ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] A.  Initial filing in New Jersey Superior Court and removal to New Jersey District Court.  This matter was initially filed in New Jersey Superior Court, Atlantic County on April 18, 2016.  (Pa115).  Plaintiff then filed an Amended Complaint on or about January 26, 2017.  (Pa118).  This matter was removed from state court based on federal question jurisdiction on February 20, 2017.  (Da006, District Court Docket Report, ECF #1).  B.  District Court – The Amended Complaint and Defendants’ premotion letter seeking dismissal.  On March 13, 2017, the Defendants filed a letter “requesting a pre-motion conference regarding dismissal pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 12(b)(6)” seeking dismissal of the Amended Complaint pursuant to New Jersey District Court [...]’s Individual Rules and Procedures.  (Da007, District Court Docket Report, ECF #6).  As required, in that letter, Defendants succinctly set forth numerous bases for dismissal.  Plaintiff failed to file a responsive letter pursuant to [...]’s Rules within the prescribed time period and, as a result, a Text Order was entered ordering “that Plaintiff shall show cause before this Court within three (3) business days why he has failed to timely respond AND why the relief Defendants seek in their pre-motion letters should not be granted. ” (Da007, District Court Docket Report, ECF #12).  Plaintiff did file a responsive letter on the third business day.  (Da008, District Court Docket Report, ECF #’s 13, 14).  On May 26, 2017, an Order was entered enjoining Plaintiff to file an amended pleading on or before June 26, 2017.  (Da008, District Court Docket Report, ECF #20).  C.  District Court – The Second Amended Complaint and Defendants’ motion to dismiss.  On June 26, 2017, Plaintiff filed a Second Amended Complaint.  (Da008, District Court Docket Report, ECF #21).  On July 6, 2017, Defendants filed a “pre-motion” letter for dismissal of the Second Amended Complaint based on R. 12(b)(6) pursuant to [...]’s Rules.  (Da008, District Court Docket Report, ECF #22).  Defendants moved for dismissal on the same basis provided in the first “pre-motion” letter.  This matter was reassigned to [...] on July 12, 2017.  (Da009, District Court Docket Report, ECF #25).  Defendants then filed a motion to dismiss the Second Amended Complaint on July 31, 2017.  (Da009, District Court Docket Report, ECF #28).  The [...] Defendants, collectively represented, also filed a motion to dismiss the Second Amended Complaint.  (Da009, District Court Docket Report, ECF #27).  Plaintiff then requested and received eight (8) extensions of time to file his opposition to the motions to dismiss.  (Da009-11, District Court Docket Report, ECF #’s 29, 30, 32, 35, 37, 38, 39, 40).  Finally, on November 3, 2017, Plaintiff filed his opposition.  (Da012, District Court Docket Report, ECF #41).  The Defendants’ motion to dismiss the Second Amended Complaint was granted on July 12, 2018.  (Da013, District Court Docket Report, ECF #’s 47, 48).  Plaintiff was given twenty-one (21) days to file any motion to amend.  D.
[brief] In R.D., “[t]he juror informed the court that as the victim's mother's nurse he ‘overheard things about her relationship with her family. ’  The court did not delve deeper into the matter. ”  Id. at 563.  Here, when Juror 12 told the Court she had spoken to her husband after a friend of theirs “gave him all the information about the trial,” the Court attempted to find out what Juror 12’s husband had told her but failed to actually get a clear answer on this.  When the Court first asked whether Juror 12’s husband told her anything, Juror 12 said she told him to stop giving her information but did not reveal what he had told her.  (24T6-25 to 1)  When the Court followed up to ask how much her husband told her and whether it was only that [...]’s family members attended the church they fellowshipped with, Juror 12 ultimately said her husband “didn’t tell who they were,” but did not answer the Court’s question about what else her husband might have told her or whether it was limited to the fact that [...]’s family members attended that church.  (24T7-5 to 15)  Accordingly, the trial court failed to abide by its duty as set forth in R.D. that “[a]n appropriate voir dire of a juror allegedly in possession of extraneous information mid-trial should inquire into the specific nature of the extraneous information. ”  169 N.J. at 560.  Here, the Court failed to definitively ascertain the full scope of the extraneous information conveyed to Juror 12.
[brief] **CONCLUSION**  Accordingly, Plaintiffs respectfully request: (a) the Orders appealed by [...] be affirmed in their entirety; (b) reversal of the portion of the June 3, 2019 Order vacating the arbitration award of 40% of the Company’s legal fees incurred in Phase I of the arbitration; and (c) reversal of the November 14, 2022 Decision and Order valuing [...]’s interests in the Company using Fair Market Value, and remanding for instructions to value [...]’s interests using Tax Book Value as of 2017.
[brief] (Sb 28-36)  However, Smart is the most recent articulation of the “unforeseeable and spontaneous” requirement by our Supreme Court interpreting our constitution.  And as the Court explained in Smart, “Witt thus deliberately kept the “unforeseeability and spontaneity” language first articulated in Alston and explicitly fortified it with the extra protections guaranteed under Article I, Paragraph 7. ”  Smart, 253 N.J. at 171 (emphasis added).  Those extra protections, including a careful analysis of whether the circumstances leading to probable cause were actually unforeseeable and spontaneous, as opposed to foreseen and planned, is what our constitution requires.  The car search here does not pass muster under our more-protective constitution.  Finally, the State cites unpublished cases in which panels of this Court upheld car searches.
[brief] The court is also not moved by [...]’s argument that the tax foreclosure action is fully and finally adjudicated, and that the Debtor may not use bankruptcy court proceedings to void the transfer of the Property.  The Bankruptcy Code offers debtors and trustees several ways to seemingly reverse final judgments under state law.  The Bankruptcy Code sets forth several avenues to avoid transfers: 11 U.S.C. §§ 522, 544, 545, 547, 548, and 549.  See In re Hackler, 938 F.3d 473, 475 (3d Cir. 2019) (affirming the bankruptcy court’s conclusion that transfer of real estate title conducted via New Jersey’s TSL was void preferential transfer under § 547(b)); In re Smith, 811 F.3d 228 (7th Cir. 2016) (setting aside Illinois tax sale foreclosure pursuant to Sections 522(h) and 548); In re Hamilton, 125 F.3d 292, 298 n.8 (5th Cir. 1997) (“By its own terms, section 544(a)(3) allows a party to avoid a foreclosure sale, and therefore to avoid the transfer that divested debtor of title to the foreclosed property, revesting title in the debtor.
[brief] In *Woodward-Clyde Consultants v. Chemical and Pollution Sciences, Inc.*, 105 N.J. 464 (1987), the New Jersey Supreme Court held that "a dismissal without prejudice is not an adjudication on the merits and does not bar reinstitution of the same claim a later action."  *Id.*  (*citing Malhame v. Borough of Demarest*, 174 N.J. Super. 28 (App. Div. 1980)).  As such, the Entire Controversy Doctrine cannot serve to bar a successive claim based upon a prior lawsuit that was dismissed without prejudice.  *Id.*  While the Trial Court and [...] repeat, *ad nauseam*, the contention that the Consent Order constituted a dismissal of the Prior Litigation *with* prejudice, or that the [...] somehow constituted an adjudication of the Prior Litigation on its merits (despite no overlap between the issues decided in the [...] and the claims in the Prior Litigation), their repetition does not convert those arguments into a fact.  Instead, as set forth above, it is clear that the Trial Court committed reversible error, as the Consent Order constitutes *only* a dismissal *without* prejudice as to the Prior Litigation, and because *nothing* decided in the [...] constituted an adjudication on the merits of any claim asserted in this lawsuit or in the Prior Litigation.  Thus, consistent with established New Jersey law, the Entire Controversy Doctrine cannot serve to bar Plaintiffs' successive lawsuit.
[brief] Here, the only piece of evidence tying [...] to this crime is an identification he made of himself in the RT-TOIC video during this interrogation.  Law enforcement recovered no forensic or physical evidence tying [...] to the scene, neither [...] nor [...] identified [...] as a person involved, and [...] had made no progress in identifying any second individual until [...] identified himself in his statement.  Without the interrogation, there is no case against [...].  Because the admission of his confession was so harmful, and because even the trial court agreed that [...] misled [...] into believing the interrogation was about a minor drug charge, [...]’s statement should have been suppressed.
[brief] .................................................................................................................. 29 - **Booth v. Bd. of Adjustment of Rockaway Twp.**, 50 N.J. 302 (1967) ....................................  28 - **Borough of Essex Fells v. Kessler Institute for Rehab.**, 289 N.J. Super. 329 (1995) .........................................................................................................................................................  31 - **Borough of Princeton v. Mercer Cty**, 169 N.J. 135 (2001) .................................................. 46 - **Cell S. of N.J., Inc. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment**, 172 N.J. 75 (2002) ................................. 28 - **Cesare v. Cesare**, 154 N.J. 394 (1998)) ..................................................................................... 23 - **Cherry Hill Towers, L.L.C. v. Township of Cherry Hill**, 407 F.Supp.2d 648 (D.N.J. 2006) ......................................................................................................................................................... 37 - **Divan Builders v. Wayne Tp. Planning Bd.**, 66 N.J. 582 (1975) ........................................... 39 - **Dunbar Homes, Inc. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment**, 233 N.J. 546 (2018) ......................... 28 - **Englewood v. Exxon Mobil Corp.**, 406 N.J. Super. 110 (App. Div.), certif. den., 199 N.J. 515 (2009) .................................................................................................................. 40 - **Essex County v. Hindenlang**, 35 N.J. Super. 479 (App.Div.1955) ........................................ 32 - **Glen v. June**, 344 N.J. Super. 372 (App. Div. 2001) .............................................................. 41 - **Gnall v. Gnall**, 222 N.J. 414 (2015) ......................................................................................... 23 - **Grabowsky v. Twp. of Montclair**, 221 N.J. 536 (2015) ....................................................... 28 - **Haynoski v. Haynoski**, 264 N.J. Super. 408 (App. Div. 1993) ............................................. 40 - **In re Community Medical Ctr.**, 623 F.2d 864 (3d Cir.1980) ................................................. 36, 46 - **In The Matter of the Adoption of N.J.A.C. 5:96 and 5:97 by the New Jersey Council On Affordable Housing**, 221 N.J. 1 (2015) ................................................................. 7 - **Jock v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, Twp. of Wall**, 184 N.J. 562 (2005) ............................... 28 - **Kampf v. Franklin Life Ins. Co.**, 33 N.J. 36 (1960) ............................................................. 36, 46 - **Klump v. Cybulski**, 274 Wis. 604, 81 N.W.2d 42, 47 (1957)
[directive] If the law enforcement officer finds probable cause, they can enter the complaint-summons in eCDR and make sure to note that it is a private citizen’s complaint, and should select the box stating, “[t]he charge was based on the observations/statements made by an eyewitness(es)” on the PLEIR.  If the law enforcement officer does not find probable cause, they can refer the case to the Prosecutor’s Office for legal review, whose decision is controlling.  J.  Every law enforcement agency having patrol Designation of Juvenile Liaison Officer.
[brief] ’”  There can be no tighter test of liability in this area than that of the common conception of what is right and just dealing under the circumstances. ”).  These facts have never been disproven, nor would learning that a transaction never occurred invalidate these facts.  Thus, even from the outset, Plaintiffs properly asserted their claims in the appropriate bounds of their cause of action.  Their actions reflected an honest legal strategy, not an intent to harass or unnecessarily prolong litigation.
