ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] See Knorr, 178 N.J. at 178 (2003) (“to establish equitable estoppel, plaintiffs must show that defendant engaged in conduct, either intentionally or under circumstances that induced reliance, and that plaintiffs acted or changed their position to their detriment. ”).  Plaintiff does not dispute that it waited more than three years since the bankruptcy preference action was filed against it and more than one year after it voluntarily settled with the action with the bankruptcy trustee, to bring a foreclosure action asking the Foreclosure Court to revive a discharge of mortgage.  Plaintiff does not dispute that it issued a Second Mortgage while in the midst of the bankruptcy litigation that it seeks to use to revive a discharged mortgage and further use as a default under the cross-collateralization clause of the Second Mortgage.  As stated by the Foreclosure Court, Plaintiff slept on its rights.  (Pa 97).  Plaintiff relies on the entire controversy doctrine to argue that all claims should be brought before the court together.  While this may be true in theory, it is simply inapplicable here.  The entire controversy doctrine does not create law or new claims and certainly does not explain what caselaw Plaintiff relies upon to argue that a discharged mortgage can be revived and automatically go into default due to a bankruptcy preference action filed years after the Plaintiff received all the mortgage payments and prepared and recorded a discharge of mortgage.  Plaintiff has no claim.  If Plaintiff is concerned with judicial economy, Plaintiff could have sued Defendants in the bankruptcy court but failed to do so.  At this juncture it is simply too late for the Plaintiff to foreclose upon a discharged mortgage which would cause undue prejudice to Defendants.
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[directive] Guideline 5(a) provides that the hearing for a final extreme risk protective order will be scheduled to be held in the Superior Court within 10 days after the petition is filed.  The actual hearing date could be adjusted to allow sufficient time for the respondent to be served with the petition and temporary order or to prepare for the hearing.  At the hearing, the respondent shall be afforded the right to testify, to present witnesses, to submit documents, to cross-examine any who may appear at the hearing, and to present information.  See Guideline 5(c).  The witnesses court will consider all relevant information, including the factors listed in Guideline 3(d), as well as any information provided by the county prosecutor or designee pursuant to Guideline 5(e).  A final extreme risk protective order will be ordered by the court upon a finding by a preponderance of evidence that the respondent poses a significant danger of bodily injury to self or others by owning, possessing, purchasing, or receiving a firearm.  Specifically, the final extreme risk protective order shall prohibit the respondent from owning, purchasing, possessing, or receiving firearms or ammunition, or from securing or holding a firearms purchaser identification card or permit to purchase a handgun pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:58-3, or a permit to carry a handgun pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:58-4 during the period that the order is in effect.  Additionally, the respondent will be ordered to surrender to law enforcement any firearms or ammunition that the respondent possesses or owns, and any firearms purchaser identification card, permit to purchase a handgun, or permit to carry a handgun held by the respondent.
