[brief] (Pa001001–1031).  In its decision, the Superior Court considered the essential question of “whether the MSRA allow[s] the Defendants to vacate any prior anticipated terminal leave payments purportedly owed to these Plaintiffs who retired in 2017 from a police force in a ‘municipality in need of stabilization and recovery?’” (Pa001027).  The Superior Court unequivocally found that “the answer is yes, the MSRA specifically allows the Defendants to do so. ” (Ibid.).  Specifically, the Superior Court found that:  [T]he Legislature clearly granted the State broad authority, and intended the MSRA to supersede any collective bargaining agreement or CNA.  Furthermore, the Court finds the Legislature also instructed the courts to construe the MSRA liberally in light of the State’s interest in addressing the City’s severe fiscal distress.  The Defendants can cap the terminal as they did here.  (Ibid.).  In reaching this decision, the Superior Court considered the “futility” of Plaintiffs’ Complaint:  The Legislature instructed the courts to liberally construe the MSRA “to give effect to its intent that severe fiscal distress in municipalities in need of stabilization and recovery shall be addressed and corrected. ”  N.J.S.A. 52:27BBBB-13.  When construing a statute, this court’s “paramount goal” is to discern the Legislature’s intent.  DiProspero v. Penrt, 183 N.J. 477, 492 (2005).  Courts must “look first to the statute’s actual language and ascribe to its words their ordinary meaning. ”  Kean Fed’n of Teachers v. Morell, 233 N.J. 566, 583 (2018).  “[T]he best indicator of that intent is the statutory language, . . . .”  Richardson v. Bd. of Trs., PFRS, 192 N.J. 189, 195 (2007) (quoting DiProspero, 183 N.J. at 492).  “If the plain language leads to a clear and unambiguous result, then our interpretive process is over. ”  Ibid. (Pa001028).  The Superior Court further observed that the MSRA directly speaks to situations, such as here, where there is an expired CNA.  Under these circumstances, the MSRA provides:  Notwithstanding the provisions of any other law, rule, regulation, or contract to the contrary, the director shall have the authority to take any steps to stabilize the finances, restructure the debts, or assist in the financial rehabilitation and recovery of the municipality in need of stabilization and recovery, including, but not limited to:  . . . (i) with respect to any expired collective negotiations agreement to which the municipality in need of stabilization and recovery is a party, unilaterally modifying wages, hours, or any other terms and conditions of employment.  . . .  N.J.S.A. 52:27BBBB-5(3)(i) (2016) as amended (2021).  (Pa001029).  [...] recognized that:  [T]here was no CNA in place covering the time between December 31, 2015 and Plaintiffs’ retirements in 2017.  The MSRA was effective on May 27, 2016 and a determination was made to cap terminal leave at $15,000.00.  The intent of the MSRA is clear and unambiguous and it permits the Defendants to exercise their authority over the [...]’s retirees and can “unilaterally modify[] wages, hours, or any other terms and conditions of employment” to take “any steps” to stabilize the City’s finances.  (Ibid.).  Accordingly, [...] found that a “reasonableness analysis is not required[.]” (Ibid.).  The Superior Court considered each of Plaintiff’s causes of action and found that none are sufficient to state a claim, where, as here, the complained of action all stems from “Defendants’ act of capping Plaintiffs’ terminal leave pursuant to the MSRA in an effort to stabilize the City’s finances. ”  (Pa001030).  Ultimately, the Superior Court held that Defendants’ actions are consistent with the MSRA.  The Superior Court’s February 15, 2024 Order and Decision should be affirmed on appeal.