ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Court rejected [...]’ Exceptions that required payback (31a, last par., to 32a, 1st 2 lines)  4.  Not approve prior Trust payments of $31,259.74 for [...]’s 2019-2022 accounting fees, as per Accounting, pending my review & resolution w/[...] of any Exceptions after submittal of requested R&S docs by me, as Qualified Beneficiary, as req’d by R.3B:31-67.  (124a, par. “b”-127a, 1st par.)  5.  Require [...]’s payback of $74,248  Trust payments, as per Account, for 2019-2021, legal fees for [...] (119a, par. 9, to 121a).  6.  Explicitly state in updated Order that [...] shall issue a Final Trust Accounting.  It was required by R.3B:14-7 in Oct. 6, ‘22 Order, par. 2 (17a).  By disallowing my standing to have Accounting Exceptions considered, the Court then did not rule on my Exceptions for Items 2-5 above.  While not ruling on Item 6, its Oct. 22 ‘Order, par. 2, which cited 3B:14-7, implicitly required it.  B. CERT. REPLY TO OPPOSITIONS TO RECONSIDER OCT. ’22 ORDER
[brief] In Combariati, the argument that the State must prove defendant knew the purse he stole contained drugs to convict him of stealing drugs was rejected.  Id. at 376- 81.  The court held the State need prove only the item was “property of another,” but was not obligated to prove either “a more specific attribute of the property” or “defendant’s knowledge of the same. ”  Id. at 379.  Those issues were relevant only to grading.  Id. at 377. \footnote{Of course, the State must prove grading issues beyond a reasonable doubt, as happened here.  See Combariati, 186 N.J. Super. at 377.}  While only a Law Division decision, Combariati’s holding should be applied for three reasons.
[brief] The State in its zeal to close this case, brought the Grand Jury a Ham sandwich to receive a True Bill. ***Second, the Supreme Courts and Great Legal minds have wrote numerous Briefs outlining cases like this one, little evidence or no evidence.  How similar cases place innocent Black men in prison for decades, and very little evidence to warrant a guilty verdict.  Jurist, must ask the obvious question, this is February 2015, not February 1960 the State with all their resources and assets should have made a copy of the foot prints in snow to compare to defendant [...]’s, and search for additional blood dropping in area where suspect escape.
[directive] The FNE, sexual assault examiner, or emergency department healthcare provider is responsible for documenting information pertaining to the victim’s report of sexual assault or contact, obtaining a pertinent medical history, performing the medical forensic exam, ensuring that necessary medical treatment is provided, providing patient education, and making all necessary referrals for follow-up care.  At the conclusion of the medical forensic exam, any specimens collected as evidence shall be packaged and secured in a manner to ensure the integrity of each specimen and the appropriate chain of custody.  It is recommended that healthcare facilities work cooperatively with the County Prosecutor’s Office to develop a written protocol to ensure proper handling of any identified and collected evidence.  Where a victim chooses to report a sexual assault to law enforcement, the FNE Coordinator shall provide the following information to the County Prosecutor’s Office of Victim Witness Advocacy within three business days following a medical forensic exam:  1. The victim’s name; 2. The victim’s contact information; 3. The responding law enforcement agency’s contact information; and 4.  The date of the sexual assault.7  This dissemination of information will enable the County Office of Victim Witness Advocacy to begin assisting the victim immediately.  The Victim Witness Advocate assigned to the case will explain the criminal justice system and prepare the victim for the next steps in the process, provide referrals to continuous support services, and familiarize the victim with their staff.  This provision does not preempt individual county protocols that otherwise provide the above 7 information to the county victim witness coordinator within the three business days.  -13-  ATTORNEY GENERAL STANDARDS FOR PROVIDING SERVICES TO VICTIMS OF SEXUAL ASSAULT
[brief] **THE COURT ERRED IN NOTING THAT TESTING AS DESCRIBED WOULD DEPRIVE THE PUBLIC ACCESS TO THESE REQUESTED ITEMS IN THEIR ORIGINAL STATE.  (Pa139-154). **  Appellant and interested parties argue, that the documents in question would not be damaged using modern-day forensic technology as described by their subject matter expert.  Said expert, [...], noted in his statement marked as Exhibit G of the Appellant’s response (Pa97) that, “It is, therefore, my professional opinion that the ransom envelopes and stamps will not suffer ‘damage,’ as the State alleges. ” (Pa103).  [...] had an opportunity to review the Respondent’s response and update his statement which is why he included the additional language.  [...] was also on standby and prepared to testify at the Superior Court hearing.  Moreover, as the Respondents are aware, more than one of the envelopes can be swiped for DNA due to the facts that they are not sealed, but are already open, and the stamp located on envelope number 11 is barely connected to the envelope, which could easily be swabbed for DNA collection without alteration.  The Court however noted that “Plaintiff’s expert does not dispute that the testing will result in permanent alteration of the items and acknowledges that they may be damaged as a result” (Pa).
