ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] 1.  The designated person, having searched the CCM Database for any case records that correspond to cases covered by an expungement order, shall make one hard copy of all documents corresponding to the expunged case found in the CCM Database.  2.  The designated person shall place those hard copies of the documents in the case file, which shall be secured in accordance with the expungement order.  3.  The designated person shall then delete the electronic versions of these documents from the CCM Database.  4.  The designated person shall complete and include in the case file the attached form (“Deletion of Records in Criminal Case Management Database”) memorializing having taken the above steps as to the CCM Database.  D.
[brief] STATEMENT OF PROCEDURAL HISTORY  3  STATEMENT OF FACTS  3  ARGUMENTS  6  POINT I THE SUPERIOR COURT ERRED WHEN IT DECIDED TO IGNORE THE FACTUAL BASIS OF MR. PFEISTER’S CONDITIONAL GUILTY PLEA AT THE MUNICIPAL COURT IN ORDER TO FIND HIM LIABLE FOR VIOLATING N.J.S.A. 23:4-16(d)(1) ON AN ALTERNATIVE GROUND (1T37-1 to 5)  6  POINT II  THE SUPERIOR COURT’S DECISION  FINDING  MR. PFEISTER  LIABLE ON AN ALTERNATIVE GROUND THAT WAS NOT ESTABLISHED IN THE RECORD AT THE MUNICIPAL COURT WAS A VIOLATION OF R. 3:23-8(a)(2) (1T37-1 to 5)  11  CONCLUSION
[brief] [...] held all of the corporate accounts.  There were three accounts: payroll, operating, and an ACH and wire account where all payments were sent by clients.  Only [...] had access to online banking and, unbeknownst to them, he was the sole signatory on all three accounts.  o (1T 79:2-80:15).  •  When he learned of the UCC filing in the first two weeks of January 2018 he asked [...] to explain what had occurred.  He and several partners confronted [...] and he also spoke with [...] afterwards.  [...] assured him it was all a "misunderstanding," and he would explain it at a meeting [...] called for the following Monday morning.  o (1T 73:15-74:24).
[brief] Had the parties intended there be multiple iterations the language would have read the Seller shall promptly deliver ‘an’ estoppel certificate.  But the PSA specifically says to deliver ‘the’ Estoppel Certificate.  Added is the fact the PSA defines ‘Estoppel Certificate’ and ‘Acceptable Estoppel Certificate’ separately.  It only requires the Defendant to use commercially reasonable efforts to obtain an Estoppel Certificate, and if obtained to promptly deliver it to Plaintiff.
[brief] (5T18-20 to 19-6, 43-19 to 21).  When [...]’s clothing was searched in the aftermath of the shooting, he was found with live handgun rounds matching both the shell-casings and discharged bullets from the shooting.  (4T162-6 to 167-1, 202-21 to 24).  [...] was also found with crack, heroin, and various pills.  (4T169-14 to 19).  [...]’s defense at trial was primarily that he was not the masked individual involved in the shooting, and that it may have been some associate of the group [...] brought back with her that night.  (6T14-21 to 15-10).  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT
[brief] See Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. United Insurance Co., 138 N.J. 437 (1994).  Under the “continuous trigger” rule, “injury occurs during each phase of environmental contamination – exposure, exposure in residence (defined as further progression of injury even after exposure has ceased), and manifestation of disease. ”  Id. at 451.  Under this approach, an occurrence triggering coverage occurs in each year from the time that the injured party is exposed to an injurious condition up to and including the date of the manifestation of the resultant disease.  Owens-Illinois, at 454, 478.  The key reason for applying the continuous trigger rule for injury arising from exposure to asbestos is that people exposed to asbestos “do not necessarily display the harmful effects until long after the initial exposure. ”  Id. at 437, 455.  As such, these “progressive indivisible injuries should be treated as an occurrence within each of the years of a CGL policy. ”  *Benjamin Moore & Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co.*, 179 N.J. 87, 101 (2004).
