ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] See Chi. Title Ins. Co. v. Ellis, 409 N.J. Super. 444, 461(App. Div. 2009) (“Despite exercise of dominion or control over money belonging to another, one who innocently received the money in exchange for something of equivalent or comparable value, without participation in or knowledge of the fraud, has a greater right to keep the money than the victim of the fraud has to its return from that person. ”)  In response to these arguments, Plaintiffs contend that they proved that the Disputed Transactions were unauthorized because [...] testified that he adopted his expert’s damage analysis (Pb59).
[brief] And this directly dovetails into the requirement for prompt delivery of any received estoppel certificate, which allows [...] to notify [...] of any issues with the estoppel certificate and provide well in advance of closing.  Thus, the mere receipt of a certificate, regardless of its content, does not trigger [...]’s right to terminate.  Rather, the purpose behind the provision is to ensure [...] delivers an Acceptable Estoppel Certificate by the time of closing, preserving the [...]’s obligation to proceed unless [...] fails to meet that specific requirement.
[brief] Pa395.  Further, the Second Application would not result in a substantial impairment to the intent and purpose of the zone plan and applicable zoning ordinance.  Id.  While the B-3 Zone allows for “efficiency apartments,” the 2018 Master Plan states, “[t]he restriction of units to efficiency apartments conflicts with Section 5:80-26.3 of the New Jersey Uniform Housing Affordability Controls (“UHAC”)[.]” Pa276, at 73:5-22; Pa395-96.  [...] further highlighted the 2018 Master Plan’s recommendation to eliminate the restriction of residential units to efficiency apartments as well as eliminating the FAR standard within the adjacent B-1 Zone to create the promotion of residential units above store fronts.  *Id.*  As the same uses are permitted in the B-3 Zone as the B-1 Zone, in [...]’s professional opinion these recommendations should be taken into consideration.  *Id.*  [...] further highlighted the Borough’s inconsistent ordinances and affirmed that the Second Application was consistent with the Master Plan.  He further noted that the proposed development will provide an appropriate population, with the stormwater improvements lessening the impact on adjoining properties with a lower amount of traffic than other permitted uses.  **F.  The Zoning Board Denies [...]’s Second Application**
[brief] N.J.S.A. 34:15-72 does not obligate an employer to maintain insurance for liability resulting from intentional wrongdoing under N.J.S.A. 34:15-8 and has no application to this case.  Section 72 provides that “every employer . . . shall forthwith make sufficient provision for the complete payment of any obligation which he may incur to an injured employee or his administrator or next of kin under said Article 1 of this chapter. ”  Ibid. (emphasis added).  Article 1 of the Act (N.J.S.A. 34:15-1 to -6) provides for the assertion of a claim of negligence against an employer where either the employer or the employee has opted out of the statutory system of compensation created by Article 2 of the Act.
[brief] [...] certified to the following:  40.  After being appointed by the Court, plaintiff retained [...] as the realtor in charge of selling the Subject Property.  41.  It is unclear what connection, if any, there is between plaintiff and [...], but I believe that [...] is an in-law or otherwise related to plaintiff.  42.  The list price of the Subject Property was $537,900, which was unfortunately, the minimum list price per the Consent Judgment.  43.  The list price proposed did not reflect the appropriate market value for the property, which was significantly higher.  44.  In fact, we had all discussed listing the property for a price between $560,000-570,000, yet this discussion was ignored by plaintiff.  45.  During this process, there were four proposed brokers suggested to the group of five owners, each of which have not only agreed to a lower commission rate than the 5% commission to be paid to [...], but also suggested list prices significantly higher than the list price from plaintiff and [...]…  46.  As support for the higher list price, I obtained a Comparative Market Analysis for the Subject Property, which showed a market value for the property at $564,000.  48.  Plaintiff was informed of both the requested list price and the Comparative Market Analysis, but still maintained the listing of the property at $537,900 and refused a 10-day reset period to adjust the market price accordingly.
