ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] ” (1T85:16-19).  Puzzlingly, the Trial Court also recognized that [...] was willing to produce the text messages, as long as he was adequately compensated for the time spent retrieving and reviewing them.  (1T85:22-25).  The Trial Court then found that [...] “was represented through counsel appointed by the District at all times. ” (1T86:10-11).  And while he had “the right to pursue an independent agenda, one which is still unclear to the Court, . . . in this Court's opinion, he's not entitled to indemnification for it. ” (1T88:8-11).  The Court then found that N.J.S.A 59:1-1, being permissive when it comes to providing indemnification for local public officials, imbued the [...] with the discretion about whether or not to expend public funds on indemnifying [...].
[brief] 202 N.J. 12, 23-24 (2010).  In Mai, officers were notified via radio transmission that there was a man with a gun, wearing a black coat and black mask, located at a specific intersection.  *Id.* at 14.  Officers responded to the location and observed a vehicle containing five occupants double parked and performed a stop based on the traffic violation.  *Ibid.*  As officers approached the vehicle, they observed the passengers moving around inside but were unable to see what they were doing.  *Id.* at 17.  Due to the inability to see the occupants movements, the officer opened the vehicle door and observed that one of the men, a passenger in the vehicle, matched the description of the man with the gun and asked him to step out of the vehicle.  *Id.* at 15.  When the man stepped out, officers were able to see a firearm on the floor of the vehicle.  *Ibid.*  The Court found that under the totality of the circumstances that were before the officers, including the furtive movements of the occupants, the time of day, and the tip regarding the firearm, satisfied the heightened caution standard to warrant the removal of the passenger from the vehicle.  *Id.* at 23.  The State submits that the present case before this Court is analogous with *Mai* and that officers were justified in removing the defendant passenger from the vehicle due to heightened caution under the totality of the circumstances.
[brief] POINT I  ALL EVIDENCE SEIZED FROM [...]’S CAR MUST BE SUPPRESSED BECAUSE POLICE LACKED REASONABLE AND ARTICULABLE SUSPICION TO BELIEVE THAT [...] WAS ENGAGING IN CRIMINAL ACTIVITY AND THEREFORE HAD NO BASIS TO EFFECTUATE A TRAFFIC STOP.  (Da 36-38)  .........................................................................................................................15  A.  [...] Has Standing To Challenge The Warrantless Stop Of Moya’s Car Because He Has A Participatory Interest In The Narcotics Seized.  .........................16  TABLE OF CONTENTS
[brief] **STANDARD OF REVIEW ON ORDERS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT**  The propriety of a trial court’s summary judgment order, such as the June 28, 2024 Order which plaintiff-appellant seeks to have overturned in the case before this Appellate Court (Pal), is a legal question and not a factual one.  *Davidovich v. Israel Ice Skating*, 446 N.J. Super. 127, 158 (App. Div. 2016).  This Appellate Court shall apply the same standard as the Motion Court did in its review of the motion record.  *Shields v. Ramslee Motors*, 240 N.J. 479, 487 (2020).  Pursuant to that standard, “the movant is entitled to judgment if, on the full motion record, the adverse party, who is required to have the facts and inferences viewed most favorably to it, has not demonstrated a prima facie case. ”  *C.W. v. Cooper Health System*, 388 N.J. Super. 42, 57 (App. Div. 2006).  In addressing plaintiff-appellant’s argument that the June 28, 2024 summary judgment Order must be vacated, this Court “must confine [itself] to the original summary judgment record because that is the limited issue before [it]. ”  *Lombardi v. Masso*, 207 N.J. 517, 542 (2001), citing *Ji v. Palmer*, 333 N.J. Super. 451, 463-64 (App. Div. 2000) (explaining that an appellate court “can consider the case only as it had been unfolded to that point and the evidential material submitted on that motion”).
