ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Following entry of the decision in the First Action, representatives from [...] contacted Plaintiff and requested a meeting to discuss the redevelopment of the Laurel-Saddlewood Block in Jersey City (which includes the Saddlewood  On February 25, 2021, representatives of Plaintiff attended a meeting with [...] ([...]’s representative), who advised Plaintiff that the City had promised and, in fact, guaranteed [...], well before the redevelopment process began, that the Laurel-Saddlewood Block would be declared blighted and that [...] or its affiliate would be designated as redeveloper.  *(Id., ¶ 26.)*  When Plaintiff expressed outrage at what appeared to be a premature and improper determination, [...] advised that [...] had promised the City a new school in exchange for the City agreeing to declare the Laurel-Saddlewood Block as an area in need of redevelopment and to designate [...] (“[...]”) as the redeveloper.  *(Id., ¶ 27.)*  In fact, [...] went so far as to admit that [...] was told by the City, prior to the time it even commissioned an investigation of the Laurel-Saddlewood Block, that if the City received a new school from [...], it would declare the Laurel-Saddlewood Block blighted and designate [...]’s affiliate – [...] – as redeveloper.  *(Id., ¶ 28.)*  As [...] tellingly explained, “this is the way things are done in New Jersey. ”  *(Pa6, ¶ 3.)*  As explained below, [...]’s revelations were later substantiated by and through the Redevelopment Agreement (defined below).  Plaintiff is Denied the Right to Assert a Bad Faith Claim in the First Action
[brief] ”  Town of Secaucus v. Hackensack Meadowlands Dev. Comm’n, 267 N.J. Super. 361, 393 (App. Div. 1993) (quoting State v. Gill, 47 N.J. 441, 444 (1966)).  Second, Appellants argue that an exemption for “routine upgrades” rather than all “upgrades” fits with the Highlands Act’s statutory scheme, as the narrower “routine upgrades” would set a higher bar for development.
[brief] The Resolution Sets Forth Hollow Conclusions That Are Unsupported by the Record and Should Be Rejected (Aa236).  The Resolution adopted by the [...] fails to set forth the Board’s true reasoning for the denial of the Application, or rather, the lack thereof.  Findings set forth in a resolution “cannot consist of a mere recital of testimony or conclusory statements couched in statutory language. ”  New York SMSA v. Bd. of Adjustment of Tp. of Weehawken, 370 N.J. Super. 319, 332-333 (App. Div. 2004), citing Harrington Glen, Inc. v. Bd. of Adjustment of Leonia, 52 N.J. 22, 28 (1968); Loscalzo v. Pini, 228 N.J. Super. 291, 305 (App. Div.  Instead, “the resolution must contain sufficient findings, based on the proofs submitted, to satisfy a reviewing court that the board has analyzed the applicant’s variance request in accordance with the statute and in light of the municipality’s master plan and zoning ordinances. ”  *Id.* at 333, citing *Medici v. BPR Co.*, 107 N.J. 1, 23 (1987).  If the resolution is lacking these elements, “the reviewing court has no way of knowing the basis for the board’s decision. ”  *Id.*, citing *Morris Cty. Fair Hous. Council v. Boonton Tp.*, 228 N.J. Super. 635, 646 (Law Div.1988).  Here, the [...] Board members made no findings and failed to explain any reasons for their decision on the record contemporaneously with their decision, except by referring to the Hearing Officer’s Report and Recommendations, which itself is devoid of the required findings and instead, relies upon vague overgeneralizations.
