ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] (Pa250-Pa251; Pa252-Pa253).  C.  Partial Summary Judgment in Favor of [...] on Count 2 of the Amended Complaint  At the close of discovery, the [...] moved for partial summary judgment as to their right to continued use of their implied easement appurtenant (Count 2 of the Amended Complaint).  (Da9).  Following substantial briefing and oral argument, the trial court granted the [...]’ motion.  The trial --- T = Transcript of November 12, 2021  Summary Judgment hearing and decision  1T = Transcript of oral argument on Motion for Leave to Amend conducted on April 16, 2021  2T = Transcript of oral argument and trial court’s decision on Motion for Leave to Amend conducted on May 21, 2021  3T = October 25, 2022  Transcript of Trial and Motions in Limine court issued an oral opinion from the bench on November 12, 2021, followed by an order granting a permanent injunction.
[brief] (T24-23 to 25-1).  He also discussed the particulars of his incident report, (Pa6-Pa7), i.e., the time of the incident and the lapse in time when he drafted the report.  (T26-20 to 27-4).  [...] acknowledged that officers use radio communication for guidance when circumstances do not justify the calling of a code.  (T29-22 to 30-4).  As to officer relations, [...] testified that officers of equal rank often call each other by their last names, usually omitting the word “officer”.
[brief] : New Jersey, Law Division, Burlington County.  Sat Below: Hon. [...], J.S.C., and a Jury  -----------------------------------------------------  BRIEF AND APPENDIX ON BEHALF OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY  -----------------------------------------------------  LACHIA L. BRADSHAW BURLINGTON COUNTY PROSECUTOR ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF- RESPONDENT STATE OF NEW JERSEY ALEXIS R. AGRE (Attorney Id 026692002)  ASSISTANT PROSECUTOR BURLINGTON COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE P.O. BOX 6000 49 RANCOCAS ROAD MOUNT HOLLY NJ 08060 [...] ([...]) OF COUNSEL AND ON THE BRIEF
[brief] (5T40-4 to 8).  [...] moves her car and calls her brother [...], who is in [...] and advises him of the situation.  While on the phone, the defendant begins to chase [...] down the street.  She returns to her car and drives to [...], and returns with Derek, and her second cousin, [...].  (5T40-20 to 41-9).  Shortly after midnight, in the early hours of October 8, the defendant returns to the residence.  [...] observed Derek and John trying to get the defendant out of the house and they were struggling over the butcher knife the defendant had taken from the residence.
[directive] Officers must recognize the heightened risk of positional asphyxiation and compression asphyxiation during restraint and be alert to any actions that must be immediately taken to avoid or minimize the risk of asphyxiation.  Positional asphyxia can occur when a person is restrained, handcuffed or left unattended in any position that impedes their ability to breathe normally, particularly in a prone position.  If the person cannot escape from the position, death may occur very rapidly.  Thus, in the course of using force officers shall be alert to the following heightened risk factors for positional asphyxiation: (a) alcohol or drug intoxication; (b) possible mental health episode or incident; (c) a substantially overweight individual; (d) possible suffering of respiratory muscle fatigue (exhaustion); (e) possible airway obstruction; and (f) unconsciousness.  3.6.1
[brief] [...] argues that [...] failed to appeal from the trial court’s January 5, 2024 Order granting its motion for reconsideration.  (TPDb27).  [...] relies a number of cases to support its position that [...] did not appeal from the that Order (TPDb28).  However, all but one case cited by [...] relies on this Court’s decision in Sikes v. Township of Rockaway, N.J. Super. 463 (App. Div. 1994).  The issue in *Sikes*, was that the appeal was not properly before the court because Appellant failed to include a trial transcript central to its argument, and as a result, the court did not have a chance to complete a full review.  *Id.* at 466.  Here, unlike *Sikes*, this Court has every material before it needed to render a decision on this appeal.  The January 5, 2024 Order that [...] argues was not appealed from was made part of [...]’s Appeal.  (Da047-Da048).  [...] has maintained that the trial Court’s denial of its motion for summary judgment and its subsequent motion for reconsideration is the error from which all other issues in this appeal stem from.  (See, Db20).  Moreover, both trial court Orders granting [...]’s motion to reconsider, and denying [...]’s were entered on the same day, and were argued on the same day.  (Da045-Da048; Da433-Da470; 2T).  Per this Court’s decision in *Sikes*, the Court has all of the relevant materials necessary to decide every issue on Appeal.  Any argument otherwise is an attempt to have [...]’s Appeal dismissed on a technicality.
