ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The factors for determining whether an attorney’s fees are reasonable are laid out in Rule of Professional Conduct 1.5(a) as follows: 1.  The time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill requisite to perform, the legal service properly; 2.  The likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of the particular employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer; 3.  The fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services; 4.  The amount involved and the results obtained; 5. The time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances; 6.  The nature or length of the professional relationship with the client; 7.  The experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the services; [and]
[brief] The scheduled trial date of February 15, 2023 at the time the discovery end date was set for May 26, 2022 was adjourned by the [...] because of the Covid-19 crisis.  The effect of delays caused by the Covid-19 crisis should be considered by a trial court in determining whether a discovery extension should be granted.  Hollywood Café Diner, Inc. v. Jaffe 417 N.J. Super. 410, 420-421 (App. Div. 2022).
[brief] Defendant [...], Who Was Late For Work, Was Not Performing Any Job Responsibilities At The Time Of The Crash  Defendant [...] was scheduled to be present in the cardiac catheterization lab to start her shift as a staff nurse at 6:45 a.m.; thus Defendant [...]’s shift had already started 14 minutes prior to the subject crash, while she was still commuting within the parking lot:  Q: [I]t’s 6:59 in the morning.  So the employee of [...] [[...]] is late, is technically late, correct?  A: Yes.  [...]: Objection to form.  Q: We can look at P-83 and see that her hours are 6:45 to 5:15, correct?  A: Yes.  Q: She is late to begin with, correct?  A: Yes.  Q: Now, also it appears she hit a person in the parking lot who was also an employee of the hospital or [...], yes?  A: Yes.  [Da1057-8 (69:14-70:3) (emphasis added); see also Pa1011 (23:5-13). ]  Defendant [...] also missed the start of her shift on the two days preceding the date of the crash, and she had not worked her entire shift the day prior to the subject crash.  Pa1011-3 (23:25-25:10); Pa1016-7 (28:15-29:22).  On October 6, 2021, the day of the fatal crash, Defendant [...] never clocked in to work and did not work at all that day.  Pa789 ([...]’s timesheet).  Defendant [...] had been scheduled that day to meet with an attorney representing the hospital with respect to a medical malpractice case and to provide deposition testimony related to said case.  Pa468-9 (15:21-16:15); Pa784-5.  Defendant [...] did not attend the meeting or the deposition on October 6, 2021.  Pa3030 (6:18-24).  Thus, Defendant [...] did not work as a nurse or perform any professional duties at any time on October 6, 2021, or, for that matter, on any other day in the weeks that followed the subject crash.  Pa1059 (71:19-24).  I.  Plaintiff’s Claims Against Defendants [...] And [...]
[brief] (Pa 50, at 75:15-18)  The union representatives relayed to Plaintiff that [...] requested Plaintiff submit a letter, or M-13, addressed to the Director explaining the incident.  (Pa 50, at 75:19-23)  On March 17, 2020, Plaintiff submitted the requested letter to [...].  (Pa 50, at 76:13-16)  The results of the event left Plaintiff feeling “insulted”, and caused Plaintiff severe stress which led him to not want to return to the workplace.  (Pa 51, at 81:5-14)  On March 21, 2020, Plaintiff met with [...] who went over the letter Plaintiff submitted and promised it would be forwarding the complaint to HR.
