ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Plaintiff’s Request for Production of Documents to Defendants made a clear request for records that were created by Defendants relating to [...].  The Trial Court Judge and Defendants made arguments as to the specificity of the records requested.  (Transcript, 29:1–12).  However, a request was made alongside Plaintiff’s Complaint, which was personally served on Defendants.  See (15a).  Furthermore, despite the fact that Defendants’ Counsel has conveniently forgotten a phone conversation that occurred between her and an employee at Plaintiff’s Counsel’s Firm, an Affidavit was submitted attesting to the fact that a phone conversation did occur, during which Defendants’ production of documents was again requested and also clarified that Plaintiff only needed Defendants’ answers to Form C Interrogatories.  See (44a).  Defendants were aware that Plaintiff needed the records that were in Defendants’ possession in order for Plaintiff to obtain an Affidavit of Merit.  Defendants’ argument that [...]’s medical records were never specifically requested and therefore were not required to be produced is illogical and underscores the gamesmanship and legal gymnastics that they are willing to go through to escape Plaintiff’s meritorious claim against them.
[brief] (Da0035; Da0799)  The Trial Court refused to exclude Plaintiff’s experts, finding they “have a sufficient basis” to opine the particulate “could have caused a retinal detachment” and could cause inflammation because “Defendant’s own recall contained those very same warnings of intraocular inflammatory reaction” and Plaintiff’s other Ozurdex® injections never resulted in injury.  (Da0816, pp. 9, 11-12 (emphasis in original))  The Trial Court found the --- 8  That testimony was not from an [...] “expert,” but from a corporate representative ([...]) designated to testify for the company on topics other than manufacturing standards, which was not her area of responsibility.  Nor did Plaintiff make any attempt to qualify [...] as an “expert” in Ozurdex® manufacturing.  experts’ opinions were sufficient to deny summary judgment on causation.  (Da0816, p. 9)  Reconsideration:  The Trial Court denied [...]’s motion for reconsideration, reaffirming its rulings on defect and admissibility of Plaintiff’s experts’ opinions on general and specific causation.  (Da0830; Da0846, pp. 5, 7-8)  It also ruled for the first time that Plaintiff could proceed on her ‘failure-to-timely-recall’ claim.  (Id., pp. 5-8)  It misconstrued [...]’s argument that this claim is preempted by federal law as an argument the claim is “preempted by the PLA,” and found no PLA preemption.  (Id., pp. 5-7)  The Trial Court has never addressed [...]’s federal preemption argument.  This Court granted [...] permission to immediately appeal these rulings.
[brief] In *James*, the expert presented studies dating back to 1928 which noted the causative link between benzene found in petroleum products and cancer.  *James, supra*, 155 N.J. at 294.  That case also recognized that “[a]nimal studies . . . have clearly and without question demonstrated the carcinogenic effects of benzene.  . . .”  *Ibid.*  The *James* Court noted, “[a] 1948 report from the [...] indicated that ‘it is generally considered that the only absolutely safe concentration for benzene is zero. ’”  *Id.* at 304.  Presumably, this is why the Spill Act findings specifically call out the hazards of petroleum products and the need to remediate the same.  *N.J.S.A.* 58:10-23.11a.  Thus, unlike capped asbestos, which is not required to be remediated, there has been legislative and administrative determinations that the release of petroleum products into the environment is detrimental to the public health, safety and welfare.
[brief] [...] also informs the court he did not have a copy of the transcript(s) prior to the appeal application before filing appeal and prior to the motion for stay submission (2T8:8-15); he could have very well asked for an extension of time to ensure preparation of trial.  Further, in the timely filed application by legal counsel, a list of all the transcript dates were not requested (AP 68), giving the Superior Court a full depiction of the hearing details and the name of the Judge was incorrect.  [...] ultimately then entered his motion to withdraw as counsel on May 17, 2023 and granted by [...] at the Motion of Stay hearing\textsuperscript{45}; although [...] already heard and decided on the Motion of Stay.
[brief] Respectfully Submitted, [...]  Public Defender Attorney for Defendant  By: _________________________  [...]  Ass’t Deputy Public Defender ID No. 084402013  DATED: February 27, 2023  June 30, 2023  Honorable Judges of the Superior Court of New Jersey  Appellate Division  Richard J. Hughes Justice Complex  P.O. Box 006 Trenton, New Jersey  08625  Re: State of New Jersey (Plaintiff-Respondent) v. [...]
[brief] No witness saw [...] before [...] escaped.  When [...] got loose and took off running, [...] and [...] were inside their house and [...] was at the top of Defendant’s driveway at the garage doors.  The steep slope of the driveway obscured his view of the [...]’s front lawn.  After he backed down the driveway, [...] saw only where [...] and [...] ended up – on the [...]’s lawn – but not where [...] was or what she was doing before [...] arrived.  [...] heard [...] barking on and off from 3:00 p.m. until 6:20 p.m.  It sounded “close. ”  Lying on the [...] lawn with both dogs, [...] clearly saw that [...] was not wearing the transponder collar that would have kept her inside the invisible fence.
[brief] ...........................................  H617a Holm-88: [...] response to discovery request HOLM-[...]-PNL-86, providing the ignition temperature for the CWT unit proposed and for catalytic heaters discussed in testimony (SOICR p. 12)  ...............  H619a Holm-89: [...] response to discovery request HOLM-[...]-PNL-87, that proposed CWT heater uses technology that results in increased thermal efficiency (SOICR p. 12) ...........................................  H620a Holm-90: [...] response to discovery request HOLM-[...]-PNL-88, that freezing at Temporary Regulator due to ambient air temperature (SOICR p. 12) ...........................................  H621a Holm-91: [...] response to discovery request HOLM-[...]-PNL-89, of measures taken to avoid water vapor in transmitted gas (SOICR p. 12) ...........................................  H622a Holm-92: [...] response to discovery request HOLM-[...]-PNL-90, identifying the maker of the regulator to be installed (SOICR p. 12) ... H623a Holm-93: [...] response to discovery request HOLM-[...]-PNL-91 described [...]’s previous experience with catalytic heaters at regulator stations (SOICR p. 12) ........................................... H624a Holm-94: [...] response to discovery request HOLM-[...]-PNL-92 with objection, why [...] no longer uses catalytic heaters (SOICR p. 12)
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[brief] “Therefore, Defendants would not have been on constructive notice because the tree appeared to be healthy before it fell.  Additionally, Plaintiff’s allegation that Defendants needed to inspect the tree after the sidewalk was repaired is unconvincing.  Any inspection that occurred would have been related to the sidewalk, not the tree, because the sidewalk is what prompted inspector [...] to issue Defendant [...] a violation notice.  (See Plaintiff’s Exhibit G at p. 13).  Lastly, it is not palpably unreasonable for Defendants to rely upon others to notify them of any dangerous conditions created by their trees.  Pursuant to the TCA, Court is not in the position to question how Defendants allocate their employees.  While the court sympathizes with Plaintiff, it is of the opinion that the Plaintiff did not meet his burden to show that Defendants had constructive or actual notice of the dangerous condition of the tree or that Defendant’s conduct was palpably unreasonable under the circumstances. ” (Pa1-7).
[directive] Page 3 of 5  ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON THE eCOURTS EXPUNGEMENT SYSTEM AND (3)  ENHANCEMENTS  The 2020 statutory amendments also required the Administrative Office of the Courts to develop and maintain a statewide system to electronically file, serve, and manage expungement applications.  N.J.S.A. 2C:52-10.l(a).  On December 8, 2020, the Court issued an Order relaxing and supplementing Part III Rules to conform to the legislation and support the 2021 launch of eCourts Expungement System and to add a 30-day timeframe for the petitioner to reply to any objection filed by the county prosecutor.
[brief] (1T:38-25 to 40-9)  When presented with the Miranda form, [...] returned to the subject of his right to silence, telling detectives that he had a “problem with” signing the form if it would mean that he could not subsequently invoke his right to silence as to particular questions, as had been established earlier.  Before signing the form, [...] made sure that detectives confirmed again that he would retain the ability to exercise his right to remain silent on a question-by-question basis:
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ADMITTED DEFENDANT’S POST-ARREST STATEMENTS  ..................................................  16  A.  Defendant’s statements during booking were made after knowingly and voluntarily waiving his Miranda rights ...........................................................................................................  22  B.  Defendant’s statements made at booking were voluntary and made in spite of repeated explanations that the police were not yet interviewing him ..................................................  25  C.  Any alleged invocation of the right to counsel at booking was ambiguous and when police tried to clarify, defendant volunteered more statements ...........................................................................  28  D.  The detectives did not contradict the Miranda warnings ............................................................................................  30  E.  Defendant was not prejudiced when the jury heard his references to contacting a lawyer at trial.  ...........................................  35  F.  Any impropriety in the admission of defendant’s statements constitutes harmless error.  ..................................................  37  POINT III
[brief] (T3, 53:1-8).  Even if the Property were used for storage, this is not an illegal use under the [...] Zoning Code.  The relevant zoning ordinance—§ 212-14 Use Regulations: BD Business District—does not list storage as a prohibited use.  § 212-14(B) (The ordinance prohibits “fish packing, shipping, canning, processing or storage”, meaning only storage associated with processing fish is prohibited).  This ordinance defines the permitted uses in the Business District broadly as “Any retail shopping facilities or service establishment which supplies commodities or performs a service primarily for residents of the surrounding neighborhood”.  § 212-14(A)(2).  Providing storage facilities is a service and therefore a permitted use of property in the Business District.  In addition, the Property owners themselves were not the ones operating the Property.
