ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] Because the possible not be Scan system, it may Live by means of the fingerprinted will not have been therefore versus complaint-warrant inform the software to risk-assessment pretrial automated run the to determination. complaint-summons is indictment before whom a direct judge prosecutor should ask the When practicable, a making the Scan prior to the court fingerprinted by Live be defendant order that the returned to decision can be informed determination so that this complaint-summons complaint-warrant versus the defendant feasible to have If is not process. it risk-assessment pretrial automated the by a made whether to issue be decision must before the system Live Scan through the fingerprinted recommendation to the judge making a prosecutor in the orcomplaint-warrant, complaint-summons 46
[brief] (Proposal Two, Pa876-877; and Za203.)  Proposal Two describes the identical work to Proposal One above, but with lower charges: (1) for the “hand sawing, chipping and breaking” pockets, it charges one person at $1,800 per day (instead of $1,900); and (2) for “wall sawing, hand sawing, chipping and breaking 150’ concrete wall at property line” at the adjacent [...], it charges $3,400 per day (instead of $3,500).  (Id.)  On July 28, 2015, [...]\(^4\) sent a Notice of Subcontractor Award (Form F) to [...] and [...] to initiate the CCIP enrollment for [...].  The following day, on July 29, 2015, [...] issued a purchase order (the “Purchase Order”) for [...]’s work, which corresponds to the work and amount in Proposal Two.\(^5\) (Pa878-879.)
[directive] Pager State [...] immediately reported to the Deputy Director of Administration.  4.  CMF  Withdrawals or Withdrawals be requested to return funds claimants their can to attomey-of-record, share forfeited funds with other law enforcement agencies, or for other categories as a particular case may warrant.  Office Checks are requested from the Property Management and Office [...]. authorized by the The Property Management shall make in all withdrawal requests memo form, attaching appropriate documentation, and indicating the account number, amount, name checks issued of and address the recipient.  All for an order to share forfeited funds with another law enforcement agency shall by sent checks under the signature of the Director, [...].  All other shall be Property of of sent under the signature designated personnel the Office Management Office.  The Property Management shall maintain ,- ’ checks record all that are requested. of a B.  Case Tracking Office
[brief] Although a general instruction on the requirement of a unanimous verdict ordinarily suffices, our Supreme Court has held that a specific unanimity instruction may be necessary where there is a “danger of a fragmented verdict. ”  Parker, 124 N.J. at 641-42.  Such circumstances may arise where “it appears that a genuine possibility of jury confusion exists or that a conviction may occur as a result of different jurors concluding that a defendant committed conceptually distinct acts.
[brief] Plaintiff’s brief fails to discuss the content of the trial court’s decision or identify any specific aspect of the trial court’s reasoning that Plaintiff contends is erroneous.  In fact, the trial court’s sound decision is well-supported by the Policy language and the requirements of the Act.  After reviewing the parties’ respective arguments and reciting the legal principles that govern the interpretation of insurance policies, the trial court observed, “The core objective of workers’ compensation is to adhere to public policy by ensuring that every injured worker has an avenue for seeking redress in cases of work-related injuries, and the plaintiff did have such recourse in the present case. ”  Ja14.  The trial court also distinguished cases such as Charles Beseler Company v. O’Gorman & Young, Inc., 188 N.J. 542 (2006), and Schmidt v. Smith, 144 N.J. 50 (1998).  Notably, Plaintiff has abandoned many of the arguments submitted to the trial court, including the contention that the Charles Beseler decision compelled coverage for Plaintiff’s claim in this case.  The trial court correctly noted that the intentional wrong exclusion adopted by the Commissioner of Banking and Insurance in 2007 removed all ambiguity from the exclusion that was the basis of the Court’s decision in Charles Beseler.  Ja14-15.  The trial court also rejected the contention that the Supreme Court’s decision in Schmidt v. Smith compelled coverage for Plaintiff’s intentional wrong claim.  The trial court correctly noted that in Schmidt the plaintiff’s claim for bodily injuries would have gone uncompensated if no coverage was found to exist.  The same outcome would have resulted from a finding of no coverage in Variety Farms, Inc. v. New Jersey Manufacturers Insurance Company, 172 N.J. Super. 10 (App. Div. 1980), in which a 15-year-old boy lost an arm while operating machinery in violation of the child labor laws.  The trial court’s decision acknowledges the critical fact that [...]’s injuries were compensated and that [...]’s payment of workers’ compensation benefits to [...], including the payment of his medical bills and disability benefits, fulfilled the public policy objectives of the Act.  Plaintiff completely ignores this dispositive fact.
