ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] (10T:17-13 to 19-17; 151-15 to 152-16).  The other masked intruder, the one armed with a gun and [...]’ murderer, was [...]’s friend, defendant [...].  (10T:17-13 to 19-17).  [...] and defendant had both driven from Atlanta, Georgia, on November 1, 2020.  (10T:13-15 to 16-15).  They arrived in New Jersey and checked into the [...] on November 2, 2020, at 11:03 a.m.  Ibid.  They spent the day visiting people and drinking.  (10T:16-16 to 25).  Eventually, [...] and defendant ended up at a bar together in Edison.  (10T:17-1 to 20-6; 151-7 to 14; 159-1 to 175-25).  [...] told defendant that he knew a good gambling spot: [...]’ barber shop, and asked defendant if he would like to go gamble.  Defendant agreed, and both men left the bar in Edison to go to the barber shop.  On their way there, [...] and defendant exchanged a look and began to laugh.  [...] asked defendant what defendant was laughing about, and defendant asked [...] the same question.  Then, they both realized they had the same idea: rob the game.  Ibid.  [...] described their plan as no plan at all: he called it a “freestyle” robbery, with no discussion of who would do what.
[brief] [Pa496-510].  Their argument was that Plaintiffs’ counsel should have immediately sued [...] because they had a sign up at the premises in 2018; when counsel had retained.  [Pa496-510].  They contended that Plaintiffs’ counsel should have assumed, from this fact, that [...] were also present over a year earlier and there was also a written lease that obligated [...] to remove snow and ice from the sidewalk.  [Pa496-510].  Other Tenant Defendants followed with the same motion, making the same claim that counsel should have “shot first,” and find the factual information to support a cause of action against the Respondents later.  [Pa522-23].  Plaintiffs opposed all motions by highlighting that they had responsibly substituted the Tenant Defendants as promptly as they had confirmed that each of them (i) was actually a tenant on March 17, 2017; and (ii) had agreed to a lease that included Article 3, the provision of the leases at issue on this appeal.  [Pa511-518].  Plaintiffs contended that parties in interest, the insurance companies, should not be rewarded because their law firm decided not to produce the leases until after the second anniversary of the accident, despite a proper subpoena having been served, seeking production before the passage of the two-year anniversary.  [Pa511-518].  One Respondent, [...], i/p/a [...], had not answered yet and instead filed a motion to dismiss the Third Amended Complaint, based on the same argument.  [Pa534-535].  Given the history of the failure to produce the leases, the motion judge, of course, denied all motions, and held that all of the Tenant Defendants/Respondents had been properly substituted as “John Doe” defendants and suffered no demonstrable prejudice.  [Pa5-13].  These orders are the basis for the cross appeals.  [Pa5-13].  [...], i/p/a [...] filed a motion for summary judgment on April 21, 2021, arguing that they had no lease or common law duty to maintain the area where [...] fell.  [Pa594-736].  Motions arguing the same were filed by [...] on April 30, 2021.  [Pa737-823]; by [...] on May 27, 2021 [Pa824-887]; by [...] d/b/a [...] on May 28, 2021 [Pa888-928].  Plaintiffs filed a motion for partial summary judgment on May 28, 2021 on the same issues against all Respondents.  [Pa929-1040].  On June 25, 2021, the Hon. [...], J.S.C. entered an order granting Respondents’ motions for summary judgment; and denying Plaintiffs’ motions for summary judgment.  [Pa1-2].  Thereafter, the matter proceeded to trial in March 2023 against the landlord defendant and [...]; however, the case was settled against the landlord defendant before a final jury verdict and a final order dismissing the case against the landlord defendant and [...] was entered on June 27, 2023 [Pa3-4].  This appeal from the June 25, 2021 Order was thereafter timely filed.
[brief] [...] does not dispute that if the Agreement is valid and enforceable, it covers her LAD claim.  See Antonucci, 470 N.J. Super. at 563 n.1.  Instead, she argues that if “an employment arbitration provision is to be enforced in the context of a discrimination claim, there can be no dispute that the arbitration provision at issue must clearly convey to the reader that it applies to the employee’s future claims of discrimination.
