ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Discovery in this matter was far from complete by the time the Court entered summary judgment.  In fact, in the month before [...] moved for summary judgment, the Trial Court had just granted an extension of the deadline for discovery—a deadline that was set for a date that was over three months after [...] filed its motion.  (P270a).  This is not a situation where discovery was “nearly” complete or that the facts that would be discovered were a forgone conclusion.  In actuality, at the time [...] filed its motion, not a single witness had been deposed.  In fact, on the day [...] filed its motion, a motion to compel further document discovery was also pending.  (P273a-P274a, P421a-P422a).  While “[a] motion for summary judgment is not premature merely because discovery has not been completed,” the types of information that have yet to be collected are relevant to the Court’s determination of the motion.
[brief] **Business Operations from 2007-2014**  The period between about 2005 and 2007 was the height of [...]’s business and personal relationship with [...] – what [...] called a “golden time. ” (4T112:5-22).  Business was booming and both men were well-compensated for their efforts.  (4T109:21 to 110:6; 5T32:9 to 33:2).  During a birthday party that [...] threw for [...], [...] expressed in a speech his gratitude for [...]’s friendship, how much he trusted and relied on [...], and called [...] as his “partner” and his “guru. ” (4T118:1-15).  In July 2007, the last of [...] and [...]’s partners sold his interest in [...], leaving the two as the company’s sole shareholders.  (4T120:11-18).  They executed a revised [...] shareholder agreement made effective as of July 26, 2007 (Da1458-80).  Each also executed an employment agreement with the company.  (P-6; P-7).  At that time, [...] acquired a 51% interest in the company and [...] acquired a 49% interest.  (Da1479).  Though they treated each other as equals (a fact memorialized in paragraph 31 of the 2007 stockholders agreement), this slightly greater ownership percentage for [...] helped the company maintain Minority Business Enterprise (“MBE”) and Disadvantaged Business Enterprise (“DBE”) status, which was critical to help the company procure government contracts.  (4T120:19 to 121:3).  Although [...] was the “face” of the company for the purpose of preserving its MBE/DBE status, [...] knowingly participated in and enjoyed the benefits of that status.  In fact, [...] supplied [...] with the financial information necessary to complete the company’s MBE/DBE applications and even completed some of the applications in his own handwriting.  [...] relied on [...] to provide financial information that was accurate.  (1T 113:2 to 114:7; 4T125:24 to 126:14; 9T9:21 to 11:9; 14:17 to 15:4; 15:23 to 16:4; 17:14-17; 17:18 to 18:21; 19:22 to 20:24; 22:4-13; 24:18 to 25:16; 15T34:19 to 36:5; Pa122, 136, 161, 184).  E.
[brief] See Hurst v. Am. Zurich Ins. Co., 2014 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2866 (App. Div. Oct. 21, 2014) (declaring that similar mold exclusion precludes coverage for mold injuries); Restoration Risk Retention Group, Inc. v. Selective Way Ins. Co., 2011 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2587 (App. Div. Oct. 12, 2011) (same).
[brief] First, it must be noted that the [...] has not cited any legal authority whatsoever for the proposition that the description of an unbuilt road as an “internal road,” “interior road,” or “access road” means that such road must be a private road. (Db34.)  The [...]’s only support for its assertion is the cite of the N.J. Mfrs. opinion (Db35), but that case literally had nothing to do whatsoever with the issue of whether the words “internal road,” “interior road,” or “access road” mean “private road.  N.J. Mfrs. Ins. Co. for Smith v. Public Service Elec. & Gas Co., 234 N.J. Super. 116 (App. Div. 1989).  Needless to say, such case does not support the [...]’s argument.  Second, the documents cited by the [...] all indicate that the Roads were to be dedicated upon completion.  The 2004 Developer’s Agreement expressly contemplated that the Roads were to be dedicated to the [...].  (Da115.)  To wit, Section 2 of such document provided that “the [...] . . . shall accept said dedication of the required curbing, drainage, pavement, etc., upon the completion of the improvements required in the Site Plan by Ordinance or Resolution.
[brief] Synonyms for the adverb “wantonly” include recklessly, heedlessly, desperately, uncontrollably, confusedly, agitatedly.  For a complete list please see “Wantonly” Merriam-Webster.com Thesaurus, Merriam-Webster, http://werriam-webster. com/thesaurus/wantonly.  Accessed 1/13/2024.  The trial court’s decision was flawed because the complaint’s allegation of “wantonly” presupposes that [...] did not have a subjective intent to injure.  See SL Industries (1992) at 209.
