ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] She was the former Director of Human Resources for [...] (T. P. 147, L8-15).  She signed the Final Notice of Disciplinary Hearing finalizing the resignation not in good standing for [...] (T. P. 170, L9-19).  She testified that she reported the matter of [...] up to the Commissioner and she knew that the Commissioner sent an Email and a letter to [...] (T. P. 158, L21 to P. 159, L13).  She testified that she wrote and signed the document stating [...] resigned not in good standing effective April 13, 2020 (T. P. 181, L5-8).  She then testified she would not terminate someone on a date before the Commissioner wrote them a letter (T. P. 183, L17 to P. 185, L10).  [...], when asked by the Judge, agreed that it was fair to say that [...] believed he had until April 16, 2020, to report his intentions about returning to work (T. P. 187, L1 to 12).  But despite this, [...] decided [...] had resigned not in good standing effective April 13, 2020.  In *DeLorenzo v. Board of Review*, Division of Employment Sec 54 N.J. 361, (1969) the Superior Court of New Jersey held that a failure to report for work because of illness not attributable to work was not in itself a voluntary quit.
[brief] Finally, the Defendants include a Request for Relief at the end of their brief, asking among other things that if the case is remanded, it be assigned to a different judge.  (Db50).  As set forth above, the trial court’s findings were supported in each instance under appeal.  Appellate courts “do not disturb the factual findings and legal conclusions of the trial judge unless we are convinced that they are so manifestly unsupported by or inconsistent with the competent, relevant and reasonably credible evidence as to offend the interests of justice[.]"  In re Trust Created By Agreement Dated December 20, 1961, ex rel. Johnson, 194 N.J. 276, 284 (2008), quoting Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v.  Investors Ins. Co. of Am., 65 N.J. 474, 483-484 (1974).  The Defendants assert that the trial judge has showed “a bias toward his previous conclusions. ” (Db50).  In the case they cite, Carmichael v. Bryan, 310 N.J. Super. 34 (App. Div. 1998), the trial court had made findings concerning the intent of one of the litigants on a motion for summary judgment “without the benefit of a plenary hearing. ”  Id., at 49.  Here, the Defendants seek this relief while appealing a two-day plenary hearing, as well as several other proceedings in which the Defendants appeared pro se and under oath.  The Defendants make the legally and factually deficient argument that the trial court “consistently maintained that the Trustee’s actions were appropriate when evaluating the evidence…”  Db50.  Elsewhere in their brief, they prove their own contention false, pointing to the trial court’s August 31, 2022 Order in which the trial court found, on the Defendants’ own motion, that any attempt by the Plaintiff to purchase the Boonton Property would be in violation of her fiduciary duty.  Db5-6, 18; Da31.  At any rate, “[b]ias cannot be inferred from adverse rulings against a party. ”  Strahan v. Strahan, 402 N.J. Super. 298, 318 (App. Div. 2008) (declining to remand the matter to a different judge).  In making this request, the Defendants betray their true intention – to indefinitely prolong this litigation by recirculating their meritless arguments where they have not already been heard over and again.  **CONCLUSION**
[brief] (Pa90).  [...]’s 2020 YouTube statements are immaterial and certainly not analogous to “political upheaval. ” (Pb18 – Pb19).  Appellant cannot successfully maintain that one official changing his mind on an issue over a three-year period is equivalent to a town voting out an entire municipal board.  Rather, [...] merely “slumbered on [its] rights” by failing to file its appeal anywhere near the required forty-five day deadline of May 23, 2022, and offers no justification for its delay beyond purported ignorance as to the existence of its cause of action.
[brief] Not only is the requested information not subject to disclosure under OPRA’s privacy provision, but the trial court also erred in finding that the information requested was a public record that the City was obligated to provide to the requestor.  The specific request was for “the [...] E-mail distribution list it uses to send all [...] e-mails.  This list would include all e-mail addresses that the [...] generally sends [...] alerts to. ”  The City does not make, maintain, or keep on file such a document or record.  As described above, the City does not send [...] e-mails.  Individuals sign up directly through [...] and [...] maintains the personal information of subscribers independently of the City.  This specific situation also leads to the issue of whether [...], a private entity, is subject to OPRA.  In this case, the information requested is not a document or record being prepared on the City’s behalf.  Rather, the information requested is personal information provided to a private entity when users sign up for its services.  This personal information, and the ability to maintain the personal information securely, is essential to [...]’s business, therefore making it proprietary information as well.  For the reasons set forth above and herein, the [...] submits that the information requested in the OPRA request does not constitute a public record, and if it were to be considered a public record, the personal e-mail addresses provided to the third-party entity should be considered not subject to disclosure pursuant to OPRA’s privacy provision.
