ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] PROCEDURAL HISTORY  This appeal arises from the Trial Court’s abuse of its discretion in ordering the Appellant to pay her adversary’s counsel fees and additional (duplicative) sanctions.  In arbitrarily and unreasonably awarding the fees and sanctions, the Trial Court ignored the irrefutable fact that the Appellee engaged in a fishing expedition of an epic magnitude, delving into subjects totally irrelevant under probate law and often based solely on the unsupported “feelings” that some things must be true.  Even worse, the Trial Court permitted and encouraged the Appellee’s discovery that was more of a flight of fancy than a legitimate search for relevant evidence.  Then, the Trial Court ordered the Appellant to pay for Appellee’s counsel’s time engaged in these unnecessary and irrelevant activities.  As if this is not enough to warrant the reversal of the fees and sanctions award, the Trial Court demonstrated a severe prejudice against the Appellant’s counsel through several disparaging remarks made by the Trial Court about said counsel.  For these reasons, a reversal of the Trial Court’s December 2, 2022 Order is necessary to avoid a gross miscarriage of justice.
[brief] TABLE OF TRANSCRIPTS  Page Transcript of Motion, dated January 24, 2020..................................................  1T Transcript of Motion, dated February 14, 2020..............................................  2T Transcript of Motion, dated June 25, 2021 .....................................................  3T  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT  Plaintiffs/Appellants [...] (“[...]”) and [...] (“[...]”) (collectively “Plaintiffs/Appellants”) submit this brief in support of their appeal from a June 25, 2021 Order of the Law Division (the “Order”).
[directive] ~e "'ioJJ -w-.::z.i!J-121-tt ~HJA].2..  [Yes/ofl] [No/o]-1..J..8..]  a.  2.  Did you commit the offense(s) to which you are pleading guilty?  i1: -i'l-o-}~ ~1-o-}c ~'i;i'-y7J}?  *~~ b.  Do you understand that before the judge can find you guilty, you will have to tell the judge [Yes/ofl] [No/01-1..J..8..] what you did that makes you guilty of the particular offense(s)?  Ji!-'3!: it~- tlJ%]j ¥1-A}7} ,'j-o-}oj];,j] ~.I!."8}7] ,'j-o-}~ ¥1-A}oj];,J] ~7]oj] o] =i78 1:loJl, i~(:)oJ]  *~ ~78%}c7.]  ~%]Jo]:%}~ 3:1~: o}1}y7J}?  ~  3.  you understand what the charges mean?  [Yes/ofl]  [NoMi..J..8..]  Do -i'l-o-l-c-¥-~1~•~.I!.~c~~11i.:i~  Do you understand that by pleading guilty you are giving up certain rights?
[brief] Consistent with the probable cause offering, [...] issued a narrow two-page warrant with precise language mirroring the affidavit.  A search was authorized on a specific Jaguar S-Type car—with designated VIN and license plate numbers—“within the [...][.]”  (Dca 8)  This scope makes sense: [...] had no occasion to consider whether there was probable cause to search [...]’s car in [...]; he only considered evidence that [...] used the car to sell drugs in [...].  (Nor, as discussed in Point II, would [...] even have the power to authorize a search outside of [...].)  Indeed, the probable cause that justified the issuance of the warrant hinged on the presence of the car in [...]—a circumstance that had occurred in the past and police believed would happen again.
[brief] State v. Bernokeits, 423 N.J. Super. 365 (App. Div. 2011) ....................................................................................14 State v. Boretsky, 186 N.J. 271 (2006) .............................................................................................................39 State v. Bruzzese, 94 N.J. 210 (1983) ................................................................................................................17, 19, 20 State v. Cancel, 256 N.J. Super. 430 (App. Div. 1992) ..................................................................................24 State v. Cantalupo, No. A-4, 142-16T2, 2019 WL 149654 (App. Div. Jan. 8, 2019) ..........................................................16 State v. Carty, 170 N.J. 632 (2002) ..............................................................................................................18 State v. Davis, 104 N.J. 490 (1986) ..............................................................................................................15 State v. Dickey, 152 N.J. 468 (1998) ..............................................................................................................12, 13 State v. Diloreto, 461 N.J. Super. 185 (App. Div. 2019) ....................................................................................35 State v. Dubaniewicz, 208 A.3d 619 (Vt. 2019) .......................................................................................................16, 19 State v. Dunbar, 229 N.J. 521 (2017) ........................................................................................................... 11, 12, 25 State v. Elder, 192 N.J. 224 (2007) ..................................................................................................................
