ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Defendant distinguishes statutory law, Insurance Department regulations, and certain case law from this appeal because they deal with automobile or commercial liability policy cancellations.  ...  True as those distinctions may be, [they] offer reasonable guidelines for assessing proofs that an insurers claims are evidence of effective notice of policy cancellation.  We consequently consider them....  [Id. at 157-158.]  In this case, in contravention of this ingrained public policy as expressed by the cited cases over the past forty years, the court below declined to apply the regulation (SSR 34-36, Dta1364), despite its facial applicability and the public policy requiring its application.
[brief] Notably, Defendants have not cited to any case law applying the doctrine of qualified immunity to an NJLAD cause of action.  In addition, even if the doctrine of qualified immunity applied to NJLAD causes of action, Defendants conveniently disregard the analysis undertaken by the Appellate Division in Brown with respect to legislative immunity.  For example, the Appellate Division noted that with respect to legislative immunity, status alone does not shield an individual from liability claims, and that one of the defendants acted “in an administrative or executive capacity, or simply on his own, in promoting and influencing a discriminatory hiring, as opposed to his immunized legislative role, he can be held liable under the LAD. ”  Brown, 348 N.J. Super. at 150; see also Greenman v. City of Hackensack, 486 F. Supp. 3d 811, 835 (D.N.J. 2020) (finding that alleged discriminatory acts are not legislative in nature, such that two council members did not enjoy absolute legislative immunity with respect to those acts).  Here, the lower court’s decision is not premised on any such consideration, and did not appreciate that Plaintiff was not complaining of the investigation itself, but instead was complaining about how the investigation, as authorized by Defendants [...] and [...], was conducted.
[brief] 9  **Point I:**  The Trial Judge Was Correct In Denying The Disqualification Motion as No Conflict of Interest Existed and/or Was Subject to Waiver  ...........................................  9  A. Conflict of Interest Rules and Law.  ......................  9  B.  The Trial Judge Correctly Determined That No Conflict of Interest Existed And/or Could Be Waived.  .........................................................  11  **CONCLUSION** ........................................................................  14
[brief] In summary, [...] denied the relief sought by [...] and [...] after a thorough examination of:  A.  The standard of review for bid appeals under the Local Public Contracts law, N.J.S.A. 40A:11-1 et seq.; 0011a.  B.  The legal standard for determining whether a bid defect is “material” or whether it is “waivable;”  0011a-0013a.  C.  An analysis of [...]’s bid, finding that it contained a non-waivable material defect; and 0013a-0015a.  D.  An analysis of [...]’s bid, finding that utilizing the services of an archaeologist who was not registered under the PWCRA was a non-material, waivable defect.  0015a.  [...] now appeals [...]’s ruling that (1) “the law itself does not require that the archaeologist subcontractor be registered under the PWCRA”, (0015a-0016a) or (2), even if archaeologists were required to be registered, it was not “arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable” for the [...] to conclude that [...]’s designation of an unregistered archaeologist was not a “material defect” and therefore waivable under the Local Public Contracts Law.  N.J.S.A. 40A:11-1 et seq. 0016a.  [...] did not appeal [...]’s ruling.  CREAMER’S STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS
[brief] Shortly thereafter, Plaintiffs filed a motion to enforce litigants rights.  In order to comply with the August 2020 Order requiring production of final decisions/settlement documents/resolutions, [...] performed a search of all records maintained by the [...] at its administrative office.  [...] also contacted outside counsel who had been retained by the Board to represent it before the Office of Administrative Law in regard to the special education matters at issue.  Pa56, Pa215.
[brief] 15, 27, 28, 30 Noonan v. Comcast Corp., 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 175549, 2017 WL 4799795 (D.N.J. Oct. 24, 2017) .................................................................  20 Novack v. Cities Serv. Oil Co., 149 N.J. Super. 542, 374 A.2d 89 (Law Div. 1977)  .........................................................................................
[brief] Worst of all, the first of the possible overt acts in furtherance of the conspiracy — that “defendant, [...], is alleged to have solicited [...] to cause bodily injury upon [...]” (Da 32; 13T 194-6 to 8) — is indistinguishable from the conspiracy itself.  The alleged agreement forming the basis for the conspiracy occurred when [...] asked, i.e. solicited, [...] to fight [...].  By instructing the jury that the conduct underlying the agreement could be the exact same conduct that constitutes the overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy, the court provided a path to a verdict that eliminated the necessary third element of a third-degree conspiracy: that the co-conspirators actually commit an act in the conspiracy beyond merely agreeing to commit a crime.
