ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] As noted above, New Jersey law vests in the Attorney General and the Director power to initiate administrative proceedings for violations of the LAD, and to seek a preliminary injunction to prevent ongoing violations before that process concludes.  *Pfaus*, 97 N.J. Super. at 8.  It thus makes eminent sense that the State would be free to seek and obtain injunctive relief that does not merely enjoin one unlawful policy, but freezes the status quo in place pending the administrative proceeding.  Were the rule otherwise—if Appellants could again modify the Original Policy before the DCR proceeding concludes—then parties could repeatedly adjust policies in even minor ways to achieve the same unlawful goals.  And if Appellants act on such a new policy before a court can preliminarily enjoin it, the affected students will experience significant and irreparable harm.  N.J.S.A. 10:5-14.1 does not set up such a whack-a-mole system of law; rather, the law provides a regime by which DCR’s administrative process will not be rendered “vain and useless” by the defendant’s intervening actions.
[directive] Èske w konprann ke si yo ta detèmine ke w se yon delenkan seksyèl residivis, enkontwolab ki ta dispoze (pwofite de) tretman pou delenkan ou pa seksyèl men dispoze patisipe nan tretman sila a epi yo ta fèmen ou nan yon lòt etablisman ki pa ta nan Sant Tretman ak Adult Diagnostic la, ou ta kab siseptib a menm tèm elijibilite libète kondisyonèl ki parèt nan seksyon 5 anlè a?  Fòm Revize Kreye pa Direktif # 01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 11081-Haitian Creole paj 2 nan 3 Revised Form Promulgated by 01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 11081-Haitian Creole page 2 of 3  Do you understand that if you are determined to be a repetitive, compulsive sex offender who not is amenable to (will benefit from) sex offender treatment but you are willing to participate in such treatment and are confined to a facility other than [...], you will also be subject to the same parole eligibility terms as contained in section 5 above?
[brief] OPRA Request to [...] dated Dated: February 26, 2020 (Omitted - same as Da1)  State of New Jersey Government Records Request Receipt Dated: November 10, 2022 (Omitted - same as Da2-Da3)  Letter in Response to Item #12 of Statement of Items on behalf of [...]  Dated: May 2, 2022 ...........................................................................  Da33  Exhibit D: Letter from Deputy Attorney General to [...]
[brief] [...]’s unsupported presumptions regarding [...]’s subjective knowledge are irrelevant  [...]’s argument that [...] had subjective knowledge and understanding of the December 2021 Agreement via the January 2021 Agreement contradicts New Jersey law and relies on speculation.  Mutual assent to arbitrate depends not on the parties’ “real intent but the intent expressed or apparent in the writing[.]” Leodori v. CIGNA Corp., 175 N.J. 293, 300 (2003) (quoting Garfinkel, 168 N.J. at 135).  This is consistent with long-standing precedent governing contract interpretation in general.  See Friedman v. Tappan Dev. Corp., 22 N.J. 523, 531 (1956); Nester v. O’Donnell, 301 N.J. Super. 198, 210 (App. Div. 1997) (stating that the meaning of a contract’s terms is determined by looking to “the objective manifestations of the parties’ intent”).
[brief] This Court vacated [...]’s attorneys’ fees awards, which were based upon the Special Master’s recommendations.  The Court “was convinced . . . that the awards of attorneys’ fees and costs to [...] and [...] must be reversed and the awards reconsidered. ”  *Id.* at *28*.  The Court stated:  “[t]he trial judge awarded the counsel fees and costs pursuant to RICO, and the judge limited [...]’s and [...]’s RICO claims to conduct that occurred from 2000 to 2011.  The court nevertheless awarded counsel fees and costs based on all of the time counsel devoted to the case. ”  *Id.*  “That includes the time spent by [...]’s and [...]’s lawyers for the pursuit of the non-RICO claims. ”  *Id.*  Most notably, this Court was “convinced the court erred by finding that all of [...]’s and [...]’s claims rested on a common core of operative facts. ”  *Id.* at *29* (emphasis added).  This Court emphasized that, “the court must limit its award to the fees and costs reasonably devoted to plaintiffs’ pursuit of their respective RICO claims.
