ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] 12.  All areas of the site not occupied by buildings, pavement, sidewalks, required screening, required parking area landscaping, **required safety islands** or other required improvements shall be **landscaped** by the planting of grass or other ground cover acceptable to the Zoning Board of Adjustment and a **minimum of two shrubs and one tree** for each 250 square feet of open space, whereas, **currently the property does not comply with this requirement**; 13.
[brief] As in *R.J.M.*, the video did not entirely support [...]’s version of [...]’s role in the incident, “the case hinged on the jury’s evaluation of witness credibility,” and [...]’s testimony “was contradictory in some respects. ”  See *R.J.M.*, 453 N.J. Super. at 270.  Here, the State’s evidence consisted of a silent surveillance video and [...]’s testimony that [...]’s words and actions escalated the confrontation between [...] and [...].  (6T:43-20 to 23); (Da 16) Mr.  Rhymes’s version of events – presented through cross-examination and his attorney’s arguments to the jury – was that the incident began as a heated verbal dispute over a small sum of money that [...] owed [...], and that [...]’s words and actions indicated that he was trying to de-escalate and end the altercation.  (6T:175-11 to 23)  In his summation, defense counsel contested [...]’s account and argued that the video depicts [...] “trying to resolve” the situation from the beginning of the incident, motioning with his hands and telling [...] to stop.
[brief] Plaintiff and Defendants are now undertaking discovery on the eight other causes of action under which Plaintiff seeks recovery.  See Stella v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 241 N.J. Super. 55, 75-76 (App. Div. 1990) (while there was no claim under the CFA available to the plaintiff, he was entitled to recover compensatory damages based on other causes of action, like negligence, common law fraud, breach of contract, etc.).  Plaintiff offers this Court no reason why he, a sophisticated, highly educated doctor and businessowner represented by an accountant and an attorney to address particular insurance needs, warrants this Court’s deviation from well-established precedent.  Accordingly, based on the Complaint and well-settled law, the trial court’s decision to dismiss with prejudice Plaintiff’s CFA claims should be affirmed.
[brief] [...]’ Letter to Highland Park Prosecutor and Court Administrator 9/25/2020 (Attached at Pa056)  Exhibit C - Attachments to Complaint Notice of Motion to Suppress and Dismiss by [...] 10/13/2020 (Attached at Pa059)  Hawkin’s Letter to Highland Park Judge 4/15/2021 (Attached at Pa061)  Certification of [...] 4/15/2021 (Attached at Pa063)
[directive] This Aggravating Factor recognizes that it is a legitimate aggravating circumstance that the offense was committed while the defendant was released on bail or on his or her own recognizance for another offense, or where the defendant commits a bail violation following his or her arrest for the present Brimage-eligible offense.  Such conduct mocks the authority of the court and deprecates public confidence in the criminal justice system, which is too often perceived as a “revolving door” that allows persons arrested for serious offenses to be released and to return almost immediately to their drug-selling haunts to go about their illicit business.
[brief] I applied the $2.00 S/F rent to [...]'s leased space of 14,200 S/F to arrive at an annual rent of $28,400.00.  I find and determined [...]'s estimates of the annual rent for the other stores in the shopping center, as set forth on page 64 of his report, to be reasonable and adopt those annual rental computations.  I conclude there was an annual rent of $366,642.00.  I applied a 7% Vacancy and Collection Loss (25,665) and arrived at an effective gross income of $340,977.00.  I adopted [...]'s estimate of total operating expenses of $65,400.00 as reasonable and determined the net income to be $275,577.00.  I applied a capitalization rate of 10.25% and thus conclude that the market value for Lot 19 as of January 27, 1994 is $2,688,556.00.
[brief] On April 27, 2023, the trial court signed four lack of standing dismissal with prejudice Orders and one mootness denial Order.  On May 10, 2023, Plaintiff filed a Rule 4:49-2 and Rule 4:50-1 Motion for Reconsideration, Alteration, Amendment and Clarification.  (Pa480 to Pa641).  On July 10, 2023, the Trial Court entered an Order denying Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration.
[brief] IV.  SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED ON PLAINTIFFS’ CLAIM FOR BREACH OF THE COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING.  (29)  The trial court also erred in dismissing Plaintiff’s claim for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing.  The trial court recognized that “[t]he implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing recognizes that every party to a contract is bound by a duty of good faith and fair dealing with both their performance and enforcement of the contract,” citing to Brunswick Hills Racquet Club, Inc. v. Route 18 Shopping Center Assoc., 182 N.J. 210, 224 (2005).  [3T17]  The trial court further stated that the “covenant requires all parties to a contract shall refrain from doing anything which will have the effect of destroying or injuring the right of the other party to receive the benefits of the contract. ”  [3T30-3, citing Palisades Properties, Inc. v. Brunetti, 44 N.J. 117, 130 (1965). ]  Relying on its incorrect findings concerning the Policy Applications, the trial court then granted summary judgment and dismissed this claim.  Defendants breached the covenant of good faith and fair dealing when it rescinded the Policies.  Defendants improperly ignored and/or deliberately misapplied the definition of Disciplinary Proceeding in its Policies to justify the rescission of the Policies.  The rescission, based on a bad faith application of the Policies’ definitions, forced Plaintiffs to obtain a substitute policy at a substantially increased cost.  [Pa573, ¶ 84]  Further, Plaintiffs lost coverage for the [...] claim to which they were entitled under the Policies.  Such actions by Defendants violated the covenant of good faith and fair dealing.  The Court should reverse the granting of summary judgment to Defendants dismissing Plaintiffs’ claim for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing and grant summary judgment to Plaintiffs on this claim.
[brief] The court and parties discussed the jury charge.  (5T119-1 to 5T137-20; 6T5-22 to 6T6-8; 6T92-16 to 6T95-86T105-8 to 6T109-2).  See also Point I, supra.  Defendant had every opportunity to raise the issues he now raises on appeal but he did not.  A failure to object shows that defense counsel had no issues with the charge or the verdict sheet.  See *State v. Singleton*, 211 N.J. 157, 182 (2012) (if defendant does not object timely to the charge, there is a presumption the charge was correct and unlikely to prejudice defendant’s case).
[brief] Plaintiff’s Claims Against [...] Were Appropriately Dismissed.  Plaintiff offers no basis to challenge the dismissal of her claims against [...] other than asserting that her request to reopen and extend discovery should have been granted.  (See plaintiff’s Point “D” at Pb17-Pb28.)  We respectfully submit that the Law Division’s dismissal of the Complaint was appropriate, because it remains undisputed that the plaintiff never served the report of any expert witness who opined that [...] deviated from the applicable standard of care, or that such deviation was a proximate cause of plaintiff’s injuries and damages.  Even when plaintiff cross-moved to extend discovery; when plaintiff moved for reconsideration; and when plaintiff moved to vacate the denial of reconsideration, no expert report was ever served regarding [...].  It is well settled in our jurisprudence that in a professional malpractice lawsuit like this, a plaintiff cannot set forth a prima facie case at trial without the testimony of a qualified expert regarding both deviations from the standard of care and proximate causation.  Newmark-Shortino v. Buna, 427 N.J. Super. 285, 304 (App. Div. 2012); Gardner v. Pawliw, 150 N.J. 359, 375 (1997).  Because no expert reports were ever served regarding [...], plaintiff was unable to set forth a prima facie case against him.  Plaintiff’s claims were therefore appropriately dismissed.
[brief] ”); see also State v. Rivera, 249 N.J. 285, 298 (2021) (explaining that resentencing is required where a sentencing court fails to apply the Code or explain its sentencing decisions); State v. Case, 220 N.J. 49, 65-66 (2014) (sentencing judges must provide “insight into the sentencing decision” and “explain clearly” their application of the Code); State v. Mance, 300 N.J. Super. 37, 65 (1997) (“[W]e are required to set the sentences aside and order the case remanded for re-sentencing based on a presentence report which fully accords with the dictates of R. 3:21–2 and N.J.S.A. 2C:44–6. ”).  Because the sentencing court did not acknowledge the existence of the statutory requirement, or make any findings as to why such a report was not necessary in this case, at the very minimum, a remand for consideration of the statutory requirement is required.
[brief] As to these three reasons, [...] testified:  “I would say all three of those things she said to me at least three, four, or five times. ” (9T225-24 to 226-2).  [...] further testified:  So, she made it very clear to me that she wanted to go -- everything to go to [...], if [...] were to predecease her to the boys, and that she deliberately did not want [...] to get anything.  I’m clear on that.  To this end, Decedent showed [...] the letter Petitioner sent to Decedent requesting the dissolution of the marriage, as quoted on page 14 above.
