ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Id. at *4.  Accordingly, there was no insured event in the chain of causation that could trigger Appleman’s Rule.  This Court distinguished *Search EDP, Inc. v. Am. Home Ins. Co.*, 267 N.J.Super 537 (App. Div. 1993), *certif. denied*, 135 N.J. 466 (1994), which applied Appleman’s Rule in a liability coverage case because a covered event in the chain of causation, professional negligence, caused the injury at issue in that case.  This Court said, “We fully subscribe” to Appleman’s Rule, which “is regarded as expressing the majority rule in those jurisdictions addressing the issue. ”  *Id.* at 543.  The Trial Court’s decision that Appleman’s Rule does not apply to CGL cases is unsupported by *Sherwood* and is, indeed, expressly refuted by other controlling cases.
[brief] Toward the end of its third day of deliberations, the jury sent a note stating that it had reached a “unanimous decision on some questions on the verdict sheet” but had been at impasse on other questions “for a good length of time” and did not believe it would “make any progress on reaching a unanimous decision. ”  (21T:17-7 to 14)  Although the jury clearly stated that it did not believe further deliberations would be fruitful, the trial court sent the jury back with the same instruction on deliberations it had already received at the close of trial. (21T:17-23 to 18-20)  The court’s failure to address the jury’s report that they had a partial verdict but did not believe further deliberations would yield a unanimous decision on the remaining counts left the jury with the clear “impression that they would be required to continue to deliberate for as long as it might take to reach unanimity” on all counts.  *State v. Figueroa*, 190 N.J. 219, 242 (2007).  The court’s actions impermissibly coerced the jury into reaching a verdict, compelling reversal.
[brief] ”  (ECF 63-2 ¶ 4.)  [...] further attests that the six Salesforce documents produced in response to RFP No. 4, which she has reviewed, “cannot possibly be all” responsive Salesforce documents because she “personally know[s] that the number of documents maintained” in Salesforce exceeds this number and that she “personally created” more than these six documents in Salesforce for the two school districts.  (ECF 63-2 ¶¶ 11-12.)  She also questions [...]’s RFP No. 4 production because she reviewed documents produced by [...] in response to RFP No. 7 that she says were clearly retrieved from Salesforce—thus “showing that Defendant can and has retrieved documents from Sales Force, they are just not doing it for the [...] and [...] districts or, alternatively, the data for those two accounts has been lost or destroyed.
[brief] See T2 at 33:17-34:6  Removing the Plaintiff’s January 30, 2023 affidavit, there is simply nothing that Plaintiff can point to in the record that establishes that Defendants promised to pay Plaintiff anything conditioned upon the sale of the hospital.  Faced with this fact, Plaintiff attempts to ‘shoe-horn’ such a condition into Plaintiff’s deposition testimony and interrogatory answers.  At his deposition, Plaintiff referenced a conversation he allegedly had with [...], where it was Plaintiff – not [...] – who raised the sale of the hospital in the context of receiving alleged owed amounts:  “Yes.  We-again, it was during the Christmas party event, which was at the end of December 2017, and myself and another physician who was owed money, too, we approached [...] and said ‘you know you’re selling the hospital but we haven’t gotten paid. ’
[brief] Id.  Constructed Wetlands Basin 2 is not required to provide a forebay and does not provide one because the stormwater runoff is pretreated before entering the BMP through Green Infrastructure MTDs designed in accordance with Chapter 9.5 or is roof runoff pretreated using a leaf screen.  Id.  Plaintiffs also ignore an August 10, 2023, email from NJDEP Staff Environmental Engineer, [...] to [...]’s consultant [...], which states, in response to further information submitted by [...] that “I don’t anticipate needing any plan revisions now that you’ve explained that the ‘forebay’ area is not actually a forebay, but a portion of the constructed wetland basin itself.
[brief] McGuire v. City of Jersey City, 125 N.J. 310, 326, 593 A.2d 309 (1991)..................46  Mihailovich v. Laatsch, 359 F.3d 892, 904-05 (7th Cir. 2004).................................13  Mosley v. Friauf, 2023 U.S.Dist.LEXIS 80018..............................................................13  N.Bergen Rex Transp. V. Trailer Leasing Co., 158 N.J. 561, 730 A.2d 843 (1997)  ........................................................................................................................................46
[directive] Purchase of evidence or information of $250,000 or more must be approved by the Under Secretary (Enforcement) or designee.  >  Costs of detention are payable if the property has been seized.  >  Security expenses are payable if the security features have no regular agency use and would not have been incurred but for a particular seizure.  >  Generally, the expenses of property disposal are incurred under the terms of the contract with the national seized property contractor and are paid under that contract.
[brief] Ins. Co. v. Phillips, 66 N.J. 277 (1974) | 12 | | Potenzone v. Annin Flag Co., 191 N.J. 147 (2007) | 2,7 | | Princeton Ins. Co. v. Chunmuang, 151 N.J. 80 (1997) | 7 | | Ryder/P.I.E. Nationwide, Inc. v. Harbor Bay Corp., 119 N.J. 402 (1990) | 7,14 | | Samolyk v. Berthe, 251 N.J. 73 (2022) | 6 | | Schmidt v. Smith, 155 N.J. 44 (1998) | 9,10,11 | | Selective Ins. Co. of Am. v. Hudson E. Pain Mgmt. Osteopathic Med., 210 N.J. 597 (2012) | 6 | | Statutes | Pages | |----------|-------| | N.J.S.A. 34:15-8 | 1,10,11,13 | | N.J.S.A. 34:15-71 | 9,13 | | N.J.S.A. 34:15-72 | 9,10,11 | | N.J.S.A. 34:15-77 | 9,13 | | N.J.S.A. 34:15-78 | 9,10,11 | | N.J.S.A. 34:15-83 | 8,16 | | N.J.S.A. 34:15-84 | 8,16 | | N.J.S.A. 34:15-86 | 8 | | N.J.S.A. 34:15-87 | 1,8 | | N.J.S.A. 39:6-46(a) | 12 | | Statutes | Pages | |----------|-------| | Regulations | Pages | |-------------|-------| | Rules of Court | Pages | |----------------|-------| | Other Authorities | Pages | |-------------------|-------| R. 4:6-2(e) | 3 | PRELIMINARY STATEMENT Plaintiff, [...], as administratrix and administratrix ad prosequendem for the [...] (“Plaintiff”), appeals the orders of the trial court granting the dismissal of her Complaint and denying summary judgment in her favor.
[brief] This litigation involves claims for inverse condemnation, just compensation, and damages which Plaintiffs sustained as a result of unauthorized entries and excavation by various entities on Plaintiffs’ property located at [...] (the “Property”).  Plaintiffs own and operate a [...] on the Property.  These unauthorized entries, excavation, and damages were authorized by the [...] in connection with its redevelopment project, which occurred on adjacent properties.  These unauthorized entries and activities constituted a physical taking of a portion of Plaintiffs’ Property without just compensation.  Despite clear evidence of a physical taking, the trial court entered summary judgment in favor of the [...] and denied Plaintiffs’ cross-motion for partial summary judgment.  The court rationalized the unauthorized physical entries on the basis that they were conducted as a part of [...]’s environmental remediation, implying that Plaintiffs received a benefit from the remediation, and that, therefore, these unauthorized entries and activities did not constitute a taking.  The trial court’s holding contradicts the purpose and intent of the environmental remediation statute and deviates from decades of well-established condemnation jurisprudence.  Moreover, there were genuine disputes of material fact regarding the installation and characterization of an Active Subsurface Depressurization System (“ASDS”) that was installed on Plaintiffs’ Property which should have precluded the entry of summary judgment in favor of the [...].  Plaintiffs also sued [...]’s engineer, [...], which had prepared a project site plan that depicted project site improvements on Plaintiffs’ Property.  Various contractors associated with the project relied upon these plans and, in reliance on those plans, entered the Plaintiffs’ Property and conducted excavation and other activities on Plaintiffs’ Property without Plaintiffs’ authorization or consent.  The trial court ultimately dismissed [...] from the litigation and entered an Order subjecting Plaintiffs to frivolous litigation sanctions.  The trial court’s holding that Plaintiffs engaged in frivolous litigation in this matter is inconsistent with the trial court’s own prior ruling, wherein the trial court held that Plaintiffs could pursue common law negligence and trespass claims without the need for an expert.  In reliance on the trial court’s prior ruling, Plaintiff pursued discovery and, during the course of discovery, confirmed that several parties relied upon [...]’s site plan in concluding that Plaintiffs’ Property was part of the redevelopment project.  Further, based upon interrogatory responses submitted by [...], there was a fact question as to whether or not [...] trespassed onto Plaintiffs’ Property which should have precluded a determination that Plaintiffs engaged in frivolous litigation.  For these reasons and the reasons to follow, the rulings at issue should be reversed and this matter should be remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.
