ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Such cursory references to noise, if applied in other circumstances, would limit, on the grounds of supposed preemption, fundamental powers of municipal governing bodies.  For instance, in *Fred v. Old Tappan*, 10 N.J. 515, 522 (1952), the Court noted that both a municipality and a board of health have powers to abate nuisances "created by removal of soil."  In *Wilber Township v. Witts*, 7 N.J. Super. 259, 261 (App. Div. 1950), the Court noted that both municipal governing bodies and municipal boards of health have power to deal with disposition of garbage.  For that proposition, the Court cited to the provisions of Title 26 and N.J.S.A. 40:48-2, as well as another set of statutes dealing with the same area, beginning at N.J.S.A. 40:66-1.  In *Izen & Robertson, Inc.*, 89 N.J. Super. 374, 380 (Law Div. 1965), the Court noted that it is within the powers of both municipal corporations and boards of health to adopt suitable measures with respect to cesspools and septic tanks.  *Ibid.* (citing 7 McQuillan, Municipal Corporations (3d. Ed. 1949), 24.263, pp. 107-109)).  The fact that there sometimes can be relationships between the powers of a board of health and a municipal governing body should not abrogate the powers of a municipal governing body, especially when such powers are entrusted to the governing body by specific language in an enabling statute as here in N.J.S.A. 40:48-1.  Indeed, an exercise of municipal power is not barred by existence of other general statutes dealing with the subject matter.  See *Ingamamort v. Borough of Ft. Lee*, 62 N.J. 521, 537 (1973) (Statutes dealing with tenancy generally in other places do not block municipal power in rent control); *Trombetto v. Mayor &* Commissioners of Atlantic City, 81 N.J. Super. 203, 226 (Law Div. 1981) (Municipalities may act under grants of general power even though the same ordinances might also be enacted under the zoning power.).  Further examples exist.
[brief] The State correctly cited in their brief the standard for such a motion.  Specifically, a motion for judgement of acquittal is to be denied if and only if, the evidence, viewed in its entirety, be it direct or circumstantial, and giving the State the benefit of its favorable testimony as well as all of the favorable inferences which reasonably could be drawn therefrom, is sufficient to enable a jury to find that the State's charge has been established beyond a reasonable doubt.  [State v. Fuqua, 234 N.J. 583, 590-91 (2018) (citations omitted). ]  The State correctly interprets the above as tasking the trial court to analyze the entirety of the evidence as it pertains to the singular conviction at hand, specifically, reckless manslaughter.
[brief] The case involved a robbery at a liquor store, where the officer found the injured victim.  After tending to the victim, the officer called the proprietor of the company that had installed the surveillance system to assist him with transferring the surveillance video of the robbery to a disc.  The proprietor arrived at the store twenty minutes later, and he and the officer viewed the surveillance video on the monitor at the store.  *Id.* at 1004-05.
[directive] Police Dog.  A dog that has been trained by a Supervising K-9 trainer or K-9 trainer and is handled by a police officer handler in the performance of his/her duties, used for law enforcement purposes or any law enforcement related activities.  Police Officer Handler.  A law enforcement officer who officially utilizes a police dog in the course of assigned duties and responsibilities.  Police Patrol Dog  A police dog used for routine patrol work in law enforcement, such as building searches, field or open area searches, wooded area searches, swamp or marsh searches, article searches, tracking and criminal apprehension.  Recall.  This exercise demonstrates that the police patrol dog handler has complete voice control over his/her dog in all situations and that the patrol dog will return to the officer handler, on command, prior to making a physical apprehension.  Scent Work.  Exercises whereby the police dog conducts searches to locate a "suspect," other subject, evidence or other articles within buildings, other types of interior structures, or exterior areas.  Semi-Annual Re-Evaluation.  A pass/fail qualification program consisting of two prescribed evaluation sessions within a 12-month period, with approximately six months between each evaluation.
[brief] This legislation makes common sense changes to improve the application process and move New Jersey in the right direction of providing a friendlier environment for job creation, while keeping safeguards for public health and safety in place.  Currently, regulations do not ‘lock-in’ until preliminary approval is granted for an application, allowing municipalities to change the requirement of an application after its initial submission, resulting in a business that is investing in New Jersey having to start the costly, time-intensive application process over, or abandoning the project altogether.
