ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] For example, in Finderne Heights Condominium Ass’n v. Rabinowitz, the Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s grant of a motion to dismiss on the papers.  390 N.J. Super. 154, 16 (App. Div. 2007).  This was despite the Appellate Division’s conclusion that the appellant had “every expectation” of oral argument and that the trial court was not justified in failing to hold such argument.  390 N.J. Super. 154, 16 (App. Div. 2007).  The Appellate Division reasoned that there was “no prejudice under the circumstances. ”  Ibid.  Likewise, in Spina Asphalt Paving v. Fairview, the Appellate Division, despite finding “no justification” for the trial court to deny oral argument on the parties’ motions, held that there was “no prejudice” in its failure to comply with Rule 1:6-2(d).  304 N.J. Super. 425, 427 n.1 (App. Div. 1997).  These cases -- and others -- establish that noncompliance with R. 1:6-2(d) is not a per se reason to remand as Appellant suggests.
[brief] # TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | Publications | Page | |--------------------------------------------------|------| | **Principles of equity and Trusts** (Fifth ed.)  Annandale | | | Page 5- [...] (2016) | | | **The impact of equitable doctrine on the law of contract** | | | (United Kingdom), Anglo-American Law Review 27 (1): | | | 1.  ISSN 0308-6569 | | ARGUMENT IN REPLY TO BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF/RESPONDENT
[directive] Rule 3:4-2(g) provides that to waive the first appearance for a non-incarcerated defendant charged on a complaint-summons for an indictable offense, the attorney must certify that:  1.  The defendant has received and read a copy of the complaint or the attorney has read it to the defendant; 1  2.  The defendant understands the substance of the change(s); 3.  The defendant has been informed of the right to remain silent and that any statement may be used against the defendant; 4.  The defendant has been informed that there is a pretrial intervention program and where and how an application to that program may be made; 5.  The defendant has been informed of the right to have a hearing as to probable cause, the right to indictment by the grand jury and trial by jury; 6.  The defendant has been informed that, if applicable, the offense charged may be tried by the court upon waiver of indictment and trail by jury, if in writing and signed by the defendant; 7.  The defendant has been informed of the date of the pre-indictment disposition conference held pursuant to R. 3:4-6, which is required to occur no later than 45 days after the date of the first appearance; program1, 8.  The defendant has been informed that there is a recovery court including where and how to make an application to that program; and 9.  The defendant has been informed of the availability of the Veterans Diversion Program for eligible service members which was enacted by L. 2017, c. 42, and codified at N.J.S.A. 2C:43-23 to -31.  1  Effective January 1, 2022, the Supreme Court transitioned the name of the Drug Court Program to the Recovery Court Program to more closely reflect the program’s purpose.  2  Waiver of First Appearance for Indictable Offenses on a Complaint-Summons For Attorney Use Only R.
[brief] In light of the expiration of the appeal deadline and the Defendant’s failure to comply with procedural requirements, the court must dismiss the Defendant’s appeal as procedurally defective.  Upholding the integrity and finality of the Trial Court’s decision is paramount to ensuring the fair and efficient administration of justice.  Any further consideration of the appeal would undermine the established procedural framework and risk unjust disruption to the resolution of the legal matter at hand.  Therefore, the dismissal of the appeal is not only warranted but necessary to maintain the integrity of the judicial process.
[brief] The Long Branch Redevelopment Zone Permit, *N.J.A.C. 7:7-7.1*, was adopted by DEP as a rule on September 15, 1997.  29 N.J.R. 3920(a).  (Rb4).  It was adopted after finding that “the Design Guidelines Ordinance complies with the Rules on Coastal Zone Management such that development constructed in accordance with Design Guidelines Ordinance and Redevelopment Plan Ordinance will be in compliance with the Rules on Coastal Zone Management and also… maintain and in some cases enhance the physical and visual access to the waterfront.
[brief] Under N.J.S.A. 2A:15-59.1 or R.1:4-8 these sanctions deter that conduct & compensate victims.  See Toll Bros. Inc. v. Twp. of West Windsor, 190 N.J. 61,67 (2007).  Under this statute, litigation is frivolous when used or continued, in bad faith, solely for the purpose of harassment, delay or malicious injury or where the party knew or should have known that the claim or defense was without any reasonable basis in law or equity & could not be supported by a good faith argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing law.  Bad faith is where there is an admitted absence of legal support for the position but the litigation is continued.  Port-O-San Corp. v. Teamsters Local Union No.863, 363 N.J.Super. 432,439 (App. Div. 2003).  Frivolous is when no rational argument can be advanced, when not supported by any credible evidence, when a reasonable person could not have expected its success, or when it is completely untenable.  Belfer v. Merling, 322 N.J. Super. 124,144 ( App. Div 1999), certif. denied, 162 N.J. 196 (1999).  Even if the action was not frivolous when filed, it can become frivolous based upon the evidence produced during the pendency of the litigation.
