ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] ”  Through an order dated April 22, 2021, the trial court appointed Hon. [...], J.A.D. (Ret.) as an implementation monitor to “oversee all actions of the Parties with regard to the Project with the overriding goal and purpose of expediting construction and completion of the Project . . . by eliminating all impediments which either stop or delay such construction. ”  On January 30, 2023, the trial court clarified and amended the order appointing the implementation monitor by stating that he did not have authority to grant site plan or use variance relief without further order of the court.
[brief] This exact Formal Brief was emailed on, 7/25/24, as allowed by the case manager, to: Superior Court Appellant Division Case Manager [...]  Court Services Officer 1-Team 4 609-815-2950 x52675 Email - heather.uccio@njcourts.gov  [...] – Former Prosecutor on Record  [...]  Email - AWOODARD@MCAPONJ.ORG  Email - APPELLATE@MCAPONJ.ORG  [...] – Attorney of record as of [...]  Email - appellate@mcponj.org  Email - mdoouteiro@mcponj.org  September 30, 2024  [...], 041202006  Assistant Prosecutor Director, Appellate Section Of Counsel and On the Brief email: mdoouteiro@mcponj.org  Honorable Judges of the Superior Court of New Jersey  Appellate Division  Richard J. Hughes Justice Complex Post Office Box 006 Trenton, New Jersey 08626  Re State of New Jersey (Plaintiff-Respondent) v. [...] (Defendant-Appellant)
[brief] It caused the fall, that it was one of the contributing factors, there's nothing -- [...]:  At a minimum it's his testimony.  He says that he believes -- THE COURT:  But he's not an expert in painting.  [...]: He's not.  He's not.  THE COURT:  I mean you can be a lay witness and an expert, right?  If I find that he qualified, like if he did something like that for a living, if he worked at Lowe's and was the man there recommending everything to me every time I go and he knows what you use, you know, right, that's different.  But there's nothing like that and the fact that he works in technology, his factual, I mean what he believes happened, doesn't a jury need to hear, at this point shouldn't you have had some type of expert?
[brief] Pa168  Exhibit C-2 to [...]’s Certification Complaint Summons 11/04/2020  Pa170  Return of Service Information 11/04/2020  Pa172  Affidavit of Probable Cause  11/04/2020  Pa173  Preliminary Law Enforcement Incident Report  Central Judicial Processing Notice – Order to Defendant [...] 11/04/2020  Set to Appear on 11/19/2020  Letter Dated 9/23/2021 from [...]  To All parties regarding 10/27/2021  Hearing Exhibit C-3 to [...]’s Certification Letter from [...] to NJ Superior Court Clerk  12/14/2021  Certification of Paralegal 12/14/2021  Notice of Motion 12/14/2021  Certification of Eldridge [...] 12/14/2021
[brief] Bank Statements a. [...] x0561 “Wire” Account, [...] September 29, 2017………………………………………………………………………………Pa168 b. [...] x1401 “Operating” Account, [...] September 29, 2017………………………………………………………………………………Pa170 c. [...] x0569 “Payroll” Account, [...] September 29, 2017………………………………………………………………………………Pa176 d. [...] x2521 Account, [...] September 29, 2017………………………………………………………………………………Pa179 P-36.  October 2017
[brief] 10  BV001  REO Blocker v. 53 West Somerset Street, LLC, 467 N.J.Super. 117 (App.Div. 2021), 5 IE’s LLC v. Simmons, 392 N.J.Super. 520 (L. Div. 2007)  5, 6 U.S.D.A. v. Scurry, 193 N.J. 492 (2007)  3  TABLE OF RULES
[directive] Each municipal law enforcement agency shall include in its rules and regulations as defined in N.J.S.A. 40A:14-118, and every county and state law enforcement agency shall include in appropriate standard operating procedures, a provision that individual law enforcement officers will be ordered to submit to a drug test when there is a reasonable suspicion to believe that the officer is illegally using drugs or is under the influence of a controlled dangerous substance or cannabis during work hours, as well as a provision that officers are subject to mandatory random drug testing pursuant to AG Directive 2018-2.
