ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] 3d 178 (3d Cir. 2001) | 40 | | Case Name | Page Numbers | |--------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------| | Karpinski v. Borough of South River, 85 N.J.L. 208, 88 A. 1073 (1913) | 21 | | Klockner v. Green, 54 N.J. 230 (1969) | 15 | | Knorr v. Smeal, 178 N.J. 169 (2003) | 11 | | Kolitch v. Lindedahl, 100 N.J. 485 (1985) | 6 | | Konopka v. Foster, 356 N.J. Super. 223 (App. Div. 2002) | 11, 12 | | Kronisch v. Howard Savings Institution, 133 N.J. Super.124 (Law Div. 1975)| 39 | | K. S. B. Technical Sales Corp. v. North Jersey Dist. Water Supply Commission of State of N.J., 75 N.J. 272 (1977), appeal dismissed, 435 U.S. 982, 98 S. Ct. 1635, 56 L.Ed.2d 76 (1978) | 24, 32, 47, 48 | | Lamb v. City of Ventnor, 161 N.J. Super. 140 (Law Div. 1978) | 24 | | Laufer v. U.S. Life Ins. Co. in N.Y., 385 N.J. Super. 172 (App. Div. 2006)| 40 | | Lee v. Carter-Reed Co., 203 N.J. 496 (2010) | 14, 29, 43, 45 | | Lehigh Valley Railroad Company v. Jersey City, 138 A. 467, 103 N.J.L. 574 (1927) | 20, 21 | | Case Name | Year | |--------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------| | Lemeldeo v. Beneficial Management Corp. of America, 150 N.J. 255 (1997) | 36 | | Leodori v. Cigna Corp., 175 N.J. 293 (2003) | 14 | | Liberty Lincoln Mercury, Inc. v. Ford Mktg. Corp., 149 F.R.D. 65 (D.N.J. 1993) | 39 | | Lowe v. Zarghami, 158 N.J. 606 (1999) | 6 | | Manalapan Realty v. Manalapan Twp. Comm., 140 N.J. 366 (1995) | 5 | | Mango v. Pierce-Coombs, 370 N.J. Super. 239 (App. Div. 2004) | 17 | | Marley v. Borough of Palmyra, 193 N.J. Super. 271 (Law Div. 1983) | 27, 28 | | McBarron v. Kipling Woods, 365 N.J. Super. 114 (App. Div. 2004) | 15 | | Morristown Assocs. v. Grant Oil Co., 220 N.J. 360 (2015) | 32 | | Moser v. Milner Hotels, 6 N.J. 278 (1951) | 16 | | Murphy v. Implicito, 392 N.J. Super. 245 (App. Div. 2007) | 17 | | N.J. Educ. Facilities Auth. v. Gruzen P'ship, 125 N.J. 66 (1991) | 28 | | Olesiewicz v. City of Camden, 100 N.J.L. 336, 126 A. 317 (E. & A. 1924) | 21 | | Olive v. Graceland Sales Corp., 61 N.J. 182 (1972) | 37 | | Case Name | Citation | Page | |--------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | Oneida Motor Freight, Inc. v. United Jersey Bank | 848 F.2d 414, 419 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 967, 109 S. Ct. 495, 102 L. Ed. 2d 532 (1988) | 12 | | Owens v. Feigin | 194 N.J. 607 (2008) | 13 | | Pami Realty, LLC v. Locations XIX Inc. | 468 N.J. Super. 546 (App. Div. 2021) | 14 | | Petak v. City of Paterson | 291 N.J. Super. 234 (App. Div. 1996) | 28 | | Plastic Surgery Ctr., PA v. Malouf Chevrolet-Cadillac, Inc.
[brief] (Pa693).  3.  The $2,000,000 Density Bonus Payment  The Plan Amendment made no provision for the $2,000,000 payment here in issue, nor did any Ordinance.  It is undisputed that the principal public benefit derived from this payment is the funding of the construction of a senior center.  (Pa17 to Pa118; Pa473).  This fee payment was agreed to by [...] as part of its negotiation to be designated as the redeveloper.
[brief] This is not a waiver case.  He was an adult.  An adult maybe who lacked a level of maturity, which is where the mitigating factor is most applicable. ”  (87-17 to 88-9)  The Sentencing Court failed to recognize that adolescent brain science has demonstrated that the prefrontal cortex is still underdeveloped at age nineteen and that as a result, nineteen-year-olds are more prone to engage in reckless and impulsive behavior than adults with fully developed prefrontal cortices at ages twenty-five or older just like juveniles under the age of eighteen are more prone to engage in reckless and impulsive behavior.