[brief] The relevance of cancellation requirements under N.J.A.C. § 11:1-20.2(d) is further reduced by the plain language of N.J.A.C. § 11:1-20.1, which details the scope of Subchapter 20 and why it does not apply to the facts here.  Specifically, N.J.A.C. § 11:1-20.1, provides the Code’s Scope as follows:  (a)  This subchapter shall apply to all commercial insurance policies [...] except workers' compensation insurance, [...] and any policy written by a surplus lines insurer.  [...] this subchapter shall not be applicable to multi-state location risks or policies subject to retrospective rating plans.  (Italics added.)  Not only does this Code Section not apply because the CCIP includes an integral worker’s compensation component, it also does not apply because the CCIP covered [...] projects located throughout the country at the time of the Accident in Pennsylvania, including several projects in California and Louisiana.
[brief] And finally, “the policy in favor of settlement suggests only that the court should view the release with an assumption that the parties intended to terminate the then existing lawsuit. ”  Id. at 335 (italics added).  A straightforward application of the above principles to the 2015 Settlement yields only one possible outcome: That settlement could not have resolved future claims arising from misconduct occurring after the entry of final judgment in [...] on Feb. 20, 2015.
[brief] .....................................................................................35  Triffin v. Am. Int’l Group, Inc., 372 N.J. Super. 517 (App. Div. 2004)  .......................................................................................25  Trustees of Columbia Univ.  v. Jacobsen, 53 N.J. Super. 574 (App. Div. 1959) .......................................................................................40, 41, 46, 47, 49  Wanaque Borough Sewerage Auth. v. West Milford, 281 N.J. Super. 22 (App. Div. 1995) .................................................................38
[directive] ATTORNEY GENERAL STANDARDS FOR PROVIDING SERVICES TO VICTIMS OF SEXUAL ASSAULT provisions of this paragraph under the laws of another state or the United States shall be excluded from the provisions of this paragraph.  c.  A person is guilty of a crime of the third degree if that person purposely or knowingly violates any provision in an order entered under the provisions of section 3 of P.L.1996, c.39 (C.2C:12-10.1) or section 2 of P.L.1999, c.47 (C.2C:12-10.2) or an order entered under the provisions of a substantially similar statute under the laws of another state or the United States when the conduct which constitutes the violation could also constitute a crime or a disorderly persons offense.
[brief] The Complaint in this matter arises out of an incident that occurred on June 26, 2020, at the [...] located in [...].  (Pa. 003).  Plaintiff/Appellant alleged in her Complaint that she was injured when an employee of [...] and [...] “improperly secured the lid and the hot tea beverage cup, containing the aforesaid hot tea drink, causing it to become dislodged when handed to the plaintiff, spilling its contents on the plaintiff’s lap. ”  (Pa. 003-004)  Plaintiff/Appellant expounded in her Answers to Interrogatories that “[a]s the male [...] employee handed [her] the large cups in a caron tray, the plastic top for the tea came loose from the rest of the cup holding the boiling hot tea, thereby spilling the contents on [her] lap.  This also caused the cup of tea to come out of the carton cup holder and spill into [her] lap. ”  (Pa. 108)  Plaintiff/Appellant sustained severe burns and permanent injuries “[a]s a result of the defendant [...]’s negligence and inattention in serving and/or handling” the beverages.  (Pa. 108)  Plaintiff/Appellant confirmed in her recorded statement to Defendant/Respondent [...] that the lid came off of the beverage causing it to spill in her lap.  (Pa. 60).  It was confirmed that Plaintiff/Appellant’s vehicle was in a stationary position when she received the hot beverages from the employee.  (Pa. 60)  Plaintiff/Appellant again confirmed at her deposition that her foot was on the brake and that her vehicle was not moving at the time that the beverage spilled.  (Pa. 062)  The tea spilled because it wasn’t fully in the cup holder and because the lid came off when the beverages were handed to her.  The lid came off and the cup fell causing the tea to spill on her.  (Pa. 113-116)  The policy of insurance issued to Plaintiff provides that personal injury protection medical expense benefits will be provided for “benefits incurred because of bodily injury caused by an accident. ”  (Pa. 124)  Defendant/Respondent denied Plaintiff/Appellant’s claim for personal injury protection benefits under her policy with [...] Garden State Insurance Company since there was no causal connection between the injuries being claimed and any qualifying automobile.  (Pa. 069; Pa. 071)  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I THERE IS NO CAUSAL NEXUS BETWEEN THE VEHICLE AND PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT’S INJURIES AND THEREFORE, PERSONAL INJURY PROTECTION
[brief] (1T).  Specifically, there was testimony and/or evidence that [...] made at least one entry into the Stowe 2 South logbook (a critical piece of evidence in the State’s case-in-chief) and/or may have conducted at least one count during the relevant time.  Even though [...] was called to testify in a separate incident, it is clear that pre-requisites of *State v. Hill*, 199 N.J. 545 (2009), have been met for this Court to draw an adverse inference against the [...] for the August 16, 2019 incident.
