ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE GRANTED THE DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION BASED UPON THE UNREFUTED CERTIFICATION OF DEFENDANTS’ INSURANCE ADJUSTER DESCRIBING HER OBSERVATIONS OF PLAINTIFF DURING JURY SELECTION.  (7T.4:4 to 21:1.)  As outlined in Point I above, there is no doubt that something occurred during jury selection which caused a Sheriff’s Officer to bring to the trial judge’s attention behavior which was out-of-the ordinary.  No contemporaneous record was made thereof, and neither Plaintiff nor any member of the Court’s staff subsequently provided any description of what occurred.  By contrast, during the course of Plaintiff’s trial testimony, the Court observed behavior which caused it to place its concerns on the record sua sponte.  That is, during Plaintiff’s trial testimony, video depicting his vehicle being pushed forward was shown to the jury.  3T.24:23 to 28:21.  As it was being shown, Plaintiff was permitted, without objection, to leave the witness stand and approach the video screen while answering questions about what was depicted thereon.  Ibid.  Upon a subsequent, unrelated objection requiring the jury to leave the courtroom, id., at 45:7 to 51:15, however, the Court observed:  We’ll have them come back in if they’re ready.  Yeah.  You know what?  Let me just say too, I know the Plaintiff has had sort of free rein of the courtroom, and I know presumably he’s in pain, but we need to keep that a little tighter.  So, up at the witness - - I mean, obviously we needed to show the video and the like, but I don’t want it to be a distraction for the jurors with the Plaintiff walking all around the courtroom and the like.  Certainly, feel free to stand up, but - - Id., at 50:22 to 51:26.  Explaining the degree of deference appellate courts owe to a trial judge’s “feel of the case,” the Court in Cuevas v. Wentworth Group, 226 N.J. 480, 501-02 (2016) noted “[i]t is the judge who sees the jurors wince, weep, snicker, avert their eyes, or shake their heads in disbelief who may know whether the jury’s verdict was motivated by improper influences and who may be privy to observations that could not have been made by the jury. ” (internal citations omitted).  Having been deprived of the opportunity to make those kind of observations and assessments of the jurors’ reactions to Plaintiff’s conduct during jury selection, the trial court did not have the same opportunity to develop a “feel” for what occurred as it did during the trial.  Instead, it was dependent on the reports of others when evaluating the potential that impressions developed before the trial began influenced the jury’s verdict, and in this instance, its decision to disregard the certification of Defendants’ insurance adjuster is not entitled to any deference from this Court.  In the absence of any contrary evidence from any source, it was improper to have done so, and Defendants’ motion for reconsideration should have been granted based upon the conduct described therein.
[brief] See Pa665-6.  [...] specifically opined that “[t]he incident site was in a hazardous condition on the day of this incident” due to “the lack of proper traffic control devices” that were needed to maintain the lot “in a safe condition. ”  Pa665.  The trial court’s erroneous overlooking of evidence in the record supporting Plaintiff's contention that [...]’s parking lot was in an inherently dangerous condition further demonstrates that its order granting summary judgment should be reversed.
[brief] *Marmo*, 478 Super. at 611-12; see also Transcript, 12:6-8 (“in our case, there’s been nothing done except paper discovery served, no answers provided, no depositions, nothing like that. ”).  Respondents anticipate that Appellant may argue that, by Respondents’ filing of their cross-motion to dismiss and the dismissal of Appellant’s unjust enrichment claim, that Respondents have benefitted from the litigation to the detriment of Appellant.  (Pa76).  But first, that cross-motion was made only in response to Appellant’s procedural motion seeking to consolidate this action with the prior collection action, and the commencement of a collection action does not constitute waiver.
[brief] The State undoubtedly has the authority to render medical treatment to children without parental consent in certain situations, *see, e.g.*, *D.C.M.M. v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct. in & for Cnty. of Clark*, No. 87207, 2023 WL 5837974, at *2 (Nev. Sept. 8, 2023) (authorizing treatment without parental consent where child needed immediate medical attention for serious medical condition and parents could not be located), but this is not one of them.
[brief] Settled Law Required [...] To Notify [...] Of Its Termination From The CCIP Liability Policies, And The Law Division Erred In Its Failure To Apply That Law (Dta1362-64; see, Dta1151,1183,1259)...............................................................27  A.  The Law Division Erred In Its Refusal To Apply New Jersey’s Regulatory Cancellation Scheme (Dta1362-1364)....................30  B.  Common Law Principles Required [...] To Provide [...] With Notice Of The Cancellation Of Its Coverage (Dta1151-55,1274)...............................................................34 ---  1,2  The references to these documents confirms that the cited arguments, which are germane to this appeal, were raised below even though the Law Division failed to address them.  R.2:6-1(a)(2).  C.  The Law Division Improperly Indulged [...]’s Delegation Of Its Non-Delegable Notice Obligations (Dta1158,59)........39  D.  The Inferential Extrinsic Evidence Cited By The Court Does Not Support Its Conclusion (Dta1144-50,1259-74)..................42  Point II .................................................................................................................................48  The Court Below Should Have Granted [...]’ Request For Reimbursement Of The Settlement Amount, Defense And Declaratory Judgment Fees, Costs And Interest (See,Dta1257-8,1279,1282²)  ......................................................48  Conclusion.........................................................................................................................49
[brief] For example, in Jacobsen, supra, 53 N.J. Super. 574 the counterclaimant sought to defend the enforcement of two (2) promissory notes by the university on the grounds that the university engaged in common law fraud by making material misrepresentations of fact in various university advertisements, which included brochures and catalogs.  Id. at 576-77.  In particular, the university’s brochures and catalogs contained the university’s general objectives, hopes, and desires together with “factual statements as to the nature of some of the courses included in its curricula. ”  Id. at 579.  The Trial Court dismissed the claim of fraud against the university.  The Appellate Division affirmed the dismissal, holding that the university’s advertisements were “nothing more than a fairly complete exposition of [...]’s [the Defendant in that matter] objectives, desires and hopes,” and that, “[o]nly by reading into them the imagined meanings” can one conclude that the advertisements constituted material misrepresentations of fact.
[brief] *Ferriera v Rancocas Orthopedic Associates*, 178 N.J. 144, 150 (2003) quoting, *Ryan v Renny*, 203 N.J. 37(2010),  Importantly, our courts have emphasized that the Affidavit of Merit statute is not to be mechanically applied, but should be construed “to avoid the risk that even a few meritorious cases may be dismissed for non-compliance with the Statute. ”  *In re Hall*, 147 N.J. 379, 392-393 (1997).  The Supreme Court reiterated this in *Ryan v Renny*, 203 N.J. 37(2010), emphasizing that “[i]mportantly, ‘there is no legislative interest in barring meritorious claims brought in good faith.  Indeed, ‘[t]he legislative purpose was not to ‘create a minefield of hyper-technicalities in order to doom innocent litigants possessing meritorious claims. ”  *Id.* at 203 N.J. 51(2010) (internal citations omitted).
[brief] PLAINTIFFS’ ATTEMPT TO DISTINGUISH NEGLIGENT  HIRING CLAIMS FROM NEGLIGENT SUPERVISION AND TRAINING CLAIMS IS IMMATERIAL AND ILLUSTRATES THE FLAW IN PLAINTIFFS’ ARGUMENT.  Plaintiffs argue they do not need to provide evidence of a dangerous characteristic of [...] to establish negligent training and supervision because these claims are subject to a different standard than a negligent hiring claim.  This is incorrect.  The New Jersey Supreme Court held that negligent training and supervision claims have “essentially the same standard” as negligent hiring claims, a fact the Plaintiffs completely overlook.  See G.A.H., supra, at 416.  The Supreme Court in G.A.H. did not exempt Plaintiffs from proving that the employee possessed a dangerous attribute in negligent training and supervision claims.  To the contrary, this Court interpreted G.A.H. to require proof of a dangerous trait in a negligent supervision case.  See E.S. for G.S. v. Brunswick Inv. Ltd. Partnership, 469 N.J. Super. 279, 296-97 (App. Div. 2021) (citing G.A.H., and explaining “[t]he motion record is devoid of any facts demonstrating that the defendant knew or should have reasonably known that [...] posed a risk to any tenant.  Plaintiff's negligent supervision cause of action, therefore, was properly dismissed.  No evidence suggested that when defendants authorized [...] to make repairs and improvements as requested by plaintiff’s family, it was foreseeable that [...] would engage in criminal conduct. ”).  Plaintiffs also concede that the employer must know or have reason to know that the lack of training or supervision could lead to a risk of harm.
