ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-7a.  In *[...]*, the issue was whether the municipal library “suffered from obsolesce” under Section 5.  *[...], supra*, at 317.  In an opinion by Chief Justice, the Supreme Court found that the specific criteria of Section 5 was not satisfied in response to plaintiff [...]’s complaint.  (Id. at 305).  The Chief Justice also pointed out that using [...] is a proper mechanism to avoid the pitfalls of the public bidding laws for the redevelopment of public property.  (Id. at 308-10)(citing N.J.S.A. 40:12-1 to 30).  In this case, the use of the “overlay” zone for the sites other than the L&T site avoids this issue of disposal of public land by municipality.  There are no sites being condemned by the municipality to effectuate this redevelopment plan.  ([...], [...]; [...], [...])  Another important, relevant, and binding case is *Hirth v. City of Hoboken*, 337 N.J. Super. 149 (App. Div. 2001).
[brief] When he returned, the other units had been renovated, but he testified that his unit was largely the same as it was prior.  The record shows that the unit has been largely neglected with no preventative or routine maintenance, decades old appliances, and some repair requests, like a non-functional intercom, being ignored for years.  [...]’s decision to purchase an apartment building and convert it to condominiums was profitable, though [...] testified that he could not remember how profitable and [...]’s counsel objected to questioning in this vein.  1T42:4-43-17.  Unit 11 is the only real property [...] still holds, but [...] has $755,562 in other assets, which [...] testified is presumably profit from selling the other units.  1T145:29-147:3.  In 2017, [...] submitted a hardship application to the [...] claiming it cannot make expenses or a fair return.  Hoboken’s RCO defines a “fair return” as a return on equity equal to 6% above passbook rate.  Equity is defined as the cash investment.  The ordinance implicitly assumes that the “investment” is the same real property at the initial investment and at the time of the hardship application.  However, here the apartment building no longer exists.  Because the definition does not apply exactly, the landlord insisted that the Board must use a different definition of equity, one that includes the condominium’s value.  The Courts below agreed, and changed the definition to include value.  However, this was error that severely undermines Hoboken Rent Control ordinance.  [...] has not been deprived of a fair return because [...]’s investment was an apartment building, [...] transformed the nature of that investment when it converted the building into condominiums, and [...] made a fair return on its investment when it sold all of the condominiums except the one unit at issue in this litigation.  The application should have been denied.
[brief] 2 POINT I  DEFENDANT'S STATEMENT WAS PROPERLY ADMITTED BY [...] .........................................................  2 POINT II  DEFENDANT WAS NOT DENIED A FAIR TRIAL BY THE ADMISSION OF HIS STATEMENT .............................................  16 POINT III  ANY ERROR BY [...] IN INSTRUCTING THE JURY AT THE CERTAIN-PERSONS TRIAL WAS HARMLESS ............................................................................................................  23 POINT IV  THE ERRORS ALLEGED BY DEFENDANT DID NOT INDIVIDUALLY OR CUMULATIVELY DEPRIVE HIM OF A FAIR TRIAL ............................................................................................................
[brief] In full, *N.J.S.A. 47:1A-3* provides:  a.  Notwithstanding the provisions of P.L. 1963, c. 73 (C. 47:1A-1 et seq.) as amended and supplemented, where it shall appear that the record or records which are sought to be inspected, copied, or examined shall pertain to an investigation in progress by any public agency, the right of access provided for in P.L. 1963, c. 73 (C. 47:1A-1 et seq.) as amended and supplemented may be denied if the inspection, copying or examination of such record or records shall be inimical to the public interest; provided, however, that this provision shall not be construed to allow any public agency to prohibit access to a record of that agency that was open for public inspection, examination, or copying before the investigation commenced.