[directive] 5.1  An officer authorized to use a CED pursuant to this policy may fire, discharge, or utilize drive stun mode of the CED during an actual operation, only against: (a) an active assailant; or (b) a threatening assailant who will not voluntarily submit to custody after having been given a reasonable opportunity to do so considering the exigency of the situation and the immediacy of the need to employ law enforcement force; or (c) a person who is attempting to cause death or serious bodily injury to him/herself; or (d) a fleeing suspect if clear and convincing evidence exists to believe the suspect has committed a crime in which the suspect caused or attempted to cause death or serious bodily injury.  5.2  Officers shall reevaluate the situation and reassess the need to use force before any second or subsequent firing or discharge or utilization of drive stun mode of the device against the same person.  Any second or subsequent firing or discharge or utilization of drive stun mode of the device must be necessary and justified by the circumstances at that moment.  5.3  An officer shall not direct an electrical charge or current against a person who is restrained by handcuffs unless: (a) Deadly force would be authorized under the Use of Force Policy; and (b) the use of physical or mechanical force is not feasible or would be ineffective.  5.4  Consistent with training, officers may point a CED at a person only when circumstances create a reasonable belief that it may be necessary for the officer to use enhanced mechanical force.  When the officer no longer reasonably believes that enhanced mechanical force may be necessary, the officer shall, as soon as practicable, secure or holster the CED.  5.5  Unholstering, displaying, or pointing a CED shall be considered a display of constructive authority.  5.6  A spark display from a CED shall be considered a display of constructive authority.  A spark display must be reported as a Show of Force on the Attorney General’s Use of Force Reporting Portal.  7
[brief] Item 1T  Transcript of Motion for Summary Judgment Hearing, June 5, 2023, filed with the September 14, 2023 Notice of Appeal  2T Transcript of Motion for Summary Judgment Hearing, October 7, 2022  2T Transcript of Deposition of [...], November 30, 2022  3T Transcript of Deposition of [...], November 30, 2022  ## TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ### CASES
[directive] Requirement Satisfying of Methods B. Training Other In-Service Satisfy That Courses C.  Qualifying ........................................7  Requirements ........................................7  Courses Repeated D.  8 ........................  Catalog Education Course Continuing Qualifying 4.  K ...............  Courses Continuing Education  Qualifying of Designation  4.1 K ..............................  Qualifying Courses of Catalog A. K ...........................  Courses Designating for B.  Standards ..............................................X  Disclaimer C. K .......................
[brief] Review and control of a completed verdict sheet is primarily the domain of the trial court judge.  See R. 3:19-1(b) (stating that, once the trial is complete, “[t]he verdict sheet shall be marked as a court exhibit and retained by the court pursuant to Rule 1:2-3. ”).  When the jury discloses its verdict to the trial court, “[p]recautions must be taken to eliminate any doubt as to the precise nature of the verdict. ”  *State v. Butler*, 27 N.J. 560, 607 (1958).  Again, there was a more than adequate basis here for charging the manslaughter offenses as lesser-included offenses of murder.
[brief] N.J.S.A. 2C:39-7 was not contained in the original version of the Criminal Code enacted by L. 1978, c. 95, but was enacted the following year, in section 6 of L. 1979, c. 179.  (Da59-60, 67)  The first version of N.J.S.A. 2C:39-7 contained a fourth-degree crime for the possession of any weapon by a person previously convicted of certain crimes or having previously been committed to a mental institution, without distinguishing between the possession of firearms or other weapons.  L. 1979, c. 179, § 6.  (Da67)  The sponsor statement said nothing about consecutive sentences or wanting to impose an additional penalty beyond the substantive offense; it merely stated that the bill: adds a new section to Chapter 39 which punishes, as a crime of the fourth degree, the possession of weapons by certain persons.  Although new to the Code, section 7, except for word changes to reflect Code crimes, follows exactly the language of the present statute, N.J.S. 2A:151-8.  [Sponsor’s Statement, A. 3352 (Introduced May 21, 1979).  (Da84)]  At that time, unlawful possession of a handgun without a permit under N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b) was a third-degree crime.  L. 1979, c. 179 § 4.  (Da63)  The Legislature amended N.J.S.A. 2C:39-7 to create the separate, second-degree crime of possession of a firearm by certain persons with prior convictions—subsection (b)—in 1992.
[brief] (Pa 127)  Here and again, [...], in its response, does not and cannot dispute that both [...]’s Order to Strike and [...] Order to Seal are legally in force to this day.  Despite knowing the existence of these two court orders, [...] failed to notice the court in either its Motion to Remove (Pa 130) to Federal Court or its Motion to Dismiss (Pa 130), or in any other correspondence or legal filings by the law firm.
[directive] 2.  An officer shall not direct an electrical charge or current against a person who has already received an electrical charge from a conducted energy device unless the person, despite the initial discharge, continues to pose a substantial risk of causing bodily injury to him/herself, an officer, or any other person.  The person shall be given a reasonable opportunity to submit to law enforcement authority and to comply with law enforcement commands before being subjected to a second or subsequent discharge, unless the person’s conduct after the initial discharge creates a risk of bodily injury that is so immediate that any delay in applying a second or subsequent -5- [DCJ 03/03/16] discharge would likely result in bodily injury.  The person’s refusal to comply with law enforcement commands after having been given a reasonable opportunity to do so shall not be a basis for a second or subsequent discharge unless the person continues to refuse to put down or surrender an object that the officer reasonably believes could be used as a deadly weapon, or unless the person continues to use or threaten to use physical force or violence against the officer, or another, in a manner and to a degree that reasonably creates a substantial risk of causing bodily injury to the officer or another.  Furthermore, the person’s attempt instinctively to reduce the leverage of a wristlock, hammerlock, or other pain compliance hold applied by the officer while attempting to apply handcuffs, or the person’s bracing or pulling against an officer’s attempt to pull/move him or her, shall not be a basis for discharging the device unless such resistance reasonably creates a substantial risk of causing bodily injury to the officer.  In the event that a second or subsequent discharge is authorized and necessary, unless the officer is equipped with and activates a body worn camera as defined in Attorney General Law Enforcement Directive No. 2015-1 so that the circumstances justifying a second or subsequent discharge are recorded by the body worn camera, the officer shall, when feasible, point the main body of the device so that the focus of the device’s internal video camera is centered on the person in order to record the circumstances justifying any such second or subsequent discharge.  3.
[brief] The State remained the real party in interest throughout the life of an NJFCA action even before the Legislature adopted the 2023 Amendment.  See N.J.S.A. § 2A:32C-5(b) (actions are brought in the State’s name); N.J.S.A. § 2A:32C-5(c) (dismissal of action requires State’s consent).  The State also maintained the right to intervene when circumstances warranted before the 2023 Amendment.  See N.J.S.A. § 2A:32C-5(d) (intervention at outset of case); N.J.S.A. § 2A:32C-6(b), (f) (dismissal and intervention for good cause); N.J.S.A. § 2A:32C-6(c) (State retains the right to settle).  Those legal realities have not changed.  Indeed, the 2023 Amendment has no impact at all on the State’s status as the real party in interest or its power to intervene at any point during the “life of the action. ”  If the State so chose, it could intervene in this case.  See N.J.S.A. § 2A:32C-6(f).  If it did, the public disclosure bar defense would not apply because the defense applies only to relator-litigated actions.  Thus, the trial court’s conclusion that prospective-only application of the 2023 Amendment would impede the State’s authority is simply incorrect.  Instead, the 2023 Amendment expands the State’s authority; it allows the State, without intervening and thus without bearing the costs of prosecution, to empower private relators motivated by substantial financial reward to litigate actions that would otherwise be blocked.
[brief] For example, if billboards are a “safety” risk, why would it be permissible to allow changing signage late at night, as the Board did, but not within 1,000 feet of an intersection?  An intersection would be more likely to have existing light and signage and therefore less distracting.  A standalone billboard on a dark road with changing signage is more distracting than a billboard lost among other light and signage at an intersection.  This is why Pullen requires assessment of the “entire proposal. ”  The Board failed that requirement.  B.
[brief] Defendant then escalated the accusations, claiming Plaintiff had dragged her by the neck and thrown her against a wall.  Plaintiff denied these allegations and stated that there were witnesses who could corroborate his version of events.  In the heat of the moment, Defendant threatened to inform Plaintiff’s mother about the supposed assault.  True to her threat, she told Plaintiff’s mother that he had hit her, prompting his mother to reprimand him.  (1T95)  Overwhelmed by fear and frustration, Plaintiff apologized to his mother.  Considering the accusations and the escalating tension, he suggested to Defendant that perhaps they should consider spending some time apart if she truly believed he had hit her.  (1T95).
[brief] [...] HR Representative [...] noted that Plaintiff began taking medical leaves of absences almost immediately after the November 29, 2018 meeting, and that [...] never denied Plaintiff her leave of absence requests.  (Da655, Defendant [...] deposition transcript, T167:2-19).  Plaintiff also applied for short term disability through the State of New Jersey, which [...] did not object to.  (Id.)  [...] assisted Plaintiff when she had questions/issues regarding her temporary disability application.  (Pa, 324, Plaintiff’s deposition transcript, T135:6-8; Da12, December 14, 2018 email from HR Representative [...]).  On December 20, 2018  Plaintiff sent an email to Defendant [...] advising that someone “overheard that my supervisor [Defendant [...]] was saying a lot of very negative things about me.  Including that I was too immature for my position and I am like a drunken prom date. ” (Da29, December 20, 2018 email from Plaintiff).  However, when asked her deposition, Plaintiff could not identify the individual who told her of this alleged comment, nor the date when it was allegedly made.  (Pa324, Plaintiff’s deposition transcript, T135:22-T136:11).
[brief] 32  Tarta Luna Properties, LLC v. Harvest Restaurants Group LLC, 466 N.J. Super. 137, 155 (App. Div. 2021) .............................................  13  Tretina Printing v. Fitzpatrick and Assocs., 135 N.J. 349 (1994) ......................  36  US Steelworkers of America v.  Warrior & Gulf Navigation, 363 U.S. 574 (1960) .......................................................... 36, 38 Watkins v. Resorts Int'l Hotel & Casino, Inc., 124 N.J. 398, 409, 591 A.2d 592 (1991) ....................................................... 22 Statutes N.J.S.A. 42:2C-47(c) ........................................................................ 7, 9, 10, 25 N.J.S.A. § 2A:24-8d ........................................................................ 30, 38, 40, 42, 44 N.J.S.A. 2A:24-8c ........................................................................ 46, 47 9 U.S.C. § 10 .............................................................................. 31, 32, 40, 42, 44 9 U.S.C. sec. 5 .............................................................................. 42, 43, 44 Rules R. 4:42-9 ...................................................................................... 7, 12, 14, 21 R. 1:10-3 ...................................................................................... 51 TABLE OF ORDERS, JUDGMENTS AND RULINGS Orders May 23, 2018 Order of Honorable [...], J.S.C. on Motion in Aid of Litigant’s Rights and [...] Cross-Motion denied ...........................................3150a May 23, 2018
[brief] TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | CASES | PAGE | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | **American Budget v. Furman,** | | | 67 N.J. Super. 134 (Ch. Div.), aff’d, 36 N.J. 129 (1961) | 7, 9 | | **Appell v. Reiner,** | | | 43 N.J. 413 (1964) | 9 | | **Bell v. Stafford Twp.,** | | | 110 N.J. 384 (1988) | 4 | | **Cipala v. Lincoln Tech. Inst.,** | | | 179 N.J. 45 (2004) | 4 | | **Columbus Life Ins. Co. v. Wilmington Tr., N.A.,** | | | 344 F.R.D. 207 (D.N.J. 2023) | 14 | | **Ferguson v. Skrupa,** | | | 372 U.S. 726 (1963) | 8, 9 | | **Harris v. N.J.,** | | | 259 F.R.D. 89 (D.N.J. 2007) | 14 | | **Knight v. City of Margate,** | | | 86 N.J. 374 (1981) | 5, 6, 8, 9 | | **Matter of Primus,** | | | 436 U.S. 412 (1978) | 15 | | **New Century Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Nason,** | | | 367 N.J. Super. 17 (App. Div. 2004) | 14 | | **Persels & Assocs., LLC v. Banking Comm’r,** | | | 122 A.3d 592 (Conn. 2015) | 10 | | **Priolo v. Shorrock Garden Care Ctr.,** | | | 2016 WL 4350133 (App. Div. Sept. 20, 2022) | 12 | | **Securities Indus.  Ass’n v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys.,** | | | 839 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1988) | 12 | | TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (cont’d) | PAGE | |-------------------------------|------| | **State v. Higginbotham,** | | | 475 N.J. Super. 205 (App. Div. 2023) | 11 | | **Toxaway Hotel Co. v. J.L. Smathers & Co.,** | | | 216 U.S. 439 (1910) | 12 |  **STATUTES**
[brief] As a matter of law, “[t]he term ‘unbecoming conduct’ has been broadly defined and identified as conduct that adversely affects the morale or efficiency of the government unit or has the tendency to destroy the public's respect for public employees and destroy the public's confidence in the delivery of government services. ”  In the Matter of [...], [...], [...], 2021 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 490, *62, [...], [...] (December 15, 2021) citing Karins v. City of Atlantic City, 152 N.J. 532, 554 (1998); In re Emmons, 63 N.J. Super.
[brief] On January 28, 2016, Defendants filed a notice of appeal.  That appeal was flagged by the Appellate Division as interlocutory.  As a result, on February 12, 2016, Defendants filed a motion for leave to file an interlocutory appeal.  On February 23, 2016, Plaintiff filed a cross-motion to dismiss the appeal.  By an Order dated March 14, 2016, the Court denied Defendant’s motion for leave to appeal and granted Plaintiff’s cross-motion to dismiss the appeal.
[brief] 60  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS  1.  Final Judgment, dated January 4, 2023, with respect to [...] and [...].  (40008a).  2.  Final Judgment, dated January 4, 2023, with respect to [...].  (40005a).  3.  Order dated November 16, 2022 regarding the remand from the Appellate Division.  (39964a).  4.  Order dated October 13, 2021 denying Defendants’ motion to recuse [...].  (39015a).  5.  In accordance with Synnex Corp. v. ADT Sec. Servs., Inc., 394 N.J. Super. 577, 587-88 (N.J. App. Div. 2007), all interlocutory orders upon which the judgments are based are appealed, including but not limited to, the October 13, 2021 Order denying Defendants’ motion to recuse [...], and the November 16, 2022 Order regarding the remand from the Appellate Division listed above.
[brief] Facing the prospect of having not to only overturn one Will, but two, petitioners (respondents on appeal), [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], and [...] (collectively, "petitioners") turned to a desperate and disfavored tactic: moving to disqualify [...] ("[...]") as counsel for Interested Parties, [...] and [...], individually and as Co-Executors of the Estate of [...], deceased (collectively, "appellants").  Specifically, petitioners sought to invalidate the Last Will and Testament of [...] ("decedent"), dated October 11, 2022 (the "October 2022 Will") in favor decedent's Last Will and Testament dated August 8, 2018 (the "August 2018 Will").
[brief] The State alleged that the Defendant and [...] broke into the victim’s home, jumped on him, covered him with a blanket, tied him up, ransacked his house, took his ATM card, demanded his pin, got his pin, threw a couch on top of him, and left him to die.  (15T47:23-50:12; 26T:2-51:13).  Furthermore, there is no indication that the jury raised a question expressing confusion on the acts submitted for their consideration.  Thus, the test set out in Parker was satisfied.  Additionally, the Defense was put on notice from the time of the issuance of the indictment that the state alleged all subsections later charged to the jury, as the indictment also referenced the same subsections.  (Da006-Da007).  Thus, the Defense was on notice of what it would have to defend against.  The situation is similar to Elliot where this court upheld a multi-subsection charge, in that the various discovery throughout this case informed the Defense of what the State’s theory of the case was.  As such, the allegations were no surprise.  The situation is also distinct from Elliot in that the subsections referenced in the jury charge were all actually delineated in Defendant’s indictment.  Thus, there were no additional subsections added and the notice to the Defense was actually more complete than in Elliot.  Furthermore, based on information and belief, the Defense never objected to the form of that count of the indictment, nor the charge for it later.  As noted in Spano, R. 3:10-2 suggests it is far too late to raise the issue now.  Accordingly, this should not be a basis to overturn the accomplice liability robbery conviction.
[brief] Not only is [...]’ testimony credible and worthy of belief, but the undisputed evidence demonstrates -- more than three months after the closing and the making of the third loan -- [...] confirmed the parties’ third loan by his August 7, 2013 email to [...].  This email contained a schedule drafted by [...], [[...]’s] Director of Accounting, confirming the existence of the third loan and [...]’s believe that he owed [...] $139,773.03 (including the late fees) as of April 30, 2013.  . . .  His own schedule confirmed, after crediting [...]’s $330,000 partial payment on that date, the remainder of [...]’s debt to [...] had not been satisfied.  [...]’s August 7, 2013 email along with the attached schedule confirms the meeting of the parties’ minds concerning the new agreement, i.e., the third loan.
[brief] POINT I  DEFENDANT WAS DENIED THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF TRIAL COUNSEL WHEN HE FAILED TO REQUIRE A WADE HEARING REGARDING THE VICTIM [‘1S IDENTIFICATION[,] WHICH DEPRIVED HIM FROM HAVING A FAIR TRIAL[,] CONTRARY TO N.J.R.E. 104 HEARING [,] U,[S]. CON[S]T[,J AMENDS. V, VI AND XIV, N.J. CONST. (1947)  ART. I, [¶ 1], 9 AND 10.  U.S. V. WADE, 388 U.S. 218 (1967)  MISIDENTIFICATION.  POINT II  DEFENDANT'S SENTENCE WAS MANIFESTLY EXCESSIVE BASED ON MITIGATING AND AGGRAVATING FACTORS USED BY THE TRIAL COURT AND MUST BE REVERSED.  Based on our review of the record and applicable law, with the exception of his conviction for third-degree shoplifting, we are not persuaded by defendant's arguments.
[brief] (8T 12:21 to 14:4).  [...] then affirmatively acknowledged that, consistent with her Certification, that they were able to find two (2) franchise agreements naming my family company, [...], as the sole franchisee of the World of Beer project in Hoboken, as well as a Tapmasters agreement showing that [...] has a thirty percent (30%) interest in the project.  [...] further testified that her family began its desperate search through these thousands of documents as they were “dumbfounded” by the verdict: