ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] There is No Conflict of Interest Under RPC 1.7(a) or RPC 1.10 that Prohibits [...] From Continuing its Representation of the Defendants-Respondents in this Consolidated Matter  RPC 1.7(a) provides that a lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation involves a concurrent conflict of interest.  A concurrent conflict of interest exists if: (1) the representation of one client will be directly adverse to another client; or (2) there is a significant risk that the representation of one or more clients will be materially limited by the lawyer’s responsibilities to another client, a former client, or a third person or by a personal interest of the lawyer.  In other words, “RPC 1.7 prohibits two types of concurrent representations: (1) direct adversarial representations, and (2) representations that pose a significant risk of material limitation in the lawyer’s responsibility to a client. ”  Richardson v. DeFazio, No. A-4169-14 (App. Div. Mar. 7, 2016) (slip op. at 8).  (Da143-47).  In determining whether a significant risk will exist, courts look to “‘the likelihood that a difference in interests’ will arise, and ‘if it does, whether it will materially interfere with the lawyer’s independent professional judgment in considering alternatives or foreclose courses of action that reasonably should be pursued on behalf of the client. ’”  In re Op. No. 17-2012 of Advisory Comm. on Pro. Ethics, 220 N.J. 468, 469 (2014) (quoting Model Rules of Pro. Conduct R. 1.7 cmt. 8 (2013)).  See also Infosphere Consulting, Inc. v. Habibi Life, LLC, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 141332, at *8 (D.N.J. Aug. 7, 2020) (finding no significant risk of materially limited representation when two co-defendants’ interest were aligned against the plaintiff’s position).  (Da148-51).  RPC 1.10(a) provides that [w]hen lawyers are associated in a firm, none of them shall knowingly represent a client when any one of them practicing alone would be prohibited from doing so by RPC 1.7 or RPC 1.9, unless the prohibition is based on a personal interest of the prohibited lawyer and does not present a significant risk of materially limiting the representation of the client by the remaining lawyers in the firm.
[brief] A Consent Order was later executed in ¹The Trial on that challenge was held before [...] on September 2, 2022 and the Court on December 1, 2022 issued an Opinion/Order reversing and invalidating the Board Resolution.  The defendant [...] has filed a separate Appeal of that Order/Opinion, Docket No.: [...].  [...] will be moving to have this Appeal and that Appeal consolidated or heard together by the same Appellate Panel.  the Law Division lawsuit challenging the Zoning Board Resolution agreeing that enforcement action, including a fence, would be stayed pending a Court determination in that case.
[brief] The final decision notes that on August 8, 2019, an email was sent to the Certifying Officers advising them of their obligations under the Ricci Act.  Pall.  However, no August 8, 2019, email was provided.  A Memorandum to the Certifying Officers was provided with no date other than “August 2019. ”  Pa81.  Even still, this Memorandum was to State Agency Certifying Officers, not to members of the retirement system.  If anything, it is proof that the members of the retirement system could not have possibly been notified within the statutory timeframe, as the Certifying Officers were not even notified within 30 days.
[brief] ....................................... | 28 | | Celanese Ltd. v. Essex Cnty. Improvement Auth., 404 N.J. Super. | | | 514 (App. Div. 2009) .................................................................. | 29 | | Chubb Custom Ins. Co. v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 195 N.J. 231 | | | (2008) .................................................................................... | 31 | | Conway v. 287 Corp. Ctr. Assocs., 187 N.J. 259 (2006)
[brief] *[...] Devs., Inc.*, 2018 WL 2449133, at *30.  This holding was binding on [...], and it is binding on this appeal.  Further, [...] found that a punitive damages award against each of [...], [...], and [...] would not violate the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.  “[T]he relative degree of reprehensibility in this case,” according to the trial court, “cannot be overstated. ”  (Da39981.)  [...] “schemed, deceived, manipulated, and stole from his partners” “with malevolent intent” in complete disregard for its partner, [...].  *(Ibid.)*  [...] and [...] owed [...] “the highest duty of loyalty and honesty” but instead gave [...] “silence in the face of his brother’s theft,” all while “he was secretly receiving millions of dollars belonging to his partners. ”  (Da39985; see also Da39988.)  [...] and [...], despite being attorneys, engaged in this unlawful conduct, and because [...] are “extremely wealthy,” punitive damages would cause them no undue burden and are proper to hold them “accountable for their actions. ”  (Da39981-82, Da39984-85, Da39988-89.)  After making these careful individualized findings with respect to [...], [...] determined the proper apportionment of punitive damages to be 60% for [...] and 20% each for [...] and [...].  As the record makes clear, the trial court’s decision to award and apportion punitive damages comported with the Appellate Division’s instructions on remand and the law.  There is absolutely no support for [...]’ contentions that the trial court “failed to follow [the panel’s] directive” and that the record does not warrant punitive damages.  (Db46.)  B.
