[brief] “In adopting the Act, […] Congress left no doubt that its purpose was to protect debtors from abuse and that Congress perceived a need for national uniformity to fulfill that goal. ”  *Rutgers-The State Univ. v. Fogel*, 403 N.J. Super. 389, 394 (App. Div. 2008).  The FDCPA begins by reciting the findings made by Congress as the basis for its adoption.  Congress found there to be “abundant evidence of the use of abusive, deceptive, and unfair debt collection practices by many debt collectors. ”  15 U.S.C. § 1692(a)\(^2\).  Those unacceptable practices “contribute to the number of personal bankruptcies, to marital instability, to the loss of jobs, and to invasions of individual privacy. ”  *Id.*  At the same time, “[e]xisting laws and procedures for redressing these injuries are inadequate to protect consumers. ”  15 U.S.C. § 1692(b).  Congress also found that “[m]eans other than misrepresentation or other abusive debt collection practices are available for the effective collection of debts. ”  15 U.S.C. § 1692(c).  After making those findings, Congress expressed three distinct purposes for adopting the FDCPA.  \(^2\)  Note that 15 U.S.C. § 1692(a), the first paragraph in § 1692, is different from 15 U.S.C. § 1692a.  The first purpose is “to eliminate abusive debt collection practices by debt collectors. ”  15 U.S.C. § 1692(e).  The second purpose is “to insure that those debt collectors who refrain from using abusive debt collection practices are not competitively disadvantaged. ”  15 U.S.C. § 1692(e).  Thus, Congress believed that enforcing the FDCPA would prevent law-abiding collectors from feeling the need to engage in prohibited practices to remain competitive.  The third purpose, which is not involved here, is “to promote consistent State action to protect consumers against debt collection abuses. ”  § 1692(e).  The federal courts’ construction of § 1692c(b) protects against invasions of individual privacy, prevents collection practices which places consumer privacy at risk, and ensures that those debt collectors who refrain from using mail vendors are not competitively disadvantage.  Hence, there is no legitimate argument that the federal courts’ interpretation is inconsistent with the FDCPA overall scheme, frustrates the FDCPA’s purposes, or yields an absurd result.  Structurally, the FDCPA imposes a Code of Conduct which, among other things, requires debt collectors to treat consumers respectfully (by prohibiting harassing, oppressive, and abusive conduct), honestly (by banning “any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means”), and fairly (by prohibiting the use of “unfair or unconscionable means”).  15 U.S.C. § 1692d, § 1692e, and § 1692f.  In 15 U.S.C. § 1692b, which is not specifically relevant to Plaintiffs’ claims but helps explain the statutory structure, the Act restricts communications with those who might have contact information (called “location information”) about a consumer.  In addition to prohibiting third-party communications, 15 U.S.C. § 1692c addresses debt collectors’ communications with the consumer during certain hours, at work, and when represented by counsel, and also provides how a consumer can require a debt collector to cease further communications.  B.