ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] B.  The Trial Properly Found that [...] Had Established An Affirmative Defense Against Vicarious Liability under Dunkley.  (Pa280-282).  Appellant’s argument on appeal of reconsideration boils down to a dispute as to whether [...] adequately presented evidence in the record establishing the fifth prong under the five prong Dunkley test for establishing an affirmative defense to liability.  However, while Appellant bases his argument on what he believes [...] “could have” done in this matter, his subjective opinion is of no consequence when considering what [...] actually did in addressing his claims of discrimination.  A full objective review demonstrates that reconsideration and ultimate grant of summary judgment on the basis of [...]’s affirmative defense was appropriate.
[brief] (Da296-303.)  Obviously, due to the late production of this information, no discovery could be taken on it.  Nevertheless, [...]’s deposition testimony was clear that he was not familiar with the letter.  (Da210 at 23:12-17.)  Critically, [...] was not aware that [...]’s defense of the Underlying Action was made under a reservation of its rights to disclaim coverage as to the amended pleading.  (Da204 at ¶16.)  [...]’s understanding from his insurance agent, [...], was that the Underlying Action would certainly fall within the scope of his policy and be covered.  (Da203 at ¶10; see also Da207 at 11:20 to 12:18.)  Based upon that information, and upon the appointment of counsel, [...] has relied upon [...] and its appointed counsel to conduct his defense in the Underlying Action.  (Da203 at ¶11.)  [...] has had exclusive control of the scope of the defense in the Declaratory Action — it has hand-picked counsel and controlled decisions regarding defenses and discovery.  (Da203-04 at ¶¶9, 12-14.)  Moreover, [...] covered this action for nearly three years without any indication that it would disclaim coverage prior to filing the instant Declaratory Action.  (Da204 at ¶15.)  On June 9, 2020, State farm filed the instant complaint seeking declaratory relief.  (Da11-25.)  It was not until the filing of the Declaratory Action that [...] had any indication that [...] may be disclaiming coverage regarding the amended pleading in the Underlying Action.  (Da204 at ¶16.)  Thereafter, on September 29, 2020, [...] filed his answer, affirmative defenses, and counterclaims and crossclaims.  (Da26-38.)  On October 27, 2020, [...] answered the counterclaims.  (Da39-47.)  Thereafter, the parties engaged in discovery including the exchange of documents and the taking of depositions, with the acknowledgment that the determination of the Underlying Action was likely to be dispositive of this action.  (Da201 at ¶¶6-7.)  In fact, during the course of the Declaratory Action, [...] repeatedly expressed its belief that the determination of the Underlying Action was likely to be dispositive of this matter.  (See, e.g., Da231-33 (declaration on behalf of [...] seeking discovery extension in part because discovery in the Underlying Matter “may impact the coverage issues in dispute in this matter. ”); Da234-36 (requests for trial adjournments from both parties reflecting the parties mutual agreement that disposition of the Underlying Action would likely be dispositive of the Declaratory Action).)  III.
[brief] When [...] was then presented with deposition testimony she had previously given where she admitted to helping her mother shower and dress before the incident (6T102:11-103:25; 6T110:25-111:13), the jury heard [...]’ response to explain her inconsistent testimony.  A  Yeah, but I didn’t -- like I said, I didn’t – the date, I didn’t recognize, you now, remember the date because, you know, I was nervous that day.  And like I said, I have a condition.  (6T112:9-12).  After the plaintiff cross examined [...], the defendant rested.
[brief] Most importantly, because the SFRA formula uses the LFS to determine state Equalization Aid, [...] experienced a 46% decline in the State’s contribution to the Adequacy Budget, from $277.5 million in 2008-09 to $148.8 million in 2019-20.  (Pa913, ¶¶ 20-22; Pa915, ¶ 32; Pa930, ¶153; see generally Pa915-Pa926.)  As Equalization Aid dropped, [...]’s reliance on transitional Adjustment Aid rose by 66%, from $109 million in 2008-09 to $181.9 million by 2019-20.  (Pa915, ¶ 38 to Pa916, ¶ 44; Pa930, ¶ 152 to Pa931, ¶ 157.)  While not contesting the evidence showing that SFRA’s operation lies at the root of [...]’s chronic funding deficits, the State does not address its own failure to examine those deficits at the four “designated mileposts” for the SFRA’s reexamination beginning 2010.
