ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The only testimony that the family court heard was from the plaintiff and his witnesses, all of whom detailed the fraud committed by the defendant during the parties’ engagement, before they married.  Moreover, all of the statements that the defendant was charged with having made – relayed to the family judge by the witnesses at trial below – showed further the marital fraud that the defendant carried out.  For instance, when confronted about her sudden change in behavior following the marriage, the defendant issued an apology in a group chat that included the plaintiff’s parents, while expressing her concern about the possibility of the plaintiff canceling her visa application, 1T89-90.  After arriving back in the United States, Plaintiff was keenly aware that Defendant was anxiously awaiting her green card, checking the mailbox daily until its arrival, 2T32-33.  Once the green card arrived, the parties’ relationship significantly deteriorated; Defendant began to have arguments with Plaintiff and constantly complained.  She continuously criticized Plaintiff and his parents, leading to frequent arguments even over minor issues such as watering plants.  (2T33).  This was not merely a he said/she said dispute.
[brief] ”  See e.g., State v. Reeves, 967 N.W.2d 144, 148–49 (S.D. 2021) (“[U]nder the silent witness theory, a photograph or video is a silent witness which speaks for itself, and is substantive evidence of what it portrays independent of a sponsoring witness. ”) (internal quotation marks omitted); 2 McCormick On Evidence § 216 ([...] ed., 8th ed. 2020) (under the silent witness theory, “[r]ecordings such as a tape from an automatic surveillance camera can be authenticated as the accurate product of an automated process”).  The problem here is that the State failed to carry its burden to demonstrate that the video shown at trial was actually footage of July 16, 2019 at 6:22p.m.
[brief] N.J.S.A. 18A:12-22.  Here the disciplinary action requested by Appellants is merely a reimposition of the penalty of “Censure. ”  [...] in the present matter, and [...] in the companion case now before the Appellate Division, each independently reviewed the Commission’s caselaw on penalty, including I/M/O [...], Commission Docket No. [...] (2021), and each independently imposed the penalty of censure.
[brief] 2T – Trial Transcript, July 12, 2023  3T – Trial Transcript, July 13, 2023  4T – Trial Transcript, July 18, 2023  5T – Trial Transcript, July 19, 2023  6T – Trial Transcript, July 20, 2023  7T – Trial Transcript, July 24, 2023  8T – Trial Transcript, July 25, 2023 pleadings, testimony, and briefs, convey his experience with and acquisition of environmentally challenged properties.
[brief] The New Jersey Cannabis Regulatory, Enforcement Assistance, and Marketplace Modernization Act (CREAMMA), N.J.S.A. 24:6I-31 to -56, now precludes police from using the odor of marijuana to establish probable cause to search.  CREAMMA took effect on February 22, 2021.  State v. Cohen, 254 N.J. 308, 328 (2023).  The stop in this case occurred in January of 2020.
[brief] *Ownership or control over the property at the time of the discharge, however, will suffice*”) (emphasis added).  Of course, [...], as might any property owner when a discharge occurs on its property, denied knowledge of the presence of contaminants and went so far as to claim that, had it known that [...] was parking trailers containing waste oil on its property, it would have stopped [...] from doing so.  Those self-serving statements were disputed issues of fact, because: (1) [...] had pled in its answer that “[...] specifically permitted defendant [...] to store bunker oil on the property” (PPCIa124); (2) [...] did in fact store trailers containing oil on the property; and (3) there was evidence of at least one historical spill event at the property (there was evidence an unrelated gasoline discharge occurred before the oil spill) (PPCIa429).  Thus, despite [...]’s attempts to deny any such knowledge in order to avoid potential liability under the Spill Act, the evidence suggests otherwise and [...] has never been afforded the opportunity to depose an [...] witness, so as to challenge these convenient statements through the crucible of cross-examination.
[brief] Further, as set forth supra at note 3, [...] possessed letters from codefendant [...] (written years prior to the Habeas Petition) corroborating [...]’ claim that he had no knowledge of the first home invasion.  If [...]’ Sworn Statement was disclosed to [...] at the time of his trial, he could have served a subpoena for the [...] letters, which may also have contained exculpatory material.  Although [...] was provided with one letter in 2021 following an evidentiary hearing, the other letters were destroyed.  [...] was never able to review the letters from [...] to his counsel.