[brief] The fact that Plaintiff, and [...] during his lifetime, may have been entitled to recover damages beyond what the Act provides does not justify obliterating the true public policy of the Act and ignoring the established principles of law that govern the Act.  There is no public policy or rational justification for obligating a workers’ compensation insurer to provide insurance coverage for an employer’s intentionally wrongful acts.  The trial court’s decision is well-reasoned and fully consistent with both public policy and the many judicial decisions interpreting the Act.
[brief] [...], ESQUIRE  DATE: August 15, 2024  [...], Esquire, of full age, on his oath deposes and says:  1.  I am the attorney for [...] in the above matter.  2.  On August 8, 2024, copies of Appellant’s Brief and Appendix was forward by regular, United States Mail to the following:  Superior Court of New Jersey Appellate Division, Clerk’s Office P.O. Box 006 Trenton, NJ 08625  3.  On August 8, 2024, copies of Appellant’s Brief and Appendix was forward by regular, United States Mail to the following:  [...]  [...], Esq. [...]  I hereby certify that the foregoing statements made by me are true.  I am aware that if any of the foregoing statements made by me are willfully false, I am subject to punishment.  I hereby certify that on August 8, 2024, I mailed/electronically filed with the Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division, Hughes Justice Complex, Trenton, New Jersey, an original Notice of Appeal, Certification, and Case Management Information Statement on behalf of Plaintiff/Appellant, [...], and also by regular first class mail, a copy of same to: [...]  [...], Esq. 15000 Midlantic Drive, Suite 200 P.O. Box 5429  Mt. Laurel, NJ 08054  [...]  Cumberland County Courthouse [...]  DATE: August 15, 2024
[brief] Where Plaintiff has established a *prima facie* breach of contract, misrepresentation, and fraudulent inducement case against Defendant [...], supported by the evidence and testimony of witnesses, the trial court improperly granted summary judgment to Defendant.  The trial court improperly asserted itself as the factfinder in this matter, where the case should have been presented to the jury.  Moreover, Defendant’s Cross-Appeal to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims on Statute of Limitations grounds must be denied, as the trial court explicitly acknowledged that there was a factual issue as to the statute of limitations argument.  For the reasons set forth above, it is requested that this Court reverse the trial court, and permit Plaintiff to present his case to the jury.
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[brief] Failing to provide any real supporting evidence either at his deposition or in written discovery, [...] exhibited what could fairly be characterized as tiresomely protracted and wickedly juvenile, bullying tantrum.  The record speaks for itself in all of its shameful ugliness.  [...] employed a crude and unhinged fury of expletives during his deposition that highlight his true colors and the way that [...], his namesake company, conducts its business.  Nevertheless, despite the pertinacity of [...]’s evasions and his inappropriate *ad hominem* attacks, [...]’s counsel persisted in asking Shallon [...] the questions that he had to answer in order to sustain [...]’s case.  In sum and substance, [...]’s depraved deposition “testimony” unleashed a prodigious effluent of verbal swill that truly captured in the amber of printed recordation the heart, soul and spirit of [...]’s President, his dysfunctional business organization (which apparently retains no pertinent business records as part of its alleged “honor system”), his utter contempt for any type of legal process, the way he treats people, and the negative consequences that directly arise from such an impotently pathetic and bully-boy approach to both life and to the legal process.
