ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] detention pretrial a for 24 should Directive in this detention established pretrial seeking from refrain or seek when to on presumptions  The N.J.S.A. 2A:162-17, see Reform Law, Bail the under release pretrial of presumption statutory with the confused be not with charged defendant is when a Law Bail Reform the under established detention of presumption statutory or the those Although 2A:162-19(b).
[directive] The petitioner or respondent may file a petition for termination a final extreme of risk protective order at any time following issuance the order.  The court, on notice to the petitioner and the respondent, the appropriate law enforcement agency, and the county prosecutor, may terminate the final extreme risk protective order after a hearing.  During the termination hearing, the court shall consider the factors enumerated in Guideline 3(d), as well as any other relevant evidence, including, but not limited to, or whether the respondent has received, is receiving, mental health treatment.  If the respondent petitioned for termination, the respondent shall bear the burden at the of of hearing proving by a preponderance the evidence that the respondent no longer of poses a significant danger causing bodily injury to self or to other persons by owning, or receiving a firearm.  possessing, purchasing, Guidelines for Extreme Risk Protective Orders
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT’S ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY  JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF RESPONDENTS SHOULD BE AFFIRMED BECAUSE THE SCHOOL FUNDING REFORM ACT, AS AMENDED, IS NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS APPLIED TO THE JERSEY CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT .........................................................................................  31  A.  There Is No Constitutional Mandate That the State Fully Fund an Adequacy Budget .............................................................................  34  B.  Appellants Failed to Establish That the State’s Funding Levels in Jersey City Were Constitutionally Deficient ....................... 40  1.  The School Funding Reform Act Was Appropriately Reviewed and Revised In Accordance With the Supreme Court’s and the Legislature’s Mandates ........................................ 40  2.  The Record Demonstrates That the [...] Received a Constitutionally Adequate Level of State Funding ........................................................................................................ 45  3.  The Record Does Not Support Appellants’ T&E Claims ....................................................................................................................  47  CONCLUSION .................................................................................................................................
[brief] ”  254 N.J. at 580.  Specifically, the *Watson* Court cited: - Nat’l Rsch. Council of the Nat’l Acad. of Scis., *Identifying the Culprit: Assessing Eyewitness Identification* 36 n.28 (2014) (concluding that “[a]n identification … typically should not occur for the first time in the courtroom”); - *2019 Report of the Third Circuit Task Force on Eyewitness Identification* 59 (2019) (noting “the extreme suggestivity of a defendant sitting at counsel table with defense counsel should, by itself, raise caution flags regarding the independent reliability of an in-court identification”); and - [...] & [...], *Who Could It Be Now? Challenging the Reliability of First Time In-Court Identifications After State v. Henderson and State v. Lawson*, 105 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 947, 990 (2015) (concluding that first-time in-court identifications have “all the suggestiveness of … show-up[s]” and should be banned).
[brief] The Board enumerated other detrimental effects, including “the visual, noise and traffic created by this high density multi-family for-profit use directly adjacent to a private residential development of single family homes and a townhome development”, “how this facility would deal with evacuation in the event of flooding, a fire, or a power outage that lasted beyond the capacity of its generator on site”, “the excess impervious coverage being proposed”, and the substantially undersized parking at 117 spaces where the Board professionals determined that 194 spaces are required.  The Board noted that the excess \(^{10}\) These included the failure of the [...] proposal “to provide adequate light, air and open space” (see N.J.S.A. 40:55D-2(c)); “to promote … appropriate population densities and concentrations that will contribute to the well-being of persons, neighborhoods,” etc. (see N.J.S.A. 40:55D-2(e)); “to properly locate transportation and traffic routes which will promote the free flow of traffic” (see N.J.S.A. 40:55D-2(h)); and to promote a desirable visual environment (see N.J.S.A. 40:55D-2(i)).”  Da139. parking needed, the excess impervious coverage, and bulk and density all related to the excessive number of units being sought.
