ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] [Da96].  Further, in the 1984 Johnson Road Agreement, the Borough explicitly agreed any new connection along Johnson Road required a connection fee to be paid to the Township, not the Borough.  [Da96].  Explicitly, Paragraph 3 of the 1984 Johnson Road Agreement provides in relevant part:  ... there shall be imposed a sewer connection fee ... for any new connection ... along Johnson Road in the [...], which sewer connection fee shall be paid to the [...] in accordance with the Agreement between the [...] and the [...] .
[brief] This court rule does not allow the respondent to file a letter brief or statement in lieu of brief except under 2 circumstances.  Which in this case was not met.  Those circumstances are: 2:6-4(c)  Statement in Lieu of Brief.  A statement in lieu of brief may be filed if the appeal is from a quasi-judicial decision of a named respondent which represents to the court that the general public interest does not require its adversarial participation in the appeal and that the parties directly affected by its decision have adequately presented, or may be expected to so present, the issues.
[directive] This decision was made 21 to enhance existing auditing practices, and not response to any finding of in this impropriety.  The Attorney General Directive authorizing manual included in is of Enclosure  Prior to adoption this Manual for External Audits of County Forfeiture  1.  Accounts (Manual), copy of the Manual was circulated to the County Prosecutor’s a of Association of New Jersey, the [...], the [...], and forfeiture auditors for comment.  The Manual was posted on the [...] web page for public comment.  Suggestions and comments on the Manual were addressed in the final version of the Manual.
[brief] The court’s authority to appoint Special Masters in Mount Laurel cases is well established.  See Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Mount Laurel Township, 92 N.J. 158 (1983).  Given the Township’s record of obstructing affordable housing projects, and the Planning Board’s past hostility to a much more limited affordable housing plan, the court’s decision to appoint the hearing examiner was justified in this case.  Id. at 232-233.  (emphasis added).
[brief] Over and over, for decades, courts have deemed fingerprint-analysis evidence generally, and the ACE-V method specifically, to be reliable.  Olenowski did not change that determination.  [...] cites studies and reports going back to the 1970s and yet cannot point to a single case, legislative action, or even an indication from a body like the Committee on Model Jury Charges, in New Jersey or anywhere else, that has accepted her view.  Her amicus brief should therefore not affect this Court’s decision as to whether [...]’s testimony was properly admitted under N.J.R.E. 702.  As explained in the State’s main response brief, the trial judge did not abuse his discretion by admitting that testimony to the extent he did at trial.  CONCLUSION
[directive] 6.3  Considerations.  General 6.3.1 last only a as but Reform Law, Bail under the option available an remains bail  Monetary assure reasonably not will conditions non-monetary on release that finds court the when resort makes law 2A:162-17(c).  The N.J.S.A. required. when court in appearance defendant's the defendant's the preventing of purpose for the imposed be not must bail monetary that clear to only be bail used can monetary that provides statute the Furthermore, Ibid. release. or community the or other person any of safety the assure to used be not may it flight; discourage process.
[brief] Defendant heard his mother calling his name.  (7T319-15 to 20).  When his mother opened defendant’s bedroom door, defendant shot her five to seven times in the torso and chest.  (8T24-23 to 25-12).  Defendant felt himself “shutting off more and more,” “like it wasn’t me really” and he “was watching a movie. ” (7T319-20 to 24, 321-21 to 25).
