ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] In addition, we previously rejected a facial challenge to the CJRA on due process grounds in Pretrial Detainees.  245 N.J. at 232.  Defendants argued that prolonged pretrial detention during the pandemic “would render the Act punitive, rather than regulatory. ”  Id. at 230.  The Court disagreed and found “that the pandemic, along with the accompanying suspension of in-person criminal jury trials,” had not “transformed the CJRA’s overall approach to pretrial detention into a punitive scheme. ”  Id. at 232.  defendant’s position here, the Contrary to Court explained that “[w]hether the length of detention violates due process . . . ‘requires case-by-case basis’ because due process is a flexible concept assessment on a that ‘does not necessarily set a bright line limit for length of pretrial confinement.
[directive] J. Richard Hughes Justice Complex- PO Box 037 - Trenton, New Jersey 08625-0037  Subj: Expedited Expungement of ArresUCharge Records Date: May 23, 2016  Page.4  Attachments c: Chief Justice [...] Assignment Judges  Criminal Presiding Judges  Municipal Court Presiding Judges  [...], Chief of Staff AOC Directors and Assistant Directors  [...], Special Assistant [...], Special Assistant Trial Court Administrators  [...], Chief [...], Chief [...], Chief Criminal Division Managers  Municipal Division Managers  Richard J. Hughes Justice Complex - PO Box 037- Trenton, New .Jersey 08625-0037  Instructions and Forms for Expungement of Arrest or Charge Records 2C:52-6 N.J.S.A.
[brief] Defendants never address this determination in their merits brief.  Thus, the trial court’s determination on this equitable estoppel issue should stand, and the remainder of the appeal should be denied as moot.  J.F., 446 N.J. Super. at 42 n.3; Greenfield v. New Jersey Dep't of Corr., 382 N.J. Super. 254, 257-58 (App. Div. 2006) (“An issue is moot when the decision sought in a matter, when rendered, can have no practical effect on the existing controversy. ”) (internal quotation and citation omitted); Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers Local 400 v. Borough of Tinton Falls, 468 N.J. Super. 214, 224 (App. Div. 2021) (“As a general matter, our courts normally will not entertain cases when a controversy no longer exists and the disputed issues have become moot.  An issue is moot when the decision sought in a matter, when rendered, can have no practical effect on the existing controversy. ”) (internal quotations and citations omitted).  III.
[brief] Contrary to defendants’ classification of the award, the amount of $449,798.59 was not an award of attorney’s fees, but an award for damages incurred by plaintiff as a result of defendant's malpractice.  C.  Plaintiff Proved  Defendants’ Malpractice was the Proximate Cause of her Damages  Plaintiff does not dispute that to successfully prove her malpractice claim she needed to show injuries that were the proximate cause of [...]’s breach of his duty.
[brief] Additionally, counsel’s failure to object below can be interpreted to mean that counsel did not consider the error to be significant in the context of the trial.  *Macon, supra*, 57 N.J. at 333.  The Sixth Amendment right to counsel includes the right to effective assistance of counsel.  U.S. CONST. amend. VI; *State v. Norman*, 151 N.J. 5, 23 (1997).
[brief] The February 11, 2022 Certification of [...] Municipal Clerk [...] filed by [...] never addressed any harm in disclosure.  (Da215 to Da217).  During the proceedings below [...] also filed the April 8, 2022 Supplemental Certification of [...], Esq., who at the time was [...] Assistant Counsel for the City of [...], Da057, but that certification only addressed whether [...] physically maintained the responsive records, not the potential harm in disclosure.  Harm was not addressed at all.  (Da057 to Da059).  On June 13, 2022, after Defendant [...] was served with the Trial Court’s order of disclosure on May 26, 2022, Da071, [...] conducted an on-line survey in which over 90 percent of respondents objected to the disclosure of their email addresses that they submitted to [...]’s email notification contractor.