[brief] (Db47-51).  Specifically, when the content of defendant’s social media messages to [...] was presented to the jury, [...] said, once, that defendant’s messages seemed “confrontational,” and a few questions later, said that [...]’ responses “seemed to be more trying to keep the peace. ” (25T:30-14 to 31-1).  Defendant also takes umbrage with the fact that [...] identified his threats to [...], and identified where defendant stated he had hit [...] so hard he had knocked him down.  (25T:31-17 to 43-20).  Defendant claims this testimony violated N.J.R.E. 701 as impermissible lay testimony that prejudiced the jury, and was not harmless error.
[brief] *Barclays Bus. Credit, Inc. v. Four Winds Plaza Partnership*, 938 F.Supp. 304, 308 (D.Vi. 1996)”, *Owen, supra* at 457(2001).  The *Owen* Court said that “[p]utting to one side the Article 9 debate and focusing instead on New Jersey assignment law, we note that N.J.S.A. 2A:25-1 provides that “all judgments and decrees recoverable in any of the courts” in New Jersey are assignable.  Thus, New Jersey law generally permits the assignment of settlement proceeds unless the parties have expressly agreed otherwise. ”  *Owen, supra* at 458.  The Supreme Court clearly supported [...]’s dissent “that section 9-318(4) was designed to nullify the “old” rule that generally prohibited assignments of personal injury proceeds and to establish, instead, the “modern” rule favoring assignability whenever possible. ”  *Owen, supra*.  Where more recent decisions of the Supreme Court plainly undermine the authority of a prior decision although not squarely and explicitly overruling it, lower courts are entitled to follow the current doctrine and need not be confined by the prior ruling.  *Kass v. Brown Boveri Corporation*, 199 N.J. Super. 42 (App. Div. 1985); See also *State v. Chiarello*, 69 N.J. Super. 479, 498 (App.Div. 1961), certif. den. 36 N.J. 301 (1962)
[brief] Our Courts have clearly and consistently held that the arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable standard is the least demanding form of judicial review.  “We have long recognized that zoning boards, ‘because of their peculiar knowledge of local conditions[,] must be allowed wide latitude in the exercise of delegated discretion. ’”  Price v. Himeji, LLC, 214 N.J. 263, 284 (2013) (alteration in original) (quoting Kramer v. Bd. of Adjustment, Sea Girt, 45 N.J. 268, 296 (1965)).  “A Court will not substitute its judgment for that of a board ‘even when it is doubtful about the wisdom of the action. ’  Cellular Tel. Co. v. Zoning Bd. of Adj., 90 F. Supp. 2d 557, 563 (D.N.J. 2000). ”  Cell South of New Jersey, Inc., v. Zoning Board of Adjustment of West Windsor Township, 172 N.J. 75, 81 (2002) (emphasis added).  Despite the Trial Court’s findings to the contrary in the 2020 Opinion, our Courts have routinely found that a board is not bound by an applicant’s expert witnesses.  M32-34.  As noted in Hawrylo v. Board of Adjustment, Harding Twp., 249 N.J. Super. 568, 579 (App. Div. 1991), “A board is free to accept or to reject the opinions of a planner proffered by an Applicant or objector. ”  Id. (citations omitted).  However, “[w]hile a board may reject expert testimony, it may not do so unreasonably, based only upon bare allegations or unsubstantiated beliefs. ”  New York SMSA, L.P. v. Bd. of Adjustment of Twp. Of Weehawkin, 370 N.J. Super. 319, 338 (App. Div. 2004)(citation omitted).  Finally, “A board may accept or reject the testimony of any witness and, so long as it is reasonably made, that decision is conclusive on appeal.  Kramer, supra, 45 N.J. at 288 .  . . .”  Nextel of New York, Inc. v. Borough of Englewood Cliffs Bd. of Adjustment, 361 N.J. Super. 22, 41 (App. Div. 2003) (emphasis added).  As noted, the Board Resolution is very detailed in general and in this regard, and the Board appropriately expressed its disagreement with the Respondents’ experts’ opinions and conclusions.  