ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Meder, 240 N.J. Super. at 478-80.  In that case, defendant [...]  (“[...]”) contracted with [...]  (“[...]”) to supply building material for a construction project.  Id. at 472.  The plaintiff’s decedent died in a fall while working on that construction project.  *Ibid.*  All defendants but [...] settled with the plaintiff, and the trial court dismissed the plaintiff’s claim against [...] at the close of her proofs.
[brief] T3, 160:1-12.  As to his motive to lie when specifically asked about [...], [...] said that the police had it “out” for [...] and that they kept “threatening” [...] “with fake charges”.  T3, 160:17-25.  Upon the State’s application, the Court approved the introduction of [...]’s statement.  T5, 48:8-12.  As it did with [...], the State introduced the redacted statement of [...] through [...].  The salient points of Mr.  Telfair’s statement are as follows:  1.  He was in the car with [...] somewhere between 3:00 and 3:30 when he, [...] and [...] went to the 7-Eleven.  T6, 30:20-25, 31:1.  2.  Telfair left [...], went back to the “Ville”.  T6, 31:10-12.  3.  “[...]”, full name unknown, was on the phone and on speaker with [...] when Telfair began to hear shots.  T6, 31:18-20.  ([...] later identified “[...]” as [...].)  T6, 139:16-19.  4.  [...] was giving [...] “play by play” of his location.  5.  Later in the day on August 11, 2015, Telfair met with [...], whom he identified as [...], during which [...], in remarks that Telfair attributed to the Butler killing said “that shit done deal”.
[brief] Exhibit 1- Extracts from Plaintiff’s Deposition ..............................................Pa145  Exhibit 2 – September 19, 2023  Order from Costlow v. Oppenheimer, [...] .................................................................Pa147  Exhibit 3 – Complete Expert Report from [...] included in confidential appendix  Exhibit 4 – Expert Report from [...] included in confidential appendix  Court’s December 1, 2023  Order Compelling the DME ..............................Pa149  Order granting stay, filed December 12, 2023 ...........................................Pa151  Order granting leave to appeal, filed December 26, 2023 .............................Pa154  DiFiore v. Pezic, No. 087091(June 15, 2023) (slip op.) .................................Pa156  VOLUME II OF II (Pa198-265)
[brief] Via its §IV, pp. 19-23, the Response argues that the denial of the appellant’s Motion for Recusal was not an error below.  The demonstrated partiality or appearance thereof by the trial judge against the appellant was apparent from the following:  1.  The trial judge cherry picked facts to support its opinion, showing its bias (raised via Appellate Brief, Point Five, pp. 25-27).  2.  The trial judge formed the following beliefs by being receptive to facts misrepresented to him by the appellant’s adversary:  “THE COURT: [...], do you want to sign it by virtue of your power of attorney?  Then we can get the space.  Get conformance, get the space right in front of your house” (1T10, 14-17).  THE COURT: “And, [...], if you want to explain that to [...], you're free to have the floor.  I know you're trying to work out a compromise with him, but it doesn't seem that he's open minded at this time,” (1T12, 20 - 23).  And, in forming such belief, the trial judge overlooked the HUD letter (Pa37), which showed that HUD ceased its direct involvement in 2020.  (Raised via §III, pp. 6-10, and Point Four, pp. 23-25, of Appellate Brief.)  3.  The trial judge decided the appellant’s Motion for Recusal, before hearing it and denied his R. 4:52 Motion without a hearing or opposition papers (raised via Appellate Brief, Point One, pp. 17-18 and Point Six, pp. 28-29).
[brief] *DiProspero v. Penn*, 183 N.J. 477, 492 (2005); *Ross v. Hotel Emps. & Rest. Emps. Int’l Union*, 266 F.3d 236, 245 (3d Cir. 2001).  Generally speaking, if the language of a statutory provision is “plain,” courts employ its “plain meaning,” giving the words of the statute “their ordinary meaning and significance. ”  *Nicholas v. Mynster*, 213 N.J. at 480 (citing *DiProspero*); *Hardt v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co.*, 560 U.S. 242, 251 (2010).  However, in deciding whether a particular statutory provision is “plain,” courts do not construe the provision “literally or in isolation,” as Appellant effectively proposes.  *Pettus v. Morgenthau*, 554 F.3d 293, 297 (2d Cir. 2009).  See also *Guiseppi v. Walling*, 144 F.2d 608, 624 (2d Cir. 1944) (The Honorable [...], stating: “There is no surer way to misread any document than to read it literally. ”); [...], A Matter of Interpretation 24 (1997) (noting “the good textualist is not a literalist”); Perez v. Rent-A-Ctr., Inc., 186 N.J. 188, 208 (2006).  Instead, “[t]he plainness or ambiguity of statutory language is determined by reference to the language itself, the specific context in which that language is used, and the broader context of the statute as a whole.