[brief] N.J.A.C. 11:3-5.4(b)(5).  [...]’s regulations require an Arbitration Plan to provide flexibility to allow the dispute resolution professional to use alternate procedures to resolve matters, such as directing mediation, settlement conferences, or expedited hearings.  Ibid.  [...]’s regulations, consistent with the No-Fault Law, also call for the use of a medical review organization to streamline determinations of the medical treatment provided, such as medical necessity or appropriateness of the treatment.  N.J.A.C. 11:3-5.4(b)(4); N.J.S.A. 39:6A-5.2.  Nothing in the regulations, however, mandates the use of a medical review organization or otherwise limits the issues in the arbitration to a review of the medical treatment.  The Amici Curiae also argue that appropriate discovery could not be conducted in arbitration.  That, too, is inconsistent with [...]’s regulations.  An Arbitration Plan must “provide for the fair and efficient conduct of adversarial proceedings . . . consistent with traditional notions of due process and fundamental fairness.
[brief] Super. 341, 9 A.3d 1064, 1076 (App. Div. 2010) | | | **Est. of Chin v. St. Barnabas Med. Ctr.,** | 58 | | 734 A.2d 778, 785-86 (N.J. 1999) | | | **Ferreira v. Rancocas Orthopedic Assocs.,** | 56 | | 178 N.J. 144, 151, 836 A.2d 779 (2003) | | Gray v. Serruto Builders, Inc., 110 N.J. Super. 297, 315, 265 A.2d 404 (Ch. Div. 1970) .
[directive] you are pleading guilty to such a charge, the minimum mandatory period of parole  If a. ineligibility is __ years and __ months in the number of years/months) and the (fill maximum period of parole ineligibility can be __ years and __ months in the (fill number of years/months) and this period cannot be reduced by good time, work, or minimum custody credits.  Si se plede wap plede koupab de tip akizasyon sa ou pap elijib pandan yon peryod rninimorn de __ ane a, ak __ rnwa (ranpli kantite ane yo/rnwa yo) epi peryod rnaksimorn ke w pap elijib kab de __ ane ak __ rnwa (ranpli kantite ane yo/rnwa yo) peryod sa pap jwenn kredi pou hon konpotman, travay, oswa kredi pou rninirnorn tan ou fe an detansyon an.  you are pleading guilty to such a charge, the minimum mandatory extended term is __ If b. years and __ months in the number of years/months) and the maximum mandatory (fill extended term can be __ years and __ months in the number of years/months).  (fill  Si se plede wap plede koupab de tip akizasyon sa a, rninimorn egzijib pou tern pwolonje a se __ ane ak __ rnwa (ranpli kantite ane yo/rnwa yo) epi rnaksirnorn egzijib pou tern pwolonge a kab __ ane ak __ rnwa (ranpli kantite ane yo/rnwa yo).  Are you pleading guilty to a crime that contains a presumption of imprisonment which means that [Y es/Wi]
[brief] \textsuperscript{10}  The \textit{Rules of Court} provide that “[t]he following matters shall be cognizable in the Special Civil Part . . . Summary landlord/tenant actions. ”  \textit{R. 6:1-2(a)(3)}.  The summons to a tenant “shall require the Tenant to appear and state a defense at a certain time and place.”  \textit{R. 6:2-1} (emphasis added).  The relevant statute at issue provides, in pertinent part that “[if] upon trial of a landlord and tenancy proceeding the Landlord shall not be able to prove, by lease or other evidence, his right to the possession of the premises claimed by him . . . the cause shall be dismissed. ”
[brief] POINT I THE COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY  JUDGMENT TO DEFENDANTS AND ERRED IN DENYING THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION (Aa411; Aa413; Aa452) (T12-T19)  2T9-2T10)  The court below granted both defense motions for summary judgment and dismissed the Plaintiff's complaint.  (Aa411; Aa414 (T12-T19)  The court was highly critical of the opposition submitted by the Plaintiff which defendant [...] claimed constituted a sham affidavit.  The court was obligated under Brill v Guardian Life Insurance 142 N.J. 520 (1995) and R. 4: 46-2.  The movant is entitled to summary judgment if on a full record the adverse party who is entitled to have facts and inferences viewed most favorably to it has not demonstrated the existence of a dispute whose resolution will in his favor will ultimately entitle him to judgment.  Summary judgment should be denied where the determination of a material fact depends primarily on a credibility determination.  See Parks v Rogers, 176 N.J. 491 (2003).  The motion should be denied where an action or defense requires determination of a state of mind or intent such as claims such as waiver bad faith fraud or duress.  See Auto Lenders v Gentilini Fors, 181 N.J. 245 (2004).  Based on this standard, [...]’s motion at least as it relates to negligence should not have been granted by the court.
