ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] Formulario enmendado promulgado por la directriz #01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 10080-Spanish página 5 de 7 Revised Form Promulgated by Directive #01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 10080-Spanish page 5 of 7  4.  (5)  ¿Entiende que si usted infringe una condición de la supervisión bajo [Sí/Yes] [No/No] [NC/NA] libertad condicional de por vida, le podrán revocar la libertad condicional y lo podrán enviar a la cárcel por un período de entre 12 y 18 meses por cada revocación que ocurra mientras lo están supervisando, y que el término de encarcelamiento que reciba no se podrá reducir por conmutación o créditos por trabajo?
[brief] As for balancing the applicable factors, the court stated:  “And so the Court in weighing the aggravating and mitigating factors and applying the considerations outlined in the relevant case law .  . . .  The Court, uh, is going to sentence, uh, [...] on Count – at Count 1, robbery in the first degree, to a term of imprisonment to the custody of the Commission of the Department of Corrections for a term of 17 years. ” (6T 14-3 to 14)  There is no indication that the court engaged in any qualitative assessment of the relevant factors or that the court thoughtfully considered how to balance them.
[brief] Upon consideration, the Court should hold that the statute does not require a motorist to signal prior to changing lanes.  In the alternative, the Court should hold that the statute is unconstitutionally vague as applied to this case.  See Db 18-19.  Either ruling would render unlawful --- \(^3\)  As a case in point, the manual states that “New Jersey law prohibits add-on tinting on windshields and front-side windows. ”  Id. at 47.  The Supreme Court determined in Smith, however, that window tinting is only prohibited where it is so dark “that police cannot clearly see people or articles within the car. ”  251 N.J. at 265.  Thus, not only did the Supreme Court not defer to the [...]’s ([...]) interpretation of N.J.S.A. 39:3-74 when deciding Smith, but the [...]’s current guidance conflicts with published law.  the traffic stop of Smith’s car, in which [...] was a passenger, and suppression of all evidence seized during the course of the traffic stop would therefore be required.  **POINT II**
[brief] Respondents all moved for summary judgment on the same issue, arguing a number of improper contentions, each of which the Law Division accepted.  Those errors will be outlined in greater detail in this brief.  However, the most notable analytical error -- the one from which all other mistakes flowed -- was that the Law Division read the word “adjacent” out of Article 3 of the Lease; mistakenly believing that the words “adjacent” and “adjoining” were synonyms, when they are not.  The Law Division thus stated: “In this case, the plain and unambiguous language requires the tenants to maintain the areas in front of their stores and nothing more. ”  That is not what “adjacent” means.  The Law Division also found that the fall happened in a so-called “common area,” not a walkway or sidewalk.  In support, the Law Division cited a single photograph and observed that this walkway area was asphalt, like the parking lot next to it.  To the contrary, the photograph shows that it would be foreseeable that a pedestrian would use it as a sidewalk and, in fact, were invited to use it for such a purpose.  Ignoring expert opinion to the contrary, the Law Division appointed itself the decisive juror and resolved what was, at best, a disputed fact, based on its review of a single photograph:
[brief] A jury could find that the relentlessness of the efforts to damage [...]’s career and force [...] from the workplace as set forth above could dissuade a reasonable employee from making or supporting a claim of discrimination.  Importantly, retaliatory harassing conduct can satisfy the Burlington Northern/Roa standard even if it is not severe or pervasive enough to alter the terms and conditions of employment.  See, e.g., Martinelli v. Penn Millers Ins. Co., 269 F. App’x 226, 230 (3d Cir. 2008) (ruling that after Burlington Northern, an employee claiming “retaliation by workplace harassment” is “no longer required to show that the harassment was severe or pervasive”).  The retaliatory actions taken against [...] were much more than just the disciplinary actions taken against him, something the trial court failed to analyze or even acknowledge.  Point  IV
[brief] “The law imposes upon the driver of an automobile the duty of exercising such care as is reasonable under all the circumstances confronting the driver at the particular time.  This duty requires motorists to use our streets and highways with reciprocal regard for the rights of others who may also be using them.  Thus, a motorist is required to make such observations for traffic and vehicles which are in or may come into the motorist’s path of travel, as a reasonably prudent person would make. ”  “Indisputably, the defendant had a duty to make proper observations as she approached and entered the intersection.  See Beck v. Washington, 149 N.J. Super. 569, 572 (App. Div. 1977)"  Troiani-Schwartz v. Dicker, Unpublished, DOC. NO. [...], 6 (App. Div. 2018).  Pa158.  Plaintiff will prove at trial that the defendant by his own admission did not see the plaintiff until the impact occurred.  This negligent lack of awareness of other vehicles within the intersection was a cause of and contributed to this accident.  Pa121:23-25, Pa122:1-3.
