ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(1).  As the Chief Justice’s comments highlight, a party is not entitled to receive every piece of relevant information.  It is only logical, then, that a party is similarly not entitled to receive every piece of irrelevant information in responsive documents if the producing party has a persuasive reason for why such information should be withheld.  Here, the Court finds Defendants have provided a persuasive reason for allowing them to redact certain irrelevant information: that disclosing such information could provide its competitors with competitively sensitive information to the ultimate detriment of each Defendant.  However, the Court finds that the seven categories proposed by the Special Master could contain highly relevant information.  For instance, one of these categories is “non-U.S. products. ”  Yet information pertaining to the decision to use, or not use, ammonium-nitrate airbags in those vehicles could be highly relevant to the case.  Similarly, the same decisions made in the context of “other makes and models” not at issue in this case—another of the seven categories—could also be highly relevant.  Because the seven categories proposed by the Special Master could contain highly relevant information, the Court modifies the Report's seven categories as follows, the producing party may redact information pertaining to the seven categories proposed by the Special Master—1) pricing, profits, non-public financial information; 2) parts, suppliers, or costs; 3) design, development, and engineering; 4) marketing and business strategy; 5) other makes and models; 6) non-U.S. products; and 7) service and quality issues—so long as that information does not concern airbags.
[brief] C.W.H., 465 N.J. Super. at 598 (“[A]ny improper influence on the jury that could have tipped the credibility scale was necessarily harmful and warrants reversal. ”).  --- 24  For that reason, this case is far worse than Cotto, 471 N.J. Super. at 533-41.  There, the Court found “error” but not plain error from a court’s failure to give a limiting instruction after the jury heard a recorded interview in which the officers confronted the defendant with video and accused him of arson.  Ibid.  Cotto declined to apply N.J.R.E. 701’s bar on ultimate-issue opinions because the opinions all occurred on a recording; however, Cotto did not cite C.W.H. or Tung and thus may not have been aware of those contrary cases, which clearly held that N.J.R.E. 701 applies equally to accusations “during the interrogation” and “during the playback. ”  C.W.H., 465 N.J. Super. at 598; Tung, 460 N.J. Super. at 102.  In any event, this case also involved improper live testimony and the recorded opinions here were much worse than in Cotto, which involved only eight challenged excerpts; “strong” evidence of guilt, including a recorded confession; and the officers there, unlike here, did not reference “incriminating facts outside the record. ”  471 N.J. Super. at 533-34, 540-41 & 540 n.14.  POINT III
[brief] After determining that consecutive sentences were supported by the record, this Court next addressed defendant’s arguments as to aggravating and mitigating factors.  (Da60).  The Court noted that the sentencing court found aggravating factors “(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense, and the role of the actor therein, including whether it was committed in an especially heinous, cruel, or depraved manner (factor one); (2) the risk of re-offense (factor three); and (3) the need for deterrence (factor nine).  The court found no mitigating factors. ” (Da61-62) (citations omitted).  The sentencing judge then analyzed both qualitatively and quantitatively these factors and concluded that “the aggravating factors substantially outweighed the mitigating factors. ” (Da62).  Importantly, this Court found the sentencing judge’s findings of fact concerning aggravating and mitigating factors [] were based on competent and reasonably credible evidence in the record.  The application of the factors to the law, including the imposition of consecutive sentences, do not constitute such clear error of judgment as to shock our judicial conscience.  Accordingly, we discern no basis to second-guess the court’s findings with respect to the statutory aggravating and mitigating factors.  [(Da62) (emphasis added). ]  Then, having upheld the sentencing court’s decisions as to the imposition of consecutive sentences and the finding and weighing of aggravating and mitigating factors, the Court turned to defendant’s final claim: that his sentence was “unconstitutional” because the sentencing judge failed to give due consideration to his youth at the time of the offenses in light of then- recent case law from both the United States Supreme Court and the Supreme Court of New Jersey.  (Da62-63).  After reviewing that decisional law, (Da63-68), the Court found that in this case, defendant was 17 years old at the time of the crimes, and that his sentence, while not literally a life-without-parole sentence, “closely approaches it. ” (Da69).  It then concluded that “the aggregate sentence must be revisited on remand for an evaluation taking into account the Miller constitutional factors of youthfulness, this time with the beneficial guidance of Montgomery, Zuber, and the new statutory amendment.
