ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] I.  THE BURDEN OF PROOF IS NOT A SHARED ONE WITH THE COURT  The record in the case at bar is that of a Plaintiff who came to trial unable to prove her case.  It is also that of a court which, facing that situation, chose not to dismiss the Plaintiff's complaint but to instead take up the task of creating a rent ledger solely relying on what records Defendant kept on her cell phone.  This conduct on the court's part, Defendant [...] urged in her original brief, crossed the line of impartiality, denied her the right to a fair and impartial adjudication and resulted in her wrongful eviction.  Plaintiff/Respondent in Point II of its brief to this Court offers the following:  "While the landlord also has the burden of proof necessary to support that they are entitled to a judgment of possession, once such a finding has been issued by the Court (that there is rent legally owed by the tenant) such grounds have been met."  (emphasis added).  Plaintiff's Brief Page 12  Plaintiff would have this Court uphold the judgment below on the reasoning that, where the trial court through its own inquiry established the grounds necessary to sustain a judgment against the tenant, the required proof for entry of judgment has been met.  Defendant submits that contrary to Plaintiff's position, responsibility for meeting the burden of proof belongs exclusively with the Plaintiff and is not a shared one with the Court.  As such, the trial court here, faced with Plaintiff's inability to carry its burden had no choice but to dismiss the complaint.  That the court instead painstakingly undertook to construct evidence for the Plaintiff represents a major transgression against judicial integrity and due process.  For the sake of upholding the public’s confidence in the impartiality of the judiciary and for the protection of other tenants who like her come unrepresented before the court, Defendant humbly requests that this Court speak strongly to the issues here presented.
[brief] 39  INDEX TO APPENDIX  Indictment No. [...] .................................................................  Da 1-2 February 2023  Order Denying Suppression ..............................................  Da 3 Plea Forms .........................................................................................  Da 4-10  Judgment of Conviction .......................................................................  Da 11-13 Notice of Appeal ..................................................................................  Da 14-17  Conference Attendance List ..................................................................  Da 18-24  [...] & [...], An Examination of the Validity of the Standardized Field Sobriety Test in Detecting Drug Impairment Using Data from Drug Evaluation and Classification Program, 15 Traffic Injury Prevention (2014) ...............
[brief] There was no legal requirement as in *Snellbaker*, which would have required [...] to receive these retroactive salary adjustments.  [...] was also an individual employee who was treated differently from “established salary policies of the member’s employer for all employees in the same position. ”  N.J.S.A. 18A:66-2(d)(1).  She received discretionary retroactive salary increases that were made in order to resolve civil employment litigation.  Here, contrary to [...]’s arguments (Pb7-8), the facts of her case are like those in *Coyle* and *Puglisi* and unlike the facts of *Snellbaker*.
[brief] Reasonable is defined as “being in accordance with reason,” “not extreme or excessive,” “moderate” and “fair. ”  Merriam-Webster.com Dictionary, Merriam-Webster.  \(^4\)  Although “body worn camera may be deactivated, consistent with directives or guidelines promulgated by the Attorney General” “while the officer is participating in a discussion pertaining to criminal investigation strategy and planning, provided that the discussion is not conducted in the immediate presence of a civilian and further provided that the officer is not actively engaged in the collection of physical evidence,” the officer must first state aloud that they are deactivating for this reason.  Attorney General Law Directive No. 2022-1, § 6.5; N.J.S.A. 40A:14-118.5 (c)(2)(c).
[brief] STATEMENT OF FACTS  The case before this Court is an appeal from the [...]’s grant of preliminary and final major site plan approval to construct an inclusionary multifamily development consisting of fourteen (14) residential units on property known as [...] in the [...] which property is further known and designated as Block 124, Lot 31 on the Borough tax map.  The property is located in the RR (Rumson Road Housing District) zone.  The RR zone was created as part of the Borough’s affordable housing settlement agreement with [...] ([...]) and [...] (hereinafter “[...]”) to provide its regional fair share of affordable housing pursuant to the Mount Laurel Doctrine.  More particularly, the property was re-zoned pursuant to a Settlement Agreement between the [...], [...] and [...] dated January 6, 2020.