[brief] In addition, when “considering fairness to the party whose claim is sought to be barred, a court must consider whether the claimant has had a fair and reasonable opportunity to have fully litigated that claim in the original action. ”  *Gelber v. Zito P'ship*, 147 N.J. 561, 565, 688 A.2d 1044, 1046 (1997).  In the context of this matter and these new claims, there can be no doubt that Plaintiffs’ claims arising out of the discovery that [...] was Sole Member of [...] and controlled and operated [...] as a sham entity *after* the dismissal of the complaint in the 2015 Action, were unknown, unarisen, and therefore unaccrued at the time of the filing of the original complaint in the 2015 Action, as well as at the time of dismissal of certain claims in the 2015 Action.  These new claims arose *after* they were uncovered by Plaintiffs during the course of litigation in the 2015 Action, overcoming years of Defendants’ concerted efforts to fraudulently conceal them.  It is inconceivable to conclude that Plaintiffs’ mere efforts to bring these new claims in the 2015 Action by way of a motion to amend constitutes Plaintiffs’ fair and reasonable opportunity to have fully litigated these new claims in the 2015 Action, especially considering the fact that The Honorable [...], J.S.C., did not deny Plaintiffs’ motion to amend in the 2015 Action for substantive reasons related to the merits of Plaintiffs’ new claims.  [...] could have simply denied Plaintiffs’ motion to amend in the 2015 Action by holding that the claims were not in fact “new”, if that were the case and if that were the Court’s position.  Rather, as is apparent by [...]’s own words, [...] solely denied Plaintiffs’ motion to amend because Her Honor did not want to delay the trial and found that Plaintiffs would not be barred from filing these new claims in a new action, where they would then be given a fair and reasonable opportunity to be fully litigated.
[directive] b.  [...] staff shall call the local law enforcement agency at the victim/witness location or the defendant’s last location, depending on the type of alert, advising law enforcement that the defendant was ordered to electronic monitoring by the court, advising them of the electronic monitoring alert, and asking law enforcement to investigate the defendant’s (last known) location, and that should law enforcement determine there is probable cause that the defendant purposefully or knowingly violated their electronic monitoring condition, they may arrest the defendant and charge the defendant with Criminal Contempt.  c.  [...] staff shall follow the attached outline authorized by the Administrative Office of the Courts to provide law enforcement with the relevant information to respond to the alert.  Staff shall follow the outline verbatim.
[directive] SUBJECT: Amendment to AG Directive 2008-1 – Submission and Analysis of Information Relating to Firearms and Ballistics Evidence.  On March 17, 2008, then Attorney General [...] issued AG Law Enforcement Directive 2008-1, “Submission and Analysis of Information Relating to Seized and Recovered Firearms. ”  This Directive called upon law enforcement across the State to respond to the emerging threats of gun violence through intelligence-led policing.  Through the Directive, the New Jersey State Police established the NJ Trace System, which links various already-established law enforcement databases to assist in identifying critical information related to recovered or seized firearms and related ballistics evidence, such as shell casings.  These databases include, among others, the National Crime Information Center (NCIC) System, the Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF) e-Trace System, the National Integrated Ballistics Identification Network (NIBIN) database.  Information entered into the NIBIN database is critical, as it can determine whether a particular firearm was used in the commission of another crime; it automates ballistics analyses and provides actionable investigative leads, generally within 24-hours of submission.  Thus, the 2008-1 Directive required entries “as expeditiously as practicable. ”  The timing of submissions was then codified in N.J.S.A. § 52:17B-9.19 which requires all law enforcement agencies to submit “as soon as practicable” any firearm into the NIBIN database and NJ Trace System that was unlawfully possessed, used for an unlawful purpose, believed to be associated with or involved in the commission of a crime, and/or acquired by the agency as an abandoned or discarded, including all shell casings.