[brief] ”  Plaintiff’s reliance on the August 7, 2013 e-mail and audio recording are insufficient evidence to constitute a “clear indication” that the alleged “Third Loan” was “pay-when-able. ”  The August 7, 2013 e-mail does not reference anything related to a “pay-when-able” term to the alleged “Third Loan. ”  At best, and giving every benefit of the doubt to Plaintiff, that August 7, 2013 e-mail would constitute just an acknowledgment of a “Third Loan,” which would make it a demand note subject to a long-expired six (6) year statute of limitation.  Moreover, the audio recording does not: (i) identify any specific amount; (ii) reference the alleged “Third Loan” in any way; or (iii) contain any indication that the alleged “Third Loan” was a “pay-when-able” loan.  Thus, even if the Court accepts that “pay-when-able loans” are viable in New Jersey, that [...] was credible like the plaintiff in Flynn, and that there was an agreement to pay back allegedly unpaid amounts on April 26, 2013, Plaintiff has still failed to meet his burden that there was a meeting of the minds or a “clear indication” that the alleged “Third Loan” was a “pay-when-able” loan.  See Newfield Fire Co. No. 1 v. Borough of Newfield, 439 N.J. Super. 202, 214 (App. Div. 2015)(A “contract requires a meeting of the minds and mutual assent. ”); Flynn, at *3 (citing Nester v. O'Donnell, 301 N.J. Super. 198, 210 (App.Div.1997)).  There is simply no evidence to support Plaintiff’s claims that [...] agreed that there was a “Third Loan” or the expressed intent to pay back Plaintiff “when he was able. ”  Plaintiff is in effect requesting that this Court create new case law on “pay-when-able” loans on facts less persuasive than the facts in the unpublished case Flynn, the only Appellate Division case that cites this concept.  Accordingly, while Defendants emphatically dispute the existence of a “Third Loan” of any type, at most the “Third Loan” is a demand loan because there is no evidence to support Plaintiff’s claim the “Third Loan” was a “pay-when-able loan. ”  Plaintiff has failed to meet his burden proving that the alleged “Third Loan” was a “pay-when-able” loan, which was the only possible scenario in which his claims would not be dismissed on statute of limitations grounds.  As a result, since Plaintiff has failed to meet his burden that the alleged “Third Loan” was a “pay-when-able” loan, at best the “Third Loan” is a demand loan on which the six year statute of limitations has long expired.  Thus, the Court should dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint with prejudice.
[brief] Trial Testimony Underscores [...]’s Fair and Reasonable Opportunity to Explore All Amounts Due Under the Multiple Agreements Between [...] and [...] at the Hackensack Project (Pa291)  During the First Arbitration, on day 1, [...] testified with respect to the Hackensack Project Completion Subcontract between [...] and [...] and [...]’s awful performance on the Hackensack Project.  Pa241-42 at 121:16- 122:17.  [...]’s now-retired Vice President, [...], testified that although the PTA included an EGP for the Hackensack Project of $1,677,588.00, [...] began to unilaterally decrease the Hackensack EGP without [...]’s agreement, see supra Pa125 & Pa906, explaining that “it’s a job that became monumentally difficult…being significantly delayed in the field,” and [...] wanted to account for reductions based on occurrences out in the field.  Pa241-42, 244 at 121:1-123:17, 130:8-131:8; see also Pa207 ¶¶ 78-80 (seeking an award declaring that [...] “was not obligated to make any further [EGP] Installment Payments on the Hackensack Project due to the unique issues on the project”).  As evidenced above, unpaid change orders (due to, inter alia, “Owner changes”) were an integral part of “the unique issues on the project. ”  On cross-examination, [...] introduced its Hackensack Project Completion Subcontract into evidence, Pa316 at 391:2-14, and made the point that revenue thereunder, and therefore EGP, was “forecasted at zero” based on in-the-field changes.  Pa318 at 397:16-398:3.  In other words, despite the PTA expressly setting an agreed-upon EGP, [...] unilaterally decreased the Hackensack EGP because, as testified by [...], [...] was owed money under the Hackensack Project Completion Subcontract, thus obviating its requirement to pay any more Hackensack EGP.  On day 2 of the trial, a principal from the ownership group at the Hackensack Project, [...], testified extensively regarding the Project.  Mr. Dorne testified with respect to his understanding of [...]’s obligations under the Hackensack Project Completion Subcontract, including [...]’s “multiple delay issues,” and his resulting reluctance to sign off on certain “change orders” related to [...]’s work at the Project.  Pa336-38 at 472:4-473:15, 478:11-24.  The Hackensack Project change orders thus became established, through evidence and testimony, as a key component supporting [...]’s express allegations in its Counterclaim that (i) the Project experienced “unique issues,” (ii) that [...] was “owed $2.1 million” at the Project, and (iii) that “[...] is entitled to an award declaring that [...] is not entitled to any further payments on the Hackensack Project.
[brief] *See infra* and *e.g.*, *In re FDCPA Mailing Vendor Cases*, 551 F. Supp. 3d 57 (E.D.N.Y. 2021); *Quaglia v. NS193, LLC*, 21 C 3252, 2021 WL 7179621 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 12, 2021); *Barclift v. Keystone Credit Services*, 585 F. Supp. 3d 748; *Kelly Jo Nyanjom v. Npas Solutions, LLC*, 2022 WL 168222 (D. Kan. Jan. 19, 2022).  In doing so, many federal courts have expressly cast doubt on the merit of letter vendor claims, even while grounding their dismissal in Article III standing.  *In re FDCPA Mailing Vendor Cases*, 59-62 (bemoaning the use and abuse of the FDCPA lawsuits which manipulate the law for improper and non-salutary purposes and citing cases); *Cavazzini v. MRS Associates*, 574 F. Supp. 3d at 142; *Barclift v. Keystone Credit Servs., Inc.*, at 759; *Quaglia v. NS193, LLC*, 2021 WL 7179621, *3; Nyanjom v. NPAS Solutions, LLC*, 2022 WL 168222, *5.  As such, it cannot be said that there is a meaningful consensus of federal case law upholding the merits of letter vendor claims.  Second, even assuming there was a genuine and effective consensus on the law from all federal courts on this matter (which there is not), as Appellant concedes, such decisions are simply not binding upon this Court.
[brief] Tarr v. Bob Ciasulli's Mack Auto Mall, Inc., 181 N.J. 70 (2004).........................................................................................47  Taylor v. Metzger, 152 N.J. 490 (1998).......................................................................................27, 34-35  Templo Fuente De Vida Corp. v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co., 224 N.J. 189 (2016).........................................................................................10  Tex. Dep't of Cmty. Affs. v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981).......................................................................................13  Victor v. State, 203 N.J. 383 (2010).......................................................................................37  W.H. Indus., Inc. v. Fundicao Balancins, Ltda, 397 N. J. Super. 455 (App. Div. 2008).............................................................48  Wilcher v. Postmaster Gen., 441 F. App'x 879 (3d Cir. 2011)....................................................................22 Williams v. Pemberton Twp. Pub. Sch., 323 N.J. Super. 490 (App. Div. 1999)..............................................................13, 20, 23, 25 Woods-Pirozzi v. Nabisco Foods, 290 N.J. Super. 252 (App. Div. 1996).............................................................27, 34, 36 Young v. Hobart W. Grp., 385 N.J. Super. 448 (App. Div. 2005).............................................................24, 25, 26, 37 Zive v. Stanely Roberts, Inc., 182 N.J. 436 (2005).........................................................................................12, 13 Other Authorities N.J.S.A. § 10:5-12(a) .................................................................................................................. 40 N.J.S.A. § 10:5-12(d) .................................................................................................................. 39, 42 N.J.S.A. § 10:5-12(e) .................................................................................................................. 42, 49
[brief] On February 17, 2022, after merging the conviction for Count II into the conviction for Count I, [...] sentenced defendant to serve the following concurrent prison terms: an extended three-strikes term of life without parole on --- 1  The State adopts the transcript designations as set forth in defendant’s brief.  Count I, first-degree murder, and two ten-year terms of incarceration with five-year periods of parole ineligibility on Counts III and IV.
[brief] Notwithstanding the expressed trepidation, the trial judge nevertheless rejected the defense anyway, holding that “while the tenant was in default or breach, he’s not entitled to fit up costs,” acknowledging that he had “already ruled” on that and that “[n]othing changes my mind about that” (3T15-2 to 3T15-4).  “[W]hen you’re in breach,” the trial judge held, “the landlord does not have to pay the fit up costs.  And I think that’s clearly outlined in the lease documents” (3T17-1 to 3T17-4).  Further contradicting the trial judge’s own comments that he was not really deciding the Tenant’s Allowance issue because he had no jurisdiction to do so is the trial judge’s own prior ruling in 2021 that “[b]ecause the Tenant is in breach of the lease due to nonpayment of five months of rent,” Tenant was “not due any refund” of the “fit up costs,” that Landlord was contractually obligated to pay Tenant under the Lease.
