ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The Court took advantage of the opportunity to expand on its findings and conclusions at the hearing for the Motion to Stay after [...] handed down his decision.  The Court explained that his findings on the record on July 31, 2023 were cut short because the Spanish court interpreter on hand for the benefit of the elderly [...]’s had another engagement (7T11:20-12:2).  The Trial Court stated at the September 14, 2023 hearing:  So the thought process behind my decision, which you may already understand, but I’ll just say it for emphasis, was effectively an equitable remedy to restore the status quo ante, A-N-T-E, to return the $50,000.00 back to Mr. and Mrs. [...].  I think that was the primary objective of the litigation, secondary to the objective of having the Court determine that the Tillbrook residence was the property of Mr. and Mrs. [...], Senior, a proposition which I rejected for equitable reasons, which I believe I placed on the record.  [7T14:15-25]  In his concluding remarks the Trial Court stated, “The equitable remedy of restitution has been applied and is set forth in the judgment” (7T30:12-13).  Nowhere does the Court state that the $50,000.00 must be returned to Francisco [...] based on a finding of unjust enrichment.  Plaintiffs’ argument that the Court improperly applied the theory of unjust enrichment must fail.  As noted above, the Court also found at the July 31, 2023 hearing that Plaintiffs placed no proofs on the record at trial in support of their repeated claims that the equity in Tillbrook belonged to Francisco [...] (6T24:21-25).  Plaintiffs on appeal point to no error of the Trial Court in this finding.  Therefore, Plaintiffs argument as to the equity must fail.  Plaintiffs rely on Moses v. Moses, 140 N.J. Equity 575 (Court of Errors and Appeals, 1947).  While Moses v. Moses discusses at length the various equitable remedies of express trusts, resulting trusts and constructive trusts and the statute of frauds as they existed in the common law in 1947, the facts in Moses are inapposite.  In Moses a general contractor transferred land into his wife’s name so that he could expand credit available to him to develop those properties.  *Id.* at 577.  The *Moses* marriage foundered, and a lawsuit resulted.  *Ibid.*  The *Moses* summary of equitable remedies at common law is dense, and Plaintiffs never show us how it applies to our facts such that it would require a reversal of the Trial Court.  Arguably, *Moses* was a joint venture, but we have no such business purpose in the record before the Court in this appeal.  The only conclusion to draw is that *Moses* does not apply in our case.  Defendants respectfully request that this reviewing Court find that the Trial Court reached its conclusions based on a theory of restitution not unjust enrichment and did not rely on the law of joint ventures in reaching its conclusions.
[brief] However, other jurisdictions have clearly ruled.  In Georgia, the case of *Flanders v. Jackson*, 810 S.E. 2d 656 (Ga. Ct. App. 2018) specifically recognizes Georgia law which maintains that a debtor’s discharge did not preclude the personal injury creditor from seeking an excess judgment against the debtor notwithstanding that, due to the debtor’s discharge, no more than the policy proceeds could be recovered personally against the debtor.  *Id.* at 660.  Specifically, the case stands for the fact that a bad faith claim can exist against the insurance carriers directly, even though the defendant would not be personally responsible.  *Id.*  In addition, in Florida, the case of *Camp v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co.*, 616 So. 2d 12 (Fla. 1993) held that an insured’s bankruptcy and discharge from liability prior to the exposure of an excess judgment via tort claim, such that an insured was never personally liable for any judgment, did not preclude a subsequent bad faith – refusal to settle cause of action against the insurer.  *Id.* at 14-15.  In addition to the above, the 5th Circuit of Appeals in *Chapman v. Bituminous Ins.*  345 F. 3d 338 (5th Cir. Ct. App. 2003), the Court specifically held that a personal injury claimant could seek judgment in excess of the insurance policy limits, even though the personal injury creditor’s claim had been discharged.  *Id.* at 343.  The Court reasoned that a “fresh start policy” is not intended to provide a method by which an insurer can escape its obligation based simply on the financial misfortunes of the insured.  *Id.*  As a result, it is clear that other jurisdictions clearly recognize that a bad faith claim can exist even if the insured defendant files for bankruptcy.
[brief] (Pa1-2)** | 8 | | A. Standard of Review.  | 8 | | B. Impermissible Use of Hearsay Documents.  | 10 | | **POINT II: PLAINTIFF’S EXPERTS WERE QUALIFIED TO OPINE ON THE RESPIRATORY CARE PROVIDED TO [...].  (Pa1-2)** | 24 | | **POINT III: CONSTANT SPEAKING OBJECTIONS, SIDEBARS, LIMITING OF PLAINTIFF’S EXPERTS’ TESTIMONY AND THE OVERALL CONDUCT OF THE TRIAL DEPRIVED PLAINTIFF OF A FAIR TRIAL.  (Pa1-2)** | 32 | | **POINT IV: THE JURY VERDICT FINDING DEVIATIONS FROM THE STANDARD OF CARE BUT NOT A VIOLATION OF [...]’S RIGHTS UNDER THE NHA IS INCONSISTENT.  (Pa131)** | 39  | POINT V:  UNDER THE NHA, ONCE A VIOLATION OF RIGHTS IS ESTABLISHED, PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO DAMAGES WITHOUT ESTABLISHING PROXIMATE CAUSE.  (Pa131)  40  POINT VI: PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO A NEW TRIAL BASED ON CUMULATIVE ERRORS THAT RENDERED THE TRIAL  UNJUST.  (Pa1-2)  44  CONCLUSION
[directive] 7.8.1  All people, including police officers, have a Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures.  In an internal affairs investigation, the Fourth Amendment applies to any search the employing agency undertakes.  The internal affairs investigator must be cognizant of the various principles governing search and seizure, particularly where the investigator will conduct a search as part of a criminal investigation or will search personal property belonging to the subject officer.  7.8.2
[brief] **Standard of Review**  When reviewing a grant of summary judgment, the Appellate Court uses the same standard as the trial court.  *Globe Motor Co. v. Igdaley*, 225 N.J. 469, 479 (2016).  A party is entitled to summary judgment if “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact challenged and that the moving party is entitled to judgment or order as a matter of law. ”  R. 4:46-2.  Although a non-moving party is entitled to have the evidence reviewed “in the light most favorable to” him, summary judgment is appropriate if “the evidence is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law. ”  Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 142 N.J. 520, 540 (App. Div. 1995).  The Appellate Court is called to first decide whether there was a genuine issue of fact, and if there was not, then it must decide whether the lower court’s ruling on the law was correct.  Walker v. Alt. Chrysler Plymouth, 216 N.J. Super. 255, 258 (App. Div. 1987).  In reviewing, the Appellate Court may only consider evidence that was also submitted to the Trial Court.  Middle Dep't Insp. Agency v. Home Ins. Co., 154 N.J. Super. 49, 56 (App. Div. 1977), certif. denied, 76 N.J. 234 (1978).  POINT I THE TRIAL JUDGE CORRECTLY GRANTED SUMMARY
[brief] Relying upon the Appellate Division’s ruling in *State v. Gathers*, 449 N.J. Super. 265, 270 (App. Div. 2017), defendant nevertheless claims the trial court erred because the delay in seeking defendant’s DNA was unreasonable.  Defendant’s reliance upon the Appellate Division’s ruling is misplaced, and his claim is without merit.  In *Gathers*, the defendant was charged with second-degree possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose, *N.J.S.A.* 2C:39-4, second-degree unlawful possession of a weapon, *N.J.S.A.* 2C:39-5(b), and fourth-degree certain persons not to have weapons, *N.J.S.A.* 2C:39-7(a).
[brief] See U.S. Bronze Powders, Inc. v. Commerce & Industry Ins. Co., 259 N.J. Super. 109, 115-16 (Law. Div. 1992), aff’d, 293 N.J. Super. 12 (App. Div. 1996) (citing Wells v. Wilbur B. Driver Co., 121 N.J. Super. 185 (Law Div. 1972); First State Underwriters v. Travelers Ins. Co., 803 F.2d 1308, 1311 (3d Cir. 1986)).  Intervenor’s attempts to create an ambiguity strain credulity.  The phrases “Non-Owned Vehicles” and “Hired Auto” are not indecipherable industry jargon.  (Ib16).  They are plain, everyday terms and are especially easily understood here because [...] knew it had to fill out the Supplemental Form to obtain coverage for the rented vans, and [...] has previously informed [...] of the purpose of non-owned/hired auto coverage.  (Ia076 at ¶ 11; Ia095 at 59:2-5; Ia119).  Intervenor’s assertions that the entirety of the Supplemental Form creates ambiguity are similarly unavailing.
[brief] Here, Respondents assert that an attorney’s knowledge of a former client’s “financial information,” which can be used in a subsequent lawsuit to the detriment of the former client, is grounds for disqualification.  (Rb15).  Respondents assert that [...] would know if [...] was of the “mindset” to settle and the reasons why.  (Rb16).  Respondents assert that [...] “would know whether or not [...] was or was not able to litigate the subject lawsuit” and therefore [...] should be disqualified.  (Rb16).  However, under Dental Health and O Builders, to demonstrate that a lawyer received confidential information from the prior relationship, a party must make more than bald and unsubstantiated assertions that the lawyer disclosed business, financial, and/or legal information related to the matter for which disqualification is sought.
[directive] The work of an internal affairs function should not be limited to resolving complaints by narrowly focusing on whether the subject officer engaged in misconduct.  In many cases, the examination of collateral issues presented by the complaint can be as important as the resolution of the allegation itself.  For example, while investigating an allegation of excessive force during an arrest, the officer’s actions in making the arrest may be improper.  In such cases, even though the investigation may exonerate the officer of the excessive force allegation, internal affairs must still examine whether the officer should have been effecting the arrest at all.  7.12.2
[brief] In order to bring a claim of retaliation under the NJLAD, a plaintiff must show that: (1) he/she was engaged in a protected activity known to the defendant; (2) he/she was subjected to an adverse employment decision by the defendant; and (3) there was a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse employment decision.  N.J.S.A. 10:5-12(d); Woods-Pirozzi v. Nabisco Foods, 290 N.J. Super. 252, 274 (App. Div. 1996).  Plaintiff’s failure to adequately plead two of the three requisite elements, namely an adverse employment action and a causal connection between any of the actions complained of and the filing of Plaintiff’s First Lawsuit in 2016, is fatal to Plaintiff’s claims under the NJLAD.  See Lehmann v. Toys R Us, Inc., 132 N.J. 587 (1993).  The trial court recognized such and correctly found that Plaintiff failed to state a prima facie case of retaliation under the NJLAD.
[brief] CASE LAW  257-261 20th Ave. Realty, LLC v. Alessandro Roberto, 477 N.J. Super. 339 (App. Div. 2023).................................................................1  261 20th Ave. Realty v. Allesandro Roberto, A-29-23 (N.J. Jan. 9, 2025)....1, 2 PC4REO, LLC v. John Kemp, A-1944-21 (N.J. App. Div. June 8.  2023)....3, 4 Rolnick v. Rolnick, 262 N.J. Super. 343, 365-66, 621 A.2d 37 (App. Div. 1993).........................................................................................3  Tyler v. Hennepin Cnty.  598 U.S. 631 (2023).................................1, 2, 3, 4, 5  APPENDIX
[brief] Eh yes like basically like I do not, I come from another, another country to here I do not know if you guys assign an attorney to me or I have to look for an attorney on my own? (Pa30).  [[...]]: So part of this I have to explain I, I am only Reading, but this is Spanish [Defendant]:  Mm-hmm  [[...]]:  I cannot give you any type of legal advice ok umm this is very simple if you want to have an attorney present that is your right.  If you want to talk with me and then consult with an attorney that is something that you, but I cannot give you any type of-of like of advice  [Defendant]: Oh ok  [[...]]: You know that is in Spanish if you understand it.  [Defendant]: Mm-hmm.  [[...]]: That is something that you have to say if you, on your own.  [Defendant]: Well yes [[...]]: So you can put your answer and your initials.  If you do not have money to hire a lawyer, one will be appointed to represent you before any questioning, if you wish.  Do you understand this right?  [Defendant]: Yes [Pa30 to 31; Pa131].  [...] then advised defendant that he could exercise his rights at anytime and not answer any questions or make any statements.  (1T40-21 to 24; Pa31; Pa131).  Defendant indicated that he understood and signed the Miranda form.  (1T41-3 to 6; Pa130; Pa131).  [...] then read the waiver portion to defendant, he stated he understood, and he signed the form.  (1T41-7 to 42-22; Pa32 to 33; Pa130; Pa131).  [...] then questioned defendant about the homicide.  (Pa33 to 129; Pa131).  Defendant never asked to stop the statement, asked for an attorney, or indicate that he was too tired to continue.  (1T50-25 to 51-10).  He did ask for water, which was provided.  (1T50-11 to 15).  Defendant took the stand on his own behalf.  (1T62-22 to 113-22).  However, when the parties returned for the continuation of the proceeding, defendant refused to answer any more questions and his testimony was stricken.  (2T4-14 to 7-17).  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I THE STATE’S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL MUST BE GRANTED IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE BECAUSE THE TRIAL COURT’S ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO SUPPRESS WAS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION.
[brief] “Under the two-court rule, appellate courts ordinarily should not undertake to alter concurrent findings of facts and credibility determinations made by two lower courts absent a very obvious and exceptional showing of error. ”  *Midler v. Heinowitz*, 10 N.J. 123, 128-29 (1952).  In the instant case, the defendant claims the municipal court and Law Division erred in finding that the defendant operated his motor vehicle causing the damage to the [...]’s vehicle and left the scene of this accident in contravention of the applicable statutes.  According to the defendant, because nobody observed him driving the car, the State’s proofs did not satisfy the standards required to prove operation beyond a reasonable doubt.  Additionally, because the defendant did not report the accident due to adverse weather conditions and the time of day, he is not culpable under the applicable statutes.  (Db 7-12).  However, the defendant misconstrues the credibly testified to facts of this case, and the controlling case law that guides courts on the question of operation and whether one has failed to properly report an accident.
[directive] A number of prosecutors and judges have commented that the trial proof adjustment feature in Part VIII of the “Brimage” Guidelines provides insufficient flexibility for prosecutors to account for unusual or exceptional litigation problems.  This has resulted in complex and protracted pretrial litigation that might have been avoided.  Providing prosecutors with more flexibility in calculating “Brimage” plea offers in these kinds of unusual or exceptional cases involving complex or pro- tracted litigation issues would enhance the overall scheme that is designed to avoid the unnecessary expenditure of prosecutorial and judicial resources.  These revi- sions, however, must include appropriate procedural and substantive safeguards to channel the exercise of prosecutorial discretion and to maintain overall uniformity in accordance with the Supreme Court’s directive in State v. Brimage, 153 N.J. 1 (1998).  B.
[brief] The dereliction of trial counsel irreparably prejudiced the defendant by trial counsel’s failure to appropriately move for a pre-trial suppression hearing of the sneak and peek evidence and to effectively represent him at trial.  However, the PCR court in addressing the defendant’s claims, which were supported by certifications did not hold an evidentiary hearing as required by State v. Porter, 216 N.J. 343 (2013).  Further, the PCR judge made credibility determinations on the certifications without hearing from the witnesses as also required by Porter, supra.
[brief] On an appeal of a grant of summary judgment, an appellate court reviews the decision *de novo*, applying the same standard as the trial court.  *L.A. v. New Jersey Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs.*, 217 N.J. 311, 323 (2014).  Accordingly, [...]’s decision granting summary judgment in favor of [...] should be reviewed under the familiar standard set forth in *R. 4:46-2*:  Summary judgment should be granted where “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact challenged and … the moving party is entitled to a judgment or order as a matter of law. ”  *Id.*; *R. 4:46–2(c)*.  Moreover, [...]’s decision that Appelmans’ rule does not apply to coverage claims under CGL policies presents a question of law for which this Court owes no deference.  *Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm.*, 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995) (“A trial court’s interpretation of the law and the legal consequences that flow from established facts are not entitled to any special deference”).  Likewise, [...]’s interpretation of the exception to the [...] policy’s mold exclusion is subject to de novo review.
[brief] The Court concluded that [...] entered the fenced-in property only after he “did everything that he could possibly have done, thought the property was clear,” and that the bite was “unprovoked” because [...] was “merely there to do a job. ”  4T67:8-12; also, 4T67:4.  Both courts below failed to consider a dog’s perception of an intruder entering his fenced yard with a large, noisy apparatus.  These are legal issues, not credibility issues.  The trial Court attributed human reasoning to a dog, expecting [...] to read a pest control contract and to distinguish between a weapon and a fogger.  Township officials apparently understood that this was not an “unprovoked” attack, as no charges were brought against [...].  For this reason, the [...] incident should not have been in evidence.
