ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Therefore, the first [Miller] factor weighs against defendant.  (17T217-14 to 18, 218-15 to 220-11).  Contrary to defendant’s claim on appeal (Db91), the court did not simply recount the nature of the offense, i.e., that four family members were brutally murdered.  The court instead focused on defendant’s deliberate and discrete acts leading up to the shootings.  Defendant’s careful planning is amply supported by the evidence and weakens any claim of immaturity, impetuousness, or failure to appreciate the risks and consequences of his actions.  The second Miller factor (defendant’s home and family environment) also weighed against defendant.
[brief] f.  **The Settlement Agreement’s release of claims is effective without a covenant not to sue (Pa00098). **  *Finally,* the Court can affirm the trial court’s decision notwithstanding Plaintiff’s “covenant not to sue” argument.  Plaintiff asserts that the Settlement Agreement released no future claims because the agreement lacks a covenant not to sue.  Pb26–Pb27.  But Plaintiff elevates form over substance in seeking to limit the scope of the *Roma* claim release through a separate covenant not to sue.  *See Breen v. Peck,* 28 N.J. 351, 358 (1958) (“The distinction between releases and covenants not to sue has properly been described as an artificial one which looks to form rather than substance and which tends to trap the unwary.
[brief] ”  Thus, New Jersey law provides parents with the rights to access accurate records and information concerning their minor children.  Accordingly, the Board sought to revise language contained in the previous version of the policy, which the Order compels the Board to reinstate, which stated that “[i]f a student has expressed a preference to be called by a name other than their birth name, permanent student records containing the student’s birth name should be kept in a separate, confidential file (Da056).
[brief] TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CONT’D Rule 4:42-11(b) ...........................................................................................................  27, 46, 47 N.J.S.A. 2A:15-5.3a ....................................................................................................  41 N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-26 to -29 .........................................................................................  3 N.J.S.A. 10:5-27.1 .....................................................................................................  13 N.J.S.A. 14A:3-6.3 .....................................................................................................  26 N.J.S.A. 47:1A-6 .........................................................................................................  13 N.J.S.A. 52:27H-21.22(a) .......................................................................................  7, 8 N.J.S.A. 52:27H-21.22(b) .......................................................................................
[brief] TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS, AND RULINGS BEING APPEALED  September 9, 2022, Order of the Hon. [...], J.S.C., granting summary judgment in favor of Defendant [...]..........................Pa80  June 23, 2023, Order of the Hon. [...], J.S.C., granting summary judgment in favor of Defendant Planning Board of the [...]........................................................................................................Pa115  ______________________  3  Plaintiff’s Notice of Appeal only designates the two Orders listed herein.  (Pa117).  However, Plaintiff’s Table of Judgments, Orders, and Rulings Being Appealed cites to six different documents.
[brief] ...........................................................................................................................................  39  | Date | Description | Page | |-----------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | Oral Decision  March 22, 2023 | | 1T | | December 01, 2017, Order Vacating and Set Aside  Any dead recorded as void ab initio | Pa 1-10 | | May 01, 2022, Order assigning [...] to the Presiding Judge of General Equity Division (Vicinage 4) | Pa 11 | | March 09, 2023, Order in [...] transferring matter to Camden County from Burlington County | Pa 12 | | March 23, 2023, [...]
