ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The defendant, [...], was charged by way of Indictment Number [...] with second-degree Aggravated Arson, N.J.S.A. 2C:17-1(a) (Counts One and Two); second-degree Possession of a Weapon for an Unlawful Purpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(a) (Count Three); and third-degree Unlawful Possession of a Weapon, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b) (Count Four).  Da1-3.  Defendant filed a pretrial motion to suppress statements, see Da4-16; (1T:4-7 to 4-13)¹, testimony and evidence on which was received by the Honorable [...], J.S.C., on October 17 and 18, 2019, and October 22, 2019.  See generally (1T, 2T, 3T).  Following argument from counsel, Judge Oxley reserved decision.  (3T:49-17 to 50-11).  By way of a November 21, 2019 order and accompanying written opinion, Judge Oxley denied defendant’s motion.  Da17-26.  Trial on this indictment took place before the Honorable [...], J.S.C., from July 12, 2021 through July 30, 2021.  (13T though 22T).  On July 30, 2021, the jury returned its verdict, finding defendant guilty on Counts --- ¹  The State’s transcripts citations will generally conform to the defendant’s Table of Abbreviations, Dbviii, with the following additions necessitated by defendant’s failure to include in his table five transcripts that were provided to this Court and which document corrections made to what defendant has identified as 20T, the return of the jury’s verdict, defendant’s post-verdict motion for a judgment of acquittal, defendant’s sentence, and corrected sentence.  The citation for these five additional transcripts are as follows:  21T refers to Transcript of Trial (Corrected), July 29, 2021.  22T refers to Transcript of Trial, July 30, 2021.  23T refers to Transcript of Motion, September 29, 2021.  24T refers to Transcript of Sentence, November 5, 2021.  25T refers to Transcript of Sentence, November 12, 2021.  Two, Three and Four, and not guilty on Count One.
[brief] STANDARD OF REVIEW  Appellant seeks review of the Trial Court’s determination on summary judgment.  “On appeal, we review a summary judgment decision de novo, applying the same legal standard as the trial court in determining whether the grant or denial of summary judgment was correct.  *Hinton v. Meyers*, 416 N.J. Super. 141, 146, 3 A.3d 601 (App.Div.2010); *Antheunisse v. Tiffany & Co., Inc.*, 229 N.J. Super. 399, 402, 551 A.2d 1006 (App.Div.1988), certif. denied, 115 N.J. 59, 556 A.2d 1206 (1989).  Of course, summary judgment is appropriate where "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact challenged and . . . the moving party is entitled to a judgment or order as a matter of law."  *R. 4:46-2(c). *  *Heyert v. Taddese*, 431 N.J. Super. 388, 411.  This “De novo review applies when appellate courts review determinations about the enforceability of contracts, including arbitration agreements."  *Kernahan v. Home Warranty Adm'r of Fla., Inc.*, 236 N.J. 301, 316, 199 A.3d 766 (2019) (citing *Hirsch v. Amper Fin. Servs., LLC*, 215 N.J. 174, 186, 71 A.3d 849 (2013)).”  *Gayles v. Sky Zone Trampoline Park*, 468 N.J. Super. 17, 23.
[brief] THE AWARD CANNOT BE CURED BY SIMPLY REDOING THE MATH AND ADDING TWO DOLLARS A SQUARE FOOT TO THE ARBITRATORS’ CALCULATIONS.(Da115;Da116)  The arbitrator indicated in his opinion, what he believed all along, that defendants and their appraisal witness were “manifestly unreasonable” and based his conclusion of value on that mistaken idea.  Even in his final comments after conclusion of the hearing, the Arbitrator could never get over the idea that: “if [...] is going to buy this property, and the revenue is .77 cents a square foot, why would I pay and base my decision upon an appraisal that says, well the market rent is $8.50?”  (7T 191 16-20)  Accordingly, the defendants’ and their experts’ credibility in the eyes of the arbitrator was improperly evaluated.  By way of illustration, the plaintiff’s appraiser had testified that [...] bought lot 19 in 1988 for two million dollars.  While Rocco [...] was testifying and producing the closing papers from that transaction to prove that [...] was wrong and that he had in fact paid $2,475,000.00 in 1988, the arbitrator responding to plaintiff’s counsel’s objections said: “So the problem is this potentially maybe Mr. [...] overpaid, …”(6T14 23-25)  Thus, the arbitrator ignored the false assumption of [...]’s opinion and concluded on a value which is only approximately $200,000.00 more than [...] paid for the property, about five and a half years before.  Considering the increase in the actual rent roll and the increase in the [...] average rent from $746.00 in 1988 to the $33,000.00 in 1993; as well as the success of the stores indicated by the [...] sales increase averaging 20% per year, his conclusion is clouded by his unwillingness to accept as valid any inference from the evidence in favor of the property owner, because of his underlying misperception of the property interests involved.
