ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Using the SCART team's diagrams of the location of [...]'s vehicle path prior to the incident, at initial impact and at the final resting place of her vehicle, coupled with field measurements made using Nearmap orthoimagery, sight distance was calculated in accordance with the American State Highway and Transportation Officials Methodology ("AASHTO").  (Da33-Da35, §3.2 Sight Distance Evaluation).  See also, Da85-Da87, Appendix B- Exhibits 6-8).  Stopping distance was defined as the distance traveled by a vehicle to stop in situations such as an emergency.
[brief] Da46-47.  Respondent rebuffed Appellant’s very tailored requests and redirected Appellant to [...]’s narrative report for “pertinent details of the TEAMs entry on the date of the search warrant. ”  Id.  Respondent knew the trial court was laser focused on how the officers entered Appellant’s apartment door and knew Appellant was seeking information about the officer’s entry on the day the warrant was executed.  Despite these uncontested facts, Respondent maintained [...]’s charade by failing to turn over his notes and then allowing him to perjure himself for a second time to ‘win’ the motion to suppress.
[brief] Defendant typically drove into the rear parking lot and entered the building through the rear entrance.  Id.  Defendant would remain at [...] for a brief period of time and then exit the building and drive away.  Id.  Between March 1, 2009 and April 21, 2009, further investigation revealed that the electric bill of one of the apartments, Apartment D2, was significantly lower than the other units in the building.  (8T195-20 to 196-19).  Undercover [...] was sent into the building to observe the location to determine whether defendant and other co-conspirators had contact with Apartment D2.  (8T197-25 to 198-24; 10T139-20 to 141-8).  On March 30, 2009, Officer Walker observed [...] enter [...], but she was unable to determine which apartment he entered.  (10T145-25 to 146-12).  On March 31, 2009, when Officer Walker was at [...], she observed [...] enter the building and unlock and enter an unmarked door between Apartments D1 and D3, which was determined to be Apartment D2.  (10T150-1 to 151-10; 10T162-3 to 16).  Thereafter, Officer Walker observed [...] exit that apartment and leave the building.  (10T152-23 to 153-10).  As a result of the undercover investigation, law enforcement installed a camera at [...] in the hallway outside of Apartments D2 and D3.
[brief] *Id.*  (emphasis added).  In this matter, Plaintiff engaged in protected activity when she objected to the constant staff reductions and poor training practices of Defendants’ establishment.  (PA000006-PA0000008).  Specifically, Plaintiff brought these concerns to the management of Defendant [...], who simply brushed her concerns aside and failed to provide any meaningful response or redress.  Id.  Following these complaints, Plaintiff quickly observed Defendants did not honor Plaintiff’s earned time off thereafter.  (PA000009).  For this reason, Plaintiff eventually filed a complaint with the [...].  (PA000009-PA000010).  Thus, Plaintiff has met this element based on a reading of the record.
[brief] See N.J.S.A. § 33:1-93.13(a) (the sale of malt alcoholic beverages in New Jersey is an industry that “vitally effects the general economy and revenues of the State, as well as the public interest and public welfare. ”)  This directive is emphasized by the “null, void and no effect” provision of the MBPA for any contract that violates the MBPA.  N.J.S.A. § 33:1-93.15(a).  Consistent with the precedential NJFPA, when a wholesaler is located in New Jersey, it should benefit from the protections of the MBPA and New Jersey law regardless of the choice-of-law provision in any wholesaler agreement.
[brief] Moore v. Hafeeza......................................... 19 212 N..J.Super 399 (Ch. Div. 1986)  New Shrewsbury Borough v. Block 115, Lot 4,... 22 & 23 74 N.J.Super. 1, 9 (1962)  Newark Morning Ledger Co v. N.J. Sports & Exposition Authority,.............................................. 5  423 N.J.Super. 140, 174 (App. Div 2011)  Nowosleska v. Steele, 400 N.J. Super 297............. 28 306 (App. Div 2008)  Peluso v. Township of Ocean .................................. 23 85 N. J. Super 209 (App. Div 1964)
[directive] Skorygowany formularz udostępniony na mocy Dyrektywy #01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 10080-Polish strona 2 z 8 Revised Form Promulgated by Directive #01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 10080-Polish page 2 of 8  2.  Potwierdzenie adresu Address  Verification  Czy rozumie Pan(i), że w przypadku przyznania się do winy w odniesieniu do oskarżenia o a)  [Tak/Yes]  [Nie/No] kwalifikowaną napaść na tle seksualnym, napaść seksualną, kwalifikowany nielegalny 2C:13-1c(2), lub usiłowanie popełnienia kontakt seksualny, uprowadzenie zgodnie z któregokolwiek z tych przestępstw, jeżeli sąd podczas wydawania wyroku stwierdzi, że Pana(i) postępowanie stanowiło element powtarzalnego i kompulsywnego zachowania, będzie Pan(i) musiał(a) potwierdzać swój adres u właściwych organów ścigania co 90 dni, a jeśli sąd nie stwierdzi, że Pana(i) postępowanie stanowiło element powtarzalnego i kompulsywnego zachowania, będzie Pan(i) musiał(a) potwierdzać swój adres u właściwych organów ściagania co rok?
