ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Statutes N.J.A.C. 19:16-5.7(g) .................................................................18  N.J.A.C. 19:16-5.7(g)2 ...............................................................22  N.J.S.A. 2A:24-1 ........................................................................12  N.J.S.A. 2A:24-8 ......................................................................12, 13, 14, 15, 27 N.J.S.A. 34:13A-14 ..................................................................12, 34  N.J.S.A. 34:13A-16d ................................................................32  N.J.S.A. 34:13A-16e ................................................................15  N.J.S.A. 34:13A-16e(2) ............................................................15  N.J.S.A. 34:13A-16e(4) ............................................................15  N.J.S.A. 34:13A-16f(5) ...........................................................3, 32, 36 N.J.S.A. 34:13A-16f(5)a ..........................................................12  N.J.S.A. 34:13A-16(g) .............................................................29, 30  N.J.S.A. 34:13A-16.2 ...............................................................41  N.J.S.A. 40A:6-4a ....................................................................6  N.J.S.A. 52:27D-118.24 ..........................................................34  Rules R. 2:10-2 ..................................................................................19  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
[brief] ”  R. 4:46-2(c).  An “issue of fact is genuine only if, considering the burden of persuasion at trial, the evidence submitted by the parties on the motion, together with all legitimate inferences therefrom favoring the non-moving party, would require submission of the issue to the trier of fact. ”  Ibid.  In order to determine "whether there exists a genuine issue with respect to a material fact[,]” the court must "consider whether the competent evidential materials presented, when viewed in the light most favorable to a non-moving party . . . are sufficient to permit a rational factfinder to resolve the alleged disputed issue in favor of the non-moving party."  *Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am.*, 142 N.J. 520, 523 (1995).  In other words, if the evidence presented is so one-sided that the moving party must prevail as a matter of law, “the trial court should not hesitate to grant summary judgment. ”  *Id.* at 540.  Here, there were no material facts in dispute, and respondents were entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.
[directive] No 10% information; or (e) by means of the abuse or threatened abuse of the law or legal process; or (f) by means of fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation against the person; or (g) by facilitating access to a controlled dangerous substance or controlled substance analog as set forth in chapter 35 of Title 2C of the New Jersey Statutes; or (2) receives anything of value from participation as an organizer, supervisor, financier or manager in a scheme or course of conduct which violates paragraph (1) of this subsection; or (3) knowingly holds, recruits, lures, entices, harbors, transports, provides or obtains, by any means, a child under 18 years of age, to engage in sexual activity as defined in paragraph (2) of subsection a. of N.J.S. 2C:34-1, whether or not the actor mistakenly believed that the child was 18 years of age or older, even if that mistaken belief was reasonable.  Actor (1) provides services, resources, or assistance with the knowledge that the services, resources, or assistance are intended to be used in furtherance of the commission of the crime of human trafficking in violation of 2C:13-8; or (2) procures or attempts to procure a person to engage in sexual activity as defined in paragraph (2) of subsection a. of 2C:34-1, 2C:13-9
[brief] Indeed, the testimony suggests the opposite: the initial argument started because the other victim, [...]’s cousin [...], “said something” to [...].  (5T90-25 to 91-1).  words, it does not matter for purposes of passion/provocation manslaughter if [...] had some fault in the initial argument when one of the people with whom he was arguing was armed with, and may have brandished, a loaded handgun.  *State v. Taylor*, 350 N.J. Super. 20, 41 (App. Div. 2002) (“[W]e need not consider whether defendant ‘started’ the verbal confrontation since, by the time the altercation became physical, defendant was not the only one armed. ”).  Nor does it matter that [...] might not have known about the gun in the very beginning of the argument.  *Ibid.*  In this vein, the State also argues that this case is distinguishable from *Mauricio* because in that case “there was testimony that the altercation was initiated by the intended victim, the bouncer. ” (Sb12).  That statement misrepresents the facts of the case.  The physical altercation between the bouncer and Mauricio did not spring out of nowhere: Mauricio was being (appropriately) refused entry into the club because of his inebriated misbehavior, and then he directly initiated the second altercation by trying to get in a second time while armed with a gun.  *Mauricio*, 117 N.J. at 405-06.  Indeed, the facts of this case are much more in line with a passion/provocation instruction than *Mauricio*.
