ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] (Da226)  [...] knew about the factual allegations concerning both of [...]’s self-dealing transactions during Phase I (the AMF, and the $970,000 loan), but the Arbitrator did not allow Plaintiffs to formally challenge those acts in Phase I.  (Pa398-400)  All parties knew the value of the fiduciary duty claims exceeded the $1,000,000 during Phase I, even though the initial pleading did not specify a dollar amount.  (Da226).  [...] mischaracterizes Phases I and II by claiming Phase I was about the identity of the members of the LLC, and Phase II was about damages.  Db34.  All claims preexisted the Arbitration—which [...] asked the trial court to compel—but the substantive claims were stayed until Phase II pending the determination of control in Phase I.  [...] treats Phases I and II as separate arbitrations, when they were not; the phases were a procedural mechanism consented to by all parties regarding the order in which issues would be adjudicated.  Ibid.  Thus, [...] waived any argument that three arbitrators were required through his inaction during Phase I, and this Court should affirm.
[brief] (Da112)  After extensive litigation and a number of interlocutory orders, Defendant consented to a blood draw in lieu of a buccal swab, and the court entered a conforming order authorizing a blood draw on November 1, 2018.  (Da113-126)  On June 4, 2019, superseding Indictment Number [...] was issued, charging all three aforementioned defendants with the same twenty-six counts as in Indictment [...] and adding three certain persons counts against Defendant and [...] for possessing firearms contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:39-7(b).
[brief] BECAUSE THE IMPOSITION OF THE DISCRETIONARY PAROLE BAR VIOLATED ALLEYNE V. UNITED STATES, THE PAROLE DISQUALIFIER ON THE WITNESS-TAMPERING COUNT MUST BE VACATED.  IN THE ALTERNATIVE, BECAUSE THE SENTENCING JUDGE IMPOSED A DISCRETIONARY PAROLE BAR WITHOUT ARTICULATING ITS REASONS FOR DOING SO, RESENTENCING IS REQUIRED.  A.  The Imposition Of The Discretionary Parole Bar Violated Our State And Federal Constitutions.  B.  Alternatively, The Sentencing Judge Imposed The Discretionary Parole Bar Without Making The Requisite Findings, And Therefore, Resentencing Is Required.  Prior to oral argument, we requested the parties to submit supplemental briefs addressing the implications of our decision in State v.
[directive] An email to in in that effect should also be sent to the prosecutor's office.  The telephone and email address are included as part of the annual registration process so 2 prosecutors can obtain this information or can get updated information from parole officers for registrants on PSUCSL.  3 of  The prosecutor's initial tier classification and scope notification package is personally served the registrant by the prosecutors' office.  The court is not responsible for sending that on information.  2 •  Subsequently, court staff should provide the hearing information and instructions how to participate remotely via video or phone, regardless as to whether there on was any indication that the registrant was not participating.
[brief] ”  (See Da347-349)  Those post-divorce judgment email communications between Plaintiff [...] and her ex-husband clearly demonstrated that the}  The PSA was a sham PSA between the parties.  The new judgment was a result of a default judgment on the part of the husband resulting from an extensively litigated contested divorce.  The Court cannot now inject a different contract between the Plaintiff and Defendant attorneys for an uncontested divorce to make defendants pay legal fees for Plaintiff’s heavily contested divorce case.
[brief] By Resolution on November 19, 2018, (Da894) the Zoning Board ruled that such Lot 8 off-site parking use was not a permitted use and was not a valid pre-existing, nonconforming use on Lot 5.  (See, footnote 1).  After the Appellate Court remand, the School moved for an Order to Disqualify [...] (Da764) as per N.J.S.A. 2A:15-49 and R. 1:12-1.  That motion was denied by Order dated August 26, 2019.  (Da814)  A subsequent Motion for Reconsideration of that Recusal Request was also denied.  (Da891)  The Trial on remand commenced on January 28, 2020.  Initially, the Court heard arguments (6T4-18 to 62-4) on various Motions in Limine.
