ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] The investigation and resolution of missing persons cases are an important responsibility of the law enforcement community in New Jersey.  The difficult problems surrounding missing persons cases demand from the law enforcement community a prompt, informed and uniform response.  It is imperative that missing and unidentified persons investigations be given the appropriate degree of priority treatment.  Follow-up investigations and public safety activities should be timely and comprehensive.  The victim's family should be kept informed of the progress of the investigation and family referrals to the appropriate support services should be made as required.  All available law enforcement resources must be utilized in an appropriate fashion to ensure that all necessary steps are taken to protect our children and other missing persons.  To better accomplish this objective each agency's chief law enforcement executive shall:  Provide leadership by developing a clear and concise written order or directive based upon these standards and disseminating it to all law enforcement officers of the agency.  These law enforcement standards will be meaningless unless the chief law enforcement executive of the agency provides direction and leadership through a well-defined written order or directive which provides an agency based framework for these missing and unidentified persons investigation standards.  PURPOSE OF MISSING AND UNIDENTIFIED PERSONS
[brief] ’”  Accutane, 235 N.J. at 266 (quoting Cornett v. Johnson & Johnson, 211 N.J. 362, 387 (2012)).  In this case, plaintiff’s failure-to-recall “claim is no more than a challenge to [the FDA’s] approval of” this product and is therefore impliedly preempted.  Cornett, 211 N.J. at 391.  Plaintiff’s argument against preemption, Op. Br. at 29, is largely based on the 1991 Feldman v. Lederle Laboratories, 125 N.J. 117 (1991) decision.  But a lot has changed concerning FDCA preemption since then – most notably Bartlett.
[brief] On the Brief: [...], Esq.  Table of Contents  Table of Contents  ..................................................................................................................  i  Table of Authorities ..............................................................................................................  ii  Table of Judgments, Orders, and Rulings Being Cross-Appealed ................................ iv  A.  Preliminary Statement .....................................................................................................  1  B.  Procedural History .........................................................................................................  2  C.  Statement of the Facts ....................................................................................................  4  D.  Appeal Legal Argument .................................................................................................  12 Issue I: Standards Of Review Of An Order Deciding A Motion For Summary Judgment .................................................................................................................................  12 Issue II: Summary Judgment Was Proper Because [...]’s Lease Does Not Provide A Basis To Find That It Was Responsible For Ice And Snow Removal Where The Plaintiff Fell .........................................................................................................................  14  Issue III: Summary Judgment Was Properly Granted To [...], As It Had No Common Law Duty To Maintain The Parking Lot Where The Plaintiff Fell.. 25 E. Cross-Appeal Legal Argument .......................................................................................
[brief] He informed the jurors that because the two guns in question contained mixtures of the same kinds of bullets, “[t]hat’s shared ammunition. ”  In other words, the similarity of bullets between the two guns created an inference that (1) the two guns had been possessed by different people, and that (2) those two people had loaded their guns together, or at least from the same stash of ammunition.  The fact that this assertion did not make much sense does not mean that there were not jurors who believed it.  After all, it was the prosecutor, who was an authority figure and presumably professionally familiar with all things ammunition-related, who told them it was so.  Of course, the mixing of bullets in the two guns would suggest just the opposite of what the prosecutor asserted: namely, that the two guns were both possessed by the *same* person who had loaded them both with whatever kind of ammunition he had on hand.  But because the prosecutor said so, there were likely to have been at least some jurors who accepted that the evidence supported a conclusion that there had been “shared ammunition” between two people, each of whom had possessed one of the guns and loaded it in conjunction with the other person from a common stash.  [...] was acquitted of both counts of weapons possession.
[directive] (1)  $2,000 in the case of a 1st degree crime (2) $1,000 in the case of a 2nd degree crime (3) $ 750 in the case of a 3rd degree crime ( 4)  $ 500 in the case of a 4th degree crime (5)  $ 250 in the case of a disorderly persons or petty disorderly persons offense  Total CCPF Penalty $ -------- [...], N.J.S.A. 2C:43-3.8 (L. 2009, c. 143).  Seo a crime envolve uma viola~o lei N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4b(3) (causar ou permitir a participayiio de menor em ato sexual para fins de fotografia ou publicayiio ), se o crime ocorreu no dia 1 ° de fevereiro de 2018 ou ap6s esta data, N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4b(4) (fotografar ou filmar um menor em ato sexual), se o crime ocorreu no dia 1° de fevereiro de 2018 ou ap6s esta data, N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4b(5)(b) (posse intencional ou visualizayiio intencional de pornografia infantil), N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4.
[brief] Far from doing so with precision, Plaintiff reasonably estimated his lost wages to be $2,867.32 through his on-the-stand arithmetic (3T, at 58:7-59:8).  With an award of $3,500.00, Defendants make the reach of asserting that the jury awarded an extra $632.69 because of some kind of prejudice.  This fallacy has already been sufficiently debunked throughout this Brief.  However, one aspect of Defendants’ argument not yet addressed deals with Plaintiff’s comment regarding continuing treatment.  During his direct examination, Plaintiff, unprompted, stated that he had recently visited a new chiropractor (3T, at 52:2-4).  Defense counsel objected, since both he and Plaintiff’s own counsel were unaware of this fact (3T, at 52:5-12).  But rather than becoming a major incident in this case, this relatively basic objection was fully addressed by the Court.  [...] suggested that the best course of action was to move on from the comment without drawing any further attention to it, and both parties agreed (3T, at 53:3-12).  Defendants only mentioned this comment as possible support for a larger argument of cumulative effect.  Like lashing together bundles of sticks to make a raft, Defendants hope that by stringing enough harmless statements together, they can create something that floats.  But anything multiplied by zero is still zero.  And since this Brief has already dispelled all of Defendants’ allegations of prejudice, they are incapable of crafting any kind of cumulative argument.
[brief] Under the terms of that Settlement Agreement, [...] was permitted to develop the site as a non-age restricted, rental Inclusionary Development of up to 473 non-age restricted residential units, to include 71 ‘affordable’ units, (i.e., a 15% set aside) to be located on [...] (Block 3103, Lots 16 and 19) (the “Residential Project”) and [...] (Block 3101, Lots 12 and 13) would remain as commercial (the “Commercial Project”), a separate non-residential commercial.
[brief] In one study, there was a false positive rate of “1 error in 604 cases, with the upper bound [of the 95% confidence interval] indicating that the rate could be as high as 1 error in 306 cases. ”  Id. at 94.  The second study found 42 false positives among 995 conclusive examinations, for an upper-bound of the 95% confidence interval false positive rate of 5.4%, or 1 in 18.  Id. at 95.  “To be considered reliable, the [false positive rate] should certainly be less than 5 percent and it may be appropriate that it be considerably lower, depending on the intended application. ”  PCAST Report at 152.  The error rates for fingerprint analysis skyrockets when “close non-matches” (CNMs) are considered.
[brief] The decision to bar [...] was an abuse of discretion.  Defendants acknowledged that [...] based his opinion on testimony from defendant [...] and plaintiff, photographs and in-person inspection of the site, measurements of the sidewalk slope, published guidelines for sidewalk construction and decades of training and experience.  Defendants simply did not like what he had to say and hired their own expert to respond.  Those opinions should be considered by the factfinder and should not be rejected by the court acting as a preemptive juror.
[directive] [...] 1713 [...]  2 to 3 Fridays a month  [...] 1704 [...]  2nd Monday  [...] 1715 [...]  2nd & 4th Thursday  [...] 1709 [...]  2nd & 4th Wednesday [...] 1708 [...]  2 to 3 Fridays a month  [...] 1712 [...]  1st & 3rd Tuesday  [...] [...] Ext. [...] 1801
[brief] (2T).  The Trial Court denied both motions and set forth its reasoning on the record (Pa 097, Pa 159, 2T18).  The Court ruled that there was an issue of material fact for a jury to determine, i.e., whether the involvement of Plaintiff’s automobile was consequential (as asserted by the Plaintiff) or merely incidental (as argued by the Defendant) to the Plaintiff’s injuries.  (2T18).  Specifically, the Trial Court held: “A fact finder could determine that the injuries resulted on June 26th were either incidental or not to the occupancy or use of the vehicle, thus establishing a claim for PIP payment. ” (2T18).  On November 15, 2023, the Plaintiff filed a Motion for Reconsideration, citing the Appellate Division decision in *Manetti V. Prudential Property & Casualty Ins. Co.*, 196 N.J. Super. 317 (App. Div. 1984) (Pa 161).
[brief] Petitioner admits that all Respondents, except [...], provided proper disclaimers.  That should be the end of the matter.  And even [...] provided a disclaimer that is almost identical to the disclaimer the Commission approved in *Fernandez*, stating that he was speaking as a “tax paying resident. ”  Compare *Fernandez*, supra, at 5 (“I am on the . . . [board] but I am reaching out to you tonight as an individual, fellow parent, alum of [the district], and taxpayer. ”)  Moreover, [...] took no action that would have compromised the Board nor did he make any promises.  Rather, he provided a link to a public website and provided an opinion, his personal opinion.  Even assuming Mr. Koveloski *was* speaking for the Board, as the Board President he is permitted to speak on behalf of the Board and his statement was not inconsistent with the Board’s position, which voted unanimously in support of the referendum.  Simply put, Petitioner’s alleged facts are insufficient to establish a violation of the Act.  Nor does the fact that [...] provided her district email address somehow nullify her use of a proper disclaimer.  Petitioner still cannot show that [...] made any personal promises or took action beyond the scope of her duties that in any way had the potential to compromise the Board.  Further, Petitioner has not cited a single Commission decision holding it a violation of the Act for a board member to use his/her board email address to communicate regarding a topic related to school business or the business of the board.  In sum, [...] provided an appropriate disclaimer that she was speaking as a member of the public, provided her opinion, and then informed the public that they could speak with Board members such as herself about the issue.  Petitioner has pled no facts to suggest that [...] made “promises” or “compromised the Board” merely by providing her Board email address.  C.
[brief] Indeed, as the trial court noted in denying leave to amend in the Prior Action, the facts supporting the claims in the Prior Action were known to Appellants at the time they filed their initial Complaint and First Amended Complaint in the Prior Action in March 2019 and July 2021, respectively.  [Pa233].  Specifically, while [...] denies the allegations that are asserted herein (and which Appellants belatedly and unsuccessfully sought to add to the Prior Action), the Appellants were well aware that the Lease contained a confidentiality provision, that the [...] had information as to the Lease and its terms, that the Lease was terminated, that a new lease was entered into with the [...] and that the [...] acquired the Solar Rights when they gained control of the Property.  [Pa233].  These are the facts that form the basis for Appellants’ claims in this action against [...].  Yet, none of these facts are new or recently discovered.  While these facts were known to Appellants prior to the commencement of the Prior Action in 2019, the Appellants did not assert any claims against [...].  Instead, they allowed discovery to conclude after 2½ years and four (4) discovery extensions, before ever seeking to add these claims in the Prior Action.  In the Prior Action, the trial court recognized the prejudice and the Appellants’ inability to justify their failure to assert the claims earlier and denied Appellants leave to amend the First Amended Complaint.  The same prejudice and unfairness that militated against allowing the belated and unjustified attempt to add these claims in the Prior Action – when Appellants were duty-bound to have included them - justifies application of the Entire Controversy Doctrine and dismissal of the Complaint.
[brief] 9 U.S.C.A. § 10(d)….  The power and authority of the arbitrators in an arbitration proceeding is dependent on the provisions of the arbitration agreement under which the arbitrators were appointed.  We think the provision of the arbitration agreement that "any arbitration hereunder shall be before at least three arbitrators" means what it says: any contract-related controversy between [...] and [...] must be arbitrated by no less than three arbitrators....  The going forward of two arbitrators after a third arbitrator was removed from the Panel thus violated the provision of the arbitration agreement that "any arbitration . . . shall be before at least three arbitrators."  [[...], supra, at 931].
[brief] **  The following five misconceptions represent the knowledge and understanding that most jurors and other lay individuals without a scientific background start with—the “preexisting beliefs” people have about forensic science.  So, whenever forensic results and expert opinions are admitted in a trial, courts should be aware that these misconceptions are going to impact how that forensic evidence is interpreted and evaluated.  A.  **People believe that forensic analysis is objective and was created by scientists. **  People who do not have a scientific background tend to be impressed by science and advanced technology.  [...], [...], [...], & [...], *Trust and Mistrust in Americans’ Views of Scientific Experts*, [...] (2019).  Most ordinary people lack the knowledge and skills needed to evaluate the quality of forensic methods and results.  Scientific information and information from someone labelled as a “forensic expert” appears very compelling to lay individuals (i.e., knowing this person was deemed an “expert” by the court or has an advanced degree leads to a presumption that they are accurate), and most people will rely on their assessment of these superficial elements rather than a careful evaluation of the content of the forensic analyst’s testimony to judge the quality of the information provided.  [...] & [...], Reasoning about Forensic Science Evidence, in Legal Reasoning and Cognitive Science: Topics and Perspectives 439 ([...] & [...] eds., 2023).  However, just because something is labeled as a “science” and is presented by an “expert” does not mean it is objective, reliable, or accurate—that type of evaluation requires a more rigorous look at the examiner’s proficiency, the information that was made available to the forensic scientist, and the methods and tools used in that particular case.
[brief] The consent order in O'Loughlin provided that "[i]f the plaintiffs file another complaint (the "New Action"), exactly the same as the First Complaint, within 15 days of the signing of this Order, then the defendants will waive any additional defenses of Statute of Limitations and Laches solely to the extent they could have been raised as defenses to the New Action."  *Id.* at 600.  Importantly, nothing in the consent order analyzed in *O'Loughlin*, like in the case here, stated that any claims filed beyond the 15 day deadline would be barred.  *Ibid.*  Thus, when the plaintiff in *O'Loughlin* filed a new complaint well after the 15 day deadline, this Court noted that "[t]he judge did not prevent plaintiffs from filing a new complaint."  *Id.*  at 601.  Rather, this Court held that "[i]t is elementary that a dismissal without prejudice adjudicates nothing and does not constitute a bar to re-institution of the action, subject to the constraint imposed by the statute of limitations.  *Id.* at 603 (*emphasis added*).  Stated differently, this Court concluded that the consent order in *O'Loughlin* was enforceable, in that it established deadlines where a party could re-file claims under the benefit of a tolling agreement, but that any claims filed after that deadline *could* be filed, but without the benefit of the agreed-upon tolling.  *O'Loughlin* conclusively demonstrates that the Trial Court below erred, when it found that the Consent Order would "have no meaning" if it were interpreted to apply only to the tolling of the statutes of limitations and repose.  Indeed, this Court, in *O'Loughlin*, clearly found "meaning" in a consent order that is nearly identical to that at issue here.
[brief] REQUIRING OPRA  REQUESTORS TO IDENTIFY THE DOCUMENTS  THEY ARE SEEKING WITH REASONABLE CLARITY AND PROHIBITING REQUESTS FOR ALL OF AN AGENCY’S RECORDS.  (Da45; Da56)  | 10 | | POINT II: REQUIRING PUBLIC ENTITIES TO RESPOND TO BROAD REQUESTS FOR ANY AND ALL RECORDS ON FILE WOULD WREAK HAVOC ON AGENCY OPERATIONS.  (Da45; Da56)  | 19 | | CONCLUSION | 28 | TABLE OF ORDERS AND RULINGS BEING APPEALED
[brief] In light of [...]’s testimony that [...] appeared nervous and was resting his injured hand on his chest in an unnatural way, the judge concluded that [...] had reasonable suspicion to believe that [...] was carrying a gun inside the fanny pack.  Thus, the court found [...]’s removal from the car and the frisk of his bag was appropriate, and the seizure of the gun and drugs from the fanny pack was lawful.  (1T 70-1 to 81-3)  [...] filed a motion for reconsideration, arguing that the State’s failure to turn over [...]’s supplemental report was a discovery violation.  In light of that violation, [...] argued that the judge should not have relied on [...]’s claims that the C.I. had provided reliable information to [...] in the past or that the C.I. told [...] that the male in the Kia was carrying a fanny pack with a gun, because those claims were not documented in any of the police reports turned over in discovery.
[directive] Effective June 9, 2004 - N.J.S.A. 39:3-29 & 39:3-29.1a - Warrant of Impoundment  If any law enforcement officer does not understand these statutory requirements, or has any questions concerning the implementation of these laws or these Guidelines, those questions must be directed through the appropriate chain of command in the law enforcement agency to the Municipal Prosecutor or the Office of the County Prosecutor.  Under no circumstances are law enforcement officers to call or contact this Division or the Attorney General for advice regarding these Guidelines.
[brief] ”); *In re Resol. Of State Comm’n of Investigation*, 108 N.J. 35, 46 (1987) (dismissing cause of action seeking a judgment declaring a party violated a statute because plaintiffs did not have a private right of action under the statute); *Ass’n of N.J. Chiropractors, Inc. v. Horizon Healthcare Servs., Inc.*, 2013 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2677 (Sup. Ct. App. Div. Nov. 4, 2013)7 (“plaintiffs 5
[brief] This matter arises out of a dispute over property rights and the imposition of deed restrictions.  Plaintiffs’ challenge below was premised on two arguments.  First, Plaintiffs established that the Genesis Deed contained no height restriction and second, [...] had no authority to change, alter, or amend the existing building restrictions.  The trial judge agreed, and as a matter of judicial restraint, limited his ruling to Plaintiffs’ premises alone.  The Judge, therefore, saw no need to rule on Plaintiffs’ broader second argument which challenged the validity of construction rules based upon lack of uniform and reciprocal application as well as self-dealing.  We submit on appeal that in the unlikely event this Court reverses the court’s ruling below, the matter would then have to be remanded for consideration of Plaintiffs’ second point of abandonment.  After Summary Judgment was granted on August 17th, 2023, Plaintiffs were granted township permits to construct.  [...] only challenges Plaintiffs’ construction based upon the height which, as planned, is lower than the 35’ feet permitted by Township ordinance.  (Db 22-24)  Plaintiffs established below that the 1947 Genesis Deed does not confer any power to [...] to change, alter, or amend the building restrictions.  [...] did not even exist in 1947 when the Genesis Deed was conveyed.  Plaintiffs’ Genesis Deed requires, however, the owner to abide the rules of the “[...]”.  The trial court did not disturb the application of general club rules.  Plaintiffs do not claim to be “above” the application of the general club rules; however, from a legal standpoint, they cannot be held to obey rules which were not contemplated at the conveyance of the deed.  The gravamen of Defendant’s argument is that the Genesis Deed developer intended for the beach association to have unbridled control over building restrictions affecting the entire community, essentially acting as a quasi-zoning board.
[directive] The statute only requires that the statement be provided to that person, and that the person acknowledge receipt of the statement.  If the person refuses to acknowledge receipt, then the law enforcement officer is to record the refusal to acknowledge receipt.  Once those requirements have been fulfilled, the defendant should be allowed to leave with the summoned person.  However, if the summoned person refuses to appropriately identify himself or herself to the law enforcement officer, then the defendant should not to be permitted to leave with the summoned person.
[brief] In an annulment, the facts which justify a declaration of the court of nullity antecede the marriage.  The grounds for annulment typically relate to conditions existing at the time of the marriage, not issues that arise during the marriage as in an action for divorce.  The petitioner bears the burden of proof for either claim.  Patel v. Navitlal, 265 N.J. Super. 402, 407–08 (Ch. Div. 1992).  An annulment should be granted under several circumstances (N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:34-1), including but not limited to, - Lack of consent or mental capacity --