[brief] As set forth above, the trial court’s April 6, 2023 Order against [...] is “final” in name only.  It did not resolve “all issues as to all parties” (see Silviera-Francisco, 224 N.J. at 136), and it was never certified as “final” by the trial judge.  See R. 4:42-2; Leonardis 164 N.J. Super. at 340.  Accordingly, the February 23, 2024 “final judgment,” which orders [...] to pay $750,000 of the “final judgment” purportedly entered against [...] pursuant to the April 6, 2023 Order, must be vacated: the April 6, 2023 Order was not a “final judgment,” and an insurer is obligated by the MCS-90 endorsement only to pay a “final judgment. ”
[brief] I.  PUBLIC POLICY REQUIRES THAT [...] SHOULD BE PERMITTED TO INTERVENE AS AN INTERESTED PARTY TO THIS PROCEEDING.  ..............................................................  11  A.  The absence of the procedural safeguards provided by the Administrative Procedures Act has prevented the creation of a complete and proper record for determination of the merits of the issue.........................................................................................  11  B.  Intervention by [...] in this Court is procedurally appropriate and substantively warranted.  .................................................................................................................................  15  II.  [...]’S APPLICATION FOR INTERVENTION IS TIMELY AND NON-PREJUDICIAL  .................................................................................................................................  18 CONCLUSION .............................................................................................................................
[brief] Exhibit 10: Facebook Post from [...], dated November 4, 2021; l.  Exhibit 11: Facebook Post from [...], dated November 6, 2021; m.  Exhibit 12: Facebook Post from [...], dated February 10 (year unknown); n.  Exhibit 13: Facebook Post from [...], date unknown; o.  Exhibit 14: Facebook Post from [...], dated November 16, 2021; p.  Exhibit 15: Facebook Post from [...], dated November 19, 2021; q.  Exhibit 16: Facebook Post from [...], dated March 7 (year unknown); r. Exhibit 17: Facebook Post from [...], dated April 6 (year unknown); s. Exhibit 18: Facebook Post from [...], dated April 9 (year unknown); t. Exhibit 19: Facebook Post from [...], dated April 11 (year unknown); u.
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT REVERSIBLE ERROR IN DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO COMPEL RETURN OF MONIES PAID OR BY GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S APPLICATIONS FOR SANCTIONS AND FEES FOR VIOLATIONS BY DEFENDANT OF THE 2017 JUDGMENT.  (Da170; Da207; Da210-693; Da751; Da816-Da844; Da965-967; Da969; Da976; 5T 34:4-44:13; 6T 4-76)…………………………………………………………………………………
[brief] THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT SPECIFICALLY STATES THAT FERMIN RETIRED DUE TO DISABILITY AND FERMIN DETRIMENTALLY RELIED UPON THIS LANGUAGE. **  The settlement agreement, which the Board argues preclude [...]'s application for disability retirement benefits, specifically contemplates and provides for [...] to apply for accidental disability benefits.  As the ALJ determined in her Initial Decision, the Board cannot fairly rely upon a settlement agreement that specially states [...] is to apply for accidental disability as a reason to bar him from applying.  As aptly stated by the ALJ:  [T]he very settlement agreement that the Board points to as a means by which to preclude [...]'s application from being processed contemplates and specifically provides that [...] will apply for accidental disability benefits.  It seems somewhat contradictory to reference a document that specifically states [...] is to apply for accidental disability benefits as a reason to bar [...] from applying for said benefits.  It should further be noted that, in the less-than-likely hypothetical situation relied on by the Board, wherein [...] receives benefits, recovers, and is then denied reemployment, the Board, upon determining that [...] is fully recovered from his disability, could simply discontinue benefits and [...] could seek employment elsewhere.  Pa128.  The language used in the settlement agreement reasonably led [...] to believe that the government would not fight his accidental disability reinterment application.  "When dealing with the public," including PFRS members, "government must 'turn square corners' rather than exploit litigational or bargaining advantages that might otherwise be available to private citizens."  Cardinale v. Bd. of Trs., Police & Firemen's Ret. Sys., 458 N.J. Super. 260, 273 (App. Div. 2019) (quoting Rudbart v. N. Jersey Dist. Water Supply Comm'n, 127 N.J. 344, 378 (1992).  "The government must act fairly and ‘with compunction and integrity. ’"  Id. at 379 (internal citations omitted).  The government is "always subject to the guiding principles of fundamental fairness."  *Milligan v. Dir., Div. of Taxation*, 29 N.J. Tax 381, 399 (Tax 2016).  Here, unlike in *Cardinale*, the settlement agreement includes statements on which [...] reasonably relied to his detriment.  See 458 N.J. at 273-274.
