ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Stated otherwise, "[s]omewhere in the total circumstances there must be some thread capable of inducing reasonable men to regard the event as bearing upon the State’s case.  *State v. Sturdivant*, 31 N.J. 179 (1959).  The doubt cast on the State's case must be based on "specific evidence linking the third-person to the crime" or to the victim.  *State v. Timmendequas*, 161 N.J. 515, 620 (1999).  In setting a standard for the admission of third-party guilt, courts have acknowledged the concern about “the ease in which unsupported claims may infect the process. ”  *State v. R.Y.*, 242 N.J. 48, 66 (2020), citing *State v. Loftin*, 146 N.J. 295, 345 (1996).  To avoid said infection, defendant’s are prohibited from introducing evidence “in order to prove some hostile event and leave its connection with the case to mere conjecture. ”  *Id.* at 66-67, citing *State v. Sturdivant*, 31 N.J. 165, 179 (1959).  The decision to admit evidence of third-party guilt is “particularly fact-sensitive and rests within the trial court’s discretion. ”  *State v. Perry*, 225 N.J. 222, 239 (2016).  A trial court’s ruling on the admission of third-party guilt evidence is assessed under the abuse of discretion standard.
[brief] For the foregoing reasons, and for those laid out in the briefs of [...], [...], and [...], defendant-respondent  [...] respectfully requests that this Court affirm the Order granting respondents summary judgment and the judgment dismissing the fourth amended complaint.  Respectfully submitted, [...]  Attorneys for Defendant-Respondent, [...]  By: ____________________________  [...] ([...])  [...]  Tel.: [...] [...]  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY  APPELLATE  DIVISION DOCKET NO. [...]  T2  [...] and [...], H/W, Appellants/Plaintiffs, v. NEW JERSEY TURNPIKE AUTHORITY; [...]; [...]; [...]; [...]; [...]; JOHN DOE, MARY DOE, ABC BUSINESS ENTITIES AND XYZ CORPORATIONS, Respondents/Defendants.
[brief] The pathologist provided accurate testimony regarding the methods that could lead to the victim’s injuries ....................... 26  1.  [...] testified about [...]’s significant head injuries .................................................................................. 26  2.  [...] testified within the bounds of his expertise when he described the victim’s injuries ...................... 27  E.  Given the entirety of the expert’s testimony and the State’s evidence, the expert testimony was proper.  ......................... 28  POINT II
[brief] Id. at Ex. D.  The Final Judgment was recorded with the Atlantic County Clerk on October 21, 2022.  Id. at Ex. E.  None of this is disputed.  The Debtor attempted to set aside the Final Judgment in the state court but failed to do so.  See Main Case Doc. No. 29.  Indeed, despite several attempts, as of the return date of the Motions, May 28, 2024, the Debtor has not been successful in doing so.  Prior to his removal from the Property under the Final Judgment, on March 17, 2023, the Debtor filed his Chapter 13 bankruptcy case.