[brief] ”); (3T117:8-9) (“It would have been pipe. ”); (3T123:25) (“It was for the pipe. ”); (3T125:18-19) (“I said pipe, and then you did not like my answer. ”)  For example, the following exchange was typical of [...]’s maddeningly circular method of answering direct questions, with its strangely fallacious underlying assumption that the applicable definition of “pipe,” in all of its vast manufactured diversity, is an all-encompassing universal construct that somehow cannot be differentiated in any way, shape or form from the unique and particularized “pipe” that the Subject Contract encompassed for the purpose of calculating Haddad’s alleged damages:  Q: And so what I’m asking you is how are we going to figure out, for page one of P-9, what goods were sent by [...] to Haddad to cover check number 2043?  A: I don’t – it would have been the – it would have been pipe.  That’s all I – that’s all I know at this point.  (3T106:19 – 3T107:2)  (emphasis supplied)  Tellingly, when [...] was asked, “[j]ust so we are clear, there is no documentation to indicate what was purchased with any of these checks”? (3T123:5-7), she made the following fatal admission:  “Correct, counsel. ”
[brief] The trial court granted summary judgment to [...] to dismiss the complaint.  On appeal, the Court examined the purpose of N.J.S.A. 2A:15-97 to eliminate the double recovery to plaintiffs that flowed from the common-law collateral source rule and to allocate the benefit of that change to liability carriers.  Id. at 133, citing Perreira, supra. at 403.  The Court focused upon the statutory language which, clear on its face, was evidence of its legislative intent.  Id. at 139, citing Perreira, supra. at 418.  “As noted, it is well established that “‘the best indicator of [Legislative] intent is the statutory language. ’”  ...When a statute is plain on its face, we do not “interpret [it] to achieve a different end. ”  ...“Our judgment is not on the wisdom of the legislative enactment, but only on its meaning. ”  [...], supra., at 138-139 (citations omitted).  Ultimately, the Court affirmed the trial court decision, finding that the plain language N.J.S.A. 2A:15-97 supported the interpretation that it barred [...]’s subrogation claim and as a result, there was no cause of action against [...].  What is clear from the foregoing is that there is no statutory or regulatory authority allowing for subrogation of med-pay benefits in New Jersey.
[brief] The Probate Court also created a far bigger “ambiguity” and a far bigger issue than it purported to solve.  The purpose of a Residuary Clause is to dispose of assets that are not specifically bequeathed or devised.  If [...]’s interest in the Palm Beach Property does not pass through the Residuary Clause, where does it go? To whom?  By what mechanism?  The Probate Court addressed none of these issues, deciding that it need not determine to whom the interest goes, just that it does not go to [...].
[brief] 1.  [...]’s Traffic Testimony.  The Resolution found [...]’s conclusion that height will not produce increased traffic, to be a “net opinion,” inconsistent with testimony from [...] and [...].  Ja030.  Nonsense.  [...]’s conclusions were based on factual data generated by ITE standards; and nothing [...] or [...] said undercut same.  The traffic study was conducted pursuant to the authoritative industry standard for traffic engineering, the ITE.  (2T 6:5-25; 7:1-9).  Using data collected from real traffic counts, the ITE generates an equation, where an independent variable is added to produce the traffic projections.  (3T 28:3-24).  For residential development, that independent variable is the number of dwelling units; for warehouses, the independent variable is square footage.
[directive] Part of that statute amends the provisions of N.J.S.A. 2C:46-1d (1):  d.  (1)  When, in connection with a sentence of probation, a defendant is sentenced to pay an assessment imposed pursuant to section 2 of P.L. 1979, c. 396 (C.2C:43-3.1), a fine, a penalty imposed pursuant to N.J.S.2C: 35-15, a forensic laboratory fee imposed pursuant to N.J.S.2C: 35-20 or to make restitution, the defendant, in addition, shall be sentenced to pay a transaction fee on each occasion that the defendant makes a payment or an installment payment, until the defendant has paid the full amount he is sentenced to pay.  All other individuals making payments on court ordered financial obligations through the probation division shall also pay a transaction fee on each payment or installment payment.  The [...] shall promulgate a transaction fee schedule for use in connection with installment payments made pursuant to this paragraph; provided, however, the transaction fee on an installment payment shall not exceed ($1.00) $2.00.  Note that the transaction fee is now applicable to any payment made through the probation division in connection with a financial penalty resulting from a sentence under Title 2C or a suspension of proceedings and an order to supervisory treatment pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:36A (conditional discharge) or N.J.S.A. 2C: 43-12 (pretrial intervention).  Transaction fees are NOT to be charged on payments made: for child support, ! in conjunction with a disposition arising from Title 2A, Article ! 2, the Code of Juvenile Justice; or in conjunction with a sentence under Title 39, Motor Vehicles.
[brief] (Db49).  This argument fails because, unfortunately, the instructions on respondeat superior had just been infected by the "negligently in self-defense" canard.  "Negligently in self-defense" appears in the same section and even in one of the same paragraphs as the rest of the instructions on respondeat superior.  (11T168:17-170:1).  The trial court starts out at 11T168:17 by saying: "Respondeat superior."  Period.  Then he goes on to give the instructions on respondeat superior, including the "negligently in self-defense" part, ending at 11T170:1.2  Then, on the next line, 11T170:2, he says: "Negligent training and supervision."  Period.  And, on from there the jury was instructed on negligent training and supervision.  This jury's verdict on respondeat superior cannot be redeemed because the only question on the first verdict sheet asked whether [...] was acting within the scope of his employment.  (Pa54).  Their answer to that question was infected by the improper instruction they just received that told them that [...] could only be within the scope if he acted "negligently in self-defense."
[brief] Judson v. Peoples Bank and Trust Co. of Lexfield, 17 N.J. 67 (1954) ..........  15 Lawson v. Dewar, 468 N.J.Super. 128 (App.Div. 2021)  .............................  Lehmann v. Toys ‘R’ Us, Inc., 132 N.J. 587, 600 (1993)  ......................... 18, 20, 23 Lombardi v. Masso, 207 N.J. 517, 534 (2011)
[brief] The automobile exception is premised on three rationales: “(1) a vehicle's inherent mobility; (2) the lesser expectation of privacy in an automobile compared to a home"; and (3) the recognition that a Fourth Amendment intrusion occasioned by a prompt search based on probable cause is not necessarily greater than a prolonged detention of the vehicle and its occupants while the police secure a warrant. ”  Id. 223 N.J. at 422-23.  Recently, the Supreme Court in State v. Smart, 253 N.J. 156 (2023), clarified the requirement reiterated in Witt, that the automobile exception applies only when probable cause to search is “unforeseeable and spontaneous.
[brief] The trial court also erred in dismissing Count IV of the Complaint, which states a claim of breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing as against both Defendants.  [...] sought dismissal of this claim, arguing that (1) this claim is an attempt to “circumvent the stipulated remedies clause”; and (2) Plaintiffs have not sufficiently pleaded bad faith or other improper motive, so as to support such a claim against [...].  [...] also argued that the Complaint fails to allege that [...] acted with bad faith or an improper motive.  These arguments do not withstand analysis.
[brief] (Transcript, 25:3–17).  “The Ferreira Conference was designed to be the Judiciary’s key tool to promote satisfaction of the AMS’s salutary policy goals.  We mandated the conference and imposed requirement on both courts and defendants to discover and address issues as to the sufficiency of a plaintiff’s AOM. ”  A.T. v. Cohen, 231 N.J. 337 (2017) (citing Ferreira, supra 178 N.J. at 155); See also Saunders ex rel. Saunders v. Capital Health Sys. At Mercer, 398 N.J. Super. 500, 510, 942.  A.2d 142 (App. Div. 2008) (finding that “[c]ontrary to defendants’ contention and the motion judge’s decision, Ferreira mandates a case management conference within ninety days of the filing of an answer in a professional malpractice case.
[brief] Plaintiff contends that it was not necessary for him to prove actual prejudice in the Trial Court, however, plaintiff argues that actual prejudice is found with the Chancery Division Judge's misconduct in adjudicating an action in lieu and civil rights actions that is not cognizable in her division for the benefit of the opposing parties.  The Chancery Division Judge abused her discretion by addressing the merits and again when she allowed the Defendants to obtain relief in an improper division and an improper venue.  This matter properly belonged to the Law Division, Civil Part of the appropriate vicinage.
[brief] ERRONEOUSLY GRANTED SUMMARY  JUDGMENT TO DEFENDANT [...] (Pa1-3, 6-12)  ...........................................................................  1  POINT II: THE TRIAL COURT’S ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY  JUDGMENT TO DEFENDANT  [...] SHOULD BE REVERSED (Pa13, 17-18)  ............................................. 6  CONCLUSION ........................................................................  15  TABLE OF REPLY APPENDIX (Pa1126-1131)
[brief] For this point as well, Plaintiffs fail to counter [...]’s arguments.  A minority or marketability discount was precluded here because the Plaintiffs had already recovered all of the damages that the Arbitrator said they could prove before the Court determined fair value.  Therefore, this case could not present “extraordinary circumstances” as were found in Balsamides v. Protameen 160 N.J. 352 (1999).  Instead, Lawson Mardon Wheaton v. Smith, 160 N.J. 383, 403 (1999) controlled.  In fact, Plaintiffs merely recite at length what marketability and minority discounts generally are, but ignore that our law, since Lawson, is that a case must be “extraordinary” for those to be justified.
