ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The Appellate Court engages in a *de-novo* review of a trial court’s opinion on a prerogative writ matter when making findings on a municipal board’s interpretation of law.  *See Dunbar Homes, Inc. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment of Twp. of Franklin*, 233 N.J. 546, 558 (2018).  “A board's decision regarding a question of law ... is subject to a de novo review by the courts, and is entitled to no deference since a zoning board has ‘no peculiar skill superior to the courts’ regarding purely legal matters. ”  *Chicalese v. Monroe Twp. Planning Bd.*, 334 N.J. Super. 413, 419 (Law Div. 2000) (*citations omitted*)  (*quoting Jantausch v. Borough of Verona*, 41 N.J. Super. 89, 96 (Law Div. 1956).  Board decisions on “purely legal” matters are to be reviewed de novo by a reviewing court and are not entitled to any particular deference.  *Reich v. Borough of Fort Lee Bd. of Adjustment*, 414 N.J. Super. 483, 499 (App. Div. 2010); see also *388 Route 22 Readington Realty Holdings, LLC v. Township of Readington*, 221 N.J. 318, 338 (2015).  Under established rules of appellate review under *de novo*, the Appellate division is not bound and gives no deference to the legal conclusions of the lower court.  *Toll Bros. Inc. v. Township of W. Windsor*, 173 NJ 502, 549 (2002).  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT  This matter involves plaintiffs’ challenge to the defendant [...]’s Resolution granting defendant [...]’s application for Preliminary and Final Major Site Plan Approval to construct an inclusionary multifamily housing development consisting of fourteen (14) residential dwelling units in six (6) buildings on the property known as [...] in the [...].
[brief] Indeed, had the New Jersey legislature wanted mistakes of law or fact to be grounds to vacate an arbitration award, it would have expressly included it in N.J.S.A. 2A: 23B-23(a).  review by providing for such expansion in their contract; that they may, for example, specifically provide that the arbitrators shall render their decision only in conformance with New Jersey law, and that such awards may be reversed either for mere errors of New Jersey law, substantial errors, or gross errors of New Jersey law and define therein what they mean by that.  I doubt if many will.  And if they do, they should abandon arbitration and go directly to the law courts.  *Tretina*, 135 N.J. at 358 (citing *Perini v. Greate Bay Hotel & Casino, Inc.*, 129 N.J. 479, 548-49 (1992)).  Courts simply may not intervene even when an arbitrator has made a good faith legal error because, absent fraud or corruption, vacatur based on good faith legal error would be inconsistent with the law post-*Tretina*.  See *Tretina*, 135 N.J. at 358; *Associated Humane Societies, Inc. v. Lynch*, No. A-0210-13T4, 2014 WL 5460721, at *4 (App. Div. Oct. 29, 2014).  Here, the trial court erred in vacating the Arbitrator’s award of 40% of the Company’s legal fees incurred in connection with Phase I of the Arbitration given the absence of statutory grounds to do so under the NJAA.
[brief] The court should also have charged aggravated and reckless manslaughter.  Aggravated manslaughter is a reckless killing, committed with extreme indifference to human life.  N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4a.  Reckless manslaughter is a reckless killing.  N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4b.  The difference between aggravated and reckless manslaughter “is the difference in the degree of the risk that death will result from defendant's conduct. ”  State v. Curtis, 195 N.J. Super. 354, 364 (App. Div. 1984).  Reckless manslaughter “involves a mere possibility of death”; aggravated manslaughter “involve[s] a probability of death. ”  Id. at 365.  Thus, the critical question in deciding whether it would be appropriate to charge these lesser-included offenses is whether the jury could have had a reasonable doubt whether [...] hit [...] intending, or at least knowing, that serious injury or death would result and, instead, the jury would believe that [...] merely recklessly disregarded that risk of death.  Our courts have been ordered to instruct juries on the lesser-included offenses of aggravated and reckless manslaughter in cases with stronger indicia of intent to kill than this case.
[brief] MONTGOMERY  McCracken WALKER & RHoads, LLP  Dated: October 23, 2024  By: s/ [...]  _______________________  [...]  [...]  Attorneys for Defendant-Respondent  [...] f/k/a [...]  Superior Court of New Jersey  APPELLATE  DIVISION  [...], on behalf of itself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff(s), v. HARBORTOUCH f/k/a UNITED BANK CARD, Defendant(s).
