ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] Second, we solicited feedback from the public through many different channels.  We established a public comment portal that was open for several months, through which over a thousand residents and organizations submitted their views on the policy, potential revisions, and other thoughts on policing and the criminal justice system more generally.  Every one of New Jersey’s 21 County Prosecutors held live listening sessions open to the community and chronicled the input they received.  Representatives from my office also attended each of these sessions, and I personally participated in multiple town halls, hearing directly from citizens about their ideas and concerns.  Third, we engaged with numerous community groups and advocacy organizations throughout the state, who expressed their concerns with the existing policy and lent their revisions.1 expertise as we developed
[brief] For reasons already explained *infra*, points I-V, this court should vacate paragraph one of the trial court’s November 10, 2021 and the entirety of the November 9, 2023 order and remand for reassessment and recalculation of the amount that Landlord owes Tenant in Tenant’s Allowance—a payment that Landlord has, to this point emphatically denied it is obligated to ever pay.  Assuming this Court agrees with Tenant that Landlord is incorrect about that, then Landlord is no longer a prevailing party in this litigation and is not entitled to any attorneys’ fees.
[directive] t a s k operations or force cases are not adoptive seizures.  Circumstances for Considerinq  Adoptinq  a Seizure  As a general rule, if a state or local agency has seized property as part of an ongoing state criminal investigation and the criminal defendants are being prosecuted in state court, the court. forfeiture action should also be pursued in state Treasury personnel in the field should consider adopting a state seizure only in circumstances that may make a federal or local forfeiture appropriate.
[brief] Pa401 (citing the “Hackensack Completion Contract,” and arguing it “has not been paid for its work on Hackensack”).  In opposition, [...] --- 4  In opposition, [...] now states that “there would only be four separate arbitrations because there were only four Backlog Projects,” Opp. at 27 n.6, but this is still alarming and remains the same exact type of piecemeal litigation the ECD prohibits. acknowledges that “such statements of fact were made for the sole purpose of substantiating [...]’s claim that [...] was not entitled to additional EGP on the Hackensack Project due to the ongoing impact of problems…which rendered the project unprofitable. ”  Opp. at 31.  This admission is crucial because: - the PTA set the Hackensack EGP at $1,677,588.00, Pa125; - [...]’s 65% EGP profit-share was $1,090,432.20, Pa76; - [...] only paid [...] $191,381.00, thus contractually owing [...] the unpaid portion of $899,051.20, Pa77; - [...] never agreed to amend the contractually-set Hackensack EGP, and thus asserted a claim in the First Arbitration for the unpaid $899,051.20, Pa186 ¶ 111; - at trial, [...] testified that it stopped paying EGP to [...] because “[...]’s claim of unpaid work on the Hackensack project”—under the subcontractor “completion contract”—was “about $1.8 million,” Pa535 at 147:14-148:2; - and yet, [...] now falsely and inconsistently states in opposition that it did not “place[] its non-payment issue on the Hackensack Project ‘squarely before the Arbitrator.
[brief] The Complaint subject to this appeal stems from the death of [...] in 2006, and the lengthy dispute between her children and heirs relating to the disposition of a sixty-acre farm.  After six unsuccessful years of probate litigation, the Probate Court appointed Defendant [...] to serve as the Administrator of the Estate.  (Pa 4a.)  As Administrator, [...] was tasked to dispose of the remaining assets within [...]’s Last Will and Testament, especially the sixty-acre farm.  Id.  Accordingly, [...] conducted a closed bid for the sale of the farm.  Id.  A.  January 2015  As-Is Contract
[brief] As of the date in which [...] opted to avail herself of the fee arb[itration], she was fully aware of the complaint of the nature of the allegations, and again opted to address the matter by way of fee arbitration.  [Ibid.]  The trial court entered judgment consistent with the fee arbitration decision, as confirmed by the DRB.  Defendant never raised or argued application of Rule 4:67 until she filed her motion for reconsideration subject of this appeal.
