ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] POINT I: THE TRIAL COURT’S DETERMINATION THAT APPELLANT’S MALICIOUS PROSECUTION CLAIMS ACCRUED WHEN HIS CRIMINAL CASE WAS REVERSED BY THE SUPREME COURT AND WERE, THEREFORE, BARRED BY THE TWO-YEAR STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS UNDER N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2 WAS IN ERROR AND CONTRARY TO DECADES OF SETTLED LAW HOLDING THAT THE CLAIM CARRIES A SIX-YEAR STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.  (Raised Below - Aa123-24; 1T12-22 to 14-9; Aa169-70; 2T13-15 to 15-2).  On February 15, 2023, the trial court granted the State Defendants’ motion to dismiss Appellant’s complaint on two grounds, concluding in pertinent part:  Therefore, I will dismiss the -- all the complaints on statute of limitations grounds except for the libel and slander complaint.  But I will dismiss those complaints for failure to file a notice of tort claim.  Aa85; 1T219-19 to 23.  See also Aa10-11; 2T20:23 to 21:1.  As discussed in the points, sub judice, the trial court’s findings are in error.  With respects to the Statute of limitations, the trial court found that Appellant’s Complaint alleged ten State claims:  The ten State law claims include false imprisonment, false arrest and imprisonment, Count One; injurious falsehood, Count two; libel-slander per se, Count Three; libel, libel per se; slander, slander per se, Count Four; negligence, Count Five; criminal conspiracy, Count Six; intentional infliction of emotional distress, Count Seven; negligent infliction of emotional distress, Count Eight; negligent hiring and supervision, Count Nine; and Civil Rights Conspiracy under N.J.S.A. 10:6-2, Count 10.  Aa76-77; 1T10:23 to 11:6.  See also Aa97; 2T11:11-20.  --- 2  1T denote transcript of Hon. [...]’s Decision on the State’s Motion to Dismiss Dated Feb 15, 2023; 2T denotes a duplicate of Judge Shanahan’s Feb 15, 2023 decision.  However, this transcript is dated Feb 16, 2023; 3T denotes transcript of Judge Shanahan’s Decision on [...]’s Motion to Reconsider, Dated April 14, 2023’ 4T denotes transcript of Hon. [...]’s Decision on [...]’s Summary Judgement Dated Dec 1, 2023..  Except for the defamation claims in Count One and Two, the federal court found that Appellant’s remaining claims were in, in fact, malicious prosecution claims.
[brief] Defense Counsel Was Ineffective at the Sentencing Hearing by Failing to Present Relevant Mitigating Circumstances as to Petitioner’s Background and by Failing to Argue Against the State’s Request for an Effective Life Sentence  This lack of advocacy to argue for the least severe sentence allowed by the criminal code continued at the sentencing hearing.  The State passionately emphasized the crimes impact on the victims by mentioning the trauma of [...], who moved back to Israel, "because they felt a country in the Middle East, where there are frequent acts of terrorism, was safer than the home that they had in Cherry Hill."  And that as a result, the two victim daughters, had to do mandatory service in the Israeli army, and that "he said that even with that, his family still feels safer there because they don't believe this kind of home invasion would actually occur."  (19T5-9 to 24)  Trial counsel made no objection to this hearsay victim impact testimony.  The State continued to personalize the victim impact on the [...] by recounting the fear and feeling of lack of safety and security, the feeling of hyper-vigilance since home invasion, including the children being constantly nervous.  (19T6-2 to 20)  Trial counsel did not object to this hearsay victim impact statement.  Driving this point home, the State argued:  . . . the impact of it is as fresh now as it was then because, again, it is a violation of the place where every citizen of this country feels that they should be the safest.  The place where you sleep and are completely the most defenseless.  The place where you feel you can leave your children safely, a teenager, and go out and socialize and go to work.  That has been taken from these families.  It can never be brought back to them, and I would ask the court to consider that, along with all of the other information that was in my brief, in rendering your sentence.
