ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The failure of Seller to obtain an Acceptable Estoppel Certificate from the Required Tenant shall not be deemed a default by Seller, it being agreed that the sole remedy of Purchaser in the event Seller does not obtain an Acceptable Estoppel Certificate from the Required Tenant shall be to terminate this Agreement and receive a refund of the Down Payment.  An estoppel certificate received from a Required Tenant shall not be an Acceptable Estoppel Certificate if such Required Tenant discloses a default on the part of landlord or tenant under its Lease or discloses another Material Matter (as hereinafter defined).  As used herein, a "Material Matter" shall mean a default or other matter relating to a Lease which, in each case, would subject the landlord thereunder to any liability, or otherwise adversely affect the rent, additional rent or other revenue that Purchaser will receive under a Lease after the Closing Date or contain a discrepancy with the information shown on the Rent Roll.  (Da211) (internal parentheticals omitted, emphasis added).  Notably the Estoppel Provision only required the “Acceptable Estoppel Certificate” to be obtained “prior to the Closing” and did not provide [...] with an option to cancel the PSA simply upon receiving an estoppel certificate it deemed not be an “Acceptable Estoppel Certificate” but only if [...] ultimately “does not obtain an Acceptable Estoppel Certificate from the Required Tenant.
[brief] ”  Id. (citing *Heim v. Shore*, 56 N.J.Super. 62, 72-73 (App. Div. 1959)); see also *Rauch v. Rauch*, DOCKET NO. A-4745-14T4, 2017 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2177, at *14 (App.Div. Aug. 30, 2017).  A court also “cannot enforce ‘an agreement to agree’ that reflects the parties’ intention ‘to postpone agreement on a term essential to their ultimate contractual objective. ’”  *Zegarski v. Zegarski*, DOCKET NO. A-2306-17T2, 2019 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1163, at *7 (App. Div. May 21, 2019) (quoting Corbin on Contracts, § 2.9[3](A)(ii) ([...] ed., rev. ed. 2018)).  “The degree of specificity required in the contract terms is even greater when equitable remedies are requested.
[brief] **[...] Would Not Have Hired Plaintiff Had It Been Aware Of Her Criminal Convictions During Application and Would Have Terminated Her Employment As Soon As It Found Out.**  [...] (“[...]”) was [...]’s Executive Director from 2016 until June 1, 2023.  (Appx 527 at ¶31).  [...] did not know that Plaintiff had any criminal convictions until after she filed this lawsuit.  (Appx 527 at ¶32).  Had [...] known about Plaintiff’s criminal convictions while Plaintiff was applying for her job, she would not have allowed Plaintiff to be hired.  (Appx 527 at ¶33).  Had [...] learned about Plaintiff’s criminal convictions while Plaintiff was employed at Defendant, Plaintiff’s employment would have been immediately terminated.  (Appx 527-28 at ¶34).  [...] has declined to hire numerous employees because of disqualifying criminal convictions.  (Appx 528 at ¶35).  [...] has also terminated numerous employees when it learned about criminal convictions or if they were convicted during their employment.  (Appx 528 at ¶35).  In just the past 12 months, [...] has disqualified (declined to hire or terminated) six individuals due to criminal convictions.  (Appx 528 at ¶35).  F.
[brief] The rule in New Jersey was succinctly stated in Bellardini v. Krikorian, 222 N.J. Super. 457, 464 (App. Div. 1988):  We have noted an increase in in limine rulings on evidence questions in recent times.  Such rulings are often in the abstract and not in the context of facts adduced at trial.  Requests for such rulings should be granted only sparingly and with the same caution as requests for dismissals on opening statements.
[brief] 4T, 33:24-34:24; 47:19-48:25.  Moreover, [...] testified that his opinion of lost profits damages is not and cannot be remote, speculative, or uncertain, because it is based on an analysis of the real, certain, actual data and information of the developed affordable housing development and on profit projections utilizing commonly accepted industry and capital market methodology for making such projections of profits, as developers, investors, and the [...] do to determine the value and profits of any 100% affordable housing project.  4T, 24:15-25:22; 33:24-34:22; 47:19-48:25.  Likewise, [...] testified that based on the irrefutable facts of the peculiarities of the financing of 100% affordable housing developments through the [...], Plaintiff [...] having control of land and said land having been rezoned by [...] for a 100% affordable housing development, was evidence that Plaintiff [...], if he desired or deemed it warranted, was more than capable of entering into a 60%-40% partnership with an affordable housing developer.
[brief] The Authority Never Took Any Steps To Prepare For The Construction Of The Authority Garage | 12 | | I.  The Authority’s Alleged Reasons For Not Constructing The Authority Garage Are Not Credible | 13 | | i.  The Authority Garage Was Supposed To Be Completed Before Time Of The Alleged 2009 Conversation | 14 | | ii.  This Purported Verbal Agreement Was Never Memorialized In A Signed Written Amendment As Required By The Redevelopment Agreement | 15 | iii. The Authority Has No Credible Explanation For Its Failure To Seek Financing Approvals ........................................... 16 J. The Authority’s Failure To Build The Authority Garage And To Lease The Other Parcels to [...] Prevented The Remaining Phases From Moving Forward ........................................... 19 K. The Authority’s Failure To Build The Authority Garage Eliminated The Parameters For Rates To Be Charged At The Project Garage .................................................................................................................. 20 L. The Authority’s Failure To Build The Authority Garage Ensured That [...] Never Shared In Any Revenue Generated From Parking At The Project Garage And The Authority Retained All Revenue ......................................................................................... 20 M. The Authority Failed To Credit [...] With Revenue Generated From All Parking In The Project Area ........ 22 N. The Authority Offered Free Or Reduced Parking Schemes Without [...]’s Consent And To [...]’s Detriment ......................................................................................................................... 23 i. The Authority Did Not Seek [...]’s Approval for Marketing Plans .................................................................................................................. 23 ii. The Authority Profited From The Marketing Plans To The Detriment Of [...] ..................................................................................................................
[brief] [...]  [...]  A Professional Corporation [...]  Tel: [...]  Fax: [...]  E-mail: [...]  Attorneys for Defendant-Respondent, Borough of Caldwell Of Counsel and on the Brief: [...], Esq. (029222001)  On the Brief: [...], Esq. (114972014)  TABLE OF CONTENTS  TABLE OF CONTENTS ........................................................................................................ i TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS BEING APPEALED iii TABLE OF CITATIONS ........................................................................................................ iv TABLE OF CONTENTS TO APPENDIX ........................................................................... vii PRELIMINARY STATEMENT ............................................................................................. 1 PROCEDURAL HISTORY ................................................................................................. 2 STATEMENT OF FACTS ................................................................................................. 4 LEGAL ARGUMENT ....................................................................................................... 12 POINT I STANDARD OF REVIEW .............................................................................. 12 POINT II THE TRIAL COURT’S STATEMENT OF REASONS FULLY COMPLIES WITH RULE 1:7-4 (Pa82, Pa225, 1T) .................................................................................. 13 POINT III FOR REASONS MORE FULLY STATED IN POINTS II AND VI OF THIS BRIEF, ORDINANCE 1423-21 WAS LAWFULLY ENACTED (Pa83) .................... 20 POINT IV THE COURT SHOULD NOT EXTEND THE TIME TO FILE AN ACTION IN LIEU OF PREROGATIVE WRITS1 .................................................................................. 20 POINT V THE SUBJECT PUBLIC MEETINGS WERE NOTICED IN COMPLIANCE WITH THE OPEN PUBLIC MEETINGS ACT (Pa83)
[brief] The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Paragraph 10 of the New Jersey Constitution guarantee that a defendant in a criminal proceeding has the right to the assistance of counsel in his or her defense.  The right to counsel includes “the right to the effective assistance of counsel. ”  *Nash*, 212 N.J. at 541 (quoting *Strickland v. Washington*, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984)).
[brief] However, even if this Court does consider defendant’s assertion, it should be denied because it is without merit.  The trial court’s statement did not infringe upon the jury’s fact-finding authority and, thus, it was not improper.  However, even assuming the court’s comment was inappropriate, it was harmless and, therefore, defendant’s conviction should be affirmed on appeal.  It is a well-settled principle that . . . appellate courts will decline to consider questions or issues not properly presented to the trial court when an opportunity for such a presentation is available “unless the questions so raised on appeal go to the jurisdiction of the trial court or concern matters of great public interest.
