ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42 (1988) ...............................................................43  Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989)..............................44  Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla. Inc., 348 U.S. 483 (1955)..........................21  Statutes 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(6).........................................................................................23
[brief] The [...] (“[...]”), and the [...] (“[...]”) address the issue pressed on appeal by defendant-appellant [...]:  1.  Whether, where “information” under N.J.S.A. 47:1A-3b is not requested as part of an OPRA request for records, a records custodian is obligated to expand his/her search beyond that which is specifically requested.  2.  Whether, where an OPRA request foes not seek “information” pursuant to N.J.S. A. 47:1A-3b and a later court order directs the release of the “information”, the requestor is not entitled to counsel fees under Mason v. Hoboken, 196 N.J. 51 (2003) as he was not the “catalyst” nor prevailed in the litigation.  INTERESTS OF AMICI  THE LEAGUE AND THE [...]  The [...], authorized by State statute, is a voluntary association created to assist municipalities do a better job of self-government.
[brief] [...] sold plaintiffs the solar rights at a significant cost.  Its land lease contained a confidentiality covenant.  Despite these facts, [...] claims that it had the right to re-sell the rights already acquired by plaintiffs and that it could sell plaintiff’s rights by breaching the confidentiality covenant.  The original complaint, as filed March 18, 2019, by plaintiffs’ predecessor attorneys, did not include [...] Estates.  [...] was originally omitted as plaintiffs had no reason to suspect [...] had committed any unlawful acts against plaintiffs; and plaintiffs simply could not fathom that a seller who received $700,000 for assignment of the rights in perpetuity (quite apart from the separate, six-figure land lease) would have the criminal audacity to re-sell those very same rights to a second purchaser.  The first amended complaint (FAC), amended July 19, 2021, had added the name “[...] Estates” so as to see discovery but still had not stated direct, substantive counts for lack of evidence other than tangential suspicion because plaintiffs still had no real basis to overcome the fact that plaintiffs were “the owners” of the solar rights purchased from [...] Estates outright, in perpetuity, under an “assignment agreement” with a “bill of sale.
[brief] **First**, the New Motion Judge’s decisions of July 14, 2023 and September 29, 2023 are rooted in hypothetical speculation.  The reasoning employed by the court – a ruling based on what the judge claimed *would* have happened “assuming” that the defendants had timely called for a C-section at 9:48 p.m. – constitutes reversible error.  Cases are decided on actual facts, not hypotheticals.  As the proof established, [...] and [...] deviated from the applicable standard of care by failing to call for an emergency C-section at 9:48 p.m.  In actual fact, the C-section was not called until about 10:12 p.m.  This fact made it impossible to complete the C-section within fifteen minutes subsequent to 9:48 p.m.  These facts must go to the jury.  The New Motion Judge’s hypothetical, asking what might have happened assuming that the standard of care had been met at 9:48 p.m., was remarkably prejudicial to Plaintiff.  When a hypothetical fact pattern is postulated so as to excise from the factual record a material and significant deviation from the standard of care, then the hypothetical proposes a dramatically different case, to say the least.  In actual effect, the New Motion Judge held that Plaintiff must “prove” her case under this alternative, hypothetical fact pattern, rather than under the actual facts.  Truth be told, it is impossible to know what might have happened if the standard of care had been met at 9:48 p.m.  This is why cases must be decided on actual facts.
[brief] See generally, *McBride v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J.*, 295 N.J. Super. 521, 524-25 (App. Div. 1996) (finding no evidence existed to support notion that defect which caused plaintiff’s injury existed at time triple net lease took effect). \(^1\)  New Jersey Courts have found that assigning sole liability to the tenant is fair because the landlord lacks the meaningful ability to discovery or ameliorate the defective condition.  See *Geringer*, 388 N.J. Super. at 402. \(^2\)  However, the protections afforded by triple net leases to landlords are not absolute.  Instead, New Jersey Courts have found that the landlord of property can be held liable for a property defect where this defect predates the inception of the triple net lease.  See *Geringer v. Hartz Mountain* --- \(^1\)  The terms, conditions, and protections afforded by a triple net lease have not been subject to significant review in published opinions in New Jersey, and there are no discernible New Jersey Supreme Court cases which analyze the propriety of these leases delegating tort liability.
