ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] ..............................................................................................  18  Petro-Lubricant Testing Labs., Inc. v. Adelman, 233 N.J. 236 (2018)  ................................................................................................................  14  Printing Mart-Morristown v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 116 N.J. 739 (1989)  ..................................................................................................................  14  Rocci v. Ecole Secondaire MacDonald-Cartier, 165 N.J. 149 (2000)  ..................................................................................................................  14  Schwartz v. Worrall Publications, Inc., 258 N.J. Super. 493 (App. Div. 1992)  ......................................................................................  27 Secord v. Cockburn, 747 F. Supp. 779 (D.D.C. 1990)  ..............................................................................................  20 Senna v. Florimont, 196 N.J. 469 (2008) ..................................................................................................................  19  Sickles v. Cabot Corp., 379 N.J. Super. 100 (App. Div. 2005) .....................................................................................  13  Sisler v. Gannett Co., Inc., 104 N.J. 256 (1986) ..................................................................................................................  14  Smith v. Datla, 451 N.J. Super. 82 (App. Div. 2017) ....................................................................................... 13 St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727 (1968)  ................................................................................................................ 20, 21, 23 Statutes N.J. Const. art. I, § 6 ........................................................................................................14
[directive] 65  (g)  Had a sustained finding that an officer has filed a false report or submitted a false certification in any criminal, administrative, employment, financial, or insurance matter in their professional or personal life, regardless of the type or severity of discipline imposed; (h)  Had a sustained finding that an officer intentionally conducted an improper search, seizure or arrest, regardless of the type or severity of discipline imposed; (i)  Had a sustained finding that an officer intentionally mishandled or destroyed evidence, regardless of the type or severity of discipline imposed; (j)  Had a sustained finding of domestic violence, as defined in N.J.S.A. 2C:25-19, regardless of the type or severity of discipline imposed; (k)  Resigned, retired, transferred or separated from the agency, regardless of the reason, while any internal affairs investigation or complaint was pending, and the misconduct ultimately sustained falls within categories (d) through (j) above or would have resulted in an action under categories (a) through (c) had the member not separated from the agency;13 or (l) Was charged with any indictable crime under New Jersey or an equivalent offense under federal law or the law of another jurisdiction related to the complaint.  “Sustained finding” refers to any finding where a preponderance of the evidence shows an officer violated any law, regulation, directive, guideline policy or procedure issued by the Attorney General or County Prosecutor; agency protocol; standard operating procedure, rule or training, following the last supervisory review of the incident(s) during the internal affairs process where the deadline for appeal has passed or following a ruling by a hearing officer, arbitrator, Administrative Law Judge, Civil Service Commission, or the Superior Court where the deadline for any subsequent appeal has passed.
[brief] [See J.E.V. v. K.V., 426 N.J. Super. 475, 492–93 (App. Div. 2012) citing R. 5:3–5(c). ]  The rationale behind factor (3) above, an assessment the reasonableness and good faith positions advanced by the parties, was explained in Fagas v. Scott, 251 N.J. Super. 194, 197–200 (Law Div. 1991):
[brief] The Department issued the HAD without a determination as to whether the new compressor station qualifies as a "routine upgrade" to Tennessee's existing gas pipeline system because the DEP maintains "routine" in Exemption 11 modifies only "maintenance and operations" and does not modify "upgrade."²  Appellants [...], [...], and [...] have appealed the HAD,³ contending we should apply the doctrine of noscitur a sociis, "an ancient maxim of statutory construction that the meaning of words may be indicated and controlled by those with which they are associated," Germann v. Matriss, 55 N.J. 193, 220 (1970), and find "the --- ² The HAD also refers to Exemption 11 in the Highlands Act Rules, which, as to the issue that concerns us, simply parrots the language of the statute.
[brief] Choice of Law (Pa0054; Pa0220)  [...]’s primary objective in the liability phase of this case was the application of New Jersey law.  Under New Jersey law, [...]’s insurers would have been estopped from enforcing the “sudden and accidental” pollution exclusions contained in many of the policies at issue.  Morton International Inc. v. General Accident Insurance Company of America, 134 N.J. 1 (1993).  This would have ensured that the majority of [...]’s damages would be covered.  [...] lost on this pivotal issue, and Massachusetts law was applied to this case.
[brief] The Trial Court Correctly Rejected Plaintiffs’ Libel Per Se Claim  During oral argument before the trial court, Plaintiffs conceded that their libel per se claim was based on the same alleged conduct as, and thus inextricably intertwined with, their proposed malicious prosecution claim, and Plaintiffs do not disavow that position on this appeal.  Based on that concession, and based on its discretionary determinations that Plaintiffs’ malicious prosecution claim was futile (as explained above) in part because Plaintiffs could not show that [...] lacked probable cause and thus did not make a false statement to the police, the trial court correctly determined that Plaintiffs’ libel per se claim was likewise futile.
[brief] This 50’-6” above finished grade dimension is consistent with the approved [...] architectural plans which clearly showed this to be the finished grade to the top of the flat roof.  (Da5).  The approved [...] architectural plans also show a parapet which has a height of 3’-3” above the flat roof.  Under [...] Ordinances §196-6 and §196-23, the height of the parapet is not included in the calculation of Building Height.
[brief] **POINT II**  **THE OWNER'S MOTION FOR REIMBURSEMENT OF HIS EXPERT FEES SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED BASED ON FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF FAIRNESS, EQUITY, AND FULL INDEMNITY.  (Da154-155;160)**  The exercise of eminent domain is one of the most awesome powers of government.  It is subject to the constitutional imperative of just compensation.  *Housing Auth. v. Suydam Investors*, 177 N.J. 2, 6 (2003); U.S. Const. amend. v; xiv; N.J. Const. art. 1, par. 20.  Just compensation is grounded on fundamental notions of fairness and justice.  *State v. Nordstrom, et. al.*, 54 N.J. 50, 53 (1969); *Jersey City Redevelopment Agency v. Kugler*, 58 N.J. 374, 383-84 (1971); *Armstrong v.* United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).  Just compensation is to make the property owner whole.  It implies full indemnity and it to be regarded from the point of view of the owner and not the condemnor.  State v. William G. Rohrer, Inc., 80 N.J. 462, 467 (1979).  It is to be determined from the perspective of what the property owner will lose, and not what the condemnor may gain.  Borough of Merch. v. Malik & Son, 218 N.J. 556, 572 (2014).  A property owner does not ask to have his property taken nor does he seek to be confronted with unwanted litigation by government over the taking of his private property.  See e.g., Rockaway v. Donofrio, 186 N.J. Super. 344, 352-353 (App. Div. 1982)  A condemnation case "raises special considerations" as a result of which courts have been "solicitous of the rights of a condemnee."  Id.  Government "may not conduct itself so as to achieve or preserve any kind of bargaining or litigational advantage over the property owner."  F.M.C. Stores Co. v. Borough of Morris Plains, 100 N.J. 418, 426-427 (1985).  Subsequent to the court having allowed the plaintiff to amend its complaint, the owner moved for reimbursement of his expert fees.  Granting plaintiff's motion to amend the complaint had negated the owner's reports.  The owner incurred the cost and expense in the amount of $14,737.50 for expert reports in preparation for the then imminent trial based on what the plaintiff subsequently admitted was its mistaken and inaccurate description of the taking.  These circumstances warranted the condemnor’s reimbursement of the condemnee’s reasonable costs for the expert reports, particularly when plaintiff had been allowed to correct its own mistake.
[brief] (Volume I Pa. [...] granted defendant’s motion to quash the subpoena on [...] because he would not permit a deposition subpoena to be served beyond the discovery end date and all applications to extend discovery in Hudson County were required to be decided by the Presiding Judge of the Civil Part.  (Volume I Pa. 134; IT1 3-25 to 5-5).  [...] produced his tax returns for all the years he worked for [...] but his accountants did not make copies of any 1099 forms provided to the Internal Revenue Service.  (Volume I Pa. 83-84; Bellifemine Dep. TR 75-25 to 80-21).  [...] produced all checks in the possession of his bank issued to him from [...] which included all checks issued in 2016 - 2017(Volume III Pa. 405-415; see Exhibit C attached to the certification of [...] in opposition to defendant’s motion for summary judgment).  [...] received a check of $10,000.00 dated September 8, 2016 a check of $10,000.00 dated August 23, 2016, a check for $10,000.00 dated April 4, 2016, a check for $10,000.00 dated December 7, 2016, a check for $10,576.04 dated September 25, 2017, a check for $10,576.04 dated September 1, 2017 for $10,576.04 a check for $10,576.04 dated August 2, 2017 a check of $961.64 dated August 19, 2017, a check for $951.54 dated June 1, 2017, a check for $961.54 dated May 22, 2017 and a check for $10,576.04 dated February 24, 2017( Volume III Pa. 405-415)  The checks produced by [...] for 2016 and 2017, the last two years defendants operated Meadowlands Hospital establish payment to him by the defendants of $95,364.82.  Defendants presented no proof of any payments to [...] such as copies of the checks or the 1099 forms issued to [...].