[brief] Generally, an applicant must establish the positive criteria by showing there are “special reasons” for approving the application, and the negative criteria by “showing that such variance and other relief can be granted without substantial detriment to the public good and [the relief granted] will not substantially impair the intent and the purpose of the zone plan and zoning ordinance. ”  *Grasso v. Borough of Spring Lake Heights*, 375 N.J. Super. 41, 48-49 (App. Div. 2004) (quoting N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70(d)).  However, “[t]he standard for establishing special reasons depends on the type of (d) variance at issue. ”  *Grasso*, supra, at 49 (citing *Cell S. of N.J., Inc.*, supra, at 83).  New Jersey courts now apply a relaxed standard of review to variance applications seeking deviations from the density requirements in a particular zone pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70(d)(5).
[brief] The Board of Public Utilities decision should be affirmed.  Respectfully submitted, [...]  ATTORNEY GENERAL OF NEW JERSEY  By: s/ [...]  [...] (Attorney ID No. 323082020)  Deputy Attorney General [...]  [...]  Assistant Attorney General Of Counsel  APPELLANT’S SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF APPEAL OF THE NEW JERSEY  BOARD OF PUBLIC UTILITIES’ DECISION  [...] [...] [...] [...]  Attorneys for Appellant  [...] Of Counsel and On the Brief: [...] (031431997)
[brief] ”).  As such, the “sympathy” arguments being made by plaintiff about the “tragic death” have no relevance to the legal analysis on co-employee immunity under the Workers’ Compensation Act.  As aptly held by this Court in a similar co-employee immunity case:  “We appreciate the hardship that this ruling may have on this plaintiff.  But our ultimate obligation in dealing with the issue before us is to preserve the integrity of the workers’ compensation law and to insure its interpretation and application in a manner consistent with its remedial and social purposes. ”  *Ehrgott v. Jones*, 208 N.J. Super. 393, 399 (App. Div. 1986).  CONCLUSION
[brief] This Court’s unpublished opinion affirming [...]’s conviction sets forth the relevant facts of the robbery as follows:  [T]he State presented evidence which established that on December 3, 2009, an African-American male entered the [...] store in [...].  He stood near the entrance, complained that the lines were too long, and left the store soon after.  Later that day, at around 5:30 p.m., [...], the store’s manager, observed that the individual who entered the store earlier had returned and was attempting to take one of the cash registers.  [...], the store’s security guard, attempted to stop the man from carrying away the register.  [...] and the perpetrator fell to the floor.  [...] pressed the store’s ‘panic button’ alarm.  When he turned around, [...] observed that the perpetrator had gotten up from the ground and was pointing a handgun at him.  [...] turned again, and the man fled the store with the register.  He had taken $125.  [Simmons, 2016 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 306 at *2-3.
[brief] (Pa36 at 90:1-8).  Plaintiff further testified that she’s had problems with the Property as of 2000, and that “this issue with the water has been long-standing . . . and the severity of the problem only seemed to get worse as the years went by .  . . .” (Pa36, 17:15-21).  She now states in her brief that the issue has existed since at least 2004 or 2005.  (Pb5).  Yet, even though Plaintiff has complained about the water intrusion on the Property for decades, the initial Complaint was not filed until 2020, somewhere between twenty to thirty years after any claim accrued, by her own admission.
[brief] The Trial Court took note of this position and Defendant’s inability to explain it:  THE COURT: The project was approved in ’05.  You have the redevelopment agreement, all the agreements.  So now we are a year later and it went from they were supportive of it, and now all of a sudden you are saying there are conversations that there was possibly issues with it, but nonetheless, there was never any attempt to formalize or get the approval.  So what was the difference between ’05 and ’06?  Like what happened that caused these issues or concerns?  [...]: Thank you, your Honor.  Thank you.  THE WITNESS: I don’t know, your Honor.
[brief] Even without the un-requested 11-lines of instruction of feedback, the jury instruction on identifications as a whole made clear to the jury that because even good-faith identifications could be mistaken, it was important for the jury to scrutinize identification testimony for outside influences or information that could “affect the independent nature and reliability” of such testimony.  The instruction further made clear for the jury that its scrutiny of the identification testimony was not limited to only those factors identified by the court, but all “any other factor based on the evidence or lack of evidence in this case” that the jury “consider[ed] relevant” to its determination on the identifications’ reliability.  Admittedly, a “principal argument[]” raised by defendant was a challenge the veracity and underlying motivation of these identifications and this formed a key point in both his cross-examination of the State’s witnesses (all of whom expressly denied outside influence or improper motivation, see, e.g., (7T:93-1 to 93-12; 106-8 to 106-15; 8T:23-11 to 24-1; 61-5 to 62-11; 82-16 to 84-10; 98-1 to 98-25)), and closing argument.  In addition to this eyewitness identification testimony, the jury had before it the surveillance videos of the burglary, which allowed it to evaluate for itself the identification of the defendant as the suspect depicted therein.  Coupled with the instruction that was given, which alerted the jury to be mindful of outside influences on identifications, allowed the jury to reach a verdict for which there can be no reasonable doubt.  The jury’s verdict here – guided by instructions that provided an appropriate roadmap for evaluation of identification testimony, even in the absence of the un-requested 11 lines of instruction – was not an unjust result.
[brief] Thomas also held that “parole hearings” are a “poor substitute for a procedure that would afford defendant” their meaningful opportunity pursuant to Comer.  Id. at 196.  This Court emphasized that: parole hearings are not adversarial; defendants at parole hearings are “not represented by counsel”; defendants “cannot present witnesses or expert testimony”; and the panel making the determination does “not consider the Miller factors. ”  Id. at 194, 197.  This Court pointed to the details of [...]’s denial of parole as “emblematic of the shortcomings” of parole.  Id. at 198.  Thomas, like [...], was convicted of two murders when he was only seventeen.  Id. at 172.  When Thomas became eligible for parole, the Board denied him seven times in a row.
[brief] (1T 10-2 to 11-5; Da 27)  [...] testified that the police “ha[d] occasion . . . to go back” to [...]’s apartment, not explaining who initiated the entry, and, once inside, [...] signed a consent-to-search form.5  (1T 11-6 to 12-18)  [...]’s daughter, who leased the apartment, also signed the form.  --- 5
[brief] (Pa232 at ¶7 and ¶5).  He further explained, this is because the SL: (1) is the only log system designed to precisely record the start and stop times of actual events, including decryption, (2) the log is stored in a secure module that cannot be tampered with, (3) the design and performance of the logging system is fully tested and confirmed by a certification lab, (4) the SL is referenced to a "secure clock" that is extremely precise, tamper-proof, battery back-up and (5) the SL uses blockchain to authenticate the contents of the log so it cannot be tampered with.  (Pa232 at ¶7).  In [...]’s own words, [y]ou would be hard-pressed to find a log of events that is more accurate, robust and secure in almost any other application.  (Pa232 at ¶7).  The Security logging system borrows cryptographic technology from the banking industry.  (Pa232 at ¶7).  By contrast, the Performance Log, TMS logs and other records are "best effort" logging systems intended primarily to track administrative tasks (like transferring files) and troubleshooting other outside systems."  (Pa232 at ¶7).  Consequently, the evidence showed that because Plaintiff was provided with the Security Log, as well as the Performance Log and Event log, in addition to all of the other secure data which she was provided, Plaintiff had not been disadvantaged by not being provided with the TMS log at issue.
[brief] e.g., Secaucus v. Jersey City, 19 N.J. Tax 10, 28 (Tax 2000) (exemptions even if connected with redevelopment must be granted sparingly and only to those who comply strictly with applicable requirements).  Just as Malanga v. Tp. of West Orange, 253 N.J. 291 (2023)\(^1\) interprets the LRHL in light of the Blighted Areas clause, so should LTTEL be interpreted against that clause, most especially given the legislative directive that LTTEL is to be construed “in concert” with LRHL.  Millenium Towers Urban Renewal LLC v. Municipal Council of City of Jersey City, 343 N.J. Super. 367, 380-81 (Law Div. 2001)(emphasizing that LTTEL’s “construing” language covers the entire legislative scheme).  \(^1\)  Contrary to the Township’s assertion at fn. 1 of its brief (Dtb6,fn1), plaintiffs did raise the Malanga decision (recently decided) below.  (3T25:21-26:6)  D.