[brief] (Pa1-22).  Plaintiffs, [...] and [...] (jointly the “[...]”) objected on several grounds during the Zoning hearing.  Notwithstanding the objections of the [...], The Board granted the [...]’ Application and issued a Resolution of approval for the variance on October 20, 2022.  (Pa87-97).  In the hearing of October 20, 2022 none of the Zoning Board Members acknowledged on the record that they had received the proposed resolution, had reviewed it and after having reviewed it agreed with its findings and conclusions.  Pa40 2T6:5 to 2T7:3.  On November 22, 2022, the [...] filed a Complaint in Lieu of Prerogative Writs (the “Complaint”) in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Gloucester County, Docket No. [...] against the Board and the [...].  (Pa131-144).  The Board and the [...] filed Answers on December 27, 2022 and December 28, 2022.  (Pa145-157 and Pa. 158-166).  On July 24, 2023, the Plaintiffs filed their Trial Brief.  The Defendants filed their briefs on August 7, 2023 and August 8, 2023.  On October 2, 2023, the Trial Court heard --- 1  Plaintiffs’-Appellants’ Appendix is cited as “Pa”.  2  Plaintiffs’-Appellants’ Brief of May 15, 2024 mistakenly used June 30, 2023 as the filing date.  argument from the parties.  On that same date, the Trial Court granted summary judgment in favor of the Defendants and dismissed all counts of the Complaint.  (Pa166-167).  The [...] filed the instant appeal on November 9, 2023.
[brief] ........................................................................................................33  #  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | CASES | PAGE | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | **Gieffels v. State**, 590 P.2d 55 (Alaska 1979) | 30 | | **Katz v. United States**, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) | 21 | | **Minnesota v. Olson**, 495 U.S. 91 (1990) | 24 | | **Miranda v. Arizona**, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) | 6, 12, 27 | | **People v. Barronette**, 507 N.Y.S.2d 73 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986) | 20 | | **Rawlings v. Kentucky**, 448 U.S. 98 (1980) | 20 | | **State v. Brockman**, 494 S.E.2d 440 (S.C. Ct. App. 1997), rev’d, 528 | | | S.E.2d 661 (S.C.), cert. denied, 530 U.S. 1281 (2000) | 30 | | **State v. Carty**, 170 N.J. 632 (2002) | 30 | | **State v. Crumb**, 307 N.J. Super. 204 (App. Div. 1997), certif. denied, 153 N.J. 215 (1998) | 22 | | **State v. Elders**, 192 N.J. 224 (2007) | 22, 23 | | **State v. Evers**, 175 N.J. 355 (2003) | 21 | | **State v. Flowers**, 598 S.E.2d 725 (S.C. Ct. App. 2004) | 24 | | **State v. Fountain**, 534 N.W.2d 859 (S.D. 1995) | 24 | | **State v. Gamble**, 218 N.J. 412 (2014) | 22 | | **State v. Gonzales**, 227 N.J. 77 (2016) | 22 | | **State v. Hagans**, 233 N.J. 30 (2018) | 26, 27, 28, 31 | | **State v. Heisler**, 422 N.J. Super. 399 (App. Div. 2011) | 19 | | **State v. Hinton**, 216 N.J. 211 (2013) | 19 | | **State v. Hladun**, 234 N.J. Super. 518 (Law Div. 1989) | 27 | State v. Johnson, 42 N.J. 146 (1964) ................................................................. 23 State v. King, 44 N.J. 346 (1965) ........................................................................ passim State v. Locurto, 157 N.J. 463 (1999) ................................................................. 23 State v. Miller, 342 N.J. Super. 474 (App. Div. 2001) ........................................... 31 State v. Miranda, 253 N.J. 461 (2023) ............................................................... 22, 25 State v. Randolph, 228 N.J. 566 (2017) .............................................................. 19 State v. S.S., 229 N.J. 360 (2017) ..................................................................... 22 State v. Santana, 215 N.J. Super. 63 (App. Div. 1987) .......................................