[brief] Appellants’ Answer denies knowledge and information as to many of Respondent’s allegations (Da87; Da215).  Appellants asserted seven affirmative defenses consisting of: (i) failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted; (ii) res judicata; (iii) collateral estoppel; (iv) entire controversy doctrine; (v) laches; (vi) unclean hands; and (vii) Respondents’ “damages” are barred by the doctrine of waiver (Da94; Da222).
[brief] ”  (ECF 63-2 ¶ 13.)  *7  [...] does not explain this discrepancy between [...]’s position that it has produced all documents responsive to RFP No. 4 and [...]’s explanation that she knows there are more responsive documents maintained in Salesforce.  The only explanation the court can muster is that [...] limited the scope of what it deems “responsive” documents to the following: Defendant produced all Salesforce data related to Plaintiff, including all of Plaintiff’s phone calls, e-mails, and visits with the respective school districts.  After all, the only reason why Salesforce data is at issue in this case is Defendant concluded that Plaintiff falsified her Salesforce entries by logging meetings with [...] in March and April 2021 that did not occur.  (ECF 65, at 4 (emphasis added). )  [...] points out that, early in the case, it “produced pertinent e-mails to Plaintiff and provided her access to the native files of these e-mails that very clearly evidenced an intent to terminate Plaintiff prior to any act of alleged insubordination at issue in this case. ”  (ECF 65, at 1-2.)  Likewise, [...]’s response to [...]’s motion for leave to supplement her motion-to-compel briefing states that [...] “has always maintained that it relied on Salesforce records to support the decision to terminate Plaintiff, which is why it already produced those records to Plaintiff. ”  (ECF 101, at 1.)  In other words, it appears that [...] has produced all Salesforce documents that it relies on or intends to use at trial to support its decision to terminate [...].
[brief] Further indicia of the peaceable possession by [...] is the failure of [...], or any member of his family, to make even an overture of ownership in all the years that Sam – that [...] was in possession.  Advanced at trial is a defense theory that [...] was nothing more than a property manager who was taking care of and paying the expenses and carrying costs of 293 as a property manager because it was convenient, since he lived or had possession of premises next door.  However, there has been presented no express property management agreement for – to support the notion that Richard was simply a manager.  Further, the conduct of the parties demonstrates that there was never any compensation to Richard for any services, and there was no reimbursements for costs and payments advanced by Richard for the repair, the maintenance, the taxes, or the mortgage, from Sam or the [...] family.  (12T9:2-10:6, January 27, 2023)
[brief] THIS LAD DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION CASE COULD NOT BE SUSTAINED UNDER THE DECLARATORY JUDGMENT ACT AND WAS APPROPRIATELY SUBJECT TO DISMISSAL ON THIS BASIS AS WELL  Plaintiff asserts that its claims were for a declaratory judgment under the LAD and that this action was appropriately brought under the Declaratory Judgment Act, N.J.S.A. 2A:16-51 ("Act").  (Pb42-44).  The Trial Court did not dismiss Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint on the basis that its claims were not appropriately framed/brought as a declaratory judgment action.  (Pa3-7).  Nevertheless, since Plaintiff opens the door to this issue for litigation on appeal, such claims as framed are inappropriate, could not be sustained and were appropriately dismissed.
[brief] Distributing advertising materials of another’s products, or having those materials available, including catalogs, or participating in advertising or listing advertisements that certain individuals or businesses sell certain products, is not what is meant by a license to use the various items referred to in the statute.  See Finlay, 146 N.J. Super. at 219.  “Simply selling goods or distributing materials which bear manufacturer's name or trademark does not license use of trademark. ”  Id.; see also [...], 2015 WL 4496653, at *5 (holding that no license was granted to Orologio because [...] merely provided Orologio with advertising materials such as window and counter displays).  In this case, [...] is akin to the hypothetical department store that sells name-brand clothing or televisions referenced by the New Jersey Supreme Court in Instructional Systems in that [...]’s business included other products, such as other branded grills and accessories, the EOK systems, outdoor furniture, fire features, and LED lighting.
[directive] Prosecution of DWI & Refusal Violations rights as required under the holding in State v. Wright, 107 N.J. 488 (1987).  The Implied Consent Laws  As a matter of law, no person may legally refuse to submit to chemical breath testing.  Refusal to submit to chemical breath testing constitutes a separate offense under one of the following statutes:  N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.4a; 39:3-10.24f; 12:7-55f.  The implied consent statute becomes operative as a result of a police or law enforcement officer having arrested the operator for a violation of N.J.S.A. 39:4-50 (DWI), N.J.S.A. 39:3-10.13 (CDL/DWI), or N.J.S.A. 12:7-46 (OVWI).
[brief] However, [...] purchased the Florida Property at a discounted price, which was premised upon the appraised value obtained by the Trust, with an effective date of over one (1) year prior.  (381a)  Consequently, the Trust’s stipulation requiring that property shares be acquired at fair market value was not observed.  Therefore, the Trustee violated her fiduciary duty to administer the Trust “in accordance with its terms and purposes,” pursuant to N.J.S.A. 3B:31-54.
[brief] In its May 29, 2012 Certificate for NEUP, FERC notes that “[...] states it has precedent agreements for long-term firm transportation services utilizing the full capacity of the proposed Northeast Upgrade Project with two shippers, [...] ([...]) and [...] ([...]). ”  Overall, FERC concluded that “[b]ased on the benefits Tennessee’s proposal will provide to the project shippers, the lack of adverse effects on existing customers and other pipelines and their captive customers, and the minimal adverse effects on landowners or communities along the route, we find...that Tennessee’s proposed Northeast Upgrade Project is required by the public convenience and necessity. ”  Therefore, the purpose of the entire NEUP (including the relevant New Jersey --- 42 FERC, Order Issuing Certificate and Approving Abandonment, 139 FERC ¶ 61,161 (May 29, 2012), P 6 (emphasis added).
[brief] *Kuzmicz* v. Ivy Hill Park Apts., 147 N.J. 510, 518 (1997).  “Critical to the imposition of liability is a direct economic benefit to the commercial landowner from the path taken by the injured party and the absence of an alternative route.  Id. at 519.  Therefore, if commercial landowners know that in providing a parking facility that customers or invitees will travel a definite route to reach their premises, the benefiting proprietor or landowner should not be permitted to cause or ignore an unsafe condition in that route which it might reasonably remedy, whether the path leads along a sidewalk or across the roadway.  Warrington v. Bird, 204 N.J. Super 611, 617 (1985).  In fact, our courts have recognized the proposition that a parking area is an integral portion of a defendant’s shopping center.  Bates v. Valley Fair Enterprises, Inc., 86 N.J. Super. 1, 6 (App. Div. 1964).  As such, a commercial defendant owes a duty to exercise reasonable care to maintain it in a reasonably safe condition and to keep it free of ice and snow.  Id.  Clearly, there is abundant case law extending a commercial landowner’s duty beyond its abutting sidewalk to an adjacent parking lot if it directly benefits the commercial landowner and if customers need to use that route to reach the commercial defendant’s premises.
[directive] The Secretary of State, county boards of elections, and superintendents of elections shall maintain a record of dispatches issued and reported including, but not limited to the time of dispatch, polling place location, the reason for the dispatch, the name of the police or law enforcement officer dispatched, the police or law enforcement officer’s badge number, the duration of the police or law enforcement officer’s presence and the immediate outcome of the dispatch.  Id.  Such information is deemed to be a public or government record under the Open Public Records Act.  Id.  This notification is not required for officers’ responses to disturbances or requests for assistance on or around the premises of the location of a ballot drop box.  Third, police officers may continue to assist, and be assigned to assist, election officials with the transport of specific election materials to and from an early voting location, polling place, or ballot drop box.  N.J.S.A. 19:6-15.1(c); N.J.S.A. 19:6-16(a); N.J.S.A. 19:63- 16.1(f).
[brief] THE COURT: All right.  You were operating a motor vehicle here in Middletown on August 11th, of 2016 while under the influence of alcohol, is that correct?  [...]: Yes.  THE COURT: And how much have you had to drink?  [...]: I think it was a half a pint of vodka.  THE COURT: And that was just prior to your operation?  [...]: Yes.  THE COURT: Have you ever plead guilty to the 3-40 violation before?  [...]: No.  THE COURT: I'm sorry, to the 4-50, the operating a motor vehicle under the influence of drugs or alcohol?  [...]: No.  THE COURT: All right.  I'm looking at your abstract, and it does appear that this would be a first offense.  I do have in the file an alcohol influence report, which indicates a .17 blood alcohol concentration as a result of the three readings that were taken on that night.  That would trigger the imposition of a interlock devise [sic] as well, you understand?  [...]: (No audible response) (T1:5-18 to 6-20).  The foregoing is the entirety of the factual basis that was obtained in the within matter on May 15, 2017.