[brief] The *Muhammad* court found that there had been no determination, post *Chew*, that *N.J.R.E. 803(a)(2)* imposed a temporal proximity requirement.  *Id.* at 388.  The court noted that the rules of evidence also supported not imposing such a requirement, stating, that “the purpose of *N.J.R.E. 803(a) (2)* is best advanced by not requiring a strict temporal requirement, but instead allowing trial judges to evaluate relevance under all of the circumstances in which the prior statement is proffered. ”  Ibid.  Turning to the case below, both the State and Defense had initially rested without the State introducing [...] second statement made in November 2019 to prove that his trial testimony was consistent.
[brief] Id. at 223.  With regard to the fence at the rear of the properties which encroached on Defendants’ property, the Court noted that the fence had been there for 25 years prior to the time the plaintiff acquired the property; it had been open, continuous, hostile, and a notorious holding under claim of right and with intent to assert such claim as against the true owner.  Id. at 224.  The Court found that the plaintiff had adequately proven adverse possession.
[brief] The NAIC’s model regulations for premium rate schedule increases, adopted at N.J.A.C. 11:4-34.18, established the minimum required information to be submitted and calculations to be performed by carriers like [...].  The purpose of the regulations was to standardize the premium rate review process that could be followed by all long-term care insurance carriers and not favor one versus another.  The Department as an agency possesses “expressly granted” powers and “those incidental powers which are reasonably necessary or appropriate to effectuate the specific delegation,” and “to enable [it] to accomplish its statutory responsibilities. ”  N.J. Guild of Hearing Aid Dispensers v. Long, 75 N.J. 544, (1978).  Agency rules are accorded a presumption of validity and reasonableness.  In re Petition of N.J. Am. Water Co., 169 N.J. 181, 188 (2001); In re Adoption of N.J.A.C. 7:26B, 128 N.J. 442, 449 (1992).
[brief] Thereafter, a Trial was held by [...] over four days in March/April 2017 on the remaining issues of whether the easement had been abandoned and defining the "utilization of the Fifth Street and Sixth Street parking lots".  As detailed in the Court’s Opinion (Da177 to 206) the principals of both entities - [...] of the [...] and [...] and his son [...] as the current [...] Administrator - testified.  [...] testified that the synagogue had been using the School courtyard for parking for many years.  (Da198)  [...]'s [...] testified differently, that the courtyard had not been used for parking other than an occasional tradesman vehicle and had been consistently used as a school play/pedestrian area until the Synagogue started having staff/attendees park there in around 2010/2012.  (Da197)  Each side also presented traffic experts and planning experts as to the feasibility of the Sixth Street courtyard ever safely being intended or able to function as an off-site parking area for the Synagogue Lot 8, or for parking in general.  The [...] traffic expert [...] indicated the Sixth Street area could be used for parking given its small size and being in front of the school, only with a layout for "stacked parking" with a valet or coordinator and a pedestrian walkway for safety.  [...]'s traffic expert [...] testified that a safe parking plan, and the [...] parking proposal, could not function on the Sixth Street area due to lack of setbacks, lack of fire lane access, stacked parking problems, and lack of handicap spaces.  [...] also presented Planner [...]' testimony that the Sixth Street courtyard was not a parking area due to its location at the entry of the school, use for student play/assembly, the 1972 Site Plan, and historical photographs, all establishing that the courtyard was not legally or physically useable as Lot 8 off-site parking facility.  (Da196 to 197)  After the Testimonial Trial, [...] on June 5, 2017 rendered his final oral Opinion, (Da177 to 207) accepting as credible the testimony of past parking use by the [...] - discounting the [...] testimony/evidence - and concluding the parking "easement" had not been abandoned or terminated.
[brief] Jacobson, 516 F.3d at 91.  The least sophisticated debtor standard requires more than simply examining whether particular language would deceive or mislead a reasonable debtor because a communication that would not deceive or mislead a reasonable debtor might still deceive or mislead the least sophisticated debtor.  This lower standard comports with a basic purpose of the FDCPA: as previously stated, to protect all consumers, the gullible as well as the shrewd, the trusting as well as the suspicious, from abusive debt collection practices.
