ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] During the course of discovery in this matter and three years after the dismissal with prejudice of [...], it was discovered that [...] was the Sole Member of [...].  570a; 622a; 625a–627a.  Plaintiffs discovered a [...] Mortgage (“Mortgage”) dated May 7, 2008, executed by [...] as Sole Member of [...].  570a.  In opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion to Vacate the Order of November 10, 2016, filed as a result of this discovery, [...] presented a certain Collateral Assignment (96a) to the Trial Court and represented that “a debt owed from Teddy [...] to Nicholas [...] in the amount of $250,000.00.  . . . was [memorialized] in an assignment between Nicholas and Teddy [...] (Exhibit “S”).  One of the consequences to that assignment required Nicholas [...] to sign certain mortgage documents .  . . .”  52a.  In August 2019, after continued obstructionist tactics by [...] despite the Trial Court’s Orders of May 24, 2019 (293a–296a), checks were uncovered that proved the Collateral Assignment, assuming arguendo it was ever real, was extinguished long before May 7, 2008.  625a–627a.  The alleged subject $250,000.00 debt of the Collateral Assignment was more than paid by January 10, 2008, since from May 4, 2007 to January 10, 2008, funds were transferred via account-to-account transfers from the [...] bank account to [...]’s personal bank account totaling $151,107.41, and two [...] checks totaling $152,000.00, made payable to [...] were deposited into [...]’ personal bank account, amounting to $302,107.41.  625a–627a; 645a–650a.  In addition, after continued obstructionist tactics by [...], in November 2019, Plaintiffs discovered an Affidavit of Title related to the Mortgage, identifying [...] as the Sole Member of [...].  622a.  Thus, [...] executed the Mortgage and related required Affidavit of Title as the Sole Member of [...] because [...] was the Sole Member of [...], as the Collateral Assignment had been extinguished by January 10, 2008  570a; 622a; 625a–627a.  **[...]’s Role in [...]**
[brief] 2T259:2-3.  Plaintiff’s expert [...], opined that [...] asphyxiated on his own respiratory secretions because there was not appropriate care to remove those secretions.  6T99:6-10.  His cause of death was respiratory failure due to mucus plugging.  6T99:12-18.  The respiratory therapist for defendant, [...], agreed that mucus plugging could lead to rapid respiratory failure that could lead to death due to asphyxiation.  3T227:13-16.  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I EVIDENTIARY ERRORS REGARDING LIABILITY WARRANT
[brief] And although [...] incorrectly believes that the trial court’s ECD ruling should be reviewed for “abuse of discretion,” Opp. at 14, “[t]he application of res judicata and the entire controversy doctrine are questions of law and, accordingly, we review those issues de novo. ”  *Mansour v. Chiacchio*, 2022 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 330, at *10 (App. Div. 2022).  [...]’s contention that it completed “the Hackensack Project under a completely separate agreement with a separate and substantively different dispute resolution provision” is demonstrably inaccurate, as the *global* PTA expressly subsumed, pursuant to Section 1.5(b), several different completion subcontracts, which included the Hackensack Project Completion Subcontract.
[directive] Prosecutor F.  Notification to County of an officer,  In the event (1) a positive drug test by (2) a refusal by an officer to take the or administration of reasonable suspicion to an officer, drug test, (3) a drug test the law enforcement chief or a designee shall agency's executive provide a confidential written notice to within their County Prosecutor or his/her designee 10 days.  Upon completion of any disciplinary Prosecutor action, each agency shall report the discipline to the County or designee.  year, every By December of each law enforcement agency shall provide written 31st Prosecutor or his/her designee of notice their County of the dates testing conducted during the to prior total number of sworn officers employed by the agency, the total of sworn year, the number of sworn officers officers tested, and the total number who tested positive.
