ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] ”  Ibid.  Here, [...] failed to abide by those principles and failed to give due regard not only to the affiant’s training and experience but also the various ways in which the CI’s information was corroborated by other information in the affidavit.  The warranted search in this case is a far cry from the warrantless search in State v. Pineiro, which defendant cites (Db16-18), where “[t]he sum of the evidence was merely the officer’s prior general narcotics training and experience, and his conclusory testimony that he knew that cigarette packs are used to transport drugs because he had seen that type of activity before. ”  181 N.J. 13, 28 (2004).  The warranted search in this case  Contrary to defendant’s arguments, the totality of circumstances as articulated in the warrant-supporting affidavit established probable cause to search for evidence of defendant’s narcotics trafficking.  [...] was wrong to conclude otherwise and overrule the probable-cause determination that [...] made on the basis of the same affidavit.  [...]’s erroneous suppression of evidence must be reversed.
[brief] ........................................................................................Da214-223  Order In Limine dated January 17, 2023 [[...]]  ..................Da214  Order In Limine dated January 17, 2023 [[...]]  ..................Da216  Order In Limine dated January 17, 2023 [[...]]  ..............Da218  Order In Limine dated January 17, 2023 [[...]]  ..............Da219  Order In Limine dated January 17, 2023 [[...]]  ..............Da221  Order In Limine dated January 17, 2023 [[...]]  ..............Da223  Work Order dated December 13, 2011 ........................................................Da225  Work Order dated May 14, 2014 .................................................................Da226  Notice of Motion for New Trial dated November 28, 2023 .......................Da229 Order denying Motion for New Trial dated January 22, 2024 ....................Da231 Order for Judgment dated January 22, 2024..............................................Da233
[brief] N.J.S.A. 10:6-2.........................................................................................................................2  N.J.S.A. 40A:9-22.2 ...............................................................................................................21  N.J.S.A. 40A:9-22.4 ...............................................................................................................21  N.J.S.A. 40A:9-22.5 ..............................................................................................................6, 20, 21, 22  42 U.S.C. §1983 .......................................................................................................................31  Rules R. 2:6-2(a)(1) ..........................................................................................................................25 R. 4:46-2.................................................................................................................................5, 12 R. 4:46-2(b) .............................................................................................................................11 R. 4:69-4.................................................................................................................................10 R. 4:69-6.................................................................................................................................18  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
[brief] [...] (hereinafter “the plaintiff”) was a customer of the [...] store located at [...] on May 30, 2019 when she was caused to trip and fall as a result of dangerous condition in one of the shopping aisles.  (Pa1). ¹  A Complaint was filed on her behalf on January 20, 2020 seeking damages for the permanent injuries she sustained as a result of the fall against [...] U.S.A., Inc. (hereinafter “the defendant”) and [...].  (Pa1).  An Answer was filed on behalf of the defendant and [...] on March 16, 2020.  (Pa8).  The claims against [...] were subsequently dismissed with prejudice.  (1T104:4-105:14).  The matter proceeded through discovery during which time the plaintiff appeared for a deposition.  (1T50:17-22; 4T208:14-262:6).  At her deposition, the plaintiff testified about using a cane for balance issues for about two years prior to her fall at [...], tingling and numbness in her legs prior to the --- ¹ Transcript and Appendix  Reference  Key 1T – Transcript of the June 5, 2023  Trial Date 2T – Transcript of the June 6, 2023  Trial Date 3T – Transcript of the June 7, 2023  Trial Date 4T – Transcript of the June 8, 2023  Trial Date 5T – Transcript of the June 9, 2023  Trial Date 6T – Transcript of the June 12, 2023  Trial Date 7T – Transcript of the June 15, 2023  Trial Date 8T – Transcript of the August 4, 2023  Motion  Hearing Pa – Plaintiff-Appellant’s Appendix incident, medication she took for the tingling in her legs, using a handicapped placard from the time she started taking the medication, and two falls that she had prior to the incident which involved tripping over a brick and sliding out of bed.