[directive] INTERNAL AFFAIRS POLICY & PROCEDURES | November 2022 49  8.2.7  A grant of use immunity shall be recorded on a form the subject officer signs and whose signature is witnessed.  The completed form must be made a part of the investigative file.  See the sample form in Appendix H.  In all cases, approval from the authorizing assistant prosecutor or deputy attorney general must be obtained before giving the Garrity warning.  8.3
[brief] As a respondent, [...] submits the trial court’s opinion granting the dismissal of plaintiff’s claim against [...] was well-reasoned and should be affirmed.  As a cross-appellant, [...] articulates an independent basis for the dismissal of plaintiff’s malpractice action.  More specifically, plaintiff initiated suit against [...] well beyond the applicable two-year statute of limitations.  Directly subsequent to [...] filing its answer, however, plaintiff’s malpractice claim against [...] was salvaged by the trial court’s misapplication of the court rule governing fictitious party pleading practice.  This brief details the deficiencies associated with plaintiff’s manner of pleading that resulted in [...] defending against a time-barred claim.  STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[brief] Similarly, a government body’s determination that a defect is material is reviewed for whether it is “arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable, or [ ] not supported by substantial credible evidence in the record as a whole. ”  Barrick, 218 N.J. at 259 (bracket in original); see also On-Line Games, 279 N.J. Super. at 267-68 (finding “there is sufficient credible evidence to support the Township's conclusion that [...]'s bid was materially defective”); On-Line Games, (finding “the Treasurer fully analyzed this issue and that his ultimate conclusion that [...]'s bid was non-conforming in a material way was supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole and accorded with the legislative policies underlying our public bidding laws”).  In short, “if a public entity's decision [on conformity and materiality] is grounded rationally in the record and does not violate the applicable law, it should be upheld. ”  Ernest Bock, 477 N.J. Super. at 263.  c.  The County’s determination of whether to waive a non-material defect must be reviewed for clear abuse of discretion.
[directive] This Directive supersedes Directive #8-65 (“Sentencing in Gambling Cases”), issued by then Administrative Director [...] on November 5, 1965, and promulgates the Supreme Court’s restatement and refinement of the procedure set out in that earlier Directive for the handling of cases involving gambling offenses under N.J.S.A. 2C:37-1 et seq.  This change results from a recommendation by the Judicial Council and is based on the changes to the management structure of the Judiciary that have occurred since 1965, specifically the advent of the vicinage Criminal Presiding Judge position and statewide Criminal Division standardization.  The Court approved this restatement at its December 7, 2004 Administrative Conference.  The focus of the earlier Directive was the need to achieve uniformity in the handling of gambling cases, in particular the sentencing in such cases.  For more than a decade, the Judiciary has been working to standardize the various components of the court system, with the Criminal Division among the first to undertake that task.  In light of the standardization of the Criminal Division and the strong supervisory role now played in the vicinage by the Criminal Presiding Judge, the Judicial Council, when asked to review the earlier Directive, concluded that gambling cases, including sentencing in gambling cases, should be handled according to the regular procedures of the Criminal Division in the vicinage.  The Supreme Court concurred in that conclusion.  Any judge assigned to handle Criminal cases in the vicinage can be assigned gambling cases, including the Directive # 1-05 January 20, 2005 Page 2 sentencing in those cases, rather than all such cases being assigned to just one judge.  Please provide a copy of this Directive to all judges assigned to the Criminal Division, as well as to any other judge who will be handling Criminal matters.  Any questions or comments regarding this Directive should be directed to the AOC’s Criminal Practice Division at [...].  P.S.C. /sdb cc: Chief Justice [...]
[brief] ..........................................................  16 - **Terner v. Spyco, Inc.**, 226 N.J. Super.  532 (App. Div. 1988).  ............................................................  15 - **W. Kingsley v. Wes Outdoor Advertising Co.**, 55 N.J.336, 339 (1970) ..............................................  17 - **White Castle v. Planning Bd.**, 244 N.J. Super. 688, 690–92 (App. Div. 1990), certif. den. - 126 N.J. 320 (1991).
