ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Public Policy Counsels Strongly In Favor of Finding a Duty of Care on HGBR2  Established public policy in New Jersey provides that a landlord is not permitted to disregard a potentially fatal and easily discoverable condition on the property, assign control of the property to a tenant, and then avoid any liability which arises from this discoverable defective condition See J.H. v. R & M Tagliareni, LLC, 239 N.J. 198, 218 (2019) (citing Scully v. Fitzgerald, 179 N.J. 114, 121-22 (2004) (noting that generally a landlord's duty arises when the harm is foreseeable and the landlord has sufficient control to prevent it); Potomac Aviation, LLC v. Port Auth. of N.Y. and N.J., 413 N.J. Super. 212, 226-27 (App. Div. 2010) (scope of a duty is determined under the totality of the circumstances, and must be reasonable under those circumstances); Monaco v. Hartz Mt. Corp., 178 N.J. 401, 414 (2004) (finding a landowner must exercise reasonable care including making reasonable inspections of its property and taking such steps as are necessary to correct or give warning of hazardous conditions or defects); Dwyer v. Skyline Apartments, Inc., 123 N.J. Super. 48, 52 (App. Div. 1973) (finding duty of care exists where landlord knew or should have been known about defective condition, so that he had an opportunity to correct it).
[brief] Unlike in Carroll, the prosecutor did not simply encourage the jury to compare a signature on the letters with samples of [...]’s signature.  Instead, he encouraged the jury to infer that [...] wrote the unsigned letters based on what the prosecutor suggested was a similarity between lowercase A’s and R’s in the unsigned letters and the two lowercase A’s and one lowercase R that [...] wrote when he printed his name on the Miranda form.  The prosecutor did that without notifying the Defense of his intention to use the Miranda form as a handwriting sample and without a ruling by the judge as to its admissibility for that purpose, i.e., without a ruling that there was anything distinctive about the A’s and R’s or that a sample of two letters of a 26-letter alphabet is a sufficient handwriting sample.
[brief] PRELIMINARY STATEMENT  Plaintiff-Appellant [...] ("Plaintiff" or "[...]") respectfully submits this reply brief in response to the brief of Defendant-Respondent [...] ("Defendant" or "[...]") and in further support of Plaintiff’s appeal of the October 6, 2023 Order ("October 6 Order"), which denied Plaintiff’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict ("JNOV"), or in the alternative, for a new trial.
[brief] The Court in denying Plaintiff’s Motion for Consolidation (Pa485, Pa535) stated:  With respect to plaintiff’s motion to consolidate, that will be denied at this point, there appears to be some question as to when the plaintiff had access to discovery.  As to the issue that he now claims is newly discovered, that is best to be reviewed in a separate proceeding.  As to whether or not that case will go forward or not, that’s not for me to say at this point, other than to say the motion to consolidate is denied.
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[brief] The Summary Judgment Standard (Pa1-3)  Summary judgment is a proper remedy only when there is no genuine issue of material fact challenged and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  See R. 4:46-2.  In Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America, 142 N.J. 520 (1995), the New Jersey Supreme Court held that the summary judgment standard “requires the motion judge to consider whether the competent evidentiary materials presented, when viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party in consideration of the applicable evidentiary standard, are sufficient to permit a rational fact-finder to resolve the alleged disputed issue in favor of the non-moving party. ”  Id. at 524.  A judge’s function is “not himself [or herself] to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial. ”  Id. at 540 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).  The movant on a summary judgment motion has the burden to “exclude all reasonable doubt as to the existence of any genuine issue of material fact.
[directive] However, employees may have a greater expectation of privacy in their own lockers, assigned desks or possibly in a vehicle assigned to them solely for their use.  If an agency intends to retain the right to search property it assigns to officers for their use, including lockers and desks, it should put officers on notice of that fact.  This notification will help defeat an assertion of an expectation of privacy in the assigned property.  The agency should issue a directive regarding this matter and provide notice of the policy in any employee handbook or personnel manual (including the rules and regulations) the agency provides.  Notice should also be posted in the locker area and on any bulletin boards.