[brief] The Amended Application was first reviewed by the [...] (“[...]”)\(^5\).  Plaintiffs attended five [...] meetings – in September 2017, December 2017, July 2018, September 2018, and January 2019 – during which the [...] provided Plaintiffs with input and comments regarding the Amended Application.  --- \(^5\)  The [...] is a development application review committee designed to provide applicants with guidance on an applicant’s development proposal prior to a public hearing before the [...].  A representative of the defendant [...] was often present at the [...] meetings.  Throughout this time, Plaintiffs further revised their proposed plans several times in response to the guidance provided by the [...].  During these meetings, the [...] actively participated in discussions regarding the development of the Subject Property.  Further, during the meetings, the Township representatives and their professionals supported Plaintiffs’ revised variance proposal, i.e., Plaintiffs were led to believe that they would be permitted to proceed with their planned development while also complying with the 660-foot buffer provided in order to allow for a sufficient distance between development and the bald eagle’s nest.  Plaintiffs also requested to meet with the [...] to obtain his feedback on their Amended Application prior to the [...]’s public hearing on the application.  However, once the [...] meeting was scheduled and representatives of Plaintiffs arrived at the [...]’s office, they were informed that no such appointment was on the [...]’s schedule.  Plaintiffs attempted to reschedule the meeting with the [...].  However, soon thereafter, Plaintiffs received a telephone call from the Township’s attorney discouraging them from holding a meeting with the [...] and instead advising that they should continue with the above-described [...] meetings and follow the guidance provided therein.  Because there was no indication from the [...] that the revised plans, with the decreased amount of developable property and decreased development yield, would be unacceptable to the Township, the [...], the [...], or anybody else, Plaintiffs amended their proposal several times per the [...]’s suggestions, at great expense, assuming that the [...] was conducting such meetings in a good faith attempt to work with Plaintiffs in amending their proposal to address any concerns and protect the bald eagle’s nest.  R25.
[brief] \(^5\)  Point II of [...]’s brief complains about Paff’s holding, which is not the first time the [...]’s office has attempted to re-litigate Paff.  If [...] or the [...] wanted to weigh in, it could have filed amicus briefs at the Supreme Court.  They did not do so, and the Supreme Court’s decision is binding on this court.  There is no dispute that [...] knows precisely which records Plaintiff seeks because it located the responsive records.  In *Paff*, the Supreme Court found the request to be valid, but acknowledged that exemptions may apply to the responsive records.  The trial court in this case also acknowledged that exemptions may apply.  It ordered [...] to produce the responsive records, along with a *Vaughn* Index\(^6\) that explained any emails that are redacted or withheld.  (Pa45).  And it retained jurisdiction should Plaintiff challenge any of those redactions or denials.  This Court should affirm that order.
[brief] The Order must, respectfully, be upheld because [...] is entitled to judgment for its First Count for ejectment under N.J.S.A. 2A:35-1, as [...] was the record owner and is entitled to enjoy its ownership of the Property free and clear from [...]’s impingement.  “Common law ejectment in New Jersey has been replaced by a statutory remedy under N.J.S.A. 2A:35-1, entitling ‘[a]ny person claiming the right of possession of real property in the possession of another . . . to have his rights determined in an action in the Superior Court.
[brief] Conveyance of Land  1.  The Congregation is a non-profit religious organization that owns and operates a synagogue located at Lot 8, Block 69, commonly known as [...], in [...] (the “Congregation’s Property”).  (Da123-143)  2.  Defendant is a religious organization with a principal place of business located at the Subject Property, adjacent to the Congregation’s Property.  Id. 3.  Prior to Defendant’s purchasing the Subject Property in 2010, the Subject Property was owned by the [...].  Id. 4.  Prior to 1963, the [...] owned both the Subject Property and the Congregation’s Property and conducted Jewish religious services in the school operated on the Subject Property.
[brief] ”  See, e.g., Db1, 15, 20, 29, 36; compare Pb 20–22, 42 (discussing Department’s earlier invocation of “aggressive[ness],” not unprecedentedness).  But these two terms do not mean the same thing, and “unprecedented” is yet another undefined term—[...] still does not know what metric the Department uses here (are rates “excessive” when they are “unprecedented” temporally, procedurally, geographically, or otherwise?).  Fifth, as discussed supra § I.A, the Department equates excessiveness to anything that “trigger[s] alarms” or “red flags.
