ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] In Port, this Court held that Rule 1:4-8 does not prohibit an award of attorneys’ fees to attorneys appearing pro se.  Id. at 441 n.  However, 3 years later, in Alpert, et al v. Quinn, 410 N.J. Super. 510 (App. Div. 2009), certif. denied, 203 N.J. 93 (2010) a different panel held that a pro se counsel cannot recover fees for frivolous litigation because Rule 1:4-8 permits reimbursement of fees & expenses incurred & not a loss of income.  Id. at 545.  The panel significantly noted that its holding was “directed solely to the language of Rule 1:4-8(d)(2)” & did not deal with “the award of fees otherwise authorized by contract, rule or statute. ”  Id. at 546 n.8.  Alpert is not the current or final state of the law for compensating a pro se victim of frivolous litigation.
[brief] There is also an implicit bias at issue that would have been highly prejudicial to the defendant.  Both [...] and [...] were going to be essential fact witnesses in the legal malpractice case against [...].  In a legal malpractice case, the plaintiff has to prove his damages.  In this matter, it was alleged that [...], due to the malpractice of [...], was obligated to pay [...] and [...].  They were therefore important fact witnesses in this case.  By assigning the interest to the lawsuit to these important facts witnesses resulted in an impermissible and unethical bias, and would have resulted in a denial of due process to this Defendant.
[brief] TRIAL COURT FAILED TO IDENTIFY AND APPLY THE APPROPRIATE LEGAL STANDARD FOR ABBREVIATION OF TRANSCRIPT AND DENIED THE MOTION BASED ON IRRELEVANT FACTORS.  TRIAL COURT'S LEGAL CONCLUSION THAT AN APPELLANT HAS THE OBLIGATION TO APPRIZE THE APPELLATE DIVISION OF ALL ISSUES IS LOGICALLY AND LEGALLY ERRONEOUS AND CONTRARY TO THE RAISON D'ÊTRE OF RULE 2:5-3(c).  (Pa1331-32)  IX.  TRIAL COURT VIOLATED RULE 1:7-4(a)
[brief] (Pa448 – Pa454).  While the website’s layout changed slightly, the verbiage remained the same, and did not include any reference to a minimum GPA or other conditions related to the period to select or opt out of the dual degree program.  (Pa152-Pa153; Pa180; Pa448-Pa454).  Plaintiff contacted the [...] to confirm his understanding of their advertisement, and attended open house meetings at FDU wherein his understanding of the plain language was confirmed.  (Pa158-Pa159).  Plaintiff also reached out to the [...], via an inquiry submission, to clarify eligibility for the dual degree program.  (Pa168; Pa239).  The [...] Dean, [...] advised Plaintiff, via email, that Plaintiff’s minor in chemistry met the requirement for the master’s portion, he met all requirements to select the master’s track, did not list any other substantive requirements, and the Defendant would begin taking applications for the Pharm.D program later in the spring.  (Pa437).  The Pharm. D program commenced classes on or around August 26, 2012.
[brief] ”  (Id.).  In their Supplemental Memorandum, defendants state their concern that the “breadth of the topics in the Rule 30(b)(6) notice along with serious privilege concerns suggest that written discovery as to the non-objectionable topics would be a more appropriate process” and be “similar to [the process] countenanced by [...] in connection with a prior Rule 30(b)(6) notice in this case. ”  (Def’ts’ Supp’l Mem. at 2 (citations omitted)).  Plaintiffs reply that the six Rule 30(b)(6) deposition topics at issue are “clearly encompassed within” the broader Rule 30(b)(6) topics in plaintiffs’ Depo Notice, and are “substantially narrower than” those topics.
[directive] A number of programs offer eligible defendants in municipal court cases diversionary treatment as an alternative to traditional prosecution.  These include conditional discharge and conditional dismissal programs.  In addition, the [...] and [...] operate innovative Community Solutions (or community court) programs focused on remedying some of the underlying causes of low-level crime.  Municipal prosecutors may be called upon to recommend whether eligible defendants should be accepted into these programs.  Nothing in this Memorandum should deter any municipal prosecutor from freely recommending that any eligible defendant be accepted into any of these diversion programs.
[brief] Finally, the clauses that [...] argues conflict with the oral misrepresentations [...] made to the Plaintiffs are qualitatively different than those addressed in the published cases on the parol evidence rule.  All the published cases concern real contractual terms such as the price to be paid or the duration of the lease contract.  The cases address either efforts to enforce the terms of the contract or to receive compensation for breach of contract.  The clauses [...] would have this Court enforce serve no real contractual purpose because they do not define any party’s rights or duties under the contract.
[brief] On November 10, 2020, [...] submitted to the Department two premium rate increase filings for its long term care policies through the System for Electronic Rates and Forms Filing (“SERFF”).  Under SERFF tracking number [...], [...] requested a premium rate increase of 142% on its Choice 2 long term care insurance policies issued on or after January 18, 2006.  (Cra61-91)¹.  Under SERFF tracking number [...], [...] requested a premium rate increase of 165% on its Choice 2 long term care insurance policies issued before January 18, 2006.  (Cra249-275).  Between November 2020 and December 2021, the Department reviewed [...]’s premium rate increase filings, issued a series of disapproval letters (“Objection Letters”) via SERFF, and provided [...] with an opportunity to respond to inquiries from the Department. (Aa95-127; Cra24-59, Cra139-196; and Cra199-236).
[brief] d.  Whether [...] felt “obligated” to access the beach via the street ends  The trial court also relied on its unsupported supposition that the original purchaser of the [...] ([...]) would not have felt “obligated” to access the beach at one of the many street ends.  (T67:8-15)  Not only is there absolutely no evidence of this in the record, and thus no way for anyone to know [...]’s private feelings, but [...]’s subjective belief would not be determinative of whether the parties to that initial conveyance – and especially [...] as the original grantor – intended there to be an unwritten easement across the [...] to the beach.
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[directive] Internal Affairs Complaint Notification To: ________________________________ _________________  Badge No.  You are hereby notified that an internal affairs complaint has been made against you.  This complaint involves an allegation of _______________________________________________ _______________________________________________________________________________ _______________________________________________________________________________ which occurred on or about _________________________________________________________  You will be contacted by the investigator if you will be needed for an interview or to render any other assistance to the investigation.  ________________________________________ Signature  ________________________________________ Print Name ________________________________________ Date  Appendix D  Sample  Immediate Suspension Notice To: _______________________________ ___________
[brief] Orner v. Liu, 419 N.J. Super. 431, 437 (App. Div. 2011); New Jersey Div. of Child Prot. & Permanency v. A.L., 462 N.J. Super. 127, 136 n.5 (App. Div. 2020); Romero, supra, 468 N.J. Super. 296.  Relief is more liberally granted, moreover, when the application is to vacate a judgment obtained by default – particularly in a divorce case (as cited above).  Marder v. Realty Const. Co., 84 N.J. Super. 313, 318 (App. Div. 1964), aff’d, 43 N.J. 508 (1964).
[brief] Thus, movants had no opportunity to address the emails, which are the only "evidence" on which the lower court based its conclusion.  And in opposing the motion for leave to appeal, petitioners admitted that the emails did not detail any prejudicial information!  It is petitioners' burden to show that the [...] had in fact, acquired significantly harmful information from [...] and [...], the only petitioners with whom Mueller had had contact.  And respectfully, it is appellants' right to know what that "evidence" is in order to contest it.  As petitioners now admit, the emails between the [...] and petitioners do *not* discuss settlement positions or strategy.  And settlement positions and strategy necessarily change when one has to invalidate not one, but two Wills.  Simply put, and consistent with what was set forth in the Certification of [...] ("Mueller Certification") opposing the motion to disqualify, Mueller is not in receipt of such information.
[brief] (2T Hearing, 10/20/2023) (Pa000637) (Pa000926).  When reviewing a trial court’s decision to award sanctions pursuant to Rule 1:4-8, this Court applies an abuse of discretion standard.  United Hearts, LLC v. Zahabian, 407 N.J. Super. 379, 390 (App. Div. 2011); Masone v. Levine, 382 N.J. Super. 181, 193 (App. Div. 2005).  An “abuse of discretion is demonstrated if the discretionary act was not premised upon consideration of all relevant factors, was based upon consideration of irrelevant or inappropriate factors, or amounts to a clear error of judgment. ”  Id. (internal citations omitted).  A party who is subjected to frivolous litigation may be awarded attorneys’ fees and costs pursuant to N.J.S.A. § 2A:15-59.1.  This statute is enforced through Rule 1:4-8.  Pursuant to Rule 1:4-8(a), by signing a pleading, an attorney certifies that, to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry under reasonable circumstances, “the paper is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation;” that “the claims…therein are warranted by existing law or the establishment of new law;” and that “the factual allegations have evidentiary support or, as to specifically identified allegations, they are either likely to have evidentiary support or they will be withdrawn or corrected if reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery indicates insufficient evidentiary support. ”  (emphasis added).  If an attorney violates Rule 1:4-8(a), opposing counsel may seek sanctions.
[directive] Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:52-5.2  This matter having resulted in conviction or shall be sealed from the public upon order of the court for (defendant name) whose date of birth is , and State Bureau of Identification (SBI) number, if (date) available, is and appears that the requirements for (SBI number, if available) , Sealing under N.J.S.A. 2C:52-5.2 have been satisfied; IT IS ORDERED this day of , , that 20 The Prosecuting Attorney handling the case, (name) The Superintendent of the New Jersey State Police, Chief(s) of the Police Department(s), The County Probation Department (if applicable), The Administrator(s) of Municipal Court, County, must seal, from the public, all their records and information relating to (defendant name) (1) arrest/custody on the charge of violating N.J.S.A. (date) (statute) ; under (complaint number) (2) ; arrest/custody on the charge of violating N.J.S.A. ( date) (statute) ; under (complaint number) (3) ; arrest/custody on the charge of violating N.J.S.A. (date) (statute) ; under (complaint number) (4) ; arrest/custody on the charge of violating N.J.S.A. (date) (statute) ; under (complaint number) (5) ; arrest/custody on the charge of violating N.J.S.A. (date) (statute) ; under (complaint number)
[brief] [...] ([...]) purchases a 100% interest in [...] ([...]) through a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU).  Defendant [...] ([...]) is the record owner of a parcel of land located at [...] (the Property).  (Da20, ¶ 11).  [...] was a subsidiary or affiliate of Defendant [...], and/or the other [...] defendants ([...] or Appellants).  Id.  (¶ 10).  Pursuant to a March 10, 2023, written and signed agreement between the parties titled “Memorandum of Understanding” (the MOU), Plaintiff [...], LLC ([...]) acquired 100% ownership of [...] in exchange for a nominal cash price, conditional cash payments, and the assumption of a $30,000,000 principal loan and --- 1
[brief] *State v. Nash*, 212 N.J. 518, 549-50 (2013).  **iii.  The Factual Predicate is Sufficient to Warrant Relief and Has Never Previously Been Adjudicated**  The State asserts that “[t]his Court [h]as . . . [a]lready [d]etermined that the [f]actual [p]redicate is [i]nsufficient to [w]arrant [r]elief” in connection with [...]’s amended first PCR petition.  State Br. at 20, 22.  However, this Court has only ever decided that [...]’ Sworn Statement is insufficient to warrant a new trial *as newly discovered evidence*.
[brief] The Arbitrator did not follow the grievance submission presented by the [...] or [...].  The issue presented by the [...] was whether [...] violated the collective bargaining agreement when it failed to calculate the overtime rate as base plus maintenance divided by 2080 times 1.5.  The Division proposed a very similar issue.  The Arbitrator determined the issue to be; whether the employer violated the collective bargaining agreement when it used the annual Treasury Circulars *instead of the language contained in the contract* to calculate overtime rates.  (Emphasis added).  First, the issue crafted by the arbitrator affirms the contract violation by the Employer.  Second, it admits that the arbitrator used an external document “instead of” the plain language of the contract.  Both are evidence that the arbitrator greatly exceeded his power.  The collective bargaining agreement states in Article XII, F., 3(b)(3), in pertinent part:  In no event shall the arbitration decision have the effect of adding to, subtracting from, modifying or amending the provisions of this Agreement.  Pa39.  The Arbitration Award issued in this matter is the epitome of rewriting, subtracting from, or modifying the terms of the contract in violation of the authority bestowed upon him in the collective bargaining agreement.  The Arbitrator has violated Article XII, F., 3(b)(3) by rewriting the language contained in Article V to now state that the overtime rate shall be base plus maintenance divided by *the fiscal year work hours contained in the annual treasury circulars* times 1.5.
