[brief] Consistent with the United States Supreme Court’s analysis in Seckinger, this Court’s published decisions examining indemnification provisions derived from A201 have found them to be unambiguous.  For example, in Leitao v. [...], 301 N.J. Super. 187 (App. Div. 1997), this Court examined the following indemnification provision:  Indemnification Agreement—The subcontractor/vendor shall indemnify and hold harmless [the general contractor] and all of its agents and employees from and against all claims, damages, losses, and expenses, including attorney's fees arising out of or resulting from the performance of the subcontractor/vendor's work under this purchase order, provided that any such claim, damage, loss or expense a) is attributable to bodily injury, sickness, disease, or death, or to injury to or destruction of tangible property (other than work itself), including the loss of use resulting therefrom, and b) is caused in whole or in part by any negligent act or omission of the subcontractor/vendor or anyone directly or indirectly employed by them or anyone for whose acts they may be liable, regardless of whether it is caused in part by a party indemnified hereunder.  Id. at 191.  The Leitao Court, despite reaching its decision prior to in Azurak and Mantilla, recognized that “[a] contract will not be construed to indemnify the indemnitee against losses resulting from its own negligence unless such an intention is expressed in unequivocal terms. ”  Id. (citing George M. Brewster & Son v. Catalytic Const. Co., 17 N.J. 20, 33 (1954)).  The Court determined that provision “[b]y its plain terms… is to be effective where the underlying claim is caused by any negligent act or omission by anyone directly or indirectly employed by the subcontractor, ‘regardless of whether’ it is caused in part by a party indemnified. ”  Id. at 195 (emphasis added).  Since Leitao, this Court found yet another similar indemnification provision to be “sufficiently plain and unequivocal” under the Azurak standard.  See, Estate of D'Avila ex rel. D'Avila v. [...], 442 N.J. Super. 80 (App. Div. 2015).  In D’Avila, this Court specifically rejected the argument “that the ‘whether or not’ phraseology contained in the contract’s indemnity provision created a fatal ambiguity. ”  Id. at 115.  The “regardless of whether or not…” phrase is one of the two phrases within the provision that the trial court in this action found ambiguous.  (Da431; 1T37:13-15).  As such, the trial court’s analysis and finding of ambiguity contradicts the holding of this Court in D’Avila, the U.S. Supreme Court in Seckinger, and other jurisdictions discussed above.  Finally, none of the foregoing cases, save for Englert, dealt with indemnity provisions containing the phrase “to the extent. ”  Here, the indemnity provision of the Subcontract omits that language to which the Englert Court took exception.  Thus, the trial court’s decision is contradicted by the overwhelming weight of authority discussed above.  The trial court also erred by incorrectly applying Englert to this matter.  Therefore, the indemnification provision of the Subcontract is not ambiguous because, among other reasons discussed, it “makes specific reference to the effect of the negligence of the indemnitee. ”  Seckinger, 397 U.S. at 213, n. 17.  The trial court’s decision finding that the Subcontract is ambiguous was in error and should be reversed.