ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The Advisory Committee has jurisdiction to accept and answer inquiries from a bar association, member of the bar, or this Court concerning proper conduct for a member of the legal profession under the Disciplinary Rules of the Code of Professional Responsibility and other rules of this Court governing the practice of attorneys.  R. 1:19-2.  Its function is to interpret these rules and to provide appropriate guidelines regarding the conduct of attorneys.  Its published opinions are made binding upon county ethics committees in their disposition of all matters.  R. 1:19-6.  Higgins v. Advisory Committee on Professional Ethics.  73 N.J. 123 (1977)  In 2001, the Committee unequivocally stated that “the Committee holds that a lawyer may ethically refer a client to a factor concerning a possible advance against an anticipated personal injury judgment or settlement, provided that the standards and limitations set forth above are followed.
[directive] (typ broni palnej) podczas popełniania lub był(a) w jej posiadaniu, tj. , lub próby popełnienia jednego z tych przestępstw, zrzeka się Pan(i) prawa do ustalenia przez ławę przysięgłych, ponad zasadną wątpliwość, że użył(a) Pan(i) broni palnej lub był(a) w jej posiadaniu podczas popełniania lub próby popełnienia jednego z tych przestępstw?  Do you understand that by pleading guilty and admitting that you used or were in possession of a firearm that is a , (type of firearm) while in the course of committing or attempting to commit one of the crimes, you are waiving your right to have a jury determine, beyond a reasonable doubt, that you used or possessed a firearm during the course of committing or attempting to commit one of the crimes?  Czy jakikolwiek inny warunek dotyczący wyroku wymagający [Tak/Yes] [Nie/No]
[brief] ”  Pa623, 624.  In fact, there is no “comprehensive financial analysis” of record to support this and related findings.  Pa242, par 9.  Plaintiffs have attempted in vain to identify the underlying financials by requesting the supporting documentation through discovery, Pa213, but both Defendants successfully opposed these efforts and obtained a ruling barring discovery.  Pa182, 197; Pa30.  In support of their discovery efforts Plaintiffs submitted the certification of [...] of [...] as an expert in real estate finance and development.  Dr. Powell has served as advisor to scores of municipalities considering whether to grant similar PILOT agreements to redevelopers.  His resume is part of the record at Pa248.  Dr. Powell reported that “nowhere in the presentation was any evidence of financial analysis” that supported the conclusion that the Project would not likely occur in its current form without a PILOT.  The absence of such analysis, he added, reduces any such representation to a “net opinion” and therefore “not credible as the evidentiary basis of the Township Committee’s official actions. ”  Dr. Powell explained that an appropriate analysis would require a pro forma cash flow projection together with detailed costs and sources and uses of funds.  He advised that financial modeling of this kind is commonly done in connection with determining the nature and extent of the need for a PILOT and the developer’s projected return on investment with and without full real estate taxes.  The Township experts testified at the Ordinance hearing that the financial analysis in this case included “(i) modeling the projected PILOT revenues, other applicable conventional taxes and overall economics of the Project; (ii) how it will impact services across the Township and School District; and (iii) a review of revenues against incremental costs to ensure that a PILOT is sufficient to fully cover these costs. ”  Pa659; Pa243, par 10.  However, as indicated, the Township has been successful in shielding that analysis from disclosure.  Pa243, par 11.  The Issue of Extraordinary Costs as Justification for the Exemption
[brief] Finally, Appellants argue that they should be entitled to an exemption from the Affidavit of Merit Statute requirements due to the fact that no Ferreira conference was conducted in the underlying case (which amounts to a request for relief for “extraordinary circumstances”).  *Ferreira v. Rancocas Orthopedic Assocs.*, 178 N.J. 144 (2003).  More specifically, Appellants argue that since [...] never requested a Ferreira conference to address the issue of an affidavit of merit, it should not be required to serve one.  Appellants’ argument is contradictory to established case, which provides that the absence of a Ferreira conference does not toll the running of the statutory period in which an affidavit of merit should be filed and served on defendants.
