ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The failure to properly consider mitigating factors, such as the various programs in which the inmate participated, letters of support, age and lack of institutional infractions, and recommendations or letters of support received from numerous sources, constitute grounds for reversal and remand to the Board.  See, e.g., [...] v. N.J. State Parole Bd., No. A-2693-07 (App. Div. Apr. 21, 2009) (slip op. at 11-16) (citing [...] VI, 166 N.J. at 189).  Indeed, our Courts have reversed and remanded Final Decisions if the Board places too much weight on select evidence in the record and not enough to other relevant evidence.  See, e.g., [...] VI, 166 N.J. at 189-92; [...], No. A-2693-07 (slip op. at 18-19).  In [...] VI and [...], the respective Courts found that the Board placed too much weight on certain aggravating evidence, and not enough weight on other mitigating evidence.  In [...] VI, for example, our Supreme Court criticized the Board for its failure to address “substantial evidence in the record, spanning many years of infraction-free incarceration and favorable psychological evaluations, that demonstrated [...]'s likelihood of success on parole” and its reliance on one negative psychological report among several others.  166 N.J. at 189.  Likewise, in [...], the Appellate Division acknowledged that "[c]ertainly it cannot be denied that the record contains a laundry list of [...]’s many crimes and negative psychological evaluations and risk assessments. ”  [...], No. A-2693-07 (slip op. at 13).  Despite the nature of [...]’s offenses and evaluations, however, the Appellate Division found that “the record as a whole consists of more,” including [...]’s infraction-free record and involvement in the community.  Ibid.  In sum, the Board has very clear statutory and regulatory obligations in deciding whether to grant or deny parole.  When the Board acts arbitrarily or fails to support or explain the reasons for denial, reversal is required.
[brief] The judge found it was “clear from the record that the property was abandoned” and that defendant had no connection to the property, which had been foreclosed.  The judge reasoned that if the church had been operating, the gate to the alleyway would have been down to protect the area, and there would not have been so much glass and debris on the ground.  *6  The judge also found [...]'s testimony was credible, noting the officer's “demeanor seemed calm,” he did not “try[ ] to deceive the [c]ourt,” and he appeared to answer the questions “honestly. ”  Based on that testimony, the judge found it was reasonable for the officers to search the alleyway, where it was reported that defendant was seen after the robbery, and it was a “simple estimate that the gun and the jacket were abandoned somewhere.
[directive] SART Coordinators shall ensure that their county’s SART program is informed by the needs of the specific vulnerable populations present in their county, and that SART activations are responsive to the different modes of service delivery these populations may require to promote inclusivity.  SART Coordinators shall also gather information about local community-based resources that are available to meet the unique needs of vulnerable people living in their county’s communities.  These resources may include the following: victim service agencies; faith-based organizations; community centers; organizations serving persons with disabilities; county human relations commissions; adult protective services agencies; and any other organizations providing services to members of vulnerable populations.
[directive] Any local unit may establish and maintain plans for award programs for employees, designed to promote efficiency and economy in government functions, to reward individual employees for meritorious performances and suggestions.  Award programs may include any or all of the following:  A suggestion award program; Awards for heroism; efficiency and incentive award program; An Awards for professional accomplishments; Awards for service.  Any local unit shall have power and authority to make appropriations of money therefor, establish and make awards in the form of cash, medals, citation certificates, insignia or other appropriate devices to employees selected as recipients of awards by it or its committee appointed in accordance with known programs established pursuant to this act.  Such committee shall be as the "Public Employees' and of Awards Committee" shall consist 5 persons who shall be officers or employees of the local unit, no or members of the governing body, and 2 of such officers or employees shall be employed in the - - - same department of the local unit.  Of the members first appointed to the committee, 2 shall be 2 1 appointed for terms of years, 2 for years and 1 fof year, and thereafter appointments shall be made 3 3 are for terms of years.  Members shall serve for the terms for which they appointed and until their successors have been appointed and qualified; a vacancy occurring by reason other than expiration of term shall be filled for the unexpired term.  Members of the committee shall serve without compensation.  The committee shall meet and organize as soon as practicable after the first appointment on of members and annually, thereafter, the call of the chief executive officer, and select a chairman from among its members.  The committee shall hold regular meetings at least once each month during the year, except during July and August, at the call of the chairman or the chief executive officer of the local unit.  The committee is authorized to request, and shall receive, such assistance as it may require from any department, official or agency.  Page 2 of 2 Document  The committee shall be responsible for the formulation of programs and shall have the power to - adopt and promulgate rules and regulations for the conduct and operation of awards programs.  The committee shall make an annual report to the governing body concerning the operation of awards programs established pursuant to this act.  L.1960, c. 169, eff. Jan. 1,1962.
