ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:23B-23(a).  The 2003 version of the statute (the one that applies here) includes the first three prongs of the 1994 version concerning fraud and misconduct, but explicitly changed the fourth stated ground (an arbitrator exceeding his powers) to remove the heightened standard that the resultant award was not “mutual, final and definite. ”  Id.; Tretina 135 N.J. at 355.  The 2003 statute also provides two additional reasons (subsections 5 and 6) that have nothing to do with fraud or corruption.  Even if the explicit removal of a qualifier in subsection 4 was not significant, the case law that followed this enactment of this version of the statute demonstrates that an arbitrator’s disregard of the terms of the parties’ agreement—even without the indicia of fraud, corruption, or wrongdoing—is an abuse of the arbitrator’s powers necessitating the vacating of an award.
[brief] THE COMMITTEE'S ADOPTION OF ORDINANCE NO. 2022-15 WAS ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS.  (3T13:24-15:2).  Defendants continue to claim the Township properly adopted Ordinance No. 2022-15.  That argument then begs the question if Ordinance No. 2022-15 was wholly proper and complied with the requirements of the LRHL, then why was it amended the mere minutes after it was adopted?  Moreover, if the Township Committee was not trying to push through an ordinance that it knew was opposed by the residents, why not defer voting on Ordinance No. 2022-15 until the Redevelopment Plan (the Plan) was properly amended?  The logical answer to both questions is that the Committee knew the Plan had glaring inconsistencies that had to be addressed before Ordinance No. 2022-15 could be adopted, and yet, they also knew the end of the year was approaching and thus, their window to push through the Plan was quickly closing.  The Committee knowingly passed a defective ordinance which it implicitly acknowledged by amending Ordinance 2022-15 minutes after passing it.
[directive] The jurisdictions. various the in committed offenses the of seriousness prosecutors assistant cross-designate Division to for the necessary is it if notified shall be Justice another in appearances court make or matters handle general to attorneys deputy special as release charging/pretrial initial coordinate  Section to is this of purpose  The jurisdiction. of the Prosecutor County a depriving as construed be shall herein nothing and decisions, authority.  jurisdictional prosecutor's the within committed offense an prosecute to authority 31, 2016.
[brief] Pa28.  The correspondence also requested that the Board take administrative or judicial notice of all affidavits submitted in all actions with respect to the issue of lack of notice of the Ricci Act for members of the State Police Retirement System.  Pa28.  To date, over ninety-eight (98) active and retired Troopers have submitted affidavits attesting that they did not receive any notice of the Ricci Act.  Pa89-284.  STANDARD OF REVIEW
[brief] In March 2020, [...] was charged, in one indictment, with possession of a gun without a permit and hollow-point bullets and hindering his own apprehension, and in a second indictment, with certain persons not to have guns.  (Da 1-3)  Following a jury trial in July 2021, he was convicted of the hindering, gun, and certain-persons charges and acquitted of the bullet charge.  (Da 4-5)  In August 2021, he was sentenced to an aggregate term of 13 years, five years without parole (Da 7-12).  [...]’s plenary brief, filed in June 2024 raised three points.  This reply brief focuses on Point II, which argued that the limiting instruction concerning the evidence about an unrelated robbery was inadequate.  The state filed a responding brief on August 12, 2024.  [...] now files this reply brief to correct the state’s mistaken characterization of the inadequate-jury-instruction claim as invited-error.
[brief] It ruled that an arbitrator can exceed his powers if the arbitration body allows that, and a Court will still enforce an award.  The Court’s reliance on U.S.  Steelworkers, supra., was misplaced.  That case was based on specific provisions of the Labor Relations Management Act, and in recognition that, “the present federal policy is to promote industrial stabilization through the collective bargaining agreement. ”  Id. at 578.  The U.S. Supreme Court recognized the difference in labor agreements from normal commercial arbitrations, in the commercial case, arbitration is the substitute for litigation.  Here arbitration is the substitute for industrial strife.  Since arbitration of labor disputes has quite different functions from arbitration under an ordinary commercial agreement, the hostility evinced by courts toward arbitration of commercial agreements has no place here.  [Ibid.]  In addition, the main reason that the U.S. Steelworkers Court held the question of arbitrability of the particular dispute between labor and management should be decided by the arbitrator was because the CBA expressly said so.  Id. at 576.  “The grievance alleged that the contracting out was a violation of the collective bargaining agreement.  There was, therefore, a dispute ‘as to the meaning and application of the provisions of this Agreement’ [QUOTING THE CBA] which the parties had agreed would be determined by arbitration. ”  Id. at 585 (emph. added).  Accordingly, that case simply recognized that in the specialized context of CBA’s and labor unions, and wherein the Particular CBA had specifically granted the arbitrator power to decide questions of arbitrability, the Courts would not interfere.  Likewise, Barcon v. TriCounty Asphalt Corp., 86 N.J. 179 (1981) did not support the Court’s assertion that minimal interference with arbitration decisions voided the statutory grounds to vacate.
