ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] C.  Even if the “SAC” was the operative complaint, [...]’s April 1, 2021, oral decision properly set forth the reasons why it was insufficient.  (4/1/21 Transcript @ T29:22 to T59:13).  While the “SAC” was not operative pleading in front of [...], even if it was, it was properly dismissed for all the reasons [...] detailed in her thorough opinion explaining why the “SAC” does not comply with N.J. Crt. R. 4:5-7.  (4/1/21 Transcript @ T29:22 to T59:13); see also, Bauer v. Nesbitt, 198 N.J. 601, 610, 969 A.2d 1122, 1128 (2009) (“An opposing party must know what it is defending against; how else would it conduct an investigation and discovery to meet the claim?”); Sequeira v. Wells Fargo & Co., 2016 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 400, at *11 (Super. Ct. App. Div. Feb. 24, 2016) (“Plaintiff’s complaint contains over 1,000 paragraphs of incomprehensible allegations and over twenty separate counts, some of which contain multiple causes of action.  It is unclear as to which defendants the claims are asserted.  It is also unclear as to what claims were included in or arise out of [Sequeira I] .  . . .  Thus, the court shall strike plaintiff’s complaint and allow him thirty (30) days to refile his complaint in order to articulate his claims in a more concise way as required by R. 4:6-4(b).”).  Indeed, as the Court can see in comparing the pleading filed on or about January 26, 2017 (the State Court First Amended Complaint) with the “SAC,” the same issues and deficiencies have been present from the beginning of this action – long rambling paragraphs, numerous legal arguments regarding policies that are not appropriately before this Court, and the overall futility of the claims asserted.  (Compare, Da37-143 with Pa9-81).  Thus, even if the “SAC” was the operative complaint, it had already been found to be insufficient by [...] in her 4/1/21 oral decision and thus was properly formally dismissed by [...] on 5/25/23.
[brief] For this exception, the State must establish, based on the totality of the circumstances, that the officer had reasonable and particularized suspicion that the stopped person had engaged in, or was about to engage in, criminal activity.  *State v. Rosario*, 229 N.J. 263, 272 (2017).  An investigatory stop is only permitted when “based on specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, give rise to a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. ”  *State v. Pineiro*, 181 N.J. 13, 20 (2004) (quoting *State v. Nishina*, 175 N.J. 502, 510-511 (2003)).  Accordingly, an investigatory stop can never be based on “arbitrary police practices, the officer’s subjective good faith, or a mere hunch. ”  *State v. Coles*, 218 N.J. 322, 343 (2014).  An investigatory stop without reasonable suspicion is unlawful and any resulting evidence must be suppressed.  *State v. Elders*, 192 N.J. 224, 247 (2007).
[brief] (79a, 44:5–20).  [...] also charged [...] his home inspector’s fee of $450.  (Da-ALL0248).  [...] received $12,050 (Extreme Home Renovations) to perform roof repairs and painting at the home.  (Id.).  Although [...] was paid to perform repairs to the home, he never did so, despite [...] confirming with [...] that he agreed to make repairs.  (91a, 90:23–91:4).  At the time [...] entered into the agreements with [...], she and [...] were defendants in a pending foreclosure action commenced by Complaint filed in 2018, captioned [...] v. [...], [...], his wife et al., Docket No.: [...].
[brief] Plaintiffs’ reliance on the single page of the 2019 Master Plan Reexamination Report, Pa 38, to establish the Amended Redevelopment Plan’s inconsistency with the Master Plan is flimsy, at best.  That page provides the following description of the project:  It is anticipated that a redevelopment project consisting of 350 residential units, of which 70 will be affordable, a commercial component, and an open space buffer along the Mill Pond and Lawrence Brook will eventually be developed at the site.  It also notes that the Redevelopment Plan was, at that time, in “the process of being amended,” that the Redevelopment Agency and the redeveloper should continue to work together to ensure a successful redevelopment, and that “[n]o further changes to the [...] are recommended at this time. ” (emphasis added).  Plaintiffs’ argument must be rejected for two reasons.
[brief] On March 10, 2023, a Union County grand jury issued [...] against defendant-appellant [...],\(^1\) charging him with: second-degree unlawful possession of a weapon, contrary to N.J.S. A. 2C:39-5b(1) (Count One); second-degree possession of a firearm while committing a controlled-dangerous-substance offense, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4.1a (Count Two); two counts of third-degree possession of a controlled dangerous substance, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10a(1) (Counts Three and Six); two counts of third-degree possession of a controlled dangerous substance with intent to distribute, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5b(3) (Counts Four and Seven); two counts of second-degree possession of a controlled dangerous substance within 500 feet of certain public property, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7.1a (Counts Five and Eight); and fourth-degree resisting arrest, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:29-2a(2) (Count Nine).  (Da 1-5)\(^2\) --- \(^1\)  Mr. Pearson was born as [...] and later changed his last name to Pearson.  (4T 4-1 to 25)  Some transcripts and appended documents refer to Pearson using either or both names.  \(^2\)  Da: Defendant-appellant’s appendix  1T: Aug. 18, 2023 (motion to suppress)  2T: Oct. 20, 2023 (motion to suppress)  3T: Mar. 4, 2024 (plea)  4T: Apr. 19, 2024 (sentencing)  PSR: Presentence Report  [...], [...], and [...] with various crimes.  (Da 5-7)  On the same day, the grand jury also issued [...], charging Pearson with second-degree certain persons not to have weapons, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:39-7b(1).  (Da 8)  Pearson and co-defendant [...] jointly filed a motion to suppress physical evidence seized following their arrests.  (2T 64-2 to 4)  The Honorable [...], J.S.C., presided over a testimonial hearing on August 18, 2023, and October 20, 2023.  (1T; 2T)  The court orally denied the motion on the record on October 20.  (2T 82-6 to 7)  A corresponding order was issued on May 14, 2024.  (Da 12)  On March 4, 2024, Pearson pleaded guilty to the certain persons charge in [...] in exchange for the dismissal of the charges in [...] and a recommended sentence of ten years with a five-year period of parole ineligibility.  (3T 6-22 to 7-4, 18-24; Da 13-19)  On April 19, 2024, [...] sentenced Pearson accordingly, imposing a sentence of ten years with a five-year period of parole ineligibility and dismissing the remaining charges.  (4T 12-14 to 18, 13-1 to 3; Da 20-26)  Pearson filed a timely notice of appeal.  (Da 27-31)
[brief] [Da1-2].  On November 6, 2023, Defendants moved for reconsideration of the Trial Court’s October 17, 2023 Order.  [Da170].  On December 15, 2023, Defendants filed an Answer with Affirmative Defenses in response to Plaintiff’s First Amended Verified Complaint, preserving their position and rights that certain of Plaintiff’s claims are subject to the arbitration provision in the parties’ Partnership Agreement.  [Da173].
[brief] Significantly, defense counsel did not have any objection to any of these revelations by Juror 12; her only concern was to ensure that Juror 12 did not recognize any of [...]’s family in attendance which was confirmed by Juror 12.  (24T 11-4 to 12-6).  As such, Defendant has failed to establish that it was an abuse of discretion for the trial court to refrain from independently excusing Juror 12.
[brief] LEGAL ARGUMENT...............................................................................................6  I.  STANDARD OF REVIEW  ..............................................................................6  II.  THE [...]’S VALIDATION OF THE CITY’S UNLAWFUL PROMOTIONS IN JULY 2022 IS ARBITRARY, CAPRICIOUS AND UNREASONABLE.  THE [...]’S USE OF THESE UNLAWFUL PROMOTIONS AS A BASIS TO DENY APPELLANT’S PROMOTION IS ARBITRARY, CAPRICIOUS AND UNREASONABLE (Raised Below: PA6, PA8)..................................7  III.  THE FAILURE TO PROMOTE APPELLANT TO CAPTAIN VIOLATED CIVIL SERVICE VETERAN STATUTES AND REGULATIONS (Not Addressed In Decision Below)........................................12  IV.  THE [...]’S ENFORCEMENT OF N.J.A.C. 4A:4-4.8(b) IS ARBITRARY, CAPRICIOUS, AND UNREASONABLE AS THE [...] APPROVED PROMOTIONS IN JULY 2022  DESPITE THE ABSENCE OF GENUINE VACANCIES FOR SUCH PROMOTIONS AND THEN ALLOWED “GENUINE VACANCIES” THAT OCCURRED AFTER SUCH PROMOTIONS TO SATISFY [...] REQUIREMENTS (Not Addressed In Decision Below).  .................................................................13  V.  THE CITY’S VIOLATION OF CIVIL SERVICE PRECEDENT TO DENY APPELLANT  A PROMOTION VIOLATES THE DOCTRINES OF EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL AND TURNING SQUARE CORNERS (Not Addressed In Decision Below).  ....................14  CONCLUSION  ........................................................................................................17
[brief] | | | Pop's Cones, Inc. v. Resorts Int'l Hotel, Inc., | 26 | | 307 N.J. Super. 461 (App. Div. 1998) | | | Printing Mart-Morristown v. Sharp Electronics Corp., | 14 | | 116 N.J. 739 (1989) | | | Sons of Thunder v. Borden, Inc., | 24 | | 148 N.J. 396 (1997)
