ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] As explained above, *Malanga* addressed a decision designating an area in need of redevelopment, not a redevelopment plan approval, as occurred here.  These are independent municipal actions governed by separate sections of the LRHL with different applicable standards.  *PADNA*, 413 N.J. Super. at 334; supra §I(D); compare N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-5(d), with N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-7.  Malanga simply is inapplicable as the 2020 designations area are not an issue in this appeal.
[directive] (Please do not provide specific medical information.  Information must be limited to frequency/date of appointment only.  The nature and type of appointment should not be included.)  ☐ ☐  1.  Will the defendant need to leave the residence for regularly scheduled Yes No medical appointments/treatment?  If Yes, what is the current schedule?  ☐ ☐  2.  Will the defendant need to leave the residence for frequent medical Yes No appointments?  If Yes, what is the frequency?  ☐ ☐  3.  Does the defendant have a medical condition that may require frequent Yes No visits to the hospital emergency room?  ☐ ☐  4.  Does the defendant understand requests to leave the home to attend any Yes No medical appointments, not specified in the release order, must be made by formal application to the Court at least 5 business days prior to change, and may require documentation of proof of attendance?  Attorney Visits: ☐ ☐  1.  Does the defendant currently have any scheduled appointments to meet Yes No with his/her attorney?  If Yes, please specify:  Form Promulgated by Directive #19-23 (10/17/2023), CN: 12973 page 3 of 5  Home Detention Screening Criteria (for Home Detention as a Condition of Pretrial Release)
[brief] Only “‘when an officer becomes more specific by repeating what some other person told him concerning a crime by the accused,’[does] that testimony violate[] both the hearsay rule and the defendant's Sixth Amendment right of confrontation. ”  Ibid.  An officer may not disclose incriminating information received from a non-testifying witness, and “[e]ven when an officer does not specifically repeat that information, the officer may not create an ‘inescapable inference’ that an unavailable source has implicated the defendant.  *State v. Medina*, 242 N.J. 397, 415 (2020).
[brief] N.J.R.E. 801 defines “writing” to include photographs.  Photographs are defined to “include still photographs, X-ray films, videos, motion pictures and similar forms of reproduced likenesses. ”  N.J.R.E. 1001(b).  To authenticate a photograph “requires a witness to verify that it accurately reflects its subject, and to identify or state what the photograph shows. ”  State v. Joseph, 426 N.J. Super. 204, 220 (App. Div. 2012).  This does not require eyewitness testimony.  Indeed, “[a]n authenticator need not even have been present at the time the photograph was taken, so long as the witness can verify that the photograph accurately represents its subject.
[brief] The NJLAD makes it an illegal retaliatory act, if an employer interferes with "any person in the exercise or enjoyment of a protected right."  N.J.S.A. 10:5-12(d)  In this case the employer interferes with the protected right of a medical leave by administering its no fault attendance policies so that it penalizes employees for doing so.  The no fault attendance policy puts employees to an unlawful choice.  If they exercise their rights to a medical leave of absence for a protected illness or injury they will be subject to the no fault policy.  Alternatively employees are coerced to forbear from taking what would ordinarily be protected leave.  The no fault policy attendance policy penalizes workers for missing work even if they are exhibiting COVID-19 symptoms, or have a contagious disease, for fear of punishment.  Similarly, an injury which requires further recuperation will have to be foregone and the employee must subject itself to the risk of exacerbation.  Employees thus will arrive for their shifts while sick or unhealed for fear of losing their promotion, their jobs, or their paychecks.  This type of passive coercion and interference with medical leave rights violates the NJLAD where it interferes with “the exercise or enjoyment of a protected right”.
[brief] The trial court correctly found that [...]’s opinions on [...]’s liability were unreliable, not supported by objective evidence, and, therefore, inadmissible at trial.  Without expert testimony, Plaintiffs could not prove their claims and thus the trial court properly granted summary judgment.  Plaintiffs fail to identify any error justifying the reversal of the trial court’s judgment.  On September 12, 2015, [...] crashed his motorcycle in the leftmost lane of the southbound Garden State Parkway.
[directive] Niniejszy dokument jest dokumentem publicznym, co oznacza, że na żądanie może on zostać udostępniony do wglądu publicznego w przedłożonej formie.  Z tego względu proszę nie podawać w nim osobistych identyfikatorów, takich jak numer ubezpieczenia społecznego (social security), numer prawa jazdy, numer tablicy rejestracyjnej pojazdu, numer polisy ubezpieczeniowej, numery aktywnych kont bankowych lub kart kredytowych.  NOTICE:  This is a public document, which means the document as submitted will be available to the public upon request.  Therefore, do not enter personal identifiers on it, such as Social Security number, driver’s license number, vehicle plate number, insurance policy number, active financial account number, or active credit card number.  Pozwy, wnioski oraz wszelkie inne dokumenty składane w sądzie powinny być w języku angielskim Complaints, motions and other papers submitted to the court should be in English  Sądownictwo w New Jersey  New Jersey Judiciary  Dodatkowy formularz oświadczenia w odpowiedzi na zarzuty dotyczące próby ucieczki przed policją (N.J.S.A. kradzieży pojazdu silnikowego 2C:29-2b) lub lub bezprawnego zajęcia pojazdu silnikowego (N.J.S.A. 2C:20-2.1) (N.J.S.A. Supplemental Plea Form for Eluding 2C:29-2b) or Theft of a Motor Vehicle or (N.J.S.A. Unlawful Taking of a Motor Vehicle 2C:20-2.1) (Polish) Na poniższe pytania powinny odpowiedzieć tylko osoby przyznające się do popełnienia przestępstwa z art. N.J.S.A. 2C:29-2b tj. próby ucieczki przed policją.  The following question needs to be answered only if you are pleading guilty for a violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:29-2b for eluding.  Czy rozumie Pan(i), że przyznanie się do winy wiąże się z konfiskatą prawa jazdy na okres od 1.  [Tak/Yes]  [Nie/No]  6 do 24 miesięcy?  Do you understand that if you plead guilty you will be required to forfeit your driver’s license for a period of time between 6 months and 2 years?
[brief] Our courts have held that the police cannot falsely imply that “the truth would be helpful”; that making a statement “could only help” or “would actually benefit” the suspect; or that such statements will “remain confidential. ”  O.D.A.-C., 250 N.J. at 422-23; L.H., 239 N.J. at 44, 47-48.  But the detectives here did each of those.
[directive] Agencies may receive law enforcement or judicially sanctioned subpoenas directing the production of internal affairs investigative records.  Before responding to the subpoena, the law enforcement executive or internal affairs investigator should consult with the agency's legal counsel to determine whether the subpoena is valid and reasonable.  Courts may modify or quash invalid or unreasonable subpoenas, but will require the agency seeking to so modify or quash to file an appropriate motion.  Similar considerations may provide grounds for opposing a records request from a Civilian Review Board that otherwise satisfies the minimum requirements described below.
[directive] Subject: Drug Court - Revised Phase Structure Requirements for Advancement and Graduation Criteria Date: August 11, 2021  This directive promulgates the revised drug court phase structure requirements, as approved by the Judicial Council.  The revisions are effective No September 2021.  later than Wednesday, August 25, 2021, each vicinage 1, [...] should provide to Statewide Court Manager [...] a breakdown of of the the risk level all drug court participants who are currently admitted into program.  on  The changes in the Directive include separate tracks in the program based and a client's risk score as determined by the Ohio Risk Assessment Tool (ORAS) new criteria for phase advancement and graduation, as well as associated forms.  New Best Jersey's  The changes more closely align drug court program with the of the by Practice standards established National Association Drug Court Professionals (NADCP).  on  Each client in the program will have an individualized case plan, based of their specific needs.  Those case plans will include employment, payments fines, and engagement in pro-social activities, based on client risk level, in a manner that ADA ENSURING rm TO AN DOOR OPEN JUSTICE  Americans with Disabilities Act of Page 1
[brief] “A party who ‘obtain[s] a favorable adjudication on the merits on a coverage question as the result of the expenditure of [counsel] fees,’ is a successful claimant under Rule 4:42-9(a)(6). ”  *Id.* at 451.  *See also Mason v. City of Hoboken*, 196 N.J. 51, 72, 951 A.2d 1017 (2008) (The phrase “prevailing party” under New Jersey law is “a legal term of art that refers to a ‘party in whose favor a judgment is rendered’”).
