ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] More specifically, Appellant identifies the plaintiffs, the buyer, the realtors, the federal and state governments, the municipality, the title insurer and the attorneys, as third parties that benefitted from his actions.  In fact, to the extent that these third parties received any funds related to this transaction, it was because of the actual sale of the Property and not related to the actions of Appellant whatsoever.  Appellant’s recent representation is self-serving at best, as said third parties were paid regardless of the actions taken by Appellant.  The Court has held "our appellate courts will decline to consider questions or issues not properly presented to the trial court when an opportunity for such a presentation is available unless the questions so raised on appeal go to the jurisdiction of the trial court or concern matters of great public interest."
[brief] She moved for relief in aid of litigant's rights to: compel defendant to pay past due and future child support; modify the child support amount; require that defendant pay his share of the children's past, present, and prospective education costs and expenses; compel defendant to pay for past and future unreimbursed medical expenses; direct that defendant maintain a life insurance policy for the benefit of the children; and require defendant's payment of plaintiff's attorney's fees.  Defendant cross-moved for an order retroactively emancipating [...] and [...] on the dates of their respective college graduations; terminating his child support obligation; and requiring that plaintiff pay his attorney's fees.  The trial court heard argument on the motions and entered July 14, 2017 orders denying without prejudice defendant's cross-motion for emancipation of the children, termination of child support, and attorney's fees.  The court granted plaintiff's motion compelling defendant to pay $8622.64 in child support arrears based on the JOD's $180 weekly support rate, and directing defendant pay $182.91 per week toward the arrears.  The court did not address the merits of plaintiff's requests for an increase in child support, defendant's payment for the children's education and medical expenses under the JOD, or plaintiff's request for an attorney fee award.  Instead, the court directed that the parties attempt to work out their remaining claims—those the court denied without prejudice—in mediation.
[brief] See, e.g., Kinderkamack Road Assocs. v. Mayor and Council, Oradell, 421 N.J. Super. 8, 21 (App. Div. 2011).  N.J.S.A. 40:55D-10(g) requires written "facts and conclusions . . . in each decision on any application for development"; the failure to make adequate findings for appellate review will generally warrant a remand for proper findings.  See Smith v. Fair Haven Zoning Bd. of Adj., 335 N.J. Super. 111, 123 (App. Div. 2000).  When the Board makes findings, the Court must review the record to ensure that there is competent evidence to support them; if a finding is not supported by competent evidence, the Court should vacate same as being an arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable board decision.
[brief] (Aa80-90).  On May 10, 2023, [...] filed a motion for Reconsideration, Alteration, Amendment, and Clarification.  (Aa480-504).  On July 10, 2023, the court denied [...]’s Motion for Reconsideration, again finding that [...] lacked standing and failed to meet the standard for reconsideration.  (Aa89).  On August 3, 2023, [...] appealed.
[brief] The FDCPA protects consumers against communications from debt collectors which are harassing, oppressive, abusive, false, deceptive, misleading, unfair, or unconscionable from the perspective of the least sophisticated consumer.  15 U.S.C. § 1692d, § 1692e, and § 1692f.  Thus, a debt collector violates the FDCPA and is thereby liable for at least statutory damages and attorneys’ fees without considering whether the plaintiff was confused or misled by the collection letter—indeed, even without regard to whether the plaintiff read the letter.  Jensen v. Pressler & Pressler, 791 F.3d 413, 419 (3d Cir. 2015) (“The standard is an objective one, meaning that the specific plaintiff need not prove that she was actually confused or misled, only that the objective least sophisticated debtor would be. ”); Tourgeman v. Collins Fin. Servs., Inc., 755 F.3d 1109, 1117–18 (9th Cir. 2014) (“An FDCPA plaintiff need not even have actually been misled or deceived by the debt collector’s representation; instead, liability depends on whether the hypothetical ‘least sophisticated debtor’ likely would be misled. ”); Bartlett v. Heibl, 128 F.3d 497, 499 (7th Cir. 1997).
[brief] 474 N.J. Super. at 503 (“[O]ur Supreme Court has adopted the stricter approach found in *Atalese* ‘only in the context of employment and consumer contracts. ’  This observation is certainly correct. ”) (quoting *Remicade*, 938 F.3d at 525).  Importantly, this Court confirmed that *Atalese* and *Flanzman* were “about the nonexistence of a waiver of the important right to seek relief in a court of law in contracts involving *consumers and employees*, who are not necessarily versed in the meaning of law-imbued terminology about procedures tucked into form contracts. ”  *Id.* at 503 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).  However, this concern “vanishes” in the commercial context:  This concern for those not versed in the law or not necessarily aware of the fact that an agreement to arbitrate may preclude the right to sue in a court . . . vanishes when considering individually-negotiated contracts between sophisticated parties – often represented by counsel at the formation stage – possessing relatively similar bargaining power.  Although our Supreme Court has not expressly declared it, and although we too have not said as much in any published opinion, we are satisfied . . . and as we now so hold – that an express waiver of the right to seek relief in a court of law to the degree required by *Atalese* is unnecessary when parties to a commercial contract are sophisticated and possess comparatively equal bargaining power.
[brief] Defendants’/Appellants’ attempt to rewrite and improve an unambiguous contract was firmly rejected by the court below and should be rejected here.  Through a written contract titled “Memorandum of Understanding” (MOU), Plaintiff/Appellee [...] ([...]) purchased a 100% ownership interest in [...] ([...]), a company saddled with debt – principally a $30 million mortgage that was in default and has now matured to a $47 million foreclosure judgment.  Prior to the execution of the MOU, [...] was a subsidiary or affiliate of Defendants/Appellants [...], and/or the other [...] defendants (collectively, [...] or Appellants).  [...] is and remains the fee simple owner of real property located at [...] (the Property).  As the new owner of 100% of the membership interests in [...], [...] gained operational control over the Property, but [...] does not own the Property.  As consideration for the purchase of a 100% interest in [...], [...] assumed [...]’ debts and liabilities totaling $2,569,838.26 plus liability from a foreclosure action amounting to $37,594,492 as of January 1, 2022.  The liability from that foreclosure action has since increased to over $47 million, as indicated by the judgment entered on June 20, 2024.  (Pa1).  Pursuant to the MOU, [...] has also expended considerable resources – including around $600,000 to cover soft costs, 1T 52:22-24 – to pursue development rights for the property, with the objective of satisfying [...]’ liabilities to the great benefit of Appellants.  Due to the magnitude of [...]’ liabilities, the parties to the MOU agreed that the assumption of debts by [...] was sufficient consideration.  Nevertheless, there was other consideration.  Per the plain text of the MOU, there was the nominal $1.00 payment together with the $2 to $3 million “kicker” in the conditional event [...] succeeded in obtaining residential zoning (the property is currently zoned for commercial use) within a certain time frame.  [...] commenced the zoning application process, but even an initial application for retail development was rejected and is now the subject of a separately-pending prerogative writ challenge in Bergen County.  339 River Rd., LLC v. Planning Bd. of the Borough of Edgewater, Docket No. [...].  Axiomatically, to date, [...] has not persuaded the town of Edgewater to pursue the residential zoning which would have entitled Appellants to the conditional payments.  [...] took the good with the bad by purchasing an entity saddled with as much debt as its assets could secure; Appellants now complain the deal was somehow unfair and wants to recant its agreement.
[brief] Page  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .................................................................................. iv TABLE OF JUDGMENTS AND ORDERS ..........................................................  viii  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT .............................................................................1  STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY .................................4  A.  [...]’S FINANCIAL CRISIS AND DESIGNATION UNDER THE MSRA .................................................................4  B.  THE MSRA CONFERRED THE DIRECTOR WITH BROAD POWERS TO STABILIZE [...] AND FACILITATE ITS RECOVERY.  ......................................................7  C.  COURTS HAVE CONSISTENTLY CONFIRMED THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE MSRA.  .........................................................8  D.  THE SUPERIOR OFFICERS DECISION  .......................................................13  E. PLAINTIFFS’ COMPLAINT  ........................................................................15  F.  THE SUPERIOR COURT’S WELL-REASONED DECISION DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT WITH PREJUDICE.  .................................................................20
[brief] \(^{10}\)  FERC staff noted in the FEIS that construction of a pipeline segment as an alternative to CS 327 “would require around 23 miles of pipeline resulting in 279 acres of temporary disturbance, including impacts on 19 acres of wetlands and 8 waterbodies; and require 121 acres of permanent operational right-of-way impact.  In addition, this alternative would impact over 200 private landowners, none of [...] was able avoid impacts to environmental resources.  Therefore, the construction, operation and maintenance of CS 327 qualifies for Exemption #11 as it would be an upgrade to [...]’s existing 300 Line gas pipeline system.  In addition, Appellants argue that [...]’s exemptions for its 300 Line Project and NEUP have not been upheld by any New Jersey court and, therefore, they should be “accorded less deference”.
[brief] Aside from the defect of publicity, the data transmitted to [...]’s mailing vendor (Plaintiff’s status as a debtor, his account number and amount owed) does not, as a matter of law, qualify as “highly offensive” to the reasonable person.  As numerous courts have indicated, an individuals’ status as a debtor is not information that, if disclosed, would be “highly offensive. ”  *See In re FDCPA Mailing Vendor Cases*, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 139848 (E.D.N.Y. July 23, 2021) (“it would be difficult to suggest, using the ‘invasion of privacy’ analysis . . . that communication of purported non-payment of a relatively *de minimis* debt to a mailing vendor constitutes a ‘matter publicized . . . of a kind that . . . would be highly offensive to a reasonable person. ”); *Shields v. Professional Bureau of Collections of Maryland*, No 2:20-cv-02205-HLT-GEB, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 197903, at *8 (Dist. Kan. Oct. 14, 2021) (“even if sending debtor information to a single vendor counted as publication for standing purposes, that information must still be highly offensive to a reasonable person for the FDCPA claim to be analogous to the common-law claim.
[brief] On or about March 3, 2023, the Bill Ricci Rescue, Recovery, and Cleanup Operations Act (hereinafter referred to as the “Ricci Act”) was signed into law.  On or about March 3, 2023, [...], along with many others, filed his Eligibility Registration Form to register his presence at Ground Zero under the Ricci Act, along with a Request for Amended Benefits Form, Affidavit, and a Petition.  Pa32.  Pa58.  Pa60.  Pa62.  On or about May 2, 2023, the [...] administratively denied [...]’s appeal, and the matter was transmitted to the [...].  Pa75.  On or about June 13, 2023, the [...] issued an initial decision to deny [...]’s request to register for the Ricci Act.  Pa26.  On or about June 30, 2023, [...]’s wife transmitted an appeal of the Board’s determination.  Pa24.  On or about July 18, 2023, through counsel, [...] appealed the Board’s initial decision and requested an administrative hearing.  Pa16.  The Board denied an administrative hearing and issued a Final Agency Decision on September 27, 2023.  Pa9.  This appeal ensued.  Pa1.
[brief] N.J. Super. 199 (App. Div. 2004) | | | In Re [...] | 8 | | 172  N.J. Super. 275 (App. Div. 1980) | | COURT RULES: N.J.S.A. 43:15A-25.2(c) ..................................................  9  N.J.S.A. 52:14B-1 et seq.  .................................................  4 N.J.S.A. 52:15B-2 et seq.  ..................................................  8  Rule 2:2-3(a)(2)...............................................................  2 N.J.A.C. 17:2-1A.1 ............................................................  2,4,7,9 N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.2(a)(1) .....................................................  7 N.J.A.C. 4A:1-1.3 .............................................................  7  Public Health Service Act 42 U.S.C. Ch. 6A §201 ..............  8 Civil Service Act .............................................................  6 N.J.S.A. 11A:1-1 et seq.  ...................................................  7 N.J.S.A. 11A:9-9 .............................................................  7  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
[brief] In *Nunez*, the plaintiff, while delivering FedEx packages, slipped and fell on an icy and snow-covered public sidewalk on February 18, 2014.  From February 17, 2014, into the morning of February 18, 2014, several inches of snow fell and accumulated on the public sidewalk where the plaintiff had his fall, which abutted the defendants’ property.  At approximately 7:15 a.m. on February 18, 2014, defendant [...] went outside and removed the snow from the sidewalk using a shovel and snow blower.  Gallo testified that he did not observe any ice in the area where the plaintiff fell.  He also acknowledged that he did not put down any salt or de-icing compound.  He then left for work at approximately 8:45 and it was still snowing.  After Gallo left for work, the snow continued to fall up until the time the plaintiff had his accident.  (Pa100 at *1.)  The plaintiff arrived at [...]’ home to make a delivery shortly before 10:00 a.m.  He pulled the package to be delivered to [...] from his truck and slipped while carrying the package on the public sidewalk adjoining [...]’ property.  He testified that he slipped on ice that was concealed by snow.  Ibid.  Thereafter, the plaintiff sued [...] alleging negligence.  In support of his case, the plaintiff relied on an expert who rendered the opinion that the plaintiff’s fall was caused by a “hidden hazard in the form of ice underneath fresh snow on a public sidewalk, which was uncleared, unsalted and/or unsanded at the time of the accident. ”  Ibid.  Following the completion of discovery, [...] moved for summary judgment.  In opposition to this motion, the plaintiff argued that the ice, which caused the plaintiff to slip, formed by the melting and refreezing of snow piles created by defendant [...] in the days prior to the plaintiff’s fall.  In addition, the plaintiff contended that [...] failed to use salt or any ice melt component on the sidewalk.  The trial court determined, as a matter of law, that the defendants had no duty to the plaintiff because [...]’s actions in clearing the sidewalk added no new danger or hazard.  Id. at *1.  On appeal, one of the arguments made by the plaintiff was that the defendants’ voluntary undertaking to shovel the public sidewalk exposed them to liability, an argument very similar to that being made by plaintiff/appellant [...] in the instant matter.
[brief] A "material change of circumstance" means a change occurring after the pretrial conference that strengthens or weakens the case of either the prosecution or the defense sufficiently to warrant a change in their plea-bargaining position.  It may be either a change in fact or in the knowledge of counsel.  Some typical examples that may constitute material change of circumstance are when new charges are filed after the plea cut-off has been imposed, a justifiable change of attorney has occurred, a witness becomes no longer available, a mistrial or hung jury occurs, or some evidence is newly discovered.  However, a change that would ordinarily have been anticipated by a reasonably competent prosecutor or defense attorney, including some of the foregoing examples, is not material; nor is a change that results from counsel's lack of ordinary diligence.  A "protracted trial" is one that will probably last two weeks or more.
[brief] [...] further explained, that the Sheriff had gone to [...]’s residence pursuant to her Order. (1T, Pg. 10, lines 4-9).  Though she explained it was for the purpose of inventory rather than arrest.  Id.  In that exchange, on September 16, 2022, [...] repeatedly accused [...] of bias, harassment, permitting the weaponizing of the courts, and corruption, targeting the Sheriff’s officers against him, and further explained that he had reported those allegations to the FBI.  He explicitly stated that he wasn’t getting justice.  Nevertheless, [...] did not recuse herself from acting as trial judge in this matter.
[brief] Elizabeth Police Officer [...] was the sole witness to testify at the evidentiary hearing.  (1T)  On December 18, 2020, at around 11:00 p.m., Maldonado and his partner, Officer [...], were patrolling the area of Fairmount and Newark Avenue in Elizabeth in a marked patrol car when they noticed a white Toyota parked at a gas station.  (1T8-24 to 8-7, 8-14 to 8-16, 8-25 to 9-10, 9-23 to 9-25)  Maldonado testified this is a “high drug area,” although he did not provide any basis for his characterization.  (1T8-12 to 8-13)  The officers noticed the Toyota due to what they thought to be heavily tinted windows.  (1T8-25 to 9-4)  They did not approach the car, however, and instead continued patrolling.  (1T9-18 to 20)  When the officers returned to the area, they again saw the white Toyota in traffic and got behind it.  (1T9-20 to 10-3)  The officers searched the car’s license plate in the National Crime Information Center (NCIC) database which returned a possible outstanding warrant for the car’s owner, [...] (1T10-4 to 10-6)  Based on this information, the officers initiated a traffic stop.  (1T10-6 to 10-8)  The stop was captured on Maldonado’s body worn camera (BWC), and the footage was admitted into evidence at the suppression hearing.  (Da74; 1T29-19 to 31-1)  Castro, approaching from the driver’s side, ordered the driver to roll down all the windows while Maldonado approached from the passenger’s side.  There were five people in the car: the driver, [...]; [...], seated in the front passenger seat; and three passengers in the back seat including [...] and [...] (1T10-20 to 11-1; Da74 04:06:05 to 04:06:20)  Maldonado testified that upon approaching the car, he immediately smelled raw marijuana.  (1T11-2 to 11-4)  Castro informed [...] that she may have an outstanding warrant.  (1T11-14 to 11-17)  [...] responded that she had some issues in Orange but that it was resolved.  (1T11-18 to 11-20)  Castro ordered [...] to step out of the car and began questioning her.  (1T12-8 to 12-16; Da74 04:07:15 to 04:07:30)  Castro asked [...] if there is anything illegal in the car to which she responded, “I don’t know. ”  (Da74 04:08:05 to 04:08:15)  Castro then told [...] that there is a strong odor of marijuana coming from inside the car and asked if she had any drugs in the car, to which [...] responded “No. ”  (Da74 04:08:15 to 04:08:30)  When asked if there were any weapons in the car, she again answered there were not.  (Da74 04:08:30 to 04:08:33)  Finally, when asked if there was anything illegal in the car, she replied “Not that I know of. ”  (Da74 04:08:33 to 04:08:38)  Castro then told [...] they were going to search her car.  (D74 04:08:40 to 04:08:43)  --- 3
[brief] Our sentencing statute contemplates a thoughtful weighing of the aggravating and mitigating factors and each factor must be given appropriate weight.  *State v. Denmon*, 347 N.J. Super. 457, 467-68 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 174 N.J. 41 (2002); *State v. C.H.*, 264 N.J. Super. 112, 141 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 134 N.J. 479 (1993).  In this case, on count two of the Indictment, [...] sentenced defendant to seven years in prison without a period of parole ineligibility and dismissed the remaining counts of the Indictment.
[brief] INDEX OF ABBREVIATIONS  Abbreviation  The Mother  The appellant’s mother.  The Application  The application filed by the appellant’s mother with the respondents in 2019, upon which she requested form them to designate a reserved handicapped parking for her in front of her house.  NJMVC  [...]  NJCRD  [...].  HUD [...].  DOJ [...].  OPRA Open Public Records Act.  #
[directive] Krol Order Contact List  lndeptndtnce•lntegrily Faimn s•Ouality sirvlce of In the Matter - Select County - County Prosecutor: Defendant's Attorney: Name Name ________  Telephone Number  Telephone Number _ ---------- Email Email  Provider Agency: Name ---------------------------  Provider Agency CEO ----------------------------  Telephone Number  Em ail Court Contact: Name Title  ----------------------------  Telephone Number  Em ail by Form Promulgated Directive #21-20 (08/05/2020), CN 12563 (KROL Order 8)  Attachment J of Order 9 - Converting the Status NGRI Committee of to the Status Civil Committee
[brief] Endre v. Arnold, 300 N.J. Super 136, 141 (1997) (citations omitted).  Expert testimony is governed by N.J.R.E 702 which states:  If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.  The test of the need for expert testimony is whether the subject matter of the testimony is so esoteric that jurors of common judgment and experience cannot form a valid judgment as to whether the conduct of the party was reasonable.  Butler v. Acme Markets, Inc., 89 N.J. 270, 283 (1982).
[brief] DIVISION DOCKET NO. [...]  [...] and, [...]  Plaintiffs/Appellants, V. [...]  [...], GOVERNOR  [...], GOVERNOR OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY and [...], Defendants/Respondents.  Civil Action On Appeal from the Final Order of the Superior Court, Law Division  Mercer County Sat Below: Hon. [...], A.J.S.C.  APPELLATE  BRIEF OF DEFENDANT/RESPONDENT