ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] Generally, if the injured person dies shortly after arriving at the hospital the investigating law enforcement officers should assume responsibility for notifying the survivors of the death.  When a critically injured person is brought to the hospital, care should be taken to preserve and label the package containing the individual's clothing and personal effects.  These possessions should be secured in accordance with hospital policy, since they may later be significant in establishing the victim's identity, assisting the investigative effort and facilitating the return of property to the victim's next of kin.  Where it is hospital policy to prepare the body of the deceased for viewing by next of kin for identification purposes, investigating law enforcement personnel should permit hospital staff adequate time to properly complete their preparation.  It is further recommended that where possible, hospital staff permit survivors sufficient time with the deceased.  Where this is not possible survivors should be provided with an explanation.  In a continuing effort to assist the next of kin of death by auto victims and victims of assault by auto, former Attorney General [...] and the 21 County Prosecutors issued a Policy Statement on July 15, 1985.
[brief] In this Order [...] was directed to provide the dates and times of his inquiries, the names of persons with whom he spoke to and the response he received in Paragraph 3 of the Court Order dated June 30, 2021.  (206-A).  The reason for disregarding the Courts repeated Orders became clear when [...] was finally able to obtain a document regarding the 401(k) showing that on March 10, 2021, [...], on behalf of [...], submitted a sworn document to collect the Paychex 401(k) on behalf of [...] by falsely indicating [...] was not married at the time of his death.
[brief] The governing statute provides that municipal officers possess the narrow authority to act within their municipality’s bounds—but not beyond it:  The members and officers of a police department and force, within the territorial limits of the municipality, shall have all the powers of peace officers and upon view may apprehend and arrest any disorderly person or any person committing a breach of the peace.  Said members and officers shall have the power to serve and execute process issuing out of the courts having local criminal jurisdiction in the municipality and shall have the powers of a constable in all matters other than in civil causes arising in such courts.  [N.J.S.A. 40A:14-152 (emphases added). ] ⁹ --- ⁹  There exists one commonsense exception to municipal police officers’ strict jurisdictional limit: N.J.S.A. 2A:156-1 permits police to cross municipal boundaries to arrest when they are in “fresh pursuit” of a fleeing suspect.  But far from pursuing an absconder, [...] officers surveilled and followed [...] State v. Cohen, 73 N.J. 331, 342 (1977) (“[P]olice officers can normally exercise the powers inhering in their office only within the confines of the jurisdiction which employs them.
[brief] Super. 660 (Law Div. 1991); Montells v. Haynes, 133 N.J. 282 (1993); Labree v. Mobil Oil Corp., 300 N.J. Super. 234 (App. Div. 1997); McGrogan v. Till, 167 N.J. 414 (2001); Balliet v. Fennell, 368 N.J. Super. 15 (App. Div. 2004).6
[brief] ”  [Pa12; emphasis added].  The application packet referenced in § 44-304(A) is the one that [...] filed on April 29, 2022 [Da318] and the complete form is attached to and made part of the LUPO.  [Pa19].  [...] is not free to make up its own definition of what an “application for development” is, use its own form, or ask this Court to re-write the City’s plainly written and clearly understood ordinance that conclusively establishes what an application for development is, and what it is not.  The terms of the LUPO are clear: the CRB application is not an application for development, and [...]’ application was neither filed nor complete when the Ordinance went into effect on April 28, 2022.
[brief] [N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-13.]  This provision of the LRHL makes plain that the MLUL is not superseded by the LRHL but that the MLUL independently governs review and approval of site plan applications.  (Emphasis added).  Id. at 566-67.  Continuing, the Court found no basis in the record to warrant the assessment for “off-site infrastructure costs,” and thus found the assessment unlawful.
[directive] Addendum A | December 2020  CEDs and Other Less-Lethal Devices and Ammunition  6  Unauthorized Uses of CEDs  6.1  The following uses of CEDs are prohibited:  (a)  A CED shall not be used or threatened to be used to retaliate for any past conduct or to impose punishment; (b) A CED shall not be used against a person who is a passive resistor or an active resistor; (c)  A CED shall not be fired or discharged for the sole purpose of preventing a person from committing property damage; (d)  A CED shall not be deployed against the operator of a moving vehicle unless the use of deadly force against the operator of the motor vehicle would be authorized; and (e)  Two or more CEDs shall not be discharged upon a person at the same time.  8  USE OF FORCE POLICY
[brief] You read [...]’ report, right?  A Yes.  Q  And what were your questions about it that you had?  A  Everything.  Q  All right.  Well, give me the most -- give me the most – the thing that stuck out to you the most about [...]’ report.  A  How he come up with that you show that the projectile came from the Glock, like what type of testing did he use.  And even before that did he have any training in that area.  This was before he all testified at trial and heard all his qualifications.  That -- that was like the main -- that was like the main thing that I needed to know.
[brief] (Da84–85.)  “Whether a particular arbitration provision may be used to compel arbitration between a signatory and a nonsignatory is a threshold question of arbitrability. ”  Eckert/Wordell Architects, Inc. v. FJM Props. of Willmar, LLC, 756 F.3d 1098, 1100 (8th Cir. 2014); see Blanton v. Domino’s Pizza Franchising LLC, 962 F.3d 842, 852 (6th Cir. 2020) (the “arbitrator should decide for itself” whether a non-signatory must arbitrate its claims when clear delegation clause exists); Evangelical Lutheran Good Samaritan Soc’y v. Moreno, 277 F. Supp. 3d 1191, 1228 (D.N.M. 2017) (whether a non-signatory is required to arbitrate his claims under third-party beneficiary theory is a threshold issue for the arbitrator).3
[brief] Garfinkle, supra, 168 N.J. at 136.  In Garfinkle, the arbitration clause was silent on the plaintiff’s statutory remedies.  The Court found that the clause’s failure to encompass the claim was not excused by the fact that plaintiff was a doctor.  “Irrespective of plaintiff’s status or the quality of his counsel, the Court must be convinced that he actually intended to waive his statutory rights.  An unambiguous writing is essential to such a determination. ”  168 N.J. at 136.  The same is true here.  Atalese requires that there be language in the arbitration clause so that it is clear and unmistakable that the consumer actually intended to waive his or her right to be in court.  Even if there were a “sophisticated” consumer exception to the Atalese doctrine, which there is not, the question of whether these plaintiffs are “sophisticated” consumers would be a factual question requiring an evidentiary hearing.
[brief] In *State v. Spivey*, 122 N.J. Super. 249 (App. Div. 1973), certification granted, 65 N.J. 21 (1974) (reversed on other grounds), the defendant was banned from the courtroom after he exhibited severely disruptive behavior including singing, kicking, braying, mouthing obscenities and insults, and spitting.  The judge tried binding and gagging him to avoid removing him, but ultimately removed him from the courtroom.  The Spivey court reiterated the options presented to the trial courts by Allen and held that the trial court’s actions were not improper when viewed in conjunction with defendant’s behavior.
[brief] Therefore, the trial court’s decision to grant the [...]’ Motion to Dismiss, with prejudice, should be affirmed.  Additionally, the other cases cited by plaintiffs such as Brizak v. Needle, 239 N.J. Super. 415 (App. Div.) certif. denied, 122 N.J. 164 (1990), (failure to protect client's claim against the running of the statute of limitations); Stewart v. Sbarro, 142 N.J. Super. 581, certif. denied, 72 N.J. 459 (1976) (attorney's failure to ensure that a bond and a mortgage were properly recorded); and Popwell v. Law Offices of Broome and Horn, 363 N.J. Super. 404 (Law Div. 2002) (Plaintiff's failure to file an application for trial de novo from an adverse arbitration decision) do not serve to support Plaintiffs' position that no Affidavit of Merit was required in this complex real estate transaction handled by the [...].
[brief] While the “net opinion” rule will exclude an expert’s opinion that is based on “personal views” untethered to any standard, Pomerantz Paper Corp. v. New Cmty. Corp., 207 N.J. 344, 372-73 (2011), an expert’s education, training, and, “most importantly,” experience, can provide “a sound foundation” for his opinion and take it outside the net opinion rule.  Townsend, 186 N.J. at 495; Rosenberg v. Tavorath, 352 N.J. Super. 385, 403 (App. Div. 2002) (“Evidential support for an expert opinion is not limited to treatises or any type of documentary support, but may include what the witness has learned from personal experience”).  See, e.g., Townsend, 186 N.J. at 495 (allowing opinion based on witness’s 14 years of clinical experience counseling hundreds of patients); Rosenberg, 352 N.J Super. at 403 (upholding opinion that chemotherapy dosage was cause of death, based on witness’s 20 years as an oncologist).
[brief] It is illogical for [...] to assert that his Unit is excepted as an “investment unit” (Db23).  All units make up the value of a specific property.  As correctly held by [...], that [...] previously realized a return on 10 units that were sold upon the conversion of the Property to a condominium property is irrelevant.  See 13T:65:18-20 (“Despite the defendant’s argument the plaintiff made money on the other units, which is irrelevant.  We are talking about this particular unit. ”)  It does not negate that [...] did not realize any return on the sale of the unsold Unit.  Likewise, [...]’s assertion that the “investment no longer exists” (Db23) is untenable.  Conversion of property to a condominium does not destroy an “investment" in all units of that property.  Even if the nature of the ownership of the property changes, the Property comprised of 11 units has always been an “investment” whether in 1993 when the Property was purchased or in 2003 when the Property was converted to a condominium.
[brief] The *Navarrete* Court acknowledged that an officer had to confirm the veracity of a tip before acting on it, but also pointed out that an “indicator of veracity is the caller’s use of the 911 emergency system. ”  *Id.* at 400.  The *Navarette* Court explained:  A 911 call has some features that allow for identifying and tracing callers, and thus provide some safeguards against making false reports with immunity.  *See J. L.*, supra, at 276, 120 S. Ct. 1375, 146 L. Ed. 2d 254 (2000) ([...], concurring).
[brief] ESTATE OF [...], deceased, by [...] as Executrix of the Estate; and [...], Individually, Plaintiffs, v. [...]; [...]; [...]; [...]; [...]; [...]; [...]; [...]; [...]; [...], and [...], Defendants.  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE  DIVISION DOCKET NO. [...]  CIVIL ACTION  On Appeal from the Orders granting summary judgment in: Law Division, Essex County, Docket No. [...] Sat Below: Hon. [...], J.S.C. BRIEF OF PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS IN SUPPORT OF THE APPEAL
[brief] State of New Jersey  Rule 1:10-3..............................................17, 18, 20 Rule 2:10-2..................................................19  Rule 4:42-11................................................26-28  N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1...........................................14-15  N.J.S.A. 47:1A-5(i) (g)...............................15-16  N.J.S.A. 47:1A-6..........................................31, 33  N.J.S.A. 47:1A-11........................................11, 31  Code of Federal Regulations
[brief] The lower court properly rejected Appellants’ argument under res judicata.  Res judicata “precludes parties from relitigating the same cause of action. ”  See e.g., Kram v. Kram, 94 N.J. Super. 539, 551 (Ch. Div.), rev’d on other grounds, 98 N.J. Super. 274 (App. Div. 1967), aff’d, 52 N.J. 545 (1968).  “Res judicata, or claim preclusion, insulates courts from the inefficiency of relitigating claims that have already been resolved, thereby protecting the integrity of judgments and preventing the harassment of parties. ”  *Bondi v. Citigroup, Inc.*, 423 N.J. Super 377 (App. Div. 2011); see also *Watkins v. Resorts Int'l Hotel & Casino, Inc.*, 124 N.J. 398, 409 (1991); *Velasquez v. Franz*, 123 N.J. 498, 505 (1991).  “The rationale underlying res judicata recognizes that fairness to the defendant and sound judicial administration require a definite end to litigation.
[brief] (Pa14; Pa70).  On June 10, 2021, the Division posted a news item on its website advising members that the statutory eligibility period to register under the Ricci Act was expiring soon and that members must submit the Eligibility Registration Form by July 8, 2021.  (Pa11).  The website further advised that failure to do so by that date would render the member ineligible to apply at a later date.  (Pa11).  On March 3, 2023, the Board received [...]’s Eligibility Registration Form completed on September 26, 2022, a Request for Amended Benefits Form completed on February 16, 2023, as well as a sworn affidavit from [...] dated September 20, 2022.  (Pa11; Pa59; Pa60; Pa56).  [...]’s affidavit asserted, in relevant part, that he “did not receive any correspondence or post card. ” (Pa56).  The Board considered [...]’s request at its meeting of May 23, 2023, where it voted to deny his request to register under the amended benefits provisions of the Ricci Act.