[brief] The Court then considered the second State Farm guidepost – “the disparity between the actual harm suffered and the punitive damages award. ”  With respect to [...], [...] found the disparity to be “substantial, but [nonetheless] reasonable considering the [his] actions and the need to deter and punish this type of conduct. ”  (40057a)  The Court noted that holding [...] responsible for only 60% of a 2.5 multiple “falls within the statutorily allowed amount of punitive damages” (i.e., 5x), rendering “the disparity … not so great as to require further process and thus does not deprive defendant of his due process rights. ”  (40057a)  Similarly, the Court found “[t]he disparity between the actual harm suffered and the punitive damages [awarded against [...] and [...] to be] substantial but [nonetheless] reasonable,” and that holding them each responsible for only 20% of a 2.5 multiple “is well within the amount statutorily permitted by the PDA,” ensuring the “disparity [does] not … violate due process. ”  (40061a, 40064a)  [...] further found that “the third guidepost” of State Farm “is met because this case is analogous to other cases in which punitive damages have been awarded for similar conduct,” specifically Saffos v. Avaya Inc., 419 N.J. Super. 244, 267 (App. Div. 2011).  Like [...] here, the “defendants in Saffos [had] engaged in a ‘deliberate, systematic campaign’ to harm plaintiffs and ‘violated long-established’ legal principles and ‘engaged in prohibited conduct while knowing or suspecting that it was unlawful. ’”  (40058a, 40061a, 40065a)  Like the Defendants in Saffos, “[...] are extremely wealthy and so punitive damages are not unduly burdensome and are proper to hold [...] accountable for their actions. ”  (40058a, 40061a, 40065a)  b.
[brief] The plaintiff, [...], was employed by [...] for approximately 28 years prior to his termination in November 2020.  Pa16.  In 2012, the plaintiff was given direct permission by his supervisor At [...], [...], to use company credit cards issued by [...] for personal use in lieu of the company paying, and he receiving, company bonuses.  T17-1-16.  The plaintiff asked his supervisor to put this in writing, but was told that was not necessary.  T19-1.  The plaintiff used the company credit cards, as he was allowed to do.  Pa14.  In 2018, the plaintiff began to complain to [...] about the fact that pens were being marketed and sold by [...] under the representation that they were “made in America”, when in fact they were made in China.  Pa17; T7-1-9.  The plaintiff continued to complain to [...] about this practice up to the beginning of 2020, and then suddenly “all communications stopped” with the plaintiff and Mr. Kjekstad in July 2020 when the plaintiff was confronted by Mr. Kjekstad, regarding the personal use of the credit cards.  T22-19-24.  The plaintiff was then placed on “administrative leave”, and shortly thereafter terminated from his employment.  Pa15.  ARGUMENT POINT I THE STANDARD ON APPEAL (Not raised below)
[directive] Conducted Energy Device (CED).  A CED means any device approved by the Attorney General that is capable of firing darts/electrodes that transmit an electrical charge or current intended to temporarily disable a person.  Constructive Authority.  Constructive authority is not considered a use of force because it does not involve physical contact with the subject.  Rather, constructive authority involves the use of the officer’s authority to exert control over a subject.  Examples include verbal commands, gestures, warnings, and unholstering a weapon.  Pointing a firearm at a subject is an example of constructive authority to be used only in appropriate circumstances outlined in Section 3.4 of this Policy.
[brief] The appellant was a pedestrian whose presence would be regularly expected to use the sidewalk, and vis-à-vis the respondent, would best be characterized as an invitee or licensee.  The respondent was not present at the property and would not be a resident of the property for a period of six months.  In a commercial setting, New Jersey law would have required no less.  According to New Jersey’s Model Civil Jury Charges, the duty owed by a property owner to an invitee or licensee is as follows:  The law imposes upon the owner of commercial or business property the duty to use reasonable care to see to it that the sidewalks abutting the property are maintained in reasonably good condition.  In other words, the law says that the owner of commercial property must exercise reasonable care to see to it that the condition of the abutting sidewalk is reasonably safe and does not subject pedestrians to an unreasonable risk of harm.  The concept of reasonable care requires the owner of commercial property to take action with regard to conditions within a reasonable period of time after the owner becomes aware of the dangerous condition or, in the exercise of reasonable care, should have become aware of it.  If, therefore, you find that there was a condition of this sidewalk that was dangerous in that it created an unreasonable risk of harm for pedestrians, and if you find that the owner knew of that condition or should have known of it but failed to take such reasonable action to correct or remedy the situation within a reasonable period of time thereafter as a reasonably prudent commercial or business owner would have done under the circumstances, then the owner is negligent.  A commercial property owner may have a duty to clear public sidewalks abutting their properties of snow and ice for the safe travel of pedestrians.
[brief] (Da1, Da7).  He made four claims for relief: Count I: Request for a Declaratory Judgment that [...] had surrendered all rights to assert an interest in a property held in [...] (Da14); Count II: Claim for Breach of the Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing for [...]’s refusal to execute documents in connection with the administration of [...] (Da15); Count III: Claim for attorneys’ fees and costs (Da17); Count IV: “Reservation of Future Claims” (Id.).
[brief] AS A MATTER OF PUBLIC POLICY, [...] CANNOT DISCLAIM COVERAGE FOR A CLAIM BASED ON THE SAME SET OF FACTS THAT REQUIRES COVERAGE.  (1T at 22:4 to 23:18). **  State Farm argues that [...] failed to provide any legal support for its position.  However, as explained in [...]’s initial brief, [...] relies on a case that State Farm exclusively relies on -- *North Plainfield*. (Pb20-21).  In *North* Plainfield, the District Court applied a breach of contract policy exclusion to numerous tort claims because the tort claims were based on the same set of facts as the breach of contract claim.  2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39555 at *44-45.  In this case, State Farm, as it has already admitted, would have been required to provide coverage for a defamation claim.  When the trial court dismissed the defamation action, [...] simply re-casted the same facts into a tortious interference claim.  Indeed, [...] used the same allegations to support his defamation and tortious interference claims.  (Da22 at ¶¶ 4 to 7, titled “Factual Background. ”)  V.
[brief] [...] provides care for Respondent’s children regularly without compensation and [...] also assisted Respondent throughout this litigation, including collecting and storing the documents that she and Respondent removed from Decedent’s Home and serving as their custodian and sorting and photocopying selected documents at Respondent’s request.  (11T57:8 to 58:12).  [...] and Respondent strategized and communicated about this litigation.  (11T51:18-24).  [...] also falsely held herself out as a co-owner of the safety deposit box rented by Decedent, even though [...] acknowledged that box was not hers.  (11T13:2-10; 11T14:2-6).
[brief] Da17.  The case of *Ehrgott v. Jones*, 208 N.J. Super. 393 (App. Div. 1986) cited by [...] involved issues and circumstances unrelated to the instant matter.  In *Ehrgott*, the plaintiff was injured while a passenger in her co-employee’s car while they were driving to an out-of-state professional meeting, which the Court held constituted a part of their work duties.  *Id.* at 395.  In *Barone v. Harra*, 77 N. J. 276 (1978), cited by [...], the Court held that co-employee immunity did not apply to a crash that occurred while two co-employees were driving together to get lunch because a specific decision holding that “lunch break” injuries are compensable, *Hornyak v. The Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co.*, 63 N.J. 99 (1973), had not yet gone into effect.
[brief] See Miller, 567 U.S. at 477-79; see also Comer, 249 N.J. at 394-95, 397-400.  Therefore, the protection against cruel and unusual punishment requires that life without parole be “uncommon” for juveniles, even in homicide cases.  Miller, 567 U.S. at 479-80; Comer, 249 N.J. at 387.  See also Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190, 195, 209, 212 (2016) (emphasizing that life without parole is a disproportionate penalty for the “vast majority” or “all but the rarest” juvenile offenders.)  When a juvenile is eligible for such a penalty, the sentencing court must consider the “Miller factors”: (1) the juvenile’s “chronological age and its hallmark features -- among them, immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and consequences”; (2) “the family and home environment that surrounds him -- and from which he cannot usually extricate himself -- no matter how brutal or dysfunctional”; (3) “the circumstances of the homicide offense, including the extent of his participation in the conduct and the way familial and peer pressures may have affected him”; (4) the effect of youth on his defense “-- for example, his inability to deal with police officers or prosecutors (including on a plea agreement) or his incapacity to assist his own attorneys”; and (5) whether the circumstances suggest “the possibility of rehabilitation.
