ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] A trial court’s factual findings premised upon evidence admitted in a bench trial are generally entitled to deference and “are binding on appeal when supported by adequate, substantial, credible evidence. ”  Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 411–12 (1998) (citing Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Investors Ins. Co. of Am., 65 N.J. 474, 484 (1974)); see also Potomac Ins. Co. of Illinois ex rel. OneBeacon Ins. Co. v. Pennsylvania Mfrs.' Ass'n Ins. Co., 215 N.J. 409, 421 (2013).  The decision on appeal before this Court is the trial court’s correct holding that, under Boston Gas, the record facts did not allow for [...]’s purported “fact-based” allocation.  (Pa0199.)  The trial court’s decision on [...]’s motion for reconsideration\(^7\) was a well-reasoned opinion that cited and discussed the --- \(^7\)  To the extent [...] relies on the motion for reconsideration standard (Pb31-32), it misstates the applicable standard.  [...]’s July 19, 2018, motion for reconsideration was directed to an interlocutory order, not a final judgment.  As such, the more lenient standard under R. 4:43-2 was applicable.  See Lawson v. Dewar, 468 N.J. Super. 128 (App. Div. 2021).  testimony and evidence provided in the Allocation Trial, and that analysis is what led the trial court to conclude that the R&R was “palpably incorrect”.  (Pa0199; Pa0204.)  The trial court correctly applied the facts to the law, and that ruling is entitled to deference.
[brief] **CONCLUSION**  While we are mindful unpublished opinions are not binding upon a Court; however, we submit they are permitted to be used as guidance by a Court.  N.J.S.A. 1:36-3.  Here, Appellant has failed to distinguish the acts complained of regarding the present appeal from those complained of in the two previous challenges to the tax exemptions granted to redevelopers under the [...] by the [...].  Appellant continues to burden both the [...] Respondents, and this Court, with repetitive filings always seeking another bite of the proverbial apple.  Moreover, Appellant has once again failed to establish that he is a taxpayer in the [...] and that he can be affected detrimentally by the acts complained of.  Clearly Appellant lacks standing to pursue the claims in the Complaint against the [...] Respondents and for that reason the judgement entered by the lower court in this matter should be affirmed.
[directive] a.  Radar operator and instructor training  Revised: 4/00 3  Over 90% of the police agencies in New Jersey participate in the voluntary radar operators certification program developed by the Division of Criminal Justice.  The program, which was instituted to ensure consistency in the training of radar operators, requires four hours of recertification training every three years.  Approximately 9,000 officers are presently certified under this program.  b.  Internal Affairs Policy and Procedures  In August 1991, the Attorney General mandated that all law enforcement agencies establish an internal affairs function.  To support this mandate, the Division of Criminal Justice provides training on the directive and internal affairs to any officer so assigned.  To date, police officers from 483 municipal, county and State law enforcement agencies have been trained in this area.  c.  Victim-Witness Services N.J.S.A. 52:4B-47 requires in part that in-service training shall be made available for police officers, assistant prosecutors, county detectives and investigators on specialized needs of crime victims and available services, but does not specify that law enforcement officers must attend.
[brief] In its opposition, [...] ([...]) fails to appreciate that disqualification is necessary because it represents the State of New Jersey in this consolidated matter and the State of New Jersey has brought criminal charges against [...] partner [...] and the indictment implicates the [...] law firm by referring to unnamed partners.  The [...] law firm is a partnership.  [...], a partner at [...] who for years had been counsel of record in this matter on behalf of the State of New Jersey, filed a “Designation of Trial Counsel” on March 9, 2022 designating himself “trial counsel for Defendants on all claims. ” (Pa161).  After his indictment by the State of New Jersey he withdrew his appearance – an acknowledgement of his conflict of interest.  (Pa120).  [...]’s partners contend that [...] – the law firm where [...] remains employed and continues to work as a partner (Pa166) – can continue representing the State of New Jersey and the other defendants as if [...], the former counsel of record, had not been indicted.  [...] seeks to sidestep the applicable legal analysis by claiming the State of New Jersey is different than other clients.  [...] contends that the legal principles applicable to all attorneys and firms in New Jersey should not apply because [...]’s client here, the State of New Jersey, is different than all other clients.  Applying different rules to [...] because its client here is the State of New Jersey creates a two-tiered ethics system that is unsupported and would contribute to the steady decline in citizens’ trust in government.  The proposition that [...] can continue to represent the State of New Jersey when the State of New Jersey has asserted that its senior partner and others in the firm committed criminal acts is outlandish.  This proposition is premised on [...]’s disavowing that it represents the State of New Jersey when it does and ignoring the positional conflict that is evident in the State of New Jersey contending that [...]’s senior partner and others in the firm committed crimes.  For the foregoing reasons and the for the reasons previously set forth, this Court should vacate the Order denying plaintiff’s motion to disqualify the [...] law firm from representing the State of New Jersey and the other defendants in this matter.
