ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] To facilitate his presentation and narrative of this odd hybrid prerogative writ/declaratory judgment/civil rights act violations case, plaintiff has combined and merged his statement of facts and procedural history sections.  In addition, for purposes of this Brief, 1T refers to the May 17, 2023 Rule 4:69-4 Case Management Conference Hearing Transcript, 2T refers to the September 22, 2023 Dispositive Summary Judgment  Dismissal Hearing Transcript and 3T refers to the March 5, 2024 Reconsideration, Alteration, Amendment and Vacation Denial Hearing Transcript.
[directive] 1.  Specimen Acquisition Procedures (Section IV); 2.  Submission of Specimens for (Section V); Analysis (Section VI); 3.  Analysis of Specimens 4. (Section VII); Drug Test Results of VIII); 5.  Consequences a Positive Test Result (Section of Refusal to 6.  Consequences a Submit to a Drug Test (Section IX); in of Resignation/Retirement lieu Disciplinary Action (Section 7.  X); XI); Record Keeping (Section and 8.  9.  Central Drug Registry (Section XII).
[brief] On May 3, 2019 the Public Trust Doctrine Law, (Chapter 8 Laws of 2019)(Pa419) codified the long existing common law “Public Trust Doctrine” as now positive statutory law, and authorized the [...] to promulgate administrative rules and regulations for enforcement of the mandate to future development.  The new law did not supersede or supplant the 200+ year old Public Trust Doctrine, but created a mechanism for oversight and enforcement concurrent to any private right of action already existing under the Common Law.  See N.J.S.A. 13:1D-150 to 156 (Pa425).  The referenced [...] regulations enacted are now found in the New Jersey Administrative Code, most significantly at N.J.A.C. 7:7-9.48 and the directly applicable “public access rule” at N.J.A.C. 7:7-16.9 which requires all local municipalities to ensure that:  “… [p]ublic access to lands and waters subject to public trust rights shall be provided in accordance with public access rule, 7:7-16.9.  Development that does not comply with 7:7-16.9, Public access, is discouraged on lands and waters subject to the public trust rights. ”  [N.J.A.C. 7:7-9.48(b)] (Pa160)  As of the date of the Statutory Public Trust Doctrine Law, all further development of public or private lands that adjoin navigable waters now had that additional requirement to be satisfied as a condition of lawful approval of the development; the Redevelopment Plan was required to satisfy and comply with the “public access rule” now found in N.J.A.C. 7:7-16.9.  The public access rule essentially mirrored the Common Law right of public access which had in the past been the source of Court Rulings addressing the competing rights of private property owners and the public and the public’s right of access.
[directive] you will be required to serve 85% of the sentence imposed for that offense(s) before you will be eligible for parole on that offense(s)?  Formulário revisado em vigor 01/08/2018, Promulgado por Complemento à Diretriz #04-14, CN 11171-Portuguese página 1 de 2 Revised Form Effective 01/08/2018, Promulgated by Supplement to Directive #04-14, CN 11171-Portuguese page 1 of 2 2.  Você entende que em decorrência da sua declaração de culpa por estas acusações o [Sim/Yes] [Não/No] juiz terá de impor um período de supervisão de liberdade condicional de ano(s) e que este período começará assim que cumprir a pena de prisão?
[brief] In addition to seeking a declaratory judgment that the arbitration clause is invalid and dismissing the AAA arbitration, plaintiffs’ Complaint herein asserts Counts for violations of the CFA and PREDFDA, breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, negligent and fraudulent misrepresentation and omission, and for a declaratory judgment rescinding their condominium purchase agreement.  Plaintiffs make the same allegations as made in four other actions pending in the Superior Court, Hudson County Vicinage by a total of 52 units in the building.
[brief] Although Plaintiffs claimed disparate impact under the LAD, there was no clear and convincing showing thereof under the Revised Policy.  Plaintiffs “must show that a facially neutral policy resulted in a significantly disproportionate or adverse impact on members of the affected class. ”  Schiavo v. Marina Dist. Development Co., LLC, 442 N.J. Super. 346, 369 (App. Div. 2015); Gerety, 184 N.J. at 399.  Moreover, an adverse effect on a single person, or even a few persons “is not sufficient to establish disparate impact. ”  Schiavo, 442 N.J. Super. at 370.  The court cited no clear and convincing evidence that the facially neutral parental notification policy resulted in any disproportionate adverse impact on LGBTQ+ students but simply concluded that the policy “opened the door to” “[m]andatory differential treatment based on LAD-protected characteristics” (p. 14, Da406) based on nothing more than unwarranted inference and its distortion of the policy’s plain language.  Significantly, the Revised Policy expressly applies to any student experiencing issues with a potentially adverse impact.  LGBTQ+ students are not the only students who experience such issues and the Policy does not exempt non-LGBTQ+ students from parental notification.  Rather, non-LGBTQ+ students are equally subject to parental notification of matters bearing a potentially adverse impact on student physical/mental health, safety and/or social/emotional well-being.  The court adduced no evidence otherwise.  B.
[brief] ’”  *State v. Blakney*, 189 N.J. 88, 96 (2006) (quoting *State v. Ramseur*, 106 N.J. 123, 320 (1987)).  Therefore, while “‘[a] prosecutor may comment on the facts shown by or reasonably to be inferred from the evidence,’ “it is for “‘the jury to decide whether to draw the inferences the prosecutor urged.
[brief] The Complaint Asserts an FDCPA Claim for Using False, Deceptive, or Misleading Representations. **  Part III.E. of Defendant’s Brief addresses the arguments set forth in Point IV.D. of Plaintiff’s Brief concerning the misleading content in Defendant’s collection letter.  The letter is misleading to the least sophisticated because a reasonable meaning of “savings” is to compare the payment plans against doing nothing.  Because the debt is time barred, the payment plans are an expense, not a savings, when compared to doing nothing.  The letter is also confusing about reviving the debt.  Accepting one of the offered settlements would form a new contract.  The letter’s language is confusing and misleading with respect to a lawsuit to enforce the accord-and-satisfaction created by accepting one of the letter’s proposed settlements.  **CONCLUSION**
[brief] The parties appeared for oral argument on September 29, 2023.  (1T).  After hearing argument, the Honorable [...], A.J.S.C. issued the Order and --- \(^3\)  The only immaterial difference is that, in the Chancery Action, Appellants asserted a claim for malicious abuse of process, and in the Complaint, Appellants asserted claims for malicious abuse of process and malicious use of process.  (1T12:12 to 13:6 and compare Pa195-196 at Twelfth Count (Chancery Action Counterclaim) with Pa27-29 at First and Second Counts (Complaint)).  \(^4\)  The September 29, 2023 transcript of the Trial Court proceedings below is referred to herein as “1T”.
[brief] Defendant-Appellant [...] (“[...]”), appeals the decision of the trial court allowing Plaintiff-Respondent, [...] (“[...]”) to proceed with the taking of private property.  Defendant-Appellant [...] (“[...]”), appeals in the companion matter under Docket No. [...].  On May 9, 2023, the [...] adopted Ordinance 15-23 that authorized the condemnation of [...]’s and [...]’s (collectively, “Defendants”), private properties purportedly for open space, in the absence of any public record to support the claim.
[brief] Templo Fuente De Vida Corp. v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, 224 N.J. 189, 199 (2016).  The Court must review the competent evidential materials submitted by the parties to identify whether there are genuine issues of material fact and, if not, whether the moving party is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.  Id. (citing Rule 4:46-2(c) and Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520, 540 (1995)).  In conducting this review, the Court must keep in mind that “an issue of fact is genuine only if, considering the burden of persuasion at trial, the evidence submitted by the parties on the motion, together with all legitimate inferences therefrom favoring the non-moving party, would require submission of the issue to the trier of fact. ”
[brief] (Pb1).  Numerosity alone is not the standard.  In *Rocky Hill*, the Court called into question “whether the number of plaintiffs in a lawsuit or signatures on a petition should impact on the true nature of defining ‘public interest. ’”  *Rocky Hill*, *supra*, 406 N.J. Super. at 399-400.  Likewise, in a concurring opinion, [...] noted in *Concerned Citizens of Princeton*, that “mere numerosity” does not necessarily create an important public interest requiring adjudication.  *Concerned Citizens of Princeton*, 370 N.J. Super. at 473.  The Trial Court in this case properly concluded that the mere attendance of the public at the JLUB meeting did not create an important public versus private interest to review Ordinance 13-2022.
[brief] (2T).  An Order memorializing the Court’s decision also entered on May 3, 2023.  (Pa22).  The underlying case proceeded against defendant [...], which ultimately resulted in a settlement pursuant to Deblon v Beaton, 103 N.J. Super. 345 (Law Div. 1968) on or around November 28, 2024.  The settlement agreement resulted in a limited release that preserved plaintiffs’ rights to pursue appellate relief as to excess coverage that may be owed by [...] to defendant [...].  The settlement check consummating the settlement with defendant [...] was received on or about December 13, 2023.  On December 27, 2023, plaintiffs filed a motion to dismiss their complaint against defendant [...] without prejudice and to certify the dismissal as final since the settlement with defendant [...] adjudicated all remaining trial-level claims.  Defendant [...] filed a partial opposition to plaintiffs’ motion on January 11, 2024.  Plaintiffs filed a reply to defendant’s opposition on January 11, 2024.  The trial court granted plaintiffs’ motion to dismiss defendant [...] without prejudice and certified the disposition as final under Court Order dated January 18, 2024.  (Pa24-25).  This appeal followed.
[brief] Having found [[...]’s] signature is on the PSA and MMA, and that [[...]] was provided with full copies of these documents at the time of the execution, when coupled with the language contained in the both documents concerning the right to legal representation to review the agreements, that each party was aware of the assets and debts of the other and that each entered into the agreement freely and voluntarily and without coercion, fraud or duress, the court finds that [[...]’s] assertions that she was unaware of the agreements and signed such without knowing her right to legal counsel, that she was under duress by [[...]] and that she never read the agreements nor understand same are found to be unpersuasive.  The court finds there was a meeting of the minds between the parties as to the terms of the settlement agreements.  [A229, Op. at 27, July 22, 2022].
[brief] ”  Trenton, 470 N.J. Super. at 226 (quotation and citation omitted); Hammock v. Hoffmann-LaRoche, Inc., 142 N.J. 356, 383 (1995) (“Confidential and proprietary information, while not privileged, is also entitled to protection from disclosure. ”).  D.  The Cases Plaintiffs Cite Do Not Support the Trial Court’s Decision.
[brief] Contrary to Plaintiff’s contention that the RPCs rendered him “control[led]” as an employee for CEPA purposes, the RPCs also afforded Plaintiff a unique insulation from termination or removal because he possessed a statutory term – during which the [...] lacked any ability to “control” him by removal.  To this end, in Coyle v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 170 N.J. 260 (2002), our Supreme Court recognized that RPC 1.16(a)(3), which requires a lawyer to withdraw from representation if he or she is discharged, is inapplicable to government lawyers with a statutory term of office, such as County Counsel:  “RPC 1.16(a)(3) was never intended to apply to public counsel with statutory terms, and we so hold. ”  Id. at 268.  As such, the only way for the Board to change its representation, barring removal of Plaintiff for cause, would have been for the Board to wait until the expiration of Plaintiff’s statutory term of office and then appoint another individual to the position.  That is exactly what happened here.  The Board followed the law and decided that at the end of Plaintiff’s term, it wanted to hire a firm with a deeper bench of attorneys and chose not to reappoint Plaintiff.  Plaintiff’s instant lawsuit is simply an attempt to shoehorn a baseless CEPA claim into a valid and lawful exercise of a public entity’s right to choose its legal representation, particularly where the public entity cannot avail itself of the typical right of a client to terminate its legal representation during the statutory term of its County Counsel.
