ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] (Pa142).  Second, even if [...] could be considered a party to [...]’s submissions, the trial court correctly determined that her complaint was “far out of time and therefore barred. ” (Pa153).  [...] submitted her complaint on September 28, 2022—205 days after [...] denied [...]’s request, 191 days after the [...] denied [...]’s request, and 62 days after [...] allegedly should have received a response from “[...].
[directive] 3.  [예/Yes]  [아니요/No]  귀하는 무슨 혐의를 받고 있는지 아십니까?  Do you understand what the charges mean?  4.  아십니까?  귀하가 유죄를 인정하면 귀하는 특정한 권리를 포기하는 것을 포기하는 포함됩니다.  즉: 권리들 가운데는 다음과 같은 것들이  Do you understand that by pleading guilty you are giving up certain rights?
[brief] When discussing the Incident, [...] cited to the specific [...] Rules and Regulations which Appellant violated, the location in the record of the Rules and Regulations, and [...]’s specific reasons based on testimony and record evidence as to why he reached the conclusions that he did.  [Pa43-Pa46].  [...] went step by step through Appellant’s testimony and discussed why it was not credible.  [Pa43-Pa46].  [...] acknowledged that Appellant did not call the Incident in to 911 as a possible drug overdose, but rather as a person having difficulty breathing.  [Pa44].  This is undisputed.  [4T50:12-15, 4T129:7-11].  [...] discussed the inconsistencies in Appellant’s “evolving theory” that started with Appellant stating he had no idea what [...] ingested, then suggesting [...]’s overdose could have been caused by alcohol, then eventually saying it could have been pills, and ending with the conclusive statement that it was oxycodone.  [Pa44; 4T52:20-24, 4T134:11-21].  [...] knew this did not harmonize with Appellant immediately requesting Narcan as soon as [...] arrived.  [4T61:14-24, 4T132:17-25].  [...] also knew Appellant was lying about initially believing [...] only ingested alcohol because Appellant outright admitted in his Internal Affairs interview that “you don’t get that way by being drunk” and that [...] “didn’t appear intoxicated to me. ”  [6T14:7-10].  There is no logical way to reconcile this with Appellant’s “evolving theory” beginning with [...] only consuming alcohol or with Appellant immediately requesting Narcan.  [4T52:20-24, 4T61:14-24, 4T132:17-25, 4T134:11-21].  Accordingly, [...] found that Appellant’s statements were inconsistent and appeared to be given in a manner as to protect himself from liability.  [Pa44].  [...] correctly concluded that the Incident constituted an “unusual emergency event,” which Appellant was required to report to [...] but failed to do, and cited the specific [...] Rules and Regulations that Appellant violated.  [Pa45-Pa46].  [...] also correctly concluded that Appellant was required to report the Incident to [...] but never did, which is undisputed by the parties and the record.  [Pa45-Pa46].
[brief] 2 Cir. 1944 (affirmed sub nom Gemsco, Inc. v.Walling, 324 U.S. 244, 65 S. Ct. 605, 89 L.Ed. 921 (1945) | 37 | | In Re Merrill, 88 N.J. Eq. 261, 273 (Prerog. Ct. 1917) | 37 | | In Re Norrell’s Estate, 139 N.J. Eq. 550, 553 (E&A 1947) | 37 | | Lloyd v. Vermeulen, 22 N.J. 200, 205 (1956) | 37 | | May v. Board of Com’rs of Town of Nutley, 111 N.J.L. 166, 167 (Sup. Ct. 1933) | 37 | | Morris Canal and Banking Co. v. Central Railroad Co., 16 N.J. Eq. 419, 428 (Ch. 1863) | 37 | | Russell v. Richardson, 905 F.  3d 239, 247 (3d. Cir. 2018) | 32 | | Schierstead v. City of Brigantine, 29 N.J. 220 (1959) | 37 | | Sears Roebuck & Co. v. Camp, 124 N.J. Eq. 403 (E&A 1938) | 26 | | Trinh v. Fineman, 9 F. 4th 235 (3d. Cir. 2021), cert. denied (March 2, 2022) | 32 | TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS ORDERS NOVEMBER 17, 2023
[brief] It would help develop information about the comparative effectiveness of different systems, would lead to a mix in which airbags and other nonseatbelt passive restraint systems played a more prominent role than would otherwise result, and would promote public acceptance.  *Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co.*, 529 U.S. 861, 879 (2000).  More recently, [...] explained that practical difficulties required a phase-in period for head-impact protection, even though head impacts with the upper interior components of vehicles are the leading cause of head injury for non-ejected occupants killed in a crash:
[directive] With one exception, all proceedings of the Grand Jury are recorded.  The testimony of witnesses can therefore be made available to the defendant and other authorized persons if an indictment is returned.  The comments of the Grand Jurors in their discussions and deliberations with each other are not recorded.  The opposite is true of discussions between the prosecutor and the Grand Jurors.  They are recorded to ensure that everything the prosecutor says to a Grand Jury may be known to all concerned.  The names of grand jurors are not contained in the transcript of the proceedings.  For example, if a grand juror asks a question of a witness, the grand juror will not be identified by name.  The Clerk of the Grand Jury will make and keep a record of the vote of each Grand Juror, by name, on each matter presented for consideration, but this record will not be made public except on the order of the Assignment Judge.
