ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] 2007 WL 4441103 (App. Div. 2007).  In Royster, plaintiff alleged that he was denied certain promotions for his numerous complaints.  There is no dispute that the denial of promotions constitute adverse employment actions under the LAD.  Such allegations were not made in this case.  Lastly, Plaintiff-Appellant’s argument that because an injunction was in place preventing Plaintiff’s transfer to another classroom or assignment to teach another grade somehow modifies Plaintiff’s burden to establish an adverse employment action is illogical and without support.
[brief] (12T26-2 to 22; 12T30-2 to 33-17; 12T36-20 to 37-2; 12T37-5 to 13; 12T38-18 to 39-1; 12T40-9 to 15; 12T41-24 to 42-10; 12T46-3 to 5; 12T48-1 to 5; 12T51-23 to 52-6; 12T57-1 to 15; 12T59-18 to 60-1; 12T60-10 to 62-1; 12T62-10 to 63-4; 12T69-21 to 70-1; 12T70-12 to 85-8; 12T90-15 to 99-14).  The suspected CDS was sent to the [...] for testing and it was determined that the substances seized were morphine, heroin, and cocaine.
[brief] Petitioner initially received a sentence of 98 years with 66.4 years of parole ineligibility, later reduced after remand to the same sentencing judge to 70 years with 57.9 years parole ineligibility, resulting in a term in which defendant will not be eligible for release until he is almost 84 years old.  Our justice system allows different treatment in sentencing for similarly culpable co-defendants who cooperate by providing truthful testimony, or who enter into negotiated pleas.  But our Supreme Court has imposed limitations in order to prevent gross-disparities and to ensure uniformity in sentencing.  Here, equally culpable participants in the same acts received a five-year term subject to NERA.  There is no valid explanation for this gross disparity - a claim that has never been properly addressed by a court despite a sentencing remand.  Petitioner seeks relief from this injustice.
[brief] N.J.A.C. 7:13-12.7(g)(6)(iv).  Specifically, compared to a pipe culvert, constructing a bridge span would disturb more area beyond the channel due to its spanning requirements and could remove native stream substrate from the tributary.  See 47 N.J.R. 1041(a) (June 1, 2015).  Further, constructing a bridge for this specific road crossing could result in greater impacts to riparian zone and wetlands, given the close proximity of wetlands, (Ra54), and riparian zone to this road crossing, (Aa31).
[directive] Dismissals on State’s Motion A. charges.  In the vast majority of Indictment lacking probable cause to support criminal criminal investigations, prosecutors possess broad discretion about whether and when to ask a grand jury to return an indictment against a target of the investigation and, as a result, prosecutors typically only present a matter to a grand jury when they believe that criminal charges are warranted.  However, because N.J.S.A. 52:17B-107(a)(2) requires grand jury presentment for fatal police encounters, assigned prosecutors must confront the all challenges associated with presenting cases even where there is little, if any, evidence to support criminal charges against the officers involved.  Though unlikely, it is possible that a grand jury could vote to return an indictment against an officer in the absence of sufficient supporting evidence, thereby leaving the assigned prosecutor to prosecute a case—in violation of Rule of Professional Conduct 3.8(a)—that is not supported by probable cause.  Should such circumstances ever arise, the assigned prosecutor may move to dismiss one or more counts of the indictment, against one or more defendants, provided that:
[brief] Advice and statements from conflicted counsel should not have any impact on the search for the truth that is meant to be the guiding principle of litigation in our adversary system.  Faced with the foregoing facts, [...]’s holding that [...] had to be disqualified due to an actual, concurrent conflict of interest was correct.  Defense counsel’s attempts to deny the existence of a conflict are without merit and rely on ignoring or erroneously mischaracterizing the record.
[brief] Defendants do not argue that the amount of the verdict, in and of itself, warrants a new trial.  Rather, it is the Defendants’ position that it resulted from the intrusion of improper influences into the deliberative process.  Thus, Defendants accept that they bear the burden of convincing this Court that the verdict represents a miscarriage of justice.  They respectfully submit that they have done so by identifying matters with “a tendency to influence the jury in arriving at its verdict in a manner inconsistent with the legal proofs and the court’s charge. ”  Panko v. Flintkote, 7 N.J. 55,61 (1951).  Prejudice, therefore, is presumed absent an affirmative showing that the irregularities identified “had no tendency to influence the verdict. ”  Kavanaugh v. Quigley, 63 N.J. Super. 153, 161-62 (App. Div. 1960).  Plaintiff has not made such a showing.  The additional errors complained of on this Appeal include the trial court’s decision to permit Plaintiff to make a lost wage claim without supporting expert testimony and its decision to permit Plaintiff’s counsel to make a time-unit argument in closing.  In each of those instances, it is submitted that the trial court abused its discretion in deciding upon the admissibility of evidence and the terms of the jury charge.  Defendants also complain that Plaintiff’s counsel’s opening and closing statements presented an impermissible and prejudicial “theme” to the jury.  For the reasons set forth below, it respectfully is submitted that each of the errors identified, standing alone and/or in combination with each other, clearly was capable of producing an unjust result and that Plaintiff’s appeal to the jury to “make things right” was plain error which the interests of justice require this Court to rectify.
[brief] At trial, the Court properly found that a confidential relationship existed between the elderly parents, [...] and [...] on the one side, and the defendants, [...] and [...], on the other.  The Court correctly found that no gift was made of $50,000 from parent [...] (a man now in his 80's and almost 90 years old) to the future son-in-law, John Cueto.  Lastly, the Court awarded that $50,000.00 back to the Plaintiffs [...] and [...] under the theory of unjust enrichment.  The Court should have imposed a constructive trust over the entire house at issue.  Once the Court ruled that 1) that there was no gift by [...] to John Cueto, 2) that there was a confidential relationship between the parents and daughter and soon to be husband, and 3) that there was unjust enrichment requiring a return of the $50,000.00, we argue that the complete remedy for essentially a breach of a confidential relationship was the imposition of a constructive trust over the entire house.  That would have resulted in giving the entire equity to Francisco and [...], which they paid for almost in its entirety.  However, the Court failed to view the actions of John Cueto through the prism of that confidential relationship, with obligations akin to a fiduciary responsibility.  Had the Court followed through and done so, the results that follow indicate that John Cueto took advantage of his confidential relationship towards his own future father-in-law by profiting off of his trust in him.  John Cueto admitted at trial that he was charged with buying a house for [...] and [...], but instead bought it for himself, and put his name, not Francisco’s, on the deed.
[brief] I.  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT | 1 | | II.  PROCEDURAL HISTORY | 2 | | III.  COUNTERSTATEMENT OF FACTS | 3 | | IV.  ARGUMENT | 9 | | A.  STANDARDS OF REVIEW | | | 1.  Motion to reopen case | 9 | | 2.  Motion to enforce Settlement Agreement | 10 | | B.  THE COURT SHOULD DISMISS PLAINTIFF’S APPEAL BECAUSE HE DOES NOT EXPLAIN HOW THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN REOPENING ROMA OR ERRED IN ENFORCING THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT (NOT RAISED BELOW) | 11 | | C.  THE COURT SHOULD AFFIRM BECAUSE THE TRIAL COURT NEITHER ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN REOPENING ROMA NOR ERRED IN ENFORCING THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT (PA000105–PA000111)  | 13 | | 1.  The trial court did not abuse its discretion in reopening [...] because [...] demonstrated good cause (Pa000105–Pa000106) | 13 | | 2.  The trial court did not err in enforcing the unambiguous Settlement Agreement (Pa000106–Pa000111) because Plaintiff’s claims are “Released Claims. ”  | 14 | | V. CONCLUSION | 28 | TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS, AND RULINGS BEING APPEALED
[brief] The court followed what the law requires when it becomes known that irregular matter had come to the jury’s attention and that is to question the jurors.  The jurors who had participated in the conversation with [...] outlined a brief conversation at lunchtime that was idle chatter about food and “Boba” tea.  There was no suggestion that [...] was trying to influence the jurors’ decision on the case.  They did not recognize him at the time of the conversation.  The issue was whether the conversation had the capacity to influence the verdict, and the innocuous nature of it had no such capacity.  Cf. Grant, 254 N.J. Super. at 581 (juror talked with spouse, a corrections officer, about evidence); State v. Weiler, 211 N.J. Super. 602 (App. Div.) (court officer told juror defendant was guilty), certif. denied, 107 N.J. 37 (1986).  Defendant claims that [...] failed to thoroughly question the last juror questioned, juror number sixteen, however, he is in a poor position to make this claim because when juror number sixteen was questioned, defense counsel did not argue the juror’s responses showed there had been discussions about the lunchbreak conversation with [...] in deliberations.  No one below construed the juror’s answers in this manner.  The judge asked juror number sixteen if he had been within “earshot” of any discussions from the other jurors about any interactions with anyone affiliated with the case; the juror answered, “just in deliberations. ” (7T40-10 to 15).  The judge told the juror the court did not want to learn the contents of the jury’s deliberations, and said her question was very specific.  (7T40-16 to 20).  She asked the juror if he had interactions with any of his fellow jurors about interactions they had with witnesses “outside of—with—with witnesses connected to this case?” (7T40-20 to 23).  The juror answered no. (7T40-16).  The fact that neither party urged the court to ask further questions indicates that the court’s question and the juror’s answer meant he had not spoken with any other juror about interactions they had with witnesses outside the deliberation room.  In any event, the nature of the conversation that the few jurors had with [...] over the lunchbreak was innocuous and had nothing to do with the case.  As such, it had no capacity to influence the jury.  The trial court properly denied defendant’s motion for a mistrial.
