ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] Directive # 04-11 July 12, 2011  2  Page the case notes that the disposition was made in the Superior Court.  The Superior Court thereafter must return the original of the previously e-mailed or faxed traffic ticket and disposition to the originating municipal court as soon as practicable, but no later than 20 days after sentencing.  ATS will electronically transfer the data regarding the Title 39 disposition to the Motor Vehicle Commission (MVC) and the data will thereby be included on the defendant’s driving record (including any suspension of driving privileges).  While a Superior Court judge may impose fines, penalties, and assessments associated with the conviction for a motor vehicle offense, the Superior Court must not collect any such fines, penalties, or assessments.  Instead, the Superior Court judge must instruct the defendant to pay the motor vehicle fines, penalties, and assessments as imposed by the Superior Court to the municipal court where the charge originated and to do so by a specified date.  The municipal court administrator of the originating court will be responsible for the collection and appropriate disbursement of any such monies.
[brief] Per the New Jersey Constitution, and New Jersey statutory law, the right to trial by a jury of 6 is to be held inviolate.  Per the Constitution, the 10th amendment and *Schick v. United States*, 195 US 65 all infractions of public laws are crimes that must be tried by a jury.  The size of the jury is 6 in the state of New Jersey per New Jersey statutory law.  While a judge can act illegally and remain immune from action per a prior Supreme court opinion, the fact remains that the denial of the right to trial by jury is a crime per title 18 section 242 and that crime has to be tried by jury regardless of whether the presiding judge will remain immune from action none-the-less.  If a presiding judge were to deny the right to trial by jury, by more than just a judge-jury of one, in a matter brought to the bar, every judge in the country would be legally obligated to preserve the right to trial by jury, per *Slocum v. New York Life Insurance Co.*, 228 US 364, Article III and Article VI of the Constitution, by bringing the case to Washington, DC, where the offending judge would not be immune from action, for trial of the matter by the Supreme court of the United States.  The Supreme court could then issue an order for the incarceration, or fine, of the offending judge, per title 18 section 242, in either the judge’s state of residence, or Washington, DC.  With the above referenced in mind, the judges in the appellate court of New Jersey can properly attend to the matters that I seek to bring to the bar by directing that a jury trial commences with regard to the matters that I seek to bring to the bar.
[brief] The form of judgment was identical to the form of judgment filed by plaintiff with its first motion on April 6, 2023.  Compare Da19-21 with Da42-44.  Thus, plaintiff’s second motion for the entry of a judgment of foreclosure also sought a judgment of $21,501,343.47 as of April 5, 2023, which included prejudgment interest at the contract rate, and postjudgment “lawful interest” thereafter.  Da43.  On May 19, 2023, [...] filed its objections to plaintiff’s motion, which were that the motion was premature and that the calculation of the amount (not the rate) of prejudgment interest was incorrect.  Da52-54.  [...] did not object to the postjudgment interest rate sought because plaintiff sought “lawful”, not contract, postjudgment interest.  On May 24, 2023, the Clerk of the Superior Court entered an administrative order transferring the matter to Hudson County for review by a judge.  Da59.  On June 9, 2023, [...] withdrew its objections.
[brief] (Not Raised Below)  The interpretation of an arbitration clause is a matter of contractual construction that the appellate court should address *de novo*.  *NAACP of Camden County v. Foulke Management Corp.*, 421 N.J. Super, 404, 430 (App. Div. 2011) (quoting *Coast Auto. Grp., Ltd. v. Withum Smith & Brown*, 413 N.J. Super. 363, 369, 995 A.2d 300 (App. Div. 2010)); see also *EPIX Holdings Corp. v. Marsh & McLennan Cos.*, 410 N.J. Super. 453, 472, 982 A.2d 1194 (App. Div. 2009) (noting that “[o]ur standard of review of the applicability and scope of an arbitration agreement is plenary”).  *De novo* review is especially appropriate in evaluating a trial court’s ruling on summary judgment.  *NAACP of Camden County*, supra, 421 N.J. Super, at 431; *Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Boylan*, 307 N.J. Super. 162, 167 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 154 N.J. 608, 713 A.2d 499 (1998).  This standard of review should apply equally to review of a trial court’s ruling on a R. 4:6-2 motion to dismiss.
