ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] PRELIMINARY STATEMENT  Plaintiff, [...], brought this action seeking to declare the [...]’s Resolution 168-2023 (“Resolution”) designating their Property in need of redevelopment invalid and stricken.  In enacting the Resolution, Defendants determined that the conditions set forth in N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 40A:12A-5(b) and (d) (the “LRHL”) necessary for such a declaration were extant at the Property.  The trial court disagreed, struck the Resolution and declared it invalid.  In their Appellate Brief, Defendants mischaracterize the trial court’s reasoning in order to persuade this Court to reverse the trial court’s Order.  Defendants contend that the trial court erred by failing to give deference to their designation of the Property as a redevelopment area.  Such designations are only entitled to deference if supported by “substantial evidence on the record” showing that the statute’s criteria have been met.  The trial court found that Defendants’ designation was not based on substantial credible evidence and instead, was arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable, and contrary to law.  The trial court properly found that the mere existence of ongoing environmental remediation pursuant to a Consent Order with the NJDEP does not support a §12A-5(d) finding that the property is detrimental to the safety, health, morals, or welfare of the community.  Further, ongoing remediation is not factual support for a conclusion that the Property and building are “dilapidated, obsolete, overcrowded, improperly arranged or designed, or lacking ventilation, light and sanitary facilities. ”  And, finally, the uncontroverted evidence of record confirms the trial court’s finding that the Property does not present a detriment to the public safety, health morals or welfare of Borough residents.  For these reasons, and the reasons discussed in depth below, Plaintiff requests that the Court affirm the trial court Order finding Resolution 168-2023 invalid and stricken.  II.  PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[brief] Any additional office, position, or employment acquired by the member shall not be deemed creditable service for the purposes of the retirement system and no designation for that member shall be made until only one of the offices, positions, or employments held on the effective date remains.  [Ibid. (emphasis added). ]  According to that plain language, it is thus clear that an office, position, or employment is not eligible for multiple member status in the event of a break-in-service from any such position.
[brief] The First Stipulation Confirming Award states:  The judgment is entered jointly and severally against [...] and [...] in the principal sum of $16,573,835.18 ("Principal Sum"), plus pre-judgment interest commencing December 1, 2020 through January 5, 2022 in the amount of $2,762,141.11, plus post award and post judgment interest on the Principal Sum at a rate of 15% per annum commencing on January 6, 2022 until payment.  Da428; Da470.
[brief] “The doctrine of collateral estoppel is a branch of the broader law of res judicata which bars relitigation of any issue actually determined in a prior action generally between the same parties and their privies involving a different claim or cause of action. ”  Selective Ins. Co. v. McAllister, 327 N.J. Super. 168, 173  For the doctrine of collateral estoppel to apply, the party asserting the bar must show that: (1) the issue to be precluded is identical to the issue decided in the prior proceeding; (2) the issue was actually litigated in the prior proceeding; (3) the court in the prior proceeding issued a final judgment on the merits; (4) the determination of the issue was essential to the prior judgment; and (5) the party against whom the doctrine is asserted was a party to or in privity with a party to the earlier proceeding.
[brief] This included inspecting the floors to make sure there were clean, dry, free of spills and free of hazards.  Id. 37.  All employees were instructed to be vigilant for hazardous conditions as they worked in the store.  Pa87, at ¶7. 38.  This included being vigilant for hazards on the floor such as liquids.  Id. 39.  All employees were instructed to immediately address any hazardous conditions they discovered including liquids on the floor.  Pa87, at ¶7. 40.
[brief] Of course, in *Jones*, the Supreme Court held that the remaining defendant was entitled to a *Burt* allocation for the liability of a --- \(^3\)  Plaintiffs’ brief wrongly suggests that such exceptions are relevant only in the case of public entity defendants who are otherwise immune from liability on a contribution claim.  (Pb. 25-27).  Of course, it is true that there is a separate statutory provision applicable to public entities regarding the allocation of fault among all tortfeasors, including non-parties.  N.J.S.A 59:9-3.1; *Maison v. New Jersey Transit Corp.*, 245 N.J. 270, 307 (2021).  However, the exceptions discussed in *Young*, *Brodsky*, *Town of Kearney*, and *Krzykalski* did not turn on public entity status.  Most importantly, *Burt* did not involve a public entity.  The determinative question is not whether a public entity is involved in this case, but rather, the legal basis on which the trial court could place [...] and [...] on the verdict after they were dismissed.
