ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Following the submission of her appellate brief, Plaintiff filed a notice of supplemental authority.  It relates to two cases from the Michigan Supreme Court: Rafaeli, LLC v. Oakland Cnty., 505 Mich. 429 (2020) (Rafaeli) and Schafer v. Kent Cnty., 2024 Mich. LEXIS 1438 (July 24, 2024) (Schafer).  In Rafaeli, the Michigan Supreme Court concluded that Michigan’s tax foreclosure law violated the Takings Clause of the Michigan Constitution because it did not permit the former owner to recover the surplus following foreclosure and resale by the foreclosing governmental unit.  505 Mich. at 474-79.  In response, the Michigan Legislature revised its law, part of which included a claims process by which foreclosed owners could obtain their surplus.  Schafer, slip op. at *4-5.  As part of that revision, the Legislature decreed that claims arising prior to the date of Rafaeli “may be made only if the Michigan Supreme Court orders that its decision in Rafaeli . . . applies retroactively. ”  MCL 211.78t(1)(b)(i).  Thus, the issue in Schafer was whether Rafaeli applied with full retroactivity.  The appeals court concluded that Rafaeli was not new law, but instead “supported by long-established constitutional principles,” and the Michigan Supreme Court agreed.  Id. at *6.  The owner’s right to surplus proceeds in a tax foreclosure was one recognized by Michigan law until the Legislature abrogated the right in a 1999 amendment to its tax foreclosure laws.  Id. at *19-21.  “Because this common-law property right is constitutionally protected by our state’s Takings Clause, no subsequent amendment of the GPTA can abrogate this basic right. ”  Id. at *19-20.  The Court also noted that Rafaeli did not overturn any caselaw, legal principles, or precedents.  Id. at *21.  Unlike Michigan, New Jersey has historically never recognized a property owner’s right to surplus equity in a tax foreclosure. \textsuperscript{13}  Strict foreclosure\textsuperscript{14} has been the state of the law since tax foreclosure came into existence in the 1800s.  \textit{See Pamph. L.} 1886, p. 161; \textit{Burgin v. Rutherford}, 56 \textit{N.J. Eq.} 666, 669 (Ch. 1898); \textit{L.} 1903, c. 208, §§56,59; \textit{Mitsch v. Owens}, 82 \textit{N.J. Eq.} 404 (Ch. 1913); \textit{L.} 1918, c. 237, §49; \textit{Atl. City v. Gardner}, 124 \textit{N.J. Eq.} 110, 112 (Ch. 1938); \textit{Varsolona v. Breen Capital Servs. Corp.}, 180 \textit{N.J.} 605, 619 (2004) (observing that a final judgment vests fee title in the plaintiff “even if the property’s value exceeds the amounts owed. ”).  And unlike \textit{Rafaeli} in Michigan, \textit{Tyler} “unquestionably” unsettled prior law in New Jersey.  \textit{Roberto} at 363.  Accordingly, the \textit{Schafer} decision of the Michigan Supreme Court does not avail Plaintiff here.
[brief] 1  Plaintiff raises this issue for the first time on appeal.  POINT VI  PLAINTIFF’S APPEAL IS BARRED BY THE LAW OF THE CASE DOCTRINE BECAUSE HE FAILED TO APPEAL  THE COURT’S ORDERS AND RULINGS DATED MARCH 4, 2022  CONCLUSION ---  2  Defendant [...] raises this issue for the first time on appeal because it was not ripe prior to appeal.
[brief] While we respectfully submit that [...] should have enforced [...]’s two denials of [...]’s prior “global” applications for general collections-related fees and instructions that [...] first establish a legal basis for his fee requests before filing a motion to 1  “Da” refers to Defendant-Appellant [...]’s appendix; “Pb” refers to Plaintiff-Respondent [...] Sipko’s opposition brief; “1T” refers to the transcript of the April 28, 2023 hearing on the Global Fee App.; “2T” refers to the transcript of the July 28, 2018 hearing on [...]’s prior global fee application; “3T” refers to the April 1, 2022 transcript of the hearing on another of [...]’s prior fee applications; “4T” refers to the Certification of Lost Verbatim Court Record filed by the Court’s Transcript Coordinator on November 20, 2023, related to the lost/damaged transcript of the May 27, 2021 transcript of the hearing on another of [...]’s prior fee applications.
