ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Since components other than the envelope could serve to contain soil, remediation could still be accomplished with less building coverage.  No evidence was put forth for the proposition that remediation could not be effectuated without the requested d(1) use, FAR, or building coverage variances.  Pa172-323.  The 65.1% proposed building coverage, which was 62% more than the 40% maximum permitted in the B-3 Zone, merely reflected the scale and mass at which Plaintiff, as a private developer, desired to develop Lot 5.  Plaintiff also tried to leverage the contaminated condition of Lot 5 by suggesting that a “benefit” of approving its application would be the remediation of same and several adjoining private properties.  Pb17.  That proffer was likewise disingenuous.  Municipalities have no obligation to remediate private property.
[brief] *[...] v. [...]*, 41 N.J.L. 66 (1879), involved suit by [...] to collect unpaid water usage charges.  There, [...] sought to recover the unpaid debt from the defendants, even though the water had actually been drawn from the main and used (without the defendants’ knowledge or permission) by a third party on an adjacent property.  *Id.* at 68-69.  The Court reasoned that in the absence of a statute authorizing [...] to impose water charges on property owners in the manner of a tax, the only legal basis upon which the municipality could seek to collect unpaid water charges was through an implied contract arising from usage of the water:  >  But *independent of a statutory provision making the owners* of lands fronting on a street on which water is supplied, *liable to assessment under a system of taxation for providing the means to defray the expenses of bringing water into a city*, *the obligation to pay water rates will arise only upon a contract express or implied*.  Such a contract will arise from the actual use of water by the party sought to be charged, and may be implied from the circumstances under which it was furnished, . . . .  *Id.* at 69 (emphasis added).  *[...] v. [...]*, 91 N.J.L. 671 (1918), similarly involved efforts by a municipality to collect unpaid water charges from an entity other than the one that used the water.  A municipality attempted to impose a lien on a landlord’s real property, after the tenant – which had obtained and used municipal water service without the landlord’s knowledge – failed to pay water charges.  *Id.* at 672.  As in the *Morris Canal* case, the Court reasoned that “[s]tatutory liens upon the landlord’s estate in leased real property for water rents or for water charges for water supplied thereon to the tenant must depend for their validity either upon the taxing power or upon contract. ”  *Id.*  Finding that the unpaid charges had not been assessed in the nature of a tax based upon the value of the landlord’s real property, but instead purely based on the gallonage of water used by the tenant, the Court explained that “*in case of water sold by measure must derive its vitality from the sale itself*, as such; that is, from contract. ”  *Id.* at 672-73 (emphasis added).  *[...] v. [...]*, 103 N.J.L. 574 (1927), aff’d, 104 N.J.L. 437, 140 A. 920 (E. & A. 1928), involved an attempt by [...] to seize and sell property of the [...], which allegedly was in arrears for a substantial amount of both “water rents” and unpaid taxes.
[brief] A.  Our standard of review on a motion to suppress is deferential -- we must "uphold the factual findings underlying the trial court's decision so long as those findings are 'supported by sufficient credible evidence in the record.'"  State v. Ahmad, 246 N.J. 592, 609 (2021) (quoting State v. Elders, 192 N.J. 224, 243 (2007)).  This Court defers to those findings in recognition of the trial court's "opportunity to hear and see the witnesses and to have the 'feel' of the case, which a reviewing court cannot enjoy."  Elders, 192 N.J. at 244 (quoting State v. Johnson, 42 N.J. 146, 161 (1964)).  A trial court's legal conclusions, however, and its view of "the consequences that flow from established facts," are reviewed de novo.  State v. Hubbard, 222 N.J. 249, 263 (2015).  B.
[brief] This Court's review of the factual record is ... limited to determining whether there is sufficient credible evidence in the record to support the Law Division judge's findings.  Id. at 161-62, 199 A.2d 809; State v. Clarksburg Inn, 375 N.J.Super. 624, 639, 868 A.2d 1120 (App. Div. 2005).  Accordingly, this Court defers to those findings made in the Law Division that are supported by credible evidence, but we owes no deference to the legal conclusions drawn from those findings.  State v. Handy, 206 N.J. 39, 45, 18 A.3d 179 (2011).  State v. Powers, 448 N.J. Super. 69, 72, 150 A.3d 951, 952 (App. Div. 2016)  As detailed Point I, above the record is devoid of sufficient credible evidence to support a finding that [...] placed a trap partially on the public portion of [...].  As detailed Points II to V, inclusive the law dictates reversal.
[brief] On July 9, 2021, the [...] returned a three-count indictment, [...], against defendant, [...].  Count One of the Indictment charged defendant with first-degree Robbery, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1a(2).  Counts Two and Three of the Indictment charged defendant with third-degree Terroristic Threats, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:12-3b.
[brief] A.  There is no “threshold” requirement before applying the two-prong Knight test.  Appellants argue that, before applying the Knight two-prong test, courts must ask the “threshold” question whether the judiciary exercised its authority over a certain subject area.  (Ab26).  Because the Judiciary exercised authority over the practice of law, their argument goes, no other branch of government may take action that relates to the practice of law.  (Ab26-28).  But Appellants’ creation of a threshold inquiry is contrary to precedent and should be rejected.
[directive] Cash Bail Option  1st Degree $50,000 to $100,000 10% permissible  Except as provided in 2C:20-17 and 2C:35-6, actor who is age 18 or older knowingly uses, 2nd Degree $25,000 to $50,000 10% permissible  Use of 17-Year-Old or solicits, directs, hires, employs or conspires with a person who is age 17 or younger to 2C:24-9  Younger to Commit commit a criminal offense.  An offense under this section will be one degree higher than the Criminal Offenses underlying offense; if the underlying offense is a disorderly persons offense, then it is a crime  3rd Degree $5,000 to $25,000 10% permissible of the fourth degree.  4th Degree $1,000 to $5,000 10% permissible 52 Updated December 2, 2013  Bail Schedule 2 STATUTES WHERE BAIL MAY BE SET BY A SUPERIOR COURT JUDGE OR A MUNICIPAL COURT JUDGE OR, IN THE MUNICIPAL COURT JUDGE’S ABSENCE, THE MUNICIPAL COURT ADMINISTRATOR OR DEPUTY COURT ADMINISTRATOR, PURSUANT TO RULE 3:26-2 requires warrants
[brief] The SICRA listed the Bulletin, SSAP No. 25, and three sets of Orders and Hearing Officer Reports approving acquisitions under the Holding Company Act involving reciprocal exchanges: In the Matter of the Acquisition of Control of [...], Attorney-In-Fact of [...], and [...] by [...]  And [...], State of New Jersey, Department of Banking and Insurance, [...], Order Approving Acquisition (September 12, 2014) (“Skylands I”).  (Ja3).  In the Matter of the Acquisition of Control of [...], Attorney-In-Fact of [...], and [...] by [...]  And [...], State of New Jersey, Department of Banking and Insurance, Hearing Officer’s Report (September 12, 2014).  (Ja4-15).  In the Matter of the Acquisition of Control of [...] and [...] by the [...] and [...], State of New Jersey, Department of Banking and Insurance, [...], Order Approving Acquisition (December 29, 2020) (“Skylands II”).
[brief] I.  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT  As a matter of law, an application for site plan approval of a permitted use, even one that requires reasonable variance relief, may not be denied based upon off-site traffic concerns.  The decision to place the use in the subject location is one made by the governing body and rejection of the location due to traffic conditions is an inappropriate arrogation of the zoning power by a land use board.  While the [...] attempted to mask the improper denial of the application here based on purported concerns about ingress and egress to the site, these alleged concerns related only to a loading area, not the point of access for patrons, and the loading area at issue was both pre-existing and not specifically required for the proposed use.  Resultantly, the rationale advanced by [...] for the denial is specious, and the Court should find that the [...] acted in an arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable manner, and denial of [...]’s application should be reversed.  II.
[brief] The standard applied by the High Court in Brunetti was clarified by the High Court in Hopewell Valley.  In Hopewell Valley, the High Court held that the inquire is whether circumstances “satisfy the standards in Rule 4:69-6(c) and warrant enlargement of the forty-five-day period because ‘it is manifest that the interest of justice so requires. ’  Id at 571.  The High Court went further by stating that “[T]he plain language of paragraph (c) suggests that a court has discretion to enlarge a Rule 4:69-6(a) or (b) timeframe when it perceives a clear potential for injustice. ”  Id at 578.  The plaintiff in Hopewell was informed by the Secretary of the [...] that that Board had published its notice on October 2, 2008.  However, the developer that obtained the approval front ran and published his notice 5 days before.  In overturning the dismissal, the High Court found that:  “Plaintiff was entirely reasonable in calling the Board Secretary for information.  Unlike defendants, we do not view that action as a punishable short-cut.  Rather, it was a logical and sensible approach.  In response, [...] inadvertently misled plaintiff regarding the date from which the forty-five-day limit had to be calculated.  To be sure, [...] was blameless, but so was plaintiff, which cannot be said to have slumbered on its rights.  Further, the six-day delay was such that defendants could not have suffered prejudice sufficient to warrant the barring of this litigation.  Indeed, this is the exact constellation of circumstances that Rule 4:69 was intended to address.
[brief] (“[...]”) and [...] (“[...]”) filed this suit against Defendant [...] (“[...]”) for patent infringement.  ECF No. 1.  [...] is the exclusive global licensee of U.S. Patent No. 6,491,589 (the “’589 Patent”) entitled “Mobile Water Ride Having Sluice Slide-Over Cover,” issued on December 10, 2002.  Id. at 3.  The ’589 Patent is “generally directed to a simulated wave water ride attraction having one or more water covers for ensuring the safety of riders and lowering the risk of injury or interference with ride operation. ”  Id.  Plaintiff [...] owns the U.S. Patent No. 8,088,016 (the “’016 Patent”), entitled “Half-Pipe Water Ride,” issued on January 3, 2012.  Id.  The ’016 Patent is “generally directed to a half-pipe water ride including a substantially flat middle section, a first curved sidewall, and a second curved sidewall opposite to the first curved sidewall. ”  Id. 1  Flow Rider and [...] are wholly owned subsidiaries of [...]
[brief] STATEMENT OF FACTS.........................................................................................................2  STANDARD OF REVIEW.......................................................................................................6  LEGAL ARGUMENT...............................................................................................................8  POINT I THE DECISION OF THE [...] WAS ARBITRARY, CAPRICIOUS, AND UNREASONABLE, AND SHOULD BE REVERSED.  (Not Raised Below) .............................................................................................................8  POINT II  THE DECISION BELOW WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE AND SHOULD THEREFORE BE REVERSED.  (Not Raised Below) ...........................................................................................................15  CONCLUSION..........................................................................................................................18
[brief] Plaintiff had a small annual income and moderate retirement savings, likely not enough to sustain her retirement for more than a few years.  She had no emergency fund in case of illness or job loss.  She knew that she had to sell the land in [...] to pay for her portion of the down payment of her townhome.  What reasonable adult would look at her financial situation at almost sixty years of age and not feel that things were dire after living a secure life for twenty-three years with the promise that it would continue forever?
[brief] ”  . . .  § 6.3.5  Consolidation or Joinder § 6.3.5.1  Subject to the rules of the [...] or other applicable arbitration rules, either party may consolidate an arbitration conducted under this Agreement with, any other arbitration to which it is a party provided that (1) the arbitration agreement governing the other arbitration permits consolidation; (2) the arbitrations to be consolidated substantially involve common questions of law or fact; and (3) the arbitrations employ materially similar procedural rules and methods for selecting arbitrator(s).  Pa603-Pa604.  Therefore, any claims arising under the [...] could be combined with another arbitration only if three factors were met: (1) the other arbitration’s agreement permitted consolidation, (2) common questions of fact and law, and (3) similar rules.  As explained below, in this case, these factors were not met.  B.
[brief] [...] held that defendant’s pre-sentence report indicated a lengthy criminal history and was awaiting trial for more offenses.  He noted defendant was currently serving a sentence for another conviction for first-degree robbery.  [6T10-24 to 12-19].  Defendant had four indictable convictions prior to this conviction.  His record spanned several states.  He had experienced fines, prison and probation.  [PSR].  Defendant’s argument that [...] did not place enough weight on mitigating factor (4) is without merit.
[brief] (T18:11 to 19:25).  The trial court ruled that the Defendants are not subject to liability under CFA because they enjoy “learned professional” immunity as articulated in Plemmons, which has been superseded by Shaw.  (T34-20 to 35-2).  Shaw restored CFA immunity to historically “learned professionals” like doctors and lawyers.  460 N.J. at 627.  The Defendants, in their capacity as licensed semi-professional insurance producers, do not enjoy the limited immunity from CFA liability under the judicially created “learned professional” exemption because they are not “learned professionals. ”  The trial court erred in dismissing with prejudice Plaintiff’s CFA claims (Count VII) and extending CFA immunity to Defendants.
[brief] In doing so, [...] avoided direct impacts to wetlands, State open waters, streams, and other waterbodies.  [...]’s HAD application also included various avoidance and minimization measures, including measures to minimize impacts to Highlands resources such as upland forest areas, steep slopes, and threatened and endangered species.  [...]’s efforts to avoid and minimize impacts to Highlands resources were confirmed by the [...] (“[...]”) in an October 16, 2019 letter to the [...].  In that letter, the [...] thoroughly analyzed the Project’s impacts on Highlands resources and [...]’s efforts to avoid and minimize those impacts.
[brief] [...]’s Imposition of the Public Access Condition on [...]’s Waterfront Development Permit is a Taking of Private Property In Violation of the United States Constitution and the Constitution of the State of New Jersey (Replying to Respondent’s Point F).  The United States Constitution and the New Jersey Constitution both prohibit the taking of private property for public use “without just compensation. ”  U.S. Const. amend. V; N.J. Const. art. I, ¶ 20.  New Jersey courts apply the same analysis for state and federal takings claims, viewing the constitutional provisions as “coextensive. ”  Englewood Hosp. & Med. Ctr. v. State, 478 N.J. Super. 626, 640 (App. Div. 2024), citing Klumpp v. Borough of Avalon, 202 N.J. 390, 405 (2010).  While “[t]he paradigmatic taking requiring just compensation is a direct government appropriation or physical invasion of private property,” these constitutional protections also guard against certain kinds of regulatory interference with a private party’s interest in their property.  See Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 537-38 (2005); see Cedar Point Nursery v. Hassid, 594 U.S. 139, 147-48 (2021).  [...], by requiring [...] to create a public access point at its property under the circumstances presented, has effectively appropriated private property for public use without just compensation and, as such, engaged in a *per se* taking in violation of the respective Constitutions of the United States and the State of New Jersey.
[brief] By its express terms and operation of law, the Mutual Arbitration Agreement is governed by the FAA. (Pa000093); see also Circuit City Stores, 523 U.S. 105 (holding employment claims governed by the FAA are arbitrable); Flanzman, 244 N.J. 119 (holding LAD claims are arbitrable).  The Agreement is explicit in that it covers “all disputes, claims, complaints or controversies” that [...] may have against [...] and its employees, clients, and/or customers, including any claims for discrimination, retaliation, penalties, or restitution, and any other claim under any federal, state, or local statute, constitution, regulation, rule, ordinance, or common law that arise out of or may be related, directly or indirectly, to her employment or termination with [...] or its clients.  (Pa000092.)  The Agreement further confirms that Plaintiff’s employment discrimination and retaliation claims will “be resolved by Arbitration and NOT by a court or jury. ”  (Id. (emphasis in original). )  [...] asserted two counts of employment discrimination under the LAD.  (Pa000001–14.)  There is no legitimate dispute that these claims are “Covered Claims” under the Agreement that [...] signed.  There is a valid and enforceable agreement that commits any and all disputes—including employment discrimination claims—to arbitration.  See Perez, 472 N.J Super. at 248.  The Agreement covers the entirety of her claims and this action.  The trial court correctly dismissed [...]’s action without prejudice and referred her instead to arbitration, as she agreed.  See, e.g., Seus v. John Nuveen & Co., 146 F.3d 175, 179 (3d Cir. 1998) (“If all the claims involved in an action are arbitrable, a court may dismiss the action instead of staying it. ”), overruled on other grounds, Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79 (2000).  This Court should affirm.
[brief] *Id.*  In this case, [...] testified based on the extensive investigations conducted at the site, that after the period of operations of each AOC, nothing further was done to add to the contamination originating from that AOC.  (Pa0284).  The evidence of record established that (1) the remediation being conducted is to address property damage caused by releases that occurred during each AOC’s period of operations; (2) any CVOCs released at the Site would have reached and damaged the groundwater almost immediately; and (3) after the period of operation of each AOC, there were no further discharges of CVOCs to that AOC.  (Pa0263-88).
[brief] In Point II of our earlier brief, we summarized the New Jersey courts’ current formulation of those doctrines.  As we will explain, [...]’s summary of the case law omits a key element of *res judicata* that is fatal to its position.  [...] “concedes that there exists commonality of parties and that there was a final judgment rendered by [...] previously,” ([...]’s Brief at 30, n. 4), but argues that there was no identity of issues because [...] asserted a different legal theory than [...] has in this case.  [...] further argues that because “none of the parties in the [...] case knew about the recorded 1966 Totten-to-Liniewicz Deed,” and it was never presented to the court at that time, [...] is entitled to a do-over.  ([...]’s Brief at 31.)  We disagree.  The fundamental premise of [...]’s argument -- that identity of issues requires assertion of precisely the same legal theory in both actions -- is simply wrong.  As we explained at length in our earlier brief at pages 23-26, causes of action are deemed part of a single “claim” if they arise out of the same transaction or occurrence.  If a litigant seeks to remedy a single wrong, in this case denial of access to the easement across [...]’s property, that litigant should present all theories in the first action.  Otherwise, theories not raised will be precluded in a later action.  *McNeil v. Legislative Apportionment Comm’n*, 177 N.J. 364, 395 (2003).  The New Jersey courts have distilled these principles to the simple phrase, reflected in decisions such as *Joseph L. Muscarelle, Inc. v. State*, 175 N.J. Super. 384, 395 (App. Div.1980), *app. dismissed*, 87 N.J. 321 (1981), that *res judicata* extends to all claims that were raised or “could have been raised. ”  175 N.J. Super. at 395 (emphasis added).  There is no reason why a claim for an express easement could not have been asserted by [...] since the purpose of that relief would have been to “remedy” the same “wrong. ”  *McNeil, supra*, 177 N.J. at 395.  [...] entirely ignores the could-have-been-raised element of *res judicata*, instead choosing to highlight the supposed unfairness of saddling [...] with the consequences of [...]’s less-than-optimal litigation strategy.  [...]’s attempt to cast itself as a victim of unfairness is problematic, for three reasons.  First, it ignores the unfairness to [...] who litigated the previous case, prevailed and reasonably relied on that result for years.  Second, it presumes that the more ineptly an earlier case was handled, the more that litigant’s privies are entitled to a second bite at the apple -- an astounding proposition.  And third, [...], like its predecessor [...]l, proceeded recklessly into the transaction without conducting appropriate due diligence.  **Point IV**
[brief] The Commissioner’s Decision  The Commissioner adopted the ALJ’s initial decision.  (Aa52).  The Commissioner found that the findings are supported by the administrative record developed during the hearings.  (Aa3).  The Commissioner made additional findings that [...]’s increase of MAE from 10% to 15% results in a higher increase that could not be justified and that [...] wanted to maximize its premiums, more than doubling them for many policyholders, and use profits to pay for other lines of insurance.  The Commissioner further explained that in line with the Legislature’s intent and concern with promoting the public interest and protecting the public when it passed the LTCI Act, rate filings are not automatically approved even if their calculation meets the requirements in the rule.  The LTCI Act still requires the Commissioner to measure whether rates are excessive, among other concerns to be addressed.  N.J.S.A. 17B:27E-11.  Accordingly, the Commissioner concluded that [...]’s premium rate requests were excessive under both the commonsense meaning of the term “excessive” as well as under the meaning ascribed to that term by an actuary in the industry.  The Commissioner rejected [...]’s claims that the Department engaged in administrative rule making and exceeded its authority under the LTCI Act.  The Commissioner further concluded that the Department was not obligated to use the word “excessive” in its findings.  [...] was not free to ignore the hardship that would be experienced by policyholders and ignore both the ordinary, dictionary meaning of the word excessive and its actuarial counterpart.  This appeal followed.
[brief] (Da215-Da216 pg. 119, Line 4 through pg. 120, Line 24.)  [...] testified not once, but multiple times, that he did not bother to question or seek any further clarification, but instead consented to [...] as well as [...] to install the ASDS.  (Da229-Da330 pg. 133, Line 24 to pg. 134, Line 14.)