ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] ”  *Id.* at 156 (citing, *inter alia*, *Jamerson*, 153 N.J. 318).  *Tyler* explained that its facts “closely resemble[d] cases from other jurisdictions, in which courts have excluded medical examiner testimony” where “the medical examiner performed an autopsy, was unable to render an opinion on cause or manner of death, and then after review of witness statements or information obtained through police investigation, rendered an opinion based largely on that information. ”  *Id.* at 164-65.  Rather than acknowledging this consensus, the State attempts to limit each case to its unique facts.
[brief] SDa33-34; see also T49:11 to 51:6.  That is why the trial court’s decision expressly found that [...] and [...] signed informed consent waivers of any potential conflict and were informed by counsel of the potential risks involved.  Pa316.  Thus, [...]’s statement that the trial court made its determination “without having seen the waivers” and based only on certifications of three out of ten individual defendants is inaccurate.  Pb10, 29-30.  The trial court received and reviewed both the waiver and the retainer agreements.  T49:11 to 51:6, 57:11-17; SDa34-35.  And, both Dr. --- 2 “SDa__” shall refer to the Sood Defendants’ Appendix.  If the Court grants the Sood Defendants’ pending motion, they will submit Volume II of their Appendix to the Court in paper form only for *in camera* review.  Sood and [...] submitted certifications—i.e., two out of the three certifications that [...] refers to.  Pa319-24.  [...]’s retainer agreement contains an express acknowledgment that the [...] represents a co-defendant, consents to that dual representation, and waives any potential conflict arising from the representation.  SDa37.  It also conveys that the [...] is not presently aware of any conflict based on its determination that [...]’s and his co-defendant’s interests are aligned in the case.  Ibid.  But it also states that, if any conflict does arise, the [...] may have to withdraw.  SDa37-38.  The same provisions are contained in [...]’s retainer agreement.
[brief] ”  *Foley v. Ulrich*, 50 N.J. 426,427 (1967).  [...] submit that the holding of our Supreme Court in *Foley* is on all fours with the instant matter, and the Motion Court properly applied it.  Like the defendants in *Foley*, the Anneses did not create a new hazard or exacerbate an existing hazard when they shoveled the sidewalk.  At worst, it can only be said that the Anneses may have been negligent or sloppy in the way they shoveled the sidewalk.  As alleged by plaintiff-appellant in her answers to interrogatories, the improper clearance of the sidewalk led to an accumulation of snow and ice on the sidewalk that caused her to fall.  It is undisputed that ice and snow are natural forces.  So, just as our Supreme Court found that the *Foley* defendants shoveling of snow may have played a role in the plaintiff’s fall, it was still the natural elements of snow and/or ice that caused her to slip and fall.  Here, even assuming that the Anneses’ shoveling may have been poorly performed, it was still snow and/or ice – natural forces – that caused plaintiff-appellant to slip and fall.
[brief] The trial court’s holding on the Distance Regulation is subject to a de novo standard of review.  *E & J Equities, Ltd. Liab. Co. v. Bd. of Adjustment of the Tp. of Franklin*, 226 N.J. 549, 565 (2016).  The trial court’s affirmation of the Board’s denial is reviewed by the same standard applied by the trial court: whether the Board’s denial is based in substantial evidence and is not arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable.  Effectively, this Court reviews the denial anew as if it were the trial court.  *Cell S. of N.J. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment*, 172 N.J. 75, 89 (2002).  The trial court and the Board’s interpretation of how the positive/negative criteria should be applied is subject to de novo review.  *Price v. Himeji, LLC*, 214 N.J. 263, 300 (2013).  LEGAL ARGUMENT
[brief] THE FACTUAL RECORD BEFORE THIS COURT ESTABLISHES AN ENFORCEABLE AGREEMENT  Respondents neglect to engage in a meaningful discussion of the factual record because the totality of the evidence shows their assent to overcome the heightened standard put in place by Atalese.  Respondents do not dispute, with any citation to the record, their representation in writing they had read, understood, and agreed to the SPA’s terms including the arbitration provision—both through their written signatures and initials on the SPA and through the letter their lawyer was authorized to send several weeks later that conveyed their approval of the agreement, and during the several years thereafter Respondents gave repeated assurances of their intention to proceed under the parties’ agreement.  These facts belie any attempt to paint the contract transaction as comparable to the agreement invalidated by our Supreme Court since Atalese was decided.
