ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] In January 2008, however, before any construction or grading began, [...] discovered an elevation error in [...]’s site and grading plans, whereby the first floor elevation of the [...] was listed as 443.15 ft instead of 445.77.  (Pa384 at ¶10) [...] advised [...] of the error.  (Pa384 at ¶10; Pa397).  After finding the error, [...] met with both [...] and [...] to discuss how to proceed.  (Pa385 at ¶11).  On March 14, 2008, as per agreement between [...], [...] and [...], [...] revised its grading plan to correct the elevation error found by [...] affecting the old Longo building, the new building to be constructed, and other aspects of the site.) (Pa385 at ¶13; Pa127).
[directive] Restrictions on Access to and Use and Dissemination of BWC Recordings  10.1  Specified Authorized Purposes for Accessing/Using Stored BWC Recordings.  No law enforcement officer or civilian employee of a law enforcement agency shall access, view, copy, disseminate, or otherwise use a BWC recording except for an official purpose as specified in this Section and the law.  BWC recordings shall not be divulged or used by any law enforcement agency for any commercial or other non-law enforcement purpose.  Access to and use of a stored BWC recording is permitted only: (a) when relevant to and in furtherance of a criminal investigation or prosecution; (b) when relevant to and in furtherance of an internal affairs investigation; (c) when relevant to and in furtherance of a management review process to identify circumstances indicating possible police misconduct or to determine the existence of a pattern or practice of possible misconduct; (d) when relevant to a supervisor’s review of an officer’s actions as part of the supervisory process authorized by the agency; (e) to show to a civilian who intends to file a complaint against an officer to demonstrate what actually occurred during the encounter so that the person can make an informed decision whether to file the complaint; (f) to comply with the State’s discovery obligations in prosecutions pursuant to the Rules of Court; (g) to comply with any other legal obligation to turn over the recording to a person or entity;5 (h) to show or disseminate the recording to a civilian or a non-law enforcement entity, or to disseminate it to the public, where the County Prosecutor or designee, or Director of the Division of Criminal Justice or designee, determines that disclosure to that particular person/entity or the public is warranted because the person’s/entity’s/public’s need for access outweighs the law enforcement interest in maintaining confidentiality; When responding to a subpoena or court order, or a request pursuant to the Open Public Records Act or 5 common law right to know, disclosure of a BWC recording under this paragraph is permitted only after providing notice to the County Prosecutor or designee, or the Director of the Division of Criminal Justice or designee, pursuant to Section 11 of this Policy.
[brief] Examples of such changes appear on pages 1, 29-32, 36-39, and 42 of Plaintiff’s amended Brief.  \(^3\)  The [...]’ Statement of Material Facts and supporting documents are included in defendants’ accompanying Appendix.  (Da4-8; Da9-163).  United States Constitution under Title 42 of the United States Code §§ 1983, 1985 and 1986.  (Aa1-43; Da12-55 (SMF 2)).  On December 14, 2020, the case was removed to the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey, Trenton Vicinage.
[brief] 03/09/2023  Order Barring the Expert Testimony of [...], and Granting Defendants’ Motions for Summary Judgment  ...........................................1280a  TABLE OF APPENDIX 12/21/2012  Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint.........................................................1a 1/31/2013  Answer to Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint, Separate Defenses, Demand for Affidavits of Merit, Demand for Statement of Damages, Crossclaims, Answer to Crossclaims, and Demand for Jury on Behalf of Defendants, [...], Esquire and [...] ..................18a 11/3/2017  Order and Opinion Denying Defendants [...] and [...]'s Motion to Strike Plaintiffs' COAH Damages Claims..............................................30a 11/3/2017  Order and Opinion Denying Defendants, [...], Esquire and Cooper Levenson, April, Niedelman & Waenheim, P.A. Motion to Strike Plaintiffs’ COAH Damages Claims...........................................................................37a 5/28/2018  Affidavit of [...], Esquire in Support of Motion for Summary Judgement of Defendants, [...], Esquire and Cooper Levenson, April, Niedelman & Wagenheim, P.A. Jr...........................................................(omitted)
[brief] She signed a certified mailing card for the letter providing her notice of the divorce hearing.  Her efforts to claim that the year on the green certified mailing card with her signature was 2013 not 2015 is simply an incredible assertion that the court finds astounding and incredible.  [A229, Op. at 24(emphasis added)].  On pages 8-9 of her Reply Brief, Defendant baselessly relies on her incredible Certification to claim she was reasonable in her timing to move to vacate.  (A301).  She was anything but reasonable in her timing and the trial court so found.
