ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] SUBJECT: Directive  Creating the Office of Policing Strategy and Innovation  As New Jersey’s chief law enforcement officer, my principal responsibility is keeping New Jerseyans safe.  Every day, over 40,000 brave law enforcement officers, working in one of New Jersey’s over 530 law enforcement agencies, tirelessly pursue this mission.  New Jersey can take great pride in the fact that we have one of the best police forces in the nation.  Our officers are among the most highly trained in the country, and collectively our law enforcement community has set the bar for modern policing:  New Jersey’s law enforcement was among the first in the country to engage the use of body-worn cameras statewide; we have ushered in the most impactful police licensing law in the country; and our officers have, without reservation, embraced collaboration with mental health providers to bring ARRIVE Together to all twenty-one counties making New Jersey the first state in the country to have such a program in place statewide.  Our officers continue to serve with distinction and innovate even as our society continues to evolve making their jobs and duties to serve more complex.  To ensure that our officers have the resources and tools necessary so that the people of this state continue to be served by the best police agencies in the nation, we need a centralized office within the Department of Law and Public Safety (DLPS or the “Department”) with a core mission to promote excellence in policing.
[brief] There is equally no evidence that the $640,000 that [...] deposited into his and Defendant’s joint bank account between November 2013 and October 2015 was wrongfully obtained, that Defendant was even aware that the funds entered the account, or that she dispersed and used these funds for her own purposes (36T36-11 to -22, 37-5 to -9); see Westhoff v. Kerr S.S. Co., 219 N.J. Super. 316, 323 (App. Div. 1987).  As such, the trial court erred by finding that Defendant converted these funds solely because they were deposited into her and her husband’s joint account without evidence that the transfers were unauthorized and that Defendant had knowledge of them (Da00506-00512, Aff. Def. #s 1, 24-25, 44).
[brief] The issue in *Hana* was whether a consumer’s understanding of the similarity between two trademarks is a question that should be decided by a judge or a jury.  The Supreme Court held that “when the relevant question is how an ordinary person or community would make an assessment, the jury is generally the decision maker that ought to provide the fact-intensive answer. ”  *Id.* 422 (citations omitted).  The underlying issue involves the reasonable person standard – whether an employer’s action would have dissuaded a reasonable employee from filing or pursuing a claim and the issue should be decided by a jury following *Hana*.
[brief] (6T:41-16 to 42-18, 48-12 to 15)  (Da 16 at 17:29:32 to 17:31:22)  Although [...] admitted that he was “not paying attention” to [...] during the incident, he claimed that [...] was not trying to stop the altercation between [...] and the other men.  (6T:43-20 to 23, 90-3 to 16)  On cross-examination, [...] denied that [...] offered to pay [...] the small sum of money on [...]’s behalf in order “to calm things down.
[brief] STANDARD OF REVIEW  Pursuant to N.J. Const. art. VI, § 5, para. 4, the New Jersey Supreme Court has adopted R. 2:2-3(a)(2), which contemplates that every proceeding to review the action or inaction of a state administrative agency would be by appeal to the New Jersey Appellate Division.  Thus, the rule mandates the exclusive allocation to the Appellate Division of review of both final decisions or actions of any state administrative agency or officer, and the validity of any rule promulgated by such agency or officer.  R. 2:2-3(a)(2).  Vas v. Roberts, 418 N.J. Super. 509 (App. Div. 2011).  Under New Jersey Court Rules, appeals may be taken to the Appellate Division "to review final decisions or actions of any state administrative agency or officer[]"  R. 2:2-3(a)(2).  Appellate Courts do not render advisory opinions or function in the abstract.  N.J. Civil Serv. Ass'n v. State, 88 N.J. 605, 612 (1982).  The Appellate Court need not defer to the agency’s determination on purely legal issues.  "[A]lthough the determination of an administrative agency is entitled to deference, our appellate obligation requires more than a perfunctory review."  Blackwell v. Dep't of Corr., 348 N.J. Super. 117, 123 (App. Div. 2002).  The Court’s function is "to engage in 'a careful and principled consideration of the agency record and findings,'" and not merely rubberstamp the agency’s decision.  Williams v. Department of Corrections, 330 N.J. Super. 197, 204 (App. Div. 2000) (quoting *Mayflower Sec. Co. v. Bureau of Sec.*, 64 N.J. 85, 93 (1973)).  Final agency actions can be reversed if those actions are 'arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable or [if the action] is not supported by substantial credible evidence in the record as a whole.'"  *N.J. Soc'y for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v. N.J. Dep't of Agric.*, 196 N.J. 366, 384-85 (2008) (quoting *Henry v. Rahway State Prison*, 81 N.J. 571, 579-80 (1980)) (alteration in original).  The Supreme Court has observed that the Appellate Court can overturn an administrative agency's determinations or findings if there is a clear showing that (1) the agency did not follow the law; (2) the decision was arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable; or (3) the decision was not supported by substantial evidence.  *Bartley Healthcare Nursing & Rehab. v. New Jersey Dep't of Health & Senior Servs.*, 2011 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 329, 27-28 (App. Div. Feb. 15, 2011) citing *In re Virtua-West Jersey Hosp. Voorhees*, 194 N.J. 413, 422 (2008).  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I THE DECISION OF THE [...] WAS ARBITRARY, CAPRICIOUS, AND UNREASONABLE, AND SHOULD BE REVERSED.
