ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] In the remand proceedings, Appellant vigorously argued his entitlement for an award of attorney’s fees, whether under R. 4:42-9(a)(2) for a fund in court or under N.J.S.A. 2A:15-59.1 and R. 1:4-8 for frivolous litigation.  After consideration of such demand, by Order dated April 1, 2024, [...] denied such request.  (Da 194-202).  The lower Court set forth the legal standard related to R. 1:4-8 for frivolous litigation.  [...] concluded that “the simple fact of the matter is that Appellant is a pro se litigant in this matter and accordingly, is not entitled to any award of attorney’s fees or costs (although [...] subsequently awarded costs incurred by later Order).  (Da 200).  [...] continued that “Appellant is no longer licensed to practice in the state of New Jersey and this matter concerns a former New Jersey attorney making efforts to collect his own outstanding debt. ” (Da 200).  The Court found that the status of Appellant as a retired or practicing New Jersey attorney would yield the same result.  (Da 200).  In reaching this determination, [...] relied upon Segal v. Lynch and other precedent cases.  Moreover, [...] considered R. 1:4-8 as discussed in Segal v. Lynch, holding that it “specifically permits only the reimbursement of attorney’s fees and expenses incurred by a party.  It does not permit the reimbursement of a party’s loss of income in dealing with frivolous litigation. ” (Da 201).  While [...] considered the allegations brought against Respondent and Respondent’s Counsel by Appellant, [...] ultimately held that “this Court does not find that the actions carried out by Respondent or Respondent’s Counsel have engaged in activity which would constitute ‘defrauding’ of any Court or warrant such impositions of Sanctions.  Rather, the Court finds that Respondent and Respondent’s Counsel pursued the matter to its fullest ability, and while the result may not have been decided in their favor, no actions carried out should subject them to such penalties. ”  (Da 201).  This determination was within the sound discretion of the trial Court, and after consideration of the respective arguments and underlying facts, [...] did not elect to entertain the notion of any claims for frivolous litigation.
[brief] The Supreme Court’s decision in *Cushing* also rejected a claim that police conducted a valid search on this principle.  There, an officer responded to a call from the adult defendant’s relative reporting marijuana found inside the defendant’s bedroom in his grandmother’s home.  226 N.J. at 192.  Neither defendant nor his grandmother were present at the home when the officer first arrived, but a relative on the scene told the officer that she had “power of attorney” over the grandmother’s “household affairs” and that she had gone inside the defendant’s bedroom earlier that day.  *Ibid.*  The relative then let the officer into the defendant’s bedroom.  *Id.* at 193.  The Supreme Court found that the officer had not acted pursuant to an objectively reasonable belief in the relative’s apparent authority to consent to search of the bedroom.
[brief] Nevertheless, at the time of the fight in the hallway, [...] did say to [...]’s attorney: “It was your client shouting that the jurors heard.  I heard his voice, you heard his voice, everyone heard his voice.  And the juror indicated they can’t hear the witness because of the shouting in the hallway. ” (4T, Pg. 60, lines 14-18).  And further, “The voice we heard shouting, I’ll tell you, was [...]’s. ” (4T, Pg. 73, lines 9-10).  And of course, as discussed above, the situation was precipitated by [...], not instructing [...] he could not leave to go the bathroom and by [...] placing the Sheriff’s officer in the Court room and not advising the officer about [...]’s prior experiences with sheriff’s officers.  **C.  [...] Prejudiced the jury by allowing them to look at 21 Bankers Boxes and piles of documents which should never have been** admitted into evidence; the sheer volume of which was prejudicial to [...].
[brief] [...] tries to distinguish between the type of futility here (*i.e.*, futility --- 4  The *Potomac* case demonstrates this point.  In *Potomac*, an insurer-defendant, [...], believed it had finally resolved the insured’s indemnity and defense claims after the parties entered into a settlement and release.  However, after the settlement, [...] sued [...] for contribution of defense payments and [...] had to relitigate its share.  *Potomac Ins. Co. of Illinois ex. Rel. [...] Ins. Co. v. Pennsylvania Mfrs. Ass’n Ins. Co.*, 215 N.J. 409, 415-17 (2013).  [...] disingenuously argues that *Potomac* supports its argument against futility (Pb19); however, neither waiver nor futility were issues in that case. because of ripeness and an inability to achieve a meaningful result) and futility due to a change in the law present in *Chassen*.