[brief] \(^2\) --- \(^2\)  It is not surprising that the exact same theory was considered in *Asmad-Escobar* as the same attorneys representing the plaintiff in *Asmad-Escobar*  The decisions looked — as is required when engaging in statutory interpretation — to the intent of the legislature when enacting the FDCPA and held:  [T]he trial judge correctly examined legislative intent to determine whether the alleged conduct violated the FDCPA.  . .  Plaintiff's complaint is premised on a conclusory allegation that defendants' use of a letter vendor to create a debt collection letter was, in and of itself, abusive, deceptive or unfair.  We concur with the trial judge’s findings that the use of a letter vendor was not abusive, deceptive, or unfair and was not the type of conduct that Congress was interested in preventing when it enacted the FDCPA.  When viewing plaintiff’s complaint and providing him every reasonable inference of fact, because plaintiff was unable to “genuinely allege” any facts about [the defendant’s] conduct that violated the FDCPA, we determine the trial court properly dismissed his complaint.
[brief] The standard is “simply a finding of error. ”  *Cox, William M., N.J. Zoning and Land Use Administration*, § 42-2.1 at p. 619 (Gann 2024 Ed.).  And while the court should not substitute its judgment for the board’s, *Rocky Hill Citizens v. Planning Board*, 406 N.J. Super. 384, 411-412 (App. Div. 2009), the court’s review is “not simply a pro forma exercise in which [the court] rubber stamp[s] findings that are not reasonably supported by the evidence. ”  *CBS Outdoor v. Lebanon Planning Bd.*, 414 N.J. Super. 563, 578 (App. Div. 2010), quoting *Chou v. Rutgers, State University*, 283 N.J. Super. 524, 539 (App. Div. 1995), certif. den., 345 N.J. 374 (1996).  In simple terms, the court must determine whether the board has followed the statutory guidelines and properly exercised its discretion.  *Id.*  Any urge to gloss over the glaring problems in the name of deference to the local board would be wrong.  I.  THE BOARD’S DECISION TO DENY [...]’S INHERENTLY BENEFICIAL USE WAS ARBITRARY, CAPRICIOUS AND UNREASONABLE; THE COURT SHOULD AFFIRM THE TRIAL COURT’S DECISION.
[brief] [N.J.S.A. 36:3A2-2.]  The Local Health Services Act is largely concerned with procedures to ensure that municipalities meet a “program of health services meeting the ‘standards of performance’, as determined by the Commissioner” of Health.  N.J.S.A. 26:3A2-10.  Accordingly, the Local Health Services Act deals generally with ensuring that local health services meet certain defined standards as determined by the Commissioner and/or the Public Health Council.  It has no specific regulatory scheme whatsoever.  It does not mention noise at all.
[brief] Pa75, at 14:25-15:1.  29.  As further detailed by Manager [...], at all relevant times including the time period of the subject accident, [...] had a maintenance company that would clean the store each morning before the store opened for business including all of the floors in the store.  Pa86, at ¶2. 30.  Before the store opened for business each morning, the Manager responsible for opening the store also walked the store to make sure the store was in order, which included inspecting the floors to make sure there were clean, dry, free of spills and free of hazards.  Pa86, at ¶3. 31.  Before the store opened for business each morning, the Sales Associates assigned to each department also checked their departments to make sure everything was in order.  Pa87, at ¶4. 32.
[brief] *Id.* at 9-10 (citing N.J. Stat. § 2A:58C–3a(2)).  Plaintiff conceded that he was required to show not only that there was an alternative design, but that *the omission of the design transformed the otherwise reasonably safe product into one that was unreasonably dangerous.*  Id. at 17.  However, his response focused on expert testimony that LDW and LKAS were available and feasible alternative designs, and that if the subject vehicle would have been equipped with these technologies, the crash would have been avoided.  Id. at 15-17.
[brief] In addition, *Drayton* is distinguishable.  There, defendant’s travel companion was arrested after he consented to a search of his person and police found drugs on him.  536 U.S. at 205-208.  Police subsequently asked defendant if they could search his person, and he consented.  *Ibid.*  The Supreme Court rejected the notion that the defendant was coerced into consenting to the search in light of his companion’s arrest, reasoning, “if anything, [his companion]'s arrest should have put [defendant] on notice of the consequences of continuing the encounter by answering the officers' questions.
