ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] A.  Plaintiff Appeals  The Court’s May 8, 2023 Final Judgment In Part, And June 26, 2023  Order Denying Plaintiff’s Motion For Reconsideration In Its Entirety, Because The Trial Court Improperly Assigned De Minimus Value For Plaintiff’s Membership Interest In [...]  (Raised Below In May 28, 2023 Motion For Reconsideration (Aa66)) ..................................................................................................................25  B.  Plaintiff Appeals  The Trial Court’s May 8, 2023 Final Judgment And June 26, 2023  Order As To Its Dismissal Of Claims Against Defendants [...] And [...], As The Court’s Credibility Determinations Go Against The Presented Evidence Which Requires The Court To Find Breach Of Fiduciary Duty And Pierce The Corporate Veil.  (Raised Below In Plaintiff’s May 28, 2023 Motion For Reconsideration (Aa66)) ..................................................................................................................28  1.  Improper Credibility Determinations Were Made By The Trial Court...29  2.  [...] And [...] Breached Their Fiduciary Duty, Engaged In Self-Dealing And Are Personally Liable To Plaintiff  ..................................................31  C. Plaintiff Appeals  The Trial Court’s May 8, 2023 Final Judgment, June 26, 2023 Order And August 30, 2023 Order, As The Trial Court Improperly Denied Plaintiff’s Request To Appoint A Receiver Or Special Fiscal Agent For [...], As A Neutral Party Should Have Been Required To Monitor The Dissolution By Defendants.  (Raised Below In Plaintiff’s May 28, 2023 Motion For Reconsideration) (Aa8; Aa66; and Aa87).  .................................................................36  D.  The Trial Court Participated In Improper Colloquies And Substantive Ex Parte Communication During Trial (Not Raised Below – Plain Error).  ...............39  1.  The Trial Court Engaged In Improper Ex Parte Communications ..............39  2.  The Court Engaged In Improper Colloquies With Plaintiff.........................42  V. CONCLUSION.............................................................................................................44
[directive] !  Whether the marijuana is in its original packaging dispensed by an Alternate Treatment Center, and whether the original label is affixed to the packaging.  !  Whether the label on the packaging indicates that the contents had been dispensed to the specific qualifying patient claiming the affirmative defense, or, where the affirmative defense is asserted by a person claiming to be a primary caregiver, whether the label on the packaging indicates that the contents had been dispensed for use by the specific qualifying patient to whom the primary caregiver is specifically authorized to provide assistance in obtaining and/or using medical marijuana.  !  Whether the medical marijuana had been dispensed by two or more -2- different Alternate Treatment Centers, considering the rule that a qualifying patient may only be registered to one Alternate Treatment Center at a time.
[brief] See Krayniak v. Board of Trustees of the Public Employees’ Retirement System, 412 N.J. Super. 232, 238 (App Div. 2010) (deciding PERS pension benefits requires a Court to balance maintenance of the financial integrity of the PERS fund with the overriding mandate to liberally interpret public pension laws in favor of retired public employees).  f)  Due process.  Due process considerations are raised where, as here, a retired public employee is essentially deprived of a meaningful right to contest a reduction in retirement benefits caused by the error of someone else.  The “Catch-22” that I faced occurred when I was first notified by the [...] in July of 2022, nearly 7 months after my retirement, that I was “short” two months of service credit, but had no remedy to correct a mistake made solely by my former employer since I was told that only active employees could purchase service credit under N.J.A.C. 17:2-5.1.
[brief] The Trial Court Erred in Concluding that the Evidence on the Record Indicated that the Property was Safe.  (See Trial Briefs). **  In concluding that the substantial detriment portion of criterion (d) had not been satisfied, the Trial Court’s erroneous held that “the LSRP has testified that the property is safe and that they have not impacted surface water or drinking water. ” (T3, 59:18-20).  Importantly, the LSRP never testified that the Property was safe.  Rather, the LSRP testified as follows:  “The concentrations that we've identified on the site **at this point** do not represent a vapor intrusion threat and we haven't found any impacts to surface water or drinking water supply because we're delineating very close to the property.  And any potential receptors other than the surface water in the bay, which groundwater flows away from the bay or a great distance that were not of concern.  (T1, 39:12-23) (emphasis added).  The LSRP included these qualifying words because he had just recently been retained and only done the first round of testing in the weeks before his testimony.  In fact, when the Property is ultimately determined to be safe, the LSRP will issue a document called a Response Action Outcome (“RAO”), which will set forth the LSRP’s opinion that the Property has been remediated in accordance with applicable standards and is now “protective of public health and safety and the environment. ”  N.J.S.A. 58:10C-14(d).
