ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Specifically, Plaintiffs rely on the “rigorous” test required to be met before preempting the CFA set forth in Lemelledo:  Before doing so, the Court must find a “direct and unavoidable conflict exists” that is both “patent and sharp. ”  The Court must be convinced that the other regulations “deal specifically, implying a Legislative intent not to subject parties to multiple regulations that … will work at cross purposes. ”  See PB 34, citing Lemelledo at 270.  [...] submits that it has met the “rigorous” test based on the following:  1.  The RETA is pinpoint, fact and law specific to presale solicitation, sale and purchase of timeshare properties; 2.  The requisite mental states perpetrating wrongful conduct under the RETA and the CFA conflict (see pgs. 27 through 32 of [...]’s moving appellate brief); 3.  The RETA allows for double damages while the CFA permits treble damages based on the same wrongful conduct but with conflicting requisite mental states (the RETA requires that the defendant “knowingly engaged” in the wrongful conduct while the CFA required no intent whatsoever).  In this instance, the RETA consumes the very same claims that Plaintiffs/Respondents asserted under the CFA for deceptive, fraudulent, misleading, and other unconscionable commercial practices.  The nature of the claims brought by Plaintiff/Respondents is entirely within the factual and legal structure of RETA from presale solicitation to purchase.  And the same conduct was alleged to establish both causes of action.  The CFA is a law of general application for all kinds of advertising misconduct while the RETA is specific to timeshare cases alleging “false, deceptive, misleading promotional or sales methods.
[directive] 12.  Listar todas as acusa,;:oes para as quais a promotoria concordou em recomendar a extin,;:ao: Ind./Acc./Compl.# Count Nature of Offense and Degree N° Denuncia./Acus./Processo Acusii9i!O Natureza e grau do crime by Revised Form Promulgated 12/31/20 I 9
[brief] 354a.  On appeal, several factual errors made by Appellant need to be addressed.  First, the testimony was clear from [...] that [...] at [...] has a portfolio of tax foreclosures and property sales, but that [...] knows many, many investors and potential sellers just like [...].  [...] testified that he contacts dozens of lien holders all the time to inquire about properties, availability, foreclosure statuses, possible assignments, possible sales and possible transactions.  T4 61:4 to T4 62:19.  He testified that he and Mr. Schwab have never had any partnership or business venture whatsoever; and the same for the other partners and the other entities; and their prior transactions were slim to none.  T4 49:3 to T4 50:25.  The text messages that Appellant claim as contradictory to the testimony of [...] do not, in fact, contradict the testimony.  The texts do not indicate that [...] and Mr. Schwab were ever - and they are not - partners, working in collusion or conducting anything whatsoever except an arms-length, legal transaction.  The texts show that [...] attempted many times to reach out to Mr. Schwab, tried to obtain deals, tried to obtain foreclosure information, and ultimately (out of his hundreds of properties owned through many other sellers) he consummated this 1 sale plus another 1 or 2 subsequent assignments of tax liens.  The records reflected the same.  While Appellant wants to use this to allege wrongdoing, nothing indicates that is wrongful.  Even if the buyer and seller had done hundreds of transactions (far from the truth and not supported by any evidence), all that it would establish is that the seller was seeking to make a profit in its business venture, and this is clear (and admitted) because the seller is in business for the purpose of conducting business and making a profit.  Appellant wants to jump to the conclusion that because a seller seeks to make profit, then its actions must be deemed wrongful, illegal or nefarious.  But nothing in the record indicates such, and the Court dismissed this claim.
[brief] The court memorialized its July 30, 2020, Opinion in an Order dated January 6, 2021.  ([...]).  Based on the Court’s July 30, 2020, Opinion and January 6, 2021, Order, [...] filed an Amended Motion for Entry of Final Judgment and Award of Attorneys’ Fees, Costs and Interest.  ([...]).  After yet another round of --- 8  In reaching this determination, [...] ignored and contradicted his own reasoning in denying the [...] Motion to Reconsider the Jan. 31, 2011, Opinion and Order by [...].  Specifically, that earlier motion was denied because, under similar circumstances, granting [...]’s Motion for Reconsideration “would be acting as an appellate court without the benefit of reviewing the entire record. ” ([...]).  discovery, further briefing and oral argument, on February 10, 2023, the trial court entered judgment in favor of [...] and against [...] as follows: - $918,894 for covered costs incurred before December 31, 2018; - $511,005 for attorneys’ fees; - $88,827 for costs; and - $1,068,835.87 in interest, for a total judgment against [...] in the amount of $2,587,561.87.
[brief] The petitioners may appear before the Court and prosecute the petition in person or by counsel, and the Attorney-General may, if required so to do by the Governor or person administering the gov- ernment, appear and defend on behalf of the State.  5.  Section 1:7-5 of the Revised Statutes is amended to read as follows:  1:7-5.  Any citizen of the State may, when a petition is filed under authority of either section 1:7-1 or section 1:7-4 of this Title, appear before the [Supreme] Court, in person or by counsel, subpoena and examine and cross-examine witnesses and defend the petition.
[brief] [...] IS ENTITLED TO BE RESENTENCED BECAUSE THE TRIAL COURT ILLEGALLY SENTENCED HIM UNDER A MISAPPREHENSION OF THE APPLICABLE LAW IN VIOLATION OF HIS DUE PROCESS RIGHTS.  (DA-13-19)  A.  The Incorrect Application of The Law During Sentencing Results in an Illegal Sentence  The trial court incorrectly analyzed [...]’s petition to correct an illegal sentence as an argument that the sentencing court incorrectly weighed the factors to impose a concurrent or consecutive sentence under State v. Yarbough, 100 N.J. 627 (1985).  This was not the argument put forth in [...]’s motion to the court.  Rather, [...] argued that he had been given an illegal sentence because the sentencing court’s misapprehension of the applicable law violated his due process rights under the 14th Amendment.  The denial of [...]’s motion without addressing the merits of the contention was improper.
[directive] 2nd Degree $50,000 to $150,000 10% permissible  17  Bail Schedule 2  STATUTES WHERE BAIL MAY BE SET BY A SUPERIOR COURT JUDGE OR A MUNICIPAL COURT JUDGE OR, IN THE MUNICIPAL COURT JUDGE’S ABSENCE, THE MUNICIPAL COURT ADMINISTRATOR OR DEPUTY COURT ADMINISTRATOR, PURSUANT TO RULE 3:26-2 requires warrants  Rule 3:3-1(c)(1) on the Bail Schedule 2 charges of robbery, criminal sexual contact, second degree aggravated assault, aggravated arson, arson, burglary, first or second degree violations of Chapter 35 (drug offenses), any crime involving the possession or use of a firearm, or conspiracies or attempts to commit such crimes.
[brief] The Court may also affirm the judgment below on grounds that the trial court did not reach but that the [...] raised below (raised below at T59:23-60:11).  .........................................................  30  A.  The Court may affirm the judgment below on any ground supported by the record.................................................................  30  B.  Plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie claim of nuisance because he did not show that the [...] made an unreasonable use of their land by repaving their driveway and replacing the railroad ties that lined their driveway with Belgian block.....................................................  31  C.  Because plaintiff already litigated to conclusion claims for property damage caused by water runoff, the doctrines of collateral estoppel and res judicata bar him from relitigating those prior claims in his suit against the [...]……………………………………………………………
[brief] It is painfully clear that Respondents either have not read amended Policy 5756 and its implementing regulation, or do not understand them.  Their arguments make broad sweeping and inflammatory – but factually incorrect – characterizations of the Policy. \(^1\)  Rather than reaching any conclusions based on the State’s superficial approach to this layered matter, this Court must reconcile the Law Against Discrimination’s (“LAD”) gender identity and expression protections with the legal obligations and practical realities of running a New Jersey public school district.
[brief] See Hyland v. Borough of Allenhurst, 78 N.J. 190 (1978); Van Ness v. Borough of Deal, 78 N.J. 174 (1978); Borough of Neptune v. Avon by the Sea, 61 N.J. 296 (1972).  The Supreme Court decision of greatest relevance to the matter before this Court is Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Association, 95 N.J. 306 (1984).
[brief] ”  Ibid. (alteration in original) (quoting Johnson, 42 N.J. at 162).  In our review, we will defer to the trial court's findings even when they are based solely on its review of documentary or video evidence.  *State v. S.S.*, 229 N.J. 360, 381 (2017).  Our “review of the trial court's application of the law to the facts, however, is plenary. ”  *Wright*, 444 N.J. Super. at 357.  A trial court may hold a *Wade/Henderson* hearing to determine whether a pretrial eyewitness identification of a criminal defendant was properly conducted and thus admissible under N.J.R.E. 803(a)(3).  A hearing is not, however, required in every case in which the State seeks to introduce such evidence.
