ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The [...] “shall issue an individual permit for a regulated activity only if the activity will not destroy, jeopardize, or adversely modify a present or documented habitat for threatened or endangered species, and shall not jeopardize the continued existence of any local population of a threatened or endangered species. ”  N.J.A.C. 7:13-11.6(d).  The [...] “shall require a survey and/or a habitat assessment for threatened or endangered species as part of an environmental report, as described at N.J.A.C. 7:13-18.8(b), for an individual permit for any regulated activity which is likely to… disturb an area known to contain a threatened or endangered species; or [d]isturb any habitat that could support a threatened or endangered species.
[brief] (2T4-15 to 2T6-1)  [...]’s motion came before the trial court for oral argument on June 20, 2023, see 1T1-1 et seq.  At the June 20, 2023, hearing, the Court reserved decision in order to review the moving and opposition papers more closely and thus scheduled a follow-up hearing date of July 18, 2023.  1T72-21.  On July 18, 2023, see 2Tx-y, the Court announced its ruling granting [...]’s Motion in Aid of Litigant’s Rights, granting [...] “reasonable attorney's fees” (2T5-23) and permitting additional submissions as to [...]’s request for ‘Delay Penalties” (sometimes referred to as “per diem penalty”)  2T13-2 et seq.  The trial court entered its written Order as to same dated August 8, 2023, Pa001.  The Trial court did not articulate specific findings of fact and/or conclusions of law, did not issue a written opinion, statement of reasons or any post-appeal amplification statement, but merely directed that to the Order would be appended [...]’s Report to the Court of October 19, 2020, Pa009.  It would thus appear that the trial court decided the 2023 Motion in Aid based on what had occurred in 2020 or upon a Court Master’s report dated October 19, 2020.  That report could not logically or properly form the basis for the relief granted in 2023, since the 2023 ‘In Aid’ relief required a finding of a breach of a Settlement Agreement that did not exist in 2020 when the Planner/Special Master’s Report was authored.
[brief] (6T30-5 to 32-21).  The Court also found that the aggravating factors “clearly outweigh[ed]” the mitigating factors.  (6T32-24 to 25).  For each factor, the Court articulated the source of its findings from the facts presented.  (6T30-5 to 32-21).  Ultimately, the Court sentenced defendant to a four-year, flat term of incarceration on Count I of [...] and a ten-year term of incarceration with a five-year term of parole ineligibility on Count I of [...], all to run concurrent to a thirteen-year term of incarceration with a five-year period of parole ineligibility on Count II of [...].
[brief] Defendants’ Defamatory Statements  For the convenience of the Court, the defamatory statements published by Defendants are reproduced in the Table below.  Although each statement is unique, the legal arguments addressing them are generally similar and thus they --- 3  [...], *White House cuts ties with CAIR on antisemitism strategy after director says Hamas attacks made him ‘happy,’* New York Post (December 7, 2023), available at https://nypost.com/2023/12/07/news/cair-head-says-he-was-happy-about-hamas-october-7-attacks-claims-aipac-controlling-the-us-government/ may be grouped together for the purposes of this Opposition to Defendants’ Appeal.  | Date/Time | Defendant(s) / Citation | Statement | |-------------------|-------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | Oct. 7, 2021 at | [...], Am. Compl. | **[...] Statement #1**  I wrote this book with the intention that moments like this would never happen again.  When will it stop?  Yesterday, [...], a teacher at [...] in [...] forcibly removed the hijab of a second grade student.  The young student resisted, by trying to hold onto her hijab, but the teacher pulled the hijab off, exposing her hair to the class.  Herman told the student that her hair was beautiful and she did not have to wear hijab to school anymore.  Imagine being a child and stripped of your clothing in front of your classmates.  Imagine the humiliation and trauma this experience has caused her.  This is abuse.  School should be a haven to all of our kids to feel safe, welcome and protected – no matter their faith.  We cannot move toward a post-racial America until we weed out the racism and bigotry that still exist in all layers of our society.  By protecting Muslim girls who wear hijab, we are protecting the rights of all of us to have a choice in the way we dress.  Writing books and posting on social is not enough.  We must stand together and vehemently denounce discrimination in all of its forms.  CALL [...] [...] and EMAIL the principal [...] and the superintendent [...] | | 4:03 p.m. Eastern Time | ¶¶ 21 - 26 (Da 013-15) | | | Oct. 7, 2021 at | [...], Am. Compl. |
[brief] The defendant next called [...], the plaintiff’s daughter who was with her at [...] on the date of the fall, as a witness.  (6T94:20-21; 6T115:5-8).  Although [...] took the plaintiff to the [...] store on May 30, 2019, she did not witness her fall.  (6T119:14-15; 6T120:12-15).  The defendant elicited testimony regarding the prior falls where the plaintiff tripped on a brick and slid off the bed, the physical therapy the plaintiff received prior to the subject fall for tingling in her legs, and that she parked in a handicapped parking spot at [...] on the day of the plaintiff’s fall.  (6T113-24; 6T114:21-115:4; 6T115:14-23).  During the charge conference, the defendant sought to have the adverse inference charge given to the jury in regard to the plaintiff’s absence from trial.
