ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] In *Morgan*, the Supreme Court rejected the prejudice-focused inquiry as to whether Federal Courts could condition a waiver of the right to arbitrate on a showing of prejudice.  142 S. Ct. at 1712-1713.  The Court reasoned, “the FAA’s policy favoring arbitration does not authorize federal courts to invent special, arbitration-preferring procedural rules . . .  But a court may not devise novel rules to favor arbitration over litigation. ”  *Id.* at 1713.  Thus, the Supreme Court only held that a showing of prejudice is not required and is not a condition of finding that a party waived its right to arbitration.
[brief] [...] TO DEFENDANT-APPELLANT  [...] ’S OPENING  BRIEF  [...], Esq., ID: 019811981  [...]  [...] [...]  [...]  [...], Esq.  (Admitted PHV)  [...], Esq.  (Admitted PHV)  9701 Wilshire Blvd., Suite 950  Beverly Hills, CA 90212  TABLE OF CONTENTS  Page  TABLE OF CONTENTS ...........................................................................................................  i  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .................................................................................................  iv PRELIMINARY STATEMENT .........................................................................................  1  STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY ............................................  4  PROCEDURAL HISTORY ...............................................................................................  11  LEGAL ARGUMENT ........................................................................................................  15  I.  THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED ALLERGAN’S MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND ITS SUBSEQUENT MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
[brief] ”  Lerner, supra, 2019 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS, at * 7 (citing, N.J. Citizen Action, Inc. v.  Cnty. of Bergen, 391 N.J. Super. 596, 605 (App. Div. 2007)).  Here, the trial court properly applied the standards of Rule 4:6-2(e) in dismissing Appellants’ Complaint as each document presented with [...]’s motion was a public record or document referred to, or explicitly relied upon, in the Complaint.  Specifically, in support of its motion to dismiss, [...] submitted the Certification of its counsel.  Twelve (12) exhibits, labeled A through L, were attached to the Certification for the Court’s consideration.  [Pa20-282].  In that regard, Exhibits A, B, D and E are all pleadings filed by Appellants themselves in this action or the Prior Action.  Exhibit A is the Appellants’ Complaint filed in this action, Exhibit B is the Appellants’ Verified Complaint filed in the Prior Action, Exhibit D is the Certification of Appellants’ counsel submitted in support of Appellants’ motion for leave to file the First Amended Complaint in the Prior Action and Exhibit E is the Appellants’ First Amended Complaint filed in the Prior Action.  Exhibits F through K are Orders and accompanying Opinions issued by the trial court in the Prior Action, all of which emanated from motions involving Appellants.  Exhibit C is a single page letter relating to discovery that was identified as having been conducted in the trial court’s Opinion denying Appellants’ motion in the Prior Action for leave to file a Second Amended Complaint.  Finally, Exhibit L is the Lease between [...] and Appellants which forms the basis of the claims asserted in their Complaint in this action.  In short, each of the documents presented to the trial court in support of [...]'s motion to dismiss was a public document, such as pleadings or orders in the Prior Action, or documents that were referred to in the Complaint.
[brief] THE TRIAL JUDGE PROPERLY GRANTED SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON RESPONDENTS’ COUNTERCLAIMS  Respondents asserted three counterclaims: (1) breach of contract; (2) promissory estoppel; and (3) unjust enrichment.  The trial court correctly found that [...] is entitled to summary judgment on its counterclaims because there is no genuine dispute in the record that Appellant misused his corporate credit card by charging personal expenses to it.  The Trial Judge found a “lack of evidentiary basis” in Appellant’s opposition to Respondents’ motion on the counterclaims.
[brief] *First*, [...] disclaimed that it had the ability to control the manner of Appellant’s performance and supervise Appellant’s work; however, the record establishes that [...] supervisors were evaluating Appellant’s performance merely two weeks prior to Appellant’s complaint of sexual harassment.  See (Da7).  Moreover, this point directly supports the proposition that [...] supervisors had some input into what skills Appellant could use when accomplishing her job duties if they were, by Respondents’ own admission, evaluating Appellant’s performance. \(^5\)  While Appellant was not paid by [...], it is clear from the information obtained during discovery that [...] controlled Appellant’s day to day and she was required to work in the [...] offices, even after her retaliatory transfer.  Finally, contrary to [...]’s proposition that the [...] work was not an integral part of their business, Appellant regularly worked in conjunction with [...] employees to provide counseling services and treatment to [...] clients.  (Pa796-98)  42:3-52:12.  Therefore, the facts weigh in favor of Appellant’s proposition that [...] and [...] were joint employers who both maintained a responsibility to facilitate a work environment free from discrimination and harassment.  Regardless, New Jersey courts have repeatedly emphasized that whether two entities are joint employers is inherently a factual question that precludes summary judgment.
[brief] POINT I: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISQUALIFYING [...] FROM ITS REPRESENTATION OF DEFENDANTS  PURSUANT TO RPC 1.7  BECAUSE NO CONCURRENT CONFLICT OF INTEREST EXISTS (Raised Below Da001-002, 1T35:10-38:20)  ..........  8  A.  Disqualification of Counsel  Pursuant to RPC 1.7 (Raised Below Da001-002, 1T35:10-38:20)  ..........................  8  B.  There Is No Direct, Concurrent Conflict of Interest In [...]’s Representation of Both [...] and [...] Within This Litigation (Raised Below Da001-002, 1T35:10-38:20)  ..........  13  CONCLUSION
[brief] The Warrantless Search Of The Surveillance Footage Was Unconstitutional Because The Landlord Did Not Consent to a Search of the Surveillance Cameras.  “It is a ‘basic principle of Fourth Amendment law’ that searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable,” Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586 (1980), and are “subject[] to particularly careful scrutiny. ”  State v. Bolte, 115 N.J. 579, 585 (1989); see also State v. Bogan, 200 N.J. 61, 72 (2009) (“Deterring unreasonable governmental intrusion into a person’s home is one of the chief goals of the Fourth Amendment and Article I, Paragraph 7” of our State Constitution).  The State bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that a warrantless search fits into an exception to the warrant requirement.  State v. Cushing, 226 N.J. 187, 199 (2016).  One exception to the warrant requirement is consent.  Specifically, the State must prove “by clear and positive testimony” that the consent was voluntary, State v. Chapman, 332 N.J. Super. 452, 466 (App. Div. 2000) (quoting King, 44 N.J. at 352), and “that the consenting party understood his or her right to refuse to consent. ”  State v. Maristany, 133 N.J. 299, 305 (1993).  Courts must examine the totality of the circumstances when determining voluntariness.  State v. Hagans, 233 N.J. 30, 40 (2018).  Consent searches “are afforded a higher level of scrutiny” under New Jersey law than federal law.  State v. Carty, 170 N.J. 632, 639 (2002).  Here, the State failed to prove the landlord voluntarily and knowingly consented to the search of the surveillance cameras.
[brief] In this case, [...]’s vague description of pedestrians approaching [...] and the group of men he was with did not establish reasonable suspicion for the stop.  [...]’s testimony also failed to establish reasonable suspicion to subject the men to a protective search for weapons.  In fact, [...] did not testify that the men were frisked because there was reason to believe they were armed.  Rather, [...] testified that the men were frisked because it is common practice for police to frisk anyone they have stopped, at least in a “high crime” area.  Because the State failed to establish that police had a reasonable and articulable basis to stop and frisk [...], the gun and drugs recovered from his person should have been suppressed as the fruits of an illegal search and seizure.
[brief] ”  N.J.S.A. 34:15-8.  As previously stated, [...]’s Complaint alleges that his employer, [...], “knew, or had reason to know, that the . . . bailer was damaged and could not be used safely,” and intentionally used “dangerous equipment in an ultra-hazardous and unsafe manner.”  Ja18 ¶6.  The Complaint further alleges that a reasonable person would “conclude with practical certainty that some employee of Defendant, [...] [sic]would be injured . . . ” by the machine.  Ja18 ¶7.  Thus, [...]’s Complaint alleged a personal injury tort claim against his employer for conduct that has been recognized to be an intentional wrong and thus outside the bar of the Workers Compensation Act.
[brief] As a preliminary matter, in response to certain allegations articulated in Defendant’s Statement of Facts, Plaintiff does not agree and has no way of confirming what [...] or the Assistant Prosecutor “believed” with respect to Defendant’s parole date because Defendant failed to proffer any evidence in support of the statement that “both the sentencing Judge, [...], and the Assistant Prosecutor both believed that the Defendant would be paroled before March 11, 2024. ”  Brf. at p. 2; see also Brf. at p. 4.  Likewise, Plaintiff does not agree and has no way of confirming that “everyone believed” Defendant would be released prior to March 11th.  Brf. at p. 3.  Plaintiff offers the following Counterstatement of Facts to supplement the timeline of the various communications between the parties and the trial court.
[brief] 7a-16a.  Upon receiving the Complaint, [...] went into [...]’s former office to locate her personnel file as she, as part of her job responsibilities, maintained all employees’ employment files.  2T at 8:10-14.  [...] did not find the Operative Agreement.  All he found in [...]’s personnel file was what appeared to be an original document that was cobbled together but containing an arbitration clause (the “Incomplete Agreement”).  Ibid., 25a-34a.  III.  The Incomplete Agreement  Similar to the Operative Agreement, the Incomplete Agreement’s signature page (found on page 9), was signed on March 7, 2019 by both [...] and [...] and witnessed by both [...]’s general counsel [...], Esq. and another [...] employee.  34a.  Upon closer inspection however, the Incomplete Agreement contained several discrepancies that caused Respondent to challenge the authenticity of it.  The Incomplete Agreement’s text spacing was inconsistent and had two pages numbered 9 (one of which was blank).  25a-34a, generally.  Most significantly, the signature page from the Incomplete Agreement is from another document.  This is evidenced by the last paragraph of Section VIII of the Incomplete Agreement, found on page 8.  The last sentence on page 8, which carries over into page 9 (the signature page), states:  Should any provision of this Agreement be held by a court of competent jurisdiction to be enforceable only if modified, such holding shall not affect the validity of the remainder of this Agreement, the balance of [page 9] agrees to indemnify and hold harmless [[...]] for any actions…  [32a-34a].  The above shows a clear disjoint between pages 8 and 9 of the Incomplete Agreement.  Section VIII found on page 8 pertains to governing law, while page 9 pertains to an indemnification provision.  Having located no other agreement signed by [...], but knowing that she signed an agreement containing a binding arbitration, Appellants filed a motion to compel arbitration, returnable on May 26, 2024 (and did so promptly to avoid an argument that they acquiesced to proceeding in court.  17a.  On September 15, 2024 oral argument was held.  Respondent questioned the authenticity of the Incomplete Agreement and the Court ordered a plenary fact-finding hearing to determine the enforceability of the arbitration clause.  389a.  IV.
[directive] Part 2: Procedures to Be Followed by Law Enforcement Agencies Regarding Infants Left at Hospitals.  2.1  The [...] is Designated the Lead Law Enforcement Agency for the Investigation of “Safe Haven Infant Protection Act” Missing Persons Cases.  2.1.1  When an infant is left at a hospital pursuant to the “Safe Haven Infant Protection Act,” the [...] shall immediately notify both the Division of State Police Missing Persons Unit at [...], and the local law enforcement agency, in whose jurisdiction the hospital is located.  If the [...] has information that the infant resides in another jurisdiction, it shall also notify the local law enforcement agency in that jurisdiction.  2.2  Responsibilities of Local Law Enforcement Agencies.  2.2.1  The purpose of the notification to the local law enforcement agency is to ensure that there is no ongoing search in that jurisdiction for a missing infant fitting the description of the Safe Haven infant.  The primary responsibility for investigating whether the Safe Haven infant has been reported missing elsewhere rests with the [...].  2.2.2  Upon receiving a report of a Safe Haven infant within its jurisdiction, the local law enforcement agency shall determine whether any infant has been reported missing within its jurisdiction within the preceding 30 days.  If so, the local law enforcement agency shall immediately notify the [...].  2.2.3  The local law enforcement agency is not required to conduct an independent missing persons investigation of the Safe Haven infant incident.  Upon request by the [...], the local law enforcement agency shall assist in the investigation.  7
[brief] Together with all and singular, the houses, buildings, trees, ways, waters, profits, privileges, and advantages, with the appurtenances to the same belonging in or in anywise appertaining; Also all the estate, right, title, interest, property, claim and demand whatsoever of the said party of the first part of, in, and to the same, and of, in and to every part and parcel hereof . . .  See Pa0923 (emphasis added).  Additionally, the deed from [...] to [...] was a warranty deed which provided, in pertinent part, that:  [T]he said party of the first part [i.e. [...]] will warrant, secure, and forever defend the said land and premises unto the said party of the second part [i.e. [...]], his heirs and assigns, forever, against any lawful claims and demands of all and every person or persons fully and clearly freed and discharged of and from all manner of encumbrances whatsoever.
[brief] The DACCA does not regulate debt adjustment services performed by an attorney representing a client.  There is no dispute that attorneys often negotiate with creditors to reduce or settle clients’ debts as part of the attorneys’ legal representation.  In that context, debt adjustment is not a standalone service but rather incidental to the attorney’s broader activity to represent the client’s interests.  In that regard, the Attorney Safe Harbor reflects the Legislature’s recognition that attorneys often provide debt adjustment services incidental to their legal representation.  By focusing on attorneys who are “principally engaged” in debt adjustment, the DACCA exempts attorneys for whom debt adjustment is not a core activity, i.e. those attorneys who principally provide these services outside of the legal representation of the client.
[brief] [...], fighting for its economic survival, engaged various title researchers and experts to investigate and ascertain the various title rights and interests in Lot 3 and 3.01 as part of its investigation and research in those pending lawsuits.  As a consequence of research by forensic title experts [...], (Piccola) and [...], Esq., (Venino) [...] obtained title information and details demonstrating that although both Lot 3 and the Subject Property, Lot 3.01, are and have been listed on Borough Tax records for many years as owned by the Borough, the Borough did not actually own the substantial majority of Lot 3 (or any portion of Lot 3.01).  The Borough only owned a small portion of said parcel as depicted in various maps, tax maps and survey (Pa900).  The Borough’s ownership claim to said parcel was premised upon a Final Decree in a Tax Foreclosure Action in the matter of [...] v. [...]  Superior Court Chancery Division dated October 23, 1939 and recorded on October 25, 1939 in Deed Book 1806 Page 403.  That Judgment describes four tracts of land, being conveyed/acquired by the Borough (J-7) (Pa927).  The description of the property being foreclosed by Keansburg in 1939 did not specify or include all of the parcel/property represented as Lot 3 and 3.01 on the Keansburg Tax Map (J-1) (Pa900, 93).  The description only included a thin strip of land located immediately North of Beachway and South of the 1918 Mean High Water Line as depicted on the Tax Map.  Thus, rather than possessing the entirety of Block 184, Lots 3 & 3.01, the Borough only acquired two (2) de minimis strips of land running North of Ocean Road (J-1) (Pa900).
[brief] The appellants may disagree with the trial court’s findings after weighing all of the evidence, but those findings are entitled to deference on appeal.  In sum, the failure to affirmatively raise the statute of limitations argument below is fatal to the appellants’ claim.  But even if it weren’t, the trial court rightly concluded that the Plaintiffs could not, by reasonable diligence, have discovered the defendants’ misappropriations sooner because of the ways the defendants concealed their conduct.
[brief] (Db19-28)  These videos – many of which were essential to the State’s case – were too blurry to reliably discern any of the images on screen, making [...]’s identification of the shooter and the Chevy reasonably disputed.  (Db21-25)  And [...]’s testimony for those blurry videos likewise violated factor four under Watson.  Id. at 604.  [...] had not witnessed any of the events on video firsthand, and she had no prior knowledge of the shooter or [...].  (Db19)  Accordingly, her testimony describing the images on the unclear videos must have been based upon inferences she drew from other facts in evidence.  Namely, that the light-colored image on the screen depicted the person observed wearing grey near the victim, and that such person was, in fact, the shooter.  (Db21)  Such narration testimony is prohibited by factor four of Watson.
[brief] The party opposing summary judgment bears an affirmative burden “to make a complete and comprehensive showing why summary judgment should not be entered. ”  *Lombardi v. Masso*, 207 N.J. 516, 556 (2011) ([...], J., dissenting).  What constitutes competent opposition to a motion for summary judgment is also well-settled.  A party does not create a genuine issue of material fact simply by offering a sworn statement.  *Carroll v. N.J. Transit*, 366 N.J. Super. 380, 388 (App. Div. 2004).  “Competent opposition requires competent evidential material beyond mere speculation and fanciful arguments. ”  *Cortez v. Gindhart*, 435 N.J. Super. 589, 605 (App. Div. 2014) (quoting *Hoffman v. Asseenontv Com, Inc.*, 404 N.J. Super. 415, 425-426 (App. Div. 2009)).  A party must point to competent record evidence that established a genuine issue of material fact at the time of the opposition.
[directive] 1  Judgment of Conviction (CN 10070) .  ...ran.-... ,oaco11~ ~ ~ ; 000 > ; <1r ggg ~.,$.~~~ ~ Superior Court of New Jersey, .....,wuu--  State of New Jersey v. Last Name  First Name  Middle Name I I  Also Known As Date of Birth  SBI Number Date(s) of Offense I I  Original Plea Date of Arrest  PROMIS Number Date Ind / Acc / Complt Filed Date of Original Plea □  I I I Not Guilty Guilty Adjudication By Guilty Plea  Jury Trial Verdict  Non-Jury Trial Verdict  Dismissed / Acquitted Date: □  □  Sealed (N.J.S.A. 2C:52-5.2)  □  Original Charges  Ind / Acc / Complt Count Description Statute Degree  Final Charges  Ind / Acc / Complt Count Description  Statute Degree  Sentencing Statement  It is, therefore, on and that the defendant is sentenced as follows:  ORDERED  ADJUDGED  It is further ORDERED that the sheriff deliver the defendant to the appropriate correctional authority.  Total Custodial Term Institution Name  Total Probation Term I I  February 2021, New Jersey Judiciary, Revised: CN: 10070 page
[brief] ”  *See id.*  Specifically, [...] used the Uber Rides platform to request transportation services for the benefit of both herself and --- ⁴  The January Terms have a substantively identical provision.  (*See Da228.*)  [...], and [...]’s claims arise out of [...]’s use of that service.  See Jansen, 342 N.J. Super. at 256, 259 (unnamed putative beneficiaries of a retirement account were bound by the arbitration agreement signed by their father expressly providing that the agreement was “binding upon” his heirs and successors, where the plaintiffs’ claims “arose out of” the contract).5
[directive] !  Whether, in the case of a person claiming to be a primary caregiver, the person is able to provide the name and address of the qualifying patient for whom the caregiver is authorized to provide assistance in obtaining and/or using medical marijuana.  !  Whether there is reason to believe that marijuana was recently smoked in a vehicle that is not presently carrying a registered qualifying patient who might lawfully have consumed medical marijuana.  !  Whether, and to what extent, the person claiming the affirmative defense is untruthful in any material respect, or is evasive, casting doubt on his or her veracity.  Although the Attorney General Enforcement Guidelines embrace the general policy that police officers should not do anything to disrupt or impede a qualifying patient’s access to or use of lawfully-dispensed medical marijuana, police officers are still expected to remain vigilant in detecting drug law violations, including but not limited to the fraudulent or otherwise unlawful possession or illicit diversion of medical marijuana.
[brief] (7T121:17 to 122:8).  Decedent never complained to Petitioner when he left the family parties early, as she understood his work requirements.  (7T122:23 to 123:2).  (3)  Respondent asserted that Decedent told [...] that Petitioner wasted money.  Db at 15.  The factual basis for Ms. [...]’s statement was that when Decedent asked Petitioner to go to the store to buy some shrimp, he brought home colossal shrimp.  (11T8:24 to 9:2).  On another occasion, when he went to Staples he purchased “real thick kind of paper. ” (11T9:1-5).  (4)
[brief] (7T:154-1 to 2).  [...] replied, “well, he didn’t say – he said – about his bad thoughts. ” (7T:154-3 to 4).  When asked again, [...] repeated “he just had bad thoughts. ” (7T:154-9).  Instead of asking the next question, the Prosecutor says, “I know this is tough for you because you love [...], don’t you?” (7T:154-10 to 11).  When asked again, [...] repeated for a third time “Definitely he was having bad thoughts, he wanted to talk to the doctor. ” (7T:154-23 to 24).  Instead of accepting her answer, the Prosecutor said “Okay.