ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] In his brief, all that [...] can possibly do, to feebly try to attack the validity of my unjust enrichment claim, is to make the absurd contention that I could not prove that his client actually benefited from keeping the vehicle.  However, as shown by my exhibits, [...] is primarily a junk yard, that actively seeks junk cars, as its primary business is selling used auto parts.  (See e.g. Pa160, which for this Court’s convenience, I have included again and attached hereto as Pra3).  Moreover, this fact is readily admitted to in the Respondent’s brief – on Db7, [...] admits: “Dirke’s is an auto shop that primarily sells used auto parts”.  Further, [...] admits to the fact that his client had repeatedly offered to purchase the car for $400 (i.e. even during mediation, had offered to pay us $466 to keep the car).  So logically, and rhetorically speaking, why else would [...] have wanted to pay out this money to buy this car, if not to make a significant profit from selling used parts off of it? (This of course is their primary business).  Further still, [...] never denied reaping this benefit; and even if it had, it would then have been an issue to be proven at trial – but since the granted motion to dismiss was based on the pleadings, all of my allegations needed to be presumed as true.  “On a motion to dismiss a claim on its face under Rule 4:6-2(e), ... we must presume ... that plaintiff's factual allegations pled in the complaint are true”.
[brief] [...] also submitted nearly eighty (80) quarterly and annual financial statement filings during this time with no opposition from the Department regarding the application of the Holding Act until its reversal of course in August 2021, as noted above.  In July 2022, the Department then indicated its new position that [...] had to treat transactions involving attorney-in-fact fees between unrelated individual subscribers and [...] as “related party” transactions, which would then allow such fees to be regulated within the definition of Statement of Statutory Accounting Principle No. 25 (“SSAP No. 25”).  [...] always conformed to the legitimate --- 3 “Aa.” refers to the December 4, 2023 Appendix submitted by [...] in connection with its Motion for Leave to Appear as Amicus Curiae.  That motion was denied on January 23, 2024.  (Ia.10).  [...] recognizes that such documents are not part of the existing record on this appeal in this Court, and, indeed, the crux of its entitlement to intervention is to be permitted to move to supplement/settle the record with additional documentation responsive to the Department’s assertions regarding [...].
[brief] PLAINTIFF WAS NOT ENTITLED TO THE BENEFIT OF THE "DISCOVERY RULE" OR THE "RELATION BACK" DOCTRINE UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE.  (1T47-19 TO 48-22; Pa5-6; 3T65-4 to 66-18; Pa1-2)  As set forth in the procedural history and statement of facts, supra., [...] was not named as a defendant in this case until the filing of the second amended complaint on June 12, 2019, approximately three months after the statute of limitations ran.
[brief] ARGUMENT POINT I: THE HUMANE SOCIETY DECISION IS DISTINGUISHABLE FROM THE PRESENT APPEAL AND SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED BINDING PRECEDENT (Responding to Sb8-13 and SCb-1, 8-13).  The Defendants argue that this Court must reject the Plaintiffs’ arguments based upon binding precedent enunciated by New Jersey Supreme Court nearly 50 years ago in Humane Society of United States v. N.J. State Fish and Game Council, 1 [...]’s original brief will be referenced as “Pb. ”  The State defendants’ brief will be referenced as “Sb” and the NJSFSC’s brief as “SCb.”
[brief] A defendant “has the right to introduce evidence that someone else committed the crime for the purpose of raising reasonable doubt about his own guilt. ”  State v. Cope, 224 N.J. 530, 552 (2016).  Thus, “third-party guilt evidence need only be capable of raising a reasonable doubt of defendant’s guilt to warrant its admissibility. ”  Ibid. (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted).  “A court cannot bar the admissibility of third-party guilt evidence that ‘has a rational tendency to engender a reasonable doubt with respect to an essential feature of the State’s case.
