ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] ”  Printing Mart-Morristown v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 116 N.J. 739, 746 (1989)  The standard governing a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to R. 4:6-2(e) is that the Complaint must be examined "in depth and with liberality to ascertain whether the fundament of a cause of action may be gleaned even from an obscure statement of claim, opportunity being given to amend if necessary."  Id.  The motion should be based on the pleadings, with the court accepting as true the facts alleged in the complaint.  Rieder v. State Dept. of Transp., 221 N.J. Super. 547, 552 (App. Div. 1987).  A motion to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim “may not be denied based on the possibility that discovery may establish the requisite claim; rather, the legal requisites for plaintiffs' claim must be apparent from the complaint itself. ”  Edwards v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Co., 357 N.J. Super. 196, 202, (App. Div. 2003), certif. denied, 176 N.J. 278 (2003).  Contrary to popular belief, “New Jersey is a ‘fact’ rather than a ‘notice’ pleading jurisdiction, which means that a plaintiff must allege facts to support his or her claim rather than merely reciting the elements of a cause of action. ”  Nostrame v. Santiago, 420 N.J. Super. 427, 436 (App. Div. 2011).  It has long been established that pleadings reciting mere conclusions without facts and reliance on subsequent discovery do not justify a lawsuit.  Gruccio v. Baxter, 135 N.J. Super. 290, 294-95 (Law Div. 1975).  A dismissal with prejudice is “mandated where the factual allegations are palpably insufficient to support a claim upon which relief can be granted,” Rieder v. State, 221 N.J.  Super. 547, 552 (App. Div. 1987), or if “discovery will not give rise to such a claim[.]”  Dimitrakopoulos v. Borrus, Goldin, Foley, Vignuolo, Hyman and Stahl, P.C., 237 N.J. 91, 107 (2019).  Here, the Court below properly granted RESPONDENTS’ Motion to Dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.  Even when examining APPELLANTS’ Complaint with great liberality, the factual allegations set forth therein are palpably insufficient to state a claim for liability under the TCA.  Id.  Further, in as much as RESPONDENTS are immune from liability under Section 59:5-4 the TCA, discovery could not possibly give rise to facts which would state such a claim.  B.  **RESPONDENTS ARE IMMUNE FROM LIABILITY UNDER THE TCA FOR FAILURE TO PROVIDE POLICE PROTECTION.**
[brief] It requires the Board to keep student records, which identify a student’s change in gender identity or name change, confidential from parents absent “a specific and compelling” need otherwise.  This violates these state and federal laws, as detailed by the Board in its initial brief (Da15).  Moreover, pursuant to the terms of the injunction, the Board is prohibited from modifying the policy to permit parental access to records (Da095).  Despite Plaintiffs’ newfound claim to the contrary, student records have much “to do with this case” (Pa27).
[brief] BECAUSE THE TRIAL COURT APPLIED  UNDISPUTED FACTS TO WELL-ESTABLISHED LAW AND CORRECTLY RULED THAT THE WARRANT AUTHORIZING THE SEARCH OF [...]’S HOME, CAR, AND PERSON WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY PROBABLE CAUSE.  (1T:3-25 to 6-19, 11-4 to 25-25)  ..................................................7  CONCLUSION  ....................................................................................20  PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[brief] See Johnson v. Johnson, 411 N.J. Super. 161, 175 (App. Div. 2009), rev. on other grounds 204 N.J. 529 (2010) (Judge resolved factual disputes against party without a hearing and expressed opinion as to credibility of witness); P.T. v. M.S., 325 N.J. Super. 193, 200 (App. Div. 1999) (Remand to be heard by a different Judge when a necessary plenary hearing was not conducted, and Judge entered sanctions for failure to comply with Orders); Leang v. Jersey City Bd. Of Ed., 399 N.J. Super. 329, 380 (App. Div. 2008), aff. in part rev. in part 198 N.J. 557 (2009) (Judge expressed opinions on credibility on Summary Judgment Motion, remand should be heard by different Judge); J.L. v. J. F. 317 N.J. Super. 418, 438 (App. Div. 1999) (first Judge found party's position not credible).
