ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] “They are distinct.  One is the real property, the corporeal element, as opposed to an element incorporeal element which is rights to access waters rather than ownership of the subaqueous lands under the water. ”  (1T47:20)  [...] points out that there are other Riparian interests that can be conveyed by the State, such as making a lease or providing a license; or it can convey its ownership, which is the Grant (1T48:12).  In this case, the State conveyed to [...] the property which is shown on the Tax Map and is also reflected in the Deed from the State to [...] (1T48:18).  The Riparian Rights would inure to the benefit of the upland owner, to have access to the waters.  He confirms that [...] is not questioning the fact that the upland owner, whether it was [...] or [...] and now [...], has a Riparian Right.
[brief] ” (Aa10).  The record does not permit the [...] to conclude that State business was being conducted or discussed at the union local office in connection with Complainant’s presence there during the afternoon incident, let alone at any other time.  [...]’s EEO investigation of Complainant’s complaint was pursuant to its requirement to maintain an effective policy concerning claims of workplace harassment.  A Civil Service regulation establishes the requirements of the policy, see N.J.A.C. 4A:7-3.1 “State Policy Prohibiting Discrimination in the Workplace. ”  The Policy prohibits “harassment or discrimination by anyone in the workplace” which includes “persons doing business with the State. ”  N.J.A.C. 4A:7-3.1(a)1.  Regarding location, the Policy “applies to conduct that occurs in the workplace and conduct that occurs at any location that can be reasonably regarded as an extension of the workplace (any field location, any off-site business-related social function, or any facility where State business is being conducted and discussed).  N.J.A.C. 4A:7-3.1(a)1 (emphasis added).  The regulation requires that State agencies “annually distribute” the policy “to all of its employees,” post it “throughout the buildings and grounds of each State agency,” and the Department of Treasury distribute the policy to “Statewide vendors/contractors. ”  N.J.A.C. 4A:7-3.1(f).  Yet, the record does not indicate whether the Treasury Department deems the local union a vendor or contractor such that it ever, let alone annually, distributes the State Policy to the union.  Plainly, the State Policy is intended to prohibit discrimination and harassment in places the State has the obligation and authority to control – the Workplaces of State employees.
[brief] Next, while state law predominates, it only does so through the Roberto court’s interpretation of federal law.  Nonetheless, the court is not required to consider all factors when making its determination.  Mendez, 600 B.R. at 334.  Third, Roberto was clear in its finding that the TSL is unconstitutional where a tax foreclosure sale results in the property owner being deprived of his equity above the tax lien and applies to third-party purchasers of a tax sale certificate in New Jersey.  Therefore, the nature of the law is neither difficult nor unsettled.  Fourth, comity is achieved through this court’s reliance on and application of the Roberto case thereby showing the court’s mutual respect and courtesy to the state court.  Next, there is no remoteness as the issue presented in the Adversary Proceeding is fundamentally related to the main bankruptcy case as avoidance of the Final Judgment is crucial to the implementation of the proposed chapter 13 plan.  Finally, the remaining elements do not apply as there is no request for a jury trial and there is no prejudice to [...] which is already the defendant in the Adversary Proceeding.  There are no other parties involved.  Accordingly, the court declines to permissively abstain.
[brief] “The ‘costs imposed upon the State[s] by retroactive application of new rules of constitutional law on habeas corpus … generally far outweigh the benefits of this application. ’”  *Teague* at 310 (quoting *Solem v. Stumes*, 465 U.S. 638, 654 (1984) (Powell, J., concurring in judgment)).  “In many ways the application of new rules to cases on collateral review may be more intrusive than the enjoining of criminal prosecutions. ”  *Id.* (referencing *Younger v. Harris*, 401 U.S. 37, 43–54 (1971)).  This is because “it continually forces the States to marshal resources in order to keep in prison defendants whose trials and appeals conformed to then-existing constitutional standards. ”  *Id.*  Prior to *Teague*, the Court in *Engle v. Isaac* also identified this problem:
[brief] All of Defendants’ theories for how the jury reached its award for lost wages are merely speculative.  The truth is that no one other than the jurors themselves knows exactly how they reached that calculation.  The factual record and applicable jury charge strongly indicate that the jurors decided on what was “probably lost” by Plaintiff, both the liquidatable wages and forced loss of sick and vacation time (Pa15).  That, along with the arguments above, is why Plaintiff can so comfortably refute Defendants’ speculation.  Even if this Court were inclined to find that Plaintiff’s wage loss claim was unsupported by the evidence, this portion of the verdict must be severed, and the remainder preserved.
[brief] PA084-085  Exhibit I to Certification of Defendant [...] (screenshots of charge of “driving or parking an unregistered motor vehicle”)  PA086-088  Exhibit J to Certification of Defendant [...] (Residential Lease Agreement)  PA089-094  Exhibit K to Certification of Defendant [...] (Event Link Multi-Record Detection Report)  PA95-120  Plaintiff’s Opposition to Defendant [...]’s Motion for Summary Judgment  PA121-123  Exhibit A to Plaintiff’s Opposition (amended declarations page)  PA124-126  Exhibit B to Plaintiff’s Opposition ([...] deposition transcript)  PA127-130  Exhibit C to Plaintiff’s Opposition (plaintiff’s deposition transcript)  PA131-161  Summary Judgment Order PA162-163  Police Report PA164-165  Progressive Declarations Page with [...]’s New Jersey address PA166-167  Original Progressive Declarations Page with [...]’s North Carolina address PA168-169  Residential Lease Agreement  PA170-174  Plaintiff/Appellant’s Deposition Transcript  PA175-204  Defendant/Respondent’s Representative, [...]’s, Deposition Transcript  PA205-212  TABLE OF CITATIONS
[brief] [...] and [...], in her individual capacity and as Power of Attorney for [...], v. [...], [...], [...], [...]  d/b/a [...], [...], JOHN DOES 1-10, and XYZ COMPANIES 1-10.  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY – APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. [...]  CIVIL ACTION ON APPEAL FROM: Superior Court of New Jersey Law Division, Hudson County  Docket No.: [...] Sat Below: Hon. [...], P.J. Civ. D.  Date of Submission: August 16, 2024
[brief] A factfinder could easily conclude that [...] was relying on Respondents’ representation prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations.  Since the Court determined that Respondents had no duty to [...] as a matter of law, the lower court did not determine whether Respondents’ breached their duty causing damage to [...].  As discussed in greater detail below, the Respondents breached their duty owed to [...] and proximately caused the damages [...] suffered.  Accordingly, [...] Miranda respectfully requests that this Court reverse the lower court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Respondents and remand the matter to the lower court to proceed to trial.
[brief] Under N.J.A.C. 4A:7-3.2, “[t]he Commission shall decide the appeal on a review of the written record or such other proceeding as it deems appropriate. ”  See also N.J.A.C. 4A:2-1.1(d) (except “where the Civil Service Commission finds that a material and controlling dispute of fact exists that can only be resolved by a hearing, an appeal will be reviewed on a written record. ”); In re Wiggins, 242 N.J. Super. 342, 345 (App. Div. 1990) (whether a material or controlling dispute of fact exists is “committed to the discretion of the [agency], and its decision will be affirmed unless it goes beyond the range of sound judgment. ”).  Here, [...] argues that there are material or controlling facts in dispute that warrant an evidentiary hearing—namely, what name, if any, [...] called [...] on September 9, 2022, and whether [...] was involved in a scheme to falsely gather signatures for [...]’s opponent in the Union election.  (Ab20).  But based on [...]’s credible and consistent account of her interactions with [...], coupled with video and text evidence, the Commission correctly found that [...] misnamed [...] as [...]. on September 9, 2022 despite being corrected more than once.
[brief] Further, New Jersey courts have long recognized the clear distinction between true misrepresentations of fact and mere “puffery” set forth in an advertisement.  See Rodio v. Smith, 123 NJ 345, 352 (1991) (“You’re in good hands with Allstate is nothing more than puffery”); New Jersey Citizen Action v. Schering-Plough Corp., 367 NJ. Super. 8, 13 (App Div.), certif. denied, 178 N.J. 249 (2003) (pharmaceutical companies’ advertisement claiming that consumers can lead “a normal nearly symptom-free life again” after using the product was not a guarantee of effectiveness of the product and was in the nature of “puffery”).
[brief] Lehmann v. Toys ‘R Us, Inc., 132 N.J. 587 (1993) .......................... 20, 24 Martin v. Rutgers Casualty Ins. Co., 346 N.J. Super. 320 (App. Div. 2002) .................................................. 19, 25, 37 Puder v. Buechel, 183 N.J. 428 (2005) ...........................................
