ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] [...], STATUTORY RECEIVER, IN RESPONSE TO APPEAL OF APPELLANTS, [...] AND [...]  On the brief: [...], Esquire – NJ Attorney ID: 263721970  TABLE OF CONTENTS  PROCEDURAL HISTORY ...........................................................................................................1  STATEMENT OF FACTS .........................................................................................................7  ARGUMENT ..................................................................................................................................24  I.  SINCE THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DISCHARGING THE STATUTORY RECEIVER, AND SINCE THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING THE MOTION OF [...] AND [...]  TO INTERVENE, THE TRIAL COURT’S ORDER SHOULD BE AFFIRMED (1T30-31 AND 1T24-31 AND 2T5) ......................24 (A).  N.J.S.A. 14A:14-2(4) - FILING A BOND .................................................................24 (B).  N.J.S.A. 14A:14-15 – NOTICE TO CREDITORS .....................................................28 (C).  N.J.S.A. 14A:14-19 – DISCONTINUANCE OF RECEIVERSHIP ..29 (D).  N.J.S.A. 14A:14-20 – ALLOWANCES TO RECEIVER AND OTHERS ..................................................................................................................................................................................30  II.  THE ORDER OF THE TRIAL COURT DISCHARGING THE STATUTORY RECEIVER SHOULD BE AFFIRMED, AND THE ORDER DENYING THE LOPEZ APPELLANTS MOTION TO INTERVENE SHOULD BE AFFIRMED .........................................................31  (A).  R. 4:53-3 – EMPLOYMENT OF ATTORNEY OR ACCOUNTANT 35 (B).  R. 4:53-7 ............................................................................................................................37  III.  SINCE THE APPELLANTS FAILED TO MEET THE STANDARD FOR RECONSIDERATION UNDER R. 4:49-2, THE TRIAL COURT’S ORDER SHOULD BE AFFIRMED .........................................................................................................................49  CONCLUSION ..........................................................................................................................50
[brief] A.  The stop was illegal because officers had no reason to suspect [...] of criminal activity.  The United States and New Jersey Constitutions protect citizens from unreasonable searches and seizures.  U.S. Const. amends. IV, XIV; N.J. Const. art. 1, para. 7.  “Because warrantless stops and searches are presumptively invalid, the State bears the burden of establishing that any such stop or search is justified by one of the ‘well-delineated exceptions’ to the warrant requirement. ”  State v. Shaw, 213 N.J. 398, 409 (2012) (quoting State v. Frankel, 179 N.J. 586, 598 (2004)).  One such exception is an investigatory stop.
[brief] (1T19-7 to 19); see also *United States v. Mitchell*, 365 F.3d 215, 244-46 (3d Cir. 2004).  And in a six-page discussion of the purported unreliability of fingerprint evidence in his appellate brief, he cites no case—New Jersey or otherwise, published or unpublished—to support his argument.  (Db8 to 14).  Any inquiry into whether the trial court abused its discretion in admitting fingerprint analysis evidence obtained using the ACE-V method should thus end there.
[brief] State v. Perez, 356 N.J. Super. 527 (App. Div. 2003)  Litigants ought not to have to face a Judge where there is a reasonable question of impartiality.  Panitech v. Panitech 339 N.J. Super. 63 (App. Div. 2001)  The litigation history clearly warranted [...] disqualifying/recusing himself from continued handling of the remand.
[directive] 10% permissible  Sexual Contact uses physical force or coercion and victim suffers severe personal injury; or actor knew or should have known that victim was physically helpless, or had a mental disease or defect which rendered the victim temporarily or permanently incapable of understanding the nature of his conduct, including, but not limited to, being incapable of providing consent, or was mentally incapacitated.  Court may withhold bail or grant bail to fugitive charged in another state; if the person is See charged with a crime punishable by death or life imprisonment, no bail shall be granted.
