ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Turning to the Questionnaire, which [...] filled out to obtain additional coverage and returned two days after the initial application, the very first question under the title “Non-Owned/Hired Auto Supplement” asks about owning or long-term leasing of vehicles.  It then warns the applicant in bold letters and larger print that if the applicant does own or lease vehicles, “you must obtain a Business Auto policy, elsewhere. ”  (Ia585)  (emphasis in original)).  Curiously, when Question 4 asked about whether any of the rented vehicles were “12 or 15-passenger vans,” it did not contain a similar warning to the applicant that “you must obtain a Business Auto policy, elsewhere. ”  Instead, the application misleadingly asked, “How many?” (Ia585) (emphasis in original)).  That implies those vehicles are allowed but may be limited in number.  That too is misleading.  The next section on the Questionnaire was titled “Non-Owned Vehicles. ”  Question 2 asked if [...]’s employees “use their autos for company business” and [...] answered “yes,” even though his employees were not using their own vehicles, but rather were using [...]’s [...] vans.  (Ia345).  The reason, [...] explained, was that he believed the word “their” in Question 2 referred to the vans [...] was renting and not to the employees’ personal vehicles since the question was under the heading of “Non-Owned Vehicles”, and [...] interpreted “Non-Owned” to mean rentals.  (Ia345).  For the same reason, [...] answered “yes” to question 3, which asked “[d]o you verify that insurance is in place with limits of at least $300,000 before employees or volunteers can use their vehicles? (Ia012).  [...] testified that he also answered “yes” to this question because it fell under the heading “Non-Owned Vehicles,” and because he had asked [...] to bind coverage for the rental vehicles for at least $1 million, “which was way over 300,000. ” (Ia345).  With regard to the question at issue – Question 4 in the Questionnaire – [...] testified that because Question 4 fell under a heading titled “Hired Auto Liability,” he believed that by asking about a “Hired” or “Rented” vehicle, Question 4 was asking if he was going to be using a bus, car, or limousine service.
[brief] ” (Ca035-036).  [...] then found that these posts were “clearly example[s] of conduct that would cause Board members to lose the confidence and respect of the public and illustrates conduct that ‘creates a justifiable impression among the public that such trust is being violated’ within the contemplation of N.J.S.A. 18A:12-22(a). ” (Ca034).  Citing to the public outcry caused by these posts, and the Resolutions passed by the Board in order to “distance itself” from Respondent’s posts (Ca034), [...] found that Respondent had violated the Act with regard to each and every Facebook post before her.  (Ca023, Ca024, Ca033, Ca035).  [...] filed her Initial Decision with the Commission on May 30, 2023.
[brief] Defendant asserts that the defense provided in the NJPLA for harm caused by an inherent characteristic of the product applies here.  It does not because defendant fails to address the limitation within the statutory language.  “(2)  The characteristics of the product are known to the ordinary consumer or user, and the harm was caused by an unsafe aspect of the product that is an inherent characteristic of the product and that would be recognized by the ordinary person who uses or consumes the product with the ordinary knowledge common to the class of persons for whom the product is intended, except that this paragraph shall not apply to industrial machinery or other equipment used in the workplace and it is not intended to apply to dangers posed by products such as machinery or equipment that can feasibly be eliminated without impairing the usefulness of the product.
[brief] ”  *Id* at 584-585.  The instant case is on all fours with *Hopewell*.  There is no doubt that the non-legally trained contractor working on behalf of Counsel for Plaintiff relied on the ZBA Secretary’s statement that the ZBA would publish on December 8, 2022 in the [...], which it did and provided an affidavit confirming the date of that publication.  This person had no idea that anything else mattered and conveyed to her client the results as she understood them.  Appellants offer this by way of explanation and not to blame anyone.  Our position is that under these circumstances, relaxation should be provided based upon all relevant equitable considerations.  In *Hopewell Valley* the delay was six days, which the High Court determined that the “defendants could not have suffered prejudice sufficient to warrant the barring of this litigation. ”  Given there is a four-day delay in the instant case, the same must be true here.  Appellants were due to file on Monday based on Applicants’ publication, but instead filed four days later on Friday.  No prejudice was suffered sufficient to warrant barring of this litigation.  The circumstances of this case satisfy the standards in *Rule* 4:69-6(c) and warrant enlargement of the forty-five-day period because it is manifest that the interest of justice so requires.  Gone are the days in which information was publicly disseminated via publication in the newspaper.  Appellants relied on the representation of the ZBA Secretary and did not anticipate a change in that circumstance.  They have paid millions of dollars to live in a historical district, but the process in [...], as articulated by Counsel for the ZBA means that the Appellants have no voice in the maintenance of the historic aesthetic that they enjoy.  There is also a public interest in historical preservation.  III.
[brief] Furthermore, defense counsel rejected the issuance of 404(b) instruction at the time this testimony was introduced, stating “No, we don't want it.  We don't want to give it because it's going to be, he has a reason why he didn't give it. ” (34T 183-11 to 183-13).  Ultimately, the Court’s instruction was a general credibility instruction for [...]’s testimony regarding Defendant’s statement.  (34T 184-7 to 185-3).  POINT IV
[directive] Thus, the following matters shall be reported to the County Prosecutor so that he or she may evaluate the material’s relevance:  (a)  A finding that a police officer has filed a false report or submitted a false certification in any criminal, administrative, employment, financial or insurance matter in their professional or personal life;12  (b)  A pending court complaint or conviction for any criminal, disorderly persons, petty disorderly persons, municipal ordinance or driving while intoxicated matter; (c) A finding that undermines or contradicts a police officer's educational achievements or qualifications as an expert witness; (d) A finding of fact by a judicial authority or administrative tribunal that is known to the officer's employing agency that concludes that a police officer intentionally did not tell the truth in a matter; (e) A sustained finding that a police officer intentionally mishandled or destroyed evidence; and (f) A sustained finding that a police officer is biased against a particular gender or ethnic group.  9.10.4
[directive] IMPLEMENTATION  QUESTIONNAIRE -- GRAND JURY STANDARDS: Standard 2.  Background Checks on Grand Jurors  Where the prosecuting authority advises the Judiciary of its interest in conducting criminal background checks on grand jurors, the Judiciary shall provide a list of jurors, with appropriate identifying information, for that purpose.  A.  Does the Prosecutor request information so that he or she can conduct criminal background checks on grand jurors?  ___ YES ___ NO B.  If the answer to A is Yes, are criminal background checks run on all prospective grand jurors, only those seated as grand jurors, or some other classification of grand jurors?  ___  ALL PROSPECTIVE GRAND JURORS ___ ONLY SEATED GRAND JURORS ___ ANOTHER CLASSIFICATION (Please explain below).  2  IMPLEMENTATION  QUESTIONNAIRE -- GRAND JURY STANDARDS: Standard 3.  Grand Juror Orientations  The Jury Manager or clerk to the grand jury shall provide a uniform grand juror orientation to give the prospective grand jurors an overview of the selection process, an understanding of the work of the grand jury and the importance of the grand jury to the criminal justice system.  In addition, those selected as sitting grand jurors shall also receive an orientation concerning county-specific information relating to their service.  A.  Are the two orientations specified in Standard 3 currently being provided to grand jurors at this time?  ___ YES ___ NO  If your response is No, please provide your plan to come into compliance with this standard, including the anticipated date on which this effort will be completed.  ________________________________________________________________ ________________________________________________________________ ________________________________________________________________ ________________________________________________________________ ________________________________________________________________  B.  Please provide a copy or an outline of your orientation for sitting grand jurors that incorporates the elements set forth in Attachment 2 of the Grand Jury Standards.  3  IMPLEMENTATION QUESTIONNAIRE -- GRAND JURY STANDARDS: Standard 4.
[brief] The court must determine the weight of the factors it finds and assess the factors and their significance in relation to each other.  *State v. Kiriakakis*, 235 N.J. 420, 442 (2018).  “[A] sentencing judge must engage in both quantitative and qualitative assessments of the aggravating and mitigating factors, and only then impose a sentence consistent with the sentencing range outlined under our Code of Criminal Justice. ”  *State v. McFarlane*, 224 N.J. 458, 467 (2016).  Where the aggravating factors outweigh the mitigating factors, the term of imprisonment will tend toward the upper end of the range.
[brief] *State v. Grate*, 220 N.J. 317, 337 (2015).  The decision to upend a sentence must not be based on a mere "difference of opinion or individual sentencing philosophy."  *State v. Roth*, 95 N.J. 334, 365 (1984).  Rather, upending a sentence is appropriate only if it was "a judgment that reasonable people [could] not reasonably make on the basis of the evidence presented."  *Ibid.*  And just as appellate courts must not substitute their judgment with respect to the overall sentence imposed, they must not "substitute [their] assessment of aggravating and mitigating factors."  *Miller*, 237 N.J. at 28 (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Miller, 205 N.J. 109, 127 (2011)).  Indeed, it is a "fundamental principle" of sentencing law "that an appellate court should not second-guess a trial court's finding of sufficient facts to support an aggravating or mitigating factor if that finding is supported by substantial evidence in the record."  State v. O'Donnell, 117 N.J. 210, 216 (1989) (citing Roth, 95 N.J. at 365-66).  Here, [...] appropriately found aggravating factors one, two, three, six, nine, and twelve, and no mitigating factors based on competent and credible evidence in the record, sentenced defendant to terms within the applicable statutory ranges, conducted a detailed analysis as to why consecutive sentences were appropriate, and thoughtfully and thoroughly explained his reasons for both each individual sentence and the aggregate term as a whole.
[brief] [...], “Rigging the Jury: How Each State Reduces Jury Diversity by Excluding People with Criminal Records,” [...] (2021), available at: https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/juryexclusion.html.  Unlike many States that only disqualify individuals with felony convictions from jury service for the duration of their sentence or for a set number of years thereafter, New Jersey disqualifies all individuals with prior felony convictions from jury service for the rest of their lives.  Studies have shown that laws excluding individuals with prior convictions from service “reduce jury diversity by disproportionately excluding Black and Latinx people, and actually cause juries to deliberate less effectively.
[brief] [...]’s mapping of its project environmental investigation includes Plaintiffs’ Property.  (Pa000826).  The contamination within Plaintiffs’ Property had migrated from the adjacent project property.  (Pa000211; [...] Deposition, page 17, line 15 to line 20; page 32, line 17 to line 20).  The location of the contamination is located in the same area where unauthorized entries were made onto Plaintiffs’ Property and where soil was excavated, leaving behind a crater.  (Pa000817).  The crater eliminated Plaintiffs’ parking area.  (Pa000779 at ¶ 30; Pa000345, page 128, line 22 to line 25; Pa000828).  [...], the president and CEO of the [...], testified that he became aware of the crater as a result of the excavation on the Property.  (Pa000298, page 119, line 9 to line 25; pg. 122, line 12 to line 16).  [...], the licensed LSRP for the project employed with [...], testified that Plaintiffs’ Property was not restored to grade with clean fill because he understood the remaining excavated portion of the Plaintiffs’ Property was part of the project.  (Pa000247, page 54, line 11 to pg. 55, line 8; Pa000828.  As such, the crater was left behind by the Defendants.
[brief] .........................  43  A.  The Trial Court’s Finding That Defendants Waived The Statute Of Frauds Defense Should Be Affirmed.  .................................................  44  B.  Even If The Statute Of Frauds Defense Had Not Been Waived, [...]’s Guarantee Falls Outside Of The Statute Pursuant To The “Leading Object” Exception.  ..................................................  45  POINT V .................................................................................................................................  48  THE TRIAL COURT’S AWARD OF POST-JUDGMENT INTEREST AT THE CONTRACT RATE OF 10% SHOULD BE AFFIRMED (Da94-97)
[brief] A jury is free to disagree with the expert’s conclusion, particularly when he is subject to extensive cross-examination as [...] was here.  And Lieutenant [...]’s testimony did not imply that the error rate for fingerprint-analysis evidence is zero.  He explained that the ultimate judgments on whether a latent print matches a known exemplar vary from examiner to examiner, a fact that opened his testimony up for cross-examination, which is exactly the strategy defense counsel chose to highlight any purported deficiencies in his testimony.
[brief] (Pa31 ¶ 28, Pa35-Pa36 ¶ 49.)  In recognition of the Appellants’ importance to the success of the [...] brand in their Territory, Section 1(a) of the Wholesaler Agreement states:  [...] and Wholesaler recognize and agree that it is essential to their mutual objectives under this Agreement that Wholesaler maintain financial and competitive capabilities to achieve efficient and effective distribution of [...]’s products in Wholesaler’s Territory (as defined hereinafter) and to assure continued protection of the high quality and integrity of [...] products.  --- \(^3\)
[directive] Si zak la gen pou wè ak vyolasyon , N.J.S.A. N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4b(3) ( ta koze oubyen pèmèt timoun angaje nan zak seksyèl ke yo ta fotografye oswa ekspoze), si zak la te komèt le ou parè le 1ye fevriye 2018, N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4b(4) (foto oswa fim timoun kap fè zak seksyèl), si zak la te komèt swa le ou aprè le 1ye fevriye 2018, N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4b(5)(b) (pou gen posesyon ak tout konesans de kòz oswa pou gade ponògrafi timoun), N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4.1 (ou se lidè yon rezon ponògrafi timoun), si zak la te komèt swa le ou aprè le 1ye fevriye 2018, 2C:34-3 (vann, distribiye, oswa ekspoze N.J.S.A. materyèl endesan ba moun ki pako gen 18 an) oswa yon enfraksyon ki gen rapò ak aktivite kriminèl enfòmatik an kontravansyon ak nenpòt nan dispozisyon Tit 2C a, chapit 20, yap enpoze yon amann egzijib jan li enimere anba a pou chak enfraksyon ke ou plede koupab?  (1)  $2,000 nan ka yon zak klasifye 1ye degre (2)  $1,000 nan ka yon zak klasifye 2yèm degre (3)  $ 750 nan ka yon zak klasifye 3yèm degre (4)  $ 500 nan ka yon zak klasifye 4yèm degre (5)  $ 250 nan ka yon zak moun kap simen dezòd oswa moun kap fè ti dezòd Total Sanksyon (CCPF)  $  Computer Crime Prevention Fund Penalty, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-3.8 (L. 2009, c. 143).  If the crime involves a violation of 2C:24-4b(3) (causes or permits child to engage in sexual act that is to be photographed or N.J.S.A. exhibited), if the crime was committed on or after February 1, 2018, N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4b(4) (photographs or films a child in sexual act), if the crime was committed on or after February 1, 2018, 2C:24-4b(5)(b) N.J.S.A. (knowingly possessing or knowingly viewing child pornography), 2C:24-4.1 (leader of a child N.J.S.A. pornography network), if the crime was committed on or after February 1, 2018, 2C:34-3 (selling, N.J.S.A. distributing or exhibiting obscene material to a person under age 18) or an offense involving computer criminal activity in violation of any provision of Title 2C, chapter 20, you will be assessed a mandatory penalty as listed below for each offense for which you pled guilty?
[directive] These convenings can create the opportunity to for both parties to meet, grow appreciation of the value of each other’s work, and build the relationships that are a precursor to any good CBVI-LE relationship. ”  In relevant part, Recommendation 4.2 of the Report notes that “The Attorney General’s should also direct 7 county prosecutors and law enforcement to work with [the [...], a unit of [...]] to support the development of LE-CBVI coordination and help resolve any conflicts.
[brief] Here, [...]’s due process rights were not violated because the DOC’s denial of a property claim based on the refusal to allow [...] to ship back refried beans for a $34 refund is not “brutal, demeaning and harmful as literally to shock the conscience of a court. ”  Rivkin, 143 N.J. at 365; see (Pa3) (detailing the cost of the beans).  Moreover, [...]’s procedural due process rights were not violated because [...] has no protected liberty interest in obtaining a refund for refried beans that did not meet his dietary restrictions.
[directive] To decision- Section a establishes this of release, revocation seek to when deciding in discretion initial seek to decision governing the Section 7 in forth set one the to similar framework making detention.  pretrial of Release.  Revocation for Applying nst ai m  A  Presumption 8.2 an committed has defendant a that to believe cause probable is there where case any  In covered case not the is and complaint-warrant by charged offense an for release on while offense under of release revocation for motion a file not shall prosecutor the 8.4, or Section 8.3 under or Director or Prosecutor, the Assistant First or Prosecutor County the unless 2A:162-24 N.J.S.A. Division, by prosecuted the in Justice cases Criminal of Division the of Director Deputy a that: determines revocation evidence the at convincing clear and present to able will be State the (a) and revocation, justify to hearing defendant that risk a serious there detained, is is defendant and revoked is release unless (b) when required, court in appear will not (i) or community, or person the other any to danger will a pose ~11~ threaten, or criminal justice process, the obstruct to attempt or obstruct will ~111~ a intimidate, or threaten, injure, to or attempt intimidate, or injure, juror. or witness prospective
[brief] “Adjacent” to the “Premises”**  As an initial matter, the Law Division defined the term “premises” narrowly to mean only the storefront location in which each of the tenants conducted business – and not retail mall premises.  Unlike most commercial leases, however, the parties never actually defined “premises” within the lease.  Notably, the Landlord’s expert opined, however, that “premises” meant the whole of the strip mall – not just each storefront separately.  Accordingly, since the area where [...] fell was “adjacent” to the “premises,” the area would be governed by Article 3 of the Lease.  Even if this Court were to accept the Law Division’s narrow definition, the Tenant Defendants all agreed to maintain the walkways and parking lot “adjacent” to the premises.  From this language, they all maintain that they had no duty to maintain walkways and parking areas which do not touch “their storefronts. ”
[brief] His was the only competent planning testimony presented.  [...] reviewed the proposed building heights, [...]’s ordinances, the Township’s Master Plan, the Township’s prior development approvals for warehouses, certain actions involving re-zoning and redevelopment plans for warehouse distribution uses, and the reports issued by the Board’s professionals.  He also visited the site on several occasions, and surveyed adjacent uses.  (5T 61:10-25; 62:1-5).  In his “no substantial detriment to the public good” analysis, [...] agreed with [...] that there is “really no distinction” between a 30 foot and 50 foot warehouse from a traffic impact and trip generation standpoint.  (5T  [...] reiterated that the project was not a fulfillment center, parcel hub, or “Amazon-like facility” providing last mile delivery services, but a “high-cube warehouse facility that is principally used to store manufactured goods prior to their distribution largely to either retail locations or other warehouses. ” (5T 74:5-13).  He concluded, that “in this instance, building height, in my opinion, can’t be viewed as a proxy for more intense—intensive use or development. ” (5T 74:14-18).  As discussed earlier, [...] also testified that any visual impacts will be mitigated by the nature of the surrounding properties and the substantial setbacks.  See Sections III(A)(2) & III(B)(1).  He concluded that the visual impacts associated with the increased height do not “rise to the level of being substantially detrimental. ” (5T 77:2-10).  The Board accepted [...] as an expert in planning, his testimony was unrebutted, and his conclusions were supported by substantial credible evidence.  Defendant’s finding that his testimony was unpersuasive because it was based on unidentified, unexplained “shaky evidential foundation” was arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable.
[brief] That language is garden-variety statutory forum language found in innumerable remedial state statutes.  See N.J.S.A. 34:19-5 (stating aggrieved employee “may . . . institute a civil action in a court of competent jurisdiction” under CEPA); N.J.S.A. 56:8-19 (stating consumer “may bring an action . . . in any court of competent jurisdiction” under CFA); N.J.S.A. 10:5-13(a)(2) (stating plaintiff “may initiate suit in Superior Court” under LAD); N.J.S.A. 34:11-56a25 (stating plaintiff “may bring [an] action” to recover wages and obtain relief “in the Superior Court” under New Jersey’s Wage and Hour Law (“WHL”)).  And it is well-settled that CEPA, CFA, LAD, and WHL claims are all subject to arbitration.  See Arafa v. Health Express Corp., 233 N.J. 147, 171-72 (2020) (WHL); Atalese v. U.S. Legal Servs. Grp., L.P., 219 N.J. 430, 446-48 (2014) (CFA); Garfinkel v. Morristown Obstetrics & Gynecology Assocs., P.A., 168 N.J. 124, 131-32 (2001) (LAD); Littman v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, 337 N.J. Super. 134, 145-48 (App. Div. 2001) (CEPA).  So, the argument that the IFPA’s judicial forum language exempts those statutes from arbitration should be rejected with finality.
[brief] STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. [...], Defendant-Appellant.  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY  APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. [...]  CRIMINAL ACTION  On Appeal from a Judgment of Conviction of the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Ocean County.  Indictment No. [...]  Sat Below: Hon. [...], J.S.C., and a Jury.  BRIEF AND APPENDIX ON BEHALF OF DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
[brief] THE ANSWER IS NO.  OR TO STATE IT ANOTHER WAY DID SHE OR DIDN’T SHE HAVE THE MONEY.  THE ANSWER IS THAT PLAINTIFF HAD THE $70,000.00 AT THE INCEPTION OF THE AGREEMENT, BUT CHOSE TO LIE AND DECEIVE AND NOT MAKE THE PAYMENT TO DEFENDANT.  SHE KEPT THE MONEY.  VERY SIMPLY, SHE HAD THE MONEY.