ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Pa047-Pa050 (emphasis supplied).  The Planning Board’s conclusion that the Redevelopment Plan was not inconsistent with the Master Plan did not preclude the Committee’s inclusion of detailed “reasons” in the Plan.  The Committee was not required to await the outcome of a litigated challenge to Ordinance 2022-15 before doing what the Redevelopment Law indisputably gave it the authority to do, i.e., include its “reasons” in the Redevelopment Plan.  Appellant is effectively arguing that the Township should be punished for its Committee’s proactive, time- and resource-saving approach to adopting the Redevelopment Plan.  Such an argument was properly rejected by the Trial Court and should likewise be rejected by this Court.  D.
[brief] [...] submitted no actual evidence below in support of the Distance Regulation, but instead hypothesized the substantial government interest: maybe safety, maybe aesthetics. \(^6\)  The Board’s chairman said it had no justification.  (1T:73.)  Others said it was a “sighting [sic] requirement. ”  (1T:73, 92.)  And still another said it existed solely to restrict speech for no purpose.  (2T:60.)  The purpose of the Distance Regulation was simply so that the location would never “contemplate a billboard. ”  (Id.)  “I don't think there's a correlation between our sighting requirements, and the safety that he [[...]’s expert] mentioned in his testimony. ”  (Id.)  So [...] was at war with itself below.  This continued even at oral argument, where [...] said the substantial government interest was safety; the Board said open space.  (3T:17, 21, 23.)  Rather than confront [...]’s contradictions, the trial court just held that every possibly hypothesized substantial government interest was sufficient, without actual evidence of what the interest, in fact, was when [...] adopted the Distance Regulation.
[brief] Defendant testified that he was “upset” after the hearing and wanted to “ask questions,” but admitted that he was not still angry in April of 2022.  (3T187-24 to 188-3; 3T189-24 to 190-4; 3T193-2 to 3; 3T201-4 to 17).  Defendant further acknowledged he obtained the victim’s cell phone through discovery.  (3T188-9 to 10).  Defendant maintained he was “wrong” for cursing, yelling, and calling the victim names, but stated he was not “prejudiced. ” (3T193-7 to 20; 3T199-11 to 12).  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY INSTRUCTED THE JURY ON TERRORISTIC THREATS UNDER THE LAW AT THE TIME, THE NEW RULE IN FAIR\(^3\) SHOULD NOT BE RETROACTIVE, AND ANY ERROR WAS NOT PRESERVED AND NEVERTHELESS HARMLESS (3T54-11 to 58-14).
[brief] Wollen v. [...], 468 N.J. Super. 483 (App. Div. 2021) .................................................................................................Passim State Statutes New Jersey Arbitration Act, N.J.S.A. 2A:23B-1 to -32 ...........................................12 Federal Statutes Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C.A. §§ 1-16 .................................................11 Rules FINRA Funding Portal Rule 1200(b)(1) (adopted by SR-FINRA-2015-040 eff. January 29, 2016) (Publicly available at: https://www.finra.org/rules-guidance/rulebooks/funding-portalrules/1200)  .................................................................7  Treatises RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 23 (1981)  ..................................13  Non-Periodical Publications Regulatory Notice 16-06 (SEC Approval of FINRA Funding Portal Rules and Related Forms, Published Jan. 29, 2016) (publicly available at: https://www.finra.org/rules-guidance/notices/16-06 .......................7  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
[brief] The conviction is supported by both [...] and [...]'s in-court testimony and identifications.  See *State v. Nero*, 195 N.J. 397, 407 (2008) (“‘[A]ny finding of plain error depends on an evaluation of the overall strength of the State's case. ’”) (quoting *State v. Chapland*, 187 N.J. 275, 289 (2006)).  Accordingly, application of the invited error rule in the instant case would not “‘cause a fundamental miscarriage of justice.