[directive] L. 1995,c.325,s.4.  Rules, regulations 40A 5-47.  The director, in accordance with the provisions of the "Administrative Procedure Act," 5. P.L.1968, c.410 (C.52:14B-1 et seq.), shall promulgate such rules and regulations as are necessary to effectuate the purposes of sections through 4 of P.L.1995, c.325 (C.40A:5-44 through C.40A5-46).
[brief] Thus, [...] (and [...] through [...]) simultaneously sought and obtained appointments of [...] as Statutory Receiver and Special Master.  Under the Statute, title would vest in the Receiver at the time of the appointment, which was September 24, 2021.  By November 4, 2021, when [...] was appointed Special Master in the Foreclosure Action, he held title of [...] and in addition, the diner had been “taken over”, on October 22, 2021.  [...] on the one hand was the Receiver entrusted with dealing with the property of the corporation, including entering into potential transactions that might be considered beneficial regarding the purposes of the Statute.  On the other hand, he was the Special Master ordered to sell property of the corporation only in the manner permitted by the Foreclosure Action.  On January 18, 2022, the purported sale of the leasehold interest and/or what was purportedly being sold took place, with the purchaser for $100 (One Hundred Dollars) being [...], a purported wholly owned subsidiary of and/or entity of [...].  Ca142.
[brief] The Trial Court also determined that [...]’s opinion that each Defendant had a duty to inspect, maintain and repair was supported by the record.  (Pa2162).  Nevertheless, the Trial Court ultimately determined as a matter of law that [...]’s opinions are “net opinions” since, as the Trial Court viewed it, (1) he does not offer any opinion as to the standard of care for inspections, (2) he changed his theory about the condition at the “eleventh hour”, and (3) the issue of causation requires an accident reconstructionist.
[directive] False Reports to Actor gives false information to law enforcement (other than with purpose to implicate 2C:28-4(a)(b) Law Enforcement Disorderly Persons $500 to $1,000 10% permissible another – which would be a fourth degree crime).  Authority  Obstructing  Actor obstructs or impairs or attempts to prevent public servant from performing official Administration of function by force, intimidation or other unlawful act; disorderly persons offense (This 2C:29-1(a)(b) Law or other Disorderly Persons $500 to $1,000 10% permissible excludes the element of actor obstructing investigation or prosecution of a crime – which Governmental would make it a fourth degree).
[brief] \(^6\) N.J.S.A. 40:55D-40.1 and N.J.A.C. 5:21-1.1 et seq., 2T 80:1-14.  [...] --- \(^6\)  [...] later asserted that the RSIS guidance on parking had changed to .5 spaces per unit and would now equate to 83 parking spaces required, 3T 40:2:10.
[brief] See In re Ocean County Com’r of Registration for a Recheck of the Voting Machines, 379 N.J. Super. 461, 473 (App. Div. 2005) (“. . . the obvious purpose of N.J.S.A. 19:49-5 is to prevent a voter from casting two votes for the same candidate—once by marking the printed name and a second time by writing in the same name. ”).
[brief] In past related cases, the Jersey Shore representatives have essentially suggested that a letter from the Planning Board Attorney, to the Borough Clerk of the [...], was not a sufficient mechanism to convey the Board’s determination.  The Respondent Board respectfully rejects such an argument.  As referenced elsewhere herein, NJSA 40A:12A-7 (regarding the Housing and Redevelopment Law) provides the following in pertinent part:  (E)  Prior to the adoption of a Redevelopment Plan, or Revision or Amendment thereto, the Planning Board shall transmit to the Governing Body, within forty-five (45) days after referral, a report containing its recommendation concerning the Redevelopment Plan.  This report shall include an identification of any provisions in the proposed Redevelopment Plan which are inconsistent with the Master Plan and recommendations concerning these inconsistencies and any other matters as the Board deems appropriate.  The Governing Body, when considering the adoption of a Redevelopment Plan or Revisions or Amendment thereto, shall review the report of the Planning Board and may approve or disapprove or change any recommendation by a Vote of a majority of its full authorized membership and shall record in its Minutes the reasons for not following the recommendations.  Failure of the Planning Board to transmit its report within the required forty-five (45) days shall release the Governing Body from the requirements of this Sub-Section with regard to the pertinent proposed Redevelopment Plan or Revision or Amendment thereof… (emphasis added).  Per the direct language of the subject statute, and per the outcome of other judicial decisions on related matters, a formal resolution (of the Respondent Planning Board of Adjustment) is not required.
[brief] As [...] utilized the “Da” (defendant’s appendix) designation for its appendix, pursuant to R. 2:6-8, [...] will utilize “TPDa” (third-party defendant’s appendix) to identify documents contained in its appendix.  Pursuant to R. 2:6-3, [...] will rely upon its appendix for the purposes of this motion and in support of its merits brief.  \(^2\)  Pursuant to R. 2:6-1(a)(2), [...] includes this motion in its entirety to establish the issue of [...]’s participation at trial was raised and waived by [...].  granting [...]’s motion and upon granting the motion, [...]’s attorney indicated “That’s fine. ” (Da462, 2T56:22-57:17; Da465, 2T62:9-21).  During argument, [...] argued against allowing [...] to participate at trial noting [...] would not appear on the verdict sheet.  (Da460-Da461, 2T53:6-54:1; Da463, 2T58:11-16).  [...] further indicated it would not seek a jury interrogatory to assess liability against [...], as that would be barred by the worker’s compensation act.  (Da459-Da461, 2T51:18-54:1).  In fact, [...] suggested allowing [...] to participate at trial would confuse the jury.  (Da461, 2T54:8-13).  The Court ultimately granted [...]’s motion for reconsideration and dismissed [...] entirely from the case.  (Da465, 2T62:8-21).  During that same hearing, the court addressed [...]’s motion to sever, which the Court determined to be moot.  (Da461, 2T54:2-8, 2T71:15-16)  Following oral argument, the Court denied [...]’s motion for reconsideration (Da045-Da046) and granted [...]’s motion to reconsider and correct a clerical error on January 5, 2024.  (Da047-Da048).  This Order completely dismissed [...] from the case.  (Da047-Da048).  [...] did not appeal this Order.  (Da96-Da101, [...]’s Notice of Appeal).  That same day, the Court denied [...]’s motion to sever as moot.  (TPDa12-TPDa13).  Plaintiffs and [...] participated in a jury trial between April 2, 2024 and April 11, 2024.  On April 11, 2024, the jury returned its verdict finding [...] 100% liable for Plaintiff’s injuries.  (Da093-Da95).  [...] filed Notices of Appeal and Civil Case Information Statements that are silent as to [...]’s intent to appeal the trial court’s January 5, 2024, Order dismissing [...] from the case outright.  (Da96-Da101, [...]’s Initial Notice of Appeal; TPDa14-TPDa18, [...]’s Amended Notice of Appeal; TPDa19-TPDa23 [...]’s Initial Case Information Statement; and TPDa24-TPDa28 [...]’s Amended Case Information Statement).
[brief] [8T 90:11-20]; See State v. Wakefield, 190 N.J. 397, 452 (2007) (“[I]n respect of the cross-examination of an expert witness, we have held that an expert witness is always subject to searching cross- examination as the basis of his opinion. ”).  To determine the credibility, weight and probative value of an expert’s opinion, one must question the facts and reasoning on which it is based.  Johnson v. Salem Corp., 97 N.J. 78, 91 (1984).  Because the evidence at the scene was so one-sided as to cause the officers to question [...]’s accusations against [...], their opinions that [...] threw the bag of grout was relevant to the jury’s evaluation of [...]’s credibility and bias in testifying that he believed in the merits of Plaintiffs’ case, and by extension, that [...] was credible.
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT VALENTINE LACKS STANDING TO ASSERT CLAIMS FOR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF (Raised Below: T1; Pa43-Pa44)  The Uniform Declaratory Judgment Law (“UDJL”) at N.J.S.A. 2A:16-53 provides that “[a] person interested under a . . . written contract . . . or whose rights, status, or other legal relations are affected by a statute . . . [or] contract . . . may have determined any question of construction or validity arising under the . . . statute, ordinance, [or] contract . . . and obtain a declaration of rights, status or other legal relations thereunder. ”  [...] is a person interested under a now void contract with [...], as well as a person whose rights, status, and legal relations are affected by a statute, to wit, the NJCFLA, the CFA, and the FDCPA.  Therefore, [...] has standing to seek declaratory and injunctive relief as pled in the Complaint.  Citing In re Resolution of State Com. of Investigation, 108 N.J. 35, 46 (1987), the trial court reasoned that “Plaintiff can’t circumvent the lack of a private cause of action by seeking relief under the New Jersey Uniform Declaratory Judgement Law. ”  SoR p. 11 (Pa43).  Notwithstanding the analysis of private right of action under the NJCFLA, discussed supra, and the fact that In re Resolution addressed a statute\(^4\) which expressly prohibits a private right --- \(^4\)  State Commission of Investigation confidentiality requirements at N.J.S.A. 52:9M-15. of action, the holding of *In re Resolution* was based on a conflict of competing equities not present here.  The court in *In re Resolution* reasoned that they would not impede the “clear public interest” of the Commissioner’s ability to investigate, prosecute, and thwart crimes perpetrated within the criminal justice system.  *See In re Resolution of State Com. of Investigation*, 108 N.J. at 45-47.  Here, there are no competing equities.  Even assuming *arguendo* that no private right of action exists under the NJCFLA, enjoining Defendants from attempting to enforce debts declared void by the legislature does not conflict with the goals of the NJCFLA or the Commissioner’s ability to enforce the same.  Indeed, enjoining Defendants from further unlicensed collection activity would further the legislative purpose of the NJCFLA, *to wit*, regulating the marketplace to ensure that only licensed entities participate.  The trial court’s reliance on *In re Resolution* and its reasoning based on the same are therefore in error as the trial court failed to analyze any competing equities in [...]’s petition for declaratory and injunctive relief.  Thus, the trial court’s Order granting Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss should be reversed.
[brief] For the reasons and facts detailed in Defendant [...]’s Brief and this Reply Brief, the Chancery Court’s Final Opinion and all related sanctions Orders are in error.  This Court respectfully should invalidate the Final Order and the various Sanctions and enter a Final Opinion and Order dismissing the Plaintiff’s Complaint and determining the 1963 Agreement granted temporary permission/licenses that have been waived and/or terminated.  Respectfully submitted, [...]  Attorney ID: 244421968 cc: [...] (via email)
[brief] Plaintiff filed his Complaint against [...] and [...] on April 29, 2019.  (Pa1).¹ [...] subsequently filed its Answer on June 3, 2019.  (Pa36).  [...] and [...] filed their motions for summary judgment on August 25, 2023.  (Pa61).  Oral argument on the summary judgment motions was held on October 13, 2023, at which time the trial court granted [...]’s motion for summary judgment.  (Pa922).  Plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration of the trial court’s October 13, 2023, decision on November 1, 2023.  (Pa924).  Plaintiff’s motion was denied following oral argument on November 17, 2023.  (Pa929). ²  This appeal followed on December 19, 2023.  (Pa999).  STATEMENT OF FACTS
[brief] (5T 124-12 to 16, 125-3)  One of these wounds injured the neck muscles and went through the right jugular vein.  (5T 126-11 to 18)  [...] explained that the stab injuries to the neck were the fatal injuries.  (5T 141-22 to 24, 147-24 to 25)  These injuries would cause death in one of two ways – hemorrhage or air embolism – though he was unable to determine which occurred in this case.
[brief] [...] were evicted from the Property and the [...] released an inspection report in which it determined that the Property was “formerly used as a parking lot [for the plaintiff’s excavating business] that was covered with a mantle of asphalt millings.  The millings had been removed and stockpiled outside the area, leaving exposed the underlying soil.  The soils observed in this area were not naturally-occurring and showed evidence of disturbance. ”  Id. at 2.  Thereafter, in October 2015, based on the inspection, [...] sought to postpone the closing and compel remediation of environmental concerns at the Property.  Id.  No legal claims for liability related to the contamination were made at that time and no legal relief or money damages were sought.  Following a hearing in Chancery Division, Probate Part, the Honorable [...], P.J.Ch. ordered specific performance of the Contract, denied [...]’ requests to compel remediation and directed that closing was to occur within thirty (30) days.  (November 17, 2015 Order by the Honorable [...], P.J.Ch., 29a).  Judge Dow did not address liability for the environmental contamination in this Order.  On January 22, 2016, Defendant [...], in his capacity as Administrator of the [...], filed an Order to Show Cause and Verified Complaint seeking to terminate the real estate contract that existed with [...] and form a new contract with a member of the [...].
[brief] And it is not just that [...] is collecting millions of documents from dozens of custodians—those 81 custodians include numerous high-ranking executives and managers who report directly to and work closely with [...] and [...].  Given the identities of those custodians and the nature of their roles inside the company, there is no reason to expect that [...]’s production from their files has gaps that must be filled by adding [...] and [...] as custodians.  Just the opposite, in fact: the myriad documents Plaintiffs cite in their motion underscore the extent to which the documents that have already been produced from the 81 existing custodians are more than adequate to capture a full range of responsive materials.
[brief] ”  *Id.* at 454.  Here, Appellants could not obtain a declaratory judgment because they litigated this case for years and sought a damages judgment against the [...].  Just as in *Rego* Industries, where the Appellate Division dismissed a claim for declaratory judgment because “another adequate remedy” was available and because declaratory judgment proceedings are only intended as “preventative justice” mechanisms, here, Appellants have been seeking the coercive remedy of a money judgment for years now.  See id. at 452-53.  This case has progressed well beyond the point where a declaratory judgment would resolve the issues or prevent further litigation; if anything, a declaratory judgment in favor of Appellants would give rise to numerous new claims because Appellants would be disrupting a settled solar facility that they did nothing to build.  C.
[brief] (Ja456-457).  Plaintiff is the contract purchaser for the Property, which is approximately 51.913 acres and located along Route 35 between Kings Highway and Kanes Lane.  (Id.).  At all times relevant herein, the Property was predominantly vacant land with the [...] and five preexisting single-family homes located on portions of the Property.  (Id.).  In 2018, the Property was placed in the [...] (“Redevelopment Plan”), which serves as an overlay zone for the underlying PD Planned Development Zone (“PD Zone”).  (Da103).  The PD Zone, with a minimum tract size of 20 acres, permits a variety of residential and non-residential uses.  Townhouses and multi-family housing are permitted uses and a density of 4.5 units per acre is permitted.  (Ja6).  However, there is no affordable housing set-aside requirement in the PD Zone.  (Id.).  --- 3
[brief] The ZBA does --- \(^5\)  In fact, the very same Ordinance number 2021-03, 3/9/21, in §5 deleted §230-101 “regulation of slopes” and in §9 added the same new §230-143.1 “regulation of slopes” (moving it from design standards to the zoning ordinance).  The steep slope provisions were moved from Article XI Environmentally Sensitive Areas, Section 230-101 to Article XV General Provisions, Section 230-143.1 of the Land Use and Development Regulations of Chapter 230 of the [...] Code.
[brief] Pursuant to the terms of the Agreement, Plaintiff voluntarily retired and the Township agreed to not stand in the way of Plaintiff applying to the State of New Jersey, Department of the Treasury, Division of Pension and Benefits’ (“NJDPB” or the “Division”) Police and Firemans’ Retirement System (“PFRS” or “Pension Board”) for disability retirement including, but not limited to involuntary ordinary disability (“IOD”) retirement.  The terms of the Agreement are clear that the Parties shall have no other obligation to one another.  Indeed, the Parties acknowledged the autonomy of the NJDPB in adjudicating IOD retirement claims, and that the Agreement was not contingent on the NJDPB accepting Plaintiff’s application.  Eventually, PFRS denied Plaintiff’s application for IOD retirement because it believed that Plaintiff was not entitled to it.  Thereafter, Plaintiff filed the instant matter alleging the Township “breached the contract” of the Agreement and seeks an order to compel the Township to revise the terms of the Agreement.  The Chancery Division ignored precedent of this Court reinforced in multiple published and unpublished opinions, and severed the provision of the Agreement which prohibited Plaintiff’s return to service.  As a result, the Chancery Division removed the bargained-for-exchange that the Township and the Plaintiff entered into in executing the Agreement.  The Chancery Division’s decision is both legally and factually incorrect, and against well-established case law.  Therefore, the decision of the Chancery Division must be reversed and Plaintiff’s Complaint dismissed with prejudice.
[brief] [...]’s Response Improperly Relies on Materials That are Not Part of the Trial Court Record.  R. 2:5-4 states that the “record on appeal shall consist of all papers on file in the court or courts or agencies below, with all entries as to matters made on the records of such courts and agencies, the stenographic transcript or statement of the proceedings therein, and all papers filed with or entries made on the records of the appellate court. ”  R. 2:5-4.
[brief] Plaintiff recounted to the family court events after the engagement, emphasizing that he and Defendant spent time together socially for couple hours a day for the next 3 days.  Plaintiff described an intimate encounter at the movies, where Defendant was very physically affectionate despite claiming to be a virgin and inexperienced.  Defendant stated that these interactions, including kissing and touching, made him feel she was trying to seduce him and reassured him about their future marriage.  After Plaintiff returned to America, the relationship continued long distance.  (1T66).