ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] Conditional Dismissals, Diversion Programs and Community Court  Depending on the facts and circumstances of a particular case, the municipal prosecutor may consider recommending, or not opposing a defendant’s request for, a conditional dismissal as an alternative to an outright dismissal if the defendant is otherwise eligible and where such a resolution would be in the interests of justice.  Again, these determinations must be made on a case-by-case basis, and the factors the municipal prosecutor should consider when deciding whether to recommend a conditional dismissal are as follows: 1.  The nature and circumstances of the offense; 2. The facts surrounding the commission of the offense; 3. The motivation, age, character, and attitude of the defendant; 4. The desire of the complainant or victim to forego prosecution; 5.  The needs and interests of the victim and the community; Commentary.pdf.  Page 5  6.  The extent to which the defendant’s offense constitutes part of a continuing pattern of anti-social behavior; 7.  Whether the offense is of an assaultive or violent nature, whether in the act itself or in the possible injurious consequences of such behavior; 8.  Whether the defendant’s participation will adversely affect the prosecution of codefendants; 9.  Whether diversion of the defendant from prosecution is consistent with the public interest; and 10.  Any other factors the prosecutor might deem relevant.  See N.J.S.A. 2C:43-13.1.  In addition to conditional dismissal programs, some cities such as [...] and [...] operate innovative Community Solutions (or community court) programs as an alternative to traditional prosecution.  Municipal prosecutors in jurisdictions offering these programs may be asked to recommend whether eligible defendants should be accepted into these programs.  Nothing in this Memorandum should deter any municipal prosecutor from freely recommending that any eligible defendant be accepted into any of these diversion programs.  If a defendant applies to the court for entry into the conditional dismissal program, or a community court program like the ones offered in [...] and [...], and the municipal prosecutor does not think the defendant should be admitted into this program, the municipal prosecutor put their objection on the record.  The order approving the defendant’s must participation in the conditional dismissal program is a final order.  However, upon request of the municipal prosecutor, this order must be stayed for a period of 10 days to permit the prosecutor time to appeal this order to the Superior Court.  See N.J.S.A. 2C:43-13.2.  When the municipal prosecutor objects to an order approving the defendant’s entry into the conditional dismissal program, or a community court program like the ones offered in [...] and [...], the municipal prosecutor shall immediately notify the county’s COVID-19 Prosecutor and/or Municipal Prosecutor Liaison so that the county prosecutor’s office can take appropriate action regarding the municipal appeal.  III.
[brief] In addition to the actual Procedural History provided to the Appellate Court in Defendant’s brief, as opposed to the argument inappropriately contained therein, Plaintiff submits the additional pertinent history:  -  On July 14, 2021, Plaintiff filed an Offer to Take Judgment in the amount of $200,000.00, Pa 1; - On September 2, 2021 the case proceeded to arbitration which resulted in an award in favor of Plaintiff in the amount of $300,000, Pa 2; - On September 27, 2021 Defendant filed for a trial de novo, Pa 3; -  On January 25, 2022 and January 20, 2023, Plaintiff sent correspondence to Defendant, advising Defendant’s counsel that Defendant was being exposed to an excess verdict and that Plaintiff intended to pursue a Bad Faith claim against his insurers, Pa 4-6; - On January 19, 2023, the jury returned a verdict for Plaintiff in the amount of $1,600,000.  An Order was issued after oral arguments on February 28, 2023 and on March 3, 2023, the Order for Judgment was entered against Defendant in the amount of $1,823,006.96 which included the jury verdict, penalties and interest, Da 23-24; - On July 19, 2023, Defendant filed a Motion to Mold Judgment, Pa 7-8; - On September 22, 2023, Defendant’s Motion to Mold Judgment was denied, Pa 9-10; - On October 12, 2023, Defendant filed a Motion to Reconsider the denial of the Motion to Amend Judgment, Pa 11-12; - On December 1, 2023, Defendant’s Motion to Reconsider the denial of the Motion to Amend Judgment was denied, however, an Order has not yet been signed.  Pa **.  RESPONDENT, [...]’S, COUNTERSTATEMENT OF FACTS
[brief] [...] Failed To Come Forward At The Midpoint Review, Or At Any Time, To The Special Master, Implementation Monitor, Or [...] With Any Viable Alternative (3-7a, 17-18a, 20-21a)...........................................  42  e.  The Trial Court Held That “Automatic Approval” Was Too Extreme Of A Remedy, Overlooking The Various Well Accepted Vehicles Available To Secure Compliance With The Judgment (11-13a, 16-17a)
[brief] *In re Courtine*, No. A-3712-06T3, 2008 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2433, at *4 (App. Div. Mar. 18, 2008).  Where there is no evidence of fraud and the intent of the voter is reasonably clear, as it is here, slavish devotion to the technicalities of our election code, especially when such an interpretation is at odds with the legislative history and purpose of the statutes, does nothing but interfere with the proper administration of democracy.
[brief] (Pa003048-003055).  In the end, the trial court found that “[...] are not the cause for Plaintiffs’ loss. ” (Pa3055).  “The termination of the Lease was due simply because of Plaintiff’s own default. ” (Id.).  “That event enabled [...] to become successors to this solar farm development. ”  (Id.)  Therefore, the trial court dismissed all claims against the [...] for failure to establish causation.
[brief] *Bright v. T & W Suffolk, Inc.*, 268 N.J. Super. 220, 225 (App. Div. 1993); see, e.g., *Romanny v. Stanley Baldino Constr. Co.*, 142 N.J. 576, 584 (1995) (in the context of workers’ compensation insurance: “We acknowledge the strong public policy favoring uninterrupted workers’ compensation coverage for all employers as well as the principle that insurance companies must comply strictly with all statutory and regulatory requirements relating to cancellation or non-renewal of such policies. ”); *Millbrook Tax Fund, Inc. v. P.L. Henry & Associates, Inc.*, 344 N.J. Super. 49, 54 (App. Div. 2001) (“If, as a matter of law, [the insurer] could not vary a material provision of that policy upon renewal without specifically informing the policyholder of the change, both parties, upon renewal, continued to be bound by the provisions of the first policy. ”); *Scott v. Jovil Constr., Inc.*, 2009 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2947, *10 (App. Div. 2009) (recognizing, in the context of automobile insurance, “that in order to be effective, notices of non-renewal and notices of cancellation must be sent in strict compliance with applicable statutory and regulatory provisions”), Pa2726-Pa2731.  Courts resist “implied cancellation,” as “insurance policies are complex contracts of adhesion, prepared by the insurer and not subject to negotiation.
[brief] Lastly, though Defendants argue that Plaintiff cannot seek declaratory and injunctive relief, that argument does not address the implied private right of action under the NJCFLA, discussed supra, or address that the CFA gives rise to Plaintiff’s standing for declaratory and injunctive relief.  Independent of the private right of action under the NJCFLA, Plaintiff is still entitled to relief as a result of Defendants’ violations of the CFA, even though they arise from Defendants’ undisputed violations of the NJCFLA.  POINT II.
