ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The second omission from Defendant’s discussion of Dimitrakopoulos, is the footnote in which the Court recognizes that transactional malpractice was exempted from the Entire Controversy Doctrine in Olds.  Footnote 4 states;  In Olds, we noted that malpractice claims arising from legal services in a transactional matter are unlikely to raise the same concerns as claims arising from a representation in litigation, as a transactional attorney “is not saddled with the conflicting roles of advocating on behalf of the client in the underlying litigation and representing his or her own interests as a defendant. ”  150 N.J. at 442, 696 A.2d 633.  We observed, however, that “[t]he line between transactional and litigation representation ... is not always clear,” and we declined to adopt a separate rule for the application of the entire controversy doctrine to legal malpractice claims arising from transactional matters.  Ibid.  Dimitrakopoulos v. [...], 237 N.J. 91 (2019)  The Supreme Court did not overrule Olds’ exemption, if they were going to overrule a bright line rule, they would have said so; not only does this leave as good law the exemption of all legal malpractice claims from the Entire Controversy Doctrine, it also renders excusable Plaintiff’s failure to join these claims to the lease litigation.
[brief] ” (T1/51:5-6).  6  Under this scenario, Appellant left open the possibility that non-cannabis product deliveries would occur from the remote parking space on Michigan Avenue.  (T2/98:1-6; 98:20-24).  this alternative, a vehicle traveling eastbound on Atlantic Avenue would pause within a live travel lane adjacent to the driveway and back reverse into the driveway to access the loading area located within the subject property.  *Id.*  In making this movement, a vehicle would cross the public sidewalk along Atlantic Avenue and pull into the loading area which then dead ends on the site.  *Id.*  In order to appreciate the Authority’s concerns with Appellant’s application, a picture is worth a thousand words.
[brief] But the trial court denied [...]’s motion, finding that the December Terms were unenforceable because they did not say specifically that the user was waiving her right to a jury trial—unlike the January Terms that [...] had also signed.  That decision was wrong.  New Jersey law requires only that an arbitration provision explain generally that a signatory is giving up her right to bring her claims in court; no “magic words” are required, as this Court has repeatedly held.
[brief] (Da4-Da8).  On June 18, 2024, the trial court entered an Order to Show Cause with Temporary Restraints, which enjoined [...]  \(^2\)  Most New Jersey municipalities filed declaratory judgment actions and voluntarily satisfied their Third Round Mount Laurel obligations through settlement, pursuant to which they obtained final judgments of compliance and repose from exclusionary zoning lawsuits.  [...] is an outlier with respect to its Third Round obligation.
[directive] Internal affairs is responsible for reviewing the incident’s investigation and conducting whatever further investigation is necessary to determine if the officer violated agency rules and regulations or if the officer's fitness for duty is in question.  In addition, internal affairs will track the proceedings of any criminal charges or civil matters that may arise out of the incident.  Internal affairs will also work with the Division of Criminal Justice or the County Prosecutor to determine if and when an officer may have their weapon(s) returned.  32  INTERNAL AFFAIRS POLICY & PROCEDURES | August 2020
[brief] TABLE OF CONTENTS  STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY ...................... 1  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I – THE ORDER SUPPRESSING EVIDENCE SHOULD BE REVERSED; THE INVESTIGATORY STOP WAS SUPPORTED BY REASONABLE SUSPICION (2T46:23-51:6 and 52:7-25)  ...........................................  9  1.  [...]’s Errant Ruling Excluding Evidence Related to the 9-1-1 Call Prejudiced the State and Compromised the Trial Court’s Decision.  (1T11:20-12:2 and 14:10-15; 2T50:2-5 and 17-23).  .................................................................................. 11  2.  The 9-1-1 Call, Even if it Were Considered Alone, Established Reasonable Suspicion.  (2T47:8-50:23 and 52:22-25) ..................................................... 12  3.  The 9-1-1 Call, Considered Alongside the Other Evidence, Established Reasonable Suspicion (2T47:8-51:6 and 52:22-25) .......................................................  18  4.  [...]’s Adverse Credibility Finding Is Clearly Mistaken and Should be Reversed (2T42:17-45:4, 48:1-49:7, 50:7-51:6, and 52:7-21) ........................................................................................................... 22 CONCLUSION................................................................................................. 25 APPENDIX Indictment [...] (Returned 10/20/21)..............................Pa001 to Pa006 Notice of Motion to Suppress Evidence, 2/25/22..............................................Pa007 State’s brief in opposition to Motion to Suppress Evidence, 5/5/22........................................................................................................Pa008 to Pa019 Order denying Motion to Suppress Evidence, 8/16/22......................................Pa020 Judgment of Conviction, 10/19/22.........................................................Pa021 to Pa024 Notice of Appeal, 11/22/22..............................................................................Pa025 to Pa029 Appellate Division decision, State v. [...], [...], 3/8/24..............................................................................................................Pa030 to Pa044 State’s supplemental brief in opposition to Motion to Suppress Evidence, 6/10/24..............................................................................................................Pa045 to Pa054 Order granting Motion to Suppress Evidence, 7/5/24........................................Pa055
[brief] The seriousness of the legislative intent of the FHACA (to protect public health and safety from improper development that could result in flooding) necessitates strict application of the DEP’s regulations when it conducts a permit review.  *Dragon v. N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot.*, 405 N.J. Super. 478, 491 (App. Div. 2009).  Critical to understanding the DEP’s failure in this case is the following regulatory definition that was in effect at the time the DEP was considering the instant permit application:
[brief] | Cases | Page(s) | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|---------| | Berner v. Enclave Condo. Ass’n, 322 N.J. Super. 229 (App. Div., 1999) | 11 | | Besler v. Bd. of Educ. of W. Windsor-Plainsboro Reg’l Sch. Dist., | 4 | | 201 N.J. 544 (2010) | | | Calabotta v. Phibro Animal Health Corp., 460 N.J. Super. 38, (App. | 10 | | Div. 2019) | | | Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986) | 9 | | Grigoletti v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 118 N.J. 89 (1990) | 11 | | Hernandez v. Region Nine Hous. Corp., 146 N.J. 645(1996) | 11 | | In re Adoption of Baby T., 160 N.J. 332 (1999) | 10 | | In re Camden Cnty., 170 N.J. 439 (2002) | 10,11 | | Jen Elec., Inc. v. Cnty. of Essex, 197 N.J. 627 (2009) | 10 | | Monell v. Dept. of Soc. Servs. of the City of New York, | 3,4,5,6 | | 436 U.S. 658 (1978) | | | Montells v. Havnes, 133 N.J. 282 (1993) | 11 | | Nini v. Mercer Cty. Cmty. Coll., 202 N.J. 98 (2010) | 10 | | Oceanport Holding, L.L.C. v. Borough of Oceanport, | 10 | | 396 N.J. Super. 622 (App.Div.2007)  | | | O’Lone v. New Jersey Dept. of Corrections, 313 N.J. Super. 249 (App. | 11 | | Div., 1998)  | | | Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469 (1986) | 4 | | Pukowsky v. Caruso, 312 N.J. Super. 171 (App. Div. 1998) | 11 | SUPPLEMENTAL APPENDIX  Traffic Impact Study, [...], [...], Lot 14.01 in Block 4, N.J. Route 33, [...], [...], New Jersey, prepared by [...], November 2021…………………………Ra191  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
[brief] Model Jury Charges (Criminal), “Aggravated Assault – Upon Law Enforcement Officer (Attempting to Cause or Purposely, Knowing or Recklessly Causing Bodily Injury) (N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1b(5)(a), (b), (c), (d), (e), (f), (g)” at 1 (rev. Dec. 3, 2001)  ........................................................................................................  23, 25 Model Jury Charges (Criminal), “Causation (N.J.S.A. 2C:2-3)” (rev. Jun. 10, 2013)  .............................................................................................................................................  24, 25  Model Jury Charges (Criminal), “Resisting Arrest - Flight Not Alleged (N.J.S.A. 2C:29-2a)” at 1 (May 7, 2007)  .................................................................  10, 20  PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[brief] THE COURT IMPROPERLY PROHIBITED INTRODUCTION OF DEFENDANT’S INCIDENT REPORT  Plaintiff respectfully submits that the Defendant’s Incident Report having been provided by the defense to the Plaintiff in its certified Answers to Interrogatories constitutes *prima facie* evidence of its genuineness, and is accordingly satisfactory proof of authentication.  See, generally, *State v. Hannah*, 448 N.J. Super. 78, 89 (App. Div. 2016) and *Konop v. Rosen*, 425 N.J. Super. 391, 411 (App. Div. 2012).  *Evid. R.* 901 provides:  The requirement of authentication or identification as a condition precedent to admissibility is satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter is what its proponent claims.  See also *Evid. R.* 1007, which provides:  The contents of writings or photographs may be proved by the testimony or deposition of the party against whom offered or by that party’s written admission, without accounting for the nonproduction of the original.  See also *Evid. R.* 803, which provides:  The following statements are not excluded by the hearsay rule:  (b)  Statement by Party-Opponent.  The statement is offered against a party-opponent and is: (1) the party-opponent’s own statement, made either in an individual or in a representative capacity; or (2) a statement whose content the party-opponent has adopted by word or conduct or in whose truth the party has manifested belief; or (3) a statement by a person authorized by the party-opponent to make a statement concerning the subject; or (4) a statement by the party-opponent’s agent or servant concerning a matter within the scope of the agency or employment, made during the existence of the relationship; or (c) Statements Not Dependent on Declarant’s Availability.  The following are not excluded by the rule against hearsay, regardless of whether the declarant is available as a witness:  (1)  Present Sense Impression.  A statement describing or explaining an event or condition made while or immediately after the declarant perceived it and without opportunity to deliberate or fabricate.  Defendant’s Incident Report and photographs of the scene as it appeared after the Plaintiff’s fall and the Defendant’s “repairs,” should have been admitted and Plaintiff should have been permitted to testify regarding them and their content.  The preclusion by the trial Court severely prejudiced the Plaintiff’s ability to prove her case, and this Court should rule that the trial Court’s rulings constituted a manifest denial of justice, and a new trial should be ordered.
[brief] State v. Baker, No. A-5326-94 (App. Div. Oct. 27, 1997); State v. Baker, 153 N.J. 48 (1998).  Defendant then filed a post-conviction relief (PCR) petition, which was denied by [...] on July 28, 2000.  (Pa10).  The denial was affirmed by this court on October 28, 2002, and on January 30, 2003, the Supreme Court denied certification.
[brief] In sum:  **1)**  [...]’s Entire Controversy Doctrine defense does not supersede the trial court’s lack of subject matter jurisdiction, nor does it revive it from being untimely under the statute of limitations argument or excuse [...]’s requirement to exhaust administrative remedies; **2)**  [...] failed to establish that this court retains jurisdiction over its 18A school law claims falling under the jurisdiction of the Commissioner of Education; **3)**  [...] fails to establish that there exists an express or implied private right to a cause of action to sue the [...] in Superior Court for a violation of a purely school law statute existing only under Title 18A within the Commissioner’s jurisdiction; 4) [...]’s disingenuous obfuscation of the [...]’s constitutional argument should be rejected by the court, and this court cannot interpret and apply N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-9(e)(3) in a manner that violates the Impairment of Contracts clauses in the U.S. and New Jersey Constitutions; 5) a substantial portion of the trial court’s money judgment must be reduced because N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-9(e)(3) has prospective, and not retroactive application; and 6) with material facts in dispute, summary judgment dismissing the Complaint and granting the Counterclaim was not warranted.
[brief] Standing is not automatic and a litigant usually has no standing to assert the rights of a third In Re: Six Month Extension of N.J.A.C. 5:91-1 et seq., 372 N.J. Super. 61, 85 (App. Div. 2004).  Once Plaintiff assigned his rights to the proceeds of this matter, Plaintiff’s stake became that of receiving a judgment to pay off his creditors.  Accordingly, the harm Plaintiff will suffer in the event of an adverse decision is not one stemming from alleged malpractice of [...], but of not being able to pay his creditors.  As a result, Plaintiff essentially assigned away his standing to prosecute this suit against Defendant.
[brief] ”  Weiswasser, supra at 343 [emphasis added].  In an unpublished opinion, the Appellate Division relied upon the Weiswasser court’s reasoning when holding:  “The Court held the defendant’s [loss of visibility as an element of severance damages may be related to a loss of access; however, the basis of compensation would be whether the loss is attributable to the taking of the property itself or off-site conditions. ”  State v. [...], [...] (unpub.) (App. Div. February 10, 2014).  Pa00100; Pa00105 [internal citations omitted].  These concepts apply to the current matter, contradicting Appellant’s arguments he is entitled to damages resulting from an alleged loss of view, privacy and wave activity from the construction of the new seawall and ramp on the Borough’s adjacent property; outside of the easement acquired in the Property.
[directive] 3.2  Training  3.2.1  Basic and in-service training for law enforcement officers should emphasize the sworn obligation of those officers to uphold the law and ensure public safety.  Police ethics should be a major component in the training curricula.  In addition, the rules, regulations, policies and procedures of the agency, including the disciplinary process, should be stressed.  There must also be a process to advise veteran officers of any new statutory requirements or significant procedural changes.  3.2.2  An agency’s supervisory personnel should always consider the need for training when officers engage in inappropriate behavior or misconduct.  The question should be, “Could training have prevented this behavior and can training prevent it from happening in the 11 INTERNAL AFFAIRS POLICY & PROCEDURES | August 2020 future?”  Perhaps a particular officer or group of officers needs a refresher course in a certain subject.  In addition, changes in the law, the agency or even within the community may trigger the need for a type of training never before given to the officer or agency.  Training in this sense can be anything from informal counseling of an officer about a particular policy or procedure to formal agency-wide training.  The agency may also take advantage of training offered by other agencies, including police academies, the County Prosecutors, the Division of Criminal Justice, other public or private entities or web-based programs.
[brief] On September 24, 2018, after the State filed a motion for an order permitting the State to use reasonable force to obtain the buccal swab, the Court directed the State to file a brief setting forth the legal authority as well as what specific procedure would be used.  (D1223; 3T7-1 to 10-25)  Defendant’s counsel indicated that Defendant still believed that the buccal swab that was taken from him at the jail should be sufficient for the State and that it was unnecessary for them to take a second sample; it appeared Defendant believed that the State’s request for a second sample meant something nefarious was going on.  (3T5-16 to 24)  On October 11, when Defendant was allowed to speak, he explained his opposition as follows:
[brief] *O’Shea v. K Mart Corp.*, 304 N.J. Super. 489, 492 (App. Div. 1997); see also; *Nelson v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co.*, 48 N.J. Super. 300, 305 (App. Div. 1958).  A business owner, such as defendant [...], owes a duty to its invitees to exercise ordinary care “to render the premises reasonably safe” for the purposes embraced in the invitation.  *M.J.C. 5.20F(5)*; see also; *Handleman v. Cox*, 39 N.J. 95, 111 (1963)(explaining that the duty of care owed by an occupier of land to an invitee is to use reasonable care “to make the premises safe[.]”).  In other words, it “must exercise reasonable care for the invitee’s safety. ”  *M.J.C. 5.20F(5)*.  This duty is imposed on business operators because they are in the best position to prevent and control the risk of harm to their patrons.  *Bauer v. Nesbitt*, 198 N.J. 601, 615 (2009).  The duty that an operator of a business establishment owes to its invitees is an affirmative duty that obligates it to not only discover and eliminate any potentially dangerous condition or circumstance on the property but also to avoid creating any conditions that would render the premises unsafe.  *Nisivoccia v. Glass Gardens, Inc.*, 175 N.J. 559, 563 (2003).
[brief] Because the burden of proof in a VOP hearing is lower than that of the “beyond a reasonable doubt” burden of proof in the criminal trial, an acquittal did not bar re-prosecution of the VOP.  *N.J. Div. of Child Prot. & Permanency v. J.R.-R.*, 248 N.J. 353, 376 n.11 (2021) (“To prove an allegation by the preponderance of the evidence, a party must convince [the factfinder] that the allegation is more likely true than not true. ”).
[brief] (Aa005-006).  On April 17, 2023, a sentencing hearing was held before [...] in the Morris County Law Division.  (7T).  That same day, [...] entered a Judgment of Conviction and an accompanying Statement of Reasons.  (Aa007-061).  On May 26, 2023, Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal with this Court, appealing the Judgment of Conviction entered by [...] on April 17, 2023.  (Aa086-089).  **STATEMENT OF FACTS**
[directive] Required Training.  Crisis Negotiators called to respond to incidents involving barricaded pursuant to Sections 4.3 and 4.4 individuals of this Policy are required to have attended a Crisis Negotiation Course of at least 40 hours duration conducted by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the National Tactical Officers Association, the Public Agency Training Council or an equivalent course approved by the County Prosecutor or Attorney General.  4.6  County Prosecutor Advisory.  Law enforcement agencies handling an incident involving a barricaded subject or hostage situation shall, as soon as possible, contact the County Prosecutor’s Office, which shall make legal personnel available to assist with decisions and legal process for search warrants, communications data warrants, electronic surveillance applications, potential criminal charges or any other legal matter.
[directive] A “stationhouse adjustment” is a mechanism that allows law enforcement agencies to resolve a juvenile’s unlawful conduct without formal court proceedings.  A stationhouse adjustment, which must be memorialized in a signed agreement, establishes one or more conditions that the juvenile must meet in exchange for the law enforcement agency declining to pursue a formal delinquency complaint against the juvenile.  5  B.  There  Presumption in favor of stationhouse adjustments for certain unlawful conduct. shall be a presumption in favor of performing a stationhouse adjustment—rather than pursuing a delinquency complaint against a juvenile—when: 1.
[directive] Rule 3:3-1(c)(1) on the Bail Schedule 2 charges of robbery, criminal sexual contact, second degree aggravated assault, aggravated arson, arson, burglary, first or second degree violations of Chapter 35 (drug offenses), any crime involving the possession or use of a firearm, or conspiracies or attempts to commit such crimes.  Rule 3:3-1(c)(2-6) (indictable offenses) and Rule 7:2-2(b)(1-6) delineate factors regarding whether a warrant or summons should issue for other offenses.  Rule 3:26-1 (indictable offenses) and Rule 7:4-1 (non-indictable offenses) delineate factors to be considered when setting bail and provide for the option of R.O.R. bail where appropriate.  Bail Ranges for attempts or conspiracies should generally be the same as the actual substantive crime.  Statute Charge Description  Degree Bail Range 10%  Cash Bail Option 3.  After being served with process or having actual knowledge of an action affecting the protective services needs of a child pursuant to Title 9 in an action affecting custody, but prior to the issuance of a temporary or final order determining custody rights of a minor child, takes, detains, entices or conceals the child within or outside the State for the purpose of evading the jurisdiction of the courts of this State; or 4.  After the issuance of a temporary or final order specifying custody, joint custody rights or Interference with parenting time, takes, detains, entices or conceals a minor child from the other parent in 2C:13-4a(1-4)  Custody violation of the custody or parenting time order.  3rd Degree $5,000 to $25,000 10% permissible (continued) (continued)  Grading of Sections 1 through 4 – crime of the second degree if the child is taken, detained, enticed, or concealed outside of the United States or for more than twenty-four hours; otherwise crime of the third degree 26 Updated December 2, 2013
[brief] The substantive aspect of this proposal was accomplished by the arbitrator’s consideration of the three units together and his determination that for this award and going forward, the units would be consolidated into a single contract.  We find that the arbitrator did not err by leaving to the parties the ministerial task of blending all of the unmodified language of the POA’s three previous contracts into a single document.  The parties have all of the information they need to unify the contracts into a single CNA that incorporates all of the changes made by this award without altering any previous terms that remain applicable to one or more of the units.  (Aa063-064).  Further, the Commission endorsed the arbitrator’s suggestion for the parties to hire a mediator to address any disputed issues.  (Aa064, Award footnote 10).⁴  [...] transmitted the 96-page Award and 6 appendices to [...] by email on December 17, 2023.
[brief] The providing of water for extinguishing fires and electricity for lighting streets and public places are governmental functions, while the distribution of water and furnishing of electricity to its inhabitants, for a price, is the exercise of a private or proprietary function by the municipality, and is governed by the same rules as apply to private corporations.  Our Supreme Court further explained: --- 61 Goldfarb v. Solimine, 245 N.J. 326 (2021)(citation omitted).