[brief] Tenth, detectives repeatedly left the interrogation room to consult with an unseen sergeant and kept [...] waiting for stretches of time until they returned, a reminder that he could not leave the interrogation room until law enforcement gave him permission.  (Da 17)  See, e.g., Hubbard, 222 N.J. at 271 (“le[ft] to wait”); Stott, 171 N.J. at 367-68 (“movements were circumscribed”).  Eleventh, the interrogation lasted for over an hour.  See, e.g., Hubbard, 222 N.J. at 271 (“detective questioned defendant for approximately an hour”).  Twelfth, [...] was not able to or permitted to leave on his own volition.  He was dependent upon detectives, who escorted him out of the police station and transported him back to his home, where they searched the grounds of [...]’s home for evidence of a crime.
[brief] Finally, the trial court properly declined to dismiss the State’s challenge to the Original Policy because the case involves “an important matter of public interest. ”  Nini v. Mercer Cnty. Cmty. Coll., 202 N.J. 98, 105 n.4 (2010) (noting New Jersey courts “often decline[... ] to dismiss a matter on grounds of mootness, if the issue in the appeal is an important matter of public interest” (citation omitted)).  Indeed, “[t]he question[] presented in this case center[s] on the interpretation of our Law Against Discrimination,” *ibid.*, and its resolution has tremendous importance to the students in this District—and across the State, given that Appellants’ policy inspired similar policies by other school boards.  Moreover, “the public interest in the finality and efficiency of litigation warrants a resolution on the merits,” *State v. Davila*, 443 N.J. Super. 577, 589 (App. Div. 2016): the challenge to the Revised Policy remained active before the Superior Court, and it was proper and efficient to make clear that the Original Policy’s flagrant illegality was impermissible too.  The court did not abuse its discretion in holding that the Original Policy violated LGBTQ+ students’ rights.
[brief] Plaintiff therefore respectfully asks that this court reverse the trial court's order granting judgment to Plaintiff, and hold that Defendant [...] is the rightful owner of the 293 property.  Dated: September 28, 2023  Respectfully submitted, By: [...] (015842007)  [...] [...]  Tel: [...]  Fax: [...]  [...]  Plaintiff/Respondent/Cross-Appellant -against- [...] a/k/a [...], GLOBAL CHAMPION CAPITAL LLC, a New York limited liability company, JOHN DOES #1-10, JANE DOES #1-10, fictitiously named parties, true name(s) unknown, and COMPANY ABC #1-10, fictitiously named entities, true name(s) unknown.  Defendants/Appellants/Cross-Respondents  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY  APPELLATE  DIVISION DOCKET No. [...]  ON APPEAL FROM SUPERIOR COURT, CHANCERY  DIVISION  HUDSON COUNTY DOCKET NO.: [...]  Hon. [...], P.J.Ch. sat below BRIEF FOR RESPONDENT/CROSS-APPELLANT [...] IN OPPOSITION TO APPEAL OF APPELLANTS/CROSS-RESPONDENTS, [...] A/K/A [...] AND GLOBAL CHAMPION CAPITAL, LLC AND IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENT/CROSS-APPELLANT’S CROSS-APPEAL
[brief] Information within this scope of discovery need not be admissible in evidence to be discoverable.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) (emphasis added); see also, e.g., *Pacitti v. Macy’s*, 193 F.3d 766, 777-78 (3d Cir. 1999) (“It is well recognized that the federal rules allow broad and liberal discovery. ”) (citing *In re Madden*, 151 F.3d 125, 128 (3d Cir. 1998)).  “At the discovery stage, the discovery requested may be wide-ranging because under Rule 26(b)(1), ‘relevance is a broader inquiry at the discovery stage than at the trial stage. ’ ”  *Pollock v. Energy Corp. of Am.*, No. 10-cv-1553, 2014 WL 562726, at *1 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 11, 2014) (quoting *In re Gateway Engineers, Inc.*, No. 09-mc-209, 2009 WL 3296625, at *2 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 9, 2009)).  “[D]istrict courts have broad discretion to manage discovery. ”  *Sempier v. Johnson & Higgins*, 45 F.3d 724, 734 (3d Cir. 1995) (citations omitted).  Here, the Court is presented with a situation where the [...] has essentially made relevance determinations on [...]’s behalf, instead of treating as presumptively relevant all of the search results found utilizing search terms to which [...] has no objection.