[brief] In any event, the mere fact that Defendant [...] operated a business within 200 feet of the flex parking removal project did not create a conflict of interest prohibiting her participation in the adoption of the bond ordinance.  In 1991 when the Local Government Ethics Law was enacted, the Legislature specifically declared that the purpose of the Law was as follows: to provide a method of assuring that standards of ethical conduct and financial disclosure requirements for local government officers and employees shall be clear, consistent, uniform in their application, and enforceable on a Statewide basis, and to provide local officers or employees with advice and information concerning possible conflicts of interest which might arise in the conduct of their public duties.
[brief] As noted, in April 2016 [...] filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment seeking a determination that the 1963 Agreement established a permanent easement allowing Synagogue staff/attendees to park vehicles on the School’s Sixth Street Courtyard and Fifth Street parking lot.  (Da160)  [...] filed a Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, asserting that the 1963 Agreement did not create an easement, but only a permissive license that had terminated.  (Da162)  The Court rendered an oral Opinion and Amended Partial Summary Judgment on August 16, 2016 that the [...] had a permanent easement for Synagogue vehicles staff/attendees to park on the School’s Sixth Street Courtyard and Fifth Street parking area and to use the School’s boiler room and water cooling tower (Da170).  After that partial Summary Judgment Order, [...] then conducted a testimonial hearing as to whether the parking easement had been abandoned, defining and establishing the "joint use" of the School property, and possible damages.  The Court rendered an oral opinion on those issues on June 5, 2017, (Da170) with a Final Order on June 27, 2017 (Da207).  [...] filed an appeal.  The Appellate Court in its June 2019 Opinion (Da839) reversed and invalidated the Partial Summary Judgment, the Final Order and all enforcement Orders and remanded the matter for a full plenary hearing.
[brief] (Da1-3).  Trial was held before the Honorable [...], J.S.C, and a jury in September 2022.  (1T-8T).  On September 29, 2022, defendant was convicted on all counts.  (Da4-5); (8T116-1 to 8).  On January 12, 2023, defendant was sentenced to forty-five years New Jersey State Prison under the No Early Release Act (NERA), N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2, for count one.  (9T39-5 to 9; Da6-9).  On February 23, 2023, defendant filed a notice of appeal.
[brief] \(^8\) (Pa1 at 13:35:50 to 13:36:04; Pa2 at 13:35:55 to 13:36:09).  Defendant argues that [...]’s testimony did not establish where or “how close” the other vehicles on the road were to [...]’s car.  (Db21).  But that level of precision is not required.  In *Moss*, this Court found reasonable suspicion for a violation of N.J.S.A. 39:4-126 existed where the defendant made a left turn without signaling.
[brief] *Mount Laurel IV*, 221 N.J. at 5-6.  The Court “emphasize[d] that courts should employ flexibility in assessing a town's compliance and should exercise caution to avoid sanctioning any expressly disapproved practices from [...]'s invalidated Third Round Rules. ”  Id. at 33.  *Mount Laurel IV* also held that “courts should endeavor to secure, whenever possible, prompt voluntary compliance from municipalities in view of the lengthy delay in achieving satisfaction of towns’ Third Round obligations.
[brief] **THE MARITAL HOME**  [...] in her Verified Complaint to be appointed Administrator, falsely claimed that [...] and [...] were married on August 27, 2006, lived together for only four years, and separated in October 2010 at which time [...] forced him out of the house that she owned and [...] purchased the [...] home for himself.  [...] also falsely certified that [...] and [...] had no contact for a decade, that [...] never lived in the marital home and [...] Sr. had been involved in a romantic relationship with a woman named [...] since 2011 (108-A).  These false statements were made to undermine [...]’s lawful claim for an interest in the marital home.  There were simply too many witnesses, inside and outside of the family, including [...] employees, to contradict this fictional scenario.  Although the parties separated in 2009, they had reconciled by June 2010 when [...] graduated.
[brief] Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343, 355 (1948).  In its opposition, the State has mischaracterized Defendant’s arguments regarding the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United States Constitution.  U.S. Cont., Art. IV § 1.  The State’s argument and all of the cases it relies upon are cases in which the one state was being asked to apply, or enforce, the law of another state due to a party residing in another state.  There is a “stark distinction between recognition and enforcement of judgments under the full faith and credit clause. ”  Adar v. Smith, 639 F.3d 146, 160 (5th Cir. 2011) (citing Baker v. General Motors Corp, 522 U.S. 222 (1998)).  Defendant is not asking this Court to “substitute the statutes of [Pennsylvania] for [New Jersey’s] own statute[] dealing with a subject matter concerning which it is competent to legislate. ”  Sb21 (citation omitted).  Defendant is not asking for unlimited extraterritorial recognition of a Pennsylvania statute.  Id.  Defendant is asking for this Court to recognize a valid license duly issued by Pennsylvania.
[directive] As New Jersey’s Attorney General, I am responsible for overseeing law enforcement throughout the state and ensuring that our criminal laws are adequately and uniformly enforced (N.J.S.A. 52:17B-112).  These responsibilities extend to policing: an area where the Department has worked extensively to ensure that law enforcement is governed by the highest standards, and that our officers have the tools needed to protect and serve New Jersey proudly and capably.  The demands and complexities of modern-day policing necessitate a statewide, centralized office that can advise and support law enforcement agencies and incentivize their growth and improvement.  The COMPLEX ∙ TELEPHONE: (609)292-9660  FAX: (609)292-4299  HUGHES  JUSTICE  New Jersey is an Equal Opportunity Employer ∙ Printed on Recycled Paper and Recyclable law enforcement profession continues to become more complex and demanding in our modern society; officers have to adapt to new technology; they are in receipt of a proliferation of information about practices and strategies with little authoritative guidance on what works best or is based reliably in research or evidence; they are in need of resiliency and support to meet the challenging circumstances of modern policing; and our law enforcement leaders are continually asked to operate at a level of leadership that we should expect from any modern institution, but for which they may not have been adequately prepared.  Under my authority as Attorney General, I am establishing a new office that will promote uniformity across law enforcement agencies and elevate the caliber of policing in New Jersey.
[brief] The law of the case doctrine requires that a legal decision made in a particular matter “should be respected by all other lower or equal courts during the pendency of that case. ”  Lanzet v. Greenberg, 126 N.J. 168, 192 (1991) (citing State v. Reldan, 100 N.J. 187, 203 (1985); State v. Hale, 127 N.J. Super. 407, 410–11  It is a rule intended to “prevent relitigation of a previously resolved issue. ”  *In re Estate of Stockdale*, 196 N.J. 275, 311 (2008) (citing [...], *Current N.J. Court Rules*, comment 4 on R. 1:36-3 (2008)).
[brief] Overview of LTCI Policies ...................................................... | 6 | | B.  The LTCI Act and Its Rules ..................................................... | 7 | | C. [...]'s Choice 2 Policies ................................................... | 10 | | D. [...]'s 2016 and 2017 Rate Increase Requests ....................... | 11 | | E.  The 2020 Rate Increase Applications ......................................... | 13 | | F. [...]'s 2020 Accumulated Income ......................................... | 16 | | G.  The Department's Rate Review .................................................. | 18 | | H.  The ALJ's Decision ....................................................................... | 21 | | I.  The Commissioner's Decision .................................................... | 23 | | ARGUMENT .......................................................................................... | 25 | | THE COMMISSIONER’S FINAL DECISION AND ORDER IS REASONABLE AND SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD ................................................................. | 25 | | A.  Neither the ALJ nor the Commissioner Rewrote the Rationale for the Department’s Disapproval.  ................................................................. | 28 |  1.  The Department’s Disapproval Letters Adequately State the Grounds for the Department’s Determination.  ...................... 29  B.  The Department’s Excessiveness Determination was Well-Grounded in Its Expertise and Concern for Policyholder welfare.  .................................................................................................................. 35  C.  The Department Was Not Required to Adopt Rules as to Excessiveness.  ...........................................................................................................................................37  1.  The Department’s Promulgated Rules Fulfilled the Department’s Obligation to Provide Guidance about the Rate Review Process..................................................................................................................37  2.  There is No Need to Separately Define “Excessiveness”.......39  3.  There is No Basis to Reverse the Commissioner's Decision.  ...48  CONCLUSION
[brief] As to the unpublished cases, these cases are not binding on this Court.  *Bowser v. Bd. of Trs., Police & Firemen's Ret. Sys.*, 455 N.J. Super. 165, 171 (App. Div. 2018) (“[O]ur court’s unpublished decisions, which do not bind us. ”).  Nor are they helpful to Landlord’s position.  Connell v. Connell, A-No. A-5645-06T3, 2008 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1416, at *3 (App. Div. July 30, 2008) was concerned with the sufficiency of the trial court’s reasoning for denying a post-judgment motion for reconsideration of the same issues that the judge had already addressed in the initial judgment of divorce.
[brief] **  In its submissions to the trial court, [...] detailed its discovery of [...]’s unauthorized dumping and provided photographic evidence depicting the mountains of solid waste and debris that [...] and [...] left behind as they vacated the Leased Premises.  [Pa215].  In response, [...] submitted a certification dated three months earlier than these events that completely ignored the evidence presented and instead made the conclusory (and demonstrably untrue) assertion that only six dump trucks of materials were transported to the Leased Premises – which the record squarely refuted.  [Pa175 at ¶ 9].  Among the evidence that [...] ignored was [...]’s testimony which put the lie to [...]’s fabricated claims.  [Pa266 at 61:7-25 (testifying that [...] did not pay anything for the material); Pa259 at 30:1-13 (testifying that the materials were from “the port” without any documentation)].  The record is unrefuted that hundreds of dump trucks of material were dumped at the Leased Premises – far more than the six trucks that [...] had claimed, which would have been bad enough.\(^5\) [Pa305 at ¶ 10].  [...] did not remove or remediate this material, and plainly did not leave the Leased Premises in “broom clean” condition, as required under the Settlement Agreement.  As a result, even if [...]’s first three breaches were not enough, this fourth breach of the Settlement Agreement presented yet another reason that the Money Judgment should have been promptly entered.  The trial court’s failure to do so was erroneous for this reason, too, and requires the Order to be reversed and this matter remanded for entry of the Monetary Judgment in the full Judgment Amount, together with attorneys’ fees and costs.
[brief] *In re Guardianship of J.N.H.*, 172 N.J. 440, 473–74 (2002); *Quagliato v. Bodner*, 115 N.J. Super. 133, 138 (App. Div.1971).  Once a Final Judgment of Divorce has been approved by the New Jersey Superior Court: Family Part, there are means by which a mistake within can be corrected; however, the path to correction isn’t straight and narrow, and not all mistakes can be corrected in any circumstance.  The difference between a mistake that a New Jersey Trial Court will consider correcting and a mistake that either or both of the separated spouses must accept depends on specific factors as laid out within New Jersey Court Rule 4:50-1, which addresses when a party may seek ‘Relief From Judgment or Order.
[brief] Kassick v Milwaukee Electric Tool Corp. 120 N.J. 130 (1990).  The Trial Court placed its ruling on the record on April 13, 2023.  After indicating the general law on the purpose of damages, the Court found that based upon the award of $25,000 that it was clear that the jury rejected the plaintiff’s argument that his pre-existing Ménière’s disease, was aggravated in anyway by the subject accident.  (8T:8-8 to 12).  The Court went on to note that as a preliminary matter, the credibility of the plaintiff was questioned throughout the entire jury trial, including his version of the events.  (8T:8-13 to 15).  The Court further found that the plaintiff had provided the jury with inconsistent versions of the accident, and his testimony of striking his head on the ground, was disputed by the MVR recording from his police vehicle.  (8T:8-15 to 19).  However, the Court did not provide any basis as to how it was clear that the jury rejected the plaintiff’s claim in its entirety when the jury did in fact award the plaintiff $25,000 in damages.
