ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] Do you understand that being sentenced to community supervision for life means that: you will be supervised for at least 15 years as if on parole, and subject to conditions appropriate to protect the public and foster rehabilitation, including, but not limited to counseling; Internet access or use; and other restrictions, which may include restrictions on where you can live, work or travel?  [예/Yes]  [아니요/No]  [해당없음/NA]  귀하의 거주지에 대한 제한은 미성년 자녀가 있는 집에 4.  (3)  거주하는 것에 대한 제한도 포함될수 있다는 것을 아십니까?  Do you understand that the restrictions on where you can live may include restrictions on residing in a home with minor children?  [예/Yes] [아니요/No] [해당없음/NA]  귀하가 종신 사회 내 감독의 조건을 위반하여 기소되고, (4) 그 위반에 대해 유죄 판결을 받는 경우, 귀하는 년 5 이하의 금고형의 선고를 받고 종신 가석방 감독의 특별 선고를 받을 수 있거나(조건의 위반이 년 월1 일 2014 7 이후에 발생한 경우), 또는 개월 이하의 형을 선고 받을 18 수 있다는 것을(조건의 위반이 년7 월1 일 이전에 2014 발생한 경우) 아십니까? Do you understand that if you violate a condition of community supervision for life and you are indicted and convicted for that violation, you may receive a sentence of imprisonment of up to 5 years and a special (if the violation of the condition sentence of parole supervision for life occurred on or after July 1, 2014) or you may receive a sentence of up to (if the violation of the condition occurred before July 1, 18 months 2014)?
[brief] (Pa187 (Emphasis supplied).  By August 7, 2022, and as shown in Board counsel’s email to [...]’s counsel (Pa172), the combination of the Township’s and Board’s planners and attorneys had drafted a revised rezoning ordinance (Pa182), drafted an amendment to the Settlement Agreement (Pa173), had discussed and received the endorsement of the Court’s Planner/Special Master (Pa172), and had also obtained approval from [...].
[brief] Carty, 170 N.J. at 647.  Thus, our Supreme Court has held that police cannot seek consent to search a stopped car without reasonable and articulable suspicion that a search of the car will yield evidence of a crime.  *Id.* at 635.  This requirement “serves to validate the continued detention associated with the search . . . . [and] prevent the police from turning a routine traffic stop into a fishing expedition for criminal activity unrelated to the stop. ”  *Id.* at 647.  Reasonable suspicion requires that the officer be able to “point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant” the belief that the suspects are engaged in ongoing criminal activity, and in the case of consent searches, that the search will yield evidence of that crime.
[directive] If an officer subject to an administrative investigation has a good-faith basis to question the impartiality or independence of the investigation, then they may report their concerns to the County Prosecutor.  Law enforcement officers employed by a County Prosecutor’s Office or the Division of Criminal Justice may report concerns to the [...] ([...]).  The County Prosecutor may, within their discretion, conduct their own review of the internal affairs investigation and determine whether any further action is warranted, including potential reassignment of the investigation to a different entity.  6.3.7
[brief] ”  *Wright v. Owens Corning*, 679 F.3d 101, 108 (3d Cir. 2012) (internal citations and quotations omitted).  Furthermore, even “where…an administrative agency must make a decision that is not subject to the requirements for rulemaking or contested cases imposed by the APA, principles of administrative due process apply to protect against arbitrary action. ”  *In re Consider Distribution of Casino Simulcasting Special Fund (Accumulated in 2005)*, 398 N.J. Super 7, 21 (App. Div. 2008) (internal citations and quotations omitted).  The Court continued that, “[i]n such cases, the agency must select an informal or hybrid procedure that satisfies the fundamental requirements of procedural due process and administrative fairness by providing adequate notice, a chance to know opposing evidence, and to present evidence and argument in response. ”  *Id.* (Internal citations and quotations omitted).  It is the role of this Court to ensure that agencies within the State of New Jersey conform to the basic tenets of due process.  *See In re N.J.A.C. 7:1B-1.1 Et Seq.*, 431 N.J. Super. 100, 129 (App. Div. 2013) (internal citations omitted); *see also Main St. Assocs. v. N.J. Hous. & Mortg. Fin. Agency*, 114 N.J. 226, 236 (1989) (rulemaking that does not “conform[] with basic tenets of due process and provide[] standards to guide both the regulator and the regulated,” will be set aside).  By issuing the Bulletin fifty years after the passage of the Holding Company Act and without providing any notice, a hearing, or an opportunity for the public to comment on the substance and implications of the Bulletin, the Department engaged in improper de facto rulemaking in violation of the APA.  **CONCLUSION**
