ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] As the Judge found:  The below table [derived from the parties’ agreed upon Damage Schedules], represents the amounts of money [...] removed from the partnership through various means, all of which were determined by [...] and affirmed on appeal:\(^{11}\) \(^{11}\)  In determining [...]’ thefts of partnership funds during the applicable NJRICO and tort SOL periods, [...]’ relied on the Certification of [...], CPA, Plaintiffs’ forensic accountant.  (HPa1-34)  Mr. Barsky utilized the Damage Schedules previously agreed upon with [...]’ accountant and adopted by [...], to calculate, by substantive category of misconduct, the amount of partnership funds misappropriated by [...], both prior to and during the SOL periods.  He then prepared detailed schedules containing the results of his forensic analysis.  (HPa11-29 )  The Wilfs have not challenged those calculations.
[brief] Plaintiffs argue that the trial court erred in two ways when it enforced the Arbitration Agreement in [...]’s terms.  First, they say the trial court should have refused to enforce the Arbitration Agreement because [...]’s terms are unconscionable.  See (Pb5–11).  Second, they say the trial court should have refused to enforce the Arbitration Agreement because the record does not show that [...] manifested assent to [...]’s terms.  Id. at 11–13.  For the reasons set forth below, each argument fails, and the trial court’s order granting [...]’s motion to compel arbitration should be affirmed.
[brief] Id. at *6.  H&G Hardware held that a ROFR holder never had an opportunity to “intelligently decide to exercise or not to exercise its [ROFR]” where terms of the prospective sale between the owner of the premises and the third party were not final.  Id. at *8.  The Appellate Division also affirmed the trial court’s further ruling that “there should have been a document prepared setting forth all of the terms and conditions of that offer and it should have been sent to [the ROFR holder] . . . . [who] would have the right to meet the offer or not. ”  Id.  Contrary to [...]’s assertion, the decision does not, however, state that the absence of an ROFR in the sale contract “is of no importance whatsoever. ”  The decision noted the lack of a ROFR but refrained from remarking substantively on that lack.  Nor was there a representation in the sale contract that no ROFR existed, as was the situation here.  The ROFR provides [...] with the right to purchase the premises on the same terms as a third party.  [...], therefore, needed to provide [...] with a copy of the final PSA containing all the terms and conditions that [...] accepted to provide [...] with (1) adequate legal notice of the sales terms and (2) the opportunity to exercise its ROFR and purchase the premises on the same terms.  See, Gutch, 142 N.J. Eq. at 431-33; H&G Hardware, 2006 WL 27624 at *1, 6. Da335.  That PSA was not finalized unless and until [...] executed Addendum II and transmitted the document to [...].  In accordance with the principles of H&G Hardware, [...] did not receive legally adequate notice of the final terms and conditions as required by Section 39 until May 8, 2023.  That day, [...], the legal assistant for [...]’s law firm, emailed [...] with a fully executed Second Addendum to the PSA, confirming the final terms and conditions of the deal that [...] needed to match to purchase the Premises.  Da072.  After receiving the final terms and conditions, [...] exercised its ROFR on June 6, 2023, within the 30-day term provided under Section 39.  Da075.  As the Trial Court did not err in finding that [...] did not provide [...] with legally adequate notice of the final terms and conditions of the prospective sale of the Premises until May 8, 2023, [...]’s appeal should be denied.