[brief] (7T:313-6 to 315-1).  [...] purchased the rifle from a firearms dealer approximately one year prior to the incident.  (6T:123-17 to 124-2).  [...] testified that he had a firearms ID card.  (6T:124-4 to 6).  [...] had a safe in his bedroom for the firearm, but he did not store the gun in the safe because it was starting to “rust the weapon. ” (6T:125-5 to 10).  [...] testified that after his mother went upstairs, he heard a gun shot and then a grunt or a moan.  (6T:117-14 to 25).  [...] shot his mother [...] five times.  (7T:321-4 to 322-7); (9T:81-18 to 24).  [...] died as a result of the gunshot wounds.  (9T:82-14 to 20).  After the first shot, [...] ran out the front door and [...] ran upstairs.  (6T:118-6 to 11).  As Steven Sr. ran upstairs, Richard and [...] ran downstairs to their apartment and ran out the back door.  (7T:144-13 to 145-1).  As [...] was running upstairs, Scott shot his father once in the head and once in the back.  (7T:324-24 to 325-3);(9T:35-12 to 21); (9T:37-21 to 38-6).  [...] later died as a result of the gunshot wounds.
[brief] In opposition to Plaintiff’s appeal, [...] asks this Court to disregard the allegations about the longstanding history between Plaintiff and [...] and the reasons why Plaintiff was justified in relying upon [...]’s statements, arguing that they were not included in the Complaint or relied upon by the trial court in its decision.  (See [...] Br., at 16, n. 4.)  However, this argument is inaccurate and misleading.  Evidence supporting these allegations was absolutely included in the record before the trial court, in the context of Defendants’ motions to dismiss.  See Pa152-157.  Contrary to [...]’s argument, there is no reason to conclude that the trial court did not consider these points in its decisions dismissing the Complaint with prejudice.  The trial court issued its rulings on the motions to dismiss from the bench (2T, 4T) and did not issue written decisions to accompany either of the Orders of dismissal.  (Pa357; Pa651).  In any event, at worst, Plaintiff should have been given the opportunity to replead its Complaint to include these factual allegations, to the extent that they were not fully articulated in the Complaint itself.  See Printing Mart, 116 N.J. at 771-72.  _____________________
[brief] The Complainant alleged that the second incident occurred at the local union office.  However, local union office is not a “State workplace” under the State Policy.  The [...] nonetheless held that because the union represents State workers, its private office is per se a workplace where “State business” is being discussed for the purposes of the State Policy.  No record evidence supports the [...]’s conclusion.  Nor would a contrary finding subject the State to a potential claim for vicarious liability by the Complainant if [...] had properly concluded that the allegations about the afternoon incident at the local union office were outside of its jurisdiction to investigate.  The State is not liable for the creation of a hostile work environment where it does not have any obligation or authority to control the conditions of the workplace.  Indeed, the [...]’s jurisdictional ruling undermines that legal principle and suggests that the State may be liable had it failed to investigate and make determinations about the allegations at the local union office.  Finally, the [...]’s determination that the fact that the matter arose out of and entirely involved a union election was irrelevant failed to harmonize the statutory rights, protections and administrative scheme established by the Legislature for public employment labor relations with the policies animating the regulation that establishes the State Policy.  Under the facts of this case, the [...]’s determination that the local union office was a State workplace is arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable, and this court should reverse it.
[brief] Union County Police Sergeant [...] testified as an expert in ballistics and firearm identification.  (5T147-17 to 19).  He testified that both the semi-automatic firearm and the revolver were operable.  (5T170-6 to 11).  He further testified that the bullet that was recovered from the hospital was fired from the semi-automatic handgun that was recovered.  (5T171-9 to 172-4).  He also testified that the two shell casings that were recovered from the victim’s Honda were ejected by the semi-automatic handgun.  (5T172-5 to 9).  Additionally, Sergeant Schaible testified that the three casings recovered from the revolver were, in fact, fired by that revolver.  (5T178-10 to 17).  He also found that two of the three bullets that were recovered from the victim’s body during autopsy, specifically, the ones recovered from [...]’s chest and back, were fired from the revolver.  (5T178-18 to 179-12; 5T180-21 to 25; 5T181-7 to 15).  Sergeant Schaible also testified that the third bullet that was recovered during the autopsy, the one that came from the victim’s knee, rendered inconclusive results, but that it could not be excluded as having come from the revolver.  (5T178-18 to 179-12; 5T181-1 to 6; 5T181-7 to 15).  [...], an expert in the field of DNA analysis, testified for the State at trial.
