ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The [...] Pollution Policy’s Arbitration Clause is Mandatory  [...] claims that because the arbitration clause in the [...] Pollution Policy states that disputes between the parties “may” be submitted to arbitration it is a permissive clause.  Pb39-40.  The word “may,” however, cannot be read in isolation.  See J.L. Davis & Assocs. v. Heidler, 263 N.J. Super. 264, 271 (App. Div. 1993) (under New Jersey’s rules of construction, meaning should be given to all contract provisions).  The clause provides that either party may demand arbitration, and once that happens, “the arbitration **shall** be conducted” – which means it is mandatory once demanded.  Da377 (emphasis added).  [...] ignores this critical language, apparently because it knows that case law interpreting similar arbitration clauses does not support its position.  *See e.g.*, *Del. River Partners LLC v. R.R. Constr.*, 2022 N.J.Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1134, at *9-10* (App. Div. June 24, 2022) (“We recognized that ‘when an arbitration provision specifically permits either party to select arbitration, once invoked, the other party may be bound to arbitrate the dispute. ’”)(internal citations omitted).  [...] also fails to address *PPT Research, Inc. v. Solvay USA, Inc.*, 2021 U.S.Dist. LEXIS 127031, at *12* (E.D.Pa. July 7, 2021), which holds that courts uniformly have rejected the argument that the use of the word “may” automatically renders an arbitration clause permissive, and have instead “interpreted arbitration clauses using the word ‘may’ to be mandatory on the grounds that such language merely manifests the parties’ intent that arbitration be obligatory if either party so chooses. ”  *Id.*  *PPT Research* is an FAA case which identifies federal courts in Pennsylvania, New York, and Delaware that have reached the same conclusion.  *Id.*  The Law Division recognized these authorities but disregarded them merely --- 12 [...] claims that *Del. River Partners* does not support [...]’s interpretation because there was no service of suit clause at issue there.  Pb43.  That is an irrelevant distinction because the Pollution Policy’s Service of Suit clause is expressly subject to the arbitration clause.  because they were from other jurisdictions.  T1 76:5-6.  [...] submits that New Jersey would be an outlier if it were to decide that this clause does not reflect the parties’ intent to require arbitration if either party chooses it.  Significantly, during oral argument below, [...] conceded that if [...] had demanded arbitration at the outset of the case, [...] would have been required to arbitrate.\footnote{[...]’s attempt to walk back this concession make no sense (Pb41), and the record speaks for itself.}  T1 31:14-16.  Finally, [...] cites to the Service of Suit clause and claims that it somehow overrides the arbitration clause.  Pb42.  [...]’s argument once again is made by ignoring key text which states that Service of Suit Clause is “subject to” the arbitration clause.  This language wholly defeats [...]’s argument that the Service of Suit clause supersedes the arbitration clause; the contract makes it clear that the opposite is true.  III.
[brief] ”  *Ibid.* (referencing the Webster’s Third New International Dictionary’s definition of “spectator”).  In *Harris v. State*, 2000 Ariz. App. Unpub. LEXIS 5, *15-*19 (Ariz. App. 2000),\(^{11}\) the Arizona Court of Appeals rejected a claim that A.R.S. § 13-2910.04 was unconstitutionally vague because the statute “does not create criminal liability for anyone who unwittingly stumbles upon a cockfight.
[brief] Order Dismissing Complaint With Prejudice and related opinion, entered May 1, 2023 (Hon. [...], A.J.S.C.)  Pa1 2.  Order Granting Defendants’ Motions for Protective Order Pursuant to Rule 4:10-3 and related opinion, entered September 12, 2023 (Hon. [...], A.J.S.C.)  Pa30  TABLE OF CITATIONS
[brief] [Pa342a], agreeing with the Special Master’s finding that [...]’s conduct was unethical (the “Decision”).  [Pa 463a, ¶ 3; Pa362a]  Like the Special Master, the Disciplinary Review Board found that [...] “lacks credibility. ”  [Pa371a]  The Disciplinary Review Board emphasized that [...]’s “statements were detailed and occurred over a period of time” and [...] “never corrected any of his misstatements. ”  [Id.]  Rather, [...] “pretend[ed] to accept responsibility for his misconduct, yet continue[d] to blame everyone but himself for how the violations occurred and for misconduct that properly should be laid at his feet. ”  [Pa376a]  Ultimately, the Disciplinary Review Board concluded that [...] “made these misrepresentations specifically to hide payments that he believed could cause the ruination of his marriage and law practice, if discovered” and that [...] “intended to keep the payments on behalf of his former paramour secret until the OAE’s investigation into the overdraft was complete. ”  [Pa372a]  [...]’s misconduct was found to be “serious and protracted,” and the Disciplinary Review Board imposed a censure on [...].  [Pa376a-377a]  The Supreme Court adopted the Disciplinary Review Board’s decision and censured [...] (the “Censure Order”).