[brief] | CASES | | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------| | Abrams v. General Star Indem., 67 P.3d 931 (Or.Sup.Ct. 2003) | 43 | | Alloway v. Bradlees, Inc., 157 N.J. 221 (1999) | 37, 38 | | Burd v. Sussex Mut. Ins., 56 N.J. 383 (1970) | 43 | | Conklin v. Hannoch Weisman, 145 N.J. 395 (1996) | 43 | | Davis v. Devereux, 209 N.J. 269 (2012) | 33, 34, 35 | | Diaz v. City of Anaheim, 840 F.3d 592 (9th Cir. 2016) | 30 | | DiCosala v. Kay, 91 N.J. 159 (1982) | 39 | | Diodato v. Rogers, 321 N.J.Super. 326 (L.D. 1998) | 28 | | Doe v. XYC Corp., 382 N.J.Super. 122 (A.D. 2005) | 39 | | Finderne Mgmt. Co. v. Barrett, 402 N.J. Super. 546 (A.D. 2008), certif. denied, 199 N.J. 542 (2009) | 31 | | Green v. N.J. Mfrs. Ins. Co., 160 N.J. 480 (1999) | 18, 22 | | Griffin v. City of E. Orange, 225 N.J. 400 (2016) | 18, 25 | | Hart v. City of Jersey City, 308 N.J.Super. 487 (A.D. 1998) | 20 | | Johnson v. Dobrosky, 187 N.J. 594 (2006) | 30 | | Lis v. Robert Packer Hospital, 579 F.2d 819 (3rd Cir.1978) | 28 | | Mavrikidis v. Petullo, 153 N.J. 117 (1998) | 37, 38, 39 | | McClelland v. Tucker, 273 N.J.Super. 410 (A.D. 1994) | 31 | | McQueen v. Green, 202 N.E.3d 268 (IL Supr. Ct. 2022) | 37, 38 | | N.J. Mfrs. v. Vizcaino, 392 N.J.Super. 366 (A.D. 2007) | 43 | | Nisivoccia v. Ademhill Assoc., 286 N.J.Super. 419 (A.D. 1996) | 44 | Redvanly v. ADP, Inc., 407 N.J.Super. 395 (A.D. 2009) cert. denied, 200 N.J. 367 (2009) State v. Darby, 174 N.J. 509 (2002)
[directive] by Revised Form Promulgated 12/31/2019 Supplement to Directive #01-18, CN 10079-Portuguese Defendant's Initials a Fonnulario Revisado Promulgado em 12/31/2019, Complementa9iio Diretriz no 0 1-18, CN 10079-Portuguese Reu lniciais do page 3 of 7 /pagina 3 de 7
[brief] CASES  State v. Diloreto, 362 N.J. Super, at 615-16 (Citing R. 3:5-7(d); R. 3:9-3(f)....20 State v. Jamar Myers, 245 N.J. 250, 251 (2021).............................................15  State v. Peter Nyema, 465 N.J. Super. 181, 185 (App Div. 2020)..................15  State v. Nyema, 245 N.J. 256, (2021)..........................................................16  State v. Stevens, 115 N.J. 289, 304 (1989)..................................................18  State v. Vallejo, 198 N.J. 122, 133 (2009)..................................................18  Rules  NEW JERSEY COURT RULES  Sec. 3:9-3(f)  Conditional Pleas.................................................................3:9........13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21  Other Authorities  Criminal Practice and Procedures, Subsection 12.22  Conditional guilty pleas......13-14  PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[brief] At the outset, a person’s mere association with “others independently suspected of criminal activity” does not give rise to reasonable suspicion.  See *State v. Rivera*, 276 N.J. Super. 346, 352 (App. Div. 1992) (quoting *Ybarra v. Illinois*, 444 U.S. 85, 91 (1979)).  In this case, [...]’s association with [...] was even less probative of potential criminal conduct, as police had minimal grounds to believe that [...] was involved in criminal activity.  All police knew about [...] at the time of the stop was that he rented a storage unit with [...] and accessed it regularly and that he had recently been in New York.  Renting and utilizing a storage unit are not criminal acts, nor is driving twenty minutes from one neighboring state to another. \(^6\)  While police had received a tip that [...] had previously accepted deliveries of heroin from New York to his storage unit, [...] testified that the informant made no mention of [...].
[brief] Third, without explanation, the court found conflicting aggravating and mitigating factors.  The court found aggravating factors 3, the risk of reoffense, without any explanation, and 6, criminal history, based on [...]’s juvenile record.  (13T 19-14 to 18)  Yet the court also found mitigating factor 7, as this was [...]’s first indictable conviction.  (13T 19-22 to 25)  As our Supreme Court has held, these aggravating and mitigating factors conflict and, though they can all be found together, a sentencing court must provide a clear explanation for the basis of these factors.
[brief] In opposing [...]’s (“Appellant”) appeal, the State (“Respondent”) argues in pertinent part that:  (1)  The trial court’s thorough consideration of the diagram before granting the motion to suppress cured any prejudice.  (2)  [...] (“[...]”) withholding his notes and twice perjuring himself on the stand was not willful or outrageous.  (3)  [...]’s notes were provided in time for their effective use at trial and were not material.  The irony and disingenuousness of Respondent’s arguments is palpable.
[brief] Even though a child did not (or does not) have a relationship with his or her father, a custodial parent and recipient of child support can seek additional support for a child’s higher education.  Also, if a child wanted financial assistance from his or her father, they can make the request before he or she incurred their college expenses.  When neither the custodial parent or child made such a request until after defendant sought to terminate child support, and the child had already graduated from college, the failure of both the custodial parent and child to request that non – custodial parent assist in paying a child educational expenses at a time that weighs heavily against ordering him to contribute to educational expenses after the education was completed.  The factors set forth in Newburgh contemplate that a parent or child seeking contribution towards the expenses of higher education will make the request before the educational expenses are incurred.
[brief] By signing, filing or advocating a pleading, written motion, or other paper, an attorney or pro se party certifies that to the best of his or her knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances: (1) the paper is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation; (2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions therein are warranted by existing law or by a non-frivolous argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law or the establishment of new law; (3) the factual allegations have evidentiary support or, as to specifically identified allegations, they are either likely to have evidentiary support or they will be withdrawn or corrected if reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery indicates insufficient evidentiary support; and (4) the denials of factual allegations are warranted on the evidence or, as to specifically identified denials, they are reasonably based on a lack of information or belief or they will be withdrawn or corrected if a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery indicates insufficient evidentiary support.  Moreover, in pertinent part, R. 1:4-8(b) provides:  An application for sanctions under this rule shall be by motion made separately from other applications and shall describe the specific conduct alleged to have violated this rule.  No such motion shall be filed unless it includes a certification that the applicant served written notice and demand pursuant to R. 1:5-2 to the attorney or pro se party who signed or filed the paper objected to.  The certification shall have annexed a copy of that notice and demand, which shall (i) state that the paper is believed to violate the provisions of this rule, (ii) set forth the basis for that belief with specificity, (iii) include a demand that the paper be withdrawn, and (iv) give notice, except as otherwise provided herein, that an application for sanctions will be made within a reasonable time thereafter if the offending paper is not withdrawn within 28 days of service of the written demand.
[brief] Respectfully submitted, [...]  ATTORNEY GENERAL OF NEW JERSEY  By: /s/ [...]  [...]  Deputy Attorney General (ID: 294762019)  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY  APPELLATE DIVISION  Docket No.: [...]  IN THE MATTER OF DENIAL OF THIRD PARTY  HEARING REQUEST OF P.T. JIBSAIL LIMITED  PARTNERSHIP FILE NO. [...]  [...]; [...]; OFFICE OF LEGAL AFFAIRS  FILE NO. [...]  Civil Action On Appeal  From: [...]  REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT
[brief] [...] further indicated that:  It’s also important to recognize that with this traffic signal at this location it improves the Levels of Service at Applegarth Road as well as at Twin Rivers Drive because we’re not – traffic will have direct access to this site and not be required to utilize other signals for U-turns like they currently do today for the approved developments.  See 1T91-2 to 1T91-9.  At no point did [...] mention or even allude to the fact that the [...] was no longer in favor of the Route 33 Signal.  See generally 1T.  In fact, even when challenged by a member of the public concerning the ability to secure the Route 33 Signal, [...] did not waiver in his position; nor did he allude to the position taken by the [...] at the 2019 [...] Meeting.  1T162 to 1T164.
[brief] Other Authorities  28 Am Jur 2d Escrow § 22 ....................................................................37  Black’s Law Dictionary (8th ed. 2004) ...................................................63  Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019)  ..................................................63  2  Corbin on Contracts § 65.33 ..............................................................24  9  Williston on Contracts (Rev. ed.), § 46 ................................................22  25  Williston, Contracts (Lord ed., 2002), § 67:2 ....................................25  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
[brief] The question of whether a member of the school community could have reasonably perceived Respondent of speaking as a Board member is directly answered by the fact that many members of the public did perceive her as speaking on behalf of the Board.  I/M/O [...], Commission Docket No. [...], at pp. 7-8 (2021) (Ca406-407) (citing Melnyk v. Fiel, Commission Docket No.  That is why the public protested her at meetings of the Board.  (Ca107-109, Ca120-122, Ca123-127).  That is why newspapers referred to her as a Board member.  (Ca123-127).  That is why the Board itself was compelled to pass two Resolutions clarifying that it did not stand behind her public statements and that her statements should not continue to be seen as having been made on behalf of the Board.  (Ca097-098; Ca137).  Respondent’s statements also led directly to litigation being filed against the Board, which was clearly reflected in the record.
[directive] Specialized iii.  Other to authorized be may department principal's a by employed civilians or Officers non-English skills, knowledge, specialized their through investigation the assist or b(i) subsection in for accounted otherwise training not or proficiency, language designee, or Director the or designee, or Prosecutor County the that provided (ii), language non-English skills, knowledge, specialized their that determines practical, balancing investigation, the support necessary to is training or proficiency, might participation such that possibility the against operational needs and logistical, the of independence and impartiality in the confidence public undermine independently shall operate personnel such that provided further and investigation, or Prosecutor County the to directly report and command of chain ordinary their of designee. or Director the to or designee, Liaison.
[brief] *Calabotta v. Phibro Animal Health Corp.*, 460 N.J.Super. 38, 61 (App. Div. 2019) (internal quotations omitted).  The more broadly the NJLAD is applied, the greater its anti-discriminatory impact.  *Id.* (Internal citations omitted); see also *Tynan* *supra*, 351 N.J.Super. at 398 ("Because the purpose of the [N]LAD] is 'to secure to handicapped individuals full and equal access to society, bounded only by the actual physical limits that they cannot surmount,' the Act besides being quite broad must also be liberally construed.").
[brief] See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (conduct at issue must be “rationally related to a legitimate state interest” when a fundamental right is not implicated).  In fact, the State’s interest in prohibiting school officials from disclosing a student’s gender identity to their parents over the student’s objection is compelling enough to survive strict scrutiny, assuming the applicability of that standard.
[brief] There is no genuine issue of material fact and summary judgment dismissing the Plaintiff’s Complaint was the appropriate disposition of this case.  First, no jury can interpret Appellant’s e-mail on behalf of herself and five of her colleagues as a request for a reasonable accommodation for a disability.  It wasn’t a request at all.  Rather, it was a demand without any mention of a disability affecting her or her co-workers.  Second, Appellant failed to demonstrate a *prima facie* claim of discrimination by failing to demonstrate the existence of a disability through evidence beyond self-serving declarations.  Third, Appellant has failed to demonstrate that Respondent’s reasons for her termination were pretextual.  Fourth, Appellant has not met her heavy burden in proving that her termination violated a clear mandate of public policy.  Therefore, Respondent respectfully requests that the Appellate Division affirm the Trial Court’s decision.