ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The Application Fails to Meet the Water Quality Requirements Under the Stormwater Management Rules.  (Aa2521-Aa2537).  [...] raised two separate and distinct issues with the water quality treatments, being (1) sediment in the forebay, and (2) inundation of the Filterra MTDs.  (Ab7-Ab9).  Pursuant to the BMP Manual, “[p]retreatment is required in any type of standard constructed wetland system.  Pretreatment reduces the velocity of incoming flows and captures coarser sediments and debris. ”  BMP Manual, Chapter 10.4, page 4.  The BMP Manual does not say pretreatment is discretionary, it is required.  The [...] argues that Basin 2 is a constructed wetlands basin and therefore it does not matter if the forebay is underwater.  (DEPb16).  The issue raised by [...] and [...] is not that Basin 2 is underwater.  The issue is that the apparent forebay is underwater, and “under no circumstances should there be any standing water in the forebay 72 hours after a precipitation event. ”  BMP Manual, Chapter 10.4, Page 4.  Again, this language is not discretionary, it is required.
[directive] Sentencing Guidance for Criminal Part Judges in Response to COVID-19 response to the growing public health crisis worldwide and this state involving in  In the COVID-19 coronavirus, the New Jersey Judiciary is implementing all possible measures to apply social distancing current court operations consistent with the in of of recommendations the New Jersey Department Health ("NJ DOH") and the Centers for Disease Control ( 11CDC").  Pursuant to the April 20, 2020 Supreme Court Order, sentencing can be conducted of remotely using video and/or phone options only with the consent all parties.  Accordingly, judges should consider the following when sentencing defendants remotely during this public health emergency.  The guidance only applies to defendants who are awaiting sentencing following a guilty plea or jury verdict.  It does not apply to defendants for whom the court has already imposed a sentence.  Practical Considerations for Sentences in the Criminal Division
[brief] "The privilege against self-incrimination, as set forth in the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, is one of the most important protections of the criminal law."  State v. Presha, 163 N.J. 304, 312 (2000) (citing U.S. Const. amend. V; State v. Hartley, 103 N.J. 252, 262 (1986)).  Likewise, New Jersey “"common law has granted individuals the 'right against self-incrimination since colonial times.' "  State v. Vincenty, 237 N.J. 122, 132 (2019) (quoting State v. A.G.D., 178 N.J. 56, 66 (2003)).
[brief] (See 11 U.S.C. § 362).  This termination of employment necessitated withdrawal of [...]’s Chapter 13 wage-earner petition with the bankruptcy court and, ultimately, termination of the bankruptcy stay on October 22, 2018 and dismissal of the bankruptcy case in its entirety on December 17, 2018.  (See In re: Jonathan P. [...], Bankr. D.N.J. Docket # [...]).
[brief] No jury instruction was necessary on the defendant’s failure to report the alleged sexual assault.  The defendant asserts that the trial court should have instructed the jury concerning the defendant’s failure to report the alleged sexual assault in this case.  The defendant’s attorney did not request such an instruction at trial and the trial judge had no obligation to issue one.  When reviewing a claim of error related to jury charges, the “charge must be read as a whole in determining whether there was any error. ”  State v. Torres, 183 N.J. 554, 564 (2005).  If, like here, defense counsel did not object to the jury charge at trial, the plain error standard applies.  Id.  Reversal is warranted only if the error was "clearly capable of producing an unjust result."  Id. at 559 (quoting R. 2:10-2).
[brief] (M718-756).  Respondents cross-appeal the decision of the trial court to dismiss their claims against the Appellants for violations of their substantive due process rights under both 42 U.S.C. §1983 (“§1983”) and the New Jersey Civil Rights Act, N.J.S.A. 10:6-2(c) (“NJCRA”) and procedural due process rights under §1983.  The Respondents do not espouse any case law that supports their contentions.  Instead, they rely almost exclusively on the lower court’s findings that regarding the Mayor’s comments as a basis for constitutional violations.  As the trial court correctly determined these findings are not as intertwined as the Respondents would like them to be.  Though the trial court believed they served as a basis to find arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable conduct, which Appellants disagree with, it is irrefutable that they cannot serve as a basis to contend that there were any constitutional violations in this matter.
[brief] ”  However, the team did find the following:  Inside the room, just inside the window, we did see that the flooring had burned completely away as well as the floor beams.  So you’re talking minimal 2 by 6, 2 by 8 pieces of wood that were burned completely away.  And the flooring, the wood sheathing, three-quarter inch plywood or greater were gone.  The floor also gave us an indication of a pour pattern, which is why the … combustible gas meter was utilized and determined that there was 486 parts per million.
[brief] On October 10, 2014, plaintiffs filed their original Complaint, arising from a construction site accident that resulted in the death of plaintiffs’ decedent, [...].  By Court Order dated January 22, 2016, plaintiffs were granted leave to file a Second Amended Complaint to add architectural/engineering firms [...] and [...] as defendants (Pa64).  In the Second Amended Complaint, plaintiffs allege that, “As a direct and proximate result of the negligence, carelessness and/or recklessness of [[...]],” the accident “ultimately caused the wrongful death of [...]. ”  [...] filed its Answer on April 1, 2016 (Pa2723).  No Affidavit of Merit was ever filed by plaintiffs.  On June 21, 2017, [...] and [...] each filed motions to dismiss based on plaintiffs’ failure to serve an Affidavit of Merit.  Plaintiffs opposed the motions and oral argument was held before the Honorable [...] on August 4, 2017.  [...] granted both motions, finding: Defendants were clearly hired, as the contract makes clear, to fulfill professional engineering obligations.  Any showing of a negligent deviation from those obligations would necessarily implicate professional negligence.  Therefore, an affidavit of merit is required.  As all parties agree that no affidavit of merit was ever served, the case against [...] and [...] must be dismissed. ” (Pa2526-27)
[directive] If adjudication. a an nor conviction of judgment be should A defendant 2C:43-13d.  N.J.S.A. 2C:43-12g(3); N.J.S.A. dismissed. are charges the will PTI be (1) plea: entering guilty after a PTI of conditions any violates or he if she that advised sentencing; of purposes for trial the list to returned will case be defendant's (2) the terminated; when Accordingly, agreement. plea the to pursuant sentenced be will defendant the (3) and PTI. from terminated if exposure penal her or his of be advised defendant must pleading a guilty, Date Effective 6.
[brief] “An affirmative defense is ordinarily \(^5\) [...]’s Answer does, however, plead the defense that [...]’s Complaint fails to state a valid claim upon which relief can be granted.  Pa409 at Sep. Def. 1.  And, the Answer also reserves [...]’s right to amend its Answer to incorporate additional defenses as the litigation continues and the bases for such defenses become known to [...].  Pa412 at Sep. Def. 33. waived if not pleaded or otherwise timely raised. ”  Buteas v. Raritan Lodge #61 F. & A.M., 248 N.J. Super. 351, 363 (App. Div. 1991) (emphasis added); see also Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules, Comment 2 to R. 4:6-7 (Gann) (same).
[brief] For example, the early leading case of Nicholas v. Mynster, 213 N.J. 463 (2013) involved the treatment for carbon monoxide poisoning in a construction worker who had inhaled noxious fumes on a jobsite.  One of the defendant physicians was Board Certified in Emergency Medicine, and the other defendant was Board Certified in Family Medicine.  The plaintiff’s expert was Board Certified in Internal Medicine and Preventive Medicine and specialized in Hyperbaric Medicine.  He had no credentials in either Emergency Medicine or Family Medicine.  213 N.J. at 467.  All three of these physicians were qualified to treat the plaintiff’s condition.  The Court held that “… Only an equivalently credentialed specialist would be qualified to testify against another specialist. ”  Id. at 483.  Because he had no qualifications in either emergency medicine or family medicine, the plaintiff expert was not qualified to give an opinion and sign an Affidavit of Merit, and the case was dismissed.  In the years since Nicholas v Mynster, supra, the courts have addressed these issues in a variety of factual settings.
