ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] All affordable units to be produced pursuant to this section shall comply with the Township’s Affordable Housing Ordinance at Chapter 73 of the Township Code, as may be amended and supplemented, and the Uniform Housing Affordability Controls (“UHAC”) (N.J.A.C. 5:80-26.1 et seq.), or any successor regulation.  This includes, but is not limited to, the following requirements for all affordable units:  (1)  Low/Moderate Income Split: A maximum of fifty percent (50%) of the affordable units shall be moderate-income units and a minimum of fifty percent (50%) of the affordable units shall be low-income units.  At least thirteen percent (13%) of all restricted rental units shall be very low-income units, which shall be counted as part of the required number of low-income units within the development.  (2)  Deed Restriction Period:  All affordable units shall be deed restricted for a period of at least thirty (30) years from the date of the initial occupancy of each affordable unit (the “Deed-Restriction Period”).  The affordability controls shall expire only after they are properly released by the Township and/or the Township’s Administrative Agent at the Township’s sole option in accordance with N.J.A.C. 5:80-26.11 for rental units or N.J.A.C. 5:80-26.5 for for-sale units.  (3)  Administrative Agent:  All affordable units shall be administered by a qualified Administrative Agent paid for by the developer.  C.
[brief] (3T:40:18-20).  Plaintiff offered no evidence whatsoever of what a market-rate or reasonable salary for a pharmacist in New Jersey was in those same years.  Said another way, there was no evidence that the salary Defendant received as the pharmacist at [...] was unreasonable.  Plaintiff only worked at [...] a couple times a month in March, April, and May 2016.  (3T28:6-16)  Plaintiff worked full-time in [...] for only the first three months of 2017.  (2T40:1-4).  Plaintiff did not work in [...] in 2018.  (2T41:6-8).  In 2019, Plaintiff worked full-time in [...] only in April and May, leading up to the asset sale to [...].  (2T50:4-7).  Plaintiff took eleven trips to Turkey between June 2016 and December 2018.  (2T53:9-54:5).  Between 2016 and May 2019, Plaintiff also took two trips to Europe.  (2T50:18-21; 54:15-55:12).  Plaintiff had full access to the pharmacy’s [...] business checking account; he could write checks, make deposits or withdrawal, use the debit card, and had full on-line access to the account, which was the only account the pharmacy had.
[brief] It should be noted that the parties were situated differently in the caption of that case.  Accordingly, in this excerpt, “Defendants” refers to the [...] and “Plaintiffs” refers to the [...].  On April 30, 2018, following discovery in the Law Division case, the [...] attempted to amend their prior pleadings to bring claims for statutory liability under the Spill Act to seek monetary damages for the environmental contamination at the Property.  *This represents the first time legal relief was sought for the pollution of the Property.*  [...] denied this request by way of her June 22, 2018 Order, in order to avoid undue delay or prejudice to the pre-existing case.  (63a).  *The substantive issue of determining liability for the Spill Act claims was not addressed at that time.*  The Law Division case was ultimately concluded, but the Spill Act claims were not resolved at that time.
[brief] Pa28.  Pa30.  Pa80.  All of those Troopers provided affidavits that they also did not receive notice of the Ricci Bill’s passage.  Pa89-125.  Furthermore, other Troopers who are not currently ill, but were only seeking to register for the Ricci Act also filed affidavits that they did not receive notice of the Ricci Act and were included in the Petition.
[directive] Ibid.  [State v. Bernhardt, 245 N.J. Super. 210, 219 (App. Div. 1991), certif. den. 123 N.J. 323 (1991)] (quoting [State v.] Corrado, supra, 184 N.J. Super. [561] at 569 [(App. Div. 1970)] (quoting [State v.] Pandoli, supra, 109 N.J. Super. [1] at 4 (App. Div. 1970])).
[directive] 4.  Legal Affairs Division.  (a)  The SDAG shall be the head of the Legal Affairs Division, which is comprised of Deputy Attorneys General of the Division of Criminal Justice.  The Legal Affairs Division has the right of first refusal for all cases initiated or investigated by the AGCCTF, except for those cases originating from a county prosecutor's office or a municipal police department.  Based on legal requirements and implications, the Legal Affairs Division provides oversight and guidance on investigative techniques to be used on Task Force cases.  Cases that are handled by the Legal Affairs Division shall follow established DCJ protocol for the review and approval of criminal cases.  The SDAG shall make the final prosecutorial determination in consultation with the DSP Bureau Chief regarding which cases shall be brought by AGCCTF and the manner in which these cases are presented.