[directive] This memorandum updates the memoranda dated March 18, 2020 and March 27, 2020.  At the direction of the Attorney General and Commissioner of Health, effective April 15, 2020, once each day by 5pm, County LINCS Agencies must provide the following information via a secure encrypted email and password protected document to a designated single point of contact (POC) at the County Prosecutor’s Office (CPO):  -A list of names, including first and last name, of individuals who tested positive for COVID-19 located in the county; and -A list of resident locations by address where each case of positive COVID-19 laboratory test is located.  County LINCS Agencies must also provide the following information to the designated single POC at the CPO via the daily secure email set forth above, so that confidential flags can be removed from the CAD system(s):  -A list of names of individuals where thirty days has elapsed from their previously reported positive; and -A list of resident locations by address where thirty days has elapsed from their previously reported positive.  County LINCS Agencies must also include the following statement in the daily email:  This e-mail, including any attachments, includes highly sensitive, confidential medical information about individuals pursuant to the Emergency Health Powers Act, specifically NJSA 26:13-13-1, et seq.  This email and any attachments are absolutely confidential, not public documents, not subject to disclosure under the Open Public Records Act (OPRA) and may only be used or disclosed in accordance with the Emergency Health Powers Act, specifically NJSA 26:13-17, as specifically approved in writing by the New Jersey Attorney General Directive and the Commissioner of Health.
[directive] The number of certified CED Instructors and Less-Lethal Instructors, who shall be responsible for the initial training and qualification of officers authorized to carry a CED or Less-Lethal Device, shall be determined by the appropriate County Prosecutor or statewide law enforcement agency executive.  A County Prosecutor may designate any law enforcement officer to serve as an authorized CED or Less-Lethal Instructor within the countywide program under their jurisdiction.  11.4  For purposes of CED and Less-Lethal re-qualification ONLY, upon approval and designation of the respective County Prosecutor’s Office, municipal police officers and/or county sheriff’s officers may be trained as a “CED Re-Qualification Instructor” or “Less-Lethal Requalification Instructor” to administer re-qualification.  Training of any CED or Less-Lethal Re-Qualification Instructor shall be identical to the training requirements for Certified CED Instructors or Certified Less-Lethal Instructors.  Each respective County Prosecutor’s Office shall maintain a list of all CED and Less-Lethal Re-Qualification Instructors.  Re-Qualification Instructors shall not be authorized to conduct the initial training of officers authorized to carry a CED or Less-Lethal Device.  11.5  The Director of DCJ, with the approval of the Attorney General, shall have the authority to set additional training and qualification requirements for CED Instructors, Less-Lethal Instructors, and officers authorized to carry a CED or Less-Lethal device.
[directive] 1  I.  First Amendment  the Right Scope of an conduct.  right record officer's not of but public member who is A. present the The to A "bystander," observe, a situation event, the part has taking in or i.e., right to witness, a on, complain law enforcement or audio photograph, comment about and record, video in public person a in has right or conducting places duties official private where officers the present.l be to as make member press, has as of same bystander recordings right to a the A the they (a) present right to public legal are, a in the as be long has where bystander including locations limited to parks, public of settings sidewalks, streets, not but places of common facilities buildings, (b) public areas and and private in protests, common the to including the has present, where bystander but limited to right not be bystander's of private facilities areas home buildings, or and a business. and in setting as a a in legal long the which the As recording 2. takes place has bystander lawful officer's to present does interfere right with safety duties, and be an not or officer shall the not: i. Tell or the the that recording police bystander of police activity, officers, of persons are subject the a action police allowed. not is who ii. Tell a a requires activity recording police bystander officer permit that or consent.