[directive] Supplemental Plea Form for (NERA) Cases 2C:43-7.2) (Haitian Creole)  Kesyon swivan sa yo fèt pou reponn sèl si w ap plede koupab a youn nan krim premye ou dezyèm degre yo, le ou aprè le 29 jwen 2001: oswa yon tantativ oubyen konplo pou komèt tip krim sa a, ki fèt asasinay, asasinay volontè agrave oswa asasinay envolotè, touye moun pandan ou sou volan machinn, agresyon agrave, retire zam nan men yon jandam fòsdelòd, kidnapinn, agresyon seksyèl agrave, agresyon seksyèl, vòlè, vòlè machinn, mete dife, epi mete yon lòt moun an danje lanmò oswa domaj kòpòrèl ki grav, vòl aletalaj, vòl ak chantaj pou pran byen lòt moun epi menase moun la ak domaj kòpòrèl, oswa kenbe moun la kont volonte li oswa restrenn nenpòt ki moun oubyen komèt yon lòt zak, mete pyèj nan fabrikasyon oubyen distribisyon enstalasyon CD yo oswa fèt le ou aprè le 18 jwen 2002; responsabilite total pou lanmò ki endwi pa dwòg; oswa ki zak teworis, oswa fèt pwodiksyon oubyen posesyon zam chimik, ajan biyolojik oswa enstriman nikleyè oubye radyolojik; oswa ki le oubyen aprè le 13 janvye 2008: fèt le oubyen aprè le 14 awout 2013: Raketay an premye degre; oswa ki fèt le ou aprè le 1ye novanm 2013: ponografi timoun; oswa ki kontrebann zam afe.
[brief] In *Bergquist, supra*, 46 N.J. Super. at 74, plaintiff sued for personal injuries and wrongful death that occurred when the decedent was performing plumbing work at defendant’s premises.  At the same time the decedent was performing his work, another contractor was at the property performing floor finishing work that involved the use of highly flammable lacquer.  The accident occurred as the decedent was using an open flame torch which ignited the flammable lacquer fumes which caused the explosion that resulted in his death.  On the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, the court considered whether plaintiff met her burden of proving proximate cause, even by circumstantial evidence.  The question before the court was whether there was sufficient proof to establish that the open flame torch ignited the lacquer fumes that resulted in the explosion that caused the decedent’s death.  Finding there was sufficient circumstantial evidence in the record to prove proximate cause, the court held:  The facts here logically and legitimately permitted an inference by the jury that the lacquer fumes were caused to explode by the open flame [being used] near the cellar beams.  Defendant suggests that the explosion may have been caused by the painter or the floor finisher’s smoking, although there is no testimony they were smoking while lacquering work was going on.  There is also a suggestion that the fumes might have been sparked by an electrical connection, although the testimony indicates the cables of the sanding machines had been disconnected at the time.  But all this was for the jury, and before it could grant an award it had to be satisfied by the preponderance of the evidence that the hypothesis of causal connection advanced by plaintiff... [the torch flame being ignited by the lacquer fumes] was more reasonably probable than any other hypothesis [smoking or electrical spark] as to cause.
[brief] At the very least, the Court should reverse the trial court’s dismissal of Appellant’s claims to make findings of facts in dispute between the parties as to whether Appellant entered into the Arbitration Agreement.  The foregoing issues of the Arbitration Agreement are exacerbated by the fact it is a contract of adhesion.  As the New Jersey Supreme Court has explained:  If an agreement is characterized as a “contract of adhesion” … non-enforcement of its terms may be justified on other than such traditional grounds as fraud, duress, mistake or illegality.
[brief] (Pa2 ¶ 6).  Since January 27, 2021, Defendant has had the sole responsibility for the administration of the Estate and Rhoda’s Trust.  (Pa2 ¶ 7); (Pa95).  On August 9, 2022, Defendant sent a letter to Plaintiff stating that (i) “all items unquestionably belonging to [...] were sold or distributed in February 2022,” and (ii) that Plaintiff had ten days to make an appointment to retrieve those items which he claimed ownership from storage.  (Pa2 ¶ 8).  Plaintiff made an appointment and retrieved his property from storage, but noted that many of his possessions stored at his Aunt’s home on January 27, 2021 were missing.  (Pa2 ¶ 9).  He requested from Defendant an accounting of the tangible property sold and distributed by the Estate and Trust.  (Id.)  Defendant responded to Plaintiff’s request by letter dated October 12, 2022, wherein he stated that he would not respond to Plaintiff’s request for information until the Judgment the Estate holds against him has been repaid.  (Pa3 ¶ 10).  Counsel for Plaintiff emailed Defendant’s counsel on October 17, 2022, stating that Plaintiff’s status as a debtor of the Estate does not relieve Defendant’s duty under N.J.S.A. § 3B:31-67 to “promptly” respond to a beneficiary’s reasonable request for information, and gave Defendant thirty (30) days to provide the information.
[brief] State v. M.L., 253 N.J. Super. 13, 20 (App. Div. 1991), certif. denied, 127 N.J. 560 (1992).  This balance requires a defendant be advised of the specific rights set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966), prior to custodial interrogation.  See also State v. Nyhammer, 197 N.J. 383, 400-01 (2009); M.L., 253 N.J. Super. at 20.
[directive] 6.1.6  In the rare cases where the agency has not filed disciplinary charges (or decided not to do so) within 180 days of receipt of the complaint, the agency must notify the County Prosecutor.  The County Prosecutor, or their designee, shall investigate the reasons for the extended investigation and shall also examine whether the agency’s internal affairs function faces any systemic issues that require additional resources or oversight.  The County Prosecutor may take any steps necessary to ensure prompt resolution of the pending matter, including supersession of the agency’s investigation.  The agency shall provide further notice to the County Prosecutor every additional 90 days that the investigation remains open (i.e., on or about the 270th and 360th days from the receipt of the complaint).  The chart in Figure 1 provides an overview of that information.
[brief] However, Plaintiff further testified that he did not issue the radio transmissions in order to correct any conduct by Defendants that was allegedly illegal or improper.  (Pa109 at T20-7 to 10).  In response to Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff also alleged that various criminal statutes were being violated by juveniles attending the Fourth of July festivities and that the performance of his duties as a police officer regarding those alleged crimes constituted protected conduct under CEPA.  (Pa23 to Pa24).  On May 22, 2023, the Trial Court issued an Order and decision granting Defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to Plaintiff’s CEPA claim.  (Pa12 to Pa27).  In so doing, the Court held that, viewing the record in a light most favorable to Plaintiff, a reasonable trier of fact could not find that Plaintiff had a reasonable belief that Defendants had violated either a law, rule, regulation, or clear mandate of public policy.  (Pa20 to Pa24).  Likewise, no rational trier of fact could find that Plaintiff objected to any such wrongdoing, or that such objection was the basis for alleged retaliatory action by Defendants.  (Pa24 to Pa27).  LEGAL ARGUMENT
[brief] Defendant asserts that Defendant was denied due process throughout the proceedings.  More specifically, Defendant asserts that Defendant was denied due process by virtue of:  a.  Plaintiff’s Complaint that: a. Failed to set forth a sum certain in the Summons; b. Was undated; c. Did not specify date and/or time for default; d. Did not have attached a Case Information Statement; e. An incorrect principal place of business for Plaintiff; and, f. Was conclusory (lacked facts).  b.  Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment that: a. Did not Comply with R. 4:105-5; b. Did not provide proper disclosures as mandated by R. 6:3-3; c. Did not provide proper notice regarding oral argument; d. Failed to include a proof of service; and, e. Was not timely served (and/or provide sufficient time for Defendant to respond).  Plaintiff respectfully submits that these arguments are incorrect.
[brief] If appellate counsel should have appealed defendant's motion to dismiss the original indictment ([...]) Strickland applies to appellate counsel as well.  Due to the perjured testimony on June 5th, 2012 and April 29th, 2014, the State failed to present any evidence to the Grand Jury of any element of any crime charged to establish a prima facie case that defendant himself committed and/or conspired to commit any of the enumerated offenses on December 8th, 2011, December 19th, 2011, January 5th, 2012 and January 12th 2012.
[brief] In *Charles Beseler*, the Court was reviewing application of the pre-2007 C.5 Exclusion to allegations of conduct that was substantially certain to result in injury to an employee.  The Court held:  “[D]ue to its lack of express language excluding conduct substantially certain to result in injury, we find C.5’s exclusion to be ambiguous and construe it, as we must, in favor of the insured. ”  188 N.J. at 548.  In *Delta Plastics*, the Court reached the same conclusion on the basis of its reasoning in Charles Beseler.  188 N.J. at 583.  Coverage was required because of the ambiguity of the pre-2007 C.5 exclusion.