[brief] (P610a-P611a).  The Sanctioned Parties maintained that the Sanctions Order should be reconsidered as it was based on the Trial Court’s misapplication of the law, as (1) the existence of a subsequent transaction was not a required element of a cause of action for tortious interference and (2) the Court had failed to provide findings of fact and 6 2T = transcript of November 19, 2021. conclusions of law that explained its basis for finding that, at some undefined point, the claim became frivolous.  (3T 5:22-6:2, 7:11-15). ⁷  In ruling on the reconsideration motion, the Trial Court declined to alter its holding that at “some point” Plaintiffs’ claim for tortious interference became frivolous,⁸ finding “it’s difficult for me to see and the same reason I’ve said in the past, if there was ever a commutable [sic] cause of action for this interference with the prospective economic opportunity or in any event as I said, the transaction never took place.
[brief] Monmouth County Indictment Number [...]........................................Da 1-4  Order of Hon.  [...]  Dated November 5, 2020...............Da 5  Order of Hon. [...]  Dated April 30, 2021...................Da 6  Verdict Sheet.................................................................................................Da 7-9  Order of Hon. [...]  Dated June 20, 2022.................................Da  10  Judgment of Conviction...............................................................................Da 11-14  Notice of Appeal.........................................................................................Da 15-18 | CASES | PAGE NOS. | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------| | Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78 (1935) | 13 | | Dolson v. Anastasia, 55 N.J. 2 (1969) | 44 | | State v. Allah, 170 N.J. 269 (2002) | 44 | | State v. Bauman, 298 N.J. Super. 176 (App. Div.), certif. den., 150 N.J. 25 (1997) | 15 | | State v. Bradshaw, 195 N.J. 493 (2008) | 14 | | State v. Clawans, 38 N.J. 162 (1962) | 26, 28, 29, 30 | | State v. Concepcion, 111 N.J. 373 (1988) | 29 | | State v. Daniels, 182 N.J. 80 (2004) | 17 | | State v. Engel, 99 N.J. 453 (1985) | 18 | | State v. Farrell, 61 N.J. 99 (1972) | 13 | | State v. Frost, 158 N.J. 76 (1999) | 14, 21 | | State v. G.S., 278 N.J. Super 151 (App. Div. 1994), rev'd on other gds, 145 N.J. 460 (1996) | 15 | | State v. Hill, 199 N.J. 545 (2009) | 27, 30 | | State v. Jordan, 147 N.J. 409 (1997) | 17 | | State v. Kluber, 130 N.J. Super. 336 (App. Div. 1974), certif. den., 67 N.J. 72 (1975) | 36 | | State v. Lazo, 209 N.J. 9 (2012) | 14 | | CASES (CONT'D) | PAGE NOS | |-------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------| | State v. Loyal, 164 N.J. 418 (2000) | 44 | | State v. Macon, 57 N.J. 325 (1971) | 17 | | State v. Marshall, 123 N.J. 1 (1991) | 15 | | State v. R.K., 220 N.J. 444 (2015) | 14 | | State v. Ramseur, 106 N.J. 123 (1987) | 13, 15 | | State v. Reddish, 181 N.J. 553 (2004) | 28 | | State v. Ribalta, 277 N.J. Super. 277 (App. Div. 1994), certif. den., 139 N.J.442 (1995)| 15 | | State v. Savage, 172 N.J. 374 (2002) | 28 | | State v. Scherzer, 301 N.J. Super. 363 (App. Div.), certif. den., 151 N.J. 466(1997)| 15 | | State v. Smith, 167 N.J. 158 (2001) | 14 | | State v. Sugar [IV], 240 N.J. Super. 148 (App. Div.), certif. den., 122 N.J. 187(1990)| 37 | | State v. Thornton, 38 N.J. 380 (1962), cert. den. sub nom Thornton v. NewJersey, 374 U.S. 816 (1963)| 21 | | United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564 (1977) | 36 | | TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (CONT'D.) | PAGE NOS | |-------------------------------|----------| | **CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS** | | | U.S. Const. amend. V. | 12, 28, 32 | | U.S. Const. amend. XIV | 12, 28, 32 | | N.J. Const. art. 1, para. 1 | 12, 28, 32 | | N.J. Const. art. 1, para. 10 | 12, 28, 32 | | **STATUTES** | | | N.J.S.A. 2C:5-1 | 1 | | N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2 | 1, 39 | | N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3 | 1 | | N.J.