[brief] Courts are to enforce contracts “based on the intent of the parties, the express terms of the contract, surrounding circumstances and the underlying purpose of the contract. ”  *Caruso v. Ravenswood Developers, Inc.*, 337 N.J. Super. 499, 506 (App. Div. 2001).  “Contracts are to be read as a whole in a fair and common sense manner. ”  *Manahawkin Convalescent v. O’Neill*, 217 N.J. 99, 118 (2014)
[directive] b.  Unless the plea agreement provides otherwise, you could be sentenced to serve the [Yes/Sim] [No/Nao] maximum time in confinement, to pay the maximum fine and to pay the maximum Victims of Crime Compensation Office Assessment?  A menos que o acordo de declarai;:iio de culpa estipule outros termos, voce podera ser condenado a servir o tempo maximo de reclusiio, a pagar a multa maxima e a pagar a multa maxima ao Gabinete de Compensai;:ao as Vitimas de Crime (VCCO)?  c, You must pay a minimum Victims of Crime Compensation Office Assessment of $50 ($100 [Yes/Sim] [No/Nao] minimum if you are convicted of a crime of violence) for each count to which you plead guilty?
[brief] Defendant also contends that the judge failed to consider his acceptance of responsibility and expression of remorse.  Tellingly, however, defendant never actually admitted during his allocution that he fired a gun the night [...] died.  Rather, he said he was “sorry for his actions,” but did not say what those actions were, and said he made the biggest mistake of his life, but did not elaborate on what that was.  (18T65-1 to 67-11).  Thus, his acceptance of responsibility and expression of remorse was not much greater than at his first sentencing hearing, where he said he was wrong for coming back to the house but denied shooting [...].
[brief] *Dickson*, 458 N.J. Super. at 531 (“We agree with the judge that plaintiff failed to meet this threshold requirement under the LAD because his obesity was not a disability caused by a bodily injury, birth defect, or illness. ”).  “LAD claims based upon a perceived disability still require ‘a perceived characteristic that, if genuine, would qualify a person for the protections of the LAD. ’”  *Id.* at 532 (quoting *Cowher v. Carson & Roberts*, 425 N.J. Super. 285, 296 (2012)).  Ultimately, Appellant alleges Respondent failed to accommodate these unsubstantiated purported disabilities.  Nonetheless, Appellant has not demonstrated that Respondent was ever put on notice, a failure that is fatal to her claims.
[brief] Mosley v. State, et al., [...] (Dec 1, 2023)…………..Aa233-62  ORDER on [...] Motion for Summary Judgment (State)  Mosley v. State, et al., [...] (December 1, 2023) ………Aa263-64  OPINION on [...] Motion for Summary Judgment  Mosley v. State, et al., [...] (December 1, 2023)………Aa265-76  DOCKET SHEET…………………………………………………………………………………..Aa277-79 NOTICE OF APPEAL……………………………………………………………………………Aa280-85
[brief] In the instant matter, the louvered system does not meet the definition of “merchandise” under the CFA.  First, [...] submitted an initial proposal to [...] only after [...] contacted [...] to inquire about installation of a [...] louvered system at its hotel.  [...] and [...] engaged in multiple negotiations over a period of approximately eleven months, which resulted in multiple revisions of the initial proposal before [...] accepted a proposal on February 14, 2018.  Second, [...] retained a structural engineer to design an adequate structural support system on which [...] was to install the louvered roof.  [...]’s original proposal called for six downspouts located in support columns, but [...], who was involved in each step of the design process, specifically requested its own engineer to change the recommended design to optimize the interior space, which resulted in the removal of two of the downspouts.  [...]’s Director of Construction was also involved in the negotiation, planning, and design process.  Third, as admitted in [...]’s brief, [...] clearly understood that Defendants are not structural engineers.  [...] knew that it was responsible for providing the structural support system on which [...] would install the louvered roof, and they retained an engineer to design a support system that would allow for proper drainage.  Finally, as to the fourth factor, the louvered system is not widely available to the general public and can only be purchased through a local distributor and installer and only after acceptance of a proposal.  Moreover, [...]’s assertion that [...] was part of the “design team” and misled [...] to believe that it would advise or direct them in the design or construction of the entire system, including its drainage, is completely baseless.  It is clear from the evidence in the record that [...] was not involved in the planning, design, or installation of the system at [...]’s hotel.  [...] did not hire [...] to design the entire system, calculate drainage, or install any part of the system.  It was the responsibility of their engineer, not [...], to account for drainage and downspouts.  It is interesting to note that [...] never asserted any claims against its engineer.  [...] only manufactured the panels which were sold by [...] to [...] to be integrated into a structural support and drainage system that was designed by [...]’s own engineer and built by a construction company hired by [...].  However, even if the louvered system is found to fall within the definition of merchandise under the CFA, the CFA further requires a plaintiff to prove three elements: (1) unlawful conduct by the defendant; (2) an ascertainable loss by the plaintiff; and (3) a causal connection between the defendant's unlawful conduct and the plaintiff's ascertainable loss.
