ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] A decision to reopen or reinstate a case is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.  *Tomney v. Ebeling*, 105 N.J. Super. 66, 70 (App. Div. 1969); *Odukoya v. Sobanjo*, No. A-3323-19, 2021 WL 1904565, at *1 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. May 12, 2021) (reviewing order on motion to reopen case); *Baskett v. Kwokleung Cheung*, 422 N.J. Super. 377, 382 (App. Div. 2011) (reviewing order on motion to reinstate case under R. 1:13-7).  Unless a trial court’s decision “rested on an impermissible basis, considered irrelevant or inappropriate factors, failed to consider controlling legal principles[,] or made findings inconsistent with or unsupported by competent evidence,” the court has not abused its discretion.  *Elrom v. Elrom*, 439 N.J. Super. 424, 434 (App. Div. 2015) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).  2.  **Motion to enforce Settlement Agreement**  Settlement agreements are contracts reviewed *de novo* based on questions of law.  *See Quinn v. Quinn*, 225 N.J. 34, 45 (2016).  An order granting a motion to enforce a settlement agreement is thus reviewed under that standard.  *See Thakkar v. [...]*, No. A-3529-14T2, 2016 WL 3909553, at *3 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. July 20, 2016).  New Jersey public policy strongly favors the settlement of litigation because it promotes the parties’ own bargained-for “certitude” and finality.  *Brundage v. Estate of Carambio*, 195 N.J. 575, 600–01 (2008); *Willingboro Mall, Ltd. v. 240/242 Franklin Ave.*, L.L.C., 421 N.J. Super. 445, 451–52 (App. Div. 2011), *aff’d*, 215 N.J. 242 (2013).  A court therefore “strain[s] to give effect to the terms of a settlement wherever possible. ”  *Brundage*, 195 N.J. at 601; *Josefowicz v. Porter*, 32 N.J. Super. 585, 590 (App. Div. 1954) (“[E]very part will be interpreted with reference to the whole and, if possible, be so interpreted as to give effect to its general purpose. ”).  It may not disturb the parties’ negotiated peace by “rewrit[ing] or revis[ing] an agreement” or enforcing “a contract better than or different from the agreement [the parties] struck between themselves. ”  Quinn, 225 N.J. at 45.
[directive] In an indictable case or for a juvenile offense involving controlled dangerous substances where our department seizes the controlled dangerous substance, we shall maintain custody of the evidence until the A-15 assistant prosecutor to whom the case is assigned directs that the evidence be turned over to the County Prosecutor's Office.  When the evidence has been turned over to the County Prosecutor's Office, the Evidence & Property Control Unit shall maintain the controlled dangerous substance until at least 70 days following the final judgement in the case.  If an appeal is taken, the evidence should be held until the expiration of the appeal.  At the expiration of 70 days following final judgement, the Evidence & Property Control Unit shall make contact with the Chief of the Trial Section of the County Prosecutor's Office and/or the Narcotics Squad Prosecutor and seek approval for destruction of the controlled dangerous substance.  The request and approval must be in writing.  If the Chief of the Trial Section or Narcotics Squad Prosecutor approves destruction, the Evidence & Property Control Unit shall destroy the controlled dangerous substance at a designated facility.  All aspects of the destruction shall be documented.
[brief] (Da0304; Da0439, p.  38)  When [...] was asked why he ignored his experience and the science to assume this silicone could cause inflammation, he answered: “one of the recall notices. ”  (Da0047, p. 54)  However, the Urgent Drug Recall letter said only that inflammation was a “potential” risk “in sensitive patients” (Da0255), and [...] never opines that Plaintiff qualifies as such a “sensitive patient. ”  Instead, the undisputed evidence reveals this reference was to patients sensitive to silicone (Da0452, p. 39), and [...] does not and cannot opine that Plaintiff is sensitive to silicone.  [...] admits no one saw a silicone particulate in Plaintiff’s eye and “there’s no way [he] could possibly know whether there was a silicone particulate in [her] eye. ”  (Id., pp. 50-52 (emphasis added))  He just assumed it was there solely because the Ozurdex® at issue came from “a recalled lot” and his mistaken belief that 22-25% of units in each recalled lot had the particulate issue.  (Id., pp. 47, 50-51)  At bottom, [...] admits “the only thing” supporting his opinion is the drug Plaintiff received was part of a “recalled lot. ”  (Id., p. 50)  2.
