ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Oral arguments were conducted on March 3, 2023.  In granting the Summary Judgment, the Court made the following finding:  Although the "[t]he Court does recognize that there was a March 29th, 2021 report submitted from plaintiff’s treating doctor which concludes that quote, ‘This patient has sustained a significant permanent injury from her accident of the said date.  And, that this permanent injury is in the form of a significant limited use of this once normal bodily function, a loss of range of motion accompanied by pain. ’  [t]he Court also recognizes that the plaintiff herself has testified during deposition that she is not suffering pain.  She’s not willing to lie to get money.  That she has resumed her normal functions.  The Court concludes that based upon the information presented.  The plaintiff has not satisfied the verbal threshold here, that has not provided legitimate evidence of a permanent injury.  And, has in fact, provided information that indicates she doesn’t have a permanent injury resulting from this accident."  “The physician’s findings or notations, the Court finds is merely a parroting of the language of the statute.  And, as the Court has repeatedly held, that does not sustain a verbal threshold, or plaintiff’s ability to vault the verbal threshold as established under the statute.  The Court finds nothing in the record that indicates the plaintiff has any objective findings of a permanent injury.  And, in fact, quite the opposite is what the record shows.  So, I am going to grant the motion as filed and grant summary judgment dismissing the matter.
[brief] [...]’s decision (1) mischaracterized evidence related to the 9-1-1 call as inadmissible hearsay, (2) failed to consider or analyze evidence related to the 9-1-1 call.  The ruling also erred by (3) considering each of the facts in isolation and requiring the State to present more than “reasonable suspicion” to sustain its burden.  Finally, [...] erred by (4) making flawed credibility findings.  Viewing the totality of the circumstances or the “whole picture”, the evidence in this case supports a finding of reasonable suspicion.  As such, the State respectfully asks this Court to overturn [...]’s decision and deny Defendant’s Motion.
[brief] Here, [...] claimed that his First Amendment right to free speech was violated when he was removed as municipal public defender in retaliation for reporting the extortion attempt, cooperating with investigators, and testifying at [...]'s corruption trial.  The City conceded that the speech at issue involved matters of public concern and, therefore, it fell under the First Amendment's protection.  Citing [...] v. [...] 192 N.J. 137 (N.J. 2007)  See, e.g., Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 675, 116 S.Ct. 2342, 2347, 135 L.Ed.2d 843, 852 (1996) (Pa 471-481)  Thus, based on the foregoing reasons and facts one (1) through thirty (30), the court should reverse because the deprivation of a right does not extinguish simply because the right is respected by defendants after they are sued for depriving the rights.
[brief] The arbitration rules established by [...]—the current forum for no-fault arbitration—do not expressly provide a right to discovery, but merely permit the arbitrator “to establish the extent of, and schedule, any such exchange [of information] pertaining to the subject matter of the arbitration. ”  Pa0395 ([...] N.J. No-Fault PIP Arb. Rules ([...] Rules), R. 40 (2022)).  Even if that rule would allow some discovery, this court has recognized that “[u]nlike civil actions in the Law Division, discovery in PIP arbitrations is limited,” *Kimba Med. Supply v. Allstate Ins. Co.*, 431 N.J. Super. 463, 490 (App. Div. 2013), and [...] has opined that *Selective Insurance*’s discovery restrictions apply in PIP arbitrations, *In re N.J. Healthcare Coal.*, 2012 WL 6653982, at *10 (Pa0497).
[brief] See, e.g., State v. Velez, 335 N.J. Super.: 552 (App. Div. 2000); certif. dism'd 167 N.J. 624 (2001), so holding as to a claim of racial profiling as the basis for a traffic stop.  Pretrial orders admitting confessions are, however, not comprehended by that rule.  State v. Smith, 307 N.J. Super.: 1 (App. Div. 1997), certif. den.: 153 N.J. 216 (1998).  While other issues may be preserved by entry of a conditional plea pursuant to R. 3:9-3(f), a conditional plea will only preserve those issues that are the subject of the condition.