[brief] [...] frivolously argues that no discovery or credibility determinations were necessary to adjudicate a ten-count lawsuit alleging fraud, deceit, conversion, civil theft, misrepresentation, and breach of contract.  Paragraphs 47–170 (15 pages total) of [...]’s certification articulates copious issues of material facts in dispute, on topics related to: 1) [...]’s deceptive and disputed invoices (Par. 47–71)  2) the District’s rejection of [...]’s invoices (Par. 72–77)  3) whether [...] unlawfully pocketed the money and did not actually pay its employees (Par. 92–98)  4) the amount of payments rendered on [...]’s invoices (Par. 104–127)  5)  [...]’s violations of N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-9(e)(3) (Par. 128–146)  6) [...]’s misstatements of fact and public policy contested by the Board related to whether [...] was entitled to the funding; and 7) the Board’s need for discovery (Par. 168–170). 14  For the sake of brevity, rather than copy and paste [...]’s certification, it is hereby incorporated by reference, as if fully set forth at length herein. 15  [...]’s disputed facts directly contradicted the self-serving certification of [...]’s co-defendant, [...], meaning that his credibility was directly in question, and required the court to not play the role of the jury by rendering a final judgment as to the money owed by accepting Martin’s contested certification.  No filing from [...] ever analyzed the elements or merits of any --- 14 Pa211 – Pa231 15 of the ten counts in the Complaint, nor did the trial court.  Instead, several months before the discovery end date, without any discovery responses that the Board propounded upon from [...] (Pa279 – Pa331), without any depositions, with a dispute of the alleged money owed, and an issue of fact as to whether [...] pocketed the money or sent to their employee, in reliance on a contested, self-serving certification from [...], without any analysis whatsoever of the elements and proofs in a ten-count complaint alleging fraud, civil theft, conversion, misrepresentation, and breach of contract, the trial court inexplicably rendered a wholesale dismissal of the Board’s 10-count complaint.  Nothing in the trial judge’s opinion discussed the merits of why the Board’s 10-count Complaint deserved a wholesale dismissal, and the trial court’s final judgment on the amount owed under the Counterclaim was impermissible when there were clearly disputes of fact on that issue.
[brief] Public opposition to an application does not and cannot constitute “undue influence. ”  Even in cases where the Mayor has apparently stirred the rabble-rousers, there is no support for the conclusion that same can be muzzled.  Indeed, land use board members are well equipped to handle polite, measured, non-violent, and non-disruptive dissent.  There is nary a public meeting that occurs where dissent isn’t voiced in varying degrees and multitudes.  A ruling in favor of the trial court’s interpretation places board counsel and, indeed, all public officials in the untenable position of representing their constituents’ interests while nervously treading through a new precarious minefield that threatens them personally with monetary damages.
[directive] Sexual assault (N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(b), 2C:14-(c)(l))  First degree robbery (N.J.S.A. 2C:15-l(a)(l),(2) or (3)) or Carjacking (N.J.S.A. 2C: 15-2(a)(l ),(2),(3) ( 4)) of Possession weapon for unlawful purpose (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(b), 2C:39-4(c)) of on Possession firearm school property w/o permission (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(e)(l))  Certain persons not to have weapons (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-7(b)(l), Transport firearms into state for unlawful sale/transfer (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-9(i))  If yes, the final recommendation is No Release Recommended.
[brief] In any event, N.J.S.A. 2C:33 – 31 provides as follows:  a.  A person is guilty of dog fighting if that person knowingly [emphasis added]: (1) keeps, uses, is connected with or interested in the management of, or receives money for the admission of a person to, a place kept or used for the purpose of fighting or baiting a dog; (2) owns, possesses, keeps, trains, promotes, purchases, breeds or sells a dog for the purpose of fighting or baiting that dog; (3) for amusement or gain, causes, allows, or permits the fighting or baiting of a dog; (4) permits or suffers a place owned or controlled by that person to be used for the purpose of fighting or baiting a dog; (5) is present and witnesses, pays admission to, encourages or assists in the fighting or baiting of a dog [EMPHASIS ADDED]; (6) gambles on the outcome of a fight involving a dog; or (7) owns, possesses, buys, sells, transfers, or manufactures dog fighting paraphernalia for the --- 4  The existence of this statue also gives rise to the application of the construction doctrine of expressio unius est exclusio alterius (the expression of one thing is the exclusion of the other) as it pertains to the conflicting culpability in N.J.S.A. 4:22 – 17 and N.J.S.A. 4:22 – 24.
[brief] 19.  In his motion to be relieved, counsel for [...] requested that, “[i]n the interest of fairness, it is respectfully requested that the return date of [[...]’s] Motion for Partial Summary Judgment be adjourned until [[...] and its principals] have an adequate opportunity to retain succeeding counsel and respond.” (PPCIa361).  20.  On January 25, 2023, [...] filed a letter brief opposition to [...]’s motion to change track assignments as well as [...]’s counsel’s motion to be relieved, and accused both motions as being “delay tactics. ”  21.  Unbeknownst to counsel for [...] (who was not consulted), counsel for [...] and [...] conferred regarding the ”track change motion” and the motion to be relieved as [...]’s counsel.  On January 30, 2023, counsel for [...] filed a proposed order in which [...] consented to the withdrawal of counsel for [...], and [...] withdrew its motion to change the case track assignment.
[brief] If the "court ignores applicable standards, we are compelled to reverse and remand for further proceedings."  Gotlib v. Gotlib, 399 N.J. Super. 295, 309 (App. Div. 2008).  The motion judge mistakenly believed that an appellant is obliged to apprise the Appellate Division of all issues as evidenced by the following statement in the May 3, 2024 order—“only be (sic) reviewing the entirety of the trial record will the Appellate Division be completely informed on all issues…” (Pa1331).  In the instant matter, only the financial aspects of the marriage dissolution are being appealed, not the child custody and child relocation determinations of the court.
[brief] Plaintiffs sued Defendant for infringement of the Asserted Patents on May 1, 2014 [see FlowRider Surf., Ltd. v. Alleshouse, et al., [...]; Surf Waves Ltd. v. Pacific Surf Design, Inc., et al., [...] ], and dismissed the suits without prejudice on June 30, 2014, pursuant to the parties’ tolling agreement pending their settlement discussions.
[brief] $350,025.60 for the 611-policy $545,181.32 for the 538-policy $168,505.60 for the [...] policy $1,063,712.24 (See Exhibit K) (R-626)  The Court held another Zoom hearing on April 4, 2022.  Although there had been a flurry of activity attempting to get the missing documents for the 538-policy they were not provided.  [...] started by claiming that he had “original policies” from the company and change beneficiary forms (19T 6).  Counsel for [...] responded that the 538-policy had not been provided, the change of beneficiary forms had not been provided, and acknowledgment from the insurance company that they had received a change of beneficiary were not provided, nor was there proof that the change was recorded.  She stated: “We don’t know how or when the change of beneficiary was done on this policy. ” (19T 7, lines17-25).  The Court executed an Order dated April 6, 2022, requiring [...] to produce all the documentation for the 538-policy that had been provided for the 611-policy no later than April 18, 2021.
[directive] Legal advice on issues pertaining to criminal law and procedure are to be obtained from the County Prosecutor or the Division of Criminal Justice.  -2-  ATTORNEY GENERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT DIRECTIVE NO. 2004-1 - APPENDIX A - GUIDELINES FOR POTENTIAL LIABILITY WARNING - N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.22 (Rev. 2-20-2004)  FORM  A law enforcement officer is NOT REQUIRED to read the POTENTIAL LIABILITY WARNING - N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.22 (Rev. 2-20-2004) Form to the person who will transport or accompany the defendant.
[brief] •  **Nebraska:** *Anderson v. Nissan Motor Co.*, 139 F.3d 599, 602 (8th Cir. 1999) (“limiting [Nebraska] products liability law to actions or omissions which occur at the time of manufacture or sale”) (forklift); *Dubas v. Clark Equipment Co.*, 532 F. Supp.3d 819, 830 (D. Neb. 2021) (“claims asserting post-sale duties to ... recall ... are dismissed”) (forklift).
[brief] The no-animals condition imposed on [...] therefore cannot find the statutory support it needs in N.J.S.A. 4:22-26.2(b).  Nor has the Legislature authorized no-contact orders in animal cruelty cases, even though it has shown that it knows how to do so in other contexts.  In domestic violence cases, for instance, a provision of the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:25-27, grants sentencing courts the authority to “impose restrictions on the defendant’s ability to contact the victim as ‘a condition of sentence. ’”  DCPP v. K.N., 435 N.J. Super. 16, 35 (App. Div. 2014).
[brief] In October of 2020, [...] was living in a three-story house in [...] with her adult daughter, [...], and Candeisha’s daughter, [...].  (5T6-7 to 9-14).  At the time, Latoya was in a romantic relationship with [...] (sometimes referred to as “[...]” in the trial transcripts), who had also been living at the house for the past year.  (5T9-15 to 10-20).  Candeisha, as well as Latoya’s son [...], did not get along with [...].  (5T40-9 to 15).  One point of contention between Candeisha and [...] was his slamming the doors of the house when he was angry.  (5T94-12 to 95-6).  On October 8, 2020, Candeisha and [...] had such an argument; Candeisha heard [...] slam a door, and she became upset because she had just recently fixed it.  (5T94-12 to 95-1).  To deescalate the situation, Candeisha left the house.  (5T102-19 to 103-2).  While she was out of the house, Latoya called Candeisha and told her that [...] now had a knife.  (5T103-3 to 14).  Candeisha stopped by a police car she happened to be passing by, alerted the police to what her mother had told her, and returned to the house with police.  (5T103-15 to 104-18).  The police went into the house, brought [...] outside, and searched him for a knife but did not find anything.  (5T38-10 to 39-4, 104-14 to 105-5).
