ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Defense counsel also did not simply comment upon the plaintiff not being present at trial.  (7T33:1-4; 7T39:24-40:3; 7T40:4-42:13).  Rather, his summation repeatedly suggested to the jury that the plaintiff was intentionally withheld from trial in order to prevent them from judging her credibility.  (7T33:1-4; 7T39:24-40:3; 7T40:4-42:13).  Defense counsel first stated, “[[...]] relied on [the plaintiff] and her honesty and her accuracy, and I guess they’re asking you to do that too, even though she didn’t come to Court to testify about what happened. ”  (7T25:2-6).  He next stated, “[t]hey didn’t call [...].  They didn’t call [...].  The two people that were actually in aisle 58 on May 30th, 2019, didn’t call either one of them in their case. ” (7T33:1-4).  Then when discussing the analysis of witness credibility defense counsel stated, “[t]he witness’s demeanor on the stand, the presence of any inconsistent or contradictory statements.  Credibility.  You weren’t given an opportunity to judge [the plaintiff’s] demeanor. ”  (7T39:24-40:3).  The clear intent from these comments was that the jury should draw an inference that the plaintiff was untruthful in her deposition testimony that was presented at trial and that her credibility would have been destroyed had she appeared at trial and testified.  “When summation commentary transgresses the boundaries of the broad latitude otherwise afforded to counsel, a trial court must grant a party’s motion for a new trial if the comments are so prejudicial that ‘it clearly and convincingly appears that there was a miscarriage of justice under the law. ””  Bender v. Adelson, 187 N.J. 411, 431 (2006), quoting, R. 4:49-1(a).  In the case at bar, defense counsel’s improper adverse inference argument had a clear capacity to cause an unjust result particularly when combined with the admission of evidence regarding the plaintiff’s prior medical condition in the absence of any medical expert opinion relating the prior condition to the cause of the plaintiff’s fall.  Although the Trial Court instructed the jury to disregard these statements and that they were not infer why the plaintiff was not present and take anything away from that, the instruction did not erase the prejudicial impact of the statements.  (7T42:15-43:5).  The defendant also argues that the verdict should be upheld because there was no objection to the other comments of defense counsel accusing plaintiff’s counsel of only giving the jury a lot of distractions at trial and implying that the plaintiff’s daughters and counsel fabricated the manner in which the plaintiff’s fall occurred and were attempting to deceive the jury and recover damages upon a fraudulent claim.  (7:21:25-22:3; 7T24:7-15; 7T35:18-36:20).  The absence of an objection does not preclude the granting of a new trial because the comments, when combined with the other comments during summation and the erroneous evidentiary rulings, were clearly capable of producing an unjust result.  Improper comments may be found to require a new trial when it is of such a nature as to have been clearly capable of producing an unjust result when no objection is raised at trial.
[brief] .............12  Estate of Anna Russzala, ex rel. Mizerak v. Brookdale Living Communities, Inc., 415 N.J. Super. 272(App. Div. 2010)  ..........9  Gershon, Adm'x Ad Prosequendum for Estate of Pietroluongo v. Regency Diving Ctr., Inc., 368 N.J. Super. 237(App. Div. 2004)..8  Hojnowski v. Vans Skate Park, 187 N.J. 323(2006)  ...............13  In re Estate of Hekemian, 2022 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 191 aff’d N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 60 (App. Div. 2023)  ............12  Martindale v. Sandvik, Inc., 173 N.J. 76(2002)
[brief] A trial court’s denial of a motion to reinstate a previously dismissed pleading for failure to provide fully responsive discovery is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.  Cooper v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 391 N.J. Super. 17, 22-23 (App. Div. 2007).  In this context, the Supreme Court has warned against “‘the natural tendency on the part of reviewing courts, properly employing the benefit of hindsight, to be heavily influenced by the severity of outright dismissal as a sanction for failure to comply with a discovery order. ’”  Abtrax Pharm., Inc. v. Elkins-Sinn, Inc., 139 N.J. 499, 517-18 (1995) (quoting National Hockey League v. Metro. Hockey Club, Inc., Accordingly, a reviewing court should not disturb the dismissal so long as “the record contains adequate, substantial, and credible evidence in the evidence to sustain the trial court’s factual findings....”  Abrax Pharm, Inc., 139 N.J. at 520 (citation omitted).  The record here not only amply supports the trial court’s conclusion that Defendants have never provided “fully responsive discovery,” but also that they have failed to provide even basic discovery.