[brief] Defendants-Appellants, [...], [...], and [...] (collectively “[...]”), submit this reply brief in support of their appeal from the jury’s verdict and the trial court’s denial of Defendants’ motion for a new trial.  Plaintiff’s and Co-Defendant’s opposition ignores the clear and inexplicable contradiction that is the jury’s verdict.  While it is true that the jury was not asked to consider Plaintiff’s negligence, the jury did not consider the Plaintiff’s comparative fault because there was no factual basis to conclude that the Plaintiff was negligent.  However, [...] engaged in the exact same conduct as Plaintiff and was assessed 40% fault for the accident.  Both Plaintiff and Co-Defendant mischaracterize the testimony and facts.  [...] did not unequivocally state that he was 200 feet from the intersection when the light changed to yellow, and he denied that he was attempting to beat the light.  Plaintiff’s brief purports to quote [...] admitting that he attempted to beat the light, which is a misrepresentation of the testimony.  The simple fact of this case is that [...] and the DISH Network defendants were the “deep pockets” Plaintiff needed to achieve a meaningful recovery.  The trial court’s evidentiary rulings in favor of the Plaintiff tilted the playing field in Plaintiff’s favor and ensured that Plaintiff would receive a meaningful recovery.  In doing so, the trial court deprived [...] a fair trial.
[brief] *Rochinsky v. State of N.J. Dept. of Transp.*, 110 N.J. 399, 408, (1988).  Among the specific immunities granted to public entities by the TCA is the immunity from liability for failure to provide police protection.  Section 59:5-4 states “Neither a public entity nor a public employee is liable for failure to provide police protection service or, if police protection service is provided, for failure to provide sufficient police protection service. ”  Id.  Section 59:5-4 of the TCA precludes suits against municipalities and their responsible officers based upon contentions that damage occurred from the absence of a police force or from the presence of an inadequate one.  How many officers a town should employ, how each should be equipped and whether a town should have any police at all are political decisions which should not be made the subject of any tort duty.
[brief] The trial court failed to recognize these fees for what they actually were: damages [...] caused [...] to incur—litigation costs against third parties—as a result of [...]’s improper, self-dealing, and often unhinged conduct.  The Arbitrator did not shift fees incurred by the Plaintiffs to prosecute the arbitration.  [...] cost [...] countless legal fees defending his improper behavior, and but for [...]’s conduct, [...] would not have incurred those fees.  Thus, the fees constitute “incidental and consequential damages” flowing directly from [...]’s myriad fiduciary breaches, which the Arbitrator and both trial court judges agreed were egregious.
[brief] Rivera, 250 N.J. at 147.  In Rivera, Id. at 148, the Supreme Court outlined the factors to be considered when evaluating the heightened interest for public disclosure: (1) the nature and seriousness of the misconduct.  Serious misconduct gives rise to a greater interest in disclosure.  For example, misconduct that involves the use of excessive or deadly force, discrimination or bias, domestic or sexual violence, concealment or fabrication of evidence or reports, criminal behavior, or abuse of the public trust can all erode confidence in law enforcement and weigh in favor of public disclosure; (2) whether the alleged misconduct was substantiated.  Unsubstantiated or frivolous allegations of misconduct present a less compelling basis for disclosure; (3) the nature of the discipline imposed.  Investigations that result in more serious discipline, like an officer's termination, resignation, reduction in rank, or suspension for a substantial period of time, favor disclosure.
[brief] [...] was intended to be an export/import wholesale medicine company.  (2T83:25-84:6).  Plaintiff testified that [...] was not something that involved Defendant, that [...] had nothing to do with her.  (2T83:18-24).  It was never Plaintiff’s intent to have Defendant be a partner in [...] (2T84:7-11).  Defendant was not invited to be a partner or otherwise to participate in [...].  (3T114:1-3).  Defendant formed [...] d/b/a [...] on December 5, 2017 (3T110:24-111:3).
[brief] (1T155-3 to 11). ²  ²  Similar to the [...] expert’s “rule of thumb”, [...] noted that the distance arcs he produced to show the jury the estimated distance from the cell  The State attempts to remedy this clear deficiency in a footnote, stating that a records custodian affirmed the accuracy of PCMD data provided to [...].  (Sb, 37).  That statement is misleading.  The records custodian testified to the reliability of the collection and production of [...] records, not to the reliability of the PCMD data therein (2T39-21 to 40-3).  Identical to [...], [...] is basing his opinion on nothing more than his training and experience; there is no consideration or analysis of the quality or accuracy of the data itself.