ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] *Id.*  As further set forth in *Weinberg*, 173 N.J. at 253  “Read sensibly, the statute allows a private cause of action to proceed for all available remedies, *including an injunction*, whenever a consumer can plead a claim of ascertainable loss that can survive a motion for summary judgment.  The legislative intent to permit a private cause of action under the Act would be frustrated if a private litigant, who succeeds in bringing such a claim to a jury, must gamble on whether he or she will prevail ultimately on proof of the loss in order to obtain attorneys' fees, when he or she otherwise proves unlawful conduct. ” (emphasis added).  Therefore with respect to injunctive relief, the only difference between a private attorney general and the Attorney General of New Jersey is that the Attorney General of New Jersey does need to allege an ascertainable loss.
[brief] Dunbar Homes, Inc. v. Franklin Twp. Zoning Bd., 233 N.J. 546 (2018).  As held in Yousefian v Wayne Twp., 152 N.J. Super. 111 (Law Div. 1977):  A local zoning determination will be set aside only when it is arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable.  Even when doubt is entertained as to the wisdom of the action, or as to some part of it, there can be no judicial declaration of invalidity in the absence of a clear abuse of discretion by the public agencies involved.  (citing Kramer v. Sea Girt Bd. of Adj., 45 N.J.  268 (1965)).  As further stated in Wilson v. Brick Tp. Zoning Bd., 405 N.J. Super. 189 (App. Div. 2009):  In reviewing a decision to grant a variance, courts typically recognize that municipal bodies, "because of their peculiar knowledge of local conditions, must be allowed wide latitude in the exercise of their delegated discretion."  Booth v. Bd. of Adjustment of Rockaway Tp., 50 N.J. 302, 306, 234 A.2d 681 (1967).  The standard of deference should be even greater where the Board is undertaking a purely planning function, as it was herein.  See, Fallone Prop. V. Bethlehem Plan. Bd, 369 N.J. Super 552, 561 (App. Div. 2004).  As the Trial Court noted “The Committee went through the proper procedure for sending the redevelopment plan to the Planning Board for referral and recommendations.  The Planning Board evaluated reports by their own planning expert and plaintiffs’ planning expert to make the determination that the redevelopment plan was not inconsistent with the master plan. ” (3T47:22-48:3).  The Board’s action was amply supported by the Planner’s November 11th letter as well as his testimony on November 22, 2022.  As such, the Board’s action cannot be said to have been arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable.  The Trial Court agreed in finding the adoption of the redevelopment plan was adequately supported by the record, and that plaintiff failed to provide sufficient evidence that the defendants’ actions were arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable.  (3T63:1-9).
[brief] In Johnson v. Salem Corp., it was determined by our Appellate Division that a judge need not recuse himself because of his general life experiences which might give him a particular insight into a controversy provided he is not rendered biased.  189 N.J. Super. 50 (App. Div. 1983), aff’d as modified on other courts, 97 N.J. 78 (1984).  In Zucker v. Silverstein, there was no need for recusal based on the fact that a judge represented non-party grantors in a sale of lands to assignors for the benefit of creditors where the asset status of those lands was in controversy.  134 N.J. Super. 39 (App. Div. 1975).  In Ferren v. Sea Isle City, a judge was not disqualified from sitting on matters in which a party-municipality was represented by the judge’s former law partner.  243 N.J. Super. 522 (App. Div. 1990).  In the present matter, Respondent has failed to set forth any facts regarding [...]’s actions as a N.J. legislator as it relates to N.J.S.A. 34:15.11.  No legislative history was produced nor were any other facts or documentation produced in the proceedings below or in support of this Appeal.
[brief] (Responding to Appellant’s Point II).  [...]’s merits brief also asserts for the first time that [...] did not appropriately address Total Daily Maximum Loads (TMDLs) for water pollutants or whether the Project is consistent with the areawide Water Quality Management Plan (“Areawide WQM Plan”).  But [...] never raised this concern in the multiple public comment letters it submitted, at the virtual meeting held with [...], or even in its Case Information Statement.  Had [...] done so, [...] would have explained why the Project is consistent with the Areawide WQM Plan.  See (Aa12; Aa24) (addressing [...]’s other public comments).  The public may “comment on the consistency of [[...]’s] permits with areawide WQM plans” and these “comments shall be taken into consideration prior to the issuance of a final permit. ”  N.J.A.C. 7:13-3.2(e).  This is particularly relevant here because the parties agree “[t]here is a rebuttable presumption” that a wastewater generating project that conveys the wastewater “to a NJPDES regulated wastewater facility is consistent with the areawide [WQM] plan” if it is in a sewer service area. \(^7\) N.J.A.C. 7:15-3.2(b).  No one \(^7\)“Sewer service area” means “the land area identified in an areawide WQM plan from which wastewater generated is conveyed to, or has been determined to be disputes the Project is in a sewer service area and that it includes a proposed sewer service extension line.  (Ab17-24).  Thus, both portions of the presumption are facially fulfilled and [...] received no comments—from [...] or any other party—raising any WQM consistency issues.  Given the extensive regulatory scheme governing water discharges, and no specific concerns raised regarding this Project’s WQMP compliance, [...] proceeded accordingly.
[brief] (Da259) (emphasis added).  The trial court not only failed to follow the Appellate Division’s instructions, but also did not follow the requirements for fee shifting under Rule 4:42-9(a)(2).  Our courts adhere to the American Rule, that litigants bear their own fees unless otherwise provided by court rule, statute, or contract.  See In re Niles Trust, 176 N.J. 282, 294 (2003); Henderson v. Camden Cty. Mun. Util. Auth., 176 N.J. 554, 564 (2003).
[brief] The minimum requirements of due process are notice and the opportunity to be heard.  *Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill* 470 U.S. 532, 533 (1985); *Nicoletta v. N. Jersey Dist. Water Supply Comm'n*, 77 N.J. 145, 165 (1978).  In fact, the New Jersey Supreme Court explicitly held in *Silviera-Francisco v. Bd. of Educ. Of City of Elizabeth*, 224 N.J. 126 (2016), that:  Notice and an opportunity to respond to an issue raised by a party or a court are fundamental elements of due process and a fair hearing.  *Mettinger v. Globe Slicing Mach. Co.*, 153 N.J. 371, 389, 709 A.2d 779 (1998).  Therefore, a court that recognizes a jurisdictional defect should notify the parties and permit them to address the issue of the court's jurisdiction.  *N. J. Office of Emp. Relations v. Commc'n Workers of Am.*, 154 N.J. 98, 108, 711 A.2d 300 (1998).  *Id.* at 141 (emphasis added).  Here, Appellants had no notice of the Commission’s abandonment of its prior holding as to what point in time jurisdiction over school board members is triggered under the School Ethics Act.  As a result, Appellants had no opportunity to be heard on the matter.  By the Court’s holding in *Silviera-Francisco*, this violated their right to due process.
[brief] (13T 47)  THE COURT: I know.  [...]: -- and this -- all this -- why?  If it's all -- you're asking [...] to get the information from [...]?  Your Honor, this information has to come from [...].  It has to come from an independent person in these proceedings.  MR. GALLAGHER:  Your Honor, I'm going to get the checks.  I'm going to try and get the checks from BBT tank -- [...] -- I'll get it right one of these days-- [...].  If the checks are made out to [...], -- THE COURT: Right.  MR. GALLAGHER: --what the delineation for principle and interest is of no business or concern for this Estate.  (13T 48)  Essentially [...] took the position that these insurance questions were “no business or concern for this Estate. ”  MR. GALLAGHER:  They're not part of the Estate.  I'll get the checks.  I don't want to go out and get the checks and them say, oh, I don't have a -- I don't have a cover letter for this one policy, so therefore the policy is void.  Obviously it was accepted and paid out by the company.  If I get copies of the check, I don't --I can't get anything more.  (13T 48)  THE COURT:  Hm-hm.  No.  [...]:  I think -- I think the Court understands that my bigger question is whether the checks should have been made payable to [...].  And [...] may also have a problem here, and I am not assuming that they don't based upon the way this was handled, and based upon the way [...] answered.  [...] told [...] that they worked for [...].  That's how close these entities are to each other and their relationships are to each other.  I don't know that [...] should have received that check.  And I think [...]’s silence is disturbing.  (13T 48)  THE COURT:  Well, let's see what [...] is going to do, but in the meantime I've resolved quite a bit of this, and I think that the only thing that we have that's still is going to be a problem or that we're still looking into are the checks for the two policies, and as [...] said, if she has an outstanding subpoena, I expect that to be honored.