[brief] In support of his opinion of the then market value, an expert may advert to the value of the property would have if rezoned, but only by way of explaining his opinion of the existing market value.  Gorga, supra at 118.  This is the exact approach taken by Respondent’s experts in the current matter, which should be barred from presentation to the jury as it was specifically rejected by the New Jersey Supreme Court.  Again, “the prospect and consequence of a probable zoning change may be readily translated into the probable-assemblage situation. ”  Hilton, supra at 591.
[brief] *Id.* (observing that no judicial bypass is required for laws prohibiting minors from marrying because “[a] minor not permitted to marry before the age of majority is required simply to postpone her decision”).  Furthermore, a right to privacy exists only where the individual has a “reasonable expectation[] of confidentiality. ”  *Fraternal Ord. of Police, Lodge No. 5 v. City of Phila.*, 812 F.2d 105, 112 (3d Cir. 1987).  Children have no expectation of confidentiality in the fact that their school is socially transitioning them.  Social transitioning is open and notorious; indeed, the transition is a “social” one.  By definition, students have no reasonable expectation of confidentiality in this information.  *Mirabelli*, 2023 WL 5976992, at *10 (“A student who announces the desire to be publicly known in school by a new name, gender, or pronoun and is referred to by teachers and students and others by said new name, gender, or pronoun, can hardly be said to have a reasonable expectation of privacy or expect non-disclosure. ”).  Finally, even if minor children had a federally protected privacy right against their parents to conceal their social transitioning at school (and they do not), it is settled that privacy rights must yield where “the government interest in disclosure outweighs the individual’s privacy interest.
[brief] The statute’s instruction to go into the leftmost lane would have [...] going into the left lane of the on-ramp to Route 280 West.  The Respondent argues without evidence that the two on-ramp lanes are used interchangeably from the left lane turning lane to alleviate backed up traffic on Route 280 Westbound, and equally without evidence, I would suggest that the pinch point at that intersection is getting off First Street and onto that on-ramp, and not the backed-up traffic on Route 280 as Respondent suggests.  D11.  This discussion of the correct way of turning only highlights the most important material issue of fact in this case, namely, where was the initial point of impact?
[brief] THE MOTION COURT CORRECTLY FOUND THAT BOTH CASES SHOULD BE ARBITRATED TOGETHER.  (1T20:4-9; 1T40:4-11; 1T44:12-13; 1T48:17-21; 1T49:5-9; 1T49:20-22)  The motion court’s decision to compel arbitration in the Chancery Action alongside the Law Division Action is further supported by the fact that the parties to both lawsuits are essentially the same, and they all played a role in the same rescue plan to save the Property.
[brief] R. 4:6-2(f).  In short, the City asserted that the individuals who would/could be adversely impacted by Plaintiff's action (and who were known to Plaintiff) are indispensable parties because the relief as sought by Plaintiff could not justly be awarded without necessarily affecting their respective interests. \(^8\) *Allen B. DuMont Labs.*, 30 N.J. at 298.  Nonetheless, Plaintiff again failed to name/join such persons in its third iteration of its Complaint and, as a result, Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint was appropriately subject to dismissal.  The Trial Court thus appropriately found that Plaintiff had failed to join indispensable parties that would be “necessary to [any] judgment” in this action.
[brief] Leading medical associations also consider social transitioning to be psychological treatment.  For example, the [...], the [...], the [...], and the [...], among others, hold the views that “[t]he recommended treatment for transgender people with gender dysphoria includes . . . social transition” and that “[s]ocial transition . . . is often a critically important part of treatment” for gender dysphoria.  Brief of Amici Curiae Medical, Nursing, Mental Health, and other Health Care Organizations in support of Plaintiff in Adams v. [...], [...] (11th Cir. 2019) at 12–13, ACa93–134.  In addition, in its recently released Standards of Care Version 8, the [...] (“[...]”)—an advocacy organization committed to the health of transgender-identifying individuals—considers social transitioning to be psychological treatment.  [...], et al., Standards of Care for the Health of Transgender and Gender Diverse People, Version 8, Int’l J. of Transgender Health (Sept. 15, 2022) (“[...] SOC8”) at S77 (noting that the “potential benefits” of social transitioning include “reducing gender dysphoria and enhancing psychosocial adjustment and well-being”), ACa135–39.
[brief] First, Plaintiffs all but ignore the New Jersey Supreme Court precedent in Barila, 241 N.J. 595.  In Barila, the New Jersey Supreme Court considered the alleged “vesting” of terminal leave and held that:  Nothing in the [applicable] 2012 Agreement suggests—let alone creates—a vested right to apply that Agreement’s compensation formula upon retirement[.]  ***  The 2012 Agreement’s limiting language is unsurprising, given the nature of the employment benefit at issue.  A teacher in the [...] who had more than one hundred days of unused sick leave while the 2012 Agreement was in effect, and who continued to work into the term of a successor agreement, faced the prospect that an illness or injury would require the use of some or all of that sick leave.  By the time of his or her retirement, that teacher might accumulate more sick leave, might use some of his or her accumulated sick leave, or might have no sick leave remaining.  It would make little sense to confer on a teacher a vested right to be compensated under an expired Agreement’s formula for accumulated sick leave, given that uncertainty.  Id. at 618–19.  The Supreme Court expressly “disagree[d]” with the Appellate Division’s finding that there was a “vested right” in accumulated sick leave compensation.  Id. at 622.  Shockingly, Plaintiffs only reference to Barila, outside of their procedural history, is in a footnote conceding that “if they were employees of [...] and active union members at the time that the First Police Matter was settled . . . they would be bound by the $15,000 cap that the parties to that lawsuit negotiated pursuant to Barila v. Board of Educ. of Cliffside Park, 241 N.J. 595 (2020). ” (Pb35 n.9).  Governing law does not allow Plaintiffs to parse so finely.  Here, each of the Plaintiffs was employed by the [...] at the time the MSRA was implemented, and expressly permitted the Director to unilaterally modify the expired CNA.  Moreover, each of the Plaintiffs, with the exception of [...], were employed by the [...] at the time of the March 13, 2017 Notice of Implementation, in which Defendants made clear their intent to limit terminal leave.  Thereafter, Plaintiffs retired, knowing Defendants’ intention to modify terminal leave and their unilateral ability to do so.  None of the cases cited by Plaintiffs support their Takings Claim.
[brief] POLICE AT THE ROADSIDE CAR STOP LACKED AN OBJECTIVELY REASONABLE AND ARTICULABLE BASIS TO SEEK MR. GALLOWAY’S CONSENT TO SEARCH HIS HOME.  N.J. CONST. ART. I, ¶ 7.  (Not Raised Below)  As described in Point III, unsatisfied with just the search of [...]’s car, police embarked on a fishing expedition and sought [...]’s consent to search his home.  But the officers had no objectively reasonable and articulable information linking the contraband found in [...]’s car to his home.  Thus, they were prohibited from asking for his consent, and the fruits from the home search must be suppressed.
[directive] eTRO 31  Page Information New When Complaint-Warrant Superseding Seek to Authority  4.2.6  Release Pretrial on Bearing Material a Has or~ Charges  Upgrading Supports Risks. to prosecutors and police encourages Directive this in established policy general  The done be can that whenever complaint-warrant than rather complaint-summons of way by charge to cases close in reluctant be may nonetheless Prosecutors safety. public jeopardizing without monitoring and conditions release to subject be would defendant the that possibility the foreclose time the at available be may that information limited the given program services pretrial the by from prosecutor a preclude to construed shall be Directive this in nothing
[brief] Other Authorities  I/M/O  A New Jersey Solar Transition Pursuant To P.L. 2018, C.17, Order, [...], [...], dated January 8, 2020 ........................................................................................................  5, 6, 7  I/M/O the Closure of the SREC Registration Program Pursuant to P.L. 2018, C. 17, Order, [...], [...], dated March 27, 2020 ..................................................................................  4  I/M/O  The Petition Of [...] for “Preferred” TREC Factor for Floating Photovoltaic Solar Pursuant to the Board’s Transition Incentive Order, Order, New Jersey Board Of Public Utilities, [...], dated July 15, 2020 .........................................................  5, 7  In The Matter of [...] – Petition for Assignment of “Preferred” TREC Factor For Floating Photovoltaic Solar Pursuant to the Board’s Transition Incentive Order, Order, [...], Docket No.  QO21020469, dated September 27, 2023 ..................  3, 10  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
[brief] 5  STATEMENT OF FACTS  6  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT ONE THE PCR COURT ERRED BY DENYING THE DEFENDANT'S CLAIMS SUPPORTED BY CERTIFICATIONS WITHOUT AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING CONTRARY TO STATE V. PORTER, 216 N.J. 343 (2013), ESPECIALLY WHERE DEFENDANT MADE A PRIMA FACIE SHOWING THAT TRIAL COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE, THEREFORE, THE ORDER SHOULD BE REVERSED AND THE MATTER SHOULD BE REMANDED FOR AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING (Da 53 and Da 95)
[brief] Da-28.  Assuming arguendo that it was not listed, it was attached to the first Notice of Appeal, cited in the CIS as integral to the September, 2022 Order and the September Order confirms it is integral by denying reconsideration  “For the reasons set forth in the court’s order dated May 27, 2022. ”  Da-59.  Tara Enters. v. Daribar Management Corp., 369 N.J. Super. 45, 60, 848 A.2d 27 (App. Div. 2004); Potomac Aviation, LLC v. Port Auth., 413 N.J. Super. 212, 222, 994 A.2d 536 (App. Div. 2010) (appeal of order is considered if "the basis for the motion judge's ruling on the [original] and reconsideration motions ²The May, 2022 Order is dated May 27 but was filed by the court on May 31, which is the date Defendant uses in her CIS and filings. was the same.
[brief] Seigelstein v. Shrewsbury Motors, Inc., 464 N.J. Super. 393, 406 (App. Div. 2020) (“The party seeking attorney's fees has the burden to prove that its request for attorney's fees is reasonable … To meet its burden, the fee petitioner must ‘submit evidence supporting the hours worked and rates claimed. ’”) (quoting Rode, 892 F.2d at 1183 and Hensley v.  Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983)).  Plaintiffs claim that the New Jersey Law Journal article is outdated, and should therefore be ignored, is also wrong.  The article, which cites data collected from 60,000 individuals “as well as surveys of legal professionals and consumers of legal services” is from 2016 and notes the average rate of New Jersey attorneys in 2016 was $288 per hour.  (Da283-4).  The Global Fee Application seeks fees from the same year, 2016\(^4\), through 2022.
[brief] On February 3, 2024 the Plaintiffs filed a one count verified complaint against Defendants\(^1\) and the Borough (Da16). \(^2\)  On February 8, 2024 the Honorable [...], J.S.C. (ret.) t/a entered an order to show cause temporarily restraining Defendants from voting on motions or resolutions regarding the hiring or firing of [...] and setting a briefing schedule and hearing date (Da5).  The sole count in Plaintiffs verified complaint alleged Defendants violated the LGEL when voting to terminate Albert [...], Esq., as an attorney for [...] (Da18).  There is no common law conflict of interest claim alleged.  Plaintiffs allege a conflict of interest exists because [...] filed a defamation lawsuit against Defendants (Da17, ¶12).  Plaintiffs allege [...] filed suit because, “During the course of their campaign for the positions of council, Defendants defamed [...] repeatedly and damaged his reputation as both a resident and attorney. ” (Da17, ¶10).  Defendants went on to win the election after [...] filed suit (Da18, ¶15).  On January 3, 2024 Defendants voted to not rehire [...] as counsel for the Borough (Da18, ¶¶17-18).  --- \(^1\) [...] was the Republican candidate for mayor, while [...] and [...] were Republican candidates for the council.  All three were victorious in their elections.
[brief] A.  The So Called “Reasons” For Disinheriting Petitioner Are Based on Speculation and Conjecture and Fail to Constitute “Unclean Hands. ”  Respondent presents six alleged incidents that she claims to be the reason for excluding Respondent from Decedent’s will.  Db at 1-2.  The so-called “reasons” that the Respondent provided are also alleged to constitute inequitable conduct that should bar him from obtaining any equitable relief.  Db at 69-60.  The so called “reasons” advanced by Respondent are not reasons that were expressed by the Decedent for disinheriting Petitioner when making the 2014 Will.
