ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] TABLE OF AUTHORITIES  N.J.Const. Art. VIII, par. 4.  Sec. 1 ...........................................................................................................34 Statutes: N.J.S.A. 18A:7A-56 ..................................................................................................................12 N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-5 (d) (10) .................................................................................................18 N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-5 (e) (1) .................................................................................................19 N.J.S.A.18A:7F-39..................................................................................................................29 N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-6 ....................................................................................................................17 N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-60..................................................................................................................32 N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-44(d)..............................................................................................................16 N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-46....................................................................................................................35 N.J.S.A. 18A:22-40..................................................................................................................29 N.J.S.A. 18A:7A-55 (b)..........................................................................................................33 Case Law: Abbott v. Burke, EDU5581-85 (initial decision), August 24, 1988.................................10 Abbott v. Burke (Abbott XX), 199 N.J. 140 (2009) .......................................................10, 17 Abbott v. Burke (Abbott XXI), 206 N.J. 332 (2011).........................................................7, 8, 9, 37, 40 Alcantara v. Allen-McMillan, 475 N.J.Super. 56 (App.Div. 2023).........................5, 10, 20 In re Pet. For Auth. To Conduct, 298 N.J. Super. 1 (App.Div. 1997).............................14 De Rolph v. Ohio, 78 Ohio St. 3d 193 (1997).................................................................14 De Rolph v. Ohio, 89 Ohio St. 3d 1, (2000) .................................................................14 Robinson v. Cahill, 62 N.J. 473 (1973).................................................................25 Robinson v. Cahill, 69 N.J.133 (1975).................................................................41 PRELIMINARY STATEMENT This nearly ten-year-old case has raised the following questions: (i) are [...] being denied their fundamental state constitutional right to a “thorough and efficient” education (T&E)? (ii) if they are being denied T&E, is the School Funding Reform Act (SFRA) the cause? and (iii) if they are being denied T&E, what remedy must be provided?
[brief] Even after confirmation of Phase I, [...] attempted to thwart new management’s control, leading to a sweeping injunction.  As the trial court prudently observed, the events that unfolded on and after February 8, 2016 were “unacceptable” and “shocking. ”  (2T33:20-25)  “[T]he company’s suspicions about [...]’s motives and plans turn[ed] out to be entirely justified.
[brief] (Da006, District Court Docket Report, ECF #1).  The First Amended Complaint itself was fifty-five (55) pages long and included with the First Amended Complaint was fifty-two (52) pages of exhibits which contained documents dated back to 2004, approximately ten (10) years prior to the subject incident.  (Da037-143, First Amended Complaint; specifically see Da107-108).  2.  The Federal Court  Second Amended Complaint – Plaintiff’s first attempt to specifically comply with Federal Court standards and the Court’s dismissal.  On June 26, 2017, Plaintiff filed a Second Amended Complaint.  (Da008, District Court Docket Report, ECF #21).  At this point, the action was in Federal Court and thus Plaintiff was fully aware that he had to comply with federal pleading standards.  Defendants filed a motion to dismiss which was granted on July 12, 2018.  (Da144-169, 7/12/18 Order and Decision).
[brief] The jury was instructed that to find [...] guilty of each count of terroristic threats, it need only find that he threatened to commit a crime of violence, specifically, aggravated assault, and did so with the purpose to terrorize [...].  (4T 55-9 to 18)  With regard to the second element – the defendant’s subjective mental state – the court informed the jury that the State alleges the defendant intended to terrorize [...].  The State need not prove that the victim actually was terrorized.  A person acts purposely with respect to the nature of his conduct, or result thereof, if it’s his conscious object to engage in the conduct of that nature or to cause such a result.  [4T 56-8 to 14.]  The jury was also told that if it found [...] guilty of making terroristic threats, it would have to decide whether the threats were made “during a declared period of [a] state of emergency. ”  (4T 56-17 to 21)  On May 4, 2023, the jury returned guilty verdicts on all counts.  (4T 82-17 to 85-21; Da45-52)  **B.
[brief] May 15, 2024  [...] ID. NO. 310912019  Assistant Deputy Public Defender Of Counsel and  On the Letter-Brief  LETTER-BRIEF AND APPENDIX  ON BEHALF OF DEFENDANT-APPELLANT  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE  DIVISION  DOCKET NO. [...] IND. NO. [...]  STATE OF NEW JERSEY, : CRIMINAL ACTION  Plaintiff-Respondent, :  On Appeal from the Denial of a v. : Motion to Withdraw a Guilty Plea, Defendant-Appellant.  : Law Division, Mercer County.  [...], : Sat Below: Hon. [...], J.S.C.  Your Honors:
[brief] Indeed, [...] testified that Defendant [...] approved the charge pay – disputing the central tenet in Respondents’ justification for Appellant’s termination.  Specifically, [...] testified as follows:  So I said why can we not at least get charge pay, which is one dollar an hour.  And she said, in front of several people, you can get charge pay, as long as I don’t get in trouble.  (Pa230).  Defendants (knowing they must discredit this evidence) claim that this testimony is contradicted by Defendant [...] as memorialized interview notes, Defendant [...]’s own denials, and the fact that other witnesses had no firsthand knowledge of the approval.  (Rb32.)  That is not true.  The notes from [...]’ interview with Defendant [...] read:  [...] asked [...] if they could get charge pay.  [...] saw another Coordinator was getting charge pay ([...] in Cath Lab).  [...] said, "yeah, we can try it if I don’t get in trouble."  It was not a sit-down conversation.  [...] assumed [...] was not in trouble because she did not say anything.  So, [...] thought they were ok. (Pa547.)  These notes are consistent with [...]’ assertion that Defendant [...], according to her, approved the charge pay.  Defendants’ version of events collapses if Defendant [...] was aware of the charge pay.
[brief] Rule 4:50 relief is also warranted under subsection (e), providing for relief where “it is no longer equitable that the judgment or order should have prospective application,” under subsection (f)’s exceptional circumstances provision, or per the Court’s inherent authority in this chancery action.  An abuse of discretion occurs where the decision under appeal “inexplicably departed from established policies,” Iliadis v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 191 N.J. 88, 123 (2007).  That is the case here, because of the fundamental flaws in the entry of the Final Judgment of Divorce in the first place – as shown by the record beginning with plaintiff’s filings, through the March 18, 2015 default judgment hearing before [...], and culminating in the Final Judgment of Divorce entered that day.
[brief] THE COMMISSIONER INCORRECTLY FOUND THAT APPELLANT VIOLATED N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24(b), 18A:12-24.1(e), and 18A:12-24.1(f)(Sg001-Sg007;Sg164-Sg183;Sg186-Sg191;Sg192-Sg201;Sg206-Sg236).  The Commissioner and the [...] erroneously concluded, without credible evidence in the record, that Appellant violated N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24(b)(use of official position to secure an unwarranted advantage), 18A:12-24.1(e)(taking actions outside the scope of officially mandated duties), and 18A:12-24.1(f)(using school resources for personal gain).
[brief] In 2010, [...] purchased the School property (he is affiliated) and around that time synagogue staff/attendees began parking in the Sixth Street courtyard.  In 2013, the [...] chiseled out an entry cut on the curb on Sixth Street in front of Lot 8 to facilitate vehicles parking in the School courtyard.  For the past several years, he has been regularly working at and for the School and has observed the safety problems arising from vehicles driving into and parking in the School courtyard (12T17-5 to 45-24).  The School then presented [...], age 60 and a life-long Lakewood resident.
[brief] The loosened standards for the lesser 70(d) variances under Coventry and its progeny call for proofs “…relevant to the nature of the deviation from the ordinance. ”  Pb 25 quoting Coventry, supra at 297-98.  In addition to never arguing before the Board that Coventry-like standards should apply to their variance application, Plaintiffs never presented any proofs about the purposes of [...]’s prohibition of accessory uses without a principal use on the same lot, how Plaintiffs’ proposed development does not offend those purposes, or how Plaintiffs’ site “….will accommodate the problems associated with the use even though the proposal does not comply with the ordinance established to address those problems.