[brief] On February 15, 2024, the Board of Fire Commissioners for Respondent [...] (“Fire Commissioners”) conducted a Fire District Election in accordance with N.J.S.A. 40A:14-72 to -77.  (Pa5 at ¶ 1.)²  By ¹  Because they are closely related, these sections are combined for efficiency and the court’s convenience.  ²  “Pa” refers to Appellant’s Appendix.  “Pb” refers to Appellant’s Brief.  “Da” refers to Cross-Appellant’s Appendix.  “Db” refers to Cross-Appellant’s Brief.  “1T” refers to the transcript of the trial on April 14, 2025.
[directive] Page 3  Safeguards to Minimize Need for Criminal Background Checks of individuals who complete qualification and Criminal background checks report for grand jury service should rarely be necessary.  Prospective jurors have of been informed the eligibility criteria established by N.J.S.A. 2B:20-l and have advised that they are qualified to serve.  They have reported to the court for potential selection to perform their civic duty.  Grand Juror eligibility criteria are reviewed again during orientation.  In addition to those safeguards, the judge conducting the grand jury selection must repeat the requirements for grand jury service and ask jurors to raise any questions about their qualification at sidebar.  Judges are reminded to focus on and, appropriate, elaborate on the criminal as of history question, especially as to any criminal offenses outside New Jersey.  Judges should ask grand jurors to disclose any pending charges and should if of remind them they are currently serving a term pretrial intervention (PTI) they are not eligible to serve.  if Judges should also ask grand jurors to speak privately at sidebar they are of not sure about the status their criminal background, especially as to any criminal voir dire of offenses outside New Jersey.  In general, a robust process should reveal any issues that might preclude an individual from serving as a grand juror.
[brief] The Trial Court Correctly Acknowledged that the New Jersey Supreme Court Has Exclusive Jurisdiction Over the Practice of Law (T. at 16:24-17:2).  As the trial court correctly recognized, the New Jersey Supreme Court has exclusive jurisdiction over the practice of law.  The State Constitution authorizes the Supreme Court to “make rules governing the administration of all courts in the State and, subject to the law, the practice and procedure in all such courts. ”  N.J. State Const. art. VI, § II, ¶ 3.  It also grants the Supreme Court “jurisdiction over the admission to the practice of law and the discipline of persons admitted. ”  Id.  In short, “[t]his Court’s authority to regulate the legal profession is of constitutional dimension. ”  In re Supreme Court Advisory Comm. on Professional Ethics Op. No. 697, 188 N.J. 549, 554 (2006).  The Supreme Court established in Winberry v. Salisbury, 5 N.J. 240, 255 (1950) that “the rule-making power of the Supreme Court is not subject to overriding legislation, but that it is confined to practice, procedure and administration as such. ”  Stated differently, “the Supreme Court has exclusive and plenary power to promulgate rules governing practice and procedure in our courts, as distinguished from matters involving substantive law. ”  Siegler Co. v. Norton, 8 N.J. 374, 381 (1952).  Since Winberry, the Supreme Court has construed these constitutional provisions to grant it exclusive jurisdiction over the practice of law in this State.  See, e.g., Knight v. City of Margate, 86 N.J. 374, 387 (1981) (“The Court’s constitutional power over the judiciary and admission to the practice of law is not limited to adjudicating individual charges of alleged misconduct but extends as well --- 1
[brief] *Id.* at 174.  The stop of [...] in this case is unlike the routine traffic stops of *Baker*, *Courtney*, and *Rodriguez*, but it closely resembles the two-hour surveillance of *Smart*.  Just like Officer Taranto in *Smart* went to the condominium complex because it was known for drug transactions, 253 N.J. at 160, in this case [...], [...], and [...] went to the Wawa parking lot specifically “because it was known as an open air drug market” and “they went to that area with the expectation that there may be drug activity taking place.
