ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] (ii)  That Appellant’s proofs that [...]’s injuries were proximately caused by the delayed delivery, and not the maternal hemorrhage on the day previous, were inadequate [Pa10-11].  In truth, Respondents’ moving papers conceded that [...]’s opinion created a jury for the issue to determine over whether [...]’s injuries were the result of the hemorrhage or the thirty-nine minutes of oxygen deprivation.  [See, e.g., Pa208].  The New Motion Judge faulted Plaintiff for not addressing the --- 4  Moreover, the New Motion Judge’s explanation on this point was one-sided and ignored [...]’s detailed testimony as to why, even though a maternal hemorrhage could cause in some cases some of the injuries suffered by causation proofs concerning the effect of the maternal hemorrhage [Pa10: “There has been no specific testimony about the cause of the infant’s multiple medical problems”] when the movants had actually conceded that this issue was not being raised by their motion for summary judgment. \(^5\)  (iii)  That [...]’s opinions did not contest that [...] met the standard of care [Pa7-8], when in fact, the defense did not actually argue that as part of their motion.  The New Motion Judge wrote: “What the Plaintiff neglects to acknowledge is that there is no expert testimony that the Defendant [...], deviated from the accepted standard of care of a resident obstetrician” and “[t]he facts are that [...] could not have called the c-section. ”  [Pa7-8].  Both of these observations are just wrong; and no party ever raised, as a legal argument, that [...] or [...] met their standard of care, as a matter of law.  [See Pa210-211; Pa212-213; Pa266-267; Pa403-410; Pa438-442].  To the extent Respondents address the due process arguments, this Court should note that they do not actually dispute that the New Motion Judge raised these issues \textit{sua sponte}; or that the New Motion Judge actually ruled against Appellant on issues that they had conceded for purposes of the motions.
[brief] In fact, in the decision, the Court extensively criticizes the terms of the proposed written Agreement, but never found that a settlement was not reached.  (2T14:21-17:20).  Instead, the Court ruled in misplaced reliance on --- 7  The Court also erroneously concluded that the waiver provisions of the OWBPA extend beyond waiver of an ADEA claim, suggesting that “it gives protections to older individuals with respect to employee benefit plan and other purposes.
[brief] [Id.]  [...] promptly issued checks refunding the Policy premiums.  [Pa435a, ¶ 46]  [...] did not rescind the Policies as to any “Innocent Insureds. ”  [Pa436a, ¶ 51]  To avoid any doubt on that point, on May 19, 2020, [...] expressly agreed that it would accept a representation by any of the individual plaintiffs that he or she had no actual knowledge of the false answers by the Firm in the Applications, and thus were “innocent insureds” to whom the Policies were not rescinded.  [Id., ¶ 52]  [...] never received such a representation from any of the plaintiffs.  [Pa437a, ¶ 52]  Ultimately, the “innocent insured” plaintiffs never alleged that they sought or were denied coverage for any Claim under the Policies, and they do not join this appeal.  [Pa438a, ¶ 57]  G.  The Trial Court Ruling
[brief] A.  The [...] Policy  On September 29, 2020, [...] issued a policy of commercial automobile liability insurance that names “[...]” as Insured (PPCIa152-53).  The [...] Policy includes Endorsement Form MCS-90, pursuant to Sections 29 and 30 of the Motor Carrier Act of 1980.  (PPCIa182-84).  Pursuant to this endorsement, and under certain conditions, [...], as a surety, may be obligated to pay a “final judgment” against [...] resulting from negligence in the operation, maintenance or use of a motor vehicle if the policy does not afford coverage.  Id.  By its statutorily mandated terms, the MCS-90 endorsement does not obligate [...] to pay any part of a judgment that the Policy would not have covered.  Id.  B.  The Underlying Oil Spill On June 1, 2021, [...] was informed that earlier that day, a tractor operated by [...] had been pulling a trailer-mounted “intermodal” (a metal container) that it had “parked” at a lot located at [...].  (PPCIa435).  As the tractor was pulling the trailer from its “parking space,” the intermodal was pierced by an adjacent trailer, spilling its contents (waste oil) onto the ground.  Id.  To [...]’s information, the subject lot is leased by the property owner, [...], to [...], which in turn, let [...] “park” trailers there.² (PPCIa436).  The intermodal comprised a metal exterior shell and a flexible interior bladder that contained a petroleum liquid – the exact substance of which remains in dispute.  (PPCIa436; PPCIa438).  The trailer had been parked at the ²  While [...] has been provided the lease agreement as between [...] and [...], [...] understands that there was no written agreement as between [...] and [...]. premises pending transportation of the container to [...], a shipping terminal located just over six miles away.  (PPCIa435).  C.