[brief] (AA0233-235)  Appellant’s Notice of Appeal clearly set forth that which the Respondent Commission ultimately held in its June 7, 2023 Final Administrative Action – that because [...] was ineligible, Appellant should be the first ranked eligible and Appellant needed to be appointed or removed from the List.  The Respondent [...] returned the completed Certification to Civil Service, without appointing Appellant or removing her name, and Appellant, who had been advised her December 23, 2022 Notice of Appeal was premature, as the Certification had not been returned to the Commission by the Sheriff’s Office re-filed her Notice of Appeal on February 10, 2023 (AA0235-236).
[brief] [...] did not report the dying declaration to police officers who responded to the scene.  (6T 43-20 to 25)  While [...] testified that the officers did not speak to him at the scene, a clip from a responding officer’s body-worn \(^3\) [...] McCullum will be referred to as [...] as he and his son share the same last name.  camera was played at trial during which the officer asked [...] what happened, and he said he did not know.  (9T 37-20 to 38-16, 54-17 to 55-3, 71-1 to 14)  An ambulance arrived, and [...] accompanied his son to the hospital.  (6T 44-7 to 14)  At the hospital, [...] spoke to two detectives and gave them his contact information; like with the responding police officer, [...] did not tell the detectives about the alleged dying declaration.  (6T 71-15 to 72-5)  Although [...] did not tell the detectives about the alleged dying declaration, Newark Police [...] testified that he did leave the hospital with the name “[...]” as the possible shooter.
[directive] As more fully explained in Section 11.4, a prosecutor is generally required by these Guidelines to use Special Application and Enhancement Feature D and must tender a plea offer that would require the defendant to plead guilty to an underlying Brimage-eligible offense and to the second-degree crime defined in N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4.1 whenever: (1) defendant’s conduct involved the actual or constructive possession of an assault firearm as defined in N.J.S.A. 2C:39-1(w) or a machine gun as defined in N.J.S.A. 2C:39-1(i); or (2) the defendant actually used or threatened the use of a firearm of any type (i.e., e.g., brandished, displayed or discharged a firearm) at any time during the course of committing a Brimage- eligible offense, or (3) a firearm of any type was found on the person or in the immediate control of the defendant at the time of the offense or arrest (e.g., in the defendant’s clothing, in a container being carried by the defendant, or in the vehicle).5
[directive] Allegation # 1 - Criminal Behavior (Simple Assault)  A review of the police reports and body worn camera (BWC) evidence, as well as interviews of the involved officers did not reveal sufficient evidence to sustain the simple assault charge.  The victim refused to cooperate with responding officers, the prosecutor or internal affairs detectives.  She declined medical attention on the night of the incident.  The Lieutenant’s statement was that the female victim attacked him and the marks on her body were the result his own self-defense.  Finding: Not Sustained Allegation # 2 - Criminal Behavior (Harassment)  The same evidence was considered on the charge of harassment by offensive touching.  Notably, the responding officers’ BWCs recorded the hysterical victim describing a physical altercation with an intoxicated [...], who was incensed when she rejected his advances.  It was difficult to determine the exact order of events during the altercation, but the evidence, including 5 the red marks on the victim’s face and arms, supports the charge that the physically larger [...] engaged in offensive touching harassment, if not simple assault.  Finding: Sustained Allegation # 3 - Conduct Unbecoming an Officer  In addition to the harassment of the victim, [...]’s behavior in telling the responding officers to leave the scene and then berating and insulting them throughout the process, as well as his disgraceful behavior outside his residence, which was witnessed by civilian neighbors, brings discredit to him and to the police department.  It fully supports the charge of Conduct Unbecoming an Officer.  Finding: Sustained Allegation # 4 - Failure to Follow a Direct Order
[brief] R. 6:3-4(a); N.J.S.A. 2A:18-53; Raji v. Saucedo, 461 N.J. Super. 166, 170 (App. Div. 2019); Alhagaly v. Mega Properties at 100-104 Romaine Ave., L.L.C., A-4287-19, 2021 WL 2944837, *3 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. July 14, 2021) (unpublished).  While Tenant did remit payment of the Rent Arrears, this was only done in accordance with N.J.S.A. 2A:18-55 so Tenant could avoid a Judgment of Possession.  (Da1-2).  Because Landlord did not seek, nor was it awarded, money damages in the Underlying Action whether Landlord reasonably mitigated its damages is irrelevant to this appeal.
