ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] D.  The Court Failed to Explain the Overall Fairness of the Aggregate Sentence.  Next, although the sentencing court cited to Torres, it did not explain why the imposition of two maximum term consecutive sentences, amounting to an aggregate 40 years subject to NERA, was fair for this young defendant.  See State v. Torres, 246 N.J. 246, 252 (2021) (requiring an explanation of the overall fairness of the sentence).  Instead, the court only concluded that the imposition of consecutive sentences was warranted based on Yarbough. (2T 41-16 to 42-8).  The court should have considered [...]’s youth, mental health and childhood in fashioning the sentence and determining whether a 40-year aggregate term, which is effectively a life sentence, was fair for him.  See Torres, 246 N.J. at 274 (“[A]ge is a fact that can and should be in the matrix of information assessed by a sentencing court, even in the deliberation over whether consecutive sentences are a fair and appropriate punishment – proportional for the individual being sentenced.  . . .  This case highlights that the fairness assessment includes consideration of the person on whom the sentence is being imposed. ”).
[brief] Pb7 and Pb7-8.  The State did not cite a reference to [...]’s testimony in the transcript, for the simple reason that he never said it.  Putting aside the fact that permanency is too esoteric an issue to be established without expert testimony, Kilen [...] never said his injury was permanent.  His subjective, uncorroborated testimony was that he walked with a cane for one and a half months, 2T30:17-18 and experienced pain and a cold sensation, 2T31:9-12, but that he was no longer seeking medical attention 2T29:23-25.  In his opinion, “I don’t believe I have the power in my leg to play soccer,” there was no medical evidence to back up this statement.  2T31:14-19.  [...]’s pending personal injury lawsuit weakens his credibility, but even if he was believed, it established – at best – that he had symptoms in February less than five months after the September 12, 2022 incident.  Five months is hardly “permanent. ”  The State is attempting to bootstrap the “serious risk” element with the lie that [...] suffered “serious bodily injury. ”  Moreover, since [...]’s injury was the basis of a finding of the first part of the statute (“injured a human”) it could not also be evidence of the second part (“serious risk”).
[directive] ”  Attorney General Guideline: Page 3  Prosecution of DWI & Refusal Violations above, the per se limit set by the statute.  N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.4a.a.: DWI refusal.  Refusal to submit to chemical breath ! 39:4-50.2.3 testing, in violation of N.J.S.A. zone. ”4  N.J.S.A. 39:4-50(g):  DWI in a “school Operating or allowing ! another person to operate a vehicle while intoxicated or with a blood alcohol concentration at, or above, the per se limit set by the statute while on school property used for school purposes owned by or leased to any element or secondary school or school board, or within 1,000 feet of such school property or driving through a school crossing designated as such by ordinance, or driving through a school crossing, knowing that juveniles are present.  N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.
[brief] He was given those assurances and he, thus, caused [...] to purchase the properties.  (T.2 at 29:13 – 30:11; 35:5-250)  He first was going to operate the pizzeria as [...] and obtained licensure to do that, but a family problem prevented him from doing so.  Instead, he leased it for two years to an operator who opened [...].  (T.2 at 45:11 – 46:15)  In 2019, after the Nicky’s lease ended, Sal leased it to its current operator, [...], who, at the time owned and operated pizzerias in Long Branch and Sea Bright.  (T.1 at 117:12-18)  Before Gambella executed the lease, he too did his homework and checked with Oceanport officials to make sure the use of the building as a pizzeria was still permitted.  He received such assurances (T.1 at 121:5-22), and he thus signed a lease and proceeded to prepare the building to reopen as [...] (“[...]”).