[brief] “This agreement is subject to the buyer being able to obtain Pinelands approval and all municipal and state permits required to construct a single family dwelling.  If such permits cannot be obtained, this agreement shall be null and void and the deposit returned. ”  Ja190 20.  [...] made a decision to purchase Block 24, Lot 12.02 without obtaining a municipal construction permit to construct a single-family dwelling upon Block 24, Lot 12.02 from the [...].
[brief] But again, the absence of a transaction between [...] and [...] demonstrates that [...] did not maliciously interfere with [...] and Plaintiffs’ alleged “de facto” partnership, nor did it cause Plaintiffs any damages.  The cases on which Plaintiffs rely simply reiterate a party’s obligation to establish malicious interference and damages.  (Pb18-Pb19).  In \textit{Van Horn v.}  \(^6\)  As detailed above, Plaintiffs never even alleged in their Complaint, let alone established through evidence, that [...] had knowledge of Plaintiffs’ existence at the time they made an offer to purchase the assets of [...]’ practice.  Van Horn, for example, the court found tortious interference where “the defendants conspired to injure [the plaintiff] Emma . . . by false and malicious statements concerning the personal and business character of Emma, [through which] they induced and persuaded [a third party] to remove the stock of goods he had supplied her with, and to refuse to deliver what he had expected to let her have, leaving her without any stock to sell or customers to sell to.
[brief] 3T14:22-15:11.  Defendants’ counsel conceded that Defendants had not done anything to cure the deficiencies that led to the denial of [...]’s motion to reinstate, claiming, by then, “[e]verything was done. ”  3T 17:19- 18:15.  Having previously pointed out that Defendants’ counsel had incorrectly claimed that the March 6 hearing had only lasted a “two minutes,” (Da98, 15:17-16:21) [...] denied Defendants’ respective motions holding “[...] went line by line as to items that you did not comply with,” but that Defendants still “fail[ed] to provide discovery. ”  3T18:19-19:3.  Following the hearing, the Court entered Orders denying Defendants’ motion to reinstate their respective answers and suppressing [...]’s answer with prejudice pursuant to R. 4:23-5(a)(2).
[brief] On February 6, 2023, the court issued Final Judgment against [...] for $1.4 Million.  [...] answered [...]’s third-party complaint, and counterclaimed [...] to have the court confirm no coverage on the [...] insurance policy, and to compel [...]’s principals to reimburse [...] for any payment it may have to make on the MCS-90 surety endorsement pursuant to a personal guarantee and indemnity they signed in the event [...] must pay a surety claim under the MCS-90 surety clause.  [...] also named [...] as an “interested party” in the event [...] filed an MCS-90 surety claim but [...] did not allege any claims or seek any relief against [...].
[brief] The primary damages that the [...] sought was the amount of money they had spent in excess interest charges (and lost equity) on the 2004 loan because of their inability to refinance the loan for nearly two decades, until finally being able to refinance in 2022.  As the [...] affirmed, they tried to refinance the 2004 loan many times but were consistently denied because their loan, which plaintiff claimed to possess and own, was wrongfully noted by plaintiff as being in default, and there was a 2009 assignment to a trustee for a trust – which in industry parlance indicated to potential lenders that there was a foreclosure.  Neither of this was true, but the [...] lost numerous --- \(^3\)  This Court has the authority to direct that remand proceedings be assigned to a new judge where “there is a concern that the [motion] judge has a potential commitment to his or her prior findings” or “where the motion judge had expressed opinions regarding the intent of one of the parties.
[directive] Nothing in this Supplemental Directive time shall be construed in any way to limit the authority of the county prosecutor at any time to make a downward depar- ture for substantial cooperation in accordance with the provisions of Part X of the “Brimage”  Guidelines.  Because the Court in State v. Brimage made clear that prosecutors must provide the reasons for choosing to waive or not to waive a mandatory minimum period of parole ineligibility under N.J.S.A. 2C:35-12, a prosecutor must note on -6- worksheet2 the revised whether this downward adjustment feature is being used and must also indicate the extent to which the adjustment has resulted in a reduc- tion in the term of parole ineligibility that would otherwise apply.  However, the prosecutor is not required to describe on the worksheet the specific factual or legal issues that gave rise to the complex/protracted litigation downward adjustment.  It is thought that prosecutors might be chilled from making appropriate use of this feature if they were required to highlight potential weaknesses in the prosecution and to make this information available to the defense, since to do so in the course of ongoing plea negotiations might suggest possible theories for cross-examining prosecution witnesses, filing defense motions, or otherwise suggest a defense strat- egy, or might even lead a guilty defendant to overestimate his chances for an ac- quittal or dismissal and opt for a trial or pretrial litigation that might properly have been avoided by a guilty plea.  (Note, however, that the prosecutor must explain the exact reasons for invoking the adjustment to the [...] on a confidential basis.  See procedural safeguards, § F(2), infra.)  As with the trial proof adjustment feature in Part VIII of the “Brimage” Guidelines, nothing in this Supple- mental Directive shall be construed in any way to affect a prosecutor’s obligation to comply with the rules of discovery, including a prosecutor’s legal and ethical duty to disclose exculpatory information.  Note that the prosecutor must continue to require the defendant to plead guilty to the school-zone charge (or other charge subject to a waivable, mandatory minimum term of imprisonment and parole ineligibility pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:35- 12), and nothing in this Supplemental Directive or in the “Brimage” Guidelines should be construed to authorize a prosecutor to dismiss any such charge in favor of a plea to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5, unless the prosecutor represents to the court on the record that the State cannot prove the 1,000-foot location element (or, where appli- cable, that the State cannot prove that the controlled substances involved exceed the weight threshold necessary to make the distribution-type offense subject to a mandatory term of imprisonment and parole ineligibility).  Accordingly, the extent of any reduction of a mandatory term of imprisonment shall continue to be limited even where the prosecutor elects to invoke the new complex/protracted litigation adjustment.
[brief] **$2 million transfer from [...]’s [...] account in December 2008**  Defendants explained that the transfer was associated with [...]’s purchase of property in Jersey City.  The gist of plaintiffs’ “evidence” that this was a misappropriation is, again, their criticism of [...]’s explanation.  They cite no evidence that this transaction occurred without [...]’s knowledge or authorization.  As the trial court observed in describing the various transactions, they might be just “sloppy bookkeeping. ” (24T33:11-25).  Plaintiffs’ criticism of defendants’ explanations of a transaction that occurred twelve years before the complaint was filed does not equate with evidence that proves a conversion, breach of contract or any other claim asserted by plaintiffs.
[brief] As explained above, Defendants litigated for 17 months in the trial court—significantly longer than the 8 months in *Morgan* and comparable to the --- \(^1\) “(1) the delay in making the arbitration request; (2) the filing of any motions, particularly dispositive motions, and their outcomes; (3) whether the delay in seeking arbitration was part of the party's litigation strategy; (4) the extent of discovery conducted; (5) whether the party raised the arbitration issue in its pleadings, particularly as an affirmative defense, or provided other notification of its intent to seek arbitration; (6) the proximity of the date on which the party sought arbitration to the date of trial; and (7) the resulting prejudice suffered by the other party, if any. ”  *Cole*, 215 N.J. at 280-81.  twenty-one months in *Cole*.  As in *White*, Defendants were aware that Plaintiff’s claims were purportedly subject to arbitration and, “[t]hus, from the outset of the litigation, [Defendants] w[ere] on notice that plaintiff’s claims could be arbitrable .  . . .”  *White*, 61 F.4th at 340.  Further, Defendants’ Brief does not address their failure to assert arbitration as a defense in their Answer or their certification that no future arbitration proceedings were contemplated, which also “informs the waiver analysis. ”  *Cole*, 215 N.J. at 281.  Even accepting Defendants’ position for the sake of argument, Defendants have conceded *at least* 4 of the 7 *Cole* factors.  And, as explained in Plaintiff’s opening Brief (and not disputed by Defendants), “in *Morgan* the Supreme Court ‘expressly rejected' the prejudice-based waiver analysis. ”  *White*, 61 F.4th at 338 (3d Cir. 2023) (quoting *Morgan*, 596 U.S. at 415-16).  Thus, a finding of prejudice is no longer *a requirement* for a finding of waiver.  Here, Defendants’ arguments in response attempt to ignore most of the litigation in the trial court, and questionably assert that after a year and a half of litigation, “the Action was (and is) still in the preliminary stages. ”  Defs.’ Br. 30.  However, Defendants do not acknowledge that the arguable lack of progress in the trial court was because of Defendants’ ongoing failure to fulfill their obligations.  When considering the totality of circumstances, the *Cole* factors, and the abrogation of the ‘prejudice-based waiver analysis’ by Morgan, it is clear that the trial court erred by finding that Defendants had not waived arbitration.
[brief] N.J. Const. art. VI, § 2, ¶ 3 ...........................................................................  8 Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 .................................................................................. 2, 6, 9, 16 Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(b)(2) ........................................................................  14  N.J. Ct. R. 4:10-2 .................................................................................. 8, 9, 20 N.J. Ct. R. 4:18-1 ..................................................................................  14  Other Authorities
[brief] After everything was explained to his client, a witness notary would go in, either myself or [...].  In this case, it was myself.  And we would witness the signatures on any documents that had to be notarized, only.  Not on documents that didn’t require a notarization. ” (179a, 79:25–80:1–9).  The Sales Contract was signed by [...] as Seller, [...] as Purchaser, and [...] as a witness.  (251a).  The Use and Occupancy Agreement was signed by [...] as Seller, [...] as Seller and Witness, and [...] as a Witness.  (234a).  The Disclosure Statement was signed by [...] as Seller and [...] and [...] as witnesses.  (262a).  The Rider was signed by [...] as a Witness.  (238a).  The HUD-1 Settlement Statement from the closing shows a purchase price of $42,294.
[brief] Id. at 22.  Defendant replies that it is entitled to broad discovery under equitable estoppel, laches, or any other claim or defense.  Reply at 2.  Defendant acknowledges that it did not initially use revival as a basis for its equitable estoppel and laches defenses, but claims that based on the discovery conducted to date it now believes that the facts surrounding the revival of the Asserted Patents are relevant to those defenses.  Id. at 3.  Defendant alleges that the ’016 Patent expired after it filed its Answer and Counterclaims, that Plaintiffs produced the ’589 Patent revival application two weeks after the amended pleading deadline, and that, consequently, it could not have used the revival as a basis for its laches and equitable estoppel defenses.  Id. at 3-5.  Defendant reiterates its arguments that the revival discovery is relevant to its defenses.  Id. at 5.  Finally, Defendant argues that facts and circumstances relevant to how the Asserted Patents were abandoned, which person(s) made the realization, why maintenance fees were not paid, and when the decision to revive the patents were made, are not privileged, and that Plaintiffs’ attorney’s investigations into those facts and signing of a petition stating that the delay was unintentional do not render the underlying facts privileged.  Id. at 6.
[brief] **[...] consented to [...] settling her third-party suit and acknowledged her UIM coverage.**  [...] received notice of [...]’s loss within days of the accident.  (Pa175).  On May 2, 2022, [...]’s counsel notified [...] that [...] had offered to settle her claims against [...].  (Pa109).  Counsel’s letter to [...] identified [...]’s suit against [...] by the case title, court, and docket number.  (Pa109).  The letter also included a copy of [...]’s proposed release and [...]’s declarations page as proof of her liability limits.  (Pa110–Pa111).  [...]’s counsel thus requested [...]’s consent to settle the claims against [...].  (Pa109).  [...] responded to [...]’s counsel two days later, on May 4, 2022.  (Pa117).  [...]’s letter did not deny coverage.  (Pa117).  [...] did not, for example, contend that [...] had failed to provide timely notice of her suit against [...].  (Pa117).  Nor did [...] alert [...] to any limitation period under the policy.  (Pa117).  In fact, [...]’s letter did not invoke any coverage defense.  (Pa117).  Rather, [...] told [...]’s counsel, “[...] gives you permission to settle with [...] for their $50,000.00 Bodily Injury Liability Limit.  [...] agrees to waive any potential further UIMBI subrogation claim for this loss. ” (Pa117).  The letter concluded, “[...] will agree to consider any information you have regarding any possible [UIM] claim for Amy [...]. ” (Pa117).  IV.
[brief] SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY  APPELLATE  DIVISION DOCKET NO. [...]  STATE OF NEW JERSEY, : CRIMINAL ACTION  Plaintiff-Respondent, : On Appeal From a Judgment of v. : Conviction of the Superior Court : of New Jersey, Law Division, [...], : Somerset County.  Defendant-Appellant. : Indictment No. [...] : Sat Below: : Hon. [...], J.S.C. BRIEF AND APPENDIX
[brief] The facts here are even more compelling than *Birkenmeier*.  Before stopping defendant’s vehicle, the police already had probable cause in the form of a search warrant to believe the vehicle contained contraband.  Officers watched as defendant drove the target vehicle away from his residence and engage in what appeared to be drug-related activity.  Then, after executing the searches at the scene, the officers recovered a weapon, ammunition, drugs, and a large amount of cash.  If a CI tip, the observation of a bag, and the odor of marijuana is enough to establish a sufficient reasonable and articulable suspicion to seek consent to search a home under *Birkenmeier*, then certainly the recovery of drugs, guns, and cash is sufficient to justify a request to search the very location where that vehicle and person were observed by police earlier that same day.  The consent search of defendant’s home complied with *Carty* because the officers had a “reasonable and articulable suspicion that a criminal offense [was] being . . . committed prior to requesting consent to search.
[directive] This Aggravating Factor is based upon § 3B1.3 of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines Manual, which applies to a defendant who used a special skill in a manner that significantly facilitated the commission or concealment of the offense.  The term “special skill” refers to a skill Page 78 [...] Guidelines 2 (2004 Revisions) not possessed by members of the general public and usually requiring substantial education, training, or licensing.  Examples would include pilots, lawyers, doctors, accountants, chemists, and demolition experts.  10.1.5
[brief] INTRODUCTION  This is Plaintiff [...]’s (“[...]”) appeal of the trial court’s affirmation of Defendant [...]’s (“[...]”) denial of bulk variance relief to [...] to erect a billboard and its related upholding of Defendant [...]’s (“[...]”) requirement that no billboard could be within 1,000 feet of an intersection (“Distance Regulation”).  At hearings before the [...], multiple [...] members and professionals conceded they either did not know the basis for the Distance Regulation or that it was merely a “siting” requirement.  In either event, the Distance Regulation is unconstitutional because the proposed billboard is protected by the First Amendment and no one could identify a substantial government interest for it.  Rather than hold [...] to actual proofs, the trial court simply accepted that the “purposes” section of the Distance Regulation was a sufficient evidential foundation, contrary to existing precedent.  The [...] relied on the Distance Regulation to deny bulk variance relief to [...].  In denying such relief, the [...] did not analyze such relief globally as part of the entire application, but instead improperly parsed out the Distance Regulation from the rest of the application, all the while as it conceded it did not even understand why the Distance Regulation existed.
[brief] Although the governing body’s “reasons” for adopting an inconsistent redevelopment plan must be “adequately supported by the record,” they need not be supported by “substantial evidence. ”  Powerhouse Arts Dist. Neighborhood Ass’n v. City Council of City of Jersey City, 413 N.J. Super. 322, 331-333 (App. Div. 2010).  Thus, the procedural requirements for building an adequate record are “decidedly less burdensome” than for a redevelopment area designation, where the “substantial evidence” standard is applicable.