[brief] \(^9\)  First, there was, and continues to be, a special relationship between the State and [...] as [...] is still a DOC employee.  Second, [...] was, and continues to be, available to the State both practically and physically.  Third, the testimony of [...] was elucidate relevant and critical facts issue.  On this issue there was considerable cross examination of [...] regarding the entry in the log bog which was admitted as a “business record. ”  [...] repeated that he could not testify as to the particulars of those entries – other than that which he purportedly observed by simply watching the video – because he was not the lead investigator on the matter.  (1T169.15-16; 1T177.4-5; 1T178.19-20; 1T187.22; 1T194.4).  Finally, [...]’s testimony appears to be superior to that already utilized in respect to the fact to be proven because he would have been able to testify: as to which entries he personally made; the reason for those entries; the policy and procedures which allowed him to make those entries; and any --- \(^9\)  It should be noted that in opposition to [...]’s initial request for the adverse inference, the State argued “Based on my recollection, [...] raised an objection to [...] [sic] testifying in the first place.  I provided a proffer that I was only interested in questioning [...] [sic] about the lineup incident.  Opposing Counsel cannot have it both ways.  If [...] believed there were critical issues with the inmate escape, he should have questioned [...].  [sic]  After all, the State did make him available and was happy to go down that path. ” (State’s January 2, 2022 letter to the Court).  To be clear, it was the State that limited [...]’s testimony because it did not want to turn over [...]’s personnel file to be used during cross examination of the August 16, 2019 incident.
[directive] Defense Input  The defendant through his or her counsel may provide the prosecutor with timely information concerning the applicability of Mitigating Factors and the Downward Departure for Trial Proof Issues, as well as information concerning the non-applicability or appropriate scoring of Special Offense Characteristics, Special Application and Enhancement Features, and Aggravating Factors.  However, as noted in Section 3.3, these Guidelines are not designed to provide a forum to conduct mini-trials to resolve factual disputes.  To the contrary, when there is no “meeting of the minds” necessary to consummate a negotiated agreement, the prosecutor must, as specifically provided in Section 3.3, object to any defense tactic to request an evidentiary hearing to decide issues that are appropriately and traditionally resolved at trial.  3.10
[brief] 1.  While [...] reported the Petitioner meets the definition of independent contractor, she notes that given the unique circumstances of the position of municipal prosecutor, this is not a strong indicator of such status.  2.  The Petitioner testified there is extensive integration between her and [...] in terms of the Municipal Court process.  In addition to all the integration with the actual Court sessions, she has extensive involvement in discussing cases with [...] Police Officers, Animal Control Officers and Zoning Officers that are on the docket.  She also has extensive interaction with the Liaison Officers who address pro-se defendants and she has regular meetings with police officers with respect to cases which are on the docket.  (T28-6)  3.  [...] conceded the Petitioner is required to report to someone at the beginning of each workday, which is indicative of employee status.  (T156-13)  4.  She also confirmed that [...] controls all of her job duties and responsibilities during the Court sessions.  (T157-16)  5.  She testified, “There is a great deal of control as to how Court sessions are performed and yes, they are very controlled methods. ”  (T157-18)  **FACTOR 4 – SERVICES RENDERED PERSONALLY**
[brief] On September 17, 2012, defendant and his co-defendants were driving through Irvington looking for someone to rob when they saw a group of boys “coming down Orange Ave[nue].”  After parking their car “around the corner,” [co-defendants] [...] and [...] robbed the four boys at gunpoint while defendant waited in the back seat of the car.  When one of the victims attempted to flee, defendant yelled to his co-defendants to “get the one in the yellow coat. ”  [...] and [...] then fired their weapons, and defendant witnessed one of the boys “fall on the ground” before they drove off.  The victim was sixteen-year-old [...], who was later pronounced dead as the result of a gunshot wound to his back.  Cash and two cell phones were taken from the robbery victims.  Defendant kept one of the phones, and when he returned to his Newark home he “put the phone in [his] top drawer….  ”  Upon suspecting the police might be tracking the stolen phone, defendant hid it in the backyard of a nearby home.  [...] of the [...] was assigned to investigate the shooting.  