ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] A.  That [...] Was Never Notified that 12-15+ Passenger Vans Were Excluded or Otherwise Ineligible for Coverage Combined with the Fact that the Insurance Policy and Related Forms Were Confusing, Contradictory, and Misleading Provided Him With A Reasonable Expectation of Coverage.............................................2  1.  The FL Dean application to obtain insurance coverage for the vans did not inform [...] of the exclusion and contradicted [...]’s own underwriting guidelines........3  2.  The questionnaire at issue did not inform [...] that the vans were excluded and, further, was misleading and unclear, especially in light of the Application, which stated that 12-15+ passenger vans could be insured in the amount of $150,000 or $500,000.......................................................5  3.  Neither the four page price quotation nor the underwriter’s guidelines informed [...] that the vans were excluded and, together, they contradict each other.........................6  4.  The underwriting guidelines, which contradict the Application, did not inform [...] that the vans Were excluded.................................................................8  5.  The Certificate of Coverage did not inform [...] of the exclusion.................................................................10  B.
[brief] Id.  [...] texted Appellant that [...] wanted to “kiss, bang, or touch a boob,” which was a misguided attempt to curry favor with Appellant.  Appellant rebuffed this harassment: “Stop yourself.  I ask you not to say that and thanks for not repeating. ”  (Pa994).  [...] made other comments about Appellant being “attractive. ”  (Pa345-46) 85:9-89:20.  Appellant felt uncomfortable and asked him to stop, but [...] refused.  Appellant was upset, confused, and angry about [...] telling her that [...] wanted to kiss, bang, touch a boob, and other sexual comments.  Id.  Soon after the above text, Appellant verbally told [...] she was uncomfortable, not to come near her, and not to make inappropriate comments.
[directive] N.J.S.A.  Zgodnie z Supplemental Plea Form Mandatory Sentence to Special Probation  N.J.S.A.  Pursuant to 2C:35-14.2  “Drug Court” (Polish)  Na poniższe pytania powinny odpowiedzieć tylko osoby kwalifikujące się do obowiązkowego wyroku specjalnego nadzoru sądowego zgodnie z 2C:35-14 („Sąd przeciwnarkotykowy”).
[brief] Aa1  Final Agency Determination of the [...] dated January 17, 2024 denying Request for Reconsideration.............................................  Aa13  ### TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | Case | Page(s) | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|---------| | **Cases** | | | Aguas v. State, | 32 | | 220 N.J. 494 (2015) | | | B & J Realty, L.L.C. v. N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., | 16 | | 381 N.J. Super. 52 (App. Div. 2005) | | | Cunningham v. Dep't of Civil Serv., | 16, 25 | | 69 N.J. 13 (1975) | | | Frank v. Ivy Club, | 16 | | 120 N.J. 73 (1990) | | | Fraternal Order of Police Lodge # 1 Camden v. City of Camden Police Dep’t., | 15 | | 368 N.J. Super. 56 (Law Div. 2003) | | | Goss v. Lopez, | 15 | | 419 U.S. 565 (1975) | | | Henry v. Rahway State Prison, | 13 | | 81 N.J. 571 (1980) | | | I/M/O Wiggins, | 16 | | 242 N.J. Super. 342 (App. Div. 1990) | | | In Matter of J.L., | 18 | | 2016 WL 512431 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Feb. 10, 2016) | | | In re Application of Virtua-West Jersey Hosp. Voorhees for a Certificate of Need, | 13 | | 194 N.J. 413 (2008) | | | In re Carter, | 13 | | 191 N.J. 474 (2007) | | | In re M.M., | 16 | | 2015 WL 2184073 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. May 12, 2015) | | | In re T.M., | 16, 19 | | 2013 WL 2301090 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. May 28, 2013) | | | In the Matter of F.P., Department of Corrections.
[brief] POINT V THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW WHEN IT ALLOWED THE PLAINTIFFS TO INTRODUCE EVIDENCE OF ALLEGED ADMINISTRATIVE CODE VIOLATIONS DETACHED FROM AND BEYOND THOSE PLED IN EITHER COMPLAINT.  IT WAS FURTHER ERROR WHEN THE COURT CONVERTED THE ALLEGED CODE VIOLATIONS INTO INDEPENDENT CAUSES OF ACTION UNDER RETA.  (Da1134; Da1166-1189).
[brief] The Nunez Court went on to hold that “residential property owners are encouraged to clear public sidewalks, and they will not be subject to liability unless they create a new danger or hazard other than the one caused by natural forces. ”  *Id.* at *2*.  Finally, the Appellate Division rejected the plaintiff’s argument that the defendants were negligent because they failed to apply a de-icer after [...] cleared the snow from the sidewalk.