[brief] But this Court has recently warned of the dangers of trial courts failing to embody their gatekeeping position to truly scrutinize the reliability of a technique, instead deferring to the fact that courts have admitted the evidence previously, making its future admission a fait accompli.  As now-[...] warned, “a long line of decisions uniformly in favor of a legal proposition suggests that a legal proposition is generally accepted.  We are mindful, however, that in science, the repetition of authority does not automatically establish reliability[.]”
[brief] Defendant relies on the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act to protect consumers.  Db28.  Defendant overlooks that the Act and its regulations prohibit sharing “nonpublic personal information” with “a nonaffiliated third party” until after providing the consumer with a certain notice.  15 U.S.C. § 6802; 16 CFR § 313.4(a)(2).  Among other things, that notice must (i) specify the type of nonpublic personal information collected, (ii) the categories of nonaffiliated third parties to whom such information is disclosed, and (iii) the consumer’s right to opt out of the disclosure of nonpublic personal information to nonaffiliated third parties.  16 CFR § 313.6.  There is nothing in the record demonstrating that Defendant provided an Act-compliant notice.
[directive] Post-Conviction of Form Any on While agency enforcement a law 4.5.2, subsection to pursuant provided otherwise as Except defendant while the committed was offense present if the acomplaint-warrant for apply shall a has defendant (i.e., offense persons disorderly or crime indictable other any for release on was or complaint-warrant by charged been had offense previous that whether charge), pending program supervision intensive probation, special probation, on while or complaint-summons, on or (PSL), life supervision for parole (CSL), life for supervision community parole, (ISP), 2C:43- N.J.S.A. by required as guilty pleaded had defendant the where (PTI) intervention pretrial appeal, or sentencing pending release on was defendant if or 98), c. 2015, P.L. (see 12(g)(3) Section with accordance in consulted general attorney deputy or prosecutor assistant an unless who 3.3.2 subsection pursuant to designated officer police supervisory a or Directive, this 3.2 of this of 4
[brief] Defendant also mentions that the trial court did not explain why he changed the parole bar from 30 to 42.5 years at the motion to correct defendant’s sentence.  (Db61).  Defendant forgets that 42.5 is the correct No Early Release Act calculation, and this was placed on the record during argument.  (37T:4-20 to 5-2, 5-24 to 6-4); N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2(a).  As for restitution, defendant never disputed the amount of restitution he was mandated to pay, and thus, there is no reason to hold an ability-to-pay hearing.
[brief] THE APPLICANT SUBMITTED ALL NECESSARY DOCUMENTATION TO OBTAIN SUBDIVISION APPROVAL.  [...] alleges that the Board permitted the Applicant to “ignore” aspects of the subdivision application and that the application for the subdivision was inadequate and lacking sufficient proofs for acceptance.  However, [...] again ignores the several documents submitted by the Applicant and the findings of the trial court.  The record shows that the Applicant provided all of the necessary documentation to obtain subdivision approval.  The application submitted by [...] on February 16, 2022, and supplemented on May 27, 2022, sought subdivision approval and also included a companion application for site plan approval.  Pa001-Pa077; Pa78-Pa119.  The overall submission contained all of the required reports and materials specified in the MLUL and the §§ 142-77 and 142-78.  Pa245.  Specifically, the submission included an EIS, Nosie Study, Storm Water Management Report, Traffic Impact Study and other utility improvement plans and reports.  Pa001-Pa077; Pa78-Pa119.  The applications were processed and reviewed by the Board Professionals concurrently.  The trial court appropriately found that the subdivision application stood on its own and the application provided sufficient evidentiary support in the record for the Board’s decision.  PA312-313.  Accordingly, the trial court properly determined that [...] failed to demonstrate that the Board acted arbitrarily, capriciously, and unreasonably in approving the subdivision approval and the trial court decision should be upheld.  **CONCLUSION**
[brief] Id. at 477.  N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.5(a) does not include a requirement that an uninsured motorist have a culpable state of mind and does not exempt motorists who have a good faith belief that they have medical expense benefits coverage.  In Hardy, supra, 198 N.J. 95, the Court interpreted another part of the Act, N.J.S.A. 39:6A-7(b)(2), which bars individuals from recovering PIP benefits if they were "occupying or operating an automobile without the permission of the owner or other named insured."
[brief] Had the court properly considered, found, and weighed the aggravating and mitigating factors, it would have found that the mitigating factors outweighed the aggravating factors, and it would have imposed something less than the twelve-year sentence given.  Moreover, at a resentencing, [...]’s family members – who were unable to attend his original sentencing due to his mother being hospitalized at the time – should be permitted to testify.  (9T:7-11 to 8-10)  **CONCLUSION**
[directive] Preliminary a is information additional as modified or clarified, supplemented, being to subject is and process investigation/prosecution.  ongoing an of course in the corroborated or learned of, lieu in to, not addition in be shall Report Incident Enforcement Preliminary Law  A to pursuant prepared subsequently reports) investigation or incident, arrest, police regular any the at or practices, customary and/or policy, procedure, operating standard agency's the request.  prosecutor's Directive.
[brief] The statute directs the court to correct any errors.  N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:23B-24(b) (“If an application made pursuant to subsection a. of this section is granted, the court shall modify or correct and confirm the award as modified or corrected. ”); Tretina Printing, Inc. v. Fitzpatrick & Assocs., Inc., 135 N.J. 349, 360 (1994) (“The clear implication . . . is that the Legislature intended that courts correct mistakes that are obvious and simple—errors that can be fixed without a remand and without the services of an experienced arbitrator. ”).  In denying [...]’s motion for modification, the Trial Court misstated the issues, concluding that the dispute is not a “mathematical error” but rather the “method of application of the interest rates to the parties’ award,” and highlighting the Arbitrator’s attempt to fix his interest miscalculations.
[directive] During either administrative or criminal investigations, generally workplace areas may be searched without a warrant.  The critical question is whether the public employee has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the area or property the investigator wants to search.  The determination of this expectation must be decided on a case-by-case basis.  There are some areas in a person's workplace where this privacy expectation can exist just as there are some where it does not.  Areas that several employees share or where numerous employees go to utilize files or equipment would present no expectation, or a diminished expectation, of privacy.  Included here would be squad rooms, lobby areas, dispatch areas, government- provided vehicles (patrol cars), general filing cabinets, etc.  7.8.5
[brief] Failure of Party to Attend at Own Deposition, per rule:  If a party or an officer, director, or managing agent of a party or a person designated under R. 4:14-2(c) or 4:15-1 to testify on behalf of a party fails to appear before the officer within this State who is to take his deposition, after being served with a proper notice, the court in which the action is pending on motion may make such orders in regard to the failure as are just, and among others it may take any action authorized under paragraphs (1), (2) and (3) of R. 4:23-2(b).  In lieu of any order or in addition thereto the court shall require the party failing to act to pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, caused by the failure, unless the court finds that the failure was substantially justified or that other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust.  The failure to act described in this rule may not be excused on the grounds that the discovery sought is objectionable unless the party failing to act has applied for a protective order as provided by R.4:10-3.
[brief] To clarify what is fact: • I worked 2 jobs and extra hours, to pay for their Room and Board at the University.  • I paid for all of their College Courses as they Matriculated from Freshman year to Senior Year, as well paid  • I paid for all of their curriculum Books each semester.  •  I paid for their Food while they were dorming at the University.  In addition, my two children had acquired Federal Student Loans, (da5-6) to assist with the balance of payments that was due to the University.  There is NO TRUTH in the statement that [...] ever made Payments in full, towards any part of their education, for either my son, or for my daughter, throughout their lifetime.
[brief] [...] – Standard of Care/Duty  Similar to Urban’s opposition, [...] also argues that the Plaintiffs failed to establish a standard of care applicable to [...] as the Inspector.  [...] presents three arguments: (a) Plaintiffs failed to establish a standard of care applicable to [...]; (b) [...] did not have a contractual duty to inspect for “pre-existing” conditions; and (c) the MUTCD does not provide a standard of care applicable to [...].
