ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] A real estate broker is in a far different category from the purveyors of products or services or other activities.  He is in a semi-professional status subject to testing, licensing, regulations, and penalties through other legislative provisions.  See N.J.S.A. 45:15-1 [e]t seq.  Although not on the same plane as other professionals such as lawyers, physicians, dentists, accountants or engineers, the nature of his activity is recognized as something beyond the ordinary commercial seller of goods or services—an activity beyond the pale of the act under consideration…  Certainly no one would argue that a member of any of the learned professions is subject to the provision of the Consumer Fraud Act despite the fact that he renders “services” to the public.  And although the literal language may be construed to include professional services, it would be ludicrous to construe the legislation with that broad a sweep in view of the fact that the nature of the services does not fall into the category of consumerism.  Macedo, 178 N.J. at 344 (citing Neveroski v. Blair, 141 N.J. Super. 379 (App. Div.1976) (superseded by statute, as stated in Lee, 199 N.J. 251).  While this exemption is a judicially created rule, courts have uniformly followed it and “the Legislature has not amended the CFA to include…learned professionals. ”
[brief] In that regard, the Court in Ariston Airline & Catering Supply Co. v. Forbes, 211 N.J. Super. 472, 479 (Law Div. 1986), stated quite succinctly that “[t]he label ‘all risk’ is essentially a misnomer.  All risk policies are not ‘all loss’ policies; all risk policies…contain express written exclusions and implied exceptions which have been developed by the courts over years. ”  As the lower court determined, this is precisely the case in this instance, where the [...] policy does not include coverage for plaintiff’s non-accidental conduct (nor for the purported consequences of such conduct), and expressly excludes alleged injuries that are expected or intended by the insured.  The lower court correctly ruled that the [...] policy provides no liability coverage for the events set forth in the underlying lawsuit.
[brief] The Settlement Includes Covered And Non-Covered Damages  Settlements are unreasonable and entered in bad faith where the policyholder “squeezes” in covered and uncovered damages.  Fireman’s Fund at 756 (“the Settlement Agreement clearly represents an inappropriate attempt to squeeze a settlement for both compensatory and punitive damages into a sum for compensatory damages alone, solely for the purpose of obtaining insurance coverage. ”); *Bob Meyer Cmty. v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co.*, 2020 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1873 (App. Div. Sept. 14, 2020) (insurer was not liable to satisfy settlement that included uncovered damages).  [...]’s Settlement squeezes in multiple forms of uncovered damages.  *First*, the Settlement includes uncovered property damage caused by mold.  In addition to settling his claim for inhalation injuries, [...] settled and released his claim for “property damage. ”  Da1232a.  [...] identified [...]’s “significant out-of-pocket losses for property damage” as a factor justifying the reasonableness of the Settlement.  Da1297a.  For the reasons explained above, under no circumstance does the Consumption Exception restore coverage for an injury that is not caused by “fungi that are, are on, or are contained in, an edible good or product intended for bodily consumption.
[brief] In [...], the carrier sought a declaratory ruling that a cause of action existed under New Jersey law for the recovery of Med-Pay benefits through subrogation against the tortfeasor.  The defendant carrier, [...], opposed the application, contending that the Med-Pay payments were subject to the collateral source rule.  The underlying facts of this case involved an injury suffered by [...], an insured of [...], who was a passenger in a vehicle owned by [...] when it was struck in the rear by a vehicle owned and operated by [...], an insured of [...].  [...] was a passenger in a taxicab, not an automobile, and, thus, was not eligible for PIP benefits.  However, she was eligible for medical payments under the Med-Pay provisions of her automobile policy.  [...] paid $5,206 in medical payments on her behalf.  [...] then filed an arbitration petition against [...] to recover the $5,206 that it paid.  [...] asserted as an affirmative defense that New Jersey law bars recovery of Med-Pay payments.  The arbitrator upheld their position and found that New Jersey law barred the claim.
