ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] (Pa91-62, PSA § 1.1).  In its role as Title Company, [...] undertook an additional set of obligations in the PSA.  (Pa90-128, PSA §§ 6.3, 9.2, 10.2, 10.3).  Under these circumstances, [...]’s self-serving efforts to distance itself from the contract and its obligations thereunder were fallacious.  [...] could not avoid its duties under the contract merely by casting itself as “caught in the cross-fire between these parties following the collapse of their deal. ”  See Pa543, [...] Mem. at 1.  Indeed, [...] was to be well-compensated for the performance of its duties.  (Pa113-114, PSA, § 10.5).  It was not merely an unwitting bystander to the deal, “caught in the cross-fire”, as it argued before the trial court.  To the contrary, [...] played a material role in the events leading to Plaintiff’s damages.  [...] acted in bad faith, breached its contractual and fiduciary duties to Plaintiff, affirmatively acted with [...] to deceive Plaintiff and cut Plaintiff out of the deal, and thus played an active role in the “collapse of [the] deal. ” (Pa15-16, Complaint ¶¶ 68-79).
[brief] Da075  Within two days of receipt of [...]’s responses to the Notice to Produce and examination of the Subcontractor Agreement (Da067 – Da076) that [...] produced, [...] initiated the arbitration process by giving “notice” in a “record” to [...]’s attorneys in the manner specified by the Uniform Arbitration Act, N.J.S.A. 2A:23B-1, et. seq. (the “Arbitration Act”).  Da078 – Da080.  [...]’s attorneys took the position that [...] waived the right to arbitrate merely by the act of filing responsive pleadings and participating in the litigation that had been brought against him, notwithstanding the fact that failing to do so would have subjected him to default, coupled with the passage of time.  Da082.  [...] contends that the arbitration requirement of Section Thirteen of the Subcontractor Agreement (Da075) is valid and enforceable, that [...] has not waived his right to arbitration, and that this Court should reverse the decision made by the trial court and compel the Parties to mandatory arbitration to be conducted in accordance with the Arbitration Act.
[directive] Èske w konprann ke si wap plede koupab de komèt zak agresyon seksyèl agrave, agresyon [Wi/Yes] [Non/No] seksyèl, kontak seksyèl kriminèl agrave oswa kontak seksyèl epi zak la te komèt le ou aprè le 1ye jiyè 2002, tribinal la fèt pou li enpoze yon amann de $100?
[brief] As the trial court observed, “the foundation of [plaintiff’s] allegations require a determination as to what the appropriate action would have been in the provision of engineering services on the project. ”  Indeed, plaintiffs’ own experts confirm how their claims are inextricably tied to [...]’s provision of engineering services, for purposes of the Affidavit of Merit Statute.  Specially, the opinions offer by [...], and relied upon by plaintiffs, include:  - [[...]] through its agent and subcontractor [...], as Resident Engineer, failed to make the inspection staff aware of the specific contract requirements for the incident contract.  - [[...]] through its agent, contractor and subcontractor HAKS/[...] failed to inspect the incident milling machine for conformance with the Specifications.  - [[...]] through its agent, contractor and subcontractor HAKS/[...] failed to ensure the incident sweeper and its operation were in conformance with OSHA regulations.  -  [[...]] through its agent, contractor and subcontractor HAKS/[...] failed to ensure that spotters were utilized in conjunction with the incident sweeper, in violation of the Specifications, including OSHA regulations.  •  [[...]] through its agent, contractor and subcontractor HAKS/[...] failed to conduct any illuminance level measurements, consistent with the reasonable and customary standards of the industry, as spelled out in ANSI/ASSE A10.47-2009, to verify the adequacy of the lighting, as required by the Specifications.
[brief] LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I GIVING THE STATE THE BENEFIT OF ALL OF ITS FAVORABLE TESTIMONY AND INFERENCES, A RATIONAL JURY COULD FIND DEFENDANT GUILTY OF RECKLESS MANSLAUGHTER.  Defendant maintains that the “verdict was against the weight of the evidence” because the acquittal of the weapons offenses precluded a finding that he was a gunman, and there was no evidence of recklessness to support manslaughter.  (Db18).  He is mistaken on both counts.  As to the former, the ample evidence of defendant’s guilt—as a principal or an accomplice—validated the manslaughter conviction regardless of the acquittals on separate counts.  As to the latter, the substantial evidence that defendant was in the pursuing car chasing another car through [...] while firing shots at it supports that he consciously disregarded a substantial and unjustifiable risk that death would result.
[directive] K-9 training sites or facilities must be under the direct supervision of a K-9 trainer or supervising K-9 trainer, and approved for training purposes by the law enforcement agency executive employing or retaining the K-9 trainer or supervising K-9 trainer.  The training site or facility must provide the environment necessary to conduct all aspects of the training set forth herein, including appropriate simulation exercises.  The area used must be adequate to accommodate an agility course as well as various types of searches.  Suitable off-site buildings and other structures for use in conducting searches and scent work exercises must be available as well as areas appropriate for tracking exercises.  Areas for tracking must include a diversity of terrains or geographical conditions.  Secure areas should be used, as appropriate, to conduct training and simulation exercises.  FAMILIARIZATION TRAINING FOR SUPERVISORS AND OTHER OFFICERS
[brief] As the trial court correctly explained, there is no duty to incorporate every possible technology on the vehicle or to design an accident-proof vehicle.  And the mere occurrence of a crash and resulting injuries does not imply that the vehicle was defective—manufacturers are not subject to absolute liability.  The bottom line is that every driver knows it is imperative to control his or her vehicle.  Driver assist features were designed to assist the driver; they are indisputably not designed as a substitute for the driver exercising control over the operation of the vehicle.  Drivers may not abdicate or transfer that responsibility.  Consistent with this, the New Jersey Product Liability Act, section 2A:58C–3a(2), precludes liability where the allegedly unsafe characteristics of the product are well known to the ordinary consumer and the alleged harm was caused by an inherent characteristic of the product.  Here, the ordinary consumer is well aware of the need to control a vehicle and the potentially fatal consequences of failing to do so.  Throughout this litigation, Plaintiff has never responded to this argument.  Finally, Plaintiff spends considerable time arguing about the issue of causation, and attempting to respond to [...]’s arguments that Plaintiff failed to present any non-speculative evidence that LKAS or LDW would have made a difference in the outcome of the crash.  However, this issue is not properly before the Court because it was never ruled upon below.
[brief] ESI Discovery Requests  Defendant seeks to compel the production of all documents that “hit” on the parties’ agreed-upon ESI search terms without further relevance review by Plaintiffs.  Mot. at 2, 5, 7-9.  In support, Defendant argues that each search term is narrowly-tailored to specific issues in this case and thus any resulting “hits” are presumptively relevant and responsive.  Id., at 2.  Defendant asserts that Plaintiffs’ culling based on relevance is not contemplated by the ESI Order, and that Plaintiffs waived any arguments that the search terms are overly broad because they agreed to those search terms.  Id., at 7-8.  Defendant thus expresses a “concern” that Plaintiffs’ culling for relevance would not produce the full scope of materials anticipated by Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 and the ESI protocol.
[brief] (Pa743 at T78:17-20; T81:1-18; Da51; Da683-Da684 at T41:4-42:6).  [...] informed Defendant [...] about the text exchange because [...] supervised [...].  (Da52; Da685 at T46:16-23).  [...] and [...] informed [...], the Local Office Manager, about the text exchange and [...] instructed [...] to contact [...]’s Equal Employment Opportunity (“EEO”) office for guidance on how to handle the situation.
[brief] Ha39.  On March 2, 2020, [...] moved to require [...] to reconsider its petition in light of the adoption of the 2019 Energy Master Plan (EMP), Ha269, adopted on January 27, 2020, Ha438, which mandated a reduction in natural gas usage in New Jersey by 75% by 2050.  Ha923-924.  By order dated June 11, 2020, the ALJ denied this motion, based on his reasoning that the EMP was not self-executing but required additional actions by the [...], Ha247, Ha251, which was manifestly incorrect.
[brief] On 3/6/23 plaintiff [...] filed a Complaint and jury demand for negligence and damages against the defendants [...], [...], [...], [...], and [...] alleging that the defendants were negligent and liable for an alleged hazardous condition of the exterior front stairs of the building at [...], which caused plaintiff to slip and fall on the steps and sustain injuries.  (Pa60-70).  On 3/8/23 plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint and added [...] (“[...]”) as a defendant.  (Pa146-159).  On 5/31/23 defendants [...] and [...] filed an Answer to the Amended Complaint.  (Pa265-281).  On 4/10/24 defendants [...] and [...] filed a motion for summary judgment.  (Pa303-403).  The trial court heard oral arguments on May 10, 2024, and on that same date entered an Order granting summary judgment to defendants [...] and [...]  (Pa1-3).  Thereafter plaintiff filed a Notice of Appeal.  (Pa11-15; Pa23-34; Pa47-52).  STATEMENT OF FACTS
[brief] This appeal is Plaintiff [...]’s third attempt to renege on a 2015 class action Settlement Agreement with Defendant [...] that resolved this matter almost a decade ago.  He first breached it by filing a related federal action in which he asserted the very claims he brought (and resolved) here.  See Gannon, et al. v. United Bank Card, Inc., et al., in the District Court for the District of New Jersey.  No. 3:23-cv-04313-ZNQ-DEA (D.N.J., filed Aug. 11, 2023).  Next, when Gannon was stayed because the Superior Court of Hunterdon County has exclusive jurisdiction over the Settlement Agreement, Plaintiff opposed [...]’s motions to reopen this case and enforce the Settlement Agreement.  Then, after [...], P.J. Ch., granted [...]’s motions and held that Plaintiff released his claims against [...] in the settlement, Plaintiff appealed.  Plaintiff’s appeal is fatally defective.  His largely recycled brief does not say how the trial court abused its discretion in reopening this case or erred in enforcing the Settlement Agreement against him—indeed, he does not even identify the relevant appellate standards of review.  And Plaintiff’s copy-and-paste arguments again fail to rebut the simple fact that he released his *Gannon* claims in the Settlement Agreement.  Disappointment is not the standard for reversal.  This Court should affirm.  II.  **PROCEDURAL HISTORY**
[brief] Both [...] and [...] testified they did not attempt to break prior to impact and that the impact occurred in their respective lanes of travel.  Additionally, the sequence of the impacts is not in dispute: After the impact between [...] and [...], the [...] vehicle impacted with the Plaintiff’s vehicle.  Finally, the jury observed both MVR dash-cam footage as well as photographs depicting the damage to the vehicles and the final resting point of the vehicles.  For these reasons, the Trooper’s personal estimations of the points-of-impact is irrelevant and not helpful to the jury.
[brief] For the foregoing reasons, Defendant/Respondent, [...] respectfully requests this Court affirm the trial court’s decision so that the parties can abide by the contractually agreed-upon dispute resolution provision.  [...]  Attorneys for Defendant/Respondent  [...]  By: /s/[...]  [...]  Date: November 1, 2024  Superior Court of New Jersey  Appellate Division  Docket No. [...]
[brief] Id.  The lack of an actual controversy bars a request for injunctive relief.  New Jersey Citizen Action v. State, 2022 WL4592552, *5 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. Sept. 28, 2022) (citing Crowe v. De Goia, 90 N.J. 126, 132-34 (1983)).  This is because no threat of irreparable harm exists where no live controversy exists, and the Court’s ruling cannot effectuate relief.  Here, once [...] withdrew its offer of employment, it rendered [...]’s second application for a preliminary injunction moot.  This was unchanged by virtue of [...]’s attempt to walk back the recission by claiming it was conditional.  The fact remains no live controversy existed before the Court.  Moreover, [...] has now secured employment outside the restricted radius—in Washington State.  Thus, even if the issue of the Restrictive Covenant had not been moot in January 2024 (and it was), it is certainly moot now.  No doubt [...] will respond that the Court should nevertheless decide the issue of whether his potential employment with [...] would violate the Restrictive Covenant in the hope that [...] might reverse its decision and reoffer him employment.  However, that is exactly the type of advisory ruling that the Court does not issue.  This was improper as noted by the Chancery Court and as discussed at length in Point VI of this brief.  [...] is asking the Court to rule on the validity of a possible defense to a potential future claim that the Practice has not yet brought—and not just against [...], but also as to [...], which is a not even a party to the action.  This is improper and is not a basis for granting declaratory judgment or an injunction, which is why the Chancery Court properly dismissed the application and the Complaint.  This Court should likewise dismiss [...]’s appeal.
[directive] See also Section 9.3 (notation (i.e., “tagging”) of certain events/encounters raising privacy or other special issues).  7.1.1  If an officer is required to de-activate the BWC in accordance with the provisions of this Section, the officer shall narrate the reason for de-activation (e.g., “I am entering a school building where children are present. ”).  The BWC shall be re-activated as soon as it is safe and practicable to do so if and when the circumstances requiring de-activation no longer exist (e.g., the officer is conversing with an adult as part of a criminal investigation while in a place within the school where children would not be in view of the BWC).  7.2  Special Restrictions When Undercover Officers or Confidential Informants May Be Recorded.  Notwithstanding the provisions of Sections 5.2 and 5.3 of this Policy, and except as otherwise required by Section 5.5, an officer shall not activate a BWC, or shall de- activate a BWC that has been activated, if the officer knows or reasonably believes that the BWC would risk revealing the identity of an undercover officer or confidential informant or otherwise would pose a risk to the safety of an undercover officer or confidential informant, unless such activation is expressly authorized by a supervisor, or unless the exigency of the situation and danger posed to an officer (e.g., active shooter, actual use of police force, officer in distress, etc.) require that the encounter/incident be recorded, in which event the officer shall inform his or her supervisor that the recording risks revealing the identity of an individual as an undercover officer or confidential informant.
[brief] The appellate case in this matter was argued March 22, 2023 and decided June 8, 2023 (Da6) and as such, this case was “in the pipeline” when Tyler (which was at the time controlling interpretation of federal law) was decided.  (Da48-Da58)  To further cement the above position, see also Virella v. TLOA of NJ, LCC (In re Virella), [...] which case is even further removed from this case and where the court still found petitioner was in the pipeline because of a pending bankruptcy which included issues related to the property.  The trial court in this matter erred in not finding this case to be in the pipeline.  The retroactive application of Tyler provided separate grounds to vacate the final judgment.  257-261 [...] v. Roberto, 477 N.J. Super.339. (Da58,Da87)  As such, the law mandates the application of Tyler to this case be given full retroactive effect in order to create a cohesive rule of law.(Da48-Da58)
[brief] Appellant [...] currently receives Special retirement benefits from the State Police Retirement System (SPRS), which became effective July 1, 2009.  (Pa10).  On July 8, 2019, the Legislature enacted L. 2019, c. 157 (the “Ricci Act”).  The Ricci Act in relevant part permitted active or retired members of the SPRS to file for a recalculation of Ordinary Disability, Service, or Special Retirement Benefits to Accidental Disability Retirement Benefits provided they participated in the rescue, recovery, or cleanup operations at the World Trade Center Site.
[brief] ”  L. 2020, c. 18 § 1(c).  The immunities provided by the statute and Executive Order No. 112 remain in effect until and terminate on September 1, 2021.  See N.J.S.A. 26:13-33.  The immunity extends to all “efforts to treat COVID-19 patients and to prevent the spread of COVID-19 during the public health emergency and state of emergency declared by the Governor in Executive Order 103 of 2020. ”  L. 2020, c. 18 § 1(c).  The stated purpose is to “ensure that there are no impediments to providing medical treatment related to the COVID-19 emergency and that all medical personnel supporting the COVID-19 response are granted immunity. ”  L. 2020, c. 18 §1(a).  The immunity does not, however, apply to the provision of medical care rendered in the ordinary course of business, for example, orthopedic procedures, OB/GYN services and necessary cardiology procedures performed during the emergency.  See ibid.  In this case, plaintiff’s allegations that her father [...], during an admission to [...] for rehabilitation for a hip fracture, developed COVID-19 and passed away on April 18, 2020 as a consequence of defendants’ alleged negligence in responding to the COVID-19 pandemic during its early stage, and at the direction of New Jersey personnel and in order to assist patients who were not receiving adequate care and treatment at other healthcare facilities, fall squarely within the immunity from civil liability for claims against medical personnel for claims of injury and death during the public health emergency afforded by the New Jersey Governor’s executive orders and New Jersey Laws of 2020, Chapter 18, as [...] recognized in entering his February 3, 2023 opinion and order.
[brief] The public access rule itself is a detailed twenty one (21) page comprehensive and specific administrative regulation promulgated by the [...] pursuant to the statutory mandate (Pa419).  Ordinance No. 1667 was adopted February 17, 2021, with the Public Trust Doctrine Statute and “public access rule” already in legal effect, and more than 200+ years after the Public trust Doctrine had been recognized on our jurisprudence.  With Ordinance No. 1667, the Borough Council adopted the Second Amended Redevelopment Plan and also repealed all other Ordinances or parts of Ordinances inconsistent herewith and are required to comply with the New Jersey Public Trust Doctrine Statute, [...]’s administrative “public access rule”, and the Common Law doctrine.
[brief] THE THIRD COUNT OF THE COMPLAINT WAS PROPERLY DISMISSED (Da1-Da24; 3T4-1 – 3T4-14)  In the trial court, Plaintiffs took the unfortunate step of smearing the Zoning Board’s professionals with a completely baseless allegation that they improperly met off the record with the [...] and the Zoning Board “for the purpose of devising methods for suppressing objections to the subject application” in violation of the Open Public Meetings Act, N.J.S.A. 10:4-6 et seq.  This outrageous allegation is false and there is not a shred of evidence to support it\(^4\).  (Da3 to Da24).  Plaintiffs also falsely allege that such a meeting --- \(^4\)  Contrary to the allegations of paragraph 58 of the Complaint, the Zoning Board’s professionals did not have meetings or communications with the [...], the Board, or each other “for the purpose of devising methods for suppressing objections to the subject application. ”  (Da3 to Da24). was “disclosed” at the hearing on the application.  No such disclosure appears in the record because no such meeting ever occurred.  (1T and 2T).  The Application in this matter was properly heard on the record at a regularly scheduled and noticed meeting of the Zoning Board in compliance with the Open Public Meetings Act, N.J.S.A. 10:4-9, -10 and -12.  (1T).  Moreover, although no meeting occurred between the Zoning Board professionals and the [...] prior to the hearing in this case, such a meeting would have been proper as “it is almost universal practice for a board to permit its professionals to deal informally and directly with professionals of the applicant in order to expedite consideration of [an] application. ”  Cox & Koenig, New Jersey Zoning and Land Use Administration (Gann, 2023), §18-4.4.  See also Morris County Fair Housing v. Boonton Twp., 220 N.J. Super. 388, 400-01 (Law Div. 1987), aff’d, 230 N.J. Super. 345 (App. Div. 1989).  Such meetings are commonplace in land use matters in New Jersey.  (Da19).  Plaintiffs never opposed the motion to dismiss the Third Count, effectively admitting the impropriety of their pleading.  The trial court properly dismissed this Count separate and apart of its dismissal of the remainder of Plaintiffs’ zoning appeal.  (3T4-1 to 3T4-14).  CONCLUSION
[brief] THE PUSH TO RETURN TO IN SCHOOL INSTRUCTION (SUMMER 2020)  The Judge of Compensation took appropriate Judicial Notice of the then “Trump” Administration’s Executive Order to reopen schools for in person instruction.  (Pa34-36).  Judicial Notice was taken of the amendment to the United States List of Critical Infrastructure Employees of August 18, 2020 to include “educators” such as Decedent, as per the Administration’s directive.  (Pa47).  The Judge also took notice of the N.J. Executive Order No. 175 promulgated by [...] on August 13, 2020, ordering the reopening of schools for in-person school instruction for the 2020 to 2021 school year.  (Pa3-17).  C.