ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The [...] adopted an ordinance that permitted submission of applications to construct thirty-four residential units.  Rocky Hill, 406 N.J. Super. at 389-91.  The proposed development generated considerable interest from a group of citizens who lived adjacent to the project and claimed the project’s nature and size demonstrated a “lack of respect for the Borough’s historic character. ”  Id. at 395.  The group filed an untimely action in lieu of prerogative writs challenging both site plan approval for the development and the adoption of the underlying ordinance.  Id. at 396-97.  The plaintiffs argued for enlargement of the forty-five day filing period, citing public interest grounds because the project threatened to undermine the “efficacy” of the town’s historic character, and because “the gravity of the public interest [in the ordinance was] evidenced by” the number and diversity of the plaintiffs and large turnout at public hearings.  Id. at 398-99.  The Rocky Hill plaintiffs also attempted to fall within the confines of Willoughby to state “important public rather than private interests” justified enlargement of the filing period.  Id. at 399-402.  The facts in Willoughby are distinguishable.
[brief] 443 N.J. Super. at 611-612.  But this Court held that the “authentication” issue was simple: the photos depicted what they were purported to depict, and were relevant and admissible.  Id. at 614-615.  Moreover, the credibility issue was for the jury, not the judge:  “[E]ven if there was some legitimate reason for questioning the witness's veracity about what the photographs depicted, the better course was for the judge, in his gatekeeping role, to acknowledge the photographs appeared to be what they were purported to be and leave for the factfinder a more intense review of the photographs and the credibility of the authenticating witness. ”  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  Similarly, here, the photos depicted what they purported -- what the cameras and walkways nearby looked like in 2021.  They were relevant for the simple reason that they tended to prove what the area looked like two years earlier.
[brief] For any other public body the filing shall be with the clerk or chief administrative officer of such other public body and each municipal or county clerk of each municipality or county encompassed within the jurisdiction of such public body.  Where annual notice or revisions thereof in compliance with section 13 of this act set forth the location of any meeting, no further notice shall be required for such meeting.  N.J.S.A. § 10:4-8.  The Open Public Meetings Act recognizes the constitutional right from Article I, Paragraph 18 that “‘the right of [a] citizen[ ] to have adequate advance notice of and the right to attend all meetings of public bodies at which any business affecting the public is discussed or acted upon in any way.
[brief] LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I THE ATTENUATION ARGUMENT, NOW RAISED BY THE STATE IN POINT II OF ITS RESPONSE BRIEF FOR THE FIRST TIME, SHOULD BE REJECTED AS IT WAS NOT RAISED BELOW.  Although an appellate court may consider allegations of errors or omissions not brought to the trial judge's attention if it meets the plain error standard under R. 2:10-2, the court frequently declines to consider issues that were not raised below or not properly presented on appeal when the opportunity for presentation was available.  Generally, unless an issue goes to the jurisdiction of the trial court or concerns matters of substantial public interest, the appellate court will ordinarily not consider it.  *J.K. v. N.J. State Parole Bd.*, 247 *N.J.* 120 (2021); *State v. Jones*, 232 *N.J.* 308 (2018); *State v. Lawless*, 214 *N.J.* 594 (2013); *State v. Robinson*, 200 *N.J.* 1, 20-22 (2009); *Nieder v. Royal Indem. Ins. Co.*, 62 *N.J.* 229, 234 (1973); Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules, cmt. 3 on R. 2:6-2 (2022).  The instant appeal involves the application of the typical standard of appellate review of a final decision made by a trial court, which restricts the parties to issues raised below and the record created before the trial court.  R. 2:6-2.  The State’s attenuation argument was never raised below, either in its initial letter brief submitted to the trial court asserting grounds to legitimize the warrantless search and seizure of the Defendant, or in oral argument at the conclusion of the testimony at the suppression hearing.  Thus, any alleged attenuation was not explored by either party in the record below.  To allow the State to raise this argument for the first time, without affording the Appellant an opportunity to challenge its applicability through the type of rigorous cross-examination available at an adversarial hearing would be unjust.  POINT II
[brief] Plaintiff made absolutely no attempt to provide any level of specifics associated with their identity.  Plaintiff therefore garners no support from Viviano on this issue.  Further, Viviano represents an exceptional interpretation of R. 4:26-4.  Viviano, 101 N.J. at 556.  The Court found “that the interests of justice require that we relax R. 4:26-4 . . .” as a result of the fact that “[e]ither intentionally or unintentionally, [the defendant] misled plaintiff about the cause of the accident and then compounded the deception with undue delay. ”  *Id.* at 546, 544.  More specifically, the defendant in *Viviano* failed to properly produce a memorandum stating the cause of the malfunction causing the plaintiff’s injuries, provided answers to interrogatories that contradicted the documents in defendant’s possession and utilized other strategies intended to delay or prejudice plaintiff’s claims.  *Id.* at 544, 556.  These circumstances do not even remotely exist in the present matter.
[directive] 1.  VOIR DIRE METHOD  The method chosen to conduct voir dire must assure a thorough and meaningful inquiry into jurors' relevant attitudes so the court and counsel can identify jurors who may possess a bias, prejudice, or unfairness with regard to the trial matter or anyone involved in the trial.  Unlike some other jurisdictions, in New Jersey, the trial judge presides over and is responsible for the conduct of the jury selection process.  The judge is vested with discretion in the manner in which the process is conducted.  That discretion, however, is not unbridled and must be exercised in a manner that will achieve the important purpose of the process.  Our practice provides, in non-capital cases, that jurors shall be examined as follows:  "For the purpose of determining whether a challenge should be interposed, the court shall interrogate the prospective jurors in the box after the required number are drawn without placing them under oath.  The parties or their attorneys may supplement the court's interrogation in its discretion."
[brief] New Jersey Courts generally apply a very deferential standard when reviewing a final administrative-agency action.  In re State & Sch. Emps. Health Benefits Comm’ns’ Implementation of Yucht, 233 N.J. 267, 279 (2018).  Furthermore, a strong presumption of reasonableness attaches to an agency decision.  In re Carroll, 339 N.J. Super. 429, 437 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 170 N.J. 85 (2001).  With respect to factual findings, the findings of an Administrative Law Judge “are considered binding on appeal, when supported by adequate, substantial and credible evidence. ”  In re Taylor, 158 N.J. 644, 656 (1999) (quoting Rova Farms Resort Inc. v. Investors Ins. Co., 65 N.J. 474, 484 (1974)).  The choice of accepting or rejecting the testimony of witnesses rests with the administrative agency, and where such choice is reasonably made, it is conclusive on appeal.  See In re Application of Howard Sav. Bank, 143 N.J. Super. 1, 9 (App. Div. 1976) (citations omitted).  These “credibility findings . . . are often influenced by matters such as observations of the character and demeanor of the witnesses and common human experience that are not transmitted by the record. ”  Taylor, 158 N.J. at 644 (quotation omitted).  Reviewing  Courts consider whether the agency acted arbitrarily, capriciously, or unreasonably, specifically whether the agency’s decision “conforms with relevant law,” is supported by “substantial credible evidence in the record as a whole,” and reaches a conclusion based on a correct application of “the relevant law to the facts. ”  In re Yucht, 233 N.J. at 279-80.  In reviewing an agency’s decision to determine whether it is supported by substantial credible evidence and is not arbitrary, unreasonable or capricious, there must be a clear statement from the administrative agency as to the basis for its decision.  See St. Vincent’s Hospital v. Finley, 154 N.J. Super. 24, 29-30 (App. Div. 1977).  The policy of our Courts in reviewing Civil Service decisions has been that the Courts will not upset the action of the Civil Service Commission in the absence of an affirmative showing that it was arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable, or not supported by the evidence, or that the Commission disregarded or failed to recognize the legislative policies enunciated in the Civil Service Act.  Greco v. Smith, 40 N.J. Super. 182, 184-85 (App. Div. 1956).  As previously stated, final administrative action is given a strong presumption of reasonableness, and the findings of an Administrative Law Judge are binding on appeal when supported by substantial and credible record evidence.  See In re Taylor, 158 N.J. at 656 (quotation omitted); In re Carroll, 339 N.J. Super. at 437.  [...]’s choice to reject Appellant’s testimony was reasonably made, and is therefore conclusive on appeal, as set forth at length below.  See In re Howard Sav. Bank, 143 N.J. Super. at 9.
[brief] POINT V THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COERC THE JURY’S VERDICT  On July 27, 2021, the jury started deliberating following the conclusion of the jury charge at 10:30 a.m. (23T:28-5 to 28-10).  The jury continued deliberating on July 28th and July 29th, while also receiving requested readback/playback.  See (20T; 21T); (23T:28-5 to 28-10; 37-25 to 38-5).  At 3:12 p.m. on July 29th, the jury sent out a note, C-9, that stated: “We have unanimous decision on some questions on the verdict sheet.  We are at impasse on some questions for a good length of time.  It seems like we will not make any progress on reaching a unanimous decision.  Please instruct. ” (21T:17-8 to 17-14; 23T:32-4).  After receiving this note, “the Court conferred with counsel, both counsel, as to what would be the appropriate charge” in response: Model Jury Charge (Criminal), “Judge’s Instruction on Further Jury Deliberations” (approved 1/14/13) or Model Jury Charge (Criminal), “Judge’s Inquiry When Jury Reports Inability to Reach Verdict” (approved 6/10/13).  (23T:32-6 to 33-16).  Since the latter charge “was not requested by either party,” and this “was the only one note from the jury regarding an impasse,” the trial court gave the jury the former charge (with the “agreement” of counsel), and instructed them to continue deliberation.  (21T:17-15 to 18-22; 23T:32-2 to 34-4).  The jury deliberated until 4:30 p.m. that day, began deliberations at 9:00 a.m. on July 30th, and rendered its unanimous verdict – finding defendant guilty on three counts and not guilty on one count – at 9:59 a.m. that day.  (22T:4-13 to 4-19; 23T:34-4 to 34-6).  Defendant objected to the above for the first time in a post-verdict motion for judgment of acquittal/new trial.  (23T).  The trial court rejected this as a basis for reversal of the jury’s verdict, relying upon factors such as that this was the first indication of an impasse from the jury, that the note requested instruction, the length of trial, and the length of deliberation to that point, which included significant playback/readback.
[brief] THE COURT: -- the concept -- I mean the thing is rolling back.  You can't bootstrap in the concept of oh, someone came in, they talked to you, oh, did you have to do anything – [...]: Right.  THE COURT: -- as a result of that.  [...]: Yeah.  THE COURT: You can't get that in [...]: No, that's hearsay.  THE COURT: -- because the concept is you can't what's not coming in here is what the state determined one way or another and you can't get it in directly when you can't get it in indirectly because the concept is you would have to have someone from the state come in and testify as to what they -- what they did.  3T185:11-186:2 (emphasis added).  The sidebar continued with the trial court repeating several times that, without producing the appropriate witness, defendant was “not getting in directly or indirectly” the State’s “conclusion” or “determination” regarding [...]’s care.
[brief] Mount Prospect Chiropractic Ctr., P.A., 98 F.4th at 469 (citing N.J.S.A. 17:33A-5 and explaining that this provision allows [...] to file an independent action).  And, if an insurer does elect to file a notice of arbitration for an IFPA claim, [...] can intervene if it chooses to do so.  Although [...] claims it cannot intervene in an arbitration, (Br. of [...] at 27), nothing in the statutes or regulations prohibits [...] from intervening.  See Mount Prospect Chiropractic Ctr., P.A., 98 F.4th at 469.  Indeed, it is hard to fathom that [...] would adopt a regulation that curtails its own rights or prevents the agency from participating in a proceeding.  These arguments are nothing more than a pretext to justify a position that is inconsistent with the statutes adopted by the Legislature and the regulations adopted by [...].
[brief] This explains why the Borough has the Building Height Definition that it does.  Prior to [...]’s Mount Laurel settlement with the Borough, the Borough did not have any multifamily residential zones – only single-family residential zones where mounding could be more of an issue. and that testimony was not disputed by the Board Engineer.  (Id.)  Additionally, [...] confirmed that this is not mounding.  (Ra360 73:4-8.)  In contrast, [...], the objector’s traffic engineer, made only conclusory statements during his testimony that the regrading of the entire site constituted mounding, such that the buildings were effectively placed on pedestals (which is not the terminology used in the definition).
[brief] (Pa139-54).  A.  The Museum and the Lindbergh Case  The [...] (“Museum”) is located at the [...]’s headquarters and is the repository of the [...]’s historical records.  (Pa36-37).  The Museum is the custodian of approximately 225,000 documents and historical materials relating to the Lindbergh case.  (Pa37).  The historical items related to the Lindbergh case include case investigation files, reports, trial evidence, photographs, and correspondence.  Ibid.  The Lindbergh case is widely considered the most celebrated and widely-publicized case in [...]’s history.  See New Jersey State Police, The history of --- 1  Because they are closely related, these sections are combined for efficiency and the court’s convenience.
[brief] When applying for a wiretap, the statute requires an application to include a “particular statement of the facts,” including: (1) the identity of the alleged offender; (2) the details of the offense; (3) the type of communication to be intercepted and a showing of probable cause; (4) the character and location of the wire or electronic facilities involved; (5) the period of time the wiretap will last; and (6) “[a] particular statement of facts showing that other normal investigative procedures with respect to the offense have been tried and have failed or reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too dangerous to employ. ”  N.J. S.A. 2A:156A-9(c).  Thereafter, the judge may authorize an application to intercept a wire, electronic, or oral communication if probable cause is found to believe that:
[brief] For example, the [...] have not yet received or reviewed security footage from the time [...] signed the Agreement.  This footage is critical for the factfinder to assess whether [...] was given a genuine opportunity to review the Agreement and to verify his assertion that a line of patrons was forming behind him, pressuring him to act quickly.  Further fact-finding is also necessary to clarify [...]’s protocol regarding how many waivers are required when an adult is supervising a minor "jumper."
[brief] The courtyard was gravel and also used as children's play/activity area.  There was no curb cut on Sixth Street and vehicles would mount the curb into the courtyard and park haphazardly, making the observation that drivers, many having recently moved from New York, were haphazard in their driving and parking.  They did not adhere to the rules (7T54-6 to 82-20).  The 1963 Agreement (Da16) did allow a temporary license for Synagogue staff/attendees to park on then vacant areas of the School Lot 5; that permission presumably extended through 1972, when it certainly ended with the School expansion.  That [...] observed Synagogue attendees parking on School property in the late 1960's/early 1970's is consistent with the temporary license.  That was the extent of plaintiff's direct case.
[brief] To address these concerns, [...] has promulgated model standards “for the range of conclusions that may be reached following friction ridge comparisons. ”  See [...] Report at 4.  The foundational premise of those standards is that an expert’s “conclusion shall not be communicated as a fact.  It is an interpretation of observations made by the examiner and shall be expressed as an expert opinion. ”  Id. at 5.  The Third Circuit’s Model Jury Instructions similarly assume that an expert’s testimony is in fact offered as an opinion:
[brief] Section 13.1 consists of three sentences, each addressing separate scenarios based on the circumstances of [...]’s default.  The first sentence described the “sole and exclusive” remedy available to Plaintiff if [...] defaulted prior to the closing of the Mack-Cali Transaction.  In that circumstance, Plaintiff’s exclusive remedy was to terminate the contract and receive the return of its Deposit.  The exercise of this stipulated termination right eliminated all further obligations owed to either party, with the exception of defined “Termination Surviving Obligations,” none of which are relevant to this action.  The second sentence of Section 13.1 granted Plaintiff a second, mutually-exclusive remedy of specific performance if [...] defaulted after the closing of the Mack-Cali Transaction, and only in the event the PSA still remained effective at that time.  The second sentence did not modify the termination right provided in the first sentence.  Rather, it added another remedy that Plaintiff could choose to elect as an alternative to termination.  However, if Plaintiff determined to exercise the termination right, and take back the Deposit, then Plaintiff lost its right to compel specific performance.  Plaintiff declared [...] in default on July 14, 2022, prior to the closing of the Mack-Cali Transaction.  In paragraph 39 of the complaint, Plaintiff alleged that it took the following actions in response to the alleged default:
[brief] Relying upon the *Morris Canal* and *Ford Motor Co.* decisions, the Court similarly concluded “that a charge for water furnished by a municipality to an owner or occupant of lands is not a tax, but is the subject of a contract, *the sale of a commodity*, creating the relationship of seller and purchaser as between the municipality and the consumer. ”  *Lehigh Valley R. Co.*, 103 N.J.L. at 576-77 (emphasis added).  The Court drew a distinction between water supplied by municipalities “for extinguishing fires” which it acknowledged to be a “governmental function”, and water provided “for a price”, which it regarded as “the exercise of a private or proprietary function” by municipalities acting in the same manner as “private corporations”.  Id. at 577 (emphasis added).  Citing the three above-discussed cases, the court observed in Daniel v.
