ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The CFA “covers fraud both in the initial sale (where the seller never intends to pay), and fraud in the subsequent performance (where the seller at some point elects not to fulfill its obligations). ”  See Weiss v. First Unum Life Ins. Co., 482 F.3d 254, 266 (3d Cir. 2007); see also Premier Health Assocs., LLC v. Medical Tech. Solutions, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 144274 (D.N.J. Aug. 24, 2018) (the “NJCFA does not just apply to the initial contract, but that it also applies to the subsequent performance of that contract. ”).  The reason the CFA applies to the performance of an insurance contract is to protect consumers against insurance companies “trying to protect its profit margin” by refusing to “comply[] with certain contract specifications while at the same time falsely representing strict compliance. ”
[directive] In the case of Unidentified Persons, living or deceased the National Crime Information Center Unidentified Persons File shall be utilized as soon as the individual identifying characteristics become available which are necessary for the basic file entry.  A File 25 (NJLETS) teletype messages with all available, pertinent information regarding the Unidentified Person shall be broadcast concurrently with the entry into the National Crime Information Center Unidentified Persons File.  The teletype will be broadcast on a statewide basis and expanded as the need exists.  In addition to a General Police Incident Report, the Unidentified Person Report for NCIC Record Entry should be used as the standard document for the collection of specific information regarding an unidentified person.  The Unidentified Persons Investigation Packet entitled "Unidentified Person File, Data Collection Entry Guide" should be used to organize data collection and to collect additional information from other appropriate sources during an unidentified persons investigation.  This document is available from the Federal Bureau of Investigation - National Crime Information Center.  When an unidentified person is identified, the record entry shall be immediately cleared from the National Crime Information Center Unidentified Persons File.
[brief] (5T88:12-89:7).  It would be the definition of inequitable to permit [...] to purchase at Tax Book Value (a lower valuation) and then, because of his bad conduct, be ordered to sell at a higher valuation.  The trial court’s January 24, 2023 Order creates a windfall that gives new meaning to the phrase “buy low, sell high. ”  The circumstances dictated that [...] not receive the best valuation in the history of the Company, when every other member who sold their shares—and were not dissociated for harming the Company—received prior year’s Tax Book Value after having done nothing wrong.
[brief] Ibid.  The Commission noted several errors in the ALJ’s findings.  (Aa31).  First, the ALJ determined that the effective date of the resignation not in good standing was April 16, 2023, which was incorrect.  Ibid.  Instead, the Commission found that the effective date was April 14, 2020, at the latest.  Ibid.  The Commission concluded that under the April 14 effective date, “there would be no meritorious reason to find that the appellant had not abandoned his position under N.J.A.C. 4A:2-6.2(b). ”  Ibid.  Further, the ALJ ignored N.J.A.C.4A:2-6.2(b), which states that the five-day threshold to declare that an employee has abandoned their position begins once the employee is advised of being absent without authorization, which the Commission found to be April 7, 2023 at the latest.  (Aa31-32).  Finally, [...] started receiving benefits for Workers' Compensation on April 15, after the date the Commission determined he had already effectively resigned, and for a condition unrelated to his failure to return to work on April 6.  (Aa32).  Having reviewed the merits briefs filed by the primary parties, the Commission has determined that the factual and legal issues involved in this appeal do not warrant filing a separate brief.