[brief] In this instance notifying the individual unit owners of the approaching storm or the fact that Management had taken no action would not, without more, likely have changed the result although it might have served to have management take some action if unit owners made inquiries as to what was being done in light of the approaching storm and the Governor’s declaration.  However, considering what had occurred in 2014 and having taken no action in the ensuing years to protect against a reoccurrence would on its face be negligent, especially in light of the more extreme weather that has occurred around the world since the building was constructed.  The unit owners pay a monthly fee of which a part of those monies is to be used to maintain the common areas.  If nothing had been done to upgrade or take reasonable precautions against a reoccurrence in almost a decade, since the damage from the 2014 flood such would be negligent all things considered.  Any such improvements to the exterior would have been noticed by Plaintiff as she is on site on a near daily basis and has noticed the recent change in the installation of the gate and holes in the wall, which would have been hard to miss.  So, per the By Laws and well as the Condominium Act the duty to care is on the Defendant.  Defendant breached that duty in two ways.  1.  It made no improvements to protect against a reoccurrence in 10 years time and 2.  It took no action to enact temporary protection of some kind notwithstanding the governor’s declaration of an emergency.  Ida was the proximate cause of the damage and the cost to repair the damages were provided both prior to commencing suit and afterwards for which Defendant was present on a daily basis while the repairs were being made.  POINT
[brief] Q  [...], if I accept what you tell me and if I'm satisfied you're pleading guilty knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily and if I find that you understand everything going on here today, I will have a great deal of difficulty believing at a later date that you did not enter this guilty plea of your own free will.  In other words, no one is forcing you to plead guilty, do you understand that?  A  Yes.  Q  At that point you would have the burden to prove to me that it would be in the interest of justice to allow you to withdraw your guilty plea before I sentence you, do you understand that?  A  Yes.  Q  Do you believe you've had enough time to discuss all these cases with your attorney, [...]?  A Yes.  Q  Has he shared with you the discovery the prosecutor would use against you in these cases?  A Yes.  THE COURT: And [...], you acknowledge you received and fully reviewed all discovery in these files with your client?  MR. HESKETH: Yes, sir.  Q  [...], by pleading guilty you're giving up certain guaranteed constitutional rights, this includes the right to a jury trial, and as you know today was the day to start selecting that jury, you have the right to be presumed innocent by that jury, the right to have the State prove your guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, you would be able to testify to a trial or remain silent, your silence could not be used against you, [...] could cross examine State witnesses and confront evidence and you would be able to bring in your own witnesses and evidence in your own defense, do you understand those rights?
[brief] The act of firing a gun from a moving vehicle at another moving vehicle “distinguishes this case from those in which a defendant shoots directly into a crowd or directly at another person, conduct which this [C]ourt has concluded defeats an inference that the shooter was not aware that death was a practical certainty. ”  *State v. Gaines*, 377 N.J. Super. 612, 622 (App. Div. 2005) (citing *State v. Mendez*, 252 N.J. Super. 155, 160-62 (App. Div. 1991), certif. denied, 127 N.J. 560 (1992); *State v. Sanchez*, 224 N.J. Super. 231, 242-43 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 111 N.J. 653 (1988)).  As the judge observed, most of the shots missed the van, and many of those that did hit it, struck lower down near the tires supporting an inference that the individual(s) in the pursuing vehicle were attempting to “disable” [...]’s vehicle.  (4T109-1 to 112-12; 10T25-24 to 25; Pa8-15).  And while the chase looped through [...], the shooting was confined to one area of [...].  (10T5-18 to 6-4; 10T20-8 to 21-5).  Thus, even if defendant were one of the shooters, there was sufficient evidence for a rational jury to return a guilty verdict for reckless manslaughter.
