ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] 1T17:16-25 to 19:1-16.  With respect to the substantive response to Request No. 1, Defendants’ counsel indicated that defendants had listed three potential banks with which Defendant [...] could have been associated, and counsel sent letters to each of the banks inquiring about account information for Defendant 78 Summit Ave JC LLC.  1T24:12-25 to 25:1-10.  Counsel did this per [...]’s directive.  Plaintiffs’ counsel ([...]) complained that Defendants did not get any financial information from defendants other than the three letters that defendants’ counsel sent to the banks inquiring about the bank information.  1T25:13-23.  [...] advised defendants’ counsel that she could not perform the due diligence on her clients’ behalf because that would make her a witness; this deficiency should be corrected, [...] said, by defendants certifying their efforts to obtain bank account information with no substantive responses from the banks.  1T28:4-25 to 30:1-21.  With respect to Requests 1 through 6, plaintiffs’ counsel advised that they “relate to the bank information” and would be resolved in accordance with the court’s instructions providing for defendants to provide certified responses from [...] (on 78 Summit Avenue’s behalf) and [...].
[brief] To the extent Defendant intended to rely upon the ZBA Record to establish an easement could not have been granted in 1963 because parking was not permitted and/or the Sixth Street Lot was never utilized by the [...] for parking, the ZBA Record is irrelevant and inadmissible.  (Pa4-27; 6T 4-76)  If evidence is to be admitted, it must be relevant, material, and competent.  Relevant evidence is “evidence having a tendency in reason to prove or disprove any fact of consequence to the determination of the action. ”  N.J.R.E. 401.  “In determining relevance, the trial court should focus on the logical connection between the proffered evidence and a fact in issue … or the tendency of evidence to establish the proposition that it is offered to prove. ”  Green v. N.J. Mfrs. Ins. Co. 160 N.J. 480,492 (1999).  The 2018 determination by the ZBA as to the validity of the current use of the Subject Property is irrelevant to determining what property interests were created in 1963 and whether those property rights remain in effect.  Thus, the Resolution is irrelevant and inadmissible.  B.
[brief] Below, the trial court correctly held that the traditional relationship between a bank and its customer is “simply that of creditor and debtor. ” (PA008 (quoting Pagano v. United Jersey Bank, 143 N.J. 220, 233 (1996))).  The Court also correctly recognized that a fiduciary relationship might arise where: “(1) there is a fiduciary relationship such as principal and agent or attorney and client; (2) one or each of the parting, in entering into the transaction, expressly reposes a trust and confidence in the other or where, because of the circumstances of the case[,] such a trust and confidence is necessarily implied; or (3) there exist contracts or transaction which in their essential nature, are intrinsically fiduciary, and necessarily call for perfect good faith and full disclosure, without regard to any particular intention of the parties. ” (Id. (quoting United Jersey Bank v. Kensey, 306 N.J. Super. 540, 551 (App. Div. 1997)) (quotation marks, brackets, and ellipses omitted).)  Finally, the trial court correctly held under the facts in this case, that no fiduciary relationship or duty existed.
[brief] 392 N.J. Super. at 87-88.  Citing Ponden v. Ponden, 374 N.J. Super. 1 (App. Div. 2004), certif. denied 183 N.J. 212 (2005), a case in which the Appellate Division reversed the trial court’s refusal to allow plaintiff leave to serve an expert report after the conclusion of discovery when no trial had been set, the court reversed the denial of the motion to extend the discovery period and the summary judgment order which resulted because plaintiff could not complete discovery.
[brief] STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. [...], a/k/a [...], Defendant-Appellant.  CRIMINAL ACTION  On Appeal from a Judgment of Conviction of the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Somerset County Ind. No. [...]  Sat Below: Hon. [...], J.S.C., and a jury  BRIEF AND APPENDIX ON BEHALF OF DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
[brief] Here, the judge found Plaintiff credible, though he also found defendant to be somewhat credible – despite the fact that defendant was a convicted felon with a money laundering conviction who was combative, belligerent, and evasive.  Even so, much of Plaintiff’s testimony about work not done remained undisputed\(^2\).  --- \(^2\)  The panel commented on the absence of an expert, however, the trial court found that [...] was an expert.  2T8:6-10, 2T13:5, 2T13:16  Defendant’s contradictory testimony abounded.
[brief] Ca200.  In Count 3 of the Complaint, Complainants allege that Respondent's attendance at a January 20, 2022 meeting of the Board without wearing a face mask in violation of Executive Order 251.  "could be reasonably be seen as compromising the Board and as speaking for the Board as a member of the public."  (Ca200-Ca201).  They further allege that Respondent swore to uphold the laws, rules and regulations of the State Board of Education.  Ca201.
[brief] ” (Db3).  Defendants state in their Appellate Brief that [...] “cannot make a prima facie case that he suffered an adverse employment action as a result of any actions by [...].  The trial court noted that [...] was never disciplined over the alleged incident and that claims about it must be dismissed.  (3T39:4-8).  There was no ‘completed’ adverse action with regard to [...]’s desk. ”  Defendants’ position regarding what constitutes an adverse action is wrong as a matter of law as discussed above.
[brief] In the wake of that decision, the parties again appeared before the district court, seeking entry of judgment consistent with pro-rata allocation.  No new evidence of continuing contamination and/or remediation was presented during this portion of the proceedings; this was not an “allocation phase” of the type that was before the SAM in this case.  The allocation phase had already taken place in 2007, along with the liability phase.  Rather, the district court (and then the First Circuit on appeal) were tasked with applying pro-rata allocation principles to an allocation period, including an end-date, that had already been determined.
[directive] Offer additional training to investigators and others involved in the disciplinary  The Division has developed a plan for additional training for individuals process. involved in the professional disciplinary process to address post-assault trauma, prevention of sexual misconduct, human trafficking, and implicit bias.  The training for investigators who conduct sexual misconduct investigations will occur by September 2021, if feasible, and will be followed by training for other employees and stakeholders, including board members; executive directors, who run board proceedings; and Deputy Page 6 Attorneys General, some of whom provide advice to the boards and some of whom prosecute professional misconduct cases.  F.
[brief] Indeed, [...]’s regulations require any Arbitration Plan to “provide that PIP dispute resolution be initiated by written notice to the administrator and to all other parties of the party’s demand for dispute resolution. ”  N.J.A.C. 11:3-5.4(b)(1) (emphasis added).  The written notice must “set forth concisely the claims, and where appropriate the defenses, in dispute and the relief sought. ”  Ibid.: compare N.J.A.C. 11:3-5.4(b)(1) (requiring arbitration notice to set for claims concisely), with R. 4:5-7 (requiring pleadings filed in court to “be simple, concise and direct, and no technical forms of pleading are required”).  Moreover, the notion that arbitration can only be based on a single accident and that party or claim aggregation is impossible is undercut by [...]’s regulations.  (See Br. of [...] at 21).  The regulations require that an Arbitration Plan “shall provide for consolidation of claims into a single proceeding where appropriate in order to promote prompt, efficient resolution of PIP disputes consistent with fairness and due process of law.
[directive] Specific qualification requirements are established for both K-9 trainers and supervising K-9 trainers.  K-9 trainers are responsible for conducting basic K-9 training and qualification as well as re-evaluating police officer handler-police dog teams.  Supervising K-9 trainers, in addition to conducting actual K-9 training and qualifying exercises, are responsible for supervising K-9 handlers who assist with any K-9 training.
[brief] [...] is misleading in Footnote 1 of its brief stating that plaintiffs did not raise the issue “to allow” in the Building Height definition before the trial court.  The trial court’s opinion misinterpreted the definition of Building Height to read “designed to” instead of the phrase “designed to allow” in the Ordinance.  (Pa14-15).  Thus, it is permissible for the plaintiffs to address the context of the trial court’s opinion in its appeal.
[brief] We conduct a de novo review of the trial court's decision on defendant's motion and apply the same standard as the trial court for granting a motion for summary judgment.  Davis v. Brickman Landscaping, Ltd., 219 N.J. 395, 405, 98 A.3d 1173 (2014).  We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, determine if there are any genuine issues of material fact in dispute, and decide whether the motion judge correctly found that the moving party was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  Brill, supra, 142 N.J. at 540.  Issues of law are subject to the de novo standard of review, Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378, 658 A.2d 1230 (1995), and we "do not defer to the trial court's . . . interpretation of 'the meaning of a statute.'"  Davis, supra, 219 N.J. at 405 (quoting Nicholas v. Mynster, 213 N.J. 463, 478, 64 A.3d 536 (2013)).  When interpreting a statute, we are required to determine the "intent of the Legislature," [*4]  Hardy v. Abdul-Matin, 198 N.J. 95, 101, 965 A.2d 1165 (2009), and must first consider the plain language of the statute because that is the best indicator of legislative intent.  DiProspero v. Penn, 183 N.J. 477, 492, 874 A.2d 1039 (2005).  We are to "asccribe to the statutory words their ordinary meaning and significance, and read them in context with related provisions so as to give sense to the legislation as a whole."  . . .  Courts are cautioned against "rewrit[ing] a plainly-written enactment of the Legislature or presum[ing] that the Legislature intended something other than that expressed by way of the plain language."  If the language is "clear on its face," courts should "enforce [the statute] according to its terms."  However, "where a literal interpretation would create a manifestly absurd result, contrary to public policy, the spirit of the law should control."  . . .  Accordingly, "when a 'literal interpretation of individual ¹ Plaintiff was working for his employer at the time of the accident.
[brief] The entire controversy doctrine “generally requires parties to an action to raise all transactionally related claims in that same action. ”  *Largoza v. FKM Real Estate Holdings, Inc.*, 474 N.J. Super. 61, 79 (App. Div. 2022) (quoting *Carrington Mortg. Servs., LLC v. Moore*, 464 N.J. Super. 59, 67 (App. Div. 2020); see also Pressler & Verniero, *Current N.J. Rules*, cmt. 1 on R, 4:30A (2023).
[brief] **Jurisdiction – This argument was not expressly made below.**  Jurisdiction is power.  The power of a municipality is governed by the authority created under the New Jersey Constitution and put into effect by the New Jersey legislature.  The New Jersey Constitution, at Art. IV, sect. 6, par. 2, permits the Legislature to delegate to municipalities the responsibility for regulating local land use by means of zoning schemes.  Our Legislature has done so through the enactment of the Municipal Land Use Law.  However, local authority is not unbridled.  In 1979, the Legislature adopted the Pinelands Protection Act, which has been implemented through the Pinelands Comprehensive Management Plan (CMP), which has jurisdiction over the property subject to this appeal.  A municipality “may not deny the proposed development based on requirements in its land use ordinance which are also regulated by the Comprehensive Management Plan.  To allow such a denial would allow a local decision to supersede the Pinelands Development Approval. ”  *Fine v. Galloway Tp. Committee*, 190 N.J. Super. 432, 442 (Law Div. 1983).  The Board and the trial court have ignored these constraints.
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[directive] Assignment Judges TO: Jud~~ Criminal Presiding 1 FROM: [...], J.A.D.  Process for Search Warrants and Communications Data Warrants in SUBJ: Response to COVID-19 April 1, 2020  DATE:  By Order dated April 2020 ( copy attached), the Supreme Court relaxed and 1, supplemented the Court Rules for search warrants to allow procedural modifications necessitated Court's by the COVID-19 public health emergency.
[brief] (g) unilaterally modifying, amending, or terminating any collective negotiations agreements, except those related to school districts, to which the municipality is a party, or unilaterally modifying, amending, or terminating the terms and conditions of employment during the term of any applicable collective negotiations agreement, or both, provided that the director determines that the modifications, amendments, or terminations are reasonable and directly related to stabilizing the finances or assisting with the fiscal rehabilitation and recovery of the municipality in need of stabilization and recovery; […] (i) with respect to any expired collective negotiations agreement to which the municipality in need of stabilization and recovery is a party, unilaterally modifying wages, hours, or any other terms and conditions of employment; Defendants simply state that the reasonableness standard should not apply to N.J.S.A. 52:27BBBB-5(a)(3)(i) without providing any substantive argument to support that contention and completely ignore that the Appellate Division found that the reasonableness standard applies to N.J.S.A. 52:27BBBB-5(a)(3)(g).  Db24-25.  The reasonableness standard, as articulated by [...], states that the Designee [State] must take into account the following: (1) that he take action that provides for the public health, safety, and welfare; (2) that public services are provided in an efficient and cost-effective manner; (3) that he ensure the development of a comprehensive plan for financial rehabilitation and recovery; and (4) that he take action that is reasonable and directly related to financial stabilization.
[brief] *Hunstein I*, 994 F.3d at 1351.  A debt collector communicating with a third party would not demand payment from that third party.  Hence, § 1692c(b)’s use of “in connection with the collection of a debt” must include communications other than ones which demand payment; otherwise, no communication with a third-party.  The court also rejected the argument that the practice of using mail vendors should be allowed because it is widespread and had not previously been questioned.
[brief] Instead, the Court in Dela Vega was more generally concerned with situations in which consumers purchase liability insurance to cover themselves and their loved ones, only to have that coverage pulled out from underneath them.  To be clear, an intrafamily liability step-down in a primary automobile insurance policy, such as the one in Dela Vega, has the exact same effect as an intrafamily liability exclusion in an excess policy, such as currently at issue.  “Step-down” and “exclusion” are used interchangeably in the Dela Vega case.  Both provisions dramatically reduce the liability coverage limits purchased by a consumer and indicated on the consumer’s insurance declarations page.  In a primary policy, the intrafamily step-down operates to reduce defendant’s liability coverage to an amount less than they purchased, such as the State statutory minimum as was the case in Dela Vega.  The exclusion in an excess policy operates to step down the available liability coverage from the limits set forth in the declarations page under the excess policy to the limits of the primary policy – whether those primary policy limits be $15,000, $50,000, $500,000, or some other amount.  The provisions do not wholly eliminate liability coverage but both operate to dramatically reduce the coverage purchased by the consumer.  The Dela Vega court was not concerned with the type of policy involved but rather the effect, on the whole, of intrafamily liability limitations in insurance policies.
[brief] Thus, on the face of it, and even ignoring that [...] had agreed to the elevator and then reneged, the inclusion of such elevator is a legitimate exercise of a planning board jurisdiction.  Moreover, a party who acts in good faith on an honest, but mistaken, belief that his/her actions were justified has not breached the covenant of good faith and fair dealing.  *Silvestri v. Optus Software, Inc.*, 175 N.J. 113 (2003).  Therefore, it is respectfully submitted that not only does the record before the trial court fail to show “bad faith” by the Board and/or by the Township, the record demonstrates the Board made a ‘good faith’ and a diligent attempt to complete the Project approval process and that [...] was the mischievous actor.
[brief] The Trial Court Erred In Concluding That Zoning Board Interpretation Was Necessary In This Case.  (5T 27-24 to 28-2).  The trial court erroneously found that Zoning Board interpretation was necessary to determine whether a use variance was a prerequisite to site plan approval.  Although Plaintiff’s site plan application proposes two principal uses on the Property, a use variance is not necessary because of the plain language of applicable Ordinances.  Therefore, the trial court’s remand to the Zoning Board to determine whether a use variance is necessary is error and must be reversed.  Westampton Township Ordinance §250-4, allows mixed use of more than once principal commercial or industrial use on property in the Industrial Zone.  (Pa3-13).  As a preliminary matter, this is demonstrated by the facts that two principal uses have already been permitted on the Property since 1997.  (Pa280-282).  Plaintiff’s site plan application merely proposes to maintain the existing cell tower use without any change to the use or physical changes to the leased area or equipment, then replace the current permitted agricultural use with a permitted, as-of-right industrial use.  Possibly to thwart the allowed development, the Board erroneously concluded the existence of the Cell Tower on the Property obligated [...] to obtain a use variance pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70(d)(1) to allow the proposed second principal use of the warehouses to replace the existing permitted principal use.  Imposing the need for a use variance allowed the Board to interpose a suggestion it lacked jurisdiction to proceed to review the site plan application.
[directive] When an officer de-activates a BWC pursuant to this Section, the officer shall narrate the circumstances of the de-activation (e.g., “I am now turning off my BWC to discuss investigative strategy with my supervisor. ”).  6.6  De-Activation on Instruction from Prosecutor.  Notwithstanding Section 5.3, an officer may de-activate a BWC when specifically authorized to do so by an assistant prosecutor or assistant or deputy attorney general for good and sufficient cause as determined by the assistant prosecutor or assistant or deputy attorney general.  When an officer de-activates a BWC pursuant to this Section, the officer shall narrate the circumstances of the de- activation indicating the assistant prosecutor or assistant or deputy attorney general who authorized the de-activation (e.g., “I am now turning off my BWC as per the instruction of assistant prosecutor (insert name).”).
[brief] (See 9T:40-17 to 44-20).  The sheer extent of defendant’s criminal convictions and failure to abide by the rules of probation or imprisonment show that the trial court did not err by finding aggravating factor three.  Though defendant argues that his criminal history consisted of “mostly remote, largely drug-related third-degree offenses,” his repeated failures to lead a law-abiding life demonstrate that he poses a risk of committing another offense if released.  (See Db49).  Aggravating factor six is also applicable based on defendant’s history of felony and disorderly persons convictions, as well as his failure to abide by the terms of his probation or sentence.  For the foregoing reasons, the trial court’s findings of aggravating factors one, three, and six and no mitigating factors were supported by credible evidence in the record, and the trial court’s sentence of life for count one, first-degree murder, was not “so unreasonable as to shock the judicial conscience” and should be upheld.
[directive] 3.5  Deadly Weapon.  Deadly weapon means any firearm or other weapon, device, instrument, material or substance, whether animate or inanimate, which in the manner it is used or is intended to be used, is known to be capable of producing death or serious bodily injury, or in the manner in which it is fashioned would lead the victim reasonably to believe it to be capable of producing death or serious bodily injury.  See N.J.S.A. 2C:11-1(c).
[brief] *Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. United Ins. Co.*, 138 N.J. 437, 450 (1994).  September 8, 1986, was the date [...] notified the [...] of the property damage and the latest that the property damage at the [...] could have been discovered.  (Pa 93).  Thus, September 8, 1986, is the last date of “triggered coverage” and, pursuant to *Boston Gas*, should be the end date for the allocation period.