ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] (Pa75).  On July 8, 2019, the Legislature enacted L. 2019, c. 157 (the “Ricci Act”).  The Ricci Act in relevant part permitted active or retired members of the SPRS to file for a recalculation of Ordinary Disability, Service, or Special Retirement Benefits to Accidental Disability Retirement Benefits provided they participated in the rescue, recovery, or cleanup operations at the World Trade Center Site.  (Pa10).  The Ricci Act also created a presumption that the disability of the member or retiree “occurred during and as a result of the performance of the member’s regular or assigned duties and not the result of the member’s willful negligence unless the contrary can be proved by competent evidence. ”  (Pa10).  1  Because the procedural history and facts are closely related, they are combined for efficiency and the court’s convenience.
[brief] (1T30-20 to 23; 1T31-1 to 9; 1T43-22 to 44-14; 2T6-13 to 7-4; Da9-0:00:45 to 0:00:50).  Although he had interacted with [...] in the past, the detective at that point was unable to pick [...] out of the group at that distance, as all three were standing together and all were dressed in black.\(^3\) (2T26-13 to 16).  Pointing with his hand-held radio at the three men, [...] ordered them to stop.  Although [...] complied, defendant and codefendant [...] took off running in different directions.  (1T30-23 to 31-18; 2T8-19 to 9-3; 2T29-3 to 5; Da9-0:00:50 to 0:00:53).  These events occurred within seconds.  (2T29-6 to 9).  Detective [...] chased codefendant [...] across the street, where [...] ran into a parked car and lost his balance, causing [...]’s handgun to fall to the ground as [...] tackled him.
[brief] ”  Duvin v. Bd. of Trs., Pub. Emps.’ Ret. Sys., 76 N.J. 203, 207 (1978).  Here, [...] seeks to avoid an obvious legislative restriction outlined in the Ricci Act that provides he is ineligible for the presumption or recalculation after July 8, 2021.  Even if [...] did not receive the postcard or any of the other notice provided by the Division, he cannot evade the two-year limitation period.
[brief] In the Amended Complaint, the [...] continued to allege that [...] acted with intent to cause injury to [...].  (Da71-75).  Specifically, they alleged that [...] fabricat[ed] allegations of inappropriate conduct and misrepresentations.  . . .” (Da72).  The [...] repeated their allegations from the initial complaint that [...] knowingly made these untrue statements with the “malicious[] inten[t] to injure . . . [[...]]’s . . . practice[,] good name and profession ” by causing [...] “infamy and disgrace. ” (Da73).  And further repeated that [...] intended to “vex, harass, oppress, and totally ruin [Dr. Rusonnella’s] profession. ” (Da73).  Moreover, they alleged that [...] “intentionally and without justification or excuse interfered with Plaintiffs[’] pursuit [of] then current and prospective business relationships, including, but not limited to the hospital. ” (Da73).  [...] concedes that the [...] were only pursuing claims of tortious interference at the time the trial court ruled on summary judgment.  (Db, p. 5).  In September 2017, [...] acknowledged receipt of an amended complaint, noted that the July 20, 2017 reservation of rights was still applicable to the amended complaint, and resent the initial reservation of rights letter with that letter.  (Da296-301).  [...] also produced a signed returned certified mail receipt for that September 2017 mailing.  (Da302-303).  COUNTERSTATEMENT OF PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[brief] Besides violating [...]’s right to Due Process, the Job FAD violates the doctrine of Fundamental Fairness.  The doctrine of Fundamental Fairness serves to protect citizens generally against unjust and arbitrary governmental action, and specifically against governmental procedures that tend to operate arbitrarily.  *Constantine v. Township of Bass River*, 406 N.J. Super. 305, 320 (App. Div. 2009).  It serves this purpose in the absence of an explicit statutory or constitutional protection to be invoked.  Fundamental Fairness is an integral part of Due Process, and is often extrapolated from or implied in other constitutional guarantees.  The doctrine serves the imperative of minimizing arbitrary action by government.  *Doe v. Poritz*, 142 N.J. 1, 109 (1995).  There is no bright-line test to determine when a court should apply the fundamental-injustice exception.  Rather, our courts examine whether the judicial system has provided a fair proceeding leading to a just outcome.  *State v. Mitchell*, 126 N.J. 565, 587 (1992).  New Jersey's procedural rules seek to achieve finality and judicial economy: their application must be balanced, however, against the doctrine of Fundamental Fairness.  *State v. Martini*, 187 N.J. 469, 481 (2006).  Here, [...]’s ability to protect and preserve his tenured teaching position were caught between the timeliness requirements of N.J.A.C. 6A:3-1.3(i) and the appellate litigation process.  Under these circumstances, it is fundamentally unfair to deny a diligent litigant the opportunity to contest or obtain relief from the consequences of adverse government action.  **CONCLUSION**
[brief] Civil Action Certification of Arrears Obligor's Payment History Civil Action Certification of Arrears  This was placed in Table of Appendix as the Trial Court sent this with the final order and in addition to the above Obligor's Payment History  This was placed in Table of Appendix as the Trial Court sent this with the final order and in addition to the above | Authority | Brief page number | |---------------------------|-------------------| | Court Rules: | | | Rule 2:10-2 | 8, 42, 44, 46 | | Rule 4(h) | 26 | | Rule 4:50-1 | 10, 22, 27 | | Rule 4:50-1 (d) | 9 | | Rule 4:50-1 (f) | 24 | | R.4:104 | 12, 20, 21, 43 | | Rule l2(b) (5) | 24 | | Rule 60(b)(4) | 10 | | Rule 60(b)(6) | 21, 44 | Case Law: Anderson v. Mercer County Sheriffs Dep't., No. 117620, 2014 WL 2196935, at *4, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71776, at *12 (D.N.J. May 27, 2014)
[brief] (Da75 to 76).  Indeed, the mere fact that defendant’s credit card was used at the hotel would not have been relevant to prove that he personally stayed there.  “‘Relevant evidence’ means evidence having a tendency in reason to prove or disprove any fact of consequence to the determination of the action,” N.J.R.E. 401, and except as otherwise provided in the rules or by law, “all relevant evidence is admissible.
[brief] Aa393.  The [...] repeatedly requested information about their investments, and, instead of providing that information, in January 2022, [...] and [...] resigned as managers and withdrew as members of the [...].  Aa393-99.  Following their resignations, [...] and [...] failed to turn over the [...]’ books and records to the [...].  Aa395-99.  In January 2023, the [...] filed the underlying state court action in Florida (“Underlying Action”), in which they sought “significant damages and related relief against [[...] and [...]] out of their theft of corporate books and records identifying, among other things, the nature and status of investments totaling in excess of $81 Million that [[...] and [...]] managed as the then [Managers] of the [...]. ”  Aa366-67.  Specifically, the [...] allege that [...] and [...]: breached their fiduciary duties, before and after their resignations (Counts I-II); committed civil theft (Count III); committed conversion by depriving the [...] of their books and records (Count IV); unlawfully detained the [...]’ books and records (replevin) (Count V); committed civil conspiracy (Count VI); tortiously interfered with the [...]’ business relationships (Counts VII, VIII and IX); required an equitable accounting of all funds and investment opportunities to determine misappropriation (Count IX); and have been unjustly enriched by their actions (Count X).  Aa407-21.  B.
[brief] (Da 1-4)  The defense filed a motion to suppress, and on October 29, 2021, the Honorable [...], J.S.C., heard testimony on the motion.  (1T)  On February 7, 2022, Judge Collins denied the motion to suppress in a written decision.  (Da 6-17)  On July 17, 2023, before the Honorable [...], J.S.C., [...] pleaded guilty to Count 2, second-degree possession of cocaine with intent to distribute.  (2T 8-10 to 9-9)  In exchange for his guilty plea, the State recommended a maximum sentence of ten years in prison and dismissal of all other charges.  (2T 4-1 to 12; Da 18-24)  On November 3, 2023, Judge Rahill --- 1 Da – Defendant’s Appendix 1T – October 29, 2021 – Suppression 2T – July 17, 2023 – Plea 3T – November 3, 2023 –  Sentence sentenced [...] to seven years in prison and imposed all appropriate fines and fees.  (3T 10-3 to 14-5; Da 25-28)  [...] filed a notice of appeal on December 13, 2023.  (Da 29-32)  This appeal follows.  STATEMENT OF FACTS
[brief] In the prior case, [...]'s decision addressed the legality and public purpose of the Ordinance, which is the very issues contested in the present litigation.  As we have demonstrated, Appellant is simply wrong when it alleges that the contract language which was authorized by the adoption of Ordinance 5-23 does not include the Appellant’s lot and does not fully explain the public purpose for the acquisition of the properties.  The facts, therefore, meet all the prerequisites for the application of collateral estoppel.  By this doctrine, the Appellant's challenge to the Ordinance's validity is precluded.
