ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Therefore, the defendants here would be unable to compel the above witnesses who gave favorable statements to [...] to appear and testify and produce records at depositions so they could explore the strengths and weaknesses of those statements.  Similarly, no party would be able to compel those witnesses to appear and testify in person at the NFADR hearing so that the DRP could assess their credibility.  Quoting its prior opinion in *Greene v. McElroy*, 360 U.S. 474, 496-497 (1959), the United States Supreme Court stated, “In almost every setting where important decisions turn on questions of fact, due process requires an opportunity to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses.
[brief] ”  *State v. Rogers*, 124 N.J. 113, 121 (1991).  The “no-free crimes” principle holds that a crime is not free where the punishment fits the crime.  The *Yarbough* guidelines contemplate that a concurrent term may be the fitting punishment.  Here, the facts and the *Yarbough* guidelines weighed in favor of concurrent terms for the p/p manslaughter and attempted p/p manslaughter convictions.  The guidelines favor consecutive terms where “the crimes and their objectives were predominantly independent of each other”; where “the crimes were committed at different times or separate places, rather than being committed so closely in time and place as to indicate a single period of aberrant behavior”; and where “any of the crimes involved multiple victims[.]”  100 N.J. at 644.  None of these factors apply here.  [...] was charged with murder and attempted murder.  The offenses occurred as part of a single, continuous episode.  Each crime involved a single victim and the court acknowledged that the evidence supported concurrent terms under the other two *Yarbough* factors stating:
[brief] He confirms that his opinion remains that [...] did not transfer title to the Riparian Grant and is the last record owner of the Riparian Grant (3T45:5).  He concurs that [...] was retained to issue a genealogy report because the Riparian Grant was not conveyed by [...] (3T45:11).  He testifies that successors to that entity, which was the last record owner, executed Deeds in order to provide clear title to the Riparian Grant (3T45:17).  He determined who the surviving heirs of the original shareholders of [...] was and predicated that determination not only on [...]’s Report but as well as an independent examination which he conducted (3T46:1).  He secured Deeds and recorded those Deeds (3T46).
[brief] Seidman v. Clifton Sav. Bank, S.L.A., 205 N.J. 150, 169 (2011).  However, "such determinations are not entitled to any special deference if the judge 'misconceives the applicable law, or misapplies it to the factual complex."  Porreca v. City of Millville, 419 N.J. Super. 212, 224 (App. Div. 2011) (citation omitted).  That exception to deference exists here.  The trial court's flawed interpretation and application of the cited contract provisions and application constituted error as a matter of law, warranting reversal by this court.
[brief] .....................................5 | | B. REJECTION OF [...], PP, AICP.  ..............................................6 | | IV.  THE DRIVEWAY IS HEIGHT NEUTRAL AND THE LOCATION MUST BE IN FLORENCE.  ...........................................................................................................8  | | V. DEFENDANT READS THE WORD “TRAFFIC” INTO THE MASTER PLAN, AND THE RELATED CONCLUSIONS ARE UNSUPPORTED BY THE DOCUMENTS ITSELF.
[brief] (Pa 9-14, 25-30, Pra 3).  Through its expenditure of counsel fees, [...] proved [...] wrong and established that \(^4\)  During the initial phase of discovery in this case, the insurance company defendants served more than 20 separate sets of interrogatories, [...] reviewed and produced more than half a million pages of documents, and the insurance company defendants deposed more than 100 current and former [...] employees and consultants.  (Da 180-181).  [...] owes insurance coverage for property damage at the [...].  (Pa 41-60).  Accordingly, [...] is a successful claimant for purposes of R. 4:42-9(A)(6).
[brief] ”  While the terms of the Rule are fairly clear that a court can correct a mistake or other circumstance, it is not always easy to gain relief.  For one, there is a timing component to the rule.  For parts (a), (b), and ©, the request for relief must be made within one year after the judgment or order.  All other bases for relief (parts (d), (e) and (f)) must be made “within a reasonable time”.  In this case NJ Rule 4:50-1 A through E are not applicable.  More specifically, NJ Rule 4:50-1 A through C, have a Strict Statute of Limitations, which is one (1) year from the time the Judgment is entered or in this case one (1) year from the time the PSA was signed.  Additionally, no pleadings, evidence and/or testimony has alluded that Rule NJ 4:50-1(d) and (e) pertain to the instant action.  Only 4:50-1 (f) the “catch-all,” is the only sub-section left for Plaintiff to try and convince this Honorable Court to re-open and re-draft the PSA clause at issue.  Let’s not forget [...] drafted the PSA which the parties executed and which was filed and incorporated within the parties divorce action approximately fourteen (14) years ago.  As one can see, there are strict yet multiple means by which a divorced spouse can appeal to the court for a change to the Final Judgment of Divorce.
[brief] "  (Pa526) (Pg14)  The Planning Board also requested that Plaintiff clear up ownership of the roadways:  [...]: [Y]ou need to clean up the ownership of these roadways” (Pa545, Transcript, pg. 90)  Despite the various “conditions” and assumed “risks” attached to the Resolutions and Developer’s Agreements and the absence of any approved maps or plats attached to those Resolutions or Agreements, the trial court “deduced” that the internal roadways were “clearly dedicated”.  (Pa18)  The trial court did not rely upon a particular map or plat but instead relied upon an unsupported statement in the 2021 Borough Resolution denying roadway dedication which provided:  “Whereas, said Plat Plan shows public rights of way proposed for dedication to the [...]; and...”  (Pa335)  The trial Court declared this “Whereas statement” as a controlling evidentiary foundation, rather than what it was - a “boiler plate” recitation likely lifted from the letter petitions of Plaintiff requesting dedication.  (Pa321 and Pa451)  There is no indication in the record as to what “Plat Plan” this Resolution is referring to or if the Borough even reviewed such a Plat Plan.  Presumably it was the letter petition addressed to [...] in 2018 (Pa451) or [...], (Pa332) which referenced a “2011 Plat”, but the Plat referred to is never adduced within the record.
[brief] 10, 11 Family Fin. Corp. v. Gough, 10 N.J. Super. 13 (App. Div. 1950)  ..................................................................................  2  Fannie Mae v. Gissubel, No. A-3389-16T3, 2018 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 699 (App. Div. Mar. 28, 2018)  .................................................................................................................................
[brief] To make such a determination, the “alleged error must be evaluated in light ‘of the overall strength of the State’s case’” and “the totality of the entire charge. ”  State v. Burns, 192 N.J. 312, 341 (2007) (quoting Chapland, 187 N.J. at 289); State v. Savage, 172 N.J. 374, 387 (2002); State v. Hipplewith, 33 N.J. 300, 317 (1960); State v. Nelson, 173 N.J. 417, 447 (2002).  No such egregious error can be found here.
[brief] To find new extra-textual rights in the United States Constitution, the Court must conclude that the right, as “careful[ly] descri[bed]” by the litigant advancing it, is “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition” and “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty. ”  *Glucksberg*, 521 U.S. at 720–21.  The argument that children have a privacy right to keep secret from their parents the fact that their school is socially transitioning them does not come close to satisfying this standard.  Indeed, the argument is devoid of any historical support whatsoever.  *See* Blackstone, --- \(^4\)  As for the State’s state-law privacy arguments, as discussed, parents’ federal parental rights trump any state-law privacy rights their children may have.
[brief] Appellants incorrectly assert that the Agreement “explicitly states that both parties shall ‘engage in good faith efforts to mediate…’” [Appellants’ Brief pg. 12].  In fact, the Agreement states that “[i]f a dispute arises under this Agreement or from Participant’s use of the Premises or participation in the Activities, the Participant shall engage in good faith efforts to mediate a settlement prior to filing a demand for arbitration. ”  Pa0089 (emphasis added).  Appellants incorrectly stated that “[t]he trial court recognized that enforcing the arbitration agreement could prevent [...] from accessing crucial discovery materials.  1T7:1-5. ”  [Appellants’ Brief pg. 6].  The trial court hypothesized about the potential prejudice that Appellants may face if the matter was compelled to arbitration and Appellants were not allowed to conduct any more discovery than they already had to date, but did not go so far as to find that there were “crucial discovery materials” that Appellants were missing.  **CONCLUSION**
[brief] (Pa1)  Plaintiff also argues that Defendants obfuscated the “factual and legal political free speech suppression issued” (Pb28), but that is not the case.  Rather, it was Plaintiff who was unclear in his expression of those claims in the Complaint and obfuscated the pertinent facts on that claim.  More particularly, in opposition to the summary judgment motion, Plaintiff asserted that there was an alleged unilateral action by Defendant [...] in January 2021 to reorder the time for public comment at the meetings to after the close of regular business; however, there was no unilateral action by the Mayor.
[brief] ”  N.J.S.A. 34:13A-16(g).  While the arbitrator does not need to rely on all factors, the arbitrator must identify and weigh the relevant factors, and explain why the remaining factors are irrelevant.  In re City of Camden, 429 N.J. Super. 309, 326 (App. Div. 2013) cert. denied 215 N.J. 485 (2013).
[brief] [FEDa115; Pa1022; Pa1110; Pa3302-3303].  [...], a principal of [...] and [...], admitted that [...] was within its rights to terminate Appellants’ Lease when the annual rental payment was not made.  [FEDa115; Pa1828 (pp. 107:4-9); Pa3303].  [...] then formed [...] in 2017 after [...]’s Lease default.  [...]’s entity was then able to enter into a lease agreement for the Property with [...].  [FEDa116; Pa3303].  [...]’s entity then requested an extension of the approval for the Solar Project from [...] and initiated its own new application process with [...].  [FEDa116; Pa3303].  [...] was subsequently informed that the Appellants were going to lose site control at the Property, whereupon [...] cancelled the WMPA.  [FEDa115; Pa3303].  In a letter dated January 31, 2018 to the Honorable [...], Secretary of the [...], [...]’s counsel notified Secretary Bose that [...] was cancelling the WMPA entered into among [...], [...] and [...].  [FEDa115; Pa3303].  The letter advised Secretary Bose that the WMPA was being cancelled due to loss of site control resulting in [...]’s default under the WMPA.  [FEDa115; Pa3303].  As pointed out by the trial court in granting summary judgment to the [...]: … the [...] Solar WMPA was being canceled because, “material terms and conditions of the [...] Solar WMPA, including the loss of site control, were breached, and were not cured, resulting in the default of the [...] Solar WMPA.
[brief] As noted above, before the trial court, [...] also sought to recover its attorneys’ fees by casting itself as a “prevailing party” under Section 18.2 of the PSA.  (Pa119).  In its Brief before this Court, [...] has abandoned its reliance upon PSA Section 18.2 – reiterating its contention that “Section 18 of the PSA does not apply to it” and focusing exclusively on Section 17.1 as a basis to recover fees.
[brief] Specifically, the minutes from the 2019 NJDOT Meeting indicate:  [...] [of the NJDOT] stated that the department was not in favor of a median turn lane at the new intersection because the abutting intersections east and west of the site have jughandles to accommodate left turns and the left turn movement along Route 33 should be consistent for the motoring public.  Furthermore, it was stated that it was his opinion that an Access Level change would be required for the department to consider a median turn lane at the subject property.  [...] stated that if the access level modification is approved, it will be necessary to submit an application with supporting documentation to justify the new traffic signal as well as a Waiver Request for relief on the signal spacing requirement.  Ba29.  Shortly after the 2019 NJDOT Meeting, on March 26, 2019, the Board hearing occurred on the Application.
[brief] (1T 23-24 to 24-7)²  But N.J.S.A. 39:4-126 unambiguously does not require that a motorist signal his intention to make a lane change.  To the contrary, the plain language of the statute indicates that a signal is only required when a vehicle stops or suddenly decreases speed, or when a vehicle turns if that turn could affect other traffic.  With respect to a lane change, the statute merely prohibits such movement unless and until it can be effectuated safely.  See N.J.S.A. 39:4-126.  An officer’s mistaken belief about what the law prohibits cannot justify a traffic stop.  Carter, 247 N.J. at 531.  That outcome would impermissibly erode core principles of our State Constitution, such as the rule of law and equal justice under the law.  Ibid.  To uphold these ideals, “we depend on legislators to craft clear statutes” and “call on officers to learn the law in advance and enforce it correctly. ”  Ibid.  Moreover, “we count on judges to interpret and uphold the laws as written — not to validate an officer’s mistaken view of the law, even if reasonable. ”  Ibid.  ____________________  ²
[brief] According to [...], [...] was unwilling to help after [...] returned from Portugal.  So, at that point, [...] agreed to take care of her father, and set up a bedroom for him.  (Da141).  [...] recalled that, on occasion, [...] would stay with [...].  She did not recall him ever staying with [...].  (Da141).  Also, [...] never had a room at [...]’s house.  (Da142).  According to [...], [...] and his wife would “shove my father into the basement to sleep … or on a couch to sleep …” (Da142).  [...] testified that neither [...] nor [...] helped out financially with the care of [...] from 2005 to his illness.  (Da143).  Also, [...] confirmed that between 2005 and her father’s illness, [...] would go back and forth to Portugal “a lot”.  (Da143).
[brief] Plaintiff Failed to Comply With the Applicable Court Rule.  In Bender v. Adelson, 187 N.J. 411 (2006), the New Jersey Supreme Court specifically addressed the spirit and purpose of Best Practices, explaining how R. 4:17-7 was amended to require that amendments to “interrogatories must be served no later than 20 days prior to the end of the discovery period.  . . .
[directive] The 51 professional boards and committees (“boards”) supported by the New Jersey Division of Consumer Affairs are responsible for licensing approximately 700,000 professionals—including accountants and acupuncturists, cosmetologists and chiropractors, doctors and dentists, and plumbers and psychologists.  Each board is charged with protecting the safety and welfare of New Jersey residents who seek professional services and upholding standards of professionalism.  The boards fulfill this responsibility to the public by, among other things, identifying requirements for obtaining and maintaining a license; establishing rules for practicing the profession; and disciplining licensees who violate the law.  As more victims of sexual assault and harassment have found the courage in recent years to report their offenders and share their stories, we have learned more about the pervasiveness of sexual misconduct by professional licensees—including but not limited to sexual harassment, assault, and abuse.  And, unfortunately, we have learned that far too many licensed professionals exploit the trust placed in them by members of the public—taking advantage of the privacy of a doctor’s office, a massage room, or a customer’s home to perpetrate sexual misconduct.  The Division and many of its professional boards have been actively addressing the problem of sexual misconduct by licensees, through both enforcement efforts and rulemaking.  Several boards have demonstrated their commitment to protecting the public and disciplining licensees who commit sexual misconduct, including by permanently revoking professional licenses when warranted.  The Board of Massage and Bodywork Therapy adopted new rules to prevent and detect sexual misconduct in the massage therapy industry.  And, in November 2020, the Division instituted a new protocol for boards’ consideration of license reinstatement requests  New Jersey Is An Equal Opportunity Employer • Printed on Recycled Paper and is Recyclable Page 2 from individuals whose authority to practice was previously discontinued.  This protocol promotes transparency around reinstatement requests and helps to ensure that victims and those charged with advocating on behalf of the public have a voice in the reinstatement process.  But we still can and must do better.  To that end, the Office of the Director of the Division of Consumer Affairs undertook a comprehensive review of how the Division and professional boards deal with issues relating to sexual misconduct by licensees and applicants.
[brief] It is also undisputed that Defendant never provided Plaintiff with QuickBooks data relating to [...]’s business account until her accountant produced this critical financial information on or about September 1, 2022, in response to Plaintiff’s subpoena.  (Pa892)²  The fact that Plaintiff had to file this lawsuit and subpoena this information from [...]’s accountant should preclude the $119,256.40 fee award in Defendant’s favor because Plaintiff should not be penalized for enforcing his rights and seeking information to which he was entitled, and which ultimately proved that Defendant improperly overcharged Plaintiff for Defendant’s own personal expenses.
[directive] The law enforcement executive shall conduct an annual review of all vehicular pursuit incidents in their department.  The review shall include, at a minimum, the following: (a) analytical reports from the Attorney General’s Use of Force Reporting Portal; (b) an audit of BWCs and other videos on a risk-based and randomly selected basis; (c) any internal affairs complaints; and (d) an analysis of vehicular pursuits to ensure that they are being conducted without discrimination based on race, ethnicity, nationality, religion, disability, gender, gender identity, sexual orientation, or any other protected characteristic.  15  USE OF FORCE POLICY
[brief] In providing its consent to the establishment of the Redevelopment Plan as set forth in Resolution 22-112, the [...] noted the reasoning behind the proposed Plan, which included “diversifying the local economy, increasing opportunities for private investment, anticipated revenue streams…, increasing pedestrian traffic, with collateral reduction in crime, and [reducing] the existing commercial vacancy rate and abandoned commercial space along Atlantic Avenue and Pacific Avenue and in the Orange Loop. ”  (Aa246\(^2\)).  The property at issue in this matter and owned by Appellant is located at [...], situated between Michigan and Ohio Avenues (the “Property”), within the Central Business (CBD) Zoning District, the Green Zone Redevelopment Area, and the [...] Tourism District.
[brief] While it is true that the informant told police that he delivered heroin to [...]’s storage unit in the past, he made this admission only after he was arrested for possessing approximately 12 kilograms of heroin.  (Dca 5)  We can safely assume that he provided this information while in police custody and that he was already facing serious charges at the time.  As the United States Supreme Court has observed, “the arrest statements of a codefendant have traditionally been viewed with special suspicion.
[brief] (Db 10 – Db12)  While both experts had access to the Performance Logs and Security Logs for review and analysis, [...] and [...] reached opposite conclusions regarding whether there were any problems with the playback of digital content on the movie screen at the time of the plaintiff’s fall.  [...] opined that the Security Logs indicated that there was flawless playback of digital content on the movie screen at the time of the plaintiff’s fall.  Whereas, [...] opined that the Performance Logs indicated that there were severe problems with the playback of digital content on the movie screen at the time of the plaintiff’s fall.
[brief] A real-estate owner’s obligations to provide notice of an offer to sell said real estate to a ROFR holder are determined by the contractual provisions governing the ROFR.  See, Gutch v. Meccia, 142 N.J. Eq. 430, 431-32 (Ch. 1948) (analyzing contractual provision granting a ROFR to determine the property owner’s specific responsibilities for providing notice of a prospective sale to the ROFR holder under the contract).  Here, Section 39 of Amendment Number 1 to MFSA governs [...]’s ROFR.
[brief] Chapter 230 “Land Use and Development Regulations”, Article XV “General Provisions”, Section 230-143 “Right to Farm” of the Code of the [...] is hereby amended to read as follows:  § 230-143  Right to farm.  A.  Purpose.  The purpose of this section is to encourage the continuation and expansion of commercial and home agricultural pursuits by continuing a positive agricultural business climate and protecting the farmer against unjustified private nuisance suits, where recognized methods and techniques of agricultural production are applied and are consistent with relevant federal and state law and nonthreatening to the public health and safety; at the same time, this section acknowledges the need to provide a proper balance among the varied and sometimes conflicting interests of all lawful activities in the State of New Jersey.
[directive] You must resist any impulse to enhance your own reputation by passing along “inside” information.  Therefore, all of your deliberations and discussions must take place in the grand jury room while the Grand Jury is in session.  It is improper for grand jurors to confer or deliberate privately by telephone or otherwise concerning Grand Jury matters.  Each grand juror has the right to expect that what is said to fellow grand jurors during deliberations will remain confidential.  In that setting, there must be the utmost freedom of expression and debate, uninhibited by fear that any views or expressions will be revealed to others.
[brief] As explained in DEP’s current CPP:  The Water Quality Management Planning rules at N.J.A.C 7:15 represent one component of the CPP.  These rules focus on procedures for adopting new or amended areawide water quality management (WQM) plans, including Wastewater Management Plans (WMPs); Lists of water quality limited (impaired) waters; and total maximum daily loads (“TMDL”) for impaired waters.  The CPP describes how these processes, along with other Department programs, integrate and unify water quality management planning processes, establish and assess attainment of water quality goals and standards, and implement control measures necessary to maintain, improve, and protect water quality throughout the State.  [[...], Water Resources Management