[brief] U.S. Const. amends. IV, XIV; N.J. Const. art. I, ¶ 7.  A warrantless search or seizure is presumptively unreasonable unless the State proves by a preponderance of the evidence that it “falls within one of the few well-delineated exceptions to the warrant requirement. ”  State v. Elders, 192 N.J. 224, 246 (2007).
[brief] If the tenure charges are sufficient to warrant dismissal or reduction in salary of the person charged, the Commissioner is required to transmit the tenure charges to an impartial arbitrator under N.J.S.A. 18A:6-17.1 for further proceedings.  suspension, he would be recommending that [...]’s employment be terminated.  (Pa41).  On November 18, 2021, the [...] approved [...]’s termination from employment.
[brief] Appellate Division’s Order Denying [...]’s Emergent Motion entered August 21, 2023...........................................Pa0177  Order dated October 2, 2023  Denying Stay.........................................................  Da214  Appellate Division’s Order Denying [...]’s Motion for Stay filed October 30, 2023......................................................Pa0179  Order Denying [...]’s Motion for an Order for Sanctions dated December 1, 2023 ..............................Pa0192
[brief] Citing N.J.S.A 2A:34-1 and Newburgh v. Arrigo 88 NJ 529, 443 A2d 1031, and other citations omitted | 32 | | State v. K.P.S., 221 N.J. 266 (2015) | 30 | | State v. Reldan, 100 N.J. 209 | 30 | | Son of Thunder, Inc. v. Borden, Inc. 448 N.J. 396 | 33 | | Wade v. Kessler Institute, 172 N.J. 327 (2002) | 39 | Williams v. Williams, 59 N.J. 229 (1971) ..................................
[brief] Plaintiff argued, however, that he needed to examine the lease in this case to determine the nature of the claim.  However, what that argument essentially states is that Plaintiff knew the identity of potential defendants, but did not know the specific theory of recovery that Plaintiff might assert against those party.  However, the fictitious-party pleading rules are simply not applicable when the defendant’s true name is known, but the nature of the claim is unknown.  Thus, the fact that Plaintiff added “John Doe” defendants in his pleading was irrelevant and was not a basis to find that he complied with the statute of limitations.  In any event, Plaintiff’s argument that he could not file suit against [...] without first examining the lease is simply false.  Plaintiff ultimately argued that [...] had a duty to maintain the area where he fell based on the lease, but also on the common law, relying a case—Nielsen—which was published in 2013.\(^9\)  Thus, at the moment of the injury, Plaintiff knew of his injury, knew [...]’s identity, and reasonably could have known the nature of the claim, i.e., that he could assert a common-law duty based on the reasoning in Nielsen.  Thus, neither the discovery rule nor the fictitious-party pleading practice applied, and Plaintiff’s failure to file suit with two years of the incident doomed his case.
[brief] 6  A.  The Applicable Standard is De Novo .............................................................................  6  B.  The Court Failed to Consider whether the LAD Creates a Well- Settled Legal Right to Exclude Parents from Information about their Children .........................................................................................................................  7 POINT II  THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ENTERING RESTRAINTS DESPITE A LACK OF CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE OF A LIKELIHOOD OF SUCCESS ON THE MERITS (Da393-417)  .........................  10
[brief] Yet the whole purpose for the hearing was for the Court to understand what occurred, determine credibility and make findings of fact.  The Court did none of that and instead treated the hearing as if it was a request for summary judgment.  The court denied the motion because there were “too many discrepancies [] to say that… [Respondent] waived her right to a jury trial. ”  2T at 56:20-25.  The Court also improperly placed the burden of proof on Appellants that there was a binding agreement to arbitrate rather than on [...] to show there was not.  On November 8, 2024, the trial Court entered an Order denying Appellants’ motion.  On December 6, 2024, Appellants filed a Notice of Appeal of the Order.  3a-6a.
[directive] Amended by 1979, c. 344, s. 5, eff. Jan. 23, 1980; L. 79, Sept. 1981, c. 290, s. 50, eff. 24, 1981; 1986, c. s. 1, eff. Aug. 6, 1986.  Disposal forfeited property 2C:64-6. of 2C:64-6.
