ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] ”  16 C.F.R. 436.8 (emphasis added).  Notably, the FTC, in an advisory opinion, has stated that a writing under this provision is extremely broad, and includes writings such as: • handwritten notes made during sales presentations; • sales receipts; • price lists; • canceled checks; • a fact sheet or other promotional materials describing the franchise; and • correspondence referring to material terms. FLORIDA FRANCHISE LAW, SBP FL-CLE 13-1 (citing BUS. FRANCHISE GUIDE (CCH) ¶ 6421).
[brief] [...] also argues that the riparian zone impacts for the road crossing exceed allowable limits.\(^4\) (Ab29-30).  But the FHACA rules allow applicant in certain instances to exceed the disturbance limits.  Here, [...] was limited to riparian zone impacts of four thousand square feet, unless it could demonstrate that safe adequate access to the site, which meets all Federal, State, and local requirements governing roadways cannot be achieved without exceeding the riparian zone impact limit.  N.J.A.C. 7:13-11.2(h)(1).  [...] showed that compliance with requirements governing roadways could not be achieved, and that public safety could not be ensured, without exceeding riparian zone impact limits.  (Aa33-34).  The width of the roadway causing riparian zone impacts is “the minimum necessary for safe access to and within the site. ” (Aa34).  [...] could not reduce the road crossing, and the riparian zone impacts for the road crossing, below the minimum necessary for safety.  Further, [...] must enhance over fifty-one thousand square feet of existing farmland with native plantings to mitigate the riparian zone impacts.  (Aa29).  [...] properly applied the FHACA rules for bridges and culverts, as well as riparian zone impacts and mitigation, and its pipe culvert determination is \(^4\) [...]’s riparian zone impacts argument is at odds with its argument that a bridge rather than a culvert should have been used for this road crossing, as constructing a bridge’s footings over this narrow channel would likely result in greater impacts to the riparian zone area and surrounding wetlands.
[brief] But when other facts are presented, or the spin on the presented facts is unspun, the Trial Court’s factual ruling below becomes not only more apparent, but the only logical outcome.  Here, the factual background, as recounted by the [...] in their sworn testimony, was littered with a great deal of hyperbole, i.e. falsehoods.  Thus, for example, [...] testified that he observed diners sitting and eating at tables inside the subject pizza parlor (“[...]”) (T.1 at 75:1-76:16), which would be a violation of its approval to have takeout and delivery service only.  Dining inside, however, is a physical impossibility.  In the 560 square foot building, which was estimated to be about a quarter of the size of the courtroom, there is only room for one or two standing customers at a time.  The only table was one used to make pizza boxes.  There never was, nor could there be, inside dining.
[brief] In November 2018, after consulting the NJDEP and notifying Defendants (see Da767-Da772; Da760-Da765), the [...] installed an at-grade, dune walkover which traversed the [...] property, returning them to status quo ante Hurricane Sandy.  The [...] dune walkover complied with the applicable state environmental regulations, and was reflected in [...]’s 2017 Coastal Area Facilities Review Act (“CAFRA”) permit.  (Da532-Da539).  In 2019, Defendants’ representatives “called [[...], NJDEP’s Director of Coastal Engineering] and said they didn’t want to allow all the oceanfront property owners to have a path across the dune. ” (Da1035).  On or about July 3, 2019, approximately eight months after the [...] installed a NJDEP-compliant at-grade dune walkover enabling access from their home to the area below the mean high-water line, the [...] emailed the [...] and other oceanfront homeowners stating—for the very first time since 1925— members could no longer access the beach from their homes.  (Da2546-Da2548; Da2100).  On July 10, 2019, [...], [...] president, sought and obtained notices of violation (“NOVs”) against both the [...] itself and the [...] with respect to the dune walkovers, alleging the dunes had been constructed without a “Township Clearing and Grading Permit. ” (Pa286-Pa288).  [...], [...]’s Municipal Engineer, testified Kirby asked for the NOVs to be issued, including the NOV against the [...], “so he could remove the [[...]’ walkover].” (Da1349-Da1350).  When Commins emailed the NOVs to Kirby, she wrote “Oddly enough – the violation you requested is attached for your use” (Pa286), because “[i]t’s odd for someone to request a violation on their own property. ” (Da1343).  The [...] retained counsel, who on August 1, 2019, informed Defendants’ counsel the [...] intended to take legal action if Defendants blocked their direct access to the ocean.
