ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The bounds of employer liability have expanded to other forms of harassment – such as disability harassment for repeated retaliations in this case.  Here is a modification of the holding in Lehmann for Court or Due Process/Disability Harassment:  We hold that a plaintiff states a cause of action for hostile [court] environment [Due Process or Disability] harassment when he or she alleges discriminatory conduct that a reasonable person [ ] in the plaintiff’s position would consider sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of [Equal Protection & Court Access] and to create an intimidating, hostile, or offensive [court] environment.  Id at 591  Judiciary liability is important in avoiding, at least, the appearance of impropriety and it would prevent many actual improprieties.
[brief] As stated in the Opinion of [...], [...] was employed by the [...] ([...]) as a Highway Technician assigned to the [...] Ramsey maintenance yard.  In March 2020, as the Covid-19 pandemic was beginning, the Ramsey yard closed after an employee tested positive for Covid-19 (EXHIBIT 4 at P. 4; P. 13a of Appendix).  For the next two weeks all of its employees, including [...], were in required quarantine.  Bartos was granted a paid leave of absences due to Covid-19 from March 20, 2020, to April 3, 2020 (EXHIBIT 4 at P. 4; P.  13a of Appendix).  During this time when Bartos was out on quarantine, the Ramsey yard went into “Reactionary Mode”.  “Reactionary Mode” meant that Bartos and his co-workers at the Ramsey yard were not to report to work, unless instructed to do so (EXHIBIT 4 at P. 4; P. 13a of Appendix).  Bartos was to remain at home and only come to the Ramsey yard if called by their supervisor for an emergency (EXHIBIT 4 at P. 4; P. 13a of Appendix).  Bartos was considered an essential employee for weather related emergencies and business continuity (EXHIBIT 4 at P. 4 & 5, P. 13a - 14a of Appendix).  The “Reactionary Mode” policy required Bartos to be on standby at his Home (EXHIBIT 4 at P. 5; P. 14a of Appendix).  Bartos was to be called by his supervisor three (3) times daily to confirm his work ready status (EXHIBIT 4 at P. 5; P. 14a of Appendix).  On Friday, April 3, 2020, the quarantine at the Ramsey yard expired (EXHIBIT 4 at P. 5; P. 14a of Appendix).  Therefore, on April 6, 2020, Bartos was required to be available for duty at the Ramsey yard under the “Reactionary Mode”, meaning Bartos was not to report to work unless instructed by a supervisor to do so (EXHIBIT 4 at P. 5; P. 14a of Appendix).  Bartos was never instructed by a supervisor to report to work.  Bartos admits he told a supervisor he did not intend to report to work because of fear of Covid-19, but Bartos was never instructed to return, and he never said he was quitting or abandoning his job (T. P. 215, L11 - 15).  On June 10, 2020, the [...] issued a Preliminary Notice of Disciplinary Action (EXHIBIT 1, P. 1a of Appendix).  Bartos was subsequently fired by [...] because it was determined Bartos abandoned his job not in good standing and there was a resignation not in good standing effective April 13, 2020 (EXHIBIT 2, P. 3a of Appendix).
[brief] N.J.A.C. 7:7-12.5; N.J.A.C. 7:7-9.6; N.J.A.C.  7:7-9.7.  Those regulations included the Submerged Vegetation Habitat Rule (“SVH Rule”) requiring that mooring areas evidence sufficient water depths to protect subaquatic vegetation, N.J.A.C. 7:7-9.6, the Navigational Channels Rule which prohibits development within fifty feet of navigational channels to protect those channels and keep them clear for general recreational and commercial use, N.J.A.C. 7:7-9.7, and the Docks Rule which provides a series of general requirements related to new recreational dock construction or modifications in the State’s waters, N.J.A.C. 7:7-12.5.
[brief] No civil reservation or other court order has been entered precluding the admissibility of [...]’s guilty plea, and the fact that a civil reservation may be applied for in the future, and may or may not be granted, is irrelevant to the present posture of this matter.  [...]’s reliance on State v. Lavrik, 472 N.J. Super. 192 (App. Div. 2022) is unavailing.
[brief] In Wolpaw, an insurer assigned one law firm to represent a mother, her son, and her sister in a personal-injury action as a result of the child accidentally firing a BB gun that blinded his neighbor’s eye.  Although the three co-defendants shared a common interest in defending the lawsuit as the [...] claim here the court recognized that each defendant had an interest in minimizing their own fault and maximizing the percentage of fault attributable to their codefendants.  Id. at 45.  Based upon that conflict, the court found that the insurer breached its duty by assigning a single law firm to represent all defendants.  Wolpaw’s reasoning is directly on point.
[brief] 40 CONCLUSION 49 TABLE OF JUDGEMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS  Civil Action Order, filed November 21, 2023 Pa1 Civil Action Order, filed, September 26, 2023 Pa17 Civil Action Final Order, filed February 16, 2024 Pa133 | Appendix document | Appendix page number | |----------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------| | Civil Action Order, filed November 21, 2023 | Pa1 | | Civil Action Order Modifying or Terminating Support Order Heretofore Entered, filed September 20, 1986 | Pa4 | | JEDS letter confirming all records have been destroyed in accordance with N.J. Retention Schedule | Pa6 | | Civil Action Order, filed March 20, 1990 | Pa7 | | Superior Court letter confirming no State Liens | Pa9 | | Defendant’s Summary of Claims for Motion to Vacate Arrears, filed, August 30, 2023 | Pa10 | | Obligor’s Payment History | Pa12 | | Amdt. 14.S1.5.4.1 Overview of Procedural Due Process in Civil Cases, Fourteenth Amendment Section 1 | Pa16 | | Civil Action Order filed, September 26, 2023 | Pa17 | | Notice of Levy Letter | Pa20 | | Letter from Superior Court, Middlesex County indicating records destroyed nearly 20 years ago | Pa21 | | Civil Action Judgement of Divorce, filed March 17, 1983 | Pa24 | | Property Settlement Agreement
[brief] The necessity of the garage for the purposes of storage was questionable at best.  [...] also testified that there was no real hardship to justify the grant of a variance in that if they removed certain equipment from the "pole barn" that they could park their vehicles in there.  "So, if he had removed his workbenches and if he removed his shelving, the whole back is full of shelves, if he removed all the cabinets that he keeps his stuff in, if he took all of his motorcycles out, then maybe we could fit two vehicles in there."  (1T19:20-2) referring to the illegally constructed garage.  [...] further admitted that the "garage for parking," was also going to be used for a gym and for storage, "Now that we have the space out there, we have a treadmill, we have a universal, we have equipment that we can to work out and we use it every day. ”  (1T34:4-6)  When questioned about furniture and other items being stored outside of their home and in the yard, other than her vehicle [...] responded, “Well, our vehicles would be in our yard.  Everything else would not be able to be outside.  We would have to again, clutter up our bedrooms and get rid of all of our equipment that we were able to put out back. ”  (1T34:16-8)  Though prompted and lead by the Solicitor and Board members, [...] did not testify about having to clutter her yard with storage.  She essentially testified that she would have to clutter the inside of her home if she did not have the extension to her pole barn.  No additional items would be stored in their yard making it generally unsightly.
[brief] She immediately submitted the request of her witnesses sequestered by subpoena, under the instruction of the lower court, for court notice production.  However, only one of the defendant’s witnesses appeared\textsuperscript{40}.  There are risks entering into legal counsel as well\textsuperscript{41}; under New Jersey law, ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims “are particularly suited for post-conviction review because they often cannot reasonably be raised in a prior proceeding.
[brief] There are two sentences in paragraph 13.10 appearing immediately before the mandate of prompt delivery.  The first states in part:  Defendant “shall, within ten (10) days after the date of this Agreement, prepare and submit . . . an estoppel certificate, in the form attached to or contemplated under each such Lease, if any, or if no form was previously contemplated, in substantially the form attached hereto as Schedule H (“Estoppel Certificate”). ”  The second says in part:  Defendant shall “use commercially reasonable efforts to obtain an Estoppel Certificate from the commercial tenant prior to the Closing. ”  The use in the first sentence of the indefinite article “an estoppel certificate” is correct as it is not referring to a defined term and goes on to define ‘Estoppel Certificate’ as being one of two possibilities: (1) as stated in the Lease, or (2) substantially in the form of Schedule H.  The second sentence is the command to use commercially reasonable efforts to obtain “an Estoppel Certificate”.  Here again the indefinite article ‘an’ is correctly used since the defined term is one of two possibilities so the proper syntax is the indefinite article.  Therefore, Defendant cannot seek to claim the use of the indefinite article in these two sentences somehow supports its arguments.
[brief] The Traffic Stop  On the afternoon of December 17, 2021, the detectives learned through the GPS tracker that [...] drove from his restaurant in Brick to the Bronx, New York, where he stayed for a short period of time before heading back to New Jersey.  The “quick turnaround” raised in the detectives’ minds the possibility that [...] went to New York to buy CDS.  (1T 24-4 to 25-5)  The detectives had no other reason to believe that [...]’ trip to New York that day was drug-related; they had not received any information from the CI or anyone else that [...] would be traveling to New York to purchase drugs on December 17th.  (1T 77-18 to 78-1)  The detectives decided to investigate further.  They “positioned themselves at mile 120 on the Garden State Parkway” in unmarked cars and waited for the Audi to pass.  (Pa 8; 1T 25-18 to 27-3; 1T 85-17 to 86-5)  When [...] spotted the Audi, he and the other detectives “began to trail [it] at a distance of fifty to four hundred yards. ”  (Pa 8; 1T 26-11 to 27-3; 1T 89-1 to 90-8)  They followed the car for approximately 15 miles (1T 89-22), during which they observed the Audi driving in an “erratic” manner, “fluctuating the speeds, driving above the speed limit, below the speed limit, changing lanes. ”  (1T 98-6 to 98-18)  The “final straw” that caused the detectives to pull the car over occurred at mile marker 105 (1T 98-11 to 98-24), when they observed the Audi “go from the far left lane, switch over two lanes abruptly without lane changes, go over a solid white line and exit” the parkway, “caus[ing] a civilian vehicle that was already exiting to actually slam on their brakes and slow down quickly to avoid a collision. ”
[brief] Unpublished Opinion  Jimenez v. Applebee’s Neighborhood Grill & Bar, 2015 WL 893236 UNPUB.  (App. Div. Mar. 4, 2015)  .........................................................Da1  Unpublished Opinion  Khutorsky v. Macy’s, Inc., 2013 WL 163301 UNPUB.  (App. Div. Jan. 16, 2013)  ........................................................................................................Da5  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CASES  Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America, 142 N.J. 520 (1995)  ...........................................4  Cotter v. United States, 2010 WL 2178958 UNPUB. (D.N.J. May 26, 2010)  ..............6  Cunningham v. Briarwood Care and Rehabilitation Center, 2016 WL 958140 UNPUB.  (App. Div. Mar. 15, 2016)  .........................................................................................6  Hopkins v. Fox & Lazo Realtors, 132 N.J. 426 (1993)  ..........................................................6  Jimenez v. Applebee’s Neighborhood Grill & Bar, 2015 WL 893236 UNPUB.  (App. Div. Mar. 4, 2015)  .......................................................................................................................7
[directive] Identification of Stolen Motor Vehicles  5.2.1  There are two ways to determine if a motor vehicle has been reported stolen: a. NCIC/SCIC terminal check of the license plate number b. NCIC/SCIC terminal check of the Vehicle Identification Number (VIN).  5.2.2  NCIC/SCIC Terminal Check of Registration Number  a.  Supply the Control Desk operator with the registration number of the vehicle, along with issuing state information.  b.  The Control Desk operator will run "wants" for the vehicle on both a State and Federal level.  5.2.3  NCIC/SCIC Terminal  Check of the Vehicle's VIN  a.  The officer must supply the Control Desk operator with complete description of the vehicle, including the manufacturer, model, body style, color, year and VIN.  b.  The Control Desk operator will run "wants" on both State and Federal level.  5.2.4  Whenever there is a "hit" on a stolen motor vehicle, the officer shall always check with the law enforcement agency issuing the want to confirm A-5 that the vehicle is stolen.  5.3
[brief] On March 1, 2024  Plaintiff moved to vacate the Order of June 9, 2023 which was a dismissal with prejudice.  (4T p. 4 lines 18-20)  In November 2022 Defendant filed a motion to dismiss with prejudice for failure to state a claim which was opposed (4T p.5 lines 3-5)  The Order noted that Plaintiff’s counsel did allege possible allegations but the complaint itself was void and it was dismissed without prejudice and no specific date to refile was listed (error in transcript as it was dismissed without prejudice)  Plaintiff did not amend.  (4T p. lines 6-12)  On February 13, 2023 Defendant moved to dismiss with prejudice, the 60 days having run (4T p. 5 lines 13-17)  Plaintiff opposed the motion and included an amended complaint.  (4T p. 5 lines 18-20)  Defendant took the position that the amended complaint was insufficient as written and the court gave Plaintiff 10 days in which to revise (4T p. 5 lines 21-24)  Defendant then filed again to dismiss with prejudice as Plaintiff did not file another revision and did not file opposition (4T p. 5 lines 25 - p. 6 lines 1-2)  A discussion took place on the record in which I was waiting for Plaintiff to contact me.  (4T p. 6 lines 2-7)  The Court dismissed the complaint with prejudice (4T. p. 6 line 8)  A new motion was filed by Plaintiff to restore which the court denied without prejudice stating it would have to be a motion to vacate the prior Order (4T p. 6 lines- 9-15)  At this point Plaintiff retained the services of [...] who reviewed the file and on February 14, 2024 filed a motion to 1) vacate the dismissal with prejudice; 2) permitting an amended complaint to be filed; 3) permit the Defendant 10 days in which to respond to the amended complaint; 4) schedule a case management conference.
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT MISAPPLY THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD.  [...] contends that the trial court failed to give him all reasonable inferences of fact in granting Defendants’ motion for summary judgment.  [...] identifies five inferences that should have been reasonably made in his favor: (1) that [...]’s conduct could violate the criminal harassment statute; (2) the trial court improperly dismissed Plaintiffs’ testimony as to whether they reasonably and objectively believed that [...]’s conduct violated the criminal harassment statute; (3) the trial court improperly dismissed [...]’s testimony regarding [...]’s alleged approval of the charge pay; (4) that the charge pay investigation was independent of [...]’s investigation into [...]’s June 24, 2020 conduct; and (5) that [...] would not have supported Plaintiffs’ termination given her staffing reduction.  However, a review of the trial court’s decision, and the record in this matter, reveals that the trial court did provide [...] with all reasonable inferences of fact.  Summary judgment should therefore be affirmed.
[brief] Firstly, there were no ‘reasons’ articulated in the valuation hearing to justify making Plaintiff’s personal expenses the obligation of the company.  [...] simply testified that he was satisfied from an accounting perspective that the managers had voted to create the corporate obligation.  (5T187:5-189:13)  There was no testimony that established why that was a legitimate business decision for the good of the Company, versus the good of the few members who voted themselves to be reimbursed.  Likewise, [...]’s expert, [...], testified that the decision was made, but not how there was any benefit to the company itself.  (8T217:24-218:3)(9T124:19-125:4)(7T126:7-10)  In reality, there was no sound ‘business judgment’ reason that benefited [...] from assuming Plaintiffs’ personal fee obligations, let alone for $2.8 million.
[brief] Despite the doctrine’s clear objective to prevent the multiplicity/waste of successive-yet-related litigations, [...] nonetheless expressly admitted on the record that “yes…there [would] have to be 12 different arbitrations on 12 different projects…because there’s 12 different arbitration clauses. ”  Mtn. Tr. at 19:5-16.  This nonsensical admission underscores that [...] indeed had a “fair and reasonable opportunity” to litigate all damages stemming from the Hackensack Project, but apparently intentionally and strategically opted to hold this claim back in a wait-and-see approach as to whether it was successful in the First Arbitration.  The Court should not condone the strategic holding-back of known claims.  Even if it is a close call based on the “same nexus” or “series of transactions,” when in doubt, a party \textit{must} bring all its related counterclaims.
[brief] Prior to Respondent’s production of the Crowe Investigation Report and Findings Report, Appellant represented and maintained that he was first granted permission to use the PCard for personal purchases in March 2020.  (Pa86).  Specifically, on November 9, 2020, Appellant through his counsel, submitted a draft, unsigned “Certification of [...]” which stated:  4.  My immediate supervisor is Defendant, [...] ....  5.  In or about March of 2020, I was approached by [...] who informed me that [...] was not going to issue any bonuses or 401 (k) benefits for the rest of the year.  6.  [...] also told me that in lieu of receiving my annual bonuses/incentives as well as not receiving my 401(k) benefits, that I could use the [...] credit card up to $3,000.00 per month[.] 7.  After [...] authorized me to use the [...] credit card, I began to use the company card in accordance with his instruction.  (Pa86, Da137-141 at paragraphs 4-7)(emphasis added).  Similarly, Appellant asserted in his December 9, 2020 Complaint that he was granted permission to use the PCard for personal purchases “on or about March 2020” in lieu of receiving bonuses and 401k benefits.  (Pa14 at ¶¶3, 5)(emphasis added).  Again, Appellant alleged that he “then began to use the company card for the next several months[.]” (Id. at ¶7)(emphasis added).  During discovery, Appellant’s story stayed the same.  Appellant’s responses to Respondents’ First Set of Interrogatories Dated May 27, 2021 confirmed at interrogatory no. 34 that he was granted permission to use the Company card for personal purchases in March 2020.  (Pa87, Da183 (request), Da209 (answer)).
[brief] ”  See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966); accord State v. Bindhammer, 44 N.J. 372, 380 (1965) (“[T]he State has a heavier burden of establishing that . . . consent was given freely, understandingly and unequivocally” while an individual was “in custody. ”).  Finally, consent that is “no more than acquiescence to a claim of lawful authority” is inherently coerced.  State v. Dolly, 255 N.J. Super. 278, 285 (App. Div. 1991) (quotation omitted).  Before even getting to the extraordinary threat police used in this case, several King factors already point strongly towards coercion.
[brief] THIS COURT SHOULD CONTINUE THE STAY OF THE CASE GRANTED BY THE COURT BELOW  As the arbitration of the claims between plaintiffs and [...] does not involve the defendants [...] and [...], these defendants took no position as to that portion of the motion to compel arbitration between those parties as long as the case were stayed as to the non-Uber defendants and Uber provided information about insurance coverage for its driver.  [LDa 22-24].  These defendants continue to adhere to that position here.  It was and remains the position of the defendants [...] and [...] that the case between plaintiff and defendants [...], [...], and [...], should be stayed until the arbitration between plaintiffs and [...] is completed.  Upon completion of the arbitration the case should then be restored to the active trial list.  Staying of the lawsuit until completion of the arbitration was the position taken by both [...] [Pa 78-110] as well as plaintiffs [Pa 414-416] in the Court below.
[brief] Respectfully Submitted, /s/[...], Esq. [...], Esq.  Dated: July 19, 2024  [...] Plaintiff-Appellant, v. [...], [...] SCHOOL OF PHARMACY, JOHN DOES  1-10 AND ABC CORPS.  1-10 (fictitious names representing any unknown defendants)  Defendants-Respondents.  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY  APPELLATE DIVISION  DOCKET NO. [...]  ON APPEAL FROM SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY – LAW DIVISION  ESSEX COUNTY DOCKET NO.: [...]  SAT BELOW: HON.
[brief] Defendant relies on the State’s Statement of Facts.  (Pb2-5)  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I  THE COURT SHOULD AFFIRM THE ORDER SUPPRESSING THE EVIDENCE  BECAUSE THE MOTION COURT CORRECTLY FOUND THAT THE CIRCUMSTANCES GIVING RISE TO PROBABLE CAUSE WERE NEITHER UNFORESEEABLE NOR SPONTANEOUS AND THUS THAT THE AUTOMOBILE EXCEPTION TO THE WARRANT REQUIREMENT DID NOT JUSTIFY THE WARRANTLESS SEARCH OF DEFENDANT’S VEHICLE.  This case involves a straightforward application of the Supreme Court’s recent holding in State v. Smart reaffirming that under the New Jersey Constitution, the automobile exception to the warrant requirement does not ¹  The following abbreviations are used:  1T – Motion Hearing (June 10, 2024)  2T – Motion Decision (June 24, 2024)  Pb – State’s Brief Pa – State’s Appendix Da – Defendant-Respondent’s Appendix permit a warrantless search of a vehicle unless “the circumstances giving rise to probable cause [were] ‘unforeseeable and spontaneous. ’”  253 N.J. 156, 171 (2023).  Here, the trial court properly suppressed the evidence because it correctly found that the automobile exception to the warrant requirement did not apply.  Specifically, the Court correctly reasoned that probable cause was not spontaneous and unforeseeable where multiple narcotics officers went to the target parking lot specifically to look for narcotics activity, they surveilled [...] over the course of two hours after recognizing he was the registered owner of the suspect vehicle—known to police from a previous search warrant, and they conducted a Terry\(^2\) stop of Lightsey on foot ten to fifteen feet away from his vehicle.  (2T 17-21 to 18-3, 18-21 to 19-4)  Thus, the trial court’s order suppressing the evidence should be affirmed.  The federal and state constitutions both guarantee “the right of the people to be secure . . . against unreasonable searches or seizures.
[brief] [citations omitted]).  Further, Appellant argues that the mail vendor could “use or misuse” his account information, or otherwise fail to prevent it from being misappropriated.  Id., at 38.  But conjecture on appeal about various harms which may, in the future, occur, without identifying any well-pled allegations about any actual past or present harm, cannot establish a “substantial likelihood” that Appellant will “suffer harm in the event of an unfavorable decision.