ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT ALSO CORRECTLY HELD THAT MOSLEY’S MALICIOUS PROSECUTION-RELATED CLAIMS ACCRUED ON MARCH 6, 2018, AND, THEREFORE, ARE TIME-BARRED.  (Addressing Appellant’s Points I.A & III.)  This court should also affirm the trial court’s finding that to the extent [...] was asserting any malicious prosecution-related claims, they began to accrue on March 6, 2018.  (1T 14:7-:15).  This court has held that “determining the date upon which a statute of limitations begins to run is an issue of law, subject to plenary review. ”  See J.P. v. Smith, 444 N.J. Super. 507, 520 (App. Div. 2016) (internal citation omitted).  Here, this court should affirm the trial court below and hold that [...]’s malicious prosecution claim accrued on March 6, 2018, when the Supreme Court reversed [...]’s VOP conviction on direct appeal, consistent with controlling and persuasive law.
[directive] The Court nonetheless cautioned that the plea agreement in that case should have spelled out more clearly what the defendant was expected to do.  Although the defendant had executed a “Confidential Informer Contract of Cooperation,” the term “cooperation”  Page 103  [...] Guidelines 2 (2004 Revisions) was not defined in that document or anywhere else in the record.  Accordingly, all plea agreements that are offered in exchange for a defendant’s promise to provide future or ongoing cooperation must set forth the reasonable expectations and obligations of both the defendant and the State in sufficient detail so that those expectations and agreed-upon responsibilities are clearly understood and can be reviewed upon request by the Division of Criminal Justice and enforced by a court, if necessary.  Nothing in this Section shall be construed to require that any information concerning the existence, nature, or extent of a defendant’s cooperation or future cooperation be made part of a record available to the public or be revealed in open court; rather, it is expected that such information, including but not limited to a completed worksheet indicating that the prosecutor has made a Downward Departure for Substantial Cooperation, should be provided to the court in camera and under seal so as to protect the defendant and to preserve the integrity of the process.
[brief] In his Complaint, Appellant alleged that Respondent sought to collect from him a debt relating to a defaulted Mastercard credit card account (the “debt”).  Appx., at 2a.  On May 23, 2020, Respondent sent Appellant a collection letter which included his name, basic information about the account (e.g., name, address, balance, name of creditor), three payment plan options to resolve his debt, and a typical time-barred debt disclosure.  *Id.*, at 2a, 9a.  Respondent used a letter vendor to print and mail the letter, which required Respondent to transmit to the vendor the above-referenced information about the debt.  *Id.*, at 3a.  From these mundane allegations, Appellant asserted that Respondent violated the FDCPA by communicating about the debt with a third party, using harassing, unfair and unconscionable means to collect a debt, and employing false, deceptive and misleading representations in its letter.
[directive] 1.  training.  The existing Use of Force Policy requires officers to complete Use of force force. ”2 twice-annual training on the “lawful and appropriate use of force and deadly  The New UOF Trainings cover that same topic, among other things.  Therefore, instead of completing two trainings in calendar year 2021 under the existing Use of Force Policy, officers need only (1) attend one semi-annual use of force training under the existing Use of Force Policy and (2) complete the eight comprehensive online training modules on the Revised Policy.  This modified training schedule does not alter the effective date of the Revised Policy, which remains December 31, 2021.
[brief] [...]  Date Submitted: July 15, 2024  [...]  ATTORNEY GENERAL OF NEW JERSEY R.J. Hughes Justice Complex  P.O. Box 114 Trenton, New Jersey 08625  Attorney for Respondent, State of New Jersey, Department of Transportation  [...] Assistant Attorney General Of Counsel [...] Deputy Attorney General (Attorney ID No.: 322812021)  On the Brief TABLE OF CONTENTS
[brief] The warrant also allowed the police to search all persons found at the service station during the execution of the search warrant.  The Court held that the warrant's authorization of the search of all unnamed persons found on the premises could only be valid if there was probable cause to believe that all persons who might be found at the service station were engaged in illegal gambling.  It emphasized that presence alone did not establish probable cause; there must be additional factors establishing a sufficient nexus between all persons present at the service station and the illegal gambling.  Here, the officer's affidavit, however, did not set forth any legitimate basis for reaching that conclusion, as is lacking in the instant case with defendant.  Therefore, the Court in Sims found the search warrant invalid with respect to the search of all unnamed persons present.  Similarly, in State v. Riggins, 138 N.J. Super. 497, 503 (Law Div. 1975), a warrant was issued to search a tavern where illegal gambling was suspected.