Before interviewing defendant, Green obtained permission from defendant’s mother, [...], who accompanied Green to pick defendant up from school after police first questioned his sister about the stolen phone.  Defendant, his mother, and Green then proceeded to an interview room at the [...].  Both defendant and his mother read and signed a form waiving defendant’s Miranda rights before defendant was questioned by Green.  In his recorded statement, defendant confessed that he and his accomplices planned to “go robbing” and rode around for approximately six hours before encountering the group of boys on Orange Avenue.  Defendant remained in the car while his two accomplices, with guns, robbed the four boys.  When one of the victims attempted to run, defendant stuck his head out the car and yelled: “Get the one in the yellow coat. ”  One of defendant’s accomplices then began shooting at the victim in yellow.  Defendant admitted receiving a cell phone that was taken from one of the victims, and he subsequently led police to the location where it was hidden.  [(Da35-36). ]  A jury ultimately convicted defendant of every charged count, with the exception of one of the two counts of unlawful possession of a weapon.  (Da13-16, 17-20, 34, 42).
[brief] Page TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS ........................................ ii  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .................................................................................. iii  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT ..............................................................................1  PROCEDURAL HISTORY ..................................................................................2  STATEMENT OF FACTS ...................................................................................3  LEGAL ARGUMENT ..........................................................................................6  POINT I THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RESOLVING QUESTIONS OF FACT IN FAVOR OF THE RESPONDENT AND GRANTING SUMMARY  JUDGMENT (Pa1-Pa10).................................................................6  I.  We Submit That the Law Should Respectfully Consider Properties Under Long-Term Renovation to be Commercial Properties For Purposes of Imposing Duties to Keep Abutting Sidewalks Clear and Safe for Pedestrians.  (Pa1-Pa10)............................10  II.  If This Court Concludes that the Respondents Are Entitled to Residential Property Owner Status, We Respectfully Submit the Trial Court  Erroneously Resolved Factual Disputes in Favor of the Movant Requiring the Reversal of the Summary Judgment Order.  (Pa1-Pa10)  .....................................................................17  CONCLUSION  ..................................................................................................22  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS
[brief] “1T” refers to the transcript from the August 16, 2022 motion to suppress hearing; “2T” refers to the transcript from the February 3, 2023 reconsideration hearing; “3T” refers to the transcript from the July 10, 2023 plea hearing; “4T” refers to the transcript from the September 22, 2023 sentencing hearing; “Db” refers to defendant’s brief; “Da” refers to the appendix to defendant’s brief.  violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4(a)(1) (Count One); second-degree possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:39-49(a)(1) (Count Two); first-degree unlawful possession of a weapon, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b)(1) (Count Three); fourth-degree resisting arrest, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:29-2(a)(2) (Count Four).  (Da8-Da12).  On July 10, 2023, defendant pled guilty to first-degree aggravated manslaughter, Count One of the Indictment, in exchange for dismissal of the remaining charges.
[brief] 6.  The [...] presented proof that they left for a family vacation prior to the time of service on the morning of the purported service and provided proof of this trip including photos taken, EZPass records, hotel and credit card receipts to prove that they were not at home at time of service.  7.  The Tax Foreclosure Complaint asserts, in paragraph 11, that a preaction notice was served upon [...].  11a.  In fact, the proof provided shows that there was no service and that this notice was not delivered to Defendants.  20a.  8.  Unattested to service records provided by the in-house process sever contain GPS coordinates which correspond to a school parking lot - not Defendant’s home as alleged in the Affidavits.  T3, p.65:2-7.  These irregularities with the service of process should have eliminated the presumption of validity and the burden should have shifted to the Plaintiff to prove that service was effectuated.  The trial Court applied an incorrect standard and instead improperly afforded the defective affidavits a presumption of validity while disregarding Defendants conflicting proofs and expert testimony.