[brief] On or about, May 1, 2018, Plaintiff re-filed her application to enforce litigants’ rights below (P-5), following a failed mediation that the lower court ordered on July 14, 2017 (P-25 to P-30).  The mediation failed when Defendant abruptly left without advising Plaintiff of his intention to unilaterally conclude the mediation (P-17 to P-24).  --- 1
[brief] \(^3\) --- \(^1\)  “[...]” is defined to mean both [...] and [...] (“[...]”) but all acts at issue in this action, including the issuing and rescission of the policies, were taken by [...] [Pa425a].  \(^2\)  [...] and [...] have abandoned their abuse of process claim on appeal.  \(^3\)  Before this case was filed, [...] filed a declaratory judgment action seeking confirmation that it was entitled to rescind the Policies as to the Firm and [...] in the lawsuit captioned, *[...] Insurance Co. v. [...] & Mennie LLC f/k/a*
[brief] This suggests that perhaps these alleged safety concerns were more about the type of business that would occupy the Property, especially given its proximity to [...], a very influential neighbor.  The Hearing Officer also concluded that Atlantic Avenue is “heavily congested” with vehicular and pedestrian traffic and that the proposed “backing maneuver” into the loading space is “unsafe and inefficient. ” (Aa244-245).  He further stated that this concern “cannot be mitigated by any reasonable condition. ” (Aa245).  The expert opinions expressed on the record below, however, indicate that there would be “minimal interaction and pedestrian activity during the times that [the Appellant’s] delivery vehicle would be traveling to and from the site. ” (T2/20:12-14).  The same expert also opined that he saw “no safety implication for the operation of the proposed loading area” based on that alleged concern.  (T2/20:22-24).  Moreover, he confirmed that the Appellant would have a security officer to aid in the delivery operations, who would be able to “stop any pedestrians that are traveling along Atlantic Avenue at the time the vehicle needs to back into the site to further improve the safety of that maneuver. ” (T2/20:24-21:7).  The Appellant’s traffic engineer also noted the low speeds of Atlantic Avenue and that backing into a property for loading in an urban environment is “completely common. ” (T2/40:9-11).  The same could also be said for parallel parking.  Finally, the Appellant was consistently amenable to agreeing to numerous options or conditions that the [...] proposed during the hearings, including but not limited to moving the location of a loading zone to meet a setback requirement, changing the gate design, and putting no parking signs at the Property.
[directive] you will be required to serve 85% of the sentence imposed for that offense(s) before you will be eligible for parole on that offense(s)?  [Sim/Yes]  [Não/No]  2.  Você entende que em decorrência da sua declaração de culpa por estas acusações o juiz terá de impor um período de supervisão de liberdade condicional de ano(s) e que este período começará assim que cumprir a pena de prisão?
[brief] Id.  See also Jacobson v. Healthcare Fin. Servs., Inc., 516 F.3d 85, 90 (2d Cir. 2008) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1692(e)).  The FDCPA provides extraordinary incentives to would-be Appellants and their attorneys to throw claims against the wall to see if one will stick: up to $1,000 in statutory damages, actual damages; strict liability; and shifting attorney’s fees.
[brief] 36 Smith v. Costco, 2023 WL 4307729 (App. Div. 2023) ........................................ 11, 31 State v. Afanador, 151 N.J. 41, 54 (1997); .....................................................  22 State v. Burney, 255 N.J. 1, 29, (2023).  ..........................................................  52 State v. Cotto, 471 N.J. Super. 489, 543 (App. Div. 2022) ...............................  34 State v. Hutchins, 241 N.J. Super. 353, 358 (App. Div. 1990) ..........................  38 State v. Jenewicz, 193 N.J. 440, 473 (2008) ...................................................  53 State v. Martin, 119 N.J. 2, 15 (1990) ............................................................  22 State v. R.B., 183 N.J. 308, 325 (2000) ..........................................................  22 State v. Robinson, 165 N.J. 32, 40 (2000) .......................................................  22 State v. Silva, 394 N.J. Super. 270, 275 (App. Div. 2007) ...............................  43  State v. Wakefield, 190 N.J. 397, 538 (2007) ..................................................  52  State v. Williams, 190 N.J. 114, 122-23 (2007) ..............................................  47  State v. Wilson, 135 N.J. 4, 14-15 (1994) .................................................. 49-50  Stigliano v. Connaught Labs, Inc., 140 N.J. 305, 317 (1995)..........................  37  Torres v. Pabon, 225 N.J. 167, 188 (2016) ....................................................23, 52 Velazquez v. Portadin, 163 N.J. 667, 689 (2000) ...........................................  23  Weiss v. Nicola Porchetta Co., 2015 WL 1540919 (App. Div. 2015) ..............  44  Wisseman v. Rengifo, 2016 WL 1618659 (App. Div. 2016).............................  44  **Rules and Statutes**