[brief] The Trial Court has discretion to deny motions to amend the pleadings and that exercise of discretion requires a two-step process evaluating whether the non-moving party will be prejudiced, and whether granting the amendment would nonetheless be futile, that is, whether the amended claim will nonetheless fail and, hence, allowing the amendment would be a useless endeavor.  Notte, supra.185 N.J. at 501.  The Trial Court and [...] were presented with evidence beyond the four corners of the pleadings.  Plaintiff submitted the evidence that eventually led to the denial of the motion and now looks to the Appellate Court.  How can one ask the Court to review evidence if it benefits them, but not when challenged?  Plaintiff opened the door and subjected the claims sought in the amendment to the thorough review by [...].  To say [...] erred is a gross characterization of her work and quite frankly, it is disingenuous.
[brief] [Id. at 570.]  Because the Appellate Division, in E & M Liquors, has extended the Weinberg rule to a public electric company, by removing immunity from that company for tortious conduct, the Trial Court, espousing the same point advanced by [...] in the present case, was incorrect for stating that it was not prepared to extend Weinberg, supra, to [...]'s conduct, which plaintiff has demonstrated is tortious conduct.  Yet again in another case, Bongo v. [...], 250 N.J.Super. 524 (Law Div. 1991), the Law Division, did not extend immunity to an electric company in the context of an automobile action, as the following shows:  Immunity is a concept not favored in the law.  Merenoff v. Merenoff, 76 N.J. 535, 547, 388 A.2d 951 (1978); Prosser, Law of Torts, 970 (4th ed. 1971).  Immunity is offensive to the bedrock proposition of justice that responsibility be assigned to fault.  Recognition of the immunity sought by [...] would have broad impact.
[brief] No.  A final agency decision is entitled to “substantial deference” and should not be overturned unless “(1) it was arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable; (2) it violated express or implied legislative policies; (3) it offended the State or Federal Constitution; or (4) the findings on which it was based were not supported by substantial, credible evidence in the record. ”  *Univ. Cottage Club of Princeton N.J. Corp. v. N.J. Dep’t of Env’t Prot.*, 191 N.J. 38, 48 (2007) (citing *In re Taylor*, 158 N.J. 644, 656 (1999)); *N.J. Highlands Coal. v. N.J. Dep’t of Env’t Prot.*, 456 N.J. Super. 590, 602 (App. Div. 2017).  The burden of proving arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable action is upon the challenger.  *Bueno v. Bd. of Trs., Teachers’ Pension & Annuity Fund*, 422 N.J. Super. 227, 234 (App. Div. 2011).  The court defers to an agency’s interpretation of rules within its sphere of authority, unless the interpretation is “plainly unreasonable. ”  *In re Eastwick Coll. LPN-to-RN Bridge Program*, 225 N.J. 533, 541 (2016).  An agency’s “interpretation of statutes and regulations within its implementing and enforcing responsibility” is entitled to deference.  *Bueno*, 422 N.J. Super at 234 (internal punctuation and citation omitted); see also *Barry v. Arrow Pontiac, Inc.*, 100 N.J. 57, 70-71 (1985) (“[T]he grant of authority to an administrative agency is to be liberally construed to enable the agency to accomplish the Legislature’s goals. ” (internal punctuation and citation omitted)).  Substantial deference must be extended to an agency’s interpretation and application of its own regulations, particularly on technical matters within the agency’s special expertise.  *In re Freshwater Wetlands Prot. Act Rules*, 180 N.J. 478, 488-89 (2004).  Here, [...] is the agency “charged with the responsibility to ‘formulate comprehensive policies for the conservation of the natural resources of the State, the promotion of environmental protection and the prevention of pollution of the environment of the State.
[directive] I.  Definitions  A. means a person who lacks firsthand knowledge of a defendant’s “Jailhouse Informant” alleged criminal conduct but offers to testify for the government at a trial or evidentiary hearing that the informant heard the defendant make inculpatory statements while detained or incarcerated in the same facility as the informant.  B. refers to the attorney(s) assigned to prosecute a particular case.  In a “Prosecution team” County Prosecutor’s Office, this will typically be an Assistant Prosecutor; in the Division of Criminal Justice (DCJ), the Office of Public Integrity & Accountability (OPIA), and the Office of the Insurance Fraud Prosecutor (OIFP), this will typically be a Deputy Attorney General or an Assistant Attorney General.  C. refers to the acting or confirmed County Prosecutor who oversees a “County Prosecutor” County Prosecutor’s Office.  D. refers to the head of an office: DCJ (the DCJ Director), OIFP (the Insurance “Director” Fraud Prosecutor), or OPIA (the OPIA Executive Director).  II.
[brief] The Supreme Court ultimately found that [...] suffered an ascertainable loss which amounted to the cost of kitchen repairs.  The court found that the credit card loan was not collectable by [...] and discharged the debt due to a breach of contract, but did not find an unlawful act under the CFA.  The $17,920 rent concession demand, by way of charging it on the client ledger and the filing of the eviction and collection actions, is an ascertainable loss suffered by [...].
[brief] With respect to Factor #3 – Integration, the IRS explained that “[w]hen the success or continuation of a business depends to an appreciable degree on the performance of certain services, the worker . . . must necessarily be subject to a certain amount of control . . . .”  Rev. Rul. 87-41, 1987-1 C.B. 296, *12.  The ALJ reasonably found that [...] did not exert a significant level of control over [...].
[brief] A.  *10  It was undisputed that no audio or video recordings were made of the showup, nor was a contemporaneous written record prepared.  Instead, approximately three hours after the showup, at 4:43 a.m., [...] completed a written “Showup Identification Procedures Worksheet,” documenting [...]'s identification of defendant.  In the worksheet, the officer set forth the time and place where the identification was conducted and the identities of the officers; checked the box indicating he had instructed [...] that the actual perpetrator may or may not be in the showup and he should not feel compelled to make an identification; and, set forth that [...] “became extremely emotional” when he saw defendant and said, “[T]hat's him, that's the guy who tried to kill me.
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[brief] The prosecutor argued it would be “contrary to the training of [...] and all fingerprint analysis experts to couch their findings in the language of “to a degree of scientific probability or to scientific certainty” because such language was “not consistent with what his opinion ultimately is,” and that it would be inconsistent to find that fingerprint analysis is reliable, have an experienced expert testify, and then “step back all the way to a reasonable degree of scientific probability. ” (4T7-20 to 10-15).  Defense counsel claimed [...] could not claim any degree of scientific certainty because his opinion is not based on science, but rather “pattern matching. ” (4T10-18 to 12-21).  The State then pointed out that defendant had no caselaw, expert, or expert report to support his argument, which could not defeat “a hundred years of published opinions” in New Jersey “accepting this sort of expert testimony.
[brief] She entered a series of orders establishing a discovery schedule.  During the discovery process, the Borough issued an expert report from [...], an attorney who is an expert in title issues, in order to rebut the expert reports issued by [...] (also an attorney) and [...] (a title searcher) on behalf of [...] regarding the title issues in this case.  On April 6, 2020, [...] subsequently filed a motion to bar the testimony of the Borough’s title expert [...] which the Borough opposed.  On May 8, 2020 [...] heard oral argument on [...]’s motion to bar this expert testimony.  See 8T.  After considering the arguments counsel, [...] denied [...]’s motion without prejudice to its renewal at trial.  8T, p. 21, lines 21-23 and p. 28., lines 13-15.
[brief] The Trial Court granted Defendants Motion to Dismiss holding in pertinent part:  The Court turns to the entire controversy doctrine.  Plaintiff asserts that the present claim is not barred by the doctrine, as the New Jersey Supreme Court in *Olds v. Donnelly* held that “the entire controversy doctrine no longer compels the assertion of a legal-malpractice claim in an underlying action that gives rise to the claim. ”  *Id.* at 443.  150 N.J. 424, 44-49 (1997).  However, as Defendant highlights, *Olds* merely holds that the doctrine does not bar a legal malpractice action against an attorney who represented a client in the prior action.  [...] had not represented Plaintiff in the prior Chancery matter, and thus Olds is thus not instructive in this respect.