[brief] Further, neither the Planning Board nor its expert, in their consistency reviews, address the fact the redevelopment of Plaintiff’s Property under the Second Ordinance results in a smaller residential development than under the existing Redevelopment Plan, and therefore is inconsistent with the use the Land Use Element of the Master Plan designated for Plaintiff’s Property, i.e., the 350 Unit [...] on the 22.5 acre site.  A use for which the Master Plan, in its 2019 Report and adoption by the Borough, expressly stated it saw no need to recommend any change.  A smaller residential component impacts residents who might consider occupying one of the residential units.  3.  Affordable Housing Objective is at Risk
[brief] ’  [...] v. Board of Trustees, Police and Firemen’s Retirement System, 311 N.J Super 333, 337 (citations omitted).  The Court further noted that an “agency has inherent power to waive de minimis violations of objective standards. ”  Id., citing SMB Assocs v. Department of Envtl. Prot., 264 N.J. Super 38, 59 (App. Div. 1993), aff’d, 137 N.J. 58 (1994).  The Court reversed the decision of the Board, noting that even though the letter was never received by [...], even if it had been, the notice was improper and late.  In this matter, like [...], the Board failed to provide timely, adequate, or proper notice of the Ricci Act.
[brief] N.J.S.A. 45:8-28(b) (emphasis added).  [...] is an architectural/engineering consulting company that was contracted to provide professional services that consisted of: engineering services covering all supervision of the said construction work as described herein, together with providing the necessary personnel, equipment, transportation and main office facilities to facilitate in every way the performance of such inspection and coordination of construction and in accordance with the Authority’s Construction Manual (Pa1800).  As the statute governing the licensing of professional engineers make clear, the supervision of construction for the purpose of ensuring compliance with plans and specifications is inherently with the scope of professional engineering services.  N.J.S.A. 45:8-28(b).  The Scope of Services further requires that the consultant employ a project manager who is a professional engineer licensed in the State of New Jersey, to oversee the work performed under the contract (Pa1801).
[brief] Moreover, “[t]ime and again in Takings Clause cases, the [U.S. Supreme] Court has heard the prophecy that that recognizing a just compensation claim would unduly impede the government’s ability to act in the public interest. ”  Arkansas Game & Fish Comm’n v. United States, 568 U.S. 23, 36-37 (2012).  And time and again, the Supreme Court has “rejected this argument.
[brief] ERRONEOUS APPLICATION OF RULE 4:46-2.  Rule 4:46-2 mandates that motions for summary judgment be accompanied by a statement of material facts.  While compliance with this rule facilitates clarity and efficiency in adjudication, it is not an end in itself.  In the present case, the Plaintiff’s purported failure to format the statement of material facts in the precise manner described by the rule was used as a basis to deny the motion for summary judgment.  However, this rigid application of the rule disregards the substantive evidence presented by Plaintiff, which included detailed documentation proving ownership of the disputed property.  The New Jersey Appellate Division’s decision in Rodriguez v. Raymours Furniture Company, Inc., 225 N.J. 343 (2016), provides a compelling analogy.  In Rodriguez, the court warned against the draconian application of procedural dictates that would preclude a substantive determination of a party's rights, especially when such an application would serve no real purpose other than to enforce a technical requirement.  Finally, the assertion that there was no dispute over the material facts was in itself a legal error, as recognized in Jennings v. Borough of Highland, 418 N.J. Super. 405 (App. Div. 2011), where it was established that summary judgment is inappropriate where the evidence presents reasonable doubts concerning material facts.  C. JUDICIAL DISCRETION AND THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE.
[brief] (5T 95-25 to 103-23; Da 40-41)  On July 28, 2023, [...] was sentenced to an aggregate term of 12 years’ imprisonment with 4 years of parole ineligibility: 5 years flat on counts 1 and 2, and 12 years with a 4-year parole disqualifier on counts 3 and 4, all to run concurrently.  (6T 12-16 to 14-11)  A Notice of Appeal was filed on August 23, 2023, and an amended Notice was filed on September 18, 2023.  (Da 49-57)  **STATEMENT OF FACTS**
[brief] [...]’s Order set forth a specific procedure of contacting parents and guardians prior to the release of the records in issue.  On June 22, 2022, defense counsel conferred with [...] to work out the issues of complying with the Order and to effectuate the payment of counsel fees.  Plaintiffs were asked to provide W-9 tax information and a Warrant to Satisfy Judgment, which was to be held in escrow until the Judgment was fully satisfied.  [...] confirmed this conversation describing it as “settlement communication. ”
[brief] I.  STANDARD OF REVIEW  ..........................................................................................................18  II.  The Trial Court Did Not Err In Granting Summary Judgment To [...] and Denying [...]’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment (raised below)  ......................21  A.  A New 30-Day ROFR Period Was Triggered by the May 2, 2024 Addendum I to the PSA (raised below, Da381).  .................................................................23  B.  The Trial Court Did Not Err in Finding That Addendum II Triggered a New 30-day ROFR Period (raised below, Da375).  .................................................................26  C.  The Trial Court Did Not Err In Finding That Addendum II Only Constituted a Final Offer Once Executed and Delivered by [...] On May 8, 2023 (Da376). ........................................................................................................................................31 CONCLUSION .....................................................................................................................................37 ### TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | Case Name | Page(s) | |------------------------------------------------|---------| | **Cases** | | | BOC Group v. Chevron Chemical Co., | 19 | | 359 N.J. Super. 135 (App. Div. 2003) | | | Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., | 18, 19 | | 142 N.J. 521 (1995) | | | Domanske v. Rapid-Am. Corp., | 20 | | 330 N.J. Super. 241 (App. Div. 2000) | | | Fernandez v. Nationwide Mutual Fire Ins. Co., | 18 | | 402 N.J. Super. 166 (App. Div. 2008) | | | Grow Co. v. Chokshi, | 20 | | 403 N.J. Super. 443 (App. Div. 2008) | | | Gutch v. Meccia, | 24, 34, 36 | | 142 N.J. Eq. 430 (Ch. 1948) | | | H&G Hardware, Inc. v. Cohen, | 34, 35, 36 | | A-0667-04T2, 2006 WL 27624 (App. Div. Jan. 6, 2006) | | | Judson v. Peoples Bank & Trust Co. of Westfield,| 19 | | 17 N.J. 67 (1955) | | | Natovitz v. Bay Head Realty Co., | 22 | | 142 N.J. Eq. 456 (1948) | | | Prant v. Sterling, | 19 | | 332 N.J. Super. 369 (Ch. Div. 1999) | | | Prudential Prop. Cos. Ins. Co. v. Boylan, | 18 | | 307 N.J. Super. 162 (App. Div.) | | | Rankin v. Sowinski, | 19 | | 119 N.J. Super. 393 (App. Div. 1972) | | | Triffin v. American Intern., | 20 | | 372 N.J. Super. 517 (App. Div. 2004) | | PRELIMINARY STATEMENT Defendant [...] Inc., d/b/a [...] ([...]) breached the Right of First Refusal (ROFR) provision in its motor fuel supply contract with Plaintiff [...] New Jersey II LLC ([...]) that would have enabled [...] to buy its service station property.
[brief] 15  Petrillo v. Bachenberg, 139 N.J. 472, 487 (1995)  .......................................................  23 R.J. Longo Const. Co. v. Schragger, 218 N.J.Super. 206, 209-10, 527 A.2d 480 (App.Div. 1987) ...........................................................................................................  23  Rosenblum v. Adler, 93 N.J. 324, 352, 461 A.2d 138 (1983) ........................................  23 Shamrock, Lacrosse, Inc., v. Klehr, Harrison, Harvey, Branzburg & Eller, LLP, 416 N.J. Super. 1 (App. Div. 2010) ..................................................................................  26 Zielinski v. Professional Appraisal Associates, 326 N.J. Super (App. Div. 1999) ....  21 Statutes N.J.A.C. 1 13:40-9.1(a) ..................................................................................................................
[brief] Improvement Auth. v. GSP Recycling Co., | 33, 37 | | 358 N.J. Super. 484 (App. Div. 2003) | | | Daoud v. Mohammad, | 51, 52 | | 402 N.J. Super. 57 (App. Div. 2008) | | | Fanarjian v. Moskowitz, | 43, 44, 45 | | 237 N.J. Super. 395 (App. Div. 1989) | | | Franzoni v. Franzoni, | 28 | | 60 N.J. Super. 519 (App. Div. 1960) | | | Geffner v. Geffner, | 29 | | A-2896-08T2, 2011 WL 2314743 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. May 11, 2011) | | | Gen. Elec. Contracts Corp. v. Band, | 39 | | 186 A. 684 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1936) | | | Han Yang Plaza, LLC v. Optical Ctr., | 54, 55 | | 2006 WL 74130 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Jan. 13, 2006)  | | Harrison Riverside Ltd. P’ship v. Eagle Affiliates, Inc., 309 N.J. Super. 470 (App. Div. 1998)  ...........................................43, 44, 45 HLP Associates, L.P. v. Carpet City Inc., A-4134-13T3, 2015 WL 1181271 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Mar. 17, 2015) ...........................................33, 39  Joey T LLC v. Hall, A-1903-19T3, 2021 WL 168473 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Jan. 11, 2021) .........................................50, 51, 52 McGuire v. City of Jersey City, 125 N.J. 310 (1991)
[brief] However, the fact is that personal service \textit{was} attempted at the address Defendant admits was his home address—[...]—at least three (3) separate times.  Plaintiff not only hired a process serving company, but also a private investigator to attempt service of process at not only 39 Shore Drive, but also numerous other addresses owned by Defendant.  Accordingly, two different process servers ([...] and [...]) made no less than three attempts to serve Defendant at his admitted home address (39 Shore Drive).  Defendant’s assertion that Plaintiff’s process server “must have misread the address or knocked on the wrong door” is, therefore, entirely unconvincing.  (Def.’s Br. at 3-4).  Indeed, Plaintiff’s motion for substitute service was the culmination of a long series of service attempts at addresses associated with the Defendant, and his evasion of service, *to wit*:
[brief] ” [quoting *DiProspero*]).  With these principles in mind, it is clear for many reasons that the Superior Court correctly found that Appellant’s suggested plain reading of the statute – whereby the FDCPA would outlaw the use of a letter vendor – must be set aside as a matter of law.  T14-22.  First, to find that Respondent’s use of a letter vendor violated the FDCPA would go against Congress’ intent to prohibit only certain especially harmful debt related disclosures to those within a debtor’s close circle (e.g., friend, neighbors, employers) — not all communications by debt collectors to third parties, particularly where individuals are not alleged to have seen the debt information.  T18-19; Cavazzini v. MRS Associates, 574 F. Supp. 3d at 142.  Second, such a statutory reading would be inconsistent with other FDCPA provisions and general statutory scheme which permit the use of service providers.  Appellant’s reading of the FDCPA improperly construes § 1692c(b) “literally” and “in isolation. ”  Third, prohibiting the use of letter vendors as an illegal communication, publication, or unconscionable debt practice under the FDCPA (§§ 1692c(b), 1692d(3), 1692f) would lead to an absurd result, preventing an “innocuous” service practice which promotes efficiency and causes no harm to consumers.  Id.  For these reasons and more, dismissal of Appellant’s FDCPA claim should be upheld.
[brief] On October 2, 2023, Defendants filed a motion for leave to appeal the ESI Order to this Court.  Da184-86.  After this Court denied the motion, id., Defendants filed a motion for leave to appeal the ESI Order to the Supreme Court of New Jersey.  Da187-88.  On March 8, 2024, the New Jersey Supreme Court granted the motion for leave to appeal and remanded the matter to this Court for consideration on the merits.  Da189.
[directive] be Computer Aided reports, prior police (e.~., fashion. straightforward and relatively swift in a - - • • - - - :- .: - _. .. _' -- - - -- - -- -- - -. - - - -- - - • - - -- -- -- -- --- - - - - - - - ., ;_ .. - - - - - - - - :.  .- .- . • i i ~ • i • • . • ~ 0 ~ i • • i i ~ i • ~ i i • i i i ~ i ' . .. ~ . ~ . • • • • ~ . • • • • ~ • i
[directive] a.  "Person" means any person charged with or convicted of a criminal offense or any juvenile charged with delinquency or adjudicated delinquent for an act which, if committed by an adult, would be a criminal offense.  b.  "Place" includes any premises, residence, business establishment, location or specified area including all buildings and all appurtenant land, in which or at which a criminal offense occurred or is alleged to have occurred or is affected by the criminal offense with which the person is charged.  "Place" does not include public rail, bus or air transportation lines or limited access highways which do not allow pedestrian access.  c.  "Criminal offense" means: (1) any of the following: N.J.S.2C:35-3, N.J.S.2C:35-4, N.J.S.2C:35-5, N.J.S.2C:35-6, N.J.S.2C:35-8, N.J.S.2C:35-9, P.L.1997, c.185 (C.2C:35-4.1), sections 3 or 5 of P.L.1997, c.194 (C.2C:35-5.2 or C.2C:35-5.3), P.L.1987, c.101 (C.2C:35-7) or P.L.1997, c.327 (C.2C:35- 7.1), or (2) the unlawful possession or use of an assault firearm as defined in subsection w. of N.J.S.2C:39-1.
[brief] Such challenge can then be adjudicated on the merits rather than prospectively enjoining the government action before it has even been taken.  3.  **Plaintiff can be remedied by compensatory or other corrective relief. **  Next, there is no irreparable harm because there is a likelihood that “adequate compensatory or other corrective relief will be available at a later date, in the ordinary course of litigation,” as well as the “availability of adequate monetary damages. ”  *Sampson*, 415 U.S. at 90; see also *Delaware* River & Bay Auth., 344 N.J. Super. at 364-65.  If [...] begins the condemnation process and a court later holds the taking is invalid, then the taking will be voided, title will revert to Plaintiff, and Plaintiff will receive its escrowed funds as well as any permitted damages.  In the alternative, if [...] begins the condemnation process and a court holds that the taking is valid, then just compensation will be awarded for the Property.  Because the condemnation proceeding will provide adequate monetary compensation either way, there can be no irreparable injury.  See id. at 365.  For all the above reasons, this Court should find that the trial court abused its discretion when it held that Plaintiff met its burden of proving irreparable harm because the potential harm is speculative, not imminent, reversible, and can be remedied by compensatory relief.
[brief] | ### TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | Cases | Page | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | Borough of Seaside Park v. Comm’r of New Jersey Dep’t of Educ., 74 A.3d. 80 (N.J. Super. 2013) | 9 | | City of Ontario, Cal. v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746 (2010) | 10 | | Estate of Lasiw by Lasiw v. Pereira, 293 A.3d. 510 (N.J. Super. 2023) | 13 | | In re Lithium Ion Batteries Antitrust Litig., No. 13MD02420, 2015 WL 833681 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 24, 2015) | 11 | | MarketRx, Inc. v. Turner, 2006 WL 851930 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2006) | 9 | | O’Donnel/Salvatori Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 339 F.R.D. 275 (W.D. Wash. 2021) | 6 | | Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20 (1984) | 9 | | Youngevity Int’l Corp. v. Smith, No. 16CV00704, 2017 WL 6541106 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 21, 2017) | 11 | | Statutes, Regulations & Rules | | |------------------------------|------| | N.J. Ct. R. 4:10-2 | passim | | Other Authorities | | |------------------------------|------| | [...], Gruden’s Emails Were Collateral Damage in Washington Football Inquiry, N.Y. Times, Oct. 12, 2021 | 7 | | [...], et al., Protective Orders in the Age of Hacking, The American Lawyer, Mar. 16, 2015 | 6 | | New SailPoint Survey Exposes Concerning Generational Differences Regarding Corporate Email Use and Cybersecurity Posture, | [...], at https://www.sailpoint. com/press-releases/new-sailpoint-survey-exposes-concerning-generational-differences-regarding-corporate-email-use-and-cybersecurity-posture/..................10  Chief Justice [...], 2015 Year-End Report on the Federal Judiciary, at https://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/year-end/2015year-endreport.pdf .................................................................13  [...], et al., Overview of the TREC 2018 Precision Medicine Track, Twenty-Seventh Text REtrieval Conf., Nat’l Inst. Standards & Tech. Spec. Pub. 500-331 ......................................................  3  [...], They Paid $42 for a SoulCycle Ride, Not for Trump, N.Y. Times, Aug. 8, 2019 ...............................................................  7  [...], [...], & [...], Law Firm Cyberattacks Grow, Putting Operations in Legal Peril, Bloomberg L., Jul. 7, 2023 ...........................................................................................................  7  The Sedona Principles, Third Edition: Best Practices, Recommendations & Principles for Addressing Electronic Document Production, 19 Sedona Conf. J. 1 (2018)  .............................................  5  STATEMENT OF INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE
[brief] The Court reviews a trial court decision compelling arbitration de novo.  Flanzman v. Jenny Craig, Inc., 244 N.J. 119, 131 (2020).  In reviewing orders compelling arbitration, however, courts “are mindful of the strong preference to enforce arbitration agreements, both at the state and federal level. ”  Hirsch v. Amper Financial Services, LLC, 215 N.J. 174, 179 (2013); see also Garfinkel v. Morristown Obstetrics & Gynecology Assocs., P.A., 168 N.J. 124, 131 (2001) (recognizing “arbitration as a favored method of resolving disputes”).
[directive] In assault involving sexual an offense for released been has defendant a where 8.4.5, subsection has defendant (1) that the believe to cause probable is there and acomplaint-warrant by charged 2C:14- N.J.S.A.  Protection Survivor Act, Assault Sexual the pursuant to issued order an violated sexual or sexual contact of commit act an to threatened or committed has (2) and -21, to 13 or caused otherwise or order restraining the by protected person any against penetration prosecutor the restraining order, the by protected person any injury to bodily cause to threatened 2A:162-24.  N.J.S.A. to release pursuant revocation of seeking motion a file presumptively shall Release.