ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] In doing so DEP relied on a meaningless survey about the setback of existing buildings of unknown age in [...], which has had high rise buildings along the waterfront for well over 100 years.  But when were the buildings in the survey built?  The setback and view shed requirements of the Scenic Resources Rule were only adopted in 1994.  DEP also relied on [...]’s spot zoning amendment limited to only the [...] site (hardly a good basis for comprehensive coastal zone decision making under CAFRA).  And DEP relied on a road separating the proposed apartment building from the boardwalk, a consideration irrelevant under the Rule.  DEP wanted an end result (pleasing [...]) and had to find some way to explain why it was disregarding its own rules.  DEP is not legally empowered to do so.
[brief] In deciding that the County was obliged to waive the defect if it was not material, the trial court bypassed the County’s responsibility to engage in the relevant exercise of discretion.  Palamar, 196 N.J. Super. at 250 (local government has discretion to waive, subject to review for a “clear abuse of discretion”).  The term “waiver” implies an affirmative action on the government entity’s part.
[brief] Seeking to circumvent the FAA, Appellants argue that “the [...]’s provision mandating adjudication of the parties’ disputes by courts supersedes the FAA pursuant to the Twenty-First Amendment. ”  (Pb at 42-46.)  This specious argument has already been rejected.  Section 2 of the Twenty-First Amendment states, “The transportation or importation into any State, Territory, or possession of the United States for delivery or use therein of intoxicating liquors, in violation of the laws thereof, is hereby prohibited.
[brief] 41 State v. M.L., 253 N. J. Super. 13 (App. Div. 1991), certif. denied, 127 N.J. 560 (1992)......................................................................................... 25 State v. Mahoney, 188 N.J. 359 (2006).................................................................. 45, 52, 53, 60 State v. Maltese, 222 N.J. 525 (2015), cert. denied, 577 U.S. 1182 (2016)...............28, 29 State v. Mance, 300 N.J. Super. 37 (App. Div. 1997)............................................. 47 State v. Melendez, 423 N.J. Super. 1 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 210 N.J. 28 (2012)....... 28 State v. Mesz, 459 N.J. Super. 309 (App. Div. 2019).......................................... 68 State v. Miller, 76 N.J. 392 (1978).................................................................... 26 State v. Molina, 168 N.J. 436 (2001).................................................................. 98 State v. Morton, 155 N.J. 383 (1998).................................................................. 45, 58 State v. Nyhammer, 197 N.J. 383 (2009).................................................................. 25, 26 State v. O’Donnell, 117 N.J. 210 (1989)..................................................................
[brief] The delay of more than two years from the alleged offense before the State motioned to compel swabs far exceeds the eight months in *Gathers*.  While the Appellate Division had several reasons for reversal apart from the timeliness, it was explicit in its holding that “timing is everything. ”  *Id.* at 272.  The trial court erred by finding the significant delay was justifiable because the parties were “actively negotiating. ”  As the factual record of *Gathers* was “quite limited” it is impossible to compare the actions of the prosecutors.  *Id.* at 267.  There is no reason to assume that parties were not actively negotiating in *Gathers*.  Furthermore, there was no consideration as to why the State could not pursue forensics while negotiating with defendants.  Therefore, the State’s motion should have been denied.  Because the court erred in granting the motion, the buccal swabs should be suppressed and [...] should be afforded the opportunity to withdraw his plea pursuant to Rule 3:9-3(f).  CONCLUSION
[directive] THE ~F sj•~~'OA, ~ v. ~ w{ ,.. ~ ~~ ~~' i, Jersey Ne of w State GENERAL ATTORNEY THE OI' OFFICE LOUGY ROBERT SAFETY PUBLIC AND LAW OF DEPARTMENT iRISTIE C[ CI-IRIS Genera! Acting Attorney 080 BOX PO Governor NJ 08625-0080 TRENTON, GUADAGNO KIM Governor Lt. C-4 20l NO. DIRECTIVE ENFORCEMENT LAW GENERAL ATTORNEY Police State Jersey New Superintendent, TO: Criminal Justice of Division Director, Prosecutors County All Sheriffs County All Chiefs Police All Executives Chief Enforcement Law All General Attorney Acting Lougy, Robert FROM: April 2016 8, DATE: and Practices Statewide Uniform Concerning Directive Enforcement Law SUBJECT: Handgun Identification Cards, Purchaser Firearms for Issuing Procedures Handguns Carry to Permits and Permits, Purchase and Public Law of Department the in Police Jersey State New the of Superintendent The enforcing implementing and for responsible are departments police of local chiefs the and Safety private by of firearms and carrying the purchase governing regulations and laws New Jersey's The State. the throughout uniformly applied be must regulations and laws These citizens.  however, noted, Jersey New in &Permitting Purchase Firearms on Report 2015 21, December State implementing in these agencies by used procedures and the practices in variations possible 30-day the of excess in times processing of observations including regulations, and laws firearms purchase or handgun cards identification purchaser review firearms to agencies police for period 2C:58-3(~. N.J.S.A. under permits necessary to State, is the it across permits process expeditiously and uniformly more
[brief] As admitted by [...], “given [their] financial situation and the pending bankruptcies, [they] and [...] agreed” that [...] would purchase the Property outright rather than loan [...] the funds to purchase it herself.  Da11, 36.  As a result of this change of plans, [...] never provided proof of financing for her purchase of the Property from [...], never provided [...] with a second mortgage on the Property, never made any of the payments contemplated by the abandoned MOU, and did not pay off the bundled loan with interest by June 1, 2014.  Da36-40.  Instead, [...] and [...] formed [...] and purchased the Property themselves\(^3\) installing [...] as the manager, not owner,\(^4\) thereof.
[brief] 28.  At trial, [...] testified that [...] wrote a check for $1,500.00 on the first day of every month because they were very honorable people to help with the mortgage and carrying costs (3T95:8-19).  29.  At trial, [...] testified that she drove her parents everywhere because [...] had given up driving when they moved to New Jersey.  She accompanied them to doctor’s appointment to translate as need be, and filled all their prescriptions at the pharmacy (3T44:19-25 - 45:1-10).  30.  The Court further found that in the spring of 2020, [...] was going through a bankruptcy and lost his job so he moved into [...] with his elderly parents (6T7:21-8:3).
[brief] Drop the gun. ”  [...] asked [...] whether he had been hit, and then drew his attention to the store’s front door.  He saw no indication that [...] had been shot.  (2T94-17 to 96-23).  [...] heard a bang, then saw “muzzle fire,” and realized that defendant had shot him when he saw a “pool of blood” “coming down my leg. ”  [...] “started backpedaling,” and radioed, “I’ve been shot. ”  When he reached the curb, [...] “fell down,” and saw [...] standing along the nearby concrete wall.  [...] yelled out, “I got you, D. I got you,” then threw [...] on his shoulder, carried him a little down [...], then put [...] in a patrol car that had arrived, which took [...] to [...].  (2T105-16 to 108-11).  [...] corroborated much of [...]’s testimony, explaining that there was a risk of danger because defendant was on top of a gun.  [...] saw the gun and muzzle fire, and [...] got shot in the knee by defendant’s gun.  [...] took the “distraught” and “screaming” [...], who was bleeding from the knee, retrieved [...]’s service gun, which had fallen, and carried [...] on his shoulder to a nearby SUV until a patrol car arrived to take him to the hospital.  He also radioed for back-up because an officer had been shot.  (2T63-22 to 67-16; 2T69-1 to 75-21).
[brief] (Da 188).  The trial court’s reduction was in addition to the reductions already calculated by [...].} (Pa 53-54).  Despite the fact that it did not succeed on certain issues, [...] did succeed on the ultimate issue – whether [...] owes it insurance coverage.  [...]’s lack of success on certain issues does not make [...] an unsuccessful claimant so as to negate a fee award; instead, “success” may be considered when calculating the fees to be awarded.  \textit{See Litton}, 200 N.J. at 387.  \section*{C.
