ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] As for the cause of action, there is no statute or reported court decision in New Jersey that has been provided in this matter that states med pay subrogation is barred in New Jersey.  Common law causes of action remain viable unless and until the New Jersey legislature or Courts rule otherwise.  (Da130 – Da138).  [...] raised a second affirmative defense which stated: Affirmative Defense - Not a Compulsory Dispute - No Consent
[brief] Environmental Contamination Remediation**  During the hearings, Plaintiff’s counsel noted the prior use of Lot 5 as a car dealership, and that approval of the application would allow remediation of on and off-site contamination as her client’s purchase contract provides for a $375,000 environmental cleanup escrow.  Pa174 at 4:23-25; 5:24; Pa175 at 6:1-4; 11-14; Pa179 at 24:1-5; 24:24-25:1.  She suggested that the proposed building size and scale are necessary to provide a cap for soil conditions.  Pa175 at 6:21-7:5.  Plaintiff’s witnesses also intimated that remediation costs are a legitimate basis upon which to obtain a d(1) use or FAR variance.  Pa192 at 74:8-75:10-25; Pa193 at 79:6-19.  However, a private developer’s remediation costs to clean up private property does not in any way form an adequate or justifiable basis upon which to secure variances.  The notion that a private developer’s financial ability to clean up private property is a relevant or otherwise legitimate consideration when seeking variance relief from a zoning board has no support whatsoever in the law.
[brief] Cases  Aronsohn v. Mandara, 98 N.J. 92, 105-106 (1984)  ..............................................  39 Bates v. Valley Fair Enterprises, Inc., 86 N.J. Super. 1, 6 (App. Div. 1964) .. 31 Brenman v. Demello, 191 N.J. 18, 30 (2007)  .........................................................  49 Cavaliere v. Bridgewater Commons Mall, 2009 WL 249104 (App. Div. 2009)  ..................................................................  48  Das v. Thani, 171 N.J. 518, 527 (2002)  ...............................................................  22 E&H Steel Corp. v. PSEG Fossil, LLC, 445 N.J. Super. 12, 25 (App. Div. 2018)  ..................................................................................................  37 Est. of Hanges v. Metro. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 202 N.J. 369, 383-84 (2010)  .............................................................................36, 37 Fowler ex rel. Edenfield v. Akzo Nobel Chems., Inc. 251 N.J. 300, 323 (2022)  ....................................................................................  22 Furst v. Einstein Moomjy Inc., 182 N.J. 1, 15 (2004) ...........................................  47 Gonzalez v. Eastern Freightways, 2010 WL 3720281 (App. Div. 2010)  ...39, 40 Green v. N.J. Mfrs. Ins. Co., 160 N.J. 480, 492 (1999)  ........................................  37 Greenstein v. Forsgate Industrial Complex, 2021 WL 3084740 (App. Div. 2021) ..................................................................................................  32  Griffin v. City of E. Orange, 225 N.J.  400, 421 (2016) ....................................... 37 Hanna v. Woodland Community Assoc., 2022 WL 16984707 (App. Div. 2022) ..................................................................................................32, 44 Komlodi v. Picciano, 217 N.J. 387, 420 (2014) .................................................... 23 Konop v. Rosen, 425 N.J.Super. 391, 401 (App. Div. 2012) .................................. 38 Pareja v. Princeton Int’l Props., 246 N.J. 546, 549 (2021) ...... 24, 25, 26, 30, 31 Pellicer v. Saint Barnabas Hosp., 200 N.J. 22, 53 (2009) ...............................52, 53 Primmer v. Harrison, 472 N.J. Super. 173, 187 (App. Div. 2022) ...................... 36 Prioleau v Ky. Fried Chicken, Inc., 223 N.J. 245, 257 (2015) ............................ 22 Sarro v. Vonage Holdings Corp., 2023 WL 2566062 (App. Div. 2023) ......................................................... 32 Seoung Ouk Cho v. Trinitas Reg’l Med. Ctr., 443 N.J. Super. 461, 470 (App. Div. 2015) .........................................................
[brief] ## Table of Citations  ### Cases - **Baxter v. Fairmont Food Co.**, 74 N.J. 588 (1977) ...........................................  41 - **Boryszewski ex rel. Boryszewski v. Burke**, 380 N.J. Super. 361 (App. Div. 2005) .................................................................................................................. 19 - **Botta v. Brunner**, 26 N.J. 82 (1958) ........................................................................ 34 - **Ciluffo v. Middlesex Gen’l Hosp.**, 146 N.J. Super. 476 (App. Div. 1977) .... 34 - **Cuevas v. Wentworth Grp.**, 226 N.J. 480 (2016) ............................................... 41 - **De Palma v. Economy Auto Supply Co.**, 3 N.J. Misc. 827 (Sup. Ct. 1925) .... 37 - **Est. of Hanges v. Metro. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co.**, 202 N.J. 369 (2010) .............. 23 - **Hayes v. Delamotte**, 231 N.J. 373 (2018) ............................................................ 18-19 - **Johnson v. Scaccetti**, 192 N.J. 256 (2007) ........................................................... 34-35 - **Kita v. Borough of Lindenwold**, 305 N.J. Super. 43 (App. Div. 1997) ............. 19 - **Kulbacki v. Sobchinsky**, 38 N.J. 435 (1962) ......................................................... 20 - **Lanzet v. Greenberg**, 222 N.J. Super. 540 (App. Div. 1988) ............................... 36-37 - **Lewis v. Read**, 80 N.J. Super. 148 (App. Div.), certif. granted, 41 N.J. 121 (1963) .................................................................................................................. 36-37 - **Manalapan Realty, LP v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan**, 140 N.J. 366 (1995) .. 18-19 - **Neno v. Clinton**, 167 N.J. 573 (2001) .................................................................... 29 - **Orientale v. Jennings**, 239 N.J. 569 (2019) ......................................................... 41 - **Paladino v. Campos**, 145 N.J. Super. 555 (Law Div. 1976) ................................. 36
[brief] The Respondents have noted several times that the minimum lot size of 75-acres in the VC-2 Zone made it impossible to develop the Property or the “middle” property without a minimum lot area variance.  However, the Board submits that the minimum lot size of 75-acres clearly evidences the intention of the Township that the entire area of the VC-2 (or at least a significant portion thereof) be developed as a singular development; or at most two developments.  5T130 to 5T231.  The Respondents’ decision to develop the “middle property” and the Property as separate developments should not alleviate the clear obligation of the VC-2 Zone.
[brief] Similarly, the Court’s factual findings prohibit Defendant from arguing that Plaintiff breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.  Indeed, the trial court specifically found that “based on the positions of the parties at that time I find that they were negotiating in good faith. ”  (4T 27:4-6)  As the court observed, “for the most part I found [...] to be credible; um, relatively straightforward.  At time there were things that she could not recall but for the most part I did not have any reason to doubt her credibility. ”  (4T 9:18-22)  In contrast, it was testimony by [...] that the trial court found “the least believable. ”  (4T 12:24)  Defendant’s argument that Plaintiff had no intention of repaying him at the time she entered into the Agreement is belied by the extensive factual record.
[brief] Plaintiff conceded at her deposition that there is nothing in the record to reflect any racist or ageist remarks were ever made by Plaintiff’s supervisors or the decisionmakers.  (Pl. Tr. 237:8-24).  There is no evidence that preferential treatment was given to employees not in the same protected class as Plaintiff.  Indeed, to the extent Plaintiff alleges [...]’s lack of communication constituted discrimination, she testified that the other Vice Principals and other staff (regardless of race) shared similar complaints about [...].  (Pl. Tr. 224:21 to 225:13; 226:3-14; 227:15-229:19).  Plaintiff admitted both she and Caucasian Vice Principal [...] were dissatisfied with receiving low scores on observations from [...].
[directive] DIRECTIVE NUMBER: 34  DATE: January 17, 2000  SUBJECT: Adoptive Seizure Policies and Procedures  BACKGROUND  The Department of the Treasury approach to adoptions was established in at a time when the majority of states did 1992, not have statutory authority to seize and forfeit.  That process was created to provide a mechanism allowing Treasury law enforcement bureaus to assist: states not possessing the (1) requisite authority forfeit criminally obtained property, and to in cases where the scope of the investigation (multi-state ( 2 ) violators or international) warranted federal investigation.  Since that time, the majority of states have obtained statutory seizure/forfeiture authority, thereby significantly decreasing the need for adoptions.  The purpose of this directive is to clarify the circumstances under which adoptions are appropriate.  The policies and procedures set forth by this directive are intended to ensure consistent review and handling of state and local seizures presented a Treasury law enforcement agency to for adoption.  In all cases, state and local law enforcement agencies should be encouraged to pursue forfeiture under state laws whenever possible.  However, a Treasury law enforcement agency may offer assistance through adoption consistent with these policies and procedures.  GENERAL ADOPTION POLICIES
[directive] When a complaint-warrant is issued pursuant to this Directive, the defendant shall be transported to the county jail as soon as practicable, considering the need to conduct investigative activities (e.g., interview of defendant, witness identification procedures requiring defendant’s presence or participation) and the availability of transport resources and the operating hours during which the pretrial services program is preparing recommendations as to release conditions in accordance with N.J.S.A. 2A:162-16.  4.13  Obligation to Forward Available Investigative Reports.  Rule 3:2-1(c) provides that when a complaint-summons is issued “all available investigative reports shall be forwarded by law enforcement to the prosecutor within 48 hours.
[brief] (39T:152-25 to 153-16).  [...] walked around the house and found a window open, which he found odd because the temperature outside was “blistering cold. ” (39T:153-17 to 154-5).  When no one responded to knocking on the front door, [...] climbed in through the window and unlocked the door for [...] to enter.  (39T:155-22 to 156-10).  The house was clean, but “smell[ed] funny. ” (39T:157-21 to 158-12).  [...] estimated that around 50 people from the fire and police departments participated in an “extensive search” for the missing child.  (39T:166-9 to 24).  [...] found a purse that weighed around 10-15 pounds in a shallow hole in the backyard by a shed.
[brief] East Orange v. Palmer, 52 N.J. 329, 334 (1968).  The "legislative objective is to enable local governments to realize taxes by returning property to the paying tax rolls without first expending money to foreclose or bar the equity of redemption."  Simon v. Deptford Township, 272 N.J.Super. 21, 26, (App.Div.) cert. den. 137 N.J. 310 (1994).  One with the right to redeem must do so by paying the delinquent taxes before the time to redeem has been cut off.  N.J.S. 54:5-54.  The right continues "until barred by the judgment of the Superior Court."  N.J.S. 54:5-86(a), N.J.S. 54:5-104.64.  "[T]he express policy of the [Tax Sale Law] is that it be liberally construed so as to bar the right of redemption, not preserve it, the goal being that marketable titles to property be secured."  Malone v. Midlantic Bank, N.A., 334 N.J.Super. 238, 250 (Ch. Div. 1999) (citing N.J.S. 54:5-85), aff'd o.b., 334 N.J.Super. 236 (App. Div. 2000).
[brief] In September 2020, shortly after acquiring the Property, Appellants paid $4,330 in fees to the [...] (96a-97a), along with other significant fees and expenses to retained professionals related to a variance application.  (96a-97a).  Those efforts were ultimately successful.  After Appellants attended hearings before the [...] on December 7, 2021 and January 18, 2022, they obtained Final Site Plan Approval for a variance.  (123a-131a).  This was after the tax sale.  The resolution approving the Final Site Plan Approval was executed by the Chairman of the Irvington Zoning Hearing Board on February 15, 2022.  (123a-131a).  After obtaining Final Site Plan Approval, unaware of the jeopardy from the sale of the Certificate, Appellants immediately initiated renovation efforts (97a-98a), retaining architect [...], to whom Appellants paid $7,250 on May 19, 2022, and engineer [...], to whom Appellants paid $4,100 on October 10, 2022.
[brief] Defendants have not argued that the second or third special equity exists, nor could they.  As to the second special equity, whether there are significant state interests, such as the remediation of pollution in New Jersey or the enforcement of New Jersey public policy, that factor could only favor [...].  Indeed, Defendants seek indemnification from [...] based on allegations that [...]’s predecessor released PCBs into the environment at its [...] plant or that PCBs escaped from products manufactured there.  (Pa134-37; Pa474-76).  Additionally, the underlying claims against the Defendants include the New Jersey DEP’s lawsuit, [...], et al. v. [...], et al., [...] (Superior Court, Gloucester County, NJ), in which the DEP alleges that [...]’s manufacture, sale, distribution and discharge of PCBs caused environmental damage in New Jersey.  Thus, New Jersey’s state interests favor retaining this case, rather than deferring to a second-filed action in Missouri to decide these issues.
[brief] Much like the instant matter, in Leon N. Weiner & Asso., Inc., v. Zoning Bd. of Glassboro, 144 509, 514 (App. Div. 1976), the Court had before it an application for senior citizen cluster housing and the issue whether “the applicant failed to bear the burden of proving compliance with the negative criteria so far as the bulk variances affect the district selected by appellee to construct this development. ”  The Court made clear that the absence of evidence in support of the denial does not in itself mean that the Board’s determination is arbitrary.  Since the burden rests with the applicant to establish the criteria for the grant of the variance, it must demonstrate that the affirmative evidence in the record dictates the conclusion that the denial was arbitrary. ”  Id. at 515.  Although noting the inherently beneficial nature of the proposed use, the Weiner Court analyzed the Board determination of the negative impact on the zone plan as follows:  This finding reflects the opinion of the board that the applicant failed to prove that the proposed use of construction in this district met the negative criteria of N.J.S.A. 40:55-39, namely, that ‘the intent and purpose of the zone plan and zoning ordinance’ will not be substantially impaired.  It was not the burden of the board to find affirmatively that the plan would be substantially impaired (although it did so in the instant case).
[brief] Pb1.  During the hearings Plaintiff did not attempt to justify the granting of a d(1) use variance on such a basis.  Pa134 at ¶4; Pa172-323.  Further, it is undisputed that the subject project containing residential use is not an inherently beneficial use, notwithstanding the proposed affordable unit set aside.  _Advance at Branchburg II, LLC v. Branchburg Tp. Bd. of Adj._, 433 N.J. Super. 247, 256 (App. Div. 2013) conclusively held that a set-aside of 20% of the units as affordable in a residential development does not make a project inherently beneficial.  For a d(1) use variance to be granted on that basis, an applicant must prove that the use promotes the general welfare because the site (Lot 5) is particularly suitable or appropriate for the proposed use.  This constitutes the positive criteria or special reasons necessary to justify the granting of a d(1) use variance.  The benefit to the general welfare derives not from the use itself but from the use of the property at that specific location.  It is the location of the proposed development that triggers the ability to proffer the position, not the proposed use without regard to its location.  Medici v. BRP Co., 107 N.J. 1, 18 (1987).  2.
[brief] **Legal Argument**  1.  The trial court committed plain error by dismissing Plaintiffs’ Complaint for environmental claims, as Plaintiffs have never had an opportunity to litigate their environmental claims on the merits.  (October 16, 2023 Order, located at 2a and 20a-23a).  The trial court committed plain error by dismissing Appellant’s environmental claims against the [...] in its October 16, 2023 Order.  Simply put, the claims have never been litigated.  In order for the doctrine of res judicata to bar a claim, “1) the judgment in the prior action must be valid, final and on the merits; 2) the parties in the later action must be identical to or in privity with those in the prior action; and 3) the claim in the later action must grow out of the same transaction or occurrence as the claim in the earlier one. ”  Rippon v. Smigel, 449 N.J.Super. 344, 367, 158 A.3d 23, 37 (2017) (citations omitted).  Similarly, the doctrine of collateral estoppel only prohibits “relitigation” of issues if: “1) the issue to be precluded is identical to the issue decided in the prior proceeding; 2) the issue was actually litigated in the prior proceeding; 3) the court in the prior proceeding issued a final judgment on the merits; 4) the determination of the issue was essential to the prior judgment; and 5) the party against whom the doctrine is asserted was a party to or in privity with a party to the earlier proceeding. ”  Allen v. V & A Bros., Inc., 208 N.J. 114, 137, 26 A.3d 430, 444 (2011).  (citations omitted).
[brief] A NEW TRIAL POINT VI:…………………………………………………………………………………7 APPELLEE’S TESTIMONY THAT APPELLANT FLED THE SCENE OF THE ACCIDENT WAS IRRELEVANT, IMPROPER AND WARRANTS A NEW TRIAL CONCLUSION…………………………………………………………………………………..7  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES  Camp v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 616 So. 2d 12 (Fla. 1993)…………4-5  Ciechanowski v. New Jersey Mfrs. Ins. Co., 2009 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2045…………………………………………………………………………………5  Colucci v. Oppenheim, 326 N.J. Super. 166 (App. Div. 1999)…………………………6  Flanders v. Jackson, 810 S.E.2d 656 (Ga. Ct. App. 2018)……………………………..4  Fleck v. KDI Sylvan Pools, Inc., 981 F.2d 107 (3rd Cir. 1992)…………………………3  Malick v. Seaview Lincoln Mercury, 398 N.J. Super. 182 (App. Div. 2008)………5  Ross v. Lowitz, 222 N.J. 494 (N.J. 2015)………………………………………………..5  Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Investors Ins. Co. of America, 65 N.J. 474 (1974)….4-5  Taddei v. State Farm Indem. Co., 401 N.J. Super. 449 (App. Div. 2008)…………4-5 | January 8, 2024 | Order regarding Bankruptcy Court Rulings | Dr4 | PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
[brief] B.  The landlord is protected from confiscation through inflation through automatic inflationary adjustments on the income from the property [...]’s income is protected from inflation by automatic CPI increases on the rent.  However, in addition to this, [...] claims that it is entitled to a CPI adjustment on its initial cash investment for inflation and appreciation on the value of the unit as real property included in equity.  However, it is a rare and valuable investment where a person receives the benefit of holding a real property asset, plus a 6% percentage return on the initial investment with the base adjusted for inflation, plus monthly income, also adjusted for inflation.  It does not violate the constitution to deny [...] this unicorn investment it claims on a run-down and neglected legacy railroad style rental.
[brief] A.  The Jury’s Verdict Precludes [...] from Obtaining Indemnification from [...] for [...]’s Own Negligence  The jury found [...] 100% at fault for the plaintiff’s injuries.  (Da093-Da095).  New Jersey law prohibits contractual indemnification where the indemnitee (i.e., [...]) is found solely liable, no matter what the contract says.  Mautz v. J.P. Patti Co., 298 N.J. Super. 13, 20 (App. Div. 1997) citing N.J.S.A. 2A:40A-1; and see Estate of D’Avila v. Hugo Neu Schnitzer East, 442 N.J. Super. 80, 101 (App. Div. 2015), Englert v. The Home Depot, 389 N.J. Super. 44, 49 (App. Div. 2006), Leitao v. Damon G. Douglas Co., 301 N.J. Super. 187, 191-192, 197-198 (App. Div. 1997).  [...] concedes both points.  (See Db17, Db20-21, Db26-27).  [...] has absolutely no standing to challenge the trial court’s finding that the [...]-[...] contract was ambiguous.  The issue of [...]’s contractual indemnification became moot once the jury returned its verdict.
[brief] That is, plaintiff must point towards some evidence, direct or circumstantial, from which a finder of fact could reasonably either (1) disbelieve the employer’s articulated legitimate reason; or (2) believe that an invidious discriminatory reason was more likely than not a motivating or determinative cause of the employer’s action.  *Fuentes v. Perskie*, 32 F.3d 759, 764-65 (3d Cir. 1994).  With regard to retaliation, the NJLAD provides:
[directive] When practicable, the reason for placing a vehicle on BOLO list shall be included with the BOLO and shall be disclosed to the officer who will react to an immediate alert.  If for any reason an officer reacting to an immediate alert should not initiate an investigative detention where (e.g., the license plate was included in the BOLO list because the department or any other agency wanted to be notified of the location of the subject vehicle without alerting the driver/occupants that they are the subject of law enforcement attention, such as in the case of Violent Gang or Terrorist Organization File (VGTOF) alert), to the extent feasible, the information attached to the license plate on the BOLO list shall be entered in such a way as to cause the ALPR to clearly designate an immediate alert as a "non-encounter" alert, and shall provide specific instructions to the officer as to who to notify of the alert.  See Section 7, infra. 7.  POLICE ACTIONS IN RESPONSE TO AN IMMEDIATE ALERT
[brief] March 20, 2024  VIA ECOURTS  [...], Clerk Superior Court of New Jersey - Appellate Division  R.J. Hughes Justice Complex PO Box 006 Trenton, NJ 08625-0006  Re: [...] v. [...]  Docket No. [...]  On appeal from a Final Agency Decision of the [...]  Letter Brief of Respondent, [...] on the Merits of the Appeal
[brief] (Aa123-142)  The Arbitrator also analyzed the remainder of the Sectio 16 (g) criteria.  The Arbitrator discussed and gave weight to factor 2 comparison of wages salaries, and conditions of employment of other public employees in similar comparable jurisdictions.  In applying that criteria, [...] noted that the City is the only municipality in New Jersey that is both a city of the first class (based on a population of greater than 100,000 residents) and a recipient of transitional aid.