[brief] Volume I  The Unpublished Opinion  *Hynes v. Gibson*, 2020 WL 4723742 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Aug. 14, 2020)  .................................................................Da1  INDEX TO ABBREVIATIONS OF TRIAL COURT TRANSCRIPTS  1T – Transcript of the June 5, 2023  Trial Date 2T – Transcript of the June 6, 2023  Trial Date 3T – Transcript of the June 7, 2023  Trial Date 4T – Transcript of the June 8, 2023  Trial Date 5T – Transcript of the June 9, 2023  Trial Date 6T – Transcript of the June 12, 2023  Trial Date 7T – Transcript of the June 15, 2023  Trial Date 8T – Transcript of the August 4, 2023 Motion Hearing ## TABLE OF CITATIONS  ### Case Law | Citation | Page | |------------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | Adamson v. Chiovaro, 308 N.J. Super. 70 (App. Div. 1998) | 28 | | Allendorf v. Kaiserman Enterprises, 266 N.J. Super. 662 (App. Div. 1993)| | | Baxter v. Fairmount Food Co., 74 N.J. 588 (1977) | 10, 11| | Brenman v. Demello, 191 N.J. 18 (2007) | 35 | | Caldwell v. Haynes, 136 N.J. 422 (1994) | 10, 11| | Camp v. Jiffy Lube, 309 N.J. Super. 305 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 156 N.J. 386 (1998) | 44 | | Caputzal v. Lindsay Co., 48 N.J. 69 (1966) | 45 | | Carey v. Lovett, 132 N.J. 44 (1993) | 10, 28| | Carrino v. Novotny, 78 N.J. 355 (1979) | 11 | | City of Long Branch v. Jui Yung Liu, 203 N.J. 464 (2010) | 29 | | Clohesy v. Food Circus Supermarkets, Inc., 149 N.J.
[brief] The elements of a claim for fraudulent concealment are set forth in Rosenblitt v. Zimmerman, 166 N.J. 391, 406-407 (2001) as follows:  (1)  That defendant in the fraudulent concealment action had a legal obligation to disclose evidence in connection with an existing or pending litigation; (2) That the evidence was material to the litigation; (3) That plaintiff could not reasonably have obtained access to the evidence from another source; (4) That defendant intentionally withheld, altered or destroyed the evidence with purpose to disrupt the litigation; (5)  That plaintiff was damaged in the underlying action by having to rely on an evidential record that did not contain the evidence defendant concealed.  The fact that the guest incident report “makes no mention of lighting or that the movie trailer failed to play as a factor in plaintiff’s fall” is not relevant to any of the elements of the fraudulent concealment claim.
[brief] The degree of reasonableness is dependent upon the totality of the circumstances.  See Moore v. Hafeeza, 212 N..J.Super 399 (Ch. Div. 1986).  Time for moving to vacate requires a court to account for concepts of public policy and equity.  M&D Associates. V. Mandara, 366 N.J.Super 341, 350 (App. Div. 2004).  Plaintiff relies upon Town of Phillipsburg v. Block 1608, 380 N.J. Super 159 (App. Div. 2005), for the proposition that the entry of a final judgment under the In Rem Act, N.J.S.A.54:5-104-64(a), “bars the right of redemption.
