ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Rather, the Supreme Court had to consider whether the injuries caused by the insured were accidental enough to constitute an “occurrence” as defined in the policy.  *SL Industries*, 128 N.J. at 193.  The underlying lawsuit concerned the alleged emotional distress experienced by an employee who alleged that he was asked to leave the company because of his age.  *Id.* at 193-94.  The employee alleged common-law fraud as well as a violation of a federal employment statute.  *Id.* at 194.  The employer sought a defense and possible indemnity from its insurer.  The insurer declined to defend alleging, in part, that the employee had not alleged a bodily or personal injury from the common-law fraud as required by the policy’s definition of “occurrence. ”  Id. at 194-97.  During discovery, it was learned that the employee did indeed experience physical manifestations from the fraud.  Id. at 196.  The Court held that was sufficient to establish a duty to defend.  Id.  When discussing how to determine whether the facts meet the definition of an “occurrence,” the Court found that a valid claim of intentional fraud presupposes a subjective intent to injure.  Id. at 209.  But the Court found that it must also decide whether “any intent to injure will render the resulting injury intentional, whether the wrongdoer must intend the specific injury that results.  . . .”  Id.  Because the Supreme Court was considering a provision concerning a grant of insurance, the Supreme Court was inclined to interpret it broadly.  Id. at 210-212 (citing Prudential Property & Casualty Ins. Co. v. Karlinski, 251 N.J. Super. 457, 598 A.2d 918 (App.Div.1991)).  The inclination to interpret a coverage provision broadly has no place here when an exclusion is at issue.  Swarner v. Mut. Benefit Grp., 72 A.3d 641, 649 (Pa. Super. 2013) (noting the exclusion must be narrowly construed while coverage clauses must be broadly construed).
[brief] Pa282.  The [...] Report explained that the value conclusions were based on “Means Construction Cost Date, 52nd Edition for the year 1994 and Marshall and Swift Valuation Service .  . .  In addition we have relied on our own library of information which includes catalogs and offering from suppliers of the equipment described in these reports. ”  Id. at 4.  Thus, [...]’s conclusion was highly speculative.  For a clearer summation, [...]’s real estate appraisal report directly contradicted [...]’s assertion that these stores and the 516 items were present in 1994.
[brief] (Ab24).  Appellants point out that N.J.S.A. 18A:13-34 (relating to the creation of regional school districts) includes categories that are similar to those identified in N.J.S.A. 18A:13-47.11(a) (relating to the withdrawal from local school districts) but also includes another category not specified in N.J.S.A. 18A:13-47.11(a): the board of education of a “district comprising two or more municipalities. ”  Ibid.  They contend that this demonstrates the intentional exclusion of municipalities such as [...] from the withdrawal provisions of N.J.S.A. 18A:13-47.11 because the Legislature had the opportunity to include other entities in the statute, but chose not to.  Ibid.  Appellants’ argument is flawed.  As noted above, the Legislature, through N.J.S.A. 18A:8-50, did expressly provide municipalities such as [...] a pathway to invoke the provisions of Chapter 13, including withdrawal under N.J.S.A. 18A:13-47.11.
[brief] *Id.* at 395.  The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s decision, holding:  Here, it is not possible to identify any [...] nurses who [...] asserts were negligent because the AOM refers generally to the entire [...] nursing staff over an extended period and indiscriminately combines the nursing staffs of two separate facilities.  Appellant did not satisfy her obligation as to [...] by serving an AOM that opines collectively as to the care provided by its nurses and the nurses at [...].  Appellate was required to ‘provide each defendant’ with an appropriate AOM and failed to do so.  *Id.* at 398.  The Court further held that “[a]t a minimum, the AOM statute entitles a defendant facing a vicarious liability claim to an AOM limited to alleged deviations by *its own licensed employees*.  [...] was entitled to an AOM that offered a clear opinion that *its own nurses* deviated from the applicable standard of care. ”
[brief] Correspondingly, the Borough obtained from an engineering firm a Concept Plan for entirely affordable-housing building located on the off-site property.  A true and correct copy of which is annexed hereto ad Exhibit A.  …. ”  In fact, the requirement for seven (7) off-site units was not identified by the Redeveloper in 2017, and, the desire to purchase [...] and develop affordable housing was suggested not by the Redeveloper, but by [...], the owner of [...].
[directive] 12.  List any charges the prosecutor has agreed to recommend for dismissal: Ind./Acc./Compl.# Count Nature of Offense and Degree 13.  Specify any sentence the prosecutor has agreed to recommend: Main Plea Form/Revised Form Promulgated by Directive #01-18 (02/23/2018), CN 10079  Defendant’s Initials page 3 of 5  NOT:  14.  Has the prosecutor promised that he or she will a. Speak at sentencing?  [Yes]  [No] b. Seek an extended term of confinement?  [Yes]  [No] c.  Seek a stipulation of parole ineligibility?  [Yes]  [No]  15.  Are you aware that you must pay restitution if the court finds there is a victim who [Yes] [No] [NA] has suffered a loss and if the court finds that you are able or will be able in the future to pay restitution?
[brief] ” (1T 100-12 to 101-12; 1T 104-10 to 12).  Waterford Police Officer [...] testified that a pedestrian had not been struck that night.  (4T 200-7 to 201-12).  The caller later told the dispatcher that the person being chased had crashed into the woods.  (1T 106-14 to 107-1).  The recording reflects the caller then fighting with that person and making threatening statements, such as “You want a piece of me? I will fuck you up. ” (1T 107-2 to 109-5).  Another 911 operator, [...], identified a call from the same number in which the speaker said “…we got him.  We’re in the woods.  Tell the cops to turn around,” and “He ain’t going nowhere.  He can’t go far. ” (1T 127-24 to 15).  [...] testified that he drove onto White Horse Pike, and then drove at 110-120 mph on that road, followed by the Impala containing [...].
[brief] ...............18  In re Estate of Dawson, 136 N.J. 1 (1994) ...........................................39-40  Ishinos Bros. P'ship v. Twp. of Franklin, 376 N.J. Super. 591 (Law Div. 2000).  .21, 26 Lakewood Realty Assoc., LLC v. ZBA of Lakewood, No. A-1981-20, 2022 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1214 (App. Div. July 5, 2022)  .........................
[directive] 2.  The age, gender, race, sexual orientation (if and ethnicity of applicants for a law enforcement officer position in the preceding calendar year; 3.  The age, gender, race, and ethnicity of applicants appointed to the agency in the preceding calendar year, with transfer applicants listed separately; 4.  The reasons for denying applicants an appointment to the law enforcement agency (Appendix A contains a list of denial reasons); and 5.  The age, gender, race, and ethnicity of each law enforcement officer eligible for promotion and promoted within the agency in the preceding calendar year, including the position to which the officer was promoted.
[brief] 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(b).  But a court may not consider extrinsic sources unless *(i)* the language is unclear or *(ii)* applying its plain meaning frustrates the statutory purpose (which is sometimes referred to as an absurd result).  The language here advances a statutory purpose and is not ambiguous or vague.  Defendant does not assert any ambiguity but contends that the construction of the federal decisions is absurd.  It is not absurd because restricting a debt collector’s dissemination of consumers’ nonpublic personal information promotes one of the FDCPA’s goals: protecting consumers’ personal privacy.  *See*, 15 U.S.C. § 1692(a) and *Douglass v. Convergent Outsourcing*, 765 F.3d 299 (3d Cir. 2014).  As discussed at Pb28-Pb29, Congress knows how to permit disclosure of private information to service providers but did not do so in the FDCPA.  It is not for this Court to re-write the FDCPA.  *Murray v. Plainfield Rescue Squad*, 210 N.J. 581, 592 (2012) (“It is not [a court’s] function to rewrite a plainly written statute or to presume that the Legislature meant something other than what it conveyed in its clearly expressed language. ”)
[directive] Degree Bail Range 10%  Cash Bail Option 2C:21-1  Forgery in statute.  4th Degree $1,000 to $2,500 10% permissible (continued)  (continued)  Actor sells, transfers, or possesses with intent to sell, a writing which falsely purports to be a 2nd Degree $35,000 to $75,000  10% permissible driver's license, birth certificate or other document issued by a governmental agency which could be used to verify a person's identity or age or who make or possesses devices or False Government materials to make such documents; second degree; if actor exhibits or utters such 2C:21-2.1(a-d)  3rd Degree $5,000 to $20,000 10% permissible  Documents documents, third degree except that this statute does not apply if actor purchases alcoholic beverage underage or tobacco underage and there is no other fraud or injury to another; if actor possesses such documents, fourth degree.  4th Degree $1,000 to $2,500 10% permissible  2nd Degree $35,000 to $75,000 10% permissible  Actor issues or passes check knowing it would not be honored or if no account to draw on; 2C:21-5(a-c)  Bad Checks second or third or fourth degree or disorderly persons offense depending upon amount of check; second degree-$75,000 or more; third degree- $1,000 but less than $75,000; fourth degree if $200 but less than $1,000; disorderly persons-less than $200.  3rd Degree $5,000 to $20,000  10% permissible 48  Updated December 2, 2013
[brief] Also, there was a gap in the call log on the phone between January 16, 2019 at 3:09 p.m. and February 8, 2019 at 6:43 a.m. (42T:239-18 to 24).  The Cellebrite software results reflected that files on the phone had been “modified” on February 7, 2019.  (42T:239-25 to 241-12).  During the day on February 8, the web history showed that the phone was used to track a package on Amazon and to access shopping sites for purses and shoes.
