ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] On May 31, 2022, after a series of public hearings, the Board denied the application of Plaintiffs seeking a height variance pursuant to NJSA 40:55D-70(d)6 to permit construction of two 48 ft. tall warehouses on a property that was, at the time of submission of Plaintiffs’ application, located in [...]’s SM Special Manufacturing Zone District in which buildings of up to only 30 ft. tall are permitted.  6T 15:7-6T 16:15.  The Board’s height variance denial decision was memorialized in [...] which was adopted on April 3, 2023.  Ja011-Ja036.  On May 19, 2023, Plaintiffs filed a Complaint in Lieu of Prerogative Writs to appeal the Board’s height variance denial decision.  Ja001-Ja010.  The Trial Court heard oral argument on February 9, 2024, and issued a bench opinion denying Plaintiff’s requested relief.  7T 52:14-7T 52:21.  The Trial Court’s oral decision upholding the Board’s variance denial decision and denying the relief requested by Plaintiffs was confirmed by way of an Order dated March 18, 2024, Nunc Pro Tunc February 9, 2024.  Ja174.  This appeal followed.
[directive] This Directive promulgates the attached Grand Jury Standards for statewide use, as approved at the October 18, 2006 Judicial Council meeting.  The Grand Jury Standards, developed by the Committee for Jury Management for the Conference of Operations Managers/ATCAs and the Administrative Council, complement the earlier Jury Management Standards promulgated by then Administrative Director [...] by memorandum dated May 20, 2004.  The Grand Jury Standards address practices that are solely within the grand jury area, including the term of service, orientation requirements, a uniform secrecy oath (required by Rule 3:6-7) for Judiciary staff who attend grand jury sessions, and a standard grand jury charge (previously promulgated by Directive #12-06).  The Standards set forth the tasks and responsibilities of grand jury clerks and requires the development of uniform training for that position.  Additionally, the Grand Jury Standards include requirements relating to providing interpreters for witnesses and making the record of grand jury proceedings.  Attached to the Grand Jury Standards are the following five documents:  Attachment 1 -- Grand Juror Initial Orientation Attachment 2 -- Orientation for Sitting Grand Jurors Attachment 3 -- Standard Grand Jury Charge Attachment 4 -- Standard Supplemental Charge -- Presentments  Attachment 5 -- Grand Jury Oath of Secrecy  Directive 23-06 December 22, 2006
[brief] Plaintiffs argue it was appropriate for their expert "to provide opinion testimony as to intent based on patterns of conduct and manipulations of data suggestive of intentionality that he was able to distill from his review of the financial records."  Pb37.  (Emphasis added).  They contend the court did not err in permitting testimony that transactions "potentially" were the products of fraudulent activity and "factors that might be indicative of fraudulent conduct."  Pb38.  (Emphasis added).  Such testimony was speculative at best.  Oddly, the criteria [...] employed to identify such transactions also led him to conclude that even payments made to plaintiffs, [...] and [...] were "unauthorized" and properly included in damages suffered by those same plaintiffs.
[brief] \textsuperscript{140}  At the core of this case are consumers seeking to redress a "common legal grievance". \textsuperscript{141}  A party's common course of conduct alone may support a finding of predominance. \textsuperscript{142}  It is unquestioned that defendant conducted themselves in a uniform manner given that hundreds of customers faced the same harm.  Individual determinations of damages for each class member won’t derail certification, because damages are clearly ascertainable from defendant’s own billing records and there are core common liability issues to be determined. \textsuperscript{143}  Only the putative class representative must satisfy standing requirements.
