ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The second factor has been held by courts to be more encompassing than limited only to an action for malpractice or negligence.  See Couri v. Gardner, 173 N.J. 328 (2002) (held in a breach of contract action that whether in contract or in tort, a claimant should determine if the underlying factual allegations of the claim require proof of a deviation from the professional standard of care for that specific profession).
[brief] Tips from various sources can provide reasonable suspicion if the circumstances surrounding the tip, including the content of the information and its degree of reliability, provide “a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the person stopped of criminal activity. ”  *Navarette v. California*, 572 U.S. 393, 395 (2014).  In evaluating whether a tip establishes reasonable suspicion, courts look at three factors: (1) the informant’s reliability and veracity; (2) the informant’s basis of knowledge of the alleged criminal activity at issue; and (3) independent corroboration of the informant’s information by the observations of law enforcement.
[brief] Thus, the Moving Defendants’ motion to dismiss under Rule 4:6-2(e) is doomed at the outset.  To seek dismiss a complaint for failure to state claim, under Rule 4:6-2(e), the inquiry is limited to the facts alleged on the complaint.  Printing Mart-Morristown v. Sharp Electronics Corp., 116 N.J. 739 (1989) and not in any extraneous matters.  In addition, Printing Mart states that a complaint must be searched “in depth and with liberality to determine if a cause of action can be gleaned even from an obscure statement, particularly if further discovery is taken.  Every reasonable inference is therefore accorded the plaintiffs and the motion granted only in rare instances and ordinarily without prejudice. ”  Id. at 746.; see also In re Contest of November 8, 2005, 192 N.J. 546 (2007).  A complaint should not be dismissed under Rule 4:6-2(e) when a cause of action is suggested by the facts and a “theory of actionability may be articulated by amendment of the complaint. ”  Printing Mart v. Sharp Electronics, 116 N.J. at 746.(emphasis added).  Furthermore, a court has discretionary powers to allow a party to amend its complaint to allege additional facts to state a cause of action.  Hoffman v. Hampshire Labs, Inc., 405 N.J. Super. 105, 116 (App. Div. 2009).  The inquiry is limited to the four corners of the complaint and, “[i]f, on a motion to dismiss based on the defense numbered (e), matters outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment as provided by R. 4:46 . . .” and not by Rule 4:6-2.
[brief] In the context of a jury charge, "plain error requires demonstration of 'legal impropriety in the charge prejudicially affecting the substantial rights of the defendant and sufficiently grievous to justify notice by the reviewing court and to convince the court that of itself the error possessed a clear capacity to bring about an unjust result.'"  State v. Montalvo, 229 N.J. 300, 321 (2017) (quoting State v. Chapland, 187 N.J. 275, 289 (2006).
[brief] State v. Rodriguez, 172 N.J. 117, 126 (2002) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968)).  Although reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause, “[n]either ‘inarticulate hunches’ nor an arresting officer’s subjective good faith can justify infringement of a citizen’s constitutionally guaranteed rights. ”
[brief] We submit that the record below is completely devoid of any evidence by which reasonable jurors could conclude that the death of plaintiff’s decedent was the result of an intentional wrong committed by Defendant [...] within the meaning of N.J.S.A. 34:15-8.  Having analyzed the evidence presented in accordance with appropriate legal standards and in a light most favorable to plaintiff, we submit that the trial court correctly granted summary judgment to the defendant and that the trial court’s decision should be affirmed.
[brief] (1T138:13-148:19)  25  A.  STANDARD OF REVIEW.  (Not raised below)  25  B.  DAMAGES  EVIDENCE WAS IRRELEVANT IN THE LIABILITY PHASE OF THE TRIAL AND UNDULY PREJUDICIAL.  (1T141:1-18)  26  III.  A NEW TRIAL IS REQUIRED BECAUSE THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR BY IMPROPERLY INSTRUCTING THE JURY.