[brief] [...] charged the defendant, [...], with second-degree unlawful possession of a firearm, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5b(1) (count one); third-degree possession of a controlled dangerous substance (CDS), contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10a(1) (counts two and three); and second-degree possession of a firearm by certain persons not to have weapons, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:39-7b(1) (count four).  (Da 1-5)  Love filed a motion to suppress evidence, which was heard and denied by the Honorable [...], J.S.C., on February 16, 2023.  (Da 6; 1T 69-13 to 82-17)  Love moved for reconsideration.  That motion was heard and denied by Judge Rodriguez on May 26, 2023.  (Da 7; 2T 14-14 to 20-7)  On June 8, 2023, Love appeared before Judge Rodriguez and entered a guilty plea to unlawful possession of a firearm, as charged in count one.\(^1\) (Da 8-13; 3T 3-18 to 3-24; 3T 8-4 to 8-25)  On July 17, 2023, Judge Rodriguez sentenced Love to five years in prison with 42 months of parole ineligibility, pursuant to the Graves Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6c.  (Da 14-17; 4T 6-8 to 8-18)  Love filed a notice of appeal on July 28, 2023.  (Da 18-22)  \(^1\)  Love also pled guilty to possession of CDS with intent to distribute under [...], which is not part of this appeal.  (3T 3-18 to 3-24)  STATEMENT OF FACTS
[brief] (44a)  The Agreement included a requirement to submit any disputes over the execution of the Agreement to binding arbitration before [...].  On March 29, 2016, an award was issued by [...] finding that the Agreement was violated and scheduling an additional hearing on damages.  (Ra12)  On May 6, 2016, Defendant filed a Complaint and Order to Show Cause seeking to enjoin further arbitration proceedings and vacate the award.
[directive] Sentences in the Criminal Division (1)  State Prison Sentences For sentences which a state prison term will be imposed, those sentences can in of proceed or be adjourned at the judge's discretion.  Any action by the Department of Corrections (DOC) to delay transport and commitment prisoners to DOC facilities should not delay the sentence.  (2)  Probation Sentences  If a probationary sentence anticipated to be imposed and to commence is immediately, Probation must be advised prior to the sentencing date.  Arrangements should be made for Probation staff included remotely by video or conference call be to 1 at the sentencing.  At sentencing, defendants must asked whether they have provided their telephone be if numbers and their address, and email address, applicable, to their attorneys.  After of the judge has imposed the sentence, Probation staff should advise the defendant the reporting conditions the record.  If the defendant is seeking to leave the State, on Probation staff should advise the defendant the record, that the documents to on transfer supervision under the Interstate Compact for Adult Offender Supervision  If (ICAOS) must be signed and provide instructions as to how this will be done.  the defendant is the county jail, the documents to transfer supervision under the ICAOS in must be signed prior defendant's discharge from the jail.  to 1  As noted, this Guidance applies only to defendants who are awaiting sentencing following a or guilty plea jury verdict (it does not apply to defendants for whom the court has already imposed a sentence).
[brief] Appellate Division Clerk's Office Superior Court of New Jersey Appellate Division  Richard J. Hughes Justice Complex 25 Market Street P.O. Box 006 Trenton, New Jersey 08625-0006  Re: [...], Plaintiff/Appellant v. [...] and Planning Board of the [...], Defendants/Respondents  Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division  Docket No. [...]  On Appeal From: Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division: Essex County Docket No. [...] Sat Below: Hon. [...], J.S.C. Civil Action
[brief] 2T56:5-7.  [...] expended approximately $50 million to build the Project Garage and the Mall.  1T14:18-20.  [...], however, never built the Authority Garage.  Indeed, and despite the mandatory language of the Redevelopment Agreement requiring that the Authority “shall construct” the Authority Garage, the Executive Director of the Authority, [...] (“[...]”), admitted at trial that the Authority never intended to build the Authority Garage.
[brief] *Spano v. [...]*, A-2361-14T3 (App. Div. July 22, 2016).  There, [...] d/b/a [...], was an anchor store in a multi-tenant shopping center.  Similar to this case, under the terms of the lease, the landlord was contractually obligated to maintain the common areas of the center, including the area where the plaintiff fell.  The landlord entered into a contract with a third-party vendor to perform snow and ice removal.  Relying on the holdings in *Kandrac* and *Holmes*, the court once again held that where the landlord retained control of maintenance of the common areas, a tenant in a multi-tenant shopping center did not have a duty to the plaintiff to remove snow and address icy conditions in a common area of the center.
[brief] See In re PSE&G, 35 N.J. at 371 (“[w]here the state has thus established an agency of its own with plenary power to regulate utilities, it is universally recognized that municipalities cannot properly interpose their local restrictions unless and only to the extent any power to do so is expressly reserved to them by statute. ”).  [...] is unable to meet its burden because the Ordinance falls outside the limited and narrow grant of statutory authority on municipalities with respect to the regulation of utility poles on public rights of way.  Id.  In addition, [...] relies upon Article IV, Section VII, Paragraph 11 of the New Jersey Constitution in support of its argument that the Ordinance is presumptively valid.  (Db236).  By its terms, Paragraph 11 cannot operate as an independent source of authority to municipalities when, as here, a municipal ordinance is “inconsistent with or prohibited by this Constitution or by law. ”  N.J. Const., Art. IV, § VII, ¶ 11.  As our Supreme Court has explained, “Paragraph 11 is not . . . an independent source of municipal power. ”  Fraternal Order of Police, Newark Lodge No. 12, 244 N.J. at 93.
[directive] Range - Agency will determine farthest distance slugs are to be deployed (i.e. 50yards, 25yards).  Phase I will be fired from the farthest distance determined and Phase II from the mid-point from the farthest distance to the target line.  The Shotgun Slug Night Qualification Course (SSNQC) will be fired from the 25 yard- line for Phase I and the 10 yard-line for Phase II  3.  Target - FBI type Q target, either paper or cardboard.  4.  Course.  a.  Total of 10 rounds of authorized service slugs per participant.  b.  Minimum passing score of 80% is required.  This is computed by counting the number of hits placed inside the scoring area on the Q target and multiply by 10.  c.  This same course of fire will be used for the Shotgun Slug Qualification Course (SSQC) conducted under daylight conditions and the Shotgun Slug Night Firing Qualification Course (SSNQC) conducted under night firing conditions, except the night firing course will not be timed.
[directive] First Degree Term of Parole Supervision - 5 years  Second Degree Term of Parole Supervision - 3 years  [Sim/Yes]  [Não/No]  3.  Você entende que se descumprir as condições da supervisão de liberdade condicional sua liberdade condicional poderá ser revogada e poderá voltar à prisão para servir o período total ou remanescente da supervisão de liberdade condicional, mesmo que tenha cumprido o termo de prisão imposto anteriormente?
[directive] Você entende que a seu próprio critério, impor um tempo mínimo de reclusão a [Sim/Yes] [Não/No] ser cumprido antes que esteja qualificado à liberdade condicional, podendo este período ser tão longo quanto a metade do período da pena de prisão imposta?  the court could, Do you understand that in its discretion, impose a minimum time in confinement to be served before you become eligible for parole, which period could be as long as one half of the period of the custodial sentence imposed?
[directive] This form should be filled out only in cases where the defendant is pleading guilty based on the judge's representation as to what the maximum sentence will be.  1.  List any promises or representations that have been made by the judge as to what your sentence will be.  2.  Do you understand that if the judge determines at the time of sentencing that [Yes] [No] imposing a sentence no greater than that which he or she promised would not serve the interests of justice, then the judge may order your plea be vacated or you will be allowed to withdraw your plea, and your case will proceed to trial.  Date: Defendant Approved by: (For purposes of plea only)  Judge Prosecutor Directive #01-18, (02/23/2018),, Form Promulgated by CN 11077 page 1 of 1
[brief] See, e.g., GEM Advisors, Inc. v. Corporacion Sidenor, S.A., 667 F. Supp. 2d 308, 328 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (“Because the October 4, 2002 agreement is invalid, the July 4, 2002 agreement remained effective after October 4, 2002”); *Danaher Corp. v. Lean Focus, LLC*, No. 19-cv-750, 2021 WL 3190389, at *18 (W.D. Wis. July 28, 2021) (“[T]he original contract remains enforceable if the substituted contract is invalid[,]”).  That result is common-sense: the first agreement cannot be superseded if the parties do not actually form a superseding agreement.  *E.g.*, *Zambrana v. Pressler & Pressler, LLP*, No. 16-CV-2907, 2016 WL 7046820, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 2, 2016) (that plaintiff arguably did not consent to 2010 arbitration agreement “is of no moment” because “she continues to be bound by the arbitration provision in the 2003 Agreement … because it was never superseded”).
[brief] (Da1158-1181; Da1421).  [...] argues that the CFA and the RETA conflict with each other because the RETA includes a knowing element while the CFA does not.  [...] argues that because of this conflict, the Court should have molded the verdict into a judgment under only the more specific RETA instead of the CFA.  The practical result of this argument is that the [...] would be subject to only double damages under the RETA instead of the treble damages the Court ordered under the CFA.  This argument is without merit.  In *Sun Chemical Corporation v. Fike Corporation*, 243 N.J. 319, the New Jersey Supreme Court laid out the history of the CFA:  The Legislature passed the CFA in 1960 “to permit the Attorney General to combat the increasingly widespread practice of defrauding the consumer. ”  In so doing, the Legislature “intended to confer on the Attorney General the broadest kind of power to act in the interest of the consumer public. ”  The CFA prohibits deceptive, fraudulent, misleading, and other unconscionable commercial practices “in connection with the sale…of any merchandise or real estate….3
[brief] Specifically, he asked that the jury be compelled, if it found defendant guilty, to indicate, via separate interrogatories on the verdict sheet, which of those scenarios all 12 of them had found.  (20T 108-3 to 109-24)  Indeed, counsel asked the judge how one otherwise would “know which one they found him guilty of?” (20T 110-3 to 4)  But the judge was unmoved, holding that because the State crammed all of the allegations of misconduct into one count, the court could ask for a verdict on that count without asking the jury to agree on the underlying acts or omissions.  (20T 110-16 to 111-7)  As a result, the charge and verdict sheet on Counts Two and Three leave this Court with absolutely no idea what the jury actually agreed upon with regard to its guilty verdicts on those counts.
[brief] [...]  [...], Esq.  Bar No.: 03651-2006  [...]  Tel: [...]  Fax: [...] (fax)  Email: [...]  Counsel for Plaintiff OF COUNSEL & ON THE BRIEF: ERIC J. WARNER, ESQ.  TABLE OF CONTENTS  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS & RULINGS ii  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ii  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT  1  PROCEDURAL HISTORY & STATEMENT OF FACTS  3  LEGAL ARGUMENT  3  POINT I: DEFENDANT SHOULD BE RESPONSIBLE FOR HIS FAIR SHARE OF THE COSTS OF HIS CHILDREN’S COLLEGE EDUCATION (P-452)  3 POINT II: THE DOCTRINE OF LACHES SHOULD NOT BE APPLIED TO THE UNREIMBURSED MEDICAL EXPENSES (P-452)  7 POINT III: ORDERING PLAINTIFF TO PAY DEFENDANT’S COUNSEL FEES IS MANIFESTLY UNJUST (P-452)  9  CONCLUSION  11  ### TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS & RULINGS
[brief] (Pa61 to Pa64).  Contrary to Plaintiff’s arguments on appeal, the lower court undertook a proper evaluation of both the relevant case law and the evidentiary record, and it was correct to dismiss Count IV.  The lower court reached the correct decision that the material facts relevant to a spot zoning determination in the instant litigation were undisputed and, further, that the amendments served the “overall goal of redevelopment and effectuation of the master plan. ”  Pa87.  The evidentiary record established that the only zoning regulations disputed by Plaintiff concern those made pursuant to the Plan Amendment.  (Pa1 to Pa22).  Thus, the zoning regulation at issue strictly arises from the redevelopment context.  As a matter of law, the Court’s finding that the amendments advanced the goals of redevelopment warranted dismissal as the amendments could not constitute spot zoning.  “Spot zoning” has been defined as the re-zoning of a lot of parcel of land to benefit an owner for a use incompatible with surrounding uses and not for the purpose or effect of furthering the comprehensive zoning plan.  See William M. Cox, New Jersey Zoning and Land Use Administration § 34–8.2 at 819 (Gann 2014).  Otherwise expressed, it is the use of the zoning power to benefit particular private interests rather than the collective interests of the community.  Taxpayers Assn. of Weymouth Tp. V. Weymouth Tp., 80 N.J. 6, 18 (1976), cert. den. 430 U.S. 977 (1977); Conlon v. Bd. of Pub. Works, 11 N.J. 363, 366 (1953).
[brief] A209  Proposed Order  A212  Certification of Plaintiffs’ Counsel in support of motion  A214 Ex. A (8/9/21 Case Management Order)  A220 Ex. B (8/3/20 Consent Order)  A223 Ex. C (2/16/21 Case Management Order)  A226 Ex. D (Expert Report of [...])  CONTAINED IN CONF.  APPX  A235 Ex. E (Plaintiffs’ communications re: deposition dates)  A257 11/18/21  Case Management Order A273 --- 1  The supporting brief has been omitted from the appendix.
[brief] ’”); Kamienski v. State, Dep't of Treasury, 451 N.J. Super. 499, 518 (App. Div. 2017) (finding an expert opinion from an English professor entitled to no deference, as an “expert’s opinion on a question of law is neither appropriate nor probative. ”).  Further, the legal opinion provided is simply incorrect.  To be clear, the law does not require a determination of whether a “reasonably prudent buyer” would be able to identify the exact nature of the error or whether it was in fact an error.  Instead, the law charges buyers with knowledge of the contents of those recorded documents and what would be further disclosed in a reasonable and diligent inquiry.  Here, the contents of those documents and what would have been disclosed in such an inquiry is obvious, and Defendants’ expert offers no opinion on this (nor could it).
[brief] On January 22, 2020, defendant and co-defendant [...] murdered the victim, [...], by shooting him multiple times.  That evening, between 6:30 p.m. and 7:00 p.m., [...] was working at the Jackson Avenue barbershop, located at [...].  (2T26-8 to 14; 2T28-5 to 6; 2T29-10 to 16).  There were four or five people inside the shop: [...], Jerry, the victim [...], [...], and another customer.  (2T29-17 to 30-9).  They suddenly heard a loud noise “right out the front door,” at which time the victim, [...], looked outside and exited the barbershop.  (2T31-20 to 32-2).  Five or ten seconds later, [...] heard five gunshots; some were “very loud noises” and others were “low noises. ” (2T32-3 to 12).  [...] ran for cover and ran into the closet that was in the back of the barbershop.  (2T35-10 to 15).  [...] went into the bathroom, while Jerry “was just scrambling around,” ultimately choosing to brace himself behind the door.  (2T35-16 to 20).  Eventually, [...] exited the closet and went to check on Jerry.  (2T35-21 to 36-1).  As he did, [...] heard a banging on the door and when he asked, “who is it,” [...] said, “it was me. ”  (2T36-1 to 5).  Jerry opened the door and [...] walked in.  (2T36-5).  [...] took four or five steps, walking approximately ten feet, and then collapsed.  (2T36-6 to 8).  [...] immediately picked up the phone and called 9-1-1.  (2T36-9 to 14).  He then tried to talk to [...], who was mumbling something; when [...] turned [...] over, [...] saw dark, red blood.  (2T36-11 to 19).  Union County Sheriff’s Officers [...], Elizabeth Police Officer [...], and [...] quickly arrived and began to render aid.  (2T39-13 to 19; 2T175-6 to 9; 2T176-10 to 18; 2T177-9 to 178-18).
[brief] [*Id.*]  The prior work orders support the Plaintiff’s position that problems with the sign show it was not properly placed and not properly maintained.  [*Id.*]  Moreover, the top of the overpass in the Plaintiff’s direction of travel was deformed from vehicles/objects striking it.  [5T62:3 to 63:20 & 66:21 to 67:18 & see Pa14-16]  The top of the overpass on the other side of the overpass where there was a low height warning sign was not deformed.  [*Id.*]  The dark road has no curbs and there were several work orders showing the sign placed on the road (by statute a sign should have been on the overpass and at the last opportunity for a driver to detour around the low overpass), showing the sign was not properly placed and not properly maintained.  There was evidence that the dangerous condition should have been discovered by the exercise of due care.  See N.J.S.A. 59:4-3(b).  The jury was charged on a notice question and was specifically asked by jury interrogatory the question as to whether the Defendant had constructive notice of the dangerous condition, and the jury answered yes.  The trial Court on the Motion for New trial correctly concluded that “[t]here was sufficient evidence by which a reasonable jury concluded there was constructive notice of the dangerous condition….  There was evidence of constructive notice and the jury was thoroughly instructed with regard to the law relative to that issue and the jury concluded there was constructive notice.
[brief] As [...] further explains:  The plaintiff must demonstrate that at the time when the defendant put the proceedings in motion the circumstances were such as not to warrant an ordinarily prudent individual in believing that an offense had been committed.  Was the state of facts such as to lead a person of ordinary prudence to believe on reasonable grounds the truth of the charge at the time it was made?  Id. at 263 (citing Mayflower Industries v. Thor Corp., 15 N.J. Super. 139, 152 (Ch. Div. 1951), aff’d, 9 N.J. 605 (1952) and Galafaro v. Kuenstler, 53 N.J. Super. 379 (App. Div. 1958)).  In other words, [...] teaches that “probable cause means reasonable grounds for suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant an ordinarily cautious man in the belief that the accused is guilty of the offence with which he is charged.