ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] POINT II  RESIDENTIAL IMMUNITY IS APPLICABLE IN THE SUBJECT MATTER AS THE CONDITION WAS NOT CREATED BY DEFENDANTS  Plaintiff’s argument is that Defendants were improperly dismissed in this matter because they created the sidewalk and thus created the dangerous condition.  Plaintiff relies exclusively on Deberjeois v. Schneider, 254 N.J. Super. 694 (Law Div.), aff’d, 260 N.J. Super. 518 (App Div. 1992) in support of it’s “exception to liability rule. ”  There, the property owner, planted a tree, which without question, caused the sidewalk to raise, and subsequently, the plaintiff to trip and fall.  Id. at 703-704.  Plaintiff then argues that the Deberjeois Court found no negligence as to the planting of the tree; however, the raised sidewalk in that case was undisputedly a hazard.  The “hazard” in this case, is snow and ice, an unquestionably natural condition, which allegedly was made more dangerous by a sloped sidewalk as per [...].  Plaintiff-Appellant’s reliance on Deberjeois is misplaced.  There was no dispute between the parties in Deberjeois that the tree root caused the sidewalk to become raised and thus brought about the hazardous condition that caused the plaintiff’s injury.  The question to be answered was whether the property owner’s action of planting a tree could be deemed an artificial condition that would overcome the residential sidewalk immunity.  This is in opposition to the issue at hand.  Here, the question at issue is whether a hazardous condition existed at the time of the incident at all.  Plaintiff has attempted to demonstrate the existence of a hazardous condition in support of this claim to overcome the residential immunity.  As discussed supra, the entirety of Plaintiff’s claims rested upon the expert opinion of [...].  But the trial court correctly found that [...]’s opinion constituted a “net opinion” and therefore could not be admissible to establish the existence of a hazardous condition.  It follows that, absent competent evidence establishing that a property owner "create[d] or exacerbate[d] a dangerous sidewalk condition[,]” residential landowners do not owe a duty to pedestrians to maintain the sidewalks abutting their property.  Luchejko v. City of Hoboken, 207 N.J. 191, 210 (2011).  Plaintiff has not and cannot present such evidence to establish a condition and this cannot establish liability.  Plaintiff then also attempts to overcome the long-established residential immunity by relying on municipal code.
[brief] Third, in November 2018, Defendants paid [...] over $15,000 in sick time payouts.  On October 1, 2016, human resources employee [...] retired.  (889a-890a, Rog., #62-63).  Derry likewise did not have a written contractual agreement but she received a sick time payout of $26,655.73.  (890a, Rogs., #64 & #65).  Fourth, in an interrogatory, Plaintiffs asked Defendants to identify any Atlantic City employees who received payments over $15,000 for sick time terminal leave pay who retired between the date of the enactment of the MSRA and December 31, 2017.  (898a-899a, Rogs., #2).  In response, Defendants stated the following:  "[...], with a date of hire of August 20, 1979, and a retirement date of December 2016 received a terminal leave payout of $44,950.18."  Ibid.
[brief] It was only then in Nov. of 2022’ them looking for reasons to disqualify people stated there was now one requirement in order to obtain your remaining and certified benefits between 5/1/21 and 9/4/21 and that is an official job offer prior to Covid-19 which I provided and they accepted (and I as well was self-employed on and off beforehand when work was available.  I fulfilled the requirement and should have more than at that point received my P.U.A., it’s clear to see the claim’s examiner in Jan. of 2023 was incompetent.  She wasn’t trying to be professional and do her job, it was pathetic, she was going off the record, not even looking way out of it.  I have provided notice again stating only an official job offer prior to Covid 19 was necessary, and this is only due to so many bad people committing fraud and using the system wrong, which I am not one of.  The whole time I was attending school full time and continuously sought work and applied for work study, and I now work 60 hours a week with disabled individuals.  They say in the 2/29/24 decision, where I have sent you an e-mail from [...] the day before from State Legislation finally hitting my breaking point and taking it to them they then “All of a sudden and magically” the next day after all those months could send a decision.
