ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS, AND RULINGS BEING APPEALED  02/20/19  Order Setting Date of Valuation .................................. Da102 10/14/20  Order denying defendant’s Motion to Bar Plaintiff’s Appraisal Report........................ Da108 10/20/2021  Order Transferring This Matter To Binding Arbitration and Dismissing Without Prejudice.........................................................  Da110 01/25/2022 Order Amending Appointment Of Arbitrator........................................................................ Da113 03/22/22 Award of [...], Arbitrator........................................................................ Da115 03/22/22 Opinion of [...], Arbitrator........................................................................ Da116 06/21/22 Consent Order Confirming the Arbitration Award and Entering Final Judgment ................ Da123 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CASES Casino Reinvestment Development Authority (CRDA) v. Katz 334 N.J. Super. 473, 485 (2000).........................................................7,8,10 City of Long Branch v. Liu 203 N.J. 464, (2010)...........................................................................16,17 Housing Authority of Newark v. Ricciardi 176 N.J. Super. 13, 19 (1980).............................................................13 Jackson v. State, 213 N.Y. 34, 106 N.E. 758 (Ct of App. 1914)....................................16 Jersey City Redevelopment Agency v. Kugler 58 N.J. 374, 352-384 (1971) .................................................. 14,15 State by Commissioner of Transportation v. Caoili 135 N.J. 252, 270 (1994) ....................................................... 6 State by Highway Commissioner v. Gallant 42 N.J. 583, 590 (1964) .......................................................... 16 State by Commissioner of Transportation v. William G. Rohrer, Inc. 80 N.J. 462, 467, (1979) ......................................................... 8 Township of Piscataway vs. Washington LLC 400 N.J. Super. 358, 371-74 (2008) ........................................... 12 Washington Market Enterprises v. City of Trenton 68 N.J. 107, 122 (1975) .......................................................... 14 West Windsor v. Nierenberg 150 N.J. 111 (1997) ................................................................ 12 Wilson v. City of Long Branch 27 N.J. 360 (1958) .................................................................. 13 STATUTES N.J.S.A.20:3-30(d) ................................................................. 10,11 N.J.S.A.20:3-38 ..................................................................... 2,10,11 COURT RULES CITED N.J.R.E. 703 ............................................................................ 21 OTHER AUTHORITIES CITED Nichols §12B.08[1];§12B-44 ..................................................... 9,21 INDEX TO APPENDIX VOLUME I (Da1-Da182)
[brief] --- \(^3\)  Defendants convicted of a Graves Act offense are typically sentenced to a term of incarceration with a period of mandatory parole ineligibility.  N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(c).  However, there are scenarios where a Graves Act waiver is applied when a defendant has not been previously convicted of a firearm offense and the interests of justice would not be served.  N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6.2.  For example, a shortened period of parole ineligibility or the institution of a noncustodial probation term is appropriate if a defendant, with no prior record and who lawfully possesses a firearm in another state, travels to New Jersey with a firearm and does not possess a firearm permit in this state.  POINT II
[brief] The matter is not moot as the application was timely filed and considered as part of the program.  The underlying Program continues despite the Board’s decision to not accept additional applications.  The Board has not asserted that the Program has ceased; only that no new applications are being accepted, and as such there is no impediment to this Court – or the Board – allowing [...]’s project to be accepted and granted TRECs.  Despite this decision to not accept new applications, the TREC Program continues to purchase and retire TREC, and will do so for no less than 15 years from the date of the last TREC-producing solar project to come on-line.  December 6, 2019, Order, at 34 (043a).  Additionally, this closure of the TI Program is not predicated upon a legislative mandate, but is instead a function of the Board’s Program and design, with a termination date set by Board operation.  January 8, 2020, Order, at 3 (048a).
