[brief] 472 N.J. Super. at 215-217.  Although not mentioned by the Court in Lavrik, the Appellate Division’s holding that the plea is neither a judgment of conviction nor an adjudication and being non-evidentiary in a civil proceeding is also consistent with N.J. Rule of Evidence 410(a), which bar statements made during a guilty plea, if a guilty plea is later withdrawn, from being admitted in a civil case.  If defendant [...] is successfully discharged from PTI, then it will have the same effect as a successfully withdrawn guilty plea as set forth in N.J. Rule of Evidence 410(a).  A Plaintiff’s ability to admit a criminal plea and the associated factual allocution should not be conditioned upon the timing of civil litigation predating the completion date of the defendant’s term of pre-trial intervention.  To do so would create a loophole to the rule that the guilty plea is neither a conviction, an adjudication and deemed non-evidential while the guilty plea is inactive.  The trial court’s decision clearly violated the Appellate Division’s holding set forth in Lavrik that the guilty plea is inactive and not considered a conviction or an adjudication and non-evidential while the plea remains inactive.  To permit such questioning regarding his criminal plea and factual allocution could have dire consequences for defendant [...].  He already had his insurance coverage disclaimed once and later reinstated under reservation of rights.  Coverage was only reinstated after [...]’s then-counsel was able to convince his liability insurers that the statements made during the plea allocution were inadmissible unless he violates PTI and ultimately gets convicted under Lavrik, supra.  Permitting plaintiffs’ counsel to question him about his criminal plea and related allocution could likely lead to loss of insurance coverage again.  The carriers previously revoked coverage and it was only reinstated under a reservation of rights after personal counsel convinced the carriers that [...]’s guilty plea and factual basis were inadmissible or non-evidential pursuant to the court’s holding in Lavrik.  [2T12-5 to 2T13-6]  Furthermore, plaintiff’s counsel opined that defendant [...] may have violated his PTI terms [1T10-13 to 14], and questioning him about this plea allocution further raises Fifth Amendment concerns.  The Court further based its decision on the broadness of discovery under R. 4:10-2, which provides no objection can be made on admissibility if the discovery sought is reasonably calculated to lead to admissible discovery.  [2T14-6 to 2T15-15]  The Court based its rationale on the belief that the defendant had to complete PTI and obtain a dismissal of the charges held in abeyance before the guilty plea and factual basis are deemed inadmissible or non-evidential.  However, it is clear from Lavrik that until defendant [...] is prematurely discharged from PTI, his guilty plea and criminal plea factual allocution are in “inactive status” and remains inadmissible or non-evidential in any civil proceeding.  472 N.J. Super. at 215-217.  Defendant [...] has not been prematurely discharged from PTI.  Therefore, the guilty plea and factual allocution remain inadmissible.  If the guilty plea and plea allocution are inadmissible, then the plaintiff and/or the Court must demonstrate that the questioning is likely to lead to admissible information as required by Rule 4:10-2.  There was no proffer by the plaintiff or the Court as to how this information was likely to lead to admissible evidence at the time of trial.  All plaintiff could point to was inconsistent testimony but that hinges on the statements made at the guilty plea being admissible.  CONCLUSION