[brief] ”  *Twp. of W. Orange v. 769 Assocs., LLC*, 172 N.J. 564, 571 (2002) (first citing *N.J. Const.* art. I, ¶ 20; and then citing *State v. Heppenheimer*, 54 N.J.L. 268, 272 (1892)).  It is well established that statutes granting the power of eminent domain are to be given strict construction because, by definition, they derogate the private property rights so comprehensively protected by the federal and State constitutions.  *See State v. Highway Comm’r v. Maas & Waldstein Co.*, 83 N.J. Super. 211, 217 (App. Div. 1964).  Under the New Jersey Local Lands and Buildings Law, a municipality may acquire property by eminent domain for public use.  The statute states:  Any county, by resolution, or any municipality, by ordinance, *may provide for the acquisition of any real property*, capital improvement, or personal property:  (1)  By purchase, gift, devise, lease, exchange, condemnation, or installment purchase agreement; (2)  Subject to lawful conditions, restrictions or limitations as to its use by the county or municipality, provided the governing body accepts such lawful conditions, restrictions or limitations.  When any county or municipality shall have acquired any real property, capital improvement or personal property upon any lawful condition, restriction or limitation, it is hereby authorized to take such steps as may be necessary and proper to the compliance by the county or municipality with such lawful conditions, restrictions or limitations.  [N.J.S.A. 40A:12-5(a) (emphasis added). ]  Thus, any property acquired by eminent domain must be for public use.  Twp. of W. Orange v. 769 Assocs., LLC, 172 N.J. 564, 571 (2001) (quoting State v. Lanza, 27 N.J. 516, 529 (1958)).
[brief] (15T 16-23 to 36-18)  Prior to imposing this four-year sentence, the court found aggravating factors (1), the nature and circumstances of the offense and the role of the actor, including whether it was committed in an especially heinous, cruel, or depraved manner; (3) the risk that defendant will commit another offense; (6), the extent of defendant’s prior criminal record and the seriousness of this offense; (7), the defendant committed the offense pursuant to an agreement to pay; and (9) the need for deterring defendant and others from violating the law.  N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a).  (15T 16-23 to 36-18)  The court did not find any mitigating factors.  (15T 16-23 to 36-18)  The court made several mistakes with regard to these findings, and further erred by imposing this near-maximum custodial sentence for [...], who had no prior felony convictions.  Accordingly, the matter should be remanded for resentencing.  When imposing a sentence, a court must consider the applicability of the aggravating and mitigating factors set forth in N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1 to determine the length of a defendant’s prison term within the available range.  This step requires a court to “identify the aggravating and mitigating factors and balance them to arrive at a fair sentence. ”  *State v. Natale*, 184 N.J. 458, 488 (2005).  In order to ensure proper balancing of the relevant factors, at the time of sentencing, a court must “state the reasons for imposing such sentence, including . . . the factual basis supporting a finding of particular aggravating and mitigating factors affecting sentence. ”  *State v. Fuentes*, 217 N.J. 57, 73 (2012).  A clear explanation of the balancing process is “particularly important,” and that explanation “should thoroughly address the factors at issue. ”  *Ibid.* (internal citations omitted).  A remand for resentencing is required when the trial court considers an improper aggravating factor, *State v. Carey*, 168 N.J. 413, 424 (2001), fails to find mitigating factors supported by the evidence, *State v. Dalziel*, 182 N.J. 494, 504 (2005), or if the trial court’s reasoning in finding aggravating and mitigating factors is not based on factual findings “supported by substantial evidence in the record. ”  *State v. O’Donnell*, 117 N.J. 210, 216 (1989).  Here, the court erred in finding and weighing aggravating factors (1), (3), (6), and (9), and erred in rejecting mitigating factors (3), (7), (9), and (10).  Individually and together, these errors render [...]’s four-year custodial sentence excessive and require a remand for resentencing.
[brief] In this Motion, Defendants raised many of the issues featured in the present appeal, including: • Plaintiff’s stretching during voir dire (6T, at 6:2-16:7); • Plaintiff’s reference to continuing treatment with a new chiropractor (6T, at 16:8-24:1); • The dispute around the time-unit rule (6T, at 24:2-35:18); and • Plaintiff’s presentation of a wage loss claim (6T, at 35:19-46:3).  In addition to these arguments, Defendants also contended that the verdict was invalidly entered because they never intended to stipulate liability on behalf of Defendant [...] (6T, at 46:4-53:3).  This argument is not included in the present appeal, likely because it was Defense counsel who, during the February 8, 2023 oral argument, vehemently insisted that liability was being stipulated as to all Defendants (Da23-24; 1T, at 10:25-12:17; 16:11-23).  [...] denied Defendants’ Motion on all grounds (Da69-70; 6T, at 64:6-10).
[brief] In a case such as the one at hand, “a layperson's common knowledge is sufficient to permit a jury to find that the duty of care has been breached without the aid of an expert's opinion."  *Giantonnio v. Taccard*, 291 N.J. Super. 31, 43 (App. Div.1996).  In some cases, however, the “jury is not competent to supply the standard by which to measure the defendant's conduct. ”  *Sanzari*, 34 N.J. at 134-35.  In those cases, the plaintiff must “establish the requisite standard of care and [the defendant's] deviation from that standard” by “present[ing] reliable expert testimony on the subject. ”  *Giantonnio*, 291 N.J. Super. at 42.  When deciding whether expert testimony is necessary, a court properly considers "whether the matter to be dealt with is so esoteric that jurors of common judgment and experience cannot form a valid judgment as to whether the conduct of the [defendant] was reasonable.
[brief] .........................................................................................  3  A. Facts Elicited At the Motion to Suppress Hearing on October 29, 2021.  .................................................................................................................................  3 B. Standard of Review.  ........................................................................................................  9  C.  [...] Had a Reasonable and Articulable Suspicion To Believe Defendant Had Engaged in Criminal Activity.  .......................  11  D.  Probable Cause to Search Defendant’s Vehicle Arose  During [...]’s Interaction with Defendant in the [...] Parking Lot......................................................................................................................
[brief] Pa14.  On June 9, 2016, Plaintiff re-filed their motion for counsel fees for work performed by them before both the trial court and the Appellate Division.  Defendants cross-moved for the imposition of a special service charge.  These motions were then carried, and the case was informally stayed while related matters were pending the Appellate Division.  Eventually, the Appellate Division decided the consolidated appeal of *L.R. v. Camden City Public School District*, 452 N.J. Super. 56 (2017).
[brief] On 10/18/22, the Board issued a letter indicating there would be a Board hearing on 11/14/22 to decide the matter.  (Pa146).  On 11/16/22 the Board rejected the ALJ Decision and affirmed its previous determination to deny [...] the right to file his application for retirement disability.  (Pa147-151).  The Board ignored the ALJ’s well-reasoned opinion and Richardson, and simply doubled down on N.J.S.A. 43:16A-8(2) without further explanation.
[brief] LEGAL ARGUMENT  I.  RESPONDENT SHARED HIS POST WITH THE PUBLIC WHEN HE POSTED IT IN A CHATROOM CONSISTING OF AT LEAST EIGHTY INDIVIDUALS; AS SUCH, “PRIVATE” CONDUCT IS NOT IN ISSUE.  The appellate court has already ruled Respondent as the holder of a public office.  (Da355).  In defending the position that Respondent’s post was “private conduct,” Respondent asserts the following: 1) the witness who testified at the hearing below was biased; 2) there was no “public” airing of the video on Facebook; 3) Respondent did not intend his post to viewed by more than one individual; 4) only one individual was identified as viewing the post; 5) the post was not created on, or transmitted from, any Borough equipment, (RB-6); 6) the post was not done on Borough time or during a public meeting; and, 7) the post did not involve public business or another employee.  (RB-12-13).  Such assertions, are, however, irrelevant as Respondent’s post became public upon its dissemination to various individuals in a chat room including, but not limited to: the current Mayor of [...], the official Facebook page of the [...], former Mayors of [...], members who live in the town of [...], [...] Council Members, the former [...], and at least one member of the [...] Board of Education.  (Da  Accordingly, the factual premise of Respondent’s primary argument - that the subject conduct was “private” – is indisputably false.  While Respondent now claims that there is no proof that he disseminated the post, (RB-18), a post he made subsequent to dissemination indicates otherwise.  Respondent posted, “Omg how did so many people get to see this wow. ”  (Da38; Da185.)  Further, Respondent had the opportunity to defend against the allegation that he disseminated the subject post when the Borough requested his interview during the investigation of the incident; Respondent, however, refused to respond for the interview.  (Da77-78; Da197-209).  Finally, the record reflects that Respondent apologized for his conduct after testimony in the departmental hearing and stated that he felt remorseful and “completely embarrassed” by the incident.  (RB-6).  II.