[brief] Paragraph 27 of the parties' PSA is a contractual provision that warranted an attorneys' fee award to [...], who was forced to incur over a million dollars in counsel fees because of [...]'s non-compliance with the terms and conditions of the PSA.  On August 27, 2017, [...] filed a motion to enforce litigants' rights under the PSA because [...] was non-compliant with its provisions.  (A33).
[brief] D.  Profitability Revisited  Defendant [...] argues, improbably, that the estimated 67.9% Unleveraged Rate of Return that appears in its Application for exemption has nothing to do with the issue of profits.  (Dlb29)  This is incorrect.  It is a matter of common knowledge that the rate of return on an investment is measured by how much profit the investor gets back in relation to the amount invested.  A rate of return of 67.9% on an investment of $1,000,000, for example, implies a profit of $679,000.  A lower percentage of return implies lower profit.  Defendant [...] also argues for the first time that the “Net Pretax Income” shown in Exhibit 13 ranges “from a very modest 3.5% to 6.5% among the five housing types. ”  (Dlb30)  However, calculation of net pretax income depends on the expenses built into the calculation.  If this contention had been argued below, plaintiffs would have been prepared to point out that [...]’s calculations reflected in Exhibit 13 include ”indirect” project costs not consistent with the definition of “total project unit cost” and “project cost” at N.J.S.A. 40A:20-3(h).  III.
[brief] Table of judgments 4  2)  Table of citations 5-7 3) Preliminary statement 8-10 4)  Procedural history 11-14 5)  Statement of facts 15  6)  Legal argument Point  1:  As a matter of law, the plaintiff is entitled to judgment versus the [...].  (Not argued below)  16 POINT 2:  Absent a jury trial of a presiding judge’s order, I have no way to really know what was decided in a matter brought to the bar (Not argued below)  17 POINT 3: [...]’s order needs to be confirmed by a jury of 12, notwithstanding the order is erroneous (Not argued below)  18 POINT 4:  Whether a matter at the bar sounds in ordinary negligence or malpractice is an issue of fact for jury.  A cause of action via a breach of statute does not sound in malpractice or negligence in one’s profession.  (Not argued below)  19-20 POINT 5:  There is avenue for recovery via a jury trial (Not argued below)  21-22 POINT 6:  Per New Jersey statutory law any change in the meaning of language is irrelevant (Not argued below)  23 POINT 7: The laws created by the past Congresses of the United States are still valid (Not argued below)  24 POINT 8: Supreme court opinions are facts that cannot 25 be otherwise re-examined (Not argued below)  POINT 9:  New Jersey common laws are facts that cannot be otherwise re-examined (Not argued below)  POINT 10:  There is a right to trial by jury via the 7th amendment per the 73rd Congress (Not argued below)
[brief] This is a case about a typical commercial landlord/tenant matter where on February 20, 2015, Plaintiff, [...], leased a $2 million dollar sports facility to Defendant, [...], d/b/a [...].  [...] required the individual guarantees of Defendants, [...], [...] and [...], the three members of the LLC, as to all obligations of the tenant as the LLC had no assets.  After a little over a year in business, on April 11, 2016, [...] sent [...] a notice of termination as the business was not doing well.  [...] and [...] met on May 5, 2016 and worked out an arrangement under which [...] agreed to stay.
[directive] Any request by a department to use an ALPR or ALPR-generated data for a purpose or in a manner not authorized by these Guidelines shall be made to the Attorney -16- General or his or her designee through the Director of the Division of Criminal Justice or his or her designee, who shall make recommendations on whether to grant the agency’s specific request for an exemption or special authorization.  Such requests shall be made in writing unless the circumstances are exigent, in which event the request by the agency and approval or denial by the Attorney General or his or her designee may be given orally, in which event the circumstances of the request and the approval or denial shall be memorialized in writing as soon thereafter as is practicable.