ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Here, both Decedent and Petitioner did not possess significant sums of wealth before their marriage.  Decedent's largest asset was (is) her Home located at [...], which Petitioner moved into after they where married.  Petitioner was clearly apprised of Decedent's largest asset because he lived in it throughout the marriage.  Decedent certainly increased her wealth throughout the marriage.  She worked tirelessly to manage the 400 individuals in her Avon sales territory.  However, Petitioner also accrued most of his wealth during the marriage, specifically during his tenure working for the [...] as a medical buyer, Petitioner has presented zero evidence that would support the proposition that Decedent did not provide a full and fair disclosure of her assets prior to the marriage.  Decedent and Petitioner had very little assets to show each other, most of their wealth was acquired during the marriage, and were kept separate in accordance with the terms of the Antenuptial Agreement.  Petitioner was never placed on the Deed and never presented any evidence of joint assets.  (Pa 40-41).
[brief] In Hollywood Café Diner Inc., 417 N.J. Super, 210, 220-221 (App. Div. 2022), the court held that a court should consider the effect of the Covid-19 health crisis on trial dates in ruling on motions to extend discovery.  In ruling on the defendant’s motion to quash the deposition subpoena on [...], the motion judge stated “I’m not going to force a deposition transcript of the witness” and stated that the procedure in Hudson County required all motions to extend discovery to be decided by the Presiding Judge of the Civil Part (TR1,3-25 to 5-5).  The Presiding Judge of the Civil Division stated in the order denying an extension of discovery that plaintiff did not seek to extend discovery beyond the May 26, 2022 the discovery end date but rather went ahead and conducted discovery without seeking that permission.
[directive] Firearms Directive #4-67 December 12, 1967  Issued by: [...]  The Attorney General requests that in appeals taken pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:58- 4e from the denial of a permit to purchase firearms or pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:58-3d from the denial of a permit to carry a pistol or revolver, notice of the date set for hearing be given (a) to the County Prosecutor if the denial was by the Chief of Police of a municipality, or (b) to the Attorney General if the denial was by the Superintendent of the State Police.  Your cooperation in giving such notice in these matters will be appreciated.
[brief] DA282.  The PSA provided for the equitable distribution of the only significant asset at issue in the divorce, [...], formerly of [...], in which Defendant owned a 25 percent interest through his family's company, [...]  DA288, para. 25.  The contractual term that Plaintiff and Defendant would share equally in the proceeds from the sale of Olga's appears at two places in the PSA, paragraph 25 and paragraph 32, as follows:  25.  REAL PROPERTY:  i.  The parties acknowledge that they own no residential property.  However, Husband holds a twenty-five percent (25%) interest in [...] and the land it is located on, at the intersection of Route 70 and Route 73, [...].  [...] and the land [are] currently listed for sale at the price of $5.8 Million Dollars ($5,800,000).  Upon the sale of [...], the proceeds from the sale will be utilized to pay down the parties' credit card debt and will thereafter be split equally between Husband and Wife.  * * *  1  The Procedural History and the Statement of Facts have been consolidated to avoid repetition and for the convenience of the reader.
[brief] [...] at 115-17.  In rendering its opinion, the Court found:  That failure of proof forecloses the relief sought by defendant.  Defendant, as movant, was required to bear the burden of production and persuasion in the request to disqualify [...].  Yet, defendant’s submissions vaguely claimed only that information concerning pending litigation and business matters had been disclosed to [...] during the February 2008 consultation.  And, [...]’s bald and unsubstantiated assertions that she disclosed business, financial and legal information related to [...] and other matters to [[...] that she] believe[d] to be related to the current law suit brought by [...], including discussion of [two then-pending cases, including the [...] case] and other general information about the circumstances of [her] business and legal affairs cannot suffice to satisfy defendant’s burden.  In stark contrast, [...] provided a detailed recitation of the matters discussed, accompanied by corroborating, contemporaneous documents, none of which were challenged by defendant.  And, the fact that [...]’s post-consultation services were limited exclusively to his consideration of whether he would assume the representation of [...] in the [...] case -- and those services terminated once [...] rejected that representation belies [...]’s assertion that anything other than that case was discussed during their February 4, 2008 consultation.  In sum, defendant has not demonstrated that the matters disclosed during the February 2008 consultation were either the same or substantially related to the subject matter of the lawsuit.  Furthermore, defendant has not shown that the information disclosed during that consultation was harmful -- much less, significantly harmful -- to defendant, in this lawsuit.  In those circumstances, defendant’s motion to disqualify [...] rightly was denied.