[brief] We made it clear at the meeting when we met with you all that, we all know that [...] is famous for postponing and postponing and postponing, and we made it clear that we weren't, as a council, interested in postponements at this time, just because we wanted to continually move forward and to be able to ensure that it continually moves forward…  (T2, 41:7-17).  In addition, the law provides protections from arbitrary acquisition of properties undergoing remediation.
[brief] (Pb 15)  In support, the State cites the Supreme Court’s warning in *State v. Arthur*, 149 N.J. 1, 10 (1997), that “simply because a defendant’s actions might have some speculative innocent explanation does not mean that they cannot support articulable suspicions if a reasonable person would find the actions are consistent with guilt. ”  (Pb 15)  [...]’ explanation for his visit to New York was not “some speculative innocent explanation. ”  Every aspect of his explanation was verified: - when asked where he was coming from, [...] said he came from New York / the detectives knew for a fact he was telling the truth because the GPS confirmed he was in the Bronx; - when asked for his itinerary, [...] said he went to the Bronx to buy meat patties for his restaurant, [...] / the detectives knew for a fact he was he was telling the truth about owning a restaurant because their investigation confirmed it.
[brief] (Pa000124-125).  24.  Nevertheless, the fees collected from [...] by Defendants for the month of March 2023, were based upon interchange rates and discount fees that exceeded those [...] agreed to pay [...] by $387.15; see Complaint, Exh. F attached thereto, comparing the interchange rates reported by [...] to its ISOs (sub-column “Residual Report Cost To ISO” highlighted in purple), with the interchange rates applied by [...] to Plaintiff [...] (sub-column “Merchant Statement Cost To Merchant” highlighted in purple) and the interchange rate published by [...] in March, 2023 at Exh. G, attached thereto.  (Pa000125).  25.  Upon information and belief, most or all of Defendants’ approximately 200,000 Merchant Customers who opted for “Interchange PLUS” pricing have experienced similar losses on a monthly basis, as a result of the violations of the terms of their agreements with Defendants, and/or as a result of the wrongful, and deceptive conduct described herein, and have experienced cumulative losses, in the form of excessive charges collected by Defendants, in the hundreds of millions of dollars.
[brief] On November 2, 2020, [...] and several friends were playing a dice game in the back of Sanchez’ barbershop.  (8T:52-5 to 25; 9T:8-15 to 12-5).  As they were playing, they were interrupted by the arrival of two masked men.  (9T:8-15 to 12-5; 27-14 to 25).  Upon their arrival, they announced, “You know what time it is,” and ordered that everyone get onto the floor.  One of them held a gun in his hand, as well.  The masked men moved to Sanchez and began trying to take his money.  One of the men in the room, [...], attempted to flee and run out through a side door.  Ibid.  He was stopped by one of the men, who grabbed his arm and said, “where are you going?” (9T:8-15 to 12-5).  The man threw Rodriguez to the floor, and as he fell, he heard a gunshot.  When Rodriguez stood up, the men had left, and Sanchez was lying face-up on the pool table in the room.  Another dice-player did not immediately understand what had transpired, and said to Sanchez, “You can get up now.  They have gone. ”  It was then that Sanchez’ friends realized that the armed intruder had shot Sanchez in the face.  Ibid.  [...] was one of the masked men who entered the barber shop that ¹ The State adopts defendant’s citation conventions. night, and he explained how and why Sanchez died: a chance to pick up a few hundred dollars.
[brief] See Point I, infra. improved real property (the “Real Property”) and the improvements thereon (the “Improvements”).  (Pa90-128 (PSA)).  Per the PSA, Plaintiff was to acquire fee title to the Real Property, by way of a deed directly from the non-party seller (the “Fee Owner”) to Plaintiff.  (Pa3, Complaint ¶ 9).  Title to the Improvements was to be concurrently conveyed by the Fee Owner to [...].  [...] was to serve as Escrow Agent and Title Company.  (Pa3, Complaint ¶ 8).  The PSA also contemplated that, immediately upon Plaintiff taking title to the Real Property, Plaintiff (as landlord) and [...] (as tenant) would enter into a 98-year Ground Lease of the Real Property.  (Pa4, Complaint ¶ 9).  (This type of real estate transaction – involving bifurcation of the leasehold interest and fee interest, with both to be purchased at a simultaneous closing – has become a common place commercial transaction.)  Although the Fee Owner of the Real Property was not a signatory to the PSA, the Fee Owner was a signatory to a separate, related contract with [...], dated August 12, 2021, whereby Fee Owner had contracted to sell the Real Property and its Improvements to [...].
