ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] As set forth supra, [...] was quickly removed from his court-appointed representation because he previously represented [...] in connection with this matter.  Although Leeds’ filing generally referenced a habeas petition filed by [...], it was offered strictly for background, and [...] had no specific knowledge of its contents.  See Pa055 (“[...] asked [another inmate] to help prepare his Petition for Habeas Corpus to be filed . . .”) (emphasis added).  Specifically, the 2017 PCR was predicated on [...]’ recantation of his trial testimony regarding the Staten Island home invasion to another inmate; the habeas petition was only referenced to provide context for why and how the other inmate met [...].
[brief] New Jersey’s Continuing Planning Process: Executive Summary --- 8  These statutes, rules, and processes form the backbone of DEP’s water pollution oversight and are augmented by other authorities as well.  See, e.g. In re Stormwater Management Rules, 384 N.J. Super. 451, 454-55 (App. Div. 2006) (describing objectives of Stormwater Management Act, N.J.S.A. 40:55D-93 to -99 which applies to municipalities and DEP).  In addition to the CPP, the WQPA also requires the development of Areawide WQM Plans.
[directive] Part I explains the major features, legislative intent, and practical effects of recently-enacted legislation that revises the mandatory minimum sentencing provisions of New Jersey’s drug-free school zone law.  This portion of the Supplemental Directive also discusses why it is appropriate, for both legal and policy reasons, to update the Attoruey General’s Brimag.q Guidelines, which channel prosecutors’ plea negotiation discretion in school zone cases.  Part i7 of this Supplemental Directive sets forth the specific new rules that all prosecutors must henceforth follow in prosecuting school zone cases, amending and supplementing the Revised Brimagg Guidelines (2004) so as to account for the recent changes to the statutory sentencing scheme.  New Jersey Is An Equal Opportunity Employer"
[brief] In the present matter, sophisticated parties with respect to real estate and development projects, represented by competent counsel and financial professionals, negotiated and committed to writing contracts that reflected the agreed upon terms at the time of negotiation.  The parties executed a Redevelopment Agreement, an Operating Agreement and a Ground Lease (all as further defined herein) that, *inter alia*, provided the [...] (the “[...]”) the right to receive the first $1,600,000 in revenue from the operation of a parking garage supporting in part a shopping mall built by [...] (“[...]”).  In exchange, [...] constructed a mall on land it leased from the [...] (for $1.00 per year for 99 years) that had previously generated approximately $1,200,000 annually for the [...].  After nearly fifteen (15) years of performance under the Redevelopment Agreement and Operating Agreement, [...] initiated this action requesting the trial court to rewrite both agreements to change the agreed upon standards for the imposition, collection and sharing of parking rates and fees in a manner favorable to [...] and detrimental to the [...].  Despite no evidence of any mutual mistake, equitable fraud, or unconscionable conduct on the part of the [...], the trial court reformed the Redevelopment Agreement and Operating Agreement to require that [...] participate in revenue sharing beginning at the first dollar received.  The trial court’s error, if not reversed by this Court, will impact the [...]’s ability to pay its existing bondholders and fulfill its statutory purpose of operating a public parking system.
[brief] Da189 (hereinafter the “Sale Confirmation Order”).  By the Sale Confirmation Order’s express terms, the stay of post-sale proceedings pending the filing of Defendants’ appeal would expire when the [...] filed their notice of appeal of that order and their motion to the Appellate Division for a continuance of the stay, or March 22, 2024, whichever occurred first.  Id.  On February 14, 2024, plaintiff filed a motion for an order dissolving the stay of post-sale proceedings pending the filing of the [...]’ appeal of the Sale Confirmation Order unless the [...] posted a supersedeas bond in the amount of $2,500,000 within one business day.
[brief] See State v. Witt, 223 N.J. 409, 419 (2015) (“Parties must make known their positions at the \(^9\) Defendant changed defense counsel prior to the motion being heard.  Both attorneys had submitted briefs on his behalf. suppression hearing so that the trial court can rule on the issues before it. ”) (citing Robinson, 200 N.J. at 19); Robinson, 200 N.J. at 21 (“The failure to raise defendant’s present claim during the motion to suppress denied the State the opportunity to confront the claim head-on; it denied the trial court the opportunity to evaluate the claim in an informed and deliberate manner; and it denied any reviewing court the benefit of a robust record within which the claim could be considered.
[brief] **B.  Collateral Estoppel Does Not Bar Respondent’s Claim**  The doctrine of collateral estoppel is equally unavailing to the Appellants for similar reasons.  It is well-settled that for collateral estoppel to apply, there must be identity of the issues litigated and to be litigated, notice, and a full and fair opportunity to be heard and equality of forum.  See generally *Winters v. North Hudson Reg. Fire.*, 212 N.J. 67, 85 (2012).  The court has broad discretion to determine whether to invoke or apply collateral estoppel in a case.  See *Adelman v. BSI Financial Servs., Inc.*, 453 N.J. Super. 31, 39 (App. Div. 2018).  Although the doctrine “is designed to protect litigants from relitigating identical issues and to promote judicial economy,” a court in exercising its discretion must “weigh economy against fairness. ”  *Id.* at 40.  As the trial court judge did below, this Court here should reject defendants’ contention that Respondent’s claim is barred by collateral estoppel both on the merits and as a matter of fundamental fairness.  As to the merits, there can be no dispute that [...] never pled a claim for express easement like the Respondent bases its claims for declaratory judgment upon here (Da178; Da194).
[brief] Docket No.: [...]  On Appeal from the Final Decision of the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Civil Part, Camden County  Docket Below: [...] | | --- | --- | |  [...], a non-profit organization, PLAINTIFF/RESPONDENT, v. [...], and [...], in his official capacity as records custodian, DEFENDANTS/CROSS APPELLANTS/RESPONDENTS.  | SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION
[directive] See e.g., id. at § 3-3.2(b)(3).  A.  State Parks and Forests  State law generally prohibits ORV use in State Parks and Forests.  “A person shall not operate an off-road vehicle on or over the lands and waters under the jurisdiction of the State Park Service at any time except that, when an area is so designated by the State Park Service, permits may be granted for organized ‘special events’ to operate on a pre-established course under prescribed conditions. ”  N.J.A.C. 7:2-3.4(d); see also N.J.A.C. 7:2-3.2(a).  Law enforcement officers may contact the State Park Service at 1-800-WARN-DEP to determine whether a special event permit for ORV use is in effect.  Some State Parks and Forests have public roads within the boundaries of the park.  “All motor vehicles operated on lands under the jurisdiction of the State Park Service shall be subject to Motor Vehicle Laws of the State of New Jersey, N.J.S.A. 39-1 et seq., all rules promulgated pursuant thereto, and this chapter. ”  N.J.A.C. 7:2-3. 3.  Properly licensed and registered ORVs, such as jeeps and pick-up trucks, that otherwise comply with the motor vehicle provisions of Title 39 are allowed to operate on established public roads and parking areas like any other motor vehicle, but they may not leave the road to enter “any cultivated or planted area, transmission line, survey line or in the woods, swamps, bogs, wetlands or fields” without a permit.  N.J.A.C. 7:2- 3.4(c).  Other State Park provisions may also apply, depending on the circumstances, and law enforcement officers may charge all violations that apply.
[brief] Abbott XX, 199 N.J. at 153. \(^{14}\)  To even begin to have its fiscal needs met, [...] needs not only a fully funded Adequacy Budget, but also one that has been adjusted to reflect its students’ unique characteristics.  To provide T&E to its students, the district obviously needs not only to be receiving that amount, but also to be spending it. \(^{15}\)  But [...]’s unique demographics, and its consequent unique fiscal circumstances, make the solving of its fiscal problems also unique.  Simply requiring, as N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-6 does, that expenditures be increased “so as to meet at least the adequacy budget” will not suffice because SFRA’s household income declines to $54,826, the number of persons per household increases to 4.94, and the poverty level rises to 30.1%.
[brief] Falcone, 420 F.2d at 1166.  Similarly, at the November 10, 2023 hearing, when the trial judge ruled--inconsistently with his own prior interlocutory ruling and his own contemporaneous comments on the merits during the hearing--that he lacked jurisdiction to make any decision whatsoever on whether Landlord owed Tenant anything under the Lease in dispute--he did so without any legal analysis, statement of reasons, or citation to a single case.  Instead, the trial judge vaguely asserted that “equity” favored the Landlord, itself reversible error, since “a court hearing a summary dispossess action lacks general equitable jurisdiction. ”  Benjoray, Inc. v. Acad. House Child Dev. Ctr., 437 N.J. Super. 481, 488 (App. Div. 2014).  The trial judge also stated it was denying Defendant’s “motion for reconsideration,” notwithstanding that Defendant had not filed a motion for reconsideration but a motion to fix the amount of Tenant’s Allowance.
[brief] Therefore, a breach of a service contract occurred and no UCC implied warranty claims are implicated.  A related argument that fails to defeat the complaint is that the Product Liability Act bars the complaint - remedial legislation regulating actions for damages for harm caused by products. \textsuperscript{93}  No cases hold that the PLA applies to sale of water services and out of pocket losses associated with the breach of a contract for their sale is a PLA claim.  Trial courts have no license to amend statutes\textsuperscript{94} and it isn’t the duty of this court to rewrite or pervert what the Legislature enacted.\textsuperscript{95}  The only right courts have to engage in "statutory surgery” is to preserve a legislative enactment from some unconstitutional taint – something not called for in this case.\textsuperscript{96}  The court's role is to effectuate legislative intent and not to alter it.\textsuperscript{97}
[brief] SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE  DIVISION DOCKET NO. [...]  CRIMINAL ACTION  On Appeal from the Letter Opinion Denying a Motion to Correct an Illegal Sentence, filed on November 1, 2023, in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Essex County, Indictment No. [...]  Sat  Below: Hon. [...], J.S.C.  REPLY BRIEF AND APPENDIX ON BEHALF OF APPELLANT, [...] (DRA-1 TO DRA-6)
[brief] 7  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES  Cases  Page Foley v. Ulrich, 94 N.J. Super. 410 (App. Div. 1967)............  6 Harman v. Belisle, 2014 Conn. Super. LEXIS 2211 (Super. Ct. Sep. 4, 2014)  .........................................................  6  Kiel v. Girard, 274 Ill.App.3d 821, 825 (1995)  ......................  7  Lucejko v. City of Hoboken, 207 N.J. 191 (2011)...............  5, 6  San Marco v. Village/Town of Mount Kisco, 16 N.Y.3d 111 (Court of Appeals, 2010)  .......................................................  6  Smith v. Town of Greenwich, 899 A.2d 563 (Conn. 2006).........  6  STATEMENT OF THE CASE
[brief] ”  Merchs. Indem. Corp. v. Eggleston, 37 N.J. 114, 126-27 (1962).  If an insurer wants to “control the defense and simultaneously reserve a right to dispute liability, it can do so only with the consent of the insured. ”  Id.  In order to reserve the right to dispute liability, a carrier must “fairly inform the insured that the offer [to defend] may be accepted or rejected. ”  Id.  Additionally, [...] refutes that Northfield Insurance Company applies because in that case, the reservation of rights letter was unclear about whether the insured could reject the offer of a defense.  Northfield Insurance Co. v. Mt. Hawley Ins. Co., 454 N.J. Super. 135, 142 (App. Div. 2018).  However, the issue in the instant matter is whether [...] even sent letters that adequately inform [...] that [...] could maintain control of the defense while simultaneously reserving its right to dispute liability.  Based on these circumstances, the Policy “should be construed to reflect the reasonable expectations of” [...], and reject [...]’s arguments.
[brief] (Db 18-25)  The State’s response is directed at [...]’s testimony that during the road trip, [...] provided her with drugs.  (Sb 19-25)  But [...] is not challenging that testimony.  As made clear in Point II of his opening brief, [...] explicitly challenges [...]’s testimony that “three or four months” before the trip when the two had just met, [...] sold or gave her drugs on multiple occasions:  Q: Can you characterize the relationship that developed between yourself and [...]?  A: I would just buy drugs from him.  A lot of the time he just gave me drugs, I didn’t have to buy them.  Q: What kind of drugs?  --- 2  Reply Point I responds to the State’s Point II.
[brief] On July 26, 2019, a 2010 black Chevy Malibu with a Vermont license plate was pulled over for a traffic violation.  (3T39-3 to 15).  The car had four occupants—two males and two females—with [...] driving.  (3T39-15 to 22).  [...], the [...] Officer who stopped the car, described Darrion as a "black male, approximately six foot, 210 pounds."  (3T38-10 to 15; 3T40-1 to 4).  Then, on August 5, 2019, the same Chevy Malibu was pulled over by Officer [...] of the [...] in Jersey City.  (3T64-13 to 17; 3T65-16 to 20 to 66-9).  This time defendant was driving alone.  (3T66-10 to 18).
[brief] The REA, which governs reciprocals, specifically excludes the applicability of any other statute unless specifically noted.  The Department, try as it might, cannot rewrite the REA through the Bulletin and use it to hold [...] hostage to the Holding Act and SSAP No. 25.  This is at odds with the language of the REA, which has exclusive authority over reciprocal exchanges.  In re Reorganization of Med. Inter-Ins. Exch. of N.J., 328 N.J. Super. at 355–56.  It is also an improper reading of SSAP No. 25, which by definition does not apply to the [...] Fees paid by the subscribers.  The fees paid to the [...] simply are not a “related party transaction” no matter how much the Department wishes they were.  Likewise, the Bulletin is grounded in unreasonable conditions and is wholly unrelated to appropriate government objectives.  Had the Legislature wanted to incorporate reciprocal exchanges under the Holding Act, it would have done so.  It did not.  The Department is now attempting to do an end-run around the Legislature’s rejection of the Department’s proposed legislation by imposing retroactive conditions on the agreements between [...]’s and their subscribers.  There is no scenario under which that is a reasonable condition in pursuit of an appropriate governmental objective.  In short, the Bulletin should not be permitted to be used as a means to bar enforcement of an otherwise valid contract between the [...] and its subscribers.  **CONCLUSION**
[brief] Appellate courts review a trial court’s decision to grant or deny a motion to amend under the abuse of discretion standard.  See Grillo v. State, 469 N.J. Super. 267, 275 (App. Div. 2021).  Rule 4:9-1 requires that motions for leave to amend “be granted liberally. ”  Notte v. Merchs. Mut. Ins. Co., 185 N.J. 490, 501 (2006) (citing R. 4:9-1).  In exercising that discretion, a court must go through “a two-step process: whether the non-moving party will be prejudiced, and whether granting the amendment would nonetheless be futile. ”  Ibid.  The court determines whether the proposed amendment would be futile by asking “whether the amended claim will nonetheless fail and, hence, allowing the amendment would be a useless endeavor. ”  Ibid.  Above and beyond this “liberal” standard, courts are required to construe the New Jersey Rules of Court in such a manner as to “to secure a just determination,” and as a result, “any rule may be relaxed or dispensed with by the court in which the action is pending if adherence to it would result in an injustice.
[brief] (4)  Consistency with RFRA.--This section shall be enforced in a manner that is consistent with section 3 of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (42 U.S.C. 2000bb-1).  (e)  No preemption.  Nothing in this section shall be construed to preempt the law of any State or local subdivision thereof to protect animals.  (f)  Definitions.  In this section (1) the term “animal crushing” means actual conduct in which one or more living non-human mammals, birds, reptiles, or amphibians is purposely crushed, burned, drowned, suffocated, impaled, or otherwise subjected to serious bodily injury (as defined in section 1365 and including conduct that, if committed against a person and in the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States, would violate section 2241 or 2242); (2) the term “animal crush video” means any photograph, motion-picture film, video or digital recording, or electronic image that (A) depicts animal crushing; and (B) is obscene; and (3) the term “euthanizing an animal” means the humane destruction of an animal accomplished by a method that (A) produces rapid unconsciousness and subsequent death without evidence of pain or distress; or (B) uses anesthesia produced by an agent that causes painless loss of consciousness and subsequent death.
[brief] 2020  New Jersey Scientific Report on Climate Change (June 2020), dep.nj.gov/wp-content/uploads/climatechange/nj-scientific-report-2020.pdf  New Jersey, Climate Change Resilience Strategy (Oct. 2021), dep.nj.gov/wp-content/uploads/climatechange/nj-climate-resilience-strategy-2021.pdf  [...], Regional Master Plan nj.gov/njhIGHLANDS/master/rmp/final/highlands_rmp_112008.pdf  [...], Water Quality Management Planning Program, nj.gov/dep/wqmp/wqmps. html
[brief] In that case, [...] sought arbitration with [...] regarding three homes that Roblyn constructed in [...].  The notices of these arbitration proceedings designated the claimant as [...] and the respondent as [...].  The notices did not indicate or remotely suggest the decision would be considered or rendered regarding the liability of [...], the president of Roblyn.  The hearings were adjourned but later occurred in the absence of [...] and [...].  The arbitrator rendered decisions regarding each of the three homes in question collectively obligating [...], and [...] “personally as guarantor”, in the combined amount of $81,739.47.  Plaintiffs thereafter filed a complaint in the Law Division seeking confirmation of the arbitration award.  On summary judgment motion filed by plaintiffs, [...] responded that he was not a party to the contract and was not a personal guarantor of the corporation’s performance of its contractual obligation.  The trial judge rejected [...]’s arguments by emphasizing that [...] signed the contract and thus had obligated himself personally to perform because he did not use the title “President” or “Vice President”, he signed it as the “Owner”.  The trial court entered summary judgment and the Appellate Division reversed.
[brief] First, defense counsel cited Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005), which discusses [...]’s findings that “‘adolescents are overrepresented statistically in virtually every category of reckless behavior. ’”  Id. at 569 (quoting [...], Reckless Behavior in Adolescence: A Developmental Perspective, 12 Developmental Rev. 339, 339 (1992)).  (Da71)  Dr. Arnett’s research defined adolescence not as ending at age eighteen but rather extending “to the early 20’s. ”  Arnett, Reckless Behavior, 12 Developmental Rev. at 340.  Additionally, defense counsel cited [...] et. al., When Does A Juvenile Become an Adult? Implications for Law and Policy, 88 Temp. L. Rev. 769 (2016).  (Da71)  In that article, [...], who has a Ph.D. in Neuroscience, discussed the neuroscientific evidence demonstrating “continued regional development of the prefrontal cortex, implicated in judgment and self-control beyond the teen years and into the twenties. ”  Id. at 783.  She further wrote that the “symmetric and dynamic changes in the structure and function of subcortical limbic and prefrontal cortical circuitry underlie the diminished capacity to exercise self-control to inhibit inappropriate actions, desires, and emotions in favor of appropriate ones” and that “[i]n social or emotionally charged situations, the limbic regions of the brain may hijack less mature prefrontal regions leading to an imbalance or overreliance on these emotional regions. ”  Id. at 783-84.  Specifically pertinent to [...], who was nineteen at the time of the offense, [...] wrote that young adults twenty-one years of age or younger “show diminished cognitive capacity, similar to that of adolescents, under brief and prolonged negative emotional arousal” but were twenty-two to twenty-five-year-olds showed greater cognitive capacity for self-regulation
[brief] A.  **The Incident**  In the Complaint, [...] alleges she was teaching her second-grade class at a public school in [...] on October 6, 2021, Da_002; Da_10-11, when she noticed one of her students (the “Student”) was “wearing a hood that was blocking her eyes. ”  Da_10-11.  [...] admits she knew the Student was an observant Muslim and “regularly wore a form-fitting hijab,” but alleges that she believed that “the Student’s hijab was being worn under the hood. ”  Id.  [...] alleges she asked the Student to “brush back her hood,” and when the Student did not respond or comply, she moved the head covering herself, “brush[ing] the hood back a few inches to uncover the Student’s eyes and facilitate learning. ”  Id.  [...] claims that once she saw the Student’s hair and realized what she had done, she “brushed the hood back to cover all the Student’s hair” and “apologized to the Student. ”  Id.  Following these events (the “Incident”), the Student’s mother contacted the school, and [...] was called to a meeting with her supervisors on the morning of October 7, 2021.  Da_011.  [...] was placed on administrative leave that same day.  Da_011.  B.
[brief] Instead, it merely confirms that [...] is reserving the rights and interests that she already had flowing from [...].  See Cohen v. [...], 2014 WL 2921601, at *18 (Ch. Div. June 24, 2014) (Dra35-37) (describing [...]’s rights and interests in the [...] from [...]).  Interpreting Paragraph 24(F) as relating to [...]’s interest in the [...] that flows from [...] also avoids a conflict with Paragraph 24(G).  To be clear, it is not [...]’s argument that the release in Paragraph 24(F) is “wholly undone” by Paragraph 24(G).  (See Pb23-24).  Instead, it is that Paragraph 24(F) and Paragraph 24(G) relate to two separate things – Paragraph 24(F) relates to [...]’s interest in the [...] flowing from [...], and Paragraph 24(G) relates to [...]’s interests in the [...] and all other assets flowing from [...].  Otherwise—if Paragraph 24(F) constitutes a release of any interest in the [...] from any source—then that negates the language in Paragraph 24(G) providing that “[[...]] is not releasing her right to receive any property to which she is entitled as a beneficiary of [...] or [...]. ” (Da96).  Accordingly, the Probate Court’s interpretation violates the principle that a specific term modifies a general term only if conflict is unavoidable.