ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I THE TRAFFIC STOP WAS UNLAWFUL BECAUSE N.J.S.A. 39:4-126 CANNOT BE CONSTRUED TO REQUIRE A MOTORIST TO SIGNAL AN INTENTION TO CHANGE LANES.  EVEN IF SUCH A CONSTRUCTION WERE PERMISSABLE, POLICE LACKED REASONABLE AND ARTICULABLE SUSPICION THAT A SIGNAL WAS REQUIRED UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES.  (Da 3-9)  Both the United States and New Jersey Constitutions protect citizens from unreasonable searches and seizures.  U.S. Const. amends. IV, XIV; N.J. Const. art. 1, para. 7.  “A motor-vehicle stop by the police, however brief or limited, constitutes a seizure of persons within the meaning of those provisions. ”  State v. Scriven, 226 N.J. 20, 33 (2016) (internal quotations omitted).  Warrantless car stops are prima facie invalid, and the State bears the burden of justifying such a seizure by a preponderance of the evidence.  State v. Atwood, 232 N.J. 433, 446 (2018).  “To justify a stop, an ‘officer must have a reasonable and articulable suspicion that the driver . . . is committing a motor-vehicle violation’ or some other offense. ”  State v. Carter, 247 N.J. 488, 524 (2021) (quoting Scriven, 226 N.J. at 33-34).  Here, the State failed to meet its burden to justify the warrantless stop of [...]’s vehicle.
[brief] [...], a Sheriff’s Officer Sergeant employed by the [...] (“[...]”) appeals from the Civil Service Commission’s decisions removing her from the eligible list for promotion to the rank of Sheriff’s Officer Lieutenant.  The Commission correctly considered Zirrith’s entire employment history in determining whether she had “a prior employment history which relates adversely to the title” sufficient for her removal from the eligible list pursuant to N.J.A.C. 4A:4-4.7(a)(1) and N.J.A.C. 4A:4-6.1(a)(9).  Zirrith’s undisputed disciplinary history included multiple reprimands and counseling in addition to major disciplinary action in the form of a 45 day suspension for Zirrith’s admitted guilt on untruthfulness and insubordination charges.
[brief] A governmental entity has an obligation to “turn square corners”.  *F.M.C. Stores, Co. v. Borough of Morris Plains*, 100 N.J. 418, 426 (1985) (quoting *Gruber v. Mayor of Raritan Twp.*, 73 N.J. Super. 120, 227 (App.Div.), aff’d, 39 N.J. 1 (1962)).  It has “an overriding obligation to deal forthrightly and fairly with property owners”.  Ibid.; *Jersey City Redevelopment Agency v. Costell*, 252 N.J. Super. 247, 257 (app. Div. 1991); see also *State v. Siris*, 191 N.J. Super. 261 (App. Div. 1983); *Rockaway v. Donofrio*, 186 N.J. Super. 344 (app. Div 1982).  Additionally, “government must ‘turn square corners’ rather than exploit litigational or bargaining advantages. ”  *W.V. Pangborne Co. v. New Jersey Dep’t of Transp.*, 116 N.J. 543, 561, (1989) (quoting *F.M.C. Stores Co.*, supra, 100 N.J. 425 (1985).
[brief] **The [...] Incident**  On the evening of July 20, 2018, [...] and [...] were at Palinczar’s home.  (T4 123:24-125:5).  They were watching TV when Palinczar noticed that [...] had passed out and he was not able to wake her up.  (T4 127:3-12).  Palinczar called 9-1-1 and reported an unresponsive female having trouble breathing.  (T4 129:7-11).  Palinczar performed CPR on [...], and he detected alcohol on her breath.  (T4 129:19-24, 131:3).  He also found a small bottle of alcohol in her purse when he looked for ID.  (T4 130:1-6).  Palinczar’s house was clean and there were no drugs or other alcohol bottles present.  (T4 58:1-16; 130:21-25).  Palinczar checked [...]’s arms for marks, and she did not appear to have injected heroin.  (T4 131:1-3).  [...] did not appear to have attempted suicide, since there were no slash marks on her wrists.  (T4 131:3-5).  There was no medication on her person, and nothing else in her pockets offering Palinczar information as to what had caused [...]’s condition.  (T4 131:15-17).  Palinczar had not seen [...] do anything to cause her to be in such a condition.  (T4 131:18-23).