[brief] OPRA provides that “a public agency has a responsibility and an obligation to safeguard from public access a citizen’s personal information with which it has been entrusted when disclosure thereof would violate the citizen’s reasonable expectation of privacy[.]”  N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1.  See Wolosky v. Somerset County, A-1024-15T4, 2017 WL 1179852, at *3 (N.J. Super. App. Div. Mar. 30, 2017).  “E-mail and home addresses do not directly relate to the “core concern” of OPRA. ”  Da217-221.  As to the request for the “distribution list that it uses to send [...] alerts” the City did not, and to this day, does not, have such a document and/or record.  Da215-217 at ¶ 11-12.  The [...] has an agreement with [...] to send out alerts to residents who sign up for [...] alerts.
[brief] (Pa54-57).²  [...] was enrolled in the PERS effective November 1, 1984, as a result of his employment with the [...] as a Recreation Attendant.  (Pa54-55).  On August 1, 2009, [...] was enrolled in PERS as a multiple-member due to his employment with [...] as a Motor vehicle  ¹  Since the procedural history and facts are interrelated, they are presented together for efficiency and the court’s convenience.  ² “Pb” refers to [...]’s brief, and “Pa” refers to his appendix.
[brief] Donald G. Melnyk v. Maryann Fiel, Highlands Borough BOE, C64-T8 (March 2019).  (Ca031) (emphasis in original).  Further, in I/M/O [...], SEC Docket Nos. C56-19 and C57-19 (Consolidated) (2021) (Ca414), also cited by [...], the Commission held:  In finding a violation of N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(e), [...] appropriately concluded that Respondents action constituted “private action that may compromise the Board. ”  In discussing the legislative intent for the School Ethics Act, [...] properly highlighted that Board members “must avoid conduct which is in violation of their public trust or which creates a justifiable impression among the public that such trust is being violated.
[brief] (Pa127.)  On June 30, 2020, the governing body adopted Resolution No. 145-2020, which designated the following parcels as areas in need of redevelopment: Block 3101, Lot 5, and Block 3103, Lot 7.  (Id., ¶12.)  On August 11, 2020, the governing body adopted Resolution No. 180-2020, which designated the following parcels as areas in need of redevelopment: Block 2502, Lot 14; Block 2506, Lot 1; and Block 2508, Lot 11 (“[...]”).  (Id., ¶ 13.)  On October 13, 2020, the governing body adopted Resolution No. 225-2020, which designated the entirety of the Town and certain properties owned by the Town as areas in need of rehabilitation.  (Id., ¶14, 16.)  The time to challenge these designations has long expired.
[brief] Id. at 1850 (citing Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 468-71, 490).  Erlinger concerned a federal sentencing enhancement, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1), which increased the penalty for a felon-in-possession conviction from a maximum sentence of 10 years to a mandatory minimum sentence of 15 years if the sentencing judge found that the defendant had been previously convicted of three predicate offenses “committed on occasions different from one another. ”  *Id.* at 1846.  At first blush, it may have seemed like the question of whether a defendant’s predicate offenses were committed on separate occasions fell within the one exception to *Apprendi*, which allows sentencing enhancements based on a judge’s finding of a prior conviction.