[directive] Shared Municipal and Police Computer Systems  If employed by the law enforcement agency, or a non-law enforcement agency, a background investigation must be conducted on all technical support staff hired after the effective date of this memorandum.  This does not apply to private contractors employed for short-term purposes such as to perform installations or repairs.  The investigation will include completed state and federal applicant fingerprint cards submitted to the State Bureau of Identification (SBI).  The employing agency must check the following state and national arrest and fugitive files prior to the submission of state and federal applicant fingerprint cards.  • New Jersey Computerized Criminal History (NJCCH)New Jersey Wanted Person System (NJWPS) • NCIC Interstate Identification Index (III) • NCIC Wanted Person File • National Law Enforcement Telecommunication System (NLETS)  Criminal History Record Information (CHRI) for non III participant states  If a record of any kind is found, pursuant to the remote terminal checks listed above, access to the law enforcement system shall not be granted, pending further investigative review and positive identification by both FBI and SBI fingerprint comparison.  If the applicant is confirmed to be a fugitive from justice or has been convicted of an indictable offense, the applicant shall not be permitted to provide technical support services to a law enforcement computer system.
[brief] The Agreement is Clear, Unambiguous and Conspicuous  Consistent with the FAA, the parties’ agreement to arbitrate must be enforced because it clearly and unambiguously indicates the intention of the parties to submit the disputes at issue to arbitration.  The provision sets forth an unambiguous agreement to resolve disputes by binding arbitration through the [...], not in court.  The provision plainly reflects that the obligation is mandatory by use of the word “shall”, making it mandatory, and the word “binding” as confirming the decision will be final.  Notably, this language is even more precise than the standard clause for pre-dispute agreement under the [...] Construction and Commercial Rule, which do not include the word “binding”.
[brief] ”  Id. at 417.  Grubbs v. Slothower, 389 N.J. Super. 377, 389 (App. Div. 2007)  Special reasons are those that promote the purposes of zoning as set forth in N.J.S.A. 40:55D–2.  Burbridge, supra, 117 N.J. at 386–87; Medici, supra, 107 N.J. at 10, 18.
[brief] Applying this Court’s reasoning in Ehler, these acts that took place after the July 5, 2016 incident raise inferences that Defendants engaged in retaliation in violation of CEPA because of Plaintiff’s performance of his job duties as a Police Captain and his refusal to look the other way at illegal conduct.  Those criminal acts by the unruly crowd on the night of July 5, 2016 included acts of assault, including those committed upon police officers, and disorderly conduct.  Plaintiff refused to refrain from performing his law enforcement duties, as that would have been a violation of our State’s broad-ranging criminal Official Misconduct statute.  Even though Plaintiff under CEPA is not required to establish Monell liability as this is not a §1983 or NJCRA case, this Court’s analysis in Ehler is applicable and persuasive here.
[brief] Additionally, the PCR court ruled that defendant’s arguments about mitigating factors that should have been advanced was essentially moot at that point since that mitigating information was presented and considered at the second sentencing, a sentence that was affirmed on appeal.  (21T18-21 to 19-2).  The court further found State v. Hess, 207 N.J. 123 (2011), cited in defendant’s original brief, was distinguishable because there defense counsel agreed as part of a plea agreement not to argue and here, at the first sentencing, defense counsel argued as to at least one mitigating factor and that certain aggravating factors should not apply.  (21T19- The PCR court denied defendant’s PCR petition without an evidentiary hearing.  (21T20-1 to 4; Da254).  Following the initial order, the PCR court issued an amended order denying defendant’s PCR petition.  (Da255).  It reaffirmed the reasons stated on the record, except those regarding defendant’s claim of trial counsel’s ineffectiveness for failing to call a specific witness.  (Da255).  It held that that claim was denied only on the basis that defendant did not proffer evidence in accordance with Rule 3:22-10(c), as detailed in the letter-decision accompanying the order.  (Da255-56).