[brief] As there, it is undisputed that Defendants’ driveway has a downward slope toward the northeast rear corner of Defendants’ driveway.  Also, as in *Hopler*, Plaintiff testified that he personally observed surface water flow from the Defendants’ property onto his own through a drainage system that the Defendant’s installed, in a manner that it did not previously flow, and that heavy rainfall from a hurricane followed that artificial drainage path created by Defendants’ and caused flooding of Plaintiff’s property.  Unlike *Hopler*, Plaintiff’s personal observations of that artificial flow path in this case were corroborated by an expert surveyor.  Based on prior surveys, his own survey, and his personal observations of the property, [...] opined that the planter at the northeast rear of the driveway obstructed that flow of surface water onto Plaintiff’s Property and directed the flow of water toward the open space along the southeast half of the rear of the driveway, allowing water to continue to flow southeasterly along Defendants’ Property.  [365a–366a].  [...] further opined that Defendants’ installation of a curb along the rear of Defendants’ driveway blocked the natural flow of water and instead caused it to flow through the gap in the curb at the northeast rear corner of the driveway and onto Plaintiff’s Property.  [Id.]  Defendants do not dispute that their installation of a gapped curb caused surface water to flow into Plaintiff’s Property that otherwise would have flowed through Defendants’ Property.  Their engineering expert, [...], focused exclusively on the topography of the land and the slope of Defendants’ driveway, completely ignoring the impact of the planter and the gapped curb on the flow of surface water.  [See 280a–293a].  Given the rebutted evidence on the summary judgment record that Defendants’ conduct altered the natural flow of surface water and caused flooding of Plaintiff’s property, [...]’s report and testimony were not essential for Plaintiff to defeat summary judgment.  [...]’s opinion regarding the quantity of water that would flow from Defendants’ property to Plaintiff’s property through the gap in the curb was merely additional evidence on the severity of the nuisance that Defendants created.  Because [...]’s opinion was not essential to establish Defendants’ liability, Plaintiff had no obligation on the summary judgment motion to provide the Court with the additional documentation of [...]’s calculations.  Based on Plaintiff’s personal observations and [...]’s expert opinion, and giving Plaintiff as party opposing summary judgment all reasonable inferences, Plaintiff has more than established at least a genuine issue of fact that Defendants altered by artificial means the natural discharge of surface water in a manner than unreasonably enhanced, accelerated, and concentrated the flow of water from their property to Plaintiff’s property.  Thus, the Chancery Division erred in granting summary judgment to the Defendants.
[brief] Any other party or entity not specifically identified herein, that is excluded by [...] [] in its sole discretion, even if such party or entity is otherwise eligible. ”  (Italics added.)  (TRVa498.)  Further, Section 4.0 INSURANCE COVERAGE of the CCIP Manual discusses “4.2 Parties Not Covered” as:  Subcontractors of any tier who will not be included in participation in the CCIP (Nonparticipating Subcontractors) shall include all vendors, suppliers, truckers, material dealers, any contractors performing abatement or otherwise working with hazardous materials, and delivery services companies, regardless of contract size.  Nonparticipating Subcontractors shall not be permitted to work on the Project until they have provided to the Program Administrator (on behalf of [...] Building Corp.) the insurance certificate(s) and endorsement(s) as required in the Contract.  [...] Building Corp. has the right to include or exclude ANY SUBCONTRACTOR of ANY tier from participating in the CCIP at their sole discretion.
