ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS THE VERIFIED COMPLAINT AS THE MSRA DOES NOT DEPRIVE PAINTIFFS’ MEMBERS OF A VESTED BENEFIT.  (Pa000017-18, 26-29)  Defendants’ characterization of Plaintiffs’ “vested right” arguments as a “red herring” is outlandish.  Db29-30.  The impacted officers worked for the City and earned wages which were never paid.  As previously discussed, there was no contingency for promoted rates, only those above the CNA rates in effect.  Defendants further argue that “Plaintiffs do not point to a single benefit that was earned but not received. ”  Db29.  This is contrary to the fundamental basis of this matter.  Promoted officers earned higher rates for every hour they worked at their previous rate.  Defendants cite Superior Officers and state that the “Appellate Division found that alleged ‘vesting’ of employee rights under expired CNAs is inconsequential following the enactment of the CBA. ”  Db29-30.  This is not what the Appellate Division found.  The Appellate Division found the following in response to the claim that accumulated sick leave was a vested right:  In the end, although no case law directly addresses whether lump sum payments upon promotion for accumulated sick leave constitute a vested right, [...]'s reasoning that the vested right was the sick leave days, not the dollar amount, is also persuasive.  The Director disapproved the arbitration award granting [...] and [...] lump sum payments for accumulated sick leave when they were promoted.  But the Director permitted them to use the accumulated leave during their tenure.  Thus, because plaintiffs retain their sick leave benefit, the arbitration award does not infringe on their vested contractual rights, if any.  Superior Officers at 24-25.  The promoted officers have no equivalent benefit unlike the accumulated sick leave in Superior Officers, which those officers were able to use but not cash out.  These officers worked at a promoted rank and earned additional wages for every hour worked at their respective promoted rank.  Moreover, earned wages cannot be divested absent a knowing and intentional waiver by each person adversely affected.  Matter of Morris School Dist. Bd. of Educ., 310 N.J. Super. 332 (App. Div. 1998).
[brief] Such action on her part was not only violative of her ethical obligations as a Board member, it also compromised the Board.  (Ca032).  [...] filed her Initial Decision with the [...] pursuant to N.J.S.A. 18A:12-29 on June 9, 2023.  Then, on August 22, 2023, the [...] issued a 4 page “Final Decision,” which “rejected” [...] Initial Decision on the asserted basis that there was not a “sufficient nexus” between Respondent’s public Facebook account and her Board membership.  (Ca016).  Ignoring abundant evidence in the record that Respondent repeatedly and consistently held herself out as a Board member, the Commission held that “there is no factual evidence” that she held herself out as a Board member, and asserted that “her Facebook page did not make any reference to the Board nor her membership on same. ” (Ca017).  This was factually incorrect, as was reflected by abundant evidence in the record at the time.  Appellants filed their appeal on October 5, 2023, Appellate Division Docket Number [...], and now seek reversal of that decision on an appeal as of right to the Appellate Division pursuant to N.J.C.R. 2:2-3(a)(2).
[brief] ”).  Notably, during oral argument, [...]’s counsel conceded this point: “[[...]] should have moved immediately to compel arbitration.  We believe they would have been successful. ”  T1 31:14-16.  [...] would have been successful because the arbitration clause required [...] to arbitrate once demanded by [...].  The case law that addresses this contract language also holds that it creates a mandatory obligation to arbitrate.  In considering similar language, this Court has ruled:  We distinguished the facts presented in Medford Township by expounding on our dicta in Riverside and noting the insurance contract there “did not provide ‘[e]ither party may make a written demand for arbitration. ’”  Id. at 9 (alteration in original) (quoting Riverside, 404 N.J. at 238).  We recognized that “when an arbitration provision specifically permits either party to select arbitration, once invoked, the other party may be bound to arbitrate the dispute. ”  *Del. River Partners LLC v. R.R. ConsT1*, 2022 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1134, at *9-10 (App. Div. June 24, 2022)(internal citations omitted).  The language in the [...] Pollution Policy falls squarely within this construct which requires that [...] is “bound to arbitrate the dispute. ”
[brief] The trial court heard argument on that motion on March 31, 2023.  The trial court held that any request for a new trial was “out of time,” under R. 4:49, despite the fact that decision on the judgment allocation was not made until well after the post-trial motions had been fully briefed and decided.  (23T7).  The trial court denied [...]’s motion to amend judgment, reasoning that joint and several liability applies notwithstanding *Burt*:  THE COURT:
[brief] Contrary to the state trial court’s and the federal court’s finding, the accrual date for Appellant’s malicious prosecution claims were not triggered by the New Jersey Supreme Court’s reversal of the Appellate Division’s affirmance.  See *Mosley*, 232 at 174, 192.  Therefore, the trial court’s conclusion on Defendants’ motion to dismiss and on Appellant’s reconsideration, that a reversal of a conviction constitutes a favorable termination of the action was in error and requires reversal.
[brief] (3T:198:12-20).  Specifically, during [...]’s testimony, [...]’s counsel opened the door wide for this testimony.  Specifically:  Q  And from your -- then from your perspective, sir, what do you view as his, quote, unquote, “true colors”?  A  You really want me to answer that?  I will answer that.  Q  I do.  A  Okay.  I think [...] is a con artist.  I think he’s -- he’s been through nine lawyers or eight lawyers on this case.  I think he was taught by his father not to pay bills.  When he gets a bill, other than his mortgage company, whether it’s from a home improvement contractor, a plumber, [...], a lawyer, to not pay the bill and basically say let’s negotiate and here’s what we’ll do, and I want you to take less.  And I do think [...] knew he wasn’t getting our bills.  He knew that.  He let us work on the case.  He gave us instructions on the case.  And he knew that when we gave him a bill when we finally realized he wasn’t getting a bill, he had enormous leverage over us because now we owed him -- he owed us a lot of money.  And he used that to try to coerce us into a contingency fee.  And I -- and it’s not just with me that he’s did that.  That’s why [...] had to sue him to get a judgment to get paid.  That’s why [...] had to sue him to get a judgment to get paid.  And there are other lawyers who’ve had to sue your client to get paid.  So I think [...] is a bad guy, and I think he’s taken advantage of a lot of people.  And it’s -- and he reached a point where people are fed up with him and they’re standing up to him.  And I’m one of those people.  Q  So that’s everyone, right, he ever deals with?  A  He has a -- yeah, not everyone.  I’m sure his mother loves him, but he’s not a good guy.  He’s a bad guy.  (5T:101:12-102:23).  Therefore, [...]’ summation was proper and the Judgment against Plaintiff should be affirmed.
[brief] VeroBlue Farms USA Inc. v. Wulf, 345 F.R.D. 406 (N.D. Tex. 2021)  ............................................................  30  Wilmore v. Savvas Learning Co., 2023 WL 6124045 (D. Kan. Sept. 19, 2023) ..........................................  21 Statutes & Other Authorities: Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) ..............................................................................
[brief] Price v. New Jersey Manufacturing Co., 182 N.J. 519, 524 (2005); W.V Pangborne & Co. v. New Jersey Dept of Transp. 116 N.J. 543, 563 (2005).  If a party seeking who seeks to invoke the statute of limitations defense has notice of a claim and no significant prejudice results, the policy reasons for invoking the statute of limitations defense recedes.  *Id.*  A defendant who takes actions which lead plaintiff to believe that the filing of a complaint is not necessary is equitably estopped from asserting a statute of limitations defense.  *Price v. New Jersey Manufacturers Co.*, supra 182 N.J. at 544 (uninsured motorist carrier which requested insured’s medical bills and reports, workers compensation lien information and scheduled a medical examination of its insured equitably estopped from asserting a statute of limitation defense based on its insured’s attorney failure to render a formal request for arbitration within the six year limitation period); *W.V Pangborne & Co. vs. New Jersey Dept.of Transp.*, 116 N.J. at 558-562; (Department of Transportation’s encouragement of contractor’s participation in an administrative review process without advising contractor that statute of limitation defense would be invoked after participation in administrative review deemed invalid because it violated the governmental duty of compunction and integrity).