[brief] ”  Da95.  Moreover, the trial court opined that “reducing the rate of interest from 10% to 2.5% [i.e., the R. 4:42-11 rate] would turn this into free money for [...] to have used for what would be upward of 50 years or more. ”  Da96.  The trial court did not abuse its discretion.  Its award of post-judgment interest at the rate of 10% per annum was based on ample equitable justification and should be affirmed.
[brief] Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 US 471 (1972) requires due process at all stages of a criminal matter.  Whether any procedural protections are due depends on the extent to which an individual will be "condemned to suffer grievous loss."  Id. (internal citations omitted).  An appeal from a criminal conviction specifically requires a judgment order from which an appeal may be taken.  A signed order of judgment starts the appellate process.  The inability to have an invalid criminal conviction reversed is a grievous loss to a defendant that warranted procedural protections pursuant to Morrissey.  Plaintiff has no due process within the meaning of Morrissey related to his criminal matter because he had no signed order from which to take an appeal.
[brief] 16a-17a  Revised decision from [...] to [...] dated 2/9/23.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18a-20a  [...]-to-[...] letter dated 9/8/22.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  21a-22a  [...]-to-[...] letter dated 8/5/22.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  23a-24a  Employment Verification Form dated 7/16/01.
[brief] (Da264, Deed for [...]).  The deed for this purchase is located in Book 4539 at page 109 at the Essex County Recorder of Deeds.  (Da264, Deed for [...].  By way of history, [...] purchased the property identified as [...] from Julia and [...] on June 22, 1967.  (Da266, Deed from Popiel to Materna).  [...] has maintained the lot next to the church identified at Lot 20 which is [...] for the duration of ownership of the church which is 47 years.  (Da264, Deed from Materna to [...])  In the winter, snow removal is undertaken on this lot and in the spring and summer the maintenance of the grass is undertaken with the work being performed by parishioners.  (Da55, [...] Answers to Interrogatories, par. 24; Da125, Affidavit of [...], par. 9).  [...] placed a chain link fence around the space which is identified as Lot 20 and Lot 22 many years ago.  *(Da125, Affidavit of [...] par. 8; Da267, Picture of lots and Fence).*  About 30 years ago, [...] contracted with [...] ([...]) and had a light pole placed on Lot 20 by [...] and since that time, the monthly light bill for the lighting in Lot 20 have been paid by [...] with the cost for lot lighting included in their monthly billing from [...] which is noted as non-metered charges.  *(Da268, [...] Electric Bill for Church and Lot 20)*  The lot identified as Lot 20 is being referred to by [...] as Lot 22 in error.  [...] owned part of Lot 22 too.  *(Da262, Deed, Property Identification Record)*  The Reverend of [...] is [...] ([...]).
[brief] The record also reflects that the Board had adequate basis to find that Plaintiff failed to meet its burden of proof as to the second prong of the negative criteria.  Plaintiff failed to reconcile its proposed non-efficiency/non-garden apartment residential use with [...]’s Master Plan and Zoning Ordinance which omitted such types of residential units from those permitted in the B-3 Zone.  A municipality’s master plan is significant because its purpose is to guide the use of lands within the municipality in a manner which protects public health and safety and promotes the general welfare.  The role of the governing body is to enact zoning ordinances based on the master plan, more specifically, the land use element of the plan.  §22:6.  *Master plan and related activities*, 35 N.J. Prac., Local Government Law §22:6 (4th ed.).  The importance of the master plan can be seen from the fact that a municipality cannot adopt a zoning ordinance until it has adopted the land use plan and housing plan elements of the master plan.  Governing bodies are to provide for a re-examination of the master plan at least every 10 years.  Ibid; N.J.S.A. 40:55D-62; N.J.S.A. 40:55D-89.  Plaintiff argues that permitting the construction of its proposed building containing non-efficiency/non-garden apartment units on Lot 5 would not be inconsistent with [...]’s Master Plan or Zoning Ordinance.  However, the Board disagreed.  As aforesaid, the law does not mandate that a municipal board accepts face value all the evidence presented by an applicant.  The Board gave clear bases for its conclusion that Plaintiff had not shown, with sufficient and enhanced proofs, that the grant of a use variance for the project would not run counter to the intent and purpose of [...]’s Master Plan and Zoning Ordinance restricting residential units in the B-3 Zone to efficiency and garden apartments:
[brief] Though “due process requires only ‘notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them the opportunity to present their objections,” “[i]t is the failure to give such notice that ‘violates the most rudimentary demands of due process of law. ’”  *Wohlegmuth*, 302 N.J. Super. at 313 (quoting *Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.*, 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950) (internal citations omitted); *Peralta*, 485 U.S. at 84; *Armstrong v. Manzo*, 380 U.S. 545, 550 (1965)).