[brief] Rather than identify himself or converse with defendant, [...] immediately demanded to know “[W]here is he[?]”; referring to [...].  The totality of circumstances objectively would have been intimidating or alarming for a citizen opening the door to this encounter.  As the Court observed in Johnson, “[m]any persons, perhaps most, would view the request of a police officer to make a search as having the force of law. ”  68 N.J. at 354.  Hence, “[u]nless it is shown by the State that the person involved knew that he had the right to refuse to accede to such a request, his assenting to the search is not meaningful. ”  Ibid.; see also State v. Rice, 115 N.J. Super. 128, 130-31 (App. Div. 1971) (ruling that where a police officer knocked on an apartment door and entered, without any words being spoken between the officer and the person who opened the door, the search was not with knowing consent and instead was, “[a]t best ... permitted in submission to authority”).
[brief] 3T184.  She still has plates and scares in her left arm and both her legs.  3T173.  She can still feel the metal.  3T173.  In terms of restrictions, Plaintiff is limited in bending one knee because the surgical hardware.  3T174.  Plaintiff has pain when she walks which she describes as a “sore feelings through her legs. ”  3T183.  She testified she never not has that sore feeling when she’s moving around.  3T183.  Plaintiff also testified she has a loss of feeling in some places in her legs which have been numb since the accident.
[brief] In addition to the reasons stated by the Court for denial of Appellant’s application, it is [...]’s position, as it was in the underlying motions, that the application should have been denied as a result of the doctrine of Unclean Hands.  “The essence of [the unclean hands] doctrine . . . is that [a] suitor in equity must come into court with clean hands and he must keep them clean after his entry and throughout the proceedings. ”  American Dream at Marlboro, LLC v. Planning Bd. of the Tp of Marlboro, 209 N.J. 161, 170 (2012) citing Borough of Princeton v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders of Mercer, 169 N.J. 135, 158, 777 A.2d 19 (2001).  A review of the long, tortured history of this Estate leads to no conclusion but that Appellant begs relief from the court with unclean hands.  He has disregarded countless orders entered by the court, defaulted in multiple lawsuits, misappropriated the Estate’s funds, and asserted baseless allegations against [...].  The February 4 Judgment requires Appellant to reimburse the Estate and [...] over $3,000,000.00, of which he has paid nothing.  He has single-handedly made the Estate effectively insolvent and it is unable to pay the New Jersey Inheritance Tax that is due and owing.  Appellant comes before the court seeking a formal accounting of an Estate he has already plundered.  **CONCLUSION**
[brief] (5T4-4 to 9-21).  She also noted that: new mitigating factor (14) would be applied; that in its opinion, this Court found the imposition of consecutive sentences for murder and robbery were appropriate; and that the felony murder count would be merged into the murder count.  (5T9-22 to 10-12).  [...] then reviewed the facts of the case, (5T10-13 to 16-11), including the original sentencing judge’s observation following the trial “that it was [...]’ decision which ultimately cost [...] his life, a decision which has and will continue to cause unspeakable pain to the [...]’ family as well as to the family of Mr. [...] himself.
[brief] (9T 40-10 to 44-20; PSR 5-12)  In sum, the \(^7\) See, e.g., Joseph Murray et al., Campbell Collab., *Effects of Parental Imprisonment on Child Antisocial Behaviour and Mental Health: A Systematic Review* 8 (2009), https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/229378.pdf; Leila Morsy & Richard Rothstein, Econ. Pol’y Inst., *Mass Incarceration and Children’s Outcomes* 9-12 (2016), https://files.epi.org/pdf/118615.pdf.  court erroneously weighed the aggravating and mitigating factors, and those factors did not justify the imposition of the maximum sentence, life with sixty-three years without parole -- which in real terms is over twice as long as the thirty-year sentence that [...] could have received.  Therefore, this Court should vacate [...]’s life sentence and remand for resentencing.
[brief] (Pb44).  He now proposes the suit was seeking to strike down a DEP “regulation” restricting employee speech.  (Pb49).  [...] reviewed the *National Treasury* analysis and then suggested that his use of the term “f-word” when speaking at the Rutgers Safe Water Drinking course as a representative of the DEP, was the same as a “blanket policy” on government employees accepting honoraria or officials needing prior approval before speaking to the media.
[brief] [3T95-19 to -21; 3T60-4 to -5].  The parking lot was bordered by a fence, but there was a gap that led to a nearby housing development at the back of the lot.  [3T96-6 to -13].  Defendant could not open the back door.  [3T62-17 to -20].  In the process of opening the door, he dropped several dollar bills.  [3T60-17 to -23].  Because the back door was out of sight of the tellers’ desk and [...] was at the desk, she believed he had left the building and began locking the front doors.