[brief] [...]  TABLE OF CONTENTS  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT: FILING OF THE REPLY BRIEF .................................................  1  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT: PLAINTIFF’S-RESPONDENT BRIEF ......................................  2  STATEMENT OF FACTS: OBTAINING TRIAL COURT RECORDS .......................................  4  LEGAL ARGUMENT: POINT  1.  THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT ............................  7 POINT 2.  BREACH OF DUTY BY PLAINTIFF’S ATTORNEY ..........................................................  9 POINT 3.  ABUSE OF DISCRETION BY THE TRIAL COURT JUDGE .............................................  11  PROCEDURAL HISTORY .................................................................................................  18  CONCLUSION ..................................................................................................................  19 | Document Name | Date | Page Number | |-------------------------------|------------|-------------| | Vacate Judgment Order | 10-19-2023 | Pa60 | | Reconsider to Vacate Judgment Order | 12-1-2023 | Pa61 | | Traverse Hearing Order | 12-1-2023 | Pa62 |
[brief] THE BOROUGH DOES NOT HAVE THE RIGHT TO “DECLINE A DEDICATION AT ANY TIME” (Da20)  Points I and II of Defendant’s brief are different variations of the same underlying argument: i.e., that a municipality can always decline to accept the dedication of a street for public use despite the fact that such dedication was offered by way of an approved subdivision plat for which the work had been done and the performance bond released.  That unsupported assertion is simply not true, and runs directly contrary to the plain, unambiguous language of N.J.S.A. 40:55D-53.j.
[brief] For all of the reasons discussed herein, the Appeal should be denied in its entirety.  Respectfully Submitted, Dated: March 27, 2024  New York, NY  By: /s/[...]  [...]  [...] (251582017)  [...] (021652010)  [...]  [...] [...] [...]  Attorneys for Plaintiff-Respondent  REPLY BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS
[brief] (1T 39-23 to 1T 49-18).  A conforming Order was signed that same day.  (Da11).  On or about June 17, 2024, the Defendant filed a Notice of Appeal with the Appellate Division under Appellate Docket Number [...].  (Da12 to Da14).  On July 17, 2024, the appeal was dismissed as interlocutory and for failing to file a motion for leave to appeal.  (Da15).  Thereafter, on September 24, 2024, the Defendant pled guilty to Count One of Indictment Number [...].  (Da16 to Da20).  Pursuant to the negotiated plea agreement, the State recommended that the Defendant be sentenced to 180 days in the county jail with no probation.  (Da18).  The State also agreed to recommend that the Defendant’s motor vehicle summonses be dismissed.  Id.  On November 8, 2024, the Defendant was sentenced by the Honorable [...], J.S.C. as follows: 180 days in the county jail with 180 days of parole ineligibility; $75 Safe Neighborhood Services Fund (SNSF) assessment; $50 Victims of Crime Compensation Office (VCCO) assessment; $30 Law Enforcement Officers Training and Equipment Fund (LEOTEF) assessment; and a $2 transaction fee.  (Da21 to Da23).  The court also dismissed the Defendant’s two (2) motor vehicle summonses.  ---
[brief] The Unjust Treatment of the [...] Has Resulted in a Cascade of Errors.  (Jarwick Devs., Inc. v. Wilf, No. A-2053-13T3, 2018 WL 2449133 (App. Div. June 1, 2018)).  This is a limited appeal from the decisions of the trial court following this Court’s June 1, 2018 remand.
[brief] (Pa32-Pa33).  Now she seeks to credit for purposes of calculating her retirement benefits, a salary of $135,765.33 for the 2018-2019 school year; $137,442.33 for the 2019-2020 school year; and $147,038 for the 2020-2021 school year, i.e. a total of a $96,250 in retroactive salary increase in order to settle the employment discrimination litigation.  (Pb11).  The Settlement Agreement characterizes these moneys as allocated to the salary of the 2018-2019; 2019-2020; and 2020-2021 school years only.  (Pa33).  [...] cites the unpublished opinion of Coyle v. Board of Trustees, Teachers’ Pension and Annuity Fund, No. A-6101-12 (App. Div. March 20, 2015), in her brief.  (Pb7-Pb8).  She argues that the retroactive salary increases were not made in anticipation of retirement but were instead made due to the Equal Pay Act and the NJLAD.  (Pb7-Pb8).