[brief] ”  [Tr., 4:15.]  “The standard for liability under the TCA depends on whether the conduct of individuals acting on behalf of the public entity was ministerial or discretionary. ”  *Henebema v. S. Jersey Transp. Auth.*, 219 N.J. 481, 490 (2014) (citing N.J.S.A. 59:2-3(d)).  When a public entity’s or employee’s actions are discretionary, liability is imposed only for “palpably unreasonable conduct. ”  *Id.* at 495.  Liability for ministerial actions, in contrast, “is evaluated based on an ordinary negligence standard. ”  *Id.* at 490.  “Nothing in [N.J.S.A. 59:2-3] shall exonerate a public entity for negligence arising out of the acts or omissions of its employees in carrying out their ministerial functions. ”  N.J.S.A. 59:2-3d; see also *Costa v. Josey*, 83 N.J. 49, 54-55 (1980) (cited with approval by *Coyne v. N.J. Dept. of Transport.*, 182 N.J. 481, 489 (2005)).  The TCA does not define “discretionary act” or “ministerial act.
[brief] In addition, when “considering fairness to the party whose claim is sought to be barred, a court must consider whether the claimant has had a fair and reasonable opportunity to have fully litigated that claim in the original action. ”  *Gelber v. Zito P'ship*, 147 N.J. 561, 565, 688 A.2d 1044, 1046 (1997).  In the context of this matter and these new claims, there can be no doubt that Plaintiffs’ claims arising out of the discovery that [...] was Sole Member of [...] and controlled and operated [...] as a sham entity *after* the dismissal of the complaint in the 2015 Action, were unknown, unarisen, and therefore unaccrued at the time of the filing of the original complaint in the 2015 Action, as well as at the time of dismissal of certain claims in the 2015 Action.
[brief] On appeal, Plaintiff raises several different nuanced arguments concerning the employee/independent contractor issue, each of which must be rejected.  First, Plaintiff first argues the trial court “failed to consider the central theme” of D’Annunzio. ”  Contrary to this claim, the trial court did consider the central theme of D’Annunzio, and in fact conducted a thorough analysis of all the factors contained in same.  Plaintiff seeks an interpretation that CEPA’s status as remedial legislation that is liberally construed leads to his complaint being automatically valid.  But that is not the law.  Our courts have reiterated that independent contractors are not subject to CEPA.  This analysis necessarily results in a finding that Plaintiff cannot bring a whistleblower claim, as the trial court found.
[brief] Following a jury trial which resulted in defendant’s conviction of the charges contained in Ind. #3 ([...]), defendant appeared for sentencing on February 10, 2004.  At that time, defendant had already been convicted and sentenced for committing the third- and second-degree offenses charged in Ind. #1 ([...]) and Ind. #2 ([...]) respectively.  Under those circumstances, defendant met the prerequisites to be sentenced as a persistent offender pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:44-3a.  Thus, the sentencing court granted the State’s motion to sentence defendant as a persistent offender.  (Da 12-13)
[directive] The the of application on inquiry sufficiency or source bail monetary a conduct to court a require, cases 57 Page See forfeited."  bail ensuring the not that is in inter "defendant's interest alia, prosecutor determine, to to authority prosecutor's a limit shall to construed be this Directive in Nothing 2A:162-13.  N.J.S.A. argue the that or bail, to monetary post assets of to used the fides and bona source the examine adequate provide incentive to fails was satisfied actually condition bail monetary which in a manner required.  appear when for to defendant the to inclined is defendant the that to believe reason is there consider if that should Prosecutors a forfeit to be inclined might also defendant criminal the court, of jurisdiction a the from abscond flight-prone  A company. surety a to owed any on debt and default premium bond monetary bail just be may words, in system, other judicial criminal the of authority the flaunt to prepared defendant defendant's if a Thus, civil debt.  a enforce to authority company's bail bond to a likely flaunt as statutory new the under monetary bail of imposition warrant to sufficient motivation is flee to company's surety the that ensuring in interest sufficient have not might defendant framework, the forfeited.  not is bond monetary a has satisfied a defendant that believe to reason prosecutor has if  Accordingly, the from money obtained posting or company, by surety by posted a of bond means a by condition bail monetary a conduct the to ask court shall prosecutor the loan, of form any or by whether gift another, or Prosecutor First County the unless 2A:162-13, N.J.S.A. to pursuant inquiry source/sufficiency bail cases in Director Deputy a or Justice of Criminal Division the of Director the or Prosecutor, Assistant the whether determine to needed not is an inquiry such that determines Division, by prosecuted the forfeited.  not monetary is bail that ensuring interest in an adequate has defendant Denied.