[brief] [...] also testified that [...] was not wearing a seatbelt, which constitutes a violation of N.J.S.A. 39:3-76.2f. (1T 24-8 to 11)  The officer clarified, however, that he did not notice that anyone in the sedan was not wearing a seatbelt before he pulled the car over.  (1T 38-18 to 39-1)  Consequently, [...]’s failure to wear a seatbelt did not provide reasonable and articulable suspicion to initiate the traffic stop.  Because N.J.S.A. 39:4-126 unambiguously does not prohibit changing lanes without signaling, [...] was wrong to stop the sedan on that basis.  Alternatively, if the statute is construed as anything other than unambiguous in this regard, it must be deemed unconstitutionally vague as applied to the conduct of changing lanes without signaling.  In either case, the traffic stop was unlawful, and all evidence seized during the course of the stop must be suppressed.  Furthermore, even if the statute could be read to require a motorist to signal a lane change under certain circumstances, [...] did not have reasonable and articulable suspicion that those circumstances were present here.  Because the stop was not supported by reasonable and articulable suspicion of a motor vehicle violation, the stop was unconstitutional, and suppression is required.
[brief] This appeal challenges the Trial Court’s May 8, 2023 Final Judgment following the bench trial, including the improper valuation of Plaintiff’s membership interest, the denial of her request for a receiver or special fiscal agent, the dismissal of claims against Defendants [...] and [...] and the trial judge’s colloquies and *ex parte* conduct.  This appeal also challenges the Trial Court’s denial of Plaintiff’s first and second motions for reconsideration.  Plaintiff seeks a fair opportunity to be heard and a fair value for her interest in [...], a company she worked tirelessly to build.  II.
[brief] *[...]* does not stand for the proposition that any disparity, no matter how extreme, is justifiable.  [...] was sentenced to fifteen years with a mandatory five year period of parole ineligibility for first degree robbery.  *Id.*, at 380.  Though the sentence of his co-defendant was not specified, the court noted that he received the presumptive sentence for a first offense and that there was no “grievous inequity” between his sentence and co-defendants, who were eligible to receive mitigation consideration by virtue of their cooperation with law enforcement.  *[...]*, 223 N.J. Super. at p. 393.
[brief] This matter arises out of a motorcycle accident that occurred on September 12, 2015.  On that date, Plaintiff [...] was the operator of a motorcycle that was traveling southbound on the Garden State Parkway in Galloway Township, Atlantic County, New Jersey.  As Plaintiff was traveling in the left-hand lane between approximately mile marker 39.9 and 40.1, he came to a declivity in the roadway and lost control of his motorcycle which caused him to crash into the concrete barrier.  (Pa0001).  On September 7, 2016, the Complaint was filed against the Authority.  (Pa1550).  On September 30, 2016, the Authority filed an Answer.  (Pal559).  The Complaint was amended four times.  (Pa1576, Pa1613, Pa1650, Pa1698)  On January 7, 2022, Defendants [...] and [...] filed Motions for Summary Judgment.  (Pa1881, Pa1841)  On January 21, 2022, the Authority filed a Motion for Summary Judgment.  (Pa1887)  On February 8, 2022, Plaintiff filed Opposition to the Summary Judgment motions.  (Pa1948, Pal960, Pa1968).  On February 8, 2022, [...] filed a Motion for Summary Judgment.  (Pa1934).  On February 22, 2022, Plaintiff filed Opposition to Midlantic’s Summary Judgment motion.  (Pa1978).  On February 28, 2022, Reply Briefs were filed on behalf of Jacobs, Urban and Midlantic.  (Pa2000, Pa2009, Pa2003)  On March 1, 2022, the Authority filed a Reply Brief.  (Pa2015).  On March 24, 2022, Defendants Motions were denied without prejudice pending the outcome of a Rule 104 Hearing.  (Pa2025).  On May 9, 2022, the Rule 104 Hearing took place before the Honorable [...], J.S.C. (Pa1422).  On June 14, 2022, all parties submitted post-hearing briefs.  (Pa2027, Pa2037, Pa2069, Pa2085, Pa2087).  On April 10, 2023, [...] entered an Order and Opinion granting Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgement.  (Pa2113).  On June 14, 2023, [...] signed an amended Order granting Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment and dismissing the case.  (Pa2171).  On May 24, 2023, Plaintiffs filed a Notice of Appeal.  (Pa2174).
[brief] 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(b).  Read literally and in isolation, § 1692c(b) arguably supports Appellant’s theory.  However, as Superior Courts in New Jersey have concluded, Appellant’s theory fails according to several principles of statutory construction.  *Miller v. Americollect, Inc.*, 2022 WL 20470401 at *8-10; *Mhrez Decision*; Appx., at 35a.  See also *Asmad-Escobar v. Phoenix Fin. Servs. LLC*, 2024 WL 2839329, at *3; *Mhrez v. Convergent Outsourcing, Inc.*, 2024 WL 2838327.  In construing a statute, the Court’s goal is to give effect to the legislature’s intent.  *DiProspero v. Penn*, 183 N.J. 477, 492 (2005); *Ross v. Hotel Emps. & Rest. Emps. Int'l Union*, 266 F.3d 236, 245 (3d Cir. 2001).
[brief] (Raised below 1T36:20 to 37:19, 1T41:15-21)  “Absent any unusual equity, a court should decide a question of title such as this in the way that will best support and maintain the integrity of the recording system. ”  Palamarg Realty Co. v. Rehac, 80 N.J. 446, 453 (1979).  [...] did not need merely to present a case, it needed to overcome the long-established presumption of a bona fide purchaser.  This is because “the principal purpose of enactment of the New Jersey recording act... ‘was to protect subsequent judgment creditors, bona fide purchasers, and bona fide mortgagees...’”  Cox v. RKA Corp., 164 N.J. 487, 508 (1999), citations omitted.  This Court must consider the impact of such a decision on real estate titles as a whole.  Where it is made to appear that one has acquired title to property and has paid a valuable consideration therefor, the purchaser is presumed to be a bona fide purchaser for value without notice until the contrary appears, and the burden of showing to the contrary rests upon the party alleging that title was acquired by the purchaser with notice of an outstanding equity or claim.
[brief] J.T. 455 N.J. at 215.  The Court ruled that the State's expert witness' response usurped the jury's role by making a definitive declaration of this jury question:  [Defendant] does not meet any of the prongs of the insanity defense.  She does not have a significant mental illness.  She was certainly upset and overwhelmed, but that's not [an] illness.  She knew the nature of the act.  That this was a bag.  She knew what a bag could do.  In fact, that was her specific intent.  And she knew that what she was doing was wrong, even if she at that point thought she had good justification.  [Id.]
[brief] First, no factfinder could reasonably conclude that [...]’s conduct constituted criminal harassment, nor is such a conclusion required.  Without citing any law, [...] contends that her belief that [...]’s conduct was unlawful was required to be analyzed “under the lens of a reasonable employee, and the plain language of the statute. ” (See Pb29).  But [...]’s testimony on the June 24, 2020 incident leaves no doubt.  (See Pa188 at 119:7-18) ([...] testified that he “just sat there and just kept calm. ”); Pa188 at 119:15-18 ([...] testified that he “relaxed” and “knew to just stay calm. ”); Pa188-89 at 120:25-121:23 ([...] testified that he completed his work after [...] yelled at him); Pa189 at 122:12-123:7 ([...] testified that he maintained his composure throughout the incident, relaxed, and “let her just do her thing”).  Not only is [...]’s opinion on this subject irrelevant given that [...] was the subject of [...]’s frustrations, but [...]’s testimony on the June 24, 2020 incident leaves no doubt, as she merely testified about how the situation made her uncomfortable and how [...] lost her temper.  (Pa301 at 93:2-4; Pa301 at 96:10-15; Pa302 at 98:7-14).  As to alleged conduct occurring before June 24, 2020, the record reflects a litany of personal workplace disputes that amount to nothing more than employees complaining that their boss is mean to them.
[brief] The Supreme Court then reviewed examples of situations where the Court has found undue influence to have resulted from a confidential relationship.  The first situation where undue influence is found is where the donor is dependent on the donee and improvidently gifts away all his assets to him without understanding the consequences of his actions.  Id. at 31.  In the present matter, it is uncontested that donor [...] was in Florida while [...] and [...], 1300 miles apart (2T74:10-14).  Furthermore, Francisco did not give [...] and [...] everything he had.  Francisco gifted $50,000.00 which left him with about $160,000 in the bank (6T15:15).
[brief] Table of Contents  Table of Contents  ..................................................................................................................  i  Table of Authorities ..............................................................................................................  ii  A.  Preliminary Statement .....................................................................................................  1  B.  Procedural History ..........................................................................................................  1 C.  Statement of the Facts ....................................................................................................  3  D.  Legal Argument ..............................................................................................................  4  Issue I: Standard Of Review In An Appeal Of An Order Granting Summary Judgment .................................................................................................................................
[brief] Otherwise, the police could somehow find justification to stop every single Black man in the general area of the store.  Nyema, 249 N.J. at 516 (Police investigation based on the “race and sex of the suspects, with no further descriptors . . . effectively placed every single Black male in the area under the veil of suspicion. ”).  The State fails to cite any case law to support its argument otherwise.  Moreover, all the evidence seized was the direct result of this unlawful stop; [...] only saw the handgun because [...] sat down to comply with the unlawful order.
[brief] On March 7, 2023, Defendants filed a motion in limine to bar evidence of Plaintiff’s medical expenses.  (Da25 to 26).  Given the stipulation subsequently made by Plaintiff with respect to the lack of any claim for medical expenses, the certification of counsel filed in support of this motion is not appended.  On March 31, 2023, the trial court heard oral argument on Plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgment and the parties’ in limine motions.  The transcript of oral argument is found at 1T.  During argument, Defendants [...] and [...] stipulated as to their full liability for the happening of the accident, and Plaintiff agreed to voluntarily dismiss his claims against Defendant [...].
[brief] In point I of its brief, Appellant principally contends that the trial court erred by holding that the Board did not have jurisdiction or authority to adopt Appellant’s interpretation of the Respondent’s use of the Sixth Street Parking Lot as a “non-conforming use” pursuant to the Municipal Land Use Law, N.J.S.A. 40:55D-1 to -92 (MLUL).  Because the trial court’s finding that the Board lacked jurisdiction was correct, Appellant’s argument fails.  From the time that Appellant made its first application to the Board in 2016, Respondent and the Board’s counsel have maintained that the Board lacks jurisdiction to issue interpretative guidance regarding the meaning of a decades-old site plan, especially when the validity of the use is already subject to judicial determination in ongoing litigation (Ra165-Ra166).  This was the correct determination as the Board initially confirmed in its unanimous decision and corresponding resolution declining the invitation to interpret the Planning Board’s 1972 Site Plan, and as [...] then affirmed (Ra173-Ra217).  When Appellant then brought another application less than a week later, again seeking an interpretation the Board lacked jurisdiction to make, the Board’s counsel again objected (Aa53-Aa54).  That ought to have been the end of the matter.  Instead, the Board ignored the advice of its own counsel and held a hearing for the purpose of formulating and announcing its "opinion as to whether [Respondent] ever obtained site plan approval for parking facilities" on the Property (Aa53-Aa58).  The arbitrary and capricious resolution that resulted never should have occurred because the Board had no authority to act on Appellant’s request to begin with.  A.
[brief] (Pa7-Pa8).  C.  The [...]’s Denial of [...]’s Request for Defense.  On October 2, 2023, [...] sent a letter to the [...], advising of the filing of [...]’s lawsuit and requesting “representation in accordance with the Wright decision. ” (Pa1).  favorable ruling by a hearing officer, arbiter, Administrative Law Judge, Civil Service Commission or the Superior Court. ” (Pa21-Pa22).  On October 16, 2023, [...] provided its final agency decision (Denial) (Pa10-Pa13), denying [...]’s request for representation because: (1) [...]’s duty under Wright to defend and indemnify county prosecutor’s office employees only obligates [...] “to provide defense and indemnification to State employees when they are being sued in civil actions seeking damages for conduct that is tortious and/or violative of 42 U.S.C. § 1983”; and (2) [...]’s complaint, which sought only various forms of equitable relief, did not assert any claims for monetary damages related to a tort or § 1983 claim.
[brief] The rise of eDiscovery presents new challenges for courts and litigants.  See The Sedona Conference: Commentary on Achieving Quality in the E-Discovery Process, 15 Sedona Conf. J. 265, 268 (2014).  One of those challenges is ensuring that the parties receive all relevant discovery.  Different approaches --- 9  The only permissible objections at a deposition are “to the form of a question or to assert a privilege, a right to confidentiality or a limitation pursuant to a previously entered court order. ”  R. 4:14-3(c). to discovery involve inherent tradeoffs between overinclusive and underinclusive productions, and trial courts must have flexibility to fashion solutions based on the unique facts presented.
