ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Defendant does not cite a single decision granting the Second Amendment right she claims, and multiple cases—along with bedrock principles of federalism—are to the contrary.  Preliminarily, defendant does not dispute that New Jersey’s carry permit requirement, as a general matter, is consistent with the Second Amendment and Bruen’s interpretation thereof.  Indeed, Bruen was emphatic that “nothing in [its] analysis should be interpreted to suggest the unconstitutionality of … licensing regimes, under which ‘a general desire for self-defense is sufficient to obtain a [permit].’”  Id. at 38 n. 9 (quotation omitted).  Bruen explained that States may, consistent with the Second Amendment, adopt licensing regimes aimed at ensuring “that those bearing arms in the jurisdiction are … ‘law- abiding, responsible citizens,”” ibid. (quoting District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008)), such as by conditioning permit issuance on applicants passing “a background check or … firearms safety course. ”  Ibid.; see also id. at 80 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (explaining that licensing regimes that “require a license applicant to undergo fingerprinting, a background check, a mental health records check, and training in firearms handling and in laws regarding the use of force, among other possible requirements … are constitutionally permissible”).  While Bruen invalidated one particular requirement for obtaining a license to carry a handgun—the requirement that applicants establish “some additional special need” to carry beyond a generic interest in self-defense, id. at 11, it cast no doubt on licensing requirements generally, id. at 38 n.9.  For this reason, this Court held in State v. Wade that New Jersey’s carry permit requirement is permissible under Bruen.  See 476 N.J. Super. at 510 (“[t]he Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on the Second Amendment makes clear that carrying guns in public can still be regulated and subject to a permit requirement”).
[brief] The ALJ’s evaluation of the 20 Factor Test is instructive here.  The Court found that all of [...]’s work was done at his home or his law firm, which is in contrast with the Petitioner who did the majority of her work in the municipal building during court sessions.  The ALJ found that [...] was not restricted from delegating his duties and other attorneys from his firm filled in for him.  This never happened with the Petitioner.  With respect to hiring, supervising and paying assistants, unlike the Petitioner here, [...] and his law firm staff would provide services for the sewage authority.  Unlike [...] who did not have set hours or a work schedule, Petitioner does have set hours and a work schedule in [...].  With respect to payment of business and travel expenses and furnishing tools and materials, unlike [...] who was not provided with any office and did not get reimbursed for any expenses, the Petitioner has been provided with the same office and supplies for almost 20 years and received reimbursement of expenses.  In *Kim Pascarella v. Bd. of Trs. Pub. Emps.’ Ret. Sys.*, 2023 N.J. AGENLEXIS 843 (Nov. 6, 2023) (Ra47), the critical factor that distinguishes this case is that the Borough’s certifying pension officer certified that the assistant prosecutor for Seaside was *not* an employee.
[brief] (Da64-Da71, ¶ 13).  In support of its motion, Appellant filed a June 7, 2023 Certification, which included Exhibits 1 through 3, attesting that he had never been served with the complaint in the Collection Action and relocated to [...] (“PA Address”) prior to commencement of the Action to purportedly establish that the Court never had personal jurisdiction over him.  (Da64-Da71, ¶ 14; a Pa22-Pa34).  On June 29, 2023, Respondent opposed Appellant’s First Motion to Vacate.  (Da64-Da71, ¶ 15).  In opposition, Respondent filed an Affirmation executed by [...], Esq. of [...] dated June 26, 2023 demonstrating [...] completed an address verification search, that the NJ Address was Appellant’s address for service of the Action, and that service of the Action was effectuated on Appellant.
[brief] Notably, by email dated October 12, 2008, a representative of the [...] agency emailed [...], copying [...] and [...], a PDF “proof” of one of the proposed catalogs, writing:  Pat, We need to know if you would like your fax number.  Please verify and reply with any corrections.  **[...]/[...]** please verify placement and/or advise.  (Pa776) (emphasis added).  Critically, the attached proposed catalogue was titled: “[...] by [...],” emphasizing the direct connection and symbiotic relationship between [...] and [...].  (Pa778) (emphasis added).  The back of the catalogue also noted (1) the availability of other “[...]” catalogs, including the “Professional Grills Catalog,” and (2) the [...] “Contact” being “[...]. ”  (Pa779).  The 2009 [...] Professional Grills Catalog also followed the same structure, with the title “[...] Professional Grills by [...],” and the back cover noting the “Contact” for [...] Professional Grills as “[...].