[brief] \(^{15}\)  [...]’s brief also fails to explain why any of the information identified as missing from [...]’s knowledge is material.  Again, the full record tells a different story.  When the initial investigation began at the [...] in the mid-1980s, [...] was responsible for overseeing that investigation.  (Pa 0259).  [...] testified:  Well, we have been studying the site for almost 30 years, and from that, we gained a great deal of knowledge as to the types of liquids that were released, whether they were DNAPLs or simply aqueous solutions that had solvents in them, and we know that with specificity with regard to each AOC.  (Pra 18).  [...] also testified:  We know quite a lot about the nature of each CVOC release that occurred, or the releases that occurred in individual AOCs.  We know, for example, which AOCs likely received DNAPLs and which received aqueous solutions that would have been less persistent in their ability to contaminate the groundwater over the long term.  We know which AOCs were degreaser pits where no liquid was released, but just slow seepage from the pits into the soil around it.  That tells us quite a bit about the relative importance of the individual AOCs as sources of the contamination, and that was information that I think should be layered into the allocation analysis.  (Pra 19).  At the time of his testimony at the allocation hearing, [...] had been involved with the investigation and remediation at the [...] for more than thirty years.  As a result of that extensive experience, he has “gained a great deal of knowledge” regarding the facility and its historical operations.  Not only is [...]’s argument that he lacks certain information unsupported, but it is also wrong.  [...] next criticizes [...]’s calculations because the calculations included damages allocated to AOCs 6 and 14, where the trial court found in its January 31, 2011 Opinion and Order ([...]) that no insured property damage occurred.  (Db, pp. 41-42).  Again, [...] tells only half the story.  [...]’s inclusion of AOCs 6 and 14 in his calculations was based on evidence discovered through investigations that occurred after the 2010 liability trial.  (Pra 20-22).  The trial court specifically granted the [...] the authority to consider “newly discovered contamination evidence from 2009 to present to determine the additional cleanup cost and future allocation. ” (Pa 187).  [...] then asserts, without explanation, that “this alone establishes the fallacy of the ‘fact-based’ allocation in this case. ”  In reality, this newly discovery contamination evidence – and the Court’s recognition of same - establishes just the opposite; namely, that [...]’s analysis and calculation was based on actual facts relating to the actual property damage at the [...].  III.
[brief] Q  You never had a name [...] – let me spell.  The first words is Y-I-N, the second word is S-H-I-N.  The last word is W-Wu.  You have never had a name [...], correct?  A  This is my brother’s name.  Q  When you said your brother, you meant the defendant, [...], correct?  A  Yes.  Q  And you never had a name [...], the second word is S-H-A-N.  A  You never had such a name, correct?  Q  It is also my brother’s name.  A  So that is not your name, to be clear, correct?  Q  Correct.  A  Your brother, [...], was also known as [...], correct?  Q  Correct.  (Trial Tr. Jan. 10, 2023, Pg. 27, Ln. 7 – 25)
[brief] \(^7\)  See U.S. ex rel. Poteet v. Bahler Med., Inc., 619 F.3d 104, 107 n.2 (1st Cir. 2010); U.S. ex rel. Hixson v. Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 613 F.3d 1186, 1188 n.3 (8th Cir. 2010); U.S. ex rel. Jamison v. McKesson Corp., 649 F. 3d 322, 326 n.6 (5th Cir. 2011); U.S. ex rel. Schweizer v. Oce N.V., 677 F.3d 1228, 1231 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 2012); U.S. ex rel. May v. Purdue Pharma L.P., 737 F.3d 908, 914–18 (4th Cir. 2013); U.S. ex rel. Antoon v. Cleveland Clinic Found., 788 F.3d 605, 614–15 (6th Cir. 2015); U.S. ex rel. Saldivar v. Fresenius Med. Care Holdings, Inc., 841 F.3d 927, 933 n.1 (11th Cir. 2016); Bellevue v. Universal Health Servs. of Hartgrove, Inc., 867 F.3d 712, 717–18 (7th Cir. 2017); Prather v. AT&T, Inc., 847 F.3d 1097, 1103 (9th Cir. 2017); Piacentile v. U.S. Oncology, Inc., No. 22-18, 2023 WL 2661579, at *1 n.1 (2d Cir. Mar. 28, 2023).
[brief] No one knows.  The resolution suggests only the latter, which would be impermissible under Pullen because it refers only to the “requested relief” in its “bland recitation of the statutory criteria. ”  The only “requested relief” that could reasonably be referred to there is the bulk variance for the Distance Regulation because the other “requested relief” was granted (and denial of site plan approval was separately set forth).  Similarly fatal, the Board made no finding on the purpose of the Distance Regulation.  How could the Board “bland[ly] recite” that the “requested relief” would “impair…the purpose of the zoning plan” if it did not make a finding on what the purpose is.  In most applications, the purpose is not in dispute, but here the Board and its professionals disputed it among themselves.  Contra e.g. Bressman v. Gash, 131 N.J. 517, 530 (1993) (upholding the board’s finding that the “proposed landscape buffer between the Steinhorn's back corner and Gash's lot met the purpose of the large rear-yard setback by enhancing privacy”).  1.  **The trial court created a new standard for the negative criteria**
[brief] For all of the foregoing reasons, and in reliance upon the legal authority set forth herein, Defendant respectfully requests that the Appellate Division grant the Defendant’s applications to vacate his prior guilty plea and have same marked as non-evidential for purposes of increasing the jail sentence of any subsequent offense under N.J.S.A. 39:4-50, N.J.S.A. 39:3-40, or N.J.S.A. 2C:40-26.  In the alternative, Defendant requests that the Appellate Division vacate the decision of the Law Division and remand the matter(s) back for another de novo hearing before same.  Respectfully submitted, [...]
[brief] (Pa56-Pa57 and see Da79).  Indeed, the record reflects that Plaintiff was only concerned about stopping a warehouse next to their homes.  In its Brief, Plaintiff characterizes the ordinance as creating a warehouse complex “on a farm field located directly across from the street Casella residential development where many young families live. ” (Pb1 & see Da79).  The Complaint also discusses that “area residents [were] concerned about the proposed warehouse development’s potential conflict with and adverse impact on their community. ” (Pa26, ¶26).  Defense counsel explained at oral argument that Plaintiff’s claims “boil down to their desire not to live or work near a warehouse development…” and this is exactly the type of private interest that the court in Rocky Hill rejected as being insufficient to enlarge time under Rule 4:69-6(c).
[brief] As part of his response to [...]’s assertions, [...] also produced documents that corroborated his representations.  In response, [...] certified generally that [a]t [the February 4, 2008] consultation, we discussed extensively my business history and several pending legal disputes for approximately three hours.  She asserted that she disclosed business, financial and legal information related to [...] and other matters to [[...]] and [that she] believe[d] to be related to the current law suit brought by [...], including discussion of [two then-pending cases, including the [...] case] and other general information about the circumstances of [her] business and legal affairs.  She insisted that [i]t remains [her] belief that the current suit will implicate portions of the information discussed with [[...]] previously when he was consulted for legal representation.  [...] also weighed in on [...]’s behalf.  In his certification, he confirmed that, since the death of [...]’s husband, he had served as advisor to [Mrs.] Kang on legal and business affairs, including several litigation cases related to her businesses and personal life.  According to [...], he arranged and attended a consultation between [Mrs.] Kang and [Attorney] Lee around February, 2008, to arrange for [Attorney] Lee to represent [Mrs.] Kang and her business.  He explained that [w]e met in a basement karaoke room at the [...] in [...], owned by M[r]s. Kang, and discussed [Mrs.] Kang’s business, pending legal disputes, finances, and other confidential matters for several hours.  Other than relating those general topics, his certification contains no specifics as to what was said or discussed.  In short, although [...], [...] and [...] all agree that they met and discussed whether [...] would assume the representation on behalf of [...] in the [...] lawsuit -- a representation [...] declined the very next day -- [...] denies anything further of substance was discussed, while [...] and [...] claim that matters concerning [...]’s business, pending legal disputes, finances, and other confidential matters were discussed, albeit without providing any details, specificity or corroboration thereof.
[brief] (Pa37)  According to [...], the investigator for the Division (“Conover”), the Certifying Pension Officer ([...]) and the Supervisor of the Pension Certifying Officer ([...]) are the individuals who are statutorily responsible for making the determination as to whether an individual is an employee of that agency. \(^3\) (T121-24)  Conover further confirmed the primary individuals in which the Board collects its information from are the Certifying Officer and the Supervising Certifying Officer.  (T183-22)  In their Report of Transfer (Pa37), both [...] and [...] determined the Petitioner was an employee of [...].  This was confirmed by Conover.  (T184-10).  As further evidence of the Petitioner’s employee status with [...], a Request for Personnel Action was issued on January 1, 2015.  (Pa38)  This form determined the Petitioner was a permanent employee as the [...] municipal prosecutor and was certified and approved by every required [...] Official.  On January 6, 2015, the [...] Municipal Clerk issued a letter to the State Attorney General’s Office confirming the Petitioner was “hired as an employee of [...] to the position of Municipal Court Prosecutor. ”  (Pa39)  [...] also \(^3\)  The Board did not call [...] as a witness which can be taken as a negative inference against it under the Rules of Evidence.
[brief] The sole basis for the motion was that [...] did not file a proof of claim in the Main Case.  Without citing any legal authority, counsel for the Debtor claimed that [...] must be limited to a claim in the amount of what the Debtor set forth on his bankruptcy petition.  But, what counsel for the Debtor failed to recognize was that the Property was not property of the bankruptcy estate and the Final Judgment made [...] the lawful owner of the Property.  As [...] did not have a claim against the Debtor but rather the Property, and the Property was not property of the estate, [...] need not file a claim.8
[brief] As there has been little presented to the court as to the merits of the case please be so kind as to permit me to clarify them.  [...], originally a rental, was built in 1976 and converted to condominiums in 1980.  It advertises itself as a three tower luxury condominium development complex consisting of 1,075 apartments in three interconnected towers with commanding views along the cliffs of the Palisades in [...] including a mall of shops and offices.  The base of the towers abuts [...] and rises up 19 floors to [...] at the top of the cliffs and then continues up an additional 20 or so floors.  The unit owners pay a monthly maintenance fee to the Management of the condominium association which pays for, among other things, maintenance of the common areas and the exterior of the buildings.  The bylaws (2 variations) and amendment to Master Deed serve as the rules and regulations of the Association and the individual unit owners and specifically state that it is the responsibility of the Association to maintain insurance.
[brief] Therefore, plaintiff must prove an affirmative link between the policy and the deprivation of the Constitutional rights.  *Board of County Commissioners v. Brown*, 520 U.S. 397 (1997); *Vippolis v. Village of Haverstraw*, 768 F.2d 40 (2d. Cir. 1985) (causal relationship was not shown since no proof of type of an adequate training); *Plesent v. Zamieski*, 895 F.2d 272 (6th Cir. 1990); *Losch v. Borough of Parksburciah*, 736 F.2d 903 (3d. Cir. 1984); *Strauss v. City of Chicago*, 760 F.2d 765 (7th Cir. 1985).  The policy, practice or custom must have directly caused the constitutional harm.  *Stoneking v. Braford Area Sch. Dist.*, 882 F.2d 720, 725 (3d. Cir. 1989).  “[O]nly where…a deliberate choice to follow a course of action is made from among various alternatives by the official or officials responsible for establishing final policy with respect to the subject matter" will liability attach to the municipality.  Thus, in order for liability to be imposed against a municipality under § 1983, the plaintiff carries the burden of demonstrating the existence of a particular municipal policy or custom, and further proving that such policy subjected or caused him to be subjected to constitutional injury.
[directive] 5.  You will have a criminal record?  [Yes]  [No] a. b.  Unless the plea agreement provides otherwise, you could be sentenced to serve the [Yes] [No] maximum time in confinement, to pay the maximum fine and to pay the maximum Victims of Crime Compensation Office Assessment?  You must pay a minimum Victims of Crime Compensation Office assessment of $50  [Yes]  [No] c. ($100 minimum if you are convicted of a crime of violence) for each count to which you plead guilty?  (Penalty is $30 if offense occurred between January 9, 1986 and December 22, 1991 inclusive.  $25 if offense occurred before January 1, 1986.)  If the offense occurred on or after February 1, 1993 but was before March 13, 1995, and [Yes] [No] d. you are being sentenced to probation or a State correctional facility, you must pay a transaction fee of up to $1.00 for each occasion when a payment or installment payment If is made? the offense occurred on or after March 13, 1995 and the sentence is to probation, or the sentence otherwise requires payments of financial obligations to the probation division, you must pay a transaction fee ofup to $2.00 for each occasion when a payment or installment payment is made?
