ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
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[directive] Section (b) – Second degree: if, in addition to acts committed under subsection a, actor places or 3rd $10,000 to $50,000  10%  Permitted causes to be placed any false or facsimile bomb in a building, place of assembly or facility or public Degree transport or in a place likely to cause public inconvenience or alarm: first degree if it occurs during a declared period of national, state, or county emergency.
[brief] ”  First, the trial court’s evidentiary rulings admitting into evidence the testimony of the plaintiff’s prior history of neuropathy and gait and balance issues and evidence of the plaintiff’s prior history of falls to impeach the credibility of the plaintiff and the plaintiff’s witnesses was well within the discretion of the trial court.  (1T12:9-14; 1T173:24-174:1T174:4-16; 1T175:16-176:8; 1T177:6-14; 2T29:4-23; 2T33:23-34:2).  As shown below, the testimony of the plaintiff and the plaintiff’s witnesses created credibility issues and established a proper foundation for the admission of evidence of the plaintiff’s prior medical conditions and falls and use of a handicapped placard.  Second, as the trial court properly recognized, where evidence of the plaintiff’s prior medical conditions, prior falls and use of a handicapped placard was used by the defendant for purposes of rebutting the plaintiff’s claims of causation for her fall and not the cause of her injuries, expert testimony was not required to introduce this evidence.
[brief] Worries about the exception swallowing the CFA rule in a case about home inspectors does not mean that the entirety of *Plemmons* was overruled or superseded, as the trial court here correctly recognized.  The Hon. [...], P.J.A.D.’s concurring opinion in *Shaw* specifically preserved the exception for insurance professionals.  As His Honor observed, “the licensure requirements for insurance brokers – and their associated fiduciary duties – appear to me to be more stringent than those governing home inspectors. ”  *Id.* at 628.  This Court did not eliminate the application of the exemption to insurance brokers and other semi-professionals based on the nature of the services they provide, nor could it given the Supreme Court and other courts’ repeated reliance on *Neveroski*:
[brief] 6T153:24-154:6.  As [...] explained it, by the divorce being pushed through so quickly, [...] lost leverage:  [Leverage].  That's what I'm talking about in the period of time from when [...] first meets [...] and they become engaged in the -- in their representation, and between that time and the divorce.  During that period of time, that's when you have the right to take that discovery.  That's when you have the right to take the deposition of a party.  That's when you have the right to take depositions of third parties.  That's when I can send out those third-party subpoenas.  That's when I can get all of my information that I need to effectively and adequately represent my client and find out what's out there.  Once you're divorced, you lose that opportunity…So during that period of time, that’s when she could have cut the best deal she could – she could have.  6T154:22-155:19.  By failing to properly utilize the leverage [...] had before the divorce was entered, [...] cost [...] dearly in her ability to collect the assets that were rightfully hers and in the legal fees she had to incur to correct his mistakes.  This is especially true considering [...]’s knowledge that [...] was mostly residing in China (2T158:17-20; 2T159:11-20) and that it is impossible to enforce an American judgment in China (7T145:18-146:2).  In 2009, [...] would have had to satisfy [...]’s financial requests if he was going to secure the divorce he so desperately desired.  The *de bene esse* deposition of defendants’ expert [...], which was actually introduced by plaintiff, identified the various ways [...] could have protected [...]’s interests prior to the divorce being entered.  10T26:5-21.  Instead of taking any steps to protect [...]’s interests, [...]’s representation of [...] essentially let [...] off scot-free.  Based on the verdict, the proximate cause between defendants’ conduct and [...]’s damages was evident to the jury.  Accordingly, there is no reason to disturb the jury verdict and the amended final judgment should stand.  **POINT III**
[brief] Here, in stark contrast to the established standards, the trial court afforded Respondent, rather than Petitioner, all favorable inferences and overlooked or undervalued crucial evidence to the extent that a miscarriage of justice was created.  Respondent contends that the Petitioner was not afforded any favorable inferences because the Court found that the Petitioner was not credible.  Db at 43.  Yet, there were witnesses other than Petitioner who provided testimony from which inferences favorable to the Petitioner should have been afforded.  In her Opposition to Petitioner’s motion, the Respondent now asks, how exactly did the trial court “cherry pick” the evidence.  The Petitioner does not say. ”  Respondent overlooks 10 pages of Petitioner’s Brief in Support of Appeal that outlined the evidence that the Court overlooked.  See Petitioner’s Brief in Support of Appeal at pgs. 20-30.  The crucial evidence that the Court overlooked or disregarded includes the following:
[brief] In arguing that [...] had a reasonable, articulable suspicion sufficient to effect a stop of Appellant on the morning of November 5, 2019, Respondent admits that when [...] approached Appellant’s vehicle, he “observed that the interior lights were on,” which, in [...]’s experience “meant that the key was in the vehicle’s ignition. ” (Resp. Brief at 16).  Respondent’s argument ignores that [...] also testified that, in his experience, this fact meant that Appellant’s vehicle “was or could be operated. ” (2T9:2-15). ¹  This point, which Respondent’s brief wholly fails to address, is crucial to the issue now before this Court.  If [...] ¹ References to the February 27, 2020 transcript of adjournment follow the form 1T__-__.  References herein to the February 25, 2022 probable cause hearing before the Denville Municipal Court follow the form 2T__-__.  References to the April 29, 2022 trial before the Denville Municipal Court follow the form 3T__-__.  References to the May 27, 2022 transcript of the decision of the Honorable [...] J.S.C. in the matter of [...], Docket No. [...], follow the form 4T__-__.
[brief] N.J.A.C. 17:2-3.9.  The undisputed fact is that [...]’s last pension contribution was made during the pay period “#22” of 2021 (covering the pay period of October 9, 2021, through October 22, 2021).  (Pa43; Pa72).  As such, she established nine years and ten months of PERS service credit at the time of her retirement.  Ibid.  Accordingly, she lacks the required ten years of service credit to receive group life insurance benefits.  The Board’s recalculation of her service credit and denial of group life insurance benefits is an issue of eligibility, which is not entitled to be liberally construed.  Accordingly, [...] cannot benefit from a liberal construction of the Correction of Errors statute, N.J.S.A. 43:15A-54, as she simply is not eligible for group life insurance benefits.  [...] also makes equity arguments and contends that she was placed in a “catch-22” situation – she detrimentally relied on the Board’s quotation letter which was issued based upon the information from her employer and she was later denied the opportunity to establish the required ten years of service credit by purchasing service after her retirement benefits had become due and payable.
[brief] PRELIMINARY STATEMENT  In this Appeal, the Appellant-Plaintiff, [...] (herein referred to as the “Appellant-Plaintiff”) challenges two Law Division Orders.  The first Order was an entry of Summary Judgment dismissing the matter with prejudice against the Respondent-Defendant [...] (herein referred to as the “Respondent-Defendant”).  The second Order was a denial of a Motion for Reconsideration and affirming the first Order.
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[brief] On February 10, 2023, police were surveilling a neighborhood in [...] that testifying officers characterized as a high-crime area.  (1T 9-2 to 12)  The surveillance team included sixteen officers, many in plainclothes and unmarked vehicles, as well as a police-operated drone called the unmanned aerial system, which displays a live video feed to its operator.  (1T 9-13 to 18, 15-24 to 16-6, 17-20 to 19-4)  Throughout the afternoon, the drone operators and the officers on the ground were in close communication, relaying and corroborating each other’s observations.  (1T 18-22 to 19-4)  [...], who testified at the hearing, was operating the drone and began tracking [...]—the officers recognized Little because he had been previously arrested and convicted for numerous narcotics offenses in [...].
[directive] Distribution of 2C:36-6a analog or sells, furnishes or gives to any person such syringe, needle or instrument.  (It is not Disorderly Persons  $500 to $1,000 10% permissible  Hypodermic unlawful to possess such items if obtained by a valid prescription issued by a licensed Syringe or Needle physician, dentist or veterinarian and it is used for its authorized purpose.)
[brief] So then they also had discussions with residents and staff, right?  A  That's what it says.  Q  Okay.  Well, it also says a review of medical records, right?  A  Yeah, I mean, keep in mind these are form letters, but yes, ma'am.  So, everyone I look at says the same thing.  So, I'm assuming they did that, but they could have used the same form letter for all I know.  Q  What do you mean for all you know?  You have a letter in front of you that the [...] sent to [...] saying that they did these things.
[brief] THIS COURT SHOULD AFFIRM THE TRIAL COURT’S SUPPRESSION OF EVIDENCE BECAUSE THE TRIAL COURT APPLIED UNDISPUTED FACTS TO WELL-ESTABLISHED LAW AND CORRECTLY RULED THAT THE WARRANT AUTHORIZING THE SEARCH OF MR. WILLIAMS’S HOME, CAR, AND PERSON WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY PROBABLE CAUSE.  (1T:3-25 to 6-19, 11-4 to 25-25)  This Court should affirm the trial court’s suppression of evidence found as the result of the search of [...]’s home and car because the trial court applied the undisputed facts set forth in the warrant affidavit to well-established search-and-seizure law, correctly concluding that the affidavit did not establish probable cause to search [...]’s home and car.  The court accordingly correctly suppressed the evidence.  In its attempt to call into question the trial court’s determination that the affidavit did not establish probable cause to search [...]’s home, car, and person, the State makes the following related arguments: (1) the motion court did not give sufficient deference to the probable cause determination made by the warrant judge (Sb 8-10), and (2) the court erred in finding a lack of probable cause to search because the warrant affiant’s observations corroborated information from a confidential informant, and the affiant drew conclusions based on his training and experience.
[brief] To avoid the conclusion that its analysis of publicly disclosed transactions is not “based upon” those transactions, Relator has attempted to confuse the legal standards, largely by focusing on cases dealing with the public disclosure of allegations, rather than of transactions.  None of the misleading arguments Relator has previously advanced create a dispute of material fact that warrants \(^{13}\)  See Ja1984 (Compl. ¶ 2), Ja1989 (¶ 26), Ja1991 (¶ 36), Ja1996–98 (¶¶ 62, 68); Ja9 (4AC ¶ 2), Ja15–16 (¶ 30), Ja62 (¶ 164), Ja90 (¶ 231), Ja93 (¶ 239).  \(^{14}\)  See Ja2173 (¶¶ 194–97).  \(^{15}\)  Ja1559–62 (¶¶ 3–4, 10, 12); Ja2098–100 (¶¶ 9, 11), Ja2104 (¶ 19), Ja2108–10 (¶¶ 25, 27); Ja4272–73 ([...] Cert. ¶¶ 17, 19–20).  denying summary judgment for Defendants.
[brief] (24T168-13 to 17)  [...] knew [...] from having previously arrested him for narcotics and possession of a handgun and described at trial him “as a mid to higher level narcotics dealer. ”  (24T168-21 to 169-6; 26T5-10)  The victim was identified as [...], who had been part of a narcotics surveillance investigation conducted by the [...] and the [...].
[directive] Notice of ALPR Policies and Revisions Provided to County Prosecutors or the Division of Criminal Justice  The chief of the department shall provide a copy of the agency’s written ALPR policy to the County Prosecutor, or to the Division of Criminal Justice in the case of a state-level agency, at or before the time of promulgation, and shall provide to the County Prosecutor, or to the Division, copies of any amendments or revisions to the agency’s ALPR policy at or before the time that such amendments take effect.  -15-  15.  ALPR PROGRAM ACCOUNTABILITY  15.1
[brief] *State v. Brunson*, 132 N.J. 377, 394 (1993).  When a defendant has multiple prior convictions, some of which are similar to the charged offense and some of which are dissimilar, the State may introduce evidence only of the date and degree of crime of all of the defendant's prior convictions, but cannot specify the nature of the offenses.  *Id.*  Alternatively, the State may introduce without limitation evidence of only the dissimilar convictions.  *Id.*  The Supreme Court recently considered the analysis for older convictions in *State v. Higgs*, 253 N.J. 333 (2023).
[brief] In assessing factor (1), the temporal proximity, the Shaw Court noted it was “the least determinative” of the three factors because the impact of “the passage of time . . . oftentimes is ambiguous. ”  213 N.J. at 416.  The Court thus concluded it was at best neutral in Shaw because lengthier detentions could actually be more intrusive than a more immediate seizure.  Id. at 416–17.  Similarly, it is at best neutral here where although police learned of defendant being a suspended driver fairly soon after the stop, nothing in the record suggests a longer delay would have made much difference in the attenuation calculus.
[brief] (2T:55-4 to 57-14)  “To address the special concerns when a juvenile is brought into custody, police officers should advise the juveniles of their Miranda rights in the presence of a parent or guardian before the police question, or a parent speaks with, the juvenile. ”  State in the Interest of A.A. 240 N.J. 341 (2020).  Officers should give the guardian an opportunity to consult with the juvenile in private.  Id.  Here, [...] was never given an opportunity to consult with his guardian in private.
[brief] LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT ONE THE COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW BY NOT FINDING THAT PLAINTIFF ESTABLISHED THAT HE WAS WRONGFULLY ARRESTED FALSELY IMPRISONED, SUBJECTED TO ASSAULT AND BATTERY AND EXCESSIVE FORCE AS WELL AS MALICIOUS PROSECUTION (Pa22-Pa23; Pa53-Pa54; Pa093, Pa094-Pa096; Pa30-Pa31; Pa561; Pa588; Pa621; Pa29; Pa041; Pa533; Pa534)  An arrest without probable cause is a constitutional violation actionable under 42 USC§ 1983.
[brief] Moreover, the date of his deposition, October 14, 2022, was less than six weeks after [...] completed his \(^4\)Alprazolam is a benzodiazepine that is sometimes sold as a prescription pharmaceutical under the brand name Xanax.  four-year probation sentence.  Da104.  The notion that [...] could not recall a four-year-old conviction for which he served four years of probation that ended only weeks before his deposition is absurd.  Mr. [...] misrepresented the facts about his conviction, and presumably about being clean for 10 years, while under oath at his deposition.  He most certainly knew he had a recent conviction for possession of drugs with intent to distribute and that he was sentenced to four years of probation – which included random drug testing and a drug and alcohol evaluation – but he lied about it at its deposition.
[brief] The “polestar of contract construction is to find the intention of the parties as revealed by the language used by them. ”  *Homann v. Torchinsky*, 296 N.J. Super. 326, 334 (App. Div. 1997).  Like any contract subject to New Jersey law, the Genesis Deed “must be construed in the context of the circumstances under which it was entered into and it must be accorded a rational meaning in keeping with the express generally purpose. ”  *Tessmar v. Grosner*, 23 N.J. 193, 201 (1957).  “Generally, in the context of restrictive covenants, a rule of strict construction should be applied to the provisions, unless such a rule would defeat the obvious purpose of the restrictions. ”  *Homann*, 296 N.J. Super. at 334.  “In such a case, ‘[t]he precise form of a covenant is of little consequence if the intent is reasonably clear, and its apparent purpose should not be defeated by a technical construction of the language used. ’”  *Id.* (quoting *Murphy v. Trapani*, 255 N.J. Super. 65, 72 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 130 N.J. 17 (1992)).  Here, the trial court concluded that the Genesis Deed failed to put the Property’s successors-in-interest on notice that the Property was subject to restrictions that can be “modified, added to, supplement[ed]” or “under the control of an entity. ”  1T47:1-23.  The trial court supported this conclusion by finding as fact that, at the time of the Genesis Deed’s initial conveyance, there “was no entity formed at that time where you would have . . . a homeowners association that was part of . . . that whole development scheme” complete with a master deed and bylaws that “gave the right of the association to modify the rules, regulations.
[brief] **CONCLUSION**  For the reasons set forth herein, Appellants respectfully request this Court reverse the trial court’s Order.  Respectfully submitted, [...]  By __/s/ [...]_____________________  [...]  [...]  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY  Appellate Division  Docket No. [...]  [...] and [...], Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. [...], [...], [...] and [...], Defendants-Respondents.
[brief] Defendant’s arguments to the contrary seem to be based on two major points.  First, the judge erred in relying on previous findings made by the original sentencing judge as to the Yarbough factors and aggravating and mitigating factors, findings affirmed by this Court on direct appeal.  And second, that the judge gave insufficient weight to certain Miller factors and so should have arrived at a lower number, indeed the lowest number, permissible by law.  Both of these arguments fail for a number of reasons.
[brief] ”  State v. L.H., 239 N.J. 22, 44 (2019).  “Telling suspects that confessing ‘could not hurt’ and ‘could only help” contradicts *Miranda* and can render a statement involuntary.  *State v. O.D.A.-C.*, 250 N.J. 408, 423 (2022) (citing *State v. Puryear*, 441 N.J. Super. 280 (App. Div. 2015); *State ex rel. A.S.*, 203 N.J. 131, 140, 151 (2010)).
[brief] C.  Since The Ordinance Approving The Second Amendment To The Redevelopment Plan Was Not Substantially Inconsistent With The Borough’s Master Plan, There Was No Requirement For The Borough Council To Follow The Statutory Procedures Necessary To Adopt An Inconsistent Ordinance  In Count Two of its Complaint, the Plaintiff contends that Ordinance 1667 should be invalidated because the Borough did not follow the statutory steps necessary to adopt an ordinance that is substantially inconsistent with its master plan.  The flaw in this argument is self-evident.  This claim is premised upon the assumption that the Second Amendment to the Redevelopment Plan is not substantially consistent with the municipal master plan and is not designed to effectuate the master plan.  Since the Second Amendment to the Redevelopment is substantially consistent with the municipal master plan and is designed to effectuate the master plan, there was no need for the Borough to follow the process set forth within the statute to adopt a zoning ordinance which is inconsistent with the master plan.  The Trial Court recognized this in its Statement of Reasons, concluding that Count Two of the Plaintiff’s Complaint was without merit and should be dismissed (Pa1747).  As this decision was supported by the record, it should be affirmed on appeal.  D.
[brief] This civil case involves joint defendants who are being sued by [...] and have determined to mount a joint defense by retaining the same counsel to represent them.  Pa319-20 ¶¶ 3-4; Pa322 ¶¶ 3-4.  [...] and [...] have each certified to their aligned interests and their desire to proceed with a unified defense.  Pa319-21; Pa322-24.  They each also certified to the requisite requirements and understandings concerning a third-party payor situation.
[brief] (Pa 157.)  According to the public hearing notice published in The Progress, Ordinance 1423-21 included a provision referring the ordinance to the Planning Board for review.  (Id.)  The legal ad did not, however, include a summary of the proposed redevelopment plan amendments and did not inform the public as to how to obtain a copy of the amendments, leaving the public ignorant as to their nature and scope.  (Id.)  The Borough also published an OPMA notice for the December 14, 2021, special meeting of the Council in the Star-Ledger on November 30, 2021.
[directive] 26.  Would you have any difficulty or reluctance in accepting the law as explained by the Court and applying it to the facts regardless of your personal beliefs about what the law should be or is?  27, Is there anything about this case, based on what I’ve told you that would interfere with your ability to be fair and impartial?  28.  The purpose of questioning you as prospective members of the jury is to select a jury which will be fair and impartial.
[brief] [...] rests his claim to the Strip on his rights pursuant to the New Jersey Recording Statute, N.J.S.A. 46:26A-1 to -12 (the “Act”).  But [...] took title to his property in 1991 on notice that there was a possible cloud on the title to the Strip.  A 1991 survey commissioned in connection with [...]’s purchase of his property clearly showed the Strip as a disputed area.  [...] admitted that before he purchased the property, he was aware that [...] was using the Strip for parking.  And [...]’s title insurer also refused to insure the Strip.  That clear indicia of a cloud on the title to [...]’s property placed [...] on notice of [...]’s claim to the Strip, which obligated [...] to inquire further about who actually owned the Strip when he purchased the property and today negates [...]’s reliance on the Act.