[brief] (Pb12).  Nor do the equities weigh in his favor.  The Board found on the basis of undisputed facts that notice was sent to [...], that information about the Ricci Act was available to him through the Division’s website and publications, and that he had sufficient time to file his Eligibility Registration Form within the statutory period.  Thus, contrary to [...]’s contention, (Pb15), there was ample evidence for the Board to reasonably conclude that he failed to demonstrate good cause, reasonable grounds, and reasonable diligence to warrant consideration of his application well beyond the statutory deadline.  (Pa14).  Finally, [...]’s argument and reference to a different applicant is misplaced.  (Pb16).  That applicant asserts that he attempted to file his Eligibility Registration Form but was told he was ineligible because he was not currently sick.  (Pb16; Pa111-113).  But those facts are not in the record before this court.  And that applicant’s assertions are irrelevant to [...]’s appeal as they deal with an entirely different set of circumstances not alleged by [...], so they should be disregarded.  **CONCLUSION**
[brief] LEGAL ARGUMENT..................................................................................................................9  POINT I THE DECISION OF THE STATE POLICE RETIREMENT  BOARD WAS ARBITRARY, CAPRICIOUS, AND UNREASONABLE, AND SHOULD BE REVERSED.  (Not Raised Below) ..............................................................................................................9  POINT II  THE DECISION BELOW WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE AND SHOULD THEREFORE BE REVERSED.  (Not Raised Below).............................................................................................................16  CONCLUSION..........................................................................................................................19
[brief] A.  [...]’s Abandonment of its Effort to Voluntarily Comply with its Third Round  Affordable Housing Obligation  On March 10, 2015, the Supreme Court issued an Opinion and Order divesting the Council on Affordable Housing of jurisdiction over municipal efforts to comply with the Fair Housing Act’s requirements for the period of 1999 to 2025 (the “Third Round”) and established a judicial process by which towns could voluntarily seek compliance through the filing of a declaratory judgment litigation.  See In re Adoption of N.J.A.C. 5:96 and 5:97 by the New Jersey Council on Affordable Housing, 221 N.J. 1 (2015) (“Mount Laurel IV”).  In accordance with Mount Laurel IV, [...] filed a declaratory judgment complaint on July 8, 2015 in Docket No. [...] (the “DJ Action”) and was provided with temporary immunity from exclusionary zoning lawsuits like the instant builder’s remedy litigation.  In July 2019, [...] sought the voluntary dismissal of its DJ Action, which was granted by way of an Order of Dismissal entered on July 19, 2019 (the “Dismissal Order”).  (Ja10).  The Dismissal Order expressly provides that “the temporary immunity granted to [...] from exclusionary zoning actions by the Court… expires with the dismissal of this action,” and that “this dismissal is without prejudice to the rights of [...] or any other party with respect to the 1  The Statement of facts and procedural history are combined because they are inextricably intertwined.
[directive] Asset Seizure, Management and Case-Related Expenses  Expenses incurred in connection with the seizure, of appraisal, or security the property are payable from the Treasury Forfeiture Fund.  Case-related expenses incurred in connection with normal proceedings undertaken to protect the United States’ interest in seized property through are also payable from the Treasury Forfeiture forfeiture, Fund. F. Law Enforcement Concurrence  Any State or local law enforcement agency that would otherwise receive an equitable share of proceeds from the sale of forfeited property must voluntarily agree to a forego its share before a Weed and Seed transfer will be authorized.
[brief] PRELIMINARY STATEMENT ...........................................................................................................1  STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY .........................................................4  A.  [...] Commenced Litigation Against [...] in Union County that was Without Probable Cause and Actuated by Malice ....................4  B.  The Evidence Adduced in the Prior Litigation Clarified with Absolute Certainty that the Alleged “Agreement” is a Forgery .............5  C.  Faced with [...]’s Deposition Testimony, [...] Concocts a Facially Absurd Attempt to Revise his False Factual Narrative ..........7  D.  [...] Amends His Pleadings in the Prior Litigation and [...] and [...] Assert Counterclaims Against [...] ...............................8  E.  The Parties Enter into the Consent Order to Dismiss [...]’s Frivolous Claims ..................................................................................9  F.  The [...] ......................................................................................................11  G. [...] and [...] Commence the Instant Litigation ...............................................................13  H.  The Court Grants [...]’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Complaint ..........................................................14  STANDARD OF REVIEW .............................................................................................................15  LEGAL ARGUMENT .....................................................................................................................15  POINT I THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY FINDING THAT THE CONSENT ORDER BARS THE INSTANT LITIGATION [Pa1 – Pa13] ..................................................................................................................15  POINT II  THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY FINDING THAT THE DOCTRINE OF *RES JUDICATA* BARS PLAINTIFFS’ COMPLAINT [Pa1 – Pa13]……………………………………………………………18  POINT III  THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY FINDING THAT THE ENTIRE CONTROVERSY DOCTRINE BARS PLAINTIFFS’ COMPLAINT [Pa1 – Pa13]……………………………………………………………21  CONCLUSION  ………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..23
[brief] Effective February 25, 1987, the purpose of APDRA is to provide a new procedure for dispute resolution to serve as an alternative to the present civil justice system and the existing arbitration system for settling civil disputes.  Mt. Hope Dev. Assocs. v. Mt. Hope Waterpower Project, L.P., 154 N.J. 141, 145 (1998) (citing Governor's Reconsideration and Recommendation Statement to A. 296, at 1 (Jan. 7, 1987)).
[brief] ## Cases  **Atkinson v. Parsekian,** 37 N.J. 143, 149 (1962) ..................................................................................................................  9  **Bornstein v. Metro. Bottling Co.,** 26 N.J. 263, 275 (1958) ....................................................................................................................  9  **Cumberland Cty. Welfare Bd. v. Jordan,** 81 N.J. Super. 406, 412, 414 (App. Div. 1963) .............................................................................  12  **Garcia v. Bd. of Review,** 191 N.J. Super. 602 (App. Div. 1983) .................................................................................................  15  **In re Carroll,** 339 N.J. Super. 429, 437 (App. Div. 2001) .......................................................................................  8  **In re Herrmann,** 192 N.J. 19, 21 (2007)  .......................................................................................................................  9  **In re J.S.,** 431 N.J. Super. 321, 329 (App. Div. 2013) .......................................................................................  8  **James v. Bd. of Trs. of Pub. Emples. Ret. Sys.,** 164 N.J. 396, 412 (2000) ................................................................................................................... 13 **Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Land,** 186 N.J. 163, 169 (2006) ................................................................................................................... 9 **Savastano v. Bd. of Review,** 99 N.J. Super. 397 (App. Div. 1968) .............................................................................................................................. 15 **Zimmerman v. Sussex Cnty. Educ. Servs. Comm’n,** 237 N.J. 465, 475 (2019) ................................................................................................................... 8 ## Statutes N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a) .............................................................................................................................. 15, 16 N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(b) .............................................................................................................................. 16 Regulations N.J.A.C. 4A:2-6.1(a) .................................................................................................................. 15 N.J.A.C. 4A:2-6.2(b) .............................................................................................................. passim TABLE OF APPENDIX E-Mail: [...] to North Region Leadership (March 20, 2020) .................................................................................................................. Ra1 E-Mail: [...] to [...] (April 6, 2020)