[brief] ”  *Id.* at 382.  In determining that the prosecutor’s comment constituted reversible error, this Court explained:  >  It is, of course, a basic tenet of our criminal jurisprudence that a defendant has no obligation to establish his innocence.  That applies with equal force to the situation of a defendant assuming the stand to testify and the situation of a defendant proffering affirmative evidence on his own behalf.  He has no obligation to do either, and his failure in either regard cannot affect a jury's deliberations.  *[Id. at 382.]*
[brief] See, e.g., 1T 74:19–79:17, 96:21–25, 108:9–10:14, 119:4–20:23, 133:22–34:24, 147:21–55:17, 159:1–66:19, 168:17–72:1, 178:3–82:8 ([...]); id. 207:11–12:14, 217:1–18:16, 228:17–20, 257:13–61:17 ([...]); 2T 283:2–85:21, 287:17–92:2, 293:5–305:5, 342:20–45:9, 356:12–59:9, 379:4–82:19, 386:7–91:19, 422:11–26:11, 466:16–76:21 ([...]); 3T 504:18–07:13, 512:18–23, 515:2–16:9, 519:14–21:3, 523:2–27:25, 544:9–47:14, 551:1–52:7, 554:8–55:7, 597:24–98:22, 601:19–02:9, 605:2–13:17 ([...]); 4T 775:16–78:9 ([...]).  regulations . . . .”); Pa71 (“I FIND that for the rate stability policies, [...] developed the increased rates according to the dual loss ratio formula in the rate stability regulation, N.J.A.C. 11:4-34.18(c).  I further FIND that [...] set the increased rates for the loss ratio policies to result in a lifetime loss ratio that complied with the 55% loss ratio standard under the loss ratio regulations. ”).  Nonetheless, the ALJ affirmed the Department’s disapproval of [...]’s rate applications, imputing to the Department a never-stated finding that the rate increases had been rejected on the grounds that they were “excessive. ”  See, e.g., Pa84.  The ALJ admitted that this excessiveness-based affirmance rested on “considerations outside the regulations. ”  Pa56; see also Pa74 (similar).  Moreover, the ALJ stated that the governing “regulations do not state what is considered [‘]excessive[’] or refer to ‘excessiveness. ’”  Pa78; Pa84 (“[T]he regulations and Act do not define what constitutes excessive, giving the Department the flexibility to assess rate requests and other requirements under the Act. ”); see also 1T 37:3–6, 49:24–50:5 (the Department’s counsel arguing that “the regulations are just a starting point”).  The Commissioner affirmed the ALJ’s ruling imputing to the Department the “excessiveness” basis for disapproval of [...]’s rate filings.  See Pa52.  This appeal followed.
[brief] When the suspect entered her home, he stated, “‘I'm here for your dad, [...],’ leading [the victim] to believe he was there to fix something at the house. ”  225 N.J. at 6.  The victim “believed she recognized the intruder as someone who had recently done contracting work on their house. ”  Id.  At trial, the victim “testified that she had seen defendant on two prior occasions” at her home, first when he was hired to clean the porch windows, and second a few weeks before the robbery when he rang her doorbell and asked for her father.
[brief] . . .  This was at least a de facto termination of the PTA. ”  Da139.  In response to [...]’s claim for EGP payments on projects that have not yet begun but [...] claims to have referred to [...], the Arbitrator held that [...] was not entitled to EGP for these projects because “the PTA was never intended to be a ‘referral’ fee arrangement. ”  Da140.  While the Arbitrator is accurate in his conclusion, he must apply that logic to [...], as the [...] contract is dated December 29, 2021, one day after the termination date of the PTA as determined by the Arbitrator.
[brief] Model Jury Charges (Criminal), "Robbery In The Second Degree (N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1)" (rev. July 2, 2009)  .....................................................30  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT  Defendant appeals his convictions and forty-year sentence for accomplice liability for felony murder and accomplice liability for first-degree robbery, accomplice liability for reckless manslaughter, reckless manslaughter and theft.
[brief] In [...], the Petitioner had been hired as a firefighter despite being over the age of 35, the maximum for such enrollment for firefighters.  Both [...] and the Township thought [...]’ military service adjusted his age to meet the statutory requirements for enrollment in PFRS, but they were mistaken, and enrollment was denied.  Id. at 53.  The appellate court reversed the PFRS’ denial of enrollment.  In so doing, the court looked not only to equitable powers to waive the age requirement, Id. at 55-57, but found that it was the Township that erred by hiring [...] when he failed to meet the age requirements for the position.  Id. at 59.  The court held that municipalities will continue to make hiring decisions based upon their understanding of the pension law, which may be the result of reasonable mistake based on past confusion.  Id. at 61.  The court further found that although a person’s age is a readily ascertainable fact, the application of adjustments depends on the numerous statutes which are not --- \(^2\)