ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] Fitness for Duty  2.4.1  One of the areas that often involves internal affairs is an employee's fitness for duty.  This is not exclusively an internal affairs issue; an officer's fitness may be impacted for reasons other than misconduct.  For instance, an officer may become unfit for duty because of a medical problem unrelated to the job.  There are occasions, however, when internal affairs may be called upon to assist in determining whether or not an officer is fit for duty.  2.4.2  It is incumbent upon a law enforcement agency to ensure that its members are fit to safely and effectively perform the duties of their profession.  If, for whatever reason, an officer's fitness for duty is questioned, the agency must have the officer evaluated by competent professionals to answer that question.  If a law enforcement executive, commander, supervisor or internal affairs investigator has reasonable concerns about an officer’s fitness for duty, they are obligated to begin the process necessary to obtain that evaluation.  If the officer in question is obviously unfit for duty, the officer in authority may effect an immediate suspension pending the outcome of the evaluation and investigation.  See Section 5.2 (“Immediate Suspension Pending Investigation and Disposition”).  2.4.3  At the same time, law enforcement work places an extraordinary mental and emotional toll on officers, and all officers must be free to seek treatment and support that enables them to cope with those pressures.  Accordingly, under no circumstances shall an officer face any sort of discrimination or adverse internal affairs consequences for the sole reason that the officer decided to seek medical or psychological treatment for a mental health concern, including depression, anxiety, post-traumatic stress disorder, or substance use disorder.  All officers are encouraged to take advantage of the resources provided by the [...], as well as the other resources identified in AG Directive 2019-1, also known as the “Officer Resiliency Directive. ”
[brief] Order denying restraints executed by the Honorable [...], P.J.Ch. Da973 - August 26, 2019  Order Denying for Recusal and Referral to a New Judge executed by the Honorable [...], P.J.Ch. Da974 - February 5, 2020  Order Denying Defendant’s Motion for Order Compelling Return of Monies executed by The Honorable [...], P.J.Ch. Da976 - March 29, 2022  Order Dismissing Defendant’s Complaint executed by the Honorable [...], P.J.Ch. Da978 - March 29, 2022  Trial Opinion decided by the Honorable [...], P.J.Ch. Da1054 - April 26, 2022
[brief] CASES  A.T. v. Cohen, 231 N.J. 342 (2017)  ..................................................................................................................10  Bender v. Walgreen Eastern Co. Inc., 399 N.J. Super., 584 (App. Div. 2008)  ......................................................................................6  Charles A. Managanaro Consulting Eng’rs, Inc. v. Carneys Point Twp. Sewerage Auth., 344 N.J. Super. 343, 347 (App. Div. 2001)  .................................................................................5  Cornblatt v. Barow, 153 N.J. 218 (1988)  .....................................................................................................................6  Cowley v. Virtua Health Sys., 242 N.J. 1 (2020) ..........................................................................................................................4, 5, 8, 9 Ferreira v. Rancocas Orthopedic Assocs., 178 N.J. 144 (2003) .......................................................................................................................6, 10 Hill Intern., Inc. v. Atlantic City Bd. of Educ., 483 N.J. Super. 562 (App. Div. 2014) .........................................................................................6 Hubbard v. Reed, 168 N.J. 387, 395, 774 A.2d 495 (2001) ....................................................................................5 In re Hall, 147 N.J. 379, 391 (1997) ..............................................................................................................5 Paragon Contractors, Inc. v. Peachtree Condominium Assoc., 202 N.J. 415,419 (2010) ..............................................................................................................5, 10 Rosenberg v. Cahill, 99 N.J. 318, 492 A.2d 371 (1985) ...............................................................................................8 Triarsi v. BSC Group Servs., LLC, 442 N.J. Super. 104 (App. Div. 2011) .........................................................................................4, 5 STATUTES N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-27 ......................................................................................................................1, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 10 N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-29 .......................................................................................................................6 PRELIMINARY STATEMENT The Appellate Court should affirm the Trial Court’s August 30, 2019
[directive] Calculation of the contributive share of any participating law enforcement A  The in agency is be determined the discretion of the prosecuting agency. to the distribution decision of the prosecuting agency shall generally reflect of in relative contribution of any law enforcement agency participating any or of the acts which led the seizure forfeiture the property- to for law  A  B. participating enforcement agency shall submit a written request as in distribution detailed  Forfeiture Proqram Administration  Standard file 07 of Operatinq  Procedure within days the seizure and the request 90 with the prosecuting agency.  121 for Criteria forfeited 3 apportioninq property
[brief] In its simplest form, the Trial Court erred by failing to consider the evidence presented by the plaintiff and whether the evidence could prove that the defendant was negligent in the operation of his vehicle, and which was a proximate cause of the accident.  It is these factual disputes which were presented below through exhibits, affidavits, depositions, and was argued in the opposition brief and during oral argument.  The plaintiff argues that the defendant was negligent in the operation of his vehicle by failing to maintain his turn within the radius which would bring his vehicle into the left lane of Route 280 West.  When he failed to negotiate the turn, whether through inappropriate acceleration through a packed intersection, or from his lack of observation of the plaintiff’s vehicle up until the moment his front bumper hit plaintiff’s driver’s side.  So, there is evidence to support a lack of observations, speed, and control.  In addition, there are traffic statutes which the defendant failed to obey which provides evidence of negligence.  The Trial Court in its decision stated, “That the Plaintiff has not cited to any material facts, which raise a genuine issue.  For those reasons, the application for Summary Judgment as to the Defendant is granted. ”  1T16:15-18.  The plaintiff must be allowed to present her case to a Jury to determine whether the defendant was negligent in the operation of his vehicle, which was the proximate cause of the accident, to determine the comparative negligence of each of the drivers, and finally award damages.
[brief] ........Pa16  Opinion, Mhrez v. First National Collection Bureau, Inc., Dkt. No. [...] (Jun. 9, 2023)  .........................Pa21  Morales v. Healthcare Revenue Recovery Grp., LLC, 859 Fed. Appx. 625 (3rd Cir. Jul. 6, 2021)  ..........................Pa31  United States ex rel. Johnson v. AmeriHealth Ins. Co., 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37479, 2022 WL 621032 (D.N.J. Mar. 3, 2022)  .................................................................Pa35  Decisions cited below by Defendant: Opinion and Order, *Asmad-Escobar v. Phoenix Capital Services, LLC*, et al., Dkt. No. [...] (Mar. 8, 2023)  ..........................................................Pa49  Transcript of Decision, *Elshabba v. Jefferson Capital Systems, LLC*, Dkt. No. [...] (Apr. 26, 2023)*  .................................................................Pa58  Opinion, *Mhrez v. Convergent Outsourcing, Inc.*, Dkt. No. [...] (Jan. 6, 2023)  ......................................................Pa96  Opinion, *Mhrez v. Convergent Outsourcing, Inc.*, Dkt. No. [...] (Apr. 19, 2023)  ......................................................Pa109  Opinion, *Mhrez v. Convergent Outsourcing, Inc.*, Dkt. No. [...] (May 26, 2023)  ......................................................Pa115  Transcript of Argument and Decision, *Mhrez v. Radius Global Solutions, LLC*, Dkt. No. [...] (Dec. 16, 2022)*  ........................................................................Pa118  Order and Opinion, *Miller v. Americollect, Inc.*, Dkt. No. [...] (Aug. 11, 2022)  ..............................................Pa127  **OTHER PARTS OF THE RECORD
[brief] Respondent contends that Estate of Ostlund, 391 N.J. Super. 390, 403 (App. Div. 2007) “has nothing to do with the instant case” and is “irrelevant" because it did not involve the making of a will but rather, the court was addressing a multiple party deposit account.  Db at 42.  Estate of Ostlund recognized that two different tests were available to determine if the proceeds in an account were to pass to the account beneficiary under a right of survivorship or to the decedent’s estate.  The first test involved a provision of the Multiple-Party Deposit Account Act that governed survivorship accounts (\textit{N.J.S.A. 17:16I-5(a)}), but if that test cannot be satisfied, the principles of undue influence provided an alternative basis to challenge the ownership of a joint survivorship account on the death of one party.  \textit{Ostlund} 391 N.J. Super. 390 at 401.  To establish a presumption of undue influence and shift the burden of proof in an inter vivos transfer, a challenger of an inter vivos transfer needs to show a confidential relationship exist[ed] between [the] donor and donee by a preponderance of the evidence.
