ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] ”  Ge Solid State v. Director, Division of Taxation, 132 N.J. 298, 307 (1993) (quoting State v. Butler, 89 N.J. 220, 226 (1982)).  “Absent a legislative intent to the contrary, such language is to be given its ordinary meaning. ”  Ibid. (citing Mortimer v. Board of Review, 99 N.J. 393, 398 (1985)).  Webster’s dictionary defines “fight” as “to contend in battle or physical combat[.]”  Merriam-Webster’s Online Dictionary, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/fight (last visited February 5, 2025).  It further defines “fighting” as “designed, intended, or trained to fight in combat[.]”  Id. at https://www.merriam-webster. com/dictionary/fighting (last visited February 5, 2025).  Other sections of Title 4, Chapter 22, Article 2B of the New Jersey Statutes lend additional context to the statutory meaning of the terms “fight” or “fighting”.  For example, N.J.S.A. 4:22-24c defines “animal fighting paraphernalia” as equipment, products, implements, and materials of any kind that are used, intended for use, or designed for use in the training, preparation, or conditioning of an animal for fighting, or in furtherance of animal fighting, and includes, but is not limited to, the following: breaking sticks, cat mills, treadmills, fighting pits, springpoles, veterinary medicine without a prescription therefor, treatment supplies, gaffs, slashers, heels, or any other sharp implement designed to be attached in place of the natural spur of a rooster, cock, or game fowl.
[brief] (Pb11).  The “cue issue” that may or may not occur an estimated once or twice a month was never a proven fact of what took place on the date in question; it was just a mere estimate and approximation made by a fact witness.  (Pa85, Pa86).  The mere possibility of errors occurring does not mean that an error occurred and even if an error occurred, that is still not evidence that the lights available were insufficient.  Plaintiff attempts to stretch the truth too far.  Again, there were aisle lights and step lights which provided adequate visual cues for someone walking in the auditorium and whether the ceiling lights were on or not, becomes completely irrelevant.  Plaintiff then employs a similar tactic when discussing the deposition of [...], one of the [...] General Managers over the years at this theatre, but not at the time at issue, suggesting that an *estimate* by this deponent is fact.
[brief] See e.g. Call v. Czaplicki, No. 09-6591 (RBK/AMD), 2010 WL 3724275, at *9 (D.N.J. Sept. 16, 2010) (dismissing CFA claims against [...]); Call v. Czaplicki, No. 09-6591 (RBK/AMD), 2011 WL 2532712, at *6-7 (D.N.J. June 23, 2011) (dismissing the CFA claims against [...] and [...] and denying the plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend as futile).  Moreover, the Complaint expressly pleads facts that are directly within the exemption to the CFA.  Plaintiff alleges that Defendants are licensed, professional insurance brokers who “were acting within the scope of their employment” with [...] when they marketed, sold, and procured insurance products to Plaintiff.  (Pa005 – Pa006, Pa011).  Plaintiff alleges that the nature of the services provided were professional, and that Defendants owed a fiduciary duty to and had a special relationship with Plaintiff.  (Pa031 – Pa047).  If there was any doubt, Plaintiff produced an Affidavit of Merit pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-27.  (Pa050 – Pa052).  The sworn certification from Plaintiff’s proposed expert, who holds “widely recognized professional insurance designations,” opines that Defendants departed from the “professional standards or practices of the insurance industry” and echoes the allegations made in the Complaint that Defendants “deviated from the accepted professional standards or practices of the insurance industry. ”  (Id.)  While reserving all rights and waiving none, Plaintiff’s proposed expert’s curriculum vitae shows the extensive professional learning and erudition needed for insurance brokers in New Jersey.  (Pa052).  Continuing to apply the exemption to insurance brokers makes sense as the Legislature has designated an insurance producer as a “licensed person” in the same classification as attorneys, architects, doctors, and other healthcare providers.  See generally N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-26.  The trial court was correct when it dismissed with prejudice Plaintiff’s CFA claims.
[brief] Here, the following facts are not supported by sufficient credible evidence in the record:  1)  The property being legally used as pizzeria for fifty years.  (Pa 37-47; Pa 55-59; Pa 66-75).  2)  Plaintiffs did not make any complaints.  (T1 at 48:6-49:24; Pa 95-96; T1 at 53:11-17, 53:23-54:16).  3)  [...] had complaints about the Renzo operation.  (T1 at 99:25-101.13; 105:5-7)  All of these facts are patently wrong.  In addition, the trial court concluded that this illegal operation of a restaurant in a residential use was just “an annoyance” as a matter of law.
[brief] ’” (Db13-Db14).  By the same token, the Legislature could have added language that specified, “did not possess a firearm at the time of any pending Recovery Court appeal. ”  Rather, it specifically and carefully chose the language, “did not possess a firearm at the time of any pending criminal charge. ”  The State is not attempting to create a new disqualifying category but instead seeks to effectuate the clear intent of the Legislature as the statute is presently written.  See State v. Robinson, 217 N.J. 594, 604 (2014) (“The objective of statutory interpretation is to effectuate the intent of the Legislature”).
[brief] For example, in Rockaway Shoprite Associates, Inc. v. City of Linden, 424 N.J. Super. 337, 348 (App. Div. 2011), the Appellate Division held in construing N.J.S.A. 40:49-2.1 that “New Jersey requires at a minimum that published notice of a zoning ordinance creating new zones and uses applicable to an area identify and briefly describe those new zones and uses.
[brief] "Venue "involves no more and no less than a personal privilege which may be lost by failure to assert it seasonably, by formal submission in a cause or by submission through conduct."  56 Am. Jur., Venue, sec. 40, pp.  44-45.  Cf. Freeman v. Bee Machine Co., 319 U.S. 448, 454, 63 S.Ct. 1146, 87 L.Ed. 1509, 1514 (1943), rehearing denied 320 U.S. 809, 64 S.Ct. 27, 88 L.Ed. 489 (1942).  Compare Wildes v. Mairs, 6 N.J.L. 320 (Sup. Ct. 1796); Thorn v. Langue, 122 N.J.L. 342, 346 (Sup. Ct. 1939)."  Thus, based on the foregoing reasons and facts one (1) through thirty (30), the court should reverse because the right to choose venue is a privilege protected by N.J. Const. Article I "rights and privileges" and the "privileges and immunities clause" of the United States Constitution, U.S. Const. Art. IV, § 2 And U.S. Const. Amend. XIV.
[directive] Such standards and protocols shall include coordination of efforts with appropriate federal authorities pursuant to the "Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2003," 22 U.S.C. See. 7101 et seq. 5.  The training provided pursuant to Section VI of this Directive shall provide instruction on how to protect human trafficking victims, and on how to implement the provisions of this subsection so as to encourage possible victims to fully cooperate in human trafficking investigations.  The training programs shall include instruction on the appropriate handling of possible human trafficking victims who may have committed an offense, including instruction on the affirmative defense to the offense of prostitution established in N.J.S.A. 2C:34-1 (e).  The training programs shall also include information concerning referrals for medical treatment, counseling and advocacy services, and housing/shelter.  Page 6
[brief] The admission of this prior bad-act evidence violated our Rules of Evidence.  Rule 404(b) sharply limits the admission of evidence of other crimes or wrongs. \(^4\)  This limitation guards against the risk “that the jury may convict the defendant because he is a ‘bad’ person in general” rather than because of the evidence adduced at trial.  *State v. Cofield*, 127 N.J. 328, 336 (1992).  “Because evidence of a defendant’s previous misconduct ‘has a unique tendency’ to prejudice a jury, it must be admitted with caution. ”  *State v. Willis*, 225 N.J. 85, 97 (2016) (quoting *State v. Reddish*, 181 N.J. 553, 608 (2004)).  More specifically, prior bad-act evidence “has the effect of suggesting to a jury that a defendant has a propensity to commit crimes, and, therefore, that it is ‘more probable that he committed the crime for which he is on trial. ’”  *Ibid.* (quoting *State v. Weeks*, 107 N.J. 396, 406 (1987)).  To ensure such evidence will be used by jurors only for appropriate, limited purposes, and not to demonstrate a defendant has a propensity to commit crime, *Cofield* set out a four-pronged test for admissibility under N.J.R.E. 404(b):
[brief] I.  De Novo Review.  The disqualification of counsel is an issue of law.  City of Atl. City v. Trupos, 201 N.J. 447, 463 (2010) (citing J.G. Ries & Sons, Inc. v. Spectrasery, Inc., 384 N.J. Super. 216, 222 (App. Div. 2006)).  Accordingly, appellate courts apply a de novo standard of review when evaluating the impropriety of a motion to disqualify counsel.  Twenty-First Century Rail Corp. v. N.J. Transit Corp., 210 N.J. 264, 274 (2012).  This evaluation requires the Court to balance competing interests, weighing the standards of attorney professionalism against a client’s right to choose counsel.  Dewey v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 109 N.J. 201, 218 (1988).  “[D]isqualification motions are often made for tactical reasons....”  Id. at 218.  “The court should also be cognizant that disqualification motions can be misused as a litigation tactic that can delay an examination of the merits of the claims and can undermine the judicial process. ”  Richardson v. DeFazio, 2016 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 497, *7 (App. Div. March 7, 2026) (citing Dewey v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 109 N.J. at 218, 221).  LEGAL ARGUMENT I.
[brief] Following our Supreme Court's decision in *Barila*, on June 8, 2021, the Honorable [...], A.J.S.C. issued an Order and written opinion regarding Defendants' motion to dismiss.  (581a-622a).  In this decision, Judge Mendez granted Defendants' motion to dismiss with prejudice as to Plaintiffs [...], [...], [...], [...], and [...].  (581a-582a).
[brief] Other fact witnesses in this case with expertise in stallion breeding also testified to the natural inclination of stallions to behave more aggressively when in the breeding environment.  [...], the veterinarian involved with freezing [...]’s semen at [...], testified during deposition that there’s a basic level of aggression in dealing with stallions, “especially when you’re using them for breeding. ” (Pa835a-Pa836a).  “When you’re dealing with breeding, you bring out a level of energy and aggression that [stallions] don’t necessarily get the rest of the time, and so that tends to make them a little more aggressive. ” (Pa836a).  [...], the co-owner of [...], which operated as Stallion Manager of the [...] Syndicate, testified that “there is general knowledge amongst people who work with horses that stallions are more aggressive in their behavior than other kinds of horses. ” (Pa374a).  The question that was before the Motion Court, then, was whether a reasonable jury could conclude that Defendants, as professional stallion breeders, knew or should have known that [...] had a natural inclination for dangerous and aggressive behavior toward people around him when in the breeding environment.
[brief] Here, the trial court considered all of the evidence presented by Plaintiff, including his proffered circumstantial evidence, but each time properly found such evidence consisted of pure speculation or conjecture, which should not go to the jury:  “We have lots of conjecture, lots of things.  It could have been the snow, it could have been the cardboard, it could have been the plywood, it could have been — that’s not enough.  We don’t allow juries to say, okay, you know what, we think it was — we think it was — we don’t allow that. ”
[brief] [Id. at 212-13.]  A member of PERS is entitled to accidental disability only if he is permanently and totally disabled as a direct result of a “traumatic event. ”  N.J.S.A. 43:15A-43.  To constitute a traumatic event, it must be “undesigned and unexpected. ”  Richardson, 192 N.J. at 212-13.  The “polestar” of the inquiry is whether an event is an “unexpected external happening” or “unanticipated mishap. ”  Ibid.  An event is not undesigned and unexpected “when all that appears is that the employee was doing his usual work in the usual way. ”  Richardson, 192 N.J. at 201 (quotation omitted).  Moreover, “work effort alone whether unusual or excessive, cannot be considered a traumatic event. ”  Cattani v. Bd. of Trs., Police & Firemen’s Ret. Sys., 69 N.J. 578, 586 (1986).  Thus, under Richardson, an event is undesigned and unexpected if there is: 1) “an unintended external event;” or 2) “an unanticipated consequence of an intended external event if that consequence is extraordinary or unusual in common experience. ”  Ibid. (quotation and emphases omitted).  The applicant bears the burden of proof.  See id. at 212.  Here, there is sufficient evidence in the record to support the Board’s decision that [...] failed to show that his injury was the result of a traumatic event.
[directive] If Czy om6wil(a) Pan(i) z adwokatem potencjalne konsekwencje imigracyjne przyznania siy do winy?  Jesli odpowiedz brzmi ,,nie", proszy przejsc do pytania l 7e.  Jesli odpowiedzial(a) Pan(i) ,,tak", proszy przejsc do pytania 17f. e.  Would you like the opportunity to do so?  [No/Nie]  [Yes/Tak]  Czy chce Pan(i) skorzystac z takiej mozliwosci?  Revised Form Promulgated 12/31/2019 Supplement to Directive #01-18, CN 10079-Polish Defendant's Initials by Skorygowany fonnularz opublikowany 31.12.2019r. w suplemencie do Dyrektywy #01-18, CN 10079-Polish Inicjaly oskarzonego page of 7 /strona 7 5 5 z 17.
[brief] [...] was the supervisor of the payroll audit section in Treasury’s Office of Management and Budget, Centralized Payroll.  (Pa107-08).  In that capacity, he was responsible for ensuring overtime rates are correctly paid to state employees.  (Pa108).  [...] testified that the circulars mandated that state employee salaries be paid according to the number of working days in each fiscal year for any agency that processes its payroll through Treasury’s Centralized Payroll, including the Division of State Police.  (Pa110-11; Pa123).  As [...] testified, overtime pay “is determined by the number of working days in the fiscal year[,] which can vary between 260, 261, and 262. ” (Pa113).  Therefore, to maintain a consistent overtime pay rate of “time-and-a-half” the regular rate of pay, the formula to calculate overtime would depend on the number of working days each fiscal year.  (Pa113; Pa121).  [...], a Human Resources manager of the Payroll and Time Management Unit within the NJSP, was responsible for processing overtime for both civilian and enlisted members of NJSP.  (Pa129-30).  [...] testified that the calculation of overtime pay for NJSP was the regular rate of pay multiplied by 1.5, and she emphasized the importance of using the correct number of working days in a fiscal year.  (Pa131; Pa138-39; Pa142; Pa151).  She explained that, when calculating the overtime rate, the divisor listed in the contract, 2,080 (the product of an eight-hour workday and 260 working days in a fiscal year), is only used in fiscal years with 260 working days.  (Pa132; Pa142-43).  In the case of fiscal years with 261 working days, the divisor would be 2,088.  (Pa133).  And in the case of fiscal years with 262 working days, the divisor would be 2,096.  Ibid.  In other words, the rate of overtime (time and one-half) remains the same each year, but the divisor used to calculate the time-and-one-half hourly rate is dependent on the number of working days in that fiscal year.  (Pa151-52).  Thus, the 2,080 divisor used in the parenthetical in the contract was merely an example of how to calculate the “time and a half” rate in fiscal years with 260 working days.
[brief] When presented with a claim that a trial judge's remark contributed to a jury's finding of guilt, we must determine “whether there is a reasonable possibility that the [remark] complained of might have contributed to the conviction. ”  *Fahy v. Connecticut*.  375 U.S. 85, 86-87, 84 S.Ct. 229, 230, 11 L.Ed.2d 171, 173 (1963).  When making that determination, we are obliged to review the overall strength of the State's case.  *State v. Bankston*, 63 N.J. 263, 272 (1973).  Where the record “presented a debatable case for the jury” and where “we cannot say the proof was so overwhelming as to foreclose a real possibility that the jury gave decisive weight to the improper [remark],” the offending remark of necessity assumes a greater weight in our analysis.  *Ibid.*  *9*  Here, although both [...] and [...] made an in-court identification of defendant, neither told the first officer on the scene that defendant was the shooter.  Not until the two young women had an opportunity to confer among themselves, before [...] arrived to take a statement from them, did they specify that “[...]” was the person who had shot [...].  The alibi evidence presented by [...] was inconclusive, as was the photograph offered by defendant's sister.  Also, the in-court identification by [...] himself was preceded by three prior occasions where he had been unable to select defendant's photo from a photo array.  Under these circumstances, as in *Bankston*, *supra*, the proof was not so overwhelming as to foreclose a real possibility that the jury gave decisive weight to the improper remark by the judge.  63 N.J. at 272.  We therefore conclude the error was harmful, warranting reversal.
[brief] The problem here is that the witness ([...]) knew nothing about the recording equipment, he responded --- 2  "Drab_" refers to the Defendant's reply to the amicus briefs.  because of difficulties encountered by whoever was trying to download the footage earlier, he did not view the footage when he downloaded it, he subsequently viewed only an unidentified portion of it, and the ostensible date/time of the footage is inconsistent with the happening of the crime as represented by the State's other witnesses.  [...] argued that accepting the State-Respondent's arguments would be tantamount to making authentication a jury question rather than a judge's responsibility – and the OAG is now trying to expand the appellate issues and suggest that it should indeed be a jury question.  The Appellate Division is urged to consider the issues raised by the parties and not effectively rewrite a Rule of Evidence at the urging of the OAG as amicus curiae.