[brief] DATED: June 17, 2024  [...], Plaintiff/Appellant, v. [...], [...] AND [...], Defendants/Appellees.  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY  APPELLATE  DIVISION  DOCKET NO.: [...]  CIVIL ACTION  On Appeal From: December 12, 2023  Final Order And Decision of the Superior Court of New Jersey, Monmouth County – Law Division  Docket Number: [...]  Sat Below: Honorable [...], J.S.C.  BRIEF OF DEFENDANT-APPELLEE
[brief] 3T.  Despite denying the motion, the trial court unequivocally stated, “I think the only dispositive fact that would, I think, change my opinion would be that if [Appellant’s] door was actually locked and someone broke it.  That would be – that would be a fact that would make a difference…  The testimony that was presented to this Court, they just kept walking through without breaking any doors.  So unless the door was broken, that would be an altering factor for this Court, for sure. ”  3T: 53:5-24 (emphasis added).  The court further indicated, “[i]f you find that it’s important to reopen because I don’t have the correct facts as to the breach of a door… let me know and I will entertain the application.  3T: 54:20-23.  d.  Second Motion to Suppress On September 1, 2023, Appellant filed a second Motion to Suppress based on newly found information from a retired police officer which indicated, for the first time, that door to Appellant’s apartment had damage to it which was consistent with it being breached with a Halligan tool.
[brief] (Pb19-25.)  Under Point II of Defendant’s brief it argues there is a difference between due diligence and delivery of the estoppel.  (Pb19-25.)  This, Defendant claims, was misunderstood by the trial court and resulted in an erroneous conclusion since the court improperly conflated the two.  To prove the difference Defendant argues the due diligence provision permitted immediate termination upon finding adverse information, while termination due to a deficient estoppel was only permitted if Defendant failed to provide an Acceptable Estoppel Certificate by closing.  (Pb21-24.)  It buttressed this temporal distinction pointing out the due diligence process is completed “well before issuance of the estoppel certificate”.  (Pb20)  Added is that due diligence was concluded within thirty days of contract execution, but delivery of the estoppel could, according to Defendant’s interpretation, occur as late as the closing.  Also, the trial court’s discussion of “cure” further shows its misunderstanding (Pb 21-22) since cure was a “meaningless concept” because failure to provide a proper estoppel certificate is not a default meaning there would be nothing to cure.  (Pb21.)  As further proof of the distinction, Defendant states the due diligence process and estoppel certificate serve different purposes - the former to assess risks prior to the transaction, and the latter solely to safeguard against post-transaction claims.
[brief] The only party engaging in a battle of the experts in this case appears to be  Plaintiff argues that a trial court should not decide the merits where there are competing expert opinions and cites to Davin LLC v. Daham, 329 N.J. Super. 54 (App. Div. 2015), wherein a judge appeared to rely on his personal experience, rather than a certification submitted to the Court, in rendering a decision.  “Relying on his prior experience as a practicing attorney, the judge stated that an attorney for a tenant never orders a title search before advising his or client to enter into a lease. ”  Id. at 71 (emphasis added).  The Appellate Division did not take issue with the Trial Judge’s reliance on a particular expert, but instead, on that Judge’s own personal experience when he had competing affidavits before him.
[brief] STATE of New Jersey, Plaintiff–Respondent, v. [...], Defendant–Appellant.  Submitted April 25, 2012.  Decided July 18, 2012.  On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Bergen County, [...].  Attorneys and Law Firms [...], Public Defender, attorney for appellant ([...], Assistant Deputy Public Defender, of counsel and on the brief).  [...], Bergen County Prosecutor, attorney for respondent ([...], Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).  Appellant filed a pro se supplemental brief.  Before Judges [...]–[...] and [...].
