ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Specifically, after the legal description of the boundaries of the uplands being conveyed, the deed went on to describe these further rights that were being conveyed:  Together with all and singular, the houses, buildings, trees, ways, waters, profits, privileges, and advantages, with the appurtenances to the same belonging in or in anywise appertaining; Also all the estate, right, title, interest, property, claim and demand whatsoever of the said party of the first part of, in, and to the same, and of, in and to every part and parcel hereof . . .  See Pa0923 (emphasis added).
[brief] The decision below will deprive parties of their constitutional rights to juries and due process, will preclude insurance carriers from their statutory remedies as Dispute Resolution Professionals (“DRPs”) cannot award treble damages or investigations fees and costs, and will ultimately deprive insurance carriers and the State of New Jersey in their ability to aggressively fight insurance fraud, which costs will be ultimately passed along to the consumers.  NEW JERSEY HAS ALWAYS RELIED UPON THE "PLAIN LANGUAGE" OF STATUTES.  The New Jersey Supreme Court has stated that “when interpreting a statute, courts must first look at the evident wording of the statute to ascertain its plain meaning and intent. ”  Bergen Commercial Bank v. Sisler, 157 N.J. 188, 202 (1999)  “Moreover, where the language is clear, courts will enforce the statute according to its terms. ”  Ibid., at 202.  It is not the courts’ function “to ‘rewrite a plainly written enactment of the Legislature or presume that the Legislature intended something other than that expressed by way of the plain language. ’”  DiProspero v. Penn, 183 N.J. 466, 492 (2005) (citing Frugis v. Bracigliano, 177 N.J. 250 (2003)).
[brief] In order to provide local governments the means to promote an area’s transformation into a productive part of the community, the LRHL authorizes a municipality to formulate, revise, and amend a unique zoning plan, i.e. a redevelopment plan, which constitutes a type of near mini-master plan.  N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-7.  The LRHL authorizes the creation of distinct land uses and building requirements within that redevelopment plan.
[brief] What makes this case so tragic is that the Trial Court initially came to that very conclusion.  The Trial Court correctly ruled in its August 30, 2022, Oral Opinion denying summary judgment that both organizations (certainly [...]) and individual defendants owed Appellant the duty to provide a workplace free of harassment, discrimination, and retaliation, and that a jury could readily conclude Defendants breached that duty.  *Infra § II (“So I will find that in the totality of the circumstances and facts that have come before this Court in a three-plus-hour oral argument, inclusive of many, many, many filings and – and the documents put forward.  There are issues of facts for [the] jury to decide this case.  I’m not going to dismiss the action on summary judgment for those reasons. ”); §VI(B)(1) (“But [] you’re saying you’re protecting her by taking her out of there, and [...] is saying, you know, what, you’re moving her in – as a – as punishment.  What am I supposed to do with these – with – with – coming from two different fact patterns of thought processes as it relates to, you know, why she was removed, why she wasn’t moved?  Isn’t that a jury question?”).*  On reconsideration, the Trial Court completely and inexplicably reversed course.
[brief] Cases  Cowley v. Virtua Health System, 242 N. J. 1 (2020)........................................... 12 Docteroff v. Barra Corp. of America, Inc., 282 N.J.Super. 230 (App. Div. 1995).................................................................................................................. 7 Ferrante v. New Jersey Manufacturers Ins. Grp., 232 N.J. 460 (2016)............... 11 Lemelledo v. Beneficial Management Corp. of America, 150 N.J. 255 (1997)... 13 Loew’s Inc. v. Somerville Drive-In Theater Corp., 54 N.J. Super. 224 (App. Div. 1959).................................................................................................................. 10 McCarthy v. Bye, 118 N.J.L. 94 (1937)................................................................. 9 Nieder v. Royal Indem. Ins. Co., 62 N.J. 229 (1973)............................................. 8 Plemmons v. Blue Chip Ins. Servs., 387 N.J.Super. 551, 556 (App. Div. 2019)...13 Shaw v. Shand, 460 N.J. Super. 592 (App. Div. 2019)........................................ 13 State v. Vincenty, 237 N.J. 122 (2019)................................................................. 8 Troy v. Rutgers, 168 N.J. 354, 365 (2001)............................................................  9 Other Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 4 (1981)......................................................  9  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
[brief] The record is muddled at best regarding what the trial judge regarded as within his jurisdiction but what is clear from the record is that the trial court failed to set forth any reasoned analysis of the relevant lease provisions on how they work together to address a situation in which both landlord and tenant owe each other at the same time under the Lease.  This Court should vacate paragraph one of the trial court’s November 10, 2021 order, vacate the entirety of its November 9, 2023 order, correct the trial court’s multiple errors in interpreting the lease at issue, and remand for further proceedings.