[brief] ”  Specifically, the Plaintiff requested:  1.  A design waiver is required from proposing street trees along the entire Fourteenth Street frontage.  2.  A design waiver is required from providing non-radial lot lines.  [...] reviewed the requested waivers, and recommended the following:  The applicant’s engineer is requesting the design waiver because of the proposed stormwater management system.  Should the Board grant the required design waiver, we recommend shade trees be proposed to the southwest of the stormwater management facilities.  The non-radial lot lines have been designed such that proposed Lots 24.06 and 24.07 will meet the minimum area and width requirements, while keeping stormwater management facilities entirely on new Lot 24.05.  Therefore, we recommend the Board grant the required design waiver.  (Ia130)  The first public hearing took place on April 5, 2022 (“April Hearing”)
[brief] The MBPA states:  Every brewer shall contract and agree in writing with a wholesaler for all supply, distribution and sale of the products of the brewer *in this State*, and each contract shall provide and specify the rights and duties of the brewer and the wholesaler with regard to such supply, distribution, and sale.  The terms and provisions of such contracts shall be reasonable, reflect the parties’ mutuality of purpose and community of interest in the responsible sale and marketing of their products, and shall comply with and conform to *State law* and the terms of this act.  N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 33.1-93.15(a) (emphasis added).
[brief] Plaintiff filed a Complaint for foreclosure of the Tax Lien.  (Pa1).  The Defendant filed a contesting Answer to the Complaint.  (Pa23).  Plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment.  (Pa25).  An order granting summary judgment was entered on June 21, 2019.  (Pa25).  The order fixing amount/time/place for redemption (“OST”) was entered on December 30, 2019.  (Pa56).  The Defendant was served with the entered OST on January 2, 2020.  (Pa56).  The Defendant was served with the Motion for Final Judgment March 24, 2020.  (Pa56).  Final Judgment was entered on June 29, 2020, thereby vesting Plaintiff with title to the Property.
[brief] Additionally, the dictionary definition of “exclusive” means, in relevant part: “limiting or limited to possession, control, or use by a single individual or group” and “excluding others from participation. ”  N.J.S.A. 34:13A-5.3 requires the [...] to “select” and “inform” specific individuals that they have been “designated” as having the “conferred status” of “exclusive representatives” for collective negotiations with the [...].  The [...], however, has refused to identify any specific individuals as exclusive representatives for negotiations.  Rather, the [...] maintains that its entire 225-employee membership has the right to attend and/or participate in all negotiations sessions, presumably whenever each such member decides to do so (i.e., on a “come-and-go” basis).  See, i.e., Pa073 ([...]’s Negotiations Chair stating in a letter to the [...]’s Director of Human Resources and Professional Development that “[a]ll [[...]] members have a right to --- 1 Exclusive, Merriam-Webster, merriam-webster. com/dictionary/exclusive (last visited February 26, 2024).  2  New Jersey appellate courts regularly rely on the definitions set forth in Merriam-Webster Dictionary when interpreting statutory language.  See, i.e., State v. Smith, 251 N.J. 244, 265, n.3 (2022); JWC Fitness, LLC v. Murphy, 469 N.J. Super. 414, 426 (App. Div. 2021); Angus v. Bd. of Educ. Of Borough of Metuchen, Middlesex Cty., 475 N.J. Super. 362, 371 (App. Div. 2023).  attend the meetings as part of this [[...]]”).  Indeed, the [...] maintains that “any member of the [...]\(^3\) has the same rights as any other negotiations team member, including lead negotiators, [including] the right to vote on any matters before the [...]s negotiation team, to address offers from the [...], and to propose contractual language, (Pa220, ¶ 6)” which is plainly violative of the Act’s requirement that majority representatives “designate representatives” for collective bargaining.  N.J.S.A. 34:13A-5.3.  Therefore, the [...] has violated N.J.S.A. 34:13A-5.3 by refusing to designate representatives for bargaining.  In essence, no [...] member has been designated as a representative for negotiations purposes, because all of the members have been.
[brief] It is obvious that these provisions of the State Policy are intended to ensure that State employees continue to be protected it when their State Workplace extends to a different location.  For example, a State worker who is assigned to work at a third-party worksite does not become unprotected from workplace discrimination merely because the State does not own the worksite.  Further, the analysis must look at why the State employee is at the workplace.  Under the facts of this case, the CSC’s determination that the local union office was a State Workplace means that all State Workplaces follow each State worker, like a movable zone of coverage.  Finally, research did not reveal any reported cases at either the administrative nor appellate review level that involved a finding of an allegation of a violation of the State Policy that occurred outside of a State workplace and did not involve State business, as are the facts presented here.