[brief] While the defendant’s relevant age in [...] was seventy-nine years old, the studies cited by [...] all demonstrate the “age-crime curve” that crime decreases as age increases.  See ibid. (citing National Research Council, The Growth of Incarceration at 155; United States Sentencing Commission, The Effects of Aging on Recidivism Among Federal Offenders 3 (Dec. 2017) (finding that “[o]lder offenders were substantially less likely than younger offenders to recidivate following release”); N.J. Dep’t of Corrections, State Parole Bd., Juv. Just. Comm’n, Release Outcome 2007: A Three-Year Follow-Up 15 (“Multivariate statistics indicated that age was inversely related to the odds of rearrest; for every one-year increase in age, the offender's odds of a new arrest decreased by a factor of .95.
[brief] However, out of an abundance of caution, [...] will provide the Court with the appropriate analysis.  The Contracts Clause of the U.S.  Constitution states that "[n]o State shall ... pass any ... Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts."  *U.S. Const.* art. I, § 10, cl. 1.  New Jersey's Constitution includes a similar guarantee that "[t]he Legislature shall not pass any ... law impairing the obligation of contracts, or depriving a party of any remedy for enforcing a contract which existed when the contract was made."  *N.J. Const.* art. IV, § 7, ¶ 3; *Berg v. Christie*, 225 N.J. 245, 258-59 (2016); see also *Burgos v. State*, 222 N.J. 175, 193 (2015); *Fid. Union Tr. Co. v. N.J. Highway Auth.*, 85 N.J. 277, 299 (1981) (noting that United States and New Jersey Constitutions provide "parallel guarantees").
[brief] Eventually, Respondent’s attorney, the undersigned, agreed (on behalf of Respondent) to pay $400 + $66 filing fee for the car in exchange for a bill of sale or certificate of title.  The undersigned was promptly informed by Respondent that Appellant had previously admitted that the car was actually owned by his late mother, and he did not have title to the car.  As such, the undersigned revised the offer on behalf of Respondent to make the $466 payment after receiving the title by fax.  (Pa23, #15-18).  This revision was clearly reasonable as Respondent had an interest in making sure the purchase of the car is proper and valid.  Given that Appellant had no authority to sell a car he did not legally own at the time the complaint was filed, the Appellant did not have standing to file a breach of contract case as there is no valid contract here.
[brief] Based upon all of the facts and legal authority set forth herein, Respondent [...] requests that the Court deny Appellants’ requested relief and determine that Appellants are obligated to arbitrate based on the enforceable Contract and arbitration clause.  Respectfully submitted, /s/[...]  [...], Esq.  Dated: November 27, 2024  REPLY BRIEF OF PLAINTIFFS/APPELLANTS, NJ
[brief] The owner [occupant] of a residential property has no duty to maintain the sidewalks adjacent to their land so long as they do not affirmatively create a hazardous condition.  The owner [occupant] of residential premises abutting a public sidewalk is not required to clear or keep the sidewalk free from the natural accumulation of ice and snow.  But the owner [occupant] is liable if, in clearing the sidewalk of ice and snow, the owner [occupant], through the owner’s [occupant’s] negligence, adds a new element of danger or hazard, other than that caused by the natural elements, to the use of the sidewalk by a pedestrian.  In other words, while an abutting owner [occupant] is under no duty to clear the owner’s [occupant’s] sidewalk of ice and snow, the owner [occupant] may become liable where the owner [occupant] undertakes to clear the sidewalk and does so in a manner which creates a new element of danger which increases the natural hazard already there.  Therefore, should you find that the defendant, in undertaking to remove the ice and snow from defendant’s sidewalk, created a new hazard or increased the existing hazard and that this new or increased hazard proximately caused or concurred with the natural hazard to cause plaintiff’s injuries, then you must find for the plaintiff.
[brief] In Plaintiff’s Certified Answers to Interrogatories**  In her certified Answers to Interrogatories, Plaintiff similarly does not describe any acts or statements of hostile work environment based on disability discrimination.  In her responses to Interrogatories Nos. 1, 2, 3, and 4, Plaintiff makes general reference to “anxiety disability discrimination” and “anxiety disability” but does not describe any facts—general or specific—that remotely demonstrate disability discrimination or hostile work environment discrimination.