[brief] LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT  1  THE TRIAL COURT MISAPPLIED  THE STANDARD FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT UNDER RULE 4:46-2(C)  Not Raised Below  Write and explain the detailed legal argument for this point heading.  Use Ctrl+e to show/hide the editing toolbar (bold, italics, underlining allowed.  Text limited to Courier New.)  The court failed to view the evidence (such as police report and medical payments detail etc,) in the light most favorable to the Plaintiffs, as mandated by *Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am.*  Substantial issues of material fact regarding the permanence of Plaintiffs' injuries were present, which should have precluded summary judgment.  POINT 2  MISINTERPRETATION OF PERMANENT INJURY REQUIREMENT UNDER N.J.S.A. 39:6-8(A)  After every point heading, the filer shall include, in parenthesis, the appendix or transcript page number where the ruling in question and argument was raised in the trial court or agency below.  If the argument was not made to the trial court or agency, please write: "Not raised below."  Not Raised Below  Write and explain the detailed legal argument for this point heading.  Use Ctrl+e to show/hide the editing toolbar (bold, italics, underlining allowed.  Text limited to Courier New.)  Legal Standard for Permanent Injury:  New Jersey law does not strictly require objective evidence like MRI's or CT scans to prove permanent injury, particularly in cases involving soft tissue or chronic pain.  **Sufficiency of Medical Evidence:**  The narrative reports from [...], DC, which were dismissed by the trial court, should be considered competent evidence.  Dr. Cohn's statements regarding the permanence of injuries, supported by his medical observation and treatments, are sufficient to establish a prime facile case of permanent injury.  CONCLUSION  Plaintiffs therefore respectfully asks that this court reverse the trial court's order granting summary judgment to defendant and the plaintiff should be granted compensation for medical expenses and damages resulting from the traffic accident.
[brief] In A.T. v. Cohen, 231 N.J. at 353, the Supreme Court held:  Going forward, advancements in our automated case management system will permit electronic notification of (1) the AOM filing obligation and (2) the scheduling of a Ferreira conference.  The electronic case management system will be updated to issue notices to counsel and accomplish those tasks.  Further details concerning those improvements will be provided through the Administrative Office of the Courts.  Apparently, defendants intended to use the AOM statute to seek relief, but they intentionally violated Ferreira and A.T. v. Cohen by remaining silent and not filing any letter requesting a Ferreira conference with the trial judge.  Under such circumstances, defendants’ unseemly litigation tactic should have been met, out of hand, with judicial estoppel, see Winters v. N. Hudson Reg'l Fire & Rescue, 212 N.J. 67, 85-88, 50 A.3d 649 (2012).  While these defendants should be saddled with the effects of their own dishonest litigation tactic, the overriding reason to have rejected their motions for summary judgment below is that the AOM is simply inapplicable because these professional defendants stole plaintiffs’ client work product and data and deployed it for the benefit of a competing (therefore conflicting) new client concerning the same project, at the same site, before the same Planning Board, concerning the same subject matter, after plaintiffs had already succeeded through the Resolution stage.
[brief] Instead, the Plaintiff is saying, even with that factual finding, the Court should have still ruled in his favor.  Specifically, the Plaintiff says:  "The trial court erred by finding that because it was not intentionally concealed, the undisclosed clause was nonetheless still enforceable."  Pb9.  The Plaintiff does not challenge the finding that there was no intent to deceive or mislead.  The Plaintiff should not be allowed to challenge that ruling now.  New arguments in a reply brief are not allowed.  Borough of Berlin v. Remington and Vernick Engineers, 337 N.J. Super. 590, 596 (App. Div. 2001).  See also Bouie v. New Jersey Dept. of Community Affairs, 407 N.J. Super 518, 538 (App. Div. 2009) ("A party may not advance a new argument in a reply brief").  The Plaintiff cannot point to any evidence to challenge this ruling, even if he were to suddenly raise this new argument.  This ruling following a bench trial is entitled to deference.  Regardless, there is no evidence that justifies overturning the trial court.  III.
[brief] \(^{13}\) | AOC | Cost | |-------|------------| | AOC 5 | $4,988,046 | | AOC 6 | $623,505 | | AOC 14| $623,505 | | AOC 16| $498,804 | | AOC 22| $5,424,703 | | AOC 26| $498,804 | | AOC 30| $169,782 | (Pa0487-88; Pa0490).  Finally, [...] testified that based on the extensive investigation conducted at the site and the findings by [...], it was his opinion that after the period of operations of each AOC, nothing further was done to add to the contamination originating from that AOC.  (Pa0284).  Thus, [...]’s covered damages for each AOC were pro-rated over the period of operations of each AOC, with the result being an allocation of [...]’s covered costs to each \(^{13}\)  The majority of covered costs incurred by [...] were for the site-wide groundwater investigation and the construction and operation of the GSM.