[brief] Such a claim is logically absurd.  An off-site parking facility/use for another separately owned property, with its own use and parking need, has always been deemed a separate principal use, and requires a Variance and Site Plan Approval as to both the property generating the off-site parked vehicles and the property receiving the off-site parking use.  See Mistretta v. City of Newark 33 N.J. Super. 205, 215-218 (App.Div. 1954) (use variance for bank parking lot on adjacent parcel zoned residential; Court grants approval); Rain or Shine Box Lunch Co. v. Bd. of Adj. of Newark, 53 N.J. Super. 252 (App.Div. 1958) (catering business use variance for off-site parking on nearby commercial parcel; Board denies; Court remands)
[directive] Policy General 12.1 ......................................................................75  Policies Escalating Plea of Issuance 12.2 .................................................................................................75 .  Features Required 12.3 ..........................................................................................76  Supervisors Designated 12.4 ..................................................................77  Rights Victims' with Adherence Strict 12.5 8 Page ................................................................................................77 .  Enforcement 12.6 Strict ........................................................................77 .  Offers Plea Judicial Unauthorized 12.7 ..........................................78  REFORM LAW BAIL OF INTERPRETATION UNIFORM 13. ............................................................................78 .
[directive] Directive #23-06 ("Grand Jury Standards - Implementation and Questionnaire") to jury promulgated standard grand policies and procedures, including a standard charge the of and jury jury (Attachment 3) a standard oath secrecy (Attachment 5).  The grand grand standards as promulgated by directive #23-06 have been implemented statewide for over a decade.  New the Jersey courts have  In response to the COVID-19 coronavirus pandemic, in jury transitioned from in-person to virtual court proceedings nearly all areas.  However, grand an in sessions have been suspended for two months and remain unable to resume in-person health on public risks.  format based  The Supreme Court on May 14, 2020 authorized a pilot program for virtual (video) grand of as jury proceedings in Mercer and Bergen counties, one method enabling criminal matters to Court's move May forward during this unprecedented crisis.
[brief] (PSR 6 to 11) to 24)  The parties also disagreed strongly on the remaining issue: whether the six convictions for which the sentences had been served outside of the Rule 609 ten-year period were admissible to affect defendant’s credibility.  (13T 51-21 to 22; 13T 49-13 to 51-4)  The judge sided with the State.  Despite the fact that none of those six convictions involved “dishonesty, lack of veracity, or fraud,” N.J.R.E. 609(b)(2)(ii), and despite the fact that the rules on admitting such convictions to affect credibility have become remarkably tougher against doing so since the days of State v. Sands, 76 N.J. 127 (1978), when all such convictions were almost always admissible, the judge ruled that one of the factors listed in N.J.R.E. 609(b)(2) -- the seriousness of those prior six convictions -- warranted admission of all of them against defendant if he testified.  (14T 10-6 to 11-24)  The judge cited only the wildly outdated decision in Sands to support her ruling.
[brief] 9  Relose v. Green, 222 N.J. Super 545, (App. Div) cert. denied 111 N.J. 610 (1988).................................................................  19 Rempfer v. Deerfield Packing Corp., 4 N.J. 135, 145 (1950)..................  18 Townsend v. Pierre, 429 N.J. 522 (App. Div. 2013)............................  6, 19 Triffin v. Am. Int’l Group, Inc., 372 N.J. Super. 517(App. Div. 2004)......  7 United States Pipe & Foundry Co. v. American Arbitration Ass'n, 67 N.J. Super. 384 (App. Div. 1961)...........................................  7 U.S. Pipe & Foundry Co. v. Am. Arbitration Assoc., 67 N.J. Super. 384, 400 (App.
