ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The trial court’s reliance on the term as “compelling evidence” in support of a continuing residency requirement for the BOG simply is misplaced.  Consistent with the tenet that we view statutory language within the context of the whole enactment, it is relevant to ask:  If lawmakers intended the BOG residency requirement to be continual in nature, why is the Rutgers Act silent as to any mechanism for private litigants such as Plaintiffs to enforce that obligation?  Why does the provision found under the Rutgers Act, N.J.S.A 18A:65-19, establish the one and only process for removing a member of the BOG and it does not involve failure to continuously reside in any particular county?  Why does the Rutgers Act, N.J.S.A. 18A:65-17, list only one action rendering a BOG member immediately ineligible to continue service—and that action is the receipt of remuneration for such service, not a change in residency?  The answer to those questions is that the residency requirement, based on its present-tense syntax and its textual connection to the act of appointment, was intended to direct the appointing authorities, not to serve as a forever obligation on the part of appointees themselves.  Similarly, any dispute over whether that direction had been followed would be resolved via a direct appeal like the one in Perez, not via a quo warranto action.  Viewed from that proper perspective, the qualifying condition of residency is satisfied at the time of appointment or reappointment and does not extend beyond those two points in time.  That perspective is the only way to give full force and effect to the entirety of the Rutgers Act.
[brief] Standard of Review  Motion to Dismiss:  Pursuant to R. 4:6-2(e), this Court applies a plenary standard of review from a trial court’s decision on a motion to dismiss.  Sickles v. Cabot Corp., 379 N.J. Super. 100, 105-06 (App. Div. 2005).  Appellate courts have “cautioned that legal sufficiency requires allegation of all the facts that the cause of action requires. ”  See Cornett v. Johnson & Johnson, 414 N.J. Super. 365, 385 (App. Div. 2010), aff’d and modified, 211 N.J. 362 (2012); and see Scheidt v. DRS Techs., Inc., 424 N.J. Super. 188, 193 (App. Div. 2012) (“the essential facts supporting plaintiff’s cause of action must be presented…conclusory allegations are insufficient in that regard”).  However, this Court owes no deference to the trial court’s conclusions.  Rezeem Fam. Assocs., LP v. Borough of Millstone, 423 N.J. Super. 103, 114 (App. Div. 2011).  In fact, this Court’s task is to liberally review the pleadings in order to “ascertain whether the fundament of a cause of action may be gleaned even from an obscure statement of claim. ”  Printing Mart-Morristown v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 116 N.J. 739, 746 (1989) (quoting Di Cristofaro v. Laurel Grove Mem. Park, 43 N.J. Super. 244, 252 (App. Div. 1957)).  Motion for Reconsideration:
[brief] 3  Although it was signed first by [...] in New Jersey on January 7, 1972, the Special Undertaking Contract was not finally executed until [...] signed it in Missouri on February 7, 1972.  (Da102).  When it entered into the Special Undertaking Contract, [...] was a New Jersey corporation that had its principal place of business in Patterson, New Jersey and [...] was a Missouri corporation that had its principal place of business in St.  Louis, Missouri.  The opinion takes note of these facts.  (Pa072).  4  Plaintiff is the successor by merger to [...].  (Pa002-003).  out of or in connection with the receipt, purchase, possession, handling, use, sale or disposition of” PCBs that were sold or delivered to [...] by [...] on or after February 7, 1972 “whether alone or in combination with other substances. ”  Id.  PCBs are a class of unique, chemically inert and heat-resistant, chemicals that [...] used to manufacture capacitors for use in electrical products such as florescent light ballasts.  (Pa107).  Between approximately 1935 and 1977, [...] manufactured and sold PCBs in bulk to a number of industrial customers like [...] who incorporated those PCBs into a wide variety of finished products.  Id.  In 1970, in response to growing concern regarding environmental persistence of PCBs, [...] announced it would phase out production of PCBs for non-electrical PCB applications.  Id.  For electrical applications, [...] agreed to continue manufacturing and selling PCBs to certain customers for use in closed electrical applications (e.g., transformers and capacitors) until suitable alternatives to PCBs became available, but only if those customers would agree to defend and indemnify [...] against all future PCB-related claims.  Id.  [...] entered into the Special Undertaking Contract so that it could continue purchasing PCBs from [...].  (Pa026).  II.
[brief] ”  Id. at *26.  The Appellate Division did not, as the [...] suggest, vacate the punitive damages awards because the record lacked sufficient evidence to award punitive damages.  Quite to the contrary, the panel held that “there is sufficient evidence in the record to support the award of . . . punitive . . . damages against both [...] and [...]. ”  Id. at *30.  The panel explicitly rejected the [...]’ argument (advanced again on this appeal) that [...] and [...] had a limited role in the partnership that precluded a punitive damages award against them.  (Compare Db50-52 with Jarwick Devs., Inc., 2018 WL 2449133, at *30-31.)  The panel also acknowledged the trial court’s findings about [...]’s lead role in the operation.  Jarwick Devs., Inc., 2018 WL 2449133, at *30.  Specifically, the panel determined that “the record supports the trial judge’s finding that [...] and [...] engaged in conduct that warrants the imposition of liability upon these defendants,” as “the [...] had operated their businesses with cooperation and coordination” and with “[...] [as] the ‘self-described master chef’” of the unlawful conduct, “[...], [...], and [...] worked together and operated on consensus. ”  Ibid.  Thus, according to the Appellate Division, the trial court on remand was to make “specific findings as to each individual defendant” “based on the existing trial record, any relevant findings of fact found by the trial judge, and such additional testimony or evidence the court may deem necessary for its decision.
[brief] (Da124-38).  Initially, the court rejected Appellants’ claim that the State had no “well-settled right” to obtain relief.  (Da125-126).  Just the opposite: the court explained that the LAD’s plain text both allows the Attorney General and the Director to “proceed in a summary manner in the Superior Court of New Jersey to obtain an injunction” prohibiting any violation of the LAD and makes clear that schools may not discriminate on the basis of gender identity or expression.
[directive] Internal Affairs Index File  9.2.1  The purpose of the internal affairs index file is to serve as a record control device to maintain an inventory of internal affairs case files and to summarize each case’s status for authorized personnel.  The instrument used for such an index file will vary by agency and could include a log book, index cards or a computerized data base.  9.2.2  All internal affairs complaints shall be recorded in the index file.  Entries should record each case’s basic information, including the subject officer, allegations, complainant, date received, investigator assigned, disposition and disposition date for each complaint.  A unique case number assigned to each internal affairs complaint will point to the complete investigation file’s location and will simplify case tracking.  54
[directive] ATTORNEY GENERAL ADMINISTRATIVE EXECUTIVE DIRECTIVE NO. 2022-10 TO: All Division Directors, Department of Law and Public Safety  FROM: [...], Acting Attorney General  DATE: September 23, 2022  SUBJECT: Directive  Creating the Division of Violence Intervention and Victim Assistance  The United States is in the midst of a crisis of violence in the aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic, and New Jersey has not been spared.  This crisis takes many forms—shootings, acts of domestic violence and sexual violence, violence motivated by hate and bigotry and domestic terrorism, and violence involving youth, both as victims and victimizers.  In many instances, this violence is cyclical, borne of the unhealed wounds and trauma that victims carry.  While it impacts all New Jerseyans, vulnerable and marginalized communities bear the brunt.  Communities with high rates of gun crimes, for example, experience a cascade of effects that extends beyond just the individual directly impacted: the whole community may experience the trauma, and physical, emotional and economic pain of an event.  Violence, particularly in communities of color, stymies the economy and personal growth, hampers the trust of law enforcement that communities depend on, and deepens patterns of racial and gender injustice and inequity.  Research shows that past strategies have been insufficient in interrupting these cycles.  These strategies fail to recognize that a victim today may be an offender in the future.  Additionally, they may at times emphasize a law enforcement and prosecutorial approach at the expense of pursuing strategies that could prevent future crime.  There is a clear and pressing need for a public health approach to public safety, one that promotes strategies that contain violence and reduce the risk factors associated with the likelihood of repeat violence and victimization.  This approach begins both with victims and those likely to commit violent acts.  New Jersey has already begun to take such a different approach.  The Administration of Governor [...], in conjunction with the Department of Law and Public Safety (DLPS), has taken clear and forceful steps in this direction: it has led to an unprecedented increase in funding for anti- Page 2 violence initiatives and for victims—with the first funding in the state’s history for the Hospital Violence Intervention Program (HVIP), Community-Based Violence Intervention (CBVI) program, Trauma Recovery Centers, and the Youth Justice Hubs.
[brief] (6T 20-15 to 25, 38-12 to 39-21, 48-20 to 50-22)  [...] spoke to [...]’s mother, [...].  (6T 41-7 to 43-1)  [...] met with detectives, gave them her son’s phone number, identified her 2000 Toyota 4Runner from pictures, and reported the car as stolen.
[brief] Respondent [...] violated *N.J.S.A.* 18A:12-24.1(e) because he “took action on Facebook that could seriously compromise the Board,” and *N.J.S.A.* 18A:12-24.1(g) because he “deliberately tried to spin all of his information in a positive light, gave incomplete answers on purpose, and deliberately gave inaccurate numbers that tried to put the referendum in the best light, and withheld answers to questions that could be seen as negative regarding the referendum.
[brief] Plaintiff supported his complaints with confidential financial documents of [...] and Defendant that had been produced by Defendant in this litigation, which documents were subject to the confidentiality order.  (Da1003 at ¶ 3, Da1069-70 at ¶ 11).  The Korean prosecutors conducted a thorough investigation of Defendant’s activities in the management of [...], including extensive document review and multi-day interviews of Defendant and Plaintiff.  The prosecutors concluded that Plaintiff’s allegations were without basis and dismissed the criminal complaints.  (Da1003 at ¶ 3; Da1069 at ¶ 10 – Da1072 at ¶ 20).  On March 16, 2017, the New Jersey trial court entered an order imposing monetary sanctions against Plaintiff for violating the court’s confidentiality orders.
[brief] ]  In addition to the similarities in the arguments and sources between this case and McGuire, the trial court here also acknowledged defendant’s persistent use of non-Frye cases from other jurisdictions to support his argument:  “I note for the record that every case Counsel submitted for the Court’s review, all of these cases relied on the Daubert standard, or a Frye issue was not raised[.]” (5T126-14 to 18).  Indeed, in this appeal, defendant continues to argue that this Court review this testimony under Daubert, despite [...]’s specific instruction to the contrary.  Instead, the State asks that this Court affirm the trial court’s decision to rely on relevant precedent regarding this exact issue of tool mark identification, particularly McGuire and Ghigliotty, in reviewing this issue.
[directive] When an officer operating a vehicle equipped with an ALPR receives an immediate alert, the officer shall take such action in response to the alert as is appropriate in the circumstances.  An officer alerted to the fact that an observed motor vehicle’s license plate is on the BOLO list may be required to make a reasonable effort to confirm that a wanted person is actually in the vehicle before -8- the officer would have a lawful basis to stop the vehicle.  See State v. Parks, 288 N.J. Super. 407 (App. Div. 1996) (police do not have reasonable suspicion to justify a stop based on a computer check that shows that the operator’s license of the registered owner of the vehicle is suspended unless the driver generally matches the owner’s physical description age and gender)).  (e.g., An officer reacting to an immediate alert shall consult the database to determine the reason why the vehicle had been placed on the BOLO list and whether the alert has been designated as a non-encounter alert.  In the event of a non-encounter alert, the officer shall follow any instructions included in the alert for notifying the law enforcement or homeland security agency that had put out the BOLO.  Se__ge Section 6.4, su_9_p_~_.  8.  SECURITY OF DATA STORED
[brief] Under the same domestic violence provision, a court also may “restrict[] the defendant’s ability to have contact with . . . an animal owned . . . by either party. ”  N.J.S.A. 2C:25-27.  Similarly, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-8 authorizes a court to “restrict[] the defendant’s contact with the victim” of a sex offense.  But there is no statutory authority for no-contact orders in animal cruelty cases.  Court-ordered anger management counseling may be imposed as a condition of a defendant’s probation or suspended sentence, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:45-1.  But as noted before, [...] was not sentenced to a term of probation.
[brief] •  “How do we know the defendant caused [...]’s death?  The defendant’s fingerprint is found on the murder weapon. ”  (8T 55-10 to 12)  And, critically, “there was blood on the finger when it touched the wine chiller. ”  (8T 55-10 to 56)  •  “How do we know the defendant caused [...]’s death?  [...]’s blood is found on the defendant’s bra in Houston. ”  (8T 56-10 to 11)  •  “How do we know that the defendant caused [...]’s death?  . . .  The strength of the assailant does not matter for these types of injuries to be inflicted.  But rather, the assailant’s enraged emotion can create this kind of injury. ”  (8T 57-10 to 58-16)  •  “How do we know the defendant caused [...]’s death?  Bloodstain pattern analysis. ”  (8T 58-25 to 59-1)  The forensic evidence was the bulk of the State’s case for guilt.  And it was inaccurate, overstated, and unscientific.  Tellingly, the jury asked only one question during deliberations: it asked for the fingerprint expert’s testimony.
[directive] 5.  Èske w konprann ke si w plede koupab:  Do you understand that if you plead guilty: a.  Wap gen dosye kriminèl?  [Wi/Yes]  [Non/No]  You will have a criminal record?  b.  Amwens ke antant la te prevwa le kontrè, yo kab kondane w pou pije tan maksimòm nan  [Wi/Yes]  [Non/No] prizon, peye amann maksimòm la ak peye frè maksimòm ba Biwo Konpansasyon Viktim Krim la/Victims of Crime Compensation?  Unless the plea agreement provides otherwise, you could be sentenced to serve the maximum time in confinement, to pay the maximum fine and to pay the maximum Victims of Crime Compensation Office Assessment?
[brief] argued for application of the “relative culpability” approach to apportioning attorneys’ fees among the parties – as opposed to the “time necessary to litigate” approach also recognized by this Court.  (Da0017-Da0020.)  In addition, [...]’s Original Motion included an expert report from its accountant, [...], which purported to calculate interest.  (Da0030-Da0045.)  Ms. Toth’s report was the second report served by [...] calculating interest.  [...] had previously served an expert report calculating prejudgment interest composed by [...], CPA, CFF, on or about December 17, 2014 (the “Ruoff Report”).  (Da0046.)  After the trial court granted [...]’s Motion for Reconsideration, [...] filed a new motion for final judgment, attorneys’ fees, costs, and pre-judgment interest, on March 5, 2021 (the “March 2021 Motion”).
[brief] “Adequate Notice” requires 48 hours’ notice of a special meeting, “giving the time, date, location and, to the extent known, the agenda of any regular, special or rescheduled meeting, which notice shall accurately state whether formal action may or may not be taken,” and which notice must be (i) posted in a prominent place, (ii) provided to a municipality’s designated newspapers which “have the greatest likelihood of informing the public,” and (iii) filed with the municipal clerk.  N.J.S.A. 10:4-8.  The trial court’s Statement of Reasons, in Sections II and III, acknowledges plaintiff’s claims that the January 11, 2023, reorganization special meeting and the February 1, 2023, curative special reorganization meeting were held in violation of the OPMA, although it does not identify the alleged defects.  Yet the court’s Substantive Analysis does not even mention the Borough’s reorganization efforts.  (Pa 86.)  The January 11th special meeting was noticed by an e-mail from the Borough to the designated newspapers dated December 28, 2021.  (Pa 170.)  Notice of the February 1st curative meeting was sent to the [...] only on January 26th and published in the paper on January 29th.  (Pa. 165, ¶12 of the [...] Cert. I)  A second notice for the February 1st meeting was sent to the [...] and [...] on January 28th but published in neither paper.  (Pa 175.)  All of the Borough’s special reorganization meeting notices directed the newspapers not to publish since they included the ubiquitous language that it was “FOR YOUR RECORD ONLY. ”  They also omitted details required for Adequate Notice.  Perhaps the trial court’s reliance on Township of Bernards, supra, in its Statement of Reasons to vindicate the notice of the Planning Board’s December 16th special meeting may be extrapolated to apply to the Borough’s deliberate decision not to publish notices of its reorganization special meetings, but it cannot justify the court ignoring the other flaws in the Borough’s efforts to reschedule its 2022 reorganization meeting, as placed before the trial court in the plaintiff’s Counter Statement of Material Facts:
[brief] (Aa5-Aa6; Aa10-Aa61).  On April 17, 2023, defendant was sentenced to mandatory fines and penalties, including a $307 fine, $33 court costs, $50 Violent Crime Compensation Board (VCCB) assessment, $75 Safe Neighborhood Services Fund (SNSF) assessment, $225 DWI surcharge\(^7\), and 12 hours at the Intoxicated Driver Resource Center (IDRC).  Defendant’s license was suspended for seven months and he was also sentenced to a seven month ignition interlock suspension period.  (7T3:20 to 7T6:23; 7T22:1 to 7T23:10; Aa7-Aa9; Aa111-Aa113; Aa120). \(^8\)  Defendant attested that he did not own, lease, or operate a motor vehicle on the Ignition Interlock Information and Notification form.  (Aa121).  This appeal follows.
[brief] In addition, the right created by Article 1 for those who opt out of Article 2 is the right to sue for negligence.  The right to sue for intentional conduct is not conferred by Article 1.  N.J.S.A 34:15-1 provides in relevant part:  When personal injury is caused to an employee by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment, of which the actual or lawfully imputed negligence of the employer is the natural and proximate cause, he shall receive compensation therefor from his employer . . . [(emphasis added). ]  Thus, even if [...] and [...] had opted out of Article 2, the requirement that [...] make “sufficient provision for the complete payment of any obligation which he may incur to an injured employee . . . under said article 1 of this chapter,” N.J.S.A. 34:15-72, applies to claims of negligence, not intentional wrongs.  By its own terms, N.J.S.A. 34:15-72 has no application to [...]’s claims for intentional bodily injury caused by [...].  Neither statute upon which Plaintiff relies mandates that insurance policies cover intentional conduct of the employer that causes injury to an employee.
[directive] 2.  For matters listed in paragraph 1, the consent of a party will not be required if the party is absent and unreachable.  If, despite diligent efforts, an attorney cannot communicate with a client and therefore cannot advise the court of the client’s position as to proceeding remotely or in person, the court will determine whether to proceed remotely or in person.  In making that determination, the court will consider all relevant factors, including the positions of other parties.  [...]
[brief] There was no further support in the Certification of [...] referring to or explaining the alleged significance of any of the minor warnings or counselings in the chart attached to the [...] submission below.  None of the incidents were referred to in support of the bypass of Appellant when the [...] improperly relied on the “Rule of Three”.  Similarly, the improper inclusion of the September 6, 2022 matter is especially prejudicial due to the Commission’s erroneous finding that it was a second incident involving Appellant’s service weapon.  The Commission also erroneously found this incident was a discipline of Appellant after her promotion to Sergeant in 2018.  Not only was there no counseling or discipline of the Appellant, the incident involved a different Officer failing to advise Appellant about his malfunctioning service weapon.  (AA0031, AA0157).  Simply put, the Commission made a critical and prejudicial error concerning the facts of this matter.  The Appellant certified as to the actual facts of the matter and she was never served with any discipline regarding the September 6, 2022, allegation and properly and immediately reported the alleged issue to her Superior Officer upon learning of it.  (AA0157)  Significantly, Appellant had no disciplinary actions following her promotion to Sergeant in 2018 and the Commission specifically relied upon this erroneous finding in reaching the decision to deny the veteran’s preference she has earned.  The proper procedures regarding removal from a promotional list due to an alleged adverse employment history were not followed.  Appellant was not provided the basis of the removal prior to the appeal and was not allowed to review the basis for the removal and properly respond and provide support for the reversal of this decision.  The most important reason this appeal should be granted is the employment history of the Appellant at the time of this list certification does not support her removal from the list and pursuant to N.J.A.C. 4A:5-2.2(c) requires her promotion to Sherrif’s Officer Lieutenant for the [...].  Appellant has overwhelming experience and qualifications for this promotion, including her rank as Lieutenant Commander in the United States Navy, her status as a disabled veteran, her training with the [...], being appointed as the Accreditation Manager by the [...] and serving as an Acting-Lieutenant with the [...] on several occasions from 2020-2023.
[brief] 3 LEGAL ARGUMENT 8 POINT I: THE LOWER COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY FINDING THAT DEFENDANT IS NOT RESPONSIBLE FOR ANY OF HIS CHILDREN’S COLLEGE EDUCATION COSTS (P-452)  8 POINT II: THE LOWER COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY APPLYING THE DOCTRINE OF LACHES TO THE UNREIMBURSED MEDICAL EXPENSES (P-452)  13 POINT III: THE LOWER COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY ORDERING PLAINTIFF TO PAY DEFENDANT’S COUNSEL FEES (P-452)