[brief] The findings of the trial court with respect to its authority to reconsider its initial denial of summary judgment were both an exercise of sound discretion and in the interest of justice.  Notably, the Appellant does not dispute that these issues were argued before the trial court at summary judgment, but were nevertheless not found in the written opinion.  As there can be no genuine dispute as to the exercise of reconsideration under R. 4:42-2, the [...] submits that the trial court was correct to exercise its discretion to reconsider.
[brief] Pursuant to N.J. Const. art. VI, § 5, para. 4, the New Jersey Supreme Court has adopted R. 2:2-3(a)(2), which contemplates that every proceeding to review the action or inaction of a state administrative agency would be by appeal to the New Jersey Appellate Division.  Thus, the rule mandates the exclusive allocation to the Appellate Division of review of both final decisions or actions of any state administrative agency or officer, and the validity of any rule promulgated by such agency or officer.  R. 2:2-3(a)(2).  Vas v. Roberts, 418 N.J. Super. 509 (App. Div. 2011).  Under New Jersey Court Rules, appeals may be taken to the Appellate Division "to review final decisions or actions of any state administrative agency or officer[]"  R. 2:2-3(a)(2).  Appellate Courts do not render advisory opinions or function in the abstract.  N.J. Civil Serv. Ass'n v. State, 88 N.J. 605, 612 (1982).  The Appellate Court need not defer to the agency’s determination on purely legal issues.  "[A]lthough the determination of an administrative agency is entitled to deference, our appellate obligation requires more than a perfunctory review."  Blackwell v. Dep't of Corr., 348 N.J. Super. 117, 123 (App. Div. 2002).  The Court’s function is "to engage in 'a careful and principled consideration of the agency record and findings,'" and not merely rubberstamp the agency’s decision.  Williams v. Department of Corrections, 330 N.J. Super. 197, 204 (App. Div. 2000) (quoting *Mayflower Sec. Co. v. Bureau of Sec.*, 64 N.J. 85, 93 (1973)).  Final agency actions can be reversed if those actions are 'arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable or [if the action] is not supported by substantial credible evidence in the record as a whole.'"  *N.J. Soc'y for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v. N.J. Dep't of Agric.*, 196 N.J. 366, 384-85 (2008) (quoting *Henry v. Rahway State Prison*, 81 N.J. 571, 579-80 (1980)) (alteration in original).
[brief] When the trial court “fail[s] to order a complete presentence report,” and does not “acquire[] all the necessary information,” “the sentences may not stand. ”  Mance, 300 N.J. Super. at 65.  N.J.S.A. 2C:44-6b specifically provides that the presentence report “shall also include a medical history of the defendant and a complete psychological evaluation of the defendant in any case in which the defendant is being sentenced for a first- or second-degree crime involving violence and . . . . the defendant has a prior conviction for . . . endangering the welfare of a child which would constitute a crime of the second degree pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4 . . . or the defendant has a prior diagnosis of psychosis.
[brief] Second, [...] never made a claim below to the trial court that R. 5:5-10 was not followed, and she violated R. 2:6-2 by failing to state that fact in her brief.  (See A77 through A219).  Any contentions about that hearing are conspicuously absent from [...]’s brief section, “The Parties’ Contentions of the Rule 4:50 Motion before [...]” at pages 10-13.  That is because she has never made this contention about Default Judgment process until now.  Her arguments to the trial court concerned the alleged “unconscionability” of the agreements, having nothing to do with the process of the uncontested divorce hearing or default judgment.  Nor could she have made her meritless claim about Default Judgment process below.  As she recognizes in footnote 5 of her Appellate Brief, R. 5:5-10 is inapplicable where there is an executed Property Settlement Agreement such as here (C14).
