ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] THE ERRORS ALLEGED BY DEFENDANT DID NOT INDIVIDUALLY OR CUMULATIVELY DEPRIVE HIM OF A FAIR TRIAL.  Defendant argues that the cumulative effect of the above alleged errors deprived him of a fair trial.  (Db60).  It is true that "[e]ven if an individual error does not require reversal, the cumulative effect of a series of errors can cast doubt on a verdict and call for a new trial."  Sanchez-Medina, 231 N.J. at 469.  "However, this principle does not apply 'where no error was prejudicial and the trial was fair.'"  Cotto, 471 N.J. Super. at 547 (quoting State v. T.J.M., 220 N.J. 220, 238 (2015)).  As previously discussed, no error was prejudicial and the trial was fair, so this court should affirm defendant's convictions.
[brief] (7T125-11 to 16).  According to [...], [...] was ranting “[a]bout people that were trying to hit him with radiation, and trying to ‘fuck with him,’ mess with him, following him, recording him. ” (7T125-17 to 24).  At some point, the couple came across another car on the road that was driving with its high beams on.  (7T126-12 to 127-1).  [...] started screaming at [...] that this is “what I was talking about . . . this is what I mean, this is what’s going on. ” (7T126-24 to 127-1).  The car noticed by [...] was being driven by [...].  (3T77-24 to 79-24).  Also in the car were [...]’s boyfriend, [...], in the front passenger seat, and their baby daughter in the back.  (3T77-24 to 80-19).  [...] had borrowed the car from her mother, but the headlamps did not work, so they were using the high beams to compensate since it was late at night.  (3T77-24 to 79-24).  After [...] saw the car with the high beams, he pulled over to let the car pass, then began tailgating [...]’s car closely, flashing his car’s high beams at them and occasionally hitting the car with his bumper.
[brief] STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS ......................................................................................7  I.  The May Marriage And Divorce ..........................................................................................7  II.  Hearings And Orders In This Case .....................................................................................9  III.  Disputed Assets ..................................................................................................................10  IV.  The Trial Court’s Prejudice Against Mother’s Counsel ....................................................14  Summary ...............................................................................................................................16  QUESTION BEFORE THE COURT ..........................................................................................17  ARGUMENT ..................................................................................................................................17
[brief] 4, 6, 9, 11, 12, 14, 15  Wolf v. Edison Props., No. [...], 2019 WL 2396994 (N.J. Super. L, Middlesex Cnty. Jan. 28, 2019)  ..............................................  7  Yancoskie v. Del. River Port Auth., 78 N.J. 321 (1978)  ..................................................................................  9  Statutes and Rules N.J. Ct. R. 1:36-3 ...........................................................................................................  2 N.J. Ct. R. 4:42-2 ...........................................................................................................  1, 2, 7  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
[brief] Like the plaintiffs in *Bayron-Paz* and *Lojewski*, [...] signed in the presence of the defendant’s representative but failed to ask what he was signing or about the effect of his signature.  Finally, like those other plaintiffs, [...] introduced no evidence that [...] misrepresented any aspect of the transaction to him.  [...] tries to distinguish *Blocker*, *Bayron-Paz*, and *Lojewski* by arguing that he, unlike the plaintiffs in those cases, had no reason to know or suspect that his relationship with [...] would be governed by contract (or, as expressed in *Lojewski*, by "some terms and conditions," 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 147246, at *23).
[brief] ” (Da189-190).  Based on these facts, the [...] requested that the [...] impose a special service charge of $5,550.00, calculated based on thirty hours of the time of [...] at his rate of $185 per hour to review all of the text messages for privilege and confidentiality.  (Da12; Da 189-190).  Although [...] and the [...] were arguing over whether the [...] was entitled to a special service charge and the amount, no one at this point was representing the interests of [...].  It was undisputed that potentially responsive text messages were located on [...]’s personal cell phone.  It was also undisputed that the text messages were not within the physical possession of the [...].  The [...] was not seeking any special service charge for the time of [...], who would be required take time away from his employment to upload and review the text messages for responsiveness, privilege, and confidentiality.  Thus, when the [...] issued its January 26, 2021 Interim Order, it did not address the issue of whether a special service charge should be assessed against the Plaintiff for his time in reviewing and retrieving records and at what rate.