[brief] Dischargers of pollutants must discharge in conformance with NJPDES permits.  N.J.S.A. 58:10A-6.  And, stormwater NJPDES permits may be required for a particular activity to control stormwater based on a TMDL.  N.J.A.C. 7:14A-24.2(a)(7).  Here, the Project may require an NJPDES permit during construction to manage stormwater.
[brief] *State v. Wilbely*, 63 N.J. 420, 422 (1973).  A jury charge that tracks the model jury charge is presumed to be proper because the process to adopt the model jury charges is “comprehensive and thorough. ”  *State v. R.B.*, 183 N.J. 308, 325 (2005).  When defendant lodges no objection to the jury charge at trial, there is a presumption that the charge was not erroneous and was unlikely to prejudice the defendant’s case.  *State v. Singleton*, 211 N.J. 157, 192 (2012).
[brief] Plaintiffs complain that the Property was not specifically targeted for open space by the Master Plan, but fail to identify any properties not currently used for open space that were targeted for such use, or more importantly, that any list of such properties was intended to be exhaustive.  Indeed, the Master Plan makes clear that the Borough, as of 2019, had not adopted an Open Space and Recreation Plan.  Pa 17, 33.  Thus, the fact that the Master Plan does not specifically identify the Property for use as open space (to the extent this claim is even true), cannot have evidentiary value since no exclusive list exists. \(^3\)  Given the lack of an explicit prohibition, and the fact that general objectives support the open space use, Plaintiffs cannot demonstrate that such a use “materially undermine[s] or distort[s] the basic provisions and objectives of the Master Plan” enough for such an inconsistency to be “substantial.
[brief] The Settlement Agreement  On September 13, 2021, following [...]’s death, the parties executed a Settlement Agreement to resolve “certain issues [that] have arisen in connection with the administration of [...]’s Estate, [...]’s [] Trust,” and two other trusts not relevant to this appeal.  (Da91, at ¶ 12).  Paragraph 23 of the Settlement Agreement included a standard general release and waiver by [...] as to several [...] trusts and estates.  (Da94).  In Paragraph 24, the parties expressly excluded ten categories from the general release and waiver:  Notwithstanding anything contained in this Agreement to the contrary, the Parties acknowledge that the release and discharge set forth in Paragraph 23 shall not apply to any of the following:  (Id.).  Paragraph 24(F) excludes from [...]’s general release and waiver and preserves [...]’s ability to enforce rights bequeathed through [...]’s Estate Plan, as previously adjudicated: 21 days of use per year and the right to participate in the proceeds of sale.
[directive] Lèt sa a se pou enfòme w ke, antan ke moun ki kondane de Evazyon konfòmeman a N.J.S.A. 2C:29-2b lisans ou revoke pou yon peryòd de (6 mwa a 2 lane) apati de jodiya.  An plis, si pandan peryòd revokasyon sa a yo ta kondane w de kondwi yon machin pèsonelman, w ap lobjè de sanksyon ki etabli nan N.J.S.A. 39:3-40:  This is to inform you that, as a person convicted of Eluding pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:29-2b, your driver’s license is suspended for a period of [6 months to 2 years], effective today.
[brief] (2T17-8 to 19-14; Da 65)  Moments after the TRPD officers stopped and searched [...]’s car, they made clear what would happen next: “We’re going back to the house. ”  (Da 17)  [...]—who was handcuffed, under arrest, and surrounded by eight police officers—initially expressed concern about consenting to a search because his wife, who was sick with cancer, and his grandchildren were at the home.  An officer responded that, “[i]f you’re gonna give us consent then . . . we’re not going to tear your house apart. ”  (Da 18)  Minutes later, after [...] again asked about the consequences of declining to consent, officers confirmed what they would do if he did not accede: “We write a search warrant,” “make entry into the house,” and “we’re gonna tear through the house. ”  (Da 25)  In addition, officers told [...] that a search was inevitable, warning him that “either way we’re going back to the house . . . it’s either with your cooperation or without your cooperation. ”  (Da 18)  And they suggested that the police department—not the court—would decide ultimately whether a warrant was justified.  (Da 18, 25)  Because these threats, misstatements of the law, and the surrounding circumstances rendered [...]’s consent involuntary, the fruits of the home search must be suppressed.  Under the State Constitution, “a warrantless search of a home is presumptively invalid, [and] the State bears the burden of establishing that such a search falls within one of the few well-delineated exceptions to the warrant requirement.
