ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] (Pa16).  With respect to Factor #11 – Oral and Written Reports, the ALJ reasonably found that [...] was not subject to any performance evaluations.  (Pa16).  Further, the oral reports [...] provided to the chief of police, zoning officer, code enforcement official, and animal control officers were specific to the cases she was assigned to.  (Pa14; 1T29:4-12).  As [...] explained, for this factor to indicate employee status, the individual should be providing regular information about the way in which their work was being conducted.  (1T181:15-18).  [...]’s meetings with the various officers did not satisfy this requirement because she was not reporting the way in which her work was being conducted.  Rather, she was meeting with them as part of the regular process required to reach a case disposition.  (Pa15).  Nothing about her meetings with the various officers indicated that [...] was exerting control by requiring [...] to be accountable for how she performed her work.
[brief] The Purchase Order provides the following:  **Description:**  SAW CUTTING  **Scope:**  Daily rates for saw cutting to expose steel reinforcement and breaking 150’ concrete wall at property line of [...] will include all union labor, equipment and materials to complete.  (TRVa1496.)  The Purchase Order describes three types of work: (A) “Hand sawing, chipping & breaking pockets x concrete slab to expose steel reinforcement” (*sic*); (B) unspecified down time; and (C) “Shaving of vertical wall ‘high’ spots to create clean edge at property line of [...], limits and flush cut wall sawing concrete slab overhang to match vertical wall limits.
[brief] A sentencing court's "predictive assessment" of the risk of recidivism "involve[s] determinations that go beyond the simple finding of a criminal history and include an evaluation and judgment about the individual in light of his or her history."  State v. Thomas, 188 N.J. 137, 153 (2006).  Therefore, a finding of aggravating factor three "can be based on [an] assessment of a defendant beyond the mere fact of a prior conviction, or even in the absence of a criminal conviction."  Id. at 154; see also Fuentes, 217 N.J. at 80 ("We also decline to find that aggravating factor nine is inappropriate in a case in which the defendant had no prior record, and the sentencing court accordingly applies mitigating factor seven." (citation omitted)); State v. Varona, 242 N.J. Super. 474, 491 (App. Div.) (concluding that the sentencing court's finding that the defendant was likely to reoffend "was clearly justified" despite "the fact that [he] had no prior record"), certif. denied, 122 N.J. 386 (1990).  Applying these principles here, [...]'s assessment of the aggravating factors was proper.  And, as the judge found, nothing in the record supported finding mitigating factor three or mitigating factor four.
[brief] PRELIMINARY STATEMENT .........................................................4  LEGAL ARGUMENT ...........................................................................4  POINT ONE (Da1)  [...] IS ENTITLED TO REASONABLE INFERENCES IN HIS FAVOR, AND PLAINTIFF HAS NOT RESOLVED DOUBTS AS TO THE EFFICACY OF PROCESS SERVICE .......................4  A. IT IS IRRELEVANT THAT [...] MOVED TO [...] IN 2023, AFTER SELLING HIS HOME ..............................................................5 B. PLAINTIFF ASKED [...] TO ACCEPT SERVICE WHILE HE WAS IN THE MIDST OF A DISBARMENT HEARING.....................................................6 POINT TWO (Da1)  PLAINTIFF DID NOT PARTICIPATE BELOW BECAUSE HE WAS UNAWARE OF THE LITIGATION, BUT TOOK IMMEDIATE ACTION UPON LEARNING OF THE CASE..........................8 POINT THREE (Da1)  THE SERVICE BY MAIL RULE REQUIRES THE AFFIRMATIVE ACT OF REFUSAL .................................................................9 POINT FOUR (Da1)  THE TWELVE-MONTH LIMIT ONLY APPLIES TO APPLICATIONS MADE UNDER RULE 4:50-1(a) THROUGH (c) ..................12 POINT FIVE (Da1)  PLAINTIFF DOES NOT ADDRESS ITS SUSPICIOUS FAILURE TO SERVE BY MAIL AT KIELY’S KNOWN ADDRESS  .................................................................13  CONCLUSION ......................................................................................15  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
[brief] [...] Was Not A Successful Claimant  Because [...] was not successful on virtually every substantive issue presented in this case, [...] should not be considered a “successful claimant. ”  E.g., Passaic Valley Sewerage Comm’rs v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 206 N.J. 596, 616-19 (2011) (court refused to award counsel fees when insured only established insurer’s duty to defend on three counts of a complaint); Enright v. Lubow, 215 N.J. Super. 306, 311 (App. Div. 1987) (no counsel fees awarded when insured recovered same amount as settlement previously offered by insurer).
[brief] Statements that are inadmissible if made by a detective at trial should not become admissible simply because they were made by the same detective during an interrogation.  See also Tung, 460 N.J. Super at 102 (finding that an officer’s commentary on defendant’s credibility, some of which was introduced through an interrogation video, was improper).  In fact, several other states prohibit such prejudicial testimony, including when it is admitted through a recorded interrogation.  The Kansas Supreme Court, for example, has held that portions of an interrogation in which an officer told the defendant that he was “a liar” and was “bullshitting” should not have been admitted because “[a] jury is clearly prohibited from hearing such statements from the witness stand . . . and likewise should be prohibited from hearing them in a videotape, even if the statements are recommended and effective police interrogation tactics. ”  State v. Elnicki, 105 P.3d 1222, 1229 (Kan. 2005).  Similarly, the Wyoming Supreme Court has held that a detective’s comments in a recorded interview that “express opinions about the accused’s mendacity and guilt and about the alleged victim’s truthfulness and credibility” should not have been admitted because they improperly “invade[] the exclusive province of the jury to determine the credibility of the witnesses. ”  Sweet v. State, 234 P.3d 1193, 1204 (Wyo. 2010); see also Commonwealth v. Kitchen, 730 A.2d 513, 522 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1999) (holding that officers’ “accusations of lying and untruthfulness must be redacted from the [interrogation] videotapes prior to their submission to a jury”).  Additionally, like [...]’s commentary on [...]’s credibility, portions of the interrogation in which [...] insisted that he saw [...] enter and exit [...] on video should not have been played for the jury.  See McLean, 205 N.J. at 462 (stating that officer testimony is “not a vehicle for offering the view of the witness about a series of facts that the jury can evaluate for itself or an opportunity to express a view on guilt or innocence”).  (7T 180-4 to 5, 182-20 to 21)  [...] did not witness these acts firsthand and had no prior familiarity with [...]; thus, he would not have been permitted at trial to identify either of the figures in the church video as [...].  See State v. Singh, 245 N.J. 1, 17 (2021).  Indeed, determining whether [...] can be seen in the church video was the exclusive responsibility of the jury.  And, as noted above, the fact that [...]’s assertion that the video depicted [...] was introduced through the interrogation video rather than direct testimony at trial does not change the analysis.  [...]’s lay opinion commentary on Mr.  Mason’s veracity and guilt should not be allowed solely because it was offered through an interrogation video instead of through live testimony.  Accordingly, the trial court erred by allowing the jury to hear [...] characterize [...] as a liar fourteen times in just over thirteen minutes and proclaim that he saw [...] enter [...] on video, usurping the jury’s role as fact finder and assessor of credibility.
[brief] PROCEDURAL HISTORY  On September 13, 2022, the Township filed a Complaint in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Morris Vicinage, bearing Docket No. [...].  [Da16-Da24].  On October 20, 2022, [...] filed its Answer.  On October 21, 2022, Appellant filed its Answer with Jury Demand.  [Da158-165].  On October 6, 2023, the Township filed a Motion for Summary Judgment (the “Motion”).  [Da1-Da145].  On October 24, 2023, Appellant filed a Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment (the “Cross-Motion”).  [Da146-Da157].  On December 4, 2023, the trial court heard Oral Argument on the Motion and Cross-Motion.  On December 8, 2023, the Court entered: (i) an Order and Statement of Reasons granting the Township’s Motion [Da166-167; Da170-180]; and (ii) an Order and Statement of Reasons denying Appellant’s Cross-Motion [Da168-Da180].  Thereafter, on January 17, 2024, Appellant initiated the instant appeal of the trial court’s rulings by filing a Notice of Appeal in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division.
