ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] Court recently-revised detailed, more generally are and discretion, enforcement/prosecutorial law of exercise the The Rules. Court and statute the in forth set presumptions than the precise and comprehensive, 13 Page see officers, judicial other and judges bind way in no Directive this in established presumptions police that positions the in uniformity and consistency promote to used rather are 24, but note officers. judicial and judges those to matters presenting when take prosecutors and this in employed presumptions rebuttable of framework the that emphasis bears also It presumption is A eliminate it. not discretion, enforcement law channel to designed is Directive of that outcome the dictate necessarily not does but analysis, case-specific for point starting the officer, supervisory designated a instances certain in or prosecutor, a requires Rather, it analysis. a from diverge to made determination is if the reasons specific document and articulate to outcome. presumptive supervisory designated or prosecutor a restricts Directive in this nothing Furthermore, not do that including those circumstance, or fact relevant any considering from officer for a apply whether to determining in example, For presumption. trigger a automatically of adjudications juvenile defendant's a detention, pretrial seek to or complaint-warrant considered, be may ago 10 years than more occurred that offenses non-violent for delinquency complaint- applying fora of presumption trigger a not would adjudications those though even under detention pretrial for moving of presumption or a 4.5.7, subsection under warrant considered be may violations probation prior defendant's a example, for too, So 7.4.3. subsection court obey to inability or unwillingness or authority judicial for disrespect of indication an as otherwise are not presumption and a invoke not violations do such that notwithstanding orders, not relevant, be would facts historical of types
[brief] As for [...]’s second motion for summary judgment, the time spent on this matter is all itemized in the billing entries.  Plaintiffs’ attempt to compare the first and second motions for summary judgment should be rejected.  [...] did not have to address Plaintiffs’ “need for consent” argument in the first summary judgment motion, which instead focused on Plaintiffs’ failure to obtain an Affidavit of Merit.  The motions were different and further, [...] unfortunately was not awarded fees relating to filing the first summary judgment motion since it was filed before the safe harbor letter was sent to Plaintiffs.  [...] produced all of the itemized invoices for billing associated with the defense of this frivolous lawsuit in its fee certification and stands by the time spent in defense of these baseless claims.
[brief] (6T8-14 to 11-16).  Almost immediately after those funds were deposited into [...]’s account—an account that had a negative balance prior to those deposits— defendant used the funds to pay a number of personal expenses that were not related to [...], including the mortgage on an apartment, car payments, and outstanding debts for the failed [...].  (4T236-15 to 248-25; 4T238-1 to 8; 4T242-24 to 243-2; 4T250-16 to 251-25; 4T253-9 to 254-21; 4T).  Little, if any, of the funds were used for expenses related to the [...] franchise.
[brief] TABLE OF CONTENTS | TABLE OF CONTENTS | Page | |-------------------|------| | TABLE OF CONTENTS | 2 | | TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS | 3 | | PRELIMINARY STATEMENT | 4 | | PROCEDURAL HISTORY | 6 | | STATEMENT OF FACTS | 6 | | LEGAL ARGUMENT | 7 | POINT I THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN APPLYING THE ARBITRARY, CAPRICIOUS, OR UNREASONABLE STANDARD OF REVIEW, RATHER THAN ONE OF ORDINANCE INTERPRETATION AS A MATTER OF LAW.  (SEE APPENDIX – OPINION P15-16)  ...............  7  POINT II  THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT PROPERLY INTERPRET THE WORD “DESIGN” IN THE CONTEXT OF “DESIGNED TO ALLOW” IN THE BOROUGH OF RUMSON BUILDING HEIGHT ORDINANCE UNDER A STRICTLY DE NOVO STANDARD OF REVIEW (SEE APPENDIX – OPINION Pa14-15) ……… 8 POINT III THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO CONSIDER WHETHER THE REVISED LOT GRADE WAS THE RESULT OF “MOUNDING, TERRACING, OR OTHER DEVICES” DESIGNED TO ALLOW INCREASED BUILDING HEIGHT (SEE APPENDIX – OPINION Pa15-16) ……………………………………………………………………………… 13 POINT IV THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADOPTING THE BOARD’S FACTUAL FINDINGS OF THE BOROUGH OF RUMSON’S BUILDING HEIGHT ORDINANCE UNDER THE ARBITRARY, CAPRICIOUS, OR UNREASONABLE STANDARD OF REVIEW (SEE APPENDIX – OPINION Pa11-12) …………………………………………..16 CONCLUSION ………………………………………………………………………….. 18 TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS
[brief] (2T 24-6 to 24)  Notably, neither [...] nor [...] is wearing black: [...] is clearly wearing a green coat and not all black, while [...]’s body-worn camera shows [...] wearing a navy coat and blue jeans.  (2T 40-23 to 41-12; Da 9 at 0:09 to 0:15, Da 10 at 2:07-2:13)  After hearing testimony from [...] and [...], the court found that the testifying officers were credible but that [...] was “somewhat . . . confused.
[brief] (PPCIa380-PPCIa502).  The trial court then recited the factual and procedural history of the matter and stated, “After [...] filed their answer in this matter, [...] did nothing.  [...] then filed its summary judgment motion on January 6, 2023, and [...] did nothing.  [...] did say that they intended to do things, however, [...] never served any discovery requests and never made any motions to extend discovery.
[brief] (17T 22-14 to 42-14)  The trial court sentenced [...] to life in prison, subject to an 85% period of parole ineligibility.  (17T 40-2 to 3)  In doing so, the court inappropriately considered arrests that did not lead to convictions and failed to account for [...] advanced age at release when considering the appropriate aggregate sentence.  The resultant sentence is excessive for [...], who was 50 years old at the time of sentencing.  When imposing a sentence, a court must consider the applicability of the aggravating and mitigating factors set forth in N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1 to determine the length of a defendant’s prison term within the available range.
[brief] “In order to be considered a communication, the only requirement of the information that is to be conveyed is that it must be regarding a debt.  We can assume that by choosing to omit any qualifier other than requiring that the call must be regarding a debt, Congress meant to allow *any* information, as long as it regards a debt. ”  *Hart v. Credit Control, LLC*, 871 F.3d 1255, 1258 (11th Cir. 2017).  Thus, when federal courts considered whether a debt collector’s voicemail message is a “communication” (and thereby triggers the obligations to make the disclosures required under 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(11)), it did not matter that the message never mentioned anything about a debt or that the caller was attempting to collect a debt.  *See, e.g.*, *Hosseinzadeh v. M.R.S. Assocs.*, 387 F. Supp. 2d 1104, 1116 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (voice message is a “communication” notwithstanding that “the messages may not technically mention specific information about a debt or the nature of the call”); *Foti v. NCO Fin. Sys.*, 424 F. Supp. 2d 643, 655 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (“Defendant’s voicemail message, while devoid of any specific information about any particular debt, clearly provided some information, even if indirectly, to the intended recipient of the message” and, therefore, is a “communication”).
[brief] For all of the reasons set forth above, this Court should affirm the trial court’s grant of summary judgment.  Respectfully submitted, [...]  Attorneys for Defendant- Respondent [...]  By /s/ [...]  CHRISTOPHER R. PALDINO  Dated: July 29, 2024 ESTATE OF [...], deceased, by [...] as Executrix of the Estate; and [...], Individually, Plaintiffs, v. [...]; [...]; [...]; [...]; [...]; [...]; [...]; [...]; [...]; [...], and [...], Defendants.
[brief] ”  *N.J.S.A. 2C:3-4c(1)* (emphasis added).  Further, the statute states that a “reasonable belief exists” if the actor was in his or her own dwelling and the encounter was “sudden and unexpected, compelling the actor to act instantly,” *N.J.S.A. 2C:3-4c(2)*, and that the actor must have “reasonably believed that the intruder would inflict personal injury” upon someone in the dwelling.
[brief] Defendant makes the same arguments that it made below, while adding new caselaw citations. \(^1\)  It argues essentially that the arbitrator personally was so critical to the arbitration that because of his demise the liability holding made before his death should be jettisoned and the entire matter should be litigated anew after ten years have passed.  The general theory amounts to finding that the arbitrator was more critical to the parties than the arbitration of disputes itself.  The Trial Court below rejected this argument, holding specifically that the arbitrator ([...]) was not as important as the agreement itself, which was a finding of fact based on the parties’ intentions, which it \(^1\)  It should be noted that Appellant cites the eight cases cited below and twelve additional cases not cited below, all of which were decided between 1941 and 2018 – well before and thus available to be cited before the Trial Court decision in this matter found to be clear and unmistakable and that there was no evidence to indicate that the only person who could arbitrate this dispute was [...].  The Court also rejected the Defendants’ argument that it lacked authority to appoint a substitute arbitrator in this case based on the same caselaw that relied on facts that showed the arbitration itself was the critical component of the agreement, within which the arbitration clause was included.  Here, the Court Ordered mediation which resulted in a settlement agreement that provided that if the settlement agreement was breached it would be sent to binding arbitration on liability and damages, whereas Defendants’ relied-upon cases were based on facts where the parties had signed an agreement to arbitrate and had chosen the arbitrator long before any dispute arose.  In Marine Prods. Exp. Corp. v M.T. Globe Galaxy, 977 F2d 66 (2d Cir. 1992), citing Trade & Transport, Inc. v. Natural Petroleum Charterers, Inc., 931 F2d 191 (2d Cir. 1991) cited by the Trial Court, the facts were that the original three-person panel decided liability and before damages were assessed, a panel member died.
[brief] On November 1, 2019, Mr. [...]\(^1\) called the police to help him resolve a dispute at a restaurant where he was eating with his family.  Two police officers, [...] and [...], responded to the restaurant, and a physical altercation occurred between [...] and the officers.  [...]’s wife, Mrs. [...],\(^2\) testified that [...] approached [...] from behind and grabbed his arm as [...] was talking to [...].  [...] testified that while the two officers pushed [...] out the front door of the restaurant, [...] put his arms up in a self-defensive motion.  Outside the restaurant, the two officers immediately attempted to take [...] down, and [...] testified that she watched [...] attempt to defend himself.  It was undisputed that during the struggle, [...] punched [...] in the eye, fracturing his orbital bone.  The incident resulted in [...] suffering a minor fracture in his wrist, and [...] experiencing some unexplained neck pain, as well as injuring his finger as a result of punching [...].  The jury convicted [...] of aggravated assault on a law enforcement officer ([...]) and of attempted aggravated assault on a law enforcement officer ([...]).  The jury acquitted [...] of resisting arrest.  Given the \(^1\) Hereinafter referred to as [...] \(^2\) Hereinafter referred to as [...].  unclear nature of the video footage shown at trial, practically the entire case turned on the jury’s assessment of the testimony of [...] and the two officers.  Against this backdrop, the trial court committed several errors that undermined the jury’s ability to fairly evaluate the evidence.  First, the court erroneously permitted both officers to testify that they had arrested [...] for aggravated assault on a police officer.  Moreover, the court failed to instruct the jury on self-defense, as well as on causation, where the evidence presented at trial clearly required the jury to be instructed on both.  Because these errors, individually and cumulatively, could have impacted the jury’s verdict, [...] was denied a fair trial and his convictions must be reversed.
[brief] For example, unlike [...]’s motion, my motion was properly addressed to the defendant at its full mailing address, and it was served properly and successfully at that mailing address.  However, I had incorrectly used the “Law Division style” for my notice of motion, therein specifying a return date, and not including the language required by R. 6:3-3(c).  On appeal, this Court found no error with the rejection of my “non-conforming motion”.  (D’Agostino v. Drazin & Warshaw, 2013 WL 4859575).  Moreover, in Eastampton Center, LLC v. Planning Board of Eastampton, 354 NJ Super. 171 (App.Div. 2002) (the only published opinion I could find on this issue), a non-conforming motion to reconsider was filed, which the trial court had denied with prejudice.
[brief] *6  Notwithstanding plaintiffs’ statistics regarding alleged “production irregularities,” or the length of time it has taken defendants to produce responsive ESI documents, the Court finds that the parties’ conjectures about each other’s motives and actions (e.g., plaintiffs are attempting to obtain attorney-client information through the Rule 30(b)(6) deposition, or defendants are actively engaged in spoliation of evidence and deliberate delay) are little more than speculation and unwarranted finger pointing.  The Court notes that defendants have represented to the Court that they have not declined to produce a Rule 30(b)(6) witness and, indeed, on June 15, 2021, they agreed to produce a Rule 30(b)(6) deponent.  ([...] Decl. Ex. 8).  The Court determines that the six issues on which plaintiffs seek to depose defendants’ Rule 30(b)(6) witness(es) are subsumed in the topics and issues presented in the Depo Notice and, therefore, the fact that they were not specifically brought up during the meet and confer process is not fatal to this Motion.
[brief] Aside from the “take-it-or-leave-it” nature present in [...]’s Terms and Conditions, including the Arbitration Agreement, Courts must also look at “the subject matter of the contract, the parties’ relative bargaining positions, the degree of economic compulsion motivating the ‘adhering’ party, and the public interests affected by the contract. ”  Rudbart, 127 N.J. at 356.  “Factors relevant to unconscionability include the characteristics of the party presented with a contract of adhesion, ‘such as age, literacy, lack of sophistication, hidden or unduly complex contract terms, bargaining tactics, and the particular setting existing during the contract formation process. ’”  Moore v. Woman to Woman Obstetrics& Gynecology, LLC, 416 N.J. Super. 30, 39 (App. Div. 2010)(citing Sitogum Holdings, Inc. v. Ropes, 352 N.J. Super. 555, 564 (Ch. Div. 2002)) (emphasis added).  In reviewing procedural unconscionability regarding [...] and the Appellants, [...] does not read, speak, or understand English and has a lack of sophistication about what rights she was giving up.  Pa431.  [...] also had no bargaining power regarding the contract.  Last, the circumstances surrounding the contract is against public interest, especially in New Jersey, where one-third of the population does not speak English.
[brief] (Ra0009)  The injured party brought suit against both [...] and the individual franchisee.  Despite Plaintiff’s assertion that [...] had apparent authority over the franchisee, the Court determined that there was no evidence that Plaintiff relied in any way on the fact that the independently-owned store was a [...] franchise.  Plaintiff made this point clear in the following deposition testimony:  Q.  Now, why did you go to the [...] store?  [PLAINTIFF]: To get cigarettes and coffee and something to eat.  Q.  Why did you choose [...]?  [PLAINTIFF]:  It was the closest store around from my sister's house.  Because the Court concluded there was simply no evidence to establish the essential element of reliance, without which a claim of apparent authority cannot be sustained as a matter of law, summary judgment was granted to the corporate [...].  *Id.*
[directive] Violence Domestic Incarceration on Mandatory Impact 4.6.1 of assistant an and/or making arrest officer the police the domestic violence, involving In cases or Directive, of 3.2  Section this with in accordance consulted general attorney deputy or prosecutor mandatory the whether shall consider 3. 3.2, subsection pursuant designated to officer supervisory a domestic the exacerbate might acomplaint-warrant of from issuance automatically resulting detention with cooperating the or charge the pursuing from victim a might discourage situation, violence of nature repetitive  Given justice. the of interest the serve not would or otherwise prosecution, may attorney also general deputy or prosecutor assistant officerand/or the offenses, violence domestic if recognition the that in acomplaint-warrant for apply to appropriate whether be would consider it pretrial on while crime new thereafter a commits and complaint-summons by charged is defendant
[brief] POINT II  THE MUNICIPALITY ALWAYS RESERVES THE RIGHT TO DECLINE A DEDICATION AT ANY TIME (Pa645) (final decision declined to address)  The statutory scheme relating to roadways provides that a municipality always retains the authority to release ownership of a roadway even if was dedicated to the public.  As the Appellate Division held within State by Comm'r of Transp. v. Birch, 115 N.J. Super. 457, 463-64 (App. Div. 1971)  Notwithstanding nonacceptance, the power of acceptance remains with the public authorities until such time as they reject or vacate the dedicated land by official municipal legislative action.  Both N.J.S.A. 40:67-19 and 40:67-1 memorializes this unfettered municipal power.  N.J.S.A. 40:67-19.  (Vacation of streets and places dedicated but not accepted; ordinance; notice and hearing) provides:  Whenever there shall have been a dedication of lands as a public street or highway or a public square or public place, and the same has not been accepted or opened by the municipality, and it shall appear to the governing body that the public interest will be better served by releasing those lands or any part thereof from such dedication, the governing body may by ordinance release and extinguish the public right arising from said dedication as to the whole or any part of those lands, and thereupon said lands or the part thereof so released shall be effectually discharged therefrom as though the dedication had not taken place; but only after notice of the intention of the governing body to consider any such ordinance, and a hearing thereon, shall have been given as provided in section 40:49-6 of this title concerning ordinances for the vacation of streets.  N.J.S.A. 40:67-1.  (Municipal ordinances) similarly provides:  "The governing body of every municipality may make, amend, repeal and enforce ordinances to......  b.  Establish, change the grade of or vacate any public street, highway, lane or alley, or any part thereof, including the vacation of any portion of any public street.......; vacate any street, highway, lane, alley, square, place or park, or any part thereof, dedicated to public use but not accepted by the municipality, whether or not the same, or any part, has been actually opened or improved....."  The statutory scheme always leaves the power of acceptance or vacation of acceptance with the municipality.  Here the governing body exercised its statutory right not to accept the roadways at issue in the public interest.  This was their statutory right.  The trial court improperly disregarded this legislative right and compelled the municipality to accept a roadway with all the attendant obligations thereto even though it had legislatively determined to reject dedication.  Accordingly, the trial court's error must be reversed.  POINT III
[brief] ”  *Francois v. Bd. of Trs., Pub. Emps.’ Ret. Sys.*, 415 N.J. Super. 335, 349 (App. Div. 2010) (citation omitted).  Here, the statute provides for the benefit if a retiree files for it within two years of the Ricci Act, i.e., by July 8, 2021.  [...] did not file for the benefit within the time permitted by the statute, so even under a liberal construction, the statute expressly states he is ineligible for the benefit he now seeks.
[brief] The [...] penalizes Firefighters who request or take a temporary medical leave of absence.  Utilizing medical or sick leave is a protected absence safeguarded by the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination.  When Firefighters avail themselves of medical leave they engage in a right that is granted or protected by the NJLAD and therefore engage in protected conduct.  Jersey City penalizes Firefighters who request medical leave by rendering them: A. Ineligible for promotion; and, B.  Subject to discipline or penalty points which leads to discipline  The Firefighter’s Union, [...], asserted two core causes of action in this case.  The first concerns the City’s adoption and application of a policy in which it renders Firefighters *ineligible* for promotion if they avail themselves of medical leave protected under the NJLAD.  This policy *directly* violates the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination.  The second cause of action asserts that the City’s medical leave policy, General Order 19-16, punishes Firefighters for requesting and taking medical leave for “three (3) or more illnesses within any twelve (12) month period of time” or “short periods of being absent on sick leave” regardless of the nature and legitimacy of the medical leave usage.  The disciplinary penalties are progressive and may lead to suspension and/or termination.  Such a policy directly violates the NJLAD and simultaneously interferes with rights protected by the NJLAD.  Where an employer interferes with "any person in the exercise or enjoyment of a protected right" such acts of the employer constitute unlawful retaliation, [...] requests that the policies be found unlawful and enjoined.
[brief] For instance, in HLP Associates, L.P. vs. Carpet City, Inc., 2015 WL 1181271 (App. Div. 2015) (unpublished), Pa162, plaintiff entered into a commercial lease agreement with [...]  Defendant, [...], was the president of the company.  Defendant [...] signed the lease on behalf of the corporation.  Id at *1.  The lease contained a provision requiring [...] to personally guarantee the rent payments in the event the lessee fails to pay them.  The personal guarantee provision was contained within the lease and there was no separate signature line for a personal guarantee.  The court enforced the guarantee against [...] stating:  ... we discern no basis for disturbing [...]’s conclusion that the terms of section 16 of the lease were clear and unambiguous.  Under the plain language of this provision, defendant’s guaranty of the lessee’s rent payments would continue ...  Id at *6.  Similarly, in Benjamin vs. Garden Operations Corp., 2013 WL 6508491 (App. Div. 2013), (unpublished), Pa239, [...], the principal of various corporations that leased bagel making equipment, argued that he considered himself responsible only in his capacity as an officer of the business entity based on his understanding that unless he signed a document, once as an officer and once as an individual, he did not assume personal liability.