgrade the offense for which defendant was arrested (e.g., downgrade possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance to simple possession; downgrade an aggravated assault to simple assault; downgrade second-degree burglary to third-degree burglary, etc.), or may decide not to charge all, or any, of the offenses proposed by the arresting officer (e.g., where the prosecutor or supervisory officer approves a charge for the underlying crime for which the defendant was arrested but does not approve filing a complaint charging obstruction of administration of law or resisting arrest).  Conversely, the prosecutor or supervisory officer may decide to upgrade the offense of arrest or add additional charges (e.g., supplement a third-degree drug distribution offense with a second-degree public park zone drug distribution offense; charge second-degree burglary instead of third-degree burglary; charge robbery in addition to theft or burglary, etc.).  In that event, when feasible, a new automated pretrial risk assessment should be run based on the actual offense(s) to be charged by a complaint-summons or complaint-warrant.  If for any reason it is not feasible to initiate a new automated pretrial risk assessment and the decision is made to apply for a complaint-warrant, the court or judicial officer to whom the application for a complaint-warrant is made shall be advised that the initial automated PSA was based on different offense(s) than the offense(s) for which a complaint-warrant is being sought.  Furthermore, if either a complaint-summons or complaint-warrant is issued for a different offense(s), or different degree of offense(s), than the offense(s) that had been entered into the Live Scan system at the time of fingerprinting, or if the decision is made not to charge any offense falling within the scope of this Directive, the agency making the arrest shall as soon as practicable contact the [...] to make certain that the CCH system accurately reflects charges that were actually filed.  4.3
[brief] (Pa82-83).  These postcards included notice of the enactment of L. 2019, c. 157, how to file for Accidental Disability Retirement Benefits under the new law, the deadline for filing for such benefits, and the ramifications for missing the deadline.  (Pa84).  A postcard with this information was sent to --- 4  Also available at: https://www.nj.gov/treasury/pensions/ricci-ch157.shtml.  (Pa10).  [...]’s home address on August 9, 2019.  (Pa14; Pa84).  On June 10, 2021, the Division posted a news item on its website advising members that the statutory eligibility period to register under the Ricci Act was expiring soon and that members must submit the Eligibility Registration Form by July 8, 2021.
[directive] If you determine that criminal charges should be brought, you will return an indictment.  An indictment is simply a formal writing prepared on behalf of the State of New Jersey setting forth the name of the defendant, the alleged criminal conduct, and specifying the Grand Jury Standards  Promulgated by Directive #23-06 (December 22, 2006)  Page 10 of 18 criminal statute or statutes of this State allegedly violated by that conduct.  The Grand Jury is an independent legal institution.
[brief] Thus, it was critical for the State to convince the jury that [...] wrote the damning letters that [...] claimed [...] had given him.  The letters were critical to the State’s case.  The State, however, did not introduce samples of [...]’s handwriting or retain a handwriting expert.  Rather, the prosecutor suggested that the Miranda Waiver form on which [...] printed his name was a sufficient sample of [...]’s handwriting, and urged the jury to compare it with the handwriting in the letters.  During his cross-examination of [...], the prosecutor asked a series of questions designed to suggest that the “A’s and R’s” [...] wrote when he printed his name on the Miranda Waiver form were similar to the A’s and R’s in the unsigned letters that [...] claimed [...] wrote:
[brief] Based upon the granting of the adjournments, Your Honor dismissed Plaintiff’s complaint as moot.  Plaintiff now seeks relief from the Court, after his complaint was dismissed as moot, seeking to file an Amended Complaint to raise additional claims of racial bias and civil rights violations in connection with the Sheriff’s Office’s original denial of his request for statutory adjournments.  The Defendants’ objection to the current motion is the same as it was to Plaintiff’s initial filing, that being, that Plaintiff received the relief sought in his original complaint.  When the Defendants granted Plaintiff his two (2) statutory adjournments to the Sheriff’s sale on his property, all claim that Plaintiff had against the Defendants were extinguished.
