ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The trial court rightly found that this Court’s decision in Plemmons v. Blue Chip Insurance Services, Inc., 387 N.J. Super. 551 (App. Div. 2006), is dispositive.  Thus, the decision below should be upheld.  Plaintiff [...], M.D. (“Plaintiff”) seeks reversal contending that Plemmons was overruled or superseded by Shaw v. Shand, 460 N.J. Super. 592 (App. Div. 2019).  But Shaw, a case about a home inspector, cannot upend this Court’s analysis or conclusion in Plemmons nor displace Plaintiff’s repeated assertions in his Complaint that Defendants are “professionals. ”  This appeal presents an issue that this Court has already decided, and Plaintiff has not provided special justification for deviation.  As such, the trial court’s decision should be affirmed.  To the extent this Court is inclined to reengage in a “nature of the services” analysis, this Court and Plaintiff have already recognized that the insurance brokerage services [...] and [...] provided are beyond the pale of the CFA.
[brief] Pursuant to the terms of the Lease, Tenant’s failure to pay any amount due and owing under the Lease constitutes an Event of Default entitling Landlord to, inter alia, regain possession of the Premises.  (Da50-53, Lease at § 17.01).  In addition, Landlord is entitled to recover from Tenant its reasonable attorneys’ fees in connection with enforcing its rights and remedies under the Lease, including pursuing eviction proceedings against the Tenant.  (Da56, Lease at § 17.06).  These amounts constitute Additional Rent due and owing under the Lease.  (Da14, Lease at § 2.01(d)).
[brief] Troy Hills Vill. v. Twp. Council of Parsippany-Troy Hills, 68 N.J. 604, 629 (1975).  However, there may be certain “atypical cases” where rent levels may still, “drive inefficient operators out of the market and may preclude persons who have paid inflated purchase prices for buildings from recovering a fair return. ”  Id. at 628.  In essence, rent increases on rent-controlled units cannot be, “so high as to defeat the purposes of rent control nor permit landlords to demand of tenants more than the fair value of the property and services which are provided. ”  Id. at 629.  [...]’s requested hardship increase does not achieve the above required balance.  On the contrary, since it would raise [...]’s rent to the point of being completely unaffordable to low- and moderate-income residents in the region, it would ultimately defeat the purposes of rent control in general and specifically Hoboken’s RCO—i.e., the maintenance of affordable housing in the City.
[brief] Plaintiff apparently filed the motion to seal in error and withdrew the motion.  (Da287).  On March 27, 2024, the Appellate Division issued a scheduling order with Plaintiff’s appellate brief due on May 13, 2024.  (Da287).  In a continuance of his longstanding pattern, Plaintiff requested and received multiple extensions of time to file his brief.  (Da287).  In a continuance of another longstanding pattern, Plaintiff’s brief and appendices were deficient.  (Da284-287).  In total, Plaintiff received three deficiency letters from the Appellate Division before his brief and appendices were finally accepted as compliant.  (Da284-287).  III.
[brief] ’”) and *N.J.A.C.* § 10:44 A-2.7(a)(“’Basic staff training…shall address, at a minimum…(2)medication training; (3)preventing abuse and neglect…’”).  (PA000006-PA000008).  Overall, these regulations have an ultimate purpose of “establish[ing] minimum requirements…of residential services to people with developmental disabilities. ”  *N.J.A.C.* § 10:44 A-1.1.  Certainly, by Plaintiff complaining about the constant understaffing and frequent movements of individuals from one understaffed facility to another “closely related” to *N.J.A.C.* § 10:44A-2.8(b) requirements because the reduction in staff coverage needed prompt justification in writing and approval by several authorities before implementing the coverage.
[brief] Ca22.  In addition, on November 4, 2021, an order was entered in the foreclosure action appointing [...] as a special master to sell the diner and other foreclosed property.  Ca145.  On January 18, 2022, [...] conducted a sale, and the foreclosed property was sold to [...] (“[...]”), a Bank subsidiary.  Ca150.  On March 30, 2022, [...] moved to intervene in this matter to sue [...] and to compel an accounting and payment of rent.
[directive] 1.1  The policies and standards established in this Policy are designed to help police departments achieve an optimal balance between potentially competing interests.  For example, it is necessary to balance the need to promote police accountability and transparency on the one hand, against the need to respect the privacy interests of persons whose images and home interiors will be captured in a BWC recording on the other.  So too, it is necessary to balance the benefits achieved by electronically recording evidence that might help to solve a crime and successfully prosecute an offender against the costs incurred if a BWC were to chill a victim or witness from providing a BWC-equipped officer with information necessary to solve a crime and convict the offender.  1.2  New Jersey now requires police departments and agencies to employ BWCs in their daily law enforcement functions.  And while P.L. 2020, c. 128 & 129 provide the basic framework for BWC use, this Policy seeks to provide additional guidance for the requirements that all departments must now satisfy.  Law enforcement agencies are nonetheless expressly authorized to impose additional requirements beyond—but not inconsistent with—those established in this Policy.  In this way, police agencies are afforded an opportunity to tailor their BWC policies and procedures to address local concerns and needs.  1. 3  Although police executives are afforded some flexibility in developing departmental policies and practices that address local needs and community concerns, this Policy makes clear that all policies must limit the discretion of individual officers in the field.  The decision to activate a BWC must be based on objective criteria (e.g., the initiation of a specified type of police action, such as a consensual field inquiry, or the start of an officer’s duty shift).  Furthermore, in any circumstance where an officer is afforded discretion in deciding whether to de-activate a BWC, the reasons for exercising that discretion must be documented to permit supervisory review.  BODY WORN CAMERA POLICY | May 2021
[brief] *Thus, regardless of who maintains the files, the fact that [...] "makes" the CDR-Is means that it can be called upon to disclose those government records. ”*  Simmons v. Mercado, 247 N.J. 24, 41 (2021)  [emphasis added]  The trial court ruling and the [...] position simply cannot be squared with this unambiguous analysis.  A government record is a such because it was made, or maintained or kept on file by a government official in the course of government business or received by a government official in the course of government business.  There is no requirement that the agency that is the subject of the OPRA request “make and maintain” or “receive and maintain”.  If the record was made in the course of government business that is enough to require production.  If the record was received in the course of government business that is enough to require production.  Then, echoing the exact same concerns pointed out by the appellate division way back when in Burnett v. Gloucester County, 415, N.J. Super.  506, 517 (App. Div. 2010)\(^2\), the Court doubled down on refusing to provide any avenue for government officials to game OPRA and obstruct an informed citizenry….  “Were we to engraft upon OPRA an exception for when a government agency has created but no longer maintains a record, it would create a perverse incentive for officials to relinquish electronic records to a third party in order to prevent their public disclosure. ”  Simmons v. Mercado, 247 N.J. 24, 42 (2021)  The contention that the [...] does not maintain the email accounts in question and thus does not control the accounts from where the logs would \(^2\) “Were we to conclude otherwise, a governmental agency seeking to protect its records from scrutiny could simply delegate their creation to third parties or relinquish possession to such parties, thereby thwarting the policy of transparency that underlies OPRA. ”  emanate cannot be given any credence.  It is not logically possible that the position could be so roundly condemned and then relied upon here to defend against disclosure - or even having to look for the records.  The purpose in enacting OPRA was "to promote transparency in the operation of government."
[brief] Weinberg involved a lawsuit filed by the owner of an apartment building against a water company in which the owner alleged that the water company was negligent in failing to provide adequate water pressure to extinguish a fire.  Id. at 472.  There, the Supreme Court addressed the narrow issue of whether the “longstanding New Jersey rule immunizing private companies from liability for their negligence in failing to provide to fire hydrants water pressure of sufficient force to extinguish a fire” should be upheld.  Id.  The Court ultimately ruled that it should not and held “that private water companies are no longer immune from such liability, except with respect to subrogation claims asserted by fire-insurance companies. ”  Id.  That holding is entirely inapplicable to the facts of the instant case, where the relevant question is whether a public electric utility has a duty to provide adequate lighting at intersections.
