ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] For example, 1)  The trial court incorrectly found that “there were no complaints made to the employer [regarding Plaintiff’s anxiety] before March 13. ” (T22:2-3); “I don’t see any evidence in this motion record that [Plaintiff] complained of \(^5\) While Defendant admitted receipt of these texts, they alleged that the texts were “interpreted as jokes”.  Pa573, PSOF ¶19.  This is a material dispute of fact for a jury to consider.  anxiety prior to the employer firing her” (T21:3-5; T29:3-12); and “My conclusion is that the employer did not know about the anxiety. ” (T24:15-16).  On March 12, 2020, the day before her termination, Plaintiff sent several texts, referenced above, to [...] expressly conveying her anxiety.  PSOF39 & 41.  Defendant admitted receipt of these texts.  This conclusion by the trial court misinterprets the facts and fails to view them in a light most favorable to Plaintiff.  2)  The trial court incorrectly found “There is nothing in the motion record to support a finding that I could see that, that the employer was aware she was getting treatment for anxiety.  There’s nothing in the motion to support any evidence that she was even getting treated for any depression or anxiety except for her testimony that maybe sometime at about two---or the interrogatory answers that sometime in about 2018 or ’19 she was seeing a psychiatrist for some undisclosed anxiety issues. ”  T29:3-12.  Defendant admitted that Plaintiff treated for anxiety and grief in 2018 and 2019.  Pa201, PSOF ¶17 and Pa573, ¶17.  Plaintiff further certified that she treated with various mental health professionals for her generalized anxiety in 2021 and 2023.  P563.  Plaintiff was diagnosed with generalized anxiety, treated for general anxiety and Defendant was aware of this.  The trial court was required to view these facts in a light most favorable to Plaintiff and failed to do so.
[brief] Here, [*8] giving plaintiffs all favorable inferences, the landlords knew that [...] was housing the four dogs; accordingly, the issue is whether the statements made by [...] and [...] to the landlords of hearing the dogs' growl and observing the dogs roaming unattended while on the property constituted notice of the dogs' vicious propensities.  In other words, did plaintiffs present sufficient facts from which a jury could reasonably infer that the landlords "knew or, in the exercise of reasonable care, should have known of the [dogs'] particular vicious . . . propensit[ies]."  Model Jury Charge (Civil), 5.60B Animal with Vicious or Dangerous Trait or Propensity (other than an owner dog bite case).
[brief] This is especially so with respect to Appellants/Cross-Respondents’ claims sounding in Equitable Estoppel, Fraud, Waiver, and Laches which are expressly precluded by the Court’s findings.  As for the claim of Statue of Frauds, to the extent arguably applicable, N.J.S.A. 25:1-11.  Writing requirement, conveyances of an interest in real estate, would govern the analysis and provides as follows:  a.  A transaction intended to transfer an interest in real estate shall not be effective to transfer ownership of the interest unless: (1) a description of the real estate sufficient to identify it, the nature of the interest, the fact of the transfer and the identity of the transferor and the transferee are established in a writing signed by or on behalf of the transferor; or (2) the transferor has placed the transferee in possession of the real estate as a result of the transaction and the transferee has paid all or part of the consideration for the transfer or has reasonably relied on the effectiveness of the transfer to the transferee's detriment.  b.  A transaction which does not satisfy the requirements of this section shall not be enforceable except as an agreement to transfer an interest in real estate under section 4 of this act.\(^1\) c.  This section shall not apply to leases.  d.  This section shall not apply to the creation of easements by prescription or implication.  N.J.S.A. 25:1-11 (emphasis added).  Because, as the Court found, there was no intention to transfer real estate by the December 1998 Deed, the statute of frauds does not apply to the December 1998 Deed.
[brief] Guido v. Duane Morris LLP, 202 N.J. 79, 87-88 (2010).  Motions for reconsideration should be granted “only under very narrow circumstances. ”  Ibid.  Defendant [...] was required to show that the court’s reinstatement of the complaint was palpably incorrect, irrational, or based on a failure to consider or appreciate competent evidence.
[brief] The claim at issue in *Lemelledo v. Beneficial Mgmt. Corp. of Am.*, 150 N.J. 255 (1997) did not arise under the NJCFLA.  “We granted defendant’s motion for leave to appeal the reinstatement of the CFA claim. ”  *Lemelledo*, 150 N.J. at 263 (emphasis added).  In addressing the Consumer Loan Act (a predecessor statute to the NJCFLA), the Court referred in dicta to a provision of the statute having to do with recovery of usurious interest.  *See Id.* at 273; *see also* N.J.S.A. 17:11C-33 (providing for “a consumer lender” to “forfeit to the borrower three times any amount of the interest, costs or other charges collected in excess of that authorized by law. ”).  Contrary to Appellant’s extensive reliance on the case, it has nothing to do with any purported private right of action to enforce the licensing requirement—as confirmed by the extensive intervening authority relied on by the Trial Court and cited above.  Even if there were a private right of action under the NJCFLA, Holder Respondents could not have violated the NJCFLA because they are not subject to its licensure requirements.  Neither [...] nor [...] are incorporated or based in New Jersey, and the Complaint does not allege that [...] or [...] engaged in any conduct in New Jersey relevant to this case.  The transactions that Appellant challenges all took place outside New Jersey and prior to a different party—[...]—filing the Collection Action.  On its face, the NJCFLA does not apply to activities that occur out of state.
[brief] SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE  DIVISION DOCKET NO. [...]  STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff/Respondent v. [...], Defendant/Appellant  CRIMINAL ACTION  On appeal from the denial of defendant’s petition for post-conviction relief  Superior Court of New Jersey  Essex County Indictment No. [...] Sat Below: Hon. [...], J.S.C. BRIEF AND APPENDIX (Da1-32; Da37-81)
[brief] Page  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ........................................................................................................ ii  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS .................................................. iii  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT .................................................................................................1  STATEMENT OF FACTS .......................................................................................................3  PROCEDURAL HISTORY .........................................................................................................4  LEGAL ARGUMENT ...............................................................................................................5  I.  PLAINTIFFS FAIL TO SUSTAIN THEIR BURDEN TO OVERCOME THE PRESUMPTION  OF VALIDITY AFFORDED TO THE AMENDED REDEVELOPMENT PLAN..................................................  5  A.  The Borough’s and Planning Board’s Actions Are Adequately Supported by the Record .............................................................................  6  B.  The Planning Board’s and Borough’s Actions Require Deference As Plaintiffs Fail to Satisfy Their Burden..............  8  CONCLUSION .......................................................................................................................12
[brief] POINT I ........................................................................................................................................17  STANDARD OF REVIEW .........................................................................................................17  POINT II .......................................................................................................................................18  BECAUSE THE ACTION BELOW, THE GRC COMPLAINT AND THE SUBSEQUENT APPEALS AROSE OUT OF OR WAS INCIDENTAL TO THE PERFORMANCE OF APPELLANT’S DUTIES AS A FIRE COMMISSIONER, HE IS ENTITLED TO INDEMNIFICATION UNDER THE FIRE DISTRICT'S BYLAWS  ............18  POINT III .......................................................................................................................................23  THE GRC ORDERS THAT WERE THE BASIS FOR MR. KUBIEL'S AGENCY  ENFORCEMENT ACTION WERE NULL AND VOID BECAUSE THE GRC VIOLATED  MR. SIPE’S PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS RIGHTS TO NOTICE AND AN OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD ........................................................................................................................................23  POINT IV .......................................................................................................................................33  MR. KUBIEL'S UNDERLYING OPRA REQUEST WAS OVERBROAD AND UNENFORCEABLE ........................................................................................................33 CONCLUSION ..................................................................................................................................39  ### TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | Cases | PAGE | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | Bent v. Township of Stafford Police Department, | 34, 35| | 381 N.J. Super. 30 (App. Div. 2005) | | | Burnett v. County of Gloucester, | 38 | | 415 N.J. Super. 506 (App. Div. 2010) | | | Burke v. Brandes, | 37 | | 429 N.J. Super. 169 (App. Div. 2012) | | | Div. of Youth and Family v. A.R.G., | 25 | | 179 N.J. 264 (2004) | | | First Resolution Inv. v. Seker, | 25 | | 171 N.J. 502 (2002) | | | Gill v. Dept. of Banking, | 25, 26| | 404 N.J. Super. 1 (App. Div. 2008) | | | In re Casino Simulcasting Sp. Fund, | 26 | | 398 N.J. Super. 7 (App. Div. 2008) | | | Jamgochian v. State Parole Bd., | 24 | | 196 N.J. 222 (2008)
[brief] A.  The Standard Of Review For A Motion For Reconsideration Is Abuse of Discretion  [Issue Not Raised Below]  The Appellate Division reviews a trial judge's decision on whether to grant or deny a motion for rehearing or reconsideration under Rule 4:49-2 for an abuse of discretion.  Branch v. Cream-O-Land Dairy, 244 N.J.  567, 582 (2021); Kornbleuth v. Westover, 241 N.J. 289, 301 (2020); Hoover v. Wetzler, 472 N.J. Super. 230, 235 (App. Div. 2022); Pitney Bowes Bank, Inc. v. ABC Caging Fulfillment, 440 N.J. Super. 378, 382 (App. Div. 2015).  “The rule applies when the court's decision represents a clear abuse of discretion based on plainly incorrect reasoning or failure to consider evidence or a good reason for the court to reconsider new information. ”  Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules, cmt. 2 on R. 4:49-2 (2022).  There is no evidence to show the trial court abused its discretion by denying [...]’s motion for reconsideration, and the decision should be affirmed.
[directive] Rule 3:3-1(c)(1) on the Bail Schedule 2 charges of robbery, criminal sexual contact, second degree aggravated assault, aggravated arson, arson, burglary, first or second degree violations of Chapter 35 (drug offenses), any crime involving the possession or use of a firearm, or conspiracies or attempts to commit such crimes.  Rule 3:3-1(c)(2-6) (indictable offenses) and Rule 7:2-2(b)(1-6) delineate factors regarding whether a warrant or summons should issue for other offenses.
[brief] And as indicated, that area is proposed to be developed with multifamily residential development.  There’s going to be potentially a small retail component which I’ll get into in a moment in the second phase of that development.  But essentially sub area two is intended to be developed in two different phases.  The first phase is to have two buildings of (tape cutout @ 56:03.5)... 204 units and a second phase would contemplate the potential construction of a third building of 110 units for a total of 314 units in that in sub area two.  In sub area two parking is going to be provided at a standard overall ratio of 1.15 spaces per residential unit regardless of which phase is being developed and there are maps and exhibits in the redevelopment plan which further describe and explain the general development approach that is going to be taken for sub area two and within each one of the two phases of the development.
[brief] But, moreover, the court failed to recognize that on multiple occasions it was suggested that [...] be made a party – and the plaintiffs repeatedly stated that it was not necessary and elected not to join [...] to the action.  Thus, this is not simply a case of a defendant not being made aware of the allegations or of the accuser – this is a case where for the entire period between the filing of the action in January 2018 and the entry of judgment in June 2022, [...] was actively denying that it had any role in the litigation.
[brief] Quite to the contrary, Your Honor.  I had no response because I was absolutely stunned.  That was the first time I had heard those letters.  The Court: I have this very scary feeling for you, that there's a lot more here.  If you say you don't know about, you best find out about it and get- and extricate yourself from this or fire this guy if he's done something wrong.  Because all of your names, every one of your partners, is on the hook if he has done something inappropriate or improper.  He's under your guidance.  You know that.  He's just an office manager.  Come on.  I mean, you guys better wake up, because this is going to be a bigger problem than you want for a very little bit of money, $800, $900,000, that's worth everybody losing your license and closing the firm?  I don't think so.  So, get busy.  I would talk to your senior partners.  I would bring everybody in on this and say we don't know what this man's been doing, who has knowledge of what he's doing, because you're telling me you don't have an idea that he even did it.  Maybe none of the partners do, but then he's going to start-then he's going to start chirping, and he's going to tell me all the people that knew about this and what he was in on with the firm, which we know is totally inappropriate for a firm to have this kind of a business connection with a client.  And the money just keeps getting more and more.  So, this is a very scary thing.  But let's talk again on Monday when you've had a chance to round up your partners or - I don't know if you're an associate or a partner in the firm.
[brief] SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. [...] IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION OF [...] TO THE [...] FOR MINOR SITE PLAN APPROVAL WITH VARIANCES PURSUANT TO N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70(C) TO PERMIT THE OPERATION OF A CLASS 5 DISPENSARY FOR THE SALE OF ADULT USE RECREATIONAL CANNABIS AT THE SUBJECT PROPERTY LOCATED AT [...], BLOCK 158, LOT 3.01, IN THE CITY OF [...], APPLICATION #[...]  On Appeal from: The Casino Reinvestment Development Authority, [...], Resolution No. 24-23 CIVIL ACTION BRIEF OF APPELLANT, [...]