[brief] **Plaintiff’s employment with [...]**  Plaintiff began employment with [...] in August 2018 as a claim’s analyst, determining whether medical insurance claims were payable.  Pa199, PSOF ¶1.  In --- 2  In reference to the transcript of August 14, 2023.  this role, reported directly to [...] and [...].  Id., PSOF ¶2  Plaintiff was a good employee, who never received any written warnings during her employment with [...].  Id., PSOF ¶5 & 6.  **Plaintiff’s Health**  Plaintiff is a 5’9” female with a weight ranging between 250 and 350 pounds.  Pa200, PSOF ¶8.  Plaintiff’s Body Mass Index (BMI) and obesity was something “that came up a lot in conversation” at [...].  Id., PSOF ¶9.  Plaintiff’s weight was compounded by a back injury she sustained in 2018, which required surgery.  Id., PSOF 10  The injury led to paralysis in her right leg and foot nerve, referred to as “drop foot”.  Id.  In 2018, Plaintiff saw specialists with regard to her back injury and losing weight, testifying that “those things sort of intersected. ”  Id.  Since leaving her employment with [...], Plaintiff began treatment for her BMI which includes Semaglutide injections on a weekly basis.  Id., PSOF ¶12.  Plaintiff was diagnosed with high blood pressure sometime prior to 2018.  Pa201, PSOF ¶14  Plaintiff had a history of being more susceptible to respiratory infections, flu and sinusitis because of her underlying health conditions.  Id., PSOF ¶15.  Plaintiff was initially diagnosed with generalized anxiety sometime in or around 2008, when she was a teenager.  Id., PSOF ¶16.  Plaintiff treated for anxiety and grief between 2018 and 2019 at [...].  Id., PSOF ¶17.  After her termination from [...]  Plaintiff treated with psychiatrist, [...] for depression, anxiety, sleeplessness and worry.  *Id.*, PSOF ¶18.  Dr. Feit prescribed Plaintiff medication relating to same.  *Id.*  Plaintiff testified that she disclosed that fact that she suffered from anxiety, and previously treated for same, to Ms. Iannotti.
[brief] See 13T:65:18-20 (“Despite the defendant’s argument the plaintiff made money on the other units, which is irrelevant.  We are talking about this particular unit. ”)  [...]’s further statement (page 17 of his reply brief) that “[t]he fact that the unit has remained unrenovated and neglected for the past several decades was [...]’s choice” is ironic.  Not only is it false that the Unit was not improved, [...] remains critical about the Unit’s condition, complaining it was insufficiently improved at a monthly rent from $675 to $723.41, while also stating that capital improvements are disallowed to be accounted for in the owner’s equity for ensuring a “fair return”.  [...]’s apparent premise is that [...] should have invested more dollars to improve the Unit—but without any right to recover those costs under a rent increase application.  [...] next repeats that the Unit’s pro rata purchase price, $47,727 (525,000/11) in 1993 was improperly adopted because the Unit may not have been “equal in value” to the other units.  [...] continues to speculate that, in 1993, [...]’s Unit “may have been worth less” (page 8) because it was occupied by a protected tenant under the Tenant Protection Act who would be protected 10 years later if the Property was converted to a condominium.  However, [...] did not present any evidence to the Board that the Unit’s pro rata purchase price in 1993 was somehow unfair or that a different price should have been adopted.  Only in this Appeal does [...] speculate that price was unfair without even relying upon any competing price.  Indeed, [...]’s position has been that [...] is not entitled to any rent increase at all based upon a return-on-equity.  If [...] is entitled to a rent increase based upon a return-on-equity, [...] should not now be heard to complain that the purchase price is incorrect when it never advanced an alternative price.  [...]’s final argument that [...] acted to confuse the Board regarding [...]’s protected status is inexplicable.  The fact of [...]’s protected status was always known to the Board—indeed, if that was untrue, [...] would not have had to apply for a hardship rent increase under Hoboken’s rent control ordinance.  The parties have disputed the ramifications of [...]’s protected status regarding a hardship rent increase, but the fact of his protected status has been a given.  **REPLY TO BOARD’S BRIEF**
[directive] The Juvenile Justice Commission does not expect every facility to be in perfect compliance with these regulations.  In the real world, circumstances will arise that may lead to occasional violations of these regulations,  This can occur even when police staff are acting in the best interest and safety of juveniles.  Furthermore, facilities vary widely in size, age, and layout which impact directly on compliance issues.  Departments are also confronted with diverse juvenile populations and challenges, and respond to them with varying levels of staff availability and resources.  A reasonable goal is to aim for as much compliance as possible and to acknowledge obstacles that get in the way.  Isolated violations are not a significant concern.  However, wherever problematic situations lead to a pattern of violations in any particular lockup, Monitoring Unit staff will cooperatively engage personnel of that facility in an effort to resolve those situations.