[brief] 22 Bacon v. N.J. State Dep’t of Educ., 443 N.J. Super. 24 (App. Div. 2015) ..........................................................  18  Barry v. Arrow Pontiac, Inc., 100 N.J. 57 (1985)  ......................................................................................  15  Bueno v. Bd. of Trs., Teachers’ Pension & Annuity Fund, 422 N.J. Super. 227 (App. Div. 2011)
[brief] C.  The trial court correctly held that [...] owed [...] no fiduciary duty to educate him about the consequence of his electronic signature.  (PA008-009.)  To sidestep the foregoing points, [...] argued in the trial court that he and [...] enjoyed a fiduciary relationship, through which the bank was required to affirmatively disclose what he was signing and the consequences of his signature.  The trial court correctly rejected that argument because: first, it was [...]’s obligation to ask for information, and there was no evidence that [...] ever asked any questions about his iPad signature; and second, because [...] did not owe [...] any fiduciary duty.
[brief] For the foregoing reasons, the Board’s denial of [...]’ Accidental Disability Pension should be overturned as it misreads Richardson, misapplied Moran, Brooks and the legislative intent, and inappropriately narrowly construed the pension statute.  [...] has satisfied all of the Richardson requirements by demonstrating that the February 23, 2017, incident was undesigned and unexpected enabling this Court to grant him his Accidental Disability Pension Benefits.  Respectfully Submitted, [...], Esq.
[brief] PRELIMINARY STATEMENT  Indictment and thereafter  Superseding Indictment of [...] was based on evidence obtained by the New Jersey State Police by virtue of: (1) installation of a GPS on just one of the two vehicles parked in the driveway at [...] and (2) the Knock and Announce Search Warrant.  The Motion Judge, Honorable [...], J.S.C., conducted an evidentiary hearing on October 3, 2023 and November 1, 2023, with resulting bench opinion on that latter date: granting the Motion to Suppress the contents recovered from the home because of the State’s violation of the Knock and Announce requirement in the Search Warrant, *State v. Caronna*, 469 N.J. Super. 462 (App. Div. 2021); the court denied the separate Motion seeking suppression of the data obtained from the installation of a GPS device on one of the two vehicles parked in the defendant’s driveway.
[directive] County Prosecutor Offices are an important alternative venue for the filing of internal affairs complaints against an officer of any law enforcement agency in their jurisdiction.  Prosecutors must be especially alert to any indication from complainants or the public that the process for receiving and investigating complaints of misconduct is not operating in accordance with the guidelines in this document.  For instance, any indication that a member of the public who attempted to file a complaint was turned away or dissuaded is extremely serious and must be immediately investigated.  10.0.3
[brief] **CONCLUSION**  For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff-Appellant [...] respectfully requests that the December 12, 2023 Order (Pa65) granting [...]’s Motion to Dismiss pursuant to R. 4:6-2(a) be reversed.  Respectfully submitted, /s/ [...]  [...]  [...] [...]  Tel. & Fax: [...]  Dated: May 15, 2024  Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE  DIVISION DOCKET NO. [...] AMBER JONES, on behalf of herself and those similarly situated.  :
[brief] 12  See also Lightning Lube, Inc. v. Witco Corp., 4 F.3d 1153, 1169-70 (3d Cir. 1993) (finding that the actions of the defendant directly resulted in franchisees abandoning their contracts with the plaintiff, a quick-lube franchisor, and finding that whether the exiting-franchisees ultimately signed franchise agreements with the defendant was of no consequence); Varrallo v. Hammond Inc., 94 F.3d 842, 848-49 (3d Cir. 1996) (finding that the plaintiff set forth facts to establish that the defendant tortiously interfered with his employment by carrying out various wrongful acts for personal motives, and not business purposes); ADP, LLC v. Ultimate Software Grp., Inc., No. 16-8664, 2018 WL 1151713, at *1, *6 (D.N.J. Mar. 5, 2018) (holding that action of mailing threatening letters to employees constituted sufficient ground for counterclaims for tortious interference regardless of whether letter-sender reaped an economic benefit as a result of its interference); ThermoLife Int’l LLC v. Connors, No. 2:13-4399, 2014 WL 1050789, at *3 (D.N.J. Mar. 17, 2014) (finding that the plaintiff had properly pleaded claims for tortious interference where defendant did not realize any economic gain from its interference); Murray v. Cty. of Hudson, No. 17-2875, 2018 WL 3000333, at *5-6 (D.N.J. June 15, 2018) (finding that although the defendants did not earn a financial benefit from their actions, a tortious interference claim existed where they knowingly took deliberate action or permitted
[brief] ”  Id. at *6.  Accordingly, [...] supports Plaintiff’s position, not Defendant’s.  Further, Plaintiff has demonstrated that the trial court did not make any findings as to whether the Defendant “acted in good faith”, that the Defendant did not act in good faith, nor did it deal fairly with its students.  (Pb31-Pb32).  The record is clear that Defendant substantially deviated from its own rules and regulations, in violation of the standard set forth in Dougherty v. Drew Univ., 534 F. Supp. 3d 363, 374 (D.N.J. 2021).