[brief] Municipalities would simply wait until a developer or property owner brought a builder’s remedy lawsuit, wait to see if the court deemed them non-complaint in their obligations, and then move to condemn the property through eminent domain, thus rendering that very builder’s remedy lawsuit moot.  If permitted, no developer or property owner would contemplate undertaking the very involved builder’s remedy and development approval process when the rug could be pulled out from under them at any time.  Such a result was in no way contemplated by the Supreme Court, especially in a municipality which affirmatively withdrew from the voluntary compliance process and has a 602-unit (or more) shortfall.
[brief] Where the invocation is “ambiguous” – it “leav[es] the investigating officer ‘reasonably unsure whether the suspect was asserting that right’” or is “susceptible to two different meanings” – clarifying questions “narrowly directed to determining whether defendant [is] willing to continue” are necessary before interrogation can continue.  *Maltese*, 222 N.J. at 545 (quoting *State v. Johnson*, 120 N.J. 263, 284 (1990)); *Diaz-Bridges*, 208 N.J. at 569l; *S.S.*, 229 N.J. at 382-83; *Gonzalez*, 249 N.J. at 629-31.
[brief] *Id.* at 55.  Rather, “the predicate for relief for cumulative error must be that the probable effect of the cumulative error was to render the underlying trial unfair. ”  *State v. Wakefield*, 190 N.J. 397, 538 (2007).  “[I]f the combined effect of multiple errors deprives a party of a fair trial, an appellate court should order a new trial.
[brief] Instead, application of the arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable standard is most appropriate.  Judicial review must only determine the validity of the agency’s action, not substitute the court’s judgment for that of the Planning Board.  CBS Outdoor, supra, 414 N.J. Super. at 578.  The Court is reviewing the determination to determine whether the board followed statutory guidelines and properly exercised its discretion.  *Burbridge v. Mine Hill Tp.*, 117 N.J. 367 (1990).
[brief] **THE COMMISSION’S FAILURE TO ISSUE THE SIX APPENDICES WITH THE INTEREST ARBITRATION AWARD CONSTITUTES REVERSIBLE ERROR.**  The six appendices, which are in the record before this Court, illustrate the cost analysis used by the Arbitrator in issuing his economic award.  However, the information used by the Arbitrator is inaccurate and materially affects how the economic award was determined.  The appendices show that the bargaining unit composition includes those that were not in the negotiations unit as of the last day of the last year of the expired contract, July 31, 2019.  See Point II, supra.  Yet they were listed as included in the negotiations unit in order to determine the base salary cost of the unit for purposes of deciding the economic award for the successor agreement.  If the economic award was premised on inaccurate information, the economic award itself is inaccurate, and therefore subject to reversal.  **CONCLUSION**
[brief] If this court accepts the arguments of [...] that the Hoboken RCO is not a value-based ordinance, then the Board should not have considered the value of his apartment at all, including its assessed value for tax purposes, and, for sure, [...]’s requested methodology for calculating the rent increase should be wholly rejected.  Such interpretation is supported by the language of the RCO and would withstand any facial challenge (though no party has made one to date).  Indeed, such a reading of the RCO would be nearly identical to the Helmsley ordinance.  It also guarantees landlords rent adjustments tied to inflation that would allow them to meet their operating expenses and receive a fair return on their initial investment.  If this court finds that the Hoboken RCO return on equity provision is value-based or partially value-based, the above case law also reflects the considerable latitude afforded to municipalities and rent control boards to create methodologies for calculating fair rent increases that ensure the maintenance of housing affordability.  There is no case law or text in the Hoboken RCO that commits the Board to calculate return on equity using the specific methodology requested by [...].  Moreover, if the RCO uses a value-based return on equity formula, there would be reason due to [...]’s protected tenancy status to find that the Board’s action, which sought to estimate a return on equity that also preserved an affordable rent, was clearly rational, well-reasoned, and consistent with the broader aims of the Tenant Protection Act of 1992.  In contrast, [...]’s methodology for calculating return on equity depends almost entirely on an estimation of [...]’s unit’s market value, despite the difficulties and inaccuracies in doing so for a rent-controlled unit.  Not only has the NJ Supreme Court made clear that such an approach is disfavored, but this court should also view [...]’s process with particular skepticism since it would have such a destructive effect on affordability and undermine the purpose of rent control, especially in the context of a unit located in a building that has undergone conversion to condominium ownership.  D.