[brief] ORDER OF JUDGMENT OF THE JURY VERDICT, FILED MAY 26, 2023………………………………………..  DA-083  ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL, FILED AUGUST 23, 2023……………………………………..  DA-088  OPINION OF THE HONORABLE  [...], J.S.C., IN SUPPORT OF DENIAL OF DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL, FILED AUGUST 23, 2023……………………  DA-089  ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR STAY PENDING APPEAL, FILED OCTOBER 4, 2023…………  DA-142  # TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
[directive] 3.  [예/Yes]  [아니요/No]  판사가 귀하의 행위가 반복적이고 충동적인 행동양식을 나타내는 있으며, 없거나, 특성이 귀하가 성범죄자 치료를 잘 받을 수 또는 잘 있지만(혜택을 것이지만) 받을 수는 받을 이런 치료에 참여할 의사가 경우, 없다고 판단할 판사는 귀하에게 성범죄자 치료를 제공하지 않는 선고하고, 경우, 다른 시설에서 형기를 복역할 것을 또한 그럴 귀하는 그러한 다른 시설에서 복역하는 동안에 모범적 행동 또는 근로 점수를 아십니까?  근거로 형기가 단축되지 않는다는 것을  Do you understand if the court finds your conduct is characterized by a pattern of repetitive and compulsive behavior and you are not amenable to sex offender treatment or if you are amenable (will benefit from) but you are not willing to participate in such treatment, the court will sentence you to a term of incarceration to be served in another and facility which will not provide for sex offender treatment in such event, you will not receive commutation time for good behavior or each work credits for time served in such other facility?
[directive] 17.  a.  시민입니까?  [예/Yes]  [아니요/No]  귀하는 미국  Are you a citizen of the United States?  “아니요”라고 응답했으면17b – 17f 합니다.  이 질문에 의 질문들에 응답해야 이 “예”라고 18 가십시오.  질문에 응답할 경우에는 번 질문으로 넘어  If you have answered “No” to this question, you must answer Questions 17b – 17f.  If you have answered “Yes” to this question, proceed to Question 18 b.  경우, [예/Yes] [아니요/No]  귀하가 미국 시민이 아닌 이 유죄 인정의 결과로  미국에서  추방  될 수도 있고또한/또는 합법적인 미국 입국 또는 재 입국이 거부될 수도 있다는 것을 아십니까?  / Defendant’s Initials 피고인의 이니셜 유죄인정 주양식/지령 제01-18 호(02/23/2018)에 의거 공포된 수정 양식, 페이지5/7
[brief] TABLE OF CONTENTS  ...........................................................................................................  i  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ....................................................................................................  ii  TABLE OF ORDERS, JUDGMENTS, AND RULINGS BEING APPEALED .................................................................  iv  TABLE OF TRANSCRIPTS ..................................................................................................... v  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT .................................................................................................1  PROCEDURAL HISTORY .......................................................................................................3  COUNTER-STATEMENT OF FACTS ......................................................................................4  LEGAL ARGUMENT ..............................................................................................................12  I.  STANDARD OF REVIEW .................................................................................................12  II.  THE TRIAL COURT’S ORDER PROPERLY GRANTED SUMMARY  JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF THE TOWNSHIP AND SHOULD BE AFFIRMED IN ITS ENTIRETY ..................................................................................................................14  A.  THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED APPELLANT BREACHED THE PARTIES’ AGREEMENTS BY IMPROPERLY ACCEPTING CONNECTION FEES DUE AND OWING THE TOWNSHIP ........................................................................................................................................14  B.  THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED THE PARTIES’ COURSE OF DEALING AND COURSE OF PERFORMANCE ESTABLISH THE TOWNSHIP’S RIGHT TO THE CONNECTION FEE.  ........................................................................................................................................18  II.  APPELLANT’S FAILURE TO BRIEF  CERTAIN FINDINGS BY THE TRIAL COURT  CONSTITUTES  WAIVE OF SAME AND RENDERS  THE APPEAL MOOT .................................................................................................................................21  CONCLUSION .........................................................................................................................23
[brief] **  Plaintiffs assert, “[a]s an initial matter,” and perhaps as an implicit acknowledgement of the Board’s contention that there is no well-settled legal right applicable to the instant matter, that New Jersey courts no longer utilize the well-established and long-standing “independent” “well-settled legal right” prong set forth in Crowe v. De Gioia, 90 N.J. 126 (1982) (Pb23).  This is simply ---  1  The statement of facts and procedural history are closely related and combined for the Court’s convenience.  2  Plaintiffs’ claim that “the ‘well-settled legal right’ and ‘reasonable probability of success’ analyses” no longer constitute “two independent prongs under Crowe” also conflicts with the trial court’s decision.  See Da104 (“Whether the State has not true.  See, i. e., Petro v. Platkin, 472 N.J. Super. 536, 553 (App. Div. 2022) (“[...] determined plaintiffs failed to satisfy the Crowe standard for granting injunctive relief because: there was no danger that plaintiffs would suffer irreparable harm if an injunction was denied; plaintiffs did not establish a settled legal right; they did not have a reasonable probability of success on the merits; and the balancing of the relative hardships weighed in favor of the public interest” [emphasis added]); Estate of F.W.K. v. M.A-V, 473 N.J. Super. 379, 383 (Law Div. 2021) (“The heart of this dispute on plaintiff’s entitlement to the relief sought involves the second Crowe factor – the legal rights underlying plaintiff’s claim.