[brief] [...], after citing a portion of Appellant’s case law, all of which supporting her arguments, attempts to argue that service of the expert report is not a discovery issue.  This argument is untenable, as the issue in this appeal is whether Appellant should have been granted an extension of discovery to serve her expert report.  This is confirmed by Respondents’ arguments that Appellant has not shown exceptional circumstances to extend discovery.  Furthermore, [...] admits that failure to produce the expert report is a discovery obligation:  “…Plaintiff is citing the doctrine in an attempt to excuse a complete and wholesale failure to fulfill her discovery her [sic] obligations in a timely fashion. ”  [...] Brief at 14.  Appellant filed Cross-Motions to Extend Discovery in the trial court in response to [...]’s and [...]’s Motion Dismissing Complaint.  Granting of Appellant’s Cross-Motion would have allowed her sufficient time to serve an expert report.  Appellant did not intend to rely on the lack of an expert report.  [...] is attempting to confuse the issues in an attempt to divert the Court’s attention from the fact that New Jersey courts heavily disfavor dismissals with prejudice for failure to comply with discovery.  See Consultants v. Chemical & Pollution SCIS., Inc., 105 N.J. 464, 471 (1987) (“a dismissal with prejudice is a severe sanction that should be imposed sparingly and ‘only when no lesser sanction will erase the prejudice suffered by the non-delinquent party. ’” (citation omitted)).  Therefore, the Orders dismissing Appellant’s Complaint against [...] and [...] with prejudice should be reversed.
[brief] POINT 3  RESPONDENT CANNOT RELY ON LANGUAGE OF 201-2B TO SUPPORT A CONVICTION OF 201-2A  THE LANGUAGE OF WHICH HAS BEEN DECLARED VOID FOR VAGUENESS.  (Raised below DA 7A)  As set forth in detail in defendant appellant’s brief Point 4, summons [...] charged defendant with violating an ordinance the language of which has been declared void for vagueness.  Respondent’s reliance on the 16 delineated nuisances in 201-2(b) supports rather than contravenes defendant’s void for vagueness argument.  Complainant could have charged defendant with any one or more of the specific nuisances delineated in 201-2B.  It did not.  Instead, it elected to charge defendant with violating 201-2A vague nuisance language.  As such, the conviction must be reversed.  CONCLUSION
[brief] POINT III  THE BOARD FAILED TO ESTABLISH THAT MR. RELDAN PRESENTS A SUBSTANTIAL LIKELIHOOD OF REOFFENSE IF RELEASED.  (Pa1-6).  [...] should have been released on parole because the Board failed to overcome the presumption of release by establishing, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he presents a substantial likelihood of re-offending if granted parole.  The Board largely based its determination on the circumstances of [...]’s forty-five-year-old criminal record, and its vague conclusion that [...] “does not accurately understand” his motives for criminal behavior.  In doing so, the Board weighed [...]’s clinical risk assessments as aggravating factors, despite the fact that the assessments conducted by the Board’s own psychologist, and an independent psychologist hired by [...], both found that [...] presents a “low to moderate” risk for future acts of criminal conduct and has a fair likelihood of success if released on parole.  (Pa319; Pa359).  The Board is not at liberty to ignore evidence that supports an inmate’s release on parole, simply because it disagrees.  In Berta, the Appellate Division held that, under the Act, the Board must tie its reasons for denial of parole to a “substantial likelihood” of reoffense and must explain how its decision reduces “the likelihood of future criminal behavior.