[brief] ”  At the hospital, [...] interviewed the individual who identified himself as [...].  He told [...] that while walking home from the bus “he was approached by two unknown black males and somehow they started asking him questions. ”  He alleged that a verbal altercation ensued and that one of the males “pulled out a gun ... and he was shot in the back area or the buttocks area as he was fleeing from the two individuals. ”  [...] also interviewed [...], the woman who had brought “[...]” to the hospital and identified herself as his girlfriend, “[...]. ”  According to [...], Ms. Williams said that they had been at Duval's grandmother's house before he was shot.  When [...] went to the scene of the purported incident, he did not find any evidence to support Duval's version of events.  When [...] went to the address where Duval's grandmother allegedly lived, a man answered the door, identified himself as Duval's uncle, and said that Duval's last name was Johnson, not Williams.  Both the uncle and grandmother denied that Duval lived at the house and neither could remember the last time that they had seen him.  When [...] re-interviewed [...], she admitted that [...], a/k/a [...], had been shot in Jersey City.
[brief] Appellant takes the position that [...] was seller’s agent and, therefore, [...]’s conduct should be imputed to Borrower or Respondent, the lender for the buyer of the property.  It is clear based on available authority that an escrow agent is not the agent of any party.  See Wagman v. Lee, 457 A.2d 401 (D.C. 1983).  In that case, the court discussed the unique position an escrow agent holds in a transaction.  The court stated an escrow holder “is the dual agent of both parties. ”  Id. at 404 (citing Ferguson v. Caspar, 359 A.2d 17, 20, 22 (D.C. 1976)).  If the escrow agent is entrusted with funds, it is acting in a fiduciary capacity with both parties in a transaction.
[brief] Civil Case Information Statement to [...] Pa508  Certification of [...], 9/26/2023  Pa509  Plaintiff’s Counter Statement of Material Facts in Opposition of Both Defendant Motions  Pa511 Certification in Opposition to Motion for Consolidation filed by [...] 10/02/2023  Pa516  Exhibit J to Certification of [...]  Pa521  Complaint Summons 2/20/20 (Attached at Pa041)
[brief] Cf. State v. Cotto, 471 N.J. Super. 489, 520-21 (App. Div. 2022) (finding no evidence of strategic deception when the “the substance of the interrogation, from start to finish, focused” on the more serious crime of arson and not the traffic warrants for which defendant was arrested).  The record thus clearly demonstrates how [...] reinforced [...]’s misunderstanding that their conversation concerned a minor drug offense, even though [...] intended all along to question [...] about the much more --- \(^2\)  The State contended that [...] told [...] that he was going to speak with him about something “apart from what he was arrested for.