[brief] For the foregoing reasons, the Court:  (1)  GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART  Defendant’s motion compel Plaintiffs’ responses and document production, in response to Interrogatory No. 1 and RFP Nos. 1-3.  Plaintiffs are ORDERED to respond to Interrogatory No. 1 and produce responsive documents to RFP Nos. 1-3 as to the ‘589 Patent by November 18, 2016; (2) DENIES Defendant’s motion to compel Plaintiffs to produce all documents that “hit” on the parties’ ESI search terms without further culling for relevance.  IT IS SO ORDERED.  Dated: 11/3/2016.  All Citations Not Reported in Fed. Supp., 2016 WL 6522807
[brief] First, the argument that [...]’s Adderall and marijuana use made him a kind of drug-crazed maniac who would have been more likely to commit a shooting is the exact kind of argument that this Court said was not permissible in Mazowski.  337 N.J. Super. at 287-88.  Arguments that [...] committed the shooting must be based on evidence tending to show he was the person who did it, not inflammatory speculation based on the notion that drug abuse generally makes someone deranged to the point of murder.
[brief] The Decedent was hospitalized for the final time on April 20, 2021, with Covid pneumonia, and died on May 6.  (11T141-16 to 143-9).  The Respondent had telephone conversations and Facetime calls with the Decedent while she was hospitalized.  The Respondent was able to understand everything the Decedent was saying, except during the last conversation a few days before she died.  (11T144-15 to 146-2).  On April 30, 2021, the Decedent called the Respondent to tell her to contact [...], and to let her know the Respondent’s mortgage\(^4\) with the Decedent was forgiven.
[brief] 15  N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. E.P., 196 N.J. 88 (2008)  10 N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. G.L., 191 N.J. 596 (2007)  10 N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. M.M., 189 N.J. 261 (2007)  9  Newburgh v. Arrigo, 88 N.J. 529 (1982)  9, 10, 11, 13  Reese v. Weis, 430 N.J. Super. 552, 586 (App. Div. 2013)  16,17 Rendine v. Pantzer, 141 N.J. 292 (1995)  16  Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Invs. Ins. Co. of Am., 65 N.J. 474 (1979)  10  Saffos v. Avaya, Inc., 419 N.J. Super. 244 (App. Div. 2011)  17  Strahan v. Strahan, 402 N.J. Super. 298 (App. Div. 2008)  16  Thieme v. Aucoin-Thieme, 227 N.J. 269 (2016)  9 N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(a)  10 RPC 1.5(a)  18 Rule 4:42-9 16, 18 Rule 5:3-5(c) 16, 17, 18  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
[brief] STANDARDS OF REVIEW  This appeal implicates two standards of review.  First, this Court’s review of the trial court’s grant of summary judgment “is de novo, using the same legal standard as the trial court. ”  Avis Budget Group, Inc. v. City of Newark, 427 N.J. Super. 326, 327 (App. Div. 2012), certif. denied, 213 N.J. 531 (2013).  Second, this Court reviews the trial court’s fee award under an abuse of discretion standard.  See Masone v. Levine, 382 N.J. Super. 181, 193 (App. Div. 2005) (“The legislature intended that judicial discretion should be used in determining an award for fees pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:15–59.1. ”).  II.
[brief] The trial court’s decision was erroneous for three reasons.  1.  **Choice of Law**  The trial court improperly applied New York law in its substantive review of the Wholesaler Agreement.  The application of New York law violates the express requirements of the MBPA, and is also inapplicable pursuant to the Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of Law § 187 since New York has no “substantial relationship” to the parties or issues in Appellants’ Verified Complaint, and New York law would violate New Jersey public policy.  Finally, the application of New York law violates clear precedent arising under the NJFAP, which the trial court was required but failed to consider under the MBPA.
[brief] The lower court correctly recognized that the account of [...]’ specific conduct set forth in the underlying complaint was simply not one that left room to argue that there was “an accident,” within the meaning of the policy definition of “occurrence” (Da8).  The [...] liability coverage is triggered only when “a claim is made or a suit is brought against an insured for damages because of bodily injury or property damage caused by an occurrence to which this coverage applies” (Da17).  Here, as the lower court correctly determined, [...]’ conduct, as described in the underlying complaint, was entirely contrary to the existence of a covered “occurrence” under the liability endorsement of his [...] policy.  Thus, [...] failed in his burden to establish that the underlying lawsuit was within the policy’s scope of coverage.  It is a basic tenet of insurance coverage law that coverage cannot be provided for damages that are allegedly the result of an insured’s willful wrongdoing; such coverage would contravene public policy.  *Voorhees v. Preferred Mutual Ins. Co.*, 128 N.J. 165, 181 (1992); *Ruvolo v. American Casualty Co.*, 39 N.J. 490, 496 (1963); *Malanga v. Manufacturers Casualty Ins. Co.*, 28 N.J. 220, 225 (1958); *Merrimack Mutual Fire Ins. Co. v. Coppola*, 299 N.J. Super. 219, 227 (App. Div. 1997); *Atlantic Employers Ins. Co. v. Tots & Toddlers Pre-school Day Care Center, Inc.*, 239 N.J. Super. 276, 284 (App. Div. 1990), certif. denied, 122 N.J. 147 (1990).