[brief] Following the law—especially one as clear as N.J.S.A. § 18A:26-2—cannot conceivably be said to constitute arbitrary and capricious conduct.  Against these undisputed facts and crystal clear law, [...] raises five arguments: 1) that the [...]’s ([...]) 90-day rule prevented him from asserting his rights by forcing him to challenge the [...]’s decision before the Appellate Division rules on his appeal in the *State Board Appeal*; 2) he was subject to inconsistent decisions by the arbitrator in the tenure proceeding and the State Board; 3) the ALJ and Commissioner failed to address this inconsistency in their decision; 4) the Commissioner’s decision violated his due process rights; and 5) the doctrine of fundamental fairness requires the Court to step in and overturn the [...]’s decision.
[brief] [Ia477-478].  At no time did the trial court find any mistake, surprise, or excusable neglect by Defendant, nor did Her Honor indicate the existence of any defense, let alone a meritorious one.  No reference to R.4:50-1(a) or (f) was even made in the analysis.  R.1:7-4.  Two potential findings were also mistaken.  The court stated that “plaintiff and intervenor were aware of [...]’s efforts at redemption and did little acknowledge them,” yet there is nothing in the record to even suggest that [...] was aware of anything at all.  To the contrary, [...] certified that he had no such knowledge whatsoever.  Ia257.  Hence, this finding of fact is “manifestly unsupported” by the record and cannot be upheld on appeal.
[brief] 15  N.J.S.A. 40:55D-2 .................................................................................................  16, 34 N.J.S.A. 40:55D-4 ...............................................................................................  23 N.J.S.A. 40:55D-28 ............................................................................................ passim N.J.S.A. 40:55D-28b(2) ....................................................................................  19 N.J.S.A. 40:55D-62 ............................................................................................ passim N.J.S.A. 40:55D-62a ......................................................................................... passim N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-1 to -73 ..................................................................................  16  N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-7d ......................................................................................... passim N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-7e .........................................................................................  21 N.J. Constitutional Provisions Art. IV, § VI, par. 2 ..............................................................................................................15  Treatises, and other sources Cox & Koenig, New Jersey Zoning Land Use Administration, § 19.7.2 (2022 ed.) .................................................................17 Cox & Koenig, New Jersey Zoning Land Use Administration, § 10-2.2 (2022 ed.) .................................................................19 ORDERS JUDGMENTS AND DECISIONS BEING APPEALED
[brief] Out of an abundance of caution, Plaintiffs ask that a different trial judge be assigned given the judge’s commitment to his findings.  Graziano v. Grant, 326 N.J. Super. 328, 349-350 (App.Div. 1999) (allowing remand "out of an abundance of --- \(^5\) Defendants also did not raise the standing issue or the general contractor issue that the trial court next relied on to dismiss the case anew. caution" where "there is a concern that the trial judge has a potential commitment to his or her prior findings").  Although we do not believe a new trial is warranted, the whole trial took approximately 75 minutes, less than many small claim matters.  There would be no significant burden to any jurist.  **CONCLUSION**
[brief] In analyzing search and seizure cases, the focus is not on the officer’s subjective intent, but the “objective reasonableness” of their actions.  *State v. Bacome*, 228 *N.J.* 94, 103 (2017).  Warrantless searches and seizures are presumptively unreasonable and are therefore prohibited unless falling within a recognized exception to the search warrant requirement.  *State v Johnson*, 193 *N.J.* 528, 552 (2008).
[brief] TO GIVE FULL FORCE AND EFFECT TO THE PROVISIONS OF KRESS’ SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT WITH THE KENILWORTH BOARD OF EDUCATION REGARDING HER EQUAL PAY AND NJLAD LAWSUIT  VIOLATED EXPRESS LEGISLATIVE POLICIES (Aa9-14; Aa18-20; Aa23-24) | 5 | | POINT II - THE BOARD  IMPROPERLY REJECTED  KRESS’ REQUEST FOR AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING IN THE OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW  BECAUSE THERE ARE MATERIAL FACTS IN DISPUTE (Aa9-14) | 10 | | CONCLUSION | 11 | ## TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS - Final Administrative Determination dated 5/5/23 ..................................