[brief] Specifically, it asserted that N.J.A. C. 14:5-7.1 imposed an unconditional requirement for [...] to follow the existing route through [...], and that therefore the Ordinance requiring [...]’s approval was invalid.  In actuality, the regulation the court relied upon provides in relevant part:  (a)  Whenever an EDC constructs an overhead transmission line, it shall:  1.  Make use of available railroad or other rights-of-way whenever practicable, feasible and with safety, subject to agreement with the owners; N.J.A.C. § 14:5-7.1 (emphasis added).  In concluding that this regulation barred the Town from having any say in the construction of the line, the court totally wrote out of existence the requirement that it be done with the agreement of the owner of the right-of-way.
[brief] Order Attached as A16  Exhibit N: April 14, 2024  Order Attached as A18  Exhibit O: Defendants’ Letter dated 4/18/23 A225  Exhibit P: Plaintiff’s First Set of Interrogatories and First Request for Production of Documents to Defendant [...], Esq. and [...]  A228  Exhibit Q: September 8, 2023  Order Attached as A20  Exhibit R: Defendants’ Responses to Plaintiff’s Interrogatories and Request for Production of Documents Attached as A308  Exhibit S: Defendant’s Answer and Crossclaims Attached as A44  Exhibit T: Plaintiff’s Punch list with responses Attached as A68  Exhibit U: December 22, 2023  Order Attached as A29  Exhibit V: December 22, 2023  Order Attached as A29  Exhibit W: Transcript of Deposition of [...]  A353  Exhibit X: Amended Certification in Reply to Plaintiff’s Opposition  A357  Exhibit Y: Letters to Bank and IRS  A363  Exhibit Z: Transcript of February 8, 2024 Conference. submitted separately  Exhibit AA: Amended Answers to Punch List Attached as A81  Exhibit BB: Transcript of Motion to Reinstate submitted separately  Exhibit CC: Certification of Plaintiffs’ Counsel in support of motion for suppression  A367  Table of Authorities State Cases
[brief] Gerba v. Bd. of Trs., Pub. Emps.’ Ret. Sys., 83 N.J. 174, 189 (1980) (citations omitted).  An agency’s factual determinations are presumptively correct; on review of the facts, a court will not substitute its own judgment where the agency’s findings are supported by sufficient credible evidence.  *Rooth v. Bd. of Trs., Pub. Emps.’ Ret. Sys.*, 472 N.J. Super. 357, 365 (App. Div. 2022).  Additionally, this court gives “substantial deference to an agency’s interpretation of a statute that the agency is charged with enforcing,” *Richardson v. Bd. of Trs., Police & Firemen’s Ret. Sys.*, 192 N.J. 189, 196 (2007).  “Such deference has been specifically extended to state agencies that administer pension statutes,” because “a state agency brings experience and specialized knowledge to its task of administering and regulating a legislative enactment within its field of expertise. ”
[brief] He told the jury that a suspended trooper is obligated to turn in all “badges, identification cards, and other [NJSP]-owned property and equipment. ”  (10T 79-9 to 15)  [...] told the jury the same thing.  (11T 38-14 to 22)  [...] also testified that defendant filed a report with the NJSP dated January 6, 2016, in which he claimed he lost --- \(^3\) Point III, infra, addresses the propriety of the judge’s eventual decision to fail to instruct the jury on those legal obligations, leaving the recitations of [...] and others to be the only time the jury heard about those requirements.  his wallet, including the wallet ID, on January 4, 2016, and that, suspecting he left it at a physical-therapy office in Brick, he contacted that office to see if anyone had found it, but the wallet was not recovered.
[brief] The indictment charged the defendant with crimes against “[...] and/or [...] and/or [...]. ”  *Id.* at 31.  During deliberations, the jurors indicated that they agreed that [...] used force during the course of the events but could not come to a conclusion as to who was the victim of the use of force.  *Id.* at 31-32.  The jurors asked what was considered a unanimous vote.  *Id.* at 32.  The trial court informed the jurors that as long as they agreed that the defendant had used force against another, then the jury was unanimous and the State had proved the use of force beyond a reasonable doubt.  *Ibid.*  The New Jersey Supreme Court reversed [...]’s conviction.
