ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The Certificate Of Insurance  Confirming [...]’s [...] Coverage  Upon [...]’s enrollment, [...] issued a Certificate of Insurance to [...] at its address of “[...],” confirming [...]’s status as a “Named Insured” under the [...] policies.  (Dta951.)  The effective date of [...]’s coverage on the [...] policies set forth on [...]’s certificate is August 3, 2015.  (Dta951.)  The certificate also confirms [...]’s separate workers compensation policy with [...].  (Dta951.)  ([...]’s designated corporate representative testified: “[If] you’re enrolled in the Work Comp, you’re enrolled in the GL [general liability] policy” scheme, and that once enrolled, a subcontractor “becomes an insured of [...]. ”  (Dta837,839,842, [...] dep. T29-21 to 30-2; T36-10 to 37-8; T52-5 to -8).)  The certificate affirmatively states:  THIS IS TO CERTIFY THAT THE POLICIES OF INSURANCE LISTED BELOW HAVE BEEN ISSUED TO THE INSURED NAMED ABOVE [[...]]  FOR THE POLICY PERIOD INDICATED, NOTWITHSTANDING ANY REQUIREMENT, TERM OR CONDITION OF ANY CONTRACT OR OTHER DOCUMENT WITH RESPECT TO WHICH THIS CERTIFICATE MAY BE ISSUED OR MAY PERTAIN.  THE INSURANCE AFFORDED BY THE POLICIES DESCRIBED HEREIN IS SUBJECT TO ALL THE TERMS, EXCLUSIONS AND CONDITIONS OF SUCH POLICIES.  (Dta951(emphasis supplied). )
[brief] The court began its analysis by noting the following:  But if [...]’s position is sound, assuming the relevancy of Coverage B, and this would be the logical extension of the trial judge’s reasoning, an injured minor knowingly employed ‘in violation of law’ would be denied protection of statutorily mandated insurance coverage under a policy such as the one herein involved.  We cannot suppose that the Legislature ever intended such a result.  [Id. at 17.]
[brief] As [...]’s civil engineer, [...], the Board’s own engineer, and the Borough’s own professional planner, [...], all agreed, the regrading of the Property did not constitute “mounding” and the purpose of increasing the grade elevations throughout the site was driven by the overall site design and stormwater management elements – particularly the underground stormwater management system (coupled with the seasonal high water table).  Further, the revised grade where the residential dwellings were proposed did not exceed the existing elevation of 18 feet in the center of the Property where the existing home is located.  Thus, the Property was essentially flattened out as opposed to creating a “mound. ”  There was no credible evidence presented to contradict the expert testimony of [...]’s civil engineer or the Board professionals.  The trial court also took an extra step to carefully analyze, under a *de novo* standard, the meaning of the word “designed” in the Building Height Definition based upon arguments raised by Plaintiffs to the trial court.
[brief] In order to discourage conventional strip commercial development, the number of retail tenants per site shall be limited to a maximum of three.  (4)  A twenty-five-foot-wide landscaped strip consisting of flowering and ornamental trees, plants and shrubs shall be provided along the street corridor in order to enhance the visual environment and depart from the typical image of strip commercial development.  (5)  Cross-access easements among adjacent properties are encouraged to assist in traffic flow and minimize conflicting turning movements along [...].  All other portions of this Section shall remain unchanged.  SECTION 20.
[brief] The Arbitrator’s award of 40% of the Company’s legal fees was not attorney-fee shifting and did not implicate the “American rule. ”  The error in the trial court’s refusal to confirm the 40% legal fee award also results from [...]’s mischaracterization of the award—which the court adopted— as impermissible attorney fee shifting between litigants implicating the “American rule. ”  But the award was nothing of the sort.  The Individual Plaintiffs were adverse to [...] and the Company during Phase I, and the award involved [...] reimbursing the Company for legal fees he caused it to expend fighting the Individual Plaintiffs for his own personal benefit, against the Company’s interests.  No fees were shifted from one side of the “v.” to another, and the decision has nothing to do with the “American rule” that litigants bear their own attorneys’ fees.
[directive] Re-Activation When Actual Law Enforcement Force is Authorized.  Notwithstanding any other provision of this Policy, in any instance where a BWC was de-activated pursuant to Sections 6.1, 6.2, 6.5, 6.6, or any other provision of this Policy, or de-activated pursuant to any policy, standing operating procedure, directive, or order issued by a department, if the circumstances develop so that an officer is authorized to use force, the BWC shall be re- activated as soon as it is safe and practicable to do so.  BODY WORN CAMERA POLICY | May 2021 14  7
[brief] "The mission of the Confrontation Clause is to advance a practical concern for the accuracy of the truth-determining process in criminal trials by assuring that "the trier of fact [has] a satisfactory basis for evaluating the truth of the prior statement."  Favre v. Henderson, 464 F.2d 359, 364 (5th Cir. 1972) (quoting California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 161 (1970)).  For this reason, it has been recognized that so-called "inferential hearsay" may be every bit as violative of the right to confrontation as an express assertion of fact.
[brief] However, Defendant has misstated the PSA’s language, incorrectly defined the role of estoppel certificates, mischaracterized the trial court decision and reasoning, and from this complex of distorted facts and principles attempted to piece together an interpretation at odds with the plain unambiguous language of the PSA.  Defendant’s view is logically flawed when viewed from the perspective of how it would operate if given effect.  If Defendant’s interpretation were correct Plaintiff, although having received an estoppel showing a landlord default, would have to appear at a closing table just to wait in the hoped for production by Defendant of an acceptable estoppel certificate.  Such an outcome eviscerates the purpose of requiring prompt delivery.  Succinctly, an estoppel certificate request was to be made, good faith efforts used to obtain it, if obtained promptly deliver it to Plaintiff and if it revealed a default, as it did, it was not an acceptable estoppel certificate relieving Plaintiff of any need to close and triggered Plaintiff’s only remedy – terminate the PSA.  That is precisely how the trial court viewed it, and what happened.  Accordingly, based on the arguments made, and to be made, and the authorities cited, Plaintiff respectfully requests the decision be affirmed.
[brief] ”  ---  6  [...] repeatedly attempts to distinguish cases involving the NJFPA as “not relevant. ”  That brazenly ignores the MBPA requirement to consider NJFPA precedent when interpreting and enforcing the MBPA.  N.J.S.A. § 33:1-93.15(e).  7  In fact, the *Winer* court vitiated a franchise agreement’s choice-of-law provision and utilized the law of the franchisee’s home state despite “little difference between
[brief] **Inadequate safeguards**  The safeguards that the Board Defendants point to in their policies cannot realistically prevent these harms.  The Board Defendants assert that gender non-conforming students will be safe because the Mandatory Notification Policies preserve confidentiality when “documented” ([...]) or “credible” ([...]) evidence exists, or when “there is reason to believe” ([...]), that physical or emotional harm will result from parental notification.  Tr. Ct. Op. at 3–6 (describing policies) (Da121–24); [...]/[...] Db31–32.  But these exceptions depend on students to predict accurately when disclosure to their parents might cause harm, to amass some sort of evidence of this risk, and to share such evidence with school personnel.  Any break in this fragile chain will defeat the exception and place the student in harm’s way.  Additionally, this safeguard comes into play only for students who persevere and ask their school to help them socially transition.  These policies will deter some gender-nonconforming students from coming out in the first instance.  The exception cannot remedy any harms to these students.  c.  **The failed justification for the district policies**
[directive] Revised Form Promulgated by Directive #01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 10080 page 4 of 5  8.  Surcharge Penalty for Certain Sex Offenses  Do you understand that if you are pleading guilty to the crime of aggravated sexual assault, [Yes] [No] sexual assault, aggravated criminal sexual contact or criminal sexual contact and the offense occurred on or after July 1, 2002, the court shall impose a fine of $100?  9.  Sex Offender Supervision Fund Penalty  Do you understand that if the offense was committed on or after July 1, 2014, as a result of [Yes] [No] your guilty plea you may be required to pay a Sex Offender Supervision Penalty of $30 per month?
[brief] ”  *Id.* at 21-22.  Nevertheless, the Supreme Court agreed with the Northern District of Illinois that an “expert’s estimates of the ranges of different cell towers were unreliable because they were based solely on the expert's training and experience. ”  *Id.* at 24 (citing *United States v. Evans*, 892 F. Supp. 2d 949, 956 (N.D. Ill. 2012)).  This is because “[e]stimating the coverage area of radio frequency waves [of a cell tower] requires more than just training and experience, . . . it requires scientific calculations that take into account factors that can affect coverage.