[directive] (3)  Actor drives a vehicle or vessel in violation of N.J.S.A. 39:4-50 (DWI) or N.J.S.A. 39:4- 50.4a (Refusal to Submit to Breath Sample) and serious bodily injury results while on or 10% permissible within 1000 feet of school property or while driving through school crossing or while 4th Degree $1,000 to $2,500 driving through non-designated school crossing, and knowing that juveniles are present; second degree if serious bodily injury results; third degree if bodily injury results.
[brief] UNIDENTIFIED DETECTIVE: “You asking me?”  [...]: “Yeah. ”  (1T 95-12 to 14; Da 109, 03:50:52 to 03:50:58; Da 126)  4.  [...]: “I don’t got nothing else to say, man.  Just get in contact with [[...]] so I can get outta here. ”  (1T 98-19 to 20; Da 109, 03:50:52 to 03:50:58; Da 127)  5.
[brief] State v. Gilchrist, 381 N.J. Super. 138, 143 (App. Div. 2005)  Thus, based on the foregoing reasons and facts one (1) through twenty-eight (28), the court should reverse because the Chancery Division was not the appropriate forum; and lacked cognizability over the action in lieu of prerogative writs under N.J. Const. Art. VI, § II, Par. 3, N.J. Ct. R. 4:3 and N.J. Ct. R. 4:69.  i.  This Matter of Constitutional Magnitude  Plaintiff contends that the matter is of constitutional magnitude because the venue is addressed under the constitutional authority to "make rules governing *, subject to law, the practice and procedure in all such courts."
[directive] D  Se requiere un escrito judicial para el dia _ b.  Brief required by Acuerdos probatorios: 17.  Stipulations: Duraci6n estimada del juicio: Causa de la fiscalia: 18.  Estimated trial time: State's case: Causa de la defensa: Defense case: -----  Iniciales de! acusado/Defendant's Initials Memorandum  Precedente  Juicio - Formulario enmendado promulgado por la directriz #23-17 (8/21/20 I 7), [...] pagina3
[directive] 2.1.1  The agency's policy management system serves as the foundation for effective discipline.  A clearly defined policy management system is designed to move the organization toward its stated goals and set the standard for acceptable performance.  The system must incorporate a mechanism for distributing rules, regulations, policies and procedures, and provide for periodic review and revision as necessary.  The system should include a classification and numbering mechanism that facilitates cross-referencing where necessary.  2.1.2  Law enforcement agencies should have a policy management system that, at a minimum, includes:  (a)  Rules and regulations.  Principles of behavior that set forth acceptable and unacceptable conduct.  In municipal police agencies, the rules and regulations must be INTERNAL AFFAIRS POLICY & PROCEDURES | November 2022 6 issued by the appropriate authority as designated by ordinance.  See N.J.S.A. 40A:14- 118.  (b)  Standard operating procedures (SOPs).  Written statements providing specific direction for performing agency activities.  Each SOP should also include the agency’s policy in that area, which is a statement of agency principles that provides the basis for the development of the procedures.  (c)  Directives or orders.  Documents detailing the performance of a specific activity or method of operation.  2.1.3  The policy management system should clearly and explicitly state management's intentions.  Employees must understand what management wants to accomplish and what behavior is expected.  Each category of documents in the policy management system should be issued in a distinctive, readily identifiable format.  2.2
[brief] N.J.S.A. 34:13A-14(1)(a).  The New Jersey Arbitration Act establishes four circumstances in which a court may vacate an arbitration award: a. where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means; b. where there was either evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or any thereof; c. where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause being shown thereof, or in refusing to hear evidence, pertinent and material to the controversy, or any of the other misbehaviors prejudicial to the rights of any party; and d. where the arbitrators exceeded or so imperfectly executed their powers that a mutual, final and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made.
[brief] Plaintiff now attempts to cure her failure to satisfy the third element by invoking OSHA's general mandate that employers provide a safe and healthy work environment, see 29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(1).  Defendant opposes the Motion, arguing Plaintiff has not adequately connected OSHA's general mandate to her particular set of facts and also that her termination is unlike those in Wheeler v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 108 Ill. 2d 502, 485 N.E.2d 372, 92 Ill. Dec. 561 (1985), and Palmateer v. Int'l Harvester Co., 85 Ill. 2d 124, 421 N.E.2d  "The tort [of retaliatory discharge] seeks to achieve 'a proper balance . . . among the employer's interest in operating a business efficiently and profitably, the employee's interest in earning a livelihood, and society's interest in seeing its public policies carried out.' "  Fellhauer v. City of Geneva, 142 Ill. 2d 495, 507, 568 N.E.2d 870, 876, 154 Ill. Dec. 649 (1991) (quoting Palmateer, 85 Ill. 2d at 129).
[brief] The New Jersey Supreme Court has long recognized rent control as a powerful and important means by which municipalities can respond to a critical need for affordable housing.  See Inganamort v. Fort Lee, 62 N.J. 521, 527 (1973).  It is used throughout the state, and like other affordable housing mechanisms such as inclusionary zoning, it serves a key anti-displacement function in places where market rents are no longer affordable to a substantial portion of the local population.  These objectives must be balanced against the right of an “efficient landlord to realize a ‘just and reasonable return’ on his property.
[brief] In fact, the 2019 updated Master Plan states as to the [...] (i.e., 350 Unit [...]) “being developed on Plaintiff’s 22.5 acre site, [n]o further changes to the [...] are recommended at this time. ” (Pa 38).  The Master Plan has not been amended after 2019 to change that recommendation.  There can be no other conclusion other than the Second Ordinance, which substantially changes the 350 Unit [...] and creates an 11 acre park on one half of Plaintiff’s land, is inconsistent with the Master Plan as a matter of law.
[brief] The New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (hereinafter “NJLAD”) states, in pertinent part that:  “[a]ll persons shall have the opportunity to…obtain all the accommodations, advantages, facilities, and privileges of any place of public accommodation, publicly assisted housing accommodation, and other real property without discrimination because of race, creed, color, national origin, ancestry, age, marital status, affectional or sexual orientation, familial status, disability, liability for service in the Armed Forced of the United States, nationality, sex, gender identity or expression or source of lawful income used for rental or mortgage payments, subject only to conditions and limitations appliable alike to all persons. ”  See N.J.S.A. 10:5-4.  Protected classes pursuant to NJLAD include race, creed, color, national origin, ancestry, age, marital status, affectional or sexual orientation, familial status, disability, liability for service in the Armed Forced of the United States, nationality, sex, gender identity or expression or source of lawful income used for rental or mortgage payments.
[brief] (1T 122-13 to 14)  In addition, [...] did not testify that [...] was behaving in ways that suggested that he was suffering from poor reaction time, lack of balance, inability to pay attention, or suffered any other deficits that would make it unsafe for him to drive.  Moreover, [...] conceded that he did not conduct any sobriety tests\(^7\) and was never trained to determine whether an individual is under the influence of drugs.  (1T 121-12 to 122-2)  Furthermore, that no officer or expert was ever requested to perform any testing to determine whether [...] was in fact under the influence and [...] was not charged with driving under --- \(^7\)  Although the officer testified that he did not conduct field sobriety tests because he thought [...] might be under the influence of drugs, not alcohol, those same tests are used to help determine whether an individual is under the influence of narcotics, hallucinogens, or other habit-inducing drugs.  See State v. Olenowski, 255 N.J. 529, 555, 555 n.8 (2023).
