ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] CONCLUSION  For the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully submitted that the relief sought in the Plaintiff-Respondent’s Verified Complaint was properly granted, and an affirmance is well-merited by the circumstances of the matter under consideration herein.  Respectfully submitted, Davison Eastman  Muñoz Paone, P.A.  By: ____________________________  [...], Esquire  Dated: June 5, 2024  In the Matter of the Estate of [...], Deceased, SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY  APPELLATE DIVISION  DOCKET NO. [...]  CIVIL ACTION ON APPEAL FROM THE FINAL ORDER OF THE SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY, CHANCERY DIVISION, PROBATE PART: MONMOUTH COUNTY DOCKET NO.: [...] Sat Below: Hon. [...], P.J.S.C.
[brief] .........................................................................................................................  34  # TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | Cases | |-------| | Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S.  648 (1979) | 17 | | Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) | 9 | | State v. Carter, 235 N.J. Super. 232 (App. Div. 1989) | 17 | | State v. Chun, 194 N.J. 54 (2008) | 27 | | State v. Daley, 64 N.J. 122 (1973) | 21 | | State v. Jarbath, 114 N.J. 394 (1989) | 17, 31, 32 | | State v. Moore, 181 N.J. 40 (2004) | 22, 23 | | State v. Morris, 262 N.J. Super. 413 (App. Div. 1993) | 20 | | State v. Robertson, 228 N.J. 138 (2017) | 15, 16, 23 | | State v. Smith, 251 N.J. 244 (2022) | 17, 19 | | State v. Torres, 246 N.J. 246 (2021) | 16, 31 | | Statutes | |----------| | N.J.S.A. 2C:44-7 | 16 | N.J.S.A. 39:4-50 ..................................................................................................................29, 30 Rules R. 3:13-3 .................................................................................................................................  33 R. 3:23-1 .................................................................................................................................  15 R. 7:13-1 .................................................................................................................................  15  Other Authorities Administrative Directive #25-19, “Implementation of New DWI Law (L. 2019, c. 248) - Includes Expanded Use of Ignition Interlock Devices for First-Time Offenders (Dec. 4, 2019)  ...........................................................................  30  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS
[directive] Page County Every Law.  Reform Bail under the release of revocation and detention preventive Criminal of Division of the Director Deputy and Director Prosecutor, Assistant First Prosecutor, Section to pursuant designated general attorneys deputy and prosecutors assistant and Justice, or courses additional such shall attend thereafter and course, this attend to required shall be 7.8, decision the approve and review who persons for Director the by prescribed be may as seminars detention.  pretrial seeking from refrain or seek to Denied.  Detention Is Pretrial for Motion
[brief] It's the degree of compression and the issues are well above and beyond something that is going to be tolerable and put her in a functional capacity.  And I believe things will progress.  Q  Incidentally, Doctor, as current - - well, you can - - you can tell me, but her - - her current treatment, if you will, plan is pain management.  Is - - is that correct, Doctor?  A  If he’s she’s unable to undergo surgery which appears to be the case from all her medical issues, she has no choice, but taking it easy, pain management, and waiting it out.
[brief] I  Plaintiff-Appellant has failed to prove that the trial court erred in dismissing the Plaintiff-Appellant’s Complaint.  “[A]n appellate court should not disturb the `factual findings and legal conclusions of the trial judge unless [it is] convinced that they are so manifestly unsupported by or inconsistent with the competent, relevant and reasonably credible evidence as to offend the interests of justice.'”  Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 412 (1998) (quoting Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Investors Ins.  Co., 65 N.J. 474, 484 (1974)).  In the instant action, Plaintiff-Appellant argues the Trial Court erred by relying on the lack of subjection complaints of pain instead of considering the objective medical evidence of the chiropractor’s expert report.  However, it is abundantly clear from the transcripts of oral argument that the Trial Judge did consider all the evidence, including the certification of the chiropractor.  Plaintiff-Appellant now brings the instant action simply because they do not agree with the Trial Court’s decision.  They fail to establish the Court’s error.  POINT II
[brief] From approximately October 2017 through May 2018, and thereafter continuing for years through the present, [...], the [...] and their cohorts created a false reality to "box in" plaintiffs with false inducements and statements that they were earnestly seeking to acquire plaintiffs’ rights, while they schemed, deployed, executed a cynical, criminal plan of stealing valuable trade assets from plaintiffs in broad daylight.  SAC ¶ 68.  Pa168.  By May 2018, defendants [...], [...], CEP Defendants’ attorney, and others in [...]' zone of authority, told third-parties that they would be receiving assignment of the solar-energy rights that had originally been reflected in [...]’s filings which plaintiffs had acquired.  Pa169-83.  Defendants [...], [...] and others in [...]' zone of authority, conspired and agreed that [...] and [...] would continue to lure plaintiffs into believing that they would acquire plaintiffs' Solar Rights for valuable consideration shortly, or eventually, and assured [...] and plaintiffs that they were genuinely intending to pursue an acquisition as soon as the rights could be fully understood.  SAC ¶ 71.  Pa178-79.  Defendants [...], [...] and others in [...]' zone of authority, conspired and agreed that [...] and [...] would destroy or hide their own "paper trail" such that even in the face of a lawsuit, and a mandatory duty to disclose relevant records pertaining to their actions, they would claim that certain records do not exist or are not in their possession, custody or control, so that plaintiffs will not expose the proverbial "smoking gun."
[brief] In re Adoption of N.J.A.C. 7:15-5.24(b), the Appellate Division explained as follows:  The Federal Act 'requires identification of areas with substantial water quality control problems and initiation of areawide Waste Treatment Management plans.' [internal citations omitted].  Accordingly, towards the goal of "restor[ing] and maintain[ing] the chemical, physical and biological integrity of the waters of the State[,]” N.J.S.A. 58:11A-2(b), the WQPA mandates the creation of wastewater treatment management planning areas and authorizes the [...] to set water quality standards, implement areawide waste treatment management plans within each of the planning areas, and adopt rules and regulations to effectuate the objectives of the WQPA.
[brief] As set forth in Section 8.5 below, the arbitrator will apply New Jersey law.  Thus, and pursuant to Paragraph 7.4 (Ja37) of [...]’s Membership Agreement, a claim of “public injunctive relief” is specifically excluded from arbitration under Paragraphs 7.1-7.2 (Ja36) of [...]’s Membership Agreement; and is defined by [...] at Paragraph 7.4 (Ja37)  “…as injunctive relief that has the primary purpose and effect of prohibiting alleged unlawful acts that threaten future injury to the general public. ”  (emphasis added)  On July 29, 2024, the trial court granted Defendant's motion to stay proceedings and compel plaintiff to arbitrate all claims set forth in her Class Action Complaint.
[brief] Gross I, 121 N.J. at 15, 17; State v. Gross, 216 N.J. Super. 98, 110-112 (App. Div. 1987) (Gross II); State v. Spruell, 121 N.J. 32, 41-41, 46-47 (1990).  “[T]he purpose of the [Rule 104] inquiry ‘is not to determine the credibility of the out-of-court statements’ but ‘whether the prior statement was made or signed under circumstances establishing sufficient reliability that the factfinder may fairly consider it as substantive evidence. ’”  Spruell, 121 N.J. at 46 (1990) (quoting Gross II, 216 N.J. Super. at 110).  In determining the reliability of pre-trial statements, the Supreme Court enumerated fifteen factors to be considered: (1) the declarant’s connection to and interest in the matter reported in the out-of-court statement; (2) the person or persons to whom the statement was given; (3) the place and occasion for giving the statement; (4) whether the declarant was then in custody or otherwise the target of investigation; (5) the physical and mental condition of the declarant at the time, (6) the presence or absence of other persons; (7) whether the declarant incriminated himself or sought to exculpate himself by his statement; (8) the extent to which the writing is in the declarants hand; (9) the presence or absence, and the nature of, any interrogation; (10) whether the offered sound recording or recording contains the entirety, or only a portion of the summary, of the communication; (11) the presence or absence of any motive to fabricate; (12) the presence or absence of any express or implicit pressures, inducement or coercion for making of the statement; (13) whether the anticipated use of the statement was apparent or made known to the declarant; (14) the inherent believability or lack of believability of the statement; and (15) the presence or absence of corroborating evidence.
[brief] Walk-and-Turn.  For W&T, [...] places subjects in a starting position—hands at sides, right foot in front of left foot touching heel to toe—and has them remain in that position for further instructions.  7T29-20/30-1.  While subjects stand in the starting position, [...] instructs them to take nine steps heel-to-toe while counting each step aloud, turn with short choppy steps after the ninth step out, and come back nine paces to the starting position while counting each step aloud and keeping hands to their sides.  7T30-2/12, 52-16/21.  Standing heel to toe is not a normal way to stand unless you are a gymnast on a balance beam—someone [...] was not.  7T53-19/54-4.  Nor is walking heel to toe.  7T54-21/23.  While most people normally stand shoulder width apart, much the way [...] stood before his arrest, standing heel to toe reduces the area over which they would normally distribute their weight and compromises balance.  7T54-5/20; see S-2.  [...] stepped out of the starting position twice whenever [...] gave additional instructions; then [...] walked nine paces out, pivoted in the turn, reset, and returned to the starting position.  7T30-16/31-4, 52-16/53-18.  [...] believed [...] walked 10 steps back (7T30-21/23), turned improperly (7T33-17/19), and stepped off the line (7T33-22).  For the MVR, we see [...] step out of the starting position with control two times when [...] gives additional instructions, but then resumes the position when told to do so.  7T52-16/53-18.  [...] walks nine steps out, pauses after those first nine steps, and asks for clarification about the rest of the test.  7T54-25/55-3.  [...] resets with his feet side-by-side rather than heel-to-toe, then walks back, touching heel to his toe with his hands at his sides on every step.  7T55-19/57-12.  After W&T, [...] decided to arrest [...].
[brief] **At Headquarters.**  [...] took [...]’s wife to Point Pleasant Beach Police Headquarters.  7T87-14/16.  Another officer took [...] there (7T34-15/19), where [...] advised [...] of his constitutional rights (7T92-17/23, 93-10/12) and read a standard statement about submitting breath samples (7T96-14/16).  [...] voluntarily agreed to do so.  7T97-14/16.  [...] watched [...] stand up from a prisoner bench, have his handcuffs removed, walk to the breath test instrument, receive instructions on how to submit breath samples, and follow those instructions.  7T95-6/20.  On release, [...] handed the summonses to [...].  7T81-14/19.
[brief] The State has established beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant operated the vehicle.  Defendant argues that the court below erred in finding that the State proved operation of the vehicle by defendant beyond a reasonable doubt.  (Db19-Db22).  Defendant is wrong.  A DWI conviction requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant either actually operated the vehicle while intoxicated or the defendant had the intent to operate the vehicle while intoxicated.  State v. Morris, 262 N.J. Super. 413, 417 (App. Div. 1993).
[brief] Appellant’s Receipt of First Wire Transfer Constituted Acceptance of the Funds Requiring Discharge of the Mortgage Under the UCC and this Court’s Unpublished Decision in Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys. v. Omar**  Another case that is also directly on point, highly persuasive and fully supports Respondent’s position that Appellant’s servicer breached the terms of the Note and Mortgage by refusing and failing to provide a credit for the First Wire Transfer, is this Court’s unpublished decision in *Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys. v. Omar*, No. A-5187-06, 2008 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1058 (App. Div. May 15, 2008).  The Trial Court below was heavily persuaded by and relied upon this Court’s analysis in the Omar decision in making her ruling.
[brief] Those factors are: (1) whether the party to receive an adverse charge against it has a special relationship, superior knowledge, or control over the uncalled witness; (2) the practical and physical availability of the witness; (3) the quality of the witness’s potential testimony; and (4) whether the testimony would be superior to that already provided.  *Id.*  The judge addressed each of these factors in turn.  As to factors (1) and (2), she found that [...] was not “particularly accessible to the State in this case,” nor would he have been inclined to “be accommodating” to the same prosecutor who had recently prosecuted him.  (15T 174-19 to 175-22)  The defense did properly, appropriately, seek the Court’s assistance in getting Mr. [...] here by use of a subpoena and a writ.
[brief] THE SUPERIOR COURT PROPERLY FOUND THAT THE BOARD’S APPROVAL OF THE APPLICATION COMPLIES WITH THE [...]’S MASTER PLAN (Pa 45-Pa 48; 3T46-21-3T48-3)  In their submission, Appellants contend that the approval violates the Master Plan because what the Applicant requested was a significant expansion of a non-conforming, in an agricultural zoned area of the town.  However, Appellants fail to support this conclusion or argue against how the Resolution clearly explained how the variance conformed to the Master Plan.  (Pa 45-47)  The Zoning Board found that the proposed use will not impair the intent and purpose of the zoning plan and the zoning ordinance.  As noted in the Board Planner’s report, the property is currently zoned Rural Development—Commercial, which could allow even more intensive uses at the Property, such as retail sales and services.  (Pa 47)  Materially, Appellants leave out of their Court submissions the fact that the Applicant’s property already contains a residential structure and therefore, the addition of an accessory garage is a natural and expected improvement to the property.  Moreover, the surrounding parcels and those across from the property contain a mix of residential and commercial uses, as well as undeveloped land.  The parcel immediately to the south of the property contains an advertising billboard.  These existing conditions were expressly taken into account when the zoning plan and zoning ordinance were adopted.  Specifically, the Rural Development Zone purposed purpose clearly states,”… [t]he intention of the Zoning Plan and Ordinance is to both maintain, where practical, the existing character of the district and preserve it as land reservoirs for future community development.”  Township Code §175-160 (A)(1).  (Pa 46)  Accordingly, by the plain unambiguous language of the ordinance, the Applicant’s existing residential and accessory structures were taken into account and anticipated in the zone.  To say otherwise is to intentionally ignore the language of the Code.  The zone will continue to have the same character as it always has and the structure fits within the plain language of the purpose of the code.  Therefore, Applicant’s properly presented their application to the Zoning Board and established how their application conforms to the Master Plan.  (Pa 48)
[brief] (Pa 56a.)  After this action was filed, on August 28, 2015, Brian and [...], in a separate proceeding, filed in the Special Civil Part before the Honorable [...], J.S.C., sought a hardship stay of the eviction until October 31, 2015, on the grounds that they were building another house that would not be ready until that time.  However, in opposition to the application for stay, the Appellant advised the Court that he and his wife were prepared to take title as-is, notwithstanding any environmental contamination, and further represented on the record:  It was discovered during the inspection process, that [the Puglia’s] had done some things to the property that needed to be remediated.  For example, he put a parking lot on part of it with what I’ll refer to as asphalt millings.  I’m not a construction guy, but that had to be removed.  And that’s been done.  (Da 41.)  Based on the representations made by the Appellant, Judge Smith ordered a stay of eviction only until September 30, 2015, requiring the [...] to vacate thereafter in spite of the fact that their new house would not be finished.  (Pa 38a.)  It was not until October 9, 2015, six months after the due diligence period expired and after the [...] had been evicted, that the Appellant requested a Phase II environmental investigation be performed at the Property at the expense of the [...].
[directive] Special Factors Relative to Offense  Defendant's Version (Complete only upon application for PTI and after conviction)  I  Victim Statement(s)  Attached If No, Check Reason Date Request Made I D D 0Not Applicable No Response Yes 0No Revised: 09/2017, CN: 10693  Case Analysis  LAST NAME FIRST NAME MIDDLE NAME SBI# INDICTMENT/ ACCUSATION/ COMPLAINT NUMBER PROMIS NUMBER  ASSESSMENT OF FACTORS  CONTRIBUTING TO PRESENT OFFENSE  2C:44-1)  (N.J.S.A.  ASSESSMENT OF DEFENDANT'S PERSONALITY, PROBLEMS  THE POTENTIAL FOR PROBATION AS A DISPOSITION, NOTING POTENTIALLY AVAILABLE  COMMUNITY & RESOURCES FOR ASSISTANCE  TEAM LEADER/ PROBATION OFFICER TEAM LEADER/ PROBATION OFFICER SIGNATURE DATE SUPERVISOR SUPERVISOR SIGNATURE  DATE Revised: 09/2017, CN: 10693
[brief] To establish a claim of trespass, plaintiff bore the burden to show that the [...] engaged in an unauthorized entry onto his land.  Pinkowski v. Twp. of Montclair, 299 N.J. Super. 557, 571 (App. Div. 1997).  However, as the trial court ruled, the record evidence showed that [...] did not enter onto plaintiff’s land, nor did he cause property damage when he disposed of tree branches by placing them in a municipal right-of-way for municipal pick up.
[brief] “An essential ingredient of a fair trial is that a jury receive adequate and understandable instructions. ”  *State v. McKinney*, 223 N.J. 475, 495 (2015); *State v. Concepcion*, 111 N.J. 373, 379 (1988) (“Accurate and understandable jury instructions in criminal cases are essential to a defendant’s right to a fair trial”).  “[T]he trial court has an absolute duty to instruct the jury on the law governing the facts of the case. ”  *State v. Butler*, 27 N.J. 560, 595 (1958).  “A charge is a road map to guide the jury, and without an appropriate charge a jury can take a wrong turn in its deliberations.  Thus, the court must explain the controlling legal principles and the questions the jury is to decide. ”  *State v. Martin*, 119 N.J. 2, 15 (1990).  Moreover, a trial judge must depart from the model instruction where doing so is critical to preserving a defendant’s right to a fair trial.  That obligation requires tailoring the legal definitions in a jury instruction to the demands of a case, see *Concepcion*, 111 N.J. at 379 (manslaughter conviction reversed when explanation of “recklessness,” which was critical in that case, did not explain the concept in light of the unusual facts); *State v. Gartland*, 149 N.J. 456, 475-476 (1997) (defendant’s manslaughter conviction reversed, because of plain error, when the jury instruction on the duty of retreat in a self-defense situation was not tailored to the facts of that case to explain how that duty might have applied in those specific factual circumstances), but more obviously requires a judge not to use a model instruction that is so obviously wrong as this one is.
[brief] N.J.S.A. 40:49-2’s requirement for a notice of introduction to include the title of the ordinance “together” with “a clear and concise statement prepared by the clerk of the governing body setting forth the purpose of the ordinance” is unmistakably unambiguous as to its meaning and intent for the notice to have at least two separate components, i.e., the title of the ordinance and a statement of purpose prepared by the clerk.  Yet, defendants insist that the Court should reject the statute’s plain language and legislative history and should instead meld the two separate requirements together so that they can be satisfied by mere publication of title alone.  Defendants base their argument on little more than two factually-distinguishable unpublished opinions.  See Meredith v. Borough Council of the Borough of Somerdale, No. CAM-L-4946-19 (N.J. Sup. Ct. Law Div. May 5, 2020), aff’d, 2022 WL 1816530 (N.J. Sup. Ct. App. Div. June 3, 2022); Gentless v. Borough of Stratford, No. CAM-L-3344-17 (N.J. Sup. Ct. Law Div. June 5, 2018, aff’d, 2019 WL 2563807 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. June 21, 2019).  It is respectfully submitted that long-settled principles of statutory construction compel the Court to reject defendants’ contention out of hand.
[brief] (8T28-13 to 29-3).  Those findings by the Court are clearly supported by the record and do not represent an abuse of discretion.  Additionally, the shooting of the three victims were separate and distinct violent acts from each other.  The testimony was that the defendant was in a tussle with [...], not [...] or [...].  There was no need to shoot any of them, much less all three of them.  They were distinct acts, committed multiple times in the case of [...] and [...].  Our Courts have clearly held that, "(C)rimes involving multiple deaths or victims who have sustained serious bodily injuries represent especially suitable circumstances for the imposition of consecutive sentences."
[directive] Any use been jury) to have excessive, affairs or a grand internal by example, unreasonable; or unjustified, officer an subject; investigations in which the is alleged violence Domestic 5. driving under including on a the influence charge; officer, of An arrest the 6. officer; against the claims  Sexual harassment 7. officer that are formally determined to have involving the Vehicular collisions 8. officer; of the been fault the officer; test by the positive drug A 9. rejected or dismissed by a court; officer that are or arrests by the 10.  Cases an officer suppressed by a obtained by is court; evidence which 11.  Cases in officer; Insubordination the by 12. officer; of by the Neglect duty  13.  ongoing criminal investigation, an officer could jeopardize the notification to System  1  If EW notification to officer or discretion delayed the permit or her in his Prosecutor may the County process.  review of EW System initiation the delayed Page 3 14.  Unexcused absences officer; by the and Any other 15. indicators, determined as by the agency's chief executive.
[brief] So what *Hirth* is saying, ordinarily, there is ordinarily no administrative record, other than.  So in other words, if it’s not ordinary, there’s something other than an administrative record.  And we’re not talking about there being something other than an administrative record.  What we’re talking about here is plaintiff seeking to have something in the -- for use at a hearing controlled by *Hirth* and controlled by what the record requires in *Hirth* that just doesn’t fit within the *Hirth* scope of what’s at play here for the Court to consider in evaluating the application.