[brief] On June 17, 2019, [...] again sends 20 Factor IRS Questionnaire to [...] (Pa104-112).  This time it is sent to attention to [...] (P-3).  On July 14, 2020, [...] notifies [...] by letter of investigator [...] of fraud and abuse unit that [...] was ineligible as of January 1, 2008 (Pa162-165).  [...] indicated no further appeal was necessary and matter was scheduled for Board of Trustees hearing on December 9, 2020.  (Pa 162-165).  [...] received an improperly dated communication January 7, 2020 (it was January 7, 2021) in response to determinations that occurred at the December 9, 2020 Board of Trustees of [...] from [...], secretary of [...] (Pa158-161).  Said letter (R-2) determined again that [...] was ineligible as of January 1, 2008 for [...].  (Pa 158-161)  [...] responded by letter of February 21, 2021 (P-4) to [...], secretary of [...] (Pa113-118).  P-4 includes with it an attachment published by the State of New Jersey Department of Labor outlining the process of worker misclassification.  This print out was downloaded directly from the State of New Jersey website.  It specifically states on page 2 of that handout that if an Employer (in this instance the Township) has an Employee ([...] in this instance) sign an independent contractor agreement does not make someone an Independent Contractor.  Thereafter, the matter is forwarded to OAL for a Hearing.
[brief] \textsuperscript{29} The student-petitioners are not alone in their belief that statutory changes must be made to the current funding approach to enable them to be assured T&E.  For example, the State monitors placed in the [...] have made repeated public comments about the district’s problems being revenue problems not spending problems.  (See videotaped statement of State monitor [...] provided by letter of then-participant [...], dated March 29, 2015, marked in the OAL as Exhibit 15).  The district’s independent auditor was recently quoted as saying that: “the district needs to see a better state funding approach because it cannot rely on loans and a mounting debt;” “to me, it is a state funding formula issue;”  “Lakewood is a one-of-a-kind school district, it does not fit like any other school district;” “district leaders are forced to rely too much on state loans due to an inadequate state aid funding formula. ”  https://www.app.com/story/news/local/2024/02/26/auditor-latest-to-demand-better-state-aid-formula-for-lakewood-schools/72699102007/.  In much the same vein, a July 11, 2023, internal report by State Auditor [...] was featured in an August 15, 2023, article in the APP, entitled “NJ Auditor finds ‘severe fiscal distress’ in Lakewood schools, recommends new funding model. ”  That report stated that the “[...] may be considered a district confronted by severe fiscal distress and could benefit from the creation of an additional state aid category. ”  Finally, State Senator [...], whose Ocean County district includes Lakewood, said of the Office of the State Auditor’s report that: “the report is proof that a state aid change is needed. ”  He also was quoted as saying that “We have no option but to do this….  We have asked to change the formula.  This explains why it has to happen. ”  Singer expressed the hope that legislation to alter the state aid formula could be introduced after the November 2023, elections, and expressed optimism about such a change being adopted because “The administration has been very cooperative with this. ” (https://www.app.com/story/news/local/2023/08/15/lakewood-schools-under-severe-fiscal-distress-auditor-finds/70587887007/). consistent with the Abbott criteria—that it be certain, predictable, non-discretionary and timely to enable effective educational planning.
[brief] See Pa243 (with arrows added to Pa92 for illustration).  That also contradicts [...]’s own Allstate Survey, which also clearly indicates the lot at issue here is [...]’s Property at Lot 22.  The Allstate Survey even delineates the boundaries of the physical church, which [...] has argued is actually located on Lot 19 instead of Lot 20 as the Surveys correctly indicate.  See Pa244 (with arrows added to Pa91 for illustration).  Arguably, [...] is advocating for the adverse possession of property it already claims it owns.
[brief] ” (Ca240-258).  Respondent shared a large banner from her Facebook page which contained the heading “[...], [...],” and directly below this headline she solicited votes for “[...] & [...]. ”  \(^2\)  Appellants filed a substantially similar Complaint against [...] member [...] as a result of her social media use.  That Complaint was also improperly dismissed by the Commission on August 22, 2023, and was appealed simultaneously (App. Div. No. [...]).
