ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] *Id.*, at 926 (emphasis original).  In that case, the parties agreed that “and any claim or dispute related to this agreement or the relationship or duties contemplated under this contract, including the validity of this arbitration clause, shall be resolved by binding arbitration by [[...]], under the Code of Procedure then in effect” and contained no provision for a substitute arbitrator.  *Id.*, at 924-925.  When the [...] was not available to arbitrate the dispute, [...] sought to compel [...] to arbitrate before a substitute arbitrator appointed by the court in lieu of litigation.  *Id.*, at 926.  As noted above, the Missouri Supreme Court rejected that application, holding “the plain and unambiguous language of the Agreement shows [...] and [...] agreed to arbitrate before – but only before – [...].  The Agreement provides [...]'s claims “*shall be* resolved by binding arbitration *by the [...]*  …The unequivocal, plain and clear terms of this Agreement establish that [...] and [...] agreed only to arbitrate before [...]. ”  *Id.*, at 926 (emphasis original).  According, because the “plain language of the Agreement” demonstrated that the “parties arbitration agreement was limited to the specified arbitrator” the Missouri Supreme Court held there was no agreement to arbitrate and therefore no authority to appoint a substitute arbitrator.
[brief] More specifically, defendant states that he “could not make a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver of his right to counsel to the most serious motor vehicle offense heard in municipal court without the benefit of ever requesting and/or reviewing [discovery] in his DWI prosecution. ” (Db 12).  However, defendant was not “uncounseled” because he was “advised by the municipal court of his right to retain counsel or, if indigent, of his right to appointed counsel without cost. ”  *Patel*, 239 N.J. at 448.  Contrary to defendant’s interpretation of “uncounseled,” [...] properly adhered to the definition espoused in *Patel*, and held, “While defendant was unrepresented when he entered his guilty plea, he was not uncounseled as defined in *Patel*, as he was advised by [...] on at least three occasions that he had a right to counsel and if could not afford an attorney one would be appointed to represent him.
[brief] [...]'s submission shall detail the basis for the claimed Per Diem Penalty, and a calculation of the amount claimed to be due and owing.  (Pa1-2)  From the record below, it appears that the trial court made two (2) findings of fact: a. the Board had approved the [...]Bay application in December 2022 (Resolution PB-2022-025, Pa106) and then “unapproved” the application in January 2023 (Resolution PB-2023-003, Pa123) (2T4-15 to 2T6-1); and b. in its “unapproval” of the [...]Bay project in January 2023 (Board Resolution PB-2023-003, Pa123) the Board and the Township acted in bad faith.  (2T4-15 to 2T6-1).  From the record below, it appears that the trial court adopted two (2) conclusions of law: a. the Board and the Township breached the January 8, 2021, Settlement Agreement b. [...]Bay was entitled to damages by way of attorney’s fees and ‘Delay Penalties’
[brief] (Pa554-58 emphasis added)  10.  Mutual Cooperation on All Governmental Approvals.  The Township and the Board, including all of its officials, employees, agents, committees, departments, shall fully cooperate and assist with [...]’s efforts, to the extent permitted under any applicable state or federal law, rule or regulations, to secure necessary municipal, county and state permits, approvals, licenses, waivers, exceptions, easements, variations and variances for the development, including the SPA, Treatment Works Approval applications/permits, soil conservation district approvals, NJDEP Freshwater Wetlands and Flood Hazard Area approvals/permits, construction/building permits, and all other necessary or useful governmental approvals (“Government Approvals”).
[brief] [...] extracted footage from all 18 cameras of the surveillance system (including covering its two entrances) from between noon and midnight, downloaded the 216 hours of video onto a 300-gigabyte hard-drive, and gave it to [...].  [...] watched it intermittently over weeks, sometimes simultaneously watching footage from multiple cameras, without documenting anything.  (5T42-16 to 23, 43-16 to 44-5, 46-24 to 48-5, 53-1 to 15, 113-21 to 114-12, 118-9 to 119-25, 120-13 to 121-22, 126-16 to 19, 165-6 to 25, 200-25)
[brief] There is a video that depicts the inside of the store and outside sidewalk of the store located [...].  The third video depicts the outside sidewalk of the barber shop located at [...].  Two screen shots were presented to the jury and admitted in evidence as S-24A (1T89-11 to 1T90-2) and S24B (1T91-1 to 1T91-20).  (Da 17)²  The State's theory was that [...] is an individual seen near the shooting of [...] in that footage.  There are numerous people depicted in the video.  The actual shooting is not depicted.  The prosecutor was allowed to publish [...]'s mugshot to the jury (2T35-6 to 2T35-8), and he was required to lower his collar and let the jurors see a tattoo on his neck that was supposedly similar to that of the shooter.
[brief] Plaintiff needs lending at all – and therefore “cast[s] a shadow *potentially* on being able to move forward with development,” while also acknowledging that “nothing has been approved yet” and “no determination has been made that the Property is appropriate for the development of affordable housing. ” (1T52:15-53:9 (emphasis added)).  Under the Eminent Domain Act (“EDA”), multiple governmental actions would need to occur before [...] could even file a condemnation complaint, and none of those actions have occurred at this time. \(^1\) (See 1T27:3-12; 1T39:17-40:23).  The court’s own decision and the EDA demonstrate that any purported harm is not imminent, concrete, and non-speculative.  Subcarrier Commc’ns., Inc. v. Day, 299 N.J. Super. 634, 638 (App. Div. 1997).  \(^1\)  Even if [...] files a condemnation complaint, the condemnation court still has to decide that [...] has the authority to take the Property.  Plaintiff also does not – because it cannot – dispute that any harm is reversible and can be remedied by monetary damages.  If [...] were to take steps toward condemnation, Plaintiff could challenge those actions and the condemnation court can void those actions if it finds that [...] lacks authority to condemn the Property (based on Mount Laurel or otherwise).
[brief] The MLUL requires a Master Plan, a periodic re-examination of the Master Plan and the adoption of zoning ordinances which, for the most part, further the aims and goals of that Master Plan.  In this case, the Trial Judge failed to grasp these essential principles and totally mis-characterized the Plaintiffs’ correct analysis and application of these principles.  The reason for this important legal requirement is that Section 5 of the LRHL requires that all studies and plans be based upon “smart growth planning principles. ”  The Trial Court upheld the “overlay zone” for the entire town of [...] which allows for redevelopment anywhere in [...].  This “overlay zone” allows the creation of new structures in two other zones within the “plan” which are not connected in any way to the [...] site, the only site in this “plan” which meets the statutory standards.  Under Section 14 of the LRHL, the “overlay zone” must aim to “prevent further deterioration” of housing, sewer, and water infrastructures.  The entire Town of [...] is decidedly not “in need” of rehabilitation or redevelopment.  The redevelopment “plan” is markedly “inconsistent” with the current Master Plan which prohibits residential housing in the GB2 zone.  The only site within the plan which meets the statutory criteria of Section 5b is the abandoned [...] department store site.  The Town’s expert Topology report (incorporated into the redevelopment plan by ordinance) agrees abandoned department stores can be re-developed into productive and desirable sites (Pages 25-26, Pa0224-0225).  However, the creation of oversized structures in this plan in other areas not connected to the abandoned store does not comply at all with the substance of the redevelopment statutes.  Such additional sites can only be redeveloped “if necessary for the rehabilitation of a larger area. ”  None of the other areas of this plan are “necessary” to the redevelopment of the [...] site.  For these reasons, the decision below must be reversed.
[brief] [Id. at 476-77 (emphases added). ]  See also City Ass’n of Supervisors & Adm’rs v. State Operated Sch. Dist. Of Newark, 311 N.J. Super. 300, 312 (App. Div. 1998) (rejecting arbitration award which relied on past practices and “ignor[ed] the clear language of the agreement”); Beaird Indus., Inc. v. Local 2297, Int’l Union, 404 F.3d 942, 946–47 (5th Cir. 2005) (overturning arbitration award in which arbitrator balanced parties’ interests instead of applying contract language).
[directive] The Act considers the State ready if the prosecutor is prepared “to proceed to voir dire or to opening argument, or to the hearing of any motions that had been reserved for the time of trial. ”  Only “delays attributable to the” Ibid. defendant can be excluded from the two-year cap.  Ibid.  Rule 3:25-4 echoes and complements the Act, identifying categories that qualify as excludable time attributable to the defendant, setting time limits to resolve certain motions, and directing that the provision to exclude time for good cause “shall be narrowly construed.
[brief] ”  To determine that [...] poses this level of threat required expert testimony, as permanency is beyond the ken of the average juror.  [...] had eight puncture wounds, consistent with two bites.  [...] had only a single, one-half-inch gash on her side.  No veterinarian or animal behaviorist testified as to whether the two incidents are probative of [...]’s future behavior.  It is undisputed that [...] was pinning [...] down, in his mouth.  It is also undisputed that [...] bit [...] on the right arm while [...] had her left hand in [...]’s mouth, giving credence to [...]’s story that [...] was squirming and twisting backward.  [...]’s treating veterinarian was not called to testify on cause of death:  Was it solely from the wound?  Was the wound exacerbated by [...] thrashing about?  Would she have survived if not for the delays at the scene and another 20-minute drive to the veterinary hospital?  [2T133:17]  Was she euthanized?  Expert testimony was needed because the Court lacked the specialized knowledge to conclude that [...]’s behavior would escalate to serious bodily injury or death.
[brief] SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE  DIVISION  DOCKET NO.: [...]  CIVIL ACTION ON APPEAL FROM LAW  DIVISION: MERCER COUNTY DOCKET NO.: [...]  Sat Below: Hon. [...], A.J.S.C. PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS’ REPLY BRIEF AND APPENDIX  Date Submitted: April 18, 2024  Of Counsel and on the Brief: [...], Esq. (005501979)  [...], Esq. (041131997)  On the Brief: [...], Esq. (026671978)  [...], Esq. (054431992)  [...]  [...]  [...]  [...] [...]  Attorneys for Plaintiffs-Appellants
[brief] (Ca028).  In fact, [...] directly addressed Respondent’s failure to include a disclaimer no less than 6 times in her Initial Decision.  (Ca028) (“It is undisputed that [...] did not post a disclaimer”); (Ca030) (“failure to post a disclaimer”); (Ca031) (“a prominent disclaimer … may have avoided the appearance … that her statements … were made in her capacity as Board member”); (Ca033) (“This admission underscores the need for a clear disclaimer to ensure that the public does not perceive that statements are being made … in her capacity as a board member. ”) (“Failure to include a clear disclaimer”); (Ca034) (“… what is problematic is that she failed to include a clear disclaimer”).  This is because the Commission had already issued clear decisional law on this issue.
[brief] There was no claim in this matter that [...] has not kept its land use planning current.  N.J.Super. 242, 253 (App.Div. 2001) ("The Zoning Board may not utilize its power to grant variances to usurp the legislative power delegated to the governing body to effect the zoning scheme."); Vidal v. Lisanti Foods, Inc., 292 N.J.Super. 555, 561 (App.Div. 1996) ("a board of adjustment ‘may not, in the guise of a variance proceeding, usurp the legislative power reserved to the governing body … to amend or revise the plan…. Feiler v. Fort Lee Bd. of Adj., 240 N.J.Super. 250, 255 (App.Div.1990) (quoting Leimann v. Bd. of Adj. of Cranford, 9 N.J. 336, 340, (1952)), certif. denied, 127 N.J. 325 (1991)").
[brief] As admitted by Plaintiff, on April 11, 2016 [...] sent a letter to Plaintiff notifying him that [...] was terminating its lease effective on the date that is 30 days after Plaintiffs receipt of the notice.  Importantly, Plaintiff does not dispute that [...] had the right to terminate the lease by this notice.  Instead Plaintiff claims [...] rescinded its notice of termination pursuant to a verbal conversation with [...] which is said to be confirmed by a letter issued by Plaintiff to [...] dated May 6, 2016.  There are two problems with Plaintiff’s position.  First, [...] disputes that he ever verbally agreed to rescind the notice of termination.  Second, the “confirming” letter sent by Plaintiff was not countersigned by [...] or any other member of [...].  In fact, Plaintiff can produce no writing signed by any member of [...] that rescinds the notice of termination.  As Plaintiff admits in his moving brief, “paragraph 17 of the Lease specifically provides that “no terms may be modified except by agreement in writing signed by both parties.
[brief] In sum, defendant's conviction for accomplice liability for first-degree robbery must be reversed because: the court failed to provide the jury with a Whitaker charge as part of the instructions on accomplice liability for robbery; it failed to instruct the jury on the elements of accomplice liability for first-degree robbery; and the verdict sheet never asked the jury to determine whether he was guilty of accomplice liability for first-degree robbery and because these errors were compounded by the omission of the Whitaker charge.  Defendant's conviction for accomplice liability for felony murder also must be reversed.  Reversal of the conviction on a predicate felony requires reversal of the felony murder conviction.  State v. Savage, 172 N.J. 374, 395-400 (2002).  In this case, defendant was acquitted of own-conduct robbery when provided with the proper instructions on Whitaker and on the elements of first-degree robbery.  It was the conviction for accomplice liability for robbery that allowed the State to obtain a conviction for murder, while at the same time, relieving it from the burden of having to prove that that murder was purposeful or knowing.  For that reason, both the conviction for accomplice liability for first-degree robbery and the conviction for accomplice liability for felony murder must be reversed.  Defendant's conviction for accomplice liability for first-degree robbery and his conviction for accomplice liability for felony murder must be reversed.
[brief] [...], Esq.  Attorney ID No. 002581973  [...] [...]  Tel. No. [...]  Fax No. [...]  E-mail: [...]  Attorneys for Appellant, [...]  #  TABLE OF CONTENTS OF BRIEF | Section | Page | |------------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | PRELIMINARY STATEMENT | 1 | | PROCEDURAL HISTORY | 4 | | A. The Parties and Their Properties | 4 | | B.  The 1996 Oceanfront-Broadway Redevelopment Plan | 4 | | C. The Amendment to the 1996 Redevelopment Plan | 5 | | D. The Pleadings | 6 | | STATEMENT OF FACTS | 7 | | A.  The $2,000,000 Payment Was Made In Return for Permitting Increased Density | 7 | | 1.  The Original 1996 Redevelopment Plan and Design Guideline 6 | 7 | | 2.  The 2020 Redevelopment Plan Amendment | 8 | | 3.  The $2,000,000 Density Bonus Payment | 9 | | B.  [...] Was Required to Obtain the Approval of Blackridge as a Condition of Amending the Redevelopment Plan | 13 | | C.  Facts Relevant to Spot Zoning | 15 | ARGUMENT ..................................................................................................................17  POINT I .....................................................................................................................17
[brief] N.J.S.A. 10:5-1, et seq.  After first concluding that a single statute of limitations should apply to all claims filed in the Superior Court founded on the Law Against Discrimination (LAD), the Court turned to a consideration of the appropriate limitations period.  It stated that its focus was on the nature of the injury, not the legal theory of the claim.  Montells, 133 N.J. at 291.  The Court noted that the Legislature has separated ‘injury to the person’ from ‘tortious injury to the rights of another’ and effectively distinguished personal injuries involving physical or emotional harm from those involving economic harm.  Ibid.  It also observed that courts have historically treated “tortious injury to the rights of another,” one of the categories within the six-year statute of limitations, “as applying primarily to actions for economic loss. ”  Id. at 291-92.  (Emphasis added)  Actions for legal malpractice, engineering malpractice, claims for lost wages based on wrongful discharge, and appropriation of a person’s likeness and name for the commercial benefit of another fall within this category and are subject to the six-year limitation period of N.J.S.A. 2A:14-1.
[directive] Executive Office for Asset Fo$eiture 22 Lx Guidelines for Seized and Forfeited Property Chapter ~ 3.  Sharing percentages that are pre-determined are normally discouraged because those pre-determined percentages might not be consistent with the assistance rendered (i.e., 7% in the case of a local department agreeing to receive of all shares yet does not participate in a given case and/or contributes less than 7% of the work involved).  However, for ease and simplicity of operation, pre-determined percentages within a task force may be agreed to if those percentages generally reflect the overall [...] contributions of the involved agencies (i.e., in a 20 person Task Force, assigns 2 of so 10%).
[brief] N.J.A.C. 19:16-5.9(b) provides:  “Each arbitrator’s decision shall be accompanied by a written report explaining how each of the statutory criteria played into the arbitrator’s determination of the final award.  The opinion and award shall be signed and based on a reasonable determination of the issues, giving due weight to those factors listed in N.J.S.A. 34:13A-16g. ”
[brief] Defense counsel’s failure to explain his trial strategy for not undertaking a reasonable investigation into defendant’s whereabouts at the time of the shooting constitutes a deficient performance under prevailing professional norms.  (19T 18-6 to 9)  In evaluating the performance of a defendant’s trial attorney, the reviewing court must make “every effort … to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight” when “reconstruct[ing] the circumstances of counsel’s challenged conduct.”
[brief] [...]’s attempt to distinguish Lawyers Guild is also weak.  The argument is that in Lawyers Guild there was the word Guaranty below the signature line and no signature is placed below that word, whereas in the case at bar the word Guaranty was not underneath the signature line.  The argument fails to address the fact that the lease in Lawyers Guild included virtually the same language as included here and that language was found insufficient given the precise wording as to how the document was signed at the place of signature.  5.  Cases Cited by [...] Fail to Support a Finding that Has Been a Personal Guaranty
[brief] The January 12th, 2012, [...] robbery.  [...] indicated that while the defendants were in the McDonald's prior to the robbery, [...] puts a gun to defendant's head.  (12T 31-22 to 23; 13T 25-20 to 21)  At trial, [...] testified that he did not know what [...] had in his hand at the McDonald’s.  (7T 264-7 to 15)  [...]’s narration that alleged co-defendant [...] Mitchell put a gun to defendant’s head on the McDonald’s video surveillance mislead the grand jury and violated N.J.R.E. 701 because if the State shown the grand jury the video, they would have witnessed it was not a weapon.
[brief] Applying the Landa principles is akin to the timeliness by the Defendant’s motion to vacate, which was filed within the “whole” of the same day [...] purchased the Premises.  The sale occurred within three months of recording the final judgment.  Defendant’s application to vacate the final judgment was filed less than expiration of the time in N.J.S.A. 54:5-87, or N. J. S.A. 54:5-104.67, as applied in the In Rem Act, which is applicable to the foreclosure.
[brief] **49a.**  On November 9, 2020, the defense submitted a motion to suppress the evidence relating to [...]’ out-of-court statements to law enforcement.  **50a.**  On March 29, 2021, the trial court granted the defendant’s motion.  **51a.**  On May 26, 2021, the defense filed a second motion to dismiss the indictment against [...].  **52a.**  On May 6, 2022, the defense withdrew the motion to dismiss the indictment.  As the case approached trial, the State filed for a Protective Order relating to the disciplinary history of one of the detectives at the Prosecutor’s Office involved in the investigation of the [...] homicide.
[brief] The trial court found that there was substantial credible evidence in the record to support the Board’s determination to grant [...]’s preliminary and final major subdivision application.  The record shows that the Board thoroughly reviewed [...]’s application that culminated in a resolution memorializing the lawful decision made after a procedurally and substantively proficient public hearing.  [...] applied for major preliminary and final subdivision approval to subdivide a 90-acre property into three lots.
[brief] (5)  Fencing, landscaping and/or screening shall be provided as required by the Planning Board.  (6)  Minimum building setbacks and maximum building and impervious coverages shall be as allowed for the zone in question.  (7)  The minimum driveway and parking area setbacks shall be consistent with § 230-80.E. as same applies to the zone in question, unless a transition buffer required pursuant to C(9) below requires a larger setback.
[brief] Alcantara, 475 N.J. Super. at 63.  The record thus supports the Assistant Commissioner’s conclusion that the SFRA is not a significant cause of [...]’s failure to provide its students T&E.  Rather, “[t]he pervasive inefficiencies, deficiencies, and the apparent shortfall in oversight and strategic systemic action by [[...]] have culminated in this inadequacy. ” (Ra124).  The Assistant Commissioner’s decision should therefore be affirmed because the SFRA is not unconstitutional as applied to [...].  Irrespective of this appeal, the Department recognizes the State’s constitutional duty to address the lack of T&E in the District, and is continuing to take steps to remedy that situation.
[directive] Assignment Judges  Supplement to Directive# 03-13 TO: / _ tf Criminal Presiding Ju~~; FROM: [...], J.A~ - - Criminal Uniform Defendant Reporting System  Revisions to the Offense  SUBJ: Information Form  September 14, 2017  DATE:  Directive # 03-13 promulgated an array of forms that constitute the Uniform Defendant Reporting System (UDRS).