ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] Page 1 of 7  c.  Do any of you have a special need or require a reasonable accommodation to help you in listening, paying attention, reading printed materials, deliberating, or otherwise participating as a fair juror?  The court will provide reasonable accommodations to your special needs but I will only be aware of any such needs if you let me know about them.  My only purpose in asking you these circumstances relates to your ability to serve as a juror.  If you have any such request, please raise your hand and I will speak to you at sidebar.  [Note: If a juror makes a request, contact the ADA Coordinator to see if the TCA can meet the request right away (e.g., a portable speaker system available immediately) or if the juror’s service should be deferred so that the TCA can arrange the accommodation timely (e.g., an ASL interpreter that may require three or four months’ reservation in advance). ]  3.  Introduce the lawyers and the defendant.  Do any of you know either/any of the lawyers?  Has either / any of them or anyone in their office ever represented you or brought any action against you?  Do you know Mr./ Ms. _________________________?  Name of defendant 4.  Read names of potential witnesses.  Do you know any of the potential witnesses?  [ Note: List witnesses’ names here or attach a separate sheet.  ]  5.  I have already briefly described the case.  Do you know anything about this case from any source other than what I’ve just told you?  6.  Are any of you familiar with the area or address of the incident?  Model Criminal Jury Voir Dire Questions Revised as Promulgated by Directive #4-07
[brief] To provide oversight of this process, the legislature delegated to [...] the sole authority to promulgate regulations, review DPR plans and insurance forms, and to monitor compliance with the program.  *Id.*  The Legislature did not deputize private insurance companies as private attorney generals to enforce AICRA through the civil provisions of the NJIFPA.  [...]’s approval of DPR plans containing mandatory arbitration provisions pursuant to AICRA was addressed in the *Coalition* case as well:
[brief] [...]’s specifications detail how the agency requires continuous security in this three-phase process, from Proposal Guaranty to Consent of Surety and, finally, to Contract Bond.  As explained in Section 102.08 of the Standard Specifications:  *The Proposal Bond or Letter of Surety shall be accompanied by a Power of Attorney and a Consent of Surety, each in a form acceptable to the Authority, which shall be executed by the surety company.*  The Power of Attorney shall set forth the authority of the attorney-in-fact who has signed the Proposal Bond or Letter of Surety on behalf of the surety company and shall further certify that such power is in full force and effect as of the date of the Proposal Bond or Letter of Surety.  The Consent of Surety shall set forth the surety company’s obligation to provide the Contract Bond upon award of the Contract to the Bidder.  [A1 (emphasis added)].
[brief] (12T: 144-3 to 20).  [...] also testified that the fleeing suspect that they first saw was wearing black sweatpants and a black hoodie.  (13T: 171-7 to 9).  He stated that when he turned onto Wilmot Alley, he saw the suspect halfway down the alley and his partner, [...], indicated that the man was carrying a gun in his hand.  (13T: 171-16 to 24).  [...] said he continued down the alley and saw the suspect make a left on Ellsworth Avenue and run alongside a house.  (13T: 172-2 to 11).  He said he lost sight of the suspect for two or three seconds after the suspect entered the alley.  (13T: 172-12 to 16).  He also said that he had not seen anyone else in the alley.
[brief] All the Objectors had to do was to read the email and calendar the filing deadline.  The critical factual distinction in the instant matter is that there was utterly no concealment (negligent or otherwise).  On the contrary, there was full and timely disclosure.  (Pa803-805).  The Board Secretary gave Objectors’ office copies of Affidavits of Publication with regard to both advertisements and even pointed out the existence of two publication in the body of her email.  (Pa803-805).  Having received both affidavits of publication, it was incumbent on the Objectors to read the notices and apprise themselves of the controlling law.  Had they done so, they would have found N.J.S.A. 40:55D-10 i. which clearly and unambiguously states, “[t]he period of time in which an appeal of the decision may be made shall run from the first publication of the decision, whether arranged by the municipality or the applicant” (emphasis added).
[brief] Letter dated July 21, 2021 from [...] regarding Trial scheduled for August 17, 2021  Letter dated August 2, 2021 from [...] regarding Trial scheduled for August 25, 2021  Letter dated August 19, 2021 from [...] regarding Trial scheduled for September 22, 2021  Letter dated May 15, 2020 from [...] to [...] regarding investigating Notice of claim received from [...]