[brief] PLAINTIFFS FILE  A COMPLAINT WHICH IS PREDICATED ALMOST EXCLUSIVELY ON A DISPUTE BETWEEN THEM AND THE [...] DEFENDANTS.  | 4 | | II.  PLAINTIFF’S BARE BONES ALLEGATIONS AGAINST [...] | 6 | | III.  [...]’S INITIAL RULE 1:4-8  LETTER AND DEMANDS FOR DISMISSAL | 7 | | IV.  DISCOVERY AND THE COURT’S URGING OF PLAINTIFFS’ COUNSEL TO DISMISS  [...] FROM THE CASE | 9 | | V.  [...]’S SECOND RULE 1:4-8  LETTER AND ADDITIONAL DEMANDS FOR DISMISSAL | 11 | | VI.  [...] SEEKS SUMMARY JUDGMENT BASED ON UNDISPUTED EVIDENCE SHOWING IT DID NOT ENTER INTO A TRANSACTION WITH DR. [...] AND HAS NOTHING TO DO WITH PLAINTIFFS’ DISPUTE WITH HIM.  | 11 | | VII.  THE TRIAL COURT GRANTS  [...]’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND DISMISSES IT FROM THE CASE | 14 | VIII.  THE TRIAL COURT AWARDS [...]  A PORTION OF THE FEES IT INCURRED IN DEFENDING AGAINST PLAINTIFFS’ FRIVOLOUS CLAIMS ...........................................16  IX.  PLAINTIFFS COMMENCE THIS APPEAL AFTER CONCLUDING THEIR LITIGATION WITH THE [...] DEFENDANTS..................................................................................18  LEGAL ARGUMENT .........................................................................................18
[brief] See DiProspero v. Penn, 183 N.J. 477, 496 (2005) (“[E]ach part or section [of the statute] should be construed in connection with every other part or section so as to produce a harmonious whole. ” (alteration in original)).  See also State v. Green, 62 N.J. 547, 554 (1973) (“It is basic in the construction of legislation that every effort should be made to harmonize the law relating to the same subject matter. ”).  Simply put, after [...]’s non-operating school district was eliminated, it did not become a “merged” school district with no right of withdrawal as Appellants contend.  Rather, N.J.S.A. 18A:8-50(8) provides that both [...] and [...] are subject to chapter 13 of Title 18A, which governs all matters concerning regional and consolidated districts, including withdrawal.
[brief] There are 22 cases that come up on a search for the word “Iqbal” in NJ case law.  (Five of which do not mention “Iqbal” anywhere.)  Of the remaining seventeen, mentioning “Iqbal” in 15 of them involve people in the case with that name.  Only two remain.  [...] v. [...], [...] (2012) (mid-way through Point Heading I) mentions an inmate’s failure to plead that he had a 14th Amendment right to own a computer after making it clear there was no such right.)  In *[...] v. [...]*, [...] (2020) cites to *Iqbal* while interpreting Federal FDA Law & Regs in Point V A. 2. to dismiss a failure to train action.  In neither case was *Iqbal* central to the case.  Our Supreme Court has never even mentioned the *Iqbal* case.  **Point IV: The Applicability of the LAD to both [...] & The State with some reference to Heck (Not Addressed Below – Assumed LAD Applied?)**
[brief] The [...] Ordinance defines a major subdivision as:  “Any division of land containing an aggregate of not more than three lots (two new lots and the remaining parcel), each fronting on an existing street or streets, not involving any new street or the installation of any street improvements or the extension of Township facilities; not involving any street(s) requiring additional right-of-way width as specified in the Master Plan or Official Map and the street requirements of this chapter, unless such additional right-of-way width, either along one or both sides of the street(s), as applicable, shall be deeded to the Township or to the appropriate governmental authority prior to classification as a minor subdivision; not adversely affecting the development of the remainder of the parcel or adjoining property and not in conflict with any provision of the Master Plan, Official Map or this chapter; and not being a further division of an original tract of land for which previous minor subdivision(s) have been approved by the Township since 1967.  The original tract of land shall be considered any tract in existence as of 1967.  Any readjustment of lot lines resulting in no new lots shall be classified as a minor subdivision. ”  [§ 142-7.]  The [...] ordinance contains what is referred to as a "creeping major subdivision provision".
