ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Denying Defendant [...]’s Motion for Summary Judgment, dated February 14, 2020……………………………Pa11 # TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | Cases | Page(s) | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|---------| | **A.D. v. Morris County Board of Social Services,** | 23 | | 353 N.J. Super. 26 (App. Div. 2002) | | | **Ahn v. Kim,** | 22 | | 281 N.J. Super. 511 (App. Div. 1995), aff’d in part, rev.’d in | | | part on other grounds, 145 N.J. 423 (1996) | | | **Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,** | 18 | | 477 U.S. 242 (1986) | | | **Aruta v. Keller,** | 31 | | 134 N.J. Super. 522 (App. Div. 1975) | | | **Atlantic Northern Airlines v. Schwimmer,** | 15 | | 12 N.J. 293 (1953) | | | **Baez v. Paulo,** | 21-22 | | 453 N.J. Super. 422 (App. Div. 2018) | | | **Baird v. American Medical Optics,** | 34, 36 | | 155 N.J. 54 (1998) | | | **Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America,** | 17-18 | | 142 N.J. 520 (1995) | | | **Burd v. N.J. Tel Co.,** | 34 | | 76 N.J. 284 (1978) | | | **Caravaggio v. D’Agostini,** | 34, 37 | | 166 N.J. 237 (2001) | | | **Carrino v. Novotny,** | 31 | | 78 N.J. 355 (1979) | | | **Deehurst Estates v. Meadow Homes,** | 10, 11, 15 | | 64 N.J.Super. 134 (App. Div. 1960), certif. den., | | | 34 N.J. 134 (1961) | | | **Farrell v. Votator Div. of Chematron Corp.,** | 29, 31 | | 62 N.J. 111 (1973) | | Fede v. Clara Maass Hosp., 221 N.J. Super. 329 (Law Div. 1987) .................................................. 30 Fox v. Passaic Gen'l Hosp., 71 N.J. 122 (1976) .............................................................................. 35 Gallagher v. Burdette Tomlin Mem. Hosp., 163 N.J. 38 (2000) ................................................................................. 37 Galligan v. Westfield Centre Service, Inc., 82 N.J. 188 (1980) .................................................................................. 36 Grunwald v. Bronkesh, 131 N.J. 483 (1993) ............................................................................... 38 Hernandez v. St. James Hosp., 214 N.J. Super. 538 (App. Div. 1986) .................................................... 30, 31 Jarusewicz v. Johns-Manville Products Corp., 188 N.J. Super. 638 (Law Div. 1983) ..................................................... 30 Kaczmarek v. New Jersey Turnpike Auth., 77 N.J. 329 (1978) ................................................................................. 35, 36 Kandrac v. Marrazzo’s Market at Robbinsville, 429 N.J. 79 (App. Div. 2012) ............................................................... 13, 16, 33 Kyle v. Green Acres at Verona, Inc., 44 N.J. 100 (1965) .................................................................................. 35
[brief] The purchase price reflected in the SPA for [...]’s interest in [...] is not the $1.6 million previously discussed and agreed upon, but, rather, $740,000.  (15T 115:18-21).  This modification did not reduce the $6.3 million in total consideration for the entire transaction, but merely reallocated $860,000 of the [...] purchase price to the [...] acquisition based on the information set forth in P-48 and P-50 that formed the basis for the parties’ deal.
[brief] **The Home Rule Act**  Ordinance No. 17-2017 was enacted under the Borough Council’s powers pursuant to the Home Rule Act.  The specific power is located at N.J.S.A. 40:48-1, which provides that “The governing body of every municipality may make, amend, repeal and enforce Ordinances to: … *** 6. prevent vice, drunkenness and immorality; to preserve the public peace and order, to prevent and quell riots, disturbances and disorderly assemblages; *** 8.  Regulate the ringing of bells and the crying of goods and other commodities for sale at auction or otherwise, and to prevent disturbing noises; … (emphasis supplied).  N.J.S.A. 40:48-1, cited in part above, was enacted as part of the “Home Rule Act. ”  Denbo v. Moorestown, 23 N.J. 476, 478 (1957); Kovalycsik v. Garfield, 58 N.J. Super. 229, 233 (App. Div. 1959); Jersey City v. Department of Civil Service, 10 N.J. Super. 140, 147 (App. Div. 1950).  The Home Rule Act applies to every municipality in the State of New Jersey, and was enacted in 1917 as L.917, c.152.