[brief] The court thus was warning that it would not tolerate contentious litigation arising from the production of irrelevant documents—a problem the ESI Order itself creates.  And while the court also sought to avoid the “contentious litigation” over relevance that had arisen in other cases, it is clear in context that the court was not crafting a special protocol uniquely tailored to avoid such disputes in this case.  Its explicit point—repeated throughout—was that because ESI is voluminous and thus always potentially susceptible to more relevance disputes, it is always necessary to allow the requesting party to conduct its own relevance review, even if the Rules provide otherwise for the “old days” of paper discovery.  The court’s policy-driven view that relevance should not be the touchstone of ESI discovery is wrong for the policy reasons articulated by Amici.  Even more importantly, it is demonstrably contrary to the Rules themselves, and this Court “will not defer to a determination based on an incorrect view of the law. ”  [...], Current N.J. Court Rules, cmt. 1 on R. 4:10-2(a) (2024); see Rivers v. LSC P’ship, 378 N.J. Super. 68, 80 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 185 N.J. 296 (2005).  As Defendants have always maintained, trial courts are afforded considerable discretion within the boundaries fixed by the Supreme Court in Rule 4:10-2(a).  Courts do have authority to mandate special discovery protocols in any case (not just ESI cases) response to demonstrated “malfeasance,” Db29-30, but the court found no such malfeasance here.  And Plaintiffs’ response to Amici cites no precedent suggesting that the speculative prospect of “contentious litigation” over discovery by itself justifies prohibiting relevance reviews whenever ESI discovery is involved.  Amici are rightly concerned that if this Court sanctions the trial court’s view of the policies and law governing ESI discovery, it would eliminate the relevancy touchstone for ESI discovery, to the detriment of every litigant in New Jersey’s courts that conducts business electronically and produces vast amounts of ESI.  **CONCLUSION**
[brief] Indeed, the Trial Court’s August 9, 2022 Order (M477) notes that Defendants raised objections to the text of the Resolution before both the SHO and the Trial Court.  Specifically, following the March 24 and 25, 2022 public hearings on Plaintiffs’ Site Plan Application, after Defendants put on their own case through expert testimony, the SHO prepared and circulated a draft Resolution for comments by the parties.  By separate letters to the Trial Court dated May 31, 2022, the [...] and [...] provided comments and objections to the SHO regarding the draft Resolution.  M127.  The [...] also provided comments by letter dated June 22, 2022.  M136.  At no time did Defendants request a “hearing” before the Trial Court as permitted by R. 4:41-5(b).  Further, the rule cited by Defendants requires that the Trial Court accept the findings of a master unless those findings are contrary to the weight of the evidence.  As set forth above, the SHO provided detailed support for his findings; the Defendants have not argued otherwise.  Defendants were afforded full due process and every opportunity to make their objections known with regard to both the hearing on the Site Plan Application and the Trial Court’s adoption of the SHO’s Resolution granting the Site Plan Application.
[brief] (2)  Upon learning of the existence of the pre-existing conditions and records, [...] failed to prepare an amended report to address them.  (2T36:8-23).  [...] prepared an addendum to his narrative report specifically addressing Petitioner’s prior records and the incidents, injuries, treatment and MRI results they contain.  (Pa173-174).  (3)  At the OAL hearing, [...] admitted his failure to address Petitioner’s pre-existing injuries in his report, and was nevertheless questioned about them as if they were “hypothetical” events.  (2T19:24-21:20).  In this context, [...] dismissed Petitioner’s prior incidents and cervical injuries as “remote” noting that Petitioner appeared to be asymptomatic until 2015 (2T22:3-23:6).  [...] testified in detail at the hearing about Petitioner’s well documented pre-existing cervical injuries, including that:
[directive] See e.g. State v. Taylor, 49 N.J. 440 (1967) (State has the duty to disclose a promise or agreement to recommend a specific sentence or leniency for the accomplice who is testifying for the State); State v. Satkin, 127 N.J. Super. 306 (App. Div. 1974) (State at the time of trial must reveal the existence of a promise or recommendation of leniency made to a material witness; a promise of leniency is not prosecutor’s work product protected from disclosure under R.
[brief] Plaintiff failed to highlight.  In account statements from October, 2016 through September, 2018, Plaintiff provided APRs for Purchases and Cash Advances.  Exhibits D (Da55), E (Da57), F (Da59), G (Da61), H (Da63), I (Da65), and J (Da67).  However, the font used to provide the APRs is no different than the font used in other words and numbers in the text.  Thus, there is no “Highlighting” as the Heading of 12 CFR Section 1026.6(b)(1)(i) requires.  There is nothing conspicuous about the APR, as Regulation Z, page 14, requires.  Because Plaintiff did not “Highlight”, emphasize nor conspicuously disclose the APRs by distinguishing them from the rest of the text and numbers, it deprived Defendant of the rights granted under 12 CFR Section 1026.6(b)(1)(i) for the entire period from October, 2016 through September, 2018.  A visual inspection by the lower Court of Defendant’s Exhibits D through Y (Da55 through Da97), would have revealed the incontrovertible fact that there is no clear and concise heading for credit counseling and debt management services.
[brief] 1T60-11 – 1T61-13.  Despite recognizing that the trial court should be reviewing the County’s action for whether it was arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable, and that refusal to waive would have been appropriate if it was an exercise of sound business judgment, the trial court did not discuss the failure of the County to act on that issue at all.  1T60-11 – 1T61-13.
[brief] ” (3T18-4 to 3T19-9).  Specifically, [...] cut the hourly rates of [...], Esq. and [...], Esq. from $570.00 and $530.00, respectively, to $425.00, the hourly rate of [...], Esq. from $395.00 to $325.00 and the hourly rate of paralegal [...] from $295 to $200.  (3T18-4 to 3T19-9; Pa47-51, 119-120).  In so doing, [...] stated the following:
[brief] The plaintiff has also had to be evacuated from the building using the stairwell in case of emergencies; his current location forces him to navigate more than one floor.  The plaintiff has also requested that defendant [...] develop a 504 plan for the plaintiff which request [...] has refused; plaintiff is the only employee for whom a 504 plan has not been prepared once requested.  No reasonable justification has been provided by the defendants for the relocation or refusal to accommodate the plaintiff’s disability.  See Clarke v. Atlantic City Bd. Of Educ. at *5.
[directive] Confidentiality  The Civilian Review Board must establish and adhere to written policies and procedural safeguards to preserve the confidentiality of internal affairs records and other confidential information, which shall include at least the following requirements:  (1)  Closed sessions for reviews or investigations.  The Board must be in a closed session whenever the content of internal affairs records are discussed or testimony or other evidence regarding a specific incident is presented.  (2)  Protection of internal affairs information.  No part of any internal affairs file may be disclosed by the Civilian Review Board under any circumstances to any person who is not a Board member or employee, the law enforcement executive, or a member of the law enforcement agency’s internal affairs function, except in a final public report appropriately redacted in accordance with instructions from the law enforcement executive.  This prohibition on disclosure includes any statement made by police officers to law enforcement investigators under the provisions of Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967).  (3)  Personal identifiers.  Even in the Civilian Review Board’s final public report, the Board may not disclose the personal identity of subject officers, complainants, or witnesses.
[brief] But that case rejected, among other claims, a due process challenge to the Council’s composition, finding that “sufficient safeguards exist to prevent an arbitrary concentration of power . . . motivated by self interest. ”  Humane Soc’y, 70 N.J. at 579.  Not only is the private nondelegation doctrine grounded in due process principles, see Ridgefield Park, 78 N.J. at 163-64, but the argument Humane Society decisively rejected is virtually the same theory [...] presses here.  For another, [...] claims the Council is unique and distinguishable from “professional licensing boards cited by the defendants” because those boards “regulate themselves and not the public in general. ” (Pb20).  But even if that characterization of other licensing boards was correct, it cannot overcome the clear findings in case law that the Council’s power is appropriately limited.  Finally, the nondelegation cases [...] cites do not support his claims.  See (Pb30-32); see also N.J. Dep’t of Transp. Div. of Aeronautics v. Brzoska, 139 N.J. Super. 510, 513 (App. Div. 1976) (invalidating authorization of private airport owners to grant licenses to flight instructors because there were no legislative standards or safeguards in place); N.J. State Firemen’s Mut. Benv. Ass’n v. North Hudson Reg’l Fire & Rescue, 340 N.J. Super. 577, 594 (App. Div. 2001) (invalidating authorization of private organization to grant convention leave because there were no legislative standards or safeguards in place).  In sum, the court below properly dismissed the Complaint for failure to state a claim and correctly rejected [...]’s cross-motion for summary judgment.  **CONCLUSION**
[brief] B.  UNFULFILLED CONDITION PRECEDENT IN THIS CONTRACT RENDERS THE CONTRACT UNENFORCEABLE AND BRINGS INTO QUESTION  WHETHER A CONTRACT EVEN EXISTS (Pa0245)  Defendants raised the issue of condition precedent below in the Trial Court following the close of Plaintiff’s case.  5T7.  In the event that the Appellate Court reverses the Trial Court's decision, Defendants then seek to preserve this issue herein.  If a condition is construed to be a condition precedent, there is no binding contract until the condition is satisfied.  *Purich v. Weininger*, 72 N.J. Super 344, (App. Div. 1962)  Executory contracts are contracts that have obligations not yet completed.  In this case at bar, the Plaintiff has recited a number of events that Defendants have not performed: that documents were not turned over to Plaintiff, that vital information not turned over to Plaintiff, that detailed environmental work was not done, that an RIR was not valid, that an RAO not performed, and so on.  Plaintiff posits that critical regulatory obligations were not performed or improperly performed.  Plaintiff continues to insist that it is Defendants’ obligation to secure an RAO.  They have taken the position throughout this litigation that, absent affirmative action by Defendants to obtain an RAO, they are not obliged to close on the property.  They have made this a condition precedent to their obligation to close.
