ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] Aggravating Factor #4a applies when the offense was committed as part of a sophisticated drug-distribution operation that involves a hierarchical structure, or a division of responsibilities, or the use of a corporation or a legitimate business to conduct or conceal the criminal conduct or to launder the proceeds of such conduct.  The point value for this Aggravating Factor ranges from +3 to +4, which should be determined by the prosecutor on the basis of the degree of sophistication, hierarchical structure, or exploitation of a corporate structure or legitimate business, as well as the scope and magnitude of the operation, the number of persons involved in various levels within the operation, and the length of time during which the operation existed.  Aggravating Factor #4b applies when there is a substantial likelihood that the defendant is involved in organized criminal activity.  This factor is derived substantially verbatim from the aggravating circumstance defined in N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1a(5).  As noted above, this factor shall not be used when the defendant is subject to Special Application and Enhancement Feature A set forth in Section 11.1 (“Street Gang Involvement”).
[brief] Nor would a reasonably willing buyer of the Property here pay substantially more for the outlets, pizza ovens, refrigerators, and the like.  Here, it is apparent that [...] and [...] submitted a net opinion on FFE by inventorying nearly every floor tile, wall, and ceiling in the Property and calling it a “fixture. ”  [...]’s report is merely a bare inventory of 516 items which he concluded (without factual basis) were present in 1994, including nonsensical items such as tiles, lights, “soap dispenser[s],” “paper towel holder[s],” appliances, shelving, electrical outlets, sinks, toilets, “toilet paper holder[s],” “wall cover[s],” “dropped ceiling,” “plywood partitions,” “circuit breaker panel[s],” paintings on windows, wall-to-wall carpeting, counters, and cabinets.  Pa281-Pa336.  Lot 19 was appraised “as improved,” which inherently meant that everything that was already in the property would factor into the real estate value.  A third-party buyer would never offer Market Value on the Property if that buyer had to pay separately for each and every electric outlet, tile, light, wall cover, dropped ceiling, circuit breaker panel, carpeting, counter, and cabinet.  Significantly, none of the items in [...]’s report add any value to the “as improved” state of Lot 19.  Market value requires the parties to place themselves in the shoes of a hypothetical buyer, who would offer a fair price for the Property *as-is* in the hopes of renting the units out to tenants with similar equipment needs.  Items needed to get a certificate of occupancy, such as toilets and ceiling tiles, are inherently included in the market value of a property.  The same rationale also applies to the larger equipment inventoried by [...].  There were several iterations of restaurant tenants who continued to use the existing kitchen equipment in the units when the previous tenant vacated.  The value of such equipment was “baked” into the lease agreement and rent, not separately accounted for.  [...] testified that a tenant coming in would not start “taking tiles off the wall,” but would “use whatever’s there” in a turnkey operation.  7T123:23-124:6.  No purchaser would be “reasonably willing” to pay substantially more for Lot 19 with such FFE included.  At a minimum, no purchaser would permit the addition of a 34% markup on appraiser values that *already* include subcontractor fees, to benefit some “phantom” general contractor.  [...] valued the FFE as if a *new* tenant wanted the exact same setup, rather than an existing tenant who would already have the benefit of the existing items in the unit.  This approach is not the correct method of calculating just compensation for existing FFE, as it far exceeds any reasonable replacement value.
[directive] Law enforcement executives shall not assign to the internal affairs function any person responsible for representing members of a collective bargaining unit.  The conflict of interest arising from such an assignment would be detrimental to the internal affairs function, the subject officer, the person so assigned, the bargaining unit and the agency as a whole.  Also, a bargaining unit representative should not be permitted to represent more than one witness or subject in a single investigation, in part to avoid potential conflicts of interest.  Although a witness/subject is entitled to a representative, he/she is not necessarily entitled to a particular representative.  4.2.6
[brief] In this case, no such relationship exists.  Neither [...] nor any other [...] lawyer involved in the representation of Plaintiff traveled to New Jersey in connection with the representation, was licensed to practice law in New Jersey, conducted legal research in New Jersey or regarding New Jersey law, or did any work on the matter that implicated New Jersey law.  Da168; Da184; Da224–25.  Those undisputed facts are alone dispositive, as the alleged conduct that forms the basis for Plaintiff’s claim simply has no nexus to any of Defendants’ limited contacts with New Jersey, much less the direct relationship required to warrant specific jurisdiction.  See, e.g., Dutch Run, 450 N.J. Super. at 598–603 (no specific jurisdiction where alleged “negligence forming plaintiff’s cause of action did not arise from defendant’s contacts with New Jersey” and plaintiff could not “show any relationship between the underlying matter and the [defendant’s] business or attorneys in New Jersey”).
[directive] In the alternative, an administrative investigation may commence with a county or municipal prosecutor’s decision to dismiss a complaint against a subject officer.  A finding of guilt by the Superior Court or a municipal court may assist in resolving an administrative investigation because such a finding requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt, which is more than is required to meet the burden of proof in administrative matters.  6.3.8  A disposition that does not involve a finding of guilt by the courts or where a complaint is dismissed by a county or municipal prosecutor means that proof beyond a reasonable doubt has not been found.  However, it does not mean that an administrative investigation cannot be pursued or should be closed.  The absence of proof beyond a reasonable doubt does not foreclose the possibility that an investigation may reveal evidence that meets the burden of proof in administrative matters.  Thus, the internal affairs investigator must continue the administrative investigation to determine whether evidence exists or can be developed that meets the “preponderance of the evidence” burden of proof for administrative proceedings.  Under no circumstances shall an internal affairs administrative investigation be closed merely because a criminal investigation was declined or terminated.
[brief] ’”  Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Manzo, 122 N.J. 104, 117 (1991).  “The law is well settled that equitable fraud provides a basis for a party to rescind a contract. ”  First Am. Title, supra, 177 N.J. at 136.  Equitable fraud “‘requires proof of (1) a material misrepresentation of a presently existing or past fact; (2) the maker's intent that the other party rely on it; and (3) detrimental reliance by the other party. ’”  Id. at 136-37.
[brief] Next, Defendants collectively argue that the Trial Court did not error in finding that (1) [...] did not address Defendants standard of care/duty and (2) without expert testimony to address each Defendants standard of care/duty then Plaintiffs cannot prove their cause of action against any of the Defendants.  Although Plaintiffs strongly disagree that Plaintiffs’ expert failed to address Defendants duties, under the facts of the case, expert testimony is not required to address each Defendants’ duties.  Each of the Defendants duties are outlined by contract and described by Defendants’ own witnesses.  The facts related to standard of care/duty will not require that a jury to be presented with expert testimony in order to evaluate evidence that is “so esoteric that jurors of common judgment and experience cannot form a valid judgment”.  Butler v. Acme Markets, Inc. 89 N.J. 270, 283 (1982).  Rather, this case involves whether or not the Defendants violated their respective statutory and/or contractual duties for the maintenance and protection of traffic.  As the engineering Defendants correctly point out, New Jersey Model Civil Jury Charge 5.52B indicates that a suit against a professional engineer “normally” requires expert testimony regarding the standard of care.  However, as Charge 5.52C also explains, expert testimony is not always required.  For example, with the appropriate facts a jury may determine, without expert testimony, a professional defendant’s duty and breach of that duty based on their common knowledge and experience.
[brief] For these reasons, the Board’s final administrative determination denying [...]’s request to file his Eligibility Registration Form for amended benefits approximately one year and three months past the statutory deadline of the Ricci Act should be affirmed.  Respectfully submitted, [...]  ATTORNEY GENERAL OF NEW JERSEY  By: /s/ [...]  [...] (ID 276482018)  Deputy Attorney General  [...]  Dated: July 19, 2024  July 11, 2024  [...], Clerk Superior Court of New Jersey  Appellate Division Hughes Justice Complex 25 W. Market Street PO Box 006 Trenton, New Jersey 08625  RE: [...] v. [...]
[brief] POINT II  THE MODEL JURY CHARGE ON “USE OF FORCE UPON AN INTRUDER”  UNDER N.J.S.A. 2C:3-4C  WRONGLY TELLS THE JURY THAT WHEN EVALUATING THE REASONABLENESS OF A DEFENDANT’S BELIEF IN THE NEED TO USE FORCE AGAINST AN INTRUDER, THE JURY SHOULD VIEW THE SITUATION AS A “REASONABLE PERSON WITH A DETACHED VIEWPOINT” WOULD VIEW IT, RATHER THAN A REASONABLE PERSON SITUATED AS THE DEFENDANT WAS; THE “DETACHED VIEWPOINT” REQUIREMENT IS NOWHERE IN THE RELEVANT STATUTE AND SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN INSTRUCTED TO THIS JURY.  (NOT RAISED BELOW).