[directive] In February 2020, I called upon every board to cooperate fully with this important undertaking, and I thank the boards for their continued cooperation.  The Acting Director’s review remains ongoing, and we will never stop asking what we can do better.  But the Acting Director of the Division has now produced a number of recommendations for how the Division and its boards can better prevent sexual misconduct by licensees and better serve victims of sexual misconduct.  Having considered these findings and recommendations, and at the Acting Director’s request, I am issuing this Administrative Executive Directive.  I look forward to working with you on these important initiatives.  Pursuant to the authority granted to me under the New Jersey Constitution and the Law and Public Safety Act of 1948, N.J.S.A. 52:17B-1, et seq., which provides for general responsibility of the Department’s operations and the supervision of the organization of the Department, I hereby direct all Division of Consumer Affairs personnel operating under the authorities of the laws of the State of New Jersey to implement and comply with the following directives.
[brief] (2T 103:12-22)  Plaintiff’s obligation came with a specific penalty provision and Defendant’s obligation came with a specific penalty provision, both of which were enforced by the trial court and confirmed by the Appellate Division.  As a consequence, at the time the Order was entered on June 30, 2020, Defendant owed Plaintiff a total of $161,750.  (A25)  On that same date, Plaintiff owed Defendant $74,306.41.  (A17)  Basic logic, as well as the language of the Order, calls for those amounts to be offset, with Defendant owing Plaintiff a net amount of $87,443.59 as of June 30, 2020.
[brief] ”  [FEDa125]; •  In dismissing Count 8 of the First Amended Complaint (injunctive relief), “[Appellants’] claims fail due to their damages being the direct and proximate result of [Appellants’] own failure to make the payments due under the Lease. ”  [FEDa127]; and •  In its conclusion, “[Appellants] defaulted under their Lease with [...] for the Property on which [Appellants] were going to pursue the Solar Project.
[brief] Trial Testimony Underscores [...]’s Fair and Reasonable Opportunity to Explore All Amounts Due Under the Multiple Agreements Between [...] and [...] at the [...] (Pa291) | 11 | | D.  The Arbitrator’s Final Award Awarded [...] All Unpaid EGP—Except for the [...] (Pa573) | 18 | | E.  [...] Continues Its Desperate Attempt to Avoid Paying the $4 Million Arbitration Award by Commencing a Second Arbitration (Pa582) | 20 | | F. [...] Requests Injunctive Relief Enjoining the Second Arbitration, But the Trial Court Nonetheless Ordered the Second Arbitration to Proceed (Pa23) | 21 | | G. [...] Moved for Reconsideration of the Trial Court’s August 30 Orders Due to the Trial Court Overlooking Critical Evidence of the [...] at the First Arbitration (Pa960) | 24 | | H. [...] Is Entitled to Injunctive Relief Enjoining the Second Arbitration (Pa4) | 25 | | LEGAL ARGUMENT | 26 | Table Of Contents (continued)
[brief] Super 160, 166 (App. Div. 2012)  ...........................................43  NUSBAUM v CB RICHARD ELLIS, INC., 171 F. Supp. 2d 377, 388 (D.N.J. 2001)  .............................................26  PA. STATE TROOPERS ASS’N v MILLER, 621 F. Supp. 2d. 246 (2008)  ..........................................................23  PIZZO v. LINDENWOLD BD. OF EDUC., 31 Am. Disabilities Cas. (BNA) 982, Civil Action No. 1:13-cv-03633 (JBS/JS), 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41499, at *35 (D.N.J. Mar. 31, 2015).  ......................26  REGO INDUS., INC.  V AMERICAN MODEL METALS CORP., 91 N.J. Super. 447, 454 (App. Div. 1966).  .............................................43  SMITH v MILLVILLE RESCUE SQUAD, 225 N.J. 373, 394 (2016).  .................................................................14,16,23,46  TOURTELLOTTE v ELI LILLY & CO., 636 F. App’x 831, 848 (3d Cir. 2016).  ..................................................45  VICTOR v STATE, 203 N.J. 383, 409 (2010).  .................................................................22,24  WILLIAMS v BOROUGH OF CLAYTON, 442 N.J. Super. 583, 592(App. Div. 2015).  ...........................................43  WILLIAMS v BOROUGH OF CLAYTON, 442 N.J. Super. 583, 594-95 (App. Div. 2015).  ....................................41,43  YOBE v. RENAISSANCE ELEC., INC., 32 Am. Disabilities Cas. (BNA) 1015, supra.  ........................................26,31  STATUTES
[brief] N.J.S.A. 18A:12-22; N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(a), (e).  Again, on a motion to dismiss, all facts are to be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.  N.J.A.C. 6A:28-8.3.  That was clearly not the standard applied here.  This decision was clearly arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable.  That being the case, Appellants respectfully request that the Appellate Division reverse the Commission’s dismissal of Count 3 as to N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(a) and (e).
[brief] *Id.*  Here, the court again abused its discretion by excluding a photograph (Da 138) which Plaintiff herself authenticated in her written discovery as being taken by Plaintiff on the date of loss at approximately 7:35AM.  (Da 44-63).  While Plaintiff attempted to disavow taking this photograph at her deposition, she did confirm that it was taken by her boss.  As set forth above, it does not matter that plaintiff did not take this photograph.  Plaintiff herself authenticated it by testifying that her boss took it.  Moreover, Plaintiff’s suggestion that the photo was taken after the date of loss is unsupported by the record.
[brief] Ordinance No. 17-2017 is clear on its face and serves a legitimate and rationale purpose.  The sections of Ordinance No. 17-2017 that the trial court found overbroad are referenced in the trial court’s decision as §146-7(c) and (p):  The following acts are declared to be loud, disturbing and unnecessary noise nuisances in violation of this article but said enumeration shall be not be deemed to be exclusive, namely:  Shouting.  The excessive shouting, screaming or loud taking of peddlers, hawkers, vendors, patrons, or others who disturb the peace and quiet of the neighborhood.  ***  Other noises.  Any other continuous noise not enumerated above which is unreasonably loud, disturbing, unnecessary, and which annoys, injures or endangers the comfort, repose, health or welfare of others within the limits of the Borough.  Da83.
[brief] Greczyn v. Colgate-Palmolive, 183 N.J. 5, 11 (2005)  Description of the defendant must be sufficient to identify his involvement in the action.  Farrell v. Votator Division of Chemetron Corp., 62 N.J. 111, 120 (1973); DiMura v. Knapik, 277 N.J. Super. 156, 161 (App. Div. 1994) (allegation against [...] of negligent vehicle operation insufficient to preserve claim of negligent maintenance of roadway); Rutkowski v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 209 N.J. Super. 140, 147 (App. Div. 1986) (general description of '[...]' as one "otherwise responsible" for plaintiff's injuries insufficient to describe carrier who was negligent in inspecting industrial equipment)
[brief] See State v. Chippero, 201 N.J. 14, 20-21 (2009) (“[A]n appellate court’s role is not to determine anew whether there was probable cause for issuance of [a] warrant, but rather, whether there is evidence to support the finding made by the warrant-issuing judge. ”); Kasabucki, 52 N.J. at 117 (“Once the judge has made a finding of probable cause on the proof submitted and issued the search warrant, a reviewing court, especially a trial court, should pay substantial deference to his determination. ”).  Moreover, [...]’s de novo review of [...]’s determination deserves no deference because it is based on a flawed analysis in which [...] applied a probable-cause standard and particularity requirement that are inconsistent with longstanding judicial precedent.