[brief] ”  N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:53A-50(c). providing him with food or drink. ”  *Id.*  The refusal to give a *get*, the flyer declares, “[i]s [d]omestic [a]buse” and encourages the reader to “help us convince [Plaintiff] to unchain [his ex-wife]!”  *Id.*  These allegations clearly implicate Defendants’ protected speech, press, and associational rights.
[brief] NJCRA NJCRA FEDERAL STATUTES 42 USC 1983 NEW JERSEY CONSTITUTION Art 1 para 1 Art. I, ¶ 7 Article 1 para 18 Article 1 para 5 Article 1 para 22 UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 4TH Amendment 14th Amendment APPENDIX INDEX Complaint and Jury 02/14/2022 (Exhibit A)
[brief] For all the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully requested that the Order of the lower court denying Defendant’s motion to suppress the motor vehicle stop, be reversed and the matter be returned to the lower court for further action.  Respectfully submitted, [...], Esq.  A Member of the Firm Attorney ID No. 01708-1987  Of Counsel and On the Brief [...], Esq.  A Member of the Firm Attorney ID No. 01668-2010  On the Brief Superior Court of New Jersey  APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. [...]  CRIMINAL ACTION  STATE OF NEW JERSEY, : Plaintiff-Respondent, : v. : [...] : Defendant-Appellant.
[brief] [...] further found that despite what had occurred at the residence, [...], was alert and engaged during the entire interview.  To that end, the court found it “significant” that [...], only allowed his emotions to come to the surface when defendant was out of the interrogation room on a bathroom break.  It was only when he was alone that [...], was seen crying.  Moreover, the judge noted that [...], was depicted on the video “immediately” putting that emotion to the side when the defendant re-entered the room.  At that time, the court found that [...], returned to being a support for the defendant.
[brief] I.  RESPONDENT’S UNTIMELY AND IMPROPER AMENDMENT WAS CORRECTLY PRECLUDED BY THE TRIAL COURT  Respondent repeatedly attempted to expand and reshape his claims in the days leading up to trial.  On April 3, 2025, he filed his first Amended Answer and Cross-Petition.  Just five days later, on April 8, 2025 – after Petitioner-Appellant had already responded to the first amended filing – Respondent submitted a Second Amended Answer and Cross-Petition.  Then, on April 11, 2025, just one business day before trial, he moved for leave to file a Third Amended Answer and Cross-Petition, seeking to introduce an entirely new issue that had not been raised in any pleadings before the court.  During trial, the court allowed Respondent’s Second Amended Answer but appropriately denied his third.  A.
[brief] \(^5\)  For the avoidance of confusion, or distortion by [...], the Award states that “the [EGP] figures moved at times and in some instances because [[...]], in good faith, realized that a credit might be due back. ”  *I find this to be the case with the [...].*  Award at 7 (emphasis added).  In other words, the Arbitrator found that a credit was indeed due back to [...] on the [...].  $0.00 on the [...], thus offsetting [...]’s entire EGP award (despite the express terms of the PTA) with “credit” given to [...]’s Hackensack EGP-offsetting Counterclaim.  Pa575.  On February 1, 2024, [...] launched its campaign to avoid paying the $4 million judgment, first with a Motion to Modify the Award.
[directive] How are new COVID-19 positive persons added to my municipal CAD system?  Every day, County LINCS Agencies submit a list of names and addresses of persons who have tested positive for COVID-19 to their CPO.  The CPO then shares this information with the Chief Law Enforcement Executive (LEE) in the municipality where the COVID-19 positive person resides.  A single point of contact (POC) designated by the Chief LEE then enters a flag in the CAD system.  Q:
[brief] Pursuant to the Municipal Land Use Law, The testimony of all witnesses relating to an application for development shall be taken under oath or affirmation by the presiding officer, and the right of cross-examination shall be permitted to all interested parties through their attorneys, if represented, or directly, if not represented, subject to the discretion of the presiding officer and to reasonable limitations as to time and number of witnesses.  [N.J.S.A. § 40:55D-10(d) (emphasis added)].  The New Jersey Supreme Court has opined on this statute, explicitly finding that “[w]ith respect to most zoning and land use applications, the MLUL ‘requires public hearings[] [and] an opportunity for the public to be heard. ’”  *Twp. of Stafford v. Stafford Twp. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment*, 154 N.J. 62, 70 (1998) (citing *Township of Berkeley Heights v. Board of Adjustment*, 144 N.J. Super. 291, 300 (Law Div.1976)).  As such, a board must provide objectors a fair opportunity to address all issues in an application.
[brief] e., disabled within the meaning of the LAD); (2) he was qualified to perform the essential functions of the job; (3) he was terminated or otherwise suffered an adverse employment action because of his disability; and (4) that the employer thereafter sought similarly qualified individuals for that job.  See Victor v. State, 203 N.J. 383, 409 (2010); Victor, 401 N.J. Super. at 614-615 (citing, Jones v. Sch. Dist., 198 F.3d 403, 411 (3d Cir.1999)); Clowes v. Terminix Int’l, Inc., 109 N.J. 575, 597 (1988).
[directive] AVISO:  Este é um documento público, o que significa que o documento tal como apresentado estará disponível ao público mediante solicitação.  Portanto, não inclua dados de identificação pessoal, tais como número de Social Security, número da carteira de motorista, número da placa do veículo, número da apólice de seguro, número de conta financeira ativa ou número de cartão de crédito ativo.  NOTICE:
[brief] [Internal citations omitted by me]  A subjective opinion that I had a strong odor of alcohol is not proof beyond a reasonable doubt.  Emphasis on "proof".  A subjective opinion that my eyes were red at 2am without knowing my eyes in general is not proof beyond a reasonable doubt.  Emphasis on "proof".  The fact that I was chewing gum is not “proof” beyond a reasonable doubt.  This is comical to state.  The fact that I admitted to consumming one beer without context of the size of the beer and when I consumed it is not probable cause.  There is nothing illegal or unreasonable about a grown adult going out and drinking one alcoholic beverage.  So many people go out to dinner and have a glass of wine or a beer or a mixed drink.  State v. Basil, 202 N.J. 570, 585 (N.J. 2010) ("In determining whether there was probable cause to make an arrest, a court must look to the totality of the circumstances, ...and view those circumstances "from the standpoint of an objectively reasonable police officer," [Internal citations omitted by me]
[brief] The colloquy between the court and the defendant will test the defendant’s understanding of the implications of the waiver, and will provide appellate courts with an objective basis for review. ”  Crisafi, 128 N.J. at 510.  “Caselaw makes clear that the goal of the colloquy is not to ascertain whether a defendant possess technical legal knowledge. ”  Outland, 245 N.J. at 506.  A defendant who has “an uncounseled conviction without waiver of the right of counsel is invalid for the purpose of increasing a defendant’s loss of liberty. ”  State v. Laurick, 120 N.J. 1, 16 (1990) (emphasis added).  Relief under Laurick is only applicable to “case[s] of repeat DWI convictions based on uncounseled prior convictions, the actual period of incarceration imposed may not exceed that for any counseled DWI convictions. ”  Ibid.  “Laurick created a special form of PCR that does not vacate the conviction, as in traditional PCR, but simply prevents the use of an uncounseled and unreliable DWI conviction to enhance a subsequent sentence.
[brief] “The essential purpose of the standing doctrine in New Jersey is to: Assure that the invocation and exercise of judicial power in a given case are appropriate.  Further, the relationship of plaintiffs to the subject matter of the litigation and to other parties must be such to generate confidence in the ability of the judicial process to get to the truth of the matter and in the integrity and soundness of the final adjudication.  Also, the standing doctrine serves to fulfill the paramount judicial responsibility of a court to seek just and expeditious determinations on the ultimate merits of deserving controversies.  *N.J. State Chamber of Commerce v. N.J. Election law Enforcement Comm’n*, 82 N.J. 57, 69 (1980).  “As a corollary…our courts will not ‘entertain proceedings by plaintiffs who are mere intermeddlers or are merely interlopers or strangers to the dispute. ’”  *Ridgewood Educ. Ass’n v. Ridgewood Bd. of Educ.*, 284 N.J. Super. 427, 432 (App.Div.1995).
[brief] Indeed, the sanctions were actually less than what Plaintiffs requested or what could have been justified by the law as applied to these egregious facts.  The Company submitted a certification of services, including costs, totaling $554,157.82, which included $293,117.38\textsuperscript{6}$ for a computer forensic expert that the Company had to hire to (a) fix the servers that [...] stole and returned damaged, and (b) examine all of the computers to determine what else [...] had done to damage the Company.  (2T4:18-20; 16:17-19)  The trial court correctly found that the Company was justified in hiring the expert, and that the cost was reasonably incurred, (2T33:17-22), in light of the court’s specific finding that [...] “directed the theft” of the servers.  (2T25:9-10)  Furthermore, of Plaintiffs’ total attorneys’ fees requested of $254,201.00, the trial court awarded $206,718.70, and noted that the delta was not awarded only because some of the work would have been needed in the arbitration even absent [...]’s bad acts.  (2T34:23-35:8)  [...]’s intentional exclusion of these facts from his brief while arguing that the Sanction was an abuse of the trial Court’s discretion is remarkably disingenuous.  The Court did assess, and even grant, a less coercive sanction than had been requested.  And of course, once the sanction was imposed, [...] stopped asserting his control over [...].  So they worked.  [...]’s “ability to pay” argument is just as meritless.
[brief] West New York v. Bock, 38 N.J. 500, 522-524 (1962).  The core of this concept is an evaluation of the nature, number, and proximity of prior disciplinary infractions, and in turn, the imposition of progressively increasing penalties.  Id.  The early theory of progressive discipline set out that a public employee's disciplinary history "may be resorted to for guidance in determining the appropriate penalty for the current specific offense."  Bock at 552.  The New Jersey Supreme Court reviewed the origin and purpose of the progressive discipline doctrine as follows:  The concept of progressive discipline finds its origins in West New York v. Bock, supra, 38 N.J. at 523, which --- This Legal Argument was made in [...]'s written closing at the Departmental Level and in his written closing at the Superior Court Level.
[brief] (“[...] defendants”)  (68a)  Plaintiffs also added Counts against [...], Esquire, [...], Esquire and [...], counsel of record for [...] and [...].  (“Marshall Dennehey defendants”)(Id.)  In this Amended Complaint, the counts alleged against the [...] defendants and the Marshall Dennehey defendants allege the following:  Thirteenth Count: Fraudulent Concealment  Fourteenth Count: Conspiracy to Commit Fraudulent Concealment  Fifteenth Count: Aiding and Abetting Fraudulent Concealment  Sixteenth and Seventeenth Counts: Legal Malpractice  Eighteenth and Nineteenth Counts: Negligent Supervision/Respondeat Superior (68a.)  On May 28, 2020, the [...] defendants filed their Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint, based, *inter alia*, on numerous applicable doctrines, including the Entire Controversy Doctrine, Law of Case Doctrine, and the Doctrine of *Res Judicata*.
[brief] Section 146-7(C)’s prohibition against “loud talking” violates the common thread of nuisance law repeated in the cases above.  The only qualifiers necessary are that the loud talking be “excessive”, “disturb the peace and quiet of the neighborhood”, and be plainly audible 50 feet from the property line per Section 146-9.  The determination of what is “excessive” or “loud” is far too subjective, and lacks any safeguards to prevent violations being issued for ordinary conversations.  And while Defendants cite to the definition of a “shout” and argue that family members speaking would not be affected by the Noise Ordinance (Db44-45), this argument glosses over the fact that Section 146-7(C) is disjunctive, and that “loud talking” alone, rather than only that speech which amounts to “shouting,” can qualify as a violation.  Similarly, Section 146-7(P)’s prohibition against “any other continuous noise which is unreasonably loud, disturbing, unnecessary, and which annoys, injures or endangers the comfort, repose, health or welfare of others” could be triggered by any type of noise as long as it lasts for one second or more.  Certainly, not all children limit their shouting while playing to under one second to be sure they meet Defendants’ definition of “impulsive sound”, and if they fail to adhere to that limitation and a neighbor is “annoyed”, summonses would be fair game.  Additionally, the lack of any time limitations on when these provisions against “loud talking” or “other noises” can be enforced could lead to such complaints being lodged in the middle of the afternoon.  These provisions of the Noise Ordinance could apply to common and acceptable actions and speech, and to allow the Noise Ordinance to stand would unreasonably burden the needs of Plaintiffs to allow patrons and guests to be able to speak in a restaurant and bar.  It can hardly be said that human speech presents the same types of “material annoyance” as with other types of noise nuisances regulated by ordinance such as amplified music, sirens, automobiles, and construction equipment.  Contrary to Defendants’ assertions, the Noise Ordinance lacks sufficient safeguards to ensure that only “unreasonable” noises are prohibited, and allows far too much subjectivity in the determination of what constitutes a noise nuisance.