[brief] The aim of any condemnation action is the determination of the property owner’s right to receive just compensation for the taking of their property.  U.S. Const. Amend. V; N.J. Const. art 1, § 20.  The fair market value of the property taken is the general measure of the award of just compensation.  *State v. Gorga*, 26 N.J. 113 (1958).  “Just compensation in its most general terms means fair market value as of the date of taking determined by what a willing buyer and a willing seller, neither being under any compulsion to act, would agree to. ”  *County of Monmouth v. Hilton*, 334 N.J. Super. 582, 587 (App. Div.), *cert. denied*, 167 N.J. 633 (2001).  The sole issue in this matter is the amount of “just compensation” for the taking of the easement upon Appellant’s Property.
[brief] Da391-93.  While [...] complained – and the lower court accepted –that it has produced “voluminous” documents and deposition transcripts\(^{12}\) from the underlying Utilities Litigation, this is a red herring.  First, with or without [...]’s participation in the coverage litigation, [...] would have had to produce these same documents to the other insurers.  There is no conceivable scenario where [...] could pursue its claim for defense and indemnity without producing the documents that relate to those topics and [...] did not incur the costs of discovery because of [...].  The only costs that are specific to [...] are [...]’s serving and responding to written discovery.  Because both [...] and [...] served and responded to such discovery, there is no inequity.  Further, because the duty to defend implicates, in part, \(^{12}\) The court’s reliance on [...]’s production of deposition transcripts from the Utilities Litigation is misplaced.
[brief] On June 24, 2021, [...] ask [...] to reconsider its denial, arguing that the Scenic Resources and Design Rule does not apply to the Project because: a) other nearby buildings did not meet the setback requirement and b) the view corridor and setbacks normally applicable to developments next to a boardwalk were inapplicable because Ocean Avenue would separate the proposed building from the boardwalk.  (Ra97-115).  On July 13, 2021, [...] sent [...] a copy of “Design Guidelines Handbook 6” of the “Long Branch Design Guidelines for the Beachfront South Area,” where the Project is located, but not the 2020 Design Guidelines amendment.  (Ra116-125).  [...] then argued that [...] approved the guidelines and the Scenic Resources and Design Rule was not applicable to that part of Long Branch.  (Ra116).  In further support of its reconsideration request and to demonstrate visual compatibility, [...] submitted a height and setback survey of Long Branch properties similarly situated to the Project along Ocean Avenue.  (Ra126-141).  On August 3, 2021, [...] declined to reconsider its denial (Ra142), and on August 5, 2021, [...] requested an adjudicatory hearing on the permit application denial.
[directive] An officer shall not activate a BWC while in a courtroom during court proceedings, unless the officer is responding to a call for service or is authorized to use constructive force or authority.  7.5  De-Activation/Removal of BWC From Alcohol Breath Testing Area.  In order to eliminate any argument that radio frequency interference from a BWC affected an electronic alcohol breath test, BWCs shall be deactivated, turned off and removed from the area of the breath test instrument before an electronic breath test is conducted.
[directive] A specific incident is required, but unlike Item 11, presence in a police report or criminal record is not required.  ✔  The incident must include physical contact, the use or attempted use of a weapon to contact the person’s body, or a threat of harm ✔ made while displaying a weapon.  The violent incident must have occurred on a separate occasion, before the Index Assault.  Information can come from sources ✔ other than criminal justice documentation, and the incident does not need to be known to the police.  ________________________________________________________________________________________________________  ________________________________________________________________________________________________________  ________________________________________________________________________________________________________  3  © 2017 [...] ODARA Scoring Form 10.
[directive] An act domestic violence means the occurrence one more the enumerated acts inflicted upon 3 or of a person protected under the Prevention Domestic Violence Act by an adult an emancipated minor pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:25-19(a}. Complex• [...] PO Box 037 • [...]  Directive #19-19 - "Guidelines for Extreme Risk Protective Orders"  August 12, 2019  Page 3  There is no fee for applying for an extreme risk protective order pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:58- 23(c).
[brief] [FEDa158].  By seeking to introduce these alleged statements, Appellants improperly seek to introduce parol evidence that goes beyond the terms of the fully integrated agreements between the parties.  Based on the parties’ fully integrated agreements, these belatedly proposed claims are without merit and, thus, futile.  As a result of Appellants’ inability to prove damages based on any alleged representations, since the direct and proximate cause of their damages was their own failure to pay rent, and their inability to augment the terms of the Lease and Purchase and Sale Agreement with these newly raised allegations, the proposed fraud in the inducement claim is futile.
