ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] [...] application of the law to the instant matter began with an acknowledgement that whereas the [...]’s use of the Bargaining Council may be unusual, neither the State Constitution nor the NJEERA restricted the [...]’s ability to determine the size of its negotiations team.  (Pa237).  [...] then recognized that the Board did not present any evidence that the Bargaining Council’s involvement at negotiations had caused or would cause any conflict of interest, ill-will, safety or security concerns.  (Pa238).  [...] continued, noting that the [...]’s Bargaining Council members were not mere passive observers to the negotiations process.  Rather, their research and analysis of Board proposals during face-to-face negotiations and the ability to provide written responses to the [...]’s lead negotiators showed that the Bargaining Council members were active participants of the negotiation sessions.  (Pa238-Pa239).  In finding that the [...]’s inclusion of the Bargaining Council as part of its negotiations team was N.J.S.A. 34:13A-5.3, [...] adopted the [...]’s (“[...]”) analysis from I/M/O Belmont School Committee, 2019 WL 3072695 (MA LRC) (hereinafter “Belmont I”) and I/M/O Belmont School Committee, 2021 WL 6883936 (MA LRC) (hereinafter “Belmont II”).
[brief] At trial, defendant offered two defenses to the four traffic stops.  The first concerned the document that he clearly showed [...] and [...], according to video and photographic evidence.  NJSP allows members to create business cards on NJSP equipment, but they are neither considered property of NJSP, nor need to be surrendered by a suspended trooper.  (11T109-5 to 21; 11T152-17 to 23; 11T216-21 to 218-4).  Defendant had a business card while in ADTU, and, in “late January, early February of” 2016, he made a new one after his transfer to the Missing Persons Unit.  (15T52-3 to 5; 16T60-9 to 11; 16T61-24 to 62-2; 16T62-24 to 63-2).  For the latter one, defendant picked a type that appeared similar to the wallet NJSP ID.  (16T63-21 to 64-6; 16T64-22 to 66-10; 16T75-11 to 18; Pa62).  The photographs and videos showed his business card.  (16T128-21 to 129-8).  Defendant did not believe he was doing anything wrong by displaying the business card during traffic stops.  (16T72-6 to 8; 16T116-7 to 15; 16T117-15 to 17; 16T128-12 to 15; 16T167-18 to 168-6).  Defendant denied displaying a copy of S-28 which he had reported stolen.
[brief] THE APPELLATE COURT’S REVIEW OF THIS MATTER IS DE NOVO (APPEALING THE APPELLATE DIVISION OPINION  DECIDED JULY 8, 2022  FOUND AT PA000065)  An appellate court reviews de novo the trial court's determination of the motion to dismiss under Rule 4:6-2(e).  Stop & Shop Supermarket Co., LLC v. County of Bergen, 450 N.J. Super. 286, 290,(App. Div. 2017).  It owes no deference to the trial court's legal conclusions.  Dimitrakopoulos v. Borrus, Goldin, Foley, Vignuolo, Hyman & Stahl, P.C., 237 N.J. 91, 108 (2019).  A.  “ALL” LEGAL MALPRACTICE CLAIMS ARE EXEMPT FROM THE ENTIRE CONTROVERSY DOCTRINE; THIS IS A LEGAL MALPRACTICE CLAIM (APPEALING THE ORDER DATED MAY 17, 2023 FOUND AT PA000337 AND ORDER DATED MAY 26, 2023 FOUND AT PA000351)
[brief] 2T.  At oral argument, [...], Esq., counsel for [...] states on the record that ...the fuel supply agreement was part of the contract.  So when I am speaking to the Court as the attorney for my client, I’m not speaking because I knew it.  I’m speaking because my client had that information.  So the buyer had the complete fuel supply agreement when the agreement was signed, including 39. ”  2T.18:2-8.  The Trial Court then confronts [...] with [...];s position that because the PSA at 10(c) states that there are no existing rights of first refusal, this created the requirement that a modification was necessary.  2T@18:23-21:21.  The Trial Court then states, "...[...] wants the buyer to acknowledge that it has a prior right, and that it was entitled to exact that corrective representation."  2T@22:10-12.  The Court then agrees that whether the buyer ([...]) knew about the ROFR from the MFSA which was supplied as part of the transaction in October of 2022 is an "issue of fact."  2T@22:16.  The Trial Court then stresses the importance of the formal acknowledgement of the buyer that Plaintiff held the ROFR which, in turn, "triggered the 30-day provision".  2T@22:22-23.  Counsel for [...] then recounts the fact that the addendum was initialed by [...] and sent to [...] by [...] on May 4th, 2023 "as requested by [...]"  2T@37:20.  The Trial Court denied the Defendants’ Motion and set a discovery schedule.
