ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The Legislature’s intent in enacting the IFPA could not have been clearer.  It expressly provides that:  “The purpose of this act is to confront aggressively the problem of insurance fraud in New Jersey by facilitating the detection of insurance fraud, eliminating the occurrence of such fraud through the development of fraud prevention programs, requiring the restitution of fraudulently obtained insurance benefits, and reducing the amount of dollars used to pay back fraudulent claims”
[brief] He affirmed that he relied entirely on his lawyer with regard to the voir dire issue.  With regard to the ballistics issue, defendant reviewed state expert [...]'s report:  Q  …  Did you talk to [...] at all about this expert report from Mr. [...]s?  A  I can’t say I talked to her, but I know I wrote her numerous letters requesting for her to hire her own ballistics expert just from the -- just from the inconsistencies that I seen from the witness statements.  1T71  Q …  So you got the [...]s report from your -- your trial lawyer, right, [...], she sent it to you.
[brief] Thus, as was the case in *O'Loughlin*, the Consent Order here should be interpreted strictly, based upon its clear language: that claims asserted after the sixty (60) day period do not benefit from the agreed-upon tolling, and are subject to defenses based upon the statutes of limitations and repose.  (Pa150 - Pa152).  Any contrary interpretation would run afoul of the reasoning in O'Loughlin and constitute reversible error.  On its face, the Consent Order is a mechanism by which the parties agreed only to toll applicable statutes of limitation and repose, pending adjudication of a tangentially related arbitration.  (Pa150 - Pa152).  As all parties agree, the Consent Order is clear and unambiguous.  By improperly adding nonexistent terms to the Consent Order, so as to dismiss Plaintiffs' instant Complaint with prejudice, the Trial Court disregarded both the Rules of Court and New Jersey law, so as to unnecessarily limit Plaintiffs' "free access to courts."  See Banach v. Cannon, 356 N.J. Super. 342 (Ch. Div. Mon. Cty. 2002) ("The court also must be careful that in protecting a plaintiff's rights by issuing such relief it does not unnecessarily limit any affected parties' free access to courts.").  As the Trial Court's decision is inconsistent with established New Jersey law, this Court should reverse the decision of the Trial Court and reinstate Plaintiffs' Complaint in its entirety.
[brief] Pa041-Pa042.  On November 4, 2020, a criminal Complaint was issued against Plaintiff which charged him with possession of methamphetamine, a controlled dangerous substance, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10(c).  Pa170.  Over the period of several days in 2021 (June 23, July 20, September 22 and October 27), the criminal matter was tried at the [...].  Pa224-Pa227.  After considering the testimony of the witnesses and reviewing the BWC video, [...] found Plaintiff guilty of: (1) obstruction of justice in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:29-1(a); and (2) resisting arrest in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:29-2(a)(1).  Pa153-Pa154 (T5:17-T6:4).  The charges related to Plaintiff’s possession of controlled dangerous substances were dismissed.  Pa467.2  [...] imposed a fine in the amount of $916.00 including costs.  Pa168.  [...] did not order a jail sentence and did not place Plaintiff on probation.  Pa155-Pa156 (T9:2-T11:14).  [...] specifically informed Plaintiff and his counsel of his right to appeal, and the need for Plaintiff to obtain a complete transcript of the entire case in order to file an appeal.  Pa155-Pa156 (T9:16-T10:9).  [...] also informed Plaintiff that he had “20 days in which to file an appeal from any decision that I rendered in your entire case,” and indicated that --- 2
[brief] (8T41:16-43:23).  [...]’s opinion was that while the corporate policy of [...] itself was adequate, [...] management at the store level in this case failed to implement its policy and standard industry practice for training and supervision and therefore breached the standard of care.  (8T72:4-74:10).  He testified that it is "consistent throughout the industry including big box stores like Lowe's that the person has to be trained in his department before he's set loose alone on the sales floor".  (8T135:10-136:18).  According to [...], the failure of Lowe's to ensure that [...] completed his training before setting him loose on the sales floor by himself constituted a breach of the standard of care in the retail industry.  (8T133:16-22).
[brief] THE MOTION COURT PROPERLY GRANTED [...] | | | AN AWARD OF ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND COSTS | 28 | | CONCLUSION | 31 | # TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | Cases: | Page(s) | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|---------| | **715 Partners, LLC v. GS Assignment, LLC,** | | | A-2527-15T3, 2018 WL 2372800 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. May 25, 2018) | 17, 25 | | **B.R. v. Vaughan,** | | | 427 N.J. Super. 487 (L. Div. 2012) | 10 | | **Banco Popular N. Am. v. Gandi,** | | | 184 N.J. 161 (2005) | 9 | | **Blum Bldg. Co. v. Ingersoll,** | | | 99 N.J. Eq. 563 (Ch. 1926) | 20 | | **Camden Cnty.
