ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] x.  Trial Court's Irrationally Decided That Plaintiffs Civil Rights Were Not Violation Because He Was Granted Adjournments Prior To Being Removed, Locked Out, And Belongings Stored And Said Decision Was Arbitrary, Capricious, Error And An Abuse Of Discretion Because The Interference Or Deprivation Of His Right To Adjournments Upon Request Was Not Extinguished By Granting The Denied Request After Civil Action In Response To The Denials and said decision follows the Trial Court's acknowledgment that request were in fact refused prior to civil action [1T]
[brief] In July 2012, the Office of the State Comptroller conducted an extensive audit of PERS local employer locations.  See [...], State of New Jersey Office of the State Comptroller, Improper Participation by Professional Service Providers in the State Pension System (2012) (“Comptroller Report”).  The Comptroller Report found that, in violation of Chapter 92, a significant number of professional services providers remained enrolled in PERS after January 1, 2008, even though many were engaged through professional services contracts awarded under the Local Public Contracts Law (the “LPCL”), N.J.S.A. 40A:11-1 thru -60, or were not “employees”
[brief] ”  Id. at 232.  The Court noted that its holding was consistent with the “expressed public policy and purpose of the statute, ‘the restitution of fraudulently obtained insurance benefits. ’”  Ibid. citing to N.J.S.A. 17:33A-2.  The Court concluded by stating that "[...] is liable to Plaintiff for compensatory damages which include the full restitution of any payments received from plaintiff during the time it was not licensed by the State Department of Health & Senior Services and reasonable investigation, expenses, costs of suit, and attorney's fees."  Id. at 234.  Similarly, in the case of Allstate v. Greenberg, 379 N.J. Super. 419 (Law Div. 2005), the Court held that Allstate's claim for disgorgement set forth an equitable cause of action.
[directive] Background  The Report is the culmination of historic investments made by the State of New Jersey in community violence intervention (CVI) initiatives:  Since 2020, Governor [...], the New Jersey Legislature, and the Office of Attorney General have committed over $125 million in funds to three new initiatives: CBVI programming, Hospital-based Violence Intervention Programs, and Trauma Recovery Centers.  These investments, in turn, were the product of significant efforts by the advocacy community that called for the State to invest in this programing, and built on years of operation of CVI initiatives at the grass-roots and community level.  CVI is best understood as a complementary public safety strategy to traditional law enforcement or policing, which traditionally uses the enforcement of the law to seek justice and promote safety.  CVI programs operate in the communities, neighborhoods, and on the blocks that are most likely to experience violence, focusing on the individuals at highest risk for violence and victimization, and are led by credible messengers who de-escalate conflicts before violence occurs.  The Working Group explicitly did not address issues that are covered by other areas of the Attorney General’s Office like mental health co-response, substance use diversion, community crisis response or other diversionary or harm-reduction initiatives which come under other units, such as the Office of Alternative and Community Responses (OACR).  The focus of this Working Group remained on the intersections of law enforcement and violence intervention.  Pursuant to the authority granted to me under the New Jersey Constitution and the Criminal Justice Act of 1970, N.J.S.A. 52:17B-97 to -117, which provides for the general supervision of criminal justice by the Attorney General as chief law enforcement officer of the state in order to secure the benefits of a uniform and efficient enforcement of the criminal law and the administration of criminal justice throughout the state, I hereby encourage all Relevant Law Enforcement Agencies operating under the authority of the laws of the State of New Jersey to implement and comply with the provisions of these Guidelines and to take any additional measures necessary to update their policies and practices accordingly.
[brief] BECAUSE APPELLANT WAS SERVED (T4 97:11 TO 101:6)  It is well settled that “a sheriff's return of service is part of the record and raises a presumption that the facts recited therein are true. ”  Garley v. Waddington, 177 N.J. Super. 173 (App. Div. 1981).  The party challenging the presumption of service must present “clear and convincing evidence that the return is false. ”  Resol. Tr. Corp. v. Associated Gulf Contractors, Inc., 263 N.J. Super. 332, 343–44 (App. Div. 1993), see also Goldfarb v. Roeger, 54 N.J. Super. 85, 89–90 (App.Div.1959).  Appellant’s assertion that the Trial Court erred in affording the Affidavit of Service the presumption of validity and “improperly shifted the burden onto [Appellants] to prove by clear and convincing evidence that they were not served” ignores established judicial practice and case law.  No legal authority exists that reverses the burden of proof to the serving party.
[brief] No expert testimony on the reliability of cross-racial eyewitness testimony was given at trial.  The only testimony given on the subject was by [...], the officer in charge of directing the show-up identification, who, on cross-examination, agreed that he was “aware of studies suggesting that cross [-]racial identifications can be more difficult for people. ”  VRP (Oct. 21, 2009) at 57.  He also agreed that “sometimes people of different races will have a more difficult time identifying somebody of a different race,” though he did not see any indication of difficulties in [...]' identification.  VRP (Oct. 21, 2009)”  \(^{52}\) Municipal Court transcript [1T52:8-10, 1T53:1-21 -11/29/2022]  However, this element does not apply as the plaintiff’s witness, the defendant and the defendant’s witness are all African American.
[brief] Instead, the $35,000 figure only looks at a 12 month period (see N.J.S.A. 56:10-4), while the “20% requirement” has no specific time frame, and a number of courts have held can be proven by a mere small window of the business relationship.  See In re Faber Assocs., Docket No. 16-cv-2821, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 202763 (D.N.J. Dec. 13, 2016) (“Importantly . . the 20% requirement does not feature a time period to determine whether the 20% threshold [is] met”); see also, Harter Equip., Inc. v. Volvo Constr. Equip. N. Am., Inc., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27210 (D.N.J. Sept. 24, 2003) (“The Court finds that by its plain language, the statute does not set forth any particular time period within which to make the determination of whether the franchisee’s gross sales satisfy the 20% requirement. ”).  Here, the Trial Court granted [...]’s Motion for Summary Judgment on [...]’s NJFPA claim for a single, narrow reason.
[directive] Examining collateral issues can provide the law enforcement agency and its executive officers with information concerning: (a)  The utility and effectiveness of the agency's policies and procedures.  (b)  The competency and skills of individual law enforcement officers.  (c)  Appropriate topics for in-service training programs.  (d)  The allocation of resources by the law enforcement agency and other municipal agencies.  43  INTERNAL AFFAIRS POLICY & PROCEDURES | June 2021
[brief] The [...] MCS-90 endorsement to [...] specifically stated:  In consideration of the premium stated in the policy to which this endorsement is attached, the insurer (the company) agrees to pay, within the limits of liability described herein, any final judgment recovered against the insured for public liability resulting from negligence in the operation, maintenance or use of motor vehicles subject to the financial responsibility requirements of Sections 29 and 30 of the Motor Carrier Act of 1980 regardless of whether or not each motor vehicle is specifically described in the policy and whether or not such negligence occurs on any route or in any territory authorized to be served by the insured or elsewhere …  It is understood and agreed that that no condition, provision, stipulation, or limitation contained in the policy, this endorsement, or any other endorsement thereon, or violation thereof, shall relieve the company from liability or from the payment of any final judgment, within the limits of liability herein described, irrespective of the financial condition, insolvency, or bankruptcy of the insured.  (PPCIa182-83).  [...] as the insured remains liable to reimburse [...] in the event [...] must pay on the surety endorsement.
[brief] On October 17, 2023, I filed a complaint against [...]/[...] ([...]), [...]/[...], and [...] (Da1).  The law suit was regarding a picture of me that was taken inside the privacy of my home where there is no visibility to the public that they were using without my consent all over social media, on flyers, in protests, etc.  (Pa1).  I do not know who took this picture or how they obtained it, but I never gave consent to anyone to use this picture.  This picture was not the original picture used in the social media posts, flyers, etc.  The original picture that was used was a proper looking picture of me (Pa2).  That picture was purposely changed out for this picture in which I look ‘unkempt’ to say the least.  On December 7, 2023, a motion was made by the Defendant to extend time to answer the complaint.  I objected to that motion on December 16, 2023.  On January 2, 2024, the Defendant’s made a motion for admission for Pro Hac Vice.  On January 2, 2024, the Defendants also made a reply to my objection to an extension of time to answer the claim.  Attached to that reply, was the order to show cause (Da47).  The Defendant failed to follow he correct procedures for filing an order to show cause.  The result was that when the defendants uploaded the reply to the motion into JEDS, they uploaded it only as ‘reply brief’ and did not in any way notify the court that there was an order to show cause there as well (Pa3).  This made the courts, as well as myself, unaware there was ever an order to show cause filed.  On January 24, 2024, before any answer was filed and before any discussion or information was provided by me to the defendant, I voluntarily dropped the case (Da58).
[brief] DOCTRINE  As an alternative ground for affirming the trial court’s judgment denying [...]’s claim for recovery of the amount it paid toward indemnity, even if it is determined that [...] was enrolled in the CCIP at the time of the Accident, settlement payments made by [...] on [...]’s behalf are unrecoverable payments subject to the voluntary payment doctrine (“VPD”).  To apply the VPD, this Court must only make four determinations, namely that [...]: 1) made the settlement payments voluntarily, 2) was without a mistake of fact, 3) was not a victim of fraud, and 4) was not under duress or extortion.  Cont'l Trailways, Inc. v. Dir., Div. of Motor Vehicles, 102 N.J. 526, 548 (1986).
[directive] ALL LAW ENFORCEMENT CHIEF EXECUTIVES FROM: [...], Director  DATE: January 8, 2001  SUBJECT: Revised DMV Standard (Refusal)  Statements for Persons Arrested for DWI, N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.2(e) and/or CDL/DWI, N.J.S.A. 39:3-10.24e  In accordance with an amendment to N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.4a (P.L.1999, c.185, §5) and to conform to a recommendation of the Supreme Court in State v. Widmaier, 157 N.J. 475, 498-499 (1999), the Standard Statements (commonly referred to as the "Refusal" statement), which must be read to every person arrested for a DWI violation under the provisions of N.J.S.A. 39:4-50, or for a DWI in a commercial motor vehicle violation under the provisions of N.J.S.A. 39:3-10.13, have been revised.  These revisions, as adopted by the Acting Director of the Division of Motor Vehicles, will become effective Thursday, February 1, 2001.  Copies of both revised Standard Statements are attached.  By law (N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.2(e); N.J.S.A. 39:3-10.24e), a standard statement prepared by the Director of DMV is required to be read to every person arrested by the police, based upon the officer's reasonable suspicion to believe that the person may have been operating a vehicle (N.J.S.A. 39:4-50) or a commercial motor vehicle (N.J.S.A. 39:3-10.13) while under the influence level.1 of alcohol or with a blood alcohol concentration at, or above, the per se 1  For a DWI violation the per se limit is a blood alcohol concentration of 0.10% or more of alcohol in the blood.  For a CDL/DWI violation, the offense the per se limit is a blood alcohol concentration of 0.04% or more in the blood or breath.  See N.J.S.A. 39:3-10.11, Definitions, “alcohol concentration. ”  New Jersey Is An Equal Opportunity Employer
[brief] Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335 (1980) | 46 | | Doe v. Poritz, 142 N.J. 1 (1995) | 60 | | Gaines v. Comm'r of Corr., 51 A.3d 948 (Conn. 2012) | 23 | | Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286 (1969) | 62 | | Harris v. Reed, 894 F.2d 871 (7th Cir. 1990) | 49 | | Hinton v. Alabama, 571 U.S. 263 (2014) | 28 | | In Re Advisory Letter No. 7-11, 213 N.J. 63 (2013) | 75 | | In re Directive of the N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 110 N.J. 69 (1988) | 60 | | Lawrence v. Armontrout, 900 F.2d 127 (8th Cir. 1990) | 52 | | Lombardi v. Masso, 207 N.J. 517 (2011) | 66 | | Matter of Robertelli, 248 N.J. 293 (2021) | 37 | | McAleese v. Mazurkiewicz, 1 F.3d 159 (3d Cir. 1993) | 49 | | Ouber v. Guarino, 293 F.3d 19 (1st Cir. 2002) | 49 | | People ex rel. Daley v. Fitzgerald, 526 N.E.2d 131 (Ill. 1988) | 62 | | CASES (cont'd) | PAGE NOS. | |------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------| | **People v. Cleveland**, 981 N.E.2d 470 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012) | 47 | | **Shumway v. State**, 293 P.3d 722 (Kan. App. 2013) | 23 | | **State ex rel. S.G.**, 175 N.J. 132 (2003) | 48 | | **State ex rel. W.C.**, 85 N.J. 218 (1981) | 61 | | **State in the Interest of A.B.**, 219 N.J. 542 (2014) | 61 | | **State v. B.H.**, 183 N.J. 171 (2005) | 28 | | **State v. Bradshaw**, 195 N.J. 493 (2008) | 53 | | **State v. Butler**, 27 N.J. 560 (1958) | 61 | | **State v. Carsetti**, 306 A.2d 166 (R.I. 1973) | 58 | | **State v. Carter**, 85 N.J. 300 (1981) | 55 | | **State v. Chew**, 179 N.J. 186 (2004) | 28 | | **State v. Cook**, 43 N.J. 560 (1965) | 61 | | **State v. Farrell**, 61 N.J. 99 (1972) | 53 | | **State v. Ford**, 240 N.J. Super. 44 (App. Div. 1990) | 67 | | **State v. Friedman**, 4 N.J. Super. 187 (App. Div. 1949) | 58 | | **State v. Fritz**, 105 N.J. 42 (1987) | 23, 32 | | **State v. Hanna**, 248 N.J. 148 (2021) | 59 | | **State v. Hannah**, 448 N.J. Super. 78 (App.
[brief] Were you satisfied with the fact that they -- with them commending you for coming forward?  A.  Yeah, satisfied to an extent.  Q. Okay.  What's the extent?  A.  I felt recognized, so that felt good.  Pa53, T87:22-88:3, Pa57, T104:1-7; T105:9-13 ; and Pa58, T106 :10-107 :13.
[brief] *Pfaus*, 97 N.J. Super. at 8.  The trial court did not abuse its discretion in preliminarily maintaining the status quo in the [...] while [...]’s administrative action proceeds.  See *Rinaldo v. RLR Inv., LLC*, 387 N.J. Super. 387, 395 (App. Div. 2006) (reviewing trial court’s decision to grant or deny preliminary relief only for abuse of discretion); *Horizon Health Ctr. v. Felicissimo*, 135 N.J. 126, 137 (1994) (“The authority to issue injunctive relief falls well within the discretion of a court of equity.
[brief] (11T: 49-2 to 6; 11T: 77-21 to 78-6).  Also on [...], he recovered a black and blue Nike Air Jordan sneaker for a left foot.  (11T: 54-17 to 55-5).  Later a matching right-foot sneaker was given to him by [...] (11T: 76-19 to 20).  Additionally, multiple spent shell casings and projectiles were recovered from the area at [...] and [...] where the victim was shot.  (11T: 60-1 to 64-14; 11T: 71-6 to 7).
[brief] In this appeal, the issue is a purely legal one, namely pertaining to the court's subject matter jurisdiction.  *Santiago v. N.Y. & N.J. Port Auth.*, 429 N.J. Super. 150, 156, 57 A.3d 54 (App. Div. 2012).  The case involves Rule 1:20A-6, known as the Pre-Action Notice, that regulates both attorney and court conduct, as listed in New Jersey’s Rules of Court under “Chapter II. Conduct of Lawyer, Judges and Court Personnel” and subsection 1:20 under “Discipline of Members of the Bar”.  The rule was established for the utmost importance of insuring that lawyers conduct themselves ethically with respect to their billing and fees by providing clients with notice of their right to fee arbitration before a lawsuit for fees can be filed.  The rule also imposes responsibilities on the court by directing it to dismiss any complaint that does not comply with Rule 1:20A-6’s mandatory Pre-Action Notice requirements, which the complaint must clearly state that 30-days have elapsed since service of the Pre-Action Notice, made by both certified and regular mail.  In this case, the Plaintiff, a New Jersey attorney, filed a complaint violating R. 1:20A-6’s Pre-Action Notice mandates.  The lower court dismissed the complaint and on October 2, 2019 ordered that the case was dismissed and would not reinstate it because the plaintiff never served the mandatory Pre-Action Notice before filing the complaint.  Thus, the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction when it was filed.  Personal jurisdiction was also lacking as the complaint was never served on the defendant.  Two years after that dismissal, the court reinstated that void complaint and simultaneously issued a judgment on it despite lacking subject matter and personal jurisdiction.  The court’s September 23, 2022 decision, on the record, states numerous times that the appellate court may disagree with it but it believes that (a) dismissing a complaint for lack of jurisdiction is the same as an order for a stay and (b) reinstating a dismissed complaint complies with Rule 1:20A-3’s mandate that a separate action must be filed to obtain judgment.  Both beliefs of the lower court are in error, and contrary to the law.
[brief] The omission of a separate and distinct “statement of the purpose” for Ordinance 13-2022 is not fatal to the requirements of N.J.S.A. 40:49-2.  The failure to include a separate “statement of purpose” did not inhibit in any way Plaintiff’s opportunity to learn of the contents of the Redevelopment Plan, determine whether it applied to their property or a neighboring property, or to participate in the public hearing on the Ordinance.
[brief] In 2008 plaintiffs amended their complaint joining Appellant, who had obtained a judgment against [...] in 2005.  (Da 22-26)  Prior to the foreclosure suit [...] had obtained a Chapter 7 bankruptcy discharge of personal obligations.  In 2013 plaintiffs applied for a final foreclosure judgment & submitted a proposed form of judgment stating therein the validity of Appellant’s judgment lien that would be paid out of surplus monies generated from a sheriff sale.  The proposed judgment was entered in the form submitted.  (Da 27-29)  In 2021 plaintiffs moved to extinguish the judgment lien on the basis that their acceptance, in 2016, of a DIL, was on the belief that their foreclosure judgment had invalidated the judgment lien.  (Da 39-45)  The motion was granted.  (Da 46)  Appellant appealed & moved for a stay of plaintiffs’ intended sale of the property.  [...] granted the motion by ordering an accelerated appeal.  (Da 47)  After briefing oral argument was held.  Plaintiffs informed this Court & Appellant, for the first time, that the property had been sold.  Plaintiffs contended that even if there was a reversal, the judgment would not be paid due to an anti-merger clause in their mortgage or DIL, which subordinated the judgment to the unpaid purported mortgage.  This Court, in a written opinion, did reverse & remand holding that the judgment lien was not invalidated by either the foreclosure judgment or DIL.  This Court also held that because the sale was not part of the record the case would be remanded to determine whether the sale affected the payment of the judgment.(Da57-67)
[brief] TABLE OF CONTENTS  Page  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ........................................................................................................ iii  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS ........................................................................................................  iv  TABLE OF TRANSCRIPTS ..................................................................................................... v  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT .................................................................................................  1  PROCEDURAL HISTORY .......................................................................................................  3  1.  The Initial Pleadings ......................................................................................................  4  2.  The Motions For Summary Judgment ...........................................................................  5  3.  The Motions For Reconsideration ..................................................................................  8  (a)  The reconsideration motion of [...]/[...] ......................... 8  (c)  The “cross motion for summary judgment” by [...] and [...] ............... 9  4.  Oral Argument of July 14, 2023 ....................................................................................  11  5.  The Post-Argument Submission .....................................................................................  11  6.  The July 17, 2023 Decision and Order ..........................................................................  12  7.  Plaintiff’s Motion For Relief From a Final Order ..........................................................  12
[brief] Instead, Landlord posits that notwithstanding the use of “shall” in the clause just cited, payment of the $730,000 was essentially optional, because the term “up to” was a maximum ceiling under which Landlord could unilaterally elect to pay less, perhaps zero.  ---  4  For the Court’s reference, Tenant lists the Reimbursement Conditions on pages 6-7 of its initial brief.  Landlord is mistaken.  While “up to” sometimes imposes a limit or boundary, as in “up to 50,000 copies a month,” it just as often, if not more often, means “as much as,” denoting the minimum point to which something is extended, such as “up to his knees in mud. ”\(^5\)  Out of these two ordinary uses of “up to,” the latter is clearly the most logical in the context of § 4.02, and the Landlord’s preferred construction the more far-fetched for at least three reasons.
[brief] ”  He points out that he was not in the hotel room when the crimes occurred, and “was not even in the state of New Jersey. ”  He emphasizes that the crimes occurred more than three hours after [...] and [...] last were in his presence, and he did not possess a gun, gloves, or duct tape.  [...]'s argument overlooks a basic principle of conspirator liability, namely, that the agreement is the heart of a conspiracy charge, and “[a]ctual commission of the crime is not a prerequisite to conspirator liability.
[brief] This Court also should not reverse the trial court’s discretionary ruling to preclude Plaintiffs from offering evidence at trial in support of claims for attorneys’ fees or punitive damages.  Plaintiffs’ claim for attorneys’ fees does not fall within any recognized basis under New Jersey law, and Plaintiffs’ attempt to base their claim on “the interests of equity” and alleged “shenanigans” is not consistent with New Jersey law and would lead to claims for attorneys’ fees in virtually every case in New Jersey.  Similarly, Plaintiffs’ claim for punitive damages fails to meet the high threshold for such a claim required under New Jersey law.  Accepting as true all of the evidence in the motion record proffered in support of Plaintiffs’ claims for such damages, the trial court found that Plaintiffs had not demonstrated a sufficient basis on which to seek either of them.  The trial court’s decision was neither incorrect nor an abuse of discretion, and should be upheld.