ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Respondent contends that the arbitrator's decision was justified, arguing that Plaintiff failed to provide sufficiently detailed documentation delineating the amounts paid by the health insurer for each CPT code on specific service dates.  According to Respondent, the absence of such detailed itemization means any reimbursement would be based on speculation rather than a precise calculation under the fee schedule.  This argument fundamentally misinterprets the Plaintiff’s amendment, which was specifically designed to simplify the reimbursement process by directly applying the fee schedule to the unpaid medical bills and adopting the admissions made by Respondent regarding what was outstanding.  As a conciliatory stipulation to further streamline the reimbursement calculations, Plaintiff agreed to accept as reimbursement the amounts paid by health insurance where those payments fell below the fee schedule rates.  This stipulation aimed to ensure equitable reimbursement for the outstanding medical expenses, particularly since there was no independent pursuit of additional reimbursement by the medical providers who were paid by Plaintiff’s health insurer.  However, Plaintiff’s conciliatory action continues to be mischaracterized by Respondent, who initially argued and still maintains that the Plaintiff failed to produce adequate health insurance documentation, leading the arbitrator to adopt this flawed perspective.  This mischaracterization improperly influenced the arbitrator's decision and led to nonpayment, which has unfairly benefitted Respondent.  Respondent’s insistence on detailed breakdowns from the health insurance lien ignores the substantive changes introduced by the Plaintiff’s authorized amendment and its own documentation, which clearly set forth the calculations for reimbursement.
[brief] To the extent [...] attempts to rely on evidence and testimony from the trial in this matter, [...] cannot support its claim for damages with evidence that was provided after the motion for summary judgment was granted and after [...] was dismissed from this case.  In fact, the Trial Court noted in its Order and Opinion dated October 27, 2023 that [...] was not a party to the August 2, 2023 trial and therefore any evidence presented by [...] at trial regarding [...] was not relevant.  (Pa170).  At no time up to and including the date of the hearing on the Motion for Summary Judgment did [...] submit evidence or even claim that the entire system would have to be replaced, nor did they submit so much as an estimate as to how much this might cost.  [...] was required to submit proof of damages to succeed on its claims but failed to do so, and the amount of any damages allegedly sustained by [...] remains unknown to this day.  Absent proof of damages, the Trial Court properly granted summary judgment in favor of [...].
[brief] ”  *Cox*, supra pp. 465.  The *Ciocon* court held that “under the facts and circumstances presented” the rear setback should be measured from the farther parcel boundary, not the transecting municipal boundary, and that no setback variance was therefore required for the development in [...].  *Ciocon* at 208.  The guidance provided by the *Ciocon* decision is that the land use controls of both towns are significant factors to be considered when analyzing parcels in two towns.  In sum, with regard to the legal question of whether it was appropriate under NJSA 40:55D-20 and NJSA 40:55D-70, and the cases applicable to accessory uses, driveways and split lots, for the Board to understand and compare more fully the standards applicable to the development in [...], to seek to weigh the character of the development proposed on the [...] part of the overall parcel, and therefore to assess the impact of the height of the proposed building on [...]: clearly it was proper for the Board to do so.  Indeed, the statutes and cases required it to do so.  IV.
[brief] 16T183-2 to -10; 17T14-3 to -9; 25T38-25 to 39- 11; Da02900 – Da02997, Da03030 – Da03039.  At various points from 2008 through 2015, [...] and his wife [...] submitted certified personal financial statements to banks in which they represented what the value of their interests in [...] and [...] were worth.
[brief] Moreover, “‘[w]here available, “[t]he official legislative history and legislative statements serve as valuable interpretive aid[s] in determining the Legislature's intent. ”’”  *Id.* at 19.  To start, examination of the differences in the language used between the notice requirements for ordinances adopted pursuant to the Local Redevelopment and Housing Law, *N.J.S.A.* 40A:12A-1, et seq.  (“LRHL”), general ordinances, and ordinances adopted pursuant to the Municipal Land Use Law, *N.J.S.A.* 40:55D-1 et seq. (“MLUL”) is critical.