[brief] The Board further breached the Settlement Agreement as Section 8(g) states that “the Board shall promptly deliberate on the SPA and vote.  Following the vote of the Board, the Board shall memorialize its decision regarding the SPA in a written resolution, which shall be adopted by the Board within the earlier of 30 days or the second meeting following the approval meeting. ”  Pa056 (emphasis added).  Paragraph 10 of the Settlement Agreement provides that the “Township and the Board . . . shall fully cooperate and assist with [...]’s efforts . . . to secure necessary municipal, county and state permits, approvals . . . including the SPA . . . [and] the Township and Board shall cooperate with [[...]] . . .
[brief] #  Table of Authorities | CASES | Page | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | Arsenis v. Borough of Bernardsville, | 20 | | 476 N.J. Super. 195 (App. Div. 2023) | | | Barila v. Board of Educ. of Cliffside Park, | 15,16,35 | | 241 N.J. 595 (2020)  | | | Bryant v. City of Atl. City, | 48 | | 309 N.J. Super. 596 (App. Div. 1998) | | | Burgos v. State, | 35,36,37 | | 222 N.J. 175 (2015)  | | | Caponegro v. State Operated School District of the | 1,26,27,28,29,31,45 | | City of Newark, Essex County, | | | 330 N.J. Super. 148 (App. Div. 2000) | | | Charlie Brown of Chatham v. Board of Adjustment of Chatham, | 47-48 | | 202 N.J.Super. 312 (App.Div.1985) | | | DiCristofaro v. Laurel Grove Memorial Park, | 21 | | 43 N.J. Super. 244 (App. Div. 1957) | | | Donato v. Moldow, | 20 | | 374 N.J. Super. 475 (App. Div. 2005) | | | Donelson v. DuPont Chambers Works, | 23 | | 206 N.J. 243 (2011) | | | Energy Reserves Grp., Inc. v. Kan. Power & Light Co., | 36 | | 459 U.S. 400 (1983) | | | Evans v. Atlantic City Bd. Of Educ., | 48 | | 404 N.J. Super. 87 (App. Div. 2008) | | Felicioni v. Admin. Office of Courts, 404 N.J. Super. 382 (App. Div. 2008)...........................................23 F.G. v. MacDonell, 150 N.J. 550 (1997)........................................................................21 F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412 (1920).......................................................................42
[brief] “The general rule is that only a former or current client has standing to bring a motion to disqualify counsel on the basis of a conflict of interest. ”  ABA, *Ann. Mod. Rules Prof. Cond.* § 1.7 (10th ed. 2023); see also [...], *Standing of Person, Other than Former Client, to Seek Disqualification of Attorney in Civil Action*, 72 A.L.R.6th 563 §§ 8-9 (2012 & Supp.) (stating the “majority view” that “only current and former clients have standing to seek disqualification of counsel”); [...], *The Rude Question of Standing in Attorney Disqualification Disputes*, 25 Am. J. Trial Advoc. 17, 34 (2001) (“The majority view is that only a current or former client has standing to disqualify an attorney.
[brief] A “criminal action” is also instituted even when the prosecutor administratively terminates a matter without further action.  Taffaro v. Taffaro, DC-0778-10, 2011 WL 6014225, at *1-2 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Dec. 5, 2011).  And in the context of insurance coverage for malicious prosecution claims, the “occurrence” that triggers the indemnity obligation is the filing of the criminal complaint, not any subsequent acts, even though the accused plaintiff’s claim for malicious prosecution does not accrue until after he has been exonerated of the underlying criminal charge.  Muller Fuel Oil Co., 95 N.J. Super. at 576-79.  No New Jersey case has ever held that the “criminal action” element requires some form of judicial action beyond the filing of the criminal complaint itself.
[brief] 1T30-31.  I know the complaints that [...] had contending that the Court did not follow the statute, that the receiver is not entitled to discharge, but what was telling was for all the work that both sides, both [...] and [...], were seeking [...] to perform relative to his position as a receiver before he would be discharged, neither of them were in a position willing to compensate him for that, and that is telling in the case to the Court, and that is part of the basis.  But I reincorporate all my findings from the October 6th hearing and my decision thereon and I deny the motion for reconsideration.
[brief] Contrary to appellant’s assertion, paragraph four does not contain a mutual indemnity obligation that required each party to indemnify the other for their respective negligence.  The clause specifically articulates the responsibilities of each party without reciprocal indemnification.  The first sentence of paragraph four (4) clearly articulates that [...] would be responsible for any claims that arise from negligent snow plowing while on [...]’s premises.  Sub judice, the provision did not apply because the accident occurred when [...] was not on site.  The sentence did not contain any mutual reciprocity with regard to indemnification.  The next sentence of paragraph four (4) stated to the fullest extent permitted by law, [...]s (Customer) shall defend, indemnify and hold harmless [...], its owners, agents, consultants, employees, and subcontractors from all claims for bodily injury and property damage that may arise from Customer’s premises including and “any” [emphasis provided] acts or omissions by Customer or Customer’s subcontractors whether employed directly or indirectly for ice which forms from daytime melting from snow and ice which is removed from, brought in by or in between vehicles.  Notably, this sentence did not contain any mutual reciprocity with regard to indemnification.  Appellant’s argument that there was mutual reciprocal indemnity language in paragraph 4 is devoid of merit.  This paragraph clearly articulated the nature of the claims subject to indemnification, i.e., bodily injury and the scope of matters from which those claims arise, i.e., [...]s’ work.  It states with specificity [...]s duty to defend.  Finally, the clause stated that [...]s will defend and indemnify [...] for bodily injury claims, including and [sic] (any) acts or omissions by Customer or Customer’s subcontractor whether employed directly or indirectly for ice...[Emphasis added].  The sentence specifically references acts or omissions of [...]’s contractor, [...].  The indemnification language contained in paragraph four (4) is enforceable as it unequivocally addresses and considered any act or omission of [...].
[brief] Regarding expert testimony and evidence specifically, engineering traffic consultant [...] produced two reports, one on April 10, 2023, review and a revised report dated April 11, 2023, both of which undermined the applicability of Plaintiff’s expert [...].  (Pa139-141; Pa199-200).  The April 11, 2023, Traffic Report by the Board’s Traffic Engineer Joseph [...] is expressly referenced in the Planning Board’s May 15, 2023, Decision and Resolution.  (Pa117-128; see specifically, Pa124).  Plaintiff’s argument that the Decisions and Resolution “does not make any real ‘findings’” is an obvious mischaracterization as it ignores the prior ten pages wherein the Planning Board provided the basis for its conclusions.  Thus, the Trial Court properly found that the Planning Board’s denial of the variance was not “arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable.
[brief] The [...] here argues that Defendant [...] should not be indemnified for a lawsuit he allegedly caused.  This argument must be rejected.  First, Defendant [...] did not “cause” the lawsuit; the lawsuit was initiated by Plaintiff [...].  Second, [...] had good-faith arguments regarding why he was unable to comply with the [...]’s order, but the [...] refused to make those arguments and refused to indemnify him.  Third, and perhaps most importantly, the underlying [...] action never resulted in any final findings of misconduct against Defendant.  The Plaintiff settled the [...] complaint with the [...] before the Office of Administrative Law held a hearing regarding whether Defendant [...] knowingly and willfully violated OPRA.  (Da480).  For these reasons, Defendant should be indemnified for his costs and expenses accrued in the action below and on this appeal.
[brief] For example, in Ramos v. Browning Feris Industries, Inc., 103 N.J. 177 (1986), the Supreme Court ruled that a contract that required the customer to indemnify the contractor for claims of injury “resulting from or arising in any manner out of [the] Customer’s use, operation, or possession of the equipment furnished” by the contractor was unenforceable with regard to indemnification for the contractor’s own negligence.  Id. at 181-82.  In that case, a waste-removal contractor sought indemnification from its customer for injuries sustained by the plaintiff, who was an employee of the customer.  *Id.* at 181.  The contractor contracted with the customer to provide a compactor to dispose of solid waste.  *Id.* at 181.  The customer’s workers would empty steel drums of solid waste into the compactor.  *Id.* at 182.  The contractor would remove, empty, and return the compactor to the customer’s premises.  *Ibid.*  The plaintiff was injured in the course of his employment as he was pushing a cart to move a drum to the compactor to empty it.  *Ibid.*  The accident happened when the cart hit a snow-covered hole, which caused the drum to fall off of the cart and onto the claimant’s leg.  *Ibid.*  The hole was created by the contractor’s trucks as they removed and returned the compactor.  *Ibid.*  The plaintiff sued the contractor, which in turn sued the customer for indemnification.  *Ibid.*  The contract between the contractor and the customer stated that the customer “accepts responsibility” for the contractor’s equipment “except when it is physically being handled by employees” of the contractor.  *Ibid.*  The contract further required the customer to indemnify the contractor for claims of injury “resulting from or arising in any manner out of [the employer’s] use, operation, or possess of the equipment furnished under this Agreement. ”  *Ibid.*  The Law Division ruled that the clause did not entitle the contractor to indemnity for the plaintiff’s loss.  *Ibid.*  The Appellate Division reversed, ruling that the customer agreed to indemnify the contractor for all losses except when the contractor’s employees were physically handling the equipment.  *Ibid.*  The Supreme Court reversed.  *Id.* at 181.  It ruled that if an indemnification clause is ambiguous, “the clause should be strictly construed against the indemnitee. ”  *Id.* at 191.  Thus “a contract will not be construed to indemnify the indemnitee against losses resulting from its own negligence unless such an intent is expressed in unequivocal terms. ”  *Ibid.*  The Court ruled that the contract was ambiguous about whether the customer would indemnify the contractor for the contractor’s own negligence at times other than when the contractor’s personnel were physically handling the equipment.  *Id.* at 193.  Because of that ambiguity, the contractor was not entitled to indemnification for the plaintiff’s claims.  *Ibid.*  In *Mantilla v. NC Mall Associates*, 167 N.J. 262 (1999), the Supreme Court reaffirmed its holding in *Ramos* that a contract that does not express an obligation to indemnify an indemnitee for the indemnitee’s own negligence in “unequivocal terms” is unenforceable.
[brief] (See Pa113 at 18:15–19, 19:10–14; Pa491–92 ¶¶ 23–24; Pa527; Pa529.)  This Court has already found that [...] expressed the basis for a bad faith claim at the February 2020 Council Meeting but declined to advance it in the First Action—and that, in any event, the bad faith claim was unmeritorious.  The trial court’s Denial and Dismissal Order of the Second Action was predicated on precisely what this Court decided.
[brief] **New Jersey Law Barred [...] from Participating at Trial**  [...] correctly asserted below that [...] would not participate in the underlying trial or appear on the verdict sheet.  As Plaintiff’s employer, New Jersey law barred [...] from participating in the underlying personal injury trial.  Approximately three decades ago, the Appellate Division held, and the Supreme Court affirmed, it was neither necessary nor appropriate to permit an injured plaintiff’s employer to participate in the personal injury trial.  *Kane v. Hartz Mountain Industries, Inc.*, 278 N.J. Super. 129, 146-147 (App. Div.) aff’d 143 N.J. 141 (1996).  Rather, “the trial of the third-party claim should be severed. ”  *Ibid.* (emphasis added).  In *Kane*, Plaintiff sustained injuries in the course and scope of his employment with [...] (“[...]”) when he fell from a 29-foot-high beam.
[brief] Ibid.; (Pa46).  On June 23, 2022, the Commissioner upheld the State Board’s order of suspension, and [...] appealed the matter to the Appellate Division, where it is still pending under *In re Certificates of Nicholas [...]*, [...]. (Pa47; Pa41).  On November 9, 2021, [...] informed [...] that because of the State Board’s order of \(^2\) N.J.S.A. 18A:6-16 requires the Commissioner to initially review tenure charges and render a determination as to the sufficiency of the charges.
[directive] 4  In addition, the rules and regulations should set forth a schedule of possible penalties an officer might receive when discipline is imposed.  The rules and regulations may incorporate a system of progressive discipline.  Progressive discipline serves an important role in the process by which the agency deals with complaints of misconduct or inappropriate behavior.  In lieu of discipline, counseling, re-training, enhanced supervision, oral reprimand and performance notices can be used as instructional or remedial devices to address deficiencies or inadequate performance.  2.2.5  In providing a range of penalties, the agency can use the disciplinary process to achieve the basic goals of instruction and address inappropriate behavior before minor problems escalate into major problems.  At the same time, the subject officer should be made aware that repeated violations of the agency's rules will result in progressive discipline.  An internal affairs complaint that has a disposition of exonerated, unfounded or not sustained should not be used to effect progressive discipline.  2.2.6
[brief] (Pa124a).  [...] was previously a custody officer and institutional major, where he handled policies and disciplines for the Department.  Ibid.  [...] explained that part of an HUO’s job is to perform inmate counts at designated times; during third shift, they should occur at 10:00 p.m., 11:00 p.m., 12:00 a.m., and then every half hour until the end of the shift.  Ibid.  After the count, HUOs should immediately report to the Center Control and enter the information into the logbook.  Ibid.  During the count, HUOs are expected to see “flesh and movement” in the bed, as required by Departmental policy.  (Pa124a-125a).  SID Investigator [...] first identified the logbook for Stowe Two North during the third shift on August 16, 2019.  (1T47:2-5).  [...] explained that according to the logbook, [...] performed inmate counts at 2:00a.m., 2:30a.m., 3:00a.m., 3:30a.m., and 4:00a.m. (1T54:9-1T55:11; Ra1).  [...] then reviewed the surveillance footage and explained that this was not possible.  (1T72:13-16).  He noted that in Stowe Two, there is a food preparation room that has only two points of entry and both are within view of a surveillance camera.  (1T65:25-66:9).  Surveillance video showed shared common space between the Stowe Two Housing Units, Stowe Two North and South.  (Pa004a).  Stowe Two North’s wings are to the right of the officer’s desk.  *Ibid.*  The food preparation room is located to the left of the officer’s desk and the wings in Stowe Two North.  (1T62:18-23).  The surveillance video for August 16 to 17, 2019 was introduced in evidence and revealed that during [...]’ shift, he took a meal break in the food preparation room, and then returned to his station at the Stowe Two North desk at 1:31 a.m.
[brief] [...] was subjected to an “hours-long ordeal,” at first “refus[ed] to cooperate or consent” (Db15), and “resisted them throughout most of the encounter” (Db21), do not withstand the slightest scrutiny of the record, since they mischaracterize the parties’ interactions for the three hours before police confronted her with knowledge of the true facts of her role.  Also, defendant’s claim [...] “initially refused to consent to an apparent police entry” (Db17) is a misinterpretation of the video; in response to an officer’s question, “Where’d you find her?”, another officer said [...] was walking, and then said she, the officer, thought “the daughter went and got her because y’all had knocked on the door, she said. ”  (Dca 1, clip four, 27:00 to 27:12).  The officer was speaking of [...], not [...], at the apartment.  Nor does defendant’s assertion that [...]’s decision to consent was “unexplained” (Db15) withstand scrutiny.  The police explained to her what the complex’s surveillance videos clearly showed, which she knew to be true.  She knew that they knew the truth, and she was warned that the only way she would get into trouble was to lie to them.  Defendant’s accusations that police “shouted at her at least once,” “threatened” her, and made “demands and promises,” (Db16-17), are shown by the video to be grossly overstated.  [...]’s consent was voluntary.  She willingly gave it to exculpate herself, a motivation that numerous courts have recognized and endorsed in upholding third-party consents.
[directive] 8.0.3  While a police officer has the same constitutional rights as any other person during a criminal investigation, their status as a police officer may create special concerns.  For the most part, the internal affairs investigator should utilize the same procedures and apply the same legal principles to the subject officer as he or she would to any other target or suspect in a criminal investigation.  However, the internal affairs investigator should recognize that the interview process of a police officer is somewhat different than that of civilians.  8.0.4