[brief] Parties  The Decedent, [...] (“Decedent”) purchased a home in 1992 in Brigantine, New Jersey, where she resided until her death from Covid pneumonia in 2021.  This home was purchased prior to her marriage to the Petitioner, and titled in the Decedent’s name only.  (7T40-13; 7T49-8 to 11; 11T91-4 to 9).  The Petitioner, [...] (“Petitioner”) married the Decedent in 1992, and for the most part, resided in the Decedent’s home until her death.  (7T41-23 to 24).  The Respondent, [...] (“Respondent”) is the daughter of the Decedent by a prior relationship.
[brief] Specifically, the Deed from [...] into [...] states that:  [T]he said party of the first part [[...]] will warrant, secure, and forever defend the said land and premises unto the said party of the second part [[...]], his heirs and assigns, forever, against any lawful claims and demands of all and every person or persons fully and clearly freed and discharged of and from all manner of encumbrances whatsoever.  See Pa0924.  Such language, “that a grantor ‘will warrant and forever defend the premises against all lawful claims, freed and discharged of all encumbrances,’ operates as a covenant against encumbrances, and also as a general warranty. ”  Carter v. Denman's Ex'rs, 23 N.J.L. 260, 261 (1852); see also, Kellogg v. Platt, 33 N.J.L. 328 (1869).
[brief] But that omission is almost understandable because in this instance the judge clearly did not need a hearing to tell him what he stated that he, the State, and the defense already knew: that [...] had accused [...] of murder and that [...] was later exonerated by the highest law-enforcement agency in the state.  (23T 13-24 to 15-11)  Obviously, Wesley’s accusation against Hill was false; the Attorney General said so.  But that fact makes the judge’s second error more confoundingly impossible to understand: why he then forbade defense counsel from doing what Rule 608(b) clearly allows -- cross-examining Wesley on the fact of Hill’s exoneration to prove that Wesley falsely accused Hill of murder.  Simply put, that error was huge in this case.  [...] was the main State witness used to counter defendant’s account of the events of January 9 with [...].  Yes, defense counsel was able to paint a picture for the jury of Wesley as a frequent snitch, but the proof that Wesley was a lying snitch -- willing to lie about a murder case for his own benefit -- was the tale of his testimony against [...] and the resulting exoneration of Hill.  By excluding the exoneration part of the story -- and, thus, the proof that Wesley had previously made a false accusation in another murder case -- the judge allowed Wesley and the State to assert, unchecked but completely falsely, that [...]’s case was an example of Wesley accurately testifying for the State.  (29T 96-18 to 25)
[brief] Defendants respectfully request that this reviewing Court find that the Court below was correct not to impose a constructive trust because no wrongful act was found, and leave the findings of fact and conclusions of law of the Trial Court undisturbed.  2.  While the court did find the existence of a confidential relationship which is the first element of undue influence, defendants were able to rebut the presumption of undue influence by clear and convincing evidence (6T31:4-5).  Pascale v. Pascale, 113 N.J. 20 (1988), a Supreme court case, neatly lays out not only the test for undue influence in *inter vivos* gifting, but also the shifting burden which allows the donee of the gift to rebut the presumption of undue influence.  The Pascale Court found that no undue influence had occurred, in that case, between a father and a son.  The underlying facts in Pascale are not “on all fours” with the present matter, but the underlying law of undue influence is the same.  In Pascale, a divorcing father who owned two highly profitable businesses backdated a transfer of stock and real estate in one business to one of his sons for purposes of defrauding his divorcing wife in the equitable distribution of assets.  *Id.* at 24.  Later the father and son relationship deteriorated, and the father sued the son to get control of his business back, alleging undue influence in the initial transfer.  *Id.* at 22.  The son successfully rebutted the presumption.  The Supreme Court stated that, “In respect of an inter vivos gift, a presumption of undue influence arise when the contestant proves that the donee dominated the will of the donor [string cites omitted], or when a confidential relationship exists between donor and donee. ”  *Id.* at 30.  As to situations that give rise to a finding of a confidential relationship, "Among the most natural of confidential relationships is that of parent and child," as we have in our case.  Ibid.
[brief] The appellate court employs the same standard as the trial court in reviewing a grant of a summary judgment motion.  *Prudential Property & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Boylan*, 307 N.J. Super. 162, 167 (App. Div. 1998), *Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co.*, 142 N.J. 520, 536-527 (1995), *Polzo v. County of Essex*, 209 N.J. 51, 56, n. 1 (2012), *Lee v. Brown*, 232 N.J 114, 126 (2018).
[brief] The Appellate Division affirmed both orders on June 8, 2023.  The June 8, 2023 Order and Opinion from the Appellate Division recognized that, “[t]he record is also bereft of any evidence or reason that defendant waited eighteen months to file a motion to vacate final judgment. ”  *Kemp* at 12.  It further emphasized that the Defendant never demonstrated that he had the ability to satisfy the tax lien, or provide a certification explaining or substantiating his claim that he suffered an alleged “severe hardship”.  *Id.* at 13.  Importantly, the Appellate Division did not remand the matter back to the lower court for further proceedings, despite the U.S. Supreme Court’s pronouncement in *Tyler*.  Thus, the Defendant’s only recourse was to file a motion for reconsideration before the Appellate Division pursuant to R. 2:11-6, which was required to be made within ten (10) days after entry of the June 8, 2023 order and opinion.  In the alternative, the Defendant could have petitioned the New Jersey Supreme Court for certification within 20 days of the June 8, 2023 order and opinion pursuant to R. 2:12-3.  However, both deadlines elapsed more than 1 year ago.
[brief] TABLE OF AUTHORITIES........................................................................................................iii  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT.................................................................................................1  PROCEDURAL HISTORY.......................................................................................................2  STATEMENT OF FACTS.......................................................................................................3  POINT I  IT IS AXIOMATIC THAT A MUNICIPALITY CANNOT BE COMPELLED TO ACCEPT  A DEDICATION OF LAND OWNERSHIP  Pa646 and Pa18 (Final Decision Declined to Address)......................................................16  POINT II  THE MUNICIPALITY ALWAYS RESERVES THE RIGHT TO DECLINE A DEDICATION AT ANY TIME (Pa644) (Final Decision Declined to Address)..................................................................................19  POINT III  THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT FOUND THE CRITERIA OF THE APPLICABLE STATUTE SATISFIED WITHOUT RESORT TO THE FACTUAL RECORD(Pa18-Pa20).............................................................................................................21  A. APPROVAL OF THE SUBDIVISION PLAT OR SITE PLAN..............................................22  B.  THE ABSENCE OF DEDICATION ON THE PLATS OR SITE PLANS....................................23  C.  NO FINAL APPROVAL LET ALONE ANY APPROVAL BY THE BOROUGH ENGINEER................26 POINT IV THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT RECOGNIZING THE CONDITION OF BOROUGH APPROVAL ACKNOWLEDGED BY PLAINTIFF (Pa17) (Not Addressed by Final Decision).................................................................30 POINT V THE ISSUES OF OWNERSHIP, MAINTENANCE AND PUBLIC ACCESS ARE SEPARATE INTERESTS TO BE DETERMINED ON A CASE BY CASE BASIS AND MUST BE ACCOMPLISHED BY A PROOF HEARING (Pa655) (Not Addressed by Final Decision)........................................................................34  POINT VI THE ZONING STATUS AND EASEMENT STATUS OF THE STRIP OF LAND UNDERLYING THE INTERNAL DRIVEWAYS ARE NOT CLEAR THEREBY PRECLUDING SUMMARY DISPOSITION (Pa659)(Final Decision Declined to Address)......................................................39 POINT VII THE ROADWAY IN QUESTION IS PROPERLY CONSTRUED AS A “BY-ROAD” (Pa665) (Final Decision Declined to Address).....................................................................45 POINT VIII THE DEVELOPER IS ESTOPPED FROM DENYING THE MAINTENANCE OBLIGATION (Not Raised Below)...............................................................................................47  CONCLUSION...........................................................................................................49
[brief] Just as in *Interlotto*—discussed at length in Defendants’ opening brief but ignored by the Trial Court and now Plaintiff—Plaintiff’s revisionist claim that it is a “New Jersey client” long “based in New Jersey”\(^6\) is belied by the reality that Plaintiff “thought so little of its relationship to this state that it failed to obtain a certificate of authority from the Secretary of State before commencing this action” or any time before then, including “when the cause of action arose” in 2016.  298 N.J. Super. at 137; see Da148–49.  Plaintiff laments that “Defendants continue to assert they were practicing law everywhere and nowhere” and “expect no court to exercise jurisdiction over them,” Pb1, 26.
[brief] Indeed, both federal courts and the majority of states apply equivalent rules to Special Masters as they do to sitting judges.  The Code of Conduct for United States Judges classifies Special Masters as “judges pro tempore” and applies most of the Code to them, including the provisions governing impartiality and disqualification in Canon 3.  See Code of Conduct for United States Judges, Compliance with the Code of Conduct; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 53(a)(2) (subjecting Special Masters to the same standards of judicial disqualification as those set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 455).  Similarly, as shown in a survey of state law that the [...] submitted to the trial court, 32 states affirmatively require that Special Masters adhere to their respective code of _____________________ Brown, 11 Va. App. 231, 233-36 (1990).  The court rejected the argument that “a commissioner's report is of little consequence since a commissioner has no power to render final orders,” noting that a commissioner’s factual findings are presumed correct.  Id. at 236. judicial conduct, and 6 more likely do so based on applicable code language or court decisions construing ethical requirements.
[directive] The Critical Decision-Making Model is an organized way of making decisions about how an officer will act in any situation, including those that may involve potential uses of force.  De-escalation.  De-escalation refers to the action of communicating verbally or non-verbally in an attempt to reduce, stabilize, or eliminate the immediacy of a threat.  De-escalation may also be used to create the time needed to position additional resources to resolve the situation with the least amount of force necessary.
[brief] Sentencing Court Opinion Reimposing Consecutive Sentence (Feb. 9, 2023) ....................................................................................................Da44-51  Sentencing Court Order Reimposing Consecutive Sentence (Feb. 15, 2023) ....................................................................................................Da52 Notice of Appeal, Docket No. [...] ............................................................Da53-56  Appellate Division Order Denying Motion To Transfer To Plenary (Apr. 12, 2023) ....................................................................................................Da57 INDEX TO APPENDIX (CONT’D) PAGE NOS. Appellate Division Order Removing Case From SOA Calendar and Ordering Plenary Briefing (Oct. 31, 2023) ........................................Da58 Legislative History for L. 1979, c. 179 ................................................Da59-85 Final Text Of Bill (S. 3329) ................................................................Da60-79 Sponsor Statement to S. 3329 ..............................................................Da80-82 Sponsor Statement to A. 3352 ...............................................................Da83-85 Legislative History for L. 1992, c. 74 ....................................................Da86-92 Final Text Of Bill ..............................................................................Da87-90
[brief] (6T149-22 to 6T150-1).  Plain error is defined as error that had a clear capacity of producing an unjust result.  R. 2:10-2.  The plain error standard of review imposes a “high bar. ”  State v. Alessi, 240 N.J. 501, 527 (2020) (quoting State v. Santamaria, 236 N.J. 390, 404 (2019)).  The “high standard” serves as a “strong incentive” for counsel to pose timely objections so that any error can be cured by the trial court.  Santamaria, 236 N.J. at 404.  It also serves to dissuade silence at trial to gain a tactical advantage on appeal.  State v. Ross (II), 229 N.J. 389, 407 (2017).  Defendant has the burden of showing “clear” and “obvious” error that prejudiced his substantial rights.  State v. Morton, 155 N.J. 383, 421 (1998); State v. Chew, 150 N.J. 30, 82 (1997).  The issue is whether the belated claim of error led the jury to a result it might not otherwise have reached.  State v. Docaj, 407 N.J. Super. 352, 362 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 200 N.J. 370 (2009).  It is well established that jury instructions are viewed in their entirety, never in isolation.