ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] In this ESI discovery dispute, the plaintiffs claim that [...] has withheld documents returned in response to the parties’ agreed upon search terms by conducting a subsequent manual search and producing only a percentage of the returned documents.  The plaintiffs ask the Court to order [...] to provide hit reports for its ESI searches and to disclose the criteria it used to withhold documents.  [...] counters that it has reviewed its collection of ESI only for responsiveness to the plaintiffs’ document demands and not for relevance.  [...] claims that it has produced all non-privileged documents responsive to the plaintiffs’ document demands except for those that it has properly withheld on the basis of an objection.  Having reviewed the parties’ submissions, the Court is satisfied that [...] has met its discovery obligations in accordance with the Federal Rules.
[brief] It is fanciful to argue that the farmers and sportsmen recommended for appointment by the statutorily designated private organizations do not have to be members of those organizations.  \textit{N.J.S.A.}  13:1B-24.  Indeed, the Legislature provides certain safeguards to sportsmen’s clubs throughout the State “[i]n order to permit for the broadest possible representation of sportsmen in the making of recommendations for appointment of sportsmen to membership in the council…”  \textit{N.J.S.A.}  13:1B-25.  Neither the State defendants, nor the [...] presented any evidence that the members recommended by the [...] are not members of that organization, or that there is a residue of sportsmen available for recommendation for appointment who are not members of the [...] or any of the subsidiary clubs comprising that organization.  The court should assume that the [...] (or any other private organization given such favored status and an opportunity to control an agency) acts to advance the interests of its own members by recommending only its own members for appointment to the Council.
[brief] The Amendments establish a schedule for the State to phase out and eliminate Adjustment Aid from the SFRA formula.  Beginning 2019-20, when the District received $181.9 million in Adjustment Aid, the State will phase out the aid category altogether by 2024-25, resulting in an estimated $1 billion cumulative loss in state aid to help fund the Adequacy Budget.  (Pa1943; Pa1954.)  The percentage reductions in Adjustment Aid rise from year-to-year, starting with 13% in 2019-20 and rising to 100% in 2024-25, the final year of the phase-out.  (Pa929, ¶ 147; Pa2251.)  b.  **Lifting the 2% Tax Growth Cap**
[brief] State v. Green, 86 N.J. 281, 288 (1981) (“The trial court’s instructions should cover all essentials and counsel may justifiably assume that fundamental matters will be covered in the charge. ”); State v. Collier, 90 N.J. 117, 122-23 (1982) (holding that inaccurate or incomplete charges on a material issue “are presumed to be reversible error”).  The trial court, however, failed to provide the jury with the model jury charge governing “Third Party Guilt. ”  See Model Jury Charges (Criminal), “Third Party Guilt Jury Charge” (approved Mar. 9, 2015).  (Dra1)  That model charge contains specific instructions as to the question of third-party guilt which are not included in any other instruction.  Accordingly, the jury was not sufficiently charged on a material issue, requiring reversal.  Collier, 90 N.J. at 122-23.  The State does not dispute that the jury was required to receive adequate instruction as to how to interpret [...]’s defense raising the possibility that [...] had been the shooter.
[brief] Respondent’s entire argument that Petitioner had to be reappointed every year is a red herring.  Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2B:25-4(b), municipal prosecutors are required to be appointed on an annual basis.  Unfortunately, when Chapter 92 was enacted, this statutory conflict was not resolved.  It is urged that this Court should look at the length of the relationship, in this case 19 out of the past 20 years, rather than the annual reappointment, which is statutory form over substance.
[brief] Appellants’ reference to Plotnick v. DeLuccia, 434 N.J. Super. 597 (Ch. Div. 2013), only underscores that the right here is well-settled.  (Db11-12).  In Plotnick, the putative father of an unborn child sought a temporary injunction requesting that he be notified when the mother entered labor and be allowed in the delivery room during the child’s birth over the mother’s objection.  Id. at 601.  The trial court found that plaintiff had not shown the legal right he sought to establish was “settled” because he offered “no legislative or judicial authority to support his conclusion” that his right to be notified of labor or to be present in the delivery room existed at all.  Id. at 618-19.  In short, because plaintiff’s asserted legal right did not exist in the first place, he had no well-settled right to proceed.  Ibid.  The opposite is true here.  The State’s right to seek injunctive relief against a policy that mandates disparate treatment and subjects students to disparate impact on the basis of gender identity or expression in schools, which are places of public accommodation, has been well-settled for at least 45 years.  See N.J.S.A. 10:5-14.1; N.J.S.A. 10:5-12(f)(1); Peper, 77 N.J. at 81-82.  And those are the rights on which the State relies here and in its administrative action.  Appellants fail to disprove the well-settled LAD rights.  ii.
[brief] Mirabelli, 2023 WL 5976992, at *18.  The preliminary restraints disrupted the Board’s ability to implement policies to address potential adverse impacts on students, secure parental involvement, maintain an open, cooperative relationship with parents and acknowledge fundamental Constitutional parental rights.  In addition, the court’s entry of restraints penalizes parents of LGBTQ+ students inasmuch as it would exclude them from information regarding issues or behaviors that may have an adverse impact on their child’s physical and/or mental health, safety and or social/emotional well-being whenever LBGTQ+ status may be implicated.  Similarly, the court’s order: (1) strips parents of LGBTQ+ students of their right to provide guidance and support to their children such as by securing potentially necessary services (e.g., therapy and counseling) to fulfill needs that schools are not equipped to address on a plenary basis; and (2) deprives LGBTQ+ students of parental guidance and support.  Moreover, as set forth at Point III, supra, the court did not adduce clear and convincing evidence of substantial, immediate and irreparable harm from the Revised Policy.  Therefore, the record lacked clear and convincing evidence that the harm, if any, from denial of the restraints substantially outweighed countervailing harms to the Board, students and parents from the imposition of the restraints.
[brief] Plaintiff hereby incorporates the procedural history and statement of facts as set forth in the Plaintiff’s opening brief.  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I:  DEFENDANT SHOULD BE RESPONSIBLE FOR HIS FAIR SHARE OF THE COSTS OF HIS CHILDREN’S COLLEGE EDUCATION (P-452)  Nothing in Defendant’s opposition brief excuses Defendant’s horrible treatment of Plaintiff and their children since remarrying.  Defendant mocks plaintiff for seeking to enforce the JOD that was entered nineteen years before her first post-judgment application (Def.’s Opp. 2), but it should be noted that when the JOD was entered, [...] was only four years old, and it would take many years before court intervention was necessary.  In 2017, the court directed the parties to work out their remaining claims in mediation.  Defendant dryly notes, “The mediation was unsuccessful. ”  (Def.’s Opp. 3.)  That is because Defendant stormed out of the mediation.  Defendant also mocks Plaintiff’s ability to afford counsel because she was receiving “tax free child support in the amount of $180.00 per week since December of 1998” to support two children, (Def.’s Opp. 12), although Defendant also admits that he stopped paying child support, (Def.’s Opp. 2-3).  Even if Defendant was meeting his obligations, Plaintiff certainly was not living in the lap of luxury on $180 a week to support two children, plus being forced to completely pay for their medical expenses because Defendant repeatedly refused to reimburse her.  Defendant merely states he “can’t afford it,” yet Defendant committed perjury on his CIS by omitting his one-half interest in his father’s home that was deeded to him 2 months prior to his execution of that CIS, and where his matrimonial attorney, [...], also prepared the deed transferring the one-half interest in Defendant’s father’s house to Defendant, thus suborning perjury, and where [...] invoked the Fifth Amendment during the pre-trial deposition, when the Undersigned attempted to explore this issue, entitling Plaintiff to an adverse inference, which was requested but not given.
[brief] “A ‘reasonable probability’ is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. ”  Nelson, 155 N.J. at 500 (quoting Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682).  In deciding materiality, courts “‘examine the circumstances under which the nondisclosure arose’ and ‘[t]he significance of [the] nondisclosure in the context of the entire record,’” considering the strength of the State’s case, the timing of the disclosure, the relevance of the evidence, and its potential admissibility.  Brown, 236 N.J. at 518-19 (quoting State v. Marshall, 123 N.J. 1, 199-200 (1991)).  However, “[n]o denial of due process occurs if Brady material is disclosed [to defendants] in time for its effective use at trial.
[brief] On or about March 26, 2018  Plaintiff, [...], (“[...]”) initiated the action below by filing a Complaint which alleged excessive overbilling, improper charges, damages relating to [...]’s inattentiveness, refusal to perform work on his behalf, and failure to properly represent [...] in the Sollecito matter. (See Complaint Pa1).  After a Motion to Dismiss was denied, Defendant, [...] (“[...]”) filed an Answer on or about July 23, 2018 which in addition to denying the allegations of the Complaint, included a Counterclaim for breach of contract alleging non-payment of legal fees and seeking additional legal fees, interest, costs and disbursements.  (See Answer Pa7).  [...] filed an Answer to the Counterclaim denying same on or about September 14, 2018 (see answer to counterclaim Pa23).  Parties exchanged discovery and after many delays related to Covid, among other things, trial was held between November 29, 2022 and December 6, 2022.  Judgment was in favor of Defendant.  This appeal follows. \(^1\)
[brief] In considering the [...]’s motion for a directed verdict, in the absence of any documentary or testimonial evidence establishing how long the sign was down, it was inconceivable for the trial court to conclude that a rational factfinder would find that the sign was missing for “such a long period of time” that the [...] should have discovered it.  Therefore, the trial court erred by not granting the [...]’s motions for a directed verdict.
[brief] The Miranda family consists of father, [...] (“Decedent” or “[...]”) and three adult children; sons, [...] and [...]; and daughter, [...] (“[...]”).  Pa134-135.  [...] resided in both New Jersey and in Portugal, where he split his time, traveling between the two places.  Pa002; Pa136.  He died on June 5, 2017 in Portugal at the age of 80.
[brief] Graham, 490 U.S. at 396.  It is also significant that Plaintiff “had a set of keys clinched in each hand specifically with the keys poking through his knuckles which could be used as a weapon. ”  Pa023.  See also Pa304.  Based upon this aggressive behavior, the Plaintiff “pose[d] an immediate threat to the safety of the officers[,]” which is another Graham factor, and further supported the officers’ actions in this case.  Graham, 490 U.S. at 396.  Lastly, although Plaintiff has made an excessive force claim, he has not presented any evidence or any injury, aside from some minor, undocumented treatment.  After the arrest, Plaintiff was transported to [...].  After Plaintiff was “medically cleared” for release, he was transferred to the [...] “without incident. ”  Pa023.  At his deposition, Plaintiff testified that he underwent one medical evaluation at the [...] about three or four months after his arrest in February 2020.  Pa439-Pa440 (T35:11-T36:21).  Plaintiff did not receive any treatment for alleged emotional distress.  Pa349 (T35:3-8).  Had Plaintiff actually sustained injuries as a result of the officers’ conduct, he would have had some medical documentation of treatment.  The absence of any such evidence further disproves Plaintiff’s claim.  There is no doubt that the officers acted reasonably and are entitled to qualified immunity and the claim was properly dismissed on summary judgment.
[brief] [Pa686 ([...] Deposition) at 18:21-23, and Pa689 at 57:18-25 and Pa690 at 58:1-4; and Pa730].  Plaintiffs failed to disclose to the Court at oral argument on January 24, 2020 and February 14, 2020 that as of March 16, 2017, April 7, 2017 and July 1, 2017 and January 29, 2019, plaintiffs knew or should have known (i) the location of where [...] allegedly slipped and fell; (ii) the mechanism of injury that allegedly caused him to fall; and (iii) the identity of the party or parties allegedly responsible for causing his alleged damages [Pa436-Pa447; Pa687 ([...] Deposition) at 37:12-25 and Pa688 at 38:1-11 and at 40:23-25 and at 41:1-11; and Pa691-Pa703; and Pa704-Pa719 and Pa686 ([...] Deposition) at 18:21-23, and Pa689 at 57:18-25 and Pa690 at 58:1-4; and Pa730; Pa691-Pa703 and Pa704-Pa719 and Pa729-Pa732].
