ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] ...........................................  7 - **Anderson v. Sammy Redd & Associates**, 278 N.J. Super. 50 (App. Div.), *cert. denied*, 139 N.J. 441 (1994)  ........... 6, 9 - **Beyer v. White**, 22 N.J. Super. 137, 144 (App. Div. 1952) .................. 13 - **Berquist v. Penterman**, 46 N.J. Super. 74, 88 (App. Div. 1957), *certif. denied* 22 N.J. 55 (1957)  .... ......................................................... 12-14 - **Brill v. The Guardian Life Insurance Co. of America, et al.**, 142 N.J. 520, 538 (1995)  ......................................................  14 - **Buckelew v. Grossbard**, 87 N.J. 512, 525 (1981) ......................... 6, 9 - **Dawson v. Bunker Hill Plaza Assocs.**, 289 N.J. Super. 309, 318 (App. Div. 1996)) ..................................................... 6-7 - **Fernandez v. Nationwide Mut. Ins.**, 402 N.J. Super. 166, 170 (App. Div. 2008), *aff’d o.b.*, 199 N.J. 591 (200).  .........................  5 - **Hansen v. Eagle Picher Lead Co.**, 8 N.J. 133, 139 (1951)  ............... 5, 9 - **Majestic Realty Assocs., Inc. v. Toti Contracting Co.**, 30 N.J. 425, 431 (1959)  .........................................................  7 - **Moore v. Schering Plough Inc.**, 328 N.J. Super. 300, 305 (App. Div. 2000) .  .................................................................  6 - **Ocasio v. Amtrak**, 299 N.J. Super. 139 (App. Div. 1997)  .................. 13 - **Rigatti v. Reddy**, 318 N.J. Super. 537, 541 (App. Div. 1999)  .............  6 - **Tarabokia v. Structure Tone**, 429 N.J. Super. 103, 113 (App. Div. 2012) .. 7 - **Yormack v. Farmers’ Cooperative Ass’n**, 11, N.J. Super. 416 (App. Div. 1951) ........................................  12  Rules Rule 4:46-2 .................................................. 5, 14  Rule 2:10-2 ..................................................  5  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS, AND RULINGS BEING APPEALED  January 6, 2023  Order granting [...]’s motion for summary judgment  ...........................................  Pa20 February 10, 2023  Order denying appellant’s motion for reconsideration  ..............................................  Pa23  PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[directive] The following is clarification regarding Directive #21-06.  With regard to the ability of jurors to read voir dire questions that are displayed or provided in print, trial judges should keep in mind that jurors are asked on their qualification questionnaire (which they return in advance of service) whether they can read and understand the English language.  Although some jurors nonetheless may raise language issues for the first time during voir dire, the Jury Management Office will have addressed any language questions that the juror indicated on his or her qualification questionnaire.  Consistent with the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), the Judiciary will, upon request, provide reasonable accommodations regarding the printed questions, such as providing a larger print size.
[brief] S.A. 10:4-6, et seq. | 34 | | N.J.S.A. 40:55D-1, et seq. | 8, 34 | | N.J.S.A. 40:55D-2 | 26 | | N.J.S.A. 40:55D-10(g) | 19 | | N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70(c) | 30 | | N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70(c)(1) | 21-22 | | N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70(c)(2) | 21-22 | | N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70(d) | 30 | # TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ## STATUTES | Statute | Pages | |----------------------------------------------|-------| | N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70(d)(1) | 2, 4, 20-21, 25, 27 | | N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70(d)(6) | 2, 4, 21, 26, 27 | ## TREATISES | Author & Title | Pages | |---------------------------------------------|-------| | Cox & Koenig, *New Jersey Zoning and Land Use Administration*, (GANN, 2023) § 19-7.1 | 18-19 | | Cox & Koenig, *New Jersey Zoning and Land Use Administration*, (GANN, 2023) § 28-3 at 605-606 | 30 | ## APPENDIX ### TABLE OF CONTENTS | DOCUMENT | PAGE | |-------------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | [...] Code § 108-6.18 | Ba1 | | Meeting Minutes April 6, 2021 Pre-Application Meeting | | | SP II-NJDOT Access Permit Application | | | (with attached Meeting Minutes from Pre-Application Meetings | | | held on April 5, 2015 and February 14, 2019) | Ba17 | | Planning Review # 1 Prepared by [...], PE, PP and | | | [...], PP, AICP, Zoning Board Planner, of | | | [...] dated August 18, 2021 | Ba31 | | Planning Review # 2 Prepared by [...], PE, PP and | | | [...], PP, AICP, Zoning Board Planner, of | | | [...] dated December 10, 2021 | Ba45 | | NJ Route 33 Traffic Signal Review Prepared by | | | [...], PE, PTOE, and [...], PE, PTOE, | | | Consulting Traffic Engineer, of [...] | | | dated August 20, 2021 | Ba65 | | NJ Route 33 Traffic Signal Review #2 Prepared by | | | [...], PE, PTOE, and [...], PE, PTOE, | | | Consulting Traffic Engineer, of [...] | | | dated December 10, 2021 | Ba69 | PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
[brief] Pursuant to Article 1 para 3, no person shall be deprived of the inestimable privilege of worshipping Almighty God in a manner agreeable to the dictates of his own conscience; nor under any pretense whatever be compelled to attend any place of worship contrary to his faith and judgment.  The Supreme Court has long held that prisoners have the right to exercise substantial religious freedom, Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, (1972); See also O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 348, (1987).  Plaintiff was denied right to practice her religion because she was not allowed to go to church while confined.