[brief] [...]’s withdrawal of the Notices does not moot this appeal because Appellants are still entitled to affirmative relief.  Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Dep’t of Health & Human Res., 532 U.S. 598, 608-609 (2001).  As noted above, [...] has been enjoined from refusing to comply with the terms of the Agreement, or interfering with Appellants’ ability to buy and resell Sapporo products during the course of this litigation.  (Pa148).  [...]’s withdrawal of the Notices merely complies with the Order granting Appellants Motion for a Preliminary Injunction, and is not a voluntary cessation of its violations and breaches.  See Hartnett v. Pennsylvania State Educ. Ass’n, 963 F.3d 301, 306 (3d Cir. 2020) (courts must be “skeptical of a claim of mootness when a defendant yields in the fact of a court order and assures us that the case is moot because the injury will not recur, yet maintains that its conduct was lawful all along”).  In any event, Appellants are still entitled to a Declaratory Judgment that they were not in breach of the Agreement and that [...] had no basis to terminate the Agreement, to ensure that this false accusation is not a recurring tactic by [...], and to establish that Appellants are entitled to monetary relief under the MBPA.  See Navigators Specialty Ins. Co. v. Scarinci & Hollenbeck, LLC, CIV.09-4317 (WHW), 2010 WL 1931239, at *5 (D.N.J. May 12, 2010) (in a declaratory judgment action, the court stated that though there was “no controversy” with respect to the plaintiff’s “current obligation to defend its insureds in the underlying Litigation, there most certainly is a controversy with respect to amounts already incurred by [the plaintiffs] in defending the Underlying Action. ”) (quotation omitted) (emphasis in original).  The remaining causes of action against Defendants, namely breach of the MBPA, New York’s ABC Law, breach of contract, unjust enrichment and breach of fiduciary duty, all entitle Appellants to damages, and attorney’s fees and costs, regardless of Defendants’ belated withdrawal of the Notices.  These all remain “viable claims” for damages against Defendants.  National Iranian Oil Co. v. Mapco Int’l, Inc., 983 F.2d 485, 490 (3d Cir. 1992) (internal citation omitted); Surrick v. Killion, 449 F.3d 520, 526 (3d Cir. 2006) (“[t]he burden of demonstrating mootness is a heavy one. ”) (internal citation omitted).
[brief] (1T180:23-181:8; 1T56:8-12).  [...] also gave conflicting answers for this factor.  (Pa109).  In the Checklist, for the question “Does the location require the individual to be trained related to their position (e.g. sexual harassment, ethics, etc.)”?  [...] answered “yes. ” (Pa56).  However, in the Questionnaire, [...] stated “We do not provide training. ” (Pa47).  For Factor #3 – Integration, [...] explained that the [...] noted that if the worker’s services are integral, the employer will exert significant control over the individual.
[brief] Both trial courts ruled that the cases against [...] must proceed in the normal course, but the State responded by filing repeated applications across both trial courts and, after the denial of those applications, repeatedly requested adjournments while seeking interlocutory review in both matters.  Pa 1-64; T1.  After the trial court denied the State’s most recent adjournment request, the State “offered” to “release” [...] on only the Hudson County charges—to vitiate any statutory speedy trial rights and persuade the trial court to reconsider granting an adjournment.  T1.  The Defense opposed the State’s opportunistic application to release [...] because, when pressed, the State indicated that it would not seek or support [...]’s release on the Union County charges and that its proposal was premised on the understanding that [...] would remain confined.
[brief] ....................33  Henschke v. Borough of Clayton, 251 N.J. Super. 393 (App. Div. 1991)...............38  Hubbard v. Reed 168 N.J. 390 (2001).........................................................................................17  Jewish Center of Sussex County v. Whale, 165 N.J.Super. 84, 397 A.2d 712 (Ch.Div.1978), aff’d 172 N.J.Super. 165, 411 A.2d 475 (App.Div.1980) ......................40  Leang v. Jersey City Bd. Of Educ., 399 N.J. Super. 329 (App. Div. 2008), aff’d in part, rev’d on different grounds, 198 N.J. 557 (2009)......................................................38  2175 Lemoine Ave. Corp. v. Finco, Inc., 272 N.J. Super. 478, 640 A.2d 346, 353 (App. Div. 1994)..............................................................................................................18, 19 Mauro v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 116 N.J. 126, 138, 561 A.2d 257 (1989)..................33
[brief] On July 10, 1996, co-defendants [...] and [...] were arrested for the above-referenced crimes, and tried separately in 1998.  (Da005).  --- ¹ T refers to transcript dated October 6, 2009, Volume I.  ² T refers to transcript dated October 6, 2009, Volume II.  ³ T refers to transcript dated October 7, 2009.  ⁴ T refers to transcript dated October 14, 2009.  ⁵ T refers to transcript dated October 15, 2009, Volume I.  ⁶ T refers to transcript dated October 15, 2009, Volume II.  ⁷ T refers to transcript dated October 20, 2009.  ⁸ T refers to transcript dated October 20, 2009.  ⁹ T refers to transcript dated October 21, 2009.  ¹⁰ T refers to transcript dated October 22, 2009.  ¹¹ T refers to transcript dated October 27, 2009.  ¹² T refers to transcript dated October 28, 2009.  ¹³ T refers to transcript dated October 29, 2009.  ¹⁴ T refers to transcript dated January 12, 2010.  ¹⁵ T refers to transcript dated September 12, 2018.  ¹⁶ T refers to transcript dated March 21, 2019.  ¹⁷ T refers to transcript dated July 27, 2021.  ¹⁸ T refers to transcript dated May 5, 2023.  Each co-defendant was found guilty and sentenced to life in prison, for their respective roles and participation in the commission of these crimes.
[directive] 8.0.7  Because the County Prosecutor is ultimately responsible for prosecuting criminal cases, the internal affairs investigator shall defer to the prosecutor’s supervision and direction in conducting officer interviews.  The investigator shall consult with the County Prosecutor prior to initiating an officer interview in matters that could involve criminal conduct, and shall pay particular attention to the County Prosecutor's instructions concerning the types of interviews to be conducted and procedures to be utilized (e.g., Miranda warning, Garrity warning,6 etc.).
[brief] ...  For the avoidance of doubt, [...] agrees to comply with all conditions and obligations imposed upon her by Section 3.3(A)(4)(d) and to refrain from asserting any Claims, rights or interests with respect to the Palm Beach Property other than as may be necessary to enforce the rights and interests provided to her by Section 3.3(A)(4)(d); (Id., at ¶ 24(F)) (white space added for clarity).
[brief] (Sb, 21).  In *Gaines*, the Appellate Division discussed the difference between shooting *above* a crowd at a wooden object and shooting directly *at* a crowd.  *State v. Gaines*, 377 N.J. Super. 612, 622 (App. Div. 2005).  The *Gaines* court reasoned, “[when] a defendant shoots directly into a crowd or directly at another person… [such conduct] defeats an inference that the shooter was not aware that death was a practical certainty. ”  *Id*.  The *Gaines* court reasoned that physical evidence such as the wooden splinters on the victim’s shirt, the entry wound and path of the bullet all reasonably supported a theory that the defendant shot *above* the crowd.  *Id*.  Compare these facts this to the current matter where Defendant is proposed to be driving a car that is shooting bullets *directly at the vehicle in which the victim is sitting*.  The facts at hand directly align with *Gaines* precedent that such behavior is universally inferred to be purposeful, not reckless.  At least six bullets hit the vehicle.  (7T91-21).  These shots hit the rear bumper, the rear windshield, both rear tires, the --- \(^1\)Defense counsel acknowledges that the trial court’s initial decision to charge the jury with lesser included offenses was also partially based on the testimony of [...].  (7T93-20 to 25).  Specifically, that [...] was also charged in connection to the murder.  (6T120-1 to 25).  driver side door, and the center sliding door of the van on the driver’s side.  (7T90-11 to 91-21).  Based on this physical evidence, it is unreasonable to infer that there was anything less than purposeful intention to cause death to the victim.  Furthermore, there was no argument nor testimony presented to suggest otherwise.  The State should not receive the benefit of an unreasonable inference pursuant to Fuqua and Gaines.  Defendant’s motion for acquittal should have been granted.
[directive] Range: 25 yards  Target: FBI Q Type 50 rounds Range Rds Position Fire Mode Course of fire Time On command fire a 2 Auto or 3 sec. 5 yds 10 Standing round burst or semi- Semi-auto (5X) automatic double tap On command fire a 2 Auto or 3 sec. 7 yds 10 Standing round burst or semi- Semi-auto (5X) automatic double tap On command fire a 2 Auto or 3 sec. 10 yds 10 Standing round burst or semi- Semi-auto (5X) automatic double tap On command fire a 6 sec. Standing Semi-auto semi-automatic double (3X) tap 15 yds 10 On command fire 4 Standing Semi-auto 10 sec. rounds On command fire 2 Standing to 10 sec. 25 yds 10 Semi-auto rounds standing; then 3 Kneeling (2X) rounds kneeling rounds 40 hits = 80% 9-83 Semi-Annual Firearms Qualification and Requalification Standards Automatic/Semi-Automatic Police Service Rifle Qualification Course (ARQC) Range: 100 yards Target: FBI “Q” type 60 rounds 3 - 20 rd magazines Range Rounds Position Course of Fire Time 5 Prone On command fire 5 rounds 1 min. 100 yds Sitting or 5 On command fire 5 rounds 1 min. Squatting 5 sec.
[brief] [...] has not cited any continuous injury cases holding that the types of common illnesses that [...] experienced, none of which were indicative of any toxic exposure to mold or any other harmful environmental condition, could “trigger” liability coverage. \(^8\)  **IV.  [...] should be ordered to pay its proportional share of the settlement. **  As discussed above, the three insurers that defended against the underlying action paid their allocated shares of the settlement amount.  [...] argues in its Opposition that the settlement was “unreasonable. ”  Pb68-75.  The Trial Court resolved that issue in [...]’s favor and [...] did not file a cross-appeal of that decision.  [...] is therefore precluded from questioning that part of the judgment here.
[brief] Risco and subsequent cases demonstrate that a party may not vacate an arbitration award under N.J.S.A. 2A:23B-23(a)(3) if they were presented with, at a minimum, the opportunity to present evidence.  See Voorhees Office Cm. LIX v. Target Bldg. Const., Inc., No. A-6337-08T3, 2010 WL 3933238, at *4 (App. Div. Oct. 4, 2010) (denying a party’s request to vacate an award due to the arbitrator’s alleged refusal to hear evidence because "[t]here was abundant opportunity for [the party] to submit its opposition."); Rock Work. Inc. v. Pulaski Const. Co., 396 N.J. Super. 344, 355 (App. Div. 2007) (refusing to vacate an award where there was no prejudice when arbitrator refused to accept rebuttal evidence after deadline for submissions); *Manger v. Manger*, 417 N.J. Super. 370, 367–77 (App. Div. 2010) (stating that a party’s “right to be heard” and “to present evidence material to the controversy” was not violated when the arbitrator declined to accept evidence after the parties failed to submit any by a pre-determined deadline).
[brief] This matter arises out of a dispute over an insurance claim with [...] ([...]), whereby Plaintiff is alleging that [...] “wrongfully denied his claims for coverage, including defense, indemnification and reimbursement, stemming from a lawsuit against him… related to his condominium homeowners association. ” (Pa380).  Plaintiff is seeking declaratory judgment that the [...] policy applies to the complaint filed against him in Docket No. [...].  (Pa380).  [...] is the insurance carrier for [...]’ Condo Owners Insurance Policy.  (Pa4, Pa216).  On April 26, 2013, [...] entered into a contract of indemnity with [...], agreeing to make cash payments in exchange for [...]’s promise to provide legal defense, indemnification, and medical payments— even if a suit is groundless, false or fraudulent.  (Pa27).  The [...] Policy has been in effect since April 26, 2013, and remains in effect to this day.  (Pa28).  --- 2T refers to the transcript from the October 11, 2023, hearing on Plaintiff’s motion to for reconsideration.
[brief] **EXHIBIT  A June 27, 2017  Order prepared by the Court and executed by the Honorable [...], P.J.Ch.  EXHIBIT B (B-1)  February 12, 2018  Correspondence from [...], Esq. to [...], Esq.  (B-2)  February 21, 2018 – Correspondence from [...], Esq. to [...], Esq.
[brief] Defendant alleges that his trial counsel was ineffective for promising to prove Defendant’s innocence, which allowed the prosecutor to rebut the assertion in closing.  Defendant fails to appreciate that his attorney’s promise was a strategic choice that was clearly motivated by the strength of the evidence that doomed the effort.  While defense counsel succeeded in establishing that Defendant’s phone was in Mays Landing at the time of the murder, he could not establish that Defendant was with his phone in Mays Landing.  But with the need for an alibi so crucial because of the three eyewitnesses who identified Defendant as the shooter, it was not unreasonable for defense counsel to package the alibi as a pledge to prove Defendant’s innocence in order to enhance the impact of an unpromising defense.  In the end, defense counsel’s clever strategy could not overcome the State’s evidence, which bore out the truth that “[m]erely because a trial strategy fails does not mean that counsel was ineffective.