[brief] The implications of the trial court’s no-relevancy-review approach are startling.  As courts, commentators, and even Plaintiffs agree, there is no way to design ESI search terms that will wholly exclude irrelevant documents.  Forgoing relevancy review thus leaves parties with an untenable choice: use search terms to screen ESI while producing vast quantities of irrelevant information, or forgo the potential efficiencies of ESI screening altogether.  That outcome would harm everyone, not just the party forced to produce legally irrelevant—but still highly sensitive—documents.  It would compound discovery costs, as producing parties would need to conduct laborious privilege reviews for thousands of irrelevant documents, while requesting parties would waste time wading through the same stack of irrelevant documents in which they have no legitimate interest.  It would force courts to police unnecessary disputes—resolving claims of privilege for irrelevant documents and enforcing confidentiality orders for documents that never should have been produced in the first place.  And it would do nothing to advance the purpose of discovery, which is to enable litigants to obtain non-privileged information relevant to the “subject matter involved in the pending action. ”  R. 4:10-2(a).  For these reasons, the ESI Order should be reversed.
[brief] See Matter of Proposed Constr. of Compressor Station, 476 N.J. Super. 556, 561 (App. Div. 2023).  The [...] attempts to provide the required feasibility determination and rationale in its legal brief, post hoc, and without any citation to the record.  The [...] claimed in its brief that the agency “determined that a bridge is not feasible,” [...] Rb18, but there is no citation to the record.
[brief] SUMMARY  JUDGMENT WAS IMPROPERLY GRANTED AS DEFENDANTS’ ACTIONS CREATED THE HAZARDOUS CONDITION (Pa303)  When a person assumes a duty to the general public, albeit a duty he was not bound to assume, he must thereafter discharge that duty with due care.  While it is true that homeowners in New Jersey generally have no duty to remove snow and ice from an abutting sidewalk, there is an exception to that rule.  Specifically, a homeowner loses sidewalk immunity where the owner creates or exacerbates a dangerous sidewalk condition.  *Luchejko v. City of Hoboken*, 207 N.J. 191, 201 (2011).  In the case at bar, there is a genuine issues of material fact as to whether defendant, by engaging in snow removal actions, created or exacerbated the hazardous condition, which caused plaintiff to fall and sustain injury.  Summary Judgment was granted on the basis that the ice condition was predicated on a freeze event that occurred the night before the incident.  However, the freeze event would not have created this icy condition if the Defendant had not piled the snow uphill from the sidewalk.  The general principles are clear.  An owner has no duty to keep the sidewalk abutting his land free from the natural accumulation of snow and ice.  *Saco v. Hall*, 1 N.J. 377 (1949).  To this general principle well-recognized exceptions have been established; namely, whether defendant's conduct created an unreasonable risk of harm to the injured party and whether defendant violated any duty to the injured pedestrian.  *Dupree v. City of Clifton*, 351 N.J. Super. 237, 246-247 (App. Div. 2002), aff'd o.b. 175 N.J. 449 (2003).  The theory underlying the rule that a landowner should be under no duty to keep the sidewalk bordering his land free from the natural accumulation of snow is that the pedestrian should be expected to endure the ordinary hazards created by natural conditions, including ice formed by the natural and incidental flow of surface water from melting snow and ice over the public sidewalk.
[brief] Plaintiffs’ argument that the [...] could have incorporated a specific height restriction in the Genesis Deed misses the mark because the [...] plainly intended to vest authority over the entire community in the “property owners’ association,” i.e., [...].  This historical fact—reached before the close of discovery—is well-documented in [...]’s opening merits brief and Plaintiffs fail to cite contrary evidence.  As the non-moving party, [...] was entitled to all reasonable factual inferences in its favor; but the trial court did just the opposite in concluding [...] lacks authority to implement and enforce the “rules” to which Plaintiffs agreed to “faithfully abide.
