ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] It was for the jury, not the judge, to determine whether [...] failed to train and supervise [...] properly, and, if so, whether that failure was a substantial factor in causing the harm in this case."  (Pa26-27).  Both claims require some level of foreseeability to be shown: For negligent hiring, that the employee had dangerous attributes; for negligent training and supervision, that the employer knew or should have known that the lack of training or supervision could lead to a risk of harm.  Moreover, there is no requirement that Lowe's should have foreseen the "exact harm" that its failure to train and supervise [...] would result in.  Only that it was "in the realm of foreseeability that some harm might occur."  Model Jury Charge 5.10B.  Our courts recognize that "a party may be liable to persons who fall normally and generally within a zone of risk created by the particular tortious conduct."  Di Cosala v. Kay, 91 N.J. 159, 175 (N.J. 1982).  Here, it was perfectly within the realm of foreseeability that when Lowe's put an inexperienced trainee on the sales floor by himself before he was ready, before he had even come close to completing his departmental training, without a uniform, without a visible name tag, whom they knew could feel "too much pressure" when dealing with customers who want answers, and encouraged him to approach those customers on his own, on a busy Saturday, that things could go bad.  Lowe's placed this employee in a situation "'in which physical consequences may follow in an uninterrupted sequence from verbal exchanges with third parties'". (See this Court's opinion at Pa29, citing Restatement (Third) of Agency § 7.07 cmt. c (Am. Law Inst. 2006)).  The trial court therefore properly denied the motion to dismiss at the close of plaintiffs' case.
[brief] *Packard-Bamberger & Co. v. Collier*, 167 N.J. 427, 440 (2001)(emphasis added).  Here, as stated in the trial court’s Order of Disposition (Pa1705), Section 10.5 of the Operating Agreement (Pa1) provides:  In the event of any suit or action to enforce or interpret any provision of this Agreement (or that is based on this Agreement), the prevailing party is entitled to recover, in addition to other costs, reasonable attorney fees in connection with the suit, action, or arbitration, and in any appeals.  The determination of who is the prevailing party and the amount of reasonable attorney fees to be paid to the prevailing party will be decided by the court or courts, including any appellate courts, in which the matter is tried, heard, or decided.  When the fee-shifting is controlled by a contractual provision (as here), the provision should be strictly construed in light of our general policy disfavoring the award of attorneys’ fees.
[brief] Second, as to the text of the Securities Law, in statutes, “the words ‘or’ and ‘and’ are [ofttimes] used interchangeably, and the determination of whether the word ‘and’ as used in the statute should be read in the conjunctive or disjunctive depends primarily upon the legislative intent. ”  In re Raymour and Flanigan Furniture, 405 N.J. Super. at 384 (quoting Grant v. Thomas, 307 N.J. Super. 252, 256 (App. Div. 1997)).
[brief] [...] filed a motion for summary judgment on August 4, 2021.  [Pa418a]  [...] and [...] filed an opposition to [...]’s motion and a cross motion for summary judgment on October 12, 2021.  [Pa516a]  [...] heard oral argument on the motions on October 22, 2021, and additional oral argument on November 18, 2021.  [1T1, 2T1]  At the conclusion of the October 22, 2021 oral argument, the Court informed the parties that it was “not going to allow any additional pleadings or submissions by anyone. ”  [1T43-2]  On March 31, 2022, after the existing discovery period ended, [...] granted [...]’s motion for summary judgment and denied the Firm and [...]’s cross motion for summary judgment.
[brief] The understanding of the reliability of ballistics analysis continues to evolve, with new developments occurring even after the filing of [...]’s initial brief.  In June, the Supreme Court of Maryland held that it was error for a State’s expert witness opine, without any limitation, that particular bullets were fired from a particular firearm.  Abruquah v. State, 296 A.3d 961, 998 (Md. 2023).  The court held that a ballistics expert could testify “about firearms identifications generally, his examination . . . , his comparison . . . , and whether the patterns and markings on the crime scene bullets are consistent or inconsistent with the patterns and markings on the known bullets.
[brief] The Wage Payment Law defines "wages" as "the direct monetary compensation for labor or services rendered by an employee, where the amount is determined on a time, task, piece, or commission basis excluding any form of supplementary incentives and bonuses which are calculated independently of regular wages and paid in addition thereto."  N.J.S.A. 34:11-4.1(c).  Under the Wage Collection Law, "wages" consist of "any moneys due an employee from the employer whether payable by the hour, day, week, semimonthly, monthly or yearly and shall include commissions, bonus, piecework compensation and any other benefits arising out of an employment contract."  N.J.S.A. 34:11-57.  The promoted officers earned and are entitled to the base line CNA rates for each police title in effect at the time of the 2016 promotions up until the June 7, 2017 Implementation Memo.
[brief] PLAINTIFF BEARS THE BURDEN, BUT THE STANDARD OF REVIEW DOES NOT ALLOW FOR THE DEFENDANT BOARD’S UNBRIDLED DISCRETION AND LIMITLESS DEFERENCE.  Plaintiff and Defendant generally agree on legal principles underlying burden of proof, discretion afforded land use boards, standard of review, and deference owed to decisions.  They disagree on how the limitations on those legal standards, and the law, apply to this case.
[brief] N.J.S.A. 18A:7A-41 .................................................................................  14  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT  Following decades of Abbott litigation, extensive research, and consultation with numerous experts, the Legislature enacted the School Funding Reform Act of 2008 (SFRA), N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-43 to -71.  That legislation overhauled the prior system of school funding and replaced it with a unitary, weighted, and wealth-equalized formula.  As a unitary formula, the SFRA applies the same funding principles to all districts.  As a weighted formula, the Department of Education calculates an adequacy budget for each district based on a district’s particular demographics, with additional resources assigned for its students with higher needs.  And as a wealth-equalized formula, funding under the formula is a shared responsibility of each district and the State, based on districts’ relative property and income wealth.  These three signature features of the SFRA are essential to achieving the overriding legislative goals of ensuring that all districts can provide a thorough and efficient education, while also allocating finite State resources based on each district’s individual needs and ability to contribute locally.
[brief] On April 1, 2019, Appellant posted an online response to a Facebook news article about a private company that wanted to bring jobs to the City of Trenton.  [5T24:13-20].  In his comment, Appellant stated that most of those jobs would not go to people from Trenton, because “a lot of people from Trenton are lazy” and “[t]hey’d rather wait for the 1st of the month, get their check every month and by the 5th day of the month they’re broke. ”  [5T24:22 – 5T25:3].  Appellant felt compelled to make this comment “because I see it every day . . .  Nobody wants to work.  Everybody is just sitting around waiting for the 1st of the month and, you know, the first couple of days of the month all hell breaks loose, and that’s why I made my statement” and that “Trentonians . . .  They like to sit at home, sit on the porch and sit on their rear end. ”  [5T24:8-18].  Appellant’s comment elicited a response from Trenton Councilman [...] (“[...]”), which resulted in Appellant and [...] exchanging their thoughts on Appellant’s comment (the “Facebook Incident”).  [5T25:23 – 5T26:18].  The Facebook Incident was not part of the Investigation.
[brief] (6T 145-23 to 146-1)  Over the next several minutes, [...] continued to search the car for her phone.  (6T 146-2 to 10)  She walked around to the back of the car, thinking that [...] may have put her phone back there.  (6T 146-12 to 25)  She again opened the rear door where [...]’s body was, and “out of nowhere,” his arm moved. \(^2\) (6T 147-4 to 9, 147-15 to 22)  In response to seeing [...]’s arm twitch, [...] “swung the tire iron” two or three times.
[brief] (Pa000122).  Despite receiving this letter, Plaintiffs and their counsel pursued discovery against the other parties and kept [...] in the case for a year, causing it to accumulate additional defense costs.  During this time, Plaintiffs never deposed any [...] representatives, nor did they request any further discovery from [...].  Plaintiffs initially noticed [...]’s deposition on September 28, 2022; however, after [...] incurred costs to prepare a representative for the deposition, it was adjourned the day prior by Plaintiffs’ counsel and never rescheduled.  (Pa000558).  In other words, Plaintiffs did nothing to develop their purported common knowledge negligence or trespass claims against [...], despite receipt of the detailed frivolous lawsuit letter.  After Plaintiffs allowed their claims against [...] to languish, on July 28, 2023, [...] filed a second Motion for Summary Judgment.
[brief] 15  N.J.S.A. 2A:23A-13(c) ........................................................................................................  15  N.J.S.A. 2A:23A-13(c)(5) ................................................................................................ 4  N.J.S.A. 2A:23A-18(b) .....................................................................................................  6, 7, 8  Court Rules N.J. Court Rule 4:46-2(c) ..................................................................................................  12  A.  Preliminary Statement
[brief] On March 1, 2013, the grand jury, sitting in Essex County, returned indictment number [...] against defendant and [...], charging them with first-degree conspiracy to commit murder in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2 and 2C:11-3a(1), (2) (count one), first-degree murder in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3a(1), (2) (count two), first-degree attempted murder in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:5-1 and 2C:11-3a(1), (2) (count three), first-degree attempted murder in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:5-1 and 2C:11-3a(1), (2) (count four), third-degree unlawful possession of a weapon in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5c (count five) and second-degree possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4a (count six).
[brief] ”  *Ibid*.  Defendant points the second element of the jury charge for N.J.S.A. 4:22-17(c)(1) which states: “the Defendant committed one or more of the following acts: tormented; tortured; maimed; hung; poisoned; unnecessarily or cruelly beat; cruelly abused; or needlessly mutilated. ”  Defendant argues that his conviction should be overturned due to the trial judge did not define the words “unnecessarily” and “cruelly” to the jury.  Defendant contends that the trial judge simply regurgitated the statutory language and added nothing to make the jury charge “less confusing.
[brief] A process of evidence evaluation, - ‘weighing’ -, is involved, which is hard indeed to express in words.  This is not a pro forma exercise, but calls for a high degree of conscientious effort and diligent scrutiny.  The object is to correct clear error or mistake by the jury.  Id. at 6.  This flexible standard of reviewing the evidence before the jury allows a judge to set aside a verdict that is against the weight of evidence or that is clearly the result of mistake, passion, prejudice or partiality.
[brief] II.  Motion For Recusal  As a preliminary matter, Plaintiff moves for [...]’s recusal.  (Plaintiff’s Letter Brief, ECF No. 61-1).  Plaintiff alleges that recusal is warranted because the Letter Order was purportedly designed to punish Plaintiff for not agreeing to a settlement offer at an April 2019 settlement conference, which [...] allegedly conducted in an unfair manner.  (Id. at 1-3).  Under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a), “any justice, judge, or magistrate of the United States shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned. ”  Id.  In particular, “Section 455(a) requires judicial recusal ‘if a reasonable person, knowing all the circumstances, would expect that the judge would have actual knowledge’ of his interest or bias in a case. ”  Avila v. New Jersey, No. CIV.A. 13-0779 JAP, 2013 WL 4597096, at *3 (D.N.J. Aug. 29, 2013) (quoting Liljeberg v. Health Services Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 860 (1988)).  Plaintiff’s “motion for the recusal of Judge [Bongiovanni] addressed to this Court is ... invalid. ”  *Huertas v. City of Camden*, No. CIV. 06-CV-4676NLHAM, 2009 WL 3151312, at *4 (D.N.J. Sept. 24, 2009) (citation omitted).  “A magistrate judge cannot be removed by another judge using a recusal standard. ”  *Id.*  Rather, “[t]he proper procedure would be to bring a motion to recuse before the magistrate judge [herself]. ”  *Id.*  Accordingly, Plaintiff’s request for [...]’s recusal is denied.  Despite Plaintiff’s contention, [...] is a professional, considerate and civil judge.  ### III.
[brief] Applicants are encouraged to exhaust administrative remedies, even those challenging the decision of the administrative officer, such as a zoning officer so that the applicant can avail itself of proper channel and the Board of Adjustment, as a policy making body may be called upon to exercise its statutory authority to review and pass upon the challenged decisions of local land use officers.  *21st Century v. D’Allesandro*, 257 N.J.Super 320, 323 (App.Div. 1992).  The approach ensures judicial deference where there are legal and factual disputes.
[brief] •  The finance committee believed at the time there should have been $1.2 million in the accounts, plus a $500,000 cushion.  They asked [...] to see the bank records and to accompany them back to the bank to clarify the issue of [...] as a signatory on the accounts.  [...] said he would go to the bank after he finished printing out the bank statements.  He locked himself in a conference room and then left the building.
[brief] The capacity of such behavior to intrude upon the jury’s deliberative process should have been clear to the Court and warranted a presumption of prejudice to the defense which could only be overcome by an affirmative showing that Plaintiff’s behavior did not influence the jury’s decision.  No such showing was made, and the trial court should have recognized that a miscarriage of justice had occurred.  The prejudice to the Defendants caused by Plaintiff’s pre-trial behavior was compounded by the “theme” of the case espoused by Plaintiff’s counsel on opening and in closing, the presentation of a lost wage claim without supporting expert proofs, Plaintiff’s unsolicited testimony concerning a renewed course of treatment and the use of a time-unit argument in closing without prior notice to the defense.
[brief] He immediately went to [...] and spoke with the two attendants.  [...], one of the [...] attendants, testified that at approximately 11:50 p.m., a man came into the gas station “cabin” where [...] and the other attendant were doing paperwork.  The man brandished a “shiny” metal rod with a “black handle” that was approximately “two to three feet” long.  He wore a “grayish hoodie,” black or “dark-colored” pants, white sneakers and gloves, and his face was covered, so only his eyes could be seen.  [...] estimated that the man was forty years old and between five feet seven and five feet nine inches tall.  The robber told the two attendants to “put everything on the table” or “I’ll kill you” or “I’ll beat you. ”  According to [...], the robber also threatened to shoot them, but [...] did not see a gun.  The men put approximately $530 in cash on the table.  The robber grabbed the cash and fled on foot toward Route 130 South.  [...] immediately called the police and [...] arrived at [...] “within five minutes. ”  Both robberies were captured on security video from the [...] and [...].  The surveillance video recordings were played for the jury at trial.
[brief] Statutes N.J.S.A. 27:23-3 .............................................................................................................................48 N.J.S.A. 27:23-6.1(a) ....................................................................................................................38 N.J.S.A. 40A:11-13 .........................................................................................................................27 N.J.S.A. 40A:11-22 .........................................................................................................................38 N.J.S.A. 40A:11-23.2 .......................................................................................................................41 N.J.S.A. 46:2B-8.2(a) ...................................................................................................................31, 38, 45, 51 N.J.S.A. 46:2B-8.9 .........................................................................................................................31 N.J.S.A. 46:14-2.1 .........................................................................................................................31 Regulations N.J.A.C. 19:9-2-12(b) ....................................................................................................................9 PRELIMINARY STATEMENT This matter arises from the [...]’s (“[...]”) rejection of a bid submitted by [...] (“[...]”) for Contract T100.638 (the “Contract”), entitled “Deck Rehabilitation of Newark Bay – Hudson County Extension (NB-HCE) Bridge Zones 2 and 3”\(^1\) (“Redecking Project”).
[brief] ”  Conway v. 287 Corp. Ctr. Assocs., 187 N.J. 259, 268 (2006) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 213 (1981); (emphasis added)); see also Ocean Cape Hotel Corp. v. Masefield Corp., 63 N.J. Super. 369, 378 (App.Div.1960) (citing Naumberg v. Young, 44 N.J.L. 331 (Sup. Ct. 1882) (“[T]he parol evidence rule operates to prohibit the introduction of oral promises to alter or vary an integrated written instrument….”; (emphasis added.))
[brief] Da150.  The Court denied the motion in an Opinion dated September 17, 2018.  8a; Da154.  In doing so, the Court expressly ruled that the Spill Act claims sought to be asserted by the [...] were barred by the doctrine of judicial estoppel.  9a; Da154.  The Court found that the [...] had taken the position at the hardship stay hearing that there were no further environmental issues, yet now were taking a different stance.  8a-9a; Da154.  The Court further ruled that the proposed cross-claims against the [...] were barred by the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel, because they already had been dismissed with prejudice by the Court’s May 16, 2017 Order.
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT BECAUSE THE ADOPTION OF THE SECOND ORDINANCE WAS ARBITRARY, CAPRICIOUS AND UNREASONABLE SINCE IT WAS BASED UPON THE PLANNING BOARD’S DETERMINATION OF THE SECOND ORDINANCE’S CONSISTENCY WITH ONLY GENERALIZED OBJECTIVES OF THE MASTER PLAN, WHICH DETERMINATION WAS ITSELF ARBITRARY, CAPRICIOUS AND UNREASONABLE AND UNSUPPORTED IN THE RECORD.  FURTHER, THERE WERE NO FINDINGS OF FACT.
[brief] The video was [never] compared to [...] description by the public or State many informants.  Because the shooter does not look like defendant.  What we have here is an over-zealous “Police Investigation and Prosecutor” to close a case with no evidence directed at defendant.  There is no motive, John Doe murder has no evidence of motive or suspects.  [...], did not care for or like defendant [...], this was well known throughout the Paterson community.  [...] was upset concerning John Doe’s murder so he had a personal dispute with defendant.  But the favor Robinson received from Police and State tip Robinson feelings and judgment to LIE for a deal!  The many people at the gathering (shrine), no one heard Robinson statements against defendant or defendant’s [...] statement against [...].  If the State is allowed to convict without evidence, i.e. DNA, Gun, Scientific evidence (Criminological), and Eye witness.  Just one witness who was a friend of [...] and received favors from State.  There is a serious problem with our Justice system.  The State’s first trial was reverse, second retrial must vacate defendant’s convictions, and allow [...]’s attorney to move to dismiss indictment.
[brief] In Omar, the borrower originally took out a mortgage loan with Lender A in 2003 and then refinanced the original loan with Lender B in 2004.  In connection with the refinance, [...], the servicer for Lender A (“[...]”) received a $298,219.57 check from the title agent at closing, [...] (“[...]”).  [...] internal records confirmed its receipt of the check but noted the check was short by $559.65 representing additional per diem interest.  Instead of depositing the check, applying the $298,219.57 to the outstanding loan balance and then contacting [...] to arrange for receipt of the additional sums, [...] apparently returned the check to [...] one (1) day later claiming it was short.  Additionally, the record also reflected that [...] returned the check to [...] a second time, and [...] ---
[brief] (Pa0264-0265; 1T179:1-7.)  [...] also testified that his calculations of “property damage” allocation were not based on the concept of allocating property damage to insurance policy periods.  (1T403:6-8) (“No, I was not trying to do an allocation to individual policies.  That was beyond the scope of what I was doing”.).  [...] instead performed a weighted analysis that attempts to identify how much contamination can be attributed to each AOC – in other words, X% at AOC1, Y% at AOC2, etc.  He did not, however, determine that X% of the contamination took place during any particular policy period – he did not say, for example, that 30% of the contamination took place in 1970.  (Pa0487-0490.)  He also did not say that any particular volume of releases and contamination took place on any particular day or at any particular time.  (Pa0491.)  [...]’s “weighted by AOC” analysis is nowhere to be found in [...].