ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] THE LAW DIVISION ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE STATE PROVED BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT THAT APPELLANT OPERATED A VEHICLE WHILE INTOXICATED BASED ON THE TESTIMONY OF OFFICER ORDWAY (Aa037).  For substantially the same reasons noted under Section IV of this brief, the Law Division also erred in finding that the State proved that Appellant violated N.J.S.A. 39:4-50 under the observational standard of proof based on the testimony of [...] and his observances on the morning of November 5, 2019.  (Aa037).  [...]’s Statement of Reasons notes that “the State at trial – using non-BAC level proofs – proved beyond a reasonable doubt that [Appellant] drove while intoxicated based on [Officer] Ordway’s credible testimony about his initial observations of [Appellant] . . . about [Appellant’s] poor performance on the walk-and-turn test, and about [Appellant’s] poor performance on the one-leg stand test. ” (Id.).  Again, the Law Division’s finding regarding the credibility of [...]’s testimony was improper given the aforementioned non-credible testimony presented by [...] at the probable cause hearing on February 25, 2022, which was replete with instances of forgetfulness and which evidenced a lack of credible recollection of the events which occurred on the morning of November 5, 2019, by [...].  For those reasons, this Court should reverse the decision of the Law Division and vacate the judgment of conviction entered against Appellant.
[directive] Frequently there is some confusion as to who has custody of an inmate of a state institution produced in court in response to a writ of habeas corpus.  To avoid any possible confusion, the following procedure should be followed:  1.  Upon the inmate's production in court, the judge should sign the endorsement on the writ acknowledging the production of the inmate, and 2.  Either direct the institutional guards producing the inmate to retain custody of him or her, or direct that the institutional guards deliver custody of the inmate to the sheriff who shall thereafter have the responsibility for the inmate's security and for his or her return to the state institution upon completion of the proceedings.  If the institutional guards are directed to retain custody, it is important that every effort be made to dispose of the matter for which the inmate was produced as expeditiously as possible.  In any instance where it may be necessary for the inmate to remain overnight, the court should direct that custody be delivered to the sheriff.  The [...] has been requested to have the guards producing the inmate advise the court if the inmate presents any special security risk so that appropriate security measures may be taken.  Your cooperation with the foregoing procedures will be most helpful.
[directive] Therefore, the new subparagraphs (N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(b)(l l)(a), N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(b)(l l)(b), N.J.S.A. 2C:35- of 5(b)(12)(a), N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(b)(12)(b)) will be excluded in all sections and calculations the PSA.  2.  Enumerated charges that must be removed when charged with specific marijuana charges.
[brief] **The PAAU/PABU:**  Each Plaintiff testified to misrepresentations they were told by [...]’s salespeople.  Only after these statements convinced the Plaintiffs to make a purchase were they handed off to the “deeder” to sign the contract documents.  The “deeder” is not told what the salespeople told the buyer and the salespeople are not allowed in the room with the “deeder” and the buyer.  (11T242:5-243:25).  Importantly, the PAAU/PABU only claims to recite what the “deeder” told the buyer, *not* the salespeople.  The first sentence of each PAAU/PABU claims only that “the items set forth below have been fully disclosed and explained to them by the person witnessing this document. ” (Da193, 195 (emphasis added)).  Each PAAU/PABU is signed only by the buyers and the “deeder,” not any salesperson.  (Da193, 195).  Since the PAAU/PABU claim only to state what the “deeders” told each Plaintiff, not the salespeople, they cannot contradict what the Plaintiffs were told by the salespeople.  The contents of the PAAU/PABU cannot trigger the parol evidence rule.  3.
[brief] Felony murder does not require a specific degree of robbery, rather only that a robbery occurred in connection with the homicide.  \textit{N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3a(3)}.  Additionally, as an appropriate accomplice liability charge was read, there are no grounds to overturn the robbery conviction based on Whitaker.  Accordingly, even if this court finds that the Defendant should be resentenced to 2\textsuperscript{nd} degree Robbery, the felony murder conviction should stand.
