ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] N.J.S.A. 17:16G-1 et seq.; Pa0035-Pa0036.  This initial version of the Act made no reference to attorneys, but under the State’s then-existing criminal statutes, “an attorney at law of this State” continued to not be deemed a debt adjuster and thereby was exempt from the Act. Pa0040.  In 1986, the Legislature amended the Act to define a “debt adjuster” as “a person who either (a) acts or offers to act for a consideration as an intermediary between a debtor and his creditors for the purpose of settling, compounding, or otherwise altering the terms of payment of any debts of the debtor, or (b) who, to that end, receives money or other property from the debtor, or on behalf of the debtor, for payment to, or distribution among, the creditors of the debtor.
[brief] In her opening statement, the AP outlined defendant’s conduct on New Year’s Eve 2017 as he methodically killed his mother, father, sister, and the woman he considered to be his grandmother with his brother’s semi-automatic rifle.  (6T24-8 to 28-18, 31-18 to 33-20).  Based on defendant’s actions, the AP informed the jury, defendant had been indicted on four counts of murder.  (6T28-19 to 25).  She refuted the defense theory that defendant was not guilty by reason of insanity:  “This is not simply an insanity case.  This is a murder trial.  This is about four victims, four people who were killed in an unprovoked attack in their own home when they should have been safe.  This is murder.  The defendant, in all of the actions you see and you hear about him in this case, the defendant appreciated what he was doing at the time he was doing it.  And he knew it was wrong. ”  (6T29-1 to 31-17, 34-4 to 12).  Defendant moved for a mistrial based on the AP’s use of the phrase “This is murder.
[brief] A disputed fact is [...]’s false statement that [...]'s employee had made the offer to purchase the vehicle contingent upon my delivery of a "proper" title to him (i.e. disingenuously inferring / suggesting that I first needed to change the title into my own name).  However the word "proper" was never used at any time during this call, and my transcript speaks for itself - I made the [...]s employee clearly aware of the fact that the title was still in my mom's name, and he had no problem whatsoever with that.  (See Pa41).
[brief] **I.**  **THIS COURT SHOULD DISMISS THIS MATTER BECAUSE DEFENDANT’S RIGHT TO A SPEEDY TRIAL WAS VIOLATED**  [Da19a-23a, 10T10-22/11-6]  Speedy trial and principles have become paramount in this case.  *See Barker v. Wingo*, 407 U.S. 514 (1972); *State v. Cahill*, 213 N.J. 253, 258 (2013); *State v. Prickett*, 240 N.J.Super. 139, 143 (App.Div. 1990).
[brief] The dispute centers on whether the allegations underlying the complaint allege at least one “potentially” covered claim (Pa419).  Defendant [...] is the insurance carrier for the Association’s Commercial General Liability (CGL) policy which was endorsed to insure members including [...] with respect to liability for bodily injury including “mental anguish”.  (Pa4, Pa16, Pa17).  An HO-6 Condo Owner’s Policy works in tandem with the Association’s Master Policy.  (Pa28).  [...]’s Policy provides “Personal Liability” coverage if a claim or suit is brought against an insured for damages because of bodily injury caused by an occurrence.  (Pa28).  [...]’s Policy provides liability coverage on an “all risks” basis including “off the insured location, if the bodily injury is caused by the activities of an insured. ” (Pa28).  When used in tandem with the Association’s insurance, one should have full coverage.  (Pa28).  [...]’s Policy is specifically designed to “dove-tail” with the Association’s CGL Policy.  (Pa29).  [...]’s Policy states that if there is other insurance in the name of a corporation or association of property owners covering same property, “this insurance will be excess over the amount recoverable under such other insurance or service agreement”.  (Pa28).  In the underlying action, Defendant/Third Party Plaintiff [...] alleged the Association breached its duty by failing to comply with N.J.S.A. 46:8B- 14(e)(f)(i) which mandates insurance to protect unit owners against liability for personal injury for accidents occurring within the “common elements” including legal defense.  (Pa6).  Specifically, the Association refused to provide service, unreasonably denied [...]’ request for insurance protection, and concealed the Association’s Liability Policy until August 2017.  (Pa6).  As a result of the Association’s improper conduct, [...] was forced to privately retain counsel and defend himself against numerous court cases and motions.  (Pa7).  See [...] Cert ¶56, 120, 130, 200, 283, 293, 296, 322, 326, 329.  (Pa7, Pa93, Pa104, Pa106, Pa124, Pa143, Pa145, Pa146, Pa155, Pa156).  Despite agreeing to provide liability insurance for all risks of loss, Defendants denied [...]’ claims for legal defense, indemnification, and reimbursement.  (Pa3).  Defendants’ decision to deny coverage was unreasonable.  (Pa3).  Defendant [...] chose to insure [...] for personal liability and provide medical payment protection against allegations of bodily injury.  (Pa4).  As a result, [...] is entitled to recover damages and seeks the Court’s declaration of the parties’ rights and duties under their respective policies pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:16-50 et seq. (Pa4, Pa37, Pa44).  On December 2, 2016, the Association commenced litigation by way of Verified Complaint and Order to Show Cause.
[directive] It is especially important for police officers to understand that CUMMA does NOT authorize a person to “operate, navigate, or be in actual control of any vehicle, aircraft, railroad train, stationary heavy equipment or vessel while under the influence of marijuana. ”  N.J.S.A. 24:6I-8(a).  The statute expressly provides that in any of those circumstances, the defendant remains “subject to such penalties as are provided by law. ”  Id.  It is thus clear that the CUMMA affirmative defense does NOT apply to the charge of driving while intoxicated in violation of N.J.S.A. 39:4-50, or to any other motor vehicle offense, disorderly persons offense, or indictable crime related to the operation of the vehicle or vessel (e.g., death by auto or vessel, assault by auto or vessel, or leaving the scene of a motor vehicle accident resulting in death or serious bodily injury).
[brief] b.  Appellant Did Not Cite Applicable Caselaw  As the trial court correctly identified, Appellant’s sole basis for pleading an ascertainable loss is that she received and reviewed the [...] Letter.  This is simply not the type of loss contemplated by the CFA.  The main import of this element is the economic position of the party claiming a loss, and Appellant did not plead that her economic position changed for the worse as a result of receiving the [...] Letter.  In fact, Appellant did not plead that she lost or paid any money to Respondents at all, let alone any amounts over the Obligation she admittedly owes.  Appellant relied on Cox, 138 N.J. 2, 647 A.2d 454, at the trial court level for the proposition that she suffered an ascertainable loss, as she also does in this appeal.
[brief] [...] said that defendant possessed “something that was carried --- \(^6\)  That belief was accurate.  See footnote 4, supra. by members of the New Jersey State Police.  So, basically, I put two and two together and figured he was a trooper. ”  (13T 91-13 to 21)  [...] admitted that his discretion to let any driver go without a ticket, even for DWI, is significant, “regardless of a card,” and that people use all types of NJSP-adjacent cards, including “PBA cards” and “union cards” to “get out of a traffic stop. ”
[brief] ## CASES  **Dennery v. Bd. of Educ. of Passaic Cty. Reg’l High Sch. Dist. No. 1, Passaic Cty.**, 131 N.J. 626 (1993).  .................................................. 15  **Dunbar Bev v. Brown**, SEC Docket No. C25-11 (2011).  ...................... 4, 11 **I/M/O Leonard**, SEC Docket Nos. C56-19 and C57-19 (Consolidated) (2021)  .................................................................  4, 7, 8, 11 **I/M/O Treston, Randolph Board of Education**, SEC Docket No. C71-18 (2022)  .................................................. 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 11, 12, 13  **In re DiLeo**, 216 N.J. 449 (2014).  ...........................................  14  **In re Perskie**, 207 N.J. 275 (2011).............................................  14  **Kennedy v. Bremerton School District**, 597 U.S. 507 (2022).  ...............  10  **Melnyk v. Fiel**, SEC Docket No. C64-18 (2019).  ............................ 5, 7, 11, 12  **Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist.**, 393 U.S. 503 (1969)..........................................................  10  **Williams-Yulee v. The Florida Bar**, 575 U.S. 433 (2015).  ..................  14  ## STATUTES AND RULES
[brief] As the Supreme Court has pointed out, “one can always argue that development brings more traffic and that a commercial establishment brings more congestion and more intensive use of the nearby local roadways.  … if concerns expressed by the neighboring residents about traffic congestion will suffice to support a rezoning ordinance [to eliminate an unpopular use], it may become impossible for any undeveloped parcel to be utilized, thus fueling faster and more intensive development as each property owner hurries to avoid being the owner of the last piece of undeveloped land. ”  Riya Finnegan Ltd. Liab. Co. v. Twp. Council of Tp. of S. Brunswick, 197 N.J. 184, 193-94 (2008).  Because the Trial Court properly found that a private interest existed the decision of the Trial Court to deny enlargement should be upheld.
[brief] ”  *Id.* at 605.  Looking at other cases decided prior to *Shaw* for context, the concern about extending this exception to professionals that might not be considered as “learned” as doctors, lawyers, and clergy makes sense.  *Id.* at 616 (“*Plemmons* thus paved the wave for subsequent decisions, including the trial court’s decision in this case, holding that the mere existence of a separate regulatory scheme would automatically preempt application of the CFA. ” (citing cases on the application of the CFA to ambulance service providers and a nursing home’s billing and collection functions)); see also *Manahawkin Convalescent v. O’Neill*, 217 N.J. 99, 124 (2014) (“We have serious doubts that the billing and collection function [of a nursing home] at issue in this case would qualify for the learned professional exception to the CFA, ‘whereby certain transactions fall outside the CFA’s purview because they involved services provided by learned professionals in their professional capacity,’” (internal quotations omitted)).
[brief] In short, Title 19 only permits an irregular ballot to be cast in favor of a candidate whose name do not appear on the ballot.  If the candidate’s name appears on the ballot, an irregular ballot for that candidate may not be counted.  That is true whether the person casting the irregular ballot communicates their preference by writing out the candidate’s name in full, in part, or by any other marking.  The Appellate Division previously addressed the facts similar to those presented here and held that the prohibition under N.J.S.A. 19:49-5 nevertheless applies.  In re Ocean County Com’r of Registration for a Recheck of the Voting Machines, 379 N.J. Super. 461, 473-76 (App. Div. 2005).
[brief] (Specific Negligence on the Part of the Defendants)  But in the meantime, the Court also found that the balance of the jury’s $500,000 damages award in the amount of $50,201.41 was without any competent evidence that plaintiff suffered any actual damages—beyond the fees incurred to vacate the PSA and original judgment of divorce and obtain the AFJD—as a direct and proximate result of defendants’ negligence (Da34), because the record showed that there was no evidence of any disposition of assets between 2009 when the divorce judgment was granted and when the divorce judgment was set aside in 2011.  (See, Da115)  This reasoning raises a question whether the negligence on the part of the Defendants had proximately caused any actual damage to the Plaintiff.  Plaintiff’s legal fees cannot be a “mere potion of the damages” suffered by the Plaintiff as a result of Defendants’ negligence when Plaintiff sustained no actual damages.  However, the Court later rejected the argument raised by the Defendants that the original Chinese agreements were declared invalid by the Family Part; therefore, Defendants’ failure to incorporate provisions from the Original Chinese agreements into PSA could not be the proximate cause to the damages sustained by Plaintiff, because the failure to incorporate provisions in the tossed out Chinese agreement is not the “but for” causation for the errors in the PSA or the original divorce judgment.
[brief] 1 | | Procedural History ..................................................................... 2 | | Statement of Facts ..................................................................... 3 | | Legal Argument ........................................................................... 30 | | I.  Standard of Review ............................................................... 30 | | II.  Petitioner was a Bona Fide Employee of the [...] and is Entitled to the Intra-Fund Transfer of her PERS Benefits from [...] to [...] (Pa19)  ........................................ 31 | | III.  The OAL’s Decision Affirmed by the Board was Arbitrary and Capricious and Not Based Upon Substantial Credible Evidence in the Record (Pa19) ...... 47 | | Conclusion .................................................................................. 50
[brief] The same issue occurred with the defendant’s trial appeal on de novo; the submitted brief from [...] nonchalantly affirms and/or suggests defendant’s admission of guilt based on the testimony of [...]\textsuperscript{42}; specifically stating, “One might unfairly infer that defendant admitted to the act to the witness.  However, we don’t know that because the witness was not there to be questioned and elaborate”.  Furthermore, Counsel’s brief was rather repetitive\textsuperscript{43} regarding [...]’s absence from trial; however, the plaintiff’s witness, [...], admitted perjury relinquishing both [...] and [...] as the one’s identifying the defendant throughout his conflicting testimonies both written and orally\textsuperscript{44}.
[brief] ”  In a six year period, the following are some of the convictions from New Jersey and Delaware of which defendant has been found guilty: three counts of receiving stolen property, criminal impersonation, resisting arrest, escape, two counts of theft, and possession or use of drugs.  Defense counsel conceded, and [...] agreed with the State, that defendant was extended term eligible in light of his unwavering disregard for the law.  However, the judge declined to impose an extended term in this case, holding that the aggravating factors significantly outweighed the one mitigating factor and as a result imposed a ten-year term of imprisonment on count one.  The sentence does not shock the judicial conscience.
[brief] In the recently decided case of *State v. Torres*, 246 N.J. 246 (2021), the New Jersey Supreme Court held that consecutive sentences must not carry a “scent of unfairness” when the courts impose them.  The Court noted that there is no presumption for imposing a consecutive sentence over a concurrent sentence, but the trial courts must engage in an analysis in determining consecutive or concurrent sentences.  *Id.* at 266.  The *Torres* Court noted, “An explicit statement, explaining the overall fairness of a sentence imposed on a defendant for multiple offenses in a single proceeding or in multiple sentencing proceedings, is essential to a proper *Yarbough* sentencing assessment. ”  *Id.* at 269.  However, the Court also noted that *Yarbough* was a guide, not a control.  *Id.*  The sentence must overall be fair.  *Id.* at 272.
[directive] ATTACHMENT F NOTIFICATION TO THE CENTRAL DRUG REGISTRY AGENCY  SUBMITTING AGENCY  PHONE ADDRESS  CITY STATE ZIP CONTACT PERSON TITLE PHONE PERSON TO BE ENTERED  LAST NAME  FIRST NAME INITIAL GENDER RACE EYE COLOR  APPLICANT TRAINEE     THIS PERSON WAS: SWORN OFFICER- REASONABLE SUSPICION    SWORN OFFICER-   RANDOM ADDRESS  CITY STATE ZIP DOB SSN SBI NUMBER (IF KNOWN)  REASON FOR NOTIFICATION    THE PERSON LISTED ABOVE TESTED POSITIVE FOR ; (IDENTIFY SUBSTANCE)   REFUSED TO SUBMIT A URINE SAMPLE; OR  UNDER THE INFLUENCE WHILE ON DUTY/DURING WORK/TRAINING HOURS.  DATE OF THE DRUG TEST OR REFUSAL  DATE OF FINAL DISMISSAL OR SEPARATION FROM AGENCY CERTIFICATION  (Must be completed by Chief or Director.  Must be notarized with raised seal)  I hereby affirm that the above information is true and correct to the best of my knowledge.  Print Name Title Signature , .  Sworn and subscribed before me this day of (Seal)
[brief] (CONT'D.)  A.  The State Improperly Admitted into Evidence a Significant Number of Irrelevant but Highly Prejudicial Personal Items from [...]’s Car to Paint Him as a Violent and Disturbed Person.  ..................  26  B.  The State Advanced Improper Arguments That [...] Committed the Shooting Because of His Adderall and Marijuana Use..............................................  30  C.  The State Elicited Irrelevant and Prejudicial Testimony About [...]’s Life While Homeless and Made Denigrating Comments About His Homelessness and Poverty.  ...........................................  35  D.  Much of the Jail Call Admitted by the State Was Irrelevant and Extremely Prejudicial.  ............................................. 39  E. Conclusion ..................................................................................  40  POINT IV  MR. MUSTAFA’S SECOND-DEGREE FIREARM POSSESSION CONVICTIONS MUST BE REVERSED BECAUSE THE TRIAL COURT  ERRONEOUSLY INSTRUCTED  THE JURY ON THE ELEMENTS FOUND UNDER N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(D), FOURTH-DEGREE UNLAWFUL POSSESSION OF A WEAPON (NON-FIREARM)  INSTEAD OF THE ELEMENTS FOUND UNDER N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(B), SECOND-DEGREE UNLAWFUL POSSESSION OF A FIREARM.  (Not Raised Below) .................................................  41  TABLE OF CONTENTS (CONT'D.)
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[brief] Furthermore, the record clearly indicates that [...] had assisted [...] in its efforts to purchase the Share as early as August 2018 from [...].  This was long before the TPDs began their surreptitious efforts to purchase the Share or to form [...].  As [...] testified, his efforts were solely for the benefit of [...] and not for any personal gain.  What most vexed the Trial Court was why [...] would donate such a large amount to a religious institution without any quid-pro-quo, stating “[h]e testified that he would put up any amount of money which was necessary to obtain the mosque for the [...].  This in itself raises more questions than I am satisfied were answered. ” (5T11: 4-7).  While asserting there was no factual basis to understand [...]’s motivation in donating such a large sum to [...] as he had done with many other causes as set forth in the record, the Trial Court decided not to award any damages to [...].
[brief] A requirement that the individual submit oral or written reports to the employer also indicates a degree of control which is indicative of employee status.  While [...] notes in her report that Petitioner is required to prepare regular reports, that is exactly the opposite of her conclusion.  In a biased way, [...] and Respondent depart from the reporting requirement under this Factor and concluded Petitioner is an independent contractor because she does not undergo “performance evaluations”.  Whether or not Petitioner undergoes performance evaluations has absolutely nothing to do with this Factor.  Petitioner testified extensively that she is required to provide oral reports to liaison officers concerning the cases in the Municipal Case Resolution System and the Plea by Mail cases.  She also testified she reports to the Township Zoning Officers, Code Enforcement Officers, and Animal Control Officers as to the disposition of their cases.  [...] conceded that had she known this, it would be indicative of employee status.
[brief] [...] waived any right to argue for a three-arbitrator panel in several ways.  First, [...] was on notice in Phase I that the claims exceeded $1 million, despite the fact that they did not explicitly state the amount.  The Third-Party Demand for Arbitration asserted in Phase I (but stayed until Phase II) included a count to dissociate [...] and force him to sell his shares.  (Da264-266)  [...] cannot possibly claim he believed then that his shares were worth less than $1 million, when his expert below argued they were worth $3,331,000.  (Da2585).  [...] knew in Phase I that his shares, worth over a million dollars, were at issue, but failed to argue for a three-arbitrator panel.  He thus waived the argument.  Second, [...] consciously sought to remove the arbitrator’s jurisdiction during Phase I *for a different reason*, yet utterly failed to raise the three-arbitrator argument, further demonstrating that [...] waived the argument.  Following [...]’s ploy in the middle of Phase I to defeat jurisdiction by transferring the Company’s domicile to Belize (later voided), (Da980) [...] was not content to merely write a letter to [...] saying he thinks the arbitrator lacked jurisdiction.
[brief] All overtime shall be compensated as paid compensation at the time and one-half (1-1/2) rate, (the overtime rate shall be base plus maintenance divided by 2,080 x 1.5), unless the employee, at said employee's sole option, elects to take compensation for overtime in compensatory time off (C.T.O.) which shall accumulate in a C.T.O. bank.  Compensatory time compensation in the C.T.O. bank shall accumulate at time and one-half (one and one-half hours banked for each hour of overtime worked in quarter hour units).  (Emphasis added).  Pa27.
[brief] Because a lane change necessarily requires a motorist to “move right or left upon a roadway,” the State maintains that a lane change is a “turn” within the meaning of the statute, such that the statute’s signaling requirements apply to lane changes.  Setting aside the absurdity of using the word “turn” to refer to all those movements, the State’s premise is wrong: the Legislature amended the 1928 version of the statute substantially in 1951, and in doing so, it changed the statute’s meaning.