[brief] ”  Concerned Citizens v. Mayor and Council of Princeton Borough, 370 N.J. Super. 429, 447 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 182 N.J. 139 (2004) (Hoens, J.A.D., concurring); Rocky Hill, 406 N.J. Super. at 400.  significant impact on density, traffic, ratables or any interest other than the concerns expressed by the individual plaintiffs and their supporters and no constitutional implications.  Plaintiffs’ primary argument is that the ordinance will undermine the “efficacy” of the District and that permissible scale, size, mass and arrangement of future construction in the District will be affected.  While certainly the ordinance is of interest to this limited public, this is not the public interest envisioned by the Court in permitting limited expansion of the [forty-five day] rule.
[brief] Had the jury had been adequately instructed on causation, it could easily have found that [...]’s wrist fracture was neither within the risk of which [...] was aware, nor within his design or contemplation, and that the injury was too remote, accidental in its occurrence, or dependent on [...]’s own volitional acts to have a just bearing on [...]’s liability.  This is particularly true where the jury ultimately acquitted [...] of resisting arrest, and the State’s theory underlying the charge of aggravated assault on [...] was predicated on [...]’s alleged recklessness in the course of resisting arrest.  The trial court’s failure to properly instruct the jury on causation was clearly capable of producing an unjust result where there was a real possibility that the jury would have acquitted [...] not just of resisting arrest, but also of aggravated assault on [...], had they been properly instructed.  Therefore, [...]’s convictions must be reversed.
[brief] As the trial court decisively found, such relief is not available here because sanctioning an alternative approach “doesn’t pass the straight face test,” subverts the plain language of a code inapplicable to multi-state risks and would “turn the whole CCIP program on its head. ” (May 26, 2023 Arg. Tr. 23:5-7, 28:1-3, 67:8-10.)  Despite overwhelming evidence to the contrary, Plaintiffs-Appellants, subcontractor [...]  (“[...]”) and its excess carrier [...] (“[...]”) (collectively, “Plaintiffs”), argue that [...] was enrolled in the CCIP maintained by [...] and [...] (collectively, “[...]”) at the time of the accident (“Accident”) that was the subject of an underlying personal injury action (“Hood Lawsuit”).  Thus, Plaintiffs contend that the CCIP, a program comprised of three policies issued by [...] (“[...]”) and [...] (“[...]”) (collectively “[...]” where appropriate), covers [...]’s liability in the Hood Lawsuit instead of the policies that [...] actually paid for, and which paid for [...]’s defense and settlement.  In doing so, Plaintiffs incorrectly argue [...] was a Named Insured under the CCIP while ignoring a key requirement for a Named Insured: that a subcontractor be “enrolled in the Contractor Controlled Insurance Program for which this policy is provided. ”  As the trial court found and the evidence shows, including [...]’s endorsement unenrolling [...] and the CCIP Enrollment Status Reports, [...] was not enrolled in the CCP at the time of the Accident.  Also, was not a Named Insured because it did not maintain required payroll.  Additionally, [...] was notified numerous times that it had been unenrolled from the CCIP because it was performing excluded demolition work and, importantly, revised its proposal for demolition work at the Ritz wall (the same work it was performing on the date of the Accident), by adding back the cost of insurance to account for its unenrollment.  Moreover, [...]’s employees acknowledged nine times in emails that [...]’s work was excluded from participation in the CCIP.  Finally, as the trial court noted, the CCIP gave [...] sole discretion to deem subcontractors ineligible, remove subcontractors from the CCIP or make modifications to the CCIP policies.  Thus, even if [...] did not know it was unenrolled, as is implausibly claimed, it simply does not matter.  Given [...]’s ineligibility under the CCIP, [...] (“[...]”) (primary insurer that defended [...] and paid its policy limits to indemnify [...] in settling the Hood Lawsuit) declined to join Plaintiffs in filing this DJ Action: a decision that speaks volumes.  This Court should affirm the trial court’s well-reasoned findings that: [...] had the sole discretion to preclude a subcontractor from the CCIP; [...]’s demolition work was ineligible under the CCIP; [...] was erroneously enrolled in the CCIP for a few hours before being notified of its ineligibility; [...] acknowledged its unenrollment from the CCIP nine times; [...] increased its proposal upon unenrollment; [...] procured insurance coverage outside the CCIP given its ineligibility; and, finally, N.J.A.C. § 11:1-20 does not apply.
[brief] #### Statutes - **Conscientious Employee Protection Act (“CEPA”)** .............................................................................  15 - **N.J.A.C. 10:44A-2.4** ..........................................................................................................................  10 - **N.J.S.A. § 2C:52-2d** ............................................................................................................................  12 - **N.J.S.A. § 30:6D-64(f)** .........................................................................................................................  12 - **N.J.S.A. 30:6D-63 - 69** .....................................................................................................................  10 - **N.J.S.A. 30:6D-64(2)(f)** .....................................................................................................................  9, 11 - **N.J.S.A. 30:6D-64(2)(g)** .....................................................................................................................  9  I.
[brief] The trial court found that [...] was “blindsided” by [...]’s “twelfth hour” declaration.  Da19, 45.  [...] tearfully begged [...] to accept the partial payment of $330,000, also explaining to [...] that his ability to close the refinancing transaction that day was dependent not only on [...]’ acceptance of the partial payment that day, but also on [...]’ agreement to discharge the Mortgage that secured [...]’s Guarantee.  Da19-20; 1T143-14 to 24, 144-7 to 17.  At trial, [...] admitted that he pleaded with [...], stating that if [...] were to exercise his rights under the Note, such action would hurt [...], his business, and his family very badly.
[brief] A.  The Record Clearly Establishes that the Commercial Use of the Property has been Discontinued.  (T3, 14:4-11).  The Trial Court erred in concluding criterion (b) was not satisfied.  The full language of N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-5(b) is as follows:  b.  The discontinuance of the use of a building or buildings previously used for commercial, retail, shopping malls or plazas, office parks, manufacturing, or industrial purposes; the abandonment of such building or buildings; significant vacancies of such building or buildings for at least two consecutive years; or the same being allowed to fall into so great a state of disrepair as to be untenantable.  (Emphasis added).  Importantly, the language used appears to be setting forth a list of options, as evident from the use of the word “or” and the Legislature’s use of semi-colons to break up the different parts of subsection (b).
[brief] About one month later, in January 2016, defendant reported he had lost one of three official identifications issued to him by [...], called either the “wallet ID” or the “credit card ID. ”  Eight months later, defendant was suspended, at which time, he was ordered to surrender virtually all property of [...], including all his uniforms, all his IDs, and his service weapon.  Defendant was also told that he had no police power while suspended and was prohibited from carrying an off-duty gun.  The solemn ritual of suspension, a regimented procedure used by the [...], guaranteed defendant was notified of the suspension, and its consequences, personally, face-to-face.
[brief] The fact that the settlement was identified and that it needed to be repaired “immediately” certainly permits a fact finder to reasonably conclude that the condition was a “dangerous condition. ”  At a minimum, isn’t that not at least one of the inferences that can be drawn in favor of the Plaintiff from a directive to perform “immediate repair”?  Although it is anticipated that the defense will argue that after the results of second inspection were circulated, there was a follow-up email which indicated that the settlement referred to in the memo was actually at the south end and not the north end of the bridge where Plaintiff was caused to lose control and crash.  (Pa1198).  However, this argument has no merit, at least in this setting, as the person that sent that email, which allegedly corrects the location of the settlement, was not the person that actually wrote the memo.  (Pa1191, Pa1192).  The memo was prepared by [...] of [...] but the email was sent by [...] of [...] (Pa1192) and (Pa1191).  In other words, there is nothing that conclusively established the accuracy of that email and that email could simply be incorrect.  A factual dispute clearly exists.