ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The issues on appeal relate to the trial court’s legal conclusions, and the application of those conclusions to the facts.  These issues are subject to plenary review by the Court.  See Spangenberg v. Kolakowski, 442 N.J. Super. 529, 535 (App. Div. 2015) (quoting Reese v. Weis, 430 N.J. Super. 552, 568 (App. Div. 2013)).  On a motion for summary judgment, the Court must “consider whether the competent evidential materials presented, when viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, are sufficient to permit a rational fact finder to resolve the alleged disputed issue in favor of the non-moving party. ”  See Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America, 142 N.J. 520, 540 (1995)(emphasis added).  Further, the trial court may not resolve contested factual issues; rather, it may only determine whether there are any genuine factual disputes.  Agurto v. Guhr, 381 N.J. Super. 519, 525 (App. Div. 2005).  A determination of whether there exists a "genuine issue" of material fact that precludes summary judgment requires the motion judge to consider whether the competent evidential materials presented, when viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, are sufficient to permit a rational fact finder to resolve the alleged disputed issue in favor of the non-moving party.  *Id.* at 540.  The Trial Court in its April 4, 2022 Order correctly found there was a genuine issue of material fact as to defendants’ conduct under the Consumer Fraud Act.
[brief] Several key findings emerged from the Integrated Energy Plan analysis:  New Jersey can meet the 2050 Global Warming Response Act requirement and 100% clean energy target by aggressively deploying existing technologies today and adopting new technologies as they become cost-competitive.  The costs to meet New Jersey's emissions and energy targets are small compared to total energy system spending and are offset by clean air and climate benefits.  Existing policies reduce emissions and are a strong start, but are not sufficient to meet 2050 targets.
[brief] Plaintiff is incorrect because if there was a determination that the search of Plaintiff’s vehicle was illegal, then the pellet-gun would have had to have been suppressed as evidence thereby invaliding Plaintiff’s acceptance and completion of PTI.  See, e.g., Russell v. Lewis, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27054, at *12 (N.D. Ala. Jan. 11, 2021) (“The facts of this case demonstrate the Heck bar applies here.  …  If this court found the initial stop to be improper, all ‘fruits of the poisonous tree’ would be subject to suppression, and the plaintiff’s conviction based on the December 29, 2015 traffic stop would be wholly undermined. ”); Cano-Diaz v. City of Leeds, Ala., 882 F. Supp. 2d 1280, 1288-89 (N.D. Ala. 2012) (“if Cano-Diaz were to prevail on her claim that she was pulled over and detained without the requisite probable cause or reasonable suspicion, the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine would apply to invalidate or expunge the second offense she was charged with”); Bowers v. Kelly, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58219, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. May 4, 2015) (“As Plaintiff’s claims alleging the unlawfulness of the traffic stop and subsequent search necessarily imply that his conviction for possession of a weapon is invalid, Heck requires that Kelly's motion be granted. ”).  Therefore, [...] did not err in finding that any claims in the proposed Second Amended Complaint (the “SAC”) challenging the impropriety of Plaintiff’s arrest, the search resulting in Plaintiff’s arrest or the charges against Plaintiff, was subject to the Heck bar.
[brief] 1.  [...]  Stock Purchase Agreements (SPAs).  The trial court adopted plaintiffs’ contention that the “Indemnification for Seller’s Benefit” clause in the SPAs provided the requisite authorization for the award of fees.  Paragraph 6.3 states:  Buyer agrees to indemnify and hold harmless Seller from and against any and all Losses incurred by Seller after the date of this Agreement and arising out of, resulting from, or relating to (i) any material inaccuracy or breach of any representation or warranty of Buyer contained in this Agreement, (ii) any material breach or violation of the covenants or agreements of Buyer contained in this Agreement and (iii) any material inaccuracy in any certificate, instrument or other document delivered by Buyer as required by this Agreement.