[brief] Moreover, plaintiffs signed their SPA and received back the fully signed contract before they retained an attorney or were even given access to the POS.  In Dispenziere, the plaintiffs were 22 purchasers of condominium units in a real estate development who sued the developer for, inter alia, breach of contract and violations of the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act.  The defendant real estate developer moved to compel arbitration based on an arbitration clause set forth in each purchase agreement.  As here, the purchase agreement was a form contract contained in the Public Offering Statement.  The purchase agreement was 17 pages and on the tenth page there appeared a clause providing that disputes “shall be heard and determined by arbitration before a single arbitrator of the American Arbitration Association in Morris County, New Jersey. ”  In the case at bar, the arbitration clause in plaintiffs’ form contract likewise appears on page 10 of the 18 page form contract.  Applying Atalese, the Appellate Division reversed the trial court's decision (which was rendered before Atalese was decided) that had granted the motion to compel arbitration because the arbitration provision “was devoid of any language that would inform unit buyers such as plaintiffs that they were waiving their right to seek relief in a court of law.
[brief] **PROCEDURAL HISTORY**  Plaintiffs commenced this lawsuit by filing a complaint on March 14, 2022 (Pa¹22-Pa25).  [...] (“[...]”) was the sole defendant, and the complaint alleged that [...] improperly cancelled an auto insurance policy, and thus declined to provide first- and third-party coverage for an accident in July of 2020 (Pa22-Pa25).  [...] timely answered (Pa29-Pa33), and the matter proceeded through pre-trial discovery.  At the conclusion of discovery, [...] filed a motion for summary judgment (Pa9-Pa113).  The motion reflected that the business auto policy at issue was validly and properly cancelled for nonpayment of premiums nearly seven months prior to the accident, on December 31, 2019 (Pa39).  Plaintiffs filed opposition to [...]’s summary judgment motion, and cross- --- ¹ Numbers in parentheses preceded by “Pa” refer to pages of the appendix to the plaintiffs’ brief. moved for partial summary judgment on liability, making several technical arguments with respect to [...]’s proofs supporting cancellation of the business auto policy (Pa114-Pa122).  In opposition to plaintiffs’ cross-motion, and in further support of its own motion for summary judgment, [...] submitted additional documents and certifications of [...] employees that demonstrated more specifically the procedures [...] utilized to transmit cancellation notices to policyholders who failed to pay their premiums, and provided more definitive proof that those procedures occurred in this instance (Pa123-Pa145; Da²1-Da3).  The motions came before Honorable [...], J.S.C., on March 15, 2024.  1T³.  [...] heard oral argument that day, and ruled from the bench, granting [...]’s motion for summary judgment and denying plaintiffs’ cross-motion for partial summary judgment.  After conducting a careful review of the arguments of the parties and the documentary evidence presented, the lower court unequivocally concluded that [...] met its burden of proof under N.J.S.A. 17:29C-10 as to proper cancellation of the applicable insurance policy.  1T.17-38.  The Court entered orders memorializing the rulings that same day, March 15, 2024 (Pa5-Pa6, Pa7-Pa8).
[brief] ........................................................................ 18  |  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT  Defendant-appellant [...] was convicted of first-degree robbery as an accomplice and second-degree conspiracy to commit robbery in connection with a January 19, 2022 incident at an [...].  The incident began as a heated verbal dispute between [...] and [...] over an alleged debt that Alcius owed Dolisca, and ended with Dolisca taking Alcius’s phone, wallet, and clothing.  Mr. Rhymes never touched Alcius, nor did he take anything from him during the incident.  The case turned on the jury’s evaluation of Mr. Rhymes’s defense that he tried to de-escalate the confrontation between Dolisca and Alcius, and that he lacked the intent or purpose to commit a robbery, let alone one with a weapon.  Prior to Mr. Rhymes deciding whether he would testify, the court erroneously ruled that his prior convictions – both of which were more than ten years old – were admissible.  The trial court’s erroneous admission of Mr. Rhymes’s prior convictions was not harmless because it prevented him from exercising his right to testify, and his testimony could have influenced the outcome of his trial.  Furthermore, the trial court’s failure to adequately instruct the jury on accomplice liability and to charge them on second-degree robbery as a lesser-included offense impaired the jury’s ability to evaluate the merits of Mr. Rhymes’s defense.  Therefore, Mr. Rhymes’s convictions must be reversed.  Alternatively, the case must be remanded for resentencing.  **PROCEDURAL HISTORY**