ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] Medications in Drug Court, Pre-Sentence Clients  Requirements for post-plea into court clients pending sentencing all drug •  Attend court weekly treatment • in Engage to •  Submit drug testing instructed as • Submit home verification documentation* of •  Follow any conditions release of for time •  Presentence clients are retained the Assessment the extent between plea and sentence in Phase  *The following acceptable for home verification: are credit issued the past addressed a not acceptable)  90 box • days (mail Utility or to card bill is in P.O. account statement a bank credit issued the past from savings • or days 60 within  Checking union or unexpired lease rental agreement applicant's name displaying • or current, Original, tax statement, receipt from the past year •  Property or bill, Any letter correspondence tax received the state tax office the past year from • (including or or bills) in IRS received from state, government agency the past months federal, mail • or six local First-class in stub past (must contain the address)  • days within 90 Pay Sentenced Clients
[brief] LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I THE FORTY-FIVE (45) DAY RULE WAS NOT VIOLATED AND AS SUCH, THE CHARGES AND DECISION MUST BE SUSTAINED (Pa218 -Pa249; Pa288 -402)  In New Jersey, employee discipline as it pertains to municipal police officers is, in certain circumstances, subject to N.J.S.A.  40A:14-147, also known as the “45-day rule".  The purpose of this Rule was to ensure municipalities act within a reasonable time frame to bring disciplinary charges against public safety officers.  The New Jersey Attorney General’s Guidelines also provide that pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40A:14-147, disciplinary charges alleging a violation of the agency’s rules and regulations must be filed within 45 days of the date the person filing the charge obtained sufficient information to file the charge.
[brief] We also decline to find that aggravating factor nine is inappropriate in a case in which the defendant had no prior record, and the sentencing court accordingly applies mitigating factor seven, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)(7).  Neither the statutory language nor the case law suggest that a sentencing court can find a need for deterrence under N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(9) only when the defendant has a prior criminal record.  [Id. at 80.]  Finally, the Court also provided an example of how a sentencing court may arrive at a mid-range sentence, as was the case in this matter.
[brief] See, e.g., Willson v. Gerber Products Company, Docket No. A-1290-22, 2023 WL 8889528 at *5 (App. Div. Dec. 23, 2023) (citing Societie Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for S. Dist. of Iowa, 482 U.S. 522 (1987)).  See also Fraunhofer-Geselleshalt Zur Forderung der angewandten Forschung E.V., 2021 WL 861493 (D.Del. March 8, 2021) at *3 (Pa310); Metcalf v. Bay Ferries Limited, 2014 WL 3670786 (D. Mass. July 14, 2021) at *1-3 (Pa314); Peiker Acustic, Inc.  v. Kennedy, 2011 WL 1344238 (D. Colorado April 8, 2011) at *2 (Pa319); In re Vitamin Antitrust Litigation, 2001 WL 35814436 (D.D.C. Sept. 11, 2001) at *7-9 (Pa323).  Finally, the German Defendants represent that their counsel does not speak to [...] when (1) he is the person who retained them, CPa11, and (2) he previously provided deposition dates, which had to be canceled when he suddenly became unavailable.  Pa352, April 12, 2024  Transcript at T:4-10.  Those claims are neither credible nor material.  [...] is a director of the German Defendants.  Therefore, the German Defendants are obligated to produce him for deposition pursuant to the Court Rules.  CONCLUSION
[brief] Although the District’s schools were closed and no services were rendered in April – July 6, 2020, [...] submitted invoices seeking payment of $1,921,550.\textsuperscript{27} for purported “custodial services” that were never rendered.  [...] claims that a school law, \textit{N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-9(e)(3)}, under the New Jersey Department of Education’s jurisdiction, enabled them to receive this $1,301,300.\textsuperscript{18}, but they did not comply with any of the major components of that law, which mandated a renegotiated written contract and allowed the Board access to certain company data to determine what a fair payment would be.  [...] alleges that the $1,301,300.\textsuperscript{18} received for not working was converted to pay its employees, but [...]’s own unionized workforce sent the Board a letter in June 2021 advising that several of their members were actually laid off by [...], and did not receive payment. \textsuperscript{5}
[brief] *Gobe Media Group, LLC v. Cisneros*, 403 N.J. Super. 574, 577 (App. Div. 2008).  Plaintiff has not elected to void the deed, and the defendants do not indicate how they would have standing to do so.  As for the arguments at Db43 to Db44, plaintiff agrees that, on this record and at this juncture, there is no statute, rule or other authority that would support an award of counsel fees in its favor.  If that changes on remand, the plaintiff would seek fees.  CONCLUSION
[brief] Da64-66.  As a result, it was not possible for an objection based thereon to have been made at trial.  Insurance adjusters are not attorneys.  They are observers rather than participants at trial.  Their levels of experience vary.  The failure of the adjuster to recognize the significance of Plaintiff’s behavior and report it to defense counsel provides no basis to disregard the content of her certification, particularly in the absence of any certification or affidavit contradicting it.  In addition, the Court’s reliance upon the failure of any member of its staff to report “attempts” by plaintiff to improperly influence the jury unduly limited the scope of the potentially corrupting influences against which courts must guard and which the Court should have considered.
[brief] [...]’s Statements at Trial.  In her testimony at trial, [...] told a different version of events, some of which was blatantly false.  [...] testified that while they were outside the restaurant, she saw “the Asian officer” pull a gun and point it at defendant.  (8T61-18 to -25).  [...] added that the officer, when asked by defendant’s mother if he was going to shoot defendant, said, “Yes, I’m going to kill him – I’m going to shoot him. ”  [...] claimed that the officer then looked around and put the gun back in his holster.  (8T63-5 to -9).  None of this is portrayed on any of the videos in evidence.  [...] denied that defendant threw any punches at the officer, (8T64-6 to -8), but a video of the struggle shows that defendant threw a hand at [...], (Da14 at 0:00:25 to 0:00:27).  Additionally, [...] initially testified that one of the officers had “his arm around [defendant]’s neck,” (8T61-6 to -19), but on cross- examination admitted that this was untrue, (8T89-2 to -15).  She also testified that [...] struck defendant twice with a “nightstick,” (8T65-5 to -6), something that the videos in evidence do not depict.  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I THE OFFICERS’ TESTIMONY THAT THEY WERE ARRESTING DEFENDANT FOR AGGRAVATED ASSAULT WAS NOT CLEARLY CAPABLE OF PRODUCING AN UNJUST RESULT.
[directive] Unless otherwise approved by the Attorney General in a specific case, forfeiture related - purposes shall not include the cost of routine maintenance of forfeited property for the use of the agency.  Forfeiture related purposes shall include the following:  a.  The cost of returning seized property to the rightful owner; b.  The cost of maintaining an equity interest in the seized - property for disposal and; c. of of  The cost disposing the seized property whether by sale or destruction either directly after obtaining title through a forfeiture action or after the forfeited property used by the was agency.  Additionally, the AMA may be used by an agency for the cost disposing of of forfeited property or property purchased with forfeiture funds when the agency holds an equity interest in such property and the proceeds from the disposal the property will be deposited into the agency’s Law Enforcement of Trust Fund.  - - New of Jersey 03
[brief] (Id).  The court concluded its Statement of Reasons in support of the May 24, 2023, Order by stating as follows:  Without belaboring the point any further here, in its opposition brief, [...] succinctly argues and concludes as follows:  [...]’s latest motion is not merely an effort to take a second bite at the apple.  --- 9  After [...]’s retirement in 2022, this case was presided over, and judgment was ultimately entered by the Hon. [...], J.S.C.
[brief] In its 2022 reversal and remand for resentencing, this Court ordered the sentencing court to “provide ‘[a]n explicit statement, explaining the overall fairness of a sentence imposed on a defendant’ pursuant to Torres, 246 N.J. at 268. ”  [...], [...] (slip op. at 12).  (Da43)  In its fairness assessment, the sentencing court concluded that the consecutive sentence was fair “was fair because Defendant’s argument of low recidivism is not persuasive and the gun possession charges had already merged. ”  (Da50)  The court failed to meaningfully grapple with the social science Mr. [...] presented (Da104-120), repeated its erroneous view that the legislative intent of the certain persons statute was to impose a sentence beyond that of the substantive offense committed with the firearm, and again impermissibly relied on dismissed charges in violation of K.S.  The fairness assessment required by Torres is not an abstract assessment of fairness akin to asking whether the sentence shocks the conscience but instead is informed by specific considerations.  Specifically, “the stated purposes of sentencing in N.J.S.A. 2C:1-2(b), in their totality, inform the sentence’s fairness.
[brief] Jerman v. Carlisle, McNellie, Rini, Kramer & Ulrich LPA, 559 U.S. 573, 609 (2010) (Scalia, J. concurring).  If Respondent’s Brief asserts the arguments it asserted below or any new arguments which seek to construe § 1692c(b) based on extrinsic sources, Plaintiff will respond in his Reply Brief.  It is sufficient at this stage to make two anticipatory observations.
[brief] More specifically, a Sheriff’s officer had been sent to his house and he was concerned that he was going to be arrested (1T, Pg. 9, lines 4-6).  [...] further stated indignantly, to [...] that she is allow the other side to use the court as a weapon with the specter of arrest and the use of the sheriff’s office in a civil matter.  (1T, Pg. 16, Lines 20-24)  He went on, to complain that it is illegal that [...] is seeking to have him arrested (1T, pg. 18, lines 20-21).  In fact [...] realized [...]’s concern regarding being arrested and even commented that was why she had scheduled that appearance on Zoom rather than in person (1T, Pg. 9, lines 14-15).
[brief] Harmful errors below, which (1) resulted in unjust results, *State v. Mohammed*, 226 N.J. 71, 87 (2016), and (2) undermined fairness, *State v. Weaver*, 219 N.J. 131, 15 (2014), were the following:  (Point One)  THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS IT DENIED R. 4:52  RELIEF TO APPELLANT, UNOPPOSED AND WITHOUT CONDUCTING HEARING (Not raised below - Order (Pa106)).
[brief] That determination was legal error.  Under UPEPA, Defendants were only required to demonstrate that they were the prevailing party on the order to show cause in order to recover attorneys’ fees.  The trial court’s apparent misapprehension in that regard is not entitled to any deference by this Court.  See Johnson, 320 N.J. Super. at 378; State, ex rel. T.M., 412 N.J. Super. 225, 231–32 (App. Div. 2010) (no deference owed where trial court improperly “imposed a burden upon the State to prove more than probable cause”).  Under the Frivolous Litigation Statute, N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:15-59.1, by contrast, the court “may” award to the prevailing party in a civil action “all reasonable litigation costs and reasonable attorneys fees, if the judge finds at any time during the proceedings or upon judgment that a complaint, counterclaim, or cross-claim or defense of the nonprevailing person was frivolous. ”  N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:15-59.1(a)(1) (emphasis added).  “A claim is ‘frivolous’ . . . if filed or pursued ‘in bad faith, solely for the purpose of harassment, delay or malicious injury,’ N.J.S.A. 2A:15-59.1(b)(1), or if ‘[t]he nonprevailing party knew, or should have known, that the [claim or defense] was without any reasonable basis in law or equity and could not be supported by a good faith argument for an extension, modification, or reversal of existing law,’ N.J.S.A. 2A:15-59.1(b)(2).
[brief] Diakamopoulos v. Monmouth Med. Ctr., 312 N.J. Super. 20, 32 (App. Div. 1998).  But “[s]ummation commentary … must be based in truth, and counsel may not ‘misstate the evidence nor distort the factual picture. ’”  Bender v. Adelson, 187 N.J. 411, 431, (2006); see also Biruk v. Wilson, 50 N.J. 253, 260-61 (1967) (disapproving counsel's tactics of making false factual suggestions to jury in closing argument).  However, “[w]hen summation commentary transgresses the boundaries of the broad latitude otherwise afforded to counsel, a trial court must grant a party's motion for a new trial if the comments are so prejudicial that ‘it clearly and convincingly appears that there was a miscarriage of justice under the law.
[brief] 9  State v Gibson, 218 N.J. 277 (2014)  1 State v. Green, 62 N.J. 547, 559, (1973)  2 State v. Irizarry, 270 N.J. Super. 669, (App. Div. 1994 )  2 State v. Guida, 118 N.J.L.289, 297 (Sup. Ct. 1937)  4 State v. Nishina, 175 N.J. 502 (2003)  5 States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630, 642-44 (1963)  9 State v. Patino, 83 N.J. 1, 7, (1980)
[brief] ”  103 N.J. at 371.  The Court adopted the trial court’s holding that the ordinance would be confiscatory “to the extent that it did not adjust the owner’s investment for inflation. ”  It emphasized that “it was precisely this ability to adjust that original investment for inflation that enabled the ordinance to survive the facial challenge. ”  103 N.J. at 372 (citing Cotali, supra, 148 Cal. App.3d at 288-90, 195 Cal.Rptr. at 831-32).  Thus, [...]’s ordinance was constitutional only because, as applied, the owner’s investment for the purpose of determining a return-on-equity was updated for inflation, and a cap of 7 \( \frac{1}{2} \) percent return on an owner’s adjusted investment is not confiscatory.
[brief] The limited studies that do exist show significant cause to conclude that fingerprint analysis is not reliable under these circumstances.  In addition to the study discussed above, which revealed staggering false positive rates of 15.9% and 28.1% by experienced, high-level fingerprint examiners who compared a CMN generated by a database to a latent print, [...] & [...], supra, other studies show that when the source of a latent print is missing from a database, a database search nonetheless produces candidates that score very high in their similarity to the latent, sometimes scoring as high or higher than the highest scoring candidate when the source of latent was in the database.  [...] et al., Beyond The Individuality Of Fingerprints: A Measure Of Simulated Computer Latent Print Source Attribution Accuracy, 7 L. Prob. & Risk 165, 173–75 (2008) (Da 21-45).  See also [...] et al., The Influence of Close Non-Match Fingerprints Similar in Delta Regions of Whorls on Fingerprint Identification, 66 J. Forensic Sci. 1482, 1487-1491 (2020) (Da 46-58) (a study running latent prints through AFIS in which both the true source and a CNM were in the database found that in 9.7% of the searches, the databank returned a close non-match but not the true match within the search results, and in another 5.3% of the searches, the database produced both the close non-match and the true match as candidates.  In the latter cases, the close non-match sometimes ranked higher than the true match.).  [...] et al., *The Relationship Between Sensitivity, Similar Non-Matches and Database Size in Fingerprint Database Searches*, 13 *L. Probability & Risk* 151, 152 (2014) (Da 59-76) (determining that the risk of a false identification varies with database size, because the size changes both the risk that a close non-match will be in the database, and the probability that the correct fingerprint will be in the database).  In sum, database searches, such as occurred in this case, create an unacceptably high risk of misidentification.
[brief] In June 2017, Defendant first breached the Agreement when he unilaterally stopped paying his monthly support obligation.  (2T 53:25-54:8)  On August 9, 2017, Defendant’s prior counsel wrote a letter to [...] alleging that the Agreement was never signed.  (2T 52:1-53:13)  [...] discovered that her signed copy of the Agreement had been removed from the file cabinet in her garage.  On August 21, 2017, Plaintiff’s prior counsel provided Defendant’s prior counsel with a copy of the signed agreement from her file.  On November 1, 2017, Defendant unilaterally chose to engage in “self-help” and set forth the ways he would breach Settlement Agreement prior to any judicial determination that said Agreement is void.  (2T 127:23-128:4)  This letter, four months after Defendant’s initial breach, was the first mention of the $70,000 repayment.  (Id.)  At this point, of course, the $70,000 plus the contractual interest that Plaintiff owes to Defendant is more than subsumed by the vast sums owed to Plaintiff by Defendant.  Defendant’s failure to pay the $1500 per month from July 2017 until June 2021, and the attendant contractual penalty provision, has created additional indebtedness from Defendant to Plaintiff.  Defendant’s claim that he had contacted Plaintiff about the missing payment is entirely unsupported by any kind of evidence.  (2T 51:13-25)  Indeed, his first claim was that the Settlement Agreement had never been signed, which was easily disproven.  (2T 52:1-20)  IV.
[brief] These changes to [...]’s formula substantially decrease the State’s share of funding the Adequacy Budget, while allowing – but not mandating -- elected City officials to increase the local share of that Budget.  The State did not proffer evidence below to show that the 2018 Amendments, standing alone or combined, are intended to eliminate the funding shortfalls in [...]’s Adequacy Budget, will actually do so in prompt fashion, and will maintain a fully funded Adequacy Budget for [...] students in future years.  The failure below to analyze the record on [...]’s implementation in [...] under the “express mandates” imposed on the State in Abbott XX to ensure its optimal operation resulted in legal errors of constitutional magnitude.  The most egregious error is the determination that [...]’s Adequacy Budget represents nothing more than an “estimate” of the cost of educating students to achieve the NJSLS and, consequently, the State is “not required” to optimally operate the [...] by ensuring District students a fully funded Adequacy Budget.
[brief] 3T19:9-10.  A separate negligence action would allow the State or the Borough to bring a third-party complaint against the contractor and allow the parties to tender any claims to their respective insurance carriers.  Appellant’s arguments that, “An owner should not be forced to defend the condemnation action and also separately have to sue for project damages that the public project foresaw and actually occurred” (Db at p. 43) contradicts the procedural structure the New Jersey Supreme Court set up in Suydam: a bifurcated trial wherein just compensation is the sole determination to be made by the factfinder.  Any extraneous issues, i.e. costs of environmental remediation or, as in the present matter, alleged damages to the property’s owner’s home from construction activities must be addressed in an action separate from the condemnation.  Appellant’s reliance upon State v. Rohrer, 80 N.J. 462 (1979) is misplaced, as that matter involved a taking that, while it had proceeded as a partial taking; the whole property should have been acquired.
[directive] Act’s  The clear and convincing evidence standard would apply to the hearings, which judges or special masters from another county would conduct.  Movants thus seek to modify the statute in two ways: requiring judges that defendants pose a “serious and imminent” risk; and imposing a to find “beyond a reasonable doubt” in place of “clear and higher standard of proof -- convincing evidence. ”  At the core of movants’ application is a simple reality: in-person criminal jury trials have been suspended because of COVID-19, which has led 6 to the continued detention of many pretrial detainees.
[brief] *Ibid.*  The court noted that it has found “equitable and countervailing considerations” in particular circumstances to allow a plaintiff to assert a claim.  *Id.* at 337 (quoting *SMB Assocs. v. Dep’t of Env’t Prot.*, 264 N.J. Super. 38, 59 (App. Div. 1993) (“[A]n “agency has inherent power to waive *de minimis* violations of objective standards. ”)).  The court concluded that under the circumstances presented, fairness and equity required [...] to be permitted to apply for Ordinary Disability.  *Id.* at 338.  Here there was no such legal impediment to [...] filing his Eligibility Registration Form nor would he have been sacrificing discrimination claims or other litigation positions by doing so.  [...] simply failed to file his Eligibility Registration Form until approximately one year and seven months past the statutory deadline, which is not a de minimis violation.
[brief] [...] cannot re-litigate construction claims in this summary action, commenced only to confirm the Award.  Such an obvious end-run around enforcement of an arbitration award cannot be countenanced.  See Barcon Assocs. v. Tri-County Asphalt Corp., 86 N.J. 179, 187 (1981) (permitting the parties to engage in extended discovery of fact issues was counterproductive to the goal of arbitration to be a forum “of providing final, speedy and inexpensive settlement of disputes”); see \(^9\) See also R. 4:67-5 (“The court shall try the action on the return day, or on such short day as it fixes.
[brief] UNLESS OTHERWISE DETERMINED, EACH OF US WILL BEAR OUR OWN COSTS OF THE MEDIATION AND ARBITRATION PURSUANT TO THE THEN CURRENT FEE SCHEDULE LOCATED AT WWW.ADR.ORG.  YOU AGREE THAT WE CAN IN OUR DISCRETION  JOIN CONTRACTORS, INSURANCE COMPANIES AND ANY OTHER PERSONS OR ENTITIES INTO THE MEDIATION AND/OR ARBITRATION AT ANY TIME, AND CONSENT TO JOINDER AND PARTICIPATION OF SUCH PARTIES.  NO ACTIONS BY US IN RESPONSE TO A LEGAL CLAIM SHALL BE DEEMED A WAIVER OF OUR RIGHT TO MEDIATION OR ARBITRATION.  NOTWITHSTANDING THE FOREGOING, WE RESERVE THE RIGHT AND MAY AT OUR DISCRETION  EXERCISE THE RIGHT TO COMMENCE LEGAL ACTION IN ANY COURT OF COMPETENT JURISDICTION TO COLLECT MONIES YOU OWE UNDER THIS AGREEMENT, IN WHICH YOU AGREE TO WAIVE THE RIGHT TO MEDIATION OR ARBITRATION.  YOU AND WE, IN PROCEEDING TO MEDIATION AND/OR ARBITRATION, AGREE THAT ALL FACTS ARISING FROM OR RELATED TO THE DISPUTE, INCLUDING RELATED DOCUMENTS USED IN THE MEDIATION AND/OR ARBITRATION, ARE CONFIDENTIAL, AND IF APPLICABLE, ANY ARBITRATION DECISION ISSUED IS ALSO CONFIDENTIAL.  SAID DECISION IS FINAL AND BINDING ON THE PARTIES.  THE PARTIES FURTHER AGREE THAT THIS DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND ARBITRATION PROVISION DOES NOT, AND IS NOT INTENDED TO, LIMIT, WAIVE AND/OR RELEASE ANY PARTY’S CLAIMS, DAMAGES, AND/OR DEFENSES  EACH PARTY MAY HAVE AGAINST THE OTHER, OTHER THAN EACH PARTY WAIVING AND RELEASING THE RIGHT TO PROCEED WITH LITIGATION IN A COURT OF COMPETENT JURISDICTION TO RESOLVE THEIR DISPUTES.
[brief] In both the insurer and surety contexts, “it is often difficult to determine when work product protection might apply. ”  99 Wall Dev. Inc. v. Allied World Specialty Ins. Co., No. 18-cv-126, 2020 WL 2730944, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. May 26, 2020).  “This is because it is routine for insurance companies to investigate claims while at the same time the potential for litigation is ever present. ”  Id.  Similarly, a surety has a duty to investigate claims, see U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Braspetro Oil Servs. Co., 369 F.3d 34, 80 (2d Cir. 2004), and, at the same time, the potential for litigation exists.