ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Presumably, this would involve reviewing the proposed pleadings for legal sufficiency and determining whether the allegations, if proven true, would constitute viable legal claims.  Instead, the trial court adopted opposition’s viewpoints, rendering a decision in their favor, without a detailed analysis.  (65a-67a)  “Naked conclusions do not satisfy the purpose of [Rule] 1:7-4. ”  Curtis v. Finneran, 83 N.J. 563, 570 (N.J. 1980).  Furthermore, Defendants argue that their supplemental complaints raised issues of disputed facts and law, which were not argued and decided previously.  The fundamental principles of due process and fairness require that Defendants have an opportunity to present evidence, cross-examine witnesses, and argue the facts before the trial court makes a determination on those facts.  Finally, Defendants highlight that their claims involving fair market value for the Boonton and Florida Properties did not accrue until [...] and [...] legally closed.
[brief] Rather, N.J.S.A. 49:3-69(a)(2) should be read expansively and conjunctively, consistent with legislative intent, as offering a non-exhaustive and non-exclusive list of possible enforcement remedies under that provision of the Securities Law.  Furthermore, if the Legislature had used “and” instead of “or,” the clause would require the court to either enter an order awarding all three remedies, or an order awarding none, i.e., it would provide that “the court may enter an order of rescission, restitution and disgorgement. ”  Because many cases do not call for granting all three remedies – for example, rescission is not possible when all defrauded investors have already sold the subject securities – the Legislature used “or” instead of “and. ”  This ensures that the court may order one, two, or three of these remedies depending on the circumstances. \(^6\)  “[A]n interpretation of a statute should not lead to an absurd result. ”  *In re Young*, 202 N.J. 50, 69 (2010) (citing *Pennsauken v. Schad*, 160 N.J. 156, 170 (1999)).  See also *Schad*, 160 N.J. at 170 (quoting *State v. Provenzano*, 34 N.J. 318, 322 (1961)) (“[i]t is axiomatic that a statute will not be construed to lead to absurd results. ”).  (Alterations in original).  **B.
[brief] The Supreme Court stated, in relevant part:  N.J.S.A. 18A:16-1.1 repeatedly states that a teacher serving in place of another should be "designated" as such.  To "designate" in common parlance means "[t]o indicate or specify," "[t]o give a name or title to," or "[t]o select for a duty, office, or purpose."  Webster's II New Riverside University Dictionary 367 (1994).  Thus, the natural reading of "designate" contemplates that a person, who is "designated" as having some conferred status, is informed that he or she has been so designated or is made aware of that conferred status.  It is a basic rule of statutory construction to ascribe to plain language its ordinary meaning.  See D'Annunzio v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 192 N.J. 110, 119-20, 927 A.2d 113 (2007) ("[W]e look first to the plain language of the statute, and we ascribe to the statutory language its ordinary meaning." (citations omitted)); N.J.S.A. 1:1-1 (providing that words in statutes shall be given their "generally accepted meaning, according to the approved usage of the language" unless that reading is inconsistent with "the manifest intent of the legislature" or "different meaning is expressly indicated").  Bridgewater-Raritan at 360.  [Emphasis added].
[brief] Moreover, any agreement alleged to exist by Appellant is rendered unenforceable by virtue of Appellant’s request for a new offer of settlement from Respondent.  Subsequent to the provision of the agreement, a teleconference was scheduled at which time counsel for Respondent informed counsel for Appellant of her intent to repudiate the settlement agreement.  Pa109-Pa111, para(s).  4-6.  During the call, counsel for Appellant then requested that Respondent provide her proposal for settlement on different terms and asked that it would be provided in writing to ensure her position did not change.  Id.  Respondent did so, and the Appellant rejected her proposal for settlement.  Pa115-Pa116; Pa61.5  It is clear from the facts that there is no ‘meeting of the minds. ’  Appellant requested a new offer of settlement on different terms than the original.  Not only does this demonstrate that there are ongoing negotiations and therefore no meeting of the minds but, moreover, Respondent provided the requested counteroffer which was rejected.  Accordingly, there is no ‘meeting of the minds’ and no acceptance.