[brief] This case returns to this Court after it remanded for reconsideration of defendant’s aggregate sentence of 55 years with an almost 47-year period of parole ineligibility.  This Court affirmed the sentencing court’s imposition of consecutive sentences for murder and robbery, and its findings regarding aggravating and mitigating factors, but concluded that the aggregate sentence had to be revisited given recent changes in the law governing the sentencing of juvenile offenders.  On resentencing, the court held a two-day hearing at which it heard from defendant’s neuropsychologist, defendant’s family, defendant’s counsel, and defendant himself.  After considering the record before her in light of the governing case law and the new mitigating factor for juvenile offenders, the judge imposed a new sentence, one in which defendant will be parole eligible four years earlier than he was on the sentence originally imposed.  To be sure, defendant has still received a long sentence, one he is no doubt disappointed with.  But this Court must remember a 16-year-old boy is dead as a direct result of defendant’s order to kill him.  The issues raised in defendant’s brief were considered and weighed by the sentencing judge, and her decision is entitled to this Court’s deference.  This Court should therefore affirm.  Counterstatement of Procedural History
[brief] Plaintiff argues in Point IV of its brief that Defendants are barred from challenging the right to take under the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel as a result of the trial court’s decision in [...] v. [...], Docket No. [...], that challenged the land swap ordinances.  (Pb 28)  In reply, Defendants rely on their argument set forth in Point II of their initial Appellate brief (Db14-20), but would reiterate that the Eminent Domain Act provides the exclusive mechanism to address all issues related to a taking.  It is simply unreasonable that Defendants ought to have been expected to “defend” a condemnation action against their private properties in an action commenced by another party against the Township filed months before the Township authorized the taking of Defendants’ properties.  (Da20; 68).  Plaintiffs assert that Defendants should have joined that action (Pb32), but Defendants could not have duly exercised their right to challenge the Township’s acquisition of their properties granted by the Eminent Domain Act via that matter.  Indeed, the ordinances challenged there did not authorize the takings.  (Da25; 45)  Defendants have every right to challenge the Township’s subsequently filed condemnation action to take their private property.
[brief] He argues that he had only two prior indictable convictions, and that “there exists in this case only a general type of deterrence that is present in every sentencing. ”  He also argues that the court failed to explain why it found a risk that he would commit further crimes.  *14  [...] also argues that the court erroneously failed to find any mitigating factors.  Specifically, he argues that his conduct was the result of circumstances unlikely to recur, N.J.S.A. 2C:44–1b(8), because he would have nothing more to do with [...].  He also argues that he cooperated with law enforcement authorities, N.J.S.A. 2C:44–1b(12), by helping them locate [...].  [...] had been convicted previously of first degree armed robbery, and he had been released from custody only one year before committing the current offenses.  Those circumstances supported the court's finding of a risk of recurrence.  On the other hand, [...]'s assertion that he would have nothing further to do with [...] was of little moment.  There was no evidence that [...] initiated the conspiracy or enlisted [...] to commit the robbery.  And there was certainly no evidence that [...] had anything to do with the previous armed robbery that [...] committed.  [...]'s argument that he cooperated with law enforcement authorities is also devoid of merit.  It was [...], not [...], who admitted her complicity in the crimes and testified against [...] and [...].  The statement [...] provided to law enforcement authorities about [...]'s whereabouts can hardly be deemed cooperation.  [...] also argues that the court erred by imposing consecutive fifteen-year sentences for his robbery convictions, counts three and four; and consecutive twenty-year sentences for his kidnapping convictions, counts eight and nine.
[brief] The answer remains “no. ”  Plaintiffs certified that they never received the Account Applications, let alone signed those or any other documents.  (Da65, ¶¶ 13-14.)  [...] does not, and cannot, refute this fact.  Likewise, [...] – who induced Plaintiffs to invest their money with him and [...] in 2018, and who was terminated by [...] in January 2024 for the very misconduct underlying Plaintiffs’ claims – does not dispute that he never provided Plaintiffs any agreements and that Plaintiffs never executed or agreed to the arbitration provision [...] relies on in support of their Motion to Compel and this appeal.  The Account Applications that [...] relies on contain no indicia that either [...] or [...] reviewed or signed those documents, or assented to waive any of their rights.  The Supreme Court has firmly stated that “an arbitration provision cannot be enforced against an [individual] who does not sign or otherwise explicitly indicate his or her agreement to it.
[brief] TABLE OF AUTHORITIES………………………………………………………v ARGUMENT……………………………………………………………………1  1.  The Record Unequivocally Demonstrates  Plaintiff Complained About What She Reasonably Believed To Be Defendants’ Violation Of Applicable Law and Regulation, Which Is Rooted In Firm Public Policy.  (PA000006-PA000008).  (PA000088)……………………………………………………………..1  a.  Plaintiff’s reliance on N.J.A.C. § 10:44A-2.8(b) “closely relates” to her complained of conduct regarding consistent understaffing at Defendant [...].  (PA000006).  (PA000089-PA000090)………………..4  b.  Plaintiff’s reliance on N.J.A.C. § 10:44 A-2.7(a) “closely relates” to her complained of conduct regarding lack of proper training at Defendant [...].  (PA000008).  (PA000090-PA000091)………………..6  2.  The Complaint Establishes A Prima Facie Showing That Defendants Took Adverse Employment Towards Plaintiff, Which Includes Defendants’ PTO Misrepresentations, Issuing Plaintiff A Baseless Developmental Plan, Holding Hostility Towards Plaintiff, and Terminating Plaintiff Following Her Whistleblowing Complaints.  (PA000001-PA000058)(argued but not ruled on)…………………………………………………………………………………..8  3.  The Complaint Establishes A Prima Facie *Pierce* Claim Because Plaintiff Has Identified Several Mandates of Public Policy In Support of Her Concerns to Defendants.  (PA000001-PA000058).  (PA000091-PA000092)..................12  4.  Defendants Failed To Timely Submit Their Opposition Brief Pursuant To R. 2:6-11…………………………………………………………………………………..12  CONCLUSION……………………………………………………………………………14
[brief] See Perry Dean et al., Saving Rutgers-Camden, 44 Rutgers L. J. 337, 342-48 (2014) (explaining evolution of Rutgers from pre-Revolutionary War institution to autonomous public university as part of a contract codified under Rutgers Act).  BOG members are not employed or compensated by the State.  N.J.S.A. 18A:65-20.  Nor are they elected by the public at large.  Instead, they serve as fiduciaries for the University and its interests.  Further, nearly half the BOG members are appointed by the Trustees.  ([...] is one such member whom the Trustees had appointed.)  And it is critical to understanding the sui generis nature of Rutgers to note that the Trustees originally comprised the sole governing board of Rutgers when it was then a private institution.  Trustees of Rutgers College in N.J. v. Richman, 41 N.J. Super. 259 (Ch. Div. 1956).  That changed when Rutgers entered the contract with the State, now codified under the Rutgers Act, the critical point being that many if not all the powers of the Trustees derived not from legislation or public referendum but via the University’s constitutionally protected charter.  Those charter rights today are still protected expressly in the Rutgers Act.  See N.J.S.A. 18A:65-4.  As a result, BOG members, especially those like [...] appointed by the Trustees from among its own members, do not hold public office from which they may be ousted by a member of the public.  The trial court erred by its contrary conclusion.
[brief] The matter was actually tried before a jury in April of 2022 (1T and 2T).  The Defendant-Counterclaimant admitted he owed to the Plaintiff certain rents, but in connection with his Counterclaim, he testified that the landlord had breached the lease, entered the premises, and removed all of his functioning equipment for his business.  The value was $104,000.  The trial Judge determined that the Appellant did not have standing to sue and ruled against the Appellant on the Counterclaim.  An appeal was taken (Da-129).  This Court reversed and remanded the matter for trial (Da-1).  While the matter was pending in this Court, the Counterclaimant-Appellant was selling marijuana.  As a result, he was arrested which resulted in him being confined to the Morris County Jail while the criminal charges were pending; and then, incarcerated in State Prison (da-24).  As indicated above, the sentencing Judge believed that he would be released by March 11th, and counsel for the Appellant went to the assignment Judge and agreed on that date.
[brief] (2T60-19 to 2T61-25).  [...] was immediately approached, arrested, handcuffed and searched.  (2T53-20 to 2T55-21).  No officer involved in that arrest ever testified or reported that he was the officer who administered Miranda warnings to [...].  [...], the case agent on this case, initially testified that “we” “handcuffed him, searched him, read him---his rights per Miranda. ” (2T20-17 to 19), but he subsequently acknowledged that at the time he reached [...], he was already in handcuffs, that he could not “definitively” say that he either administered Miranda rights to [...], or that he heard -- or could identify -- any other officer administer Miranda rights, either in the parking lot or in Apartment B.
[brief] Sugar (II), 100 N.J. at 237-38.  The first and third prongs are most relevant to this case.  Under the first prong, the State must establish that proper procedures “would have been pursued” to continue the investigation leading to the discovery of the evidence.  Ibid.  (emphasis added).  “Would” does not mean “could”; it requires much more than a mere expression of hope as to what the police ought to have done instead of conducting an illegal search.  See [...], Search and Seizure, §11.4(a), at 359 (5th ed. 2012) (“[C]ourts must be extremely careful not to apply the ‘inevitable discovery’ rule upon the basis of nothing more than a hunch or speculation as to what otherwise might have occurred. ”); [...], Current N.J. Arrest, Search & Seizure (Gann), §33:3-3, at 991 (2018) (“The fact that police could have obtained a search warrant does not mean that they would have obtained a search warrant) (citing State v. Keaton, 222 N.J. 438, 451 (2015)).  Under the third prong of the inevitable discovery doctrine, the State must establish that the discovery of the evidence through the use of the proposed hypothetical inevitable procedure would have occurred wholly independently of the discovery of such evidence by unlawful means.  Sugar (II), 100 N.J. at 237-38.  In other words, the State must prove that the illegal action did not taint any theoretical independent avenue to obtain the evidence.  In this case, the State failed to establish both the first and third of these prongs of inevitable discovery.
[brief] Moreover, defendant undermined plaintiff’s case by asserting plaintiff hid those documents from the jury.  The trial was plagued by defendant’s speaking objections and the trial judge’s many, lengthy sidebars – even when there was no objection.  Defendant sought to relitigate at trial every issue on which it lost pretrial.  The trial judge made preemptive rulings prohibiting plaintiff’s experts from saying certain words and then telling the expert what words he could use instead.  In particular, the trial court so limited [...], plaintiff’s expert on the violation of rights under the NHA, that the claim got lost amid endless sidebars and the random striking of his answers on direct examination.
[brief] The Respondent's brief includes in the Appendix the "Estimate of Retirement Benefits Public Employees' Retirement System" that was dated May 25, 2021.  The Estimate indicates that if I retired on September 1, 2021 that I would have 9 years and 8 months of service.  The other Estimate indicates that if I retired on October 1, 2021, I would have 9 years and 9 months of service.  That is not being disputed by me.  That is why I did not retire on September 1, 2021 or October 1, 2021.  I knew that I would not have the requisite 10 years of service to be eligible for State health benefits or to receive the life insurance policy awarded for 10 years of service.  With the assistance of the Leave Specialist ([...]), the [...] in the Superior Court of New Jersey and my Judge, The Honorable [...], I decided to remain as an active employee to attain the 10 year goal.