ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] POINT II  THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING [...]’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT WHERE THERE WERE GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT AND PLAINTIFF ESTABLISHED A PRIMA FACIE CLAIM OF BREACH OF CONTRACT (3T78 – 3T88)  Again, there can be no dispute that Plaintiff established a prima facie breach of contract claim against Defendant [...], and therefore such claim should have been presented to the jury.  The uncontroverted facts demonstrate that Plaintiff was not provided the opportunity to enter and complete the master’s degree in conjunction with the Doctor of Pharmacy, despite him reaching the requisite 3.0 Grade Point Average (“GPA”).
[brief] In State v. Randolph, 219 N.J. 330, 334 (2012), the Supreme Court held affirmed that when a defendant is sentenced, no matter the context, “the trial court should view defendant as he stands before the court on that day. ”  The Court explained that rehabilitative efforts during incarceration relate to the risk of re-offense, aggravating factor (3).  Id. at 343-44.  Of course, the less likely re-offense is, the less important specific deterrence, a component of aggravating factor (9), is.  In addition, rehabilitation would be relevant to mitigating factor (9), the character and attitude of the defendant indicates he is unlikely to commit another offense.  Here, the trial court made no reference to the rehabilitative efforts or their relationship to the aggravating and mitigating factors.  This oversight is particularly problematic in this case, where almost ten years elapsed from the date of the offense until the date of sentencing.
[directive] Setting and Implementing Enforcement Priorities that Promote Racial Justice  Responding effectively to individual complaints is important.  At the same time, to fulfill its mission, a civil enforcement agency must do more than effectively handle individual complaints.  Civil enforcement agencies should proactively identify appropriate targets for investigation and possible enforcement actions, rather than rely solely on the submission of complaints.  These investigations and enforcement actions may allow agencies to identify and remedy systemic problems that have disproportionate impacts on underserved communities but that may be difficult or impossible for affected individuals to identify themselves.
[brief] New Jersey State Troopers are assigned a badge number upon successful completion of the academy and these badge numbers are never repeated.  Currently, the New Jersey State Police badge numbers only reach the 9,000s; meaning that in the entire history of the New Jersey State Police, there are less than 10,000 New Jersey State Troopers, which includes all active or retired members of the State Police Retirement System.  Failure to provide any notice, adequate or actual, is reasonable and equitable grounds for relaxing the deadline for registration under the Ricci Act.
[brief] At the time these depositions took place, counsel had no way of predicting what questions would be asked of co-defendants and whether any testimony would reference [...].  Of course, Plaintiffs ultimately did try to use such testimony against [...] when it opposed [...]’s second Motion for Summary Judgment, citing to testimony from [...]’s representative that he reviewed the preliminary site plan when determining the Property was part of the redevelopment project.  (Pa000199).  The fact that a significant number of hours were expended on a matter does not, in and of itself, render the number of hours unreasonable.  Plaintiffs’ “strategic decision” not to conduct any discovery regarding [...] required its counsel to participate in other means of discovery for one year and then develop a strategy to file a second Motion for Summary Judgment.  As stated above, RPC 1.5(a) sets forth multiple factors for courts to consider when determining whether an attorney’s fees charged to a client are reasonable.
[brief] *Id.* at 489.  The Court found that the “proposed project clearly fail[ed] to meet the express language” of the applicable rules, and the Department did not have the express or implied authority under CAFRA to use the settlement process “to circumvent CAFRA’s substantive permitting requirements. ”  *Id.* at 492, 497.  The Court further noted that even the Commissioner found that the proposed project did not comply with the infill development rule.  *Id.* at 492.  Essential to the decision in *Dragon* was that the Department allowed the project even though it determined that it did not comply with applicable regulations.
[brief] In Louis, where the defendant, an adult, stabbed a mother and her child, raped the mother, and then started a fire in their apartment, the Court held that “the crimes did involve separate acts of violence against multiple victims, but the crimes and their objectives did not seem to be predominantly independent of each other. ”  Id. at 254.  In addition, the Court suggested that the offenses were “committed so closely in time and place as to indicate a single period of aberrant behavior. ”  Id.  The Court upheld a decision of the Appellate Division reducing an adult’s 130-year sentence with a 65-year parole disqualifier to a 60-year sentence with a 30-year sentence with a mandatory minimum.
[brief] ATTORNEY GENERAL OF NEW JERSEY  By: /s/ [...]________________________  [...]  Deputy Attorney General  [...]  Assistant Attorney General Of Counsel  cc: all counsel of record (via eCourts)  IN THE MATTER OF [...], [...], OCEAN COUNTY, SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY  APPELLATE  DIVISION CIVIL ACTION DOCKET NO.: [...]  On Appeal from State Agency Decision on May 15, 2024
[brief] “[N]o amount of discovery would be likely to uncover such useful information as the strengths and weaknesses of [a] corporate client's decision-makers or their attitude towards settlement. ”  See Reardon v. Marlayne, 83 N.J. 460, 476, 476 (1980).  Similarly, in an unpublished opinion, Delaney v. Dykstra, A-1953-19T1 (App.Div. Jul. 9, 2020) (309a), the Appellate Division upheld the trial’s finding that [...]’s knowledge of its former client’s financial information was grounds for disqualification.
[brief] For all of the foregoing reasons, Appellant [...] respectfully submits that the Public Access Law does not provide [...] with the authority to impose new public access under the circumstances presented by [...]’s permit application.  As such, [...] respectfully requests that this Court vacate the Department’s October 6, 2023 Final Decision and declare Pre-Construction Condition #1 of [...]’s Waterfront Development Permit to be void \textit{ab initio} or, in the alternative, to remand this matter to the Department for a plenary hearing to clarify and supplement the record below.  Respectfully submitted, /s/ [...], Esq. [...], Esq. [...] [...] [...]  DATED: May 7, 2024 Counsel
[brief] **a.  DEFENDANTS DID NOT FAIL TO COMPLY WITH R.4:67-1. **  Plaintiff argues that Defendants “failed to follow the guidelines for an order to show cause under New Jersey Rule 4:67-1” and that their proposed order to show cause is therefore “irrelevant. ”  Opp. at 4–5.  This argument was not raised in opposing the motion to reopen below and is therefore waived.
[brief] 351 N.J. Super. at 481-483.  The court reasoned that the testimony was far more prejudicial than probative.  Id. at 483.  Acknowledging that some of the testimony was necessary to rebut the defense contention that the defendant did not suffer from an antisocial personality disorder, the court suggested that the State expert be permitted to give his final diagnosis without the prejudicial hearsay references.  Id. at 484.  The court also suggested that the evidence could be excluded in its entirety under N.J.R.E 403.  Id.  The court also noted that in any situation involving hearsay placed before the jury through expert testimony, the jury should be instructed that the probative value of the opinion is no greater than the hearsay statements on which it is based.  *Id.* at 480-81.
[brief] (Pa11; Pa58; Pa60; Pa55).  [...]’s affidavit asserted, in relevant part, that he “did not receive any correspondence or post card. ”  (Pa55).  The Board considered [...]’s request at its meeting of May 23, 2023, where it voted to deny his request to register under the amended benefits provisions of the Ricci Act.  (Pa24-27).  The Board concluded that [...] was notified as required by the Ricci Act but failed to submit his Eligibility Registration Form by July 8, 2021.  (Pa26).  [...] appealed the Board’s decision by letter dated July 18, 2023.
[brief] Assuming the trial court follows the sentencing guidelines, the one exception to that obligation occurs when a sentence shocks the judicial conscience.  [State v. Cassady, 198 N.J. 165, 180 (2009) (quoting State v. O'Donnell, 117 N.J. 210, 215–16 (1989)).]  The ordinary term for a first-degree crime is between ten years and twenty years.  N.J.S.A. 2C:43–6a(1).  The length of the term within this range depends on the court's analysis of the aggravating and mitigating factors.  N.J.S.A. 2C:44–1a.  Once the appropriate sentence is determined, the court shall “state on the record the reasons for imposing the sentence, including its findings pursuant to the criteria for withholding or imposing imprisonment ... and the factual basis supporting its findings of particular aggravating or mitigating factors affecting [the] sentence. ”  N.J.S.A. 2C:43–2e; R. 3:21–4(g).  “The absence of such a statement conceals both sound and improper reasons and bars informed evaluation on appeal. ”  State v. Martelli, 201 N.J.Super. 378, 385 (App.Div.1985).  “Without such a statement, appellate review becomes difficult, if not futile. ”  State v. Kruse, 105 N.J. 354, 360 (1987).  *10
[brief] If an exemption is not needed to attract private capital, any cost-benefit analysis required by N.J.S.A. 40A:20-11a. is moot and the exemption itself would be constitutionally problematic since it would be unmoored from the redevelopment goals of the Blighted Areas Clause.  Indeed, the Township’s own experts have confirmed the critical importance of this criterion.  At the public hearing on the Ordinance, attorney [...], appearing for the Township as an expert, testified:  A long-term tax exemption law allows municipalities to grant PILOTS [to] the projects that would not otherwise be able to be financed, projects that would not likely occur in their proposed form without the PILOT.  Redevelopment projects in general are frequently unable to attract private investment without assistance in the form of a municipal PILOT or in some cases, bond financing.  The combination of risks associated with redevelopment projects and the uncertainty of conventional taxes make marginal projects difficult to finance.  That’s common because by definition, you’re talking about the development of properties or projects that face stresses, burdens that * * * the development of raw land, proximate utilities and things like that don’t otherwise face. \(^8\) --- \(^8\)  [...]’s analysis is confirmed by the Municipal Tax Abatement Handbook of the N.J. Department of Community Affairs which states:
[brief] When a direct action is brought on behalf of the entire class of injured shareholders and the company’s solvency is not in question, there is less reason to insist that the action be brought derivatively.  *Brown*, 323 N.J. Super. at 37.  Indeed, one of the main reasons to abandon the distinction between a direct and derivative action in a context like this – a closely held entity with few shareholders – is that even if a minority owner overcomes the procedural hurdles to bring a derivative suit, “any recovery accrues to the corporation and hence remains under the control of the very parties who may have been defendants in the litigation. ”  *Id.* at 38, citing *Richards v. Bryan*, 879 P.2d 638, 647 (Kan. 1994).  Here, the trial court correctly exercised its discretion to allow this suit to proceed directly, calling it the “exception” to the need to file derivatively.  (26T47:18 to 50:9).  First, the lawsuit did not unfairly expose the defendants to a “multiplicity of actions. ”  [...] and [...] were already defendants, as were the entities to which [...] improperly transferred funds.  Second, this suit did not materially prejudice [...] and [...] creditors.  The Amended Complaint alleges (and [...]’s testimony and report schedules confirm) that [...] underreported assets, overreported liabilities, and diverted millions from [...] and [...] to the Plaintiffs’ detriment several years ago with minimal impact on the financial wellbeing of the companies.  The defendants did not identify any third-party creditor claims as a defense to the claims here.  Third, there is no reason to believe that this lawsuit will interfere with distribution of the recovery among interested persons.  The only interested persons here are [...], [...], and their wives, all of whom are already parties.  And, one of the main reasons that Plaintiffs amended their complaint to name additional defendant companies was so that Plaintiffs could obtain complete relief from the entities that [...] controls if Plaintiffs prevailed at trial, which they ultimately did.  Accordingly, even if the Court declines to find that Plaintiffs suffered a special injury, the trial court was still correct to exercise its equitable discretion to allow this suit to proceed directly, rather than derivatively.  Finally, Brown also confirms that allowing Plaintiffs’ to proceed directly was a matter of discretion for the trial court.  Thus, this Court should only reverse that holding if it concludes that the trial court abused its discretion, which, as set out above, it plainly did not.  See Brown, 323 N.J. Super. at 39.  D.
[brief] It is clear that such a motion may be properly granted although the state of the evidence would not justify the direction of a verdict.  *Franklin Discount Co. v. Ford*, supra (27 N.J., at 490).  A process of evidence evaluation, -- "weighing" --, is involved, which is hard indeed to express in words.  This is not a pro forma exercise, but calls for a high degree of conscientious effort and diligent scrutiny.  The object is to correct clear error or mistake by the jury.  Of course, the judge may not substitute his judgment for that of the jury merely because he would have reached the opposite conclusion; he is not a thirteenth and decisive juror.  It was said in *Kulbacki*, "[w]hat the trial judge must do is canvass the record, not to balance the persuasiveness of the evidence on one side as against the other, but to determine whether reasonable minds might accept the evidence as adequate to support the jury verdict * * *."  38 N.J., at 445.  This does not mean that the test is the same as on a motion for judgment.  Rather what was meant was that in ruling on a motion for a new trial, the trial judge takes into account, not only tangible factors relative to the proofs as shown by the record, but also appropriate matters of credibility, generally peculiarly within the jury's domain, so-called "demeanor evidence", and the intangible "feel of the case" which he has gained by presiding over the trial.  The whole process is well summed up in the dissenting opinion in Kulbacki: "the question is whether the result strikes the judicial mind as a “Miscarriage of Justice”, * * *", 38 N.J., at 459.  This is the standard intended to be conveyed by R. 4:49-1(a), although expressed negatively and somewhat redundantly:  "The trial judge shall not, however, set aside the verdict of a jury as against the weight of the evidence unless, having given due regard to {55 N.J. 7} the opportunity of the jury to pass upon the credibility of the witness ([...]), it clearly and convincingly appears that there was a manifest denial of justice under the law."  The rule might be more precisely stated as "the trial judge shall grant the motion, if, having given due regard to the opportunity of the jury to pass upon the credibility of the witness, it clearly appears that there was a Miscarriage of Justice under the Law."  See: Dolson v. Anastasia, 55, N.J. 2:258 a2d 706, (1969)  POINT IV
[directive] Agencies should use the incident command system.  This will help to ensure that appropriate resources are brought in and that all interests are represented in the decision-making process.  The incident command structure shall include, at a minimum, a tactical team representative, a Crisis Negotiation Team representative, a senior member of the County Prosecutor’s Office command staff, a mental health professional in a consulting role when available, and the incident commander.  Communication between the tactical team and the Crisis Negotiation Team is critical for the effective operation of the Unified Command.  Communication in real time will permit the incident commander to make appropriate decisions about how to successfully resolve the situation.
[brief] Courts have continually and routinely determined that the type of logic advanced by Appellant in this case does not state a sufficiently clear mandate as required to support a *Pierce* claim.  *See, e.g.*, *Warner v. United Nat. Foods, Inc.*, 513 F. Supp. 3d 477 (M.D. Pa. 2021) (granting a motion to dismiss under similar Pennsylvania law because plaintiff could not identify a clear mandate of public policy articulated by governor’s executive orders regarding COVID-19 testing); *Valdivia v. Paducah Ctr. for Health & Rehab., LLC*, 507 F. Supp.
[brief] The fact that there were no genuine vacancies at the time Appellant was ranked first on a certification does not constitute interference with those rights on the part of the [...] or [...], nor is there a “significantly close connection” between the [...]’s good-faith mistake in filling anticipated vacancies, the [...]’s one-time relaxation of its rules, and Appellant’s rights under N.J.A.C. 4A:10-1.1(d).  CONCLUSION
[brief] His time spent on reducing it by $20,219.50 was misspent since he spent his time on the WRONG issues, and NEVER on [...]/[...] refusals to work on a readily achievable Settlement (see p. 38-40, par. 34 above).  Furthermore, Judge’s rejections for $20,219.50 of billed work from the requested $113,497 were also very questionable and subjective, rather than irrefutable & objective.  As one example, his misdirected reductions DISREGARDED that some of their billed services were for legal work for Estate Case Docket No. [...], and was NOT under the Trust Case, and should NEVER have been approved by the Court.  (also confirmed on p. 28, 2nd par., above)  As per my Nov. 28, ’22 Certification, [...]’s potential legal work, which I intelligently itemized, & which could have been reimbursed by Trust, would have been limited to around $5K that I intelligently estimated if they had worked for quick 3-Way Settlement.