[brief] B.  The Appellants’ Complaint was Properly Dismissed as to [...] due to Appellants’ Failure to Serve an Affidavit of Merit Pursuant to the Statute.  The Supreme Court, in the case of Cornblatt v. Barrow, 153 N.J. 218 (1998), held that a plaintiff’s failure to submit an affidavit of merit required by N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-27, is deemed a failure to state a cause of action, resulting in dismissal of the complaint with prejudice.  See also Cowley v. Virtua Health System, 242 N.J. 1, 16 (2020) (citing A.T. v. Cohen, 231 N.J. 337, 346 (2017).  While it has subsequently been held that a plaintiff may be given some leeway to produce an affidavit of merit after the 60-day period, but before the 120-day period provided in N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-27, upon a showing of excusable neglect, no additional or further extensions can be granted in excess of 120 days from the date of the filing of the professional defendant’s answer.  Burns v. Belfasky, 326 N.J. Super. 462 (App. Div. 1999), aff’d, 166 N.J. 466 (2001); Palanque v. Lambert-Woolley, 327 N.J. Super. 158 (App. Div. 2000) rev’d on other grounds, 168 N.J. 398 (2001).
[brief] The sentence that is cut off at the bottom of page eight, and the sentence that begins on the second page nine, clearly do not run together.  [24a, 33a-34a]  Since the second page nine is the signature page, it is fairly easy to come to the conclusion, the signature page Appellant certified was part of this agreement was actually from a different agreement.  [24a-34a]  This was such a poor attempt at recreating a document, there were even more obvious problems.  The spacing on the first eight pages is double-spaced.  [24a-34a]  The spacing on the signature page is single spaced.  [24a-34a]  The margins on the first eight pages are not justified on the right margin.  [24a-34a]  The signature page inserted by the Appellant has a justified right margin.  [24a, 34a]  [...]’ made it clear he would never allow an employee to sign this document.  [90a]  The Respondent’s Affidavit states this page comes from a prior agreement signed in 2019, which did not include this arbitration agreement.  [37a]
[directive] F.  For the purposes of this Joint Crash Investigative Protocol:  1.  Unless otherwise defined in this Attorney General Directive, “County Prosecutor” shall mean, and include, any County Prosecutor or acting County Prosecutor of the State of New Jersey, or in those cases where the Attorney General has intervened or superseded the County Prosecutor, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 52:17B-106 or -107(a), the Director or acting Director of the Division of Criminal Justice.
[brief] E.g., *Van Winkle v. N.J. Dep’t of Corr.*, 370 N.J. Super. 40, 47–49 (App. Div. 2004) (prohibiting state prisons from denying work credits to a person serving a concurrent sentence out-of-state while permitting inmates to receive work credits for serving sentences in-state); *Forstrom v. Byrne*, 341 N.J. Super. 45, 48 (App. Div. 2001) (holding that, although the fundamental right to education was not implicated, school district was required to provide speech therapy to home-schooled student on the same basis as to others similarly situated).
[brief] *See Silviera-Francisco, supra at 141, citing Sikes v. Twp. Of Rockaway*, 269 N.J. Super. 463, 465-66 (App. Div.) (declining to review trial ruling not identified in notice of appeal), *aff’d o.b.*  138 N.J. 41 (1994)  **B.  Does there exist a contract between Plaintiff and [...]?**
[brief] The appellant Replies to the September 30, 2024 Response Brief by the respondents ("the Response").  The matter at bar comes by way of the May 31, 2024 ORDER by Hon. [...], P.J.A.D. (Pa301), which Denied the respondents' Motion to Dismiss, compelling them to file the Response.  Hon. Mayer denied the said motion, after the appellant filed opposition brief and exposed how the respondents' motion (1) violated Rule 2:5-4(a) and (2) misrepresented material existing facts upon lack of Duty of Candor.  And now__ the Response is an unfazed continuance upon the same.  STATEMENTS
[brief] The first part of [...]’ cross-appeal challenges the trial court rejection of [...]’ contention that the contract for sale was unenforceable due to Plaintiff’s manifest, undisputed violations of the FRFPA and therefore, identical to the Tax Sale law issue, that all of plaintiff’s claims were without legal foundation. in attempting to consummate its failed real estate “deal. ”  [...] submits that the trial court erred here, and that the complaint warranted dismissal due to the FRFPA violations on the same basis as Plaintiff’s failure to comply with the New Jersey Tax Sale Law: both render the contract for sale unenforceable.
[brief] See (1T82-9 to 14; 1T85-25 to 86-15; 1T86-25 to 87-12; 1T87-22 to 88-9).  Defendant’s claim that [...] was an expedient substitute for other witnesses whom the State was unable to obtain to authenticate the video is a spurious contention belied by the record.  The State always intended to introduce the surveillance video and still shots through [...].  When defense counsel objected that the proprietor of the store needed to testify to authenticate the video, the prosecutor responded, “I don’t see why I would need . . . the owner to say that he gave consent.  There is nothing in the [] motion practice saying there was anything wrong with the way the videos were downloaded. ” (1T65-7 to 11).