[directive] you will be required to serve 85% of the sentence imposed for that offense(s) before you will be eligible for parole on that offense(s)?  2.  Czy rozumie Pan(i), że z powodu przyznania się do winy odnośnie ww. zarzutów sąd [Tak/Yes] [Nie/No] może wydać wyrok nadzoru kuratora sądowego po zwolnieniu warunkowym przez okres lat i ten wyrok rozpocznie się natychmiast po zakończeniu odbywania przez Pana/Panią kary pozbawienia wolności?
[brief] “The error committed must be so serious as to undermine the court's confidence in the jury's verdict or result reached. ”  State v. Chew, 179 N.J. 186, 204 (2004) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694).  “With respect to both prongs of the Strickland test, a defendant asserting ineffective assistance of counsel on PCR bears the burden of proving his or her right to relief by a preponderance of the evidence. ”  State v. Gaitan, 209 N.J. 339, 350 (2012).
[brief] Plaintiffs’ complaint arising from the underlying July 20, 2022 fatal crash was filed on September 15, 2022.  Pa1.  On October 13, 2022, the [...] firm filed an answer on behalf of all Defendants.  Pa19.  Based on the facts set forth below, on February 28, 2024, the Honorable [...], J.S.C., entered an order disqualifying [...] from representing Defendants due to a conflict of interest.  See Da001 and T6:5-11:18; 34:20-41:12\(^2\).  Defendants were granted leave to file the present interlocutory appeal of the February 28, 2024 order.  Pa55.  Plaintiff [...] now submits this brief in opposition to Defendants’ appeal and in support of [...]’s disqualification order, which should be affirmed.
[brief] N.J.S. A. 10:6-2 (c).  The Act "does not define substantive right, nor is the term self-explanatory."  Tumpson, 218 N.J. at 473.  A prevailing party under the Act is entitled to reasonable attorney's fees and costs.  Id. at 472 (quoting N.J.S.A. 10:6-2(f)).  473 N.J. Super at 475.  Also see, Winberry Realty v. Rutherford, 247 N.J. 165 (2021) ([...] setting forth the 3 elements of a CRA claim: (1) a substantive right conferred by our State constitution or other laws of the State, (2) a municipal official deprived plaintiff of that right; and (3) the municipal official was "acting under color of law" when he or she did so.)
[brief] [...] alleges that its claim for nonpayment at the Hackensack Project stems exclusively from [...]’s alleged nonpayment to [...] under the [...].  See Pa584 (commencing the Second Arbitration under the [...]).  Thus, the trial court’s finding that [...]’s claim against [...] under that subcontract somehow did not “ripen” until the conclusion of the [...]—a separate arbitration between different parties under a different contract—is plain error.
[directive] e.  In a case involving a victim of human trafficking as defined in section 1 of P.L. 2005, c. 77 (C. 2C:13-8) the Office of Victim-Witness Advocacy or the county prosecutor’s office involved in the case shall ensure that the victim of human trafficking obtains assistance in receiving any available benefits or services, including assistance in receiving any necessary certifications or endorsements needed to be recognized as having federal T non-immigrant status for the purpose of receiving any federal benefits or services available pursuant to the “Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2003,” 22 U.S.C. § 7101 et seq. f.
[directive] 다른 의무적 선고 조항이 보다 장기간의 가석방  부적격 항목(예: NERA, 삼진법, 기간을 규정하는 그레이브스법 모살)에 적용됩니까?  Does any other mandatory sentencing provision apply to the Graves Act count that provides for a greater period of parole ineligibility (e.g., NERA, Three Strikes, Murder)?
[brief] 47:1B-1....................................................40 Other Authorities The Model Surface Use and Mineral Development Accommodation Act: Easy Easements for Mining Interests  42 Am. U.L. Rev. 607, 614 n.25 (1993)..........................21 Black’s Law Dictionary (4th Ed. 1951)............................21 28 C.J.S. Easements..................................................24 [...], Reservations in Favor of Strangers to the Title, 6 Okla. L. Rev. at 127 (1953).................................18, 20, 21, 25 [...] and [...], The Law of Easements and Licenses in Land (2021-22 Ed.)......................24 PRELIMINARY STATEMENT