[directive] A detailed schedule and lesson plan must be developed for all basic training programs conducted for K-9 patrol teams or K-9 specialty teams.  Copies of both the schedule and lesson plan along with initial training evaluation and qualification records must be maintained at the training facility, as well as the employing agency of the K-9 team.  K-9 patrol team and K-9 specialty team training must be conducted by a K-9 trainer or supervising K-9 trainer who satisfies the criteria set forth herein.  K-9 trainers or supervising K-9 trainers would be responsible for the overall K-9 training program, in particular, those areas which involve or pertain to the police officer-police dog team training.  However, specialists in fields such as veterinary medicine and canine care, law, and tracking or scent work, should be utilized, as appropriate, to conduct training in their respective field.  Training by specialists is at the discretion of the K-9 trainer, supervising K-9 trainer, or agency executive.  K-9 training must be conducted at a training site as described herein and must take place under conditions that are similar to those that will exist in the field during actual assignment or when otherwise deployed or utilized.  5 7/2002  K-9 Training Standards and Qualification Requirements
[brief] [...] argues at Pb-31 that since [...] relies on the authority of the COVID Statute in asserting that [...] has an obligation to pay it for the period it was unable to provide services due to the statewide closure of schools at the outset of the pandemic, it is in fact seeking a writ of mandamus, and that pursuant to R. 4:69-6(a), it is thus subject to a limitations period of 45 days, which expired long before [...]’s counterclaim was filed.  [...] does not offer a position as to when that limitations period commenced to run, or cite to any cases that hold that actions for money damages against governmental entities constitute such actions.  Given the spuriousness of this position and [...]’s failure to support it with any form of legal authority, a discussion of its lack of foundation may be seen as unnecessary, however, [...] will address it notwithstanding those shortcomings.  A mandamus action is an action brought to compel a government official to perform a ministerial duty.  Seloby v. Keough-Dwyer Correctional Facility, 375 N.J. Super. 91, 96 (App. Div. 2005), citing McKenna v. N.J. Highway Auth., 19 N.J. 270, 275 (1955).  Such actions are brought to challenge the inaction of an agency or public official, where the inaction is the non-performance of a mandated ministerial obligation.  *Cohen v. Univ. of Medicine and Dentistry*, 240 N.J. Super. 188, 199 (Ch. Div. 1989), citing *Equitable Life Mort. v. N.J. Div. of Taxation*, 151 N.J. Super. 232, 238 (App. Div. 1977).  The making of a decision as to whether to pay a contractor is hardly tantamount to the performance of a ministerial duty, and actions seeking money damages against a governmental agency have never been treated as governed by the 45 day limitations period of R. 4:69-6.  As with its argument for the unconstitutionality of the COVID Statute, [...]’s failure to support its novel argument with any citation to case law supporting its conclusion should lead to the rejection of its position.  [...]’s unsupported argument to the effect that [...] is precluded from raising its counterclaim following its being sued by [...] is meritless and demands rejection out of hand.  **POINT V – SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS PROPERLY GRANTED**
[brief] ”  *In re Election for Atl. Cty. Freeholder Dist. 3 2020 Gen. Election*, 468 N.J. Super. 341, 358-59 (App. Div. 2021) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).  The procedures under the Ballot Cure Act, which provide assurances that mail-in votes are not cast fraudulently, provide limited bases upon which a ballot may be cured.  As those procedures did not exist when *Kriso* was decided, that case is factually distinguishable and of little value in addressing whether a process exists to address blank inner envelope certificates.
[brief] 16  POINT I .....................................................................................................................................  16  THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED [...]’S SUMMARY  JUDGMENT MOTION AND PROPERLY APPLIED  THE FRAUD EXCEPTION TO THE PAROL EVIDENCE RULE TO ALLOW PLAINTIFFS’ TESTIMONY.  (2T9:20-16:9; 2T32:25-37:12; 3T20:10-22:17; 21T16:16-17:2; Da1096)
[brief] Municipal, public or private corporations may be authorized by law to undertake such clearance, replanning development or redevelopment; and improvements made for these purposes and uses, or for any of them, may be exempted from taxation, in whole or in part, for a limited period of time during which the profits and dividends payable by any private corporation enjoying such tax exemption shall be limited by law.  The conditions of use, ownership, management and control of such improvements shall be regulated by law. ”}  Since both [...] and [...] have their constitutional footing in the Blighted Areas Clause, both statutes must be construed in light of its constraints.
[brief] • Change to Grievance Procedure language [. . .] • Change Longevity [. . .] • Change Comp Time [. . .]  • Change payment for earning Certifications [. . .]  • Change Leave flexibility to be in increments of 4 hours • Change Transfer requests to be assigned by seniority • Change Mutual Swaps [. . .]  Our review of the record, including comparison of the [...]’s September 12 Final Offer to its subsequent revised final offers, confirms the arbitrator’s determination that the [...]’s revised final offers included new substantive proposals that were not included in its final offer.
[brief] In support of his claim, defendant argues that change in the law is required to keep up with evolving polices regulating the use of police body cam.  Additionally, he argues that because the trial court failed to find a “negative inference” against the State for not providing the audio of the police announcing themselves prior to the search, “there is absolutely nothing to deter law enforcement to properly follow police procedure and activate their body worn cameras. ”  (Db11).  Defendant’s arguments must fail for three reasons.
[brief] [...] (ID [...])  [...]  [...] (ID [...])  [...]  On the Brief #  TABLE OF CONTENTS | PAGES | |-------| | TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORD ERS, AND RULINGS | ii | | TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | iii | | TABLE OF CONTENTS TO APPENDIX | iv | | PROCEDURAL HISTORY | 1 | | STATEMENT OF FACTS | 2 | | LEGAL ARGUMENT | 10 | | STANDARD OF REVIEW | 10 | | I.  THE COURT’S ASSUMPTION OF THE BURDEN OF PROOF AND ITS RELIANCE SOLELY ON DEFENDANT’S RECORDS  CROSSED THE LINE OF IMPARTIALITY (1T21-10) | 11 | | II.  THE COURT’S FINDING THAT DEFENDANT OWED $8,000 IN RENT LACKS ANY BASIS IN FACT (1T32-19) | 14 | | CONCLUSION | 16
[brief] .......................................................  10  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES  CASES  Perreira v Rediger, 169 N.J. 399 (2001)  ......................... 4-5  Mid-Century Insurance Co. v. Freeman, 2016 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1127 (Law Div. May 16, 2016)  ...  7,9 Walsh v. Starr Transit, 2008 WL 199740 (N.J. Super. A.D.) ..................................................  7 Warnig v Atlantic City Council Special Services, 636 N.J. Super. 563 (App. Div. 2003).  ...........................  6 STATUTES AND OTHER AUTHORITIES
[brief] In *State v. Elliot*, this court considered whether a reversal was warranted where the jury was "instructed that it could convict defendant of robbery if it found that he either knowingly used force or threatened to use force against the victims in committing a theft, pursuant to subsection (1) or (2) of N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1(a), respectively."  *State v. Elliot*, 2010 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 718, *8 App. Div. 2010* (emphasis in the original).
[brief] *State v. Stovall*, 170 N.J. 346, 372 (2002) ([...], J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting *State v. Arthur*, 149 N.J. 1, 7-8 (1997)); accord *State v. Alessi*, 240 N.J. 501, 518 (2020).  Determining whether reasonable and articulable suspicion exists for an investigatory stop is a highly fact-intensive inquiry that demands evaluation of “the totality of circumstances surrounding the police-citizen encounter, balancing the State’s interest in effective law enforcement against the individual’s right to be protected from unwarranted and/or overbearing police intrusions. ”
[directive] It also incorporates the June 4, 2014 Memorandum from the Director of the Division of Criminal Justice, issued pursuant to authority granted by the Attorney General.  This compilation is not intended to supersede these amendments and clarifications, but rather serves as a guide for ease of reference for law enforcement.  -1-  [DCJ 03/03/16]  The revised policy now closely follows New Jersey statutory law defining the offense of resisting arrest, see N.J.S.A. 2C:29-2, which upgrades the disorderly persons offense to an indictable crime if the suspect “uses or threatens to use physical force or violence against the law enforcement officer or another,” or “uses any other means to create a substantial risk of causing physical injury to the public servant or another.
[brief] Plaintiff’s expert [...] based his opinions on industry standards such as the Institution of Transportation Engineers’ Transportation and Traffic Engineering Handbook, which provides that the use of traffic signs and markings must have "uniformity" in order to commend the attention and respect of drivers.  Pa661-662.  Here, there was an unsafe lack of uniformity in [...]’s “inconsistently maintained” parking lot, where traffic controls and pedestrian safety measures such as stop signs, stop lines, and crosswalks were implemented in the area of the lot where physicians and management parked, but were absent from the intersection in question in the distant part of the lot where [...] required nurses such as [...] to park.  See Pa665-6.  [...] further explained the safety function of having islands and peninsulas at the end of rows of parking spaces, something that, again, was implemented in the management parking area but not where [...] was required to park.
[brief] In its submission, [...] accuses [...] of disqualifying the company based upon a “fabricated defect” in its consent of surety, and thereby disputes that the Standard Specifications required a POA to support that undertaking and further argues that the Consent of Surety at issue was, in fact binding.  Each of these contentions lacks merit.  As an initial matter, [...]’s lengthy and long-standing Standard Specifications and the procurement practices memorialized thereunder are well known and understood within the highway construction community.  If [...] had a dispute with the meaning or interpretation of the specification, then it was required to bring that challenge to [...] prior to bid submission.  It is a well-settled principle of public contracting that unsuccessful bidders who bid on a contract without first objecting to the specifications lack standing to later attack those specifications as illegal or unenforceable.
[brief] ”  Isetts v. Borough of Roseland, 364 N.J. Super. 247, 254 (App. Div. 2003).  To discern the parties’ intentions, a court should initially look to the four corners of the settlement agreement itself.  Marwood v. Elizabeth Forward Sch. Dist., 93 F. App'x 333, 336 (3d Cir. 2004).
[brief] Since the State concedes OPMA requires listing an item “to the extent known,” discovery should have been granted to determine whether it was known as of January 4, 2022 that A.6260 and S.49 were to be introduced and the subject of legislative hearings.  (Sb24.)  Given the bills were voted out of committee on January 6, 2022 and because the only day left in the legislative session was January 10, 2022, then it was known, and thus, OPMA required, that notice be given that the bills would be considered on January 10, 2022.  The remedy for violating OPMA is same under either N.J.S.A. 1:7-3 or N.J.S.A. 10:4-15(a): voiding the statute.
[brief] ”  (1T 20-15 to 20)  On cross-examination, [...] admitted that he did not see the driver snort anything, could not see if there was any powder or other substances around the man’s nose, and the only thing he actually observed was that the man bent down and then came back up.  (1T 39-9 to 19)  [...] testified that he made eye contact with the driver, at which point the driver left the parking lot, driving onto Route 37 and eventually onto the Garden State Parkway northbound.  (1T 20-20 to 24)  [...] testified that “[a]t that time, given [his] . . . training and experience and the totality of everything [he] observed, [he] believed that a narcotics-related transaction between the defendant and the driver of the Dodge Ram had just occurred.
[brief] On January 7, 2022, while the Rent Arrears were still being held in escrow with the Clerk of Court, Tenant filed a seven-hundred (700) page motion for reconsideration of the Post Trial Order titled “Motion to Fix Amount Due for Tenant Fit-Up Reimbursement and Other Related Relief” (the “Motion for Reconsideration”).  (Da173-178).  The Motion for Reconsideration wholly ignored the Post Trial Order and re-asserted Tenant’s failed argument that it is entitled to the 2020 and 2021 Tenant Allowance Payments under Section 4.02 of the Lease despite its admitted monetary defaults.  (Da173-175).  Pursuant to the Motion for Reconsideration, Tenant argued that the $196,669.16 in Rent Arrears being held in escrow with the Clerk should be paid back to Tenant.
[directive] In August 1991, the Attorney General issued Internal Affairs Policy & Procedures (IAPP), a landmark document outlining the role and functions of an Internal Affairs unit.  Five years later, in 1996, the Legislature went a step further, requiring that each law enforcement New Jersey Is An Equal Opportunity Employer • Printed on Recycled Paper and is Recyclable Page 2 agency in New Jersey adopt its own policies consistent with IAPP.  P.L.1996, c.115 § 10 (codified at N.J.S.A. 40A:14-181).  Over the past three decades, Attorneys General have revised the document several times to strengthen or clarify various provisions.  Today’s Directive marks one of the most substantial revisions to since its initial publication and represents a IAPP significant step forward in our effort to strengthen public confidence and promote public accountability.  Pursuant to the authority granted to me under the New Jersey Constitution and the Criminal Justice Act of 1970, N.J.S.A. 52:17B-97 to -117, which provides for the general supervision of criminal justice by the Attorney General as chief law enforcement officer of the state in order to secure the benefits of a uniform and efficient enforcement of the criminal law and the administration of criminal justice throughout the state, I hereby direct all law enforcement and prosecuting agencies operating under the authority of the laws of the state of New Jersey to implement and comply with the revised appended to this Directive, and to IAPP take any additional measures necessary to update their guidelines consistent with IAPP, as required by N.J.S.A 40A:14-181.