[brief] **In Camera Review Of The Certification (T23:21-25). **  Following the initial hearing on the Disqualification Motion, and as part of the supplemental submissions permitted by the trial court, Respondents submitted a certification prepared by [...] (the “Certification”) for review by the trial court *in camera* which purportedly identifies the confidential information disclosed to [...].  (297a).  On November 7, 2024, the trial court held another hearing and inexplicably reserved course, now accepting the Certification submitted *ex parte*. (T23:17-24:22; 25:20-24).  To be clear, [...] has never seen the contents and is not aware of the information contained in the Certification.  Nevertheless, the trial court exclusively relied on the Certification in disqualifying [...], thereby depriving [...] and Appellants of their due process rights:
[brief] Thus, the [...]’s comments were only one factor for [...] to weigh in making its own final determination regarding the second component of the agency’s June 23, 2021 HAD.  Regarding Point #1, [...]’s reference to “the information submitted” makes no mention of the hundreds of public comments that the agency received regarding [...]’s Project.  And these public comments included statements arguing that the Project was not consistent with the goals and purposes of the Highlands Act.  For example, one of the goals of the Highlands Act is “the protection of the water...of the New Jersey Highlands. ”  But in their joint public comments, [...], the [...], and the [...] argued that “The proposal which includes a 19,000 hp polluting compressor as well as backup --- 49 *Highlands Applicability*, 433 N.J. Super. at 237-238 (App. Div. 2013) (quoting N.J.S.A. 13:1D-9) (emphasis added).
[directive] Confirmação de endereço Address  Verification a)  Você entende que se está se declarando culpado pelo crime de agressão sexual qualificada, [Sim/Yes] [Não/No] agressão sexual, contato sexual criminal qualificado, sequestro segundo os termos da lei 2C:13-1c(2) ou por tentativa de cometer qualquer um destes crimes e na sentença o juiz decidir que sua conduta se caracteriza por um padrão de comportamento reincidente e compulsivo você terá que confirmar seu endereço com o devido órgão policial a cada 90 dias no Formulário revisado promulgado pela diretiva 01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 10080-Portuguese página 2 de 7 Revised Form Promulgated by Directive #01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 10080-Portuguese page 2 of 7 ou, se o juiz decidir que sua conduta não se caracteriza por um padrão de comportamento reincidente e compulsivo, você terá que confirmar seu endereço anualmente? Do you understand that if you are pleading guilty to aggravated sexual assault, sexual assault, aggravated criminal sexual contact, kidnapping pursuant to 2C:13-1c(2) or any attempt to commit any of these crimes and at sentencing the court finds that your conduct was characterized by a pattern of repetitive, compulsive behavior you must verify your address with the appropriate law enforcement agency every 90 days or if the court finds your conduct is not characterized by a pattern of repetitive and compulsive behavior, you must verify your address annually?
[brief] [...]: Continued public hearing, [...], [...], site of [...], [...], Block 13, Lot 14 in the OL2 zone.  Applicant seeks variance relief to construct a regulator station, a regulator station, which is an additional principal use on the site.  Variance relief to construct the proposed regulator station within the buffer required between a non-residential use and residential zone where 384.25 feet is required and 74.5 is proposed.  Variance relief for fence height in front, side and rear yard, 8 foot proposed, 6 foot permitted.  [...]:  Thank you.  Do you want to do a recap where we are and where we are left to do today?  [...]: Absolutely.  Good evening, Board Members.  [...], [...], on behalf of the Applicant, [...].  The first hearing, on this matter, was February 3rd, followed by an onsite inspection on February 27th.  The second hearing was conducted on March 2nd, on May 18, July 20,  In order to conserve paper and preserve the environment, pages 7 to 79 have been omitted.
[brief] On PCR, the defense wanted an expert to conduct a forensic examination of the drive to determine if any vestige of footage survived.  PCR counsel wrote to [...] in 2018 requesting it “ensure it has preserved and will continues to preserve” the hard drive so it could be made available for “inspection or cloning” on PCR.  (Da194-95)  However, when PCR counsel requested the drive, [...] refused to even confirm its continued existence.  (See 20T11-8 to 13)  Thus, on April 24, 2019, PCR counsel filed a motion to compel production of the hard drive for examination, and, if it turned out footage was irretrievably lost, to have the opportunity to probe whether any of the processes resulting in the loss came after the August 2013 preservation order.  (Da196)  On December 21, 2021, [...], who had previously presided over the PCR proceedings, found “[t]his is an unusual case” and the discovery request was narrow, specific, and limited.  (21T46-14 to 25, 47-17 to 48-4, 48-11 to 12)  He determined [...] should be permitted to conduct his own forensic examination of the drive for critical evidence pertaining to his alibi, granted the order, and directed the prosecutor to determine whether the drive still existed, and about its use in any subsequent cases.
[brief] ”  State v. Roth, 95 NJ 334, 365 (1984).  Indeed, even when a factor is inappropriately applied, the sentence should stand provided it is not otherwise capable of producing an unjust result.  See R.2:10-2; State v. O'Donnell, 117 N.J. 210, 215-16 (1989); State v. Ghertler, 114 N.J. 383, 393 (1989); State v. Roth, 95 N.J. 334, 363-65 (1984).
[directive] Honesty is an essential job function for every New Jersey law enforcement officer.  Officers who are not committed to the truth, who cannot convey facts and observations in an accurate and impartial manner and whose credibility can be impeached in court cannot advance the State’s interests in criminal matters.  In addition, defendants in criminal matters may be entitled to certain evidence the prosecutor has concerning the credibility of prosecution witnesses, including police officers.  Prosecutors are considered to possess such evidence even when law enforcement agencies create and maintain information concerning the honesty of individual officers.  Furthermore, prosecutors may be required to provide such evidence to the court.  It is therefore imperative that the internal affairs investigator assist prosecutors with their legal duty to review and, if necessary, disclose evidence that may impact the credibility of police officers.
[brief] This appeal provides the opportunity to correct erroneous legal conclusions in which the Trial Court found, contrary to controlling authority, that (a) “Appleman’s rule” does not apply to third-party liability insurance coverage, even though this Court and the Supreme Court have applied the rule in such cases, (b) an exception to a mold exclusion that says the exclusion does not apply to cases in which there is mold “on edible goods intended for human consumption” also required proof that (i) there were mycotoxins in the mold, (ii) the mycotoxins were ingested by the claimant, and (iii) the ingestion caused injury, and (c) the “manifestation” trigger of coverage applies to a case in which there was undisputed proof of continuous injurious exposure to a harmful substance, even though it has been the settled law of New Jersey since at least 1994 that a “continuous trigger” of coverage applies to cases such as this one.
[brief] Ia674 • Exhibit L, November 12, 2019 email from [...], USF 1425 and dep exhibit PP7 Ia683  ###  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES  **Rules:** N.J.S.A. 17B:24-3(d)  **Cases:** | Case Name | Citation | |------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------| | Allstate Ins. Co. v. Meloni | 98 N.J.Super. 154 (App. Div. 1967) | | American Policyholders’ Ins. Co. v. Portale | 88 N.J.Super. 429 (App. Div. 1965) | | Bhagat v. Bhagat | 217 N.J. 22 (2014) | | Botti v. CAN Ins. Co., | 361 N.J. Super. 217 (App. Div. 2003) | | Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., | 142 N.J. 520 (1995) | | Clarendon National Ins. Co. v. The Ins. Co. of the West | 442 F. Supp. 2d. 914 (E.D. Cal. 2006) | | Daibo v. Kirsch | 316 N.J. Super. 580 (App. Div. 1998) | | Doto v. Russo | 140 N.J. 544 (1995) | | Fairlawn Indus. v. Gerling America Ins. Co., | 342 N.J. Super. 113 (App. Div. 2001) | | Fargas v. Gorham | 276 N.J. Super. 135 (Law Div. 1994) | | Fellippello v. Allsate Ins. Co., | 172 N.J. Super. 249 (App. Div. 1979) | | First Am. Title Ins. Co. v. Lawson | 177 N.J. 125 (2003) | | Fisher v. New Jersey Auto. Full Ins. Underwriting Ass’n., | 224 N.J. Super. 552 (App. Div. 1988) | | Flomerfelt v. Cardiello | 202 N.J. 432 (2010) | | Globe Motor Co. v. Igdalev | 225 N.J. 469 (2016) | | Hawkins v. Globe Life Ins. Co., | 105 F.Supp.3d 430 (2015) | | Katsoufris v. Adamo | 216 N.J. Super. 84 (1987) | | Ledley v. William Penn. Life Ins. Co., | 138 N.J. 627 (1995) | | Lehrhoff v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., | 271 N.J. Super. 340 (App. Div. 1994) | viii Liebling v. Garden State Indemnity, 337 N.J. Super. 447, certif. denied, 169 N.J. 606 (App. Div. 2001)