[brief] On August 16, 2017, a Cumberland County Grand Jury returned superseding indictment number [...], charging [...] with first-degree murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3a(1) or (2) (counts one and nine), second-degree possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(a)(1) (counts two and ten), second-degree unlawful possession of a weapon, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b)(1) (counts three and eleven), and second-degree possession of a weapon by a convicted person, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-7(b)(1) (counts eight and twelve).5 (Da7-11).  Counts nine through twelve, which pertained to a separate murder, were severed on April 26, 2022.  (Da7-11; Da56).  On May 6, 2022, defendant’s motion to bar Special Agent [...]’s expert testimony was denied.  (Da58; 1T91-14 to 96-3; 1T188-18 to 198-9).  A jury trial began on May 10, 2022 before the Honorable [...].  (2T).  Following a N.J.R.E. 104 hearing on May 13 and 17, 2022, Judge D’Arrigo permitted the out-of-court statements of [...] and [...] to be admitted with redactions.  (Pa1; 5T38-22 to 56-6).  On May 26, 2022, the jury found defendant guilty of second-degree reckless manslaughter, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4(b)(1), as a lesser-included offense of murder.  5  [...] was charged under counts four through seven with aggravated assault, hindering, and tampering with physical evidence.  (Da8-9).  (count one).  (Da60).  Defendant was found not guilty of counts two and three, and count eight was dismissed.
[brief] In the instant matter, substantial, legally competent evidence does not exist to support the agency’s unreasonable findings.  **Board Policy 0174 Authorized Appellant’s Request**  The plain language of Board Policy 0174 authorizes Appellant’s act of requesting the Board Attorney to investigate another Board member’s potential ethics violations during an election.  Board Policy 0174 states in pertinent part:  The Board of Education authorizes the Superintendent of Schools, Superintendent of Schools’s designee, School Business Administrator/Board Secretary, and the Board President as designated persons to request services or advice from contracted legal counsel.  [See Sg048-Sg050]  Further, Board Policy 0174 limits the use of legal services from the Board Attorney to claims or causes of action that benefit the school district as a whole.  See ¶5, p. 21; Sg049.  In the instant matter, the factual record demonstrates that Appellant requested the Board Attorney to investigate Board member [...]’s conduct on election day itself when she attempted to use her official position on the Board as authority for demanding a copy of the voter tallies.  In addition, Board Policy 0174 does not require Appellant as a designated person with authority to request legal services to obtain an affirmative vote or resolution from the Board for permission to request such services.
[directive] 2C:40-26(a)(b)  4th Degree $2,500 to $25,000  10% permissible Vehicle During Period of License b.  Actor operates a motor vehicle during the period of license suspension in violation of Suspension R.S. 39:3-40, and the actor’s license was suspended or revoked for a second or subsequent violation of R.S. 39:4-50 or R.S. 39:4-50.4a  80  Updated December 2, 2013
[brief] While a reasonable jury could determine that Defendant [...] terminated Plaintiff, [...], and [...] for another reason, such as her own complicity in their charge pay, it could also attribute a different motive and conclude that she did so in retaliation against three employees who had previously made complaints regarding her conduct.  Indeed, there is record evidence that Defendant [...] exhibited an antagonism towards the complaints that had been made against her, as well as ignorance of Defendants’ workplace policies as a whole.  During the June 2020 incident with [...], Defendant [...] referenced [...]’s prior complaints.  (Pa655).  Specifically, she stated that Defendants’ management “laughed” at [...]’s complaints and that he was a “laughingstock” for having made them.  (Pa656).  Defendant [...], in recounting Defendant [...]’s reaction to having learned that an investigation may be commencing in connection with Plaintiff’s latest complaint, dismissively responded: “what now. ” (Pa101).  Even in her deposition testimony in connection with this lawsuit, Defendant [...] claimed to have no knowledge of whether Defendant [...] even had an anti-retaliation policy, and stated that she did not recall receiving training on Defendant [...]’s anti-harassment policies.  (Pa665).  The totality of the circumstances could support an inference that Defendant [...] was not above taking action to shut down a pending investigation into her conduct.