[brief] 17  Gomez v. ALN International, Inc., 2021 WL 3774221 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 24, 2021) .........................................  17 Goodwin v. Premier Ford Lincoln Mercury, Inc., 2020 WL 3621317 (N.D. Miss. July 2, 2020) ................ 15 Gregory v. Cincinnati, Inc., 538 N.W.2d 325 (Mich. 1995) .......................................................... 10 Gupta v. Asha Enterprises, L.L.C., 422 N.J. Super. 136 (App. Div. 2011) ...................................................... 22 Hamilton v. TBC Corp., 328 F.R.D. 359 (C.D. Cal. 2018) ....... 9 Hammes v. Yamaha Motor Corp., 2006 WL 1195907 (D. Minn. May 4, 2006) ............................................ 15 Harman v. Taurus International Manufacturing, Inc., 661 F. Supp.3d 1123 (M.D. Ala. 2023) ......................... 13 Harris v. Raymond Corp., 2018 WL 6725329 (N.D. Ala. Dec. 21, 2018) ........................................... 13 Haskell v. PACCAR, Inc., 2021 WL 5407853 (W.D. Mo. Nov. 18, 2021) .......................................... 16 Hernandez v. Aurobindo Pharma USA, Inc., 582 F. Supp.3d 1192 (M.D. Fla. 2022) ............................ 25 Hernandez v. Badger Construction Equipment Co., 34 Cal. Rptr.2d 732 (Cal. App. 1994) ............................. 9 Horstmyer v. Black & Decker (U.S.), Inc., 151 F.3d 765 (8th Cir. 1998)
[brief] More specifically, as described by the State in its brief, these circumstances include:  - [...], who had been “involved in hundreds of narcotics-related investigations” was on duty as part of the SET—“a plain-clothes unit that uses surveillance to monitor controlled-dangerous-substance (CDS) activity. ”  (Sb 3)  - [...], “[h]aving conducted approximately one hundred surveillance operations from that location in the past, . . . was aware that the parking lot was frequently used to conduct narcotics-related transactions. ”  (Sb 4)  - “Defendant’s actions in going from talking to a person in one vehicle to talking to a person in another vehicle raised [...]’s suspicions” because “[t]hrough his training and experience, he was aware that CDS distributors will sometimes meet up with multiple users in parking lots in order to sell,” and “[p]arking lots also have a large volume of --- 2
[brief] In this case, by contrast, the undisputed evidence shows that there was no consummation of the marriage, and Defendant never had any intention of creating a meaningful relationship with Plaintiff.  The undisputed evidence shows that Defendant misled Plaintiff into believing that she had bona fide intention to marry Plaintiff when, in reality, Defendant married Plaintiff solely for immigration purposes—unknowingly to the young, naïve Plaintiff.  Such fraud is a recognized basis for annulment because the misrepresentations that Defendant made to Plaintiff related directly to conditions existing at the time of the parties’ marriage upon which Plaintiff relied in agreeing to marry Defendant.  These were not conditions that arose only after the parties married.
[directive] The criteria and procedural safeguards for exercising prosecutorial discretion in making a Downward Departure for Trial Proof Issues are more fully described in Section 12.  Finally, it should be noted that there is no provision in these Guidelines for an “upward” departure from an authorized plea offer, since the facts and circumstances of the offense and the offender that would ordinarily result in a longer sentence (for example, the severity of the defendant’s conduct or defendant’s criminal history) are already integrated within the structure of these Guidelines.  Notwithstanding the foregoing, and as expressly noted in Section 1.1, where for any reason the tendering of a plea offer determined in accordance with these Guidelines would compromise or jeopardize the investigation or prosecution of a more serious offense that involves one or more direct victims or that would likely result in greater punishment then provided by these Guidelines, the prosecutor may in the exercise of reasoned discretion elect not to tender a plea offer pursuant to these Guidelines, provided that the prosecutor explains to the court the reasons for not tendering a plea offer to dispose of a Brimage-eligible offense.