[directive] Firearms qualification  A.  Accommodations.  A pregnant officer may choose to request an accommodation regarding 3 firearms qualification, including to not participate in a firearms qualification program until the officer is cleared for full-duty status post-pregnancy.  Pregnant officers who fail to complete a firearms qualification test during the mandatory firearms qualification period shall be treated the same as any other officer who has not qualified.  If a pregnant officer requests an accommodation regarding wearing their firearm, the agency and officer should engage in an interactive process and communicate to determine whether a reasonable accommodation(s) is available under applicable law.  Agencies may not revoke firearms privileges solely because an officer becomes pregnant.  B.  Re-certification.  Upon being cleared for full-duty post-pregnancy, an officer who has fallen beyond the firearms qualification period shall be scheduled for a qualification as soon as practicable.  V.
[brief] As a courtesy, [...], at [...]’s request and at no cost to her, arranged for some of the garments that had been damaged as the result of the water leak at [...]’s home to be transported to a dry cleaner.  Even if one were to assume that this act established the necessary predicate of whether [...] owed a duty to [...], she still must prove that the unreasonable acts or omissions by [...] in performing this act proximately caused damage to or the loss of her personal property.  Before [...] arranged for certain items of [...]’s personal property to be transported to a dry cleaner, [...] certified to [...] that all of the items were damaged.
[brief] TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS  i.  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES  ii.  PROCEDURAL HISTORY  1  STATEMENT OF FACTS  2  A.  The Automobile Accident  2  B.  Plaintiff Specifically Recalled How the Accident Took Place.  2  C.  The Accident Took Place in the [...] Crosswalk.  3  D.  The Intersection of [...] and [...] Was Designated a Dangerous Intersection by [...].  3  E.  [...] Officials Have No Familiarity with Their Lighting Systems and Agreement with [...].  4  F.  Defective Lighting Led to a Dangerous Condition in the Intersection.  5  G.  [...] Failed to Advise [...] on an Effective Streetlight for a Dangerous Intersection.  6  H.  “Backlighting” Prevented the Driver from Seeing [...] and Caused him to Strike [...].  7  1.  Plaintiff’s Liability Experts  7  2.  Defendants’ Liability Experts  I.  Dispute of Material Facts  As to Notice to [...].  J.  The Trial Court’s Decisions.  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY
[brief] (Pa78).  The Resolution in Paragraph 15 cites the testimony of [...]’s engineer, [...] who testified contrary to [...]’s opinion that the grading plan was designed to maintain the required two-foot separation between the first floor of the buildings and the seasonal high water table.  Mr. Decina opined that the re-design of the grading of the entire site was in order to meet the requirements of the State and municipal stormwater management regulations which require addressing the quality, quantity and re-charge of stormwater, and not designed in order to increase allowable building height.  (Pa78-79).  The Resolution also in Paragraph 15 refers to the Borough Planning consultant, [...] who testified that she agreed with Mr. Decina.  [...] opined that the ordinance allowed variations in grades.  [...]’s testified that she agreed with Mr. Decina that the grading plan presented was meant to design the entire site to properly function as a whole and not designed to raise building heights.  [...]’s testified that she agreed that the design will properly control stormwater management and the required separations between buildings first floor and the seasonal high water table.  [...] opined that the Ordinance intends to permit the measurements for building height from any revised lot grade shown on an approve site plan and that [...]’s plan meets those requirements.  [...]’s rejected the assertion that grading plan was designed to allow increased building height and noted that there were no articulated reasons to do so on the property.  (Pa78-79).  The Resolution in Paragraph 16 finds that the testimony of Mr. Decina and [...] is credible and supports [...]’s position that the revised lot grade was developed for the purposes set forth in Mr. Decina’s testimony and Mr. Lelie’s testimony, and not designed to allow increased building height.  (Pa79).