[brief] Pace, Nicholas M. & Zakaras, Laura, [...], Where the Money Goes: Understanding Litigant Expenditures for Producing Electronic Discovery (2012)  ........................................................................8  Pressler, Sylvia B. & Verniero, Peter G., *Current N.J. Court Rules*, R. 4:10-2 (Gann 2007) ................................................................. 4, 6, 12  The Sedona Principles, Third Edition: *Best Practices, Recommendations & Principles for Addressing Electronic Document Production*, 19 Sedona Conf. J. 1 (2018) ...........................................................................................................  5  **Rules** Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 .................................................................................................................. 5, 20 Fed. R. Civ. P. 34 .................................................................................................................. 20 N.J. Court R. 4:10-2 ............................................................................................................. passim N.J. Court R. 4:10-3 ..............................................................................................................  4, 5  INTRODUCTION
[brief] Indeed, the Trial Court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law, as stated on the record, are wholly inadequate and essentially nonexistent.  The Trial Court merely stated:  So, the question is whether the litigation was frivolous.  Again, I’m not going to go back over the whole -- the Court’s reasoning at the time.  . . .  That’s what I recall the conversation as being and of course it took two years of litigation and summary judgment motion  . . . .  I don’t find there was any conceivable cause of action for . . . intentionally interfering with a prospective economic opportunity and I do find that further pursuing the litigation was frivolous.  . . .  He had the right to do some discovery but at some point I think that the litigation became frivolous in nature[.] (2T 17:12-13, 18:1-2, 18:9-14, 18:17-18) (emphasis added).  The Trial Court’s approach to awarding sanctions failed to meet the requisite explicit findings of fact and detailed legal conclusions as mandated by Rule 1:7-4.  The vague remarks made by the Trial Court fall short of providing a clear, justified rationale for the sanctions imposed, renders the decision procedurally deficient and denies the parties a meaningful opportunity to understand or challenge the basis of the decision.  1.
[brief] **The Operating Agreement of [...] does not give the Members direct management authority, despite what Respondents allege and the trial court found. **  Respondents’ pleadings and the trial court’s order on summary judgment both rely on Section 3.1.1 of [...]’s Amended & Restated Operating Agreement (which was in effect at the time the relevant loan agreements were signed) when citing the authority of the members and the restrictions imposed upon the Appellant as manager.  Respondents allege (and the court concluded) that Appellant was obligated to act “in accordance with the will of the members” and that the Respondents retained “‘full, exclusive, and complete discretion, and authority’ to ‘manage, control, administer, and operate the business and affairs of the company. ’”  Da315; Da892-93.  The problem with this allegation – and with the court’s conclusion – is that the Section 3.1.1 cited to is from the *original* operating agreement of [...], not the Amended & Restated Operating Agreement, which appears separately as Exhibit C to Respondents’ motion for summary judgment.  Da886.  And, while similar in content, the *correct* Section 3.1.1 qualifies precisely how the members may exercise their authority.  And that is, “…by replacing any and all members of the Executive Committee, at a meeting called specifically for that purpose, by a two-third majority vote. ”  *Ibid.*  Furthermore, the language “in accordance with the will of the members” was removed from the Amended & Restated Operating Agreement.  Thus, the members lacked the direct control that they seem to rely on – and which the trial court accepted them to possess – in granting the relief sought.  Oral argument would have been yet another opportunity for this error to be addressed.  C.
[brief] Public Policy Still Favors Arbitration.  Despite Plaintiff’s representations to the contrary, Defendants have repeatedly conceded that the scope of this arbitration provision does not embrace the statutory claims Plaintiff hopes to resolve through a jury trial, e.g., claims based on CEPA, NJLAD, and the NJFLA.  As such, the Court need not address Plaintiff’s superfluous arguments regarding recent amendments to the NJLAD or the EFAA.  Of additional note, this Court has held that Section 12. 7 of the NJLAD is preempted when applied to prevent arbitration called for in an agreement governed by the FAA.  Antonucci v. Curvature Newco, Inc., 470 N.J. Super. 553 (App. Div. 2022).  Thus, NJLAD claims can be subject to arbitration, albeit amid different circumstances than those present.  Regardless, Plaintiff’s non-statutory claims arise out of the Partnership Agreement, and, therefore, fall directly within the scope of arbitration.  Moreover, in the absence of contrary authority, an express waiver of arbitration, like an implied waiver, should be considered under the totality of the circumstances pursuant to Cole.  As illustrated here, a statement of waiver, standing alone, does not waste judicial resources or harm the party opposing waiver.  In the aggregate, the Cole factors essentially look to see how a waiver has impacted the proceedings of a case, and there is no legal justification to disregard this consideration by holding an express waiver as more irrevocable than a party desiring to test the waters of litigation through inconsistent conduct.  Where the purpose of arbitration is to streamline proceedings, minimize costs, and conserve judicial and private resources, that purpose is not furthered by holding inconsistent conduct to a separate standard than a party who makes express waiver at an early stage of a case.  In sum, application of the Cole factors equally to implied and express waivers eliminates artificial distinctions and simplifies the waiver analysis.