[brief] POINT IV  PREVIOUS APPELLATE HOLDINGS HAVE FOUND SIMILAR  NO FAULT POLICIES TO BE ARBITRARY AND UNREASONABLE (Pa52)  The employers method of application of the “Sick Leave Injury Procedures” Policy 19-16 is inherently arbitrary and capricious and therefore unreasonable.  Aside from violating Civil Service laws and the NJLAD the City disciplinary policy relating to sick leave is also arbitrary because it fails to consider whether the sick leave taken was legitimate.  The Appellate Division has struck policies where “the assigned [sick leave] rating is a merely mathematical consequence and unaffected by the reason for the absence.  In addressing a similar arbitrary history of analyzing sick leave, the Appellate Division in Montville Township Board of Education, N.J.P.E.R. Supp. 2d ¶140 (1985), rejected an arbitrary rating system which did not take into consideration the use of sick leave in proper circumstances.  The Appellate Division in Montville concluded that merely assigning a rating based upon a mathematical consequence was an arbitrary act by a governmental entity.  “A rating so assigned is, in our view, arbitrary.  We are therefore persuaded that the local board's action is indeed unreasonable. ”  Montville Twp. Educ. Ass'n v. Montville Twp. Bd. of Educ., No. A-1178-84T7, 1985 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 11, at *5 (App. Div. Dec. 6, 1985), N.J.P.E.R. PERC Supp. 2d ¶140 (1985)  In this case the employer attaches a presumption that the sick leave was punishable regardless if it was used for a legitimate illness or injury.  By attaching a presumption of illegitimacy the employer’s application of its sick leave policy is arbitrary and unreasonable as Montville, has determined.  In this case the medical leave policy is an arbitrary exercise of municipal power and is therefore void.  As such the sick leave policy at issue should be enjoined.
[brief] During cross examination, the Prosecutor on incorrectly stated the legal standard for insanity to [...].  (11T:120-11 to 13).  Specifically, the Prosecutor stated “To qualify for a defense of not guilty by reason of insanity, a person has to suffer a mental disease or defect; is that correct?  *Id.*  “And, as a result, that mental health defense, there are two alternatives that are possible right?” (11T:120-16 to 17).  “It could be … one or the other or both. ” (11T:120-19 to 20).  The Prosecutor asked [...] if she wrote in her report whether or not [...] knew that his actions were wrong.  (11T:122-16 to 17).  [...] replied that “That’s wording that was … he did not know or recognize the nature of his actions, the implication of those actions. ” (11T:122-18 to 22).  “That implied in that is that he did not know that what he was doing was wrong. ” (11T:122-22 to 23).  The Prosecutor then stated, “You know that’s an important legal standard, right?” (11T:123-8 to 9).  [...] replied “I didn’t ask – the I did not say whether he knew right from wrong. ” (11T:123-14 to 15).  “That’s actually not the standard. ” (11T:123-15 to 16).  “Whether he knew whether the specific actions that he was engaged in were right from wrong, not whether he in a broader sense knew …” (11T:123-16 to 18).  At that point the Court interrupted and said, “For the record purposes, Ladies and Gentlemen, I’ll say what the standard is one way or another. ” (11T:123:22 to 24).  “So—the witness can testify.  (11T:123-24).  “But, at the end of the day, I just want to remind you the law will come from me at the end of the case.  Okay?  Go ahead.  (11T:123-24 to 124-2).
[brief] See O’Rourke, 405 N.J. Super. at 23 (“[W]hen a law enforcement agency adopts rules pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40A:14–181 to implement the Attorney General’s Guidelines, the agency has an obligation to comply with those rules.  [When] it fail[s] to do so, and [when] the deficiencies taint[] the disciplinary process, the [] decision to remove [an employee] from his position cannot stand. ”).