ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] #  TABLE OF CONTENTS FOR APPELLANT’S APPENDIX | Description | Page | |----------------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | MRI report of the lumbar spine of Plaintiff | 101a*| | Narrative report of [...], MD, dated 02/28/20 | 102a*| | Narrative report of [...], MD, dated 04/21/20 | 105a*| | Narrative report of [...], MD, dated 06/05/20 | 108a*| | [...] Evaluation, dated 02/25/20 | 112a*| | [...] Follow Evaluation, dated 04/27/20 | 115a*| | [...] Follow up Evaluation, dated 06/10/20 | 118a*| | [...] progress notes dated 02/25-09/02/20 | 121a*| | [...] Initial Evaluation | 125a*| | Affidavit of [...], MD, dated 02/28/23 | 61a | | Order of March 31, 2023 granting summary judgment to Defendant | 63a | | Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration | 66a | # TABLE OF CONTENTS FOR APPELLANT’S APPENDIX -Cont’d- | Description | Page | |-----------------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | Certification of Counsel in support of motion for reconsideration | 68a | | Exhibit “A” (Duplicate of Plaintiff’s response to statement of facts at 74a) | 70a | | Exhibit “B” (Duplicate of Certification of [...] at 76a) | 71a | | Exhibit “C” (Duplicate of prior certification of counsel at 72a) | 72a | | Order of April 28, 2023, denying Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration | 73a | | Notice of Appeal (deficient) | 75a | | Amended Notice of Appeal | 78a | | Transcript delivery certification | 83a | # TABLE OF CONTENTS FOR APPELLANT’S CONFIDENTIAL APPENDIX | Description | Page | |------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | Defendant’s Exhibit “C” – Expert report of [...], MD | 84a | | CV for [...], MD | 86a | | MRI report of the cervical spine of Plaintiff | 99a | | MRI report of the lumbar spine of Plaintiff | 101a | | Narrative report of [...], MD, dated 02/28/20 | 102a | | Narrative report of [...], MD, dated 04/21/20 | 105a | | Narrative report of [...], MD, dated 06/05/20 | 108a | | [...] Evaluation, dated 02/25/20 | 112a | | [...] Follow Evaluation, dated 04/27/20 | 115a | | [...] Follow up Evaluation, dated 06/10/20 | 118a | | [...] progress notes dated 02/25-09/02/20 | 121a | | [...] Initial Evaluation | 125a | | Cases | Page | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America, 142 N.J. 520 (1995) | 10, 13, 14, 17 | | Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986) | 13 | | City of Atl. City v. Trupos, 201 N.J. 447 (2010) | 10 | | Cohn v. Public Service Co-Ordinated Transport, 109 N.J.L. 387 (1932)| 17, 18, 19 | | DepoLink Ct. Reporting & Litig. Support Servs. v. Rochman, 430 N.J. Super. 325 (App.
[brief] ............................................................................................  16 - **Jewish Ctr. of Sussex Cnty. v. Whale**, 86 N.J. 619 (1981) .................................................. 33 - **Lone v. Brown**, 199 N.J. Super. 420 (App. Div. 1985) ....................................................... 34 - **Mayflower Indus. v. Thor Corp.**, 15 N.J. Super. 139 (Ch. Div. 1951), aff’d, 9 N.J. 605 (1952) .......................................................................................................................... 34 - **Melone v. Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co.**, 18 N.J. 163 (1955) ................................. 19, 29 - **New Jersey Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. A.W.**, 103 N.J. 591 (1986) .... 30 - **Oella Ridge Tr. v. Silver State Sch. Credit Union**, 137 Nev. 760 (2021) ........ 13 Phoenix Pinelands Corp. v. Davidoff, 467 N.J. Super. 532 (App. Div. 2021), cert. denied, 249 N.J. 95 (2021) ......................................................... 17, 18 Poland v. Parsekian, 81 N.J. Super. 395 (App. Div. 1963) ...................... 19, 29 Rogers Carl Corp. v. Moran, 103 N.J. Super. 163 (App. Div. 1968) ........... 34 Segal v. Lynch, 413 N.J. Super. 171 (App. Div. 2010) .......................... 36 Shotwell v. Shotwell, 24 N.J. Eq. 378 (Ch. 1874)
[brief] Even if this Court were to find that [...]’s testimony as to Defendant’s words did reasonably justify an inference of consciousness of guilt, this Court should find that it failed to satisfy the fourth Cofield prong, which requires that “[t]he probative value of the evidence must not be outweighed by its apparent prejudice. ”  Ibid (quoting Cofield, 127 N.J. at 338).  Here, any probative value was extremely limited in light of the explanations Defendant gave for his refusal (3T5-16 to 24; 4T30-3 to 13) and the fact that he ultimately consented to give a blood sample instead.  (5T3-14 to 7-11)  This minimal probative value should have been weighed against the prejudice, wherein the State emphasized twice that while [...] had agreed to give a buccal swab, Defendant had refused, to rebut Defendant’s theory that [...], not Defendant, shot [...].  (38T178-5 to 17, 191-2 to 3)  The prejudice of this testimony thus clearly outweighed any miniscule probative value.  The prejudice of [...]’s testimony was heightened by the fact that this occurred in the context of Defendant litigating the State’s motion to compel a buccal swab—litigation that the record makes clear he honestly (though mistakenly) believed he had the right to continue to litigate.
[brief] He cites Cherokee LCP Land, LLC v. City of Linden Planning Bd., 234 N.J. 403 (2018), to prove he has standing as having a financial interest in the property, even without title.  As Appellant correctly notes in his brief, this case involves the rights of tax certificate lien holders.  The plaintiffs in this case have a physically observable financial interest in the subject property, therefore, they have standing.  Appellant goes on to state, “there is nothing speculative about my financial interest in the outcome of [Respondent]’s possession of our mom’s car, as sadly there is no possibility at all that my mom could choose to [‘]redeem[‘] her vehicle” (Pb p. 20).
[brief] The Right To Specific Performance In The PSA Was Contingent On Conditions That Were Not Met  Even if Plaintiff did not terminate the PSA, it still was not entitled to specific performance of the PSA because, as the trial court properly found, the conditions upon which the right to specific performance was contingent never occurred.  Section 13.1 of the PSA unambiguously states that “in the event [[...]] closes title under[] the Mack-Cali Agreement, and thereupon [[...]] defaults in its obligation to close title under this [PSA] Agreement, [Plaintiff] shall . . . have the right of specific performance. ” (Pa115-116 (emphasis added)).  The trial court correctly interpreted this language as providing that the right to specific performance only arose if two conditions were met: (1) [...] *first* closed title under the Mack-Cali Agreement; and (2) [...] *then* defaulted in its obligation to close title under the PSA.  (2T13:5-12; 2T14:4-11).  In doing so, the court correctly noted that the word “thereupon” means “as a consequence” of something.  (2T14:21-24).  To hold that these two conditions did not need to be met in the sequence set forth in the PSA would render the word “thereupon” meaningless.  These conditions were never met.  As Plaintiff acknowledges, Plaintiff declared [...] to be in default under the PSA and received back its deposit *before* the closing of the Mack-Cali transaction.  (Pa10-11, ¶¶39-41)  Thus, Plaintiff never had the right to specific performance.  **D.
[directive] Any such determination shall be documented in the case file and shall be subject to review by the Attorney General or designee upon request.  Nothing in this Section shall be construed to impose substantive or procedural limits on the authority of the prosecutor to appeal the sentence on the grounds that the defendant was not eligible to be sentenced pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7b, see Part 1/, Section 2b, infra (generally appeal in those circumstances), or to appeal a probationary sentence, including a requiring an county jail sentence, in any case where the defendant is subject to the presumption of imprisonment pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1d.  See N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1f(2) (authorizing a prosecutor to appeal a noncustodial or probationary sentence when a defendant is convicted of a crime of the first or second degree).  4.
[brief] Further still, the Separation Agreement does not call for a “final determination’ or exhaustion of administrative appeals (Argued at Db 38, Point VI) before Paragraph 15 of the Separation Agreement (Da18) can be enforced – this paragraph directs the parties to go to the Superior Court of New Jersey in the event of a dispute under the Separation Agreement.  Respondent’s actions herein are responsive the terms of the Contract.  The Court’s July 25, 2023 Order did not award benefits.  Instead, it enforced the Agreement itself under the plain language of that document.
[brief] (Da69, Da69-81.)  The motion appealed from followed.  F.  Plaintiff’s Partial Summary Judgment Motion; Defendant Intentionally Argues Only Plaintiff’s Construction is not Reasonable; and Court Grants the Motion Certifying it as Final Plaintiff filed for partial summary judgment to compel release of the deposit, to amend to add causes of action for fraud in the inducement, adding Defendant’s counsel for aiding and abetting the fraud, and extend the discovery end date.
[brief] ....................................................6 - **Knorr v. Smeal**, 178 N.J. 169 (2003) .........................................................................................13 - **Lavin v. Board of Educ. of City of Hackensack**, 90 N.J. 145 (1982) ......................... 13, 14 - **Mancini v. Township of Teaneck**, 179 N.J. 425 (2004)  ..........................................................13 - **Morris County Fair Housing Council v. Boonton Twp.**, 220 N.J. Super. 388 (Law Div. 1987), aff’d as modified, 230 N.J. Super. 345 (App. Div. 1989).17 - **North Bergen Rex Transport v. TLC**, 158 N.J. 561 (1999) ..................................................10 - **Pascack Assoc’n, Ltd. v. Mayor & Council of the Twp. of Washington**, 74 N.J. 470 (1977) .........................................................................................................................................................17 - **Pennbar Corp. v. Insurance Co. of No. America**, 976 F.2d 145 (3d Cir. 1992) .................................................................4, 11 - **Pomerantz Paper Corp. v. New Community Corp.**, 207 N.J. 344 (2011) ...............................15 - **Scullion v. State Farm Ins. Co.**, 345 N.J. Super. 431 (App. Div. 2001)
[brief] (Da13)  The court first ruled the tinted windows did not justify a stop pursuant to State v. Smith, 251 N.J. 244 (2022).  (Da26-28)  However, the court found the stop was justified by the officers’ reasonable belief that the vehicle’s owner had an outstanding warrant.  (Da28-31)  The court credited [...]’s testimony that the database is generally reliable and had only reflected inaccurate information on two occasions.  (Da30)  The court went on to find the search of the vehicle to be lawful under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement.  (Da32-34)  On November 10, 2022, almost two years after [...] was arrested and nearly thirteen months after he was indicted, the State informed defense counsel it intended to seek DNA testing of the handgun and sought consent for buccal swabs of each defendant.
[brief] [...] testified that on February 28, 2017, at approximately 7:15 a.m., he stopped [...]’s (“[...]”) red Ford F-150 pick-up truck on Route I-80 for an Illinois mudflaps or splash guard violation.  (1T19-11 to 15; 1T124-6 to 9).  [...] identified [...] by her Nevada driver’s license.  (1T22-23 to 23-1).  [...] was accompanied by one passenger in the vehicle, identified by his Nevada driver’s license as [...] (“[...]”).  (1T23-1 to 3).  The stop of [...]’s vehicle was captured on the [...]’s squad vehicle’s dual-function video camera, which captured video inside and outside of the vehicle.  (1T83-5 to 8; Da73; Pa9).  While walking toward the truck, [...] glanced through the right rear window of the truck’s topper with a flashlight.  [...] can be heard to say out loud on the videotape, “One 30 Nevada.  I think he’s covering something.  Looks like duffel bags. ”  (Da73/Pa9 at 1:38 to 1:41; accord 1T132-17 to 19).  The officer saw a piece of plywood and cardboard partially concealing a few black duffel bags on the truck bed.  (1T21-2 to 10).  When [...] questioned [...] and [...] as to whom the vehicle belonged, [...] responded with “[...]. ” (1T23-6 to 9).  [...] informed [...] that “[...]” was in Reno, and they were traveling to New York to pick up a car.  (1T23-9 to 13).  [...] requested that [...] exit the truck and accompany him back to his trooper car while he ran a check on her driver’s license and prepared a warning for a splash guard violation.  (1T23-23 to 24-16).  It was customary in Illinois to have the motorists sit in the police car while the officer ran his routine checks on the motorist’s driver’s license and license plate.
[brief] *President v. Jenkins*, 180 N.J. 550, 569 (2004).  A court may grant judgment to a plaintiff as a matter of law “where the evidence permits no conclusion other than that the broker was ignorant of available coverage, failed to obtain requested coverage, or failed to advise the customer of the unavailability of requested coverage. ”  *Avery v. Arthur E. Armitage Agency*, 242 N.J. Super. 293, 303 (App. Div. 1990).  The failure of the broker to produce the coverage or else warn the client at once that coverage could not be obtained constitutes a failure to exercise the requisite skill or diligence required of a broker to the same extent as would have obtained had there been a failure to issue a policy which the broker promised to procure.
[brief] Noteworthy is that before the Law Division they abandoned their “anti-merger clause” argument previously advanced to this Court, in 2022.  Instead, plaintiffs, for the very first time in 17 years, argued the invalidity of the judgment lien.  Even though plaintiffs conceded their lack of standing & a time bar, Appellant was forced to brief how the doctrines of judicial estoppel, collateral estoppel, entire controversy doctrine, laches & the bankruptcy code all barred the plaintiffs’ belated & meritless argument.  (Da 118-154)  Not surprisingly, plaintiffs abandoned the challenge of the judgment lien validity at oral argument.  The court did not even address that in its Statements of Reasons.  Nevertheless, Appellant was forced to expend an inordinate amount of time addressing the frivolous argument.  With a combined legal experience of over 40 years, including in the practice areas of real estate & foreclosure, plaintiffs & their attorney ignored the discharged mortgage, the DIL & the private sale.  Yet without any authority, plaintiffs argued priority to the fund over a judgment lien that the Appellate Division had held was still valid against the foreclosure judgment DIL.  No reasonable person could have expected these arguments to prevail.  Stated another way, Plaintiffs’ arguments were unreasonable & designed, in part, to compensate for their decision to forego a Sheriff sale—their decision only.  Their litigation was pure & simple frivolous.  The lower court insulated plaintiffs’ misconduct by relying on Segal v. Lynch, 211 N.J. 230 (2012).
[directive] County 251 595 510 799  Prosecutors, FNEs, and law  Total Hold Kits Reported: 2158 enforcement reported their volume of Hold kits separately, as the CPO REPORTED HOLD KIT AGE possession of these kits may be other.13  unknown to the Results  2-3 yrs old 4-5 yrs old 5+ yrs old indicated that the bulk of Hold kits 1 yr old 167 548 453 800 reside with the FNE.  In total, FNEs reported 2,158 Hold kits and CPOs  Total Hold Kits Reported: 1968 reported 1,968 Hold kits.
[brief] See MDb44, n.4; see also 1T10:8-14.  Therefore, it should not be considered by this Court.  See generally Nieder v. Royal Indem. Ins. Co., 62 N.J. 229, 234 (1973) (explaining that reviewing courts “will decline to consider questions or issues not properly presented [below] … when [the] opportunity for such a presentation is available ‘unless the questions so raised on appeal go to the jurisdiction of the [proceeding] or concern matters of great public interest’”).  Regardless, Plaintiffs fail to articulate any provision of the Master Plan that the amended Redevelopment Plan offends by increasing the amount of open space on the property while decreasing the size of the developed portion of the property.  Given this clear and substantial record supporting the challenged municipal actions of Borough and Planning Board, the trial court properly concluded that the substantial deference and presumption of validity afforded to the municipal actions could not be overcome.  See Fallone Properties, L.L.C. v. Bethlehem Twp. Planning Bd., 369 N.J. Super. 552, 562 (App. Div. 2004) (“[W]hen reviewing the decision of a trial court that has reviewed municipal action, we are bound by the same standards as was the trial court” and “will give substantial deference to findings of fact” so long as the challenged actions are “grounded in evidence in the record”).  With Plaintiffs’ burden unsatisfied, the actions of the Borough or Planning Board cannot be set aside as arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable.
[brief] See Guidi v. City of Atl. City, supra, 286 N.J.Super. at 245,668 A.2d 1098.  Although knowledge that the municipality considers certain behavior to be a nuisance allows ordinary people to understand that their conduct is prohibited by the ordinance, it does not prevent arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement of the ordinance in the first place.  See Betancourt v. Town of W. New *485 York, supra, 338 N.J.Super. at 423, 769 A.2d 1065 (setting forth the requirements for determining the constitutionality of penal ordinances).
[directive] Due to the risks to both officers and the public, supervisors are expected to exercise an enhanced level of control over vehicular pursuits.  4.8.1  Vehicular pursuits shall only be initiated if the pursuing officer reasonably believes that: (a) the violator has committed, or is engaged in a conspiracy or attempt to commit, a crime enumerated in Section 3.2(a) of Addendum B; or (b) the violator poses an imminent threat to the safety of the public or other police officers.  This determination shall be made based upon the violator’s actions or operation of the vehicle prior to the initiation of the attempted motor vehicle stop.  The violator’s subsequent actions, including speeding or evasive driving during the pursuit itself, although often supporting the criminal charge of Eluding, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-2(b), shall not constitute an authorization to initiate or continue a pursuit.
[brief] A proper OPRA request “must identify with reasonable clarity those documents that are desired. ”  Bent v. Twp. of Stafford Police Dep’t, 381 N.J. Super. 30, 37 (App. Div. 2005).  An OPRA request “should not require the records custodian to undertake a subjective analysis to understand the nature of the request” or what is being sought.  Paff v. Galloway Twp., 229 N.J. at 355.  Put another way, “[s]eeking particular information from the custodian is permissible; expecting the custodian to do research is not. ”  Ibid.  Thus, the measuring stick of determining whether a records request is overbroad depends on whether it “require[s] the record custodian to exercise subjective judgment in determining which records must be produced. ”  Simmons v. Mercado, 247 N.J. 24, 43 (2021).  [...] is correct that a requestor may not request “any and all records on file,” but Plaintiff’s OPRA request does no such thing—it seeks a specific type of record (emails) during a very narrow time frame (three days).  The requests at issue in the Appellate Division cases to which [...] cites in support of its argument are a far cry from the request at issue in this case.³
[brief] The trial court recognized appellants' disagreement with what they thought petitioners were claiming:  Respondents  [Appellants] argue that Petitioners fail to demonstrate that the information Counsel allegedly received during the consultation is significantly harmful to Petitioners.  Respondents contend that Counsel discussed procedural matters with Petitioners and the proprietary [sic] of engaging in litigation to resolve the dispute amongst family members.  Respondents assert that Counsel did not discuss settlement of the matter nor did Counsel provide an analysis of the merits of any affirmative claims or defenses in the matter.  Additionally, Respondents contend that the only relevant information exchanged is in connection with the statute of limitations.  Respondents assert that he advised Petitioners that the statute of limitations was close to running.  [Pa7.]  However, rather than credit this account – purportedly the only account the trial court considered – the court disregarded it entirely on the basis of emails that disclosed nothing prejudicial to petitioners.  Indeed, the unidentified and unauthenticated emails, now acknowledged by petitioners to be non-prejudicial, apparently only "prove" that [...] had contact with [...].  The trial court did not consider any sworn testimony.  Nothing the court considered shows petitioners shared any prejudicial facts with the [...] Firm.  This demonstrates petitioners' failure to carry their burden of production and persuasion.  The motion should have been denied on this basis alone.
[brief] ” (Id.).  Regarding the Navigational Channels Rule, [...] indicated that the policy was met because “the two proposed open type boat lifts are located suitably away from the marked navigation area of Barnegat Bay,” and that “[n]avigability of the Barnegat Bay will not be affected by allowing the two boat lifts to be constructed. ” (Aa106).  Finally, regarding the Docks Rule, [...] indicated that “(t)he proposed open type boat lifts will not hinder navigation or access to adjacent water areas. ” (Aa107).  On March 11, 2019, [...] notified [...] that it would be approving the [...] 2018 Modification Application.
[brief] Plaintiffs argue that the specific requirements set forth in N.J.S.A. 17:29C-10 to establish proof of mailing should not suffice, and proof of receipt should be the standard, urging the Court to reverse the lower court’s ruling because of “the absence of proof of plaintiffs’ actual receipt of the notice of cancellation”  Pb16.  Yet plaintiffs acknowledge, as they must, that the statute “is silent on the issue. ”  Pb17.  Plaintiffs further acknowledge that New Jersey courts have held that mailing of the cancellation notice, rather than its receipt, is the determinative factor as to whether cancellation is effective.
[brief] [...] was convicted on two second-degree counts of terroristic threats for leaving threatening voice messages for a then-municipal court judge in 2021, and three fourth-degree offenses -- harassment, stalking, and retaliation for past official action -- for harassing phone calls to the judge in 2022.  The State upgraded the terroristic threats charges for the 2021 voicemails from third- to second-degree offenses on the basis that they occurred “during a declared period of national, State, or county emergency” – namely, the COVID-19 pandemic.  N.J.S.A. 2C:12-3(a).
[brief] Similarly, in Dombrowska v. Kresge-Newark, Inc., 75 N.J. Super. 271, 275 (App. Div. 1962), the court held that a finding of constructive notice was impossible where there was no evidence to show how long the allegedly dangerous condition existed.  In Dombrowska, the plaintiff claimed that she was injured in a fall as a result of a dangerous condition inside a department store.  Id. at 272.