ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The first is [...]’s contention that it sent invoices to [...] for the months of April, May and June 2020 “so that it could pay its employees” for those periods.  There is no honest dispute here as to the invoices being sent, and that [...]’s custodians assigned to [...] were paid for the period May-June 2020 once [...] received [...]’s payment for those months, the same payments which [...] seeks to claw back in this action.  [...] contends that “per the Complaint and [...] Cert., the invoices were fraudulent and deceitful, and there is evidence that the money was used for other unlawful purposes.
[brief] Mt. Laurel and Background History of Builder’s Remedies  In the late 1960s, leaders of the centuries-old Black community in [...], which originated with people escaping from slavery on the Underground Railroad, attempted to construct thirty-six garden apartments to replace existing dilapidated housing such as converted chicken coops.  Southern Burlington County v. Tp. of Mt. Laurel, 67 N.J. 151, 169 (1975) (Mount Laurel I).  1  The statement of facts and procedural history are combined because they are inextricably intertwined.
[brief] Because State Defendants Are Not “Persons” Subject to Suit Thereunder.  The NJCRA permits a claimant to sue for deprivation “of any substantive due process or equal protection rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or any substantive rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of this State,” or when the claimant’s “exercise or enjoyment of those substantive rights, privileges or immunities has been interfered with or attempted to be interfered with, by threats, intimidation or coercion by a person acting under color of law. ”  N.J.S.A. 10:6-2(c).  Our Supreme Court has thus noted that that NJCRA actions “may only be brought against persons who are acting ‘under color of’ law. ”  Perez v. Zagami, LLC, 218 N.J. 202, 215 (2014) (emphasis added).  And this court has ruled that the State is not a “person” and therefore cannot be sued under the NJCRA.  Brown v. State, 442 N.J. Super. 406, 426 (App. Div. 2015), rev’d in part on other grounds, 230 N.J. 84 (2017).  Specifically, Brown held that “the State is not a ‘person’ under the [NJCRA], [and] is equally immune from suits for damages as it is for suits seeking injunctions and other equitable relief. ”  Ibid.  The law in this state is equally clear that claims against state officials, brought against those state officials in their official capacities, also fail as a matter of law for the following reason.
[brief] ”).  When [...] called 9-1-1, she described the shooter as Black.  (3T19-18 to 19)  An unnamed witness interviewed by police after the shooting described the shooter as “African American[.]” (7T23-13 to 14, 29-20 to 15) (Da12, at D-3, 2:10 to 2:24)  And when police put a call over the radio after arriving on scene, they described the suspected as a “black man.
[brief] N.J.S.A. 40:55D-2(h):  To encourage the location and design of transportation routes which will promote the free flow of traffic while discouraging location of such facilities and routes which result in congestion or blight [truck traffic going to and from Route 206 only]  N.J.S.A. 40:55D-2(i):  To promote a desirable visual environment through creative development techniques and good civic design and arrangement [setback distances and landscaping/berming regulations]  N.J.S.A. 40:55D-2(j):  To promote the conservation of historic sites and districts, open space, energy resources and valuable natural resources in the State and to prevent urban sprawl and degradation of the environment through improper use of land [Black House, solar in Sec. 2.6.9; and electric vehicle/service equipment (EV/SE) at Sec. 2.5, page 10]” (Pa47-Pa50).  This extensive reasoning, as well as the inclusion of five other amendments to Ordinance 2022-15, were approved by the requisite majority of the [...] on December 8, 2022.
[brief] Plaintiff contends that division defects necessarily constitute trial error.  The remedy for a trial in the wrong division is a trial in the right division.  Retrial is the remedy for every analogous constitutional trial error—including errors in the composition of the jury—and is the one prescribed by historical practice and this Court's precedents.  A contrary rule, which would grant factually guilty defendants a windfall preclusive judgment for venue errors, lacks textual, precedential, or logical justification.  The Appellate Division should vacate the Chancery Division Order (Pa 13) and assign the matter to a Law Division Judge outside of Camden County in light of the obvious appearance of impropriety.
[brief] For example, N.J.R.E. 803(c)(8) provides a hearsay exception for public records, reports and findings, as follows:  Subject to Rule 807 [prior notice of intention to introduce evidence], (A) a statement contained in a writing made by a public official of an act done by the official or an act, condition, or event observed by the official if it was within the scope of the official’s duty either to perform the act reported or to observe the act, condition, or event reported and to make the written statement, or (B) statistical findings of a public official based upon a report of or an investigation of acts, conditions, or events, if it was within the scope of the official’s duty to make such statistical findings, unless the sources of information or other circumstances indicate that such statistical findings are not trustworthy.
[brief] [...] then told the officer, “This is going to be the guy who robbed the gas station last night,” and the other officer said, “Oh, yeah.  He’s got a ski mask and gloves in the car. ”  (3T 202-20 to 203-1)  On redirect, [...] explained that the previous night there was an armed robbery in South River, the description of the suspect was “a black male with a black jacket and black pants that furnished a silver and black handgun,” and the officers thought [...] “could be the guy” who did the armed robbery.
[brief] THE DECISION BELOW WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE AND SHOULD THEREFORE BE REVERSED.  The substantial evidence presented does not support the final agency determination made by the [...].  Substantial evidence has been defined alternately as "such evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion," and "evidence furnishing a reasonable basis for the agency's action."  Figueroa v. N.J. Dep't of Corr., 414 N.J. Super. 186, 192 (App. Div. 2010) (citations omitted).  The Board’s determination references a “presumption” that mail properly addressed with proper postage was received by the party it was addressed to.  However, [...] certified in an affidavit provided to the Board that he never received a postcard from the Division, regardless of if it was ever sent.  This affidavit should overcome any presumption that the postcard was received.  The Board’s decision failed to consider the almost one hundred affidavits of other active and retired troopers who also did not receive a postcard from the Division notifying them of the Ricci Act that were submitted to the Board in support of [...]’s appeal.  As such, the finding that it was “undisputed” that the Division sent the postcard to [...] (and others) is not supported by the facts and evidence presented.  Furthermore, any presumption claimed by the Board has clearly been rebutted by the overwhelming evidence presented in this matter.  Considering the evidence presented, the agency’s action does not have a reasonable basis.  Additionally, the Board failed to consider the evidence presented demonstrating that Registrations Forms submitted were not accepted by the Division because the Trooper(s) who submitted them were not sick at the time the Registration Form was sent.  [...] attempted to file an Eligibility Registration Form back in September of 2019.  [...] was denied the ability to register because he was told the Ricci Bill “is for those who are currently sick.  Not for possible future illnesses. ”  Pa122.  The Board also failed to consider the evidence presented regarding the [...] membership polling.  [...], President of the [...], polled his membership to ascertain whether anyone received notice of the Ricci Act.  Of the fifty-nine (59) [...] members (retired troopers) who responded to the polling, fifty-seven (57) did not receive any notice of the Ricci Act.  The Board ignored the evidence from this polling when making its determination.  In light of all of the evidence presented on [...]’s behalf, a reasonable mind could only conclude that these postcards were never received.  Without proper notice, [...] should have been permitted to register for the Ricci Act.  Therefore, the determination below should be reversed because it is against the substantial weight of the evidence.
[brief] Moreover, there are any number of scenarios whereby the Supreme Court and Legislature may be completely at odds regarding an attorney’s provision of legal services.  For example, an attorney who specializes in debtor/creditor work and properly provides such services for a client would be in complete compliance with the Rules of Professional Conduct.  The Supreme Court would take no issue with those services rendered and the attorney would not be disciplined.  On the other hand, the Legislature, under the exact same facts, has deemed the provision of such legal services *to be a fourth degree crime*.  That is the very definition of interference with the Supreme Court’s exclusive jurisdiction over the practice of law.
[brief] (ARa1). ²  [...]’s building (to the north of 290) is fully stepped back (ARa2), not because Blackridge didn’t want a bigger building with more units closer to the waterfront like [...] wants, but because its designers understood that was what was required.  The second building to the north is an older building which was designed before the step back and view shed requirements of the Scenic Resources and Design Rule were adopted in 1994.³
[directive] Resiliency training symposium.  All RPOs, County RPO Trainers, and State RPO Trainers shall attend a two-day Resiliency Training Symposium scheduled for October 10-11, 2019, at the War Memorial in Trenton, New Jersey.  The symposium will provide the RPOs with an overview of this Directive and the NJRP-LE.  In exceptional circumstances, where an RPO cannot attend the two-day symposium, they must request in writing to be excused by the Director of the Division of Criminal Justice.  The two-day symposium is separate and apart from both the NJRP-LE train-the-trainer and the required NJRP-LE training for all law enforcement officers.  III.
[brief] 1T48:15-19.  The trial court judge agreed with this testimony and also found that the Defendant appeared startled when he was first observed by the State’s witness.  2T44:2-7⁴.  Thus, although the trial court judge explicitly stated the opposite, the trial court judge actually found that the testimony of the State’s witness that the Defendant appeared startled was credible.  The trial court then – after making a factual finding that was consistent with the factual testimony of the State’s witness – stated that it was finding the State’s witness not credible.  2T48:1-3⁵.  The trial court sought to explain that, although it agreed that the witness saw what he testified to having seen – the startled look – it disagreed with the witness’s conclusion that the startled look was due to criminal activity.
[brief] ”  Sandvik, Inc. v. Statewide Sec. Sys., 192 N.J. Super. 272, 276 (App. Div. 1983) (citing Jackson v. Muhlenberg Hosp., 53 N.J. 138, 142 (1969)).  Simply put, the record is too bare, with many material facts in dispute, thus requiring further discovery and ultimately causing the dismissal decision to be wholly inappropriate at this time.  As such, Plaintiff respectfully requests this court reverse the Motion Judge’s holding and remand this matter for a jury trial.
[brief] Defendant was sitting with his family and getting ready to ring in the New Year when he felt the need to go upstairs.  (7T308-11 to 24).  He worked on a presentation for class, then thought about a neighborhood bully who once held a knife to him and about someone else in school who hit him in his stomach so hard he fell to his knees.  (7T308-25 to 311-22; 8T100-4 to 9).  These memories made him feel “not good. ” (7T312-1 to 4).  Defendant said he kept his emotions to himself: “I don’t want to push problems onto other people, and so it kind of, like, builds up until I cry or I move on from it. ” (7T312-5 to 18).  Immediately before the murders, defendant’s thoughts were building up: “It was like basically everything coming together and I was just tired of it. ” (7T312-19 to 313-2).
[brief] While in Virginia, defendant asked [...] if she wanted to go to New Jersey with him.  Because there was nothing else to do in the hotel room and because she had never been to New Jersey, [...] agreed to accompany defendant.  [4T133-17 to 134-2].  Defendant grabbed the backpack with the narcotics in it before leaving the motel room.  [4T134-3 to -6].  He placed the backpack on the floor on the passenger’s side of the truck because he did not want to be separated from it.  [4T135-23 to -24; 4T136-5 to -7].  The dollar bill and tinfoil that [...] used to ingest heroin that day were in the pocket of the backpack.  [4T134-11 to -21].  The key to luggage lock on the backpack was on defendant’s beltloop.  [4T136-10 to -12].
[brief] Da – Appendix for this brief 1T – Miranda Hearing dated February 25, 2021  2T – Miranda Decision dated March 25, 2021  3T – Jury Selection dated January 14, 2022 4T – Jury Selection dated January 18, 2022 5T – Jury Selection dated January 19, 2022 6T – Trial on February 9, 2022 7T – Trial on February 10, 2022 8T – Trial on February 11, 2022 9T – Trial on February 14, 2022 10T – Trial on February 15, 2022 11T – Trial of February 16, 2022 12T – Trial of February 17, 2022 13T – Trial on February 18, 2022 14T – Trial on February 22, 2022 15T – Trial on February 23, 2022 16T – Trial on February 24, 2022 17T – Trial of sentence on June 30, 2022 enhancer pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(c); Count Three, Murder, first degree, contrary to the provisions of N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3a(1), with a sentencing enhancer pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(c); Count Four, Murder, first degree, contrary to the provisions of N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3a(1), with a sentencing enhancer pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(c); and Count Five, Possession of a Weapon for an Unlawful Purpose, second degree, contrary to the provisions of N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(a).  (Da19).  On June 30, 2022, Appellant appeared before the Honorable [...], J.S.C. for sentencing.  On Count One, Appellant was sentenced to the custody of the Commissioner of the Department of Corrections for a term of fifty (50) years pursuant to the conditions No Early Release Act and the Graves Act.  (Da16-19).  On Count Two, Appellant was sentenced to the custody of the Commissioner of the Department of Corrections for a term of fifty (50) years pursuant to the conditions of the No Early Release Act and the Graves Act.  Id.
[brief] So even if the court declined to find that the Commissioner of Education has exclusive jurisdiction, the court lacked primary jurisdiction over [...]’s Counterclaim.  The court committed legal error when it reversed itself and held that it retained jurisdiction over [...]’s Counterclaim.  1.  / 2.  “whether the matter at issue is within the conventional experience of judges”; “whether the matter is peculiarly within the agency’s discretion, or requires agency expertise” (Argued at Pa369 – Pa370)  3.  “whether inconsistent rulings might pose the danger of disrupting the statutory scheme” (Argued at Pa370 – Pa371)  4.  “whether prior application has been made to the agency” (Argued Pa371)  Page 20 – 21 POINT THREE
[brief] The Eleventh Circuit’s decisions focused on whether the debt collector’s communication to the mail vendor was “in connection with the collection of any debt. ”  After concluding that such a communication is facially made in connection with the collection of a debt, the court addressed the debt collector’s argument to the contrary.  The court rejected the argument that, to be in connection with the collection of a debt, the communication must include a demand for payment.  The court observed that, if a payment demand were necessary, then much of the section’s exceptions would be superfluous which would violate a “cardinal principle of statutory construction” to give meaning to every word.  Hunstein I, 994 F.3d at 1351.  A debt collector would not demand payment from a third party who is not alleged to owe the debt.  Thus, § 1692c(b) use of “in connection with the collection of a debt” includes communications other than one which demands payment.  If, instead, the phrase were limited to communications which demanded payment then debt collectors could disclose all sorts of private information about debts to anyone so long as they did not demand payment.  *Hunstein I* rejected the argument.
[brief] [...] described the closing taking place in a conference room at [...] with [...] (86a, 73:9-22).  [...] admits that while in a conference room with Lyndsay, he had her sign the transaction documents including a price calculation, repurchase agreement, listing agreement, contract, use and occupancy agreement, and a disclosure statement.  (87a, 74:4-12).  None of these documents are part of Allstates’ file; they were only in plaintiff’s document production in discovery.  Plaintiff argues that the parties should be bound by the terms of the title commitment.  However, plaintiff initiated the transaction without regard for the terms of the title commitment.  [...] testified on March 4, 2019, he unilaterally arranged to visit [...] in jail for the purpose of having him sign the property over to [...] (266a) (76a, 31:6-32-1).  He, then, withheld recording the deed.  On March 7, 2019, Allstates issued a title commitment (301a).  At the time of the closing on April 5, 2019, the deed from [...] was still not recorded with the County Clerk.  It would not be recorded until May 8, 2019 (263a).  The decision, therefore, on how to proceed with the transaction rested solely with [...], who appeared at the closing with an unrecorded deed changing title to the property without regard to the requirements of the title commitment outlined below.  Therefore, from the inception of the transaction, the plaintiff paid no mind to the terms of the title commitment and now cannot argue, to the contrary, that it is an enforceable contract.
[brief] But -- and the other problem is, is suggested is a lot of these things that [...] is trying to correct here his son didn't even face.  Yes, they might have been a threat of going into the MIP Court, but there was, also, a threat of incarceration.  He didn't face any of that.  What he got was PTI.  And he got his charges ultimately dismissed.  It just – I -- the complaint is impossible for anybody to defend on the defense side.  It's not fair.  It's prejudicial to have them try to even acknowledge what these causes of action are or try to glean through the 65 pages of just incomprehensible stream of consciousness for somebody to acknowledge.  Like I said I -- I appreciate [...]'s passion.  I appreciate his -- his wanting to correct the wrongs that he feels that his son has faced.  But this complaint doesn't do it.
[brief] (Da 17 (“We’re going back to the house. Who’s back in your house right now?”); Da 18 (“Either way we’re going back to the house . . . it’s either with your cooperation or without your cooperation. ”)); see Hornberger v. ABC, Inc., 351 N.J. Super. 577, 600 (App. Div. 2002) (“Once a search has begun, there is no effective right to refuse.  Therefore, consent given after the search has begun is neither voluntary nor meaningful.
[brief] The record, however, shows that the Plaintiff’s expert never analyzed any facts and drew a conclusion that the $449,798.50 in damages were proximately caused by the defendants’ negligence. \footnote{In the instant case, the Plaintiff’s expert offered a net opinion as to the legal fees incurred by the Plaintiff during the trial.  (Da113-114, Trial Transcript 6T156-157 and 9T203-204)  He never stated how he arrived at such an opinion for the damages in the amount of $449,798.50.  When defendants’ attorney objected to his net opinion, the trial court judge realized this fact and stated on the record:  “Well, no.  But he is not offering an opinion as to the value.  He’s just confirming what he said before.  I overrule that objection. ”  (Da114)  Beyond this single instance where the trial judge confirmed that the Plaintiff’s expert was not offering an opinion as to the value of damages, the trial record clearly shows that the amount of damage allegedly sustained by the Plaintiff were never proven, analyzed, or discussed further in any capacity.}
[brief] THE FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW BY THE [...] OPINION  DEMONSTRATES THE MALICIOUS VIOLATION OF DUE PROCESS AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT  The initial publication of the unlawfully obtained CHR first occurred in the [...] Complaint filing on March 7, 2006 (Pa 271 id 2).  After being sealed and stricken, the CHR was published on the internet in the fall of 2006 (Pa 165 id 7 ¶¶ 38).  [...] immediately sought to demonstrate to the court that, but for one conviction in 1987, the published information contained highly confidential and non-public data and including content that was false, incorrect, and expunged in the 1970s.  (Pa 303)  [...] then re-published the knowingly private, sealed, stricken, and legally protected data on December 20, 2009 on PACER (Pa 145 id 3 ¶13).  [...] claimed that they were required to publish the information to show that it did not obtain the information from [...] or his parents but from the Internet.  (Pa 130 id 7 ¶1)
[brief] E.  The Supreme Court Reverses, Reinstating The 2021 HAD And Remanding The Matter To This Court With Instructions To Continue The 2021 Appeal.  While the remand proceedings were ongoing, in February 2024, our Supreme Court granted [...]’s petition for certification to review the Appellate Division’s August 31, 2023 decision.  256 N.J. 350 (2024).  The Court ultimately reversed, finding it “undisputed” that [...] is a public utility, and holding that an “upgrade” need not be “routine” to be exempt from the Highlands Act.  In re Proposed Constr. of Compressor Station (CS327), 258 N.J. 312, 330-331 (2024).  The Court remanded to the Appellate Division for “specific findings” on whether [...] correctly determined that the Project is consistent with the goals and purposes of the Highlands Act.  Id. at 332.  In doing so, the Court recognized that “the Highlands Act does not preclude development in [the preservation area]; it limits only development that is incompatible with preservation and would therefore cause a decline in the environmental quality of the region. ”  Ibid.  The Court also advised that, in considering whether construction of the compressor station is consistent with the goals and purposes of the Highlands Act, “it will be necessary to consider the circumstances of the project, including the fact that Compressor Station 327 is being built upon already disturbed lands that are unsuitable for vegetation and wildlife. ”  Ibid.  F.