[brief] “Due to a potential sale of the business, I am requesting that you provide me with the [...] branding penalties as well as penalties to terminate supply agreement with [...] for site [...].  The potential buyer would operate the site as an unbranded gas station. ”  Da111.\(^4\)  The September 18, 2022 email contained zero terms or conditions and did not constitute a bona fide offer as required by the ROFR.  Ibid.  As requested by [...] for [...], on October 26, 2022, [...] provided the penalty calculations for termination of the supply agreement by email, which were calculated at $512,933.77.  Da112.  However, unbeknownst to [...], 12 days earlier, on October 14, 2022, [...] had already entered into the executed PSA to sell the Premises to [...] for $2.5 million.
[brief] ”  The March 8, 2024 order does not explain why the court did not exercise its authority under Rule 1:5-3 and provide plaintiff an opportunity to submit additional proof such as a tracking number if it had any concerns regarding the service of motion instead of summarily denying the motion.  It is hard to escape the conclusion that the motion judge allowed expediency to prevail over the professionalism and conscientiousness expected of a New Jersey Superior Court Judge.  Because the motion for reconsideration was denied without prejudice, I recognize that the March 8, 2024 order would be deemed interlocutory for which technically a leave to appeal needs to be sought pursuant to Rule 2:5-6.  However, because the March 8, 2024 order is a naked exercise in procrastination and evasion of judicial responsibilities by the motion judge in violation of Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, I respectfully request this court to grant the leave to appeal nunc pro tunc and adjudicate on merits the appeal of the March 8, 2024 order in the interests of justice as well as judicial economy instead of dismissing the appeal as interlocutory.
[brief] Starting with the latter, Landlord reaches all the way back to 1960 for the Appellate Division’s discussion of R. R. 4:53-1 and 4:93-1--rules that no longer exist--in *Franzoni v. Franzoni*, 60 N.J. Super. 519, 522 (App. Div. 1960), a case that does not support Landlord’s position.
[brief] Purpose (a) to encourage the appropriate use of land, purpose (e) to promote appropriate population densities and concentrations, purpose (g) to provide sufficient space and appropriate location for residential and nonresidential uses, purpose (e) to promote appropriate population densities and concentrations, and, purpose (g) to provide sufficient space and appropriate location for residential and nonresidential uses as the land uses are not advances by these variances.  Although the Master Plan and the Housing Element envision this type of development on this site the Master Plan and Zone Plan for the VC-2 Overlay Zone are premised upon conformance with the regulation of the affected areas by the applicable zoning ordinances, and the current application's departure from those regulations are substantial and therefore vitiate advancing the purposes of the Master Plan and Zone Plan.
[brief] Respectfully submitted, [...], Esq. cc: [...], DAG  November 22, 2024  Filed via eCourts [...], Clerk Superior Court of New Jersey  Appellate Division 25 Market Street, P.O. Box 006 Trenton, New Jersey 08625  Re: [...] v. [...]  Docket No. [...]  Dear Mr. Orlando:  Please accept this letter brief on behalf of Respondent, [...] (“[...]”).  TABLE OF CONTENTS
[brief] [...] _____________________________________  [...], ESQ., Attorneys for Plaintiff(s)-Appellant(s), [...], [...], and [...]  Dated: May 1, 2024  ESTATE OF MILES C. BRACKIN : CIVIL ACTION by DEBORAH A. BUTZBACH, : General Administratrix and : Administratrix Ad Prosquendum, DEBORAH A. BUTZBACH, : individually, and PHILLIP S. BRACKIN, JR., individually, Plaintiffs-Appellants, vs. [...], [...], JOHN DOES 1-100 (fictitious names), and ABC CORP.  1 - 100 (fictitious names), JOHN DOES 1- 10(Fictitious names), Defendants-Respondents.  BRIEF AND APPENDIX FOR DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT [...]
[directive] 8.4.6  If the agency wants to continue its administrative interview and the County Prosecutor agrees to grant use immunity, the agency shall advise the subject officer in writing that he or she has been granted use immunity if their answers implicate him or her in a criminal offense.  The officer must then answer the questions specifically related to performing their official duties, but no answer given, nor evidence derived therefrom, may be used against the officer in a criminal proceeding.  If the officer still refuses to answer, he or she is subject to disciplinary charges for that refusal, including dismissal.  This information shall be contained in a form that the subject officer signs and whose signature is witnessed.  The completed form must be made a part of the investigative file.  See the sample form in Appendix H.
