ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] 4.2.1  Personnel assigned to conduct internal affairs investigations should be energetic, resourceful and committed to the agency's mission and the internal affairs function.  They must display a high degree of perseverance and initiative.  The internal affairs investigator must maintain an appropriate balance between professional commitment and personal and group loyalties.  Internal affairs personnel must be of unquestioned integrity and possess the moral stamina to perform unpopular tasks.  It is important that these investigators possess the ability to withstand the rigors and tensions associated with complex investigations, social pressures and long hours of work.  The investigator must possess the ability to be tactful when dealing with members of the agency and the community.  It is recommended that personnel assigned to the internal affairs function provide the agency with the opportunity to access all segments of the community.  For example, if a particular community has a significant proportion of the population that speaks a foreign language, the law enforcement executive may wish to consider assigning an officer to the internal affairs function who speaks that language.  4.2.2
[brief] 12/6/2008  Transfer from [...]’s [...] checking Account to [...]’s [...] account for $2,000,000 (24T35:8 to 36:10)  11/5/2013  Transfer from [...]’s [...] account to Emanuel and [...]’s [...] account for $500,000 (24T36:11-22)  2013 “Arbor Hills” transactions cited by [...], (24T34:20-35:3) which included the following invoices for site investigation services six years or more before the complaint was filed: | Date | Invoice # | Amount | |------------|--------------|-------------| | 5/13/2013 | 2013041 | $10,000.00 | | 7/5/2013 | 201300601 | 104,687.00 | | 7/18/2013 | 201300601\(^6\) | 104,687.00 | | 11/7/2013 | 20131001 | 31,692.50 | Employing the same methodology as the trial court, it follows that one-half of the amounts of these time-barred transactions, or $1,375,533.25, was erroneously included in the compensatory damages award of $2,872,358.93.
[directive] ATTORNEY GENERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT DIRECTIVE  NO. 2005-5 ESTABLISHING UNIFORM STATEWIDE PROCEDURES FOR IMPLEMENTING THE VINE (VICTIM INFORMATION AND NOTIFICATION EVERYDAY) SYSTEM  WHEREAS, Article 1, paragraph 22 of the New Jersey Constitution guarantees the right of all crime victims to be treated with fairness, compassion and respect by the criminal justice system, and to such other specific rights as may be provided by the Legislature; and WHEREAS, it is appropriate for New Jersey’s criminal justice system to use the best available technology to make certain that crime victims are promptly and automatically notified when an offender is released from custody.  Registered crime victims should also be able to confirm an offender’s custodial status and location at any time and without any cost to the victim; and WHEREAS, the New Jersey VINE (Victim Information And Notification Everyday) System is a state-of-the-art software system that uses data in the County Correction Information System (CCIS) operated by the Administrative Office of the Courts.  The VINE System tracks when an offender is released from custody or is transferred within the correctional system, and can automatically alert crime victims who elect to register with the System; and WHEREAS, on or about January, 2006, the VINE System will be operational in all twenty-one counties across the State; and WHEREAS, it is necessary and appropriate to establish statewide procedures for use by all law enforcement agencies to ensure the uniform and efficient implementation of the VINE System; NOW, THEREFORE, I, [...], Attorney General of the State of New Jersey, by virtue of the authority vested in me by the Constitution and by the Criminal Justice Act of 1970, N.J.S.A. 52:17B-97 et seq., do hereby DIRECT that the following procedures be implemented:
[brief] Courts in other jurisdictions that have explicitly addressed the issue have almost uniformly held that “negligent act, error or omission” means “negligent act, negligent error, or negligent omission. ”  These courts reasoned that it would be self-defeating for the insurers who draft these contracts to limit coverage for intentional acts, while at the same time covering intentional errors and omissions.  See, e.g., Employer’s Reinsurance Corp. v. Teague, 972 F.2d 339 (4th Cir. 1992); U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. 896 F.2d 200, 203 (6th Cir. 1990); Group Voyagers, Inc. v. Employers Ins. of Wausau, C 01-0400, 2002 WL 356653 (N.D. Cal. March 4, 2002); *TIG Ins. Co. v. Joe Rizza Lincoln-Mercury, Inc.* 00 C 5182, 2002 WL 406982 at *9 (N.D. Ill. March 14, 2002); *City of Dillingham v. CH2M Hill N.W., Inc.*, 873 P.2d 1271, 1275 (Alaska 1994); *Golf Course Superintendents Ass’n v. Underwriters at Lloyd’s London*, 761 F.Supp. 1485, 1490 (D.Kan. 1991).  Cf. *Connecticut Indem. Co. v. DER Travel Serv., Inc.*, 328 F.3d 347 (7th Cir. 2003) (assuming that the clause applies only to negligence).
