ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] **Plaintiffs Conceded that the 2020 Designations Were Not Being Challenged**  [...] also sought to confirm that the 2020 designations of the redevelopment area being in need of redevelopment or rehabilitation were not an issue in the instant lawsuit or at trial.  (T36:14-37:2).  After a recess, Plaintiffs conceded that they were not seeking to invalidate the 2020 designations in this action and that the trial was limited to challenging the 2023 Ordinance approving the Redevelopment Plan.  (T38:19-39:1; Pa80.)  3.
[brief] Here the plaintiff fails this test.  In conclusory fashion its alleged that the County Defendants had “actual or constructive notice” of tax credit errors and omissions (Compl. Par. 414) while failing to sufficiently make out a claim as to: (1) how plaintiff was directly harmed; (3) that plaintiff is a member of a discreet class subjected to the potential harm brought about by the County’s actions; and (4) how the County defendants used their authority in a way that created or rendered plaintiff more vulnerable to danger than had they not acted at all.
[brief] The Shaw panel had the benefit of briefing from the Attorney General which is tasked with enforcing the CFA, as to its analysis of the CFA and the judicially created exemption at issue in Plemmons.  The appellate panel in Shaw invited the Attorney General to participate as amicus curie “in order to discern both on a narrow basis the agency’s view whether home inspectors should be deemed ‘learned professionals,’ and on a broader basis how and when the ‘learned professionals’ exemption should be applied by the court to exempt individuals from CFA liability. ”  Shaw, 460 N.J. Super. at 599.  As the panel noted in Shaw, though an appellate court is “not ultimately bound by an agency’s statutory interpretation, ‘[g]enerally, courts afford substantial deference to an agency’s interpretation of a statute that it is charged with enforcing. ’”  Id. at 617 (alteration in original) (citing Univ. Cottage Club of Princeton N.J. Corp. v. Dep’t of Env’t Prot., 191 N.J. 28, 48 (2007)).  The Shaw Court gave considerable deference to the Attorney General’s view that licensed semi-professionals should not be exempt from CFA liability.  This Court should follow Shaw and, once again, give deference to the Attorney General’s restrictive view of CFA immunity.¹ ¹
[brief] The Board Planning Consultant, [...], provided her interpretation at the hearing of whether the application increased building heights by way of mounding or terracing.  [...] testified as follows:  I also want to point out as it relates to the ordinance and the Settlement Agreement – both of which I'm intimately familiar with and was part of the negotiation with the Applicant -- there are very clear exhibits with regards to the building height.  And it comes from grade.  I don't think it matters whether it's existing grade or future grade.  We know that it met the building height.  (Pa154; 63: 8-15).  However, [...]’s statement was clearly incorrect as the Settlement Agreement and ordinance are completely silent on elevations as it related to Building Height.
[brief] *State v. Burney*, 255 N.J. 1, 11 (2023).  The Burney expert was similarly found by the trial court to be an expert in historical cell site analysis, referred to as “the use of cell phone companies’ business records to approximate where a user may have been at a particular time of interest. ”  *Id.*  Within those business records included the date and time of calls and text messages, as well as the cell towers that the phone used.  *Id.*, at 11-12.  Of note, the records that the Burney expert assessed were also [...] records from 2015, as are the records assessed by [...] in the current matter.  *Id.*  In the Burney Frye hearing, the CAST expert testified that information from the cell phone’s communication with a given cell tower could be used to estimate a sector extending from each of the cell towers, within which the phone would reasonably be located.  *Id.*, at 12.  The Burney expert testified that this sector had a radius of approximately one mile.  *Id.*  This distance was based on a “rule of thumb” based on his knowledge and experience with the “particular technology” and “this particular frequency in this particular area. ”  *Id.*  Based on such, the expert opined that the defendant’s phone was reasonably within the coverage sector he created from the [...] records, and the crime scene was also reasonably within that coverage sector.  *Id.*, at 13.
[directive] 20.  [예/Yes]  [아니요/No]  [해당없음/NA]  선고 공판 시 귀하가  유죄를 인정한 죄목에 대해 별도의  선고를 할 수 포기합니까?  없다고 주장하는 권리를  Are you giving up your right at sentence to argue that there are charges you pleaded guilty to for which you cannot be given a separate sentence?
[brief] The Trial Court also determined that, at all times relevant to the adjudication of the GRC complaint, [...] was represented through counsel for the District:  At the time the Board responded to [[...]’s] OPRA request in July of 2019, mediated a potential settlement in December of 2019, and filed all submissions, including the Statement of Information, which has been referred to as the SOI throughout, to the state agency, [...] and the Board were represented by [...].  And the Court has no idea of the communications between [...] and Mr. [...], nor is the Court interested in them, but nonetheless, he was represented through counsel for the Fire District.  In the end, the Trial Court found, while [...] was no longer on the Board by the time the GRC issued its first decision, . . . he had been represented as a Board member at all times from when the OPRA request was made, while the GRC was still considering the merits of the matter and accepting briefs and legal argument.  (1T54:4-10)  As a result, the Trial Court rejected Mr. [...]’s arguments on the issue of due process violations (1T54:11-23) and alleging a conflict of interest.  (1T54:24-56:4) of District counsel.  The Trial Court declined to consider [...]’s arguments as to the merits of the GRC orders, citing Rule 4:67-6(c)(3) which provides that, "The validity of an agency order shall not be justiciable in an enforcement proceeding."  (1T57:6-13).  Regarding indemnification, the Trial Court stated that the actual language of the bylaws talks about an officer who is a defendant, and . . .
[brief] Scope of Construction Supervision Services  The Scope of Services prepared by the [...] provided that the “work shall include engineering services covering all construction supervision of the construction work as described herein,” as well as “the necessary personnel” for accomplishing that work.  Id.  The Scope of Services further required that the contractor’s Project Manager, or a Principal, be a professional engineer licensed in the State of New Jersey, to oversee the work performed under the contract (Pa1801).  [...]’ employee [...] is a licensed professional engineer and served as Project Manager (Pa1914 at T8:25-9:5; Pa1916 at T15:29-16:2).  The Scope of Services also required the employment of a Resident Engineer, underneath the supervision of the Project Manager.  The Resident Engineer was required for all periods of construction activities “to perform construction inspection and administrative services for cost control, progress control and quality control” (Pa1801).
[brief] [...]  [...], Esq. (041131997)  [...], Esq. (022552004)  [...] (973)  533-0777  Attorneys for Plaintiffs-Respondents, [...] and 78  Summit Avenue Partners  DATED: September 26, 2025  Of counsel: [...], Esq.  [...], Esq.  On the brief: [...], Esq.  TABLE OF CONTENTS  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ........................................................................................................ ii  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT .................................................................................................1
[brief] (Vol. 1 Pa.74; [...] Dep. TR 39-11 to 40-1).  The payments went from being “3 months behind, 4 months behind and then it went to years behind”.  (Vol 1 Pa. 74; [...] Dep. TR 40-19).  When Dr. [...] received payments from [...] he received one monthly check for all his positions.  (Vol. 1 Pa. 75; [...] Dep. TR 40-9 to 13).  Dr. [...] was asked why he agreed to assume the position of Chief Medical Officer when he was not being paid fully for his services as Director of the Sleep Clinic and President of the Medical Staff, Dr. [...] stated he considered [...], one of the owners of the hospital to be a good friend and [...] and [...] the Executive Vice-President of [...] told him that he would be paid in full for his overdue salaries when the hospital was sold.
[brief] The Defendant’s Resolution confirms that Defendant did not apply the appropriate level of deference:  “Comity, and practical considerations oblige adjoining municipalities to be respectful of each other’s development standards and regulations. ”  Ja043 (emphasis added).  This “respectful” standard is remarkably similar to the “mindful” attention the [...] gave to [...]’s zoning.  The Supreme Court rejected it.  Consequently, the standard is neither “respectful” nor “mindful”, but an “obligat[ion] to give significant weight to the zoning ordinance and plan of the adjacent municipality[.]”