[brief] The parties’ agreement also applies to “any and all” claims and disputes between Plaintiffs and with Seller and its parent and affiliates, with the scope broadly defined as “arising from the Unit warranty, any other agreements, communications or dealings involving Buyer, or the construction or condition of the Unit. ”  The clause also states that its scope includes, but is not limited to, “disputes concerning breach of contract, express and implied warranties, personal injuries and/or illness, mold-related claims, representations and/or omissions by Seller, on-site and off-site conditions and all other torts and statutory causes of action (“Claims”).
[brief] Pa238, at 78:5-81:24.  Specifically, [...] testified that the mixed-use building proposed in the Second Application would generate six (6) entering vehicles and twelve (12) exiting vehicles in the morning and twelve (12) entering vehicles and ten (10) exiting vehicles during the evening.  Id., at 78:5-12.  [...] further testified that the proposed use would be significantly less intense than other uses permitted under the Zoning Ordinance and will provide significantly less traffic than the prior commercial use on the Property.  Pa249, at 85:14-24.  Finally, [...]’s professional planner, [...], testified that [...]’s requested variance relief was justified.
[brief] **Standard of Review:**  **Motion to Dismiss/Amendment of Complaint**  *R.*  4:6-2(e) permits dismissal of a Complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; however, such motions should only be granted in “the rarest instances. ”  *Lieberman v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J.*, 132 N.J. 76, 622 A.2d 1295, 1296 quoting *Printing Mart v. Sharp Elecs.*, 116 N.J. 739, 772, 563 A.2d 31 (1989).  The threshold question under *R.* 4:6- 2(e), is whether the pleadings suggest a basis for the requested relief.  *Printing Mart*, 116 N.J. at 746.  See also *Glass, Molders, Pottery, Plastics & Allied Workers Int’l Union v. Wickes Cos.*, 243 N.J. Super. 44, 46, 578 A.2d 402 (Law Div.1990) ("The test for determining the adequacy of a pleading is whether a cause of action is suggested by the facts.").  The Rule requires that the pleading be generously examined, that all matters outside of the pleadings be excluded and that the trial court make an assumption that the allegations of the pleading are true and affords the pleader all reasonable factual inferences when determining whether the pleadings suggest any basis for relief.  *Seidenberg v. Summit Bank*, 348 N.J. Super. 243 (App. Div. 2002); *F.G. v. MacDonell*, 150 N.J. 550 (1997); *Velantzas v. Colgate-Palmolive Co.*, 109 N.J. 189, 192, 536 A.2d 237 (1988).
[brief] Ocean County Indictment Number [...] charged [...] with: murder, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3a(1), (2) (Count One); third-degree possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4d (Count Two); and fourth-degree unlawful possession of a weapon, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5d (Count Three).  (Da 1-3)  Trial began before the Honorable [...], J.S.C., and a jury on September 19, 2022.  (1T)  On September 29, [...]\(^1\) was convicted of all counts.
[brief] ¹  While Higgins addressed this issue in the context of alleged misconduct by co-employees, the Court’s analysis is applicable here to the facts underpinning Plaintiff’s CEPA claim.  As argued in our Brief, the Trial Court incorrectly imposed an unworkable and newly-created burden upon a plaintiff in order to establish employer liability under CEPA, akin to that which is required in a civil rights claim under 42 U.S.C. §1983 or under the New Jersey Civil Rights Act, N.J.S.A. 10:6-1 et seq. (“NJCRA”), pursuant to Monell v. Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
[brief] Cf. State v. Szima, 70 N.J. 196, 198-99 (1976) (trial beginning seven months, inclusive of an interlocutory appeal, after indictment).  The parties in the present case were ready for a motion to suppress and trial as of October 18, 2022 (day 314).  The next in-person court appearance takes place 49 days later on December 6, 2022 (day 363), but nothing happens.  An unexplained hiatus of 240 days takes place before trial on August 3, 2023 (day 603), 20 months after issuance.  “[T]he primary burden [is] on the courts and the prosecutors to assure that cases are brought to trial.
[brief] 23  | Judgment, Order and/or Ruling | Record Citation | |-------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------| | March 25, 2024  Order Denying Plaintiff's Motion to Compel the Deposition of [...] | Pa4 | | April 19, 2024  Order Denying Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration | Pa9 | # TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | Cases | Page(s) | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|---------| | **Campbell v. Sedgwick Detert, Moran and Arnold,** | | | Civil No. 11–642–ES–SCM (D.N.J. March 28, 2013), 2013 WL 1314429 | 14 | | **Connolly v. Burger King Corp,** | | | 306 N.J. Super. 344 (App. Div. 1997) | 10 | | **D’Agostino v. Johnson & Johnson,** | | | 242 N.J.Super. 267 (App.Div. 1990) | passim | | **Dixon v. Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey,** | | | 110 N.J. 432 (1988) | 10 | | **Ecclesiastes 9:10-11-12, Inc. v. LMC Holding Co,** | | | 497 F.3d. 1135 (10th Cir. 2007) | 14 | | **Elasticsearch v. Floragunn GMBH,** | | | 2021 WL 1753796 (N.D.Cal. May 4, 2021) | 14 | | **Environmental Tectonics v. W.S. Kirkpatrick Co,** | | | 659 F.Supp. 1381 (D.N.J. 1987), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, | 15, 16 | | 847 F.2d 1052 (3d Cir. 1988) | | | **Fraunhofer-Geselleshaft Zur Forderung der angewandten** | | | Forschung E.V., 2021 WL 861493 (D.Del. March 8, 2021) | 20 | | **Hardwicke v. American Boychoir School,** | | | 188 N.J. 69 (2006) | 13 | | **Lawson v. Dewar,** | | | 468 N.J. Super. 128 (App.Div. 2021) | 10, 21, 22 | | **Lombardi v. Masso,** | | | 207 N.J. 517 (2011) | 22 | | **Loughran v. PepsiCo, Inc,** | | | Civil No. 22-4390 (D.N.J., Jan. 29, 2024), 2024 WL 328740 | 14 | Metcalf v. Bay Ferries Limited, 2014 WL 3670786 (D. Mass. July 14, 2021)
[brief] Rather, the six-year Statute of Limitations begins to run when the plaintiff either knew or should have known of the claim:  The question in a discovery rule case is whether the facts presented would alert a reasonable person, exercising ordinary diligence, that he or she was injured due to the fault of another.  The standard is basically an objective one—whether plaintiff “knew or should have known” of sufficient facts to start the statute of limitations running.  That does not mean that the statute of limitations is tolled until a plaintiff has knowledge of a specific basis for legal liability or a probable cause of action.  It does, however, require knowledge not only of the injury but also that another is at fault.  Caravaggio v. D'Agostini, 166 N.J. 237, 246 (2001).  In this case, [...] should have known of the 3.0 GPA requirement no later than September 22, 2012, when he acknowledges the website was updated; and in addition, through the information provided to him by way of the Graduate Student Manual and in the Beyond the Curriculum course.  ([...] Dep. T108:19-T109:2 at Pa. 366-67.)  However, even accepting that the [...] website was not revised to reflect the 3.0 GPA requirement until September 22, 2012 – and that it was somehow reasonable for Plaintiff-Appellant to not have known about the requirement before that date – Plaintiff-Appellant’s Complaint is nevertheless barred by the applicable six-year Statute of Limitations.
[brief] There, he heard the ring of a cell phone, which had been placed in the shoe of [...], who was in a cell.  [...] identified the phone as his; an officer gave it to him and told him to unlock it, which he did, and another officer later confiscated it.  (2T 233-5 to 234-17).  DNA analyst [...] testified that she identified Eric [...] as the source of bloodstains found on [...]’s jeans, as well as on a sweatshirt belonging to [...].  (5T 127-5 to 127-19).  [...] of the State Police testified that he had found no records of a license as a private detective or bounty hunter for defendants [...], [...], [...], or [...].  (8T 126-14 to 25).  Mr. [...] declined to testify.  (8T 157-21 to 158-2).  LEGAL ARGUMENT
[brief] ”  (6T 138-19 to 23)  [...] explained that “at first,” she “didn’t do anything” and “just balled up and . . . was just crying. ”  (6T 139-10 to 11)  Her clothes were wet from the blood, so she took them off and put on some clothes from the floor of the car.  (6T 139-5 to 18)  The clothes she put on did not belong to her — “[i]t looked like a mechanic shirt” — which she assumed belonged to [...].