ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] Thus, the following matters shall be reported to the County Prosecutor so that he or she may evaluate the material’s relevance:  (a)  A finding that a police officer has filed a false report or submitted a false certification in any criminal, administrative, employment, financial or insurance matter in their professional or personal life;12  (b)  A pending court complaint or conviction for any criminal, disorderly persons, petty disorderly persons, municipal ordinance or driving while intoxicated matter; (c)  A finding that undermines or contradicts a police officer's educational achievements or qualifications as an expert witness; (d)  A finding of fact by a judicial authority or administrative tribunal that is known to the officer's employing agency that concludes that a police officer intentionally did not tell the truth in a matter; (e) A sustained finding that a police officer intentionally mishandled or destroyed evidence; and (f) A sustained finding that a police officer is biased against a particular gender or ethnic group.
[brief] Summary judgment is proper when a moving party is able to show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that it is thereby entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  R. 4:46-2.  See also, Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 142 N.J. 521, 540 (1995).  R. 4:46-2 states in pertinent part that a motion for summary judgment should be granted “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact challenged and that the moving party is entitled to judgment or order as a matter of law. ”  “[T]he standard of decision governing the grant or denial of a summary judgment emphasize that a party opposing a motion is not to be denied a trial unless the moving party sustains the burden of showing clearly the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. ”  Judson v. Peoples Bank & Trust Co. of Westfield, 17 N.J. 67, 75 (1955).  In Brill, the Supreme Court held that “a determination whether there exists a ‘genuine issue’ of material fact that precludes summary judgment requires the motion judge to consider whether the competent evidential materials presented, when viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, are sufficient to permit a rational factfinder to resolve the alleged disputed issue in favor of the non-moving party. ”  Brill, 142 N.J. at 540.  Even if there is a denial of essential fact by the non-moving party, a motion for summary judgment should be granted if the rest of the record viewed most favorably to the party opposing the motion demonstrates the absence of a material and genuine factual dispute.
[brief] See Db27–32 (citing Seven Caesars, Inc. v. House, 2014 WL 4450441, **8–9 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Sept. 11, 2014); SMS Financial P, LLC v. M.P. Gallagher, LLC, 2019 WL 5459849, *6 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. Jan. 25, 2019) (“The precise issue before this court is whether this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction[.]”); Form Tech Concrete Forms v. Two Bros. Contr., 2019 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 6257, *10 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. May 20, 2019) (“The statute is unambiguous, and provides a jurisdictional standard[.]”).  **CONCLUSION**
[brief] After being confronted with the metadata, Defendants stipulated at trial to the authenticity of the Exhibit.  1T16-20 to 19-24, 21-3 to 6, 161-5 to 162-21, 167-9 to 11, 171-24 to 172-2, 172-11 to 13, 172-2 to 5.  The trial court found that “the undisputed metadata evidence clearly establishes that [...] last modified his schedule on August 7, 2013 – more than three months after the closing, and [...] transmitted the schedule to [...] that same day.
[directive] Note that if a waived juvenile is not charged by complaint- Rule warrant, they are not an “eligible defendant” under Criminal Justice Reform, and thus would not be monitored by the pretrial services program or be subject to the possibility of pretrial detention.  Accordingly, when the Prosecutor’s Office determines that the juvenile upon waiver should be charged as an adult by means of a complaint-warrant, the Assistant Prosecutor shall direct that a complaint-warrant be prepared.  In deciding whether to issue a complaint-summons or to apply to the court for a complaint-warrant, the Assistant Prosecutor shall conduct the analysis as if the person originally had been arrested as an adult.  G.
[brief] (2T32-33).  On July 14, 2022, Defendant traveled to Kansas with Plaintiff’s cousin for a baby shower.  Plaintiff messaged Defendant during her trip to gauge her feelings, asking if she loved being away from them; Defendant responded positively, expressing her desire to return and be with them.  Plaintiff explained that Defendant often expressed that she missed him and wanted to return to be with him while she was away in Kansas.  (2T33).  The green card arrived when Defendant was still in Kansas, and she returned on July 18, 2022.
[brief] Here, [...] and [...] violated these rules by relaying what the unidentified witnesses supposedly told them: that [...] was suspected of shooting [...]; that [...] had distinctive blue eyes; that [...]’s real name was [...]; and as a result of this incriminating information, police put [...]’s photo in an array.  This testimony was clearly inadmissible as it conveyed to the jury information allegedly provided by unnamed witnesses who never testified at trial yet who apparently had critical information implicating [...] in the shooting.
[brief] Respondent-Appellee.  ON APPEAL FROM: Final Agency Decision Board of Review, Department of Labor Agency  Docket No: [...]  CIVIL ACTION SAT BELOW: [...], [...], and [...], Members, Board of Review, Department of Labor  REPLY  BRIEF OF CLAIMANT-APPELLANT  [...] FILING FEES WAIVED R. 1:13-2  [...]  [...]  Phone: [...], Ext. 6279  Fax: [...]  Email: [...]  By: [...], Esq.
[brief] *Ibid.*  This part of the Supreme Court’s ruling in *Grunow* was relied upon by the Appellate Division in *State v. Pridgen*, 245 N.J. Super. 239, 250-51 (App. Div.), *certif. denied*, 126 N.J. 327 (1991), where the defendant, charged with purposeful or knowing murder and convicted of aggravated manslaughter, argued on appeal that the trial court erred in denying his request for a charge on passion/provocation manslaughter.  The Appellate Division in *Pridgen* held that the trial court should have instructed the jury on passion/provocation manslaughter and thus reversed defendant’s conviction.
[directive] Available.  Not Are Risks)  Manage Might That Services defendant the by posed risks) determines the that prosecutor the where be may cases There that service intervention monitoring or of form some by only managed adequately be can release upon the risk(s).  to mitigate available not is otherwise or program services pretrial the by provided not is addiction (e.g., her or his to related is that activity criminal defendant's a example, of By way defendant's drug the support to funds acquire to committed burglaries residential or robberies shown program, as treatment acourt-ordered in participating by interrupted be might dependency) opportunities treatment provides Program, which Court Drug Jersey's New of success proven the by 2A:162-17(b)(2)(i)  N.J.S.A. See crime. addiction and of cycle vicious break the to incentives and ...for ...treatment available defendant "undergo the that include might conditions release (pretrial pretrial recognized that Legislature the that note to added (emphasis dependency") alcohol or drug statutory reasonable of matter a As 6.2.4. subsection also See available). be not might treatment pretrial from immune be to deemed be not should defendant a policy, public sound and interpretation manage the to sufficient been have might in theory conditions release unavailable because detention trial. pending release defendant's by posed risks) identified of Section provisions other the with accordance in determines prosecutor the if cases, such In detention pretrial the at argue shall prosecutor the detention, pretrial seek to Directive this of 7 would conditions of combination condition or no purposes, legal and practical for that, hearing of safety the of protection the required, when in court appearance defendant's the assure reasonably the obstruct to attempt or obstruct will defendant not that and community, or person the other any is detention pretrial that argue shall prosecutor the other words, In process. justice criminal serious remain will release defendant's by posed risks) if the Law Reform Bail the under authorized have might otherwise that condition release a of unavailability practical the to due unabated and risk(s). the mitigated motion. such any on 66 Page pretrial seek to presumption a creating as construed shall subsection in be Nothing this address how a on to uniform to prosecutors guidance subsection provides this detention.
[brief] Defendant was discharged from the hospital at 8:44 p.m. on June 4, 2019.  (Da 23-24).  Defendant was discharged with prescriptions for muscle spasms and pain and was instructed to follow up with his own primary care provider in two days.  (Id.).  These prescriptions included a prescription to take a 10 mg tablet of Cyclobenzaprine, 2 times per day up to 8 doses.  (Id.).  Cyclobenzaprine is a powerful muscle relaxant with sedative hypnotic side effects, including drowsiness, dizziness and blurred vision.  (Id.).  It is hardly the type of drug that medical professionals would be expected to give an individual who would be toxic for Clonazepam if the State’s lab results are to be trusted.  The blood samples taken from [...] were then tested by [...] on or about June 18, 2019.
[brief] N.J.S.A. 17B:27D-5.  This Court should avoid an interpretation that yields an absurd result such as ignoring the Legislature’s use of the word “mandate” in order to avoid the duty to send the bill to the Commission.  See Burnett v. Cnty. of Bergen, 198 N.J. 408, 425 (2009)(reviewing extrinsic evidence to construe statute to avoid absurd result).  The State concedes the Open Public Meetings Act “OPMA” applies to the Legislature, but it was violated because no legislative calendar disclosed that either A.6260 or S.49 were being introduced, and the publicly available calendar failed to list consideration of either A.6260 or S.49 on January 10, 2022.\(^4\) (Sb24; Sb7; Pa114; Pa102 at ¶¶ 18-20.)
[brief] ”  It is a question of law which the court must decide in light of the particular circumstances of each case.  The sources determinative of public policy are, among others, our federal and state constitutions, our public statutes, our judicial decisions, the applicable principles of the common law, the acknowledged prevailing concepts of the federal and state governments relating to and affecting the safety, health, morals and general welfare of the people for whom government -- with us -- is factually established.  [Id. at 478 (internal citations omitted). ]  With respect to the applicability of public policy considerations to insurance agreements, the New Jersey Supreme Court has recognized that “[o]n public policy grounds, insurance contracts have consistently been construed strictly against insurance companies.
[brief] The ALJ’s decision also cited [...] v. Board of Trustees, Police & Firemen’s Retirement System, 2022 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1198 (App. Div. July 1, 2022).  [RA - Exhibit “B”]  Dispatched to an emergency medical call, police officer [...] entered a trailer home and found a 250-pound man slumped over in a wheelchair, unconscious and in respiratory distress from an overdose.
[brief] THE [...] SETTLEMENT DOES NOT PRECLUDE THE CLAIMS ASSERTED BY [...] IN FEDERAL COURT BECAUSE THE EXPRESS TERMS OF THE SETTLEMENT DID NOT REACH FUTURE CLAIMS ARISING FROM MISCONDUCT OCCURRING AFTER FEB. 20, 2015.  A settlement agreement is a contract and should be construed as such.  See Halderman v. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp., 901 F.2d 311, 318 (3d Cir.
[brief] (Da56; Da60-Da62).  In 2009, [...] created a single Planned Development zone which encompassed the [...] site and included both commercial and residential uses with a 25% set aside for affordable housing.  (Da56-Da57; Economic conditions in 2009 were not favorable for development, and the properties remained stagnant until 2015, when buyers emerged to purchase the site.  On July 1, 2015, the Planning Board adopted a Resolution granting general development plan approval ("GDP") to [...], the then-contract purchaser for the commercial portion of the [...] site, the Property that is the subject of this lawsuit.
[brief] Doubts or ambiguities as to the scope of exculpatory language must be resolved against the drafter of the agreement and in favor of affording legal relief.  *Gershon v. Regency Driving Center*, 368 *N.J.Super.* 237, 248 (App. Div. 2004), citing *Chemical Bank of New Jersey v. Bailey*, 296 *N.J.Super.* 515 (App. Div.), cert. den. 150 *N.J.* 28 (1997).
[brief] TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS, AND RULINGS BEING APPEALED  October 20, 2023  Oral Opinion Granting Defendant [...] Frivolous Litigation Sanctions.........................................................  2T Hearing December 5, 2023  Statement of Reasons Granting  Defendant [...]  Frivolous Litigation Sanctions and Setting Fee..............................Pa000637  March 6, 2024  Order Granting Defendant [...]’s Motion for Summary Judgment.  ........................................Pa000869  March 6, 2024  Order Denying Plaintiffs [...] and [...]’s Cross-Motion for Partial Summary Judgment...............Pa000871  March 6, 2024  Statement of Reasons Granting Defendant [...]’s Motion for Summary Judgment and Denying Plaintiffs’ Cross-Motion for Partial Summary Judgment........................................Pa000873  May 10, 2024  Order Denying Plaintiffs [...] and [...]’s Motion for Reconsideration........................................Pa000926
[brief] Neuter.  See "Number; gender," infra, this section.  Number; gender.  Whenever, in describing or referring to any person, party, matter or thing, any word importing the singular number or masculine gender is used, the same shall be understood to include and to apply to several persons or parties as well as to one person or party and to females as well as males, and to bodies corporate as well as individuals, and to several matters and things as well as one matter or thing.
[brief] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14  Stier v. Shop Rite, 201 N.J. Super 142 (App. Div 1985) . . .  20  Torres v. Tamburri Assocs, Inc. 2010 N.J. Super Unpub. LEXIS 2901 (App. Div. December 3, 2010)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19 Vitty v. D.C.P. Corp., 268 N.J. Super 447 (App. Div. 1993)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12, 19, 20, 21 Weichert Co. Realtors v. Ryan, 128 N.J. 427 (1992)
[brief] If, however, the Court chose to decide the motion prior to the close of discovery, these facts establish a genuine issue of material fact as to each of the elements of tortious interference.  The Trial Court compounded its error by dismissing Plaintiffs’ conspiracy claim solely because the Trial Court had decided that Plaintiffs could not establish their tortious interference claims.  (See 1T 23:24-24:16, 25:24-26:6 (“[S]imilarly, . . . there’s no conspiracy here.  . . .  There’s nothing unlawful . . . that’s been alleged or . . . certainly proven thus far in discovery that they did anything that was unlawful, other than trying and . . . buying another business. ”)).  Accordingly, because the tortious interference claim should have survived summary judgment, so, too, should have the conspiracy claim—which had also previously survived a motion to dismiss.
[brief] As a result, and because the detective immediately identified the object in defendant's pocket as contraband without first manipulating it, the seizure of the handgun was lawful.  See State v. Toth, 321 N.J. Super.  609, 616-17 (App. Div. 1999) (holding that a pat-down in which an officer immediately identifies an object as contraband without “in any way[ ] manipulat[ing] or explor[ing]” it “with his fingers” was a valid Terry frisk under the plain-feel doctrine).  Accordingly, the trial court properly denied defendant’s motion to suppress.  That denial should be affirmed.  CONCLUSION
[brief] TABLE OF CONTENTS  STATEMENT OF PROCEDURAL HISTORY  1  STATEMENT OF FACTS  2  LEGAL ARGUMENT  6  POINT I THE TRIAL COURT  ERRONEOUSLY SUPPRESSED THE EVIDENCE FOUND IN DEFENDANTS VEHICLE INCORRECTLY FINDING THAT PROBABLE CAUSE WAS NOT SPONTANEOUS AND UNFORESEEABLE, THUS, THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE DEMANDS THE STATE’S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL BE GRANTED.  (2T19-23 to 20-24; Pa6).  6  CONCLUSION
[brief] *Rova Farms*, 65 N.J. at 504.  In this case, the trial court relied on *Rova Farms* and found that [...] had incurred damages exceeding the limits underlying [...]’s policy by 1989.  (Pa 57).  Accordingly, that was when [...] was deprived of the money to which it was entitled.  (Id.)  [...]’s final argument that only 6.4% of [...]’s damages are allocated to its policy period and its criticism of [...]’s alleged “dilatory conduct” do not alter this outcome.
[brief] A court must vacate an award in public sector labor arbitration because of a mistake of law.  CWA, Local 1087 v. Monmouth County Board of Social Services, 96 N.J. 442, 453 (1984).  Here, the Arbitrator disregarded plain and unambiguous contract language and thus, committed a mistake of law.  Because he ignored the plain language of the contract, he was not arguably construing or interpreting the contract language.
[brief] See, Polzo II, 209 N.J. at 75 n. 12 (“Although ordinarily the question of whether a public entity acted in a palpably unreasonable manner is a matter for the jury, in appropriate circumstances, the issue is ripe for a court to decide on summary judgment”); Carroll, 366 N.J. Super. at 390-91 (holding there was no proof of palpable unreasonableness warranting jury consideration and affirming entry of summary judgment in favor of the public entity); Maslo, 346 N.J. Super. at 350-51 (affirming grant of summary judgment to public entity because plaintiff failed to sufficiently show that a rational factfinder could resolve the issue of palpable unreasonableness in plaintiff’s favor); Black, 263 N.J. Super. at 452 (holding that a palpably unreasonable determination finding, “like any other fact question before a jury, is subject to the court’s assessment whether it can reasonably be made under the evidence presented”).  Here, the trial court properly determined Plaintiff failed to satisfy the strenuous burden of proof required to prove the Township acted palpably unreasonable.  The competent evidence of record is entirely devoid of any evidence as to specific or general behavior by the Township that can be considered palpably unreasonable.
[brief] (Pa319-330)  He did not need the contracts to ascertain whether or not he had a common law cause of action.  Plaintiff’s admitted belief that he had a cause of action against all tenant defendants also renders the assertion contained in [...]’ answers to interrogatories that [...] was the only other potentially culpable party (Pa211, Pa213) a “red herring. ”  Plaintiff clearly thought otherwise and was not “misled” (1T47-25) by the information contained in those interrogatories.  The protestations of counsel must yield to the sworn testimony of plaintiff himself.  This defendant was not afforded an opportunity to oppose the motion for leave to file the second amended complaint.  Although that motion was granted, the granting of such a motion does not foreclose the newly added defendant from asserting any and all applicable defenses to a plaintiff’s claims.
[directive] 7.5  Physical Tests  7.5.1  Police officers who are the subjects of internal investigations may be compelled to submit to various physical tests or procedures to gather evidence.  7.5.2  N.J.R.E. 503(a) states that "no person has the privilege to refuse to submit to examination for the purpose of discovering or recording his corporal features and other identifying characteristics or his physical or mental condition."  Evidence that may be obtained or procedures that may be used to obtain evidence under this rule include: (a) Breath sample; (b) Blood sample; (c) Buccal swab; (d) Requiring suspect to speak; (e) Voice recordings; (f) Participation in a lineup; (g) Handwriting samples; (h) Hair and saliva samples; (i) Urine specimens; (j) Video recording; and (k) Field sobriety tests.  7.5.3
[brief] This distinction was addressed in detail in *Weitz v. [...] Ins. Co.*, 273 N.J. Super. 548, 551 (App. Div. 1994), which also held that the Injury to an Insured exclusion in an excess policy barred coverage for a liability claim by the wife-passenger against the husband-driver stemming from an auto accident.  The Court rejected an argument similar to the one put forward by Appellants in this matter as to public policy concerns.  There, the Court noted:  Plaintiff contends that because her husband's primary automobile insurance policy could not have excluded coverage for claims brought by members of his household, see N.J.S.A. 39:6A–3 to –4, he would reasonably assume that his personal umbrella policy could not have contained such an exclusion.  We disagree.  The Legislature has not required automobile insureds to purchase umbrella policies; and there is no legislation dictating the parameters of coverage contained in such policies.  Unlike his underlying automobile policy whose scope is defined by statute, [...]'s umbrella policy is defined by the policy's plain language, unencumbered by the statutory requirements for automobile insurance.  Plaintiff suggests no compelling reason to tack onto one form of insurance the statutory requirements governing another.  See Horesh v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 265 N.J. Super. 32, 37, 625 A.2d 541 (App.Div.1993) (“In the absence of any statutory or substantial public policy requirement to cover liability for an insured's injury, a homeowner's insurance policy may exclude such liability from coverage,” even where such an exclusion could not be enforced if contained in an automobile liability insurance policy)[.] . . .  The unambiguous exclusion set forth in [...]'s umbrella policy must be enforced as written.  Id. at 551-52 (emphasis added).  As in Weitz, coverage under the [...] Excess Policy is not determined by statutory requirements but rather by the plain language of the policy.  As described above, New Jersey courts have held in an unbroken line of cases that Injury to an Insured exclusions are valid and not against public policy when used outside of the primary automobile coverage context.  In doing so, those cases also rejected similar public policy arguments, finding that the policies applied based on their plain language because coverage under such policies was not mandated by statute.
[brief] Thiedemann v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, 183 N.J. 234 (2005)……………………………………………………………..34  United States v. Free, 839 F.3d 308 (3rd Cir. 2016) ……………………………………………………..48  Untermann v. Untermann, 19 N.J. 507 (1955) ………………………………………………………………..43  Weller & Lichtenstein v. Jersey City, Hoboken & Paterson Ry., 68 N.J. Eq. 659 (E.&A. 1905) ……………………………………………………22, 25, 26 Federal Statutes  11 U.S.C.A. § 521(1) ………………………………………………………………..49  11 U.S.C.A. § 521(4) ………………………………………………………………..46  11 U.S.C.A. § 523(a)(3) ……………………………………………………………49  11 U.S.C.A. § 541(a)……………………………………………………………..45  11 U.S.C. § 323……………………………………………………………………20, 47  11 U.S.C. § 704(1) ………………………………………………………………..47  11 U.S.C. § 1306(a) ………………………………………………………………..45  11 U.S.C. § 1306(b) ………………………………………………………………..45, 46  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
[brief] SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY  APPELLATE DIVISION  DOCKET NO. [...]  INDICTMENT NO. [...]  STATE OF NEW JERSEY, : CRIMINAL ACTION  Plaintiff-Respondent, :  On Appeal from a Judgment of v. : Conviction of the Superior : Court of New Jersey, Law [...], : Division, Monmouth County.  Defendant-Appellant.  : Sat Below: : Hon. [...], J.S.C.; DEFENDANT IS CONFINED