ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Furthermore, according to [...], while there had not been any snowfall on February 17, 2021, there had been snowfall of 7” on February 16, 2021.  According to the testimony of respondent [...], he or another member of his family would have gone to [...] and removed the snow from the sidewalks within 12 hours of the snowfall on February 16, 2021.  (Id.).  A reasonable inference from that testimony supports the appellant’s contention that respondent’s efforts were poor and incomplete, and the respondent instead created a dangerous condition on the sidewalks, which resulted in the appellant’s injury.  It is undisputed that at the time of the appellant’s injury, the property involved in this incident was not the residence of and was not occupied by the respondents.  In fact, the property was totally unoccupied until six months after the injury.  At the time of this incident, since the property could not be characterized as a private residence, because no one resided there, the law that would ordinarily apply to duties of residential property owners would be inapplicable.  When drawing all inferences in favor of the appellant, the only conclusion is that the respondents did not remove snow in a reasonable manner, created as new and hazardous condition.  I.  We Submit That the Law Should Respectfully Consider Properties Under Long-Term Renovation to be Commercial Properties For Purposes of Imposing Duties to Keep Abutting Sidewalks Clear and Safe for Pedestrians.
[brief] ”  (6)  .....  22  1.  Rules Of Construction Of Insurance Policies Require That They Must Be Construed To Comport With The Reasonable Expectations Of The Insured.  (6) .................................................. 22  2.  The Premise To The Trial Court’s Ruling That A Material Misrepresentation Occurred Based On An Absence Of Ambiguity In The Application That The OAE Proceeding Constituted A Reportable Disciplinary Proceeding Ignored The Material Facts In The Record Which Would Have, At Minimum, Created A Material Fact Dispute.
[brief] *In Re Docteroff*, 133 F.3d 210, 214 (3d Cir. 1997).  The Appellant had the opportunity to contest [...]’s ruling by joining in that litigation.  It chose not to do so.  Collateral estoppel exists to promote judicial consistency, encourage reliance on court decisions, and protect parties from being forced to relitigate the same issues in multiple lawsuits.  *Allen v. McCurry*, 449 U.S. 90, 94 (1980).  Under New Jersey law, a party seeking to invoke the doctrine of collateral estoppel must demonstrate that: (1) the issue to be precluded is identical to the issue decided in the prior proceeding; (2) the issue was actually litigated in the proceeding; (3) the court in the prior proceeding issued a final judgment on the merits; (4) the determination of the issue was essential to the prior judgment; and (5) the party against whom the doctrine is asserted was a party to or in privity with a party to the earlier proceeding.
[brief] The Board further asserts that the case was not fully adjudicated to a final judgment.  Quite obviously that was unnecessary inasmuch as the parties amicably adjusted their differences and settled the case.  As reflected in the caselaw, there are many cases which are settled for a host of reasons.  The fact that they are not fully litigated does not diminish their validity.  See e.g. *Gere v. Louis*, 209 N.J. 486, 500 (2012) holding that there is a strong public policy favoring the settlement of litigation.
[brief] STATEMENT OF PROCEDURAL HISTORY  3  ADDITIONAL STATEMENT OF FACTS  3  ARGUMENTS  4  POINT I THE STATE’S MISREPRESENTATION OF THE RECORD AS TO WHAT OCCURRED BOTH AT THE MUNICIPAL COURT AND AT THE SUPERIOR COURT IS AN EFFORT TO JUSTIFY THE SUPERIOR COURT’S DECISION TO IGNORE THE FACTUAL BASIS FOR MR. PFEISTER’S CONDITIONAL GUILTY PLEA  4  POINT II  THE STATE IS OBFUSCATING THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF MR. PFEISTER’S PROSECUTION BY WRONGLY STATING THAT HE IS CHALLENGING THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE STATUTE ITSELF  9  CONCLUSION  10
[brief] The Resolution claims [...] needed relief from § 230-101(B) of the LUDO.  [Da120].  But [...] repealed § 230-101 on March 9, 2021 – three months before the Board’s vote, so the Board could not enforce it.  [Pa320].  And the new ordinance that transferred steep slopes regulations to Part 4 of the LUDO, which are [...]’s Zoning Regulations, was ineffective as to [...] under the Time of Application Rule, N.J.S.A. 40:55D-10.5, because [...] could not apply the heightened standard after the filing of the application.
[brief] (Da4).  To facilitate the appointment of a part-time County Counsel, the Board issued a Request for Proposal (“RFP”), which was published in the New Jersey (Sunday) Herald on May 1, 2018.  (Da34).  The RFP was issued pursuant to the competitive contracting provisions of the Local Public Contracts Law, N.J.S.A. 40A:11-4.5.  (Da40).  The RFP set forth “Technical Specifications” for the position of part-time County Counsel, which in relevant part stated:  The [...] is soliciting proposals from attorneys licensed to practice in the State of New Jersey to serve as County Counsel on a part-time basis.  The individual selected will be paid at an hourly rate established by the [...], and will not be hired as an employee, or receive a salary or benefits.  The individual selected will be expected to personally perform the contractual services as County Counsel.  [(Da60)].  The RFP set forth certain responsibilities of the part-time County Counsel, including maintaining office hours and attending meetings of the Board.  (Da63).  The RFP provided that the County Counsel would be paid on an hourly basis for work performed at the rate of $150.00 per hour.  (Da63).  Several law firms submitted bids in response to the RFP for the position of part-time County Counsel, including Plaintiff’s law firm, [...].  (“[...]”)  (Da81).  [...]’s RFP response highlighted Plaintiff’s substantial experience practicing law in Sussex County.  (Da82).  In a cover letter contained on [...]’s letterhead, Plaintiff described his qualifications and stated that he was “familiar with the decades-long part time operations of County Counsel. ” (Da83).  Following the bidding process, at its June 27, 2018 meeting, the Board adopted a resolution appointing Plaintiff to serve as part-time County Counsel through [...].
[brief] See Loigman v. Twp. Comm. of Middletown, 297 N.J. Super. 287, 297-99 (App. Div. 1999) (court found that taxpayer lacked standing to interfere in the township labor contract where there was no “great public interest” or “special or additional private interest”).  “Taxpayers may not assert the constitutional rights of another. ”  Id. At 295.  The plaintiff must establish that they will experience some harm if the court returns an unfavorable decision.  N.J. State Chamber of Commerce v. N.J. Election Law Enforcement Comm'n, 82 N.J. 57, 67 (1980).  [...], in this case, has not established taxpayer standing.  He is neither a resident nor a property or business owner in [...].  (Aa9-10).  He lives and pays property taxes in the same county, [...], but not in the same municipality.  (Aa8).  His family businesses are in [...].  (Aa10).  The record thus supports the court’s finding that he does not have the standing of a resident or property or business owner of [...] to challenge its municipal actions.
[brief] 32 State v. Medina, 242 N.J. 397 (2020)...........................................................................  26 State v. Melendez, 423 N.J. Super. 1 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 210 N.J. 28 (2012).......  12 State v. Miller, 76 N.J. 392 (1978)............................................................................  11 State v. Nyhammer, 197 N.J. 383 (2009)...........................................................................  10, 11 State v. O’Neil, 193 N.J. 148 (2007)...........................................................................  11 State v. Orecchio, 16 N.J. 125 (1954).............................................................................  32 State v. Presha, 163 N.J. 304 (2000)...........................................................................  11 State v. Roman, 382 N.J. Super. 44 (App. Div.), certif. dismissed, 189 N.J. 420 (2007) .................................................................................................  12 State v. S.S., 229 N.J. 360 (2017)...........................................................................  10, 12 State v. Sailor, 355 N.J. Super. 315 (App. Div. 2001).................................................. 10 State v. Sanchez, 247 N.J. 450 (2021)...........................................................................  20 State v. Stott, 335 N.J. Super. 611 (App. Div. 2000), rev’d o.g., 171 N.J. 343 (2002) .................................................................................................  9  State v. Timmendequas, 161 N.J. 515 (1999), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 858 (2001) .......................  11 State v. Tucker, 190 N.J. 183 (2007) ...........................................................................  18 State v. Vallejo, 198 N.J. 122 (2009) .........................................................................  21 State v. Watson, __ N.J. __ (2023) ..............................................................................  20 State v. Winter, 96 N.J. 640 (1984) .........................................................................  21  Statutes N.J.S.A. 2C:17-1 .................................................................................. 1 N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4 ..................................................................................
[brief] This matter involves an incident that occurred on April 26, 2019, in which Plaintiff, [...] (“Plaintiff”), suffered serious and permanent injuries after being struck from behind by an overloaded industrial sized cart, known as a “U-boat,” while she was a customer at Defendant, [...]’s (“[...]”) [...] warehouse.  The accident transpired as a result of co-Defendant, [...]’s (“[...]”) negligent operation of the [...] supplied U-boat and its employees’ failure to address and rectify said dangerous condition due to [...]’s lack of a formal policy in place to ensure the safety of its customers.  [...] was a customer who shopped for co-Defendant [...] d/b/a [...] (“[...]”) and was paid for his services.  The instant action was filed by Plaintiff, and her husband, [...], against various defendants, including [...], [...], and [...].  Defendants, [...] and [...], have since been granted summary judgment.  Although deposed, [...] failed to answer, and after a proof hearing that took place before the Honorable [...], P.J.Cv. on February 27, 2024, an Order of Judgment by Default was entered by the Court against [...] on March 14, 2024 in the amount of $355,006.00.  As a result of the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to [...] and [...], Plaintiffs have suffered the drastic consequence of being unable to present their meritorious personal injury action to a jury for resolution.
[brief] Appellant includes and supplements the Procedure History provided in this brief with the following additions:  07/25/2024, Appellant’s Brief filed 09/11/2024, 09/12/2024  Respondents motion for summary disposition filed 09/19/2024  Appellant’s opposition to motion to dismiss filed 10/07/2024  Respondents’ motion for summary disposition denied 10/22/2024, 10/23/2024  Respondents’ Briefs filed  OPPOSITION TO STATEMENT OF ISSUES
[brief] The statute required the Board to promulgate rules to provide notice to active and retired members of the State Police Retirement System.  The Certifying Officer Letter is proof that the website posting is not sufficient notice.  Pa81.  The notice of the Ricci Act to the Certifying Officers advises the Certifying Officers that they must distribute the information to employees pursuant to N.J.A.C. 17:5-1.4.  It also required that the Certifying Officers to provide a certification that the information was distributed.  The Respondent claims that the mailing of the postcard to a correct address establishes a presumption that the postcard was received.  This presumption is rebutted by the fact that [...] and 98 others certified via affidavits that they did not receive said postcard.  Additionally, the claim that postcards were mailed out to all “200,647 SPRS retirees” is a misstatement of fact.  Rb13.  New Jersey State Troopers are assigned a badge number upon successful completion of the academy and these badge numbers are never repeated.  Currently, the New Jersey State Police badge numbers only reach the 9,000s; meaning that in the entire history of the New Jersey State Police, there are less than 10,000 New Jersey State Troopers, which includes all active or retired members of the State Police Retirement System.  Failure to provide any notice, adequate or actual, is reasonable and equitable grounds for relaxing the deadline for registration under the Ricci Act.  Furthermore, the Division admits that it did not notify the members of the retirement system within 30 days of the Ricci Act’s enactment.  This further establishes good cause to relax the timeframe.  We respectfully request that the decision below be reversed, and that [...] be permitted to register his presence at 9/11 and apply for amended benefits under the Ricci Act.  CONCLUSION
[brief] **Whether the delay in seeking arbitration was part of the party’s litigation strategy. **  As noted above, there was no delay on [...]’s part.  Therefore, it cannot be said that there was a delay in seeking arbitration as part of a litigation strategy.  To whatever extent there was any delay in seeking to arbitrate the dispute, the delay clearly was not attributable to an identifiable litigation strategy such as was the case in *Cole* where discovery had been exchanged, dispositive motion practice had occurred, and pretrial submissions to the court had been filed when, on the eve of trial, the arbitration demand was made.  Here, there was no identifiable “litigation strategy” during [...]’s time as a pro se litigant.  Therefore, it cannot be said that the delay in seeking arbitration was part of [...]’s litigation strategy.  d.
[brief] New Jersey Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. M.M., 189 N.J. 261, 278 (2007) (stating the court’s scope of review “is limited to whether the trial court's decision is supported by the record as it existed at the time of trial”); Townsend v. Pierre, 221 N.J. 36, 45 n.2 (2015); Davis v. Devereux Found., 209 N.J. 269, 296 n.8 (2012). origin.  (Pa141).  There is no dispute that the testing request will result in permanent alteration.  (1T25:5-6).  [...] ultimately denied [...]’s research request to perform DNA tests on the Lindbergh items.  (Pa5-6; Pa37; Pa86).
[brief] (Ja209; Ja285).  Specifically, [...], through his reports and testimony before the Planning Board, concluded that “substantial evidence” did not exist to demonstrate that the Property’s conditions are “substandard, unsafe, unsanitary, dilapidated, or obsolescent,” as required under the LRHL at N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-5(a), and that the AINR Report does not document any fire, building, or health code violations that would substantiate the Property’s alleged substandard conditions.  (Ja282; Ja289).  Likewise, [...] concluded with respect to criteria (d) that the AINR Report falls far short of the “substantial evidence” standard because it fails to demonstrate that certain specified problems exist and that they cause actual detriment or harm “to the safety, health, morals, or welfare of the community.
[brief] This is a wrongful death medical malpractice action arising out of a cosmetic liposuction procedure, which resulted in [...]’s death.  On December 23, 2021, Plaintiff’s decedent, [...], presented to the [...] to undergo a simple cosmetic liposuction procedure, which was performed by Defendant [...], MD, who is an obstetrician-gynecologist, and Defendant [...], CRNA.  Ms. Rugbeer was fifty-five years of age.  Thirty minutes into her procedure, her vitals became unstable.  This was followed by twenty plus minutes of unaccounted time before a code was called and 9-1-1 was contacted.  She was transported by ambulance to [...] and was diagnosed with a catastrophic anoxic brain injury.  Her condition quickly deteriorated, and she was pronounced dead on December 24, 2021.  Plaintiff/Respondent, the Estate of [...], has asserted a wrongful death claim and a survivorship claim.
[brief] By all means, the Plaintiffs’ decision to impose their personal fees on the company, and therefore [...] at the rate of his 29.5% interest, was a vote to circumvent the American Rule and the Court’s power to enforce the law and public policy.  By refusing to reject the effort and the fee-shifting effect of Plaintiffs’ management vote, the Court here ceded all existing and required judicial control over fee-shifting in this case to one set of litigants in this shareholder action: those holding the majority of interests.  That decision should be reversed just for the protection of the judicial system’s right to control its litigants’ actions, and for proper relegation of the business judgment rule to lawful decisions only.
[brief] The Supreme Court set forth the standard for the grant of a "D variance" pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70(d)(3) in Smart SMR v. Fair Lawn Bd. of Adj., 152 N.J. 309 at 323,  The statute thus requires an applicant to prove both positive and negative criteria to obtain a use variance.  In general, the positive criteria require that an applicant establish "special reasons" for granting the variance.  "The negative criteria require proof that the variance 'can be granted without substantial detriment to the public good' and that it 'will not substantially impair the intent and the purpose of the zone plan and zoning ordinance.'"  Sica v. Bd. of Adj., 127 N.J. 152, 156 (1992).  The Zoning Board may not utilize its power to grant variances to usurp the legislative power delegated to the governing body to effect the zoning scheme.  Feiler v. Fort Lee Bd. of Adj., 240 N.J. Super. 250, 255 (App. Div. 1990)).  In short, the Zoning Board may not rezone by variance, which it did in this instance.
[directive] The revised Guidelines are designed to address concerns that have been raised by prosecutors, judges, corrections officials, public defenders and private defense counsel.  The revised Guidelines were prepared by the Division of Criminal Justice in consultation with the county prosecutors, and after receiving helpful input from the Conference of Criminal Presiding Judges, the Public Defender’s Office and the New Jersey Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers.  The revised Guidelines are designed to ensure fairness and proportionality in the application of New Jersey sentencing laws, while complying with the requirement for statewide uniformity mandated by the New Jersey Supreme Court’s ruling in State v. Brimage.  Page 3  Attorney General Brimage Guidelines 2 (2004 Revisions)  1.1  Scope of Guidelines  For the purposes of these Guidelines, the term “prosecutor” refers to a county prosecutor and his or her assistants and also includes the Director of the Division of Criminal Justice and assistant and deputy attorneys general.  These Guidelines are designed to channel the exercise of a prosecutor’s discretion in formulating and tendering negotiated plea offers to resolve charges for offenses arising under Chapter 35 of Title 2C that carry a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment and parole ineligibility that are subject to waiver and reduction pursuant to the provisions of N.J.S.A. 2C:35-12.
