[brief] The trial court further explained that it is undisputed Appellants defaulted two times prior to the third default in January 2023, and both times [...] provided Appellants additional time to make the required payments.  (2T15:22-16:18).  Because Appellants were granted these allowances, the trial court could not find that “[...]’s actions regarding the [Concession Recovery Provision] [were] generally applicable to every [putative] class member with a similar lease provision. ” (2T16:19-24).  The trial court’s conclusion in this respect is appropriate under the applicable rule.  To satisfy Rule 4:32-1(b), the trial court would have to consider (i) whether the provision is unreasonable as to each putative class member, and (ii) whether [...] engaged in unconscionable conduct as to each putative class member.  Each of these questions would be individualized and fact-sensitive and require the consideration of numerous factors, such as the nature and extent of the tenant’s breach, [...]’s actual damages from that breach, when the breach occurred in relation to the remaining term of the lease, [...]’s conduct with respect to each tenant, and the prior course of dealings between the parties—all of which will vary for each putative class member.  Consideration of these factors would require individualized assessments or a “parade of mini-trials” to determine class membership in violation of Rule 4:32-1(b).  See White, 208 F.R.D. at 129.  Consider, for example, a tenant that accepted the rent concessions and occupied an apartment for four months at no cost.  In month five, the tenant failed to make their required monthly rent payment and vacated the property, both in clear breach of the lease agreement.  Then, in accordance with its duty to mitigate damages, [...] secures a new tenant to lease the original tenant’s space in month six.  In this scenario, if [...] then sought to recover the rent concessions against the original tenant, that tenant would be included in the sub-class as defined in the Counterclaims.  (Da99 at ¶ 38).  But, it cannot be seriously contended that [...]’s attempt to recover the concessions would constitute an unlawful penalty in this scenario.  In exchange for allowing the tenant to occupy the space for four months, [...] did not receive any consideration (i.e., a single rent payment) for such benefit and, thus, would have suffered a clear loss.  The above example illustrates the fatal defect with Appellants’ purported sub-class definition in that a tenant would be a member of Appellants’ sub-class but would have no viable claim against [...].  Green v. Green Mountain Coffee Roasters, Inc., 279 F.R.D. 275, 285 (D.N.J. 2011) (dismissing class action under CFA because “the putative class includes individuals who do not presently have a claim against Defendants … [t]herefore Court concludes that common issues of fact do not predominate with the CFA claim. ”).  It would also require the Court to improperly engage in “mini-trials” to determine on an individual basis as to which tenants the Concession Recovery Provision operates as a penalty to.  Accordingly, the trial court properly concluded that Appellants had not shown a basis to proceed with a class action and, thus, the November 8, 2023 Order should be affirmed because Appellants cannot sustain a class-wide claim under the CFA as a matter of law.  **CONCLUSION**