[brief] It was learned that [...] and her union rep met with [...] after she was written up by [...] to have the write up received in May 2019 removed from her employee file.  It was further learned that [...] ordered the write up removed from [...]’s Performance Evaluation.  Counsel for the Respondents mis-states the number of times that [...] engaged in the use of the racial slur as Counsel claimed that [...] used the racial slur once.  [...] engaged in the use of the racial slur during her class twice, once in January of 2019 and once in May of 2019.  Despite this engagement in violation of the school policy which prohibits discrimination and harassment, [...]’s contract was renewed.
[brief] AMENDED APPENDIX  “Status Quo”  Order, June 4, 2021  [...], J.S.C.................................................................Da1  Final Judgment, August 4, 2023  [...] J.S.C.............................................................Da2  Order Denying Motion to Stay, September 14, 2023  [...], J.S.C..............................................................Da9  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS BEING APPEALED
[brief] “Common sense and good judgment . . . require that police officers be allowed to engage in some investigative street encounters without probable cause. ”  *Davis*, 104 N.J. at 505.  Officers may thus stop someone if they have a particularized and reasonable suspicion to do so.  *Id.* at 504.  The United States Supreme Court and New Jersey courts have held this reasonable-suspicion standard means there must be “some minimal level of objective justification” for conducting the investigatory stop.
[brief] [...] argues that his conviction should be reversed because the trial court erroneously declined to sever his trial from [...]'s trial, misapplied its discretion when it refused to excuse a juror for cause, and improperly instructed the jury.  [...] also argues that the court erroneously denied his motion for a judgment of acquittal, and imposed a manifestly excessive sentence.  [...] contends that his conviction should be reversed because at trial the prosecutor failed to fully disclose the State's plea agreement with one of its witnesses, presented unreliable and unduly suggestive in-court identifications, and elicited improper hearsay and perjured testimony.  [...] also argues that his sentence was excessive.  We affirm the judgment of conviction for each defendant.  I.
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT’S JULY 29, 2024 DECISION COMPELLING ARBITRATION AND STAYING PLAINTIFF’S CASE SHOULD BE REVERSED (Ja5-Ja12)  A.  Standards For Evaluating Motions To Compel Arbitration  “It is the FAA’s ‘principal purpose’ to ‘ensur[e] that private arbitration agreements are enforced according to their terms’ (citations omitted)”  See Gaffe v Foulke Mgmt., Corp., 238 N.J. 191, 208 (2019)  “Pursuant to the FAA, courts must ‘place arbitration agreements’ on equal footing with all other contracts (citations omitted).  Thus, a state may not ‘subject an arbitration agreement to more burdensome requirements than those governing the formation of other contracts’ (citation omitted)”  See Skuse v Pfizer, Inc., 244 N.J. 30, 47 (2020); Atalese v U.S. Legal Services Group, L.P. 219 N.J. 430, 441 (2014)  A state may regulate agreements, including those that relate to arbitration, by applying its contract law principles that are relevant in a given case.  See Leodori v Cigna Corp., 175 N.J. 293, 302 (2003); Atalese, 219 N.J. at 441-442.  “Arbitration agreements are interpreted under the objective, "average consumer" standard.  Atalese v. U.S. Legal Servs. Grp., L.P., 219 N.J. 430, 446, 99 A.3d 306 (2014); see also Morgan v. Sanford Brown Inst., 225 N.J. 289, 308, 137 A.3d 1168  Given that arbitration is a contractual matter, before a court compels arbitration pursuant to the FAA, it must determine that: (1) a valid agreement to arbitrate exists, and (2) the particular dispute falls within the scope of the agreement.
[brief] Rma012. the project’s role in sprawl development or its air pollution emissions (including its contributions to the ongoing climate crises). ”  Asb7.  Appellants never raised the issue of sprawl development before [...] or in their initial brief before this court, see Ab30-33\(^7\) and Aa0337-0340, and only generally alluded to air pollution and climate change impacts in their initial brief.
[brief] ”  Because [...] and his lawyer lied to [...] to obtain the divorce judgment in the first place, and because the manner in which [...] proceeded at the default judgment hearing violated the fundamental requirements for entry of divorce judgments on default against an absent spouse, the final judgment that was entered that day was void and, because it was void, has been without legal effect from its inception, regardless of how much time has passed since it was entered, cf. Dawson v. Wright, A-0952-06T5, 2007 WL 3376226 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Nov. 15, 2007) (“Nothing in the Rules of Court permits out-of-state mail service upon an individual at a commercial establishment.  This attempt at service violated Wright's entitlement to due process and the judgment was void at the moment it was entered. ”)
[brief] Section 13.1  Default by [[...]].  In the event the Closing and the transactions contemplated hereby do not occur as herein provided by reason of any default of [[...]], [[...]] may, as [[...]]’s sole and exclusive remedy, elect by notice to [[...]] within ten (10) Business Days following the Scheduled Closing Date, terminate this [PSA] Agreement, in which event [[...]] will receive from [[...]] the Earnest Money Deposit, whereupon [[...]] and [[...]] will have no further rights or obligations under this [PSA] Agreement, except with respect to the Termination Surviving Obligations.  Notwithstanding the foregoing, in the event [[...]] closes title under[] the Mack-Cali Agreement, and thereupon [[...]] defaults in its obligation to close title under this [PSA] Agreement, [[...]] shall, in addition to its termination right, shall have the right of specific performance.  [[...]] expressly waives its rights to seek damages in the event of [[...]]’s default hereunder.  (Pa115-116 (emphasis added)).  [...]’s involvement and obligations owed under the PSA Agreement were limited to “Articles IV, X, and XVII,” as can be seen reproduced below:\(^3\) (Pa128).
[brief] (M38-57; M477-513)...........................................................................................................11  POINT III ....................................................................................................................  17  ON APPEAL FROM A SUMMARY JUDGMENT DECISION, THE APPELLATE COURT EMPLOYS THE SAME STANDARD OF REVIEW AS THE TRIAL COURT.  (Issue not Raised Below) ...........17  POINT IV .................................................................................................................................19  THE TRIAL COURT’S DISMISSAL OF RESPONDENTS’ CIVIL RIGHTS AND DAMAGES CLAIMS UNDER 42 U.S.C. §1983 and N.J.S.A. 10:6-2(c) WAS APPROPRIATE AND SHOULD BE AFFIRMED.
[brief] He cites to his statements during the motions to compel the buccal swabs claiming that he refused because he didn’t see a laboratory report saying that such samples are necessary.  (Db 44, 4T 30-3 to 30-13).  However, this explanation is entirely incredible considering the Court allowed counsel to go over the portions of discovery with Defendant which evidenced the spit samples found near [...]’s body and the preliminary CODIS match to Defendant requesting a reference sample of his DNA.  (4T 31-7 to 31-20).  Thus, Defendant was provided with the laboratory reports he requested and then still refused to provide a saliva sample, instead opting for blood.  (5T 6-22 to 7-12).  These facts reflect a strong and intrinsic relationship between Defendant’s refusal and his knowledge that the sample would likely be used to link him with the murder.
[brief] AFTER 22 DAYS OF TRIAL, THIS COURT MUST DEFER TO JUDGE JEREJIAN’S WEIGHING OF THE EVIDENCE AND CREDIBILITY DETERMINATIONS.  (26T4:1 to 56:13; 27T71:25 to 97:1).  The bulk of the appellants’ arguments for reversal center on the manner in which [...] weighed the evidence at trial and a mistaken belief that the evidence was insufficient to support liability.  (Db Points I, III-V, VII).  However, these arguments fly in the face of the appropriate standard of review.  Appellate courts should defer to the trial court’s factual findings and legal conclusions, especially in non-jury trials, so long those facts are supported by adequate competent evidence in the record.  The appellate court should not disturb those findings and conclusions unless it concludes that “they are so manifestly unsupported by or inconsistent with the competent, relevant and reasonably credible evidence as to offend the interests of justice. ”  *Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Investors Ins. Co.*, 65 N.J. 474, 484 (1974).  This standard applies no matter the type of evidence presented, whether live, recorded, or written evidence.  *State v. McNeil-Thomas*, 238 N.J. 256, 271 (2019).  Furthermore, when witness credibility is an important factor – as it was here – “the trial court’s conclusions must be given great weight and must be accepted by the appellate court unless clearly lacking in reasonable support. ”  *N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. F.M.*, 375 N.J.  Super. 235, 259 (App. Div. 2005).  “Deference is especially appropriate when the evidence is largely testimonial and involves questions of credibility” because an appellate court’s review cannot replace “the trial court’s opportunity to hear and see the witnesses who testified on the stand. ”  *Balducci v. Cige*, 240 N.J. 574, 594-95 (2020).  This deferential standard holds even if the trial judge’s reasons for the credibility determination are not articulated in detail.  *State v. Locurto*, 157 N.J. 463, 470 (1999).  In this 22-day bench trial, [...] watched and listened to the witnesses and reviewed the documentary evidence.  As discussed below, the evidence supports the trial court’s factual findings and legal conclusions.  Deference by this Court is warranted, and the judgment must be affirmed.