[brief] It is understood and agreed that the MLUL requires applicants to give notice to the public, N.J.S.A. 40:55D-12A and to owners of property within 200 feet of the property that is the subject of the hearing, N.J.S.A. 40:55D-12B.  At the meeting on February 27, 2023, counsel for the plaintiff appeared and made the argument that the notice was insufficient for a few reasons.  Primarily, he argued that the notice lacked specificity, in his opinion, pursuant to the Perlmart of Lacey, Inc. vs. Lacey Township Planning Board 295 N.J. Super. 234, 237 (App. Div. 1996) and Pond Run Water Shed Association vs. Township of Hamilton Zoning Board of Adjustment 397 N.J. Super. 335:350  Those cases maintain that the notice must fairly apprise the public and the neighboring property owners of the nature and character of the proposed development so that they can make an informed determination as to whether they should participate in the hearing or at least look more closely at the plans or other documents on file.  The cases further state that the notice should be viewed from the perspective of the, “ordinary layman, and not as it would be construed by one familiar with the technicality solely applicable to the laws and rules of the Zoning Commission”.  Respectfully, there is no question that the notice provides adequate information under the case law with regard to Notice.
[brief] *5  On February 21, 2020, in their first communication to [...] about the custodians whose files should be collected, reviewed, and produced, Plaintiffs identified [...] and [...].  Ex. 2 at 5-6.  The parties ultimately agreed on a set of 72 initial custodians, and the Court ordered the addition of nine others on May 15, 2020.  Dkt No. 436, Ex. 3.  On November 2020, Plaintiffs again requested that [...] add [...] and [...] as document custodians.  Plaintiffs raised the issue to [...], who ordered that the “addition of further custodians for discovery purposes is premature at this time. ”  Dkt. No. 588, Ex. 4 at 2.  On July 19, 2021, [...] issued an Order Setting Case Schedule, with depositions set to begin on November 1, 2021 and document production to be substantially completed by January 2022.  Dkt. No. 706, Ex. 5.  Thus, there is now less than four months remaining for [...] to complete production from the agreed custodians, non-custodial sources, and new custodians, such as [...] and [...].
[brief] ’”  U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Williams, 415 N.J. Super. 358, 365 (App. Div. 2010) (quoting, Higgins v. Polk, 14 N.J. 490, 493 (1954)).  “Such determinations should not be overturned on appeal unless it can be shown that the “court palpably abused its discretion, that is, that its finding was so wide off the mark that a manifest denial of justice resulted.
[brief] [...] Ordinance §142-77.  In addition, “[n]o application for development shall be approved unless it has been affirmatively determined, after an environmental assessment, that the proposed project:  [1]  Will not result in a significant adverse impact on the environment.  [2]  Has been conceived and designed in such a manner that it will not significantly impair natural processes.  [3]  Will not place a disproportionate or excessive demand upon the total resources available to the project site or to the impact area. ”  [...] Ordinance §142-77(B)(26)(f).  Not only does the [...] Ordinance require these explicit items to be covered for the approval of subdivision application, these are submissions required by the MLUL as well.
[brief] ....................1 Matter of Farrell, 108 N.J. 335(1987) ..............................3  Moore v. Woman To Woman Obstetrics & Gynecology, L.L.C., 416 N.J. Super. 30(App. Div. 2010)  ..................................11, 13 Morgan v. Sanford Brown Inst., 225 N.J. 289(2016) ..............1 Perna v. Pirozzi, 92 N.J. 446(1983) .................................7 Rudbart v. Water Supply Com’n, 127 NJ 344(1992) ...............9  Sitogum Holdings, Inc. v. Ropes, 352 N.J. Super. 555(Ch. Div. 2002)  .................................................................10  Stelluti v. Casapenn Enters., LLC, 203 N.J. 286..................8  Vasquez v. Glassboro Service Asso., 83 N.J. 86(1980)  ..........1, 4 Statutes Fairness in Nursing Home Arbitration Act, S. 4087, 118th Cong. (2024)  .................................................................3  Other Authorities Model Jury Charges (Civil), 5.50C, “Informed Consent (Competent Adult and No Emergency)” (rev. Apr. 2002)  .........................3  American Arbitration Association, https://www.adr.org/sites/default/files/document_repository/AAA_Healthcare_Policy_Statement.pdf(last visited Sept. 18, 2024)  ....3  Treatises Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 177(1) (1981)  ...............11  Preliminary Statement  The physician-patient relationship must continue to be protected and simultaneously strengthened by New Jersey courts.  Every New Jersey citizen must be able to trust and rely upon their physician, and they should never have any reason to doubt that the physician has anything but their best interests in mind at all times.  It is axiomatic that New Jersey courts will not enforce arbitration agreements that violate public policy.
[brief] Garden apartment buildings housing four or more dwelling units.  Bulk requirements of the A-1 Zone apply to construction under this subsection.  (2)  All other uses not set forth above are prohibited in this zone.  (3)  Lot dimensions.  (a)  The minimum lot dimensions are as follows:  [1]  Width: 150 ft.  (b)  The minimum yard requirements of a principal building are as follows:  [1]  Front yard setback: 15 ft.  [2]  The rear yard shall be used to meet the parking requirements of this chapter.  [3]  Side yard setback.  The minimum side yard shall be 10 feet; the minimum total of both side yards shall be 25 ft.  (c)  Maximum building coverage: 40% of the total lot area.  (d)  Maximum lot coverage, including buildings and impervious material, but excluding the water surface area of any swimming pool/pond: 85% of the total lot area, except that if all the parking is contained under the building, then the maximum lot coverage shall be 80% of the total lot area.  (e)  **Floor area ratio:** no more than 35%.  (emphasis added).  Pa415-416.  The permitted uses in the **B-1 Business Zone** which are also permitted in the B-3 Zone as above stated, are set forth at §240-6.5(G), as follows: (a) Business, professional, and governmental office, including parking accessory thereto; (b) Retail stores, or mercantile stores, excluding auction galleries and automotive sales or service establishments; (c) Dancing, music, and art instruction studios; (d) Radio and television repair, locksmiths, watch, clock and jewelry repair, upholstery and furniture repair and other similar service establishments furnishing services other than of a personal nature, but not including gasoline filling stations and other automotive services; (e)  Residential units in other than the ground floor are permitted, **provided that they are efficiency apartments. ** (emphasis added).  Pa414-415.  There is no ambiguity in the Zoning Ordinance.  Permitted residential uses in the B-3 Zone are limited to garden apartment complexes with four or more dwellings, and those that are permitted in the B-1 Zone.  The B-1 Zone permits efficiency apartments provided they are not located on the ground floor. C.
[directive] When taking a formal statement from a civilian, the investigator shall video- or audio- record the statement according to the same protocols that would apply if the civilian were being interviewed in connection with a criminal investigation.  If a witness objects to the recording of the interview, the investigator may proceed with the interview without recording, but must document in writing the reasons for doing so.  7.1.6  When taking a formal statement from an officer, the investigator shall video or audio- record the statement, except that in cases that did not arise from a civilian complaint, the investigator need not record the statement unless the officer being interviewed requests such.  7.2
[brief] 1071a  Exhibit 7 – [...] Frozen Semen Inventory 2018 – 2019 for [...] ....................................  1074a  Exhibit 8 - Email from [...] to [...], dated September 12, 2018 ...........................................................  1076a  Exhibit 9 - Casatelli v. Dressler, Docket No. A-5769-09T3, 2011 N.J. Super. Unpub., LEXIS 1683 (App. Div., June 27, 2011)
[brief] Plaintiff will, of course, complain that this issue has been argued and decided by the prior Courts.  Defendant’s position is that it was ignored by the initial trial Court; the Appellate Division chose to ignore the issue despite the fact that it is the singularly most devastating financial issue in this matter; and the Court below assessed the second penalty without any supporting reasons.  As an attorney Defendant certainly understands the procedural difficulties in now trying to undo the damage done in the Three Courts that have mishandled this issue/matter.
[brief] As such, the Court went back to the beginning of N.J.R.E. 609 and noted that N.J.R.E 609(a)(1) notes that for the purpose of attacking the credibility of any witness, the witness’s conviction of a crime, subject to Rule 403, shall be admitted unless excluded by the court pursuant to paragraph (b) of this rule.  The Court noted the Court’s prior ruling granting co-defendant [...]’s motion for to bar his criminal convictions relied upon Rule 403 and the Court still finds upon reconsideration that Rule 403 needs to be applied.  The Court went through R. 403 and exercised the Court’s discretion and denied Defendants’ [...] and [...] motion for reconsideration for the following reasons.
