ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Defendant-appellant [...]’s (“Defendant”) appeal should be dismissed because he fails to articulate any cognizable basis to overturn the trial court’s denial of his motion for reconsideration.  Defendant asked the trial court to reconsider its denial of his request to reinstate his counterclaim after the trial court dismissed it for his failure to appear at the peremptory trial.  Notwithstanding his prior agreement to that peremptory trial date, Defendant sought to have the trial adjourned on numerous occasions, only to have each one denied.  Despite those denials, Defendant still failed to appear at trial due to his failure to follow the trial court’s unambiguous and repeated instruction that he must pay the prisoner transportation fee, as the court arranged with [...] to have Defendant transported to the [...] and housed at the [...] (“[...]”) during the pendency of his trial.  Unfortunately, considering Defendant’s numerous failed adjournment requests and the court’s repeated instruction that the prisoner transportation fee must be paid in advance, defense counsel’s sole excuse in support of Defendant’s appeal - that he did not know about that requirement - strains credulity.  In fact, as the trial judge wrote, it “defies credulity. ”  While preparing for trial while incarcerated may not have been easy, it was not impossible.  The trial court made accommodations to Defendant and his counsel, including, but not limited to, arranging for his transport to Morris County and his temporary housing at [...] during the pendency of the trial, to assist Defendant in the process.  After being afforded the opportunity to prosecute his claims against plaintiff-appellant, [...] (“Plaintiff”), on a date he selected, Defendant squandered that opportunity, and the court appropriately dismissed his counterclaim.  The trial court properly denied his attempt to reinstate his claims due to the lack of any legal basis for the reinstatement and because the facts betrayed his proffered excuse.  The trial court correctly denied reconsideration of that decision as Defendant again lacked any legal basis for same and the facts continued to betray his argument.  Respectfully, Defendant’s appeal should meet the same fate for the same reasons.
[brief] TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ........................................................................................................ ii  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS ON APPEAL ................ vi TABLE OF APPENDIX ........................................................................................................... vii  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT .................................................................................................1  PROCEDURAL HISTORY .......................................................................................................3  STATEMENT OF FACTS .......................................................................................................5  A.  Defendants’ Alleged Fraudulent Insurance Scheme ......................................................5 1.  The [...] .............................................................................................7  2.  The [...] ...............................................................................................9  B.  The Trial Court’s Denial of [...]’s Disqualification Motion .................................10  LEGAL ARGUMENT ............................................................................................................11
[brief] ” (Pa88).  [...] relied, principally, on a 1995 NJDOT Roadway Design Manual for his conclusion that the alleged repour of the sidewalk was done negligently.  (Pa103).  NJDOT’s stated purpose of the Roadway Design Manual obviates that it is meant for the structure and design of new roads; making the application of this standard to residential sidewalks improper and baseless.  (Pa162).  In response to [...]’s report, Defendants retained, and served a report from [...] (“[...]”).
[brief] [...] specifically rejected the Board’s reduction to 5% of operating income: [...] presented testimony and records to support the fact that the management fee was actually incurred, actually paid, and in line with the marketplace rates.  The Board resorted to an arbitrary rate of 5% of the income generated based on “board precedent” and “independent research. ”  Counsel for the Board characterizes the 5% finding as something that was “settled on” and defends the figure by expressing the Board’s apparent reticence to approve [...] paying fees to [...] due to the common ownership.  The fact remains that some entity has to provide management services and Julip’s rates were proven to be typically $150 per month for other clients in the same market.  The actual proofs submitted by [...] far outweighed the admittedly subjective compromise figure of 5%, which was the absolute low end of the range of 5%-12% suggested by the “independent research. ”  This issue is remanded for further consideration and evaluation as the 5% allowance seems arbitrary and motivated by suspicion of, or animus for [...]. (Da 20).  Then, after reducing the management fee paid by [...] from $150 to $100, [...] held that the Board “arbitrarily slashed the cost by a third. ”  13T:65:9-10.  The uncontroverted testimony in the record established that the management fee for units of this size range from $150-$200 per month.  7T:29:14-20.  [...] paid $150 per month.  5T:27:7.  It was arbitrary and capricious for the Board to reduce the fee to $100.  Further, common ownership of [...] and [...] is irrelevant.  As held by [...], “some entity has to provide management services and Julip’s rates were proven to be typically $150 per month for other clients in the same market. ”  Da 20.  There was no showing that [...] did not provide the management services for the Unit, and that the monthly management fee paid by [...] (whether to [...] or some other management company) is unreasonable and improper self-dealing as baldly argued by the Board.
[directive] These Guidelines provide two distinct means by which a prosecutor may account for the use or possession of weapons during the course of the underlying Brimage-eligible offense or at the time of the defendant’s arrest.  (In certain circumstances, both options may or must be used in order to fully account for defendant’s relevant conduct.)  One option that may be available is to treat weapons involvement as a Special Offense Characteristic, which is then used to determine the appropriate row within the applicable Table of Authorized Plea Offers.  (The practical effect of treating weapons involvement as a Special Offense Characteristic in most cases is to increase the term of parole ineligibility by six months.)  The second option that may be used, and that in some cases is required to be used, is to treat the weapons circumstance pursuant to Special Application and Enhancement Feature D under Section 11.4 by requiring the defendant to plead guilty to at least one applicable Brimage-eligible offense and also to plead guilty to the second-degree crime defined in N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4.1.  That statute provides that the sentence imposed on the second-degree drug-related weapons offense must be served consecutively to the sentence imposed on any underlying drug distribution-type conviction.  (When this option is used, the practical effect, taking into account ordinary parole laws, is to increase the time actually served by the defendant by approximately fourteen months, as compared to the automatic six- month increase resulting from the use of the Special Offense Characteristic #1.)  When a prosecutor is required or otherwise elects to account for weapons involvement as a Special Application and Enhancement Feature pursuant to Section 11.4, the prosecutor is prohibited from “double counting” the weapons circumstance by also using the Special Offense Characteristic based upon the same conduct, event or episode that was used to establish the basis for the Special Application and Enhancement Feature.  In other words, if a prosecutor in Page 50 Attorney General Brimage Guidelines 2 (2004 Revisions) a school zone case uses Special Application and Enhancement Feature D to account for a specific weapons-related circumstance, the prosecutor may not use rows B, D, or F in Table 1 in determining the authorized plea offer to account for the same specific conduct.  However, a prosecutor shall use both Special Offense Characteristic #1 and Special Application and Enhancement Feature D based upon separate and distinct conduct, episodes or events.
[brief] (Ab53).  Furthermore, in relying on the State’s clean energy and climate policies outlined in the EMP, the Clean Energy Act, the Global Warming Response Act, and the NJDEP-issued “New Jersey’s Global Warming Response Act: 80x50 Report: Evaluating Our Progress and Identifying Pathways to Reduce Emissions 80% by 2050” (80x50 Report), which address the State’s goals to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and natural gas consumption, [...] argues that [...] must reduce its natural gas usage by immediately “halting installations in new construction,” including the Project.  N.J.S.A. 26:2C-38; N.J.S.A. 48:3-87.9; (Ab42-43).  However, [...] provides no support for its contention that the above-referenced statutes and policy documents would impact the construction of reliability projects pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40:55D-19.
[brief] Appellant relies heavily upon the case of *Willingboro Mall, Ltd. v. 249/242 Franklin Ave., LLC*, 215 N.J. 242 (2013) in support of its contention that it is entitled to enforcement of the terms set forth on record on December 20, 2022.  Appellant’s arguments should not be found at all persuasive and should be rejected in their entirety.  --- \(^3\)  It also indicates initial agreement/acknowledgment by Appellant that the proper forum in which to seek relief would be to petition the Civil Service Commission; further indicates the position that the agreement – absent a writing – was incomplete and not binding.  To the extent that Appellant implies that the alleged agreement here should be enforced because the Willingboro Court upheld a settlement agreement which lacked a writing, such should be disregarded.  As the Willingboro Court declared, going forward, if parties to mediation reach an agreement to resolve their dispute, the terms of that settlement must be reduced to writing and signed by the parties before the mediation comes to a close.  Willingboro, 215 N.J. at 262-263.  In those cases in which the complexity of the settlement terms cannot be drafted by the time the mediation session was expected to have ended, the mediation session should be continued for a brief but reasonable period of time to allow for the signing of the settlement.  Id.  A settlement that is reached at mediation but not reduced to a signed written agreement will not be enforceable.  Id (emphasis added).  In the instant case, the conversations in efforts to resolve the matter took place in a mediation session outside of the departmental hearing.  Therefore, a fully completed settlement agreement would be required to be put in writing and signed by the parties for it to be enforceable.  However, no such writing was ever signed by the parties and accordingly, the terms set forth on December 20, 2022 are not properly enforceable.
[brief] (Da10; S-28 in evidence); (7T176-5 to 7).  “That’s me,” defendant instantly responded and sign the photo.  (Da10; S-28 in evidence); (7T176-8 to 12).  [...] next showed defendant a photograph of the assailant who held the green jacket on Sycamore, to which defendant immediately stated, “[...]” and signed the photograph.  (Da11; S-29 in evidence).
[brief] As the United States Supreme Court has held, “the constitutional rights of children cannot be equated with those of adults. ”  Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 634 (1979), overruled on other grounds by Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Org., 597 U.S. 215 (2022); see also Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 654 (1995) (noting that “unemancipated minors lack some of the most fundamental rights of self-determination”).  Adults have the constitutional right to marry, Loving v.  In its briefing below, the State attempted to obscure this fact, describing the case as involving a “teenager. ”  ACa75.  While that description is not incorrect, it also ignores the categorial distinction between minors and adults in connection with parental rights.  Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967), to engage in consensual sexual relations, Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), and to view indecent material, Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497 (1987), for example, yet almost every state in the union, including New Jersey, has laws prohibiting minors from engaging in these activities, see, e.g., N.J.S.A. 37:1–6 (prohibiting minors from marrying); N.J.S.A. 2C:14–3 (restricting sexual activity with minors); N.J.S.A. 2C:34–3 (prohibiting distribution of indecent material to minors).  More importantly, the proposed right at issue is not some abstract privacy right.  Rather, it is a proposed privacy right in children against their parents.  But minor children generally “lack . . . rights vis-à-vis [their] parents. ”  Nunez by Nunez v. City of San Diego, 114 F.3d 935, 944–45 (9th Cir. 1997).  Indeed, considering “the peculiar vulnerability of children; their inability to make critical decisions in an informed, mature manner; and the importance of the parental role in child rearing,” the Court should be highly skeptical of arguments that seek to interpose the United States Constitution between parents and their children.
[brief] Attorneys for Defendant-Appellee, [...] Dated: September 16, 2024  By: /s/[...] STEVEN A. ZABARSKY  For the Firm [...] [...] September 30, 2024  Honorable Judges of the Superior Court of New Jersey Appellate Division 25 W. Market Street Trenton, NJ 08625-0006  Re: [...], Plaintiff-Appellant, V. SEASIDE HEIGHTS PLANNING BOARD and [...]
[brief] (Pa 81 - 88).  Plaintiff appealed this decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.  By Judgment dated February 28, 2011, the Third Circuit affirmed [...]’s Order denying Plaintiff’s motion to remand and granting Defendant’s motion to dismiss the Complaint.  (Pa 90).  Plaintiff did not file a Petition for Certiorari with the United States Supreme Court.
[brief] ”  \textit{State v. Higginbotham}, 475 N.J. Super. 205, 221 (App. Div. 2023).  Likewise, laws “implicating First Amendment liberties are subjected to sharper scrutiny and given more exacting assessment. ”  \textit{Heyert v. Taddese}, 431 N.J. Super. 388, 424 (App. Div. 2013).  The trial court’s holding that the meaning of “principally engaged” and “attorney-at law of this State” are “not substantially incomprehensible, and a person of common intelligence is able to understand its essential terms” flies in the face of the record.
[directive] Probably  Proceeding charged with a crime punishable by death or life imprisonment, no bail shall be granted.  Act  Permissible 4th Degree $1,000 to $2,500  No 10%  Contempt of Actor purposely or knowingly violates any provision of a Domestic Violence Restraining  2C:29-9b  Domestic Violence Order; fourth degree if conduct constitutes a crime or disorderly persons offense; otherwise offense.1
[brief] (23T149-9 to 14; 23T150-1 to 10; Defendant placed the gun in his jacket pocket for protection.  (23T151-6 to 9).  He then waited outside for the two female companions of [...], but he did not see them or [...].  (23T151-16 to 17; 23T151-23 to 25).  Defendant claimed that as he waited outside, a man pulled up his shirt and exposed a gun.  (23T156-12 to 16).  Defendant claimed he put his hand in his pocket to send a message to this man to back off.  (23T156-13 to 18).  Defendant claimed people in the crowd were still saying, “smoke you crab ass n-words. ” (23T158-1 to 3).  Defendant claimed that “crab” was a term for the Crips street gang.  (23T158-1 to 2).  Defendant denied being a gang member, himself.  (23T158-6 to 9).  Defendant claimed he had no issue with [...] or with [...].
[brief] After reviewing the incredible fee application of plaintiffs’ counsel and issuing its 20-page decision categorizing the fee request as a “free for all,” the Court granted reconsideration without amending or striking any of its comments that plaintiffs’ counsels’ billing tactics were “excessive,” “incredible,” “unreasonable” and “unnecessary. ” (Da1411).  The Court’s 8-page decision granting reconsideration respectfully restated the incomprehensible billing practices of plaintiffs’ counsel captured by their fee application, yet the Court minimalized the previous 33% reduction and increased the fee enhancement based only on the *Rendine*’s Court’s statement that the range in “typical contingency cases ranges between 20% and 35% of the Lodestar,” with a general range of 5% to 50%.  *Rendine*, supra at 343.  That statement in *Rendine*, however, allowed the trial Court to do exactly what it did when it set a 10% enhancement and reduced the total award by a percentage that in the trial Court’s discretion was appropriate based on plaintiffs’ counsels’ excessive and unfettered billing practices.  Although [...] acknowledges that the award of attorneys’ fees and costs is committed to the discretion of the trial Court, [...] submits that the Court abused its discretion when it reconsidered its original award of $722,714.00 in attorneys’ fees and costs based on nothing more than a single sentence from the *Rendine* Court that permitted the Court to do precisely what it did and without amending or striking any of its factual findings regarding the plaintiffs’ excessive and unfettered billing practices as set forth in its February 1, 2023 Order and Memorandum of Decision.  The Court erred when it abused its discretion and increased the attorney fee award to the plaintiffs by approximately $300,000.00.
[brief] *Id.*  Defendants cannot point to anything in the record which suggests that these actions or inactions, if permitted by the MSRA, were reasonable.  There was no communication submitted by Defendants to indicate any reason why earned wages were not paid.  Indeed, as Defendants are relying upon this defense, discovery is necessary to show the reasonableness of withholding earned wages to the promoted officers.  Defendants’ refusal to comply with their pre-MSRA contractual obligations is completely unreasonable and in violation of the MSRA and is sufficiently pled in the Complaint.
[brief] ”  Saving Rutgers-Camden, 44 Rutgers L.J. at 374 (emphasis in original).  They further explain, “Rutgers University simply has no role in implementing the laws enacted by the New Jersey Legislature, nor does it have any role in governing the state. ”  Ibid.  Those statements are directly at odds with the trial court’s analysis.  Other authorities concur that the proper use of a quo warranto action is to remove governmental officials who were ineligible for election.  One such authority is *Branch v. Pitts*, 110 N.E.3d 87 (Ohio. Ct. App. 2018).  In that case, the court refused to apply the writ to oust an official appointed as a clerk of a town council, concluding: “The clerk of the Council is not an elected position, nor does it constitute a public position to which a portion of the legislative, executive, or judicial authority attach. ”  *Id.* at 95.  That is the case here.  Members of the BOG are not elected officials, nor do they possess any form of legislative, executive or judicial authority as to the general public.  They do not, for example, pass laws that members of the general public must follow, as elected lawmakers do, or perform any other legislative function that could bind the general public.  Neither do they hold any authority that resembles executive or judicial authority in the ordinary governmental sense.  Thus, the quo warranto statute simply does not apply.  **B.
[brief] - Put simply, the Plan establishes a Zoning Overlay to encourage a Mixed-Use Revitalization of the Bayshore by encouraging a more dense-yet still appropriate-development to enhance economic opportunities, while preserving natural resources, maximizing year-round recreational uses, and fostering an attractive visual environment, among other goals.  -  Despite the foregoing, [...] asserts 6 alleged inconsistencies – though many overlap.  Accounting for overlap, the alleged deficiencies shall be addressed in turn.  Overall, it can be said that [...]’s challenges to the Plan are too myopic – focusing on the leaves despite the forest – and advancing its own subjective vision of what Keansburg’s Bayshore should look like.  (emphasis added)
[brief] DEP brief --- 3 Highlands Exemptions #9 and #11 are the only Exemptions that are granted with the condition that the activity is consistent with the goals and purposes of this Act.  The benchmarks for finding consistency with the Highlands Act, and specifically addressing exemptions, are provided at N.J.A.C. 7:38-1.1(i) and (j).  These regulations are in addition to those expressly listed at N.J.A.C. 7:38-9.2 or 9.5 and N.J.A.C. 7:38-11.2, 11.3, and 11.7, as required for consistency determinations as set forth by the DEP’s regulations that implement the WQMA, at N.J.A.C. 7:15-3.2. at 30-31.  In fact, the DEP routinely employs very specific methods and pays very close attention to deforestation and impervious cover in some of its primary regulations which share the same objectives as the WQMA.  See the DEP’s Coastal Zone Management (“CZM”) rules which implement the Wetlands Act of 1970, the Flood Hazard Area Control Act, the Waterfront Development Act, and the Coastal Area Facility Review Act (“CAFRA”).  For instance, the DEP has duly promulgated a very detailed subchapter in the CZM rules which “…sets forth requirements applicable in general land areas and certain special areas for impervious cover and vegetative cover on sites in the upland waterfront development area and in the CAFRA area. ”  N.J.A.C. 7:7-13.1, emphasis added.  Accordingly, the DEP’s argument that it could not look at potential water impacts from impervious cover or deforestation should be rejected by this Court.  The DEP knows how to do this and does so routinely.  It should have considered these issues as part of its Water Quality Management Plan Consistency Determination in this case.
[brief] The Complaint makes clear that Plaintiff’s breach of covenant claim depends on Plaintiff’s ability to enforce the PSA when it alleges that [...] had a duty “not to act in a manner so as to frustrate Plaintiff’s ability to perform under the Agreement.  . . .” (Pa15, ¶77).  However, Plaintiff cannot state a claim for breach of the covenant of good faith because Plaintiff did not have the ability to enforce the PSA because the PSA was terminated and/or right to specific performance never arose.
[brief] Page  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ...........................................................................  iii TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS, AND RULINGS .................................. v  TABLE OF APPENDIX ..............................................................................  iii  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT .....................................................................  1  PROCEDURAL HISTORY ..........................................................................  2  STATEMENT OF FACTS  .........................................................................  5  A.  [...] sold PCBs to [...]’s predecessor and others while concealing their risks .........................................................  7  B.  [...] belatedly tenders dozens of PCB-related lawsuits to [...] after years of litigation, adverse verdicts, and on the eve of settling another group of cases .........................................................  9  C.  [...] files this action seeking a declaration that the Special Undertaking is void and unenforceable ............................................  10  D.  [...]’s second-filed suit in Missouri .............................................  11  E. [...]’s repeated motions seeking to dismiss this first-filed action ..........................................................................................  12  ARGUMENT ...............................................................................................