[directive] 1 Applicability: Forfeiture Program Participating Agencies - 12 of SOP No, Distribution Forfeited Property to 12- 1  Law Participatina Enforcement Aqencies 12- 1 ticabilit y: Al/ Enforcement Personnel Law App 13:77.1, N.J.kC. Supersedes: et. seq. 12- 1 10-2  Source of Funding for Reallocations
[directive] ____________________________________________________________________________________________________ ____________________________________________________________________________________________________ ____________________________________________________________________________________________________  18.  Did you repeat back to the witness the language quoted in the answer to #17 and confirm that is what he/she said □ □ about their level of confidence?  Y N  19.  Was there any other dialogue between anyone in attendance during the identification procedure not described in □ □ detail in the answers to #14 and #17?  Y N (If yes, provide a verbatim/detailed summary of the dialogue).  ____________________________________________________________________________________________________  ____________________________________________________________________________________________________ ____________________________________________________________________________________________________  20.  Did you instruct the witness not to discuss the identification procedure or its results with other witnesses and not to □ □ obtain information from other witnesses/sources?  Y N □ □  21.  Did you preserve the photo array, digital photos, or physical photos used?  Y N □ □  22.  Was this worksheet completed during/immediately following the identification procedure?  Y N (If no, explain)  ____________________________________________________________________________________________________  ____________________________________________________________________________________________________ ____________________________________________________________________________________________________  Date: Time: Signature Print Name  New Jersey Division of Criminal Justice, Issued 2/9/2021
[brief] Applicants’ Exhibit A-8, [...]  Approval dated January 11, 2022..............................................................................SDa011  Applicants’ Exhibit A-10, Zoning Board of Adjustment Minutes (April 19, 1976).................................................................SDa012  Applicants’ Exhibit A-11, Zoning Board of Adjustment Minutes (May 10, 1976).................................................................SDa021  Applicants’ Exhibit A-12, Location and Topographical Survey prepared by [...] and dated October 15, 2020.................................................................SDa026  Because there are multiple Defendants/Respondents, the Appendix to the Appellate Brief submitted on behalf of the Defendants/Respondents, [...] and [...], will use the convention “SDa” with “S” intended to reference the Defendants’/Respondents’ last name.
[brief] ”  N.J. Const. art. I, ¶9; see also N.J. Const. of 1844 art. I, ¶7 (the “right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate”).  The role of the trial court is to determine only whether there exists a genuine dispute regarding a material fact.  It has no authority to resolve such a dispute.  Suarez v. E. Int'l College, 428 N.J. Super. 10, 27 (App. Div. 2012), certif. denied, 213 N.J. 57 (2013) (motion judge may not abrogate the jury's exclusive role as the finder of fact).  Given the constitutional implications of denying a trial by jury, all inferences must be resolved in favor of the non-movant.  The trial court below erred by substituting its judgment, its weighing of the facts, both disputed and undisputed, to determine that no reasonable trier of fact could find that [...] committed an intentional wrong as defined by the caselaw.  Pa10.  The facts here support a finding that [...]’s conduct was beyond the pale and that the injury was not a fact of life but rather extremely avoidable.
[brief] But even if they were advancing another claim, for example, that the board should not have granted variance relief, that is a sufficient basis to articulate standing.  For example, in *Funeral Home*, *supra*, this Court held, “As a citizen and taxpayer of Oradell and operating, as well, a competing business within a mile of the site, we would think plaintiff met the broad definition of ‘interested party’ in *N.J.S.A. 40:55D-4.*”  319 N.J. Super. at 215.  Similarly, the decision in *Edison* highlighted the problem with the objector’s arguments, and noted that it could have challenged the variances that the developer sought.  Standing is to be considered on a case-by-case basis.
[brief] THE POST TRIAL ORDER AND RECONSIDERATION ORDER ARE IN COMPLIANCE WITH RULE 1:7-4(a) (Da1-3)........28  POINT II  TENANT IS NOT ENTITLED TO OFFSET THE AMOUNTS DUE TO LANDLORD WITH THE TENANT ALLOWANCE (Da1-3)..................................................................................................................32  A.  Tenant is Not Entitled to Payment of the Tenant Allowance Due to Its Undisputed Monetary Defaults (Da1-3).................................................................32  B.  Tenant Cannot Rewrite the Lease for Its Own Benefit (Da1-3) ..................................................................................................................35  C.  Landlord Did Not Fail to Mitigate its Damages (Da1-3)......................................................................................................................42  (i) Tenant is Barred from Arguing Landlord Failed to Mitigate Damages Because This Issue Was Not Raised Below (Da1-3)............................42  (ii) Landlord Did Not Seek Money Damages in the Underlying Action (Da1-3) .......................................................43 (iii)  Landlord Did Not Fail to Mitigate Its Damages (Da1-3).................................................................................................44  POINT III  THE LOWER CONSIDERED, AND PROPERLY REJECTED, TENANT’S OFFSET DEFENSE (Da1-3)  .............................................................46  POINT IV  TENANT’S APPEAL IS MOOT (Da1-3).................................................................50
[brief] BECAUSE DEFENDANT DID NOT CONTEST CAUSATION OF ALL INJURY AND BECAUSE CAUSATION OF SEVERE BODILY INJURY IS NOT AN ELEMENT OF THIRD-DEGREE AGGRAVATED ASSAULT ON A POLICE OFFICER, THE TRIAL JUDGE WAS NOT REQUIRED TO SUA SPONTE INSTRUCT THE JURY ON CAUSATION.  In Point III of his brief, defendant submits that it was plain error for the trial judge to not sua sponte instruct the jury on the causation of [...]’s injuries.  (Db27-32).  The State submits that defendant’s argument lacks merit.  To convict a defendant of third-degree aggravated assault on a police officer, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(5)(a), the State must prove the defendant: 1. that the defendant purposely attempted to cause or purposely, knowingly or recklessly caused bodily injury . . .; 2. that [the victim] was a law-enforcement officer; 3[]. that the defendant knew that [the victim] was a law enforcement officer acting in the performance of (his/her) duties or while in uniform or exhibiting evidence of (his/her) authority[.]
[brief] ”  Ibid. (emphasis added).  The delegation provision expressly tasks the arbitrator with responsibility for “determining all threshold arbitrability issues, including issues relating to whether” [...]’s terms are “unconscionable. ”  Ibid. (emphasis added).  In sum, “[i]f there is a dispute about whether this Arbitration Agreement can be enforced or applies to a dispute, you and [...] agree that the arbitrator will decide that issue. ”  Ibid.  II.
[brief] During the hearing conducted by the Trial Court on March 27, 2024, the Appellant refused to accept the clear fact that the Board did not rely on the Rendering to establish the building’s approved height.  Instead, the Appellant solely relied on the Rendering and ignored the actual approved plans.  Even after the Court made clear that the Rendering was irrelevant to the building’s approved height, the Appellant then attempted to introduce the Rendering into evidence to demonstrate that the actual building height was higher than the height shown on the Rendering.  [...] objected to the introduction of the Rendering into evidence on the grounds that the Rendering was not relevant because it was not considered by the Board.  The Trial Court sustained [...]’s objection and denied the introduction of the Rendering into evidence.  (2T20:24 to 21:5, 2T23:1-10, 2T23:20-21, 2T30:19-24, 2T32:13-18, and 2T33:14-16).  The Appellant then attempted to introduce the [...] ad which showed cinder block dimensions to demonstrate that the building height exceeded the +/- 51’ building height shown on the Rendering.  As the Rendering had already been ruled irrelevant, the Trial Court held that the [...] ad to prove the building was somehow not built in accordance with the Rendering was likewise irrelevant and therefore inadmissible.  (2T36:24 to 39:14).  The Appellant’s burden was to prove that the actual building height exceeded the approved building height of 43’-6” above DFE as shown on the approved plans and not the Rendering.  (2T39: 4-25).  The Trial Court gave the Appellant numerous opportunities to introduce relevant evidence to support his claim that the actual building height exceeded the building height shown on the approved plans.  (2T40:12-16).  Instead of introducing evidence that the building exceeded the height shown on the approved plans, the Appellant repeatedly attempted to introduce evidence related to the building’s height in contrast to the irrelevant not-to-scale Rendering.  After excluding the Rendering and the [...] ad from evidence, the Trial Court appropriately dismissed the Complaint with prejudice as the Appellant failed to carry his burden of proof.  (2T40:20 to 42:8).
[brief] Ra7 Attorney General Directive No. 2015-1 ...............................................  Ra8  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CASES Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301 (1958) .................................................. 10 State v. Ahmad, 246 N.J. 592 (2021) ................................................................. 8 State v. Bieniek, 200 N.J. 601 (2010)...............................................................
[brief] A finding that the State deliberately delayed the trial to hamper the defense would weigh heavily against the State while a more neutral reason such as negligence or overcrowded courts would weigh less heavily against the State.  Here, almost immediately after defendant’s arrest, he was “swooped up” by the federal government and detained in the [...] on the federal charges.  Nothing in the record showed that the [...] knew that he was in New Jersey.  (2T8-3 to 6; 2T8-14 to 17; 2T9-23 to 24).  As to whether defendant asserted his speedy trial right, the court noted that defendant claimed he did not know about the indictment until he was arraigned.
[brief] TABLE OF CONTENTS  REPLY ARGUMENT  .................................................................................................................. - 1 - I.  Respondent improperly conflates the terms “stipulated damages” and “liquidated damages” to argue, incorrectly, that the free rent chargeback provision is exempt from scrutiny under Wasserman’s and other precedents to determine whether it provides for a penalty........................................................................................................... - 1 - II.  The validity of the “free rent” chargeback provision at issue here is not “supported by the majority of appellate courts in other jurisdictions,” as Respondent claims........................................................................................................................................... - 3 - III.  The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Robey v. SPARC Group has no bearing on ascertainable loss under the facts alleged in this action......................................................... - 8 - IV.  Respondent’s dismissal of its claim for the $17,900 unlawful debt against the Appellants, after the Appellants’ had already filed counterclaims for treble damages and equitable relief under the Consumer Fraud Act, does not somehow extinguish their claims, or the ascertainable loss that existed when the CFA claims accrued.-  12 - CONCLUSION
[brief] Respectfully, it is submitted that [...] does not have the resources to adjudicate Fraud Act cases such as the instant matter consistent with traditional notions of due process while preserving by the parties’ constitutional rights as discussed below.  C.  COMPELLING INSURANCE CARRIERS AND/OR DEFENDANTS TO RESOLVE FRAUD ACT CLAIMS THROUGH THE NFADR PROCESS DEPRIVES ALL PARTIES OF THEIR RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL.  Here, three groups of defendants filed Answers to [...]’s Complaint in which a jury demand was asserted.  [See Pa 152-333].  As a result, all parties had a right to rely upon these jury demands and to insist upon a jury trial to resolve the claims asserted under the Fraud Act.  In [...] v. Lajara, 433 N.J. Super 20, 29 (App. Div. 2013), the court stated, “Once one party demands a jury trial on all issues, ‘the waiver provisions of subsection c of the rule [4:35-1] cannot be the basis for denying a jury trial to a party who has not demanded such a trial. ’  500 Columbia Tpke. Assocs. v. Haselmann, 275 N.J. Super. 166, 170, 645 A.2d 1210 (App. Div. 1994).  Consequently, trial by jury could be ‘dispensed with only by consent of all the parties or their counsel,’ including that of plaintiff.  Ibid. ”  The Supreme Court held that all parties to a Fraud Act case have a constitutional right to a jury trial. \(^5\)  See [...] v. Lajara, 222 N.J. 129, 134-135 (2015).  Thus, the trial court’s order here that compels [...] and the answering defendants to resolve this matter via the NFADR process deprives [...] and the answering defendants of their constitutional right to a jury trial.
[brief] \(^2\) (Appx 537-38 ¶¶67-68).  \(^2\)  “[A] party cannot contradict his or her own deposition testimony in an attempt to defeat summary judgment. ”  Verhoorn v. Cardinal Health 110, Inc., No. A-2232-12T1, 2013 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2815 (Super. Ct. App. Div. Nov. 21, 2013) (citing Shelcusky v. Garjulio, 172 N.J. 185, 201 (2002)); see also R. 4:46-2(b) (“all material facts in the movant’s statement which are sufficiently supported will be deemed admitted … unless specifically disputed by citation conforming to the requirements of paragraph (a) demonstrating the existence of a genuine issue as to the fact. ”).  ARGUMENT POINT I THE TRIAL COURT
[brief] LEGAL POINT VII.  THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY DENYING MY REQUEST TO GRANT ME PAIN AND SUFFERING DAMAGES AND PUNITIVE DAMAGES FOR COMMITTING FRAUD UPON THE COURT BY [...]  Raised Below: paragraph 39 (029a).  In 1T page 8 lines 2-6.  [...] did not oppose and did not deny my claims and arguments.  The denial order is at (221a).  LEGAL POINT VIII
[brief] 5.  Release of Claims.  TO THE FULLEST EXTENT PERMITTED BY LAW, ADULT PARTICIPANT, ON BEHALF OF HIMSELF/HERSELF AND ON BEHALF OF ANY CHILD PARTICIPANT AND ON BEHALF OF ANY SPOUSE, HEIRS, EXECUTORS, AND REPRESENTATIVES OF ANY PARTICIPANT HEREBY RELEASES, DISCHARGES AND AGREES TO HOLD HARMLESS... THE “PROTECTED PARTIES” FROM AND AGAINST ALL LIABILITIES, LOSSES, DAMAGES, CLAIMS, JUDGMENTS, DEMANDS, ACTIONS, SUITS, CAUSES OF ACTION, COSTS, FEES, AND EXPENSES (INCLUDING REASONABLE ATTORNEY’S FEES AND COURT OR OTHER COSTS) RELATING TO, RESULTING FROM, OR ARISING OUT OF OR ALLEGED TO HAVE RISEN OUT OF (IN WHOLE OR IN PART) ANY BODILY INJURY TO OR DEATH OF PARTICIPANT OR DAMAGE TO OR LOSS OF PARTICIPANT’S PROPERTY: (A) DURING OR RELATING TO PARTICIPANT’S PARTICIPATION (WHETHER ACTIVELY OR PASSIVELY) IN ANY ACTIVITIES ON THE PREMISES OR OTHER LOCATION WHERE THE ACTIVITIES ARE BEING CONDUCTED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO PARTICIPANT’S USE OF ANY EQUIPMENT, PARTICIPANT’S INVOLVEMENT IN ANY CLASSES OR INSTRUCTION, AND PARTICIPANT’S INVOLVEMENT IN ANY COMPETITION OR EVENT SPONSORED BY THE PROTECTED PARTIES...
[brief] Order of Judgment and March 6, 2018  Order of Chancery Division Vacated by the Appellate Division filed December 24, 2019.  Da820  **EXHIBIT  A Order entered by The Honorable [...], P.J.Ch. on June 27, 2017.  (Da207)  15  Not omitted because filed as an Exhibit with Trial Court.  16  Not omitted because filed as an Exhibit with the Trial Court.  **EXHIBIT B**  Order entered by The Honorable [...] P.J.Ch. on March 6, 2018.  EXHIBIT C  Checks to [...], Esq.  Trust Account from Defendant.  **EXHIBIT D**  Appellate Court decision decided June 25, 2019.  EXHIBIT E  Correspondence from [...] To [...], Esq. dated November 14, 2019.  EXHIBIT F Correspondence from [...], Esq. to [...] dated November 22, 2019.  EXHIBIT G  Correspondence from [...] to [...], Esq. dated November 25, 2019.  EXHIBIT H  Email from [...], Esq. to [...] with correspondence from [...], Esq. attached dated November 27, 2019.  PLAINTIFF’S OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO COMPEL RETURN OF MONIES PAID PURSUANT TO JUNE 27, 2017
[brief] State v. Judge, 275 N.J. Super. 194 (App. Div. 1994).  The validity of a motor vehicle stop depends on whether a police officer has an articulable and reasonable suspicion that the driver has committed a motor vehicle offense or was or is involved in criminal activity.  State v. Locurto, 157 N.J. 463 (1999); State v. Thomas, 110 N.J. 673 (1988).  The determination of whether the police have the required articulable and reasonable suspicion to justify a motor vehicle stop depends on the totality of the circumstances.  *Alabama v. White*, 496 U.S. 325 (1990); *Florida v. J.L.*, 529 U.S. 266 (2000) ("The reasonableness of the official suspicion must be measured by what the officers knew before they conducted their search.")
[brief] On the brief and of counsel: [...], Esq. (#021062011)  [...]  [...], Esq. (#009821988)  [...] #  TABLE OF CONTENTS – REPLY BRIEF | Section | Page | |----------------------------------------------|------| | TABLE OF CONTENTS – REPLY BRIEF | i | | TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS | ii | | TABLE OF TRANSCRIPT DESIGNATIONS | ii | | TABLE OF CONTENTS - APPENDIX | iii | | TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | vii | | LEGAL ARGUMENT | 1 | | POINT I: THE ARGUMENTS OF DEFENDANTS