[brief] 1.  The reasons relied on by the trial court do not establish an implied easement  As noted above, the trial court’s analysis of whether plaintiffs had an implied easement appurtenant required a fact-specific inquiry and a determination as to whether the record established the existence of such an easement by clear and convincing evidence.  Moreover, because it was plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment, the trial court needed to determine that no reasonable factfinder could do anything other than decide in plaintiffs’ favor.  The speculative and unsupported reasons proffered by the trial court in support of its decision failed this standard, and accordingly, the trial court’s decision should be reversed.  a.
[brief] v.  Had the Board Attorney not sent the February 17, 2021 communication to the [...], then, in that event (because of the pending Governing Body meeting), the Planning Board would have had no meaningful participation in the Development Plan Amendment process.  As referenced above, the controlling Statute (NJSA 40A:12A-7) only provides the Planning Board with a maximum period of forty-five (45) days within which to transmit its report (on the proposed Amendment to the Redevelopment Plan) to the Governing Body.  The controlling Statute furthermore provides that the failure of the Planning Board to timely submit its report to the Governing Body would essentially permit the Governing Body to dispense with the requirement of having to consider Planning Board comments.
[brief] DEFENSE COUNSEL’S COMMENTS DURING CLOSING WERE ENTIRELY WITHIN THE BROAD LATITUDE AFFORDED COUNSEL, DID NOT RESULT IN A MISCARRIAGE OF JUSTICE AND DO NOT WARRANT A NEW TRIAL.  (8T34:1-35:20)........................................................................................................39  POINT FOUR .......................................................................................................................43  THE JURY’S VERDICT WAS NOT AGAINST THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE, DID NOT RESULT IN A MISCARRIAGE OF JUSTICE AND THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL.
[directive] 1.0.3  The New Jersey Legislature also recognized the importance of the internal affairs function in 1996 with the enactment of N.J.S.A. 40A:14-181.  The statute provides that:  Every law enforcement agency shall adopt and implement guidelines which shall be consistent with the guidelines governing the "Internal Affairs Policy and Procedures" of the Police Management Manual promulgated by the Police Bureau of the Division of Criminal Justice in the Department of Law and Public Safety, and shall be consistent with any tenure or civil service laws, and shall not supersede any existing contractual agreements.  1.0.4  In accordance with this mandate, and recognizing that proper administration of internal affairs is a critical priority for the State’s criminal justice system, Attorneys General have periodically issued updated versions of this Internal Affairs Policy & Procedures document through the Division of Criminal Justice.  This most recent round of revisions reflects the need to incorporate emerging best practices into the State’s internal affairs system, and to ensure that all law enforcement agencies in the State are adhering to the guidelines.
[directive] NJ Const., art. I, para. 2:  New Jersey Constitutional Amendment for Victims Rights  A victim of a crime shall be treated with fairness, compassion and respect by the criminal justice system.  A victim of a crime shall not be denied the right to be present at public judicial proceedings except when, prior to completing testimony as a witness, the victim is properly sequestered in accordance with law or the Rules Governing the Courts of the State of New Jersey.  A victim of a crime shall be entitled to those rights and remedies as may be provided by the Legislature.  N.J.S.A. 52:4B-36.
[brief] *Robey*, 256 N.J. at 555.  In the Court’s own words,  In construing the meaning of “ascertainable loss,” we have held that the loss must be “‘quantifiable or measurable,’ not ‘hypothetical or illusory. ’ ”  *D’Agostino v. Maldonado*, 216 N.J. 168, 185, (2013) (quoting *Thiedemann [v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC*, 183 N.J. 234, 248 (2005)]).
[brief] Following the settlement of the First Police Matter, the Appellate Division had its first opportunity to consider the MSRA and confirmed that the “Legislature instructed the courts to liberally construe the MSRA ‘to give effect to its intent that severe fiscal distress in municipalities in need of stabilization and recovery shall be addressed and corrected. ’”  [...] v. [...], (Superior Officers) No. A-3117-20, 2022 WL 2352376, *6 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. June 30, 2022) (quoting N.J.S.A. 52:27BBBB-13); (Pa000675).
[brief] (1T16-11 to 23).  At that time, no one was able to identify the second suspect.  (1T16-24 to 17-5).  Between the incident date of August 22, 2021 and the end of September, officers on the street came across other individuals believed to look like the second suspect in the disseminated flyer, but none of those leads resulted in a positive identification.  (1T19-7 to 13).  On September 30, 2021, defendant was arrested for unrelated distribution of narcotics.