[brief] The appellant returned to his employment with [...] on September 21, 2020.  [Pa4]  When the appellant applied through [...] to be re-enrolled, the [...] requested confirmation that the appellant was subject to a layoff.  [Pa13]  [...] sent the [...] a letter on October 5, 2021.  [Pa 14]  This letter states in relevant part, “…he was laid off as our building had to close down due to COVID 19. ”  [Pa14]  This is consistent with [...]’s prior letter of January 20, 2021, which stated, “…he was let go due to COVID 19.  He was returned to our location on 9/21/20 and began contributing to the 4th Quarter 2020. ”  [Pa11]  This should reasonably have ended this inquiry.  When the Division denied his re-enrollment in PERS, the Appellant wrote to the [...] on January 20, 2022.  [Pa 9]  He explained his situation and advised the Division that he was laid off due to COVID 19.  He also included the Divisions Fact Sheet which provides members of the pension system with information on pension eligibility.  [Pa9,53]  This fact sheet defines “break in service. ”  [Pa53]  Despite the efforts of the appellant, he was unable to convince the respondent that he was eligible for re-enrollment in the pension system.  [Pa13,17]  Appellant then hired legal counsel to pursue the appeal of the denial to allow him to re-enroll in the State Pension system.
[brief] That the site be developed with the proposed use and in accordance with the current plans and renderings as submitted to the Zoning Board of Adjustment except as modified by the Board as set forth herein.  (28a)  This same resolution also provides a list of documents that represent the plans and renderings submitted to the [...] (hereafter “[...]”) by which [...] is to be bound (11a).  This list includes the Park Avenue (West Side) Diagrammatic Elevation (hereafter, “Diagrammatic Elevation”)(11a, 4a).
[brief] (Pa5-64).  On March 18, 2025, [...] filed an answer to the verified petition and a cross-petition for election contest alleging, among other things, that the Board improperly rejected five mail-in ballots that were postmarked after the election and improperly refused to allow [...] to cure her defective mail-in ballot.  (Pa98-103).  On April 3, 2025, [...] filed an amended answer and cross-petition in which he alleged the Board improperly accepted a mail-in ballot with an incomplete inner certificate.  (Pa108-114).  On April 8, 2025, [...] filed an answer to the amended cross-petition.  (Pa115-119).  That same day, [...] filed a second amended cross-petition, adding two additional mail-in ballots that were postmarked after the election which he alleged should have been accepted by the Board.  (Pa120-126).  On April 14, 2025, the trial court began a two-day hearing.
[brief] Yet Plaintiffs concede that in order for the employer to be liable under a theory of negligent training or supervision, the employer must at least know “that the lack of training or supervision could lead to a risk of harm. ”  See Pb12.  This foreseeability of harm element of a negligent training or supervision claim depends on the employee’s job duties and whether the training and supervision provided by the employer is reasonable in light of the employee’s fitness, skill level and competence (i.e., the employee’s personal attributes) to ensure that the employee performs their job duties without creating a risk of harm to others.
[brief] (Da1-2).  The Honorable [...], J.S.C., presided over the trial in this matter.  (2T-30T).  Jury selection began on September 20, 2021, and the jury returned its verdict on October 22, 2021.  (2T; 29T).  On count one, the jury found defendant guilty of passion/provocation manslaughter; on count two, the jury found defendant guilty of attempted passion/provocation manslaughter; on counts three and four, the jury found defendant guilty.  (Da3-8; 29T8-15 to 29T9-23).  On January 4, 2022, [...] sentenced defendant to an aggregate sentence of twenty years in prison, subject to the parole bar under the No Early Release Act (NERA).  (Da9).  On count one, the judge imposed a sentence of ten years in prison, subject to NERA.  (Da9; 30T59-22 to 30T60-4).  On count two, the judge imposed a consecutive sentence of ten years in prison, subject to NERA.  (Da9; Da12; 30T61-15 to 24).  Counts three and four were merged with counts one and two.  (Da9; Da12; 30T61-25 to 30T62-1).  The applicable fines and penalties were also imposed.  (Da10; Da13; 30T62-24 to 30T63-2).  Defendant thereafter filed a Notice of Appeal with this court.