[brief] See Pa101-103.  This individual was first identified to Defendants when their counsel received the subpoena.  [...] was never identified in any discovery produced in this case and could not even be named by Plaintiff at his own deposition, simply recalling that he had private conversations with a “Russian girl”.  See Pa63-100 at 48:14-49:25.  Plaintiff made no attempts to amend/supplement his prior discovery responses, nor extend discovery, at any time prior to the discovery end date on May 26, 2022.  Similarly, Plaintiff has never asserted that Defendants’ productions were incomplete and have never served Defendants with a deficiency letter or moved to compel any discovery alleged to be owed by Defendants.
[brief] Kochen v. Consol. Police & Firemen's Pension Fund Comm'n, 71 N.J. Super. 463, 478, (App. Div. 1962).  See Duignan v. Bd. of Trs., Pub. Employees' Ret. Sys., 223 N.J. Super. 208, 216 (App. Div. 1988) (same); Hillman v. Bd. Trs., Pub. Employees' Ret. Sys., 109 N.J. Super. 449, 455 (App. Div. 1970) (same).  Francois v. Board of Trustees, 415 N.J. Super. 335, 349.
[brief] However, DCF’s EEO investigator did not request witness statements from [...]  Moreover, the F.P. case reveals that when the appellant there tried to support his appeal with self-gathered written statements, “the Commission expressed ‘serious concern’ regarding [appellant’s] solicitation of witness statements as part of his appeal, contending that it violated the confidentiality provision of N.J.A.C. 4A:7–3.1(j). ”
[directive] There are, however, occasions when deadly force is necessary to protect officers and the public.  An officer may use deadly force only when the officer reasonably believes that such action is immediately necessary to protect the officer or another person from imminent danger of death or serious bodily injury.  Officers must adhere to the following: (a) as discussed in Core Principle Three, when feasible, officers shall attempt to de- escalate situations, issue verbal warnings, or use non-lethal force with the goal of resolving encounters without using deadly force; (b) officers shall not use deadly force if a reasonably available alternative will avert or eliminate an imminent danger of death or serious bodily injury and achieve the law enforcement purpose safely; (c) when feasible, prior to using deadly force the officer shall identify themselves as a law enforcement officer and give a clear verbal warning to the suspect that the officer will use deadly force; and 13 USE OF FORCE POLICY | December 2020 (d) officers shall not use deadly force when the use of deadly force creates a substantial risk of injury to innocent persons.
[brief] ...........................................  29  A.  Although Not Relied Upon by the Trial Court, the August 26, 2021 E-mail Confirms the Intent of the Parties Regarding the Settlement Agreement (Da273a).................................................................36  IV.  THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY HELD THAT [...] WAS ENTITLED TO AN AWARD OF ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND COSTS UNDER THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT (DA280a-81a).................................................. 39
[directive] It should be such constructive immediate need to use motor police activity, such as a would have initiated a the officer already constructive authority or force arises, use to the the requirement to activate for that would have triggered to a call service, stop, or response vehicle stop, "Terry" often will co-occur during in section activities enumerated this (recognizing two or more police note 2 that BWC; see encounter) .  police-citizen course of a single the 11 Page law specified of list the expand to chooses a in When department field.  of discretion the officers the circumstances objective clearly the shall establish 5.2, section in forth it enforcement set activities uniformed authorize under to section this is activation.
[brief] Besides the matter not being properly before this Court, two issues preclude granting summary judgment to [...].  First, the “material facts” relied upon by [...] in support of this motion do not exist in the record.  [...]’s asserted “material facts” are in dispute; therefore, summary judgment is not appropriate.  For example, [...] contends that [...] “sent” the video to members of the [...] Community; however, only [...] testified to seeing the video.  There is no proof [...] intended to or did disseminate the video to the “community. ”  Second, it is dispositive of the motions that [...]’s actions are not “misconduct in office,” the only statutory basis for removal of a sewerage authority commissioner under N.J.S.A. 40:14A-5(c).