ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] ”  (31a)  On September 6, 2022, Defendants filed a Motion for Emergency Relief for Stay Pending Reconsideration, along with Certifications explaining that Defendants discovered that [...] was planning to purchase and flip the Boonton Property to a third-party who previously submitted an offer for $800,000 to the Trustee.  (471a)  Pursuant to Rule 1:6-2(d), Defendants requested oral argument if their motion was opposed.  On September 13, 2022, prior to opposition submitting positions, the trial court ordered that Defendants’ motion was denied without oral argument.  (37a)  There was no explanation as to why oral argument was denied.  On September 21, 2022, Plaintiff filed a motion to confirm the sale of the Boonton Property to Co-Defendant and to remove Defendants from the Boonton Property.  (477a)  Plaintiff requested oral argument.  Defendants filed a cross motion to enforce litigants rights and requested oral argument if their motion was opposed.  (474a)  On October 12, 2022, the trial court granted Plaintiff’s motion without oral argument and denied Defendants’ motion, allowing Co-Defendant to oppose without oral argument.  (51a)  There was no explanation as to why oral argument was denied.  Furthermore, the trial court ordered that (1) the September 15, 2022 sale of the Boonton Property to Christoper for the sum of $601,000 closed; and (2) Defendants were required to vacate the Boonton Property by December 1, 2022.  (51a)  On February 16, 2023, Defendants submitted a motion for leave to file a Supplemental Complaint seeking damages resulting from (1) Plaintiff’s breach of fiduciary duty as Trustee involving the sale of the Boonton Property to [...] below fair market value; and (2) Co-Defendant’s wrongful acts which resulted in Trust property being diverted to Co-Defendant, who was unjustly enriched, at Defendants’ expense.
[brief] The Shooting**  The evidence established that on Monday, November 2, 2020, at approximately 8:46 p.m., Franklin Township police were dispatched to a --- \(^5\) [...] supplied the letters to his attorney on January 7, the same day he entered his guilty plea, and his attorney supplied the letters to the prosecutor on January 10.  (2T 65-22 to 68-8)  \(^6\)  At trial, the Defense explained [...]’s fingerprints on the unsigned letters, which [...] adamantly denied writing.  One of the letters was written on a piece of paper that [...] had handled because it was part of the packet of discovery sent to [...] by his attorney.  (14T 162-17 to 162-19)  [...] admitted that when he and [...] were in jail together, he took all of [...]’s discovery and never gave it back.  (10T 14T 168-6 to 168-10)  As to the other two, [...] remembered handling at least one because [...] handed it to him to sign, but [...] refused and handed it back.  [...] also testified that he and [...] handled each other’s papers because all their paperwork was mixed together (14T 162-17 to 162-22) – something [...] did not dispute.  (10T 234-8 to 234-9) shooting that occurred at a barbershop on Hamilton Avenue (8T 40-7 to 41-8)
[brief] In McCormick v. State, 446 N.J. Super. 603 (App. Div. 2016), the court recognized that an Affidavit of Merit is required when the plaintiff’s claim of vicarious liability hinges upon allegations of deviation from professional standard of care by a licensed individual who worked for the named defendant.  Id. at 615.  While here Appellant now seeks to couch his claim as against [...], the obligation to ensure compliance with he plans and specification is with the licensed professional engineer, not the employee.
[brief] ”  Heyert v. Taddese, 431 N.J. Super. 388, 435 (App. Div. 2013) (citing Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 266-267 (1985)); see also Cito v. Bridgewater Twp. Police Dep’t, 892 F.2d 23, 25 (3d. Cir. 1989).  “In New Jersey, that statute is N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2, which requires that a suit for personal injury be commenced within two years from the accrual of the cause of action. ”  Heyert at 435 (citing 3805 Kennedy Realty Co., 287 N.J. Super. at 323 (citing Cito, 892 F.2d at 25))) (italics in original) (emphasis added).  Accordingly, Plaintiff had two (2) years from when he knew or should have known that a violation of his Constitutional rights occurred to file a Complaint.  That did not happen in this instance matter.  Plaintiff admits that an application for a handicap parking space was filed with the Borough on or about February 19, 2019.  (See Pb3; see also Pa006-Pa015).  Plaintiff further admits that on or before August 5, 2019 [...] denied Plaintiff’s handicap parking space application.  (See Pb4; see also Pa019; Pa052; Pa194; Pa240; Pa242; Pa268; Pa27; Pa282).  In fact, in the Complaint Plaintiff admits:  On August 01, 2019 the Borough’s Clerk, [...] (“[...]”), responding to Plaintiff’s inquiry on the [sic] matter emailed him, “per the chief of police this request is denied,” (080a), while refusing to mail a letter of denial thereof.  (Pa087 (underline in original); see also Da011).  Therefore, the indisputable date of accrual, and notice of same, was the denial of Plaintiff’s application, which occurred on or prior to August 5, 2019.  Thus, Plaintiff had until August 5, 2021 to file a Complaint alleging deprivation of his civil rights.  Plaintiff did not file his Complaint until August 25, 2023, over two (2) years after the expiration of the Statute of Limitations.  Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 were properly dismissed with prejudice by the Court Below as time barred.
[brief] ”  She did not know his real name and only knew him as “[...]”.  (14T48-22; 14T50-3 to 25).  [...] was alone with defendant in her apartment at the [...] in [...] around 12:00 or 12:52 a.m. and walked with him out of the building around 1:00 a.m. (14T51-1 to 52-21; 14T68-6 to 16).  [...] tried to have sex with defendant for the eight minutes he was in her apartment, but he wasn’t paying attention to her.  (14T68-17 to 70-20).  On cross-examination, [...] stated that she never saw defendant after May 27, 2012.  (14T77-24 to 78-5).  No one ever told her defendant was arrested two months later in July 2012, that he was found guilty of aggravated manslaughter in July 2014 and sentenced in September 2014.
[brief] (Pa24 to 34).  Ordinarily, once an issue has been fully and fairly litigated, it is not subject to relitigation between the same parties either in the same or in subsequent litigation.  Nevertheless, [...] revisited an evidentiary ruling made by [...], and ruled that [...]’s expert opinion and testimony about [...] would no longer be admissible at trial.  In doing so, the trial court erred in analyzing the relevancy of the evidence, its probative value, and the prejudicial effect of same.  The trial court’s ruling was an abuse of discretion and cannot stand.
[brief] N.J.S.A. 59:2-3 particularly recognizes that government has no choice but to govern.  A private person or firm that cannot afford the people and equipment to do a good job can withdraw rather than perform in a dangerous way.  Government rarely has that option.  It cannot withdraw from law enforcement if its police force is too small, from fire protection if its trucks are in poor repair, or from maintaining streets if it cannot afford to keep them in perfect condition.  That is why high level discretionary policy decisions whether to burden the taxpayers to furnish equipment, material, facilities, personnel or services are absolutely immune.  That is also why operational governmental decisions to devote existing resources to one activity at the expense of another are immune unless palpably unreasonable.  The two adjoining statutory provisions exist to protect hard but necessary governmental choices.
[brief] As to the first Rudbart factor, the court found, “we discern no inherent harm to the doctor/patient relationship that flows from the agreement to substitute one forum for another in the event of future claims. ” (Da067).  While the court in Moore conceded that there may be unequal bargaining power in the context of doctor/patient relationships, that issue was insufficient to defeat the enforceability of the arbitration agreement in light of its findings as to the third and fourth Rudbart factors.
[brief] The key consideration is whether the discovery violation can be cured by a lesser remedy to ensure that a defendant has a fair trial.  The same is true for a violation of Rule 3:13-3, the court rule pertaining to discovery.  Commonsensically, where dismissal of an indictment with prejudice would be inappropriate for a constitutional violation under Brady, so too should dismissal be inappropriate for a court rule violation where a defendant’s prejudice can be remediated by a lesser remedy.  Even under Rule 3:13-3(f), which provides the remedies available for a discovery violation under Rule 3:13-3, “the public interest in the completion of criminal trials weighs against [dismissing an indictment] where other remedies are available,” State v. Ruffin, 371 N.J. Super. 371, 388 (App. Div. 2004), and “this drastic remedy is inappropriate where other judicial action will protect a defendant’s fair trial rights.
[brief] Plaintiff affirmed that he was seeking the annulment because the Defendant had lied to him in order to induce him into their marriage.  (2T35).  [...] shared that within his culture and family, divorces are rare, and he would be the first to experience such a situation, which carries a significant stigma.  He emphasized that he has conducted himself honorably throughout the marriage, asserting that he has neither used bad language nor engaged in physical or sexual abuse.  [...] also noted that he had not consummated the marriage and remained a virgin (which also was important in his culture as a prospect for marriage).  He expressed concern about the challenges he would face in finding another virgin partner if he were to get divorced.
[brief] Moreover, it is just as plausible to conclude that any discussions between [...] and [...] focused solely on issues presented by the particular facts of the prior matters, as it is to conclude that there was a philosophical discussion concerning [...]’ general attitudes toward litigation and settlement strategy. \(^2\) --- \(^2\)  Respondents cite Reardon v. Marlayne, Inc., 83 N.J. 460 (1980) for the proposition that discovery would be unlikely to reveal the strengths and weaknesses of a corporate client’s decision makers or their attitudes toward See McCarthy v. John T. Henderson, Inc., 246 N.J. Super. 225 (App. Div. 1991) (holding that “there is simply no basis in the record to conclude that any information was conveyed to [...] of the nature that could be used to defendants’ disadvantage in the present case which involves wholly unrelated issues”).  For these reasons, the Order should be reversed as unsubstantiated assertions concerning the purported disclosure of “financial” information and general attitude toward litigation are not grounds for disqualification.
[brief] The Trial Court heard argument on the Marioni factors during oral argument and these factors were also noted in the parties’ moving papers that were reviewed by the Trial Court in making its determination as noted below:  1)  The Separation Agreement at issue is valid and enforceable: the validity of the Separation Agreement is not in dispute and was not raised below.  Both parties --- \(^7\) Marioni v. 94 Broadway, Inc., 374 N.J. Super. 588 agreed that the Separation Agreement was binding on each party and required each party to take certain actions thereunder.  2)  The terms of the Separation Agreement are clear, such that the court can determine with reasonable certainty the duties of each party and the conditions under which performance is due:  Both parties argued the plain language of the Separation Agreement in their moving papers below.  This is not in dispute. was also addressed at 1T 22:6-25, and Da199.  3)  An order compelling performance would not be "harsh or oppressive" to the Appellant; discussed at (1T19:12-23 discussing that it was in the interest of the Appellant to enter into the Agreement, (also1T 22:6-25), discussing both parties receiving a benefit by the disability filing)  4)  A denial of specific performance would leave Respondent without an adequate remedy (addressed at 1T16:13-16, discussing best interest of both parties to file IOD, also at 1T17:6-21 discussing the futility of entering into the Agreement if the Agreement would not reach the level of an IOD vote, and 1T18:12 to 1T20:21 and Da200)  The Trial Court considered these factors and the July 25, 2023 and August 14, 2023 Orders should not be disturbed.  Wherefore, Appellant’s case should be dismissed.
[brief] Federal courts have permitted discovery in Freedom of Information Act lawsuits where the plaintiff-requestor has made a "showing of bad faith on the part of the agency sufficient to impugn the agency's affidavits or declarations."  Carney v. United States Dep't of Justice, 19 F.3d 807, 812 (2nd Cir. 1994); In re Clinton, 973 F.3d 106, 113-114 (D.C. Cir. 2020).  Importantly, there is no authority prohibiting discovery with regard to common law right of access to public records claims.
[brief] Trial 39T July 26, 2011  Trial 40T July 27, 2011  Trial 41T August 1, 2011  Trial 42T August 2, 2011  Trial 43T August 3, 2011  Trial 44T August 4, 2011  Trial 45T August 8, 2011  Trial 46T August 10, 2011  Trial 47T August 11, 2011  Trial 48T August 15, 2011  Trial 49T August 16, 2011  Trial 50T August 17, 2011  Trial 51T September 1, 2011  Trial 52T September 6, 2011  Trial 53T September 7, 2011  Trial 54T September 8, 2011  Trial 55T September 12, 2011  Trial 56T September 13, 2011  Trial 57T September 14, 2011  Trial 58T September 15, 2011  Trial 59T September 20, 2011  Trial 60T September 21, 2011  Trial 61T September 22, 2011  Trial 62T September 26, 2011  Trial 63T September 28, 2011  Trial 64T October 3, 2011  Trial 65T October 4, 2011 Trial 66T October 5, 2011
[brief] Regardless, neither appellant/plaintiff [...]’s opposition to the summary judgment motion nor his Brief on this appeal contain a statement of what further discovery was needed.  The motion filed by [...] conclusively demonstrates that there was no discovery required which would alter the analysis that he failed to maintain insurance meeting the requirements of N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4 on April 13, 2022.  Moreover, as respondent/defendant argued herein, the claims against [...] and its internal policies and decisions, are irrelevant to the analysis of N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.5 in the context of appellant/plaintiff [...]’s ability to recover damages for personal injury.  Even if relevant, the doctrine of *res judicata* is applicable.  *Velasquez v. Franz*, 123 N.J.498, 505 (1991).  Under the doctrine, “a cause of action between parties that has been finally determined [ ] cannot be relitigated by those parties or their privies in a new proceeding. ”  Ibid.; see also, *Watkins v. Resorts Int'l Hotel & Casino, Inc.*, 124 N.J. 398, 409 (1991) (*res judicata* “insulat[es] courts from the relitigation of claims [ ] and prevents the judicial inefficiency inherent in multiplicitous litigation. ”)  For an action to be barred based on the application of *res judicata* there must be (1) a final judgment by a court of competent jurisdiction, (2) identity of parties, and (3) substantially similar or identical causes of action.  *Culver v. Ins. Co. of N. Am.*, 115 N.J. 451, 460-61 (1989).  These elements are present in this action, warranting the application of the doctrine.  CONCLUSION
[brief] Next, the court should have considered [...]’s mental health and the abuse he suffered in weighing the mitigating and aggravating factors.  [...]’s mental illness and trauma are specifically relevant to mitigating factors 4 and 11, and the fact that he went to psychological therapy for a long period of time after he was incarcerated undermines the application of aggravating factors 3 and 9.  See N.J.S.A.  2C:44-1b(4) (substantial grounds tending to excuse the conduct); 2C:44-1b(11)(incarceration will cause excessive hardship); 2C:44-1a(3) (risk of recidivism); 2C:44-1a(9) (need for deterrence).  Where, as here, there is evidence that a defendant struggles with serious mental illness that contributed to the offense, that mental disability should be considered under mitigating factor 4 (substantial grounds tending to excuse the conduct).  See State v. Nayee, 192 N.J. 475 (2007) (remanding for the trial court to consider the defendant’s mental illness under mitigating factor 4); State v. Briggs, 349 N.J. Super. 496, 504 (App. Div. 2002) (finding that the trial court was required to consider the defendant’s history of abuse and PTSD when considering mitigating factor 4); see also State v. Hess, 192 N.J. 123, 149 (2011) (finding that evidence of the defendant’s Battered Women’s Syndrome was relevant under factor 4).
[brief] Murder victim [...] was 70 years old, which defendant should have known as Mary was his grandfather’s girlfriend and part of the [...] for over 30 years.  (17T203-18 to 204-10).  Defendant conceded at trial that this aggravating factor applied.  (17T159-18 to 20).  The judge gave aggravating factor twelve “some weight. ” (17T203-16 to 17). ⁹  [...] found four applicable mitigating factors.
[brief] It is plausible that defense counsel chose not to insist upon direct testimony about the AFIS materials before the jury to protect his client against the stigma of criminality that could attach to individuals whose fingerprint data are already in the AFIS.  Had [...] timely objected to the AFIS documents, the trial court could have determined if [...]'s testimony was proper under *N.J.R.E.* 703 or, if a hearsay objection was sustained, the State could have either proffered a witness to provide a foundation for the document as a business record, *N.J.R.E.* 803(c)(6), or collected its own fingerprints of [...] to cure the hearsay problem.
[brief] (36T:12-17 to 14-21).  Specifically, on August 10, 2022, defendant filed a letter to the State about an unnamed Essex County case in which [...] was a witness.  The State noted that defense counsel was aware of that unnamed case as it was referenced in materials provided to defendant on [...]’s case.  When the State became aware of the case before trial in September 2021, it reached out to the Essex County Prosecutor’s Office to acquire information about it, but never received any documents.  Ibid.  On August 16, 2022, [...] asked Wesley if he had any other information after defendant filed his letter, and in so doing, discovered the case was *State v. [...]*.  Ibid.  The State then reached out to Essex County again, who informed the State that that case was a multi-defendant case, and they only had filings from one of the codefendants, none of which mentioned Wesley or any cooperation agreements involving him.  The State then asked Essex County again to go into their archives for Lance to find anything else, but no further information was provided.  The State did provide a Promis/Gavel printout for the case to defense counsel.  Ibid.  Defendant now claims that this case ended in a not-guilty verdict, and that this was valuable impeachment material.
[brief] *Ibid.*  "The proposed development would not encourage the location and design of transportation routes which will promote the free flow of traffic while discouraging location of such facilities and routes which result in congestion or blight."  *Id.*, paragraph F3.  The Board had ample grounds for questioning whether [...] could accommodate as many as eighteen families' occupants, and their guests, and Amazon trucks, and emergency vehicles, etc.  The Board also had every right and reason to be concerned about access to and from [...] -- the only way in or out of the development.  At 4T44-13 to 4T45-25, the court questioned what was "reasonable" and insinuated that the applicant had been subjected to "abuse."  The Board had every right and reason to analyze the application as set forth above, especially when the applicant was seeking two waivers and could not base either on hardship.  At T46-22, the judge concluded that the Board denied the application because it felt the density was excessive.  While the density may not have violated a zoning standard, the applicant would not have needed waivers from the subdivision standards but for its decision to shoehorn nine lots on this tract to increase its profit at the expense of Public Health Safety & Welfare as well as dictates of appropriate plan density as set forth in Sec. 18-601 of the UDO.
[brief] To sufficiently allege a claim of State Created Danger, a Plaintiff must present the following evidence as set forth in *Bright v. Westmoreland County*, 443 F.3d 276 (3d Cir. 2006): 1. the harm ultimately caused was foreseeable and fairly direct; 2. a state actor acted with a degree of culpability that shocks the conscience; 3. a relationship between the state and the plaintiff existed such that “the plaintiff was a foreseeable victim of the defendant's acts,” or a “member of a discrete class of persons subjected to the potential harm brought about by the state's actions,” as opposed to a member of the public in general; and 4. a state actor affirmatively used his or her authority in a way that created a danger to the citizen or that rendered the citizen more vulnerable to danger than had the state not acted at all.
[directive] 1  Enter the complete name of the governmental Agency that has legal - authority to expend forfeiture funds that are the subject of the the u-, proposed disbursement.  [...]).  1). in Enter the business mailing address of the Agency entered block 2.  Enter the name and title of the person is legally empowered to who 3.  1).  in commit funds of agency entered block the - in Enter the Agency telephone number of the person specified block 4.  - ii * 3)- 5-  Enter the New Jersey Law Enforcement Telecommunication System, (NJLETS) (ORI) Origination Number, of the Agency identified in block ORI,  If the Agency has more then one enter the one which 1)- designates the Agency's headquarters location.  Enter the complete name of the person, group or organization that 6. would receive the forfeiture funds which are the subject of the proposed disbursement.
[brief] In their opinion the Court cites AAA Mid-Atlantic Ins. of N.J. v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 336 N.J. Super. 71 (App. Div. 2000) for the proposition that the Court rather than an arbitrator should resolve purely legal questions.  AAA Mid-Atlantic involved a claim for reimbursement between a PIP carrier and a homeowner’s policy wherein the PIP carrier was seeking reimbursement pursuant to the statutory provisions of N.J.S.A. 39:6A-9.1.  AAA Mid-Atlantic has been subsequently overruled by both a statutory enactment and subsequent judicial decision.  N.J.S.A. 2A:23B-1 et seq. was enacted in 2003 and sets forth the statutory requirements for construing arbitration agreements and conducting arbitrations.