[brief] *Weedo* applied the “your work” exclusion to bar liability coverage to general contractors for construction defects.  *Weedo* has been cited throughout the United States and in New Jersey as barring insurance coverage on the ground that construction defects are an uninsurable “business risk. ”  The *Cypress Point* Court decided that it was not bound by *Weedo* because the exclusionary language in the CGL form had changed.  The revised CGL form in *Cypress Point* contained “a subcontractor exception to the [policy’s] ‘your work’ exclusion that was not included in the [previous] form. ”  *Id.* at 414.  The revised language of the “your work” exclusion provided that the exclusion “does not apply if the damaged work or the work out of which the damage arises was performed on your behalf by a subcontractor. ”  *Id.* at 417-18 (emphasis added).  Accordingly, noting that this exception was not included in the CGL policy form addressed in *Weedo*, the *Cypress Point* Court held that the exception “unquestionably applies in this case,” ruling that “if the insurer decides that this is a risk it does not want to insure, it can clearly amend the policy to exclude coverage, as can be done simply by either eliminating the subcontractor exception or adding a breach of contract exclusion.
[brief] ”  2.  School Ethics Commission’s August 23, 2022  Decision on Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss in Lieu of an Answer  a.  Reversing the School Ethics Commission’s August 23, 2022 dismissal of Count 7 as to N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(e); b.  Reversing the School Ethics Commission’s August 23, 2022 dismissal of Count 3 as to N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1 (a) and (e); and c.  Reinstating Counts 3 and 7 of the Amended Complaint for further proceeding before the Office of Administrative Law.  Respectfully submitted, [...]
[brief] Reversal of a grant of a directed verdict motion is applicable in those circumstances when the factual findings and legal conclusions of the trial judge went 'so wide of the mark that a mistake must have been made.'"  Llewelyn v. Shewchuk, 440 N.J. Super. 207, 214, 111 A.3d 1132 (App. Div. 2015) (quoting N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. M.M., 189 N.J. 261, 279, 914 A.2d 1265 (2007)).  Such a mistake may arise from the court's "obvious overlooking or under evaluation of crucial evidence."  Pioneer Nat'l Title Ins. Co. v. Lucas, 155 N.J. Super. 332, 338, 382 A.2d 933 (App. Div. 1978).  Also, as with any non-jury case, deference will not be given to legal determinations which are manifestly unsupported by or inconsistent with competent, relevant and reasonably credible evidence as to offend the interests of justice."  Perez v. Monmouth Cable Vision, 278 N.J. Super. 275, 282, 650 A.2d 1025 (App. Div.  1994) (quoting Rova Farms Resort v. Investors Ins. Co., 65 N.J. 474, 484, 323 A.2d 495 (1974), certif. denied, 140 N.J. 277, 658 A.2d 301 (1995).  An application of these standards to this matter warrants that the directed verdict be reversed, and Petitioner’s claims of undue influence be reinstated.
[brief] Ruvolo, 39 N.J. at 500.  [T]he credibility of the expert and the weight to be accorded his testimony rests in the domain of the trier of fact.  Unless contrary to common sense, common knowledge, or recognized physical laws, or based on primary facts absent from the proofs, the expert's statements are to be sifted by the jury like other testimony. ”  *Angel v. Rand Express Lines, Inc.*, 66 N.J. Super. 77, 85-86 (App. Div. 1961).  A jury is entitled to credit or reject a plaintiff’s expert’s opinion or a defendant’s expert’s opinion in assessing their credibility in deciding a case based on the facts.
[directive] 7.1.1  Any agency receiving a subpoena or court order for the disclosure of ALPR data shall, before complying with the subpoena or court order, provide notice to the County Prosecutor (or Director of the Division of Criminal Justice (DCJ)). data.  If ALPR data is accessed as part of an investigation—including but Release of ALPR not limited to a BOLO query, a crime scene query, or crime trend analysis—a record of the access, which may be automated, and corresponding data shall be included in the agency’s investigative file (electronic or physical).  If the investigation results in criminal charges, the ALPR records shall be turned over in discovery pursuant to applicable court rules and case law.  Compliance policy.
[brief] PERC’s affirmation of the Arbitration Award (“Award”) in this matter was well reasoned and logical rather than arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable and, therefore, its decision must be affirmed.  The fundamental flaw in Appellant [...]’s (“the Union”) appeal is that even if its belief that its members deserved greater raises is true, it does not entitle the Union to vacate the Award.  The Arbitrator found that greater raises would be fiscally irresponsible.  It also does not matter that reasonable minds could differ (although that is not the case here).  Arbitrator [...], (“Arbitrator” or “[...]”) undertook an evaluation of the statutory criteria and proffered a detailed well-reasoned decision.  Absent from the record is any evidence of fraud, corruption, impartiality or undue means which is what the Union would have to establish to vacate the Award with clear and convincing evidence.  The Award was not indefinite or lacking in finality, and thus may not be disturbed.
[brief] We respectfully submit that the answer is obvious—because these professionals are not “crafts”, and the “other” category is only meant to facilitate filling out the application for registration, nothing more.  B.  THE ARCHAEOLOGIST IS NOT EXPECTED TO HIRE A CREW OF LABORERS (not addressed in the Decision).  [...] suggests that the registered archaeologist might be called upon to perform work “with laborers”.  Carb5.  [...]’s support is a reference to Addendum No 1 to the bid documents, Item U22 at 1334a, which [...] claims “created a separate schedule of values for certain additional work the archeological subcontractor is to perform on the Project site with laborers. ”  Carb5 (emphasis added).  [...] avoids stating that the archaeologist would or could employ said laborers, however, that seems to be what [...] is insinuating.  Carb5.  We respectfully submit that there is nothing in this record that suggests that the archaeologist may need to employ laborers (a prevailing wage classification).  For clarity, the complete description of the subject item U22 is as follows:  Item U22 – Additional Time for Services of Registered Archaeologist:  For the unit price bid for Item U22 the Contractor shall provide services of a registered archaeologist above the schedule of values to be provided by the contractor.  The additional hours may arise from additional excavation needs, or requests from the Owner.  The unit price bid shall include all costs required to compensate the archaeologist for labor for on-site services including expenses and all Contractor markups included.  No separate payment will be made for these items.  1334a (emphasis added).  We respectfully submit that the term “labor” referred to above is a reference to the archaeologists’ own efforts, and neither a requirement, expectation, or direction for the archaeologist to hire its own laborers as employees.  Conclusion  Therefore, for the reasons set forth above, the [...] respectfully requests dismissal of the Appeal and a release of any restraints on the [...]’s ability to proceed with [...] on the Contract.
[brief] ADMIT __X__ DENY ______ •  At the time you made the January 17, 2022 post that is the subject of Count 5 of the Complaint, some of your Facebook friends were members of the [...] community, including but not limited to parents, teachers, students, and staff.  ADMIT __X__ DENY _____ •  Your posts on Facebook have been the subject of criticism during the public comment portion of Board meetings during 2022.
[brief] R. Jennings Mft., 286 N.J. Super. at 416.  The Appellate Division in R. Jennings only dealt with the narrow issue of the interest rate to be applied to the judgment. ”  Id. at 414.  In R. Jennings, the judgment debtor “argued that once a judgment is obtained, only the amount of interest specified in R. 4:42–11 applies. ”  Id.  The judgment creditors argued that “when contracting parties agree that specific interest is to be paid on detention of a debt, it becomes part of the bargain and is recoverable, with principal, as of right up to the time of payment, even if a judgment is rendered. ”  Id. at 416-417.
[brief] Further, the Defendants’ injuries with respect to their loss of the Boonton Property were entirely based on the simple fact that [...], having a perfectly equal opportunity to bid on the property, submitted the losing bid after rejecting the proposed listing of the property and dismissing the prospect of a sale to the [...].  Their claim is barred by their own actions, as self-inflicted injuries cannot be the basis of a claim for damages.  See, e.g., Gennari v. Weichert Co. Realtors, 288 N. J. Super. 504, 546 App. Div. 1996, aff’d as modified, 148 N.J. 582 (1997); Frink v. Adams, 36 N.J. Eq. 485, 487 (Ch. 1883) (observing that a party “can have no redress for a self-inflicted injury).
