ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Civil Action ORDER GRANTING A FINAL AWARD OF FEES AND DISBURSEMENTS TO THE ADMINISTRATOR, DESIGNATING DEFENDANT (OR HIS AGENT) AS A PARTY HAVING THE AUTHORITY TO FILE A NON-RESIDENT UNITED STATES TAX RETURN, FORM 706-NA, IF HE OR HIS AGENT DETERMINES THE FILING OF THE RETURN IS REQUIRED, AND DISCHARGING THE ADMINISTRATOR OF ANY FURTHER DUTIES AS ADMINISTRATOR IN THIS MATTER THIS MATTER having been brought before the Court by [...], Esq., (the "Administrator") in his capacity as the Administrator of the Non-Resident New Jersey Estate of [...], Deceased (the "Estate"), in the presence of [...], P.C. ([...], Esq., appearing), Attorneys for Plaintiff, [...]) and [...], Attorneys for Defendant, [...] ([...], Esq., appearing), and for good cause appearing, NOW THEREFORE, IT IS on this 19th day of June, 2023, ORDERED as follows:  1.  That a final award of $25,000.00 (the "Final Award") be, and hereby is, awarded to the Administrator for fees and disbursements; 2.  That no further request for fees and/or disbursements shall be made by the Administrator and no additional fees and/or disbursements shall be authorized beyond this Final Award; 3.  That Defendant, in order to assist the Administrator in the completion of his responsibilities as Administrator of the Estate, and in exchange for this negotiated Final Award, and to facilitate a prompt payment of the Final Award, and with the knowledge that the payment of fees is the responsibility of the Estate of [...], has agreed to pay the Final Award to the Administrator from his personal funds without prejudice to his right to obtain reimbursement from the Estate's interest in [...], with such payment being made within fourteen (14) days from the entry of this Order; 4.  That the Administrator's designation of Defendant [...] (or [...]'s agent) as a person having the authority to file a Non-Resident United States Tax Return, Form 706-NA, if they determine that one is required to be filed, is approved; 5.  That [...], Esq., the Administrator, be, and hereby is, discharged of any and all further duties as Administrator; 6.  That the within Order is the final order in this matter that concludes all issues and proceedings presently before the trial court in connection with this action; and, 7.  That a copy of the within Order shall be served via email upon all parties within seven (7) days of the date hereof.
[directive] 2.6  Warning and opportunity to comply.  Officers should generally not use force immediately when encountering noncompliance with verbal directions.  Instead, whenever feasible, before using force, officers shall: (a) provide clear instructions and warnings; (b) attempt to determine whether the person has a special need, mental condition, physical limitation, developmental disability, or language barrier (See Section 2.7); (c) state the consequences of refusing to comply with a mandatory directive, including that force will be used unless the person complies; and (d) give the suspect a reasonable opportunity to comply.
[brief] Ibid.  At some point, Absecon police allegedly “kidnapped” [...] and returned him to the police station against medical advice and before he had been medically discharged.  Ibid.  [...] alleges that hospital staff, but not the police, called [...] to inform him of that.  Ibid.  [...] allegedly attempted to commit suicide again while at home several days later.  (Pa22).  [...] allegedly attempted to procure an emergency judicial order to keep [...] at the hospital by asking to speak with the emergency judge on duty in Vicinage I at the time [...] was hospitalized, spoke to the judge’s law clerk and explained the situation, and was told he would receive a call back, but did not receive a call.
[brief] They claimed yet another imminent loan closing that would facilitate payment of the Judgment.  Plaintiff opposed the Sale Objection, citing the historic failure of Defendants to close refinancing transactions.  Da244.  Plaintiff proved prescient.  The refinancing transaction did not close, and on January 22, 2024, after the hearing, the Court overruled the Sale Objection, issuing a written order (the “Sale Confirmation Order”).