[brief] (Da 1 to 12)  After trial before the Honorable [...], J.S.C. and a jury in April and May 2022, defendant was acquitted of Counts One, Four, and Six, and convicted of Counts Two, Three, and Five.\(^2\) (Da 7 to 12)  On March 15, 2023 2023, after merger, [...] sentenced defendant to serve an aggregate five-year prison term, all five years without parole, to forfeit his pension, and to pay the usual fees and penalties.  (Da 16 to 19)  On May 12, 2023, defendant filed his notice of appeal.  (Da 20 to 23)  STATEMENT OF FACTS
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[brief] The Committee Never Made a Finding of Inconsistency.  (Pa632); (T10:6-21).  Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-7(e), a township is required to "identif[y] . . . any provisions in the proposed redevelopment plan which are inconsistent with the master plan."  The record before the trial court was devoid of any finding of inconsistency either by the Committee or the Planning Board.  Here, the trial court correctly found the Plan was inconsistent with the master plan and as such, Ordinance No. 2022-15 was null and void.  (T50:22-
[brief] *Bandler v. Landry’s Inc.*, 464 N.J.Super. 311 (App. Div. 2020) rejected this same argument [...] advances.  In *Bandler*, the plaintiff sued a casino under both the Casino Control Act (“CCA”) and the CFA for falsely advertising the prize money available in a poker tournament.  The CCA contains language addressing possible conflicts with other remedial statutes that is very similar to the RETA language.  As [...] points out, the RETA says, “In a case of conflict between the provisions of this Act and the provisions of any other law…the provisions of this Act shall control.
[brief] I don’t need to go into that now other than to say that the Supreme Court reversed the conviction in a lengthy opinion.  The opinion is found at 249 N.J. 509 and that conviction was reversed by the Supreme Court in January of 2022.  As best I can tell, and I ask [...] to correct me if I’m wrong on this, there was no direct appeal of the murder case.  There was, however, a post-conviction relief application that was filed in that matter and it was denied by [...].  I have the order here.  I just seem to have misplaced that in with all of my other paperwork.  Give me just a minute.  It was denied by [...] or, I’m sorry, dismissed by [...] on February 7 of 2022.  And that matter involved [...] being represented by counsel, [...], P-a-s-t-a-c-a-l-d-i.  And that is what brings us to this matter today.
[brief] Pa437.  Additionally, the Schmidt decision provides little guidance to resolving the issues presently before the Court.  The public policy considerations and policy language at issue here are all entirely different than those at issue in Schmidt.  The Schmidt Court’s primary concern was the possibility that a work-related bodily injury claim would be rendered uninsured.  Such is not the case here.  Although the remedies available to Plaintiff under the Act may be significantly less than the Consent Judgment [...] agreed to and that might be recoverable in a common law intentional wrong action, the Act provides a defined set of available benefits for injuries arising out of and in the course of employment.