[brief] Because its arguments are untenable, [...] attempts to obfuscate what is a straightforward rule of civil procedure with misleading citations and arguments.  For example, [...] argues that the only method by which a plaintiff can obtain the deposition of a corporate officer or director by notice is if the corporation designates that director as its corporate representative pursuant to R. 4:14-2(c).  U.S.Df.Br. at 8-9.  This argument is a clear misstatement of the law.  See PRESSLER & VERNIERO, Current NEW JERSEY COURT RULES, Comment R. 4:14-2 ("Paragraph (c) of this rule is taken from Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(6).  It provides that the noticing party may, in addition to or in lieu of naming the person he wishes to depose, designate the subject matter on which he proposes to examine.") (emphasis added).  [...] then emphasizes the language of R. 4:23-4 that relates to designated representatives, which is irrelevant, to deflect the Court’s attention from the language in the rule that empowers trial courts to enforce notices to depose corporate directors.  See U.S.Df.Br. at 9 ("Rule 4:23-4 merely provides, inter alia, that if the ‘officer, director, or managing agent of a party or a person designated under R. 4:14-2(c) or 4:15-1 to testify on behalf of a party’ fails to appeal, the party may be sanctioned.").  The bolded language of the Rule highlights only the specious nature of the Defendants’ argument, not any language that is dispositive to this appeal.  The rule is written in the disjunctive and there are three separate instances when the rule applies, including, where, ---  1  Interestingly, this argument was not advanced before Plaintiff secured the depositions of [...] (HR Director of [...]), [...] (CFO of [...]), [...] (President of [...]), or [...] (Regional President of [...]), which he accomplished via Notices of Deposition that named each witness.  as here, the plaintiff noticed the deposition of a specific director of a party defendant, [...].  Therefore, the trial court’s Orders should be reversed with instructions to compel [...] to produce Reiff for deposition in New Jersey.  B.
[brief] Plaintiffs’ argument that the trial court correctly awarded Plaintiffs their attorneys’ fees, expert fees, and costs under the [...], [...], and the [...] does not withstand scrutiny.  New Jersey has a strong policy disfavoring shifting of attorneys’ fees.  See N. Bergen Rex Transp. v. Trailer Leasing Co., 158 N.J. 561, 569-70 (1999).  Such a policy has been grounded in the notion “that sound judicial administration is best advanced if litigants bear their own counsel fees.
[brief] ’”  Jerista v. Murray, 185 N.J. 175, 190-91 (2005) (quoting, McGrogan, 167 N.J. at 425).  The plaintiff bears the burden of proving all three elements.  Davis v. Brickman Landscaping, 219 N.J. 395, 406 (2014).  To establish proximate causation and damages in a legal malpractice action, a plaintiff must first establish causation in fact which “requires proof that the result complained of probably would not have occurred ‘but for’ the negligence conduct of the defendant. ”  Conklin v. Hannoch Weisman, 145 N.J. 395, 417 (1996).
[brief] No. A-3674-21, 2023 WL 7545067, at *6 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Nov. 14, 2023).  And in *Griffin v. Burlington Volkswagen, Inc.*, 411 N.J. Super. 515 (App. Div. 2010) (cited at Pb21, 25), this Court approved of language substantially more opaque than “not in a court of law”:  “By agreeing to arbitration, the parties understand and agree that they are waiving their rights to maintain other available resolution processes, such as a court action or administrative proceeding, to settle their disputes. ”  *Id.* at 518.  If “maintain other available resolution processes, such as a court action or administrative proceeding” suffices under New Jersey law to tell a consumer that she is waiving the right to sue, then “will be settled by binding individual arbitration between you and [...], and not in a court of law” obviously does too.  (Da82.)  Plaintiffs also ignore the numerous examples in [...]’s brief of other provisions in the Agreement that explain the differences between arbitration and “the judicial forum. ” (Pb24–28.)  Those examples include the Exceptions to Arbitration section, which says that certain “limited” types of claims are “not require[d]” to be arbitrated, but by contrast “may be brought and litigated in a court” (Da85); and the delegation clause, which provides that “only an arbitrator, and not any … court” has the authority to decide certain issues.
