ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Raised below(2T 5:24-25; 6:1-24; 26:1-25; 27:1-2; 29:2-13; 32:25; and 33:1-7)  ..................................  4-6  Conclusion .......................................................  6  TABLE OF JUDGEMENTS  Order Denying Petition for Post Conviction Relief ...........  Da6  Order Denying Appeal and Opinion by the Honorable [...], J.S.C. ................................................ Da11-26 APPENDIX: [...] ..............................................
[brief] Indeed, even in the civil context, “[t]here is no bright-line rule regarding what constitutes a ‘final judgment’ for issue preclusion. ”  Free Speech Coal., Inc. v. Attorney Gen. of U.S., 677 F.3d 519, 541 (3d Cir. 2012); see also In re Liquidation of Integrity Ins. Co., 214 N.J. 51, 68 (2013) (observing the finality requirement for collateral estoppel is “less stringent” than the finality requirement for res judicata).  Rather, “finality ‘may mean little more than that --- 6  Despite being a key factor, “New Jersey courts hold that a judgment is final even pending an appeal. ”  Bondi v. Citigroup, Inc., 423 N.J. Super. 377, 426 (App. Div. 2011).  the litigation of a particular issue has reached such a stage that a court sees no really good reason for permitting it to be litigated again. ”  Free Speech Coal., Inc., 677 F.3d at 541 (quoting In re Brown, 951 F.2d 564, 569 (3d Cir. 1991)).  To determine whether the prior ruling constitutes a final judgment for issue preclusion, courts consider “whether the parties were fully heard, whether a reasoned opinion was filed, and whether that decision could have been, or actually was, appealed. ”  Ibid. (quoting Brown, 951 F.2d at 569).  Notably, “[n]one of these factors appears to be determinative. ”  Ibid.  Here, defendant’s motion to suppress was fully heard in [...].  Both parties briefed the motion, testimony was taken, the court heard oral argument, and the court issued an order and opinion setting forth its reasons for denying the motion.  The court’s ruling is “sufficiently firm to be accorded conclusive effect,” Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 13 (1982), and litigation of the motion has reached such a stage that there is “no really good reason for permitting it to be litigated again,” Free Speech Coal., Inc., 677 F.3d at 541 (quoting Brown, 951 F.2d at 569).  For these reasons, the [...] court’s denial of defendant’s motion to suppress satisfies the finality requirement for the purpose of collateral estoppel, and the trial court erred when it found otherwise.
[brief] 1.  Excerpts from Order Issuing Certificate (April 21, 2022)  179 FERC ¶ 61,041 ........................................  TGPa0001  2.  Excerpts from Highlands Council Project Review Procedures (June 2019)  .................................................  TGPa0007  3.  Excerpts from Final Environmental Impact Statement (FEIS) (September 2021)  ...........................................  TGPa0014  4.  Excerpts from Notice to Proceed with Construction – Compressor Stations 321 and 327 (October 6, 2022)  ............  TGPa0041  5.  Excerpts from Order on Rehearing and Denying Stay (October 24, 2021)  181 FERC ¶ 61,051 ............................  TGPa0043  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
[brief] The New Jersey Arbitration of Collective Bargaining Agreements Act, N.J.S.A. 2A:24-1, et seq. (“Arbitration Act”), which the Legislature incorporated into the Police and Fire Public Interest Arbitration Reform Act, N.J.S.A. 34:13A-14, et seq. (“Interest Arbitration Act”), at N.J.S.A. 34:13A-16f(5)a, provides four statutory bases for vacating an arbitration award at N.J.S.A. 2A:24-8.  See East Rutherford, supra, 213 N.J. at 202.  Under that statute, a court or PERC may vacate an award: a. Where the award was procured by corruption, fraud or undue means; b. Where there was either evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or any thereof; c. Where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone a hearing . . . or in refusing to hear evidence . . . or of any other misbehaviors prejudicial to the rights of any party; [or] d. Where the arbitrators exceeded or so imperfectly executed their powers that a mutual, final and definite award upon the subject matter was not made.
[brief] 35 Samatula v. Piechota, 142 N.J.Eq. 320 (Ch.1948)  .................................................................................. 37 Spiotta v. Wm. H. Wilson, Inc., 72 N.J. Super. 572 (App. Div. 1962), certif. denied, 37 N.J. 229 (1962).  ......................................................................  20 Till v. Delta Sch. of Com., Inc., 487 So. 2d 180 (La. Ct. App. 1986) ....................................................................  22 Vispisiano v. Ashland Chemical Co., 107 N.J. 416 A.2d 66 (1987)  ..............................................................................  42  Wanaque Borough Sewerage Auth. v. Twp. of W. Milford, 144 N.J. 564 (1996) .............................................................................................  22  Williston on Contracts, § 3 3d ed. 1957 ...............................................................  21 Statutes N.J.S.A. 2A:14-1 ...................................................................................................  41 Rules R. 4:46-2(c) .............................................................................................................  19  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
[brief] There is no dispute as to the Building Height Definition within Ordinance 22-2.4 – namely “the vertical dimension measured to the highest point of the building… from the lowest original lot grade or any revised lot grade shown on a site plan….  Such revised lot grade shall not include mounding, terracing, or other devices designed to allow increased building height. ” (emphasis added).  Plaintiffs continue to attempt in this appeal (as they did in the trial court) to reshape the Board’s consideration of the issue of building height calculation as an interpretation of the Building Height Definition, when in reality the Board made a clear factual determination as to whether the regrading of the entire site constitutes “mounding, terracing, or other devices designed to allow increased building height. ”  The issue is whether [...] could use the revised lot grade, consistent with the Ordinance, in measuring building height.  The trial court properly found that the Board’s application of the Building Height Definition – and the factual findings therein – were amply supported by the record and, therefore, were not arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable.
[brief] The causes of action were Discrimination Based on Race, Hostile Work Environment and Harassment, Retaliation and Discrimination Based on Age which are pled under the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (NJLAD).  There existed no support in the record regarding race and age neutral decisions to not renew the contract for the Appellant.  The Appellate Court is not bound by the interpretation and application of the law made by the Trial Court.  The Trial Court failed to recognize the evidence that supported the Appellant’s case and as a result, the decision reached did not comport with the evidence and the application of the case law.
[brief] Docket No. [...]  BRIEF OF APPELLANT  [...]  [...]  A Professional Corporation [...]  [...]  [...]  Telephone: [...]  Facsimile: [...]  [...]  [...]  Telephone: [...]  Facsimile: [...]  [...]  [...]  Telephone: [...]  Facsimile: [...]  [...] [...]  [...]  Telephone: [...]  Facsimile: [...]  Attorneys for Appellant [...]
[brief] In the Background and Procedural History section, the Final Decision briefly summarizes the district’s submission (Final Decision at 6).  In the Analysis section, however, the Final Decision makes only two passing references to points made in the district’s rebuttal and dismisses both out of hand.  (Final Decision at 19 and 20).  [...].  However, the Final Decision never: (i) quantifies how much could be raised by [...] by dint of greater efforts (within the legally-prescribed limits)\textsuperscript{20} or saved by [...] personnel implementing State-recommended efficiencies, and how that would compare to the huge and constantly escalating amount of State loans extended to keep Lakewood afloat; or (ii) explains why, for at least the last 15 years,\textsuperscript{21} the educational and fiscal problems afflicting the [...] have not prompted the State to use its undeniable power and duty to order the district to implement available and necessary fiscal and educational measures.
[brief] “No person shall engage in business as a consumer lender or sales finance company without first obtaining a license or licenses under this act. ”  N.J.S.A. 17:11C-3(a) which is part of the New Jersey Consumer Finance Licensing Act (“NJCFLA”).  It is undisputed that, when [...] engaged in those businesses by attempted to take assignment of the [...] credit account allegedly belonging to [...], it did not hold either of the required licenses.  The NJCFLA further states that:  A consumer lender who violates or participates in the violation of any provision of section 3 . . . of this act, shall be guilty of a crime of the fourth degree.  A contract of a loan not invalid for any other reason, in the making or collection of which any act shall have been done which constitutes a crime of the fourth degree under this section, shall be void and the lender shall have no right to collect or receive any principal, interest or charges .  . . .”  N.J.S.A. 17:11C-33(b) (emphasis added).  Thus, the alleged debt was void upon the assignment to [...].  Nevertheless, [...] then initiated a collection lawsuit against [...] to enforce the void debt.  [...] disputes he was properly served with [...]’s collection Complaint.  Moreover, he was unaware of the NJCFLA, its licensure requirements, [...] failure to hold a required license, and, the consequent voiding of the debt.  [...] later sought and, on or about April 21, 2017, obtained default judgment was entered against [...].  But, at all times relevant to the collection action, [...] had no legal right to collect, enforce, or attempt to collect or enforce [...]’s alleged consumer debt because [...] failed to obtain the required license.  [...] moved to vacate under R. 4:50-1(d) and (f)—arguing the default judgment is void for defective service and the debt is void by virtue of the NJCFLA.  In denying [...]’s motion to vacate, the trial court erroneously concluded his motion was not brought within a reasonable time and is barred by laches.  Accordingly, the trial court Order (Da72) denying [...]’s Motion to Vacate Default Judgment should be reversed.
[brief] d.  The Only Location Ever Identified By The Borough As Providing A Realistic Opportunity To Construct The Off-site Affordable Units Was [...].  [...] Failed To Come Forward At The Midpoint Review, Or At Any Time, To The Special Master, Implementation Monitor, Or FSHC With Any Viable Alternative (3-7a, 17-18a, 20-21a)  The trial court seemingly placed the burden on [...] to demonstrate the Off-site Property Block 610 as the location for the seven Off-site affordable units was set forth in the judgment, itself.  This shifts the burden.  It is the Borough’s obligation as part of the Settlement Agreement and Judgment to provide a realistic opportunity for satisfaction of the Borough of [...]’s Fair Share of low and moderate-income housing, including the location for the seven Off-site units.
[brief] \(^1\)  Defendants failed to substantially comply with the requirement prescribed by R. 2:6-11(a), and filed their Opposition late on July 16, 2024.  With such disregard to the Court’s rules, the Court should suppress Defendants’ Opposition Brief, and make its ruling solely based on Plaintiff-Appellant’s filings.  \(^1\)  To be clear, thirty (30) days from June 14, 2024 would result in a Sunday, July 14, 2024 due date.  For this reason, Plaintiff looks to the next weekday, Monday, July 15, 2024 as the due date.  CONCLUSION
[brief] The Trial Court’s surgical excision of [...] testimony does not stop there.  The Court goes on to criticize the reliability of [...]’s opinions and state the following:  “Other factors also indicate that his opinions are not reliable because that are not any facts to support the opinion.  [...] never inspected the roadway.  [...] never took any measurements of the depth of the whole, of the abrupt elevation change, or the tapering. ” (Pa2166).
[brief] The issue in this appeal is whether the lower court erred in failing to grant the appellant an annulment on the grounds of fraud, as N.J.S.A. 2A:34-1 provides.  The respondent contends that there was no fraud because she did not marry the plaintiff to obtain a green card and did not misrepresent her character or beliefs.  However, all the competent, relevant, and reasonably credible evidence shows just the opposite -- that the defendant made at least the following material misrepresentations to the plaintiff in the months leading to the parties’ marriage:  Defendant represented that her last name was [...], which the plaintiff subsequently learned was false after the engagement, 1T67.  Relatedly, the plaintiff found out the defendant's family did not adhere to or observe traditional customs; defendant represented that her family adhered to and observed traditional customs as they claimed to be [...]s, and every [...] known to the plaintiff observed these customs.  Defendant promised that she would observe these customs once they were married.  However, she did not; plaintiff learned, after the parties’ marriage, that the defendant’s family did not observe the traditional customs either, 1T72-73.  Similarly, the defendant represented that her sister would not be engaged to someone outside of the plaintiff’s caste—which is very important in Indian culture; this, too, was false, which the plaintiff learned after their engagement 1T68-69.  Defendant expressed to plaintiff, during the engagement and before marriage, her eagerness to start a family together, but changed her stance regarding children after the marriage, 1T80.  When plaintiff asked defendant about having children, defendant told the plaintiff, before they were married, that she wanted to have two children and start a family immediately; plaintiff held the same views and agreed.  However, after they married, defendant’s stance changed to wanting to wait, which plaintiff believed impacted the integrity of their marriage.  This further proves the defendant’s intention to commit fraud by never intending to enter into a bona fide marriage with the plaintiff, T115-116.
[brief] The [...] and the Initial Decision Erred As A Matter Of | | | Law In Ignoring The Decisions And Conclusions Of The | | | [...] And Accepted And Relied Upon Paid | | | "Expert" Testimony That Contradicted The Expert Findings | | | Of The [...] | 15 | | 7.  The [...] Arbitrarily And Capriciously Approved [...]'s | | | Failure To Consider Alternatives | 18 | | CONCLUSION | 20 | # Table of Authorities ## CASES | Case | Page | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | In Re Monmouth Consolidated Water Co., 47 N.J. 251 (1966) | 19 | | In Re Proposed Quest Academy Char., 216 N.J. 370 (2013) | 2 | | In Re Pub Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 35 N.J. 358 (1961) | 17, 19 | | *In The Matter Of The Proposed Construction Of Compressor Station | | | (CS237), Office Building And Appurtances, Highlands Applicability | | | Determination Program, Interest No.: 1615-17-0004-2 (APD200001), | | | ___ N.J. Super. ___, (slip op., August 31, 2023) | 3, 11, 12, 16, 18 | | Muise v. GPU, Inc., 332 N.J. Super. 140 (App. Div. 2000) | 6 | | Underwriters v. Public Electric, 459 N.J. Super. 436 | | | (App. Div. 2019) | 6 | ## STATUTES | Statute | Page | |------------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | N.J.S.A. 13:20-28; -31 | 4 | | N.J.S.A. 40:55D-19 | 1, 3, 17, 18 | | N.J.S.A. 48:2-3 | 9 | | N.J.S.A. 52:27F-15b | 10 | Appendix
[brief] 3T80:13-18.  Although he stated he made this loan and was subsequently paid on said loan via the settlement, [...] stated there “may be” a promissory note, but admittedly never produced said promissory note.  3T97:21-98:1.  Although Plaintiff brought on [...], the “only major customer” as described by [...], Plaintiff received no part of this settlement.  3T39:20-23.  According to [...], [...] “basically failed” after [...] fired them following Plaintiff’s departure.  3T39:12-23.  When asked about the $1.028 million settlement that [...] paid to [...], [...] confirmed that $587,000.00 of this amount went to [...], and that the other $262,535.36 went to [...] for legal fees and to repay his loan with interest of $93,455.65, and that there was another $40,000.000 that went to the “[...] settlement.
[brief] ” (17T209-9 to 15).  He rejected mitigating factors eight, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1b(8) (defendant’s conduct was the result of circumstances unlikely to recur) and nine, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1b(9) (defendant’s character and attitude indicate that defendant is unlikely to commit another offense) because the judge had already given significant weight to aggravating factor three (the risk exists that defendant will commit another offense).  (17T210-17 to 211-16).  He rejected mitigating factor ten, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1b(10) (defendant is particularly likely to respond affirmatively to probationary treatment), because defendant was convicted of crimes which carried the presumption of incarceration.  (17T211-17 to 23).  He rejected mitigating factor 11, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1b(11) (imprisonment would entail excessive hardship to defendant or his dependents), because defendant had no dependents, was doing well academically in jail, and did not claim that incarceration harmed his mental health.  (17T211-24 to 211-19).  He rejected mitigating factor 13, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1b(13) (defendant was substantially influenced by another person more mature than defendant), because there were no facts supporting this factor.  (17T214-11 to 14).  Engaging in a qualitative balancing of the sentencing factors, [...] found that “the aggravating factors outweigh the mitigating factors.  (17T217-3 to 7).  On appeal, defendant challenges a multitude of the sentencing court’s findings.
[brief] In Hardwick, Vermont’s highest court held that the term “damages” in a liability insurance policy included “financial loss without regard to the basis upon which its liability might technically be premised. ”  177 Vt. at 433, 869 A.2d at 91 (quoting Village of Morrisville Water & Light Dep’t v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 775 F. Supp. 718, 727 (D. Vt. 1991)).  Hardwick held that the policy term “damages” encompassed “costs incurred in complying with a government order to take actions aimed at cleaning up contamination that he [the insured] caused.
[brief] Pa284-Pa285.  The Order made reference to the prior Scheduling Order dated March 9, 2022 which: (1) required Plaintiff to file a copy of all municipal court transcripts with the Superior Court by April 8, 2022; and (2) notified Plaintiff that the matter would be dismissed if the transcripts were not filed, unless an extension was obtained.  Pa285.  According to the Order, as of April 22, 2022 Plaintiff had not filed the transcripts and had not obtained an extension, and his appeal was therefore dismissed.
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[brief] #  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ## CASES | Case | Page | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | Balducci v. Cige, 240 N.J. 574, 595 (2020) | 24 | | Beach Realty Co. v. City of Wildwood, 105 N.J.L. 317 (1929) | 44 | | Boylan v. Borough of Point Pleasant Beach, 410 N.J. Super. 564, 569 (App. Div. 2009) | 26 | | Bron v. Weintraub, 42 N.J. 87 (1964) | 47 | | Cherokee Equities v. Garaventa, 382 N.J. Super. 201, 206 (N.J. Super. Ch. Div. 2005) | 48 | | C.R. v. M.T., 248 N.J. 428, 440 (2021) | 24 | | Carter v. Denman's Ex'rs, 23 N.J.L. 260, 261 (1852) | 43, 44 | | Dickinson v. Fund for Support of Free Public Sch., 95 N.J. 65, 79 (1983) | 28 | | Gnall v. Gnall, 222 N.J. 414, 428 (2015) | 24 | | Greenwood v. Robbins, 108 N.J. Eq. 122 (Ch. 1931) | 44 | | Griepenburg v. Twp. of Ocean, 220 N.J. 239, 254 (2015) | 24, 25 | | Healy v. Fairleigh Dickinson Univ., 287 N.J. Super. 407, 413 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 145 N.J. 372 (1996) | 56 | | Hofer v. Carina, 4 N.J. 244, 250 (1950) | 56 | | Kellogg v. Platt, 33 N.J.L. 328 (1869) | 43 | | Kuntzman v. Smith, 77 N.J. Eq. 30 (1910) | 44 | | Moore v. Rake, 26 N.J.L. 574, 575 (1857) | 43 | O Y Old Bridge Dev. Corp. v. Cont'l Searchers, Inc., 120 N.J. 454, 577 (1990) .........................................................47, 48 O'Neill v. State Highway Dep't., 50 N.J. 307, 323 (1967)
[brief] (6T 161-11 to 14)  [...] did not see what the gun fell out of.  (6T 180-15 to 21)  The search he was conducting was not photographed as it proceeded.  (9T 43-8 to 44-10)  [...] did not write a report about finding the gun.  (6T 180-22 to 23)  [...] of the New Jersey State Police testified that he conducted a search and did not find a gun permit or an application for a permit submitted by [...].  (10T 8-3 to 21)  The gun was a central piece of evidence.  No fingerprints or usable DNA were found on it.  (8T 75-20, 10T 56-20 to 58-19)  [...], of the New Jersey State Police, testified as an expert in firearms and tool mark identification.  (11T 22-1 to 6)  Before trial began, the defense moved to limit his testimony to what is scientifically valid — that the casings, bullets, and gun shared “class characteristics. ”  (Da 22-43)  The denial of that motion is the subject of Point I, infra.  [...] testified that the “discharged metal jackets” found at the scene were “discharged from that submitted firearm,” found in [...]’s closet.  (11T 45- 14 to 22)  He also testified that three bullet fragments found during the autopsy were “discharged from the submitted pistol. ”  (11T 52-19 to 23)  An affidavit written by [...] was read into the record.  In it, [...] wrote that he placed the gun in the closet and he did so alone.  (13T 20-19 to 21-4)  In closing, the defense pointed out that the State did not obtain video from surrounding streets that would corroborate [...]’s alibi that he was at [...] at the time of the shooting and failed to pursue [...] as a suspect.  (14T 27-14 to 29-17)  The defense argued forcefully that [...] had the motive and opportunity to commit the shooting, noting that he was dropped off by [...] three blocks away from the shooting, this his fingerprints were on [...]’s car, and that he was known to be involved in drug dealing in the same area [...] had been dealing drugs.  (14T 40-5 to 18)
[brief] B.  THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BECAUSE THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE FROM WHICH A REASONABLE JUROR COULD CONCLUDE THAT HASSAN POSSESSED ANY ATTRIBUTE THAT POSED A RISK OF HARM TO CUSTOMERS.  The claims for negligent training and supervision should have been dismissed at the close of Plaintiffs’ case-in-chief, because there was no evidence that [...] had reason to know that Mr. [...] was unfit, incompetent, or posed a danger to customers in the absence of additional training or supervision.