[brief] The trial court’s concern that the private email accounts were not maintained within the control of Board’s custodian is unavailing.  First, the definition of a government record **is not** that a record was “made, maintained **and** kept on file” in the course of government business.  Rather, a government record is one “made, maintained **or** kept on file”.  *N.J.S.A. 47:1-1.1*  The Legislature included a disjunctive "or" where it could have used a conjunctive "and" and the reason is important.  The status of something being a government record is not dependant upon who owned the pen that wrote it or the email account that created it.  Government record status is determined by who produced it and if a government official made it, obtained it or stored it, that material is a government record no matter its genesis.  Our courts have also long rejected the potential for mischief inherent in allowing government records access somehow being beholden to the government’s actual possession of the record.  Burnett v. Gloucester County, 415 N.J. Super. 506, 517 (App. Div. 2010), clearly outlined the obligation to recover records no matter who possessed them or where they were located.
[brief] Among the genuine issues of material fact which should have precluded entry of summary judgment against [...] (see Db17-21), [...] averred in its Verified Complaint that: (1) it was unaware as to the oil content of [...]’s trailer; (2) had it been aware, it would have prohibited the trailer on the property; and (3) even though oil was in fact being stored on [...]’s property (and despite evidence of prior spills and contamination), “[...] is not in the business of providing space for trailers carrying bunker oil or hazardous substances and is not a used oil transfer facility” (PPCIa055).  It is respectfully submitted that such statements are entirely self-serving and were put forth solely to deflect [...]’s own liability for the spill by having allowed trailers containing waste oil to be parked/staged on its property without having installed the oil discharge containment system required by the Spill Act and federal regulation.  See Marsh v. New Jersey Spill Compensation Fund and Environmental Claims Admin., 286 N.J.Super. 620, 630 (App. Div. 1996) (“‘A party even remotely responsible for causing contamination will be deemed a responsible party under the [Spill]Act.’ (emphasis added)”; State, Dept. of Environmental Protection v. Ventron Corp., 94 N.J. 473, 502 (1983) (“The subsequent acquisition of land on which hazardous substances have been dumped may be insufficient to hold the owner responsible.
[brief] Here, the trial court’s use of the date of the liability trial decision defeats these benefits.  The date of the 2010 Liability Trial decision is wholly arbitrary and completely unrelated to the language of the [...] Policy or any facts relating to the property damage at the Site.  This lack of any relation to policy language or material facts eliminates the predictability that courts identify as a benefit of the time-on-the-risk method.  In Maestranzi Bros., 2010 Mass. Super LEXIS 65, at *14, the Massachusetts Superior Court specifically rejected the date of the jury verdict as the end date of the allocation period because it “is plainly a random date that does nothing to ensure predictability or fairness. ”  This case was filed in 2005 and because of the extensive discovery taken by the defendants, liability was not decided until almost six years later.  (Pa0091-137).  If the trial and decision had occurred a year earlier, the allocation period would be a year shorter, and [...]’s allocated share of [...]’s damages would be greater.  Conversely, if the trial and decision had been a year later, [...]’s allocation, for the same loss, would be less.  None of this would be predictable.  Use of the date of the 2010 Liability Trial decision also violates the public policy of both New Jersey and Massachusetts.  State statutes and regulations declare and define public policy.  *Lindsey v. Normet*, 405 U.S. 56, 70 n.18 (1972); *Pickett v. Lloyd’s*, 131 N.J. 457, 468 (1993) (the Unfair Claims Settlement Practices Act “declare[s] state policy”).  Both Massachusetts and New Jersey have passed a version of the UCSPA, which specifically requires the prompt investigation and resolution of insurance claims.
[brief] D.  Plaintiffs do not deserve a new trial for their failure to vet their own expert’s background  Plaintiffs do not deserve a new trial simply because they failed to learn of their expert’s background prior to the deadline to produce expert reports or prior to his deposition.  At the deposition of [...], a number of issues regarding his experience as a surgeon, as well as his experience as an expert witness, were probed during defense counsel’s questioning.  This knowledge was readily obtainable by plaintiffs’ counsel not only prior to [...]’s deposition, but prior to hiring him.  All they needed to do was talk to him and review his curriculum vitae.
[brief] First, as Plaintiffs acknowledge, the writ of quo warranto is “ancient. ”  There is, of course, nothing inherently wrong with ancient law.  In this setting, however, this ancient writ has been completely displaced by the specific removal provisions of the Rutgers Act, which do not envision a private cause of action to oust BOG members.  Second, we can foresee an economic aim in a quo warranto action if it results in the removal of a paid governmental official.  Third, assuming for argument’s sake only that the NJFA and the quo warranto statute have dissimilar aims, that fact does not lessen the persuasive authority contained in Kratovil.  The bigger picture remains that [...] carefully examined the exact term (office) and position (Rutgers’ BOG membership) at issue here and concluded in a thorough, published decision that BOG members do not hold office.
[brief] A.  PLAINTIFF CANNOT ESTABLISH INDIVIDUAL LIABILITY AGAINST DEFENDANT [...], AS CONCEDED BY PLAINTIFF AT THE TRIAL LEVEL (17a-18a, DGSA1, T16-4-21, T43-10-15)........................................12  B.  PLAINTIFF’S AMENDED COMPLAINT FAILS TO PLEAD FACTS  SUFFICIENT TO SATISFY  THE STANDARD FOR AIDER AND ABETTOR LIABILITY AGAINST DEFENDANT [...] (14a-18a)........................................17  POINT II
[brief] The string of cases cited by Defendant within its Opposition (Db35-Db37) miss the mark, as this is simply not a matter related to student grading, student evaluation, disciplinary actions, the elimination of a program, or the like, as this is not a matter related to purely academic decisions.  Romeo v. Seton Hall Univ., 378 N.J. Super. 384, 395 (App. Div. 2005), is distinguishable from this matter for the same reasons as Mittra v. University of Medicine & Dentistry of New Jersey, 316 N.J. Super. 83 (App. Div. 1998).
[brief] Furthermore, although the testifying gas station attendant, [...], stated that the pipe found in the Taurus registered to [...] was “like” the weapon used in the robbery based on its handle, he was unable to identify defendant.  The other eyewitness to the Valero robbery, [...], never testified, never gave a statement, never participated in an out-of-court identification procedure, and never was shown the pipe retrieved from [...]'s vehicle.  Importantly, the surveillance videos of the two robberies do not show the perpetrator so clearly as to permit the jury to make an independent identification.  Cf. Watson, —— N.J. Super. at ——— (slip op. at 102) (noting the defendant's girlfriend was able to positively and unequivocally identify defendant as the robber from the bank surveillance video and a screenshot from the video, leading the court to conclude that “the jurors could see for themselves the perpetrator shown in the surveillance video”).  We conclude our review of the incriminating trial proofs by emphasizing that the issue before us in this appeal is not whether the State presented sufficient evidence to convict.  Rather, our fact-sensitive inquiry in applying plain error analysis focuses on whether the inadmissible hearsay evidence “may have tipped the scales.
[brief] In addition to discovery, [...] further affirmatively and irreversibly availed itself of this Court’s jurisdiction in a number of ways, including cross-moving for summary judgment on February 8, 2021, joining a motion to compel [...] to produce documents on May 20, 2021, opposing [...]’s motion for reconsideration on April 22, 2021, and responding to [...]’s cross-motion for partial summary judgment on February 19, 2021, among other things.