[brief] [...] states that Plaintiffs’ claims in this matter arise from environmental remediation performed on Plaintiffs’ property.  ([...] Brief at page 8).  While environmental remediation performed on the property was certainly one issue raised by the Plaintiffs, environmental remediation was only a portion of the overall claims alleged by Plaintiffs.  Plaintiffs had suffered damages at the hand of various entities and/or individuals.  At the time the Complaint was filed, the scope of these unauthorized entries and activities was not fully known and required the full and fair benefit of discovery.  (Pa000001-Pa000013).  [...] states that despite Plaintiffs’ reservations pertaining to remediation services, Plaintiffs “consented to other remediation services on the Property. ” ([...] Brief at page 9).  However, Plaintiffs’ permission was under the threats that Plaintiffs’ business would be shut down and based upon the representation that the disturbance to the business would be minimal.  (Pa000619; Pa000777 at ¶ 19-20; Pa000333, page 80, line 2 to line 15; Pa000339, page 103, line 3 to line 14; Pa000371, page 232, line 4 to line 22).  [...] also certified that he would not have permitted access had the actual scope of the [...] work been accurately and fairly represented.  (Pa000778-Pa000779 at ¶ 21-30).  [...] states that Plaintiffs “did nothing to develop their purported common knowledge negligence or trespass claims against [...]. ” ([...] Brief at page 16).  This belies the truth and factual record in this matter.  Plaintiffs served interrogatories and deposed two witnesses in this matter.  In [...]’s response to interrogatories, [...] acknowledged that a representative of [...] may have trespassed on Plaintiffs’ Property in connection with the preparation of site plans (Pa000108).  [...] and the trial court both fixated on the fact that Plaintiffs did not depose a representative of [...], but litigants are not required to depose every possible potential witness.  In this matter, because there were numerous defendants, Plaintiffs elected not to depose a representative of [...] and elected to elicit testimony pertaining to the site plan from representatives of [...] and the [...], while maintaining the right to call a representative of [...] at trial.  [...] was permitted to file another motion for summary judgment at the conclusion of discovery, [...] exercised that right.  (Pa000086).  But failure to depose a representative of a defendant is not a basis for the trial court to make a determination that the Plaintiffs had engaged in frivolous litigation, and certainly not a basis to enter an award for fees that included time before the conclusion of discovery.  (Pa000637).  **ADDITIONAL FACTUAL BACKGROUND AS TO [...]**
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO APPLY THE THREE SUBSTANTIVE SECTIONS OF THE LRHL TO THE REDEVELOPMENT PLAN AND STUDY, THEREBY REQUIRING THAT THE REDEVELOPMENT ORDINANCE MUST BE VACATED (Pa0074-Pa0098)  A.  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT OF LAW  Can a municipality create a valid redevelopment “plan” which follows the statutory procedural steps but fails to meet the substantive criteria required by the applicable sections of the “LRHL? ”  To pose this question is to answer it.  A municipality’s redevelopment “plan,” to be legally valid, must satisfy the substance all of the applicable sections of the LRHL.  The Trial Court failed to apply and analyze three key provisions of the LRHL law which must be satisfied to have a valid redevelopment “plan. ”  First, Section 7a (plan) requires that the “criteria” of Section 5 (study) be applied to any redevelopment “plan. ”  Second, Section 5h (study) requires that any redevelopment “plan” under Section 7 be “consistent with smart growth planning principles. ”  Third, Section 14 requires that a redevelopment “plan” which has an “overlay” zone for an entire town must aim at preventing “further deterioration” of the sewer and water infrastructures and housing stock more than 50 years old.  The only site in the [...] redevelopment “plan” which satisfies any of these three mandatory statutory criteria is the abandoned [...] under Section 5b (discontinued use of a building for commercial purposes).  Accordingly, under these circumstances, the redevelopment “plan” must be vacated so that the Town can create a legally valid “plan” which satisfies the substance of all applicable statutes.  This case also raises the issue of whether the redevelopment “study” adopted three years before the “plan” can form the legal basis of that “plan” when, during that three-year gap, the COVID epidemic altered drastically (and probably permanently) the way most people work and live.  This consideration is especially relevant in this case because the “plan” calls for the construction of 310,000 square feet of new office space where none previously existed.  Where is the data to support the concept that there will be enough workers who will occupy that space when COVID has caused many employees to work from home?  Probably most disturbing in the Trial Court opinion is the lack of any analysis to these applicable statutes and then failing to apply the criteria of those statutes to the redevelopment plan of the Town of [...].
[brief] 3  User Agreement – [...], available at https://adam4adam.zendesk.com/hc/en-us/articles/115001825345-User-Agreement (last accessed March 19, 2024).  careless action on the part of the State, and defendant was unable to prove otherwise.  Third, [...] abused his discretion in basing his ruling on unwarranted credibility findings based on nothing more than assumptions.  The State had informed the court that [...] had used a non-work email address to create the [...] profile in 2019 and had since forgotten his password for the site.  (1T12-25 to 13-19).  [...] found this lapse in memory was further proof of the State’s bad faith:  [T]he State concedes, or at least the State asserts that [...] simply forgot the login information that he used to create the profile.  Whether that information is credible or not, and -- and one might infer, as the defense does, perhaps, that that is -- that there is connivance on the part of the detective in this situation or not, whether it is or it isn’t, again, it is such an egregious mis -- egregious carelessness.  And not only that.  Even if not deliberate, certainly that information, that assertion that he simply forgot the login information, it’s simply not reliable.  I don’t find it to be reliable.  And why is that?  Because the cell phone extraction of [...], the phone with which [...] maintains that he used to create the profile, none of the information used to create the profile, including the email address purportedly used, was recovered from the phone.  [2T14-24 to 15-17].  He continued, “[I]t’s extremely troubling to this Court that while all of the significant incriminatory information regarding the texts and the online exchanges between [defendant] and [...] were preserved, the bait, the . . . online profile, was not, with seemingly no explanation other than he forgot the login information. ”  (2T16-6 to 12).
[brief] The Prevailing Wage Act’s definition of “public work” does not justify Respondents erroneous emphasis of the word “work”, as used in N.J.S.A. 34:11-56.51a, while simultaneously ignoring the phrase “at any construction site” that immediately follows.  This is particularly so when considering that the Prevailing Wage Act utilizes the term “public work” in a descriptive sense to identify general classes of work (construction, reconstruction, demolition, etc.) that fall within its purview.  In contrast, N.J.S.A. 34:11-56.51a uses the term “perform work” in a more active sense to excuse only those who are not performing work on site.  Moreover, the PWCRA uses the Prevailing Wage Act to define the type of projects to which it applies.
[brief] Furthermore, the following depositions were taken in discovery in this matter prior to the summary judgment order on May 8, 2014: a. [...] – 8/28/13; b. [...] – 8/27/13 and 8/28/13; c. [...] – 9/30/13; d. [...] – 2/11/14; e. [...] – 2/18/14; and f. [...] – 2/28/14.  (Da824 at ¶ 13).  D.  Summary Judgment and the First Appeal
[brief] IN RESPONDENT’S BRIEF  Respondent makes arguments in various footnotes on pages 4, 5, 6, 9-11, 26, 31-32 and 43 of Respondent’s Brief.  “Additional legal issues may not be raised by footnotes in a brief. ”  State v. King, 210 N.J. 2, 22 (N.J. 2012).  “Nor will we address issues raised merely by a footnote. ”  In re Lobasso, 423 N.J. Super. 475, In *Almog v. Israel Travel Advisory Service, Inc.*, 298 N.J. Super. 145, 155 (App. Div. 1997), appeal dismissed, 152 N.J. 361 (1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 817 (1998), the court did not permit the raising of additional legal issues by footnotes, confining its review of the issues to those arguments properly made under appropriate point headings.  In *Coast Automotive Group v. Withum Smith Brown*, 413 N.J. Super. 363 (App. Div. 2010), and *Lippman v. Ethicon, Inc.*, 432 N.J. Super. 378, 386 n.6 (App. Div. 2013), the courts ignored the footnotes submitted in those cases.  Respondent’s footnotes do not satisfy the requirements of R. 2:6-2(a)(6) that arguments shall be made under separate point headings and R. 2:6-10 that footnotes must be in the same format as the brief.  Footnotes 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7 in Respondent’s Brief should be ignored by the Court.  VI.
[brief] The defendant’s water facility is a municipally owned public utility established under legislative authority of R.S. 40:62-47 et seq.  *There is authority for the position that the establishment of a water supply system and its operation for the protection of the public health and safety is a matter comprehended in the police power of a municipality and as such, is a governmental function.*  Reid Dev. Corp. v. Parsippany-Troy Hills Twp., 31 N.J. Super. 459, 462 (App. Div. 1954) (emphasis added).  A few years later, New Jersey’s Supreme Court rejected the notion that municipal supply of water is a “proprietary” function, and skeptically referred to the proprietary/governmental distinction as “illusory”:  *Plaintiffs urge that the supply of water is a “proprietary” rather than a “governmental” function* and hence should be subject to the Ho-Ho-Kus ordinance.  *We cannot agree that the distinction between governmental and proprietary functions is relevant to this controversy.  The distinction is illusory; whatever local government is authorized to do constitutes a function of government, and when a municipality acts pursuant to granted authority it acts as government and not as a private entrepreneur.*  The distinction has proved useful to restrain the ancient concept of municipal tort immunity, not because of any logic in the distinction, but rather because sound policy dictated that governmental immunity should not envelop the many activities which government today pursues to meet the needs of the citizens.  Township of Wash. v. Village of Ridgewood, 26 N.J. 578, 584 (1958) (emphasis added).
[directive] Internal Affairs Case Reporting  This workbook is deisgned to assist your completion of Internal Affairs Cases Reporting Requirements per the Attorney General's 2019 Internal Affairs Policies & Procedures.  To begin, select your Agency Name from the drop down list and fill in the year below.  Then proceed to the Quarterly Sheets.  Agency Name: Year:  Click the link below to reivew the full Internal Affairs Policies & Procedures  Internal Affairs Policies & Procedures this year.  Fill in the information below for each case opened within IA Number, Dates, Officer, and Discipline are free-text fields.  ALL OTHER FIELDS HAVE A PRE-DEFINED RESPONSE LIST.  THE LENGTH OF CASE FIELD WILL CALCULATE AUTOMATICALLY AND FLAG CASES OVER 180 DAYS.  Click on each cells and click on the dropdown menu that appears to view all response options.  NOTE:  Be sure to update cases as their status or other elements change.  Classify each case by the most serious allegation while pending.  When the case closes, classify by the most serious sustained allegation or most serious allegation if none are sustained.  Internal Affairs Annual Report Date
[brief] Thus, the remaining evidence sustained the indictment for murder.  Ultimately, the grand jury testimony had no impact on defendant’s conviction.  Counsel cross-examined [...] about his grand jury testimony in an attempt to undermine his credibility.  (6T115-7 to 119-16).  Counsel then argued that [...]’s “misrepresentation” was a basis not only to question his credibility but to find reasonable doubt.  (8T45-20 to 47-9).  The error was not repeated at trial, with [...] testifying that it was [...] who initiated the text conversation.  (6T116-9 to 11).  The jury heard the full context of why investigators originally suspected [...] of luring the victim and ultimately abandoned this theory.  (6T107-8 to 121-21; 6T171-2 to 172-20).  To the extent it can be claimed that the contested grand jury testimony supported a theory that the shooting was premeditated, the petit jury rejected that theory by acquitting defendant of purposeful murder.  Thus, clearly there was no prejudice to defendant in his indictment for murder.  The verdict demonstrates that the jury carefully considered the evidence in finding defendant guilty of reckless manslaughter while acquitting him of the other counts.  Defendant’s belated attempt to dismiss the indictment should be denied.
[brief] BECAUSE IT IS NOT STEPPED BACK, BECAUSE IT DOES NOT PRESERVE 30% OF THE CURRENT WATERFRONT VIEW, AND BECAUSE IT IS NOT COMPATIBLE WITH ITS SURROUNDINGS; PLAINLY THE SETTLEMENT IS AN ARBITRARY, CAPRICIOUS AND UNREASONABLE FAILURE TO ENFORCE AN IMPORTANT COASTAL ZONE RULE (Raised below: Aa5-Aa12; Aa41-Aa53; Aa63-Aa70)  A.  Standard of Review of DEP’s CAFRA Permit Approval.
[brief] APPELLANTS RELY ON THEIR BRIEF-IN-CHIEF IN RESPONSE TO ARGUMENTS ABOUT THE JURY’S VERDICT AGAINST THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE (DA001-DA082; 4T:133:1-25—159:1-25;4T:110-199; 7T:57:1-25—86:1-25).  For the sake of judicial economy, Appellants rely on the arguments made in their brief-in-chief regarding the jury’s verdict against the weight of the evidence.  The only additional point in this regard is that Respondent’s counsel mischaracterizes and takes out of context Respondent’s testimony about the stoppage of the Grant salary and her retaliation claim.  Accordingly, this Court should reverse the trial court’s ruling on the motion for new trial and remand this matter for a new trial limited to the issues of disability discrimination and retaliation.  The jury’s verdict regarding religious discrimination is not the subject of this appeal and should not be disturbed.