[directive] Forfeiture Pragrarn Administration Index Page - 1  1 - Federal laws and regulations 6 - 3 6:4  Forfeited Property - 3-4 6  Transfer of Ownership  2  12- Forfeited Property, defined 2  12- Forfeited Records, defined - for 7 - A Propem Form Request of Forfeited 2pp. Distrr’bution 7 - 7:2  A 1-3 Form Preparation of - Forfeiture Program 11 pp- County 8 - Form Report 6 for 8:2 8 - 1-5 of Form 6  Completion Instructions Report Program - Form C Forfeiture 9 - Report Municipal 5pp. 9:2 F 1-3 C Report 9 - Instru~tions/Completion the of orrn - 11 - Form D Request Forfeiture Fund Distribution 3pp. for to a Non-Law Enforcement Agency 2
[brief] [...]  [...]  [...]  Telephone [...]  Fax [...]  [...]  Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant, Daria Ortiz  [...] (ID 412622024)  [...]  [...] (ID 015211977)  [...]  On the Brief TABLE OF CONTENTS  STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY ........................................1  STANDARD OF REVIEW ..................................................................................2  LEGAL ARGUMENT ..........................................................................................3  I.  THE BURDEN OF PROOF IS NOT A SHARED ONE WITH THE COURT......................................................................................................3  II.  THE TRIAL COURT’S FINDING THAT THE PLAINTIFF IS OWED $8,000 IN BACK RENT HAS NO BASIS IN FACT .........................4  CONCLUSION  ....................................................................................................5  STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[brief] There was no credible evidence that the property was listed for sale for $5.8 million when the PSA was signed.  Defendant was a principal in [...], and acted as its representative throughout the eminent domain proceedings.  He agreed in the PSA that Plaintiff would receive 50 percent of whatever monies were obtained through the sale of [...], yet he knew that the sale would not happen.  Under these facts, construing the term "sale" so narrowly as to exclude the eminent domain proceedings would lead to an absurd and grossly inequitable result, as the Trial Court found.  3T22.  It was the intention of the parties "to provide plaintiff with consideration in the form of money from the business...[and] the source of the money was not intended to be limited to a traditional sale versus a forced sale, through eminent domain proceedings or through condemnation, or inverse condemnation, or even a settlement of the legal action."  3T22-23, 25.  POINT TWO IN THE ALTERNATIVE, THE LOWER COURT’S RULING SHOULD BE UPHELD UNDER THE EQUITABLE THEORY OF CONTRACT REFORMATION.
[brief] Despite the Board’s prior findings that the Redevelopment Plan was not inconsistent with the Master Plan, the governing body went an extra step and amended the Redevelopment Plan to address reasons for its adoption of same citing N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-7.d.  The Board defers to the [...] on its defense of Ordinance 2022-17.  However, as the Trial Court correctly noted, “the adoption of Ordinance 2022-17 is akin to a “reasons resolution” process under the Municipal Land Use Law”, N.J.S.A. 40:55D-62.a.  Subsection 7.d. of the Redevelopment Law states:  All provisions of the redevelopment plan shall be either substantially consistent with the municipal master plan or designed to effectuate the master plan; but the municipal governing body may adopt a redevelopment plan which is inconsistent with or not designed to effectuate the master plan by affirmative vote of a majority of its full authorized membership with the reasons for so acting set forth in the redevelopment plan.
[brief] (1T:11-4 to 25-25)  In his decision, [...] acknowledged that search warrants are presumed to be valid, that a reviewing court must give substantial deference to the determination of the warrant-issuing judge, and that cases where the adequacy of the facts in the search warrant supporting probable cause is “doubtful or marginal” should be resolved by sustaining the search.  (1T:11-4 to 12-20)  The court correctly set forth the standard for probable cause, noting that “[t]o justify the search of a place, there must be specific objective and particularized facts which taken together reasonably support the conclusion that evidence of the proceeds of criminal activity will be discovered in the place to be searched. ”  (1T:15-2 to 7)  Applying the well-established law, the court found that the search warrant was not supported by probable cause, noting that “while there seems to be some interaction or exchange between [...] and the other individuals, nothing more can be identified than there’s an exchange” because the affiant “never identified” the items exchanged and never saw money being exchanged.  (1T:16-7 to 17-5, 18-24 to 19-2)  The court also noted that the affiant relied almost exclusively on [...]’s criminal record, consisting primarily of marijuana charges, and on the criminal records of several people he was seen interacting with, to conclude that the observed conduct was not innocuous but indicative of criminal activity.
[brief] Seven of the representations in Sections 9.01 and 9.02 of the Financial Agreement declare in various ways that the exemption is necessary.  Most specifically, both Sections conclude with the representation that the long-term exception is necessary to make the project “financially feasible. ”  B.  THE ORDINANCE FINDINGS ARE CONCLUSORY  Throughout this litigation, plaintiffs have maintained that the Township’s findings are conclusory, meaning lacking in any supporting evidence, and thus do not meaningfully respond to the statutory requirements.
[brief] Rule 30(b)(6)  Deposition  On April 22, 2021, plaintiffs served defendants with a Rule 30(b)(6) deposition notice (“Depo Notice”), seeking testimony about defendants’ document preservation policies and practices, the steps taken by defendants to collect and preserve documents relevant to this litigation, and the steps taken by defendants to review documents for responsiveness, including the names, titles, and locations of the people involved in collecting and reviewing documents (“Topic No. 1”).