[brief] (Pb24-Pb28).  Instead, he oversimplifies Gazzillo as holding that the notice of claim requirement depends on whether an individual employee is sued in their “individual capacity” or “official capacity. ” (Pb27-Pb28).  Likewise, he relies on a similar misreading of our Supreme Court’s ruling in Velez v. City of Jersey City, 180 N.J. 284 (2004).  Ibid.  Neither of those decisions stand for the proposition that would make a plaintiff’s obligation to file a tort claims notice turn on how that plaintiff chooses to classify a defendant.  See Gazzillo, 398 N.J. Super. at 259-65; Velez, 180 N.J. at 284-97 (2004).
[brief] The facts in *Superior Integrated Sols.* concerned whether the insured infringed on a competitor’s copyrighted computer software.  *Id.* at *5-7*.  When the insured sought coverage for the infringement lawsuit, the carrier denied coverage under an “intentional acts” exclusion.  *Id.* at *21-22*.  The Appellate Division concluded that the insurer did have coverage.  But its conclusion was not based on an examination of extrinsic evidence.  *Id.* at *23-24*.  Rather, it found that the burden was on the insurer to establish that the competitor’s “complaint alleged an intentionally caused injury. ”  *Id.* at *22* (citing *Hammer v. Thomas*, 415 N.J. Super. 237, 249 (App. Div. 2010)).  This Court in *Superior Integrated Sols.* then provided a summary of the pleadings and concluded that the competitor “never alleged that it suffered an intentional injury. ”  *Id.* at *23*.  Rather, the Court found that the motive for the infringement was alleged to be “profit driven. ”  *Id.*  The Court was further persuaded to find coverage because the underlying claim was intentional copyright infringement, a strict-liability tort that does not require an intent to injure.  *Id.* at *24*.  This matter is distinguishable from *Superior Integrated Solutions* in two ways.
[brief] The height of the mounding is affected by the amount of infiltrated stormwater runoff, the soil permeability, the saturated zone thickness, and the BMP.  If the mounded groundwater reaches the bottom of the stormwater infiltration basin, the rate of infiltration out of the BMP is reduced and infiltration may stop. \footnote{https://dep.nj.gov/wpcontent/uploads/stormwater/bmp/nj_swbmp_13.pdf}  [...]’s engineer undertook the required groundwater mounding analysis using the Hantush equation, which calculates the maximum height of the temporary groundwater mounding and assumes all groundwater flow is horizontal above an infinite aquifer.\textsuperscript{15} (Aa1369-1400).  [...]’s study used conservative input values to measure groundwater mounding, such as a 0.50 recharge rate as opposed to the standard 5.0 recharge rate, and correctly applied the coastal plain multiplier based on the Property’s geographic location.  \textit{Ibid.}  The graphs included therein demonstrate that groundwater mounding would not impact any of the basins or proposed structures.  \textit{Ibid.}  [...] next argues that [...] should have replaced and tested the soil under the proposed buildings as well as under the infiltration basins.  This claim is unfounded because the Stormwater Management rules do not require a soil analysis throughout the entire Property as soils under the buildings will be compacted by the weight of the structure.
[brief] The family court denied Plaintiff’s petition for annulment.  2T43.  The judge said that the facts presented did not make out a case for annulment based on fraud.  “The Court finds that the defendant wasn’t necessarily ending the marriage but rather trying to find her independence, which may not have been supported.  The plaintiff has not met the legal standard for proving fraud, nor for granting an annulment, which the Court denies. ”  2T45.  The court instead granted Defendant’s application for a judgment of divorce, with the final order entered on June 14, 2024.  A6.  The court ruled that all jewelry acquired during the marriage shall be equally shared between Plaintiff and Defendant within 60 days from the date of the Judgment, and that Plaintiff shall pay Defendant $5,327.00 within 60 days from the date of the Judgment to account for part of fees and costs the defendant had incurred.
[brief] 3 COUNTER-STATEMENT OF FACTS ..................................................................  6  A.  The Parties’ Relationship And [...]’ First Loan to [...] .........................................................  6  B. [...]’ Second Loan To [...] .................................................................  8  C. [...]’s Default On The First Loan ............................................................  9  D.  The Parties Entered Into A New Loan On April 26, 2013.  ..................  11  E. [...]’s Confirmation Of The Third Loan .................................................. 15  F. [...]’s Continuing Acknowledgement Of His Payment Obligation Under The Third Loan.  .........................................................  18  G.  Defendant’s Failure To Pay Any Sum Due On The Third Loan.  .  21  LEGAL ARGUMENT .............................................................................................
[brief] Then confirms his testimony about what [...] knows, but [...] failed to explain how and why he knows what somebody else thinks; that the questions were improper since they are deemed irrelevant, misleading, confusing, and unnecessarily repetitive with many objections to the defendant’s direct examination questions, all sustained (2T15:13-25).  The Court furthers that it was difficult for [...] because the defendant continuously spoke over the Judge when he was trying to rule on the objections, concluding this testimony had very little value in determining the guilt or innocence of the defendant (2T16:1-7)\(^{31}\).  --- \(^{30}\)
[directive] Order 1 - Mandating First Post-Acquittal Psychiatric Evaluation as to the NGRI Acquittee's Dangerousness Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:4-8 (Attachment A)  This court order would be used to obtain the first post-acquittal psychiatric evaluation required by N.J.S.A. 2C:4-8(a) and State v. Krol.  In cases where the examination is by a psychiatrist in the Department of Health, the acquittee will be committed to one of the State psychiatric hospitals for the evaluation and recommendation as to current dangerousness to self, others or property as a result of mental illness.  Order 2 - Mandating Observation and Treatment of NGRI Acquittee Who Has Refused to Cooperate with the Psychiatric Evaluation of Dangerousness (Attachment B)  This court order would be used when the acquittee does not cooperate with the psychiatric evaluation.  In such instances, the standards of N.J.S.A. 2C:4-5(c) are triggered, specifically, that the court may permit examination without cooperation, appoint a different psychiatrist or commit the defendant for observation for a period not exceeding 30 days except on good cause shown.  Order 3 - Mandating Commitment of NGRI Acquittee Who has been Found Dangerous to Self, Others, or Property as a Result of Mental Illness (Attachment C)  This court order would be used to commit the NGRI acquittee after there has been a finding that the person cannot be released into the community, with or without conditions, without posing a danger to self, others, or property as a result of mental illness pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:4-8(b)(3).  The person would be committed into the care and custody of the Commissioner of the Department of Health and confined to an appropriate institution to be treated as a person civilly committed.  Page 2 of 4  Directive# 21-20 -- Proceeding for Defendants Found Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity (NGRI) and Other Commitments Resulting from Criminal Proceedings
[brief] Sat Below: Hon. [...]  J.S.C.  BRIEF AND APPENDIX ON BEHALF OF STATE – RESPONDENT  [...], ACTING GLOUCESTER COUNTY PROSECUTOR COUNTY JUSTICE COMPLEX ATTORNEY(S) FOR [...].  Acting Assistant Prosecutor Attorney ID. 16506-2015  [...]  [...] JUSTICE COMPLEX [...]  [...] [...] [...]  DEFENDANT IS PRESENTLY CONFINED
[brief] **UNDER THE NHA, ONCE A VIOLATION OF RIGHTS IS ESTABLISHED, PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO DAMAGES WITHOUT ESTABLISHING PROXIMATE CAUSE.  (PA131)**  The charge to the jury stated that plaintiff had to show that any violation in any claim brought had to have proximately caused [...]’s death.  11T164:22-25.  See also 6T28:17-23 (“If they did something wrong but it did not lead to [...]’s death, no one’s talking about it. ”).  Regarding the NHA claim, that is incorrect as a matter of law.  Section 8(a) of N.J.S.A. 30:13 states in part as follows:  “Any person or resident whose rights as defined herein are violated shall have a cause of action against any person committing such violation * * *.  Any plaintiff who prevails in any such action shall be entitled to recover reasonable attorney’s fees and costs of the action. ”  As recognized in Ptaszynski v. Atlantic Health Systems, Inc., 440 N.J. Super. 24 (App. Div. 2015), if a jury finds a violation of one of the enumerated resident’s rights contained in N.J.S.A. 30:13-5, plaintiff shall be entitled to recover actual and punitive damages and reasonable attorney’s fees.  440 N.J. Super. at 33-34.  Proving that the violation of [...]’s rights under the NHA caused [...]’s death is not necessary to prevail on the NHA cause of action.  The violation is itself actionable pursuant to the plain language of the statute.  To hold otherwise would negate the public policy and purpose of the remedial statute – and the availability of remedies of punitive damages and attorney’s fees and costs – to deter violations that do not have a clearly defined mental, emotional or monetary value.
