ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] In Hopkins v. Fox & Lazo Realtors, 132 N.J. 426, 433 (1993), the Supreme Court indicated that the inquiry pertaining to the existence of a duty to maintain real property “should be not what common law classifications most closely characterize the relationship of the parties, but whether in light of the actual relationship between the parties under all of the surrounding circumstances, the imposition on the landowner of a general duty to exercise reasonable care in preventing foreseeable harm to visitors is fair and just. ”  Id., at 438.  “Whether the landowner owes a duty of reasonable care toward another turns on whether the imposition of such a duty satisfies an abiding sense of basic fairness under all of the circumstances in light of considerations of public policy. ”  Id. at 439.  This inquiry involves identifying, weighing, and balancing several factors, i.e., the relationship of the parties, the nature of the attendant risk, the opportunity and ability to exercise care, and the public interest in the proposed solution.  Id.  This analysis is very fact specific; it must lead to solutions that properly and fairly resolve the specific case and generate intelligible and sensible rules to govern future conduct.  Id.  The determination of whether a party owes a duty of reasonable care to another is to be made by the court.
[brief] “[F]ederal opinions, including district court decisions, may have significant persuasive effect. ”  *Jusino v. Lapenta*, 442 N.J. Super. 248, 252 (Law. Div. 2014) (quoting [...] & [...], *Current N.J. Court Rules*, Comment 3.5, on R. 1:36–3).  In *Dewey v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.*, 121 N.J. 69, 80 (1990), the Supreme Court instructed that, when construing federal statutes in the absence of binding precedent, judicial comity requires giving “due respect” for the decisions of the lower federal courts—particularly when the federal courts are in agreement.  Doing so helps “ensure uniformity” and “discourages forum shopping. ”  *Dewey*, 121 N.J. at 80.  *Loigman v. Kings Landing Condo. Ass’n, Inc.*, 324 N.J. Super. 97 (Ch. Div. 1999) is an example of applying *Dewey* to the interpretation of the FDCPA.
[brief] (10T 31-6 to 11, 31-12 to 19, 90-2 to 16)  They explained that “truthful” meant inconsistent with what they initially told the police that did not implicate [...], but consistent with their statements made months after the incident, after they had been charged and spent time in jail.  (10T 31-24 to 32-4, 32-8 to 13, 90-2 to 16)  [...] testified that on May 20, 2018, [...] called him, told him that [...] “got beat up[,] and he needed somebody to handle it. ”  (9T 75-12 to 20, 75-21 to 23; see also 10T 57-2 to 8)  [...] testified that “handle it mean[s] fighting. ”  (9T 76-1)  He testified that after getting the phone call from [...], he walked over to his mother’s house where he met up with [...] and [...].  (9T 76-8 to 77-24)  [...] testified that [...] had a “big red mark on her face,” and her cheek was swollen.  (9T 78-7 to 9, 79-13 to 14)  According to [...], [...] told him that he would pay him $40 if he went to [...]’s house to “mess him up” or “[b]eat him up.
[brief] (Pa12).  The County Counsel is a statutory position with a term of three years.  N.J.S.A. 40A:9-43 (“In every county the board of chosen freeholders shall appoint a county counsel .  . . .  The term of office of the county counsel shall be 3 years .  . . .”).  Notably, the Administrative Code expressly provides that the County Counsel “shall be permitted to conduct private law practices,” demonstrating a part-time intent for the role.
[brief] The Board concluded that the borough did not comply with the Administrative Code Sections applicable to a layoff and therefore there was a break in service.  [Pa54]  What if [...] was not a Civil Service jurisdiction?  Would the email notification be sufficient to satisfy the Board?  The very purpose of the Civil Service Act is to provide stability and fairness in public employment.  N.J.S.A. 11A:1-1 et. seq.  The Board’s decision to cling to the technical requirements of the Civil Service procedures undermines their very purpose.  The Board made the incorrect factual and legal conclusions that the appellant was terminated.  [Pa54-57]  The termination of a permanent or tenured Civil Service employee also has specific administrative requirements.  N.J.A.C 4A:2-2.2 (a) (I) [...] did not comply with the administrative requirements for termination.  A permanent Civil Service employee cannot be separated without the employer’s compliance with the Administrative Code.  N.J.S.A. 11A:9-9, N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.2 (a)(1)  [...] was a career permanent employee who could only be terminated for cause.  N.J.A.C. 4A:1-1.3  He essentially was a tenured employee entitled to Civil Service protection.  There was no consideration of these portions of the Administrative Code when the Board determined he was terminated and not laid off.