[brief] It is also for this reason that each and every case cited by Plaintiffs, arising outside of the MSRA, is inapposite.  None of the cases relied on by Plaintiffs involve a takeover statute like the MSRA, which was intended to ensure the financial recovery of the City.  On appeal Plaintiffs cannot rehabilitate their claims by arguing that they are immune from the MSRA based on their retirement dates.  Each of the Plaintiffs retired months after the City was designated a municipality in need of stabilization and recovery, and the MSRA was enacted to avoid precisely the sort of expense Plaintiffs seek to impose.  The Superior Court properly dismissed Plaintiffs’ Complaint and denied Plaintiffs’ motion for leave to amend as futile, where, as here, the entirety of Plaintiffs’ claims relates to action permitted under the MSRA.
[directive] I.  Modifications to Random Drug Testing Deadlines for 2022 and 2023  A.  Law enforcement agencies must conduct at least two random drug tests during the period from January 1, 2022 to March 31, 2023.  Each of these tests must include at least 10 percent of the total number of sworn officers within the agency, and every officer must have an equal chance of selection during each test.  In effect, the requirement contained in Section II.C of Directive 2018-2 that two random tests be conducted during the “calendar year” of 2022 shall be extended and interpreted to include the period January 1, 2022 to March 31, 2023.  B.  Law enforcement agencies must conduct at least two random drug tests during the period from April 1, 2023 to December 31, 2023.  Each of these tests must include at least 10 percent of the total number of sworn officers within the agency, and every officer must have an equal chance of selection during each test.  In effect, the requirement contained in Section II.C of Directive 2018-2 that two random tests be conducted during the “calendar year” of 2023 shall be amended and interpreted to include the period April 1, 2023 to December 31, 2023.  C.  If a law enforcement agency has conducted two random drug tests during calendar year 2022, and then conducts a test during the period, January 1, 2022 to March 31, 2023, that third test may count toward the 2023 requirement of two tests.  To summarize, law enforcement agencies must conduct a total of at least four random drug tests between January 1, 2022 and December 31, 2023.
[brief] Equally as improper is [...]’s reliance upon new “facts” offered up for the first time in opposition to [...]’s motion for summary judgment and repeated on appeal.  Those “facts” and [...]’s reliance upon them must be rejected.  For example, in support for its argument that it pays for utility charges on [...]’s Property, [...] proffers that [...] contracted with [...] to erect a light pole (App. Brf. at p. 11) and that Public Service “recognized that the lots were owned by [...]” (App. Brf. at p. 31); however, [...] offers no evidentiary support for those assertions, just like it opinions that are contrary to the reports of the expert surveyors even though defense counsel has not been qualified as an expert surveyor.
[brief] **THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT MAKE ANY ERRORS IN DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO RECONSIDER, VACATE, AMEND AND/OR ALTER THE ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT. **  Although Plaintiff’s point heading in Point IV of his Brief takes issue with the trial court’s denial of his motion for reconsideration, vacation, amendment and alteration of the order granting summary judgment (hereinafter at times referred to as “motion for reconsideration”), Plaintiff argues there were errors by the court throughout the litigation.
[brief] STATEMENT OF FACT  Below, Plaintiff will set forth the essential factual narrative critical to the affirmative case for medical malpractice.  A detailed recitation of the facts, along with specific citations to the record, must by necessity be included within Plaintiff’s response to the “factual” postulations by the New Motion Judge set forth in the September 29 and July 17, 2023 decisions.  Therefore, these recitations will be set forth in the Argument section of this brief, in a point-by-point fashion.  Accordingly, for the Court’s convenience, this factual statement has been edited and shortened to avoid redundancy.
[brief] Unbeknownst to Plaintiff [...], despite the representations, assurances, and promises from Defendants [...] and [...], another entity, [...] (“[...]”), owned by an individual named [...], had on June 13, 2007 entered into an agreement with [...] to sell them [...] in 2007.  845a-861a.  That agreement was signed without Plaintiff [...]’s knowledge and while [...] was the contractual buyer of [...].  445a-449a (128:12-132:14.)  Indeed, the record demonstrates that [...] did not have any ownership interest in [...] on June 13, 2007.  445a-449a (128:12-132:14).  Notably, [...] and [...] were represented by Defendant [...].
[brief] Notice of Motion for a Protective Order filed by Appellee on December 12, 2022; b.  Certification in Support of a Notice of Motion for a Protective Order; c.  Exhibit A: Appellants’ Interrogatories, Requests for the Production of Documents, and Requests for Admission to Appellee.  27.  Letter from Appellants to Appellee and [...], Requesting to Hold Appellee’s Discovery Motion in Abeyance for Lack of Ripeness, dated December 13, 2022.  28.  Letter from Appellee to [...] and Appellants, Withdrawing Motion for a Protective Order, dated December 28, 2022.  29.  Letter from Appellants to [...] and Appellee, Withdrawing Motion to Deem Admitted Allegations in the Complaint, dated January 13, 2023.
[brief] The same result must apply here.  As detailed above (supra, pages 5-9)  Appellants admitted in their depositions that [...] never gave any information or advice to them about the assignment, the [...], or [...].  828a-829a, 856a.  They further testified that they were relying on others, but not [...] or [...], in making their decisions.  858a-859a.  “An invitation to rely and reliance are the linchpins of attorney liability to third parties. ”  Banco Popular v. Gandi, 184 N.J. 161 (2005).  Appellants’ own admissions establish, beyond any genuine dispute, that those “linchpins” never existed between them and [...].
[brief] But he did not.  Nevertheless, the trial court found the following was an ambiguous invocation of defendant’s right to counsel.  NB: [...]  You have the right to talk to a lawyer and have him present while you are being questioned.  Do you understand this right?  [...]: Yes, but I just want to say something there.  Eh yes like basically like I do not, I come from another, another country to here I do not know if you guys assign an attorney to me or I have to look for an attorney on my own?  [Pa30 (emphasis added)].  As argued in the State’s initial brief, this is not an invocation of one’s right to counsel, ambiguous or otherwise.  Defendant merely asked if he needed to find his own attorney or if one would be provided.  That is a request about how to obtain an attorney if/when defendant decides that he wants one, not a statement that he wants one at that time.  Thus, the trial court’s finding was incorrect.
[brief] “ORDERED that all post-sale proceedings (specifically the delivery of a Deed by the [...]) be and hereby are stayed until March 22, 2024 or until such time as Defendants --- 4 “T” refers to the transcript of the January 22, 2024 hearing before [...], which was filed with the Appellate Division on March 12, 2024.  herein file an appeal and move in the Appellate Division for a further stay pending the resolution of the appeal, whichever date is sooner. ”
[brief] CIVIL ACTION ON APPEAL FROM THE ORDERS OF THE SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY, LAW DIVISION, BERGEN COUNTY  Docket No. [...]  Sat Below: HON. [...], J.S.C. BRIEF AND APPENDIX ON BEHALF OF DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT  [...]  Attorneys for Defendant-Respondent  98 Floral Avenue, Suite 201 New Providence, New Jersey  07974 [...]  [...]  [...]  On the Brief: [...]  Attorney ID# 016201981  [...]  Attorney ID# 035981986  Date Submitted: October 10, 2024
[brief] Sometime later, after [...]’s death, [...], [...], and [...]’s mother went to the prosecutor’s office to speak with officers.  (6T 47-10 to 13, 47-6 to 48-5)  [...] testified that at this meeting, he “was asked did I know anything or was anything said to me and I told what was told to me,” (6T 47-23 to 25) and agreed with the State that “[...]’s name was out there” after this meeting.  (6T 48-3 to 5)  However, on cross-examination, [...] agreed that when he spoke to a female detective on the phone following [...]’s death, he made no mention of the dying declaration.  (6T 72-14 to 73-8)  Moreover, he acknowledged that the first time he specifically told police about his son’s alleged dying declaration was in his formal, recorded statement on October 21 — after [...] had seen an online news story with [...]’s name and picture indicating that [...] had been arrested and charged with [...]’s murder.  (6T 73-9 to 17, 74-5 to 75-22)  [...] testified that he learned [...]’s real name from this online news story, though he recognized [...]’s face, and particularly his blue eyes, from seeing [...] hang out with his son.  (6T 52-16 to 21, 53-7 to 54-1)  The State’s other key piece of evidence at trial was from [...].