[brief] The essential elements of fraud upon the court are: (1) an intentional fraud; (2) by an officer of the courts; (3) which is directed to the court itself and (4) in fact deceived the court.  *Herring v. U.S.*, 424 F.3d 384 (3d. Cir. 2005)  Here, the Findings of Fact and Law as determined by the [...] fully establish that an intentional crime was committed by officers of the court to disseminate confidential FBI data.  A fraud on the court was further perpetrated by [...] through omission and deception which misled the court in reaching its findings that no sealing order was in place when [...] published on PACER on December 20, 2009.  The leading case before the Third Circuit regarding fraud upon the court is *Herring v. U.S.*
[brief] At the core of this dispute is the absence of language in the PSA (1) imposing a deadline for delivering an Acceptable Estoppel Certificate before the closing date, or (2) providing [...] the right to terminate the agreement upon receipt of an estoppel certificate deemed non-compliant.  Aware of this, [...] attempts to create such a deadline by focusing on the distinction between the words “the” and “an” in the PSA, arguing that the use of “the” in the sentence, “Upon receipt of the executed Estoppel Certificate, Seller shall promptly furnish a copy thereof to Purchaser,” provides that (1) Seller was only allowed to deliver a singular estoppel certificate and (2) therefore allows [...] to immediately termination right the PSA if that estoppel certificate is deemed non-compliant.  This strained interpretation, however, isolates specific terms without considering the PSA as a whole, contradicting the principles of proper contractual interpretation, which require giving effect to all provisions and avoiding contradictions or redundancies.  Indeed, it stubbornly focuses on one single use of the phrase “the executed Estoppel Certificate” in an irrelevant context and ignores that in the critical relevant language — and indeed seven times in the PSA the phrase “an estoppel certificate” or “an acceptable estoppel certificate” is used.
[brief] 4.  The trial court refused to delay consideration of the motion until after critical depositions were conducted regarding these factual issues.  Plaintiffs had served deposition notices for the deposition of [...] regarding the inconsistency of his conclusory statements as compared to [...]’s own Underwriting Guidelines.  [Pa709]  The failure to permit such discovery on the critical issues is inconsistent with basic summary judgment jurisprudence.  In short, substantial issues of material fact abound as to the claims that were dismissed.  The court erroneously usurped the function of the jury by exercising its own judgment by qualitatively weighing and evaluating evidence to reach its conclusion, thus compelling a reversal and a remand to complete discovery and for a trial on the merits.
[brief] The record revealed that Defendant’s BAC was under the legal limit at .07% and that he passed the field sobriety tests.  There was no debate by the Law Division that the HGN test was “worthless” and that Defendant passed the walk-and-turn test.  While it was perhaps at first questionable whether Defendant passed the one-leg stand test, this question was resolved when the State’s own witness acknowledged that Defendant passed the one-leg stand test after an initial instruction issue, which is easily attributable to the fact that Defendant uses a second language.  Yet, despite Defendant’s satisfactory performance, the Law Division supported its finding with his “poor performance” (Da33).  Having said this, the observations of the officers as to DWI were that Defendant admitted he consumed alcohol, had slurred speech and glassy eyes, and had been in an accident.
[brief] Lieberman v. Port Authority, 132 N.J. 76, 79 (1993).  When a defendant files a motion to dismiss on the basis that the complaint fails to state a claim, the applicable standard requires only that a cause of action be suggested by the facts.  Printing Mart-Morristown v. Sharp Electronics Corp., 116 N.J. 739, 746 (1993) (citing Velantzas v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 109 N.J. 189, 192 (1988)).  The court must limit its inquiry to “examining the legal sufficiency of the facts alleged on the face of the complaint. ”  Id. (citing Rieder v. Dept. of Transportation, 221 N.J. Super. 547, 552 (App. Div. 1987)).  In applying this extremely liberal standard, the court must afford the plaintiff every reasonable inference of fact and the court need not determine if plaintiff can ultimately prove the allegations contained in the complaint.  Id. (citing Somers Constr. Co. v. Bd. of Education, 198 F. Supp. 732, 734 (D.N.J. 1961); Independent Dairy Workers Union v. Milk Drivers Local 680, 23 N.J. 85, 89 (1956)).  The Supreme Court in Printing Mart explained:  We approach our review of the judgment below mindful of the test for determining the adequacy of a pleading: whether a cause of action is “suggested” by the facts.  Velantzas v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 109 N.J. 189, 192 (1988).  In reviewing a complaint dismissed under Rule 4:6-2(e) our inquiry is limited to examining the legal sufficiency of the facts alleged on the face of the complaint.  Rieder v. Department of Transportation, 221 N.J. Super. 547, 552 (App. Div. 1987).  However, a reviewing court “searches the complaint in depth and with liberality to ascertain whether the fundament of a cause of action may be gleaned even from an obscure statement of claim, opportunity being given to amend if necessary”  DiCristofaro v. Laurel Grove Memorial Park, 43 N.J. Super. 244, 252 (App.  Div. 1957).  At this preliminary stage of the litigation the Court is not concerned with the ability of plaintiffs to prove the allegation contained in the complaint.  Somers Constr. Co. v. Board of Edu., 198 F. Supp. 732, 734 (D.N.J. 1961).  For purpose of the analysis plaintiffs are entitled to every reasonable inference of fact.  Independent Diary Workers Union v. Milk Drivers Local 680, 23 N.J. 85, 89 (1956).  The examination of a complaint’s allegations of fact required by the aforestated principles should be one that is at once painstaking and undertaken with a generous and hospitable approach.  Id. at 746.  The Supreme Court then summarized the standard:  The importance of today’s decision lies not so much in its explication of the principles of tortious interference and defamation as in its signal to the trial courts to approach with great caution applications for dismissal under Rule 4:6-2(e) for failure of a complaint to state a claim on which relief may be granted.  **We have sought to make clear that such motions, almost always brought at the very earliest stages of the litigation, should be granted only in the rarest of instances.
[directive] It (OAG) is Ofice the policy of the Attorney General that the of the Attorney General and shall Law (DLPS) withir? the Department of and Public Safety administer proceeds law or or funds received by,any Division entity of the DLPS, any other state enforcement 2C:64-1, agency, as result of forfeitures brought under the authority of N.J.S.A. et seq., a 2C:21-25 seq. N. J.S.A. , (civil forfeiture), N. J.S.A. 2C:41-1 et seq. (racketeering); et (financial facilitation of crime), or under any other statute as directed by the Attorney (DCJ) shall General.
[brief] “[t]o the extent our prior decisions, including [Plemmons] have applied the learned professional exception to ‘semi-professionals’ who are regulated by a separate regulatory scheme, we are constrained, upon further review, to depart from that reasoning as inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s decision in [Lemelledo].”  Id. at 599 (emphasis added).  The Shaw Court issued its opinion in 2019, and since that time, there have been no New Jersey cases—published or unpublished—that diverge from its holding.  Even [...], who sat on both the Plemmons and Shaw panels, plainly stated in his concurring opinion in Shaw:  “I recognize that thirteen years ago I served on the appellate panel in [Plemmons], which held that an insurance broker is a regulated ‘semi-professional’ who is excluded from liability under the CFA .  . . .  With all due respect, I’ve changed my mind. ”  Id. at 628 ([...], J., concurring).  --- 2  A recent search has revealed one unpublished, non-binding New Jersey District Court case, McCray v. Sanders, No. 20-12370, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11307 (D.N.J. Jan. 21, 2022), that applied the Plemmons holding after Shaw was published.
[brief] The issues of law in this appeal are: (1) were the details of this “plan” consistent with Sections 5, 7 and 14 of the LRHL? and (2) were certain exhibits (the WARD memo and the transcript of the February 6, 2023, Planning Board meeting) offered by plaintiffs properly excluded from the record?  The standards for this appellate court to consider in resolving these legal issues are well established.  An appellate court’s review of rulings of law for the applicability, validity and interpretations of laws is *de novo*.  *In re Ridgefield Park Bd. Of Educ.*, 244 N.J. 1, 17 (2020).  A “trial court’s interpretation of the law and the legal consequences that follow from established facts are not entitled to any special deference. ”  *Rowe v. Bell & Gossett Co.*, 239 N.J. 531, 529 (2019) (*quoting Manalapan Realty LP v. Twp. of Manalapan*, 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995)).  If a judge acts under a misconception of the applicable law or misapplies that law, that action becomes an arbitrary act that is not subject to usual deference by an appellate court.  *Summit Plaza Assocs. v. Kolta*, 462 N.J. Super. 401, 409 (App.Div. 2020)  In such a case, the appellate court must adjudicate the dispute *de novo* under the applicable law to avoid a manifest denial of injustice.
[directive] 년6 월29 일까지의 기간 동안에 발생한 제1 급 및 제2 급 1997 2001 강력범죄에  대해 유죄 시인을 하는 경우에만 다음의 질문들에 답변해야 합니다.  The following questions need to be answered only if you are pleading guilty to a first or second degree violent crime that occurred between June 9, 1997 and June 29, 2001.  강력범죄란 귀하가 사망에 이르게 했거나, 심한 신체적 상해를 유발했거나, 또는 귀하가 즉각적으로 흉기를 사용 했거나  사용하겠다고 협박한 모든 범죄를 의미합니다.  또한 강력범죄에는 가중 성범죄, 또는 귀하가 즉각적으로 신체적인 힘을 사용했거나
[brief] Respondent served Appellants with requests for responses to Form Interrogatories, Supplemental Interrogatories, Loss-of-Consortium Interrogatories, and Notice to Produce Documents on April 3, 2023 [Pa0290]; Appellants produced responses on May 2, 2023 [Pa0292].  Respondent served Appellants with requests for responses to a Supplemental Notice to Produce Documents on December 20, 2023 [Pa0287-Pa0289]; Appellants produced responses on January 5, 2024 [Pa0301].  Appellants amended their responses to Interrogatories and Notice to Produce Documents on October 2, 2023, December 18, 2023, January 4, 2024, January 29, 2024, February 13, 2024, and March 29, 2024.  Pa0291-Pa0307.  Respondents answered Appellants’ requests for responses to Form Interrogatories on May 1, 2023.  Pa0328-Pa0339.  Appellants have not propounded any Supplemental Interrogatories or Notice to Produce Documents on Respondents since May 1, 2023.  Pa0292.  On January 24, 2024, Appellant [...] underwent an independent medical evaluation (“IME”) with [...], MD, FAAOS, FACS.  Da0001.  On February 14, 2024, Appellant [...] underwent an IME with [...], Ph.D, ABPP.  Da0002.  The depositions of Appellants were conducted on October 3, 2023.  Pa0094.  Appellants have never noticed any deposition of Respondent’s corporate representatives or employees.  Pa0353.  On April 19, 2024, Appellants noticed an inspection on June 11, 2024, of the site where the alleged injuries took place.  Da0003.  The inspection had previously been scheduled to take place on April 15, 2024, and on May 21, 2024, however Appellants notified of their need to reschedule both of these dates.  Pa0353.  Both Appellants and Respondents retained expert witnesses to attend the site inspection.  Both expert witnesses were located out-of-state and therefore needed advanced notice of the date of inspection to make travel plans.  Pa0353.  Additionally, the site inspection needed to be scheduled for a date and time when the business was either closed to the public or not expected to be busy, so as not to interfere with Respondents’ normal business operations.  Pa0353.  On March 22, 2024, Respondents filed a Motion for an Order staying the case as to all parties pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:23B-7 and compelling arbitration.
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN ALLOWING THE BOROUGH’S TITLE EXPERT, EDWARD EASTMAN, TO TESTIFY AT TRIAL..................50  A.  [...] Failed to Object at Trial to the Borough’s Presentation of Testimony from its Title Expert, [...] .................................51  B.  The Trial Court did not Err in Allowing the Borough’s Title Expert, [...], to Testify at Trial...............................................................53  CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................................................................58
[brief] E.g., Bruen, 597 U.S. at 1; McDonald v. Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010); District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U. S. 570 (2008).  As stated by the Supreme Court:  The test that we set forth in Heller and apply today requires courts to assess whether modern firearms regulations are consistent with the Second Amendment’s text and historical understanding.  In some cases, that inquiry will be fairly straightforward.  For instance, when a challenged regulation addresses a general societal problem that has persisted since the 18th century, the lack of a distinctly similar historical regulation addressing that problem is relevant evidence that the challenged regulation is inconsistent with the Second Amendment.  Likewise, if earlier generations addressed the societal problem, but did so through materially different means, that also could be evidence that a modern regulation is unconstitutional.  And if some jurisdictions actually attempted to enact analogous regulations during this timeframe, but those proposals were rejected on constitutional grounds, that rejection surely would provide some probative evidence of unconstitutionality.  Bruen, 597 U.S. at 26-27.  In this case, the State has not stated a societal problem that is addressed by not recognizing Pennsylvania’s, or any other state’s, carry permit and has not shown any legislation in our history to support its argument.  The issue in this case is quite similar to the one settled by the Supreme Court in Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 (2015).
[brief] (Pa2-Pa5).  Defense Counsel appeared with Defendant for an Arraignment on December 2, 2019, and for conferences on February 10, 2020, and March 2, 2020.  At the March 2, 2020 conference, Defense Counsel advised the Court and the State of an intent to file a Motion to Dismiss the Indictment in this matter; a briefing scheduled was set.  On April 8, 2020, Defense Counsel filed a Notice of Intent to Rely Upon the Statutory and Due Process Defenses of Entrapment.
[brief] The reciprocal in question did not have a certificate of authority to operate, so the REA’s exclusivity provisions did not apply and the statute in question did not pertain to the internal operation of reciprocals.  Similarly, In re Reorganization of the Med Inter-Ins. Exch. Of N.J., 328 N.J. Super. 344 (App. Div. 2000) involved the transformation of a reciprocal to a stock company that would fall squarely within the Holding Act’s parameters according to the Department, but which is utterly absent here.  this; it just ignores this.  The Department’s new interpretation of the Holding Act cannot change these facts.  The Department similarly ignores the undisputed fact that [...] has never previously filed any of the Forms required by the Holding Act and the Department knows this.  Does the Department truly expect this Court (or the Legislature or Governor) to believe that it simply allowed [...] and other reciprocals to remain out of compliance with past practice and interpretation for the past fifteen years without penalty?  Of course not.  The reality is that this Department’s current leadership has changed the historic course of conduct and interpretation of the Holding Act and SSAP No. 25 in a manner that is completely inconsistent with past practices and interpretation of the Holding Act and the REA.
[brief] She testified that she was surprised to learn of [...]’s involvement.  (2T 208-209)  The family had a close relationship with [...] and his brother because they worked at the [...] family’s diner and [...] frequently acted as Michael [...]’s tailor.  (1T 105-5); (1T 102-104).  [...] had even been to the Staten Island house many times and had spoken to [...]'s father.  (1T 102-107).  Following the incident, [...] and his brother continued to visit the diner.  (10T 122).  The victims in the Staten Island home invasion did not see [...] at their house on September 16, 1995, nor did they hear his voice.  (1T 108-109).  If they had, they would have recognized it.  (1T 110-5); (1T 140); (1T 152-18 to 215-1); (1T 159).  [...] spoke with a heavy accent and stutter.  (7T 158)  They believed that [...] was one of the perpetrators, and the other was a Hispanic male.  The only scintilla of a suggestion that a third individual was present in the house was the sound of footsteps above them while they were in basement.  (1T 74).  Further, no forensic evidence connected [...] to the offense.  (10T 118).  **Englewood Cliffs Home Invasion**
[brief] “Acknowledging that a trial court’s factual findings are entitled deference” admittedly “does not mean that appellate courts must give blind deference to those findings. ”  *S.S.*, 229 N.J. at 381.  “Deference ends when a trial court’s factual findings are not supported by sufficient credible evidence in the record” or “when factual findings are so clearly mistaken – so wide of the mark – that the interests of justice demand intervention.
[brief] 72  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS, AND RULINGS APPEALED WITH CITATIONS TO PLAINTIFF’S APPENDIX  Order of Honorable [...], Superior Court, Hudson County, dated June 2, 2023, Dismissing Counts III, IV, V and VI of Plaintiff [...]’s Complaint as Against Defendant [...], Without Prejudice………………………………………Pa199 Order of Honorable [...], Superior Court, Hudson County, dated June 9, 2023, Granting Defendant [...]’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint as Against [...], With Prejudice…………………..Pa357 Order of Honorable [...], Superior Court, Hudson County, dated August 25, 2023, Granting Reconsideration of June 2, 2023 Order, and Dismissing Complaint as Against [...], With Prejudice……………Pa651 Order of Honorable [...], Superior Court, Hudson County, Denying Defendant [...]’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees and Costs, filed September 27, 2023………………………………………………………………………..Pa688 Order of Honorable [...], Superior Court, Hudson County, Denying Defendant [...]’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees Without Prejudice, filed September 28, 2023………………………………………………………………………..Pa688