[brief] [...] Investigates the Unauthorized Entry and Receipt of Charge Pay.  Following this discovery, [...] contacted HR.  (Pa475).  HR Business Partner [...] launched an investigation.  (Pa102-03 at 77:20-78:14).  [...] interviewed each of the staffing coordinators about the charge pay.  [...] was present for various interviews.  (Pa99 at 62:11-63:5).  [...] took detailed notes for each of these interviews.  (Pa536-41).  Neither [...], nor [...], nor [...] dispute the accuracy of [...]’s notes.  (Pa193 at 138:17-140:7; Pa245 at 83:5-84:8; Pa319 at 166:8-167:3).  On September 3, 2020, [...] and [...] met with [...].  (Pa473).  [...] recalled a conversation she had with [...] upon her discovery of their receipt of charge pay.  [...] asked [...] why [...] would be receiving charge pay.  [...] attempted to shift responsibility to management, stating that the “higher uppers” would have more information.  (Pa473).  [...] also met with [...], but [...] did “not know anything about hourly charge. ” (Pa543).  [...] and [...] also met with [...].  (Pa545; Pa99 at 63:4-9).  During their meeting, [...] denied receiving charge pay and explained that none of the staffing coordinators receive hourly charge pay.  (Pa545).  [...] admitted she was working on July 27, 2020—the exact date that the Kronos Time Card Audit Trail reveals her login information was used to enter charge pay on behalf of [...].  (Pa545).  During her interview, [...] never claimed that [...] directly approved her entry or receipt of charge pay.  (Pa545).  And [...] confirmed at her deposition that she had no firsthand knowledge of [...] approving charge pay for any staffing coordinator.  (Pa297 at 80:10-14).  [...] also met with [...].
[directive] (2)  The propertpswbject to seizure poses an immediate threat to the public health, safety or welfare.  G F c.  For the purposes of this section:  "Untaxed special fuel" means diesel fuel, No. 2 fuel oil and kerosene on which the motor fuel tax is imposed pursuant to R.S.54:39-1 et seq. is not paid that delivered, possessed, sold or transferred in this State in a manner not authorized pursuant to R.S.54:39-1 et seq. or P.L.1938, c.163 (C.56:6-1 et . seq .)  Amended 1979,~.344,s. 1981 ,c.2907s.46; 1992,c.23,s.70.  1 ; Forfeiture procedures; prima facie contraband 2C:64-2.  - - 3  2  Document Page of Forfeiture Procedures; Prima Facie Contraband.  Except as provided in N.J.S.  2C:35-21, prima facie contraband shall be retained by the State until entry of judgment or dismissal of the criminal proceeding, if any, arising out of the seizure.
[brief] The State moved for an extended sentence based on defendant's eight prior convictions, including a prior firearms conviction under N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(2).  After hearing argument, the judge granted the State's motion providing “the extended term range of sentencing for the crime of murder is [thirty-five] years to life and the statute requires that [thirty-five years] be served without parole. ”  The impact statements submitted from [...]'s mother and brother were also considered.  The judge found no mitigating factors, but found aggravating factors three, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(3), “risk that the defendant will commit another offense,” six, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(6), “extent of the defendant's prior criminal record and the seriousness of the offenses of which the defendant has been convicted,” and nine, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(9), “need for deterring the defendant and others from violating the law. ”  The judge found the aggravating factors predominated.  Defendant was sentenced to a fifty-year prison term for murder, subject to the No Early Release Act (NERA), N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2, to be served consecutively to a ten-year sentence with a five-year period of parole ineligibility for unlawful possession of a firearm.  On appeal, defendant argues:
[brief] Here, the trial court correctly held that *Tox* “points out the limiting language of *Atalese*” and that “[c]ommercial entities such as the parties here should not need to be told if they agree to arbitrate, they can’t litigate also. ” (Pa7.)  Appellants then curiously rely on *County of Passaic*, which reaffirmed that *Atalese* is generally inapplicable to commercial contracts.
[brief] BRIEF AND APPENDIX ON BEHALF OF DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT  THOMAS J. DINAPOLI [...] 60 Route 46 East Fairfield, New Jersey  07021 [...]  Attorneys for [...]  Of Counsel: [...] (030781998)  On the Brief: [...] (335352021)  TABLE OF CONTENTS  PROCEDURAL HISTORY ...........................................................................................................1  STATEMENT OF FACTS .............................................................................................................2  LEGAL ARGUMENT ..................................................................................................................9  POINT I.  THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY PRECLUDED  [...]’S TESTIMONY AS TO BZE ALLEGEDLY FOUND IN THE DEFENDANT’S SYSTEM BECAUSE THIS EVIDENCE HAD VERY LITTLE PROBATIVE VALUE, WOULD MISLEAD THE JURY, AND WOULD GREATLY PREJUDICE THE DEFENDANT.  (Pa 24)  .................................................................9  POINT II.  THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY PRECLUDED  [...]’S TESTIMONY AS TO BZE ALLEGEDLY FOUND IN THE DEFENDANT’S SYSTEM BECAUSE ITS INTRODUCTION ONLY SERVED AS EVIDENCE OF OTHER CRIMES, WRONGS, OR ACTS FOR THE PURPOSE OF PROVING THE DEFENDANT’S GUILT.  (Pa24)  ..................................................13  CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................................17
[brief] The hotel developer gave notice of "138 rooms along with the following amenities: (1)  Meeting rooms (2)  Food prep area/kitchen (3) Lounge (4) Bar area (5)  Dining area (6) Pool & (7) Exercise Room" (slip op. at 7), but did not identify the proposed banquet facility.  The approval was void based on the panel's application of Pond Run and Perlmart.
[directive] d) Você entende que terá que fornecer ao devido órgão policial as informações sobre a rotina do [Sim/Yes] [Não/No] (se o crime foi seu acesso ou uso de computador ou dispositivo habilitado com internet? cometido em 25 de fevereiro de 2008 ou após esta data)  Do you understand that you must provide the appropriate law enforcement agency with information about your (if the offense was committed on or routine access to or use of a computer or device with Internet capability? after February 25, 2008) e) Você entende que se não notificar o devido órgão policial sobre a rotina do seu acesso ou uso [Sim/Yes] [Não/No] de computador ou dispositivo habilitado com internet ou uma mudança de tal uso ou acesso, você estará sujeito à acusação de um crime de terceiro grau e poderá receber uma pena de 1o (se o crime foi cometido em de julho de 2014 ou após esta data) prisão de até 5 anos ou estará sujeito à acusação de um crime de quarto grau e poderá receber uma pena de prisão de (se o crime foi cometido em 25 de fevereiro de 2008 ou após esta data mas até 18 meses 1o antes de de julho de 2014)?
[brief] On the other hand, Judges must avoid actual conflicts of interest as well as the appearance of impropriety in order “to promote confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the Judiciary. ”  DeNike v. Cupo, 196 N.J. 502, 507 (2008).  In matters of conflict or impropriety, the Administrative Office of the Court has issued policy statements allowing venue transfer without motion.  Thus R. 4:3-2 and R. 4:3-3 must be exercised in service to Policy #5-15 which states that “the Assignment Judge…shall take appropriate action to avoid any appearance of impropriety.
[brief] - Paragraphs 257-262 and 270-275 alleged that [...], acting individually and on behalf of the [...], instituted a criminal complaint against [...] by filing a false handwritten complaint with the [...] on August 6, 2019.  - Paragraphs 268 and 281 alleged that [...] and the [...] were motivated by malice, namely that [...] was admittedly “incensed” when he filed the criminal complaint.  The evidence submitted in support of the motion further established that [...] Board members, after learning the [...] intended to take legal action if the [...] blocked their direct access to the beach, discussed how a criminal complaint against [...] would give them a litigation advantage.  •  Paragraphs 264-267 and 277-280 alleged that [...] and the [...] lacked probable cause to prosecute the criminal complaint because (1) [...] later admitted at deposition he knew that the statements in the criminal complaint were false and that he did not witness [...] doing the alleged acts, and (2) the Municipal Court concluded there was no probable cause.  •  Paragraphs 267 and 280 alleged that the criminal action was terminated favorably to [...] when the Municipal Court concluded there was no probable cause.  (Pa65-Pa72).  The trial court erroneously concluded that the proposed malicious prosecution claim would be futile because [...] could not prove (1) that a criminal action was instituted against him; and (2) that [...] lacked probable cause.
[brief] By sentencing defendant to an extended term of six years with two years of parole ineligibility—a sentence shorter on both counts than the State sought—it imposed a fair penalty for defendant’s crimes.  The judge acknowledged defendant’s extensive history of indictable convictions and disorderly persons offenses, placing great weight on that history in his finding that the aggravating factors substantially outweighed the mitigating factors, which was all that was required to impose a discretionary prison term and parole disqualifier.  Defendant’s reasonable sentence should therefore be upheld.