[directive] Raw Score (sum of Items scored 1)  _____  Number of Missing or Unknown (“?”)  Items  _____  Final Score (use Prorating Table if indicated)  _____  ODARA PRORATING TABLE  Only use if 1 or more Items are scored as missing or unknown (“?”), indicating the Item might be present but the available documentation or information is unclear or incomplete.  Note: The ODARA can be scored with up to 5 missing Items.  The ODARA cannot be interpreted if 6 or more items are scored as “?”  Note: If Raw Score is 7 or above, do not use the Prorating Table, and count the Raw Score as the Final Score.
[brief] In order to prevail on a breach of contract action in New Jersey, the “law imposes on a plaintiff the burden to prove four (4) elements: first, that ‘[t]he parties entered into a contract containing certain terms’; second, that ‘plaintiff[s] did what the contract required [them] to do’; third, that ‘defendant[s] did not do what the contract required [them] to do[,]’ defined as a ‘breach of the contract’; and fourth, that ‘defendant[s’] breach, or failure to do what the contract required, caused a loss to the plaintiff[s].’”  Globe Motor Co. v. Igdalev, 225 N.J. 469, 483 (2016) (citations omitted).  However, a nonparty to a contract cannot be liable for another’s breach without privity of contract.  FDIC Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Bathgate, 27 F.3d 850, 876 (3d Cir. 1994); Rieder Cmtys., Inc. v. Twp. of N. Brunswick, 227 N.J. Super. 214, 222 (App. Div.) (citations omitted), certif. denied, 113 N.J. 638 (1988).  Of the five contracts in dispute, the Court only held Defendant liable for breaching the [...] and the [...] because she “was legally part of it in this Court’s mind. ”  36T50-10 to 51-21.  However, Defendant was not a party to either of those contracts.  Da02701, Da2712.  Accordingly, the trial court clearly erred as a matter of law by holding Defendant personally liable for breaching contracts she was not a party to.  *Id.*; see *FDIC Deposit Ins. Corp.*, *supra*, 27 F.3d at 876 and *Twp. of N. Brunswick*, *supra*, 227 N.J. Super. at 222.  Moreover, the court made no factual findings regarding the elements of breach of contract that Plaintiffs established against Defendant.  Therefore, the Judgment against Defendant on Counts 7 and 8 of the Amended Complaint must be reversed as a matter of law.
[brief] ”  The only source of the “demolition work” exclusion is a CCIP “bound program” binder submitted to [...] that expired on February 28, 2014, well before the accident.  Pa2228.  This temporary insurance binder was ultimately replaced by the CCIP Policy, which did not include such an exclusion.  Still, according to the trial court, “demolition work” was apparently intended to be excluded from coverage.  While [...] acknowledges that certain early work done on the [...] retaining wall in August 2015 may have been intended to be excluded from coverage under the CCIP because it was deemed to be “demolition work,” [...] was still enrolled in the CCIP going forward, including at the time of the Hood accident.
[brief] THIS COURT SHOULD REVERSE THE TRIAL COURT’S SUPPRESSION OF EVIDENCE BECAUSE THE EVIDENCE WAS SEIZED PURSUANT TO A LAWFUL AND JUDICIALLY AUTHORIZED SEARCH WARRANT.  (Pa4; 1T11-4 to 25-24).  The State maintains that the trial court’s suppression of evidence in this case was erroneous for the reasons argued in the State’s August 30, 2024 amended brief.
[brief] Q.  So, do you disagree with the owners’ manuals warnings that the driver remains responsible for safely operating the vehicle?  A.  *Again, overall, I would say no.*  Pa186.5  Likewise, Plaintiff’s causation expert, [...] testified as follows:  Q.  Do you agree with me that these systems that we just spoke about, LDW, LKAS, and RDM, are driver-assist systems?  A.  They assist the driver in the driving task, yes.  Q.  The driver remains responsible for safely operating the vehicle and avoiding collisions, correct?  A.  Well, ultimately, these aren’t SAE Level 3 and above systems where what I call the robot has ultimate responsibility.  *Here, the human is the driver and in control of the vehicle.*  But these systems --- 5
[directive] SUBJECT: Directive  Revising Internal Affairs Policy & Procedures  Since 1991, the Attorney General’s Internal Affairs Policies & Procedures (IAPP) has established statewide standards for the operation of internal affairs units in New Jersey’s state, county, and local law enforcement agencies.  In December 2019, I issued Attorney General Law Enforcement Directive (“AG Directive”) No. 2019-5, which represented the most significant revision to IAPP in its three-decade history.  Today’s directive makes several minor edits to IAPP and formalizes a number of other policy changes implemented since AG Directive 2019-5 was announced last year.  Originally, AG Directive 2019-5 mandated that its revisions to IAPP would take effect on April 1, 2020.  Several months later, I ordered that the effective date of those revisions be delayed to August 31, 2020, as part of a broader effort to ease administrative burdens on law enforcement agencies at the height of the COVID-19 pandemic response.  See AG Directive 2020-2.
[brief] N.J.S.A. §2A:23A-18.  It is undisputed that all of the automobile insurance policies effective at the time services were provided and paid, for which Plaintiffs now seek recoupment, contain mandatory arbitration clauses requiring the submission of all disputes for medical expense benefits to alternate dispute resolution with [...].  The insurance policies under which Plaintiff now sues, which were all approved by the [...], require all health care provider assignees to submit any and all disputes under the plans to NAF/[...] arbitration.  It was a conscious decision by Plaintiffs to include mandatory alternative dispute language in their policies of automobile insurance and mandatory submission to alternate dispute resolution is permitted by statute.
[brief] The Court should affirm the judgment below because the trial court correctly granted summary judgment to the [...].  As the trial court ruled, the failure of plaintiff’s expert witnesses to provide any generally-accepted standards to support their opinions that the [...] caused water to run from their driveway onto plaintiff’s property rendered their testimony inadmissible net opinion.  Plaintiff also failed to raise any genuine issue of material fact to support his claim of trespass.  In addition, the Court should affirm the judgment below on three grounds that the [...] asserted below but that the trial court did not need to reach.  First, plaintiff failed to establish a claim of nuisance, because he failed to offer any legal basis to support his claim that the [...] made an unreasonable use of their land that by repaving their driveway and by replacing the railroad ties that lined their driveway with Belgian block.  Second, the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel bar plaintiff’s claims against the [...] for water runoff that plaintiff previously litigated in the Burke Action.  Third, plaintiff’s failure to apportion his damages between the preexisting water runoff and any alleged increase in water runoff that he attributed to the [...] was fatal to his claim, because plaintiff cannot recover any damages from the [...] for preexisting conditions.  I.  The Standard of Review is De Novo.  Because plaintiff appeals from a grant of summary judgment, the Court’s standard of review is de novo.  Templo Fuente De Vida Corp. v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co., 224 N.J. 189, 199 (2016).  II.  The Court should affirm the judgment below because the trial court correctly entered summary judgment in favor of the [...] (raised below at T60:17-68:12).
[brief] Respectfully submitted, [...]  MIDDLESEX COUNTY  PROSECUTOR  By: [...]  Assistant Middlesex County Prosecutor  NJ Attorney ID 123752014  Date: July 8, 2024 c/ [...], Esq.  Superior Court of New Jersey  Appellate Division  DOCKET NO. [...]  Criminal Action ON APPEAL FROM FINAL ORDER DENYING POST CONVICTION  RELIEF.  LAW  DIVISION  MIDDLESEX COUNTY  Sat Below: Honorable [...] J.S.C PRO SE BRIEF  [...] [...]  [...]  [...]  DEFENDANT IS CONFINED Contents  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES  ...........................................................................................................  ii  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS AND RULINGS BEING APPEALED .................................................. iv INDEX TO THE APPENDIX ....................................................................................................... iv PROCEDURAL HISTORY ......................................................................................................... 1 PRELIMINARY STATEMENT .................................................................................................... 1 STATEMENT OF FACTS .......................................................................................................... 2 A. December 8th, 2011 Robbery ............................................................................................. 3 B. December 19th, 2011 Robbery ......................................................................................... 5 C. January 5th, 2012 Robbery .............................................................................................. 6 D. January 12, 2012 Robbery ............................................................................................... 8 E. Michael's Post-Arrest Statements .................................................................................... 14 F. Co-defendant [...]' Trial Testimony and Post-Arrest Statement .................... 15 G. Cell-Phone-Records Evidence ......................................................................................... 22 H. Cell-Tower-Map Evidence .............................................................................................. 23 LEGAL ARGUMENT .................................................................................................................. 25 THE PETITIONER WAS DENIED HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL (U.S. CONST., (Amend. VI, XIV; N.J. Const., (1947), Art I, par. 10), AND BECAUSE HE WAS PREJUDICED THEREBY.
[brief] The first prong of N.J.R.E. 702 governing the admissibility of expert testimony requires that the intended testimony of the proposed expert concern a subject matter that is beyond the ken of the average juror.  N.J.R.E. 702(1).  The plaintiff contends that “the trial court abused its discretion in permitting [...] to testify about the location of the fall under the guise of expert testimony as no such expertise was required to provide this opinion. ” (Pb35).  It is the plaintiff’s position that [...]’s testimony “was essentially a lay interpretation of the video footage of the plaintiff’s fall that the jury was just as qualified to make on its own”.  (Pb40).  This is simply incorrect.  The admissibility of expert testimony turns not on whether the subject matter is common or uncommon or whether many persons or few have knowledge of the matter, but [on] whether the witnesses offered as experts have peculiar knowledge or experience not common to the world which renders their opinions founded on such knowledge or experience any aid to the court or jury in determining the questions at issue.  State v. Zola, 112 N.J. 384 (1988) (quoting Rempfer v. Deerfield Packing Corp., 4 N.J. 135, 141-42 (1950)).  Thus, the opinion of an expert can be admitted in evidence if the expert's testimony on such a subject would help the jury understand the evidence presented and determine the facts, it may be used as evidence.  State v. Odom, 116 N.J. 65, 70–71 (1989), abrogated by State v. Cain, 224 N.J. 410 (2016).  In the present case, [...] offered his opinion as to the location of the plaintiff’s fall in line with his qualifications as a forensic engineer and human factors expert.
[brief] N.J.A.C. 11:3-5.1 ......................................................... 8, 12, 25 N.J.S.A. 17:33A-7(a) ..................................................... 2, 21, 26 N.J.S.A. 17:33A-7(b) .....................................................  21 N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4 ........................................................ passim N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4(a) .......................................................  6 N.J.S.A. 39:6A-5.1 .........................................................  7, 8, 9, 25 N.J.S.A. 39:6A-5.1(a) .................................................... 5, 6, 11, 26 N.J.S.A. 39:6A-5.1(c) ....................................................  5, 10 N.J.S.A. 52:14B-1 ........................................................  13, 17 N.J.S.A. 52:14B-4(a)(1) ..................................................  13  N.J.S.A. 52:14B-4(a)(3) ..................................................  13  N.J.S.A. 52:14B-4(d) ....................................................  13 R. 2:10-5 .................................................................  28 R. 4:35-1 .................................................................  27  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
[brief] See State v. S.S., 229 N.J. 360, 374-81 (2017) (clarifying the limited scope of appellate review of factual findings based on video evidence, but declaring that “[a]ppellate courts have an important role in taking corrective action when factual findings are so clearly mistake – so wide of the mark – that the interest of justice demand intervention”); see also State v. A.M., 237 N.J. 384, 395-96 (2019).  This is insufficient proof that he knowingly and voluntarily consented to their search into the dwelling.  Wearing garb that identified him as a law enforcement officer, [...] knocked on the door with several other officers assembled behind him.
[brief] ARGUMENT POINT I THE HOLDING COMPANY ACT APPLIES TO RECIPROCAL EXCHANGES  New Jersey’s statute governing insurance holding company systems, the Holding Company Act, was enacted in 1970, 25 years after the Reciprocal Exchange Act.  L.1970, c. 22 (N.J.S.A. 17:27A-1 to -14).  Its plain language leaves no doubt that reciprocal exchanges fall within its scope.  The Holding Company Act defines “insurer” as “any person or persons, corporation, partnership or company authorized by the laws of this State to transact the business of insurance . . . in this State. ”  N.J.S.A. 17:27A-1(e).  The fact that the definition does not enumerate “reciprocal exchanges” does not signify an intent to omit those entities.  The definition does not enumerate any specific type of insurance carrier.
[brief] (Ibid.)(Da3255)  The Court decides fair value case-by-case and is fact sensitive.  Sipko v. Rogers, 251 N.J. 162, 182 (2022).  In addition, “[w]hether the corporation's fair value should be reduced by a marketability discount or any other discount is part and parcel of the fair value determination. ”  Ibid. (emph. added).  Moreover, a discount is reviewed de novo.  "We need not give deference to the trial judge's determinations of what discounts or premiums the determination of fair value may include, or must exclude, since they are questions of law."  Id. at 179.  In determining fair value here, a Court clearly has full power to make an adjustment for whatever Plaintiffs had put on [...]’s books as liabilities that resulted a discount to equity.  That is part and parcel of the valuation process.  The Court certainly had the power to disregard a ‘liability’ imposed by Plaintiffs for their personal legal fees where discounted [...]’s equity value, in a valuation hearing.  Sipko, supra.
[brief] Furthermore, beneath the POA language is an excerpt of a signed and sealed corporate resolution of the surety company.  In the section of the corporate resolution entitled, “Certificate of Designation,” authority is granted by the President of [...], to its Assistant Secretary, [...], to appoint attorneys-in-fact as follows:  The President of the Company, acting pursuant to the bylaws of the Company authorizes [...] Assistant Secretary to appoint such attorneys-in-fact as may be necessary to act on behalf of the Company to make, execute, seal, acknowledge and deliver as surety any and all undertakings, bonds, recognizances and other surety obligations.  ³  [Footnote 1 of the POA reads: Affiliates, [...] and [...], are also named in the POA.  In construing the overall intent and import of this document, [...] reviewed the limiting language imprinted on the header of the POA form stating that [...] has “no authority to bind the Company except in the manner and to the extent stated” together with her specific appointment to “sign, execute and acknowledge the following surety bond:… [...]” that is, the identification number assigned to the Proposal Bond.  Contrasting this with the full extent of [...]’s more expansive authority to appoint attorneys-in-fact to deliver the more expansive categories of “any and all undertakings, bonds, recognizances and other surety obligations” it is obvious that the attorney-in-fact’s authority was circumscribed and limited only to the issuance of the specifically referenced Proposal Bond.
[brief] The issuance of the Tyler decision on May 25, 2023, does not provide a basis upon which the Defendant can file a motion for reconsideration of the June 8, 2023 Kemp decision 9 months later.  Lastly, affirming the April 26, 2024 Order denying reconsideration is appropriate because the Defendant is prohibited from asserting arguments related to Tyler since he failed to raise them before the Appellate Division.  Since Tyler was decided on May 25, 2023, and the Appellate Division did not issue its opinion until June 8, 2023, the Defendant could have filed a supplemental submission asserting his Tyler arguments pursuant to R. 2:6-11(d)(1).  However, Defendant’s Tyler claims are deemed waived since they were not raised on appeal.  See Green Knight Capital, LLC v. Calderon, 469 N.J. Super. 390, 396 (App. Div. 2021) (“[a]n issue not briefed on appeal is deemed waived”).  Moreover, although Defendant was precluded from raising new legal arguments in his untimely second and post-appeal motion for reconsideration, neither Tyler nor Roberto provide the Defendant with automatic entitlement to relief from the four (4) year old Final Judgment.