[directive] Retention of BWC Recordings 8.1  Minimum 180-Day Retention Period.  A BWC recording shall be retained by the law enforcement agency that employs the officer for a retention period consistent with the provisions of this Section, after which time the recording shall be permanently deleted.  A BWC recording shall be retained for not less than 180 days from the date it was recorded, but shall be subject to additional retention periods as required in Sections 8.2, 8.3 and 8.4.  8.2
[brief] [11T110-19 to -24].  At 1:05 a.m., defendant texted [...] and told her he was “excited. ”  [11T115-4 to -16].  [...] responded that he should be safe that and she wasn’t going to be able to sleep until he was done.  [11T115-22 to -25].  Defendant answered, “Get some sleep, though, ima be all right.  This ain’t my first. ”  [11T116-25 to 117-1].  At 1:11 a.m. [...] texted defendant, “I hate that you left me for the night. ”  [11T117-18 to -23].  At 2:43 a.m. defendant responded, “It’s only for the night cuz we bout to get old girl dike. ”  [11T118-5 to -7].  Around 9:30 a.m. the next morning, [...] walked herself to a nearby hospital because she wasn’t feeling well.
[brief] (Pa80).  Shortly thereafter, [...] received notice from the owner of the property that Appellants’ lease had been terminated for failure to make payment.  (Pa80 and Pa81).  [...] and [...] were further advised by the property owner that [...] had obtained rights to the Project and would continue toward constructing the solar farm at the Holland site.  (Pa80 and Pa81).  Once [...] was informed that [...] had obtained rights to the Project, it was engaged directly by [...] to continue performance of engineering services on the Project, specific to the Holland, NJ property (to which Appellants no longer possessed any rights) (Pa81).
[brief] He and [...] were in the Somerset County Jail together after they were arrested.  Sometime during the summer of 2021, he received the State’s discovery for his case, which contained [...]’s post-arrest statement to police.  [...] got angry at some of the things [...] said about him in the statement, prompting [...] to write letters explaining why he said certain things to the police.  (10T 22-22 to 24-13)  [...] said that [...] explained in writing instead of verbally because “We was in lock-up and he didn’t want nobody to hear it. ”  (10T 24-14 to 24-18)  When asked “what would happen if somebody heard him say something inculpatory in lock- \textsuperscript{8}  [...] was in combat in Afghanistan and suffers from PTSD as a result.
[brief] Plaintiff [...] ("[...]") commenced this action by the filing of a Complaint in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division on August 21, 2019.  (Pa26)  Identified as defendants were [...], [...] and [...].  (Pa26)  Pursuant to the Order dated March 4, 2020 of the Hon. [...], J.S.C. plaintiff was granted leave to file an Amended Complaint.  (Pa54)  By way of Amended Complaint, the defendants were identified as [...], [...] and [...].  (Pa43)  [...] alleged that on February 21, 2019 he was working on a construction site in Madison, New Jersey when he was caused to fall sustaining bodily injury.  (Pa43)  He alleged negligence in failing to provide him with a safe place to work on the part of the general contractor, [...] ("[...]"), and the property owner, [...] ("[...]") and its principal, [...].  (Pa43)  On October 30, 2019 [...] filed an Answer to the Complaint.  (Pa38)  On September 3, 2020 [...] filed an Answer to the Complaint.  (Pa69)  No Answer was filed on behalf of defendant [...].  On May 1, 2021 the Court issued a Dismissal Order for Lack of Prosecution against the defendant, [...].  (Pa80)  On November 17, 2022 defendant [...] moved for summary judgment pursuant to R. 4:46-2.  (Pa81)  On December 2, 2022 [...] moved for summary judgment pursuant to R. 4:46-2.  (Pa191)  On December 2, 2022 plaintiff [...] filed a letter with the Court opposing defendant [...]’s motion for summary judgment.  (Pa190)  On December 27, 2022 plaintiff [...] filed his opposition to the motion for summary judgment filed on behalf of defendant [...].  (Pa245, 261, 279)  On January 6, 2023, oral argument was heard before the Hon. [...], J.S.C.  Following oral argument, [...] issued her Opinion (1T34:24 to 1T44:18)\(^1\) and entered Orders dated January 6, 2023 granting summary judgment in favor of defendants [...] and [...] dismissing the Amended Complaint.
[brief] *Id.* at 88 (citing *Faison v. Parker*, 823 F. Supp. 1198, 1201 (E.D.Pa. 1993)).  In this instance, the residents are providing their contact information, including e-mail address, through a private, non-governmental entity, which then allows them to receive notifications from their local municipality.  These individuals have a reasonable expectation that their contact information will be used by [...] for the intended purpose in accordance with the Terms of Service (to receive notifications from the municipality) and not for any other purpose.  This particularly applies to political emails, which are prohibited under [...]’s Terms of Service.  After the City received the lower court’s decision, the City utilized [...] to send out a short survey to [...] users to take the temperature of how important the privacy issue is to them and what their expectations were regarding the maintenance of their e-mail address and other personal information.
[brief] It is undisputed that the Notice of Classification is not a statutorily required document.  Accordingly, [...]’s omission of a copy of its existing Notice of Classification from its bid is, at worst, subject to waiver under the River Vale test.  Palamar Constr., Inc., 196 N.J. Super. 241; Thassian Mech. Contr., Inc., 2020 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 27 at *5.  This remains true regardless of whether the Solicitation deems the Notice of Classification mandatory or not.  Ibid.  Moreover, for the reasons set forth in Point I supra, [...] reasonably interpreted that the Notice of Classification was not mandatory and, to the extent there is any ambiguity, such ambiguity is construed against [...] as the drafter.  M.J. Paquet v. N.J. DOT., 171 N.J. 378, 395 (2002)(construing ambiguity in NJDOT specifications against public owner).  In any event, [...] did not challenge the requirements of the Solicitation.  Rather, [...] challenged [...]’s rejection of [...]’s fully responsive bid.  Therefore, [...] was not required to file a pre-bid challenge to the Specifications and its decision to refrain from doing so is of no moment (since all parties agree that the River Vale test must be performed, regardless of the interpretation of the language in the Solicitation).
[brief] But the individuals and entities identified in the text have a direct role in debt collection activity and are far more likely than the employee of a postal service, telephone or telegram operator or letter vendor to examine and use the information transmitted to them.  That Congress determined to create an exception for transmission of information to such individuals and/or entities – no doubt in recognition of the fact that prohibiting the same would cripple legitimate debt collection activity – does not mean that Congress intended to bring far more mechanical transmissions of debtors’ data to postal services, telephone/telegram companies, or letter vendors within the purview of the statute.
[brief] Moreover, if a suspect requests counsel during an interview, “the interrogation must cease until an attorney is present. ”  *Miranda*, 384 U.S. at 474.  Questioning may not resume “until counsel has been made available [or] unless the accused [] initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with police. ”  *State v. Chew*, 150 N.J. 30, 61 (1997) (alterations in original) (quoting *Edwards v. Arizona*, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85 (1981)).
[brief] Pa254.  On August 30, 2022 Defendants [...] and [...] filed opposition to the motion for reconsideration and a cross motion to amend judgment to clarify what amounts might be found due against Defendants [...] and [...] under the Court’s orders.  Pa 259.  On September 1, 2022 Plaintiff submitted a reply to the foregoing submission.  The Court heard oral argument on these cross motions on September 23, 2002.  T2.  By order dated November 29, 2022 the Court denied the motion for reconsideration and granted the motion to amend the judgment.
[brief] EVEN IF LIMITED TO THE STANDARD OF ARBITRARY, CAPRICIOUS OR UNREASONABLE TO REBUT THE PRESUMPTION OF VALIDITY, PLAINTIFF HAS MET THAT STANDARD.  (Pa 118-121, 129-130)  .........................................................7  POINT  THREE CONTRARY TO THE ARGUMENT OF THE DEFENDANTS, THE DECISION OF THE PLANNING BOARD CAN ONLY BE MADE BASED ON THE RECORD BEFORE IT.  FACT (Pa 118-121, 129-130)  .................................................................12  CONCLUSION ............................................................................................14
[brief] [...]’s argument that the premiums it receives are immune from scrutiny by the Department cannot be justified simply because the policyholder/subscriber has signed a power of attorney.  A simple hypothetical will demonstrate the inequity of that position.  Each policyholder/subscriber signs a power of attorney that authorizes that up to 12.5% of premiums paid for its insurance coverage can be used to pay the attorney-in-fact for management services provided to the reciprocal insurance exchange.  If there are $20 million in premiums, the attorney in fact could charge up to $2.5 million (12.5% x $20 million) for providing management services to the reciprocal insurance exchange.  The hypothetical further assumes the reciprocal insurance exchange has reported a $2.5 million loss in overall income during the year and is deemed to be in a hazardous financial condition.  If the attorney-in-fact has provided only $500,000 in services to manage the reciprocal insurance exchange, it would not be fair and reasonable for the attorney-in-fact to reap $2 million in profits while the reciprocal insurance exchange is burdened with $2.5 million in expenses.  Such a result could jeopardize claim payments and disadvantage subscribers who could be entitled to savings realized by the reciprocal insurance exchange, if any.  SSAP No. 25 provides the important regulatory protection that the insurance-buying public relies on to ensure that related party transactions are fair and reasonable.  Yet, [...]’s position (and by extension, that of the [...]) would eliminate the requirement for the attorney-in-fact to justify the payments it receives as fair and reasonable for the services it provides to the exchange.
[directive] Iniciais do Réu / Defendant’s Initials no Formulário Padrão de Declaração Judicial/Formulário Revisado Promulgado pela diretiva 01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 10079-Portuguese página 4 de 7 Main Plea Form/Revised Form Promulgated by Directive #01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 10079-Portuguese page 4 of 7  12.  Listar todas as acusações para as quais a promotoria concordou em recomendar a extinção:
[brief] In such cases, liability to a public entity may attach where the challenged action was “taken pursuant to a policy adopted by the official or officials responsible under state law for making policy in that area of the city’s business. ”  See City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 123 (1988).  This Monell requirement to establish employer liability does not exist under CEPA.  Nonetheless, this Court has ruled that evidence of a policy or custom under Monell may be inferred from conduct that occurred after the events in question.  See Ehler v. Belleville Police Dept., 2007 WL 2162526 (App. Div. 2007) (976a), citing Grandstaff v. City of Borger, 767 F.2d 161 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 916 (1987).
[brief] N.J.S.A. 42:2C-37(b)(1) (“The management and conduct of the company are vested in the members”) and N.J.S.A. 42:2C-49(c) (“if a dissolved limited liability company has no members, the legal representative of the last person to have been a member may wind up the activities of the company”).  As such, a member’s expectation to be included in dissolution is reasonable and required by NJ RULLCA.  It is well known that Courts have an inherent power to appoint a special receiver for a corporation on the ground of gross or fraudulent mismanagement by corporate officers, or gross abuse of trust or general dereliction of duty; solvency of the corporation is not a bar to such action.  Gillies v. Pappas Brothers, 138 N.J. Eq. 202, 205 (Ch. 1946); Hollander v. Breeze Corporations, Inc., 131 N.J. Eq. 585, 606, 612 (Ch. 1941) (aff’d. 1942).  Here, the Trial Court properly found Plaintiff was an oppressed minority member.  As a member of [...], Plaintiff’s expectation to be included in the company’s dissolution was reasonable.  Plaintiff was denied an opportunity to inspect the books and records of [...] prior to dissolution and was excluded from any role in winding up the company.
[brief] Furthermore, [...] could have been more proactive in making recommendations, consistent with section 2.5 of the Tariff, to [...] to make improvements to the lighting systems located on [...].  [...] further states:  “Although [...] did not have adequate staffing to drive at night to determine any potential inadequacies in light levels and other maintenance relate[d] issues, knowing the performance of their own lighting systems, seeing “Dangerous Intersection” signs, and tall trees that would obscure and block light levels on the car driven surfaces, they should have at least made recommendations to the [...]” (Pa386).
[brief] As we have noted there were two separate proceedings before the [...], and that Board denied both applications with resolutions making detailed findings of fact.  The primary relief [...] sought was a variance from the ordinance's requirement of one principal use per site, a very common provision aimed at controlling inappropriate over-development.  See, e.g. Sun Co. Zoning Board, 286 N.J. Super. 440 (App. Div.) certif. denied, 144 N.J. 376 (1966).
[brief] The Court Erred in Double Counting the Prior Endangering Conviction in Applying the Aggravating Factors and Imposing a Consecutive Sentence.  Next, the court erred in double counting the existence of the endangering conviction in applying aggravating factors and in imposing a consecutive sentence.  The Supreme Court has explained that courts should not rely on the same factors in imposing the maximum term, as in imposing consecutive sentences.  See State v. Miller, 108 N.J. 112, 122 (1987) (“[F]actors relied on to sentence a defendant to the maximum term for each offense should not be used again to justify imposing those sentences consecutively."); State v. Carey, 168 N.J. 413, 422-423 (2001) (citing *Yarbough*, 100 N.J. at 643-44) (explaining that courts should not double count aggravating factors in this way).  Here, the sentencing court considered the nature of the prior offense in weighing the aggravating and mitigating factors and imposing the maximum term, and in deciding to make the sentences consecutive.  (2T 38-17 to 21, 41-24 to 42-5)  For instance, in finding aggravating factor 6, the court stated, “Aggravating Factor Number 6, the extent of the -- the defendant’s prior criminal record.  Clearly, it’s not extensive in terms of numbers, but it is in terms of the severity of the prior offense, so I do believe that that applies. ”  (2T 38-17 to 21)  And, of course, the crux of the court’s *Yarbough* analysis was about the nature of and differences between this and the prior offense.  (2T 41-24 to 42-5)  It was improper for the court to impose a maximum sentence for the instant conviction based on the same prior offense it ran the instant conviction consecutive to.  See *State v. Streater*, 233 N.J. Super. 537, 546 (1989) (“The only factor which could support imposition of a consecutive sentence under the criteria set forth in *Yarbough* is that there were multiple victims of defendant's fraudulent schemes.  However, this circumstance was one of the primary factors which justified sentencing defendant to a maximum extended term for the conspiracy conviction. ”).  Thus, resentencing without improper double counting is required.
[brief] It was stipulated by the parties that the 9-1-1 call was placed at 11:44 p.m. (3T:101-6 to 7).  operator tried to calm [...], but he was pleading, “help me, help me,” “please hurry up,” and “I’m losing her. ”  After getting his location, the operator told [...] that help was on the way.  (3T:94-5 to 97-4).  Around this same time, Patrolman [...], an eight-year veteran of the [...], was on patrol and positioned on Route 33 westbound.
[brief] Plaintiff violated FDCPA because of misleading statements. **  The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act ("FDCPA") prohibits debt collectors “from making false or misleading representations and from engaging in various abusive and unfair practices. ”  *Heintz v. Jenkins*, 514 U.S. 291, 292 (1995).  *FDCPA* is a strict liability statute that “makes debt collectors liable for violations that are not knowing or intentional. ”  *Reichert v. Nat’l Credit Sys., Inc.*, 531 F.3d 1002, 1005 (9th Cir. 2008).  Whether conduct violates 15 U.S.C. Section 1692e requires an objective analysis that takes into account whether “the least sophisticated debtor would likely be misled by a communication. ”  *Dunlap v. Credit Protection Ass’n, L.P.*, 419 F.3d 1011, 1012 (9th Cir. 2005) and *Swanson v. S. Or. Credit Serv., Inc.*  869 F.2d 1222, 1227 (9th Cir. 1988).  In the Heintz case, the Supreme Court held that FDCPA “applies to attorneys who ‘regularly’ engage in consumer-debt-collection actively, even when that activity consists of litigation.
[directive] custodial of in lieu acomplaint-summons in domestic violence cases issue police to require, much less station with an up-to-date Live police equipped defendant at a fingerprinting the arresting and when Assessment (PSA) and the ODARA scores Safety Public obtaining the and Scan system required.  Other Risk and Assessment Tools by ^ ~•*~m~*~a D~-~+M;~' Informed Decisions Charging 4.2  Information Sources. and Scope Values Flags.  Safety Assessment ~~~~~~e~public 4.2.1.a ";~'~ '' complaint- charges that must be charged by specified serious involving in cases Except non-indictable amended, or in cases involving recently as Rule 3 :3-1(e), required by warrant as decision statute, see subsection 2.2.2, the required by not fingerprinting is which for offenses this court for acomplaint-warrant under apply to a or to acomplaint-summons issue whether to pretrial risk-assessment generated by the automated results the informed by will be Directive 2A:162- pursuant N.J.S.A. Director of the Courts to Administrative the approved by process risk-assessment initiated automated pretrial process is The 4.5.1.
[brief] Any delay in raising it by motion was relatively brief.  The timeline of this litigation is reflected in the docket which we have provided to the Court.  (Da884)  [...] filed its complaint on December 8, 2021, but the pleadings stage of the case was not concluded until late June 2022.  [...] filed its summary judgment motion on November 11, 2022, only five months later, and [...]’s cross-motion promptly followed.  In the meanwhile, the parties did exchange interrogatories and took two depositions, but that relatively fast-tracked discovery period is no basis to deny application of the entire controversy doctrine.  Our Supreme Court has invoked the entire controversy doctrine to dismiss a subsequent claim where the delay in raising it was far longer.  In *Oliver v. Ambrose*, 152 N.J. 383 (1988), the defendant pleaded an entire controversy doctrine defense for the first time three years after the complaint was filed, and did not move for summary judgment on that ground until the year after that.  The Supreme Court, in upholding dismissal of the complaint based on the entire controversy doctrine, observed that judicial economy is only one consideration, and such concerns cannot override the doctrine's overall objective of fairness to litigants.