[brief] To the extent that this Court wishes to consider the argument in Section III, Plaintiff addresses this argument below.  In *Malanga*, the New Jersey Supreme Court overturned an ordinance designating a public library as an area in need of redevelopment under subsection (d) of the LRHL.  The Court found that the record lacked substantial evidence that the library was obsolete or suffered from faulty layout where the Township merely presented evidence that various conditions in the library needed improvements or upgrades.  *Malanga*
[directive] note Cf. charge. initial that on preventively defendant hold and restrictive on the least released be should defendant a that provides Reform Law Bail  The prevent to and proceedings at court appearance her or his assure to necessary conditions with that Consistent 2A:162-17.  N.J.S.A.  See crimes.  new committing from defendant only complaint-warrant by charged be need defendant a Directive under this policy, legislative to risk the flight, of risk the manage to appropriate are conditions or condition release when some obstruct will defendant that risk the and/or victims, and witnesses, community, the of safety the to object not would State where the case any in example, for Thus, process.
[brief] What would have occurred if the appellant used, for example 60 days of PTO and then went on unemployment?  What would his status have been after any available PTO was exhausted?  Would the Board have concluded that after an employee exhausted PTO they were terminated, or there was a layoff?  Regardless of what choice the appellant made in March of 2020 at some point he would have been out of work and in a pension reporting period without pay.
[brief] …*[T]he Board is not convinced that these variances are reasonably required due to any hardship.  Neither the size of this conforming lot nor the location of the structures already existing thereon dictate these variance conditions.  There were little or no proofs provided to establish that applicant could not meet the ordinance requirements for these elements if the design of the development were altered.  Moreover, the Board does not find, nor has applicant met its burden of proof, that the benefits of these deviations would substantially outweigh the detriments….
[brief] APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS RELATING TO LICENSURE  WERE NOT ARGUED BELOW AND SHOULD BE STRIKEN (NOT RAISED BELOW)**  The question of whether [...] had a license, or needed a license, pursuant to the NJCFLA, was not argued below nor was any decision rendered regarding that issue by the trial court.  The question should not now be addressed as a determining factor in deciding whether to grant or deny this appeal, as to the dismissal based on the inapplicability of the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act.  Appellant fails to point out that fact.  There is no excuse for, or exception to, the rule requirement that points not raised below be identified.  *State v es*, 132 N.J. Super. 121, 143 (App Div. 1977) aff’d in part and rev’d in part 78 N.J. 342 (1978).  Appellant’s primary attack on the lower courts ruling here is her allegation that [...] was required to be licensed under the NJCFLA and that it was not licensed at a certain point in time.  Neither of those allegations were ruled on by the lower court.  Matters not raised in the Court below are not proper subjects of appeal and may not be considered by the appellate tribunal.
[brief] However, because it is otherwise expensive to procure and increases the bidder’s costs, the Contract Bond, in the full amount of 100% of the bid, in this case $70,865,354.00, is not required to be obtained, executed and delivered until the time of contract execution.  In addition to the cost of purchasing the Contract Bond, construction contractors generally have a limited total bonding capacity based upon the surety’s assessment of their assets and ability to perform the work if selected.  Thus, delaying issuance of the Contract Bond until execution provides a benefit to the contractors in that it preserves their bonding capacity and ability to bid on other projects in the interim, and in turn this results in increased competition and lower prices.  However, given the importance of the Contract Bond – essentially, the surety company’s guarantee that the work will be performed – [...] also requires an additional document, the “Consent of Surety” as evidence that the surety company will, in fact, issue the Contract Bond at the time of execution of the contract if the bid is accepted.  The Consent of Surety thus spans the limited duration from bid opening, to ratification of the award by the Board, to transmittal of the certified minutes to the Governor, through expiration of the ten-day veto period and, ultimately, until the time of execution when the Contract Bond is furnished.
[brief] Appellant [...] (hereinafter “[...]”, “Petitioner” or “Appellant”), appeals the Exception filed by the [...] ([...] or respondent) to the determination by Judge [...], ALJ of the Office of Administrative Law (OAL) affirming the determination of the [...] (“[...]”) declaring [...] ineligible for pension benefits retroactive to January 1, 2008 pursuant to N.J.S.A. 43:15A-7.2(a).  [...] asserts that he successfully established before ALJ that no professional services contract existed prior to 2015 and [...] investigators never evaluated nor made any determination regarding whether [...] was an independent contractor.  [...] asserts that the finding of the ALJ be reversed in full (complete pension eligibility reinstated) or in part (ineligibility changed from January 1, 2008 to January 1, 2015) as 2015 was the first year of a Professional Services Contract.
[directive] 3. warunkowym, zwolnienie warunkowe może zostać cofnięte i może Pan(i) wrócić do zakładu karnego i pozostać tam przez cały pozostały okres nadzoru kuratora sądowego po zwolnieniu warunkowym, pomimo zakończenia odbywania poprzedniej kary pozbawienia wolności?  Do you understand that if you violate the conditions of your parole supervision that your parole may be revoked and you may be subject to return to prison to serve all or any portion of the remaining period of parole supervision, even if you have completed serving the term of imprisonment previously imposed?
[brief] (Da108-10) (“It is clear that [...] submitted false statements under --- \(^1\)  In fact, [...] is identified by [...] in his Habeas Petition as the attorney who “ignored” [...]’ request to investigate an alibi defense to the Staten Island home invasion (the home invasion at the heart of this Appeal).  (Da077).  oath in his Habeas Petition when he claimed to have no knowledge of the Staten Island robbery before it occurred”).  During [...]’s trial and for the next fifteen years while it adjudicated appeals and post-conviction applications, the State possessed the Sworn Statement and did not disclose it to Appellant or the Court.  The State’s failure to do so constitutes a violation of [...]’s fundamental right to due process and all courts considering this issue have ordered reversal.
[brief] 1T28:10-24.  The court addressed these claims during oral argument, noting that Appellant could have stepped out of line to review the Agreement more closely or asked questions about it.  1T11:22-12:11; 1T28:10-14.  The trial court went on to note that Appellant had the option to simply not sign the Agreement if he was uncomfortable or felt that he did not understand the terms.  1T13:5-14:23; 1T28:10-14.  Appellant, [...], is a college educated computer software engineer that manages several employees overseeing a computer system that runs a financial company in Manhattan.  He is not an unsophisticated person of limited intelligence.  Clearly, he was capable of reading and understanding the agreement.  III.
[brief] That case involved a “study” to redevelop the municipal library located on municipal property.  The trial court and appellate court both found that Section 5 was satisfied.  Yet the Supreme Court reversed that finding because the attempt to redevelop the municipal library did not meet the necessary elements of Section 5.  This case, although cited and argued in plaintiff’s briefing, was not addressed at all by the Trial Court in this case which is another reason to reverse the Trial Court’s decision.  This case is relevant, and perhaps dispositive, because the explicit statutory standards of Section 5 are required to be applied to any Section 7 redevelopment “plan. ”  The specific language, as quoted hereinabove, provides in Section 7: no redevelopment…plan shall be undertaken or carried out except… according to the criteria set forth in Section 5.
[brief] For the foregoing reasons, Defendants respectfully request that this Honorable Court uphold and affirm the Trial Court's granting of the motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 4:5-1(b)(2) and the Entire Controversy Doctrine.  Respectfully submitted, [...]  Attorneys for Defendants/Respondents  [...] and [...]  By: /s/ [...]  [...]  Dated: April 2, 2024
[brief] POINT I PROSECUTION OF DEFENDANT  VIOLATES THE SECOND AMENDMENT  The State takes the position that whether New Jersey must recognize [...]’s Pennsylvania carry permit is not an issue answered by the Second Amendment, but one that is addressed by the Full Faith and Credit Clause.  Sb²12.  This is not supported by any of the caselaw since the Supreme Court decided N.Y.  State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1, 71 (2022).  For example, in United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. ___, 144 S.Ct. 1889, 1901-03 (2024), the Court applied Bruen in determining whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) was both facially valid and valid as applied.