[brief] In Fitch v. State, 36 S.W. 584, 584 (Tex. Crim. 1896), a Texas court held that it was error for the court not to instruct the jury that it was required to determine whether a “stick of wood or piece of rail,” which was three or four feet long and weighed three or four pounds, was a “deadly weapon. ”  Ibid.  The court reversed the defendant’s conviction due to the failure to present to the jury the questions of whether the weapon was a deadly weapon and whether its use evinced an intent to kill.  Ibid.  See also Pannill v. Commonwealth, 38 S.E.2d 457, 462 (Va. 1946) (“Generally, unless a weapon is per se a deadly one, the jury should determine whether it, and the manner of its use, places it in that category, and the burden of showing these things is upon the Commonwealth.
[brief] The defendant contends prior counsel was ineffective for purportedly failing to effectively counter the State’s ballistics’ expert.  (Db40).  This argument is entirely without merit.  Defendant posits that prior counsel’s decision to not cross-examine the State’s expert nor call an expert of its own is akin to counsel’s decision to not present mitigating evidence at sentencing, held by the Supreme Court as mandating post-conviction relief in Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 396 (2000), and in Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 521–22 (2003).
[brief] ”  See 2018 Op. at *22-23.  Specifically, this Court affirmed the Trial Court’s determination that [...] had engaged in racketeering conduct in violation of NJRICO – N.J.S.A. 2C-41-2(c) and (d) – by having committed “the predicate acts of theft by unlawful taking, N.J.S.A. 2C:20-3; theft by failing to make the required disposition of property, N.J.S.A. 2C:20-9; misapplication of entrusted property, N.J.S.A. 2C:21-15; theft by deception, N.J.S.A. 2C:20-4; falsification or tampering with records, N.J.S.A. 2C:21-4; and mail and wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343.
[directive] Statute Charge Description  Degree  Bail Range 10%  Cash Bail Option  Actor commits, attempts to commit, conspires with another to commit, or threatens the immediate commission of an offense specified in Chapters 11 through 18 of Title 2C of the New Jersey Statutes; 2C:33-4; 2C:39-3; 2C:39-4 or 2C:39-5, (1)
[brief] PLAINTIFF  STILL SUFFERS FROM THE ADVERSE CONSEQUENCES CAUSED BY THE PRIOR PROCEEDING; CIVIL RIGHTS IS A MATTER OF PUBLIC INTEREST; DEFENDANTS MISREPRESENT THE RELIEF SOUGHT IN THE COMPLAINT PURSUANT TO R. 4:69 AND N.J.S.A. 10:6-1-2 WITH RELIEF SOUGHT BY PLAINTIFFS MOTIONS PURSUANT TO R. 4:69-3 and N.J.S.A. 2A:17-36; DEFENDANT'S CHANGE IN CONDUCT DID NOT MOOT THE CIVIL RIGHTS CLAIMS; THE CHANCERY DIVISION ORDER DOES NOT ADDRESS PLAINTIFFS MOTIONS; APPELLANT'S CASE IS NOT MOOT BECAUSE IT IMPLICATES HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO BE FREE FROM DISCRIMINATION; TO EQUAL PROTECTION AND NJLAD RIGHT TO BE FREE FROM HARRASMENT AND N.J.S.A. 2A:17-36 RIGHT TO ADJOURNMENT UPON REQUEST; PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY'S FEES AS THE PREVAILING PARTY ON HIS CIVIL RIGHTS CLAIM
[brief] Similarly, [...] had control over [...] and was complicit in ousting Plaintiff.  2T135:1-138:8.  [...] was employed by [...] to engage in business development, despite acquiring no clients.  2T130:9-10; 2T170:8-19.  Although [...] brought no value to [...], [...] benefited from [...] through repaying his personal credit card debt via company funds.  (Aa28); 2T132:9-133:15.  [...] was the only one with access to said accounts, despite initially denying the same.  2T205:20-206:12.  2T205:12-206:12.  Despite this testimony, the Trial Court still found that [...] did not have access to these accounts.  (Aa47).  The evidence on the Trial Court’s record of [...]’s conduct and his personal credit card debt repaid by [...] directly contradicts the Trial Court’s decision finding no personal liability.  [...], like [...], was complicit in [...]’ ouster of Plaintiff and did not question [...]’ expulsion of Plaintiff.