ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] On May 22, 2020, defendants-respondents filed a Motion for Summary Judgment.  Pa77a et seq.  This Motion was filed after the close of discovery.  It included the report by plaintiff’s sole proposed expert, [...], an appraisal firm.  Pa280.²  In response to the Motion of 2020, plaintiffs did not identify [...] as a proposed expert, nor provide a curriculum or report by [...], nor seek to re-open discovery.  See Pa364 et seq.  In September 29, 2020, the trial court granted partial summary judgment in favor of defendants-appellants.  Pa1; 1T.  Thereafter, plaintiffs did not move to re-open discovery or otherwise move for leave to name [...] as an expert.  On July 22, 2022, defendants-appellants filed a second motion for summary judgment after the close of all discovery.  Pa441 et seq.  The opposition for plaintiffs ² Plaintiffs’ Appendix abridged that report for purposes of appeal. did not include a cross-motion or other application for leave to name [...] as an expert.  Pa449 et seq.  By written opinion and Order of December 7, 2022, the trial court dismissed the remainder of plaintiffs’ claims.  Pa3.  On December 27, 2022, plaintiffs filed an application styled as a Motion for Reconsideration.  Pa499.  In substance, plaintiffs sought, for the first time, to re-open discovery to name [...] as a new expert witness.  By written opinion and Order of January 20, 2023, the trial court denied plaintiffs’ Motion for Reconsideration.  Pa16.  **CONCISE STATEMENT OF FACTS**
[brief] Factual Disputes Preclude Summary Judgment (Ja1-3; 4T)  Courts typically apply a four-part inquiry to the NJFCA’s public disclosure bar codified in N.J.S.A. § 2A:32C-9(c).  First, courts ask whether the operative pleading’s allegations or transactions have been publicly disclosed.  _____________________  3  Defendants’ persistence in asserting that the trial court “[m]istook [l]egal [a]rguments for [f]actual [d]isputes,” Db26, is belied what the trial court did.  The trial court proceeded in standard fashion by determining the legal requirements for application of the bar, 4T 30:4-33:9, and then determining whether there were disputes of material fact, id. 33:10-35:14.  Second, they ask whether the disclosure occurred in one of the channels enumerated in the statute, here “by the news media. ”  Third, they consider whether the action is “based upon” or “substantially similar to” the publicly disclosed allegations or transactions.  Fourth, if all three questions are answered in the affirmative, the court determines whether the relator can demonstrate that it is as an “original source. ”  See, e.g., United States v. Omnicare, Inc., 903 F.3d 78, 81-83 (3d Cir. 2018).  1.  Rate Data Was Not Publicly Disclosed (Ja1-3; 4T)
[brief] B.  That the School site with the expansion no longer had any "vacant lands" as the entire Lot 5 was committed by the Site Plan to school needs and use.  The School site had insufficient parking for its own needs and required a variance for the expansion.  If a Synagogue parking right existed on School property, that would logically be preclusive to the School expansion and, if it existed, was required to be disclosed by both the Synagogue and by the School.  See Db48 to 53, cases cited there.  C.
[directive] 2.  Range - 50 yards 3.  Target - F B I type Q target, either paper or cardboard.  4.  Course a.  Total of 60 rounds per participant.  b.  Magazine capacity will be given on command at each firing stage.  c.  To achieve a passing score of 80%, the participant must place a minimum of 48 shots within the border of the Q-target silhouette.
[brief] Ma'am, please listen to me very carefully.  You're saying you don't owe her, I have to determine what proofs confirm that you don't owe her.  [...]: Right.  THE COURT: That's why we're going through this painstaking activity.  Do you understand that?  [...]: Yeah.  THE COURT: I can't just accept your word that you don't owe the landlord.  (1T21-10)  [...], who had not anticipated the court requiring that she prove four years of payments, was missing some rent receipts.
[brief] As the trial court agreed, Defendant’s reliance on is Rutkowski v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, 209 N.J. Super. 140, 143 (App. Div. 1986) is misplaced.  In Rutkowsky, that Court’s decision was largely based on its’ criticism that the Plaintiff’s in that case used a reference for the unidentified defendants that was entirely too general.  In that case, the complaint only referred to fictitious defendants as those defendants that might be “otherwise responsible”.  Unlike the Plaintiff in Rutkowski, here, not only does Plaintiffs’ Complaint properly plead fictitious parties pursuant to Rule 4:26-4 but it also properly identifies the fictitious defendants and their potential role for being responsible for the inspection, maintenance, and correction of dangerous conditions in the roadway.  (Pa1550).
[brief] On January 07, 2020, the [...] returned [...], charging defendant, [...], with the following: first-degree Murder, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3a(1) and N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3a(2) (Count Two); first-degree Felony Murder, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3a(3) (Count Three); second-degree Conspiracy to Commit Robbery, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2a(1) and N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1a(1) (Count Four); first-degree Robbery, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1a(1) (Count Five); second-degree Possession of a Weapon for an Unlawful Purpose, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4a(1) (Count Six); second-degree Unlawful Possession of a Weapon, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5b(1) (Count Seven); and second-degree Certain Persons Not to Have Weapons, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:39-7b(1) (Count Eight).
[brief] In terms of a jury charge, meeting the plain error standard requires “legal impropriety in the charge prejudicially affecting the substantial rights of the defendant and sufficiently grievous to justify notice by the reviewing [C]ourt and to convince the [C]ourt that of itself the error possessed a clear capacity to bring about an unjust result. ”  *State v. Nero*, 195 N.J. 397, 406 (2008) (quoting *State v. Hock*, 54 N.J. 526, 538 (1969)).  This burden rests on defendant’s shoulders.  *State v. Koskovich*, 168 N.J. 448, 529 (2001).  Jury “charges must be read as a whole in determining whether there was any error. ”  *State v. Torres*, 183 N.J. 554, 564 (2005).  The effect of any error must be considered “in light ‘of the overall strength of the State's case. ’”  *State v. Walker*, 203 N.J. 73, 90 (2010) (quoting *State v. Chapland*, 187 N.J. 275, 289 (2006)).
[brief] The conduct in question is Respondent’s posting of a vulgar, obscene, pornographic, and misogynistic video in a “chat room” that included various individuals.  While Respondent contends that his conduct in creating the post was “private,” his alleged “private” conduct became public when he shared the post with various members of the public.  Notably, as to the post’s dissemination, Respondent posted, “Omg how did so many people get to see this wow. ”  Accordingly, Respondent’s reliance on the argument that this matter involves “private conduct” is unavailing.  Respondent would also have this Court believe that egregiously improper conduct, as long as occurring in private, could not constitute cause for removal of a commissioner under N.J.S.A. 40:14A-5(c).  Such an interpretation is an abomination of this State’s precedent, as well as legislative intent, to hold public officials to a higher standard of conduct, both in their public and private lives.  By any stretch of the imagination, Respondent’s dissemination of the subject post cannot be said to uphold this standard.  REPLY STATEMENT OF FACTS
[directive] Statute Charge Description  Degree Bail Range 10%  Cash  Bail Option  Obstructing  Highways and Actor purposely or recklessly obstructs a public passage or, in a gathering, refuses to obey Petty Disorderly 2C:33-7(a)(b)  $500 to $1,000 10% permissible  Other Public a reasonable official request to move.  Persons
[brief] To be sure, she was seeking well over $5 million dollars as confirmed by her sworn answers to interrogatories #101 in evidence: - $720,000 in alimony ($10,000 per month for 6 years), - $2m in bankruptcy settlement proceeds, - $2m in account funds, - the [...], - ½ of any proceeds from [...]’s malpractice case, - Lexus ($52,395 purchase price), and other significant economic claims.  (See Pa55, Pl.’s Trial Ex. P-23, [...]’s Interrog. Answers #101, Sep. 27, 2018).  [...] and her attorneys knew this was more than [...] can ever afford, especially following bankruptcy and their knowledge of the bankruptcy settlement and expenses incurred therein and a result thereof.  Additionally, the trial court erred in concluding “certain sections of the court rules (governing counsel fees)... are not relevant or sufficiently probative to address in its findings based on the factual record at trial. ”  It is an abuse of discretion if the trial court does not consider the relevant portions of the Rule.
[brief] [...], Plaintiff(s)-Appellant(s), -vs- [...], [...], [...], John Does 1-10 (fictitious names representing unknown individuals) and/or XYZ Corps. 1-10 (fictitious names representing unknown corporations, partnerships and/or Limited Liability Companies or other types of legal entities), Defendant(s)-Respondent(s)  Superior Court of New Jersey  Appellate Division  Docket No.: [...]  Civil Action On Appeal From: Superior Court of New Jersey Law Division  Hudson County Docket No. [...]  Sat Below: Hon. [...], J.S.C.
[brief] The Borough established evaluation criteria (after an internal deliberative process), which it then published in the Evaluation Sheet.  Indeed, the Borough Administrator emailed [...]’s consultant a copy of the evaluation criteria on March 18, 2022, in response to her inquiry from earlier in the week asking whether any criteria had been developed.  (136-141a).  The Borough should not be permitted to inform a candidate of specific review criteria only to change horses in the middle of the stream and apply whatever criteria it wants.  See F.M.C. Stores Co. v. Borough of Morris Plains, 100 N.J. 418, 426-27 (1985) (noting that “[i]n dealing with the public, government must turn square corners”); W.V. Pangborne & Co., Inc. v. N.J. Dept. of Transp., 116 N.J. 543, 562 (1989) (recognizing “the supervening obligation of government to deal scrupulously with the public”).
[brief] E.  The Improper Admission Of Defendant’s Statements Was Harmful Error.  The improper admission of [...]’s booking statement and interrogation was harmful error that requires reversal of his conviction.  Although [...] maintained that he did not instigate the fight and instead tried to deescalate the situation in his statements, (see, e.g., Da 43, 45, 48, 50, 52, 73, 74-92) the State pointed to inconsistencies between the statements to discredit [...]’s claims of innocence.  The State returned again and again to the theme that [...] should not be believed because he “gave four remarkably different versions of what happened. ”  (13T 134-20 to 24)  The State cited [...]’s four “wildly different” versions of events to try to convince the jury that [...] must have lied to police when he told them he was not involved.  (13T 143-8 to 149-17)  [...]’s inconsistent statements to police meant that he lied, and he lied because he must be guilty:  “He knew he was responsible.  . . that’s why, not only did he lie with different versions every time, to try to throw officers off.  That’s why, eventually he tried to shift the blame to [...]. ”  (13T 154-11 to 15)  The State’s use of the inconsistencies between [...]’s statements as evidence of his guilt, combined with the jury repeatedly hearing that [...] requested a lawyer, unfairly bolstered the State’s case.  Without the booking video and the invocations and without [...]’s formal interrogation, the State would not have been able to argue as persuasively that [...] must be guilty because he must have lied to the police.  Thus, the improper admission of the booking video and interrogation, either separately or together, was harmful error.  The improper admission of these statements deprived [...] of his rights to due process and a fair trial and requires reversal of his conviction.
[brief] A.  Where An Eyewitness Has Failed To Identify Defendant In A Pretrial Procedure, There Should Be A Pretrial Hearing Before The Prosecutor Is Allowed To Ask That Witness To Identify Defendant In Court.  B.  The Prejudice To Defendant Was Not Rectified By The Trial Court's One-Sentence Statement That “The Last Answer Of The Witness Is Stricken From The Record And The Jury Will Disregard It. ”  The Judge Should Have Instructed The Jury That [...]’s In-Court Identification Was Unreliable And Could Not Be Considered For Any Purpose.  *4  POINT  II
[brief] As a result, the Mayor proposed that [...] include such an elevator in Building E, and in exchange the municipality would agree to increase Building E’s unit count (and hence, the Project’s overall unit count) by 10 additional units.  (Pa268, 2nd ¶)  In furtherance to same, there were various discussions between and among the attorneys for [...], the Township, and the Board as to the details of such arrangement, including that same would require an amendment to the Settlement Agreement and that the Project approval Resolution and the amendment to the Settlement Agreement should be presented to the Board simultaneously.  (Pa268-Pa269)  The day before the June 13, 2022 Board hearing, an agreement was reached and was confirmed by email of [...]’s attorney [...], addressed to the attorneys for the Board and the Township, which, in relevant part, reads:  To follow up, [...] accepts the proposal discussed on Friday.  To sum up, [...] will agree to install an elevator in Building E if (i) the Planning Board and the governing body approve one additional story with no more than 10 total units only 1 of which is affordable and (ii) contingent upon the Planning Board approving the [...] project on Monday, 6/13 (see below).  As a result, the total number of units at the [...] project will equal 483 including 72 affordable units.  In terms of procedure, [...] will bring its affirmative presentation to a close on Monday, 6/13 and seek a vote at that meeting.
[brief] The present-day iteration of the NJCFLA originated as the New Jersey Small Loan Law (“NJSLL”), enacted in 1914.  The NJSLL was meant to curtail predatory loan practices widely unregulated at the time.  The small loan business has long been the subject of study, legislation and judicial determination.  See Gallert, Hilborn and May, Small Loan Legislation (Russell Sage Foundation, 1932); Hubachek, Annotations on Small Loan Laws (Russell Sage Foundation, 1938); 8 Law and Contemporary Problems (Winter, 1941).  New Jersey was one of the five large industrial states which early adopted general acts designed to regulate and control the business of making small loans.  Thus P.L. 1914, c. 49 provided for the licensing of small loan companies and granted power to the Commissioner of Banking and Insurance to reject an application for license because of lack of character or fitness of the applicant.  In 1916 the Russell Sage Foundation submitted its first draft of a Uniform Small Loan Law which adopted the regulatory philosophy of the New Jersey act and some of its provisions.  Family Fin. Corp. v. Gough, 10 N.J. Super. 13, 19 (App. Div. 1950).  The NJSLL—like the NJCFLA—allowed for enforcement by the Commissioner and was intended to protect consumers from usurious, predatory, and unlawful loan practices by regulating and limiting what entities could enter the consumer loan marketplace.
[brief] Plaintiff was represented by [...], Esq. (“[...]”).  [...], PE, PP (“[...]”) provided testimony on behalf of the Plaintiff.  [...] testified that the application complied with all of the requirements of § 18-902(E).  He explained that the homes built on the subdivided lots would be custom homes but would all comply with the ordinance.  When questioned by the Board as to why the plans did not reflect the exact size of any potential homes, [...] responded:  We show building boxes, because we don't know what's going to be built there.  These are going to be sold to people that want to move into that neighborhood and they're going to put houses that conform with the ordinance.  …  The drainage, if the building size is doubled it will be contemplated for by the, by a new drainage system and I believe this is something that at plot plan would be submitted, just as on an existing lot when somebody comes in to build on an existing lot and they build a bigger house, the Board, the Township engineer looks at that and says, well, you're creating some kind of drainage, you need to compensate that, and it's done all the time and it's very simple to accommodate any additional area.  (T1: p7, ln 8-25)  The Board continued to ask about the potential building sizes.  [...] then testified that the R-12 Zone allows for 30% building coverage.  He further testified that since the homes would be custom, there is no way to tell the exact building sizes.  However, any future home would comply with the requirements of the R-12 Zone.  [...] testified, “all we’re asking for is to subdivide it [the property] into conforming lots.
[brief] Id. at 352-53 (citations omitted).  On the other side of the ledger, King also listed factors tending to indicate voluntariness: (1) the individual thought police would find no contraband; (2) the individual admitted guilt before consent; and (3) the individual affirmatively assisted police.  Id. at 353 (citations omitted).  Still, the King Court cautioned, “the existence or absence of one or more of the above factors is not determinative” and that consideration depends on “the totality of the particular circumstances of the case[.]”
[directive] 1o  Você entende que se o crime foi cometido em de julho de 2014 ou após esta data, em [Sim/Yes] [Não/No] decorrência da sua declaração de culpa poderá ser exigido o pagamento de uma multa mensal de $30 para o Fundo de Supervisão de Agressores Sexuais?  Do you understand that if the offense was committed on or after July 1, 2014, as a result of your guilty plea you may be required to pay a Sex Offender Supervision Penalty of $30 per month?
[brief] It found that there was an obvious trash and dumping at the site that currently exists without the proposed expansion.  The expert testimony did not provide any credible evidence that the project at the site would accommodate the problem.  The Board, again, found that the project would exacerbate an existing problem of solid waste removal at [...].  (Pa035)  Based upon the above analysis, the Board found that the first prong of the Grubbs positive criteria could not be met, and that the Applicant could not meet its burden of proof.
[brief] Further, the Council is neither a private regulatory organization nor controlled by a private organization.  The members are duly appointed public officials: members of the Council must be nominated by the Governor and approved by the Senate.  (As *Humane Society* notes, the Legislature did not require that any members be a member of a sportsmen’s club.)  Furthermore, the DEP Commissioner must approve any CBBMP for it [to] become effective.  This, in addition to the legislative restraints mentioned above on the Council’s authority demonstrates that Plaintiffs’ assertion the Council is controlled by a private interest group lacks merit and is not supported by an indica of evidence.  (Pa129).  -  Importantly, the Court in *Humane Society* also observed:  The governmental interest in establishing regulations to ensure a plentiful supply of game animals for consumption and sport is suitably furthered by placing a degree of regulatory control in the hands of a Fish and Game Council composed of sportsmen, farmers, and commercial fisherman.  Opening the Council’s membership to persons with differing philosophies might reflect the art of public relations, but is not a constitutional necessity.  [Id. at 577.] (Pa129).  -  It is not the role of the judiciary, absent any constitutional violation, to second guess the composition of the Council, especially “because [the entities proscribed in the Council’s nominating statute] are most directly affected by the Council’s regulations and possess the requisite expertise for achievement of the statutory objective. ”  Id. at 577.  (Pa129-130).  -  In light of the principles articulated in Humane Society regarding the Federation’s role in the nomination process and the above stated legislative instructions limitations on the Council’s authority, the delegation of rulemaking authority to the Council does not violate Article IV., par. 1 of the New [Jersey] State Constitution.  For these reasons, Count Two of Plaintiffs’ complaint contains no legally recognizable cause of action, and the Court must dismiss Count Two.  (Pa130).
[brief] Decedent spoke to [...] often told her that she was paying the cell phone for Respondent, had purchased a car for her, and purchased a real estate lot for Respondent.  (9T69:13 to 70:11; P561a-562a, P566a-570a; P600a-605a)  [...] observed Respondent repeatedly bully and harangue Decedent to get what she wanted, openly referring to Decedent as a “bitch.
[brief] The excess UIM coverage part of the [...] follows form to the underlying primary [...].  As to underinsured motorist coverage, the insuring agreement of the [...] provides in relevant part:  *We will pay compensatory damages which a **covered person** is legally entitled to recover from the owner or operator of an **uninsured motor vehicle** or **underinsured motor vehicle** because of: (1) BI sustained by a **covered person** and caused by an auto accident[.] . . . (Pa 59, [...], at Part C – Underinsured Motorist Coverage).  Thus, as a condition of coverage, the insuring agreement requires that the accident involve an “underinsured motor vehicle” as defined in the [...].  The definition of “underinsured motor vehicle” expressly excludes any vehicle “[o]wned by or furnished or available for the regular use of **you** [named insured] or any **family member**. ”  *Id.*  A “family member” is defined in the [...] in relevant part to include “a person related to **you** by blood, marriage . . . who resides primarily in **your** household. ” (Pa 35, at Definitions (F)).  The vehicle at issue was owned by named insured [...] and was furnished for the use of “family member” Defendant [...].  Because the vehicle was owned by the named insured and made available for the use of a family member, the accident did not involve an “underinsured motor vehicle,” and the insuring agreement is not satisfied.
[brief] In 2017, [...] plead guilty to conspiracy to use a runner after admitting that from 2009 to 2014 he conspired with non-licensee brothers Karim and [...] to use runners and pay the Bandys for these referrals of clients.  *In re Walker*, DRB 17-379 (N.J. Apr, 17, 2018)\(^9\).  See also, CAIFa0053 and CAIFa0057\(^10\).  Certifications of --- \(^9\) [https://casetext.com/case/in-re-walker-395](https://casetext.com/case/in-re-walker-395) \(^{10}\)  The exhibits to this certification have been omitted in compliance with HIPAA regulations.  A complete copy of the certification can be made available for in camera review upon request.  [...] and [...] detailing the criminal enterprises conducted in the names of professionals which would never have been discovered without extensive discovery on parties and non-parties. \textsuperscript{11}  But for discovery afforded under the New Jersey Rules of Court, neither of the Bandy brothers nor [...] or any of the other criminals involved in the kickback scheme would have been discovered, sued, prosecuted and shut down, ultimately saving the consumers of New Jersey from fraudulent billing and ultimately higher rates.