[brief] _Heller v. [...]_, 2016 W.L. 818734 (App. Div. 2016), (Vol. II, Pa 157) (unreported) addressed the same language.  The court reversed an order permitting arbitration stating whether the language satisfied _Atalese_ could not be determined because the arbitration agreement to which the application refers was not attached to the application nor was it presented to the trial court.  The case was thus remanded for further proceedings and if there were irreconcilable factual disputes an evidentiary hearing was to be conducted.  _Id._ at *4. (Vol. II, Pa 159).  _In McMillan v. [...]_, 2009 W.L. 1686431 (ND Calif. 2009) (Vol. II, Pa 161) (unreported) the court noted the account application recited applicant has received a copy of the applicable account agreement but oddly does not actually say what account agreement is applicable and omits any acceptance of any terms of that document.  _Id._ *4. (Vol. II, Pa 163).  Noting that fact issues were presented as to whether certain forms were ever agreed to or even received, the court ordered discovery.  _Id._ *5. (Vol. II, Pa 164).  _In Mitchell v. [...]_, 280 F. Supp 3d 1261 (CD Utah 2017) a class action case, (including NJ residents) the same account application, and language were at issue _Id._ at 1277-1278.  Plaintiffs in _Mitchell_ stated they did not receive the Account Agreement or sign any Account Application.  *Id.* at 1278.  There were so many questions of fact whether the Plaintiffs actually entered into any agreements, agreed to arbitration, the meaning of the arbitration clause or whether Wells Fargo’s procedures were reasonable, the court ordered a summary trial to resolve the factual issues.
[brief] See John & Jane Parents 1 v. Montgomery Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 622 F.Supp.3d 118, 139 (D. Md. 2022) (finding transgender students “could hardly feel safe in an environment where expressing their gender identity resulted in the automatic disclosure to their parents”), vacated for lack of standing, 78 F.4th 622 (4th Cir. 2023).  The harm to students from such involuntary outing is thus felt disparately as well.  See Sterling v. Borough of Minersville, 232 F.3d 190 (3d Cir. 2000) (police violated teenager’s rights when they threatened to tell his family he was gay, after which he died by suicide).
[brief] Indeed, it cannot be disputed that the officers’ conduct would have been lawful if the warrant in this case was valid, and common sense dictates that a warrant is supported by probable cause.  Thus, had the warrant been valid, its existence in the mobile data terminal provides not only reasonable and articulable suspicion to investigate, but probable cause to arrest.  Although it was subsequently determined that the warrant was not for this M.P., the officers’ reliance on that mistake of fact and their overall conduct in this case, nevertheless, was reasonable.  A police officer’s objectively reasonable mistake of fact does not render a search or arrest unconstitutional.
[brief] ”)(Pa1099a).  The Appellate Division expressly recognized the common law cause of action for strict liability against animal owners for harm caused by an animal attack:  “If, however, the owner had ‘knowledge of [the animal’s] mischievous or vicious propensities, he is strictly liable for any injuries caused by the animal, regardless of the precautions he took. ”  Feritta-Zepp v. [...], A-6217-08T3 (Pa1107a).  Therefore, the Motion Court erred when it determined that strict liability would be “[in]appropriate” to apply to a horse attack and granted summary judgment because Defendants were not liable “in either the common-law negligence or premise liability contexts.
[brief] C.  [...] Prejudiced the jury by allowing them to look at 21 Bankers Boxes and piles of documents which should never have been admitted into evidence; the sheer volume of which was prejudicial to [...].  (Raised below multiples times, including 2T, pg. 15; and 5T, pg. 30)  It is very difficult to understand the argument of Defendants on this point, however in Footnote 12, at the bottom of page 27 of their brief, they concede that their own witness testified 21 bankers boxes of evidence was never turned over to Mr. [...]’s attorney in this matter.  D. [...]-Jones Erred in Barring [...]’s Expert’s Testimony even though [...]’s expert had the same deficiency.