[brief] The Trial Court use of the Respondent’s Statement of Undisputed Material Facts word for word in the Statement of Reasons set forth an appearance of bias.  In addition, the Trial Court failure to grant Appellant’s Motion to Compel the Completion of the Plaintiff’s Deposition showed bias.  It is customary for the Counsel for the deponent to have an opportunity to question the deponent on redirect at deposition to address some of the questions posed by Counsel for the Defendants.  It is not the norm for Counsel for the deponent to schedule the deposition of her client.  The Trial Court appeared to exhibit bias which favored the Defendants.  It is requested that this matter be reversed and remanded, that Appellant’s deposition be completed and that the matter be scheduled for trial.
[brief] ’”  State v. W.B., 205 N.J. 588, 602 n.3 (2011).  Rather, “Rule 3:5-7 . . . deals with motions to suppress physical evidence,” and “the State has the affirmative duty to prove” a defendant’s statement is admissible.  Ibid.  The court’s determination that the issues are different because defendant intends to raise different arguments similarly rests on a faulty premise.  Initially, collateral estoppel is “guided by the ‘fundamental legal principle . . . that once an issue has been fully and fairly litigated, it ordinarily is not subject to relitigation between the same parties either in the same or in subsequent litigation.
[brief] That version of the DPRP contained the following language regarding dispute resolution as a condition of assignment:  Assignment of a named insured’s or eligible injured person’s rights to receive benefits for medically necessary treatment, durable medical equipment tests or other services is prohibited except to a licensed health care provider who agrees to:  . . .  (e)  Submit disputes to alternative dispute resolution pursuant to N.J.A.C. 11:3.  [Pa511.]  After Plaintiffs filed this appeal, they learned of a revised version of the DPRP, which [...] approved, effective March 1, 2020, and which applies to some of the PIP claims at issue in this case.
[brief] (3T 126-6 to 16)  At around 5:00 p.m., [...] told [...]’s father that the landlord had given his consent for the police to enter the house and search the surveillance cameras.  (3T 117-20 to 118-3; 4T 20-22 to 21-6, 45-11 to 14)  Although the landlord had already left [...], [...] testified that the landlord gave consent over the phone.  (3T 112-19 to 113-6, 128-8 to 13)  However, [...] did not record the phone call or mention it in his police report.  (3T 113-5 to 22, 118-4 to 16; 4T 73-25 to 74-1)  There is no record of the phone call or what was said.  (3T 113-21 to 22, 118-4 to 16, 126-21 to 127-7)  Although [...]’s father was unable to speak with the landlord himself about the consent to search (4T 47-10 to 13), he “took [Det.] Simpkins at his word about what [the landlord] had said. ”  (4T 48-24 to 49-15)  [...] then read a consent to search form aloud, including the right to refuse the search, and explained to [...]’s father that “This is just a formality. ”  (3T 47-5 to 48-6)  Believing that the landlord had already given his consent, [...]’s father signed the consent form limited to a search of the surveillance cameras.  (3T 94-4 to 96-5; 4T 23-5 to 10, 34, 48-12 to 49-14)  Relying on the consent form signed by [...]’s father, the police entered the house and seized footage from the landlord’s DV-R system in the basement, which was connected to the surveillance cameras.  (2T 126-2 to 8; 4T 54-18 to 25)  The footage showed [...] behind the house with an object, allegedly a gun, in his hand.  (9T 57-13 to 60-16; 10T 24-8 to 14; Da20, 33:25 to 33:30)  The trial court granted [...]’s motion to suppress the trail camera footage because [...]’s father was never informed of his right to refuse that search.  (4T 71-4 to 23; Da6)  However, the court denied [...]’s motion as to the surveillance footage, finding that [...]’s father gave valid consent for the search of the landlord’s surveillance cameras.  (4T 75-3 to 12; Da6)  The court found “very troubling” the facts that [...] “knew the cameras did not belong to” [...]’s father and “did not have any record of his conversation with the landlord. ”  (4T 74-1 to 5)  But the court’s concerns were “somehow ameliorated” by the fact that the landlord “was there [at the house], could have remained on the scene if he had concerns about anybody entering the property,” but chose not to, and the fact that “the only person . . . concerned about anybody entering the property was” [...]’s father.  (4T 74-5 to 15)  “[R]egardless of whether [Det.] Simpkins actually” got the landlord’s consent, the court found that the police reasonably believed [...]’s father was a tenant and therefore had the apparent authority to consent to a search of the house.  (4T 72-10 to 25, 74-23 to 75-2)  The court concluded that [...]’s father’s apparent authority over the house allowed him to give consent to a search of the landlord’s surveillance cameras.  (4T 75-3 to 12)  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I THE SURVEILLANCE FOOTAGE MUST BE SUPPRESSED BECAUSE THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY FOUND THAT DAVID’S FATHER GAVE VALID CONSENT FOR THE WARRANTLESS SEARCH.
