ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Throughout this litigation, [...] appeared to use its joint representation to throw its client [...] under the bus for the benefit of its other clients, the [...].  Under [...]’s representation in municipal court, [...] pled guilty to committing an illegal U-turn that resulted in the subject fatal crash, despite [...]’s belief that his conduct was defensible because the [...] had instructed him to use “the turnaround”, which [...] never told him was unauthorized.  Later, in response to testimony by [...] that appeared to blame [...] for failing to provide him with detailed instructions, an [...] attorney submitted a certification in which he contradicted [...], his own client, and promoted the version of his other clients, the [...], that specific instructions had been given to [...].  [...] has argued that there was a mere “miscommunication” between [...] and the [...] and, thus, there is no conflict between their positions.  Disturbingly, an [...] attorney appeared to attempt to influence [...]’s deposition testimony by telling him that a “miscommunication” had occurred when, in fact, [...]’ own version was that [...] never gave him detailed instructions.  [...] admitted that his only source for saying that a “miscommunication” had occurred was that his [...] attorney told him so.  [...] apparently may have used its conflicted joint representation to get [...] to testify against his own interest and contrary to his own version of events for the benefit of the [...], as strengthening [...]’s “miscommunication” theory would detract from the direct negligence claims against [...] for failing to properly train and supervise [...].
[brief] ## TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | Cases | Page(s) | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|---------| | **Bright v. Westmoreland County,** | 13, 14 | | 443 F.3d 276 (3d Cir. 2006) | | | **Cherrits v. Ridgewood,** | 12-13 | | 311 N.J. Super. 517 (App. Div. 1980) | | | **Crescent Park Tenants Ass’n v. Realty Equities Corp. of N.Y.,** | 7, 9 | | 58 N.J. 98 (1971) | | | **Feld v. City of Newark, et al.,** | 2 | | A-1272-16T4, 2019 N.J. Super. Unpub. 2019 WL 2303248 | | | (App. Div. 2019), cert. den. Feld v. City of Newark, et al., | | | 2020 N.J. WL 808315 (N.J, Feb. 6, 2020) | | | **Feld v. City of Orange Twp.,** | 8, 9, 10| | 2015 N.J. Super. Unpub. 2014 WL 8277956 (App. Div. | | | Mar. 26, 2015) | | | **Glass v. Suburban Restoration Co.,** | 6, 11, 14| | 317 N.J. Super. 574 (App. Div. 1998) | | | **Guzman v. City of Perth Amboy,** | 15 | | 214 N.J. Super. 167, 518 A.2d 758 (App. Div. 1986) | | | **In re Adoption of Baby T.,** | 6, 7 | | 160 N.J. 332 (1999) | | | **Jen Elec., Inc. v. Cty. of Essex,** | 7, 9 | | 197 N.J. 627 (2009) | | | **Jenkins v. Region Nine Housing,** | 6 | | 306 N.J. Super. 258 (App. Div. 1997), | | | certif. den. 153 N.J. 405 (1998) | | | **Kozesnik v. Twp. of Montgomery,** | 7, 9 | | 24 N.J. 154 (1957) | | | **Reider v. Department of Transp.,** | 6 | | 221 N.J. Super. 547 (App. Div. 1987) | | Salorio v. Glaser, 82 N.J. 482 (1980)
[brief] See generally Jason R. Baron & Edward C. Wolfe, A Nutshell on Negotiating E-Discovery Search Protocols, 11 Sedona Conf. J. 229 (2010).  The Court is confident that Plaintiff and [...] will reach agreement on such protocol, consistent with the Fourth Circuit’s instructions in Jordan and the proportionality principle reflected in Rule 26.  Available at https://thesedonaconference.org/sites/default/files/publications/229%_20%_20236%_20A%_20Nutshell%_20on%_20Negotiating%_20E-Discovery%_20Search%_20Protocols_0.pdf  Finally, the Court notes that hits on a given search term in a given document for a particular custodian, including during the time frames above, does not necessarily mean the document is discoverable.  See, e.g., O’Donnell/Salvatori Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 339 F.R.D. 275, 277 (W.D. Wash. 2021) (“[A] party’s agreement to run search terms does not waive its right to review the resulting documents for relevance so long as the review can be done in a reasonably timely manner. ”).  *4
[brief] PROCEDURAL HISTORY  On July 29, 2016, [...]\(^1\) applied for an ADR. (Pa1).  By letter dated October 17, 2017, Respondent ruled in [...]’s favor on all of the criteria enunciated in Richardson v. Board of Trustees Police & Firemen’s Retirement System, 192 N.J. 189 (2007), with the exception of two.  (Pa2-Pa4).  Those two rejected criteria were: 1.  [...]’s “reported disability [was] not the result of a traumatic event, as the event [was] not caused by a circumstance external to the member. ”  2.  [...]’s claim was “the result of a pre-existing disease alone or a pre-existing disease that is aggravated or accelerated by the work effort. ” (Exhibit Pa2-Pa4).  Alternatively, Respondent awarded [...] an ordinary disability retirement (“ODR”).  (Pa2-Pa4).  Following an appeal filed by [...], a request for a hearing in the Office of Administrative Law (“OAL”) was approved by Respondent with matter being transferred to the OAL with a hearing taking place on September 6, 2019 (1T), September 11, 2019 (2T), and September 21, 2020\(^2\) (3T).
[directive] b.  The written court order releasing the defendant shall contain the court’s directives specifically restricting the defendant’s ability to have contact with the victim or the victim’s friends, co-workers or relatives.  The clerk of the court or other person designated by the court shall provide a copy of this order to the victim forthwith.  c.  The victim’s location shall remain confidential and shall not appear on any documents or records to which the defendant has access.  N.J.S.A. 2C: 44-8.  Convicted defendants, prior restrictions continued  When a defendant is found guilty of a sex offense, the court may, at the time of sentencing and in addition to any other disposition authorized by law, order the continuation of a prior order or condition of bail that restricts the defendant’s contact with the victim, or enter an order imposing such restrictions at the time of sentencing.
[brief] (14T 118:1-15).  In July 2007, the last of [...] and [...]’s partners sold his interest in [...], leaving the two as the company’s sole shareholders.  (14T 120:11-18).  They executed a revised [...] shareholder agreement made effective as of July 26, 2007 (Da2712).  Each also executed an employment agreement with the company.  (Da970; 976).  At that time, [...] acquired a 51% interest in the company and [...] acquired a 49% interest.  (Da2732).  Though they treated each other as equals (a fact memorialized in paragraph 31 of the 2007 stockholders agreement), this slightly greater ownership percentage for [...] helped the company maintain Minority Business Enterprise (“MBE”) and Disadvantaged Business Enterprise (“DBE”) status, which was critical to help the company procure government contracts.  (14T 120:19 to 121:3).  Although [...] was the “face” of the company for the purpose of preserving its MBE/DBE status, [...] knowingly participated in and enjoyed the benefits of that status.  In fact, [...] supplied [...] with the financial information necessary to complete the company’s MBE/DBE applications and even completed some of the applications in his own handwriting.  [...] relied on [...] to provide financial information that was accurate.  (3T:113:2 to 114:7; 14T 125:24 to 126:14; 19T 9:21 to 11:9; 14:17 to 15:4; 15:23 to 16:4; 17:14-17; 17:18 to 18:21; 19:22 to 20:24; 22:4-13; 24:18 to 25:16; 25T 34:19 to 36:5; Da2865; 2879; 2998; 3054).
[brief] *In re Grand Jury* says that where a party other than the client is paying the client’s legal fees, “(3) [t]here cannot be any current attorney-client relationship between the lawyer and the third-party payer. ”  200 N.J. at 495.  If that was extended to this case, it would mean that [...]’s co-defendant medical practice entities cannot pay for [...]’s counsel because the entities, too, have an attorney-client relationship with the [...].  Indeed, under [...]’s theory, in any case where an individual and his or her company are both either plaintiffs or defendants in a civil lawsuit, the company cannot pay the owner’s bills and vice versa.
[brief] [...] testified at trial that the pipe used by the robber to threaten him and his co-worker was “like” the metal pipe found in the Taurus, which he recognized by “the black handle. ”  There is no indication in the record that [...] was ever asked to make an out-of-court identification of the robber.  Furthermore, when [...] was asked at trial whether he could recognize the individual who came into the gas station that night, he testified that he could not.
[brief] ”  (Ibid.) (emphasis added).  Given the undeniable business relationship between [...] and [...], Plaintiff does not dispute on appeal that [...] is [...]’s client or customer.  (Pa57; Pb35).  As a result, based upon the definition of “Covered Claims” in the MAA, Plaintiff’s claims against [...] must, consistent with the unequivocal terms of the MAA, be submitted to arbitration.  B.