[brief] (2T26-13 to 2T26-17  [...] testified that the photographs where the shell casing was found were corrupted and lost.  As such, there were no photographs showing where the objects were in relation to each other.  (1T54-9 to 1T54-22)  No eyewitnesses testified as to what they observed at the time of the shooting, nor did any eyewitnesses authenticate surveillance video footage the State sought to admit at trial.
[brief] LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT  I APPELLANT DID NOT FAIL TO BRIEF THE NECESSARY ELEMENTS OF THE TORTS CLAIM ACT AND THEREFORE THOSE ISSUES WERE NOT WAIVED  Although [...] argues that issues that are not briefed are deemed waived, Appellant did actually address all of the issues in the brief and did not need to brief the underlying arguments set forth in their oppositions as the trial Court did not make a determination as to actual or constructive notice and palpable unreasonableness based upon the merits of the case, they were only determined to be denied because a dangerous condition was not found by the trial Court.  (Pa11-12, Pa296-320, Pa420-435)  [...] states in their brief that if one element of the TCA fails, then all claims must fail, which is also how the Court outlined their Order and reasoning.  (Pa1-19)  The trial Court did not adjudicate the actual or constructive notice element and the palpably unreasonable element on the merits of the facts, they simply stated that without the finding of a dangerous condition that those other elements could not be found.  Therefore, by addressing the dangerous condition element in Appellant's brief, and the fact that the other elements were based upon the determination of the dangerous condition element and not on the merits, requesting they be remanded for a determination if the dangerous condition element is reversed is a proper way to address the issues in the appeal.  The cases that [...] base their argument on, Sklodowsky, State and 539 Absecon Boulevard LLC, regarding waiver of issues are cases where they either did not address an issue at all, where they didn't address an issue until the reply brief, or cases where there was no brief filed at all.  In the case at bar, all the relevant issues were addressed in Appellant's filed brief and therefore the cited cases do not apply in this matter.
[brief] ARGUMENT I.  THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE APPELLANT-PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT BECAUSE IT APPLIED  AN INCORRECT STANDARD UNDER AICRA IN RELYING ON THE LACK OF SUBJECTIVE COMPLAINTS OF PAIN, RATHER THAN CONSIDERING THE OBJECTIVE MEDICAL EVIDENCE THAT WAS THE BASIS OF THE PLAINTIFF’S EXPERT REPORT AND THE CERTIFICATE OF PERMANENCY.  (Raised Below, Pa29)  Under the Automobile Insurance Cost Reduction Act ("AICRA"), the verbal threshold's limitation on lawsuit threshold bars a recovery for pain and suffering unless the plaintiff suffers an injury that results in the following: 1) death; 2) dismemberment; 3) significant disfigurement or significant scarring; 4) displaced fractures; 5) loss of a fetus; or 6) a permanent injury within a reasonable degree of medical probability, other than scarring or disfigurement.
[brief] 3T33:3-34:4.  As in the selection of lab sites, each of the partners was free to make suggestions regarding business opportunities and engaged in making decisions.  By way of example, in 2013, [...] suggested that they open a new company in India that would provide services for a customer in the United States.  [...] agreed and they formed a new company for that purpose, defendant [...], ([...]) a virtual employment agency that was owned by [...] and [...], but no longer exists.  3T36:14-37:10; 15T37:2-3.²
[brief] TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | Cases | Page(s) | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|---------| | **Brill v. The Guardian Life Insurance Company of America,** | 19 | | 142 N.J. 520 (1995) | | | **Britwood Urban Renewal, LLC v. City of Asbury Park,** | 30, 31, 32 | | 376 N.J. Super. 552 (App. Div. 2005) | | | **Conlon v. Bd. of Pub. Works,** | 45 | | 11 N.J. 363 (1953) | | | **D’Annunzio v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am.,** | 23 | | 192 N.J. 110 (2007) | | | **Davis v. Brickman Landscaping,** | 19 | | 219 N.J. 395 (2014) | | | **DiProspero v. Penn,** | 23 | | 183 N.J. 477 (2005) | | | **Divan Builders v. Planning Bd. of Wayne,** | 26 | | 66 N.J. 582 (1975) | | | **Genon Rema, LLC v. South Amboy Redevelopment Agency,** | 25, 26, 27 | | Docket No. [...], 2015 WL 10986574 (N.J. Super. Ct. | | | Law Div. May 18, 2015) | | | **Globe Motor Co. v. Igdalev,** | 19 | | 225 N.J. 469 (2016) | | | **Hirth v. City of Hoboken,** | 45 | | 337 N.J. Super. 149 (App. Div. 2001) | | | **Hoboken Land Building, L.P., and Hoboken Holdings, L.P. v. City of | 34, 35 | | Hoboken, et. Al., | | | Docket No. [...] (N.J. Super. Ct. Law. Div. March 26, | | | 2019) | | Housing Auth. Of City of Newark v. Ricciardi, 176 N.J. Super. 13 (App. Div. 1980) .........................................................41 Jersey Urban Renewal, LLC v. City of Asbury Park, 377 N.J. Super. 232 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 185 N.J. 392 (2005)