[brief] Rule 1:4-8 is designed to ensure that attorneys do not initiate or pursue litigation that is frivolous.  First, the Rule imposes an obligation on the attorney or pro se party to certify, based on a reasonable inquiry, that the pleading "is not being presented for any improper purpose," that the assertions "are warranted by existing law or by a non-frivolous argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law or the establishment of new law," and that there is "evidentiary support" for the allegations being made.  R. 1:4-8(a)(1), (2), (3).  Second, the Rule imposes a continuing duty on the attorney or pro se party who filed the pleading to correct or withdraw the allegations or the denials contained therein based upon further investigation and discovery.  R. 1:4-8(a)(3), (4).
[brief] Plaintiff explained that promotions are selected from the top tier, but she couldn't get into the top tier because of “my evaluation,” she never got into the top tier while at the Academy (1T; 137:13).  She stated that because of the evaluation being a lie, she was subjected to points deducted and that is significant because a 0.5 is “huge when you’re vying for a Lieutenant or Captain’s position (1T; 138:2).  Plaintiff applied for a number of positions and the deduction in points for the false evaluation kept her out of some of them (1T; 138:20).  According to Plaintiff, she was as qualified as any of the people that got the promotions (1T; 139:8).  As to [...], she had a meeting with him in the parking lot at Division Headquarters about her evaluation; sent him an email requesting a meeting and they met (1T; 141:14).
[brief] As outlined in [...]’s initial brief, it is respectfully submitted that the Trial Court erred in denying [...]’s counterclaims, which are all premised on the dishonest and fraudulent conduct of the Appellants.  Indeed, as outlined below, in opposing [...]’s counterclaim on these issues, Appellants concede the that their previously articulated defense – actual ownership of the property – was a conjuring for this litigation.  In fact, Appellants now go so far as to argue, for the first time, that they were simply acting upon the advice of counsel when their attorney, [...] discovered the error in the December 1998 Deed.  Respectfully, Appellants’ resorting to new arguments at this late date to account for the otherwise unaccountable actions evidences the very fraud they argue against.  A.
[brief] Arbitration and alternative dispute resolutions are the byproduct of a parties’ agreement.  The availability of compulsory arbitration is a contract question, which is “dependent solely on the parties' agreement. ”  Cohen v. Allstate Ins. Co., 231 N.J. Super. 97, 101 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 117 N.J. 87 (1989).  “Only those issues may be arbitrated which the parties have agreed shall be. ”  Grover v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 80 N.J. 221, 228 (1979).
[brief] It is only the requirement of litigation against a stranger that calls the exception into play.  [DiMisa v. Acquaviva, supra, 198 N.J. at 554 (emph. added)].  The Court found no stranger to the parties existed:  To be sure, [...] left much to be desired as a partner and no one could approve of his chicanery.  However, what he did, as [...] found, was to act wrongfully through [...].  That makes [...] the instrument of [...]'s deceit, not a separate and distinct third party.  Thus, we disagree with the Appellate Division's conclusion that plaintiffs were entitled to an award of counsel fees for suing [...], an alter-ego of [...], in a single litigation.  Whatever [...] was, it was not a third party under Ventron or its progeny, and we reverse the Appellate Division's contrary conclusion.
[brief] ”  (Da2009)  •  Making “a number of... untypical transfers... in the waning days of his control when the Court had already ordered that nothing out of the ordinary course of business be undertaken,” (Da2001-2002), including transfers of $95,000 to himself for alleged medical expense reimbursement that he could not later substantiate, (Da2002), $125,000 to a Canadian attorney as an advancement on hypothetical attorneys’ fees, (Ibid); and $150,000 to [...] (a subsidiary), as compared to the usual $40,000 to cover payroll (Ibid).
[brief] See *Lanzet v. Greenberg*, 222 N.J. Super. 540, 542 (App. Div. 1988) (*citing Lewis v. Read*, 80 N.J. Super. 148, 174 (App. Div.), certif. granted, 41 N.J. 121 (1963)); *Paladino v. Campos*, 145 N.J. Super. 555 (Law Div. 1976).  The Appellate Division in *Lewis v. Read* stressed that damages for pain and suffering must be “limited to compensation and compensation alone,” and therefore “conscious suffering is the only proper basis for pain and suffering. ”  Lewis v. Read, 80 N.J. Super. at 174; see Lanzet, 222 N.J. Super. at 543.
[brief] (Da551).  At that point, discovery had been closed and none of the Administrative Code Regulations had been addressed in discovery.  For three (3) years, [...] had been defending the plaintiffs’ claims of oral misrepresentations allegedly in violation of the RETA and the CFA.  By the time [...]’s motion for summary judgment was heard in December of 2021, a new motion Judge was assigned and granted a portion of the plaintiffs’ cross-motion with regard to an alleged Administrative Code violations.
[brief] The claimed damage to the house on defendant’s remaining property from vibration during construction of the seawall is not damages as a consequence of the taking.  Rather, defendant seeks damages as a consequence of the manner in which a project was performed or carried out by third parties.  Such issues may be the subject of a separate litigation that may include other necessary parties and full discovery.  For the foregoing reasons, the trial court’s order barring Appellant from seeking damages related to construction activities dated August 6, 2021 should be affirmed.
[brief] 1707 Realty, LLC, supra, 2022 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1303, *18 (citing, Dimitrakopoulos v. Borrus, 237 N.J. 91, 114 (2019)).  Thus, the trial court’s determination to dismiss the Appellants’ Complaint pursuant to the Entire Controversy Doctrine is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.  On appeal, courts “do not second-guess the exercise of sound discretion by the court because [they] recognize ‘[j]udicial discretion connotes conscientious judgment, not arbitrary action; it takes into account the law and the particular circumstances of the case before the court.
[brief] Pa471–42 ¶ 7; Pa483 ¶ 37; Pa878–94 & ¶¶ 21–122.  The majority of the Association’s unit owners were unhappy with [...]’s representation (Pa747 ¶ 96) and voted to support claims arising in part from alleged professional misconduct on the part of [...] and [...].  Pa472–74 ¶¶ 7–11.  The verified complaint in the Derivative Action (Pa874–906) asserted nine (9) claims against [...] for damages, including claims for unfair and deceptive claims practices, breach of contract, inducing breach of fiduciary duty, negligence, and related torts arising from [...]’s, [...]’s, and [...]’s having actively encouraged former Association officers [...], [...], and [...] (the “[...]”) to disobey a Preliminary Injunction Order issued August 23, 2018, which had commanded:
[directive] 1.  No agreement that is inconsistent with Treasury sharing policy should be entered into.  All such agreements should be in written form and signed by officials from the participating agencies.  These agreements should be reviewed annually to ensure they of are reflective current situations and equitable in their treatment all participants. of 2.  The lead agency should normally conduct the seizure/forfeiture and any Treasury agency contributing to the seizure efforts of a given task force must be entitled to a share of the forfeitures that is reflective of the assistance rendered by that agency.
[brief] One of the most basic principles of New Jersey criminal law is that “[a]ccurate and understandable jury instructions in criminal cases are essential to a defendant’s right to a fair trial. ”  *State v. Concepcion*, 111 N.J. 373, 379 (1988).  The charge must provide a “comprehensible explanation of the questions that the jury must determine, including the law of the case applicable to the facts that the jury may find. ”  *Ibid.* (internal quotation marks omitted).  Therefore, instructional errors on essential matters, even in cases where those errors are not raised below, are traditionally deemed prejudicial and reversible error because they interfere with the jury’s proper assessment of the defendant’s culpability.  *State v. Rhett*, 127 N.J. 3, 5-7 (1992).  Here, where the jury was improperly urged to convict [...] as an accomplice on a faulty theory of liability, the jury charge on accomplice liability failed to dispel that legally inaccurate basis for conviction.  The combination of the inadequate instruction and incorrect argument was clearly capable of causing an unjust result and mandates reversal.  *R.*  2:10-2.
[brief] Id.  The lower court decision indicates that [...]’s privacy policy does not actually make any promises to safeguard someone’s privacy, when read closely and with a critical eye.  Da111.  However, it is undisputed that amongst [...]’s subscribers in [...], there was a reasonable expectation that the information they used to sign up for [...] would be maintained privately.  Da240-251.  Further, the numbers clearly show that an overwhelming majority of subscribers would find it harassing to receive spam or unwanted e-mails from third-parties based upon the fact that they subscribe to [...] alerts.  Id.  Therefore, there is a reasonable expectation of privacy on the part of the residents that their personal information would not become public record by passively signing up for a third-party, private service to merely receive local government alerts.
[brief] Exclusion C.5 of Part Two generally excludes “[b]odily injury intentionally caused or aggravated by you. ”  Pa80.  Additionally, the New Jersey Part Two Employers Liability Endorsement expressly excludes from coverage any and all claims of intentional wrong, including claims that the employer’s conduct created a substantial certainty of injury:  With respect to Exclusion C5, this insurance does not cover any and all intentional wrongs within the exception allowed by N.J.S.A 34:15-8 including but not limited to bodily injury caused or aggravated by an intentional wrong committed by you or your employees, or bodily injury resulting from an act or omission by you or your employees, which is substantially certain to result in injury.  [Ja76.]  Notably, the language of the New Jersey Part Two Employers Liability Endorsement excludes from the coverage of the Policy any allegation of intentional wrong, no matter how the allegation is phrased, and specifically excludes from coverage any allegations that the employer’s conduct was “substantially certain to result in injury. ”  Ibid.  Based on the Policy’s clear, unambiguous language, Plaintiff’s claims against [...], consisting only of intentional wrongs and conduct substantially certain to cause injury, are expressly excluded from coverage.
[brief] And other leading experts in the field—like [...]—consider social transitioning to be psychological treatment.  [...], the former head of the [...] in Toronto, has opined that social transition is a form of “psychosocial treatment that will increase the odds of long-term persistence. ”  Zucker, K.J., The myth of persistence: Response to “A Critical Commentary on Follow-Up Studies and Desistance Theories about Transgender and Gender Non-Conforming Children” by [...] et al., International Journal of Transgenderism, 19, 231–245 (2018), ACa140–56.  [...], the former President of the [...] in the United Kingdom, has similarly opined in her recent *Interim Report* that childhood social transition is an “active intervention [that] may have significant effects on the child.
[directive] Addendum B | April 2022  Vehicular Pursuit Policy  (b) whether the identity of the violator is known so that later apprehension is possible; (c) degree of risk created by pursuit: (1) volume, type, speed and direction of vehicular traffic; (2) nature of the area (residential, commercial, school zone, open highway, etc.); (3) population density and volume of pedestrian traffic; (4) environmental factors, such as weather and darkness; and (5) road conditions (construction, poor repair, extreme curves, intersections controlled by traffic signals or signs, ice, etc. ); and (d) police officer characteristics: (1) driving skills; (2) familiarity with roads; and (3) condition of police vehicle.  3.4
[brief] (Not Raised Below)  Conspiracy, N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2, like a criminal attempt, N.J.S.A. 2C:5-1, is an inchoate offense.  Unlike a completed substantive offense that can be committed with a purposeful, knowing, or reckless state of mind, an attempt or conspiracy to commit that same crime can only be committed purposely.  Thus, there is no such thing as a conspiracy to commit aggravated assault with any mental state less than a specific purpose to cause significant bodily injury.  The jury instructions here failed to convey this specific intent requirement, instead permitting the jury to return a guilty verdict even if it found [...] had acted only knowingly or recklessly with respect to the result of his actions.  The failure to properly instruct the jury prevented the jury from returning a valid verdict, so [...]’s conviction must be reversed.