[brief] Even if this case were eligible for a laches analysis, the equities weigh in favor of [...]  Laches is “an equitable doctrine, utilized to achieve fairness. ”  Fox, 210 N.J. at 422.  Even if laches were available here, the Court must consider “length of the delay; reasons for the delay; and ‘changing conditions of either or both parties during the delay. ’” Cnty. of Morris v. Fauver, 153 N.J. 80, 105 (1998) (quoting Lavin, 90 N.J. at 152).  Here, the “delay” was less than four years from when the City took title and sold [...]’s property, well within the applicable statutes of limitations.  It is also readily explained.  [...] did not know of her tax delinquency until after the foreclosure judgment because the City never contacted her at her residential address, (Ja182, No. 5) despite having it on file in connection with her purchase of the property (Ja3, ¶10; Ja210–11), and despite the fact that mailings sent to the Property were returned undeliverable (Ja31–32).  Neither did the City inform [...] of her tax delinquency when it accepted nearly $2,000 from her in exchange for a construction permit on the Property.  (Ja202, Nos. 6–7).  During part of the relevant time, [...] was caring for her terminally ill husband (Ja4; Ja159).  Although she consulted with legal counsel, she was advised that there was a low likelihood of reversing the foreclosure.  (Ja165–66, Nos. 17–18).  She eventually found a nonprofit organization which had been successful in bringing takings claims in response to foreclosures in other jurisdictions, and was willing to represent her pro bono.  (Ja166, No. 18; Ja169, No. 25).  She filed this action within three months of making contact with that organization.  (Ja166, No. 18; Ja169, No. 25).  And, as explained above, Defendants are not prejudiced by any change in conditions.
[brief] Defendants’ reliance on Smith v. Costco Wholesale Corp., and Weiss v. Nicola Porchetta Co. of N.J., Docket No. [...], WL 1540919 (N.J. Super. Ct. Apr. 8, 2015) (Da55-59), is improper.  Smith v. Costco Wholesale Corp., dealt with the same snowstorm, in which the plaintiff, on March 7, 2018, during the snowstorm, drove to Costco, parked in the parking lot, and went inside to shop.  (Da29).  As the plaintiff walked out to her vehicle, she slipped backwards and fell, injuring herself.  (Id.)  The defendants moved for summary judgment, and in March 2022, the trial court granted the defendants’ motion based on Pareja.
[brief] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .46  APPENDIX TABLE OF CONTENTS  VOLUME I:  PAGES 1a-142a 1a-5a.  Amended Notice of Appeal  6a-23a.  Order Vacating Final Judgment  Filed on April 3, 2023  24a-25a.  Order Denying Motion to Compel Filed on September 27, 2023  26a-27a.  Order Denying Motion to Reconsider  Filed on November 14, 2023  28a-34a.
[brief] An appellate court conducts a de novo review when determining the enforceability of arbitration agreements.  *Hirsch v. Amper Fin. Servs., LLC*, 215 N.J. 174, 186, (2013).  In conducting this review, the Court considers (i) whether the parties entered into a valid and enforceable agreement to arbitrate disputes, and (ii) whether the dispute falls within the scope of that agreement.  *Id.* at 187-88.  While this Court need not give deference to the trial court’s analysis, it may do so where the analysis is persuasive.  *Wollen v. Gulf Stream Restoration & Cleaning, LLC*, 468 N.J. Super. 483, 495 (App. Div. 2021) (quoting *Kernahan v. Home Warranty Adm’r of Fla., Inc.*, 236 N.J. 301, 316 (2019)).  An appellate court need not consider matters not properly raised below.  *Nieder v. Royal Indem. Ins. Co.*, 62 N.J. 229, 234 (1973); Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules, cmt. 3 on R. 2:6-2 (2022).  Here, [...]—again—attempts to present issues not raised in its merits brief below.  *State v. Smith*, 55 N.J. 476, 488 (1970) (stating that a party is not permitted to use a reply brief to enlarge his or her main argument); *Berlin v. Remington & Vernick Engrs*, 337 N.J. Super. 590, 596 (App. Div.) (“Raising an issue for the first time in a reply brief is improper. ”), certif. denied, 168 N.J. 294 (2001).  As discussed more fully below, Point IV of [...]’s brief (Db18-27) should only be considered if it meets the plain error standard under Rule 2:10-2.  “Relief under the plain error rule, R. 2:10-2, at least in civil cases, is discretionary and ‘should be sparingly employed. ’”  Baker v. Nat’l State Bank, 161 N.J. 220, 226 (1999) (quoting Ford v. Reichert, 23 N.J. 429, 435 (1957)).  POINT