[brief] ”  160 N.J. Super. at 510-511 (emphasis added).  “And it is within the special function of a jury to decide if the facts on which the answer of an expert is based actually exist, and the value or the weight of the testimony of the expert is dependent upon and no stronger than the facts on which it is predicated. ”  Id. [...]’s expert [...], Ph.D., PE, AICP, inspected the staircase landing and steps and concluded that the Defendants’ lack of proper maintenance of the deteriorating concrete led to or exacerbated the icy condition as a result of a mere trace of freezing rain:
[brief] Exhibit A: Appellate Court Notice  1.  June 11, 2024  Letter from Court .................................................. 1-2  2.  Statement 06/11/2024 ................................................................. 3-4  3.  MOTION FILING NOTICE ............................................................ 5-6  4.  June 12, 2024  Defendant Letter to Court ..................................... 7  5.  Notice of Motion for Extension of time (30 days) ....................... 8-10  Exhibit B: Lower Court Orders
[brief] [3T75-4 to -6].  [...] warned defendant that there would be no more outbursts.  [3T75-12 to -15].  Trial resumed.  After the testimony of the State’s fourth witness for the day, out of the presence of the jury, defendant demanded to see more surveillance footage from the bank’s security cameras.  [3T123-23 to 124-9].  [...] informed defendant that he had received all of his discovery.  [3T124-5 to -25].  After the State called its fifth witness to the stand, defendant demanded to be taken into the back room and removed from the court.  [3T126-12].  [...] excused the jury.
[brief] (Id.)  The hyperlinks were underlined and in bright blue text.  (Id.)  When the user clicked on the hyperlinks, they would display, respectively, the then-operative Terms of Use and Privacy Notice for the user to review.  (Id.)  The screen also displayed an image of a blue pencil signing on a signature line marked by an “X. ”  (Id.)  Underneath the hyperlinks was a checkbox.  (Id.)  The only other text on the screen appeared next to the checkbox and read, in bold text: “By checking this box, I have reviewed and agree to the Terms of Use and acknowledge the Privacy Notice. ”  (Id.)  It also stated, in less prominent text: “I am at least 18 years of age. ”  (Id.)  Below the checkbox was a button marked “Confirm. ”  (Id.)  [...]’s digital records show that on January 8, 2022, [...] logged into her [...] account using her password, checked the box next to the statement “I have reviewed and agree to the Terms of Use,” and pressed “Confirm.
[brief] The Court cited two reasons: (1) absent an imposition of liability, an innocent person could be left without recourse; and (2) it gave commercial property owners incentive to maintain the adjacent sidewalks.  *Id.* at 202-03.  However, in *Kandrac v. Marrazzo’s Mkt.*, 429 N.J. Super. 79 (App. Div. 2012), the court held that those considerations did not apply to a tenant in a multi-tenant shopping center where the tenant did “not have control or maintenance responsibilities for common area and [had] no contractual obligation to maintain such areas. ”  *Id.* at 86 (citing *Barrows v. Trs. Of Princeton Univ.*, 244 N.J. Super. 144, 148 (Law Div. 1990); and *Holmes v. Kimco Realty Corp.*, 598 F.3d 115 (3d Cir. 2010)).  Relying on *Holmes*, the court held that while a tenant derives a benefit from the common areas in a multi-tenant shopping center, “countervailing policy considerations weigh more heavily against imposition of a duty. ”  *Id.* at 86-87.  Under the facts of this case and the law discussed herein, [...] owed no duty to maintain the area where plaintiff fell.
[brief] ..........  19  1966 [...]-TO-[...] AND 1955 [...]-TO-[...] DEEDS.  19 POINT III ...........................................................................  26  THE COURT BELOW PROPERLY REJECTED APPELLANTS’ ...............  26 DEFENSES OF RES JUDICATA AND COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL ..........  26 TO BAR RESPONDENT’S CLAIM FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT .......  26 POINT IV ...........................................................................
