ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] *N.J.R.Evid.*  702 defines expert testimony:  If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.  That is:  The primary justification for permitting expert testimony is that the average juror is relatively helpless in dealing with a subject that is not a matter of common knowledge.  *Angel v. Rand Express Lines, Inc.*, 66 N.J. Super. 77, 85 (App.Div.1961).  Thus, the proponent of expert testimony must demonstrate that testimony would “enhance the knowledge and understanding of lay jurors with respect to other testimony of a special nature normally outside of the usual lay sphere.
[brief] U.S. District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania, Dec. 27, 2010 757 Supp. 2d 535), to which bares precedent; once a challenge to the sufficiency of service is lodged, (Pa10-Pa11; Pa33-Pa35; Pa39-Pa40; Pa58-Pa59; Pa62) "the party asserting the validity of service BEARS the burden of proof on that issue."  Grand Entm't Grp., Ltd. v. Star Media Sales, Inc., 988 F.2d 476, 488 (3d Cir. 1993).  As previously cited, where default was entered without proper service of the complaint, it is “a fortiori void, and SHOULD BE SET ASIDE.
[brief] As for factor three—the type and nature of the case, including any unique factual issues which may give rise to discovery problems—this was a complex medical malpractice case that was already over three years old.  The case involved several defendants, and numerous experts on both sides.  There had already been several extensions of the discovery end date and all parties were struggling to schedule expert depositions prior to the deadline of October 17, 2021.  Thus, permitting plaintiff to replace their existing expert, who had already been deposed, would have only caused further and unnecessary delays.
[brief] The court denied annulment in Patel, supra, 265 N.J. Super. 408, because the marriage was consummated and thus required clear and convincing proofs to demonstrate grounds for annulment.  In the instant case, the marriage was never consummated, see Bilowit v. Dolitsky, 124 N.J. Super. 101, 102–03 (Ch. Div. 1973) (“Our courts have long required a more substantial quantum of fraud to entitle a party to an annulment where the marriage has been consummated than where it has not.  Any kind of fraud which would render a contract voidable may be the basis for the annulment of a marriage similarly infected” (citing Ysern v. Horter, 91 N.J. Eq. 189 (Ch. 1920); Caruso v. Caruso, 104 N.J. Eq. 588 (Ch. 1929)).  Moreover, both parties in Patel, supra, 265 N.J. Super. 408, testified that it was their intention to live as husband and wife.  It was the Plaintiff’s intention to live in the United States.  It was the Defendant's intention to live with her husband as his wife.  Both parties had the requisite intent to create a meaningful relationship at the time of the marriage or civil ceremony as required by law and, therefore, grounds for annulment were not shown – there was no pre-marital lie or fraud that related to conditions existing at the time of the marriage.  Patel, supra, 265 N.J. Super. 409; Faustin, supra, 85 N.J. 507.  In Plaintiff’s case here, by contrast, the undisputed evidence showed that there was no consummation of the marriage, and that Defendant never had any intent to create a meaningful relationship with plaintiff.
[brief] The test for determining whether the right to a speedy trial has been violated was established by Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972).  Barker held:  We can do little more than identify some of the factors which courts should assess in determining whether a particular defendant has been deprived of this right.  Though some might express them in different ways, we identify four such factors: length of delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant’s assertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant.  Barker, 407 U.S. 514, 530, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 2192, 33 L.Ed.2d 101.  Four years later, New Jersey adopted Barker’s four-prong test in State v. Szima, 70 N.J. 196 (1976).  Szima noted that Barker rejected the suggestion that a fixed time period be set, holding instead that the right to a speedy trial is relative and depends upon circumstances.  Id. at 200.  Szima emphasized that the conduct of both the State and a defendant must be weighed in evaluating delays under the Barker test.  Id. at 201-202  In State v. Cahill, 213 N.J. 253 (2013), defendant was convicted of DWI after his motion to dismiss based on speedy trial grounds was denied.  Notice of trial date in the [...] was 29 months from the date of his arrest.  Ultimately, the Cahill Court declined to adopt “a rigid bright-line try-or-dismiss rule” and reaffirmed “adherence to the four-factor Barker analysis” noting that “knowledge of the facts of an individual case are the best indicators of whether a right to a speedy trial has been violated. ”  Id.  The Cahill Court found, “None of the Barker factors is determinative, and the absence of one or some of the factors is not conclusive of the ultimate determination of whether the right has been violated. ”  Id. at 267  Here, the De Novo Court found that none of the Barker factors weighed in Defendant’s favor.  Although there was approximately 20 months from the date of Defendant’s arrest until the date of his trial, the Court correctly found that length of time by itself did not control the analysis.  (Da21)  The Court recognized that it wasn’t until 20 months after his arrest that Defendant even asserted his right to speedy trial on the record.  (Da23)  The Court also found Defendant failed to demonstrate any prejudice from this delay and, significantly, that this delay was mostly attributable to Defendant and his “futile and overly-broad” discovery effort.  (Da22-Da23)  Accordingly, the De Novo Court properly found that there was no violation of Defendant’s right to a speedy trial and that decision should be affirmed.