[directive] Vehicular pursuits present officers with difficult decisions that involve balancing the duty to enforce the law and apprehend violators with the risks created by pursuing motor vehicles, often being operated at high speeds by irresponsible drivers in densely populated areas.  The decision to pursue a motor vehicle must be objectively justifiable after giving due consideration to a number of factors.  Although impossible to create a policy that addresses every potential scenario, officers and supervisors shall conduct vehicular pursuits only within the parameters outlined in Addendum B of this Policy.  Due to the risks to both officers and the public, supervisors are expected to exercise an enhanced level of control over vehicular pursuits.
[brief] I COMPLAINANT'S INITIATION OF AND CONTINUED PROSECUTION OF THESE PROCEEDINGS  CONSTITUTE A BLATANT ATTEMPT TO CIRCUMVENT THE ELECTION PROCESS AND TO CURTAIL RESPONDENT'S FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS.  8  POINT II  THE COMMISSION'S FINAL DECISION WAS SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL CREDIBLE EVIDENCE.  9  POINT III  THE COMMISSION'S FINAL DECISION WAS NOT INCONSISTANT WITH ITS STATUTORY MISSION.  12  POINT IV  THE COMMISSION DID NOT ERR IN DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT BASED ON THE FACT THAT RESPONDENT'S FACEBOOK POSTS CONTAINED NO DISCLAIMERS.  13  POINT V.  THE COMMISSION DID NOT ERR IN DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT IN RESPONSE TO COMPLAINANTS' MOTION FOR A SUMMARY DECISION.  17  POINT VI  THE COMMISSION DID NOT ERR IN STATING THAT ITS FINAL DECISION WAS APPEALABLE TO THE APPELLATE DIVISION RATHER THAN THE COMMISSIONER OF EDUCATION.  POINT VII  THE COMMISSION DID NOT ERR IN DISMISSING COUNT  5 OF THE COMPLAINT  POINT VIII  THE COMMISSION DID NOT ERR IN DISMISSING COUNTS 2 AND 3 OF THE COMPLAINT.  CONCLUSION
[brief] ”  Here, there is not even an allegation that [...] or [...] signed [...]’s Contract.  Plaintiffs have nothing in their possession to show that [...] ever signed this document.  (Pa169)  In *Hirsch v. Amper Financial Services, LLC*, 215 N.J. 174, 196 (2013), the Court emphasized the right to a jury trial and held that “in the absence of a consensual understanding neither party is entitled to force the other to arbitrate their dispute”
[directive] Clerks Courts  Attorney General [...] Trial Court Administrators  Public Defender [...] Special Assistants  Criminal Division Managers and Assistants  Criminal Division Judges Family Division Judges Family Division Managers  Municipal Presiding Judges  Municipal Division Managers  [...], Director, DCJ Vicinage  Chief Probation Officers  [...], Chief of Staff [...], Chief, Criminal Practice  AOC Directors and Assistant Directors  [...], Assistant Chief, Criminal Practice  ATTACHMENT  1  PTI  APPLICATION of Superior Court
[brief] The Supreme Court explained that the source of the error was the trial court’s failure to appreciate that the facts of Taylor involved allegations that “the engineer in the exercise of diligence and reasonable care could have seen that the plaintiff’s automobile was stalled on the crossing, in time and at such a distance so as to have stopped the train before colliding with it” while the facts of Jelenik involved a truck that simply failed to yield to an approaching train.  Id.  Our Supreme Court then explained the general duty of an engineer approaching a crossing as follows:  The engineer can rightfully assume that travelers in the exercise of due care with due regard to the railroad's right of way, will not attempt to cross the tracks.  But if in the exercise of reasonable diligence it should become apparent that the traveler in disregard of due care or the railroad's right of way will or is attempting to cross the crossing before the train so that a collision will probably result, then from that point on the engineer must with all reasonable care and diligence attempt to stop the train.  If he does so then there is no negligence.  Id. (citation omitted) (emphasis added).  Going further, our Supreme Court explained:  We do not subscribe to the view that the use of the words ‘possible danger of collision’ in the Taylor opinion when read in proper context gives rise to the imputation that the railroad must with reasonable care and diligence attempt to stop its train merely because there is a bare possibility of collision because such a view disregards the reciprocal rights and duties of the railroad and the traveler at the crossing.  The duty of reasonable care and diligence is founded on the probabilities of a given situation, not on mere possibilities.  Id. (quoting Taylor, 87 N.J.L. at 675) (emphasis added).  The rule explained in Jelenik -- that an engineer does not owe a duty to slow or stop a train until after it is apparent that a person, in disregard of the train’s right of way, is present on, or will enter onto, the railroad tracks -- was most recently cited with approval by our Appellate Division in Lopez v. New Jersey Transit, 295 N.J. Super. 196 (App. Div. 1996).
[brief] \(^2\)  Pursuant to R. 2:6-8, “Da” refers to the applicable document in the accompanying Appendix. and Plaintiff employed improper pressure tactics on [...] clients to transfer their matters to the [...].  [Da8].  On March 20, 2023, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Verified Complaint with Exhibits, the operative pleading in this matter, raising new factual allegations to support his claim for retaliation under the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (“NJLAD”).  [Da36].  On March 23, 2023, the parties appeared before [...] for oral argument on the [...]’s Order to Show Cause. \(^3\)  Thereafter, [...] entered an Order denying the relief requested by the [...].  [Da159].  On March 24, 2023, the Hon. [...], P.J.Ch. ordered both parties’ actions to be transferred to the Law Division of the Essex County Superior Court.  [Da164-65].  On March 29, 2023, the [...] voluntarily dismissed its Complaint against Plaintiff and the Fredson firm without prejudice so that the claims could be asserted as a counterclaim and a third-party complaint in the Law Division in the present matter.
[brief] ”  *Presbyterian Home at Pennington, Inc. v. Borough of Pennington,* 409 N.J. Super. 166, 180 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 2009) (citing *Jablonowska v. Suther,* 195 N.J. 91, 105, 948 A.2d 610 (2008)).  Thus, under typical circumstances, the Court should “first look to the plain language of the statute in question[,] . . . [and] give those words their ordinary meaning and significance. ”  *Matter of C.P.M.*, 461 N.J. Super. 573, 582–83 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 2019) (citations and quotations omitted).
[brief] See Rendine, 141 N.J. at 322-337.  Courts simply are not permitted, under the Rendine standards, to reduce and/or eliminate reasonable attorney’s fees requested in a counsel fee application by 93 percent – in effect – to almost nothing.  (Pa9-21).  As our Supreme Court has stated:  No one expects a lawyer to give his services at bargain rates in a civil matter on behalf of a client who is not impecunious.  No one expects a lawyer whose compensation is contingent upon his success to charge, when successful, as little as he would charge a client who in advance has agreed to pay for his services, regardless of success.  [Rendine, 141 N.J. at 338 (quoting Cherner v. Transitron Elec. Corp., 221 F. Supp. 55, 61 (D. Mass. 1963)].  In light of the foregoing, the trial court’s reduction and elimination of fees requested in plaintiff’s fee application should be reversed.
[brief] In April --- 1  The procedural and factual histories are wholly entangled and are therefore combined for clarity and to avoid repetition.  2  “Da” refers to Defendant-Appellant [...]’s appendix.  2018, following a plenary hearing, the Chancery Court concluded that those transfers were made to avoid having sufficient cash to post a bond to secure the judgment.  By Order dated July 3, 2018 (July 3rd Order), the Chancery Court directed [...] and [...] to return $18 million (Funds) by July 16, 2018, and, if they failed to do so, they were to appear in Court on July 19, 2018 to be remanded to the [...] (BCJ) to serve each weekend until the money was returned.
[directive] The new commit will flee, defendant a likelihood that the assess to courts requiring approach, the of One witnesses. other and victims intimidating by justice obstruct or activity, criminal process predictive this that is initiative reform entire the undergirding innovations critical most been has that process risk-assessment pretrial objective an by informed be will henceforth of a use  The 2A:162-25(c).  N.J.S.A. research.  See empirical through validated and designed and just a toward advance major a represents instrument risk-assessment pretrial validated process risk-assessment pretrial the because  However, system. release pretrial effective adult defendant's and charge present the of nature general the on depends AOC the by approved relevant for all account not may history, it court-appearance and conviction criminal Jersey  New current which the in manner specific or the defendant the to pertaining circumstances and facts to prosecutors police and for appropriate and necessary is therefore It committed.
