ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Lying near or close to; contiguous.  The difference between adjacent and adjoining seems to be that the former implies that the two objects are not widely separated, though they may not actually touch, while adjoining imports that they are so joined or united to each other that no third object intervenes.  People v. Keechler, 194 111. 235.  62 N. E. 525; Ilanifen v. Armitage (C. C.) 117 Fed. &45; McDonald v. Wilson. 59 Ind. 54; Wormley v. Wright County, 108 Iowa, 232, 78 N. W. 824; Hennessy v. Douglas County, 90 Wis. 129, 74 N. W. 9S3; Yard v. Ocean Beach Ass’n, 49 N. J.Eq. 300, 24 Atl. 729; Henderson v. Long, 11 Fed. Cas. 10S4; Yuba County v. Kate Hayes Min. Co., 141 Cal. 3G0, 74 Pac. 1049; United States v. St. Anthony It. Co.. 192 U.
[brief] He testified as to site plan/variance procedures and that the 1972 School Site Plan (Da934) does not depict any parking in the Sixth Street courtyard, only in the Fifth Street Lot.  He presented a 1963 aerial photograph of the site.  In that photo, the Sixth Street area is vacant and appears to have vegetation and the Fifth Street lot area appears like a parking or open area.  He then presented a 2010 aerial photograph (Da900) which shows the 1972 School addition with the Sixth Street concrete courtyard and the Fifth Street lot as an open area.  [...] was at the site in November 2019 and observed up to 19 vehicles pull in the chiseled curb cut on Lot 8, cross over and enter the Sixth Street courtyard, park, and later exit through the chiseled curb cut in front of Lot 8.  The 1972 Site plan (Da934) does not have any curb cut on school Lot 5 for vehicle access to the courtyard (11T4-15 to 46-15).  On cross-examination, [...] acknowledged he knew of no Site Plan for the School earlier than the 1972 Plan and knew of no Site Plan for the Lot 8 synagogue.  He also acknowledged the 1972 Site Plan did not have a parking legend depicted on the Fifth Street lot (11T46-17 to 75-24).  Trial was then suspended for an extended time due to the Covid pandemic, resuming on July 27, 2021 (12T) with the School presenting Lakewood resident [...].
[brief] (Ra210).  According to the Report, on top of the teacher evaluation program, supervisors conduct classroom walkthroughs and observations each week, and “instructional coaches” observe classrooms on a weekly basis.  Ibid.  Plus, principals and assistant principals are required to complete three to five classroom walkthroughs per day.  Ibid.  This level of oversight, the Report found, was “excessive and has had [a] negative [impact] on school-based staff. ”  Ibid.  Because of the strict adherence to the District’s pacing guides, teachers are required to “move on to keep up with the pacing guides” even if “their students are struggling. ” (Ra212; Ra229).  This is especially true for ELL students — while “some scripts and instructional frameworks may have suggestions for differentiating for their ELL students, there is no time to incorporate those ideas as [teachers] have to rush through their lessons to ensure they are on track. ” (Ra212).  And the frequency of walkthroughs is also “likely disruptive to classroom instruction and has not resulted in increased student gains. ”  Ibid.  Notably, a survey of educators in [...] revealed the deleterious effect these policies have had on the quality of education in the District.
[brief] The Settlement Agreement may only be enforced based on its terms; a court may not write a better contract for the parties than the parties wrote for themselves.  Kampf v. Franklin Life Ins. Co., 33 N.J. 36, 46 (1960).  In its motion before the trial court, [...] argued that the Board’s failure to adopt a Resolution by the second meeting in October (after [...]’s counsel sent to the Board’s Counsel what [...] wanted as the final form of resolution) and the Board’s adoption of a Supplemental Resolution in January 2023, the Board breached a ‘duty to cooperate’ with [...] in obtaining “Required Approvals” and “Government Approvals” under the terms of the Settlement Agreement.  The trial court made no such finding(s) of fact.  In apparent recognition that there were no findings of a breach or default under the government approvals provisions, [...] argues for the first time in opposition to this appeal that the condition for inclusion of an elevator in Building E violated a provision in the Settlement Agreement prohibiting cost-generative features because its professional opined during the Planning Board hearing that the elevator was not required by the Uniform Construction Code (“UCC”). ¹ ([...] Rb39)  [...] made no such argument to the trial court and such was not a stated basis for the trial court’s award of fees or penalties.  As such, [...] cannot argue to this Court that there was a breach ¹  Contrary to the argument of [...], the Planning Board did not make a finding that there was no requirement for an elevator; it merely acknowledged testimony by [...]’s professional that such elevator was not required by the Uniform Construction Code—nothing more. of that provision to justify the trial court’s awards, which were not based on that provision or any alleged default of that provision.  See State v. Robinson, 200 N.J. 1, 18-19 (2015).  Because there was no finding of default of the Settlement Agreement in the motion record, there was no predicate for an award of fees or assessment of per diem penalties and, accordingly, the orders must be reversed.  POINT III
[brief] (3/20/23 Transcript @T75:16-T78:7).  Plaintiff alleged that multiple studies have been done to show that crash rates do not change because of digital billboards.  (3/20/23 Transcript @T80).  Plaintiff’s representative further testified that the studies were of billboards which were closer to intersections than the billboard Plaintiff was proposing.  (3/20/23 Transcript @T80:25-T81:5).  Plaintiff made reference to a “McMahon study” from 2018, taking into account 12 separate billboard locations and doing traffic studies.  (3/20/23 Transcript @81:8-T81:14).  The Planning Board members or one of them then questioned whether the studies referred to concerned intersections similar in nature to the proposed site of the billboard at issue, to which Plaintiff’s representative answered: “yes, similar.  Again, there’s multiple locations of different types of settings.  And so is it similar?  Several of the intersections would likely be similar. ”  (3/20/23 Transcript @T82:10-T82:13).  Plaintiff’s representative further responded that he did not know the distance of the billboards from the intersections in the “McMahon study. ”  (3/20/23 Transcript @T82:16-T82:17).  The discussion of the variance came to Plaintiff making the following statement:  “We have more [guidance from professionals apart from the McMahon study], but not the specific.  Couple of thoughts…  I haven’t had [...] [Plaintiff’s engineer] actually provide the planning testimony yet, but…  I think we’re going to ask for a continuance to get that more specific data that you raised in terms of traffic accident[s] because I think it's relevant to a variance request, because certainly you have the authority to deny if you think it’s unsafe, putting aside any other concern you might have.  But your boarding [presumably the word was “ordinance” not “boarding”), for example, doesn’t have an aesthetic standard.
[brief] Plaintiffs also note that [...] announced the launch of an investigation into app developers’ use of the platform (the ADI), but [...] was not personally involved in conducting ADI, and, as Plaintiffs acknowledge, the Court has already ordered that certain ADI materials should be produced separately.  That order obviates any need to add [...] as a custodian on ADI issues.  Mot. at 6, 9.  Plaintiffs contend that [...] has unique information because shortly after the [...] events, [Redacted] Mot. at 9-10 (citing Weaver Decl., Ex. 24).  This argument is a red herring.  There has been no [Redacted], and the ADI materials [...] ordered [...] to produce will show no data misuse akin to the [...] events.  Plaintiffs have made no showing that documents [Redacted] will be found among [...]’s custodial files.  Mot. at 10.  In any event, [...] was not involved in ADI, so there is no reason to believe relevant documents would be uniquely located in her files.
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION AND SHOULD BE REVERSED AS IT BASED ITS DECISION ON A PALPABLY INCORRECT OR IRRATIONAL BASIS; DEFENDANT WAS NOT INVOLVED IN ANY CONDUCT WHICH CONSTITUTED PROBABLE CAUSE OR REASONABLE SUSPICION PRIOR TO THE SEARCH OF HIS PERSON ON SEPTEMBER 28, 2020 (T19-3 to 22-11)  Defendant moved for reconsideration (Ca135) based on the New Jersey Supreme Court's July 5, 2022 decision in State v. Goldsmith, 251 N.J. 384 (2022), in which the Court, in a 4-2 decision, found that the police officers' conduct of blocking defendant's path on the walkway next to a vacant house constituted an investigatory stop, as would require reasonable suspicion, and the officers lacked reasonable suspicion for such stop (mandating suppression of a gun and drugs found on defendant).17
[brief] (Pa000892).  The basis for [...]’s argument in favor of reconsideration was that the trial court, in limiting sanctions to $30,000, failed to conduct a proper lodestar analysis or consider all factors laid out in Rule of Professional Conduct 1.5(a).  At oral argument, Plaintiffs’ counsel did not properly address any arguments as to why [...] was not entitled to sanctions, instead speaking at length about issues that, as the trial court pointed out, were never previously briefed.  (4T at 29:5-14).  The trial court then continued:  I did not permit you to go forward on negligence claims that – that would require an affidavit of merit.  And what you’re talking about today is that [...] prepared a site plan for somebody else…that your client --- 9  This argument ignores the fact the [...]’s preliminary plan for future paved parking spaces did not call for any remediation activities on Plaintiffs’ Property.  Further, Plaintiffs sued co-defendant [...] regarding the remediation work, and they could have explored this reliance argument against [...]. ultimately rejected and then [[...]] re-did a site plan to exclude your client’s property and somehow that violated some duty of care they owed you…  …[T]he only thing I let you go forward on were trespass claims that your client said they could never establish one way or the other if [...] ever went on their property.  You never even took any depositions of [...]’s individuals to try to establish that they went on your client’s property.  (Id. at 30:8 to 31:4).  The trial court again correctly acknowledged that [...]’s site plan was completely unrelated to the remediation efforts performed by [...] and the other defendants.  (Id. at 32:18-24).  The trial court then denied all Motions for Reconsideration – including [...]’s, without giving counsel for [...] an opportunity to address [...]’s reconsideration position at oral argument.  Plaintiffs’ appeal and [...]’s cross-appeal follow.  (Pa000928; Da01).  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN FINDING THAT PLAINTIFFS’ CLAIMS AGAINST FRALINGER WERE FRIVOLOUS.
[brief] *Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp.*, 870 F.2d 1292, 1298 (7th Cir. 1989) explained:  [T]he Supreme Court vacated the Federal Circuit’s decision on the ground that it was inappropriate for the Federal Circuit, in the interests of justice, to decide the merits of a case over which it did not have jurisdiction.  Nevertheless, there is no indication that the Supreme Court found any error in the Federal Circuit’s decision.  Thus, although vacated, the decision stands as the most comprehensive source of guidance available on the patent law questions at issue in this case.  See, also, Action All. of Senior Citizens v. Sullivan, 930 F.2d 77, 83 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (“Although the Supreme Court vacated our prior opinion, […] it expressed no opinion on the merit of these holdings.  They therefore continue to have precedential weight, and in the absence of contrary authority, we do not disturb them. ”); United States v. Adewani, 467 F.3d 1340, 1342 (D.C. Cir. 2006); United States ex rel. Espinoza v. Fairman, 813 F.2d 117, 125 n.7 (7th Cir. 1987) and Cty. of L.A. v. Davis, 440 U.S. 625, 646 n.10 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting).  Thus, although Hunstein I and II are not binding and were subsequently vacated on unrelated jurisdictional grounds, they remain as precedential authority with respect to the sufficiency of the mail vendor claim.
[brief] ”  Id.  In this matter, there is no misrepresentation and no detrimental reliance of the Plaintiff-Appellant.  Defendant-Respondent, [...], initially confirmed coverage, because there was coverage.  However, confirming coverage and providing consent to settle did not automatically mean that Plaintiff-Appellant did not have to comply with the policy terms and conditions from which she sought benefits.  In addition, the Plaintiff-Appellant’s attorney was provided a certified copy of the policy, at issue, on December 23, 2019.  (Da017).  Therefore, notwithstanding that Plaintiff-Appellant, as the named insured, would have a copy of her own insurance policy; the Attorney for the Plaintiff-Appellant also received a certified copy of the policy four years prior to the action being instituted.
[brief] *Hargrove v. Sleepy's, LLC*, 220 N.J. 289 (2015).  The "ABC" test presumes an individual is an employee unless the employer can make certain showings regarding the individual employed, including: (A) Such individual has been and will continue to be free from control or direction over the performance of such service, both under his contract of service and in fact; and (B) Such service is either outside the usual course of the business for which such service is performed, or that such service is performed outside of all the places of business of the enterprise for which such service is performed; and (C) Such individual is customarily engaged in an independently established trade, occupation, profession or business.  *Id.* at 305.  The New Jersey Supreme Court noted that the inability to meet any one of these three criteria results in a finding that the individual is an employee.  Id.  The mere fact that determining that [...] was not eligible as he was not an employee is the conclusion the pension unit wishes to reach, does not make it so.  All [...] ever did was accept a job and then he was enrolled into a pension program at his employer’s direction as they promised when they induced him into a low paying position.  He then performed the service in an exemplary manner for decades and continues to do so.  He was paid on a salary on a W-2 and not a 1099.