[brief] See R. 4:69–1 to –7.  A Court will overturn municipal action if it is arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable.  Charlie Brown of Chatham v. Board of Adjustment of Chatham, 202 N.J. Super. 312, 321 (App.Div.1985); Bryant v. City of Atl. City, 309 N.J. Super. 596, 610, (App. Div. 1998).  Here, Resolution 591 (242a) is arbitrary and capricious as it violates established and vested contractual rights, the New Jersey Constitution, and the CRA.  Further, Defendants' application of the MSRA was arbitrary and capricious because they engaged in conduct not authorized by the statute.  In interpreting a statute, “the overriding goal is to determine as best [the court] can the intent of the Legislature, and to give effect to that intent. ”  State v. Hudson, 209 N.J. 513, 529 (2012).  The best indicator of legislative intent is “the plain language chosen by the Legislature. ”  State v. Gandhi, 201 N.J. 161, 176 (2010).  In interpreting a statute, Courts are to give the relevant language its ordinary meaning and construe it “in a common-sense manner. ”  State in Interest of K.O., 217 N.J. 83, 91 (2014).  Further, the Court may utilize the doctrine of “expressio unis est exclusion alterius,” which suggests that when items are specifically listed, those excluded were excluded purposefully.  Evans v. Atlantic City Bd. Of Educ., 404 N.J. Super. 87, 91 (App. Div. 2008).  Finally, Courts should “avoid interpreting a legislative enactment in a way that would render it unconstitutional. ”  State v. Fortin, 198 N.J. 619, 630 (2009).  In this matter, by the plain language of the statute, the MSRA provides authority to prospectively nullify CNAs as well as prospectively modify wages, hours, or other terms and conditions of employment regarding employee rights arising out of expired CNAs.  Absent from the statutory language of the MSRA is any explicit language that the Legislature intended to abrogate previously vested property rights, such as the deferred compensation at issue in this litigation.  If it were the Legislature’s intention to discharge the debts of municipalities in need of stabilization and recovery, it would have plainly stated that the MSRA “discharges,” “forgives,” or “absolves” debts. \footnote{The MSRA authorizes the “restructure of debts” which refers to the renegotiation of debt.
[brief] (See Db 16).  As the judge stated on the record prior to opening statements, “It was indicated quite clearly going back for some time that [defendant] instructed his counsel that he did not want to pursue an insanity defense and that insanity defense was withdrawn…You’ll recall our previous conversations in Court on prior occasion when [...] had indicated that you have instructed him to withdraw any insanity defense, is that right?  To which defendant responded, "Yes, Judge."  (3T:10-8 to 22) (emphasis added).
[brief] JUDGMENT TO DEFENDANTS  BECAUSE, AS [...]’S OWNERS, THE DEFENDANTS ARE STRICTLY LIABLE IF THEY KNEW OR SHOULD HAVE KNOWN THAT [...] HAD A NATURAL INCLINATION OR HABITUAL TENDENCY TO ACT IN A WAY THAT ENDANGERED PEOPLE WHEN IN THE BREEDING ENVIRONMENT (Pa1085a-Pa1086a)  A.  THE MOTION COURT ERRED BECAUSE PLAINTIFF SUBMITTED SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE FOR A JURY TO REASONABLY CONCLUDE THAT DEFENDANTS KNEW OR SHOULD HAVE KNOWN THAT [...] HAD A NATURAL INCLINATION TO ENDANGER PEOPLE WHEN IN THE BREEDING ENVIRONMENT (Pa1090a)  .................................................................................................................................  15  B.  THE MOTION COURT ERRED BECAUSE PLAINTIFF SUBMITTED SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE FOR A JURY TO REASONABLY CONCLUDE THAT DEFENDANTS KNEW OR SHOULD HAVE KNOWN THAT [...] HAD A HABITUAL TENDENCY TO ENDANGER PEOPLE WHEN IN THE BREEDING ENVIRONMENT (Pa1085a-Pa1086a) ......................................................................................................................... 21 POINT II THE MOTION COURT ERRED BY USING THE EQUINE ACTIVITY LIABILITY ACT TO LIMIT DEFENDANTS LIABILITY DESPITE THE ACT BEING INAPPLICABLE TO DEFENDANTS AS A MATTER OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY (Pa1086a-Pa1088a)
[brief] Here -- just like in Carrero -- if the jury rejected self-defense,\(^{13}\) either of \(^{13}\)  We obviously do not know why the jury rejected self-defense -- which, as noted, was “intruder” self-defense in this case -- but it could have occurred for at least two reasons: with the jury concluding either that [...] was not an intruder, or that defendant responded in a manner that was simply too extreme, i.e., not “immediately necessary” to protect himself.  *N.J.S.A.*
[brief] No facts that the State points to in its brief create the requisite suspicion.  The State argues that, in addition to [...]’s flight, there was reasonable suspicion to justify the stop because [...] and [...] were “affiliating with someone conducting drug trafficking in a crime-ridden location, possibly taking part in an ongoing drug enterprise. ”  (Pb 20; see Pb 22, 26-28)  (emphasis added)  But merely speaking with a suspected drug dealer in one’s neighborhood cannot justify an investigatory stop—if it could, anyone who [...] interacted with outside that afternoon could have been stopped by the police.  Even the State’s speculative argument that [...] may have been a participant in what [...] described at the beginning of his testimony as a “multi-tiered” drug distribution scheme falls flat, (Pb 28-30) as Morales testified later that [...] appeared to be interacting with his customers and maintaining his stash by himself, without any assistance from [...] or [...]. or any other individual.
[brief] The second element that the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt is that the defendant committed one or more of the following acts: tormented the animal; tortured the animal; maimed the animal; hung the animal; poisoned the animal; unnecessarily or cruelly beat the animal; cruelly abused the animal; or needlessly mutilated the animal.  [Ibid.]  Following the model charge for animal cruelty thus leaves a trial court’s “obligation to define critical terms” unfulfilled.  *State v. N.I.*, 349 N.J. Super. 299, 308 (App. Div. 2002).  That obligation “follows from the fundamental proposition that ‘[t]he criminal law cannot be administered justly or efficiently if the jury is allowed to speculate as to what conduct the law intended to proscribe by a specified crime. ’”  Ibid.  (quoting *State v. Alexander*, 136 N.J. 563, 572 (1994)).  This is the trial court’s duty “even when statutory terms have common or well-understood meanings,” because “words whose meanings are ordinary and understandable often require a judicial determination with respect to their intended scope of application. ”  *Alexander*, 136 N.J. at 572-73.  Each word in a statute is presumed to have meaning.  *In re N.B.*, 222 N.J. 87, 101 (2015); see also *In re Commitment of J.M.B.*, 197 N.J. 563, 573 (2009) (“Interpretations that render the Legislature’s words mere surplusage are disfavored. ”).  The statute under which [...] was convicted, N.J.S.A. 4:22-17(c)(1), must be “[c]onstrued in a manner that gives meaning to all of the words chosen by the Legislature. ”  *In re N.B.*, 222 N.J. at 90.  Here, where the statute does not prohibit beating or abusing, but unnecessarily or cruelly beating and cruelly abusing, the critical words are “cruelly” and “unnecessarily.
[brief] As the trial court plainly put it, “[...] has violated the rights of low- and moderate-income households, to have a place to live in [...].  That’s what [constitutionally noncompliant] means. ”  (2T9:6-8).  [...] advocates for the injunction to be lifted and the builder’s remedy litigation to continue, during which the Township would be able to initiate condemnation proceedings at any time.  In other words, [...] would have Plaintiff fight in a second litigation while the builder’s remedy suit is pending.  That contradicts the Mount Laurel doctrine’s principle that a “strong judicial hand” must be used to “provide a realistic opportunity for housing, not litigation” and to avoid “confusion, expense, and delay,” which the Supreme Court deemed the “primary enemies of constitutional compliance.
[brief] (Aa63-70).  [...] argued that it was entitled to an adjudicatory hearing because the Project will block sunlight and cause aesthetic damages to the public and [...] and [...] violated [...]’s right to equal protection.  (Aa70).  On August 28, 2023, [...] opposed [...]’s hearing request, arguing that [...] failed to identify a statutory or constitutional right to a hearing.  (Aa72).  On August 28, 2023, [...] denied [...]’s hearing request.
[brief] [...]’s charges arose from a fight between [...], Aaron and [...], and [...], in which Pierce stabbed Tarpley, killing him.  [...]’s defense at trial focused on challenging Aaron and Archie’s credibility to show the absence of any conspiracy at all, and arguing in the alternative that --- 3 *State v. Reyes*, 50 N.J. 454 (1967).  even if there were a conspiracy, there was no agreement to cause significant bodily injury.  (See 13T 106-22 to 25, 129-22 to 130-6)  [...], one of Tarpley’s friends, testified for the State that on the day of the fight, [...], [...]’s girlfriend, had gotten into an argument with Tarpley, struck Tarpley with a skateboard and her keys, and that Tarpley retaliated by hitting McCormick.  (10T 107-6 to 25)  According to Harden, McCormick “was mad” when she left and said she was going to return.  (10T 108-14 to 23, 109-1)  Co-defendants and twin brothers Aaron and [...] testified for the State after having been charged with assault and weapons possession charges.
[directive] Fòm Pledwaye Siplemantè pou Enfraksyon Dwòg Supplemental Plea Form for Drug Offenses (Haitian Creole)  Kesyon swivan sa yo fèt pou reponn sèl si w ap plede koupab daprè yon enfraksyon ki tonbe anba N.J.SA. 2C:35 1 seq. oswa N.J.S.A. 2C-1 seq. ak ak  The following additional questions need to be answered only if you are pleading guilty pursuant to an offense under 2C:35-1 seq. or 2C:36-1 seq.
[brief] By operation of law, with the passage of thirty years, there was a bar to [...] making any claim to Lot 22.  It was not until the summer of 2021 that there was a tepid claim of owning this land when [...] from [...] said to [...] that she believed that [...] owned this land but at the same time asked if [...] could buy the land.  (Da107, [...] Answers to Request for Admissions, par. 3; Da55, [...] Answers to Interrogatories, par. 18).  Because of the failure to object to Lot 22 being used by [...] with actual and obvious notice of this usage for a period of thirty years, the tenets of adverse possession have been satisfied.  [...] owns Lot 20 which is [...] and the entirety of Lot 22.  The trial court erred in granting summary judgment for [...].
[brief] [(Da0785; Da0816; Da0846); COURT DID NOT ADDRESS PREEMPTION ALTHOUGH IT WAS RAISED IN THE BRIEFING]  ...........................................  18  A.  The PLA Does Not Recognize a ‘Failure-to-Timely-Recall’ Claim.  [ISSUE WAS RAISED (Da0785; Da0816; Da0846)] .............  18  B.  Federal Law Preempts A ‘Failure-to-Timely-Recall’ Claim.  [(Da0785; Da0816; Da0846); COURT DID NOT ADDRESS PREEMPTION  ALTHOUGH IT WAS RAISED IN THE BRIEFING]  ..................................................................................  19  III.  THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED A MISCARRIAGE OF JUSTICE IN ALLOWING PLAINTIFF’S MANUFACTURING-DEFECT CLAIM WITHOUT ANY PROOF THAT THE SPECIFIC PRODUCT AT ISSUE HAD THE ALLEGED DEFECT.
[brief] RPC 1.7(a)(1) is clear and unequivocal in its prohibition: “a lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation . . . of one client will be directly adverse to another client. ”  Comando v. Nugiel, 436 N.J. Super. 203, 214 (App. Div. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting RPC 1.7).  Direct adversity does not necessarily mean that parties are on opposite sides of a lawsuit; concurrent representation of multiple parties whose goals, objectives, or positions are fundamentally in conflict with each other suffices.  See Am. Bar Ass’n Standing Committee on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 05–434 (Dec. 8, 2004) (“Direct adversity requires a conflict as to the legal rights and duties of the clients, not merely conflicting economic interests. ”); Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.7, cmts. 6, 7.  An example of such adversity is the longstanding prohibition on an attorney’s dual representation of a driver and passenger in an automobile accident if there is any unresolved issue concerning liability.
[brief] [A] determination whether there exists a ‘genuine issue’ of material fact that precludes summary judgment requires the motion judge to consider whether the competent evidential materials presented, when viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, are sufficient to permit a rational fact finder to resolve the alleged disputed issue in favor of the nonmoving party…If there exists a single, unavoidable resolution of the alleged disputed issue of fact, that issue should be considered insufficient to constitute a ‘genuine’ issue of material fact for purposes of Rule 4:46-2.  The import of our holding is that when the evidence ‘is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law,’ the trial court should not hesitate to grant summary judgment.  [142 N.J. at 540 (citing Liberty Lobby v. Anderson, 477 U.S. 242, 250-52 (1986)).]  The thrust of the Brill decision was to encourage trial courts not to refrain from granting summary judgment when proper circumstances present themselves.  Id. at 541.  While the New Jersey Supreme Court recognized the importance of not shutting a deserving litigant from trial, it stressed that it was just as important that the court not “allow harassment of an equally deserving suitor for immediate relief by a long and worthless trial.