[brief] (“[...]” and, together with [...], “Appellants”), respectfully submit this brief in support of their Appeal of the trial court’s Order (the “Disqualification Order”), dated November 7, 2024, disqualifying [...] (“[...]”) from its representation of Appellants.  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT  In its oral opinion granting the Disqualification Order, the trial court admitted disqualification was not an appropriate remedy:  *Nothing has been provided to the Court* regarding the corporate litigation that the Court would find sufficiently specific, nor the matters therein, as compared to the present one, *to be sufficiently substantially similar as to warrant disqualification* on their own.  Although the [...] matter and the present one involved a failed attempt to expand the business of [...] through ventures that ultimately failed, *there is nothing else so similar about them* so as to distinguish their relevance beyond those exhibited in City of Atlantic City v. Trupos, 201 N.J. 447.  *Thus, no apparent violation of RPC 1.9(a) based on the representation alone.* (T21:4-17) (emphasis added).  The trial court could have (and should have) stopped its analysis there.  Now, the Appellate Division must end the analysis where the trial court should have, and reverse and overturn the Disqualification Order because the instant matter is not sufficiently similar to any matter wherein [...] represented its prior clients, among a plethora of other reasons.
[brief] For example, [...] testified that “[h]e worked himself up into a state of mind, armed himself, readied himself, to show the world that he is strong, not a victim anymore, not helpless and being picked on but now a figure worthy of [...] or his dad or Chuck Norris, the powerful good guys who wouldn’t be bullied. ”  (14T:98-1 to 6).  This was hearsay information taken out of context from [...]’s school records that was subsequently used by [...] as substantive evidence to provide a motive for the shootings.  Id. b.  The State Argued Inadmissible Hearsay Elicited by [...] as Substantive Evidence in the State’s Closing Argument (15T:193-14 to 195-2); (17T:27-21 to 28-23) (Partially Raised Below)
[brief] The fifth count of Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint alleged violation of N.J.S.A. 10:6-2(c) for depravation of Civil Rights by way of threat or coercion.  New Jersey law, through the Civil Rights Act (N.J.S.A. 10:6-2, et. seq.), clearly sets forth the requirements for a cause of action under the Act:  “Any person who has been deprived of any substantive due process or equal protection rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or any substantive rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of this State, or whose exercise or enjoyment of those substantive rights, privileges or immunities has been interfered with or attempted to be interfered with, by threats, intimidation or coercion by a person acting under color of law, may bring a civil action for damages and for injunctive or other appropriate relief. ”  N.J.S.A. 10:6-2(c)  The New Jersey Civil Rights Act is the State’s “analogue” to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and New Jersey courts typically interpret cases arising under the New Jersey Civil Rights Act as they would arising under the federal equivalent.  *Morillo v. Torres*, 117 A.3d 1206 (N.J. 2015).
[brief] Objectors seek a review of the Trial Court Judgment denying them a requested extension of time in which to file their Complaint in Lieu of Prerogative Writs.  (Pa862).  Objectors argue that the Trial Court erred by failing to acknowledge the existence of important public rather than private concerns.  (Pa852).  Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Objectors admit that: 1) [...] (owned by the Objectors, [...] and [...]) is not a contributing home within the [...].
[brief] In order for me to do that...I probably would hold an evidentiary hearing."  (See October 19, 2023 Hearing Transcript, Page 16, Line 9-13 and cited in the Defendants-Appellant Brief on p.17).  And then the trial court judge continued, saying: "In other words, [...] invited me to swear him in, and if – if he files an appeal, the Appellate Division send this back for an evidentiary hearing, I'll hold an evidentiary hearing."  (See October 19, 2023 Hearing Transcript, Page 17, Line 13-16).  The trial court ERRED when he said in the November 28, 2023 decision transcript:  "It's clear after I heard all the evidence back on October 19, [...] was served and it is a very, very old judgment."
[directive] Attorney General [...] Guidelines 2 (2004 Revisions)  Prosecutors are not required to delay the pre-indictment disposition of a case by initiating a supplemental investigation to determine whether the offense occurred in a public park, public housing, or public building zone where the jurisdiction in which the offense was committed has not produced an approved map depicting the location and boundaries of any such zones.  It is expected that a prosecutor’s ability to determine the applicability of this aggravating factor would be greatly facilitated by the creation of such maps and their approval by local or county ordinance, and prosecutors are strongly encouraged to work with local and county engineers and governing bodies to develop and update these maps as appropriate.  Under these Guidelines, prosecutors are permitted but are not required to dismiss a count charging a violation of non-[...]-eligible drug offenses, including a count charging a violation of the second-degree crime defined in N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7.1, in exchange for the defendant agreeing to plead guilty to a violation to the offense defined at N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7.
[directive] The fact that the officer preparing a PLEIR does not check a “check- off” box should not be construed to mean that such fact or circumstance does not exist, but rather only that the officer at the time of completing the PLEIR does not have sufficient basis, or immediate need, to indicate the existence or non-existence of such fact or circumstance.  The information documented in the PLEIR can be supplemented, clarified, or modified, as additional information is learned or corroborated in the course of the ongoing investigation/prosecution.  A PLEIR shall be in addition to, not in lieu of, any regular police arrest, incident, or investigative report(s) prepared pursuant to the agency’s standard operating procedures, policy, practices, or at the prosecutor’s request.
[brief] [...]: Before any of the initial … could you have shot the dog first?  [...]: I don’t know.  LIEUTANANT TOZZI: You don’t know?  [...]: (indiscernible).  [...]: I probably wouldn’t.  [...]: You probably would or you probably wouldn’t have.  [...]: I wouldn’t have noticed him.  LIETENANT TOZZI: You wouldn’t have noticed him?  So would you say that your dog was on the agenda for you to shoot or no?  [...]: No, no -- [8T:64-3 to 17]  [...]: How come you didn’t shoot the dog?  [...]: Well if he tried to attack me, I would have.  [...]:  So, if the dog tried to attack you would – [8T:64-20 to 25]  [...]: You wouldn’t have shot him?  [...]: I would doubt it.  [...]: And how come?  [...]: (No audible response.  [...]: Do you love your dog?  [...]: Yeah, I like my dog.  LIETENANT TOZZI: Okay, so you like your dog.  You wouldn’t have shot your dog?  [...]: No.  [...]: Okay.  Do you like your parents?  [...]: Yeah.  I liked everyone.  [8T:65-6 to18].  During the exchange, despite repeated questions from Lieutenant Tozzi, Scott ultimately said he wouldn’t have shot his dog and that he liked his dog.
[brief] | ### TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | Case | Page(s) | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|---------| | **Cases** | | | A-1 Am. Fence, Inc. v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., | 30 | | 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 254241 (E.D. Tex. July 14, 2021) | | | ADP, LLC v. Lynch, | 8 | | No. 16-1111, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85636 (D.N.J. June 30, 2016), aff’d| | | 678 F. App’x 77 (3d Cir. 2017) | | | Alpert, Goldberg, Butler, Norton & Weiss, P.C. v. Quinn, | 25 | | 410 N.J. Super. 510 (App. Div. 2009) | | | Antonucci v. Curvature Newco, Inc., | 6 | | 470 N.J. Super. 553 (App. Div. 2022) | | | Argabright v. Rheem Mfg. Co., | 21 | | 201 F. Supp. 3d 578 (D.N.J. 2016) | | | AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, | 7 | | 563 U.S. 333 (2011) | | | Barnett Bank of West Florida v. Hooper, | 20 | | 498 So.2d 923 (Fla. 1986) | | | Bayron-Paz v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., | 9, 10, 12, 13 | | No. 22-6122, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 116807 | | | Berryman v. Newalta Envtl. Servs., | 28 | | No. 18-793, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 186789 | | | (W.D. Pa. Nov. 1, 2018) | | | Blocker v. Wells Fargo Bank, | 9, 12 | | No. 08-1196, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36387 | | | (D. Or. Mar. 30, 2011) | | | Capital Bank v. MVB, Inc., | 20 | | 644 So.2d 515 (Fla. 1994) | | | Chase Bank USA, N.A. v. Staffenberg, | 17 | | 419 N.J. Super. 386 (App. Div. 2011)
[brief] (AA0217)  Appellant further certified, in support of her Request for Reconsideration, that other than the 2012 major discipline action, none of the disciplines listed on the improper “discipline history summary” submitted by the Respondent [...] existed in her personnel file.  (AA0158)  She asserted the Respondent erred by relying on these minor incidents, including the false entry, which was the only alleged incident subsequent to her promotion to Sergeant in 2018.  (AA0158)  Since she had improperly not been provided notice of a request to remove her name from the eligible list, she also explained the nature of the minor incidents improperly relied upon by the Respondent Commission to remove the name of a first ranked disabled veteran from the list:
[directive] In all cases in which real property or in which property having a value of $10,000 or more is the subject of a forfeiture, such forfeiture action shall proceed by a complaint filed in Superior Court as authorized by N.J.S.A. 2C:64-3.  This policy will ensure that a public record is established for property having significant value, when that property is subject to a forfeiture.  Further, a Superior Court Judge, as a neutral judicial officer, can adjudicate claims by parties asserting an interest in the property and must sanction any final disposition of the forfeiture complaint.  (3)
[brief] In other words, “[t]he challenger must show that the Board engaged in ‘willful and unreasoning action, without consideration and in disregard of circumstances.  Where there is room for two opinions, action is [valid] when exercised honestly and upon due consideration, even though it may be believed that an erroneous conclusion has been reached. ’”  *Northgate Condo. Ass'n v. Borough of Hillsdale Planning Bd.*, 214 N.J. 120, 145 (2013)(second alteration in original) (quoting *Worthington v. Fauver*, 88 N.J. 183, 204–05 (1982)).
[brief] (Pb17-18).  Specifically, [...] never pled in the Underlying Action what specific injury he actually suffered.  For example, [...] never pled in the Underlying Action that [...]’s tortious interference impacted a specific relationship that [...] had with a third party and what injury he actually suffered regarding that third party.  In any event, the trial court never conducted a Karlinski analysis, which [...] now relies on, to compare the injuries that [...] claimed he suffered and [...]’s subjective intent.
[brief] “[S]imple keyword searches are both over- and under-inclusive in light of the inherent malleability and ambiguity of spoken and written English. ”  *Id.* at 233.  This is a common problem that courts have long recognized.  *E.g.*, *Victor Stanley, Inc. v. Creative Pipe, Inc.*, 250 F.R.D. 251, 260 (D. Md. 2008) (recognizing “well-known --- [^4]: Available at https://thesedonaconference.org/sites/default/files/publications/217-264%20Search%20and%20Information_0.pdf. limitations and risks associated with [keyword searches]”); *Moore v. Publicis Groupe*, 287 F.R.D. 182, 190-91 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (“Another problem with keywords is that they often are over-inclusive, that is, they find responsive documents but also large numbers of irrelevant documents.
[brief] \(^7\) [...] objects to the number of partners that have worked on the matter, but fails to acknowledge that [...] and [...] were counsel and associate when initially staffed on the matter upon joining the firm in 2016 and 2017, respectively.  Based on their familiarity with the complicated history of this matter, they have continued to work on it following their respective elevations to partner.  Plaintiff’s application made clear that the time sought to be awarded had been reviewed for reasonableness by counsel before being submitted, i.e., counsel did not simply include all time that was billed over the prior six years, but rather engaged in a reasoned review to cull out time that, while reasonably incurred, could not under the complex circumstances by sought to be charged to Defendants even despite their egregious fraud on the court.  (Da10).  Plaintiff also did not seek an award of fees that had been previously awarded, or for the more than $1.4 million incurred on the 20+ appeals Defendants have filed since 2016.\(^8\) (Da6-8).
[brief] On August 21, 2023, thirty-nine (39) days after Plaintiff offered the Property as an inclusionary development, [...] adopted Resolution No. 23-227, which designated [...] (“[...]”) as the designated redeveloper of the Property (the “Redeveloper Resolution”). \textsuperscript{4} (Da206).  The Redeveloper Resolution provided that [...] and the Township had 90 days (from August 17) to enter into a redeveloper agreement with [...], which apparently did not happen.  (Id.).  Upon information and belief, when the Township adopted the Redeveloper Resolution, [...] had no rights, contractual or otherwise, with respect to the Property.  (Ja456).
[brief] Defendants are medical professionals, administrative laypersons, and entities treating, among others, patients suffering from injuries sustained in automobile accidents.  (C.C.Da.1-10).  At its core, the theory of [...]’s complaint is that Defendants fraudulently billed [...] for medical services that were either not necessary or appropriate, were not provided or were forced to be provided by doctors of lower licensure or no licensure or were the product of illegal referrals.  Therefore, [...] argues that the claims were not covered under the [...] insurance policies.  (C.C.Da.1-100).
[brief] Pa6.  Despite the broad and straightforward language of N.J.S.A. 39:6A-5.1(a) and (c), [...] tries to substantially narrow it.  [...] says the phrase “recovery of benefits” in N.J.S.A. 39:6A-5.1(a) “ordinarily refers to ‘how much money should the insured receive from the insurer. ”  Pb25.  Stated another way, [...] tries to engraft the word “pending,” “unpaid,” or a similar phrase into N.J.S.A. 39:6A- 5.1(a).  But the statutory language does not limit disputes to those concerning benefits not yet paid or to disputes only over exact the quantum of money that should be paid.  Rather, the statute governs any dispute concerning the recovery of PIP benefits, which encompasses disputes about whether the medical provider should be recovering or should have recovered PIP benefits from the insurer at all.  The entire premise of [...]’s Complaint and claims here is that it disputes all of the PIP benefits that the [...] and other defendants recovered under the insured-patients’ policies.  In other words, [...] contends the defendants should have recovered nothing.  And, by the same token, [...] is trying to recover PIP benefits payments from the [...] that [...] paid because [...] claims the [...] were “ineligible” to be paid PIP benefits.  See Pa77-82, 106-09 (seeking in its Complaint to disgorge PIP benefits payments through declaratory judgment and other claims).  In short, N.J.S.A. 39:6A-5.1(a) is clear, unequivocal, and has only one meaning: all disputes related to PIP benefits must be arbitrated, an insurer’s attempt to couch the dispute as involving “fraud” notwithstanding.
[brief] 1T at 50:18-25.  The significance of this date is that [...] presented an email dated December 19, 2019, from [...] to [...], stating:  Please take a look at this and see if you find it acceptable.  It has the new expanded arbitration clause.  The document is dated as being revised today, 12-19-2019 and you should keep it with this caption so that you know how to track it from today forward.  [1T at 50:7-10.]  The email contained an attachment entitled “FULL TIME SALARIED FACULTY GC final rev 12-19-2019.doc”.  374a.  [...] did not include this attachment.  However, in correspondence to the Court, Defendants provided it with both this email and attachment.
[brief] The present-day iteration of the NJCFLA originated as the New Jersey Small Loan Law (“NJSLL”), enacted in 1914.  The NJSLL was meant to curtail predatory loan practices widely unregulated at the time.  The small loan business has long been the subject of study, legislation and judicial determination.  See Gallert, Hilborn and May, Small Loan Legislation (Russell Sage Foundation, 1932); Hubachek, Annotations on Small Loan Laws (Russell Sage Foundation, 1938); Law and Contemporary Problems (Winter, 1941).  New Jersey was one of the five large industrial states which early adopted general acts designed to regulate and control the business of making small loans.
[brief] (Aa0006).  Similar objections were made by Appellant before the 2017 WFD Permit was issued and NJDEP considered prior to issuing the 2017 WFD Permit to [...].  (Aa0378; Aa0379).  At NJDEP’s request, on April 7, 2017, [...]’s engineer, [...], P.E., submitted a revised Waterfront Development Permit plan to NJDEP reducing the size of [...]’s dock extension to 167.3 ft. from 185 ft.  (Aa0020- NJDEP also requested additional minor revisions in line with the 299 ft. dock previously approved for the property at [...] which is adjacent to [...]’s property and owned by [...].  (Aa007-Aa008; Aa0016-Aa0017; Aa0020).  On May 19, 2017, NJDEP issued Waterfront Development Permit No. [...] to [...] pursuant to the Waterfront Development Act (WFDA), N.J.S.A. 12:5-3 and the CZM Rules.
[brief] Without actually owning the property in question, [...] cannot maintain an action for trespass or conversion because ownership is a required element of each such claim.  See Ross v. Lowitz, 222 N.J. 494, 510 (2015) (citing Restatement § 158. and § 165, respectively) (observing that a defendant is liable in trespass for an intentional entry onto another’s land, regardless of harm).  For this reason, this Court must, respectfully, uphold the trial court Order dismissing [...]’s First Count of its Counterclaim for trespass.