[brief] [...] first entered a 9/25/20 Stay Pending Appeal Order (10a) of [...]'s final order (8a).  Yet, two months after the stay was dissolved by this Court's 5/18/22 affirmance (22a), the Board had not complied with the final order (8a).  From 7/18/22 to 11/25/22, [...] filed multiple motions (1a, 68a, 187a, 194a) for enforcement, interest and sanctions.
[brief] .........................................................  17 [...] & [...], *Psychosis*, StatPearls Publishing (Jan. 2024) ..  17 [...], *White Paper on the Science of Late Adolescence: A Guide for Judges, Attorneys and Policy Makers* 17-18 (2022) ......................................................... 29 [...], & [...], *Psychotic Symptoms in Bipolar Disorder and Their Impact on the Illness: A Systematic Review*, 12(9) World Journal of Psychiatry 1204–1232 (2022) ................................................................. 17 [...], “Madness” and Penal Confinement: Some Observations on Mental Illness and Prison Pain, 19 PUNISHMENT & SOC’Y 310 (2017) .. 30 [...], *Physical Victimization in Prison: The Role of Mental Illness*, 31 INT’L J. L. & PSYCHIATRY 385 (2008) ........................................... 30 Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 103 (5th ed. 2022) .................................................................................................. 17, 20 [...], *Vulnerability and Just Desert: A Theory of Sentencing and Mental Illness*, 103 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 147 (2013) ........ 30 [...] et al., *Changes in Anger and Aggression After Treatment for PTSD in Active Duty Military*, 76(3)  Journal of Clinical Psychology (2020)  ........................................................................................................  21  [...], From Youth Justice Involvement to Young Adult Offending (2014)  .........................................................................................  32  PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND STATEMENT OF FACTS
[brief] The trial judge added: “Once you’re no longer in breach, maybe you are entitled to the costs.  But that’s something for another day.  You want that money you’ve got to get out of breach” (2T12-22 to 2T12-25).  Tenant’s counsel asked if the Escrow Funds would remain with the court “pending the further motion practice regarding the tenant improvement” and the trial judge confirmed that was the case (2T15-21 to 2T16-4).
[brief] ”  Visiting Homemaker Serv. of Hudson Cty. v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 380 N.J. Super. 596, 607 (App. Div. 2005) (citations omitted).  None of Appellants’ arguments satisfy this high standard.  Appellants contend that the presumption of constitutionality to which ordinary legislation is entitled is categorically inapplicable here because the DACCA Attorney Safe Harbor allegedly impinges on a constitutionally protected right to practice law.  (Ab20).  In support of this argument, Appellants rely on Bell v. Stafford Twp., 110 N.J. 384 (1988), which held that there was no presumption of validity for a municipal ordinance which “directly and drastically encroache[d] on a fundamental constitutional interest, freedom of speech and expression. ”  Id. at 395.  The reliance on Bell is misplaced for two reasons.  First, Appellants incorrectly assume, without citing any authority, that there is a fundamental constitutional right to practice law.  Second, Appellants incorrectly posit that the DACCA Attorney Safe Harbor “directly impinges” on the right to practice law.
[brief] [...]: I'm sorry, Your Honor.  [...]: Do you have your witnesses?  [...]: The State does still have their witnesses, however, it's still been 13 years.  Memories fade.  [...]: Well, how do we know that?  Anybody interview them?  [...]: I do not know, Your Honor.  [...]: I didn't think you did, I'm rhetorical.  [...]: It's okay.  And as such, we would argue that it would be unfair prejudice to the State to allow this defendant to withdraw his plea.  [...]: Okay.  All right, thank you.
[brief] See, Estate of Warshaw v. Dir., Div. of Taxation, 27 N.J. Tax 287, 292 (App. Div. 2013), observing that for estate tax purposes, the value of a decedent’s gross estate is determined by the value of the property in the estate “at the time of death,” and that “[o]rdinarily, events subsequent to death are not considered in fixing fair market value of a decedent’s gross estate. ”  Moreover, the approach to fair market value now urged by the Defendants is directly contrary to the position they took in open court and in their pleadings, where they fully embraced and even urged a date-of-death approach based on appraisals.  Prior to the parties’ first court appearance in this matter, the Defendants filed a counterclaim, seeking a fair market value appraisal of the [...].  (Da22).  During that first appearance, [...] noted that prior to the hearing he had asked the Court to order appraisals (1T12:15-17), and stated to the Court that “the way I read the provision is that it was bequeathed to me or my brother at a fair market value at the time of [the Decedent’s] death. ” (1T14:16-18).  The January 25, 2022 Order specified that the appraisals of both the Boonton and [...] were intended to establish their fair market value, as of July 24, 2021, the Decedent’s date of death.  (Da15, at ¶¶ 3 & 4).  The craven self-interest and disingenuousness in the Defendants’ present position on value is perhaps best illustrated by their motion for partial summary judgment.
[brief] School board members are tasked with administering the public schools.  N.J.S.A. 18A:11-1.  In enacting the Act, "the Legislature declared its intention 'to ensure and preserve public confidence' in local school board members by providing local board members with advance guidance on ethical conduct so that such members might conduct their personal affairs appropriately and within the bounds ethically expected."  *Bd. of Educ. of Sea Isle City v. Kennedy*, 196 N.J. 1, 16 (2008) (citation omitted) (quoting N.J.S.A. 18A:12-22; citing N.J.S.A.18A:12-24(j)).  To that end, the Legislature has declared that school board members and officials must conduct themselves to “avoid conduct which is in violation of their public trust or which creates a justifiable impression among the public that such trust is being violated[.]”  N.J.S.A. 18A:12-22(a).  A.  The Commissioner Correctly Found [...] in Violation of N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24(b) and -24.1(f).
[brief] References to the January 27, 2023 trial de novo before the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division follow the form 5T__-__.  References to the February 17, 2023 trial de novo before the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division follow the form 6T__-__.  References to the April 17, 2023 sentencing hearing before the Honorable [...], J.S.C. follow the form 7T__-__. believed, at the time he came upon Appellant on the side of the road on the morning of November 5, 2019, that Appellant’s vehicle was operable, and [...] admitted as much at the probable cause hearing on February 25, 2022, then there would have been no reason for [...] to render aid under the community caretaking function.
[brief] Immediately after turning to aggravating factor nine, the Court stated, “Now this is not just specific deterrence, but general deterrence.  And I ask myself, how many young people just like [...] will I see?  Quite a few.  That’s why they’re here.  We’re here because they’ve done things that shouldn’t have been done under circumstances that they should not have acted the way they acted. ”  (8T 80-9 to 15)  The Court then addressed [...] but did not point to any facts about [...] or his specific offense that warranted a finding of the need for deterrence, instead speaking in general terms about why the Court did not consider [...]’s prison record and rehabilitative efforts as evidence weighing against the need for deterrence.
[brief] Courts have construed “substantial nexus” to mean “closely relates” and find that a judgment for a defendant should only be entered when “no such law or policy is forthcoming. ”  Dzwonar v. McDevitt, 177 N.J. 451, 463 (2003).  Notably, with respect to improper quality of patient care outlined in CEPA’s N.J.S.A. § 34:19-3(c)(1), a plaintiff asserting an employer’s conduct is incompatible with a mandate of public policy concerning public health must “identify authority that applies to the ‘activity, policy, or practice’ of the employer.
[brief] Plaintiff presents absolutely no meritorious arguments as to how the trial court judge committed reversible error based on applying the evidence actually produced at trial to what ¶25 of the JOD actually says and requires as opposed to what the Plaintiff wishes it said coupled with the anemic evidence she adduced at trial.  Again, these educations were: (i.) unilaterally planned and selected without the Defendant’s meaningful involvement; (ii.) debt financed without any financial transparency by the Plaintiff until after the children graduated; (iii.) completely unaffordable to the Plaintiff and the Defendant at the time; and (iv.) sought by the Plaintiff for the first time to be paid for by the Defendant seven (7) years after the oldest child enrolled in college and five (5) years after the youngest child enrolled in college.  For the trial court judge to view these facts in any other manner than she ultimately did would have lead to an absurd and completely unjust result and bad precedent.
[brief] CONCLUSION  For the reasons set forth above, it is clear that the trial court erred when Plaintiffs-Appellants’ case was dismissed on Summary Judgment, as the Appellant can meet his burden under N.J.S.A. 59:4-2.  Respectfully Submitted, [...]  Attorney(s) for Plaintiff(s) s./a.asphall  BY: [...] 015691989  [...] 043952010  On the Brief 22  Under R. 2:6-1(a)(2) “briefs submitted to the trial court shall not be included in the appendix, unless either the brief is referred to in the decision of the court or agency, or the question of whether an issue was raised in the trial court is germane to the appeal. ”  However, because the trial court effectively cited to and relied upon every fact as stated by the Defendant/Respondent [...] and not a single fact stated by the Plaintiff/Appellant in his Statement of Facts was cited to or mentioned in the Decision by the trial court, portions of the briefs are included as an exception to this rule.  Also, the question of which issues were raised in the trial court is germane to this appeal.
[directive] Domagac siy zastrzezenia dotyczqcego niekwalifikowania siy do zwolnienia warunkowego?  Are you aware that you must pay restitution if the court finds there is a victim who [No/Nie]  [NA/Niedotyczy]  15.  [Yes/Tak] has suffered a loss and if the court finds that you are able or will be able in the future to pay restitution?  Czy zdaje Pan(i) sobie sprawy, ze bydzie Pan(i) musial(a) zaplacic odszkodowanie jesli sqd stwierdzi, ze osoba pokrzywdzona poniosla straty, a Pan(i) jest lub bydzie w stanie wyplacic odszkodowanie?
[directive] For example, a County Prosecutor may: specify additional circumstances when a municipal police department BWC must be activated; impose limits on the authority of a municipal police department to specify additional circumstances when a BWC must be activated; categorically prohibit the use of BWCs with enhanced audio/visual capabilities such as infrared night vision (cf. Section 7.6, which requires prosecutorial approval to use such features); and specify additional circumstances when a BWC recording will be “tagged,” etc.  13  Violations  If a law enforcement officer, employee, or agent fails to adhere to the recording or retention requirements contained in this Policy, intentionally interferes with a BWC’s ability to accurately capture audio or video recordings, or violates any other provision of this policy, the officer, employee, or agent shall be subject to appropriate disciplinary action, in addition to any judicial consequences outlined in the law.
[brief] The building in the background cuts off most of the view of 6th Street so that only the top half of vehicles can be seen, making it impossible to discern the full shape of any vehicles, let alone see their license plates.  Moreover, the sunlight reflecting off the windows of the identified car blends into the light reflected off of the roof of the building, making it difficult to discern the specific color of that car, or keep track of the vehicle or driver’s movements, if any.  The image identified by the detective as the “shooter” exiting the car is even harder to discern.  Absent contextual clues, the light-colored amorphous shape would not even be discernible as a person.  (Da11 at 37, 19:03:13)  Indeed, the jury evidently had a difficult time discerning the images in S-37, because they requested to watch a magnified version of that video while deliberating.  (8T3-8 to 4-13)  But even when the video is magnified, no features can be discerned that would support the detective’s testimony because the video was magnified without being enhanced in any way, making the zoomed-in version just as obscure and blurry as S-37, only closer-up.  (Da11 at 173)  (5T241-12 to 244-15; 6T72-22 to 25)  Even under the most charitable interpretation, the video shows, at best, a light-colored shape moving at a walking pace away from a dark colored sedan.  The detective’s opinion that the image depicted the shooter exiting the Chevy was thus far from clear, and was subject to reasonable dispute.
[directive] Accordingly, in order to protect the motoring public from the intoxicating effects of medical marijuana, whenever a police officer has reason to believe that -3- medical marijuana has recently been smoked in a motor vehicle (e.g., a plain smell of burning marijuana), the officer is expected to investigate whether the vehicle had been or is being operated by a person while under the influence of marijuana.  When an officer has reason to believe that marijuana has recently been smoked in a vehicle that is currently in operation (e.g., when an officer detects recently-smoked marijuana during a motor vehicle stop), in order to ensure safe operation of the vehicle following the encounter, the officer is required by the Attorney General Enforcement Guidelines to pursue all reasonable and necessary investigative steps to determine whether the vehicle operator may be under the influence of marijuana, whether from direct inhalation or from second-hand smoke.  This public safety investigation may entail, as the circumstances warrant, ordering the driver to exit the vehicle for sobriety testing, and subjecting the driver to on-scene drug recognition testing by a qualified drug recognition expert (DRE), when practicable.