[brief] Dated: September 2, 2022  TABLE OF CONTENTS  TABLE OF DECISION BEING APPEALED  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
[brief] \(^3\)  If raised at all, it was one line in [...]’s reply brief, as compared to pages arguing the January 2021 Terms imprinted [...] with knowledge sufficient to override the December 2021 Terms’ deficiencies, hence the written decision’s remark:  “The Court rejects, and Defendant seemingly does not argue, that the January 18, 2021, Agreement does not come into effect, but instead relied on the January Agreement as part and parcel for their “notice” they have provided to [[...]].”  (Da304).  In *Moore v. Woman to Woman Obstetrics & Gynecology*, L.L.C., 416 N.J. Super. 30, 45 (App. Div. 2010), this Court specifically noted it was not “aware of any legal theory that would permit one spouse to bind another to an agreement waiving the right to trial on his or her claim without securing his consent to the agreement. ”  There, a medical facility attempted to bind a mother’s child and husband to arbitration, based upon an agreement she had executed.  *Id.* at 45-46.  While this Court recognized a parent may “bind a minor child to arbitrate future tort claims,” it did not find any analogous theory in our jurisprudence as to spouses.  *Id.* at 45 (quoting *Hojnowski v. Vans Skate Park*, 187 N.J. 323, 343 (2006)).  Addressing the question again, after remand, this Court reaffirmed its determination.  *Moore v. Woman to Woman Obstetrics & Gynecology*, L.L.C., No. A-683-11 (App. Div. Aug. 14, 2013) (slip op., at *18-20) (*Moore II*) (Pa69-88).  In recognition of several factors, such as the importance of clear waiver of a right to civil litigation, the husband’s claim being direct and not purely derivative of his wife’s (like [...]’s individual claims being predominate over those for loss of consortium), and the law’s rejection of some presumption of agency between spouses.  See *Moore II* (slip op., at *16-20) (quoting *Hirsch*, 215 N.J. at 194; and *Restatement (Second) of Agency* § 22 comment b (1958) (“Neither husband nor wife by virtue of the relation has power to act as agent for the other. ”)).  More recently, in *Gayles v. Sky Zone Trampoline Park*, this Court relied on this principle from *Moore*, in recognizing that absent guardianship or another like legal relationship, there was no basis to permit one to person to bind another to arbitration.  468 N.J. Super. 17, 26 (App. Div. 2021) (rejecting non-guardian’s execution of waiver on behalf of child).  Here, there is no actual or implied agency relationship between the McGintys that would permit [...] to bind [...] to arbitration.  [...] does not consent.  And [...]’s claims are not predominantly derivative.  Under these circumstances, there is no basis to depart from New Jersey law and permit a third-party to waive his right to trial.  **V. UBER WAIVED ITS AGREEMENT TO ARBITRATE**
[brief] CREATING A PRECEDENT FOR FUTURE PLANNING BOARDS AND GOVERNING BODIES TO APPROVE ORDINANCES  CONTRARY TO THE SPECIFICS OF THE LAND USE ELEMENT OF THE MASTER PLAN WITHOUT EXPLAINING THEIR REASONS FOR DEVIATING FROM THE MASTER PLAN’S LAND USE VISION, CONTRARY TO THE LEGISLATURE’S REQUIREMENTS IN ITS DELEGATION OF POWER TO MUNICIPALITIES.  (PA 124-130).  The Trial Court upheld the Planning Board’s determination that the Second Ordinance was not inconsistent with the Master Plan and the Borough Council’s pro-forma adoption of the Planning Board’s determination.  The Trial Judge accepted the Board Planner’s conclusion that based on the general objectives\(^8\) of the Master Plan, as opposed to its specific recommendations which are contained in the Land Use Element of the Master Plan, the Second Ordinance was consistent with the Master Plan.  (Pa 125-128).  The Trial Judge stated he “is not going to second guess the Borough’s determinations. ” (Pa 128).  But the Trial Judge missed the point that both the Planning Board and Borough Council failed to consider the specifics of the Land Use Element of the Master Plan in coming to their unfounded determinations.  (Pa 128-129).  The Judge’s job is to review these determinations.  A review is not “second guessing”.  We know of no Master Plan in this state which does not start out by reciting the general objectives of zoning as set forth in the preamble of the MLUL (N.J.S.A. 40:55D-2) particularly subsection (g) thereof which states that the intent and purpose of the act is: to provide sufficient space in appropriate locations for a variety of agricultural, residential, recreational, commercial uses and open space, both public and private, according to their respective environmental requirements in order to meet the needs of all New Jersey citizens.