[brief] A career in law enforcement that spans 22 years should not end based on the above facts.  Indeed, the [...] ostensibly felt the same when requiring the ALJ to provide “further support” for his original decision.  (Pa156).  The ALJ responded by issuing a nearly identical opinion.  This was shocking considering that the [...] maintains final decision-making authority.  See *In re Kallen*, 92 N.J. 14, 20 (1983) (“An agency head has the exclusive right to decide contested cases in administrative hearings.”); see also *N.J. Election Law Enf’t Comm’n v. DiVencenzo*, 451 N.J. Super. 554, 566 (App. Div. 2017) (“ALJs have no independent decisional authority.
[brief] [...] noted that in light of the special duties of a municipal prosecutor, some of the factors were inapplicable to the analysis and while a few minor factors led toward independent contractor, the weight of the other factors, when considered as a whole, and in the appropriate context, supported the conclusion that [...] was not an independent contractor and rather an employee within the meaning of N.J.S.A. 43:15A-7.2(b).  Overwhelming evidence adduced at the OAL Hearing by both Petitioner, and the witnesses called by the Respondent, demonstrates Petitioner was an employee of [...] as its municipal prosecutor from 2015 to the present.  Under the “IRS 20 Factor Test”, even Respondent concedes that four of the Factors are indicative of employee status and eight of the other sixteen Factors or half are not strong indicators of independent contractor status.  Since 2010, [...] has consistently determined Petitioner was an employee entitled to be enrolled in PERS except when they were directed by the Board to remove Petitioner from PERS in 2009.  Except for perhaps one or two of the 20 Factors, Petitioner’s testimony, supported by [...] and largely uncontradicted at the time of the OAL Hearing, strongly favors employee status.  The Respondent’s investigator had to concede that most, if not all, of the sixteen Factors they found were indicative of independent contractor status were not based upon proper information.
[brief] .............................................................................................................  1  I.  DEFENDANTS ADOPT THE SAME FLAWED ANALYSIS USED BY THE LOWER COURT TO GRANT DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT.  .................................................................................................................  1  A.  The Defendants Failed to Consider Settled Case Law  Establishing that Genuine Issues of Material Fact Concerning the Parties’ Relationship Must Be Resolved by the Jury.  ...........................................................................................................  2  B.  The Evidence Demonstrates that Defendants Knowingly Undertook the Representation of [...]’s Interests in the Will Contest.  .................................................................  8  II.  THE COURT CANNOT CONSIDER THE ISSUE OF PROXIMATE CAUSATION AS IT WAS NOT RAISED BELOW.  ........................................................................................................  9  CONCLUSION .......................................................................................................................  11
[brief] ”  Da310 [emphasis added].  The [...] also states, “The Seawall Project included --- 2  To clarify, the [...] was the subject of two (2) separate orders: the January 28th, 2022 Order barred those aspects of the [...] which relied upon off-site conditions, i.e. the “pocket” (Da446); and the October 7, 2022 Order barring the remainder of the [...] as a net opinion (Da505).
[brief] In evaluating a tip from a confidential informant, courts typically look at three factors: (1) testimony about the reliability and veracity of the informant, see State v. Smith, 155 N.J. 83, 93-94 (1998); (2) testimony that the informant has a reliable basis for knowing that the particular criminal activity is occurring, id. at 94-96; and (3) independent corroboration of the informant’s information by the observations of law enforcement, see State v. Rodriguez, 172 N.J. 117, 127-28 (2002).  While these three factors are the frequent focus of the analysis, ultimately, the test for how much weight should be attributed to an informant tip remains a totality-of-the-circumstances analysis.
[brief] However, [...] himself stated that the design waivers requested were not testified to as being a hardship.  (4T721-23)  As previously discussed, the “hardships” cited by the applicant were purely economic in nature.  While the applicant could have presented a fully conforming subdivision with fewer lots, it chose to present a non-compliant subdivision with more proposed lots simply for profit.  The applicant failed to provide the requisite hardship proofs and as such the Board’s decision to deny the application was not arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable, and further, the Court overstepped its authority in ordering the approval of the application.