[brief] Here, as in Sayler, a particularized unit of government is implicated and the persons who achieve office do not have plenary powers.  The [...] is a specialized body, with statutorily prescribed duties and statutory limits on its powers and activities.  Its members serve by appointment, not by election.  *Humane Society* at 572.  Finding that a “rational basis” standard of review applies to the statutory challenge, the Supreme Court next concluded:
[brief] Instead, the applicant states only that:  A culvert is proposed to facilitate the bridge crossing based on the width and character of the existing feature.  The feature comprises, what appears to be a historically man-made drainage ditch, which presently contains a bed of less than 5 feet wide.  The feature is dominated by dense vegetation that offers little or no value to aquatic species.  As a result, construction of a culvert is a more practical application at this location.  [Aa155.]  This information is nonresponsive to the regulations and does not demonstrate that a bridge is not feasible, N.J.A.C. 7:13-11.1(c)(2), or spanning the channel is not practicable due to physical constraints, N.J.A.C. 7:13-12.7(g)(6).  Whatever the applicant means when it says it is not “practical,” this does not demonstrate that it is not “practicable. ”  The [...] did not request additional information from the applicant to rectify these deficiencies.  The [...] therefore impermissibly issued this permit “absent satisfaction of the applicable statutory criteria. ”  Riverkeeper Network, 463 N.J. Super. at 113 (internal citation omitted).  B.  [...] Did Not Hold the Applicant to the Strict Requirements for a Circular Culvert (Aa001)
[brief] ”  The signature line of the Sub-Tenant under the sublease, as described by the Court was as follows:  “The names [...] and [...] are handwritten twice under the typed name, “[...] ”  Each is written once in cursive form and once in printed form.  Underneath those signatures appears the word “GUARANTORS:. ”  No signatures are written beneath that word and there are no separate guaranties appended to the sublease as are appended to [the prime lease]”.  Id. at *4.  The Trial Court granted summary judgment for [...] and dismissed all claims against him.  This holding was affirmed on appeal.
[brief] For the foregoing reasons, [...] respectfully requests that this Court affirm the trial court’s ruling on allocation, vacate the trial court’s Order of fees, costs, and interest, and remand this matter for further proceedings before the trial court consistent with the results of this appeal.  Respectfully submitted, [...] /s/ [...], Esq. [...], Esq. [...], Esq. [...], Esq.  Attorneys for Plaintiff, [...]  Dated: January 29, 2024  [...] (F/K/A [...]), Plaintiff-Appellant, V. [...]; [...]; [...]; [...], [...]; [...]; [...]; [...]; [...]; [...]; [...]; [...]; [...]; [...]; [...], Defendants and, as to [...], Appellee and Cross-Appellant.
[brief] [A229, Op. at 55].  The trial court found “no evidence. . .in this proceeding that provides sufficient proofs that all creditors and all other interested parties’ claims were not disposed of fully by way of the GSA. ”  Id.  The trial court properly concluded:  “[[...]] is not an innocent party.  . .she signed the Agreements which she now claims violated the stay.  She took affirmative actions in obtaining the $200,000 due to her by transactions made in September 2014 even before the GSA was reached and during the period of time that she argues the bankruptcy was pending.  To find she had unclean hands based on her own actions would be an understatement. ”  [Id. at 56 (emphasis added)].  For those reasons, [...] failed to prove procedural unconscionability.
[brief] The New Motion Judge, remarkably, rejected [...]’s opinions as “hypotheticals” even though, at his deposition, [...] was asked these hypotheticals – and he explicitly rejected the hypothetical nature of the questioning.  Still, [...] was asked to entertain hypotheticals, ultimately irrelevant, about varying times of birth and asked to assess, on a more likely than not basis, whether the outcome would have been the same.  [Deposition Testimony of [...], 68:23-70:10].  In truth, [...]’s answers that the earlier [...] might have been delivered, the better chance she had at a better outcome.  The New Motion Judge misconstrued the import of these answers.  The case concerns a fetus deprived of oxygen for a considerable period of time.  Every additional minute of oxygen deprivation rendered a poor outcome an increasing risk.  Thus, when asked if [...] had been delivered 10 minutes earlier (10:17 p.m. and 15 minutes after the standard of care), would the outcome have been the same, [...] replied “most likely, yes, but it is impossible to know. ”  [Deposition Testimony of [...], 69:2-6].  Then the hypothetical was changed to 15 minutes earlier and then 20 minutes earlier, and was posed on a “more likely than not” basis, and [...] said the outcome would have been the same, *more likely than not*.  [Deposition Testimony of [...], 69:2-14].  When the hypothetical then changed to 25 minutes earlier (10:02 p.m.), [...] referenced his report and replied that, at that, the outcome would have been better.  [Deposition Testimony of [...], 69:15-23].  At 25-30 minutes, [...] observed that the “medical certainty” required by law to offer an opinion concerning causation was present.  The New Motion Judge erred in holding that [...]’s testimony was supposition and not proper to establish proximate causation.  [...] testified that [...] was at risk for thirty-nine minutes, when being at risk for more than 25-30 minutes rendered it certain that she would suffer the injuries she did.  There is no doubt that [...]’s testimony establishes a material issue of proximate causation.  **CONCLUSION**
[brief] During the meeting, [...] asked questions about [...]’s assets, how he wanted them to be distributed and any concerns that he had.  (Pa000155).  [...] told [...] that he wanted his assets distributed between his wife and children.  (Pa000155, Pa000200).  [...] wanted (i) his wife to have the house, (ii) [...] to be repaid some monies that she had loaned to him and (iii) his business to go to [...].  As for the mortgage on the property, he wanted [...] to have the mortgage and note.  (Pa000156).  [...] did not discuss estate or inheritance taxes with [...] or [...] during the July 1, 2014 meeting or at any time.  (Pa000202, Pa000212).  The only reason why [...] addressed the issue of taxes in the Certification that he signed and provided to [...] Carol’s divorce attorney was because [...] had raised the issue in his draft Certification and [...] believed it was important to [...].
[brief] .............................................  18  N.J.S.A. 2A:58C-1(b)(3) ...............................................  19  N.J.S.A. 2A:58C-4 ......................................................  21  Other Authorities  5 [...] & [...], Products Liability, §57.01[4] (2010) ........................................................................  16  Restatement (Third) of Torts, Products Liability §11 7,10,12,16 (1998) .........................................................  17  Restatement (Third) of Torts, Products Liability §11, comment a (1998)  .......................................................  8  [...], “The Post-Sale Duty to Warn: Two Unfortunate Forks in the Road to a Reasonable Doctrine,” 58 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 892 (1983)  .............................................  11
[brief] Restatement § 654.  Comment (d) to this section of the Restatement further explains:  Under the rules stated in Clauses (a) and (b), formal action must be taken by an official or a tribunal before there can be that institution of criminal proceedings which the plaintiff must prove in order to make his accuser liable under the rule stated under § 653.  The mere fact that a person has submitted to a magistrate an affidavit for the purpose of securing a warrant for another's arrest or a summons for him to appear at a hearing, does not justify a finding that he has initiated criminal proceedings against the other.  The proceedings are not instituted unless and until the warrant or summons is issued.
[brief] Similarly, in arguing that the trial court did not explain how it calculated the lodestar, Plaintiff ignores the separately labeled section “Statement of Reasons” in which the trial court effectively “shows its work” in reaching its determination of reasonable attorney’s fee.  See P011a – P021a.  Contrary to Plaintiff’s claims, the trial court sufficiently articulated its calculation of the lodestar.  First, the trial court concluded that the reasonable hourly rate in Essex County is $395.00 per hour. \(^1\)  See Statement of Reasons at p. 13, P021a.  Under Rendine, the trial court has the discretion to “make appropriate adjustments” to the requested hourly rates based upon “the experience and skill of the prevailing party's attorneys and compare their rates to the rates prevailing in the community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, experience, and reputation. ”  Rendine, 141 N.J. at 337.  Although Plaintiff submitted declarations \(^1\) Defendant expressly does not agree that the hourly rate of $395 was “reasonable” in this action or similar actions.  Defendant argued that the hourly rate should be $250/ hour.  See [...] Declaration, P171a – P172a.  Nevertheless, Defendant notes that the Court exercised its discretion and allowed a higher hourly rate than suggested by Defendant.
[brief] (Pa914, ¶¶ 23-24.)  --- 5  [...]’s Adequacy Budget also grew to $622.8 million over the decade, an increase of nearly $150 million, or 31%.  (Pa913, ¶20; Pa931, ¶ 160.)  6  The “blame game” is also evident in the State’s complaint that the City “artificially” reduced the local tax base by granting tax abatements, entering into agreements for payments in lieu of taxes (PILOT), and not providing any of those payments to the District.
[brief] The standard on appellate review of a new trial motion under R. 2:10-1 is that “[t]he trial court’s ruling on such a motion shall not be reversed unless it clearly appears that there was a miscarriage of justice under the law. ”  This standard is also applicable to proceedings under R. 3-20-1.  See Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules, Comment R. 3:20-1[2].  See also Dolson v. Anastasia,55 N.J. 2, 6 (1969).  "The trial judge shall grant the motion [for a new trial] if, having given due regard to the opportunity of the jury to pass upon the credibility of the witnesses, it clearly and convincingly appears that there was a miscarriage of justice under the law"….  However, a motion for a new trial "may be properly granted although the state of the evidence would not justify the direction of a verdict."
[brief] It stated:  In seeking to enforce the arbitration provision, defendants point out that many of the plaintiffs were represented by counsel when they executed their purchase agreements.  Defendants argue that these purchasers therefore had an opportunity, through counsel, to fully review the arbitration provision, object to its inclusion in the purchase agreement, and terminate the contract if they were not satisfied.  We do not find this argument persuasive.  438 N.J. Super at 19.  See also, Garfinkle, supra, 168 N.J. at 136.  This is the identical argument made by Appellants here (Br. at 38, 46). ¹  Similarly, in Itzhakov v. Segal, 2019 WL 4050104 at *4 (App. Div. 2019) (Da1402) the Appellate Division held that Atalese was not limited to consumer and employment contracts and that the arbitration clause there did not meet the Atalese standard, even though the party was represented by counsel.  (“[E]ven a sophisticated party, or one represented by counsel, will not be deemed to waive his or her rights – whether constitutional, statutory, or common-law – without clear and unambiguous language.
[brief] (2T Pg. 12, Ln. 24).  On March 9, 2023, the State moved to dismiss summons [...], which the Municipal Court granted.  (3T Pg. 6, Ln. 15-24).  Trial took place on March 9, 2023.  After considering all evidence, the Municipal Court returned a conviction, finding the Defendant guilty under summons [...], [...] and [...] for violation
[directive] Had a sustained finding of discrimination or bias against any person because of the individual’s actual or perceived race, creed, color, national origin, ancestry, age, marital status, civil union status, domestic partnership status, affectional or sexual orientation, genetic information, sex, gender identity or expression, disability, nationality, familial status, or any other protected characteristic under N.J.S.A. 10:5-1 et seq., regardless of the type or severity of discipline imposed; 7 (e) Had a sustained finding that the officer utilized excessive force in violation of departmental policy or the Attorney General’s Use of Force Policy, regardless of the type or severity of discipline imposed; (f) Had a sustained finding that the officer was untruthful or has demonstrated a lack of candor, regardless of the type or severity of discipline imposed; (g) Had a sustained finding that an officer has filed a false report or submitted a false certification in any criminal, administrative, employment, financial, or insurance matter in their professional or personal life, regardless of the type or severity of discipline imposed; (h) Had a sustained finding that an officer intentionally conducted an improper search, seizure or arrest, regardless of the type or severity of discipline imposed; (i) Had a sustained finding that an officer intentionally mishandled or destroyed evidence, regardless of the type or severity of discipline imposed; (j) Had a sustained finding of domestic violence, as defined in N.J.S.A. 2C:25- 19, regardless of the type or severity of discipline imposed; (k) Resigned, retired, transferred or separated from the agency, regardless of the reason, while any internal affairs investigation or complaint was pending, and the misconduct ultimately sustained falls within categories (d) through (j) above or would have resulted in an action under categories (a) through (c) had the member not separated from the agency;4 or (l) Was charged with any indictable crime under New Jersey or an equivalent offense under federal law or the law of another jurisdiction related to the complaint.
[brief] Manuel v. City of Joliet, 580 U.S._ (2017).  The NJCRA does the same for the federal constitution, as well as for the New Jersey constitution.  See N.J.S.A. 10:6-2( c).  In Davis v. Scherer, the Supreme Court held that: "Officials are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate the clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known."
[brief] While [...]’s sworn statement offers an explanation for the initial report of contact at [...] in February of 2021 (Da43, Process Server Report), it admittedly contradicts other proofs offered by [...] in the course of pursuing a judgment.  The most notable of these are the “Affidavit of Service” (Da74) and related report (Da76) authored by [...]’s private investigator.  But the investigation report is not presented in the form of a Certification or Affidavit that complies with R.1:4-4.  In fact, the private investigator’s “Affidavit of Service” is not signed or certified in accordance with R. 1:4-4, either (Da74).  Even the acknowledgement block is blank.  Ibid.  In fact, none of the “proofs of due diligence” supplied by Plaintiff’s process server were, in fact, affidavits or certifications, as would be required by the line of [...].  [...] presented these documents through a Certification of Plaintiff’s Counsel (Da65), which offered and asked the court to draw conclusions from hearsay documents.  Appending those documents to a certification signed by Plaintiff’s Counsel does not cure the defect, as R. 1:6-6 still requires facts to be presented to the court by way of “affidavits made on personal knowledge, setting forth only facts which are admissible in evidence to which the affiant is competent to testify …”
[brief] The Authority Never Provided The Contractually Required Monthly Compilation Report Relating To The Operations Of The Authority Garage  To account for the Project Garage’s Operations, the Redevelopment Agreement required the Authority “provide to [[...]] on a monthly basis following the first full month following the issuance of a Certificate of Occupancy for the Authority Garage or the Project Garage, as the case may be, (a) a Compilation Report and (b) following the close of each Fiscal Year, audited financial statements. ”  Pa106 (§ 8.3(c)(iv)).  Since the Authority began operating the Project Garage by 2007, the Authority had never provided this required monthly Compilation Report.  1T65:13-18.
[brief] [...], ESQ., FOR THE DEFENDANT, [...].  HONORABLE  [...], J.S.C.  September 30, 2016.  Da96  The State seeks to introduce the surveillance video evidence from the 7-Eleven robberies in Hamilton Township and Pennsylvania to identify [...] as the suspect in his trial for the Brunswick Avenue Pharmacy homicide in Trenton and as the suspect in the attempted robbery at the Vizzoni's Pharmacy in Hamilton Township under N.J.R.E. 404(b).
[brief] This is an appeal from a murder conviction where the most damning evidence against the defendant is that he lived across the street from a woman who was stabbed in her Lexington Avenue home in Jersey City.  Mr. [...] has consistently maintained, however, that he has never been inside of his neighbor’s home, and that he had nothing to do with this offense.  The State’s proofs against [...] were weak.  Although the offense was partially captured on video surveillance, the perpetrator’s face is obscured.  No witnesses were able to directly identify the perpetrator, who walked unapprehended from the crime scene to John F. Kennedy Boulevard, and then disappeared off-camera.  The jury at the first trial hung on all charges after seven days of deliberations.  The State obtained a conviction at the second trial by alleging that [...] was not truthful in his recorded statement to police.  Two witnesses who watched surveillance video out-of-court identified [...] as a faceless man who walked from the direction of Kennedy Boulevard toward [...]’s home on Lexington Avenue, though [...] had told police he returned home from the opposite direction.  That is the entire thrust of the State’s case; even those same witnesses could not say that it was [...] on video entering and leaving his neighbor’s house.  This Court should order a new trial for two reasons.  First, the trial judge erred by admitting [...]’s recorded statement as evidence in support of the State’s criminal case-in-chief.  Interrogators failed to give [...] Miranda warnings before confronting him with evidence that their murder suspect had walked toward his home.  Because no reasonable person in [...]’s position would have felt free to leave the interrogation, his unwarned statement should have been inadmissible.  Second, the trial judge failed to provide a mandatory jury instruction on how to evaluate the identification evidence, including that identification had to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt, and also failed to hold an admissibility hearing.  Although the witnesses were familiar with [...], he denies that they correctly identified him.  Notably, the face of the person walking in the direction of [...]’s home from Kennedy Boulevard is not visible, and the procedures used to obtain the identifications were partially unrecorded, and highly suggestive.  Among other problems, one of the witnesses had earlier been unable to say that it was [...], and the other witness only said it was [...] after the detective administering the identification procedure inappropriately prompted her to give the expected answer.  But even if the identification evidence was admissible, the jury at minimum needed to be instructed on the standards for evaluating whether the State had met its burden.  Individually and cumulatively, in a case with a troubling lack of evidence that the defendant had anything to do with this offense, these errors had the capacity to cause a wrongful conviction.  This Court must order a new trial.