[brief] There was testimony during the trial on each of these issues, including from [...], the attorney who prepared the Will.  His testimony was clear and convincing that the Decedent’s expressed desires on multiple occasions was to disinherit the Petitioner from her Will and that she was not under any undue influence from Respondent at any time.  [...] testified credibly, under oath, concerning all of his conversations with [...] and her wishes for her Will.  He did the same at his deposition, taken by Petitioner's counsel.  Whether or not Maguire took any notes, kept any notes, or still has any notes is not relevant in a spoliation claim.  Spoliation of evidence in a prospective civil action occurs when evidence pertinent to the action is destroyed, thereby interfering with the action's proper administration and disposition.
[brief] Deed for the Matter of [...] to [...] for [...] Exhibit 38 -  Deed for the Matter of [...] to [...] for [...] Exhibit 39 -  Deed for the Matter of [...] to [...] for [...] Exhibit 40-  Deed for the Matter of [...] to [...] for [...] Exhibit 41-  Deed for the Matter of [...] to [...] for [...] Exhibit 42 - Deed for the Matter of [...] to [...] for [...] Exhibit 43 -  Deed for the Matter of [...] to [...] for [...] Exhibit 44 -  Deed for the Matter of [...] to [...] for [...] Exhibit 45 -  Deed for the Matter of [...] to [...] for [...] Exhibit 46 - Deed for the Matter of [...] to [...] for [...] Exhibit 47 - Deed for the Matter of [...] to [...] for [...]
[directive] Overview of Interviews 8.1.1  In the sections that follow, the details of interviewing law enforcement officers in internal matters will be discussed.  The chart in Figure 2 provides an overview of that information.  Figure 2.  Investigation is  Investigation is CRIMINAL  ADMINISTRATIVE  Officer is Prosecutor notification  Obligation to cooperate • •  Treat as any other defendant  Administrative interview form • • SUBJECT  Miranda warning if appropriate  May require special reports • •  No Garrity warning unless prosecutor Cannot charge as a subterfuge • • approves  Right to representative •  May require routine business reports •  No special reports •  Right to counsel (attorney)  •
[brief] In deposition testimony, the City’s Business Administrator, [...], explained that the negotiation and discussion of the Redevelopment Payment proceeded the designation of [...] as Redeveloper:  Q.  Now at some point, there was an agreement by [...] to make a $2 million payment to the City.  Is that correct?  A. Yes.  Q.  And was that discussed prior to the designation of 290 Ocean, LLC as the redeveloper?  A.  It was part of the discussion and negotiation of the project.  Q.  Okay.  The question I asked though, was that discussed before [...] was designated – excuse me, 290 Ocean, LLC was designated as the redeveloper?  A. Yes.  (Pa878; 3T12:22 – 13:9).  Further, Mr. Jackson explained that the Redevelopment Payment was requested as a contribution to the community for a community improvement amenity and that the Redevelopment Payment was indeed devoted to the expansion and redevelopment of the City’s Senior Citizen Center: Q.  Okay.  What was the basis for a request for a $2 million contribution?  A.  For a contribution to the community for a community improvement amenity, something to benefit the community of [...].  Q.  And what was the community amenity that the $2 million was to be used for?  A.  It’s being used for the expansion and redevelopment of our senior center.  (Pa879; 3T14:12-20).  Pursuant to Ordinance No. 20-21, enacted on August 25, 2021, the City Council authorized the appropriation of the $2,000,000 Redevelopment Payment from the City’s Developer Contributions Trust Fund for the purpose of the improvements, renovation, and expansion of the Senior Citizen Center located at Block 287.01, Lots 18.01 and 22.02, commonly referred to as 77 Second Avenue, [...], New Jersey, which improvements include, but are not limited to, (i) the construction of a new multipurpose/activities room and other rooms dedicating to programs, (ii) modifications to the existing floor plan, and (iii) upgrades to all exterior and interior finishes.  (Pa903 to Pa906).  Pursuant to Ordinance No. 16-22, enacted on August 10, 2022, the City Council authorized the appropriation of $5,500,000 to pay for the costs of capital improvements, renovations, and upgrades to the Senior Citizen Center.  (Pa906 to Pa908).  E.  Dismissal of Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint
[brief] The title of the document is “Lawsuit Funding Agreement”, which indicates the service being provided.  As that service, whether denominated as a loan, assignment, share purchase or otherwise, is contrary to the law of New Jersey, it does not observe the basics of fair dealing and honesty embodied in New Jersey law.  The Consumer Fraud Act defines "merchandise" as any objects, wares, goods, commodities, services, or anything offered, directly or indirectly, to the public for sale.  N.J.S.A. 56:8-1(c).  The courts have noted the "broad" and "expansive" nature of this definition.  See Gonzalez v. Wilshire Credit Corp., 207 N.J. 557, 577 (2011); Real v. Radir Wheels, Inc., 198 N.J. 511, 521 (2009); Quigley v. Esquire Deposition Serv., 400 N.J. Super. 494, 505 (App. Div. 2008).  And see Czar, Inc. v. Heath, 198 N.J. 195, 201 (2009) (CFA is broad remedial legislation enacted to protect consumers of wide variety of goods and services).  The lawsuit finding provided in this case is a service under the act.