[brief] [...] necessarily ignores the facts and exceeds all bounds of rational thinking to argue that he “had honored the change of management control Order. ”  Db49 (emphasis supplied).  This sentence is a blatant, fact-free fabrication.  And [...]’s argument that he did not take action to prevent new management from controlling the Company plainly ignores reality, particularly while arguing that [...]’s actions were “just allegations in a Complaint,” (Db48).  First, it is simply untrue that [...] did not attempt to interfere with management of the Company.  [...] did more than file allegations in the SDNY Action; he orchestrated a theft of company property, encrypted its emails, wired Company money out of the country, and was caught on a recorded line plotting to remove even more of the Company’s assets from the United States.  Second, [...]’s argument that these were “just allegations”—which is completely false—also completely misses the point of that part of the sanctions that are related to the SDNY Action.  The sanction included Plaintiff’s counsel fees to defend those allegations, the very assertion of which was a direct violation of multiple trial court orders including an injunction, i.e., those counsel fees directly resulted from [...]’s violation of the Court’s injunction.
[brief] **Plaintiff knew the representations were false**  Because Plaintiff signed the 2016 Contract and the Petition on the same date, it is self-evident that Plaintiff knew it was a misrepresentation that she had not been contemplating filing for bankruptcy.  Furthermore, she clearly knew that she had filed for bankruptcy when she signed the 2018 and 2019 Contracts.  Even if Plaintiff’s PI Attorney, [...] had not reviewed the Contract with her, the general rule is that a party to a contract is presumed to have read and understood the contract.  *Roman v. Bergen Logistics, LLC*, 456 N.J. Super. 157 (App. Div. 2018)
[brief] *In re Keogh-Dwyer*, 45 N.J. 117, 120 (1965).  Accordingly, interpreting election statutes requires close attention to legislative intent.  *See* *ibid.*  There, the Court held that personal choice ballots should not be counted unless the voter made a proper mark, such as a cross X, plus + or check checkmark, in addition to writing the candidate’s name.  *Id.* at 121.  Although the voter in *Keogh-Dwyer* substantially complied with the statutory requirement, the Court made clear that failure to do so would render the ballot void.  *See* *ibid.* (citing *In re Election for Mayor*, 9 N.J. Misc. 25, 152 A. 641 (1930), holding that a voter’s intention must be manifested by a mark substantially in the designated place, demonstrating an honest intent to follow the law in order for a ballot to be counted).  By contrast, here, the voter did not comply with the statutory requirements at all.  Instead, they violated an explicit prohibition by casting a personal choice vote for a candidate whose name already appeared on the printed ballot – conduct that directly contravenes the clear language of the governing statute.  The instructions on the machine are also compliant with the statutes mandating the language to be used.  N.J.S.A. 40A:14-73.  As technology evolved, the Legislature had multiple opportunities to amend the statutory requirements, but notably did not alter fundamental rules, such as the ones established in Keogh-Dwyer.  In fact, the Supreme Court reaffirmed and extended that holding in In re Municipal Election Held on May 10, 1994 for Three Positions on the Sparta Township Council, 139 N.J. 553 (1995), applying it to electronic voting systems.
[brief] [...] filed its complaint on March 17, 2005, seeking coverage in connection with an Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) action that began in 1986, and resulted in an Administrative Order on Consent in 1993.  (Pa0001.)  [...]’s complaint alleged it was entitled to liability insurance coverage in connection with the purported continuous release of pollutants at the Site from 1958 to 1993.  (Pa0008.)  This case originally involved 15 defendant insurers.  (Pa0001.)  In or about 2010, 12 of the defendant insurers (the “Pollution Exclusion Insurers”)\(^1\) moved for --- \(^1\)  The Pollution Exclusion Insurers are [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], summary judgment on the issues of choice of law and application of the pollution exclusion.  (Pa0087.)  The Pollution Exclusion Insurers argued that Massachusetts law was applicable to this action, and that under Massachusetts law, pollution exclusions in their policies applied to preclude coverage.  (Pa0065.)  [...] opposed the Pollution Exclusion Insurers’ motions and filed a motion seeking the application of New Jersey law.  (Pa0089.)  [...] did not take a position on choice of law and did not have a pollution exclusion in its policy.  (Pa0087.)  By Order dated April 7, 2010, the Pollution Exclusion Insurers’ motions were granted and [...]’s motion was denied.  (Pa0087.)  The Pollution Exclusion Insurers were subsequently dismissed from the case, or reached settlements with [...] prior to the decision.  (Pa0087.)
[brief] “If the police are performing a law enforcement function in an appropriate manner, i.e., not with an excessive use of force, then a citizen is obligated to comply with the directions of the police.  State of New Jersey v. Camillo, 382 NJ Super 113 (2005).  Under State of New Jersey v. Camillo, 382 NJ Super 113 (2005) a Defendant must have “obstructed” by means of “flight” (not attempted flight).
[brief] Patent applicants have a duty to prosecute patents in the PTO with candor and good faith, including a duty to disclose information known to the applicants to be material to patentability, and patent applicant’s breach of this duty may result in a finding of inequitable conduct.  See 37 C.F.R. § 1.56; Molins PLC v. Textron, Inc., 48 F.3d 1172, 1178 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
[brief] On March 23, 2023, correspondence was sent to the [...] to clarify the request that the Board consider all of the affected Troopers in a single collective petition.  Pa33.  The correspondence also requested that the Board take administrative or judicial notice of all affidavits submitted in all actions with respect to the issue of lack of notice of the Ricci Act for members of the [...].  Pa33.  To date, over ninety-eight (98) active and retired Troopers have submitted affidavits attesting that they did not receive any notice of the Ricci Act.  Pa85-280.
[brief] Pressing return on investment priorities further, the Architect said adhering to the 40% building coverage zone criteria would yield a footprint and floor area ratio that likewise would be insufficient to offset costs:  Architect:  “Even if you were to apply the 40 percent maximum lot coverage, which is still rather constricting.  That would result in a footprint of 10,200 square feet.  If you double that and you make that a two-story building with parking, that would result in a floor area ratio of about 1.2 … that would still not provide a very substantial number of units to offset the costs of the cleanup… in short, I think the project makes sense.  It can support the high cleanup costs…”  Pa192 at 75:12-21, 23-25 emphasis added.
[directive] Promulgated by 12/31/2019 Supplement to Directive #01-18, CN 10079-Haitian Creole Defendant's Initials  Revize pa Sipleman Direktifnimewo 01-18 kite pwomilge le 31 desanm 2019, CN 10079-Haitian Creole Inisyal Akize a page of7/paj nan 7 5 5 17. f.  Having been advised of the possible immigration consequences and of your right to seek [Yes/wi] [No/Non] individualized legal advice on your immigration consequences, do you still wish to plead guilty?  Apre yo fin deja eksplike w konsekans posib sou stati imigrasyon ansanm ak dwa w pou chache konsey legal endividyel konsenan tout konsekans sou imigrasyon yo, eske w vie plede koupab toujou?
[brief] i.  Legal Analysis: The Standard on Appeal for Setting Aside Verdicts as Against the Weight of the Evidence (RAISED BELOW: Pa50-Pa51)  The Appellate standard for reviewing a jury verdict as against the weight of the evidence is governed by R. 2:10-1, which states:  In both civil and criminal actions, the issue of whether a jury verdict was against the weight of the evidence shall not be cognizable on appeal unless a motion for a new trial on that ground was made in the trial court.  The trial court's ruling on such a motion shall not be reversed unless it clearly appears that there was a miscarriage of justice under the law.  Under this standard, Appellate Courts “apply a narrow scope of review to civil jury verdicts.  [They] ordinarily do not set them aside and order a new trial unless there has been a proven manifest injustice. ”  Jacobs v. Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co., 452 N.J. Super. 494, 502 (App. Div. 2017) (internal citations omitted).  Under this narrow scope of review, a jury verdict “is impregnable unless so distorted and wrong, in the objective and articulated view of a judge, as to manifest with utmost certainty a plain miscarriage of justice. ”  Carrino v. Novotny, 78 N.J. 355, 360 (1979) (citing Baxter v. Fairmont Food Co., 74 N.J. 588 (1977)) (emphasis added).
[brief] ...............-  17 - A.  Defendant Cannot Be Liable For Breaching Contracts That She Was Not A Party To ...........................................................................................................................................- 17 - B.  The Trial Court Improperly Held Defendant Liable For Breaching The Covenant Of Good Faith ..............................................................................................................- 21 - C.  The Trial Court Erred By Finding Defendant Liable For Unjust Enrichment When There Was An Express Contract Providing For Renumeration .........................................................................................................................- 23 - III.  DEFENDANT DID NOT WAIVE HER STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS  ARGUMENT (10T58-7 to 100-23; 13T57-8 to -15; 23T95-9 to 105-12; 36T52-7 to -10)  .........................................................................................................................-  24 -  IV.  THE TRIAL COURT INCORRECTLY DENIED DEFENDANT’S SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION (13T64-6 to 97-9)………………………- 26 -  V.  THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY FOUND DEFENDANT JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY LIABLE (23T96-3 to 97-15; 36T49-11 to 51-21; 37T42-15 to 45-5)
[brief] POINT IV  PLAINTIFF’S HAS A VALID CLAIM FOR MISREPRESENTATION  (Pa386)  In order to have a valid claim for misrepresentation a plaintiff must establish 1) a material misrepresentation by the defendant of a presently existing fact or past fact, (2) knowledge of its falsity, (3) an intent that plaintiff rely on the statement, (4) reasonable reliance by the plaintiff, and (5) resulting damages.  Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Land, 186 N.J. 163, 175 (2006).  Here, Plaintiff has credibly testified that she was advised by the Defendant that the Defendant would restore her Property.  The Defendant never took any action to restore the Property and thus knew any representations were false.  Furthermore, it would have no basis to believe the Defendant was not being honest and her reliance was reasonable.  Accordingly, a question of facts as to whether Defendant is liable for misrepresentation exist and Summary Judgment was not appropriate.  **CONCLUSION**  For all of the above stated reasons, the trial court’s granting of Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment must be reversed.
[brief] See NOTWITHSTANDING, Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) (defining “notwithstanding” as “in spite of” or “not opposing”).  Finally, severing the provision does not “defeat the primary purpose of the contract” because, again, the provision is not at issue, has no bearing on Plaintiff’s claims, and is otherwise “not opposed” to the remainder of the arbitration agreement.  Jacob v. Norris, McLaughlin & Marcus, 128 N.J. 10, 33 (1992).  Thus, for all these reasons, [...] respectfully submits that this Court should affirm the trial court’s May 30, 2024 Order and compel the parties to abide by the contractually-agreed-upon dispute resolution provision.
[brief] TABLE OF JUDGMENTS ...........................................................................................................iv  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .........................................................................................................v  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT .................................................................................................1  PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND STATEMENT OF FACTS ..................................................4  A.  Background ..........................................................................................................................4  B.  The Morning Incident ..........................................................................................................5  C.  The Afternoon Incident .......................................................................................................7  D. DCF Issues a LOD ...............................................................................................................9  E. [...] Appeals the LOD to the CSC .....................................................................................9  F.  The CSC Denies [...]’s Appeal .........................................................................................10  G. [...] Requests Reconsideration, Which is Denied ............................................................12  LEGAL ARGUMENT ..................................................................................................................13
[brief] Krzykalski v. Tindall, 232 N.J. 525, 542-43 (2018).  Here, none of the recognized exceptions to the CNA—other than that found in Burt—would allow for [...] and [...] to be on the verdict sheet.  They did not settle with plaintiffs, had no defenses based on bankruptcy discharge or the statute of repose, and were not fictitiously pled “John Doe” defendants.  The jury was instructed that they were “procedurally dismissed.