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE AVAILABILITY OF STATE ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS PRECLUDES AN IMPLIED PRIVATE RIGHT OF ACTION UNDER THE CONSUMER FINANCE LICENSING ACT (RAISED BELOW: T1)**  In granting Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, the trial court reasoned that the “NJCFLA does not confer a private right of action.  Only the Commissioner of Banking and Insurance has the authority to pursue claims for violations of the NJCFLA.  That’s N.J.S.A. 17:11C-18. ”  T1 54: 13-18.  The trial court makes clear that its reasoning is based on N.J.S.A. 17:11C-18; however, nothing in N.J.S.A. 17:11C-18 precludes a private right of action.  It does not state that “[o]nly the Commissioner . . . has the authority to pursue claims for violations of the NJCFLA. ”  N.J.S.A. 17:11C-18 merely provides for the Commissioner’s authority and available remedies under the NJCFLA.  Importantly, all of the NJCFLA’s statutory predecessors (discussed *infra*) provided for enforcement by the Commissioner of Banking and Insurance and provided for an implied private right of action.  To suddenly read private enforcement out of the NJCFLA would not be consistent with the NJCFLA statutory structure, its legislative intent, or its legislative history.
[brief] ””  Ibid. (quoting State v. Cassady, 198 N.J. 165, 178 (2009)).  Here, the trial court stated:  And understandably so.  I want the record to be clear.  The video obviously shows [...] with a gun.  It was testified to that a gun was involved which gives it a first-degree -- makes it a first-degree robbery.  If that were at all in question, then clearly the lesser included of second-degree robbery or potentially theft might be included.  But it is not, given the video that was introduced into evidence already and that the jury has already seen.  There really isn't a lesser included.  So just to be clear on that.  [(6T 156:6-16). ]  Because defendant was charged with first-degree robbery through accomplice liability, there was no rational basis to charge defendant with anything less than first-degree robbery.
[brief] [...], Plaintiff/Respondent vs. [...]  Defendant/Appellant pro se  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY, APPELLATE DIVISION, DOCKET NO. [...]  CIVIL ACTION ON APPEAL FROM: SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY CHANCERY DIVISION – FAMILY PART MORRIS COUNTY DOCKET NO. [...] Sat Below HON.  [...], J.S.C. APPELLANT’S BRIEF, REVISED
[brief] The property in question is Seaside Heights Borough Tax Map Block 1, Lots 7, 10 and 19.02, also known as 9 & 11 Ocean Terrace and 24 Porter Avenue.  See 1T9-17 to 1T9-21 (Board Attorney [...]).  Ocean Terrace runs north-south and Porter Avenue runs east-west; to the east of Ocean Terrace is the Boardwalk.  See testimony of the Applicant's engineering-planning witness, [...] (1T32-6 to 1T32-7; 1T42-11 to 1T42-12).  See also the historic aerial photographs in Exhibit A-5 (Pa104).  Formerly the site of [...], the 18,564-sf rectangular parcel (+/- 110' along Ocean Terrace, +/- 167' along Porter Avenue) is currently used as a parking lot.  Wilder (1T31-8 to 1T31-21); Pa10 (Application Section Two-A).  In the historic (1920-2012) aerial photographs (Pa104), the bar building first appears in the 1963 photograph -- there are no buildings or other improvements in the 2012 photograph.  Thus, the property had been a vacant lot for more than 10 years prior to the development application at issue.  The land is in the R (Residential) and RB (Retail Business) zoning districts.  See Pa19 (resolution at ¶ 2).  [...]'s property (30 Porter Avenue) is to the west.  See 1T75-24 to 1T75-3 ([...] (resident of 40 Porter)).  The Applicant gave public notice that it was seeking site plan approval with variance relief:  The applicant is seeking Board approval of this major preliminary and final site plan with variances.  The site plan includes three (3) structures which will house a total of seventeen (17) residential townhomes.  The applicant seeks the following variances: - Front yard setback on Porter Avenue - Front yard setback on Ocean Avenue - Height - Lot area/unit Pa103.  The public was advised that "[c]opies of the application and plans are available for review at the Borough of Seaside Heights Municipal Offices, [...] . . ."
[brief] (2T:6-13 to 6-19).  The State informed the court it was ready to proceed to trial.  (2T:6-20 to 6-23).  Defendant was not; she requested additional body camera video because she believed that the previously-provided video was “not the correct footage. ” (2T:8-16 to 8-17).  According to defendant, the video provided was “inconsistent with [her] experience and perception of the events. ”  Db1-2.  This request was denied.  (2T:5-20 to 6-23; 2T:7-16 to 7-22).  The court explained defendant’s options to her: 1.) have a trial where she would represent herself pro se, or, 2.) plead guilty pursuant to the agreement offered by the State.  (2T:8-6 to 9-5).  Defendant elected to plead guilty to the amended charge of obstructing traffic, admitting that at approximately 2:28 pm on November 14, 2021 she obstructed traffic on Route 9.
