ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] This designation was entirely inappropriate because Appellant still had every right and ability to file and prosecute third-party claims against both [...] and [...], irrespective of whatever Plaintiff/Respondent did and even given the fact that Plaintiff/Respondent could not assert direct claims against them.  See R. 4:8- 1(a).  The statute of limitations was no impediment to Appellant’s contribution claims against Drs. [...] and [...].
[brief] Respondent [...] responded that she had not filed a formal complaint.  Respondent [...] then became upset and raised her voice at Appellant.  Respondent [...] blamed Appellant, claiming it was her fault for talking to caseworkers.  Id.  Rather than investigate, Respondent [...] told Appellant that she would be transferred.  Appellant hung up the phone in disbelief.  She tried to call Respondent [...], but there was no answer, so she left a voicemail.  Id.  On the next day, November 27, 2018, at about 10:30a.m., Respondent [...] returned Appellant’s call.  (Pa230).  Appellant explained her concerns with [...].  Respondent [...] said she would speak with her boss and call Appellant back in five minutes.  Almost four hours later, Respondent [...] called Appellant to schedule a meeting on November 29, 2018 with the head of human resources, Respondent [...].
[brief] Cases  Furst v. Einstein Moomjy, Inc., 182 N.J. 1, 21 (2004) ..............................................  13  Grow Co., Inc. v. Chokshi, 424 N.J. Super. 357, 365 (App. Div. 2012) ........  16 Hansen v. Rite Aid Corp., 253 N.J. 191, 221 (2023) .................................................  16  Litton Industries, Inc. v. IMO Industries, Inc., 200 N.J. 372, 386 (2009)  ...... 13 LoBiondo v. Schwartz, 199 N.J. 62 (2009) ...............................................................  11  Rendine v. Pantzer, 141 N.J. 292, 335 (1995) .........................................................
[brief] Prior to her transfer to the Academy, the Plaintiff was told that she would work better with a female, and she was told that by [...] (1T; 95:14).  Actually, they gave her a case from OPS which was unusual (1T; 93:13).  Plaintiff questioned [...] and was told that everything was in place and that she was not “too sure what to give you” (1T; 96:17).  Actually, in the transfer to the Academy, the Captain wasn’t looking for a person, she was looking for a “position number to promote” (1T; 97:1).
[directive] FROM: [...], Acting Attorney General  DATE: December 7, 2021  SUBJECT: Promoting Diversity in Law Enforcement Recruiting and Hiring  In order to most effectively serve the communities of New Jersey, it is important for law enforcement agencies to strive for workforces that reflect the diversity of the jurisdictions they serve and that can effectively interact with all community members.  With this need in mind, in October 2020 the Legislature passed a law requiring each law enforcement agency in New Jersey to establish a program designed to ensure every agency was “comprised of law enforcement officers who reflect the diversity of the population of the community the agency is charged with protecting. ”  N.J.S.A. 52:17B-4.10 et seq. (the “Act”).  The Act directed the Attorney General to develop these Guidelines to ensure its uniform application.
[brief] Likewise, in Reilly v. City of Atlantic City, a CEPA case, the Court held that there was sufficient evidence of causation to defeat the defendants’ summary judgment motion even though there was a ten-year gap between the whistle-blowing activity and the adverse employment action.  427 F.  Supp. 2d 507, 524 (D.N.J. 2006), aff’d in part, rev’d in part on other grds., 532 F. 3d 216 (3d Cir. 2008).  Although the defendants argued a lack of temporal proximity prohibited a finding of causation, the Court reasoned that there was circumstantial evidence of causation where the employer’s proffered reasons for their disciplinary recommendations were unworthy of credence.  Reilly, 427 F. Supp. 2d at 524.  Plaintiff engaged in statutorily protected activity in July 2016 and was retaliated against commencing in August 2017, immediately upon there being a public outcry about the police response to the July 5, 2016 incident, an issue that [...] conceded was of concern to “the politicians”.  Thus, under the facts established in the record, in addition to the direct evidence outlined supra, temporal proximity is also indicative of Defendants’ retaliatory intent.  Here, Plaintiff has, at the very least, demonstrated “some evidence, either direct or circumstantial, from which a reasonable fact-finder could conclude that defendants' proffered reasons were ‘either a post hoc fabrication or otherwise did not actually motivate the employment action (that is, the proffered reason is a pretext),’” as is required to defeat a defendant-employer’s motion for summary judgment.  Kolb, 320 N.J. Super. at 480, quoting Fuentes, 32 F. 3d at 764.  Thus, the grant of summary judgment below as to Plaintiff’s CEPA was in error and should be reversed.
[brief] Defendant relies on *Higgs*, but the facts of *Higgs* were completely different.  There, the defendant “was released from confinement on these convictions 21 years before trial.  The final conviction was 14 years old at the time of trial. ”  *Higgs*, 253 N.J. at 369.  *Higgs* did not deal with a situation where, as here, defendant was released for a NERA conviction only about two years before the current offense was committed.  As the trial court properly ruled on the admissibility of defendant’s prior convictions to impeach his credibility, his convictions should be affirmed.
[brief] TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, RULINGS, & ORDERS BEING APPEALED  Resentencing ...........................................................................................................  (5T; Da 29-32)  INDEX TO APPENDIX  Indictment ..................................................................................................................  Da 1-12  Verdict Sheet ...............................................................................................................  Da 13-16  Judgement of Conviction 5/22/2015 .........................................................................  Da 17-20  Judgement of Conviction 7/22/2015 .........................................................................  Da 21-24  Judgement of Conviction 5/9/2023 ..........................................................................  Da 25-28  Judgement of Conviction 5/18/2023 .........................................................................  Da 29-32  Prior Appellate Division Opinion ..............................................................................  Da 33-69  Notice of Appeal ........................................................................................................  Da 70-73  Order ............................................................................................................................  Da 74  [...]  Judgement of Conviction .....................................................................  Da 75-78  [...] Expert Report (D-1) ..................................................................................  Da 79-98  [...] Mitigation Report (D-3) .................................................................................. Da 99-134 Defense Resentencing Memorandum ........................................................................ Da 135-218 Educational Records (D-5) ....................................................................................... Da 219-221 Department of Corrections Records (D-6) ............................................................... Da 222-232 Certificates of Completion (D-7, D-15, D-16) ............................................................ Da 233-247 Statement of [...] 2/24/2012 (D-12) .................................................. Da 248-271 Affidavit of Defense Attorney [...] (D-8) .................................................. Da 272-274 ## TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ### Cases **Graham v. Florida**, 560 U.S. 48 (2010) .............................................. 8, 20, 27, 31, 48, 50 **Miller v. Alabama**, 567 U.S. 460 (2012)......................................................... passim **Montgomery v. Louisiana**, 577 U.S. 190 (2016) ............................................. 19, 48 **Roper v. Simmons**, 543 U.S. 551 (2005)....................................................... 19, 20, 27, 43 **State v. Bieniek**, 200 N.J. 601 (2010)..........................................................
[brief] ”  (T1: p8, ln 14-24)  [...] testified that, “whatever is required by ordinance and whatever the Board professionals during resolution compliance say we need, we will provide. ”  (T1: p13, ln 17-17)  [...] then made it clear that no waiver was being requested regarding evergreen buffering, stating, “We’re not requesting a waiver, because a waiver is not required… we will do everything with respect to landscaping that’s required by the ordinance” (T1: p14, ln 20-23)
[brief] On June 16, 2000, [...] appeared for sentencing.  The sentencing court found that the mitigating factors clearly outweighed the aggravating factors and that the terms of the plea agreement were appropriate.  A period of three years’ probation was imposed, along with all appropriate fees, penalties, and restitution.  The judgment of conviction was entered on June 23, 2000.  Thereafter, [...] successfully completed his probationary sentence and was discharged from probation in June of 2003.  *Id.* at 300.  On October 3, 2007, roughly seven years after being sentenced and four years after completing his sentence and being discharged, the sentencing court was notified by the [...] that [...]’s judgment of conviction did not contain any reference to the mandatory community supervision for life in accordance with the terms of N.J.S.A. 2C:43–6.4.
[directive] The following additional questions need to be answered only if you are pleading guilty pursuant to an offense under 2C:35-1 et seq. or 2C:36-1 et seq.  N.J.S.A.  N.J.S.A.  1.  Have you and the Prosecutor entered into any agreement to provide for [Yes] [No] a lesser sentence or period of parole ineligibility than would otherwise be required?  (If yes, be sure to include in questions 12 and 13 above).  2.  Do you understand that if you plead guilty:  a.  You will be required to forfeit your driver’s license for a period of [Yes] [No] time from 6 to 24 months, unless the court finds compelling circumstances warranting an exception?  b.  You will be required to pay a forensic laboratory fee of $50 for each [Yes] [No] offense for which you plead guilty?  c.  You will be required to pay a mandatory drug enforcement and [Yes] [No] demand reduction (D.E. D.R.) penalty as listed below for each offense for which you plead guilty?  The mandatory penalties are as follows:  1st (1) $3,000 in the case of a degree crime 2nd (2) $2,000 in the case of a degree crime  3rd (3) $1,000 in the case of a degree crime  4th (4) $ 750 in the case of a degree crime (5)  $ 500 in the case of a disorderly persons or petty disorderly persons offense  TOTAL  D.E.D.R. Penalty $  Date: Defendant: Defense Attorney: Prosecutor: Form Promulgated by Directive #01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 11000
[brief] ’  *Cashner v. Freedom Stores, Inc.*, 98 F.3d 572, 577 (10th Cir. 1996) (citing *Thompson v. Kerr-McGee Ref. Corp.*, 660 F.2d 1380, 1384-85 (10th Cir. 1981)).”  *DEG, LLC. v. Township of Fairfield*, 198 N.J. 242, 263, 966 A.2d 1036 (2009).  “Rule 4:50-1(f), the so-called catch-all, provides relief for ‘any other reason.  . . .  No categorization can be made of the situations which would warrant redress under subsection (f).  . . .  [T]he very essence of (f) is its capacity for relief in exceptional situations.  And in such exceptional cases its boundaries are as expansive as the need to achieve equity and justice. ’”  *DEG, LLC. v. Township of Fairfield*, 198 N.J. 242, 269-270, 966 A.2d 1036 (2009) (quoting *Court Inv. Co. v. Perillo*, 48 N.J. 334, 341, 225 A.2d 352 (1966)).  Final Judgement here are the result of the Appellate Division of the Superior Court of New Jersey had corrected the trial court’s mistake and vacated the unsubstantiated jury award of $500,000 for Plaintiff’s failure to prove actual damages, but had substituted an unsubstantiated jury award of $500,000 with a new award for $449,798.50 to Plaintiff’s attorneys for legal fees despite the fact that Defendants had not been afforded an opportunity to challenge this new award and the trial records were devoid of any analysis regarding the legal fees claimed by Plaintiff.
[brief] \textsuperscript{136}  In this case, trial issues are synergistic between the plaintiff and class members because the class is challenging a uniform policy. \textsuperscript{137}  However, "[P]redominance does not require the absence of individual issues or that the common issues dispose of the entire dispute" and "[i]ndividual questions of law or fact may remain following resolution of common questions", especially when remainder issues go to damages. \textsuperscript{138}  Moreover, even of different factual situations \textsuperscript{136}  See \textit{Amchem Prod. V. Windsor}, 521 U.S. 591, 623, 117 S. Ct. 2231, 138 L. Ed. 2d 68 (1997).  \textsuperscript{137}  See \textit{Amchem Products, Inc., v. Windsor}, 521 U.S. 591, 625, 117 S. Ct. 2231, 138 L. Ed. 2d 689 (1997).  \textsuperscript{138}  \textit{Iliadis v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.}, 191 N.J. 88, 108-113 (2007).  arise with respect to the defenses as to different plaintiffs, such won’t derogate from the fact that the affirmative cause of action itself has the community of interests and of questions of law or fact justifying class treatment. \textsuperscript{139}  This case presents a "common nucleus of operative facts" lending itself to class treatment – uniform charges for water that is contaminated by the same contaminant.
[brief] (Raised Below: Da11-13)  However, the trial court contended that this provision’s purpose was to ensure prompt delivery of the executed certificate in order to allow [...] to exercise its right to terminate the PSA if the initially forwarded certificate was non-complaint.  Although the Court agrees with [...] that it was not obligated to deliver an Acceptable Estoppel Certificate within 10 days of execution – the agreement plainly required it only to seek the certification within such time - - the agreement also explicitly required [...] Street to deliver any certificate it recovered from the tenant.  The obvious purpose of such provision was to ensure prompt delivery of what the tenant provided to enable [...] to exercise would what become its immediate right to terminate the agreement if the certificate recorded adverse information.  (Da11)  The trial court’s conclusion that the provision ensures [...]’s immediate right to terminate the PSA if the certificate promptly delivered contains adverse information misinterprets the timing and purpose of the provision.  While the trial court correctly noted that [...] is required to promptly deliver any certificate it receives from the tenant, the purpose of this requirement was not to allow [...] to immediately terminate the PSA upon receipt of a non-compliant certificate.  Rather, it was intended to ensure that [...] was informed of the status of the estoppel process as it unfolded.
[directive] Although important to it is unintended control costs and mitigate criminal justice reform, and to of full benefits achieve the to will devise and test and police executives County  Prosecutors expected that it is consequences, resources in their respective and available the practical problems adapted to innovative solutions developed practices are an ongoing dialog where best contemplates Directive  This jurisdictions.  See Section 16. appropriate. in other jurisdictions as replicated locally, shared, and 13 Page Directive. of 1.6  Scope an committed have to alleged is defendant a where all to applies cases  This Directive "eligible an (defining 2A:162-15 N.J.S.A. disorderly See offense. persons or crime indictable with complaint-warrant by charged defendant Law Reform a as Bail the for of purposes defendant"  Directive 3:26-1, Rule this with In accordance offense).  disorderly persons or crime an indictable where cases to apply Directive not does  This offenses. disorderly to persons apply petty may also offense.  motor vehicle a or violation an ordinance is offense most serious the complaint- by charged the is defendant where limited cases not to is Directive that this Note issue on guidance to when provide to is major Directive of features of the the one because warrant, Directive Nor 4.
[brief] It Did Not Furnish Police With Reasonable Suspicion To Stop The Car, Independent Of The Traffic Infractions.  In Carty, the Court held that in order to request consent to search a car following a valid stop, police must have reasonable and articulable suspicion that the search will reveal evidence of criminal wrongdoing, prior to making the request.  170 N.J. at 635.  Thus, as prosecutor below correctly observed, in order to establish the validity of a consent search under Carty, the state must demonstrate: (1) that there was a lawful basis to stop the car, and (2) police had reasonable and articulable suspicion of criminal wrongdoing prior to seeking consent.
[brief] [...] engages in significant discussion of a document submission checklist included with the Solicitation.  Pb3, Pb8-9.  However, [...] neglects to point out that the checklist does not purport to be all inclusive or to exclude --- \(^1\) References to “Db” are to the SSI Brief. submissions required elsewhere in the Solicitation.  Da21.  [...] also attempts to minimize the [...] Notice requirement by referencing only one section of the Solicitation.  Pb3.  However, as set forth in the SSI Brief, Db4-6, the requirement was set forth in three separate locations, including on the second page of the Solicitation.  Da16, Da110-11.  LEGAL ARGUMENT I.
[brief] 1.  Whether the motion judge erred by granting summary judgment dismissing defendants [...] and [...] under the Affidavit of Merit Act.  2.  Whether the motion judge erred by granting summary judgment dismissing defendants [...], [...], [...] and [...] on disputed facts.  3.  Whether the motion judge erred by dismissing [...] for failure to state a claim, without prejudice, only for the defendant to be dismissed with prejudice when a separate action was filed by Appellants/Plaintiffs following the dismissal without prejudice in the action below.  4.  Whether the motion judge abused judicial discretion by denying Appellants’ leave to file their second amended complaint.  5.  Whether the other erroneous Orders should be deemed subsumed or moot upon reversal and remand.  Among these 5 chronologically-identified Orders, Issues 2 and 3 are clearly most important as those issues “set the stage” for the other issues/Orders, even though Issue 1 arises from the first ruling adverse to Appellants/Plaintiffs.
[brief] Here, the governing laws, regulations, documents, and case law as decided by Judge [...], U.S.D.J., require arbitration of all claims asserted against Defendants, supporting the decision of the trial judge.  As Judge Shipp decided in GEICO v. Elkholy, 3:321-cv-16255 (6/30/2022)² the No-Fault laws and the insurers DPR plans mandate that any dispute related to the recovery of PIP benefits be submitted to arbitration.  (C.C.Da.106-30).  See, also, N.J.S.A.§39:6A-5.1 (emphasis added).  That language is clear and unequivocal and can have only one meaning: all disputes related to PIP benefits must be arbitrated.  See, Jimenez v. Quarterman, 555 U.S. 113, 118 (2009) (“It is well established that, when the statutory language is plain, we must enforce it according to its terms. ”).  Judge Shipp held that the federal analog to R. 4:6-2 – the FRCP 12(b)(6) standard - was the appropriate standard of review and that the heightened pleading standard of fraud under Rule 9(b) was applicable.  In his analysis, Judge Shipp refused to blue pencil an express statute (the No Fault Statute) with an adjective that the legislature “pointedly omitted in drafting” to carve out causes of action subject to mandatory No Fault Arbitration.  (C.C.Da.118).  He ²  Other US District Court judges have issued similar opinions as Judge Shipp.  See, Gov't Employees Ins. Co. v. MLS Med. Grp. LLC, 2013 WL 6384652, at *4 (D.N.J. Dec. 6, 2013)([...], U.S.D.J.); GEICO v. Tri Cnty. Neurology & Rehab, LLC, 721 F. App’x 118, 122-123 (3d Cir. 2018)([...], U.S.D.J); State Farm v. Tri-County Chiropractic, et. als., Civ. Action 22-4852 (7/06/2023)([...], U.S.D.J.); GEICO v. Menkin, et. als, Civ. Action 23-218 (12/30/23)([...], U.S.D.J.). held, “[u]nder the plain meaning of the statutory language, accordingly, the GEICO entities common law fraud, RICO, and unjust enrichment claims do not elude the No-Fault laws arbitration mandate.  . .  The Court therefore dismisses these counts in favor of arbitration. ” (C.C.Da.118-19).  Judge Shipp further dismissed GEICO’s declaratory judgment claim as duplicative to the dismissed counts.  (C.C.Da.129-30)  Therefore, based upon the well-reasoned decision issued by Judge Shipp in Elkholy, the complaint was properly dismissed by the Trial Court for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to R.4:6-2.
[brief] Dover Twp. Homeowners & Tenants Assn. v. Dover Twp., 114 N.J. Super. 270 (App. Div. 1971).................................................... 31, 32, 33, 34 Dunbar Homes, Inc. v. Twp. of Franklin Bd. of Adj., 233 N.J. 546 (2018).............................................................................. passim Edison Bd. of Ed. v. Bd. of Adj., 464 N.J. Super. 298 (App. Div. 2020) .... 35, 36 Funeral Home Mgmt., Inc. v. Basralian, 319 N.J. Super. 200 (App. Div. 1999)  ...........................................  29, 31, 34, 36
[brief] On August 7, 2019, the [...] added information about the Ricci Act to its website.  (Pa10).  The webpage included information for active members, retirees, and employers about qualifying dates, locations, health conditions and impairments, the Eligibility Registration Form, the Request for Amended Benefits Form, a sample postcard to be mailed to retirees, and materials for employers about dissemination of information to employees.  (Pa10-11).  On August 8, 2019, the Division sent a letter to the Certifying Officers of the [...], the [...], and the [...].  (Pa11).  The subject of the letter was “New Legislation Notice – P.L. 2019, c. 157” and it served to notify active employees of the newly enacted law.  (Pa11).  All Certifying Officers were advised of their responsibilities to distribute the information and to certify that they had done so.
[brief] (Da651, 688)  The Court entered a permanent restraint until the Appellate Division ordered otherwise, finding an intentional violation where attorney's fees were appropriate in the amount of $11,257.50.  (3T110-112)  (Da967, 969)  This impossible situation really illustrates and confirms the error and illogic of [...]’s position and the Trial Court’s rulings in 2016 and 2017- now adopted once again by the Trial Court.