[brief] ”  Appellant’s Br., at 7.  However, by law, even where the statutory language is “plain,” courts decline to apply the “plain” meaning where it is either at odds with Congress’s intent or would lead to absurd results.  *Pub. Citizen*, at 455 (“Looking beyond the naked text for guidance is perfectly proper when the result it apparently decrees . . . seems inconsistent with Congress’ intention, since the plain-meaning rule is ‘rather an axiom of experience than a rule of law, and does not preclude consideration of persuasive evidence if it exists. ’”).  Under such circumstances, a court should decline to apply the literal interpretation of the statute and presume “the legislature intended exceptions to its language [that] would avoid results of this character. ”  *Id.*  See also *Nicholas v. Mynster*, 213 N.J. at 480 (rejecting a statute’s “plain” meaning and resorting to extrinsic evidence, such as legislative history, “if a plain reading of the statute leads to an absurd result or if the overall statutory scheme is at odds with the plain language.
[brief] If anything, that holding illustrates why the [...] firm was conflicted out of representing both [...] and the Estate.  However, that holding is inapplicable to the current circumstances between [...] and [...].  Additionally, while the Respondents argue that [...] and [...] are “blaming” each other for the accident, they fail to show support for such a baseless position within the record.  That is because neither [...] nor [...] is assigning fault to the other.
[brief] Most notably, the Restatement of Contracts, which has been adopted in New Jersey with respect to evaluation of stipulated damages provisions\textsuperscript{11}, cautions against drafting tactics like those used by [...] to attempt “disguise a provision for a penalty”:  \textit{Disguised penalties}.  Under the [reasonableness] rule stated in this Section, the validity of a term providing for damages depends on the effect of that term…  Neither the parties' actual intention as to its validity nor their characterization of the term as one for liquidated damages or a penalty is significant in determining whether the term is valid.  Sometimes parties attempt to disguise a provision for a penalty by using language… that purports to offer a discount for prompt performance…  [A] court will look to the substance of the agreement to determine…whether the parties have attempted to disguise a provision for a penalty that is unenforceable under this Section.  \textit{Restatement (Second) of Contracts} § 356, comment c (1981)(emphasis added).
[brief] *State v. Walls*, 85 N.J. 218, 221, 426 A.2d 50 (1981).  Pre-trial identifications must be requested in a timely manner and it is up to the judge's discretion whether to grant or deny the request.  *Ibid.*  We are satisfied that the photographic array presented to [...] was not suggestive.  She was shown six photographs, all of African-American men with short hair, facial hair and mustaches.  She was specifically instructed by the police that the photographs were not shown in any particular order of importance.  She was not placed under any time restrictions nor pressured by the police to choose defendant's photograph.  Defendant's claim that his photograph was emphasized because his “photo[graph] was last in the array” is belied by the report in this case.
[brief] TABLE OF CONTENTS  TABLE OF CONTENTS  ........................................................................................................i  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ................................................................................................. ii LEGAL ARGUMENT ...........................................................................................................1  I.  The Trial Court Erred When It Determined [...] Checked The Confirmation Box And Agreed To Be Bound To Arbitration Without Discovery Because The Evidence Provided By [...] Is Inconsistent .........................................................2  II.  The Question of Unconscionability Is Within The Trial Court’s Discretion, Not the Arbitrator  ..................................................................................................3  A.  It Is Improper for [...] to Argue  It Is Not The Court’s Decision To Determine Unconscionability For The First Time In Response to This Appeal .........................................................................................4  B.  Appellants Already Disputed The Delegation Provision In Their Opposition To the Motion to Compel Because It Goes Against New Jersey Law ........................................................................5  III.  The Arbitration Agreement Is Both Procedurally And Substantively Unconscionable..............................................................................................................7