[brief] #  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | CASES | Pages | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|-------| | **Barone v. Harra,** | 11 | | 77 N.J. 276 (1978) | | | **Bergen Commercial Bank v. Sisler,** | 13 | | 157 N.J. 188 (1999) | | | **Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America,** | 1 | | 142 N.J. 520 (1995) | | | **Davis v. Brooks,** | 4 | | 280 N.J. Super. 406 (App. Div. 1993) | | | **DeCicco v. Anderson,** | 11 | | 99 N.J. Super. 243 (App. Div. 1968) | | | **Ehrgott v. Jones,** | 11 | | 208 N.J. Super. 393 (App. Div. 1986) | | | **Fisher v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,** | 2 | | 363 N.J. Super 457 (App. Div. 2003) | | | **Grawehr v. Twp. of E. Hanover,** | 10 | | 2017 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1634 (App. Div. 2017) | | | **Hornyak v. The Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co.,** | 11 | | 63 N.J.
[brief] 253 N.J. at 160.  Importantly, while the CI had provided police information a month prior to the stop that the defendant was a drug dealer who used his vehicle to traffic drugs, the police were not actively looking for the defendant’s car on that date; [...] was simply conducting “surveillance in front of a condominium complex located in an area known to him as a place where frequent narcotics transactions and other criminal activity occurred” and just happened to observe the defendant’s car.  *Ibid.*  After recognizing [...]’s car, connecting it with the information Taranto had about [...] from the CI, and suspecting [...] may be dealing drugs from the car, Taranto and another officer then “surveilled defendant collectively for forty-seven minutes before the stop. ”  *Id.* at 172.  Through their surveillance, the officers developed reasonable suspicion that [...] had engaged in drug transactions based on his “disappearing into the backyard of the residence, reemerging with another person, and then reentering the GMC shortly thereafter. ”  *Id.* at 172.  The officers stopped [...]’s car, patted him down, and called for canine unit to conduct a sniff test on the car after the pat down yielded nothing.  *Ibid.*  The Supreme Court found the circumstances giving rise to probable cause were not unforeseeable because the police “had invested almost two hours investigating, surveilling, and utilizing five officers” and thus “reasonably anticipated and expected they would find drugs in the GMC” at the time of the motor vehicle stop.
[brief] First, Plaintiff notes that, as a matter of law, the Pinelands waiver controls the setback question due to the legislative ends of the Pinelands legislation.  The trial court fails to recognize the primacy of the Pinelands authority, its findings of fact, and its conclusions.  Starting on p. 14a, Plaintiff-Appellant agrees with the first five paragraphs of the trial court’s opinion.  However, in the sixth paragraph, the trial court references a decision by the Board ‘on the merits’ without differentiating between the positive and negative criteria, which are not quantified.  The trial court’s position lacks an enumeration of the factual “merits” from which legal conclusions may be drawn.  This omission fails to identify the relevant sections of the [...] ordinance, creating a significant oversight of both matters considered and matters neglected.  b.
[brief] At the time of the incident, it is undisputed there was active precipitation in the form of freezing rain – this is confirmed by meteorology reports served on behalf of both Plaintiff and defendants.  (Pa386; Pa439).  Plaintiff testified at his deposition that his fall occurred as a result of ice.  (Pa339, 55:22-56:16; Pa328, 13:12-15).  Plaintiff further testified that he slipped immediately after stepping onto the landing.  (Pa329, 16:22-24).  Plaintiff fell while he was on the landing before he even reached the steps.  (Pa329, 16:22-24; 17:8-12 (“As soon as my foot hit the landing, that was it.  The next thing I know I was on the sidewalk.  There was no additional steps. ”)).  Plaintiff was asked during his deposition if he was aware of a connection between paint on the steps and ice.  He responded: “What does the paint have to do with the ice?  What does the paint have to do with the ice?  I don’t know. ”  (Pa339, 57:8-12).  3.  Plaintiff’s expert engineer [...] does not opine that paint contributed to Plaintiff’s fall or that [...] breached a standard of care in the industry  Plaintiff has served the report of expert engineer [...] in support of his claims.  (Pa455).  Berkowitz writes in his report that the slippery steps on which Plaintiff fell were caused by “icy conditions[.]” (Pa471).  Berkowitz’s report is silent as to a causal connection between Plaintiff’s fall on ice and the paint used by [...].  Berkowitz contends that there was a “low coefficient of friction” due to icy conditions but does not say that this was related to [...]’s work.  (Pa471).  Berkowitz does not opine that [...] used the wrong kind of paint.  (Pa470-71).  Finally, Berkowitz does not suggest that [...] failed to adhere to industry standards.  ARGUMENT I.
[brief] DEFENDANT LODI HAS NOT EFFECTIVELY DEMONSTRATED TO THIS COURT THAT THERE WERE NO DISPUTED ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACTS, AND THAT THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY BARRED THE COMPETENT OPINIONS OF PLAINTIFF'S ENGINEERING EXPERTS.  (Raised below: Pa1021-1066; 1T42-52; 2T21-33; 3T)  Defendant [...] ("[...]") failed to address the garden-variety of facts existing in this matter from many witnesses that establish that its conduct was palpably unreasonable.  Even the Trial Court singled out a few such facts that were disputed, though there were many more.  It was even after acknowledging such dispute of facts that the Trial Court barred the opinions and analyses of plaintiff's engineering experts.  [...] asserts that somehow plaintiff's experts, [...] and [...], improperly relied on the recall of [...] who testified at deposition that, at the time of the accident, he was in the crosswalk.  [...] posits that this assertion is unreliable because of Sanchez’s traumatic brain injuries.  (DbL31)².  However, the reliability of a fact is in the province of a jury.  In addition, no one in this matter has given the opinion that Sanchez could not recall that very specific fact because of his brain injury.  He had recalled that fact and passed it along to his wife, as he was convalescing not long after accident, and his wife likewise recounted the same fact at deposition.  [...] asserts that the Trial Court found that there was “no actual or constructive notice of the alleged dangerous condition. ” (DbL32).  However, it is demonstrated at length in plaintiff’s initial brief that the issue of notice is highly disputed, and that neither the defendants nor the Trial Court addressed the dispute established from the reports of plaintiff’s private investigator and the testimony of [...], the neighbor living next to the streetlight.  Moreover, [...] states that it did not have constructive notice of the defective streetlight as it did not receive any complaints about it and was not aware of “of any alleged backlighting on or near [...] prior to Plaintiff’s injury...” (DbL36-7).
[brief] The Court then asked defense counsel to confirm that the plea agreement was specifically what had been negotiated and at Page 16 of the transcript [...] acknowledged that it was the agreement that had been negotiated and he highlighted for the Court that [...] was reserving his right to appeal the 404(b) decision in the homicide case and the motion to suppress physical evidence in what he characterized as the Hamilton armed robbery case.  But he said that other than that, that's what the deal was.  And the Court acknowledged that [...] had the opportunity that was the proceeding in terms of broad summary.  But as I indicate, both the plea form and the plea colloquy transcript are preserved as a part of this record.  [...] ultimately did sentence [...] consistent with the plea agreement here.  I think it was on or about July 7 of 2017.  Again, in broad summary form, he got a 30-year sentence with a 30-year stipulation on the murder charge, he got a 12-year sentence subject to the No Early Release Act on the robbery charge.  These sentences were concurrent to one another.  The mandatory parole supervision was ordered.  All mandatory fines and penalties were ordered.  The defendant appealed the robbery case and there was a very interesting procedural history as regards the co-defendant in the appeal of the robbery case.
[brief] Defendant [...] filed a retaliatory private citizen municipal criminal complaint against a vocal dissident without a dated and executed probable cause finding.  (Pa219-SJCS #64, #65, #66, #67; Pa320; Pa324).  All individual defendants were fiduciaries of a public trust subject to a heightened standard of care.  (Pa219-SJCS #62).  Each individual defendant took an oath of office swearing to execute and to enforce the law.  According to defendant [...], [...] had a policy of litigating and not mediating all disputes with residents.  (Pa219-SJCS #8).  Defendants declined to disclose how the contested Flex Parking Removal and 911 Memorial Capital Bond Projects were funded without bond proceeds.  (Pa219-SJCS #57).  Defendants refused to disclose whether prevailing wages were paid in connection with the Flex Parking Removal Project.  Despite the explicit RPC 4.2 political free speech comment carveout, defendants refused to meet with plaintiff to discuss non-litigation matters of public importance.  (Pa219-SJCS #55).  PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[brief] **POINT III.  [...] VIOLATIONS OF THE CONSUMER FRAUD ACT AND CONSUMER FINANCE LICENSING ACT GIVE RISE TO MCQUEEN’S STANDING TO SEEK DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF**  Razor cites to *Woo-Padva* 2 to argue that McQueen lacks standing to seek relief under the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Law (“UDJL”) due to an ostensible lack of a private right of action under the NJCFLA.  *See* Razor’s Br. 16-17.  *Woo-Padva* 2 (at *9) in turn, cites to *In re Resolution of State Com. of Investigation*, 108 N.J. 35, 46 (1987), to reason that “Plaintiff cannot circumvent the lack of a private right of action by seeking relief under the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act. ”  Notwithstanding the analysis of private right of action under the NJCFLA discussed in McQueen’s opening Brief and the fact that *In re Resolution* addressed and analyzed a statute where the “extrapolation of the implicit private cause of action . . . would frustrate, rather than further, the legislative scheme that underlies N.J.S.A. 52:9M-15(a). ”  *Id.* at 36-37, 44.  *In re Resolution* analyzed N.J.S.A. 52:9M-15(a)—which governs improper disclosures of information related to investigations into crime by the State Commissioner of Investigation (“SCI”).  Investigation of such improper disclosures by private individuals would frustrate the legislative purpose of the statute itself, i.e., improper disclosures on confidential information related to ongoing criminal investigations.  Here, with respect to the NJCFLA and enforcement by private individuals, there is no frustration of the NJCFLA’s purpose of policing the consumer credit industry in New Jersey.  Because private enforcement would not frustrate the NJCFLA’s manifest purpose, the holding in *In re Resolution* was misapplied by the court in *Woo-Padya* 2—*In re Resolution* supports McQueen’s position.  Thus, the trial court’s March 21, 2024 Order should be reversed.  **POINT IV.
[brief] Griepenburg v. Twp. of Ocean, 220 N.J. 239 (2015).......................................19  Hayes v. Delamotte, 231 N.J. 373 (2018).....................................................24-25  In re Ridgefield Park Bd. of Educ., 244 N.J. 1 (2020).................................18 Kocanowski v. Twp. of Bridgewater, 237 N.J. 3 (2019).................................18
[brief] SINCE DEFENDANT ADMITTED TO DRIVING WHILE HIS LICENSE WAS SUSPENDED AND HIS DRUG POSSESSION COUNT WAS DISMISSED, HIS REQUESTED RELIEF IS NO LONGER AVAILABLE TO HIM.  Not only should defendant’s conviction be affirmed because the police did indeed have a reasonable and articulable suspicion to stop his car as discussed in Point I, above, but he also fails to state a claim on appeal on which his requested relief, suppression of evidence, can be granted.  The remaining drug charge after the motion to suppress was granted in part and denied in part was ultimately dismissed as part of the plea bargain that led to defendant pleading guilty only to driving while suspended.  In other words, his suppression claim has become moot and his challenge to the admission of the drug evidence should be summarily dismissed.  Since the test for suppression is not a “but-for” test, defendant’s status as an individual with a suspended license preexisted in a source independent from the search and is not suppressible.
