ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] ## TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS, AND RULINGS | Subject Matter | Date | Appendix Page | |-------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------|---------------| | Case Management Order ([...], P.J.Ch.) | May 15, 2019 | Pa001 | | Order Granting Leave to File Amended Complaint ([...], P.J.Ch.) | July 3, 2019 | Pa004 | | Order Denying [...] Permission to File Emergent Motion to Appellate Division ([...], J.A.D.) | September 15, 2020 | Pa008 | | Order Denying [...] Permission to File Emergent Motion to Supreme Court ([...]) | September 16, 2020 | Pa009 | ### TABLE OF PARTIES | Name | Appellate Role | Trial Court Role | Status | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------|------------------|-------------------------| | [...] | Appellant | Defendant | Did not appear at trial | | [...] | Respondent | Plaintiff | Participated Below | | [...], Individually and on behalf of [...] | Respondent | Plaintiff | Participated Below | | [...], Individually and on behalf of [...] | Respondent | Plaintiff | Participated Below | | [...], Individually and on behalf of [...]| Respondent | Plaintiff | Participated Below | | [...], Individually and on behalf of [...] | Respondent | Plaintiff | Participated Below | | [...], Individually and on behalf of [...] | Respondent | Plaintiff | Participated Below | | [...], Individually and on behalf of [...] | Respondent | Plaintiff | Participated Below | ---
[brief] 3T.  Counsel for Defendants argued that Defendants had provided fully responsive responses to discovery following the February 8 hearing by virtue of having provided a certification from [...] stating that she agreed with the certification of the Defendant LLC’s principal, [...], claiming that was “all [[...]] required. ”  3T12:17-13:20.  As counsel for Plaintiffs pointed out simply providing “[a] certification that I agree with the LLC, is not an answer to discovery. ”  3T13:19-14:1.  Plaintiffs’ counsel pointed out further:  They certified in their interrogatories, that they barely answered, that they did not destroy any documents, but they have not given us one single document.  They ran an apartment building for five years, have no maintenance records, no bank statements, no contractor bills.  They – we found from tenants’ emails with [...] where they were discussing the mold problem.  She – oh, I have no emails.  We have emails.  How do you not have emails?  [3T 14:11-21].  Thus, as Plaintiffs’ counsel pointed out, on March 6, [...] found that Defendants had done nothing to comply with their discovery obligations and denied their motion to restore.
[brief] ”  Payton, 148 N.J. at 535 (quoting N.J.R.E. 401).  Indeed, as Defendants explained to the trial court, their “experiences in the related litigations demonstrate that even agreed-to search terms result in a significant volume of irrelevant documents that the [...] had then removed from their production pool. ”  Da105.  Based on that experience, the [...] estimated shortly after the trial court issued its July 6 Directive that the ESI Order would require it to produce review after the parties ran search terms.  In re Actavis Holdco U.S., Inc., 2019 WL 8437021, at *1 (3d Cir. Dec. 6, 2019).
[brief] If this information is not furnished 30 days in advance of trial, the expert witness may, upon application by the defendant, be barred from testifying at trial[.]  On this procedural issue, Defendant recognizes that the decision to allow or exclude testimony based upon a discovery violation rests within the discretion of the trial court.  *State v. Williams*, 214 N.J. Super. 12, 22 (App. Div. 1986), cert. denied, 107 N.J. 629 (1987).  “In exercising its discretion, the court may consider (1) whether the party who failed to disclose intended to mislead; and (2) whether the aggrieved party was surprised and would be prejudiced by the admission of expert testimony. ”  *State v. Heisler*, 422 N.J. Super. 399, 415 (App. Div. 2011) (further citations omitted).  “Prejudice”, as explained by the court in *Heisler*, refers not to the impact of the testimony itself, but “the aggrieved party's inability to contest the testimony because of late notice. ”  *Id.*  In evaluating a claim of prejudice stemming from a trial court’s decision to bar the testimony of an expert offered by a defendant in *State v. Marshall*, 123 N.J. 1, 129–30, (1991), *cert. denied*, 507 U.S. 929 (1993), the higher court relied upon the reasoning that unfairness results to an opposing party who might then have difficulty engaging in effective cross-examination or be unable to locate and prepare a rebuttal witness.  This reasoning is applicable here, where two years elapsed from the time that both parties exchanged expert reports and the defense was surprised with the addition of a brand-new expert with a different opinion on the eve of trial.