[brief] Examples of statements by defendant that [...] told the jury were threatening or, in one instance, “evidence of a prior act of assault,” are:  (1)  “[B]e careful not to offend the wrong one.  That’s what you continuously did, and if there’s no amends, someday there will be ramifications.  Good luck in life, but unlike what you disrespectfully said to me a few years ago, you’re not going to need luck, and I say that sincerely” (25T 32-19 to 24); (2) “All the false, irrational comments you made will not be forgotten.  Refer to the earlier quote[:] do not offend the wrong one without amends” (25T 33-10 to 13); (3)  “You feel entitled but who are you?  You got multiple personalities and act according – according different to who you around [sic], but I’m done talking.  I’ll see you around.  You should off the wrong one without amends, and I shouldn’t have had to written that three times.  The obliviousness will continue” (25T 33-18 to 23); (4)  When I knocked you down, you got up and said no one ever hit me that hard.  I needed that.  Then a month later denied saying that and claimed the only reason you went down was you were still on drugs.  All these situations could have been prevented” (25T 34-17 to 21); and (5) “[...] got killed recently.  His own brother shot him in the head.  Google Piscataway shooting.  Something to ponder upon. ”  (25T 35-3 to 5)  [...] also testified that the following post by [...] to defendant exhibited an attempt “to defuse [spelled “diffuse” in the transcript] what is being written to him” by defendant:
[brief] The New Jersey Supreme Court has held that to meet the ascertainable loss requirement, a plaintiff “must proffer evidence of loss that is not hypothetical or illusory.  It must be presented with some certainty demonstrating that it is capable of calculation . . .  The certainty implicit in the concept of an ‘ascertainable’ loss is that it is quantifiable or measurable. ”  Thiedemann v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, 183 N.J. 234, 248, 251 (2005).
[directive] General In of •  Any confidential evidence being submitted for purposes the hearing should be submitted by secure means.  •  Depending the type of matter, court staff will need to coordinate the Megan's on Law calendar both advance and the day of the hearing to confirm the on in parties' availability the scheduled court date.  on •  It the responsibility of court staff to provide the hearing information (the link and is the instructions to participate remotely via video or phone) to the parties.  The preferred technology for these hearings  Microsoft Teams. is Pro Se Cases  For pro se matters, court staff must work with the prosecutor's office to obtain the registrant's contact information (home address, phone number, and email address, if applicable).2
[brief] Further, [...] testified, confirming [...]’s deposition testimony, that prior to [...] voting the aforesaid rule change in January 2009, which became effective later in time, Plaintiff [...] could have developed the affordable housing project on his own without entering into a partnership with an affordable housing developer.  6T, 139:24-140:13.  [...] testified that [...] did not expend a dime in developing the 100% affordable housing development on [...].
[brief] The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, paragraph 10 of the New Jersey Constitution guarantee criminal defendants the right to an impartial jury during trial.  *State v. R.D.*, 169 N.J. 551, 557 (2001).  Criminal defendants are “entitled to a jury that is free of outside influences and [that] will decide the case according to the evidence and arguments presented in court in the course of the criminal trial itself. ”  *State v. Williams*, 93 N.J. 39, 60 (1983).  “[I]f during the course of the trial it becomes apparent that a juror may have been exposed to extraneous information, the trial court must act swiftly to overcome any potential bias and to expose factors impinging on the juror's impartiality. ”  *R.D.*, 169 N.J. at 557-58 (citing *State v. Bey*, 112 N.J. 45, 83-84 (1988)).  As the Court stated in *State v. Fortin*, “We think it ill-advised, as a general rule, to seat any juror who is acquainted with a murder victim's loved ones, no matter how convincingly that individual proclaims his or her ability to remain impartial.
[brief] [...]  On the Brief: [...], Esq. (Attorney I.D. 019912005)  [...]  TABLE OF CONTENTS  Page(s)  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ........................................................................................................ iv  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT .................................................................................................  1  PROCEDURAL HISTORY ........................................................................................................  4  STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS .....................................................................................  6  STANDARD OF REVIEW .......................................................................................................  12  LEGAL ARGUMENT ...............................................................................................................  14  POINT I  THE TRIAL COURT  CORRECTLY APPLIED  THE STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS AS SET FORTH IN THE NEW JERSEY TORT CLAIMS ACT IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT  ...........................................