M68-86.  Additionally, the Trial Judge determined that the record is lacking in “substantial proof” to justify the Board’s decision.  M29-31, M44, M59-60.  However, the Trial Judge failed to give due consideration to the case law which holds that the Board Resolution is part of the record and as noted above, properly detailed the findings of fact, the Board’s analysis of the application and the basis for its decision.  As noted by the Courts and as remarked upon on by the noted commentator, [...], the Court should not only review the transcript and exhibits but should also give substantial weight to the memorializing Board Resolution.  See, Scully-Bozarth Post # 1817 of the Veteran of Foreign Wars of U.S. v. Planning Bd. of City of Burlington, 362 N.J. Super. 296, 311-312 (App. Div. 2003), New York SMSA, L.P. v. Bd. of Adjustment of Tp. of Weehawken, 370 N.J. Super. 319, 333-334 (App. Div. 2004), and Cox & Koenig, New Jersey Zoning and Land Use Administration, (GANN, 2023) § 19-7.1, see also, N.J.S.A. 40:55D-10(g).
[directive] STATUTES WHERE BAIL MAY BE SET BY A SUPERIOR COURT JUDGE OR A MUNICIPAL COURT JUDGE OR, IN THE MUNICIPAL COURT JUDGE’S ABSENCE, THE MUNICIPAL COURT ADMINISTRATOR OR DEPUTY COURT ADMINISTRATOR, PURSUANT TO RULE 3:26-2 requires warrants  Rule 3:3-1(c)(1) on the Bail Schedule 2 charges of robbery, criminal sexual contact, second degree aggravated assault, aggravated arson, arson, burglary, first or second degree violations of Chapter 35 (drug offenses), any crime involving the possession or use of a firearm, or conspiracies or attempts to commit such crimes.  Rule 3:3-1(c)(2-6) (indictable offenses) and Rule 7:2-2(b)(1-6) delineate factors regarding whether a warrant or summons should issue for other offenses.  Rule 3:26-1 (indictable offenses) and Rule 7:4-1 (non-indictable offenses) delineate factors to be considered when setting bail and provide for the option of R.O.R. bail where appropriate.  Bail Ranges for attempts or conspiracies should generally be the same as the actual substantive crime.  Statute Charge Description Degree  Bail Range 10%  Cash Bail Option  2C:18-2(a)(b)  Burglary explosives or a deadly weapon or threatens to inflict or inflicts bodily injury; second degree.  3rd Degree $10,000 to $50,000  10% permissible (Continued)  (Continued)  a.  Actor enters or surreptitiously remains in any research facility, structure, or separately 4th Degree $1,000 to $2,500 10% permissible secured or occupied portion thereof.  If committed in a school or on school property, in a dwelling, research facility, public utility or any facility that stores, generates or handles hazardous chemical or chemical compounds; fourth degree; otherwise it is a disorderly persons offense.  2C:18-3(a)(b)(c)  Criminal Trespass Disorderly Persons
[brief] Plaintiff’s Omnibus Motions, filed on March 15, 2023, and April 21, 2023, and including:  Certification in Support of Motion for Stay and Adjournment ...............................  Pa 39-40  Certification in Support of Motion for Stay; Adjournment and Orders to Show Cause and For Temporary Restraining Order .................................................................  Pa 41-43  Certification in Support of Motion for Stay; Adjournment and Orders to Show Cause and For Temporary Restraints and Preliminary Injunction  ........................................  Pa 44-100
[directive] Rule 3:3-1(c)(1) on the Bail Schedule 2 charges of robbery, criminal sexual contact, second degree aggravated assault, aggravated arson, arson, burglary, first or second degree violations of Chapter 35 (drug offenses), any crime involving the possession or use of a firearm, or conspiracies or attempts to commit such crimes.  Rule 3:3-1(c)(2-6) (indictable offenses) and Rule 7:2-2(b)(1-6) delineate factors regarding whether a warrant or summons should issue for other offenses.  Rule 3:26-1 (indictable offenses) and Rule 7:4-1 (non-indictable offenses) delineate factors to be considered when setting bail and provide for the option of R.O.R. bail where appropriate.  Bail Ranges for attempts or conspiracies should generally be the same as the actual substantive crime.  Statute Charge Description  Degree Bail Range 10%  Cash Bail Option Knowingly Leaving the Scene of a Motor Actor operating a motor vehicle knows he is involved in an accident and knowingly leaves the 2C:12-1.1
[brief] [Da83].  The Purchase Agreement clearly references the existence and effect of the parties’ Partnership Agreement, stating: “pursuant to the terms and conditions set forth herein and in the Limited Liability Partnership Agreement of [...] (the “Partnership Agreement”). ”  [Da83].  Section 2 (“Representations and Warranties”) also references the Partnership Agreement at three consecutive points, acknowledging “the restrictions set forth in the Partnership Agreement[.]”  In addition, the Partners’ Certificate itself references the “Limited Partnership Agreement” in Section 8.  [Da90].  Plaintiff fails to explain the conflict or support the absurd conclusion that Defendants abandoned the 1991 Partnership Agreement.
[brief] Plaintiffs were not entitled to anything more from [...] at the time of valuation because of their damage awards.  They continued to play victim during the valuation process on the improper contention that Balsamides requires a discount if oppression occurred, whether or not a separate remedy was previously awarded for it.  Plaintiffs even show their misconception by contending the “purpose” of a discount here was not to punish but to reflect economic reality of the lack of marketability.  (Pb47)  Lawson held directly that “the absence of a trading market in the shares” is not enough.  Lawson, supra, 160 N.J. at 403.  In addition, Plaintiffs clearly argued for their discounts based on [...] being an oppressor and the Chancery Court did base its discounts on that ‘oppression’.  (11T20:13-21:3)(Da3203-04)  However, that argument and its resultant finding both rested on the incorrect basis that the law does stand for discounting in most cases and whenever oppression existed.  The Chancery Court was therefore wrong about discounts being ordinarily available, and also made no finding of “extraordinary circumstances”.
[brief] Pa250  Exhibit A, Exhibit G-13- View from [...] of Proposed Structure.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Pa252  Exhibit A, Exhibit G-14- Street View of Proposed Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Pa254  Exhibit A, Exhibit G-15- 2017 Picture of [...] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
[brief] On April 1, 2019  [...] had a dispute with City of Trenton [...] on Facebook.  Blakely accused Palinczar of being a racist based upon a Facebook post in which Palinczar stated that citizens of Trenton do not work.  (T5 24:10-32:24).  On April 2, 2019, Blakely and the Mayor publicly called for Palinczar’s removal as a police officer.  (T5 32:24-35:6).  Blakely went on the radio calling Palinczar a racist who does not deserve to be a police officer.  (T5 49:24-50:14).  On April 4, 2019, Palinczar was called into IA and told he was being investigated for a “major rule infraction” for violating the Department’s social media policy as a result of the Facebook post.  (T5 36:11-23).  [...], the lead detective on the TL investigation, was aware of Palinczar’s confrontation with [...] at the time it had occurred.  (T1 151:7-16, 153:6-13).  Snyder was also aware that [...] had publicly called for Palinczar’s termination.  (T2 130:18-131:4).  Snyder conceded that the IA investigation into the TL matter was initiated on since July 23, 2018 and then, one (1) week after Palinczar Facebook dispute with Blakely in April, 2019, the TL investigation was concluded and Palinczar was terminated.  (T1 151:17-152:22).  **The Unlicensed Drivers**