[brief] Empower, 453 N.J. Super. 565, 583.  Additionally, the approach adopted by the trial court is illogical and unrelated to the facts of the case.  The “multiplier” in the calculation represents a percentage of “property damage” initially allocated to [...] that was reversed by [...] in 2020 as being “palpably incorrect. ”  (Pa0199).  It should not have been considered for any purpose in determining compensable legal fees.  Further, the 85 “divider” applied by the trial court bears no relation to the 6.4% of costs allocated to [...].  Indeed, nowhere is [...]’s actual involvement in the case (liability or litigation activity) considered by the court.  The trial court further erroneously rejected the “relative culpability” approach as one that would only work if each party was allocated a relatively even share.  The court held that limiting [...] to 6.4% of its fees would penalize [...], “despite [[...]] largely succeeding in establishing coverage under the policies. ” (Pa0055).  This analysis of the relative culpability approach is inconsistent with the law and facts.  The purpose of a “relative culpability” approach is to award fees based on the “level of responsibility of each entity .]”
[brief] If precertification is denied, the patient or treating provider is required to submit one or more appeals before filing a demand for NFADR.  [Pa0504]  Thus, the parties are well aware of the patient’s/provider’s basis for seeking additional care and the basis for the carrier’s denial of same.  In Selective Ins. Co. of America v. Hudson East Pain Management, 416 N.J. Super. 418, 429-430 (App. Div. 2010), the court confirmed that carriers are only entitled to the limited discovery provided for by N.J.S.A. 39:6A-13(g) in the NFADR setting.
[brief] VI.  AS PLAINTIFF FAILED TO INITIATE SUIT AGAINST URBAN WITHIN TWO YEARS OF THE DATE OF THE ACCIDENT GIVING RISE TO THIS LITIGATION, PLAINTIFF’S PERSONAL INJURY CLAIM AGAINST URBAN IS TIME-BARRED.  Under New Jersey law, “[e]very action at law for an injury to the person caused by the wrongful act, neglect or default of any person within this State shall be commenced within two years next after the cause of any such action shall have accrued. ”  N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2.  In a personal injury context, the cause of action accrues when the accident occurs.  See Burd v. New Jersey Telephone Co., 149 N.J.Super. 20, 30 (App. Div. 1977).  Thus, plaintiff’s cause of action against [...] in this matter accrued on the date the accident giving rise to this litigation occurred, September 12, 2015.  Plaintiff therefore had until September 12, 2017 to initiate suit against [...].  As plaintiff did not initiate suit against [...] until May 17, 2019, which was nearly 44 months subsequent to the accident, plaintiff’s personal injury claim against [...] is unsustainable.  Plaintiff’s complaint against [...] should have therefore be dismissed with prejudice upon filing its initial motion for summary judgment.
[brief] The Report also highlighted certain Board policies which “have a big impact on the school District and its operations .  . . .” (Ra184).  First, the Report looked at Policy 5112: Entrance Age, which was raised as a concern by District staff because in most districts students entering kindergarten must turn five-years old by October 1 of that given school year.  (Ra135; Ra184-85).  Under Policy 5112, [...] permits students who will not turn five-years old until December 31 to register for kindergarten.  (Ra135; Ra184-85).  As a result, the District’s kindergarten classes can have students aged four to six years old for nearly half of the school year, and by third grade classes can have students aged seven to ten years old.  (Ra135; Ra185).  This policy is “particularly problematic” because “[s]tudies have shown that in the early stages of school age children development, there is a significant difference in terms of maturity, --- 7
[directive] Second degree – Any violation of subsection b. or a violation of subsection c. if the value of (continued) (continued) the services, property, personal identifying information, or money obtained or sought to be obtained exceeds $5,000; or a violation of subsection e. if the data, database, or computer identifying information, medical information concerning an program… contained personal identifiable person, protected government or court records, or has a value exceeding $5,000.  Third degree – Any other violation of subsection c; any other violation of subsection e; a violation of subsection f. if the damage exceeds $5,000.  $1,500 to $2,500 10% permissible
[brief] Threats, which occurred on the earlier dates, were relevant to the homicides, as evidence of defendant’s jealousy, intent, state of mind and motive for the murders.  In finding no abuse of discretion regarding the joinder of the offenses, the Supreme Court said, “A critical inquiry is whether, assuming the charges were tried separately, evidence of the offenses sought to be severed would be admissible under Evidence Rule 55 in the trial of the remaining charges. ”  *Id.* at 601-02.  The Court explained that if the evidence of the offenses sought to be severed were nevertheless admissible, then the alleged prejudice to the defendant resulting from a joinder of offenses for trial would be lessened.  *Id.* at 602 (citing *State v. Coruzzi*, 189 N.J. Super. at 299.  In *State v. Urcinoli*, 321 N.J. Super. 519, 542 (App. Div.), certif. denied 162 N.J. 132 (1999), the court explained that in exercising its discretion to determine severance or joinder of offenses, a trial court should consider whether the jury could arrive at a decision on each charge separately and irrespective of the evidence concerning guilt on the other charges.
[brief] The party opposing summary judgment “must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts. ”  Triffin v. Am. Int’l Group, Inc., 372 N.J. Super. 517, 523-24 (App. Div. 2004) (citations omitted).  “Competent opposition requires ‘competent evidential material’ beyond mere ‘speculation’ and ‘fanciful arguments. ’”  Hoffman v. Asseenontv.com, Inc., 404 N.J. Super. 415, 426 (App. Div. 2009) (quoting Merchs. Express Money Order Co. v. Sun Nat’l Bank, 374 N.J. Super. 556, 563 (App. Div. 2005)).  A court cannot deny a motion for summary judgment merely because the opposing party points to an insubstantial or controverted fact.  Id.  The determination that a genuine issue of material fact exists cannot be made based on a mere argument of counsel or the bare assertion of a conclusion opposite to the factual position of the adversary.  Amabile v. Lerner, 74 N.J. Super. 43 (App. Div. 1963); U.S. Pipe & Foundry Co. v. Am. Arbitration Assoc., 67 N.J. Super. 384, 400 (App. Div. 1961); Ocean Cape Hotel Corp. v. Masefield Corp., 63 N.J. Super. 369 (App. Div. 1960).
[brief] PRELIMINARY STATEMENT  ..........................................................  1  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I  PLAINTIFF  IMPROPERLY ATTEMPTS TO SHIFT  BLAME ONTO THE DEFENDANT FOR PLAINTIFF’S OWN CARELESSNESS (Da80-85).  .........................................................  3 POINT II  DESPIRE THE FACT THAT PLAINTIFF IS UNDER A LEGAL DUTY TO PROVIDE AN ACCURATE AND UNAMBIGUOUS DESCRIPTION OF THE EASEMENT, THE TRIAL COURT RULING REQUIRES THAT DEFENDANT PAY FOR PLAINTIFF’S “MISTAKE”, A RESULT THAT IS CONTRARY TO THE BODY OF JURISPRUDENCE RELATED TO “JUST COMPENSATION”.(Da154-155;160).  ..............................................  5 POINT III  THE DEFENDANT’S EXPERT SHOULD HAVE BEEN PERMITTED TO TESTIFY AS TO THE INCREASED VULNERABILITY OF WAVE OVERTOPPING AND LOSS IN VIEW (Da505; 6T23:1-24:8; Da446-447; 5T 36:19-38:10)  ....................  7  POINT IV  THE OPINION OF DEFENDANT’S COASTAL ENGINEERING EXPERT WAS NOT NET OPINION (Da505; 6T 23:1-24:8).......  9 POINT  V VIBRATIONS FROM THE SEAWALL PROJECT CONSTRUCTION ARE COMPENSABLE DAMAGES IN CONDEMNATION (Da390-400).  ...........................................................................  13 CONCLUSION ..................................................................................
[brief] [Exhibit L to Certification of [...]]  Employee Terminated Employee [...]’s “salary change”  Personnel Action Sheet – Dated 02/28/2019.  [Exhibit M to Certification of [...]]  Deposition transcript  [...] – Dated 03/07/2022.  [Exhibit N to Certification of [...]]  Deposition transcript of [...] – Dated 03/07/2022  [Exhibit O to Certification of [...]]  [...], New Jersey and [...], [...] effective January 1, 2015 through December 31, 2018.
[brief] A.  Standard of review.  The “standard of review on a motion to suppress is deferential. ”  State v. Nyema, 249 N.J. 509, 526 (2022).  “[A]n appellate court reviewing a motion to suppress must uphold the factual findings underlying the trial court's decision so long as those findings are supported by sufficient credible evidence in the record. ”  *State v. Ahmad*, 246 N.J. 592, 609 (2021) (alteration in original) (quoting *State v. Elders*, 192 N.J. 224, 243 (2007)).  Reviewing courts will “defer[ ] to those findings in recognition of the trial court's ‘opportunity to hear and see the witnesses and to have the “feel” of the case, which a reviewing court cannot enjoy. ’ ”  *Nyema*, 249 N.J. at 526 (quoting *Elders*, 192 N.J. at 244).  Furthermore, higher courts review “[a] trial court's legal conclusions ... and its view of ‘the consequences that flow from established facts,’ ... de novo. ”  Id. at 526-27 (quoting *State v. Hubbard*, 222 N.J. 249, 263 (2015)).  The general rule as to the admission or exclusion of evidence is that “[c]onsiderable latitude is afforded a trial court in determining whether to admit evidence, and that determination will be reversed only if it constitutes an abuse of discretion. ”  *State v. Feaster*, 156 N.J. 1, 82 (1998), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 932 (2001).  Under that standard, an appellate court should not substitute its own judgment for that of the trial court, unless “the trial court's ruling ‘was so wide of the mark that a manifest denial of justice resulted. ’ ”  *State v. Marrero*, 148 N.J. 469, 484 (1997) (quoting *State v. Kelly*, 97 N.J. 178, 216 (1984)).
[brief] E.  Defendant’s Initial Motion to Dismiss and Remand by Appellate Division  On August 4, 2017, the Trial Court dismissed plaintiff’s complaint for failing to file an affidavit of merit.  (Pa2522)  Subsequent to same, plaintiff filed motion for reconsideration and provided an Affidavit of [...] (Pa333); an Affidavit from [...] (Pa2324); and a report from [...] (Pa688).  Appellant and their experts claimed that no affidavit of merit was required as they were not suing [...] for professional negligence.  Plaintiff appealed and the matter was remanded by the Appellate Division.
[brief] Option 1: $150,000  Hired/Non-owned Auto Liability Coverage can be added for an additional premium of $225.00.  Option 2: $500,000  Hired/Non-owned Auto Liability Coverage can be added for an additional premium of $500.00  Option 3: $1,000,000  Hired/Non-owned Auto Liability coverage is available for additional premium subject to a Minimum Premium of $850.00 and our receipt and approval of our Hired/Non-owned Auto supplemental application.  Please note that 12 and 15+ Passenger Vans are excluded.  Please contact me if you would like this application.  [Ia147].  Moreover, the exclusion of the vans provided in the Quote (that was evidently not provided to [...]) that says $1 million coverage is not available for 12-15+ vans totally conflicts with the Application that [...] completed, which states that coverage on the vans “is available but subject to additional underwriting.
[brief] G.  THE [...] DOES NOT BELIEVE THAT CREAMER MADE AN ERROR BY ITS CHOICE OF ARCHAEOLOGIST (0017a-0018a).  Any “defect” here was not the result of an error or omission by [...] or failure by [...] to construe the true intent of [...]’s bid instructions.  As mentioned above, although the specifications failed to define the meaning of “a qualified Registered Archaeologist (RA)” under Specification “Demolition” 02 41 00 – 9 § 3.09A, there is certainly no indication anywhere in the bidding documents that the term “Registered Archaeologist” was intended to mean a PWCRA-registered archaeologist.  See 0912a-0913a § 3.09.  This position is supported by the fact that, as mentioned infra, four of the five bidders named a proposed archaeology subcontractor that was not registered under the PWCRA.  See 0276a ¶2.  II.