[brief] ”  (1T 111-23 to 25)  [...] testified that after he was handcuffed, the police told him they were going to search his Jeep, and further told him that “if there’s anything in [the] vehicle, [they were] going to arrest [[...]] and the female companion [he was] with. ”  (1T 112-21 to 24)  [...] therefore told the police that there was nothing in his vehicle, but that “if you find anything in the vehicle, it’s mine. ”  (1T 112-24 to 113-3)  [...] maintained that he never told the police that there were drugs in the car.  (1T 113-19 to 24)  The police then searched the car, found drugs, and only then did they read [...] his Miranda rights.  (1T 113-3 to 5, 114-7 to 12)  Following briefing, the trial court denied the defense motion to suppress.  (Da 6-17)  The court found the police testimony credible and [...]’s testimony incredible.  (Da 11)  The court concluded that police had reasonable suspicion to support the initial investigatory stop of [...] because the parking lot was known to be a “high-crime area, specifically for narcotics transactions,” and because of [...]’s observations of [...] and [...].  (Da 13-15)  The court further ruled that the search of [...]’s car was permissible under the automobile exception because there was probable cause the car contained contraband given [...]’s observations and [...]’s admission.  (Da 15-16)  In addition, the court concluded that probable cause to search the car arose spontaneously because (1) the SET members were not specifically looking for [...] when they began surveillance; (2) [...] only had reasonable suspicion when he first stopped [...]; and (3) [...]’s admission about possessing drugs “was not an anticipated or foreseeable response to [...]’s investigative inquiry. ”  (Da 16-17)  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE MOTION TO SUPPRESS BECAUSE THERE WAS NO REASONABLE SUSPICION FOR THE STOP, AND POLICE DID NOT HAVE PROBABLE CAUSE TO SEARCH DEFENDANT’S CAR.
[brief] A FUNDAMENTAL INJUSTICE RESULTED BY THE FAILURE OF DEFENDANT’S TRIAL  ATTORNEY TO CONDUCT A PRETRIAL ANALYSIS OF THE CELLULAR TELEPHONE DATA PRODUCED BY THE STATE AS DISCOVERY.  (19T 19-1 to 13)  CONCLUSION TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS  PCR judge’s order dated June 27, 2023 denying defendant’s petition for post-conviction relief Da  78  PCR judge’s oral decision denying defendant’s petition for post-conviction relief, concluding a. that he was not prejudiced by his trial attorney’s failure to call two witnesses whose testimony related to his whereabouts at the time of the crime; and 19T 18-6 to 9, 19-14 to 17 b. that, as to the cellular data, defendant failed to show a fundamental injustice resulted under N.J.R. 3:22-4(a)  19T 1 to 13  ## TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | Cases: | Page | |-----------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | **Kimmelman v. Morrison**, 477 U.S. 365 (1986) | 19 | | **State v. Arthur**, 184 N.J. 307 (2005) | 20 | | **State v. Chew**, 179 N.J. 186 (2004) | 20 | | **State v. Fritz**, 105 N.J. 42 (1987) | 17,18,24,25,28 | | **State v. Gross**, 121 N.J. 1 (1990) | 10 | | **State v. Hannah**, 248 N.J. 148 (2021) | 29 | | **State v. L.A.**, 433 N.J. Super. 1 ((App. Div. 2013) | 24,25,26,28 | | **State v. Mitchell**, 149 N.J. Super. 259 (App. Div. 1977) | 28 | | **State v. Nash**, 212 N.J. 518 (2013) | 16,29 | | **State v. Pierre**, 223 N.J. 560 (2015) | 16,17,18,19,24 | | **State v. Porter**, 216 N.J. 343 (2013) | 27,28 | | **State v. Savage**, 120 N.J. 594 (1990) | 20 | | **Strickland v. Washington**, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) | 17,18,19,24,25,26,28 | | Statutes: | | |-----------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | N.J.S.A. 2C:5-1 | 3 | | N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2 | 3 | | TABLE TO THE APPENDIX | Page | |-----------------------|------| | [...] | Da 1 | | Verdict sheet | Da 8 | | Judgment of conviction dated September 22, 2014 | Da 12 | | Appellate Division decision decided June 27, 2017 | Da 16 | | Defendant’s pro se verified petition for post-conviction relief with exhibits | Da 31* | | Exhibit A: Report from [...] dated December 6, 2019 | Da 33** | | Exhibit B: Report from [...] dated February 3, 2020 | Da 37 | | Exhibit C: Defendant’s cellular telephone record | Da 39*** | *