[brief] [...]’s specific actions here indicate a consistent strategy to delay.  See generally, Chavis v. Norwood Terrace Health Ctr., No. A-1442-19, 2021 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 785, at *4-5 (App. Div. May 4, 2021), (affirming waiver where defendant had a “‘defense strategy’ to delay bringing this matter \(^2\)
[brief] This matter arises from a tragic train accident on the Hudson Bergen Light Rail.  [...], infant Plaintiff (and appellant) [...]’s mother, was struck by a light rail train and killed.  Shea’s guardian, Shannon’s beloved sister, [...], brought this case on behalf of the Estate of [...] for the decedent’s conscious pain and suffering pursuant to New Jersey’s Survivorship Statute on behalf of [...] individually for her pecuniary loss, pursuant to the New Jersey Wrongful Death Statute.
[brief] On May 10, 2023, the trial court ordered without oral argument that (1) Defendants’ motion for leave to file a Supplemental Complaint is denied; (2) Defendants’ motion for leave to file a Second Supplemental Complaint is denied; and (3) the parties are to appear for a status conference to address the scheduling of a plenary hearing on the amounts due to the Trust from Defendants for rent and legal fees.  A Statement of Reasons cited authorities:  New Jersey Court Rule 4:9-4 provides that, “[o]n motion by a party the court may, upon reasonable notice and on terms, permit that party to serve a supplemental pleading setting forth transactions or occurrences which took place after the date of the pleading sought to be supplemented."  *R. 4:9-4*.  New Jersey Courts have held that leave to file supplemental pleadings, like amendments, should be freely granted.  See Comment to *R. 4:9-4*, citing *State v. Standard Tank*, 284 N.J. Super. 381, 396 (App. Div.  1995).  The Appellate Division noted that “if a claim does not arise until after a complaint has been filed, leave to amend to add that claim should be granted as of course so long as the moving party has exercised due diligence, and the amendment will not cause the trial to be unduly delayed or complicated. ”  *Id.*  *(66a)*  Here, Defendants’ supplemental pleadings (224a) (335a) set forth transactions and occurrences which took place after the date of their initial counterclaim and therefore leave should have been “freely granted. ”  Furthermore, shortly after the disposal of both Trust properties, Defendants promptly submitted their additional pleadings prior to any case management conferences or discovery involving this litigation.  Therefore, Plaintiff and Co-Defendant would not have been prejudiced.  Defendants’ Motion for Leave to File a Supplemental Complaint established a cause of action for (1) Plaintiff’s breach of fiduciary duty as Trustee involving the sale of the Boonton Property to [...] below fair market value; and (2) Co-Defendant’s wrongful acts which resulted in Trust property being diverted to [...], who was unjustly enriched.
[brief] ”  “[T]he essential nature of a contract of adhesion is that it is presented on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, commonly in a standardized printed form, without opportunity for the ‘adhering’ party to negotiate except perhaps on a few particulars. ”  Muhammad, 189 N.J. at 15 (quoting Rudbart v. North Jersey District. Water Supply Com’n, 127 N.J. 344, 353 (1992).  Plaintiff contends that the one-sided arbitration clause is procedurally unconscionable.  However, case law further establishes that “a contract of adhesion” is just the beginning point of a more intensive fact-sensitive inquiry into whether grounds exist to negate the agreement on the basis of procedural unconscionability.  Before granting Defendant dispositive relief on Plaintiff’s Count III, on procedural unconscionability grounds, the Law Division was obligated to grant limited discovery and then conduct a fact hearing on this issue.  It declined to do so, contending that Appellant’s complaint did not allege facts supporting a claim for procedural unconscionability.  As an initial matter, the Law Division’s observations were incorrect.  Appellant’s entire third count alleges facts sufficient to sustain a claim for procedural unconscionability and, further, additional facts before the Court by way of the motion demonstrated that it was a pre-printed consumer commercial services agreement offered to Appellant on a “take-it-or-leave it basis. ”  The Law Division’s refusal to permit limited discovery or conduct a hearing, and to rule prematurely without allowing limited discovery, was in error.  *Muhammad v. County Bank of Rehoboth Beach, Delaware*, 189 N.J. 1, 12 (2006).  **B.
[brief] DATED: FEBRUARY 28, 2024  TRIAL COURT JUDGE: HON.  [...], J.S.C. [...], Third-Party Plaintiff, vs. ESTATE OF [...], DECEASED, [...], [...], [...], A MINOR, [...], A MINOR AND WARD OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY AND JOHN DOES 1–10, THE UNKNOWN HEIRS OF [...], Third-Party Defendants.  REPLY BRIEF ON BEHALF OF DEFENDANT/RESPONDENT/CROSS-APPELLANT, [...], d/b/a [...]
[brief] The State’s reliance on Allen does not include discussion of the Court’s finding that part of the narration testimony at issue was in fact violative of Watson.  Specifically, the Court found that even though the officer’s testimony was offered for a legitimate purpose – explaining how the surveillance informed his investigation – it was nonetheless inadmissible where it presented the officer’s opinion on a disputed fact.  254 N.J. at 548-49.  It was thus proper for the officer to explain that he looked for muzzle flashes on screen in order to find ballistic evidence, but it was improper for the officer to testify that: the “‘white blip’ on the video indicated ‘the defendant firing the handgun’; that a particular frame depicted the suspect ‘turning towards the officer;’ that another view of the first muzzle flash showed ‘where the suspect has turned and discharged the first round’; and that the video showed ‘where [the suspect] was standing when he fired the round. ’”  Ibid.  The key fact that made this latter testimony improper was that, in each, the officer had opined on a disputed fact: because the officer had no firsthand knowledge of the events on screen, and because the actions of the defendant were in dispute, it was improper for the officer to testify “in support of the State’s position as to sharply disputed facts. ”  Id. at 549 (emphasis added).  A generic example from Watson further illustrates this distinction.
[brief] ”  (63a.)  Similarly, the Application requests “documents evidencing community and/or local support for the Applicant’s business. ”  (59a.)  - The Evaluation Sheet requests information about, “Applicant’s proposal to provide community benefits in the Borough. ” (63a.)  Similarly, the Application requests information about the “Applicant’s community impact plan, and/or whether the Applicant will be offering a community host agreement with the Borough, summarizing” the Applicant’s intent to leave a positive impact on the community, ties to the community, its economic impact plan, and a description of community outreach activities planned.  (58a.)  - The Evaluation Sheet requests information about the applicant’s “demonstrated commitment to diversity in its ownership composition and hiring practices. ” (63a).  Similarly, the Application asks the applicant to “[d]escribe the Applicant’s commitment to diversity at the proposed facility. ”  (56a.)  - The Evaluation Sheet asks about “[p]ublic input regarding Applicant’s proposed cannabis facility in the Borough. ”  (63a.)  Similarly, the Application states that following the Subcommittee’s review, the Applicant “will be invited to attend the next scheduled public meeting of the Borough Council to make a presentation to Borough Council and the public and to respond to questions raised. ”  (48a.)  - The Evaluation Sheet asks about the applicant’s “financial capability to open and operate the cannabis establishment for which the Applicant is seeking a permit. ” (63a.)  Similarly, the Application requests “[p]roof of financial capability to open and operate the cannabis establishment for which the Applicant is seeking a permit, including a detailed description of the proposed financial plan for the development, operation, and maintenance of the facility”  (59a.)  - The Evaluation Sheet states that the applicant will be reviewed based on the “Applicant’s completed Application for a Municipal Cannabis Business License, including all required documents set forth on Page 13 of the Application; Applicant’s interview with the Subcommittee. ” (63a.)  Similarly, the Application states that “[t]he Cannabis Subcommittee’s review will also include an interview with the Applicant. ”  (48a.)  As evidenced by the above comparisons, the Subcommittee and Council’s review of the applications necessarily encompassed a review of the criterion identified on the Evaluation Sheets.  As such, [...] cannot claim that the Borough failed to evaluate the applications based on the Evaluation Sheet criterion.  [...] has not—and cannot—identify any arbitrary or unreasonable consideration that the Subcommittee made when making its recommendation to the Council to award a resolution of support in favor of [...].  As a result, the Council’s decision to issue the Resolution in favor of [...] was not “arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable,” and this Court should affirm the Order.
[brief] (1T54:8-55:7).  That holding cannot stand, for two reasons.  First, Plaintiff did not present any evidence that it needed financing from lenders or that its financing would be jeopardized if an injunction were not granted.  As noted earlier, the court’s finding is “‘so manifestly unsupported by or inconsistent with the competent, relevant and reasonably credible evidence as to offend the interests of justice. ”  See Griepenburg, 220 N.J. at 254 (quoting Rova Farms, 65 N.J. at 484).  Second, the court abused its discretion by failing to consider any harm to [...].  Specifically, the court failed to consider that [...] is: (1) being denied its Constitutional right to redevelopment, (2) losing redevelopment opportunities for the Property, and (3) harmed by being unable to serve the public interest by revitalizing the Property with commercial development to improve residents’ quality of life and spur new job growth and business opportunities.
[brief] In addition, the transactions involved in *Gannon* took place long after entry of final judgment in *Roma Pizzeria*.  To that extent, Defendants’ arguments fall afoul of the basic principle of claim preclusion under New Jersey law, that “the parties in the later action must be identical to or in privity with those in the prior action[, and] the claim in the later action must grow out of the *same transaction or occurrence* as the claim in the earlier one. ”  *Watkins v. Resorts Int'l Hotel & Casino*, 124 N.J. 398, 412 (1991) (emphasis supplied, internal citations omitted).
[brief] [...] WAS DEPRIVED OF A FAIR TRIAL WHEN THE JURY HEARD [...] ACCUSE [...] OF LYING FOURTEEN TIMES, EXPRESS HIS LAY OPINION ON THE VIDEO FOOTAGE, AND AFFIRM THAT [...] HAD BEEN ARRESTED ON UNRELATED CHARGES.  (Not raised below)  Even if the court finds that [...]’s waiver and subsequent statements were knowing and voluntary, reversal is still required because the interrogation video, twice played for the jury, included two types of inadmissible evidence that should have been redacted.  First, the video featured [...]’s extensive commentary on [...]’s veracity and guilt, including at least fourteen accusations of dishonesty, thereby usurping the jury’s role as fact finder.  Second, the video included [...]’s reference to [...]’s unrelated arrest which, without any analysis or limiting instruction from the court, created the impermissible risk that the jury believed [...] had a propensity to commit crimes.  The erroneous admission of these statements was clearly capable of causing an unjust result and requires reversal.  U.S. Const. amends. VI, XIV; N.J. Const. art. I, ¶¶ 1, 10; R. 2:10-2.
[brief] As a result, anything relating to her “service and business interactions” with those school districts is responsive, not just the few select interactions that [...] claims support its decision to terminate her.  That is presumably why the parties agreed early on that the scope of RFP No. 4 was limited to Salesforce records for the [...] and [...] accounts.  [...] has met her burden to establish those documents are relevant to her claims, as they may bear on [...]’s reasons for terminating her employment and could lead to other matter that could bear on whether [...]’s reasons were pretext for age and sex discrimination.
[brief] Contrary to [...]’s argument, which relies on a single instance of testimony from [...], the record is replete with evidence of what [...], [...], and [...] actually thought—that [...] was difficult to work with on a day to day basis, that she was mean to her employees, and that they did not like her.  (See, e.g., Pa446 ([...] texting a coworker “I’m over [...] and her bullshit. ”); Pa237-38 at 49:1-55:25; Pa242 at 72:13-17; Pa243 at 74:5-24 (noting [...]’s bickering with other staffing coordinators); Pa175 at 67:13-68:6 ([...] stating [...] would “freak out on everybody”); Pa240 at 64:10-18 (staffing coordinators upset at the way [...] “treated people”); Pa285 at 30:23-31:5 ([...] stating [...] was not a “team player”); Pa286 at 35:1-7 ([...] treated the staffer coordinators like children); Pa184 at 101:22-102:6 ([...] was belittling and degrading toward staffing coordinators)).  As the trial court found, “Plaintiffs cannot show objectively and reasonably believe that [...]’s yelling and screaming at Mr. [...] on June 24, 2020 was a violation of the harassment statute. ” (See 1T 28:10-13).
[directive] no, proceed to if Step 12: an  Determine the highest current charge is indictable offense or a disorderly persons offense that is domestic violence related and is therefore eligible for pretrial detention.  If yes, the preliminary recommendation from Steps 5, 6, or 8 is the final recommendation.  +  Ifno, No ofRelease any preliminary recommendation PML 3  EM/HD or Release Not Recommended is decreased to Release with PML 3 - Legally Eligible for Detention.  3  Pretrial Release Recommendation  Decision Making Framework (DMF)