[brief] Id. at *2  Here in this case, the facts are even more favorable for my position, in that: 1) unlike Haylett who had no relationship whatsoever with the vehicle’s titled-owner ([...], whom was still alive), my sister and I had inherent financial interest (and standing) as the natural heirs of our mom’s vehicle; 2) unlike [...], our deceased mom could not possibly ever “redeem” her vehicle; 3) our mom’s vehicle would never be driven again, unlike the Perez vehicle that was driven on the road again by a new owner; and 4) our mom had expressly assigned her vehicle rights to us (i.e. she had signed it for the purpose of our being able to sell it after she passed), and she had authorized me to negotiate the sale of the vehicle post-mortem.
[brief] The Teston opinion went on to say that:  These decisions and advisory opinions also make clear the use of a disclaimer does not give a school board official carte blanche to then discuss Board business and/or matters in a way that is, or appears to be, on behalf of the Board.  Ibid.  Here, Respondent's Facebook posts did nothing of the kind they did not discuss business of the Board and do not appear to be posted on behalf of the Board.  By contrast, the Respondent Board of Education member in Teston wrote an op-ed article that endorsed four candidates for election to the Board while criticizing complainant, another candidate for election to the board, and contending that she should not be elected.  Id. at 1, 2-3.  The Commission observed that "the power of Board-backed non-endorsement of a candidate cannot be denied."  Id. at 11.  No such evidence exists in this matter.
[brief] Order of January 19, 2016, Dismissing Plaintiffs’ Complaint against Defendants [...], Esq., and [...]……………………………………41a–42a  Order of November 10, 2016, Denying Plaintiffs’ Motion to Vacate the Order of January 19, 2016…………………………………………………50a–51a (1T40:23–41:10)  Order of April 3, 2018, Denying Plaintiffs’ Motion to Vacate the Order of January 19, 2016…………………………………………………………188a–189a (2T68:7 – 69:2)  Order of January 24, 2020, Denying Plaintiffs’ Motion to Amend the Complaint……………………………………………………………..376a–377a (3T84:18-20)  Order of December 16, 2020, Denying Plaintiffs’ Motion to Reconsider the Order of January 24, 2020………………………………………………379a–380a (5T26:9-11)
[brief] The Special Master rejected the [...]’ arguments that work preparing certain witnesses on contract claims, that had little to do with their RICO claims, should be excluded.  (39079a-39082a).  The Special Master’s analysis on this point reflects his broader error of awarding fees for work that might have some small, tangential connection to the RICO claims, instead of adhering to this Court’s requirement to only include such fees if the work was “reasonably required” for those claims.  Thus, the Special Master found that fees for the testimony of [...] and [...] were recoverable, notwithstanding that they testified about contract claims; that is, the partnership’s inception in the 1980s long before the RICO limitations period.  (39060a).  But the Special Master made no finding that the actual testimony elicited, in its entirety, was reasonably required to show whether the parties “had agreed to distribute money in a particular way or allow for self-dealing. ” (39080a).  Similarly, as to the testimony of [...], [...], and [...], who testified about the initial development of the Project, the Special Master found that this testimony was “relevant” to the RICO claims because these witnesses testified that they interacted with [...], not with the [...], and [...]’s work developing the Project helped rebut the [...]’ entitlement to development fees.  (39081a).  The tangential relevance of a small piece of these witnesses’ testimony does not establish that the entirety, or even most, of their testimony was “reasonably required” for the RICO claims.  Defendants’ Appeal.
[directive] Note:  Certain convictions will render the person ineligible for a Certificate, for example NERA crimes (N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2), second degree crimes defined in chapters 13, 14, 15, 16, 24, 27, of of 30, 33, Title 2C the New Jersey Statutes, and Megan's 38 Law crimes under N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2.  See N.J.S.A. 2A: 168A- 8(c).
[brief] On or about January 3, 2023 the [...] received [...]’s Request for Amended Benefits Form.  Pa66.  On or about March 3, 2023, [...] provided an Eligibility Registration Form to register his presence at Ground Zero under the Ricci Act and a Request for Amended Benefits Form.  Pa18.  Pa20.  On or about February 8, 2023, the Division of Pensions administratively denied [...]’s application.  Pa66.  On or about March 3, 2023, [...], along with many others, appealed the Division of Pensions Administrative Denial to the [...].  Pa23.  On or about April 4, 2023, the [...] issued an initial decision to deny [...]’s request to register for the Ricci Act.  Pa51.  On or about May 9, 2023, [...] appealed the Board’s initial decision and requested an administrative hearing.  Pa54.  The Board denied an administrative hearing and issued a Final Agency Decision on July 26, 2023.  Pa9.  On or about August 7, 2023, [...] requested reconsideration; however, the Board did not address the request because it did not meet prior to the appeal being filed.  Pa60.  This appeal ensued.
[brief] These restrictions demonstrate that the data, even after a person has entered into a license agreement, is still not freely useable, Repko, 2011 WL 3875987 at *7, and the [...] does not have “an intention to widely disseminate information,” United States ex rel. Osheroff v. Humana Inc., 776 F.3d 805, 813 (11th Cir. 2015).  Its intention is patently the opposite: to restrict dissemination.  Finally, the [...] does not have anything like First Amendment-type freedom that are the hallmark of the “news media. ”  The [...] had to seek the permission of the [...] to even permit it to license data in the first place and must seek the [...]’s permission to change virtually any aspect of its subscription services.  See, e.g., [...] Release No. 34-66522, dated Mar. 6, 2012; [...] Release No. 34-59881, dated May 7, 2009.  Even the information that the [...] can even offer is chosen by the [...], which supervises every aspect of the operation of the SHORT Subscription Service and the SHORT Historical Data Product.  See Ja2891, 2894 (history of [...]’s seeking [...]’s approval for changes to data product offerings).  There is no known news media that must ask the government for permission to change how it operates.
[brief] Defendant relies on Whitaker, 200 N.J. at 448-49 (2009), to assert that the State relied on a “faulty theory of liability” when it told the jury that defendant could still be guilty of murder if [...] was the shooter and [...] helped him hide the murder weapon because Whitaker prohibits accomplice liability for individuals who become involved after the crime has been committed.  (Db33-34).  However, the State submits that Whitaker’s facts are distinguished from this case because defendant is the alleged principle in this case and there was sufficient information for the jury to determine that defendant intended to commit the relevant offenses.
[brief] ”  Id. at 370  Although that municipal power may be restricted when “the State Legislature has not spoken” and also involves “matters inherently in need of uniform treatment. ”  Id.  Here, however, the Legislature has spoken through P.L. 1898, c. 197, N.J.S.A. 48:7-6, and N.J.S.A. 48:7-1; and in doing so has granted the power without restriction.  By conferring that power, the Legislature also determined that the placement and manner of construction of above ground lines is not a matter inherently in need of uniform treatment.
[brief] From FY2008-09, when the SFRA was enacted, until the present time, the amount [...] actually contributed to its school budget through its local tax levy was significantly less than its LFS as calculated under the SFRA.  (Aa1110-12; Aa1873).  For instance, in FY2009, [...]’s LFS was calculated at $196,262,527, but it contributed only $86,122,268 through its local levy.  (Aa331; Aa347; Aa1110; Aa1459-60; Aa1873).  Between then and FY2022, [...]’s LFS has increased by 171%, from $196,262,527 to $532,807,366, reflecting a dramatic evolution in the District’s income and property wealth relative to other districts in the State.  (Aa1110-12; Aa1873).  Due to [...]’s rising LFS, coupled with the impact of tax abatements and tax levy caps, over this period [...] continued to under-tax as compared to its LFS.  (Aa10-11; Aa1110-12; Aa1459-60; Aa1873).  For example, in FY2018, [...]’s LFS was calculated at $370,261,455, yet it contributed only $116,692,448 through its local levy.  (Aa718; Aa728; Aa1111-12; Aa1460; Aa1873).  In FY2020, [...]’s local levy of $136,504,704 was 28% of its LFS of $474,039,468.  (Aa1112; Aa1509; Aa1518; Aa1873).  In FY2021, [...]’s LFS was calculated at $522,089,435, but it contributed $189,234,798 (or $332,854,637 less than its LFS), through its local levy.  (Aa1112; Aa1519; Aa1528; Aa1873).  And in FY2023, its local levy of $426,247,606 was more than 80% of its LFS of $532,016,412.  (Aa1112; Aa1147; Aa1538; Aa1873).  Moreover, in looking at the funding [...] has received under the SFRA, [...] has consistently received more funding than it should have received before aid growth caps were applied or adjustment aid was calculated (“uncapped aid”): | Fiscal Year | Uncapped State Aid | Actual K-12 State Aid | Amount over Uncapped | % Over Uncapped Aid | |-------------|--------------------|-----------------------|----------------------|---------------------| | FY2009 | $306,574,506 | $417,733,738 | $111,159,232 | 36.3% | | FY2010 | $307,786,723 | $417,733,738 | $109,947,015 | 35.7% | |--------|--------------|--------------|--------------|-------| | FY2011 | $290,947,588 | $391,023,629 | $100,076,071 | 34.4% | | FY2012 | $301,827,281 | $417,859,149 | $116,031,868 | 38.4% | | FY2013 | $303,205,542 | $417,859,150 | $114,653,608 | 37.8% | | FY2014 | $309,098,776 | $417,859,150 | $108,760,374 | 35.2% | | FY2015 | $308,317,677 | $418,471,290 | $110,153,613 | 35.7% | | FY2016 | $306,778,250 | $418,859,260 | $112,081,010 | 36.5% | | FY2017 | $286,939,364 | $418,779,890 | $131,840,526 | 45.9% | | FY2018 | $258,849,750 | $410,404,292 | $151,554,542 | 58.5% | | FY2019 | $236,126,258 | $406,904,292 | $170,778,034 | 72.3% | | FY2020 | $197,604,778 | $379,711,659 | $182,106,881 | 92.2% | [(Aa1458-59).
[brief] THE FAILURE TO PROVIDE THE TRANSCRIPTS OF THE 2004 AND 2010 PLANNING BOARD RESOLUTION IS FATAL TO PLAINTIFF’S CLAIM OF DEDICATION  Plaintiff places almost exclusive reliance upon a 2010 Planning Board Resolution in which Plaintiff asserts that the internal roadways in question were addressed and intended for dedication.  The transcript of that 2010 Resolution proceeding was never presented in this case.  Plaintiff did not provide a transcript but did provide a number of maps.  (See Pa 110)" (2002), “Pa171" (2004) and Pa173 (2010).  But there is no evidence in the evidentiary record that those maps or plats were ever reviewed or approved by the planning board in 2004 or 2010.  In New Jersey, where there is a dispute as to whether private property has been accepted by a municipality, the private property owner bears the burden to establish the requisite intent and actual dedication.  Velasco v. Goldman Builders, Inc., 93 N.J. Super. 123. 137, (App. Div. 1966) (“doubts are generally "resolved against the dedicator and in favor of the public””)  In this matter the Plaintiff has not met its high burden.  It was error of the trial court to essentially shift the burden of proof upon the Borough to prove that the dedication did not occur.  POINT IV
[brief] They have no absolute right to construct a project of any size or shape in a district selected by them, merely on the thesis that senior housing promotes the public welfare. ”  Id. at 517-18 (emphasis added).  Stated another way, the Court in Price vs. Strategic Capital Partners, LLC, 404 N.J.Super. 295, 306 (App.Div. 2008) held that, in addressing the so-called negative criteria, the applicant would need to demonstrate that the increase in density would not have a more detrimental effect on the neighborhood than construction of the project in a manner consistent with the zone’s restrictions.
[brief] In Shark River, the District Court found that Plaintiff’s notice of an alleged violation of the Clean Water Act was defective.  In affirming the District Court on an alternative basis, the court stated:  Although the Notice was sufficient to permit Defendants to locate the site of the alleged violation, it was defective in another, key respect.  It did not ‘provide enough information to enable the recipient, i.e., [Defendants], to identify the specific effluent discharge limitation which has been violated, including the parameter violated[.]’  Hercules, 50 F.3d at 1348 ("We read the regulation to require just what it says[.]").  Thus, WE WILL AFFIRM THE DISMISSAL OF THE [...]'S CITIZEN SUIT ON THIS ALTERNATIVE GROUND – ALTHOUGH IT WAS NOT REACHED BY THE DISTRICT COURT.