[brief] (6T78:10 to 80:8, 144:25 to 145:3.)  The PSA further provides as follows:  It is agreed that from and after the Effective Date Purchaser, in the event Seller has not fully completed all of the above requirements then prior to Closing, the Purchaser may either cancel this Agreement or extend the date for Closing for such period as determined by Purchaser to be appropriate to allow for completion by Seller of the said obligations.  If Purchaser elects to terminate this Agreement the Deposit shall be immediately refunded by Purchaser as herein required.  (Pa0261, Art. 11.2(b).)  In addition, the PSA provides that “[f]rom and after the Effective Date Purchaser shall, through Purchaser’s LSRP determine what remedies, if any, should be performed in order for the issuance of those items in Section 11.2 above prior to Closing. ” (Pa0261-62, Art. 11.2(c).)  With respect to a default by Defendants, Article 13.2 of the PSA provides, in pertinent part, as follows:  If Seller (i) defaults in its Closing obligations (i.e., fails or refuses to timely Close as required in this Agreement) or otherwise defaults in the performance of any of its obligations hereunder which are to be performed on, or as of, the Closing Date, or (ii) otherwise defaults hereunder and such default is not cured within thirty (30) days after notice thereof . . . then, and in either such event, Seller shall immediately pay to Purchaser any and all amounts required to be paid to Purchaser pursuant to the terms of this Agreement, if any, plus Purchaser may at Purchaser’s election either (x) pursue an action for specific performance of this Agreement by Seller hereunder, without abatement, credit against or reduction of the Purchase Price except as otherwise provided in this Agreement and/or (y) seek any and all damages available at law or in equity and/or (z) terminate this Agreement by written notice to Seller and Escrowee, whereupon the Deposit and all interest earned thereon shall be refunded to Purchaser.  (Pa0265, Art. 13.2.)
[brief] To the extent that Appellant cites to *Glassman v. Friedel*, 249 N.J. 199 (2021), and *Adams v. Yang*, 475 N.J. Super. 1 (App. Div. 2023), neither is of any benefit to Appellant here.  Both of these cases deal with the effect of settlements before trial, and whether plaintiffs may comment upon or take positions at trial with respect to settling defendants.  The heart of these rulings dealt with whether plaintiffs – having served expert reports and having settled based upon those allegations – were permitted to assert the non-culpability of the settling defendants.
[brief] Anonymous call report by [...] .................. Da.  25  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | CASES | PAGE NOS | |--------------------------------------------|----------| | California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970) | 5,6 | | Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 194 (1973) | 4 | | Crawford v. Washington 541 U.S. 36, 59 (2004) | 5 | | Farve v. Henderson, 464 F.2d 359 (5th Cir. 1972) | 6 | | Keen v. State, 775 So. 2d 263, 272 (Fla. 2000) | 6 | | State v. Bankston, 63 N.J. 263 (1973) | 6,7 | | State v. Branch, 182 N.J. 338, 351 (2005) | 8 | | State v. Farthing, 331 N.J. Super 58, 75 (App. Div. 2000) | 8 | | State v. Garron, 177 N.J. 147, 169 (2003) | 4,5 | | State v. Irving, 114 N.J. 427, 447 (1989) | 7 | | State v. Kemp, 195 N.J. 136, 154 (2008) | 8 | | State v. Roach, 146 N.J. 208, 224-26 (1996) | 9 | | State v. Slaughter, 219 N.J. 104, 116 (2014)| 9,10 | CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
[brief] Redevelopment agreements are uniquely crafted to help implement and facilitate the clear historical and legislative intent of rehabilitating those areas that have fallen into contagious disrepair – a condition which the Legislature “presumed to be having a negative social or economic impact or otherwise being detrimental to the safety, health, morals, or welfare of the surrounding area or the community in general. ”  62-64 Main Street, LLC v. Mayor and Council of City of Hackensack, 221 N.J. 129, 151 n. 5 (2015).
[brief] (Da041-042; Da043-044; Da412-432; 1T)¹.  The trial court, per the Honorable [...], ¹ Pursuant to R. 2:6-8, the transcript of the oral argument and decision on [...]’s motion for summary judgment and [...]’s Cross-Motion for found the Subcontract’s indemnification clause to be ambiguous, though she acknowledged competing caselaw.  (Da43; 1T36:14-24, 37:1-15).  On November 9, 2023, [...] moved to reconsider the trial court’s denial of its Motion for Summary Judgment, and the trial court’s grant of [...]’ cross-motion.  In its moving papers, O.A.  Peterson asserted that the trial court failed “to provide or state on the record what the two competing interpretations of the clause are” citing to Nester v. O’Donnell, 301 N.J. Super. 198, 210 (App. Div. 1997) (“An ambiguity in a contract exists if the terms of the contract are susceptible to at least two reasonable alternative interpretations”) (internal quotations omitted).  Further, [...] submitted that the Court did not interpret the Subcontract by giving its terms their plain and ordinary meaning, citing to Kieffer v. Best Buy, 205 N.J. 213, 223 (2011).