[brief] (1T et seq.).  He testified that he learned about the robbery on the day it occurred and began collecting video from the area.  (1T6-6 to 8-7).  As a result, he recovered video from [...] and the church across the street.  (1T7-15 to 22).  The [...] video “showed two individuals, one dressed in black, one dressed in blue, come up to the building, to the door, go into the building. ” (1T8-10 to 12).  After a couple minutes, “they come running out of the building[ a]nd they run down past the church, down towards . . . [...]. ” (1T8-12 to 15).  The church video showed them going into and then out of the building at [...].  (1T8-21 to 9-1).  [...] developed two still images from the video to make an “attempt to identify flyer. ” (1T9-20 to 24).  The purpose of the flyer was to provide the image throughout the police department to see if any officers recognized the suspects from prior experience or in their travels.  (1T10-1 to 7).  [...] received a tip from another officer regarding the male in black, leading them to a home the potential suspect shared with a witness who positively identified him in the photograph as “[...]. ” (1T12-17 to 15-25).  [...] was later identified as [...], upon whom [...] filed charges.
[brief] “The grading discrepancy did not affect the entire Property, the majority of which was wooded.  The grading discrepancy concerned only the [...].  The Court’s reasoning, which focused on the [...], rather than wooded land that was unaffected by the alleged error, was not so palpably incorrect to warrant reconsideration. ”  (Pa23).  In fact, the grading error affected the entire property, which property was no longer “wooded land,” as the judge wrongly surmised.
[brief] Appellate courts review the trial court’s grant or denial of a motion for summary judgment *de novo*, applying the same standard used by the trial court.  *Samolyk v. Berthe*, 251 N.J. 73 (2022); *Stewart v. N.J. Tpk. Auth./Garden State Parkway*, 249 N.J. 642, 655 (2022); *Branch v. Cream-O-Land Dairy*, 244 N.J. 567, 582 (2021).  The Court must consider “whether the competent evidential materials presented, when viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, are sufficient to permit a rational factfinder to resolve the alleged disputed issue in favor of the non-moving party. ”  *Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am.*, 142 N.J. 520, 540 (1995).  Summary judgment is a favored practice in New Jersey, as it eliminates cases from crowded court calendars in which a trial would serve no useful purpose.  See *Judson v. Peoples Bank & Trust Co.*, 17 N.J. 67, 77 (1954).  It is designed to provide a “prompt, businesslike, and inexpensive” method of disposing of any claim that plainly lacks any sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury.  *Id.* at 74.  For nearly as long as [...] has complained to the Township about water intrusion on her property, courts in New Jersey have recognized that disposition by summary judgment is proper where the party opposing summary judgment points only to disputed issues of fact that are “of an insubstantial nature.
[directive] N.J.S.A. 2A:162-18, -19(f).  Trial courts can consider a number of factors to assess those risks: The length of detention to date as well as the projected length of 1. ongoing detention.  See Commonwealth v. Lougee, 147 N.E.3d 464, 475 (Mass. 2020); see also El-Hage, 213 F.3d at 78-79 (considering the expected length of pretrial detention through the end of trial in the context of a due process challenge); El-Gabrowny, 35 F.3d at 65 (same); Millan, 4 F.3d at 1044 (same); Gonzales Claudio, 806 F.2d at 341 (same).  The Judiciary is committed to restart jury trials as soon as practicable.  The Court did so temporarily from September to mid-November 2020.  In that limited time, trial courts conducted about a dozen trials yet were able to 20 resolve more than 340 civil and criminal cases by scheduling actual trial dates matters.4 in those Nov. 16, 2020 Notice and Order, at 2; Press Release, New Jersey Courts, New Jersey Supreme Court Order Suspends Jury Trials Amid Second Wave of COVID-19 Pandemic (Nov. 16, 2020).  As the second wave of the pandemic crests and more people are vaccinated, we hope to able to resume trials later this year.  That said, it is difficult to be precise in estimating the projected length of detention at this time because of the ongoing and evolving nature of the pandemic.  Whether a defendant has been or will be in detention longer than the 2. likely amount of time the person would actually spend in jail if convicted.
[brief] Contrary to the argument of Plaintiff the percentage of wetlands found on this property is not 89% because it has not been determined by a measurement made by a licensed professional.  Ja169, Ja170, Ja54 Line 9 to Line 15 and Line 20 to Line 23, Ja107 Line 19 to Ja108 Line 17.  Both applications requested substantial clear cutting along [...] destroying the scenic tree lined street, neighborhood seclusion and undeveloped feel of the neighborhood.  169a to Ja172, Ja217, Ja224, Ja275, Ja289  Both applications raised substantial concern with regard to water runoff affecting neighboring properties.  Ja123 Line 12 to Line 25, Ja135 Line 7 to Line 14  Both applications proposed substantial fill be trucked to the property to increase the grade of the home by 10 feet thereby raising flooding concerns for a neighboring property and [...].
[brief] (Da1\(^1\)-Da15).  After the motion was opposed, the trial \(^1\) Da = Defendant/respondent’s appendix. court conducted a plenary hearing on the question of whether plaintiff had agreed to a settlement with defendant [...], on January 4, 2024.  (1T:5-56).  The trial court granted defendant [...]’s motion at the conclusion of the plenary hearing.  (1T:43-55; Da16).  **COUNTER-STATEMENT OF FACTS**
[brief] ”  Id. conclude that the checks he did produce constitutes a complete record of his payments in 2016 and 2017.  A  Well, I have the checks to my bank and know the months that I worked there.  Q  When you say you have the checks, did you produce those checks in this litigation?  A  Yes, I did.  Q  And what year did those checks reflect?  A  I assume from the beginning, 2000 -- is it 2011?  I think so.  Because I went to my bank and asked them to give me all the checks from [...] from those years.  I think [...] has those checks.  [...]: I'm going to share a document that I'll be marking as D-7.  Q  These are the checks that were produced in this case by your attorney.  A  Uh-huh.  Q  Are these the checks you're referring to?  A  Yes.  Q  So is it your assertion that you have provided all the checks that you had going back to 2011 from [...]?  A  Yeah, I assume so, because I went to the bank and asked them to give me all the checks from [...] for those years.  Da69 at 41:1-25.  Distilled to its essence, Defendants did not induce Plaintiff into his statute of limitations problems, and Plaintiff’s sham affidavit in combination with his newly referenced testimony highlights Plaintiff’s lack of candor and further demonstrates why the lower Court’s ruling in granting Defendant’s summary judgment was correct and should not be disturbed.
[brief] See discussion of the proposed Rule in 22 N.J.R.1191-92 (April 16, 1990).  The mandatory 30% view shed and 2 to 1 step back requirements of the Rule are numerical standards that any architect or engineer can follow when designing a building—there is no special agency expertise involved.  [...] chose to ignore the Rule and applied for a CAFRA permit to build an almost 100 foot tall building rising straight up (not stepped back) only 88 feet from the Long Branch boardwalk, whereas a building that tall must be set back almost 200 feet.  And it provides only a 25% view shed.  Appellant [...], owner of an adjacent apartment building, filed objections to the application.  Blackridge’s apartment building was constructed in compliance with view shed and step back requirements and thus has significantly less interior space (fewer apartment units) than a block like, taller, wider, non-stepped back building such as [...] proposed.  [...] first denied the application due to its blatant non-compliance with the mandatory requirements of the Rule.
[brief] It is a discretionary rule that calls on one Court to balance the value of judicial deference for the rulings of a coordinate (court) against those factors that bear on the pursuit of justice and, particularly the search for truth.  *Lombardi v. Masso*, 207 NJ at 538-39 (quoting *Hart v. City of Jersey City*, 308 N.J. Super 487, 498 (App. Div. 1998).  The doctrine should not and cannot be applied if the decision is clearly erroneous and enforcement would cause manifest injustice.
[brief] Absent exceptional circumstances, no extension of the discovery period may be permitted after an arbitration or trial date is fixed.  If a motion for an extension of discovery is returnable prior to the expiration of the discovery period, the party seeking an extension must demonstrate good cause and not exceptional circumstances to justify the extension.  Viti v. Brown, 359 N.J. Super. 40, 45 (Law Div. 2003); Montiel v. Ingersol, 347 N.J. Super. 246, 248-249 (Law Div. 2001).
[brief] TRANSCRIPT  KEY  “Da” – Defendant-appellant’s appendix  “PSR” – Presentence Report “1T” – February 10, 2021 (motion)  “2T” – May 31, 2022 (trial)  “3T” – June 1, 2022 (trial)  “4T” – June 2, 2022 – Part 1 (trial)  “5T” – June 2, 2022 – Part 2 (trial)  “6T” – June 7, 2022 (trial)  “7T” – June 8, 2022 (trial)  “8T” – June 9, 2022 (trial)  “9T” – October 6, 2022 (sentencing)  | CASES | PAGE NOS. | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------| | Commonwealth v. Wardsworth, 124 N.E.
[brief] Letter From Police Safety to [...] Regarding Outstanding Bill for Discovery, Dated 7/29/2020 (Attached at Pa0051)  Facsimile to [...] From [...] 6/22/2020 (Attached at Pa077)  Letter From [...] to [...] 6/22/2020 (Attached at Pa078)  Notice of Claim to [...], Dated 2/27/2020 (Attached at Pa0053)
[brief] Plaintiffs believe that they can force BOG members to maintain in-county residency to continue their service, while Defendants assert that residency is a condition for appointment or reappointment.  The Rutgers Act is silent as to a continuing residency requirement, and the parties propose two vastly different interpretations of the existing language.  Those facts demonstrate that the alleged continuing residency requirement is not “unmistakably clear. ”  Plaintiffs’ action, therefore, cannot survive a proper Berg analysis—an analysis the trial court should have undertaken but did not even mention.  Nor can this action survive other more generalized principles related to the interpretation of contracts or the tenets related to an ordinary statutory construction case.  **CONCLUSION**
[directive] Guideline  4.  Limitation  No plea agreements whatsoever will be allowed in drunken driving or certain drug offenses.  A.  Driving while under the influence of liquor or drugs (N.J.S.A. 39:4-50)  . . .  If a defendant is charged with driving while under the influence of liquor or drugs (N.J.S.A. 39:4-50) and refusal to provide a breath sample (N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.2) arising out of the same factual transaction, and the defendant pleads guilty to the N.J.S.A. 39:4-50 offense, the judge, on recommendation of the prosecutor, may dismiss the refusal charge.  . . .  Nothing contained in these limitations shall prohibit the judge from considering a plea agreement as to the collateral charges arising out of the same factual transaction connected with any of the above enumerated offenses in Sections A and B of this Guideline.  The judge may, for certain other offenses subject to minimum mandatory penalties, refuse to accept a plea agreement unless the prosecuting attorney represents that the possibility of conviction is so remote that the interests of justice requires the Attorney General Guideline:  Page 14  Prosecution of DWI & Refusal Violations acceptance of a plea to a lesser offense.  Plea Agreement Guideline as adopted 7-28-2004, effective 9-1- 2004.  The Supreme Court Plea Agreement Guidelines only apply to two specific offenses: DWI, N.J.S.A. 39:4-50 and DWI refusal, N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.2 and 39:4-50.4a.  They do not apply to other DWI or DWI refusal offenses referenced in the definitions for this Guideline.  In any situation where a prosecutor, in a Municipal Court proceeding, intends to engage in plea bargaining, subject to the Limitations imposed by the Supreme Court, the prosecutor must consider other obligations associated with plea negotiations.
[brief] threshold arbitrability question, and an arbitrator must determine whether [...]’s claims against [...] are arbitrable”); *Goffe v. Foulke Management Corp.*, 238 N.J. 191, 211, 208 A.3d 859, 872 (2019) (“[o]ur court has acknowledged the legitimacy and applicability of…delegation provisions in New Jersey arbitration agreements”) *(citation omitted)*; *Schmidt v. Laub*, 2020 N.J. Super.  Unpub. LEXIS 827, * 11 (App. Div. May 5, 2020) (“[w]e conclude that the incorporation of the AAA rules into the arbitration provision clearly and unambiguously expressed the parties’ intent to empower the arbitrator to determine arbitrability”).  Here, the Delegation Clause in the parties’ arbitration agreement specifically provides that the AAA or the JAMS rules “will apply” to the arbitration of any “Disputes,” as that term is defined in the arbitration agreement’s Dispute Clause.
[brief] As the judge correctly instructed the jury, “[m]ere association… with an alleged coconspirator is not enough to establish a defendant’s guilt of conspiracy…” (16T 160-22 to 24)  The preceding only applies to the question of whether or not [...] knew in advance that [...] intended to try to kill [...] and/or [...].  Mr. [...] submits that there was no evidence from which the jury could have reasonably inferred that he had prior knowledge.  But even if this Court finds otherwise, it must conclude that there was insufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that [...] had conspired with [...] in that attempt.  The most a reasonable jury could have found was that he had chosen to go along for the ride.