ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] (Da124-125).  The detectives also did not impermissibly contradict the *Miranda* warnings defendant waived.  They did not promise him that his cooperation would result in him being able to go home or imply that he had no option but to continue the interview, nor did they promise him leniency they could not guarantee.  As the judge properly found, none of the detectives' actions throughout the course of defendant's interview crossed the line, and when assessed under the totality of the circumstances as they must be, it is clear that they did not overbear defendant's will and that defendant's statement was voluntary beyond a reasonable doubt.
[directive] Annual review of overall department use of force.  The law enforcement executive shall also conduct an annual review of use of force incidents in their department.  The review shall include, at a minimum, the following: (a) analytical reports from the Attorney General’s Use of Force Portal; (b) an audit of body worn cameras and other videos on a risk-based and randomly selected basis; (c) any internal affairs complaints; and 21 USE OF FORCE POLICY | April 2022 (d) an analysis of the uses of force to ensure that force is being applied without discrimination based on race, ethnicity, nationality, religion, disability, gender, gender identity, sexual orientation, or any other protected characteristic.  7.7  Based on that thorough review, the law enforcement executive shall determine whether changes in departmental structure, policy, training, or equipment are appropriate.  The law enforcement executive shall then provide a written report documenting the annual review to the County Prosecutor.  Each County Prosecutor’s Office and each statewide law enforcement agency shall make its report to the OPIA.  22  USE OF FORCE POLICY | April 2022  Use of Force Policy Addendum
[brief] Nuveen Mun. Trust v. Withumsmith Brown P.C., 752 F.3d 600, 605-06 (3d Cir. 2014) (ruled that even through Nuveen’s allegations of fraud against Withum were styled as intentional torts, rather than negligence or malpractice claims, they nonetheless required proof that Withum deviated from professional standards of care for an accountant).  The third factor focuses on whether the factual allegations implicate the care exercised by the professional and whether it fell outside the acceptable standards of practice in the industry.  See Alpert, Goldberg, Butler, Norton & Weiss, P.C., v. Quinn, 410 N.J. Super. 510, (App. Div. 2009) (required an affidavit of merit in breach-of-contract claim against an attorney because the pleadings alleged that “the quality of work product was not sufficient” and that the attorney “failed to do a complete and competent job”, and those allegations required “proof of a deviation from the professional standard of care applicable to attorneys”; and see Charles A. Manganaro Consulting Eng’rs., Inc. v. Carneys Point Twp. Sewerage Auth., 344 N.J. Super. 343, (App. Div. 2001) (found that an affidavit of merit was required for a breach of contract claim because the factual allegations were that the engineering firm failed to properly prepare the plans and specifications, which was professional malpractice).
[brief] (Pa530; Pa641).  [...]’s employer failed to take appropriate remedial action to protect him from retaliation and the harassment and hostility intensified.  [...] opposed discrimination and retaliation in 2014 when he complained to Assistant Commissioner [...] that [...] the Assistant Director of Water System Operations said to him in front of Bureau Chief [...] and Bureau Chief [...], that [...] should not attend a 2014 conference because [...] was “too old. ”  Bureau Chief [...] objected to [...]’s statement by stating out loud to that [...] “did not really mean to suggest that [Alan [...]] was too old to attend a conference” and [...] persisted and insisted that is “exactly what she meant. ”  (Pa869-Pa870; Pa659).  [...] reported the comment to [...], the Director and [...]’s supervisor and made an EEO complaint that [...] was told in November of 2014 was being referred to the NJDEP EEO office for investigation.  On November 17, 2014, [...]’s complaint of age discrimination and retaliation was sent to the NJDEP EEO office ([...]) for handling by the NJDEP Office of Labor Relations responsible for discipline ([...]).  (Pa834).
[brief] Plaintiff’s Motion stated in the Notice of Motion that RULING ON THE PAPERS pursuant to Rule 1:6-2 is hereby requested.  ORAL ARGUMENT WILL BE SCHEDULED only if directed by the Court, pursuant to R. 1:6-2 upon request by you in written objection or opposing affidavit or certification filed with the Court and served upon the undersigned, Attorneys for Plaintiff, no later than 8 days before the above return date.  PA – 20 to 21.  Defendant’s argument borders frivolousness in that he waived oral argument in his submission to the trial court.
