ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] [...] admitted that he was aware he was receiving hourly charge pay.  (Pa477).  During his meeting with [...] and [...], [...] admitted that he never received direct approval to enter or receive charge pay.  (Pa477).  [...] claimed that entering the unauthorized charge pay was [...]’s idea.  (Pa477).  [...] claimed that he and [...] misinterpreted [...]’s silence on the topic as permission to begin entering the charge pay, stating that the two took [...]’s non-answer to [...]’s initial request as permission.  (Pa477).  [...] admitted that [...] likely entered the charge pay on [...]’s behalf.  (Pa477).  [...] further confirmed that [...] never saw the unauthorized charge pay entries.  (Pa477).  In discussing the unauthorized entry of charge pay with [...], [...] stated she would “never” have approved only three of the five staffing coordinators for charge pay.  (Pa475).  [...] also informed [...] that she would have documented any approval.  (Pa105-06 at 89:6-90:6).  Following [...]’s investigation into the unauthorized entry of charge pay, [...] determined that there was sufficient evidence to conclude that the charge pay taken by Plaintiffs was entered by them without proper authorization.
[brief] See, Erny v. Estate of Merola, 171N.J. 86, 98-99 (2002).  The resulting statute, as a result, logically reflects a policy determination that it would be reasonable to require that any direct defendant sixty percent (60%) at fault or greater pay the full measure of damages, again with the remedy of contribution from other co-defendants.  Id.; See also Lee’s Hawaiian Islanders, Inc. v. Safety First Food Prods., Inc., 195 N.J. Super. 493, 505-06 (App. Div. 1984).  As a logical imperative, then, there is nothing inequitable or offensive about applying the statute allowing full recovery against this culpable, direct defendant.
[brief] The subject negligence and declaratory judgment matter from an automobile accident that occurred on Route 295 north in Hamilton Township, New Jersey.  (Pa26-28).  Plaintiffs’ decedent, [...], was the passenger in a GMC Yukon operated by defendant [...], which left the roadway, struck a concrete overpass, and killed Miles.  (Pa26-28).  Miles’ mother, plaintiff [...], M.D. (“[...]”), was the registered owner of the 2019 GMC Yukon that defendant Brackin was driving at the time of this accident.  (Pa26-28).  The GMC Yukon was insured by [...] under a policy issued to [...], which provided $500,000/$1,000,000 in both liability coverage and UM/UIM coverage.  (Pa29-32).  Plaintiffs also maintained an excess insurance policy with defendant [...] (herein, “[...]”) that provided for $5,000,000 in excess liability coverage and $1,000,000 in excess UM/UIM coverage.  (Pa77-80).  USAA has provided liability coverage up to its $500,000 limits for defendant Brackin as to plaintiffs’ negligence claims against him.  Although it is undisputed that defendant Brackin was an insured under the excess [...] policy, defendant [...] has denied liability coverage for defendant Brackin up to its $5,000,000 limits.  Additionally, while denying defendant Brackin liability coverage, hence leaving him with only $500,000 in coverage in the face of damages that well exceed same, [...] has also denied plaintiffs claim for UIM coverage up to the $1,000,000 policy limits.  Legal Argument
[brief] Plaintiffs apply the wrong standard in their attempt to derail the current Court-approved collection, production, and review process and fail to carry their burden to meet the correct standard.  According to Plaintiffs, the fact that a handful of produced documents purportedly show [...] and [...]’s involvement in issues related to this case is enough to justify sweeping, intrusive discovery of their files.  This claim ignores that [...] has produced hundreds of thousands of documents on the same issues from the files of 81 other custodians who had direct managerial and day-to-day involvement in the specific, long-defunct data-sharing practices at issue in this case.  And Plaintiffs’ demand that [...] search [...]’s and [...]’s files for documents responsive to at least 34 different RFPs (Swanson Decl., Ex. 4) is a far cry from the narrow, gap-filling potential discovery that [...] ordered would be the limit of what might be permissible after [...] had completed its production from other sources.  1.
