ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The trial court ignored bedrock New Jersey law that “when a subject matter designation is made . . . [that] testimony will bind the organization . . .”  Rule 4:14-2(c); Pressler and Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules, cmt. 3 to R. 4:14-2(c) (2024) (emphasis added).  The trial court completely dismissed Plaintiffs’ proper service of a deposition notice on [...], which requested it to present a “designated representative” to testify on topics pertaining to the Act and Limited Attorney Exemption.  Defendants produced [...] as [...]’s representative.  As a matter of law, the trial court was required to evaluate his testimony on behalf of [...].  The trial court cannot shirk its duty to consider [...]’s testimony as binding on [...] by deeming him to be a random “lay person” or describing his responses as legal conclusions.  First, [...] selected and designated [...] to testify on its behalf, and it did so understanding that his testimony would be binding on the agency.  [...] is the very agency charged with enforcement of the Act; it is hardly a “lay person” with no knowledge or expertise in this area. \(^2\)  Furthermore, as shown by the many excerpts of testimony recited in the Statement of Facts, [...] responded to questions regarding a bevy of facts, including but not limited to, the failure to define terms in the Act, the failure to establish criteria applicable to \(^2\)  Even if [...] were a mere “lay person,” his supposed “lay person opinion” on the definition or interpretation of undefined terms in the Limited Attorney Exemption would, at a minimum, be relevant to Plaintiffs’ vagueness argument, which concerns how a person of common intelligence would understand the terms.  See Section D, infra. enforcement of the Act, the failure to issue any bulletins or other guidance as to the definition of terms in the Act, and the lack of prior enforcement proceedings that could show how the Act was actually previously enforced and applied.  The trial court’s failure to consider [...]’s pertinent testimony on numerous factual issues improperly excluded relevant and compelling evidence from the factual record.
[brief] I.  The Standard of Review (Not Raised Below)  This appeal seeks review of the motion court’s grant of Defendant’s motion under R. 4:6-2(e) to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.  This Court’s review is de novo, “affording no deference to the trial court’s determination. ”  Pace v. Hamilton Cove, No. 088302, 2024 WL 3351149, at *7 (N.J. July 10, 2024).  A court must assume the facts asserted in the complaint are true, *Lembo v. Marchese*, 242 N.J. 477, 481 (2020), and the “plaintiff is entitled to the benefit of every reasonable inference as we ‘search[ ] the complaint in depth and with liberality to ascertain whether the fundament of a cause of action may be gleaned even from an obscure statement of claim, opportunity being given to amend if necessary. ’”  *Id.* (quoting *Printing Mart-Morristown v. Sharp Elecs. Corp.*, 116 N.J. 739, 746 (1989) quoting *Di Cristofaro v. Laurel Grove Mem'l Park*, 43 N.J. Super. 244, 252 (App. Div. 1957)).  **POINT II.
[directive] Notwithstanding civilian a when WC B a de-activate may officer an section, this by authorized be may de-activation as it where circumstances under off turned be device the that officer requests with conversing the with the cooperate otherwise or information provide not will person the that appears reasonably BWC person the that the to suggest not shall officer  The respected.4 is request that unless officer that prefer the would or she he whether person the ask officer the shall nor de-activated; be should civilian.  the by self-initiated de-activation be must for request the Rather, de-activated.
[brief] 59 Rules: New Jersey Court Rules R. 1:12-1 .................................................................................................  63 R. 1:12-2 .................................................................................................  62 R. 4:49-1 .................................................................................................  84 R. 4:49-2 .................................................................................................  71 Rules of Evidence N.J.R.E. 801(c) .......................................................................................  84  Statutes: N.J.S.A. 2A:15-49 .................................................................................. 63
[brief] ”  *El-Sioufi v. St. Peter’s Univ.*, 382 N.J. Super. 145, 167 (App. Div. 2005).  Similarly, to state a claim of hostile work environment sexual harassment, an employee must demonstrate that: (1) the complained of conduct would not have occurred but for the employee's protected characteristic; (2) the conduct was severe or pervasive; and (3) a reasonable person would believe that the work environment was hostile or abusive.  See, *Lehmann v. Toys R Us, Inc.*, 132 N.J. 587, 604-606, 611–614 (1993).
[brief] 2.  **Defendant’s Effort to Distinguish  The Majority Case Law is Flawed** (Pa1-Pa16)  (a)  *[...] Didn’t “Reject” Taylor or Wisc. Auto; The Court Distinguished Them* (Pa1-Pa16)  Defendant next argues that cases cited by Plaintiff were “rejected” by the Supreme Court in *[...]*.  In *[...]*, the Supreme Court considered a uniformity of case law holding that one-way arbitration clauses were suspect.  Among that authority, the cases then divided on the narrow question on the permissibility of carve-outs for foreclosure remedies.  The Supreme Court sided with allowing this carve-out since foreclosure remedies were procedural remedies unavailable in mediation.  *[...]*, 189 N.J. at 48-49.  Defendant therefore simply misreads *[...]* to create a “rejection” of *Taylor* and *Wisconsin Auto Title Loans* when the Court merely distinguished them.  If Defendant’s reading were accurate, then the Supreme Court would have ruled more broadly and approved one-sided arbitration clauses in general.  Believing to have felled *Taylor* and *Wisconsin Auto Title Loans*, Defendant then dismisses any authority citing these decisions as “rejected” in New Jersey.  Defendant thereby avoids a massive body of case law casting doubt on its position before this Court, and it does so without analysis of any of the legal reasoning behind these cases.
[brief] Moreover, instead of merely dismissing the request to exclude the testimony out of hand, the court was required to analyze the Olenowski factors: (1) whether the technique has been tested; (2) the error rate and the existence of standards governing the technique; (3) whether the technique has been subjected to peer review and publication; and (4) whether the technique is generally accepted in the relevant scientific communities.  Olenowski, 253 N.J. at 147.  The court’s failure to consider these factors is an abuse of discretion, requiring reversal.
[brief] In instructing the jury on count three, the judge stated:  “For you to find that the defendant caused bodily injury to [...], the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he would not have been injured but for defendant’s conduct. ” (8T231-1 to -4).  The judge defined “injury” for third-degree aggravated assault on a police officer as “physical pain, illness, or any impairment of physical condition. ” (8T229-4 to -5).  Plainly, this correctly guided the jury and instructed them to convict defendant if they found that he committed simple assault against a police officer.  Defendant’s reliance on State v. Green, 318 N.J. Super. 361 (App. Div. 1999), (Db29-30), is inapt.  There, a defendant was charged not only with third-degree aggravated assault of a police office, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(5)(a), but also second-degree aggravated assault causing severe bodily injury, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(1).  This Court held that the trial judge erred by not instructing the jury on causation of injury on the second-degree aggravated assault count, not that the jury required a causation instruction on the third-degree aggravated assault count.  This Court noted that the causation of the victim officer’s severe bodily injury for the purposes of the second-degree aggravated assault count was at issue, even though defendant’s causation of minor injuries to the officer were not in dispute.  *Id.* at 373-75.  As such, *Green* implicitly supports the State’s position that a full causation instruction was unnecessary for the third-degree aggravated assault charge.
[brief] Here, no such action was sought against [...] (Aa15; Ra3).  Thus, nothing in this line of unpublished and factually-distinguishable cases supports disturbing the Commission’s determination that [...] misnamed [...] by calling her [...]. even after she corrected him and informed him that her preferred name was D[a].  [...]’s attempt to blame both the Commission and [...] for his own failure to provide any evidentiary support whatsoever for his version of events rings hollow.