[brief] | CASES | Page(s) | |--------------------------------------------|---------| | Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986) | 22 | | Auburn Police Union v. Carpenter, 8 F.3d 886 (1st Cir. 1993) | 48 | | Baird v. Cutler, 883 F. Supp. 591 (D. Utah 1995) | 45 | | Baliko v. Stecker, 275 N.J. Super. 182 (App. Div. 1994) | 42 | | Battaglia v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 214 N.J. 518 (2013) | 41 | | Bell v. Stafford Township, 110 N.J. 384 (1988) | 44 | | Bostock v. Clayton County, 590 U.S. ____, 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020) | 40 | | Branch v. Cream-O-Land Dairy, 244 N.J. 567 (2021) | 13 | | Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520 (1995) | 13, 14, 21 | | Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006) | passim | | Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983) | 45 | | Cutler v. Dorn, 196 N.J. 419 (2008) | 43 | | Davis v. N.J. Dep’t of Law & Pub. Safety, 327 N.J. Super. 59 (Law. Div. 1999) | 48 | | Dewees v. RCN Corp., 380 N.J. Super. 511 (App. Div. 2005) | 21, 22 | | Failla v. City of Passaic, 146 F.3d 149 (3d Cir. 1998) | 42 | | Friedman v. Martinez, 242 N.J. 450 (2020) | 14 | | Fuchilla v. Layman, 109 N.J. 319 (1988) | 42 | | Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759 (3d Cir. 1994) | 21 | Gilhooley v. Cnty. of Union, 164 N.J. 533 (2000) ..................................................21
[directive] In cases not otherwise covered under Section 7.3, unless the presumption of seeking pretrial detention is overcome pursuant to subsection 7.4.6, the prosecutor shall apply for pretrial detention if the present offense is an indictable crime of the first or second degree(regardless of its degree), and the defendant committed the present offense: (a) while on pretrial release for (i) an indictable crime or (ii) a disorderly persons offense involving domestic violence as defined in N.J.S.A. 2C:25-19(a), whether that previous offense had been charged by complaint-warrant or complaint-summons, or (b) while on probation, special probation, intensive supervision program (ISP), parole, community supervision for life (CSL), parole supervision for life (PSL), or was on pretrial intervention (PTI) where the defendant had pleaded guilty as required by N.J.S.A. 2C:43-12(g)(3) (see P.L. 2015, c. 98), or if the defendant was on release pending sentencing or appeal.  See note 18.  Cases Involving a New Violent Criminal Activity Flag.
[brief] **A. Facts  Germane to Whether the Motor Vehicle Stop was Justified**  On the night of January 1, 2020, Officer [...] (“Soulias”) of the [...] (“[...]”) was on patrol in an unmarked police vehicle near the intersection of Route 18 and Eggers Street.  (1T7-7 to 8, 12 to 13, 22 to 23, 24 to 25).  He was positioned on the southbound side of the highway and perpendicular to the roadway.  (1T8-7 to 25).  At approximately 10:50PM, Soulias observed a Chevrolet Suburban drive past him in the southbound lane at a “high rate of speed” in the center lane.  (1T9-3 to 8).  The vehicle was passing other cars on both the left and right sides.  (1T9-17 to 18).  Soulias, however, was initially unable to identify the driver because the front windows of the vehicle were shut and “completely tinted. ” (1T10-7 to 13).  Consequently, Soulias began to follow the vehicle, ultimately engaging his overhead emergency lights and performing a motor vehicle stop.  (1T10-25 to 11-4).  Soulias approached the vehicle, which had since lowered its windows, observed an open bottle of whiskey, and detected the odor of marijuana.  (1T11-11 to 15)².  The driver was unable to convey his requested paperwork and provided a false name and date of birth.  (1T12-7 to 14, 19 to 21).  Upon arrival of a backup officer, Soulias shifted to the driver side of the vehicle where he detected a more potent smell of marijuana.  (1T13-8 to 20).  After sparring with Soulias over his identity, the driver ultimately revealed that he was, in fact, [...], the defendant.