[brief] (5/25/23 Transcript @ T4:20 to T23:18).  After some discussion, [...] determined that the Fifth Amended Complaint (Da293-358) was the operative complaint.  (5/25/23 Transcript @ T22:23 to T23:18).  When asked if “everyone agreed” that the Fifth Amended Complaint was the operative complaint, counsel for the [...] replied, “Yes, Your Honor. ”  (5/25/23 Transcript @ T23:15).  Plaintiff’s counsel replied, “That's not unreasonable, Your Honor. ”  (5/25/23 Transcript @ T23:16 to T23:17).  In dismissing the Fifth Amended Complaint, [...] reasoned as follows:
[brief] This Court found that the IFPA did not regulate “the internal operations and financial responsibility matters akin to the subject matter in the TIA” and therefore no conflict existed.  Id.  at 559.  Moreover, the Department had been charging and title insurers had been paying the IPFA assessments for ten years before the appeal.  Id. at 553 and 560.  In other words, there existed an established course of conduct supporting enforcement of the IFPA assessments.  Furthermore, the Legislature was aware of and approved the past course of conduct because it did not intervene.  Based on the totality of the circumstances, the Court did not find a conflict. \(^1\)  In contrast to the circumstances in Chicago Title, the provisions of the Holding Act relate directly the “internal operations and financial responsibilities” of the companies within its scope, which do not include reciprocals, whose --- \(^1\)  When there is a conflict between a general and specific statute, the more specific statute controls.
[directive] As perguntas abaixo devem ser respondidas somente se você for elegível à sentença obrigatória de suspensão condicional de pena especial nos termos da lei 2C:35-14 (“Tribunal de Drogas”).  N.J.S.A.  The following questions need to be answered only if you are eligible for a mandatory sentence of special probation pursuant to 2C:35-14 (“Drug Court”).
[brief] Although Defendants concede that Rule 4:27-1 provides that “a plaintiff in the complaint or in an answer to a counterclaim . . . may join, either as independent or as alternate claims, as many claims, either legal or equitable or both, as he or she may have against the opposing party,” it is axiomatic that the claim must be one recognized by our courts.  There is no authority that allows Plaintiff to revive a discharged mortgage because of a default alleged to have occurred long after the mortgage was fully satisfied and discharged of record.  If the Court allows Plaintiff to reinstate a discharged mortgage in this case, it will not be long before other lenders also try to revive discharged mortgages, leading to the collapse of the real estate recording system as we know it.  “A revival of a mortgage once paid is tantamount to executing a new mortgage, and once satisfied, a mortgage may not be revived without the authorization of the obligor on the bond and the owner of the estate in land. ”  Mc Carthy v. Schwalje, 234 N.J. Super. 396, 399 (Super. Ct. 1988) (citing First Federal v. Fink, 99 N.J. Super. 76 (Ch. Div. 1968) and Atlantic Seaboard Co. v. Borough of Seaside Park, 36 N.J. Super. 142, 154 (App. Div. 1955), certification denied, 19 N.J. 619 (1955)).  No such authorization to revive the mortgage exists here.
[brief] [...]’s analogizing to *Fawzy* requires the Court to credit her post-fact, self-serving statements over her unequivocal, written acknowledgment that she read, understood, and voluntarily entered into the Agreement to arbitrate her employment related claims.  This subverts New Jersey law: as this Court has explained, an “employee who signs but claims not to understand an arbitration agreement will not be relieved from an arbitration agreement on those grounds alone. ”  *Roman v. Bergen Logistics, LLC*, 456 N.J. Super. 157, 175 (App. Div. 2018).  The indisputable fact remains that [...] signed the Agreement with its express acknowledgements.  Her contention that the trial court or this Court must disregard those clear and unequivocal acknowledgements is made without authority or proper support.  [...]’s signature created a “conclusive presumption” of her receipt of the Agreement and nothing presented below or now raises a plausible inference that she did not sign the agreement or that she did not understand and voluntarily and knowingly agree to it.  *Tharpe v. Securitas Sec. Servs. USA, Inc.*, No. 20-cv-13267, 2021 WL 717362, at *3 (D.N.J. Feb. 24, 2021) (Ra27-Ra33); *also Stelluti*, 203 N.J. at 305 (“When a party enters into a signed, written contract, that party is presumed to understand and assent to its terms, unless fraudulent conduct is suspected. ”).  Post-fact assertions that [...] did not read or understand what she acknowledged as having read and understood provide no basis to avoid arbitration.  *Roman*, 456 N.J. Super. at 175; *also Goffe*, 238 N.J. at 212 (rejecting the “argument that plaintiff did not understand the import of the arbitration agreement and did not have it explained to her by” her employer as “simply inadequate to avoid enforcement of” the “clear and conspicuous agreement” that she signed).