[brief] the extent to which agency self-evaluation, program improvement, or other decisionmaking will be chilled by disclosure;  With regard to the third [...] factor, there is nothing to indicate that the responsive records contain any information regarding agency self-evaluation or program improvement.  Furthermore, there is nothing to indicate that the [...]'s decisionmaking would be chilled by disclosure.  Here, two Supreme Court panels already found proof beyond a reasonable doubt that [...] committed the acts underlying the criminal charges [...] ultimately brought.  Another judge found probable cause to issue a warrant for [...]'s arrest on these public corruption charges.  If anything, the [...]'s decision not to prosecute [...] in light of the weight of evidence raises questions about the [...]'s integrity and the corruption of its decisionmaking process.  (4) the degree to which the information sought includes factual data as opposed to evaluative reports of policymakers;
[directive] The participant will explain the principles of good marksmanship and will demonstrate the techniques with the handgun and shotgun.  The presentation will minimally include:  (a)  Stance (b)  Grip (c)  Breath control (d)  Sight alignment (e)  Trigger control (f)  Follow through  The participant will demonstrate commonly recognized handgun shooting positions.  These positions will minimally include:  (a)  Kneeling (barricade, strong and support side)  (b)  Crouched barricade position (over the top of cover)  (c)  Standing Point  Shoulder with and without barricade (d)  Weaver, Isosceles or Tactical Stance 9-19 Revised (5/03)  Semi-Annual Firearms Qualification and Requalification Standards (e)  Ready Positions (f)  One-handed shooting (strong and support-handed)  (g)  Weapon Retention Position  The participant will demonstrate recognized shooting positions with the agency authorized shotgun.  These positions will minimally include:  (a)  Police Ready Condition (b)  Standing, point shoulder, muzzle depressed position  Section 9.  Non-Qualifying Participants
[brief] (T2: p95-96)  Following the public comment section, a Board Member asked if the applicant would consider a four-lot subdivision instead of nine.  [...] indicated that the applicant would not and proceeded to make closing remarks.  [...] noted that the applicant agreed to comply with the engineering report.  He further noted that the Board’s power was simply to follow the dictates of the relevant ordinance, and that only the Board of Adjustment could interpret ordinances.
[brief] Such factors do not rise to the level of extraordinary and equitable reasons to award post-judgment interest above what R. 4:42–11 provides.  Factors (i) and (ii) are found in every breach of loan case, and factor (iii) is found in almost every breach of loan case.  The potential that a judgment could go unpaid for years is entirely speculative and applies to all judgments.  If these factors are sufficient to constitute extraordinary and equitable reasons, then contract-rate post-judgment interest would be imposed in all breach of loan cases, thereby negating R. 4:42–11.  Lastly, it is a faulty premise to argue that [...] has allegedly had the benefit of the balance from the alleged Third Loan since 2013.  The alleged Third Loan consisted of interest on interest and not any principal from the $330,000 Loan.  Moreover, according to the Court’s factual findings, the alleged Third Loan was a pay-when-able loan, and thus [...]’s obligation to pay would not trigger until he was financially able to pay the loan.  The Court found that [...] was not able to pay the alleged “Third Loan” until October 2019.  Da28-29.  Accordingly, under the trial court’s reasoning, [...] did not allegedly breach the Third Loan until October 2019 and thus it cannot be argued that he had the benefit of this loan balance prior to that date.  The Court cannot find there are equitable reasons to award post-judgment interest based on [...] not paying the alleged “Third Loan” since 2013 when it found he was not able to pay the loan back until October 2019.  Under the Court’s reasoning, [...] was under no obligation prior to October 2019 to pay the alleged “Third Loan” back because he was not able to repay the loan prior to that date.  [...] was not in breach prior to October 2019.  If the Court is penalizing [...] for not paying the alleged “Third Loan” since April 2013, then the statute of limitations should run from April 2013, because under that reasoning, the alleged “Third Loan” was either: (i) a demand loan with a six (6) year statute of limitation period; or (ii) it was a pay-when-able loan and the statute of limitations period began in April 2013 because [...] had the ability to pay the loan at the time it was made.  Thus, there are no extraordinary or equitable reasons warranting an award of post-judgment interest at a rate greater than the Court Rules’ post-judgment interest rate.  **CONCLUSION**
[brief] See Doc. No. 119.  [...] produced its privilege log on October 12, 2012.  On October 29, 2012, and before the Court ruled regarding [...]'s in camera review, [...] produced 26 e-mails between [...] and [...] that it originally claimed were privileged.  The Court addressed these issues in a November 8, 2012 phone conference, followed by its November 13, 2012 Order.  Doc. No. 129.  Concerned about the adequacy and thoroughness of [...]'s production, the Court Ordered: that by no later than November 19, 2012 defendant County of [...] Board of Freeholders (“[...]”) shall produce an affidavit describing in detail the search it has done for documents responsive to plaintiff's discovery requests and Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1)(A).