[brief] Table of Contents  Procedural History  1  Statement of Facts  2  Argument 21  The family court abused its discretion in denying Rule 4:50 relief to defendant (A227, A437)  A. Unfairness in the Process 21  B. Unfairness in the Result 37  C. [...]’s Errors  40  D.  Relief should not be denied to [...] on grounds of time 45  Conclusion 50
[brief] The Court’s conversion of the motion to dismiss to a motion for summary judgement was proper.  Plaintiff is incorrect that the Trial Court’s “conversion” of the Defendants’ countermotion to dismiss to one for summary judgement “highlights” the Trial Court’s error.  On the contrary, the Trial Court’s conversion of the Defendants’ motion to one for summary judgment highlights how well settled the law is regarding the constitutionality of restricting “off-premises” versus “on-premises” signage.  In that regard, Plaintiff is incorrect that the Trial Court should have conducted a plenary hearing.  There was simply no need to do so in this case because, as explained above, the law regarding restricting “off-premises” signage is well settled and it is clear that the Distance Regulation passes the intermediate scrutiny test.  As explained above, Plaintiff misinterprets and misapplies *E & J Equities*.
[directive] 2C:39-9a., b, e or g. or N.J.S.A. 지령 제01-18호(02/23/2018)에 의거 공포된 양식, 페이지1/2 CN 11172-Korean Form Promulgated by Directive #01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 11172-Korean page 1 of 2 (3)  2013년8월8일 합니다:  N.J.S.A. 귀하는 이후에 발생한 다음의  범죄에 대하여  유죄 시인을 2C:39-5(f)에 소지.  의한 공격 총기의 불법 (3)  You are pleading guilty to the following offense that occurred on or after August 8, 2013: unlawful possession of an assault firearm, 2C:39-5(f).
[brief] 1T 130-131.  However, it is not customary for the consumer to be responsible for the water management and resulting drainage associated with the system.  Id.  In other words, it is not expected that the customer will hire an engineer to oversee or plan for water management for the [...] system.  Id.  Based on its initial discussions with [...] and [...], [...] began evaluating options for a functional indoor/outdoor event space that would be connected to the existing hotel building to be utilized in connection with weddings and other special events.
[brief] In State v. Bankston 63 N.J. 263, 268-69, 271-73, 307 A.2d 65 (1973); the court held that when an officer testifies about information from someone else either directly or by inference and the information incriminates the defendant, the confrontation clause and hearsay rule is implicated because the officer never testified before the grand jury and was not subjected to cross-examination.  On April 29th, 2014, assistant prosecutor [...] returned to the Middlesex County Grand Jury for a superseding indictment [...] to add theft by unlawful taking which was omitted from the original indictment.  The State and [...] continued to provide perjured testimony before the grand jury.  In vouching the case for the State, [...] testified that the maps presented by the State to the grand jury allegedly placed defendant in the area of the robberies.
[brief] In *SL Industries v. American Motorists Insurance Company*, the Supreme Court of New Jersey held that, where a cause of action against an insured had an intent requirement, the court was required to make determinations regarding “the insured’s intent to cause the injury rather than on its intent to commit the act that resulted in the injury. ”  128 N.J. 188, 207 (1992).  Reviewing a claim wherein an insured was sued for purported fraud, the Supreme Court held that review of an insurance policy’s exclusions where issues of intent were raised, a court must evaluate the insured’s “intent to injure or expectation of injuring,” the plaintiff.  *Id.* at 212 (remanding for a determination of whether the insured intended to cause the harms alleged).