[brief] *Id.* at 601-02.  In so holding, the New Jersey Supreme Court confirmed that its decision in *Zuber* did not "extend *Miller*'s protections to defendants sentenced for crimes committed when those defendants were over the age of eighteen."  *Id.* at 596.  In short, under the well-established precedent, defendant may have been a young adult, but he was an adult nonetheless when he committed the brutal murder of [...] at nineteen years old.  Indeed, defendant recognizes that his requested relief would require this Court to "extend" *Comer* "beyond the age of seventeen." (Db14).  This Court should decline defendant's request to extend New Jersey Supreme Court precedent.  See *Pannucci v. Edgewood Park Senior Hous. - Phase 1, LLC*, 465 N.J. Super. 403, 414 (App. Div. 2020) ("[P]laintiff does not ask us to fill a gap in the law; she asks us to change the law the Supreme Court has established.  That, we may not do.").  This Court has stated it would not infer a "departure from controlling precedent" absent "an unmistakable" signal from the Supreme Court, *State v. Hicks*, 283 N.J. Super. 301, 308 (App. Div. 1995), recognizing that any such "departure should be undertaken 'by the court of last resort, and not by the Appellate Division,'" In re State ex rel. A.C., 115 N.J. Super. 77, 84 (App. Div. 1971) (quoting Casale v.  Housing Authority, City of Newark, 42 N.J. Super. 52, 62 (App. Div. 1956)).  Here, there is no "unmistakable signal" from the Supreme Court that Comer, which was decided January 10, 2022, should extend to adult homicide offenders.  To the contrary, the Court in Ryan, decided February 7, 2022, found that neither Miller nor Zuber applied to a defendant being sentenced for a crime committed as an adult.
[brief] The State also absurdly suggests that “[h]ad [...] or [...] not been present at the bank, the elements of the offense would still have been met” because [...] entered the bank, simulated possession of a weapon, and demanded money.  (Sb 40-41)  Once again, the State appears to completely ignore its burden to prove that the essential elements of first-degree robbery were satisfied as to an identifiable victim.  If [...] walked into an empty bank demanding money and simulating possession of a weapon, no robbery would have occurred.  See 2C Chapter Headings (categorizing robbery as an offense “involving danger to the person”).  Someone had to be the robbery victim, and the State had to prove that [...], while committing a theft, threatened that victim with the immediate use of a deadly weapon by leading that victim to actually and reasonably believe that he was armed.  Thus, the jury had to unanimously agree as to who that victim was.  Finally, the State asserts that “[t]here was no confusion from the jurors” as to the victims (Sb 41), but as discussed in [...]’s initial brief, this is entirely unsurprising considering the jury instructions as a whole and the indictment.  (Db 39, n.11)  Both the instructions and the indictment referred to the victim of the first-degree robbery as “[e]mployees and patrons of the [...]. ”  (Da 1; 4T 114-4 to 12, 126-13 to 19, 127-15 to 20)  Problematically, the jury was never told that it had to consider whether the elements of first-degree robbery were satisfied with reference to an identifiable victim.  The jury was instead left with the false impression that it could consider a disperse group of individuals as “the victim” for purposes of first-degree robbery.  In other words, the jury didn’t know what it didn’t know.  In short, this Court must reject the State’s arguments that no specific unanimity instruction was required on these facts.  Because the failure to give a specific unanimity instruction was plain error, and because the court further erred by failing to instruct on the second element of robbery and the grading of the offense (Db 28-34), [...]’s conviction must be reversed.
[brief] Table of Authorities…………………………………………………………………………………i-ii  Introduction……………………………………………………………………………………1  Counterstatement of Facts and Procedural History………………………………………..4  Legal Argument………………………………………………………………………………….9  I.  THE BOARD REASONABLY DETERMINED THAT [...] IS NOT ELIGIBLE TO APPLY FOR AD BENEFITS…………………………………………………………………………………..9  A.  Inability to Comply with N.J.S.A. 43:16A-8(2)…………………………..12  B.  Ineligible Under N.J.A.C. 17:1-6.4(b)………………………………………..16  Conclusion…………………………………………………………………………………..21
[brief] Allstate Ins. Co. v. Howard Sav. Inst., 127 N.J. Super. 479 (Ch. Div. 1974)  23 Dillett v. Kemble, 25 N.J. Eq. 66 (Ch. 1874)  23 Pollino v. Pollino, 39 N.J. Super. 294 (Ch. Div. 1956)  21  See Ins. Co. v. Howard Sav. Inst., 127 N.J. Super. 479 (Ch. Div. 1974)  24  COMBINED PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND COUNTERSTATEMENT OF FACTS
[brief] 15T 16-23 to 36-18 | CASES | PAGE NOS. | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------| | Adams v. United States ex rel McCann, 317 U.S. 269 (1942) | 12 | | Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981) | 21, 23 | | Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975) | 12, 14, 15| | In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) | 36 | | Maryland v. Shatzer, 559 U.S. 98 (2010) | 23 | | Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96 (1975) | 21 | | Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) | Passim | | Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582 (1990) | 18 | | Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980) | 18 | | State ex rel. A.S., 203 N.J. 131 (2010) | 27 | | State v. Abrams, 256 N.J. Super. 390 (App. Div. 1992) | 30 | | State v. Afanador, 151 N.J. 41 (1997) | 34 | | State v. Alston, 204 N.J. 614 (2011) | 22, 24 | | State v. Bzura, 261 N.J. Super. 602 (App. Div. 1993) | 38, 39 | | State v. Carey, 168 N.J. 413 (2001) | 42 | | State v. Chew, 150 N.J. 30 (1997) | 24 | | State v. Concepcion, 111 N.J. 373 (1988) | 34 | | State v. Condon, 391 N.J. Super. 609 (App. Div. 2007) | 40 | | State v. Crisafi, 128 N.J. 499 (2019) | 13 | | CASES (CONT'D.) | PAGE NOS. | |----------------|-----------| | State v. Cunningham, 153 N.J. Super. 350 (App. Div. 1977) | 18 | | State v. Dalziel, 182 N.J. 494 (2005) | 42 | | State v. Feaster, 156 N.J. 1 (1998) | 25 | | State v. Frisby, 174 N.J. 583 (2002) | 36, 37, 40 | | State v. Fuentes, 217 N.J. 57 (2012) | 42, 43, 46 | | State v. Gandhi, 201 N.J. 161 (2010) | 38 | | State v. Gentry, 183 N.J. 30 (2005) | 36, 38 | | State v. Gonzalez, 249 N.J. 612 (2022) | 21, 22 | | State v. Green, 318 N.J. Super. 361 (App. Div. 1999) | 31 | | State v. Harmon, 104 N.J. 189 (1986) | 30 | | State v. Hartley, 103 N.J. 252 (1986) | 21 | | State v. Hubbard, 222 N.J.
[brief] [...] seemingly concedes (as it must) that the inadvertent omission of a mandatory document from a bid is a non-material and waivable defect if it satisfies the test prescribed by Township of River Vale, 127 N.J. Super.at 216.  Yet, [...] maintains that a non-material and waivable document (such as the NJDOT Notice of Classification) cannot be furnished after bid opening.  [...] is wrong.  Case law is clear that the omission of a non-material and waivable document can be furnished after bid opening because the omission is non-material and waivable.
[brief] Pressler & Verniero, CURRENT N.J. Court Rules, (GANN), Comment R. 4:30A-1 ....................................  29  INTRODUCTION  Here, [...], et al.  ([...]) filed suit against numerous defendants asserting claims, in part, under the New Jersey Insurance Fraud Prevention Act (the Fraud Act), N.J.S.A. 17:33A-1, et seq., and the New Jersey RICO Statute, N.J.S.A. 2C:41-2, et seq.  They seek to recover compensatory damages, treble damages, attorney’s fees, and the costs of investigation and suit.  Significantly, several defendants filed Answers to the Complaint and asserted jury demands.  Others moved to dismiss the plaintiffs’ Complaint arguing that plaintiffs’ claims are subject to mandatory “arbitration. ”  The trial court granted those motions, dismissed the plaintiffs’ Complaint, and remanded this matter to "arbitration."  The trial court's rulings are erroneous.  Compelling this matter to be resolved via New Jersey’s No-Fault Alternative Dispute Resolution (hereinafter “NFADR”) process established by the Automobile Insurance Cost Reduction Act (hereinafter the No-Fault Act) deprives plaintiffs and those defendants who demanded a jury trial of their constitutional right to same.  It also deprives all parties of their right to party discovery; non-party discovery; to compel witness testimony at depositions and at hearings; and to resolve this matter in one comprehensive hearing.  The trial court’s ruling not only deprives plaintiffs of their ability to obtain a damages award, but it also deprives the Commissioner of the [...] ([...]) of its statutory right to intervene in the matter to collect statutory penalties and its ability to seek suspension of defendants’ driving privileges.  As a result, the trial court's ruling in this matter should be reversed.  **PROCEDURAL HISTORY**
[brief] Plaintiffs’ argument exalts form over substance, especially when [...] had actual knowledge it was unenrolled based on undisputed facts in the record.  *See Fitzpatrick v. Qasim*, 2023 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS *10 (App. Div. Sept. 13, 2023).  Also unavailing is Plaintiffs’ reliance on *Piermount Iron Works, Inc. v. Evanston Ins. Co.*, 197 N.J. 432 (2009), to suggest that that N.J.A.C. § 11:1-20 should apply because it was promulgated by the Commissioner of the [...] (“[...]”) to address non-renewal and cancellation notices.  In *Piermount*, the New Jersey Supreme Court actually highlighted the limitations of N.J.A.C. § 11:1-20 after an insured contractor argued for a regulatory penalty of automatic extension where the insurer failed to provide notice of non-renewal.
[directive] Therefore, do not enter personal identifiers on it, such as Social Security number, driver's license number, vehicle plate number, insurance policy number, active financial account number, or active credit card number.  A VISO:  Este es un documento publico, lo cual significa que el documento tal como se presente estara a la disposici6n del publico cuando se solicite.  Por lo tanto, no anote en el mismo ning(m identificador personal, como por ejemplo: el numero de Seguridad Social, el numero de la licencia de conducir, el numero de la matricula del vehiculo, el numero de la p61iza del seguro, el numero de una cuenta financiera activa, o el numero de una tarjeta de credito activa.  Las demandas, pedimentos y demas papeles presentados al tribunal deben estar en ingles.  Complaints, motions and other papers submitted the court should be in English to New Jersey Judiciary County  ___________ _ Poder Judicial de Nueva Jersey Condado Prosecutor File Number _____  _  Plea Form  Numero de archivo de! fiscal Formulario de Declaraci6n de Culpabilidad (Spanish)  Defendant's Name: Nombre del acusado: before Judge:----------------------------------- ante el Juez 1.
[brief] The Trial Court Rejected the ‘Law of the Case’ and Refused to Permit Plaintiff to Respond to the Motion (Pa-171).  This appeal involves the trial Court’s rejection of “law of the case,” and refusal to permit the Plaintiff to answer the Motion after the “law of the case” was rejected.  What the Court below did was to reject State v. Hale, 127 N.J. Super. 407, which stated:  It has been generally stated that the ‘law of the case’ doctrine applies to the principle that where there is an unreversed decision of a question of law or fact, made during the course of litigation, each decision settles that question for all subsequent stages of the suit; Id. at 410.  Relying on that statement, the Plaintiff argued the law of the case.  That was rejected by [...]; and so was Hale, Id.  At this juncture, we are dealing with the doctrine of "law of the case."  Such a doctrine is applied to the question of whether or not a decision made by a trial Court during one stage of the litigation is binding throughout the course of the action.  The use of the doctrine, in this situation, avoids repetitious litigation of the same issue during the course of a single trial.  With respect to this aspect of "law of the case," it has been generally stated that:  The law of the case concepts is a non-binding decisional guide addressed to the good sense of the Court in the form of a cautionary admonition against re-litigation when the occasion demands it; Ross Products, Inc. v. N.Y. Merchandise Co., 242 F. Supp. 878, 879 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).  The distinction between the doctrine of the law of the case and res judicata is readily apparent.  One directs discretion.  The other supersedes it and compels judgment.  In other words, in one, it is a question of power and the other of submission; Southern R.Y. Co. v. Clift, 260 U.S. 316, 319.  Law of the case operates as a discretionary rule of practice and not one of law.  The application of the "law of the case" doctrine in New Jersey was thoroughly explained in Hale, supra.
[brief] (Db14-17).  Voters using mail-in ballots must place completed ballots within the inner envelope, seal it, and then complete the certificate attached to the inner envelope.  The certificate requires the voter to print their name, their street address, and their municipality, sign their name, and, if someone assisted with completing the ballot, the assistor’s name, address, and signature.  N.J.S.A. 19:63-13(a); 19:63-16(a).
[brief] The result goes well beyond the scope of rectifying the single line in dispute “between the owners of adjoining land” as prescribed by N.J.S.A. 2A:28-1.  For this reason, the [...] appeal from Final Order of the trial court as the Report is *ultra vires*.  See Generally, City Council of Orange v. Edwards, 455 N.J. Super. 261, 270-71 (App. Div. 2018), cert. denied 237 N.J. 205 (2014).  The Final Order of the trial court necessarily affects the neighboring properties owned by parties who did not have the opportunity to participate in any pre-trial or trial proceedings under N.J.S.A. 2A:28-1.  The Final Order of the trial court creates a problem well beyond the problem for which Boundary Commissioners had statutory authority.