[brief] There is no basis in law or fact to do as defendant requests.  The individual alleged errors complained of by the defendant do not alone rise to the level of reversible error, see supra, and, for that reason, cannot and should not be aggregated to cumulative error warranting reversal of defendant’s conviction.  POINT IV  DEFENDANT’S CONCESSION AS TO BOTH THE AMOUNT OF RESTITUTION AND HIS ABILITY TO PAY THAT AMOUNT MAKE HIS CURRENT REQUEST FOR A REMAND FOR A RESTITUTION HEARING UNWARRANTED
[brief] ”  The Court reasoned that it “know[s] of no other constitutional right that an individual may exercise only after demonstrating to government officers some special need. ”  Id. at 70.  The Court also stated that “when the Second Amendment’s plain text covers an individual’s conduct, the Constitution presumptively protects that conduct.  To justify its regulation, the government may not simply posit that the regulation promotes an important interest.  Rather, the government must demonstrate that the regulation is consistent with this Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation.  Only if a firearm regulation is consistent with this Nation’s historical tradition may a court conclude that the individual’s conduct falls outside the Second Amendment’s ‘unqualified command. ’”  Id. at 17. (citation omitted).  At the time Bruen was decided, New Jersey, along with New York, were among seven states with laws that had “may issue” statutes.  Id. at 14-15.  As a result of Bruen, New Jersey’s statute at the time of [...]’s arrest was invalidated, and New Jersey was required to institute a “shall issue” policy.  The issue now remains whether New Jersey must now give full faith and credit to Pennsylvania gun permits, and the answer is yes.
[brief] Specifically, Appellant alleged that “[a]ccording to the New Jersey Code of Ethics for Engineers, ‘Engineers shall act for each employer or client as faithful agents or trustees. ’  The Code of Ethics further provides that ‘Engineers shall not accept compensation, financial or otherwise, from more than one party for services on the same project, or for services pertaining to the same project, unless the circumstances are fully disclosed and agreed to by all interested parties’ and that “[...] and [...] breached their professional and ethical duties to Plaintiffs by selling the engineering site plans and drawings to [...].
[brief] In Atalese, the Court examined an arbitration clause in a consumer context.  Atalese, supra, 219 N.J. at 435.  In that case, plaintiff was an individual consumer who contracted with the defendant for debt-adjustment services.  Ibid.  The subject contract contained an arbitration provision to resolve any dispute between the parties, however the terms failed to mention that plaintiff waived her right to seek relief in court.
[brief] “A trial court’s interpretation of the law and legal consequences that flow from established facts are not entitled to any special deference. ”  *Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Township Committee of Township of Manalapan*, 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995).  Therefore, the standard of review by the Appellate Division is a *de novo* review of the Trial Court’s application of legal principles.  *Washington Commons, LLC v. City of Jersey City*, 416 N.J. Super. 555, 560 (App. Div. 2010).  In reviewing a trial court’s decision regarding the validity of a local board’s determination, the reviewing court applies the same standards as the trial court.  *Fallone Properties, L.L.C. v. Bethlehem Twp.  Planning Bd.*, 369 N.J. Super. 552, 562 (App. Div. 2004).  When reviewing a board’s decision, the board’s factual determinations are presumed to be valid.
[brief] On January 5th, 2012, [...] was working at the [...] at [...].  (9T 25-25 to 26-13)  Around 11:00am, two men walked in.  One of the men asked for a phone case for the iPhone 4S.  Uppal described one man as lighter skinned and the other darker skinned.  (9T 35-24 to 36-12)  He said that the lighter skinned man was wearing a hoodie and jeans and the hood was covering his head.  The darker skinned man was wearing a hoodie with red thread, and he was slimmer of the two.  (9T 37-23 to 38-7)  Uppal testified that he directed the men to the middle of the store where the cases was kept.  (9T 38-22 to 39-5)  The darker skinned man grabbed Uppal and pushed him towards the safe in the back room of the store.  (9T 39-17 to 22)  The man held a gun to the back of Uppal’s head.  (9T 40-11 to 15)  They ordered him to open the safe and they started collecting phones.  (9T 41-13 to 17)  Uppal testified throughout the robbery, he kept his eyes looking down.  Uppal was ordered to remain standing in the storage area with the men as they filled the large black plastic bags with the phones.  (9T 42-9 to 13)  Uppal said that he did not know if the plastic bags came from the store.  (9T 45-6 to 10)  The darker skinned man kept the gun pointed at him.  (9T 43-2 to 9)  Both men were wearing clear translucent gloves.  (9T 44-11 to 16)  Uppal recalled that the darker skinned man was on the phone telling someone, “Okay, I’m hurrying up. ”(9T 45-20 to 23)  Uppal testified that he was not paying attention to any of the ongoing conversation.  (9T 46-1 to 10)  After they collected the phones, the men asked about cash.  They emptied out the cash from the store; led Uppal to the back room and told him to get on the floor and count to 200.  (9T 47-17 to 48-11)  The men left from the back of the store.  Uppal claimed that he heard a car zoom past the back of the store.  (9T 49-17 to 22)  D. JANUARY 12, 2012
[brief] (Da083-Da084).  There is no evidence in the record that, prior to doing so, she had any questions, did not understand the Terms of Use, or that she objected to the SEC-approved FIRNA arbitration agreement or the arbitration process.  In fact, Respondents did not submit any evidence whatsoever that (1) they had not registered for online account access via SAM in 2022, and/or (2) that they were unaware of the SAM Terms of Use or the predispute arbitration clause.  Thereafter, Respondents also had the ability to view the SAM Terms of Use and the Client Agreement at any time when logged in.  (Da0085-Da0086; Da0497-Da0498).