[brief] Fingerprint evidence, especially using the ACE-V method, has repeatedly been accepted and deemed reliable under both the Frye and Daubert-like standards.  And, as noted, defendant has not and cannot provide caselaw to the contrary.  Expert testimony on fingerprint analysis clearly “assist[ed] the trier of fact to understand the evidence,” satisfying N.J.R.E. 702.  The court thus properly exercised its role as gatekeeper when it denied defendant’s motion to exclude [...]’s testimony.
[brief] For the reasons set forth above, it is respectfully requested that this Court hereby reverse the decision of the trial court as set forth in its Orders and Opinions dated October 14, 2020, October 15, 2020, June 16, 2021, September 14, 2021, and August 9, 2022.  Respectfully submitted, [...]  By: ____________________________  [...], Esq.  Dated: September 7, 2023  [...] and [...]  Plaintiffs-Respondents/ Cross-Appellants v. [...], [...], and MAYOR [...], in his Official capacity as Mayor of The Township of Monroe, Defendants-Appellant/ Cross-Appellants.  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE  DIVISION  Docket No.: [...]  ON APPEAL FROM: SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY LAW DIVISION, MIDDLESEX COUNTY SAT BELOW: HON. [...], J.S.C.  Docket No.: [...]  BRIEF OF DEFENDANT/CROSS-APPELLANT  [...] IN SUPPORT OF CROSS-APPEAL
[brief] ”  253 N.J. at 164.  But here, the judge ruled that the circumstances giving rise to probable cause were unforeseeable and spontaneous based on credibility and factual findings.  A point thus in need of clarification is whether “the circumstances giving rise to probable cause are unforeseeable and spontaneous” is a question of law to be reviewed de novo by an appellate court, or a question of fact to be decided by the motion judge and accorded deference.  In addressing a similar question in deciding that an automobile-exception search was improper in Witt, the Supreme Court deferred to the motion court’s finding that exigent circumstances were lacking based on its factual findings, acknowledging that it “must defer to those findings because they are supported by sufficient credible evidence in the record. ”  223 N.J. at 450.  The Court further “acknowledge[d] that a different outcome might be reached under the Alston standard. ”  Ibid.; See also, Gonzales, 227 N.J. at 103 (finding reviewing court failed to give proper deference to motion court’s factual finding that inadvertence prong was met for warrantless entry and seizure under plain-view doctrine).  It logically follows that if a reviewing court must defer to a judge’s ruling of whether exigent circumstances existed based on the judge’s factual findings to justify an automobile-exception search, then a reviewing court must equally defer to the judge’s fact-based ruling — when supported by the credible evidence — that the circumstances giving rise to probable cause were sufficiently unforeseeable and spontaneous to justify an automobile-exception search.
[brief] ”  [Pa193].  [...] did, in fact, install “catch basins and additional PVC piping to collect water and direct it back into Canoe Brook. ”  [Pa339 ¶ 13].  The new drainage system worked as designed; the pooling of water on [...]’s property had been abated and the plants in [...]’s backyard began to flourish again.  [Pa339 ¶¶ 14-18].  Water that came down Defendants’ driveway would flow eastward through their property and discharge in Canoe Brook behind Defendants’ house, without causing any flooding on [...]’s property.  [Pa340 ¶ 29].  Over the decade after that drainage system was installed, there was no pooling of water into [...]’s backyard emanating from his neighbor.  [Id. ¶¶ 20-21].  Put simply, the nuisance resulting from the [...]’ actions had been fully abated and ceased causing any harm to [...].
[brief] \(^3\)  In truth, [...] herself actually testified that a second-year resident can “give orders” [Pa529, Papapetrou Dep., 85:13-15], so long as she consulted the attending physician.  [Pa529, Papapetrou Dep., 85:23-86-1].  Even under the unproven hospital policy, all she needed to do was consult with [...] before giving the order, according to [...].  [Pa529, Papapetrou Dep., 85:13-15; 85:23-86-1].  So accepting her testimony as true, [...] deviated from the applicable standard of care by not consulting with [...] in a timely fashion, by her own admission.
[directive] [Promulgated by Directive #12-06 (July 20, 2006)]  Page 1 of 2 again you are not limited simply to a consideration of matters that are presented to you by the prosecutor.  Unlike an indictment, a presentment is not the beginning of a criminal process and does not result in trials of individuals.  A person who is named in a presentment has no defense nor any way of answering the presentment except under very limited technical procedures.  For this reason, presentments require the exercise of sensitive judgment on your part, as well as a review by the Assignment Judge before they can be made public.  If the public should be made aware of a condition that is caused by the non-criminal misconduct of a public official, that individual may be named and criticized.  Before such a presentment seeking censure of an individual is approved, you must be satisfied that the proof of such wrongdoing is conclusive to show that the conduct of the individual is unquestionably related to the undesirable condition reported upon.  Criticism of a public official is allowable only where it is closely associated with the need to draw critical attention to the undesirable public condition.  It would not be fair to name a person unjustifiably in a presentment and perhaps destroy that person’s reputation and standing in the community.  And so, as a matter of fundamental fairness, if you return a presentment naming and censuring a specific individual, it will not be made public until I, as Assignment Judge, obtain and review the full record of the testimony and exhibits and determine that sufficient evidence has been presented to support such charges.  If the Assignment Judge determines that the presentment is proper, it will be filed with the clerk of the court and disclosed to the public.  Please be aware that the secrecy provisions relating to your service as a grand juror also prevent you from disclosing any matters relating to a presentment.  [Standard Charge for Grand Juries Regarding Presentments]
[brief] PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND STATEMENT OF FACTS ...........................................1  LEGAL ARGUMENT ..................................................................................................1  POINT I NEW JERSEY COURTS HAVE NEVER FOUND THAT BALLISTIC ANALYSIS IS RELIABLE ENOUGH TO BE ADMITTED AT TRIAL.  THE FAILURE OF THE TRIAL COURT TO HOLDING A HEARING ON THE RELIABILITY OF THIS METHOD WHEN REQUESTED WAS ERROR.  .........................................................................................1  POINT II  UNDULY RESTRICTING THE THIRD-PARTY GUILT DEFENSE BY STRIPPING IT OF IMPORTANT AND COMPELLING DETAILS  VIOLATED DEFENDANT’S RIGHTS AND REQUIRES REVERSAL OF HIS CONVICTIONS .............................................................................................................5  POINT III  PRESENTING THE JURY WITH A LEGALLY INCORRECT THEORY OF ACCOMPLICE LIABILITY, TOGETHER WITH THE FAILURE TO INSTRUCT THE JURY AS TO IDENTIFICATION AND ALIBI, REQUIRES REVERSAL OF DEFENDANT'S CONVICTIONS...............................................................................................9  CONCLUSION
[brief] DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT NOT WITHSTANDING THE VERDICT WAS PROPERLY DENIED, AS WAS HIS MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL.  A.  Motion for Judgment  Not Withstanding the Verdict  The standard for appellate review on motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict is the same that is applicable to a motion of acquittal – whether "viewing the State's evidence in its entirety, be that evidence direct or circumstantial, and giving the State the benefit of all its favorable testimony as well as the favorable inferences which reasonably could be drawn therefrom, a reasonable jury could find guilt of the charge beyond a reasonable doubt."
[brief] All of the evidence is to the 8  Plaintiffs also seem to suggest that [...] had knowledge of Plaintiffs’ optical shop because it “engaged in preliminary discussions with [[...]] . . . at his two office locations .  . . .” (Pb22).  The documents to which Plaintiffs cite, however, do not state that the discussions occurred at the office locations, but rather that the discussions concerned the purchase of the assets located at his two office locations.
[brief] [...], the victim’s aunt, testified she, [...], [...], and [...] were --- 3  The timestamp is six minutes ahead of the real time.  (11T187-6 to 188-5) sitting at the dining table in the living room of her second-floor apartment when they heard a gunshot; they ran to the windows to look.  [...] yelled, “[T]hat’s [...], that’s [...].”  [...] did not see the shooter fire the gun because she only looked out the window after hearing the shot.  The shooter’s face was covered and she did not recognize him, but when the shirt and gun fell, she saw his face for “[a] hot second. ”  After the shot, [...] saw the shooter run toward a field next to the High Gate apartments, crossing 10 lanes of traffic and meeting up with another person there.
[brief] The plaintiffs in Davis asserted that defendants (professional fire inspectors) negligently failed to inform a hotel manager of the need to install a sprinkler in a storage closet.  Id. at 402.  The plaintiffs’ expert asserted that a reasonable sprinkler inspector would have informed the owner of the hotel about the need for an additional sprinkler.  Id. at 410.  While the plaintiffs’ expert referenced several National Fire Protection Association standards in his report, the Supreme Court found that none of the cited sources directly supported the expert’s conclusions.  Id. at 412.  Rather, the expert relied primarily on his personal opinion.  Id. at 413.  The Court ruled that the plaintiffs’ expert’s opinion as to the applicable standard of care was therefore an inadmissible net opinion that “lacked any factual foundation. ”  Id. at 414.  Here, the trial court accurately applied Rule 703 and the reasoning of the Davis and Taylor opinions.
[directive] See also Section 15 (ongoing study and evaluation of Bail Reform Law’s effectiveness and impact).  In the event that the defendant thereafter is charged with yet another new crime while on release and the prosecutor again seeks revocation of release pursuant to Section 8, or initial pretrial detention on the new charge pursuant to Section 7, the prosecutor shall provide a copy of the motions papers to the court that had denied the revocation of release motion even if that court is not the court that will decide the new revocation of release motion or a new initial pretrial detention motion.  This amended Section shall become operational immediately upon issuance of this Directive.
[brief] Order of Hon. [...], P.J.Cv., Granting Summary Judgment to Respondent [...] and Dismissing Appellant [...]'s Claims With Prejudice, July 5, 2023.  Pa-9  Order of the Hon. [...], P.J.Cv., Granting the [...]'s Motion to Quash Appellant [...]'s Subpoena Duces Tecum, January 17, 2023.  Pa-10  Order of the Hon. [...], P.J.Cv., Denying Appellant [...]'s Motion to Compel Discovery, January 17, 2023.  Pa-12  Order of the Hon. [...], P.J.Cv., Dismissing the Complaint Without Prejudice, March 4, 2022.
[brief] [Pa102-103.]  During the pendency of the motions relating to the subpoena, prior counsel for [...] moved to withdraw (Pa109).  On August 25, 2023, the trial court entered an Order permitting prior counsel for [...] to withdraw (Pa109).  On September 29, 2023, the trial court denied the motion to quash and entered the Order enforcing the subpoena of Donna [...] (Pa110-111).  Days before the motion was to be heard, [...] filed the pro se motion to vacate that is the subject of this appeal (Pa3-9).  Plaintiff filed opposition (Pa10-77).
[brief] See DAb11 to DAb13; DBb34 to DBb39.  The expert's observation that "the lot is directly across the street from the Boardwalk which is elevated 5 feet above the subject property" (DBb35) overlooks the fact that the entire boardwalk is improved.  See the 2012 aerial photo at Da104.  Every property along Ocean Terrace is across the street from a boardwalk that is "elevated above the street level" (DAb13).  And if the plaintiff and other Ocean Terrace property owners can be elevated to 48.13 to advance their purely private interests in having superior ocean views, then there is no principled reason why neighbors to the west (like the plaintiff herein) cannot elevate to 55-65 feet to reclaim their lost easterly views.  The purpose of the ordinance is to avoid vertical overdevelopment -- the reasoning behind the variance would encourage such overdevelopment.  II.