[brief] Davis v. Brickman Landscaping, Ltd., 219 N.J. 395, 405 (2014).  Summary judgment is appropriate when “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact challenged and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment or order as a matter of law. ”  R. 4:46-2(c).  On summary judgment, the court must view the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.  Estate of Hanges v. Metropolitan Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 202 N.J. 369, 374 (2010).  The non-moving party may not simply allege any disputed fact; to defeat summary judgment, the non-movant must identify genuine disputes of material fact that a rational factfinder could resolve in the non-movant’s favor.  Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520, 529 (1995).  If there are no such disputes of material fact, an appellate court must next decide whether the trial court properly applied the law to the facts.
[brief] The [...] policy only applies to liability for bodily injury that results from an “occurrence,” unequivocally defined as “an accident” that causes “bodily injury,” which is defined as “bodily harm, sickness or disease, including required care, loss of services and death that results. ” (Da7, Da8).  In this instance, the underlying complaint specifically described conduct by [...] that was voluntary and intentional – regardless of what was exactly his intent towards the recipient of his actions – and not by any definition an “accident. ” (Pa183-Pa193).  The underlying complaint sought injunctive relief and damages for contract shortcomings occasioned by [...]’ behavior, as well as for assault and harassment (Pa183-Pa193).  Bodily injury was not the basis upon which damages were sought.
[brief] However, Respondents brief omits the following language on the same page of the decision in *Olds*:  The line between transactional and litigation representation, however, is not always clear.  Often, the same law firm or even the same attorney may represent a client in both transactional and litigation matters.  Thus, transactional attorneys and their firms often have an ongoing relationship with their clients.  **Requiring a client to notify a trial court of a potential malpractice claim relating to one transaction** when the attorney or firm continues to represent the client on other matters **can intrude unduly on the attorney–client relationship.
[directive] 4  Directive Seized Cash Management Policy Directive  Weed and Seed Initiative; Transfers of Real Property  9 the Directive Expeditious Payment Liens, Mortgages and Taxes by of 14 of Department the Treasury Directive  18  Policy for Payment(s) to Local, County, and State Police Officers Participating with Treasury Law Enforcement Agencies  27  Directive Processing Interlocutory Sales of Directive Seizure of Motor Vehicles, Payment Liens and Official Use  33  Requirements  Directive Adoptive Seizure Policies and Procedures  34  EOAF Policy Directives are periodically revised due to changes in the law or to improve To the efficiency and effectiveness of Treasury Forfeiture Fund operations.
[brief] See Order on Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 40 at 13).  Previously, in this case, the district judge declined to address Defendants’ argument that Plaintiff is not entitled to remedies under the Song-Beverly Act.  The Court ruled that because Plaintiff is entitled to remedies under the California Commercial Code, Cal. Com. Code § 2714(2), the Court need not address the availability of remedies under the Song-Beverly Act.  ECF No. 43 at 7.  To the extent that Plaintiff is seeking discovery relevant only to damages available under the Song-Beverly Act, it behooves this Court to determine Plaintiff’s entitlement to that discovery.  Plaintiff is entitled to discovery relevant to “claims and defenses” under Rule 26.  With the dismissal of all Song-Beverly claims, the question is whether Plaintiff’s claim under the MMWA incorporates the remedial scheme of the Song-Beverly Act.  If so, Plaintiff is entitled to discovery to support his damage claim under the MMWA.  If not, that is, if the MMWA does not include Song-Beverly damages in this case, Plaintiff is not entitled to Song-Beverly discovery.  Recently, one of our sister courts decided that very issue adversely to Plaintiff’s position.  In Scott v. Jayco, Inc., 443 F. Supp. 3d 1143, 1150-51 (E.D. Cal. 2020), the court found that the relevant or applicable state law to inform the remedies available under the MMWA to a plaintiff in California who cannot assert claims under the Song-Beverly Act, but has remedies otherwise available under state law, is that other state law, and not the Song-Beverly Act.  Here, the district judge has found that Plaintiff has a remedy under the California Commercial Code, Cal. Com. Code § 2714(2).  The remedy comports with Plaintiff’s claim under the MMWA for violation of an express warranty.  Consequently, as in Scott, the Court finds that Plaintiff is not entitled to discovery relevant only to damages available under the Song-Beverly Act.  Plaintiff argues his desire to obtain this discovery but does not tie those desires to any specific RFPs.  To the extent that Plaintiff seeks that discovery in connection with the disputed RFPs, the motion to compel is DENIED.
[directive] Strict Home Detention must be ordered for defendants ordered to home detention who are only permitted to leave the residence to comply with court requirements or meet with defense counsel.  Strict Home Detention is more restrictive than HDLE.  Specifically, a defendant ordered to Strict HD shall only be permitted to leave their residence for attending (1) in-person court appearances, (2) in-person pretrial appointments with Pretrial Services or in-person Instructions  Promulgated via Directive #19-23 (10/17/2023), CN: 12972 page 5 of 8 Probation appointments, or (3) in-person appointments with counsel after providing 48-hour notice to PSP.  Defendants ordered to Strict HD must remain confined to their homes at all other times and shall not have any additional exceptions.  Prior to ordering a defendant to Strict HD the court must ensure that the defendant is able to comply with the condition.
[directive] E.  The DL&PS SADA interest generated from the shall be periodically DCJ transferred by the the Asset Maintenance Account as outlined under to 02.  Forfeiture Prowam Administration Standard Operatinq Proceduires  2 4  Establishment an Asset Maintenance Account of placed into  All DL&PS SADA interest generated from the shall be a A of dedicated fund maintained by the Department the Treasury and the DCJ.  known fund administered by the This dedicated shall be as Asset (AMA).  Maintenance Account AMA in B.  Explnditures from the shall be made accordance with Forfeiture 12 Proaram Administration Standard Operatina Procedcures only for costs forfeiture related purposes.  Forfeiture related purposes are those directly related to the administration or operation of the Statewide forfeiture program and the seizure, acquisition, maintenance and preservation of seized property prior a final judgment of forfeiture.  Unless otheNvise to approved by the Attorney General a specific case, forfeiture related in of purposes shall not include the cost routine maintenance of forfeited property for the use of the agency.
[brief] It was not a conspiracy to commit aggravated assault if [...] purposely agreed to promote the fight yet only acted knowingly as to the result of the fight.  See Model Penal Code Commentaries, § 5.03 at 407-08.  It was even more nonsensical to instruct the jury that [...] could have purposely entered into an agreement to facilitate recklessly causing a particular result.  “An actor cannot intend an unintended result. ”  Rhett, 127 N.J. at 7.  But the instructions here included that “logical impossibility. ”  Ibid.  In short, the court’s instructions on conspiracy to commit aggravated assault failed to communicate the elements of that offense: that [...] purposely agreed to promote or facilitate aggravated assault and specifically intended that significant bodily injury result.  This faulty jury instruction that permitted the jury to convict without a finding of the requisite purposeful mens rea was particularly harmful in this case because of the dearth of evidence that [...] specifically intended to cause significant bodily injury.
[directive] In the vast majority of interactions between law enforcement and the general public, gender is irrelevant: a law enforcement officer will have no occasion to treat men or women any differently whether they are a suspect, victim, or witness.  But some interactions do turn on an individual’s gender.  Such interactions can include certain non-exigent custodial strip searches (in which cross- gender searches are prohibited), as well as gender-segregated detention in police stations.  The general rule under this Directive is simple: whenever the action that an officer takes depends at least in part on an individual’s gender, then that action shall be performed in accordance with the individual’s gender identity, regardless of the gender that individual was assigned at birth and/or their anatomical characteristics, including but not limited to the examples outlined below.  In other words, officers must treat a transgender woman as they would treat any other woman, and they must treat a transgender man as they would treat any other man.
[brief] (1T26:17-23).  The trial court’s sanctions award is consistent with this Court’s recent decision in Trautner (to which Plaintiffs cite, (Pb39)).  Trautner, 2024 WL 1708605 at *1.  In Trautner, this Court affirmed an award of sanctions against the [...] (the “Borough”) in connection with its pursuit of claims against its former attorneys and a developer that had previously obtained a judgment against the Borough.  Sanctions were warranted, this Court found, because the Borough “knew or should have known, when it filed suit . . . that its claims were contrary to the clear evidence[.]”