[directive] General Practices  (a)  Each agency must establish by written policy an internal affairs function.  (b)  Each agency must accept reports of officer misconduct from any person, including anonymous sources, at any time.  (c)  Each agency must thoroughly, objectively, and promptly investigate all allegations against its officers.  (d)  Each agency must notify its officers in writing of complaints made against them, unless this notification would interfere with any investigation resulting from these complaints.  (e)  Each agency must notify its officers of the outcome of any Internal Affairs investigation involving them.  (f)  Each agency must notify complainants of the outcome of their complaints.  (g)  If an agency’s internal affairs investigators are unable to complete an investigation within 45 days of receiving a complaint, they must notify the agency’s law enforcement executive,1 who may take steps to ensure prompt resolution of the matter.  Notifications to the County Prosecutor
[brief] Sanzari v. Rosenfeld, 34 N.J. 128, 141, 167 A.2d 625 (1961)  . . . . . . . . . . . .  59, 59 Smith v. Millville Rescue Squad, 225 N.J. 373, 397, 139 A.3d 1 (2016) . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7  Triarsi v. BSC Group Services, 422 N.J. Super. 104, 114 (App. Div. 2011)  . . . . . . . . . .  58  Winters v. N. Hudson Req'l Fire & Rescue, 212 N.J. 67, 85-88, 50 A.3d 649 (2012)  . . . . . . . . . .  57
[directive] 1.  Is anyone a tenant?  2.  Is anyone a landlord?  3.  Is anyone a homeowner?  4.  Have you or a family member or close personal friend ever been involved …as either a plaintiff or a defendant…in a slip and fall accident in which an injury resulted?  5.  Have you or a family member or close personal friend ever been involved in litigation or filed a claim of any sort?  6.  Have you or a family member or close personal friend sustained an injury to the _______ or have chronic problems with __________?  Model Civil Jury Voir Dire Questions Revised as Promulgated by Directive #4-07  Page 8 of 11  Medical Malpractice Note:  This information is not to be included on printed copies provided to jurors.  It is expected that the parties will submit a few specific questions seeking juror attitudes towards particular injury claims, such as pecuniary loss for wrongful death or a claim for emotional distress, if applicable, or juror attitudes about other particular types of claims, such as wrongful birth or informed consent issues.  In particular, wrongful birth claims might require a questionnaire or separate voir dire to address attitudes about termination of pregnancy.  Before asking the questions below, explain that the trial involves a claim of medical negligence, which people sometimes refer to as medical malpractice and that the terms both mean the same thing.
[brief] ’”  Id. at 445-46 (quoting Miller, 567 U.S. at 478-79).  The Supreme Court has relied on an overwhelming consensus in the fields of psychology and neuroscience, as well as “what ‘any parent knows,’” Miller, 567 U.S. at 471 (quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 569), in holding that juveniles are categorically less mature and more irresponsible relative to adults, “qualities that often result in impetuous and ill-considered actions and decisions,” Roper, 543 U.S. at 569 (internal citation omitted).  These characteristics — heightened thrill-seeking with poor impulse control — combine catastrophically, helping to explain why, as the Supreme Court recognizes, “‘adolescents are overrepresented statistically in virtually every category of reckless behavior. ’”  Roper, 543 U.S. at 569.
[brief] There, [...] terminated an employee, and the arbitrator there ruled that the termination was without just cause.  The Court opined that “where an arbitrator determines what a contractual phrase, such as ‘cause’ in a submission means, the arbitrator’s determination must be informed by what that word was intended to mean[].”  *Id.* at 302.  The Third Circuit deferred to the arbitrator’s framing of the issue before him, as “interpretation of the submission will likely involve consideration of the same issues as a review of the merits. ”  *Id.* at 302.  In actually reviewing the arbitrator’s award at issue in *[...] Oil*, however, the Third Circuit ruled that the arbitrator did not dispense with his own brand of industrial justice.
[brief] PRELIMINARY STATEMENT ..................................................................................1  PROCEDURAL HISTORY .......................................................................................3  STATEMENT OF FACTS ......................................................................................4  LEGAL ARGUMENT .............................................................................................8  I.  PLAINTIFF’S APPEAL PRESENTS  SEVERAL PROCEDURAL ISSUES THAT MUST BE ADDRESSED.................................................................8  A.  Plaintiff’s appeal fails even under the applicable deferential standard of review............................................................................................8  B.  The trial court properly considered matters of the public record in deciding the motion to dismiss, and Plaintiff’s self-serving certification cannot be considered on appeal........................................................................12  II.  THE LAW DIVISION CORRECTLY HELD THAT PLAINTIFF WAS NOT AN “EMPLOYEE” UNDER CEPA  BECAUSE HIS LAW FIRM WAS RETAINED BY [...] TO PERFORM LEGAL WORK ON AN AS-NEEDED, INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR BASIS..................................................................................................................13  III:  THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT PLAINTIFF’S NON-RENEWAL DID NOT CONSTITUTE A RETALIATORY ACTION AS A MATTER OF LAW...........................................25  CONCLUSION
[directive] List the charges to which you are pleading guilty:  Enumere los cargos a los que usted se declara culpable: Statutory Maximum/Penalidades legales maximas Time Fine VCCO Assmt* Ind./ Acc./Comp.# Count  Nature of Offense Degree vcco•  Tiempo Multa Multa de la Ac. F01D1al / No. de Cargo Naturaleza  Grado de infracci6n la Ac./Denuncia Max/Maximo Max/Maximo Max/Maximp Max/Maximo Max/Maximo  Total/Total  Your total exposure as the result of this plea is:  Su exposicion como resultado de esta declaracion de culpabilidad es: total  Please Circle Appropriate Answer/Slrvase marcar la respuesta apropiada con un circulo [Yes/Sf]
[brief] [See Da555]  Exhibit DB-3: Opinion of Appellate Division, dated 3/16/10 in *Trunell v. Trust for Harrison* [See Da633]  Exhibit DB-4: Deposition of [...], dated 10/11/22 [See Da658]  Exhibit DB-5: Deposition of [...], dated 10/11/22  [See Da687]  Exhibit DB-6: Roth to Rowe contract of sale…………………………Da731  Exhibit DB-7  Title insurance policy………………………………………Da749  **Volume VIII (Pages Da770 – Da886)**
[brief] )  Relatedly, Article XIV of the CBA, Discharge, provides, in pertinent part, the following:  **ARTICLE XIV**  **DISCHARGE**  A.  The Employer may discharge any employee for just cause.  Upon the Union’s request, the Employer shall give notice of said discharge to the Trades Council, in writing, stating the reasons therefore.  B.  In the event the Union or employee disputes said discharge, the matter shall be handled in according with the applicable procedures set forth in Article XIII.  It is mutually understood and agreed that Article XIII sets forth the exclusive remedy in the event of a disputed discharge.  (Pa45)
[brief] 11  STANDARD OF REVIEW ON ORDERS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ..  11  I.  THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY GRANTED RESTAURANT DEPOT SUMMARY JUDGMENT  BECAUSE PLAINTIFFS CANNOT PROVE RESTAURANT DEPOT WAS NEGLIGENT WITHOUT SUPPORTING EXPERT TESTIMONY .................................................................................  13  II.  THE MOTION COURT PROPERLY HELD THAT PLAINTIFFS CANNOT ESTABLISH THAT RESTAURANT DEPOT BREACHED ANY DUTY OWED TO PLAINTIFF OR HAD ACTUAL OR CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE OF THE ALLEGEDLY DANGEROUS CONDITION AT ISSUE .................................................................................  21  III.  PLAINTIFFS/APPELLANTS HAVE FAILED TO DEMONSTRATE THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT RULED THAT RESTAURANT DEPOT DID NOT FAIL TO PRESERVE EVIDENCE AND DID NOT GRANT AN ADVERSE INFERENCE CHARGE ...... 31 CONCLUSION ............................................................................................... 38 TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS Order Granting [...], LLC’s (improperly pled as [...]) Motion for Summary Judgment Entered January 19, 2024…………………………………………………………… Pa385 – Pa386 Order Denying Plaintiffs’ Motion for Interlocutory Appeal entered on February 26, 2024 ……………………………………………………………………………………..Pa391 TABLE OF APPENDIX
[brief] - that [...] claimed that co-worker [...] also saw [...] under the desk and, in fact, had a conversation with [...] when he was under the desk.  (PSMF 160) which [...] later denied.  Also, [...] testified at deposition that she never told anybody that [...] saw [...] under [...]’s desk.  (Pa692).  - that [...] had knowledge of meetings that he would not otherwise be privy to inferring he planted some sort of listening device.  (Pa681) which is a vague and unspecified allegation ominously and falsely suggestion that Dillon installed a microphone or other listening device that lacked any proof whatsoever.  On March 17, 2016, [...] sent an email to [...] asking for “the status of the incident and [...] told her that he had “opened up a case investigation on this matter” and that [...] was “coming in with his union representative next Tuesday [March 21, 2016] to be interviewed regarding the matter” (Pa681-Pa682) which a jury could find supports a retaliatory animus because discipline in the [...] is supposed to be kept strictly confidential.