[brief] The trial court’s decision sets a dangerous precedent that departs from well-settled law by permitting and even encouraging unbridled requests for each and every document in an agency’s possession.  These requests can hardly avoid substantially disrupting agency operations; would require the undoing of two decades of precedent to sustain; and would risk chilling or grinding to a halt government operations.  For all of these reasons, this court should reject the trial court’s attempt to forge new ground and instead reaffirm that a requestor must identify the documents they are seeking with “reasonable clarity” by way of reference to a “discrete and limited subject matter,” and that they cannot resort to a request for all of an agency’s documents to avoid doing so.
[brief] Respondents’ reliance below on the unreported case of Wells Fargo [...] v. NJ Prop. Group, 2020 N.J. Super., Unpub., LEXIS 1130; 2020 WL 3124679 (Pa46), to support their position is misplaced.  T12.8-12.  Contrary to respondents’ position, we contend the facts in Wells Fargo, supra, are distinguishable.  In Wells Fargo, a purchaser who acquired title after the mortgage was discharged of record relied upon the Recording Act, N.J.S. 46:26A-1, et seq., which showed a cancelled mortgage.  The third party changed his position by mortgaging and improving the property.  In Wells Fargo, unlike here, reinstatement of the mortgage would impose extreme hardship on the successor grantee and mortgagee and, therefore, was disallowed.  In stark contrast, the only two parties involved here are the [...] and [...].  No harm would result to anyone if the [...] mortgage was reinstated.  Respondents’ argument below that reinstatement of the mortgage “would set a very dangerous precedent” (T-4.2) and “reek havoc on the real estate industry” (T4-8) is simply not true.  The facts of this matter are unique and will not be a basis for a landslide of future cases.  The sole authority cited by the Court is Atwater v. Underhill, 22 N.J. Eq. 599, 602 (E.& A. 1872) (94a) holding that extinguishment of the underlying debt also extinguishes the mortgage.  Here, Plaintiff alleges that the underlying debt was not extinguished by virtue of the repayment to the [...]ruptcy Trustee.  Therefore, reliance on *Atwater* is inappropriate since the gravaman of Plaintiff’s Complaint is that a portion of the debt is still outstanding.  Although the trial court agreed that Plaintiff “could be right that the reimbursement is appropriate” (T-11.22-23), its written analysis and decision (Pa95-97) were in error in that the court totally ignored all equitable considerations, including the non-existence of other innocent third parties who relied on the cancelled mortgage or who would suffer any detriment if reinstatement was granted.  Moreover, it cited no authority to support its conclusions and its decision was contrary to established case law and other legal authorities as cited supra.
[brief] . . .  Estoppel cannot be applied solely because the parties and claims are intertwined. ”  *Hirsch v. Amper Fin. Servs., LLC*, 215 N.J. 174, 192-93, 71 A.3d 849 (2013) (emphasis added).  What is more, it held that “the doctrine of equitable estoppel does not apply absent proof that a party detrimentally rel[ied] on another party's conduct. ”  *Hirsch*, 215 N.J. at 174 (citing *Knorr v. Smeal*, 178 N.J. 169, 178, 836 A.2d 794 (2003)).  *KPH Healthcare Servs.*, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 196095 at *19-20.  Though [...] argues that it detrimentally relied upon the contract between [...] and [...], [...] has not met its burden of proof to show detrimental reliance—[...]’s Brief cites only to Plaintiff’s Complaint and the trial court’s December 12, 2023 Order.
[brief] Thus, the conclusory dismissal of [...]’ testimony concerning the 2019 Foxdale resolution was arbitrary and capricious.  3.  Factually Unsupported Assumption Concerning Height and Intensity.  The Resolution makes the assumption that height and the intensity of land use have a linear relationship—as height increases, so does the intensity of use.  Ja034.  To reach this conclusion, the Board focuses on testimony that described the operations inside the building; irrelevant to the land use implications of the project, such as setbacks, impervious coverage, parking, and even traffic.  The assumption is unfounded.  The Township’s ordinances for front, side, and rear-yard setbacks are the same for 30 foot buildings in the SM Zone are they are for 75 foot buildings in the GM Zone; parking space and impervious coverage requirements are based on square footage.  No land use requirements are volumetric, so height is indeed irrelevant.  To accept Defendant’s assumption that height and intensity of land use have a linear relationship, one must suspend reality, and ignore the Township’s own identical treatment of the setbacks for the SM and GM Zones, regardless of building height.  The Board incorrectly substitutes “density of capacity” for “intensity of land use. ”  This is simply wrong, and belies the testimony.  The Plaintiff’s witnesses testified that taller buildings allow for more product in a smaller footprint.  (5T 11:20-25; 12:5-10; 47:8-25).  [...] testified, based on the ITE data, that height does not influence traffic for this category of warehouse.  Contrary to its findings, the Board had no evidence that the storage of more product, on a smaller footprint, generates more traffic.  Simply because a structure can store more product in less square footage, does not equate to a more “intense” use inside or outside the four walls.  Different products may “turn over” more, or less, frequently, than others; so simply because a structure can fit more product in a smaller footprint, does not by default equate to a more intense use of the land.  Any assumption of that outcome is pure speculation, unsupported by factual predicate.  The proposed warehouses are for inventory storage, which will have less throughput of products moving in and out of the facility on a daily basis than other types of warehouses.  See, e.g., (2T:1-9; 5T 43:15-20; 47:8-16; 74:2-8).  The Board’s assumption to the contrary is simply wrong.  A close review of the Resolution makes clear that the Board drew several inferences, from which it reached factually unsupported conclusions.  It had no evidence, never mind substantial credible evidence, to do so.  The Resolution’s statement that there is “no credible, probative evidence” to support the requested height variance ignores the record.  Without substantial credible evidence in the record to support the application’s denial, the Board’s Resolution must be deemed arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable.
[brief] Courts faced with whether legislative enactments may be given retroactive effect consider to whether doing so would sweep away settled expectations, impair rights a party possessed when it acted, increase a party’s liability for past conduct, or impose new duties with respect to transactions already completed, Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 280 (1994).  Here, Defendants are not subject to new legal consequences for past events.  New Jersey courts have identified “three circumstances that will justify giving a statute retroactive effect: (1) when the Legislature expresses its intent that the law apply retroactively, either expressly or implicitly; (2) when an amendment is curative; or (3) when the expectations of the parties so warrant.
[brief] She brought suit originally in federal court, but the court in that case dismissed her claims because she lacked standing to sue based on the complete lack of any concrete or particularized injury.  The trial court in this case then dismissed Appellant’s second try at bringing such claims because there is no private right of action under the NJCFLA supporting declaratory or injunctive relief or an FDCPA claim, and because Appellant failed to allege the sale of “merchandise” or “ascertainable loss” necessary to sustain a CFA claim.  The trial court dismissed Appellant’s claims correctly.  As discussed in detail below, New Jersey law simply does not support her claims.  Appellant’s counsel have filed a rash of similar suits against other debt buyers and debt collectors, all with similar results.  In response to certain such cases, the Appellate Division already held that there is no private right of action under the NJCFLA.  This case is not any different.
[brief] Nevertheless, “we acknowledge that ‘correct jury charges are especially critical in guiding deliberations in criminal matters, [and] improper instructions on material issues are presumed to constitute reversible error. ’”  *Funderburg*, 225 N.J. at 84 (alteration in original) (quoting *State v. Jenkins*, 178 N.J. 347, 361 (2004)).  Here, it is uncontroverted that the trial court delivered the model jury charge, Justification of Use of Force Upon an Intruder (N.J.S.A. 2C:3-4c).” (Db42).