[brief] Respectfully, /s/ [...]  [...], J.D. Attorney for Defendant  May 24, 2024  [...], 041202006  Assistant Prosecutor Director, Appellate Section Of Counsel and  On the Brief email: [...]  Honorable Judges of the Superior Court of New Jersey  Appellate Division  Richard J. Hughes Justice Complex Post Office Box 006 Trenton, New Jersey  08626  Re State of New Jersey (Plaintiff-Respondent) v. [...] (Defendant-Appellant)  Appellate Division  Docket No. [...]  Municipal Appeal No. [...]; Misc. Case No. [...]  Criminal Action: On Appeal from a Final Judgment of Conviction in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division (Criminal), Monmouth County
[brief] The federal district court relied on alleged fraudulent joinder to maintain jurisdiction over the case in federal court.  This is so despite the fact that the Honorable [...] U.S.D.J. struck the [...] complaint in its entirety, which contained the defamatory material on October 11, 2006, making the [...] March 7, 2006, complaint a nullity.  In addition, [...] continued to enforce the prior sealing Order by [...].  [...], in the Court’s Order gave the [...]’s twenty (20) days to file an amended complaint (operative complaint), which removed all of the defamatory statements.
[brief] Pa32.  Included with the Petition were other retired Troopers who are requesting registration and amended health benefits in retirement.  Pa32.  All of those Troopers provided affidavits that they also did not receive notice of the Ricci Bill’s passage.  Pa32.  Pa86-122.  Furthermore, other Troopers who are not currently ill, but were only seeking to register for the Ricci Act also filed affidavits that they did not receive notice of the Ricci Act and were included in the Petition.  Pa30.  Pa123-270.  Additionally, other retired Troopers who were not present at the September 11, 2001 attacks and aftermath also submitted affidavits that they did not receive any notice of the Ricci Act in further support of the Petition.  Pa271-281.  President of the [...], [...], submitted an affidavit that he did not receive any correspondence or postcard from the [...] notifying him of the Ricci Act.
[brief] (7T:96-20 to 97-3)  [...] stated that he wrote the incident report when he returned to work – about eight weeks after the incident – from a combination of his recollection and the evidence provided to him.  (7T:99-19 to 100-12, 104-1 to 6)  [...] testified that he injured his middle finger, and that his injury was the result of punching [...].  (7T:98-6 to 16; 156-18 to 157-10)  He stated that he had some neck pain after the arrest, without specifying the cause.  (7T:98-16 to 18)  [...] testified that he sustained “a small fracture” in his right wrist when he fell on the ground in the parking lot, while “rolling around with [...]. ”  (6T:163-19 to 164-5)  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT
[brief] (Ra3-7).  Relevant here, DEP analyzed [...]’s compliance with the Scenic Resources and Design Rule.  (Ra6-7).  First, DEP noted that the Project did not need to meet the Scenic Resources and Design Rule because it is located in the Redevelopment Zone, and instead needed to follow the Redevelopment Plan’s October 15, 2020 amendment for the subject property.  Ibid.  Since the Project is located within the [...], the corresponding Long Branch Redevelopment Plan and Design Guidelines Ordinances – which DEP had previously approved as “consistent” with the CZM rules – do not require the open view corridor or the setback N.J.A.C. 7:7-16.10(d)(1-2) usually requires.  Ibid.  Indeed, DEP found that the rule’s setback requirement has not been applied within the [...], in furtherance of comprehensive redevelopment planning.  Ibid.  Finally, DEP noted that the Project provides a 25% view corridor to the shoreline, even though a “significant portion” of the viewshed westward of [...] is blocked by preexisting development.  Ibid.  On July 19, 2023, DEP noticed issuance of the permit in the DEP Bulletin.  (Aa62).  On August 9, 2023, [...] requested an adjudicatory hearing and also a petition demanding that DEP rule on the request within thirty days.
[brief] The law is well-settled that enlargement must be granted in circumstances where (1) substantial and novel constitutional questions; (2) informal or ex parte determinations made by administrative officials that do not involve a sufficient crystallization of a dispute along firm lines to call forth the policy of repose and where the right to relief depends upon determination of a legal question; and (3) an important public rather than a private interest that requires adjudication or clarification.  See In re Ordinance 2354-12 of West Orange, Essex Cnty. v. Twp. of West Orange, 223 N.J. 589, 601(2015).
[brief] (Pa34).  A Notice of Motion for a new trial pursuant to Rule 4:49-1(a) was filed on behalf of the plaintiff on July 5, 2023.  (Pa35).  The plaintiff argued that the jury’s verdict was inconsistent and against the weight of the evidence and that aggregation of erroneous evidentiary rulings by the Trial Court and improper comments by defense counsel in summation resulted in a miscarriage of justice.  (Pa37-Pa46).  The defendant filed opposition and the motion was argued before [...] on August 4, 2023.  (8T).  After hearing oral argument, [...] found that the evidentiary rulings were appropriate, that the curative instruction given to the jury in regard to defense counsel’s comments during summation cured any prejudice to the plaintiff, and that the verdict was supported by the evidence.  (8T20:5-36:18).  An Order denying the motion for a new trial was filed on August 4, 2023.  (Pa47).  A Notice of Appeal was filed on behalf of the plaintiff on August 25, 2023.
[brief] Ocean County Indictment No. [...] (July 7, 2021)  .......................  Da 1-7  Ocean County Superseding Indictment No. [...] (Sept. 8, 2022) .................................................................................. Da 8 to 14 [...], Dash Camera Motor Vehicle Recording (MVR) (Aug. 7, 2020), State’s Suppression Exhibit S-4 ................................ Da 15 [...], MVR Transcription, State’s Suppression Exhibit S-8 .............................................................. Da 16 to 50 [...], Car Search Inventory Log Sheet, State’s Suppression Exhibit S-5 ............................................................. Da 51 [...], Consent to Search Home Form, State’s Suppression Exhibit S-6 ............................................................. Da 52 [...], Officer Report for Case [...], State’s Suppression Exhibit S-7 ............................................................. Da 53 to 64 Order Denying Motion to Suppress (July 28, 2022) ................................ Da 65 Opinion and Order Denying Pro Se Motion to Dismiss Indictment (Dec. 28, 2022) .................................................................................. Da 66 to 86 Order and Opinion Denying Pro Se Motion for Reconsideration of July 28, 2022 Suppression Order (Mar. 28, 2023) ................................. Da 87 to 101 Order Dismissing Pro Se Motion to Suppress (Mar. 28, 2023) ............... Da 102 Plea Forms, Ocean County Superseding Indictment No. [...] (Mar. 28, 2023) .................................................................................. Da 103 to 110 Judgment of Conviction and Order for Commitment, Ocean County Superseding Indictment [...] (June 6, 2023) ........................ Da 111 to 114 Notice of Appeal .................................................................................. Da 115 to 118 INDEX TO APPENDIX (CONT’D) Defendant’s Brief in Support of Motion to Suppress¹ (Exhibits Omitted) ................................................................. Da 119 to 130 State’s Brief in Opposition to Motion to Suppress (Exhibits, Proposed Order, and Certificate of Service Omitted)... Da 131 to 141 Defendant’s Reply Brief in Support of Motion to Suppress ......... Da 142 to 146 INDEX TO CONFIDENTIAL APPENDIX Search Warrant Affidavit (Aug. 5, 2020), State’s Suppression Exhibit S-1 .............................................. Dca 1 to 7 Search Warrant (Aug. 5, 2020), State’s Suppression Exhibit S-2 ..............................................
[directive] 3.5  “Departures” from the Prescribed Authorized Dispositions (See also Sections 12 and 13)  As the Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized, the primary purpose of N.J.S.A. 2C:35-12 is to provide practical incentives for defendants, especially lower and middle-level drug offenders, to cooperate with law enforcement agencies in identifying, apprehending, prosecuting, and convicting other, more culpable drug offenders.
[brief] ”  *Francois v. Bd. of Trs., Pub. Emps.’ Ret. Sys.*, 415 N.J. Super. 335, 349 (App. Div. 2010) (citation omitted).  Here, the statute provides for the benefit if a retiree files for it within two years of the effective date of the Ricci Act, i.e., by July 8, 2021.  [...] did not file for the benefit within the time permitted by the statute, so even under a liberal construction, the statute expressly states he is ineligible for the benefit he now seeks.  Nevertheless, [...] argues that the limitation period in the statute should not be strictly applied because it “fails to advance the legislative purpose of the Ricci Act.
[brief] DEFENDANT'S CONVICTIONS BASED ON ACCOMPLICE LIABILITY FOR FIRST-DEGREE ROBBERY AND ACCOMPLICE LIABILITY FOR FELONY MURDER MUST BE REVERSED, BECAUSE MULTIPLE ERRORS IN THE RELATED JURY INSTRUCTIONS HAD THE CLEAR CAPACITY TO LEAD TO AN UNJUST RESULT (not raised below)  ........................................................................................................................................26  TABLE OF CONTENTS (CONT'D.)  1.  It Was Plain Error Not To Instruct The Jury As Part Of The Accomplice Liability Instructions That, Pursuant To State v. Whitaker, 200 N.J. 444 (2009), Defendant Could Not Be Found Guilty As An Accomplice To Robbery Or As An Accomplice To Felony Murder, Based Solely On His Conduct After Someone Else Had Robbed And Killed The Victim..................27  2.  It Was Plain Error For The Court To Instruct The Jury In The Accomplice Liability Instructions On All Of The Possible Elements Of Second-Degree Robbery And None Of The Elements Of First-Degree Robbery, Which Was The Only Theory Argued By State Based On The Victim's Death, And Then To Allow Defendant To Be Convicted And Sentenced As An Accomplice To First-Degree Robbery, Which Was Not Even A Question On The Verdict Sheet.  ..............................................31  POINT III
[brief] (See Pa25a).  Counts Six and Seven of the Complaint are directed at defendants [...] (“[...]”) and [...] (“[...]”).  (See Pa61a to Pa62a).  Count Six of the Complaint alleges individual liability under the LAD against [...].  (See Pa61a).  Count Seven of the Complaint alleges individual liability under the LAD against [...].  (See Pa62a).  On October 26, 2021, [...] and [...] moved to dismiss the Complaint pursuant to Rule 4:6-2(e), in lieu of an answer.
[brief] **ii.  Plaintiffs’ contention that the Comparative Negligence Act prohibits any departure from imposing full responsibility for tortfeasor’s deemed 60% or more at fault is belied by longstanding legislative acquiescence. **  Relatedly, plaintiffs submit that N.J.S.A. 2A:15-5.3(a) requires a party who is determined to be 60% or more at fault to pay for the total damages, with no “exceptions or circumstances under which this mandate may or should be modified. ” (Pb. 22).  Yet, *Burt* has stood as a published decision of this Court since 2001, and, in 2017, the Supreme Court explicitly endorsed the allocation method articulated in *Burt* when recognizing a similar “exception” for when one of the joint tortfeasors is an immune public entity.
[directive] Notice to court and defense counsel of defendant’s apparent eligibility to be sentenced in the court’s discretion  In the event that the prosecutor exercises the discretion afforded by paragraph a. of this Section and elects not to tender a plea offer calculated in accordance with the Brimagg Guidelines, the prosecutor shall advise the court and defense counsel that, based on currently available information, the defendant appears to be eligible upon conviction of the school zone offense(s) to be sentenced in the court’s discretion pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7b, and that the prosecutor does not intend to contest the defendant’s eligibility to be sentenced in the discretion of the court.  Such notice shall serve as the explanation for why the prosecutor has not tendered a Bfima~e plea offer as would otherwise be required in school zone cases by the Brima~e Guidelines.  If the prosecutor subsequently determines that the defendant is actually ineligible to be sentenced in the discretion of the court pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7b, see Part lI, Section 2a, infra, the prosecutor shall immediately advise lahe court.and defense counsel of the basis for that new determination, shall immediately withdraw any outstanding plea offer that does not comport with the requirements of the Brimag_~ Guidelines, and shall prepare and tender a Brimag_e. plea offer.  c.  Prosecutor’s right of allocution at sentencing
[brief] But let's get back to basics, [...].  (21T 23, lines 10-18).  [...] stated Yes.  The Court responded:  THE COURT: They have not complied.  There is no compliance.  I agree with you.  You don't need to keep arguing that.  You have asked for many, many things that you don't have as of today.  (21T 23, lines 19-24).  The Judge then gave the option of not continuing the trial.
[brief] Complaint ¶ 2.  [...] was formerly the Director of the Youth Services Department.  In that position she directed the actions of the [...] and was the Administrator for Cape May's Youth Shelter, which provided youth housing in crisis situations.  Complaint ¶ 3.  [...] was the Director of the Department of Human Services for the County.  Id. ¶ 4.  [...] is an attorney and as of January 26, 2010, she was also employed as Cape May's County Counsel.  Plaintiff alleges that in January and February 2007 [...] inappropriately interfered with recommendations he made regarding two placements to family court judge, The Honorable [...], J.S.C.
[brief] (2T35:25-36:4).  During the hearing, and solely at the suggestion of Petitioner’s counsel, the theory was presented that all of [...]’s references to Petitioner’s 2009 accident were typographical errors, and that [...] was instead referring to the 2000 incident.  (2T38:9-39:17).  Petitioner’s counsel advised [...] during the hearing that a PFRS investigation into Petitioner’s prior accidents, including a request for workers’ compensation records from the [...]’s insurance carrier, turned up no records for either the 2009 incident or another 2002 incident.  (2T38:9-22).  Petitioner’s counsel then asked [...] “to assume that [...] has testified that the [description of the 2009 incident] is actually the factual predicate of the 2000 workers’ compensation injury” adding, “this wouldn’t be the first time that a doctor has made a mistake in terms of the date on a report, would it?” (2T37:18-22).  [...] agreed with counsel’s statements.  (2T37:23).  Notably, Petitioner presented no such testimony and the typographical error theory was not raised during Petitioner’s appearance before the ALJ.
[brief] While the case against defendant indeed relied in large part on his statement, it was his self-identification that damned him.  While the State did not have a lot of physical evidence to connect defendant to the robbery, once he identified himself in the photograph the evidence instantly became overwhelming.  Two men go in to the building, two men come out.  [...] has severe injuries and is missing a wad of cash.  Video surveillance captures two men going in, running out, the taking off their tops with a wad of cash in their hands.  The missing piece was not what happened, but rather who did it.  The second defendant identified himself in the photograph, the combined evidence of his guilt was overwhelming.  Accordingly, even if the jury should not have heard [...] call defendant a liar, there is no reasonable probability that it produced an unjust result.
[directive] Veterans Diversion Program Page 2 or fourth degree; and has a prior diagnosis of mental illness or for whom a law enforcement (2) officer or prosecutor believes has a mental illness based behaviors symptoms exhibited and on during the commission of the offense or while custody, or information provided during their in investigation.  An eligible service member defined any veteran or enlisted person or officer as is of the United States Armed Forces, or a reserve component thereof, or the organized militia of New Jersey pursuant to N.J.S.A. 38A: 1-3.  A veteran defined any enlisted person or officer as is who was discharged or otherwise released from active service the United States Armed in Forces, or any reserve component thereof, or the organized militia of New Jersey, under conditions other than dishonorable.  A person not eligible for this program if he or she has: pending charges for a first or (1) is second degree crime, a prior conviction for a crime under the Early Release Act (N.J.S.A. No (2) of 2C:43-7.2), or (3) the crime or offense committed involved violence or the threat violence.  Additionally, there a presumption against admission for a person charged with any crime or is offense involving domestic violence, while subject to a domestic violence restraining order.  N.J.S.A. 2C:43-26(b)(2).
[brief] In Kleine, plaintiff was told by the admissions person that he needed to sign the agreement "right away."  Kleine at 549.  Conversely, in the instant action, the Trial Court recognized that Plaintiff had sufficient opportunity to read the Agreement and was not compelled to execute the Agreement.  Specifically, [...] stated in his ruling:  ***  Well, let –let me stop you right there.  You said he had a minute or two to read it and sign it because the line behind him was getting longer.  Well, was he forced to sign it?  He could have stepped away out of the line and reviewed it, signed it, or had questions about it then.  I—don’t understand what—the issue you brought up about, he didn't have time to review it.  I—I don't understand how that—how that plays into this.  Certainly he didn't have to sign it.  He could have stepped out of line, reviewed it, and, it he wanted to proceed, sign it, or not.  ***  T.11 L. 22-T. 12 L. 9.  Clearly, Plaintiff voluntarily entered the Park, signed the Agreement, and received the benefit of the bargain for which he signed the Agreement.  Plaintiff has failed to provide any reason to suggest that he did not intend to be bound and the Agreement must be enforced by its terms.  Therefore, the Appellate Division should affirm the Trial Court's May 2, 2024 Order granting [...]'s Motion to Stay the litigation and Compel Arbitration.