[directive] Page 2 of 3  Specifically, the enactment amended paragraph (a) of N.J.S.2C:29-9 (“Contempt”), to read as follows:  (a)  (1)  Except as provided in paragraph (2) of this subsection, a [A] person is guilty of a crime of the fourth degree if the person purposely or knowingly disobeys a judicial order or protective order, pursuant to section 1 of P.L.1985, c.250 (C.2C:28-5.1), or hinders, obstructs, or impedes the effectuation of a judicial order or the exercise of jurisdiction over any person, thing, or controversy by a court, administrative body, or investigative entity, or purposely or knowingly violates a condition to avoid all contact with an alleged victim or a condition of home detention with or without the use of an approved electronic monitoring device, ordered pursuant to subparagraph (b) of paragraph (1) or subparagraph (k) of paragraph (2) of subsection b. of section 3 of P.L. 2014, c.31 (C.2A:162-17), when the conduct which constitutes the violation could also constitute a crime or a disorderly persons offense.
[brief] [...]'s testimony could have impeached [...] and the exculpatory testimony could have had the probability to persuade the jury not to convict [...].  [...] was facing 185 years in prison, with a significant period of parole ineligibility.  (8T 669 to 74-5)  Instead of pleading guilty to any of the charges in the indictment, he pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit theft, a third-degree offense.  (8T 25-15 to 24)  The plea bargain called for [...]'s testimony at trial in exchange for a five-year flat sentence.
[brief] 16T150-3 to 155-5; 17T38-24 to 55-13; 24T50-11 to 51-1; Da02865 – Da02896, Da03054 – Da03058, Da03060, Da 03061 – Da03062.  [...] also had signatory authority on [...] and [...]’s bank accounts, signed corporate checks and transferred funds between the companies, and paid corporate expenses.
[directive] 2C:25-31 provides that when a defendant is arrested on a charge of contempt of a domestic violence restraining order, the law enforcement officer shall conduct a search of the Domestic Violence Central Registry.  This statute provides that when a person is charged with any of the designated offenses in 2C:35-5.6c, and the person is released from custody on bail or recognizance, or is otherwise issued a summons, the court may, upon application of a law enforcement officer or prosecuting attorney, issue a written restraining 2C:35-5.7 order prohibiting the person from entering the designated area surrounding the place of the alleged offense.  This order shall provide a prohibition on the person Drug Offender Restraining Order Act from entering an area up to 500 feet surrounding the place unless the court rules that a different buffer zone would better effectuate the purposes of this Act.
[brief] On February 20, 2024, the Township adopted Resolution 24-96, which authorized and directed the Township Administrator to prepare and issue a Request for Expressions of Interest to solicit proposals from qualified redevelopers for the redevelopment of the \textsuperscript{4}  Although Plaintiff named [...] as an interested party in this matter, [...] failed to appear, resulting in the entry of default on January 31, 2024.  (Trans. ID [...]).  Property, which was returnable in 90 days (the “New Redeveloper RFEI Resolution”).
[brief] CASES  American Civil Liberties Union v. New Jersey Div. of Crim. Justice, 435 N.J.Super. 533 (App.Div. 2014)  ..........  16  Bent v. Tp. of Stafford, 381 N.J.Super. 30 (2005)  .....................  11,16  Fuster v. Tp. of Chatham, __________ N.J.Super.  _______________  12 App.Div. 2023)  Libertarians for Transparent Government v. Cumberland Co., 250 N.J. 46 (2022)  ....................................  15  MAG Entertainment, LLC v. Div. of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 375 N.J.Super. 534 (App.Div. 2005) ....................................
[brief] Due to the Covid-19 pandemic [...]’ yard in Ramsey was under quarantine.  The State Government and Courts were closed.  Ironically some of the very people involved in the fate of [...] were working remotely at this time.  [...] found that [...] was very concerned about being infected with the Covid-19 virus in March and April 2020 and that it was the primary reason he did not want to return to work at the Ramsey yard (EXHIBIT 4, P. 11, last paragraph).
