ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] In *State v. Cassady*, 198 N.J. 165 (2009), the New Jersey Supreme Court reversed an Appellate Division decision that vacated a bank robbery conviction after the defendant demanded money from the bank teller.  *Id.* at 179.  The defendant told the teller, “Hurry up.  I know how to get it. ”  *Id.* at 170.  He then proceeded to jump over the glass partition separating the teller and the defendant.  He did not issue a direct threat of violence or brandish a weapon, but the teller nonetheless felt threatened by the exchange.  *Ibid.*  In reviewing the Appellate Division’s opinion, which reversed defendant’s conviction and remanded the matter to the trial court to include jury instructions for the lesser-included offense of theft from the person, the Supreme Court stated, echoing the dissent, “This was a bank robbery: plain and simple.  In my view, no rational jury could come to any other conclusion. ”  *Id.* at 179, quoting *State v. Cassady*, 396 N.J. Super. 392 (App. Div. 2007) ([...], J.A.D., dissenting).  Here, there was ample evidence to support the Robbery charge going forward to the jury.  Several witnesses heard defendant tell [...] and [...] to give him all of the money.  [3T58-13; 3T95-6 to -7].  [...] testified that she saw defendant motion with his pocket as if he had a firearm.  [3T95-14 to -19].  [...] testified that she was afraid defendant would injure or kill her.  [3T97-1 to -6].  [...] also testified that defendant announced that he had a gun.  [3T77-18 to -22].  [...] did not state that the statement was directed specifically at [...] or at [...].  Defendant’s argument that, because [...] placed the money on the counter before defendant gestured with his pocket, she was not the victim of a robbery must fail.  [...] testified that she was afraid of defendant’s actions.  [3T97-1 to -6].  [...] placed the money on the counter because she recognized the scenario as a robbery in progress.  [3T95-1 to -11].  Similarly, defendant’s argument that because [...] did not testify she could not have felt threatened must also fail.  Moreover, [...] and [...] were not named victims in the first-degree Robbery count.
[brief] (Pa000014.)  [...] claimed that [...]’s intent in his 2014 Will was to release only him but not [...] from their joint mortgage obligation.  The Will provided in relevant part:  I do give, devise and bequeath the unpaid principal balance and accrued interest, if any, in and to a certain mortgage lien which I hold on the property known and as by the street address [...] unto my son [...] Ventre.  It is my wish and I direct that such debt be forgiven and the mortgage lien cancelled of record by my Executor.  [Pa000019 at ¶38.]  Plaintiffs seized upon the first sentence in this provision to argue that [...] only intended to release [...], but not [...].  (Pa000018 at ¶26, Pa000019 at ¶s 34-36.)  Plaintiffs advanced this argument even though [...], who drafted the subject provision, was absolutely clear in his understanding that [...] intended to forgive the entire debt and discharge the mortgage.
[brief] THE BOROUGH NEVER AGREED TO ALLOW SEVEN (7) UNITS TO BE PLACED ON [...] [See Order dated May 12, 2023 specifically at 11a]  The basis of [...]'s Motion to Enforce heavily relies on the Certification of the former Mayor, [...].  While the Borough maintains this Certification should be disregarded in its entirety due to numerous violations of the Court Rules governing same, even if considered, it does not support any legal authority for the arguments made.  The Borough submits that these Certifications should be disregarded in their entirety based upon the gross deviation from the N.J. Court Rules governing such Certifications and their contents, and further submits that the allegations contained therein are not only immaterial to the question before the Court, but also contain inaccuracies and falsehoods.
[brief] Brill, supra, 142 N.J. at 540.  The Court must not “ignore the elements of the cause of action or evidential standard governing the cause of action. ”  Stewart v. New Jersey Turnpike Authority, 249 N.J. 642, 655 (2021), citing Bhagat v. Bhagat, 217 N.J. 22, 38 (2014).  Furthermore, evidentiary rulings, such as the trial court’s decision that the [...] report constituted an inadmissible net opinion, are reviewed for abuse of discretion.  *State v. Erazo*, 126 N.J. 112, 131 (1991).  To the extent that the award or denial of summary judgment turns “on the admissibility of evidence, an appellate court reviews the trial court’s underlying evidentiary determination for an abuse of discretion. ”  *State v. Garcia*, 245 N.J. 412, 430 (2021).  This standard applies to a trial judge’s ruling that an expert’s report constitutes an inadmissible net opinion.  *Pomerantz Paper Corp. v. New Community Corp.*, 207 N.J. 344, 371 (2011); *Riley v. Keenan*, 406 N.J. Super. 281, 295 (App. Div.), *cert. den’d* 200 N.J. 207 (2009).  A decision to admit or exclude evidence “must stand unless it can be shown that the trial court palpably abused its discretion” and entered an order “so wide of the mark that a manifest denial of justice resulted. ”
[brief] Unfortunately, the judge erred when she interrupted and didn’t allow the officer to admit the lie, stating, "I’ll look at the video and determine it".  But it is clear that she doesn’t even want to look at those provable allegations.  She states, “maybe the officer didn’t ask him to restart at the starting position.  None of that even comes close to my findings that there’s not probable cause for defendant to be arrested. ”  4T:37-(12-17).  So, lying to arrest someone is completely acceptable to the judge.  Lies cannot add to a person’s credibility.  (Da 3a, 1T:23-(5-17), [1T:28(22-25) - 1T:29-(1-10)], [4T:14-(4-25) – 4T:15-(1-14)], The very beginning of [...] bodycam)
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[brief] [...] and the [...] filed an action in New Jersey Superior Court, Law Division, on March 17, 2017 challenging, *inter alia*, the constitutionality of the MSRA.  *PBA Local 24 and [...] v. [...] et al.*, [...] (“Police 1”).  Plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of the MSRA and the legality of Defendants’ actions in decimating the terms of the respective CNAs.  The gravamen of Police 1 was that the MSRA violated the Police Unions’ constitutional rights by eliminating all of the employees’ prospective contractual rights, all rights pursuant to the Employer-Employee Relations Act (“EERA”), N.J.S.A. 34:13A-5.4, the Civil Service Act, N.J.S.A. 11A:1-1, *et seq.*, and the Interest Arbitration Act, N.J.S.A. 34:13A-16.  On March 17, 2017, the Court entered a Temporary Restraining Order maintaining the status quo with respect to all terms and conditions of employment, including wages.  Pa000289-296.  The Court later issued an Order on May 23, 2017 denying an injunction with respect to changes to salary, overtime, health insurance, longevity and education pay, workers’ compensation, and terminal leave over $15,000.  Pa000305-306.  The Court granted an injunction for the reduction of the police force, change in work schedule, and elimination of terminal leave over $15,000.  The Court, however, did not permit these changes to become effective until after the “close of business on Tuesday, June 6, 2017. ”  Id.  Defendants drafted an implementation memorandum dated June 7, 2017 (“Implementation Memo”) outlining the changes to employment which had been approved by the Court.  Pa000208-212.  The Implementation Memo stated the following for new salaries:  -  **Effective June 7, 2017**, a new salary guide is hereby established for **all** current and future employees (including **future promotions** to the rank of Sergeant).  Police officers will be placed on the step that is closest to their current base salary.  (Step 15 is maximum for Police Officers).  Base salary is defined as the employee’s total pensionable salary.  The below salaries shall be the entire compensation for each employee.  --- 2  The [...] had a separate Implementation Memo adjusting salaries and other terms and conditions of employment which was also effective June 7, 2024.  Defendants did not submit that memorandum in this action with their Trial Court filings.  The parties agreed to resolve Police 1 and entered into the November 17, 2017 Settlement Agreement, submitted to the Court on or about January 16, 2018, which incorporated all nonconflicting terms of the Implementation Memo.
[brief] Eight months after the incident occurred and five months after indictment, the State sought, and was granted, an order authorizing a buccal swab.  *Ibid.*  The affidavit in support of the motion did not establish probable cause in support of the request and, thus, the Appellate Division reversed the trial court’s order.  *Id.* at 269 (emphasis added).  In reaching its decision, the Appellate Division also found that the order was unreasonable because of the timing of the request and, importantly, because of the information the State already possessed.  *Id.* at 270 to 273.  Specifically, the Appellate Division noted that the State had accesses to defendant’s DNA in CODIS\(^4\) and could have compared that to the DNA on the weapon, but “[t]he State, however, chooses not to connect the available dots.  It prefers to intrude into defendant’s mouth for additional DNA so that it may wrap up all its potential evidence in one neat package for its laboratory personnel. ”  *Id.* at 273.  Finding the State did not need defendant’s DNA, the Appellate Division ruled the State’s request was unreasonable.  *Id.* at 274.  Although the Supreme Court affirmed the Appellate Division’s ruling because the State’s affidavit failed to provide probable cause in support of its --- \(^4\)
[brief] Instead, they have misdirected this Court’s attention to “facts” that are not material to this appeal (i.e., inside dining; the percentage of increase in traffic vs. that there was in fact an increase in traffic).  Defendants try to minimize Plaintiffs’ complaints by saying “where are the other people from the neighborhood?”  In doing so, they ignore two important facts: (1) Plaintiffs are the people most affected by the Defendants’ operation, as they are immediately adjacent to where truck deliveries, illegal parking and U-turns and K-turns occur and have had their lives affected the most; and (2) [...], who lives on [...] across the street from Plaintiffs, also testified and complained about the operation of [...] (hereinafter “[...]”).
[brief] The Bar Against Third-Party Communications.  (T16:21-T22:22)**  Under § 1692c(b), a debt collector is barred from virtually all third-party communications—excepting only as expressly allowed in the statutory language.  It is undisputed that no statutory exceptions apply here.  Thus, the statutory language is “a debt collector may not communicate, in connection with the collection of any debt, with any person. ”  The mail vendor is a person and, to the extent Defendant seeks to argue otherwise, those arguments must be rejected based on the *R. 4:6-2(e)* standard which requires accepting the Complaint’s allegations as true and drawing all reasonable inferences favorable to Plaintiff.  In addition, it cannot be disputed that Defendant communicated with its mail vendor.  The FDCPA defines “communication” as “the conveying of information regarding a debt directly or indirectly to any person through any medium. ”  15 U.S.C. § 1692a(2).  It is undisputed that Defendant conveyed information about Plaintiff and the alleged debt to its mail vendor.  Finally, Defendant’s conveyance of the debt information to its mail vendor was “in connection with the collection of any debt. ”  The federal courts look to the purpose and context of a communication to determine if it is “in connection with the collection of any debt.
[brief] A Board Member noted that the proposed [...] would intersect with an extremely congested portion of [...] (2T24-1 to 2T24-7), raising concerns over safe ingress and egress.  [...] was not qualified as a traffic engineer and the so-called 'study' by [...] and his Senior Associate was downright sloppy.  Even if the subdivision plan didn't depict two lateral units per proposed home, the proposed basements meant that the nine homes would qualify for basement apartments (UDO Sec. 18-910) -- making the potential number of families eighteen, not nine.  [...]'s study is useless as he assumed his client was proposing "9 single family dwellings" (page 1 of plaintiffs' Exhibit D).  The [...] study also fails because the preparers did not disclose the "similar residential developments" considered in his "local research" on Lakewood traffic rates.  A land use board may not base its findings on "net" opinions unsupported by data.  *New Brunswick Cellular v. Borough of South Plainfield Bd. of Adj.*, 160 N.J. 1, 16 (1999).
[brief] Further, the noble public policy objectives of saving a municipality in financial distress does not vitiate this fundamental property right.  It is respectfully submitted that the Court does not have to reach the issue of whether the Legislature has the power to retroactively eliminate a vested property right.  This is because there is no language in the MSRA that clearly and unambiguously authorizes the State to terminate vested property rights.  Similarly, Barila v. Board of Ed. of Cliffside Park, 241 N.J. 595 (2020) supports Plaintiffs' position in this appeal.  Therein, our Supreme Court defined a vested right to be "a present fixed interest which … should be protected against arbitrary state action."  Barila, 241 N.J. at 617-18, quoting Phillips v. Curiale, 128 N.J. 608, 620 (1992).  "[T]o become vested, a right 'must have become a title, legal or equitable, to the present or future enjoyment of property, or to the present or future enforcement of a demand, or a legal exemption from a demand made by another …."  Barila, 241 N.J. at 618, quoting Phillips, 128 N.J. at 621.  Based upon this legal guidance, the Barila Court sought to answer the following question, "whether the parties to that Agreement intended to confer on teachers such as plaintiffs, who remained in the Board's employ during the entire term of the 2012 Agreement, a vested right to compensation for accumulated unused sick leave up to a maximum of $25,000[?]"
[brief] **NON-BLIGHTED AREAS IN ANY PLAN MUST BE NECESSARY TO DEVELOP BLIGHTED AREAS (Pa0074-Pa0098)**  The general rule is that “non-blighted” areas may be included in a redevelopment plan “**IF NECESSARY** for rehabilitation of a larger blighted area. ”  [Emphasis Added]. 62-64 Main Street v. Mayor, 221 N.J. 129, 158 (2015) quoting Gallenthin Realty Development, Inc. v. Borough of Paulsboro, 191 N.J. 344, 372 (2007).  It is unmistakable that in this case that only one site in the entire redevelopment plan meets the statutory criteria of blight: the [...].  All the other sites in the [...] “plan” are **NOT NECESSARY** for the redevelopment of that store.
[brief] But the phrase “routine upgrade” is, in fact, used in the energy industry context in ways that are quite common sense.  For example, in FERC Order in 2007, a dissenting Commissioner referred to “the question of whether a project is merely a *routine upgrade* necessary to maintain reliable service to existing customers, or a more *proactive upgrade* that brings broad ranging public interest benefits. ”\(^{22}\)  And in another FERC Order from 2007, “[p]arties --- \(^{20}\) Brief of Respondent [...] in *Highlands Applicability* (June 6, 2012), pg. 31.
[brief] 198 N.J. Super. at 28.  The bottle had not been tested for fingerprints and although the chromatograph results concluded the liquid in the bottle was gasoline, there was no testimony as to the reliability of the chromatograph used.  Id. at 25.  The defendant filed a motion to dismiss his indictment alleging the destruction of the bottle prevented him from affirmatively using the evidence that may have exculpated him and from “meaningfully confronting and examining the chemist who testified to results of the analyses of the contents of the bottle. ”  Ibid.  The trial court rejected [...]’s argument and this Court affirmed that decision.  *Id.* at 28.  This Court ruled, “[I]t was not apparent before its destruction that the evidence had any exculpatory value and, while the physical properties were not available after destruction, the methods used in the analyses of the liquid content and the results obtained were subject to examination. ”  *Id.* at 27-28.  Thus, it ruled, that key evidence was not exculpatory.  Similarly, a defendant’s unsubstantiated claim that evidence would have called a witness’s credibility into question does not make evidence exculpatory.
[directive] 2.  An officer shall not carry or use a conducted energy device during an actual operation unless the officer has been expressly authorized in writing by the chief executive of the department, considering the officer’s experience and demonstrated judgment, and the officer has successfully completed a training course approved by the Police Training Commission in the proper use and deployment of conducted energy devices.  The chief executive of the department shall have the continuing responsibility to ensure that all officers authorized to carry or use a conducted energy device remain qualified by experience, demonstrated judgment, and training and Police Training Commission-approved qualification and re-qualification procedures to be equipped -4- [DCJ 03/03/16] with these weapons, and the chief executive may at any time limit, suspend, or revoke the authority of an officer to carry or use a conducted energy device.  3.  A law enforcement officer authorized to carry and use a conducted energy device pursuant to this supplemental policy shall be exempt from criminal liability under N.J.S.A. 2C:39-3(h) for knowing possession of a stun gun provided by his or her department.  V.
[brief] Land Use Code 154 includes 50 foot warehouses, as the data set includes counts from warehouses 24 feet or taller, and incorporates various sizes and types of buildings that fit within the specific ITE classification.  (3T 30:11-17 through 33:1-3).  Height is irrelevant for choice of the classification of warehouse.  (3T 27:13-25; 29:5-25).  Nevertheless, when asked whether the project would be a last mile facility, [...] answered, “[t]his is definitively not proposed to be a last mile facility.
[brief] **Statutes** - N.J.S.A. 2C:1-2 ...........................................................................................................  43, 45 - N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3a(1) ......................................................................................................  1 - N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4b(5)(b) .................................................................................................  1 - N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4a(1) .....................................................................................................  1 - N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5b(1) .....................................................................................................  1 - N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6 ............................................................................................................  48 - N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1 ............................................................................................................  17, 43 - N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.53(a) ...............................................................................................  19 | Court Rules | |-------------| | R. 1:12-1 .........................................................................................................................49 | | Rule 3:21-4(h) ..................................................................................................................13 | | Regulations | |-------------| | N.J.A.C. 10A:71-3.11 ...........................................................................................................20 | | Other Authorities | |-------------------| | [...] et. al., When Does A Juvenile Become an Adult? Implications for Law and Policy, 88 Temp. L. Rev. 769 (2016) .......................24 | | [...] and [...], Examining the Sources of Variation in Risk for Recidivism, 28 Just. Q. 146, 156 (2011) ......................................................19 | | [...], Reckless Behavior in Adolescence: A Developmental Perspective, 12 Developmental Rev. 339 (1992)
[brief] Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 104 (1975); State v. Hartley, 103 N.J. 252, 262-67 (1986).  If a suspect’s invocation of his rights is not scrupulously honored, an inculpatory statement must be suppressed notwithstanding its voluntariness.  Mosley, 423 U.S. at 104.  There are no particular words that a suspect must use to invoke his rights.  Rather, any words that are susceptible of being interpreted as a desire to remain silent or to have counsel present will suffice to stop the interrogation.  Because the right to counsel “is fundamental, courts interpret equivocal requests for counsel in the light most favorable to the defendant.
[brief] THE COURT ERRED BY FAILING TO PROVIDE ANY EXPLANATION FOR THE AGGRAVATING FACTORS IT FOUND, RENDERING DEFENDANT’S SENTENCE EXCESSIVE.  (13T 19-14 to 20-11; Da 13-15)  This offense was 19-year-old [...]’s first conviction.  In imposing a 35-year sentence, the court found aggravating factors 3, the risk of reoffense; 6, defendant’s prior record; and 9, the need to deter.