[brief] He identified potential depositions of [...] witnesses concerning underwriting knowledge.  However, when respondent/defendant [...]’s motion was decided, depositions of the [...] representatives were completed.  Appellant/plaintiff [...] could have, but did not, conduct additional depositions within the time provided by the Court Rules; rather, he temporarily settled his coverage claim, so there was no active litigation on the coverage dispute (i.e., the Declaratory Judgement action) when respondent/defendant [...]’s N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.5 motion was granted.  Notably, appellant/plaintiff [...]’s Declaratory Judgment Complaint against [...] was dismissed on an unopposed motion for summary judgment on June 7, 2024.  The decision of the motion judge specifically held that appellant/plaintiff [...]’s vehicles were garaged in New Jersey, so there is no coverage under the North Carolina policy.  (DR03).  If garaged in New Jersey, appellant/plaintiff [...] was required to have coverage mandated by N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4 on his vehicles.  He did not.  Consequently, the unopposed Order granting summary judgment effectively eliminates any claim that a “fact issue existed” when the Court granted respondent/defendant [...]’s N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.5 summary judgment motion.
[brief] 1.  Complaint- First and Second Count .......................................................... 8-12  2.  Summons – [...] and [...] .............................. 13  3.  Civil Case Information Statement ............................................................. 14  4.  Track Assignment Number ........................................................................ 15  5.  Proof of Mailing for Request to Enter Default ............................................. 16  6.  Proof of Mailing  Final Judgment by Default ...............................................  17  ### Exhibit D: Defendant’s Letter and Motion
[brief] When determining whether a jury verdict is against the weight of the evidence, “all evidence supporting the verdict must be accepted as true, and all reasonable inferences must be drawn in favor of upholding the verdict. ”  Boryszewski v. Burke, 380 N.J. Super. 361, 391 (App. Div. 2005) (citing Harper-Lawrence, Inc.v. United Merchants & Mfrs., Inc., 261 N.J. Super. 554, 559 (App.Div.1993)) (emphasis added).  “[B]ecause reasonable people may disagree about inferences which may be drawn from common facts, neither a trial judge nor an appellate court may reweigh the evidence and impose a new verdict simply because they disagree with the jury's decision. ”  Crego v. Carp, 295 N.J. Super. 565, 578 (App. Div. 1996) (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added)  “Only when upon examination the verdict is found to be so contrary to the weight of the evidence as to give rise to the inescapable conclusion that it is the result of mistake, passion, prejudice or partiality, may it be disturbed. ”  Aiello v. Myzie, 88 N.J. Super. 187, 194 (App. Div. 1965) (citing Hager v. Weber, 7 N.J. 201, 210 (1951)).  In the end, “[j]ury verdicts should be set aside in favor of new trials only with great reluctance, and only in cases of clear injustice.
[directive] In any case where the defendant commits a Brimagg-eligible offense and also violates N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4.1, the prosecutor is now required to invoke Special Application and Enhancement Feature D unless the prosecutor would be authorized under the Graves Act Directive to dismiss the firearms charge.  -12- and/or that violence was used or threatened (Special Application and Enhancement Features C1 and C2 or Aggravating Factor #3a).  b, Requirement to appeal if court waives/reduces the mandatory minimum sentence  If the court rejects the prosecutor’s argument that the defendant is ineligible to be sentenced in the court’s discretion under N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7b court rejects the (e.g., the prosecutor’s contention that the present offense conduct occurred while on school property or a school bus, or involved violence, threatened violence, or possession of a firearm, or that the defendant is subject to an extended term under N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6f), the prosecutor shall notify the [...], and shall appeal the sentence unless the sentence imposed by the court is equal to or greater than the sentence authorized by the plea offer tendered by the prosecutor pursuant to paragraph a. of this Section, or unless the Director approves the prosecutor’s recommendation to the Director that an appeal is not warranted.
[brief] *4  However, the Court does find that two questions posed...  In determining whether a personal injury protection (PIP) benefit was overdue for purposes of awarding statutory interest penalties, the subjective purpose for insurer’s assertion of a defense to payment of benefits was not relevant, and thus, trial court abused its discretion over the management of the discovery proceedings in insured’s action for PIP benefits when it allowed insured to depose insurer’s in-house counsel and compelled the production of PIP aid and training materials so that insured could examine insurer’s motive in denying her claim.