[brief] Attorney General Law Directive No. 2022-1, Update to Body Worn Camera Policy, § 1.1 (Jan. 19, 2022)  ..................................................35  [...], et al., Distribution of Pupil Size and Associated Factors: Results from the Population-Based Gutenberg Health Study, Journal of Ophthalmology (2022)  ..........................................................18  N.J. Gov. Statement to Assemb. B. 4312 (Oct. 19, 2020)  ..............................................35  New Jersey Office of the State Comptroller, The High Price of Unregulated Police Training to New Jersey (Dec. 6, 2023)  .............................................5  [...], et al., Pupillary Responses in Non-Proliferative Diabetic Retinopathy, Sci. Rep. 7, 44987 (2017)  .................................................................18  [...] & [...], An Examination of the Validity of the Standardized Field Sobriety Test in Detecting Drug Impairment Using Data from the Drug Evaluation and Classification Program, 15 Traffic Injury Prevention (2014)  ........................................15  TRANSCRIPT
[brief] Defendant’s Statement of Facts does glancingly reference this, stating that “due to the severity of [...]’s psychiatric diagnoses, [...] was unable to understand and/or fully appreciate the nature or the cause of the legal proceeding against him. ”  (Db2)  Defendant further states “However due to the severity of [...]’s psychiatric diagnoses-requiring in-patient treatment, he was unable to fully understand and/or appreciate the nature of the action against him or the cause of the legal proceeding” (Db5).  While Defendant makes these broad assertions, there is nothing in the record to explain how the diagnosis prevented Defendant from answering the complaint in a timely manner and how it prohibited Defendant from filing a motion to vacate judgment for six years.  Nor does Defendant argue in his brief the excuse for the nearly six-year delay, other than the references noted above.  Defendant’s certification failed to provide the requisite proof, by failing to explain how Defendant’s condition caused or led to the delay in filing.  However, Defendant did not address the matter in his appellate brief and, like the claims brought under R. 4:50-1 (a), appears to have abandoned this claim, and the Court is left unguided by Defendant on this point.  Plaintiff notes finally that Defendant was required to show both excusable neglect and a meritorious defense.  “Generally, a defendant seeking to reopen a default judgment must show that the neglect to answer was excusable under the circumstances and that he has a meritorious defense.  Marder v. Realty Const. Co., 84 N.J. Super. 313, 318 (App. Div.), aff'd, 43 N.J. 508 (1964).  See also US Bank Nat. Ass'n v. Guillaume, 209 N.J. 449 (2012).  Carelessness may be excusable when attributable to an honest mistake that is compatible with due diligence or reasonable prudence.  Diprospero, supra, at 395; Mancini v. EDS on Behalf of New Jersey Auto. Full Ins. Underwriting Ass'n, 132 N.J. 330 (1993).  Here, as argued above, Defendant’s failure to explain why he failed to file the motion to vacate default until nearly six years after the judgment is fatal to a claim that his carelessness was excusable neglect.  There is no attempt to explain the delay, beyond reference to a medical condition, and no attempt to tie the specifics of Defendant’s condition to the six years of delay.  Looking at the lack of excusable neglect and the six-year delay for which Defendant proffered only a broad explanation, the trial court held Defendant “cannot establish that six years is a “reasonable time” within which to have brought this motion. ”  Plaintiff respectfully suggests this conclusion of law is well within the trial court’s discretion.
[brief] Also, [...] had made additional credibility determinations in his sanctions Rulings in 2018 and awarding sanction/attorney fees against [...].  (Da969, Da971)  That Motion for Recusal was denied by [...], (Da814) the Court finding that recusal was not warranted as its earlier determinations were “not based on credibility or to the extent there were credibility determinations were not indicative of prejudice or predetermination (4T1-16).  A subsequent Motion for Reconsideration of that Recusal Denial was also denied.  (Da891)  This erroneous and unfair determination led inevitably to the legal errors in the Trial Court’s Final Opinion/Order now on appeal here.  The need and basis for [...]’s recusal were clear and simple.  The Courts have consistently found that in a non-jury context where a Judge has rendered a final decision, inclusive of weighing witness credibility, and then the case is remanded because of the erroneous exclusion of evidence bearing on those issues involving an assessment of credibility, the first judge should be recused or withdraw and a new Judge hear the matter on remand.
[brief] Similarly, courts have held that a contractual waiver of the right to jury trial must be voluntary.  See Fairfield Leasing v. Techni-Graphics, 256 N.J. Super. 538, 543 (Law Div. 1992) (holding that a non-negotiated jury waiver clause could not be enforced).  Therefore, recognizing the importance of the right to sue for discrimination—and particularly the right to a jury trial on discrimination claims—New Jersey courts have held that such a right cannot be waived involuntarily by mandatory arbitration.
[brief] (Not Raised Below)  ...........................................................................................................  41  POINT VI  THE GUN POSSESSION CONVICTION MUST BE REVERSED BECAUSE THE COURT FAILED TO INSTRUCT THE JURY ON THE THIRD ELEMENT OF THE OFFENSE.  (Not Raised Below)  ..............................................  42  TABLE OF CONTENTS (CONT'D)  POINT VI  THE COURT ERRED BY FAILING TO PROVIDE ANY EXPLANATION FOR THE AGGRAVATING FACTORS IT FOUND, RENDERING DEFENDANT’S SENTENCE EXCESSIVE.  (13T 19-14 to 20-11; Da 13-15)  .................................................................  45  CONCLUSION ..................................................................................................................  49
[brief] Indeed, [...] dismissed all of Plaintiffs’ claims against [...] in the 2015 Action due to the lack of an affidavit of merit.  A court cannot dismiss non-legal malpractice claims for lack of an affidavit of merit.  Accordingly, in dismissing all of the prior claims against [...] in the 2015 Action, it necessarily follows that [...] ruled that all of Plaintiffs’ prior claims against [...] were legal malpractice claims.  Therefore, as forcefully and repeatedly argued by [...] and as [...] agreed and held, the Court in the 2015 Action held that Plaintiffs never filed a non-legal malpractice claim against [...] in the 2015 Action.
[brief] Defendants first argue that the unlawful denial of the Plaintiffs’ application giving rise to Plaintiffs’ civil rights claims fails to meet the test established in Monell v. Dept. of Soc. Servs. of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978), namely that: (1) the direction of the Township’s chief executive office - the Mayor – cannot be considered as the policy of the Township; (2) there is no evidence of a causal link between the Mayor’s directive and the denial of Plaintiffs’ application; (3) the unlawful denial of Plaintiffs’ application at the direction of the Mayor does not adequately shock the conscience; and (4) the Defendants’ unlawful denial of Plaintiffs’ application cannot otherwise amount to a denial of substantive due process.  Under Monell, governing bodies and their executive officers – mayors - can be sued directly under 42 U.S.C. §1983 for monetary, declaratory, or injunctive relief where “the action that is alleged to be unconstitutional implements or executes a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated by that body's officers. ”  Id. at 690.  Moreover, “local governments, like every other §1983 ‘person’, by the very terms of the statute, may be sued for constitutional deprivations visited pursuant to governmental ‘custom’ even though such a custom has not received formal approval through the body's official decision-making channels. ”  T & M Homes, Inc. v. Mansfield Twp., 162 N.J. Super. 497, 504 (Law. Div. 1978).  Indeed, the Township’s reply brief itself acknowledges that the Monell policy, practice or “custom” requirement is met when the unlawful action in question is the action of the municipality itself.  See Township reply brief at p. 22 (“Trb22”) where the Township acknowledges that municipal action through a resolution or ordinance satisfied the policy, practice or custom standard.  For some reason, however, which the Township does not explain, the Township asserts that similar authoritative action by the Township’s chief executive officer does not similarly satisfy that standard and establish liability.
[brief] [...] properly followed the sentencing guidelines in imposing an extended term and maximum sentence in light of defendant’s “history of violent offenses and weapons offenses” and inability “to remain out of criminal trouble for any period of time. ” (10T56-1 to 2; 10T57-4 to 6).  Accordingly, this Court should affirm.  As the trial court correctly found, defendant qualified as a persistent offender based on his age at the time of the present offense (twenty-six), his record of at least two predicate convictions, and the time of his last release from confinement.  (10T56-16 to 57-1).  See N.J.S.A. 2C:44-3(a).
[brief] DIVISION  [...], on behalf of himself and those similarly situated, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. [...]; [...]; [...]; [...]; [...]; and JOHN DOES 1 to 10, Defendants-Respondents.  DOCKET NO. [...]  CIVIL ACTION: On Appeal  From the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Bergen County  Docket No. [...]  SAT BELOW: Hon. [...], J.S.C.  DATE SUBMITTED: March 25, 2024  BRIEF FOR DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS