ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] 12.1  In all instances when a CED or less-lethal device is fired or discharged during an actual operation, the law enforcement officer who employed such force shall complete: (a) Any agency required reports made necessary by the nature of the underlying incident; and (b)  A report in the Attorney General’s Use of Force Reporting Portal.  12.2  In all instances when a CED or less-lethal device is fired at or discharged upon a person by a law enforcement officer, a higher-ranking supervisor shall investigate the circumstances and outcome of the device’s use.  The investigating supervisor shall report on the incident to the law enforcement executive, providing the law enforcement executive information on all relevant circumstances, deployment, and outcome, including whether the deployment avoided injury to an officer and avoided the need to use deadly force.  Upon receipt, the law enforcement executive shall issue a report, including a finding on whether the firing and all discharges complied with the Attorney General’s Use of Force Policy.
[directive] 6.1  Criteria for and Examples of Legitimate BOLO Situations  A license plate number or partial license plate number shall not be included in an ALPR initial BOLO list unless there is a legitimate and specific law enforcement reason to identify or locate that particular vehicle, or any person or persons who are reasonably believed to be associated with that vehicle.  A license plate or partial license plate number shall not be included in a Post-Scan BOLO list unless there is a legitimate and specific law enforcement reason to ascertain the past locations(s) of that particular vehicle, or of any person or persons who are reasonably believed to be associated with that vehicle.  Examples of legitimate and specific reasons include, but are not limited to: persons who are subject to an outstanding arrest warrant; missing persons; AMBER Alerts; stolen vehicles; vehicles that are reasonably believed to be involved in the commission of a crime or disorderly persons offense; vehicles that are registered to or are reasonably believed to be operated by persons who do not have a valid operator’s license or who are on the revoked or suspended list; vehicles with expired registrations or other Title 39 violations; persons who are subject to a restraining order or curfew issued by a court or by the Parole Board, or who are subject to any other duly issued order restricting their movements; persons wanted by a law enforcement agency who are of interest in a specific investigation, whether or not such persons are themselves suspected of criminal activity; and persons who are on any watch list issued by a State or federal agency responsible for homeland security.  -7-
[brief] Upon entering 132’s front door, there was a stairwell that winded up to the second floor.  (1T51-11 to 22; 1T82-6 to 20; Ra30 to 31; Ra37 at 0:00:01 to 0:00:13).  The second floor had a hallway, with unnumbered bedrooms and a bathroom, that ran from the front of the property to its rear and led into a kitchen.
[brief] The first [...] hearing on [...]’s application took place on February 3, 2016, followed by an onsite inspection of the Original Proposed Site on February 27, 2016.  Six subsequent hearings were conducted on March 2, May 18, July 20, August 17, September 21 and December 7, 2016.  During those seven hearings, the Company presented voluminous testimony from six witnesses (nearly all of whom testified and/or answered Board and public questions on multiple occasions).  Two witnesses—[...] and [...]—are [...] employees directly involved in the design, construction and operation of the proposed Facility and/or the Site Analysis.  The four other witnesses were independent outside experts in the fields of engineering, landscape architecture, noise impacts and planning.  32.
[directive] The Presentence Report Form is a Facesheet which provides space for a brief summary of the defendant's case status at the time of sentencing.  Type of Conviction, Custodial Status, Jail Credit Time, Original Charges, Final Charges, the Plea Agreement (if applicable) are also reported on the form.  An additional optional form is provided for cases where the offender is being sentenced on multiple indictments or accusations.  Section I.