[brief] Id.  See also Lopez v. Swyer, 62 N.J. 267, 273 (1973); Fernandi v. Strully, 35 N.J. 434 (1961)  A fortiori, neither plaintiff nor his counsel were entitled to wait until receipt of any or all of the tenants’ leases before filing suit against them.  Plaintiffs’ cause of action in the instant matter accrued on the date of loss, March 16, 2017.
[brief] Negotiations shall not include indirect costs such as fuel or tolls.  As a condition of negotiations, a contracted service provider shall reveal to the school district whether the entity has insurance coverage for business interruption covering work stoppages.  A school district shall not be liable for the payment of benefits, compensation, and emoluments pursuant to the terms of a contract with a contracted service provider under this paragraph for services which otherwise would not have been provided had the school facilities remained open.
[brief] The point is that the judicial function here is quite a mechanical one.  The trial court is not concerned with the worth, nature or extent (beyond a scintilla) of the evidence, but only with its existence, viewed most favorably to the party opposing the motion.  *Dolson v. Anastasia*, 55 N.J. 2, 5-6 (1969) (citations omitted).  The trial court’s Opinion and Order granting [...]’s Motion for Reconsideration ignored and failed to consider any of the evidence presented, other than the evidence that property damage is continuing to occur as part of [...]’s remediation efforts.
[brief] Finally, the Court found that there was no invalidity of service based upon the process server himself being somehow in what Appellants allege is collusion.  The judge addressed this and dismissed it as simply untenable, including the allegation of office-sharing.  T4 98:1-6.  The judge found that the process server was there, spoke with someone who identified themselves as (what he heard as) [...], and that the evidence including the GPS coordinates places him there at the right date, right time and right location.  T4 97:16 to T4 101:6.  Thereafter Appellant filed this appeal.
[brief] For example, [...] filed a certification but the Arbitrator failed to grant any favorable inferences from [...]’s denials, when summary judgment’s standard required all of those statements to be accepted as true.  (Da2548)  (4T53:12-20)  In that certification [...] had disputed that he owed medical bills.  (Da2550-51)  However, the Arbitrator gave no benefit of any favorable inferences and did not accept the denial as true or creating a genuine issue for dispute.  Instead, he awarded $95,000 for medical reimbursement.
[brief] “As such, a consent judgment may only be vacated in accordance with R. 4:50-1.”  Id., citing Middlesex Concrete, etc. Corp. v. Cartaret, 35 N.J. Super. 226, 235 (App. Div. 1955).  Rule 4:50-1 states:  On motion, with briefs, and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or the party's legal representative from a final judgment or order for the following reasons: (a) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (b) newly discovered evidence which would probably alter the judgment or order and which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under R. 4:49; (c) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party; (d) the judgment or order is void; (e) the judgment or order has been satisfied, released or discharged, or a prior judgment or order upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment or order should have prospective application; or (f) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment or order.  Here, there was never any motion to vacate the Consent Judgment nor were there any arguments advanced that any party should be relieved from the Consent Judgment for any reasons enumerated under Rule 4:50-1.
[brief] First and foremost, Appellant has failed to provide a scintilla of evidence or a cite to the record that [...] committed theft of client work product, let alone had any involvement or control over the use or the dissemination of the Project Plans.  In fact, on or about November 14, 2017, Appellants terminated all existing contractual relationships with Appellee and as such, [...] had no custody or control, let alone ownership of the Project Plans nor other work product that Appellants allege was converted.  Additionally, any purported conversion or theft of Project Plans raises questions of professional and ethical duties, as referenced by Appellant in the Complaint, that can only be evaluated by a professional engineer with experience regarding the customary practices related to the custody and control of Project Plans.  As the Trial Court properly reasoned, “[i]n the field of professional engineering, the proper use, and determination of ownership of particular engineering plans and designs is a complex issue that requires expert opinion and determination, pursuant to the factual circumstances of the individual case. ” (Pa972).  Accordingly, Appellants were required to obtain an affidavit of merit to sustain the allegations in the Complaint that “[...] and [...] breached their professional and ethical duties to Plaintiffs by selling the engineering site plans and drawings to [...]. ”  (Pa19) (emphasis added).  The factual record is clear that no Affidavit of Merit was obtained by Appellants and served on [...] within 120 days after [...] filed its Answer to the Complaint on or about April 23, 2019.  Accordingly, [...] filed a Motion to Dismiss of the Complaint and Crossclaims for Appellants failure to obtain an Affidavit of Merit in accordance with N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-27.  On or about August 30, 2019, the Trial Court granted [...]’s Motion to Dismiss.  B.
[brief] The Current Litigation  Sometime after the execution of the Settlement Agreement, [...] demanded that [...] execute certain documents in connection with the Florida probate and administration of [...]’s and [...]’s Estates.  (Da13, at ¶ 28).  [...] refused and asserted her rights to receive [...]’s 21.5 percent interest in the Palm Beach Property, which passed to her through the Residuary Clause of [...]’s Trust.  (Da14, at ¶ 30).  On April 29, 2024, [...] filed the Verified Complaint and Order to Show Cause.  (Da1; Da7).  [...] sought a “declaratory judgment” that prohibits [...] from asserting an interest in the Palm Beach Property aside from what is expressly identified in Paragraph 24(F) of the Settlement Agreement and an order compelling [...] to execute documents in Florida.  (Da14-15).
[brief] Neither of defendant’s objections to the judge’s response to the second jury note\(^{17}\) has merit.  First, the judge was not obligated to give the model supplemental charge, “Judge’s Inquiry When Jury Reports Inability to Reach Verdict. ” (See Da27). \(^{18}\)  A Czachor instruction may be given more than once to a jury.  State v. Figueroa, 190 N.J. 219, 234-35 (2007) (citing Czachor, 82 N.J. at 406).  In this case, nothing suggested that the jury had reached an “impasse” prohibiting a second Czachor instruction.  Rather, the jury revealed it had reached some decisions in less than one day of deliberations, but also asked the judge what it should do.  (21T36-3 to 10).  See Figueroa, 190 N.J. at 239-40 (considering brevity of deliberations, no error for judge to avoid asking whether further deliberations would likely be fruitful); cf. State v. Adim, 410 N.J. Super. 410, 420-21, 424 (App. Div. 2009) (ruling when second jury note came before 10:00 a.m. of second day of deliberations indicating no agreement on any counts and each juror was “firm on their decision,” and nobody believed further --- \(^{17}\)
[brief] Rule 4:21A-(c)(2)  Rule 4:37-2(a)  Rule 4:46  Rule 4:46-1 Rule 4:46-2  Rule 4:46-2(b)  Rule 4:46-2(c)  Rule 4:50-1  Rule 4:105-5  Rule 4:105-5(a)  Rule 4:105-5(b)  Rule 4:105-5(e)  Rule 6:3-3  Rule 6:3-2(a)  Rule 6:3-3(c)(3)  Rule 6:3-3(c)(4)  Rule 12A:3-305(3)  Case Law: American Oil Co. v. Valenti, 179 Conn. 349 (Conn. 1979)
[brief] Both the Supreme Court of the United States and this Court have held that, where a contract clearly and unmistakably “delegates the arbitrability question to an arbitrator”—as the December Terms did—“a court may not over- ride the contract. ”  *Henry Schein, Inc. v. Archer & White Sales, Inc.*, 139 S. Ct. 524, 529 (2019); see *Cottrell v. Holtzberg*, 468 N.J. Super. 59, 71 (App. Div. 2021); *Singh v. Uber Techs., Inc.*, 67 F.4th 550, 563 (3d Cir. 2023) (“In the presence of a delegation clause, we cannot reach the question of the arbitration agreement’s enforceability. ”) (internal quotation marks omitted).  The sole exception to that rule is if a party challenges the enforceability of the “delegation provision specifically. ”  *Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson*, 561 U.S. 63, 72 (2010) (emphasis added); see *MZM Constr. Co. v. N.J. Bldg. Laborers Statewide Benefit Funds*, 974 F.3d 386, 399 (3d. Cir. 2020) (“[U]nless the party opposing arbitration challenges ‘the delegation provision specifically,’ the district court ‘must treat it as valid’ and ‘must enforce it’ by sending ‘any challenge to the validity’ of the underlying *arbitration agreement* to the arbitrator.
[brief] Sat  Below Hon. [...], J.S.C  BRIEF ON BEHALF OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY  GRACE C. MACAULAY  CAMDEN COUNTY PROSECUTOR  ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT  RACHEL M. LAMB  [ID: 247922017]  ASSISTANT PROSECUTOR MOTIONS AND APPEALS UNIT CAMDEN COUNTY PROSECUTOR’S OFFICE  200 FEDERAL STREET CAMDEN, NEW JERSEY 08103 [...] OF COUNSEL AND ON THE BRIEF.
[directive] Defendant's Name: Imi~ nazwisko oskari:onego: i before Judge:----------------------------------- przed sc;dzil!:  1.  List the charges to which you are pleading guilty:  Pros~ wymienic zarzuty, do kt6rych sic; Pan(i) przyznaje:  Statutory Maximum/Maksimum ustawowe Ind./Acc./Comp.# Count Nature of Offense Degree Time Fine  VCCO Assmt* Akt Zarzut osk./okrarzl Czas Grzywna NawiljZlca VCCO*  Charakter przes~stwa/wykroczenia Stopieti pow6dztwo __________________________  ____________ _  Max/Maksimum  Max/Maksimum  Max/Maksimum -----------,- ----- ---- ------- ------- ---- -----  Max/Maksimum ----- Max/Maksimum Total/Ogolem  Your total exposure as the result of this plea is:  Kary grozll<:e w wyniku przyznania sic; do winy - lll<:znie: Please Circle Appropriate Answer/ Proszt; zakreslic wlasciw11 odpowiedz a. · 2.
[brief] PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND STATEMENT OF FACTS  On March 28, 2017, [...], P.E., of [...], [...]’s engineer, submitted a Waterfront Development permit application to NJDEP for the construction of a 4 ft. x 185 ft. pier dock extension offshore of [...]’s property situated on Barnegat Bay with two 12 ft. x 12 ft. open type boat lifts to be located at the end of that extension.  (Aa0022-Aa0050).  Appellant received legal notification of [...]’s Waterfront Development Permit application.  (Aa0041-Aa0042).  The Policy Compliance Statement filed in support of the [...]’s Waterfront Development Permit application and prepared by [...], P.E. directly addressed [...]’s dock’s compliance with NJDEP’s Coastal Zone Management Rules, N.J.A.C. 7:7 (CZM Rules).  (Aa0030-Aa0038).  Specifically, Mr. Lindstrom addressed N.J.A.C. 7:7-9.7 (Navigational Channels) and N.J.A.C. 7:7-12.5 (Recreational Docks and Piers), concluding that [...]’s proposed pier dock extension will not affect or hinder navigation and access to adjacent water areas.  (Aa0035-Aa0037).  The Compliance Statement also concluded that in accordance with N.J.A.C. 7:7-9.6 (Submerged Vegetation Habitat), due to mapped submerged --- 1
[directive] The Executive Director will set the programmatic and policy vision of OPSI, manage performance and outcomes of OPSI offices, and identify funding, grant, partnership and legislative opportunities for the Office and Department.  The Executive Director or their designee will serve as the lead point of contact, subject matter expert, and coordinator for DLPS on all matters relating to policing policy, strategy, and innovation.  The Executive Director will serve as the authority of the state of policing in New Jersey, assessing the strengths and weaknesses across the system of law enforcement agencies, and advise the Attorney General of opportunities for growth and the need for action.  Under their leadership, the Executive Director will bring together thought leaders from around the state to highlight best practices, and foster a culture of learning and collaboration.  The Executive Director will be responsible for instilling a culture of continuous improvement and the highest standards of excellence in the Office and across law enforcement agencies.  The Executive Director will work with the constituent units within OPSI to ensure streamlined communication and collaboration, and that the units support each other in fulfilling their respective functions.  The Executive Director will also ensure that OPSI serves as the Office responsible for providing operational oversight to law enforcement agencies in supersession by the Attorney General, as well as to provide resources, assistance, and agency-specific trainings, to law enforcement agencies undergoing monitorships by County Prosecutors.  Working with the Attorney General’s Director of Community Engagement, the Executive Director or their designee will develop and maintain strong working relationships with local, State, and federal partners, community and industry stakeholders, the Division of the New Jersey State Police, the 21 County Prosecutor Offices, law enforcement agencies statewide, and other organizational units and divisions within DLPS and other State agencies.  The Executive Director or their designee will coordinate or support training and outreach efforts by OPSI’s constituent organizational units, and manage shared services among them, including research, training, policy support, use of data, management of programmatic and policy elements of grants, grant applications, technical assistance, and community engagement.  OPSI.
[brief] “The publicized material in a false-light claim must constitute a major misrepresentation of [plaintiff's] character, history, activities or beliefs. ”  Id. at 295 (quotations omitted).  “Thus, there can be no recovery for false-light invasion of privacy unless it is shown that the publicity at issue was of a character highly offensive to a reasonable person. ”  Id. (quotations omitted).  Importantly, “[c]laims for invasion of privacy based on placing plaintiff in a false light are subject to the one-year statute of limitations imposed by N.J.S.A. 2A:14-3.