[brief] BECAUSE (1)  THE MOTION RECORD DEMONSTRATED THAT THE PREMISES OWNER HAD TRANSFERRED AND RELINQUISHED ALL CONTROL OF THE PREMISES EXCLUSIVELY TO A SINGLE TENANT, INCLUDING THE RESPONSIBILITY TO REPAIR AND MAINTAIN THE INJURY-PRODUCING CONDITION, (2) BECAUSE NEITHER OF THE THREE COMMON LAW EXCEPTIONS TO THE NON-LIABILITY RULE APPLY, AND (3) BECAUSE THE RECORD SHOWED THAT THE OWNER DID NOT CONCEAL THE CONDITION
[brief] This Section is not intended to, in whole or in part, supersede any other ordinance of the [...].  The retention of agricultural activities is desirable to all citizens in [...] because it ensures numerous social, environmental and economic benefits, including the preservation of open space, atmospheric habitat, the preservation of land as a nonreplenishable resource and as a source for agricultural products for this and future generations, and the protection and maintenance of the aesthetic beauty of the countryside and rural character of the community which includes farm and architecture and scenic variety.  B.  Right to farm.  Farms, as defined herein, shall be permitted in any zone, and it shall be presumed that such uses, agricultural activities and structures in connection therewith shall not constitute a public or private nuisance, provided that such agricultural uses are conducted in conformance with the acceptable agricultural management practices defined herein.  C.  Permitted uses.  All uses and structures customarily incidental to farms and agricultural activities shall be permitted accessory uses on all farms, as defined herein, including but not limited to: (1)  The storage, processing and sale of farm products where produced.  (2)  The use of irrigation pumps and equipment.  (3)  The application of manure, chemical fertilizers, insecticides, pesticides and herbicides.  (4)  On-site disposal of organic agricultural waste.  (5)  Installation of soil and water conservation practices in accordance with a Conservation Plan approved by the [...] Soil Conservation District.  (6)  Transportation of slow-moving equipment over roads within the municipality.  (7)  Utilization of tractors and other necessary equipment.  (8)  The employment of farm laborers.  (9)  The creation of noise, dust, odors and fumes inherently associated with such uses.  (10)
[brief] Thus, the adoption of this Redevelopment Plan does not conflict with the Township’s planning objectives relative to farmland preservation, environmental protection, historic preservation and sustainability, and in this regard can be considered consistent with the Township’s Master Plan. ”  Pa426, Redevelopment Plan, Sec. 3.1 at p. 17 (emphasis added).  At its meeting of September 20, 2022, the Planning Board reviewed the Redevelopment Plan for consistency with the Master Plan pursuant to N.J.S.A.
[brief] At approximately 11:41 p.m., he observed occupants in a white Chevy Impala.  He observed that they appeared to react to his presence.  They looked startled and that caught his attention.  (3T:117-20 to 25; 120-22 to 122-12).  As [...] focused in on the Impala, it approached a gas station and abruptly turned into its parking lot.  [...] was unable to safely pull into the same gas station parking lot due to the speed he was traveling, so he continued on down the road.  After driving approximately three quarters of a mile, [...] pulled to the side of the road to wait for the Impala to leave the gas station.  Meanwhile, he ran the license plate on his MDT system.  The search returned information that the car was registered to [...].  (3T:119-5 to 16; 122-13 to 124-21; 132-1 to 134-14; 139-19 to 25).  At 11:48 p.m. and while he was still parked on the side of the road, a dispatcher came over the radio and advised that there was a shooting in Freehold and that a Chevy Malibu was identified as being involved.  At approximately 11:51 p.m., another call came over the radio advising that the vehicle leaving the scene of the shooting was not in fact a Chevy Malibu, but was actually an “older” Impala.  (3T:124-20 to 126-3; 129-1 to 12).  [...] responded back to the gas station where he had last observed the Impala he had come in contact with.  He saw two other Manalapan police officers in the parking lot; however, the Impala was gone.  [...] advised the other officers that he had just encountered an Impala that dispatch had just advised was suspected of being involved in a shooting in Freehold and how that vehicle had turned into the gas station parking lot.  After briefly speaking with the gas station attendant, advising other officers in Manalapan and Freehold, along with any other responding officers of the necessary information regarding the Impala, [...] and the officers left the gas station and continued their search for the Impala, but were ultimately unable to locate it.