[brief] [Appeal of private right to a cause of action, no remedy, issues] (Argued at Pa378 – Pa380)  To determine whether there is an implied private right to a cause of action, there also must be a private remedy.  Courts cannot infer a private right to a cause of action unless a private remedy exists.  The statute that [...] seeks relief under, N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-9(e)(3), does not include a private remedy.  Hence, without a private remedy, the court cannot infer that [...] has an implied private right to a cause of action to sue the Board in Superior Court, requiring the dismissal of the Counterclaim.  POINT SEVEN
[brief] (Pa856-Pa859).  Thereafter the following took place:  -  On June 24, 2015, two months after being advised that the harassment, discrimination and retaliation reported by [...] was “unsubstantiated”, [...] and [...] again brought disciplinary action, authorized by [...], [...] and Director of Human Resources Director [...], against [...] alleging “Insubordination and Conduct Unbecoming of a Public Employee” (Pa477).  -  On November 24, 2015, 6 days after [...] again reported discrimination and retaliation by [...], [...] retaliated against [...] by preventing him from speaking on matters of public concern in his field of expertise and initiating disciplinary charges against him for allegedly not receiving her approval prior to submitting an abstract to the American Water Works Association on Safe Drinking Water - a matter of public concern.
[brief] *State v. Chew*, 150 N.J. 30, 61 (1997) (quoting *Edwards*, 451 U.S. at 484-85).  If a suspect makes an ambiguous assertion that is “susceptible to two different meanings, the interrogating officer must cease questioning and ‘inquire of the suspect as to the correct interpretation. ’”  *S.S.*, 229 N.J. at 382-83 (citation omitted); see also *State v. Gonzalez*, 249 N.J. 612, 629 (2022).  “[A] suspect need not be articulate, clear, or explicit in requesting counsel; any indication of a desire for counsel, however ambiguous, will trigger entitlement to counsel. ”
[brief] The Process Fashioned by the Trial Court for the SHO was Flawed and Failed to Adequately Permit Township and Public Participation in the Hearing and was Inconsistent with the Municipal Land Use Law.  (M 1-64; 462-473).  The process set forth by the trial court required the matter to be heard at an inconvenient location rather than within the Township, and at an inconvenient time that limited public participation and Township professionals’ participation, and grossly limited the Board’s participation.  This “hearing” stood in stark contrast to those envisioned by the Open Public Meetings Act (hereinafter the “OPMA”).  In enacting the OPMA, the Legislature declared its explicit intent to ensure the public’s right to be present at public meetings and to witness government in action:  The Legislature finds and declares that the right of the public to be present at all meetings of public bodies, and to witness in full detail all phases of the deliberation, policy formulation, and decision making of public bodies, is vital to the enhancement and proper functioning of the democratic process; that secrecy in public affairs undermines the faith of the public in government and the public's effectiveness in fulfilling its role in a democratic society [...]