[directive] From the County Law Enforcement Trust Fund report select a sample of money returned to defendant and perform the following:  a.  Note the amount of money involved with the case and determine whether the amount returned the defendant agrees to the amount per Court to Order 2 [...] Law Enforcement Trust Funds Audit Program b.  Verify that check has been cashed or included in unclaimed Dropertv  I  From the Municipal Forfeiture Program Reports of the Other Law Enforcement Agencies selected in the above, schedule the expenditures reported for the audit  Deriod I  Select a sample of receipts form the cash book and trace to the bank statement.  Note whether the receipts were deposited within 72 hours.  - Select an adeauate samDle  Verify that a notation as the specific forfeiture to case was sent with distribution checks to the law enforcement agencies selected above  Verify that Community based expenditures were authorized by the Division of Criminal Justice  TDF  Examine all 92-22.46 and DAG-71's issued in Year of audit
[brief] Furthermore, the recipient may be storing or using the data for other purposes yet to be discovered.  But liability under § 1692c(b) turns on what Defendant’s conveyance of Plaintiff’s information and not how an unidentified recipient used that information.  Even the information were only used for mailing collection letters and the recipient were treated like a telephone or telegraph operator, the data Defendant shared far exceeds the type of information which can be lawfully provided to a telephone or telegraph operator.  A debt collector must comply with all FDCPA provisions and not just 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692d(6), 1692f(5), 1692f(8) which are specific to its use of telephones and telegrams.
[brief] APPELLATE  BRIEF TABLE OF TRANSCRIPTS | Transcript Number | Proceeding Date | Proceeding | |-------------------|-------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------| | 1T | February 27, 2023 | Hearing before the Board.  | | 2T | April 11, 2024 |  Trial in action in lieu of prerogative writs in the Superior Court, Ocean County.  |  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT  [...] (the "Applicant") is the owner of property located at [...] and [...], also known as Block 1, Lots 7, 10, and 19.02, as designated on the Official Tax Map of the [...] (the "Property").
[brief] (Pa973-989)  As for the responsibility for the external portion of the property, the lease made the tenant responsible for the sidewalk adjacent to the tenant’s unit, but made the landlord responsible for the common areas, with the tenants each contributing a fee for that maintenance.  (Id.)  Paragraph 3 of the lease states as follows:  3.  Care and Maintenance of Premises.  Leasee acknowledges that the premises are in good order and repair, unless otherwise indicated herein.  Leasee shall, at his own expense and at all times, maintain the premises in good and safe condition, including plate glass, electrical wiring, plumbing and heating installations and all other system or equipment upon the premises and shall surrender the same at termination hereof, in as good condition as received, normal wear and tear excepted, lease shall be responsible for all repairs required, excepting the roof, exterior walls, structural foundations, and SEE RIDER which shall be maintained by leasor.
[brief] On appeal, Defendant’s position seems to be generally that Defendant’s conditional guilty plea in the municipal court was to decide “the sole issue whether a pump house is an occupied building” under the statute.  (Db 7)  He claims that although there were two structures listed on the ticket which formed the basis of the charges, he only pled guilty to being within 450 feet of the pump house, and not the residence also listed on the ticket.  The Law Division Judge found otherwise, however, as stated above.  The Law Division found that Defendant was indeed on notice of the charges.  Defendant admits in his brief to this Court that he was adequately noticed of the contents of the ticket – specifically the two structures at issue which formed the basis of the violation.  Nevertheless, Defendant argues, “[t]he fact that [...] was on constructive notice of the alternative marker listed on the back of the ticket, because it was provided in discovery is irrelevant,” (Db 8), because presumably, “neither the back nor the front of the ticket was ever mentioned on the record at the municipal court.  It formed no part of the plea colloquy between [...] and the municipal court. ”  (Db 12)  Further, while Defendant admits to this Court he was provided “the front and back of the ticket” in discovery, (Db 12) he maintains that “[n]othing in the relevant court rules make it clear that any or all the back of a municipal ticket is part of the complaint.  The back of the ticket did not have the word ‘complaint’ stated anywhere as clearly stated on the front. ”  (Db 13)  Defendant’s position was pressed before the Law Division which found, “the pleadings include the complaint and nothing has been presented to the Court that the entirety of the ticket is not the pleading. ”  (1T38-15 to 38-19)  The argument, now repeated to this Court, is clearly without merit.
[brief] 1T November 3, 2021, Trial Transcript before the Hon. [...], P.J.Ch.; 2T November 4, 2021, Trial Transcript before the Hon. [...], P.J.Ch.; 3T November 18, 2021, Trial Transcript before the Hon. [...], P.J.Ch.; 4T March 9, 2022, Trial Transcript before the Hon. [...], P.J.Ch.; 5T February 8, 2023, Trial Transcript before the Hon. [...], P.J.Ch.; 6T February 15, 2023, Trial Transcript before the Hon. [...], P.J.Ch.; 7T April 25, 2023, Trial Transcript before the Hon. [...], P.J.Ch.; 8T May 8, 2020, Motion in Limine before the Hon. [...], P.J.Ch.;¹ 9T September 25, 2023, Transcript of Decision
[brief] Cole’s sixth factor is “[t]he proximity of the date on which the party sought arbitration to the date of trial. ”  Cole 215 N.J at 281.  In Cole, the defendant sought arbitration a mere three days before trial was set to begin.  Here, no date for trial has been scheduled in this matter, and the parties agree that trial will not be appropriate until at least late 2025 as the jointly proposed CMO No. 6 provides for the filing of dispositive motions in October of 2025 with a subsequent trial date to be determined.  Thus, the trial date is not at issue here, which the lower court agreed.
[brief] Defendant asserts the judge had already given two Czachor instructions (Db22), but that is misleading.  The first utterance of those principles came in the main instructions, which was given before the jury received the case to begin deliberations.  (20T203-6 to 204-1).  \(^{18}\)  The Model Jury Instruction is not to be given before at least one Czachor instruction is given, and even then should only be provided if the jury indicates its deliberations have reached “an impasse. ”  A footnote in the charge provides that the judge may, in her discretion, decide when the instruction should be given, in consultation with the parties.  (Da27).  discussions would be helpful, judge was required to discharge jury).  As nothing in this jury’s second note even hinted further deliberations would be futile, the judge was entitled to repeat the original Czachor instruction, rather than give the instruction defendant urges.  Nor did the judge coerce a verdict by telling the jury she would inquire how late they could deliberate that day.  For one thing, the judge told the jury to deliver another note if the group felt it necessary.  (21T42-13 to 17).  For another, the judge advised “there are options” if they could not conclude after deliberating “a little while longer. ” (21T42-17 to 43-1).  With these statements, the judge said nothing indicating any time constraint, or that the jury either must conclude, or return.  See Figueroa, 190 N.J. at 226-27, 242-43 (holding judge’s statement to the jury on Wednesday that he was free all weekend, and “we will be here as long as it takes you to go through this process” gave impression that the jury “would be required to continue to deliberate for as long as it might take to reach unanimity”).  Her decision to defer addressing the vacation issue, (21T44-15 to 19), to avoid “potentially influenc[ing] the ongoing deliberations,” (21T27-19 to 29-19), was an appropriate exercise of discretion that simply permitted further deliberation.
[brief] *See, e.g.*, *Nieder v. Royal Indemnity Ins. Co.*, 62 N.J. 229, 234 (1973) (“It is a well-settled principle that our appellate courts will decline to consider questions or issues not properly presented to the trial court when an opportunity for such a presentation is available unless the questions so raised on appeal go to the jurisdiction of the trial court or concern matters of great public justice. ”); *Nextel of N.Y., Inc. v. Borough of Englewood Cliffs Bd. of Adjustment*, 361 N.J. Super. 22, 45 (App. Div. 2003) (“Where an issue is based on mere conclusory statements by the brief writer, we will not consider it. ”).
[brief] Last, this search cannot be sustained as a registration search because the registration-search exception violates the federal constitution.  The United States Supreme Court interpretations of the federal constitution establish “the floor of minimum constitutional protections. ”  *State v. Gilmore*, 103 N.J. 508, 524 (1986).  Thus, although our courts are free to provide greater constitutional protections than the United States Supreme Court has found the federal constitution necessitates, our courts cannot provide lesser constitutional protections.  *Ibid.*  As both the majority and [...]’s dissent in *Terry* recognize, the United States Supreme Court has never recognized a registration-search exception to the probable-cause and warrant requirements.  232 N.J. at 242, 272.  Although the majority in *Terry* concluded that the exception passes constitutional muster, the dissent correctly recognized that the registration-search exception falls below the constitutional floor set by the United States Supreme Court because a search that dispenses not only with the warrant requirement but also with the probable-cause requirement does not comport with the Fourth Amendment.
