ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] On April 22, 2015, a bridge inspection was performed on behalf of the [...] for the subject roadway.  (Pa1343).  As a result of that inspection, a 2-inch settlement deficiency was identified and the deficiency was recommended for repair.  (Pa1350);(Pa1351);(Pa1367).  In addition, independently from the Biennial Bridge Inspection, an additional onsite inspection was performed on June 24, 2015 at the subject location.  As a result of that inspection it was determined that “the pavement at the north approach exhibited significant settlement”.  (Pa1193).  It was recommended that the settlement be repaired immediately.  (Pa1193).  In fact, [...]’s own engineer, [...], was shown a photo provided by Plaintiff and agreed that an elevation change along the abutment joint would be a dangerous condition to users of the roadway.  In other words, the facts support that the settlement in the road at that location was dangerous condition to users of the roadway.
[brief] *See Cty. Coll. of Morris*, 100 N.J. at 393.  Moreover, in *Linden*, the Supreme Court explained that an arbitrator’s determination of “just cause” is particularly suited to cases of “misconduct” where the arbitrator must determine whether the employee’s actions “rise to a level . . . that constitutes just cause for discharge. ”  202 N.J. at 279.  But this matter does not concern misconduct, but rather [...]’s ability to terminate an employee unable to perform.  The Union argues that [...] is attempting to insulate all of its personnel decisions from arbitral review by claiming it has “unfettered discretion” to terminate anyone it wants.  The Union’s argument is disingenuous.  In cases of employee discipline, for example, there is no question an arbitrator can apply traditional standards to determine whether [...] has just cause to terminate an employee.  This particular matter, however, concerns an employee who could not perform the essential duties of their job, where the CBA grants [...] the exclusive right to set the standards of performance.  Accordingly, in this particular case, but certainly not in all cases, [...] had the authority to terminate [...] in its sole discretion.  The Arbitrator should have reached that conclusion upon reviewing the CBA’s terms, but failed to do so.
[brief] In this case, three errors in the jury instructions interfered with the jury’s deliberations, violated [...]’s rights to due process and to a fair trial, and require reversal of her convictions.  U.S. Const. amend. XIV, N.J. Const. art. I, ¶¶ 1, 9, and 10.  First, the trial court erroneously told the jury it could infer that [...] intended to kill [...] by the mere fact that a wine chiller was the implement used in the killing.  Because a wine chiller is not a deadly weapon, that instruction should not have been given.  Second, the trial court did not charge the jury on any lesser-included offenses to murder, even though they were clearly indicated in the record.  Last, the trial court diminished the State’s burden of proof by telling the jury that if the jury was “firmly convinced of the defendant’s guilt, more or less the defendant is guilty of the crime charged, you must find her guilty. ”  (8T 69-2)  There is nothing “less” about the high standard that is reasonable doubt.  This instruction was erroneous and misleading.  Separately and together, these instructional issues prevented the jury from the proper assessment of [...]’s culpability.  [...]’s convictions must be reversed.
[brief] (Aa25).  The letter did not contain attached witness statements, text messages submitted, notes created or the surveillance video.  Rather, [...]’s letter from counsel summarized witness statements and described the contents of the other evidence.  (Aa25-Aa36).  [...] also relied upon what it referred to as “[...]’s Prior Disciplinary History. ” (Aa35).  However, the record indicates that no disciplinary action has ever been taken against [...]  Rather, [...] cited to three prior investigations by its EEO Office: 1) a 2012 complaint that was not substantiated; 2) a 2020 Complaint that [...] admitted was closed out in 2020 without any findings; and 3) and an August 2021 LOD that is the subject of a still pending unfair practice complaint pending before the [...].  (Aa35).  On June 27, 2023, [...] filed a letter brief to the Commission in reply to [...]’s Response Letter.  (Aa39).  F.  The [...] Denies [...]’s Appeal.
[brief] Respectfully submitted, /s/ [...], Esq.  [...], Esq., counsel for Respondent [...] and [...] 9/14/2023  [...], SR. ESQ. [...]  [...] NJ  Attorney Id #2011-04070  [...] (t)[...]; (f)[...]  [...]  Attorney for Respondent Intervenor [...]  POPPY HOLDINGS, LLC, Appellant, v. [...], his heirs, devisees and personal representatives or any of their successors in right, title and interest, 1-10, [...], spouse of Ruslan Milov; [...]; [...].
[brief] (Pa2390; and [...] Tr., at 25:3-19 at Pa955 and 70:5-11 at Pa967.)  [...]’s corporate designee, who was also the lead underwriter, testified that demolition contractors were not permitted to enroll.  ([...] Tr., 19:4-23 at Pa2102; 24:10-24 at Pa2103; 34:5-35:16 at Pa2106; 79:9-13 at Pa2117.)  As the trial court determined, the evidence confirms that [...] was performing demolition on the day of the Accident.  (SSR, p. 18, Pa2733.)  Thus, to the extent this Court determines that [...] was enrolled in the CCIP, the CCIP Policies should be rescinded as to [...] because: [...]’s enrollment forms contained false statements; the false statements were material; [...] reasonably relied on [...]’s representations in erroneously enrolling [...] into the CCIP; and had [...] been truthful with the type of work it was actually performing, it would never have been erroneously enrolled.
[brief] 6  A. The Trial Court correctly ruled that Plaintiffs had knowledge of the facts essential to Defendant’s alleged malpractice when Plaintiffs received the March 25, 2014 Attorney General’s Notice ............................................................................ 8 POINT TWO THERE IS NO MERIT TO PLAINTIFFS’ CLAIM THAT THE DISCOVERY RULE TOLLED THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS UNTIL “ACTUAL DAMAGES” WERE ESTABLISHED ..............................................................................................12 CONCLUSION ..................................................................................................18 # TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | Cases | Page(s) | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|---------| | **Banco Popular N. Am. v. Gandi,** | 7 | | 184 N.J. 161 (2005) | | | **Ben Elazar v. Macrietta Cleaners, Inc.,** | 12, 13 | | 230 N.J. 123 (2017) | | | **Burd v. New Jersey Tel. Co.,** | 9 | | 76 N.J. 284 (1978) | | | **E. Dickerson & Son, Inc. v. Ernst & Young, LLP,** | 7 | | 361 N.J. Super. 362 (App. Div. 2003) | | | **Fox v. Passaic Gen. Hosp.,** | 8 | | 71 N.J. 122 (1976) | | | **Frederick v. Smith,** | 7 | | 416 N.J. Super. 594 (App. Div. 2010) | | | **Grunwald v. Bronkesh,** | passim | | 131 N.J. 483 (1993) | | | **Lapka v. Porter Hayden Co.,** | 13 | | 162 N.J. 545 (2000) | | | **Leon v. Rite Aid Corp.,** | 6-7 | | 340 N.J. Super. 462 (App. Div. 2001) | | | **Lopez v. Swyer,** | 8, 9 | | 62 N.J. 267 (1973) | | | **Major v. Maguire,** | 6 | | 224 N.J. 1 (2016) | | | **Martinez v. Cooper Hospital-University Medical Center,** | 13 | | 163 N.J. 45 (2000) | | | **McGrogan v. Till,** | 8 | | 167 N.
[brief] **FACTOR 1 – INSTRUCTIONS**  1.  Virtually all of Petitioner’s prosecutorial services were required to be performed and were actually performed in the courtroom of the municipal building in Winslow.  (T12-18 to T26-9).  2.  During the Pandemic, there were no in-person appearances, and the Court Administrator still controlled the Court sessions and the dockets by use of the Plea by Mail and the Municipal Case Resolutions Systems.  (T15-4 and T16-4).  3.  At all times, the Court supplied the Petitioner with all records, discovery, driver abstracts, and the Plea by Mail forms.  (T17-6)  4.  During the Pandemic, the Petitioner was not allowed to work in the Municipal Building.  (T18-4)  5.  Other Court employees were also required to work outside the Municipal Building during the Pandemic.  (T18-16)  6.  The Petitioner did most of her municipal prosecutor work during the Pandemic at her law office.  (T18-17)  7.  The Petitioner must complete the entire docket and finish the Court sessions and she has no discretion on when she can leave.  (T20-23)  8.  The Court Administrator determines which type of cases are on the docket.  (T21-10)  9.  The Court Administrator maintains all Municipal Court files at the Municipal Building.  (T22-12).  10.  The [...] handles all the local discovery in Municipal Court cases.  The [...] gathers the discovery information and sends it out to the attorneys or the pro-se defendants.  (T23-18)  11.  [...] uses letterhead as its discovery form with the Petitioner’s name at the bottom.  (Pa61)  12.  In the [...] report, she found with respect to this factor, that despite the unique duties of a municipal prosecutor, Petitioner meets the definition of independent contractor.