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED THE PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO STRIKE THE TESTIMONY OF THE DEFENSE LIABILITY EXPERT.  (6T48:9-16; 8T33:2-25)  The defendant offered the testimony of [...] as an expert in the fields of civil engineering, forensic engineering and human factors.  (5T99:24-100:4; 6T99:24-100:1).  Notably, the plaintiff did not object to [...]’s qualifications as an expert in civil or forensic engineering, but only to his qualification as an expert in the field of human factors.  (6T101:11-14).  Ultimately, the court qualified [...] as an expert in all three fields, stating:  …I will recognize him as an expert in the field of civil engineering, forensic engineering and human factors based upon the testimony that he’s provided.  I’ll leave it to you for cross examination and to the jury itself at the end of the day to comment on which expert they wish to believe and why.  But I believe he does have the sufficient -- he has sufficient experience, qualifications, training and education and society memberships in this case to be qualified at this stage as an expert in those three area: civil engineering, forensic engineering and human factors.  (5T103:22-104:8).  At the conclusion of [...]’s testimony on direct, the plaintiff moved to strike [...]’s testimony in its entirety on the basis that his testimony addressed subject matter that was within the common knowledge of a layperson and did not require expert testimony.  (6T42:9-43:6).  The trial court denied the plaintiff’s motion to strike the testimony of [...], stating:  An expert can certainly give testimony regarding their specialized knowledge, skill, and training and experience, but the expert is not precluded from providing testimony that, as counsel puts it, a layperson could simply have just measured things out.  That doesn’t make it inadmissible.  It certainly goes to the -- the weight of the evidence but not to the admissibility of the evidence.  (6T48:9-16).  On her motion for a new trial, the plaintiff renewed her argument that the trial court should have stricken [...]’s testimony, but this time, on the basis that [...]’s testimony was not within the area of his expertise as an engineer and therefore he was unqualified to render an expert opinion.⁷ (8T:2-25).
[brief] [...], *A surfeit of science: The “CSI effect” and the media appropriation of the public understanding of science*, 24 Pub. Understanding of Sci. 130 (2015).  Of course, the value of the knowledge gained from this type of incidental learning turns on the validity and accuracy of the information: if the information people encounter is not accurate or balanced, any resulting knowledge or beliefs will also be inaccurate or skewed.  News and entertainment media provide a mixed bag with some accurate information about forensic evidence and methods mixed in with misleading information or misinformation.  *Id.*  Because these mediums aim for entertainment value, newsworthiness, or attention, they cannot be relied upon to help people form accurate knowledge and beliefs.  Disseminating the truth about forensic evidence does not always make for an exciting narrative—in reality, forensic science can be complicated and time consuming, with elements of science and significant limitations.  Ordinary people are not well equipped to critique such information, so they are more likely to accept incorrect information about those topics and form misconceptions.
[brief] Rule 3:5-5 instructs that “[a] search warrant may be executed by any law enforcement officer .  . . .”  It is abundantly clear that New Jersey jurisprudence recognizes that officers may at times be required to cross the boundaries of their municipalities in the furtherance of their official duties.  See State v. White, 305 N.J. 322, 327 (App. Div. 1997).
[brief] A whistle-blowing activity consists of (1) disclosing, or threatening to disclose, to a supervisor or public body an illegal action, N.J.S.A. 34:19-3(a)(1); (2) objecting to or refusing to participate in an activity violating the law, N.J.S.A. 34:19-3(c)(1); or (3) objecting to, or refusing to participate in, conduct “incompatible with a clear mandate of public policy. ”
[brief] Alternatively, [...] was granted an Easement by Necessity or an Irrevocable License.  (Da13-18; Da166-169; Da948, Da 980; 7T, 8T)  The Congregation steadfastly maintains the 1963 Agreement constitutes a grant of an express easement by the [...] to [...], only terminable by Plaintiff.  However, assuming arguendo this Court was to disagree, the Court may alternatively conclude the evidence presented establishes an easement of necessity by implication or an irrevocable license was created.  i.  The evidence presented at trial establishes an easement by necessity was created.  (Da13-18; Da166-169; Da948; 7T; 8T)  “Easements of necessity arise by virtue of inference or implication of an intent implied from the facts surrounding the primary conveyance. ”  Tidewater Oil Company v. Camden Securities Company, 49 N.J. Super. 155, 161 (Ch. Div. 1958).  Typically, an easement by necessity arises where there was a unity of ownership and the subsequent severance of title resulted in the grantee or grantor owning a parcel that, as a result of the conveyance, is landlocked.  See Ghen v. Piasecki, 172 N.J. Super 35, 40 (App. Div. 1980).  Prior to deeding Plaintiff the property upon which the synagogue was constructed, the [...] owned both the Subject Property and [...]’s Property.  While [...]’s Property is not technically landlocked, it is surrounded by the Subject Property on its western and southern borders, and by public roadway on its eastern and northern borders.  There is no available parking on [...]’s Property.  Given the terms of the 1963 Agreement (construction of the synagogue in return for use of the parking lots and the boiler room located on the Subject Property) and the manner in which [...]’s Property was developed (no provisions for parking or a boiler room), an easement by necessity has clearly been established under the circumstances of this case.