[brief] As part of the trial court’s November 16, 2022, Order granting summary judgment to the [...], the trial court explicitly determined (i) the [...] had no notice of any allegedly dangerous condition and (ii) the [...] did not act in a palpably unreasonable manner.  However, and as set forth above, Plaintiff’s failure to brief such issues on appeal constitutes Plaintiff’s waiver of same.  See, Sklodowsky, 417 N.J. Super. at 657; R. 2:6-2, cmt. 5.  Even assuming *arguendo* the Appellate Division finds with Plaintiff as to the issues of dangerous condition and permanent injury, Plaintiff has waived its opportunity to appeal the requisite notice and palpable unreasonable elements of the TCA.  As such, given Plaintiff has waived critical requisite elements of --- \(^1\)
[brief] Respondent turned a blind eye to the facts and the truth and instead issued an investigation report that was fatally flawed.  (Pa95)  Respondent also fails to realize that any court, including a municipal court, is an independent branch of the government.  That disconnect by Respondent and the ALJ surely results in arbitrary and capricious findings.  The notion that the Respondent could argue the Township and Petitioner had an attorney-client relationship rather than an employer-employee relationship shows a complete lack of understanding of how the municipal court system works.  (Rb29).
[directive] on 31, operational October become shall subsection This in Complaint- Participation Prosecutorial Direct Require to Authority Prosecutor's 3.4 Countv A,~~lication.  Warrant for application a during an advocated properly are interests State's the that ensure  To prosecutor assistant an that require to authority the have shall Prosecutor County a complaint-warrant, or court other judge with colloquy the in the directly participate 3.2 Section to pursuant consulted Page 24 official to whom an application for acomplaint-warrant is submitted.  This Section shall become operational on October 31, 2016.
[brief] SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE  DIVISION  Appellant  Docket No.: [...]  Sat Below: Hon. [...], J.S.C.  Docket No: [...]  On appeal from the Order entered on May 19, 2023 from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Union County  APPENDIX OF DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT, [...] VOLUME I  Da 1 – Da 5  [...]  [...]  [...]  Tel: [...]  Fax: [...]  [...], Esq. (#076972013)  Of counsel and on the brief  Attorneys for Defendant-Respondent  City of Plainfield Index to Appendix
[brief] (Pa 145; Pa 146; Pa 147; Pa 148; Pa 150; Pa 151; Pa 152; T1 at 56:6-57:20; 59:3-5; 60:6-9; 61:9-25; 63:25-64:3; 102:1-106:11; 187:19-189:8; T3 at 20:24-21:14; 60:5-61:6).  There are refrigerator diesel trucks that deliver food product to the [...] and leave their engines idling for extended time periods while delivering to the restaurant.
[brief] Defendant first argues that [...] did not follow the proper sentencing procedures because he stated that he was “reducing” the sentence originally imposed.  This argument, focusing on a single sentence taken out of context, elevates semantics over substance.  [...] spent nearly 40 pages of the transcript explaining his sentence, including the aggravating and mitigating factors that resulted in finding a new mitigating factor, lengthy Yarbough and Torres analyses, and a discussion of why he imposed a different sentence than he did initially.  (8T75-13 to 113-17).  His mention of the length of the first sentence does not invalidate the proper consideration of the new sentence.
[directive] Furthermore, a complaint-warrant should be sought in domestic violence cases where imposition of a no-contact or other restraint is reasonably necessary to assure the immediate protection of the victim.  See subsection 4.6.3.  Note, moreover, that issuance of a complaint- warrant would preserve the option of applying for pretrial detention, or revocation of release if defendant were to violate a release condition, and/or to seek electronic monitoring (an ankle bracelet) by the pretrial services program as a release condition.  See Section 4.6.  Also note that the decision to issue a complaint-summons in a domestic violence case pursuant to this Directive does not impact the mandatory arrest policy set forth in the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act at N.J.S.A. 2C:25-21(a).  The determination whether to apply for a complaint-warrant under this Directive generally occurs after the defendant has been arrested, transported to the police station for processing, and fingerprinted using the Live Scan system.  Cf. Sections 4.9 and 4.10 (dealing with “direct” indictments and complaints issued before a custodial arrest is made).  Nothing in this Directive, therefore, shall be construed to authorize, much less require, police to issue a complaint-summons in domestic violence cases in lieu of arresting and fingerprinting the defendant at a police station equipped with an up-to-date Live Scan system.
[brief] (5T 111:16-21).  [...] testified as to the cause of death and manner of death of the victim.  (5T 114:4-11).  He discussed photos taken of the victim’s body and the “sharp force” injuries to the victim’s neck, one of which severed the victim’s jugular vein.  (5T 123:14 to 126:18).  [...] also discussed the blunt force injuries to the victim.  (5T 125:4-25).  After viewing photos of the Toyota, [...] testified that the blood stains in the Toyota were not consistent with someone being stabbed in the back seat of the Toyota and “exsanguinating which is when you die from blood loss. ” (5T 136:25 to 140:15).  The amount of blood found in the Toyota was minimal, while a severed jugular vein would have expelled an enormous amount of blood into the Toyota.  [...]’s testimony was entirely appropriate for a forensic pathologist.
[brief] See also State v. Terry, 232 N.J. 218, 265 (2018) ([...], dissenting) (“Under N.J.S.A. 39:3-29, a driver must present a license, insurance card, and registration certificate when an officer asks for them.  If the driver of a car fails to do so, the police can issue a summons that may result in a fine of $150.  [It] does not authorize impoundment.
[brief] Appellant here tries to lump multiple claims in part (a), and alleges that the Trial Court made errors/omissions by not reaching the following factual conclusions:  1.  The GPS expert testimony and data indicates that service of process was impossible given the toll booth distance; 2.  The process server was not independent but should be considered part of the Plaintiff’s company and/or the Plaintiff’s attorney office.  3.  The buyer was not an arms-length buyer.  All 3 of these points were addressed, with factual determinations discussed, analyzed and decided by the Trial Court.
[brief] A salaried employee does not have to submit timesheets and the notion that Petitioner would be required to do so, makes no sense.  Furthermore, Respondent’s finding here is simply not true.  [...] conceded during the OAL Hearing that she did not evaluate any other employees of the Township and believed that other salaried employees, like the court administrator and Judge, did not have timekeeping records.  There was absolutely no evaluation of anyone else in the Township or the municipal court.  (T166-9 and Pb17).  **Factor 9 – Doing Work On Employer’s Premises**
[brief] IV.  The Applicants Have Standing to Challenge the Statute in the Law Division.  The New Jersey Supreme Court has rejected the State’s only objection to Applicants’ request for a remand in the event that the appeal is dismissed.  (Sb30.)  Applicants have standing to challenge this abortion statute because the Court has held that “the explicit allegation of a conviction that . . . abortion is a religious duty is a sufficient additional interest to warrant consideration of the merits. ”  Right to Choose v. Byrne, 91 N.J. 287, 313 (1982).  Therefore, if the application is denied, the matter should be remanded for consideration of Applicant’s substantive challenge.
[brief] (1T 30-12 to 25; 2T 8-5 to 24, 67-10)  For that stop to be constitutional, police needed reasonable, articulable suspicion that [...] himself was involved in criminal activity.  However, the testifying officers here admitted that, at the time of the stop, “there were no facts linking [[...]] to criminality. ”  (1T 59-20 to 21)  Indeed, the surveilling officers did not know or recognize [...] (1T 40-25 to 41-2; 2T 34-11 to 15); they did not see [...] buy drugs, sell drugs, go to [...]’s stash location, or engage in any kind of transaction with [...] (1T 41-11 to 42-7; 2T 16-2 to 21, 34-16 to 25); and they did not witness [...] engage in any other activity that could reasonably be characterized as suspicious or criminal.  (1T 41-18 to 43-4, 50-8 to 24; 2T 34-16 to 35-11)  Rather, [...] was only stopped because he was standing next to [...] and [...], and the responding officers could not identify [...] in the trio.  (1T 43-2 to 4; 2T 24-6 to 14)  The officers’ testimony explicitly highlights that there was no “objective manifestation” that [...] “was or is involved in criminal activity. ””  Arthur, 149 N.J. at 8.  Still, the hearing court found reasonable suspicion to justify the stop because [...] was speaking with a suspected drug dealer in a high-crime area.
[directive] Sources Information ....................................29  Values and Flags Assessment Score Safety Public 4.2.1.a  5 Page ........................31  Values Score Risk Assessment Assault Domestic Ontario 4.2.1.b  Known Relevant Consider to Obligation Enforcement Law 4.2.2  Risk Pretrial Automated in for the Accounted Not Information Assessment.................................................................................................31 in Registry Central Violence Domestic Check to Requirement 4.2.3 .........................................................................33 .
[brief] A.  The Investigatory Detention of Defendant was Based on Reasonable and Articulable Suspicion and Therefore Constitutional.  This Court evaluates police conduct under the Fourth Amendment of the federal constitution and under Article I, Paragraph 7, of our state constitution, which protect against “unreasonable searches and seizures” by government officials.  *State v. Watts*, 223 N.J. 503, 513 (2015).  Because this case involves an investigatory detention, it does not involve the type of police-citizen encounter subject to the Warrant Clause nor does it require probable cause.  See *Terry v. Ohio*, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968).  “Instead, the conduct involved in this case must be tested by the Fourth Amendment's general proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures. ”  Ibid.  “The question is whether in all the circumstances of this on-the-street encounter, [a defendant’s] right to personal security was violated by an unreasonable search and seizure.
[brief] (Ab19).  In that case, a government contractor was debarred from all federal contracting, but the Government Accounting Office changed course at the end of three years of negotiation to advance new grounds for his debarment.  There is no change of course here.  As [...] testified at the hearing, the extremeness of [...]’s rate increase request during the rate review process supported the conclusion that [...]’s rate request was excessive.  (T3 585:18 to 587:8).  [...] was on notice why its premium rate increase requests were disapproved.  Therefore, reversing the Commissioner’s decision is unnecessary when, at bottom, [...]’s challenge boils down to second-guessing the excessiveness determination that the Legislature entrusted to the Department to make.
[brief] (2T:29-25 to 30-5).  Defendant frequently used his hands to speak, and, as the stop continued, defendant became more and more anxious, stating “I have no reason to lie”.  (2T:38-1 to 41-1).  Defendant referenced lying at least three times during the initial stop.  Id.  Defendant then displayed an orange safety vest, which he initially held up to show officers he was on his way to work, before placing it over his waistband area for the remainder of his time seated in the Jeep’s driver seat.  (2T:18-7 to 18-23).  From [...]’s training and experience, he knew that criminals commonly conceal weapons in their waistband, so the detective was immediately alerted by the fact that defendant chose to place the safety vest over his waist.
[directive] 2 L.1995,c.325,s.5.  TABNO.  5  Untitled Document 16 32 Page of 2.  In the case of a three year emergency, amount not less than one-third of the net deferred charge, an full. unless the local unit elects to include a greater amount until the emergency has been funded in  (c)  Revenues fi-om Federal or State governments for emergencies resulting fi-om natural or other disaster shall be recognized as miscellaneous revenues, or may be credited to the appropriation, only if the grant is a reimbursement for hnds expended by the local unit for emergency purposes in advance of receipt of the grant and in the fiscal year the emergency took place.
[directive] The allocation framework described in this  No use of categorical exclusion criteria: document differs in two important ways from other allocation frameworks.  First, it does not categorically exclude any patients who, in usual circumstances, would be eligible for critical care resources.  Instead, all patients are treated as eligible to receive critical care resources and are prioritized based on potential to benefit from those resources; the availability of critical care resources determines how many priority groups can receive critical care.  There are compelling reasons to not use exclusion criteria.  Categorically excluding patients will make many think that their lives are “not worth saving,” leading to justified perceptions of discrimination.  Moreover, categorical exclusions are too rigid to be used in a dynamic crisis, when critical care resources shortages will likely surge and decline episodically during the public health emergency.  In addition, such exclusions violate a fundamental principle of public health ethics: use the means that are least restrictive to individual liberty to accomplish the public health goal.  Categorical exclusions are not necessary because less restrictive approaches are feasible, such as allowing all patients to be eligible and giving priority to those most likely to benefit.