[brief] [...], thirteen (13) minutes after emailing [...] and offering him $650,000 for the property, on February 14, 2022 at 2:53 p.m. (after Final Judgment), offered to buy the same property from Plaintiff [...]/[...] in WhatsApp messages for $400,000.  196a.  To be clear, [...] paid $20,654 to redeem a tax sale certificate and take ownership of property without a mortgage that they sold days later for $375,000 to [...] who had just offered to buy it from the owner for $650,000.
[brief] .................................................................................................................  1  I.  The Proposed Stormwater System is Not Compliant with the Stormwater Management Rules, Therefore the Issuance of the FHA Permit Should be Reversed.  (Aa2521-Aa2537)..................................................................................  1  A.  The Application Fails to Meet the Water Quality Requirements Under the Stormwater Management Rules.  (Aa2521-Aa2537)..............................................  2  B.  The Application Fails to Meet Groundwater Recharge Requirements Under the Stormwater Management Rules.  (Aa2521-Aa2537)...............................  4  C.  The Application Fails to Meet Peak Flow Requirements Under the Stormwater Management Rules.  (Aa2521-Aa2537).  ..............................................  9  II.  The [...] Failed to Adequately Consider Impacts to Endangered or Threatened Wildlife Species Identified on Site, Therefore the Issuance of the FHA Permit Should be Reversed.  (Aa2576-Aa2616)..............................................  10  CONCLUSION .........................................................................................................................
[brief] New Jersey’s expert rule allows for hearsay evidence to be presented if it is the type of evidence reasonably relied on by experts in the field.  That evidence is then admissible for the limited purpose of apprising the jury of the opinion’s basis and not for its contents’ truth.  *State v. Torres*, 183 N.J. 554, 576 (2005) (quoting N.J.R.E. 703).  Thus, “an expert may offer out-of-court statements of others to support the opinions presented. ”  *Ibid.* (citing *State v. Pasterick*, 285 N.J. Super. 607, 620 (App. Div. 1995)).  In criminal cases, the limit is that the expert testimony cannot become “a vehicle for the ‘wholesale [introduction] of otherwise inadmissible evidence. ’”  *State v. Vandeweaghe*, 351 N.J. Super. 467, 481-83 (App. Div. 2002).  Our courts have not addressed expert testimony on the ACE-V method used for fingerprint analysis.
[brief] (Pa042).  [...] testified that if an incident was not captured on camera then [...] would not preserve any video.  (Pa096).  [...] produced its discovery on November 9, 2021 at which point it disclosed it was not in possession of any video surveillance footage from the date of loss.  On January 10, 2023, [...] requested that Plaintiffs’ counsel produce a copy of any and all notices of preservation ever sent to [...] and proof of service of same.  (Da032).  Plaintiffs never produced any notices of preservation sent to [...] nor proofs of service of same in discovery.  On appeal, Plaintiffs concede no such notices were ever sent.  **PROCEDURAL HISTORY**
[brief] State v. Triestman, 416 N.J. Super. 195 (App. Div. 2010).......................43  State v. Williams, 214 N.J. Super. 12 (App. Div. 1986), cert. denied, 107 N.J. 629 (1987).................................................................30  State v. Williams, 218 N.J. 579 (2014)..................................................16
[brief] This brief is submitted on behalf of defendant-respondent-cross appellant, [...] i/p/a [...] (“[...]”), in response to plaintiffs’ appeal and in support of [...]’s cross appeal seeking to reverse the Law Division’s denial of [...]’s motion to dismiss in lieu of answer and motion for summary judgment, both, on statute of limitations grounds and in the interests of justice, for plaintiffs’ failure to file the action against [...] within the applicable statute of limitations, and, upon reversal, granting [...] summary judgment and dismissing the third amended complaint with prejudice, for plaintiffs’ failure to file the action against [...] within the applicable statute of limitations.  This matter arises from plaintiff, [...]’s, a then 55 year old, Caucasian, male, claim that on March 16, 2017 at approximately 6:00 p.m., he allegedly slipped and fell on black ice on the surface of the parking lot located in a shopping mall at [...] (the “Premises”) and allegedly sustained bodily injuries.
[brief] [...]’s convictions must be reversed.  In the alternative, the matter must be remanded for an evidentiary hearing.  C.  The failure to properly address the fingerprint testimony at voir dire, to limit the examiner’s testimony at trial, and to charge the jury on the limits of such testimony deprived defendant of his rights to an impartial jury and a fair trial.  Because the State failed to demonstrate the reliability of fingerprint comparisons that are generated from database searches, the evidence should have been excluded in its entirety.