[brief] 10.  This is incredibly significant in that the Defendant has twice been penalized related to this $70,000.00 payment as will be discussed herein (DA 3, page A25 paragraph 2 and DA 5, page A A51 and A52, paragraph 1).  It is clear that [...] lied.  The question is what impact her ability to credibly lie should have on the outcome of the case.  11.  In [...]’s decision he never mentioned this misrepresentation as it relates to the assessment of the first penalty.  Likewise, the Appellate Division never mentioned this misrepresentation as it relates to the assessment of the first penalty.  And there was no mention, even though this issue represents the single most devastating financial issue in this case.
[brief] The Legislature has rejected holding a public entity liable on the basis of strict liability in N.J.S.A. 59:9-2b.  Accord Kenny v. Scientific, Inc., 204 N.J. Super. 228, 237-38, 257-58 (Law Div. 1985) (citing this part of the Act) (“as already mentioned above, N.J.S.A. 59:9-2b flatly mandates that “[n]o judgment shall be granted against a public entity or public employee on the basis of strict liability”); Ross v. Lowitz, 222 N.J. 494, 510-11 (2015) (explaining that strict liability is finding someone liable regardless or without fault).  Furey v. Ocean Cty., 273 N.J. Super. 300, 312-13 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 138 N.J. 272 (1994).  This requirement in the Tort Claims Act "imposes a steep burden on a plaintiff" and "implies behavior that is patently unacceptable under any given circumstances."  Kolitch v. Lindedahl, 100 N.J. 485, 493 (1985).
[directive] If specify Jersey, of New the State of laws the of authority the under operating agency enforcement law as queries deconfliction make to shall use agency the that system deconfliction automated the Directive.  this by required Understanding. of Memorandum E. approve and negotiate to authorized shall be Justice Criminal of Division the of Director  The designated a maintaining agency enforcement law between the Understanding of Memorandum a using agencies enforcement law municipal and county, State, all and system deconfliction automated Directive.
[directive] Plea Agreements or Plea Bargains  The New Jersey Supreme Court has established its own Guidelines with respect to negotiated pleas (i.e., plea bargains) in the Municipal Courts.  Plea bargains in the Municipal Courts are governed, initially by R. 7:6-2(d), but are also supplemented by “Guidelines for Operation of Plea Agreements” in an Appendix to Part VII of the Rules Governing the Courts of the State of New Jersey.  Plea bargains, in the Superior Court, Law Division, are governed by a separate body of Court Rules: R. 3:9-2.  The Municipal Court Guidelines, however, contain certain limitations with respect to the disposition of DWI and DWI refusal offenses in the Municipal Courts.  The relevant provisions of the Limitations, as set by the Supreme Court are as follows:
[brief] In any event, as noted above, the Court in Dela Vega acknowledged that intra-family step-down provisions (and Injury to an Insured exclusions) have been upheld by New Jersey courts, and did not purport to overrule or challenge the holding of such cases.  Id. at *8 (citing Aubrey v. Harleysville Ins. Companies, 140 N.J. 397 (N.J. 1995); Hanko v. Sisoukraj, 364 N.J. Super. 41 (App. Div. 2003); Rao v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 228 N.J. Super. 396 (App. Div. 1988)).  Rather, the court found that those cases were distinguishable because none of them “limited coverage and benefits to the purchaser of the policy – as this one does. ”  *Id.*  This matter is like the prior precedent and unlike *Dela Vega* given that liability coverage is being sought not by the purchaser of the policy, but on behalf of Defendant [...] as the operator of the vehicle and son of the named insureds.
[brief] 5T 50:22-24.  The Trial Court also agreed with the Board’s conclusion that the greater height of the proposed building would result in a more intense use than [...]’s ordinances anticipated.  5T 51:3-5T 51:15.  There is no reason in fact or law for this Court to disturb these findings, which show that even under this formulation of a standard less stringent than *Medici*, the Plaintiffs are not entitled to approval.  VI.
[brief] (Pa49; Pa115)  On October 29, 2019, [...] filed a probable cause certification in the [...].  *(Id.)*  On November 12, 2019, [...]’s Complaint against [...] was transferred to the [...] for review for potential prosecution.  On February 20, 2020, Hudson County Presiding Municipal Judge [...] found probable cause for [...]’s charges against [...].  (Pa115)  [...]’s OPRA/common law right of access lawsuit relates to the [...]’s investigation with respect to his citizen’s Complaint against [...].