ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] ”  In addition, individuals convicted of a second or subsequent drug offense are subject to a separate provision of the Criminal Code that mandates an extended term of imprisonment for recidivist drug offenders.  N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(f).  However, these drug crimes differ from the State’s other mandatory minimum offenses in one key respect: the period of mandatory parole ineligibility can be waived pursuant to a “negotiated agreement” between the defendant and the State.  Under N.J.S.A. 2C:35-12 (“Section 12”), the parties can enter into an agreement—before or after conviction—that provides for a shorter period of parole ineligibility, among other possible sentence modifications.  In addition, ordinary parole process, N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.53.  Both administrative parole and “ordinary” parole include presumptions in favor of release.  In addition to extended periods of parole ineligibility mandated for specific crimes, the Criminal Code also 3 authorizes the court at sentencing to impose a discretionary period of parole ineligibility for crime when the any court is clearly convinced that the aggravating factors substantially outweigh the mitigating factors, as defined in N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(b).  This Directive only addresses the imposition of statutorily required periods of parole eligibility.
[brief] Following review of those submissions, the Trial Court reached a decision, in light of the alleged impossibility of specific performance, finding that Defendant had continued to take an unreasonable position resulting in an unconscionable position, and imposed an equitable remedy which acknowledged that without equitable relief, [...] would be required to pay millions of dollars in expenses without ever realizing any revenue for its efforts.  The Trial Court initially held that “part of what I found was that anything otherwise [other than reformation] would be unconscionable. ”  6T11:1-2.  Further, the Trial Court found Defendant’s position to be, essentially, “[w]e just want your money and then we could do what we want and run the garage. ”  6T11:24-25.  Thus, the Trial Court properly found that “that is unconscionable and that is why the formula needs to be revised. ”  6T12:1-3.  _____________________ (citations omitted).  Here, the Trial Court properly held that Defendant took the position, regardless of whether it was intentional or otherwise, which resulted in the unconscionable result of a deal in which [...] bore the costs of the parking garage, and Defendant enjoyed all the profits, with no recourse to [...].
[directive] This On-Call Enforcement Incident by P~elimina~y Law Report Access to Electronic 5.6.2 Prosecutors.  Division of Criminal shall develop and and the Justice Prosecutor's Office  Each County general with the assistant prosecutors and deputy attorneys on-call plan equip a to implement Preliminary Incident transmit Law Enforcement approve, and read, edit, receive, capacity to Cause prepared pursuant to this Directive. of Probable Affidavits electronic Reports and immediately upon of Directive.  operational issuance this shall become subsection
[brief] THERE IS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD TO DENY SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON PLAINTIFF’S CEPA CLAIM (Pa708-Pa728).  Plaintiff filed a complaint alleging violations of the Conscientious Employee Protection Act (CEPA), N.J.S.A. 34:19-1 et seq. (Pal – Pa8).  The trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Defendants because the evidence on record sufficiently supports Plaintiff’s CEPA claim, precluding summary judgment as a matter of law.  There is sufficient evidence for Plaintiff to support her claims under CEPA, including that she had a reasonable belief that a violation of law, regulation, or clear mandate of public policy was occurring, engaged in protected whistleblowing activity, and suffered an adverse employment action that was causally related to her protected activity.
[brief] “This presumption can be overcome only by proofs that preclude the possibility that there could have been any set of facts known to the legislative body or which could reasonably be assumed to have been known which would rationally support a conclusion that the enactment is in the public interest. ”  *Hutton Park Gardens v. Town Council of Town of W. Orange*, 68 N.J. 543, 565 (1975).  This is true even if there is no explicit statement of purpose contained within the ordinance.  “Even if a court cannot ascertain the actual purpose of the statute, it should sustain the statute if it has any conceivable rational purpose. ”  *Auge v. N.J. Dep't. of Corr.*, 327 N.J. Super. 256, 266 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 164 N.J. 559 (2000).  In other words, a party challenging the validity of an ordinance must “negative every conceivable basis which might support [the legislative arrangement]. ”  *Madden v. Kentucky*, 309 U.S. 83, 88 (1940).  Therefore, it was [...]’s burden not only to overcome the deference accorded to the Planning Board’s determination that the Second Amendment to the Redevelopment Plan was substantially consistent with the Master Plan, but to also overcome the presumption of validity accorded to the Borough’s Council’s decision to adopt the Second Amendment to the Redevelopment Plan.
[brief] .....................................................  6  Washington v. Magazzu, 216 N.J. Super. 23 (App. Div. 1987)  .........................................................  11  Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. Admiral Ins. Co., 138 N.J. 106 (1994)  ..............................................................................  9  Wilson v. Paradise Vill. Beach Resort And Spa, 395 N.J. Super. 520 (App. Div. 2007)  .....................................................  8  Statutes N.J.S.A. 42:2C-65(a) ..............................................................................  14 Rules Rule 4:4-4(a)(5)  .......................................................................................  5  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
[brief] Cases  Care of Tenafly, Inc. v. Tenafly Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 307 N.J. Super. 362 (App. Div. 1998) .................................................................................................................. 3 Cola v. Packer, 156 N.J. Super. 77 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1977) ........................................... 8 Fanarjian v. Moskowitz, 237 N.J. Super. 395 (App. Div. 1989) ............................................. 6 Graham v. United States, 231 U.S. 474 (1913) ...................................................................... 4 In re Simon, 206 N.J. 306 (2011) .......................................................................................... 5 Jersey City v. Hague, 18 N.J. 584 (1955) ................................................................................. 7 Kernan v. One Washington Park, 154 N.J. 437 (1998) .......................................................... 6 Oscar v. Simeonidis, 352 N.J. Super. 476 (App. Div. 2002) .................................................... 6 Rivera v. Gerner, 89 N.J. 526 (1982) ....................................................................................... 7 S & L Assocs., Inc. v. Washington, 61 N.J. Super. 312 (App. Div. 1960) ..............................  3  Van Itallie v. Franklin Lakes, 28 N.J. 258 (1958) ..................................................................  4  Statutes N.J.S.A. § 40A:9-22.4 ..............................................................................................................  10 Rules Rule 1:7-4 ..................................................................................................................................  9  Rule 4:9-2 ..................................................................................................................................  7  TABLE OF SUPPLEMENTAL  APPENDIX  Relevant excerpt of Defendants’ brief\(^1\) entered March 15, 2024 ……………………89a --- \(^1\)
[brief] It is only the requirement of litigation against a stranger that calls the exception into play.  See, e.g., Jugan, supra, 275 N.J.Super. at 573, 646 A.2d 1112 (“[A]lthough [plaintiff] may not recover his litigation expenses for litigating with [defendant] to establish that his transfers were fraudulent, he is entitled to reimbursement for reasonable attorneys' fees expended in litigating with third parties, including the other defendants, to void or set aside the transfers. ”).  DiMisa v. Acquaviva, 198 N.J. 547, 553–54 (2009)
[directive] All designated Tactical Teams must, at a minimum, meet the standards for a Tier 3 Tactical Response Team as established by the National Tactical Officers Association (NTOA) in the Tactical Response and Operations Standard for Law Enforcement Agencies, published June 2023.5  These NTOA standards ensure that the designated Tactical Teams will have the requisite leadership, staffing, capabilities, specialized equipment, initial and ongoing training, and necessary oversight to address the complex issues encountered in scenarios involving barricaded individuals.  County Prosecutors, in cooperation with local tactical team commanders, shall be responsible for approving tactical teams operating within their counties and determining which teams meet the requisite standards to respond to incidents involving barricaded individuals and hostage situations.  Prior to any team being designated pursuant to this directive, and annually thereafter, county prosecutors shall ensure that each team meets all of the qualifications as set forth or referenced in this directive.  County prosecutors shall be cognizant of the requirements for optional capabilities consistent with the NTOA standards, and ensure that a designated team meet the requirements for all approved optional capabilities.  The utilization of NTOA Tier 3 as a minimum standard does not prohibit County Prosecutors, in cooperation with qualified tactical commanders, from making necessary modifications to suit the needs of the people of their respective jurisdictions for tactical teams exceeding the Tier 3 minimum requirement.  The Office of the Attorney General has referenced NTOA standards to provide a professionally accepted standard of leadership, staffing, and capability when encountering barricaded individuals and these standards should be utilized as a reference prior to making modifications.  This directive does not preclude a county prosecutor from requiring more stringent qualifications than the ones set forth or referenced in this directive.  County prosecutors shall issue a written directive to each law enforcement agency in their jurisdiction, informing such agencies of the Tactical Teams that have been designated to respond pursuant to this section.6 4.4
[brief] In the order of appointment of September 25, 2021, appointing [...] as receiver, the order provided that the “receiver shall be paid from the proceeds collected in the amount of 15% which shall be addressed as an additional cost of the judgment. ” (Ca22).  The appellants argue that [...] amended his payment charge without seeking leave of court to do so.  However, as noted in [...]’s certification in support of the motion to be discharged, he would not accept such an exorbitant amount of money as provided in the order.  [...], rather, agreed to accept $300.00 per hour, which was not paid by the corporation.  Rather, it was paid by [...] outside of the operating corporation to allow [...] to continue operating without the expense of 15% of gross.  Now, the appellants seek to penalize [...] for taking less than what was required under the order appointing him.