[brief] Plaintiff confuses the application of the Court Rules governing motions in limine with the evidentiary rules regarding the admission of expert testimony, including N.J.R.E. 702 and N.J.R.E. 703, potentially in the context of an N.J.R.E. 104 hearing to assess the expert’s qualifications at trial.  Oftentimes, the qualifications and scope of opinions of an expert and the admissibility of expert testimony are left to the discretion of the trial judge.  See, e.g., State v. Torres, 183 N.J. 554, 572 (2005); State v. Summers, 176 N.J. 306, 312 (2003).  A motion to confine an expert to his or her areas of expertise thus is expectant, to be made at any time, as the proponent of the expert seeks to qualify the witness and the issues present themselves at trial.
[brief] Id. at 403.  The remaining factors – 2 (family and environment), 3 (details of incident and peer pressure), and 4 (capacity to aid in legal defense) – must also be considered, but are “likely to [have] remain unchanged” since the original sentencing.  Ibid.  If the court concludes, based on its analysis of Miller, that the juvenile is fit to reenter society, then that juvenile will be entitled to “obtain release” from prison via the imposition of a “lesser sentence and a reduced parole bar.
[brief] ”  Aa0330.  Notice of [...]’s HAD application was published in the September 23, 2020 DEP Bulletin.  Aa0003.  The comment period was extended over several months through March 2021.  Aa0007, Aa0011.  During this extended public comment period, [...] received hundreds of public comments on [...]’s HAD application, the overwhelming majority of which were form comments, i.e., substantially identical written comments.  See Aa0337 through Aa1177.  On June 23, 2021, [...] issued the HAD to [...], determining that the portion of [...]’s Project in the Highlands Preservation Area qualified for Exemption #11, and was consistent with the goals and purposes of the Highlands Act as well as the areawide WQMP.
[brief] It applies to, among other things, “all claims, disputes and controversies between or among [...] and [[...]],” regardless of the nature of claim, “arising out of or relating in any way to” [...]’s [...] bank accounts.  (PA126.)  Other courts have held that similar arbitration provisions are unambiguous.  See Berryman v. Newalta Envtl. Servs., No. 18-793, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 186789, at *5, *14 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 1, 2018) (holding as a matter of law that arbitration provision applying to “all disputes, claims or controversies” between the parties that were “arising out of or relating in any way” to their relationship was “unambiguous”); see also, e.g., Vollmering v. Assaggio Honolulu, LLC, No. 22-2, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 184938, at *9, *32 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 19, 2022) (holding that arbitration provision governing “[a]ll disputes” between employer and employees was, “while broad, not ambiguous”); D-J Eng’g Inc. v. UBS Fin. Servs., No. 11-1316, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6678, at *7 (D. Kan. Jan. 20, 2012) (holding that arbitration provision governing “any controversy” or “all controversies” between the parties was “plain and unambiguous”).  Fourth, because the DAA arbitration provision is unambiguous, it does not require application of the doctrine of contra proferentem.
[brief] Rule 4:10-3, Rule 4:10-2(g).  Under these circumstances, a court may grant the person from whom discovery is sought various forms of relief, including: “[t]hat the discovery not be had,” “the discovery . . . be had only on specified terms and conditions,” or “the scope of the discovery be limited to certain matters. ”  Rule 4:10-3(a), (b), and (d).  See Canlar v. Estate of Yacoub, 2018 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1764 (App. Div. July 24, 2018).  These guardrails are in place “to avoid placing undue burdens upon litigants. ”  In re Pelvic Mesh/Gynecare Litigation, 426 N.J. Super. 167, 196 (App. Div. 2012).  Courts thus deny discovery when, “[a]fter assessing the needs of the case … there exists a likelihood that the resulting benefits would be outweighed by the burden or expenses imposed as a consequence of the proposed discovery. ”  Deibler v. Sanmedica Int’l, LLC, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 247974, at *10 (D.N.J. Dec. 30, 2021) (citations omitted) (explaining “the goal of all parties should be to conduct discovery in the most efficient and cost-effective way possible”).