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[brief] Da135-36.  At the Trial Court, [...] asserted all of the same exact arguments it asserted in the Arbitration, which it now hopes to re-assert and re-litigate here in the Appellate Division.  See Da581-82.  After eight days of evidentiary hearings, the Arbitrator saw through [...]’s counterclaim gymnastics --- 4  If a project lost money, that risk would be borne by [...], which was, after all, purchasing a business.  [...], as seller, and determined not to lose money while selling its multi-million dollar business, expressly carved itself out of any post-execution risks, and that agreement was embodied in the evidence in the case and credited by the Arbitrator in his Award.  See Da134-35. and held [...] to finally live up to its obligations under the PTA for projects handed to it on a silver platter.  Da137-38.
[directive] If the prosecutor elects in these circumstances not to withdraw an outstanding offer and the offer thereafter expires, the next plea offer in the graduated system must account for the bail violation.  If the defendant commits a bail violation after a guilty plea has been entered but before sentence is imposed (e.g., the defendant fails to appear at the sentencing hearing), the prosecutor may move to vacate the plea and withdraw and replace the plea offer to account for the additional aggravating points under Aggravating Factor #2.
[brief] More importantly, the complete absence of any detriment to the Plaintiff’s legal position weighs against a finding of waiver.  Specifically, Defendants have acknowledged that the scope of the parties’ arbitration agreement is limited to Plaintiff’s common law claims relating to the parties’ former partnership.  On that note, Defendants’ right to arbitrate certain claims raised by the Plaintiff should not be foreclosed due to Plaintiff’s failure to disclose the arbitration agreement within the partnership documents that he voluntarily signed, followed by his repeated disingenuous efforts to refute their existence and applicability.
[brief] TABLE OF CONTENTS  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ...........................................................................................................  ii  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS .................................................. iii  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT .................................................................................................  1 PROCEDURAL HISTORY .......................................................................................................  2 STATEMENT OF FACTS .........................................................................................................  3 LEGAL ARGUMENT ...............................................................................................................  4 POINT I.  THE STANDARD OF REVIEW .............................................................................  4 POINT II.  THIS COURT SHOULD AFFIRM  THE TRIAL COURT’S ORDER
[brief] Consequently, courts have held that a public entity’s refusal to waive a non-material mistake, when doing so would yield $47,000 in taxpayer savings, is an abuse of discretion and requires that the public entity’s decision be set aside.  Tec Elec., Inc., 284 N.J. Super. at 488.  Here, given that [...]’s omission of a copy of its existing Notice of Classification is a non-material and waivable defect, the County must provide the Court with a legitimate reason for declining to waive the alleged non-material defect that would provide a significant cost savings to the taxpayers.  *Tec Elec., Inc.*, 284 N.J. Super. at 488.
[brief] | 10 | | Hirsch v. Amper Fin. Servs., LLC, 215 N.J. 174 (2013) | 12 | | Hojnowski v. Vans Skate Park 187 N.J. 323 (2006) | 8 | | Jansen v. Salomon Smith Barney, Inc., 342 N.J. Super. 254.  | 2, 11| | (App. Div. 2001) | | | Kindred Nursing Centers Ltd. P’ship v. Clark, 581 U.S. 246 (2017) | 4, 6 | | Marmet Health Care Ctr., Inc. v. Brown, 556 U.S.  530 (2012) | 5 | | Matter of Est of Hekemian, [...], 2023 N.J. Super. Unpub. | 9, 12| | WL 176098 (App. Div 2023)
[brief] Even though N.J.S.A. 24:61-36 does not contain factors that a local governing body must consider in evaluating retail cannabis licenses, the Borough chose to establish a process and evaluation criteria for assessing applications.  This evaluation criteria required the Borough’s Subcommittee adhere to the standards contained in the Evaluation Sheet when reviewing applications and making a recommendation to the Council.  (48a-63a (“The Borough’s Cannabis Subcommittee will review.  . . .”)).  But the Subcommittee failed to do so, tainting the entire process and undermining the very transparency and integrity it sought to ensure.  Respondents claim that the Evaluation Sheet, along with the Chief of the [...]’s questionnaire, were strictly “internal guidance. ” (Keyport Db7; Blaze Db7).  That too is inconsistent with the record before the Court.  The Borough’s published Evaluation Sheet states: “The criteria enumerated thereunder were provided to the public via the Borough’s website, to ensure transparency in the evaluation process. ”  (48a-63a (emphasis added)).  Moreover, the Evaluation Sheet states: “The Borough’s Cannabis Subcommittee will review and evaluate each Applicant based on the following criteria in making its recommendation to the Borough Council. ” (Ibid. (emphasis added)).  Once the Borough published the Evaluation Sheet, announcing the Evaluation Sheet was “to ensure transparency in the evaluation process,” the Borough bound itself to doing what it said it would do.
[brief] The introduction of these opinions through a recorded interview rather than live testimony does not alter the analysis.  [...]’s lay opinions would not have been permitted live at trial, as “[t]he State may not attack one witness’s credibility through another witness’s assessment of that credibility. ”  R.K., 220 N.J. at 458.  Permitting the admission of portions of an interrogation in which detectives opine on credibility and guilt in a manner not permitted at trial would place directly before the jury the exact type of evidence the court otherwise prohibits.
[brief] Self-defense is only a defense to resisting arrest or aggravated assault on a police officer where an officer “uses excessive or unnecessary force. ”  *Simms*, 369 N.J. Super. at 472; N.J.S.A. 2C:3-4(b)(1)(a).  Where an officer uses excessive or unnecessary force, “the citizen may respond or counter with the use of reasonable force to protect himself .  . . .”  Ibid. (quoting State v. Mulvihill, 57 N.J. 151, 156 (1970)).
[brief] Defendant claims that the judge did not evaluate aggravating factor nine in the context of State v. Zuber, 227 N.J. 422 (2017).  (Db81-82).  Notably, defendant conceded below that this factor applies to him.  (17T159-18 to 21).  Regardless, the judge properly found the need for general deterrence of homicide and related weapons offenses.  (17T202-1 to 3).
[brief] As for factor two, while plaintiffs had mainly met deadlines for discovery prior to the cross-motion, they were now seeking to submit a new expert report after the deadline to do so had passed.  Furthermore, they had access to the same information about [...]’s background as an expert and his medical practice history as did defendant.  Indeed they would have had more access, for they, unlike defendant, could have spoken directly to [...] and inquired about the details of his career as a surgeon and as a forensic expert—details which his curriculum vitae lacked or did not make entirely clear.  They obviously retained him before they filed his affidavit of merit with the trial court on November 21, 2018 (Pa150), twenty-two months before he authored his report of August 30, 2020, and thirty-two months before his June 8, 2021 deposition (Pa58).  All that time, plaintiffs had the same October 2018 curriculum vitae of [...] (Pa55) that was served on the defendants; yet they did not question him about essential details in his background as a physician or his experience as an expert.  This failure in vetting of their expert bespeaks a lack of due diligence.
[brief] [...]’s decision was based on established law.  Appellant failed to demonstrate a statutory right or a constitutional right to a hearing.  See In re Amico/Tunnel Carwash, 371 N.J. Super. 199, 210 (App. Div. 2004); Spalt v. DEP, 237 N.J. Super. 206, 212 (App. Div. 1989); In re NJPDES Permit No. NJ0025241, 185 N.J. 474, 482 (2006).  Furthermore, [...]’s March 14, 2023 decision is supported by substantial, credible, and undisputed evidence in the record demonstrating that the decision was not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable.