ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] (Da311).  In accordance with this language, on July 30, 2012, [...] was formed out of necessity by [...] and [...] via an Operating Agreement for the specific purpose of purchasing [...], and thereby its interest in the Property, in order to carry out the intent of the parties under the MOU.  (Da79, ¶22).  [...] then became the sole member of [...], which owns the commercial office building located on the Property.  (Da115-16, 138-52).  Pursuant to the Operating Agreements of [...] and [...], Plaintiff was named Manager of the Companies.  (Da125, 142).  The motion court correctly rejected Defendants’ contention that the Operating Agreements are unrelated to the MOU and found that the Operating Agreements were part and parcel of [...]’s promise to save the property for his niece, Plaintiff.
[brief] During the about three years, from when the Application was filed by the Mother to the day the appellant’s complaint was filed, respondents were leaving unmarked cars (decoy) parked in front of his house, sometimes for month(s), while they were conducting covert video recordings of his house and street front, 24/7.  These were entrapments by the respondents, Under Color of State Law and apparently without any court order, as the resolve of the respondents was to criminally implicate the appellant.  Through such entrapments the respondents were denying to appellant potentially available parking space in front of his house.  In another word—by such orchestrated actions the respondents routinely were forcing the appellant to locate a remote street parking space and have his 92 years old mother walk with walking frame to and from such remote location, just to be able to access in and out of a car.  Respondents had ignored/obstructed the Application by the Mother, because granting disability accommodation to her would have jeopardized the respondents’ entrapment schemes against the appellant.  These entrapments were ongoing when the appellant filed his complaint and after the trial court disposed of his case and denying him Discovery to secure evidence in his favor.  The appellant evidenced the said abuses of power by the respondents to the trial court and the respondents did not dispute his evidence, but argued that the statute of limitations for that particular evidentiary proof, was expired.
[brief] And the planning Board subsequently reviewed the project separately and concluded not to move the project any further.  6T 88:5-14 (emphasis supplied).  He testified that a nearly identical project was rejected by the governing body for rezoning and considered and rejected by the Planning Board for inclusion in the Land Use Element updated in 2019, yet [...] requested that the Board grant a variance for a larger same use on the same property.  6T 88:15-24.  [...] testified, “[U]ltimately all land use decisions are up to the governing body and planning board and that, as you know, sovereign municipal entities functioning as the MLUL intended.
[brief] Furthermore, a plaintiff cannot maintain a direct cause of action against an officer/director/manager/member for lost wages.}  [...]: I feel you're probably underselling your role in this and -- [...]:  Again, I don't want to say anything or do anything that will bring my blood pressure up.  [...]: Let me ask you some questions specifically and see if I can get this.  Would it be fair to say that you worked without salary for a rather long portion of time in 2018?  [...]:  Myself, yes.  I think my weekly check was probably 75 to 85 percent reduction, not the typical 50 percent that the others took.  I – I’m a single person so I was able to do that.  I sacrificed heavily but, again, I – as I did when I invested in the company with my personal – I personally invested $50,000\footnote{[...]’s use of the term “personally invested” is misleading.  He established in his testimony that he made a loan of $50,000.00 to [...], which was repaid in full.  This was not an “investment” made by [...] in [...]; no more so than a mortgage lender would be able to say it “invested” in a borrower’s personal residence.  [...] did not invest in [...]; he loaned [...] money and he was repaid in full.} because I believed in the company and the people that I work with.  So, again, I took it upon myself to take a huge salary reduction because I knew the other people couldn't so I had to or the company wasn't going to survive.  [...]: Right, and over the course of really an insane week from January 8th through the 14th of 2018 it's fair to say that you watched everything you built so hard over the last three years just vanish?  [...]:  Well, again, it didn't vanish, it would never vanish unless I gave up the fight and unless my partners and coworkers did the same and that's not what we're about.  So, again, [...] underestimated the resiliency and the resolve of his former partners in digging ourselves out and in righting the ship and in finding out the truth of what actually transpired and that's what we've been presenting over the last two and a half years.  [...]:
[directive] Additionally, [...] will:  1.  Promote a trauma-informed approach in the provision of victim assistance and violence intervention and prevention services and in the formulation of policies by the [...].  2.  Promote access to and deployment of services to vulnerable and hard-to-reach victim populations, and address the needs of more populations of victims than are currently served by the [...].  3.  Assist the State in developing an infrastructure for victim assistance and violence intervention and prevention services, supporting the development of new initiatives and strategies, supporting community-based organizations that provide these services, setting goals and statewide strategy for the growth and standardization of services, leading community engagement, driving program accountability, and conducting oversight.
[brief] The case then moved to trial and [...] again took the witness stand as the sole witness for the State.  Following his testimony, the trial court found the defendant guilty of DWI based on the observations of [...] and the MVR recording of the stop (entered into evidence as S-2).  (2T:68-12 to 68-13;39-8 to 15; 63-4 to 64-2; 65-15 to 21).  Defendant was also found guilty of Failure to Maintain Lane and Reckless Driving, which were merged into the DWI conviction.  (2T:71-10 to 16).  In finding defendant guilty, the trial court specifically found [...]’ testimony to be “extremely credible. ”  The court found the officer to be “clear, concise” and specifically noted that he “obviously recall[ed] the incident…listened to defense counsel’s questions [and] answered them well. ”  In fact, the trial court concluded that [...] was “more than credible, excellent. ” (2T: 64-9 to 19).  The court also noted that “as the trier of fact, I watched the results of those tests…” ultimately finding that “[t]here’s no other explanation, other than impairment, that could possibly, in conjunction with being – smelling the alcohol, not being able to maintain the car in its lane, not being able to do the physical psychophysical test, but now cannot even do the ABC tests. ” (2T:66-20 to 25).  Based on his driver’s abstract, defendant was sentenced as a second offender to a $507.00 fine, $33.00 court cost, $225.00 in DWI surcharge, a VCCO penalty of $50.00, and a Safe Neighborhood fine of $75.00.  (2T:70-13 to 70-16).  He was also sentenced to a one-year driver’s license suspension, the installation of an ignition interlock device for two years, and a 30-day suspended jail sentence conditioned upon competition of at least 48 hours in IDRC.
[brief] See Am. Bar Ass’n, Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct, Rule 1.7, cmt. 23 (2023) ("A conflict may exist by reason of . . . the fact that there are substantially different possibilities of settlement[.]").  All of those concerns are compounded by the fact that all defendants stand to be jointly liable to Plaintiffs for $1,737,113.94 in damages (before trebling, counsel fees and other statutorily mandated awards pursuant to the IFPA and RICO).  The court’s finding that Plaintiffs’ claims are “based on speculation” (Pa310; Pa316) is unsupported, as the cases cited by the trial judge all make clear that the standard for establishing conflict is “more than a fanciful possibility” and “must have a reasonable basis. ”  Dewey v. R.J. Reynolds, 109 N.J. 201, 216 (1988); see also State v. Loyal, 164 N.J. 418, 429 (2000).
[brief] (Pa69 § 11.)  Rule 7(a) of the [...]’s Commercial Arbitration Rules states that “[t]he arbitrator shall have the power to rule on his or her own jurisdiction, including any objections with respect to the existence, scope or validity of the arbitration agreement or to the arbitrability of any claim or counterclaim. ”\textsuperscript{16}  New Jersey and New York courts have repeatedly held that incorporation of the [...] Rules constitutes clear and unmistakable evidence that the parties agreed to arbitrate the issue of arbitrability.  \textit{Tox}, 2019 WL 7183687, at *4 (Pa281-Pa287) (“[v]irtually every circuit to have considered the issue has determined that incorporation of the [[...]] arbitration rules constitutes clear and unmistakable evidence that the parties agreed to arbitrate arbitrability”) (internal quotations and citations omitted). \textsuperscript{17}  Thus, as the trial court held, the Wholesaler Agreement’s incorporation of the [...] Rules requires that any “gateway” questions regarding arbitrability be decided by the arbitrators. \textsuperscript{18}  \textsuperscript{16}  See [...], Commercial Arbitration Rules and Mediation Procedures, Rule 7(a), available at https://www.adr.org/sites/default/files/Commercial-Rules_Web.pdf.  \textsuperscript{17}  See also \textit{Neal v. [...]}, No. 13-6981, 2016 WL 3566960, at *14 (D.N.J. June 30, 2016) (Da122-Da143) (“By agreeing to arbitrate in accordance with [...] rules, the parties . . . clearly and unmistakably agreed to arbitrate the issue of arbitrability. ”); \textit{Goffe}, 238 N.J. at 211 (“[W]hen the parties’ contract delegates the question of the arbitrability of a particular dispute to an arbitrator, a court may not override the contract”); \textit{Schmidt}, 2020 WL 2130931, at *5 (Pa275-280) (“[T]he incorporation of the [...] rules into the arbitration provision clearly and unambiguously expressed the parties’ intent to empower the arbitrator to determine arbitrability. ”); \textit{Fritschler v. Draper Mgmt., LLC}, 164 N.Y.S.3d 609, 611 (1st Dep’t 2022) (same).  \textsuperscript{18}  The cases Appellants cite are again distinguishable.
[brief] In particular and relevant to the within appeal are ¶ 6 (Pa052):  --- \(^5\)  It should be noted that the adoption process requires a three (3) step process: ordinance introduction (aka ‘First Reading”) and then a separate adoption (aka ‘Second reading’) both at duly noticed public hearings, see N.J.S. 40:49-2, as well as requiring the referral to the Planning Board for consideration at a separate noticed public hearing to take place between the First and Second Readings, see N.J.S 40:55D-37, and thus the process, even if expedited, requires close to 60 days.
[brief] The Highlands Water Protection and Planning Act, N.J.S.A. 13:20-1 to 13:20-35 (the Highlands Act), directs the Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) to regulate development in the Highlands Region.  N.J.S.A. 13:20-2.  Certain activities are exempt from the Act.  N.J.S.A. 13:20-28.  Exemption #11, at issue here, exempts “the routine maintenance and operations, rehabilitation, preservation, reconstruction, repair, or upgrade of public utility lines, rights of way, or systems, by a public utility” that is “consistent with the goals and purposes of” the Highlands Act.  N.J.S.A. 13:20-28(a)(11).  On June 23, 2021, DEP issued [...] ([...]) a Highlands Applicability Decision (HAD), which determined [...]’s proposed additional compressor station along [...]’s existing natural gas pipeline system in [...], [...], is exempt from the Highlands Act.  DEP reasonably found [...] to be a public utility upgrading its utility system.  The compressor station will be in a former quarry with minimal impacts to natural resources, including wastewater.  Appellants [...], [...], and [...] appealed the HAD, relying on factual misstatements and novel legal theories that ignore tenets of statutory interpretation and find no support in DEP’s regulations.  The substantial evidence in the record supports DEP’s decision, which is entitled to deference and should be affirmed.
[brief] 2.  In Determining a Reasonable Attorney Fee Award, The Trial Court Should Have Assessed Whether the Award is Appropriate in View of the Size of The Estate.  The trial court failed to make the required analysis as to whether the award is appropriate in view of the size of the Estate.  The trial court also failed to analyze the proportionality of the legal fees to the results achieved.  With respect to the size of the Estate, the Administrator’s Report concluded that the owner’s equity in [...] was $1,224,321.93.  Da369.  The minority interest held by the Decedent’s beneficiaries was, therefore, at most, 40.8% of that total, or $499,523.35.  The $1,049,589.14 counsel fee award in favor of Plaintiff dwarfed the entirety of the value of Decedent’s New Jersey estate assets.  How could this have been construed to be a result that benefited the Estate?  It would drain the Estate completely.  The Appellate Division’s comment in its March 23, 2021 Decision, that, “no one would quarrel with the notion that it is unreasonable to spend $100,000 in fees to recover $50,000,” is applicable.  (Da259).  Why would it be appropriate to award Plaintiff $1,049.589 in legal fees to be paid by an estate valued at $449,523.79?  Would it not have been appropriate, if any fees were to be awarded, to award an amount that took into consideration all of Plaintiff’s bad acts and wasteful litigation during the course of this matter and be in the magnitude of $50,000 and not $1,000,000, if any fees were awarded at all?
[brief] Table of Contents  Counter-Statement of Procedural History ..............................................1  Counter-Statement of Facts ........................................................................1  Point  I  The trial court properly found defendant’s prior convictions admissible to impeach his credibility .................................................................3  Point  II  The jury was properly instructed ...............................................................9  Point III  No cumulative errors denied defendant a right to a fair proceeding ......14  Point IV  The trial court properly sentenced defendant .............................................14  Conclusion ..................................................................................................20
[brief] N.J.A.C. 11:3-5.1 explains that the purpose of the regulations “is to establish procedures for the resolution of disputes concerning the payment of medical expense and other benefits provided by the personal injury protection coverage in policies of automobile insurance. ”  N.J.A.C. 11:3-5.1 also states that the regulations codified in N.J.A.C. 11:3-5 “implement[] N.J.S.A. 39:6A–5.1 and 5.2, which provide that PIP disputes shall be resolved by binding alternate dispute resolution as provided in the policy form approved by the Commissioner.
[brief] Respondent conflates timeliness and meritorious, but these concepts are not interchangeable.  An untimely motion might otherwise be meritorious, while a timely motion might be frivolous.  Our argument is twofold.  First, the motion was untimely because it was filed after the property was re-sold, even though filed within the time permitted by R.4:50–2 or N.J.S. 54:5-104.67.
[brief] The proof that the Memorandum was actually adopted and implemented in New Jersey is set forth on the face of the memorandum itself.  See Pa37, where the [...] clearly adopts the Memorandum when it pointedly directs New Jersey Employers as follows:  "If per this guidance you can identify as an Essential Employee, please refer to the attached documents."  (See highlighted section, Pa37).  The Memorandum then links the reader to a [...] credentialling system which generates an “ID Card” for essential employees in case they are stopped or questioned by law enforcement while in transit to their jobs.  Obviously, the Memorandum was not advisory but was adopted by New Jersey.  Ibid.  The determination of essential worker status by the Judge of Workers’ Compensation does not constitute the entire prima facie case for Petitioner.  Petitioner still must prove that Decedent contracted the virus during the period of occupational exposure and that Covid 19 was a material factor in causing her death.  The ruling by the Judge of Workers’ Compensation only allows Petitioner the presumption as to causal relationship to Decedent’s employment and Petitioner still must prove through competent medical evidence the other prongs of the prima facie case.
[brief] “The Doctrine is designed to prevent litigants from playing fast and loose with the Courts. ”  Id. (quoting Scrano v. Cent. R. Co. of N.J., 203 F. 2d 510, 513 (3d Cir. 1953).  Judicial estoppel may be imposed when: (1) the party to be estopped is asserting a position that is irreconcilably inconsistent with one he or she asserted in a prior proceeding; (2) the party changed his or her position in bad faith, i.e., in a culpable manner threatening to the court’s authority or integrity; and (3) the use of judicial estoppel is tailored to address the affront to the court’s authority or integrity.
[brief] [...]’s allegations that the application was deficient or lacking information in violation of the [...] Ordinances is not consistent with the record of the hearing.  Appellants accurately point out that Robbinsville has adopted Ordinances which govern the submission requirements for subdivision applications.  [...] Ordinance 142-77B(26).  (Pa254-Pa265).  However, they neglect to mention that the Robbinsville Ordinances also explicitly allow the Board to waive any requirements related to an environmental impact assessment.
[directive] Example  County Plaintiff Plaintiff DOCKET NO.: -vs- Civil Action  Defendant – Certification  Lack of Consent or Defendant Unknown Position as to Proceeding  Remotely  I, , an attorney at law of the State of New Jersey, certify as follows:  1.  I represent in the above matter.  2.  The court on proposed to schedule a remote matter, which pursuant to the Supreme Court’s proceeding in the above February 22, 2021 Order cannot proceed remotely without the consent of all parties.  [ ]  Option 1: 3.  I have advised my client that pursuant to the Supreme Court’s February 22, 2021 Order, this matter cannot proceed remotely over their objection.  a.  I have further advised my client that in the absence of consent to proceed remotely, the court will schedule this matter for an in-person hearing.  Directive # 06-21 February 23, 2021  Page 8 b.  I have informed my client of (a) the options for participating in remote court events, including through use of technology provided by the Judiciary; and (b) the public health precautions implemented by the Judiciary to prevent exposure to the COVID-19 coronavirus.  c.  I have advised my client that even for an in-person hearing, the court will determine how other participants, including witnesses, will participate (including whether they will be required to appear in person or to participate remotely).  d.  My client, , has advised me that my client does not consent to proceed remotely and understands that based on that lack of consent this matter will be conducted in person.  [ ]  Option 2:  Despite diligent efforts, including , I have been unable to communicate with my client.  Accordingly, I cannot advise the court of my client’s position about proceeding remotely or in person.  I certify that the foregoing statements made by me are true.  I am aware that if any of the foregoing statements made by me are willfully false, I am subject to punishment  Date: Signature: Name: Directive # 06-21 February 23, 2021  Page 9  Attachment B – Certification of Party Lack of Consent to Proceed Remotely SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
[brief] The September 1, 2016 letter from Plaintiff’s former attorney, [...], notifying [...] of the claim, was not even sent out until 19 days after the August 13, 2016 incident, based on the date assigned to the letter by counsel, not the date of receipt by [...].  (Pa113).  Factoring in the 5-day typical timeframe for mail to be received means at the earliest, [...] cannot be charged with receiving the letter before September 6, 2016, i.e. 24 days after the incident of August 13, 2016.  See N.J. Ct. R. 1:3-3.  Plaintiff went on to testify that a trailer failed to play but also admitted under oath that she could still the lights as she walked through the auditorium.  (Pa152 at 29-6 to 16, Pa152 31-4 to 20 and Pa152:31-18 to 25).  Additionally, Plaintiff’s son testified he also saw lights in the auditorium at the time of her fall.  (Pa157:25-613).  Depositions of multiple [...] theater employees [current and former ones] took place during the course of litigation.  (Pa80, Pa87, Pa101, Pa107).  In previous motion practice, Plaintiff took snippets of the testimony out of context in an attempt to present an unfounded theory on liability against [...] and Appellant has not altered their approach and looks to do the same here before this Court.
[brief] [...] MISSTATES THE STANDARD OF REVIEW NECESSARY TO MODIFY AN ARBITRATION AWARD, BUT IN ANY EVENT, THE ERRORS IN THE AWARD ARE “OBVIOUS AND SIMPLE”  In response to [...]’s arguments concerning the modification of the Award, [...] oversimplifies the distinct errors in the Award and fabricates a standard of review that is not controlling in New Jersey.  [...]’s motion for modification of the Award was based on four distinct errors made by the Arbitrator: (1) errors in the calculation of interest owed on ongoing projects, (2) errors in the description of EGPs for two projects that were subject to contracts specifically listing those EGPs, (3) errors in the transcription of three projects’ EGPs, and (4) errors in including the Bayonne 3 project in the EGP award because [...] never listed it in the Financial Reporting and [...] did not include it in the latest-in-time Forecasts.
[brief] It was agreed [...] could not have performed the C-Section herself as a resident, only that she should have called for the surgery earlier.  (Da6).  If she did call for a section, she would have to get [...] or [...] to agree and perform the surgery.  [...] was not in the hospital and there was no expert testimony that she was required to be or that she was required to drive to the hospital any sooner than she did.  Within minutes of speaking with [...], [...] asked the nurse to get [...] for assistance, but he was already in the operating room attending to his own patient.
[brief] The applicable inquiry into whether an administrative agency acted in an arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable manner is restricted to four inquiries: 1) whether the agency’s decision offends the State or Federal Constitution; 2) whether the agency’s action violates express or implied legislative policies; 3) whether the record contains substantial evidence to support the findings on which the agency based its action; and, 4) whether in applying the legislative policies to the facts, the agency clearly erred in reaching a conclusion that could not reasonably have been made on a showing of the relevant factors.  *George Harms Const. Co., Inc. v. New Jersey Turnpike Authority*, 137 N.J. 8, 27 (1994) (citations omitted).  In the within matter, the evidence is uncontroverted that the [...]’s Final Administrative Action that there were no genuine vacancies allowing for Appellant’s promotion to captain was based on erroneous facts and omissions from the [...].  II.