[brief] Hahn v. [...] – [...] POINT 7:  The laws created by the past Congresses of the United States are still valid (Not argued below)  The Constitution reading in pertinent part as follows:  Article. I. Section. 1.  All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives.  Section. 8.  The Congress shall have Power...  To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.  Article. IV.  Section. 3.  The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States; Section. 4.  The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government,  There is nothing at the bar stating that a law passed by a prior Congress becomes void upon a change in the composition of a Congress of the United States.  POINT 8:  Supreme court opinions are facts that cannot be otherwise re-examined (Not argued below)
[brief] The Legislature finds and declares:  a.  In our representative form of government it is essential that the conduct of members of local board of education and local school administration hold the respect and confidence of the people.  These board members and administrators must avoid conduct which is in violation of their public trust or which creates a justifiable impression among the public that such trust is being violated.  b.  To ensure and preserve public confidence, school board members and local school administrators should have the benefit of specific standards to guide their conduct and some disciplinary mechanism to ensure the uniform maintenance of those standards among them.
[brief] Desiring to return contaminated property back to productive use, on May 25, 2023, the Mayor and [...] of the [...] (collectively, the “[...]”) adopted Resolution No. 121-2023 authorizing the [...] (“[...]”) to conduct an investigation to determine whether the Property should be designated as Condemnation Redevelopment Area pursuant to the Local Redevelopment and Housing Law, N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-1 et seq. (the “LRHL”).
[brief] PLAINTIFFS’ EXPERT OPINION IS A NET OPINION  An expert’s opinion must be based on evidence that is credible.  Any such opinion is entitled only to such weight as allowed by the facts and reasoning upon which that opinion is predicated, and bare conclusions are inadmissible.  *Buckelew v. Grossbard*, 87 N.J. 512, 524 (1981).  In this regard, the New Jersey Supreme Court has held:  The opinions of experts must be based either upon the facts within their own knowledge which they detail to the jury or upon hypothetical questions embracing facts supported by the evidence upon which the expert opinion is sought.  When the opinion is so lacking in proper foundation as to be worthless it is not admissible.  Expert opinion is valueless unless it is rested upon the facts which are admitted or proved.  In other words, a hypothetical question cannot be invoked to supply the substantial facts necessary to support the conclusion.  *Stanley Co. of America v. Hercules Powder Co.*, 16 N.J. 295, 305 (1954).  See also, *Johnson v. Salem Corp.*, 97 N.J. 78, 81 (1984), wherein our Supreme Court held that expert testimony was inadmissible because its underlying reasoning was infirm.
[brief] I.  The Events of October 6, 2021  On October 6, 2021, Plaintiff [...], who is Jewish and is a beloved teacher with 33 years of experience, was teaching her second-grade class at [...] (the “School”) in the [...] (the “District”).  Am. Compl. ¶¶ 1, 2, 10 (Da 002-04 & 10).  With the class busily engaged on a writing assignment, [...] noticed one of her female students (the “Student”) wearing a hood that was blocking her eyes.  Id. ¶ 10 (Da 10).  While [...] was aware that the Student—who was 7 years of age—regularly wore a form-fitting hijab, the article of clothing [...] witnessed that day did not resemble the hijab that the Student wore every day prior.  Id.  Accordingly, [...] believed in good faith that the Student’s hijab was being worn under the hood.  Id.  Intending to encourage the Student to engage in her schoolwork, as her eyes were partially blocked by the hood, [...]—in accordance with school policy which indicates the students should not be allowed to wear items that block their vision—asked the Student to brush back her hood.  Id.  This was a particularly reasonable request as the rest of the Student’s face was already significantly covered by a mask being worn to protect against COVID-19.  Id.  When the Student did not respond to [...]’s request, [...], justifiably believing the Student’s hijab was underneath, brushed the hood back a few inches with her hand in order to uncover the Student’s eyes and facilitate learning.  *Id.*  While lightly brushing back the hood itself, and without making contact with the Student physically, [...] noticed the Student’s hair and that the Student was not wearing her regular form-fitting hijab underneath.  *Id.*  [...] immediately and gently brushed the hood back to cover all the Student’s hair and, out of respect for the religious practices of Islam and for the Student’s observation of same, apologized to the Student.  *Id.*  The hood never left the Student’s head, this momentary interaction did not attract the attention of the other students, and classroom learning went on as normal.  *Id.*  During this interaction, [...] did not speak to the Student, other than the aforementioned initial request of the Student to brush back her hood and apology.  *Id.* ¶ 11 (Da 11).  Nor did [...] remove the hood from the Student’s head or use physical force of any kind on the Student and her hijab, including grabbing, pulling, ripping, or stripping; rather, [...] merely *brushed* the hood back, and lightly at that.  *Id.*  II.