[brief] (1T86-2 to 15).  Considering there were only two detectives and three potential suspects – one of whom had a history of violently evading capture – defendant and [...] were asked to exit the vehicle and walk to the rear.  (1T86-17 to 87-4).  [...] complained of leg pain and asked if she could sit in the car.  (1T87-9 to 10).  [...] accommodated this request and opened the passenger door for her to sit.  (1T87-11 to 13).  Opening the vehicle to assist [...], [...] detected the odor of marijuana coming from the cabin.  (1T87-16 to 17).  At this time, $3,117 in cash was seized from [...]’s pocket and consequently, all three individuals were Mirandized.  (1T89-4 to 25).  [...] and defendant agreed to answer questions, during which they gave conflicting stories explaining their purpose: [...] claiming he was buying car parts, defendant claiming he was selling a car.  (1T90-5 to 16).  [...] then reminded defendant that he does not sell cars.  (1T90-16 to 18).  [...] then asked defendant to confirm his ownership of the car and for consent to search the vehicle based on the odor of marijuana; defendant attempted the former and declined the latter.  (1T92-8 to 25).  [...] then arrived and an application for a telephonic search warrant for the vehicle was sought.  (1T93-11 to 22).  The warrant was ultimately granted by [...], J.S.C.. (2T54-18 to 23).  Meanwhile, [...] attempted to obtain defendant’s driver’s license, registration, and proof of insurance.  (2T16-10 to 17-24).  Defendant advised that his registration and insurance cards were either in the glove box or the arm rest.  (2T17-22 to 18-1).  Given [...]’s intimate knowledge of defendant’s history, [...] did not allow defendant to return to the vehicle to retrieve the documents, electing to gather them himself.  (2T18-2 to 21).  While retrieving the documents from the glove box, [...] recognized wrapped heroin bundles inside a leather document holder similar to that which contains an owner’s manual.  (2T19-2 to 6).  [...] did not take or otherwise manipulate the leather container.  (2T21-19 to 21).  The search warrant was executed, revealing cocaine, heroin, marijuana, a large sum of cash, and various items of paraphernalia from the glove box and surrounding vehicle.  (2T78-19 to 86-22).  Curiously, no car parts or vehicle deeds were retrieved.  At sentencing, [...], J.S.C., noted defendant’s then-twenty-five-year criminal history and his frequent residency in the prison system.
[brief] (5T 69:21-25; 70:1-3).  Therefore, not only are immediately adjacent structures consistent with the proposed height, the more contemporary warehouses spread throughout [...] also have similar building heights, well above 30 feet.  Though ignored in Defendant’s Resolution, the record also demonstrates that any potential impact from the height deviation will be mitigated by the character of the surrounding properties and the placement of these structures.  The Property is largely bordered by Interstate 295, and a 150-foot wide [...] easement with overhead transmission lines.  (5T 75:20-25; 76:1-13).  The largest contiguous property adjoining the Property is preserved farmland.  (5T 75:20-25; 76:1-13).  The closest residential structure on “[...]” is 700 to 800 feet from the nearest proposed warehouse, and the lone residential property bordering the property on [...] is at least 400 feet from the closest proposed warehouse building.  (5T 75:25; 76:1-3; 76:14-25; 77:1).  In addition to proposed landscaping, the warehouses are setback 700 feet from [...] ([...]), when the SM Zone only requires 75 feet.  All other setbacks from bordering roads are also substantial: 145 feet front yard setback from [...] ([...]), when 75 feet is required; 125 feet side yard setback, when 50 feet is required; and 67 feet rear yard setback, when 50 is required.  (5T 75:6-19; 76:1-3; 76:14-25; 77:1).  Any potential impact from the excess height will be mitigated by the character of the surrounding properties and significant setbacks from the rights-of-way.  While relevant to the negative criteria, these facts also establish that the proposed height deviation will be consistent with the surrounding neighborhood.  Whether by undue hardship, or that the requested height variance will not offend the purpose of the height restriction and will be consistent with the neighborhood, Plaintiff presented substantial, credible, and unrebutted evidence to establish the positive criteria under Grasso for a (d)(6) height variance.
[brief] ........................................................................................................  15  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS  Order on Return Date of OTSC, entered July 8, 2024 ……………………  Da9-Da11 Order Denying Motion to Reconsider, entered October 4, 2024……  Da12-Da13  ### TABLE OF AUTHORITIES  ####  Cases | Case | Page(s) | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|---------| | 62-64 Main Street, L.L.C. v. Mayor & Council of Hackensack, | 10 | | 221 N.J. 129 (2015) | | | Crowe v. DeGioia, | 5 | | 90 N.J. 126 (1982) | | | Deland v. Township of Berkeley Heights | 13 | | 361 N.J. Super. 1 (App. Div. 2003) | | | Essex County Voc. Schs. of Educ. v. New United Corp., Nos. A-4402-11T2, | 4 | | A-1873-12T2, 2014 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 786 (App. Div. April 8, | | | 2014) | | | Griepenburg v. Twp. of Ocean, | 3, 9 | | 220 N.J. 239 (2015) | | | Mount Laurel Twp. v. MiPro Homes, LLC | 11 | | 188 N.J. 531 (2006) | | | Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. Intermodal Props., LLC | 12, 13 | | 215 N.J. 142 (2013) | | | Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Investors Ins. Co., | 3, 9 | | 65 N.J. 474 (1974) | | | S. Burlington N.A.A.C.P. v. Mt. Laurel Twp., | 6 | | 92 N.J. 158 (1983) | | | Subcarrier Commc’ns, Inc. v. Day, | 3 | | 299 N.J. Super. 634 (App. Div. 1997) | | | Twp. of Readington v. Solberg Aviation Co., | 5 | | 409 N.J. Super. 282 (App. Div. 2009) | | | Twp. of West Orange v. 769 Assocs., LLC | 11, 14 | | 172 N.J. 564 (2002) | | | Waste Mgmt. of N.J., Inc. v. Morris Cnty. Mun. Utils. Auth., | 7 | | 433 N.J. Super. 445 (App. Div.
[brief] New Jersey Judiciary Certification that Submission Contains No  Confidential Information or Confidential Personal Identifiers  This form shall be completed by any party who files a document in a public court matter in the Supreme Court or in the Appellate Division of the Superior Court.  1.  Confidential information / confidential personal identifiers (must select one):  I certify that I have reviewed Rules 1:38-3, 1:38-5, and 1:38-7 and:  ☒  This document does not contain any confidential information or any confidential personal identifiers; OR ☐  This document; previously contained confidential information or confidential personal identifiers, which have been redacted (meaning removed or made anonymous by using fictitious first names or initials, where applicable).  The cover of the redacted version of the document contains the word "REDACTED."  I acknowledge that a non-redacted version must be filed simultaneously with the redacted version in matters where the confidential information is necessary to the disposition of the matter; OR ☐  This document contains confidential information, but redaction is not required because the document is excluded from public access pursuant to court order, Rule, statute, or other authority.  If applicable, skip paragraphs 2 and 3.  2.  Return and resubmission:  I certify that if any confidential information is discovered in this submission and brought to the court's attention, the court will return the document to me, and I will be responsible to redact or remove the confidential information before resubmission.  I understand the court could impose sanctions, including suppression of the brief, dismissal in extraordinary cases, and other measures for a failure to accurately make this certification or for the discovery of confidential information in a document that has been filed.  3.  Briefs posted online:  I understand that the presence of confidential information or confidential personal identifiers in a document that has been posted on the Judiciary's public website will be grounds for the removal of such online posting, pending correction by the filing party, on an expedited timeline.  The court in its discretion could postpone further proceedings pending the resubmission of the document.  I certify that the foregoing statements made by me are true.  I am aware that if any of the foregoing statements made by me are willfully false, I am subject to punishment.  Date: 11/20/2024  Signature: [Signature]  PLAINTIFFS/APPELLANTS, [...]; [...], individually as per quod claimant and as guardian ad litem for minor plaintiffs, [...] and [...]’S REPLY
[brief] ²  References to the Appellant’s Appendix are in the form of (XXXa.) by the Board when it noted that “new or innovative solar technology can file a petition with the Board requesting that they be assigned a TREC factorization level. ”  Id. at 3.  (048a.)  Floating solar is exactly what it sounds like.  Rather than being mounted on the ground or to a rooftop, solar photovoltaic panels are mounted to a structure that floats on water, in this case the dredge pond left over from sand mining.  Benefits include not using prime land for the development of solar, as well as minimizing water evaporating, restricting algae blooms, and providing a use for otherwise “useless” or underused property.  Additionally, water cools the panels, making them, on average, more efficient.  They are, however, more expensive to install, and the State recognized this by developing a process to allow for a higher incentive for floating solar developments.  These properties are considered ideal for solar development, as shown by their inclusion as one of only 4 types of land eligible for solar development under the Board’s 2023 Community Solar Energy Program.  See In the Matter of The Community Solar Energy Program, Order, [...], Docket No. [...], dated August 16, 2023, at 24.  (051a.)  The Board then issued a decision setting the default TREC Factor for floating solar at 0.6 (or essential 60% of a full TREC value) while explicitly authorizing petitions for higher TREC Factors.
[brief] Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 299-300 (1980)(quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 478.)  Essentially, "The fundamental import of the privilege while an individual is in custody is not whether he is allowed to talk to the police without the benefit of warnings and counsel, but whether he can be interrogated."  Ibid.  Indeed, the protection against self-incrimination expressed in Miranda only applies to statements made by defendants in custody in response to "express questioning or its functional equivalent."  Ibid. at 300–01; accord State v. Stott, 171 N.J. at 365.
[brief] These are these webs and these mazes and conduit accounts and these co-mingled accounts, were in the control of [...].  I know his wife had 51 percent in one of the entities, and these monies are being moved around.  Monies maybe are still being moved around.  That is not before the Court, I have no idea.  But to say that when the music stops playing, well, this one and that one didn’t have any – bottom line, is, there are all woven out of the same cloth and they are all controlled by the same person.
[brief] ”  (Pb13)  (citing Pa232)  But [...] could not back up that empty statement with any evidence at all, despite countless opportunities to do so.  [...]’s utterly baseless certification was nothing but “lay net opinion. ”  5 Dwight Assocs. v. Township of Fairfield, 2012 Tax Unpub. LEXIS 36, at *35 (N.J. Tax Ct. October 26, 2012)  [...]’s much-touted certification was comprised of nothing more than “bare conclusions, unsupported by factual evidence . . . .”  Buckelew v. Grossbard, 87 N.J. 512, 524 (1981)  In the end, the Law Division had all of the evidence before it that [...] could provide.  This same evidence was justly found wanting as a matter of law and, a fortiori, left the Law Division with no viable alternative than to grant [...]’s motion for summary judgment, and dismiss this case in its entirety.
[brief] 14.  On or about December 7, 2021, a demand was filed by [...] seeking recovery of $5,000.00 on behalf of [...] as a result of an automobile collision that reportedly occurred in New Jersey on May 7, 2021.  This arbitration was assigned [...] (Da178-Da186).  15.  On September 20, 2022 the arbitrator denied [...]’s affirmative defense that New Jersey law prohibits [...]’s Med-Pay subrogation claim and as a result, the dispute was outside the scope of the Agreement.  A full arbitration hearing was held on September 20, 2022, and by decision published September 23, 2022, the arbitrator found in favor of [...].  The arbitrator simply found that the [...] insured was fully responsible for the underlying loss.  As a result, the arbitrator directed [...] to reimburse [...] the $5,000.00 demanded (Da178-Da186).
[brief] ”  *Barrett v. New Jersey Mfrs. Ins.*, 295 N.J. Super. 613, 617 (App. Div. 1996), cert. denied, 150 N.J. 29 (1997).  Consenting to settlement, moreover, precludes a UIM insurer from denying coverage “despite a clear contractual provision excluding the claim from coverage of the policy. ”  *Boritz v. New Jersey Mfrs. Ins.*, 406 N.J. Super. 640, 649 (App. Div. 2009) (quoting *Griggs v. Bertram*, 88 N.J. 347, 356 (1982)).  This binding precedent should have precluded dismissal below, yet none of these opinions are addressed in the trial court’s analysis.  In fact, the trial court focused on whether [...]’s limitation provision is conscionable—an issue that neither side raised.  At any rate, [...]’s conduct estopped it from disclaiming coverage.  Like NJM in *Price*, [...] continued to negotiate with [...], accepted her records, and engaged in discovery, even after the alleged policy limitation period ended.  And like NJM in *Barrett* and *Boritz*, [...] consented to [...]’s settlement with [...], thus acknowledging the availability of UIM coverage.  As with NJM, [...] should have been estopped from disclaiming coverage, making dismissal improper.  New Jersey’s insurance regulations also support this conclusion.  Under N.J.S.A. § 17:29B-4, insurers must “affirm or deny coverage of claims within a reasonable time after proof of loss statements have been completed. ”  N.J.A.C. 11:2–17.5(a) also requires insurers to “fully disclose . . . all pertinent . . . provisions of an insurance policy or insurance contract under which a claim is presented. ”  Similarly, no insurer “shall conceal . . . provisions of any insurance policy or insurance contract when such . . . provisions are pertinent to a claim. ”  N.J.A.C. 11:2–17.5(b).  [...] violated these regulations by invoking the policy’s suit limitation provision more than 17 months after receiving notice of [...]’s UIM claim.  Rather than grant dismissal, the trial court should have applied the doctrine of equitable estoppel to preclude [...] from denying coverage.  III.