[brief] Ra24 --- 1 Ra1 to 3, Ra4 to 7, Ra17 to 23, and Cma1 to 21 were omitted from defendant’s appendix, and are essential to understanding the procedural history of this case and issues raised herein.  See R. 2:6-1(a)(1)(I).  Ra8 to 16 was incorporated by reference by the judge for this matter, and is essential to considering the issues raised.  (6T3-13 to 4-9).  Ra24 to 39 are photographic and video exhibits from the motion to suppress, which are also essential to properly considering the issues raised in this appeal.
[brief] The exhaustive procedural history, including submission of legal briefs, a full-day evidentiary hearing, and post-hearing submissions, amply establishes that the trial court’s application of the TCA was based on a detailed analysis of the roadway condition at issue and thorough exploration of the basis of the opinions set forth by [...].  It is undisputed that five months prior to the accident, a non-party engineering firm inspected the abutment joint at issue, took note of an elevation change and did not indicate it was a dangerous condition in need of emergent repair.  In fact, the engineering firm rated the roadway and bridge as being in “satisfactory” condition and the approach was in “fair” condition.  Furthermore, there were no prior complaints or accidents in the area.  Moreover, Plaintiff, Plaintiff’s wife, Plaintiff’s friend, and the New Jersey State Trooper who responded to the accident, were unable to identify any roadway condition that caused the accident.  Additionally, none of the Authority contractors who were working in the area reported any roadway conditions requiring emergent repair.  Based on its thorough review of all the evidence and testimony, the trial court correctly concluded: 1) the elevation change was not a “dangerous condition” and did not give rise to a claim under the TCA; 2) the Authority was not provided actual or constructive notice of a dangerous condition in the area of the accident; 3) Plaintiff failed to establish that the elevation change caused the accident; and 4) the Authority’s conduct was not palpably unreasonable.
[brief] The Parties disagree only about whether Plaintiff’s *Gannon* class claims are “Released Claims” under Section 1.29.  The trial court correctly held that they are.  Plaintiff chiefly argues on appeal—as he did below—that the *Roma* Settlement Class Members did not release “future claims. ”  Pb16–23.  The trial court rightfully rejected Plaintiff’s argument because the Gannon claims are related to the claims in Roma, making them “Released Claims.
[brief] 3.  [...]’ Sworn Statement is Admissible Because He Conceived the Contents of the Sworn Statement  The PCR Judge maintained a preconceived notion that [...] was guilty of the crimes charged and would not grant the Petition, regardless of the merits of the application.  Recognizing that the Sworn Statement should have been produced by the State in advance of [...]’s trial, the Court pivoted, concluding that the Sworn Statement was not Brady because another inmate assisted with drafting the Habeas Petition, notwithstanding the fact that [...] swore under penalty of perjury to the accuracy of the contents.  In reaching the conclusion that [...]’ Sworn Statement would not be admissible under N.J.R.E. 803(a)(1), the PCR Court found that the statement was not material, because “the court knows now that [...] conceived the contents of the petition; indeed, these are not truly [...] words. ” (Da172-73).  At the outset, this finding ignores [...]’ testimony at the July 27, 2021 evidentiary hearing.  At the hearing, [...] admitted that the substance of the Petition was conceived years prior and memorialized in communications between [...] and [...], as well as [...] and defense counsel.  [...] admitted that he possessed letters from [...], wherein [...] advised that “he was willing to give an affidavit on [[...]’] behalf. ” (7T 47:3 – 49:20).  These letters were prepared and sent in the late 1990s and early 2000s (i.e., nearly a decade prior to [...] seeking assistance from [...] with the Habeas Petition).  In fact, following his testimony, the [...] subpoenaed [...] for the letters.  Although [...] no longer possessed many of the letters, including letters to defense counsel, he was able to produce at least one letter from [...], confirming that the substance of the arguments in the Sworn Statement were actually conceived by [...] and [...], not [...].  The Superior Court’s findings were erroneous, merely pretextual, and designed purely to support a decision to deny the Petition for Post-Conviction Relief.  b.