[brief] Defendant’s claim is purely a vague, conclusory, and speculative assertion with no support in fact or law.  She merely continues to assert that accepting the plea deal was the wrong decision and therefore argues that trial counsel was deficient in participating in that decision.  There is no evidence presented that trial counsel did not properly weigh the considerations involved.  Defendant, thus, has failed to establish either prong of Strickland was met.  Accordingly, the PCR court’s proper denial of this claim should be affirmed.
[brief] With regard to the 82.4 hours billed for the second motion for summary judgment, it should be noted that the second motion for summary judgment is substantially similar to the first motion for summary judgment that was previously prepared, filed and denied.  (Pa000043; Pa000086).  While [...] attempts to argue that the two motions are substantially different, a review of the two motions belies this fact.  The only modifications of significance in connection with the second summary judgment motion is the 1) attachment and reference to [...]'s interrogatory responses, 2) the attachment and reference to [...]'s frivolous litigation letter, 3) the attachment and reference to deposition transcript of Plaintiffs' representative [...] (which is not even used in any material respect), 4) and the Certification from [...]'s engineer pertaining to an engineering duty of care.  The vast majority of the law, facts, and analysis of the second motion, however, were nearly identical to the first motion.  Certainly, [...] did not need to spend eighty-two (82) hours removing the argument pertaining to the failure to obtain an affidavit of merit, drafting a certification for its expert, and attaching interrogatories and a deposition transcript to a certification.
[brief] With regard to the per se standard, Respondent fails to address that the factual record does not support a finding that [...] waited for the mandatory two-minute lock-out period when performing breath tests of Appellant, as required under State v. Chun, 194 N.J. 54 (2008).  In arguing that it proved DWI under the observational standard beyond a reasonable doubt, Respondent also fails to address the numerous instances of forgetfulness and inconsistent testimony by [...], which was incorrectly credited by the Law Division.  Fourth, contrary to Respondent’s assertions, Appellant’s claim that Respondent violated the relevant discovery rules is a compelling reason to overturn the conviction in this matter.
[brief] Defendant tries to buttress this argument by correctly pointing out that even “innocuous remarks” can be deemed suggestive, but there is simply no allegation any such innocuous remarks were made by the officer.  Moreover, regarding defendant’s argument that a repeat showing of the same properly constituted photo array is somehow akin to mugshot exposure wherein, as defined by the Court, mugshot exposure occurs when “‘views a set of photos’ then at a ‘later identification procedure’ selects someone ‘depicted in the earlier photos.
[brief] Defendants now appeal contending that no valid arbitration agreement exists, and even if it did, Plaintiff’s ownership claims fall outside the scope of the arbitration provisions, and Plaintiff waived her right to arbitration.  The motion court properly rejected these arguments.  As correctly found below and as more fully argued herein, the parties mutually agreed to a valid and enforceable arbitration agreement within a Memorandum of Understanding (“MOU”) executed in 2012 that was the start of [...]’s “rescue” plan to save the property for Plaintiff.
[brief] Correspondence to [...] 3/23/23.................................Pa28  Petition for Ricci Action Registration 3/3/23..........................................................Pa30  Affidavit of [...].......................................................................................Pa56  [...] Eligibility Registration Form........................................................................Pa58  [...] Request for Amended Benefits Form..........................................................Pa60  Administrative Denial of Ricci Benefits.....................................................................Pa61  Legislative Notice August 2019................................................................................Pa62  Postage Statement......................................................................................................Pa64  Universal Document Converter Postcard....................................................................Pa66  Email to Certifying Officers 8/16/19........................................................................Pa67  [...] Quotation of Retirement Benefits.................................................................Pa68  [...] Special Retirement Approval 4/08/03.........................................................Pa69  1  Per R.2:6-1(a)(2), Pa16, Pa24, Pa28, and Pa30 are included in the Appendix because they are germane to the appeal.
[brief] (TRVa1488.)  Proposal Three describes the identical work as Proposals One and Two, but adds back the $100 per day for each type of work, an upward adjustment based on [...]’s unenrollment.  (TRVa1488.).  [...] also sent an e-mail to [...] with Proposal Three, which totaled $22,900, an increase to account for [...]’s insurance costs, stating, “attached is the updated proposal to reflect the change in CCIP status. ”  (TRVa1491.)  (Empasis added.)  Later on August 5, 2015, [...], Controller for [...], copied on the e-mail sending Proposal Three, responded stating “I am confused.  Are we switching to a CCIP or they are (sic) removing us from it?” (TRVa2797.)  Moments later she sent another e-mail stating “Now I see that there is no CCIP” and instructs [...] of [...] (also cc’d) “if we filled out the CCIP forms, disregard and issue them a certificate and let [...]\textsuperscript{4} know that it has switched please.  Very important. ”  (TRVa2800.)  [...] responded one minute later stating “the owners are excluding all structural foundation demolition work from their CCIP, which applies to our work this time. ”  (Italics added.)  (TRVa2803.)  [...] immediately sent another e-mail to Morris and Dimacale confirming “this contract with C. [...] that has been excluded. ”  (Italics added.)  (TRVa2808.)  Thus, as the trial court observed, “as of August 5, 2015, all parties involved in the CCIP - including [[...]] -undoubtedly knew and understood that [[...]] was not enrolled in the CCIP.
[brief] Additionally, excess policies are not subject to the statutory mandates placed on primary auto insurance coverage.  It is for this reason that Injury to an Insured exclusions are repeatedly upheld and found not to violate public policy in connection with excess policies, or any policies other than primary auto insurance.  Appellants suggest no compelling reason to apply to one form of insurance the statutory requirements governing another, or why the [...] should be rewritten.  In the alternative, Appellants argue that coverage is available under the excess UIM coverage part of the [...] based on the insureds’ reasonable expectations.
[brief] DNJMa24-25 (citing *Schmidt*, 155 N.J. at 50-51).  The panel cited the *Schmidt* Court’s holding that Exclusion C.5 did not apply to the claims asserted in *Schmidt* because there was no allegation that the employer acted intentionally.  The panel noted that to hold that coverage existed based on wording contained in Exclusion C.7 would be contrary to the holding in *Schmidt*, which the panel concluded supported the conclusion that a claim of intentional wrongdoing was excluded by the Policy.  DNJMa25-26.  Most importantly, the *Tejada* Court concluded that there was no basis to support the contention “that public policy favors coverage for plaintiff’s intentional wrong[ claim] filed in [the] Law Division.
[brief] ”  (Pa 22)  The stated purpose of the GPS warrant was to allow members of the State Police to instantly and continuously track the position and location and receive monitoring signals of the [Audi.]  . . .  The information provided by the GPS will allow for the covert investigation of the violations of the criminal laws, as well as to identify individuals engaging in them.  . . .  Its only function is to identify the [Audi] location and travel and transmit monitoring signals as authorized by the Court[.]  (Pa 21-22)  ______________________
[brief] [...], ESQ., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. [...]; MAYOR [...]; DEPUTY MAYOR [...]; COMMITTEE-PERSON [...]; COMMITTEEPERSON [...]; COMMITTEEPERSON [...]; and BUSINESS ADMINISTRATOR [...]; INDIVIDUALLY AND IN THEIR OFFICIAL CAPACITIES, Defendants-Respondents.  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE  DIVISION  Appellate Docket No. [...]  CIVIL ACTION  On Appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey Law Division, Civil Part Passaic County Docket No. [...]  Sat Below: Hon. [...], J.S.C.  BRIEF AND APPENDIX OF RESPONDENTS
[brief] Article III Standing Requirements is directly from the US Constitution.  [...] did not reveal how much it paid [...] for the forged recycle mortgage assignment of 2/27/2009 (065a), the Affidavit of Lost Note of 2/12/14 (088a), and for the mortgage assignment of 2/28/14 (097a).  Also [...] did not reveal how much it paid [...] to forge my signature on the HAM Agreement of 2015 (103a) and to forge my signature on her Notary Journal dated 10/18/22 (115a).  The total costs of that forgery operation cannot exceed $1,000.  And [...] wants to take my house for that.  In the Foreclosure Complaint of 5/12/16 [...] did not prove any injury in fact and it lacked Article III Standing for a Federal Claim and State claim.
[brief] **CONCLUSION**  For the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully requested that the Court reverse the conviction entered against the Defendant, [...] and/or remand for a new sentencing.  RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED BY [...] ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT s/[...]  Dated: May 10, 2023  ROBERT N. AGRE, ESQUIRE  Superior Court of New Jersey  APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. [...]
[brief] Following the case management conference, [...] entered a November 9, 2023 Case Management Order providing in relevant part:  2.  Punch list or highlighted specific requests of any outstanding paper discovery shall be served by existing parties by November 13, 2023.  3.  The existing parties’ answers to the punch list or highlighted requests of any outstanding paper discovery shall be provided by November 20, 2023.  4.  Depositions of existing parties’ fact witnesses shall be conducted by December 1, 2023.  5.  The Plaintiffs’ Motion to Strike is adjourned to December 15, 2023, with Oral Arguments set for the same date, unless the motion is withdrawn.  6.  Supplemental information, if any, as to the Motion to Strike should be filed via E-Courts with hard copy mailed to the Court by December 8, 2023.  [A27]  On November 20, 2023, Defendants provided responses to the “Punch List” in accordance with the November 9 Order.
[brief] To be clear, the [...] were already brought in and dismissed from the underlying litigation on purely legal grounds – the lack of an affidavit of merit.  No facts can change that.  Even if the court were to apply the “interests of justice” standard set forth in Lawson v. Dewar, 468 N.J. Super. 128 (App. Div. 2021), the court finds that it would be manifestly unjust to reconsider its prior decision regarding the [...].
[directive] Point of Contact  Providing Response: County: Date of Response: Address 2: City/Town: State/Province: ZIP/Postal Code: Country: Email Address: Phone Number:  1.  Does your County maintain written policies or procedures for handling SAFE Kits?  N/A Yes No Other (please specify)  2.  Does your County maintain written policies or procedures for logging SAFE Kits?  N/A Yes No Other (please specify)  3.  Does your County have written policies or procedures that list speciﬁc criteria for submitting SAFE Kits to an approved forensic laboratory for testing?  N/A Yes No 16 | P a g e Appendix A 4.  Does your County have policies or procedures that specify timelines within which your agency should send SAFE Kits to an approved forensic laboratory for testing?  N/A Yes No  5.  Does your County maintain written policies or procedures for tracking SAFE Kits?  N/A Yes No 6.  Does your County maintain written policies or procedures for storing SAFE Kits?  N/A Yes No Law Enforcement  The following questions should be completed by each law enforcement agency (Municipal/County/State Law Enforcement Agency).
[brief] On January 14, 2019, the plaintiff, a New Jersey attorney, filed a complaint for fees that omitted a statement that a bill was mailed to the defendant and omitted compliance with Rule 1:20A-6.  1a.  The complaint made a bald statement at paragraph 7 that there was an invoice and at paragraph 11 admitted that the plaintiff’s purported mailings on November 16, 2019 of a Pre-Action Notice were returned by the post office.  Thus, never served.  The plaintiff next misrepresents at paragraph 12 that there was service when that is impossible as in the same filing he admits the mailings were returned.  The lower court’s docket shows that the complaint was never served within sixty-days of filing it, which would have been March 14, 2019.
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[directive] a.  [예/Yes]  [아니요/No]  [해당없음/NA]  유죄 인정을 하면 귀하의  보호관찰  또는 가석방  조건을 위반하는 아십니까?  결과가 발생한다는 것을  Do you realize that a guilty plea may result in a violation of your probation or parole?
[brief] 13  Commonwealth v. Carnes, 933 N.E.2d 598 (Mass. 2010) ..................................................  25  Commonwealth v. Chappell, 40 N.E.3d 1031 (2015) ..........................................................  16  Commonwealth v. Fulgiam, 73 N.E.3d 798 (Mass. 2017) .................................................. 13, 14, 16
[brief] Appellant, [...] (“Jenkins”), was terminated for her theft of hospital funds.  Unable to accept the consequences of her actions, she filed this action alleging retaliation in violation of the Conscientious Employee Protection Act (“CEPA”), N.J.S.A. 34:19-1 to -14, by Respondents, [...] (“[...]”), [...] (“[...]”), and [...] (“[...]”) (collectively, “Defendants”).  [...] employed Jenkins as a Staffing Coordinator, with duties that included ensuring various hospital units were adequately staffed and inputting employee time to facilitate payroll.  Jenkins believed she was underpaid and regularly complained about it, joining in multiple requests for more money.  Those requests were denied.  Jenkins then abused her position of trust by entering a category of additional pay—known as “charge pay”—to give two other staffing coordinators, [...] (“[...]”) and [...] (“[...]”), an extra dollar per hour for each of their shifts.  In return, they entered “charge pay” for Jenkins.  The three did so without approval.  They did so by manipulating the payroll system to which they had access to after their supervisor reviewed the records, but before the time was posted, in order to avoid detection.  Ultimately, their misconduct was discovered and their employment was terminated.  Jenkins argues she was a whistleblower because she complained about her supervisor, [...], and was terminated in retaliation for that protected activity.  However, as the trial court found below, no reasonable fact finder could credit those claims for several reasons.  As an initial matter, the trial court found that none of Jenkins’s “complaints” implicate any reasonably believed violations of law or public policy, putting them outside the scope of conduct protected by CEPA, which is fatal to her claims.  All of Jenkins’s “complaints” were either made years prior to her termination, or amounted to generalized gripes about her allegedly callous supervisor.  Even if that were not the case, [...] investigated and addressed Jenkins’s complaints prior to terminating her employment.  Moreover, the trial court found that these complaints played no role in the decision to terminate Jenkins’s employment, which was made for legitimate non-retaliatory reasons that cannot be rebutted.  Jenkins schemed with two coworkers to pay themselves more money, without approval, thereby defrauding and stealing from [...].  On appeal, Jenkins has failed to identify any genuine issues of material fact capable of supporting her claim.  This Court should affirm the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendants.  **PROCEDURAL HISTORY**
[brief] The application of the Fourth Amendment's requirement of probable cause does not depend on whether an intrusion of this magnitude is termed an "arrest" under state law.  The mere facts that [a person] was not told he was under arrest, was not "booked," and would not have an arrest record if the interrogation had proved fruitless...obviously do not make [the person's] seizure even roughly analogous to the narrowly defined intrusions involved in Terry and its progeny.  Dunaway v. New York, supra, at 212-13.
[brief] [...] vowed to "provide a plan that . . . show[s] that the drainage works" (1T21-21 to 1T21-22).  It should be noted that the applicant sought a design waiver from the required placement of street trees to accommodate the proposed drainage system.  See Da163 ([...] review letter, item III-1); see also the Flannery testimony at 1T4-24 to 1T5-2; 2T28-4 to 2T28-15.  Although [...] represented that a homeowner association would be formed to manage stormwater (see 2T29-25 to 2T30-2), an objector's planning expert ([...]) pointed out that no documentation had been submitted for review (see 2T79-4 to 2T79-23).  And when Board Engineer/Planner [...] suggested a conservation easement to alleviate drainage concerns, [...] retorted that the applicant did not have to make any concessions since it was 'only' requesting waivers.