[brief] Not omitted because this was filed as an Exhibit with the Trial Court 11  Not omitted because this was filed as an Exhibit with the Trial Court July 25, 2018  **EXHIBIT A** Excerpt of the June 5, 2017 Transcript (omitted) (Da177) **EXHIBIT B**  Excerpt of the February 14, 2018 Order to Show Cause Hearing (omitted) (Da283)  Certification of [...] in Further Support of Plaintiff’s Motion to Enforce Litigant’s Rights and in Reply to Defendant’s Opposition dated July 24, 2018 with photograph exhibits Da521  Supplemental Certification of [...] in Further Support of Plaintiff’s Motion to Enforce Litigant’s Rights (Sixth Street Violation) dated October 4, 2018 with photograph exhibits Da603 **February 21, 2019 Order Granting Award for Sanctions and for Counsel Fees and Judgment executed by the Honorable [...], P.J.Ch. (Sixth Street Violation) (Da965)** **May 29, 2019 Order for Judgment Award for Attorney’s Fees and Cost related to Sixth Street Violation executed by the Honorable [...], P.J.Ch. (Fence Violation) (Da967)**
[brief] [...]’s time was split 50/50 between the United States and Portugal at the time.  (Da143).  [...] explained that [...] would stay in Portugal in the Summer, and then would return to the United States around Halloween.  (Da143).  Eventually, [...] needed heart surgery.  (Da121).  Following the surgery, [...] had rehab.  (Da121).  [...] was still living in [...].  (Da141).  Also, [...] recalled that her son was in daycare at the time, and she would use her lunch hour to come home and check in on her father.  She would then return to work.  (Da143).  On some occasions, when [...] needed help, she asked [...], but [...] gave an excuse that he had to work.  (Da144).  So, [...] never came to the house to assist [...] with [...]’s bathing.  (Da145).  At one point, there was a meeting at [...]’s home where [...] stated he did not want to stay in the United States, and did not want to go to a nursing home.  (Da145).  [...] testified that her father always maintained that he did not want to go into a nursing home.
[brief] By way of Executive Order No. 103, on March 9, 2020 [...] declared COVID-19 a Public Health Emergency and State of Emergency.  The Order further declared that the International Health and Regulations Emergency committee of WHO declared the outbreak a public health emergency requiring an international response.  By March 13, 2020, COVID-19 had spread worldwide and was classified as a pandemic.  Per the website, on March 11, 2020 statement from the WHO reads, "In the past two weeks, the number of cases of COVID-19 outside China has increased 13-fold, and the number of affected countries has tripled.  There are now more than 118,000 cases in 114 countries, and 4,291 people have lost their lives.  Thousands more are fighting for their lives in hospitals.  In the days and weeks ahead, we expect to see the number of cases, the number of deaths, and the number of affected countries climb even higher.  WHO has been assessing this outbreak around the clock and we are deeply concerned both by the alarming levels of spread and severity, and by the alarming levels of inaction.  We have therefore made the assessment that COVID-19 can be characterized as a pandemic."
[directive] Among them are:  4.  ,'j~~*~•~1~~-i'l"81-c=i1~~~•£~"81-c3:!:~11Y*~~~~~~=~¾~~qgJJJ- ~~3:1:01 ~~~yq_~: a.  The right to a jury trial in which the State must prove you guilty beyond a reasonable doubt?  [Yes/ofl]  [No/01-1..J..8..]  ~~~•~oJJ~~4c,'j"O"J-~•~~~~~~~~ti~¾~~:~•%Jl~"81-~~*¾@¾ 3:1¾ 0}1Jy77}?  ~~7}  ~~ b.  The right to remain silent?  [Yes/ofl]  [No/o]-i..j..8..]  ~A}~ ~~7} 3:!: 0~1}y77}?  ~1:1]~:  ~~ an~  *Victims of Crime Compensation Office Assessment/'tl 11 :fl lI]  At Aj-Ji!-~ ~ ~ Revised Form Promulgated 12/31/2019 Supplement Directive #01-18, CN 10079-Korean by Defendant's Initials to 0J=-61, ~Al- Al~ 'r1! .s!.¼ 'd 2019 12 31 01-18 CN 10079-Korean §.<>I]