[brief] See N.J.S.A. § 2A:32C-9(c).  False claims act precedent does not require that public disclosures be unencumbered by intellectual property protections.  10  Ja2098–100 (¶¶ 9, 11), Ja2103–05 (¶¶ 18–19), Ja2108–10 (¶¶ 25, 27); Ja1559–62 ([...] Cert. ¶¶ 3–4, 10, 12); Ja4272–73 ([...] Cert. ¶¶ 17, 19–20).  11  Ja2104–05 (¶ 19); Ja2191–201 ([...] Cert., Exs. 2–3); Ja2986–3004 ([...] Cert., Ex. J); Ja3906–08 (¶¶ 151–55).  12  Ja3896 (¶ 131), Ja3902–03 (¶ 144).  The only question is what follows, as a matter of law, from these undisputed facts.  The NJFCA public disclosure bar precludes actions that are “based upon the public disclosure of . . . transactions” through a statutory “news media” source, and where the relator is not “an original source” of that information.
[brief] [...] testified that there are social-media posts that show defendant and [...] communicating with one another.  (25T 29-10 to 30-1)  In those posts, from the summer of 2017, [...] would ask for the return of certain personal items, like “clothes,” and Sidorski testified, over repeated defense objection, that he perceived defendant’s responses to be “confrontational” and to contain “threat[s],” and even a reference to “a prior assault,” while [...] was “more trying to keep the peace, just being more easygoing. ”\(^{15}\) (25T 30-6 to 32-14; 25T 66-2 to 18; 25T 40-10 to 43-9)  Defense counsel specifically objected that the social-media posts “speak for themselves,” that “[w]e don’t need an interpretation from this witness,” and that the jurors should be free to “form their own opinion” of what the various intents of \(^{15}\)
[directive] The members of the (INSERT NAME) Police Department are committed to providing law enforcement services that are fair, effective, and impartially applied.  It is in the best interests of everyone that your complaint about the performance of an individual officer is resolved fairly and promptly.  The Police Department has formal procedures for investigating your complaint.  These procedures are designed to ensure fairness and protect the rights of both citizens and law enforcement officers:  1.  Reports or Complaints of officer/employee misconduct must be accepted from any person, including anonymous sources, at any time.  2.  Complaints shall be accepted regardless of age, race, ethnicity, religion, gender, sexual orientation, disability, or immigration status of the complaining party.  3.  Your complaint will be sent to a superior officer or a specially trained internal affairs officer who will conduct a thorough and objective investigation.  4.  You might be asked to help in the investigation by giving a detailed statement about what happened or providing other important information or documents.  5.
[brief] [Ibid., internal citations omitted.]  Here, Plaintiff was entitled to such equitable relief at the time of the complaint filing.  As set forth in Plaintiff’s initial brief at page 4, while litigation was pending, four more repair attempts were made on the Santa Fe at Hyundai dealerships.  (Pa42-43; Pa254; Pa271).  During the June 29, 2021 repair attempt, after 16 months of attorney involvement and seven months of litigation, the Santa Fe’s repair issues were permanently resolved.  Ibid.  Once the defects were permanently fixed, the relief afforded by Defendant’s limited warranty became only monetary.
[brief] ..................................................................................................  17  RESPONDENT’S APPENDIX ....................................................................... iv # TABLE OF AUTHORITIES **Agha v. Feiner,** 198 N.J. 50, 60-61 (2009) ........................................... 9 **Amaechi v. Clark,** 268 N.J. Super. 186, 192-193 (Law Div. 1992) ..................... 8 **Asuncion V. Farrell,** No. A-2258-08Tl, 2009 N.J Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1681 (App. Div. June 25, 2009) .................... 7 **Brill v Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America,** 142 N.J. 520 (1995) .................................................. 6, 7 **Buckelew v. Grossbard,** 87 N.J. 512, 524 (1981) .............................................. 14, 15 **Clifford v. Opdyke,** 156 N.J. Super. 208, 212 (App. Div. 1978) ......................... 7 **Davidson v. Slater,** 189 N.J. 166, 181 (2007) .............................................. 9 **DiProspero v Penn,** 183 N.J. 477 (2005) .................................................. 13 **Espinal v. Arias,** 391 N.J. Super. 49,58 (App. Div.), cert. denied, 192 N.J. 482 (2007) ..................................................