[brief] (1T112-113).  Defendant’s True Intentions are Made Clear  Plaintiff recounted his efforts to improve the couple’s relationship, including a suggestion that they share something positive with each other before going to sleep.  His wife rebuffed this idea, which was disheartening for him.  (2T34-35).  On September 10, 2022, [...] took his wife to Ocean County Lake, hoping to discuss and resolve their issues in a peaceful setting.  Unfortunately, she was uncooperative, which frustrated him further.  To address their problems, [...] offered to live separately from his parents to give the new couple space.  However, his wife declined the offer, reinforcing his growing suspicion that she had married him solely for the green card.  (2T42).  Defendant implied that she would have married someone else and still would have come to America.  This reaction left [...] feeling used and convinced him that Defendant’s primary intention was to immigrate to the United States, not a true and genuine marriage with the Plaintiff.  (2T43).  Additionally, his wife made comments suggesting that if something were to happen to her, Plaintiff should find someone else and be happy.  These remarks puzzled Plaintiff, as they seemed to underscore her lack of commitment to the relationship.  (2T43)  As Plaintiff argued to the family court, there was misrepresentation and fraud by the Defendant upon the Plaintiff – primarily Defendant’s false representations that she was entering into the marriage to build a life with Plaintiff, when it really was only to obtain a green card, after which she would promptly leave Plaintiff.
[brief] The Evidence Shows [...]’s and [...]’s Detailed and Intimate Knowledge of Friend Sharing, Whitelisting, and Business Partners  Plaintiffs’ Motion demonstrates that [...] and [...] shaped [...]’s platform around friend sharing.  For instance, [Redacted] Ex. 10; see also Ex. 12 [Redacted].  Likewise, [...] [Redacted].  See, e.g. Id. at FB-CA-MDL-01681584 [Redacted].  [...]’s and [...]’s custodial files will assuredly contain additional relevant information regarding friend sharing on [...].  [...] argues that Plaintiffs have not identified a gap in the production because these documents only show that [...] and [...] provided “high-level guidance” distributed to existing custodians, among others.  Opp. at 9.  To state the obvious, as [...] and [...] are not custodians, Plaintiffs are largely only able to view their contributions in the context of information shared with other custodians.  While [...] has produced some of [...]’s and [...]’s communications with existing custodians, [...] has not provided other documents reflecting their thoughts.
[brief] Just as [...] lacks a basis for recovery in the action below, so too do the [...] and [...] Capital Partners LLC.  Neither the trial testimony nor the pleadings establish that any party (exclusive of possibly [...], which was not a party prior to the entry of judgment) suffered any damages as a consequence of the allegations made.  Because the elements of fraud under New Jersey’s common law include “(1) a material misrepresentation of a presently existing or past fact; (2) knowledge or belief by the defendant of its falsity; (3) an intention that the other person rely on it; (4) reasonable reliance thereon by the other person; and (5) resulting damages” *Gennari v. Weichert Co. Realtors*, 691 A.2d 350, 367 (N.J. 1997).  (Emphasis added). , the establishment of actual, resultant damages is an integral part of a determination that a fraud occurred under New Jersey law.  Here, those damages simply do not exist vis-à-vis the originally-named plaintiffs.