[directive] Indexes  Bail Schedule 1 Crimes ........................................................................................................................................................................................................................ 2  Bail Schedule 2 Crimes ........................................................................................................................................................................................................................ 3  Bail Schedule 2 - Disorderly Persons Offenses and Petty Disorderly Persons Offenses -  These offenses may appear as lesser included offenses in Bail Schedule 2 and/or in the separate Bail Schedule 2 Disorderly Persons Section herein...........................................................................................................................................  9  Rules and Statutes Regarding Bail for Indictable Offenses  .................................................................................................................................................................  12  Rules and Statute Regarding Bail for Disorderly Persons/Petty Disorderly Persons Offenses  ...........................................................................................................  13  Summary of Rules and Statutes Regarding Bail for Indictable Offenses.............................................................................................................................................  14  Summary of Rules and Statute Regarding Bail for Non-Indictable Offenses - Disorderly Persons/Petty Disorderly Persons Offenses ..............................................  18  Bail Schedules ..................................................................................................................................................................................................................................
[brief] “For the purpose of testing the sufficiency of a pleading, allegations of time and place are material and shall be considered like all other allegations of material matter. ”  Thus, the absence of the date of when the Complaint was issued is a material fact.  R. 4:5-8(e) (Exhibit A) (Da2).  The absence of a material fact in the Complaint necessarily makes it void for lack of notice.  Additionally, because Defendant did not know the date the Complaint was issued, Defendant was unable to verify whether the 10 and 15 day timeline requirements specified in R. 4:5A-2 and R. 4:37-2(a) had been satisfied.  Defendant was thereby prevented from analyzing whether there were proper grounds for dismissal under 4:37-2(a) because the Complaint was undated.  C.
[brief] The court’s decision failed to hold the State to this burden, improperly shifting the burden to the defense to establish unreliability.  The State did not introduce testimony of experts, scientific literature, or persuasive judicial decisions to establish that forensic bone analysis was generally accepted as reliable in establishing the timing of injuries.  On the contrary, the only testimony regarding the scientific community’s view of the reliability of bone analysis to determine the timing of injuries was [...]’s testimony, which admitted that bone analysis was considered less reliable than the “gold standard” of soft tissue analysis for determining the timing of injuries.  (15T:49-2 to 25; 82-10 to 18)  Nonetheless, the court admitted the testimony based on an absence of evidence of unreliability.  The trial court failed to perform its gatekeeping function under Rule 702.  Properly applied, this standard is intended to be a high hurdle for the proponent to meet, because proof of general acceptance “can be elusive” and “entails the strict application of the scientific method, which requires an extraordinarily high level of proof based on prolonged, controlled, consistent, and validated experience.
[brief] [...]’s observations in the Walmart parking lot were the sole basis for both motor vehicle stops.  1T:45-4 to 45-9.  [...] and [...] stopped the Codefendant’s vehicle.  1T:26-19 to 27-1.  The Codefendant appeared nervous and advised that he met with Defendant to exchange money for a football pool.  1T:24-14 to 27-19; 1T:31-19 to 31-25.  The Codefendant was then asked for consent to search his person which was granted.  1T:27-14 to 27-19.  Located on Codefendant’s person was a plastic bag containing white powdery capsules, which field tested positive for cocaine but later tested negative for a controlled dangerous substance.  1T:27-21 to 28-1; 1T:30-15 to 30-22.  Accordingly, the charges pending against the Codefendant were subsequently dismissed.
[brief] \textsuperscript{13}  For the same reasons discussed in this section, if [...] is a “successful claimant,” the Court should respectfully exercise its discretion and deny an award of pre-judgment interest.  \textit{In re Estate of Lash}, 169 N.J. 20, 34 (2001).  Here, [...] voluntarily paid its portion of the settlement attributed to [...].  (TRVb1.)  [...] does not allege fraud, duress or extortion.  And there is no mistake of fact because [...] was aware of the Accident and that [...] had disclaimed a coverage obligation to [...] under the CCIP.
[brief] Therefore, I recommend opposing this argument was in furtherance of Plaintiffs’ RICO claims.  (39121a)¹⁵ c.  [...] Adopted the Special Master’s Remand R&Rs  [...] rejected the [...]’ objections to [...]’s comprehensive Reports and Recommendations finding, among other things: [...] conducted a rigorous and detailed analysis of the claimed fees and costs.  He fully explained why, even with the new limitations period set by the Appellate Division, the attorneys’ fees award should include fees incurred prior to the beginning of the limitation period.  As [...] recognized, the work performed by plaintiffs’ counsel prior to October 1, 2004, established the existence of the RICO claim and provided the evidence in support of plaintiffs’ RICO claim.
