ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] On November 9, 2023, plaintiff filed and served the AOM of [...], M.D. (Da207-224.)  Dr. Davis reviewed the amended complaint, [...]’s death certificate, the [...] records, and the contract tracing report prepared by [...] that was attached to the amended complaint.  --- \(^2\) Ferreira v. Rancocas Orthopedics Associates, 178 N.J. 144 (2003) (see Da210 ¶5), and set forth his factual findings as detail (see Da210-213 ¶6).  Dr. Davis then gives the opinion that [...] had COVID as of March 18, 2020 and that, in light of his symptoms, the progress of the pandemic, multiple comorbidities, his roommates’ symptoms and his own, and his family’s request for a COVID test, failure to provide one until March 24, 2020, was a breach of the standard of care “by the facility and staff of [...]”.  (Da215.)  The failure on the part of “[...]” or “the facility” to transfer to [...] to a higher level of care when his condition worsened was a direct and proximate contributor to his death.  (Ibid.)  “[...]” or “the facility” also failed to comply with the CDC guidance for monitoring residents’ respiratory illness symptoms and avoiding group activities, and allowed “a resident to ambulate ad-lib within the facility until March 19, 2020. ”  (Da217.)  “[...]” or “the facility” also, in Dr. Davis’ opinion, did not develop a care plan to comply with the CDC guidance in monitoring respiratory symptoms and fever, avoiding group activities, avoiding communal dining, restricting ambulation and encouraging hand hygiene and promoting social distancing.  (See ibid.)  Dr. Davis notes that the complaint further alleged failure to provide adequate care to [...], including proper nutrition and hydration, and a delay in treatment because a doctor was on vacation.  (See Da217-218.)  Although there was a report of no COVID cases, there were at least five, and [...] accepted new COVID positive patients.  If those allegations were proven, [...] and its staff violated the standard of care.  (See ibid.)  Dr. Davis thus concludes that there was “a reasonable probability that the care, skill, or knowledge exercised or exhibited by [...] and its staff fell outside acceptable standards of care. ”  (Da218.)  Dr. Davis’ affidavit and curriculum vitae indicate that he is board certified in family medicine and has served as a medical director and attending physician in skilled nursing facilities.  (See Da218-219.)  By letter dated December 21, 2023, defendants objected to Dr. Davis’ AOM.  (Da225-228.)  Defendants then submitted a motion to dismiss as directed.  (Da1-280.)  By order and rider filed April 24, 2024, [...] denied defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint due to plaintiff’s failure to submit an AOM from an appropriate licensed person.  (Da306-325.)  The court held that Dr. Davis was qualified to offer an AOM against “the facility” or “[...]” for its “institutional failures” or “administrative negligence” in responding to the COVID-19 pandemic, including failure to transfer [...] to a higher level of care when he developed COVID pneumonia and failure to comply with CDC guidelines to limit the transfer of COVID-19.
[brief] On or about September 28, 2022, the [...] filed a motion for reconsideration of the denial of summary judgment.  (Pa1024).  The crux the [...]’ motion was that the trial court mistakenly denied summary judgment based upon an alleged factual issue as to [...]’ ability to control and dictate the terms and conditions of State DCPP employees such as Defendant [...] when there was actually no evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that [...] had any such “control. ” (3T 5:23-7:1).  Following oral argument on the motions for reconsideration, which occurred on December 19, 2022, [...] ultimately granted the [...]’ motion and dismissed Plaintiff’s sexual harassment discrimination, hostile work environment and retaliation claims with prejudice.
[brief] For the reasons stated above, the denial of [...]’s motion to withdraw from his guilty plea must be reversed.  Respectfully submitted, [...]  Public Defender Attorney for Defendant-Appellant BY: /s/ [...]  Deputy Public Defender Attorney ID: 063222014  Dated: October 18, 2024  Defendant [...] was indicted for controlled dangerous substance (CDS) and weapons offenses arising out of a warrantless search of a house in [...].