[brief] After considering its equitable power and the affidavits presented, the Board reasonably concluded that “[...] did not exercise reasonable diligence nor demonstrate reasonable grounds for such a protracted delay in filing the eligibility registration form,” where he filed his form approximately one year and three months past the deadline.  (Pa14-15).  Nor did [...] demonstrate extreme hardship in this matter, as he will continue to receive his Special Retirement benefits with concurrent retiree health benefits coverage.  (Pa83-84).  It should also be noted that cases involving the use of the Board’s equitable power for reopening proceedings or relaxing deadlines “were bottomed on the inherent power of an administrative agency, in the absence of legislative restriction, to reopen or to modify and to rehear orders previously entered by it.
[brief] See Atalese, 219 N.J. at 443; Noonan v. Comcast Corp., 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 175549, 2017 WL 4799795 (D.N.J. Oct. 24, 2017) (Da79-Da86).  BINDING ARBITRATION.  You have the right to REJECT this agreement to arbitrate by using the procedure explained below.  If you do not reject this agreement to arbitrate, you GIVE UP YOUR RIGHT TO GO TO COURT and controversies or disputes between us will be resolved by a NEUTRAL ARBITRATOR INSTEAD OF A JUDGE OR JURY, using rules that are simpler and more limited than in a court.  Arbitrator decisions are subject to a VERY LIMITED REVIEW BY A COURT.
[brief] The Court reviews those cases in detail and notes that even inquiries or investigative techniques that do not qualify as searches and seizures must still comport with the Equal Protection Clause.  And New Jersey jurisprudence is well-settled that seemingly furtive movements, without more, are insufficient to constitute reasonable and articulable suspicion.  The totality of the circumstances of the encounter must be considered in a fact-sensitive analysis to determine whether officers objectively possessed reasonable and articulable suspicion to conduct an investigatory stop.  (pp. 23-27)
[brief] Moreover, the idea that [...] would have participated in an arbitration with [...] and risked not being made whole (Pb15-16) does not withstand scrutiny.  [...] would never have left itself exposed to recovering less than all of its alleged damages.  [...]’s attempt to compare the futility of arbitration here to the risk of settlement by a single defendant when others go to trial is unsound.  *Id.* at 16.  The arbitration [...] envisions would not have even resulted in a final judgment as to [...]’s allocable share.  Subsequent litigation to finally decide the insurer’s contribution claims would have ensued.  Thus, “the standard waiver analysis should not apply in [this] futility context.
[brief] The Outstanding 26 Documents.  With regard to the outstanding 26 documents at issue, the Special Master will address them in their respective “categories” through the below tables.  The tables are divided to show the document number and the Special Master’s finding regarding each document at issue.  1.  The 11 Documents.  *4  These 11 documents are communications with counsel regarding [...]’s bid protests.  [...] contends all of these documents are generally responsive to RFPs 2, 12-15, and 18.  [...]’s applicable RFPs are produced verbatim as follows:
[brief] First, the Trial Court minimized the severity of Defendant [...]'s actions both before and during the June 2020 incident and failed to analyze it under the harassment statute, describing it as “just disagreements within the workplace, not very nice, uncomfortable disagreements” (T33-5).  However, Plaintiff’s belief that the conduct was unlawful should have been viewed through the lens of a reasonable employee, and the plain language of the statute.  A jury could reasonably infer that Defendant [...]'s conduct – berating people in close proximity, using profanity, slamming doors and file cabinets – created a work environment that violated the plain language of the harassment statute.  The Trial Court also improperly weighed the veracity of the testimony by Plaintiff, [...], and [...], stating “Yes, of course, in their depositions they’re going to say well we felt that this was harassment. ” (T28-13).  This statement indicates that the court dismissed this testimony, treating it as self-serving rather than viewing it in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.  The Trial Court’s decision also relied on the absence of corroborating testimony from other staff regarding Defendant [...]’s approval of charge pay and its own interpretations of Defendant [...]’s actions and motives.  For example, the court noted that "no other witness and no other document has corroborated her testimony" (T21-24).
[brief] ”  Ibid.  Such is the exact same case here.  Defendant claims the judge should have given the charge because he claims that there was no risk of prejudice to him, as the jury already knew the two were friends.  Here, the trial court held a comprehensive charge conference on its own court day, on the record, going through each page of the jury charge with trial counsel.  See (15T).  Defendant acquiesced to the jury charge both before, (16T:3-8 to 15), and after, (16T:170-1 to 4), it was given at trial.  “Pursuant to Rule 1:7–2, a defendant is required to challenge instructions at the time of trial or else waives the right to contest the instructions on appeal.
[brief] For the foregoing reasons, plaintiff’s counsel respectfully requests that the judgment below be reversed and the matter remanded for a determination of a reasonable fee award consistent with state and federal public policy guaranteeing equal access to courts, together with the legal precedent and principles governing this determination, and a clear articulation of factual findings correlated to the relevant legal principles.  Respectfully submitted, Appellate Section Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant, [...]  Dated: June 20, 2024  By: ___[...]___.  [...]
[brief] Here, the Borough owns the land “adjacent to” and “immediately south” of Appellant’s Property serving as the Borough’s public beach club.  The Superior Court of New Jersey Appellate Division rejected a similar argument in State v. Stulman, 136 N.J. Super. 148 (App. Div. 1975).  The defendant’s property was the subject of a partial taking which resulted in a relocation of his ingress and egress to the public roadways.  Stulman, supra at 161.  The Appellate Division rejected the defendant’s argument that he should be compensated for the loss of the view of his property due to construction activities which took place not on the defendant’s property, but on an adjacent property.  See, Stulman, supra at 162.  The Supreme Court of New Jersey relied upon the Stulman court’s reasoning when allowing damages for the loss of visibility of the property resulting from alterations to the portion of the property belonging to the condemnee.  In State by Commissioner of Transportation v. Weiswasser, 149 N.J. 320 (1997), the Supreme Court ruled: Loss of visibility as an element of severance damages may be related to a loss of access and the basis for the compensability for such damages would be whether the loss is attributable to the taking of the Property itself or off-site conditions.
[brief] (Pa000120).  11.  In fact, however, for approximately the last ten years, [...] has effectively ignored the rates agreed to in the Merchant Customer Application forms, and instead has billed its Merchant Customers at steadily increasing rates far above the “interchange rates” charged by the credit card issuers.  [...] has likewise ignored the “discount fees” agreed to in their contracts with their Merchant Customers, and instead has increased those “discount fees” to the point that they now exceed the mark-ups of the major credit card issuers themselves.
[brief] (Pa21a).  The trial court filed a Consolidated Statement of Reasons in support of its Orders on these defendants’ motion, as well as on the Orders concerning the motions to dismiss filed by the other defendants in this matter.  (Pa5a).  As to Defendants [...] and [...], the trial court found that these defendants are entitled to qualified immunity with regard to the claims brought against them.  The trial court found that Plaintiff alleged defendants [...] and [...] violated the LAD by authorizing an investigation with regard to Defendant [...]’s complaint against Plaintiff.  Plaintiff alleged that the investigation was retaliatory.  (Pa12a).  The trial court found that “the actions of these Defendants were required responses to a complaint of another employee which, by the very nature of their jobs, they were required to investigate.  Accordingly, these Defendants are shielded from liability based on qualified immunity. ” (Pa12a).  The trial court continued, providing the basis for dismissal of Counts Six and Seven of the Complaint as to Defendants [...] and [...].
[brief] Cf. Kelly v. Berlin, 300 N.J. Super. 256, 268 (App. Div. 1997).  Surveyors like [...] are licensed in New Jersey for a reason and are required to satisfy certain requirements and regulations in order to obtain one.  See generally N.J.S.A. 45:8-27 (requiring surveyors to be licensed in this State).  Expert opinions like [...]’s are invaluable, especially when called upon by the trial court to provide guidance on a critical issue.