[brief] (4T 133-24 to 134-8, 135-18 to 25, 146-21 to 147-19)  He testified that the blood was “[m]ostly toward the back seat on the driver’s side of the vehicle,” and “[t]here was also blood on some of the objects” in the car.  (4T 154-12 to 15)  Both the knife and tire iron tested positive for blood, with a mixture of [...] and [...]’s DNA on the handles, and [...]’s DNA on the knife blade and end of the tire iron.
[brief] (Pa14).  [...] filed its Answer on July 2, 2023.  (Pa22).  [...]’s Answer did not claim that [...]’s action was untimely under her policy’s four-year limitation provision.  (Pa24–Pa28).  Rather, [...]’s Answer contended that [...]’s claims were “barred by the Statute of Limitations[.]” (Pa26).  With its Answer, [...] also served [...] with a preservation notice, document requests, interrogatories, and a demand for medical authorizations.  (Pa29–Pa42).  [...] responded to [...]’s discovery requests on August 16, 2023.  (Pa172).  As part of her discovery responses, [...] produced over 700 pages of medical records and other documents.  (Pa138).  On October 5, 2023, in the middle of discovery, [...] filed a “Motion Dismissing Complaint. ” (Pa44).  [...]’s Motion argued that [...] had violated her policy’s suit limitation provision and cooperation provision.  (Pa3–Pa5).  [...]’s Motion raised these contract defenses—for the first time—more than 17 months after receiving notice of [...]’s UIM claim.  (Pa109).  Although [...] did not specify which Court Rule applied, the Motion included a statement of material facts and attached evidence.  (Pa46–Pa48).  [...] opposed the Motion on October 17, 2023.  (Pa135).  Her Opposition established that she had provided prompt notice of her claim to [...].  (Pa5–Pa6).  [...] also contended that New Jersey’s six-year statute of limitations applied to her claim based on the policy’s conformity-to-law provision.  (Pa6).  Additionally, [...] argued that [...] was equitably estopped from disclaiming coverage.  (Pa6–Pa7).  The trial court heard oral argument on November 17, 2023.  (T1).  At argument, the trial court cited three opinions that [...] had not.  (T13-21).  For this reason, [...] filed a supplemental letter brief hours after the hearing.  (Pa124).  That same day, the trial court issued its Order and Memorandum Decision dismissing [...]’s Complaint with prejudice.
[brief] The New Jersey Supreme Court has “recognized that the cumulative effect of…errors may be so great as to work prejudice, and..have not hesitated to afford the party suffering that prejudice relief where it has been warranted. ”  Pellicer ex rel. Pellicer v. St. Barnabas Hosp., 200 N.J. 22, 53 (2009); see also Torres v. Pabon, 225 N.J. 167, 191(2016); see also Morales-Hurtado v. Reinoso 2018 N.J. Super. LEXIS 169 (approved for publication Dec. 6, 2018).
[brief] ”  *Ibid.*  Defendant again stated, emphatically, that “I’m telling the truth, sir.  Somebody came to my property with a gun…” (21T:189-12 to 13).  Defendant also claimed that when he shot [...], they were very close together – approximately two feet apart.  (21T:194-15 to 195-9; 22T:208-7 to 21).  [...] was shot once in the leg, and then fatally in the chest, and his death was declared a homicide.
[brief] ”  (Pa14); Kulwicki, 969 F.2d at 1465 (holding use of allegedly false testimony “in connection with the prosecution is absolutely protected” from liability under the doctrine) (citing Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 485 (1991)).  For these reasons, this court should hold, similar to [...]’s federal constitutional claims, that the Prosecutor Defendants are entitled to absolute prosecutorial immunity from liability as to [...]’s NJCRA constitutional claims.  See Brown, 442 N.J. Super. at 425.
[brief] However, the Court skipped the part about not wanting to hurt anybody and only focused on “covering his tracks” to attribute more weight than necessary to aggravating factor nine (9).  The Court then stated, “In fact despite multiple evaluations, defendant’s competency has never been mentioned. ” (17T:202-19 to 20).  “Defendant’s own desires and choices guided his actions, not any mental deficiency. ”  (17T:202-20-21).  This statement by the Court contradicts the testimony of both experts.  When it came to applying weight to aggravating factors three (3) and (9), the Court stated that [...] had no remorse and called him a cold-blooded killer incapable of rehabilitation.