[brief] [...], Plaintiff, v. [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], JOHN DOE ADMINISTRATORS AND STAFF  1-10, AND ABC BOARD  MEMBERS  1-10, SAID NAMES BEING FICTITIOUS, Defendant, SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY  APPELLATE  DIVISION  DOCKET NO: [...]  APPEAL SOUGHT FROM: SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY LAW  DIVISION, ESSEX COUNTY  DOCKET NO: [...]
[brief] This case stems from a separate matter filed against [...], M.D. (“[...]”) by [...], D.O. (“[...]”), alleging a claim of tortious interference.  See [...], D.O. et al. v. Robert Hole, M.D., Docket No. [...] (the “Underlying Action”).  The Underlying Action relates to statements allegedly made by [...] to [...] (“[...]”) related to [...]’s misconduct.  [...] had a reasonable and good faith belief that [...] had conducted himself in a manner that violated medical standards and put patient safety at risk, which [...] felt triggered an obligation to inform [...] of these risks.  In that matter, [...] (“[...]”) agreed to represent [...] and thereafter undertook complete control of the defense of those claims.  [...] has undertaken and completely controlled [...]’s defense for over five (5) years, and [...] has relied on them to do so.  Notwithstanding this reliance, in June 2020, [...] filed the instant declaratory action (the “Declaratory Action”) seeking to disclaim coverage.  In addition, on January 5, 2023 — after two and a half years of agreement among the parties that disposition of the Underlying Action would be dispositive of the Declaratory Action, and mere months before the Underlying Action was scheduled for trial — [...] sought and obtained summary judgment on its declaratory judgment claim and dismissal of [...]’s counterclaims.  The entry of summary judgment in this matter was, as a matter of law, error.  As a matter of law, [...] did not sustain its burden to show that the exclusions cited in the applicable insurance policy apply to a claim of tortious interference.  The exclusions require an intent to injure to disclaim coverage, but a claim of tortious interference does not require an intent to injure as an element.  The exclusions, by their plain language, do not apply to a claim of tortious interference, and, thus, [...] should be required to defend the Underlying Action.  The trial court did not clearly state why it found to the contrary.  Moreover, [...] and the trial court relied exclusively on mere allegations in the pleadings of the Underlying Action — a standard which the Supreme Court of New Jersey has expressly rejected when it comes to intent based policy exclusions.  Rather than mere allegations of intent, the trial court was required to look at [...]’s purported subjective intent to injure.  The only proofs on record before the trial court regarding subjective intent showed that [...]’s intentions were to ensure patient safety and compliance with the laws that apply to [...], including anti-kickback laws and the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (“HIPAA”).  For these reasons, and those more fully articulated below, the trial court committed reversible error in granting [...]’s motion for summary judgment.  [...] therefore respectfully requests this Court reverse the summary judgment order dated March 17, 2023 granting summary judgment to [...] and remand for further proceedings.  **STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY**
[brief] He testified against defendant at trial (16T55-7 to 16T155-14;17T23-2 to 17T24-25).  [...] testified that he knew [...] and that he had been to [...]'s home (16T55-15 to 25).  [...] would go over to [...]'s house on occasion to work with him or his father (16T141-24 to 16T142-11).  [...] also knew defendant, because they worked together doing construction and "tree work" for about four years, and they hung out shooting pool and doing drugs together (16T57-18 to 16T59-25;16T64-17 to 16T65-10).  [...] said [...] and defendant had been friends, but they were not getting along because [...] would come over to [...]'s lake house "drunked up" (16t66-18 to 16T67-25).  [...] was staying in defendant's Garrison Lake house (16T56-23 to 16T57-5;16T60-3 to 16).
[brief] --- 1Da refers to defendant’s appendix  1T refers to August 7, 2015  Trial Transcript 2T refers to November 10, 2015  Trial Transcript 3T refers to November 17, 2015  Trial Transcript 4T refers to November 5, 2015  Trial Transcript. p. m. session 5T refers to March 24, 2014  Motion 6T refers to March 13, 2014  Motion 7T refers to November 09, 2015  Trial Transcript.  VI & VII 8T refers to November 30, 2015.  Trial Transcript 9T refers to November 04, 2015.  Trial Transcript.  VI & VII 10T refers to November 2, 2015, Trial Transcript 11T refers to March 04, 2016  Sentencing Transcript 12T refers to June 06, 2012  Grand Jury Transcript 13T refers to April 29, 2014  Grand Jury Transcript 14T refers to November 16, 2015.  Trial Transcript 15T refers to November 18, 2015.  Trial transcript  The petitioner adopts by reference Rule: 1:4-3 as to germane his legal arguments and appendix within his pro se brief to [...] plenary brief, appendix, and procedural history.  **STATEMENT OF FACTS**
[brief] Nevertheless, as explained in detail in the State’s main response brief and its response to [...]’s amicus brief, fingerprint-analysis evidence has been deemed sufficiently reliable for use in New Jersey criminal trials for a century.  (See Pb at 17, PAb at 5-6); see also State v. Cierciello, 86 N.J.L. 309, 313-15 (E. & A. 1914) (holding it would be “no ground for error” if properly obtained fingerprint was offered into evidence and used at trial).  The Court, in State v. Olenowski, held that any evidence previously validated under Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923), would remain admissible and reliable unless “the scientific reliability underlying the evidence has changed.
[brief] From 2003 until 2007, [...] was enrolled in PERS for her municipal prosecutor positions in [...], [...], [...], [...], and [...].  (1T10:15-22; Pa154-55).  Her duties and responsibilities in the municipalities where she served as a Municipal Prosecutor were essentially the same.  (T11:17-21).  In 2010, the [...] ([...]) began an investigation into [...]’s eligibility for PERS.  (Pa155; Ra1-3).  The [...] concluded [...] was an employee of the [...] and remained eligible for PERS based on that employment, but she was ineligible for PERS participation and service credit for the other four municipalities, including [...], because she was engaged under a professional services contract with them.  (Pa155).
[brief] See Townsend v. Pierre, 221 N.J. 36 (2015).  It is well-settled law in New Jersey that negligence is a fact which must be proven and which will never be presumed.  See Tong v. Tandy, 36 N.J. 44 (1961).  The mere showing of an incidence causing damages sued for is insufficient alone to authorize an inference of negligence on the part of the defendant.  See Vander Graef v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 32 N.J. Super. 365 (App. Div. 1954).  Similarly, Plaintiff must show by a preponderance of the evidence that the Township’s alleged negligence was a proximate cause of the injury.  See Townsend, supra.
[brief] As more fully delineated below, the trial court failed to properly apply the criteria for injunctive relief and dispensed with the clear and convincing standard which governs injunctive relief.  The court failed to consider: (i) whether Plaintiffs established a settled legal right; and (ii) the public interest.  The court found a likelihood of success based on distortion of the policy language, baseless inference and in derogation of the Constitutional right of parental autonomy.  The court found irreparable harm based on generalized studies, its presumption of parental malevolence and further distortion of the policy language -- as opposed to facts.  The court’s analysis of relative hardships disregarded harm to fundamental Constitutional rights.  In addition, the court decided a non-justiciable, moot issue in restraining a repealed policy.  PROCEDURAL HISTORY and STATEMENT OF FACTS
[brief] A divorce in plaintiff’s Indian Kadava Patel community is socially devastating.  Nobody will even consider plaintiff as a suitable marriage partner now because this divorce from the Defendant is on his record – a divorce entered after a three-month relationship, without consummation, where Defendant left upon receiving her green card.  The plaintiff, being a virgin in this fraudulent marriage, if judgment of divorce is given, will not find a virgin partner in the future -- which is highly important in his community.  The Court should vacate the judgment of divorce the Family Court entered below and remand with direction that a judgment of annulment be entered in accordance with the governing New Jersey law cited above; the Court should also vacate the award of attorney’s fees entered against plaintiff that are premised on the Family Court’s denial of his petition for annulment.  Respectfully submitted, /s/ [...]
[brief] Sweeney Trial Exhibit D-2 [...] Guarantee dated July 8, 2008 (INTENTIONALLY OMITTED)  Sweeney Trial Exhibit D-3 Collateral Mortgage dated July 7, 2008 ................Da0127 Sweeney Trial Exhibit D-4 “In-Kind” Service and Materials, Bates stamped SWEENEY004-020.................................................................Da0132  Sweeney Trial Exhibit D-5 Check Image of $330,000 payment, dated April 26, 2013 .................................................................Da0149  Sweeney Trial Exhibit D-6 Discharge of Mortgage, dated April 26, 2013 ........................................................................Da0150  Plaintiff Trial Exhibit P-1 Email from [...] to [...], dated June 25, 2008................................................................................Da0152
[brief] The Trial Court’s construction renders both Paragraph 23 and 33 superfluous and nonsensical.  Given the law favoring arbitration, Garfinkle, supra, it is inconceivable that these two sophisticated parties would include in their contract a provision regarding alternative dispute resolution which was wholly permissive and could not be enforced by either party and was therefore meaningless and then subsequently give the Arbitrator the power to specifically enforce the agreement.  The construction that they would then include a second provision giving further force to the earlier meaningless provision is farcical when considered with the “presumption of arbitrability”  Curtis, supra.  Arbitration is particularly appropriate when contracted for by attorneys who practice together.  Our Courts’ longstanding endorsement of arbitration as a favored remedy, “reflects its value as a procedure for resolving disputes out of court that in the process combines the advantages of privacy and efficiency.  Its virtues have special application to conflicts arising out of agreements between lawyers in practice together.  Such conflicts are best resolved quickly and efficiently, and the parties' best interests are likely to be served by a dispute-resolution process that limits notoriety about the underlying issues. ”  Heher v. Smith, Stratton, Wise, Heher & Brennan, 143 N.J. 448, 459, (1996), (emphasis added)  By erroneously requiring the shareholder’s Dispute Resolution provision to comply with the notice requirements of consumer contracts and by interpreting the dispute resolution provision to be entirely permissive and requiring the consent of both parties the Trial Court rendered the provision meaningless and its decision is contrary to public policy and the expectation of the parties.  In so ruling the Trial Court deprived Defendant of her prudent choice to enter into a dispute resolution provision that limits the notoriety of the underlying issues as Defendant expected and as counseled by Court in Heher, supra.  This Court should correct that injustice.  CONCLUSION  For the foregoing reasons the Trial Court’s Order denying Plaintiff’s motion should be reversed and the matter should be remanded to Trial Court to enter the proposed form of Order which accompanied Defendant's motion (Pa023a).
[brief] More than a mere defense to liability, prosecutorial immunity embodies the “right not to stand trial. ”  *In re Montgomery Cty.*, 215 F.3d 367, 373 (3d Cir. 2000) (citing *Mitchell v. Forsyth*, 472 U.S. 511, 525 (1985)).\(^6\)  This absolute immunity arises from the “concern that harassment by unfounded litigation would cause a deflection of the prosecutor’s energies from his public duties, and --- \(^6\)  Although New Jersey state case law on the subject is scant outside the context of claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, at least one published Appellate Division decision—noting the dearth of state law precedent—applied federal case law in analyzing prosecutorial immunity.  See generally *DeGroot v. Muccio*, 115 N.J. Super. 15 (App. Div. 1971); cf. *Ramos v. Flowers*, 429 N.J. Super. 13, 24 (App. Div. 2012) (using federal case law to analyze another immunity defense in context of NJCRA claims).  the possibility that he would shade his decisions instead of exercising the independence of judgment required by his public trust. ”  *Imbler v. Pachtman*, 424 U.S. 409, 422–23 (1976).  “Ultimately, whether a [defendant] is entitled to absolute immunity depends on whether [he] establishes that [he] was functioning as the state’s ‘advocate’ while engaging in the alleged conduct .  . . .”  *Yarris v. Cty. Of Del.*, 465 F.3d 129, 136 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting *Buckley v. Fitzsimmons*, 509 U.S. 259, 274 (1993)).  In effect, courts employ a “functional approach” and consider “the nature of the function performed” in determining when absolute immunity attaches to a particular government official’s actions, rather than “the identity of the actor who performed it. ”  *Burns v. Reed*, 500 U.S. 478, 486 (1991); *Forrester v. White*, 484 U.S. 219, 229 (1988).  In *Imbler*, 424 U.S. 409, the Court held that absolute prosecutorial immunity applies to activities “intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process. ”  See id. at 430; see also *Kalina v. Fletcher*, 522 U.S. 118, 125 (1997) (holding absolute prosecutorial immunity applies where a prosecutor is “performing functions that require the exercise of prosecutorial discretion”).  Here, any decisions that the [...] or its staff made about how to prosecute [...] and/or with respect to PTI were “intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process,” and thus covered by absolute judicial immunity.  **POINT II**
[brief] THE [...]IDENT, THE HOOD LAWSUIT AND [...]’S TENDER OF COVERAGE TO TRAVELERS AND EVANSTON | | | A. The Accident | 17 | | B.  [...]’s Work on the Date of the Accident | 18 | | C. The Hood Lawsuit | 19 | | D.  [...]’s Tender to Its Direct Liability Insurance Carriers | 20 | | IV.  THE INSURANCE COVERAGE ACTION | 21 | | LEGAL ARGUMENT | 23 |
[brief] For example, in Randolph, the State “argue[d] that automatic standing does not relieve defendant of his obligation to show that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the apartment searched. ”  228 N.J. at 583.  The Court explained that it had “dismissed a similar argument in Johnson, stating, ‘the State’s proposed approach merely places another layer of standing -- the federal standard -- on top of our automatic standing rule. ’”  Ibid. (quoting Johnson, 193 N.J. at 546).  The Court added that it had “roundly rejected hinging a defendant’s right to challenge a search based on ‘a reasonable expectation of privacy’ analysis. ”  Ibid. (citing Johnson, 193 N.J. at 546 and State v. Alston, 88 N.J. 211, 226-27 (1981)).  See also Brown, 216 N.J. at 529 (reaffirming that New Jersey has “rejected the amorphous legitimate expectations of privacy in the area searched standard” and further places the “burden of establishing that the defendant does not have standing to challenge the search” on the State) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
[brief] Cases, Continued Ptaszynski v. Atlantic Health Systems, Inc., 440 N.J. Super. 24 (App. Div. 2015), certif. denied, 227 N.J. 357, 227 N.J. 379 (2016)…..6, 22, 47  Risko v. Thompson Muller Auto. Grp., Inc., 206 N.J. 506 (2011)
[brief] (Pa97-98, Pa230, Pa358-60, Pa374-77, Pa984-89, Pa990-92, Pa999, Pa1022-23)**  While Appellant was still out on doctor-prescribed medical leave, she learned from another co-worker that someone was spreading a false rumor to new [...] employees that the reason for her retaliatory transfer to [...]’s Camden office was because she was having sexual relationships with multiple people at her prior office.  (Pa230, Pa358-60, Pa97-98)  135:21-143:4.  Appellant immediately objected to such disgusting, vile, and false rumors, which were only made in an effort to discredit Appellant’s prior (and substantiated) complaints of sexual harassment and retaliation.  *Id.*  Moreover, [...]’s human resources department completely ignored her emails regarding her employment status and whether she could apply for long-term disability while she was out on her doctor-prescribed medical leave.  Id.  In furtherance of the continuing retaliation against her, [...]’s human resources department did not respond to Appellant’s questions or emails.  (Pa999).  Appellant reported the ongoing retaliation to her medical providers.  One of Appellant’s medical providers advised that [...]’s workplace “would be a horrible environment for her future employment. ” (Pa230, Pa990, Pa984-89).  Appellant immediately forwarded same to [...]’s human resources department, who acknowledged receipt of same.  Thus, as a result of Respondents’ retaliation, Appellant was constructively discharged from her employment by her medical providers in or about August of 2019.  Id.  However, this did not stop Appellant from being further subjected to illegal conduct and retaliation.  [...] again stalked and followed Appellant outside of work.  Id.  Specifically, on or about October 28, 2019, Appellant, who was leaving Target with her husband and young son, observed the same dark-colored Dodge RAM pick-up truck following them from the Target parking lot.  (Pa230, Pa374-77)  201:11-211:25; (Pa1022-23 – recordings, Pa991-92).  Appellant advised her husband that she believed that [...] was again following her.  She then turned around, looked out the back windshield of their car, and saw that it was in fact [...] driving the aforementioned Dodge RAM pick-up behind them.  Id.  [...], who lives near her residence, continued to follow her and her family well beyond where he would have needed to turn to head towards his own home.  She again confirmed that it was [...] following behind her and her family because he then passed her vehicle and she saw him in the driver’s seat of the Dodge RAM pick-up truck.  Appellant contacted the police department and made a report of [...] stalking her.  Id. Appellant went to the police station and tried to file a police report.  She did not see the license plate of the vehicle but witnessed [...] in the truck.  Id.  IV.
[brief] The diagram stated: “Closet door outside kitchen was breached.  No indication it was separate from the residence.  Door led to 3rd Floor loft. ” (Da44).  The diagram does not indicate how this door was “breached,” unlike the front door to [...] (which the diagram noted was “[b]reached with [a] ram”).  (Da44); (see also 5T31-3 to 34-16).  [...] testified at both the reopened hearing on December 15, 2023, and the initial evidentiary hearing on October 13, 2022.
[directive] 3.8.1  Prior to using force against people in a crowd, officers shall: (a) provide clear instructions and warnings in a manner that can be heard by persons in the crowd, such as through a bullhorn or speaker system when available; (b) state the consequences of refusing to comply with a mandatory directive, including that arrests will occur and force may be used unless persons comply; and (c) give a reasonable opportunity to comply.  3.8.2  Force shall not be used against crowds engaged in peaceful demonstrations.