[brief] In early 2023, due to financial and personal difficulties\(^6\) Defendants fell behind one month of rent.  Da96, ¶ 20.  On March 3, 2023, Defendant [...] went to [...]’s management office intending to immediately pay all arrearages (Da97, ¶ 21), but was told that the account had already been referred for eviction.  Da97, ¶ 22.  Defendants later discovered that [...] had filed an eviction action ([...]), demanding “unpaid rent” of more than $22,000, $17,920 of which consisted of “charge-backs” of the promotional “free” rent and parking concessions applied at the beginning of the lease.  Da97-98, ¶¶ 26-29; Da3, ¶ 13.  On March 6, 2023, Defendant [...] e-mailed [...]’s management agent, referencing her personal hardship that led to the late payment, and offering to pay all arrearages immediately by certified check, except for the $17,920 “charge-back” fee.  Da76-77.  [...]’s agent responded by e-mail that the $17,920 “concession chargebacks can’t be reversed” because [...] had previously waived the $17,920 fee “as a one-time courtesy” when the Defendants October 2022 was received late.  Da78-79.  On March 28, 2023, [...] filed a Complaint in the Law Division (the case on appeal) seeking judgment against Defendants for unpaid “rent” totaling $23,042.52 which included the $17,920 free rent charge-back fee, one month of --- \(^6\)
[brief] In making this argument, Plaintiff contends that Defendants attempted to delegate this duty to Plaintiff and that Defendants’ duty to maintain the premises in a reasonably safe condition did not change simply because the condition may have been observed by passersby.  However, Plaintiff fails to address the fact that the duty of a business owner to an invitee is not without limit.  Plaintiff further argues that the trial court misapplied the appropriate duty of care despite the fact that the trial court specifically noted that it was undisputed that [...] owed Plaintiff a reasonable duty of care as a business invitee.  The trial court correctly applied the principles of the open and obvious doctrine in this case and provided a thorough analysis of whether a duty existed in the face of the raised barricade leg.  The trial court noted that the issue before it was whether the condition was open and obvious and correctly found that Plaintiff saw the condition noting that it was open and obvious to anyone traversing the area and therefore, Defendants had no duty as to the specific condition of the raised barricade leg because it was open and obvious.  Plaintiff argues that the trial court’s findings were contrary to established legal authority but fails to cite a single case that addresses the facts of the case at bar.
[brief] [3T60-8 to -19].  Defendant came into the main area of the bank and demanded to be let out of the front door.  [3T62-11 to -12; 3T76-14 to -14; 3T95-24 to 96-5].  [...] complied with his demands.  Defendant dropped several more dollar bills and a dirty bottle of Corona beer.  [3T61-13 to -17; 3T117-7 to 13].  When the crime scene investigators arrived on the scene, the beer bottle was dusted for fingerprints and then secured and taken to the New Jersey State Police Forensic Laboratory for DNA testing.
[brief] On February 14, 2020, Indictment No. [...] charged defendant [...] a/k/a [...] with third-degree aggravated assault on police officer [...], N. J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(5)(A) (count one); third-degree resisting arrest, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-2(a) (count two); and third-degree aggravated assault on police officer [...], N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(5)(A) (count three).  (Da1-2).  Defendant’s trial was held before the Honorable [...], J.S.C., and a jury on October 18, 19, 21, and 25, 2022.  (6T; 7T; 8T; 9T).  The State presented the testimony of [...] to authenticate video surveillance footage and cell phone footage that Li filmed, (6T78-9 to 110-17); --- 1  Citations to the record are as follows: “Db” – defendant’s brief “Da” – defendant’s appendix “Pa” – State’s appendix “1T” – transcript dated 9/22/2022  “2T” – transcript dated 10/11/2022  “3T” – transcript dated 10/12/2022  “4T” – transcript dated 10/13/2022  “5T” – transcript dated 10/14/2022  “6T” – transcript dated 10/18/2022 (Separated into Vol. I (pages 1-200) and Vol. II (pages 201-269))  “7T” – transcript dated 10/19/2022  “8T” – transcript dated 10/21/2022  “9T” – transcript dated 10/25/2022  “10T” – transcript dated 12/16/2022  2  Judge Catuogno is now the Assignment Judge for Bergen County.  Bergenfield Police Officer [...], (6T116-8 to 253-24, 7T20-20 to 65-23); and Bergenfield Police Officer [...], (7T69-20 to 229-8).  Defendant presented the testimony of his wife, [...].  (8T20-25 to 97-10).  On October 25, 2022, the jury returned its verdict, finding defendant: guilty of the lesser included offense of fourth-degree aggravated assault (of Officer Hwang) under count one; not guilty of third-degree resisting arrest under count two; and guilty of third-degree aggravated assault (of Officer Enriquez) under count three.  (9T131-19 to 133-11).  On December 16, 2022, the trial judge sentenced defendant to three years of probation on count one and three years of probation on count three, which ran concurrent with count one.  (Da5; 10T36-20 to 37-13).  **STATEMENT OF FACTS**
[brief] Plaintiff commenced the above-captioned matter by filing a Complaint on October 1, 2020, asserting, amongst other things, a cause of action for negligence against Defendants.  Plaintiff subsequently moved for partial summary judgment, which was granted, dismissing Defendants’ affirmative defense of immunity under the Equine Activities Liability Act (Act), N.J.S.A. 5:15-1, et seq. (Pa41a – Pa 42a).  The Motion Court determined that the Act did not apply to Defendants because they were not “operators” of an area where “participants” engaged in “equine animal activities. ”  Plaintiffs were subsequently granted leave to file a First Amended Complaint asserting a cause of action for strict liability, over the Defendants’ opposition.  (Pa43a – Pa44a).  The Court granted Plaintiffs leave to file the First Amended Complaint because New Jersey law makes the owner of an animal strictly liable for injuries caused by that animal if the owner knew or should have known that the animal had vicious or dangerous traits or propensities.  Pursuant to a case management consent order, Defendants moved for summary judgment upon the completion of discovery regarding liability but before service of all expert reports regarding damages.  (Pa45a – Pa46a).  The Motion Court granted Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment because it determined that i) [...]’s “skittishness” around the breeding process could not rise to the level of a vicious or dangerous propensity and ii) the motion record did not have a basis to find that [...], as a stallion in the breeding environment, was inherently vicious.  The Motion Court further found that, while the Act did not protect Defendant-Respondents from liability, the application of strict liability against Defendants would be against the Act’s legislative intent.  (Pa1082a – Pa1090a).  **STATEMENT OF FACTS**
[brief] [...] filed its petition under the regulatory framework of the TI program and the January 2020 Order that permitted a party to file a petition requesting assignment of a TREC factor for “new or innovative” technology.  (Aa1-6); N.J.A.C. 14:8-10.2 to 10.6.  Here, [...]’s grid supply floating solar project is not a project type that is eligible for entry in the TI program absent a waiver.  The Board identified market segments eligible for entry into the TI program (“Subsections”) and assigned each a TREC factor, ranging from 0.6 to 1.0.  (Aa3; N.J.A.C. 14:8-10.5).  A grid supply project is eligible for the TI program only if it is based on a “landfill, brownfield, [and] areas of historic fill” pursuant to Subsection (t) or when it had been conditionally certified as “ground mount[ed]” pursuant to Subsection (r) in the legacy SRP.  (Aa3).  [...]’s project does not meet that criteria, so it is not eligible for the TI program.
[brief] (Aa0001)  DEP’s HAD is premised on the erroneous determination that “the proposed Project is ‘Consistent’ with the WQMP and is in accordance with the WQMP rules. ”  Aa0002.  But the DEP failed to account for the totality of the proposed project, including all the impacts (including cumulative impacts) from the proposed construction and use of the new compressor station, office building, and appurtenances.  The only factor DEP weighed in making this fundamental consistency determination was the anticipated gallons of water used and flushed per day.  Aa0002.  The DEP’s consistency determination myopically ignored the total impacts that should be anticipated from the proposed project, including the deforestation and addition of impervious surfaces that will be associated with the construction and use of the new compressor station and appurtenances - all beyond just the number of gallons of water that might enter the septic system itself.  Critically, the DEP ignored the impacts to water resources that will likely result from the increased use of fossil fuels associated with this project, including climate change impacts and air pollution that will in turn become or cause water pollution.
[brief] However, it was denominated, the purpose of the agreement was to provide funds to the plaintiff with her pre-judgment personal injury suit as collateral.  That it was not described as a loan, but rather a purchase, does not define the nature of the transaction, the court’s interpretation of the contract does that.  The reasonable interpretation of the agreement is that its purpose was the provision of funding, in return for compensation to the funder.  That it was non-recourse was a factor in the lending decision but should not determine the nature of the transaction.  If it was not a loan, it was an assignment, for a fee, and the provision of the funds in return of the assignment was a service.  Finally, if it was a sale or assignment, such a transaction is barred by New Jersey law, and the fees charged for the plaintiff to obtain the right to have a share of her pre-judgment personal injury suit bought by the defendant are not permitted.
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT DID ERR IN DENYING THE APPELLANT'S MOTION TO RECONSIDER THE JUDGMENT  [...] & the trial court need to also STOP “assuming arguendo that the Appellant has standing to challenge the IA”, since I have repeatedly substantiated that I have standing to challenge the IA based on R.4:87, Verified Complaint, par. 4, and the Will, par. 10.6.  [...] remains, & trial court was, in denial that reconsiderations of Oct. 6, 2022, March 7, ‘23, & Sept. 6, 2023
[brief] In Count 11, plaintiffs alleged that [...], [...], [...], [...] and [...] breached the covenants of good faith and fair dealing implied in the [...] Stockholder Agreement and the [...] Operating Agreement by “causing [...] and [...] to historically and continually issue false financial records, which Defendants knew Plaintiffs would rely on at the dates of the SPA and Purchase Agreement, while at all times concealing the falsity of the financial records from Plaintiffs. ”  Da50-51.  It is evident that this allegation relates to plaintiffs’ failed contention that defendants used “false” representations regarding the values of [...] and [...] to fraudulently induce them to accept a depressed value for their interests in those entities.  As a result, the trial court should have dismissed Count 11 when it rejected and dismissed the fraudulent inducement claims.  To prove a breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, a plaintiff must prove that "the defendant, with no legitimate purpose: 1) acted with bad motives or intentions or engaged in deception or evasion in the performance of contract; and 2) by such conduct, denied the plaintiff of the bargain initially intended by the parties."  Model Jury Charge (Civil), § 4.10J "Implied Terms – Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing" (December 2011).  The evidence failed to establish these essential elements and the trial court did not make the requisite findings that such elements were proven.  Rather, the court spoke only of conduct that equated with a breach of contract.  24T50:18-51:21.  And, again, the linchpin for the court's ruling was that the challenged transactions were unauthorized, a premise that plaintiffs failed to prove.
[directive] For the purposes of these Guidelines, a defendant is a “fugitive” if he or she has been arrested and released on bail or recognizance for any offense and is in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:29-7, or otherwise has failed to appear at any court appearance where his or her presence was required, or where it appears that the defendant has left the State or gone into hiding to avoid pretrial supervision by a probation department imposed as a condition of bail or release on recognizance.  4.5  The Functional Equivalent of Pre-Indictment Offer  Some counties do not have in place formal pre-indictment case disposition programs that would allow defendants a reasonable opportunity to review and accept or reject a pre-indictment offer tendered pursuant to the graduated plea Page 27 [...] Guidelines 2 (2004 Revisions) policy established in these Guidelines.  (Pre-indictment programs are cooperative ventures established by the courts with the concurrence and participation of the prosecutor and the Public Defender’s office.)  Consequently, in these jurisdictions, defendants charged with Brimage-eligible offenses might be denied a meaningful opportunity to enter an early guilty plea pursuant to the “pre-indictment” offer authorized pursuant to these Guidelines, even though many of these defendants might be willing to accept such an offer.
[directive] Note that these Guidelines generally do not determine the maximum sentence to be imposed by the court.  Rather, these Guidelines focus on the minimum term of imprisonment during which the defendant will be ineligible for parole.  Note also that while the Guidelines will in many cases afford the prosecutor some discretion in selecting an appropriate plea offer from within a given range of authorized dispositions (e.g., discretion as to the extent of an adjustment from the Presumptive Offer based on the grand total of Aggravating and Mitigating Factor points; discretion as to the extent of a Downward Departure for Trial Proof Issus or Substantial Cooperation, etc.), the plea offer tendered by the prosecutor generally must be a specific term of parole ineligibility.  The prosecutor may not tender a plea offer that provides for a variable range of possible terms of parole ineligibility except as part of a cooperation agreement in accordance with the requirements of State v. Gerns, 145 N.J. 216, 230-31 (1996), where the extent of a Downward Departure is to be based on the nature and quality of a defendant’s future cooperation (i.e., cooperation or assistance given by the defendant between the date of the plea agreement and the date set for the sentencing hearing.)  See Section 13.2.  Page 9
[brief] The Court chose to deviate from the statute in favor of counting the voters’ write-in ballots in order to comply with the overarching mandate in favor of enfranchisement.  No information was provided to voters outside the voting booths explaining how properly to cast write-in votes.  *Gray-Sadler*, 164 N.J. at 478-79.  And inside the voting machines, in small font, was an instruction stating, “PERSONAL CHOICE WARNING!  Do not touch personal choice unless you intend to write in.  Ask Election Judge for instructions before entering machine to vote. ”  *Id.* at 472.  Voters in *Gray-Sadler* who wanted to vote for a write-in candidate had to undergo a complex process of holding down a lever with one hand, simultaneously sliding open a metal window with the other hand, and then adding the name of their desired candidate in writing or with a sticker on the paper revealed in the open window.  *Id.* at 471.  But the stickers did not always appear in the correct locations, causing the voter’s write-in vote to be invalidated. \(^6\)
[brief] Here, the exclusions apply only to injuries caused by the insured with “the knowledge that the injury would result” or arising out of the publication of material published “with knowledge of its falsity,” and, therefore, those exclusions apply only to conduct that is intended to cause the injury alleged.  Tortious interference, on the other hand, does not require any intent to injure.  Since the elements of a tortious interference claim do not fall within the exclusions at issue, it was an error of law for the trial court to hold that the Policy’s exclusions applied to disclaim coverage in the Underlying Action.
[brief] (Plaintiff “had a duty to investigate all potentially responsible parties. ”)  *Id.* at 53.; *DiMura v. Knapik*, 277 N.J. Super. Super. 156 (App. Div. 1994) ("Fictitious name practice may be used only when the plaintiff does not know or have reason to know of the identity of an alleged culpable party...")  Id. at 162.  After the denial of defendant's original motion, the defense learned that plaintiff had taken photographs of the area where he had fallen immediately after the accident.  (Pa846-849; Pa1149-1151)  He retained counsel sometime between March 16, 2017 and April 7, 2017.  Counsel then retained [...].  [...] visited the strip mall on April 7, 2017, and submitted his report to counsel on July 1, 2017.  (Pa694-697)  Moreover, plaintiff [...] admitted at his deposition that he believed that he had a cause of action against all of the tenants in the strip mall as of the date of loss.  (Pa832-834; Pa882-883)  Counsel for [...] again moved for summary judgment on the statute of limitations in June 2021.  The court's holding is set forth in the statement of facts, and is found at 3T65-21 to 66-16.
[directive] The elements of a violation of the DWI offenses are:  Operation !  Of a vehicle or vessel !  By a person !  While intoxicated, and/or !  With a blood alcohol or alcohol concentration at, or above, the per se limit ! set by the statute.  The elements of a violation of a DWI “school zone” offense (N.J.S.A. 39:4-50(g)) are the same as a DWI offense with the additional requirement to prove:
[brief] It was, rather, the burden of the applicant to prove the converse.  (citations omitted).  Id. at 516.  As in the current case, applicant in the Weiner case sought bulk and density changes from the zoning requirements, such as 10 four-family dwellings and a community recreational building instead of the maximum of 2 dwelling units per structure, an area of 3,000 square feet per dwelling unit, a waiver of the 50-feet frontage requirement, and a reduction in the requisite parking.  In the current case, [...] was seeking one immense three-story building with excess impervious coverage, reduced parking setbacks, undersized parking, and far more density than allowed in the zone or even in any other zones where these uses are permitted.  As in this case, there were other zones where the proposed use would be acceptable and similar bulk and density more nearly conforming.  In concluding that the board had not acted in an arbitrary or exclusionary manner in the denial of the variances, the Weiner Court held that Plaintiff and the housing authority can construct their senior housing project on the proposed site if they reduce the density proposal to accord with that particular district, or they can select a site in one of the R-5 districts where the proposed project is legally permissible in whole without the necessity of variances.
[brief] By its verdict, the jury found that Plaintiff had sustained an injury in the accident and awarded damages of $3,500.00 for past lost wages.  The jury also determined that Plaintiff had sustained a permanent injury within the meaning of N.J.S.A. 39:6A-8(a) (the limitation on lawsuit threshold) and awarded $927,000.00 in non-economic damages.  On July 25, 2023, Defendants filed a motion for new trial.