[directive] See N.J.S.A. 19:6-15.1.  No full-time or part-time police officer shall serve as a member of a district board (also known as a poll worker) unless the person is off-duty.  N.J.S.A. 19:6-15.1(a).  Nor shall a full-time or part-time police officer serve as an authorized challenger for a political party or a candidate or on a public question in the municipality in which that person is employed or if employed by an institution of higher education, in the municipality in which such institution is physically located, unless the person is off-duty.  N.J.S.A. 19:6-15.1(a).  This also applies to any officer employed by a county or the state: such officer shall not serve as a member of a district board or as a challenger in the county that person is employed or stationed, unless off-duty.  Any police officer who is a candidate for an office and whose name appears on the ballot to be voted for an election may act as a challenger during the election as may be permitted under the laws for a candidate to act as a challenger.
[brief] *(Pa196, [...] Answers to Interrogatories par 8)*  In the period of time after Appellant had to address the discrimination exhibited by some of the Caucasian teachers towards their students, the work environment changed as well as the working relationship that Appellant had with [...].  *(Pa196, [...] Answers to Interrogatories, par. 26; Pa1, Complaint, par. 25)*  In January of 2019, Appellant learned from the students that one of their teachers, [...] ([...]) was routinely making statements in the class comprised of Mexican students that she was glad that Trump was going to build a wall.  *(Pa1, Complaint, par.48)*  The students complained to Appellant who was the supervisor Ms. [...].  *(Pa1, Complaint, par. 48-50)*  Appellant notified [...] of the comments made by Ms. [...] and that she had to be disciplined.  *(Pa1, Complaint, par. 50)*  [...] told Appellant to meet with Ms. [...] and give her a verbal warning and Appellant did meet with Ms. [...], counseled Ms. [...] and gave her a verbal warning.  *(Pa1, Complaint, par. 50)*  The working relationship with [...] changed after January 2019 and he communicated less with Appellant and in many instances avoided Appellant.  *(Pa1, Complaint, par. 25)*  Mr. [...] became more critical of the Appellant, conducted Observations of Appellant that did not comport with the requirements of the education statutes in New Jersey for Observations, he misconstrued statements that Appellant made in an effort to justify his criticism of her and it became a common practice in staff meetings for Mr. [...] to tell Appellant to leave the meeting to take care of issues that arose in the school.  As a result of having to leave the meetings, Appellant missed important information that was disseminated in staff meetings.
[brief] ”  Dzwonar, 177 N.J. at 462.  Whether a plaintiff’s belief is reasonable is evaluated using an objective standard.  Id. at 464.  A threshold requirement then, is the identification of a statute, regulation, rule, or public policy that relates closely to a plaintiff’s complained-of conduct.  *Chiofalo v. State*, 238 N.J. 527, 541 (2019).  “[W]hen no such law or policy is forthcoming, ’ judgment can and should be entered for the defendant.
[brief] *Raspantini v. Arocho*, 364 N.J. Super. 528, 531 (App. Div. 2003).  Under Rule 1:6-2(d), a trial court may decide a motion on the papers when there are no contested facts requiring an evidentiary hearing for disposition.  See PRESSLER & VERNIERO, Current N.J. Court Rules, cmt. 5 on Rule 1:6-2(d) (2023); *Guzman v. City of Perth Amboy*, 214 N.J. Super. 167, 176 (App. Div. 1986).  The movant must show there was prejudice warranting reversal if the trial court denies a request for oral argument on a motion.  *Finderne Heights Condo. Ass’n*, 390 N.J. Super. 154, 165-66 (App. Div. 2007).  Appellant has not identified any error resulting from the denial of oral argument on Respondents’ motion regarding Count VI.  As discussed above in Point IV, the only two parties to the Repurchase Agreement were [...] and [...], and since both agreed to rescission, Appellant failed to identify any argument that he would have raised orally but did not in his papers.  Similarly, Appellant failed to identify any error resulting from the denial of oral argument on Points II and III.  As discussed above in Point III, the Court’s decision was based on the uncontested documents and Appellant’s own statements under oath that he signed the agreements, concealed them from Respondents, transferred money to companies he owned pursuant to these agreements, and never disclosed the balances from these agreements on any financial report for Respondent.  He similarly admitted under oath that he withheld employee tax contributions from [...]’s employees and transferred it to his own companies instead of paying it to the state and federal authorities.  Inasmuch as the Court based its decision on Appellant’s own sworn admissions, there was no need for an evidentiary hearing to address any factual dispute, and thus, it was not an abuse of discretion for the Court Below not to hold argument.  See, Connectone Bank v. Bergen Protective Sys., 2021 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2578, * 27 (App. Div. November 1, 2021).  POINT IX: REVERSAL IS NOT WARRANTED BECAUSE OF THE HYPOTHETICAL POTENTIAL FOR DOUBLE RECOVERY.
[directive] Parole Supervision for Life (1)  ¿Entiende usted que si acepta culpabilidad por un delito de agresión [Sí/Yes] [No/No] [NC/NA] sexual con agravantes, agresión sexual, abuso deshonesto con agravantes, rapto conforme a 2C:13-1c(2), poner en peligro el bienestar de un/a menor por participar en conducta sexual que perjudique o pervierta la moral del (de la) menor conforme a 2C:24-4a, poner en peligro el bienestar de un/a menor conforme a 2C:24-4b(3), poner en peligro el bienestar de un/a menor conforme a 2C:24- 4b(5)(b)(i) o (ii) (si la infracción se cometió el 1 de febrero de 2018 o después de esa fecha), seducir, o la tentativa de cometer cualquiera de estos delitos, y el delito ocurrió el 14 de enero del 2004 o después de esa fecha, o el incumplimiento de una condición de una condena especial de supervisión de por vida en la comunidad si la infracción ocurrió el primero de julio del 2014 o después de esa fecha el juez, además de cualquier otra condena, le impondrá una pena especial de supervisión de la libertad condicional de por vida?
[directive] The following are some of the types of assistance which may be required by survivors.  In those cases where the decedent was the primary source of family income, financial assistance will be of paramount importance.  If financial need is demonstrated, survivors should be directed to the municipal or county welfare department.  Where children are involved, and the integrity of the family is temporarily endangered because of financial hardship, the Division of Youth and Family Services will provide indirect emergency financial aid.  Every police department and health care facility which provides emergency medical care must by statute make available and post information pertaining to assistance provided by the Violent Crimes Compensation Board.  In cases of homicide, survivors should be provided assistance in completing the Violent Crimes Compensation Board claim form.  In addition, survivors should also be directed to the regional Social Security office to apply for available benefits and should be reminded of potential insurance and pension benefits.
[brief] The City was on notice.  That there’s constructive notice there that there was an issue with the sign.  Supporting that is the fact that the police officer noted that the sign was missing.  He – he didn’t note that the sign was laying on the ground.  That the -- the sign was entirely gone.  So the City argues that, that doesn’t mean anything, but if the sign fell the day before, where did it go?  So some period of time -- it’s reasonable to draw the inference that the sign was down for a period of time so that it disappeared entirely from the scene.  [1T17:20-25-18:9].  Based on the trial court’s finding; to survive summary judgment, a plaintiff may create an issue of genuine material fact by simply offering evidence of the time period between the last time an alleged dangerous condition existed and the current instance at issue.
[brief] Specifically, the court in *D’Agostino* recognized:  >  The use of a subpoena is merely intended to assure that the non-party whose testimony is sought submits to an examination.  There is no necessity for requiring service of a subpoena *upon a party* since adequate sanctions are provided . . . in the event that *the party* fails to respond to a notice to take a deposition.  *D’Agostino*, 242 N.J. Super. at 275 (emphasis added) (internal citation omitted).  As discussed above, Plaintiff has confirmed that he is seeking to depose [...] in his individual capacity, *not* as the representative of a party or on behalf of a party.  As a result, the trial court’s denial of Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel [...]’s deposition by way of notice issued to the German Defendants (and the U.S. Defendants) was not an abuse of discretion.
[brief] First, the lawsuit will not unfairly expose the defendants to a “multiplicity of actions. ”  [...] and [...] were already defendants, as were the entities to which [...] improperly transferred funds.  Second, this suit does not materially prejudice [...] and [...] creditors.  The Amended Complaint alleges (and [...]’s reports show) that [...] underreported assets, overreported liabilities, and diverted millions from [...] and [...] to the Plaintiffs’ detriment several years ago with minimal impact on the financial wellbeing of the companies.  The defendants did not identify any third-party creditor claims as a defense to the claims here.  Third, there is no reason to believe that this lawsuit will interfere with distribution of the recovery among interested persons.  The only interested persons here are [...] and Fariba [...], and [...] and [...], all of whom are already parties.  And, one of the main reasons that Plaintiffs amended their complaint to name additional defendant companies was so that Plaintiffs could obtain complete relief from the entities that the [...]s control if Plaintiffs prevailed at trial.  Accordingly, even if the Court declines to find that Plaintiffs suffered a special injury, the trial court was still correct to exercise its equitable discretion to allow this suit to proceed.
[brief] The Trial Court, in its December 14, 2023 Opinion, was correct in acknowledging that there existed many issues of disputed facts from the parties’ positions.  However, in order to grant summary judgment to [...], the Trial Court, despite the severe dispute of almost all material facts in the case, took the approach of barring plaintiff’s expert reports and testimony.  The Trial Court should have let a jury decide, on the strength of the disputed facts alone, whether or not [...]’s conduct was palpably unreasonable.  As seen above, [...]’s officials had no clue whatsoever about how its streetlight system operated and how to maintain an intersection it deemed dangerous.  Moreover, as will be discussed in detail, plaintiff’s experts provided extremely useful and competent factual analyses and opinions that would aid a jury in understanding plaintiff’s position that there was a hazard created in the intersection due backlighting, which caused the driver not to see [...] cross the intersection and to be impacted at that location.  **POINT III**
[brief] The same claim that indispensable parties were not named were rejected by the Court in a similar challenge to a promotional process which violated New Jersey statutory law.  In *Williams v. Borough of Clayton*, 442 N.J. Super. 583, 594-95 (App. Div. 2015) the Appellate Division stated:  We also reject the Borough's contention that plaintiff's omission of [...] and [...] as co-defendants requires dismissal of the complaint.  We are mindful that the UDJA provides that "[w]hen declaratory relief is sought, all persons having or claiming any interest which would be affected by the declaration shall be made parties to the proceeding."  *N.J.S.A.* 2A:16-56.  See also *Gotlib v. Gotlib*, 399 N.J. Super. 295, 313, 944 A.2d 654 (App. Div. 2008) (implementing this principle).  Although the Borough is correct that the court could not adjudicate the individual rights of the other candidates in their absence, Plaintiff brought this action for declaratory relief under *N.J.S.A.* 2A:16-52 against the Borough.  He clearly did so to assure that the Borough itself would not pursue an appointment process based upon an incorrect conception of the applicable statutes and their appoint-from-within eligibility requirements.  The final declaratory order issued by the trial court was directed at the Borough, not at any other applicants.  * * *  In sum, a declaration and reaffirmation of the statutory restrictions that the Borough must heed in the hiring process can be fairly issued without requiring the participation of the other applicants.  *Williams v. Borough of Clayton*, 442 N.J. Super. 583, 594-95 (App. Div. 2015)  Neither the trial court nor the Defendant cite to any other interested parties who would adversely be impacted.  In this case the union, acting on behalf of all of its members, adequately represents any impacted persons particularly when all that it asks is compliance with the law.
[brief] See State v. Melvin, 248 N.J. 321, 352-53 (2021) (“Viewing the proceedings from the defendant's perspective, it might be difficult to comprehend how the same judge who has twice sentenced him [or her] could arrive at a different determination at a third sentencing. ”); see also R. 1:12-1(d); [...] and [...], Current N.J. Court Rules, cmt. 4 on R. 1:12-1 (2023) (providing “the appellate court has the authority to direct that a different judge consider the matter on remand and in subsequent proceedings in order to preserve the appearance of a fair and unprejudiced hearing”).  CONCLUSION
[brief] Defendant filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was argued before [...] on October 6, 2023.  (27T).  On December 8, 2023, the judge denied defendant’s motion in a written order and opinion.  (Da95 to 113).  On December 14, 2023, defendant filed an amended Notice of Appeal.  (Da114 to 117).  The State’s response now follows.
[directive] a.  In all cases where all of the defendants have been charged and all of the defendants in the case are deceased, upon proof of death being submitted, a request for destruction authorization may be submitted.  b.  In cases where the defendants were conv.icted and no appeals or post-conviction relief motions are pending, after a period of 5 years from the date of conviction or upon the defendants expiration of sentence, whichever is later, a request for destruction authorization may be submitted.  c.  In all cases where the defendants have been admitted into the Pre-Trial Intervention Program (PTI), have successfully completed PTI, and have been discharged, upon the court’s signing an order dismissing the case as to all parties, and upon the expiration of the longest sentence of any co-defendants not admitted into PTI, a request for destruction authorization may be submitted.  Attorney General Guidelines - Evidence Retention - Page 5 January 2011 d.  In cases where no suspects have been identified but a DNA profile has been obtained and submitted to CODIS, or in the case of fingerprint evidence that has been submitted to AFIS, or in cases where there is no statute of limitations, the evidence shall be retained indefinitely.  Only the Prosecutor or their designee, may authorize the destruction of this evidence.  e.  In cases where the victim has signed a waiver of prosecution, has not contacted the police/prosecutor’s office indicating a desire to pursue a prosecution, or has reported as a "Jane Doe" pursuant to the the evidence Standards for Providing Services to Victims of Sexual Assault, shall not be authorized for destruction for a minimum of 90 days from the date of the collection of said evidence.  f.  In cases involving juvenile defendants who have been charged, except in Homicide cases, and where there is no referral of the case to another court, with or without the juvenile’s consent, a request for destruction authorization may be submitted 4 years after the final adjudication or disposition of all juvenile defendants or upon release from custody, whichever is later.  Evidence in juvenile cases which are referred (waived) to another court, or in which there are adult co-defendants, shall be subject to the retention periods for adult cases.  3.  Narcotic Evidence
[brief] (4T:69:14-18).  Plaintiff’s counsel argued that [...] wanted a mistrial because of what “… he feels was generated by law enforcement.  And he respectfully believes that prejudices his case and asks for a mistrial on that basis.  And I realize that ruling is within the discretion of the Court, Your Honor. ”  (4T:70:15-19).  The defense objected to the mistrial since it was plaintiff who caused the interruption.  (4T:70:22-25).  The Court explained to plaintiff’s counsel that it was [...] who left the courtroom, and that it was the Court’s expectation that anyone who was seated should not leave without asking permission to do so since he was a party to the litigation.
[brief] 16  A.  The Jury’s Verdict Precludes [...] from Obtaining Indemnification from [...] for [...]’s Own Negligence .  16  B.  [...] Created an Invited Error By Urging The Trial Court To Dismiss [...] .................................................................................. 17  C. New Jersey Law Barred [...] from Participating at Trial ....  19  D. [...] Failed To Address The Plain Error Standard and Thus Waived Its Argument Regarding [...]’s Trial Participation ..............................................................................  24 POINT II .......................................................................................................
[brief] Two people talking to each other -- THE COURT: That’s not hard to do.  In many towns, that’s not hard to do to have a police officer -- What if they don’t like [...]?  She’s a little too mouthy and she’s -- they’re getting sick of her fighting with the other person.  That’s not hard to do.  We all know it’s not hard to do to write a summons.  Boom.  Here, I’m sick of hearing it from you.  Here it is.  [...]: Well, -- THE COURT: Do I have a reasonable expectation that me talking in my backyard with my not really loud voice that we know we can hear from over 50 feet away in the back of the courtroom, that somebody should write a summons because I’m having a conversation?
[directive] $ 250 in the case of a disorderly persons or petty disorderly persons offense  Total CCPF Penalty $ Iniciais do Réu / Defendant’s Initials no Formulário Padrão de Declaração Judicial/Formulário Revisado Promulgado pela diretiva 01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 10079-Portuguese página 3 de 7 Main Plea Form/Revised Form Promulgated by Directive #01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 10079-Portuguese page 3 of 7 o juiz poderá, 6.