[directive] Greater force, such as strikes, punches, CEDs, or less lethal devices shall not be used.  (c)  Active Resistor.  When dealing with an active resistor, in addition to the options available for passive resistors, officers may use physical strikes with hands or feet, OC spray, batons or asps applied with non-impact pressure, and taking the person to the ground.  As more fully detailed in Section 4.2, intentional strikes to the head or face, which are only allowed in an act of self-defense, are not permitted when dealing with an active resistor.  Police canines shall not be utilized against an active resistor.  (d)  Threatening Assailant.  In general, when dealing with a threatening assailant, officers may use all types of force options other than deadly force.
[directive] Section 79 enacted an entirely new statute, N.J.S.A. 39:3-29.1a.  It requires a person charged with a violation of N.J.S.A. 39:3-29 to produce, within 24 hours, to the issuing law enforcement agency the insurance identification card or other satisfactory proof of insurance for the vehicle which was being operated at the time of the violation.  Failure to produce proof of insurance within 24 hours will result in the issuance of a warrant for the immediate impoundment of the vehicle that was being operated at the time of the offense.  Working with the Administrative Office of the Courts, this Division agreed to the use of a standardized form that will enable law enforcement officers, under the provisions of N.J.S.A. 39:3- 29.1a, to apply to the Court for the issuance of a warrant for the immediate impoundment of the vehicle that was being operated at the time of the offense.  This standardized form to obtain a Warrant of Impoundment consists of two parts: a Certification, to be completed by the law enforcement officer; and a Warrant of Impoundment, to be completed by a Judge.  A copy of that form is appended to this memorandum.  This standardized form is the only form that will be accepted by Courts in New Jersey.  Under separate cover, the Administrative Office of the Court has distributed this standardized form to municipal court judges, municipal court directors and municipal court administrators.  Municipal Police Departments are to contact the Court Administrator of their Municipal Court to obtain the version of the form to be utilized by that Municipal Police Department.
[brief] (Id.)  The Court may have taken judicial notice of the State of Emergency, but it was not material to the Court’s decision.  (Da30-31).  The Court made its decision because it found it unreasonable to hold the defendants responsible when the plaintiff went out in the middle of an ongoing storm and a reasonable amount of time had not passed for the defendants to clear the premises of the dangerous condition.  (Id.)  Weiss is a case in which the defendants filed an appeal of the Chancery Division denying their motion to set aside a sheriff’s sale because of inclement weather.
[brief] Instead of providing this correct instruction, the court gave an incorrect one: telling the jury, “you have found the defendant Not Guilty of Murder” and “If you have found the defendant Not Guilty of Murder, go to Question 3,” which asked about the applicability of self-defense as to passion/provocation manslaughter.  (Da 13-14)  The court’s incorrect instructions to the jury — that they should go on to consider other homicide offenses even though they already found that [...] acted in self-defense — explains why the jury returned an inconsistent verdict.  As in Gray, where the cause of this inconsistency is the court’s incorrect instructions, reversal of defendant’s convictions is required.  Gray, 147 N.J. at 17.
[brief] ”).  Finally, this Court exercising personal jurisdiction over Defendants is supported by the fact “it was Defendants’ representations of being able to supply multi-jurisdictional services which created interest by the Plaintiff,” leading to New Jersey’s “interest in adjudicating a matter which involves a multi-jurisdictional law firm with substantial presence within the state of New Jersey. ”  Da14–15.  See Waste Management, Inc. v. Admiral Insurance Co., 138 N.J. 106, 125 (1994) (factors relevant to fair play and substantial justice include “the burden on defendant, the interests of the forum state, the plaintiff’s interest in obtaining relief, the interstate judicial system’s interest in efficient resolution of disputes, and the shared interest of the states in furthering fundamental substantive social policies… burden of a defendant coming to the plaintiff’s state, as opposed to the plaintiff going to the defendant’s home state, is too slight an imbalance to defeat jurisdiction. ”)
[brief] Instructional errors on essential matters, even in cases where those errors are not raised below, are traditionally deemed prejudicial and reversible.  State v. Rhett, 127 N.J. 3, 5-7 (1992).  In particular, a lack of proper identification instruction is reversible error in an identification case.  Sanchez-Medina, 231 N.J. at 467.  The failure to give appropriate instructions in this case was particularly harmful because of the weakness in the State’s case.  There was no physical evidence tying [...] to the shooting, no motive for the shooting, and substantial reasons to doubt the two core pillars of the State’s case — the dying declaration/identification, belatedly revealed after [...] had seen news of [...]’s arrest, and [...]’s out-of-court identification based on a view of the perpetrator that lasted only seconds and with a real risk of unconscious transference.  The failure to properly instruct the jury cannot be deemed harmless.  [...]’s convictions must be reversed.
[brief] •  Petitioner “had a pre-existing disc herniation and disc bulging at C5-C6 and C6-C7” and “had stenosis at…C5-C6 and C6-C7. ” (3T22:2-14).  • Petitioner “had pre-existing pathology that was aggravated by this accident that caused him to be disabled” and “it wasn’t anything new that happened from this accident that caused him to be disabled. ” (3T22:2-14).
[brief] 3T178.  For the first week she was there, she could not go upstairs to her room on the second floor because she did not have any equipment to get up the steps.  3T179.  Plaintiff stayed downstairs for the first week.  3T179.  After the first week, Plaintiff was able to get upstairs only by using her hands to push herself up and put her butt on the next step while some other person held her legs so they wouldn’t fall.  3T179.  Her legs were casted.  3T179.  Plaintiff is now 26 years old.
[brief] Now here you've heard me use the word with purpose, or purposely.  A person acts purposely with respect to the nature of his conduct, or a result thereof, if it is his conscious object to engage in conduct of that nature.  In order to prove that the defendant was in the course of committing a theft, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant threatened another with, or purposely put another in fear of immediate bodily injury.  The phrase bodily injury means physical pain, illness, or any impairment of physical condition.  Although no bodily injury need have resulted, the prosecution must prove that the defendant either threatened the victim with, or purposely put the victim in fear of such bodily injury.  Should you find that the State has failed to prove either of these elements of the crime of robbery beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must find [...] not guilty.
[brief] See generally United States v. Nicholson, 721 F.3d 1236, 1246 (10th Cir. 2013) (“We have often instructed district courts to vacate convictions upon our reversing the denial of a motion to suppress.  We see no reason the government should receive the benefit of relitigating this motion as a result of its own failure[.]”) (citations omitted); State v. Atwood, 232 N.J. 433, 449 (2018) (“The State’s refusal to present [relevant] evidence at the motion hearing amounted to a failure to carry its burden as to the stop. ”); State v. Wilson, 178 N.J. 7, 17 (2003) (“[W]e cannot fill in gaps in the record to supply the requisite proofs required of the State under constitutional standards. ”).  The only permissible remedy is to reverse the trial court’s erroneous denial of the defendant’s motion to suppress and vacate his convictions.  The State failed to present sufficient evidence that the front windows inhibited the officer’s ability to clearly see occupants or articles inside of the vehicle.  Smith, 251 N.J. at 266.  Absent such proof of “non-transparency,” the State failed to meet its burden of proving that the warrantless stop was justified. \(^7\) \(^7\)  In State v. Haskins, 477 N.J. Super. 630, 644-46 (App. Div. 2024), this Court held that Smith should be afforded pipeline retroactivity.  As in Haskins, while POINT II REVERSAL IS REQUIRED BECAUSE THE TRIAL COURT ISSUED AN INADEQUATE LIMITING INSTRUCTION REGARDING HOW TO CONSIDER TESTIMONY IMPLICATING DEFENDANT IN AN UNRELATED ROBBERY.