[brief] The trial court’s oral decision states two primary bases for ruling that [...]’s rent concession charge-back clause is not an invalid penalty clause.  First, the court held that it “does not view the charge-back provision as a liquidated damage clause” implying that the charge-back provision cannot be deemed a penalty under Wasserman’s and similar case law because it not a stipulated damages provision\(^8\) subject to those precedents.  2T20-8 – 2T20-9.  Second, the court held that “even if… the rent concession [charge-back] provision does constitute liquidated damages, the Court does not find it unreasonable. ”  2T20-9 – 2T20-13.  The trial court erred on both points.
[brief] The limited extraordinary circumstances exception is inapplicable to the facts alleged by Appellant.  Specifically, Appellants allege that they should be entitled to the limited circumstances exception based on the flawed theory that no Ferreira conference was conducted.  See Ferreira v. Rancocas Orthopedic Assocs., 178 N.J. 144 (2003).  Moreover, and fatal to Appellants’ allegations, is that the absence of a Ferreira conference does not toll the running of the statutory period in which an affidavit of merit should be filed and served on defendants.  See Paragon Contractors, Inc. v. Peachtree Condominium Assoc., 202 N.J. 415, 419 (2010).  The New Jersey Supreme Court in Paragon held that “lawyers and litigants should understand that, going forward, a reliance on the scheduling of a Ferreira conference to avoid the strictures of the Affidavit of Merit Statute is entirely unwarranted and will not serve to toll the statutory time frames. ”  Id. at 426.  Therefore, Appellants’ flawed argument based on the absence of the Ferreira conference is unwarranted.  Equally as unwarranted is Appellants’ reliance on the A.T. v. Cohen case, in which the Court found extraordinary circumstances existed when there was the absence of a Ferreira conference and the crucial fact that an affidavit of merit was filed in response to a motion for summary judgment after the 120-day period.  A.T. v. Cohen, 213 N.J. 342, 348 (2017).  Here, Appellants never obtained, filed, or served an Affidavit of Merit within the applicable timeframes in N.J.S.A 2A:53A-27 or in response to [...]’s Motion to Dismiss.  Appellants simply never did what they were required to do to pursue a professional malpractice claim against [...].  As such, no “extraordinary circumstances” exist that would alleviate the need for Appellants to obtain an Affidavit of Merit.
[brief] Subcarrier Commc’ns., Inc. v. Day, 299 N.J. Super. 634, 638 (App. Div. 1997).  The likelihood that adequate compensatory or other corrective relief will be available at a later date, in the ordinary course of litigation, weighs against a claim of irreparable harm.  Delaware River & Bay Auth. v. York Hunter Constr., 344 N.J. Super. 361, 365 (Ch. Div. 2001) (citing Sampson v. Murray, 415 U.S. 61, 90 (1974)).  In fact, “[t]he availability of adequate monetary damages belies a claim of irreparable injury. ”  Id. at 364-65 (citation omitted).  In other words, plaintiff must have no adequate remedy at law.
[brief] (Ia095 at 59:2-5).  The terms “fair, festival, and event” can only be understood to mean the 2019 Summer Camp in this context.  Intervenor is plainly attempting to create an ambiguity where none exists.  New Jersey case law is clear that the Intervenor’s efforts should be rejected, as courts are not to indulge in strained or distorted constructions, or read documents in such a way as to create an ambiguity that does not exist.