[directive] State v. Tischio, 107 N.J. at 517-518.  DWI  With a Chemical Breath Test (Per se Offense)  Where a chemical breath test has been administered and results or readings were obtained, a per se DWI violation can be proven by the State, using the same observations, described above, and by also introducing the chemical breath test result or reading.  The results or readings obtained from chemical breath testing have been deemed to be admissible, as having met the beyond a reasonable doubt standard of proof, if the State satisfies the standard of evidence for the foundational evidentiary criteria of “no greater than clear and convincing evidence. ”  Those foundational criteria are: (1) judicial notice of the scientific reliability and accuracy of the chemical breath test instrument; (2) the Operator was properly trained; (3) the Instrument was operating properly; (4) the Operator used the instrument in accordance with the training.  State v. Johnson, 42 N.J. at 170-171; Romano v. Kimmelman, 96 N.J. at 73, 86, 87-8, 93, 94.  Attorney General Guideline: Page 7
[brief] As shown below, there is no merit to this argument, and the Court's decision should be reversed.  The Affidavit of Merit statute, N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-26 et seq., requires that an “Affidavit of Merit” be provided by a plaintiff in all professional negligence cases.  This includes suits against medical professionals such as physicians, dentists, podiatrists, chiropractors, nurses, etc., as well as against non-medical specialists such as attorneys, accountants, engineers, architects, etc.  The Affidavit of Merit serves a gatekeeping function at the beginning of a malpractice case.  It requires that, within 60 days of the date of the filing of an Answer to a Complaint alleging malpractice, a plaintiff must serve an Affidavit of Merit which states that “…there exists a reasonable probability that the care, skill or knowledge exercised or exhibited in the treatment, practice, or work that is the subject of the complaint, fell outside acceptable professional or occupational standards or treatment practices. ”  N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-27.  Thus, the Affidavit of Merit is a statement of probable cause of malpractice by a professional at the beginning of the case.  Failure to provide an Affidavit of Merit requires a dismissal of the case with prejudice.  Cornblatt v Barow, 153 N.J. 218 (1998).  The purpose of the Affidavit of Merit statute is “to require plaintiffs in malpractice cases to make a threshold showing that their claim is meritorious in order that meritless lawsuits readily could be identified at an early stage of litigation. ”  In re Hall, 147 N.J. 379, 391 (1997).  Mayfield v. Community Medical Associates, 335 N.J. Super. 198, 204 (App. Div. 2000).  The goal is “…to weed out frivolous lawsuits early in the litigation while at the same time, ensuring that plaintiffs with meritorious claims will have their day in court. ”
[directive] Procedures  A.  Strip Search  1. Conducted by person of same sex, and 2. Conducted in private, and 3. Conducted under sanitary conditions, and (7/95)  Strip Search and Body Cavity Search Requirements and Procedures  4.  Conducted in a professional and dignified manner, and 5.  In custodial confinement, conducted in accordance with Department of Corrections regulations  B.  Body Cavity Search  1. Conducted by licensed physician or registered nurse of same sex, and 2. Conducted in private, and 3. Conducted in a medically acceptable manner and environment, and 4. Conducted under sanitary conditions, and 5.  Conducted in accordance with Department of Corrections regulations.  IV.
[brief] These concerns are not present at all in this case.  Likewise in *Levin*, there existed a 120-acre site that was “stagnant, undeveloped and unproductive,” except for the “construction of a few scattered homes. ”  *Levin, supra*, at 538.  Those 120 acres were indeed “an economic wasteland. ”  *Id.*  No such comparable considerations are involved in this case.  The most important and relevant case to the application of the substantive criteria of Section 5 is the recent case of *Malanga v. Twp. of West Orange*, 235 N.J. 291 (2023).
[brief] [...] may be liable via vicarious liability for the negligence of its officers, employees, and agents, and [...], as [...]’ subconsultant, is an agent of [...].  So, if you find that an officer, employee or agent [choose appropriate term] of defendant [name] acted negligently while in the scope of his/her duties or authority, that negligence is as a matter of law charged to the principal, here defendant [name].  If you so find, defendant [name] will be deemed negligent for the wrongdoing to the same extent as the officer, employee or agent.  N.J. Model Jury Charge (Civil)  5.10H Agency (Rev. 08/2011).
[brief] When a defendant attempts to substantiate a *prima facie* claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, he must satisfy the two-prong test formulated in *Strickland v. Washington*, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984), and adopted by the New Jersey Supreme Court in *State v. Fritz*, 105 N.J. 42, 58 (1987).  A defendant must show that counsel’s performance was deficient such that the “representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness,” and that such a deficiency prejudiced the defendant.  *Strickland*, 466 U.S. at 687-88; *Fritz*, 105 N.J. at 58.  Moreover, a defendant must establish both prongs of the Strickland/Fritz standard for his claim to be successful.
[directive] See Section 2.6 (requiring that officers provide warning and an opportunity to comply before force is used against active resistors).  Bodily Injury.  Physical pain or temporary disfigurement, or any impairment of physical condition.  Bodily harm and bodily injury have the same definition for the purposes of this Policy.  See N.J.S.A. 2C:11-1(a); N.J.S.A. 2C:3-11(e).