ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Plaintiff could have avoided years of litigation had he dropped his claims that a search should continue for additional transfers and malfeasance, which was at the heart of the Administrator’s work. \(^3\)  As was observed by the Appellate Division in its initial Decision on the legal fee issue, “plaintiff could have inquired into these matters himself before he moved for summary judgment in 2014. ”  (Da242).  Plaintiff could have also avoided a good portion of the fees incurred during the summary judgment phase.  Moreover, once the summary judgment appeal by both parties had been decided, Plaintiff could have demanded that [...] immediately adjust its books to account for the Decedent’s 40.8% interest.  If his demand went unheeded, he could have filed a relatively simple enforcement action, asking that the court appoint an accountant to adjust the books and records, just as the accountants had done in Exhibits F. and G.  This could have been accomplished in relatively \(^3\) Once the Administrator commenced his search for additional New Jersey assets after the court’s May 8, 2014 summary judgment, the Administrator advised that any adjustment of [...]’s books and records to account for the minority interest should await the results of his investigation, as the discovery of additional assets would change the percentage of the minority interest.  short order.  The adjustment would have been (and was) the task of an accountant, not an attorney; the attorney’s fees that ensued in the litigation would have been avoided.  Instead, Plaintiff chose to spend 10 years litigating his false claims of malfeasance and that almost ten million dollars of additional assets existed, that did not exist.  The trial court failed to follow case law and Rule 4:42-9(a)(2) in determining whether attorney fees should be shifted in this case.  Not only did the trial court erroneously award fees in full through January 5, 2017 for every item of work listed in the invoices, but the trial court also erred by awarding any fees at all.
[brief] Moreover, because this immunity is absolute, Plaintiff cannot replead his request for this relief in a way that is not barred by this immunity, so those claims should be dismissed with prejudice without providing [...] another opportunity to amend.  In a similar way, [...]’s claims against the [...], [...] and/or the [...] are barred by prosecutorial immunity because they relate to the handling of a criminal matter and the related topic of whether [...] could participate in PTI.
[directive] 16.  Do you understand that if you are a public office holder or employee, you can be [Yes] [No] [NA] required to forfeit your office or job by virtue of your plea of guilty?  17.  a.  Are you a citizen of the United States?  [Yes]  [No]  If you have answered “No” to this question, you must answer Questions 17b – 17f.  If you have answered “Yes” to this question, proceed to Question 18 b.  Do you understand that if you are not a citizen of the United States, this guilty [Yes] [No] plea may result in your removal from the United States and/or stop you from being able to legally enter or re-enter the United States?
[brief] Posing as a fourteen-year-old boy named [...], undercover [...] detective [...] created a profile on [...], an adults-only social-networking website for gay males and used an age-regressed photo of himself as the profile picture.  Around 9:00 p.m. on April 11, 2019, he received a message from user “[...],” later determined to be defendant, that asked, “Hey are you looking for fun tonight?”  “[...]” replied, “Sure. ”  After some discussion about sexual positions, “[...]” asked defendant how old he was and defendant replied, “29 and you[?]”  “[...]” replied that he was fourteen years old and would be fifteen in two weeks.  Defendant replied, “Oh ok. ”  After some more back-and-forth conversation, “[...]” messaged defendant, “I want [sic] sure if [you] were ok with my age with the oh ok answer. ”  Defendant responded with, “Lol . . . when your [sic] free[.]”  After “[...]” said he was free that night, defendant agreed to drive to his house to meet him for sex, telling “[...],” “I would like to rim you, give you oral and sex and kissing if your [sic] into that” and that he would bring the lubrication.  When defendant arrived at the pre-arranged location less than an hour later, he had the [...] application open on his phone on the passenger seat of his car and had the bottle of lubrication with him.  (Pa14-15).
[brief] 6  Defendant’s certification did not dispute Defendant’s residency at the service address of the Affidavit identifying service upon Defendant in his individual capacity (Pa81).  Defendant’s certification did not dispute service upon him at his residency (Pa81).  Defendant to appear for a post-Judgment asset deposition at the [...] – the same location identified on the Affidavit of Service of [...] in his individual capacity (Pa87).
[brief] ”  155 N.J. Super. 549, 553 (App. Div. 1978).  Additionally, when discussing whether to merge the certain persons offense with the weapons possession conviction, the Court in *Wright* stated, “[t]he Legislature could not have intended that a convicted felon who possesses or carries an operable gun in a place not excepted from the permit requirements of N.J.S.A. 2A:151-41(a), be treated the same as a defendant who is not such a felon. ”  *Id.* at 555.  The sentencing court below pointed to *State v. Flowers* to demonstrate “[t]he statute and case law show a legislative will to a) deter convicted felons from obtaining and possessing firearms and b) penalize those who would knowingly obtain and possess a firearm in defiance of their certain persons status. ” (Da49-50).  The court chose this case in order to highlight that this Court upheld an imposition of a consecutive sentence for a certain persons offense in a factually similar case.
[brief] PA – 191 Account Statement with Closing Date of May 26, 2018 ending in 1373…………………………………………………………………………………  PA – 197 Account Statement with Closing Date of June 26, 2018 ending in 1373…………………………………………………………………………………  PA – 201 Account Statement with Closing Date of July 26, 2018 ending in 1373…………………………………………………………………………………  PA – 205 Account Statement with Closing Date of August 26, 2018 ending in 1373…………………………………………………………………………………  PA – 211 Account Statement with Closing Date of September 26, 2018 ending in 1373…………………………………………………………………………………  PA – 215 Account Statement with Closing Date of October 26, 2018 ending in 1373…………………………………………………………………………………
[brief] DOCKET NO. [...]  Civil Action ON APPEAL FROM: Superior Court of New Jersey Chancery Division, Sussex County  Docket No, [...]  SAT BELOW: The Hon. [...], P.J.Ch. (2022-present)  The Hon. [...], P.J.Ch (2019-22)  The Hon. [...], P.J.Ch.  (2018-19)  BRIEF OF DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
[brief] POINT I – [...]’s Statement Was Statement Was ---------------------8  Admissible Substantively And Alleged Error In The Form Of Admission Was Harmless.  POINT II – The Accomplice Liability Charge Was ----------------------18 Adequate.  POINT III – The Robbery Conviction Should Stand ---------------------22 Because The Elements Were Provided To The Jury And The Jury Returned A Verdict Based On Those Elements.  A.  The Elements Of First Degree Robbery --------------------------22 Were Provided.  B.  The Elements Of Accomplice Liability ---------------------------25 Robbery Were Sufficiently Stated.  POINT IV – The Defendant’s Due Process Rights Were ----------------31 Not Violated By the Break In Proceedings.  POINT V – The Failure To Advise The Defendant Of The ---------------33 Mandatory Minimums He Faced On The Lesser-Included Robbery Offense Was Harmless Error.  POINT VI – The Court Did Impose A Sentence That Was --------------  34  Within The Permissible Range, But Did Not Adequately Explain The Aggravating And Mitigating Factors Found.  CONCLUSION
[brief] Pa163.  Although Defendants did not raise the issue, the trial court on its own and without notice, now questioned the authority of [...] testifying on their behalf and found that he was akin to a general contractor, not a proper witness.  2T13:15-22.  This factual finding is entirely unsupported in the trial transcript.  To the contrary, [...] was a manager for all three plaintiffs and a partial owner of one.  This finding finds no support whatsoever in the record.
[directive] Discarding Actor discards, in a place accessible to other persons, a hypodermic needle or syringe Petty  Disorderly 2C:36-6.1  Hypodermic without destroying the hypodermic needle or syringe, or owner or lessor or person in control $100 to $500 10% permissible  Persons  Needle or Syringe of property knowingly allows said items to remain.  49  Bail Schedule 2  DISORDERLY PERSONS OFFENSES AND PETTY DISORDERLY PERSONS OFFENSES
[brief] [...] testified that after exiting the restaurant, he and [...] attempted to grab [...]’s arms on the sidewalk outside of the restaurant.  (6T:152-4 to 153-3)  According to [...], they grabbed at [...], attempting to take him down, until [...] and the officers ended up on the ground (6T:153-4 to 20)  According to [...], upon exiting the restaurant, [...] “landed on the hood” of a police car that was partially on the curb, both officers landed on top of him, and all of them “fell off the curb and rolled onto the parking lot. ”  (7T:81-24 to 82-4 to 7)  [...] and [...] testified that [...] tried to swing at [...] and grab his leg, and that [...] punched [...] in the face.  (7T:84-18 to 85-11)  [...] testified that he pushed [...] “because she was involved, either to calm [[...]] down or to stop us from – she claimed, hurting him,” and that he “had to push her off to separate her to stop her from getting involved. ”  (6T:156-13 to 18)  The officers proceeded to handcuff and arrest [...], whose left eye was visibly semi-shut and swollen from [...]’s punch.  (6T:158-17 to 24; 7T:97-22 to 98-5, 172-13 to 25; Da 16-17)  The entire incident from the officer’s arrival on the scene until [...]’s arrest took a total of approximately eight minutes.
[brief] TABLE OF CONTENTS  REPLY APPENDIX  TABLE OF CONTENTS..................................................ii  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS, AND RULINGS.............................iii  PROCEDURAL HISTORY..............................................................................2  STATEMENT OF FACTS.............................................................................2  LEGAL ARGUMENT..................................................................................2  POINT I THE DECISION BELOW WAS ARBITRARY, CAPRICIOUS, AND UNREASONABLE, AND NOT SUPPORTED BY THE SUBSTANTIAL WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE.  (Not Raised Below) .................................................................2  POINT II  ADEQUATE NOTICE OF THE RICCI ACT WAS NOT PROVIDED AND THEREFORE, LAMARRE SHOULD BE ENTITLED TO RICCI ACT BENEFITS.  (Raised Below.  Pa16. Pa30.) .......................................................6  CONCLUSION............................................................................................11
[directive] Making "Decision research.-based  The NCA FTA and the monitoring when and conditions non-minimal release impose court a that recommend to program because complaint-summons by charge to inappropriate be generally would it cases, those In higher. or 4 are scores by necessary appropriate and monitoring deemed of level the precluding of effect practical the have that would defendant's release.  by posed risks the manage to research empirical 39 Page to Prosecutor County by authorized the who officer is supervisory or a Directive, of 3.2 this of presumption the that determines Directive, this of 4 Section under presumptions overcome subsection 4.5.9. to pursuant overcome is complaint-warrant charging by Higher.
[brief] *Natale v. Camden Cnty.*  Correctional Facility, 318 F.3d 575, 581 (3d Cir. 2003); Moore v. Luffey, 767 Fed. Appx. 335, 340 (3d Cir. 2019) (unpublished).  However, not all medical conditions faced by incarcerated persons give rise to constitutional claims.
[brief] The Supreme Court specifically stated that “[t]hose fees do not implicate the American Rule because they were incurred in the litigation on the bond, rather than the litigation against [...] (the administrator). ”  See Lash, 169 N.J. at 32.  Plaintiff in the brief in opposition also cited Rudolf v. Shayne, 8 N.Y.3d 438, 443 (2007) to support her proposition that legal fees incurred in the underlying matrimonial case is the damages sustained by the Plaintiff.  Rudolf again supports Defendants argument that unless plaintiff successfully proves the underlying tort case, then legal fees incurred is part of the damages sustained by the plaintiff.
[brief] Similar to Outback Steakhouse, in *Nagy*, who spoliated a portion of the surveillance footage, [...] also failed to retain footage.  However, [...] was even more remiss than Outback in its duties to preserve surveillance evidence by electing not to preserve any footage surrounding Plaintiff’s incident.  Moreover, despite the fact that similar to Outback, [...] was on notice that litigation was reasonably likely due to Plaintiff’s injuries after having been struck by an industrial grade U-boat, and notwithstanding the fact that like Outback, [...] is a sophisticated business entity, [...] neglected to retain any footage whatsoever of the events preceding Plaintiff’s incident and/or of the actual incident itself when Plaintiff sustained her injuries.  The Nagy Court further concluded that Outback was aware it had a duty to preserve relevant evidence because it is not an unsophisticated litigant.  Id. at *11.  Despite this awareness, Outback’s restaurant manager was tasked with preserving the footage without obtaining any guidance from corporate as to how much video to preserve.  Id.  The Court noted that saving additional footage would not have been unduly burdensome.  Id. at *12.  Similarly, [...], like Outback, has had experience defending a myriad of suits, and should have possessed the requisite knowledge to retain all available surveillance footage from the calendar day of the incident up through the moment when Plaintiff was struck by the U-boat.  Like Outback, despite [...]’s awareness of the need to preserve the video evidence and the simple process of retaining such footage, [...] permitted its manager, [...], to make his own independent determination as to whether video should be preserved.  (Pa98)  However, [...] went even further than Outback, by failing to preserve any video evidence whatsoever even though [...] had in place the technology that permitted and allowed for easy surveillance preservation, exportation, and transfer.
[directive] 귀하가 가중 성폭행, 성폭행, 가중 범죄적 성접촉에 대한 범죄, 2C:13-1c(2)에 의한 유괴, 에 의한 2C:24-4a  아동의 도덕성을 손상 또는 타락시키는 성행위를 함으로써 아동의 복지를 위태롭게 하는 행위, 2C:24-4b(3), 또는 (5)(a)에 의한 아동의 복지를 위태롭게 하는 행위, 또는 (ii)에 의한 아동의 복지를 (4)  2C:24-4b(5)(b)(i) 위태롭게 하는 행위(범죄가 년 월 일 이후에 저질러진 경우), 에 의한 아동 음란물 2018  2  1 2C:24-4.1 조직망의 두목(범죄가 년 월 일 이후에 저질러진 경우), 에 의한 아동을 유혹 또는 유인하는 2018  2  1 2C:13-6 행위, 피해자가 미성년자인 경우 에 의한 범죄적 성접촉, 에 의한 유괴, 에 의한 2C:14-3b 2C:13-1 2C:13-2 범죄적 구속, 또는 피해자가 미성년자이고 범죄자가 부모가 아닌 경우2C:13-3 에 의한 불법 감금, 2C:35- (4)에 의한 아동 성매매를 촉진하는 행위, 또는 그런 범행의 미수에 대해 유죄를 인정하는 경우, 다음의 1b(3), 추가 질문들에 답변해야 합니다.
[brief] PROCEDURAL HISTORY........................................................................................................1  STATEMENT OF FACTS........................................................................................................2  STANDARD OF REVIEW.......................................................................................................6  LEGAL ARGUMENT...............................................................................................................8  POINT I THE DECISION OF THE [...] WAS ARBITRARY, CAPRICIOUS, AND UNREASONABLE, AND SHOULD BE REVERSED.  (Not Raised Below) ..............................................................................................................8  POINT II  THE DECISION BELOW WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE AND SHOULD THEREFORE BE REVERSED.  (Not Raised Below) ...........................................................................................................15  CONCLUSION..........................................................................................................................18
[brief] C.  **Plaintiff Failed to Satisfy the Negative Criteria for a d(1) Use Variance. **  Without waiving any of the foregoing arguments that the denial of the Application should be upheld by virtue of the sole fact that the Board reasonably found Plaintiff did not meet the N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70 positive criteria for a d variance, Defendant sets forth below how Plaintiff also failed to satisfy the negative criteria, a showing that is just as critical to an applicant’s burden of proof.
[brief] Da1259, Da1266.  [...] filed a counterclaim seeking to recover from [...] the unpaid, $1,978,725 portion of the settlement and Consent Judgment.  Da66.  After production of the voluminous record in the underlying case, but before expert discovery commenced, the parties filed cross motions for summary judgment, which the Trial Court denied.  Da165, Da516, Da156.  On October 17, 2019, however, the Trial Court granted [...]’s motion for reconsideration of its summary judgment motion, ruling that the mold exclusion in the [...] policies barred coverage because “Appleman’s rule” – which restores coverage if there is a covered cause of loss in the sequence of events leading to the damage at issue – did not apply to CGL insurance policies such as those issued by [...] to [...].  Da154.  The court reserved for trial the applicability of an exception that the mold exclusion “does not apply” in situations involving mold (fungus) on edible goods “intended for human consumption. ”  Da154-55.  Following completion of discovery, this action was called for a bench trial, which commenced before the Honorable [...] on October 11 and was concluded on October 14, 2022. \(^2\)  On May 24, 2023, [...] ruled, among other things, that the settlement of the underlying case was reasonable in accord with *Griggs v. Bertram*, 88 N.J. 347 (1982).  Da30.  [...] has not cross appealed that ruling.  She also ruled that the “consumption exception” to the mold exclusion did not apply and also that [...]’s injuries caused by mold contamination had “manifested” before the [...] coverage commenced.  Da3.  [...] filed a timely Notice of Appeal on July 6, 2023.  Da144.
[brief] So, what an investigator, legal professional, or fact finder already believes they know about forensic evidence will frame their interpretation and evaluation of any new forensic information encountered.  An example can be used to illustrate here.  Imagine, for example, a juror believes that fingerprint evidence is infallible.  If prosecutors later present that juror with incriminating fingerprint evidence, even very explicit statements about the limitations of that evidence or clear evidence that the expert in the case was unreliable might not be enough to sway that juror’s judgment about that evidence.  Because the juror believes fingerprint results cannot be inaccurate, they find ways to discount or disregard evidence that does not correspond with that view.  Any subsequent decisions made about the relevant evidence are more likely to align with their preexisting beliefs about fingerprint evidence.
[brief] [...] directed him to shop at [...] and to purchase certain products for its business.  (Pa64-Pa65)  On the date of Plaintiff’s incident, [...] was at [...] for exactly that purpose—to purchase products for [...].  (Pa83)  [...] provided him with a [...] [...] membership card, which [...] furnished after the accident.  (Pa69; Pa99; Pa163)  Without such a card, [...] could not make purchases for anyone at [...].  Once he purchased those products, he was directed to deliver those products to [...]’s store in Manhattan.  (Pa87)  The sole purpose for hiring [...] was for him to purchase essential ingredients in order for [...] to prepare dishes for patrons, and as such the products he purchased helped derive an economic benefit to [...].
[brief] Substantial evidence is described as, "such evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support that conclusion."  In re Application of Hackensack Water Co., 41 N.J. Super. 408, 418 (App. Div. 1956).  See, also, N.J. Transit Bus Operations, Inc. v. Amalgamated Transit Union, 187 N.J. 546, 554-555 (2006) (on review of arbitration decision, the standard is whether the interpretation of the contractual language is “reasonably debatable. ”)  Id. at 554-555.  A reviewing court may not substitute its own judgment for that of the arbitrator, despite of the court's view of the correctness.  Id. at 554.  The policy of strict limiting judicial interference with arbitration, was intended to “promote arbitration as an end to litigation. ”  Id. at 554.  See, also, Country College of Morris Staff Ass'n v. County College of Morris, 100 N.J. 383, 390 (1985) (“to the extent possible, arbitration should spell the conclusion of litigation rather than the beginning of it. ”)  Id.  Here, Plaintiff’s argument fails.  In order to be reimbursed on a lien, it is the Plaintiff’s burden to prove that what the lien seeks is in compliance with the New Jersey Fee Schedule.  The crux of this case is that the Plaintiff only submitted the [...] lien and not the underlying EOBs from the health insurer, [...]\(^4\).
[brief] (Pa1-3).  . .  7  A.  The Motion Court Erred When It Found the Issues in Both Motions to Suppress Are Not Identical.  .........................  8  B.  The Motion Court Erred When It Determined the Union County Order Does Not Satisfy the Finality Requirement Under the Doctrine of Collateral Estoppel.  .................................  12  C.  The Court’s Reliance on the Doctrine of Fundamental Fairness Is Misplaced Because Defendant Has Already Fully and Fairly Litigated the Motion to Suppress in Union County.  ............  15  POINT II ...........................................................................  19  THIS COURT SHOULD GRANT THE STATE LEAVE TO APPEAL BECAUSE THE STATE HAS DEMONSTRATED GRANTING LEAVE IS IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE.  ..........................................................  19  CONCLUSION ..................................................................
[brief] (2T:19-2 to 19-8).  Defendant can be heard on the body-worn camera, stating “I’m on my way to work.  I got the two o’clock shift.  . . (indiscernible) and no reason to lie. ”  (2T:29-25 to 30-3).  Defendant was speaking so fast that he was difficult to understand, and he was mumbling his words and sticking his hands in his waistband during the initial exchange with officers.  (2T:16-18 to 17-2).  Upon being stopped, defendant immediately began making excuses and telling officers about his comings and goings before they even asked him about his travel pattern that day.
[brief] *Daniel v.  Borough of Oakland*, 124 N.J. Super. 69, 304 A.2d 757 (App. Div. 1973) further explains:  **Charges by a municipality for water furnished to its customers involve a sale and arise from a contractual relationship between it and the customer. **  As the court stated in *Lehigh Valley R.R. Co. v. Jersey City*, 103 N.J.L. 574, 576, 138 A. 467, 468 (Sup. Ct. 1927), aff'd 104 N.J.L. 437, 140 A. 920 (E. & A. 1927):  Our conclusion is that a charge for water furnished by a municipality to an owner or occupant of lands is not a tax, but is the subject of a contract, the sale of a commodity, creating the relationship of seller and purchaser as between the municipality and the consumer.