[brief] In Counts 7 and 8 of the Amended Complaint, the Plaintiffs asserted breach of contract claims against [...], [...], [...], and the [...] relating to the [...] Operating Agreement and the [...] Stockholder’s Agreement.  To establish a breach of contract claim, a plaintiff must show that the parties entered into a valid contract, the defendant failed to perform his obligations under the contract, and the plaintiff sustained damages as a result.  *Coyle v. Englander’s*, 199 N.J. Super. 212, 223 (App. Div. 1985).  Damages are intended to compensate the injured party for losses due to the breach and to put that party in as good a position as if performance had been rendered as promised.  *Totaro, Duffy, Cannova & Co., L.L.C. v. Lane, Middleton & Co.*, L.L.C., 191 N.J. 1, 12-13 (2007).  [...]’s argument on appeal is that the trial court erred by holding her liable for breaching contracts to which she was not a party.  (Db35).  The problem, however, is that she definitely was a party to contracts that the trial court concluded had been breached, and the Plaintiffs showed that money flowed into accounts that she controlled as a result of those breaches.  (23T 9:23 to 29:9; 37T:87:20 to 88:4).  To the extent [...] claims that the trial court’s conclusions are contrary to the evidential record, that argument falls flat because the evidence was sufficient to establish her liability when the trial court considered the documents, testimony, and credibility of the witnesses.  There is no basis for this Court to reverse the lower court’s well-founded conclusions after thoroughly weighing of the evidence presented during an extensive 22-day trial.
[brief] I.  Standard of Review  An appellate court reviews a grant of summary judgment de novo, “applying the same standard as the trial court. ”  L.A. v. New Jersey Div. of Youth and Family Services, 217 N.J. 311, 323 (2014).  Summary judgment is warranted where “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact challenged and … the moving party is entitled to a judgment or order as a matter of law. ”  R. 4:46-2 (c).  An issue of material fact arises where “the competent evidential material presented, when viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, are sufficient to permit a rational fact-finder to resolve the alleged disputed issue in favor of the non-moving party. ”  Brill v. Guardian Life. Ins. Co., 142 N.J. 520, 540 (1995).  Here there is clearly an issue as to the notice and date and nature of the same.  II.
[brief] In granting the [...] appeal, [...] further respectfully requests that this case be remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent a grant of the [...] appeal – namely, a reevaluation of the covered damages allocated to [...] in connection with past and future remediation at the [...] and a corresponding reevaluation of allocated legal fees and costs, as well as interest.  Dated: April 12, 2024  Respectfully submitted, /s/[...]  [...], Esquire  [...], Esquire  [...] [...]
[brief] N.J.S.A. 11:1-20.1(a).......................................................................10  N.J.S.A. 34:15-81 ............................................................................10  Rule 4:42-9(a)(6) ...........................................................................13, 14  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT  Between this appeal and [...]’ coordinated appeal ([...]), [...] and [...] have submitted a staggering 110 pages of briefing to this Court, but a single page would have sufficed: a notice of cancellation issued to [...].
[brief] Pepe v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 254 N.J. Super. 662, 666 (App. Div. 1992).  12  Ibid.  13  Ibid.  14  See N.J.S.A. 42:2C-67 (LLC member direct action must "plead and prove an actual or threatened injury that is not solely the result of an injury suffered or threatened to be suffered by the limited liability company”).  rule, which provides shareholders who suffer an injury may not recover for the injury to [their] stock alone, but must seek recovery derivatively [on] behalf of the corporation.  Only upon proof of fraud or injustice will the corporate veil be pierced to impose liability on the corporate principals.\footnote{Tully v. Mirz, 457 N.J. Super. 114, 123 - 124 (App. Div. 2018)(internal quotes and citations omitted); See also Strasenburgh.}
[brief] See Musconetcong Watershed Ass’n, 2023 N.J. Super. LEXIS at *28-29.  The Water Quality Planning Act was enacted in New Jersey in 1977 in response to analogous sections of the federal Clean Water Act, and claimed the same objective: “to restore and maintain the chemical, physical and biological integrity of the waters of the State. ”  N.J.S.A. 58:11A-2.  As described at the time the act was passed, the WQPA “establishes a process for planning and managing a comprehensive pollution control program for municipal and industrial wastewater, storm and combined sewer runoff, nonpoint source pollutants and water quality as it relates to land use. ”  Aa223.  “With specific regard to water resources,” the \textsuperscript{14}  A wasteload allocation is the amount of a pollutant that is allocated to a specific point source, and combined with other sources, makes up the TMDL, or total maximum daily load.  See N.J.A.C. 7:9B-1.4 (definition of wasteload allocation).  Stormwater discharged through an outfall is considered a point source discharge under the Clean Water Act.  33 U.S.C. § 1362(14).  \textsuperscript{15}  Impaired waters are those that do not support their designated uses because they exceed the pollutant levels required by the surface water quality standards.  These are commonly referred to as impaired waters.  Sierra Club, Inc. v. Leavitt, 488 F.3d 904, 907 (11th Cir. 2007).  WQPA “provides for the restoration and maintenance of water quality in this State, including a planning process to control and maintain water quality. ”  *In re Adoption of N.J.A.C. 7:15-5.24(b)*, 420 N.J. Super. 552, 558 (App. Div. 2011).