[brief] Having found no evidence to support Plaintiffs’ speculation [...] would have been able to deliver [...] even if called at 9:48pm, it was unnecessary for [...] to repeat the concessions that Plaintiffs’ experts made regarding the timing of the delivery and the inescapable conclusion that there simply was not enough time to deliver the baby in time to offer a chance to avoid injury.  In other words, even assuming everything worked perfectly within the standard of care, at best the delivery would have occurred by 10:05-10:10pm, as [...] testified.  That delivery would have been only 17 to 22 minutes earlier.
[brief] Ibid.  Property in the preservation area must adhere to a regional master plan (RMP) created by the [...] ([...]) that embodies these values.  N.J.S.A. 13:20-10; N.J.S.A. 13:20-14.  The Act also --- 1  Because they are closely related, these sections are combined for efficiency and the court’s convenience. delegates to [...] the responsibility to implement a Highlands permitting review program.
[brief] (Aa26).  alleged that, while collecting signatures for a friend’s petition to run for CWA president against [...] outside of the NJDOL building, [...] approached her and called her D[], to which [...] immediately corrected [...] by informing him of her preferred name.  (Aa26).  Despite being corrected by [...], [...] continued to refer to her as D[] and used masculine pronouns.  (Aa26-27).  As a result of their interaction, police were called to the building.
[brief] The Constitution neither mandates nor tolerates that kind of discrimination. ”  Id. at *15.  In its conclusion, the court further reasoned:  A request to change one's own name and pronouns may be the first visible sign that a child or adolescent may be dealing with issues that could lead to gender dysphoria or related coexisting mental-health issues.  Communicating to a parent the social transition of a school student to a new gender … is called discrimination/harassment by the defendants, despite having little medical or factual connection to actual discrimination or harassment.  ….  Parental involvement is essential to the healthy maturation of schoolchildren.  The … School District has adopted a policy without parent input that places a communication barrier between parents and teachers.
[brief] At depositions, [...] confirmed [...]’s understanding that the Ritz wall work that [...] performed “in August” was the only excluded work:  Q.  [W]hat’s -- what’s the [...] work that you’re talking about?  A.  The [...] work was the work that we did do in August, and that was the work that was to be excluded from the CCIP because that was structural demo, and it was just for that work.  Q.  And how do you know that?  A.  Based on the information that I was given through these e-mails, speaking with [...] at the time.  Because we had already enrolled in CCIP, then they came back and said this work was separate.
[brief] The Special Master anticipated and rejected the [...]’ argument – raised for the first time on this appeal, and thus waived – that “work done to avoid liability for [...] on a non-RICO theory is not work ‘reasonably devoted’ to establishing [his] RICO claims” (Db41).  As explained by [...], the work undertaken by [...]’s counsel to debunk the [...]’ claimed entitlement to bogus “developers,” “construction,” and “management fees” was the very same work necessary to defeat the [...]’ equally bogus “claim of right” defense to all of [...]’s RICO claims:
[brief] With the addition of bad faith as a consideration, it is also apparent that fees may be used to prevent a maliciously motivated party from inflicting economic damage on an opposing party by forcing expenditures for counsel fees.  This purpose has a dual character since it sanctions a maliciously motivated position and indemnifies the "innocent" party from economic harm.  The trial court's reasoning on each of the areas of [...]'s non-compliance addressed above shows [...]'s bad faith positions and total lack of credibility.
[brief] ## TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | Cases | Page(s) | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|---------| | **240 Half Mile Rd., LLC v. Twp. of Middletown,** | passim | | 2022 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1002 (App. Div. June 7, 2022) | | | **62-64 Main Street LLC v. Mayor,** | 36 | | 221 N.J. 129 (2015) | | | **Bryant v. City of Atlantic City,** | passim | | 309 N.J. Super. 596 (App. Div. 1998) | | | **Centex Homes, LLC v. Twp. Comm. of Tp. of Mansfield,** | 27, 45 | | 372 N.J. Super. 186 (Law Div. 2004) | | | **Cliff v. City of S. Amboy,** | 33 | | 2008 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 340 (App. Div. Aug. 8, 2008) | | | **Coal. for Friendly Env'tl. Expansion, Inc. v. Bor. of Magnolia,** | 33 | | 2011 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2258 (App. Div. Aug. 22, 2011) | | | **Downtown Residents for Sane Dev. v. City of Hoboken,** | passim | | 242 N.J. Super. 329 (App. Div. 1990) | | | **Fallone Props., LLC v. Bethlehem Twp. Planning Bd.,** | 22, 25, 28 | | 369 N.J. Super. 552 (App. Div. 2004) | | | **Fees v. Trow,** | 43 | | 105 N.J. 330 (1987) | | | **Fieramosca v. Twp. of Barnegat,** | 47-49 | | 335 N.J. Super. 526 (Law Div. 2000) | | | **Gardens v. Passaic,** | 23, 26 | | 130 N.J. Super. 369 (Law Div. 1974) | | | **Grabowsky v. Twp. of Montclair,** | 28, 30 | | 2013 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1897 (App. Div. July 26, 2013) | | Hirth v. City of Hoboken 337 N.J. Super. 149 (App. Div. 2001) .................................................................passim Hous. Auth. of Newark v. Ricciardi, 176 N.J. Super. 13 (App. Div. 1980)
[brief] On December 9, 2022, Plaintiff filed a Verified Complaint against [...] (hereinafter “[...]”) and [...] (hereinafter “[...]”) (together “defendants”), under Docket Number [...], seeking a declaratory judgment that defendants’ policy exclusions do not apply to the coverage sought by Plaintiff, alleging breach of contract, and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing.  (Pa01).  Defendant [...]’s Motion to Dismiss was based on plaintiff’s failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.  (Da001).  On February 20, 2023, Plaintiff filed opposition to [...]’s Motion to Dismiss.  (Da11)  On August 7, 2023, the Hon. [...], J.S.C. entered an Order granting [...]’s Motion, dismissing Plaintiff’s Complaint against [...] with prejudice.  (Pa398).  On August 28, 2023, Plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration of the August 7, 2023 Orders dismissing the complaint against defendants with prejudice.  (Pa416.)  On October 11, 2023, the Hon. [...], J.S.C. heard oral argument on Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration and denied the motion.  (2T15-1; Pa520).  On October 30, 2023, Plaintiff filed a Notice of Appeal, “Appealing Orders dated 8-7-23 and 10-11-23 in favor of [...] Insurance Company. ” (Notice, ¶ 8).  On January 22, 2024, Plaintiff filed a legal brief which was deemed deficient on January 26, 2024, --- 1 T refers to the 5/26/23 motion hearing transcript; 2T refers to the 10/11/23 motion hearing transcript. by the Brief Deficiency Letter filed by the Clerk instructing Plaintiff, among other things, to “Add a copy of the order dated 08/07/23 dismissing [...] Mutual Insurance Company to the appendix,” and “Add the order dated 08/07/23 dismissing [...] Mutual Insurance Company to the Table of Contents for the appendix. ” (1/26/24 Deficiency Letter, pp. 1, 2).  On February 16, 2024, Plaintiff’s revised brief and appendix were accepted for filing.  (Pb, Pa1-Pa528).
[directive] Section 2 of L. 2009, c. 192 authorizes certain inmates to move to have their school zone sentence reviewed and to be re-sentenced pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7b.  This re-sentencing option is only available to inmates who, on the effective date of the law, are "serving a mandatory minimum sentence as provided by section 1 ofP.L. 1987, c. 101 (C.2C:35-7)...."  Because the phrase "mandatory minimum sentence" refers to a statutorily-preseribed term of parole ineligibility, t~fis of the new law would not authorize a court to review or modify a Section sentence that did not include a court-ordered period of parole disqualification.  The new statute also makes clear that the re-sentencing option is not available if the defendant has already been released on parole.  As to any defendant who on the effective date of the act was still serving a mandatory minimum sentence on his or her school zone conviction, the new statute authorizes the reviewing court to re-sentence the defendant "if the court finds that the sentence under review does not serve the interests of justice."  In making this determination, the court "shall consider all relevant circumstances, including whether the defendant pleaded guilty pursuant to a negotiated agreement, and whether the prosecution had agreed to dismiss one or more charges which, upon conviction, would have subjected the defendant to the presumption of imprisonment...."  This feature is designed to ensure that the reviewing court takes into account the State’s reasonable expectations with respect to the negotiated disposition of multiple charges, and is consistent with -8- the common-sense principle, discussed in Section F, su_.p.L~, that a drug dealer who had operated in a school zone should not as a result of the new law end up serving a less time in prison than would have been served had the offense conduct occurred outside a drug-free school zone.  The new law expressly provides that the re-sentencing determination by the court shall not be subject to appeal.  Accordingly, a prosecutor cannot appeal the re-sentencing court’s discretionary application of the "interests of justice" standard.
[brief] *See, e.g.*, NJCFLA Section 17:11C-18; *Veras*, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34176, at *27.  Appellant cannot plausibly dispute that this is the law in New Jersey, as the cases her counsel already litigated and lost make clear.  *See Jefferson Cap.* --- Unpublished decisions involving Appellant’s counsel come to the same conclusion.
[brief] \(^1\) (Pa273-Pa285; Pa286-Pa293; Pa294-Pa299; Pa300-Pa314; Pa315-Pa321; Pa322-Pa323; Pa324-Pa325)  Also, by Order dated August 25, 2023, Plaintiffs’ motion to re-open and extend discovery and to extend the time for the parties to serve expert reports was granted.  (Pa326-Pa327)  The Court found that Plaintiffs met the requisite showing for exceptional circumstances, which justified the re-opening and extension of discovery because [...], counsel for [...], retreated from his commitment to participate in mediation.  (Pa326-Pa327)  The new discovery end date was November 30, 2023, and Plaintiffs were to serve a liability report by September 30, 2023.  (Pa326-Pa327)  \(^1\)T. 8/25/23  Transcript of Oral Argument on [...]’s Motion for Summary Judgment
[brief] See (Op. Br. 12–13).  The City cannot dispute that Harper calls for full retroactivity (Resp. Br. 12).  Harper itself involved retroactive application of a decision to a pre-decisional facts brought in a post-decisional claim. \(^1\)  Instead, the City’s argument rests on the same improper conflation of a takings claim and a foreclosure action (Resp. Br. 12–14).  It tries to distinguish Harper by characterizing this case as one in which a final judgment has been reached and all appeals exhausted.
[brief] (Townshipb46).  Focusing only on the two dimensional controls and not the enhanced height component which is essential to the function of a high cube warehouse with an automated racking system, the Township calculates that the C-57 zoning would enable a by-right plan with 480,000 square feet of warehouse space on the Harrison side of the development comprised of 20,000 square foot buildings spread over 24 separate 3-acre lots.  Whether purposely or otherwise, the Township’s overly-simplistic hypothetical yield plan neglects to account for the internal roads and other access drives that would consume much of this acreage and be needed in order to facilitate ingress and egress to and from these 24 separate lots to the adjacent right-of-way.  The Township similarly omits mention of other space-saving benefits accruing from larger buildings, such as a lesser number of stormwater management facilities as well as the ability to avoid the loss of entire lots because of environmental constraints such as wetlands and wetlands buffer areas.  (Townshipa091a).  In sum, and even without accounting for the difference in cubic feet enabled by the near-double permitted height standard, no comparison exists between the new and the old zoning insofar as the types of warehouses and the intensity of development which the new zoning enables.
[brief] (Pa1).  The trial court found, “[[...]] to not be credible concerning both her procedural and substantive unconscionability arguments, failed to carry her burden and failed to file her motion in a reasonable period of time. ” (Pa1, Op. at 11).  The trial court further found: [...] was unreasonable in attempting to vacate the FJD by asserting arguments that she did not sign the PSA; she was not served the divorce Page 13 of 15 complaint and she was unaware that she was divorced until almost two years after the FJD was entered.  All of these arguments were clearly rejected by the court.  Her assertions that she never received the $200K payment as required by the FJD was also a total façade.  [Id. at 12-13(emphasis added)].  However, the trial court went on to rule that since enforcement relief was afforded to both parties and “under the totality of the circumstances” the trial court followed the “American Rule,” requiring each side to pay their own counsel fees.  See Id. at 12.
[brief] In that case, the officer testified that the informant provided “positive” information on seven to ten cases in the past, her information had been relayed to other law enforcement agencies and led to arrests, and the information she provided pertained to drugs.  *Id.* at 33.  The officer, however, failed to “specif[y] the nature of the information provided by the informant, the ‘agencies’ to which it was transmitted, the names of the targets of their investigations ... or whether any had been convicted of crimes following arrests resulting from those investigations.
[brief] 2  “Da” refers to the appendix attached to this brief.  “PSR” will refer to the presentence report dated October 27, 1992.  The transcripts are the following:  1T - February 10, 1995 (trial)  2T - March 24, 1995 (sentencing)  3T - October 28, 2022 (resentencing motion)  3  In summarizing the evidence, the motion court relied on the terse fact statement in the prosecutor’s response to the motion.  (Da 18 to 19)  The present brief cites to the more complete factual summary in the Appellate Division decision on direct appeal.  (Da 10 to 13)  [...]’s apartment to rob him.  [...] told interrogators that he had surprised [...], had stabbed him multiple times in the head and neck, and had taken his wallet.