[brief] (12)  The outdoor storage requirements set forth at Subsection A(1) through (10) above shall not apply to the following:  (a)  The outdoor parking in the open of delivery and service vehicles, which parking shall be subject to the requirements provided in § 230-205.  (b)  The parking of trucks and trailers in connection with permitted trucking terminals and moving and storage operations, which parking shall be subject to the location requirements applicable to off-street loading.  (c)  The parking of trucks and trailers at loading docks during the course of loading and unloading and temporarily preceding and following the loading or unloading operations.  B.  In the TC, OB, PBR and PBO Zones, outdoor storage is prohibited except for the storage of trash and garbage in containers and in locations as approved by the Planning Board.
[brief] As the trial court found, applying those definitions to the language of the statute, a person of ordinary intelligence — including defendant — would reasonably know what conduct is prohibited.  Similarly, the statute defines the offense of third-degree animal cruelty with sufficient definiteness in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement.  Like N.J.S.A. 4:22-24a(2), the plain text of N.J.S.A. 4:22-17c(3) does not invite guessing at its meaning or differing as to its application.  Defendant is charged with purposely, knowingly, or recklessly causing or procuring the torment or cruel abuse of roosters through the use of other roosters during a violent cockfight that left many of the roosters seriously injured or dead.  When the statute’s terms and their common meanings are read in conjunction with the clear and unambiguous statutory text, defendant’s facial and as-applied void-for-vagueness arguments fail.
[directive] If the answer is “No,” proceed to question 6.  If the answer is “Yes,” proceed to question 7.  6.  Would you like the opportunity to do so?  [Yes]  [No]  7.  Having been advised that the court may be required to impose a mandatory period of [Yes] [No] special probation for the purpose of participating in a court-supervised drug treatment program (“Drug Court”), do you still wish to plead guilty?
[brief] *Id.* at *2*.  That required findings of fact and conclusions of law for the request.  *Id.* at *6*.  Here, however, Defendant did respond and participated by signing a property settlement agreement and all other operative documents at issue, as was confirmed by credible notaries.  On page 11 of her Reply brief, Defendant again ignores that here was a signed property settlement agreement, which obviates any need for findings of fact and conclusions of law.  To reiterate, R. 5:5-10 states in pertinent part:
[brief] Newark I failed to discuss the November 2018 shift in State executive branch urban renewal entity formation oversight.  Newark I failed to cite N.J.A.C. 5:13-1.1.  Newark I was issued in CY 2019 prior to the CY 2020 unsealing of federal indictments and guilty pleas arising from plaintiff’s discoveries in the [...].  Newark I was decided before the beginning of the PILOTs to Schools Movement.
[brief] So although it is true, as the trial court noted, that firearm examination evidence has been admitted in New Jersey for decades, that admission is not the byproduct of rigorous gatekeeping and standard setting.  Rather, it has been the byproduct of inertia and a lack of scrutiny of the underpinnings of firearm examination.  Since 2008, three different reports have been issued by preeminent groups of scientists, calling attention to the deficits in the evidence base for the reliability of firearm examination and raising concerns about its use in court.  Relying on these reports, [...] sought not to bar entirely the testimony of the states’ experts, but to limit that testimony to that which is scientifically reliable.  Two of these reports were issued by the National Research Council, part of the National Academic of Sciences.  The National Academy of Science, together with the National Academies of Engineering and Medicine, were founded by an Act of Congress and “provide independent, objective analysis and advice to the nation and conduct other activities to solve complex problems and inform public policy decision.
[brief] Defendant attempts to couch the Dela Vega decision as being premised upon a finding that the intrafamily limitation violated our State’s statutorily mandated minimum automobile liability laws.  Such a position was never raised by either of the parties in Dela Vega.  In fact, the Court in Dela Vega acknowledged that the defendant-insurer’s intrafamily liability “exclusion has an exception, however, to make plaintiff’s policy compliant with the omnibus statute. ”  Id. at 12.  In other words, the intrafamily liability exclusion at issue in *Dela Vega* was, in fact, compliant with our State’s minimum insurance laws since it did not wholly eliminate liability coverage, which would, of course, violate the omnibus statute.  Violation of our statutory minimum insurance laws was simply never an issue in *Dela Vega*.  The significant concern over intrafamily liability coverage limitations expressed by the Court in *Dela Vega v. Travelers Ins. Co.* centered upon the general application of such clauses that indiscriminately reduce the liability coverage indicated on the declarations pages of the policies purchased by consumers as against the claims of certain classes of plaintiffs.  The *Dela Vega* Court was concerned over the effect of such exclusions generally – not, as defendant would have this Court believe, only in the context of primary automobile insurance policies.