[brief] The Elements Of Equitable Fraud As A Basis For Rescission Require Determination Of The Inherently Fact-Sensitive Issues Of “Material Misrepresentation” And “Detrimental Reliance”.  (9)  “The law is well settled that equitable fraud provides a basis for a party to rescind a contract. ”  First Am. Title Ins. Co. v. Lawson, 177 N.J. 125 (2003).  “In general, equitable fraud requires proof of (1) a material misrepresentation of a presently existing or past fact; (2) the maker’s intent that the other party rely on it; and (3) detrimental reliance by the other party. ”  Liebling v. Garden State Indem., 337 N.J. Super. 447, 453 (App. Div. 2001).  The elements of equitable fraud must be established by clear and convincing evidence.
[directive] establishes a presumption of this Directive will notification that presumption of pretrial detention applies telephonic or electronic a immediate within which make determination to seek additional time to the the prosecutor's office provide detention/revocation hearing for that or revocation of release, and to prepare the pretrial detention supervisory shall be of Although all designated officers within a few days the arrest. would be heard presumption of seeking pretrial detention or establishes a to recognize when this Directive trained prosecutor, nothing notification on-call duty assistant to immediate tothe revocation of release ensure whether authority under this Directive to decide delegate a prosecutor's herein shall be construed to detention or revocation of release.
[brief] Pa070  Letter from Public Safety to [...] 7/7/2020  Pa071  Discovery Checklist (billing date 7/7/20) (Attached at Pa0028)  Consent to Search Vehicle 2/20/20-00:47 (Attached at Pa0029)  Use of Force Report by [...] (Attached at Pa0030)  Use of Force Report by [...] (Attached at Pa0031)  Evidence Form (Marijuana) (Attached at Pa0032)  Evidence Form (Orange Pill) (Attached at Pa0033)  Evidence Form (Money) (Attached at Pa0034)  Evidence Form (1 Key and other items) (Attached at Pa0035)  Evidence Receipt from Lab (Tab/Marijuana) (Attached at Pa0036)
[brief] Appellant argues that although the use of telegrams and telephone operators is regulated and restricted by the FDCPA, the statute does not “expressly authorize or endorse [their] use,” and so the plain (or literal) reading of § 1692c(b) prohibiting any disclosure not expressly exempted by the statute must still apply.  Appellant’s Br., at 30.  But this ignores the rules of statutory construction set forth by the New Jersey Supreme Court and Appellate Division.  Under those rules, provisions of a statute “cannot be viewed in isolation; all the parts of a statute must be read to give meaning to the whole of the statute. ”  Nicholas v. Mynster, 213 N.J. at 480.  And, as noted supra, where “the overall statutory scheme is at odds with the plain language,” courts should set aside the plain meaning and consider extrinsic evidence, such as legislative history, to properly construe the statute.  Id; Bergen County PBA Loc. 134 v. Donovan, 436 N.J. Super. at 197.  Here, it is beyond cavil that Appellant’s expansive reading of prohibited third-party disclosures, which in his view includes letter vendors and telegram operators, is at odds with the rest of the FDCPA statutory scheme which regulates the use of telegrams for permitted use under law.  As such, Appellant’s “plain” reading of the statute must be set aside in favor of an interpretation which renders the FDCPA internally consistent and in line with Congressional intent and legislative history.  See Mynster, at 480; Donovan, at 197.