[brief] DEFENDANTS DID NOT MEET THE HIGH STANDARD FOR A MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT.  ACCORDINGLY, THE SUPERIOR COURT’S ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS’ PRE-ANSWER MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD BE AFFIRMED .........................  13 POINT II  THE ARBITRATION CLAUSE DOES NOT MEET THE ATALESE STANDARD...............................................................................................  14 POINT III  DEFENDANTS  ERRONEOUSLY ARGUE THAT ATALESE DOES NOT APPLY ......................................................................................................  21
[brief] Unlike the defendant in Kucinski, who merely claimed to not remember certain things or asked to “not talk about that part” in response to questions, 227 N.J. at 623, [...] expressly invoked his right to remain silent and referenced “Miranda” when he declined to answer certain questions during the interview.  (17T:95-20 to 22; 96-18 to 97-4; 114-20 to 115-10)  The court was also wrong to conclude that redacting these portions of the interview would have misled the jury by implying the detectives had not asked [...] questions about when he had been in New Jersey.  (16T:110-11 to 111-7)  In cases where a defendant’s statement concerns “substantial evidence” about “the underlying crime” such that a jury might speculate about “why testimony regarding subsequent events was not offered,” a trial court may “permit testimony explaining why an interview or interrogation was terminated.
[brief] Defendants Conditionally Granted Coverage In The Kentos Matter After Undue Delay.  On August 23, 2019, Defendants conditionally agreed to cover the Claim.  In its coverage letter, Defendants advised that they “will agree to provide a defense to the Insureds in the Lawsuit, subject to a full and complete reservation of its rights under the Policy and at law…”  [Pa477]  Defendants further acknowledged that, “[u]nlike the original Complaint filed in the Lawsuit, which did not arise out of a Legal Services Wrongful Act, the Amended Complaint appears to qualify as a Claim arising out of a Legal Services Wrongful Act by one or more Insureds….”  [Pa477]  Defendants at no time disclaimed coverage based upon whether the allegations in the Estate’s amended complaint satisfy the definition of a Legal Services Wrongful Act in the LPL Policies.  [Pa572]  The coverage letter also referenced “Condition O” of the LPL Policies, which provides that the Insureds affirm the accuracy of statements made in the applications for the policies.  [Pa483-Pa484]  Defendants noted that, in each application, the Firm responded to questions regarding the existence of any “bar complaint, investigation or disciplinary proceeding” in the negative.  [Pa484-Pa485]  Defendants then requested that the Firm provide information concerning the OAE Proceeding.  [Pa485]  F. [...] Revoked Coverage And Improperly Rescinded The Policies As To All Insureds.
[brief] Table of Contents  Procedural History 1 Statement of Facts  3 Argument 40 Point 1  The trial court erred in ruling that defendant’s trial counsel provided constitutionally effective assistance with regard to countering at trial the State’s ballistics expert (A66)  40 Point 2  The trial court erred in ruling that defendant’s trial counsel provided constitutionally effective assistance with regard to the voir dire of the jury panel following the revelation about Juror No. 14 (A66)  46 Conclusion 49 Table of Judgments, Orders, and Rulings Order and Opinion denying post-conviction relief A66 Table of Appendix (attached, A1-92)  Verified Petition for Post-Conviction Relief DA1 Attachments to Petition Appellate Division Opinion on direct appeal DA26 August 11, 2020 Letter with Opinion denying PCR DA32 April 7, 2020 Pro Se Petition for Post-Conviction Relief DA40 PCR trial Exhibit D-3 ([...] Expert report) DA50 Ex. D-6 (defendant’s letter to trial counsel) DA52 Ex. D-7 (defendant's letter to trial counsel, with attach.) DA53 State’s PCR-1 (chart) DA56 State’s PCR-2 (projectile) DA57 State’s PCR-3 (photo) DA58
[brief] “[T]o state a cause of action under the [NJ]CFA, a plaintiff must allege the commission of a deception, fraud, misrepresentation, etc., ‘in connection with' the sale of merchandise or services. ”  Castro v. NYT Television, 370 N.J.  Super. 282, 851 A.2d 88, 95 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2004) (citing N.J.S.A. 56:8-1).  “The reach of the [NJCFA] is intended to encompass only consumer oriented commercial transactions involving the sale of merchandise or services.  Huertas v. Galaxy Asset Mgmt., 641 F.3d 28, 35 (3d Cir. 2011) (holding New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act \(^{18}\) (Da10-Da16). does not apply to debt buyers or collectors as they do not market or sell any merchandise or services); *Brancato v. Specialized Loan Servicing, LLC*, 2018 U.S. Dist. Lexis 96658, at (D.N.J. June 8, 2018) (holding NJCFA did not apply to a mortgage servicer because plaintiff never bought any merchandise or real estate from defendant); *Geter v. ADP Screening & Selection Servs.*, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53354, at *15, 2015 WL 1867041 (D.N.J. Apr. 23, 2015) (same).
[brief] Whenever a public agency, during the course of an investigation, obtains from another public agency a government record that was open for public inspection, examination or copying before the investigation commenced, the investigating agency shall provide the other agency with sufficient access to the record to allow the other agency to comply with requests made pursuant to P.L. 1963, c. 73 (C. 47:1A-1 et seq.).  b.  Notwithstanding the provisions of P.L. 1963, c. 73 (C. 47:1A-1 et seq.), as amended and supplemented, the following information concerning a criminal investigation shall be available to the public within 24 hours or as soon as practicable, of a request for such information: where a crime has been reported but no arrest yet made, information as to the type of crime, time, location and type of weapon, if any; if an arrest has been made, information as to the name, address and age of any victims unless there has not been sufficient opportunity for notification of next of kin of any victims of injury and/or death to any such victim or where the release of the names of any victim would be contrary to existing law or Court Rule.
[brief] Moreover, no separate guaranty agreement or even separate guaranty page is attached to the Lease.  The confusing and "buried" guaranty language in the Lease is in sharp contrast to the clear and unequivocal language that Plaintiff used to state a personal guaranty in the lease Plaintiff used for the immediately preceding tenant for the Leased Premises (the “Prior Lease”).  DKV001.  The Prior Lease includes a separate page announcing in Block Caps:  “INDIVIDUAL PERSONAL GUARANTEES”.  The separate page then includes the following language as a separate paragraph and not buried in a “WHITNESS WREREOF” clause:  “The undersigned jointly and severally each hereby personally guarantee the obligations of the Tenant hereunder, including but not limited to the Tenant’s obligations for rent and additional rent. ”  DKV001.  The Prior Lease than goes on to include a separate set of signature lines to evidence the agreement by the signatories to be personally liable for the obligations under the lease.  Id.  Notably, in the Prior Lease the members of the tenant LLC signed in two places, once to evidence the LLC’s agreement as tenant to be bound by the lease and a second time on the personal guaranty page to evidence agreement to be personally liable for the obligations of the LLC tenant under the lease.  The contrast of the two leases, which are virtually identical in form except for the guaranty language, clearly demonstrates that Plaintiff knew how to draft a clear personal guaranty provision if Plaintiff wanted to but that Plaintiff simply choose not to do so for the Lease in the case at bar.
[brief] The Award was not appealed, but a dispute arose when the parties attempted to draft a contract reflecting the terms of the Award.  In _Bergenfield_, the Arbitrator awarded: Salary.  2018-0% salary increase, full step increases, longevity and senior officer differential; 2019-0% salary increase, step increases October 1, 2019, longevity compensation and senior officer differential in accordance with the terms of the Agreement; 2020-0% salary increase, no step movement, longevity and senior officer differential in accordance with the terms of the Agreement.
[brief] **[...] SUPPORTS NEW JERSEY’S STRONG PUBLIC POLICY PREFERENCE IN FAVOR OF ARBITRATION**  There is no dispute that the Parties entered an Agreement that is subject to the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 1 (“FAA”).  (Pa136-Pa146 & Pa170).  Thus, any calculus begins with the strong presumption in favor of arbitration created by the FAA.  *Marmo & Sons Gen. Contr., LLC v. Biagi Farms, LLC*, 478 N.J. Super. 593, 602 (App. Div. 2024).  The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the “principal purpose of the FAA is to ensur[e] that private Arbitration Agreements are enforced according to their terms. ”  *See, e.g.*, *AT&T Mobility, LLC v. Concepcion*, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1748 (2011) (citing *Volt Info. Scis. v. Bd. of Trustees*, 489 U.S. 468, 479 (1989)); ; *Atalese v. U.S.  Legal Servs. Grp., L.P.*, 219 N.J. 430, 440, 99 A.3d 306, 312 (2014).  II.