[brief] During oral argument on the motion for reconsideration, Plaintiff’s counsel conceded that [...] could not terminate Defendant [...] or change his employment status (3T 21:4-22), but essentially argued that, because other remedial measures potentially existed, such as placing Plaintiff paid administrative leave, [...]’ decision to transfer Plaintiff must have been retaliatory.  (3T 21:5-24:9).  Even Plaintiff’s own counsel acknowledged that the Trial Court was incorrect in holding, as part of its original decision to deny summary judgment, that [...] had control over [...] employees.  Accordingly for this reason, and those expressed below, the Trial Court was correct in reconsidering its prior Order denying [...]’ motion for summary judgment.  POINT II
[directive] Sexual Assault Response Team in each county a.  The county prosecutor’s office in each county shall establish a Sexual Assault Response Team or shall enter into a collaborative agreement with another county to share the services of that county’s response team.  The response team shall be comprised of: a certified forensic sexual assault nurse examiner, a rape care advocate (*now referred to as a Confidential Sexual Violence Advocate or “CSVA ) from the county program established, or designated by the Division on Women in the Department of Children and Families, as provided under section 3 of P.L.2001, c.81 (C.52:4B-51), and a law enforcement official.  The response team shall: (1) respond to a report of sexual assault at the request of a victim of sexual assault pursuant to guidelines established by the Attorney General pursuant to section 17 of this act; and (2) provide treatment, counseling, legal and medical forensic services to a victim of sexual assault in accordance with the standard protocols developed by the Attorney General pursuant to subsection d. of section 6 of P.L.1985, c. 404 (C.52:4B-44).  b.  Each member of the response team shall complete the standardized education and training program developed by the program coordinator pursuant to subsection e. of P.L.2001, c.81 (C.52:4B-52).  A- 25  ATTORNEY GENERAL STANDARDS FOR PROVIDING SERVICES TO VICTIMS OF SEXUAL ASSAULT  XI.  PROTECTION ORDERS FOR SEXUAL ASSAULT
[brief] [...] [...]  Phone: [...]  Email: [...]  Attorneys for [...]  TABLE OF CONTENTS  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ........................................................................................................ ii  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT .................................................................................................  1  STANDARD OF REVIEW .......................................................................................................  4  LEGAL ARGUMENT ..................................................................................................................  7  THE DECISION OF THE OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL DENYING COVERAGE TO THE [...] UNDER WRIGHT V. STATE IS INCORRECT AS A MATTER OF LAW AND SHOULD BE REVERSED ..............  7  (Not raised below)  CONCLUSION ..........................................................................................................................
[brief] Direct evidence and/or circumstantial evidence may be used to prove either.  State v. Ebert, 377 N.J. Super 1, 10 (App. Div. 2005).  Operation of the vehicle may be proved by observation of the defendant inside or outside of the motor vehicle under circumstances which indicate that the defendant had been driving while intoxicated, Id.; see also State v. Mulcahy, 107 N.J. 467, 476 (1987); Morris, 262 N.J. Super. at 419-20; State v. Sweeney, 77 N.J. Super. 512, 521 (App. Div. 1962), or by the defendant’s own admission, State v. Hanemann, 180 N.J. Super. 544, 547 (App. Div. 1981).  In State v. Daly, 64 N.J. 122 (1973), our Supreme Court upheld the reversal of a DWI conviction where the defendant’s testimony established that he realized he had too much to drink and decided to “sleep it off.
[brief] Defendant’s claim is without merit.  Notably, [...] did not say “yes,” but rather responded that “[i]t depends on how that particular tower is configured. ” (8T165-25 to 166-1).  He further stated, “[i]f that tower is configured to cover that distance, which would not be typical in an urban environment, that could be possible. ” (8T166-3 to 5).  He then explained that “typically, in an urban environment where there’s a need for a large amount of cell sites, there are large quantity of cell sites that cover a smaller distance.  In an area that might not be as densely populated, cell sites might cover further distances in miles. ” (8T166-6 to 13).  Such testimony was accurate and was not an opinion about the specific location of the defendants’ phones.  Thus, defendant’s claim is meritless.
[brief] For the foregoing reasons, the [...] respectfully request that this Court reverse the September 15 and November 27, 2023 Orders of the trial court enforcing the MOU and requiring the [...] to execute an Assignment of Interest transferring the Property, declaring that “Plaintiff has no obligation to indemnify any guarantors of any debt against the Property or against any of the Defendants,” and awarding counsel fees to Plaintiff.  Additionally, since the MOU is unenforceable and there was no failure to comply with the September 15, 2023 Order, the [...] also respectfully request that the Court reverse the trial court’s February 5, 2024 Order granting Plaintiff’s fee application.
[brief] B.  The lower court’s analysis of the sentencing factors was based on competent and credible evidence.  [...] found four applicable aggravating factors: One, the nature and circumstances of the murders and defendant’s role in committing the offenses, including whether or not they were committed in an especially heinous, cruel, or depraved manner, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1a(1).  The judge considered that defendant shot his parents and his sister multiple times, “far in excess of what was necessary” and beyond what was “minimally required to satisfy the element of the crime. ” (17T187-16 to 189-17).  Defendant continued to shoot at the victims after they “were already on the ground, completely helpless, and shot them again[.]” (17T189-17 to 23).  That defendant chose not to shoot his grandfather “is vitally important to this Court’ ultimate determination here today …  It shows if nothing else he knew exactly what he was doing. ” (17T193-5 to 14).  The judge gave aggravating factor one “significant weight. ” (17T186-12 to 13).  Defendant conceded below that this factor applied to him and he does not argue otherwise on appeal.
[brief] Amended Policy 5756 ....................................................................................... passim Rules N.J. Ct. R. 1:6-6 ....................................................................................................  13  N.J.R.E. 401 ........................................................................................................ 12, 13 N.J.R.E. 403(a) ....................................................................................................  12, 13 N.J.R.E. 801 ........................................................................................................ 12, 13 N.J.R.E. 802 ........................................................................................................  12, 13  Regulations N.J.A.C. 6A:32-7.3(b)(1) .................................................................................. 5, 11
[brief] [Emphasis added.]  Pa167-68.  The three Docket Numbers established by plaintiffs  In the Matter of the Implementation of L. 2012, C. 24; In the Matter of the Implementation of L. 2012, C. 24, N.J.S.A. 48:3-87(T)-A Proceeding to Establish a Program to Provide SRECS to Certified Brownfield, Historic Fill And Landfill Facilities; [...] [...]; were Docket Nos. [...], [...] and [...].
[brief] During the search of room 517, the officers located a safe which [...] had previously given them the code to open.  Inside, the officers discovered various quantities of different types of CDS which [...] later admitted belonged to him.  (27T 155-22 to 156-5; 30T 234-13 to 234-24).  The later executed search of [...]’s white Infinity did not result in anything of evidential value.
[brief] ”  Ab13-15.  DEP offers no definition of “consistent” from any dictionary that supports its position that the Legislature repeatedly invoked this language to signify an intent to abrogate the common law public trust doctrine with which consistency is required, rather than to codify it.  Rb15-19.  *Black’s Law Dictionary*, 2nd edition, defines “consistent” as “(1) an order done logically with a pattern; (2) anything that doesn’t change; (3) following the rules of standards. ”¹  Emphasis added.  By contrast, *Black’s* defines “inconsistent” as “[m]utually repugnant or contradictory; contrary, the one to the other so that both cannot stand, but the acceptance or establishment of the one implies the abrogation or abandonment of the other. ”²  Emphasis added.  Thus, the Public Access Law’s repeated use of the phrase “consistent with the public trust doctrine” plainly evidences the Legislature’s intent to codify, rather than to abrogate, the scope and application of the public trust doctrine through the Public Access Law.
[brief] Transcript of Hearing before Zoning Board of Adjustment.  | March 26, 2019 | | (2T)  Transcript of Trial Proceeding | July 15, 2020 | | (3T)  Transcript of Motion for Reconsideration | June 15, 2021 | | (4T)  Transcript of Motion to Enforce Litigants Rights | September 14, 2021 | | (5T)  Transcript of Hearing before Special Hearing Officer (Day 1) | March 24, 2022 | | (6T)  Transcript of Hearing before Special Hearing Officer (Day 2) | March 25, 2022 | | (7T)  Transcript of Motion for Summary Judgment | February 10, 2023 | # TABLE OF AUTHORITIES  ## CASES | CASE | PAGE(S) | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|---------| | Casamasino v. City of Jersey City, 158 N.J. 333 (1999) | 13 | | Cohen v. Fair Lawn, 85 N.J. Super. 234 (App. Div. 1964) | 11 | | Reinauer Realty Corp. v. Nucera, 59 N.J. Super. 189 (App. Div.) | | | certf. den. 32 N.J. 347 (1960) | 2 | | State v. Kouvatas, 292 N.J.Super. 417 (App.Div. 1996) | 13 | | Summer Cottagers’ Ass’n v. City of Cape May, 19 N.J. 493 (1955) | 13 | ## STATUTES | STATUTE | PAGE(S) | |------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------| | N.J.S.A. 40:55D-1, et seq. | 9 | ## TREATISES | TREATISE | PAGE(S) | |--------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------| | Cox & Koenig, New Jersey Zoning and Land Use Administration, (GANN, 2023) § 18-5.4(d) | 2 | | Cox & Koenig, New Jersey Zoning and Land Use Administration, (GANN, 2023) § 19-6.2 | 11 | APPENDIX TABLE OF CONTENTS
[brief] With respect to the legislature’s intent in enacting the NJCFLA, the NJCFLA’s intended mechanisms of enforcement, and the history of the same, the Court must consider the NJCFLA’s predecessors for context.  The present-day iteration of the NJCFLA originated as the New Jersey Small Loan Law (“NJSLL”) in 1914.  *See Family Fin. Corp. v. Gough*, 10 N.J. Super. 13, 19 (App. Div. 1950). ¹  The NJSLL was superseded by the New Jersey Consumer Loan Act (“NJCLA”), which was subsumed by the New Jersey Licensed Lenders Act (“NJLLA”), N.J.S.A. 17:C-1 to -49., in 1997.²  The NJLLA was superseded by the New Jersey --- ¹ “New Jersey was one of the five large industrial states which early adopted general acts designed to regulate and control the business of making small loans. ”  *Family Fin. Corp.*, 10 N.J. Super. at 19.  ²  “On January 8, 1997, the Governor signed the New Jersey Licensed Lenders Act, which combines the CLA with two mortgage-related statutes.  *L. 1996, c. 157* (codified at N.J.S.A. 17:11C-1 to -49). ”  *Lemelledo v. Benefit Mgmt. Corp.*, 150 N.J. 255, 262 n.1 (1997).  Residential Mortgage Lending Act (“NJRMLA”), N.J.S.A. 17:11C-51 to -89, and the NJCFLA in July of 2010.
[brief] Therefore, such allegations are barred by the Court’s September 17, 2018 ruling.  Even apart from the dispositive September 17, 2018 ruling by [...], the claims asserted in the Complaint and Amended Complaint would have to be dismissed because the facts underlying the claims were already disposed of and/or asserted in the Chancery and Law Division litigations.  The doctrine of collateral estoppel bars discrete issues when “(1) the discrete issue to be precluded is identical to an issue in the prior proceeding; (2) the issue was ‘actually litigated’ in the prior proceeding; (3) the court in the prior proceeding issued a ‘final judgment on the merits;’ (4) the determination of the issue was ‘essential’ to the prior judgment; and, (5) the party against whom the doctrine is asserted was a ‘party to or in privity with’ a party to the earlier proceeding. ”  *Hennessey v. Winslow Township*, 183 N.J. 593, 599 (2005).  The doctrine of *res judicata* “provides that a cause of action between parties that has been finally determined on the merits by a tribunal having jurisdiction cannot be relitigated by those parties or their privies in a new proceeding. ”  *Velasquez v. Franz*, 123 N.J. 498, 505 (1991).  Both these doctrines apply here.
[brief] Here, defendant alleges that the State falsely advised the jury that defendant should be found guilty as an accomplice even if [...] fired the weapon because defendant assisted in hiding the firearm after the murder.  (Db33-34).  See Whitaker, 200 N.J. at 465 (“If all the jury believed was that defendant aided [co-defendant] in concealing the weapon after [co-defendant] committed the robbery, then defendant could not be found guilty” of those offenses. ”).  However, this is a clear misrepresentation of the evidence supporting the State’s theory that defendant was the principal actor in these offenses.  Unlike in *Whitaker*, here the jury heard much more evidence about defendant’s role in the murder before the firearm was stashed: defendant left [...]’s vehicle, committed the assault and murder, rode his bicycle away, was picked up after in [...]’s vehicle, and then stored the murder weapon at his friend’s home.
[brief] (1T 90-22 to 91-2, 92-6 to 7, 93-1 to 14, 95-13 to 22, 98-7)  Indeed, [...] intended to question [...] only about the robbery, [...] remained in custody only to be questioned about the robbery, and, ¹ Db: Defendant-appellant’s appellate brief Pb: Plaintiff-respondent’s appellate brief nonetheless, [...] gave a “deliberately vague and incomplete answer” when [...] asked about the basis of his arrest.  *Diaz*, 470 N.J. Super. at 518.  Because such deception renders a waiver involuntary, and because none of the State’s arguments to the contrary are persuasive, the hearing court’s order must be reversed.
[brief] ”  Here, the police acted recklessly and outrageously by beating the Plaintiff for no explained reason, proximately causing him to fear for his life and to cry hysterically.  (Pa471).  Plaintiff was forced to seek medical and other help to try and assist him in not having the constant intrusive thoughts of the outrageous police beating.  (Pa017).  Plaintiff suffers from continuing the pain which prevents him from having peace and sleep.  (Pa093).  The defendants violated the plaintiff and have caused him to lose his enjoyment of life which is guaranteed to him under New Jersey Constitution, Article 1, para 1 and were not entitled to summary judgment.
[brief] **Petitioner, Not the Board, Bears the Burden of Proof of Demonstrating the Board’s Decision was Arbitrary, Capricious and Unreasonable. **  In arguing that the Board should substantiate the information in the records of Petitioner’s own treating physician Petitioner conflates the burdens of proof and attempts to transfer its burden to the Board.  The Board’s decision will be sustained unless there is a clear showing by the Petitioner that it is arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable, or that it lacks fair support in the record.
[brief] 50  LIST OF PARTIES | Name | Designation | Trial Court Role | Trial Court Status | |---------------|-------------|------------------|-------------------| | [...] | Appellant | Defendant | Participated Below| | [...] | Appellant | Defendant | Participated Below| | [...] | Respondent | Plaintiff | Participated Below| | [...]| Respondent | Co-Defendant | Participated Below|  TABLE OF TRANSCRIPTS | Proceeding | Date | Transcript | |------------------|-----------------|-----------| | OSC, Motion | January 10, 2022| 1T | | OSC | May 27, 2022 | 2T | | Motion | June 8, 2022 | 3T | | Motion | August 10, 2022 | 4T | | Motion | June 28, 2023 | 5T | | Motion | September 13, 2023 | 6T | | Trial | December 6, 2023| 7T | | Trial | December 14, 2023| 8T | TABLE OF ORDERS BEING APPEALED | Date | Decision | Page | |--------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | 06/10/2022 | Order - Disposal of Boonton and Florida Properties | 18a | | 08/31/2022 | Order - Breach of Trust, Revised Disposal Instructions | 31a | | 05/10/2023 | Order - Supplemental Complaint Denied | 60a | | 05/10/2023 | Order - Second Supplemental Complaint Denied | 62a | | 02/14/2024 | Order - Plenary Hearing, Rent, Frivolous Sanctions | 91a | ## TABLE OF ORDERS BEING APPEALED AND INTERMEDIATE DECISIONS PERTINENT TO THE APPEAL | Date | Decision | Page | |------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | 01/25/2022 | Order - Appraisals, Settlement Conference | 14a | | 05/27/2022 | Order - Temporary Injunction Granted | 16a | | 06/10/2022 | Order - Disposal of Boonton and Florida Properties | 18a | | 08/12/2022 | Order - Stay of Deadlines for Boonton Property | 30a | | 08/31/2022 | Order - Breach of Trust, Revised Disposal Instructions | 31a | | 09/13/2022 | Order - Reconsideration Denied | 37a | | 10/12/2022 | Order - Ejectment, Boonton Property Sale Confirmed | 51a | | 05/10/2023 | Order - Supplemental Complaint Denied | 60a | | 05/10/2023 | Order - Second Supplemental Complaint Denied | 62a | | 06/19/2023 | Order - Reconsideration Denied | 69a | | 07/05/2023 | Order - Scheduling Discovery and Motion | 75a | | 07/05/2023 | Order - Scheduling Trial | 77a | | 08/04/2023 | Order - Motion for Leave to Appeal Denied | 80a | | 10/04/2023 | Order - Motion to Determine Controlling Law Denied | 81a | | 10/04/2023 | Order - Motion for Violation of Due Process Denied | 83a | | 02/14/2024 | Order - Plenary Hearing, Rent, Frivolous Sanctions | 91a |
[directive] 10% permissible listed sex offense, fails to register under the statute.  (Megan’s Law)  Actor fails to notify law enforcement of change of address or employment or school status; or Registration of Sex 2C:7-2d(1)(2), fails to provide law enforcement with information with respect to access or use of a computer  Offenders  4th Degree $2,500 to $7,500 10% permissible 7-2e or any other device with internet capability; or provides false information concerning his place (Megan’s Law) of residence or fails to verify his or her address with the appropriate law enforcement agency.  1st Degree $150,000 to $350,000  10% permissible  Actor causes death while recklessly driving a vehicle or vessel; first degree if driving while in Death by Auto or 2C:11-5 violation of R.S. 39:4-50 or R.S. 39:4-50a while on or within 1000 feet of a school or driving Vessel through a school crossing; otherwise, second degree.
[brief] (36T 37:17-23).  The foregoing confirms the diverted funds were moved into accounts that [...] and [...] jointly controlled, like the personal account ending in 0319, or into an [...] bank account, like that ending in 8309, a company in which --- 11 Appellant incorrectly identifies the date of this transaction as December 6, 2008 and the destination as [...]’s Capital One account.