[directive] Index Assault:  The most recent incident in which the person being assessed (Defendant, as defined below) assaulted his/her current or former Partner (as defined below).  Assault is any act of violence that involved physical contact with the Victim (as defined below) or a credible threat of death made with a weapon displayed in the presence of the Victim.  Defendant: For the purposes of scoring ODARA, the Defendant is the person being assessed.  Victim:  For the purposes of scoring ODARA, the Victim is the person upon whom the Index Assault was committed.  Partner:  For the purposes of scoring ODARA, a Partner is a person who currently is, or previously was, involved with the Defendant in an intimate relationship.  This includes current or former spouses, current or former intimate cohabitants, co-parents, and those currently or formerly in a dating relationship.  INSTRUCTIONS
[brief] (Pa48-Answ #62, #82, #94, #98, #103).  However, since the commencement of this action, [...]'s and [...]'s terms of office ended on December 31, 2022.  [...]'s and [...]'s terms of office ended on December 31, 2023.  [...]’ term of office will end on December 31, 2024.  (Pa219-SJCS #13).  On January 5, 2021, defendant [...] (with the tacit consent of all other individual defendants) unilaterally (and without any prior public input) altered [...]'s public meetings policy and procedure.  Defendants suppressed plaintiff’s prior right to be heard on all non-ordinance agenda action items until after consideration and official action.  (Pa48-Answ #13).  In January 2022 and shortly after the trial court denied defendants’ first motion to dismiss with prejudice on the pleadings, defendants (under the watch of [...]) reversed course and restored plaintiff’s right to be heard on all posted agenda action items prior to consideration and official action.
[brief] As noted in the Preliminary Statement, if the Court reverses the Trial Court on the above point and finds that the Lease did not create any personal guaranty, then the Court need not determine whether any personal guarantees were terminated as of May 11, 2016 as ruled by the Trial Court.  However, if this Court does reach such issue, it should affirm the Trial Court on this point.  Under the single sentence in the Lease that is relied upon to create the guaranty, the guaranty is limited to “the obligations of the Tenant herein. ” (emphasis added).  It is clear that “herein” in the foregoing sentence means the month to month lease dated February 20, 2015.  Thus once the obligations under the February 20, 2015 Lease were terminated so too were all guaranty obligations under the Lease (if any).  See, Peoples Nat'l Bank v. Fowler, 73 N.J. 88, 101 (1977) (guarantor’s obligations cannot and should not be extended either by implication or by construction beyond the confines of its contract (quoting Monmouth Lumber Co. v. Indemnity Ins. Co. of N. Am., 21 N.J. 439, 452 (1956); see also Ctr. 48 Ltd. P'ship v. May Dept. Stores Co., 355 N.J. Super. 390, 409 (App. Div. 2002) (termination of lease pursuant to a lease right would have relieved tenant of its obligation to pay rent under the lease and would have likewise discharged any obligation of guarantor).
[brief] See Thiedemann v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, 183 N.J. 234, 248 (2005) (“[T]he plaintiff must proffer evidence of loss that is not hypothetical or illusory.  It must be presented with some certainty demonstrating that it is capable of calculation, although it need not be demonstrated in all of its particularity to avoid summary judgment. ”); Rocci v. Macdonald-Cartier, 323 N.J. Super. 18, 22 (App. Div. 1999) (“[I]t is the lack of any proof of any damages that causes us to affirm summary judgment for defendants. ”), aff’d sub nom., 165 N.J. 149 (2000); [...] United States v. [...], 2022 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 719, at *7 (N.J. Super Ct. App. Div. May 2, 2022) (“Plaintiffs have no proof of damages under any view of the evidence.
[brief] Here, the vibrations from the delivery, dumping, and placement of tons of boulders to construct the new seawall physically damaged the nearby [...] house.  Moreover, the project reasonably foresaw the possibility of actual damage and implemented vibrations monitoring on the [...] property itself during the seawall construction activities.  The damage was a necessary, natural, and proximate result of the project.  Mr. [...] is entitled to just compensation for the physical damage to his house from the project construction.  Defendant has provided a sufficient basis for causation via the Defendant’s reports to the Defendant’s expert and the Defendant’s own certification.  (Da109).  Mr. [...], who has lived in the house on the property for many years, was there during project construction.  He personally experienced the house shaking during the project and is prepared to testify as such.  (Da107-108)  The floor shifted, ceiling plaster separated, and doors went out of plumb.  (Da317, 333).  Whether or not a jury believes that the damages were caused by the project or were pre-existing is a matter of weight, not admissibility.  For the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully submitted that the court below erred in excluding just compensation for the physical damage to the house during construction of the seawall.