[brief] Opposing Parties.  A lawyer representing a party in a litigation has no duty of care to the opposing party under this section and hence no liability for lack of care, except in unusual situations such as when a litigant is provided an opinion letter from opposing counsel as part of a settlement .  . .  [T]he opposing party is protected by the rules and procedures of the adversary system and, usually, by counsel.  [Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers, §51 cmt. b (1998)]  See, also, DeAngelis v. Rose, 320 N.J. Super. 263, 274-75 (App. Div. 1999) (citing tentative draft of the Restatement)  Of course, determining if a duty exists to a third-party is a question of law for the Court.  Estate of Albanese v. Lolio, 393 N.J. Super. 355, 368 (App. Div), certif. denied, 192 N.J. 597 (2007).  In this case, the privity requirement may not be relaxed because the [...] were Plaintiffs’ adversary counsel.
[brief] As such, this determination as to frivolous litigation should not be disturbed upon appellate review.  In Appellant’s Motion for Reconsideration, Appellant vigorously argued his entitlement for an award of attorney’s fees, under R. 4:42-9(a)(2) for a fund in court (as [...] focused her prior denial on N.J.S.A. 2A:15-59.1 and R. 1:4-8 for frivolous litigation).  After reconsideration of such demand, by Order dated April 29, 2024, [...] relying upon Porreca v. City of Millville, recognized that “the applicable standard of the equitable ‘fund in court’ exception is whether plaintiff ‘is doing more than advancing his own interests’ and whether other persons have benefited from plaintiff’s litigation rendering it ‘unfair to saddle the full cost’ of advancing the suit on plaintiff. ”  [...] concluded that “the Court finds it abundantly clear that Appellant was only serving his own interest in litigating this matter and accordingly, no such attorney’s fees are warranted. ”  (Da 216).  After analysis of Appellant’s renewed demand for attorney’s fees, the lower Court, “in its discretion, denies Appellant’s request for attorney’s fees” pursuant to R. 4:42-9(a)(2).  As R. 4:42-9(a)(2) clearly states that such determination is ”in its discretion” and the Court considered and denied such request, this should not be disturbed upon appellate review.
[brief] The function of a summary judgment motion is not to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter, but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.  Id at 540; Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986)  A factual dispute resolution should be up to a jury.  Suarez v. E. Intern. College, 428 N.J. Super. 10, 27 (App.Div. 2012); Mangual v. Berezinsky, 428 N.J. Super. 299, 308 (App.Div.2012).  The slightest doubt as to an issue of material fact must be reserved for the fact finder and precludes a grant of judgment as a matter of law.  Akhtar v. JDN Props at Florham Park, LLC, 439 N.J. Super. 391, 399 (App. Div. 2015).  As set forth in the Court’s May 26, 2023 Orders denying [...]’s motions for summary judgment and based upon the evidence presented by [...] and [...], [...] has clearly presented “sufficient evidence to create a dispute of material fact as to whether a product defect caused Plaintiff’s injuries” (Da816; Da0825)
[directive] This system shall include provisions to: (a) ensure that all recordings are uploaded to a secure data storage system in a timely fashion; (b) prevent tampering with or deletion of recorded data both before and after downloading from the BWC and uploading to the storage system; (c) prevent unauthorized access to stored BWC recordings; (d) document all instances where BWC recordings are accessed, viewed, copied, disseminated, or deleted; and (e) permit auditing of all instances where BWC recordings are accessed, viewed, copied, or deleted.  9.2  Capacity to Locate Specific BWC Recordings.  Every department shall establish and implement a system that permits the agency to locate and retrieve all recordings associated with a specific incident/event, investigation, case, or criminal charge.
[brief] (Da 41)  However, none of the witnesses had sufficient familiarity with [...] to identify him as the person in the video.  The detective met [...] for the first time only after viewing the video and the police officer had never seen [...] in person before identifying him in the video during trial.  None of [...]’s relatives who identified him had seen him in a decade.  The police witnesses and [...]’s long estranged relatives were in no better position to identify him as the person shown in the video than the jury was.
[brief] On February 23, 2024 the Ocean County Superior Court held that [...]’s conditional guilty plea was irrelevant because it determined that there was an alternative ground to uphold the conditional guilty plea.  1T37-1 to 5.  The Superior Court believed that it had the authority to do this based on its de novo standard of review of the municipal court’s factual findings per R. 3:23-8(a).  1T27-17 to 20.  Based on that standard, it took judicial notice of the back of the ticket where [...] had written “213 ft from Woodview Dr”.