[brief] DEFENDANT IS CONFINED  TABLE OF CONTENTS  PROCEDURAL HISTORY ...........................................................................................................  1  STATEMENT OF FACTS............................................................................................................  4  LEGAL ARGUMENT  ..................................................................................................................  9 POINT I THE SURVEILLANCE FOOTAGE MUST BE SUPPRESSED BECAUSE THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY FOUND THAT DAVID’S FATHER GAVE VALID CONSENT FOR THE WARRANTLESS SEARCH.  (4T 75-8 to 12; Da5-6)  .................................................................  9  A.  The Warrantless Search Of The Surveillance Footage Was Unconstitutional Because The Landlord Did Not Consent to a Search of the Surveillance Cameras ...............  10  B.  [...]’s Father Could Not Consent To The Search Because He Lacked Common Or Apparent Authority Over The Landlord’s Surveillance Cameras.  .........................  12  C.  [...]’s Father Involuntarily Signed The Consent Form Because He Had Adamantly Refused To Consent To Any Search Of The Home Until The Officers Undercut His Right To Refuse.  .................................................................  18  POINT II THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING DAVID’S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL AFTER ONE JUROR DISCLOSED TO OTHER JURORS THAT HE WAS CONTACTED BY A FAMILY MEMBER OR FRIEND OF DAVID AND NEEDED TO BE DISMISSED.
[brief] (5T 64, lines 8-10)  "I didn't even know he had a policy until he died...  I didn't know he had one until he died.  (5T 65, 8-10)  The Court responded by asking, "How much was it worth?"  [...] responded, "It was worth - - I would say it was worth 800 and something thousand dollars."  (5T 66)  Because [...], with the assistance of the [...], had repeatedly denied that the decedent had any life insurance at the time of his death in Answers to Interrogatories and in responses to a Notice to Produce this admission was shocking to the Court, [...], and [...]
[brief] In *Bubis* there were streets running directly from the oceanfront lots to the beach, yet the grantors conveyed an express easement for the oceanfront properties to access the beach in order to “resolve” any “possible doubt” of rights to the beach.  As the *Bubis* court explained:  . . . plaintiffs' predecessors in title purchased lots in a planned development immediately adjoining the Atlantic Ocean.  The map with reference to which those lots were sold showed streets running directly from the lots to the beach and an unnamed street next to the Beach and Bluff.  Consequently, any person acquiring one of those lots would reasonably have assumed that one of the benefits of property ownership was convenient access to the beach and ocean by means of this street network.  Moreover, if there were any possible doubt that access to the ocean and beach was an essential part of the package of benefits which the developers conveyed to plaintiffs' predecessors in title, that doubt would be resolved by the fact that each purchaser acquired not only a lot but also an express easement over the Beach and adjoining Bluff.  Id. at 611.  Thus, as the foregoing cases make clear, nothing about the proximity of the [...] to the beach provides a basis on which to imply an easement for access across the [...], and the trial court was wrong to give this notion any credence.