[brief] EVEN ASSUMING THAT DEFENDANT APPLIED THE APPROPRIATE DEFEERENCE, IT DELIBERATELY IGNORED THAT PLAINTIFF SOUGHT A USE VARIANCE FOR PERMITTED ACCESSORY USES THAT ARE ENTIRELY HEIGHT NEUTRAL.  Defendant will pretend that by declaring that it was “respectful of” [...]’s zoning, it was actually applying “significant weight” to [...]’s zoning ordinance when it denied Plaintiff’s application.  Even if this Court accepts that invention, Defendant ignored the relief sought from the Defendant: a use variance for height-neutral permitted uses accessory to a permitted principal structure located entirely within the adjacent municipality.  (emphasis added).  On the [...] portion of the Property, the proposed improvements include the entirety of the structure, and parking and stormwater management facilities.  Ja073: 1T 32:17-21.  On the [...] portion of the Property, the proposed improvements include car parking spaces, loading spaces, trailer parking spaces, a septic disposal system disposal area, stormwater management facilities, and the driveway.  (1T 33:17-23).  The principal use as a warehouse/distribution facility is permitted both in [...]’s ODL and [...]’s SM Zones, as are the accessory uses.  Ja085; Ja097; Ja146.  Since the structure is proposed to be located entirely within [...], there is no principal use on the [...] portion of the Property, and therefore the otherwise permitted accessory uses become the principal uses in [...], which require a use variance under N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70(d)(1).
[brief] (14T27-14 to 21).  Law enforcement seized numerous documents, including a passport in [...]’s name, a key to a Cadillac, six empty SIM card holders, seven SIM cards inside holders, five cellular phones and cellular phone batteries.  (14T32-20 to 34-20; 14T35-11 to 38-9).  On April 24, 2009, officers executed a search warrant for the Cadillac CTS, driven by Abdul [...], and recovered $3,699 in United States currency in the center console, three cellular phones and two SIM cards for cellular phones.
[brief] Several of Respondent’s postings on Facebook have been the subject of community criticism at Board meetings and cause the Board to take official action to formally condemn and denounce certain posts, request the respondent to remove the posts, and publicly comment that no on Board member has the authority to speak for the Board.  (Ca024).  It was obvious below – as it is obvious now – that these events actually occurred.  Respondent asks the Appellate Division to deny what it can see with its own eyes.  This argument carries no weight and should be disregarded.  Respondent clearly compromised the Board in violation of the Act.
[brief] The trial court’s grant of summary judgment in this case was based on the absence of a triable issue of material fact, not an issue of statutory construction.  Similarly, the requirement that a non-movant on summary judgment receive all favorable inferences of fact is not a license for the court to distort the factual record or abandon common sense.  While the evidence is to be viewed “in the light most favorable to” the non-movant, the evidence must be “sufficient to permit a rational factfinder to resolve the … issue in favor of the non-moving party. ”  *Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America*, 142 N.J. 520, 523 (1995)(emphasis added).  When a non-movant points only to disputed issues of fact that are “of an insubstantial nature,” the proper disposition of the matter is summary judgment.
[brief] THE COURT BELOW ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY GRANTING INJUNCTIVE RELIEF  BECAUSE PLAINTIFF FAILED TO SATISFY THE CROWE FACTORS.  [Da9-Da11; Da12-Da13]  This is an appeal from a court’s order granting injunctive relief and denial of a motion for reconsideration of that order.  A trial court’s decision to issue a preliminary injunction will be overturned on appeal if it results from an abuse of discretion.  Waste Mgmt. of N.J., Inc. v. Morris Cnty. Mun. Utils. Auth., 433 N.J. Super. 445, 451, 456 (App. Div. 2013).  Although this standard “defies precise definition,” the inquiry “requires consideration of the trial judge’s explanation as well as the legal grounds upon which the decision was based. ”  Id. at 455.  A court abuses its discretion when its decision is made without a rational explanation, inexplicably departs from established policies, or rests on an impermissible basis.  Ibid.  Reversal is proper when of trial court’s order “was not premised upon consideration of all relevant factors, was based upon consideration of irrelevant or inappropriate factors, or amounts to a clear error in judgment. ”  McDaniel v. Man Wai Lee, 419 N.J. Super. 482, 498 (App. Div. 2011) (quoting Masone v. Levine, 382 N.J. Super. 181, 193 (App. Div. 2005)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  A trial court’s decision to deny a motion for reconsideration is also reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard.  Branch v. Cream-O-Land Dairy, 244 N.J. 567, 582 (2021).  Interlocutory injunctive relief may be granted only when (1) the plaintiff has no adequate remedy at law and the irreparable injury to be suffered in the absence of an injunctive is substantial and imminent; (2) the plaintiff’s claim is based upon a settled legal right and has demonstrated a reasonable probability of success on the merits of its claim; (3) a balancing of the equities weighs in the plaintiff’s favor; and (4) the public interest will not be harmed.