[brief] Plaintiffs did not appeal the June 5, 2020 order.  [Pa93-94].  [9T 116:12-17].  Despite this admission, the motion was denied.  [10T 4:1-6:23].  In an oral opinion, the trial court ruled there were factual issues requiring determination by the factfinder due to Plaintiffs’ claiming [...] allowed [...] to interact with customers on his own and by having a supposed lack of ID.  [10T 6:10-21].  After the defense rested, the jury returned a defense verdict, finding [...]’s conduct was outside the scope of his employment and that he was not negligent.\(^7\) [Pa71-73].
[brief] In the ensuing oral argument, the Court outlined the procedure of a builder’s remedy case: once a finding has been made that [...] is not constitutionally compliant, “the burden shifts over to the municipality . . . to show that the property is for either environmental reasons or . . . clearly contrary to sound land use planning” (2T:9:25-10:3-4).  In balancing the harms to the parties, the Court noted that there were other places in town that it can seek to use its condemnation powers for commercial use, but that the way to achieve immunity from builder’s remedy suits was to “file the DJ action and you follow through” (id. at 15:21-22).  The court noted that it did not have “any cases in front of [the court] that anyone can point to as an example that says if you are constitutionally non-compliant, you can condemn property where a builder’s remedy lawsuit has been filed and where you have been found to be constitutionally non-compliant, which would have the result of making that property unavailable for the development of affordable housing” (id. at 22:15-21).  The trial court denied the motion for reconsideration.  This court then granted [...]’s motion for leave to appeal from the denial of the motion for reconsideration.
[directive] Patient or consumer navigators can Expand use of patient and consumer navigators. guide victims through the investigative and disciplinary process, act as liaisons between victims and the boards, and ensure boards are attuned to the interests of victims.  The Board of Medical Examiners already has a staff member performing this role.  The Division will hire an additional consumer navigator to work with other boards, as well.  These navigators will be trained on best practices for supporting victims, such as providing victims with a clear explanation of their rights and remaining in contact with them throughout the investigative and disciplinary process.  E.
[brief] The lower court also incorrectly speculated that [...]’s use of the word “presently” in its Rule 4:5-1(B)(2) certification was “somewhat curious. ”  T1 73:6-7.  However, caselaw demonstrates that the addition of “presently” to the Rule 4:5-1(B(2) certification is not uncommon.  See Marmo & Sons Gen. Contracting, LLC v. Biagi Farms, LLC, 478 N.J. Super. 593, 601, (App. Div. 2024) (“Biagi's pleadings were accompanied by its own Rule 4:5-1(b)(2) certification, stating the matter is “not presently the subject of any ... pending arbitration or administrative proceeding. ”)  [...]’s Rule 4:5-1(B)(2) certification was accurate when filed as it “presently” did not contemplate any other action or arbitration, and this statement was accurate when made in 2019 because the multi-party nature of the case made it impossible to achieve complete resolution of the claims at that time.
[brief] Defendant failed to submit Counsel Certification, or Defendant Certification regarding the Motion for Transfer.  Plaintiff asserted that Plaintiff’s factual representations regarding discussions and occurrences in his Motion for Transfer is speculation, “not based on observation, or fact” but based upon what a dead man told his wife and now she is telling her Attorney” (2T15-19)(2T43-4)  The record substantiates that on September 30, 2011 [...] assumed the Mortgage Note between [...] and [...], the original mortgagors; the original Mortgagee/Lender was [...], [...] as Beneficiary of the estate of [...].
[brief] While the cost of MSRB SHORT ($10,000 per year, Ja2159 (\textsection 131)) and Bloomberg Terminal (roughly $26,000 per year, Ja3901–03 (\textsection 144)) are undisputed, nothing in the text of the statute limits “public” disclosures through “news media” to those available for free.  N.J.S.A. \textsection 2A:32C-9(c).  Nor did the Legislature include a price limit in the statutory definition of “news media” or “public disclosures. ”  Courts have also consistently rejected the argument that subscription fees somehow disqualify a source as a public disclosure.