[brief] (Pa10).  The Appellate Division affirmed [...]’s VOP conviction on September 7, 2016.  (Pa49).  [...] sought further review and on December 12, 2016, our Supreme Court granted certification to consider the limited issue of the trial court’s acceptance of hearsay testimony.  State v. [...], 228 N.J. 433 (2016).  While his appeal to the Court was pending, [...] served his remaining sentence, and in July 2017 was released from custody.  (Pa12).  On March 6, 2018, roughly nine months after [...]’s release, the Court issued its decision.  State v. [...], 232 N.J. 169, 191 (2018).  The Court held that the underlying VOP proceeding was procedurally deficient because the State used hearsay evidence to sustain the VOP charge.  Id. at 192.  It thus reversed the Appellate Division judgment and vacated [...]’s VOP ---
[brief] To the extent the defect was not material, significant and varied business justifications exist, consistent with our public bidding laws, to allow the County to refuse waiver of the defect.  In such case, the County must be provided an opportunity to determine how to exercise its discretion.  The Court should reverse the judgment of the trial court and find [...]’s failure to timely submit the NJDOT Notice to be a material defect.  To the extent the Court finds the defect was not material, the Court should reverse the judgment of the trial court and either: (a) remand to the County to determine whether to waive the defect; or (b) direct the dismissal of [...]’s Complaint and allow the County to proceed in the ordinary course, based on the guidance provided by the Court.  Respectfully Submitted, HANKIN PALLADINO  WEINTROB BELL & LABOV, P.C. /s/ [...]
[brief] New Jersey's public policy favors enforcement of valid agreements to arbitrate.  See Martindale v. Sandvik, Inc., 173 N.J. 76, 83-86, (citing New Jersey's Arbitration Act, N.J.S.A. 2A:24-1 to -11).  N.J.S. A. 2A:23B-6(a) states that "[a]n agreement contained in a record to submit to arbitration any existing or subsequent controversy arising between the parties to the agreement is valid, enforceable, and irrevocable except upon a ground that exists at law or in equity for the revocation of a contract."  N.J.S.A. 2A:23B-6(a).  A court’s analysis is limited to: (1) whether a valid agreement to arbitrate exists and (2) whether the dispute falls within the scope of the agreement.  See Martindale 173 N.J. at 92; Perez v. Sky Zone, LLC, 472 N.J Super. 240, 248 (App. Div. 2002).  The scope of what claims are subject to arbitration is to be delegated to the arbitrator.  Perez 472 N.J. Super at 248.  The terms of an arbitration provision must be “sufficiently clear to place a consumer on notice that he or she is waiving a constitutional or statutory right. ”  Atalese v. U.S. Legal Servs. Grp., L.P., 219 N.J. 430, 443 (2014), “No particular form of words is necessary to accomplish a clear and unambiguous waiver of rights. ”  Id. at 444.  If “at least in some general and sufficiently broad way” the language of the clause conveys that arbitration is a waiver of the right to bring suit in a judicial forum, the clause will be enforced.  Id. at 447, 99  “The key... is clarity. ”  Barr v. Bishop Rosen & Co., Inc., 442 N.J. Super. 559, 607 (App. Div. 2015).  That the Arbitration Agreement satisfied both requirements is beyond cavil: it states that “any dispute arising from medical services rendered by [...], [...] and or any physician nurse or person associated therewith shall be submitted to binding arbitration and shall not be resolved by a court of law...”, (Da004), and states, in boldface type and in all caps, immediately before the signature line:  Decedent, when she signed the Arbitration Agreement, acknowledged:  Indeed, the Estate did not oppose the [...]’ motion on the ground that the Arbitration Agreement is ambiguous, such decedent could not have understood that she was waiving her right to a jury or judge trial.  Instead, the Estate argued that the Arbitration Agreement was unconscionable.  However, pursuant to NJSA 2A:23B-6 and Goffe v. Foulke Mgmt. Corp., 238 N.J. 191 (2019), the arbitration panel had the sole authority to determine issues of enforceability following the trial court’s order of March 22, 2024.