[brief] On March 1, 2024, the trial court granted respondent/defendant [...]’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the claims of appellant/plaintiff [...] for economic and non-economic loss, on the grounds that the appellant/plaintiff [...] failed to maintain insurance as required by N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4, was “culpably uninsured,” and therefore could not maintain an action for economic and non-economic loss against respondent/defendant [...] pursuant to N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.5.  This Order was Certified by the trial court as a Final Order and Entered on April 29, 2024.  The appellant/plaintiff [...] argues in this appeal that, due to his “innocent oversight” confusing the importance of his “mailing address” with the “garaging address” when he purchased the [...] (“[...]”) policy in January 2022, after he moved to New Jersey in April 2021, such “innocent oversight” was not a material misrepresentation.  He also argues that discovery was incomplete when summary judgment was granted.  Neither argument is relevant to his failure to maintain the required N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4 coverage.  The appellant/plaintiff [...]’s PIP claim and defendant [...]’s Counterclaim for Declaratory Judgment were temporarily settled under a confidentiality agreement when the trial court granted respondent/defendant [...]’s motion for summary judgment.  The trial court subsequently granted defendant [...]’s unopposed motion for summary judgment, concluding that, “plaintiff’s vehicles were garaged in New Jersey so there is no coverage under the North Carolina policy. ”  Accordingly, any claim that a fact dispute existed, or that discovery was required, to resolve appellant/plaintiff [...]’s failure to obtain coverage on his vehicles required by N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4 has been concluded.  The appellant/plaintiff [...]’s opposition to respondent/defendant [...]’s motion for summary judgment had no merit when the motion was decided on March 1, 2024 and has less merit now that the trial court found that the “vehicles were garaged in New Jersey…”  For the reasons set forth herein, respondent/defendant [...] respectfully requests the decision of the trial court granting summary judgment and dismissing appellant/plaintiff [...]’s complaint pursuant to N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.5 be affirmed.
[brief] This is the law in most jurisdictions within the United States.  [...], The Law of Closing Protection Letters, 36 Tort and Ins. L.J. 845 (2001) ("A substantial majority of courts hold that if a title insurance company has not issued a closing protection letter, the title insurer has no liability for fraud or other misconduct by a settlement agent in connection with a real estate closing.").  [...], Title Escrow Claims Guide, §17.2 (2021) explains that modern title agency contracts explicitly state that escrow or closing duties assumed by the agent are outside the scope of the agency relationship with the title insurance underwriter and a title agent has no authority to enter into an escrow agreement as an agent of the underwriter in the absence of a closing protection letter.  The CPL is a direct statement from the underwriter advising the company will indemnify the purchaser or lender should the agent not follow the purchaser or lender’s written closing instructions given in advance of the closing.
[brief] “Our reservations about a sentencings court’s prescience to divine future needs do not in any way bear upon its authority or discretion to articulate…by way of providing full background for the Parole Board, all the factual concerns, judgements, and insights it has developed. ”  Id. at 537.  [...] specifically talks about future needs, but that is not the issue in the instant case.  The Defendant was sentenced to 180 in days jail with no probation or parole to follow.  Imposing the conditions of Parole at the time of sentencing was not a future need.
[brief] Id. at 517.  Much like the circumstances in Spaeth, [...] was a pro se litigant and, once having been sued, he should not be presumed to have had the sophisticated legal knowledge and background to understand and appreciate the effect the arbitration clause or his substantive rights under the Arbitration Act.  [...] acknowledges that in *Tuckey v. Harleysville Ins. Co.*, 236 N.J. Super. 221 (App. Div. 1989), the Court observed that *pro se* litigants are required to follow accepted rules of procedure and are presumed to know, and are required to follow, the statutory laws of the State.
[brief] Despite acknowledging that the Operating Agreement prohibited her from loaning money from [...] absent Plaintiff’s consent, Defendant admitted that she loaned money to her friends without telling Plaintiff or asking for his consent.  3T133:21 to 3T134:20  Based on the forgoing admissions and uncontroverted evidence that proves Defendant breached the Operating Agreement and violated the LLC Act, the jury’s verdict in favor of Defendant was clearly against the weight of the evidence, and reasonable minds cannot disagree that Plaintiff is entitled to judgment notwithstanding the verdict as a matter of law.  Therefore, the trial court has made an error when denying Plaintiff’s Motion for JNOV, and this denial should be reversed.  POINT II
[brief] .................................................................46  Garfinkle v. Morristown Obstetrics & Gynecology Assocs., P.A., 168 N.J. 124 (2001)  .........................................................................................25  Gilmer v. Interstate Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991) ..........................................................................................25, 50 Goffe v. Foulke Mgmt. Corp., 238 N.J. 191 (2019)  .........................................................................................24  Grandvue Manor, LLC v. Cornerstone Contracting Corp., 471 N.J. Super. 135 (App. Div. 2022) .............................................................50 Highgate Development Corp. v. Kirsh, 223 N.J. Super. 328 (App. Div. 1998) .............................................................53 Hirsch v. Amper Financial Services, LLC, 215 N.J. 174 (2013) .........................................................................................24 Hojnowski v. Vans Skate Park, 187 N.J. 323 (2006) .........................................................................................24 Kernahan v. Home Warranty Adm'r of Florida, Inc., 236 N.J. 301 (2019) .........................................................................................24, 35, 36 Kindred Nursing Centers L. P. v. Clark, 581 U.S. 246 (2017) .......................................................................................passim Levison v. Weintraub, 215 N.J. Super. 273 (App. Div. 1987) .............................................................39, 40 Littman v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, 337 N.J. Super. 134 (App. Div. 2001) (following Young because “the right to jury trial, even under an anti-discrimination statute, does not alone control the issue of enforceability of an agreement to arbitrate”) ....................................................................................................45 Manalapan Realty v Twp. Committee, 140 NJ 366 (1995) ..........................................................................................24 Martindale v. Sandvik, Inc., 173 N.J. 76 (2002) .................................................................25, 41 McCullough v. Sullivan, 102 N.J.L. 381 (E&A 1926) .......................................................39 Morales v. Sun Contractors, Inc., 541 F.3d 218 (3d Cir. 2008) .....................................................29 Morgan v. Sanford Brown Institute, 225 N.J. 289 ..............................................................................24 N.J. Mfrs. Ins. Co. v. Franklin, 160 N.J. Super. 292 (App. Div. 1978)...........................................52 Preston v. Ferrer, 552 U.S. 346 (2008)..................................................................44 Rose v. Shore Customs Homes Corp., 2024 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2091 (App. Div. Sept. 3, 2024) ...............41 Sarbak v. Citigroup Global Markets, Inc., 354 F. Supp. 2d 531 (D.N.J. 2004)...............................................50
[brief] On February 11, 2020, [...] remanded the matter to the New Jersey Superior Court Law Division, [...].  (Aa112).  On February 26, 2020, the State Parties filed a motion to dismiss.  (Aa116).  On April 17, 2020, [...] filed his opposition.  (Aa172).  The other defendants, the [...], [...], and [...], also filed motions to dismiss the complaint.  (Aa80-90).  Subsequently, on June 12, 2020, August 27, 2020, and September 11, 2020, [...] submitted correspondences to the court requesting that the Motions to Dismiss and the Motion to Designate Trial Counsel be adjourned pending a decision on an appeal of another matter filed by [...], *In re Approval of a Financing Commitment for the Project Known as Norman Towers*, [...], [...] (May 31, 2022).
[brief] Since the inception of this case, the primary insurers and [...] attempted to resolve various defense-related issues that applied to all parties.  --- \(^3\)  See, e.g. Brennan v. Orban, 145 N.J. 282, 289 (1996).  \(^4\) [...] includes [...]’s June 5, 2019 Brief in Support of its Motion to Sever and Stay to demonstrate the factual point that [...] argued that the indemnity claims now being litigated should be and were stayed.  [...] is not seeking review of that motion.  It was understood that the case could not proceed to the indemnity phase until the defense issues and the underlying Utilities Action were resolved.
[brief] If an annulment was deemed warranted in *Williams*, supra, 98 N.J. Super. 1, an annulment is warranted in Plaintiff’s case here because the lies that Defendant told Plaintiff to induce him to marry impacted an even more essential of a marriage – the desire to marry the Plaintiff in good faith at all.  Several cases outside of New Jersey have ruled that an annulment is proper where one party secretly entered into the marriage solely to obtain a green card, as in Plaintiff [...]’s case here, see, e.g., *Nwankwo v. Uzodinma*, 185 N.E.3d 513 (2022); *In re Marriage of Goodwin-Mitchell & Mitchell*, 40 Cal. App. 5th 232 (Cal. Ct. App. 2019) (concealed intent to marry solely to obtain favorable immigration status supports annulment); *In re Marriage of Rabie*, 40 Cal. App. 3d 917, 922–923 (Cal. Ct. App. 1974) (husband induced wife to marry him solely to acquire green card and never intended to remain faithful or stay married); *In re Marriage of Liu*, 197 Cal. App. 3d 143, 156 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987) (wife entered marriage to obtain a green card and did not intend to consummate marriage); *Seirafi-Pour v. Bagherinassab*, 2008 OK CIV APP 98 (annulment proper based on evidence that wife married he husband solely to enter United States and without intention of assuming duties of marriage); *Matter of Marriage of Kidane & Araya*, 53 Kan. App. 2d 341 (2017) (evidence sufficient to support finding that parties engaged in a sham marriage for sole purpose of allowing husband to obtain green card, rendering marriage voidable under annulment statute).
[brief] *See ibid.*; N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.47.  Moreover, these determinations, in which the Board hears and sees the evidence and testimony, are entitled to substantial deference because they involve issues of credibility.  *See Goulding v. N.J. Friendship House, Inc.*, 245 N.J. 157, 167 (2021) (discussing deference awarded to a workers’ compensation court’s credibility determinations); *H.K. v. State of N.J.*, 184 N.J. 367, 384 (2005) (discussing deference awarded to an administrative law judge’s credibility determinations).
[brief] (Da6).  Thereafter, [...], Esq’s letter fully adopted the legal arguments and positions offered by [...] on behalf of [...].  [...]’s letter also confirmed his clients did not wish to intervene or participate in the underlying litigation and further did not object to the adoption of the Commissioners’ Report as it related to the [...] and [...].  The letter stated:  The case appears limited to plaintiff’s demand that a boundary commission delineate the boundary between only Lots 10 and 11.  As the boundary commission appears to have completed that task, there is really nothing left remaining to litigate, and particularly no reason to further involve any third party.  …  For these reasons, together with those offered by [...], which we adopt by reference in their entirety, the Court’s apparent desire to “quiet title” as to third party properties and owners, for which issue has not yet been joined, is reason enough to allow the Court to disregard any further efforts to expand the pending dispute, which should be limited to the border delineation between the existing litigants, [...] and [...].
[directive] 1.  I am being questioned as part of an investigation by this agency into potential violations of department rules and regulations, or for my fitness for duty.  This investigation concerns 2.  I have invoked my rights on the grounds that I might incriminate myself in a Miranda criminal matter.  3.  I have been granted use immunity.  No answer given by me, nor evidence derived from the answer, may be used against me in any criminal proceeding, except for perjury or false swearing.  4.  I understand that I must now answer questions specifically, directly and narrowly related to the performance of my official duties or my fitness for office.  5.  If I refuse to answer, I may be subject to discipline for that refusal which can result in my dismissal from this agency.  6.  Anything I say may be used against me in any subsequent departmental charges.  7.  I have the right to consult with a representative of my collective bargaining unit, or another representative of my choice, and have him or her present during the interview.  Assistant Prosecutor or Deputy Attorney General authorizing: ____________________________________  Signature: __________________________________
[brief] While such a recital might be sufficient to satisfy the first part of the statutory requirement (consistency with the “Objectives” element), the second part of the statutory requirement, consistency with the land use element, is absent.  Hence, there is no mention of such a finding, let alone the underlying facts in support of that conclusion, in the resolution, be it in a recital or otherwise.  Satisfying one out of the two statutory requirements does not satisfy the requirement for valid enactment of a land use ordinance.  In Point Two of Plaintiff’s initial brief, the requirement of findings of fact and the lack of such findings by the Planning Board and governing body is addressed.