[brief] Furthermore, neither of the remand Judges “treated the analysis [of [...]’s fee application] as all-or-nothing. ”  (Db38)  As explained herein and as set forth in the Remand R&Rs, the lodestar – both for trial work and on appeal – was reduced by [...] to eliminate “categories of legal work” based upon his “granular analysis of time entries [and] specific projects” (Db39).
[brief] As both [...] and [...]: … it would have placed no undue burden on the parties to have drafted a clear, unambiguous indemnification provision.  The parties could have spelled out their intention as to which party would bear liability under various circumstance, in particular, whether [the indemnitor] would bear [the indemnitee’s] entire liability, irrespective of whether [indemnitee’s] obligation to a third party arose in part from its own negligence. [...] at 57 (internal citations omitted).
[brief] ”  Id. at 585 (citations omitted).  Moreover, “[o]ne of the hallmarks of the ‘turn square corners’ doctrine is that its application is not dependent upon a finding of bad faith.  Instead, it focuses the judicial inquiry upon whether government seeks an unfair ‘litigational advantage’”.  Id. at 586-587.  In addition, as the Supreme Court has held:  We have in a variety of contexts insisted that governmental officials act solely in the public interest.  In dealing with the public, government must “turn square corners. ”  Gruber v. Mayor and Tp. Com. of Raritan Tp., 73 N.J. Super. 120 (App. Div.), aff’d., 39 N.J. 1 (1962).  This applies, for example, in government contracts.  See Keyes Martin v. Director, Div. of Purchase and Property, 99 N.J. 244 (1985).  Also, in the condemnation field, government has an overriding obligation to deal forthrightly and fairly with property owners.  See Rockaway v. Donofrio, 186 N.J. Super. 344 (App. Div. 1982); State v. Siris, 191 N.J. Super. 261 (1983).  It may not conduct itself so as to achieve or preserve any kind of bargaining or litigational advantage over the property owner.  Its primary obligation is to comport itself with compunction and integrity, and in doing so government may have to forego the freedom of action that private citizens may employ in dealing with one another.  [F.M.C. Stores Co. v. Borough of Morris Plains, 100 N.J. 418, 426-27 (1985) (supersession by statute unrelated to the holding regarding the square corners doctrine) (emphasis added).
[brief] Raleigh Ave. Beach Assoc. v. Atlantis Beach Club, 185 N.J. 40 (2005) .................................................................20, 21 Sea Point Condo. Ass’n, Inc. v. N.J. Dep’t of Env’t Prot., No. ELU 04852-21, 2022 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 797 (October 5, 2022)  ..............................................................................................................9
[brief] (7T 142-18 to 143-9; 151-14 to 152-23; 148-24 to 149-2)  They found paperwork associated with various cell phones; two sets of T-Mobile paperwork for [...] for an electronic pin for phone number [...]; and paperwork associated with [...] at [...], the telephone number belonging to [...]'s Samsung Galaxy found on the front passenger seat of the car.  (7T 145-23 to 146-7, 146-20 to 147-8, 147-12 to 25)  While [...] was following the Buick and arresting [...], at the T-Mobile store on [...], [...] was working with [...].
[brief] TSI, 215 N.J. at 42-43.  The same reasoning applies here; the same outcome should attain.  When height variances under N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70(d)(6) “are requested in connection with a permitted use, a lower threshold equivalent to the standard applicable to conditional use variances is appropriate. ”  Price, 214 N.J. at 296 (2013) (citing Randolph Town Ctr. Assocs., 324 N.J. Super. at 416-17).  The proposed use as a warehouse is permitted in the SM Zone; it is not prohibited.  The Defendant failed to properly apply the more-lenient standard articulated in Grasso, as evidenced by the Resolution and transcript.  See Ja033 (“[It] makes it even more difficult, under the New Jersey Supreme Court's Medici holding, for the Board to accept the applicant's special reasons rationale. ”); see also 12/5/22 T. 13:22-23 (the charge given to the Board specifically stated that the Board needed to find “special reasons to grant a use variance”).  Defendant’s application of the enhanced standard of proof to the negative criteria also transformed the height variance application into a use variance.  This expressly contradicts the Coventry Square line of cases, and in particular, the Court’s decision in TSI.
[brief] For example, the Appellate Division refused to apply a perfunctory Tort Claim Act defense because of a want of a statement of facts explaining the basis for said defense:\textsuperscript{20}  Defendant filed an answer denying the allegations of the complaint.  The answer set forth as a separate defense that "(t)he plaintiff has failed to comply with the provisions of the Municipal Tort Claims Act N.J.S.A. Title 59 and is therefore barred from bringing this cause of action."  Thereafter, plaintiffs answered defendant's interrogatories and defendant obtained an order compelling more specific answers to its interrogatories.  These events transpired before [...]'s 19th birthday.  The parties then engaged in further discovery consisting of depositions and a physical examination.  In August 1980, over 21/2 years after the complaint was filed, defendant brought a motion for dismissal based on plaintiffs' failure to comply with the notice requirements of the Tort Claims Act.  The trial judge granted the motion and this appeal followed.
[brief] Docket No.: [...]  Honorable Judges of the Appellate Division:  Pursuant to Rule 2:6-2(b), kindly accept this letter brief on behalf of amicus curiae [...] in the above-captioned matter.  TABLE OF CONTENTS  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT……………………………………………………………...  1 STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY ……………………..  2 ARGUMENT…………………………………………………………………………………..  2  I.  Ordinary people form misconceptions about forensic science through learning that occurs outside their awareness……………………………………..  2  II.  Common misconceptions plague ordinary people’s view of forensic evidence…………………………………………………………………………………..  5  A.  People believe that forensic analysis is objective and was created by scientists…………………………………………………………………………………..  5  B.  People believe that forensic results are very rarely inaccurate.  …  10  C.  People believe that forensic science reliability does not vary much across types of evidence.  ..................................................  13  D.  People believe that forensic evidence is commonly available in criminal cases.  ...........................................................................  15  E.  People believe that forensic evidence can tell you whether a specific person committed a crime.  ..................................................  16  CONCLUSION..............................................................................................................  18  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT  Dr. [...], an expert in decision making and judgment in legal contexts, seeks to participate as *amicus curiae* in this case to explain how ordinary people learn about forensic evidence and to identify common misconceptions about forensic evidence that ordinary people hold, including jurors.
[brief] She testified that the Petitioner “left the house, left the marriage. ” (5T17-23 to 18-20).  In response, the Petitioner alleges an “acknowledgement” by the Respondent that her state of undress may have been the result of a “dream” during the night.  (Pb 6).  However, the ludicrous nature of this position, as shown by counsel’s ineffective cross-examination, becomes clear:  Q.  So you’re saying the next morning you woke up you were undressed?  A.  Yes.  Q.  And you were confused because you didn’t have any idea what happened, correct?  A.  Yeah, and I had never woken up undressed before previous to that and never have again.  Q.  And you hadn’t been drinking with your boyfriend, had you?  A. No.  Q.  Had you been doing drugs?  A. No.  Q.  Don’t you think you could have been dreaming?  A.  About what?  Q.  Having a dream that night and that something had happened?  [...]: You mean about waking up unclothed?  A.  I may have dreamt – [...]: No, dreaming something going on in her dream where she undressed herself.  A.
[brief] [Appeal of jurisdiction issues]  (Argued at Pa369 – Pa371)  A primary jurisdiction analysis requires the court to determine whether the matter at issue is within the conventional experience of judge, is peculiarly within the agency’s discretion or expertise, whether inconsistent rulings would disrupt the statutory scheme, and whether prior application has been made to the agency.  The application, interpretation, and enforcement of the school law, State aid statute, N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-1, et seq., is not within the conventional experience of judges; is a matter peculiarly in the Commissioner of Education’s discretion; inconsistent rulings will disrupt the statutory scheme; and no application to the \(^{20}\) Pa169 – Pa175 \(^{21}\) Pa153 – Pa159 Commissioner was made by [...].  So even if the court declined to find that the Commissioner of Education has exclusive jurisdiction, the court lacked primary jurisdiction over [...]’s Counterclaim.
[brief] [See Ja71(Question received from the Department on December 7, 2022 in connection with their review of [...]’s Q3 2022 Quarterly Statement).]  [...] and [...] objected to this request.  Id.  Only thirteen days later, the Department issued the Bulletin.  The Department is clearly now attempting to use SSAP No. 25 and the Bulletin to scrutinize and regulate profits of an AIF.  Id.  On January 27, 2023, [...] and [...] submitted a letter to the Department objecting to the Bulletin, the attempted imposition of the Holding Act to [...] and the application of SSAP No. 25 to [...]’s AIF Fees, and asked the Department to rescind the Bulletin or stay enforcement, requesting a response on or before February 1, 2023.
[brief] The Supreme Court has long held that prisoners have the right to exercise substantial religious freedom, Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, (1972); See also O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 348, (1987).  The Supreme Court has stated that Under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, inmates retain a right to reasonable opportunities for free exercise of religious beliefs without concern for the possibility of punishment.  See Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 (1972) (per curiam).  Pursuant to the highest Court, reasonable opportunities must be afforded to all prisoners to exercise the religious freedom guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendment without fear of penalty.  Cruz, 405 U.S. at 322, note 2.  In Cruz v. Beto, the United States Supreme Court established that claims of religious freedom by prison inmates should not be dismissed outright without factual findings by trial courts.
[brief] [...] and [...]  #  TABLE OF CONTENTS | Section | Page(s)  | |------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------| | PRELIMINARY STATEMENT | 1 | | COUNTER-STATEMENT OF FACTS | 4 | | LEGAL ARGUMENT | 7 | | I.  THE TRIAL COURT’S ERRONEOUS ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY  JUDGMENT TO PLAINTIFFS FOR AN IMPLIED EASEMENT  APPURTEnant MUST BE REVERSED | 7 | | A.  An Implied Easement Appurtenant Must Be Established by Clear And Convincing Evidence | 7 | | B.  The Record Before the Trial Court Did Not and Cannot Establish an Implied Easement Appurtenant by Clear and Convincing Evidence Sufficient to Meet the Summary Judgment Standard | 8 | | 1.  Lennig is not controlling | 10 | | 2.  Plaintiffs’ “totality of evidence” argument | 12 | | II.  THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DENIED PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION TO AMEND THEIR COMPLAIN TO IMPLEAD [...] AND ASSERT CLAIMS FOR MALICIOUS PROSECUTION AND LIBEL PER SE | 14 | | A.  The Trial Court Correctly Rejected Plaintiffs’ Malicious Prosecution Claim | 14 | | 1.  Institution of a criminal action | 15 | | 2.  Lack of probable cause | 17 | | 3.  Lack of malice | 21 | | B.  The Trial Court Correctly Rejected Plaintiffs’ Libel Per Se Claim | 21 | III.  THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY PRECLUDED PLAINTIFFS FROM OFFERING EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF A CLAIM FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES OR PUNITIVE DAMAGES  ...........................................24  1.  Defendants’ application to bar the evidence was not untimely ............25  2.  Attorneys’ fees .........................................................................................27  3.  Punitive damages .....................................................................................32  CONCLUSION ..................................................................................................34