[brief] [Private right to a cause of action issues] (Argued Pa372 – Pa373)  The Legislature does not authorize lawsuits against public entities for any and every statutory violation.  To sue a public entity in Superior Court for statutory violations, the Legislature must express a private right to a cause of action.  After several amendments to N.J.S.A. 7F-9, the Legislature never expressed that there is a private right to a cause of action for a private company to sue a public school district in Superior Court.  Since [...] lacks an express private right to a cause of action, its Counterclaim against the [...] must be dismissed.  The court thus committed legal error in granting the Counterclaim.  POINT FOUR
[brief] There was a first purchase of a Florida Home located at [...] in December of 2014 by [...].  Neither [...], nor [...] are on the HUD or closing disclosure as buyers.  (Pa 201-207; Pa331-Cueto Deposition p. 7 L 9-12).  There was a sale of the first home on December 4, 2015 by [...].  Neither [...], nor [...] are on the HUD or closing disclosure as sellers.  (Pa208-209).  There was a second (2\textsuperscript{nd}) purchase of a home at [...] on April 29, 2016 by [...].  Neither [...], nor [...] are on the HUD or closing disclosure as buyers.  (Pa210-212)  This is the home over which Plaintiffs believe a constructive trust should be imposed designating the true owners as [...] and [...].  [...] is a graduate of Rutgers University with a college degree as well as a graduate MBA degree from St. Joseph College.  (Pa330 - Cueto Deposition p.5, L 13-25).  [...] and [...] both worked as janitors and Ramona only had a 6\textsuperscript{th} grade education and neither was a high school graduate.
[brief] *C.T. v. M.T.*, 257 N.J. 126, 152 (2024).  In any event, and to reiterate, N.J.R.E. 901 requires the proponent "[t]o satisfy the requirement of authenticating" prior to admissibility."  While New Jersey may have "increased the admissibility of video recordings" (OAGb23), excising language from N.J.R.E. 901 is not a function of this Court.  At OAGb23, the Attorney General recognizes the duty of the "trial court to make a presumptive determination of reliability .  . . ."  However, the OAG had just argued that authentication is "ultimately for the jury" (OAGb22).  The evidential standard being proposed is confusing and it would invite a free-for-all whenever the so-called 'silent witness' of video footage is involved.  As written, N.J.R.E. 901 requires authentication before admission, and thus the jurors cannot be the ones who ultimately decide authentication.  And the fact remains that the [...] testimony cannot satisfy the rock-bottom existing authentication requirements.  At OAGb26-OAGb29, the Attorney General attempts to dispute what [...] actually testified to about viewing video footage before preparation for trial.
[brief] *See, e.g.*, *Lemelledo*, supra.  Next [...] cites to *Woo-Padva* 1 to argue that the “consumer loan business,” as defined by the NJCFLA, includes “buying, discounting or endorsing notes” but not buying debts.  See [...]’s Br. 23; see also N.J.S.A. 17:11C-2 (definition of “consumer loan business”).  Thus, [...] argues, the NJCFLA is inapplicable to [...] here as a purchaser of debt.  However, this argument has been roundly rejected in both the federal District Court of New Jersey and the Superior Court of New Jersey.
[brief] (1T; 2T:6-2 to 6-3).  As such, at the March 8th appearance, [...] adjourned the matter to give defendant time to find a new attorney and receive and review discovery.  (1T:2-24 to 3-15).  Even though [...] provided defendant with all the discovery, defendant submitted a pro se discovery request to the municipal prosecutor.  (2T:6-5 to 6-9).  The State reissued discovery to defendant directly, which contained the ticket, the officer’s notes, body worn camera video, MVR video, and “additional body worn camera footage that was not relevant. ” (2T:6-13 to 6-19).  On April 13, 2022, defendant appeared in [...] pro se.  (2T).  Before appearing on the record, the State met with --- 4
[brief] There is no evidence that [...] saw a Facebook post from [...] that the prosecutor speculated somehow set him off to kill his neighbor.  (24T 26-13 to 22)  There is also no evidence that any cash was taken from [...].  (27T 30-17 to 18)  That the State’s proofs were very weak is illustrated by the first trial, where the State introduced comparable proofs, including [...]’s and [...]’s out-of-court identifications (3T 123-3 to 126-16; 4T 168-22 to 172-5), and [...]’s recorded statement.