[brief] The blurry video in S-38 does not depict facial features, and the lack of context makes it difficult to reliably discern the person’s height or body type.  At best, the video shows that the person wore light-colored clothing with sleeves and a hood, but no further details can be discerned (a viewer could not determine, for example, whether the clothing was white or a light gray color).  The detective had no firsthand knowledge of the incident or the suspected shooter.
[brief] See also *Schlossman’s Inc. v. Niewinski*, 12 N.J. Super. 500, 506, (App.Div.1951):  “[W]here ‘fraud in the inducement is charged,…testimony [is not] made inadmissible because the contract in suit includes a provision, ‘this is our entire agreement and cannot be changed orally. ’”  Here, Plaintiffs have pleaded and proven that [...]’s misrepresentations were made knowingly and intentionally, as part of a pattern and practice to induce consumers to purchase timeshares.
[brief] Once a property has been designated, the municipality must adopt a redevelopment plan, setting forth a plan for development of the redevelopment area and identification of property to be acquired, N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-7 & N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-8, and must identify a project to be undertaken pursuant to that redevelopment plan, before it is authorized to exercise eminent domain.  Borough of Glassboro, 457 N.J.  Super. at 430-431 & 435.  Protection continues to be available, even after designating a property as a Condemnation Redevelopment Area.  Property owners whose property is taken by way of eminent domain continue to have the right of payment of just compensation for any land that is taken.  62-64 Main St., supra, 221 N.J. at 155.  A property owner is also free to pursue a redevelopment agreement with the municipality to undertake redevelopment of their own property.  Id. at 161-162.  Here, Plaintiff is also free to pursue a redevelopment agreement with [...].
[brief] Hearing Testimony Concerning Post-Accident Paving Records  [...] next addressed paving records generated approximately two months post-accident.  The records concerned the north approach to the subject bridge in the southbound direction.  [...] testified that he considered the paving records as evidence that a dangerous condition existed in the area where plaintiff's accident allegedly occurred.  (3T95:18-99:15).  On cross-examination, [...] was shown a November 12, 2015 email from resident engineer [...], P.E. directed to general contractor [...] regarding the post-accident paving.
[brief] In Geffner v. Geffner, No. A-2896-08T2, 2011 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1203, at *22 (App. Div. May 11, 2011), the Appellate Division rejected on appeal that the trial court’s ruling failed to set forth adequate findings under Rule 1:7-4(a) on a “critical issue. ”  Geffner v. Geffner, No. A-2896-08T2, 2011 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1203, at *22 (App. Div. May 11, 2011).  That affirmance was because, unlike here, the trial court had made “specific” record-based findings supported by record evidence.  Ibid.  That the only precedents Landlord even claims to be supportive of the trial court’s conclusory ruling here are matrimonial cases is more than a mere curiosity—it is quite telling.
[brief] But this is a misinterpretation that contradicts the Legislature’s actual intent, as explicitly stated in the statute it enacted.  “The Court’s obligation when interpreting a law is to determine and carry out the Legislature’s intent. ”  Sussex Commons Assocs., LLC v. Rutgers, 210 N.J. 531, 540-41 (2012) (citing Allen v. V & A Bros., Inc., 208 N.J. 114, 127 (2011)).  “[T]he best indicator of that intent is the statutory language[.]”  Richardson, 192 N.J. at 195 (first alteration in original) (quoting DiProspero v. Penn, 183 N.J. 477, 492 (2005)).  “A court should ‘asccribe to the statutory words their ordinary meaning and significance, and read them in context with related provisions so as to give sense to the legislation as a whole. ’”  D’Ambrosio v. Dep’t of Health & Senior Servs., 403 N.J. Super. 321, 334 (App. Div. 2008) (citing DiProspero, 183 N.J. at 492).  Here, the Legislature clearly intended a limitation period of eligibility for the presumption or recalculation provided under the Ricci Act, as the plain language of the statute sets a two-year deadline ending July 8, 2021, after which a “retiree shall not be eligible” for such benefits.  N.J.S.A. 53:5A-10(e)(4).  Under [...]’s argument, any member of [...] who was unaware of the Ricci Act could apply at any arbitrarily distant point in the future.  This would nullify the two-year time limitation created by the Legislature, extend the presumption beyond its intended time frame, and diminish the ability of [...] and [...] to verify applicants’ dates and locations of service as witnesses and memories inevitably continue to become unavailable and fade.  Ignoring the plain language of the statute, which imposes a two-year deadline, would not further the legislative purpose of the Ricci Act.  Even if the statutory language were not clear, [...]’s position would lead to an absurd result which would render the two-year statutory limitation superfluous.  In this regard, “[w]hen construing a statute, ‘legislative language must not, if reasonably avoidable, be found to be inoperative, superfluous or meaningless. ’”  State v. Regis, 208 N.J. 439, 449 (2011)(quoting Franklin Tower One, LLC v. N.M., 157 N.J. 602, 613 (1999).  Accordingly, [...] reasonably denied [...]’s request to apply for amended benefits under the Ricci Act because he failed to file his Eligibility Registration Form within the required statutory timeframe.