[brief] Defendant’s brother also indicated that counsel never spoke with him about this “exculpatory” evidence.  As found by the PCR court, “[...]’s testimony alone would have contradicted the defendant’s statement to police. ”  Da166.  Indeed, the defendant placed himself at the scene of the robbery while driving the suspect vehicle.  Additionally, [...]’s alleged “exculpatory” testimony would have also contradicted his previous statement to police and sworn testimony that he told the truth to police.  See (20T).  Furthermore, the physical evidence, which corroborated the defendant’s initial statement to police and [...]’s statement to police – a statement that he testified under oath was truthful – would have contradicted any proposed “exculpatory” testimony.  With the benefit of hindsight, defendant blanketly assumes that counsel’s performance was deficient for failing to present this “exculpatory” evidence.  However, defendant’s hindsight ignores the real-life implications of this testimony.  It is reasonable to conclude that [...]’s contradictory testimony would have had far reaching negative implications for the defendant, rather than lead to defendant’s acquittal.  Thus, it was entirely reasonable for counsel to reject the idea of presenting this testimony.  Furthermore, defendant failed to establish how the introduction would have led to a different result.  Therefore, failing to establish that he was prejudiced in this case.  As such, the PCR court appropriately rejected defendant’s claims.
[brief] The Law Division case held that “[i]n this case the appraiser did not consider the actual rents from the property as an element when he arrived at fair market value.  The appraiser considered only hypothetical comparable rents.  I recognize that the property's actual rent and income history should not be the sole basis upon which to determine market rent subject to capitalization, but the cited authority is clear that it must be a factor.  By failing to consider the actual rental history of the property, the appraiser's value did not reflect the actual loss to the property owner. ”  Katz, supra, 334 N.J. Super. at 485.  Although the Court in Katz found that the actual rents were higher than the market rent and thus should have been factored into the analysis, the opposite must also hold true.  If actual rents were lower than market rents, an owner would be overly indemnified if awarded more than what he could have reasonably expected.  Katz went so far as to draw a distinction between tax assessments, which must be based upon the potential rent, and condemnation proceedings, holding the “need for permanency that exists for property tax assessments does not carry the same weight when property is valued for condemnation purposes, where full indemnification of the property owner, not a stable tax base, is the goal.
[brief] ”); Ferolito v. Park Hill Ass'n, Inc., 408 N.J. Super. 401, 408 (App. Div. 2009) (“[A]n award cannot be sustained if the ‘plaintiff did not act in bad faith in asserting’ or pursuing the claim. ” (quoting McKeown-Brand, 132 N.J. at 549)); United Hearts, L.L.C., 407 N.J. Super. at 389 (“Where a party has [a] reasonable and good faith belief in the merit of the cause, attorney’s fees will not be awarded. ” (quoting First Atl. Fed. Credit Union v. Perez, 391 N.J. Super. 419, 432 (App. Div. 2007))).  As explained by the Court in Konefal v. Landau, No. A-2781-18T2, 2020 WL 2466216, at 2–3 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. May 13, 2020) (839a):
[brief] The Original SAC was the first complaint reviewed by a New Jersey State judge.  The Motion to file the Original SAC was denied by an Order dated April 5, 2021.  Pa4-5.  An appeal to this Court resulted in a remand.  [...] (Feb. 28, 2023).  The Remand Judge did not review the Revised Second Amended Complaint, which we thought was the point of the Remand.  His Honor also did not re-review the Original SAC, believing its 2021 rejection barred his review.
[brief] Specifically, General Language Provision 2 (GP2) of the 2025 Appropriations Act provides: “All dedicated funds are hereby appropriated for their dedicated purposes. ”  See L. 2024, c. 22; see also Mid-Atlantic Solar Energy, 418 N.J. Super. at 506-07 (noting that statutorily dedicated clean energy funds are appropriated pursuant to GP2).  The caveat is that there is a critical distinction between “budgeted revenue” and “appropriated revenue” in the Appropriations Act.  *Karcher*, 97 N.J. at 491.  While budgeted revenue is “a reservation or designation of a specific amount of money for a particular purpose,” appropriated revenue is “reflected in the budget not as a specific numerical figure but by means of general language committing funds in an unspecified amount for a particular purpose. ”  *Ibid.*  Funds appropriated pursuant to GP2 constitute appropriated revenue may only be expended to the extent they are collected.  *Cargill Meat Solutions Corp. v. Direc., Div. of Taxation*, 477 N.J. Super. 85, 106-07 (App. Div. 2023).  Therefore, the court may only order the [...] to expend monies on Appellant to the extent sufficient funds are received; if sufficient funds are not received, the court may not order the expenditure of funds in excess of the appropriated funds.  **CONCLUSION**
[brief] The Project would occupy six private easement areas on Block 13, Lot 13, which, pursuant to [...]’s zoning code, allows public utility infrastructure ______________________ months on October 12, 2017, and renewed the status on June 15, 2018.  (Aa61).  as a conditional use.  (Aa856-57; Ra5; Ra18); [...], N.J., Mun. Code § 30-141.5(a) (2022).
[brief] TABLE OF CONTENTS | Section | Page | |------------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS BEING APPEALED | ii | | TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | iii | | PROCEDURAL HISTORY | 1 | | STATEMENT OF FACTS | 1 | | LEGAL ARGUMENT | 1 | | I.  The PSA’s Plain Language Precludes [...]’s Interpretation.  | | | (Raised Below: Da11) | 1 | | a.  What the PSA Does Not Say | 3 | | b.  Plaintiff’s Half-Hearted Textual Interpretations Fail | 4 | | II.  [...] Misconstrues [...]’s Position Concerning the Requirement to Deliver an Acceptable Estoppel Certificate.  | | | (Responding to [...]’s Argument at Point II(i) (Pb 28-29)) | 5 | | (Raised Below: Da11-13) | | | III.  The PSA’s Structure Demonstrates That the Seller’s Obligations Extend Until Closing, Refuting Plaintiff’s Overreliance on the Definite Article “The” and Mischaracterization of Key Contractual Distinctions.  | | | (Answering [...]’s Argument at Point II(i) (Pb 29-34) | 6 | | (Raised Below: Da11-13) | | | IV.  The PSA Distinguishes the Purpose and Timing of Estoppel Certificates from Due Diligence.  (Answering [...]’s Argument at Point II(iii) (Pb 40-46) | | | (Raised Below: Da11) | 9 | | V.  The Trial Court Erred in Concluding that the Purchaser would have an “Unfair Advantage”, and [...]’s Argument Ignores the Logical Flaws in Its Own Interpretation.  (Answering [...]’s Argument at Point II(iv) (Pb 46-49) | | | (Raised Below: Da14) | 11 | | CONCLUSION | 13 |
[brief] The Court Did not Err in Permitting In-Camera Review.  The Court was correct in permitting an in-camera review of the Certification of [...].  The Supreme Court has clearly and decisively articulated that a Certification can be submitted for in-camera review and stated:  [A] movant seeking disqualification of opposing counsel always is presented with a Hobson's choice in respect of the disclosure of confidential information.  In those instances where the disclosure of confidential information must be made so that the court can grapple fairly with the issues, the parties may protect the confidentiality of their information by, among other means, requesting that the record be subject to a protective order, see R. 3:13-3(f) (criminal); R. 4:10-3 (civil), and the movant may further request that the application be considered in-camera.  See generally Pressler Verniero, supra, comments 2.2 and 2.3 to R. 1:2-1.  Furthermore, in those instances, as the one presented in this appeal, where the lawyer whose disqualification is sought denies ever receiving the claimed confidential information, an appropriate screening device would be to engage substitute counsel to oppose the disqualification motion.  O Builders, supra, 206 N.J. at 129.  Here, the Court reviewed O Builders and concluded that submission of the Certification by in-camera review was permitted.  1.
[brief] ”  *City of Burlington v. Glens Falls Ins. Co.*, 133 Vt. 423, 424, 340 A.2d 89, 90 (1975); see *Gerrish Corp. v. Universal Underwriters Ins.*, 754 F. Supp. 358, 366 (D. Vt. 1991) (citing *City of Burlington* for the same proposition); see also *Princeton Ins. Co. v. Chunmuang*, 151 N.J. 80, 95, 698 A.2d 9, 16–17 (1997) (“insurance policy exclusions must be narrowly construed; the burden is on the insurer to bring the case within the exclusion”).
[brief] (PA008-009.)  The court explained:  [T]here is no evidence of a fiduciary relationship, other than [[...]]’s subjective impressions which caused him to believe that the bank was acting in his “best interest. ”  No representations of any sort are attributed to the bank.  There is no evidence of expression by either party reflecting anything other than the typical debtor/creditor relationship, nor do the circumstances necessarily imply a heightened duty.  No fiduciary duty existed, and the general rules articulated above apply.