[directive] The court shall direct that when a judgment is entered:  a.  The judgment shall state that payments are to be made payable to the “State of New Jersey Bail Account. ”  b.  Judgments entered pursuant to R. 3:26-6(c) shall contain the following paragraph:  Failure to satisfy a judgment will result in removal of the names of all of a corporate surety company’s licensed insurance producers and limited insurance representatives (bail bondsmen) from the Bail Registry maintained by the Clerk of the Superior Court pursuant to Rule 1:13-3(e) until such time as the judgment has been satisfied.  c.  A copy of a judgment entered pursuant to R. 3:26-6(c) shall be served by ordinary mail on the corporate surety company and the licensed insurance producer or the limited insurance representative named in the judgment at the address recorded in the Bail Registry maintained by the Clerk of the Superior Court.  d.  Upon the failure of a corporate surety to pay a forfeiture or to file a motion to vacate the forfeiture within seventy-five (75) days of the date of the notice sent pursuant to R. 3:26-6, the court shall send two copies of the judgment to the Clerk of the Superior Court indicating that the surety has failed to pay or file an objection pursuant to the rule.  3.
[directive] As Approved by the Supreme Court  Promulgated by Directive #21-06 (December 11, 2006)  The Supreme Court, as reflected in its September 15, 2006 Administrative Determinations on the report and recommendations of the Special Committee on Peremptory Challenges and Jury Voir Dire, approved these Standards for Jury Selection.  The Special Committee developed these Standards in accordance with the Court’s charge to make recommendations on ways to improve current jury selection practice.  In developing the Standards, the Special Committee engaged in extensive discussions with and received input from trial judges, organized bar association groups, and individual members of the bar.  The Special Committee also reviewed case law, noting, however, that in the rare instances where jury selection issues have been the subject of reported decisions, those instances have nearly always occurred in capital trials.  The purpose of jury selection is to obtain a jury that can decide the case without bias against any of the involved parties, that will evaluate the evidence with an open mind, and that will apply the law as instructed by the judge.
[brief] **Continued Local Watchdog Efforts **  Plaintiff never stopped questioning the validity of the July 30, 2021 fair share housing settlement under State law.  Plaintiff filed another notice of civil rights act violation notice with defendants.  (Pa123; Pa125; Pa219-SJCS# 29).  Plaintiff also contacted [...] questioning whether he had in fact prohibited the disclosure of the final settlement terms until after consideration and official action.  Plaintiff claimed that defendants violated the Whispering Woods Doctrine\(^2\).  Plaintiff also claimed that defendants violated our State’s strong public policy in favor of robust informed civic participation and the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing contained in all New Jersey contracts.  Plaintiff advised Judge Gardner of the June 2021 broken promise not to develop the contaminated DPW site without any prior citizen input.  Plaintiff suggested that defendants hold a Whispering Woods Doctrine public hearing to ratify the July 30, 2021 fair share housing settlement.  On Friday September 17, 2021 ("Constitution Day"), Essex County Civil Presiding Judge [...] and [...] both admonished [...] for asserting that residents had no right to monitor virtual case management conferences.  On September 17, 2021, Essex County Civil Presiding Judge Moore admonished [...] to mediate and not to litigate the validity of its expanded appointed 5 district SID under State law.  On Friday September 17, 2021, [...]'s Labor Attorney responded to plaintiff’s August 17, 2021 TC meeting civil rights act violation allegations.  (Pa123).  This cursory response letter shifted the false and misleading prohibited --- \(^2\)  See, Whispering Woods at Bamm Hollow v. Twp. of Middletown, 220 N.J. Super. 161, 172-173 (law Div. 1987) (requiring any public land use related settlement to be subject to public presentation, a public hearing thereon and a public vote.)  disclosure representations liability to Attorney [...]-[...]'s planning board/special fair share housing litigation counsel.  (Pa123;Pa219-SJCS #31).  **Defendants' September 30, 2021
[brief] When developed, TMDLs must include load allocations (the portion of the receiving water’s total maximum daily load for a specific pollutant that is allocated to existing or future nonpoint sources of pollution) for nonpoint sources of pollutant load and wasteload allocations (the portion of the receiving waterbody’s TMDL for a specific pollutant that is allocated to one of its existing or future point sources of pollution) for point sources of pollutant load and an implementation plan to achieve water quality standards.  N.J.A.C. 7:15-5.3(b)(5) and (6).  TMDLs are typically implemented through NJPDES permits, which establish limits and conditions to ensure water quality standards are met.  N.J.A.C. 7:14A-2.4; N.J.A.C. 7:14A-13.2(a)(2); N.J.A.C. 7:14A-25.6(e).
[brief] Consequently, one must first examine whether a per se bar applied.  Here, plaintiff contended that a Grabowsky municipal land use law 200 feet radius bar applied.  Second, if there were no per se bar, the court then must apply an objective reasonable person test.  Here, the trial court misapplied this objective reasonable person test.  Cf: The Ridge at Back Brook, LLC v. The East Anwell Township Planning Board, A-3710-19 (App. Div. July 20, 2021) (Pra6)(disqualifying mayor’s participation due to prior adverse comments made by him).  Accordingly, due to her ownership of a business within the flex parking removal one block area and her campaign pledge to remove flex parking, [...] had a disqualifying conflict of interest and appearance of impropriety.  Therefore, the contested capital bond ordinance was void ab initio.  III.
[brief] [...]’s Alleged “Complaints” About [...]  Prior to June 24, 2020.  [...] admitted that she never once made any written complaints to anyone at [...] about anything and never made more than offhand comments about [...] to others.  (Pa241 at 62:18-64:9; Pa238-39 at 49:1-55:25; Pa243 at 72:13-17; Pa244 at 74:5-24).  [...] was advised that she could complain to HR if she believed it was serious, but never did.  (Pa241 at 64:11-18; Pa241 at 62:20-64:18; Pa409 at 27:12-17; Pa409 at 27:19-28:5).  None of [...]’s conduct was ever directed at [...].  (Pa241 at 62:5-12).  In connection with [...]’s June 24, 2020 argument with [...], [...] did not identify any law, rule, regulation, or public policy that she reasonably believed [...] violated.  (Pa241 at 61:18-62:8).  VIII.
[brief] 18 Sportsman’s Alliance Foundation v. New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection, 182 N.J. 461 (2005) ....................................................................................... 7 State v. Harper, 229 N.J. 228 (2017) ..................................................................................... 22 State v. Provenzano, 34 N.J. 318 (1961) ....................................................................................... 22 Sunshine Antracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381, 60 S.Ct. 907, 84 L.Ed. 1263 (1940) ........................................ 25 U.S. Sportsmen’s Alliance Foundation v. N.J. Dept. of Envt’l Prot., 182 N.J. 461 (2005) ..................................................................................... 19, 29 United Hunters Assoc. of N.J. v. Bontempo, 53 N.J. Super. 181, 189-90 (App. Div. 1958) ........................................... 6, 35 Wilson ex rel. Manzano v. City of Jersey City, 209 N.J. 558 (2012) .................................................................................. 22 Constitutional Provisions New Jersey Constitution, Art. III, Par. 1 ........................................................ passim New Jersey Constitution, Art. IV, Sec. 1, Par. 1 of the (1947) ......................... passim Statutes 15 U.S.C.A. §3052 ......................................................................................... 25 L. 1979, c. 199, §72, eff. Sept. 19, 1979 ....................................................... 27 Pub. L. No. 117-328, 136 Stat. 4459 (2022) .................................................... 25 N.J.S.A. 2A:16-52, -53 ............................................................................... 15 N.J.S.A. 4:1-15 .......................................................................................... 21 N.J.S.A. 4:1-4 ............................................................................................. 21 N.J.S.A. 13:1B-2 ......................................................................................... 4 N.J.S.A. 13:1B-24 ...................................................................................... passim N.J.S.A. 13:1B-25 ...................................................................................... passim N.J.S.A. 13:1B-27 ..................................................................................... 5, 29 N.J.S.A. 13:1B-28 ..................................................................................... 5, 6, 7, 12 N.J.S.A. 13:1B-3 ......................................................................................... 4 N.J.S.A. 13:1B-30 .....................................................................................
[brief] A litigant should not seek reconsideration merely because of dissatisfaction with a decision of the Court.  Rather, the preferred course to be followed when one is disappointed with a judicial determination is to seek relief by means of either a motion for leave to appeal or, if the Order is final, by a notice of appeal.  Reconsideration should be utilized only for those cases which fall into that narrow corridor in which either 1) the Court has expressed its decision based upon a palpably incorrect or irrational basis, or 2) it is obvious that the Court either did not consider, or failed to appreciate the significance of probative, competent evidence.