[brief] (Da3).  In particular, Defense Counsel sought the production of:  All details associated with the “[...]” profile utilized by [...] Detective [...] to communicate with Defendant on the date of the incident (to wit: “Mark”), including but not limited to a full color photograph of Mark’s profile picture and all details provided by Detective Borow to generate Mark’s profile (such as Mark’s age, height, weight, etc.).  In response to Defense Counsel’s filing, the State indicated that the “[...]” profile utilized by [...] Detective [...] to communicate with Defendant did not appear to have been preserved.  While the State sought to confirm same, the Trial Court encouraged Defense Counsel to seek to obtain the requested information directly from “[...]. ”  In July 2021, Defense Counsel successfully made contact with the attorney for “[...].
[brief] Q.  Now, showing you a different still from the same Exhibit S-23 that’s been premarked.  Is this another angle that you recovered from the surveillance videos?  A. Yes.  Q.  And has this been altered or edited in any way?  A. No.  Q.  And what are we looking at here?  A.  The inside of a supermarket facing, camera angle is facing the front door.  Q.  Okay.  And this is the same video that you previously reviewed and you and I reviewed together?  A. Correct.  ...  Q.  And in front of you I have another still.  I fast[-]forwarded it through the player.  Is this another camera angle that you recovered in your surveillance videos?  A. Yes.  Q.  Has this been edited or altered in any way?  A.  No.  Q.  Is this also the video that you previously reviewed and you and I reviewed together in preparation for today?  A.  Yes.  Q.  And what are we looking at here?  A.  Outside camera [jview should be facing westbound.  [(1T85-25 to 86-15; 1T86-25 to 87-12; 1T87-22 to 88-9).]  This testimony established that [...] was familiar with the scene, that the video accurately represented it, and that the video that was played in court was the same video that [...] viewed at the store a short time after the shooting.
[brief] But that discovery was the product of an unlawful seizure and cannot be considered in evaluating whether the affidavit established probable cause.  See Point I.B-C, supra.  Even assuming that the narcotics found in [...]’s car could be considered, they are insufficiently connected to the informant’s tip regarding [...].  [...] was not at the scene at the time of the search of [...]’s car, and although [...] stated that he followed [...] to the storage facility, [...]’s involvement in the alleged criminal activity of [...] was unknown at that point.  (Dca 10)  All police knew of [...] was that he was an alternate tenant of [...]’s storage unit and accessed it regularly.  However, on the day of the stop and search of [...]’s car, neither [...] nor [...] were seen accessing the storage unit.  (Dca 8)  This further undermines the notion that the drugs found in [...]’s car had any connection to the storage unit.  Finally, the K-9 sniff as detailed in the affidavit cannot be considered in the probable cause analysis.  (Dca 11)  To be sure, a positive alert by a trained narcotics-detection dog can provide probable cause to believe that narcotics are present in the location sniffed.  But the warrant affidavit provided no indication that “[...]” was trained in narcotics detection.  “The reasonableness of relying on the behavior of a police dog depends on what one knows about the dog,” and here, there is no information whatsoever.  *United States v. Grupee*, 682 F.3d 143, 147 (1st Cir. 2012).  While the United States Supreme Court has made clear that evidence of a dog’s performance in the field is not necessary to establish the dog’s reliability, *Florida v. Harris*, 568 U.S. 237, 246-48 (2013), at the very least police must indicate that a dog has undergone drug-detection training, *United States v. Berry*, 90 F.3d 148, 153 (6th Cir. 1996).  See also *Harris*, 568 U.S. at 246-47 (explaining that “[i]f a bona fide organization has certified a dog after testing his reliability in a controlled setting, a court can presume . . . that the dog’s alert provides probable cause to search”).  Because the warrant affidavit failed to meet this low bar, the reliability of “[...]” was not established, and the sniff cannot support a finding of probable cause.  See *State v. Hall*, 2017 ND 124, ¶ 26 (2017)  (“[W]ithout a statement attesting to the training of the dog that conducted the sniff, the sniff cannot be considered. ”)  In sum, [...]’s affidavit did not establish that probable cause existed to search [...]’s storage unit, as the investigation failed to corroborate that [...] was engaged in any criminal wrongdoing.  All evidence seized from the storage unit must be suppressed as the fruits of an illegal search.  See Novembrino, 105 N.J. at 157-59 (exclusionary rule applies to evidence seized following a search where the warrant affidavit did not establish probable cause).
[brief] When the APs’ remarks are properly considered in the context of the trial as a whole, as they must be, State v. Morton, 155 N.J. 383, 416 (1998), it is clear that each was fair comment on the evidence revealed during trial and the reasonable inferences to be drawn from that evidence, State v. Mahoney, 188 N.J. 359, 376 (2006), and in direct response to defense counsels’ remarks at trial.  State v. Williams, 317 N.J. Super. 149, 158 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 157 N.J. 647 (1998).  A. State’s reference on opening to the indicted crimes of murder.
[brief] In doing so, it joined numerous Superior Courts throughout the state of New Jersey that have rejected Appellant’s letter vendor theory of liability as an improper exercise of “uncritical literalism. ”  *See infra*.  More importantly, however, the Superior Court’s decision aligns with this Court’s recent rejection of letter vendor allegations as a theory of FDCPA liability.  In fact, this is not Appellant’s counsel’s first time appealing this very issue.  This Court should continue to uphold the trial courts’ proper dismissal of these allegations and find that “the use of a letter vendor was not abusive, deceptive, or unfair . . . [or] the type of conduct that Congress was interested in preventing when it enacted the FDCPA. ”  *Asmad-Escobar v. Phoenix Fin. Servs. LLC*, 2024 WL 2839329, at *3 (App. Div. June 5, 2024).  *See also Mhrez v. Convergent Outsourcing, Inc.*, 2024 WL 2838327 (App. Div. June 5, 2024); T23 (“This is not a violation that was intended within the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. ”).  II.
[brief] (Da1-3.)³  “It is well-settled that appellate courts will generally ‘decline to consider questions or issues not properly presented to the trial court when an opportunity for such a presentation is available,’ unless the issues relate to jurisdiction or substantially implicate public interest. ”  Trachtenberg v. Township of West Orange, 416 N.J. Super. 354, 377 (App. Div. 2010) (quoting Nieder v. Royal Indem. Ins. Co., 62 N.J. 229, 234 (1973)).  Even if the Court were to consider [...]’s improper argument, it fails as ³ [...]’s brief in opposition to the Motion is properly included in [...]’s Appendix because [...]’s opening brief advances arguments that were not raised before the trial court, and, therefore, it is germane to this appeal.
[brief] ”  Id. at 115-16.  Defendant did not request this charge at trial, meaning this claim must be reviewed for plain error, or error ‘clearly capable of producing an unjust result. ’”  Singleton, 211 N.J. at 182 (quoting Adams, 194 N.J. at 207); R. 1:7–2.  There is no error in not sua sponte adding a charge when there is no rational basis for it, such that it is “jumping off the page. ”  State v. Fowler, 239 N.J. 171, 188 (2019) (citing Funderburg, 225 N.J. at 81).
[brief] (Dra1)  The charge goes on to note that “[t]he defendant does not have to produce evidence that proves the guilt of another, but may rely on evidence that creates a reasonable doubt.  In other words, there is no requirement that this evidence proves or even raises a strong probability that someone other than the defendant committed the crime.  You must decide whether the State has proven the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, not whether the other person or persons may have committed the crime(s).
[brief] ”  *Ibid.*  Under our case law, when a suspect asks a question about obtaining an attorney that does not clearly or directly request an attorney at the present time, our courts have found the question to be at least an ambiguous assertion of the right to counsel when it concerned the process of obtaining an attorney; however, if the question solicited advice about whether the suspect should have an attorney, it has been found not to be an assertion of the right to counsel.  Thus, in *State v. Messino*, 378 N.J. Super. 559, 573 (App. Div. 2005), this Court found that the defendant’s question, “[d]o you think I need a lawyer?”, “was a request for the officer’s opinion,” “not a request for counsel. ”  Likewise, in *Alston*, the Supreme Court found that defendant’s question, “should I not have a lawyer?”, was a “request for advice about what the detective thought that defendant should do.
[brief] Notably, there are some public unions in New Jersey that have thousands of members – for example, [...] has as many as 70,000 members\(^4\).  Thus, if permitted to stand, [...]’s holding would enable such unions to also designate their entire membership as members of their bargaining team by self-identifying them as a “Bargaining Council” or something similar, and to require that all members attend all negotiations sessions as a precondition to negotiations, unless the government agency can identify specific members as having “ill-will” or posing safety concerns (Pa236).  Taken to its extreme, allowing a public employee representative of such a large size to make such demands before agreeing to negotiate, as [...]’s precedential decision would allow them to do, might require the parties to rent out stadiums such as [...] or the [...] to conduct --- \(^4\) [...] NEW JERSEY, https://cwanj.org/about-cwa-d1-new-jersey (last visited February 26, 2024).
[brief] ”  “[A] party's burden of proof on an element of a claim may not be satisfied by an expert opinion that is unsupported by the factual record or by an expert's speculation that contradicts that record. ”  Townsend v. Pierre, 221 N.J at 55; see also, Polzo, 196 N.J.at 583.  It was, therefore, reversible error for the court to find plaintiffs proved their claims based upon [...]’s net opinion that transactions were “unauthorized. ”  POINT V THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN ENTERING JUDGMENT FOR PLAINTIFFS ON THE BREACH OF CONTRACT AND QUASI-CONTRACT CLAIMS.
[brief] C.  Legislature undisputedly did not express retroactive application of N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-9(e)(3).  D.  Under the first prong of the implied retroactive application test, [...]’s claims fail because the Legislature never intended to give N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-9(e)(3) retroactive application.  E.  Under the second prong of the implied retroactive application test, [...]’s claims fail because the retroactive application will result in either an unconstitutional interference with vested rights or a manifest injustice.
[brief] See N.J.S.A. 46:10B-60 and -61. $215,250).  Per item 37 of the Sales Contract, it was subject to the Attorney-Review Clause, which states that the contract would be “legally binding at the end of a three-day period unless an attorney for the Buyer or Seller reviews and disapproves of the Contract” – even though the attempted closing was scheduled the same day – i.e., April 5, 2019.  The Sales Contract provided further that “payment of the balance of the purchase price by the Buyer shall be made at the closing, which will take place on April 4, 2019, one (1) day prior to the date that [...], [...], and [...] signed the contract.  The Sales Contract reflected, under Item 33, Brokers’ Information and Commission, that [...] was listed as the Listing Firm with a REC Licensee ID of 1466646 and that [...] was the Listing Agent, with a REC License ID of 1431883.  According to the Sales Contract, under item 34, the Disclosure that Buyer or Seller is a real estate licensee, “Not Applicable” was marked with an ‘X. ’  The Use and Occupancy Agreement was not a lease.  The Agreement provided further that [...] was obligated to make a monthly payment of $833.00 and that she had the right to repurchase the Property within eighteen (18) months for a total purchase price of $105,871.  It provided that [...] would be responsible for all carrying costs --- 4  The 82% value requirement is set forth in the FRFPA at N.J.S.A. 46:10B-63(a)(2). of the Property for the Agreement’s eighteen (18) month duration.  (232a, ¶17).  However, if [...] did not repurchase the Property within 18 months, the Agreement provided that Plaintiff was “entitled to peaceable entry upon the subject premises” to “retake possession thereof or obtain immediate entry of judgment for possession of land and issuance of a writ of possession….”  (233a, ¶22).  Neither the Sales Contract nor the Use and Occupancy Agreement provided for a length of time of at least three (3) years within which [...] could exercise her right to purchase back the property.  (239a; 228a).  The Disclosure Statement identified [...] as both the real estate salesperson and the representative of the Plaintiff, [...].  (252a, ¶1).  Moreover, the Disclosure stated that [...] was not represented by legal counsel in this transaction.  (253a, ¶4).  **The Failed Closing**
[brief] There was sufficient information presented to determine that the non-renewal of the Appellant’s contract was discriminatory based on race and was a retaliatory action because one week prior, a Caucasian teacher, [...] was reported and was disciplined for engagement in use of a racial slur, the N word.  The Appellant had been previously praised by [...] for her effective communication.  Further, the written evaluation total score is the determinant of whether the Appellant was meeting expectations.  In each observation performed on the Appellant she met expectations.  The improper interpretation of each segment of the observation is an incorrect reading of this document because it is the overall score that determines if the employee is effective.  There were no performance deficiencies as noted in the effective observations.  Further, the strategy employed at the Plaintiff’s deposition which did not allow time for Appellant’s Counsel to ask Appellant questions on redirect of the Appellant resulted in the deposition being incomplete.  It was error to dismiss the Complaint with Prejudice as the work was not complete.
[brief] Defendant further argues in a pro se supplemental brief that the prosecutor committed misconduct during both the charging process and at trial, and that the mandatory sentence of life imprisonment without parole imposed pursuant to the “Three Strikes Law,” N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.1, is illegal.  The prosecution hinged on proving the identity of the robber, which was contested at trial.  The defense argued that police prematurely focused on defendant to the exclusion of the true culprit.
[brief] COUNTER STATEMENT OF FACTS  [...] substantially adopts the Statement of Facts set forth in its Appellate Brief except the footnote at page 4 of the [...]'s Brief (Db4) is not entirely accurate.  The litigation filed by [...] under Docket No. [...] was consolidated with litigation filed by the [...] under Docket No. [...].  Those matters were stayed pending disposition of litigation filed by [...] under Docket No. [...].  A decision was entered in that litigation on September 25, 2023 and an appeal was filed by [...] on October 30, 2023 ([...] Beach & Boardwalk vs. [...] of Keansburg, et al, Docket [...]).
[brief] \textit{See State v. Jones}, 66 \textit{N.J.} 563, 567–68, 334 A.2d 20 (1975); \textit{State v. Copling}, 326 \textit{N.J.Super.} 417, 441, 741 A.2d 624 (App.Div.1999), \textit{certif. denied}, 165 \textit{N.J.} 189 (2000).  Therefore, the trial court should reconsider this part of defendant's sentence.  We also conclude that the consecutive aspects and overall length of the remainder of defendant's sentence must be reconsidered.  The determination whether sentences should be served consecutively or concurrently, and the overall length of consecutive sentences, are governed by the criteria set forth in \textit{Yarbough}:
[brief] (Pa1343);(Pa1191).  As explained by [...] field project supervisor on the project, if settlement existed in the roadway, Defendants had a duty ensure that the settlement was re-paved settlement to correct the issue.  (Pa0599).  At a minimum, the [...] should have ensured that warning signs were installed per the contract requirements to adhere to the MUTCD.  (Pa1337);(Pa2205).  (b)
[brief] It was abundantly clear from evidence in the record before the Commission that Respondent had publicly campaigned for her seat on the Board from her Facebook account, that she posted that she was a Board member, and – as the Commission even admits – that she was speaking on Board issues while a sitting Board member.  (Ca263, Ca265, Ca267-268, Ca270, Ca272, Ca274, Ca276); (Ca017) (“the subject matter of the Facebook posts ... may relate to the business of the Board”).  As a result, members of the [...] community protested the Board itself and Respondent in her role as Board member at meetings of the Board, as evidenced in Board minutes and news articles that were in the record at the time the Commission issued its Final Decision.  (Ca107-109, Ca120-122, Ca123-127).
[brief] 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-2312 ............................................................................................................. 2  15 U.S.C. § 2302(a) ...................................................................................................................  23  15 U.S.C. § 2304(a) ...................................................................................................................  23  15 U.S.C. §§ 2310(d) ...........................................................................................................  23  15 U.S.C. § 2310(d)(2) .........................................................................................................  23  42 U.S.C. § 1988 ....................................................................................................................  22 OTHER SOURCES