[brief] (Da7; 11T25-23 to 26-2; 11T27-5 to 12).  As to the certain persons conviction in [...], the judge sentenced defendant to a term of ten years in prison, with a five-year period of parole ineligibility, followed by three years of parole supervision.  (Da10; 11T26-16 to 22).  The judge ordered the sentence in [...] to run concurrently to [...].  (Da11 to 12; 11T27-25 to 28-6).  The court also imposed the appropriate fines and penalties for each offense.  (Da8 to 12).  On April 27, 2023, defendant filed a Notice of Appeal.  An amended Notice of Appeal subsequently was filed on May 11, 2023.  (Da13 to 17).  This appeal follows.
[brief] Appellants have attempted to argue that the trial court overlooked “twenty-eight” defectively e-filed exhibits that included, according to Appellants, deposition testimony by [...] to the effect that [...] misrepresented the identity of the person who was allegedly an “imposter” of [...] at the alleged meeting at [...].  Suffice it to say that [...] gave no such testimony.  During his deposition, [...] was pressed to recount every word that was allegedly spoken by [...] at the alleged meeting and, in response, he testified as follows:  Q: Did [...] say he was the attorney for [...]?  A: Yes.  ***  Q:  Did – aside from saying he was the attorney for [...], did [...] say anything else at the meeting?  A: I don’t recall….The only thing I do recall, we discussed a little bit about Pork Chop Hill and that was it.  ***  Q: Do you remember who did the talking on that subject?  A: [...] and [...].  Q: What did [...] say?  A: I don’t remember.  264a (emphasis added).  The trial court took this testimony into account, properly concluded that [...] never said what Appellants portrayed him as having said, and correctly determined that Appellants failed to show anything in the twenty-eight defectively filed exhibits that would be capable of creating a genuine issue of material fact. 7T78:14-81:13.
[brief] (Not Raised Below)  The jury’s determination of the critical question – was [...] the person seen on the surveillance footage wearing the NASA jacket and red sneakers? – hinged on whether the jury believed [...]’s trial testimony.  To determine the credibility of [...]’s testimony, the jury was instructed on factors that affect witness credibility in general, e.g., the witness’s demeanor and interest in the outcome of case, and whether the witness made any inconsistent or contradictory statements.  It was also instructed that it may consider [...]’s prior conviction for robbery in assessing his credibility.
[brief] Although the jury rejected almost all of the State’s theory of the case, the jury still had to decide between two possible versions of events.  In one version, [...] stabbed [...] in self-defense and believed she had killed him.  She later hit him with the tire iron because, although she believed him to be dead, she saw him move and hit him reflexively.  If the jury credited this testimony, the stabbing was not a crime because it was justified by self-defense, and hitting [...] with the tire iron was not a crime because [...] was already dead.
[brief] Pressler & Verniero, *Current N. J. Court Rules*, comment R. 2:2-3 at 451 (Gann 2024) | Date | Order Description | Reference | |--------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------| | January 4, 2024 | Consent Order by Hon. [...], J.S.C. directing parties to arbitration and staying case for 120 days | Pa162 | | May 24, 2024 | Order by Hon. [...], J.S.C. denying [...]’s Motion to Stay Case | Dr44 | | June 20, 2024 | Order by Hon. [...], J.S.C. denying Plaintiffs’ Motion to Vacate Arbitration Order and Invalidate Unenforceable Contract Provisions of Defendant, [...] Corporation’s contract | Pa253 | | August 16, 2024 | Order by Hon. [...], J.S.C. denying [...]’s Motion to Reconsider the May 24, 2024 Order | Pra270 | | August 16, 2024 | Order by Hon. [...], J.S.C. denying [...]’s Motion to Stay Case | Dr67 | | November 8, 2024 | Order by Hon. [...], J.S.C. denying [...]’s Motion to Remove from [court]
[brief] N.J.S.A. 2C:5-1(a)(1)  Db2  N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(1)  Db2  N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(1)  Db2  N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(a)(1)  Db2  N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b)(1)  Db2  N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(c)  Db3  RULES OF COURT R. 3:18-1 Db16  NEW JERSEY RULES OF EVIDENCE  N.J.R.E. 403 Db11  N.J.R.E. 803(e)  Db13  N.J.R.E. 901 Db13, Db15  RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT RPC  3.7(a)  Db16  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT  Who shot [...]?
[brief] [...] – Dangerous Condition & Proximate Cause  Similarly, [...] argues that [...]’s opinions lack foundation.  For all the reasons already mentioned above, [...] is wrong.  [...] ignores the core evidence that supports [...]’s opinions.  Rather than addressing the evidence that supports [...]’s opinions, [...] attempts to distract this Court with other documents provided by [...] at [...]’s request.  [...] then isolates portions of [...]’s responses during cross-examination in an attempt to show that these additional documents do not support that the condition was dangerous.  However, even if [...] feels it “gained points” during cross-examination, there is nothing in [...]’s opposition that changes the fact that [...]’s opinions are supported by the core evidence in the record.  For example, [...] had a responsibility to inspect and identify settlement and elevation changes in the travel portion of the Parkway.  (Pa0678 at 20:15 to Pa0679 21:1-7).  The fact that the Defendants were actively looking for these types of conditions in order to fix them or warn against them creates the inference that these types conditions, if left uncorrected, are dangerous to users of the roadway.  Also, both the Biennial Bridge inspection and the T&M memo establish that the condition existed in the southbound left lane of travel at the northern bridge abutment joint and that the condition needed to be fixed. (Pa1343); (Pa1191).  The fair inference here is that, since the settlement was flagged for repair, the settlement was dangerous to users of the roadway.  Finally, and perhaps the most obvious example, [...] engineer [...] looked at the picture of the condition provided by Plaintiff and testified that it would have been dangerous to users of the roadway.  (Pa0801).  Accordingly, for [...] to suggest that other documents or a limited portion of [...]’s testimony on cross-examination, somehow negates the credibility of all the other evidence, ignores the requirements that apply to summary judgment motions.  Nevertheless, even without [...]’s testimony, the aforementioned evidence provides an independent basis for Plaintiffs to prove that the condition that caused Plaintiff’s accident was dangerous.  (4)
[brief] However, the surprises continued.  In April 2020, Plaintiff found out about Defendant’s sister’s engagement to someone outside their caste.  While plaintiff’s family does not discriminate, this engagement was unexpected because he had been told prior to his engagement that the sister would not be getting engaged outside of their caste.  The sister’s engagement only proceeded after Plaintiff agreed to marry Defendant.  In addition, Plaintiff learned about Defendant’s brother’s divorce and remarriage, which is not viewed favorably in his family’s culture.  Plaintiff felt deceived that the revelation of the brother’s divorce and remarriage occurred only after his own commitment and engagement to Defendant.  (1T68-69).  But it was too late, as he was already engaged in February 2020 in front of around 400 of his own family and breaking an engagement would not be viewed favorably in the culture and traditions of his family.
[brief] A.  Plaintiff Served as a Staffing Coordinator for Defendant [...].  Plaintiff began her employment with Defendant [...] in 2010 and worked in the staffing office from 2019 until her termination.  (Pa27).  Staffing coordinators are responsible for a variety of tasks, including the printing and distribution of daily staff sheets, assigning hospital staff, reviewing payroll entries, maintaining call logs, answering phone calls from hospital staff related to payroll, and assisting the nursing supervisor with staffing.  (Pa28).  Plaintiff reported directly to Defendant [...], who at the time served as the Lead Administrative Nursing Supervisor.  (Pa26 – Pa27).  At all times relevant to this litigation, Plaintiff was one of approximately six staffing coordinators, including her former co-workers [...] (“[...]”) and [...] (“[...]”).  (Pa27 – Pa28).  Neither [...] nor [...] had ever been disciplined by Defendants prior to their eventual termination.  (Pa656).  Similarly, Plaintiff’s job performance was described as “very good” by Defendant [...].  (Pa656).  B.