[brief] Proposed Order (Attached at Pa184)  Notice of Appeal to NJ Superior Court 11/05/2021 (Attached at Pa185)  Notice of motion for waiver of transcript fees and cost Dated 11/05/2021 (Attached at Pa186)  Application in Support of a Support Fee  Waiver Dated 11/11/2021 (Attached at Pa187)  State v. [...] (Attached at Pa190)  Documents Submitted on JEDS by [...] (Attached at Pa218)  Complaint Summons 2/20/2020 (Attached at Pa0041)
[brief] [...] and [...], P.E.R.C. Docket No. [...] ([...], 2014), citing Elkouri & Elkouri, How Arbitration Works, 7th Ed. 2012 (Section 9-8).  Pa180.  The following has been stated as a test for determining if the language is clear and unambiguous:  The test most often cited is that there is no ambiguity if the contract is so clear on the issue that the intentions of the parties can be determined using no other guide than the contract itself.  This test borders on tautology, however, for it comes perilously close to a statement that language is clear and unambiguous if it is clear on its face.  Perhaps a better way of putting it would be to ask if a single, obvious and reasonable meaning appears from a reading of the language in the context of the rest of the contract.  If so, that meaning is to be applied.
[brief] (Pa 74-82).  There is no further discussion other than the observation that the Master Plan states open space as a general planning objective.  (Pa 74-82).  The Board Planner also mentioned Objective 3 and 6 of the Master Plan.  (Pa 74-76).  As for objective 3’s provision for low and moderate housing, serious analysis of the Second Ordinance would have revealed that this objective is adversely impacted by the Ordinance but was not recognized by the Planner and not considered by the Planning Board.
[directive] (c)  Each agency must thoroughly, objectively, and promptly investigate all allegations against its officers.  (d)  Each agency must notify its officers in writing of complaints made against them, unless this notification would interfere with any investigation resulting from these complaints.  (e)  Each agency must notify its officers of the outcome of any Internal Affairs investigation involving them.  (f)  Each agency must notify complainants of the outcome of their complaints.  (g)  If an agency’s internal affairs investigators are unable to complete an investigation within 45 days of receiving a complaint, they must notify the agency’s law enforcement executive,1 who may take steps to ensure prompt resolution of the matter.  Notifications to the County Prosecutor  (h)  Where a preliminary investigation indicates the possibility of a criminal act on the part of the subject officer, the County Prosecutor must be notified immediately.  No further action should be taken, including the interviewing of, or the filing of charges against the officer, until the County Prosecutor so directs.  (i)  Pursuant to AG Directive 2019-4, the agency must notify the County Prosecutor immediately of any use of deadly force, any use of force by an officer that results in death or serious bodily injury, or any death in custody that occurs within its jurisdiction.  (j)  In the rare cases where the agency has not made a charging decision within 180 days of receiving a complaint, the agency must notify the County Prosecutor, who may take whatever steps he or she deems appropriate, including supersession of the investigation, to ensure prompt resolution of the matter.  Recordkeeping & Data Reporting
[brief] A.  Principal Uses.  The following principal uses shall be permitted in the Senior Housing – 1 Overlay District:  (1)  Adult community housing, as defined at §230-54, in multifamily-type structure(s).  (2)  Historical museum or exhibition space, provided that same is open to the public and restricted to historic structures located on any Locally Designated Historic Sites or Districts, as identified on Schedule G, which is included in Chapter 230 as Attachment 9.  B.
[brief] e.  I asked about whether and EIN was requested or obtained in connection with this trust account.  [...] said that one was obtained, but that it was taken out in [...]'s individual name—not the Estate—because trust account setting up requesting an EIN and not the individual's SSN.  Because nothing was taken out in connection with the Estate, [...] maintains that the EIN would not affect the Estate's ability to obtain an EIN for itself.  (R-272)  He further indicated that he reached out to [...], the [...]'s treasurer/accountant but [...] did not get back to him.  Finally, he stated the following in Paragraph 10.  **Paragraph 10. **  In addition to setting forth the details of the Court's ruling to [...] on Thursday April 15, 2021, I asked [...] on the aforementioned phone call for documents pertaining to the EIN for the trust account, the trust account, the trust itself, the Wyoming attorney, and documents pertaining to [...], indicating that an Order by the Court to this effect would be anticipated.
[brief] Vippolis v. Village of Haverstraw, 768 F.2d 40 (2d. Cir. 1985) ..................................................................................23  Wyzykowski v. Rizas, 132 N.J. 509 (1993) ..............................................................................................16  Statutes 42 U.S.C. §1983 ....................................................................................................passim Civil Rights Act of 1871 .........................................................................................21