[brief] Ruling Admitting [...]’s Testimony ……………………..  15T:102-19 to 128-2  Ruling Admitting [...]’s Testimony …………………………  10T:34-16 to 42-6  Disqualification of Juror 115 …………………………………………………..  29T:21-1 to 27-6  Judgment of Conviction……………………………………………………………..  Da 15-18 | CASES | PAGE NOS. | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------| | Bond v. Commonwealth, 311 S.E.2d 769 (Va. 1984) | 17 | | Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993) | 27 | | Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923) | 29, 31 | | In re D.J.B., 216 N.J. 433 (2014) | 36, 39 | | In re Hyett, 61 N.J. 518 (1972) | 15 | | In re Kollman, 210 N.J. 557 (2012) | 39 | | In re T.P.D., 314 N.J. Super. 643 (Law. Div. 1997) | 36 | | Mason v. United States, 170 A.3d 182 (D.C. App. 2017) | 42 | | People v. Eberle, 265 A.D.2d 881 (4th Dep’t N.Y. 1999) | 17 | | Rubanick v. Witco Chemical Corp., 125 N.J. 421 (1991) | 29 | | State v. Andujar, 247 N.J. 275 (2021) | 37, 41, 43| | State v. Cain, 224 N.J. 410 (2016) | 14, 23 | | State v. Chun, 194 N.J. 54 (2008) | 29 | | State v. Doriguzzi, 334 N.J. Super. 530 (App. Div. 2000) | 30, 33 | | State v. Gomes, 253 N.J. 6 (2023) | 40 | | State v. Harvey, 151 N.J. 117, (1997) | 29, 32, 34| | State v. Hurd, 86 N.J. 525 (1981) | 29 | | State v. J.L.G., 234 N.J. 265 (2018) | Passim | | CASES (CONT'D.) | PAGE NOS. | |--------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------| | State v. J.R., 227 N.J. 393 (2017) | 28 | | State v. Jamerson, 153 N.J. 318 (1998) | Passim | | State v. Kelly, 97 N.J. 178 (1984) | 14, 28 | | State v. Olenowski, 2023 N.J. LEXIS 206 (2023) | 27 | | State v. Raso, 321 N.J. Super. 5 (App. Div. 1999) | 28 | | State v. Rochat, 470 N.J. Super. 392 (App. Div. 2022) | 30, 32, 35| | State v. Sosnowicz, 270 P.3d 917 (Ct. App. Ariz. 2012) | 16 | | State v. Torres, 183 N.J. 554 (2005) | 29, 30 | | State v. Tyler, 867 N.
[brief] \footnote{As the State recognized at the Wade/Henderson argument, even in Reid’s later interview, “she never identifie[d] the defendant. ”  (2T 11-2 to 12-25)  She only recognized the shooter as a man in the surveillance videos; she did not “pick” [...] in a lineup or photo array.  (Da 113)}  (Da 113, 155)  They did not take the first break until after about an hour and a half of questioning.
[brief] A: Award of Damages at Trial/New Trial/Relief from Judgment  To the extent Appellant’s post-trial motion is deemed a motion for new trial based on the weight of the evidence, a damages award below should only be set aside if it “shocks the judicial conscience. ”  Boryszewski v. Burke, 380 N.J. Super. 361, 392 (App. Div. 2005).  A review requires this Court to view all damages evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, with “deference given to the trial court’s feel for the case.
[brief] In 2015, the DEP amended the WQM Rules, seeking to “streamline” and “simplify” the planning process, including the Consistency Assessment.  As a part of these proposed revisions, the DEP “eliminate[d] the separate formal consistency determination review as part of the water quality planning process” and shifted this requirement to the permitting process, “when actual proposals and current conditions can be part of the decision making. ”  47 N.J.R. 2531(a) (Oct. 19, 2015).  The WQM rules as amended provide that The Department shall determine if a project or activity is located within an area eligible for sewer service as part of the Department’s review of a permit application.