[brief] (Da2209-2223)  He granted approximately $1,100,000 in additional relief against [...], in some parts on undocumented claims.  (Ibid.)  He ordered [...] to reimburse [...] for $504,058.35 “for its Payment of [[...]’s] legal fees and arbitration charges in this arbitration” on his behalf.  (Da2212; Da2220)  He awarded Plaintiffs another legal fee reimbursement of $70,975.36 for fees [...] Paid for [...] in a “Morris County Estate Litigation. ”  (Da2213)  He voided $95,000 of medical expense reimbursements [...] paid to [...].  (Da2214)  He also shifted to [...] $314,730.10 of Plaintiffs’ legal fees in this action, based on his belief and the Plaintiffs’ argument that the third-party tort exception to the American Rule and R. 4:42-9 somehow applied, although this was a direct action.  (Da2215-16)  The “Final Award” decided all of Plaintiffs’ monetary claims, rejected all of [...]’s claims and expelled [...] from [...], subject to valuation of his interests.
[brief] In this case, it is seemingly impossible for the ballots to have been untimely cast and still received by the USPS and Board on the following Tuesday after a holiday weekend, when both had been closed previously.  “Based on the evidence before it, the Court finds the probability remote that any ballots lacking a postmark and received within forty-eight hours of the closing of the polls are cast after Election Day. ”  Donald J. Trump for President, Inc. v. Way, 492 F. Supp. 3d 354, 371 (D.N.J. 2020).  Nevertheless, when faced with testimony of three voters who testified they timely mailed their ballots, the Court should look at the legislative intent to enfranchise voters and construe Title 19 liberally wherever possible.
[brief] When the parties were arguing jury instructions the next day, [...] contradicted its own argument and insisted this issue should be one for the Court to decide.  Now [...] argued, “this is not a jury question,” and “That is a function exclusively \(^5\) “Any stipulation or provision purporting to bind a purchaser acquiring an interest in a timeshare plan subject to the provisions of this act to a waiver of compliance with the provisions of this act shall be void. ”  N.J.S.A. 45:15-16.80(c). in the Court’s zone, not the jury zone. ” (16T62:21-63:4).  The Court maintained its original position and charged the jury on this issue.  [...] also claims that it submitted a proposed jury instruction on this issue but has not provided a copy of this on appeal.  The parties’ discussion of the jury instruction on this issue does not include any reference to a proposed instruction from [...].  (16T62:5-72:4).
[brief] [...] relies on the statement of facts set forth in his initial brief.  (Pb 3-17).  In opposition to defendants’ motion for summary judgment, [...] relied on the contracts between him and defendants which were submitted in support of defendants’ motion for summary judgment (Vol. 1 Pa. 159-177).  Defendants have not contested [...]’s contention that he was entitled to $306,000.00 for his services for his positions at [...].  Although [...] was unable to produce checks he deposited in his bank account prior to 2016, [...] was able to obtain all checks issued to him by [...] in 2016 and 2017 (Vol. I, Pa. 75; TR 43-24 to 47-18).  [...]’s answer to defendant’s Statement of Undisputed Material Facts listed all the checks issued to him by [...] (Vol. III, Pa. 389).  Defendants do not dispute that the correct total for all the checks produced by [...] from [...] or 2016 and 2017 was $95,364.82 (Vol. III Pa. 405-415).  As [...], Defendant MHA LLC’s bookkeeper advised [...] that $255,000.00 in December of 2017, the checks submitted to the motion court establish that $210,635.00 of the $255,000.00 claim for damages accrued in 2016 and 2017 which were respectively within four and three years of the filing of [...]’s Law Division Complaint.  When [...] received payments from MHA LLC he received one check for all his positions (Vol. 1 Pa. 75).  None of the checks issued by MHA LLC designated a specific period time for which MHA LLC sought to apply the payment for its debt to [...] (Vol. 3 Pa. 404-415).  ARGUMENT
[brief] The next day, on August 24, 2021, defendant left two additional voicemail messages on the victim’s law office line, which were also saved and turned over to the police.  (3T32-10 to 33-2; S-2 in Evidence).  Defendant continued to threaten the victim by name, referenced the August 19, 2021 hearing, mentioned both [...] and the judge’s hometown of [...], and used vulgar and sexually explicit language, with statements such as, “You better motherf**king move out of mother**king [...]…” (Pa6), and “I will have my foot in your motherf**king ass,” (Pa6).  (3T34-7 to 35-17; 3T36-21 to 37-3; Pa5-7; Da6; Da10).  Around that time, defendant was also calling the [...] trying to reach the victim.  (3T63-14 to 64-22).  Defendant would identify himself by name, and get “irate,” yelling, cursing, and threatening of the judge when the court administrator would not let him speak to the judge.  (3T64-11 to 66-22).  On August 23, 2021, after receiving three such calls, the court administrator filed a judiciary incident report out of concern for the judge’s safety.
[brief] ”  *Id.*  565.  Moreover, the costs of the Senior Center, to which the Redevelopment Payment was dedicated, are not the type of off-tract improvements governed by *N.J.S.A.* 40:55D-42, which concerns “reasonable and necessary street improvements and water, sewerage and drainage facilities, and easements therefor, located off-tract but necessitated or required by construction or improvements within such subdivision or development.
[brief] ...[A] determination whether there exists a genuine issue of material fact that precludes summary judgment requires the motion judgment to consider whether the competent evidential materials presented, when viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, are sufficient to permit a rational fact-finder to resolve the alleged disputed issue in favor of the non-moving party.  The judge’s function is not himself [or herself] to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.  It is critical that the trial court ruling on a summary judgment motion not shut a deserving litigant from his [or her] trial. ’ (other citations and quotations omitted).  *Brill v. Guardian Life Insurance Company of America*, 142 N.J. 520, 540 (1995) (other citations omitted).  A jury has the unyielding role of determining the ultimate question in employment matter cases alleging discrimination or retaliation:  The role of determining whether the inference of discrimination is warranted must remain with the province of the jury, because a finding of discrimination is at bottom a determination of intent.  In making that finding, the jury must perform its traditional function of assessing the weight of the evidence, the credibility of the witness through observation of both direct testimony and cross-examination at trial, and the strength of the inferences that can be drawn from the elements of the *prima facie* case and the evidence that undermines the employer’s proffered reasons for its actions.  This is uniquely the role of the fact-finder, not the court.
[brief] S.C. Civil Action  DEFENDANTS’ BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL  On the Brief and of Counsel: [...], Esq. N.J. Attorney No. 000821994  [...]  [...], Esq. N.J. Attorney No. 0034492010  [...]  [...]  The Point at Morristown  [...]  [...] [...]; Fax [...]  Attorneys for Defendants/Movants  [...] d/b/a [...] and [...]
[brief] ” (See Exhibit I, Transcript of Oral Argument, pp. 47:20 – 48:22).  However, neither of those reasons are well-founded.  First, the issue regarding the lease was, as the foregoing section of this argument demonstrates, nothing but a red herring.  Plaintiff did not need to review the lease to know that he had been injured by the fault of another, to know [...]’s identity, nor that he had a potential cause of action on a common-law duty theory.  Consequently, the lack of a lease did not preclude Plaintiff from filing the complaint under the common law theory he later espoused.  In addition, there is no merit to the claim that [...]’s answer to interrogatories was misleading.  The courts have invoked several equitable doctrines, including equitable estoppel, detrimental reliance, and equitable tolling, to toll the statute of limitations when a statement induces a plaintiff to withhold filing his or her complaint until after a statute of limitations period expires.
[brief] According to the complaint, [...] is a local group located in [...] dedicated to keeping [...] Public School in [...].  (32a.) makes her message sound as if it is an official [B]oard action despite her disclaimer.  (37a-38a.)  •  **Count 17**:  Respondents [...], [...], [...], and [...] violated *N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(e)* because there “seems to be a strong indicator . . . that some or all of the [five] [...] Board members . . . are working outside of the Board to negotiate on issues with the City of [...] . . . [and] [t]his clearly is harmful to the [Board],” and violated *N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(f)* because “it appears that the some or all of the 5 [...] Board [m]embers may be captive to a special interest, in this case the City of [...],” and that the interests of the City of [...] are being held “above the interest of the overall [D]istrict.
[directive] Under no circumstances may a law enforcement agency’s internal affairs investigatory function be contracted or delegated to a private entity.  Instead, when necessary, law enforcement agencies may request that an internal affairs complaint be investigated directly by the County Prosecutor, who shall determine whether to investigate the matter, refer the matter to the Internal Affairs function of another law enforcement entity, or return the matter to the originating law enforcement agency if the County Prosecutor determines that the original agency can appropriately investigate the matter.  4.2.8  Where appropriate, an agency may enter into an agreement with another law enforcement agency to conduct an Internal Affairs investigation, and smaller law enforcement agencies that consistently have difficulty carrying out the internal affairs function are encouraged to 17
[brief] | TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS | |----------------------------------------| | Order, entered October 8, 2021 .......... Pa087 | | Sua Sponte  Order for Clarification of October 8, 2021 | | Order and Decision, entered October 27, 2021 ..............  Pa091 | | Order to Amend Complaint April 1, 2022 ..................... Pa146 | | Order & Reasons, entered June 16, 2022 ..................... Pa186 | | Order Dismissing Complaint March 18, 2024 ................... Pa267 | | Statement of Reasons ...........................................  Pa269 | # TABLE OF CONTENTS  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT ..................................................  1  PROCEDURAL HISTORY ......................................................  3  STATEMENT OF FACTS .......................................................  5 LEGAL ARGUMENT ..................................................................  8  I.  APPELLATE STANDARD OF REVIEW.  ... Error!
[directive] CourtSmart recording remains official court record, pursuant to 1 :2-2 and Directive #07-10.  R. for  The division manager responsible the trial must reach out to the Regional Court The Reporter Supervisor to advise that a freelance stenographer has been proposed.  Regional Court Reporter Supervisor will then consult with the freelance stenographer, verify of of of the status the stenographer's license with the State New Jersey, provide a copy the for "Transcript Format Judicial Proceedings" handbook, and confirm that the freelance stenographer has provided all necessary information and·completed all required forms.  As noted, the CourtSmart recording remains the official court record, notwithstanding the approval for a freelance stenographer to make an unofficial daily record.
[brief] [...] stated in its answer to Interrogatory No. 1 of the plaintiff’s First Set of Supplemental Interrogatories that it reviewed the “in-house” error logs and determined that there were no errors in the computer operation of the digital cinema.  [...] saw fit to review the “in-house” error logs after the plaintiff’s accident but then allowed these records to self-delete.  The fact that [...] reviewed the “in-house” error logs shortly after the plaintiff’s accident put [...] under a duty to preserve this evidence.  There is an issue of fact regarding whether the “in-house” error logs self-deleted after eight days or after three weeks.  The court found as fact that the logs self-deleted after eight days based upon the self-serving certification of [...], the [...] Director of Technical Operations.  (T55:25 – T56:1-2)  On the other hand, [...] manager [...] testified at her deposition on August 31, 2018 that the logs self-deleted after three weeks.  (Pa107 to Pa112)  Nevertheless, the court found as fact, “Since [...]’s request was not made within eight days of plaintiff’s accident there is no merit to plaintiff’s argument that [...] destroyed the logs despite [...]’s letter. ”  (T56:4-8)  The “playing field” is not “fair and even” as between the plaintiff and [...] because of the plaintiff’s lack of access to the “in-house” error logs that were destroyed by [...].
[brief] The court quoted and relied on a 1996 FTC Staff Letter involving similar facts which stated:  The **purpose** of the letter is […] to obtain recipients’ telephone numbers so that they can be contacted by a creditor or collector in connection with the collection of debts allegedly owed by them to third parties.  **To the extent that the letter serves a collection function** (albeit an indirect collection function), which we believe it does, it brings your client within the coverage of the FDCPA.  *Id.* at 1147 (italics removed, emphasis added).  Here, the only purpose for Defendant’s conveyance of the information regarding Plaintiff’s debt was to prepare and mail Defendant’s letter to induce payment of the debt.  Thus, Defendant’s conveyance of information about the debt to its mail vendor “serves a collection function” and “is in connection with the collection of debts.
[brief] Here, the fee shifting provision contained in the parties’ Operating Agreement provides the Court with discretion to determine who is the prevailing party and the amount, if any, fee award, that the prevailing party is entitled to receive from the non-prevailing party.  See Pa15, SG Health Operating Agreement at ¶ 10.5.  Plaintiff brought this action in good faith and successfully used discovery in this litigation to obtain financial information relating to [...] to which he was entitled pursuant to the Operating Agreement and LLC Act.  Defendant did not assert a counterclaim, nor did she obtain any affirmative relief against Plaintiff.  Prior to discovery in this lawsuit, Defendant had failed and refused to provide this information to Plaintiff.  Therefore, despite the jury verdict in favor of Defendant, Defendant should not be deemed the prevailing party for purposes of fee shifting under the Operating Agreement.  To hold otherwise would unfairly penalize Plaintiff for seeking to enforce his contractual and statutory rights, and reward Defendant for withholding this information from Plaintiff until he sued her.  Therefore, the trial court erred in granting Defendant’s fee application because Defendant was not the prevailing party under the relevant Singer formula, and Plaintiff brought this action in good faith and discovery in this litigation was necessary for Plaintiff to obtain financial information relating to [...] to which he was entitled pursuant to the Operating Agreement and LLC Act.
[brief] For example, it would not be enough for a landlord to provide a numerical value for condominium or management fees.  Instead, the landlord must show what the condominium fees include.  The Board must then also determine whether each itemized cost resulting from a conversion added services or amenities not previously provided.  If they did not, then the cost may not be passed to the tenant.  For each claimed expense a landlord seeks reimbursement for, the Board must analyze each cost as follows:
[brief] It is within the Board’s power to relax time limits.  The Board’s initial denial has failed to consider, evaluate, and weigh [...]’s equitable claims.  Most notably, it failed to even mention the approximately one hundred affidavits submitted that support the fact that these postcards were never received by [...] or other members of the pension system.  Furthermore, the Board’s decision inflicts obvious and unnecessary harm upon [...] and fails to advance the legislative purpose of the Ricci Act.  The legislative purpose of the Ricci Act was to provide first responders with the ability to alter their retirement benefits if they have fallen ill as a result of their honorable and heroic service at the largest terrorist attack this country has ever seen, not to unnecessarily and arbitrarily deny sick retired troopers accidental disability benefits.  [...] and ninety-seven (97) other active and retired troopers provided affidavits that they never received notice sent regarding the Ricci Act.  Because the Board failed to fulfill its statutory obligation under the Act to provide notice to all the members of the retirement system within 30 days, and further because it appears that the vast majority never got any notice at all, the Board’s determination was arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable.  As such, in the interest of justice and in the furtherance of a just accommodation, we respectfully request that Board’s determination be reversed and that [...]’s application to register his presence at Ground Zero and his request for amended benefits be granted.