[brief] Defendant, however, seeks to rewrite not only this case law, but the definition of “principal use” in its own ordinance.  It argues that an undefined “character” of the use determines whether the driveway is actually accessory to the warehouse.  Since the accessory uses and structures in [...], most especially the driveway, will be used for ‘the business purpose in question’ and thereby take on the character of that use, it is imperative that the Board fully understand and weigh the nature of that business purpose in order to measure the particular suitability of the lands in [...] for the structures and uses accessory to that use and to assess the effect of the use on the zone plan and the public good.  Db13.  In other words, Defendant wants the court to ignore that driveways, stormwater basins, and parking spaces are accessory uses to the principal (and permitted) warehouse use, but to instead consider other things, undefined, which go to the “character” of that warehouse.
[brief] By failing to apply the correct legal standard, the motion judge failed to appreciate that anti-discrimination laws rely on employee’s complaints for enforcement and when an employee complains about discrimination, anti-discrimination laws are supposed to protect that worker from retaliation.  Under clear New Jersey precedent, an employee suffers an adverse action if the employer’s retaliation would dissuade a reasonable person from complaining about discrimination.  This case is important because motion judges, like the motion judge here, are declaring a wide swath of conduct as insufficiently serious to constitute retaliation as a matter of law and are thereby making factual determinations about what reasonable people think.  Motion judges are increasingly making factual findings on motions for summary judgment declaring, as here, there are no disputed issues of material fact under the guise that the non-moving party did not present “credible or reliable evidence. ”
[brief] Specifically, our order of November 7, 2005 granted defendant leave to appeal (1) the trial court’s May 13, 2005 order, which compelled the deposition of an in-house attorney and which denied defendant’s motion for a protective order; (2) a second May 13, 2005 order, which denied defendant’s motion to quash a subpoena that called for the production of defendant’s training materials; and (3) the August 23, 2005 order, which denied reconsideration of both May 13, 2005 orders.  At the same time, we denied defendant’s motion for leave to appeal regarding other discovery that the trial judge had ordered at or about the same time.
[brief] In the first scenario, where evidence is presented at trial indicating that the defendant was not under arrest or did not know that he was being arrested when he used force, the jury must be instructed that the same self-defense principles apply to the altercation between the defendant and the police officer as ordinarily apply to combat between private individuals.  (Db 16-21) (citing State v. Mulvihill, 57 N.J. 151, 159-59 (1970); State v. Montague, 55 N.J. 387, 403-06 (1970)).  These principles are set forth in the general model jury charge on self-defense.  (Db 16) (citing Model Jury Charges (Criminal), “Justification – Self Defense” (rev. June 13, 2011)).  In the second scenario, evidence is presented at trial indicating that the defendant was under arrest or knew that he was being arrested, but that he used force in self-protection in response to the police officer’s use of excessive force.  In this scenario, the jury should be instructed in accordance with the principles set forth in the model jury charge on self-defense in the context of resisting arrest.  (See Db 16-19); (citing Model Jury Charges (Criminal), “Justification – Self Defense Resisting Arrest” (approved Oct. 17, 1988)).  When there is a factual dispute as to whether the defendant was under arrest when he had a physical altercation with a police officer, the court needs to give the jury both the general self-defense charge and the resisting arrest self-defense charge, as well as instructions on when and how to apply each.
[brief] See In re Will of Catelli, 361 NJ. Super. 478 (App. Div. 2003).  The Court also found that Decedent’s discussions over the phone in her final days confirmed her competency.  (P22a, P33a\textsuperscript{16}).  In making that finding, the Court disregarded Respondent’s description of the Decedent during a facetime call that she and Petitioner had with Decedent a four to five days before she died.  (11T145:20 to 146:2; 12T 24-15).  Respondent met Petitioner at his home for that facetime call, as she knew that it was coming in from the hospital.  (11T145:20 to 146:18; 12T24:11-18).  Respondent stated that she couldn’t understand a word Decedent spoke during that call and just heard Decedent moaning, “like in pain. ” (11T 146:9-18).  Likewise, Petitioner recalled that during that facetime call, Decedent just moaned.  (7T159:1-10).  Respondent took a picture of that Facetime call that she provided to Petitioner.  (P708a).  Decedent was in no condition to make phone calls the last five days of her life.  P120a  The Court disregarded this, among other testimony when finding that there was no evidence that Decedent lost her soundness of mind upon admission to the hospital.  P33a.
[directive] Protocol to Implement L. 2003, c. 301 in the Municipal Courts – Referrals to DYFS in Cases Involving Persons Convicted of Certain Enumerated Offenses Where Victim was Under the Age of Eighteen Directive # 4-04 (supplement)  May 21, 2004  Issued by: [...]  Administrative Director Directive #4-04 (dated April 13, 2003) set out a protocol for implementation of L. 2003, c. 301 in the Criminal Division.  That legislation, signed into law on January 14, 2004 and effective as of April 13, 2004, (a) establishes requirements for the collection of information regarding the care of minor children when the sole caretaker is being incarcerated and for referrals to DYFS in certain such situations; and (b) provides for referrals to DYFS in certain instances where an individual is convicted of one or more specifically enumerated offenses, the victim was under age eighteen at the time of the offense, and the defendant lives in a household with minor children or is the parent of a minor child.
[brief] (4T:16-7 to 15).  The trial court noted that [...] was in fact the first person to respond, and found that defendant’s statement right afterwards was admissible as a spontaneous statement.  (4T:16-16 to 18).  The trial court then described that it believed the whole interaction, including what followed, was not intended to elicit an incriminating response, but nonetheless, the trial court indicated it would exclude anything that defendant said that was in response to a direct question.
[brief] \(^7\)  In reconsidering [...]’s NJRICO fee award, initially the Honorable [...] and ultimately Judge [...] were required to review the record before the Trial Court in order to determine whether the time “reasonably devoted” by [...]’s counsel in investigating, ferreting out and presenting the critical facts relating to the period prior to October 1, 2004, was “reasonably required to establish [[...]’s] RICO claims. ”  In providing guidance to the lower Court, this Court directed:  The special master and the judge correctly noted that when a plaintiff presents claims for which fees can be awarded along with claims for which such fees cannot be awarded, attorneys’ fees for all of the time devoted by counsel to the case can be awarded if the work on the unrelated claims ‘can[ ] be deemed to be part of the \(^7\) “We also reject defendants’ contention that the judge erred by awarding [...]’s attorneys a fee enhancement....” (2018 Op. at *28)  In their Brief, [...] falsely state that “[...]’s attorney received 25% of [...]’s share of the sale’s proceeds in addition to [...]’s award of counsel fees,” as if to disparage [...]’s counsel’s fee arrangement (Db14).  [...]’s counsel’s modified contingent fee was based upon [...]’s aggregate monetary recovery, including the attorney’s fees which were and will be again awarded to [...], not [...] or his firm. pursuit of the ultimate result achieved.
[brief] [...] confirmed that [...] specifically referenced “a complaint of racial profiling” in the context of discussing Plaintiff’s employment, even though [...] testified, “I don’t recall any specific allegation of racial profiling against [...].  I recall there being allegations of racial profiling with respect to the July 5th, 2016 incident generally, but I don’t recall there being anything specific about [...]”.  ([...] Dep. 195:24-197:4, 659a).