[brief] (Pa37).  At its January 18, 2017 meeting, the Board denied [...]’s request for an intra-fund transfer from the [...] to [...].  (Ra18-19).  The denial was based on a determination by [...], the then-acting director of the [...], that there were no material changes in [...]’s duties and the attempt to allow [...] to convert her status from independent contractor to employee via an ordinance violated the very purpose of Chapter 92.
[brief] [...] (Appellant) was hired to work at the [...] in September of 2016.  (Pa1, Complaint, par. 12-14).  Appellant interviewed for the position of Vice Principal for an elementary school within the [...] but was invited by [...] (Redler), Principal of [...] to come and work with him because Redler was impressed with Appellant’s work history and wanted her to work at [...].  (Pa195)  Appellant was interviewed by Redler on October 13, 2016; Appellant was then interviewed by [...] on October 14, 2016.  (Pa193, Pa194)  The interviews were rated and Appellant learned that she had received ratings of very good and excellent on the interviews.  (Pa193 Smith Interview Ratings)  Appellant had worked in a variety of roles in the education field and as a result had a wealth of experience working in administrative and supervisory positions.  (Pa211, Smith Dep. Transcript, T42:4-17, T48:8-9, T50:11-25, T51:1-11)  Appellant spent a number of hours at the [...] working to enhance the educational experience for the students and provide support for the staff.  (Pa196, Smith Answer to Interrogatories, par. 7)  Appellant received evaluations with the rating of effective.  (Pa298)  The school environment was positive until January of 2019 when the Appellant had to address the statements and behaviors of some of the Caucasian teachers who engaged in actions that were discriminatory towards the students in their classes.
[brief] "Defendants twice exercised their statutory right to an adjournment of the sale date."  Wells Fargo Bank v. Carrano, DOCKET NO. [...], 3 (App. Div. Dec. 30, 2020)  “Under Section 1983, federal courts have found that a plaintiff is deprived of a right at the point a government official denies a plaintiff a permit or other authorization to exercise a right, even though judicial relief is later secured, and the plaintiff freely exercises the right without any interruption.
[brief] State v. Case, 220 N.J. 49 (2014) ................................................................. 34  State v. Clark, 251 N.J. 266 (2022) .................................................................. 12  State v. Dabas, 215 N.J. 114 (2013) .................................................................. 49  State v. Dalziel, 182 N.J. 494 (2005) .................................................................. 37, 39  State v. Dangcil, 248 N.J. 114 (2021) .................................................................. 31  State v. Di Paglia, 64 N.J. 288 (1974) .................................................................. 22 State v. Engel, 249 N.J. Super. 336 (App. Div. 1991) ........................................... 17, 20, 22, 24 State v. Feaster, 156 N.J. 1 (1998) .................................................................. 24 State v. Frost, 158 N.J. 76 (1999) .................................................................. 17, 18, 24 State v. Fuentes, 217 N.J. 57 (2014) .................................................................. 34, 35, 41 State v. Galicia, 210 N.J. 364 (2012) .................................................................. 12 State v. Garcia, 195 N.J. 192 (2008) .................................................................. 43, 44 State v. Haines, 20 N.J. 438 (1956) .................................................................. 43 CASES State v. Hogan, 144 N.J. 216 (1996) ................................................................. 47 State v. Jenewicz, 193 N.J. 440 (2008) .................................................................. 21 State v. Johnson, 203 N.J. Super. 127 (App. Div. 1985) ........................................... 42, 46, 47 State v. Kromphold, 162 N.J. 345 (2000) ..................................................................