[brief] The RMP is judicially noticeable as determinations of a government agency or subdivision.  N.J.R.E. 201(a); N.J.R.E. 202(b); Manata v. Pereira, 436 N.J. Super. 330, 337 n.3 (App. Div. 2014).  addition, as explained below, the Project’s location at the Property impacts minimal natural resources.
[brief] In this case, the Court’s ruling was, in essence, a premature summary judgment ruling as the issues were improperly presented by way of an emergent application and the ordered sale of the Subject Property was in contravention of the April 13, 2022 Consent Judgment entered into between the sibling co-owners of the Subject Property relating to its sale.  Thus, the Appellate Division’s review in this case is de novo.  In reviewing the grant or denial of summary judgment, the appellate court applies the same standard as the trial court with respect to the same motion record.  See Rule 2:10-2; W.J.A. v. D.A., 210 N.J. 229, 237-38 (2012); Wilson v. City of Jersey City, 209 N.J. 558, 564 (2012); Rowe v. Mazel Thirty, LLC, 209 N.J. 35, 41 (2012).  A party is entitled to summary judgment only if there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact.  See Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Amer., 142 N.J. 520 (1995).  On a motion for summary judgment, **the judge’s function is not to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter**, but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.
[brief] As to mitigating factor eleven, the judge was not required to find it sua sponte.  See State v. Hyman, 451 N.J. Super. 429, 460 (App. Div. 2017) (ruling that the record did not support the claim that mitigating factor eleven should have been found where the defendant did not show either that his five "children would experience 'excessive' hardship from his absence" or that he was a significant source of support for them), certif. denied, 232 N.J. 301 (2018).  Although the judge should have found mitigating factor fourteen, the failure to do so constitutes harmless error, as made clear by the judge's other appropriate findings.  Furthermore, trial courts "have discretion to decide if sentences should run concurrently or consecutively."
[brief] In Piscitelli, Justice [...]—who Judge [...] called the conscience of our State Supreme Court—summarized the municipal conflict of interest standard as follows:  The overlapping conflict-of-interest codes that apply to this case can be distilled into a few common sense principles.  A citizen's right to "a fair and impartial tribunal" requires a public official to disqualify himself or herself whenever "the official has a conflicting interest that may interfere with the impartial performance of his duties as a member of the public body."
[brief] (Da4; Da23).  In denying the request, [...] explained that the “request [was] denied as an invalid request” under OPRA for “failure to supply the subject or content of the emails sought. ” (Da33).  [...] further stated that the request was “overly broad” and that review of the records was “substantially disruptive and overly burdensome” to the University’s operations. (Da34).  [...] responded on January 24, 2023, asserting that the denial was “unlawful. ” (Da4; Da36).  [...] also threatened to “file suit with the courts” if [...] failed to provide the requested records.  (Da4; Da36).  On January 25, 2023, [...] advised [...] that it was unable to fulfill his requests for the reasons it had previously outlined in its January 13 and 24, 2023 communications.
[brief] **B.  [...] did not breach the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.  (31)**  The implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing “requires all parties to a contract shall refrain from doing anything which will have the effect of destroying or injuring the right of the other party to receive the benefits of the contract. ”  [3T30-4, citing *Palisades Properties, Inc. v. Brunetti*, 44 N.J. 117, 130 (1965)].  As the trial court determined, there is no “evidence that any of the actions of [...] amounts to conduct destroying or injuring the right of the plaintiffs to receive the benefits of the contract. ”  [3T31-8]  Rather, it was [...]’s own conduct “throughout the misrepresentations [in] the application and renewal application that deprive the plaintiffs of the benefits of the contract. ”  [3T31-14]  There also is “no evidence of bad faith by [...]. ”  [3T31-8]  Accordingly, [...] and [...]’s claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing fails as a matter of law.