[brief] Determining whether such intrafamily liability exclusion clauses comport with our State public policy requires, in the first instance, an understanding of the dynamic between the consumer and the insurance carrier.  It is axiomatic under our State’s jurisprudence that “insurance policies that are contracts of adhesion and, as such, are subject to special rules of interpretation. ”  Progressive Cas. Ins. Co. v. Hurley, 166 N.J. 260, 272 (2001); see also Longobardi v. Chubb Ins. Co., 121 N.J. 530, 537 (1990); Bromfeld v. Harleysville Ins. Companies, 298 N.J. Super. 62, 74-75 (App. Div. 1997).
[brief] ” (Da4, ¶15) (emphasis added).  The Verified Complaint failed to contain the language required in affidavits that “I certify that the foregoing statements made by me are true.  I am aware that if any of the foregoing statements made by me are willfully false, I am subject to punishment. ”  R. 1:4-4(b).  (Da17).  See R. 4:67-2(a) (requiring Orders to Show Cause be brought by “complaint, verified by affidavit made pursuant to R. 1:6-6…”)  A finding that Plaintiff was timely remediating the Property and was in compliance with the ACO is not supported by evidence.  The Trial Court’s reliance on the Verified Complaint as evidence of compliance with the ACO was inappropriate because: (1) the verified complaint was not certified as to the truthfulness of the facts under penalty of perjury (Da17); and (2) the truthfulness of the facts was only valid as of October 5, 2023, and not as of the date of Trial.
[brief] PROCEDURAL HISTORY  On February 13, 2024, Plaintiff filed a three-count Complaint against [...].  (Pa29).  On April 1, 2024, [...] filed a motion to dismiss and compel arbitration pursuant to R. 4:6-2(a).  (Pa39).  On April 18, 2024, Plaintiff filed a “Cross Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings on Count III of the Complaint. ” (Pa68).  On May 30, 2024, the Honorable [...], J.S.C. issued two orders and a written decision granting [...]’s motion to dismiss and compel arbitration (Pa1-14), and denying Plaintiff’s cross motion for “judgment on the pleadings. ” (Pa15-16).  Plaintiff filed this appeal on June 5, 2024.  (Pa17-18).  III.
[brief] The report of defendants’ expert, [...], he notes that the [...] report failed to address the legal merits of the claim filed by [...] that was being decided by [...].  (Da156).  As properly noted by Mr. Henkel in his report, [...] simply stated that “The Court would have set aside the 2014 Will and plaintiffs would have each received one-third of their father’s Estate. ” (Da156).  However, that is simply a conclusion, and it was not based upon any facts or legal analysis.  In any event, the Court should reject the conclusions in the [...] report, as well as [...] opinion that because [...] benefited from the Will, there are “suspicious circumstances”.
[brief] First, [...]’s contention that the location of [...]’s sales establishes a substantial relationship to New York, as discussed above, is inapplicable and irrelevant.  Second, the other alleged connections with New York can hardly establish a substantial relationship.  [...]’s and [...]’s respective incorporation in New York cannot sustain New York law.  See Wright-Moore Corp. v. Ricoh Corp., 908 F.2d 128 (7th Cir. 1990).  [...]’s previous headquarters in New York when the Agreement was signed is irrelevant, particularly since [...] relocated to California several years ago.  See Rowen Petroleum Properties, LLC v. Hollywood Tanning Syst., Inc., 889 F. Supp. 2d 303, 307 (D.N.J. 2012).  Nor can [...]’s New York licenses and permits establish a substantial connection, as they are incidental to sales, which as discussed above, are irrelevant to the choice-of-law analysis.  Simply put, these tenuous connections, independently or in the aggregate, do not constitute a “substantial relationship” or have any relevance to this matter.