[brief] (Pb18-Pa22).  Plaintiff’s argument in Point Two is also ridiculous.  The Trial Court is under no obligation to mediate or otherwise order alternative dispute resolution proceedings unless otherwise required.  See R. 1:40-6(a).  In this particular instance there is no such requirement.  This is especially true when the litigation at issue is the subject of a pre-Answer Motion to Dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.  That being said, a review of the October 20, 2023 hearing transcript clearly shows that the Court sought to amicably resolve this litigation, i.e., mediate, prior to ruling on the merits of [...]’s Motion.  (See 1T3 through 1T12; see also 1T14:23-25, 1T15:1-14).  It was in fact Plaintiff who refused to engage in such mediation efforts by the Trial Court based upon his own seeming intransigence and misplaced odium against [...].  Plaintiff’s argument is again entirely without evidentiary support and is thus without merit. C.
[brief] **C.  This Case Involves a Naturally Occurring Freeze Event, Not A New Element of Danger or Hazard**  The facts in case are not as straight-forward as Plaintiff’s counsel makes them seem.  This is not simply an instance of snowfall on February 16, 2021, followed by melting and refreezing over a week’s time, which then led to Plaintiff’s incident.  Here, there were intervening events, including snow and rain on February 22, 2021, the day before Plaintiff’s fall.  Putting aside a homeowner’s duty as to melt and refreeze events in general, homeowners do not have a duty to remediate overnight ice from a snow and rain event which ended at 7pm that evening.  Plaintiff argues that this case is strictly about where the snow from a week prior to the incident was mounded, but that is an oversimplification.  On February 22, 2021, the day before plaintiff’s fall, snow and rain was reported between 12pm and 7pm, starting as snow and turning to rain, with a total snowfall accumulation of .54 inches.  (Pa133).  Sunset had occurred at 5:40pm on February 22, 2021.  (Pa134).  Plaintiff’s fall then took place the following morning at 6:07am.  (Pa28)  Sunrise was at 6:37am on February 23, 2021.  (Pa134).  Even if we look to the more stringent requirements of the local municipal code, the Defendants were not negligent.
[brief] Facsimile to [...] from [...] Pa098  Email from [...] to [...] 3/5/2020 Pa099  Authorization for Health Information Disclosure of [...] 5/28/2020 Pa100  [...] Form Filled out by [...] Pa101  Hawkin's Letter to [...] and [...] Regarding Amended Notice of Claim  12/3/2020  [...] Letter to [...] and [...] Regarding Submission of Notice of Claim
[brief] In Silver v. City of Alexandria, 470 F. Supp. 3d 616 (W.D. La. 2020) the district court upheld an injunction allowing the plaintiff to attend work meetings remotely.  The court held that the plaintiff’s heart condition made him more susceptible to contracting Covid-19.  Id at 618.  The court found that the plaintiff had a qualifying disability under the ADA “in substantial part, from the existence of the COVID-19 pandemic in our nation, and the existence of his obvious co-morbidities. ”  Id at 622.  The court rejected the defendant’s argument that the plaintiff was not entitled to claim he was disabled because the disabilities claimed were only COVID related, or that his disabilities were only situational due to the pandemic.  Id.  Instead, the court adopted a “totality of the circumstances evaluation”.
[brief] Prosecutor’s Office Detective Sergeant [...] testified on behalf of the State. \(^2\)  Burlington County Prosecutor Detective Sergeant [...] also testified on behalf of defendant.  [10T; 11T; 12T; 13T; 14T].  After the State rested, the court denied defendant’s motion for a judgment of acquittal pursuant to Rule 3:18-1.  [12T222-8 to 223-13].  Prior to charging the jury, a conference was held.  [13T104-12 to 109-21].  The jury was charged on October 19, 2022, and deliberated on October 20, 2022.
[directive] 5.3  Officers shall use signaling, verbal intervention, or physical intervention, if necessary, to stop any improper use of force.  It is important to note that the duty to intervene does not stop at one officer.  It is the responsibility of all officers to ensure use-of-force compliance.  If officers observe a situation where another officer is attempting to intervene in an improper use of force, officers shall assist in that effort.  5.4
[brief] Unlike most private tort litigants, a civil rights plaintiff seeks to vindicate important civil and constitutional rights that cannot be valued solely in monetary terms.  See Rendine v. Pantzer, 141 N.J.292, 323, 338, 661 A.2d 1202, 1218 (1994).}  The case before the Court is not a case to end civil rights or discrimination violations, but a private tort case.
[directive] Triggers for wandering behaviors include:  Confusion related to time of day and night #  Stress, noise, crowds, or isolation #  Delusions, hallucinations or misinterpreted sights or sounds #  Concerns about fulfilling past obligations involving a former job, # home, friend or family member  Recent move or change of routine #  When confronting a person who has wandered and is lost, police officers may find that the person:
[brief] T4, 94:5-25, 95:1.  In further elaborating on [...]’ emotional condition during [...]’s alleged telephone conversation with him on the night of [...]’s murder, [...] in her statement to the police said that [...] was “upset” and “crying” and “filled with emotion”.  T6, 81:17-21.  When [...] told [...] “let it go”, he responded “it’s too far” which [...] interpreted to mean that whatever was bothering [...] he could not “let it go”.  T6, 81:22-25.  [...] also said that [...] always carried a “big gun” which she said was a .40.  T6, 82:24-25.  She quoted [...] as saying that he “got .40 for these niggas”.  T6, 83:1-3.  In an undated telephone conversation sometime after the discussion which allegedly took place on the night of [...]’s murder, [...] allegedly lamented “that the cops traced all the stuff down to him.
[brief] ”).  **a.  [...] bore no responsibility for ice removal on the date of the incident**  There is no dispute that the Plaintiff fell on ice.  (Pa315 (“[Plaintiff] was exiting his apartment and stepped onto the landing of the exterior step of the building where he resides, where he encountered an icy condition causing him to slip and fall to the ground. ”); Pa339, 56:10-16 (Q.  So you testified that…you stepped outside with your left foot, your left foot landed on ice which caused you to slip and fall down the stairs.  Is that – is that all fair to say?  A. Yes.)).  Plaintiff’s brief struggles mightily to direct the court’s attention away from the presence of ice.  When describing Plaintiff’s fall, Plaintiff vaguely asserts that he “slipped”, leaving the reader to guess at the cause of same.  (Pb7-8 (“As he exited and placed his left foot down on the landing, he slipped. ”).  But the nature of the hazard is not in doubt and was confirmed by Plaintiff’s expert [...].
[directive] STANDARD  5.  CHALLENGES FOR CAUSE  Jurors should be excused for cause, either by the court sua sponte or upon a party's request, when it appears that it will be difficult or impossible for the juror to be fair and impartial in judging the case.  The Special Committee found that in courtrooms where judges liberally grant challenges for cause, the jury selection process moves along more quickly, the use of a large number of peremptory challenges is avoided, and the parties' satisfaction with the final composition of the jury is high.
[directive] ~: :Q-,& a.  You will have a criminal record?  [Yes/oil] [No/0}1.-J..8.]  711 01 Zl 0}1l ,q -3:! 15}oJ] 7]~ ,1g tj-~ % t..J 77}?  ~~ b.  Unless the plea agreement provides otherwise, you could be sentenced to serve the [Yes/oil] [No/0}1.-J..8.] maximum time in confinement, to pay the maximum fine and to pay the maximum Victims of Crime Compensation Office Assessment?
[brief] On May 18, 2023, Plaintiff-Appellant, [...]’s counsel forwarded an email to Defendant-Respondent, [...], which included a May 16, 2023 letter of representation for his new firm and a courtesy copy of the Complaint filed.  (Da047).  On May 24, 2023, prior to assigning counsel, Defendant-Respondent, [...], sent correspondence acknowledging counsel’s representation, in accordance with the mandates of the New Jersey Department of Insurance, and reiterating the prior settlement offer of $100,000.00, which had not been withdrawn nor was it rejected by Plaintiff-Appellant.
[brief] Pa2; Pa64; Pa110.  Consideration was also given generally to the requirements of the Borough’s Request For Applications, including the four broad areas to be considered in granting a Support Resolution (namely, nuisance mitigation; community impact; environmental impact; and, safety and security).  Id.  These were all efforts undertaken by the full Council upon a full, substantive record, and with the public interest in mind.  These efforts undertaken in the broader public interest with respect to cannabis oversight at the local level, along with the Support Resolution, should not be enjoined or disturbed because of [...]’s subjective belief in the veracity of its own application over that of [...]’s – and its subjective belief that it might prevail on this appeal despite the weight of the record.
[brief] Instead, it listed six very specific prerequisites to the vesting of Tenant’s right to receive Tenant’s Allowance, and the exclusion of Tenant’s monetary default from that group is deemed intentional under the doctrine expressio unius est exclusio alterius.  See, eg., Evans v. Atl. City Bd. of Educ., 404 N.J. Super. 87, 92 (App. Div. 2008) (holding that omission of “such as” or “including” before listing four specified items in list reflected Legislature’s intention to exclude unmentioned items from list under “expresio unius” doctrine).  Third, because since the date the Gym Closure was lifted in September 2020 (aka one year before trial until the present), Landlord has consistently owed Tenant more money than Tenant owed Landlord, Landlord’s complaint should have been dismissed.
[brief] Rivera v. Am. Gen. Fin. Services, Inc., 6 P.3d 803 (N.M. 2011) ..........................................................................................  24 Rudbart v. North Jersey District. Water Supply Com’n, 127 N.J. 344 (1992)  ...........................................................................................................  21 Schroeder v. Fageol Motors, Inc., 86 Wash.2d 256, 544 P.2d 20 (1975) .................................................................................. 17 Taylor v. Butler, 142 S.W.3d 277 (Tenn.S.Ct. 2004) ...................................................................................... 11, 23 Tillman v. Commercial Credit Loans, Inc., 362 N.C. 93 (2008) .................................................................................................................. 25 Walther v. Sovereign Bank, 386 Md. 412, 872 A.2d 735 (2005) .........................................................................................  27 Wein v. Morris, 194 N.J. 364 (2008) ..................................................................................................................  5  Wisconsin Auto Title Loans, Inc. v. Jones, 714 N.W.2d 155 (Wis. 2006) .................................................................................................  25  Zuver v. v. Airtouch Commc’ns, Inc., 153 Wash.2d 293, 103 P.3d 753 (2004) ..................................................................................  17
[brief] ”  (Db23) (citing Burnett v. Cnty. of Gloucester, 415 N.J. Super. 506, 512-13 (App. Div. 2010)).  The reason why the email lists are public records is because [...] pays for the use of the [...] emergency alert system.  Taxpayers fund the collection of the emails and the use of the system.  Indeed, when [...] transmitted its privacy survey, it did so through [...].  (Da246).  Also, when residents sign up for [...]’s [...] alerts, they do so “through the official [...] website. ” (Da091).  Thus, even though [...] is a contractor and [...] does not physically store the [...] alert email addresses, those lists were compiled in the course of the official business of [...] by [...]’s agent.  Therefore, they are public records.
[brief] [Da56;Pb55 (emphasis added). ]  Again, if this Court rules in Tenant’s favor on appeal, Landlord’s breach shall have been established and then, on remand, Tenant would be well within its rights to seek “reasonable attorneys’ fees” under § 17.06.  No “express terms of the Lease” contradict this, notwithstanding Landlord’s bald invocation of a phantom provision that says otherwise.  POINT VI
[brief] Respectfully submitted, [...]  Attorneys for Defendants, [...] & [...]  By: s/[...]_____________________  KRISTEN JONES, ESQ.  Dated: October 5, 2023  [...], Plaintiff, v. [...], [...], LORRAINE RESTEL, [...], [...], [...], JOHN DOE ADMINISTRATORS AND STAFF 1-10, AND ABC BOARD MEMBERS 1-10, SAID NAMES BEING FICTITIOUS, Defendant, SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE
[brief] Ibid. (citation, quotation marks and footnote omitted).  Once it is determined that the plaintiff is a "prevailing party," a two-factor computation determines the "lodestar", that is "the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate."  Ibid.  This calculation is critical because it "provides an objective basis on which to make an initial estimate of the value of a lawyer's services."  Ibid.  R.M. v. Supreme Court of New Jersey, 190 N.J. 1, 9-10 (N.J. 2007)
[brief] (Pa. 270-273.)  Those inconsistencies were not identified in the minutes of the December 28, 2021, Council meeting when the ordinance was adopted, as required by N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-7(d) and (f).  (Pa 278-279.)  The Verified Complaint identifies additional inconsistencies between the Master Plan and Ordinance 1423-21, allegations which were never addressed below, either in briefing or the trial court’s analyses.
[brief] Public Defender Attorney for Defendant-Appellant  BY: ___/s/ [...]_____________  Deputy Public Defender  Dated: October 9, 2024  Honorable Judges of the Appellate Division  Superior Court of New Jersey Hughes Justice Complex  P.O. Box 006 Trenton, New Jersey 08625  Re: State of New Jersey (Plaintiff-Appellant) v. [...] (Defendant-Respondent)
[brief] (ECF 63, at 2, 11; ECF 65, at 7.)  [...]’s email memorializing the parties’ meet-and-confer stated that “defendant is running the search requested by this RFPD.  All responsive hits will be produced, and any privilege material will be placed on a privilege log.  In the event that the hits are extremely voluminous, counsel will discuss ways to narrow the search. ”  [...]’s counsel responded, “Correct. ”  (ECF 65-1, at 2.)  [...] then reportedly attempted to collect the Google drive and email accounts of the five agreed-upon custodians and run the search terms using the requested date parameters.  As such, [...] supplemented its response to RFP No. 7 to state that, “[s]ubject to the search terms prepared by Plaintiff’s counsel on May 4, 2023, responsive documents will be produced on a rolling basis” and identified a set of documents (F000133-4340) as responsive to the request.