[brief] ”  (Pa 14)  19.  N.J. Const. Article VI.  Judicial Section V P. 4 (Pa 160-163).  “Prerogative writs are superseded and, in lieu thereof, review, hearing and relief shall be afforded in the Superior Court, on terms and in the manner provided by rules of the Supreme Court, as of right, except in criminal causes where such review shall be discretionary. ”  20.  “In almost all prerogative writ proceedings, the public interest is directly involved, and factual disputes are generally closely interwoven with legal issues.  It is generally felt, therefore, that no substantial invasion of the principle of trial by jury of legal disputes involving private rights would ensue from rendering all issues in prerogative writ proceedings triable by the court.  This view was incorporated in the revision of the Judiciary Article contained within the proposed revised Constitution of 1944, wherein, in Article V, Section VII, paragraph 4, it was expressly provided that determinations of questions of fact arising in prerogative writ proceedings might be made by the court without a jury.
[directive] In 2013, the Department established a Diversity Council as a significant step towards strengthening our diversity efforts.  In 2016, adopting a recommendation from the Diversity Council and consistent with best practices, the Department created a full-time senior level role, now known as the Chief Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion Officer (“CDEIO”), a position established as part of the Attorney General’s Executive Leadership Team and held by an Assistant Attorney General with direct accountability to the Office of the Attorney General.  Since then, additional resources have been allocated and assigned within the Office of the Attorney General under the leadership of the CDEIO in support of the Department’s DEI initiatives.  The Department also has expanded the Diversity Council, and it has called upon our divisions, offices or commissions (“Divisions”) to formalize and submit Division-specific DEI plans, crafted in consultation with the CDEIO.  The Department has created additional supporting organizational units for diversity, such as a Diversity and Inclusion Unit within the Employee Relations and Community Outreach Section of the Division of State Police.  With the guidance of the CDEIO, the Division of State Police has also created an Equity in Policing and Inclusion Committee (EPIC) to further broaden and support DEI in that Division.  This Attorney General Executive Directive formalizes the creation of the Office of Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion, ensuring its long-term place within the Department and creating a clear and defined approach and organizational structure and authority for the Department’s DEI initiatives.
[brief] ..................................................... 24, 27 | | Model Jury Charges (Criminal), “Murder, Passion/Provocation and Aggravated/Reckless Manslaughter (N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3a(1) and (2); 2C:11-4a, b(1) and b(2)” (rev. June 8, 2015) ....................................................................................33 | | Model Penal Code: Sentencing (Am. Law Inst., Proposed Final Draft, 2017).26  | | National Institute of Justice, From Juvenile Delinquency to Young Adult Offending, Office of Justice Programs, https://www.nij.gov/topics/crime/Pages/delinquency-to-adult-offending.aspx (Mar. 11, 2014)  ..............................................................................................................25 | TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (Cont'd)  PAGE NOS.  National Institute of Justice, From Youth Justice Involvement to Young Adult Offending, https://nij.ojp.gov/topics/articles/youth-justice-involvement-young-adult-offending (Mar. 11, 2014)  ..........................................................25  National Research Council, The Growth of Incarceration in the United States: Exploring Causes and Consequences ([...], [...], & [...] eds., 2014)  .........................................................................................46  New Jersey Criminal Sentencing and Disposition Commission, 2019 Annual Report 41 (Nov. 2019)  ..............................................................................................................27  Pressler and Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules, cmt. 4 on R. 1:12-1 (2023)  .49  [...], [...], [...], From Juvenile Delinquency to Young Adult Offending (Study Group on the Transitions between Juvenile Delinquency and Adult Crime) (July 2013), available at https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/242931.pdf ...........................................26 S. Jud. Comm. Statement to A. 4373 (Aug. 24, 2020) .....................................................27 PROCEDURAL HISTORY [...] charged Defendant-Appellant [...] with one count of murder in the first degree, N.J.S.A 2C:11-3a(1)(Count 1), one count of possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose in the second degree, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4a(1) (Count 2), one count of unlawful possession of a weapon in the second degree, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5b(1) (Count 3), and one count of aggravated assault in the fourth degree, 2C:12-1b(4) (Count 4) (Da1-2).
[brief] Statutes and Other Authorities:  9 U.S.C. § 4 ...............................................................................................................................  14 N.J.A.C. 13:45A-16.1 ..................................................................................................................  5 N.J.A.C. 13:45A-16.2(a)(12)(iv) .............................................................................................  5 N.J.S.A. 2A:23B-6(b) ..................................................................................................................  14 N.J.S.A. 2A:50-1 to -68 ............................................................................................................  26 N.J.S.A. 56:8-1 ..........................................................................................................................  5 R. 4:6-2(a) .................................................................................................................................  4 R. 4:6-2(e) .................................................................................................................................  4 R. 4:64-1 to -8 ..........................................................................................................................  26 R. 4:64-5 .................................................................................................................................  26  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
[brief] The procedural history is correctly and completely set forth in the Trial Court’s Decision and Judgment dated February 26, 2024.  (Pa0074-Pa0080).  In addition to the arguments presented below and in the main brief of Plaintiffs, this Court should also consider the Letter Brief of Plaintiffs dated August 2, 2024, submitted in response to Intervenor’s appellate motion to strike exhibits from the Plaintiffs’ Appendix.  The Appellate Panel directed by Order dated August 9, 2024 that motion to be decided by this Court.  (Da114-115).  **STATEMENTS OF FACTS**
[brief] (Pa352).  The proposed improvements include modifications to existing parking lots and three new parking lots bringing the total number of proposed parking spaces on the site to 573 (where 671 would be the minimum amount required under the Residential Site Improvement Standards (RSIS) if the new proposed units were developed).  (Pa6).  Currently there are 388 parking spots in the complex, where 488 is required under the RSIS.  (Pa252).  Therefore, currently 79.5% of the required parking in the complex exists and the application would maintain 79.5% of the required parking with the additional development.  (Pa252).  However, the existing parking ratio of 1.46 parking spaces per unit would actually be increased to 1.56 spaces per unit.  [...], who has been the property manager at the site since 2016, also testified regarding the procedures for issuing parking decals.  In addition, [...] confirmed that since she began as property manager in 2016, she has never observed any parking issues or operational issues with parking; specifically stating that there is plenty of parking on the site and they have never received a complaint from a tenant regarding lack of parking.  Furthermore, Plaintiff’s traffic experts testified that the improvements would only increase traffic on average to about one new car every minute spread out amongst the whole complex.  The application also provides for seven proposed trash enclosures, as well as upgrading the existing trash enclosures, which are currently not fully enclosed, to provide new fencing and screening.  The application also provides for an increase in the amount of courtyard area, additional concrete sidewalks, landscaping, lighting and four underground stormwater management systems.  In addition, the application ensured that 42.4 percent of the site would remain as open space, including courtyards, recreation areas, and passive grassy areas, whereas only 20 percent of open space is required.
[brief] On the re-recorded deed, it stated that “The within deed is being re-recorded in order to recite the correct lot number of the premises being conveyed and to provide the correct metes and bounds description of the property. ” (Da347-350).  5.  The deed dated October 25, 2019 from [...] to [...].  A deed dated October 25, 2019 was recorded on February 11, 2020 purporting to transfer title to the Property from “[...]” to [...] for consideration of $180,000.00 (the “October 2019 Deed”).  (Da351-370).  [...] signed in the name of “[...]. ”  Seller’s residence certification/exemption stated that the gain from the sale is not recognized for tax purpose under 26 U.S. Code section 721.(Da354).  Under said section, the gain is not recognized when a property is contributed to a partnership in exchange of an interest in the partnership.  In the seller’s Affidavit of Title, [...] made a sworn statement certifying that he had never used any other name, despite the fact that he had exclusively used the names “[...]” and “Sam [...]” for over 30 years, and had never used the name “[...]” to sign any documents before.  (Da359).  At trial, because of [...] and his wife’s substantial holding of investment properties in New York, mountains of documents were introduced to show that [...] had exclusively used the names “[...]” and “Sam [...]” to sign documents.  The established fact at trial is that [...] had never used the name “[...]” to sign any documents other than the 2019 fraudulent deed.  (Pa506-798, 799-819, 843-1097, 1098-1118, 1119-1152).
[directive] Exception without Complaint- by Charged Must Be That Crimes Specified 4.4.1 .....................................................................................................37  Warrant.  Out-of-State or Federal, Jersey, New and Cases Extradition 4.4.2  Detainers....................................................................................................38  a for of Presumption Applying Rebuttable a Is There Where Cases 4.5 ................................................................................................38  Complaint-Warrant or Elevated, Moderate, an Indicates Assessment Safety Public 4.S.l.a .........................38 or Activity, Violence Criminal New of Flight, Risk High or 3 of Score Risk Assessment Assault
[brief] Moreover, Plaintiff fully performed the modification by accepting five (5) months of reduced rents.  Even without implying consent to the modification, the Court can simply accept [...]’s statement in the Consent Order of April 17, 2019 where [...] stipulates the Lease of 2015 “remains in effect”.  By stipulating that the Lease “remains in effect”, [...] is acknowledging that the Lease of February 20, 2015 has been in effect since February 20, 2015 and continued to be in effect on April 17, 2019 and thereafter until terminated in April of 2020.  Similarly, it is undisputed that [...] occupied the premises and ran its business out of the premises continuously and uninterrupted and without interference from February 20, 2015 to April 19, 2020.  Those facts have already been set forth above.