[brief] Traffic on marked lanes.  When a roadway has been divided into clearly marked lanes for traffic, drivers of vehicles shall obey the following regulations:  a.  A vehicle shall normally be driven in the lane nearest the right-hand edge or curb of the roadway when that lane is available for travel, except when overtaking another vehicle or in preparation for a left turn.  b.  A vehicle shall be driven as nearly as practicable entirely within a single lane and shall not be moved from that lane until the driver has first ascertained that the movement can be made with safety  39:4-50.4a  Refusal to submit to test; penalties.  The municipal court shall determine by proof beyond a reasonable doubt whether the arresting officer had probable cause to believe that the person had been driving or was in actual physical control of a motor vehicle on the public highways or quasi-public areas of this State while the person was under the influence of intoxicating liquor or a narcotic, hallucinogenic, or habit-producing drug, or marijuana or cannabis item as defined in section 3 of P.L.2021, c.16 (C.24:6I-33); whether the person was placed under arrest, if appropriate, and whether he refused to submit to the test upon request of the officer; and if these elements of the violation are not established, no conviction shall issue.
[brief] (1T53:21-24.)  [...] conceded that there are only three standardized field sobriety tests: the horizontal gaze nystagmus “HGN”, the walk and turn, and the standing leg raise tests, which do not include the alphabet test.  (1T59:13-21.)  [...] testified that [...] did not tell him anything about the scoring on the HGN test.  (1T65:4-7.)  [...] testified that the field sobriety tests are reliable when administered in a certain manner.  (1T60:14-62:16.)  [...] conceded that he was trained to perform the tests on a dry, non-slippery surface so that the environment does not impact the result of the test.  (1T65:13-24.)  [...] conceded the tests were performed in the rain on a wet surface.
[brief] [...] made significant adjustments to its original site plan based on comments and concerns raised by the Zoning Board and members of the public during the numerous hearings.  For example, based on concerns raised during the Zoning Board hearings regarding the possibility of vehicular collision with the Facility (an extremely unlikely event), [...] proposed to (i) install bollards and a New Jersey Department of Transportation-compliant guardrail; (ii) expand an earthen berm with a retaining wall to surround the front and two sides of the property, which would significantly increase the height of the proposed landscaping; and (iii) lower the ground level of the Facility in order to reduce, if not completely remove, any visual impacts to the surrounding homeowners.
[brief] In light of the above, it is respectfully requested that the decision of the trial court below dismissing the Complaint against [...]’s is incorrect and should be reversed.  [...], ESQ.  [...], ESQ.  Attorney for Plaintiff  Appellant  [...], Plaintiff/Appellant vs. [...], M.D., [...], M.D.; [...], M.D., [...], M.D.; [...], M.D., [...], M.D.; [...], M.D., [...], M.D., [...]; [...] AND DR. JOHN DOE 1-5 (BEING FICTITIOUS DESIGNATIONS), Defendants/Respondents
[brief] Second, Defendants seek “all documents concerning any arrangements, agreements, or understandings (whether oral or written) involving any of the firms representing investors in connection with this Action. ”  Dkt. 210 at 10.  It is Defendants’ stance that they “are entitled to conduct discovery into the arrangements between and among proposed class counsel to test the adequacy of proposed class counsel at the class certification stage. ”  Id.  I disagree.  Separate law firms have been appointed as lead counsel to pursue § 10(b) and § 14(a) claims on behalf of a purported class.  Lead counsel is obligated to work for the class’s benefit.  That can include, in certain limited circumstances, enlisting other law firms to assist them in the prosecution of claims.  Although I generally have found that the involvement of multiple law firms often unnecessarily inflates attorney’s fees, it is not my role at the class certification stage to delve into the relationship between lead counsel and other firms they have enlisted to work on the case.