[brief] ”\textsuperscript{135}  The two attorneys representing plaintiff certified to their significant experience with class action  \textsuperscript{130}  Hayworth v. Blondery Robinson & Co., 980 F.2d 912, 923 (3d Cir. 1992).  \textsuperscript{131}  Weisfeld v. Sun Chemical Corp., 210 F.R.D. 136, 140 (D.N.J. 2002).  \textsuperscript{132}  Baby Neal v. Casey, 43 F.3d 48, 58 (3d Cir. 1994).  \textsuperscript{133}  Weiss v. York Hosp., 745 F.2d 786, 809-10 (3d Cir. 1984).  \textsuperscript{134}  See Weisfeld v. Sun Chem. Corp., 210 F.R.D. 136, 140 (D. N.J. 2002)  \textsuperscript{135}  Weiss v. York Hosp., 745 F.2d 786, 809-10 (3d Cir. 1984).  representation, having certified many class actions.  14a-28a.  These attorneys: (1) have done extensive work identifying and investigating their claims; (2) have experience prosecuting consumer class actions; (3) have been designated as class counsel in state and federal courts; (4) are knowledgeable in class action and consumer law; (5) expended significant resources in representing the class, which evidences that they are willing to continue to do so.  14a-28a; 31a-110a.  Plaintiff certified to his interests being aligned with the other class members.  6a-10a.  As to these issues of attorney and lead class plaintiff sufficiency, defendant offered no contrary proofs.  613a-686a.  Therefore, adequacy is amply satisfied.  Rule 4:32(1)(b)(3) requires that the party proposing a class action establish that issues common to the class predominate over the individual issues of particular class members.
[brief] Based on my review, I am of the opinion that there exists a reasonable probability that the care, skill or knowledge exercised or exhibited by [...], [...], [...], [...], [...] and [...] fell outside acceptable professional treatment standards.  (Pa42)  Similarly, affiant, [...], RN, opines as to Helping Hand, “[b]ased on my review, I am of the opinion that there exists a reasonable probability that the care, skill or knowledge exercised or exhibited by [...], RN, [...], [...] and [...] fell outside acceptable professional treatment standards. ”  (Pa58)
[brief] Appellate Division  Richard J. Hughes Justice Complex  25 West Market Street, P.O. Box 006 Trenton, New Jersey 08625-0006  Re: [...] v. [...]; Docket No. [...] on Appeal from Docket No.: [...]; Orders 2/21/2019, 2/21/2019, 5/29/2019, 5/29/2019, 6/5/2019, 8/26/2019, 2/5/2020, 3/29/2022, 3/29/2022 & 4/26/2022 by the Honorable [...], J.S.C. in the Ocean County Superior Court – Chancery Division
[brief] TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CITED  State v. Acevedo, 205 N.J. 40 (2011)  .................................................................  3 State v. Haliski, 273 N.J. Super. 157 (App. Div. 1994)  ...........................................  3 State v. Njango, App. Dkt. No. A-1400-12T1 (Decided April 14, 2015)(Aa1-3)...
[brief] [...]: Yes.  THE COURT:  That's not your husband had current church – [...]:  No, he was employed as a musician there, as was the friend, and that's how they came into the conversation.  THE COURT:  So it's not like, your husband currently doesn't go to that church?  [...]: Correct.  THE COURT: And he's not a pastor there?  [...]: Correct.  We had our churches fellowship together so several times throughout the year, that's how he knows the family members of the victim.  THE COURT:  So how does that make you feel, do you feel that prevents you from being fair and impartial to – [...]: I do not.
[brief] See, e.g., Musto, 333 N.J. at 75 (finding “no abuse of discretion in the trial judge’s decision to award compound rather than simple interest”); Gleason v. Northwest Mortg., Inc., No. 96-4242, 2008 WL 2945989, at *4 (D.N.J. July 30, 2008) (exercising discretion to comply compound annual interest on equity grounds, so as to strike a balance between “hasten[ing] the accumulation of debt” and wrongfully punishing plaintiff by awarding “interest at a rock-bottom level”); Buck v. Consultants, Inc. v. Glenpointe Assocs., No. 03-454, 2010 WL 2104982, at *3 (D.N.J. May 25, 2010) (exercising discretion to apply compound interest in part because “it is reasonable to assume that a sophisticated business entity, such as [the prevailing party], would have deposited the withheld funds in a financial vehicle that earned compound interest”).  Neither Township of West Windsor v. Nierenberg, 345 N.J. Super. 472 (App. Div. 2001) nor AGS Computers, Inc. v. Bear, Stearns & Co., 244 N.J. Super. 1, 5 (App. Div. 1990), relied on by [...], requires a different analysis.  Nierenberg involved a condemnation action that implicated the interest standards of the Eminent Domain Act, N.J.S.A. 20:3-32, which are inapplicable here.  345 N.J. Super. at 478.  Nonetheless, the panel found no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s decision to award prejudgment interest at the prime rate compounded annually and deferred to the trial court’s factual findings.  *Id.* at 478-49.  The appellate panel in *AGS Computers, Inc.*, similarly acknowledged that “prejudgment interest is discretionary,” and in remanding the issue back to the trial court, did not “foreclose the judge from considering the appropriate rate of interest to award and the date or dates from which interest is to run.
[brief] ”  Rudbart, 127 N.J. at 353 (quoting Fivey v. Pa. R.R. Co., 67 N.J.L. 627, 632 (1902)).  “[C]ourts have generally found clickwrap agreements” like [...]’s “enforceable because ‘[b]y requiring a physical manifestation of assent, a user is said to be put on inquiry notice of the terms assented to. ’”  Santana, 475 N.J. Super. at 288–29 (alterations in original) (quoting Applebaum v. Lyft, Inc., 263 F. Supp. 3d 454, 465 (S.D.N.Y. 2017)); see also Wollen v. Gulf Stream Restoration & Cleaning, LLC, 468 N.J. Super. 483, 495 (App. Div. 2021) (“Consumer web-based contracts are no longer a novel concept.  Indeed, New Jersey courts have recognized the validity of such contracts for decades. ”).  These principles would be reduced to a nullity if the court were to embrace Plaintiffs’ view and hold that [...]’s objective and knowing manifestations of assent were not enough to form an enforceable contract.
[brief] 3 DepoLink Court Reporting & Litig. Support Servs. v. Rochman, 430 N.J. Super. 325 (App. Div. 2013) ................................................... passim Dewey v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 121 N.J. 69 (1990) .............................................................................. 6, 13 Gonzalez v. Wilshire Credit Corp., 207 N.J. 557 (2011) .............................................................................. 4, 8 Hoffman v. Asseenontv.Com, Inc., 404 N.J. Super. 415 (App. Div. 2009) ....................................................
[brief] Rule 3:9–3(e) provides:  If at the time of sentencing the court determines that the interests of justice would not be served by effectuating the agreement reached by the prosecutor and defense counsel or by imposing sentence in accordance with the court's previous indications of sentence, the court may vacate the plea or the defendant shall be permitted to withdraw the plea.  In determining whether to reject a plea bargain under Rule 3:9–3(e), a trial court has “wide discretion. ”  State v. Madan, 366 N.J.Super. 98, 108, 840 A.2d 874 (App.Div.2004).  “One reason for permitting wide discretion in the sentencing judge is that at the time a plea is entered the judge ordinarily has before him only the offense.  A fuller picture of the offender does not emerge until sentencing, when the judge has had the benefit of a defendant's presentence report. ”  State v. Brockington, 140 N.J.Super. 422, 427, 356 A.2d 430 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 71 N.J. 345, 364 A.2d 1077, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 940, 97 S.Ct. 357, 50 L. Ed.2d 310 (1976).  However, in determining whether to accept a plea bargain, a trial court is not limited to consideration of information in the presentence report that is contrary to representations made during the plea hearing.  State v. Daniels, 276 N.J.Super. 483, 487, 648 A.2d 266 (App.Div.1994), certif. denied, 139 N.J. 443, 655 A.2d 446 (1995); State v. Salentre, 275 N.J.Super. 410, 418–20, 646 A.2d 482 certif. denied, 138 N.J. 269, 649 A.2d 1289 (1994).
[brief] Using the totality of the circumstances test, our Supreme Court emphasized the factors to be considered, including a police officer’s “common and specialized experience,” and evidence concerning the area’s reputation for crime.  *State v. Moore*, 181 N.J. 40, 45-46 (2004).  Indeed, a “police officer charged with the duty of crime prevention and detection and protection of the public safety must deal with a rich diversity of street encounters with citizens. ”  *State v. Sheffield*, 62 N.J. 441, 446, cert. denied, 414 U.S. 876 (1973).
[brief] The lower court did not, as defendant now claims, fail to “make any explicit findings” with regard to the amount of restitution or defendant’s ability to pay.  Db34, 37.  Instead, the lower court relied upon defendant’s express concessions as to both the amount of restitution and his ability to pay, supported by defendant’s express plan with regard to future employment and defendant’s self-reported employment history.  In so doing, the lower court did not err, but instead followed this Court’s precedent of State v. Orji.  This Court should affirm.
[directive] If no payment schedule is established, the total is due forthwith.  If the offense occurred on or after February 1, 1993, a transaction (N.J.S.A. fee of up to $2.00 is to be paid on each occasion when a payment or installment payment is made 2C:46-1d.).  Enmendado 03/2007, CN: 10973-English-Spanish  Página 2 de 3 2 3  Revised: 03/2007, CN: 10973-English-Spanish Page of Condiciones normales de libertad a prueba de adultos / Standard Conditions of Adult Probation