[brief] ”  NAIC Accounting Practices and Procedures Manual, Vol. 1, ¶ 45, at P-9 (as of March 2023) (emphasis added).  Clearly, SSAP No. 25 applies to a reciprocal exchange and its AIF.  In fact, [...] even concedes as much:  “According to SSAP No. 25, the AIF for a reciprocal exchange is considered a related party to the exchange, and therefore transactions between the exchange itself and the AIF may be subject to SSAP No. 25.  Thus, a transaction between the exchange . . . and the AIF may implicate SSAP No. 25 and its accounting principles. ” (Ab14 and n.9).  SSAP No. 25, Section 4, defines related parties as “entities that have common interests as a result of ownership, control, affiliation or by contract. ” (Ra5 (emphasis added)).  Section 4 sets forth a list of the types of entities considered to be “related parties. ”
[brief] Similarly, as there was already testimony provided during discovery regarding dissatisfaction of work being done in the 2017/2018 snow season, with no specific reference to it being only related to the April 2018 snow event, the trial court granted Defendants’ motion and restricted Plaintiff from asking regarding the termination or nonrenewal but properly gave Plaintiff the ability to ask about their satisfaction of the work.  In accordance with the trial court’s ruling, Plaintiff never asked about the termination or nonrenewal of the contract and any testimony about the April 2018 snow event was first mentioned by testimony of a Defendant, not by Plaintiff’s counsel.  Lastly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it determined not to admit a photograph that could not be authenticated under the rules of Evidence.
[brief] **  At each stage in this decades-long litigation, [...] repeatedly have ignored the settled record, rejected the factual findings and conclusions of the Chancery Division and the Appellate Division that do not favor them, made legal submissions that plainly misstate and grossly mischaracterize binding decisions and orders, and twisted the ethical rules to accuse two highly regarded jurists of unfounded conflicts of interest.  As these deceptive and distracting tactics have proven unsuccessful time and time again, [...] attempt to bolster them on --- \(^2\)  On June 20, 2022, the New Jersey Supreme Court temporarily assigned [...] to the Appellate Division, and, in [...]’s place, the Court assigned [...] to be the General Equity Presiding Judge for Vicinage 10 (Morris and Sussex Counties).
[brief] “If a lesser sanction could erase the prejudice against the non-delinquent party, dismissal of the complaint with prejudice would not be appropriate and would therefore constitute an abuse of discretion. ”  Id. at 120.  Indeed, the “drastic remedy” of dismissing the indictment “is inappropriate where other judicial action will protect a defendant’s fair trial rights. ”  *State v. Clark*, 347 N.J. Super. 497, 508 (App. Div. 2002); see *State v. Franklin Sav. Account No. 2067*, 389 N.J. Super. 272, 280 (App. Div. 2006) (“[T]he extreme sanction of dismissal is inappropriate where a less drastic remedy would rectify the harm.
[brief] (Pa38; Pa75-79).  The Notices accused Appellants of violating the “best efforts” provision of the Agreement by pointing to Appellants’ alleged decline in sales in 2022 relative to its, and its competitors’, pre-pandemic performance in 2019 (Pa38-39; Pa76; Pa78).  [...] claimed that Appellants’ drop in sales was based on [...]’s unsupported “belie[f]” that Appellants utilized “driver sales personnel” and reduced the number of these personnel from 2019.  This is false.  (Pa77; Pa79).  As stated in the Verified Complaint, [...] employs a team of ten (10) to twelve (12) delivery drivers and helpers.  (Pa40).  [...] maintains a sales team separate and apart from their drivers, who conduct no sales whatsoever.
[brief] [...], a [...] truck driver, confirmed that [...] used to keep a truck assigned to the sweeper so that it would not have to race around the job site.  Pa1526.  “It used to be before [[...] got hit], but it was enforced, you know, more so again after that happened. ”  Ibid.  On the night [...] was hit, there was no truck for the sweeper.  Ibid.  [...] also failed to develop and to follow an internal traffic control plan, which was required under the contract and specifications.
[brief] Indeed, the Hill court held that the error of a Clawans charge was forcing the defendant into “the Catch-22” of deciding whether to call an adverse witness “or else submit to a jury charge where the court informed the jury that it may find an adverse inference against [the defendant] for failure to call [the adverse witness].”  Id. at 569.  Here, such an adverse inference was not only absent, but specifically condemned by the trial court’s instruction.