[brief] [1T65:5-24 (emphasis added). ]  In fact, it was noted that the “[B]oard as a matter of law has absolutely no authority to grant more units.  [...] knows that.  It would have required a use variance. ”  1T70:3-6.  Stated succinctly:  [w]hat is relevant is the fact that there was a resolution of approval adopted that specifically indicated there was no elevator for building E.
[brief] STATEMENT OF PROCEDURAL HISTORY  1  STATEMENT OF FACTS  5  Vehicular Homicide Facts: 5  Expert Testimony Relevant to Issue on Appeal:  8  LEGAL ARGUMENT  10  POINT I  THE STATE’S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL MUST BE GRANTED IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE  BECAUSE THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT REVERSED THE LAW OF THE CASE AND GRANTED  DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO PRECLUDE EVIDENCE RELATED TO THE PRESENCE OF BZE IN HIS BLOOD.  (Pa24 to 34).  10  CONCLUSION
[brief] In both Cole and Marmo and Sons General Contracting, LLC v. Biagi Farms, LLC, 478 N.J. Super. 593 (App. Div. 2024), the Supreme Court and this Court found that the right to arbitration had been waived.  The dispositive facts in those two cases contrast with the critical facts in this matter.  A comparison will illustrate why the actions of [...] and other facts that do not necessarily fit neatly within the seven Cole factors are highly relevant to the analysis in this case.
[brief] Id. at 97.  The court found that that provision of the Home Rule Act, though its basic terms appeared to address garbage and refuse, “is clearly aimed at something different. ”  Id. at 97.  Instead, the court found that “Ordinance powers over matters therein pertaining to health are ordinarily conferred upon the local board of health [under the] Board of Health Act . . .  It does not follow that because the presence of garbage may be harmful to health the township committee may legislate thereon. ”  Id. at 98.  The court held:  “No authority having been shown for the exercise by the township committee of legislative powers over the subject-matter, we conclude that the ordinance is void. ”  *Ibid.*
[brief] Q  Okay.  And they checked off medical records, right? A  That's what it says.  Q  They checked off staff, resident interviews, right? A  That's what it says, sure.  Q  They checked off review of other facility documents? A  Yes, ma'am.  Q  Okay.  Go to the second, please -- page please, if you don't mind.  A  Oh, glad to.  Q  Okay.  A
[brief] Id. at 459.  However, the Supreme Court in Heher allowed that only on condition that there would be an “enhanced level of judicial review” of an arbitrator in those cases.  “Moreover, the arbitrator's disposition will be subjected to an enhanced level of judicial review in order to afford appropriate relief from an arbitration award that obviously would frustrate a clear mandate of public policy.  Weiss, supra, 143 N.J. at 443. ”  Id. at 459-460.  Plaintiffs incorrectly attempt to distinguish these cases because they were not cases involving fee-shifting decisions by arbitrators.  That is not why they control this arbitrator’s violation of public policy.  They control because in each case an arbitrator made a ruling that violated New Jersey public policy and in each case the Supreme Court recognized that Courts must vacate such a violation.
[brief] iii.  The Authority Has No Credible Explanation For Its Failure To Seek Financing Approvals  Further, the Authority lacked any reasonable justification for its failure to seek financing approvals needed to build the Authority Garage.  The Redevelopment Agreement contemplated that the Authority would finance construction of the Authority Garage by issuing bonds that would be insured by [...]  (“[...]”), which was and is the insurers of the Authority’s revenue bonds.  Da111 (§§ 8.7(a), (b)).  If [...] refused to insure bonds for the Authority Garage, the Authority was obligated to seek alternate financing.  *Ibid.*  (§ 8.7(d)).  Though the Authority was, by its own admission, obligated to begin efforts to secure financing no later than 2006, the evidence and testimony demonstrated that the [...] made no such effort since execution of the Redevelopment Agreement.  Contrary to its representations in the Redevelopment Agreement, the Authority never actually had any substantive communications with [...] seeking approval to finance the Authority Garage.  3T16:2-11.  Section 8.7 of the Redevelopment Agreement stated that “the Authority represents that it has approached [...] . . . and [...] has indicated a *willingness to support* the Project and to insure additional obligations . . . to finance the Authority Garage[.]”  Da111 (§ 8.7(b) (emphasis added)).  [...] confirmed that, when seeking [...] approval for a project, the Authority would be required to provide studies, designs, drawings, and other related documents.  2T89:22-90:14.