[brief] But the [...] said on November 30, 2022, that the floodway lines “cannot be on there to be approvable. ”  The [...] must clarify whether it approved the floodway lines that existed on the plans which were last revised on November 29, 2022, as expressly stated in the permit decision, or whether it did not approve of the floodway lines as it asserted it could not do in an email to the applicant on November 30, 2022.  The [...] cannot have it both ways.  The plans approved by the permit cannot be altered after the last revision date listed in the permit decision.  In addition, it must be considered that the applicant and the [...] could not have sufficiently determined (or estimated) the extent of the floodway in this matter by mere visual inspection or estimation precisely because the updated precipitation data would have affected the calculation of the extent of both the total flood hazard area and the floodway.  It is unclear what type of data was used for the [...]’s finding that “it is clear that the floodway will not be impacted. ”  It also cannot be determined from the record whether any activity will take place within a properly delineated floodway.  The failure to make an adequate record and findings on this related point also requires a remand to the [...] for a more fulsome adjudication and application of the [...]’s regulations.
[brief] It is not enough that the defendant “purposely promoted or facilitated the actor’s conduct knowing that the criminal result was sufficiently likely to follow. ”  *State v. Ramirez*, 246 N.J. 61, 68-69 (2021); see also *State v. Weeks*, 107 N.J. 396, 403 (1987) (noting that accomplice liability statute “limits the scope of liability to crimes which the accomplice had the purpose of promoting or facilitating” and “is intended not to include those which he merely knowingly facilitated substantially”).
[brief] (12T2-71:9-16; 11T41 to 42:16; 11T436-12).  Respondent proclaimed at trial that her longstanding goal was to be a millionaire.  (11T103:23 to 104:11).  In 2013, Respondent obviously knew that her goal was not likely to be achieved.  Respondent was working as a waitress and living with her live in boyfriend, [...] (with whom she had two children) who was actively using and selling drugs and stealing to support his habit.  (9T65:24 to 67:8; 12T77:20-22).  Therefore, in 2013, Respondent turned her attention to Decedent and moved just a few blocks from the Home and spoke with Decedent multiple times daily about personal and private matters.
[brief] (Pa8, Complaint ¶ 31).  On June 28, 2022 – the last-adjourned “Closing Date,” as agreed upon in the Fourth Amendment to the PSA – [...] advised Plaintiff that the closing was not proceeding on that date, and that [...] was in discussions with the Fee Owner to further extend the Closing Date in the Mack-Cali Agreement by one day.  [...] forwarded a proposed Fifth Amendment of the Mack-Cali Agreement which, its counsel said, “is extending the closing date for 1 day. ” (Pa8-9, Complaint ¶ 32).  Plaintiff responded that afternoon, stating that Plaintiff did not object to an extension of the Closing Date by another day “to tomorrow” – but noting that Plaintiff expressly reserved and did not waive all of Plaintiff’s “rights and benefits” under the PSA.  Later that day, [...] replied: “This confirms the extension to tomorrow for the [Agreement with Plaintiff],” and inquired about the costs and expenses that had been incurred by Plaintiff to that point in time.  (Pa9, Complaint ¶ 33).  On June 29, 2022, Plaintiff advised [...] that, as of that date, Plaintiff had already incurred millions of dollars to maintain the bank financing Plaintiff had secured to fund the acquisition of the Real Property.  Once again, Plaintiff expressly reiterated that Plaintiff reserved its rights and benefits under the PSA.  (Pa9, Complaint ¶ 34).  Later that afternoon, Plaintiff indicated that it did not object to another one-day extension of the Closing Date of the Mack-Cali Agreement but again asked for confirmation that the Closing Date under the PSA was likewise extended by another day.  Here, too, Plaintiff expressly reserved and did not waive its rights under the PSA.  (Pa9, Complaint ¶ 35).  That evening, [...]’s counsel wrote an email to Plaintiff’s counsel, advising that [...] would not honor or perform its obligations to Plaintiff, under the PSA.