ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] Other Law Enforcement Officers Training Safe Neighborhoods Services Fund Number of Months and Equipment Fund  Penalty Assessment (N.J.S.A. 2C:43-3.2)  Non-resident driving privileges revoked (N.J.S.A. 2C:43-3.3) $ Offenses @ □ - $ End Date Start Date Total: $ Probation Supervision Fee Statewide Sexual Assault Nurse Details Examiner Program Penalty (N.J.S.A. 2C:45-1d) (N.J.S.A. 2C:43-3.6) $ □ $ Offenses @ Transaction Fee - (N.J.S.A. 2C:46-1.1)  Jurisdiction Driver's License Number Total $ □ Domestic Violence Offender Certain Sexual Offenders Surcharge  If the court is unable to collect the license, complete the following: Surcharge (N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29.4) (N.J.S.A. 2C:43-3.7)  Defendant's Address $ $ Sex Crime Victim Treatment Fund Fine Penalty (N.J.S.A. 2C:14-10) $ $ □ City State Zip Restitution Joint & Several Total Financial Obligation $ $ Sex Date of Birth
[brief] ”); New Century Fin. v. Trewin, 2018 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1688, *9-10 (Ch. Div. May 24, 2018) (Where the court vacated a years old default judgment and held that it was “satisfied that the judgment obtained by plaintiff’s predecessor is void, by virtue of [the loan assignor’s] unlicensed status.  N.J.S.A. 17:11C-33(b). ” (emphasis added)).
[brief] Order entered May 3, 2023 granting Plaintiff’s Motion to Enforce Litigant’s Rights and ordering Defendant to pay Plaintiff $91,250.00 ........................................................................Da1 # TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | Authority | Brief Page Number | |--------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------| | **Court Rules:** | | | Federal Rules of Court 60(b) | 28, 29 | | N.J. Court Rule 4:50-1 | 4, 16, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 24, 27, 30 | | N.J. Court Rule 4:50-2 | 28 | | Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules, comment 3 on R. 4:50-2 (2015) | 22 | | Uniform Commerical Code 1-205 | 29 | | **Case Law:** | | | Avelino-Catabran v. Catabran | 445 N.J. Super 574, 589, 590 (App. Div. 2016) 25, 26 | | Baumann v. Marinaro | 95 N.J. 380, 392 (1984)
[directive] on how to assign patients to color-coded priority groups.  For those institutions that prefer to create broader, color-coded priority groups, this section provides instructions on how to multi-principle scoring system do so.  Once a patient’s priority score is calculated using the described in Table 1, each patient should be assigned to a color-coded triage priority group, which should be noted clearly on their chart/EHR (Table 2).  This color-coded assignment of priority groups is designed to allow triage officers to create operationally clear priority groups to receive critical care resources, according to their score on the multi-principle allocation framework.  For example, individuals in the red group have the best chance to benefit from critical care interventions and should therefore receive priority over all other groups in the face of scarcity.  The orange group has intermediate priority and should receive critical care resources if there are available resources after all patients in the red group have been allocated critical care resources.  The yellow group has lowest priority and should receive critical care resources if there are available resources after all patients in the red and orange groups have been allocated critical care resources.  10  Table 2.  Assigning Patients to Color-Coded Priority Groups Use Raw Score from Multi-principle Scoring  System to Assign Priority Category Level of Priority and Code Color  Priority score from Multi-principle Scoring System  RED  Priority score 1-3  Highest priority Priority score 4-5  ORANGE  Intermediate priority (reassess as needed)  Priority score 6-8  YELLOW  Lowest priority (reassess as needed)  In the event that there are Resolving “ties” in priority scores/categories between patients.  ‘ties’ in priority scores/categories between patients and not enough critical care resources for all patients with the lowest scores, life-cycle considerations should be used as the first tiebreaker, with priority going to younger patients.  We recommend the following categories: age 0-17, age 18-40, age 41-60; age 61-75; older than age 75.  We also recommend that individuals who are vital to the acute care response be given priority, which could be operationalized in the form of a tiebreaker or subtracting points from the score.  If there are still ties after applying priority based on life-cycle considerations and consideration of healthcare workers, and if the hospital used the 3 -priority category approach described above (e.g., high, intermediate, and low priority), the raw score on the patient prioritization score should be used as a tiebreaker, with priority going to the patient with the lower raw score.  If there are still ties after these two tiebreakers are applied, a lottery (i.e., random allocation) should be used to break the tie.  It is important to reiterate that all patients will be to receive critical care beds and eligible services regardless of their priority score.
[directive] In State v. Brimage, 153 N.J. 1 (1998), the Supreme Court suggested that differences in available county resources as well as varying backlog and caseload situations could be legitimate factors that prosecutors may consider, but only if those factors are explicitly set forth in and authorized by Attorney General Guidelines.  153 N.J. at 24.  After careful consideration, it has been determined that there is no practical way to account for local resource, caseload, and criminal calendar conditions without reintroducing institutionalized disparity between counties in contravention of the principle rule established by the Court in Brimage.
[brief] I.  Pleadings and Trial  Due to the Events of Default and Tenant’s failure to respond to Landlord’s written notices regarding the same, on July 22, 2020, Landlord commenced the underlying summary commercial eviction proceeding by filing a Summons and Verified Complaint (Non-Payment of Rent) (the “Complaint”) with the Clerk of the Superior Court of New Jersey, Middlesex County, Special Civil Part, Landlord-Tenant Division under Docket No.: [...] (i.e. the Underlying Action).  (Da88-101).  Due to the restrictions on commercial evictions put in place by the State of New Jersey arising out of COVID-19, the Underlying Action was not scheduled for trial until August 18, 2021 (i.e. more than a year after the Complaint was filed)\(^1\).  (Pa115).  On August 18, 2021, the case was tried before The Honorable [...], J.S.C. (Pa115).  At trial, Judge Corman heard oral arguments from counsel as well as testimony from representatives of Landlord and Tenant.  (Pa115; 1T).  At the conclusion of this testimony and arguments, Judge Corman directed the parties to file short, post-trial briefs concerning the amount due to Landlord under the Lease.  (Pa115; 1T34-13 to 1T36-25).  \(^1\)  As such, based on Tenant’s own representations, its business was reopened and operating for more than eleven (11) months prior to trial yet Tenant failed to pay any of the past due Rent and Additional Rent it admittedly owed under the Lease.  (Db11).  II.
[brief] In [...] v. [...], OAL Docket No. [...], decided on July 21, 2015 (Pa123), [...] found that [...] was an employee as the municipal prosecutor for the [...].  This decision was upheld by the Board.  (Pa145)  In that case, the Administrative Law Judge noted that if the legislature wanted to simply ban municipal prosecutors from the pension system they could have done so.  However, Chapter 92b requires a fact-sensitive analysis of the “IRS 20 Factor Test”.  Similar to the Petitioner in this case, [...] also maintained a private practice of law.  However, [...] in answering the Employee/Independent Contractor Checklist determined [...] was an independent contractor.  Here, [...] found Petitioner is an employee.  Despite both [...]’s and the Board’s initial finding that [...] was an independent contractor, the Administrative Law Judge and Board ultimately found that upon analysis of all the factors and the totality of the circumstances, [...] was an employee and not an independent contractor and should never have been removed from [...] in the first place.
[brief] LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I THE TRIAL COURT’S AUGUST 31, 2022 AWARD OF LEGAL FEES AND COSTS SHOULD BE REVERSED, BECAUSE PLAINTIFF’S FEE APPLICATION DID NOT MEET THE REQUIREMENT UNDER R. 4:42-9(a)(2) THAT THE EQUITIES OF THE CASE SUPPORTED FEE SHIFTING IN THIS CASE; PLAINTIFF DID NOT PROVE THAT THE LITIGATION BENEFITED BENEFICIARIES OTHER THAN HIMSELF; AND BECAUSE THE TRIAL COURT’S CALCULATION OF THE LEGAL FEES THAT SHOULD BE AWARDED WAS NOT PERFORMED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE APPELLATE DIVISION’S RULINGS AND RELEVANT COURT RULES AND CASE LAW.  (Trial Court Order and Opinion dated August 31, 2022, Da271).  A.  The Appellate Court’s Instructions And Applicable Law for Fee Shifting.  In its March 23, 2021 decision, the Appellate Division vacated the trial court’s January 14, 2019 attorney fee award in the amount of $1,049,589.14 and remanded the matter to the trial court for further proceedings “in conformity with this opinion.
[brief] T9.14-16.  At that time, the preference lawsuit was not yet resolved.  On January 24, 2022, [...] executed to [...] a home equity loan Note in the amount of $97,000 of that date to secure that sum, with interest at the rate of three and one-quarter (3.25%) per cent per annum, payable in installments of $1,319.84 per month on the first day of each and every month commencing March 1, 2022 and terminating February 1, 2027.
[brief] (Pa050).  The criminal charges against Plaintiff were transferred from the Municipal Court of the Township of Edison to the Borough of Highland Park, due to Plaintiff’s filing of a Notice of Tort Claim against the Township of Edison alleging excessive force and false arrest.  (Pa166).  Plaintiff’s case was tried in the Highland Park Municipal Court over the course of several trial days.  (Pa177; Pa269-Pa281).  On October 27, 2021, after a virtual (Zoom) trial, Highland Park Municipal Court Judge, [...], found Plaintiff guilty of violating N.J.S.A. 2C:29-1(a), Obstructing the Administration of Law, and 2C:29-2(a)(1) Resisting Arrest.
[brief] The evidentiary record before the trial court set forth the dates on which [...] came into possession of [...].  The evidentiary record also set forth the date on which [...] came into possession of [...].  The record is clear based on the message sent to [...] by [...] and subsequent communication from [...] in the summer of 2021 regarding [...], that the statute of limitations had run.  As noted in the statute, N.J.S.A. 2A:14-30, the failure to object within the thirty year time period results in the property in question becoming that of [...].  By operation of law, [...] became the rightful owner of [...] in its entirety by adverse possession on June 30, 2006 and this barred [...] from laying any claim to [...] after that date.  The trial court failed to apply the statute of limitations and as a result, the decision reached which dismissed [...]’s Motion for Summary Judgment and found for [...] determining that [...] belonged to [...] was in error.  It is requested that the Appellate Court vacate the decision of the trial court which granted Summary Judgment to [...] and determined that [...] owned [...].  It is requested that the Appellate Court vacate the decision of the trial court which denied Summary Judgment to [...].  It is requested that the Appellate Court find that per Adverse Possession that [...] is the owner of [...].  POINT II
[brief] In this case, at some point [...] was approached about the placement of luminaires by [...] at an intersection.  It sold [...] a streetlight of 0.0 foot candles that did not effectively illuminate the intersection.  In doing so, it created, or contributed to, the hazard that came to exist in the intersection, which gave rise to the blacklight condition, and which caused [...] not to see [...] in the process of crossing the intersection.  Therefore, although plaintiff has established that there is evidence to establish actual or constructive notice, no notice actually was required to be given to [...], as one of the originators of the hazard.
[brief] In 2016, [...] was designated a municipality in need of “stabilization and recovery” under the MSRA, and the Director of the Division of Local Government Services within the New Jersey Department of Community Affairs (the “Director”) was given broad authority to facilitate the City’s financial recovery.  Among the powers bestowed upon the Director pursuant to the MSRA, was the authority to unilaterally modify or amend expired collectively negotiated agreements in recognition of [...]’s dire financial position.  To date, only one appellate court has interpreted the MSRA in an unpublished decision, but its holding is clear and well-supported.  In Atl. City Superior Officers’ Ass’n v. City of Atl. City, No. A-3117-20, 2022 WL 2352376 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. June 30, 2022), the Appellate Division recognized that the “Legislature instructed the courts to liberally construe the MSRA ‘to give effect to its intent that severe fiscal distress in municipalities in need of stabilization and recovery shall be addressed and corrected. ’”  Id. at *6.  The Appellate Division explained that alleged “vesting” of employee rights under expired CNAs is “inconsequential” following the enactment of the MSRA, as the MSRA permits Defendants to unilaterally modify the terms of expired CNAs.  But the Appellate Division went further, stating that elimination of lump sum accumulated sick leave payments does not “infringe on . . . vested contractual rights[.]”  Id. at *9.  In so ruling, the Appellate Division explicitly rejected constitutional claims similar to those raised by Plaintiffs here.  As recognized by the Superior Court, this changes the entire context of Plaintiffs’ case, which is primarily predicated on constitutional challenges that have already been rejected, and mandates that the Superior Court’s decision be affirmed.
[brief] (Da80)  The court indicated the map remained essentially unchanged and sufficiently identified the taking, and that amendments are to be freely granted in the interest of justice, citing Rule 4:9-1.  The court concluded there was no undue prejudice, that the amendment would not be futile, and that a final judgment can be amended under Rule 4:5-1 (f) within a reasonable time for any other reason justifying relief.  (Da82-85)  The court so concluded notwithstanding that final judgment imposing the permanent easement on defendant’s property had been entered in accordance with the metes and bounds description more than one year earlier in violation of R.4:50-2.