[brief] For the foregoing reasons and for the reasons previously set forth, this Court should enter and Order reversing the Order of the Law Division dated July 31, 2024 and disqualifying [...] from representing the State of New Jersey and the other defendants in this matter.  Respectfully submitted, LAW  OFFICE OF [...]  Attorneys for Plaintiff [...]  By: ___s/ Donald F. Burke__________  [...]  Dated: October 28, 2024  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION  [...], Plaintiff-Appellant, v. [...], [...]; [...]; THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE [...]; [...]; [...]; [...]; [...]; AND [...], Defendants-Respondents.  Docket No. [...]  Civil Action No. [...] Sat  Below: Hon. [...], J.S.C. [...], Plaintiff-Appellant, v. [...]; [...], DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, DIVISION OF BEHAVIORAL HEALTH SERVICES; [...]; [...], CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER, [...]; [...], DIRECTOR OF HUMAN RESOURCES, [...]; ANN  Docket No. [...]  Civil Action No. [...]  Sat Below: Hon. [...], J.S.C. KLEIN FORENSIC CENTER; [...], DIRECTOR OF HUMAN RESOURCES, AND [...], Defendants-Respondents.  BRIEF ON BEHALF OF DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS
[brief] In *Mason v. City of Hoboken*, the Court found that the plaintiff was not considered a prevailing party simply because the agency produced documents after an OPRA suit was filed.  196 N.J. 51, 78 (2008).  Rather, a complainant is a “prevailing party if he or she achieves the desired result because the complaint brought about change (voluntary or otherwise) in the custodian’s conduct. ”  *Teeters v. Division of Youth and Family Services*, 378 N.J. Super. 423, 432 (App. Div. 2006).  As set forth above, Plaintiffs’ motion practice was not the catalyst for the disclosure of the records or payment of the monies owed.
[directive] These records may contain, but are not limited to: a.  Records required by federal, state and local taxing authorities, b.  Records required by the labor departments, c.  Records required by state/local law or policy.  d.  Original invoices for services, equipment, travel, etc.  Each participating local, county or state law 2. enforcement agency shall submit on agency letterhead "certified as accurate" copies of payroll records, or statements overtime costs of incurred, to support the request for reimbursement to the lead Treasury law enforcement agency for review and authorization for payment.
[brief] See Guerra v. Twp. of Lyndhurst, 2015 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1816, *13-*14 (App. Div. 2015) (emphasis added)\(^1\).  Furthermore, our Courts have long held that:  There cannot be the slightest doubt that the mere presence…of persons with criminal intent or purpose does not constitute a --- \(^1\)  Pursuant to R. 1:36-3, a copy of the unpublished opinion Guerra v. Twp. of Lyndhurst, 2015 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1816 (App. Div. 2015), is available beginning at HHA_Da001. dangerous condition within the meaning of the [TCA] so as to impose liability upon the [public entity].  To the contrary, liability cannot be visited upon the [public entity] under the Tort Claims Act by reason of the criminal assault and robbery of [plaintiff].  Rodriguez v. New Jersey Sports & Exposition Authority, 193 N.J. 39, 44 (App. Div. 1983) (citing Setrin v. Glassboro State College, 136 N.J. Super. 329, 333 (App. Div. 1975)) (emphasis added); see also Posey v. Bordentown Sewerage Auth., 171 N.J. 172, 188 (2002); Pagan v. Newark Housing Authority, 2017 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2485, *4-*6 (App. Div. 2017).
[brief] In fact, the Insurance Fraud Prevention Act created a whole division within the Department of Banking and Insurance devoted exclusively to the investigation and prosecution of insurance fraud matters.  See N.J.S.A. 17:33A-8.  The Fraud Prevention Act also imposes an obligation upon individuals who believe that a violation of the Act has occurred to notify the Department of Banking and Insurance of their belief.  See N.J.S.A. 17:33A-9.  The Fraud Act provides State insurance investigators with the ability to subpoena those believed to possess relevant evidence.  See N.J.S.A. 17:33A-10 and 11.  Lastly, the Fraud Act preserved the State's ability to criminally prosecute individuals suspected of having engaged in insurance fraud.
[directive] For any firearm that has not been connected to any suspect or defendant and which has been submitted as found property, a request for destruction authorization may be submitted one year and one day after any necessary attempts to trace ownership of the weapon and upon verification that no prosecution has been instituted relating to the evidence.  5.  Other Evidence  a.  In all cases where all defendants have been charged and all of the defendants in the case are deceased, upon proof of death being submitted, a request for destruction authorization may be submitted.  b.  In cases where the defendants were convicted and no appeals or post-conviction relief motions are pending, after a period of 5 years from the date of conviction or upon the defendants expiration of sentence, whichever comes later, a request for destruction authorization may be submitted.  If there is a legal owner of said evidence who is not a defendant, no forfeiture proceedings are pending or have been concluded and there are no appeals of said forfeiture action pending and the ownership has not been granted to a law enforcement agency by court order, said property shall be returned to the legal owner of same, rather than being authorized for destruction.  g.  In cases involving juvenile defendants who have been charged, except in Homicide cases, and where there is no referral of the case to another court, with or without the juvenile’s consent, a request for destruction authorization may be submitted 4 years after the final adjudication or disposition of all juvenile defendants or upon release from custody, whichever is later.  Evidence in juvenile cases which are referred (waived) to another court, or in which there are adult co-defendants, shall be subject to the retention periods for adult cases.  6.
[brief] (Pa 57, at 103:20 – 104:6, 105:9-13)  During the meeting Plaintiff was informed that Defendant [...] would be discipled.  (Pa 58, at 106:10-21)  Plaintiff was not told what form of discipline Defendant [...] would be subjected to.  (Pa, at 106:19-21).  Yet, while discipline was promised, Defendant [...] was never actually subjected to any form of discipline.
[brief] (12T4:15-9:17)  As to fee-shifting it ruled there was no evidence to support self-dealing because [...]’s expert had not confirmed what the Court’s expert and [...]’s expert had definitely confirmed: the [...] “long term liability” was mostly Plaintiffs’ own legal fees.  (12T6:12-7:21)(Pa3209)  [...]’s own expert confirmed that.  (8T58:9-23)  The Court also reiterated its original belief that discounts normally should apply under law, and that [...]’s arguments of law were not correct.  (12T7:22-8:11)  This appeal followed.
[brief] Plaintiff’s assignor filed the complaint to foreclose a tax sale certificate on June 22, 2022.  (28a-34a).  The matter was uncontested and final judgment entered on November 7, 2022.  (85a-88a).  On February 2, 2023, Defendants [...], [...], and [...] (“Defendants”) filed a motion to vacate the final judgment.  (90a-142a).  On February 23, 2023, third-party [...] (“[...]”) filed a motion to intervene and protect its title.  (329a-376a).  On April 3, 2023, the court entered two orders which: 1) granted [...]’s motion to intervene, and 2) denied Defendants’ motion to vacate without prejudice pending a 90-day discovery period.  (6a-7a, 377a-378a).  On August 11, 2023, [...] filed a motion to compel discovery, which the court denied on September 27, 2023.  (395a-449a, 24a-25a).  On October 17, 2023, Defendants filed a motion for reconsideration and to vacate the judgment.  (451a-788a).  The court denied the motion on November 15, 2023.  (26a-27a).  Defendants filed an appeal on December 8, 2023.  (1a-5a).  --- # refers to Defendants’ appellate appendix and page number.  1T refers to the motion transcript of March 17, 2023.  2T refers to the motion transcript of September 27, 2023.  3T refers to the motion transcript of November 15, 2023.