ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] ”  In State v. Parker, our Court reemphasized “the significance of a petition for post-conviction relief and … that a hearing on such a petition is not a pro forma exercise, but a meaningful procedure to root out mistakes that cause an unjust result either in a verdict or sentence.  "  State v. Parker, 212 N.J. 269, 279 (2012).  Parker emphasizes “the need for each judge to remain constantly aware that each such matter involves not just docket numbers but individuals who have turned to the courts seeking relief from what they perceive as unfairness and injustice. ”  Id. at 273.  A.  [...]’s PCR should be remanded for further proceedings because the dismissal of the PCR prior to submissions and oral argument is premature.
[brief] The constitutional guarantee to a public trial, as expressed in both the federal and State constitutions, applies to all phases of the trial, including jury selection.  *Press–Enterprise Co. v.* Superior Court of Cal., 464 U.S. 501, 104 S.Ct. 819, 78 L. Ed.2d 629 (1984); State v. Cuccio, 350 N.J.Super. 248, 260, 794 A.2d 880 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 174 N.J. 43 (2002).  If a defendant is denied the right to a public trial, the error is deemed “structural,” which mandates reversal of the conviction without a showing that the defendant was prejudiced by the denial.
[brief] See also Packard-Bamberger & Co. v. Collier, 167 N.J. 427, 444 (2001) ([...]’s “deferential standard of review guides our analysis”).  An appellate court should reverse a trial court’s award of fees for abuse of discretion only when the court’s decision “was based on irrelevant or inappropriate factors, or amounts to a clear error in judgment. ”  Garmeaux v. DNV Concepts, Inc., 448 N.J. Super. 148, 155-56 (App. Div. 2016).  In Furst, our Supreme Court “strongly discourage[d] the use of an attorney-fee application as an invitation to become mired in a second round of litigation.
[brief] Plaintiff did not claim and did not offer proof that there was anything wrong with the design of the subject vehicle that caused it to leave its proper lane and crash head-on into [...]’s vehicle.  *See Macri v. Ames McDonough Co.*, 211 N.J. Super. 636, 641 (App. Div. 1986) (granting involuntary dismissal at the close of the evidence on plaintiff’s design defect claim because the risk of a hammer chipping during use did not amount to evidence that it was defective); *see also Myrlak v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J.*, 157 N.J. 84, 98 (1999) (plaintiff is required to show that “something was wrong with the product”).  Indeed, as Plaintiff concedes, the 2016 Honda CR-V complied with all relevant government standards.  Pa194-95.  Further, Plaintiff’s expert could not identify any “mechanical failure” of the subject vehicle that caused the crash.  Pa179.  In short, Plaintiff offered no evidence that the subject vehicle, which – like all other vehicles – requires its driver to maintain control over it, is somehow unreasonably unsafe.
[brief] ##  Case Law  **Ahn v. Kim,** 145 N.J. 423, 439 (1996) (quoting N.J.R.E. 301) .................. 2  **Crane v. Bielski,** 15 N.J. 342, 349 (1954)  .........................................................  12  **Garley v. Waddington,** 177 N.J. Super. 173, 180-81 (App. Div. 1981) .......................  2  **Jameson v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co.,** 363 N.J.Super. 419, 426-427 (App. Div.  2003) ...................... 1, 6 **Resolution Trust Corp v. Associated Gulf Contractors,** 263 N.J. Super. 332, 344 (App. Div.), certif. denied 134 N.J. 480 (1993) ........................................... 2 **Rosa v. Araujo,** 260 N.J. Super. 458, 462 (App. Div. 1992), certif. denied, 133 N.J. 434 (1993) ........................................ 6 **Rudbart v. Bd. Of Review,** 339 N.J. Super. 118, 122-123 (App. Div. 2001) ..................... 15 **Seymour v. Nessanbaum,** 120 N.J. Eq. 24, 25 (Ch. 1936) .............................................. 2 **State v. Cuccio,** 350 N.J. Super. 248, 257 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 174 N.J. 43 (2002) .......................................... 2 ## Court Rules and Statutes N.J.S.A. 52:7-10 et seq. .......................................................... 13 Appellants, Ruslan and [...], submit this reply brief in reply to the briefs submitted by Plaintiff, [...] (PHPb) and Intervenor, [...] (341Ib).
[directive] Witness acknowledgement form  May be entitled to a Weingarten • • representative  May be entitled to a Weingarten • representative7 8.1.2  Serious allegations of officer misconduct may implicate both a violation of a criminal statute and of an agency’s rules and regulations.  As a result, a criminal investigation and an administrative disciplinary investigation may be needed to properly resolve a misconduct complaint.  In general, criminal investigations and administrative investigations should be kept separate to the extent possible, with criminal investigations led by the County Prosecutor’s Office preceding internal affairs disciplinary investigations.
[brief] It is well-established that an agency’s determination will not be upset unless it is affirmatively shown that it is arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable or that it lacks fair support in the record as a whole.  Karins v. City of Atl. City, 152 N.J. 532, 540 (1998).  A strong presumption of reasonableness attaches to the Commission’s decision.  In re Carroll, 339 N.J. Super. 429, 437 (App. Div. Thus, a court must affirm the decision if the evidence supports it, even if the court may question its wisdom or would have reached a different result.  *Campbell v. N.J. Racing Comm’n*, 169 N.J. 579, 587 (2001).  The Commission’s decision should be affirmed given that it is supported by ample evidence in the record and consistent with applicable law.
[brief] On May 30, 2018, Deputy [...] of the [...] in Spotsylvania, Virginia, got a notification from New Jersey law enforcement that [...] was wanted for the charges.  (16T:7-10 to 9-14)  Using a “cell phone ping,” Plunkett found [...] in the parking lot of the [...] in Spotsylvania and took him into custody.  (16T:7-10 to 8-22)  Plunkett found two BB guns in a computer bag in [...]’s hotel room.  (16T:12-11 to 17-15)  The BB guns were operable and were legal to own and possess in Virginia.  (16T:69-6 to 16, 123-17 to 128-2)  It could not be determined whether the BB’s found at [...] had come from either of the BB guns.  (16T:134-1 to 10)  Two days after the arrest, Sergeant [...] of the [...] drove to Spotsylvania with [...] to interview [...].  (17T:18-20 to 19-10)  Weisbrot told [...] that he was charged with three counts relating to his possession of a firearm in Holmdel.  (17T:27-15 to 28-5)  Even though [...] was the primary suspect in the two arsons at [...], the detectives did not tell [...] that he was suspected in connection with the arsons prior to seeking his Miranda waiver.  (17T:196-9 to 197-17)  [...] had instructed Deputy Plunkett “not to let Mr. [...] know that he is being investigated for the arsons” prior to the interview.  (17T:7021 to 71-1)  [...] asked extensive questions about the process for invoking his Miranda rights before signing the waiver form and then invoked his right to silence in response to certain questions during the interrogation. \(^3\) (Da 40; 17T:29-18 to 126-3)  **Text Messages to [...]**
[brief] In addition, the Court may affirm the judgment below for three reasons raised below that the trial court did not need to reach.  First, plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case of nuisance because he did not show what legal duty of care [...] allegedly breached by repaving their driveway or by replacing the railroad ties that lined their driveway with Belgian block.  Second, under the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel, plaintiff cannot sue [...] for preexisting water runoff because he litigated those claims to a final adjudication in the Burke Action.  Third, plaintiff’s failure to apportion his alleged damages between water runoff caused by preexisting conditions and water runoff that he sought to attribute to [...] was fatal to this action.  This Court should thus affirm the judgment in favor of [...], both for the reasons that the trial court relied on and for those that it did not need to reach.  **PROCEDURAL HISTORY**
[brief] They submit that the verdict resulted from the intrusion of improper influences upon the deliberative process.  Their arguments are made in good faith based upon the record below.  In response, Plaintiff has chosen to denigrate them as “works of legal alchemy” and an “assault upon justice” portraying the trial as “some kind of circus. ”  The tenor of that response reflects the emotional appeal made to the jury in presenting a “theme” of the case which identified Defendants’ refusal to “make things right” as the reason for the parties, the jurors and the Court having to appear for trial.  Reprising that theme, Plaintiff now castigates the Defendants for “spar[ing] no expense, and pay[ing] no mind to the resources of the judiciary, to see … justice undone. ”  Attacking Defendants’ trial counsel and insurance adjuster as unbelievable and “laughably self-serving” raises the ad hominem ante.  Pejoratives aside, however, Plaintiff’s Respondent’s Brief simply misses the point.  STATEMENT OF FACTS