[brief] After the Commission granted [...] an extension of time to complete its investigation, [...] provided [...] with a written determination on March 6, 2024, concluding that [...] had violated the State Policy and engaged in gender identity discrimination against [...] (Aa19-21; Aa38).  In reaching this conclusion, [...] relied upon [...]’s allegations and [...]’s response to them, along with a review of the video footage from outside the [...] building which confirmed that an incident had occurred between [...] and [...] on the date in question.  (Aa20).  The body language in the video showed that the interaction was “contentious,” that [...] followed [...] after she moved away from him to continue obtaining signatures, and that police responded to the building.  (Aa20).  [...] also confirmed that a second incident between [...] and [...] occurred later that same day at the union office.
[brief] THE COURT:  I know, I know all I can say is that’s a sham affidavit because when you’re asking in an interrogatory to give me a summary of any and all statements that anybody made in this case that’s relevant and you leave that point out, and you go through an entire deposition of May 26th of 2022 and you leave that point out about the hospital and the only time it comes up is to respond to defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, I may rule that that’s a sham affidavit because obviously it’s not -- [...]: It doesn’t -- THE COURT: -- got produced in discovery and it should have been.
[brief] TABLE OF CONTENT | Section | Page | |------------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | TABLE OF AUTHORITY | 3 | | PRELIMINARY STATEMENT | 5 | | STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY | 5 | | LAEGAL ARGUMENT | 8 | | LEGAL POINT A: THE TRIAL JUDGES GROSSLY ABUSED THEIR DISCRETION | 8 | | LEGAL POINT B: [...] FAILED THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE NJ UCC LAWS | 11 | | LEGAL POINT C: [...] HAS BEEN A DEBT COLLECTOR DISGUISED AS A MORTGAGE LENDER AND SERVICER TO EXTORT HUGE PROFIT | 13 | | CONCLUSION | 19 | | CERTIFICATION | 20 | | Case Name | Citation | Page | |-----------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | Akalwadi v. Risk Mgmt. Alternatives, Inc. | 336 F. Supp. 2d 492, 505 (D. Md. 2004) | 15 | | Allen v. Bank of America Corp. | No. CCB-11-33, 2011 WL 3654451, at *7 n.9 (D. Md. Aug. 18, 2011) | 14 | | Allen v. LaSalle Bank, NA | 629 F. 3d 364 - Court of Appeals, 3rd Cir. 2011 | 18 | | Brown v. Card Serv. Ctr. | 464 F.3d 450, 453 (3d Cir.2006) | 19 | | Deutsche Bank Nat. v. Mitchell | 27 A. 3d 1229 - NJ: Appellate Div. 2011 | 12 | | Flagg v. Essex Cnty. Prosecutor | 171 N.J. 561, 571 (2002) | 9 | | Heintz v. Jenkins | 514 U.S. 291, 292, 115 S.Ct. 1489, 131 L.Ed.2d 395 (1995) | 18 | | In Re: Accutane Litig. | 234 N.J. 340, 391 (2018) | 10 | | Johnson v. Midland Funding, LLC | 823 F.3d 1334 (11th Cir. 2016) | 17 | | Lipscomb v. Aargon Agency, Inc.  | No. PWG-13-2751, 2014 WL 5782040, at *3 (D. Md. Nov. 5, 2014).  | 15 | | Newark Morning Ledger Co. v. N.J. Sports & Exposition Auth., | 423 N.J. Super. 140, 174 (App. Div. 2011) | 9 | | Schlosser v. Fairbanks Capital Corp. | 323 F.3d 534, 536-39 (7th Cir. 2003) | 14 | | State v. Brown | 236 N.J. 497, 521 (2019) | 9 | | State v. Chavies | 247 N.J. 245, 257 (2021) | 9 | | State v. R.Y. | 242 N.J. 48, 65 (2020) | 9 | | Stewart v. Bierman | 859 F. Supp. 2d 754, 759 (D. Md. 2012) | 14 | | Townsend v. Pierre | 221 N.J. 36, 52 (2015) | 10 | Union Cntv. Improvement Auth. v. Artaki, LLC, 392 N.J. Super. 141, 149 App. Div. 2007).