[brief] See Mehlman v. Mobil Oil Corp., 153 N.J. 163, 190 (1998); and see James v. Bessemer Processing Co., 155 N.J. 279, 308 (1998).  Plaintiff’s LSRP testified that the benzene levels on site were at concentrations 10 times the acceptable limit, where one microgram per liter is the standard and 10 to 11 micrograms per liter are on the Property.  (T1, 34:7-13).  [...]’s Mayor noted the cancer concern caused by the Property’s contamination, explaining, “there does seem to be a lot of cancer on these barrier islands.  And it's a concern.  I mean, I think that's my concern that I want it cleaned up for health reasons.  (T1, 26:24-27:1).  She also noted that “[a]s a pathologist and an epidemiologist, there is a, you know, there is a danger in polluted land and there is a -- there has been a huge increase in cancer associated with gas stations throughout the entire country, not just in [...] or along the coastal areas.  We are, I think, more vulnerable along the coastal areas.  I think many oncologists would tell you that they've seen an increase in cancer in areas like this.  So it's a real problem. ” (T2, 38:24-39:9).  The Trial Court erroneously rejected this information, concluding that “[t]he Mayor’s comments were specifically not addressed to the specific detriment from the site but were – in the context of a more general comment as to the risk of soil contamination as to cancer and were not subject to cross-examination as testimony ordinarily would be. ” (T3, 57:1-6).  Studies, however, have shown a causal link between benzene and cancer for decades.
[brief] The Court in *Patel*, further held that public policy encourages full disclosure of pertinent facts especially in contemplation of entering a bond as significant as marriage.  *Id.* at 411.  Conversely, the law imposes a duty to investigate in matters affecting character.  *Id.*  The Court in *Patel* cited to [...], in *Lindquist* writing for a unanimous court, who stated  In regard to countenance, as well as to other personal traits and attributes of character, it is the duty of a party to make due inquiry beforehand, and not to ask the law to relieve him from a position into which his own discretion or want of diligence has led him.  *Lindquist* at 20.  The Court in *Patel* eventually held that prior to the civil ceremony, the plaintiff was aware that not all requisites had been met by defendant to be considered of the same caste.  *Id.*  It was incumbent upon plaintiff to conduct further investigation after being placed on notice of any alleged impediments, particularly in light of the fact that the defendant was presented to the plaintiff through a marriage broker.  *Id.*  Plaintiff specifically waived any objection to any impediments by his marrying the defendant.  *Id.*  Plaintiff is therefore equitably estopped from asserting any grounds of the Asian-Indian caste system as a basis for an annulment of the marriage or that it constitutes an essential of the marriage.
[brief] [...]  TABLE OF CONTENTS  Page TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS........................................ii  TABLE OF CITATIONS .................................................................................. iii  PROCEDURAL HISTORY ..............................................................................1  STATEMENT OF FACTS.............................................................................1  LEGAL ARGUMENT....................................................................................1  I.  The Jury’s Finding That [...] was 100% Liable Does not Foreclose Reversal Of The Trial Court’s Erroneous Decision Finding That The Contractual Indemnity Provision Was Ambiguous........................................1  A.  The Doctrine Of Invited Error Is Inapplicable To This Appeal................5  B.  The D’Avila Case Is Controlling In This Appeal .........................................6  C.  The Plain Error Standard Is Inapplicable To This Appeal...........................9  II.  The Trial Court’s Error In Ruling That The Indemnification Clause Is Ambiguous Is A Predicate And Threshold Error Requiring Reversal And Remand........................................................................................................9  III.  [...] Appealed From Both January 5, 2024 Orders.....................10  IV.  The Subcontract Is Not Ambiguous..........................................................11  A.  The Subcontract Makes Specific Reference To The Effect Of the Negligence Of The Indemnitee..................................................................................11  B.  Englert v. The Home Depot Is Distinguishable  The Doctrine Of Invited Error Is Inapplicable To This Appeal .................................................................14  CONCLUSION
[brief] **Plaintiff’s Causation Arguments Are Not Supported By Record Evidence.**  Plaintiff argues Defendant never told her she could return to work after removing her from the schedule, leading to an inference of retaliation.  (AB at pp. 17-18).  However, evidence on the record shows Plaintiff on March 2, 2020, Plaintiff texted a Program Director, “I am ONLY interested in maintaining the 16 hrs a month, in order for me to uphold my position as a sub/per diem. ” (Appx 535 at ¶59).  On March 29, 2020, Plaintiff texted the same Program Director she could not take any hours because “my children are in remote learning and unfortunately I have no one to step up during my absence.  I truly apologies [sic] if this caused any inconvenience…” (Appx 535 at ¶60).  Nothing here supports a finding on an inference of retaliation.  To the contrary, Plaintiff appears to have let a Program Director know she only wanted minimal and then no hours.  Plaintiff argues temporal proximity between her alleged January 8, 2020 whistleblowing activity and her subsequent removal from the schedule around January 20, 2020 and subsequent failure to contact her to return is highly suggestive.  (AB at p. 17).  Plaintiff admitted during oral argument that the removal from schedule *was not* an adverse employment action.  (Appx 569-70 at 17:14-22) (“Plaintiff is not alleging that [removal from the schedule] independently was an adverse employment action because it's clear that it happened to other employees.  The adverse employment action takes place afterwards. ”).  Moreover, temporal proximity between one and two months is not unusually suggestive.  See, e.g., Schummer, 965 F. Supp. 2d at 499 (one month is not an unusually suggestive amount of time); Flear, 159 Fed. Appx at 393 (two months did not establish sufficient connection between plaintiff’s complaints and termination to deny summary judgment for employer).  Accordingly, no inference of retaliation is present here.  As shown above, none of Plaintiff’s so-called “points” fail to demonstrate facts upon which a reasonable fact finder can infer a retaliatory motive.
[brief] (5T:19-1 to 20-1)  The court accepted the State’s theory that “this was a conscious, thought-out decision, that it was not an impetuous act, but was calculated to make certain that … [...] was not apprehended for the robberies. ”  (5T:15-6 to 9, 16-8 to 11)  The court found that [...] “appreciated the consequences of being apprehended and so to avoid same … order[ed] the co-defendants to stop the fleeing victim,” and that he understood the “significant risk that death could or would result from his actions. ”  (5T:19-23 to 20-1)  In support of this conclusion, the court noted that [...] told his codefendants to stop the victim from fleeing “after the robberies were completed. ”  (5T:19-11 to 22)  (emphasis own)  However, both the court’s finding that [...] only shouted to his codefendants after the robberies were completed and its conclusion that this was a calculated act rather than an impulsive one are unsupported by the record.
[brief] The Amendment to the 1996 Redevelopment Plan  In late 2020, the [...] adopted Ordinance § 26-20, which amended the Oceanfront-Broadway Redevelopment Plan.  (Pa671 to Pa673; hereafter the “Plan Amendment”).  The Plan Amendment, was drafted to apply to a single parcel of land - the land owned by, Defendant, [...].  Id.  On December 9, 2020, the City Council adopted Resolution 243-20 appointing [...] as the redeveloper for the three lots subject to the plan amendment.  (Pa709 to Pa711).  That Resolution authorized the Mayor to execute a Redevelopment Agreement.  Id.  Pursuant to that Redevelopment Agreement, [...] was required to pay a $2,000,000 fee to the City, a $100,000 administrative fee, and, in addition, to be responsible for off-site improvements caused by its project.  (Pa713 to Pa745; Pa723 to Pa724).  D.
[brief] For example, in State v. Pineiro, 181 N.J. 13 (2004), an officer saw two men he recognized — one was a suspected drug dealer, while the other was a known “drug user” he had previously arrested — standing on the corner that was known as a high-drug-crime area.  *Id.* at 18.  The officer saw the defendant give the known drug user a pack of cigarettes, and the officer knew that cigarette packs were often used to transport drugs.  *Ibid.*  The officer further noticed that neither man was smoking.  *Ibid.*  The men noticed the officer, looked “shock[ed] and surprise[d],” and fled.  *Ibid.*  The Supreme Court held that these specific observations amounted to reasonable suspicion because the officer knew both men were involved with drugs, saw the exchange of a cigarette pack that neither man was actively using, and watched both men flee upon noticing the police presence.  *Id.* at 25.  Here, unlike in *Pineiro*, [...] did not know or suspect [...] to be a drug dealer based on his prior police investigations.
[brief] PROCEDURAL HISTORY/STATEMENT OF FACTS  Appellant relies upon the Procedural History/Statement of Facts laid out in his defense counsels brief.  ARGUMENT POINT I AN ILLEGALLY LENIENT SENTENCE IS ALSO SUBJECT TO CORRECTION AT ANY TIME BY MOTION OR BY THE COURT ACTING SUA SPONTE.  Appellant [...] submits that although the concurrent sentences imposed by the court on [...] appeared to be favorable to him at the time, the sentences were nevertheless illegal pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:44-5(h), which mandates that sentences for crimes committed while on bail must be consecutive unless the trial court makes a "serious injustice finding in consideration of the character and condition of the defendant that would override the need to deter."