[brief] Following Plaintiff’s presentation of evidence during a three (3) day trial, the Court found that Plaintiff owned a 10% membership interest in [...] and was an oppressed minority member.  (Aa59).  The Trial Court then concluded that it had no reliable means to value [...]’ shares because Plaintiff did not provide the court with a reasonable formula to do the same or utilize cognizable valuation techniques to value [...] shares.  (Aa41).  The Trial Court then denied Plaintiff’s valuation of $250,000.00 for her 10% interest in [...] based on [...]’ financial records, and instead gave a de minimus value to [...], resulting in Plaintiff receiving no value for her membership in [...] and compensation for unearned income only, totaling approximately $11,000.00.  When denying Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration, the Trial Court reiterated, “[w]ithout an expert report or other reliable means to valuate [...], the court found plaintiff had not proven by a preponderance of the evidence that she was entitled to $250,000.00 for her 10% share of [...]. ” (Aa71).  In the absence of a reliable valuation methodology presented by the Plaintiff, and consistent with Borodinsky and Torres, the Trial Court should have appointed an independent expert to ensure a fair and informed assessment of [...]’ value; Id.  As a result, the Trial Court’s arbitrary attribution of a de minimis value to [...]’ membership interest, without seeking additional expertise, constitutes reversible error.  The Trial Court’s failure to properly value [...] under relevant case law should be reviewed de novo since case law speaks directly to the issue and the Trial Court’s failure to act in accordance with well-established case law is a legal issue.  Further, the Trial Court’s deviation from case law was clear error and prevented Plaintiff from receiving a fair valuation of her membership interests.  Therefore, the Trial Court’s May 8, 2023 and June 26, 2023 judgments and orders should be vacated, in part, and remanded with a directive to the Trial Court to appoint an expert to value Plaintiff’s membership interest, consistent with Borodinsky and Torres.
[brief] [...] directly answered the questions and was not in any way evasive.  (2T71-9 to 17).  The court also found [...] credible, despite defense attempts to raise doubts about his credibility.  Although the detective was somewhat confused in response to some of the questions, he was forthright and not attempting to evade or give untruthful responses.  (2T71-25 to 74-22).  The court found that if the two defendants “had merely stood still, we wouldn’t be here today. ” (2T75-9 to 11).  The court had to look at all of the circumstances involved in the situation, including the body-worn camera footage, the drone footage, and the testimony of the police officers.  (2T75-16 to 19).  Although the defense might have been correct to argue that flight alone is not enough, here the flight was combined with other factors, and the police had to respond, short of arrest, to a suspicious situation, as “[p]olice are not to be mere spectators of events” and “[n]ot every police pursuit is a seizure. ” (2T75-19 to 76-18) (quoting State v. Tucker, 136 N.J. 158, 173 (1994)).  The court further noted that Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), and its progeny recognize the need of police officers to respond to suspicious situations with a brief stop for questioning if they are to investigate and prevent crime.  (2T76-19 to 23).  While the New Jersey Supreme Court did not find the seizure justified in Tucker, under the circumstances in this case the opposite is true.  (2T76-24 to 77-7).  The court found that the defense argument might have merit if the circumstances were to be taken apart piece by piece but, when they are looked at in their entirety, with the overall situation considered in light of the evidence, including the video, there existed a well-grounded suspicion that criminal activity was afoot and that the persons might be armed and dangerous.  (2T77-7 to 79-23).  The court further found that probable cause for arrest existed, given the drug transactions conducted by [...], the drugs found on one of [...]’s customers, the defendants walking in the area with [...], the flight of the defendants from the police, and [...]’s gun dislodging within seconds of his flight.  (2T79-24 to 82-5).  The court therefore denied defendants’ motion to suppress.  (2T82-6 to 8).  This appeal follows.
[brief] (17T:38-17 to 40-15).  She stated that [...] had instructed her to drop him off a block or so away from the house, and was going to collect clothes and belongings from the [...].  (17T:56-21 to 66-14, 70-8 to 71-15).  He expected to be back later, and told [...] he would call in a few hours to be picked up; that call never came.
[brief] Second, and more fundamentally, Plaintiff is a private entity and lacks the power to condemn.  Accordingly, the trial court was not allowed to undertake a comparative evaluation of competing uses to determine whether Plaintiff’s use should prevail as the paramount use or examine whether a potential or future use might be more beneficial than [...]’s proposed redevelopment use.  Ibid.  Because [...] has proffered a legitimate public use and has exercised good faith, the court below erred by interfering with its exercise of discretion in its decision to use its eminent domain power.  Therefore, this Court should reverse.
[brief] None of the cases [...] cites establishes that retrospective and prospective arbitration agreements are interchangeable.  As to the actually pertinent case law, [...] did not distinguish this matter from Martindale, 173 N.J. 76, in which the Supreme Court upheld an arbitration agreement as valid and enforceable.  (Pb31–32.)  Primarily, insofar as [...] contends that the facts presented in Martindale are the only circumstances allowing a court to find a knowing and voluntary agreement to arbitrate, she is incorrect: Martindale drew no such bright-line.  The facts here bear sufficient similarity to the circumstances in Martindale and in no way meaningfully differ so as to support the contention that there was no knowing and voluntary agreement to arbitrate [...]’s claims.
[brief] To discredit the trial court’s findings, Plaintiffs also argue the adoption of Ordinance 2022-17 is not supported by “substantial evidence” (Pb21) because the record is “devoid of any discussion by the Committee members regarding the reasons for the adoption” of the ordinance.  (Pb22).  In other words, Plaintiffs object to the lack of discussion and debate by the Committee Members before voting on the amending Ordinance (2022-17) at the October 27, 2022 Township Committee meeting.
[directive] Scheduling In-Person Hearing  Effective immediately, for those court events listed in the Court’s February 22, 2021 Order, attorneys will be required to file a certification that their client does not consent to proceed remotely or that they are unable to communicate with their client and thus cannot advise the court of their preference.  A template certification is provided as Attachment A.  In matters involving self-represented litigants, the court may require a similar certification or may conduct a colloquy on the record as to the party’s position as to proceeding remotely or in person.  A template certification for a party who is self-represented is provided as Attachment B.  Directive # 06-21 February 23, 2021
[brief] (a)  Requirements in Support of Motion.  The motion for summary judgment shall be served with a brief and a separate statement of material facts with or without supporting affidavits.  The statement of material facts shall set forth in separately numbered paragraphs a concise statement of each material fact as to which the movant contends there is no genuine issue together with a citation to the portion of the motion record establishing the fact or demonstrating that it is uncontroverted.  The citation shall identify the document and shall specify the pages and paragraphs or lines thereof or the specific portions of exhibits relied on.  A motion for summary judgment may be denied without prejudice for failure to file the required statement of material facts.  *R.*  4:46-2(a).  The “requirements [in Rule 4:46-2] for the filing of statements of material facts by parties to a motion for summary judgment are designed to focus . . . attention on the areas of actual dispute and facilitate the court’s review of the motion. ”  *Claypotch v. Heller*, 360 N.J. Super. 472, 488 (App. Div. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted).  A party’s failure to dispute facts in an opposing party’s statement of material facts should result in all such facts being deemed admitted.  *Housel*, 314 N.J. Super. 602 (citing *R.* 4:46-2(b)).  In this case, even if the trial court had delved into the substance of the parties’ summary judgment arguments, the trial court would have (and should have) arrived at the same result.  The Plaintiff’s counsel did not file any document disputing the Defendants’ Statement of Material Facts.  Under Rule 4:46-2(b), all of those facts are deemed admitted by the Plaintiff.  There was no dispute as to any alleged material facts in the Defendants’ summary judgment motion before the trial court as the Defendants’ summary judgment cross-motion was unopposed and the Plaintiff never denied any of the material facts set forth in the Defendants’ Statement of Material Facts.  Furthermore, the substance of the parties’ dispute confirms that summary judgment was appropriately entered in favor of the Defendants and against the Plaintiff.
[brief] On November 28, 2020, [...], Esq., counsel for plaintiff-appellant, [...] (“plaintiff”), filed a 59 paragraph seven (7) page civil complaint with seventeen (17) attached exhibits (totaling 57 pages), in the Essex County Superior Court, Law Division, alleging that the defendant-respondent, [...] a/k/a [...] (“defendant”), violated the Magnusson-Moss Warranty Act (“MMWA”), 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-2312, a federal fee-shifting statute.
[brief] J. Super. 275 (App. Div. 2001) | 34 | | State v. McCoy, 759 S.E.2d 330, 333 (N.C. Ct. App. 2014) | 30 | | State v. McNeil-Thomas, 238 N.J. 256 (2019) | 39 | | State v. Munoz, 340 N.J. Super. 204 (App. Div. 2001) | 38 | | State v. Neal, 361 N.J. Super. 522 (App. Div. 2003) | 39 | | State v. Pantoja, 169 N.J. 610 (2001) | 38 | | State v. Ramseur, 106 N.J. 123 (1987) | 33 | | State v. Rodriguez, 365 N.J. Super. 38 (App. Div.), | 37 | | certif. denied 180 N.J. 150 (2003) | | | State v. Schumann, 111 N.J. 470 (1988) | 36 | | State v. Sherman, 230 N.J. Super. 10 (App. Div. 1988) | 38, 39 | | State v. Stevens, 115 N.J. 289 (1989) | 34 | | CASES | |-------| | State v. Spruill, 16 N.J. 73 A.2d 278 (1954) | 41 | | State v. Wakefield, 190 N.J. 397 (2007) | 38 | | State v. Weeks, 107 N.J. 396 (1987) | 34 | | State v. Williams, 113 N.J. 393 (1988) | 37 | | STATUTES | |----------| | N.J.S.A. 2A:82-1 | 28 | | N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2a(1) | 1 | | N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2a(2) | 1 | | N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3a(1) | 1 | | N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3a(2) | 1 | | N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3a(3) | 1 | | N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3b(1) | 2 | | N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1a | 1 | | N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1a(2) | 1 | | N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1a(3) | 1 | | N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4a | 1 | | N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5b | 1 | | TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (CONT'D.) | PAGE NOS, | |-------------------------------|-----------| | **STATUTES (CONT'D.)** | | | N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6c | 2 | | N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2 | 2 | | N.J.S.A. 2C:58-4 | 1 | | **RULES** | | | R. 2:10-2 | 32, 39, 43| | **RULES OF EVIDENCE** | | | N.J.R.E. 404(b) | 34, 35 | | **CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS** | | | N.J. Const., art. I, ¶ 1 | 27, 33, 40| | N.J. Const., art. I, ¶ 10 | 27, 33, 40| | U.S. Const., amend. V | 27, 33, 40| | U.S. Const., amend. XIV | 27, 33, 40| | **OTHER AUTHORITIES**
[brief] Knight, 86 N.J. at 394.  This statute has nothing to do with the practice of law or provision of legal advice or services; it is a conflict-of-interest statute that serves only to prohibit business relationships between members of the judiciary and casino and gaming entities.  Thus, the Court concluded that the statute did not interfere with its administration of the court system and regulation of the legal profession and practice of law.  Id. at 394-95.  Thus, in contrast to the Act’s Limited Attorney Exemption -- which regulates the practice of law by regulating debt adjustment services (legal services) -- the statute at issue in Knight does not impinge upon the constitutionally-protected practice of law.
[brief] Id., § 2, comment g.  Even so, the Restatement has been (mildly) criticized for creating the impression that the risk/utility test “undervalues individual choice. ”  [...], The Value of Consumer Choice In Products Liability, 74 Brooklyn L. Rev. 781, 783 (2009).  According to [...], however, “the impression is misleading. ”  Ibid.  In fact, he argues, the value of consumer choice actually explains why risk/utility balancing is the proper test for design defect:  A liability rule that is supposed to address the safety problems created by uninformed consumer choice should require the amount of safety that would be chosen by consumers if they were fully informed.  A fully informed consumer chooses the amount of product safety satisfying the risk-utility test.  Consequently, the reasonable safety expectations of the ordinary consumer can be defined by the risk-utility test, a formulation of the liability rule that has been adopted by an increasing number of jurisdictions.
[brief] Judson v. Peoples Bank & Trust Co. of Westfield, 17 N.J. 67, 75 (1954).  But “bare conclusions in the pleadings, without factual support in tendered affidavits, will not defeat a meritorious application for summary judgment. ”  United States Pipe & Foundry Co. v. American Arbitration Ass’n, 67 N.J. Super. 384, 399-400 (App. Div. 1961).  Here, we submit that the trial court followed the appropriate standard and properly granted summary judgment.  This Court should affirm that decision.  POINT I THE TRIAL COURT  APPROPRIATELY GRANTED SUMMARY JUDGMENT TO DEFENDANT [...].
[brief] Defendants removed the Complaint to federal court on February 17, 2010.  (Da 1).  [...] denied Plaintiff’s motion to remand on April 14, 2010.  (Pa 131).  [...]’s decision denying the motion to remand was affirmed by the Third Circuit on February 28, 2011.  (Pa 90).  Plaintiff did not appeal to the United States Supreme Court.  The trial court denied Plaintiff’s motion to reinstate the complaint because it no longer had jurisdiction over the matter once Plaintiff’s motion to remand was denied.