[brief] In imposing a sentence, the sentencing judge is required to make individualized assessments based on the facts of each case and the aggravating and mitigating sentencing factors.  See State v. Jaffe, 220 N.J. 114, 121-22 (2014).  The judge must provide its reasons for the sentence and “the factual basis supporting a finding of particular aggravating or mitigating factors affecting [the] sentence. ”  R. 3:21-4(h); see also N.J.S.A. 2C:43-2(e) (requiring sentencing court to state on the record the reasons for imposing a sentence and the “factual basis supporting its findings of particular aggravating or mitigating factors affecting sentence”).  *7  When sentencing a defendant for multiple offenses, “such multiple sentences shall run concurrently or consecutively as the court determines at the time of sentence. ”  N.J.S.A. 2C:44-5(a).  In Yarbough, 100 N.J. at 642-44, our Supreme Court established criteria that a sentencing judge must consider when deciding whether to impose consecutive sentences.
[brief] And here, all the evidence is that this was a demand loan.  Since it was a demand loan, whether we run the Statute of Limitations from the making of the loan in 1988 or the demand for payment in 1990, it's clear that the Statute of Limitations ran a good eight to 10 years ago.  And that being the case there cannot be recovery had on the loan at this point.  So, if that's the truth, I would have to enter a judgment dismissing the complaint based on the affirmative defense of the Statute of Limitations.
[brief] In the instant case, the lower court mistakenly exercised its discretion when it denied [...]’s motion to vacate default judgment.  The court considered the application only under *Rule* 4:43-1, failed to appreciate that [...]’s issuance of process pursuant to an order authorizing substituted service does not prove [...]’s actual receipt of process, and improperly resolved doubts regarding process service in favor of [...].  Furthermore, the court failed to consider that [...] improperly procured the order authorizing substituted service, as well as its default judgment, with incompetent evidence prohibited by R. 1:6-2(a) and R. 1:6-6.  An application for relief from a default judgment is governed by Court Rule 4:43-3.
[brief] Here, the State sought to justify its warrantless search under the consent exception, for which it carried the heavy burden of presenting “clear and positive” proof of voluntariness.  But it failed to present any testimony about the critical moments leading up to [...]’s eventual signing of the consent form.  See Williams, 84 N.J. at 227 (holding “the State has not met the burden of showing that the [third party] knowingly consented to the search” where it presented “no proof of facts surrounding the consent”).
[directive] Mobile video recording system.  A device or system installed or used in a police vehicle or worn or otherwise used by an officer that electronically records visual images depicting activities that take place during a motor vehicle stop or other law enforcement action.  Proactive enforcement team.  Includes officers who are typically assigned to target vice, drugs, organized street crime, violent crime and/or any other targeted enforcement.  Unlike officers who are responsible for responding to traditional calls for service, these officers are typically assigned the singular responsibility of addressing the aforementioned activities, and they are sometimes referred to as crime suppression units.  The nature of their work is varied and may include being dressed in traditional uniform, modified uniform, or plain clothes.
[brief] ”  Furthermore, the State presented multiple videos from surveillance cameras around the city that show defendant and [...] in his Chevy from as early as 6:23 a.m. on July 30, 2018.  The jury then saw another video from 7:42 a.m. of the shooter riding a bicycle and shooting a firearm into [...]’s vehicle while he and [...] were inside.  This video was corroborated by the ShotSpotter activation, which went off at 7:42 a.m.  Eyewitness [...] testified that he observed the shooter ride his bicycle down Third Street and observed him get into [...]’s Chevy Captiva, testimony that was corroborated by another surveillance video showing the shooter getting off of his bike and into the Chevy at 7:43 a.m.
[brief] This matter is therefore very similar to what occurred in Delray Holding v. Sofia Design, 439 N.J. Super. 502 (App. Div. 2015).  In that case, the plaintiff investors sued the defendant corporation alleging that one of its principals had diverted corporate loan proceeds, all of which had been deposited into a company bank account to pay company debts, for improper purposes.  The company’s bank account records, however, showed that the amounts paid from the company’s account to pay company bills exceeded the amount of the loan proceeds originally placed into the account.  The defendant therefore moved for dismissal of the plaintiffs’ damages claims.  The defendant presented a very simple argument with respect to the absence of damages:  Since the company bills that got paid out of the account exceeded the amount of the loan proceeds deposited into the account, there was no possible way that the plaintiffs could have suffered any damages as the result of the defendant’s alleged misconduct.  The trial court therefore granted summary judgment and dismissed plaintiffs’ case with prejudice, and the Appellate Division affirmed.  The same result must apply here.  Appellants have failed to adduce any facts that could legitimately support a claim for damages against [...] or [...].  Since proof of actual damages was an essential element of each and every one of Appellants’ purported causes of action, including their legal malpractice claim, the trial court properly granted [...] and [...] summary judgment.
[brief] There is Competent Record Evidence to Support the Finding That [...] Suffered a Drug Overdose.  Doctor [...] (“[...]”) was the doctor who treated [...] on the night of the Incident after she was taken to the hospital.  [4T10:2-5].  [...] confirmed that Narcan is only used to treat opioid overdoses, and that it is not used for alcohol or marijuana.  [4T21:8-12].  Upon admission, [...] was placed on a Narcan drip in addition to previously receiving two (2) doses of Narcan while at Appellant’s residence.  [Pa132, 4T22:7-10].  This is clear evidence of an opioid overdose, as Narcan only revives victims suffering from opioid overdoses and would not have any effect on someone overdosing on alcohol or marijuana.  [4T34:4-9].  [...] also explained that “we see it all the time, patients are taking a lot of narcotics and their urine drug screen is not positive typically for opioids . . . we see this happen [] more frequently than not. ”  [4T24:14-22].  [...] also confirmed that if [...]’s overdose had been primarily caused by alcohol, this would have been indicated in the “present illness” section of [...]’s hospital admission form (Exhibit R-8 in the OAL Trial), and that it was not.  [4T41:17-22].  Therefore, the conclusion that [...] suffered from an opioid overdose is supported by record evidence.
[directive] a)  Do you understand that as a result of your conviction your name, age, race, sex, date of [Yes] [No] birth, height, weight, eye color, any distinguishing scars or tattoos you have, your photograph, the make, model, color, year and license plate number of any vehicle you operate, the street address, zip code, municipality and county in which you reside and a description of the offense for which you are pleading guilty, may be publicly available on the Internet?  b)  Do you understand that if you are convicted and your conduct was found to be [Yes] [No] characterized by a pattern of repetitive and compulsive behavior your name, age, race, sex, date of birth, height, weight, eye color, any distinguishing scars or tattoos you have, your photograph, the make, model, color, year and license plate number of any vehicle you operate, the street address, zip code, municipality and county in which you reside and a description of the offense for which you are pleading guilty, may be publicly available on the Internet?
[brief] 22.  The Court should keep in mind that the reason for the assessment of penalties was to make certain that Plaintiff had available funds to pay her expenses.  INASMUCH AS PLAINTIFF KEPT THE FUNDS THAT WERE AVAILABLE TO PAY DEFENDANT, HOW CAN IT BE SAID THAT PLAINTIFF DID NOT HAVE THE FUNDS TO PAY HER EXPENSES.  HOW, THEREFORE, IS THE OBVIOUS MISREPRESENTATION, LYING, AND DECEITFUL CONDUCT NOT WORTHY OF DISCUSSION BY THE COURT BELOW OR BY THE APPELLATE DIVISION?
[directive] A.  Where a police officer determines that a party has violated an existing restraining order either by committing a new act of domestic violence or by violating the terms of a court order, the officer must 1.  Arrest and transport the defendant to the police station.  2.  Sign a criminal contempt charge concerning the incident on a complaint-warrant (CDR-2).  3.  The officer should sign a criminal complaint for all related criminal offenses.  (The criminal charges should be listed on the same criminal complaint form that contain the contempt charge.)  4.  Telephone, communicate in person or by facsimile with the appropriate judge or bail unit and request bail be set on the contempt charge.  a.  During regular court hours, bail should be set by the emergent duty Superior Court judge that day.  b.  On weekends, holidays and other times when the court is closed, bail should be set by the designated emergent duty Superior Court judge except in those counties where a municipal court judge has been authorized to set bail for non-indictable contempt charges by the assignment judge.  c.  When bail is set by a judge when the courts are closed, the officer shall arrange to have the clerk of the Family Part notified on the next working day of the new complaint, the amount of bail, the defendant's whereabouts and all other necessary details.  d.  If a municipal court judge set the bail, the arresting officer shall notify the clerk of that municipal court of this information.  5.  If the defendant is unable to post bail, take appropriate steps to have the defendant incarcerated at police headquarters or the county jail.  B.
[directive] Rather, younger individuals receive priority because they have had the least opportunity to live through life’s stages.  Evidence suggests that, when individuals are asked to consider situations of absolute scarcity of life- sustaining resources, most believe younger patients should be prioritized over older ones.9  Public engagement about allocation of critical care resources during an emergency also supported the use of the lifecycle principle for allocation decisions.6  [...] summarizes the moral argument in favor of life-cycle–based allocation as follows:
[directive] 4.1.4  An internal affairs function may conduct an internal investigation on its own initiative or upon notice to or at the direction of the law enforcement executive or the internal affairs supervisor.  Internal affairs may refer investigations to the employee's supervisor for action as permitted by agency policy and procedures.  4.1.5  Internal affairs investigations must be considered as important to the agency as any criminal investigation.  Members of the internal affairs function therefore should have the authority to interview any member of the agency and to review records and reports of the agency relative to their assignment.  In addition, the agency's personnel should be instructed that the internal affairs function acts at the behest of the law enforcement executive in all internal affairs investigations.  The agency's personnel should be further instructed that during an internal affairs investigation, every member of the agency, regardless of rank, shall treat an order or a request from a member of the internal affairs function as if the order or request came directly from the law enforcement executive.  4.1.6  The internal affairs function shall maintain a comprehensive central file on all complaints received, whether investigated by internal affairs or assigned to the officer's supervisors for investigation and disposition.  In addition, internal affairs should establish protocols for tracking all complaints received by the agency and the conduct of all officers.  The protocols must include criteria for evaluating the number of complaints received by the agency and the number of complaints filed against individual officers.  4.2
[brief] B.  The Doctrine of Unclean Hands Barred the Petitioner From Obtaining Equitable Relief.  Court of equity follows the equitable maximum that “he who seeks equity must do equity. ”  This principle obliges a party seeking equitable relief to what is required by conscience and good faith.  *Natovitz v. Bay Head Realty*, 142 N.J. Eq. 456, 463 (E.&A. 1948); *Hopewell Valley Citizens' Grp., Inc. v. Berwind Prop. Grp. Dev. Co., L.P.*, 204 N.J. 569, 585 (2011).  Related to this principle is the “unclean hands” doctrine, which provides that a court will refuse relief to any party which has acted in a manner “contrary to the principles of equity. ”  *Johnson v. Johnson*, 212 N.J. Super. 368, 384 (Ch. Div. 1986).  It is based on the belief that courts should not grant relief to one who is “a wrongdoer with respect to the subject matter in suit. ”  *Faustin v. Lewis*, 85 N.J. 507, 511 (1981).  The essence of the unclean hands doctrine is that a “suitor in equity must come into court with clean hands and he must keep them clean after his entry and throughout the proceedings. ”  *A. Hollander & Son, Inc. v. Imperial Fur Blending Corp.*, 2 N.J. 235, 246 (1949).  As noted by a leading authority:  Whenever a party, who, as actor seeks to set the judicial machinery in motion and obtain some remedy, has violated conscience or good faith, or other equitable principles, in his prior conduct, then the doors of the court will be shut against him in limine; the court will refuse to interfere on his behalf, to acknowledge his right, or to award him any remedy.  2 Pomeroy, *Equity Jurisprudence* § 397, p. 657 (3rd ed. 1905); See also, *Chrisomalis v. Chrisomalis*, 260 N.J. Super. 50 (App. Div. 1992) (wife was equitably estopped by her fraud and unclean hands from seeking declaration that antenuptial agreement was invalid and unenforceable).  Here, the Petitioner’s repeated reprehensible conduct barred him from obtaining equitable relief.  Because he came into equity with unclean hands, the Chancery Division committed reversible error in granting him a life estate in the Decedent’s property.
[directive] If the firearm involved is an assault firearm or machine gun, the prosecutor must use Special Application and Enhancement Feature D pursuant to Section 11.4.  Page 52  [...] Guidelines 2 (2004 Revisions) deemed to be one that involves weapons for purpose of this Special Offense Characteristic unless the prosecutor has a reasonable basis to believe that the defendant knew or had reason to know that his or her partner would possess a firearm or would use or threaten the immediate use of a weapon other than a firearm, or has a reasonable basis to believe that the defendant had the purpose to promote or facilitate an offense involving the possession of a firearm or the use or threat to immediately use a weapon other than a firearm.
[brief] For the reasons set forth above, the Appellate Division should affirm the entry of the Summary Judgment Orders in all respects.  [...]  A Professional Corporation Attorneys for Defendant/Respondent, [...]  By: /s [...]  MATTHEW N. FIOROVANTI  Dated: June 17, 2024  [...], Plaintiff-Appellant v. [...], 290 OCEAN, LLC, [...], [...], AND [...]
[brief] The second order, [...], was issued six years after the first order and is no more illuminating than its predecessor.  The second order pertains to a subsequent acquisition of the same entity so a reader of this order (assuming that reciprocal exchanges had an obligation to review an order approving an acquisition) and the first order could easily infer that the statements therein are limited to that entity.  Nothing in it indicates that it applies to all reciprocal exchanges.2  Once again, it is unreasonable to contend that this 2.
[brief] (Pa 83, at § 1 – Definitions).  The insuring agreement of the excess liability coverage part provides:  We will pay for damages that an insured is legally obligated to pay as a result of property damage or personal injury caused by an occurrence to which this coverage applies: a.  In excess of the underlying insurance or the minimum required underlying limits, whichever is greater; or b.  From the first dollar where coverage provided by required underlying insurance does not apply or underlying insurance is not required.  (Pa 86. at § II – Coverages, A. Excess Liability).
[brief] The Subconsultant Agreement between [...] and [...] likewise indicates that “[i]f the work to be performed by the Subconsultant is of a professional nature, the work shall be performed under the direct supervision of a licensed professional consultant” (Pa1790).  [...] employee [...], a licensed professional engineer, served that supervisory role for [...], and reported to [...], vice president with [...], and the Project Manager (Pa2614 at T17:11-24, T66:23-67:6).  Both [...] and [...] are licensed professional engineers and qualify as “licensed persons” under the Affidavit of Merit Statute (Pa1914 at T8:25-9:9; Pa2613 at T13:8-17).  [...], [...]’s Resident Engineer on the Turnpike project, worked under the supervision of [...], a licensed engineer, in carrying out the requirements of both the Subconsultant Agreement and HAK’s professional service contract with the [...].
[directive] ¿Se han comprometido por algún acuerdo usted y el fiscal a que se estipule una sentencia o un período en que no podrá recibir libertad condicional menores a los que de otro modo se requerirían?  (En caso afirmativo, asegúrese de incluirlo en las preguntas 12 y 13 que anteceden).  Have you and the Prosecutor entered into any agreement to provide for a lesser sentence or period of parole ineligibility than would otherwise be required?
[brief] In addition, while a landlord is certainly able to make a fair return on his investment, the RCO is clear that “it is not the intention of this chapter to permit a hardship rental increase when the landlord has not made a reasonably prudent investment. ”  §155-14(3).  In determining whether the Board should grant a hardship rental increase, the RCO is also clear that the Board is to consider whether the landlord has made a reasonably prudent investment.
[brief] However, Appellant failed to obtain an Affidavit of Merit in accordance with N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-27 in order to sustain their professional malpractice claim that [...] breached its ethical and professional duties to Plaintiffs by continuing to provide professional engineering services to [...] on the solar project.  [...] filed a Motion to Dismiss the Complaint and Crossclaims for Appellants failure to obtain an Affidavit of Merit in accordance with N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-27.  The Trial Court granted [...]’s Motion to Dismiss.  Now, Appellants are appealing the aforementioned Order alleging again that an Affidavit of Merit was not required, which is meritless (no pun intended).