[brief] v. : Sat Below: [...], : Hon. [...], J.S.C., Defendant-Appellant.  : and a Jury.  Your Honors:  This letter is submitted in lieu of a formal brief pursuant to R. 2:6-2(b).  DEFENDANT IS CONFINED  TABLE OF CONTENTS  REPLY  PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND STATEMENT OF FACTS  ............  1  LEGAL ARGUMENT  .................................................................................  2  REPLY POINT  I THE SUPREME COURT DID NOT ANNOUNCE A NEW RULE IN FAIR, BUT IF IT DID, PIPELINE RETROACTIVITY IS REQUIRED, AND CONSTITUTIONALLY DEFICIENT  JURY INSTRUCTIONS ON THE ELEMENTS OF AN OFFENSE ARE REVERSIBLE  ERROR......  2  1.  No retroactivity analysis is required because Fair did not announce a new rule.  .................................................................  2  2.  If Fair announced a new rule, then federal and state retroactivity law requires that it apply to cases on direct appeal.......................  5  3.  Failure to instruct the jury on the element of an offense is reversible error, and arguments of counsel are no substitute for correct instructions from the court...........................................  7  REPLY POINT II  THIS COURT IS NOT BARRED FROM CONSIDERING ON APPEAL  MR. RUSSELL’S CLAIM THAT THE SECOND-DEGREE ENHANCEMENT IN THE TERRORISTIC THREATS STATUTE IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL, AND THE STATE HAS FAILED TO IDENTIFY AN INTEREST IN PUNISHING MORE HARSHLY THREATS THAT ARE ENTIRELY UNRELATED TO AN EMERGENCY DECLARATION..................................................  10  CONCLUSION .........................................................................................  13  REPLY PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND STATEMENT OF FACTS  Following a jury trial in 2023, defendant-appellant [...] was convicted of two counts of second-degree terroristic threats, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:12-3(a); one count of fourth-degree harassment, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4(e); one count of fourth-degree retaliation for past official action, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:27-5; and one count of fourth-degree stalking, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:12-10(b).
[brief] As a result, a parent cannot bind their child to an arbitration agreement especially when the treatment is for the parent themselves and not the child.  The instant matter involves an unconscionable arbitration agreement binding non-signatory illusionary family members and healthcare providers.  The arbitration agreement states “I understand that all claims for damages arising from medical services rendered by [...] and or [...], and/or any associate or substitute physicians, nurses or employee must be arbitrated.  This includes any claim of a spouse, heir, child (born or unborn), or other successor in interest to any such claim”\(^1\) (emphasis added) (Da122).  Like Moore, the subject agreement binds [...]’s spouse and unborn child.  Binding any non-signatory party, whether it is the patient’s family or another healthcare provider, is unconscionable.  The only privity in the arbitration agreement is between the parties who signed it, which in this case are the plaintiff and her physician, [...].  It is against public policy to bind unknown speculative people to an agreement.  This is especially true in the surgical context where the anesthesiologist, who often has a different employer than the surgeon, is not known until the day of surgery.
[brief] The Board reconsidered the matter pursuant to the instructions of [...] on October 24, 2018 and November 28, 2018.  After conducting the October & November 2018 hearings, the Board passed a resolution granting a hardship rent increase to [...].  DA-83.  A few months later, [...] appealed the Board’s determinations, asserting that the hardship increase of $105.04 per month was arbitrary.  DA-9.  On November 20, 2019, the Hon. [...], J.S.C. found that the Board’s determination regarding the unit’s tax liability was not arbitrary or capricious, but well-reasoned and supported by the testimony of [...]’s witness and caselaw.  Id.  [...] upheld the Board’s decision in part, and remanded in part.
[brief] The Court finds the defendant, [...], has provided an adequate factual basis to accept his guilty plea to Count 3 of Indictment [...], felony murder in the first degree.  Likewise, I find he has provided a factual basis to accept his guilty plea to Count 1 of Indictment [...], armed robbery in the first degree and similarly find because of these guilty pleas he violated the terms of his probation in these three matters including [...], [...] and finally [...].  I find the defendant has entered these guilty pleas knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily and not as a result of any threats or any promises not disclosed on the record.  Defendant has entered these pleas after consulting with his attorney, [...], and upon the advice of competent counsel with who this defendant has admitted he is satisfied with.  As a result I find the defendant understands the nature of the charges and consequences of his plea.  I find the defendant has been very alert and comprehending throughout this entire proceeding as illustrated by the Court's colloquy with him.  I find the defendant is not under the influence of any alcohol, drugs or medication which could have interfered with his ability to think clearly and understand these proceedings.  I find the defendant has knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily waived his constitutionally guaranteed rights and signed the plea form which the Court incorporates into its findings.  I find the defendant has not been threatened or coerced in pleading guilty, that he understands the range of sentence that may be imposed, including the 30-year -- year period of parole ineligibility.  I therefore accept defendant guilty pleas and set this matter down for sentencing.
