ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] ” (13T 26-12 to 13)  The Court did not consider that this monthly supervision fee adds up to a total of $1,500 over the course of the five years of probation to which [...] was sentenced.  The Court’s failure to consider [...]’s financial means in the context of the probation supervision fee and its failure to articulate any factors on which it based the amount of the fee entails that this Court should vacate the probation supervision fee and remand.
[brief] 34 Kant v. Seton Hall Univ., 2010 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2469 (App. Div. 2010) .........................  27 Kellam Assocs., Inc. v. Angel Projects, LLC, 357 N.J. Super. 1332 (App. Div. 2003)  ..................................................  47 Klein v. Univ. of Med. & Dentistry, 377 N.J. Super. 28 (App. Div. 2005), certif. denied, 185 N.J. 39 (2005)  .... 23 Krouse v. Am. Sterilizer Co., 126 F.3d 494 (3d Cir. 1997) .................................................................. 26, 27 Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Land, 186 N.J. 163 (2006) ..............................................................................
[brief] ” (Ca199-212).  Next, as noted above, attached to the Complaint was an actual photograph Respondent posted to her Facebook page of herself swearing in as a member of the Board.  (Ca222).  Also attached to the Complaint was a comment [...] made below this picture in which she stated – while a sitting Board member – “I was elected onto the central regional district board of education (BOE) come on man LOL” (Ca223-224).  As a result, [...] found in her Initial Decision, as an “UNDISPUTED FINDING OF FACT”:
[brief] [...]’s repeated motions seeking to dismiss this first-filed action  As detailed above, prior to Defendants’ subject motion for reconsideration seeking to escape New Jersey’s jurisdiction on comity grounds, Defendants had previously filed three motions seeking to dismiss or stay this case on the same comity grounds in favor of their second-filed Missouri Action.  (Pa481-96; Pa512-25; Pa756-69).  Defendants’ pre-answer motion to dismiss was denied by [...] on October 18, 2017.  (Pa500-511).  Defendants filed renewed motions to dismiss five years later, on September 21, 2022, including on comity grounds.  (Pa512-25).  Defendants then filed yet another motion on November 2, 2022 alternatively seeking to stay the case on the same comity grounds.  (Pa756-59).  Defendants’ renewed motions to dismiss and to stay were all denied by [...] in orders dated January 20, 2023.  (Pa770-75).  On February 10, 2023, three weeks after [...]’s orders were entered and on the heels of his retirement, Defendants filed their motion for reconsideration before [...].  (Pa078-79).  [...] heard oral argument on May 3, 2023, and on July 24, 2023 granted reconsideration and dismissed the case on comity grounds in favor of the second-filed Missouri Action.  (Pa056-57).
[directive] within prosecutor 48 the to enforcement law by forwarded be shall reports investigative shall reports investigative available "all issued acomplaint-warrant is when that provides it And complaint." of the upon issuance immediately prosecutor the to enforcement law by forwarded be 54 Page for Police. Materials Instructional and Program Training 4.14 Association Prosecutors County with cooperation the in Criminal Justice, of Division The within shall of Police, of Chiefs Association Jersey New the and Police, State the Jersey, of New made officers, for police program training a develop Directive of this issuance the of days 60 the explain to feasible, if means electronic other or by system Learn NJ the through available they as Directive this of requirements the and Law Reform Bail the under established policies of issuance the of within days 60 shall also Division The officers. and agencies police to pertain concisely that officers police dissemination to for instruction card an prepare Directive this The officers. and agencies to police pertain that Directive this of features key the summarizes State the Jersey, of Association New Prosecutors County the with cooperation in Division, training special a develop Police, may of Chiefs of Association Jersey New the and Police, 3.3.2. subsection to pursuant designated officers supervisory for program this of issuance upon immediately operational become shall Section amended This law ODARA by the of administration ODARA the (i.e., the of implementation Actual Directive. in decision-making frame to ODARA scores of utilization the and officers enforcement law all which point at 1, 2017, November on begin shall Directive) this with accordance in forth training set as received will have Offices Prosecutors' County and agencies enforcement subsection 4.6.9.
[brief] As part of her job as the Admin Officer, she forwarded an email to [...] and asked him if he could get back to [...] (1T; 29:15).  The emails got a little heated between Guidi and Plaintiff (1T; 29:1).  As a result of those emails, Guidi went into the office of [...] (1T; 29:33).  Guidi opened the door and screamed at Plaintiff to come into the office saying, “[...], get in here” (1T; 30:1).  Guidi continued to scream, and she told him, “If you continue, I'm going to EEO” (1T; 30:4).  At the same meeting with Harkness, the Plaintiff told him about the treatment by Guidi and also, the complaints by the civilian women (1T; 30:12).
[brief] *Gerba v. Board of Trustees, supra.*, 83 N.J. at 188; *Korelnia v. Board of Trustees, Public Employees Retirement System*, 83 N.J. 162, 170 (1980); *Petruccelli v. Board of Trustees*, 211 N.J. Super. 280, 287 (App. Div. 1986).  As noted by the Supreme Court, the legislative purpose of the “direct result” requirement is to apply a more exacting standard of medical causation, thereby rejecting the workers’ compensation concept that an “accident” can be found in the “impact of ordinary work effort upon a progressive disease.
[brief] See State v. Cummings, 321 N.J. Super. 154, 170 (App. Div. 1999).  Defendant proposes that the State should discover files of criminal proceedings of individuals unrelated or only peripherally related to Defendant’s case, a practical impossibility if employed in PCR cases at large.  Defendant does not come asserting any information that such discovery would have uncovered, noting instead that there could have theoretically been found information that “could have” undercut a witness’s credibility.  Notwithstanding Defendant’s lack of confidence in his own assertion, Defendant is nevertheless accurate; the discovery request was a means of perusing case files to fish for possible claims, not to prove already-made, non-bald assertions meriting the highly unusual remedy of PCR discovery.  As discussed supra, PCR “is not a device for investigating possible claims, but a means for vindicating actual claims.
[brief] ”  Ibid.  The Commission also rejected [...]’s argument that because she was promoted to Sergeant after her major discipline for untruthfulness, that discipline could not be a basis for her removal from the eligible list for promotion to Lieutenant.  Ibid.  Instead, the Commission explained that the decision to promote her to Sergeant in 2018 (prior to Attorney General Directive 2019-6) “was at the appointing authority’s discretion and not relevant to the subject matter as the Commission was not asked to review [[...]]’s background for the Sergeant promotion, and that discretionary decision by the appointing authority did not prohibit or estop it from requesting that the [[...]]’s name be removed from a future list based on the subject major discipline, since the appellant has subsequent adverse history, and a Sheriffs [sic] Officer Lieutenant is a higher title than Sheriffs [sic] Officer Sergeant. ”  Ibid.  The Commission denied [...]’s appeal and upheld [...]’s promotion, while further ordering the removal of [...]’s name from the certification.
[brief] See id.  [...] found that because [...] failed to establish that the Challenger Lot and Baxter Lot originated from the same ¹ By Order and decision dated February 28, 2024, [...], P.J. Ch., entered final judgment in favor of the Respondent against the [...], confirming Respondents’ access rights across the [...]’ property a/k/a the [...] along the existing roadway to access the Challenger Lot. grantor, [...] was not entitled to an easement by necessity (Da105-106).  Addressing [...]’s claim for easement by prescription, [...] found that [...] also failed to offer the Court any evidence that he satisfied the *prima facie* elements to obtain that relief (Da104-105).  [...] then addressed, in *dicta*, whether there could be an easement by express right notwithstanding that [...] never pled the claim (Da106).  That portion of [...]’s decision is telling insofar as it evidences that neither [...] nor the [...] ever placed the operative deeds covering the South Baxter Parcel before the court.  Instead, [...] clearly decided the case using the incomplete and truncated language in the [...]-to-[...] Deed that omitted the clause giving “rights of the public or owners of property lying westerly and southerly of [...] to use a roadway or driftway running thru [the South Baxter Parcel] to reach their properties from [[...].]” (Da106).
[brief] New Jersey has a strong public policy favoring the settlement of litigation.  Zuccarelli v. Dept. of Environmental Protection, 326 N.J. Super. 372, 380 (App. Div. 1999).  See also Jannarone v. W. T. Co., 65 N.J. Super. 472, 476 (App. Div. 1961) (“settlement of litigation ranks high in our public policy. ”).  In recognition of this strong public policy:  [C]ourts will strain to give effect to the terms of a settlement wherever possible.  It follows that any action which would have the effect of vitiating the provisions of a particular settlement agreement and the concomitant effect of undermining public confidence in the settlement process in general, should not be countenanced.  Dep’t. of the Pub. Advocate v. N.J. Board of Pub. Util., 206 N.J. Super. 523, 528 (App. Div. 1985).  Parties may bring a motion to enforce a written settlement agreement in the same action that was settled.  See Hannigan v. Township of Old Bridge, 288 N.J. Super. 313, 320-21 (App. Div. 1996).  A settlement agreement between parties to a lawsuit is a contract like any other contract, Nolan v. Lee Ho, 120 N.J. 465, 472 (1990), as is a lease, both of which must be enforced according to their terms.  Fargo Realty, Inc. v. Harris, 173 N.J. Super. 262, 265-66 (App. Div. 1980); Swisscraft Novelty Co., Inc. v. Alad Realty Corp., 113 N.J. Super. 416, 421 (App. Div. 1971).  The terms to which parties have agreed must be afforded a rational interpretation consistent with the parties’ intentions.  Liqui-Box Corp. v. Estate of Elkman, 238 N.J. Super. 588, 599 (App. Div. 1990).  Courts should not undertake to write a different contract than the parties themselves made.  Kampf v. Franklin Life Ins. Co., 33 N.J. 36, 43 (1960).  Here, [...] breached the Settlement Agreement and Lease by: (i) failing to make the final October 2023 payment [Pa176 at ¶ 17]; (ii) failing to timely vacate the Leased Premises on or before October 31, 2023 [Pa298 at ¶ 4]; (iii) failing to leave the Leased Premises in “broom clean” condition [Pa309 at ¶¶ 4-5]; and by (iv) facilitating unauthorized dumping of unknown materials at the Leased Premises.
[brief] G.  Even If [...] Prevailed in Her Argument That She Was Improperly Removed From The Eligible List, She Would Not Be Entitled To Appointment.  Finally, in this appeal, [...] requests that this Court “order the promotional appointment of Appellant with backpay and retroactive seniority. ”  (Ab35.)  Such relief is not available to her even assuming, arguendo, that she were to prevail on her appeal.  It is well-settled that [w]here a candidate is improperly removed from a list, or an appointing authority fails to consider a candidate as required under the Rule of Three, ‘[t]he appropriate remedy’ is not appointment, but rather a direction to ‘the [Commission] to add appellant’s name to the certified list of eligibles or to order [the Commission] to revive an expired list and add appellant's name. ’”  Foglio, 207 N.J. at 48 (emphasis added) (quoting Nunan v. New Jersey Dep’t of Pers., 244 N.J. Super. 494, 498 (App. Div. 1990)).  Accordingly, even if [...]’s arguments against her list removal had merit, which they do not for the reasons addressed infra, [...] would merely be entitled to be returned to the eligible list and not to the promotional appointment she seeks.  Her appeal must be denied.
[brief] Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 11A:2-6, Administrative agencies have broad discretion to adjudicate disputes.  Greenwood v. State Police Training Ctr., 127 N.J. 500, 513 (1992).  The Civil Service Commission is empowered, in relevant part, to provide for interim remedies or relief in a pending appeal where warranted.  N.J.S.A. 11A:2-6 (emphasis added).  Such powers to award relief include injunctive relief.  See e.g. In the Matter of [...], [...], [...] (granting officer’s petition for enforcement of prior order(s) of the commission to municipality to place officer on paid leave and to schedule departmental hearing).  In the case at bar, Appellant has not pursued the administrative remedies available to them by way of the Civil Service Commission.
[brief] See Cunningham, Control of Land Use in New Jersey, 14 Rutgers L.R. 37 (1959).  The Legislature in 1928 adopted a Zoning Enabling Act, again following the Model Act, broadened in 1930 by the first Planning Act, codified as R.S. 40:55-1 to 21, that allowed for master plans, planning boards, and subdivision procedure.  See generally Pennington Homes v. Planning Bd. of Stanhope, 41 N.J. 578, 583 (1964).  These Acts allowed municipalities to adopt zoning ordinances to classify properties into districts or zones.  See generally Cox & Koenig, New Jersey Zoning and Land Use Administration §1-1; Roselle v. Wright, 21 N.J. 400, 408-410 (1956).  By the early 1930’s, most municipalities had adopted zoning regulations that established limited zoning controls.  In 1953, a new Planning Act was adopted, replacing the earlier Law.  This Act was more sophisticated, establishing for example the two step Preliminary and Final Approval procedure for Subdivisions and Site Plans.  This 1953 Planning Act was in place in 1963 when [...] acquired Lot 8 and constructed its Synagogue.
[brief] (5T, at 9-10).  See, e.g., JMD Holding, 828 N.E.2d at 613 (promise to pay another's fees in indemnification agreement “must be exclusively or unequivocally referable to claims between parties on the contract rather than claims of third parties”); Oscar Gruss & Son, Inc., 337 F.3d at 200 (2d Cir. 2003) (“Examining the parenthetical language in light of the surrounding provisions, it can apply only to a situation where [...] refuses to indemnify [...] from a third party action and not to an action commenced by [...] against [...]”); Bourne Co.
[brief] I DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO BAR EVIDENCE OF THE THIRTY-YEAR-OLD ACME LEASE SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED AS A MATTER OF LAW (Da108)  A.  The Law of New Jersey and the text of the Appraisal Institute both agree that an Appraisal for a condemnation taking of fee simple estate cannot be lower than as valued by “Market Rent” when using the income capitalization approach.  The taking in this case is the fee simple estate free and clear of the remaining leaseholders as of the date of taking all of whom were named as defendants.  The title that the plaintiff will ultimately convey to the redevelopers is the title taken in this case, the fee simple estate free and clear of any leasehold interests.  The designation of a date of valuation of January 27, 1994 pursuant to the intent and purpose of N.J.S.A. 20: 3-30 (d), does not change the fact that the “property” taken, for which “just compensation” must be paid is the fee simple estate.  There is just one award, in obedience to the constitutional and statutory requirements which must constitute the summation of all the values of the separate interests of the property.  State v. Hudson Circle Service Center, Inc., 46 N.J. Super. 125, 131(App. Div. 1957)  Merchantville v. Malik & Son, LLC, 429 N.J. Super. 416, 427(App.Div.2013).  The award in this case must include any separate interest such as the leasehold interest of the [...] that was actually terminated in 1999.  The trial judge did not seem to grasp the point of law defendants were arguing on the motion to bar evidence of the [...] contract in [...]’s calculation of gross income in the income approach.
[brief] [Pa 20].  In an unpublished opinion, the Appellate Division reversed dismissal of the claims for negligence against [...] and [...].  [Pa7-38].  In particular, the panel determined there were genuine issues of material fact as to whether 1) [...] intentionally assaulted [...]; 2) [...] acted within the scope of his employment with [...]; and 3) whether the incident was caused by [...] failure to properly train and supervise [...].  [Pa25-31].  Plaintiffs’ claims for negligence against [...], and claims against [...] for negligent hiring, training and supervision and respondeat superior were reinstated and the case was remanded back to the trial court.
[brief] Recently, in *Lapsley v. [...]*, 249 N.J. 427 (2022), the New Jersey Supreme Court analyzed the premises rule in determining if an accident arises out of and in the course of employment.  In *Lapsley*, plaintiff was employed as a librarian for the [...] at the [...].  The library was located in a municipal complex with athletic fields, offices and three common-use parking lots, which are open to Township employees and the general public alike.  The Township did not direct employees to park in the parking lots, assign parking spaces for employees, or require permit or paid parking.  Nor did the Township restrict employees’ manner of traveling between the parking lots and the library.  The Township owned and maintained the parking lots.  On the day of her accident, plaintiff closed the library early because of a snowstorm.  Plaintiff’s husband drove to the library to pick up his wife.  The husband parked his vehicle in a parking lot adjacent to the library and went inside.  After plaintiff and her husband walked approximately eighteen feet into the parking lot, plaintiff was struck by a snowplow owned by the Township and operated by [...], a Township employee.  Plaintiff filed a personal injury complaint in the Law Division against the Township, the library, [...] and the [...].  Defendants all filed a motion to dismiss in lieu of an answer, arguing they all had immunity because plaintiff’s claims were barred by the Workers’ Compensation Act.  Plaintiff then filed a summary judgment motion, arguing that her accident and injuries were not compensable under the Workers’ Compensation Act.  Defendants then filed a cross-motion to stay the Law Division matter and transfer the case to the workers’ compensation court for determination of compensability.  After the matter was transferred, the [...] ultimately ruled that plaintiff’s injuries arose out of and in the course of her employment, and were, therefore, compensable under the Workers’ Compensation Act.
[brief] Pa128.  His Registration Form notes that he was present at Ground Zero/WTC on 9/15/01 for 10 hours.  Pa128.  In response to his filing, [...] received correspondence from the Division of Pensions requesting medical information.  Pa130.  [...] contacted Pensions on November 18, 2019, and was advised that the Ricci Act “is for those who are currently sick.  Not for possible future illnesses. ”  Pa130.  It is unknown at this time how many other Troopers Eligibility Registration Forms may have not been filed or how many Troopers were not registered because the member was not ill at the time the forms were sent.
[brief] See Borough of Harvey Cedars v. Karan, 214 N.J. 384, 413 (2013).  [...] further claims that Plaintiffs asserted a new argument during the motion for reconsideration, specifically, whether or not consent provided by Plaintiffs for certain entries was "informed consent."  At every stage of the proceeding, Plaintiffs argued that the Defendants had failed to adequately inform the Plaintiffs of the scope of the ASDS being installed on Plaintiffs' property, and that consent was obtained under threat that Plaintiffs' business would be shut down [...] did not consent.  This statement contradicts the record, and more importantly, is entirely irrelevant to the pending appeal.
[brief] We further submit that the penal consequences must attach to a 20-year license suspension and, accordingly, trial courts must be required to establish on the record that a pleading defendant is aware of any such loss of license for that 20-year period is part of the sentence to be imposed. \(^7\)  The colloquy that took place between the sentencing court and the defendant in this matter revealed that the defendant had no \(^7\) State v. Kovack, 91 N.J. 476, 483 (1982).  contemplation that there would be a 20 year loss of license to his sentence. \(^8\)  Defendant received, unbeknownst to him, a sentence to a 20 year loss of license. \(^9\)  Because the imposition of the 20 year loss of license was "manifestly beyond" the defendant's contemplation (20 years, instead of 10 years),\(^10\) the court failed to make certain that the defendant was made aware of the penal consequences of his plea of guilty would result in a 20 year loss of license \textit{which was} a material component of his sentence." \(^11\)  The record is “abundantly clear” that [...] had no such understanding and, consequently, the sentence must be vacated. \(^12\)  Accordingly, this matter must be remanded to the trial court and defendant must be given the option to (1) renegotiate the plea agreement, or (2) withdraw his guilty plea and proceed to trial.
[directive] Institutional Wages $ $ Other Assets Income From Rental Properties $ $ TOTAL MONTHLY INCOME  TOTAL ASSETS $ $ Rent Mortgage Loan Balances $ $ Mortgage Vehicle Loan Balances $ $  Property Taxes Support Arrearage $ $ I  Child Support/ Alimony / Medical Dental Hospital Debts DYES D $ PAID PROBATION THROUGH DEPT.  Attorney Fees  NO $ $ & Vehicle Loans  Insurance Fines Owed to Other Courts $ $ Household Utilities  Credit Card Balances $ $ Other Household Expenses  Civil Judgments Owed $ $ & Other Loans Expenses  Other Debts and Expenses $ $  TOTAL MONTHLY PAYMENTS  TOTAL DEBTS FINANCIAL COMMENTS INCLUDING DEFENDANTS REPORTED
[brief] Petitioner received an 18-year sentence with an 85% parole disqualifier for the robbery.  (19T 4-8)  The trial court merged the assault, possession with an unlawful purpose, and conspiracy into the robbery, but imposed a consecutive eight-year sentence with a four-year period of parole ineligibility for the possession of a weapon and a consecutive one-year sentence for taking the car.  (19T 40-4 to 40-10)  In imposing a consecutive sentence for the possession of a weapon, the trial court merely stated that "[t]he elements of this [of]fense are separate and distinct from the charge of armed robbery, and there can be no free crimes."  (19T 39-13 to 15)  The trial court also sentenced petitioner to a consecutive sentence for taking a motor vehicle without consent because, according to the trial court, it was a "separate and distinct crime."  (19T 40-12 to 14).  In regard to the Gola robbery, petitioner was convicted of burglary, possession of a weapon with an unlawful purpose, conspiracy to commit robbery and/or burglary, and three kidnapping charges, one each for [...] and two of his children.
[brief] TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS, AND RULINGS BEING APPEALED  June 20, 2024  Transcript of Motion to Compel Arbitration………………1T38:16-51:8  June 25, 2024  Order of the New Jersey Superior Court, Chancery Division, Bergen County, Compelling Arbitration …………………Da1  July 14, 2024  Amended Order of the New Jersey Superior Court, Chancery Division, Bergen County, Compelling Arbitration ……………………Da2