[brief] The legislature enacted the TOA Rule specifically to prevent situations such as occurred here wherein an Applicant relies upon the Ordinance in effect at the time it files its application with the CRB and proceeds in good faith in order to first obtain an endorsement from the CRB.  Obtaining an endorsement from the CRB is a necessary predicate step that must be complied with before an application can be filed with the Planning Board seeking site plan and conditional use approval for a “micro” cannabis business.  The Trial Court’s decision to overturn the Planning Board unanimous approval of a conditionally permitted use is contrary to the overall purpose, intent, spirit and application of the TOA Rule.
[brief] Plaintiff’s case has merit, but due to complications and defendants’ fraudulent concealment, plaintiff faces challenges in securing legal representation.  The court has the authority to exercise discretion to facilitate Justice.  Plaintiff’s case is meritorious; however, due to the complexities of the incident and the defendants' fraudulent concealment, plaintiff faces difficulties in aligning with prospective attorneys.  The court, as the final arbiter of justice, has the authority to take measures to resolve the dispute effectively.
[directive] a of violation or issuance concerningprior information 5.4 (discussing factual Section and Central Violence Domestic Re~istrv) of query as prepared Report Enforcement Incident Preliminary Law  a in court the to provided be may that the 5.1.1 requiring subsection and acomplaint-warrant) for applying for process the of part charged Whether offense the Cause. is Probable of Affidavits in information certain of inclusion the with accordance in shall, victim the complaint-summons, or complaint-warrant by a for a~ply to how be informed Manual, Procedures Violence Domestic of the requirements inform requirement Act. to This Domestic Violence of Prevention the under order restraining of imposition from seeking prosecutor or officer the preclude to construed be not shall victim the as acomplaint-warrant of on condition release a as restraint appropriate other or no-contact a 6.2.3. or 4.6.11 subsections to pursuant required may be Records. Expunged 4.7 acomplaint-summons presumption issuing of the overcome whether to determining In subsection designated to pursuant supervisory officer or prosecutor a 4.3, Section to pursuant See of circumstances. relevant of totality the part as records expunged consider 3.3.2 may any to provided shall or convictions be prior of arrests . . . records ("expunged 2C:52-21 N.J.S.A. services the Court, pretrial Superior of Division the Probation the prosecutor, county court, bail a with conjunction in use for requested are same when General Attorney the or agency, 31 c. of 2014, 11 through P.L. 1 sections to pursuant determination release pretrial [or] hearing, Law]").
[brief] Pursuant to the Stormwater Management Rules, an Applicant must maintain the same amount of groundwater recharge for the site pre-development and post-development.  N.J.A.C. 7:8-5.4(b).  By maintaining the same amount of groundwater recharge pre- and post-development, the goal is to prevent an increase in the amount of stormwater runoff and therefore local flooding impacts offsite.  N.J.A.C. 7:8-5.1.
[brief] R. 2:10-2.  At trial, the State’s veterinarian and [...]’s family veterinarian both testified that the dog was healthy, save for a patch of hair loss.  (2T 86-8 to 87-1; 3T 38-24 to 39-1; 40-11 to 13)  The State’s veterinarian, who examined the dog the day after the incident, explained that the dog showed no signs of bruising, no signs of trauma, no fractures, and had normal bloodwork.  (2T 86-8 to 87-1)  Had the jury been informed that to act “cruelly” involves the infliction of pain and suffering, prolonged torment or vexation, and so on, the lack of injuries or signs of trauma testified to by the veterinarians could have led the jurors to a different conclusion.  Worse, the State told the jury in summation that it did not have to find any injury to the dog to convict [...] of animal cruelty.  (3T 65-15 to 22)  While a discernible injury is not an explicit statutory element of the charged offense, N.J.S.A. 4:22-17(c)(1), the State’s remarks undermined the requirement that a finding of “cruelty,” for the reasons already explained, requires finding something more than that an act of punching, kicking, or dragging took place.  The court’s failure to define the central elements of the offense with which [...] was charged denied him a fair trial.  See Jordan, 147 N.J. at 422-23 (“Some jury instructions . . . are so crucial to the jury’s deliberations on the guilt of a criminal defendant that errors in those instructions are presumed to be reversible.  . . .  [T]he court must always charge on the elements of the crime. ”).  His convictions must be reversed and the matter remanded for a new trial.
[brief] It is insufficient to argue that Plaintiff was qualified for the position of Vice Principal and previously received “Effective” Observations scores.  There is no policy that requires renewal of non-tenured staff simply because she received an “Effective” rating.  (Da406 ¶12).  Observations are only part of the evaluation of an employee’s overall job performance and are not the only factor in deciding whether someone is performing to expectations (Id. ¶13).  In fact, the record shows that Plaintiff failed to perform at her prior positions with other employers, as well, resulting in discipline and termination of her prior employment.  (Pl. Tr. 52:10 to 54:27; 56:17 to 57:18; 118:23-24).
[brief] #### CASES - **State v. Jackmon**, 305 N.J. Super 274 (App. Div. 1997) ...........................................60 - **State v. Jackson**, 43 N.J. 148 (1964) .............................................................................. 30, 32 - **State v. Jones**, 364 N.J. Super. 376 (App. Div. 2003) .................................................. 54, 60 - **State v. Jordan**, 147 N.J. 409 (1997) .................................................................................49 - **State v. Kociolek**, 23 N.J. 400 (1957) ............................................................................. 35, 48 - **State v. Lazo**, 209 N.J. 9 (2012) ....................................................................................... 61, 62, 63 - **State v. Mann**, 132 N.J. 410 (1993) .................................................................................. 43, 44, 57 - **State v. McLean**, 205 N.J. 438 (2011) .............................................................................. 61, 63 - **State v. Medina**, 147 N.J. 43 (1996) .................................................................................. 53 - **State v. Miller**, 67 N.J. 229 (1975) ...................................................................................... 30 - **State v. Montgomery**, 183 P.3d 267 (Wa. 2008) ..............................................................  55 - **State v. Muhammad**, 182 N.J. 551 (2005) ....................................................................... 56, 60 - **State v. O’Neal**, 190 N.J. 601 (2007) ...............................................................................  18, 21 - **State v. O’Neill**, 193 N.J. 148 (2007) ............................................................................... 16, 22, 24 - **State v. Orecchio**, 16 N.J. 125 (1954) .............................................................................. 64 - **State v. P.Z.**, 152 N.J. 86 (1997) .......................................................................................  17 - **State v. Pearson**, 318 N.J. Super. 123 (App. Div. 1999) .................................................. 17 - **State v. Phillips**, 166 N.J. Super. 153 (App. Div. 1979) .................................................. 43 - **State v. R.D.**, 169 N.J. 551 (2001) .................................................................................... 29, 30, 33  ### TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (cont'd)
[brief] ”  (Pa80; T 7.)  As to the WARD Memo in particular, it is undisputed that the Governing Body hearing is not a factual or quasi-judicial proceeding, and so the memo was not received as evidence in the record.  To the extent the Governing Body’s consideration of the WARD Memo is relevant (and Appellants have not shown that it is), it can be gleaned from the transcript of the Governing Body hearing, which is a Joint Exhibit.  Further, merely arguing that the Governing Body should have considered a document does not make it part of the record.  There are countless documents that are not considered by municipal bodies when approving a redevelopment plan, and the record cannot logically include all such documents.  Rather, when acting legislatively in approving a redevelopment plan, the Governing Body is presumed to act based on “adequate factual support,” which may “be overcome only by proofs that preclude the possibility that there could have been any set of facts known to the legislative body … [that] would rationally support a conclusion that the enactment is in the public interest.
[brief] Especially given that [...] testified he “just sat there and just kept calm. ” (Pa188 at 119:7-18).  Far from criminal harassment, the record reflects only that [...] was difficult to work with on a day to day basis, that she was occasionally mean to her employees, and that they did not like her sometimes.  (See, e.g., Pa446) ([...] ⁴  Under N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4, criminal harassment requires “intent to harass. ”  State v. Duncan, 376 N.J. Super. 253, 261 (App. Div. 2005) (“A finding that defendant acted with a purpose or intent to harass another is integral to a determination of harassment. ”).  “The mere exposure to profanity, though irritating to many people, is not necessarily indicative of an intention to harass. ”  Id. at 263.  Similarly, “mere venting of frustration or irritation at the situation is insufficient by itself to constitute harassment under the statute. ”  Id. at 264. texting a coworker “I’m over [...] and her bullshit. ”); Pa237-38 at 49:1-55:25; Pa242 at 72:13-17; Pa243 at 74:5-24 (noting [...]’s bickering with other staffing coordinators); Pa175 at 67:13-68:6 ([...] stating [...] would “freak out on everybody”); Pa240 at 64:10-18 (staffing coordinators upset at the way [...] “treated people”); Pa285 at 30:23-31:5 ([...] stating [...] was not a “team player”); Pa286 at 35:1-7 ([...] treated the staffer coordinators like children); Pa184 at 101:22-102:6 ([...] was belittling and degrading toward staffing coordinators)).  As noted above, New Jersey case law has clearly established that these sort of petty workplace grievances are not covered under CEPA.
[brief] For the foregoing reasons, the Orders dated August 8, 2023 and December 19, 2023 should be reversed.  Respectfully submitted, ______________________________________  [...]  ATTORNEY ID NO. [...]  Dated: May 6, 2024 SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION  Appellate Docket No. [...] IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION OF THE [...], a Municipal Corporation of the State of New Jersey, Plaintiff/Petitioner Appellant Submission Date: March 28, 2024
[brief] Additionally, both the trial court and Plaintiffs failed to acknowledge the double-review process performed by both [...], Esq., as well as [...]’s insurance carrier.  (Pa000478-79).  This double-review process ensured that the services performed by [...]’s counsel were fair and reasonable, as opposed to excessive or redundant, and it should have been considered in the calculation of [...]’s fee award.  [...]’s fee application disclosed that certain invoices were reduced by the carrier, and it only sought to recover fees from Plaintiffs that were actually paid by the carrier as opposed to the recovery of fees billed.  At the very least, [...] is entitled to a more thorough analysis of why its fee award was reduced to only $30,000.  See Grow Co., Inc. v. Chokshi, 424 N.J. Super. 357, 365 (App. Div. 2012); Hansen v. Rite Aid Corp., 253 N.J. 191, 221 (2023).  Absent a proper consideration of all factors listed under R.P.C. 1.5(a), as well as a proper explanation of what would constitute a reasonable number of hours expended on this litigation, the trial court’s $30,000 award remains arbitrary, and it must be reconsidered or remanded for further analysis.
[brief] [Da29 - Da30].  On September 27, 2023, this Appellate Court affirmed the trial court’s November 17, 2022 dismissal order, concluding that there was no legal error or abuse of discretion in the assignment judge’s dismissal of Plaintiff’s Notice of Motion as frivolous.  [Da35].  This Appellate Court observed that, pursuant to Rule 1:4-8(c), where traditional sanctions have failed to deter a litigant from his pattern of bringing repetitive, meritless, and harassing actions, an assignment judge may enjoin a litigant from bringing further actions.  [Da34].  Having affirmed under 1:4-8(c), this Appellate Court declined to address the Assignment Judge’s application of Rules 4:6-4 and 4:5-2.  [Da35].
[directive] 9  Internal Affairs Records 9.0.1  Every law enforcement agency shall maintain a system for documenting the work of its internal affairs function and preserving records of this work.  9.1  The Internal Affairs Report 9.1.1  At the conclusion of the internal affairs investigation, the investigator shall submit two separate and distinct reports as follows:  (a)  Investigative Report.  This report will be an objective recounting of all the relevant information the investigation disclosed, including statements, documents and other evidence.  Such report shall be similar in all respects to a standard law enforcement investigative report, and should contain a complete account of the investigation.  (b)  Summary and Conclusions Report.  This report shall summarize the case and provide conclusions of fact for each allegation.  The report should be organized as follows:  (1)  A Summary of the Allegations against the officer, including a recitation of the alleged facts; (2)  A Summary of Factual Findings in which the investigator outlines the facts proven or supported by the evidence reviewed during the investigation, and applies those facts to each allegation.  This shall include a conclusive finding on whether each allegation is to be recorded as exonerated, sustained, not sustained or unfounded.  For sustained findings that qualify for disclosure under Section 9.11.2, the summary of factual findings, along with the discipline imposed, should be the basis for the brief synopsis required under Section 9.11.2; (3)  A Discipline Imposed section in which the final discipline imposed on the officer will be recorded.  This section should be completed once the discipline imposed becomes final.  See Section 9.11.2 for guidance on when the officer’s discipline is final.  Examples of completed Summary and Conclusions Reports are included in Appendix O. 9.1.2  If the conduct of an officer was found to be improper, the Summary and Conclusions Report must cite the agency rule, regulation, or SOP violated.  Any aggravating or mitigating circumstances surrounding the situation, such as unclear or poorly drafted agency policy, inadequate training or lack of proper supervision, shall also be noted in the Summary and Conclusions Report.  9.1.3  If the investigation reveals evidence of misconduct not based on the original complaint, this too must be reported and memorialized in both the Investigative Report and the Summary and Conclusions Report.  An investigation concerning this secondary misconduct shall be conducted.  INTERNAL AFFAIRS POLICY & PROCEDURES | November 2022 54
[brief] Accordingly, a landlord cannot disregard a code violation which poses a serious and potentially fatal risk.  See Reyes, 404 N.J. Super. at 458 (“an owner of property is directly responsible for compliance with the building codes . . . and a violation of code may be evidential if not conclusive of the lessors' potential breach of a duty. ”).  Where there is such a serious code violation, the landlord of the property must be required to ameliorate this condition prior to assigning control of the property to the tenant.  Allowing an opposite policy to prevail would unreasonably imperil those entering and coming into contact with the property and would encourage landlords to either remain obtuse to discoverable defects or disregard the need to repair such defects prior to transferring control of the property.  As the general principles of fairness espoused in upholding the protections of a triple net lease are absent from this case, [...], as the landlord of the Property, should be found to have owed a duty of care to inspect the Property and ameliorate the defective electrical panel box prior to assigning the Property to [...].  [...]2’s failure to do so is a breach of this duty.  That [...] knew or should have known about the defective fuse box does not change the determination that [...] owed a duty of care, nor is it sufficient to offset the duty of care owed by [...] in this matter.  See Sanna v. Nat'l Sponge Co., 209 N.J. Super. 60, 67 (App. Div. 1986) (“The possibility that another person may also have been negligent does not relieve the landowner of his legal duty. ”).  While the knowledge of a tenant is determinative in a §358 Restatement (Second) of Torts analysis, this is not the applicable analytical framework for this matter.  Accordingly, the trial court’s reliance on the knowledge of [...] to offset liability against [...] is an erroneous determination, and [...] must be found to have owed and subsequently breached its duty of care in this matter.  CONCLUSION
[brief] The principles of Grand Jury apply “[r]egardless of the setting—whether administrative, criminal or civil, either as part of an investigation, during grand jury proceedings, or before, during and after trial,” and are clear: “a lawyer may represent a client but accept payment, directly or indirectly, from a third party provided each of the six conditions is satisfied. ”  Grand Jury, 200 N.J. at 485, 495 (emphasis added); see Maxlite, Inc. v. ATG Electronics, Inc., No. 23-1719, 2024 WL 1526749, at *4 (3d Cir. Apr.  9, 2024) (Pra078) (noting that a valid third-party arrangement must meet all six conjunctive conditions, “not only some of them,” and holding a violation of any of Grand Jury’s conditions precludes the third-party payer arrangement).  Grand Jury’s conditions are intended to curb the fertile ground for improper conflicts of interest.  Plaintiffs are entitled to a fair trial, not a trial where some defendants have the capacity to use economic coercion to control co-defendants’ litigation strategy to their own benefit and the detriment of their co-defendants.  See State v. Alexander, 403 N.J. Super. 250, 255-56 (App. Div. 2008) and In Re Garber, 95 N.J. 597, 608 (1984) (disqualifying counsel because he “created the opportunity, whether or not --- 7  The [...]  Defendants surprisingly do not address Grand Jury at all in their briefs – a case that clearly forecloses those defendants’ payment arrangement. actually exploited, of influencing” one client’s testimony in a manner favorable to another client).  Because defendants breached Grand Jury’s clear prerequisites to a valid third-party payer relationship, respective counsel cannot continue jointly representing the [...] and [...] in the present manner.