[brief] ”  Parratt, supra 451 U.S. at 544.  Accord Ayers v. Jackson Township, 202 N.J.Super.  106, 128-129 (App.Div.1985) (“[A] state remedy may be sufficient, even if not as complete as that allowed under 42 U.S.C. §1983), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 106 N.J. 557 (1987).  Plaintiffs’ action in lieu of prerogative writs provided an adequate state post-deprivation remedy as required by the Parratt doctrine.
[brief] Except in tax and mortgage foreclosure actions, all applications for the allowance of fees shall be supported by an affidavit of services addressing the factors enumerated by RPC 1.5(a).  The affidavit shall also include a recitation of other factors pertinent in the evaluation of the services rendered, the amount of the allowance applied for, and an itemization of disbursements for which reimbursement is sought.  If the court is requested to consider the rendition of paraprofessional services in making a fee allowance, the affidavit shall include a detailed statement of the time spent and services rendered by paraprofessionals, a summary of the paraprofessionals' qualifications, and the attorney's billing rate for paraprofessional services to clients generally.  No portion of any fee allowance claimed for attorneys' services shall duplicate in any way the fees claimed by the attorney for paraprofessional services rendered to the client.  For purposes of this rule, paraprofessional services shall mean those services rendered by individuals who are qualified through education, work experience or training who perform specifically delegated tasks which are legal in nature under the direction and supervision of attorneys and which tasks an attorney would otherwise be obliged to perform.
[brief] N.J.S.A. 40:55D-62 provides:  The governing body may adopt or amend a zoning ordinance relating to the nature and extent of the uses of land and of buildings and structures thereon.  Such ordinance shall be adopted after the planning board has adopted the land use plan element and the housing plan element of a master plan, and all of the provisions of such zoning ordinance or any amendment or revision thereto shall either be substantially consistent with the land use plan element and the housing plan element of the master plan or designed to effectuate such a plan elements; provided that the governing body may adopt a zoning ordinance or amendment or revision thereto which in whole or part is inconsistent with or not designed to effectuate the land use plan element and the housing plan element, but only by affirmative vote of a majority of the full authorized membership of the governing body, with the reasons of the governing body for so acting set forth in a resolution and recorded in its minutes when adopting such a zoning ordinance.  The critical importance of the MLUL’s enhanced requirement of “planning” and for the Master Plan to serve as the basis for zoning Ordinances is set forth in Medici v. BPR Co., 107 N.J. 1, 21 (1987) in [...]’s concurring opinion in Riggs v. Long Beach Tp., 109 N.J. 601, 621 (1988), Kaufmann v. Planning bd. of Warren Tp., 110 N.J. 551, 557 (1988), and numerous other cases.
[brief] Contrary to the lower court’s ruling, the OWBPA does not serve as a legal impediment to enforcement of a settlement reached and memorialized on the record.  To this end, in arguing that [...]’s finding that “there was no settlement” based exclusively upon the OWBPA language contained in the unexecuted draft Settlement Agreement (“SA”) never signed by Respondent – should be upheld, like the trial court, Respondent misunderstands the relief sought by Appellant below, and now, before this Court.  (Rb22-Rb23).  As argued below and on appeal, Appellant contends that the settlement contract reached and memorialized on the record before the hearing officer, the affirmance of the terms of which and agreement to the resolution memorialized was agreed to by Respondent upon questioning by her counsel and the hearing officer, was an enforceable settlement contract, containing all material terms, which accordingly should have been enforced by the court below.  Nowhere in those terms memorialized on the record was there any discussion of an OWBPA revocation period.  (Pa33-Pa34).  Moreover, the OWBPA serves as no impediment to the enforcement of the settlement agreement reached and memorialized on the record, the OWBPA statutory requirements, by its terms, are only applicable to waiver of ADEA claims.
[brief] *Id.* at *3*.  Specifically, the Appellate Division held:  [I]t is undisputed that after [...] shoveled the snow, it continued to snow and additional snow accumulated.  Consequently, nothing [...] did created a new danger or hazard.  The ice was present under the snow before [...] shoveled it.  The ice was also present under the snow that accumulated after [...] shoveled the public sidewalk.  *Id.* at *2-*3.  In the instant matter, the evidence that was presented to the Motion Court demonstrated that plaintiff-appellant [...] simply slipped on snow and/or ice on the sidewalk, and it is undisputed that snow and ice are elements or hazards caused by natural forces.
[brief] The jury instructions plainly were lacking any legal explanation of the duties of a suspended trooper to turn in NJSP ID or to refrain from using NJSP ID.  (20T 168-23 to 184-20)  All those instructions said about the scope of a suspended trooper’s duties was to repeat the State’s allegations from the indictment (20T 168-23 to 170-19), and to note that the State must also prove that the defendant was on notice of his legal duties of a trooper, because one must know a duty exists in order to commit official misconduct, under Grimes, 235 N.J. Super. at 89.  (20T 173-24 to 174-22)  Put simply, under Grimes, Deegan, and Brady, the scope of the legal duties of a suspended trooper are a matter of law, to be explained by the judge in the jury instructions, not a matter of fact for the State to prove to the jury.  Yet the jury instructions in this case never explained those legal duties, and instead the sole source of any explanation of the law governing those duties came from the State’s factual witnesses, who, as noted in the Statement of Facts, were asked a number of times to tell the jury about the parameters of a suspended trooper’s duties.
[brief] Exhibit E – [...] Ordinance #23-20, “Ordinance of the [...], County of Monmouth, State of New Jersey, Adopting Amendments to the Oceanfront-Broadway Redevelopment Plan” .............................................................................  190a Exhibit F – Transcript of the Planning Board Meeting, October 20, 2020 ........................................................................................................  204a Exhibit G – Transcript of the City Council Meeting, October 28, 2020 ........................................................................................................  229a Exhibit H – Transcript of the Planning Board Meeting, November 10, 2020 ....................................................................................................  234a Exhibit I – Transcript of the City Council Meeting, November 12, 2020 .................................................................  245a Exhibit J – Transcript of the City Council Meeting, November 24, 2020 .................................................................  256a Exhibit K – [...] Ordinance #26-20, “Ordinance of the [...], County of Monmouth, State of New Jersey, Adopting Amendments to the Oceanfront-Broadway Redevelopment Plan” .............................................................  269a Exhibit L – Transcript of the City Council Meeting, December 9, 2020 .................................................................. 272a Exhibit M – Amendment to the Oceanfront-Broadway Redevelopment Plan Beachfront South Sector for Block 216, Lots 11, 13 & 24, October 15, 2020 ........................................... 285a Exhibit N – [...] Resolution #199-20, “Resolution of the [...], in the County of Monmouth, New Jersey, Designating a Conditional Redeveloper for Block 216, Lots 11, 12, 13 and 24 on the Tax Map of the City and Authorizing the Execution of an Interim Costs Agreement with Respect Thereto” ........ 298a Exhibit O – [...] Resolution #243-20, “Resolution of Mayor and Council for the [...] Designating [...] as Redeveloper for a Portion of the Oceanfront-Broadway Redevelopment Area and Authorizing Execution of a Redevelopment Agreement in Connection Therewith” ....................................... 306a Exhibit P – Redevelopment Agreement entered into between the [...] and [...], December 14, 2020 .................................................................. 347a Exhibit Q – Email from [...], CFO of the City, to [...], Esq., December 15, 2020 ......................................
[brief] See Lesatz, 416 N.W.2d at 337; Manning, 442 S.E.2d at 785; S. Star, 872 S.E.2d at 909; Frank, 4 S.W.3d at 606.  As such, the trial court’s finding that “[t]here was nothing illegal, oppressive, abusive, . . . unconscionable, or otherwise improper about the [Concession Recovery P]rovision or [...]’s enforcement of [same]” should be affirmed.  (2T26-17-20).  This conclusion is supported by the undisputed facts of this matter and the applicable law.  There is simply no “fraud” that Appellants can point to here because, at its core, this is a case where “[...] did not fail to perform pursuant to the” Lease Rider.