[brief] ”  *Id.* at *2, Pa440.  The court further held that the LRHL “does not limit said entities to defraying costs on a ‘per project’ basis, but rather permits said entities to defray all costs of the agency, past and present, in performing its statutory functions and in carrying out its authorized purposes. ”  *Ibid.*  [...] observed that unlike the MLUL, whose nexus and *pro rata* proportionality requirement served as “the Legislature’s check on a municipality’s planning power,” the LRHL “imbues municipalities with broad power to facilitate and encourage the redevelopment of blighted and unproductive areas, as evinced by both the statutory language and the policies promoted therein. ”  *Id.* at *9, Pa445.  Referring to the statutory authority to “negotiate and collect revenue from a redeveloper to defray the costs of the redevelopment agency” under *N.J.S.A.* 40A:12A-8(f), [...] explained:
[brief] Pa456 ¶ 24; Pa1042 ¶ 24; Pa475 ¶ 14; Pa661; Pa665.  To protect [...]’s interests, the [...] filed two notices of withdrawal of legal filings that [...] and her firm, [...], had made in [...]’s name but without [...]’s authorization.  Pa456 ¶ 24; Pa1042 ¶ 24; Pa475 ¶ 14; Pa659; Pa663.  The [...] notified attorney [...] that her representation of [...] was terminated and requested that she and [...] turn over their Association-related files.  Pa456 ¶ 25; Pa1042 ¶ 25; Pa475 ¶ 14; Pa656.  Meanwhile, on December 16, 2019, the [...] launched a hostile corporate takeover bid in the form of a separate action against [...] and others captioned [...], [...], and [...] v. [...], et al., [...] (Vermont Super. Ct.) (the “HCH Action”)
[brief] See Pa26.  But here, the evidence at trial established that [...] did know about grout; did know how to interact with customers; and that he did provide correct information to [...] about the grout.  That is why Plaintiffs urge this Court to find that any trainee, regardless of his or her knowledge or skill, is a risk of harm to customers.  However, Plaintiffs’ position is not supported by the law.  In addition, even if it were assumed that [...] violated its policy by allowing a trainee to interact with a customer on his own (which would be contrary to [...]’s trial testimony), the factfinder must still determine whether the employee’s knowledge, skill, or attributes created a risk of harm.  Because some video or other procedure might still have proper knowledge.  8T 125:8-25.  Thus, the employee’s specific traits determine whether the employer’s conduct is reasonable and if it was foreseeable to the employer that a risk of harm existed.  Whether the employee completed his training is not determinative of foreseeability.  trainees possess more knowledge and experience than others, allowing a particular trainee to interact with customers would not necessarily create a risk of harm.  Further, at some point before officially becoming a red vest employee, the trainee meets the requirements to become a red vest employee.  Thus, the argument that all trainees, regardless of their experience and qualifications, are not qualified to interact with customers on their own is flawed.
[brief] “Thus, it is now clear that an ‘intentional wrong’ is not limited to the traditional assault and battery, or to actions taken with a subjective intent to harm, but also includes instances where an employer knows that the consequences of its acts are substantially certain to result in harm or injury to an employee. ”  Fisher v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 363 N.J. Super 457, 465 (App. Div. 2003), certif. den., 179 N.J. 310 (2004) (citing Laidlow, 170 N.J. at 613, 617-618) (emphasis added).  Critically, the New Jersey Supreme Court in Laidlow made clear that the determination of whether an employer’s conduct created a substantial certainty of injury must be “grounded in the totality of the facts contained in the record” and is not to be determined based upon any per se or categorical rule.
[brief] (10T7:2).  [...] looked at the following dates: April 4, 2017, April 5, 2017, April 8, 2017, April 13, 2017, April 18, 2017, April 21, 2017, October 12, 2017, November 14, 2017, November 17, 2017, November 19, 2017, November 23, 2017, April 23, 2017, and April 28, 2017.  (10T7:2-7).  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I