[brief] Two months later, on January 13, 2015, [...], the firm that had been providing “financial advice” during the parties’ marriage, filed a Complaint for Divorce on [...]’s behalf, against [...].  Two days before the Complaint was even filed, [...] had already secured from [...] a “Waiver” of her “right to file an Answer to the Complaint” – prepared by [...] and notarized by one of its paralegals.  A11.  On February 20, one month after the divorce lawsuit began, [...] filed on [...]’s behalf a “Request to Enter Default Judgment” against [...].  A13.  A “hearing for final judgment of divorce” was held before [...] the next month, on March 18.  25T.  [...] of [...] appeared for the plaintiff, [...].  Neither [...] nor any attorney on her behalf appeared at the default judgment hearing.  [...] asked Judge Light to enter the proposed Final Judgment of Divorce giving effect to the Mid-Marriage and Matrimonial Settlement Agreements presented to the court:
[brief] . .  The Court hereby accepts the Housing Element and Fair Share Plan and finds that it creates a realistic opportunity for satisfaction of the [...]’s Fair Share of low and moderate-income housing.  241a.  However, the Court required that the Borough provide an accounting of status at the midpoint review:  9.  The Fair Housing Act includes two provisions regarding action to be taken by the Borough during the Repose period provided in this Order.  The Borough shall comply with those provisions as follows:  a.  For the midpoint realistic opportunity review due on July 1, 2020, as required pursuant to N.J.S.A. 52:27D-313, the Borough will post on its municipal website, with a copy provided to [...], a status report as to its implementation of its Plan and an analysis of whether any unbuilt sites or unfulfilled mechanisms continue to present a realistic opportunity and whether any mechanisms to meet unmet need should be revised or supplemented.
[brief] Like the fact that New Jersey repeatedly has promulgated regulations specifically to define “excessive” in other statutory schemes, this unravels any notion that there is a single meaning to the term.  The unraveling does not stop there.  For instance, straying far from any dictionary definition or ASOP guidance, the Department has admitted that its ad hoc interpretation of “excessive” in this case included the amorphous “public interest” consideration discussed supra, at 34–35.
[brief] As a threshold matter, due to [...]’s confusing attempts to re-label the lot numbers of both [...]’s Property at Lot 22 and [...]’s own property at Lots 19 and 20, it is uncertain which property [...] is seeking to adversely possess.  The [...] and the [...] both clearly identify the lots, but [...] is intent on contradicting those surveys to argue that [...]’s Property on Lot 22 is actually [...]’s Lot 20.  Compare Da126, ¶¶ 7, 8 with [...] Pa92 and [...], Pa91.  That contradicts the [...], which clearly indicates [...] owns the Property on Lot 22 where the debris piles are located.
[brief] Plaintiff moved for leave to file a second amended complaint on May 21, 2019.  (Pa198-316)  This motion was granted on June 7, 2019.  (Pa317-318)  One of the parties added to the case in the second amended complaint was [...], d/b/a [...].  (hereinafter “[...]”)  (Pa317-318)  This defendant was not placed on 1T=transcript of January 24, 2020  2T=transcript of February 14, 2020  3T=transcript of June 25, 2021 notice of the motion for leave to amend the complaint and had no opportunity to respond thereto.
[brief] (1T8-4)  [...] began by describing how in 2020 she had applied to DCA for rental assistance but that “They took almost two years to help. ”  (1T8-6)  At that point, the court interjected that it was only concerned with the period of August 2023 to the present.  (1T8-12)  In response [...] explained that the reason she was talking about 2020 was because she had learned that DCA had made a $21,000 rental assistance payment on her behalf to the Plaintiff.  (1T8-15)  [...] next testified that the payment covered the very months Plaintiff had also accepted rent from her.  Accordingly, she explained, the Plaintiff had been “double paid. ”  (1T8-18)  “She was paid from me and she was paid from the program. ”  (1T8-19)  Having now heard from the tenant that the Plaintiff may have double billed for rent, perhaps in the amount of $21,000, the court asked nothing of the Plaintiff.
[brief] On July 26, 2021, Plaintiff submitted a request for records pursuant to the Open Public Records Act (“OPRA”) and the common law right of access to public records to Defendant [...].  Pa-39 to 40.  The request seeks all documents related to the [...]’s investigation or prosecution of the criminal case of State of New Jersey v. [...], Complaint-Warrant No.: [...] and any court filings by the [...] in that matter.  Id.  The request further seeks communications between the [...] and the [...] and the [...] regarding the case.  Id.  The [...] denied the request in an August 9, 2021 dated response by [...] stating, “The [...] is making it very clear, that to the best of its knowledge, information and belief, except for the records it disclosed to you in its November 5, 2020 response, it possesses no other records responsive to your current request. ”  Pa-42 to 43.  In response to the previous request, the [...] disclosed a summons and stated, “[t]he [...] possesses no other records in response to your request. ”  Pa-69, 70.  Subsequently, on August 19, 2021, Plaintiff filed a Verified Complaint in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Hudson County Vicinage claiming the [...] violated his common law right of access to public records.  Pa-16 to 26.  IV.
[brief] Citing the “purposes” section of the Distance Regulation is not competent evidence of a substantial government interest or narrow tailoring  The United States and New Jersey Constitutions prohibit laws abridging freedom of speech.  U.S. Const. amend. I.; N.J. Const. art. I, ¶ 6.  Although New Jersey’s free speech clause is generally “interpreted [at least] as co-extensive with the First Amendment,” Twp. of Pennsauken v. Schad, 160 N.J. 156, 176 (1999), it is actually one of the broadest in the nation, and affords greater protection than the First Amendment, Dublirer v. 2000 Linwood Ave. Owners, Inc., 220 N.J. 71, 78-79 (2014).
[brief] The issue on appeal is whether the trial court erred in finding the Township articulated a valid public purpose for Defendants’ Properties.  “Eminent domain is the power of the State to take private property for public use. ”  *State v. Lanza*, 27 N.J. 516, 529 (1958).  This power “is subject to several important constitutional limits: the property acquired must be taken for a ‘public use,’ the State must pay ‘just compensation’ in exchange for the property, and no person shall be deprived of his or her property without due process of law.
[brief] **Hearing Testimony Concerning Post-Accident Video**  During his opening statement, plaintiff’s counsel played for the Court a video taken by his client at some point following his accident.  Counsel represented to the Court that plaintiff’s intention in taking the video was to ride a vehicle over the same location he encountered on the day of his accident to memorialize its existence.  (3T20:4-10).  Plaintiff’s counsel represented to the Court that the video depicted the location of the roadway condition that allegedly caused plaintiff’s accident.  Counsel further represented that the video demonstrated the roadway condition’s physical impact on the vehicle depicted in the video.  (3T20:4-15).  Although the subject roadway condition is not visible in the video, [...] testified that the physical “jolt” that the vehicle experienced when encountering the condition indicated the presence of a dangerous roadway condition associated with an abrupt elevation change.  (3T141:14-142:12).  Critically, however, on cross-examination, [...] twice conceded that there is no way to know whether the vehicle in the video traveled over the same ground as plaintiff’s motorcycle on the day of plaintiff’s accident.  (3T142:15-143:2; p.161:5-12; 162:4-165:17).
[brief] [...] could not have brought her takings claim before this event because no uncompensated taking had yet occurred.  So too with unjust enrichment.  Goldsmith v. Camden County Surrogate’s Office, 408 N.J. Super. 376, 382 (2009).  The City attempts to avoid this truth by suggesting that [...] could have raised a takings claim in the form of an affirmative defense.  But its cited authority demonstrates the opposite.  For example, it points to R. 4:64-5’s instruction that “germane counterclaims and crossclaims may be pleaded in foreclosure actions without leave of court. ”  Yet R. 4:64-5 specifically applies to mortgage foreclosures.  By contrast, foreclosures of tax sale certificates are controlled by R. 4:64-6, which limits defenses to those of “the invalidity of the tax . . . , or the invalidity of the proceedings to sell, or the invalidity of the sale[.]”  None of these issues are relevant to the takings claim, which challenges not the legitimacy of foreclosure but the failure to pay for surplus equity after the fact.  The City also points to the New Jersey Supreme Court’s “temporary rule change” of July 12, 2023, that an allegation of surplus equity “shall be treated as a contesting answer to the tax foreclosure. ”  Yet this “temporary rule change” only proves that prior to July 12, 2023, the rules did not treat an allegation of surplus equity as a contesting answer in a tax foreclosure proceeding.  Otherwise, the Court’s announcement would have been redundant and would not have been a rule “change” at all.