[brief] When interpreting a written contract, a court may not “make a different or better contract than the parties have seen fit to make for themselves. ”  Schnakenberg v. Gibraltar Savings & Loan Ass’n, 37 N.J. Super. 150, 155 (App. Div. 1955).  Rather, the polestar of contract construction is to discover “the intention of the parties to the contract as revealed by the language used, taken as an entirety. ”  Conway v. 287 Corp. Ctr. Assocs., 187 N.J. 259, 269 (2006) (quoting Atl. N. Airlines v. Schwimmer, 12 N.J.  293, 301 (1953)) (emphasis added).  To aid the interpretation of an integrated contract, evidence of the situation of the parties and surrounding circumstances is always admissible, even where the contract is free from ambiguity on its face.  Schwimmer, 12 N.J. at 301.  Importantly, however, where a contract is integrated, the parol evidence rule bars the introduction of extrinsic evidence that tends to alter, vary, or contradict the integrated written agreement.  See U.S. v. Clementon Sewerage Auth., 365 F.2d 609, 613 (3d Cir. 1966); Conway, 187 N.J. at 269.  Indeed, as stated by the New Jersey Supreme Court in Schwimmer, [t]he admission of evidence of extrinsic facts is not for the purpose of changing the writing, but to secure light by which to measure its actual significance.  Such evidence is admissible only for the purpose of interpreting the writing—not for the purpose of modifying or enlarging or curtailing its terms, but to aid in determining the meaning of what has been said.  So far as the evidence tends to show, not the meaning of the writing, but an intention wholly unexpressed in the writing, it is irrelevant.  The judicial interpretive function is to consider what was written in the context of the circumstances under which it was written, and accord to the language a rational meaning in keeping with the expressed general purpose.  Schwimmer, 12 N.J. at 301-02 (emphasis added); Clementon Sewerage Auth., 365 F.2d at 613 (“[E]vidence, whether parol or otherwise, of antecedent understanding and negotiations will not be admitted for the purpose of varying or contradicting the writing. ” (citation omitted)).  To prove a claim for breach of contract, a plaintiff must establish (1) the existence of a contract containing certain terms; (2) that the plaintiff did what the contract required it to do; (3) that the defendants did not do what the contract required them to do; and (4) that the defendants’ breach caused a loss to the plaintiff.
[brief] 1  PROCEDURAL HISTORY ....................................  2 STATEMENT OF FACTS ....................................  3  STANDARD OF REVIEW ....................................  4  LEGAL ARGUMENT – POINT I THE [...]  IMPROPERLY DETERMINED THAT [...] IS NOT ENTITLED TO AN ACCIDENTAL DISABILITY PENSION  BECAUSE THE INCIDENT CAUSING HIS DISABILITY WAS UNDESIGNED AND UNEXPECTED (Aa1-Aa3)(Aa30-Aa33) (1T12:20-25 .................................................  7 CONCLUSION ..................................................
[brief] 9 11T means Transcript of Trial dated September 2, 2022.  Petitioner built a large shed in back yard and a large office off the laundry room and made the home energy efficient.  (7T65: 9-22; 7T67:1-15; 7T68:19 to 70:8; P468a-P481a; P511a).  On October 16, 2002, Petitioner underwent heart surgery and was granted partial Veterans Administration (VA) disability.
[brief] 1T31 8-15.  Instead, it appears that the sole reason for Appellant’s Motion to Vacate is to advance the argument, yet again, that Respondent purportedly violated the CFLA, and to render the Debt time-barred.  But permitting Appellant to advance these arguments should be and indeed is barred by the doctrine of laches.  The Lower Court correctly reasoned and held that, because Appellant conceded to becoming aware of the Action in 2019, but chose to first commence a Class Action before moving to vacate her default in the Collection Action and, likewise, failing to proceed with any Motion to Vacate his default until 2024, she is barred by the doctrine of laches.
[directive] (the organization activity detention (requiring prosecutor seeking preventive to specify the type of risk justifying detention).  Section 7.5 a See Enforcement Directive No. 2016-1 (deconfliction) does General Law not require a law enforcement 5 Attorney deconfliction query when the agency for an automated applies acomplaint-warrant following an agency initiate to Deconfliction Directive Section 1(c) (exempting See routine booking after an unplanned arrest. procedures aCDR-2, from an application for the definition of a "planned However, including operation"). unplanned arrest, conducting an agency from a deconfliction query to information does not preclude provide additional that Directive Page 33 when Finally, be instances relevant criminal there may history information is not of missing in the accounted for because data databases that the pretrial risk- automated For the foregoing assessment software queries. reasons, the of interests and public safety and/or protection of require police victims' rights prosecutors to fill in the informational gaps information whenever providing to the court not possible, accounted for by automated the additional pretrial risk assessment where that information suggests that the defendant poses a criminal activity or greater risk of flight and/or new violence than is or indicated by the FTA NCA or the lack of a violence flag (i.e., the NVCA indicator).