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY INSTRUCTED THE JURY ON DEFENDANT’S LEGAL DUTIES, WHILE FACT WITNESSES PROPERLY EVIDENCED THAT DEFENDANT KNOWINGLY VIOLATED THOSE DUTIES FOR THE JURY TO RENDER A VALID GUILTY VERDICT OF OFFICIAL MISCONDUCT.  Defendant contends that the judge failed to instruct the jury on defendant’s legal duties and then compounded that error by wrongly allowing the State’s witnesses to define defendant’s official duties.  The argument misapprehends the proper division between the judge’s role to permit a charge of official misconduct to be presented to a jury on finding a clear duty existed, and the jury’s role to find whether defendant knew of the duty alleged to have been violated, and knowingly violated it.
[brief] 1.  Lennig is not controlling  Just as the trial court did, Plaintiffs continue to misunderstand the import – or lack thereof – of Lennig v. Ocean City Ass’n, 41 N.J. Eq. 606 (1886).  Lennig, which involved an attempt by the defendant developer to change the use of a designated “tenting ground” property shown on a map on which the plaintiff claimed he had relied when purchasing his property, supports the proposition that a conveyance describing land conveyed by reference to a map may imply the creation of a servitude restricting use of the land shown on the map to the indicated uses.  Id. at 608-610; see also Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes § 2.13 (“In a conveyance . . . description of the land conveyed by reference to a map or boundary may imply the creation of a servitude, if . . . (1)  A description of the land conveyed that refers to a plat or map showing streets, ways, parks, open space, beaches, or other areas for common use or benefit, implies creation of a servitude restricting use of the land shown on the map to the indicated uses”).  The Lennig court determined that the defendant could not change the denoted use of the “tenting ground” property because such a change would interfere with rights which the plaintiff had otherwise acquired at the time he purchased his property in reliance on the description of that property as “tenting ground. ”  Lennig, 41 N.J. Eq. at 608-610.  Here, there is no dispute that [...] has never changed the use of the beach as a beach nor prevented Plaintiffs from using or accessing the beach from the designated street ends shown on the 1925 Map.  If [...] had tried to change the use of the beach as a beach or had tried to preclude Plaintiffs from accessing the beach from the street end-access points shown on the map, then Lennig would be applicable.  But that is not the issue at issue on this appeal.
[brief] In particular, LTTEL sought to encourage investment by “private capital” in projects designed to further the public purpose of restoring “deteriorating or neglected properties” and eliminating “blighted conditions. ”  N.J.S.A. 40A:20-2.  See MEPT Journal Square Urban Renewal LLC v. Jersey City, 455 N.J. Super. 608, 623 (App. Div. 2018), certif. den. 236 N.J. 387 (2019).  Importantly, Section 40A:20-2 of the LTTEL directs that the act “should be construed in conjunction with” the Local Redevelopment Law.  Id.  See, e.g., Millennium Towers Urban Renewal LLC v. Municipal Council of City of Jersey City, 343 N.J. Super. 367, 778 A. 2d 498 (App. Div. 2001)(emphasizing that LTTEL and LRHL must be construed in concert).
[directive] Czy zdaje Pan(i) sobie sprawę, że jeżeli zostanie Pan(i) uznany(a) za przestępcę [Tak/Yes] [Nie/No] 6. seksualnego, którego postępowanie jest powtarzalne i kompulsywne i który może odnieść korzyść z terapii dla przestępców seksualnych, ale nie wyrazi Pan(i) zgody na udział w tego rodzaju terapii i zostanie osadzony(a) w innej placówce, a nie w Centrum Diagnostyki i Leczenia Dorosłych, również będzie Pan(i) podlegać zasadom dotyczącym zwolnienia warunkowego opisanym w punkcie 5 powyżej?  Do you understand that if you are determined to be a repetitive, compulsive sex offender who not is amenable to (will benefit from) sex offender treatment but you are willing to participate in such treatment and are confined to a facility other than [...], you will also be subject to the same parole eligibility terms as contained in section 5 above?  Czy zdaje Pan(i) sobie sprawę, że jeśli Pana(i) postępowanie stanowiło nie [Tak/Yes] [Nie/No] 7. elementu powtarzalnego i kompulsywnego zachowania lub że nie odniesie Pan(i) korzyści z terapii dla przestępców seksualnych, nie będzie Panu(i) początkowo przysługiwało prawo do zwolnienia warunkowego przed upływem obowiązkowego minimalnego okresu pozbawienia wolności nałożonego przez sąd lub przed odbyciem jednej trzeciej orzeczonej kary w przypadku, gdy nie ustalono obowiązkowego minimalnego okresu pozbawienia wolności żaden z i tych okresów nie będzie mógł być skrócony za dobre sprawowanie lub za pracę? not Do you understand that if your conduct is characterized by a pattern of repetitive, compulsive behavior or you are not amenable to sex offender treatment you will not become primarily eligible for parole until you have served any mandatory minimum term imposed by or the court one third of the sentence imposed where no mandatory minimum term is fixed and neither term will be reduced by commutation time for good behavior or work credits?
[directive] Responsibilities  1.  Division of Criminal Justice:  •  To establish a system of compliance, provide oversight for this policy, and assist in implementing the policy statewide.  •  To provide all necessary and reasonable assistance to state, county, and municipal law enforcement agencies and other agencies affected by this policy.  •  To maintain a record of those persons identified by state agencies who are authorized to carry an automatic or semi-automatic assault weapon pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:39-6.
[directive] ATTORNEY GENERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT DIRECTIVE  2005-3  ESTABLISHING A STATEWIDE TRAINING POLICY ON THE SAFE RETURN PROGRAM TO RECOVER LOST INDIVIDUALS WITH ALZHEIMER’S DISEASE AND RELATED DISORDERS  WHEREAS, Alzheimer’s disease affects approximately four million Americans diagnosed with the disease, and countless family members and caregivers dedicated to caring for these individuals; and WHEREAS, Alzheimer’s disease is a progressive brain disorder that gradually destroys a person’s memory and ability to learn, reason, make judgments, communicate and carry out daily activities.  As Alzheimer’s progresses, individuals may also experience changes in personality and behavior, such as anxiety, suspiciousness or agitation, as well as delusions or hallucinations; and WHEREAS, 60% of the four million Americans diagnosed with Alzheimer’s disease will become disoriented and wander away from home, law enforcement personnel will come into contact with individuals with Alzheimer’s Disease during the course of their duty; WHEREAS, it is particularly important to find a person with Alzheimer’s disease within the first 24 hours to ensure safety and survival; and WHEREAS, the New Jersey legislature enacted N.J.S.A. 52:17B-77.7-77.10 in order to insure all law enforcement in New Jersey are trained on the utilization of the Safe Return program to facilitate the safe recovery of those who wander off and become lost; and WHEREAS, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 52:17B-77.7-77.10,the Attorney General must establish a training policy for all State Police and local law enforcement personnel on the utilization of the Safe Return Program in order to protect the health and welfare of those state residents diagnosed with Alzheimer’s disease and related disorders; and NOW, THEREFORE, I, [...], ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY, by virtue of the authority vested in me by the Constitution and the Criminal Justice Act of 1970, N.J.S.A. 52: 17B-97 et seq. and pursuant to N.J.S.A. 52:17B-77.7-77.10 do hereby DIRECT the following:
[brief] (a)  A dispute resolution professional employed by the dispute resolution organization shall be either:  1.  An attorney licensed to practice in New Jersey with at least 10 years of experience in cases involving personal injury or workers' compensation; 2.  A former judge of the Superior Court or the Workers' Compensation Court, or a former Administrative Law Judge; or 3.  Any other person, qualified by education and at least 10 years' experience, with sufficient understanding of automobile insurance claims and practices, contract law, and judicial or alternate dispute resolution practices and procedures.  N.J.A.C.11:3-5.5.  Accordingly, most DRPs are former No-Fault attorneys or retired judges with decades of experience in the industry.  They are the undeniable experts in the field of No-Fault disputes, including allegations of fraud in No-Fault claims.
[brief] On April 14, 2020, the Governor signed a bill passed by the Legislature, later codified at N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-9e(3), that required school districts to pay contracted service providers during the COVID-19 shutdown as if schools were still open and the services were being rendered, without regard to whether any services were being rendered or not; on June 29, 2020, the Statute was amended to require that contractors receiving such payments make payment of wages to all employees who were laid off due to the school closure.