[brief] (Db37, 39.)  However, deference is entirely inappropriate where, as here, [...]’s claim is grounded in the Abbott constitutional precedents.  The trial court committed plain error when it ruled that [...] was obligated but “failed to provide sufficient facts to show that its students are not receiving T&E. ” (Pa43.)  Moreover, Stubaus v. Whitman, 339 N.J. Super. 38 (App. Div. 2001), relied on in the decision below (Pa43), rejected a taxpayers’ challenge to disparate tax rates for school funding in non-Abbott districts and provides no support for this contention.
[brief] [...] said he and defendant went into the living room where "[...] grabbed a blanket and threw it over his head, and we jumped on him" (16T87-3 to 13).  Then [...] held [...] while defendant duct-taped his legs and feet (16T98-11).  [...] "started looking for money" by checking [...]'s pockets, going through the house, and rummaging through drawers (16T98-25 to 16T99-18).  He did not find any cash (16T99-20).  [...] found and took a credit card from the counter (16T99-2 to 3;16T100-21 to 25).  He got the pin number from [...] (16T101-3).  [...] claimed that he cut a hole in the blanket because [...] said he could not breathe, and that he did not see [...] get tied up with the orange electrical cord, but he knew that [...] was tied up before they left the house (16T100-2 to 4;16T101-10 to 14;16T102-16 to 19).
[directive] The following question needs to be answered only if you are pleading guilty for a violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:29-2b for eluding.  1.  Do you understand that if you plead guilty you will be required to forfeit your [Yes] [No] driver’s license for a period of time between 6 months and 2 years?  The following questions need to be answered only if you are pleading guilty for a violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:20-2 for theft of an automobile and the offense occurred on or after April 2, 1991, or for a violation of 2C:20-10 for unlawful taking of a motor vehicle ("Joyriding") and the offense occurred on or N.J.S.A. after August 2, 1993.  1.  Do you understand that if you plead guilty you will be required to forfeit your [Yes] [No] driver’s license?  1st Offense - 1 year license suspension  2nd Offense - 2 year license suspension  3rd or Subsequent Offense - 10 year license suspension  2.  Do you understand that if you plead guilty you will be required to pay a mandatory [Yes] [No] penalty?  The mandatory penalties are as follows:  1st Offense $ 500 2nd Offense $ 750 3rd or Subsequent offense $1,000  Total Penalty $ 3.  Do you understand that if you plead guilty to more than one theft of an automobile [Yes] [No] or unlawful taking of a motor vehicle that the license forfeitures and mandatory penalties imposed can be consecutive to each other?  Date  Defendant Defense Attorney Prosecutor Form Promulgated by Directive #01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 11168
[directive] Cf. State v. Rolex, 165 N.J. 447 (2001) (per curiam), affirming 329 N.J. Super. 220 (App. Div. 2000) (suggesting the need for statewide uniformity concerning how prosecutors treat a defendant’s failure to appear at sentencing).  Note that pursuant to this Section, a defendant’s failure to appear is treated as an aggravating circumstance but is not treated as the basis for unilaterally rescinding the previously tendered plea offer altogether and requiring the court to sentence the defendant to the full term of imprisonment and parole ineligibility prescribed by statute for the Brimage-eligible offense.  Note also that the decision to grant or deny a prosecutor’s motion to vacate the plea is vested in the discretion of the court.
[brief] But that courts at times have utilized this procedure demonstrates the ultimate point: the trial court’s protocol was one of several permissible alternatives.  Additionally, the trial court believed that the arbiter of whether documents are relevant should not be the producers of the documents.  (T5-20 to -23.)  [...] contends that this was error.  (Db26-30.)  It was not.  Although producing parties often make unilateral relevancy determinations prior to production, the [...] are aware of no rule commanding that procedure in all instances.  Nor has [...] identified one.  In fact, the only New Jersey authority that [...] cites in support of its categorical position is Lipsky.  (Db27-28.)  But, as explained above, Lipsky’s holding that Rule 4:18-1 does not allow opposing parties direct access to each other’s electronic devices is not implicated here, because the trial court did not grant the parties such access.  Instead, it merely compelled the parties to copy and produce the non-privileged documents based on hits from mutually agreed to search terms.  (Da167-68.)  That was entirely consistent with Lipsky.  Finally, [...]’s entire position is premised on an unduly narrow understanding of the scope of permissible discovery.