ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] But the Board fails to tell this Court it recanted that same argument below when it admitted to the trial court that the recommendations in the MPA had never been implemented.  [Pa348].  Moreover, the essence of an inherently beneficial use is that it will serve the public good no matter where it is located.  Paragraph 23 of the Resolution seeks to turn this maxim on its head by suggesting that “there is a public interest in providing adequate senior housing living units in appropriate locations . . .”  [Da133, ¶ 23; emphasis added].  The Board does not base its conclusion on any facts in the record that substantiate its conclusion that the general welfare is advanced only if the location where the senior housing is proposed is “appropriate” nor explain why such a showing is required.  *Sica*, *supra*, holds that no such showing is required.  127 N.J. at 160.  Indeed, there is nothing in the record, or case law\(^3\), to suggest that this inherently beneficial use – which, by definition promotes the general welfare and is universally considered of value to the community – did not do so because [...] sought to develop the use at the Property.  What the phrase in Paragraph 23 does highlight was the Board’s predetermined mindset – it did not want the Property developed with the proposed use.
[brief] B.  SEA BRIGHT IS NOT A CONSTITUENT DISTRICT OF A LIMITED PURPOSE REGIONAL SCHOOL DISTRICT.  (Aa19 – Aa21)  Likewise, [...] is not a constituent district of a limited purpose regional district and has not been since July 1, 2009.  Limited purpose regional school districts are comprised of multiple constituent school districts and are “organized to provide and operate in the territory comprised within such districts one or more of the following: elementary schools, junior high schools, high schools, vocational schools, special schools, health facilities or particular educational services or facilities. ”  N.J.S.A. 18A:13-2(b) (emphasis added).  Constituents of a limited purpose regional district have their own boards of education, which provide for those grade levels not provided for by the regional district.  For example, N.J.S.A. 18A:13-40.1 – Coordination of limited purpose regional school districts with constituent district – which provides the procedures for how the limited purpose regional school district is to coordinate with the constituent school district.  N.J.S.A. 18A:13-40.1.  By contrast, all-purpose regional districts are “organized for all the school purposes of the municipalities included within such regional districts. ”  N.J.S.A. 18A:13-2(a).  Municipalities, like [...], are only constituents of all-purpose regional school districts because, when an all-purpose regional school district is formed, the local districts which formed it are dissolved.  See N.J.S.A. 18A:13-3.  Municipalities cannot constitute a constituent of a limited purpose regional district because the board of education governing the local district still exists.  [...], which is within the boundaries of the [...], has no school board of its own, and therefore cannot be a constituent district of [...].  On the contrary, by virtue of the Commissioner’s merger of [...] and Oceanport, and consistent with the statutory scheme governing such merger, [...]’s local school district is the [...].  Therefore, [...], as a municipality, cannot be a constituent district of a regional school district as required to avail itself of N.J.S.A. 18A:13-47.11.
[brief] ”); Hight, 137 F. Supp. at 1134 (finding no basis to prolong the detention where the defendant was driving cross country, with voluminous cargo, cash, and occupants in a rental car, after being released from jail, and appeared frustrated, and the officers discovered an non-extraditable warrant for “dangerous drugs”).  What is missing here is critical – any suspicious behavior indicative of criminal activity.  Apart from knowing that [...] had some kind of criminal history, all the officer knew was that [...]’ pupils appeared small (which the officer ultimately conceded was not indicative of intoxication) and that he seemed nervous.  For the reasons explained above, this was not enough.
[brief] Here, any drug dog sniff would have prolonged the stop because the tasks related to the traffic stop had been completed.  See id.  \textsuperscript{13}  On appeal, the Supreme Court said, “We decline the invitation to consider whether the reference to the dog was so unduly coercive as to be constitutionally infirm [in violation of the Fifth Amendment].  By the time the officer said that he could have a dog brought to the scene, he had discovered that [the codefendant] did not have a valid license and [codefendant] had already admitted that some of her earlier responses were false and that they had been involved in illegal use of narcotics earlier in the day. ”  \textit{State v. Baum}, 199 N.J. 407, 425 n. 5, 425–26 (2009).  call for a drug dog, if [...] was not willing to consent or confess that there were drugs in the car.  (1T 43-8 to 14)  At no point did the officer advise [...] of his right to refuse consent, see State v. Johnson, 68 N.J. 349, 354 (1975) (holding that the State must prove knowledge of the right to refuse consent, to justify a search on this basis), or, as explained in Point III, of the right against self-incrimination.  Unlike in the above cases, here, the officer lacked an adequate basis to engage in the threatened course of conduct.  Specifically, [...] did not have reasonable suspicion to prolong the detention or seek consent to search, and yet he told him that he was going to prolong the detention until [...] either incriminated himself or consented to a search.  By making it exceedingly clear that [...] was not free to leave and by pressuring him to waive his constitutional rights, [...] rendered [...]’ confession involuntary.  Because [...]’ confession that there were drugs in the car was the result of coercion, that confession and the derivative evidence, including the physical evidence and subsequent statements, must be suppressed.
[brief] (SDa1)  Having lost every single attempt to bring [...] and [...] back in the 2015 case and to consolidate both matters, on April 30, 2020, six days after plaintiffs’ Motion to Consolidate was denied, plaintiffs filed an Amended Complaint to add Counts against [...], Esquire, [...], Esquire and [...], counsel of record for defendants, [...], [...], [...], and [...].
[brief] 3.  The Shape and Configuration of the Property, Along with the Pre-Existing, Non-Conforming Lack of Parking at the Property, Justified the Bulk Variance Relief Sought.  (T1/69:14-23, 77:14-19).  As part of the Application, the Applicant sought variance relief pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70(c) regarding the number of parking spaces required.  Based on the pre-existing, non-conforming conditions at the Property, the Applicant presented testimony that a “(c)(1) variance” would be appropriate.  The core question presented by an application for a (c)(1) variance is whether the Applicant can show peculiar and exceptional practical difficulties to, or exceptional and undue hardship upon the Applicant arising out of: exceptional narrowness, shallowness or shape of a specific piece of property; exceptional topographic conditions or physical features uniquely affecting a specific piece of property; or an extraordinary and exceptional situation uniquely affecting a specific piece of property or the structures lawfully existing thereon.
[brief] THE FUTURE OF NATURAL GAS IN THE STATE HAS YET TO BE DECIDED THEREFORE THE TOWNSHIP’S STRANDED ASSET ARGUMENT MUST FAIL  The Township argues that the proposed Regulator would immediately become a stranded asset as soon as it is placed in-service, because the state’s energy and climate policies mandate immediate and continuing decreases in natural gas consumption until 100% of the energy sector is decarbonized by 2050.  Hb pp. 52-53.  This is an oversimplification of the State’s policy, as the state has yet to issue definitive guidance in this area.  While the Township may be correct that the Regulator could become a stranded asset at some point in the future, natural gas is currently being utilized and the gas utilities have the responsibility to maintain the system for safe and reliable service.  N.J.S.A. 48:2-23.  The Initial Decision adopted by the Board found under these specific set facts that the Regulator was needed for reliability.  H60a at p. 33; H38a at p. 18.  Specifically the ALJ stated “the proposed station is not an expansion or upgrade of [...]’s system and is necessary for [...] to continue providing reliable service to its customers. ”  H60a at p. 31.  The Court must evaluate this matter within these specific set of circumstances.
[directive] Si wi, kilès ladan yo?  If so, which one?  Dat/Date  Akize a/Defendant Avoka LaDefans/Defense Attorney Komisè Gouvènman/Prosecutor Fòm Kreye pa Direktif #01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 11172-Haitian Creole paj 2 nan 2 Form Promulgated by Directive #01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 11172-Haitian Creole page 2 of 2
[directive] Description of Requested Property which a. Indicate a description of the property has been U, S. or requested, either Currency (Item Other Property #9) #lo). of (Item The description shall include the type property or ('VIN") requested including a Vehicle Identification Number serial number and the estimated value.  in b.  Based upon the agency's participation the surveillance, investigation, arrest andor prosecution, the requesting agency .__ . #l in form of l), shall indicate a proportionate share (Item the f a percentage, of the total contributive share distribution made in or by the prosecuting agency.  The county prosecutor, the case of the Division of Criminal Justice, the Director shall determine all contributive share distributions a manner in consistent with applicable law and administrative code.
[brief] Additionally, by zooming the photo in, it visually distorted scale and perspective of the image.  Therefore, as an initial matter, the question and answer should not have been considered by the Trial Court at all; particularly when the obvious purpose for manipulating the photo was to create ambiguity in any response given.  Although the dialogue between [...] and counsel regarding photographs goes on for approximately 10 transcript pages, the Trial Court isolates a single response by [...] as support for its Trial conclusion that he was “changing his theory.
[brief] He testifies generally that the [...] has been responsible for improvements or rehabilitation of the walkway on Lot 3 along with Beachway Avenue (5T80:10).  The redevelopment area consists of Block 184, Lots 1, 3, 3.01 and there is a Redevelopment Plan that governs the zoning (5T80:23).  There is a Redevelopment Agreement with the [...] for Block 184, Lot 3.  The Borough subdivided Lot 3 because of the Redevelopment Plan.  There was an application to the [...] in order to get a portion of the Tidelands extinguished or released from Lot 3.  The Tidelands Agency Department requested that a subdivision be provided to section out just the parking lot area for ease of relinquishment of that current Tidelands claim.  The subdivision resulted in a lot which was just the Municipal Parking Lot.  The remainder of Lot 3 would include the area currently known as the go-cart area and then the dune system and the boardwalk that is immediately north of the existing gravel parking lot (5T82).  He testifies the Tidelands claim is across the entirety of Lot 3 up to the 1918 mean high water line that runs adjacent to Beachway Avenue.  The claim does not include the portion of Lot 3 that was formerly the [...] area (5T83:2).
[brief] 23 State v. Torres, 192 N.J. 599 (2007) ...........................................................................................................  23  Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) ..............................................................................................................  49  Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263 (1999) ..............................................................................................................  26  Torres v. Ricci, [...] .............................................................................................  23 United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976) .................................................................................................................. 26, 27 United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985) ................................................................................................................ 26, 28 United States v. Evans, 2022 WL 16631263 (D.N.J. Nov. 2, 2022) .......................................................................  39  United States v. Giglio, 405 U.S. 150 (1972) ............................................................................................................... 7, 36, 38 United States v. Gil, 297 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2002) ....................................................................................................  31 United States v. Murphy, 569 F.2d 771 (3d Cir. 1978) ....................................................................................................  39  United States v. Zomber, 299 Fed. Appx. 130 (2008) ....................................................................................................  40  Statutes 18 U.S.C. § 3500 .........................................................................................................................
[brief] Da1-Da7.  On June 9, 2022, an Ocean County grand jury indicted the Defendant on both charges contained in the complaint.  Da8-Da10.  On September 22, 2022, the Defendant filed a notice of motion to suppress.  On March 8, 2022, the trial court conducted a testimonial hearing.  On April 20, 2023, the trial court returned a written decision granting in part and denying in part the Defendant’s motion to suppress.  Da11-Da22.
[brief] Plaintiff [...], by her parents and natural guardians [...] and [...], filed her complaint on March 9, 2018 [Pa60-71] and an Affidavit of Merit on that same day.  [Pa72-75].  The complaint originally named as defendants [...]; her practice, [...]; [...]; [...]; [...]; and various John Does.  No application was subsequently made to add “John Doe” defendants.  [...] and [...] filed an Answer with Crossclaims on March 28, 2018.  [Pa82-87].  [...] and [...] filed an Answer with Crossclaims on April 10, 2018.  [Pa89-97].  On November 17, 2018, plaintiff/infant [...] died at the age of four.  [Pa106; Pa111].  On April 17, 2019, Plaintiff filed a motion to amend the caption and the complaint in order (i) to identify the Plaintiff as The Estate of [...], by its administratrix [...], and (ii) to assert additional claims in wrongful death and survival.
[brief] Green Knight Capital, LLC v. Calderon, 469 N.J. Super. 390, 396 (App. Div. 2021) (“An issue not briefed on appeal is deemed waived[.]” (quoting Woodlands Cmty. Ass’n v. Mitchell, 450 N.J. Super. 310, 319 (App. Div. 2017))).  These arguments misunderstand the legal questions in this case, and do not support overturning this narrow injunction.
[brief] This statute follows closely the language of the Federal Arbitration Act’s (“FAA”) vacatur provision of 9 U.S.C. § 10, which allows vacatur: (4) where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made.  New Jersey courts confirm that, “in adopting the Act, the Legislature intended to follow the FAA....”  Minkowitz v. Israeli, 433 N.J. Super. 111, 133, (App. Div. 2013).
[brief] ”  Luchejko, 207 N.J. at 204, 208.  We respectfully submit, however, that the respondents here were not merely homeowners, they were acting as general contractors for an extended period of time, rehabilitating and renovating a residential property.  In Luchejko, the Court was considering the differences between condominiums and rental premises, resolving that a condominium was a residence and carried more facts in common with a privately owned residential home.  Here, however, we are respectfully asking the Court to consider the differences between a residential home and a property that is under renovation.  Our NJ Supreme Court has concluded that commercial landowners have a duty to make abutting walkways safe.
[brief] (Da67).  Statement of the Material Facts  Defendant was sued and failed to respond to the suit, resulting in a judgment entered against him.  Defendant thereafter failed to take any action regarding this judgment for almost six (6) years.  Defendant then sought to vacate the default judgment under R. 4:50-1.  In each of the three motions to vacate default judgment Defendant filed, Defendant asserted grounds under R. 4:50-1(a), (d), (e), and (f).  However, on appeal Defendant’s entire argument rests solely on his assertions the judgment in question was void because Plaintiff allegedly failed to comply with N.J.S.A. 17:11C-3 (a subsection of the New Jersey Consumer Finance Licensing Act, N.J.S.A. 17:11C-1 to -49, ("NJCFLA" or "CFLA")).
[brief] Indeed, the FDCPA is a strict liability statute which requires a completely different analysis.  See, e.g., *Midland Funding LLC v. Thiel*, 446 N.J. Super. 537, 546, 144 A.3d 72 (N.J. Sup. Ct. App. Div. 2016) (“[b]ecause the [FDCPA] imposes strict liability, a consumer need not show intentional conduct by the debtor to be entitled to damages. ” (quoting Rutgers-The State Univ. v. Fogel, 403 N.J. Super. 389, 392 n.2, 958 A.2d 1014 (N.J. Sup. Ct. App. Div. 2008) (second alternation in original) (quoting Russell v. Equifax A.R.S., 74 F.3d 30, 33-34 (2d Cir. 1996))); Allen Martin v. LaSalle Bank, N.A., 629 F.3d 364, 368 (3d Cir. 2011) (“[t]he FDCPA is a strict liability statute to the extent it imposes liability without proof of an intentional violation. ”) (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1692k)).
[brief] Defendant has suffered such prejudice by being deposed in the underlying action but not being named as a defendant, that the Trial Court aptly termed it an "ambush."  (T28:10).  In *DiTrolio v Antitles*, 142 NJ 253, 273 (1995) the New Jersey Supreme Court examined this very issue where the defendants were deposed in the underlying action where they were not named as defendants.
[brief] Finding consistency based on the consideration of only general objectives contained in the Master Plan, as the Planning Board did in the Case before the Court, was an easy way to avoid the work that the New Jersey Legislature requires.  There was no consideration of the fact that (i) the Plaintiff’s property was not shown in the Master Plan as having any open space; (ii) the right to use the proposed open space never included anyone residing outside [...] (i.e. opening up a new park for the entire county); (iii) the increase in density per acre of the development brought about by reducing the land area for the Mt. Laurel development from 22.5 acres to about 11 acres and changing the number of units permitted to be constructed (350 residential units shown in the Master Plan reduced to 300 residential units in the Second Ordinance) i.e. a 50% reduction in land size but only a 14% reduction in number of units resulting in a substantial increase in density from 19 units per acre to 27 per acre, thereby impacting the character of the development; and (iv) by keeping the number of Mt. Laurel units the same (70 units) while decreasing the number of market units by 50 units, thereby substantially reducing the likelihood that the project will ever be built\(^9\) and the Mt. Laurel obligation of the Township will ever be met with Plaintiff’s land.  --- \(^9\)  If the ordinance is not overturned, the Redeveloper will have only 230 market residential units to support the cost of the 70 Mt. Laurel units.  Presently, in the Master Plan there are 280 market units intended to carry the 70 Mt. Laurel units.  The reason for the universal provision of a 20% set aside is that such a set aside has been proven to be such that a project can economically handle that level of low-cost housing.  With only 300 residential units and 70 Mount Laurel units, the project therefore will have an almost 25% set aside.  There was no discussion by the Planning Board or Borough Council as to whether the project can handle such a burden, as a result the chance the project will not be built increases.  CONCLUSION
[brief] ASSOCIATION UNIT MEMBERS MAY NOT BE PENALIZED FOR LAWFULLY USING MEDICAL LEAVE  It is axiomatic that public employees should not be penalized for lawfully utilizing leave to which they are entitled by State Statute.  This legal doctrine has been adopted by the Courts of Pennsylvania and this same principle should be applied in New Jersey.  In White v. Department of Corrections, 110 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 496, (Pa. Cmwlth. 1987), cert. den., 518 Pa. 628 (1988) the court held that a public employer could not punish employees for using validly earned benefits.  [W]e believe that an employee cannot be penalized for using an earned benefit in a lawful manner.  Again, we emphasize that the [employer] does not contend that the sick leave was improper, but merely excessive, despite the fact that [the employee] had the sick leave time accrued.  If, as the [employer] asserts, it must keep its staffing at high levels for security purposes, it has other options to discourage abuse of sick leave such as requiring employees to produce written medical excuses.  No such requirement was placed upon [this employee], although he did produce such documentation for seven of his eleven absences.  The [employer] cannot punish employees for using validly earned benefits.  The decision above correlates with the Appellate Division decision which found similarly on slightly different grounds.  In [...], N.J.P.E.R. Supp. 2d ¶140 (1985), the Court found it unreasonable to penalize employees who validly utilized sick leave.  Montville also considered a “no fault” attendance policy and found it arbitrary and unreasonable as a matter of law and thereby an improper act.  (“[An employer] cannot accept as reasonable an attendance evaluation system which would determine a teacher's attendance evaluation rating solely upon the basis of the accumulative number of days of absence, regardless of the circumstances of the absences or a teacher's previous attendance history. ”)  Penalizing an employee for the lawful use of a sick or medical leave benefit is unreasonable and arbitrary.  Such a policy is not a proper exercise of municipal action and should be declared void.
[brief] The Remand  On remand, this matter was reassigned to the Honorable [...], who was appointed as the Presiding Judge of the Morris County Chancery Division after [...] retired in January 2014.  The parties briefed the issues, including: (1) the recalculation of RICO damages based only on injuries that occurred on or after October 1, 2004; (2) the recalculation of non-RICO tort damages and punitive damages based only on injuries that occurred on or after October 1, 2003; and (3) the recalculation of attorneys’ fees.  On November 18, 2019, [...] appointed [...] as Special Master to resolve Plaintiffs’ renewed applications for fee awards on remand.  (Da38991-94.)  The Order of Reference directed the Special Master “to review and report to th[e] Court in accordance with the directions set forth by the Appellate Division” in its June 1, 2018 opinion.  (Da38992.)  The Court further ordered that when undertaking this review, the Special Master “shall review the Fee Applications, [...]’s Amended Complaint, [...]’s Complaint, the [...]’ Answers and Cross-claims thereto, and the findings of fact and conclusions rendered by the Honorable [...], P.J.Ch. (ret.) following trial that were affirmed on appeal by the Appellate Division, together with any additional documents submitted by Plaintiffs . . . or by the [...], as well as the written submissions of the parties and arguments of counsel. ”  (Da38993.)  A.  The Recusal Motion