[directive] 3rd Tuesday Alpine 0202 (201) 768-6866  2nd Thursday Bergenfield 0203 (201) 387-4055  2nd Thursday 2nd & 4th  Monday Bogota 0203 (201) 440-2111  @Little Ferry Carlstadt 0205 (201) 438-4306  1st & 3rd Thursdays  Monday/Tuesday/Wed Central 0290 (201) 768-8702 nesday Cliffside Park Boro 0206 (201) 313-2014  Every Thursday Closter Boro 0207 (201) 784-0600  1st & 3rd Tuesday Cresskill 0208 (201) 569-7636  1st & 3rd Thursday  Demarest 0209 (201) 768-1160  2nd Wednesday 2nd & 4th Monday Dumont 0210 (201) 387-5032  @Tenafly Elmwood park 0211 (201) 796-1457  Every Tuesday East Rutherford 0212 (201) 438-0169  Every Wednesday Edgewater 0213 (201) 493-1700  1st & 3rd Thursday Emerson 0214 (201) 262-6058  2nd & 4th Thursday Tuesday & Englewood 0215 (201) 569-0255  Wednesday Englewood Cliffs 0216 (201) 568-7860  1st & 3rd Thursday  Every Wednesday/ 1st Fair Lawn 0217 (201) 794-5348  Tuesday Fairview 0218 (201) 943-4368  Every Wednesday Tuesday, Wednesday Fort Lee 0219 (201) 592-3500 and Thursday Franklin Lakes 0220 (201) 891-5480 2nd & 4th Wednesday Every Tuesday and Garfield 0221 (973) 340-2000 Wednesday Glen Rock 0222 (201) 670-3950 2nd & 4th Tuesday Every Monday, Hackensack 0223 (201) 646-3971  Wednesday and Thursday Harrington Park 0224 (201) 768-0500 2nd Thursday Hasbruck Heights 0225 (201) 288-4004  Every Wednesday Hawthone 0226 (201) 384-4883 1st Monday Hillsdale 0227 (201) 666-4800 2nd & 4th Wednesday Ho-Ho-Kus 0228 (201) 652-0699 1st Wednesday Leonia 0229 (201) 592-5780 1st & 3rd Monday Little Ferry 0230 (201) 440-2111 1st & 3rd Monday Lodi 0231 (973) 859-7450
[brief] First, [...] ignores the portion of the Panetta decision which held that a riparian grant does pass with the transfer of title to the uplands if there is “evidence that the parties intended its inclusion”.  Panetta, 190 N.J. at 307.  This is true even if there is no specific recitation of the riparian grant in the deed.  Panetta, 190 N.J. at 307, 322.  The Supreme Court expressly stated in Panetta that if a deed were to inadvertently omit an adjacent riparian grant, for example as the result of a scrivener’s error, the deed should be construed and reformed to conform to the parties’ actual intent.  Panetta, 190 N.J. at 322.  Thus, the Panetta court affirmed the long-standing principle that the intent of the parties controls what is conveyed.  The Trial Court focused on the principle in Panetta that a riparian grant can pass with the conveyance of upland property despite not being mentioned by deed.  See 9T, p. 9.  [...] reviewed the chain of title and determined that the parties intended riparian rights and grants to have been conveyed.  9T, p. 10.  Indeed, there is ample evidence that it was the intent of the parties that the [...] and any other riparian rights held by [...] were being conveyed to [...].  While admittedly the deed from [...] to [...] did not mention the [...] by name and the [...] was not included within the boundaries of the legal description of the lands being conveyed, this was not unusual.  To the contrary, every conveyance in the chain of title after Quinlan acquired the [...] only contained a legal description of the uplands being conveyed, and none of the deeds in the chain of title ever mentioned the [...] either by name or by legal description.  The deed from [...] to [...] was no different.  Although the deed from [...] to [...] did not mention the [...] by name, it did contain provisions that collectively show that it was [...]’s intent to convey all of its property rights, including the property rights in the [...], to [...].
[directive] In many cases, the examination of collateral issues presented by the complaint can be as important as the resolution of the allegation itself.  For example, while investigating an allegation of excessive force during an arrest, the officer’s actions in making the arrest may be improper.  In such cases, even though the investigation may exonerate the officer of the excessive force allegation, internal affairs must still examine whether the officer should have been effecting the arrest at all.  7.12.2  Examining collateral issues can provide the law enforcement agency and its executive officers with information concerning: (a)  The utility and effectiveness of the agency's policies and procedures.  (b)  The competency and skills of individual law enforcement officers.  INTERNAL AFFAIRS POLICY & PROCEDURES | November 2022 43  (c)  Appropriate topics for in-service training programs.  (d)  The allocation of resources by the law enforcement agency and other municipal agencies.  7.12.3  The identification and examination of collateral issues is critically important to the internal affairs process.  Internal affairs investigators are in the unique position of examining law enforcement operations from the inside.  Their insight, if properly used, can be extremely helpful to management.  In contrast, the failure to use this resource can deprive the law enforcement agency of the ability to identify and correct problems with personnel and procedures through self-critical analysis.  It can also lead to an erosion of community support for the agency.  An internal affairs process that is objective and complete is critical to the credibility and reputation of the law enforcement agency within the community.  INTERNAL AFFAIRS POLICY & PROCEDURES | November 2022 44  8
[brief] Use of the special interrogatory was mandatory.  Inclusion of Question 1(b) was entirely appropriate because the judge faced a grading issue concerning the theft charge.  Unless the jury found that the wallet ID qualified as a “public record, writing or instrument kept, filed or deposited according to law with or in the keeping of any public office or public --- 28  The jury instruction on this issue was the subject of extensive discussion in the charge conference.  (18T33-16 to 47-12).  Defense counsel approved the jury instruction before it was given.  (19T4-12 to 5-9).  After the judge instructed the jury, defense counsel stated no objection to this charge, even as he requested a change to Question 1(a) on Count Five on the verdict sheet, which the court granted.  (20T211-11 to 212-17; 20T213-5 to 215-11).
[brief] (2T16-10; 2T34-22; 2T40-2).  [...] paid nothing for [...]’s share of the property.  (3T165-4; Da317 – Da320).  [...] did not give the donation to [...].  (3T166-22).  The money was never in [...]’s possession.  (Db18; Da317 – Da320).  The alternative ‘facts’ created in [...]’s brief, however, are confusing, convoluted, and unsupported by the record below.
[brief] THE COURT:  In that case, the court addressed the affidavit of merit statute.  THE COURT: And specifically addressed whether that -- whether the affidavit of merit statute could be applicable to a breach of contract claim.  The court there found that "it is not the label placed on the action that is pivotal, but the nature of the legal inquiry.  Accordingly, when presented with a tort or contract claim asserted against a professional specified in the statute, rather than focusing on whether the claim is denominated as tort or contract, attorneys and courts should determine if the claims underlying factual allegations require proof of a deviation from the professional standard of care applicable to that specific profession.  If such proof is required, an affidavit of merit is required for that claim, unless some exception applies."  Id. at 340.  THE COURT: “a claimant should determine if the underlying factual allegations of the claim require proof a deviation from the professional standard of care for that specific profession."  Applying that standard to the remaining claims, the court respectfully denies the motion, and maintains its dismissal of the remaining claims.
[brief] Perez v. Zagami, LLC, 218 N.J. 202, 209 (2014) (quoting State v. Buckley, 216 N.J. 249, 263 (2013)).  As "[t]here is no more persuasive evidence of legislative intent than the words by which the Legislature undertook to express its purpose," id. at 209-10, we look first to the plain language of the statute, giving the "words their ordinary meaning absent any direction from the Legislature to the contrary," TAC Assocs. v. N.J. Dep't of Env't Prot., 202 N.J. 533, 541 (2010), "and read them in context with related provisions so as to give sense to the legislation as a whole," DiProspero v. Penn, 183 N.J. 477, 492 (2005).
[brief] (Aa062-064).  The Commission’s decision applied the established Commission and judicial standards of review for interest arbitration awards.  Teaneck, supra, 353 N.J. Super. 289, aff’d o.b., 177 N.J. 560 (2003); Hillsdale PBA Local 207 v. Borough of Hillsdale, 137 N.J. 71, 82 (1994); In re State, 443 N.J. Super. 380, 385 (App. Div. 2016); and Bedminster Tp., 2020 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1503 (App. Div. 2020), aff’g P.E.R.C. No. 2020-11, 46 NJPER 119 (¶27 2019); see also City of Newark, P.E.R.C. No. 99-97, 25 NJPER 242 (¶30103 1999); Lodi Bor., P.E.R.C. No. 99-28, 24 NJPER 466 (¶29214 1998); and Cherry Hill Tp., P.E.R.C. No. 97-119, 23 NJPER 287 (¶28131 1997).
[brief] Similarly, petitioners' assertions that disclosure of the [...] could harm their case is counterintuitive.  If the [...] was already in possession of such detrimental information, there could be no possible harm in requiring petitioners to disclose to the [...] that which it already allegedly knew, subject, if necessary, to a protective order to limit any further disclosure.  *O Builders* reached this same conclusion:  We are not unmindful of the theoretical quandary… that, in order to sustain its burden seeking disqualification, [former prospective client] [...] must disclose the very confidential information she claims not only deserves protection, but also triggers counsel's disqualification.  In practice, however, we reject that notion as rationally inconsistent.  Defendant asserts that the reason for disqualification is that [...] already disclosed confidential information to [...]; therefore, those disclosures now, at least in respect of [...], are— if defendant is to be believed— nothing more than repetition and, more importantly, not the initial disclosure of confidential information.  In other words, defendant cannot have it both ways: [...] cannot claim that she has disclosed confidential information to [...] yet refuse to make those disclosures to the court for fear of disclosing confidential information to [...].  Either the claimed confidential information has been disclosed or it has not; the logical tightrope defendant has sought to walk leaves any court with nothing of substance on which to base its decision.
[brief] N.J.S.A. 13:1B-28.  There is no evidence that the sportsmen members of the Council, who are recommended by the [...] to the Governor, are not members of that organization, or that there is a residue of the sportsmen available for appointment who are not members of the [...], or any of the subsidiary county sportsmen’s clubs comprising that organization.  N.J.S.A. 13:1B-24.  The statutory policy of the Legislature is to advance the interests of private sportsmen’s clubs “[i]n order to permit for the broadest possible representation of sportsmen in the making of recommendations for appointment of sportsmen to membership in the Council…”.  N.J.S.A. 13:1B-25.  The purpose of this legislative policy is to ensure that every sportsmen’s club of at least 25 members and duly organized and existing under the laws of New Jersey shall be eligible for membership in the appropriate County Federation of Sportsmen's Clubs; if a County Federation of Sportsmen's Clubs refuses to accept a Sportsmen's Club into membership, the [...] is given the statutory right to reverse that decision.
[directive] If the at restraining offender sexual 2C:21-25(a), a N.J.S.A. Reform or Law by Bail the authorized condition 2C:35- N.J.S.A. to order pursuant restraining offender or 2C:14-12, N.J.S.A. drug a pursuant to order prosecutor assistant the court, any been by issued previously has order restraining such any if or 5.7, pretrial of conditions special be made such restraints that shall request general attorney or deputy Domestic Prevention of the under orders restraining for apply may victims  In addition, release. soon prosecutor as as shall The Protection Act.
[brief] ”.  And then immediately after they made that false statement of fact, they disingenuously argued: “That determination by the fact finder should not be overturned”.  However, a review of the transcript reveals that the trial court never made any ruling as to any party’s intent.  Instead, without conducting any factual inquiry at all, the trial court immediately ruled (in pertinent part):  THE COURT: “It doesn't matter ... once you cashed that check, your case is over. ”  •  On Db16-Db17, the Respondents falsely state: “... the fact finder did not find the Plaintiff's testimony credible.  ...  The contradictory testimony led the trial court to tell the Plaintiff "Well, at least, at least be consistent”.  They falsely stated that the trial court had concluded that my testimony (about accord and satisfaction) was not credible, when in reality all I had testified to about that was that I had accepted the check “under protest” – a fact which the court did not doubt, concluding instead that “it doesn’t matter. ”  But their paltering did not stop there.  They then continued their pattern of grossly distorting the truth so as to suggest that the purported finding of “no credibility” had formed the basis for the trial court’s finding that my contract claim was barred by the doctrine of accord and satisfaction.
[brief] ”  (14a.)  Similarly, the Commission found that Petitioner’s allegations of violations of N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(f) by Respondents [...], [...], [...], and [...] in Count 13 and Count 17 “should be dismissed” because Respondents did not take any action which “inure[d] a specific benefit to them. ”  (15a.)  Finally, with regard to the alleged violations of N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(g), the Commission explained:
[brief] Defendant was under age 18 and required the presence of a guardian before the police could speak with him.  (7T267-16 to 268-1).  With both parents dead, defendant’s brother, 20-year old [...], was his next of kin.  (7T268-1 to 6, 271-23 to 272-6).  [...] was comfortable with defendant speaking to the police.  He advised defendant that he and his parents still loved him: “Just tell these guys everything.  We’ve all got your back. ” (7T291-10 to 17).  Defendant understood the Miranda warnings and initialed each right.  He and his brother signed the Miranda form at 2:18 a.m. (7T281-6 to 291-2; 8T13-2 to 16-4).
[brief] Id., ¶ 10.  The 2007 agreement that reflected this promotion (Da220) did not have an independent arbitration clause but characterized itself as an addendum to the 1991 agreement that did have such a clause.  The 2007 agreement did not attach the 1991 agreement to it and Defendants have produced no evidence that Defendants ever, prior to this litigation, presented Plaintiff with the 1991 Agreement or its arbitration clause, or offered any proof that Plaintiff knew of the clause and agreed to it.
[brief] Parks v. Rogers, 176 N.J. 491, 502 (2003)  ...............5  Regan v. New Brunswick, 305 N.J. Super. 342, 355 App. Div. 1997)  ..................................18  Romano v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 284 N.J. Super. 543 (1995) .........................22  State v.  Hoffman, 149 N.J. 564 (1997)  ......................17  Wilson v. Amerada Hess, 168 N.J. 236, 253-54 (2001)  .........5  Young v. Hobart West Group, 385 N.J. Super. 448, 467 (App. Div. 2005)  .........................22  Young v. Schering Corp., 275 N.J. Super. 221, 233 App. Div. 1994)  .................................18  Zive v. Stanley Roberts, 182 N.J. 436, 448 (2005)  ..........15  Statutes & Rules: N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4 ..............................................17 N.J.S.A. 34:19-4 ................................................14, 21 R. 4:46 ............................................................5
[directive] [Wi/Yes]  [Non/No]  4.  a.  Ke nenpòt ki libète kondisyonèl a lavni pap konfòmel ak direktiv konsènan tout lòt Libète kondisyonèl yo? that any future parole will not be guided by the normal parole guidelines?  [Wi/Yes]  [Non/No]  b.  Ke wap elijib pou yo lage w aprè Komisyon Libète Kondisyonèl Leta a resevwa rekomandasyon nan men Komite Revizyon Klasifikasyon espesyal la ta detèmine ke w gen kapasite pou fè ajisteman sosyal ki akseptab nan kominote a? that you will be eligible for release when the State Parole Board, after receiving a recommendation from a special classification review board, finds that you are capable of making an acceptable social adjustment in the community?
[directive] 7.5  De-Activation/Removal of BWC From Alcohol Breath Testing Area.  In order to eliminate any argument that radio frequency interference from a BWC affected an electronic alcohol breath test, BWCs shall be deactivated, turned off and removed from the area of the breath test instrument before an electronic breath test is conducted.  Nothing herein shall be construed to preclude the use of a BWC to record the behavior of a person arrested for driving while intoxicated other than while the person is in the breath-testing area while the electronic breath testing device is being operated.  If this provision requires de-activation of a BWC, the officer shall narrate the reasons for de-activation (e.g., “I am de-activating the BWC because the suspect is about to take a breath test. ”), and the BWC shall be re- activated when safe and practicable to do so following the completion of the breath testing operation.  7.6
[brief] - *Red Bank Reg’l Educ. Ass’n v. Red Bank Reg’l High Sch. Bd. of Educ*, 78 N.J. 122, 140 (1978)  – Noting in dicta that waiver in the grievance process is well-established in the private union sector and citing NLRB cases.  - *Dixon v. Rutgers, the State Univ. of N.J.*, 110 N.J. 432, 460–61 (1988)  – Noting in dicta that waiver in a collective bargaining agreement of certain discovery under evidentiary rules must be “plainly expressed,” and citing cases that discussed waiver of rights through conduct, not contract.  Only two cases cited in *[...]* even arguably involved a disputed issue of contractual waiver of a constitutional or statutory right.
[brief] [...] qualifies as a person in the same specialty of internal medicine as [...].  Furthermore, [...] satisfies subsection (a)(1) of the statute.  The bases of the Complaint are negligence in the administration of Appellant’s medications and failure to diagnose Appellant’s conditions.  These medications and conditions had to do with Appellant’s blood.  This is confirmed by the allegations stated in the Complaint, that when Appellant showed complications, the hospital’s Hematology/Oncology department responded.  Pa3 ¶14.  [...]’s credentials satisfy subsection (a)(1) of the statute because he is credentialed with treating patients and performing the same procedures that are the bases of the Complaint.