[brief] All of these principles show that [...] abused his discretion in denying relief to [...] in the court below, including his ruling that [...]’s “application based on procedural unconscionability was not filed within a reasonable period of time. ” (A257).  [...] erred by failing to apply the “reasonable time” provision of R. 4:50-2 with regard to the “totality of the circumstances of this case” – measured from August 2017, when [...] was the subject of domestic violence and ejected from her home by plaintiff, and in light of the timing of [...]’s own motion to enforce litigant’s right filed that same month (August 2017) – which was the first time either party acknowledged the Final Judgment of Divorce previously filed in this case and then challenged by [...] in her Rule 4:50 motion, cf. Romero v. Gold Star Distribution, LLC, 468 N.J. Super. 274, 297 (App. Div. 2021) (measuring “reasonable time” from when movant “learned of” the facts or evidence upon which motion is based).  In short, if the Court concludes, as we urge, that both the process and result of the Final Judgment of Divorce is unfair and inequitable to [...], relief should not be denied to her on the ground that she waited too long to file for it.
[brief] As in Showalter, defendant _____________________  26  Defendant did not proffer that the proposed witnesses would confirm defendant showed them his business card, but only that they “could potentially be shown the business cards in question or a union card that the [d]efendant also legally possessed, and – and could be asked to jog their memory, ‘Did he show you this. ’” (9T68-5 to 9).  Thus, defendant failed to even evidence the conduct he claimed represented his habit. tendered far too little information to permit the judge to find a habit.
[brief] The New Jersey Supreme Court and this Court have repeatedly held that the language in N.J.S.A. 2A:23A-18(b) essentially bars any review of a Law Division judge’s confirmation of an award under the APDRA.  “We have said that ‘when the trial judge adheres to the statutory grounds in reversing, modifying[,] or correcting an arbitration award, we have no jurisdiction to tamper with the judge's decision or do anything other than recognize that the judge has acted within his jurisdiction. ’”  Monmouth Med. Ctr. v. State Farm Indem. Co., 460 N.J. Super. 582, 590 (App. Div. 2019) (quoting N.J. Citizens Underwriting Reciprocal Exch. v. Kieran Collins, D.C., L.L.C., 399 N.J. Super. 40, 48 (2008)).  The only exceptions to the bar to further review are “rare circumstance[s]” which do not exist here, such as child support orders or “where such appellate review is needed to effectuate a ‘nondelegable, special supervisory function’ of the appellate court. ”  New Jersey Manufacturers Ins. Co. v. Specialty Surgical Ctr. of N. Brunswick, 458 N.J. Super. 63, 68 (App. Div. 2019).  Thus, absent “rare circumstances,” an appellate court has “no jurisdiction to tamper with the [trial] judge's decision or do anything other than recognize that the judge has acted within his[ or her] jurisdiction. ”  Monmouth Med. Ctr., 460 N.J. Super. at 590 (quoting N.J. Citizens Underwriting Reciprocal Exch., 399 N.J. Super. at 48).  Indeed, when “the trial judge act[s] within APDRA's bounds,” “N.J.S.A. 2A:23A-18(b) requires a dismissal of an appeal of that determination regardless of whether we may think the trial judge exercised that jurisdiction imperfectly. ”  Fort Lee Surgery Ctr., Inc. v. Proformance Ins. Co., 412 N.J. Super. 99, 103-04 (App. Div. 2010).  The New Jersey Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of N.J.S.A. 2A:23A-18(b) in Mt. Hope Dev. Associates. v. Mt. Hope Waterpower Project, L.P., 154 N.J. 141, 148-52 (1998).
[brief] However, N.J.R.E. 403 requires a showing that the probative value of the disputed evidence is substantially outweighed by undue prejudice.  N.J.R.E. 403(a).  Only “undue prejudice” will support application of N.J.R.E. 403 to exclude otherwise admissible evidence and only if the undue prejudice “substantially outweighs” the probative value of the evidence.