ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] .......................................23  Skuse v. Pfizer, Inc., 244 N.J. 30 (2020)  ...............................................................................10, 13, 23  Stelluti v. Casapenn Enters., 203 N.J. 286 (2010)  ..............................................................................14  Vincent v. Campbell, 140 N.J. Eq. 140 (Ch. 1947)  ..................................................................13
[brief] H1616a  [...]’s [...] October 18, 2018 replying to the [...]’ October 9, 2018 letter is included in this Appendix at Ha1585.  Email from [...]’s [...] October 24, 2018 enclosing her response to the [...] October 16, 2018 Review ..........  H1617a  [...]’s [...] responded October 24, 2018 to [...]’s Engineering Consultant [...] claiming inaccuracies .......  H1618a  [...] response to RCR-ENG-9 (2018) re no communication with [...] about other stations which could be expanded .....  H1620a [...] response to RCR-ENG-10 (2018) re icing ..............  H1622a  Attaching photo showing equipment encased in ice ...........  H1623a [...] response to RCR-ENG-11 (2018) ......................  H1624a [...] cover letter March 3, 2020 enclosing response to RCR-ENG-12 ..................................................
[brief] THE BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT HAD JURISDICTION FOR THE SCHOOL’S 40:55D-68 APPLICATION (IN SUPPORT OF Db Pt. I AND RESPONDING TO Pb Pt. I)  [...] continues to assert the Zoning Board did not have jurisdiction to hear and decide the [...] application under N.J.S.A. 40:55D-68 for a determination as to whether the Lot 8 attendee/staff parking use of the School Lot 5 was a legally constituted pre-existing non-conforming use/facility.  [...] largely responds with a confused and irrelevant argument about the “interpretation” provision at N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70 and that the School’s Application under N.J. S.A. 40:55D-68 is somehow barred or precluded by a prior School Application for Interpretation of the 1972 School Site Plan that the Zoning Board declined to hear.  That the Zoning Board declined to consider a prior Interpretation appeal under N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70 is not relevant and is not an issue here.  [...]’s claim here is that the Zoning Board can only entertain an application under 40:55D-68 from a party (presumably the property owner) applying for a “certificate certifying that the use ... existed before the adoption of the ordinance which rendered the use ... nonconforming,” and has no jurisdiction or authority to entertain under N.J.S.A. 40:55D-68 an application from an objector asserting that an on-going use is non-conforming and is not a legal pre-existing use.
[brief] The surveillance video depicted the suspect retrieving the key to the basement office from the north end of the bar where it was kept.  (7T 70-2 to 17, 71-4 to 16)  This was the key to the basement office where the cash was secured at [...].  (7T 69-25 to 70-17)  The key had a void card on the key chain, but not a label identifying it as the key to the basement office.  (7T 70-11 to 71-2)  After the suspect grabbed the keys, the surveillance video depicted the suspect with the keys in his hand in the downstairs office where the money was stored.  (7T 72-3 to 19)  A photograph taken after the burglary showed one of three wooden boxes where the money was stored had been broken; the boxes were not broken prior to the burglary.  (7T 74-6 to 75-5)  The top two boxes are ordinarily locked by a key that is stored in the bottom box; the bottom box is locked with a combination lock.  (7T 75-6 to 19)  [...] testified that he changed the combination within a week after he fired [...] in September; however, he admitted that he had told the police on February 5 that he had changed the combination “recently. ”  (7T 75-10 to 11, 107-1 to 4, 95-5 to 97-8)
[brief] The Trial Court’s refusal on a motion for reconsideration to rescind the Defendants’ prior express waiver of arbitration is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard.  Cummings v. Bahr, 295 N.J. Super. 374, 389 (App. Div. 1996).  As to the earlier October 17, 2023 Order, it is reviewed *de novo* as to questions of law, *Barr v. Bishop Rosen & Co., Inc.*, 442 N.J. Super. 599, 605 (App. Div. 2015), but factual finding, as admitted by Defendants (Db12), are subject to a clear error standard.  *Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Investors Ins. Co. of Am.*, 65 N.J. 474, 483-84 (1974).  See also, *Brickstructures, Inc. v. Coaster Dynamix, Inc.*, 952 F.3d 887, 891 (7th Cir. 2020)(applying a clear error standard and explaining “there is both a factual and a legal dimension to a waiver inquiry…the facts drive the waiver analysis, but the inquiry takes direction from the background legal rules,…we review *de novo* the district court’s determinations …[of] legal principles, …but defer to the district court’s findings with respect to the facts and the legal consequences of those facts. ”).  **POINT I**
[brief] *Fuentes*, 217 N.J. at 79.  Social scientists have analyzed data before and after various changes in sentencing law in an attempt to determine the deterrent effect of those laws, including: California’s Three Strikes law, [...], G.  Hawkins, & [...], *Punishment and Democracy: Three Strikes and You’re Out in California* (2001), [...] & [...], *Three Strikes and You’re Out: The Impact of California’s New Mandatory Sentencing Law on Serious Crime Rates*, 43 *Crime & Delinq.* 457 (1997), [...] and [...], *An Assessment of the Effect of* California’s Three Strikes Law (2002), [...] & [...], Does Three Strikes Deter? A Nonparametric Estimation, 42 J. Hum. Resources 309 (2007); and sentencing enhancements for the use of a gun, [...], One with a Gun Gets You Two: Mandatory Sentencing and Firearms Violence in Detroit, 455 Annals Am. Acad. Political & Soc. Sci. 150 (1981), [...], The Deterrent Effects of the Florida Felony Firearm Law, 75 J. Crim. L. & Crimonology 250 (1984), C. Loftin et al., Mandatory Sentencing and Firearms Violence: Evaluating an Alternative to Gun Control, 17 L. & Soc’y Rev. 287 (1983), [...] & [...], Prison Sentence Enhancements: The Case of Protect Exile, in Evaluating Gun Policy: Effects on Crime & Violence ([...] & [...], eds., 2003).  Scientists have also examined whether the heightened threat of imprisonment that attends coming under the jurisdiction of the adult courts at the age of majority has any deterrent effect.  [...] & [...], The Deterrent Effect of Prison: Dynamic Theory and Evidence (2009), [...], Crime and Expected Punishment: Changes in Perceptions at the Age of Criminal Majority, 11 Am. L. & Recon. Rev. 209 (2009).  Finally, scientists have examined the deterrent effect of certain, swift, and short periods of confinement (1-2 days) for probation violations.
[brief] DEP’s IMPOSITION OF THE PUBLIC ACCESS CONDITION ON SEA POINT’S WATERFRONT  DEVELOPMENT PERMIT WAS NOT IN ACCORDANCE WITH LAW AND IS NOT ENTITLED TO DEFERENCE  .................................................................2  A.  The Public Access Law did not abrogate or modify the common law public trust doctrine and did not delegate to DEP new authority to impose public access conditions (replying to Respondent’s Point A) ......2  B.  Even if the Public Access Law abrogated the common law public trust doctrine and delegated to DEP new authority to impose public access conditions, DEP failed to properly apply the Law to [...]’s Application (replying to Respondent’s Point B)  .......................10  C.  DEP cannot enforce the Public Access Law until DEP Complies with the Law’s express requirement that it adopt implementing regulations (replying to Respondent’s Point C)  ...........................................10  D.  Monetary contributions can and should satisfy public access requirements under the Public Access law in appropriate circumstances (replying to Respondent’s Point D)  .............................................16  E.  This Court should remand this matter for further fact-finding (replying to Respondent’s Point E)  .................................................................19  F.  DEP’s imposition of the public access condition on [...]’s Waterfront Development permit is a taking of private property in Violation of the United States Constitution and the Constitution of the State of New Jersey (replying to Respondent’s Point F). …………21  CONCLUSION…………………………………………………………………………………24
[brief] The case arose from a December 16, 2011 construction site accident where the injured plaintiff, [...], stepped into an unguarded hole while working as an employee for [...] (“[...]”).  Mass. Bay Ins. Co., 2018 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS at *4.  [...] (“[...]”), was the general contractor and hired [...].  Id. at *4-5.  [...] joined [...] as a third-party defendant and therein asserted claims seeking, common law contribution and indemnification as well as contractual indemnification therefrom.  Id. at *5. meet the bright line standard.  Mass. Bay, 2018 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS at *47-*48.  In doing so, Mass. Bay ignored the fact that Englert included the phrase “to the extent caused” whereas D’Avila did not.
[brief] Beginning with the altercation inside the restaurant, the court was required to instruct the jury on self-defense because there was sufficient evidence adduced at trial that [...] acted in self-defense.  [...] testified that [...] never hit [...], but that [...] grabbed [...]’s arm and began “forcefully pushing him” towards the door, in response to which [...] put his hands up “in a kind of … self-defensive motion. ”  (8T:59-4 to 11)  The officers, on the other hand, testified that Dua hit [...] unprompted.  (7T:81-1 to 20)  Considering the State and the defense case together, the jury could have concluded that [...] grabbed [...] and both officers forcefully pushed him out of the restaurant, at which point [...] responded by attempting to hit [...] in self-defense.  Thus, a self-defense instruction was warranted.
[brief] # TABLE OF AUTHORITIES  ## STATUTES  N.J.S.A. 53:5A-10...........................................................................................................2, 9  ## COURT RULES  R.2:2-3(a)(2).........................................................................................................................6  R.2:5-5(b).............................................................................................................................9  ## CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS  N.J. Const. art. VI, § 5, para. 4............................................................................................6  ## CASES  Bartley Healthcare Nursing & Rehab. v. New Jersey Dep't of Health & Senior Servs., 2011 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 329 (App. Div. Feb. 15, 2011).........................................................7  Blackwell v. Dep't of Corr., 348 N.J. Super. 117, 123 (App. Div. 2002).................................................................6 In re Carter, 191 N.J. 474, 482-83 (2007).................................................................8 Ensslin v. Board of Trustees, Police and Firemen’s Retirement System, 311 N.J Super 333 (App. Div. 1998).......................9, 10, 11 Figueroa v. N.J. Dep't of Corr., 414 N.J. Super. 186 (App. Div. 2010)......................15 Henry v. Rahway State Prison, 81 N.J. 571 (1980).........................................................7 In re Issuance of Permit by DEP, 120 N.J. 164 (1990)..................................................8 Mayflower Sec. Co. v. Bureau of Sec., 64 N.J. 85 (1973)..............................................6, 7 Mazza v. Bd. of Trs., 143 N.J. 22 (1995).................................................................8 N.J. Civil Serv. Ass'n v. State, 88 N.J. 605 (1982).........................................................6 N.J. Soc'y for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v. N.J. Dep't of Agric., 196 N.J. 366 (2008).........................................................7  SMB Assocs v. Department of Envtl. Prot., 264 N.J. Super 38 (App. Div. 1993), aff’d, 137 N.J. 58 (1994)..................11  State v. Atley, 157 N.J. Super. 157 (App. Div. 1978)..............................8  In re State & Sch. Emples. Health Benefits Commissions’ Implementation of Yucht, 233 N.J. 267 (2018)...................8, 9  Vas v. Roberts, 418 N.J. Super. 509 (App. Div. 2011)................................6  In re Virtua-West Jersey Hosp. Voorhees, 194 N.J. 413 (2008).................................................................................7  Williams v. Department of Corrections, 330 N.J. Super. 197 (App. Div. 2000) .................................................6, 7  APPENDIX TABLE OF CONTENTS
[brief] (Da121).  Pursuant to the terms of the Contract, Plaintiff-Respondent’s realtor obtained estimates for contractors to install the proper Smoke and Carbon Monoxide detectors at the property and to convert the Property back to a garage and to have his bill paid from the sale proceeds.  (Da118).  The Buyer conducted an inspection of the property and requested repairs, or a credit in lieu of repairs, for the deficiencies listed in the inspection report.  (Da121).  Despite the Buyer’s requests, she agreed to accept the Property in “As Is” condition, subject to the agreement to convert the Property back to a garage and the Seller obtaining the proper Smoke and Carbon Monoxide certifications from the [...] prior to closing.  (Da186).  On May 4, 2023, [...], Esquire notified the Plaintiff-Respondent that he was no longer representing Defendant-Appellant with regard to any issues involving the sale of [...].
[brief] Q.  At any point between the time of the incident on July 5th 2016 and the time [...] retired on September 1, 2017, did anyone ever tell you or make an allegation that [...] engaged in some wrongdoing on that night of the July 5th, 2016 incident, during the police response to the incident?  A. No. Q.  Did anyone at any point between July 5th, 2016, and September 1st, 2017, ever allege or suggest that [...] didn’t do something he was supposed to do or did something he wasn’t supposed to do?  A. No. Q.  Are you aware of any specific allegation of wrongdoing against [...] as a result of the July 5th, 2016 [sic], with regard to his actions or his supervision on that night?  A. No. Q.  Did any member of the Township Council ever make such an allegation, specifically that [...], specifically [...], engaged in some misconduct on the night of July 5th, 2016, or did not take some action he was supposed to take?  (objection)  A. No. ([...] Dep. 50:25-52:3, 515a).
[brief] [...] at (Da43) claimed the [...] intended to move to the new Pine Grove shopping center as of Jan 27, 1994, however, such a move did not take place until 1996 and only after an agreement signed May 31, 1995 between the [...] and two separate [...] entities whereby the [...] agreed to forego its own acquisition of the Pine Grove property in favor of [...] Stores Properties, Inc.  ([...]) as its nominee and "fast track the approval process for a new proposed shopping center about two blocks away from the subject.  (Da147).  (6T38 4-10).  The [...] was granted the option to sublet the existing [...] store on the subject property, however [...] obtained a summary judgment terminating the [...] lease March 15, 1999 (Da165).  (6T36-13;38-10)  Plaintiff adopted the Ordinance (Da168) authorizing condemnation of the subject property January 15, 1998.  (6T 41-13-25)  The [...] building on the subject remained vacant as of the date of taking March 5, 2018.
[brief] Desistence studies -- which follow a specific sample of offenders over time -- are consistent with the age-crime curve.  That is, those who offend in their late teens and early twenties tend to desist from crime as time goes by.  By their late twenties and early thirties, these young adult offenders are similar to the general population in their unlikelihood of committing crimes.  See [...], *Long-Term Recidivism Studies Show That Desistance Is the Norm*, 45 Crim. Just. & Behavior 1340, 1341-42 (2018); [...] & [...], *Redemption in the Presence of Widespread Criminal Background Checks*, 47 Criminology 327, 337-40 (2009); [...] & [...], *When do Ex-Offenders Become Like Non-Offenders?*, 48 Howard J. Crim. Just. 373, 375-77, 380-83 (2009); [...] et al., *Enduring Risk? Old Criminal Records and Predictions of Future Criminal Involvement*, 53 Crime & Delinquency 64, 72-76 (2007).  Studies like these have produced an overwhelming consensus among developmental scientists that individuals in their late teens and early twenties disproportionately engage in risky behaviors and criminal activity -- but generally age out of these misbehaviors within a few years.
[brief] Further, the notion that the lack of discipline somehow diminishes [...]’s interest in clearing his name of spurious determinations such that a fact-finding hearing is unwarranted diminishes the ideals that animate the State Policy itself.  A determination that an individual violated the State Policy by engaging in intentional, repeated discrimination is extraordinarily serious.  Yet, the [...]’s failure/refusal to refer the matter to a fact-finding hearing merely because no discipline was imposed effectively deems the allegations and determination not to be important enough to warrant independent review to confirm whether they were credible or correct.  That is an absurd and unjust result.  Likewise, [...] attempts to minimize the consequences of its determination that [...] “deliberately violated the State Policy when he repeatedly and intentionally misnamed [...]” by “emphasizing” that a State Policy violation can occur even if the accused person did not intend to do so.
[brief] In fact, it is against the common law of New Jersey, and public policy, for a municipality to “be bound in contract, express or implied, unless the officer or employee has authority to enter into such a contract on behalf of the corporation. ”  Saint Barnabas Med. Ctr. v. Cty. of Essex, 111 N.J. 67, 78-79 (1988).  Further, for a contract with a municipality to be binding, it must “be evidenced by an affirmative act of the governing body, making, either for a contract or ratification thereof . . . .”  Ballagh Realty Co. v. Dumont, 111 N.J.L. 32, 37 (1933).  According to Plaintiff’s own testimony, she made a “handshake deal,” for which there were no witnesses and no corroboration that such a deal took place.
[brief] “The court finds no evidence supporting plaintiff’s contention that the Resolution is not based upon the evidence produced at the hearing.  Specifically, the Borough’s ordinance supports the 1.77 FAR calculation. ”  Pa31, emphasis added.  “Plaintiff’s insistence that it “overwhelmingly showed that the negative criteria was satisfied” ignores the huge impact upon the surrounding properties of its proposed FAR.  The assertion is self-serving and ignores the small yard distance to six adjoining single-family home properties which sit lower than the applicant’s property and are separated by the retaining wall which was proposed to be replaced.  It further ignores the complaints of shadow resulting from the proposed building’s height and proximity to the property line.  The court further finds as to plaintiff’s assertion that the proposed use would be significantly less intensive than other uses permitted by ordinance finds that this is not only speculative, but fails to appreciate that the permitted use, mixed residential and retail is part of the Master Plan scheme for the district of which this parcel constitutes more than one-half the area.  Regarding the calculation of the FAR, the court notes floor area ratio is defined in N.J.S.A. 40:44D(4) as the sum of the area of all floors of buildings or structures compared to the total area of the site.
[brief] In response to Respondent’s January 17, 2022 Facebook posts which implored teachers to drop out of their unions – with which the Board negotiates labor contracts – the Board issued a Resolution on March 7, 2022, stating that “the Board disavows any statements posted or attributed by any individual that is contrary to the” Workplace Democracy Enhancement Act.  (Ca137).  24.  As Respondent refused to take down her November 19, 2022 Kyle Rittenhouse Facebook post well into her membership as a sitting Board member, on March 17, 2022, a majority of the Board adopted a Resolution formally requesting that “[...]” remove specific Facebook posts which the Board stated were “racist and/or biased against African-Americans. ”  (Ca097-098).  25.
[directive] Severability.  The provisions of this Directive shall be severable.  If any phrase, clause, sentence or provision of this Directive is declared by a court of competent jurisdiction to be invalid, the validity of the remainder of the Directive shall not be affected.  C.  Any questions concerning the interpretation or implementation of this Questions.  Directive shall be addressed to the Director of the Division of Criminal Justice, or their designee.  D.  This Directive shall take effect November 1, 2020, and shall remain in Effective date. force and effect unless and until it is repealed, amended, or superseded by Order of the Attorney General.
[brief] The court continued as to the nuisance determination, that N.J.S.A. 55:19-82 which defines when a property is a nuisance and had to be consulted where, as here, there was no municipal determination to that effect.  The Court rejected, again, reliance upon a report’s conclusory determinations;  As noted, no municipal official ever took the position or advised the owner of any of the conditions that might support such a finding.  Moreover, even though [...] checked boxes on his form certification to suggest some of these conditions were present, for the most part, his certification only presents conclusions that parrot the statutory language.  The only actual detail [...] provided suggested that the concerns were minor and could have been quickly remedied if they were known or reported.  [...] Cust for PC7 First Trust v. Block 64, Lot 6 2020 WL 4196664 at *5.  The themes of [...] and [...] are the same.  The Court should be hesitant to accept preprinted inspection forms containing conclusory statements parroting N.J.S.A. 55:19-81 as proof of abandonment.  That determination is the basis for accessing the in rem foreclosure procedure under N.J.S.A. 54:5-86(a) where “the propriety of the commencement of these actions and the legitimacy of the judgments under review were dependent on whether the properties were abandoned.
[brief] ”  (6T78-24).  None of it had any relation to the material issue in dispute, and its only function was to inflame the jury against [...].  The State then, of course, used the evidence for exactly that purpose, arguing the inflammatory items found corroborated that [...] was a disturbed person who would have likely committed such a crime.  Even if the trial court did not believe that a mistrial was proper, it could have nonetheless issued a limiting instruction that the jury should not consider the items found in the car as evidence that [...] would have been more likely to commit the shooting.  Instead, the jury was invited to make exactly that improper inference.  This improper evidence and arguments, in conjunction with the other issues discussed below, improperly tainted [...]’s trial such that his convictions should be reversed and a new trial had.