[brief] One significant issue was that [...] declined to turn over to [...] and [...] full MRL backup data and supporting documents.  By letter dated September 6, 2019, [...] admonished [...] that he and [...] still had not received the full set of backup documentation that they had been requesting to support the MRL tax returns.  At the end of the letter, [...] advised [...] that if [...] was not willing to provide the information that [...] was requesting, [...] would have no choice but to pursue legal action.  (Da2842-44).  Neither [...] nor the defendants ever turned over the full set of much sought-after backup documentation prior to [...] commencing suit.  (16T 74:24 to 75:7).
[brief] 2.  **Best Efforts and Expenses.**  The Parties will use their best efforts to take all other actions, and to do, or cause to be done, --- \(^5\)  The unexecuted 2017 Agreement was a continuation of the parties’ discussion of what was contemplated by the MOU, i.e. that [...] was going to save this property for his niece.  (1T25:21-24).  The 2017 Agreement was not executed because [...] decided he preferred a lump sum payoff rather than wait 25 years for repayment, as was provided in the unsigned 2017 Agreement.  (Da38).  He also did not want to have any further liability with regard to the Property and, thus, was not interested in acting as a guarantor for any loan Plaintiff obtained.  Ibid.  It was still intended that Plaintiff take back legal title to the Property, in furtherance of the MOU, as evidenced by the subsequently executed 2022 Addendum.  (Da44-45).  all other things necessary, proper or advisable to carry out their obligations under this Memorandum and to achieve the objectives of this Memorandum.  (Da311).  Thus, the Operating Agreements\(^6\), the unexecuted 2017 Agreement, and the 2022 Addendum were all a continuation of the parties’ best efforts to achieve the broader objectives of the MOU, which was that [...] would rescue the property until Plaintiff secured financing to repurchase it.  In sum, the Chancery dispute is not an isolated issue, but part of a continuous transaction originating with the 2012 MOU aimed at rescuing the Property from foreclosure and bankruptcy.
[brief] [Id. at 607.]  The Court also noted that the officer “described what appeared in various stills of the surveillance footage. ”  Ibid.  The Court held that this “[c]ontinuous commentary and speculation about each step the robber took inside the bank did not satisfy the requirements of the rules of evidence” because “[t]he video was not confusing, chaotic, or lengthy. ”  Ibid.  The Court also held that it was not proper for the officer to offer his opinion, “from [his] observations [that] it looks like the suspect has two fingers on the note, holding the note as if it’s on the counter.
[brief] STANDARD OF REVIEW  Appeals to the Appellate Division may be taken as of right to review final decisions or actions of any state administrative agency.  N.J.C.R. 2:2-3(a)(2).  A final agency decision has been described as one in which the agency communicates written notice of the finality of its decision.  Silviera-Francisco v. Bd. of Educ. of City of Elizabeth, 224 N.J. 126, 136 (2016) (citing Bouie v. N.J. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs, 407 N.J.Super. 518, 527, 972 A.2d 401 (App. Div.2009)).  The Court will uphold a final agency decision unless it is arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable, unsupported by substantial credible evidence in the record as a whole, offensive to the federal or state constitution, or inconsistent with the administrative agency’s statutory mission.  See In re Stallworth, 208 N.J. 182, 194 (2011); Circus Liquors, Inc. v. Middletown Tp., 109 N.J. 1, 9-10 (2009); Hemsey v. Board of Trustees, PERS, 198 N.J. 215, 223 (2009).  In determining whether agency action is arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable, a reviewing court will consider: (1) whether the agency action violates the enabling act’s express or implied legislative policies; (2) whether there is substantial evidence in the record to support the findings upon which the agency based application of the legislative policies; and (3) whether, in applying the legislative policies to the facts, the agency clearly erred by reaching a conclusion that could not reasonably have been made upon a showing of the relevant factors.  Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas Co. v. N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 101 N.J. 95, 103 (1985).  The Appellate Division will reverse the final order of an agency that is not supported by substantial credible evidence in the record as a whole.  In re Stallworth, supra, 208 N.J. at 194.  Where the agency has made certain findings of fact, the Appellate Court will consider whether the agency’s findings could reasonably be reached, on sufficient credible evidence present in the record, considering the proofs as a whole.  Jackson v. Concord Company, 54 N.J. 113, 117 (1969).  Appellate review of legal questions is de novo.  L.A. Bd. of Educ. of Trenton, 221 N.J. 192, 204 (2015); Univ. Cottage Club of Princeton N.J. Corp. v. N.J. Dept. of Envtl. Prot., 191 N.J. 38, 48 (2007); In re Taylor, 158 N.J. 644, 656-58 (1999).  While the Appellate Division will give weight to an agency’s interpretation of a statutory scheme, such interpretations need not be adopted where they are plainly unreasonable.  *In re Advisory Op. No 01-2008*, 201 N.J. 254 (2010).