[brief] See Harris v. Peridot Chem. (NJ), Inc., supra. at 293.  The trial court refused to allow the line of questioning by the plaintiff, stating that it had yesterday already ruled on the issue (precluding the admission of evidence of defendant’s remedial measures).  (2T44-8 to 46-16).  The Court’s refusal to allow the use of this evidence in cross examination of the defense expert witness was contrary to the long established and recognized rule that such evidence when used to affect the credibility of a witness is admissible.  Hansson v. Catalytic Construction Co., 43 N.J. Super. 23, 27 (App. Div. 1956) citing Lombardi v. Yulinsky, 98 N.J.L. 332 (Sup. Ct. 1923).  See also Millman v. U.S. Mortgage Title Guaranty Co. of New Jersey, supra, at 34-35, where, as here, the defendant denied the existence of the pleaded defect.  There, the plaintiff’s proofs of remedial repairs was held admissible with respect to the cross- examination of the defendant’s engineer witness specifically to challenge the engineer’s testimony that the conditions that existed did not require the type of remedial repairs that had in fact been made.  It is often said that a trial is a search for the truth.  It bears noting as well that “[c]ross-examination is the greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of truth. ”  State v. Silva, 131 N.J. 438, 444 (1993).  There can be little doubt that the defense expert’s testimony was the centerpiece of the defendant’s case, and the Court’s refusal to allow the use of this evidence in cross examination of the defense expert witness was a momentous error that deprived plaintiff of a fair trial, constituted a manifest denial of justice, and requires reversal and that a new trial be ordered.
[directive] CN 10080-Korean 6/8  지령 제01-18 호(02/23/2018)에 의거 공포된 수정 양식, 페이지 Revised Form Promulgated by Directive #01-18 (02/23/2018), CN 10080-Korean page 6/8  제조회사, 모델, 색깔, 번호, 운전하는 차량의 연도 및 면허판 귀하가 거주하는 거리명, 변호, 카운티, 곳의 우편 시 및 그리고 귀하가 유죄를 인정하고 있는 아십니까?
[brief] “It is the general rule that to be aggrieved a party must have a personal or pecuniary interest or property right adversely affected by the judgment in question. ”  *State v. A.L.*, 440 N.J. Super. 400, 418 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 2015) (citing *Howard Sav. Inst. v. Peep*, 34 N.J. 494, 499, 170 A.2d 39 (1961)).
[brief] (emphasis added)  Luchejko, at 201.  It is common knowledge, and New Jersey Courts are well aware, that snow will melt and refreeze, no matter where it is piled.  There is no exception for homeowners who pile snow a certain way on their property.  In the Appellate Division dissent in Foley, which was subsequently adopted by the Supreme Court, [...]’s found “[t]he danger to the safe use of the sidewalk which existed when plaintiff fell was solely that caused by natural forces, the freezing of melting snow, a natural phenomenon which would have occurred if defendants had not shoveled the sidewalk, particularly since defendants' lawn sloped toward the sidewalk.  Foley, 94 N.J. Super. at 423-24 (Kolovsky, J.A.D., dissenting). ]  The Court has already considered this exact issue in the current case before, including a property sloped towards a sidewalk, and they have continued to uphold that there is no extension of liability to a residential homeowner for melt and refreeze events on an abutting public sidewalk.  Further, as confirmed by the Supreme Court in Foley, it is expected that melting snow will occur, specifically on sloped properties but this does not give rise to an increased duty by a residential homeowner.  Residential property owners do not owe any duty to physically remove snow from sloped properties to avoid such an occurrence, as plaintiff is expecting of the Defendants in this case.  The Courts have made it clear that melt and refreeze events are a natural event for which homeowners will not be held liable for injuries on public sidewalks.  The burden which the Plaintiff in this case would like to place on homeowners regarding snow and ice removal on public sidewalks is a heavy one.  First, they are asking the Court to impose liability on a homeowner for snow which melts and refreezes on a public sidewalks.  If a homeowner has a property on an incline or slope, homeowners would need to physically remove snow on their property to avoid a melt and refreeze event.  The financial burden that would impose on millions of homeowners in New Jersey would be substantial.  Second, in this particular case the freeze event took place overnight, just hours before plaintiff’s fall.  (Pa134)  Temperatures were above freezing the day before, dropping to below freezing overnight.  (Pa134, 136).  What plaintiff is suggesting is that homeowners also be responsible for a “24/7” ice watch on public sidewalks.  This goes against decades of well-established caselaw and would create an unattainable standard for residential property owners.  CONCLUSION
[brief] In accordance with regular practice and procedure, the Superintendents prepared regulations implementing the Policy.  The regulations define several aspects of the Policy and outline the procedure for student support and parental notification.  See Da158, Para.14; Da235, Para.10; Da162-165; and Da262-265.  Of particular importance, the regulations define the evidence warranting an exception from the notification provisions of the Policy.  See Da162 and Da262.  The Court questioned the prerequisites for the exception to apply; however, as is evident from its written decision, the Court neglected to review those regulations, nor consider the manner in which the Policy would be implemented.
[brief] (Pa13).  The Division went so far as to hire a company, [...], to mail postcards to all 200,647 SPRS retirees at their home addresses on file with the Division.  (Pa70-72).  And a postcard was indeed mailed to [...]’s last home address on August 9, 2019. (Pa13; Pa72).  Nonetheless, [...] asserts, without offering any legal authority, that his affidavit declaring that he never received a postcard should overcome the presumption that he received it.
[brief] On May 10, 2023, [...] filed Motion in Aid of Litigant’s Rights under Docket No. [...] seeking an order “(i) “invalidating and nullifying [Board] Resolution PB-2023-05” [conditioning the grant of the [...] project upon inclusion of an elevator in Building E], (ii) compelling the [...] to pay Per Diem Penalties in accordance with the --- \(^9\) [...] did not submit any transcript of the December 12, Board hearing, or of any of the Board Hearings. settlement agreement between the parties; and (iii) imposing other obligations and penalties on the [...] and the Planning Board of the [...], as deemed necessary by the Court to deter such conduct in the future. ”  Pa035.  On May 11, 2023, [...] filed a Prerogative Writ Complaint against the Board under Docket No. [...], Pa128.  The Motion in Aid of Litigant’s Rights was decided by the Trial court, and following same, [...] submitted Certification of Counsel in support of application for attorney’s fees, Pa365 and Supplemental Certification of Counsel, Pa385, together with law memo.  The Township and the Board submitted Certification of the Township Planner, Pa378 and additional exhibit (as part of Counsel’s Brief), Pa395 and legal memo.  The Court awarded attorney’s fees in the amount of $28,909.52, and Delay Penalties of $112,000, Pa021.
[brief] The brief was both untimely and 46 pages overlength in violation of N.J. Crt. R. 1:6-5.  Plaintiff submitted neither a request for a further extension of time to file his reply, nor did he request leave to file an overlength brief.  (Da034, eCourts Case Jacket).  On Friday, March 5, 2021, the parties attended oral argument regarding Plaintiff’s motion to amend the complaint; wherein the Court allowed Defendants two weeks to file a sur-reply and set the return date for the motion for April 1, 2021.
[directive] For the purposes this Directive, I am treating disciplinary violations as sufficiently serious to warrant public disclosure of an officer’s identity when the sanction involves Page 3 termination of employment, reduction in rank or grade, and/or a suspension greater than five days.  Correspondingly, I am revising to indicate that every law enforcement agency’s IAPP annual synopsis report must include all final disciplinary actions that meet this threshold.  This classification mirrors the distinction that the [...] draws between “minor discipline,” which may result in a written reprimand or a suspension of up to five days, and “major discipline,” which may result in termination, reduction in rank, or lengthier suspensions.  Major disciplinary violations can include conduct involving, among other things, excessive force against civilians, racially derogatory comments, driving while intoxicated, domestic violence, theft, the filing of false reports, and/or conduct that results in criminal charges against the officer.  To be clear, today’s Directive applies prospectively.