[directive] Revised Form Promulgated 12/31/2019 Supplement to Directive #01-18, CN 10079-Korean by Defendant's Initials ?1 °J-61, :all o]i...J11 .!i.¾ S]-a}oj .il].:il~S] ii'-.¥..{! 20191d 1211 31 01-18 CN 10079-Korean ;,:]"5 §.oJ] <1J_;,:} 01 page 2 of7/;;J]  ;;,;]2/7  If f. the offense occurred on or after January 5, 1994 and you are being sentenced to probation, [Yes/off] [No/0 5. 1-i...1-8..] you must pay a fee of up to $25 per month for the term of probation?
[brief] Emails from counsel with Zoom information for deposition.  | .7 hrs. | $266.00 | $22,040 | | 34| 7/6/22 | Deposition (Day-1) of [...] | 3.2 hrs.  | $1,216.00 | $23,256.00 | | 35| 7/11/22 |  Receive and review email and letter from Plaintiff’s counsel with the plaintiff’s supplemental discovery demand for items [...] testified about during her deposition.
[brief] *Castagna*, 187 N.J. at 315.  To warrant relief, the defendant bears the burden to “demonstrate a reasonable likelihood that [his] claim, viewing the facts alleged in the light most favorable to the defendant, will ultimately succeed on the merits. ”  R. 3:22-10(b).  Although claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are well suited for post-conviction review, R. 3:22-4(a); *Preciose*, 129 N.J. at 460, the mere raising of such a claim does not entitle a defendant to an evidentiary hearing.
[brief] ”)  The [...] repeated its position on multiple occasions and put [...] on notice of its position that she should be removed for the same reasons she was bypassed if she was placed first.  AA228-29 (asserting that “her background not only justified her bypass in this matter, but would also justify her list removal if she were to become first ranked on a lieutenant certification. ”); AA230 (explaining that “[...]’s disciplinary history demonstrates a lack of judgment and reliability, which is simply unacceptable for someone seeking a law enforcement lieutenant position” and “the public interest would not be served by rewarding a person who has engaged in serious insubordination and untruthfulness in the past with elevation to the high ranking lieutenant position. ”).  As emphasized by the Commission, [...] had an opportunity to respond to the [...] before it considered whether to remove her.
[brief] DEFENDANT [...] WAS PROPERLY GRANTED SUMMARY JUDGMENT BECAUSE THE UNDISPUTABLE FACTS SHOW THAT THE JUDGE OF THE [...] MUNICIPAL COURT ENTERED A JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION AND THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR OF THE [...] MUNICIPAL COURT RETURNED THE COURT FILE TO THE [...], WHERE THE CASE ORIGINATED.  Here, Plaintiff continues to make numerous false claims concerning the Municipal Court proceedings that took place before the Highland Park Municipal Court, the return of the case file to Edison Municipal Court following completion of the trial before the Highland Park Municipal Court, and the filing of and failed perfection of Plaintiff’s appeal.
[brief] .........................................................................................................................  38  CONFIDENTIALITY CERTIFICATION (R. 1:38-3, 1:38-5, 1:38-7)  .............................................39  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS BEING APPEALED  Order denying Appellant’s Motion to Compel Arbitration and Stay Proceedings…………………………………………………………Da216  Oral Opinion denying Defendants’ Motion to Compel Arbitration and Stay Proceedings……………………………………………………………………T1 63:22 – 79:17  Trial Judge’s ruling on the record holding that the arbitration provision in the [...] Pollution Policy does not require that [...] arbitrate this dispute……………………………………………………………………………T1 63:22  Trial Judge’s ruling on the record holding that the arbitration clause in the [...] Umbrella Policy does not mandate arbitration of this dispute……………………………………………………………………………T1 76:2 – 77:8  Trial Judge’s ruling on the record that [...] established by clear and convincing evidence that [...] intentionally waived its right to arbitration based upon its conduct in the case.  ………………………………………………………T1 75:1-17 #  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | Cases | Page(s) | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|---------| | Alfano v. BDO Seidman, LLP, | 13 | | 393 N.J. Super. 560 (App. Div. 2007) | | | Atalese v. U.S. Legal Servs. Grp., L.P., | 12, 14 | | 219 N.J. 430 (2014) | | | Badiali v. New Jersey Mfrs. Ins. Grp., | 14 | | 220 N.J. 544 (2015) | | | Barr v. Bishop Rosen & Co., Inc., | 12 | | 442 N.J. Super. 599 (App. Div. 2015) | | | Brennan v. Orban, | 6 | | 145 N.J. 282 (1996) | | | Brown v.