[brief] \(^8\)  While the court told the jury in its final charge that it “cannot use any reference of alleged criminal activity that occurred in South River to determine the guilt or the innocence of the defendant[] as to the particular charges in this case” (5T 11-12 to 15), this instruction was insufficient to focus the jury on the “fine distinction” between the prohibited and permitted uses of the evidence.  \textit{Hernandez}, 170 N.J. at 131.
[directive] The revisions the and Directive this of provisions explain the to program training supplemental a develop training supplemental  This Devices.  Energy Conducted on Policy Supplemental the to made conducted use a carry and to authorized are who officers all to available made shall be program procedure qualification and course training the into incorporated be shall also and device, energy Devices.  Energy Conducted on Supplemental Policy the of VII Section to pursuant established 11  Page DEVICES APPROVED OF REVISED  LIST  4.  within Justice, Criminal of Division with the consultation in Police, State Jersey New  The of the requirements the satisfy that models device energy conducted identify shall days 120 into taking Directive, this by amended as Devices Energy Conducted on Policy Supplemental conducted deploy a and purchase to Directive this to pursuant authorized is agency an that account any that provided recording digital video making a of capability the have not does that device energy in defined as camera body worn a with equipped officer an by only carried and used is device such 2015-1.
[brief] October 16, 2023  Final Agency Decision  [...] v. [...] .................................................................  Pa10  ### TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ####  Cases - **Abouzaid v. Mansard Gardens Associates, LLC**, 207 N. J. 67 (2011) .................................. 16 - **Coleman v. Kaye**, 87 F.3d 1491, 1499 (3d Cir.1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1084 (1977)  .................................................................................................................. 10 - **Courier News v. Hunterdon County Prosecutor's Office**, 378 N.J. Super. 539 (App. Div. 2005) ...........................................................................................................  10 - **DeLisa v. Cnty. of Bergen**, 326 N.J. Super. 32, (App. Div. 1999) .................................. 10 - **County of Essex v. [...]**, Docket No. A-0725-20 (App. Div. 2022) (Unreported)(Not relied on)  .........................................................  15 - **Gramiccioni v. Department of Law & Public Safety**, 243 N.J. 293 (2020) .......................................................................................................................... 10, 11, 12, 14, 15, 16 - **Lavezzi v. State**, 219 N.J. 163 (2014) .................................................................................. 5, 6, 9, - **N. Jersey Media Grp., Inc. v. Township of Lyndhurst**, 229 N.J. 541, 565, 163 A.3d 887 (2017) .................................................................................................................. 10 - **Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. Intermodal Props., LLC**, 215 N.J. 142, 165 (2013) ...................... 6 - **Prado v. State**, 186 N.J. 413, 427 (2006) ............................................................................ 5 - **Wright v. State**, 169 N.J. 422, 441-42 (2001) .................................................. 3, 7, 8, 9, 10, 14, 15, 16 #### Statutes - **N.J.S.A. 40A:14-181** ............................................................................................................. 12 - **N.J.S.A. 52:17B-98** ............................................................................................................. 9, 10 - **N.J.S.A. 59:1-1 to 12-3** ....................................................................................................... 7, 8, 9, 14, 16 PRELIMINARY STATEMENT This appeal involves the review of a final agency action taken by the [...] (the “OAG”) in refusing to defend and indemnify the [...] (the “[...]”), on a claim contained in a civil lawsuit.
[directive] 3:  In those vicinages in which Assignment Judges have authorized Municipal Court judges to hear search warrant applications, effective immediately and until further order only Superior Court Judges should handle such applications.  This will continue as long as the protocol set forth of in this memorandum is operational.  This change does not affect the handling blood-draw search warrants by Municipal Court judges.  Since blood-draw search warrants are handled telephonically and do not involve a direct appearance by law enforcement before the judge, that process will continue with no change.  #
[brief] -----------------------------------------------  23 Thompson v. Taylor, 65 N.J.L. 107, 109, 46 A. 567 (Sup.Ct.1900)  ---------  46 Thorpe v. Bd. of Trs., 2023 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 332, *1 --------------  32 Tiffany v. Boatman's Sav. Inst., 85 U.S. 375, 376, 21 L. Ed. 868 (1873)  ---- 47 Totaro, Duffy, Cannova and Co., L.L.C. v. Lane, Middleton & Co., L.L.C., 191 N.J. 1, 13 -------------------------------------  35 Waldor v. Untermann, 10 N.J. Super. 188 (App. Div. 1950)  ------------------ 45 Ward v. Keenan, 3 N.J. 298, 302 (1949)  ------------------------------------  45 Zapanta v. Isoldi, 212 N.J. Super. 678, 687  -------------------------------  13 Miscellaneous Am.Jur.2d 355, Contracts § 19; --------------------------------------------  13  Black’s Law Dictionary  --------------------------------------------------- 46 Williston, Contracts, (3 ed. Jaeger 1957), -------------------------------- 13
[brief] Plaintiffs’ failure to amend the R. 4:5-1 statement did not cause any substantial prejudice and was excusable.  By simply disclosing to the Trial Court in an amended 4:5-1(b) certification in the lease litigation that Plaintiffs were contemplating suing the Defendants prior to the Stipulation of Dismissal being filed, the Plaintiffs would indisputably be immune from the Entire Controversy Motion to Dismiss that was granted in this case.
[brief] **JUDICIAL REVIEW BY THE APPELLATE COURT MAY REVERSE THE BOARD/TRIAL COURT DECISION IF ARBITRARY, CAPRICIOUS OR UNREASONABLE. **  *(Not raised below)*  Our Supreme Court addressed the issue of judicial review of an agency decision in *In the Matter of the Proposed Quest Academy Charter School of Montclair Founders Group*, 216 N.J. 370 (2013).  On page 386, it states:  > ...the arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable standard applicable to the review of administrative agency decisions subsumes the need to find sufficient support in the record to sustain the decision reached....  The point is beyond argument, for a failure to consider all the evidence in a record would perforce lead to arbitrary decision-making.  This standard emphasizes the necessity for a thorough and comprehensive review of the entire record.  Any failure to consider all relevant evidence inherently results in arbitrary and capricious decision-making, undermining the integrity of the administrative process.  POINT VIII
[brief] **  The court’s August 31, 2022 analysis and award mirrored the analysis and award from the first legal fee appeal that had been vacated.  Once again, the court used the arbitrary date selected by the Administrator and awarded the exact same amount as the first award – $1,049,589.14.  The court awarded fees for every single time entry up to January 5, 2017, without examining the time entries or evaluating whether the work performed benefited the Estate or otherwise met the requirements of Rule 4:42-9(a)(2).  By way of example, the trial court did not explain why work searching for assets in Hawaii was being reimbursed; why work with regard to [...] was being reimbursed, even though [...] had ruled on May 8, 2014 that [...] asset was not a part of the case; and why invoices from the [...] totaling $309,000 were included in the award, even though Rosensteel was a New York firm that had never appeared in the case, and whose work was duplicative and not necessary – [...], the law firm of record, was fully engaged in the case, entering all the appearances and preparing and submitting all of the filings.  In fact, in his opinion on August 31, 2022, the court lists the attorneys and law firms that had represented Plaintiff, and never mentions the Rosensteel Law Firm.  (Da276-277).  In addition, the trial court performed no analysis of the overall equities of the case to determine whether fees shifting was appropriate.  The trial court’s opinion also contained no analysis as to whether the legal fee award was reasonable in view of the size of the Estate from which the legal fees are to be paid.  The court did not review any time entries to determine whether the time entered was in furtherance of activity that benefited the Estate, as opposed to activity that was spent pursuing Plaintiff’s false claims.  The court also never explains why an award that was in excess of $1 million is appropriate when Plaintiff had initiated his action with a Verified Complaint acknowledging that the beneficiaries had already reported to Korean authorities the Decedent’s $900,000 investment in [...], yet urged that there was a need to appoint an Administrator to recover an additional $10,000,000 in Estate assets in New Jersey, and to uncover the “malfeasance” of Defendant in his management of [...].  (Da272)  The Administrator concluded, after a long and arduous effort, that all of Plaintiff’s allegations were untrue.  In summary, the trial court did not perform the required analysis in accord with case law, Rule 4:42-9(a)(2) and the Appellate Division’s instructions.
[brief] If plainly expressed, the insurers are entitled to have liability limitations construed and enforced as expressed. ”  244 N.J. Super. at 250-51.  The Court further explained that while “a liability policy covers all losses which are fairly within the terms of the policy, it cannot be extended to liabilities or losses which are neither expressly or impliedly within its terms. ”  244 N.J. Super. at 251.  In this case, plaintiff filed a complaint seeking a determination that [...] was obligated to provide him a defense and indemnity for the underlying lawsuit, which itself alleged entirely intentional conduct amounting to assault and harassment, as well as resulting in interference with contractual relations.
[brief] Pa000286-88.  ¹ “Pa” refers to Plaintiff’s appendix.  Plaintiffs timely refiled this action on October 5, 2023 with identical allegations: Count I- Breach of Contract; Count II- Breach of Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealings; Count III- Promissory Estoppel; and Count IV, New Jersey Wage Payment and Collection Law.  Pa00030-47.  Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss on November 9, 2023 seeking to dismiss the Complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to R. 4:6-2(e).  The Court held oral argument on February 16, 2024.  Pa000001.  The Court granted Defendants’ motion on March 4, 2024 and dismissed the Verified Complaint in its entirety on the issue of the MSRA but did not reach the issue of res judicata and the entire controversy arguments raised by Defendants.  Pa000025-39.  Plaintiffs timely filed for appeal on April 17, 2024.  Pa000001.  **STATEMENT OF FACTS**
[brief] LEGAL ARGUMENT STANDARD OF REVIEW  This Appeal arises from the Trial Court’s dismissal of a claim for failure to serve an appropriate Affidavit of Merit and the standard of review is de novo.  See, Baskin v. P.C. Richard & Son, LLC, 246 N.J. 157, 171 (2021); Natale v. Camden County Corr. Facility, 318 F.3d 575, 579 (3d Cir. 2003); see also Smerling v. Harrah's Entm't, Inc., 389 N.J. Super. 181, 186 (App. Div. 2006) ("review of a trial court's order of dismissal of a complaint pursuant to Rule 4:6-2(e) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, is plenary").  Any issue as to the Trial Court’s interpretation of the Affidavit of Merit Statute, is reviewed de novo.  “Questions of statutory interpretation are legal ones” that the Appellate Division reviews de novo.  See State v. Gargano, 476 N.J. Super. 511, 523 (App. Div. 2023); citing State v. Bernardi, 456 N.J. Super. 176, 186 (App. Div. 2018)(quoting State v. S.B., 230 N.J. 61 (2017)).  New Jersey’s Supreme Court has also consistently reiterated, "[w]e review questions of statutory interpretation de novo as well."  C.V. v. Waterford Twp. Bd. of Educ., 255 N.J. 289 (2023); citing W.S. v. Hildreth, 252 N.J. 506, 518 (2023).  In construing statutes, "[t]he overriding goal is to determine as best we can the intent of the Legislature, and to give effect to that intent."  State v. Hudson, 209 N.J. 513, 529 (2012).  "There is no more persuasive evidence of legislative intent than the words by which the Legislature undertook to express its purpose," and we thus "first look to the plain language of the statute."  Perez v. Zagami, LLC, 218 N.J. 202, 209-10 (2014).  Here, as will be established below, the Trial Court appropriately dismissed Plaintiff’s Complaint since failing to comply with the Affidavit of Merit Statute constitutes a failure to state a claim warranting dismissal with prejudice.  See, N.J.S.A. § 2A:53A-29; and Cornblatt v. Barow, 153 N.J. 218 (1988).  A plenary review of this matter will confirm the appropriateness of the dismissal and this Honorable Appellate Panel should affirm same.  POINT I THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DISMISSED