[directive] Surveillance and Communications Equipment.  6.3  Tactical Teams shall be equipped with devices to enable the teams to maximize communication and intelligence gathering capabilities in a variety of scenarios.  These devices shall include: devices to enable communication such as throw phones, specialized cell phones, megaphones, or robots with two-way communication; and devices to enable observation and surveillance, such as surveillance drones, under-the-door cameras, telescopic cameras, or pinhole cameras.  If available, Tactical Teams should utilize robots and infrared sensors if authorized under law.  Such devices permit the Tactical Team to assess the environment in the vicinity of the barricaded individual without the need for officers to make entry, keeping officers and barricaded individuals safer and avoiding undesirable outcomes.
[brief] [...]’ order of October 24, 2023 states, in the final paragraph, that plaintiffs were to advise the court if they intend to continue with “Count IV, the inverse condemnation, claim” or whether any other issues remain.  It appears the trial court incorrectly referenced the inverse condemnation claim as Count IV, rather the inverse condemnation claim was Count III of the Amended Complaint.  Plaintiffs [...], [...], and [...] (collectively the “Plaintiffs”) own and operate a restaurant at [...] in [...], known as [...] (“[...]”).  Plaintiffs brought this Prerogative Writ action against the [...] of [...], Mayor and [...] Council of the [...] of [...] (collectively the “[...]”) specifically challenging the [...]’s amendment to its Nuisance Code, with provisions governing noise, via Ordinance No. 17-2017.
[brief] Well, if you didn’t – if you didn’t have – if you didn’t have $200,000 to keep the lease alive, how could you possibly have purchased this property?  [...]:  That assumes – I’m going to object to the form of the question.  A.  So the question is.  Is that you - - as you know we were in a dispute with my partners at that time.  so it was very difficult when we were fighting each other to move forward on the transaction.  But closing on the transaction is not a problem.  Q.  Okay.  But as of September 2017 you didn’t have $200,000 to keep this lease going forward?  A.  You don’t know that.  Q.  Well, so you let the lease die while you had $200,000 in the bank?  A.  My – my problem with the lease was my partner.  It was not the money.
[brief] In *Hathaway*, “[a] patron reported an armed robbery in a face-to-face conversation with casino personnel,” and was thus “more akin to an eyewitness citizen informant than an anonymous tipster. ”  *Id.* at 475.  “Moreover,” the citizen’s “report was not taken at face value.  [The officer] directed security personnel to call the surveillance department to corroborate the patron’s report. ”  *Id.* at 475-76.  The surveillance showed the victim with three other people going to the place indicated by the tip, and then saw the “panicked” victim leaving.  *Ibid.*  These facts gave rise to probable cause to conduct a search.  As in *Basil*, J.L., and other cases discussed above, the assertion of *criminality* was corroborated, not just the fact of a person’s location.
[brief] In Warnig v Atlantic City Council Special Services, 636 N.J. Super. 563 (App 2003) the court concluded that med-pay benefits are not subject to recovery pursuant to the collateral source rule set forth in N.J.S.A. 39:6A-6.  That finding is consistent with sections of the no-fault statute which do not apply to med-pay benefits.  A number of sections of the statute give an insurance company certain rights in regard to PIP benefits paid pursuant to N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4 or N.J.S.A. 39:6A-10.  Those PIP sections of the statute do not apply to med-pay.  The provisions of N.J.S.A. 39:6A-6, N.J.S.A. 39:6A-9.1, and N.J.S.A. 39:6A-12 which enumerate recovery rights for PIP payments are all inapplicable as to any claims involving Medpay benefits which are not PIP.
[directive] When a member of the State Police or any agency supervised by the State Police is involved in the use of force as defined in Paragraph 1, the State Police shall immediately notify the Division of Criminal Justice.  The Division will have the discretion to conduct the investigation with the shooting response team described in Paragraph 2 or to refer the matter to the appropriate County Prosecutor to conduct the investigation with the assistance of the shooting response team described in Paragraph 2.  The shooting response team and the assigned Deputy Attorney General or Assistant Prosecutor shall report directly to the Division of Criminal Justice, Operations Bureau.  6.
[brief] II.  THE TRIAL COURT FOUND PRAJAPATI CREDIBLE, WEIGHED THE OPINIONS HE PRESENTED, AND REACHED PROPER CONCLUSIONS BASED ON THE EVIDENCE AT TRIAL.  (26T4:1 to 56:13; 27T71:25 to 97:1).  Because the appellants offered no expert who reviewed the defendants’ financial records, they are left to attack the only witness who did, Plaintiffs’ accountant, Hemant [...].  The trial court found [...] credible, even when it didn’t always completely agree with his conclusions.  (26T23:8-11; 55:21-25; 27T75:10-13).  At bottom, the attacks on [...] all fail because they do little more than dispute the way the trial court weighed the evidence.  Because the evidence that [...] and the Plaintiffs offered was more than sufficient to support the judgment below, this Court must affirm.  A.
[brief] (emphasis added)  Further, the redeveloper has a number of options available to satisfy its obligation to construct the seven (7) units.  The Redeveloper may: 1. Redesign the project at [...] so that it does not require a Use Variance; 2. Purchase other suitable property within the [...] on which to build the units; 3. Designate seven (7) additional units in the [...] development to be affordable units.; or, 4.  Some combination of the three items above.  While the Redeveloper is free to determine which combination of the above proposals best suits its need to construct the seven additional off site units, it may not simply claim that the fact that it is providing affordable housing trumps the Borough's zoning laws.
[brief] At trial, [...] testified she had only seen him around a few times, and [...] testified they never dated and she did not know him well.  (10T38-18 to 39-15, 116-14 to 20; Cf. State v. Watson, 224 N.J. 558, 587 (2023) (domestic partner or friend who knew defendant for some time might be sufficiently familiar); State v. Sanchez, 247 N.J. 450, 474 (2021) (sufficient familiarity when parole officer met with defendant at least twice monthly for preceding 15 months).
[brief] Thus, the integrity of the judicial process is unaffected; the perception that either the first or second court was misled is not present. ”  See Kimball Intern., Inc. v. Northfield Metal Products, 334 N.J. Super. 596, 607 (App. Div. 2000) (alteration in original) (quoting Edwards v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 690 F.2d 595 (6th Cir. 1982).  As set forth above, the Consent Order lacks any provision, stating that future claims are barred, if brought more than sixty (60) days after the completion of the [...].  (Pa150 - Pa152).  Indeed, nothing in the Consent Order provides that any of Plaintiffs' claims – now or in the future - should be dismissed with prejudice.  (Id.).  Thus, as it relates to the Consent Order, Plaintiffs' position in the Prior Litigation is identical to the position Plaintiffs take here.  As a result, [...] cannot identify any position or representation in the Prior Litigation that is inconsistent.  Accordingly, the doctrine of judicial estoppel in inapplicable to the instant facts, and should not serve as a basis to dismiss Plaintiffs' Complaint.
[brief] The Chairman went on to state, “You know, yes, it's a conforming application, I get it, but it's also conforming in a very exclusive neighborhood. ”  He continued:  It is an exclusive neighborhood and it's a sensitive neighborhood.  People have lived here for a long time.  There are no basements in this area here.  It's a certain look.  He wants to change the look and he has no right to change the look, but he has to understand that that's why he's getting some opposition, because he's changing the look for a whole neighborhood and that's why we're here for the 15th time and probably it will go to 20 or so, that's why.  (3T: p23, ln 6-15)  The Board voted to deny reconsideration, with only [...] voting to reconsider, stating:
[brief] In opening and summation, the prosecutor argued that there were only incoming communications during this period, and the lack of outgoing communication suggested that [...] was not actually with his phone, because only he (the person with the access code) could have made a phone call or sent a text.  *(See, e.g., 9T31-20 to 33-1; 15T87-8 to 89-13)*  Though trial counsel argued against this inference, he failed to marshal available compelling evidence combatted the State’s theory: [...]’s Facebook timeline showed his phone was sending Facebook messages from 11:50am to 12:30pm, strongly suggesting it was [...] who generated them and that he was miles away when the shooting occurred.  Screenshots of the Facebook timeline from [...]’s phone showed from 11:33 to 11:57am he liked a photo and wrote personalized messages to users; he became friends with users at 12:04pm and 12:07pm; and from 12:26 to 12:38pm, he updated his status, wrote a message, and liked photos.  (Da471, 474)  Counsel turned over the screenshots in discovery but failed to prepare for their admission.  Instead, he attempted to inject the Facebook activity into [...]’s cross examination.  The State objected on hearsay, foundation, and authentication grounds; objections were sustained or counsel implicitly conceded and moved on, never again trying to admit this critical exculpatory evidence.  (13T102-1 to 104-16)  As a result, the Facebook records were never presented to the jury.