[brief] Plaintiffs disingenuously argue that [...] was enrolled in the CCIP in July 2015, when it received the automated Welcome Letter and COI and, therefore, conclude [...] is entitled to coverage as a “Named Insured” going forward. \(^{13}\) \(^{13}\)  Plaintiffs’ reliance on a “form letter” shown to [...]’s [...] during deposition (at Pb10) is equally unpersuasive as such letters are used for cancellation of an entire CCIP Program at the request of the First Named Insured, not unenrollment of a specific subcontractor.  *(See Pa2673, the form letter, which was not provided by Plaintiffs in support of their Motion below.)*  This argument ignores the plain language of the COI which states it is issued for “INFORMATION ONLY AND CONFERS NO RIGHTS UPON THE CERTIFICATE HOLDER” and “DOES NOT CONSTITUTE A CONTRACT BETWEEN THE ISSUING INSURER(S), AUTHORIZED REPRESENTATIVE OR PRODUCER, AND THE CERTIFICATE HOLDER. ” (Pa619.)  It further ignores the fact that [...] was not actually enrolled in the CCIP on the Accident date and, thus, cannot satisfy the [...]’s definition of “Named Insured.
[brief] ]  The Due Process Clause guarantees more than fair process, "it provides heightened protection against government interference with certain fundamental rights and liberty interests."  Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 719-20 (1997).  Article 1 para 1 of the New Jersey Constitution is the counterpart to the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment and affords all persons the same fundamental rights as the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution.  See King v. S. Jersey Nat'l Bank, 66 N.J. 161, 178 (1974).  Article 1 para 1, like the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause, requires that the State provide safe conditions for confinement.  Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 315-16, (1982).  A safe environment was not provided to the plaintiff.  The conduct of [...] and its prison employees violated clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of the plaintiff which a reasonable person would have known.
[brief] Even though the applicant ultimately updated the plan to show the maximum coverage as allowed by the ordinance, the Board’s concerns remained as any of the future homeowners could potentially obtain a variance to create a larger home from the Board of Adjustment.  Adding to the uncertainty was the fact that the applicant never provided the Board with a concrete answer as to whether a homeowner’s association would be maintaining the stormwater management areas once the homes were built.  This was a critical piece of information, considering that drainage owned by individual property owners is not allowed under the new stormwater regulations.  (1T28-12 to 1T28-16)  The Board conducted two full public hearing(s) with adequate notice having been provided to the public.  The Board duly considered the testimony of the applicant’s professionals and the objector’s professionals.  For any expert witness, the Board can accept all, some, or none of the professional’s testimony.  Klug v. Bridgewater Tp. Planning Board, 407 N.J. Super. 1 (App. Div. 2009).  The Board duly considered all evidence presented, including the testimony provided by [...], the traffic report submitted by the applicant, and the substantial public comments voiced by several members of the public at both hearings, and voted to deny this subdivision application with design waivers for significant drainage, traffic and safety issues concerning the subject property and the immediate surrounding area.  Municipal actions enjoy a presumption of validity.
[brief] On March 3, 2023, a Petition to the State Police Retirement Board was filed on behalf of [...] and many others.  Pa30.  Included with the Petition were other retired Troopers who are requesting registration and amended health benefits in retirement.  Pa30.  All of those Troopers provided affidavits that they also did not receive notice of the Ricci Bill’s passage.  Pa30.  Pa87-123.  Furthermore, other Troopers who are not currently ill, but were only seeking to register for the Ricci Act also filed affidavits that they did not receive notice of the Ricci Act and were included in the Petition.  Pa30.  Pa124-271.  Additionally, other retired Troopers who were not present at the September 11, 2001 attacks and aftermath also submitted affidavits that they did not receive any notice of the Ricci Act in further support of the Petition.  Pa272-282.  President of the [...], [...], submitted an affidavit that he did not receive any correspondence or postcard from the Division of Pensions notifying him of the Ricci Act.  Pa276.  Upon notice by another retired Trooper, Wren underwent a massive polling of the [...] to ascertain whether his membership received notice of the Ricci Act.  Pa276.  Of the fifty-nine (59) [...] members (retired troopers) who responded to the polling, fifty-seven (57) did not receive any notice of the Ricci Act by letter, correspondence, or postcard.  Pa276.  Additionally, active Trooper [...] provided an affidavit that he also did not receive any notice of the Ricci Act.  Pa128.  Despite not receiving notice, Licameli attempted to file an Eligibility Registration Form back in September of 2019.  Pa130.  His Registration Form notes that he was present at Ground Zero/WTC on 9/15/01 for 10 hours.  Pa130.  In response to his filing, Licameli received correspondence from the Division of Pensions requesting medical information.  Pa132.  Licameli contacted Pensions on November 18, 2019, and was advised that the Ricci Act “is for those who are currently sick.  Not for possible future illnesses. ”  Pa132.  It is unknown at this time how many other Troopers Eligibility Registration Forms may have not been filed or how many Troopers were not registered because the member was not ill at the time the forms were sent.  On March 23, 2023, correspondence was sent to the State Police Retirement Board to clarify the request that the Board consider all of the affected Troopers in a single collective petition.  Pa28.  The correspondence also requested that the Board take administrative or judicial notice of all affidavits submitted in all actions with respect to the issue of lack of notice of the Ricci Act for members of the State Police Retirement System.  Pa28.  To date, over ninety-eight (98) active and retired Troopers have submitted affidavits attesting that they did not receive any notice of the Ricci Act.  Pa87-282.
[brief] Every land use board decision is entitled to a presumption of validity.  In Kramer v. Bd. of Adjustment, Sea Girt, 45 N.J. 268, 296-97, (1965), the New Jersey Supreme Court recognized that Board members are uniquely qualified to make findings of facts, saying:  Such public bodies, because of their peculiar knowledge of local conditions must be allowed wide latitude in the exercise of delegated discretion.  Courts cannot substitute an independent judgment for that of the boards in areas of factual disputes; neither will they exercise anew the original jurisdiction of such boards or trespass on their administrative work.  So long as the power exists to do the act complained of and there is substantial evidence to support it, the judicial branch of the government cannot interfere.
[brief] The standard for the admissibility of business records has remained constant.  In order to qualify under the business record exception to the hearsay rule, the proponent must satisfy three conditions: First, the writing must be made in the regular course of business.  Second, it must be prepared within a short time of the act, condition or event being described.  Finally, the source of the information and the method and circumstances of the preparation of the writing must justify allowing it into evidence.  (citing *State v. Matulewicz*, 101 N.J. 27, 29, 499 A.2d 1363 (1985)).  The Respondent has failed to provide any evidence whatsoever that any of these three elements have been met.
[brief] ”  This aggravating factor incorporates general deterrence, defined as deterrent effect on the public, and specific deterrence, defined as deterrent effect upon the defendant.  State v. Fuentes, 217 N.J. 57, 79 (2014).  Defendant contends that general deterrence is not applicable because “the threat of a lengthy jail sentence is less of a deterrent for juveniles than adults. ”  But if that reasoning is accepted, general deterrence is never applicable in a case involving juvenile offenders.  The magnitude of the violence in this case, as well as its preplanned and unnecessary nature, make clear that the public needs to be deterred from similar conduct.  As for specific deterrence, defendant’s history demonstrates a consistent failure to appreciate the harm he causes others.  This is evidenced not just by the animal abuse, carjacking, or double murder he committed, but also by the fact that eighteen years after killing the [...], defendant insisted to this court that he did not kill or intend to kill anyone.  Under these circumstances, the judge is did not err in finding aggravating factor nine.  Mitigating factor seven states: “The defendant has no history of prior delinquency or criminal activity or has led a law-abiding life for a substantial period of time before the commission of the present offense.
[brief] A.  Plaintiff was incorrect to state there as no genuine issue of material fact.  Plaintiff’s Brief states in part: “Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment should be granted under R. 4:46-2 because no genuine issue of material fact exists...”  The last sentence of the Brief states: “Therefore, as there is no genuine issue of material facts in dispute, Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment should be granted. ”  The statement “there is no genuine issue of material fact” is incorrect.  As discussed above on pages Db6 and Db8, R. 4:5-8(e) states that time and place shall be considered like all other allegations of material matter.  Thus, time and place are as important as an allegation of nonpayment of an account.  The Complaint is undated; the Complaint does not state the date the claim arose; Plaintiff incorrectly stated its “place of business”; and as discussed in Section VI.  E. below, Plaintiff double-billed for the period of April 27, 2017 to May 27, 2017.  Pursuant to R. 4:5-8(e), the undated Complaint, the omission of the date Plaintiff’s claim rose, the misrepresentation as to its principal place of business and the fact of double-billing are material facts.  A fact is “material” if it “might affect the outcome of the suit under governing law” and is genuinely in dispute if “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. ”  Roe v. City of Waterbury, 542 F.2d 31, 35 (2d Cir. 2008).  Thus, the grant of summary judgment was void because of the existence of genuine issues of material facts affecting Plaintiff’s motion.  B.
[directive] Procedures for De-Activation Upon a Civilian’s Request.  When an officer de-activates a BWC pursuant to Section 6.1 or 6.2, the following procedures shall be followed: 1) the discussion between the officer and the civilian concerning the request for de-activation shall be electronically recorded; 2) the officer before de-activating the BWC shall narrate the circumstances of the de-activation (e.g., “I am now turning off my BWC as per the victim’s request. ”); 3) the officer shall report the circumstances concerning the de- activation to his or her superior as soon as is practicable; and 4) the officer shall document the circumstances of the de-activation in any investigation or incident report concerning the incident under investigation.  See also Section 9.3 (notations (i.e., “tagging”) to indicate BWC recordings that raise special privacy or other issues).  Cf. R. 3:17(b)(iv) (explaining that station house custodial interrogations must be electronically recorded 4 unless “a statement is made during a custodial interrogation by a suspect who indicated, prior to making the statement, that he/she would participate in the interrogation only if it were not recorded; provided however, that the agreement to participate under that condition is itself recorded”).  BODY WORN CAMERA POLICY | January 2022 15 6.4
[brief] The Agreement’s Choice-of-Law Clause Is Null and Void (Pa5).  As discussed in [...]’s opening brief, after passage of the MBPA, the Agreement’s New York choice-of-law provision, by operation of the MBPA’s own terms, was necessarily rendered null and void upon the Agreement’s post-MBPA renewal because the provision would otherwise run afoul of the MBPA’s mandate that New Jersey law must apply to brewer-wholesaler relationships in the State.  NJSA 33:1-93.15(a).  There is no authority—and [...] cannot cite any—holding that the MBPA cannot render the renewed Agreement’s New York choice-of-law provision a nullity. \(^4\)  Instead, quoting from the language defining the scope of the MBPA’s reach, [...] wrongly suggests that [...] is seeking to apply the MBPA’s provisions to [...]’s sales of [...] products to New York retailers.  Pa23-25.  That suggestion is not only incorrect, it disregards both New Jersey’s three-tier distribution paradigm and the crux of this case: [...]’s bad faith and ill-conceived plan to discontinue the supply of [...] products to [...] \textit{in New Jersey}.
[directive] WAIVER OF MIRANDA RIGHTS  I, __________________________, have been read the above statement of my rights aloud.  I understand each of my rights and at this time I am willing to give up my right to remain silent and speak to you without a lawyer present.  No promises or threats have been made to me.  A mi,____________________, me han leido en voz alta la declaracion que figura arriba.  Entiendo cada uno de mis derechos; en este momentum, estoy dispuesto a renunciar a mi derecho de guarder siliencio, y hablare con usted sin tener a un abogado presente.  No me han hecho ni promesas ni amenazas.  Signed (Firma):_______________________________  Witness: ___________________________  Date:__________________________  Time: ______________________  Advising Officer: _____________________________________________  Appendix H