[directive] Prosecutor Review of Applicant's Appeal from Denial of an Application for a Permit to Carry  N.J.S.A. 2C:58-4(e) requires aggrieved applicants appealing the law enforcement denial of a carry permit to serve the request for a hearing on the county prosecutor.  County prosecutors are not required by law to provide input to the court regarding these appeals.  If they wish to do so, however, county prosecutors must file their response to these appeals within 14 days of the filing of the appeal.  If the prosecutor does not respond within 14 days, the court is to move forward with the appeal hearing.  Questions or comments may be directed to Criminal Practice Division by email to the AOC Criminal Practice Division at [...] or by phone at [...].
[brief] The Authority’s *only* construction obligation was to build the Authority Garage.  Da98.  According to [...], the Authority typically requires two to three years to prepare plans, drawings, and schematics for a parking project and to arrange financing.  3T116:19-23.  Based on the phasing sequence and Project schedule, [...] admitted at trial that the Authority needed to start designing and planning for the Authority Garage by no later than 2006 in order to build it following completion of the Project Garage and at the same time as the Mall.  3T117:2-4.  The Authority never took any elementary steps to prepare for the Authority Garage by drafting plans, conducting studies, or arranging financing.  When this was made painfully clear at trial, [...] was pointedly asked what steps the Authority took to prepare for construction of the Authority Garage, and he replied, “[n]othing. ”  2T48:22-49:4.
[brief] P.L. 2019, c. 157.  Under the Ricci Act, the [...] was required to promulgate rules and regulations necessary to implement the new law.  The Ricci Act states that the [...] “shall notify members and retirants in the retirement system of the enactment of this act, P.L. 2019, c. 157, within 30 days of enactment. ”  N.J.S.A. 53:5A-10(e)(4).  (Emphasis added).  The Board was required to notify all members of the [...] of the Ricci Act by August 7, 2019, including the requirement to “register” by filing a form indicating the dates and locations of service within two (2) years.  On August 8, 2019, more than 30 days after the Ricci Act’s passage, the [...] distributed an email to all Certifying Officers “advising them of their responsibilities under the Ricci Act. ”  Pa11.  However, while this is cited in the Final Agency Decision, no actual email dated August 8, 2019, was ever produced, only a Memorandum dated “August 2019. ”  Pa64.  On or about August 9, 2019, more than 30 days after the passage of the Ricci Act, the [...] contracted [...] to mail postcards to retirees.  Pa66.  No “close date” appears on the document.  Pa66.  In support of his request for amended benefits under the Ricci Act, [...] submitted an affidavit that he did not receive any correspondence or postcard from the [...] or the [...] with respect to the passage of P.L. 2019, c.157 (Chapter 157), the Bill Ricci World Trade Center Rescue, Recovery, and Cleanup Operations Act.
[brief] (Aa39; Aa307).  On February 13, 2020, [...] presided over a hearing regarding the proposed Project.  (Aa39).  On March 2, 2020, [...] filed a motion to suspend the briefing schedule and direct [...] to “undertake a formal review of the merits of this [P]roject measured against the new policies” of New Jersey’s 2019 Energy Master Plan (EMP).
[brief] See N.J.S.A. 40:55D-40.1 et seq.  There was never any change to the number of parking spaces to meet the RSIS.  1T 82.  [...] questioned the trash compactor shown, but none of [...]’s witnesses had mentioned the trash compactor or its noise.  1T 85:1-7.  The Board did not find the noise issues to be adequately addressed at all, except for a promise to test the equipment after installation.  No proof of noise levels was provided.  1T 85:17-87:8.