[directive] Fonnulario revisado promulgado para el 12/31/2019, Suplemento a la Directiva #01-18, [...] Spanish Iniciales del acusado page 2 of 7 /pagina 2 de 7  If the offense occurred on or after January 5, 1994 and you are being sentenced to probation, [Yes/Si] 5. f. [No/No] you must pay a fee of up to $25 per month for the term of probation?  Si la infracci6n ocurri6 el de enero de 1994 o despues de dicha fecha y se le esta sentenciando a libertad a 5 prueba, usted tendra que pagar un cargo de un maximo de $25 d6lares por mes durante el termino de la libertad a prueba?
[brief] Oct. ‘22 Order, par. 1b, should not have approved [...]’s prior paid $31,259.74 accounting fees (not for Intermediate Account) (67a&69a) since Roth did not allow me to verify accuracy/validity of excessive fees for 4 years of tax returns & potentially unwarranted Trust admin.  It required my request, as Qualified Beneficiary, as per 3B:31-67, for billings w/itemized work descriptions & their issued documents for my review/exceptions prior to any Court approval.  [...]’s prior paid, $15,022 legal fees (66a), w/[...] as Roth’s counsel, should NOT be approved (Oct. 2022 Order, par. 1c) due to Exceptions by me & [...] ([...]), counsel for [...], Co-Trustee (“Respondent”, “Interested Party”), for $4,120 for unwarranted 2021 legal work (June 17 to July 9) since C&D was counsel for Trustees before these contested matters, & also wrongly checked Trust requirements based on [...]’ (our father) Will, which was not relevant.  Our Exceptions to remaining $10,902 for unwarranted legal work (Nov. 11, ’21-Jan. 31, ’22) were due to Roth & Jacobson rejecting a guaranteed settlement w/no Trust liabilities for Roth, that led to Ambrose’s unnecessary Feb ’22 filing(P-069-22) for Roth Co-Trustee discharge as part of accepting informal accounting.  My Exceptions to $93,277 (Mar. 7, ‘23 Order, par. 1) included P-242-22/P-069-22 filings.  All that legal work should NEVER have occurred if they had agreed to 3-Way Settlement w/[...], Roth, & me for his discharge w/informal Accounting, per R.4:87-3, for our review, but w/no exceptions, rather than his requested formal accounting, per R.4:87-3, w/allowed exceptions for Court approval or denial.  Minor adjustments were needed to awarded fees of $17,649 for Accounting & $2,039 for Commissions based on my Exceptions (Mar. 7, ‘23 Order, par. 2).  Court needs to vacate Mar. 7, ‘23 Order, par. 3, in order to grant my Motion for Reconsideration for Oct. 2022 Order, par. 1 &1c&d, & vacate Sept. 6, 2023 Order, par. 3&4, to grant my May 25&30, 2023 Cross-Motion based on refuting relevant Feb. 17, ‘23 Hearing rulings for March 7th Order, par. 3, and rejecting [...]’s legal fees and revising [...]’s accounting & Roth’s Commission fees in March 7th Order, par. 1&2.  Court needs to order [...] to issue Final Accounting in compliance w/Oct. ’22 Order, par. 2, incl. 3B:14-7.  Key Order provisions, which were overlooked by Court in my Motion for Reconsideration & Cross-Motion, also needed to be added to Oct. ‘22 & Sept. ‘23 Orders.  Updated proposed Order will combine all relevant Appeal issues.  PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[brief] Da289a.  If a claim falls within this coverage grant, [...] will pay damages unless the claim is otherwise excluded.  [...]’s “mold on food” interpretation renders the insuring grant meaningless.  [...] could not have been ordered to pay damages to [...] simply because mold contaminated [...]’s food.  Nor could [...] have been obligated to pay damages to [...] if he ate moldy food but was not injured.  In either case, [...] would have no claim for relief against [...] because there are no damages.  For the Consumption Exception to be read consistently with the policy as a whole, it must be read to restore coverage for bodily injuries caused by mold on [...]’s food.
[brief] No.  Plaintiffs’ counsel’s failure to disclose to the Court at oral argument on January 24, 2020 and February 14, 2020 that, based upon [...]’s investigation and report, as of March 16, 2017, April 7, 2017 and July 1, 2017 and January 29, 2019, plaintiffs knew or should have known (i) the location of where [...] allegedly slipped and fell; (ii) the mechanism of injury that allegedly caused him to fall; and (iii) the identity of the party or parties allegedly responsible for causing his alleged damages, resulted in the Court erroneously denying [...]’s motion to dismiss in lieu of filing an answer on the ground that plaintiffs failed to file an action against [...] within the applicable statute of limitations.