[directive] Throughout the course of a vehicular pursuit, pursuing officers shall not attempt to overtake or pass the violator’s moving vehicle.  5.8  During the course of a pursuit and when approaching an intersection controlled by traffic signals or signs, or any other location at which there is a substantially increased likelihood of collision, the operator of any pursuit vehicle shall, prior to entering the intersection, reduce the vehicle’s speed and control the vehicle so as to avoid collision with another vehicle or pedestrian.  The officer shall observe that the way is clear before cautiously proceeding through the intersection.
[brief] (Pa0289-90).  [...]’s allocation calculations were based on the specific facts as to where and when the CVOC contamination originated, and how it is distributed in the groundwater and managed.  (Id).  [...] began his allocation calculations by considering the specific operations conducted at each AOC, the nature of the property damage emanating from each AOC, and the relative contribution of each AOC to the Site-wide groundwater problem to calculate a weighting factor for each AOC.
[brief] As [...] opined in his report:  Focusing on the site itself, a change from 59 units in a mid-rise building following the same bulk standards as its neighbors to 109 units in a high-rise that is taller and bulkier than its neighbors does nothing to advance additional public goals in the context of redevelopment or the neighborhood itself.  The change in the intensity of permitted development is for the benefit of one developer without any expression of further public benefit, other than the payment of a fee, which is the very definition of spot zoning.  (Pa965; see also discussion at Pa963 to Pa965).  Thus, as [...] noted, “a conforming building to the original plan would meet all of the redevelopment goals. ” (Pa965).  Nowhere in this record was there any indication that a denser, taller building, which shadows its neighbors is a desired component of the redevelopment plan.  And there is simply nothing in this record to allow the Court to conclude that increased density and height advance any public purpose.  Therefore, Plaintiff advanced a credible spot zoning claim.  This is not to say that the Court could not reject the opinion of Plaintiff's expert, but it could not do so without explaining its decision.  *Reich v. Fort Lee Zoning Bd. of Adjustment*, 414 N.J. Super 483, 504-525 (App. Div. 2010).  For this additional reason, the Court erred.  **CONCLUSION**
[brief] 12.  Although Respondent’s counsel initially listed Model Civil Jury Charge 8.11F (aggravation of pre-existing disability) on the Respondent’s Pre-trial Information Exchange, the record at trial did not support a finding of aggravation attributable to the subject accident.  (Da14-Da19).  13.  No follow-up request for an aggravation charge consistent with Model Civil Jury Charge 8.11F was made at the charge conference on October 5, 2023 (T3).  14.  No follow-up request for a charge of aggravation of a pre-existing disability under 8.11F was made the following morning when counsel for Plaintiff/Respondent made an additional charge request.  No such request was made until after both Appellant and Respondent had completed their respective closing arguments.  Thereafter, counsel for Respondent requested an additional charge consistent with the Model Civil Jury Charge 8.11F regarding aggravation of a pre-existing disability.  (T3 8-4 through T3 13-20).  15.  After argument outside of the presence of the jury, and over the objection of Appellant’s counsel, the court granted the Respondent’s request for the supplemental charge.  (T4 95-11 through T4 105-4).
[brief] 5.  On or about June 8, 2022, Defendant and Plaintiff entered into a subcontractor agreement ("Contract") designating Defendant as the general contractor and Plaintiff as a subcontractor.  Da002.  7.  The Contract provides the Plaintiff agrees to perform work for the Defendant on the Property in consideration for payment from Defendant.  Da002.  11.  The Contract states:  "Time is of the essence for the completion of this Agreement.  Subcontractor shall promptly commence the subcontracted work following general Contractor’s order to do so."  Da002.  The Contract is dated June 8, 2022; it provides that [...] will perform work for [...] at the Property; and, that [...] is the subcontractor and [...] is the general contractor.  Da067.
[brief] 11  Point V: [...] Denied Plaintiff Public Accommodation (Pa41, Pa52, Pa22-23)  Point VI: The Common Law Claims were Unjustly Dismissed (Pa94-97, Pa52)  Point VII: [...] Denied Plaintiff of Public Accommodation And was Not Entitled To Summary Judgment As Shown In Plaintiff’s Appellate Brief and Complaint (Pa652-54, Pa470-488, Pa344, Pa654, Pa533, Pa505, Pa511-515)  Point VIII: Summary Judgment Was Improperly Granted Because [...] Violated NJSA 10:6-2 And The New Jersey Constitution By Failing To Provide The Plaintiff With An Order From Which He Could Appeal His Conviction (Pa652-654, Pa533, Pa501, Pa499, Pa494, Pa498, Pa485, Pa488, Pa470, Pa471, Pa137, Pa41)  Point IX: Defendants Are Incorrect In Stating That The Borough of [...] Is Protected By Judicial Immunity (Pa654, Pa533; Pa91, Pa52, Pa41)  Point X: [...] is liable for Constitutional, NJCRA, NJLAD and other Violations Under Counts I, II, IV, & Reckless Intentional Infliction of Extreme Emotional Distress (Pa21-23; Pa41, Pa96, Pa54, Pa303-304, Pa470-471, Pa653)
[directive] Page 2 applicable; (3) copies of the Judgment of Acquittal and the [...] orders must be forwarded to the County Adjuster as noted above; (4) the scheduled date for periodic review hearings should be included in the court orders, where applicable; (5) these hearings are in camera.  except that hearings for defendants acquitted of murder by reason of insanity shall be in open court unless there is good cause for an in camera hearing.  See R. 3:19-2; and (6) prior to the maximum term of commitment permitted under N.J.S.A. 2C:4-8(b)(3), the court shall schedule a hearing to determine if the person remains a danger to self, others or property as a result of mental illness.  See Order# 9 entitled "Converting the Status of NGRI Committee to the Status of Civil Committee" (Attachment J).  Overview of the [...] Orders
[brief] Plaintiffs filed their claims by Complaint dated December 3, 2018, alleging causes of action for breach of the CNA for failure to pay out accumulated sick leave and for passing Resolution 591, prerogative writ purportedly seeking to void Resolution 591, violations of the New Jersey Civil Rights Act and the New Jersey --- 3  The Police Unions have appealed [...]’s decision, which is pending under Appellate Docket [...].  State Constitution, unjust enrichment, and quantum meruit.  *(See generally* Compl., Pa000016–41). ⁴  Plaintiffs are all retired members of the [...], alleged to have retired between February 1, 2017 and November 1, 2017.
[brief] [...]'s new proposal for comprehensive amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP) is aimed at helping courts and parties manage their obligation to protect privacy rights and avoid cyber security risks in civil litigation.  Because of the vast expansion in the amount of electronically stored data and growing cyber threats related to litigation, the current rules are no longer adequate to ensure that courts and parties are balancing the needs of particular cases with the burdens of protecting parties and non-parties from risks posed by unauthorized access, use, and disclosure of personal and confidential information.  [...]'s Rules Suggestion has been submitted to the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules and is an important step in advocating for necessary and transformational changes to the FRCP.  The proposal is the product of many [...] members who made significant contributions to the preparation of this substantial proposal.  [...] welcomes feedback on this Rules Suggestion and invites you to share it with colleagues and potential allies.  The Rules Suggestion is available on [...]’s document directory and here.  [...] is a non-profit 501(c)(6) trade association and does not employ any attorneys for hire.
[brief] Similarly, the police may not invoke a suspect’s children and communicate “the notion that a jail term would be incompatible with the needs of his daughter, who required a father in her life. ”  L.H., 239 N.J. at 48-49; accord, e.g., State v. Carrion, 249 N.J. 253, 281-82 (2021) (recognizing the “coercive” nature of threats about a suspect’s children); United States v. Tingle, 658 F.2d 1332, 1335-37 (9th Cir. 1981) (statement involuntary where police implied “if [defendant] failed to cooperate, she would not see her young child for a long time”).  Finally, aggressive police conduct -- such as shouting, swearing, name-calling, and table-banging -- can contribute to a coercive atmosphere.
[brief] Cf. Halderman, 901 F.2d at 319.  The claims of the proposed [...] class members could not have been asserted or alleged by any of the members of the [...] class on Feb. 20, 2015, because those claims do not relate to misconduct that occurred before Feb. 20, 2015; they relate to misconduct occurring after that date.  The claims being asserted by the [...] plaintiffs did not accrue until [...] engaged in misconduct long after 2015; in fact, Dr. [...]’s complaint in federal court proposed several examples of wrongful fees and surcharges occurring in 2020.  (Pa0023-25, at ¶¶ 29-33).  Those claims were brought in the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey on the basis of diversity jurisdiction.  They were not brought in New Jersey Superior Court, and the trial court never had jurisdiction over them because the claims alleged by the *[...]* class fall well outside the scope of the 2015 Settlement in *[...]*.
[brief] ” (Emphasis added.)  In turn, OPRA enumerates twenty-seven exemptions, described as “information which is deemed to be confidential for the purposes of [OPRA]” and one of these exemptions is for “criminal investigatory records. ”  Importantly, if a government record does not fall within a categorized exemption, the custodian must, with limited exception, grant or deny a request for access to the record not later than seven business days after receiving the request.  One of the enumerated exemptions is for “criminal investigatory records. ”  A criminal investigatory record is specifically defined as “a record which is not by law to be made, maintained or kept on file that is held by a law enforcement agency which pertains to any criminal investigation or related civil enforcement proceeding,” N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1.1.  Our Supreme Court has identified various law enforcement records that either do or do not qualify for the exemption based upon the two prongs of: (1) pertaining to a criminal investigation; and (2) not being required by law to be made or maintained.
[brief] There is, however, no legal support for this proposition.  While recognizing an in-court identification is inherently suggestive, *State v. Madison*, 109 N.J. 223, 243 (1988), our Supreme Court has noted the United State Supreme Court, to which we look for guidance, has set no guidelines for in-court identification procedures nor indicated that in-court identification must be made in a way that is not suggestive.  *State v. Clausell*, 121 N.J. 298, 327 (1990) (citing *Domina*, supra, 784 F.2d at 1368).
[brief] And the significance of that case, Your Honor, is the Appellate Division recognizing that New Jersey is going to abandon the common law approach to construing deeds and conveyances like this in favor of the restatement view.  And that's significant because under the common law there was a general prohibition about parties to a conveyance making rights and favor of a stranger.  And the restatement position, the more modern approach said, That's nonsense.  What we need to do is we need to enforce and construe these instruments consistent with the grantors and vent.  Hands of the Appellate Division adopted the restatement, rejected the common law.[sic]  (Transcript at 8-9)  Unlike Abel v. Board of Works of City of Elizabeth, 63 N.J. Super. 500 (App. Div. 1960), where “[t]here was nothing whatsoever to alert either the trial court or counsel to a realization that these matters were in issue,” id at 510, New Jersey’s supposed rejection of the stranger-to-the-deed rule was raised before the trial court by [...] itself to rebut [...]’s contention that the deeds in question should not have been construed to grant rights to third parties.
[brief] (Pa33).  Same reasons except the third reason was omitted (Pa33).  Had defendant not conducted an inadequate and improper investigation of [...]’ claims then defendant would have realized that no debatable reason exists for the denial of [...]’ insurance claims.  (Pa34).  It is quite apparent, based upon the face of [...]’s denial letters (Exhibits “U.2” and “U.3) that defendant did not conduct a thorough investigation into the merits of [...]’ claims and never intended to insure such claim(s)... (Pa34, Pa241, Pa245).
[brief] Additionally, the Board failed to consider the evidence presented demonstrating that Registrations Forms submitted were not accepted by the Division because the Trooper(s) who submitted them were not sick at the time the Registration Form was sent.  [...] attempted to file an Eligibility Registration Form back in September of 2019.  [...] was denied the ability to register because he was told the Ricci Bill “is for those who are currently sick.  Not for possible future illnesses. ”  Pa133.  The Board also failed to consider the evidence presented regarding the [...] membership polling.  [...], President of the [...], polled his membership to ascertain whether anyone received notice of the Ricci Act.  Of the fifty-nine (59) [...] members (retired troopers) who responded to the polling, fifty-seven (57) did not receive any notice of the Ricci Act.  The Board ignored the evidence from this polling when making its determination.  In light of all of the evidence presented on [...]’s behalf, a reasonable mind could only conclude that [...] did not receive any notice of the Ricci Act.  Without proper notice, [...] should have been permitted to register for the Ricci Act.  Therefore, the determination below should be reversed because it is against the substantial weight of the evidence.