[brief] In this case, [...] assumed that, because he questioned certain transactions in the books and records of the entities, the transactions were orchestrated by defendants, without any authorization from plaintiffs, to wrongfully divert funds.  The record reveals that this opinion is no more than a "mere guess or conjecture."  [...] was retained for the express purpose of reviewing "Exhibit S," (P-50), the schedules prepared during the negotiations between [...] and [...], "to verify the validity of that spreadsheet and to determine if it was false and misleading.
[brief] --- 3 235T77:12-20.  “[T]he bad faith and evil motive [of the [...]] were demonstrated by the testimony of [...] himself. ”  (223T42:20-23)  The “statements made by [...] in his Certification, in opposition to the resumption of distributions to [...] in 2009 and 2010, was clearly false and knowingly false. ”  (224T48:22-25; see also 224T48:22-49:3)
[directive] •  If there is no response by the registrant, court staff should follow with a phone up call to the registrant at least two weeks before the scheduled hearing date and inquire if the registrant would like indigency determination.  an •  Court staff should confirm the home address, phone number, and email address, if applicable, and the method for sending the hearing information {mail, text, or email).  The option for a return receipt notification that the email was read and should be used if email is sent to the registrant.  an •  Court staff should not inquire whether the registrant will object or participate at the proceeding.  However, if the registrant indicates that he/she not contesting is the matter via email, that email should be retained the court's file.  If the in registrant indicates verbally that he/she not contesting the matter, court staff is should record that some manner, for example, a note the file.
[brief] When reviewing the Miranda form with detectives, defendant was an active participant, asking many questions, which the detectives answered.  No right contained on the form was abandoned; detectives spoke with the defendant until he told them he understood the right being explained to him.  Right “[n]umber three” – “You have the right to consult with an attorney at any time and have him present before and during questioning?” – was treated no different.  Pa6-8; (1T:41-22 to 45-15).  Defendant’s immediate response to being read this right and asked if he understood it was, “I do understand what it is that you have just read to me. ”  Pa6; (1T:42-1 to 42-2).  Defendant then asked the detectives if the hypothetical attorney would be the Virginia Legal Aid attorney that had been appointed to represent him on his extradition or a New Jersey attorney.  Pa6-8; (1T:42-1 to 45-10).  Defendant told the detectives that this “was an example question, I’m not I’m not saying that that’s what I’m looking for I’m saying as an example. ”  Pa7; (1T:42-24 to 43-5).  The detectives were candid with defendant that they did not know about how court-appointed counsel in Virginia worked, and that court-appointed counsel in New Jersey was via the Public Defender’s Office.  Pa6-8; (1T:41-22 to 45-15).  However, the detectives made clear to the defendant that he had “a right to have an attorney, any attorney that you want, present with you, at the time … that we’re asking you questions” and that the decision to speak with or without counsel was defendant’s.
[brief] Pursuant to the clear and convincing evidence standard, [...] cannot establish that the purpose of the December 10, 1998 deeds was merely to reaffirm his ownership, or somehow his blatant forgery of [...]’s signature was an innocent error.  When the December 10, 1998 deed was prepared, at that time, the property was already under [...]’s name, pursuant to the June 28, 1998 deed (transferring the title from [...] to [...]), which was also prepared by [...].  At that time, [...] possessed an U.S. master’s degree obtained in New York, had been involved in real estate transactions multiple times, and was assisted by a real estate lawyer [...] who was the one that also prepared the June 28, 1998 deed.  [...] incredibly claimed that after paying off the mortgage, he merely wanted to make sure that the property was under his name, so he asked his lawyer [...] to prepare the December 10, 1998 deed.  The trial court should not have accepted [...]’s fabricated story that he, as an experienced property owner with a Master’s Degree, somehow felt a need to prepare a new deed at the time, knowing he was already the title owner at the time.