[brief] The Respondent incorporates its Preliminary Responding Statement of Facts and offers its recitation of the statement of facts and procedural history.  The township of [...] assigned its municipal tax sale certificate No. 15-0754 to [...] (interchangeably referred herein as the “Defendant”).  The township previously designated the Premises as abandoned.  [...] engaged [...], Esq. as counsel, to foreclose the tax sale certificate.  The foreclosure was processed by in personam foreclosure, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 54:5-869(a) (Aa236)  Though [...] continuously characterized the Defendant’s foreclosure similar to the Plaintiff, as pursuant an abandoned property, under N. J.S.A. 55:19-78, it was not.  This misstated fact is intended to diminish [...]’s belief that the Plaintiff’s action would have taken longer to reach a final judgment, and is factually contrary to manner that Mr. Bonchi conducted Defendant’s tax sale foreclosure.  The attempt to discredit [...] statement is meant to challenge any equitable consideration available to the Defendant- contrary to the Intervenor’s good faith purchaser status and the intractable nature of Plaintiff’s final judgment.  Defendant’s final judgment was entered on June 23, 2021 thereby vesting recorded title to the Defendant (Aa162).  The recorded judgment vested to [...] Enterprises LLC, (herein “[...]”) title to [...], Township of [...], Essex County, New Jersey, Block 87, Lot 10, the “Premises. ”  During its ownership Defendant expended tens of thousand dollars on demolition, clean up, survey and architectural plan for the renovation and rehabilitation of the Premises.  (IA168-to 183).  The Plaintiff’s interest in the Premises arose from its assignor, [...], purchase at a December 29, 2020 tax sale by the Township of [...] of tax sale certificate NO. 20-0423.
[brief] SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY  APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. [...]  CIVIL ACTION ON APPEAL FROM FINAL ORDERS OF THE SUPERIOR COURT, LAW DIVISION, SOMERSET COUNTY DATED AUGUST 7, 2023; AND OCTOBER 11, 2023  Sat Below: Hon. [...], P.J.Cv.  Trial Court Docket No.: [...]  LEGAL BRIEF FOR APPELLANT
[brief] Id. at 265–66, 307 A.2d 65.  At trial, one of the detectives testified that the defendant fit an informant's description of a person with drugs in the tavern.  Id. at 266, 307 A.2d 65.  The Court noted that [i]t is well settled that the hearsay rule is not violated when a police officer explains the reason he [or she] approached a suspect or went to the scene of the crime by stating that he [or she] did so “upon information received.
[brief] And so [...]'s lawyers are also trying to prove that the company has been so stupid, careless and irresponsible as to expose its shareholders to substantial risks of expensive damages suits to be tried to a jury.  Of course, [...] is not a stupid, careless and irresponsible natural gas company.  Fortunately, the company's same witnesses, when compelled to answer cross-examination, proved that the current regulator is indeed safe, reliable and able to continue in service, certainly until the New Jersey Energy Master Plan deadlines for decarbonization take hold, and after.  The facts of record prove that the proposed regulator is wasteful and not reasonably necessary.  As set out in detail in our initial brief, [...]'s witnesses admitted on cross-examination that the current regulator station, in fact, has many more years of useful life; that the current regulator poses no risk of harm to the [...] system, and no safety hazard to the surrounding community; that the current regulator can safely handle the reduced loads it is designed for; that the company's projected increase in load on this part of the system is approximately one percent a year and the current regulator can handle it.
[brief] On November 3, 2021, [...]’s (“Plaintiff”) applied to the [...] (“Board”) for a Major Subdivision for the purpose of creating nine (9) residential lots from three (3) existing lots known as Lots 23, 24.01, and 34 in Block 24.  (see Application Ia18 and Project Narrative Ia23)  The application further proposed to widen the existing Fourteenth Street and construct a new 50’ wide right of way terminating in a cul-de-sac.  The site is located in the R-12 Single-Family Residential Zone, which lists “single family detached housing” as a permitted use pursuant to Lakewood’s Unified Development Ordinances (“UDO”) § 18-902 (E).
[brief] (Raised below: Pa1021-1066; 1T42-52; 2T21-33; 3T)  POINT IV  THE TRIAL ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT TO THE DEFENDANTS BECAUSE EVERY MATERIAL FACT IN THIS COMPLEX MATTER WAS DISPUTED BY THE PARTIES AND THEIR EXPERTS.  (Raised below: Pa1021-1066; 1T42-52; 2T21-33; 3T)  CONCLUSION | Description | Page | |-----------------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | Order granting summary judgment to [...] | Pa922 | | Filed October 13, 2023 | | | Oral Decision (October 13, 2023) | 1T | | Order denying plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration | Pa929 | | Filed November 17, 2023 | | | Oral Decision (November 16, 2023) | 2T | | Order granting defendant [...]’s motions for summary Judgment and bar experts’ testimony | Pa995 | | Filed December 14, 2023 | | | Oral Decision | 3T | # TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | Authority | Brief Page No. | |------------------------------------------------|----------------| | **STATUTES** | | | N.J.S.A. 59:4-2 | 32 | | N.J.S.A. 59:4-3 | 34 | | **RULES** | | | R.4:46-2(c) | 47 | | N.J.R.E. 702 | 39 | | N.J.R.E 703 | 40 | | **CASE LAW** | | | Brill v. Guardian Life Inc., 143 N.J. 520, 535 (1995) | 47 | | Clark v. Safty-Kleen Corp., 179 N.J. 318, 338 (2004) | 40 | | Clohesy v. Food Circus Supermarkets, 149 N.J. 496, 503 (1997) | 20 | | Jeter v. Sam’s Club, 250 N.J. 240, 251 (App. Div. 2022) | 24 | | Robinson v. Vivirito, 217 N.J. 199, 208-209 (2014) | 20 | | Furey v. County of Ocean, 273 N.J.Super. 300, 10 (App Div. 1994) | 33 | | Gaskill v. Active Environmental Technologies, Inc., 360 N.J.Super. 530, 536-537 (App. Div. 2003) | 33 | | Prioleau v. Kentucky Fried Chicken, 434 N.J.Super. 558, 564 (App. Div. 2014) | 24 | | State v. Moore, 122 N.J. 420, 458-59 (1991) | 40 | | Weinberg v. Dinger, 106 N.J. 469 (1987) | Passim | PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[brief] [...] testified as to the issue of the stormwater pipe and sewer line easement.  [...]’s stormwater discharge was proposed to be located in the existing sanitary sewer easement running through the adjacent townhome development.  However, the easement as agreed to does not permit stormwater discharge.  1T 89:24-92:13.  The Board members also questioned [...]’s experts, including how many room air conditioning units, 1T 117:3-9, comparing this project visually to the setbacks that would be used for senior housing zones rather than its use of single-family setbacks, questioning the actual parking needed for this facility.  The Board asked for more detail on grading to understand the actual impact of the height and mass of the building.  The Board requested an alternative to the 8-feet high fence proposed.  They also questioned the noise and smell of the diesel generator, 1T 119, and if there are any other three-story buildings in town.  1T 120.  Many of these questioned areas were never adequately addressed by [...].
[brief] N.J.S.A. 40A:20-2.  The tax exemptions authorized by LTTEL are thus designed to give municipalities necessary tools to attract investment in projects that would otherwise be passed over by private capital.  The Township plainly understood this when it asked defendant [...] to state why it believed that a long-term exemption was necessary to make the project “economically feasible. ”  (Dlb26)  Its current claim that defendants have imported a feasibility or but/for test into LTTEL therefore rings hollow.  C.
[brief] Plaintiff owns a two hundred sixteen (216) acre parcel located in both [...] and [...] (the “Property”).  Ja024.  Familiarly known as the “[...]”, the site is bounded by Interstate 295 to the east; Florence-Columbus Road (County Route 656) to the south; Old York Road (County Route 660) to the west; and the New Jersey Turnpike to the north.  (1T 29:20-25).  It does not sit on any municipal roads.  --- ³ “4T 147:3-25; 148:1-6” references the transcript of the May 31, 2022 hearing, at page 147, lines 3-25, and page 148, lines 1-6.
[brief] ...............  29  Lee v. Park, 2015 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1233 (App. Div. May 27, 2015)  ..................................................................................................................  23  Loew’s, Inc. v. Somerville Drive-In Theater Corp., 54 N.J. Super. 224 (App. Div. 1959)  .............................................................................................................  24  Manning Eng'g, Inc. v. Hudson Cnty. Park Comm'n, 74 N.J. 113 (1977).  24, 25 Marx v. Jaffe, 92 N.J. Super. 143 (App.Div. 1966)  ...........................................  21, 22 Oyola v. Xing Lan Liu, 431 N.J.Super. 493 (App.Div. 2013) ............................  33  President v. Jenkins, 180 N.J. 550 (2004) ..........................................................  32 Rider v. Lynch, 42 N.J. 465 (1964) ......................................................................  31  Sandler v. New Jersey Realty Title Ins. Co., 36 N.J. 471 (1962) ....................... 28  Satec, Inc.  v. Hanover Ins. Group, Inc., 450 N.J.Super. 319 (App. Div. 2017) .........................................................................................................................  31  Spring Motors Distribs., Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 98 N.J. 555 (1985) ..............  29 Stella v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 241 N.J. Super. 55 (App.Div. 1990) ....  21 U.S. v. Farrell, 606 F.2d 1341, 1348-49 (D.C. Cir. 1979) .....................................  23 Walker Rogge, Inc. v. Chelsea Title & Guarantee Co., 116 N.J. 517 (1989).  28, 29 Walker v. Atl. Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 216 N.J. Super. 255 (App.Div. 1987) .................................................................  31 Weinisch v. Sawyer, 123 N.J. 333 (1991) ..................................................  30  Woytas c. Greenwood Tree Experts, Inc., 237 N.J. 501 (2019).......................  33  New Jersey Administrative Code N.J.A.C. § 11:17A-4.10 ...........................................................................
[brief] 3.  The court correctly issued the model jury charge on fingerprint analysis instead of defendant’s proposed charge.  The trial court properly instructed the jury using the model jury charge on fingerprint-analysis evidence.  Defendant’s proposed jury charge, which would have introduced claims from a study that defendant did not move into evidence at trial, would have been improper and prejudicial.  Instead, the model charge accurately guided the jury in the precise manner envisioned by the courts and the Committee on Model Criminal Jury Charges, and this Court should not disturb the jury’s verdict on this basis.
[brief] See, **Park Center v. Zoning Bd.**, 365 N.J. Super. 284,(App. Div.2004).  By its conduct, the developer is estopped from denying its obligations.  **Talcott Fromkin Freehold Assocs. v. Freehold Tp.**, 383 N.J. Super. 298, 315-16 (Super. Ct. 2005)  The doctrine of estoppel dictates that one may, by voluntary conduct, be precluded from taking a course of action that would work injustice and wrong to a party who with good reason and in good faith has relied upon such conduct.  **Summer Cottagers Ass'n of Cape May v. City of Cape May**, 19 N.J. 493, 503-504, (1955).  In this case the developer knew that dedication was conditional upon Borough approval.  When the Borough did not grant approval it disavowed it contractual arrangements and sued to relieve itself of the conditional obligation to which it had agreed.  On grounds of fundamental fairness  Plaintiff is now estopped from doing so.  CONCLUSION
[brief] And that evaluation requires a “painstaking analysis of the facts. ”  *Dewey v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.*, 109 N.J. 201, 205 (1988).  In evaluating an alleged conflict of interest, courts must “balance the need to maintain the highest standards of the profession against a client’s right to freely choose his counsel. ”  *Ibid.*  *RPC* 1.7(a) states that “a lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation involves a concurrent conflict of interest,” except as permitted by paragraph (b) of the rule.
[brief] (Da39).  In August 2014, \(^{2}\)T refers to the transcript of May 20, 2019  2T refers to the transcript of June 10, 2019.  3T refers to the transcript of August 4, 2023.  Pa refers to appendix to this brief; defendant was brought to the [...] on a federal detainer.  (2T4-18 to 21; Da33). ³  On August 27, 2014, [...] was filed, charging defendant with second degree eluding, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-2b (count one) and second degree aggravated assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-2 (count two).
[directive] The maintenance of an orderly, accurate and contemporary record system is essential to the overall property function.  The property record system should include a centralized filing system and a system of property reports and receipts to record the details of each property transaction.  These records serve several purposes: - Inventory of items in custody; - Inventory of items that have been disposed of and released from custody or destroyed; - Chronological record of the chain of custody of each item.  In addition, the records of a property transaction may in fact become evidence themselves to verify or dispute some fact about that item of property.  The maintenance of the property records should be assigned to the designated property officer to insure that the type and manner of entries are consistent.  Centralized Filing System.  Each law enforcement agency must have a centralized filing system which contains information on all property which is taken into police custody.  This single source filing system provides consistency and uniformity to the overall property records system.  Any inquiry about property should begin at the centralized filing system, where sufficient references will identify the appropriate detailed records.  There are several important principals to be followed in maintaining a centralized filing system.  These principals apply whether the centralized record in a bound log book or a computerized data base.