[brief] Indeed, there was evidence that the township was aware that Kearny Avenue was badly in need of repairs as evidenced by an email from [...], who was the Town Administrator to [...] and [...] from [...], dated July 16, 2020.  This email indicates that the Town Administrator had been travelling Kearny Avenue in 2020 to observe for paver defects and thus, had an opportunity to observe the pothole existing at the accident location.  There was also another email from [...] to [...], dated October 2, 2020 that states “Stephen . . .as previously requested we have an item for resetting pavers included in the Kearny Avenue Roadway Improvements project.  I have the Town’s DPW list for the paver problem areas and our office also has walked the streetscape and generated a list. ” (Pa 400).  This indicates that the town knew that this area was a problem long before the Plaintiffs sustained injuries and the failure to rectify this problem was palpably unreasonable because it is "manifest and obvious that no prudent person would approve of its course of action or inaction." ."  Polyard v. Terry, 148 N.J. Super. 202, 216 (Law Div. 1977).
[brief] (Pa126-127).  Also in 2006, Petitioner visited [...] and [...], complaining of constant pain and stiffness in his neck and “flare ups” during which the pain radiated from his back is neck through his back to his knees bilaterally.  (Pa131).  (5)  Although these contradictions between [...] and [...] do not even include Petitioner’s 2009 incident, neck pain and treatment, discussed in detail in Point C, infra, the Board found that, “because [...] made no mention of the alleged typographical errors in his expert report, his response to leading questions by [Petitioner’s] counsel does not support the conclusion that he is more credible than [...]. ”  (Pa112).  (6)  [...]’s credentials are more substantial than [...]’s.  [...] is Board Certified in Orthopedic Surgery, and is currently a practicing orthopedic surgeon, and was qualified by the ALJ as an expert in both Orthopedics and Orthopedic Surgery.
[brief] The Chancery Division and Respondents fail to recognize the legal requirements of operating a school district.  The gender of every student is required at the time of registration and is maintained as a mandatory student record.  N.J.A.C. 6A:32-7.3(b)(2).  Only parents have access to, and therefore maintain the sole right to change a student record.  N.J.A.C. 6A:32-7.5(e)(1)-(3).  Thus, the general rule is parents of every student inform the District of their child’s gender, and only those parents have access to their child’s student record.  While the LAD protects gender identity and expression in schools, there is no statute, regulation, caselaw or administrative decision which authorizes a student to unilaterally change their student record.  Allowing as much is an application of LAD not previously endorsed.  Indeed, the Policy affords transgender students a special and unique right to engage is a broad spectrum of activity to express their gender – all without parental notification.  Rather, parental notification occurs when students are afforded the special right to change a mandatory student record.  A right not available to their cisgender peers.  Further, parental notification occurs in limited circumstances when parental discovery of a student’s gender is otherwise inevitable – when participating in a gender-specific activity or team, or utilizing an alternate restroom or bathroom.
[brief] THE JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION MUST BE AMENDED TO MERGE COUNT THREE INTO COUNT TWO AND TO REFLECT 1,119 DAYS OF JAIL CREDITS.  (Not Raised Below).  When felony murder provides an alternative theory of liability for the homicide of a victim and the jury convicts the defendant of the underlying felony, felony murder, and murder, the felony murder conviction merges into the murder conviction and the underlying felony survives the merger.  State v. Bellamy, 468 N.J. Super. 29, 41-42 (App. Div. 2021).  Accordingly, the judgment of conviction in this case must be amended to reflect that count three (felony murder) merges into count two (purposeful murder).
[brief] While harassment at school is correlated with negative mental health outcomes, the “opposite is also true . . . : transgender students have better mental health outcomes when their gender identity is affirmed. ”  Grimm v. Gloucester Cnty. Sch. Bd., 972 F.3d 586, 597 (4th Cir. 2020) (applying Title IX to invalidate Virginia school district policy that barred transgender students from appropriate restrooms and declined to reflect their gender identity in school records).
[brief] *Id.* at 493.  The Appellate Division reversed, ruling that the plaintiff’s proofs were sufficient to allow a jury to find that [...]’ failure to ensure compliance with safety regulations was a proximate cause of the decedent’s death.  *Id.* at 477.  [...] filed a third-party claim against [...] seeking contractual indemnification.  *Ibid.*  [...] based its indemnification claim on the three indemnity provisions in its contract with [...].  *Ibid.*  The first indemnity clause required [...] to indemnify [...] for losses arising out of the performance of the contract work “occasioned wholly or in part by any act or omission of” [...] or its employees or agents.  *Id.* at 478.  [...] also contracted to defend [...] in any suit provided, that [...] was not found liable to [...] in such a suit.  *Ibid.*  The second provision required [...] to indemnify [...] for all losses and claims that may arise out of [...]’s performance of its work and that are caused by any act or omission of [...] or its employees or agents.  *Ibid.*  The third provision required [...] to assume “the entire responsibility and liability for” all losses and claims “sustained or alleged to have been sustained in connection with or to have arisen out of or resulting directly or indirectly from the performance of the work by” [...], its employees, or agents.  Ibid.  The Meder Court ruled that the contract did not unequivocally express an intent to indemnify [...] for its own negligence.  Id. at 480.  The court stated that “If anything, the three indemnity provisions together suggest the contrary intent; that reading is supported by the principle that ambiguities in an indemnification agreement are to be strictly construed against the indemnitee. ”  Ibid.  Finally, to the extent that a single provision might require indemnification for [...]’ own negligence, that intent failed when the three provisions were read in conjunction.  Id. at 479.  The Appellate Division therefore remanded the matter for entry of an order dismissing [...]’ claim for indemnification for its own negligence.  Id. at 480.  III.
[brief] Trial courts may properly revisit interlocutory orders if intervening factual or legal changes so warrant.  At the same time, any such change that affects a litigant’s substantive rights must be done before that litigant-and, for that matter, all involved-detrimentally rely on the court’s legal determinations.  Even if one assumes that Burt is no longer viable under the circumstances of this case, the trial court’s decision of December 2017, reiterated on November 28, 2022, defined the “rules of the game” leading into the December 2022 trial.  Changing those rules in February 2023, after the completion of trial, was palpably unjust.
[brief] ”  Stallworth, 208 N.J. at 194.  \(^9\)  Contrary to Plaintiff’s assertion there is nothing “willful or unreasoning” about the Authority’s decision.  Bayshore Sewerage Co. v. Dept. of Envtl. Prot., 122 N.J. Super. 184, 199 (1973).  Even this authority cited by Plaintiff recognizes that “[w]here is room for two opinions, action is not arbitrary or capricious when exercised honestly and upon due consideration, even though it may be believed that an erroneous conclusion has been reached. ”  Id.  In the event this Court finds for Appellant and reverses the Authority’s denial of Appellant’s application, the Authority submits that remand to the Authority would be appropriate.
[brief] Da51-52, ¶¶ 2-3.  The parties asserted claims related to alleged damage to the [...], alleged damage to the underground cables owned and operated by the [...], alleged damage caused by the debris in the riverbed, and cleanup costs allegedly owed due to the release of dialectic fluid.  Da52-53, ¶ 6.  Until the [...] Litigation was resolved, the value (if any) of [...]’s Indemnity Claim was unknown as it was subject to various claims and crossclaims between the parties to the [...] Litigation.  [...] commenced this DJ Action on September 4, 2018 in connection with the underlying [...] Litigation.
[directive] An administrative investigation may commence with the disposition of a complaint against the subject officer by the Superior Court or a municipal court.  In the alternative, an administrative investigation may commence with a county or municipal prosecutor’s decision to dismiss a complaint against a subject officer.  A finding of guilt by the Superior Court or a municipal court may assist in resolving an administrative investigation because such a finding requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt, which is more than is required to meet the burden of proof in administrative matters.  6.3.8
[brief] ”  *Ibid.* (emphasis added).  That regulation permits requests for extensions of leave which “shall not be unreasonably denied. ”  Generally, for the purposes of N.J.A.C. 4A:2-6.2(b) “the five-day threshold begins once the employee is advised of being absent without authorization. ” (Aa32).  Here, ample evidence in the record shows [...] failed to return to work from his approved leave and was absent for five consecutive business days without supervisory approval.