[directive] School Park Public drug  Generic charges use if automatically excluded automatically charged excluded automatically/ manually excluded if 2C:35- conjunction in with charge is found to be 5(b)(l or 2C:35-5(b)(12)  1)  marijuana-related (automatically if charged excluded in 2C:35-5(b)(l conjunction with 1) or 2C otherwise, :35-S(b fact- 12 )( ), sensitive analysis is required)  2C:35-5(b )(11)  2C:35-7(a)
[brief] (Aa202).  Pursuant to N.J.A.C. 6A:23A-5.2(b), no school district shall contract with legal counsel or use in-house legal counsel to pursue any affirmative claim or cause of action on behalf of school district administrators and/or any individual district board of education member(s) for any claim or cause of action in which the damages to be awarded would benefit an individual rather than the school district as a whole.  [(emphasis added). ]  As such, while [...] was certainly authorized as the Board President to unilaterally request legal research from the Board attorney, he was not authorized to do so for his own personal benefit.  The research he requested was not intended to benefit the school district, as it was neither publicly voted on by the Board, nor shared with the Board afterwards.  And [...] initiated the ethics complaint in his individual capacity after the Board expended $5,085 on the legal research that he used to support his personal complaint.  (Aa233).  Moreover, as the Commissioner noted in his final decision, [...] had other options available to him if he believed [...] was committing ethics violations.  (Aa235).  For example, [...] could have asked the Board to vote on the research request before contacting the Board attorney, or he could have requested a free advisory opinion from the Commission.  Ibid.  [...] could have also initiated an ethics complaint “directly against [...], as she did to him, without the use of the Board attorney research and the unnecessary expense to the Board. ”  Ibid.  [...]’s use of the Board attorney to pursue his ethics claim against [...] at no personal cost clearly violated N.J.A.C. 6A:23A-5.2.  The Commissioner has previously found such self-serving unilateral behavior to be a violation of N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(e).
[brief] PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT’S BRIEF  Table of Contents  FACTUAL BACKGROUND ..................................................................................14  PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND ...........................................................................18  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT .............................................................................25 ARGUMENT ............................................................................................................28  POINT I: THE FOLLOWING IS TO ADDRESS MOST OR ALL OF JUDGE CHETNEY’S CONCERNS AND CRITICISMS REGARDING THE COMPLAINT (1T-33-16 TO 1T-56-18) .................................................................28  A. COMPLAINTS ABOUT THE COMPLAINT (1T33-16 TO 1T56-18) ......................29 B. BRETT’S STANDING FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF & MOOTNESS (NOT ADDRESSED BELOW)  ..............................................................................................................44
[brief] Our Courts recognize that injunctive relief, even when only to preserve the status quo, represents a significant intrusion into the affairs of the parties and the interests of the public.  Waste Mgmt. of New Jersey, Inc. v. Union County Utilities Auth., 399 N.J. Super. 508, 538 (App. Div. 2008).  Thus, they have held that injunctive relief is an extraordinary remedy to be used sparingly and to be granted only in the clearest of factual circumstances and for the most compelling of equities.  Mays v. Penza, 179 N.J. Super. 175, 180 (Law Div. 1980).  Accordingly, a party seeking such relief must satisfy a “particularly heavy burden. ”  Guaman v. Velez, 421 N.J. Super. 239, 247-248 (App. Div. 2011).  In order to obtain the extraordinary remedy of injunctive relief Plaintiffs must establish, by clear and convincing evidence, all of the following factors prescribed by *Crowe v. De Gioia*, 90 N.J. 126 (1982) and its progeny: (1) Plaintiffs’ claim is based on a well-settled legal right; (2) Plaintiffs have a reasonable probability of success on the merits; (3) Plaintiffs will suffer irreparable harm if the relief is denied; and (4) the harm to Plaintiffs, if the injunction is denied, will be greater than the harm to the opposing party if the injunction is granted.
[brief] Accordingly Count 1 of the complaint was valid.  Because Counts 5 (unjust enrichment) and Count 6 (breach of covenant of good faith) are quasi contractual, these should not be dismissed as well.  Because Count 8 (injunctive relief) is still feasible and Count 9 (declaratory relief against [...]) must await final determination on all the claims against the [...], those should not be dismissed at this premature stage, even though the [...] would like to receive a credibility determination on the basis of the conflicting papers filed in this motion sequence.
[brief] Plaintiff had to go through [...] to make arrangements for attendance at funerals and the like (1T; 69:19).  What was going on was a “stressful work environment” (1T; 71:3).  Plaintiff was not permitted to do the job she was commanded to do by the Major and the part of the job involving the Intake Unit, she was prohibited from contacting them (1T; 71:4 to 71:16).  Her “character” as an Admin Officer was being questioned; her ability to do those functions was curtailed yet Admin Officers in the past and in the future, all did what she was restricted in doing (1T; 71:22).  The Admin Officer that came in after her, [...], got promoted to Lieutenant in that job (1T; 72:11).
[brief] [Pa77 at ¶ 17]  The Lease also prohibited [...] from making “alterations or additions to the Leasehold or any Building System without Landlord’s prior written consent,” and provided that “[a]ll costs and expenses incurred with respect to any alterations or additions will be paid promptly when due by Tenant….”  [Pa80 at ¶ 21]  [...] also agreed to: indemnify, defend and hold Landlord harmless from any liabilities, obligations, damages, claims, charges or expenses including reasonable legal fees which may be imposed upon --- 3 Base Rent, Additional Rent, and additional sums due under the Lease shall be referred to collectively as “Rent. ” or incurred by Landlord, by reason of any of the following occurrences during the term of this Lease:  a.  Any matter, cause or thing arising out of Tenant’s use or occupancy of the Leasehold or any part thereof or any act or omission of Tenant, Tenant’s agents, representatives or invitees.  * * * d.  Any failure on the part of the Tenant to perform or comply with any covenant, agreement, term or condition in this Lease.  [Pa85 at ¶ 44].  The Lease provided that if [...] fails to pay Rent or any other sums payable under the Lease within ten (10) days of the due date, it shall be in default.
[brief] “[...], on behalf of the [...], looked at four separate charts.  She looked at [...]’s chart as well, looked at staffing.  Didn’t find a single violation. ”  11T93:15-18.  No such witness existed.  There was no such testimony.  In reality, we have no idea what [...] did or did not do.  The [...] documents, marked for identification as D-5 and D-6, also were used to show that the nurses did nothing wrong because, if they had, they would have been disciplined by the [...].  Defendant hailed the [...] as the agency “that’s supposed to see if you have compliance with regulations. ”  11T77:2-7.  Defendant then uses the non-existent [...] witness to establish that the [...] found there were no deficiencies in the care rendered to [...].
[brief] (Pa000007).  Plaintiffs further accused [...] of trespass.  (Pa000011-12).  6  Deposition testimony later revealed that [...] was responsible for the fencing plan to remediate soil erosion and sedimentation.  (Pa000295 at 108:7-22).  Plaintiffs responded to [...]’s First Set of Interrogatories on March 29, 2022.  (Pa000053).  In the Responses, Plaintiffs conceded that, despite signing a complaint and filing a cause of action for trespass against [...], they “[did] not know whether [...] physically entered upon the Property without the Plaintiff owner’s and/or Plaintiff tenant’s authorization or that [...]’s actions resulted in others doing so. ” (Pa000060) (emphasis added).  Also in these responses, Plaintiffs acknowledged that [...]’s alleged negligence was limited to the design of, and the Property’s incorporation into, the preliminary site plan.
[brief] Generally.  “CEPA is remedial legislation entitled to liberal construction, with the purposes of protecting whistleblowers from retaliation by employers and discouraging employers from engaging in illegal or unethical activities. ”  Lippman v Ethicon, Inc., 222 N.J. 362, 378 (2015); Abbamont v. Piscataway Twp. Bd. Of Educ., 138 N.J. 405, 431 (1994)(emphasis added).  CEPA’s purpose, as pronounced by the New Jersey Supreme Court, “is to protect and encourage employees to report illegal or unethical workplace activities and to discourage . . . employers from engaging in such conduct. ”  Id. at 443.  “In this instance, any fair analysis of CEPA’s scope must ‘begin . . . by looking at the statute’s plain language, which is generally the best indicator of the Legislature’s intent.
[brief] Appellant is utilizing this litigation in order to try to obtain leverage for the eventual payment for the acquisition of the property.  In order to do so, it is making many false and misleading statements.  The Ordinance which initiated the exchange of property with [...], and therefore the acquisition of the property owned by the Defendant is set forth at [...].  Notwithstanding Defendant’s assertion that there is not any “direct evidence of a valid public use of Defendants’ properties”, that simply is not correct.  In [...], (Pa8) filed herewith, the Respondent Township Council is clear that the purpose of the acquisition is to “promote and protect the health, safety, and welfare of the residents of the Township” ….  In addition, the Ordinance adopted spawned the eventual adoption of [...] (Pa31).  Notwithstanding the assertions of the Appellant in its brief, clearly the public purpose for the acquisition of Appellant’s property was amply provided.  This is the truth, notwithstanding the fact that Appellant has asserted in its brief that which was approved by the adoption of [...] “is not conditioned upon inclusion of Defendants’ lots”.  That is simply not true.  [...] (Pa8) provides in part that the Township will convey all the properties listed on Exhibit “A” to the contract.  Exhibit “A” includes the Appellant’s property, [...].  That is clear and without dispute and cannot reasonably be denied.  The contract which was made part of and therefore authorized by [...] provides in part:  The property to be exchanged from Township to Bellevue is referred to on the attached Scheduled A consisting of multiple tax blocks and lots in [...].  In addition, the contract provides in part, at Section 2(b)(1): “Bellevue is acquiring title to two of the Township parcels that it does not own”.  One can easily see by reviewing Schedule A attached to the contract that there is an asterisk next to lots “not owned by Township”.  However, those lots are to be conveyed by the Township to the developer.  Two of the lots are the lots which are the subject of this litigation.  Appellant has always been aware of that.  In addition, Appellant clearly had the opportunity to intercede in the litigation, which is referenced in Appellant’s trial brief, and was venued before [...].  That litigation was finalized and [...] found that the “mother ordinances” were “not arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable”.  He found that there was a public purpose for the adoption of those Ordinances.  As can be seen by reviewing the Appellant’s trial brief to [...] (Pa42 See Pages 2, 4 and 12), Appellant was aware that the litigation before [...] was still then pending and was aware that the issue of the “proposed exchanges” was “even legal”.  Appellant, however, chose not to intercede or participate in that litigation.  As a result, we respectfully suggest that it is estopped from attempting to allege that collateral estoppel does not apply, for the reasoning detailed herein.
[brief] During cross-examination, [...] volunteered at various times that defendant “did cocaine,” was arrested separately for Driving While Intoxicated, and was a “Pagan. ”  The first was directly responsive to counsel’s question and passed without objection, the second was partially responsive and elicited an objection, and the third was unsolicited and objected.  (4T144-18 to 145-8; 155-15 to 17).  After the third, the trial court summoned counsel to sidebar, whereupon defense counsel requested a mistrial.  (4T155-19 to 158-21).  The trial court reserved that decision and issued an instruction to the jury ordering that they “completely disregard [the] last answer given by the witness. ” (4T161-14 to 16).  The application for mistrial was resurrected following the verdict, when defense counsel brought it to the attention of [...], who was covering for [...].