[brief] A.  The Trial Court Abused its Discretion in Admitting Evidence Regarding the Plaintiff’s Prior Unrelated Falls, Medical Conditions, and use of a Handicapped Placard without the Necessary Expert Testimony Establishing its Relevance to any Issue before the Jury (1T12:9-14; 1T173:24-174:2; 1T174:4-16; 1T175:16-176:8; 1T177:5-21; 1T179:4-190:20; 1T203:1-14; 2T29:4-23; 2T30:21-35:12; 2T39:11-13; 2T40:10-18; 6T48:6-19).  The defendant served a single report from [...] in discovery.  (Pa176).  The purpose of an expert’s report is “to forewarn the propounding party of the expected contents of the expert’s testimony in order to enable preparation to counter such opinions with other opinion material. ”  *Maurio v. Mereck Constr. Co., Inc.*, 162 N.J. Super. 566, 569 (App. Div. 1978).  This principle is codified in *Rule* 4:17-4(e) which explicitly provides that an expert’s report “shall contain” a “complete statement” of the expert’s opinions.  An expert’s trial testimony is, therefore, generally confined to the opinions expressed in his or her reports.  *Mauro v. Owens-Corning Fiberglass*, 225 N.J. Super. 196, 225 (App. Div. 1988), *aff’d sub nom, Mauro v. Raymark Industries, Inc.*, 116 N.J. 126 (1989).  In this matter, [...] did not offer an opinion in his report that the plaintiff’s prior falls or prior medical history contributed in any way to her fall in the [...] store or the injuries she sustained as a result of the fall.
[brief] To argue that the defendants knew at that point-in-time (June of 2020) the law and their rights under the law and that they failed to assert those rights is absurd.  Due to financial circumstances, a closed business lost after 30 years and living on Social Security monthly payments, the defendants COULD NOT afford to hire an attorney.  Reluctantly, the defendants complied with the court order, despite NOT recalling that they had received notice about the court ordered default judgment.  When the business failed after 30 years, there were many debts, but the defendants believed that those debts would be written-off based on the many successful and profitable years doing business with [...]; most were, like the Business Line of Credit debt with [...].  It was much later, *ex post facto*, that the defendants acquired knowledge about the law concerning judgments and their rights under the law, and whether a judgment was valid or not.  We ask this court to NOT make the same *implicit Pro Se bias error*.  That error, made both by the trial court judge and the plaintiff’s attorney, prevented the defendants from getting a fair and impartial hearing on their Motion to Vacate the Final Judgment by Default.  The defendants have followed all the Rules of the Court that they were aware of, but that DOES NOT mean that they knew the law, *ipso facto*, and their rights under the law as would the plaintiff’s attorney or the trial court. judge.  Today, using the internet, defendants can acquire knowledge after the fact about the law and a defendant’s rights under the law, but that knowledge is acquired, *expo facto*.  To argue that the defendants were silent and did not assert their rights sooner is tantamount to saying a *Pro Se* defendant knows the law and his rights with the same knowledge as a bar approved experienced attorney.  That’s absurd.
[brief] Meshinsky v. Nichols Yacht Sales, 110 N.J. 464, 478 (1988).  In contrast, pre-judgment interest on contractual claims is not mandated, but a court has the discretion to award it in accordance with equitable principles.  *Id.* at 478.  Equitable discretion is “broad,” and merits appellate deference “unless it represents a manifest denial of justice. ”  *Musto v. Vidas*, 333 N.J. Super. 52, 74, (App. Div. 2000).  Under R. 4:42-11(b), pre-judgment interest is calculated from the later of the date of the institution of the action or six (6) months after the date the cause of action arises.
[brief] Peper v. Princeton Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 77 N.J. 55 (1978).............................................................................29  Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 84 N.J. 58 (1998)............................................................................2,3,18  Shanley & Fisher, P.C. v. Sisselman, 215 N.J. Super. 200 (App. Div. 1987)..............................................16
[brief] *Estate of Hanges v. Metro. Prop. & Cas. Ins.  Co.*, 202 N.J. 369, 385 (2010).  Here, the trial court acted well within its discretion in denying the motion to bar or limit [...]’s testimony before trial and allowing his testimony at trial.  This was a complex business divorce in which Plaintiffs’ alleged fraud, diversions, and misappropriations of company funds.  Before trial, the lower court was presented with defense arguments about the extent to which [...] could testify on issues of intent.  Plaintiffs’ response to those concerns was that it was appropriate for [...], based on his years of experience, to provide opinion testimony as to intent based on patterns of conduct and manipulations of data suggestive of intentionality that he was able to distill from his review of the financial records, and the defendants were free to cross examine [...] as to those opinions.  (13T 42:2 to 44:1).  Contrary to appellant’s arguments now, the trial court was sensitive to those concerns.  Though it deferred those issues for trial, the trial court explained at the motion hearing:
[brief] Pa008-009; Pa050 (Compl. ¶¶ 56-57, 331).  Like his brother, [...]’s role included compelling practitioners to perform treatments that were not medically necessary and to make unlawful referrals under threats and intimidation.  Pa050 (Compl. ¶ 331).  Defendant [...], [...]’s “Clinical Director,” who is only a chiropractor, had oversight of operations and medical practices, and like the Bufanos, was involved in influencing and directing medical decisions and controlled which patients the plenary physicians at [...] should treat.  Pa009; Pa051 (Compl. ¶¶ 58-59, 334).  Defendant [...] is [...]’s “Medical Director” according to its website, a misleading title intended to create the false perception that [...] is controlled by a plenary physician.  Pa051 (Compl. ¶ 335).  Defendant [...], Esq., [...] and [...]’s general counsel and chief compliance officer, assisted the Bufanos’ insurance scheme by interfering with clinical decision-making.
[brief] SAC ¶ 14. Pa163.  --- 2  In the first and second amended complaint, plaintiffs mistakenly stated their belief that an eviction action had been commenced.  See SAC ¶ 66.  In fact, no eviction action had been filed by [...].  [...] simply proceeded with self-help.  [...]’s default letter/notice dated October 17, 2017, did not result in any subsequent tenancy action or judicial declaration of eviction or as to the rights of the parties under the yearly lease, which had been in negotiations for sale/purchase.  What is undisputed and clear in the record is that [...] Estates and [...] began to negotiate in June 2017 for [...] to re-sell and for [...] to purchase “anew” the same set of solar-energy developmental rights including, importantly, the WMPA and S-recs which are, separately and together, tradeable commodities.
[directive] The life convincing release clear and evidence that no establishes by State only when the overcome reasonably defendant's will assure the eligible conditions combination of or condition of of any other person or the protection the safety the when required, in court appearance criminal justice obstruct or attempt to obstruct the will not defendant or that the community, statutory under Directive it to that standard, this Pursuant 2A:162-19.  N.J.S.A. process.  See for seek pretrial detention, motion prosecutor to and no norm, for a the exception, not shall the be be authorized by this Directive.
[brief] Pb8.  As such, Ordinance Sections 900B and 902A were ultra vires and void.  Pb11.  Plaintiffs-appellants raised the issue below on their Motion for Summary Judgment.  5T14 – 1 to 25; 5T15 – 1 to 8.  In Point Two of their Brief, plaintiffs-appellants argue [...] Ordinance Section 906 authorizing a direct appeal to [...] ([...]) of an [...] ([...]) decision denying a Certificate of Appropriateness (CofA) is violative of N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70.2 and N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70a.
[brief] But *Veras* failed to acknowledge that the NJCFLA’s statutory predecessors all contained enforcement mechanisms by the Commissioner and an implied private right of action—including the most recent NJLLA, which contained the same codifications comprising the current NJCFLA under a subsection with the same title.  There was virtually no basis to reason that the separation of the NJRLMA from the rest of the current NJCFLA suddenly also removed the implied private right of action from the NJCFLA.  In context, *Veras*'s citation to *In re Resolution* in ostensible support of the notion that the NJCFLA does not provide for a provide right of action does not make practical sense given that the enforcement mechanisms in subsection 18 have always coexisted with the implied private right of action in the NJSLL, NJLLA, and NJCLA.
[brief] See Abouzaid v. Mansard Gardens Association, 207 N.J. 67 (2011) at 81 which notes that coverage is triggered "where the complaint does not state facts with sufficient definiteness to clearly bring the claim within or without coverage".  "If the complaint is ambiguous, doubts should be resolved in favor of the insured and thus in favor of coverage (emphasis added)."  See Voorhees at 173 (citations omitted).  Lastly, there is simply no cause of action for harassment.  (Pa510).