[brief] 2.  Section 1:3-8 of the Revised Statutes is amended to read as follows:  1:3-8.  The treasurer of each county, upon receiving the number of paper volumes allotted to his county pursuant to the provisions of section 1:3-7 of this Title, shall, after retaining one copy for himself, forthwith distribute the remaining volumes at the expense of the county as follows:  a.  To each municipal magistrate in the county, one copy; b. To the clerk of the board of chosen freeholders, and to each chosen freeholder, one copy; c.  To each incorporated library company in the county which does not receive a bound copy of the laws under the provisions of said section 1:3-7, one copy; and d.  The remainder shall be transmitted in equal proportions to the clerks of the several municipalities in the county, each of which clerks shall, after retaining one copy for the use of his municipality, distribute the residue, within one week after receiving the same, to the following officers in his mu- nicipality, giving them preference in the order named: the assessor, collector and director of welfare, each one copy.  The receipts of the persons receiving copies of the laws from the county treasurer shall be sufficient vouchers to such treasurer in the settlement of his accounts, for the money expended by him for this purpose, and for a reasonable compensation for his trouble.  3.
[brief] (Not Raised Below)  After [...]’s first trial, this Court reversed his convictions and remanded for the redaction from his police interrogation video of several improper lay opinions by [...], which opined that [...] was lying about his alibi and was guilty of [...]’s murder.  On remand, although other redactions were made, the trial court failed to fully comply with this Court’s order.  As a result, the jury again heard Maldonado repeatedly accuse [...] of lying and of killing [...].  For the same reasons as already articulated by this Court, those opinions were highly improper and deprived [...] of a fair trial, requiring reversal.  U.S. Const. amends. VI, XIV; N.J. Const. art. I, ¶¶ 1, 10; R. 2:10-2.
[brief] Moreover, making the contracts evidential, particularly the 6 AM deadline for completion of snow and ice removal, was tantamount to expanding the common law duty of care since the common law duty makes no reference to a specific completion time for snow removal.  The lower reasoned that the contracts were needed to make an apportionment of liability among the defendants and as they were relevant to the expectations among the defendants.  (1T 42:23-43:2; 46:3-11).  Yet, the expectations by and between the Defendants who were parties to the agreements are not relevant as set forth above.  What the defendants owed each other under the contract is not probative on whether they satisfied their duty to remove snow and ice within a reasonable period of time or whether their snow removal efforts were adequate under the circumstances.  Moreover, liability could have been apportioned among the Defendants easily, especially when Defendants were willing to stipulate that [...] was the snow removal subcontractor (1T 37:2-6) and when the role of each defendant could have been ascertained in testimony without referencing the details of the snow agreements.  Since the lower court’s ruling essentially expanded the duty of care, the jury consequently applied the wrong substantive law, which means that no deference should be afforded to its ruling on the admissibility of the contracts.  Not only are the snow removal agreements irrelevant, but the repeated questioning on the agreements, particularly the 6 AM completion and the prohibition against subcontracting was especially inflammatory and unduly prejudicial to Defendants.  The Statement of Facts above goes through in detail how plaintiff endlessly brought up these two contract provisions.  Plaintiff’s clear intention and suggestion was to highlight how Defendants violated these clauses.  It is self-evident that repeatedly pointing out how Defendants breached the snow contract harmed the perception of Defendants among the jury, which easily misled the jury into conflating these contractual breaches with breaches of the common law duty of care as to snow and ice removal.  These repeated references to Defendants’ breach of the contracts prejudiced the jury against Defendants, which rendered the jury unable to assess the real issue fairly and impartially, that is, whether Defendants breached their duty of care as to snow and ice removal.  III.
[brief] ## Cases: - **Coventry Square v. Westwood Zoning Bd. Of Adjustment,** 138 N.J. 285 (1994)  ..................................................................................................................6 - **Grasso v. Borough of Spring Lake Heights,** 375 N.J. Super. 41 (2004)  ...........................................................................................................12 - **Kramer v. Bd. Of Adjustment of Sea Girt,** 45 N.J. 268 (1965) .....................................................................................................................8 - **Lang v. Zoning Board of Adjustment of the Borough of West Caldwell,** 160 N.J. 41 (1999)  ....................................................................................................................10 - **Medici v. BPR Co.,** 107 N.J. 1 (1987) .......................................................................................................................12 - **Northgate Condo v. Borough of Hilldsale Planning Bd.,** 214 N.J. 120 (2013)  ....................................................................................................................8 - **Perlmart of Lacey, Inc. v. Lacey Township Planning Board,** 295 N.J. Super. 234 (App. Div. 1996) ......................................................................................15, 17, 18 - **Pond Run Water Shed Association v. Township of Hamilton Zoning Board of Adjustment,** 397 N.J. Super. 335 (App. Div. 2008) .......................................................................................15-16, 17, 18 - **QuickPlus Realty, LLC v. City of Bridgeton Zoning Board,** 2019 WL 2480152 ....................................................................................................................17, 18 - **Smart SMR v. Borough of Fair Law Board of Adjustment,** 152 N.J. 309 (1998) ....................................................................................................................12 - **Ward v. Scott,** 15 N.J. 16 (1954) .......................................................................................................................8  ##  Statutes & Other Authorities: - **N.J.S.A. 40:55d-4** ..................................................................................................................11 - **N.J.S.A. 40:55D-10(g)** .............................................................................................................8 - **N.J.S.A. 40:55D-12A** ............................................................................................................15  PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[directive] Law enforcement agencies must utilize the information developed by these mechanisms to prevent individual officers from engaging in conduct or behavior that violates the constitutional liberties every member of the community enjoys.  It also is expected that law enforcement agencies will utilize the information to prevent development of patterns, practices or trends of inappropriate behavior or conduct.  3.4.3  Per AG Directive 2018-3 v2.0, also known as the “Early Warning Systems Directive,” law enforcement agencies are required to implement a specific mechanism to track employee behavior, commonly known as an "early warning system."
[brief] I.  **THE CHANCERY COURT ERRED IN COMPELLING ARBITRATION BECAUSE THE CONTRACT UPON WHICH PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT’S CLAIM IS BASED DOES NOT CONTAIN AN ARBITRATION PROVISION (1T38:16-40:19; 1T42:15-46:16; 1T48:7-51:8).**  [...] admitted that the May 21, 2022 Addendum to Promissory Note Agreement between [...] and Martha [...] (the “2022 Addendum”) upon which her case is premised has no arbitration provision.  See Pb2, 14 (admitting that [...]’s claims seek to enforce the 2022 Addendum); Pb19 (2022 Addendum “admittedly, does not have any arbitration terms”).  As there is no agreement to arbitrate in the 2022 Addendum, the Court cannot rewrite it to compel the Parties to arbitration.  See *Martindale v. Sandvik, Inc.*, 173 N.J. 76, 93 (2002); *Atalese v. U.S. Legal Servs. Grp., L.P.*, 219 N.J. 430, 442 (2014); *Garfinkel v. Morristown Obstetrics & Gynecology Assocs., P.A.*, 168 N.J. 124, 132 (2001); *Grover v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co.*, 80 N.J. 221, 229 (1979).
[brief] N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(1) ......................................................................................  1 N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(1) .....................................................................................  1 N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(a)(1) .....................................................................................  1 N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b)(1) .....................................................................................  1 N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(c) .........................................................................................  35  N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2 .........................................................................................  2 N.J.S.A. 2C:44-6 .............................................................................................  31, 32
[directive] ......................................................................................59  Prosecutor by Attendance 6.1 ...............................................................59  Conditions Release Special for Requests 6.2 ...................................59  Offenses Concerning New Restraints for Requests 6.2.1 with Contact Concerning Restraints for Requests 6.2.2 ......................................................................................59  Victims/Witnesses Restraining DORO SASPA, and SORO, Violence, Domestic 6.2.3  60  Orders......................................................................................................... ..........................................60  Monitoring Intervention and Abuse Substance 6.2.4 on Restrictions  Curfews, Arrest, House Monitoring, Electronic 6.2.5 .............................61 .  Conditions Release Other and Associations, Personal ..................................61 .  Bail Monetary of Imposition for Requests on Restrictions 6.3  8  Page ..............................................................................61  Considerations General 6.3.1 ............................................62  Monetary Bail Seeking Against Presumption 6.3.2 ...............................62  Bail Monetary Against Presumption the Overcoming 6.3.3  Ensuring in Interest  Defendant's Inquiry to as Presumptive 6.3.4 ........................................................62 .  Forfeited Not Is Bail Monetary That Release Special for Request Specific When Appeal or Documentation 6.4 ...............................................................................................63  Denied ConditionIs ..............................................................................64  MOTIONS DETENTION PRETRIAL 7.
[brief] Defendant’s brief overstates two aspects of this Court’s decision in Grasso v. Borough of Spring Lake Heights, 375 N.J. Super. 41 (App. Div. 2004) in claiming: (1) Plaintiff’s profitability margin was not an adequate reason to grant this (d)(6) hardship variance; and (2) height is always a method of limiting intensity of use.  Db17-Db21; Db23.  First, Plaintiff’s evidence on feasibility is very different from the facts in Grasso on profitability.  In Grasso, it was the style of the home that was less marketable—the developer could still build a house, just with a different, less profitable style.  Id. at 52.  Here, the issue is not profitability but feasibility; no warehouse can or will be built at the permitted 30 foot height.  Unlike Grasso where the height reduced profitability, the height restriction here completely bars the permitted use from being financed, marketed, and therefore, constructed.  Second, Defendant continues to conflate intensity of use and height, and overstates the language in Grasso regarding the intent of the relevant height limitation.  Defendant relies primarily upon the following language:  “Height restrictions like restrictions on density, bulk or building size, can also be a technique for limiting the intensity of the property’s use. ”  Id. at 53 (citations omitted).  Plaintiff does not disagree that height can be a way to limit intensity of use, but there is no credible evidence in this record that it does.  Indeed, while height can be a way to limit intensity, residential density (e.g., number of units per acre) and commercial floor area ratio are the traditional controls for intensity.  “Density restrictions, in the residential context, and [floor area ratio] restrictions, in the commercial setting, both serve to limit the intensity of the use of the land to be developed. ”  Grubbs v. Slothower, 389 N.J. Super. 377, 388 (App. Div. 2007) (citing Commercial Realty & Res., Corp. v. First Atl. Props. Co., 122 N.J. 546, 561 (1991)); see also N. Bergen Action Grp. v. N. Bergen Twp. Planning Bd., 235 N.J. Super. 597, 602 (App. Div. 1989) (“[D]ensity restrictions, primarily applicable to residential structures, perform the same functions as floor area ratios, primarily applicable to nonresidential structures.  N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70d(4),(5).”), rev’d on other grounds, 122 N.J. 567 (1991).  Defendant distorts this language to support its preconceived belief that taller buildings, by default, create a more intense use.  No evidence in the record supports this proposition.  Instead, substantial credible evidence satisfies the positive and negative criteria under Grasso.  IV.
[brief] ”  PCAST Report at 3; see also AAAS Report at 8, 44-45.  Fingerprint evidence can provide reliable and helpful information if properly presented, but unqualified individualization testimony is always misleading because meaningful error rates exist, despite previous claims by practitioners of “zero error rates. ”  As such, error rates must inform how latent print evidence is presented to a jury, including by preventing experts from testifying that two fingerprints “match. ”  --- 7  https://www.nist.gov/system/files/documents/2018/07/17/standard_for_friction_ridge_examination_conclusions.pdf.  “OSAC was established in 2014, in collaboration with NIST and the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) to help the forensic science community . . . establish standards and best practices within and between disciplines related to terminology, methodologies, and training.