[directive] Some open-ended questions must be posed verbally to each juror to elicit a verbal response.  The purpose of this requirement is to ensure that jurors verbalize their answers, so the court, attorneys and litigants can better assess the jurors' attitudes and ascertain any possible bias or prejudice, not evident from a yes or no response, that might interfere with the ability of that juror to be fair and impartial.  Open-ended questions also will provide an opportunity to assess a juror's reasoning ability and capacity to remember information, demeanor, forthrightness or hesitancy, body language, facial expressions, etc.  It is recognized that specific questions to be posed verbally might appropriately differ from one case to another, depending upon the type of case, the anticipated evidence, the particular circumstances, etc.  Therefore, rather than designating specific questions to be posed verbally to each juror, the determination is left to the court, with input from counsel, in each case.  The verbal questions should be selected based upon what is deemed particularly important in the jury selection process in that case.  They could be derived from the standard list of questions or be developed without regard to the standard questions by the judge, with input from counsel, to address case- specific issues.  The verbal questions should elicit open-ended answers.  The judge must ask at least three such questions, in addition to the biographical question and the two omnibus qualifying questions.  This is a minimum number Directive # 4-07 May 16, 2007 Page 5 and judges are encouraged to ask more where such action would be appropriate.  If questions are derived from the standard list of questions, they must be reformulated to elicit open-ended answers.  Appended to this Supplemental Directive is a list of sample open-ended questions, provided here only for the purpose of assisting judges and counsel by illustrating the type of questions contemplated.  These are examples; they are not model, or standard, open-ended questions.  Some of the examples are reformulations of standard questions, and others are not.  There is no requirement that any of these examples be used in any case, although they may be used.  The open-ended questions shall be asked either at sidebar or in open court, in the discretion of the court, with input from counsel.  B.
[directive] It is important to note that law enforcement encounters are never static and rapidly evolve.  Thus, officers must continuously assess the effectiveness, proportionality, and necessity of their actions, including their tactical positioning, in order to decrease the likelihood of force being needed for self-protection.  Officers may increase the time 6 USE OF FORCE POLICY | April 2022 available to evaluate the threat by positioning an object between themselves and the subject, being aware of their surroundings, and waiting for backup, when it is available.
[brief] Given this presumption, a reasonable auto shop owner that wants to keep his business would wait a significant amount of time for redemption before junking the car.  Appellant readily admits to this stating “only after a certain period of time, if no further action was taken, could [Respondent] then keep the vehicle to sell as parts and scrap metal” (Pb p. 22).  Appellant has not argued that he did in fact sell the parts and benefit.  Appellant seems to be clearly aware that Respondent hasn’t done so yet, rendering his argument for why he refused to redeem the car senseless.  Appellant’s argument regarding unjust enrichment also indicates that he is unaware of the issues present in this case and is simply arguing to argue.
[brief] Permanent injury of [...] for [...] | 12/12/2022 | -Page 47 | | Exhibit D to certification of license by [...] | 12/12/2022 | -Page 49 | | Exhibit E for answered by plaintiff Xinan yan | 12/12/2022 | -Page 51 | | Exhibit F for plaintiff named xinan Yan's medical record by Dr. Ari.cohn | 12/12/2022 | -Page 61 | | Exhibit G for health insurance claim form of [...] | 12/12/2022 | -Page 86 | | Exhibit H for plaintiff named [...] medical record by ZhuPing, Chang.  MD | 12/12/2022 | -Page 139 | | Exhibit I for plaintiff named [...] medical record by [...] | 12/12/2022 | -Page 145 | | Exhibit J to certification  Permanent injury of Dr. Ari. Cohn for [...] | 12/12/2022 | -Page 163 | | Document/Exhibit Title or Description | Date | Page Number | |--------------------------------------|------------|-------------| | Exhibit K answered by plaintiff named [...] | 12/12/2022 | -Page 165 | | Exhibit L for plaintiff named [...]'s medical record by Dr. Ari. cohn | 12/12/2022 | -Page 175 | | Exhibit M for the plaintiff named [...] medical recond by ZhuPing, Chang.  MD | 12/12/2022 | -Page 203 | | Exhibit N for plaintiff named [...] medical record by [...] | 12/12/2022 | -Page 209 | | Exhibit O for plaintiff named [...] medical record by [...] | 12/12/2022 | -Page 226 | | Plaintiffs filed an opposition to Defendant's Motion for summary judgment | 01/10/2023 | -Page 251 | | Notice of Appeal | 06/29/2023 | -Page 269 | | Civil Case Information Statement | 06/29/2023 | -Page 272 | | Case/Other Authority | Category | Brief Page Number | |----------------------|----------|-------------------| | | | | | Party Name | Appellate Party Designation | Trial Court/Agency Party Role | Trial Court/Agency Party Status | |--------------------|-----------------------------|-------------------------------|---------------------------------| | [...] and [...] | | | | PRELIMINARY STATEMENT TABLE OF PROCEDURAL HISTORY | Date | Proceeding | Filed By | Result | Appendix Page Number/Transcript | |------------|------------|------------|--------|---------------------------------| | 03/24/2021 | Complaint | Plaintiff | Filed | - | | 05/04/2021 | answer | Defendant | Filed | - | | 12/12/2022 | Motion | Defendant | Filed | - | | 01/10/2023 | opposition | Plaintiff | Filed | | STATEMENT OF FACTS
[directive] 그러므로, 이 문서에 소셜 시큐리티 번호, 운전면허증 번호, 차량 번호판 번호, 보험증권 번호, 사용 중인 금융계좌 번호, 또는 사용 중인 신용카드  번호 등 개인의 신원을 확인할 수  있는 정보를 기재하지 마십시오.  NOTICE:  This is a public document, which means the document as submitted will be available to the public upon request.  Therefore, do not enter personal identifiers on it, such as Social Security number, driver’s license number, vehicle plate number, insurance policy number, active financial account number, or active credit card number.