[brief] | | Mount Laurel Twp. v. MiPro Homes, LLC, 379 N.J. Super. 358 (App. Div. 2005)  .........................................................37, 41, 42  Mount Olive Complex v. Twp. of Mount Olive, 340 N.J. Super. 511 (App. Div. 2001)  ..........................................................  31  Mountain Hill, L.L.C. v. Twp. of Middletown, 403 N.J. Super. 146 (App. Div. 2008)  ..............................................................7, 8 N.J. Housing & Mort. Fin. Agency v. Moses, 215 N.J. Super. 318 (App. Div. 1987)  .............................................................36, 40  In re N.J.A.C. 5:96 & 5:97, 221 N.J.  1 (2015) ............................................................................................4, 13 Norfolk S. Railway Co. v. Intermodal Props., LLC, 215 N.J. 142 (2013) .......................................................................................47, 48 Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Investors Ins. Co., 65 N.J. 474 (1974) .........................................................................................20, 22 Sampson v. Murray, 415 U.S. 61 (1974) .........................................................................................20, 28 State v. Lanza, 48 N.J. Super. 362 (Law Div. 1957) ...............................................................37 Subcarrier Commc’ns, Inc. v. Day, 299 N.J. Super. 634 (App. Div. 1997) .............................................................20, 22 Tex. E. Transmission Corp. v. Wildlife Preserves, Inc., 48 N.J. 261 (1966) .........................................................................................37, 47, 48 In re Twp. of Bordentown, 471 N.J. Super. 196 (App. Div. 2022) .............................................................31 Twp. of Readington v. Solberg Aviation Co., 409 N.J. Super. 282 (App. Div. 2009) .............................................................25, 26 Twp. of West Orange v. 769 Assocs., LLC, 172 N.J. 564 (2002) .......................................................................................36, 37, 38, 41 Valentine v. Lamont, 13 N.J. 569 (1953) .........................................................................................43 Vineland Constr. Co. v. Twp. of Pennsauken, 395 N.J. Super. 230 (App. Div. 2007) .............................................................46 Waste Mgt. of NJ, Inc. v. Morris Cnty. Mun. Utils. Authority, 433 N.J. Super. 445 (App. Div. 2013) ...........................................................Passim Wilson v. City of Long Branch, 27 N.J. 360 (1958) .................................................................35, 39, 40, 41 Statutes N.J.S.A. 20:3-6 ..............................................................................13, 23, 37 N.J.S.A. 20:3-17 .............................................................................23 N.J.S.A. 20:3-18 .............................................................................24 N.J.S.A. 20:3-19 .............................................................................24 N.J.S.A. 20:3-22 .............................................................................24
[brief] The Respondent Commission erred and violated veteran’s preference when it requested the comparison to the non-veteran [...] and provided the Respondent [...] a “second bite of the apple” and an opportunity to make additional arguments.  In In the Matters of [...] and [...], County Correction Officer (S9999U), [...], 2019 N.J. CSC, LEXIS 420 (June 28, 2019), the Respondent Commission granted the list removal appeals of two entry-level candidates who had multiple criminal, employment and driving record adverse issues.  When the [...] sought reconsideration, the Commission denied the Sheriff’s Office a “second bite of the apple” and held the Sheriff’s Office “needed to indicate [it’s alternate arguments] at the time it submitted its background report when it returned the certification to this agency. ”  Id. (emphasis added)  As a Veteran seeking promotion, Appellant should have been promoted to Lieutenant when the Respondent [...] failed to request the removal of her name from the Certified List.  For these reasons, the June 7, 2023 and October 11, 2023 Final Administrative Action of the Respondent [...] should be reversed and this Court should order the promotional appointment of Appellant with backpay and retroactive seniority.