[brief] 1 STATEMENT OF PROCEDURAL HISTORY...............................  3 STATEMENT OF FACTS.....................................................  4 LEGAL ARGUMENT.........................................................  18  POINT I THE SCHOOL’S APPLICATION/APPEAL TO DETERMINE THE VALIDITY OF THE SYNAGOGUE’S OFF-SITE PARKING USE OF THE SCHOOL LOT  5 AS A NONCONFORMING USE WAS PROPERLY BEFORE THE ZONING BOARD AS PER N.J.S.A. 40:55-68 (RAISED BELOW BEFORE ZONING BOARD Da1-6 AND TRIAL COURT Da270).......................................  18 POINT II  AN OFF-SITE PARKING USE/FACILITY ON THE SCHOOL LOT 5 FOR LOT 8  SYNAGOGUE  STAFF/ATTENDEES IS NOT A PERMITTED USE FOR EITHER LOT 8 OR LOT 5 UNDER CURRENT ZONING REGULATIONS (RAISED BELOW BEFORE ZONING BOARD Da1 AND TRIAL COURT Da270)  ...........................................  22 POINT III  THE BURDEN OF PROOF AS TO THE LEGALITY OF THE NONCONFORMING OFF-SITE PARKING USE OF THE SCHOOL LOT 5 BY THE SYNAGOGUE  ATTENDEES/STAFF WAS ON THE SONS OF ISRAEL AS PROPONENTS OF THE USE (RAISED BELOW BEFORE ZONING BOARD Da1 AND BEFORE TRIAL COURT Da270).  ..................................................  27 POINT IV  THE PLAINTIFF SYNAGOGUE AND THE ZONING BOARD ATTORNEY (NOT THE ZONING BOARD ITSELF)  ERRONEOUSLY ASSERTED BELOW THAT THE CHANCERY COURT DETERMINATION --- THAT A PARKING EASEMENT ON LOT 5 WAS ESTABLISHED BY THE 1963 AGREEMENT --- WAS DETERMINATIVE AS TO THE N.J.S.A. 40:55D-68 DETERMINATION OF THE ZONING BOARD.  THE TRIAL COURT  ERRONEOUSLY ADOPTED THAT ANALYSIS/POSITION (RAISED BEFORE ZONING BOARD, Da1, AND BEFORE TRIAL COURT Da270)  ...........................................  37 POINT V  THE SUBMISSION BY PLAINTIFF OF NEW DOCUMENTS NOT BEFORE THE ZONING BOARD WAS NOT PROPER.  THE TRIAL COURT'S RELIANCE ON SUCH DOCUMENTS FOR ITS INCORRECT DECISION REQUIRES REVERSAL (RAISED BEFORE TRIAL COURT Da177-213  COURT ORDER APPEALED Da214 Da270).
[brief] POINT I  THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT [...]’S FAILURE TO IDENTIFY A PWCRA-REGISTERED ARCHAEOLOGIST IN ITS BID WAS NOT A STATUTORY MATERIAL DEFECT THAT RENDERED ITS BID NON-RESPONSIVE (0015a-018a).................................................................................10  A.  The PWCRA Requires That All Contractors and Each Listed Subcontractor Performing Work on Public Projects be Registered with the DOL at the Time of Bid Opening (0015a-0018a)  .........................................................11  B.  Archeological Subcontractors are Subcontractors Subject to the PWCRA Registration Requirement (0015a-0018a)  .................................................................15  C.  [...]’s Failure to Identify a PWCRA-Registered Archeological Subcontractor is a Statutory Violation that Require Automatic Rejection of its Bid (0015a-0018a)  .................................................................................................23  POINT II  THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT [...]’S FAILURE TO IDENTIFY A PWCRA-REGISTERED  ARCHAEOLOGIST IN ITS BID WAS NON-MATERIAL AND WAIVABLE ........................................................................................................25  CONCLUSION ..................................................................................................................29
[brief] Even with regard to the materiality of the policies for the purposes of the motion to dismiss, the policies were not material; the trial court judge found himself abundantly able to decide the issue and had taken testimony regarding the policies and their requirements as known to the actors in the case.  The purported “newly discovered evidence” is not “of the sort that would probably change the jury's verdict if a new trial were granted. ”  *State v. Fortin*, 464 N.J. Super. 193 (App. Div. 2020) (quoting *State v. Carter*, 85 N.J. 300, 314 (1981)).
[brief] Defendant’s reliance on out-of-state statutory schemes regarding unrelated subjects as requiring a nexus to accomplish their purpose is misplaced.  (Db18-20).  Defendant recognizes that none of those statutes relate to a terroristic threats enhancement.  (Db18).  Those few cases defendant references all involve crimes that require a nexus to further the purpose of the enhancement legislation in order to distinguish them from status crimes.  Rather, the instant legislation is more like that recently upheld in Illinois, where the crime itself furthers the purpose of the enhancement.
[brief] The police conduct here was in stark contrast to the conduct in Shaw that weighed most heavily against the State and led to suppression.  See 213 N.J. at 421.  The police who stopped, arrested, and searched Shaw were specifically tasked with arresting fugitives on open arrest warrants.  Id. at 401.  And even though the warrant for which Shaw was ultimately arrested was not the warrant for which he was first unlawfully stopped, the Court found it was not sufficiently attenuated from the illegal stop since the initial stop was an unlawful attempt to check for warrants based on the grossly inappropriate basis on which Shaw was stopped.  See id. at 419–20 (finding it was hardly the chance discovery of an outstanding warrant contemplated by attenuation precedent).  He was essentially stopped because he was a black man since the subject of the initial warrant was known to be a black man; but it was a different black man.  *Id.* at 420.  Not surprisingly, the Court found this was a blatantly unconstitutional basis to stop someone to check for warrants and factor (3) weighed most heavily against the State.  *Id.* at 421.  And that police learning Shaw actually had his own open parole warrant after being stopped was not sufficiently attenuated from their initial blatantly unconstitutional attempt to execute the initial warrant.  Unlike here where defendant was under investigation for something completely unrelated to driving while suspended for a prior drunk driving, thus making this case directly at odds with *Shaw*.
[brief] Furthermore, both the secret [...] and the [...] confirm that [...] is the record owner of the Property.  The [...] also clearly indicates that the debris piles in question are located on [...]’s Property, which is perhaps why [...] unfathomably failed to include a copy of the [...] in its Appendix in its submission to the Appellate Division.6  All five counts of [...]’s Complaint sought to avail [...]’s property rights and the trial court properly granted judgment in [...]’s favor with respect to all five.
[brief] When defendant mentioned his letter and that he wanted to marry her, [...] replied, “Marrying me is, is a joke.  That’s a joke. ”  When defendant asked why she thought it was a joke, [...] responded, “Because it’s not fucking true. ”  Defendant told her “to just stop and tell me what’s going on. ”  (7T:160-10 to 19).  In between telling [...] he loved her, he would interject his own theories about the shooting.
[brief] (P-59.)  7  POINT IV: WHETHER DEFENDANTS’ CONDUCT IN FAILING TO REMOVE THE ILLEGAL, LARGE, MAKESHIFT LIQUOR CONCESSION STAND WAS “PALPABLY UNREASONABLE” SHOULD BE LEFT TO A JURY.  (P-59.)  9  POINT V: PLAINTIFFS ARE ENTITLED TO DISCOVERY REGARDING THE COMPLAINTS ABOUT THE ILLEGAL, LARGE, MAKESHIFT CONCESSION STAND AND THE EXTENT THAT DEFENDANTS’ EMPLOYEES FAILED IN THEIR MINISTERIAL DUTIES TO SHUT IT DOWN.  (P-59.)  10  CONCLUSION
[brief] THE BOARD IMPROPERLY REJECTED KRESS’ REQUEST FOR AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING IN THE OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW  BECAUSE THERE ARE MATERIAL FACTS IN DISPUTE (Aa9-14)  In accordance with the New Jersey Administrative Procedure Act, N.J.S.A. 52:14B-9, 10-12, an evidentiary hearing is mandated when proposed administrative action is based on disputed adjudicatory facts.  Matter of Farmers’ Mut. Fire Assur Ass’n, of New Jersey, 256 N.J. Super 607 (App. Div. 1992).  See also, Spalt v. N.J. Dept. of Environmental Protection, N.J. Super 206 (App. Div. 1989), certif. denied 122 N.J. 140.  In the present case, there exist disputed facts which warrant an evidentiary hearing in the Office of Administrative Law.  These facts concern how and when [...] acquired knowledge of the salary disparities as well as the [...]’s efforts to obfuscate the facts.  For example, had the facts been made known earlier on in [...]’ tenure at the [...], she might well have litigated her claims earlier, clearly dispelling any presumption that her salary increases were in anticipation of retirement.  These issues can only be resolved in the setting of an evidentiary hearing at the OAL.  CONCLUSION
[brief] If a judge makes a discretionary decision but acts under a misconception of the applicable law or misapplies it, the decision is simply not subject to the usual deference.  Summit Plaza Assocs. v. Kolta, 462 N.J. Super. 401, 409 (App. Div. 2020); Alves v. Rosenberg, 400 N.J. Super. 553, 563 (App. Div. 2008).  In such a case, the reviewing court must instead adjudicate the controversy in the light of the applicable law in order that a manifest denial of justice be avoided.  State v. Lyons, 417 N.J. Super. 251, 258 (App. Div. 2010); State v. Steele, 92 N.J. Super. 498, 507 (App. Div. 1966); Kavanaugh v. Quigley, 63 N.J. Super. 153, 158 (App. Div. 1960).  We trust the judge understood the correct standard as was conceded at oral argument.  The letter opinion inadvertently references the incorrect standard under Court Rule 4:49-2.  We submit that any such error can be cured de novo on appeal for reconsideration was not warranted even under the lower standard since same was not required in the interest of Justice.  CONCLUSION
[brief] A.  [...] Did Not Improperly Raise a New Issue in a Reply Brief and the Trial Court Properly Considered All Relevant Materials in Calculating Interest..................................................  22  B.  The Trial Court Selected an Appropriate Start Date for the Beginning of its Interest Calculation ...........................................  24  C.  The Trial Court Properly Exercised its Discretion by Applying the 2% Enhancement to the Interest Rate .................. 28  ARGUMENT - PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT’S REPLY ..................................................
[brief] Cases  Bilotti v. Accurate Forming Corp., 39 N.J. 184, 203 (1963)  .................................................................  20  Dando v. Bimbo Food Bakeries Distribution, LLC, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 132038 (D.N.J. 2015)  ..................................  24 F.P.P.E. Consulting Eng'rs, Inc. v. Morda, 2009 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 419 (App. Div.) .............................  20 Goncalvez ex rel. Goncalvez, 188 N.J. Super. 620, 629 (App. Div. 1983) ....................................  22  Halderman v. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp., 901 F.2d 311 (3d Cir. 1990) ......................................................... 16, 17, 26 Home Props. of N.Y., L.P. v. Ocino, Inc., 341 N.J. Super. 604 (App. Div. 2001) ...........................................  23  In re Estate of Miller, 90 N.J. 210 (1982) ......................................  23 Isetts v. Borough of Roseland, 364 N.J. Super. 247 (App. Div. 2003) .......................................... 16, 30 Joao v. Cenuco, Inc., 376 F. Supp. 2d 380 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) ..........................................  27 Marwood v. Elizabeth Forward Sch. Dist., 93 F. App'x 333 (3d Cir. 2004) ....................................................  16  M.J. Paquet, Inc. v. N.J. DOT, 171 N.J. 378 (2002)  ..................................................................  16 Monaco v. Mitsubishi Motors Credit of Am., Inc., 34 F. App'x 43 (3d Cir. 2002) ....................................................  22 Medtronic AVE Inc. v. Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., 247 F.3d 44 (3d Cir. 2001).................................................................24  Schwartz v. Dall. Cowboys Football Club, Ltd., 157 F. Supp. 2d 561 (E.D. Pa. 2001)..................................................19  Sullivan v. DB Invs., Inc., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81146 (D.N.J. 2008)......................................26  Shutte v. Armco Steel Corp., 431 F.2d 22 (3d Cir. 1970).................................................................28  Stelluti v. Casapenn Enters., LLC, 203 N.J. 286 (2010)  ...........................................................................19, 21 Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Schultz, 2013 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 406 (Ch. Div. 2013)............................19  Watkins v. Resorts Int'l Hotel & Casino, 124 N.J. 398 (1991)  ...........................................................................24  Witasick v. Minn. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 803 F.3d 184, 192 (3d Cir. 2015).........................................................22  Other Authorities  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (7th ed. 2000).............................................2  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
[brief] 17  Bragg v. Hi-Ranger, Inc., 462 S.E.2d 32 (S.C. App. 1995) .....................................................  13,17  Bryant v. Thoratec Corp., 343 F. Supp.3d 594 (S.D. Miss. 2018) ....................................................  27  Burke v. Deere & Co., 6 F.3d 497 (8th Cir. 1993) ...............  15  Matter of Cadillac V8-6-4 Class Action, 93 N.J. 412 (1983)  ..................................................................  18  Carlson v. Triton Industries, Inc., 605 F. Supp.3d 1124 (W.D. Wis. 2022) ......................................................
[brief] R. 2:6-1(a)(2).  Therefore, the contentions and arguments in the Defendant Intervenor’s brief about the “offer” of these exhibits as part of the administrative record are without merit.  Three cases support the inclusion of these documents into the administrative record for the Trial Court’s review.  First, in Hirth, supra, the plaintiff purchased a tract contingent on getting approval for eighty residential units.  Hirth, Id., at 158.  The plan, however, called for plaintiff’s property to act as a buffer between other residences and an adjoining commercial property.  The Appellate Division ruled that a remand back to the trial court was necessary to determine if this change in the use to commercial for the plaintiffs’ property by the plan was arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable.  However, that remand was contingent upon the Trial Court “reviewing the complete administrative record, including transcripts of the relevant proceedings before the [Planning Board] and City Council. ”  Id.  Accordingly, in this case, the Planning Board transcript of February 6, 2023, should be part of the administrative record for any judicial review in this case.  Second, in Malanga v. Twp. of West Orange, 235 N.J. 291 (2023), plaintiff sued to contest the designation for the redevelopment of the municipal library.
[brief] BECAUSE THERE WAS NO MOTION TO BAR PLAINTIFF’S EXPERT, HIS TESTIMONY SHOULD HAVE BEEN CONSIDERED.  Defendants baldly assert that no motion to bar plaintiff’s expert is required.  Db6.  In support, they cite Townsend v. Pierre, 221 N.J. 36 (2015), and Schwartz v. Menas, 251 N.J. 556 (2022).  Neither case supports defendants’ position.  Both cases held that properly raised evidentiary issues need to be resolved before rendering a decision on a pending dispositive motion.  There is nothing novel about those holdings.  In both cases, however, there was a properly raised motion to preclude the non-movant’s expert from testifying.  The motions to preclude were argued and decided, as they should have been.  Here, there was no properly raised evidentiary issue.  Absent a motion to preclude, the evidence and inferences should have been resolved in the non-movant’s favor.  **POINT III**
[brief] The only other relief [...] required related to steep slope disturbance, which was also a design exception because that section of the LUDO, like the front yard parking requirement, is a site plan design standard.  The Board does not explain why [...]’s site plan must adhere to the 35% impervious coverage limit mandated for single-family dwellings in the R-20A Zone, but there is a good reason why it need not do so.  Single-family dwellings are exempt from site plan review, and the general obligation to comport with stormwater management requirements associated therewith.
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[brief] (3T36:9-11).  [...] indicated that if an Officer was not logged into their MDT they are "off the grid" and dispatch has no other way to track them.  (3T37:21).  [...] also noted that there have been problems as far as the radios not working correctly or getting stepped on or static interference and communications failing to transmit and go through.  (3T38:4).  [...] did not have a record of those problems and did not know whether such records were kept.  (3T38:8).  [...] would, however, keep track of what emails were sent about those issues.
[brief] Defendants are not required to plead recoupment or set-off when there are issues of legislative policy.  Citizens have a great public interest in the equal application of TILA.  1  Appellant is using “Drb” to indicate pages in Appellant’s Reply Brief.  i.  Respondent and Appellant argued TILA defense on the merits.  ii.  New Jersey Supreme Court applied the policy of TILA to permit the affirmative defense of recoupment in a promissory note case.  iii.  The Appellate Division applied the “remedial goals” of TILA to permit the affirmative defense of recoupment in a foreclosure case.  iv.  “Importance of public question” generally applied.  C.  The affirmation by the Court of the trial Court’s denial of the affirmative defense of recoupment or set-off would produce an anomalous and inequitable result.  Prevention of an anomalous and inequitable result is a matter of great public interest.  X.
[brief] In addition to this constitutional mandate, the Township’s condemnation of the Shopping Center is subject to the provisions of the Eminent Domain Act of 1971 (the “EDA”), N.J.S.A. 20:3-1 to -50, together with N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-8(c) of the LRHL.  However, just compensation does not entitle the [...] to what constitutes double recovery—profit from the rent-producing commercial Property from 1994 to 2018, when the Township actually took possession, as well as the market value of the Property as of January 27, 1994 premised upon what a third-party buyer would pay for complete possession and ownership of the Property some twenty four years preceding the eminent domain action.  The clear intent and purpose of just compensation is to put the owner in the same position as if the condemnor had never resolved to take the subject property.  *U.S. v. Reynolds*, 397 U.S. 14, 15 (1970).