[brief] ”  It does not take much to satisfy N.J.S.A. 40:55D-10(g) but it takes more than this.  Its sole conclusory statement is couched in statutory language and lacks any reference to specific facts and circumstances surrounding the application…This is exactly the sort of resolution that has repeatedly been recognized as deficient by the courts. ”  *N.Y. SMSA, Ltd. P'ship v. Bd. of Adjustment of Tp. of Weehawken*, 370 N.J. Super. 319, 333 (App. Div. 2004).  The second problem, related to the first, is that the statements Board members provide on the record are not a substitute for the resolution.
[brief] [...] claimed that defendant said he had been “stabbed,” and she testified that he sounded “frantic,” but that did not stop her from hanging up on him.  (2T 67-18 to 68-6)  [...] testified that defendant told her he was “hurt” and needed a ride, but she told him she was in bed, asleep, and she did not help him.  (2T 209-4 to 212-24)  [...] similarly refused to assist defendant, and claimed that defendant said he “had gotten attacked,” was “shirtless,” hiding under a tree, and “freezing” in the cold, and “may have stabbed somebody. ”  (2T 219-16 to 220-11)  Hudson also agreed that defendant told him he had “some type of sexual encounter” with the man who later attacked him, which embarrassed defendant, and that the attack came while they were watching the movie “Spartacus. ”  (2T 222-15 to 22)  [...], [...]’s brother (hereinafter “Joseph” to avoid confusion), testified that about 18 months prior to his brother’s death, his brother’s longtime male companion passed away.
[brief] YOU AND WE AGREE THAT ANY CONTROVERSY, DISPUTE OR CLAIM, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY CLAIM FOR CONSUMER FRAUD OR ANY OTHER STATUTORY CLAIM, (COLLECTIVELY “CLAIM”) ARISING OUT OF OR RELATING IN ANY WAY TO THIS AGREEMENT OR ITS BREACH THAT CANNOT BE SETTLED THROUGH DIRECT DISCUSSIONS SHOULD BE SUBMITTED BY THE CLAIMANT TO NONBINDING MEDIATION, ADMINISTERED BY A MEDIATOR MUTUALLY SELECTED AND AGREED TO BY THE PARTIES, OR IF THE PARTIES CANNOT AGREE ON A MEDIATOR, BY A MEDIATOR WITH THE [...] (“[...]”) PURSUANT TO ITS COMMERCIAL MEDIATION RULES.  MEDIATION MAY PROCEED REMOTELY AT [...]’S OR CUSTOMER'S ELECTION.  IF THE PARTIES ARE UNABLE TO RESOLVE THE CLAIM THROUGH MEDIATION, THE CLAIM SHALL BE SUBMITTED BY CLAIMANT FOR AND RESOLVED BY BINDING ARBITRATION  PURSUANT TO THE [...]  COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES AND ADMINISTERED BY AN ARBITRATOR  MUTUALLY SELECTED AND AGREED TO BY THE PARTIES, OR IF THE PARTIES CANNOT AGREE THEN ONE ASSIGNED BY THE [...].  THE JUDGMENT ON THE AWARD RENDERED BY THE ARBITRATOR MAY BE ENTERED IN ANY COURT HAVING JURISDICTION.  YOU AND WE ARE CHOOSING MEDIATION AND ARBITRATION  INSTEAD OF LITIGATION TO RESOLVE OUR CLAIMS AND VOLUNTARILY AND KNOWINGLY WAIVE A RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL.  UNLESS OTHERWISE DETERMINED, EACH OF US WILL BEAR OUR OWN COSTS OF THE MEDIATION AND ARBITRATION PURSUANT TO THE THEN CURRENT FEE SCHEDULE LOCATED AT [[...] website].7  YOU AGREE THAT WE CAN IN OUR DISCRETION  JOIN CONTRACTORS, INSURANCE COMPANIES AND ANY OTHER PERSONS OR ENTITIES INTO THE MEDIATION AND/OR ARBITRATION AT ANY TIME, AND CONSENT TO JOINDER AND PARTICIPATION OF SUCH PARTIES.  NO ACTIONS BY US IN RESPONSE TO A LEGAL CLAIM SHALL BE DEEMED A WAIVER OF OUR RIGHT TO MEDIATION OR ARBITRATION.  NOTWITHSTANDING THE FOREGOING, WE RESERVE THE RIGHT AND MAY AT OUR DISCRETION  EXERCISE THE RIGHT TO COMMENCE LEGAL ACTION IN ANY COURT OF COMPETENT JURISDICTION TO COLLECT MONIES YOU OWE UNDER THIS AGREEMENT, IN WHICH YOU AGREE TO WAIVE THE RIGHT TO MEDIATION OR ARBITRATION.  (Pa61).  ____________________  7The website link has been modified to prevent the link from being activated.
[directive] State of New Jersey  [...]  [...] OFFICE  ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE Governor  Attorney General  DEPARTMENT LAW  PUBLIC SAFETY OF AND PO BOX 080  [...] TRENTON, NJ 08625-0080  Lt. Governor  ATTORNEY GENERAL GUIDANCE TO: All Law Enforcement Chief Executives  All Members of the Press FROM: [...], Attorney General  DATE: April 20, 2021  SUBJECT: Guidance on Interactions Between Law Enforcement and Press at Public Protests
[brief] He asserted his right to a speedy trial in the *Letter of Representation* and in a motion when the parties appeared for the motion to suppress and trial on August 3, 2023, when the matter was **603** days old and **289** days after it was ready for trial.  Adjournments were due to prosecutorial delays in dealing with discovery requests, which were not resolved until the case was more than ten months old.  After that, there is no explanation why it took so long to schedule testimony.  Delay itself causes prejudice:
[brief] In the within matter, adding information to a website cannot be construed as notice of the Ricci Act’s enactment or the requirements to register within a certain timeframe.  The statute required the Board to promulgate rules to provide notice to active and retired members of the State Police Retirement System.  The Certifying Officer Letter is proof that the website posting is not sufficient notice.  Pa64.  The notice of the Ricci Act to the Certifying Officers advises the Certifying Officers that they must distribute the information to employees pursuant to N.J.A.C. 17:5-1.4.  It also required that the Certifying Officers to provide a certification that the information was distributed.  The Respondent claims that the mailing of the postcard to a correct address establishes a presumption that the postcard was received.  This presumption is rebutted by the fact that [...] and 98 others certified via affidavits that they did not receive said postcard.  Additionally, the claim that postcards were mailed out to all “200,647 SPRS retirees” is a misstatement of fact.  Rb13.
[brief] \(^{10}\)  This means that only an arbitrator can decide disputes over whether plaintiff’s injunction claim qualifies as a claim for “public injunctive relief” under the Dispute Clause.  *See Blueprint Cap. Advisors, LLC v. N.J. Div. of Inv.*, 2023 U.S. App. LEXIS \(^{10}\)  The AAA Commercial Arbitration Rules supplement the AAA Consumer Arbitration Rules, which are also referenced in the parties’ arbitration agreement.  Rule 7(a) of the AAA commercial rules states that “[t]he arbitrator shall have the power to rule on his or her own jurisdiction, including any objections with respect to the existence, scope, or validity of the arbitration agreement or to the arbitrability of any claim or counterclaim. ”  Similarly, Rule 11(b) of the JAMS rules states that “[j]urisdictional and arbitrability disputes, including disputes over the formation, existence, validity, interpretation or scope of the agreement under which Arbitration is sought…shall be submitted to and ruled on by the Arbitrator…[t]he Arbitrator has the authority to determine jurisdiction and arbitrability issues as a preliminary matter.
[brief] POINT I  THE STOP AND SEARCH OF THE DEFENDANT WERE ILLEGAL.  (Da 4-20; 3T 49-12 to 59-19; 4T 32-18 to 36-16)  ..................................................................................9  A.  The initial stop of the defendant was illegal.  ..................................9  B.  It was unlawful to search the car for the registration ..................................................................................13  C.  The unlawful search cannot be saved by resort to the inevitable discovery doctrine.  ...........................................18  D.  The evidence must be suppressed.  ................................................25  POINT II  DEFENDANT’S SENTENCE IS EXCESSIVE ........................................26  CONCLUSION ....................................................................................33