ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] After over fifteen years of parole hearings, unexplained rejection of mitigating evidence, denials of parole on contrived grounds, imposition of excessive FETs, administrative appeals, reversals, and remands, it is abundantly clear that the Board does not ever intend to release [...] on parole despite his eligibility.  It is respectfully submitted that this Court should not countenance the Board’s consistent defiance of judicial commands, its refusal to consider critical mitigating evidence submitted on [...]’ behalf, and its failure to offer any meaningful explanation or analysis of its reasons for doing so.  No matter how heinous the Board may consider [...]’s prior conduct, that cannot serve as the basis for denying parole.  As our Supreme Court has eloquently summarized:  From the standpoint of retribution, perhaps no prison sentence, whatever its length, is sufficiently severe.  Nevertheless, the punitive elements of retribution and general deterrence cannot, under the law, be the determinative factors in resolving [a] prisoner’s eligibility for parole release.  [Trantino IV, 154 N.J. at 43-44.]  The Board continues to punish [...] for his crimes, despite his significant rehabilitation which is demonstrated by the overwhelming mitigation evidence and the clinical risk assessments in this matter.  At every turn, the Board places the greatest amount of weight on the nature and circumstances of [...]’s offenses – historical facts that cannot be changed no matter how long [...] may serve in prison – and simultaneously fails to give due consideration to the mitigation evidence of record.  For the foregoing reasons, and based upon the authorities cited, it is respectfully requested that this Court reverse the Board’s February 28, 2024 Final Decision, and exercise its authority to grant [...]’s application for parole.
[brief] ”  Lennig, 41 N.J. Eq. at 608.  That appurtenance – direct access from the Premises to the proposed boardwalk and beach – not only runs with the land, but also applies to [...]’s “heirs and assigns” and [...]’s “successors[] and . . . all and every other person or persons whomsoever lawfully claiming or to claim the same. ” (Da448-Da449).  Accordingly, [...] acquired the rights to use not only the roads designated on the 1925 Plan, but also to use the proposed boardwalk and restrooms and the NBA Beach Lands to the east, i.e., “open spaces,” for his enjoyment.  Restatement, § 2.13, cmt. c.; see also Lennig, 41 N.J. Eq. at 608.  The 1925 Plan showed oceanfront lots directly abutting the open space of the beach.  The 1929 conveyance to [...] specifically referenced the 1925 Plan more than once, which “impliedly create[d] private rights in those streets, rights of way, [and] beaches. ”  E. Shores, Inc., 131 N.J. Super. at 311.  [...] purchased the Premises as any reasonable purchaser would, understanding that he had the right to directly access the Atlantic Ocean from the Premises.  For all the reasons set forth above, the 1925 Plan supports the implied easement appurtenant.  The analysis and conclusion of Defendants’ “expert” contending [...] intended only street ends be used for beach access is belied by the map itself.
[brief] “Released Claims” shall mean any and all actions, causes of action, suits, claims, defenses, covenants, controversies, agreements, promises, damages, judgments, demands, liabilities and obligations in law or in equity relating solely to claims of statutory damages under the federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”), that Plaintiffs and the Settlement Class Members, as defined herein, asserted or could have asserted as a result of, arising out of, or in connection with the collection of a debt on behalf of [...] and on behalf of Pinnacle Credit _____________________ (Da20-Da28).  Services, LLC when they were not licensed under New Jersey Consumer Finance Licensing Act (“NJCFLA”), N.J.S.A. 17:11C 1 et seq., from the beginning of time to the date of this Agreement.  (Pa25-Pa33, ¶ 19) (emphasis added).  In addition, Paragraph 19 of the Settlement Order states:  Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Plaintiffs and Settlement Class Members specifically reserve the right to sue for actual damages and to dispute the amount of the alleged debts that they may owe to [...] or [...].  Additionally, The Released Claims specifically do not include any claims that Plaintiffs and Settlement Class Members may have against any of the Released Parties for any causes of action other than arising from [...]’s or Pinnacle Credit Services LLC’s failure to be licensed under the NJCLFA.  Id. (emphasis added).  Accordingly, since Appellant’s central allegation is that Respondents were not appropriately licensed under the NJCFLA, Appellant’s claims are specifically covered by the Settlement Agreement and Settlement Order and, therefore, they are barred.
[brief] I.  Defendant’s Position is Incompatible with Binding Precedents  Appellate courts reviewing a grant or denial of a motion to suppress must uphold the factual findings underlying the trial court's decision so long as those findings are supported by sufficient credible evidence in the record.  State v. Lamb, 218 N.J. 300, 313 (2014).  Legal conclusions, however, are reviewed de novo.  Ibid.  Here, the relevant question is one of law.
[brief] Attorneys’ fee awards routinely involve analysis at that level of specificity, see, e.g., Hansen v. Rite Aid Corp., 253 N.J. 191, 221 (2023).  And Hansen, decided while this appeal was pending, should at least require a remand to assure complete compliance with the Supreme Court’s latest instructions about evaluation of fee applications.  [...] further argues that certain arguments made by the [...] were previously made on the prior appeal.  ([...]_Pb 34-35).  That much is true --- 3
[brief] And courts, including [...], have distinguished violations of the NJCFA from those of the FDCPA and held a violation of the FDCPA does not trigger a violation of the NJCFA.  See [...], 430 N.J. Super. at 338 (“defendant has not cited any regulations under the [NJCFA] which either the plaintiff or the collection agency violated.  While defendant points to the collection agency’s violation of the FDCPA, it is not a regulation under the [NJCFA].”).  In addition, distinct from an FDCPA, which is not alleged here, an NJCFA claim is held to a higher standard of pleading and must plead specific facts and circumstances and not merely conclusory statements as Appellant has done in the Complaint.  See Katz v. Ambit Northeast, LLC, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 169407, at *9, 2020 WL 5542780 (D.N.J. Sept. 16, 2020) (holding plaintiff failed to satisfy the pleading standard for the NJCFA and dismissing the claim – “Katz makes a conclusory allegation that is devoid of facts sufficient to meet both the elements of the NJCFA and the heightened pleading requirements of Rule 9(b).
[directive] (4)  Screening.  If a Board member or staffer has a close personal or business relationship with an interested party or any individual who meets any of the criteria listed under the “inherent conflicts,” the Board member or staff should establish a screen to ensure the non-disclosure of sensitive information involving the Board.  (d)  Criminal History of Board Members and Staff  All Civilian Review Board members and staff who support the Board’s work, on a full- or part-time basis, must undergo a criminal history background check.
[brief] We have repeatedly stated that “[t]he point is to assure that the parties know that in electing arbitration as the exclusive remedy, they are waiving their time-honored right to sue. ”  *Ibid.* (quoting *Marchak*, supra, 134 N.J. at 282, 633 A.2d 531); *Hirsch*, supra, 215 N.J. at 187, 71 A.3d 849 (same).  No particular form of words is necessary to accomplish a clear and unambiguous waiver of rights.  It is worth remembering, however, that every consumer contract in New Jersey must be written in a simple, clear, understandable and easily readable way.
[brief] Accordingly, “logic and reason dictate” that the Township’s “[z]oning ordinances which permit 'customarily incidental' accessory uses to the main activity permit, by implication” continued offsite parking on Lot 5 as an accessory use to Respondent’s principal use of the structure on Lot 8 for a house of worship.  Charlie Brown of Chatham, 202 N.J. Super. at 323.  Appellant’s claim to the contrary is meritless.  POINT III
[brief] First, the motion to dismiss the indictment was not based on this ground.  (See Db42) (alleging that the “misconduct . . . only became evident during the trial” and stating that this issue was “not raised below”).  Defendant maintained below that the State elicited testimony from [...] that [...] lured [...] “when no such evidence . . . exists to support this conclusion. ” (Pa48).  However, now, defendant argues that the State affirmatively “misrepresented” the facts to support the luring theory.  (Db44).  Grounds for objection must be clearly stated to preserve the issue for appeal.  See State v. Melton, 136 N.J. Super. 378, 381 (App. Div. 1975); R. 1:7-2.  “[T]he notice of appeal is hardly the vehicle to question the integrity of the grand jury proceeding, especially when the basic information to challenge the indictment was known or knowable before the trial commenced. ”  State v. Simon, 421 N.J. Super. 547, 557 (App. Div. 2011); see also R. 3:10-2(c) (stating challenges to the indictment must be made before trial).  The defense had the means to discover [...]’s error as soon as [...]’s cell phone records were received in discovery.  Likewise, “transcripts of grand jury proceedings are discoverable prior to trial. ”  State v. Lee, 211 N.J. Super. 590, 597 (App. Div. 1986) (citing R. 3:13-3(a)(3)).  Indeed, the defense relied on these records in confronting [...] on this issue at trial.  (6T115-7 to 116-15).  Defendant’s complaint should not be heard now when he failed to “mov[e] for dismissal of --- 13
[brief] Pa047; DSOF ¶ 4.  Appellant worked for [...] in this role until March 13, 2020.  Pa047; DSOF ¶ 5.  As of March of 2020, Appellant reported to [...].  Pa047; DSOF ¶ 6.  [...] was responsible for some day-to-day monitoring of the claims department and for ensuring work on insurance claims had been completed and for assigning new claims to Appellant.  Pa047; DSOF ¶ 7.  [...] was Ms.  Iannotti’s direct supervisor.  Pa047; DSOF ¶ 8.  [...] did not have a separate human resources department in March of 2020.  Pa047; DSOF ¶ 9.  Appellant resided at [...] for a majority of her employment at [...], within a 35-minute walk of the [...] office.  Pa047; DSOF ¶ 10.  In February or March of 2020, Appellant moved to her boyfriend’s apartment located at [...].  Pa047; DSOF ¶ 11.  He is a business executive that worked from home.  Pa256.  On Thursday March 12, 2020, text messages were exchanged on a group text message chain between Appellant, [...], [...], and [...].
[brief] First, it is black letter law that one legislature may not bind its successor by enacting procedural requirements and barriers to the enactment of future legislation.  But even if such rules could be effective, the enactment of Chapter 375 did not violate them.  First, N.J.S.A. 1:7-1 to -7 allows only for Petitioners to challenge a law’s enactment as violating constitutionally mandated procedures, not with processes established by other statutes.
[brief] Plaintiff filed her opposition to the Railroad Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on January 23, 2024.  Pa761.  Plaintiff conceded that “some of the causes of actions plead by plaintiff in her complaint have been abandoned as discovery developed”, explaining that the following claims should be dismissed: negligent design, construction, and maintenance of dangerous conditions; failure to design adequate warnings; premises liability allegations regarding physical defects of the premises or lack of warning devices and barriers to control pedestrians; allegations of engineering negligence; and punitive damages.
[brief] In the present case, the plaintiff claims the testimony of [...] was unreliable because the defense did not establish the soundness of the methodology he relied upon in formulating his opinion as to the location of the plaintiff’s fall.  (Pb40).  To the contrary, [...] explained to the jury his scientific methodology for recreating the plaintiff’s accident, which involved an investigation, whereby he pieces together various materials related to the case to come up with the most reasonable explanation of the cause.  (5T106:23-108:1).  This included his review of the depositions of the plaintiff, plaintiff’s daughter and several employees of [...]; review of ASTM standards; review of applicable codes that go to property maintenance for the [...], for the jurisdiction that it’s in; review of the CC-TV video of plaintiff’s incident; and review of some reference material related to the use of rollators.  (5T112:25-113:17).  These materials relied upon by [...] are all materials that fall within one of the three categories set forth in N.J.R.E. 703, thereby establishing a proper foundation for [...]’s expert opinions.
[brief] This principle is likewise applicable when construing an insurance application.  *Fellippello v. Allsate Ins. Co.*, 172 N.J. Super. 249, 257 (App. Div. 1979).  Thus, although intentional acts designed to mislead an insurance company justify rescission\(^6\), rescission is not appropriate if the insured’s misrepresentation results from an ambiguity in the insurer’s questions on the application for insurance.  *American Policyholders’ Ins. Co. v. Portale*, 88 N.J. Super. 429 (App. Div. 1965, overruled on other grounds, *State Farm v. Wall*, 92 --- \(^6\) *Pioneer National Title Ins. Co. v. Lucas*, 155 N.J. Super. 332 (App. Div.), aff’d o.b., 78 N.J. 320 (1978) (rescission of title insurance policy justified where attorney ordering search asked for standard 60-year search when he knew of alleged title claims more than 60 years old).  N.J. Super. 92 (1966) (finding insured could misunderstand meaning of word “conviction” relating to disclosure of motor vehicle violations in insurance application, and rescission was not warranted).
[brief] Pa416-419.  That is not correct.  At no time did [...] produce any expert opinion, or other evidence for that matter, proving that [...] is responsible for the damages she allegedly sustained.  On this significant point, [...] cannot demonstrate that the Trial Court either did not consider, or failed to appreciate the significance of probative, competent evidence, because such evidence does not exist.  In granting summary judgment in favor of [...], the Trial Court correctly recognized that [...] did not proffer any credible evidence that the damages and losses she alleged to have sustained were the natural and probable consequences of anything [...] did or failed to do.  During the motion hearing, the Trial Court recognized that [...] failed to demonstrate that [...] was responsible for any of the items [...] claimed were missing.  In fact, [...] does not dispute that other individuals and entities, including [...] and [...], were in her home and removed items following the incident well before the arrival of [...].  [...]’s own testimony establishes that the items of her property that are at issue in this case were already damaged by the water event and the activities of [...] at her home.  That fact coupled with the lack of any evidence proving that [...] caused additional damage to those items above and beyond what was already done precludes [...] from meeting her burden of proof, such that a trial against [...] in this case would be an unnecessary and fruitless exercise.  Accordingly, the Trial Court’s decision granting summary judgment in favor of [...] was not at all arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable.
[brief] On March 20, 1990, the Honorable Judge [...], Superior Court NJ, Chancery division, [...], Docket #: [...] ordered Defendant, [...] to make child support payments through [...]  (da3-4)  At that time, past Child support Arrears were set at $24,195.00, which Were Served against defendant: [...], and in favor of myself: [...].  (da3-4)  6.  It was not until the Superior Court of NJ, [...] contacted me last year: June 2023, stating that they had located [...].
[brief] *Cohen v. Radio-Electronics Officers*, 275 N.J. N.J. Super. 241 (App. Div. 1994) citing *Taylor v. Hoboken Bd. Of Educ.*, 187 N.J. Super. 546, 553 (App.Div.), citing N.J. Const. art. VI, § II, ¶ 3 (1947)0, *certify. Denied*, 95 N.J. 228 (1983)
[brief] In Hudson County Ind. No. [...], defendant, [...] was charged with Maintaining/Operating a CDS Production Facility (1st Degree); Five counts of possession with Intent to Distribute (1st Degree); possession with intent to distribute (2nd Degree); possession with intent to distribute (3rd Degree); possession with intent to distribute while within 1,000 feet of school property (3rd Degree); possession with intent to distribute within 500 feet of real property compromising a public building (2nd Degree); possession of CDS (3rd Degree).  These charges arose from evidence recovered following the execution of a search warrant in [...], New Jersey.  (Da9)  Defendant filed a motion to suppress, and the State requested the court conduct a testimonial hearing.  A testimonial hearing was thereafter conducted on June 22, 2017, and the court heard oral argument on April 27, 2018.  (1T; 2T; respectively).  The State’s sole witness, [...], testified at the testimonial hearing.  (1T).  On March 11, 2019, [...] denied defendants’ motion to suppress.  (Da15 through Da36).  On November 7, 2022, [...] entered a guilty plea to Count 2 of the indictment charging [...] with first degree, possession with intent to distribute CDS, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5B(1).  Pursuant to the plea agreement, Defendant was to be sentenced in the second-degree range, providing the trial court with a wide latitude as to the ultimate sentence.  On October 10, 2023, Defendant submitted a sentencing memorandum requesting that the trial court sentence [...] to a flat term of Five Years in New Jersey State Prison.  (Da27 through Da33).  On October 13, 2023, Defendant argued that the court sentence [...] to a term of flat term of Five Years in New Jersey State Prison.  Ultimately, [...] sentenced [...] as a second degree-offender and sentenced [...] to a flat term of Seven Years in New Jersey State Prison.  (3T24-8 to 18); (Da103 through Da106).  On October 18, 2023, a Notice of Appeal was timely filed with the Appellate Division, and an Amended Notice of Appeal was filed on October 23, 2023 and assigned Docket No. [...].  (Da107 through Da111).  **STATEMENT OF FACTS**
[brief] Appellant valued his own personal concerns over those of his houseguest, [...] and, therefore, over the public at large. ”  Pa058.  And further that:  “…Having a cache of various pills at his home might have given [...] the impetus or the opportunity to take an overdose of drugs. ”  Id.  As to [...], there is insufficient evidence to conclude that her medical event resulted from an opioid overdose.  [...]’s drug screen was negative for opioids.  T4 23:13-22, 24:7-10, 24:11-25:3, 145:3-13.
[brief] Contrary to [...]’ argument, the Appellate Division in *Eastampton* decided to grant the defendant an extension of time to “perfect” his non-conforming motion because it would “secure a just determination. ”  (*Id.* at *187*) (citing to N.J. Ct. R. 1:1-2).  The appellate court notes:  “[n]otwithstanding the inadequacy of defendants’ motion papers, and without condoning defendants’ practice, our concern is that a matter of substantial public interest should be resolved on the merits and not by a procedural default. ”  (*Id.*)  Here, the Trial Court properly decided the Motion on the merits, rather than on the basis of an alleged procedural defect.
[brief] [1T, 58-11, 18]  17.  The Court also dismissed [...]’s claim that [...] was responsible for the erroneous placement of excavation benchmarks by [...], the licensed professional surveyor:  On the respondeat superior, there is really no claim of a negligent retention or the like.  [1T 5-17, 18]  Again, when I look at the respondeat superior, there is no evidence that [...] Rusin exercised control over the manner and means of the work being performed.  So, again, and they are not a GC, so there is no issue where your GC has a nondelegable duty.  [1T 14-13, 17]  I am going to grant the application on the respondeat superior, though, so there is no basis for the application of that doctrine, vis-a-vis [...] given the lack of control over the manner and means of the work being performed.  [1T 57-10, 14]
[directive] The victim should be provided with the telephone number of the a. Victim Witness Unit of the Prosecutor's Office when a criminal complaint or domestic violence contempt complaint is signed, or b. Family Division Case Management Office/Domestic Violence Unit when a domestic violence complaint is signed.  4.  The victim should be instructed to contact the appropriate office to provide new telephone numbers if the victim changes telephone numbers from the numbers listed on the Victim/Witness Notification Form.
[brief] Q.  You just testified that when you left the hospital you had a name, a nickname: correct?  A. Yes. Yes.  Q.  And that nickname was [...]?  A. Yes.  Q.  That didn’t come from the victim’s father; correct?  A.  I can’t remember who exactly gave the name [...], but I remember the family, they were all together with me.  Q.  They were all there together?  A.  They were all there together and they gave the name [...].  Q.  Okay.  You wrote a report in this case; right?  A.  Yes, ma’am.  ....  Q.  Without getting into who that information came from, there’s nowhere in that report that it says the dad gave that information; correct?  A.  Specifically the dad, no.  Q. Right.  But there is information in that report about who gave you the name [...]; correct?  A.  It was the family members of [victim], yes.  [(8T168:23 to 169:22). ]  Hence, the defendant chose to advance this line of questioning as part of “strategy,” that is to impugn the victim’s father’s truthfulness regarding the dying declaration, but that “strategy [did] not work out as planned,” and defendant is barred from “cry[ing] foul and win[inng] a new trial.
[brief] See Asmad-Escobar, 2024 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1044, at *7.  In actuality, the only person that has made Plaintiff’s status as a debtor public is Plaintiff herself.  The record establishes that prior to filing this lawsuit, Plaintiff filed for bankruptcy and received the benefit of a discharge of her debts.  Plaintiff’s bankruptcy petition expressly listed the debt at issue in this case by providing the name of the creditor, Plaintiff’s account number and amount of the debt.  (See Da28 at § 4.19).  Bankruptcy filings are public and so it is completely illogical for Plaintiff to claim that she was “harmed” by the private transmission of her debt information to a mailing vendor when she has released this very same information to the public.  It is therefore apparent that Plaintiff has suffered no harm and definitely no “ascertainable loss” as a result of the alleged acts of [...].  For these reasons, the Trial Court correctly dismissed Plaintiff’s CFA claim.
[brief] Ibid.; see also Campbell v. New Jersey Racing Comm’n, 169 N.J. 579, 587 (2001); Atkinson v. Parsekian, 37 N.J. 143, 149 (1962).  “If the Appellate Division is satisfied after its review that the evidence and the inferences to be drawn therefrom support the agency head’s decision, then it must affirm even if the court feels that it would have reached a different result. ”  Gerba, 83 N.J. at 189 (quotation omitted).  Thus, the Board’s “decision will be sustained unless there is a clear showing that it is arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable, or that it lacks fair support in the record.