[brief] 6T118:22-119:2.  [...] was never advised about her options for proceeding with and finalizing the divorce.  6T119:21.  According to [...], [...]’s conduct was a clear deviation from the standard of care.  6T121:10-16.  [...] further testified that [...]’s failure to communicate with [...] led to a deviation in [...]’s requirement to exercise independent judgment and render candid advice as required by RPC 2.1.
[brief] Mitigating factor three, whether defendant acted under a strong provocation, did not apply because defendant “had the ability to sit down, contemplate, call people, [and] get them to come to his house to help engage in the conduct .  . . .” (15T33-2 to 5).  As for mitigating factor seven, whether defendant had “no history of prior delinquency or criminal activity or has led a law-abiding life for a substantial period of time” prior to the offense, the judge again referenced defendant’s municipal court history.  (15T33-9 to 21).  He also rejected mitigating factor nine because defendant exploited the [...]’ trust to influence [...] to fight [...], failing to “demonstrate that he’s unlikely to commit another offense. ” (15T33-23 to 13).  On mitigating factor ten, the judge found that defendant “still engaged in this offense” despite prior probation.  (15T34-14 to 23).  Finally, regarding mitigating factor twelve, the judge observed that defendant cooperated with police solely “to exonerate his involvement” in [...]’s death and “to make himself out to be the hero. ” (15T23-8 to 24-20; 34-25 to 35-1).
[brief] I.  THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO REOPEN UNDER R.4:50-1(f).  In their motion to reopen and at oral argument, Defendants identified two “exceptional situations” warranting relief from the court’s order of dismissal.  See T20:10–12 (arguing that “we have demonstrated that there are two exceptional circumstances warranting reopening of the judgment. ”) (emphasis added).  First, Defendants argued that failure to reopen the judgment in light of Plaintiff’s voluntary dismissal would create a perverse incentive for SLAPP litigants to file speech-suppressive lawsuits, only to dismiss them before the court could rule on a pending order to show cause under UPEPA and only after subjecting defendants to the costs, burdens, and stress of litigation.  See T39:18–40:2 (arguing that failure to reopen judgment “would provide a roadmap for future litigants on how to circumvent the statute’s provisions”); see also Jacobson v. Clack, 309 A.3d 571, 581 (D.C. 2024) (noting that “[i]f [plaintiff] were correct that a voluntary dismissal nullifies any right to attorneys’ fees, then plaintiffs could inflict the harm the Anti-SLAPP Act was meant to combat—siphoning defendants’ money, time, and resources—without recompense. ”).  Such a result, Defendants warned, would “render UPEPA a dead letter. ”  T8:3–4.  Defendants also argued that a second exceptional circumstance warranting relief was the profound inequity that would result if Defendants were to be rendered without a remedy “[on] account of [Plaintiff]’s gamesmanship” and “despite attorney’s fees being statutorily authorized. ”  Id. at 39:18–20.  Attorneys’ fees, Defendants noted, were particularly necessary in this case to dissuade Plaintiff from continuing to use the justice system to settle his own personal vendettas.  See id. at 10:24–11:25 (arguing that failure to reopen judgment to allow Defendants to seek attorneys’ fees would mean that Plaintiff “in the future could threaten or again file the exact same claims against our clients in the future. ”).  In denying Defendants’ motion, however, the trial court did not mention or consider Defendants’ first proffered “exceptional situation”: that allowing Plaintiff to voluntarily dismiss the case despite a pending proposed order to show cause would “profoundly subvert the purpose of the New Jersey anti-SLAPP statute[,] which was to nip in the b[u]d lawsuits like [Plaintiff’s], . . . to disincentivize . . . them in the first place.
[brief] Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959) .......................................................................44  People v. Santamaria ....................................................................................................58, 59 Riley v. Payne, 352 F.3d 1313, 1324 (9th Cir. 2003)  ......................................................53  Royce v. Hahn, 151 F.3d 116, 118 (3rd Cir. 1989)  .........................................................1  Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 362 (1966)  ...........................................................58  State v. Afanador, 151 N.J. 41, 56, 697 A.2d 529, 576 (1997)  ........................................36  State v. Allen, 308 N.J. Super. 421 (App. Div. 1998)  .....................................................64  State v. Bankston 63 N.J. 263, 268-69, 271-73, 307 A.2d 65 (1973)  ..............................40  State v. Burgess, 154 N.J. 181, 186, 712 A.2d 631, 633 (1998); .......................................36  State v. Catlow, 206 N.J. Super, 186, 194-95, 502 A. 2d 48 (App. Div. 1985) ................28  State v. Chandler, 98 N.J. Super. 241, 236 A.2d 632 (1970) ..........................................45 State v. Chew, 179 N.J. 186, 217 (2004) .....................................................................62
[brief] A court can consider “extrinsic evidence, including legislative history, committee reports, and contemporaneous construction” only after deciding that the statutory words are ambiguous or that the plain reading of the statute leads to an absurd result by frustrating the statute’s purpose.  *Courtney*, 243 N.J. at 86; and see *Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Services, Inc.*, 545 U.S. 546, 568-69 (2005) (addressing the limitations on the use of legislative history).  Here, the statute is 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(b), which states:
[brief] IV  EVEN IF ANY ONE OF THE COMPLAINED-OF ERRORS WOULD BE INSUFFICIENT TO WARRANT REVERSAL, THE CUMULATIVE EFFECT OF THOSE ERRORS WAS TO DENY DEFENDANT DUE PROCESS AND A FAIR TRIAL.  (Not Raised Below)  .................................................................  45  POINT V  THE SENTENCE OF 45 YEARS IS EXCESSIVE FOR DEFENDANT, WHO WAS 50 YEARS OLD AT THE TIME OF SENTENCING AND WAS A FIRST-TIME OFFENDER.  (9T 34-17 to 40-18)  .................................................. 47  CONCLUSION ...........................................................................................................  50  JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS BEING APPEALED  Final Jury Charge .................................................................  8T 65-15 to 106-10  Sentencing Decision ..............................................................  9T 34-17 to 40-18  Judgment of Conviction ..........................................................  Da 6-9  INDEX TO APPENDIX
[brief] In [...]’s response to Plaintiff’s interrogatories, [...] stated “Plaintiff constantly asked [...], LLC for more money than he was entitled to.  After his role with [...], LLC was terminated in December of 2017, Plaintiff asked for payment for alleged services from [...], LLC, and agreed to a final payment of $10,000.00.  As a result, [...], LLC paid Plaintiff via check #0035895 the amount of $10,000.00 on January 26, 2018, which he received without objection on February 8, 2018.  Defendants understood that this final payment was satisfactory to Plaintiff and no further amounts were owed.
[brief] DEFENSE WAS NOT WAIVED.  (24T52:7-10)¹  The statute of limitations was asserted as an affirmative defense in defendants’ answer and counterclaim, Da642, and also explicitly referenced in defendants’ summary judgment motion.  Dra 3-4.²  Although plaintiffs contend the statute of limitations defense was waived, they have presented no evidence that defendants did so “clearly, unequivocally and decisively,” as is required to deprive defendants of this defense.  Moreover, the ¹ In their opposition brief, plaintiffs employ different references to the transcripts than those used by defendants in their initial brief.  Defendants will continue to use the following references:  | | | | |---|---|---| | 1T = 12/20/21 | 10T = 2/15/22 | 19T = 3/08/22 | | 2T = 1/18/22 | 11T = 2/16/22 | 20T = 3/09/22 | | 3T = 1/20/22 | 12T = 2/17/22 | 21T = 3/10/22 | | 4T = 1/25/22 | 13T = 2/22/22 | 22T = 3/16/22 | | 5T = 1/26/22 | 14T = 2/23/22 | 23T = 3/17/22 | | 6T = 1/27/22 | 15T = 2/24/22 | 24T = 6/30/22 | | 7T = 2/08/22 | 16T = 3/01/22 | 25T = 9/09/22 | | 8T = 2/09/22 | 17T = 3/02/22 | | | 9T = 2/10/22 | 18T = 3/3/22 | | Db and Da refer to defendants’ initial brief and appendix.
[brief] A defendant's behavior in prison since the time of the offense would shed light on those questions.  Ibid.  Other factors, like the circumstances of the homicide offense, would likely remain unchanged.  Ibid.  A juvenile who played a central role in a heinous homicide and then had a history of problematic behavior in prison, and was found to be incorrigible at the time of the later hearing, would be an unlikely candidate for relief.  Id. at 370-71.  On the other hand, a juvenile who originally acted in response to peer pressure and did not carry out a significant role in the homicide, and who presented proof at the hearing about how he had been rehabilitated and was now fit to reenter society after two decades, could be an appropriate candidate for a lesser sentence and a reduced parole bar.
[directive] 5.3  An officer shall not direct an electrical charge or current against a person who is restrained by handcuffs unless: (a) Deadly force would be authorized under the Use of Force Policy; and (b) the use of physical or mechanical force is not feasible or would be ineffective.  5.4  Consistent with training, officers may point a CED at a person only when circumstances create a reasonable belief that it may be necessary for the officer to use enhanced mechanical force.  When the officer no longer reasonably believes that enhanced mechanical force may be necessary, the officer shall, as soon as practicable, secure or holster the CED.  5.5
[brief] *Marmo*, 478 N.J. Super. at 602.  And once the plaintiff in that case had received the substantial benefit of discovery that would not have been afforded to it in arbitration, turn to arbitration to obtain a desired result.  *Id.*  This is evidenced in that, despite having already engaged in arbitration with respect to the lien, at the time of service of its counterclaim and third-party complaint, plaintiff served defendant with 100 written discovery demands.  *Id.*  And not only were those demands served, but defendant provided substantial responses, including “over 800 pages of documents and several gigabytes of e-discovery that required the use of an outside vendor to complete. ”
[brief] Furthermore, hearings before the CRB are required to be on notice to the public with notice of the application and hearing to be served upon all property owners as shown on the current tax duplicates located within 200’ in all directions of the proposed location.  Furthermore, the notice is required to comply with the notice procedures of the MLUL pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40:55D-12b and notice is required to be provided at least 10 days prior to the date of the hearing.  (M-Da357-358).  In accordance with Section 36-4D, the CRB has 45 days from the conclusion of the hearing to issue either an endorsement or a report to the contrary to the land use board exercising jurisdiction over the application.  (M-Da358).  At the April 22, 2022 CRB meeting, the CRB conducted a public hearing in regard to [...]’ application under Docket No. [...].  At the conclusion of the public hearing, the CRB issued its endorsement approving [...]’ development application.  (Da423, 424).  A Resolution of support was memorialized by the CRB on July 6, 2022, specifically finding that [...] will have a positive impact on the City’s community.  The Board also determined that the application was consistent with the intent of the City’s Cannabis Ordinances.
[brief] (29T 165-16 to 168-10).  At trial, [...] testified that before the events of the murder, Defendant had been utilizing [...]’s “trap phone” – the phone corresponding to a phone-number ending in 1702 – to sell drugs to [...]’s customers for him.  (29T 173-1 to 174-1).  The victim, [...], was [...]’s supplier and would regularly sell him drugs for cash or on credit.  (29T 171-1 to 172-1).  By the time of the murder, [...] owed [...] $18,000 for drugs he had provided a couple of weeks prior.
[brief] The Appellant filed opposition to the Motion together with a Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment seeking an order striking Respondent’s answer, defenses and counterclaim, entering default and returning this matter to the Office of Foreclosure on January 12, 2024 (“Cross-Motion”).  (Pa210-436).  On January 29, 2024, Respondent filed its Response to Appellant’s Statement of Material Facts and related pleadings filed in connection with the Cross-Motion.  (Pa437-41).  (Collectively, the Motion and Cross-Motion shall be referred to as the “Motions”).  The parties presented oral argument in connection with the Motions before the Honorable Judge [...], J.S.C. on March 1, 2024.
[brief] The Fire Officers negotiations unit of Fire Captains, Battalion Chiefs and Deputy Chiefs comprise about 5% of the employees employed by the City.  In addition to fire suppression duties, the Fire Department provides full-time EMS operations.  Fire Captains serve as company officers on each fire apparatus and Battalion Chiefs are assigned as Incident Commanders at the scene of a fire.  In addition, Captains supervise EMS operations.  (Aa067).
[brief] Appellants’ responses—that the State lacks a settled right to relief, that the Revised Policy is necessary to protect parents’ constitutional rights, and that some claims are moot—fall short.  A.  The Trial Court Correctly Found That Both Policies Likely Violate The LAD.  The State established that the Original and Revised Policies likely violate the LAD because they mandate disparate treatment of, and will have a disparate impact on, LGBTQ+ students.  (Da404-06; Da409).  The trial court thus did not abuse its discretion in preliminarily enjoining enforcement of these two policies while [...]’s administrative action remains pending.
[directive] N.J.S.A. to pursuant required been have would as fingerprinted been arrested will defendant not have the Because 5.  note  See :1-18.1.  53 S.A. N.J. and :1-15 53 system, Scan the of Live means fingerprinted by been have not will therefore and offense this for the inform to risk-assessment process pretrial automated the run to possible be not may it acomplaint-warrant. for apply or acomplaint-summons issue whether to decision a for apply to or prosecutor issue a by made is determination the where case any In other the shall apply prosecutor instead the indictment, or arrest before complaint the of upon the on results not depend 4 do that Section in forth set provisions/presumptions feasible shall when prosecutor the addition, In 8.
[brief] Later at the Absecon police station, [...] alleges that the police again denied him counsel and access to his anxiety medication.  (Pa14-Pa16).  He alleges he attempted to commit suicide in his holding cell.  Ibid.  Absecon police found him in the process, rescued him and transported him to the hospital.  Ibid.  At the hospital, [...] alleges he was treated with various psychiatric medications and improperly questioned by local police while under the influence of these medications.  (Pa16-Pa19).  He also alleges that Absecon police refused to let hospital personnel contact his father, [...], who is also his attorney.  --- 4  “Pa” refers to [...]’s Appendix; “Pb” refers to [...]’s Brief; “Da” refers to the Absecon Defendants’ Appendix; and “SDa” refers to the Appendix submitted by State Defendants with this response brief.
[brief] A copy of this unpublished opinion is included in Cross-Appellant [...]’s appendix at Oda14.  it, by opting to terminate the PSA early and get its deposit back, while still claiming that it maintained the right to sue for both specific performance – without a deposit in place that the contract it claims it wants to enforce requires – and damages, despite expressly waiving all claims to damages in the PSA.  And it has the temerity to nevertheless argue that [...]’s construction of Section 13.1 somehow enabled [...] to cut Plaintiff out of the deal with total impunity, which Plaintiff asserts would make the PSA illusory.  That is not the case.  Plaintiff had the option to seek specific performance to enforce its deal with [...], but only if Plaintiff kept the Deposit in escrow and waited.  By receiving the return of the Deposit, Plaintiff irrevocably abandoned the transaction under the express terms of the PSA.  The motion court properly held Plaintiff to that business decision and its consequences, to which Plaintiff expressly agreed when it signed the PSA.
[directive] Do you further understand that by pleading guilty your right to appeal the e. you are waiving [No/No]  [Yes/Si] denial of all other pretrial motions except the following:  usted renuncia a l,Entiende, ademas, que al declararse culpable su derecho a apelar la denegacion de todos los demas pedimentos previos al juicio excepto los siguientes:  Do you understand that if you plead guilty:
[brief] Both the long-term role of State monitors in [...] and the extraordinary amounts of advance state aid extended under another statute are linked since such loans can only be provided to districts with State monitors in place.  This raises serious questions about whether the State has used those statutes beyond their reasonable purview as a means of evading the more direct and appropriate response to [...]’s longstanding fiscal problems—a long overdue retooling of SFRA, and perhaps other legislative action, to directly and adequately address [...]’s obvious fiscal problems and the denial of T&E to [...] public school students caused by those fiscal problems.