[brief] (36T 47:18 to 48:4; 50:6-9).  The trial court also found that the defendants breached their obligations under the [...] and [...], the [...] and the [...].  (36T 50:18-25; 51:10-19; 37T 87:20 to 88:4; 89:5-11).  Moreover, the trial court found that the defendants breached the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, which included claims under the [...], the [...], the [...], and the [...].  (36T 51:19-21; 37T 95:24 to
[brief] The Motion Judge erred in his restrictive reading of United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012) and its progeny [and related State constitutional principles] and the Federal Supreme Court’s complementary common law trespassing prohibitions to justify the State Police entry onto the premises (driveway, i.e. curtilage) of [...] to install a GPS tracking device on one of the Defendant’s vehicles:  (A)  The Motion Judge confused and conflated the State and Federal warrant requirement by equating a Communications Data Warrant (CDW) authorizing installation of the GPS device on vehicles with a Search Warrant authorizing entry onto and into the premises of a residence; (B)  The Motion Judge also erred in characterizing the driveway, although encompassed within the concept of curtilage, as an implied invitation to “[t]he UPS guy, the Amazon guy” and law enforcement to “walk up that driveway”.  The Judge failed to appreciate the limits of the third-party intervention doctrine as a deviation during a “walk up that driveway” to then affix a GPS device on a vehicle by law enforcement exceeds any implicit invitation to the public to walk up and knock at one’s door, see State v. Wright, 221 N.J. 456 at 477 (2015), Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409 at 1415 (2013), Collins v. Virginia, 138 S.Ct. 1603 (2018).  [See 11/1/23 and 5/30/24 bench opinions at T2 and T3, respectively]  (C)  The Motion Judge failed to address the additional “invasion of one’s reasonable expectation of privacy” argument, based on Jones and Katz v. United States, 88 S.Ct. 507 (1967)  [see Brief on Reconsideration Motion at Da25-30]  POINT  II  When, if ever, is a CDW sufficient to authorize entry onto private property [or into a home] to install a GPS tracking or recording device which does not invade one’s reasonable expectation of privacy, and, When, if ever, under federal and State constitutional protections, does a driveway adjacent to one’s home allow unauthorized and warrantless entry for government agents to engage in any conduct other than that accorded to a “plumber, dinner guest, or a landlord”, State v. Wright, 221 N.J. 456 at 477 (2015).
[brief] To avoid this, he added, it must be presumed as a matter of law conclusively that, “common sense and experience dictate that a consumer’s use of a bank account is governed by an agreement between the consumer and the bank” (1T 23-2 to 23-4).  The court at oral argument seemed to adopt this view:  “The courts view of the law is an individual signing a document that has something to do with a bank account at a financial institution is reasonably charged with understanding what he is signing (1T 27-5 to 27-17).
[brief] Pa112.  [...]’s own appraiser also concluded that there was a reasonable probability of zoning approvals on the date of valuation.\footnote{[...]’s most recent appraisal was authored by [...], MAI.  [...]’s appraisal applies the outdated R-2 zoning, but – significantly - also concludes that “there is a reasonable probability of a zone change or variance(s) to allow the subject property to be developed at a density of 200 units per acre, with the inclusion of affordable housing units. ”  Pa80-Pa81.}  Pa80-Pa81.  Out the outset of his analysis, [...] opined that the Property, “from a market standpoint, involves a transit-oriented development (“TOD”) site located in Jersey City’s Gold Coast market area, ideally linked to public transportation.
[brief] Franklin, 184 N.J. at 534 (“That a defendant possessed a gun during the commission of a crime is a fact that must be presented to a grand jury and found by a petit jury beyond a reasonable doubt if the court intends to rely on it to impose a sentence exceeding the statutory maximum. ”); State v. Fortin, 178 N.J. 540, 646 (2004) (“We, therefore, hold that our State Constitution requires that aggravating factors be submitted to the grand jury and returned in an indictment. ”).  Thus, the factual findings which must be determined by a petit jury pursuant to *Erlinger* -- whether the defendant’s predicate convictions were committed at different times and within the requisite ten-year period -- must also be submitted to the grand jury and included in the indictment.
[brief] PLAINTIFF HAS NOT OFFERED ANY EVIDENCE THAT THE DEFENDANT FAILED TO COMPLY WITH THE POSTED SPEED LIMIT**  Plaintiff’s argument that Defendant failed to heed the posted speed is also unavailing here.  There is no citation to the evidence in this case or any basis in fact that there was any such violation.  Nothing in Plaintiff’s testimony or answers to interrogatories suggest that speed was ever an issue in the case.  In fact, Plaintiff testified that once she began moving after being stopped at the red light, she did not see [...]’s vehicle prior to the impact.  **Pa 50:21-25. **  Therefore, other than being at a full stop, she has no first-hand knowledge of [...]’s speed and that argument should be disregarded.  The Court below was correct in deciding that there was no evidence that “Defendant has done anything other than operate his vehicle in the manner in which he’s expected to in the State of New Jersey.  There is nothing that suggests that he had a duty to do anything different from what he did.  There is nothing in the record that suggests he was negligent . . . in the means in which he was operating the vehicle. ”  1T15:25, 1T16:1-10.  CONCLUSION
[brief] 246 N.J. at 268.  That is precisely what [...] did here, explaining at great length why the sentence was fair.  He acknowledged that the victim’s family might not think the sentence was fair, but that the question of fairness focused on the defendant, not the victim.  (18T101-8 to 15).  He recognized that, even if he re-imposed the original twenty-year sentence (which he did not), defendant would be under 40 years’ old when he was paroled.6 (18T101-16 to 20).  [...] therefore found the sentence was not unfair given the gravity of the crimes, including defendant’s separate decisions to get a gun for one purpose and to point that gun and pull the trigger hours later for another reason.  (18T101-25 to 104-14).  While defendant may disagree with [...]’s assessment, to say that this statement did not comply with the dictates of Torres disregards the judge’s detailed and thoughtful explanation of his reasons for imposing consecutive sentences.7 --- 6
[brief] 47  A NEW TRIAL IS WARRANTED BASED UPON THE COURT’S COMMENTS AND INTERRUPTIONS DURING DR. SANTINA’S EXPERT TESTIMONY (Not Raised Below)  .................................................................  47  a.  [...] was Prejudiced  During his Trial because during the Defense Expert’s testimony, the Court consistently interrupted the Defense Expert and did not Interrupt the State’s Expert in the Same Fashion (Not Raised Below)  ...........................................47  b.  The Court Prejudiced [...] by Allowing [...] to Testify about the Legal Definition of Insanity (17T:100-14 to 109-13)  ..................................................................................................................52  POINT V .................................................................................................................................55
[brief] The preliminary injunction directed Appellants “to preserve the status quo ante prior to the adoption of Amended Policy 5756, until such time as the litigation before [[...]] arising from a separate administrative complaint filed on June 21, 2023 is resolved. ”  (Da116).  But the trial court went no further than maintaining the status quo: the court emphasized that it was “not rendering any final judgments or determinations as to the merits of either the State or the School Boards’ claims,” which would “be left to the sound determination of the [...] after a full development of the factual and legal record in that matter.