ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Further, the court gave little weight to factor 6, his prior record, noting that this was defendant’s first indictable conviction.  Factor nine, the need to deter, was supported by the court’s enumeration of the repeated chances at probation, and defendant “failed to report on at least five occasions” as well as effectively “liv[Ing] the life he wanted]” with no regard for the consequences.  (13T15:1-5).  Contrary to defendant’s argument, this is no way double counting of the offense.  State v. Yarbough, 195 N.J. Super. 135, 143 (App. Div. 1984), rem’d, 100 N.J. 627 (1985).  And there was simply no error in regard to the court’s weighing of the two aggravating factors against the mitigating factors of 7 and 14, lack of a criminal record and defendant is under the age of 26.  N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)(7), (14).  The court explained it gave little weight to factor 7 and was convinced that the aggravating factors outweighed.  (13T20:1-16).  The sentencing judge, who was also the trial judge, had to impose a sentence between 30 years and life for the murder of [...].  See N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3b(1).  After finding and balancing the aggravating and mitigating factors, the judge imposed a 35-year sentence with the remaining counts merged or ran concurrently.  (13T18-12 to 21-20).  While the judge’s findings were brief, defendant fails to show any abuse of discretion in that sentencing decision.  Conclusion
[brief] POINT 11:  There is a right to trial by jury via Slocum v. New York Life Insurance Co., 228 US 364.  (Not argued below)  POINT 12:  The right to trial by jury is to remain inviolate per the New Jersey constitution and New Jersey statutory law.  (Not argued below)  POINT 13:  All crimes are to be tried by jury (Not argued below)  POINT 14:  The Supreme court can issue an order to incarcerate, or otherwise fine, a judge that is denying the right to trial by jury (Not argued below)  POINT 15:  New Jersey law allows for a transactionally related action to relate back to the original filing date of the complaint (Not argued below)  Point 16:  The [...] order relied upon is not binding common law (Not argued below)  Point 17:  The [...] order is an illegal Bill of Attainder (Not argued below)  POINT 18:  A Rule of the court of the state of New Jersey does not have the effect of binding law.  POINT 19:  The laws of the United States, made by congress, are the supreme law of the land.  7)  Conclusion  8)
[directive] For victims who want an official investigation and command notification, in addition to healthcare, victim advocacy, and legal services, they should use the current reporting channels:   Law Enforcement/Military Investigative Organization (MCIO) (will initiate an investigation and start a “report of investigation”)   Commander (who will then immediately contact the MCIO to start a “report of investigation”)  DoD Directives 6495.01 and 1030.01, Directive Type Memorandum 14-007, and DoD Instructions 15 6495.02 and 1030.2.  A-  12
[brief] The Subcommittee charged with developing New Jersey’s amended rules likewise expressly intended to “parallel the Federal Rules regarding discovery of ESI. ”  Committee Report, at 1.  And the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were amended the same year “to confirm that discovery of electronically stored information stands on equal footing with discovery of paper documents. ”  2006 Advisory Comm. Note to Rule 34. ordinary discovery rules—including the “relevance limitation[] provided under Rule[ ] 4:10-2(a)”—to ESI, the same as it would to paper documents.  Id. at 464.  B.
[brief] b.  Petitioner’s motion for [...]’s accounting fees is GRANTED IN PART, DENIED IN PART.  [...] is awarded $16,575.  He shall pay back to the Trust $1,074.57, which is the overpayment from the $17,649.57 awarded in the March 7, 2023 Order.  c.  Petitioner’s motion for [...]’s Trust income and corpus commission fees is **GRANTED IN PART, DENIED IN PART**.  [...] is awarded $1,946.56.  He shall pay back to the Trust $92.97, which is the overpayment from the $2,039.53 awarded in the March 7, 2023 Order.  d.
[brief] That statute states in relevant part:  [E]very employer . . . who is now or hereafter becomes subject to the provisions of article 1 of this chapter (34:15-1 et seq.) shall forthwith make sufficient provisions for the complete payment of any obligation which he may incur to an injured employee . . . under said article 1 of this chapter.  [N.J.S.A. 34:15-72.]  This statute also does not apply to [...]’s claim against [...].  [...] and [...] did not elect Article 1 (opt out of workers compensation law benefits) for [...]’s potential workplace injuries.  They were subject to Article 2 (workers compensation law benefits), and [...] received typical no-fault workers compensation benefits through those sections of the Workers Compensation Act.  Plaintiff seeks to apply the requirements of N.J.S.A. 34:15- 72 to an employer that was subject to Article 2 of the Act, but the statute by its own terms does not apply to that Article.
[brief] Plaintiff filed her initial Complaint on December 1, 2020 alleging various violations of LAD by the Defendants (the “Complaint”).  (Pa1-Pa25).  Defendants filed their Answer to the Complaint on February 11, 2021.  (Pa27-Pa43).  The Court ordered the parties to mediation by notice dated May 26, 2021.  (Pa44).  By letter dated April 8, 2022, with Plaintiff’s counsel’s consent, Defendants requested a 60-day extension of discovery.  (Da58).  The discovery period was extended to July 6, 2022.  (Da59).  The parties thereafter sought another extension of discovery, which was granted, and by Order dated July 5, 2022, the discovery period was extended 177 days to allow for the completion of discovery.  (Da60).  Thereafter, Plaintiff’s deposition was conducted remotely on August 17, 2022.  (See Pl. Tr.).  By letter dated September 27, 2022, Plaintiff submitted another Consent Order to extend discovery, which she prepared—wherein she did not indicate that her deposition still needed to be completed.  (Da62).  On September 29, 2022, the Court signed that Consent Order.  (Da63).  In that Consent Order, the December 31, 2022 discovery deadline was extended to February 28, 2022, for the completion of Defendants’ depositions (not Plaintiff’s) and any expert discovery.  (Ibid.).  On October 10, 2022, Defendants moved to compel certain discovery from Plaintiff.  (Da65).  Plaintiff opposed that motion (Pa57-71) and cross-moved to compel discovery (Pa72-81).  Plaintiff, however, did not request that the Court compel the continuation of her own deposition.  (Ibid.)  Following oral argument, on November 4, 2022, the Court granted Defendants’ Motion to Compel Discovery (Pa82-84), and partially granted Plaintiff’s Cross-Motion (Pa85-86).  On November 30, 2022, Defendants moved for another extension of discovery.  (Pa87-92).  On December 8, 2022, and for the first time since her deposition was taken on August 17, 2022, Plaintiff, by cross motion, sought to compel her own deposition at Defendants’ expense.  (Pa93-101).  Following oral argument, on December 16, 2022, the Court granted Defendants’ motion and denied Plaintiff’s cross motion.  (Pa113-116).  Significantly, Plaintiff did not move the Trial Court to reconsider that decision nor did she file an interlocutory appeal.  Plaintiff also did not move to extend discovery again for the purpose of conducting any further discovery.  Discovery was complete, as the parties exchanged written discovery and conducted depositions.  Following the close of the discovery period on March 31, 2023, Defendants moved for summary judgment seeking to dismiss the Complaint.  (Pa117-143, Da88-389).  Plaintiff opposed the motion (Pa144-188), and Defendants responded appropriately (Da400-468).  On May 12, 2023, the parties argued the motion before the Honorable [...], A.J.S.C.  By Order dated January 5, 2024, the Trial Court granted Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, thereby dismissing the Complaint, in its entirety and with prejudice.  (Pa189-190, Da1-57).  On February 4, 2024, Plaintiff filed a Notice of Appeal.  **STATEMENT OF FACTS**
[brief] Id. at 536-37 (emphasis added).  Concerning the applicant’s expert testimony, the court specifically noted that “[n]o competing evidence, expert or otherwise, was presented by any interested party or the Board to counter [the applicant's expert] testimony. ”  Ocean Cty. Cellular, 352 N.J. Super. at 526.  Similarly, in New York SMSA, the Appellate Division found that “it was not reasonable for the Board to reject [the expert]’s testimony summarily and without articulation[.]”  370 N.J. Super. at 340.  In New York SMSA, the applicant’s expert witness presented maps based on computer models accepted in the industry, described the technical causes for the service issues, explained the appropriateness of the proposed site to address those issues, and readily answered the board’s questions.  Id.  Here, the Board’s Resolution summarily and unreasonably dismissed [...]’s testimony concerning traffic generation and [...]’ planning testimony concerning the negative criteria.  Notably, the Board accepted both as expert witnesses, and made no findings on the record concerning their credibility.  (2T 5:24-25 through 43:1-7; 5T 32:13-25 through 60:1-9).  The Resolution completely ignores [...]’s testimony on financability, construction, and marketability of a 30 foot warehouse.  Their expert testimony was not rebutted; and their credibility was not challenged.
[brief] [...] then went on to opine that Plaintiff’s retinal detachment must have been caused by “a defective Ozurdex” because the purportedly defective applicator was the only variation from Plaintiff’s previous treatments.  (Da0187.)  Defense counsel asked [...] again how he knew the Ozurdex was defective, and the doctor replied, “Because it’s from a defective lot. ”  (Id.)  Surprisingly, [...] came to that conclusion despite knowing that only “two to three percent” of the lot was affected.  (Da0193.)  The flaw in [...]’s reasoning is obvious—the fact that Plaintiff’s Ozurdex unit came from a lot where two percent of the units had an issue is far from conclusive evidence that the product was defective.
[brief] On August 11, 2022, a State Grand Jury returned [...] in this April 23, 2022 carjacking, charging defendant with second-degree conspiracy to carjack; first-degree carjacking; two counts of first-degree robbery; second-degree unlawful possession of a weapon; second-degree possession of a weapon for unlawful purpose; two counts of fourth-degree prohibited weapons and devices; second-degree eluding; two counts of fourth-degree resisting arrest; two counts of third-degree resisting arrest; fourth-degree aggravated assault on a law enforcement officer; and third-degree receiving stolen property.
[brief] On November 2, 2022, the Civil Service Commission (“Commission”) issued a Final Administrative Action upholding the ALJ’s Initial Decision, after reviewing [...]’ exceptions, the Department’s reply to exceptions, and the record.  (Pa033a).  The Commission determined that there was no reason to comment extensively on [...]’ exceptions because the filings were not persuasive enough for the Commission to find the ALJ’s Initial Decision arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable.  *Ibid.*  The Commission cited to the Initial Decision where it stated that [...] “allowed an escape attempt to take place on his watch.  Although thwarted, an escaped convict would pose a security threat to other inmates, other prison officials, and the public at large.  Prison safety was of paramount concern, and the failure to follow official protocols was an egregious offense. ” (Pa034a).  The Commission also explained that [...]’ conduct “presented the public with the image of an undependable officer. ” (Pa035a).  This appeal followed.  ARGUMENTS POINT I
[brief] And we think this will raise reasonable doubt on whether or not that bullet that went into the officer’s leg even continued from the Glock.  If you had that, would you have called that countervailing expert at trial?  A  I can’t say right now at this point.  THE COURT: That’s all speculation.  It’s all speculation.  You know, I understand what you’re saying.  [...]: The nature of the beast.  THE COURT:  You can -- you -- right, you can raise those arguments in your summation, you can raise these arguments with the other expert, but you can’t change the facts as they exist.  She went with one theory of the case.
[brief] Defendants are thus unable to meet the threshold issue set forth in Knight, and consequently, the trial court erred in applying the “two-prong test” to the Limited Attorney Exemption.  3.  Even If the Trial Court’s Decision to Apply the Two-Factor Knight Test to the Limited Attorney Exemption Were Correct, the Trial Court Erred in Determining That the Limited Attorney Exemption to the Act Satisfies Both Factors (T. at 10:18-17:19).
[brief] ii.  The court failed to properly apply Miller factor 5 (rehabilitation) by disregarding expert psychological testimony indicating that Defendant has rehabilitated.  At a Comer resentencing, there is significant overlap between consideration of a juvenile’s maturation and consideration of their rehabilitation.  The same factors are relevant to the court’s findings on both.  Comer, 249 N.J. at 403 (holding that a “defendant’s behavior in prison since the time of the offense would shed light” on both maturation and rehabilitation).  And both findings inform the court’s conclusion as to whether a juvenile offender is fit to reenter society.  Comer, 249 N.J. at 386.  Here, the court’s refusal to consider [...]’s prison conduct as evidence of rehabilitation also rendered the court’s application of Miller factor 5 improper given the factor’s focus on rehabilitation.  And, as was true for maturation, the court erred in disregarding [...]’s expert testimony.  [...] concluded that [...]’s ability to stay out of trouble and remain committed to rehabilitation while in prison evinced that he had “learned to control” his impulses; that his “aggressive propensity has resolved”; and that he was “capable of returning to the community and complying with its laws and norms. ”  (3T14-6 to 17; 22-19 to 21) (Da49)  The State provided no evidence to rebut these findings.  The court, however, did not credit [...]’s report as establishing rehabilitation, nor did it explain why the report failed to do so.  In fact, the court did not make a finding on the question of rehabilitation at all.  As discussed, the court’s consideration of [...]’s report was limited to an acknowledgment that [...] had a difficult youth, and an expression of concern with one detail about 11-year-old [...]’s behavior.
[directive] Ind./Acc./Compl.# Count Nature of Offense and Degree No. de Ac. Formal/Ac./Denun.  Cargo Naturaleza grado de la infracci6n y Revised Form Promulgated 12/31/2019 Supplement to Directive #01-18, CN 10079-Spanish by Defendant's Initials  Fonnulario revisado promulgado para el 12/31/2019, Suplemento a la Directiva #01-18, CN 10079- Spanish lniciales de! acusado page 4 of7/pagina 4 de 7
[brief] N.J.S.A. 52:27H-21.22(b).  By way of example, in his capacity as COO, he submitted a DBE Certification Affidavit Renewal in 2014 in which he certified the gross receipts for [...] were: $5.1 million in 2011, $6.5 million in 2012 and $4.9 million in 2013.  Dra12.  The form required him to “swear that the foregoing statements and attachments are true, accurate and complete and include all material information necessary to identify and explain the ownership and operation of [...] Consulting group, Inc. ”  Dra14.  If there was a “willful provision of incorrect information,” possible penalties included debarment procedures and referral to Department of Justice for prosecution under 18 U.S.C. 1001, which subjects a defendant to a fine and imprisonment of up to five years.
[brief] : HON. [...], J.S.C.  BRIEF ON BEHALF OF DEFENDEDANT-RESPONDENT  [...]  Attorneys for Defendant- Respondent  On the Brief: [...], ESQ.  [...]  Attorney ID# 238812017  [...] [...]  [...], ESQ.  [...]  Attorney ID# 332692021  [...]  Date Submitted: December 16, 2024 #
[brief] Although plaintiff took no depositions and provided no expert reports, the trial court denied plaintiff’s motion to extend discovery on the return date of the motion despite the fact that no arbitration or trial date had been set.  The court termed plaintiff’s counsel’s discovery efforts “disheartening. ”  392 N.J. Super. at 88.  The court expressed skepticism regarding plaintiff’s need to obtain information from defendants to learn the identity of the individuals who would have to be deposed since plaintiff named the School Superintendent, the biology teacher and the cheerleading coach as individual defendants.  392 N.J. Super. at 93.  The court noted that the factors to consider in whether an extension of discovery is justified in the absence of a fixed arbitration or trial date include (1) the movant’s reason for the requested extension of discovery; (2) the movant’s diligence in earlier pursuing discovery; (3) the type and nature of the case including any unique factual issues which may give rise to discovery problems; (4) any prejudice which would inure to the individual movant if an extension is denied; (5) whether granting the application would be consistent with the goals and aims of “Best Practices”; (6) the age of the case and whether an arbitration date or trial date has been established; (7) the type and extent of discovery that remains to be completed; (8) any prejudice which may inure to the non-moving party if an extension is granted and; (9) what motions have been heard and decided by the court to date.
[brief] Thus, ‘[i]f the correctness of the award, including its resolution of the public policy question, is reasonably debatable, judicial intervention is unwarranted’”); *International Ass’n. of Machinists*, 3 *N.J. Super.* at 566-67 (“In a loose sense, the arbitrators may be said to have fallen into an error or mistake when they have judged wrong upon the evidence before them”; “But this is not the kind of error or mistake intended [to overturn an arbitration award], because so far as they have exercised their judgment, it is conclusive, though to other minds the result might seem palpably erroneous”; “The mistake must be of a different character, something which has deceived or misled them, and not a mere mistake in drawing conclusions of fact from observation or evidence”).  See also *McFeely v. Board of Pension Comm’rs.*, 1 *N.J.* 212, 215 (1948) (explaining judicial discretion as the exercise of judgment or discretion by discerning the course presented by the law in regard to some specific factual predicate; explaining that the limitation is that it cannot be arbitrary or capricious).
[brief] (Pa5-6)  On May 27, 2021, defendant [...] again moved for summary judgment, this time on the statute of limitations and liability for plaintiff's accident.  (Pa824-887, Pa118-130, Pa319-330, 1T1-3 to 59-18)  On May 28, 2023, plaintiffs filed a cross motion for partial summary judgment on liability.  (Pa929-1040, Pa752-754)  Plaintiffs opposed [...]' motion for summary judgment on June 15, 2021.  (Pa1068-1075)  [...] opposed plaintiffs' cross motion for partial summary judgment on June 15, 2021.  (Pa1134-1179)  [...] replied to plaintiffs' opposition to their summary judgment motion on June 21, 2023.  The motions were argued on June 25, 2023.  (3T7-11-to 47-6)  Hon. [...], J.S.C., Passaic County, granted [...]' motion for summary judgment on liability.  (3T58-25 to 59-6, 3T59-14 to 61-18, Pa1-2)  She denied plaintiffs' cross motion for partial summary judgment on liability.  (Id.)  Finally, she denied that portion of the motion based upon the statute of limitations.  (3T65-4 to 66-18, Pa1-2)  Summary judgment was also entered in favor of [...], i/p/a [...], [...] i/p/a [...], and [...] d/b/a [...] i/p/a [...]  (Id.)  The complaint had been dismissed with prejudice as to [...] personally on October 4, 2021.  (Da1-2)  The matter was tried from February 6, 2023 through March 30, 2023 as to [...] and [...].  (Pa3)  The case settled as to [...] prior to the jury verdict.  A stipulation of dismissal with prejudice was filed as to [...] on May 16, 2023.  (Da3-4)  The jury returned a verdict of no cause of action as to defendant [...] and an order for judgment in its favor was entered on June 27, 2023.  (Pa1-2)  This order for judgment also noted that the matter had been fully resolved and ordered that the court’s file be marked closed.  (Id.)  Plaintiffs filed a notice of appeal from the June 27, 2023 order and from portions of the June 25, 2021 order.  Specifically, they appeal the portions of the order granting summary judgment in favor of [...], [...], i/p/a My Sister’s Gourmet Deli, [...] i/p/a [...], and [...] d/b/a [...] i/p/a [...] and the provision denying their motion for partial summary judgment on liability.  (Pa14-20)  [...] filed a notice of cross appeal from the June 27, 2023 order on August 16, 2023.  It also protectively cross appealed the January 24, 2020 order denying its motion for summary judgment on the statute of limitations and that portion of the trial court’s June 25, 2021 order denying its motion for summary judgment on the statute of limitations.  (Pa61-68)
[brief] Da83.  Based on the facts set forth supra; including the information provided to Appellant prior to the condemnation action even being filed; the trial court denied Appellant’s motion seeking reimbursement of its expert fees.  Da154.  While Appellant provided zero legal support to the trial court in support of its request, Appellant now provides the Appellate Division with generalized condemnation law related to notions of fairness and justice, which fails to establish any legal basis for his request.  Nothing in the cases now cited by Appellant provides for any fee shifting to the condemning authority.  For instance, Appellant now relies upon F.M.C. Stores Co. v. [...], 100 N.J. 418 (1985) for the established maxim that a condemning authority “may not conduct itself so as to achieve or preserve any kind of bargaining or litigational advantage over the property owner” however, the record indicates that at no point did the [...] act to Appellant’s detriment; rather, the [...] provided information and numerous courtesies to allow Appellant to produce an accurate appraisal report.  The trial court confirmed the amendment sought was “simply a clarification” and was “consistent” with the initial Verified Complaint.  Da84.  Ironically, Appellant argues that a property owner does not “seek to be confronted with unwarranted litigation by government over the taking of his private property” (see, Db23 citing, Rockaway v. Donofrio, 186 N.J. Super. 344 (App. Div. 1982) [emphasis added]) yet this matter has required near constant intervention by the trial court as a direct result of Appellant’s attempts to gain windfalls by misconstruing the easement location and seeking damages for non-compensable items, discussed in greater detail infra.  Therefore, Appellant had failed to provide the trial court with any legal or factual basis upon which to shift Appellant’s expert fees to the [...].  Based thereon, the trial court’s Order of January 8, 2021 should be affirmed.
[brief] [...] clarified that he was heading to his daughter’s house but continued to struggle to come up with the name of the state where she lived.  (Da 16 at 0:03:26 to 0:03:29)  [...] asked who was in the passenger seat and [...] answered that she was a friend of his.  (Da 16 at 0:03:30 to 0:03:34)  [...] asked how long [...] had known her and he estimated about six months.  (Da 16 at 0:03:35 to 0:03:37)  [...] asked how the two met and [...] said they met at a friend’s house in New Hampshire.  (Da 16 at 0:03:38 to 0:03:45)  [...] asked why they had gone to look at a country club, and [...] answered that they went “to check it out, see what it was all about. ”  (Da 16 at 0:03:55)  [...] asked several more questions about what the country club “entails” and whether [...] is a golfer and what he “normally shoot[s].”  (Da 16 at 0:04:04 to 0:04:24)  [...] recalled that his daughter lives in Virginia and told [...] that they were headed to Virginia Beach.