[brief] GIGI’S IS A PROPER NON-CONFORMING USE  [...] testified that before [...] purchased the property which contained both the pizza parlor and a residence that was in a two-family zone, he went to the Oceanport Borough Hall, spoke with the appropriate officials, and was satisfied as to the zoning and that the pizza parlor could operate as such.  [...] then purchased the property.  (T.2 at 29:13 – 32:17).  Although [...] originally planned to operate the pizza parlor as Sal’s Pizza, a family problem prevented him from doing that.  He then rented it to an operator who, in 2017, opened it as [...].  It operated without problems or interference for two years.  (T.2 at 45:10 -47:22).  When Nicky’s lease ended [...] entered into a lease with [...] who operated pizzerias in Long Branch and Sea Bright.  He went with Gambella to the Borough Hall to “get all the paperwork he needed. ” (T.2 at 51:4-19).  Gambella did his own investigation and got all the permits he needed to operate what became known as [...].  (T.1 at 121:5-122:4).  As part of the basis for the Borough officials’ determinations that the pizzeria was a valid non-conforming use was a 1984 determination by the Borough’s Board of Adjustment to that effect.  (Pa-69-78).  Once the Borough officials gave their opinions and both [...] and [...] acted pursuant to those opinions, that should be sufficient for a non-conforming use designation.  Appellants, frankly, nonsensically, would have not only the Respondents here, but every applicant for land use approvals, not only investigate and second guess current municipal officials, but also prior rulings by town boards.
[brief] 42 N.J.S.A. 40:55D–25 ..........................................................  42 N.J.S.A. 40:55D–4 ..........................................................  42  N.J.S.A. 40:55D–62 ..........................................................  42  N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70 ................................................................. passim N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70(c) ......................................................... passim N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70(d) ......................................................... passim N.J.S.A. 52:27D-325 .......................................................... 60 Rules N.J.R. 4:41-5(b) ........................................................................ 59 R. 4:41-5(b) ........................................................................... 61, 62 Treatises Cox, Koenig, Drill & John-Basta, New Jersey Zoning & Land Use Administration, § 19-6.2 at 431 (2021) ............................................................. 57 Regulations Residential Site Improvement Standards ("RSIS") ......................... 49 APPENDIX Filed Complaint in Lieu of Prerogative Writs, dated May 22, 2019......................................................Ra1 Order of the Honorable [...], J.S.C. denying Township and Mayor’s Motion to Dismiss, dated and entered on October 25, 2019......................................................Ra121 Order of the Honorable [...], J.S.C. dismissing Count Eight of the Complaint, dated and entered on October 22, 2021......................................................Ra125 Letter from [...], Esq. to Honorable [...], J.S.C. in response to the SHO’s Draft Resolution, dated May 31, 2022......................Ra127 Letter from [...], Esq. to Honorable [...], J.S.C. in response to the SHO’s Draft Resolution, dated May 31, 2022......................Ra136 Resolution of the Special Hearing Officer Approving the Site Plan Application, dated June 7, 2022......................................................Ra138 “Monroe Mayor Calls for Zoning Board to Reject Proposed [...] Housing Development on Route 33”, March 19, 2019......................................................Ra171 “Mayor [...] Will Not Be Silenced” press release issued by [...], June 11, 2019......................................................Ra173 Certification of [...], P.P. in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment and in Support of Plaintiffs’ Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, dated January 2, 2023......................................................Ra175 South Salem Street Associates, LLC v. Planning Bd. of Twp. of Montville, 2008 WL 4647539 (N.J. Super. A.D.), cert. denied, 197 N.J. 477 (2009)......................Ra181 TABLE OF DECISIONS, ORDERS AND JUDGMENTS
[brief] TOBIN:  One of the State's witnesses that they like the most is [...].  She comes in to say, oh, well I buccal swabbed [...] and he gave me no problems.  He obviously had nothing to hide because he gave me no problems.  I would posit for you that [...] is not smart enough to know, [...] thinks he's smart enough, I got this beat, the gun, I know it doesn't have my DNA on it, I claim, but when we go through DNA, we'll hear about transference and how a gun in his car, in his hat could possibly have his DNA, but he didn't seem to think that or know it.
[brief] See Mynster, at 480; Donovan, at 197.  In fact, several courts have noted this inherent conflict in the statutory scheme in rejecting Appellant’s theory that Congress intended § 1692c(b) to prohibit transmitting information to a service provider, like a letter vendor.  See Miller v. Americollect, Inc., 2022 WL 20470401, at *9; Ciccone v. Cavalry Portfolio Servs., LLC, 2021 WL 5591725, *5 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 29, 2021); Barclift v. Keystone Credit Servs., 2022 WL 444267 at *9; [...] Transcript, T10 22-25 (“[A] literal interpretation of the act is – I’ll say this word – ridiculous, in this type of business in this type of field. ”); [...] Decision at pp.10-11.