[brief] 16T:17-14 to 20 (emphasis added).  Defendant’s summation was geared to persuade the jury that Defendant had no motive for robbing the dice game at the Hamilton Avenue barbershop, in part because he gets this check every month --- \(^6\) A check from the federal government in favor of Defendant was admitted into evidence as Exhibit D-20.  (14T:169-12). and does not need the money.  In direct response to Defendant raising the issue of motive in summation, the Prosecutor said the following:  Now, [defense counsel] puts up this check, holds up this check, $1,400 check he gets – [...] gets once a month from the military and [defense counsel] says, “Oh, he doesn’t need money, he doesn’t need money.  He’s a successful musician. ”  I don’t know if you ever heard of him, I hadn’t before this case, but – and he gets a check from the military, completely inconsistent with [...]’s statement to the police by the way because when the police interview [...], and I wouldn’t even bring up his financial status if [defense counsel] hadn’t brought it up first and tried to say, “Well, he wouldn’t rob a place because why would he rob a place when he has money?”  He tells the police, “I ain’t got too much shit.  I am homeless.  All I got is my clothes.  I lost my crib.  I needed money for a house,” and he says, talking about a murder, “I am not even into this type of shit, yo.  I do little shit.  Like, I may steal, but I ain’t into that. ”  Well, I guess if he’s stealing from people, he needs money and I guess he was stealing from those people in the barbershop[.] 16T:68-2 to 22 (emphasis added).  This context illustrates that the Prosecutor only referenced Defendant’s prior statements for the sole purpose of rebutting Defendant’s argument in summation that Defendant “doesn’t need to rob anybody.
[brief] ” (Id.).  The trial court judge found, based on [...]’s Certification, that “Defendants do not possess the legal authority, administrative right, or technological capability to generate email logs from the personal email accounts of its Board members. ” (Pa32).  “There is no substantial amount of manipulation of information technology that would cause the email logs, that are not within the custody or control of the Defendants, to be generated,” and that “[t]he compelled production of the requested records would require Defendants [to] conduct a search for [documents] not within its custody or control and manually compile and collate information to create a log. ” (Id.).  The trial court concluded that “OPRA does not authorize” nor can courts compel this “arduous task.
[brief] Here, Plaintiffs want to build a new home.  [...] and/or the “developer” has rights in the Genesis Deed to approve (or disapprove) in writing all building plans.  Plaintiffs’ action implicates the rights of [...] and, as the Court in Garnick stated, it is not sufficient to avoid naming [...], the “developer,” or their successor-in-interest, as a party merely because it may be difficult.  The trial court declared the rights and obligations under the Genesis Deed without a party that has an interest in the very subject matter of this dispute: building on the Property within the [...] community.  Moreover, Plaintiffs recognize that there are thousands of other deeds with the same restrictions yet, instead of naming the other property owners as Plaintiffs or members of a class, instead chose expediency.
[brief] The fact that the officer admitted to improperly administering the field sobriety test 2T:25-(22-25), 2T:26-(1-3) and the prosecutors and judge’s statements in court that I didn’t perform the tests poorly, 4T:34-(14-20), [5T:8-(19-25), 5T:9-(1-4)], 5T:6-(14-16) 5T:9-(8-15), 5T:11-(16-21) definitely shows proof beyond a reasonable doubt of my innocence and that there was NO probable cause.  State v. Kazanowski, DOCKET NO. [...], 9 (App. Div. Dec. 9, 2020) ("In our review of a Law Division decision on a municipal appeal, we consider "whether the findings made could reasonably have been reached on sufficient credible evidence present in the record."  [Internal citations omitted by me]  Legal Argument – Point 3 - Articulation of Odor of alcohol, red eyes, admission to consuming 1 beer, and chewing gum do not amount to probable cause under the "totality of the circumstances" analysis approach.