[brief] The Detective’s opinion “intruded on the jury’s role” because “[i]n an identification case, it is for the jury to decide whether an eyewitness credibly identified the defendant. ”  Id. at 22, 24.  Conversely, in Singh, a detective testified that sneakers depicted in a surveillance video were similar to ones he saw the defendant wearing at the time of his arrest.  245 N.J. at 19.
[brief] In [...], two younger assailants were brawling with an older, inebriated man.  Id. at 278-81.  The men began to fight and struggle with each other after the victim allegedly used ethnic slurs against the assailants.  [...] himself, just as defendant here claims, said he was “willing to fight [the victim] if that’s what he wanted. ”  [...] then claimed his co-defendant, [...], took out a knife and stabbed the victim to death.  There was no evidence that [...] was hurt by or in fear of the victim, nor was there any evidence that [...] had become enraged by any extreme emotional disturbance.  Ibid.  Rather, the New Jersey Supreme Court found that “[t]he very slight evidence of appellant’s provocation, consisting of the “ethnic slurs” and the victim’s attempt to strike appellant, after being spurred on by appellant’s invitation to fight, was not acknowledged by any witness to have caused appellant to participate in the homicide. ”  Id. at 280.  Thus, there was no rational basis to charge passion-provocation manslaughter despite the brawl, because “[w]hat appellant’s version of the evidence clearly conveyed was the existence of a gross mismatch, an older inebriated man against two younger men, at least one armed with a knife. ”  Id. at 279.  The Court so ruled even though it acknowledged the “common-law rule was that mutual combat under certain circumstances could constitute adequate provocation to reduce murder to manslaughter. ”  Id. at 274 (citing Model Penal Code, § 210.3 comt. at 57 (Official Draft and Revised Comments, 1980)).  [...] is particularly telling, here, and is part of a long-standing principle in New Jersey that mutual combat does not exist when only one person is armed, particularly where the admitted armed party also admitted, in his statement to police, to throwing the first punch.
[directive] No Early Release Act  (Spanish)  Es necesario que conteste las siguientes preguntas solamente si está aceptando culpabilidad por de uno de los siguientes el 29 de delitos graves de primer o segundo grado, o por una tentativa o conspiración para cometer tal delito, que ocurrió junio del 2001 o después de esa fecha: asesinato, homicidio no premeditado con agravantes u homicidio no premeditado, homicidio con vehículo, agresión con agravantes, desarmar a un agente del orden público, secuestro, agresión sexual con agravantes, agresión sexual, robo con violencia, robo de un automóvil con personas adentro, incendio intencional con agravantes que expone a otra persona al peligro de muerte o lesiones corporales graves, escalamiento o allanamiento con fines delictivos, robo mediante extorsión al obtener bienes de otro amenazándole con infligirle lesiones corporales, o restringir o sujetar a cualquier persona, o cometer otro delito, trampas explosivas en instalaciones de fabricación o ocurrió el 18 de junio del 2002 distribución de CDS o responsabilidad objetiva por muertes provocadas por drogas; o que o después de esa fecha; terrorismo, o producir o poseer armas químicas, agentes biológicos o dispositivos nucleares o ocurrió el 13 de enero del 2008 o después de esa fecha: radiológicos; o que delitos de mafia de primer grado; o que ocurrió el 14 de agosto del 2013 o después de esa fecha; ocurrió el 1 de noviembre del pornografía infantil; o que 2013 o después de esa fecha; tráfico de armas de fuego.
[brief] Pursuant to the Municipal Land Use Law (“MLUL”), N.J.S.A. 40:55D-1 et seq, the [...] has in place an “Official Master Plan”, being adopted in 1988 (with “Re-Examination Reports” adopted in 2003, 2012 and 2015) (Pa577,716, 741, 760).  Plaintiffs own and operate the “[...]”, being an ongoing and substantial oceanfront seasonal recreational business in place for well over 100 years, located in the immediate vicinity and on part of the Redevelopment Plan area at issue here.  On May 14, 1999, [...] entered into a formal lease with the Defendant Borough for Block 184, Lot 3 (now known as Lot 3.01), along with other real property on adjoining Lot 4, for use for parking and as a commercial Go-Cart Track and related seasonal businesses  The Go-Cart Track and amusement park was, is, and has been an ongoing flourishing operational business.  Because of this long term Lease and the availability of parking, [...] expended large sums of money to improve both this leased property and its nearby amusement park facilities (Pa3).  On July 27, 2005 Keansburg designated the entire Borough as “An Area in Need or Rehabilitation” under the Local Redevelopment Law (“LRHL”), N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-1 et seq.  Later in 2005, Keansburg adopted the original “Beachway Avenue Waterfront Redevelopment Plan” which provided a plan for redevelopment of an area along the beachfront where [...] owned and operated its businesses.  The Plan included Block 184, Lot 3.01, already used by [...] for parking and the Go-Cart Track pursuant to the 1999 Lease.  As a result, the first of many legal challenges to Keansburg’s efforts to establish a Redevelopment Plan for this area commenced.  Most of those legal challenges have either concluded or been mooted by Keansburg’s passage of the SECOND Amended Redevelopment Plan challenged herein (Pa68, 533).  At some point, [...] also ascertained that Keansburg did not actually have legal title to Block 184, Lot 3.01, the parcel Leased and occupied by [...].  [...] on obtaining this significant information then acquired Quitclaim Deeds from various heirs to establish what they claim is clear legal title to Block 184, Lot 3.01, and filed a separate legal action against Keansburg to quiet title in [...]’s favor.  That separate legal action is resolved and a decision entered after a recent Bench Trial in the Chancery Division, Monmouth County – [...] Beach and Boardwalk Company, Inc. a/k/a [...] Beach & Boardwalk Inc. v. [...], a Municipal Corporation; Docket No.: [...].
[brief] And she knew about it - over two months prior to the start of trial.  In Chandok v. Chandok, 968 A. 2d 1196, (App. Div. 2009) recusal was found to be required and the judgment “c[ould] not [be] sustain[ed]” where the Judge had previously “filed a complaint against [the attorney for one of the parties] which, in [that attorney’s] fair description of the pleadings, alleged "that [that attorney] acted deceitfully, that [the attorney] had embezzled funds, and that [the attorney] had assaulted him [the judge] which resulted in his calling the police.
[directive] In material a that have circumstances and facts those only consider shall prosecutor a bail, monetary Facts required.  when court in appear not would released if defendant the that risk the on bearing the than other activity, criminal commit new might defendant that risk the only to relevant or crime violent a commit might or 2C:29-7, N.J.S.A. of violation in jumping bail of offense whether deciding in considered not be shall process, criminal the obstruct to attempt or obstruct Section.
[brief] Here, like *Marmo*, Defendants failed to assert arbitration as an affirmative defense in the Answer (Pa25) to the Counterclaim in the Collection Lawsuit and in their Answer (Pa78) to the Class Action Complaint, despite asserting several other affirmative defenses.  And in both pleadings, the R. 4:5-1 Certification stated that “[t]he matter in controversy is not the subject of any other action pending in any Court or a pending arbitration proceeding; and no other action or arbitration proceeding is contemplated. ”  Here, like *Marmo*, “[the] pleadings strongly weigh as a factor in favor of waiver.
[directive] Establishing Existence of Certain Relevant Facts and Circumstances.  7.6.2  Notwithstanding any other provision of this Section, with respect to any fact or circumstance that is not accounted for in the automated pretrial risk-assessment process (e.g., street gang or other organized crime involvement, especially heinous manner in which offense was committed, threatening statements made by defendant, untreated addiction or mental illness associated with violent or other criminal behavior, out-of-state charges or convictions, nature and extent of history of juvenile delinquency, expunged records, etc.), the prosecutor shall not consider such fact or circumstance as a basis for overcoming the presumption against pretrial 28 N.J.S.A. 2A:162-20 provides that a court, when determining whether to order pretrial detention, may take into account information concerning: (a) the nature and circumstances of the offense charged; (b) the weight of the evidence against the eligible defendant, except that the court may consider the admissibility of any evidence sought to be excluded; (c) the history and characteristics of the eligible defendant, including: (1) the eligible defendant’s character, physical and mental condition, family ties, employment, financial resources, length of residence in the community, community ties, past conduct, history relating to drug or alcohol abuse, criminal history, and record concerning appearance at court proceedings; and (2) whether, at the time of the current offense or arrest, the eligible defendant was on probation, parole, or other release pending trial, sentencing, appeal, or completion of sentence for an offense under federal law, or the law of this or any other state; (d) the nature and seriousness of the danger to any other person or the community that would be posed by the eligible defendant’s release, if applicable; (e) the nature and seriousness of the risk of obstructing or attempting to obstruct the criminal justice process that would be posed by the eligible defendant’s release, if applicable; and (f) the release recommendation of the pretrial services program obtained using a risk assessment instrument under N.J.S.A. 2A:162-25.
[brief] Exhibit AA to [...]’s Certification Day 1 - Highland Park Municipal Court Zoom Session 2PM  Oral Argument 6/23/2021  Exhibit BB to [...]’s Certification --- 5  Also on Pa218 but should not be considered duplicate since the submitted button does not clearly reflect that it was in fact submitted  Day 2 - Highland Park Municipal Court Zoom Session 2PM  Oral Argument 6/23/2021  Exhibit CC to [...]’s Certification  Day 3 - Highland Park Municipal Court Zoom Session 2PM  Oral Argument 6/23/2021  Exhibit DD to [...]’s Certification  Day 4 - Highland Park Municipal Court Zoom Session 2PM  Oral Argument 6/23/2021  [...] Notice of Motion for Summary Judgement to [...], Dated 8/10/2023
[brief] Pursuant to Rule 2:6-1(a)(2), Plaintiffs’ brief is permissible content for Appellants’ Appendix as it raises an issue which is germane to the appeal.  Namely, Plaintiffs’ brief demonstrates that the Trial Court erroneously found that Plaintiffs failed to provide evidence to support their claims that [...] made misrepresentations to Plaintiffs, concealed facts from Plaintiffs, and failed to disclose facts to Plaintiffs.  December 17, 2009, with the intent that Plaintiffs rely on said misrepresentations, adding another substantial semblance of credibility to the scheme to defraud Plaintiffs of their money through the scam [...] transaction.
[brief] [...] said:  Like I described in the report, it is a multi-tiered system where not only individuals hide drugs in a stash location, hand off the drugs and the proceeds to other people, you know, there’s time when we’re doing surveillance that we can’t maintain a constant visual for -- we could miss a split second.  So is there a possibility that any of the detectives or officers want to stop and conduct a field inquiry of who [...] was in the company with while he walked several blocks away from the location we observed in conducting hand-to-hand drug sales -- (1T58-4 to 14).  The officer thereby explained that the police suspected that defendant could be a participant in this “multi-tiered system” of drug distribution.  The officer’s answer on cross-examination that “no facts linked them to criminality” should not be taken at face value, but should be read in context of all of the testimony, including the testimony about local drug dealers’ modus operandi.
[brief] Pa71; Pa48.  The trial court issued a written decision in connection with the Summary Judgment Orders.  Pa50.  With regard to Count I of the FAC and Plaintiff’s contention that the $2 million redevelopment fee was unlawful, the trial court recited the parties’ respective arguments and observed that the LRHL was enacted to “promote the advancement of community interests through programs of redevelopment, rehabilitation and incentives to the expansion and improvement of commercial, industrial, residential and civic facilities.
[brief] See also, *Gonzalez v. Safe & Sound Sec. Corp.*, 185 N.J. 100, 118 (2005); *New Jersey Model Civil Jury Charge*, 1.18, revised October 2016.  In the New Jersey Model Civil Jury Charge, the Court provides the following guidance to the trial court to determine whether an adverse inference charge should be given:  To guide that assessment, the Court in *Hill*\(^8\) prescribed a four-pronged test: (1) that the uncalled witness is peculiarly within the control or power of only the one party, or that there is a special relationship between the party and the witness or the party has superior knowledge of the identity of the witness or of the testimony the witness might be expected to give; (2) that the witness is available to that party both practically and physically; (3) that the testimony of the uncalled witness will elucidate relevant and critical facts issue; and (4) that such testimony appears to be superior to that already utilized in respect to the fact to be proven.