[brief] (Pa26; Pa116).  It drew significant public interest particularly from area residents concerned about the proposed warehouse development’s potential conflict with and adverse impact on their community.  (Pa26; Pa140-Pa145).  As explained, the notice which [...] published and served for the site plan hearing constituted the first occasion which residents had reason to understand the practical effect of Ordinance No. 13-2022 since the notice which preceded Ordinance No. 13-2022’s passage provided no substantive information at all.  (Pa26; Pa89; Pa114-Pa115).  The hearing on [...]’s application was continued to December 1, 2022 in order to accommodate public comment.  (Pa26; Pa116).  In the interim, multiple media outlets including, but not limited to, [...], [...] and [...] featured stories about the tremendous public outcry over [...]’s proposed warehouse development.  (Pa26).  In fact, the planned continuation of the hearing on December 1, 2022 ultimately did not occur because the number residents who appeared to object to [...]’s application exceeded the capacity of the municipal building.  (Pa26; Pa116).  The [...] rescheduled the continuation of the hearing to December 15, 2022 at the larger [...].  (Pa26; Pa116).  In the interim time, the [...] conducted its regularly scheduled bi-monthly meeting on December 5, 2022.  (Pa26).  Although [...]’s application was not on the Committee’s agenda that night, [...], also a member of the [...], publicly announced that he would vote against it.  (Pa27).  The continuation of the hearing on [...]’s application subsequently occurred as scheduled on December 15, 2022 at the [...].  (Pa27; Pa116).  [...] recused himself and did not participate.  (Pa27; Pa116).  Following a public comment period which lasted approximately three-and-a-half hours, the Board voted unanimously to deny [...]’s site plan approval due to traffic concerns.  (Pa27).  The Board subsequently memorialized its decision in a resolution which [...] challenged in separate litigation and which the trial court reversed.\(^4\) (Pa116-Pa147; Pa241-Pa266; Pa267; Pa268-Pa283).
[brief] LEGAL ARGUMENT  I.  THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS SUA SPONTE CONSIDERATION AND RAISING OF THE DISCOVERY RULE TO DETERMINE WHEN THE APPELLANT’S CAUSE OF ACTION ACCRUED, RATHER THAN CORRECTLY APPLY THE EQUITABLE DOCTRINE TO DETERMINE WHETHER THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS SHOULD BE TOLLED.  8  (Not raised below)  II.  THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN RELYING UPON THE DATE OF THE VERDICT RATHER THAN THE JUDGMENT OF ACQUITTAL TO DETERMINE WHEN THE MALICIOUS PROSECUTION CLAIM ACCRUED.  13  (Raised below: Appellant’s Opposition to Respondents’ Motions to Dismiss)
[brief] ”  *President v. Jenkins*, 180 N.J. 550, 563 (2004); see *Sosa*, 458 N.J. Super. at 646-47 (“‘[I]f there is more than one possible interpretation of the language, courts apply the meaning that supports coverage rather than the one that limits it’”), quoting *Flomerfelt v. Cardiello*, 202 N.J. 432, 442 (2010); *Voorhees v. Preferred Mut. Ins. Co.*, 128 N.J. 165, 175 (1992) (holding that, “[w]hen the meaning of a phrase is ambiguous, the ambiguity is resolved in favor of the insured . . . and in line with an insured’s objectively-reasonable expectations (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)’); see also *U.S. v. Pantelidis*, 335 F.3d 226, 235 (3d. Cir. 2003) (“A contract is ambiguous where the contract is susceptible of more than one meaning or if it is subject to reasonable alternative interpretations (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). ”  In the case *sub judice*, when analyzing the ambiguity of the Questionnaire, it was critical for the court to consider not only the language of the Questionnaire but the context in which the insured answered the questions.  Here, [...] was told he would need a separate insurance supplement for the vans.
[directive] See pretrial bearing on the of Supervisors.  Designation 7.8 shall Division of Criminal Justice, Director of the Prosecutor, and the County  Each general or deputy attorneys who supervisor-level assistant prosecutors or more one designate presumption established pursuant to decision to overcome a the approve authorized to shall be Directive. or of this Section 8 7 74 Page Training.  7.9  Advocacy General's Attorney with the cooperation in Justice, Criminal of Division  The shall Jersey, New Association of Prosecutors County with the consultation in and Institute discuss that courses education legal continuing more or one update periodically and develop to relating skills advocacy and procedures, and practices prosecutorial best issues, legal County Every Reform Law.
[brief] Moreover, Defendants have the right to dispute claims made against them and have those disputes resolved by a jury.  *Henker v. Preybylowski*, 216 N.J. Super. at 516.  It is improper, therefore, to attack a defendant for doing so.  *Ibid.*  That, however, is exactly what Plaintiff’s counsel did.  He characterized Defendants’ decision to go to trial as their refusal to “make it right. ”  The remarks were all the more egregious because counsel was aware that the decision to try the case was made by the Defendants’ insurer rather than the Defendants themselves and that any evidence concerning insurance was inadmissible.
[brief] THE DECISION BELOW  The Trial Court decision established by Federal and State statutes as 9 U.S.C. §5 and NJSA 2A:23B-11(a) its statutory authority to appoint arbitrators to fill a vacancy or if an arbitrator fails or is unable to act and a successor has not been appointed.  The Court noted that after the passing of two years and nine rejections, the parties themselves were unable to agree on a substituted arbitrator.  It then established an appointment process that allowed each party to submit three names and if a name appeared on both submissions he would be appointed or, if not, the Court would make the choice.  The Court, noting its authority to appoint, proceeded to find that here it was appropriate to do so and in the process serially rejected Defendant’s caselaw submissions by clearly distinguishing those cases both factually and legally.  The Court cited Trade & Transport, Inc. v. Natural Petroleum Charterers, Inc., 931 F2d 191 (2d Cir. 1991) in its decision, which Plaintiffs believe is dispositive on the law and based on the Trial Court’s factual findings which will be discussed below.  The Trial Court adopted the caselaw in New Jersey that when an arbitrator named in an arbitration agreement cannot arbitrate the dispute, here merely damages and fees, having already decided liability, by reason of his death, the Court does not void the agreement but instead appoints an substituted arbitrator.  McGuire, Comwell & Blakely v. Grider, 77 F.Supp.319 (D.Cdo 1991).
[brief] N.J.S.A. 43:16A-7.  To demonstrate compliance with this statute, and as established by the New Jersey Supreme Court, an applicant for AD must demonstrate each of the following five elements: 1.  That he is permanently and totally disabled; 2.  As a direct result of a traumatic event that is a. identifiable as to time and place, b. undesigned and unexpected, and c. caused by a circumstance external to the member (not the result of preexisting disease that is aggravated or accelerated by the work); 3.  That the traumatic event occurred during and as a result of the member’s regular or assigned duties; 4.  That the disability was not the result of the member’s willful negligence; and 5.  That the member is mentally or physically incapacitated from performing his usual or any other duty.
[brief] THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT AGAINST [...] IS VOID AND UNENFORCEABLE  [...] first argues that the trial court correctly ruled that Diana’s Motion to Vacate was not filed within a reasonable time, asserting, *inter alia*, that “where the defendant challenges service, the right to attack a judgment on jurisdictional issues may be waived if not brought within a reasonable time. ”  [...]’s Br. at 17. (citing *Bascom Corp. v. Chase Manhattan Bank*, 363 N.J. Super. 334 (2003); *Wohlegmuth v. 560 Ocean Club*, 302 N.J. Super. 306, 312 (1997); *Berger v. Paterson Veterans Taxi Serv.*, 244 N.J. Super. 200, 204 (1990)).  [...] further argues that the court in *Bascom* “den[ied] the motion to vacate pursuant to Rule 4:50-1 because the motion was not made within a reasonable time and did not establish excusable neglect, even where the challenge was based on jurisdiction. ”  *Ibid.*  However, the facts in *Bascom* render the holding\(^1\) inapposite to the case at bar—*Bascom* did not address defective service of process.  *Wohlegmuth* and *Berger*, on the other hand, provide analysis into an ‘anomaly’ arising from technically defective service of process, which is present here.  The anomaly was first recognized by [...]’s dissent in *Garza v. Paone*, 44 N.J. Super. 553 (App. Div. 1957), “namely the existence of a judgment of record which can neither be set aside nor enforced,” arising from the interplay of the ‘reasonable time’ requirement in *R. 4:50-2* and the United States Supreme Court’s holding in *Peralta v. Heights Med. Ctr., Inc.*, 485 U.S. 80, 108 (1988).
[brief] Rb24.  That statement is a legal argument and it is accompanied by no citation.  Because it is absurd.  Information that is publicly available for review is not somehow “nonpublic” until some sufficient number of people decide to read it.  Numerous cases are to the contrary.  See Ab31–32.  Relator goes on to emphasize that the terms of service agreements in connection with the VRDO Data Sources place supposedly “extreme limitations” on use of the data.
[brief] (Pa000121).  The frivolous litigation claim was based on three documents pertaining to the vacation of Church Lane, the approval of revised plans by the Bridgeton City Planner, [...], and an email from the city engineer approving those changed plans.  (Pa000459-Pa000460 at ¶ 20-21; Pa000121).  The documents were created in 2021.  (Pa000121).  Notably, none of the factual averments or documents referenced in the safe harbor letter refuted an allegation of trespass or denied and/or explained the reason why [...] showed proposed project improvements to Plaintiffs’ property.  Thus, substantial factual inquiries were not addressed in [...]’s letter.  This is evidenced by the trial court decision, wherein the trial court denied [...]’s first motion for summary judgment.