[brief] STATEMENT OF INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE  The Amici [...] and the [...] file this brief as it is in the interest of physicians and the provision of health care to the public in general, that no exceptions be made to carve out claims asserting medical malpractice with respect to surgical procedures, and/or wrongful death claims when reviewing and ruling upon the enforceability of otherwise valid and enforceable agreements entered into between a physician and a patient.
[brief] Order denying Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss the Complaint dated February 11, 2022 ..........................................................Pa013  Order permitting Plaintiff to file an Amended complaint dated May 13, 2022 .................................................................Pa015  Order Granting Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment dated August 14, 2023 ......................................................Pa577  Order Granting Appellant's Motion to Extend Time to File Appellant’s Brief for 30 Days dated March 18, 2024 .........................Pa587
[directive] The Commission found that mandatory minimum laws have not simply fueled the significant increase in the State’s prison population over the last four decades but, also, have contributed to the stark racial disparities found in our prisons.  The Commission noted, for example, that Black residents constitute 14 percent of the State’s overall population but 61 percent of its inmate population, many of whom are serving sentences for non-violent offenses.11 drug  The Commission argued that by eliminating mandatory minimum sentences for these crimes, New Jersey would take a “significant step” towards addressing the lack of proportionality in the State’s sentencing laws and help undo a system of “mass incarceration”
[brief] APPELLEE’S TESTIMONY THAT APPELLANT FLED THE SCENE OF THE ACCIDENT WAS IRRELEVANT, IMPROPER AND WARRANTS  A NEW TRIAL (Raised below: 1T42:7-21)  Appealle’s argument that the testimony was relevant to identifying the Appeellant as causing the accident is absurd.  Appeellant stipulated to same prior to trial.  Moreover, the reference to Appeellant having fled occurred before any verification of property damage photographs took place which were also undisputed.  **CONCLUSION**
[brief] Thereafter, in 2021, [...] (“[...]”), on behalf of Developer, applied for authorization to connect into the existing sanitary sewer system in anticipation of the construction of an 87-unit residential development at [...], Block 200, Lot 8 (the “Subject Property”).  [Da130-Da133].  [...] requested the Township endorse a Treatment Works Authorization Endorsement (“TWA”), as the sewage flow from the Subject Property will ultimately be conveyed, through the Borough, to the [...] owned and operated by the Township.  [Da130-Da133].  As such, Developer was required to pay a connection fee to the Township in accordance with the Township’s Municipal Code.  Specifically, the Township’s Municipal Code § 410-3(B) mandates a $6,000.00 connection fee per unit.  As the Developer proposes a project of 87 residential units, [Da131], the Township is due a connection fee of $522,000 (the “Connection Fee”).  The previous owner of the Subject Property submitted a connection fee to the Township of $17,250.00 for 3,750 GPD flow.  As such, Developer is entitled to a reduction on the flow previously paid (3,750 GPD), which amounts to $54,000.  The TWA Application indicated that eighteen (18) of the proposed units will be affordable in accordance with the applicable Council on Affordable Housing Standards.  [Da131].  As such, those eighteen (18) units are entitled to a fifty percent (50%) reduction on the connection fee, or a $3,000 connection fee per unit.  Similarly, the Developer is entitled to COAH credit to the connection fee of $54,000.  Thus, the total Connection Fee has been reduced by $108,000.  Given the foregoing, the Connection Fee in full of $414,000 is due and owing to the Township.  On or about February 6, 2022, in pursuit thereof, on February 6, 2022, the Township sent a formal demand (“Demand Letter”) to [...] requesting payment of the Connection Fee pursuant to the Township Code and the 1999 Agreement.
[brief] When his aid did not work, [...] picked up [...] and began running towards the road signs to see where on Route 33 he was located.  In shock at this point, all [...] could think to do was call family, so he called [...]’s mom, but she did not answer.  He then called his sister and then his mother and spoke to them for about five minutes.  After he hung up, [...] called 9-1-1.²  While [...] was speaking with the 9-1-1 operator, [...] was still alive and groaning.  (3T:89-3 to 91-2).  [...] told the operator that [...] had been shot in the head and that he did not know what to do.  When asked where he was located, [...] told the operator he was on Route 33 in Freehold.  --- ²
[brief] To the contrary, the State's entire theory, and the evidence that was introduced to prove it, was that [...] participated in an intentional shooting that led to a death.  As further indication that the State's evidence did not support a finding of guilt on the reckless manslaughter charge, the Court is urged to consider the fact that both the defense and the State objected to the instruction to the jury regarding its ability to find [...] guilty of the lesser included offenses of aggravated or reckless manslaughter.  Nevertheless, the trial court presented the jury with these alternate options, despite both parties' positions that the evidence introduced at trial did not support a basis to instruct on either lesser charge.  It appears that the court decided to charge the lesser included offenses based upon the fact that originally [...], not [...], was charged with conspiring to commit aggravated assault with [...] on [...].
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT MISAPPLY THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD.  [...] contends that the trial court failed to give her all reasonable inferences of fact in granting Defendants’ motion for summary judgment.  [...] identifies five inferences that should have been reasonably made in her favor: (1) that [...]’s conduct could violate the criminal harassment statute; (2) the trial court improperly dismissed Plaintiffs’ testimony as to whether they reasonably and objectively believed that [...]’s conduct violated the criminal harassment statute; (3) the trial court improperly dismissed [...]’s testimony regarding [...]’s alleged approval of the charge pay; (4) that the charge pay investigation was independent of [...]’s investigation into [...]’s June 24, 2020 conduct; and (5) that [...] would not have supported Plaintiffs’ termination given her staffing reduction.  However, a review of the trial court’s decision, and the record in this matter, reveals that the trial court did provide [...] with all reasonable inferences of fact.  Summary judgment should therefore be affirmed.
[brief] Cases  Albrecht v. Correctional Med. Servs., 422 N.J. Super. 265 (App. Div. 2011) .................................................................  13 A.T. v. Cohen, 231 N.J. 337 (2017) ..................................................  10 Borough of Berlin v. Remington & Vernick Eng’rs, 337 N.J. Super. 590 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 168 N.J. 294 (2001) ...........................................  13  Couri v. Gardner, 173 N.J. 328 (2002) ..................................................  15  Edwards v. Our Lady of Lourdes Hospital, 217 N.J. Super. 448 (App. Div. 1987) .................................................................  21 Ferreira v. Rancocas Orthopedics Associates, 178 N.J. 144 (2003) ..............................................................................  6  Fink v. Thompson, 167 N.J. 551 (2001) .................................................. 10, 13, 16 Galik v. Clara Maass Med. Ctr., 167 N.J. 341 (2001) .............................................  14  Hargett v. Hamilton Park OPCO, LLC, 477 N.J. Super. 390 (App. Div. 2023), certif. denied, 256 N.J. 453 (2024) ....................... 12-14, 16 Haviland v. Lourdes Medical Center of Burlington County, 250 N.J. 368 (2022) ................................................................. 11, 16 Hill International, Inc. v. Atlantic City Board of Education, 438 N.J. Super.  562 (App. Div. 2014), appeal dismissed, 224 N.J. 523 (2016)  ...........................................................................  12-13  McCormick v. State, 446 N.J. Super. 603 (App. Div. 2016) .........................  11-12  Medeiros v. O’Donnell & Naccarto, Inc., 347 N.J. Super. 536 (App. Div. 2002)  ...........................................................................  14  Nicholas v. Mynster, 213 N.J. 463 (2013) ..................................................  13  Parks v. Pep Boys, 282 N.J. Super. 1 (App. Div. 1995) ...........................................  21 Cases, Continued In re Petition of Hall, 147 N.J. 379 (1997) .................................................. 10, 13 Rivera v. Valley Hospital, Inc., 252 N.J. 1 (2022)  ..............................................  21  Schultz v. Roman Catholic Archdiocese, 95 N.J. 530, 538 (1984) ....................  11  Shamrock Lacrosse, Inc. v. Klehr, Harrison, Harvey, Branzburg & Ellers, LLP, 416 N.J. Super. 1 (App. Div. 2010) .................................................  13 Steinberg v. Sahara Sam's Oasis, LLC, 226 N.J. 344 (2016) .............................  21 Weiss v. Goldfarb, 154 N.J. 468 (1998) ..........................................................  11 Statutes, Rules and Regulations L. 2020, c. 18 ........................................................................................................ 2, 4, 9, 18-20 N.J.S.A. 2A:15-5.9 to -5.17 ..................................................................................
[brief] 3B N.J. Prac., Real Estate Law and Practice § 35:15 (3d ed.) ...............  25  13B N.J. Prac., Real Estate Law and Practice § 35:16 (3d ed.) ............. 25 76  C.J.S. Reformation of Instruments § 74 ............................................  38 CHAIN OF TITLE, Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019)  .....................  24  Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules (2025)  ............................  18-19  Preliminary Statement
[brief] The trial court’s order granting Plaintiffs partial summary judgment provides that Plaintiffs are not required to obtain any form of approval from [...] or anyone else prior to constructing their new home.  The order, however, also confirms that Plaintiffs are bound by the Genesis Deed’s restrictions.  Such a ruling is internally inconsistent, effectively rewrites the Genesis Deed, and improperly impairs the rights of a non-party, [...], that should have been added as an obvious indispensable party in this litigation by the Plaintiffs.
[brief] FACTORS TIP DECIDEDLY IN FAVOR OF REVERSAL CONCLUSION TABLE OF AUTHORITIES  Cases  Alfonso v. Fernandez, 606 N.Y.S.2d 259 (Ct. App. 1993)  .................................................................  19 B.P.J. v. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ., No. 2:21-CV-00316, 2023 WL 111875 (S.D. W. Va. Jan. 5, 2023)  ......................  8 Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979)  .................................................................................. 24, 25, 26 C.N. v. Ridgewood Bd. of Educ., 430 F.3d 159 (3d Cir. 2005) ........................................................................ 17, 18, 19 Campaign for S. Equal. v. Bryant, 64 F. Supp. 3d 906, 949 (S.D.
[brief] The exigency is predicated on actions taken by officers.  The exigency would not exist but for the officers’ actions in chasing the suspect; after all, had the officers not observed and chased the suspect, there would be no need to enter the home.  But the exigency is not invalid because the exigency was “police-created. ”  Db24.  The New Jersey Supreme Court elucidated this in *State v. Hutchins*, in which it found that “although the exigent circumstance [in Hutchins] can properly be described as ‘police-created,’ it may have arisen as a result of reasonable police investigative conduct intended to generate evidence of criminal activity.
[brief] Final Decision and Order, 11/9/2023 ..........................................................  Pa1 # TABLE OF AUTHORITIES  ## Federal Cases  **Bowman Transp., Inc. v. Arkansas–Best Freight Sys., Inc.,**  419 U.S. 281 (1974) .................................................................................................................. 19  **FCC v. Fox TV Stations, Inc.,** 567 U.S. 239 (2012) .................................................................................................................. 44  **Friedler v. Gen. Servs. Admin.,**  271 F. Supp. 3d 40 (D.D.C. 2017) ............................................................................................ 19 **Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe,** 401 U.S. 402 (1971) .................................................................................................................. 16 **Whitfield v. United States,** 543 U.S. 209 (2005) .................................................................................................................. 30 ## State Cases **Airwork Service Division v. Director, Division of Taxation,** 97 N.J. 290 (1984) ..................................................................................................................... 35, 36 **App. Of Union Cnty. Bank** 144 N.J. Super. 39 (App. Div. 1976) ......................................................................................... 36, 44 **Berta v. N.J. State Parole Bd.,** 473 N.J. Super. 284 (App. Div. 2022) ....................................................................................... 16, 18 **Boller Beverages, Inc. v. Davis,** 38 N.J. 138 (1962) ...................................................................................................................... 25, 26, 31, 32, 33, 44 **Cammarata v. Essex Cnty. Park Comm’n,** 26 N.J. 404 (1958) ..................................................................................................................... 37 **In re Council on Affordable Housing to Adopt Tr. Fund Commitment Reguls.,** 440 N.J. Super. 220 (App. Div. 2015)