[brief] 62  TABLE OF JUDGMENT, ORDERS & RULINGS  APPEALED  Order filed 8-30-2019, granting dismissal and/or summary judgment in favor of defendant [...] and defendant [...]  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Pa972, Pa984  Order filed 9-23-2021, granting summary judgment in favor of defendants [...], [...], [...], and [...]  .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Pa3036  Order filed 12-7-2021, granting dismissal “without prejudice” in favor of defendant [...], and denying plaintiff’s motion for leave to file a second amended complaint.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Pa3298  Order filed 4-5-2022, granting defendant [...]’s motion to dismiss; along with Order filed March 7, 2022, vacating the March 3, 2022, declaratory judgment Order rendered against [...]  . .  Pa3389  Order filed 4-5-2022, dismissing defendant [...] from the first amended complaint . . . . .  Pa3419  ### TABLE OF AUTHORITIES #### CASES | Case | Page | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | **A.T. v. Cohen,** | 56 | | 231 N.J. 337, 175 A.3d 932 (2017) | | | **Adolph Gottscho, Inc. v. American Marking Corp.,** | 53 | | 18 N.J. 467, 114 A.2d 438 (N.J. 1955) | | | **Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,** | 40 | | 477 U.S. 242 (1986) | | | **Aster v. Shoreline Behavioral Health,** | 60 | | 346 N.J. Super. 536, 788 A.2d 821 (App.Div. 2002) | | | **Baer v. Chase,** | 53 | | 392 F.3d 609, 627 (3d Cir. 2004) | | | **Bender v. Walgreen E. Co.,** | 58 | | 399 N.J. Super. 584, 590, 945 A.2d 120 (App. Div. 2008) | | | **Brill v. Guardian Life Insurance Co. of America,** | 40, 49| | 142 N.J. 520 (1995) | | | **Bruno v. Gale, Wentworth & Dillon Realty,** | 49 | | 371 N.J. Super. 69, 852 A.2d 198 (App. Div. 2004) | | | **Buckelew v. Grossbard,** | 59 | | 87 N.J. 512, 527, 435 A.2d 1150 (1981) | | | **Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,** | 40 | | 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) | | | **City of Trenton v. Cannon Cochran Mgmt. Servs., Inc.,** | 51 | | Civ. No. A-5576-09T1, | | | 2011 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2076, | | | 2011 WL 3241579 (App. Div. 2011) | | | **Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Elizabethtown, Inc. v. Coca-Cola Co.,** | 51 | | 988 F.2d 386, 409 (3d Cir. 1993) | | | **Commc'ns Workers of Am. v. Rousseau,** | | | 417 N.J.
[brief] POINT I SETTLED LAW REQUIRED [...] TO NOTIFY [...] OF ITS TERMINATION FROM THE CCIP LIABILITY POLICIES, AND THE LAW DIVISION ERRED IN ITS FAILURE TO APPLY THAT LAW.  (Dta 1362-64,1151,1183,1259.)  The requirement that insurers provide their insureds with proper notice of coverage changes, especially those that limit or terminate coverage, has been a touchstone of New Jersey law for over sixty years.  Its roots are in common law concepts of contractual good faith.  Bauman v. Royal Indem. Co., 36 N.J. 12, 25 (1961) (“common fairness” dictated continuation of broader coverage where the insured was not notified of “lessened coverage” in a policy renewal).  Proper notice as a prerequisite to effective coverage cancellation and the "concomitant obligation to continue coverage when an insurer fails to satisfy that notice requirement" has since evolved into "strong public policy," *Piermount Iron Works v. Evanston Ins. Co.*, 197 N.J. 432, 441 (2009), and are said to reflect parties' "reasonable expectations."  *Harvester Chem. Corp. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co.*, 277 N.J.Super. 421, 431 (App.Div.1994).  These precepts led to the promulgation of various statutes and regulations imposing upon insurers stringent formal timing, mailing, and record retention requirements to satisfy their burden of proving policy cancellation and non-renewal, as well prohibiting mid-term cancellations except in certain narrowly prescribed circumstances.  *Id., In re N.J.A.C.*, 208 N.J.Super. 182 (App.Div.1986) (summarizing regulatory history).  Regulatory inapplicability does not vitiate the insurer's obligation to provide notice of coverage changes, which still must be "clearly" and "specifically" conveyed even in the absence of the formal mailing and record retention provisions of the regulation.  *Skeete v. Dorvius*, 187 N.J. 5, 8 (2005).  These common law, public policy and regulatory principles are jurisprudentially construed as complementary and synergistic, with the common law and public policy components informing the construction and application of their statutory and regulatory corollaries, and *vice versa*.  See, Harvester Chem., 277 N.J. Super. at 430; Valley Nat'l. v. American Motorists Ins. Co., 316 N.J.Super.152, 158 (App.Div.1998); McClellan v. Feit, 376 N.J.Super. 305 (App.Div.2005) (each transferring related notice concepts from analogous, but technically inapplicable, sources).