[brief] THE COURT:  I -- on Page 23, plaintiffs assert that [...]'s negligent supervision of the attorney trust account would not require the explanation of a legal expert.  I -- I -- again, they -- they cite no case law that supports that proposition.  And of course, there are a number of rules that address an attorney's obligation, or law firm's obligation with respect to its attorney trust account.  So, again, respectfully, I -- I just cannot see how that would be within the ken of a -- of a juror.  THE COURT:  It's not a situation where a deadline was missed.  It's not a situation where there was a failure to file a motion timely.  It's not a case where there was a failure to relay a settlement offer, for example.  It's not simply a failure to produce an expert witness in a trial.
[brief] It would be illogical for the Legislature to provide as such if it did not consider “merged” school districts to be a form of regional or consolidated school district from which one constituent party could withdraw.  If a “merged” district really is just a single school district, as Appellants contend, there would be no reason for the regionalization provisions to apply, thus rendering the language of N.J.S.A. 18A:8-50(8) meaningless at best and contradictory at worst.  See generally DiProspero, 183 N.J. at 492-97 (noting that courts must construe statutory language harmoniously and presume that the Legislature acts with specific intent to harmonize statutory language).  See also State v. Frye, 217 N.J. 566, 575 (2014) (noting that courts must avoid statutory interpretation that leads to an absurd result); Shelton v. Restaurant.com, Inc., 214 N.J. 419, 440-41 (2013) (holding that courts must avoid interpreting a statute in a manner that renders certain words or provisions to be meaningless or mere “surplusage”).  In sum, [...] and [...] both are subject to the regionalization provisions of chapter 13, which was amended by N.J.S.A. 18A:13-47.11 to expressly permit municipalities to withdraw from their current district and to join or form new regional school districts.  Thus, the Legislature has specifically provided that municipalities such as [...], which do not have their own boards of education, are covered by the withdrawal provisions of chapter 13, regardless of whether they have “merged” with another district.  To hold otherwise would be to ignore the wider statutory scheme that the Legislature has implemented and that the Commissioner is charged with enforcing.  Relatedly, the statute’s use of the disjunctive term “or” also supports the Commissioner’s interpretation of the statute.  *N.J.S.A. 18A:13-47.11* provides that a board of education **or** a municipal governing body may seek to withdraw from a regional or consolidated school district.  The use of disjunctive phrasing suggests that the Legislature intended that both boards of education **and** municipalities, independently and of their own accord, have the ability to seek withdrawal from a regional or consolidated school district.  *See Pine Belt Chevrolet v. Jersey Cent. Power*, 132 N.J. 564, 578 (1993) (explaining importance of disjunctive phrasing and use of the term “or”).  Moreover, the Legislature also authorized municipal governing bodies to apply for regionalization feasibility study grants under *N.J.S.A. 18A:13-47.3*.  Given that chapter 13’s statutory scheme empowers municipalities to seek withdrawal from a district on their own accord, permits them to apply for feasibility study grants, and expressly applies chapter 13 to municipalities that have been merged into other school districts, it is clear that the Legislature intended that municipalities such as [...] are permitted to seek withdrawal from a regional or consolidated school district.
[brief] ([...] Dep. 15:6-17 & 17:25-18:18, 622a-623a; 141:19-20, 647a; [...] Dep. 11:13-19, 709a).  [...], the Mayor of [...] in August 2017, similarly admitted as follows:  Q.  Does the Township Committee, including the Public Safety Committee, ever become involved in internal affairs investigations being conducted by the police department of individual officers who are employed by the police department?  A.  No.  Q.  Does the Township Committee, including the Public Safety Committee, ever become involved in decisions regarding disciplinary action to be taken against an officer?  A. No.  Q.  When I say “disciplinary action,” I’m referring to reprimand, suspension, demotion, and removal.  Do you understand that?  A. Yes.  Q.  And is your answer to my question still no?  A.  … My answer is still no.  ([...] Dep. 16:6-25, 670a).  As outlined supra, the [...] confirmed in writing to Defendants that pursuant to its investigation, any allegation that Plaintiff engaged in conduct that could give rise to any administrative disciplinary action was not sustained, and Defendants were bound by that finding.  (303a).  Consistent with the internal affairs and disciplinary process, and the [...] findings as to Plaintiff, outlined above, [...] confirmed that the [...] conducted no internal affairs investigation of Plaintiff.  (Williams Dep. 18:12-22, 585a; 57:14-18, 594a; 61:22-62:3, 595a-596a; 64:6-13, 596a).  [...] did not even interview Plaintiff pursuant to her internal affairs investigation of the July 5, 2016 incident.  (Id. at 19:22-24, 585a).  Plaintiff testified that at 9:00pm on August 1, 2017, he received a call from [...] advising Plaintiff that Defendants had suspended him, with that suspension being without cause and without the [...] Police Department conducting an internal affairs investigation of which Plaintiff was the target and that resulted in a “sustained” finding, in violation of state statute, specifically Title 40A, and Attorney General Guidelines which govern internal affairs and police discipline.
[brief] (17T202-7 to 1).  Contrary to defendant’s claim (Db81), the judge expressly addressed deterrence in the context of defendant’s Autism, finding that, unlike the defendant in State v. Jarbath, 114 N.J. 394 (1989), whose mental and emotional deficiencies precluded her from understanding that she had committed a crime, this defendant was capable of understanding his actions and knew they were wrong.  (17T202-7 to 10).
[brief] Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:14-1, any claim “for recovery upon a contractual claim or liability . . . shall be commenced within 6 years next after the cause of any such action shall have accrued. ”  “[S]tatutes of limitations have been adopted regarding all causes of action, in order to ‘promote repose by giving security and stability to human affairs. ’”  Caravaggio v. D'Agostini, 166 N.J. 237, 245 (2001)(quoting Wood v. Carpenter, 101 U.S. 135, 139 (1879)).
[brief] [...] immediately ruled as follows:  THE COURT:  Thank you, [...].  I’ve heard the testimony of the plaintiff.  I find the plaintiff to be credible.  I find that the parties have entered into an agreement that resolves all the issues in the divorce.  They’ve done so voluntarily without coercion or duress.  The plaintiff believes the agreement is reasonably fair and equitable under all the circumstances.  He’s satisfied with the services of counsel.  And he will be able to maintain a lifestyle reasonably comparable to that which he did during the marriage.  In addition, I note that the defendant, while not being represented by counsel of record, did have an attorney review the agreement on her behalf.  So for those reasons I will accept the agreement and incorporate that into the final judgment.
[brief] The Plaintiffs-Appellants claim that the Boundary Commissioners’ Report does in fact affect the surrounding Lots because the Report “must be met with an equal adjustment in the boundary line of adjacent properties. ”  Based upon this claim, the Plaintiffs-Appellants further argue that the Boundary Commissioners’ Report affects non-parties to the suit, i.e. the surrounding Lot owners who failed to be joined as “necessary” parties in the Trial Court litigation.  These assertions are based on Plaintiffs-Appellants misinterpretation of the Boundary Commissioners’ Report and the Trial Court’s Final Order, as well as an inappropriate assertion of third-party rights by the Plaintiffs.  The Boundary Commissioners’ report would only affect neighboring properties and potentially cloud neighbors’ title if the report concretely impacted all downward property lines by 4.5 feet the same as it impacted the [...] property line.  However, the Boundary Commissioners’ Report does not necessitate this “domino effect”.  While the Plaintiffs sought a determination from the Trial Court that the Report did in fact necessitate a modification to all surrounding Lots and property lines, the Court rejected this claim.  The Court analyzed the Boundary Commissioners’ Report as well as the underlying statutory authority and determined the Report neither necessitates nor has the authority to impact sounding Lots.  The Report is only “final” as to the parties to the lawsuit, i.e. the [...] and [...], and thereby only implicates the [...] and [...] properties in the ultimate determination of the proper placement of the disputed boundary line.  Furthermore, the Plaintiffs-Appellants do not have standing to unilaterally claim a cloud on neighbor’s title for the benefit of their own legal position.  Peaceable possession by the claimant is a jurisdictional prerequisite of an action affecting title to a property.  N.J.S.A. 2A:62–1; Braue v. Fleck, 23 N.J. 1, 5, 127 A.2d 1 (1956); Persons v. Bergmann, 182 N.J.Super. 476, 479, 442 A.2d 647 (App.Div.1982).  N.J.S.A. 2A:62–1 specifically provides that:  “Any person in the peaceable possession of lands in this state and claiming ownership thereof, may, when his title thereto, or any part thereof, is denied or disputed…maintain an action in the superior court to settle the title to such lands and to clear up all doubts and disputes concerning the same. ”  Plaintiffs-Appellants do not maintain either possession nor title to the surrounding lots and thereby do not satisfy the standing requirement to assert any hypothetical title issues on behalf of their neighbors.  In the event that subsequent owners of neighboring properties seek to dispute the Boundary Commissions’ Report or pursue claims of cloud on title, the owners retain the right to pursue an independent quiet title action.  As such, subsequent property owners retain a remedy without one having to be fashioned now by the Appellate Division based on Plaintiffs-Appellants hypothetical claim of cloud-on-title to a neighbor’s property, without either consent of the neighbors or standing to do so.
[brief] Within the context of SFRA’s cost-based, weighted student structure, “optimal” can only mean funding [...] at its Adequacy Budget level, a meaning the Supreme Court made clear in Abbott XXI when ordering full SFRA funding in Abbott districts in the wake of the State’s $402 million funding cut:  [t]he relief granted to the State [in Abbott XX] was thus conditioned on two express mandates.  The first required that the SFRA be fully funded.  The second mandate, requiring a ‘look back’ and retooling of the SFRA after its reexamination, underscored the first requirement of full funding.  It was no small matter that our decision expressly took into account that SFRA’s three-year period of implementation would be subject to rigorous review due to its requirement for reexamination, and adjustment, if necessary, to component parts of the formula.  Id., at 354 (emphasis added).  In essence, the Supreme Court rejected the same argument the State makes in its Brief: that underfunding [...]’s Adequacy Budget is constitutionally permissible.
[brief] *Jury was tainted by highly prejudicial summation by [...] which [...] did not address at all*  During his summation, counsel made highly prejudicial, incurable, statements regarding [...] not testifying that the legal bills were unreasonable.  (6T pg. 237, line 15 - pg. 238, line 9).  And [...] permitted the jury to listen to those words despite the fact that the reason [...] didn’t testify to such, as stated above was due to [...]’s own order precluding same.  Specific statements by [...]’s counsel during summation included: that [...] “didn’t say that the bills were unreasonable.  He didn’t say the bills were excessive.  He didn’t say that the bills were not necessary.  He didn’t offer that opinion.  So he’s not on the same wave length as his own, as his own client, [...], who said well they’re unreasonable…  He didn’t say one time that the bills were excessive, unreasonable and not fair, not one time. ”  Id.  After the weekend, on December 5, 2022, [...] formally requested a mistrial because [...] had not recused herself.  (6T, Pg. 215, lines 2-12.)  [...]’s counsel did not understand the details of the argument, he had only been retained about a month before the trial (5T, Pg. 29, lines 14-17) and (4T, Pg. 314, lines 2-3).  But [...] himself had been complaining of bias and harassment from the beginning of Trial.  Moreover [...]’s attorney made many objections based on prejudice and other grounds and [...] made many objections as well and in a great majority, the Court ruled against [...].  ARGUMENT
[brief] (2T:12-13 to 15-7).  [...] sentenced defendant to a fine of $57 and $33 in court costs.  (2T:15-9 to 15-10).  ______________________________ noted defendant’s submission of the pro se request for discovery “indicat[ed] she intended to proceed pro se. ”  Sa2.  On April 22, 2022, defendant appealed her conviction to the Superior Court, Law Division.
[brief] On September 3, 2019, [...] moved to dismiss [...]’s pleadings, pursuant to R. 4:6-2(e).  The motion was briefed, opposed, argued and denied.  But in denying the motion, the trial court was bound by the strictures of Printing Mart-Morristown v. Sharp Electronics, 116 N.J.  739 (1989).  That New Jersey Supreme Court decision required the trial court to accept as true all of the factual allegations made by [...]; and required the trial court to give [...] all favorable inferences suggesting she actually had a cause of action.  So the trial court’s denial is understandable.