[brief] See Hudson Cty. v. State House Com., 130 N.J.L. 90, 92 (1943) (citing P.L. 1940, c. 197, codified as N.J.S.A. 19:48-3).  Presumably because these machines could only process one pre-programmed ballot at a time and because these new machines would not allow election officials to determine if someone had double voted for a presidential elector, the Legislature quickly removed the carve-out language for presidential electors.  See P.L. 1941, c. 166, p. 530.  Voting machines at that time could only provide the final results and not individualized breakdowns of 5.  Voters in New Jersey had been able to split their tickets for presidential electors for decades before this statute was adopted, and it merely formalized the process.
[directive] Such suspensions may be immediately necessary, as in the case of an officer reporting for work under the influence of alcohol.  In other cases, however, a suspension need not be immediate but rather would follow a preliminary investigation into the matter that indicates that one of the above criteria has been met.  In any case, suspension prior to disposing of the case must be clearly documented and justified.  At the time of the suspension, the individual shall be provided with a written statement of the reasons the action has been taken.  (A sample form is found in Appendix D).  In the event of a refusal by the individual to accept that written statement, a copy shall be provided to the individual's collective bargaining representative as soon as possible.  If a supervisor or commander authorized to do so imposes an immediate suspension, the law enforcement executive must be advised without delay.  He or she will then determine the status of the suspension given the facts of the case in light of the above criteria.  In no case shall an immediate suspension be used as a punitive measure.
[brief] (3T159-16 to 161-19).  Accordingly, the court determined a Gross hearing outside the presence of the jury was required to determine the admissibility of [...]’s prior statement.  (3T168-1 to 171-7).  At that hearing, [...] continued to maintain the details from his statement were untruthful.  (3T171-15 to 172-12).  [...] claimed that he was questioned off the record before and after his statement and fed “little things” about the investigation that he “can draw conclusions from. ” (3T172-13 to 17; 3T174-15 to 175-15).  So, [...] allegedly “just started making things up that put it together. ” (3T175-16 to 17).  [...] testified that after he was “raided” in 2014, officers continually harassed him and threatened him and his girlfriend with drug charges to get him to talk.  (3T173-5 to 24).  [...] testified at the hearing that, on August 21, 2015, he was summoned to the [...] around 2:30 a.m. to speak to [...] who was under arrest for an outstanding warrant.
[brief] Law enforcement officers may not mislead a suspect about the seriousness of the offense that he faces to induce that suspect’s waiver of his right to silence.  Here, the trial court agreed that the interrogating detective affirmatively misled [...] to believe that he was waiving his rights to discuss a minor narcotics offense, even though the detective intended all along to discuss a much more serious first-degree armed robbery.  Once the detective reinforced [...]’s false impression, [...] identified himself in a still photo from an RT-TOIC security camera that was located a few blocks from where the robbery occurred.  It was only then that the detective shifted his interrogation to the assault and robbery.  The detective’s deception gutted [...]’s ability to provide a knowing and voluntary waiver.  Because our courts do not tolerate such trickery in the waiver process, [...]’s statement should have been suppressed.  Critically, [...]’s statement is the only evidence tying him to the assault and robbery that occurred in the warehouse at [...].  There is no forensic or physical evidence tying [...] to the scene, and the only surveillance footage facing 250 Mechanic—pulled from the church across the street—is far too blurry to identify the two figures that appear to enter the building.  Indeed, no witness identified the individuals in the RT- TOIC footage as the same individuals that appear in the church video.  Consequently, without [...]’s statement, there is no evidence against him.  But even if the court finds [...]’s waiver voluntary and his statement admissible, it must find that the interrogation video as shown to the jury deprived [...] of a fair trial.  After viewing the interrogation video during both the State’s case-in-chief and deliberations, the jury twice heard the interrogating officer: (1) accuse [...] of lying fourteen times; (2) offer his opinion that the church video conclusively showed [...] entering 250 Mechanic; and (3) disclose that [...] had been arrested on unrelated charges.  This impermissible lay opinion of [...]’s credibility and guilt and inadmissible “other crimes” evidence created a danger that the jury would convict not based on admissible evidence, but based on the officer’s belief that [...] was a liar and guilty and the perception that he had a propensity for criminal acts.  Finally, the prosecutor compounded the error in summation by denigrating the defense theory.  Relying on an extended metaphor about magicians who employ “distractions” to create their “tricks” and “illusions,” the prosecutor implicitly referred to defense counsel as a magician and warned the jury that “a lot of what the defense counsel wants you to believe are distractions. ”