[brief] The deliberative process “must be insulated from influences that could warp or undermine the jury’s deliberations and its ultimate determination. ”  Risko v. Thompson Muller Automotive Group, Inc., 206 N.J. 506, 523 (2011).  Such influences include both deliberate attempts to undermine the process and unintentional acts with the capacity to improperly intrude upon it.  In this case, the trial court was concerned only with the failure of anyone to report a deliberate attempt to influence the prospective jurors.  Much like insurance adjusters, Sheriff’s Officers and Court Attendants are not attorneys, and their levels of experience vary.  Appreciating the significance of Plaintiff’s conduct and its potential impact upon the ultimate outcome of the case is not their responsibility, and the failure of the Court’s staff to report any deliberate attempt by Plaintiff to influence the jury did not provide a basis to reject the otherwise unrefuted observations of Defendants’ insurance adjuster which, when accepted as true, clearly warrant a new trial.  Based upon the foregoing, it respectfully is submitted that the “problem” which the trial court sought to avoid by limiting Plaintiff’s movements in and around the courtroom during jury selection had already occurred by the time it was brought to its attention.  Impressions developed by jurors based upon Plaintiff’s multiple forays among them had the clear capacity to influence decisions subsequently made in the jury room.  That capacity to improperly influence the ultimate outcome requires that prejudice to the Defendants be presumed and a new trial ordered absent an affirmative showing that no actual prejudice was suffered.  Kavanaugh v. Quigley, 63 N.J. Super. at 161-62.  The trial court failed to apply that standard on Defendant’s motion for new trial, and thereafter, on their motion for reconsideration.  As no showing was made that prejudice had not been suffered, a new trial must be ordered.
[brief] The Disqualification Order Has No Basis In Law Or Fact | 10 | | A.  Respondents Failed To Demonstrate, And The Trial Court Did Not Find, Substantial Similarity (214a – 219a) | 14 | | B.  Respondents Failed To Specifically Identify The Purported Confidential Information (289a – 290a) | 18 | C.  RPC 1.9(c) Was Not Argued And Is Not An Independent Basis For Disqualification (102a – 135a).  ......................  23  D.  Respondents Failed To Demonstrate How The Alleged Confidential Information Could Or Is Being Used Against them (102a – 135a)  ..........................................................  25  II.  The Disqualification Order Violated Appellants’ And [...]’s Procedural Due Process Rights As Appellants Were Precluded From The In Camera Review Of The Certification (T23:21-25; T24:1-3)  .........................................................  28  III.  Respondents’ Dilatory Conduct Should Have Precluded Disqualification (220a – 222a)  ............................................. 32  CONCLUSION ...........................................................................
[brief] See U.S. ex rel. Winkelman v. CVS Caremark Corp., 827 F.3d 201, 209 (1st Cir. 2016) (no requirement to use “magic words or specifically label disclosed conduct as fraudulent”); U.S. ex rel. Poteet v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 F.3d 503, 512 (6th Cir. 2009) (“To qualify as a public disclosure of fraud, the disclosure is not required to use the word ‘fraud’ or provide a specific allegation of fraud. ”), abrogated on other grounds by U.S. ex rel. Rahimi v. Rite Aid Corp., 3 F.4th 813, 829 (6th Cir. 2021).
[directive] A trial court denying bail shall state briefly its reason therefore.  A judge allowing bail may at any time revoke the order admitting the defendant to bail.  This Rule provides that where the person has been arrested in an extradition proceeding, pursuant to the Uniform Criminal Extradition Law, N.J.S.A. 2A:160-6 et Rule 3:26-1(d) seq., the court may set monetary bail or bond except where that person is charged with a crime punishable by death or life imprisonment.
[brief] Singh, 245 N.J. at 17.  Here, [...] was presented with S-113 and asked whether he had seen the item before:  Q  Again, Detective, I'm going to show you now what's been marked as S-113 and ask if you've seen that before?  A  Yes, sir, I've seen this picture before.  Q  And what is that?  A  It’s a picture of [...].  [(26T72-25 to 73-5)]  The prosecutor attempted to correct Dotto’s plainly inadmissible testimony by responding, “No, I don't want you to identify the picture. ”  (26T73-6)  However, Dotto had already testified as to his opinion that S-113 depicted Defendant.  The court did not strike the testimony or give a curative instruction.  Dotto’s testimony was plainly inadmissible.
[brief] [11T121-15 to -22].  [...] acted surprised while on the phone, but then chuckled about it after hanging up.  [11T122-2 to -9].  After they returned to their home, defendant told [...] why he was acting quiet.  He explained that he no longer trusted [...] and thought [...] might try and kill him.  [11T125-15 to -17].  Defendant also told [...] about what happened the previous night.  He stated they picked up [...] and rode around in her vehicle.  [11T125-24 to 126-4].  They parked in front of [...]’s family member’s home.  He stated that in the middle of them talking, he shot [...].  He explained he and [...] devised a plan to ask her to keep the gun, and if she refused, defendant would shoot her when [...] stated, “that shit’s crazy. ”  Defendant told [...] that [...] stated that she borrowed the gun from someone else so [...] could not keep the gun.  Defendant told [...] that after he fired the first shot into the back of [...]’s head, she was shaking, so he shot her again in the neck and then got out of the car.  [...] and defendant ran to [...]’s grandmother’s home and once there, [...] sent a message to [...]’s phone to make it appear like they were looking for her.  [...] also shared that a few days after the murder, defendant threw his cell phone out of the window of an Uber they were in.
[brief] The basis for its decision was clear and unequivocal: Plaintiff’s present motion in effect seeks to vacate the District Court’s 2010 dismissal order and is improper for the reasons already stated in the opinion by the District Court .  . . . (T8- 20 – 24.)  The motion to remand was denied by [...].  And it went up on appeal to the Third Circuit, who affirmed [...]’s decision.  If [...] disagreed with any decision in the Federal Courts he would have been required to appeal to the Third Circuit, which he did.  And then petition the United States Supreme Court for cert.  If he didn’t appeal that issue within the required time that issue is waived.  Therefore, [...]’s motion to reinstate and [...]’s motion for summary judgment, which is really a motion to reinstate, are both denied with prejudice.  In short, the Court does not have jurisdiction over these matters.
[brief] The Arbitration Agreement Need Not Have Been Explained To Plaintiff To Be Enforceable (Da027-Da029; Da162-Da163)  New Jersey law does not require that a copy of an arbitration agreement must be provided or explained to the person who resists arbitration.  Courts repeatedly have enforced arbitration agreements that have not been provided or explained.  See, Martindale v. Sandvik, Inc., 173 N.J. 76 (2002); Curtis v. Cellco Partnership, 413 N.J. Super. 26, 31 (App. Div. 2010); Griffin v. Burlington Volkswagen, Inc., 411 N.J. Super. 515, 518 (App. Div. 2010); Morgan v. Sanford Brown Institute, 225 N.J. 289, 312 (2016).  In Martindale, [...] noted in dissent that the agreement failed to explain the fees required under AAA rules, but the majority rejected this as a basis to invalidate the arbitration clause, affirming the order to compel arbitration.  173 N.J. at 97 (majority opinion), 104 (Stein, J., dissenting).  Further, the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Flanzman v. Jenny Craig, Inc., 244 N.J. 119 (2020), enforced an arbitration agreement that did not even identify what rules would apply to the arbitration.  Thus, if the arbitration provision need not include reference to the particular rules that will apply, there can be no requirement that a copy of such rules be provided or such rules be explained in order for the provision to be enforceable.  Even in the context of medical malpractice, the fact that a patient does not receive a copy of the arbitration agreement does not defeat the otherwise clear and unmistakably intent of the parties to arbitrate any dispute.  See Moore v. Woman To Woman Obstetrics & Gynecology, L.L.C., 416 N.J. Super. 30 (App. Div. 2010).  In Moore, it was undisputed that the plaintiff had not received a copy of the signed arbitration agreement.  Id.  Here, decedent was provided with a copy of the arbitration agreement well in advance of the liposuction procedure (Da039-Da040; Da054)  As detailed above, [...] testified that he met with decedent on October 14, 2022 and went over the arbitration contract with her (Da054).  [...] testified that decedent returned to the office on October 28th, two weeks later, and was given a copy of the signed arbitration agreement (Da056; Da060).  IV.