[brief] On this point, see also the Appellate Division’s March 23, 2021 Decision, pages 7 and 22, wherein the Court notes that [...] had already ruled that the assets of [...] were not included in the Estate, and that Plaintiff had failed to appeal that ruling.  The Administrator’s certification also attached evidence that Plaintiff continuously insisted that a search in Hawaii should be conducted to find assets.  (Da30; Da42; Da52) and see also, Da229, page 22, fn. 6).  D.  **The Trial Court Failed to Conduct a Proper Analysis to Determine Whether the Particular Work of Plaintiff’s Attorneys Was a Benefit to the Beneficiaries of the Estate Other Than Plaintiff.
[brief] "[I]n reviewing the exercise of discretion it is not the appellate function to decide whether the trial court took the wisest course, or even the better course, since to do so would merely be to substitute our judgment for that of the lower court.  The question is only whether the trial judge pursues a manifestly unjust course. ”  *Gittleman v. Central Jersey Bank Trust Co.*, 103 N.J. Super. 175, 179, 246 A.2d 757 (App. Div. 1967), rev’d on other grounds, 52 N.J. 503, 246 A.2d 713 (1968).  [Gillman v. Bally Mfg. Corp., 286 N.J. Super. 523, 528 (App. Div. 1996.)]  There was no “manifestly unjust” conclusion here by the Trial Judge.  To the contrary, the decision was reasonable, rational and based upon the competent evidence in the record.
[brief] But he testified that he fled because he thought he was about to get shot:  I was scared and -- and after -- after -- after -- after the gunshot, I turned around, I fired once in the air.  As I’m running I heard two more shots.  So I’m just -- I’m trying to get … to my car. ”  (23T 174-25 to 175-10)  I was scared.  I’m like this guy is about to shoot me.  …  I seen him with a gun.  …  I just fired once and just kept running[.]  (23T 176-12 to 17)  I was scared for my life.  …  I was scared because people were just trying to kill me.  (24T 215-24 to 216-1)  [...] fled because he believed [...] gang members were threatening to shoot him (24T 237-19 to 20, 265-4 to 7); because friends at the scene told him he was in danger (23T 140-24 to 141-16, 146-3 to 19, 148-23 to 150-19, 23T 160-19 to 161-20, 194-4 to 195-4); because he saw people, including [...], with guns (23T 151-10 to 155-16, 175-24 to 176-16); because he heard [...] say he saw someone with a gun (22T 247-11 to 17); and because he heard gunfire (23T 173-4 to 7, 175-2 to 7).
[brief] The State wrote in its suppression opposition brief below:  In this case, there was an inadvertent typographical error where the language "all persons present reasonably believed to be connected with said property and investigation," was omitted from the warrant granting the search of [...], but was a part of the application for the search warrant.  (Sbr. Page 11; Ca13).  The State also "concedes that there was a clerical error."  (Sbr. Page 15; Ca17).  The State vehemently urges this Court to validate the omission from the search warrant of any mention of defendant, or any individual found in or exiting the premises to be searched, as a minor, insignificant faux pas of the type which has occurred in numerous other search warrants afflicted with similar glitches, which ultimately have been disregarded by the courts and have upheld the search.
[brief] United States v. National Treasury Employees Union, 513 U.S. 454 (1995).  44, 45, 47, 48, 49 Walker v. Johnson, 798 F.3d 1085 (D.C. Cir. 2015)..............................................19  Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661 (1994)............................................................45  Williams v. W.D. Sports, N.M., Inc., 497 F.3d 1079 (10th Cir. 2007)....................19  STATUTES
[brief] ”  *Id.* at 262.  That is, availability of state tort claims would hasten implementation of new safety technology, not delay it as amicus suggests.  Interestingly, amicus acknowledges that consumer expectations are part and parcel of the risk/utility analysis but claims that “[p]laintiff is seeking to establish a new and expanded rule of duty. ”  Ab8.  Plaintiff is asserting a duty that has existed for centuries as a bedrock principle of tort law: people must act reasonably under the totality of the circumstances.  As amicus states, this is a case “where consumer expectations can be determinative on risk/utility balancing. ”  Ab6 (“cases where ordinary consumers can be fully informed about both the costs and the benefits”).  There is no reason to take from the factfinder, a jury of ordinary consumers, the risk/utility analysis of whether defendant breached its duty.  *Green v. General Motors Corp.*, 310 N.J. Super. 507, 517 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 156 N.J. 381 (1998) (“Thus, in determining whether the product was defective, a jury must determine the risks and alternatives that should have been known to a reasonable manufacturer and then assess whether the manufacturer discharged its duty to provide a reasonably fit, suitable and safe vehicle. ”).  Rather than justify a limitation of [...]’s responsibility to market a product that is fit, suitable and safe, amicus acknowledges that a jury is fully capable of fulfilling its constitutional role as factfinder.  CONCLUSION
[brief] [ISSUE RAISED AND DECIDED (Pa003-Pa012; Pa024-Pa026; Pa033-Pa036; Da0852-Da0853)]**  A.  **Failure to Warn  Post-Sale  [ISSUE RAISED AND DECIDED (Pa003-Pa012; Pa024-Pa026; Pa033-Pa036; Da0852-Da0853)]**  [...] has repeatedly attempted to obfuscate issues and mislead the court by claiming that its May 2018 package insert warning was sufficient, FDA approved and therefore preempted.
[brief] The language of a related provision, N.J.S.A. 39:4-88, further demonstrates that the Legislature used the word “turn” to refer to a change in course and used the word “move” to refer to a change in lanes.  N.J.S.A. 39:4-88 provides in pertinent part that “[w]hen a roadway has been divided into clearly marked lanes for traffic[,] . . . [a] vehicle shall be driven as nearly as practicable within a single lane and shall not be moved from that lane until the driver has first ascertained that the movement can be made with safety. ” (emphasis added).  N.J.S.A. 39:4-88 also specifies that a car must be driven in the farthest right lane when possible, “except when overtaking another vehicle or in preparation for a left turn. ” (emphasis added).  That the Legislature used the word “turn” elsewhere in N.J.S.A. 39:4-88 but did not use it when discussing lane changes indicates that the Legislature did not consider a lane change to be a type of turn.  The inclusion of the phrase “so turn” in the second sentence of N.J.S.A. 39:4-126 does not alter this analysis.
[brief] \textit{State v. Olenowski}, 255 N.J. 529, 587–88 (2023).  Likewise, [...]’ nervousness does not provide the officer with reasonable suspicion that [...] was under the influence or in possession of illegal drugs.  Our Supreme Court has repeatedly made clear that nervous behavior, including excited movements, does not justify a detention, prolonging a detention or asking for consent to search.  See State v. Rosario, 229 N.J. 263, 277 (2017) (explaining that because “[n]ervousness and excited movements are common responses to unanticipated encounters with police officers on the road,” those factors do not warrant reasonable suspicion); Carty, 170 N.J. at 647 (holding that an individual’s appearance of nervousness does not justify extending the scope of a detention or requesting consent to search).
[brief] See In re Estate of Byung-Tae Oh, 445 N.J. Super. 402, 406 (App. Div. 2016).  Finally, while [...] may argue that this matter should be treated as one for partition under N.J.S.A. 2A:56-2, this argument is also without merit.  There is no issue here about the ownership interests in the property or how the property should be partitioned.  Rather, the only issues here relate to determining the appropriate sale price and whether the proposed sale to [...] was in line with fair market value; especially given the actions of [...] and [...] during the sales process as outlined in detail in Point I above.  This type of determination is not subject to summary proceedings and discovery is absolutely necessary to determine the validity of the price; especially given the difference between the sales price (improperly) accepted by [...] without the consent of the five sibling co- owners, as compared to the Comparative Market Analysis and comparable sales all within the same relevant time period.  Accordingly, this Court should reverse the Court’s October 13, 2023 Orders confirming the sale of the Subject Property and denying [...]’s motion for leave to file counterclaims as the matter should not have proceeded summarily nor should it have proceeded in the Chancery Division, Probate Part.
[brief] First, the introductory paragraph of N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-8 extends powers of a redevelopment agency to be used “in order to carry out and effectuate the purposes of this act and the terms of the redevelopment plan. ” (emphasis added).  Use of funds paid by a developer to erect a new senior center has nothing to do with the “purposes of the” [...], which is to address deteriorated structures and areas.  N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-2.  Since the senior center is not mentioned in the “redevelopment plan,” and is not even a permitted use in the plan (Pa290), the payment of these funds does not advance the purposes of the plan.  Second, the “property and services” of the senior center are not provided “in connection with the redevelopment area. ”  There is nothing in the record indicating that the senior center was proposed in a redevelopment area.  Third, *N.J.S.A.* 40A:12A-8(f) only allows revenues paid by a redeveloper to be used to defray the costs of the redevelopment entity including where applicable the costs incurred in conjunction with bonds, notes or other obligations issued by the redevelopment entity, and to secure payment of such revenues.  The use of funds to erect a new senior center is an investment; it is not a “cost of the redevelopment entity. ”  For these reasons, each in itself sufficient to render the $2,000,000 payment unlawful, *N.J.S.A.* 40A:12A-8(f) does not authorize the $2,000,000 payment approved by the Court.
[brief] Instead of reducing the front yard nonconformity, which was found to be objectionable in the [...] application, [...] elected to increase that same nonconformity.  Instead of finding a way to leave a tree lined street as undisturbed as possible, which clear cutting along [...] was found objectionable in the [...] application, both applications sought to significantly disturb the scenic tree lined street, neighborhood seclusion and the undeveloped feel of the neighborhood.  The Cole proposal to clear cut 150 feet of trees along [...] is unnecessary to bring construction equipment on to the property for purposes of constructing a single-family residence.  Contrary to the contention of Plaintiff, the neighboring [...] property is tree lined along [...] with the exception of a horseshoe driveway immediately in front of the home.  Ja176 to Ja178 and Ja208.  Instead of finding a way to move the septic system to a location farther from [...], [...] elected to place the septic system in the same location as the [...] application.  In addition, the issue of water runoff on to the adjacent property owned by Mr. [...] and [...] resulting from raising the grade of the subject property by 10 feet, which was found to be objectionable in the [...] application, was again not satisfactorily addressed.  Water runs down-hill.
[directive] Based on that thorough review, the law enforcement executive shall determine whether changes in departmental structure, policy, training, or equipment are appropriate.  The law enforcement executive shall then provide a written report documenting the annual review to the County Prosecutor.  Each County Prosecutor’s Office and each statewide law enforcement agency shall make its report to the OPIA.  21  USE OF FORCE POLICY | December 2020  Use of Force Policy Addendum
[brief] POINT IV  THE TRIAL COURT INCORRECTLY DISMISSED THE COMPLAINT AGAINST BOTH RESPONDENTS [...] AND [...] (1T,2T, Pa1-34)  Appellant asserts that the Court below erred in granting summary judgments in this matter as there were questions of material fact that should have been determined by a jury.  As required by the standard set forth in Brill, the Court should determine “whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law. ”  As explained above, it is our position that the trial Court erred in finding that there was not sufficient information to demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact of a dangerous condition, that Appellant has not suffered a permanent loss of bodily function that is substantial, and that there was no duty owed by Respondent [...] to Appellant.  For the reasons set forth above, we submit that the trial Court erred in failing to find a question of material fact based upon Appellant’s Complaint, testimony of Appellant and Respondents and their employees, and evidence presented, which clearly show sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury.  For the foregoing reasons, Appellant submits that the decision below was erroneous and incorrect and must be reversed.  CONCLUSION
[brief] When Plaintiff received the money from [...], she was not unconditionally obligated to make repayment.  Plaintiff confuses contingent and non-recourse as if they are the same.  Plaintiff claims that in a non-recourse loan, a lender may “attach only the collateral, not the borrower’s personal assets, if the loan is not repaid. ”  (Pb21)  That description misses the point.  If [...] is not paid because the plaintiff lost their case, no money is owed.  If [...] is not paid because plaintiff recovered proceeds in the case but did not pay [...], [...] cannot just seize an asset.  This is a contingency, not a non-recourse loan.
[directive] In these tools bothassessment or tool assessment either such, thereof.  As lieu in not and PSA scores there that anticipated it  Likewise, detention. is pretrial for apply to presumption a _er trig could presumption. trigger a will tool neither which in cases be will History.  Juvenile and Violent Score Risk Moderate a Involving Crimes Serious 7.4.3 seeking of presumption the unless 7.3, Section under covered otherwise not cases
[directive] (a)  A finding that a police officer has filed a false report or submitted a false certification in any criminal, administrative, employment, financial or insurance matter in their professional or personal life;11  (b)  A pending court complaint or conviction for any criminal, disorderly persons, petty disorderly persons, municipal ordinance or driving while intoxicated matter; (c)  A finding that undermines or contradicts a police officer's educational achievements or qualifications as an expert witness; (d)  A finding of fact by a judicial authority or administrative tribunal that is known to the officer's employing agency that concludes that a police officer intentionally did not tell the truth in a matter; (e)  A sustained finding that a police officer intentionally mishandled or destroyed evidence; and (f) A sustained finding that a police officer is biased against a particular gender or ethnic group.
[brief] “chief of police denied this request in an e-mail dated August 5th, 2019, stating that the applicant had a significant driveway and that there was a handicapped parking space across the street. ”  This cherry picking of facts by the court was done in disregard of evidence and law, as the following explain:  a.  Under state and federal laws a minimum width for accessible parking spaces for disabled person is eight feet with five feet aisle  b.  Via his Complaint the appellant had materially told the trial court, “Plaintiff’s driveway is about ten feet wide and is bound from two sides by tall concrete retaining walls, which prevent passenger side doors of car from opening to any such extend to accommodate a disabled person like the Mother,” picture (Pa85, ¶5), supporting the said with picture of his driveway (Pa5).  c.  Via his *Complaint* the appellant had informed the trial court that the handicapped parking space alluded by the trial judge in his opinion was removed, stipulating “this designated handicapped parking space magically vanished in or about August of 2023, after Plaintiff made clear to the Defendants that he shall seek court injunction against them” (Pa93, §G).  d.  Further, appellant supported pictures to the trial court, showing that the said handicapped parking space, when in place, was a regularly parking space for respondent [...] and other public officials (Pa31 - Pa34).  Yet, in his findings of fact on the matter, the trial judge cited that (1) the appellant had significant driveway and (2) there was an available handicapped parking space across the street, viewing that it was reasonable for the 92 years old Mother unable to walk to hop across the street and traverse over 50 yards to access such NON existing handicapped parking space, when the provision of C. 39:4-197.6. and C. 39:4-197.5 entitled her to have a reserved handicapped parking space in front of her house (1T19, 15-18).
[brief] This argument is erroneous.  The record conclusively establishes that the Bankruptcy Court’s Order affirmed that the stay was lifted and the Borough’s requested relief was not granted \textit{nunc pro tunc}.  This is the reason the Borough readopted the Amended Redevelopment Plan.  Objective two talks about how future plans should provide for additional parks and open space in the borough.  And one of the -- you may recall one of the main purposes behind the last amendment to the plan was to change some of the standards because the county, borough, the redevelopment agency, the redeveloper had entered into a four party agreement that ... called for the -- the county to acquire a larger piece of -- of the property to be used for -- for open space in the future.  So that goal is certainly directly consistent with ... the amended redevelopment plan.  [Pa 31, 74-75 (2:25-3:11), emphasis added].