[brief] Municipal ordinances, like other legislative enactments, “carry a presumption of validity” and will be upheld where “any state of facts may reasonably be conceived to justify [them]. ”  *Quick Check Food Stores v. Springfield*, 83 N.J. 438, 447 (1980); *Hutton Park Gardens v. Town Council of Town of W. Orange*, 68 N.J. 543, 565 (1975).  This standard arises from an understanding that “the underlying policy and wisdom” of the ordinance is left to the governing body, not the courts.  *Quick Check Food Stores*, 83 N.J. at 447.  Notwithstanding this “less extensive record” standard applicable to legislative enactments, including redevelopment plans, the record in this matter, supporting these Ordinances, is quite extensive.  Because municipal actions are presumed proper, any challenge to their validity is a “heavy burden” to overcome.  *Bryant v. City of Atl. City*, 309 N.J. Super. 596, 610 (App. Div. 1998).  Only a showing of “clear and compelling evidence demonstrating the [action’s] unreasonableness” may overcome this presumption.  *Dock Watch Hollow Quarry Pit v. Twp. of Warren*, 142 N.J. Super. 103, 116 (App. Div. 1976), aff’d, 74 N.J. 312 (1977).  Here, where the lower court correctly enunciated the legal standard of review and consistently applied that standard in its thorough review of the record, Plaintiffs have not met their burden to reverse the trial court.  **III.
[brief] REPLY APPENDIX  TABLE OF CONTENTS........................................ii  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS, AND RULINGS..........................iii  PROCEDURAL HISTORY........................................................................2  STATEMENT OF FACTS.......................................................................2  LEGAL ARGUMENT..............................................................................2  POINT I  THE DECISION BELOW WAS ARBITRARY, CAPRICIOUS, AND UNREASONABLE, AND NOT SUPPORTED BY THE SUBSTANTIAL WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE.  (Not Raised Below).................................................................2  POINT II  ADEQUATE  NOTICE OF THE RICCI ACT WAS NOT PROVIDED AND THEREFORE, [...] SHOULD BE ENTITLED TO RICCI ACT BENEFITS.  (Raised Below.  Pa16. Pa30.).....................................................6  CONCLUSION....................................................................................11
[brief] [3T132-15-17; 3T146-17; 4T41-5 to -17; 4T71-5 to 9; 4T34-22 to 35-8].  Defendant’s DNA, confirmed by a buccal swab taken from defendant, matched the DNA on the bottle in every location.  [3T132-18 to 136-1; 4T88-22 to 89-5].
[brief] [...] WAS PROPERLY GRANTED SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON COUNT III, ALLEGING A VIOLATION OF THE NEW JERSEY LAW AGAINST DISCRIMINATION.  Plaintiff’s Complaint included claims of racial discrimination in a place of public accommodation pursuant to N.J.S.A. 10:5-4; 10:12(d)(e)(f); and 10:1-2.  Generally, the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (NJLAD) prohibits discrimination.  See Lehmann v. Toys ‘R’ Us, 132 N.J. 587, 600 (1993).  Each referenced statute states, in effect, that all persons shall have the opportunity to obtain all accommodations, advantages, facilities, and privileges of any place of public accommodation without discrimination because of, inter alia, race.  This opportunity is recognized as and declared to be a civil right.  The Complaint intimates that Plaintiff was not afforded privileges and immunities in a place of public accommodation due to his race.  While not specifically pled against the Defendant Borough, Plaintiff lacked any factual or evidentiary basis to maintain such a claim against the Defendant Borough.  As has been addressed above, Defendant [...] had no role in Plaintiff’s arrest, charging, or prosecution and have committed no violation of Plaintiff’s civil rights.
[brief] Because they are closely related, the procedural history and facts relevant to this motion are combined for efficiency and the court’s convenience. requirements.  N.J.A.C. 7:7-16.10(b-d).  Those same rules also include rules that recognize that [...] identified its Redevelopment Zone as an area “critical to the economic well-being of the City and would benefit the most from a comprehensive plan for revitalization and redevelopment, as well as” specific guidelines that regulate the design elements of projects proposed in the Redevelopment Zone.  29 N.J.R. 3920(a) (Sept. 15, 1997).  The Scenic Resources and Design Rule was adopted in 1978 to ensure that new development would be visually compatible with its surroundings.  10 N.J.R. 184(a) (May 4, 1978); 10 N.J.R. 384(a) (Sept. 7, 1978).  That standard remains in the rules.  N.J.A.C. 7:7-16.10(b).  In 1994, [...] amended the rule to add view corridor and setback requirements.  26 N.J.R. 943(a) (Feb. 22, 1994); 26 N.J.R. 1561(c) (Apr. 18, 1994).  These requirements are the same in the current CZM rules, that requires “new coastal development adjacent to a bay or ocean or bayfront or oceanfront, beach, dune, or boardwalk and higher than 15 feet in height measured from the existing grade of the site or boardwalk” to “[p]rovide an open view corridor perpendicular to the water's edge in the amount of 30 percent of the frontage along the waterfront where an open view currently exists” and “[b]e separated from either the beach, dune, boardwalk, or waterfront, whichever is further inland, by a distance of equal to two times the height of the structure. ”  N.J.A.C. 7:7-16.10(d)(1-2).  This “ensure[s] that proposed developments do not adversely affect existing views of and access to beaches and waterfront areas” by respectively requiring open view corridors of the waterfront between buildings and a setback to avoid crowding the waterfront.
[brief] To that end, [...] asserts that to the best of her knowledge, the only [...] application she had on her phone on January 8, 2022 was [...] Eats.  Throughout its motion and appellant’s brief, [...] refers only to the “[...] app. ” (Da72).  However, in January 2022 and even today, [...] maintains multiple applications.  On the consumer side, [...] maintained two applications, an [...] application and an [...] Eats application.  See [...].com, Introducing [...] One (Nov. 17, 2021), available at: https://www.uber.com/newsroom/introducing-uber-one/ (“open your [...] or [...] Eats app”).  Even assuming [...] or her daughter did click the checkbox, they almost certainly did so within the [...] Eats application.  In that case, it would be difficult for any consumer to anticipate or discern from the terms that any arbitration agreement would cover not just the [...] Eats application, but also claims concerning other [...] applications and services not even on the phone.
[brief] [...] relies primarily on two non-precedential decisions to advance its theory that Plaintiffs should be estopped from litigating their claims in State Court.  (Db13-15.)  Specifically, [...] cites Schwartz v. Comcast Corporation, 256 Fed. App’x 515 (3d Cir. 2007) and Parrella v. Sirius Xm Holdings, 2022 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 59 (App. Div. Jan. 18, 2022) for the proposition that because Plaintiffs received benefits from their contractual relationship with [...], they are bound to arbitrate any and all claims against [...].
[brief] Legal Argument I raised the issue: “[...] Failed to demonstrate That an In-Camera Review is Warranted. ” (Da324-330).  Appellant argued: 1.  The court had previously rejected the request for in-camera review; 2.  In-camera review renders it impossible for Appellant to rebut Respondent’s contentions; and, 3.  Respondents could have sought a protective order.  3.  The November 7, 2024 Oral Arguments.
[brief] 17, 19 [...] et al., Bringing Science to Law and Policy: Brain Development Social Context, and Justice Policy, 57 Wash. U.J.L.& Pol’y 13 (2018)  ...........................................................................................................  17  [...] and [...], Adolescent Decision Making: A Decade in Review, 31 Journal of Research on Adolescence 1006 (2021) .................................................................................................................. 17, 19 [...], Structural Magnetic Resonance Imaging of the Adolescent Brain, 1021 Annals of the N.Y. Acad. Of Sci. 77 (2004) .................................................. 19 [...], Reckless Behavior in Adolescence: A Developmental Perspective, 12 Developmental Review 339 (1992) .........................................................  9  [...] at al., Adolescents in Peer Groups Make More Prudent Decisions When a Slightly Older Adult Is Present, 27 Psychological Science 322 (2016)  ...........................................................................................................  18  [...] & [...], When do Ex-Offenders Become Like Non-Offenders?, 48 Howard J. Crim. Just. 373 (2009)  ............................................  16  [...] & Elizabeth S. Scott, Less Guilty by Reason of Adolescence: Developmental Immaturity, Diminished Responsibility, and the Juvenile Death Penalty, 58 Am. Psychologist 1009 (2003)  ......................  9  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (CONT'D)
[brief] (6T92-8 to 16).  But defendant testified, without relying on any documents, that he and [...] were 50/50 partners in the [...] franchise because [...] had gradually withdrawn from the company.  (6T116-2 to 119-9).  Defendant contended that he did not recall signing the Hoboken operating agreement showing that he only had a 5% interest in [...] and the only reason he may have done so was to secure a small business loan. (6T10-2 to 8; 6T173-13 to 18).  Based on the evidence that defendant took $750,000 from six individuals in exchange for 30% of a business that he did not own, then spent the money on unrelated personal expenses, defendant was convicted of one count of second-degree theft by deception of property valued in excess of $75,000.
[brief] Pa2729-30.  Regarding [...] and [...]’s argument that [...] could not have been covered as it did not have dedicated payroll, [...] and [...] have only pointed to certain emails communicating confusion regarding difficulties with uploading payroll in September of 2015, referring to work well before the December 2015 accident.  [...] Db27-28.  Further, these communications show that [...] did have dedicated payroll for on-site employees.
[directive] The investigator should then submit a report to the law enforcement executive or appropriate supervisor summarizing the matter and indicating the appropriate disposition.  Possible dispositions include:  (a)  Sustained.  A preponderance of the evidence shows an officer violated any law; regulation; directive, guideline, policy, or procedure issued by the Attorney General or County Prosecutor; agency protocol; standard operating procedure; rule; or training.  (b)  Unfounded.  A preponderance of the evidence shows that the alleged misconduct did not occur.  (c)  Exonerated.  A preponderance of the evidence shows the alleged conduct did occur, but did not violate any law; regulation; directive, guideline, policy, or procedure issued by the Attorney General or County Prosecutor; agency protocol; standard operating procedure; rule; or training.  (d)  Not Sustained.  The investigation failed to disclose sufficient evidence to clearly prove or disprove the allegation.  6.2.4  If the investigator determines that the complaint is unfounded, exonerated or not sustained, the investigative report is to be forwarded to internal affairs for review and entry in the index file and filing.  The subject officer shall be notified in writing of the investigation’s outcome.
[brief] (1029a).  The Court also based its decision in part upon the fact that [...] amended and extended the MSRA in June 2021.  Ibid.  Further, the Court found that "a reasonableness analysis is not required."  Ibid.  The Trial Court also expressly stated that there was no "reason to consider the Plaintiffs' attorney's arguments that the Defendants act[ed] unconstitutionally."  Ibid.  --- 3  Plaintiffs refer to this transcript as "1T."  With respect to Plaintiffs' motion to amend the Complaint, the Court asserted Plaintiffs sought to add a "contract theory," which it concluded was denied based upon a futility argument.  *Ibid.*  However, Plaintiffs' already pled contract and quasi-contract theories in their initial Complaint.  (34a-35a & 38a-39a).  Further, the Court denied Plaintiffs' motion to amend regarding the direct constitutional claims, in part, because they were supposedly duplicative of the CRA claims.  (1030a).  The Court further mischaracterized Plaintiffs' constitutional claims as only arising out of an alleged violation of their rights to collectively bargain.  *Ibid.*  On February 22, 2024, the Trial Court denied Plaintiffs' motion to extend the discovery end date. (1039a).  On March 18, 2024, Plaintiffs filed their Notice of Appeal.  (1a).  **LEGAL ARGUMENT**
[brief] ”  N.J.S.A. 2C:44-2(b).  Furthermore, “[i]n determining the amount and method of payment of restitution, the court shall take into account all financial resources of the defendant, including the defendant's likely future earnings, and shall set the amount of restitution so as to provide the victim with the fullest compensation for loss that is consistent with the defendant's ability to pay. ”  N.J.S.A. 2C:44-2(c)(2) (emphasis added).  Thus, “[i]n order to impose restitution . . . there must be an explicit consideration of defendant's ability to pay.
[brief] Plaintiff’s unabashed forum shopping through the filing of a preemptive declaratory judgment action is a sufficient basis on its own to support the trial court’s dismissal of this case.  See *Century Indem.*, 398 N.J. Super. at 438 (noting courts “in other jurisdictions” have “dismiss[ed] first-filed preemtory declaratory judgment actions instituted to obtain a forum advantage, so as to permit the ‘natural plaintiff’s’ action to proceed in the plaintiff’s chosen court. ”); *Sensient Colors*, 193 N.J. at 388.  Courts across the country take a “dim view” of declaratory judgment actions like this one, which are preemptively filed by natural defendants in hopes of securing a favored forum.  See, e.g., *AmSouth Bank v. Dale*, 386 F.3d 763, 788 (6th Cir. 2004) (“Courts take a dim view of declaratory plaintiffs who file their suits mere days or weeks before the coercive suits filed by a ‘natural plaintiff’ and who seem to have done so for the purpose of acquiring a favorable forum.  Allowing declaratory actions in these situations can deter settlement negotiations and encourage races to the courthouse, as potential plaintiffs must file before approaching defendants for settlement negotiations, under pain of a declaratory suit. ”); Digitrax Entm’t, LLC v. Universal Music Corp., 21 F. Supp. 3d 917, 923 (E.D. Tenn. 2014) (dismissing first-filed declaratory judgment suit where the parties were engaged in pre-litigation settlement discussions on the basis that the filing party “engaged in forum shopping and procedural fencing, if not bad faith” in an effort to “secure its preferred forum”).  Indeed, as correctly noted by the trial court, court after court has dismissed first-filed declaratory judgment cases in favor of second-filed coercive actions.