[brief] Accordingly, after considering post-judgment submissions, the Trial Court had no choice but to prevent what it found would be an “unconscionable” result.  Thus, the Trial Court reformed the Redevelopment Agreement to compensate [...] and prevent the unconscionable result of requiring [...] to continue to pay all expenses for the subject garage, without seeing any return on its $25 million investment in the project, which became unattainable because there were only half the number of parking spots created, while Defendant pursued its other parking project nearby.  Defendant now appeals, asking this Court to reverse the reformation remedy.  What Defendant does not do is ask this Court to reverse any of the Trial Court’s fact-finding, or any other remedy which the Trial Court imposed.  Accordingly, the only issue on appeal is propriety of the reformation remedy.  As set forth within, the Trial Court properly applied a reformation remedy.  A Trial Court, especially a Trial Court sitting in equity, has broad discretion to impose a remedy to fit the particular facts and circumstances of any given matter.  While its discretion has limits, as applied here, the Trial Court fairly and equitably resolved the matter to avoid what the Trial Court clearly and unequivocally found, based on the facts and circumstances, to be an “unconscionable” result.  Defendant asks this Court to impose a rote, paint-by-numbers approach to reformation, arguing that reformation is not appropriate without a finding of mistake or fraud.  That argument ignores Defendant’s misconduct and the Trial Court’s discretion to remedy the result.  Accordingly, and as set forth within, [...] respectfully requests that this Court affirm the Trial Court’s reformation of the Redevelopment Agreement, compel Defendant to pay the sums owed to Plaintiff, and allow [...] to begin receiving the benefits of its multi-million-dollar investment in downtown [...].  **STATEMENT OF FACTS**
[brief] STANDARD OF REVIEW  Trial judges are afforded wide discretion in deciding many of the issues that arise in civil and criminal cases.  Appellate courts review those decisions for an abuse of discretion.  "A court abuses its discretion when its decision is made without a rational explanation, inexplicably departed from established policies, or rested on an impermissible basis."  State v. Chavies, 247 N.J. 245, 257 (2021) (quoting State v. R.Y., 242 N.J. 48, 65 (2020)).  "[A] functional approach to abuse of discretion examines whether there are good reasons for an appellate court to defer to the particular decision at issue."  State v. R.Y., 242 N.J. 48, 65 (2020) (quoting Flagg v. Essex Cnty. Prosecutor, 171 N.J. 561, 571 (2002)).  "When examining a trial court's exercise of discretionary authority, we reverse only when the exercise of discretion was 'manifestly unjust' under the circumstances."  Newark Morning Ledger Co. v. N.J. Sports & Exposition Auth., 423 N.J. Super. 140, 174 (App. Div. 2011) (quoting Union Cnty. Improvement Auth. v. Artaki, LLC, 392 N.J. Super. 141, 149 App. Div. 2007)).
[brief] In arguing otherwise, defendant isolates “turn” from the statute and argues that the public would not understand this to mean switching lanes.  First, as argued above, rotation—as in rotating the wheels of a vehicle—is within the definition of “turn. ”  See Merriam-Webster, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/turn (defining “turn,” in part, as “to cause to move around an axis or center; make rotate or revolve”); Hrlic, 744 N.W.2d at 224 (observing that “a partial rotation would constitute movement around ‘a central or focal point’ and it would constitute a change in direction or course” under the definition of “turn”) (quoting The American Heritage Dictionary (1985)).  More importantly, it is presumed that the public can read words and phrases in context.  “Analysis of constitutional vagueness is not ‘a linguistic analysis conducted in a vacuum’ but requires consideration of the questioned provision itself, related provisions, and the reality in which the provision is to be applied. ”  State v. Saunders, 302 N.J. Super. 509, 521 (App. Div. 1997) (quoting In re Suspension of DeMarco, 83 N.J. 25, 37 (1980)).  “Turn” does not appear in a vacuum in N.J.S.A. 39:4-126.  In pertinent part, it appears within the phrase “or otherwise turn a vehicle from a direct course or move right or left upon a roadway,” which a person of ordinary intelligence can understand to include changing lanes.  “Turn” is also preceded by “so” in the second sentence, empowering a person of ordinary intelligence to understand that “so turn” includes the movements set forth in the preceding sentence.  When read in context of the aim of the statute—signaling—and the surrounding language, “turn” is within the understanding of persons of ordinary intelligence.