[brief] A review of the recorded documents in Defendants’ chain of title from when [...] took title to Lot 3 forward unequivocally demonstrates:  (1)  [...] acquired Lot 3 by the 2010 [...] Acquisition Deed, then including 105’ of frontage on 21st Street South and 110.69’ of frontage on the public alley, Ja65-67; _____________________  8
[brief] (Da125-126).  10.6  Additional Remedies.  The rights and remedies of any Member or Manager hereunder shall not be mutually exclusive.  ...  [N]othing herein contained is intended to, nor shall it limit or affect, any other rights in equity or any rights at law or by statute or otherwise of any party aggrieved as against the other for breach or threatened breach of any provision hereof, it being the intention of this Section ... to make clear the agreement of the parties hereto that their respective rights and obligations hereunder shall be enforceable in equity as well as at law or otherwise.
[brief] As to “reasonable doubt” specifically, “reasonable-doubt instructions must be considered in their entirety. ”  State v. Medina, 147 N.J. 43, 51-52 (1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1190, cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1214 (1997).  “Only those instructions that overall lessen the State’s burden of proof violate due process. ”  Id. at 52.  Here, the trial judge instructed the jury that defendant was presumed innocent, that the State had the burden to prove each element of each crime beyond a reasonable doubt, and that the State’s burden never shifted to defendant.
[brief] The standard of review of a trial court’s factual findings is one of deference, requiring that the facts as found are supported by adequate competent evidence.  While the trial judge’s factual findings are considered binding on appeal, the findings must be supported by substantial and credible evidence.  As articulated in *Rova Farms Resort v. Investors Ins. Co.*, 65 N.J. 474, 483-484 (1974), [The appellate division does] not disturb the factual findings and legal conclusions of the trial judge unless [it is] convinced that they are so manifestly unsupported by or inconsistent with the competent, relevant and reasonably credible evidence as to offend the interests of justice…and the appellate court therefore ponders whether, on the contrary, there is substantial evidence in support of the trial judge’s findings and conclusions.  When an appellant claims that the judge erroneously granted an order for judgment, the issue for the trial judge and the appellate court is the same: could the evidence, together with legitimate inferences that can be drawn from it, sustain a judgment in favor of the party opposing the application for judgment?  *Dolson v. Anastasia*, 55 N.J. 2, 5 (1969).  The appellate court reviews the trial court's determinations, premised on the testimony of witnesses and written evidence at a bench trial, in accordance with a deferential standard.  The appellate court needs only to decide whether the findings made could reasonably have been reached on “sufficient” or “substantial” credible evidence present in the record, considering the proofs as a whole.  The court gives “due regard” to the ability of the factfinder to judge credibility.  *In re Adoption of Amend. To Northeast Water*, 435 N.J. Super. 571, 583-584 (App. Div. 2014).  Final determinations made by the trial court sitting in a non-jury case are subject to a limited and well-established scope of review: “we do not disturb the factual findings and legal conclusions of the trial judge unless we are convinced that they are so manifestly unsupported by or inconsistent with the competent, relevant and reasonably credible evidence as to offend the interests of justice[.]”  *Seidman v. Clifton Sav. Bank, S.L.A.*, 205 N.J. 150, 169 (2011)(quoting *In re Trust Created by Agreement Dated Dec. 20, 1961, ex rel. Johnson*, 194 N.J. 276, 284 (2008)); *accord Rova Farms*, supra, 65 N.J.at 483-484.  Questions of law are decided de novo and a trial court’s interpretation of the law and the legal consequences flowing therefrom is not entitled to any special deference.  *Manalapan Realty v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan*, 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995).
[brief] 21 C.F.R. § 7.42 ......................................................................................................................20-21  FDA’s Regulatory Procedures Manual ..............................................................................19-21  Other Authorities  66 A.L.R.2d 1082 ..................................................................................................................38-39  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS, AND RULINGS  Order Denying [...]’s Motion for Summary Judgment…………………………Da0785  Order Denying [...]’s Motion to Exclude the Testimony of Plaintiff’s Experts and for Summary Judgment………………………………………Da0816  Order Denying [...]’s Motion for Reconsideration of the Orders Denying [...]’s Motions for Summary Judgment…………………………Da0846  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT  This Court should reverse the decision below because it is founded on the erroneous notion that if there has been a product recall—no matter the import, extent, or nature of the recall—a product-liability defendant can never secure summary judgment and the case automatically goes to trial.