ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] See, e.g., Heidbreder 438 F. Supp. 3d at 596–597 (father was bound to arbitration agreement with video game company that his minor son purportedly agreed to while using father’s account with father’s permission); Chung v. StudentCity.Com, Inc., No. 10-10943, 2013 WL 504757, at *4 & n.8 (D. Mass. Feb. 12, 2013) (minor daughter acted as agent for parents and within the scope of her authority with the ability to “assent on their behalf” to agreement containing an arbitration provision); Wolfire Games, LLC v. Valve Corp., No. C21-0563, 2021 WL 4952220, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 25, 2021) (enforcing arbitration agreement against parents: “under an agency theory, [parents] effectively appointed their children as their agents when they purchased games on their parents’ behalf using the parents’ credit card information and their own Steam accounts”); Third Restatement of Agency § 3.05, cmt. B, illus.  1.  What’s more, even if the infancy defense could apply to a situation like this, it does not apply here for the additional reason that an exception to the infancy defense exists “if the minor, when entering the contract, misrepresented that he or she was an adult. ”  Matullo, 472 N.J. Super at 227.  If Plaintiffs’ daugh- ______________________ and agree” button to complete the transaction, then later claim (when convenient) that the contract is unenforceable as to the parent.  ter signed the contract with [...] for [...], she did so by checking a box certifying “I am at least 18 years of age. ”  (Da77.)  Regardless of whether [...] agreed to the December Terms herself—or whether her daughter agreed to those Terms for her mother’s benefit, on her mother’s behalf, and using her mother’s [...] account with her mother’s permission—the December Terms are enforceable against [...].
[brief] Ibid.  [...] not only sought withdrawal of [...]’s determination, but also requested an evidentiary hearing if the Commission believed any material facts were in dispute.  (Aa24).  On April 18, 2023, the Commission acknowledged receipt of [...]’s appeal, which it held in abeyance pending confirmation of whether [...] had pursued disciplinary action against [...] (Ra1).  On May 8, 2023, the Commission confirmed that [...] had not sought disciplinary action and the appeal could proceed.
[brief] (1T1:1-57:19).  Petitioner’s counsel then asked [...], “You would agree with me also that on a keyboard, a nine is next to a zero, is it not?  (2T38:2-3).  [...] again agreed with counsel’s statement.  (2T38:4).  Ultimately, Petitioner’s counsel asked, “so would you agree with me that, it’s more likely than not that this is a typographical error and this actual 2009 reference is really for the year 2009 incident?” (2T39:11- [...] again agreed, but clarified his agreement was “based upon that there was no formal worker’s comp issue on the court’s online. ”  (2T39:15-17).  [...] determined that Petitioner was permanently and totally disabled, but noted he “had some degenerative changes, he had some arthritic changes” that “were not caused by the accident” but “[p]redated the accident.
[brief] He invalidates his case since he chose **NOT** to refute, let alone even address, any of my facts and arguments in my prior Brief based on my Certification for my Motion for Reconsideration that refuted the Judge’s Rider claims & rulings.  He destroys his credibility by falsely/wrongly stating that I “moved for reconsideration of the [Oct. 6, 2022] Judgement repeating the same facts and arguments in his exceptions.  162a-226a”.
[brief] Indeed, the argument is devoid of any historical support whatsoever.  *See* Blackstone, --- \(^4\)  As for the State’s state-law privacy arguments, as discussed, parents’ federal parental rights trump any state-law privacy rights their children may have.  *Montgomery*, 577 U.S. at 205.  Commentaries on the Laws of England at 440–41 (recognizing the obligation of children to parental “subjection and obedience”); Kent, 2 Commentaries on American Law at 207 (providing that children’s duties to their parents include “obedience”); Hodgson, 497 U.S. at 483 (noting that, under the common law, parents had the right, “not merely to be notified of their children’s actions, but to speak and act on their behalf”) ([...], concurring in part and dissenting in part).  Below, the State cited Sterling v. Borough of Minersville in support of its position, State’s Br. at ACa76, but Sterling did not involve a minor.  Instead, Sterling involved an eighteen-year-old.  232 F.3d 190, 192 (3d Cir. 2000).  Even if adults had a privacy right to keep the state’s social transitioning of them secret (and the United States Supreme Court has never held that they do), that holding would not extend to minors.
[brief] The Court in *Leodori* quoting from *Williston on Contracts* stated, "When one party, however, presents a contract for signature to another party, the omission of that other party's signature is a significant factor in determining whether the two parties mutually have reached an agreement.  Cf. 1 [...], *Williston on Contracts* §2:3 (4th ed.1990)..."  *Leodori v. Cigna Corp.*  175 N.J. 293 (N.J. 2003)  What occurred here is simple to understand.
[brief] \(^4\)  [...] seeks to reword the exception to require proof that its plain language does not require and that cannot be added by implication.  *Cypress Point*, *supra*.  The Trial Court’s decision to reword the exception is reversible, legal error.  \(^4\)  LCS, Inc. v. Lexington Ins. Co., 371 N.J.Super. 482, 497 (App. Div. 2004).  See also IMO Indus., Inc. v. Transamerica Corp., 437 N.J.Super 577, 625 (App. Div. 2014 (citing Owens-Illinois v. United Ins. Co., 138 N.J. 437, 477 (1994) for the proposition that “where the insurers… refused to involve themselves in the defense of the claims as presented, they should be bound by the facts set forth in the insureds’ records…. and there can be no relitigation of those settled claims. ”) (Owens-Illinois, 138 N.J. at 477; emphasis added).  III.
[brief] However, as the parties finalized their discussions, [...] additionally discovered that the roof over his units, an association common element, was leaking (Da155, [...] Cert., ¶9).  When he advised [...] of the leaks, he was instructed not to attempt to repair them at his own expense.  Id. at ¶10.  However, [...] also refused to provide [...] with any assurance that it would, in fact, perform a repair.  Id. at ¶11.  This new issue caused a breakdown in the parties’ settlement discussions, and [...] rejected tender\(^1\) of a payment made by [...]’s attorney under the settlement agreement.  Ibid.  About three months later, [...] filed a lawsuit to collect the full amount of unpaid dues, late charges, and legal fees shown on [...]’s association account statement (Da8, Complaint).  Due to an error by [...]’s process server, [...] never effectuated personal service upon [...] (Da156, Second [...] Cert., ¶¶17-19).  Instead, [...] obtained jurisdiction over [...] by way of substituted mail service to the vacant condominium units he owned in the association.  The uncontested case proceeded to final judgment by default (Da4, March 18, 2022 Order Entering Judgment).  As a result, [...] was deprived of his --- \(^1\) [...] acknowledges that the tender was delivered after a deadline established by [...], and does not dispute that [...] was within its rights to reject payment. ability to contest the accounting that [...] presented to the court in support of the judgment.  [...] was further unable to assert his own claims, relating to the water damage that had rendered his condominium units untenantable.
[brief] Unlike cases in which a trial judge or court attempts to reconstruct post-facto, in the instant case, the attempt to do so while the hearing was in-flight destroyed the continuity and fairness of the process.  It is a lawyer’s dream to know the exact questions that will be asked on cross-examination of a witness months before they are to conduct the direct examination of the same witness.  As previously stated, the Resolution is not supported by the record.  The motion judge determined that Counsel for Appellants were to blame for that failure.  (Pa837)  The motion judge suggested that Counsel for Appellants squandered their “opportunity” to put matters on the record.  However, none of these determinations explain why the Resolution references both facts and law not found in the record.  There is nothing that Counsel for Appellants could do to prevent any member of the [...] from relying on what transpired but was not recorded at the May meeting.  This fact makes it impossible for the Superior Court to review the Resolution.
[brief] ........................................................................................................................................ 22, 23, 29 Genon Rema, LLC v. South Amboy Redevelopment Agency, Docket No. MID-L-390-13, 2015 WL 10986475 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. May 18, 2015)  .................................................................................................................................. 26, 27 Giannone v. Carlin, 20 N.J. 511 (1956) ..................................................................................  42 Gillette Enters. v. Borough of Sayreville, No. A-5838-10T1, 2012 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1181 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. May 29, 2012)
[brief] Both projects were considered “upgrades” to [...]’s natural gas pipeline “system. ” (Aa78).  On February 11, 2010, DEP found that [...]’s project to add approximately 350,000 dekatherms per day of natural gas capacity by constructing 10.94 miles of 30-inch diameter gas pipeline adjacent to [...]’s existing 24-inch pipeline and other above-ground appurtenances was exempt.  (Aa224-237).  DEP’s April 25, 2012 HAD exempted [...]’s proposal to construct another 7.6 mile segment of 30-inch diameter gas pipeline on the 300 Line with above-ground appurtenances that added 636,000 dekatherms per day of [...]’s capacity and impacted over 100 acres of land.  (Aa279; Aa290-300).  To deliver additional natural gas to its customers, [...] now proposes to add new compressor units at two existing compressor stations along the 300 Line in New Jersey and Pennsylvania and construct a new natural gas compression station, identified as “CS 327,” in [...].  (Aa53-54).
[brief] BECAUSE THERE ARE NO MATERIAL FACTS IN DISPUTE AND THE LAW IS IN THEIR FAVOR  As this appeal requires a review of a decision on summary judgment, this Court derives the facts from the evidence submitted by the parties in support of, and in opposition to, the summary judgment motion, and which must be viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff as the party who opposed entry of ¹ "Redler Tr." refers to the transcript of the deposition of [...], conducted on October 28, 2022.
[brief] The statutory scheme as a whole would not make sense otherwise.  See DiProspero, 183 N.J. at 492-97.  The Commissioner’s decision therefore not only is reasonable, but beyond reproach.  Appellants’ arguments to the contrary are designed to support the absurd suggestion that [...] must first somehow “demerge” from [...], become its own non-operating district, and elect a local board of education before it may withdraw from [...] or [...].  Any such action would be impossible.  No statute or regulation provides a mechanism to facilitate such a process; there is therefore no way for the Commissioner of Education to review and approve any such action.  Indeed, on its face, Appellants’ position is that none of the municipalities of any previously non-operating school districts could seek to form new or enlarged regional districts without undergoing this pointless conversion process.
[brief] The Planning Board said nothing about the Land Use Element of the Master Plan.  The Borough Council did but did not do anything to explain the reasons for the Ordinance’s inconsistency with the Master Plan’s Land Use Element.  As the Second Planning Board Resolution should be declared invalid by this Court, so too must the Resolution of the Borough Council adopting the Second Ordinance, which was based upon nothing more than the erroneous consistency determined by the Planning Board, be declared invalid.  To conclude otherwise is to eliminate the restrictions that the Master Plan is designed by the Legislature to place on municipal land use decisions and support ad hoc decision-making by a municipal body which is judicially unreviewable.  POINT THREE THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY RUBBER STAMPING THE PLANNING BOARD’S CONSISTENCY DETERMINATION BASED SOLELY ON THE GENERAL OBJECTIVES SET FORTH IN THE MASTER PLAN
[brief] [...] has alleged that because it sold [...] it somehow automatically obtained a license to use [...]’s propriety information.  [...] was simply permitted to use the manufacturer's name, here, [...], to market the products, [...] grills.  Instructional Sys., 130 N.J. at 352 (holding that “not every grant of permission to use a trademark in the sale of goods or services is a “license” within the meaning of the Franchise Act.
[brief] In that case, the Court considered whether “defendant's June 2009 disorderly persons offense was sufficient to ‘bridge the gap’ and admit the 24- and 14-year-old convictions. ”  *Id.* at 369-70.  The Court found that seriousness alone could not outweigh the prejudicial impact of remote convictions that have nothing to do with dishonesty, but they were also considering “convictions sought to be admitted [that] were certainly remote in time, as one conviction was 14 years old, and the others, as the trial court noted, were ‘almost a quarter century old. ’”  *Id.* at 370.  In this case, the trial court considered both the remoteness and the seriousness of defendant’s criminal record, not just the seriousness.  (14T:10-6 to 11-23).  The judge highlighted that she believed there was a “pattern” established by defendant’s history.  (14T:11-19 to 24).  While seriousness was undoubtedly a factor, it was not the only factor the trial court considered.  A crucial difference between this case and Higgs also exists due to the convictions that both sides had agreed would be admissible.
[brief] One Councilperson noted that there were potential impacts to the water supply even though the contamination was not near the wells.  “I take offense to the argument that our wells aren’t close enough to the site to be affected.  Our water pipes are.  Our sewer pipes are.  Our sewer pipes and our water pipes are connected by coupling.  Some of them are over 100 years old.  We know that we have water infiltration into our water and our sewer system. ” (T2, 37:2-8).  Plaintiff did not present any evidence to indicate any sampling was done to confirm that no contaminated groundwater from the Property was entering the Borough’s water and sewer pipes.
[brief] Even if the Court were to accept [...]’s testimony, reject the testimony of all of the other [...] witnesses, and determine that [...] had knowledge that [...] operated his sweeper in an unsafe manner a few days before the accident, [...]’s actions would still not rise anywhere near the level of intentional misfeasance sufficient to satisfy the narrow exception to the immunity provided by the Act, particularly where [...] has admitted that the accident was indisputably his fault.  At worst, accepting only the facts most favorable to Plaintiff, [...] allegedly negligently allowed [...] to continue working on [...] jobs, because his continued operation of sweepers on [...] jobs may have presented some slightly heightened probability of injury to a [...] employee.  That level of culpability and probability of injury is far below the requisite “deliberate intent” and “substantial certainty” to support a claim made on behalf of an employee against his employer for injuries sustained during the course of his employment.
[brief] See 2006 Special Session Joint Legislative Committee, Public Employee Benefits Reform Final Report, (Dec. 1, 2006).4  “Recommendation 10” of the Joint Legislative Committee again urged that all professional services contractors be excluded from PERS membership.  The Committee stated:  [B]oth the Internal Revenue Service and the New Jersey Department of Labor have rules that govern the distinction between an employee and an independent contractor.  The purpose of this recommendation is to ensure that all public employers adhere to these rules.  [Id. at 83.]  4 Report can be found at http:www.htdspace.njstatelib.org/xmlui/bitstream/handle/10929/25028/p4182006zb.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y.  In the years that followed, the Legislature enacted a series of sweeping reforms designed to curb abuses and restore fiscal integrity to the retirement systems.  Specifically, Chapter 92 was enacted in May 2007 to effectuate several recommendations in the Joint Legislative Committee Report.
[brief] [2T P49]  The Appellants failed to meet this threshold burden.  [2T P48-57]  The trial court made this clear, “And so, I’m left with a big question mark.  And with a big question mark, I can’t compel the Respondent to submit her claim to arbitration because I don’t even get to interpret the language within because the—the agreement itself seems not to be a complete agreement.  [2T P49:L9-14]  Arbitration Agreements are generally governed by contract law.  Atalese v. U.S. Legal Services Grp., L.P. 219 N.J. 430 (2014)  “An agreement to arbitrate, like any other contract, must be the product of mutual assent, as determined under customary principals of contract law. ”  Atalese, at P442.  A contract cannot be enforceable unless there is an agreement or a meeting of the minds of the parties.
[directive] The Civilian Review Board’s conflicts-of-interest policy must include, at a minimum, the following stipulations:  (1)  Incident-specific conflicts.  Any Board member or staffer with an incident-specific conflict must immediately recuse from all proceedings related to that matter.  (2)  Inherent conflicts.  At least the following categories of persons are considered inherently conflicted and may not serve as a Board member or staffer:  a.  A sworn officer or employee of a law enforcement agency within the Board’s jurisdiction, or any person who has held such a position in the last five years; b.  A sworn officer or employee of any other state, county, or local law enforcement agency; c.  A prosecutor or criminal defense attorney currently practicing in the county within the Board’s jurisdiction; d.  A relative of any of the aforementioned individuals, as defined in the New Jersey Conflicts of Interest Law at N.J.S.A. 52:13D-21.2(2)(d); e.  A current candidate for public office; or f.  With respect to Board membership, a current officer or employee of the municipality.  (3)  Duty to disclose.  Board members and staff have an ongoing duty to affirmatively disclose any conflict of interest that they may reasonably become aware of, whether that conflict is inherent or incident-specific.  (4)  Screening.  If a Board member or staffer has a close personal or business relationship with an interested party or any individual who meets any of the criteria listed under the “inherent conflicts,” the Board member or staff should establish a screen to ensure the non-disclosure of sensitive information involving the Board.  (d)  Criminal History of Board Members and Staff
[brief] II.  THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DENIED PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION TO AMEND THEIR COMPLAINT TO IMPLEAD KIRBY AND ASSERT CLAIMS FOR MALICIOUS PROSECUTION AND LIBEL PER SE  In their cross appeal, Plaintiffs allege that the trial court incorrectly denied their motion to amend their complaint to implead [...] and assert claims for malicious prosecution and libel per se.  As Plaintiffs acknowledge (Pb22), the trial court’s decision is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard.
[brief] **THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE SIXTEENTH COUNT THROUGH THE NINETEENTH COUNT OF PLAINTIFFS’ COMPLAINT FOR LEGAL MALPRACTICE AGAINST THE MARSHALL DEFENDANTS (184a -185a)**  The Sixteenth Count through the Nineteenth Count of Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint allege legal malpractice against the [...].  Said legal malpractice Counts arise solely from the [...]’ fraudulent concealment of the newly discovered evidence and newly discovered claim in the 2015 Action that [...] was Sole Member of [...] and controlled and operated [...] as a sham entity.  None of these facts nor claims were alleged in the complaint that was dismissed against [...] in the 2015 Action, as said facts were discovered in the course of the 2015 Action following said dismissal.  The Trial Court’s sole basis for dismissing said Counts was stated as follows:  [N]o duty is owed to opposing parties in litigation.  See Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers, § 51, cmt. b (1998).  Moreover, Plaintiffs point to no case law or other legal authority explicitly extending the imposition of a duty to non-clients to the litigation setting.  The Court agrees with the Defendants that the extension of such a duty would chill the adversarial process and is not warranted here.  As a result, the claims for legal malpractice and negligent supervision fail as a matter of law.  The Trial Court does not explain how claims for legal malpractice arising from an attorney’s fraudulent concealment of evidence would “chill the adversarial process. ”  The Trial Court’s simplistic, unnuanced, and curt analysis seems to strain itself in order to achieve a desired outcome, but it comes woefully short of making any sense in fact, law, or reason.  The Trial Court’s holding is deeply disconcerting, as it necessarily implies that fraudulent concealment is an acceptable tool for attorneys in the adversarial process.  The Trial Court’s erroneous holding necessarily implies that attorneys may lie, cheat, forge, and conceal in litigation simply because they owe no duty to opposing parties.  The Trial Court acknowledges the decision of the Supreme Court of New Jersey in Petrillo v. Bachenberg, 139 N.J. 472 (1995).  However, the Trial Court erroneously holds that Petrillo does not extend to the litigation setting.
[brief] (9T 24-3 to 28-25)  Although the issue was not relevant at sentencing, insofar as the court’s reasoning may be cited by the State as justifying the failure to issue the instruction at trial, the court’s retrospective attempt to justify its failure to issue the instruction is unavailing.  The court relied on its own view of the pictures of the scene to conclude that the argument that [...] bought poison was “not sensible” and that the meat “had not been touched. ”  (9T 28-1 to 22)  But the trial court misapprehended the appropriate standard.
[directive] Approval and Documentation of Cooperation Agreements  All Downward Departures authorized pursuant to this Section must be approved by a supervisor who is authorized in writing by the county prosecutor or Director of the Division of Criminal Justice to approve such departures.  The county prosecutor and Director are authorized to designate one or more persons with sufficient experience and expertise to approve these departures.  A cooperation agreement pursuant to these Guidelines must include the requirement that the person fully cooperate in disclosing all criminal activities known to the person, and by turning over or assisting in obtaining any records that corroborate criminal activities.  In State v. Gerns, 145 N.J. 216 (1996), the Court held that it is neither arbitrary nor capricious for a prosecutor to base the decision to recommend a waiver of a mandatory sentence under the Comprehensive Drug Reform Act on the value of the cooperation received from a defendant.
[brief] On --- 2  There are five (5) volumes of transcripts, one from each of the four (4) hearings before the Defendant Zoning Board, and the Trial Court’s Oral Decision.  The transcripts shall be designated as follows:  1T: February 7, 2022 (Hearing Night One)  2T: March 7, 2022 (Hearing Night Two)  3T: April 4, 2022 (Hearing Night Three)  4T: May 31, 2022 (Hearing Night Four)  5T: October 27, 2023 (Trial Court’s Oral Decision)  the fourth night, the Defendant voted 6-1 to deny the application.