[brief] (Db at 3-10; 21-27, Oct. 11, 2023; 25T)  R. 2:6-2 requires that “If the issue was not raised below [the brief must include] a statement indicating that the issue was not raised below. ”  Along the same lines, “It is a well-settled principle that our appellate courts will decline to consider questions or issues not properly presented to the trial court when an opportunity for such a presentation is available unless the questions so raised on appeal go to the jurisdiction of the trial court or concern matters of great public interest.
[brief] “A contract of indemnity is to be interpreted in accordance with the rules governing the construction of contracts generally. ”  Bethlehem, 132 N.J. Super. at 499.  Thus, Courts interpret the intent of a contractual indemnification provision based on its plain language.  Quinn, 225 N.J. at 45, 54 (upholding the terms of a divorce settlement that were “clear, unambiguous, and mutually understood”); Barila, 241 N.J. at 616 (quoting Quinn and stating that “plain language of the contract is the cornerstone of the interpretive inquiry”); JPC Merger Sub LLC v. Tricon Enters., Inc., 474 N.J. Super. 145, 167 (App. Div. 2022) (reversing lower court’s contract interpretation that was counter to the plain language of the contract).
[brief] A.  [...]’s Initial Retention for the Project and CCIP Submissions  On June 29, 2015, [...] provided its first proposal to [...], No. 106439 (“Proposal One”), with a total of $22,900, which includes the added cost of [...] being excluded from the CCIP, as expected at the time.  (TRVa1476.)  Proposal One describes [...]’s work including: (1) “hand sawing, chipping and breaking” pockets of “concrete slab to expose steel reinforcement” (one person at $1,900 per day); (2) six days for “wall sawing, hand sawing, chipping and breaking 150’ concrete wall at property line” at the adjacent Ritz and also describes the scope as “‘shaving’ of vertical wall at ‘high spots’ to create a clean edge at property line limits” and “flush cut wall sawing concrete slab overhang to match vertical wall limits” (two laborers at $3,500 per day).  (TRVa1476.)  However, on July 9, 2015, [...] sent an email to [...] and [...] requesting: that [...] enroll [...] in the CCIP; and a revised proposal from [...] not to exceed the “previous proposal” (which was higher based on the originally anticipated exclusion from the CCIP).  (TRVa1447.)  [...] then emailed [...] on July 21, 2015, inquiring about [...]’s revised proposal (Email, TRVa2676) and providing [...] with CCIP paperwork based on the expectation - at the time - that [...] would enroll (Email, TRVa2559/ZURa243; CCIP Paperwork, TRVa498-573/ZURa244-289).  The CCIP paperwork included “Schedule ‘A’ to the C. [...] Contractors Subcontract” which describes the CCIP and Insurance Requirements for the Project (also identified as Attachment 3, Amendment to the [...] Perini Building Corp. Subcontract with [...], referred herein as the “CCIP Contract”), CCIP Insurance Procedures Manual (“CCIP Manual”) and other enrollment forms for the CCIP.  (TRVa498-573 or ZURa244-289.)  Undermining [...]’ argument that CCIP enrollment was mandatory at the Project, the CCIP Contract defines “Excluded Parties”, including: “e.
[brief] The basement boxes shown on the plans were, as noted above, were only placed on the plans due to the Board’s request to see a plan with the maximum allowable building size depicted.  Based upon the on-record testimony, the acknowledgement by the Board Attorney, and the ruling of the trial court, it is clear that basement apartments were not a part of this application.  The Board, furthermore, did not and has not taken the position that there was anything legally deficient about the Plaintiff’s public notice.  As such, the Court should uphold the decision of the trial court and find Intervenor’s argument to be unconvincing.  Conclusion
[brief] 21.  The Court below found that [...] was denied a mortgage for the new condominium initially because he already had a mortgage on his own home and a car loan (6T23:20-23).  22.  The Court found that again [...] came to the rescue by paying off the car loan so that [...] could get the mortgage needed to purchase the Tillbrook condominium for his in-laws (6T23:20-23).  23.  [...] closed on the new property located at [...], on April 29, 2016 for $232,000.00 with the help of the money from the 1031 Exchange and a mortgage of $174,000.00 (6T18:20-19:6).  24.  [...] told [...] that he could not afford to put more than $1,500.00 per month toward the carrying costs for their new home.  [...] and [...] pay the condominium association fees from their own money each month.  As taxes have increased, they have absorbed the increases as well (6T19:7-9, 1T108:16-19).  25.  The Court further found that [...] discounted the monthly payment [...] paid him by $500.00 per month until he had repaid [...] in full for paying off [...]’s car loan (6T23:20-23).  26.  The Court below observed that based on the testimony at trial, the family had a long history of helping each other out in this way (6T16:1-3).  27.  The trial court found that throughout this time period [...] and [...] and [...] and [...] were very close (6T17:3-22).
[brief] (Da150 pg. 54, Lines 14-16; Da162-Da163 pg. 66 Line 1 through pg. 67, Line 9; Da264 pg. 168, Lines 10-14; Da278 pg. 182, Lines 7-13; Da290-Da291 pg. 194, Line 22 through pg. 196, Line 1; Da295 pg. 199, Lines 20-23; Da306-Da307, pg. 210, Line 22 through pg. 211, Line 3; Da341 pg 245, Lines 8-16.)  However, Plaintiffs never retained any experts.
[brief] NOTWITHSTANDING THE FOREGOING, WE RESERVE THE RIGHT AND MAY AT OUR DISCRETION  EXERCISE THE RIGHT TO COMMENCE LEGAL ACTION IN ANY COURT OF COMPETENT JURISDICTION TO COLLECT MONIES YOU OWE UNDER THIS AGREEMENT, IN WHICH YOU AGREE TO WAIVE THE RIGHT TO MEDIATION OR ARBITRATION.  [Pa61]  (bold-faced added).  ARGUMENT  Introduction
[brief] In *Walker v. Giuffre*, 209 N.J. 124 (2012) the Court stated:  Our decision in *Rendine* also articulated the principles that inform the calculation of a reasonable hourly rate, noting that it “is to be calculated according to the prevailing market rates in the relevant community” and should include an assessment of the “experience and skill of the prevailing party's attorneys and [a] compar[ison] . . . to the rates prevailing in the community for similar services” by comparable lawyers.
[directive] THE CARE AND HANDLING OF THE POLICE SPECIALTY DOG GOAL:  The police officer handler will have the knowledge necessary to properly care and handle the police specialty dog under routine conditions and emergency care situations.  1.6.1  The police officer handler will demonstrate knowledge of the methods and procedures for selecting, evaluating and preparing police specialty dogs for training.  1.6.2  The police officer handler will demonstrate familiarity with K-9 equipment used with police specialty dogs and the proper use of that equipment.  1.6.3  The police officer handler will list the requirements of proper routine care of a police specialty dog, to include daily health check inspections, routine health care and veterinarian visits, feeding, grooming, and housing.  1.6.4  The police officer handler will identify the proper techniques, procedures and equipment to be used in police specialty dog emergency care situations, to include heat stroke, bloating, trauma, poisoning.  2.