[brief] LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I THE MOTION COURT’S DECISION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION SHOULD BE AFFIRMED BECAUSE IT CORRECTLY FOUND THAT A VALID ARBITRATION AGREEMENT EXISTS WITHIN THE MOU, AND THE PARTIES INTENDED IT TO BE A PART OF THE 2022 ADDENDUM.  (1T43:2-7; 1T49:5-16)  A.  Standard of Review
[brief] (Dta685.)  [...]’ counterclaim sought a declaration that if, as alleged, [...] was enrolled, or allowed to enroll, in a CCIP for its work at the site, then an exclusion in the [...] policy for \(^1\) [...] and [...] are corporate affiliates and are generally collectively referred to as “[...]” unless context otherwise requires.  [...]’ correct name is “The [...] Indemnity Company of America. ”  injury arising out of a project subject to such an insurance program precluded coverage for [...] in the then-still-pending underlying action.  (Dta19.)  The crossclaim alleged that [...] wrongfully disclaimed coverage to [...] for the underlying action.  [...] sought a declaration that [...] should defend and indemnify [...], as well as for reimbursement of its fees, costs and interest.  (Dta22.)  ([...] subsequently voluntarily dismissed a separate crossclaim it asserted against [...].  (Dta1143.))  On June 17, 2019, [...] and [...] filed a common answer, admitting that they issued the policies alleged in the complaint, adopting their “terms, conditions, provisions, exclusions and endorsements.
[brief] *Carbajal v. Patel*, 468 N.J. Super. 139, 157 (App. Div. 2021) (citing *Alves v. Rosenberg*, 400 N.J. Super. 553, 565 (App. Div. 2008)).  Under Rule 4:37-2(b), a trial judge will grant a motion for a directed verdict only if, accepting the non-moving party's facts and considering the applicable law, “no rational jury could draw from the evidence presented” that the non-moving party is entitled to relief.  *Pitts v. Newark Bd. of Educ.*, 337 N.J. Super. 331, 340 (App. Div. 2001); see also Rule 4:37-2(b) (stating that “such motion shall be denied if the evidence, together with the legitimate inferences therefrom, could sustain a judgment in plaintiff's favor").  The trial court’s decision not to grant a directed verdict after the close of Plaintiff’s case and after the close of all evidence was not supported by the applicable law and the facts before it.
[brief] ***  Furnishing water might be considered as a sale of a "service", as distinguished from the sale of "goods", on the theory that water is a naturally produced item which is simply being distributed.  ***  A (water) public utility is selling a service.  Since then, the governmental-proprietary fiction continues to be rejected as relevant:\(^{156}\)  Since the enactment of the Tort Claims Act the Supreme Court, in *K.S.B. Tech. Sales v. North Jersey Dist. Water Supply*, 75 N.J. 272, 381 A.2d 774 (1977), rejected the governmental-proprietary distinction in holding that a district water supply commission is a governmental agency acting in furtherance of a governmental purpose in distributing water for sale at cost within eight municipalities.  \(^{156}\)  *Tower Marine, Inc. v. City of New Brunswick*, 175 N.J. Super. 526 (Ch. Div. 1980).  Moreover, dismissal of the complaint offends constitutional protections for freedom of contract\textsuperscript{157} – the very reason the TCA carves out an exception for contract claims, lest it be declared unconstitutional.
[brief] THE TOWNSHIP SHOULD NOT BE PROHIBITED FROM CONTINUING TO HONOR ITS CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS WITH BELLEVUE ESTATES, LLC.  Clearly, the Township has a contractual obligation to [...] to exchange property.  If the Township is constrained from conveying the property, it will be subject to litigation initiated by [...].  As a result, the Township, its residents and taxpayers, will be harmed.  The purpose of Ordinances 5-23 and 7-23 is to acquire open space for the benefit and pleasure of the Township, citizens and taxpayers.  Effectively, the property exchange will result in [...] constructing religious-related improvements on properties which the Township found would be in the best interest of its residents in terms of diminishing traffic issues, congestion, etc.  The open space to be acquired by the Township is geographically centered in the [...], so that it can be enjoyed more easily and more often by the Township residents.  To delay the implementation of the Ordinances, including the Ordinances authorizing the acquisition of the property owned by [...], would cause unnecessary hardship and expenses for the Township and its residents.
[brief] In November 2021, a Camden County grand jury issued Indictment No. [...] against defendant-appellant [...] and co-defendant [...], charging them with: first-degree armed robbery, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1a(1) (Count One); second-degree conspiracy to commit robbery, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2/N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1a(1) (Count Two); second-degree aggravated assault, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1b(1) (Count Three); third-degree possession of a weapon for unlawful purpose, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4d (Count Four); and fourth degree unlawful possession of a weapon, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5d (Count Five).  (Da 1-6)  Prior to trial, [...] filed a motion to suppress statements he made to the police following his arrest.  (1T 3-12 to 14)  The Honorable [...], __________________  1  Da: Defendant-appellant’s appendix  1T: June 21, 2022 (Miranda hearing)  2T: Aug. 2, 2022 (Miranda decision)  3T: Sept. 12, 2022 (scheduling conference)  4T: Sept. 19, 2022 (scheduling conference)  5T: Sept. 27, 2022 (scheduling conference)  6T: Oct. 17, 2022 (pretrial conference)  7T: Nov. 14, 2022 vol. 1 (trial)  8T: Nov. 14, 2022 vol. 2 (trial)  9T: Nov. 16, 2022 vol. 1 (trial)  10T: Nov. 16, 2022 vol. 2 (trial)  11T: Nov. 17, 2022 (trial)  12T: Nov. 18, 2022 (trial)  13T: Mar. 17, 2023 (sentencing)  PSR: Presentence report  J.S.C., presided over a testimonial hearing on June 21, 2022.  (1T)  The court denied the motion on the record on August 2, 2022.  (2T 16-5 to 7; Da 8)  Trial in front of [...] and a jury commenced on November 14, 2022.  (7T)  During trial, the jury watched [...]’s statement—once during the State’s case-in-chief and once during deliberations.  (7T 171-15 to 191-3; 11T 59-10 to 77-12)  On November 18, the jury acquitted [...] of aggravated assault (Count Three) and found him guilty of the four remaining counts.  (Da 14-17)  The court sentenced [...] on March 17, 2023 and imposed: a ten-year sentence for armed robbery, subject to the No Early Release Act (NERA); a concurrent five-year sentence for conspiracy, subject to NERA; and a concurrent sentence of eighteen months flat for unlawful possession of a weapon.  (13T 18-2 to 20)  The court merged [...]’s conviction for possession of a weapon for unlawful purpose (Count Four) with his conspiracy conviction (Count Two).  (13T 11-15 to 18, 18-14 to 16)  [...] filed a timely notice of appeal on April 20, 2023.  (Da 22)
[brief] Although the road’s alignment, improvement and maintenance are governed by [...], [...] has the authority and responsibility, not the County, to “… adopt zoning ordinances limiting and restricting to specified districts and regulating therein, buildings and structures, according to their construction, and the nature and extent of their use, and the nature and extent of the uses of land[.]”  New Jersey Constitution Article 4, Section 6, Paragraph 2.  Under our 1947 Constitution, the Legislature may delegate the zoning power only to “municipalities, not counties” which is precisely what the MLUL does.  Id., NJSA 40:55D-62.  Under the County Planning Act, NJSA 40:27-1 et seq., in accord with our Constitution, counties have a role in infrastructure planning, but not zoning, and the principal role of county infrastructure is to accommodate the development authorized by local municipalities through their local zoning.
[brief] SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE  DIVISION DOCKET NO. [...]  INDICTMENT NO. [...] STATE OF NEW JERSEY, : CRIMINAL ACTION  Plaintiff-Respondent, : On Leave to Appeal from an v. : Interlocutory Order of the [...], : Superior Court of New Jersey, Defendant-Appellant : Law Division, Monmouth County.  Sat Below: Hon. [...], J.S.C.
[brief] \(^{11}\)  The transcripts in this matter are cited as follows:  May 21, 2021, the court heard a second round of argument.  (See 2T).  Ruling from the bench, the trial court (1) denied the [...]’ motion for leave to amend their complaint, and (2) denied Defendants’ cross-motion for partial summary judgment on the [...]’ claim for attorneys’ fees.  (Pa246-Pa247; Pa248-Pa249; 2T69:14-2T73:21).  In denying Defendants’ cross-motion, the trial court explained “I think I am going to reserve on that to the conclusion of the case. ” (2T71:23-2T74:2; Pa248-Pa249).  The [...] sought reconsideration, which the trial court denied without oral argument on June 25, 2021.