[directive] Initial Initial Initial Final Final Final juvenile 3 weapons  DESCRIPTION than OFFENSE than used/employed less weapons  no older defendant weapons  2C:35-6 2C:35-6 2C:35-6 years no C.  B. A.  Term 84 90 93 78 84 87 72 78 81 66 72 75  Enhanced 78 84 87 72 78 81 66 72 75 60 66 69  Extended V 78 81 66 72 75 72 60 66 69 54 60 63  Term 66 87 72 78 81 78 84 72 75 60 66 69  Extended 72 75 72 78 81 69 66 54 60 63 66 IV 60 66 69  66 72 75 63 60 48 54 57 60 54 69 66 72 75 60 66 54 57 54 60 48 63  Serious 60 66 69 54 60 63 51 48 54 42 48 III 57 54 60 63 48 54 57 42 48 51 36 42 45  2C:35-4
[brief] C.  The special assessment was absolutely included in the condo fees granted to [...] and [...] knows this  The Board had multiple conversations about the fact that the $5772 condominium fee amount included a $72 per month special assessment that ended in 2016 before [...] filed its hardship application.  3T81:18-82-7.  [...] was well aware of this.  See 5t:102:6-7 ([...] testifying “currently there is no special assessment”).  Board members recognized that there was a disconnect between [...]’s opinion and what they had actually done.
[brief] The Court is to search the Complaint in depth and with liberality to determine if a cause of action can be gleaned even from an obscure statement being given the opportunity to amend if necessary.  Every reasonable inference is given to the plaintiff and the Motion is to be granted only in rare instances and ordinarily without prejudice.  Id., at 746.  “The inquiry of a reviewing court ‘is limited to examining the legal sufficiency of the facts alleged on the face of the complaint.  Printing Mart, supra, 116 N.J.at746, 563A.2d 31 (citing Rieder v. Department of Transportation, 221 N.J. Super. 547, 552, 535 A.2d 512 (App. Div. 1987).  The proper inquiry is thus whether a cause of action is suggested by the facts.  Printing Mart, supra, 116 N.J. at 748, 563 A.2d 31 (citing Velantzas v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., Inc., 109 N.J. 189, 192, 536 A.2d 237 (1988).  Every reasonable inference of fact is accorded the party whose claim is being assessed and that a motion to dismiss on these grounds is rarely granted.  Printing Mart, supra, 116 N.J., at 746, 563 A.2d 31. ”  Paternoster v. Shuster, 296 N.J. Super 544, 558-59 (App.Div. 1997).  Plaintiff’s Complaint at Pa1 sets forth legitimate causes of action for breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and reinstatement of Plaintiff’s mortgage and should not be dismissed.  A)
[directive] It should be clear that the suspension of an officer before completing an investigation or disposing of a case is a serious matter.  Such suspensions may be immediately necessary, as in the case of an officer reporting for work under the influence of alcohol.  In other cases, however, a suspension need not be immediate but rather would follow a preliminary investigation into the matter that indicates that one of the above criteria has been met.  In any case, suspension prior to disposing of the case must be clearly documented and justified.
[directive] Indeed, early through officers assist to also Prosecutors County some and of such systems utility the recognized have State the throughout this these reasons, of all For them. use to jurisdictions their within agencies require already implement adopt and Jersey New in agencies enforcement law all that mandates now Directive forth below.  set requirements with the consistent Systems EW of Act Criminal Justice the under me to granted authority the to  Accordingly, pursuant justice criminal of supervision general for the provides which -117, to 52:17B-97 N.J.S.A. 1970, a of benefits the secure to State officer the of enforcement law chief as General Attorney by the justice criminal administration of law the criminal and of the enforcement efficient uniform and prosecuting and law all enforcement DIRECT hereby Grewal, Gurbir S. I, State, the throughout and implement to New Jersey of State the of laws the of authority the under operating agencies practices. and standards, procedures, policies, following with comply the ....
[brief] It addresses specifically claims for “discrimination” and “retaliation” arising out of her employment, which, as of when she signed it, she had not yet begun.  It is simply not credible or legitimate to argue that [...] did not know or should not have reasonably understood that her agreement to arbitrate would apply to any and all claims arising out of her forthcoming employment.  As in Antonucci, the Agreement here is valid and enforceable as to [...]’s claims.
[brief] (Da279).  On September 8, 2020 Appellant filed a motion to stay proceedings which was denied on September 14, 2020.  (Da273).  On September 11, 2020, the Court held a pretrial conference in which Appellant participated.  (1T 4:8-11).  During the conference, Appellant stated that he did not object to the admissibility of any of Respondent’s exhibits and consented to the Court taking judicial notice of the five arbitration awards entered in favor of [...] and against his various companies.  (1T 7:16-8:24).  “And [Appellant] stated on the record that he had no opposition to any of the exhibits as be—coming into evidence. ” (1T 9:6-8).  Appellant made multiple attempts to stay the trial at the eleventh hour, filing an application for permission to file an emergent motion on short notice to the Appellate Division, which was denied on September 15, 2020 (Pa8), and then filing an application for emergent relief in the Supreme Court of New Jersey, which was denied on September 16, 2020.
[brief] 33.  Initial Decision, dated May 30, 2023.  34.  Order of Extension to issue a Final Decision (until August 28, 2023), executed on June 2, 2023, by School Ethics Commission Acting Director [...].  35.  Final Decision adopted by the School Ethics Commission at its meeting on August 22, 2023.  Respectfully submitted, [...]  ATTORNEY GENERAL OF NEW JERSEY  By: /s/[...]  [...]  Deputy Attorney General  Dated: February 27, 2024  [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], AND [...], Complainants-Appellants, v. [...], [...], OCEAN COUNTY, Respondent-Respondent.
[brief] Da444  Motion to Exclude Increased Wave Overtopping Vulnerability  Plaintiff’s Notice of Motion to Bar  Defendant’s Motion to Exclude Increased Wave Overtopping Vulnerability Engineering Report Filed 8/10/22 .................................................................  Da446 Certification of [...], Esq.  In Support of Plaintiff’s Motion to Bar [...]’s Engineering Report Filed 8/10/22 .. Da448 Exhibit 1 [...] 04/07/21 report ........................................  Da310 Exhibit 2 [...] 10/21/21 report ........................................  Da418 Exhibit 3 03/01/22  Deposition Transcript of A. [...] .. Da456
[brief] 3.  [...] claimed to be oblivious to the bankruptcy proceedings and the financial loss to the marital estate, but trial court found otherwise:  Defendant was an integral part of the bankruptcy as was represented by her own counsel, [...] in that proceeding.  The court also finds that the evidence shows that defendant was fully aware of the risks which arose from the bankruptcy proceeding and that she had mutual interests with plaintiff to receive as many assets as possible at the conclusion of the bankruptcy.  [A229, Op. at. 55].
[brief] (6T9-10 to 16, 18-14 to 17, 21-11 to 23).  He explained that he evaluated the latent prints recovered from both burglaries, concluding that they originated from the same source as defendant’s known fingerprints in the AFIS database.  (6T46-5 to 14, 52-23 to 53-22, 54-7 to 56-21).  He first explained ACE-V,\(^2\) the process by which he reached his conclusion.  (6T31-16 to 21, 32-3 to 17, 33-9 to 45-7).  [...] also demonstrated how he examined the latent thumbprint recovered on September 28 and one of the latent prints recovered on September 30, walking the jury through the entire ACE-V process.  He showed twenty-six separate points of identification when comparing the September 28 thumbprint with the known exemplar and thirty-four separate points of identification when comparing the September 30 print with the known exemplar.  (6T66-25 to 67-24, 72-19 to 73-13).  As noted, the jury convicted defendant of both charges.
[brief] (Pa89; Pa45, dep. tr. p. 38-39).  Indeed, Appellant admitted there was no written document memorializing any agreement between [...] and Appellant.  (Pa65, dep. tr. 116-117; Pa89 at paragraph 45).  Moreover, Appellant does not dispute that he habitually used the PCards for personal purchases/expenditures over the course of several years, despite signing an Employee agreement which stated, in pertinent part: “I agree to use this Card for approved purchases only and agree not to charge personal purchases. ” (Pa90, Da72).  D.  Appellant’s Allegations  Pertaining to [...]’s Misconduct  Appellant contends he was terminated because Respondents knew that Appellant was aware that the Company was selling products that were marked “Made in America by way of lasering the ‘Made in China’ stamp off and replacing it with the said ‘Made in America’ stamp.
[brief] In J-M Mfg. Co. v. Phillips & Cohen, LLP, 443 N.J. Super. 447 (App. Div. 2015), the defendants former employee filed a federal qui tam action in California under the False Claims Act, alleging plaintiff defrauded governmental entities.  In the California action, plaintiff did not file a counterclaim.  While the qui tam action was pending in California, plaintiff sued defendant in New Jersey, seeking damages against the defendant and his attorneys for defendant’s investigatory activities, including the removal of confidential documents and other claims breaches of his contractual commitments to plaintiff.  Defendant moved for dismissal of the New Jersey case based on the entire controversy doctrine and the trial court dismissed the case.  On appeal, the Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s ruling and held that the entire controversy doctrine mandated the dismissal of the New Jersey Complaint because it was based on the same transaction or transactional circumstances as the California proceeding and held that the fact that the cases were being pursued simultaneously did not prevent the application of the entire controversy doctrine.
[brief] ”  *Id.* at 541-42 (quoting *Dzwonar*, 177 N.J. at 463).  In determining whether a plaintiff’s belief is a reasonable one, courts analyze whether a substantial nexus exists between the complained-of conduct and the law or public policy that plaintiff believes that the conduct violates.  *Tegler v. Global Spectrum*, 291 F. Supp. 3d 565, 580 (D.N.J. 2018).  Without a substantial nexus between the plaintiff’s complained-of conduct and any identified law or public policy, summary judgment must be granted.  See *Hitesman v. Bridgeway, Inc.*, 218 N.J. 8, 32 (2014) (“[A] pivotal component of a CEPA claim is the plaintiff’s identification of authority in one or more of the categories enumerated in the statute that bears a substantial nexus to his or her claim. ”).  As the Appellate Division has made clear, CEPA “is not intended to shield a constant complainer who simply disagrees with the manner in which [a] hospital is operating one of its medical departments, provided the operation is in accordance with lawful and ethical mandates. ”  *Klein*, 377 N.J. Super. at 42; see also *Young v. Schering Corp.*, 275 N.J. Super. 221, 237 (App. Div.1994) (noting CEPA “was not intended to provide a remedy for wrongful discharge for employees who simply disagree with an employer’s decision, where that decision is entirely lawful”); Battaglia v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 214 N.J. 518, 559 (2013) (“Vague and conclusory complaints, complaints about trivial or minor matters, or generalized workplace unhappiness are not the sort of things that the Legislature intended to be protected by CEPA.
[directive] E. Hon. [...]  Criminal Presiding Judges of6  Page 5  Municipal Court Presiding Judges  Criminal Division Judges  Municipal Court Judges of [...], Chief Staff  AOC Directors and Assistant Directors of Clerks Court Special Assistants to the Administrative Director  Criminal Division Managers and Assistant Division Managers  Municipal Division Managers and Assistant Division Managers  [...], Statewide Pretrial Services Manager  [...], Chief, Criminal Practice  [...], Chief, Municipal Court Services  [...], Chief, Municipal Court Services of6  6 Page Pretrial Making (DMF) Framework Recommendation Release Decision 2022]
[brief] (Resp. Br. 12).  That is obviously not true, as we are on initial appeal from the trial court’s decision now.  The City’s reliance on George v. McDonough, 596 U.S. 740 (2022), misses the mark.  That case does not concern retroactivity doctrine at all, but rather the interpretation of a statutory provision which permits a claimant for veterans’ disability benefits “to seek collateral review at any time on grounds of clear and unmistakable error. ”  596 U.S. at 742 (internal quotations omitted).  The case therefore turned on whether a subsequent change in law constituted a “clear and unmistakable error” for purposes of the statute.  Id. at 746.  It is inapposite.
[brief] Although [...] of [...] advised Appellant in a telephone call in the fall of 2021 that all “75 Orders in this case were being reviewed” in the “Trenton office it is blatantly evident that Probation lost track of the numerous court Orders in this case, and failed to properly review all pertinent court Orders for impact upon the account record.  2.  Further, Appellant calls the Appellate Court’s attention to the letter dated 4/2/2004 issued by [...], to Probation (DA471) which provides notice to Probation that the Order of 3/25/2004 requires a $10,354.73 credit, the elimination of $16,519.20 in posted support arrears, and the reduced payment schedule of support of $36,711—which to this day have not been fully posted on the account record.
[brief] THE ISSUES TO BE PRECLUDED ARE NOT IDENTICAL.  There is no dispute that the April 23, 2022 arrest at issue in the Hudson County case was also the subject of the Union County suppression motion.  However, [...] carefully reviewed the record before the trial court and properly determined that collateral estoppel was inapplicable because the issue to be precluded is not “identical” to one decided in the prior proceeding.  This finding was supported by several pertinent differences.  First, the scope of discovery provided to the Defense in Hudson County was different than what was provided in Union County prior to the suppression hearing conducted there.  Dra 2-4.  While those sets of discovery overlap, the differences in what was available based on the separate underlying incidents charged in each county affect the adjudication of each motion.  For instance, the [...] provided police reports about the carjacking in Elizabeth that caused officers to pursue the vehicle which [...] is alleged to have run away from before his arrest in Jersey City.  However, additional evidence like the body worn camera footage from the investigation into that carjacking and the radio transmissions between Elizabeth, Newark, and even Jersey City officers were not provided.  The State’s proofs are, of course, circumscribed by the scope of discovery.  Thus, the issue to be precluded is not identical.
[brief] I.  We discern from the record the following facts that are pertinent to the issues raised on appeal.  On April 14, 2017, the [...] convenience store ([...]) on Route 130 in [...] was robbed.  At approximately 11:30 p.m., [...] employee [...] was working at the cash register when a “middle-aged white male approached” her and asked for a pack of Newport cigarettes.  He wore a “gray jacket with a blue or black hat” and gloves.  [...] turned around, as the cigarettes were located behind her, grabbed them and gave them to the man.  The man then “leaned over the counter with the knife in his hand and said, ‘and everything in the register. ’ ”  [...] said, “excuse me?” and the man said again, “everything in the register. ”  [...] immediately “got on [her] radio and started calling to the other associates who had radios to help, we were being robbed.
[brief] “Because of the favored status afforded to arbitration, ‘an agreement to arbitrate should be read liberally in favor of arbitration. ’”  Griffin, supra, 411 N.J. Super. at 518 (quoting Garfinkel v. Morristown Obstetrics & Gynecology Assocs., 168 N.J. 124, 132 (2001) (quoting Marchak v. Claridge Commons, Inc., 134 N.J. 275, 282 (1993)).  Courts apply a “presumption of arbitrability” unless it is clear “that the arbitration clause is not susceptible of an interpretation that covers the asserted dispute. ”  Curtis, supra, 413 N.J. Super. at 34 (citing Epix Holdings Corp. v. Marsh & McLennan Cos., 410 N.J. Super. 453, 471 (App. Div. 2009), overruled in part on other grounds, (quoting Caldwell v. KFC Corp., 958 F. Supp. 962, 973 (D.N.J. 1997)).  Here, the Defendants cannot rebut the presumption of arbitrability.  The broad and expansive scope of the three governing provisions requires the parties in this action to resolve their disputes in arbitration.  Therefore, the motion court’s decision to compel arbitration should be affirmed.
[brief] On the other hand, counsel, in his summation to a jury should not misstate the evidence nor distort the factual picture.  Colucci v. Oppenheim, 326 N.J. Super. 166, 177 (App. Div. 1999).  In this case, defense counsel’s summation was proper and argued the evidence as it was presented to the jury.  At no time did counsel make any misstatements of evidence or distort the factual picture to the jury.  As the law says, counsel is allowed to argue inferences to the jury with broad latitude.
[brief] Further, there was no reasonable basis in this Court’s mind to believe that the video showing operation of the U-boat by [...], if that’s his name, as he traversed the store before the incident was relevant, which would have placed [...] in a position of understanding, it should have preserved that.  That is, [...], the facts demonstrate they met with the Plaintiff shortly after the incident, within moments of the incident, apparently, reviewed to see what they could find.  They did not find the moment of incident and had no awareness of a necessity to preserve beyond that.  The Court doesn’t find that to be unreasonable.  So I don’t find that they would have breached any duty in that regard.  As to the Mode of Operation argument.  Same is simply inapplicable to the case law as applied to the facts in this case.  The Court grants summary judgement.  (2T20:9-21:17).
[brief] [...] also certifies that [...] “reviewed our system to ensure that they accurately reflect the status of this account. ”  PA – 47.  Notably, Plaintiff was the originator of this credit card account.  Defendant’s assertion is wholly unsubstantiated opinion and is incorrect.  Defendant’s reliance on a consent order between the [...] and [...] in 2013 is wholly irrelevant and has no bearing on this matter.  This argument should fail.
[brief] . . .  [I]f this case comes bank on appeal and I’m – and I’m instructed to hold an evidentiary hearing as to whether or not in fact you – you did receive, because remember the process server for all the problems in the affidavit service, he describes you – somehow he knew, I – I think you were about 65 back then, give or take.  You – you have to admit the description of you is pretty on the nose.  . . . .  So, in any event, . . . my narrow ruling is this – this motion is about three years too late.