[brief] By comparison, *Model Civil Jury Charge* 5.20B(2)(b) provides in pertinent part:  “A commercial property owner may have a duty to clear public sidewalks abutting their properties of snow and ice for the safe travel of pedestrians.  Maintaining a public sidewalk in a reasonably good condition may require removal of snow or ice or reduction of the risk, depending upon the circumstances.  The test is whether a reasonably prudent person, who knows or should have known of the condition, would have within a reasonable period of time thereafter caused the public sidewalk to be in reasonably safe condition. ”
[brief] At the October 15, 2018 hearing on the Appellant’s second application for an interpretation from the Board, the Board’s attorney made the following representation:  [...]:  Just so the record is clear, I've been speaking with [...], the attorney for the applicant.  [...], the attorney for the adjoining property owner, the Son's property, for lack of a better characterization and have indicated to them that there is no need for, and we will not set any expert testimony.  Each of the attorneys will have an opportunity to present their case.  They have presented over the last week and a half an encyclopedia thick of documents that you've all had an opportunity to review.  [...]: Which is right here on my desk.  [1T4-13 to 1T4-25.]  Appellant’s counsel noted, “I have submitted a series of documents as well . . . as had my adversary, [...]” (1T5-13 to 1T5-15).  At one point, a board member made a motion that Respondent’s use of Lot 5 for parking under the Easement was “not a valid conforming use” (1T62-13 to 1T62-14).  By a vote of three to two with one abstention, the Board voted in favor of that motion (1T74-9 to 1T74-25).
[brief] “[T]he Appellate Division found the imposition of a consecutive sentence [] for count eight for the knowing and purposeful murder of [...] was and is fully supported by the record created at the sentencing on May 8th of 2015….” (5T9-22 to 10-2).  This Court’s affirmance of a consecutive sentence was binding on [...].  R. 3:22-5.  As this Court determined on direct appeal:  [A]s defendant candidly concedes, the crimes involved multiple victims, [Yarbough] factor (3)(c), and “separate acts of violence or threats of violence,” factor 3(b), in that four victims were robbed at gunpoint, and one was fatally shot.  Also, given the multiple victims of the robbery, the homicide, and the unlawful use of weapons, the convictions were necessarily “numerous,” factor 3(e).  Factor 3(a) is also implicated because although the crimes were committed close in place and time, the objective of the robbery, to obtain the four victims’ property, was independent of the purpose behind defendant’s homicide conviction, which was to wound or kill [...], who wore the yellow jacket.  Accordingly, we conclude the record amply supports the imposition of consecutive sentences for murder and robbery consistent with the Yarbough guidelines.
[brief] The Sood  Defendants glibly argue that Techdan undermines Plaintiffs’ claim given that one attorney represented four defendants and the Supreme Court did not discuss the conflict issue.  SDb31-32.  But just three weeks after Techdan’s publication, defense counsel recognized the obvious conflict imposed by the required CNA apportionment, and moved to withdraw, certifying that he could not simultaneously represent multiple defendants under RPC 1.7.
[brief] After being struck in the head by [...], plaintiff testified that he yelled that he was going to call the police on him (7T76:5-11).  Another [...] employee, [...], who was a few aisles away, confirmed that the plaintiff said he was going to call the police at the same time she saw [...] walking away "mumbling."  (6T101:23-102:20).  According to the police officer and the police report, the plaintiff did in fact call the police.
[brief] (Pa1150).  The January 12, 2024 order also denied defendant’s request for the transfer of the marital assets awarded to her.  Further, plaintiff was directed to pay the withheld alimony to defendant within 15 days.  Plaintiff paid the outstanding alimony amount on the same day i.e. January 12, 2024.  (Pa1207).  On January 16, 2024 plaintiff filed an OTSC seeking vacation of the provision in the January 12, 2024 order directing deposit of the passports or a stay pending the outcome of a contingent appeal in the Appellate Division.