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE RESPONDENTS AND DENYING APPELLANT’S CROSS MOTIONS TO EXTEND DISCOVERY (ISSUE RAISED BELOW: SEE JANUARY 20, 2023, TRIAL COURT ORDERS)  1.  Exceptional Circumstances Exist to Re-Open and Extend Discovery  New Jersey case law has dealt with the issue facing the Plaintiff many times and has expressly laid out the requirements the Court must consider in determining whether to grant an extension of discovery after the discovery end date has passed:
[brief] The cancellation notice mailed to [...] at the policy address/Feder residence on December 13, 2019 was one of 147 cancellation notices pertaining to personal and commercial auto insurance policies that [...] generated and mailed that day (Pa126-Pa140; see Pa130).  [...] followed a specific procedure to ensure that the cancellation notices were properly delivered to the West Trenton Post Office, where it obtained a date-stamped proof of mailing from the United States Postal Service documenting the mailing of 147 such notices (Pa140, Pa141-Pa143, Pa144-Pa145).  [...] employee [...] provided a certification that detailed her actions on December 13, 2019, the date the business auto policy cancellation notice was mailed to [...] (Pa144-Pa145).  Ms. D’Orazio’s certification made clear that she had reviewed the proof of mailing register for December 13, 2019 (Pa126-Pa140) and was thus able to certify that on that date, she followed the established internal procedure of [...] to ensure that each piece of mail was contained within the group to be taken to the Post Office (Pa144-Pa145).  Specifically, Ms. D’Orazio verified, one by one, that each piece of mail listed on the proof of mailing register was there, and as she verified each she put a corresponding slash mark in the left hand column of the proof of mailing register next to each policyholder’s listing (Pa126-Pa140, Pa144-Pa145).  [...] also presented the certification of a claims attorney employed by [...] that provided additional verification of the authenticity of the proof of mailing register and additional information regarding [...]’s procedures for mailing cancellation notices (Pa141-Pa143).  Ms. D’Orazio’s certification made clear that she confirmed that the envelope addressed to [...] was within the December 13, 2019 mailing group, and that she knew she had done so because she noted that by placing a slash mark in the left hand column next to the [...] listing (Pa130, Pa144-Pa145).  After verifying that each of the 147 envelopes listed on the proof of mailing register were within the assemblage of cancellation notices to be taken to the Post Office, Ms. D’Orazio initialed the proof of mailing register on the extreme right hand side of the signature line, marking it with her initials, “JD” (Pa140, Pa141-Pa143, Pa144-Pa145).  The mailing was then taken to the Post Office by [...], an employee in [...]’s stockroom who also signed the proof of mailing register (Pa140, Pa141-Pa143, Pa144-Pa145).  The proof of mailing register bears a stamped receipt reflecting payment of $60.27 (Pa140).  That stamp reflects receipt by the Post Office of 147 pieces of mail (individually verified by Ms. D’Orazio), and payment by [...] of the .41 “fee” for each of the 147 pieces of mail (Pa140, Pa141-Pa143, Pa144-Pa145).  The “Postage” is paid separately (Pa141-Pa143).
[directive] The Division will take Support victims’ ability to cooperate with enforcement actions. steps to facilitate victims’ cooperation with enforcement actions, including by providing connections to support services that are tailored to particularly vulnerable populations.  For example, the Division will ensure that throughout the investigation and hearing process, the boards’ staff take appropriate steps to facilitate victims’ meaningful participation, including by ensuring translation or other accommodations are readily available, and by connecting victims with organizations that may be able to assist them with their needs.  D.