[brief] For the foregoing reasons, defendant’s appeal is without merit and, therefore, the State respectfully requests that defendant’s conviction and sentence be affirmed.  Respectfully submitted, [...]  Prosecutor of Union County s/[...]  By: MILTON S. LEIBOWITZ  Assistant Prosecutor Attorney ID No. 082202013  MSL/bd January 27, 2025  [...] ID. NO. 429382023  Assistant Deputy Public Defender Of Counsel and On the Letter-Brief REPLY LETTER-BRIEF ON BEHALF OF DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
[brief] PRELIMINARY STATEMENT .....................................................................................................1  ARGUMENT ..................................................................................................................................3  I.  Plaintiffs’ DPRP requires assignees to participate in PIP ADR for disputes falling within AICRA’s dispute-resolution provision and does not contain any independent contractual obligation to arbitrate .................................................................................................................................3  II.  The court should not avoid the issue of statutory interpretation presented in this case, which [...] and [...] agree is a matter of public importance ..................................................................................................................................................12  CONCLUSION  ..............................................................................................................................18  ## TABLE OF AUTHORITIES  ### Cases
[directive] Final Notice of Disciplinary Action (For Use in Non-Civil Service Jurisdictions Only)  FROM Employing Agency Name Address & Phone Number  Case ID # TO Employee Name Title Date  On________________ you were served with a Preliminary Notice of Disciplinary Action and notified of the pending disciplinary action.  You requested a hearing which was held on ___________________  You did not request a hearing  You requested a hearing and did not appear at the designated time and place  Sustained Charges: Incident(s) giving rise to the charge(s) and the date(s) on which it/they occurred  If checked, charges are continued on attached page.  If checked, incidents are continued on attached page.
[brief] Decedent could not have been talking “normally” her last few days of life due to her medical condition.  Yet, [...] testified that less than a week before Decedent died, during the phone call, Decedent was talking normally and spoke about her medical condition, where she was and stated that she needed to talk to [...] because it was important to her that Respondent get everything that she wanted her to get.  (10T60:9-23; 10T59:8-19).  Likewise, [...] said that Decedent was talking normally during his conversation.  (9T262:19-21).  Decedent was not speaking normally a few days before she died, making it apparent it was Respondent they were speaking to, not Decedent.
[brief] Based on substantiated evidence, I refuted all false objections to my filings & false accusations against me by [...] & [...].  No matter how many times I refute them, they repeat false claims/accusations with a hope to mislead the Court.  In fact, [...]’s Case Information Statement, in response to my Notice of Appeal, had 23 false claims & accusations based on objections for irrelevant Estate matters, & 23 false claims & accusations based on objections for Trust matters, that I had refuted (Exh. “AE”) (499a-500a).
[brief] Specifically, the prosecutor said in closing, “[Defense counsel] didn’t talk about S-102 whatsoever.  This is a photograph that [...] identified and signed and said that is [...].  That’s [...].  Now, why would Counsel not bring that up?  There’s a reason why, ladies and gentlemen.  He didn’t talk about S-15 either.  This is the photograph that [...] identified depicting [...] in it. ”  (14T 48-10 to 24)  Later, the prosecutor again argued the jury should find the faceless person was “[...], no one else.  Why?  [...] tells us it’s [...].  [...] tells us it’s [...]. ”  (14T 67-1 to 4)  Familiarity does not obviate the need for an instruction, particularly when the witnesses were asked to make an identification of a faceless person.
[brief] ’”  120 N.J. 130, 135 (quoting Turon v. J. & L. Constr. Co., 8 N.J. 543, 552 (1952)).  However, “[t]he verdict may not . . . be molded if the result reached might contravene the jury's intention."  Buteas v. Raritan Lodge #61 F. & A.M., 248 N.J. Super. 351, 366, 591 A.2d 623 (App. Div. 1991).  Here, as the trial Court concluded, all of the evidence points in the same direction.  The jury rejected Plaintiff’s claim of aggravation of Meniere’s disease, thus the trial Court’s decision was correct and should be affirmed.
[brief] Respondent [...] relied on In re Kerney, [...] and In re Reid, [...] in support of its improper action.  Kerney involved a candidate who provided false information on his residency, his driving record and his interactions with police.  His removal was for the falsification of his application, the integrity of the job of police officer had no impact on this decision.  In *Ried*, the candidate for Police Lieutenant in East Orange alleged harassment by the Chief of Police as the basis for her improper bypass.  The Respondent [...] states that *Ried* supports removal where the employment history revealed extensive minor discipline or as little as one major discipline.  *Id.* at 3.  The extensive minor discipline matter involved 20 separate minor disciplines in a ten year period.  *In the matter of [...], Correction Lieutenant (PS63201) Department of Corrections* (MSB, decided July 17, 2002) (cited in *Reid*).  The one major discipline that was sufficient cited in *Ried* was the removal from a Sheriff’s Officer Lieutenant promotional list for a Sergeant who received a six-day suspension for misuse of public property three months prior to the certification of his name for appointment.  *In the Matter of [...]* [...], 2006 N.J. Super. Unpub 2002 Lexis 469 (App. Div. 2006).  The final matter relied upon in *Ried* was the removal from a Correction Lieutenant list for a Correction Sergeant whose record included two official reprimands for absenteeism and a 30-day suspension for falsification of a report.  *In the Matter of [...] Correction Lieutenant, Department of Corrections* (PS63201) [...] (App. Div. 2002) (cited in *Reid*).  Appellant’s record is not consistent with these matters.  The major discipline is over ten years ago and is mitigated by her service to this Country and status as a veteran, as well as the decision of the Respondent [...] to promote Appellant to the position of Sergeant in 2018.  The disciplinary history since this 2012 discipline does not support a determination that Respondent was permitted to deliberately maintain the ineligible candidate [...] to by-pass Appellant under the Rule of Three and avoid her promotion based on her status as the number one candidate with veteran preference.  Further, it does not support the untimely, improper and unsupported request to remove Appellant from the eligible list based on this disciplinary history.  The actions of Respondent [...] were deliberate and in bad faith and the Commission acted in an arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable in this decision to uphold this removal.
[brief] Tel: [...]  Fax: [...]  Attorneys for Appellant [...]  VIVIENNE I. ALLEN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. [...], Defendant- Respondent  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY  APPELLATE  DIVISION  Civil Action  On Appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey  Bergen County, Law Division [...]  Docket No.: [...]  Sat below: Hon. [...], J.S.C. APPELLANT’S APPENDIX
[brief] Throughout her brief, Plaintiff refers extensively to the preliminary injunction that was issued by the trial court in Plaintiff’s First Lawsuit.  Importantly, the subject injunction was not produced by Plaintiff’s counsel nor attached to any of the pleadings or motions below, and, as such, is not a part of the record on appeal.  According to Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint, the injunction that was issued in or about June/July 2016 simply “prevent[s] the transfer of Plaintiff” from her position as third-grade teacher at the [...] to fifth-grade teacher at a different school within the district.
[brief] The court committed legal error when it reversed itself and held that it retained jurisdiction over [...]’s Counterclaim.  “The two main purposes of primary jurisdiction are to (1) allow an agency to apply its expertise to questions which require interpretation of its regulations…and (2) preserve uniformity in the interpretation and application of an agency's regulations. ”\textsuperscript{22}  The Appellate Division recited: four factors [that] must be weighed when determining the application of the primary jurisdiction doctrine: 1) whether the matter at issue is within the conventional experience of judges; 2) whether the matter is peculiarly within the agency’s discretion, or requires agency expertise; 3) whether inconsistent rulings might pose the danger of disrupting the statutory scheme; and 4) whether prior application has been made to the agency. \textsuperscript{23}  In a matter arising under the school laws that was litigated in the Law Division of Superior Court, our Supreme Court concluded that, “the Law Division action should have been dismissed because the Commissioner of Education has primary jurisdiction to hear and determine all controversies arising under the school laws”.\textsuperscript{24}
[brief] ’”  State v. Rivera, 249 N.J. 285, 297-98 (2021) (quoting State v.  Moreover, the test “is not whether a reviewing court would have reached a different conclusion” on the appropriate sentence, but rather, whether “on the basis of the evidence, no reasonable sentencing court could have imposed” that sentence.  *State v. Ghertler*, 114 N.J. 383, 388 (1989); see also *State v. Dalziel*, 182 N.J. 494, 499 (2005).  It is well-settled that an appellate court, therefore, is “bound to affirm a sentence” so long as the sentencing court followed the Code’s guidelines, found aggravating and mitigating factors supported by the preponderance of the evidence, and correctly balanced those factors.  “On review, appellate courts are deferential to sentencing determinations and ‘must not substitute [their] judgment for that of the sentencing court.
[brief] Application of this statute as written can lead to arbitrary and curious prosecutions instigated by disgruntled family members, co-workers, neighbors, customers, business proprietors, voters, lottery ticket purchasers and other members of society who experience “anguish” over anything at all.  This can criminalize, for example, tendering a tepid cup of coffee when the recipient expected a hot one, making a customer or guest wait on line too long to use a bathroom, requiring an employed to have to work at an office with the thermostat set at 60 degrees or exposing anyone to listening to more than eight (8) bars of music by [...] or [...] (or both) against their will.  This statute also literally criminalizes having an incessantly barking dog on one’s property (i.e. through “indirect means,” the barking dog… “another living animal or creature” … “torments” a listener (a living animal or creature” with the barking).  As for N.J.S.A. 4:22 – 24a(2), neither the State or the trial court can rewrite this statute to save it from abrogation on the grounds of unconstitutionality (Da61 – Da64 & Da30).
[directive] Actor not licensed or privileged enters or remains in any place where notice is given by communication, posting or fencing; petty disorderly persons offense.  c.  Peering into dwelling.  Actor when not licensed or privileged peers into a window or other Petty Disorderly $100 to $500 10% permissible opening of a dwelling or other structure adapted for overnight accommodation for the Persons purpose of invading the privacy of another person; fourth degree 2C:20-2 Theft
[brief] First, despite Plaintiff-Appellant’s argument to the contrary, the Court did acknowledge the existence of the injunction, as set forth in the Court’s written opinion.  (Pa5).  Furthermore, this issue was raised by Plaintiff during oral argument and was considered by the Court below.  (1T35:3-37:2).  Simply because Plaintiff-Appellant is unhappy with the outcome, does not mean that the analysis was in any way deficient.  Rather, the Court extensively reviewed, and considered each and every allegation of Plaintiff-Appellant’s voluminous Amended Complaint, in determining whether or not a *prima facie* cause of action was pleaded, and appropriately determined one was not.
[directive] a served either violation date IDRC for days, of convictions birth term or in days, form as by 180  Offense participation 3rd program previous approved such 17th 39:4-50(a)(3) than a 90 for or AND years 100 OR exceeding 39:5-41 thru lower foreign fines probation service less  Subsequent visitation of $ 3rd year service, offense facility 10  39:4-50(i) run years not mandatory may order for including N.J.S.A. community 10 to Incarceration not thereafter $100 court of 10 inpatient Suspension Suspension community subsequent $50 may supervised $75 condition day, Within N.J.S.A DDEF VCCB except SNSF $1000 under Court Other each No in & than a 39:4-50(g) birth or 48 in as previous foreign probation more participation than program years 17th service service 100
[brief] And, in his letter dated 11-29-23 (Rb-19), he filed his brief in Support of the Motion for a Traverse Hearing.  In the November 30, 2023, decision transcript the trial court judge said:  “It may be that the process server even made a mistake in his paperwork.  He couldn’t be at two places at once or was lying about it; that could be it.  But there’s no question that [...] was served.  And my recollection is [...] had never certified that he never was served.  Or at minimum, has never plausibly or credibly contended that he, in fact, wasn’t served. ”  (See November 30, 2023 Decision Transcript, Page 4, Lines 24-25 and Page 5, Lines 1-6).