[directive] d.  Medical Appointments:  A defendant with regularly scheduled medical appointments should be permitted to leave the home for such appointments.  i.  These appointments should be explicitly delineated in the pretrial release order.  A defendant with sporadic appointments may not be a good candidate for HDLE.  Defendants who wish to leave the home for medical appointments not delineated in the court order must make application to the court via the “Request for Leave from Home Detention” form.
[brief] The FHACA rules set forth design and construction requirements for activities proposed in a channel.  N.J.A.C. 7:13-11.1.  For FHACA purposes, a channel is “a linear topographic depression” that “continuously or intermittently confines and/or conducts surface water” and can be either natural or manmade.  N.J.A.C. 7:13-1.2.  Where, as here, an applicant proposes crossing a channel, DEP must ensure that channel disturbances are “eliminated where possible” and “minimized” where the disturbance is “not possible to eliminate[.]”
[brief] While this is clearly what the Respondents hoped for, it would be definitively in violation of the MLUL’s powers delegated to land use boards.  See N.J.S.A. 40:55D-25 and 40:55D-70.  Additional speculation painted the trial court’s decision.  The trial court found that:  [U]nbeknownst to the Applicant, [the Mayor] resorted to surreptitiously authorizing publication of a press release that was posted to the Township’s official website to convey his sentiments utilizing the Township’s resources (which release, inferably, was likely email blasted as an E-Newsletter to all Township residents who subscribed to the website or otherwise taken from electorate lists).  M40.  Without any evidence in the record to support this claim, the trial court determined that a press release posted on the Township’s website was email blasted as an E-Newsletter to an indeterminate number of Township residents or otherwise taken from electorate lists.  This “inference” is doing a lot of work that should otherwise be done by factual evidence.  But without them, the end result does not sound nearly as nefarious.  No such evidence exists that these Nevertheless, the lower court proceeded to admonish the Appellants for imagined issues.
[brief] In March 2022, the [...] (the “Board”) approved [...]’s (“[...]”) preliminary and final major site plan application to construct a multi-family residential housing development consisting of fourteen residential dwelling units located in two duplex townhouse buildings, two carriage buildings, and two triplex townhouse buildings (the “Project”), on [...] on the Borough’s tax map (the “Property”) in the Borough.  The Project is part of a court-approved Mount Laurel settlement agreement between [...] and the Borough in the Borough’s Mount Laurel affordable housing case and the Property was specifically rezoned to allow for the Project.  The trial court subsequently affirmed the Board’s resolution of approval for the Project.
[brief] Additionally, the CFA provides that any person who suffers any ascertainable loss as a result of an unlawful practice in violation of the act is entitled to treble damages, plus reasonable attorneys’ fees, filing fees and reasonable costs of suit.  N.J.S.A. 56:8-19.  Alternatively, a victim of consumer fraud can recover reasonable attorneys’ fees, filing fees and costs if they can prove the defendant committed an unlawful practice, even if they cannot prove an ascertainable loss and cannot recover treble damages.
[brief] - **Louisiana:** Weams v. FCA US L.L.C., 2019 WL 960159, at *23 (M.D. La. Feb. 27, 2019) (“failure to recall is not a theory of liability under the” exclusive Louisiana product-liability statute) (automobile).  - **Massachusetts:** Ahern v. Sig Sauer, Inc., 2021 WL 5811795, at *4 (D. Mass. Dec. 7, 2021) (plaintiff “cites no legal duty to impose a mandatory recall”) (firearm); National Women’s Health Network, Inc. v. A.H. Robins Co., 545 F. Supp. 1177, 1181 (D. Mass. 1982) (“[n]o court has ever ordered a notification and recall campaign on the basis of state law”) (contraceptive device) (“[...]”).  - **Minnesota:** Kladivo v. Sportsstuff, Inc., 2008 WL 4933951, at *5 (D. Minn. Sept. 2, 2008) (“Minnesota courts have not recognized a cause of action for negligent recall”) (inflatable swimming tube); Hammes v. Yamaha Motor Corp., 2006 WL 1195907, at *11 (D. Minn. May 4, 2006) (“this Court declines to impose a separate duty to recall”) (motorcycle); Berczyk v. Emerson Tool Co., 291 F. Supp.2d 1004, 1016 (D. Minn. 2003) (“Minnesota would refuse to impose a duty on manufacturers to recall and/or retrofit a defective product because the overwhelming majority of other jurisdictions have rejected such an obligation”) (power saw).13 - **Mississippi:** Goodwin v. Premier Ford Lincoln Mercury, Inc., 2020 WL 3621317, at *4 n.2 (N.D. Miss. July 2, 2020) (“there is no post-sale duty to warn or recall in Mississippi”) (automobile); Clark v. General Motors, 2016 WL 3574408, at *7 (S.D. Miss. June 23, 2016) (same) (automobile); Murray v. General Motors, 2011 WL 52559, at *2 (S.D. Miss. Jan. 7, 2011) (plaintiffs “cannot show that [defendant] breached its duty by not recalling their vehicle”), aff’d, 478 F. Appx. 175 (5th Cir. 2012) (automobile).
[brief] The New Jersey Supreme Court’s *Laidlow* holding abrogated earlier cases, such as *New Jersey Mfrs. Ins. Co. v. Joseph Oat Corp.*, 287 N.J. Super. 190, 195-196 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 142 N.J. 515 (1995), that had relied on the outmoded conception that a “deliberate intention to injure” was the only way to satisfy the intentional wrong/substantial certainty test.  See *Charles Beseler*, 188 N.J. at 548 n. 2.
[brief] Based upon what it termed a lack of “credible or reliable” evidence supporting plaintiff’s cause of action, the motion judge concluded that the employer had a “legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the disciplinary or adverse employment action taken against [[...]]” (3T23:25-3T24:2) – and that “plaintiff has not been able to show any type of pretext or implausibilities in that explanation. ” (3T23:14-15).
[directive] This Matter having come before the Court upon request of seeking release of:  Expungement  Order ☐ Copy of Expungement Petition ☐ Sealed Record ☐ Other (list document type)  ☐  The Court being satisfied that the individual seeking the expunged or sealed records is the petitioner, It Is on This Day of , 20 , Ordered that a copy of the above documents shall be released to: .  s/ Date , Judge’s Signature.
[brief] (2T)  (Da 21-24)  The court merged conspiracy to commit robbery with the robbery charges, and unlawful possession of a handgun with possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose.  It imposed 15 year terms, with an 85% parole bar pursuant to the No Early Release Act (NERA), on the robbery counts, to run concurrently with each other; 40 year terms, subject to the NERA parole bar, for felony murder and knowing or purposeful murder, to run concurrently with each other but consecutively with the robberies; and a concurrent term of eight years with a four year period of parole ineligibility for unlawful possession of a handgun.  (2T:25-19 to 30-2)  [...] appealed.
[brief] That is a bridge too far.  As reflected in Footnote 1 to his report, [...] based his assumptions on the limited testimony of a fact witness, [...].  Pa 274.  [...] is a consultant who assists developers in applying for and obtaining low-income tax credits for affordable housing projects from the [...].  However, in the present case, [...] testified that he had only preliminary discussions with [...] regarding the [...] project, never reviewed any project documentation or evaluated [...]’s financials (Pa 1003, 26:4-27:4), and, thus, made no determination of whether [...] would be qualified to pursue an affordable housing deal (Id., 35:18-36:13).  Nor did [...] explore partnering Plaintiffs with an experienced affordable housing developer, as he had done for others.  (Id.).  [...]’s blind acceptance of Bershtein’s speculative testimony was reflected in his testimony at the Rule 104 hearing, where he conceded he did not know the following basic information:  - Whether [...] ever entered into a Retainer Agreement with Mr. [...] to provide professional services; - If Mr. [...] ever provided [...] with any documents pertinent to the Monroe project; - Whether [...] ever looked at whether there were any project plans for the development; - Whether Bershtein looked at any of Mr. [...]’s financial statements, tax returns or bank statements; - Whether Mr. [...] ever created the infrastructure, water, electric, roadways, parking lots, and signage for a new development; - Whether [...] ever owned construction equipment’ or - Whether [...] had the workforce on hand to develop the [...] project.