[brief] DEFENDANT’S NOTICE OF MOTION FOR DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGE ON THE REMAND AS PER N.J.S.A. 2a:15-49 AND R. 1:12-1.  --- 14  This Point Six from a previously filed Appellate Brief ([...]) is included because it is relevant to show the Trial Court error argued at Point Seven in this Appeal.  Notice of Motion for Disqualification of Judge on the Remand as Per N.J.S.A. 2A:15-49 and R.1:12 filed July 11, 2019.  Da764  Certification of [...] in Support of Notice of Motion for Disqualification/Recusal filed on July 11, 2019.  Da767  **EXHIBIT  A Transcript of Trial dated June 5, 2017 (Da177)  EXHIBIT  B Transcript of Motion dated July 15, 2016.15  Da774  EXHIBIT  C  Relevant portions  Transcript of Order to Show Cause dated October 19, 2018.16  Da795  Order filed August 26, 2019 denying Defendant’s Motion for Recusal and Referral to a New Judge denied by [...].  Da814  DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO COMPEL RETURN OF MONIES PAID PURSUANT TO JUNE 27, 2017  ORDER OF JUDGMENT AND MARCH 6,2018  ORDER OF CHANCERY DIVISION WHICH WAS VACATED BY THE APPELLATE DIVISION  Notice of Motion to Compel Return of Monies Paid Pursuant to June 27, 2017  Order of Judgment and March 6, 2018  Order of Chancery Division Vacated by the Appellate Division filed December 24, 2019.  Da816  Certification of [...] in Support of Defendant’s Notice of Motion to Compel Return of Monies Paid Pursuant to June 27, 2017
[brief] However, for the sake of completeness, we address and reject defendant's remaining contention.  The record clearly provides that the court set forth its reasons for imposing defendant's sentence in accordance with the plea agreement.  In weighing the sentencing factors, the court noted defendant's age and his extensive and significant criminal history (including parole violations) and concluded that aggravating factor three, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(3) (the risk of re-offense), applied.  The court specifically found that no mitigating factors applied.  Thus, there is no basis for a remand based upon alleged errors made at sentencing.
[brief] In re Petition of Kriso, 267 N.J. Super. 337 (App. Div. 1994), does not require a different result as [...] appears to suggest.  (Db14).  In that case, the Appellate Division held that absentee ballots submitted by voters who failed to include bearer information on the outer envelope as required by the absentee voting statute then in effect should not be automatically rejected.  Kriso, 267 N.J. Super. at 345-46.  The evidence at trial indicated that three of the sealed ballots were mailed by close family members on behalf of disabled voters, while the fourth voter utilized a corporate messenger service.  Id. at 345.  The court characterized the failure of “close family members” to complete the outer envelopes as “purely inadvertent,” and found that the fourth voter’s failure to note the corporate messenger service as the bearer on her outer envelope was due to “an innocent misunderstanding of the election laws. ”  *Ibid.*  The court concluded that “to invalidate these four ballots simply because the voters did not carefully read and follow the directions for absentee voting would unnecessarily disenfranchise them without promoting the integrity of the electoral process. ”  *Id.* at 345-46.  Unlike in *Kriso*, the court here determined that [...]’s ballot with a completely blank inner certificate failed to provide the assurances of voter accuracy and reliability intended by the Legislature, and thus the court did not have the “ability to guarantee that vote [was] cas[t] accurately and credibly.
[brief] Moreover, [...] is bound by the arbitration provisions in the Operating Agreements because she is a member of [...].  See Meade v. Cardinale & Jackson Crossing Assoc., LLC, Docket No. A-3358, 2013 WL 362761, at 3-6 (App. Div. Jan. 31, 2013) (affirming trial court’s order compelling members of LLC to arbitrate claims), and a representative of [...].  Furthermore, Defendants assert counterclaims against Plaintiff seeking rescission of the 2022 Addendum upon which Plaintiff relies in support of her equitable ownership claims.
[brief] Higgins, 158 N.J. at 419 (emphasis added).  In interpreting the statute, specifically, the Court reasoned as follows:  A plain reading of the statute suggests that the CEPA covers employees who object to the conduct of co-workers.  The term ‘any’ in subsection ‘c’ indicates that the statute applies regardless of the source of the activity, policy or practice.  Although subsections ‘a’ and ‘b’ limit the statute's application to policies, practices and activities ‘of’ or ‘by’ ‘the employer,’ subsection ‘c’ contains no such limitation.  The omission of the phrase ‘of the employer’ in subsection ‘c’ is too obvious to ignore.  Ibid. (emphasis added).
[brief] Under such circumstances, as the Supreme Court explained in DiMisa v. Acquaviva, 198 N.J. 547, 553-554 (2009), New Jersey courts have recognized the third-party exception to the American Rule as discussed in the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 914(2) (1979):  One who through the tort of another has been required to act in the protection of his interests by bringing or defending an action against a third person is entitled to recover reasonable compensation for loss of time, attorney fees and other expenditures thereby suffered or incurred in the earlier action.
[brief] *Dockser, supra*, 433 F. 3d at 425.  That means that *Dockser* cannot have been interpreted to stand for the proposition that the Chancery Court adopted here; that the Court had to defer to procedural decisions of the [...] in a post-award confirmation decision.  The opposite is plainly true.  On the motion to confirm the partial and final awards of 2018, the Court was required to decide whether 1 arbitrator was “agreed” by the parties to be eligible to decide Plaintiffs’ large monetary claims.  The Chancery Court would not reach the issue believing it had no authority.  (3T87:20-88:25)  The Court even refused to reconsider when shown that Dockser was not applicable to a post-award confirmation as this was.  (4T11:7-14:23)  This was a misapplication of law requiring reversal and remand for that determination to be made on its merits.
[brief] POINT IV  THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADOPTING THE BOARD’S FACTUAL FINDINGS OF THE [...]’S BUILDING HEIGHT ORDINANCE UNDER THE ARBITRARY, CAPRICIOUS, OR UNREASONABLE STANDARD OF REVIEW (SEE APPENDIX – OPINION Pa11-12).  The trial court erred in adopting the Board and applicant’s professionals’ legal definition of the Ordinance under the “arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable” standard.  Generally, when a reviewing court is considering an appeal from an action taken by a planning board, the standard employed is whether the grant or denial was arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable.  See Burbridge v. Mine Hill Tp., 117 N.J. 376, 385 (1990); Kramer v. Bd. of Adjustment, Sea Girt, 45 N.J. 268, 296 (1965); Md. Ctr. v. Princeton Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 343 N.J. Super. 177, 198 (App. Div. 2001).  However, a municipal board's interpretation of the law is reviewed de novo and not entitled to deference.  See Dunbar Homes, Inc. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment of Twp. of Franklin, 233 N.J. 546, 558 (2018); see Point I, supra.  Here, the trial court erred in deferring to the Board and applicant’s professionals’ incomplete definition and interpretation of the Building Height Ordinance, rather than making a legal interpretation of the ordinance under de novo review.  The trial court concluded that the legislative intent of the ordinance was for the land use Board to make a determination of whether the revised grading was done for the design, or purpose of allowing increased building height which is subject to review by the trial court using the “arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable” standard of review.  (Pa 15).  [...] and the Board in their opposition briefs both address in specific detail the factual findings of the Board and the credibility of all the witnesses in the Board hearing below.  However, the question of the Building Height ordinance is ostensibly a legal question, to be decided under de novo review, not by deference to the Board under an arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable standard.  The trial court improperly deferred to the Board and applicant professionals to opine on a legal question at the Board hearing even though they are an engineer and planner, respectively.  None of these professionals could have legally interpreted the plain language of the statute.  Therefore, the trial Court should have determined the legal definition of the ordinance under the de novo review standard, rather than defer to the Board under the “arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable” standard.  Thus, the failure of the Court to apply the de novo review standard should result in the reversal of the trial court below.  **CONCLUSION**
[brief] Notably, new legislation authorizing a sentencing court to “order that the person convicted of an animal cruelty violation shall not own, harbor, reside with, or have custody or control of any other animals for a period of time that the court deems appropriate” was enacted on July 26, 2023 – more than three years after [...]’s offense and over a month after he was sentenced.  See L. 2023, c. 129, § 5, codified at N.J.S.A. 4:22-26.2(b)(2).  The legislation provided that it would “take effect immediately. ”  L. 2023, c. 129, § 6.  Because the Legislature did not intend this statute to apply retroactively, and because retroactive application would violate the Ex Post Facto Clauses of the Federal and State Constitutions, the passage of this legislation does not convert the illegal lifetime ban on owning animals imposed on [...] to a legal sentence.