[brief] Defendants, in their Statement of Facts, have misrepresented the actual facts of this case.  There is no evidence in the record that in 1984, [...] was the “owner/operator” of a food store.  The owner of the property was [...].  [...] wanted to lease the building to [...] and get rent.  [...] wanted to operate a pizza parlor.  (Pa 55-59, 69-75).  [...] actually testified before the Board of Adjustment that he purchased the property in 1932.  Plaintiffs have shown that to be a lie.  (Pa 55-59).  Thus, [...]’s testimony that the property was used as a food store use prior to the first ordinance in [...] was also a lie.  (Pa 37-47).  This did not permit a food store use on the PQ.  In addition, [...]’s testimony that it was “always a food store” was also a lie.  His article in 1969 said that at that time, the PQ was used as a business that “buys, sells, and repairs televisions, radios and stereos. ” (Pa 67-68).  The true and accurate recitation of the facts in this case is in the Plaintiffs’ Brief.
[brief] 38.  [...] took over making the $1,500.00 monthly payment from [...]’s checking account to [...], and once [...] took over, every month the payment was late (1T110:1-111:20).  39.  [...] also began deducting fabricated expenses from the monthly $1,500.00 payment (6T31:24-32:3, 1T109:17-110:9).  40.  [...] then represented to the [...] that he was the owner of [...].  He got a permit to install a charging station in [...] for his Tesla with no notice to [...] or [...] (3T103:24 – 104:24).  41.  [...] was then parking his RV illegally in the [...]’s driveway which led to penalties for by-law violations that accrued to [...] as the owner (2T53:1-7).  42.  Out of exasperation that [...] and his son were living for free on [...]’s property and incurring parking penalties, [...] drafted and sent a letter threatening to evict them as alleged (2T58:3 – 59:10).  43.  No evidence was introduced at trial that [...] had done a “cash-out” refinance to personally enrich himself from equity in the Florida or [...] properties as alleged.  44.  The Court below found that there was also nothing entered into evidence to support the notion that [...] ever told [...] that he would never get a mortgage as alleged (6T14:22-15:7).  45.  In his deposition, when asked about the details of his agreement with [...] that led to the purchase of the Florida property, [...] answered, “I don’t remember” nine times and repeatedly volunteered that his memory wasn’t so good anymore (Pa493, [...] [...] Dep. 14:20-22, 15:9-24, 16:4-16) (Pa495, 23:20-23, 25:4-13) (Pa496, 27:19, 28:5).  46.  The Court found for the record that all parties agreed that [...] has significant memory problems (6T10:21-11:1).
[directive] 5.1.1  If an officer locates property which he suspects might be stolen, he may have the Control Desk operator check the NCIC/SCIC terminal for any record of it being stolen.  The officer must provide the following information for such checks:  a.  Description of article (TV, stereo, radar detector, etc.)  A-4 b.  Brand name of article (RCA, Sony, GE, etc.)  c.  Model number or name d.  Serial number of the article e.  Any owner ID numbers (O.A.N.).  5.1.2
[brief] Da36, ¶ 46.  Discussions about succession and a formal succession plan continued over the next three years.  On or about December 7, 2022, during a lengthy office meeting, [...] told Plaintiff that soon the [...] would present [...]’s succession plan for Plaintiff’s review.  Id., ¶¶ 47-48.  On or about January 18, 2023, in a telephone call to Plaintiff, [...] further discussed [...]’s succession plan at [...] Law.  Id., ¶ 49.  During that time period, Plaintiff’s success in practicing law continued.