[brief] [...]’s primary argument is that the Redevelopment Agreement required [...] to pay a redevelopment fee in the amount of $2 million, which [...] equates to an unlawful “bribe. ”  Yet under the plain and unambiguous language of the Local Redevelopment and Housing Law (“LRHL”), N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-1 et seq., as interpreted by well-regarded jurists in this state, [...] was statutorily authorized to “negotiate and collect” such revenue.  There are no conditions imposed under the LRHL which limit such revenue only to the recovery of those costs which the municipality will incur as a direct and proximate result of the redevelopment, so long as the fee was negotiated and collected in order to effectuate the purpose of the LRHL and the Amended Redevelopment Plan.  Because the fee enabled the redevelopment of the last remaining undeveloped parcel in the Beachfront South Sector of the Redevelopment Area, the fee accomplished this goal.  Next, [...]’s assertion that it possesses perpetual veto power over any future amendments to the Redevelopment Plan only serves to underscore the fact that [...] is motivated solely by its own economic interests.  Plaintiff, as well as its expert, speculates that the purpose of the “written consent” provision was to ensure that the first developer can maintain the value of its initially risky investment.  Plaintiff seeks to undermine the very purpose of the LRHL —the redevelopment of blighted areas—simply to protect its investment.  Plaintiff’s argument is not only premised on wild speculation, but contrary to the fundamental purpose of the LRHL.  Lastly, [...]’s assertion that the adoption of the amendments to the Redevelopment Plan constitutes “spot zoning” is equally without merit.  Under the well-settled law described herein, when a municipality such as [...] adopts a Redevelopment Plan which relaxes density and building requirements in accordance with its statutory authority to address blighted areas under the LRHL, such conduct does not equate to “spot zoning. ”  The fact that the Redevelopment Agreement may be more favorable than [...]’s redevelopment agreement with [...] in terms of density and building height does not render the agreement invalid or unlawful.  When granting substantial deference to [...]’s actions as required, this court, like the trial court, should conclude that [...]’s adoption of the Amendment Redevelopment Plan and entry into the Redevelopment Agreement was not unlawful and affirm the entry of summary judgment in favor of [...] and [...] in all respects.
[brief] 5  [...] also takes issue with Plaintiff’s reference in its opening brief to certain email exchanges that occurred between Plaintiff’s and [...]’s counsel.  (See [...] Br., at 16, n. 4).  Yet, these documents were placed into the record by Defendants, in support of their motions to dismiss the Complaint.  (Pa130; Pa321-333).  Here, too, there is no basis for [...]’s argument that these documents were not considered by the trial court.  PLAINTIFF’S ARGUMENTS IN OPPOSITION TO CROSS-APPEAL POINT
[directive] Procedure to Issue an Automated Writ  The automated writ is to be used to produce an adult state inmate or civilly committed sexually violent predator for a Criminal or Family Court appearance.  Use of this writ does not apply to state inmates housed in county jails.  By order of the Supreme Court dated April 30, 2002 (copy attached), the Superior Court is permitted to issue and transmit to the Department of Corrections electronic Orders to Produce.  The orders or writs are permitted to contain an electronically affixed signature of the Superior Court judge, rather than an original signature.  This automated procedure provides an electronic alternative to the process where the standardized writ form bearing an original signature is mailed to the Department of Corrections Central Transportation Unit.
[brief] Indeed, within the two weeks prior to signing the PSA, Defendant received a letter from [...] canceling the lease which allowed access to [...] through Route 70.  The State was moving ahead with its eminent domain condemnation.  Nonetheless, on April 10, 2009, Defendant signed the PSA with Plaintiff, promising that she would share equally with him in the proceeds from the sale of [...].  The PSA said nothing about the eminent domain proceedings which had been going on for months.  Plaintiff had no idea.  Beginning in April 2009, [...] proceeded with a governmental taking of the access lots to [...] along with a portion of the [...] property which it used as a construction yard.  [...] was supposed to provide alternative access to the diner, but failed to do so.  The issue of just compensation for [...]’s governmental taking led to a lawsuit and a 2014 jury verdict in [...]’s favor for $998,400, of which Defendant received nothing after legal expenses and other obligations were satisfied.  In a separate bench trial, [...] pursued a claim for inverse condemnation for loss of use of the property due to the governmental taking.  Again, [...] was the prevailing party.  Ultimately, all claims were settled, and in December 2020, Defendant, as the [...] representative, received a settlement check for $1 million.  Defendant retained $182,250 as his share, and he admits he told Plaintiff nothing about it.  Defendant’s position is that the [...] proceeds came to him through eminent domain, not technically a “sale;” therefore, he owes Plaintiff nothing.
[brief] On the Brief  [...], Esq.  Submitted: July 12, 2024 # TABLE OF CONTENTS | Section | Page | |----------------------------------------------|------| | PRELIMINARY STATEMENT | 1 | | PROCEDURAL HISTORY | 1 | | STATEMENT OF THE FACTS | 2 | | LEGAL ARGUMENT | 4 | | Point I: Plaintiff’s Assumption of the Debt of Appellee [...] is Meaningless | 4 | | Point II: Plaintiff’s Conduct Demonstrates the Illusory Nature of its Obligations Under the MOU as Enforced by the Trial Court | 5 | | Point III: The MOU as Enforced by the Trial Court Leads to an Absurd Result | 6 | | Point IV: The [...] Preserved Their Right to Object to the Fee Award | 9 | | CONCLUSION | 10 | | Authority | Page | |--------------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | Borough of Princeton v. Bd. Of Chosen Freeholders of Mercer, | 7 | | 333 N.J. Super. 310 (App. Div. 2000) | | | Bryant v. City of Atl. City, | 5-6 | | 309 N.J. Super. 596 (App. Div. 1998) | | | Conway v. 287 Corporate Ctr. Assocs., | 8 | | 187 N.J. 259 (2006) | | | Carroll v. United Airlines, Inc., | 7 | | 325 N.J. Super 353 (App. Div. 1999) | | | Porreca v. City of Millville, | 7 | | 419 N.J. Super 212 (App. Div. 2011)
[directive] Effective today, the Legislature passed and [...] enacted the Real Accountability for Consequences of Unlawful Trafficking of Firearms Act (the “Act”), L. 2023, c. ___ (S. 3150 (2022)), providing law enforcement with a tool to hold persons who illegally traffic in firearms accountable for the harm those firearms ultimately cause.  Under the Act, any person who illegally traffics a firearm may be held strictly liable when that firearm is later used in the course of committing a crime causing death, serious bodily injury, or significant bodily injury within three years of the initial trafficking act.  This Directive provides guidance to prosecutors and police officers to ensure that the Act is enforced uniformly and effectively throughout the State.  To further those goals, it requires that agencies obtain the prior approval of the Director of the Division of Criminal Justice, or their designee, before charging an offense under the Act.  Pursuant to the authority granted to me under the New Jersey Constitution and the Criminal Justice Act of 1970, N.J.S.A. 52:17B-97 to -117, which provides for the general supervision of criminal justice by the Attorney General as chief law-enforcement officer of the State to secure the benefits of uniform and efficient enforcement of the criminal law and the administration of agencies1 criminal justice throughout the State, I hereby direct all law-enforcement to follow the guidance and notification requirements outlined in this Directive.  Law-enforcement agency includes all law enforcement agencies created by the governing municipal body and 1 promulgated by statute, including municipal police departments, county law-enforcement agencies, state law- enforcement agencies, and part-time municipal police.
[brief] THE COURT: [...], did [...] have the benefit of counsel?  MR. KLEIN: [...] waived counsel, Your Honor.  And she did execute and the Court should have the affidavit of service and the waiver of the right to answer.  THE COURT: I’m just -- MR. KLEIN: Yes.  THE COURT:  I mean, sometimes in these cases, even though there’s a default, the person has an attorney advise them.  MR. KLEIN: Well, if you would like I certainly would ask a couple extra questions.  THE COURT: You can.  MR. KLEIN: Okay.  BY MR. KLEIN:  Q  Sir, your wife waived her right to counsel, is that correct?  A  She had someone look at the -- Q I was going to get to that.  A  Okay.  Q  She waived her right to counsel who entered an appearance.  Is that correct?  A Correct.  Q  All right.  And based upon advice by you and other individuals in her realm, in her world, and frankly on my advice, she had the agreement completely reviewed by an individual, an attorney-at-law of her own choosing.  Is that correct?  A Yes.  Q  Who never entered an appearance on her behalf, correct?  A Correct.  Q  All right.  And you’re satisfied, and you have had many conversations with your wife as well since that time, that she’s also entered into this freely, voluntarily and willingly, correct?  A Yes.  Q Okay.  MR. KLEIN:  Nothing further, Judge.