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE REQUESTED INFORMATION WAS A PUBLIC RECORD AS DEFINED IN THE OPEN PUBLIC RECORDS ACT (Da107)**  The Trial Court erred on two different conclusions when it found that the requested information was a public record as defined in the Open Public Records Act.  Foremost, the Trial Court erred in finding that the OPRA Statute includes entities acting under the “Authority” of a State Entity.  The Trial Court also erred when it found that the information requested should be considered a public document or record.  Based upon these erroneous findings the holding of the Trial Court should be overturned.
[brief] [4T47:23-24].  As for the consideration of whether any delay was part of Defendants’ litigation strategy, Plaintiff concludes without any support that the motion to compel arbitration constitutes a change in Defendants’ litigation strategy.  In Cole, the defendant actively engaged in the protracted litigation for twenty-one months and took advantage of the judicial forum through discovery and motion practice.  Cole, 215 N.J. at 281.  Here, in contrast, there is nothing before this Court to even suggest that Defendants utilized the brief delay in moving to compel arbitration in bad faith to frustrate the Plaintiff’s rights, or to obtain some benefit that would be otherwise precluded in arbitration.
[brief] Defendant’s argument regarding mitigating factor (9) – the character and attitude of the defendant indicate that he is unlikely to commit another offense – is similarly meritless.  Indeed, sobriety alone is insufficient for finding of mitigating factor (9).  See State v. Locane 454 N.J. Super 98, 129 (App. Div. 2018) (holding that the defendant’s sobriety, given her past conditional discharge in municipal court for marijuana possession, was not adequate support for finding mitigating factors that defendant’s conduct was the result of circumstances unlikely to recur and that the character and attitude of the defendant indicated that she was unlikely to commit another offense).  Here, the sentencing judge found that:  I don’t find that his character is such unlikely he would commit another offense.  He committed this offense while he was on drug court probation, apparently, resulted in his termination, and whether that program was a wake up call for him or not, I don’t know.  We won’t know.  I mean, the changes he’s experienced are relatively short-lived in terms of the length of addition that he suffered from.  He got out of jail a little more than a year ago and has made – has made certainly efforts to improve himself.  However, 14 months while under supervision of the court I don’t think provides significant evidence for this Court to determine his character and attitude is such that he wouldn’t commit another offense.
[brief] Potter v. Charles V. Finch & Sons, 76 N.J. 499, 502 (1978) (quoting N.J.S.A. 48:12-152) (emphasis added).  As noted above, the statute was amended in 1998 by the Legislature.  The June 3, 1996, Assembly Committee Statement explains that “[...] estimates that since 1981 over 300 trespasser cases have resulted in approximately $24 million in actual and projected claim payouts by the corporation. ”  Pa1024.  The December 1, 1997, Senate Transportation Committee Statement further explains, that the purpose for the amendment was to bar recovery based on prohibited behavior:  This bill would amend R.S.48:12-152 to clarify the law concerning prohibited behavior with regard to railroad property and the ability to recover for injuries sustained as a result of that behavior.  It is the sponsor's intent that the provisions of this bill affect recovery when a person engages in prohibited behavior and not when a person is injured only because of a railroad's negligent or reckless action.
[brief] Second, after allowing the State to extricate itself from the Abbott constitutional framework, the trial court compounded its legal error by accepting the State’s argument that SFRA’s Adequacy Budget is nothing more than a cost “estimate” used by the Department of Education to “determine each district’s State aid. ”  (Db35; Pa37.)  In Abbott districts, the Adequacy Budget is much more than that: it is the “core” of the SFRA formula and represents the constitutionally-prescribed level of resources and funding necessary to remedy the T&E violation to their students.  Abbott XIX, 196 N.J. at 552-58; Abbott XX, 199 N.J. at 153.
[brief] Exhibit G – Certification of [...], dated August 12, 2021 .................................................................. 0441a  Exhibit H - Deposition Transcript of [...], taken November 8, 2021 ..............................................................  0445a  Exhibit I – Email from [...] to Defendants describing [...], dated September 18, 2017 ...........................................  0586a  Exhibit J – [...] Boarding Agreement to board [...], dated July 18, 2018.........................................................
[brief] (T55-9-16].  Plaintiff cites the deposition testimony of Ms. [...] and current (at the time) [...] Manager Ms. [...], as alleged proof of some wrongdoing.  (Pb5).  Both witnesses were deposed on August 31, 2018.  (Pa80, Pa87).  With respect to Ms. Puff’s deposition transcript, Appellant extracts six nonsequential pages as “evidence” for the brief (just as Plaintiff did in the original motions).
[directive] from two b.  For a period of years the date of enactment of P.L. 1993, c.227 (C.26:4-100.13 et al.), of 10% the proceeds obtained by the Attorney General under the provisions of subsection a. this of section shall be deposited into the Hepatitis Inoculation Fund established pursuant to section 2 of P.L. 1993, c.227 (C.26:4-100.13).  c.  Beginning years the date enactment of P.L.1993, c.227 (C.26:4-100.13 et al.) and in from of two subsequent years, 5% of the proceeds obtained by the Attorney General under the provisions of subsection a. of this section shall be deposited into the Hepatitis Inoculation Fund established pursuant to section 2 of P.L. 1993, c.227 (C.26:4-100.13).  Amended 1979,c.344,s.6; 1985,c.llO,s.l; 1986,c.135,s.l; 1993,c.227,s.l. 2C:64-7.
[brief] Id.  Contrary to Appellants’ assertions, this does not mean that the [...] provides no coverage in any instances, or no coverage when the underlying vehicle has $500,000 in liability coverage.  Rather, coverage must be determined by comparison of the respective policies at issue and will apply (given its gap filler nature) when the bodily injury limits of the tortfeasor’s policy are less than the UIM limits of the insured (under the policy providing the highest amount of UIM coverage).
[directive] A.  Does the Jury Manager supervise the grand jury clerk(s)?  ___ YES ___ NO  B.  Are grand jury staff, including the grand jury clerk(s) located within the Operations Division?  ___ YES ___ NO  C.  Does the grand jury clerk perform the duties set forth in this Standard?  ___ YES ___ NO  Please briefly explain any NO response.  ________________________________________________________________ ________________________________________________________________ ________________________________________________________________  D.  Does the grand jury clerk perform any duties that are inconsistent with constitutional and statutory requirements, court rules, and Judiciary policies?  If so, please specify those duties and provide your plans for addressing any situations of that kind, including the anticipated date when the grand jury clerk will no longer perform those duties.  ________________________________________________________________ ________________________________________________________________ ________________________________________________________________ ________________________________________________________________ ________________________________________________________________  5
[brief] [...] immediately moved for reconsideration (Pa503).  On June 10, 2022 the Trial Court denied that Motion (Pa1729) (6T).  Thereafter, on February 17, 2023 [...] moved for an Order in Limine prohibiting [...] from even mentioning the Common Law Public Trust Doctrine, the Statutory Public Trust Doctrine, and the Administrative Public Access Rule recently enacted by the [...] (Pa528-529).
[brief] The Second Application sought to construct five (5) affordable units to help assist the Borough with its substantially unmet affordable housing obligation.  Pa391.  By including the affordable units, the Second Application clearly promotes the public health, safety, morals and general welfare of the community and provides “sufficient space in appropriate locations for a variety of . . . residential [and] commercial uses . . . in order to meet the needs of all New Jersey citizens. ”  See N.J.S.A. 40:55D-2(a) (“To encourage municipal action to guide the appropriate use or development of all lands in this State, in a manner which will promote the public health, safety, morals, and general welfare”); N.J.S.A. 40:55D-2(e)(g).  Under the current permitted uses, affordable units cannot be built in this zone because “efficiency units,” (which are the only permitted uses in the B-3 Zone), cannot be used as affordable units under the applicable UHAC guidelines.  See N.J.A.C. 5:80-26.3(b)(1) (“The combined number of efficiency and one-bedroom units is no greater than 20 percent of the total low-and moderate-income units. ”).  The Borough’s Ordinance No. 19-05, mandates that for every multifamily residential development of five (5) dwelling units or more, a set aside rate of fifteen (15%) must be Affordable Housing Units.  Pa350.  The Second Application sets aside seventeen (17%) of the units as affordable and is consistent with the Borough’s mandatory affordable housing set-aside requirements.  Pa390.  Despite following the Borough’s mandate, the Borough refuses to allow affordable units to be built in this zone of the Borough.
[brief] (4)  “The trial court failed to follow case law and Rule 4:42-9(a)(2) in determining whether attorney fees should be shifted in this case.  Not only did the trial court erroneously award fees in full through January 5, 2017 for every item of work listed in the invoices, but the trial court also erred by awarding any fees at all. ”  (Defendant’s Brief, page 42).  (5)  “Plaintiff’s Verified Complaint acknowledged from the start that the Decedent’s beneficiaries had reported to the appropriate Korean authorities that the Decedent had invested $900,000 in [...] (which translated into a 40.8% interest).  Plaintiff filed the lawsuit anyway, according to the Verified Complaint, in order to have an Administrator appointed to search for an alleged additional $10 million in assets, and to examine Defendant’s alleged mismanagement of [...], both of which proved not to exist. ”  (Defendant’s Brief, page 44).
[directive] 5.3  No more than two police vehicles (primary unit and secondary unit) shall become actively involved in a pursuit unless otherwise specifically directed by a supervisor.  5.4  A motorcycle officer may initiate a pursuit, but will relinquish primary unit status immediately upon the participation of a marked police vehicle.  5.5  An unmarked police vehicle will not participate in a vehicular pursuit unless it is equipped with an emergency light and an audible device.  The unmarked car shall relinquish primary unit status immediately upon the participation of a marked police vehicle.  5.6  To diminish the likelihood of a pursuit, an officer intending to stop a vehicle for any violation of the law shall, when possible and without creating a threat to public safety, close the distance between the two vehicles prior to activating emergency lights and an audible device.  Officers shall recognize that, while attempting to close the distance and prior to the initiation of a pursuit and the activation of emergency lights and an audible device, they are subject to all motor vehicle laws governing the right of way (e.g., N.J.S.A. 39:4-91 and -92).  While closing the distance between the two vehicles, officers shall activate the motor vehicle recorder (MVR) and body worn camera (BWC), if equipped and activation is possible without activating emergency lights.  5.7  Throughout the course of a vehicular pursuit, pursuing officers shall not attempt to overtake or pass the violator’s moving vehicle.  5.8  During the course of a pursuit and when approaching an intersection controlled by traffic signals or signs, or any other location at which there is a substantially increased likelihood of collision, the operator of any pursuit vehicle shall, prior to entering the intersection, reduce the vehicle’s speed and control the vehicle so as to avoid collision with another vehicle or pedestrian.  The officer shall observe that the way is clear before cautiously proceeding through the intersection.  At all other times including an attempt to close the distance prior to the initiation of a pursuit and upon the termination of a pursuit, officers  8  USE OF FORCE POLICY
[brief] Respectfully, such conclusion is simply unsupportable.  The only real post-Settlement Agreement act complained of was the Board’s requirement (condition) of the inclusion of the elevator in Building E.  [...]’s complaints about delay getting to the resolution and or that the Board adopted a primary resolution and a supplemental resolution are merely red herrings.  Those events merely get us to the final event, to wit, the Board’s condition of an elevator in Building E.  It defies reason and belies the record before the trial court, to find that such a condition was imposed by the Board in “bad faith” rather than for the benefit of the [...] project, the first responders and the residents and guests of Building E.
[brief] In this eight-year-old case alleging fraud, conversion, tortious interference, New Jersey RICO, aiding and abetting, conspiracy to commit same (hereinafter collectively referred to as “Tort Claims” or “Tort Counts”) and legal malpractice, the Law Division made numerous serious legal errors.  Plaintiffs [...] (“[...]”), [...] (“[...]”), [...] (“[...]”), and [...] (“Plaintiffs”) seek to appeal each of those errors and respectfully request that they be reversed in the interest of justice.  First, the Law Division dismissed legal malpractice claims against Defendants [...] (“[...]”) and [...] (hereinafter collectively referred to as “[...]”) for failure to provide an affidavit of merit (“AOM”), pursuant to the governing statute, N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-26, et seq., despite the fact that said claims fit under the “common knowledge” exception of the AOM statute.  Point I, infra.
[brief] In 2013, the Appellate Division Determined that a “Routine Upgrade” is One Whose Purpose is to Serve the Reliability Needs of a Public Utility’s Existing Customer Base** (Aa0001)  Unfortunately, “[n]either ‘routine’ nor ‘upgrade’ are defined in the [Highlands Act] statute. ”\(^{24}\)  And Environmental Appellants are not aware of any New Jersey court having settled the question of whether “routine” applies to “upgrade” in Exemption #11.  In 2013, however, the Appellate Division did outline what type of project would qualify for a “routine upgrade,” as described below.  In the 2013 case of *Highlands Applicability*, the Appellate Division considered a challenge by [...] --- \(^{23}\) FERC, Order Granting Petition for Declaratory Order, 121 FERC ¶ 61,168 (November 16, 2007), P 112 (emphasis added).
[brief] (Da198-199: Trial Transcript 4T87 17-25 and 4T88 3-10)  The $2.2 Million Dollars was typed in the proposed Amended Final Judgment of Divorce and was based on [...]’s admission that he possessed $2.2 Million Dollars in the so-called Will.  (Da199-200: Trial Transcript 4T88-89)  The $2.2 Million Dollars number was contained in the document so called “Will”.  (Da206-208)  (Da203: Trial Transcript 4T92 14-18 and 4T93 1-5)  The $2.2 Million Dollars in the Amended Final Judgment of Divorce was not from any other financial documents, such as Vanguards accounts and other family financial documents that were submitted to Court after the English PSA and all Chinese agreements were set aside by [...].
[brief] [...]’s underwriting guidelines expressly state that [...] will not issue non-owned/hired auto coverage for insureds that hire or rent 12 to 15-passenger vans.  [...] relied on [...]’s representations that it did not hire or rent such vehicles in issuing the Policy to [...], as attested to by [...]’s underwriter, [...] (“[...]”).  These undisputed facts clearly satisfy New Jersey’s equitable fraud standard supporting rescission.  There was: (1) a misrepresentation in an insurance application; (2) that was material to the risk insured by [...], and (3) that was relied upon by [...] when issuing the Policy to [...].  Accordingly, the trial court properly granted [...]’s summary judgment motion and ordered rescission of the Policy.
[brief] These errors, individually and/or collectively, were clearly capable of producing an unjust result.  R. 2:10-2.  A.  Emphasizing Defendant’s Right To Proffer An Alternative, Exculpatory Explanation For His Tattoos To Counter The State’s Inculpatory Explanation, Violated Due Process By Diluting The State’s Burden Of Proof, Shifting The Burden To Defendant, And Burdening Defendant’s Choice To Remain Silent At Trial.
[directive] It manifests before age 22, is likely to continue indefinitely, and results in substantial functional limitations in three or more of the A-  2  ATTORNEY GENERAL STANDARDS FOR PROVIDING SERVICES TO VICTIMS OF SEXUAL ASSAULT following areas of major life activities: self-care; receptive and expressive language; learning, mobility; self-direction; and capacity for independent living.  Developmental disabilities, include, but are not limited to: autism spectrum disorder; hearing loss; vision loss; muscular dystrophy; cerebral palsy; spina bifida; fragile X syndrome; Tourette’s syndrome; and fetal alcohol spectrum disorders.
[brief] In fact, not only did [...] not object to the instruction, he (along with [...]) requested that it be provided to the jury before the cross-examination was to begin.  Ordinarily, “a defendant waives the right to contest an instruction on appeal if he does not object to the instruction[ ]” at trial.  State v. Adams, 194 N.J. 186, 206–07 (2008); see also N.J. Div. Youth & Family Servs. v. M.C. III, 201 N.J. 328, 339 (2010) (“[I]ssues not raised below will ordinarily not be considered on appeal unless they are jurisdictional in nature or substantially implicate the public interest. ”); R. 1:7–2.