[directive] ”  N.J.S.A. 13:1D-158.  Other civil enforcement agencies may consider using the Department of Environmental Protection’s Environmental Justice Mapping Tool to help them assess how their own actions may affect racial justice and equity for underserved communities.  4 [...] is the state agency charged with enforcing the Law Against Discrimination to combat discrimination and bias-based harassment in employment, housing, and places of public accommodation, but other agencies also should recognize that the laws they enforce also may prohibit discriminatory or harassing conduct in these or other areas.  Agencies should identify which of the laws they enforce incorporate anti-discrimination and anti-harassment principles and apply those laws to promote racial justice and equity for underserved communities to the full extent of their authority through both regulation and enforcement.  In particular, anti-discrimination and anti-harassment principles may be embedded in laws of broader applicability.  For example:  Professional and occupational boards’ authority to take action against a licensee for • “professional or occupational misconduct” has been understood to include an anti- mandate.5 discrimination  [...] may take action against licensees that discriminate against customers pursuant to its • broad authority to ensure the proper regulation and control of the manufacture, sale, and beverages.6  distribution of alcoholic Casino licensees are required to afford equal employment opportunity to prospective and • employees.7  actual [...], through its regulations, maintains strong policies and procedures prohibiting discrimination and harassment, including sexual harassment, and requiring industry Equal Employment Opportunity Business Plans and Plans Prohibiting Discrimination.8  Harassment and [...] may impose penalties upon and obtain other relief from a regulated person or • entity who engages in discriminatory actions if [...] determines that those actions sport. ”9 constitute “conduct detrimental to the Where a civil enforcement agency other than [...] has overlapping authority to address discrimination and harassment, the agencies should determine how best to coordinate investigations and enforcement actions.
[brief] In this matter, the State called [...] to testify about the August 16, 2019 incident.  During his testimony, McDowell made reference to [...], saying Minivich would only perform counts when [...] or McDowell were on their break.  Minivich would then move on to the next post.  During re-cross by [...], McDowell stated that Minivich was the cover guy for all four officers on duty, so he would cover for [...] or McDowell or the other two officers.  Minivich did not cover for McDowell that night because McDowell did not take a dinner break that night.  On redirect, McDowell said that [...] took only one break on August 16, 2019, so Minivich would have only done one count for [...] that night.  On re-cross, McDowell stated that if Minivich had come in at the beginning of [...]’ forty-minute break, he might have conducted two counts for [...] that evening.  (2T at page 4)(emphasis added.)
[brief] The State attempts to avoid the need for suppression by arguing that the detectives only interrogated [...] “as a result of defendant’s repeated, volunteered diatribes. ”  (Rb 26)  But the police had no need to respond to anything [...] was saying.  They should have simply told [...] to stop speaking, not asked any substantive questions, and not responded if [...] continued to talk.  Instead, the police capitalized on [...]’s apparent desire to tell his side of the story, without having been told he had the right to remain silent, the right to a lawyer, and being warned that anything he said would be used against him in court.  This interrogation, beyond anything that was necessary to book [...], was impermissible and requires suppression of [...]’s statement.  (See Db 17-20)  Third, the State claims that although [...] repeatedly told the police that he had a lawyer coming and wanted to call a lawyer, none of these invocations require suppression because [...] continued to volunteer statements.
[brief] There Were Genuine Issues of Material Fact with Respect to Each Element of Plaintiffs’ Tortious Interference Claims  In this case, Plaintiffs alleged both that [...] tortiously interfered with Plaintiffs’ contracts with the [...] and with Plaintiffs’ prospective economic relationships.  (P111a-P115a).  The elements for these claims are largely coextensive: (1) the existence of some “protectable right—a prospective economic or contractual relationship”; (2) interference with that relationship that “was done intentionally and with ‘malice,’” meaning only that the “harm was inflicted intentionally and without justification or excuse”; (3) “there was a reasonable probability that the victim of the interference would deliberate actions to occur against the plaintiffs for the purpose of causing them harm at work and to their business). have received the anticipated economic benefits” and (4) “the injury caused damage.