[directive] 4.4  Truthful  Response to with or inquires whether officer equipped a BWC, civilian of an officer the is  If a inquires Prosecutor or answer truthfully unless the County the officer shall whether the device is activated, expressly authorized the Criminal or designee, has or Director of the Division of Justice designee, apply to officers recording.  Cf. section 2(a) (Directive does not officer covert electronic to make a conducting/participating in a station house undercover capacity, or while while operating in an Nothing in section in with Rule 3 :17).  this interrogation electronically recorded accordance custodial  See section suppressing statement or other evidence.  15 establish basis for a shall be construed to a third parties).  (non-enforceability by THE ACTIVATION OF BWCs
[brief] (1T90-6 to 106-6; Order at Da6).  On September 1, 2022, defendant moved for reconsideration.  (Ca135-136).  Following briefing by defendant (Ca137-139) and the State (Ca140-144) and oral argument on February 3, 2023 (again before [...]), the reconsideration motion was denied.  (2T19-3 to 22-11; Order at Da7).  On July 10, 2023, defendant was indicted in an Amended Indictment and charged with Aggravated Manslaughter - First Degree, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4a(1) (Count 1), Possession of a Weapon for Unlawful Purpose - Second Degree, --- 4
[brief] ⁴  On or about February 14, 2020, [...] (“[...]”) filed a collection complaint in the Law Division, Monmouth County against [...] (the “[...] Matter”).  (141a – 142a).  [...] alleged that [...] owed $32,570.00 in connection with engineering services it provided to [...].  (141a – 142a).  On March 17, 2020, [...] filed an Answer on behalf of [...].  (144a – 146a).  The [...] matter has no connection to this case as that matter involved entirely different parties and claims.  (141a – 142a).  [...] and/or its principal(s) are not parties to the instant litigation.  (1a – 23a; 61a – 72a).  On March 17, 2020, [...] filed a Complaint on behalf of [...] and [...] against [...] and [...] Waste Management -- a separate legal entity (the “Longo Matter”).  (150a – 158a).  The Complaint alleges that Longo usurped certain business opportunities and that, as a result of Longo’s ⁴ Absurdly, Respondents had initially asserted that [...] should also be disqualified based [...]’s representation of [...] against [...], [...], and [...] (the “Rodriguez Matter”).  However, [...] did not represent [...] or [...] in this unrelated personal injury matter as [...] filed the lawsuit against [...].  Respondents recognized this argument lacked merit and did not address this matter in their reply or supplemental briefing.  actions, [...] and [...] suffered damages, including lost business opportunities.  (150a – 158a).  Just as the [...] matter, the Longo Matter involved different parties and unrelated claims.  (150a – 158a).  Longo and [...] Waste Management are not parties to this case.  (1a – 23a; 61a – 72a).  IV.
[brief] ”  State v. K.S., 220 N.J. 190, 199 (2015) (emphasis  Thus, evidence of a defendant’s prior arrests that do not materialize into convictions cannot be considered at sentencing.  The Court in K.S. specifically disapproved State v. Brooks, 175 N.J. 215, 229 (2002) and State v. Green, 62 N.J. 547 (1973), which had allowed for the practice in some circumstances.  K.S., 220 N.J. at 199.  Although Brooks addressed prosecutors’ consideration of charges not leading to convictions when considering applications for Pre-Trial Intervention, Green addressed judges considering such charges when imposing a sentence.  Therefore, consideration of these types of unproven allegations to find aggravating factors is improper at sentencing as well as in the PTI context.9
[brief] The challenged Development Plan was approved February 17, 2021; almost twenty (20) months AFTER the statutory Public Trust Doctrine or the [...]’s administrative “public access rule” had been in effect.  At the time that the “Redevelopment Plan” was adopted, [...] was required to affirmatively comply with and satisfy the legal obligations imposed on municipalities pursuant to the Public Trust Doctrine Statute and [...]’s administrative “public access rule”.
[brief] It cannot be questioned that [...] is the record owner of its Property at Lot 22 and its deeded rights are dispositive of its ownership of the parcel.  The [...] concludes [...]’s record ownership of Lot 22 through its extensive research.  On or about [...], [...] of [...] produced a report regarding deed searches it performed on the subject properties.  Pa16-88.  The parties jointly retained [...] at the recommendation of the court-appointed mediator, [...], Esq., of [...].  The title report was necessary because [...]’s Deed for the Property was for multiple parcels [...] purchased from the [...] and did not list the individual metes and bounds for the Property.
[brief] *A contract of a loan not invalid for any other reason . . . shall be void and the lender shall have no right to collect or receive any principal, interest or charges.  . . .*”  N.J.S.A. 17:11C-33(b) (emphasis added).  both the Answer to the Counterclaim (Pa25) and the Answer to the Class Action Complaint (Pa78), Defendants moved to compel arbitration.  (Pa116).  In granting Defendants’ Motion to Compel Arbitration, the trial court erred by 1) finding that Defendants had not waived their purported ability to compel arbitration through repeated affirmative litigation conduct, 2) finding that Defendants were able to enforce a provision of a void contract, and 3) holding that Defendants were able to compel arbitration despite no discovery into the terms of the assignment of the account as it relates to arbitrability, Defendants’ abject and unjustifiable refusal to participate in discovery (including any discovery related to the Collection Lawsuit initiated by [...]), and the Court’s withdrawal of [...]’s Motion to Compel Discovery Responses (Pa114).