ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] DOVE v CMTY. EDUC. CTRS., INC., No. 12-4384, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 170081, at *63 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 2, 2013)  ..........................................................31  EBLER v NEWARK, 54 N.J. 487, 490-91 (1969)  ...........................................................20  FEEMSTER v BSA LTD. P’SHIP, 548 F. 3d 1063, 1070 (D.C. Cir. 2008) ...........................................17  GOTLIB v GOTLIB, 399 N.J. Super. 295, 313, 944, A.2d 654 (APP.  DiV. 2008)  .........................40  GUINUP v PETR-ALL PETROLEUM CORP., 786 F. Supp. 2d 501, 514 (N.D.N.Y. 2011) ...........................................31  KENNEDY v CITY OF NEWARK, 29 N.J. 178, 184-185 (1959) .......................................................20  MCDEVITT v BILL GOOD BUILDERS, INC., 175 N.J. 519, 527 (2003)  ..........................................................18  MONTVILLE TOWNSHIP BOARD OF EDUCATION, N.J.P.E.R. Supp. 2d ¶140 (1985)  ....................................................37  MONTVILLE TWP. EDUC. ASS’N v MONTVILLE TWP. BD. OF EDUC., No. A-1178-84T7, 1985 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 11, at *5 (App. Div. Dec. 6, 1985)  .............................................37  NAACP v N. HUDSON REG’L FIRE & RESCUE, 665 F. 3d 464, 468 (3D Cir. 2011) ..................................................23,42  NEW JERSEY BANKER’S ASS’N v VAN RIPPER, 1 N.J. 193, 198 (1948)  ..............................................................43  NINI v MERCER CTY., CMTY. COLL., 202 N.J. 98, 108 (2010) ..............................................................46  N.J. DENTAL ASS’N v METRO LIFE INS. CO., 424 N.J.
[brief] This is especially the case with [...], who testified that he voted more than a week before the election.  [...] is also fully disabled and has no other method of voting available.  (1T50:15-16; 1T50: 22-24).  This Court should ask itself if it is comfortable allowing a disabled voter to be disenfranchised because he physically had no choice but to trust that USPS officials would do their job.  Here, the USPS was simply closed on Sunday and Monday and unable to process (and timely postmark) the ballots, to no fault of the voters.  See generally, Gray-Sadler, 164 N.J. at 468 (holding that voters should not be disenfranchised due to errors by officials not within their control).  Postmarks are ripe for failure, and it is why “the postmark date is not and cannot be controlling; the received date is and must be conclusive to avoid fraud and provide some finality to the closing of the polls.
[brief] See, FMC Stores v. Borough of Morris Plains, 100 N.J. 418 (1985) (in dealing with the public, public entities must “turn square corners,” “comport itself with compunction and integrity” and not “conduct itself so as to achieve or preserve any kind of bargain or litigation advantage” over a member of the public); CBS Outdoor Inc. v. Borough of Lebanon Planning Bd/Bd of Adjustment, 414 N.J. Super. 563, 586-87 (App. Div. 2010) (To invoke the “turn square corners doctrine,” citizens need not prove that they were blameless or that the government acted in bad faith”).  No one is above the law.
[brief] See Ins. Co. v. Howard Sav. Inst., 127 N.J. Super. 479, 489 (Ch. Div. 1974).  In the case at bar, not only did the Plaintiff “sit on her rights,” her doing so has created the proper factual and legal basis for the rational explanation which rests on a permissible basis and which does not depart from established policies.  [This space intentionally left blank]
[brief] The Board was also very concerned about drainage at the site.  At the first hearing, the applicant conceded that the actual size of the houses that will ultimately be built on each lot was unknown.  (1T10-19 to 1T10-24).  This was a significant issue to the Board, which questioned what the stormwater management plan submitted was based on if the fact of the matter was that the final size of the homes—which could greatly affect the drainage proposed—was an unknown.
[brief] Id. at 596-600.  Or, as the Frisby Court put it, “a more specific instruction was required in order to avert the possibility of a fragmented verdict. ”  Id. at 598.  Indeed, the Frisby Court distinguished the result in State v. Parker, 124 N.J. 628, 639 (1991), where the allegations of a “core of conceptually-similar acts relating to the students' educational relationship with the teacher and her abuse of that relationship” in an official-misconduct case were held not to warrant a unanimity charge which would require the jury to be unanimous on which specific ones of those “conceptually-similar acts” the teacher committed in front of her students.  The Frisby Court noted that Parker specifically held that one of the types of cases which requires a more-specific unanimity instruction is one where “a single crime can be proven by different theories based on different acts and at least two of these theories rely on different evidence, and [when] the circumstances demonstrate a reasonable possibility that a juror will find one theory proven and the other not proven but that all of the jurors will not agree on the same theory.
[brief] Haymen vs. Bishop ....................................................................... 32  15 N.J. Super. 266, 269 (App. Div. 1951)  Headley vs. Cavileer .................................................................... 23  82 N.J.L. 635, 637 (E&A 1912)  Hoffman vs. Seidman .................................................................... 19  101 N.J.L. 106 (E.&A. 1925)  [...] vs. [...] .................................................................................. 24
[brief] This matter involves a good faith administrative error made by the [...] (the “City”) with respect to its long-standing past hiring practices, which was cured by the [...] (the “[...]”) pursuant to their statutorily delegated authority to do so.  N.J.A.C. 4A:4-4.8(b) requires there to be a “genuine vacancy,” i.e. a “current vacancy,” in a municipality’s fire department in order for a fire officer to be promoted to fill that vacancy.  Therefore, “expected” or “anticipated” vacancies cannot be used as a justification for promotion.  Prior to being aware of that statute, the City had a long standing past practice of requesting certifications and promoting officers to fill expected vacancies, to account for potentially lengthy bureaucratic red tape and its own thorough internal interview and hiring process.  The City did so in good faith, and were ignorant of any laws or regulations to the contrary.  The [...] was not aware and had no reason to be aware of the City’s good faith past practice of requesting certifications and promoting in advance of expected vacancies until January of 2023, when Appellant’s promotion eligibility happened to expire.  Once it advised the City of the impermissible nature of promoting officers to fill expected vacancies, the [...] utilized its statutory authority to “relax” civil service regulations in order to cure the City’s good-faith administrative error and allow July 2022 promotions to fill vacancies created in September and October of 2022.  Now that the City has been advised of the impermissible nature of this practice, it will no longer utilize it.  The relief sought by Appellant, to retroactively demote the fire officers who were promoted to fill the September and October 2022 vacancies, would unfairly prejudice those officers since they are otherwise entirely qualified to hold those positions.  Additionally, the public policy supporting the [...]’s prohibition of promotions to fill expected or anticipated vacancies has not been offended by [...]’s relaxation of its own rules, since the anticipated vacancies ended up being actually created, and qualified officers filled those vacancies.
[brief] The Supreme Court has long held that issues of credibility are ordinarily for the trier of facts, and the judge does NOT function as a trier of fact in determining a motion for summary judgment.  Judson v People’s Bank, 17 NJ 67, 75 (1954).  From the moment that the trial judge read office Kohut’s statement wherein he declared that he was in his patrol car but could somehow see the hole where the spare tire was kept under the floorboard from where he was seated, and that he that he needed [...]’s keys to determine whether she owned the car, the judge should have concluded that [...] was not a credible witness.
[brief] 3, 4 Israel v. Bally's Park Place, Inc., 283 N.J. Super. 1 (App Div. 1995) ...............................................................  6  Metromedia, Inc. v. Dir., Div. of Taxation, 97 N.J. 313 (1984) .................................................................  3 Regulations N.J.A.C. 12:17-9. 3(b) ..........................................................  2, 3, 4, 5 N.J.A.C. 12:17-9.3(d)  ..........................................................  6  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
[brief] Plaintiff’s amended Demand for Arbitration was intended to streamline the calculation process by applying the fee schedule directly to well-documented unpaid bills and substituting lower reimbursement amounts by stipulation, where necessary, to account for Plaintiff’s actual loss.  Respondent provided the documentation, including the EOBs, which contained all necessary details to correctly apply the fee schedule to the outstanding bills.  Respondent’s breakdown, which incorporates the lien documentation provided by the health insurer’s subrogation services provider, accounted for the payments made by the health insurer and, thus, also contains all the necessary details to appropriately calculate reimbursement in light of Plaintiff’s stipulation. \(^3\) \(^3\)  While not applicable here, even where an arbitrator may be unable to incorporate health payments into an arbitration award, the fee schedule must still be applied in any scenario where the treatment is deemed medically necessary.  this, the arbitrator overlooked the substance of the amendment as the finding that additional itemization was required directly contradicts Plaintiff’s authorized amended Demand for Arbitration, the stipulations contained therein, and the documented evidence presented.  Consequently, the arbitrator failed to apply the fee schedule to the outstanding bills found to be medically necessary and causally related to Plaintiff’s motor vehicle accident in violation of N.J.A.C. 11:3-29 (authorized pursuant to N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.6), constituting prejudicial error in applying the applicable law to the issues and facts presented for arbitration as well as the imperfect execution of a final and definite award pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:23A-13.
[brief] The Counterclaim sought certification of a R. 4:32-(b)(2) class defined as those who within the six years of the complaint filing entered into a lease with [...] containing the same or similar Concession Cancellation terms.  It also sought certification of a R. 4:32(b)(3) subclass which consisted of those Class Members from whom [...] sought or was seeking to charge-back the “free” rent concessions.  Here, [...] pled that [...] has engaged a pattern or practice of utilizing the same or similar Chargeback Provision in its lease agreements with consumers like [...].  Da99-101.  The Walshes likewise pled that Class and Subclass members claims "arise out of the same policies, practices, and conduct, and the same or similar documents used by [...] in their dealings with [...] and the putative class and subclass. ” (Emphasis added).  Da99-101.  Thus, the trial erroneously stated no such allegations were made.  Regarding the Rule 4:32-1(b)(2) Class claim, the trial court and [...] contend that the class definition “would require the Court to engage in more case-by-case screening to determine whether [...]'s specific conduct as to each tenant rises to the level of an unconscionable commercial practice.
[brief] [Da348].  The Board imposed conditions in a resolution adopted on March 1, 2023.  [Da359].  The parties filed a stipulation dismissing the remaining counts with prejudice on October 17, 2023 and then the Board filed this appeal on November 28, 2023.  [Da382, 391].  [...] terminated its contract to purchase the subject property after the Law Division reversed the Board’s decision, and [...] has elected to vindicate the Law Division’s decision and maintain the court-ordered approval on appeal.  [Da452].
[brief] (T9:18-10:1).  Further, Plaintiff argued:  The Supreme Court in Mehlman…clearly stated CEPA’s goal is, quote, not to make lawyers of conscientious employees but rather to prevent retaliation against those employees who object to employer conduct that they reasonably believe to be unlawful.  In turn, it is not the actual occurrence of a violation of an authority or public policy, but rather the existence of a reasonable belief to the effect that such authority or policy has been breached under Mehlman and Estate of Roach, which is exactly what we have here.  Plaintiff reasonably believed that these regulations were being violated based on the lack of staffing, the inappropriate training, and the…movement of the direct…professionals from one group home to another.  (T11:4-11:20).  Plaintiff went on to conclude, The public policy is underlying these laws…to keep…developmental groups properly staffed for safety purposes and to ensure no individuals are being hurt, whether it’s the residents or the caretakers.  Now, specifically, Plaintiff very clearly had a reasonable belief that Defendant [...] did not have a policy in place regarding the proper ratio of staff members to individuals in violation of…10:44A-2.8b…and this reasonable belief was based on her awareness of a proper ratio of staff members to individuals was necessary to ensure adequate care was consistently given to each resident…which is the exact public policy underlying these codes.  And if you take a look at the purposes of these codes, it specific states that these codes are to establish minimum requirements for residential services to serve people with developmental disabilities.  (T12:2-12:22)(emphasis added).  See also N.J.A.C. 10:44A-1.1(a).  Ultimately, after the arguments were presented from both sides, the Motion Judge reserved his decision and advised an order with a statement of reasons would be provided on a later date.
[brief] As indicated in the [...]’s Environmental Report, savannah sparrows (and other species, including great blue heron, American kestrel, and grasshopper sparrow), are “either not threatened/endangered or not considered freshwater wetland species under the Freshwater Protection Act Rules. ”  (Aa0055).  As a result, and consistent with [...]’s jurisdictional rationale, supra, the [...] did not have jurisdictional authority to withhold approval of the FHA Permit based upon Plaintiffs’ alleged concerns regarding these species.
[brief] ”  Liqui-Box Corp. v. Estate of Elkman, 238 N.J. Super. 588, 600 (App. Div. 1990).  “A basic principle of contract interpretation is to read the document as a whole in a fair and common sense manner. ”  Hardy v. Abdul-Matin, 198 N.J. 95, 103 (2009).  “[W]here the terms of a contract are clear and unambiguous, there is no room for interpretation or construction and the trial judges must enforce those terms as written. ”  *Namerow v. PediatriCare Assocs., LLC*, 461 N.J. Super. 133, 140 (Ch. Div. 2018).  Accord
[directive] Fecha/Date: Acusado/Defendant: Defensor/Defense Attorney: Abogado Fiscal/Prosecutor Formulario enmendado efectivo 01/08/2018, Promulgado por un suplemento a la Directiva #04-14, CN 11171 en español página 2 de 2 Revised Form Effective 01/08/2018, Promulgated by Supplement to Directive #04-14, CN 11171-Spanish page 2 of 2  Supplemental Plea Form for No Early Release Act (NERA)  Cases (N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2)(on or After June 29, 2001)  English-Haitian Version  AVI:  Sa se yon dokiman piblik.  Pa mete okenn enfòmasyon idantifikasyon pèsonèl sou li, kankou nimewo Sosyal, nimewo Lisans pou kondwi, oswa nimewo kont an bank ak kat kredi aktif yo.  Dokiman sa a ap disponib ba piblik la sou demann jan li soumèt la.  NOTICE:  This is a public document, which means the document as submitted will be available to the public upon request.
[brief] In addition to being untimely, plaintiff’s motion lacked merit.  The premise of plaintiff’s proposed amended complaint was the alleged agreement by the [...] to blight the Block in exchange for [...]’s promise to build a new school  Plaintiff contends its motion was based on ‘newly-discovered evidence. ’  Yet, during the Council’s February 13, 2020 public hearing, [...], plaintiff’s managing member, acknowledged and took credit for the proposed construction of the school:  ‘we are in support of the future development and fully on board of the proposed affordable [housing] and school that is proposed by the [...].  The school was our idea. ’  During that hearing, [...] also asserted ‘the [...] is unfairly and illegally favoring a competing developer.  . . ’  Even though its managing member was aware of the school construction and the alleged illegal ‘favoring of a competing developer,’ plaintiff chose not to include a bad-faith claim in its complaint and inexplicably waited until after the trial judge rendered a verdict to seek leave to add a claim based on those allegations.  [Pa789-90.]  The Trial Court Improperly Ignores Its Express Factual and Credibility Determinations and Dismisses  Plaintiff’s Claim with Prejudice
[brief] The Court further noted that an “agency has inherent power to waive de minimis violations of objective standards. ”  Id., citing SMB Assocs v. Department of Envtl. Prot., 264 N.J. Super 38, 59 (App. Div. 1993), aff’d, 137 N.J. 58 (1994).  The Court reversed the decision of the Board, noting that even though the letter was never received by [...], even if it had been, the notice was improper and late.  In this matter, like [...], the Board failed to provide timely, adequate, or proper notice of the Ricci Act.  Also like [...], [...] never received the notice.  The Board did not fulfill its obligation to notify the members of the [...] of this legislation “within 30 days” of July 8, 2019, including the requirement that they had to register their presence at the World Trade Center within 2 years of the law’s enactment, as was required by law.
[brief] The trial court did not address the issue of voidness under the NJCFLA or, perhaps more importantly, the fact that the attempted collection of a void debt is a *prima facie* violation of, *inter alia*, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e(2)(a) (prohibiting the false representation of the character, amount, or status of a debt), 1692e(10) (prohibiting “[t]he use of any false representation or deceptive means to collect or attempt to collect any debt”), and 1692f(1) (prohibiting the attempted collection of any amounts not permitted by law).
[directive] A stationhouse adjustment shall include one or more conditions that the Conditions. juvenile must satisfy, which may include, but are not limited to: 1. Mediation; 2. Restitution; 3. Community service; 4. Letters of apology or other writing projects; 5.  Consequences imposed by the juvenile’s parent or guardian/caregiver/designee, such as a suspension of driving privileges;  If intervention is clinically appropriate, juveniles should be referred for diagnostic assessment and appropriate 6 treatment.  Local planning bodies, including [...], the [...], and the [...], can assist with identifying available assessment and treatment resources.
[brief] Like the Court reasoned in *Luchejko*, we submit that keeping the property free from hazards is a risk that can be spread in the cost of renovation.  Id.  At 203, citing Mirza v. Filmore Corp., 92 N.J. 390, 395-96.  (“The many innocent plaintiffs that suffer injury because of unreasonable accumulations should not be left without recourse.  See Stewart, 87 N.J. at 155, 157.  Ordinary snow removal is less expensive and more easily accomplished than extensive sidewalk repair.  Certainly, commercial landowners should be encouraged to eliminate or reduce the dangers which may be so readily abated.
[brief] The Court’s holding in *Luchejko* is directly on point to the case at hand.  The Defendants cleared snow and ice from a sidewalk, which subsequently (along with additional precipitation) froze on the sidewalk.  Plaintiff in the current case argues that the subject ice was due to negligently placed snow from a prior snowfall which melted and refroze.  Notably, no case law exists which carves out an exception for homeowners who pile their snow next to a sidewalk, which then melts and refreezes.  In fact, and entirely on point, the Courts have already considered this exact situation and clearly held:  “As such, if a sidewalk had been cleared and the melting snow subsequently froze into a layer of ice, the “refreeze” would not be an ‘element of danger or hazard other than one caused by natural forces. ’”  *Id.* (quoting *Foley v. Ulrich*, 94 N.J. Super. 410, 424 (App. Div) (*Kolovsky*, J.A.D., dissenting), rev’d 50 N.J. 426 (1967) (reversing and adopting the Appellate Division dissent by [...]).  Plaintiff is now asking the Court to overturn all prior case law on this issue, ignore the public policy implications and impart a substantial burden on residential property owners.
[brief] The Department’s denial of [...]’s 2020 rate increase applications, and [...]’s challenges that led to this appeal**  [...] submitted applications in 2020 for rate increases, formulated in response to the same issues that have impacted the long term care insurance industry at large: lower voluntary termination or lapse rates and rising costs of care to populations who now live longer, among other things.  Given the Department’s prior approvals of less than the rate amounts [...] requested,\(^5\) [...] had to request significantly increased rates in 2020 because, in addition to all the industry-wide issues, there was now less time to earn the necessary premiums, compounded with fewer policyholders among whom to \(^5\)  In previous years, the Department had approved rate increases conditioned on recognition that further increases would be necessary to achieve certain expected loss ratios.  *See, e.g.*, Pa124; Pa127; Pa13 (discussing the offer letters, and the Department’s stated expectation to help [...] achieve 64.6% lifetime loss ratio, which it then downgraded to 75% in 2018).  spread the rate increase.  *See*  1T 87:6–19, 204:22–05:10; 2T 308:1–15.  As [...] explained in a presentation to the Department, “emerging claims experience has been significantly worse than originally expected, particularly at the attained ages of 75 and older. ”  Pa9 (cleaned up).  Unless the necessary rate increases were granted in a timely manner, [...] would “need future, significant additional rate increases. ”  Pa9.  Importantly, [...]’s requested premium rate increases were calculated in accordance with formulas specified in the regulations.  Yet, after over a year of back and forth with [...] during which time [...] answered the Department’s questions and provided additional information and analysis, the Department disapproved [...]’s proposed rate increase for the policies issued after January 2006, stating:  -  Your assumption regarding the acceptable maximum lifetime *loss ratio* of 64.3% represents an *aggressive loss ratio* target.  [...]’s positions to both bring the lifetime *loss ratio* closer to the original pricing target and to use profits from this block to pay claims for other [...] business do not represent an intent for [...] to share the burden of the unfavorable performance for these policies with the policyholder .  . . .  The Department expects carriers to share materially in the unfavorable performance.  -  The current lifetime *loss ratios* without margins for adverse experience and before any rate increase in New Jersey, 88.8%, and nationwide, 86.4%, do not reflect enough deterioration to warrant a rate increase currently.  Therefore, the Department does **not** approve your request for an increase.  Pa120 (emphasis in italics added).  The Department also disapproved [...]’s proposed rate increase for the policies issued earlier, finding the approvals inter-dependent.