[brief] A particularly misleading example necessarily casts doubt upon the veracity of petitioners.  Attempting to cast shade upon appellants, petitioners assert that the scrivener of the October 2022 Will is (or was) counsel for appellants.  Pa17 at ¶38(h).  Petitioners omit to mention that that same law firm, [...], drafted the 2018 Will that petitioners seek to reinstate.  See Pa73 (signature pages of October 2022 Will) and Pa51-2, those of the August 2018 Wills.  In other words, appellants did not steer decedent to their lawyer, who would draft a document favoring appellants.  Rather, this was the same lawyer decedent (and her husband) had used years prior for estate planning.  This misdirection is both clear and unequivocal, but it does not present the true picture.  It shows that petitioners (including [...]) can twist the facts when it is believed to be to their benefit.
[brief] The term is defined as a “residential property consisting of from one to four dwelling units, at least one of which is occupied by the owner as the primary residence, and which is the subject of a mortgage foreclosure proceeding.  . . .”  N.J.S.A. 46:10B-54.  The subject Property was a single-family residence where [...] lived with her children.  (71a, 15:11–13).  Here, the Property was the subject of a mortgage foreclosure proceeding (“Foreclosure Action”) in which a Complaint in an action for foreclosure was filed in 2018 and which remained pending at the time of the contract for sale and the proposed closing date.  (276a; 72a, 15:20–16:13).  Specifically, the Foreclosure Action remained ongoing throughout 2019 when [...] was negotiating the attempted agreement and at the time of the failed “closing” on April 5, 2019.  (72a, 15:20–16:13).  The debt underlying the Foreclosure Action, a lien from unpaid municipal taxes, was recorded as a mortgage secured against the Property in the [...].  (276a).  There is no question that the Foreclosure Action, which involved the unpaid tax lien and recorded as a mortgage, constitutes a “mortgage foreclosure proceeding” within the statutory definition of “distressed property” set forth in N.J.S.A. 46:10B-54.  It necessarily follows that [...], as the intended purchaser in the attempted transaction, was a “distressed property purchaser” under N.J.S.A. 46:10B-54.
[brief] After Plaintiffs insisted they could not take [...]’s counsel at his word, [...] provided Plaintiffs with a sworn certification in which its representative explained that: (i) [...] did nothing more than engage in preliminary discussions with [...] regarding the possibility of acquiring his practice; (ii) [...] sent [...] the Draft LOI, which [...] did not sign; (iii) there were no negotiations of any definitive agreements between [...] and [...]; and (iv) [...] never consummated a transaction with [...].  (Pa260a-Pa262a).  In light of these facts, [...] demanded dismissal of the Complaint.  But Plaintiffs inexplicably refused.  Plaintiffs’ insistence on keeping [...] in the case -- despite the absence of a completed transaction -- became so egregious that the trial court urged them to dismiss [...] from the case during a hearing in October 2020.  (Pa429a ¶ 14).  The court’s comments initially seemed to resonate with Plaintiffs’ counsel, who said he would be “inclined” to dismiss [...] from the case upon receipt of additional discovery.  (Ibid.).  But once [...] provided that additional discovery -- including the Draft LOI that [...] never signed -- Plaintiffs still refused to dismiss [...] from the case.  (Pa430a ¶ 17).  Plaintiffs then doubled down on their frivolous Complaint by seeking leave to file a second amended complaint which included some new allegations concerning [...] that Plaintiffs manufactured out of whole cloth and which did not provide a basis for a cause of action in any event.  (Pa431a ¶ 21).  Ultimately, Plaintiffs’ tactics compelled [...] to oppose Plaintiffs’ motion to amend and file a cross-motion seeking dismissal of the case.  (Ibid.).  In granting [...]’s cross-motion for summary judgment, the trial court recognized the obvious -- that from “day one” of this case Plaintiffs did not have a basis to pursue claims against [...].
[brief] ”  (2T20-1 to 7)  [...] was not specifically looking for [...]’s vehicle, just as [...] was not specifically looking for [...]’s vehicle.  *Ibid.*  [...] began surveilling Smart’s vehicle when he recognized it as matching the description of the vehicle involved in drug deals as described by a CI, and a database search of the registered owner led [...] to believe that Smart was the drug dealer described by the CI.  *Id.* at 160-61.  Likewise, shortly after [...] began observing [...]’s vehicle, he ran its plate and realized the car belonged to [...], a suspected drug dealer.  (1T 42-5 to 16)  In both cases, what followed was lengthy surveillance of the defendants and their vehicles for almost two hours.  *Id.* at 172-73.  (1T 35-14 to 36-3; 2T20-8 13; Da26)  Just as the circumstances in *Smart* giving rise to probable cause were not unforeseeable because the police “had invested almost two hours investigating, surveilling, and utilizing five officers,” *id.* at 172, the police here “surveilled [[...]’s] vehicle for over two hours,” and called for backup such that five officers were on scene by the time of the third suspected transaction and seven were on scene at the time of [...]’s arrest.  (2T 18-22 to 19-8)  Additionally, just like the circumstances giving rise to probable cause in *Smart* “were anything but spontaneous” because “they did not develop . . . suddenly or rapidly” but rather “unfolded over almost two hours,” *id.* at 173, the circumstances here also unfolded over two hours.  (1T 35-14 to 36-3; 2T 18-22 to 19-8; Da26)  Indeed, because of the length of time that elapsed, the motion court found that officers could have used the time to secure a warrant for the vehicle—a fact conceded by the State below.  (1T 78-15 to 23; 2T20-16 to 19)  Thus, the motion court correctly concluded that, just as in Smart, probable cause to search [...]’s vehicle did not arise spontaneously and unforeseeably.
[brief] (1T12:9-14; 1T173:24-174:1T174:4-16; 1T175:16-176:8; 1T177:6-14; 2T29:4-23; 2T33:23-34:2).  On June 7, 2023, the plaintiff’s counsel gave opening statements to the jury, at which time, the jury was shown surveillance video footage of the plaintiff, on the day of the incident, walking into the [...] store and eventually down aisle 58 in the garden center until the time of her fall.  The plaintiff is seen using a rollator walker as she walks.  (3T61:23-63:13).  This enabled the jury to see firsthand the plaintiff’s unsteady gait and reliance on a rollator for support.  On June 8, 2023, the plaintiff called her liability expert, [...], to testify.
[directive] New Jersey Judiciary Certificación y solicitud de designación como fiscal privado  Certification Application for Appointment as Private Prosecutor  Estado de Nueva Jersey contra State of New Jersey vs. Número(s) de Expediente(s)  Docket Number(s): Cargo(s)  Charge(s)  Información sobre el Abogado: Attorney Information: Nombre y apellido:  Name: Dirección: Address: Número de Teléfono:  Telephone Number:  La presente Certificación se presenta al Tribunal Superior de conforme a lo que disponen R. 3:23-9(d) y State v. Storm, 141 N.J. 245 (1995) para informar al juez y al fiscal de todos los hechos que se prevea puedan afectar la equidad de los procedimientos y permitir que el juez determine si me puede designar fiscal privado imparcial para , el testigo denunciante en el asunto citado más arriba.
[directive] e.g., Memorandum from [...] to Director, Division of Criminal Justice, et al., Guidance 5  See, Regarding Municipal Prosecutors’ Discretion in Prosecuting Marijuana and Other Criminal Offenses, August 29, https://nj.gov/oag/newsreleases18/2018-0829_AG-Memorandum.pdf.  Nothing in this Guidance shall be 2018, construed in any way to create any substantive right that may be enforced by any third party.
[directive] In case any not charged sexual assault involving offense for an been released has defendant a where subsection 8.4.5, an violated has defendant the (1) that believe cause to is probable there and acomplaint-warrant by and -21, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-13 to Protection Act, Survivor Sexual Assault pursuant the order to issued any penetration against or contact sexual sexual an of act commit to threatened or committed (2) has bodily to injury to cause threatened or caused otherwise restraining or order by protected the person seeking motion presumptively a file shall prosecutor the order, restraining the by person protected any 2A:162-24. N.J.S.A. pursuant to release of revocation of Release.
[brief] ”  (3T, p. 12, lines 11-20)  While there was lots of billed work, the extensive evidence, with communications by [...] & by me with [...], validated that NONE of that extensive and endless billed legal work (based on unnecessary Court filings) would have been necessary if [...] & [...] agreed to work on a readily achievable, 3-Way Settlement (see par. 30 above).  Once again, Judge also wrongly conflated “history of the [Trust] case” with very litigious, 8-year, Estate Case, [...].  There would NOT have been a 1-year Case nor litigation if Jacobson & [...] had agreed to 3-Way Settlement.  I substantiated all of these facts/arguments in my Court filings & Dec. 22nd Hearing (2T, p. 4, line 5, to p. 7, line 16; p. 11, line 1, to p. 12, line 6; p. 24, line 8, to p. 32, line 18).
[brief] ]  Here, because all five of the above factors were present, [...] was correct that [...]’s prior ruling regarding the use of Appellant’s property for parking was entitled to conclusive, determinative effect in the action in lieu of prerogative writ.  Appellant, in the action in lieu of prerogative writ before [...], specifically argued that Appellant’s use of Lot 5 for parking was disallowed without zoning approval (Aa281-Aa282).  In granting final judgment to Respondents, [...] noted that earlier that same year, following the appellate remand, [...] had found that Respondents “established . . . an express permanent easement to the use of the Defendant’s property for parking, both on the Fifth Street Lot and the Sixth Street lot, since the early 1960s,” and “that site plan application by [[...]] approved in 1972 and 1993 did not affect or limit those rights” (Aa273).  In his prior decision, [...] had also found that [...] had previously applied for and obtained a variance from the Township in 1972 to “construct ‘an addition to an existing school with insufficient parking, insufficient side lines and exceeding the maximum lot coverage’” (3-29-22 opinion at 3).  In approving the variance, the Township stated "although evidence presented indicates parking provisions to be less than those required pursuant to the existing ordinance, the applicant will have the benefit of parking facilities on adjoining properties owned by [Plaintiff] should additional parking facilities be required” (Ra243;Aa20).  Accordingly, the issue presented to [...] as to whether Respondent’s use of Lot 5 for parking was disallowed absent zoning approval was identical to an issue that was litigated and decided on the merits by [...] in the prior proceeding in which Appellant participated and in which such determination was essential.  Since all five elements were met, [...] correctly held that Appellant was collaterally estopped from asserting its zoning claim.  Dawson, 136 N.J. at 20.  POINT V
[brief] Thus, the contract governing the alleged debt was void upon assignment to [...] pursuant to N.J.S.A. 17:11C-33(b).  Upon assignment of the void account, [...] initiated a collection lawsuit against [...] in the Special Civil Part of the Bergen County Law Division.  Like any person without a legal education, [...] was unaware of the NJCFLA and its licensure requirements, let alone the fact that [...] was unlicensed and enforcing a void debt.  Moreover, due to the severity of [...]’s psychiatric diagnoses, [...] was unable to understand and/or fully appreciate the nature or the cause of the legal proceedings against him.  [...] later sought default judgment on the void debt and, on or about September 12, 2017, default judgment was entered against [...].  However, as mentioned above, at all times relevant to the collection action, [...] had no legal right to collect, enforce, or attempt to collect or enforce [...]’s alleged consumer debt as [...] failed to obtain the required licensure necessary to engage in the “consumer loan business” pursuant to the NJCFLA.  See N.J.S.A. 17:11C-2; N.J.S.A. 17:16C-1(f); N.J.S.A. 17:11C-3; N.J.S.A. 17:11C-33(b).  On September 20, 2023, [...] moved to vacate the legally void default judgment.  On October 26, 2023, the trial court denied [...]’s Motion to Vacate.  In so doing, the trial court incorrectly reasoned that the NJCFLA did not afford a private right of action, that an ostensible lack of a private right of action precludes asserting the NJCFLA as an affirmative defense, and that the CFLA has no motivating interests of public policy.  However, as explained herein, the trial court failed to analyze the legislative intent and history of the NJCFLA as it relates to Defendant’s unlicensed collection activity and [...]’s defenses.  Accordingly, the trial court’s October 26, 2023 Order (Da58) denying [...]’s Motion to Vacate should be reversed.
[brief] The PI Claim settled, and on January 11, 2019, [...] faxed to [...] a Payoff letter for $7,043.92.  *(Da052; Da034; Da201-202)*  On January 14, 2019, Plaintiff approved payment of $7,043.92 to [...] and $2,604.34 to Plaintiff.  *(Da204)*  On January 15, 2019, [...] mailed the $7,043.92 check to [...] for the 2016 & 2018 Contracts.  *(Da206)(Da052; Da073)*  H.  **Plaintiff’s UIM Complaint and the 2019 Contract**
[brief] ”  Horne, 135 S. Ct. at 2426.  As set forth above, the Trial Court did not engage in any constitutional analysis of Plaintiffs' claims either with respect to Plaintiffs' motion to amend their Complaint or Defendants' cross-motion for reconsideration.  Presumably, in their opposition brief, Defendants will first argue that this was not a governmental taking by disputing Plaintiffs' assertion that they have property rights in their terminal leave pay.