[brief] He did not -- as [...] wrongly asserts -- issue a directive “to compel production of irrelevant documents. ” (Db2.)  The court acknowledged, however, that the byproduct of its decision to prioritize comprehensive production of relevant materials would be the inevitable effect of netting some number of irrelevant documents.  (T24-11 to 25-14.)  The court had to select between two less-than-perfect discovery schemes in light of the contentious history between the [...] affiliates and [...].  The parties have accused each other of using the pre-production relevancy review to withhold relevant documents or render them incomprehensible by redactions.  Both sides appear to admit that pre-production relevancy review has led to the non-production of relevant evidence.  The trial court’s discovery Order maximizes the production of relevant evidence with the tradeoff being the production of some number of irrelevant documents.
[brief] 1  I.  PLAINTIFF BEARS THE BURDEN, BUT THE STANDARD OF REVIEW DOES NOT ALLOW FOR THE DEFENDANT  BOARD’S UNBRIDLED DISCRETION AND LIMITLESS DEFERENCE.  ..................................................................................................................  1  II.  DEFENDANT’S REJECTION OF EXPERT TESTIMONY WAS UNREASONABLE.  .................................................................................................................................  7  III.  DEFENDANT OVERSTATES THE COURT’S HOLDING IN GRASSO V. BOROUGH OF SPRING LAKE HEIGHTS.  .......................  11  IV.  DEFENDANT’S RELIANCE ON DE FACTO ZONING  CASE LAW IS MISPLACED.  ....................................................................................................................  13  CONCLUSION  ..........................................................................................................................  15  ## TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
[brief] (Da39 to 50).  The New Jersey Supreme Court denied defendant’s Petition for Certification on February 11, 2020, and the United States Supreme Court denied defendant’s Petition for a Writ of Certiorari on June 22, 2020.  State v. Abdullah, 241 N.J. 60 (2020); Abdullah v. N.J., 141 S.Ct. 140 (2020).
[brief] Pa249, at 85:14-24.  The B-3 Zone permitted uses include: retail stores, mercantile stores, professional and governmental offices, radio and television repair as well as furniture repair, and other similar service establishments furnishing services other than that of a personal nature.  Pa407.  Restaurants are also permitted as conditional uses.  As [...] testified, a retail use or restaurant, for example, would not be as appropriate of a use compared to the non-conforming mixed-use building in Plaintiff’s Second Application because the number of available parking spots would be lower and the constant inflow of deliveries in and out of the Property would be significantly larger.  Pa250, at 87:11-17, 89:3-11 (“This development is not anticipated—we don’t expect it to have an intense delivery, especially when compared to, for example, a larger development . . . for example, a large restaurant that needs the deliveries constantly in and out, or some of the other uses that are permitted in the zone. ”).  Instead of giving deference to Plaintiff’s traffic engineer ([...]), the trial court focused on a hypothetical assertion not based in fact or confirmed by an expert.
[brief] POINT I SUPPRESSION IS REQUIRED BECAUSE DEFENDANT HAS STANDING TO CHALLENGE THE SEARCH AND THE STATE FAILED TO PROVE THIRD-PARTY CONSENT.............................1  A.  The State’s Argument That [...] Does Not Have Standing Is Both Waived For Purposes Of Appeal And Lacks Merit Because He Has Automatic Standing Given His Possessory Interest In The Gun And The State’s Failure To Prove Abandonment  ........................................................................................................2  B.  [...] Did Not Provide Valid Consent For The Search Of [...]’s Bedroom ..................................................................................................................8  CONCLUSION..........................................................................................13
[directive] and  The prosecutor may also ask the court at the time of the dismissal to expunge all records information relating to the arrest or charge the diversion.  the alternative, the person and and In may seek expungement of the records at any time after the dismissal order pursuant to an N.J.S.A. 2C:52-6(c)(2).  Since municipal court judges are not authorized grant expungements, to municipal courts should provide these defendants with the municipal court expedited expungement form, along with the information to apply for this expungement.  fee will No be charged for this expungement.  Information filing expungement of criminal records on is an included the pro se expungement packet, which downloaded from the Judiciary's be can in website at https://njcourts.gov/forms/10557 _expunge_kit.pdf.
[brief] It is a recognized tenet of municipal law that the term “ordinance” encompasses matters legislative in character.  Albigese v. Jersey City, 129 N.J. Super. 567, 569-70 (App. Div. 1974) (quoting McLaughlin v. Millville, 110 N.J. Super. 200 (Law Div. 1970)).  This Court has also recognized this, acknowledging, as prescribed in the LRHL, that the adoption of a redevelopment plan is “…a legislative function of a municipal government, akin to the adoption of a master plan or zoning ordinance.
[brief] See, e.g., *Manetti v. Prudential Property and Casualty Insurance Company*, 196 N.J. Super 317 (App. Div. 1984); *Van Dissel v. Jersey Central Power & Light Company*, 181 N.J. Super 516 (App. Div. 1981).  [Land, slip op. at 8, n.4]  Had the Appellate Division believed that the liability aspect of the Land case was properly tried before a jury there would have been no need for the court to discuss the parties' constitutional right to a jury trial.  The fact that the Appellate Division elected to discuss this issue and its citation to the Manetti case, wherein the court held that a party to a PIP suit is not entitled to a jury trial, suggests that the Appellate Division believed that the Land case was not properly tried before a jury.  As is noted above, the Land court stated that "where actions created by statute have distinctive features with respect to substantive and procedural standards that would render them virtually unknown to the common law, there is no right to jury trial."  Land, slip op. at 8, n.4.  Here, the Fraud Act utilizes distinctive substantive and procedural standards which did not exist at Common Law and, therefore, there is no right to a jury trial.
[brief] (Appx 529-30 at ¶38); See also State v. Brown, 236 N.J. 497 (2019).  The New Jersey Supreme Court stated:  1.  “[Plaintiff] gave inconsistent statements to the police. ” (Appx 529-30 at ¶38); 2.  “[Plaintiff] filed a false police report against Brown accusing him of pointing a gun at her. ”  (Id.)  3.  “[Plaintiff] erroneously implicated [...] in [...]’ dying declaration. ” (Id.).  4.  Plaintiff’s cellmates reported that Plaintiff admitted conspiring to kill her husband.  (Id.)  At her deposition in this case, Plaintiff claimed she could not recall things that she should have been able to recall as a competent witness.  (Appx 530-32 at ¶39).  She repeatedly said she did not recall facts that she should have remembered.  (Id.)  For example:  Q.  And you really can’t recall where you spent last night, like, where you slept?  A.  No.  I really can’t.  Q.  So sitting here under oath, you can’t recall where you slept last night; is that right?  A.  I might not have went to sleep.  So I don’t recall.  ***  Q.  What kind of drugs were you selling [when you were convicted]?  A.  I don’t recall ***  Q.  When you went to prison, was that in New Jersey?  A.  No Q.  What state was that in; do you remember?  A.  No.  I don’t recall.  ***  Q.  Were you paid money as a result of your car accident?  A. Yes.  Q.  How much were you paid?  A. I don't recall.  Q.  Was it over $10,000?  A. I don't recall.  Q.  Was it over $50,000?  A. I don't recall.  Q.  Was it over a million dollars?  A. I don't recall.  Q.  Was it over five million dollars?  A.  I don't recall.  Q.  The only thing you remember is it was serious and you didn't claim emotional distress, right?  A.  That's correct.  (Id.)  Plaintiff further claimed she could not recall the name or street of the restaurant where she had dinner the night before.  (Id.)  This feigned failure to recall is consistent with the New Jersey Supreme Court’s finding in *State v. Brown* about Plaintiff’s complete lack of credibility.
[brief] (12T135-2 to 10).  the party in his shirt.  (22T220-8 to 9; 22T220-22 to 24; 22T221-1 to 4).  He had no gun on him.  (22T221-6 to 8).  He claimed that when someone in the crowd came at him, he swung the bottle of alcohol at this person.  (22T243-3 to 16).  [...] also claimed he saw a gun which was why he flung the bottle.  (22T243-14 to 16).  [...] claimed to have heard four or five gunshots.  (22T246-4 to 8).  The defense also produced a 9-1-1 dispatcher from March 23, 2019, to show that a caller described the shooter as a black male with a white jacket, (23T27-7 to 23T28-1), and that dispatchers knew there were possibly two shooters.  (23T76-15 to 23T77-6).  The State produced rebuttal to show that [...] was killed on May 18, 2019, (25T61-20 to 23), and that [...] had a conviction from 2012 for aggravated assault, which was admitted on the issue of propensity for violence.  (25T62-19 to 22; 25T63-12 to 19).  Based upon the evidence outlined above, the jury convicted defendant of passion/provocation manslaughter, attempted passion/provocation manslaughter and the weapons-related offenses.
[brief] Moreover, Plaintiffs’ Property was not the source of the contamination.  The contamination migrated from the adjacent Project land.  Therefore, Plaintiffs would not be liable for any clean-up costs for their Property.  Those costs would be the responsibility of the fund established for environmental clean-up, so any claim that [...] had conferred a benefit on the Plaintiffs was irrelevant speculation.  See N.J.S.A. 58:10-23.11g.  The issue before the trial court was whether there was a taking.
[brief] On or about August 20, 2020, a demand was filed by [...] seeking recovery of $1,972.84 on behalf of [...] as a result of an automobile collision that reportedly occurred in New Jersey on November 19, 2018.  This arbitration was assigned [...] (Da139-Da146).  7.  On August 22, 2022 the arbitrator denied [...]’s affirmative defense that New Jersey law prohibits [...]’s Med-Pay subrogation claim and as a result, the dispute was outside the scope of the Agreement.  A full arbitration hearing was held on August 22, 2022, and by decision published August 23, 2022, the arbitrator found in favor of [...].  The arbitrator simply found that the [...] insured was fully responsible for the underlying loss.  As a result, the arbitrator directed [...] to reimburse [...] the $1,972.84 demanded (Da139-Da146).  8.
[brief] (6T75-19 to 25).  [...], who could not walk very well, stayed on the floor next to [...]’s body.  (6T76-6 to 8).  [...] and [...] ran to their apartment in the basement.  (6T69-1 to 7, 118-6 to 17; 7T144-2 to 147-4).  At 11:50 p.m., Monmouth County Sheriff’s Officer [...], was dispatched to the [...].
[brief] In this case, the trial court tentatively indicated on May 22, 2006 that it would accept a plea bargain under which defendant would plead guilty to the two Egg Harbor and six Atlantic City robberies and the State would recommend a maximum aggregate sentence of sixteen years imprisonment, subject to NERA.  At the plea hearing, defendant provided a factual basis for his pleas to each of the eight robberies.  The factual basis that defendant provided for one of the robberies only established commission of a second-degree robbery because defendant denied using or threatening the use of a gun in that robbery.  However, in view of the fact that defendant had provided an adequate basis for his pleas to seven other armed robberies, the prosecutor indicated that the indictment could be amended to reflect that the eighth robbery was a second-degree offense.  The trial court then tentatively accepted the plea bargain and informed defendant:  “I'll review a presentence report, and so long as I'm satisfied that this is an appropriate plea agreement, which I, at this point, believe it is, I will sentence you in accordance with it....”  Defendant's confederate, [...], who pled guilty to the robberies the same day as defendant, was scheduled to be sentenced before defendant.  During the course of colloquy with the trial court at sentencing, Reid characterized the proceedings as “bull shit. ”  The court then held Reid in contempt and rejected the plea bargain Reid had entered into with the State based on the bad attitude he displayed at sentencing.
[brief] For all of the above reasons, the Defendant respectfully requests this court to (a) reverse the May 27 and September 23, 2022 Orders reinstating the void complaint, (b) vacate any Judgment based on that void complaint and (c) directing that the lower court has no jurisdiction to issue a judgment, hear motions or take any action under that complaint.  /s/  [...]  Dated: September 28, 2023  ______________________________  [...], Esq.  [...], ESQ., Plaintiff/Respondent, - against - [...], ESQ., Defendant/Appellant.
[directive] Whenever or sexual practicable, notice shall be given to victims of domestic violence in discipline related to the incident.  advance of an agency’s disclosure of  The required posting to the agency’s public website shall remain in place and publicly accessible.  9.11.3  Agencies may not, as part of a plea or settlement agreement in an internal affairs investigation or otherwise, enter into any agreement concerning the content of a synopsis subject to public disclosure under Section 9.11.2, including any agreement regarding the identities of officers subject to final discipline, summaries of misconduct, No State, transgressions or statements of the sanctions imposed.