[brief] He described the School site and the Synagogue site, using a 2010 Aerial photograph.(Da900)  He stated that synagogue staff/attendees have been using the School's Fifth Street lot and Sixth Street courtyard for parking daily since he has been there in 1991 (6T104-5 to 111-25).  The plaintiff then called current Zoning Board Attorney [...].  He authenticated the minutes and documents as to the 1972 School Variance/Site Plan approval for its expansion.  (Da901 to 904; Da923 to 934; Da938 to 944)
[brief] It is hornbook law that “public policy supports a narrow interpretation of the insurer’s volunteer status. ”  *Carolina Cas. Ins. Co. v. Burlington Ins. Co.*, 951 F.3d 1199, 1215 (10thCir.2020), quoting, 16 Couch on Ins. §223:26 (3d ed.); *Jefferson Ins. Co. v. Healthcare Ins. Exchange*, 247 N.J.Super. 241, 246 (App.Div.1991), quoting *Appleman Ins. Law of Practice*, §4921, and noting public policy considerations encouraging “swift payment of claims” and discouraging the necessity of “legal action.
[brief] [...] argued [...]’s conduct was outside the scope because his conduct was intentional and this intentional conduct was outside his job duties and not expected by [...].  He either intentionally assaulted Plaintiff or intentionally used self-defense against Plaintiff.  But the word “intentional” in the charge allowed Plaintiffs to rebut [...] argument by arguing [...]’s intentional assault or self-defense originated from his effort to fulfill an assigned task and serve his employer.  C.
[brief] A primary objective in establishing them is to induce able persons to enter and remain in public employment, and to render faithful and efficient service while so employed.  3 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations (3d Ed. Rev. 1963) § 12.141.  They are in the nature of compensation for services previously rendered and act as an inducement to continued and faithful service.  Being remedial in character, statutes creating pensions should be liberally construed and administered in favor of the persons intended to be benefited thereby.
[brief] [...], a/k/a [...]  Plaintiff/Appellant vs. [...]  a Municipal Corporation  Defendant/Respondent  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE  DIVISION DOCKET NO. [...]  On Appeal from Orders dated May 11, 2020, and September 25, 2023  Superior Court of New Jersey Law Division-Monmouth County  Docket No. [...]  SAT BELOW: Hon. [...], P.J., Ch. Hon. [...], P.J. Ch.  AMENDED
[brief] [...] brought claims that defendants deprived him of rights protected by the New Jersey Constitution directly and through the New Jersey Civil Rights Act.  The New Jersey Supreme Court has held that the New Jersey Civil Rights Act “is intended to ‘provide the citizens of New Jersey with a State remedy for deprivation of or interference with the civil rights of an individual. ’”  *Tumpson v. Farina*, 218 N.J. 450, 473 (2014) (quoting *S. Judiciary Comm. Statement to S. No. 1558*, 211th Leg. 1 (May 6, 2004)).
[brief] He then administered the standard field sobriety tests (hereinafter SFSTs).  (2T12:9-17).  [...] testified that he completed the New Jersey State Police Field Sobriety training.  (2T14:16-22; Aa75).  [...] testified that in his past experiences, he has observed individuals under the influence of alcohol both in and out of the motor vehicle setting.  (2T14:23 to 2T15:16).  [...] first conducted the horizontal gaze nystagmus (hereinafter HGN) test.⁴ (2T15:18-23).  [...] observed that defendant had glasses on and asked defendant whether he had any prior eye --- ⁴ HGN tests are not admissible at trial to establish intoxication.  State v. Doriguzzi, 334 N.J. Super. 530 (App. Div. 2000).  The police can, however, use them to ascertain probable cause.  Id. at 546. surgeries or defects with his eyes.  Defendant answered in the negative.  (2T16:4-19).  During the HGN test, [...] noticed all six indicators of nystagmus. (2T16:16-24).  [...] testified that defendant did not have issues following directions or standing for the HGN test.