[brief] (Pa054).  [...] who had no warrant, asked [...] for the keys to the [...]’s jeep so he could make sure the vehicle belonged to “[...],” even though he could run the plates himself and identify the vehicles by their registration numbers in his report.  (Pa022)  At that time neither [...] nor any other person had given any consent for [...] or [...] to search her vehicle without a warrant because the consent to search time was dated 2/20/20 00:47 while Officer’s Kohut’s narrative report is dated 2/20/2020 00:23.  (See Pa022; Pa029).  After the police approached him without reasonable suspicion or probable cause, the plaintiff fell to the ground and started crying out of fear.  (Pa054; Pa93).  The police started utilizing physical force against the plaintiff.  (Pa093-Pa096; Pa054)
[brief] October 2020, A.4848 (2020) and S. 3030 (2020).  (Pa101-03 at ¶¶ 17-22, Pa378-472.)  As a result, the public was not informed about the proceedings for these suddenly introduced bills, and certainly had no adequate opportunity to examine the text of these bills.  Id.  The Legislature’s website had no recording or broadcast to prove that either the first or second readings from the floor of either House took place on January 6, 2022.  (Pa101-03 at ¶¶ 17-20.)  Although the State has provided the legislative journals, the public was deprived of notice of the texts of the bills given 1) the bills were not listed on the Legislature’s website, 2) the legislative calendar did not give any notice that they would be considered in committee, and 3) there was no adequate notice that the bills would be introduced.  (Pa112-129.)  One of the issues and irregularities in this case is whether the Legislature complied with the Constitution’s requirement that there be twenty-four hours between the second and third reading of the S. 49 (2021) / A. 6260 (2021).
[brief] DEP undertook just such an analysis here, combining \(^{17}\) N.J.A.C. 7:7A-3.2(c).  on-site data with the prior species sightings to determine the Property was not suitable bald eagle habitat.  DEP therefore found that the Property was not a suitable habitat for threatened or endangered species.  The court should defer to DEP’s expertise in this area.  Pinelands Preservation Alliance, 436 N.J.  Super. at 533.  DEP’s permitting decision should be affirmed.
[brief] To be protected, the speech must be on a matter of public concern, and the employee’s interest in expressing herself on this matter must not be outweighed by any injury the speech could cause to “the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees. ”  *Connick*, 461 U.S. at 142 (quoting *Pickering*, 391 U.S. at 568).  In 1995, the Supreme Court in *United States v. [...]*, 513 U.S. 454 (1995) (“National Treasury” or “[...]”) significantly altered the *Pickering* balance test, greatly increasing the government’s burden to justify regulations requiring public employees to obtain permission to speak with the media.
[brief] There were only 2 witnesses to the execution of [...]’s Small Business Contract (“Contract”) with Plaintiff, [...] (“[...]”) dated June 30, 2022 (Pa15; Dr163): [...] representative [...] (“[...]”) and [...] representative and Plaintiff, [...] (“[...]”).  [...] presented the first page of the Contract on his [...] iPad to [...] at the residence in [...] that he shares with Plaintiff [...] (“[...]”).  [...] signed the cover page of the form contract on behalf of [...] and was unable to read the remaining 7 pages.  The only issues discussed between [...] and [...] were prices and cameras.  (Pa169)  There was no mention of arbitration, waivers, or any other contract provisions.  [...] was not permitted or qualified to negotiate even if the subjects had been questioned.  [...] did not sign the Contract individually.  [...] did not sign it at all.  [...] did not sign the Contract.  (Pa169)4  Installation began immediately thereafter.
[brief] At Issue  On April 10, 2023, [...] issued an order granting summary judgment in favor of each defendant, including [...].  The order was accompanied by a 55-page opinion providing the bases for the Court’s rulings.  Encompassed within the rulings, were the following specific findings: 1) [...] failed to articulate the standard of care governing [...]’s project-related services; 2) [...]’s opinions about the alleged defect at issue are unreliable as they changed throughout the course of the litigation; 3) [...] failed to provide any support for the position that the roadway condition was dangerous and caused plaintiff’s accident; 4) Plaintiff’s post-accident video is not a reliable piece of evidence upon which [...] could support his opinions; 5) It is material that [...] could not identify any other accidents that occurred at the subject location; and, 6) It is material that [...] did not perform an accident reconstruction as the facts available for that analysis were available.  (Pa2113).  Given the foregoing findings, [...] concluded that [...] had presented a net opinion insufficient to substantiate a professional malpractice claim against [...] and granted [...]’s motion for summary judgment.
[brief] ” (quoting *In re Freshwater Wetlands Gen. Permits*, 372 N.J. Super. 578, 595 (App. Div. 2004)).  This Court, in reviewing an administrative action of the Board, is obligated to consider three overarching issues: “(1) whether the agency’s action violates express or implied legislative policies, that is, did the agency follow the law; (2) whether the record contains substantial evidence to support the findings on which the agency based its action; and (3) whether in applying the legislative policies to the facts, the agency clearly erred in reaching a conclusion that could not reasonably have been made on a showing of the relevant factors.
[brief] [...]’s deposition notice on defendants returnable within the discovery period of May 26, 2023 required defendants to produce [...], [...] and a designated representative with relevant knowledge of the litigation pursuant to R. 4:14-4.  (Volume I, Pa. 121}.  The deposition notice required defendant to produce [...]’s file and correspondence, notes memorandum, email agreements invoices and documentation regarding the litigation.  (Volume I, Pa. 119-122).  [...] was produced for his deposition on May 26, 2022.  (Volume I, Pa. 64-101)
[brief] For purposes of the instant appeal only, Plaintiff relies upon the Procedural History as articulated in Defendant’s moving papers, except to state that the jury trial on April 4, 2022 and April 5, 2022 occurred before the Hon. [...], J.S.C., and not the Hon. [...], J.S.C., as stated in Defendant’s papers.  Brf. at p. 1.  COUNTERSTATEMENT OF FACTS
[brief] In addition, the Court should give no weight to Appellants utilization of *Delaney v. Dickey* to illustrate a requirement that “the basic advantages and disadvantages of each element of arbitration proceedings be discussed. ”  Dr127, citing 244 N.J. 466, 496 (2020) (internal quotations omitted).  No such requirement applies here and Appellants’ reliance on *Delaney* to the contrary is misleading and erroneously attempts to heighten [...]’s burden.  *Delaney* involved a situation unique from the one in this case because the relevant arbitration provision was contained in a retainer agreement for legal services.
[brief] So August '20 I see a Zelle.  August is — we're starting from — actually I'm concerned with October of 2020, because that's when you're saying she received, October.  So let's see October.  Okay.  Zelle 10-23-20 to [...], 10-16, [...] $1,200.  There's a payment in October.  November, let's see.  Okay.  Melendez $1,200 for October — I mean November.  December $1,200 that's December of 2020.  Okay.  Let's see '21.  Okay.  There's one for $500 in January of '21.  February.  (1T13-21).  As [...] continued presenting her receipts, she would hear from the court "You really should have your proofs ready for the court."  (1T15-23).  THE COURT: That's a transfer.  That's not even a Zelle.  So how did — I don't see a payment here for January.  MS. ORTIZ: Of 2022  THE COURT: Yeah.  It just says, there's a Zelle transfer for $20, one for 60, there's a banking transfer to check 9930 for $1,200.  (1T19-14).  As the hour wore on, the court expressed its growing frustration.  Addressing [...], the court stated: THE COURT:
[brief] Id.  The Lowe’s court contrasted its holding with the U.S. Supreme Court’s opinion in Continental Wall Paper Co. v. Louis Voight & Sons Co., in which the Court found that contracts wall paper distributor were not collateral because the distributor was formed as part of an illegal scheme that restricted commerce in violation of the Anti-Trust Act of 1890.  212 U.S. 227, 260 (1909).  There, numerous wallpaper manufacturers conspired to form one distribution company that would allow them to collectively fix the price of goods at all levels of distribution and required all purchasers to resell the goods at fixed-price set by the distributor.  Id. at 261.  The court found that the purchase contract was illegal, and not a collateral contract, because the manufacturers creation of the distributor in combination with its fixed-pricing model was part of an overall illegal scheme to monopolize the market and restrain trade in violation of the Anti-Trust Act.  Id. at 266–67.  Thus, the Court held that the contract was illegal and not collateral because the contract furthered an illegal purpose in direct violation of the Act.  Id.  Here, Plaintiff attempted to obtain title insurance from [...] through [...] in furtherance of its overall illegal scheme to purchase the Property in direct violation of the Tax Sale Law and Foreclosure Resue Fraud Prevention Act.  The entire basis for which Plaintiff sought title insurance was only in connection with the attempt to purchase the Property - illegally.  In other words, without the overall illegal scheme to purchase the Property in violation of the Tax Sale Law (and FRFPA), there would have been no need for Plaintiff to purchase title insurance.  Despite Plaintiff’s dishonest assertion, Plaintiff’s attempted real estate transaction was tainted by illegality and completely contrary to public policy.  Even though Plaintiff failed to consummate the contract by fulfilling the requirements pursuant to the Commitment’s conditions – therefore meaning that no contract was ever formed in the first place – the two attempted transactions are anything but independent or mere collateral.  Similar to the distributor created by the manufacturers in Continental Wall Paper, [...] created [...] for the sole purpose of purchasing the Property.  This purchase was clearly illegal, and the Trial Court correctly ruled as much, because [...] – a sophisticated individual and businessman – took advantage of [...] by exploiting her lack of real estate knowledge and financial distress.  Yet, while Plaintiff finally acknowledges the illegality of the underlying real estate transaction, Plaintiff continues to minimize its direct violations of the law and seeks to reap the benefits of its unconscionable and outrageous conduct.  III.
[brief] ’”  Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982) (quoting F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920)).  However, the “legislature must have substantial latitude to establish classifications that roughly approximate the nature of the problem perceived, that accommodate --- 10 [...]'s retirement date is an issue that Plaintiffs seek to clarify as part of the remaining discovery to be conducted before dispositive motion practice.  competing concerns both public and private, and that account for limitations on the practical ability of the State to remedy every ill. ”  Plyler, 457 U.S. at 216.  As such, “[i]f a statutory distinction has some reasonable basis, a State does not violate the Equal Protection Clause merely because the classifications made by its laws are imperfect. ”  Whitaker v. DeVilla, 147 N.J. 341, 358 (1997).  New Jersey Courts have found that the concept of equal protection is implicit in Article I, Paragraph 1.  McKenney v. Byrne, 82 N.J. 304, 316 (1980); Guaman v. Velez (Guaman I), 421 N.J. Super. 239, 267 (App. Div. 2011).  The analysis under a New Jersey equal protection challenge differs from the federal analysis, but “the tests weigh the same factors and often produce the same result. ”  Sojourner A. v. N.J. Dep’t of Human Servs., 177 N.J. 318, 333 (2003).  Under the New Jersey Constitution, Courts apply “a more flexible balancing test that considers three factors: ‘(1) the nature of the right asserted; (2) the extent to which the statute intrudes upon that right; and (3) the public need for the intrusion. ’”  Guaman I, 421 N.J. Super. at 267.  The MSRA violates Plaintiffs’ equal protection rights under the New Jersey Constitution.
[brief] [...] does not dispute this amount.  See Deposition of [...], September 8, 2021, p. 48, l. 20 through p. 51, l.19.  Pa107-110.  In addition, [...] was entitled to attorney’s fees under ¶5 of the Lease.  On June 18, 2020, [...] filed suit against [...] and guarantors, [...], [...] and [...].
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