[brief] buyer and willing seller would likely consider the benefits to the remainder that are not speculative or conjectural and that are not projected into the indefinite future.  [214 N.J. at 412]  The Karan Court quoted approvingly from Los Angeles Cnty. Metro. Transp. Auth. v. Cont'l Dev. Corp., 941 P.2d 809, 812 (1997) in part, as follows:  [I]n determining a landowner's entitlement to severance damages, the fact finder henceforth shall consider competent evidence relevant to any conditions caused by the project that affect the remainder property's fair market value insofar as such evidence is neither conjectural nor speculative.  [214 N.J. at 413]  (Emphasis added.)  In Public Service Elec. & Gas v. Oldwick, 125 N.J. Super. 31 (App. Div. 1973), certif. denied, 64 N.J. 153 (1973), the Appellate Division disallowed consideration of three towers erected as part of the project on the lands of others near the owner's property.
[brief] *Ibid.*  Further, Ordinance No. 26-20 identified that the Project would require amendments to the Redevelopment Plan, particularly the Design Guidelines.  *Ibid.*  Ordinance No. 26-20 also provided that [...], P.P. AICP, the City’s Planner, had prepared amendments to the Redevelopment Plan and the Design Guidelines that provide for multi-family residential uses and associated accessory and amenity use, along with bulk standards associated therewith.  *Ibid.*  Ordinance No. 26-20 recognized that the Mayor and Council had referred the proposed amendments to the City’s Planning Board for its review and comment in accordance with N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-7 of the Redevelopment Law and that the Planning Board found and concluded that the proposed amendments *were consistent* with the City’s Master Plan.  *Ibid.*  Ordinance No. 26-20 was passed upon first reading at the November 24, 2020 meeting.  *Ibid.*  On December 9, 2020, the City Council conducted a meeting and second reading of Ordinance No. 26-20.  (Pa272 to Pa284).  Following public comment, the City Council unanimously approved the adoption of Ordinance No. 26-20.  *Ibid.*
[directive] Intervening to prevent improper use of force can assist fellow officers by preventing them from engaging in conduct that may be illegal, inappropriate, and in violation of this Policy.  5.2  Thus, all officers who observe another officer about to use force that is illegal, excessive, or otherwise inconsistent with this Policy must, if feasible, do whatever they can to interrupt the flow of events before the fellow officer engages in an improper use of force.  Officers can serve each other and the public by simply saying or doing the right thing to prevent a fellow officer from resorting to force illegally or inappropriately.
[brief] The purpose of the Flood Hazard Area Control Act Rules is “to minimize damage to life and property from flooding caused by development within flood hazard areas, to preserve the quality of surface waters, and to protect the wildlife and vegetation that exist within and depend upon such areas for sustenance and habitat.  N.J.A.C. 7:13-1.1(c).  An individual permit shall not be issued if there are, in relevant part, significant and adverse effects on water quality, flooding, drainage, threatened and endangered species or their current or documented historic habitats.
[brief] Fourth and last, the risk of undue prejudice of the statement outweighs its limited probative value.  Due to the inflammatory nature of other wrongs or acts evidence, the court must balance its probative value against the potential for prejudice and confusion, to guarantee the party affected by the evidence a fair and impartial trial.  Gillispie, 208 N.J. at 89–90; State v. Barden, 195 N.J. 375, 389, 392 (2008); Williams, 190 N.J. at 131–33.  This prong is “the most difficult to overcome. ”