[brief] Furthermore, the other cases about the Battle of the Experts which [...] cited in his Brief, of course have differing facts.  Every case rests on its own facts.  The general principle of allowing the jury to weigh expert evidence always remains, however, and the trial court here erred in deciding the issue and taking the case away from the jury.  Defendant [...] also attempts to distinguish factually the exceptions to the Ongoing Storm doctrine, as recognized in Pareja.  For example, Pareja cites Terry v. Central Auto Radiators, Inc., 732 A.2d 713, 717-18 (R.I. 1999), in noting that a landowner can be held liable despite an ongoing storm “by creating ‘unusual circumstances’ where the defendant's conduct ‘exacerbate[s] and increase[s] the risk’ of injury to the plaintiff. ”  Pareja, 246 N.J. at 559.  Defendant [...] argues the facts of Terry as being distinguishable because in that case the defendant had moved the plaintiff’s vehicle to the rear of its business and then directed the plaintiff to remove it from there, forcing the plaintiff to walk over a hundred feet in the snow. ([...] Brief at pp. 5-6).  The differing facts of Terry cannot undermine the applicability of the Pareja exception in this case based on the Defendants’ lack of maintenance and the preexisting deterioration of the concrete staircase, because the exception is a principle of general application depending on each case’s facts and circumstances.  [...] only need show that the Defendants created “unusual circumstances” in not maintaining the concrete steps, allowing water infiltration and ice formation upon a mere trace of freezing rain.
[brief] 44.  In 2008, the [...] sought protection under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code by filing a voluntary petition for relief in the United States Bankruptcy Court, District of New Jersey (the “Bankruptcy Court”).  (Da125-126)  45.  Following the auction of the Subject Property, on August 11, 2010, the Bankruptcy Court entered an Order authorizing the sale of the Subject Property from the [...] to Defendant (the “Sale Order”).  (Da20-23)  Paragraph 3 of the Sale Order provides that the buyer, Defendant, shall take the Subject Property “subject to all liens, claims, interests, encroachments, and encumbrances” granted to and enjoyed by Plaintiff.  Id.  Defendant has never disputed it was aware of and took title to the Subject Property with actual knowledge of and subject to the 1963 Agreement and Recorded Easement.  (Da907)  Defendant’s Interference with the Congregation’s Easement Rights After Purchasing the Subject Property
[brief] "Health care worker" means an individual employed by a health care facility.  "Public safety worker" includes a member, employee, or officer of a paid, partially-paid, or volunteer fire or police department, force, company or district, including the State Police, a Community Emergency Response Team approved by the New Jersey Office of Emergency Management, or a correctional facility, or a basic or advanced medical technician of a first aid or rescue squad, or any other nurse, basic or advanced medical technician.
[brief] **Alternatively, the Trial Court Was Well Within Its Discretion to Treat Plaintiffs’ Claims As Direct Rather Than Derivative. **  Unlike some other states, New Jersey adopts a flexible approach in determining whether to couch an action as direct or derivative in the context of closely held entities.  *Am. List Couns., Inc. v. Andrew Ostroy & Belardi-Ostroy, Ltd.*, 2013 WL 12201498, at *7 (D.N.J. July 31, 2013).  This is because the difficulties that arise when trying to apply corporate norms to closely held entities “has led to the development of substantial authority permitting departure from these norms and recognition instead of the real relationships of the principals. ”  *68th St. Apts., Inc. v.* *Lauricella*, 142 N.J. Super. 546, 558 (Law Div. 1976).  For decades, our courts have molded a body of law holding that: the conception of a legal entity distinct from the persons composing the corporation is to be disregarded, in equity, in cases not within the reason and policy of this legal fiction, *e.g.*, to adjust equities among members of the corporation internally where the rights of the public or third persons are in no wise involved.  *Id.*  The trial court rightly exercised its equitable powers in adopting this approach.
[brief] 3T121:12-25.  After rebuking Plaintiff on proper trial etiquette and procedure regarding hard-copy exhibits, which was never communicated to Plaintiff or found anywhere in the *pro se instructions on eCourts, the Court continuously rushed Plaintiff and pressured her during her testimony, direct examination, and cross examination.  1T9:13-19; 1T15:4-18; 3T121:17-21.  As stated above, New Jersey Rules of Judicial Conduct allow for a judge to “make reasonable accommodations to ensure pro se litigants the opportunity to have their matters fairly heard.
[brief] [...]  [...] (#009821988)  [...] #  TABLE OF CONTENTS – BRIEF | Section | Page | |------------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | TABLE OF CONTENTS - BRIEF | i | | TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS | ii | | TABLE OF TRANSCRIPT DESIGNATIONS | ii | | TABLE OF CONTENTS - APPENDIX | iii | | TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | vii | | PRELIMINARY STATEMENT | 1 | | PROCEDURAL HISTORY | 2 | | STATEMENT OF FACTS | 4 | | LEGAL ARGUMENT | 6 |