[brief] The SEC modified the ALJ’s recommended penalty of reprimand in favor of censure.  See Sg005.  However, the SEC’s decision to do so reflects an organization that has overprioritized the stamping out of any alleged politicization of school boards, even when the conduct at issue was deemed justified, and would have been reasonable in any other circumstance.  As noted supra, Appellant’s chief moral duty as a school board member was rendering a righteous judgment, and the ALJ’s decision as to [...], determining her as having betrayed her duty to the Board in favor of political candidates and having made remarks alleging sitting board members had conflicts of interest preventing them from acting impartiality, solidifies that Appellant’s request was both justified and in line with that moral duty.  As further noted supra, if the SEC’s decision is affirmed, the relationship between board president and board counsel will be fundamentally changed in a manner that disincentives requests requiring immediate legal services and inter-board accountability while simultaneously empowering third-party politicization of board affairs.  Accordingly, the SEC’s decision to enhance the ALJ’s recommendation was arbitrary and capricious and therefore must be overturned.
[brief] In Huntington Ingalls Industries, Inc. v. Ace American Ins. Co., 287 A.3d 515 (Vt. 2022), the Vermont Supreme Court stated:  “An insurance policy is construed according to its terms and the evident intent of the parties as expressed in the policy language. ”  Cincinnati Specialty Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Energy Wise Holmes, Inc., 2015 VT 52, ¶ 16, 199 Vt. 104, 120 A.3d 1160 (quotation omitted).  Policy provisions must be “read together and viewed as an integrated whole. ”  Progressive N. Ins. Co. v. Muller, 2020 VT 76, ¶ 11, 213 Vt. 145, 249 A.3d 24 (quotation omitted).  We interpret terms in an insurance policy “according to their plain, ordinary, and popular meaning,” and will enforce unambiguous terms as written.  Brillman v. New Eng. Guar. Ins. Co., 2020 VT 16, ¶ 19, 211 Vt. 550, 228 A.3d 636 (quotation omitted).  “Words or phrases in an insurance policy are ambiguous if they are fairly susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation. ”  Whitney, 2015 VT 140, ¶ 16, 201 Vt. 29, 135 A.3d 272.  When the language is ambiguous, we construe the terms “liberally in favor of the insured and full coverage. ”  Pharmacists Mut.  Ins. Co. v. Myer, 2010 VT 10, ¶ 10, 187 Vt. 323, 993 A.2d 413.  “However, the fact that a dispute has arisen as to proper interpretation does not automatically render the language ambiguous. ”  Rainforest Chocolate, LLC v. Sentinel Ins. Co., 2018 VT 140, ¶ 7, 209 Vt. 232, 204 A.3d 1109 (quotation omitted).  The insured has the burden of proving coverage under the policy, and once coverage is shown, the insurer has the burden of proving any exceptions to coverage apply.  *N. Sec. Ins. Co. v. Stanhope*, 2010 VT 92, ¶ 10, 188 Vt. 520, 14 A.3d 257.  B.  **[...]’s Denial of Coverage**
[brief] \(^5\)  The Planning Board did not consider, in fact, totally ignored, reconciling consistency with the fact that the land use element of the Master Plan did not designate Plaintiff’s Property as a location for an 11-acre park open to any resident of the county nor was there any consideration of how the Second Ordinance hurt the possibility of providing Mt. Laurel housing (Objective 2) nor the increase in density of housing that resulted from the Second Ordinance.  1.  Open Space  While increasing open space may be within the general objectives of the Master Plan, the split use of Plaintiff’s Property between the Redeveloper and the County and the calling for an 11 acre park in an area never designated for such use in the Master Plan, as provided in the Second Ordinance, “materially undermine(s) or distort(s)” the plans for the use of Plaintiff’s Property contained and endorsed in the land use provisions of the 2019 updated Master Plan.  Accordingly, the Second Ordinance cannot be substantially consistent with the Master Plan.
[brief] The “net opinion rule” precludes experts from expressing bare conclusions unsupported by factual evidence.  Buckalew v. Grossbard, 87 N.J. 512, 524 (1981).  The expert’s opinion must be based upon “facts or data . . . perceived by or made known to the expert. ”  Stanley Co. of Am. V. Hercules Powder Co., 16 N.J. 295, 305–06 (1954); Fink v. City of Paterson, 44 N.J. Super. 129, 135 (App. Div. 1957).  When evaluating an expert, “a court must ensure that the proffered expert does not offer a --- 6 Consistent with R. 1:36-3, unpublished decisions cited herein are attached hereto. mere net opinion. ”  Pomerantz Paper Corp. v. New Comm. Corp., 207 N.J. 344, 372 (2011).  The Pomerantz Court described the Net Opinion Rule as follows: