ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The question of whether the Plaintiff has stated a viable claim for relief turns ultimately upon whether [...] and the other assignees of the Plaintiff’s credit card account and debt were functioning as a “consumer lender” and/or “sales finance company” under the NJFCLA at the time they accepted assignment of such account and debt and/or sought to enforce and collect the same and were thereby required to secure a license.  If they were so obligated, the Plaintiff has stated a viable claim for relief under the FDCPA as against [...], inasmuch as one could reasonably conclude in such circumstances that the letter [...] sent to the debtor was misleading and/or unconscionable because it did not report that the serial creditors were unlicensed at the time they accepted assignment of the debt and/or initiated legal proceedings against the debtor in the Bergen County Action and that the debt was void.
[brief] On October 18, 2016, Plaintiff predecessor [...] purchased tax sale certificate number [...] for $2,330.07.  (Da21)  On December 17, 2018, [...] filed a foreclosure complaint.  (Da8)  Plaintiff filed an amended complaint on February 25, 2019.  (Da8)  [...] filed a contested answer on April 1, 2019.  (Da22)  May 1, 2019  [...] filed chapter 13 petition for bankruptcy (which was dismissed four months later.)  (Da8)  On June 21, 2019 the Court granted Plaintiff [...] summary judgment, struck [...]’s answer and entered default.  (Da8-Da9)  The Court set February 28, 2020 as the last date for redemption.  (Da9)  Plaintiff filed a motion for final judgment on May 24, 2020 (Da9) and the Court entered final judgment in favor of Plaintiff on June 29, 2020 barring [...]’s right to redeem and vesting title to [...]’s property over to Plaintiff.  (Da1)  December 2, 2021  [...] filed a motion to vacate judgment.  (Da9)  On January 7, 2022 the Court denied the motion finding that [...] failed to satisfy Rule 4:50-1 noting the judgment was over a year old, [...] did not certify he had funds to redeem and circumstances were not compelling.  (Da11)  The Court denied [...]’s request to carry the motion to finalize the loan and redemption due to the fact that the lender did not file a motion to intervene (despite the fact that same is not required by law.)  (Da12)  On January 11, 2022 the Court entered Plaintiff’s writ of possession.  (Da12)  On January 11, 2022 [...] filed Chapter 7 petition for bankruptcy which was dismissed February 28, 2022.  (Da12)  On January 31, 2022 [...] filed a motion for reconsideration and informed the Court that [...] had the funds of $111,095.40 to redeem the tax sale certificate (Da12)  On February 18, 2022 the Court denied the motion for reconsideration stating there “was nothing new” and the judgment was 18 months old.  (Da13)  [...] filed an appeal arguing that the Court errored in entering judgment and again in denying the motion to vacate and motion for reconsideration.  (Da14)  On June 8, 2023, the Appellate Court denied the appeal stating there was not adequate proof that [...]’s loan was approved and [...] did not properly certify and show proof to substantiate his hardships and did not certify as to why he waited 18 months.  (Da14)  However on May 25, 2023 the US Supreme Court’s decision in Tyler v. Hennepin County, 598 U.S. 631, 143 S. Ct. 1369, 215L.Ed. 2d 564 (2023) declared a taxing authority’s confiscation of a property owner’s equity violated the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause.  (Da29)  As the Court and all parties are aware, the NJ Appellate Division in light of the US Supreme Court decision in Tyler v. Hennepin County has made it clear that it is unconstitutional for a tax lien holder, who is already earning hefty interest, to also steal an owner’s equity in their homes.  Both the NJ Supreme Court and State Legislature recognized the holding in Tyler by introducing legislature amending the TSL and implementing the Notice to the Bar.  (Da35)  Application of Tyler to this matter which was pending and in the pipeline is mandated.  257-261 20th Ave. Realty LLC v. Roberto 2023 N.J. Super LEXIS 121.
[brief] Subcarrier Commc’ns., 299 N.J. Super. at 638.  Here, the trial court found irreparable harm based on its belief that, if [...] took steps toward condemnation, it potentially could affect Plaintiff’s ability to secure lending, which could then affect Plaintiff’s ability to move forward with development of its inclusionary project:  [T]echnically, you know, money damages isn’t an irreparable harm, but I think that the ability to move forward, unless the developer has all of the money themselves, and they are just taking it out of their piggy bank to build this, you’re going to banks . . . the fact that the public entity is moving ahead with condemnation . . . any lender is going to know about that and I think it does cast a shadow potentially on being able to move forward with development.  So, while it technically is a money issue, it’s bigger than that I think.  It’s the potential for being able to move forward with development of a project.  Nothing has been approved yet and no determination has been made that the property is appropriate for the development of affordable housing, but I think that they have satisfied the first principle.  [1T52:15-53:9 (emphasis added). ]  The court’s decision on the motion for reconsideration reiterated that the developer or property owner should not “have to deal with a condemnation proceeding,” including the preparation for it.  (2T18:1-9; 14:11-15:4).  1.  Any potential harm is speculative and not imminent.  The trial court abused its discretion in finding imminent, irreparable harm based on its belief that, if [...] takes steps toward condemnation, it may affect Plaintiff’s ability to secure lending – if Plaintiff needs lending at all – and therefore “cast[s] a shadow potentially on being able to move forward with development,” while also acknowledging that “nothing has been approved yet” and “no determination has been made that the Property is appropriate for the development of affordable housing.
[brief] In the 2015 case, you continuously argued various alternative theories and allege the discovery of new evidence, to which the Court has denied your claims at each turn.  The Court also denied your request to bring [...] and [...] back into this case.  However, in your new Complaint, you attempt to make the same arguments before a different Court in an attempt to obtain a different result, which is wholly improper.  This instant Complaint is highly improper based on numerous applicable doctrines, including the Entire Controversy Doctrine, Law of Case Doctrine, and the Doctrines of Collateral Estoppel and *Res Judicata*.  You continuously seek to challenge the actions and judgments of various Judges in Monmouth County and now seek to apply to a different Court seeking to obtain a different result.
[brief] Pa15-16.  It is also notable that Plaintiff has abandoned her reliance on the unpublished decision in Rodriguez-Ortiz v. Interstate Racking & Shelving, No. A-1614-19 N.J. Super. LEXIS 2072 (App. Div. September 3, 2021).  Ja475.  Plaintiff argued before the trial court that this unpublished decision held that public policy required coverage for intentional wrong claims.  The trial court correctly rejected this argument and noted that the court in Rodriguez-Ortiz expressly stated that it was not deciding that issue.  Pa15.  Plaintiff has abandoned this argument in her merits brief filed with this Court.  Lastly, the trial court concluded that the [...] Policy’s exclusion for intentional wrongs is fully consistent with public policy.  It is a long-standing public policy of New Jersey that insurance provisions that exclude coverage for intentional acts are enforceable.  As observed by the trial court, The removal of Exclusion C5 would lead to an increase in moral hazard, going against public policy.  Employers are explicitly warned that they cannot jeopardize their employee’s well-being through intentional wrongs without consequences.  Exclusion C5 acts as a safeguard, preventing insurers from becoming a safety net for employers who permit the use of hazardous or malfunctioning equipment, remove safety guards from machines, or deceive employees about work-related illnesses.  Therefore, Exclusion C5 establishes a standard that holds employers accountable for maintaining the utmost safety and preventing incidents classified as “intentional wrongs. ”  [Pa16.]
[brief] f.  The MRSA  Effective May 27, 2016 the Legislature passed the MRSA, N.J.S. A. 52:27BBBB-1, et. seq. (30a ¶100).  The MRSA gave the State or their designee the ability to: (a) Unilaterally modify CNAs; (b) Supersede the jurisdiction of the Public Employees Relations Commission; (c) Refuse to abide by conventional arbitration decisions; and (d) Refuse to abide by interest arbitration decisions.  (30a ¶101).  On June 6, 2016, pursuant to the MRSA, the Director of the Division of Local Government Services ("DLGS"), in conjunction with the Commissioner of the Department of Community Affairs, deemed [...] a “municipality in need of stabilization and recovery.
[brief] Defendant police officer did not tell plaintiff he was under arrest for any offense.  (See Pa22; Pa302-Pa304; Pa453).  Plaintiff was wrestled back down to the ground and choked by the police.  (Pa303; Pa54; Pa093; Pa094)  The [...] seized, choked, beat up and punched the plaintiff repeatedly, took the keys from him and searched both vehicle without exigent circumstances and retrieved whatever they desired.  (Pa303; Pa54; Pa055; Pa093)  Plaintiff was hysterical in fear and sustained severe emotional distress.  (Pa055).  The police officer placed their knees into plaintiff’s ribs.  (Pa054)  The plaintiff did not present himself as a danger as he was on the ground when he was taken into custody.  (Pa023; Pa093).  Plaintiff had a panic attack, endured extreme emotional distress requiring him to be taken by ambulance obtain medical treatment.
[brief] [...] filed a motion for reconsideration arguing that pursuant to NJSA 46-3-16, she was the highest conforming bidder.  N.J.S.A.46:3-16 provides:  Every deed conveying land shall, unless an exception shall be made therein, be construed to include all and singular the buildings, improvements, ways, woods, water, watercourses, rights, liberties, privileges, hereditaments and appurtenances to the same belonging or in anywise appertaining; and the reversion and reversions remainder and remainders, rents, issues and profits thereof, and of every part and parcel thereof.  The Judge disagreed stating that [...] could only convey that which it owned.
[brief] In the absence of a constitutional violation, the Judiciary does not have the power to compel the Board to expend funds that are not within a current legislative appropriation.  Karcher v. Kean, 97 N.J. 483, 490 (1984) (“With the ultimate constitutional responsibility for appropriations vested in the Legislature, . . . the judiciary has accepted its own absence of authority to compel either the Legislature to make a specific appropriation or the Governor to recommend or approve one. ”); accord N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. D.C., 118 N.J. 388, 399 (1990); City of Camden v. Byrne, 82 N.J. 133, 148 --- \(^2\)
[brief] **THE TRIAL COURT ERRED FINDING THE OLDER WORKERS BENEFIT PROTECTION ACT PERMITTED DEFENDANT TO REPUDIATE THE AGREED-UPON AND MEMORIALIZED SETTLEMENT.**  (2T18:22-20:14)  Plaintiff also argues that the trial court erred in holding that the OWBPA precluded enforcement of the settlement reached and memorialized on the record because it permitted Defendant to repudiate the entirety of the agreed-upon and memorialized settlement.  Moreover, to this end, Plaintiff contends that the judge improperly denied its OTSC on analysis which was neither briefed nor argued by the parties at oral argument. \(^6\)  Nonetheless, Plaintiff will address this --- \(^6\)  Unless issues relate to a court’s jurisdiction or matters of substantial public interests, Your Honors generally will not consider issues that were not raised or addressed below.  See Nieder v. Royal Indem. Ins. Co., 62 N.J. 229, 234 (1973) contention and maintains that the OWBPA does not invalidate the settlement reached or permit Defendant to unilaterally repudiate the entire settlement, and so, as argued below, the Court should have enforced the settlement reached pursuant to the terms memorialized on the record.
[brief] B.  Plaintiff Has Waived His Right To Appeal  The Trial Court’s Orders Dismissing The Complaint Against [...] By Failing To Seek Relief Or Brief Any Issue Regarding Defendant [...].  [Issue not raised below]  Although “[t]he comment to the relevant court rule states that ‘it is clear that it is only the judgment or orders or parts thereof designated in the notice of appeal which are subject to the appeal process and review,’” Campagna ex rel. Greco v. American Cyanamid Co., 337 N.J. Super. 530, 550 (App. Div. 2001), courts generally favor a “public policy that, whenever possible, litigation should be resolved on the merits rather than on procedural violations. ”  The Tr. Co. of N.J. v. Sliwinski, 350 N.J. Super. 187, 192 (App. Div. 2002)(emphasis added).  “An issue not briefed on appeal is deemed waived. ”  Green Knight Capital, LLC v. Calderon, 469 N.J. Super. 390, 396 (App. Div. 2021); see also Comprehensive Psychology Sys., P.C. v. Prince, 375 N.J. Super. 273, 274 n.1 (App. Div. 2005) (where court only considered the issue briefed in the appeal and deemed all other issues abandoned).  Here, Plaintiff’s brief specifically “asks this court to reverse the trial court’s decision granting Defendant [...]’s motion to dismiss on August 7, 2023; reverse the decision to deny Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration on October 11, 2023; and remand the matter back to the trial court for further proceedings including trial. ” (Pb9).  (emphasis added).  Not only did Plaintiff omit the [...] Orders from his Notice of Appeal, but Plaintiff’s appeal also fails to seek relief from those Orders, or to brief any issue of fact or law related to those Orders.
[brief] This Court is obligated to review the records and request the Plaintiff to provide certification of attorney fees record to \(^2\)  See Webb v. Texas, 409 U.S. 95, 93 S.Ct. 351, 34 L.Ed.2d 330 (1972) (Depriving Defendant’s right to present a defense was a violation of his due process and this right is a fundamental element of due process of law); Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 87 S.Ct. 1920, 18 L.Ed.2d 1019 (1967) (The right to present a defense, the right to present the defendant’s version of the facts is a fundamental element of due process of law); Hovey v. Elliott, 167 U.S. 409, 17 S.Ct. 841, 42 L.Ed. 215 (1897) (Judgment rendered without affording due process of law was unenforceable).
[brief] R. 4:5-7 ....................................................................................................................43  R. 4:6-2 ..................................................................................................................  3, 10, 12, 20, 24, 44, 45, 46, 47 R. 4:9-1 ..................................................................................................................  22 R. 4:46 ....................................................................................................................45, 46  TABLE OF ORDERS BEING CROSS-APPEALED  Order  (I) Denying Plaintiffs’ Leave To File A Second Amended Complaint and (II) Dismissing Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint Without Prejudice As Against [...], Entered December 7, 2021¹ …………………Pa3298
[brief] Plaintiff also relies on *Lodato v. Evesham Twp.*, 388 N.J. Super. 501 (App. Div. 2006).  That matter involves a plaintiff tripping and falling over a sidewalk slab raised by a tree root.  *Id.* at 503.  In finding that constructive notice existed, the Court relied on the fact that the same condition existed for almost eighteen years and similar conditions existed throughout the neighborhood.  *Id.* at 512.  Additionally, the homeowners on both sides of the property in question, had similar conditions in front of their houses and the DPW removed those threes, but not the tree in question.  *Ibid.*  *Lodato* is factually distinct from the case at bar.
[brief] Moreover, it is undisputed that Plaintiff (a) never filed a change-of-address form with the municipal tax collector, N.J.S.A.  54:4-104.48; (b) shirked her obligation to ascertain and pay her taxes, even though she never received a tax bill, N.J.S.A. 54:4-64(a)(3); (c) admitted she did not set up a mailbox at the property (Ja160#8); (d) did not have her mail forwarded from the subject property to her home address (Ja173#7); and (e) never provided the City Tax Office with a tax mailing address different from what was on the vesting deed to the subject property, (Ja288¶8).  In these circumstances, the case of Brick v. Block 48-7, Lots 34, 35, 36, 202 N.J. Super. 246 (App. Div. 1985) controls.
[directive] 1. of a to or distribution made after either the DCJ county prosecutor's office a obtains either: a. a final judgment by default; a consent decree/stipulation settlementlfinal judgment; b. of or a final judgment confirming forfeiture; c. d. a consent forfeiture placed on the record guilty plea, to at - - 02 of State New Jersey Forfeiture Program Administration Standard Operating Procedure Paw: 2 sentencing or similar d-ispositional proceeding- or 2.  Transfer of funds a county municipal Law Enforcement Trust to or, Account an escrow account established for a specific municipal law enforcement agency as defined under Forfeiture Promam Administration Standard Operating Procedures 04, as that after governmental entity’s share of a forfeiture distribution made of the DCJ office prosecutor‘s either the or a county obtains one following: by a final judgment default; a. a consent decreektiputation of sett lement/final judgment; b. c. final judgment confirming forfeiture; or d. a consent forfeiture placed on the record at guilty plea, to .- r sentencing or similar dispositional proceeding.  or Return of all, some portion of, claimant‘s seized funds either to a 3. the claimant the claimant’s attorney of record the forfeiture or in litigation if the claimant obtains either:, a final judgment by default; a. b. or a consent decree/stipulation of settlementha1 judgment; a final judgment confirming the claimant’s property right.
[brief] ”  Id. at *25.  [...] properly relied on [...]’s factual findings to conduct this inquiry for each individual Defendant, [...], [...], and [...], under the new limitations period.  Those factual findings included abhorrent acts of theft, fraud, concealment and other criminal misconduct that [...] as a collective “repeated over and over and over and over again” even after the Appellate Division made clear in a 2006 holding that [...] and [...] were partners and that “[...] had a fiduciary duty to [...].
[directive] ATTORNEY GENERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT DIRECTIVE NO. 2019-1 TO: All Law Enforcement  Chief Executives FROM: [...], Attorney General  DATE: August 6, 2019  SUBJECT: Directive  Promoting Law Enforcement Resiliency  The men and women of law enforcement put their lives on the line every day to protect the citizens of New Jersey.  Often the first to respond to a scene, these officers regularly encounter some of the most traumatic events affecting their community.  They also typically operate in a state of hypervigilance while on duty.  The emotional and mental toll of this work can build over time and contribute to a range of health issues, including increased blood pressure, heart disease, diabetes, substance misuse, family and relationship stress, self-harm, and risk of suicide.  We have a special responsibility to ensure that New Jersey’s law enforcement officers are equipped with the tools they need to cope with the unique stressors of their work.  “Resiliency” is defined as the ability to overcome adversity, and the New Jersey Resiliency Program for Law Enforcement (NJRP-LE) is designed to do just that.  This Directive recognizes that protecting an officer’s mental health is just as important as guarding their physical safety, and strives to create a supportive culture for law enforcement officers, their families and friends, as well as the broader New Jersey community.  As a result, this Directive requires all law enforcement agencies to appoint at least one Resiliency Program Officer (RPO), who will be responsible for implementing the NJRP-LE in their agency pursuant to the structure and parameters outlined below.  The RPO will not only train the officers in their agency on the NJRP-LE, but also will be available to all law enforcement officers to answer questions directly related to the training and provide contact information for any other support services and programs.  The RPO is not meant to replace existing support programs and law enforcement officers are encouraged to continue to use these and other programs whenever needed.  New Jersey Is An Equal Opportunity Employer • Printed on Recycled Paper and is Recyclable  Therefore, pursuant to the authority granted to me under the New Jersey Constitution and the Criminal Justice Act of 1970, N.J.S.A. 52:17B-97 to -117, which provides for the general supervision of criminal justice by the Attorney General as chief law enforcement officer of the State in order to secure the benefits of a uniform and efficient enforcement of the criminal law and the administration of criminal justice throughout the State, I hereby direct all law enforcement and prosecuting agencies operating under the authority of the laws of the state of New Jersey to implement and comply with the following directives.
[brief] [...] was aware of the revisions (see below).  Yet [...] never supplied the surveyor with the engineer's revised grading plan.  In January 2008, plaintiff [...] came to realize that [...]'s April 11, 2005 grading plan was inaccurate, with the first floor elevation of the pre-existing [...] building listed as 30" lower than it actually was.  (Pa384 at ¶10).  After finding the error, [...] met with his engineer [...] and with [...], president of [...], to discuss how to proceed.  It was decided to revise the plans.  (Pa385 at ¶11).  On March 14, 2008, as per agreement with [...] and [...], [...] revised its grading plan, correcting the finished floor elevation (FFE) of the existing building from 443.15 to 445.77 ft. (Pa385 at ¶13; Pa127).  On October 7, 2008, [...] sent [...] and [...] a revised site plan with corrected elevations.  (Pa403; Pa386 at ¶18).  On November 3, 2008, [...] sent to Morris Plains Engineer [...], cc to [...] and to [...], a letter with copies of the original grading plan and the revised grading plan.  [...]'s engineer [...] explained in the letter:  “As you are aware based on our discussions, it appears that the main finished floor of the existing building is approximately 3' higher than that which was originally identified in the Boundary and Topographical Survey.  At this time, we have regraded the site maintaining the same site layout....  Please note that we have attempted to highlight the major changes to facilitate your review of the enclosed plans."  (Pa404).  On January 26, 2009, the [...] approves the new grading plan with revised elevations.  (Pa406-412).  This approval occurred almost two years after the Board of Adjustment had approved the original plan.