[brief] Da87 (“venue for any dispute involving this promissory note shall be in a court of competent jurisdiction in Essex County, New Jersey. ”); see also, Da86, ¶ 13.  On or about May 21, 2019, Plaintiff and Defendant [...] each signed a document titled [...] Gallardo Gonzalez & Winograd, L.L.P. Partners’ Certificate (“Partners’ Certificate”), which certified certain information to [...] in order to get a loan for the Firm.
[directive] Thereafter, the Covid-19 pandemic ensued, followed by the AG SAFE survey, placing a pause on requests for destruction until further guidance could be promulgated.  17  Age of kit is rounded up.  Kits under 1-year old are represented in the “1-year old” category.  18  Multiple response options were permissible on this question.  8 | P a g e  After a kit is tested, 273 agencies require the test to be returned to the agency and/or county for storage while 64 agencies do not require the test to be returned, and 241 agencies responded not applicable or did not respond to this question.  Returned kits were most frequently stored in evidence.  Law enforcement and County Prosecutors reported their volume of tested and untested SAFE kits.  From 2018 to 2020, less than 40% of all SAFE kits collected were not tested in each year – 36.24% in 2018, 27.91% in 2019, and 33.66% in 2020.  9 | P a g e  When the decision is made not to test REASONS NOT TESTED
[brief] There are no policies in place to ensure that prisoners are able to make their Court appointments.  [...] has no policies in place to ensure that inmates are able to properly and voice their concerns.  There are no policies in place to ensure that prisoners have contact with their attorneys.  There are no policies in place to ensure that inmates are able to report threats of bodily harm.  Because plaintiff was harmed due to knowing violations under color of law, qualified immunity does not attach.
[brief] With regard to the tort action for fraudulent concealment, the *Rosenblitt* court set forth the elements for such a claim as follows:  (1)  That defendant in the fraudulent concealment action had a legal obligation to disclose evidence in connection with an existing or pending litigation; (2) That the evidence was material to the litigation; (3) That plaintiff could not reasonably have obtained access to the evidence from another source; (4) That defendant intentionally withheld evidence with purpose to disrupt the litigation; (5)  That plaintiff was damaged in the underlying action by having to rely on an evidential record that did not contain the evidence defendant concealed.  Id. at 406-407.  Also with regard to the claim for fraudulent concealment, the Rosenblitt court stated in part:  In sum, where an adversary has intentionally hidden or destroyed (spoliated) evidence necessary to a party’s cause of action and that misdeed is uncovered in time for trial, plaintiff is entitled to a spoliation inference that the missing evidence would be unfavorable to the wrongdoer and may also amend his or her complaint to add a claim for fraudulent concealment.
[brief] In 2018, a predecessor to [...] filed a request with [...] to rezone this same property to allow precisely the same uses -- congregate care senior apartments, assisted living units and memory care.  The applicant was [...] (“[...]”), which was the contract purchaser of the Property at that time and proposed to construct a mix of 150 units.  The Township Planner issued a report on August 9, 2018, which included the following as to the Master Plan:  Based on the above review of Montville’s 2010 Land Use Plan, it appears that a zoning amendment to permit a senior residential health care facility on the applicant’s property may promote some of the Township’s land use goals and objectives – namely the encouragement of senior citizen community housing construction – but that it may be incompatible with other goals outlined in the Plan – namely allowing for attached residential uses in locations not specifically prescribed for in the Plan.
[brief] ”  Taylor v. Metzger, 152 N.J. 490, 500 (1998) (quoting Lehmann, 132 N.J. at 606-07) (alteration in original).  [...]’s claim that [...] once asked him about retirement, balanced against his numerous previous applications for retirement, is not “severe” or “pervasive” enough to change the work environment into one which is hostile to older people.  The dismissal of discrimination claims against [...] should be affirmed.