ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Any unchallenged issue with the jury charge is considered “in light of ‘the totality of the entire charge, not in isolation. ’”  *State v. Burns*, 192 N.J. 312, 341 (2007) (quoting *Chapland*, 187 N.J. at 289).  Regarding the testimony of a cooperating co-defendant or witness charge, there is specific guidance enumerated within the charge itself that puts this claim to rest.  “While a defendant is entitled to such a charge if requested and a judge may give it on his own motion if he thinks it advisable under the circumstances, it is generally not wise to do so absent a request, because of the possible prejudice to the defendant.  *State v. Begyn*, 34 N.J. 35, 54-56 (1961); *State v.* Gardner, 51 N.J. 444, 460-461 (1968).  Certainly, it is not error, let alone plain error, for a trial judge to fail to give this cautionary comment where it has not been requested.
[brief] Chasin 159 N.J. at 429.  Indeed, Gramiccioni contains no mention at all of Chasin, and Lavezzi makes only passing reference to Chasin.  See Lavezzi, 219 N.J. at 172 (“The TCA was enacted ‘to supersede the patchwork of statutory provisions providing for the defense and indemnification of state employees. ’” (quoting Chasin, 159 N.J. at 425)).  The suggestion that the Court intended these decisions to be a sea change from its prior rulings on the scope of the [...]’s defense obligation as described in Chasin (which was issued only fifteen years before Lavezzi) cannot be sustained.  The [...]'s obligation to defend State employees in lawsuits is triggered by a plaintiff seeking damages.  N.J.S.A. 59:10A-1.  Only after a Plaintiff makes the appropriate request for relief would one need to undertake additional analysis under Wright, Gramiccioni and Lavezzi to determine whether a prosecutor’s office employee qualifies as a State employee under N.J.S.A. 59:10A-1.  Thus, to find that the [...] must defend prosecutor’s offices whenever those offices can claim to have been performing a “law-enforcement function,” regardless of the type of relief requested, would produce an absurd result in which prosecutorial defendants -- and no other State employees -- can secure a defense for claims other than civil claims for monetary relief.  No statutory support exists for the position that prosecutorial defendants were intended to receive a greater right to defense that other public employees, nor does any reported case law indicate that prosecutorial employees alone have a superior right to defense to all other State employees.
[brief] The AP was referring to [...]’s testimony that “the central theme is that the story evolves in a direction in which the defendant is less responsible for what occurred and less blameworthy and that’s a self-protective feature that I understand will happen because of various influences on the defendant including internal thought processes. ” (14T22-3 to 21).  [...] did not believe that defendant was lying to him or making up stories:  “I do think that he’s protecting himself from a recognition of the terrible things he’s done by adopting an explanation in which somehow mental illness did this to him[.]” (13T228-3 to 16).  Defendant’s evolving explanations for his horrific actions, [...] explained, was “a normal, human protective function to want to explain this to oneself and to not have to live with the burden of guilt for what one has done. ” (14T23-2 to 8; see also 13T228-17 to 20).  Referencing [...]’s testimony, the AP told the jury why his own initial conclusion that defendant was lying was proven wrong by the State’s expert witness.
[directive] Entry of Stolen Property into NCIC/SCIC Terminal  5.3.1  When an officer is investigating a theft where property that has been stolen has sufficient identifiers, the officer should make every effort to obtain this information for entry into the NCIC/SCIC terminal.  Once this information has been obtained, it is to be provided to the Control Desk operator who will make the entry.  The teletype number shall be logged on the officer's incident report.  5.3.2  If this information is not available, but there is enough of a description of the articles taken, the officer should make sure that at least teletype information be dispatched through the Control Desk operator as soon as the report has been received.  5.4  Stolen/Recovered Bicycles
[brief] (a)  Mobile retail food establishments shall obtain written approval from the owner of the property where their business will be conducted.  (b)  Mobile retail food establishments shall not operate within fifty (50) feet of an existing fixed retail food establishment without the prior written consent of the owner or authorized representative of the retail food establishment.  (c)  Mobile retail food establishments shall not operate at any one location for more than two (2) hours in one 24-hour period, except if it is in relation to an approved limited special event or private function.  (d)  The vendor must setup and operate the mobile retail food establishment unit so as to maintain a minimum five (5) foot clear pedestrian pathway in all directions from the unit.  (4)  In zones wherein eating and drinking establishments are not permitted uses pursuant to this Chapter 230, including residential zones, mobile retail food establishments may only be permitted to operate on private property for approved limited special events or private functions.
[brief] (9T239:16 to 238:17; 9T237:23 to 238).  The Court also disregarded the significant amount of assets that made up the Estate.  At the time of her death, Decedent held title to the Home, the residuary estate to a home at [...], two IRA accounts with $273,000 (P702a), and a mortgage to a home Decedent had built for the Respondent in the sum of $350,000\(^6\) (P656a; 9T234:22 to 235:23).  The Court found that a mother would take care of an alleged financially needy child over a spouse who allegedly failed to meet the mother’s needs.
[brief] H. [...]  Admitted highly prejudicial character evidence over repeated objections.  (raised below 3T, Pg. 194)  Defendant simply states what they did was okay because Plaintiff admitted to negotiating his bills.  But that misses the whole point.  If he admitted, there was no probative value in rehashing it and especially by claiming he had judgments issued against him.  That is designed to prejudice a jury and has little to no probative value because the fact they allege they are trying to provide evidentiary support for has already been admitted.  **CONCLUSION**
[brief] The OWBPA issue is nothing more than a red herring.  There was no discussion of a revocation period or compliance with the OWBPA in the settlement contract memorialized on the record.  Moreover, counsel made clear that Appellant was prepared to proceed based upon the material terms of the settlement contract memorialized on the record, which did not include an OWBPA compliant release of ADEA claims and/or a concomitant revocation period.  Accordingly, the lower court’s determination that somehow the OWBPA language contained in the unexecuted draft SA undermined the settlement reached and memorialized on the record is without basis in fact or law.  That is particularly true since Respondent repudiated the agreement reached and memorialized on the record without ever agreeing to or executing the draft SA and now seeks this Court to uphold that repudiation purportedly based upon a term which was not contemplated or included in the settlement contract memorialized on the record and expressly agreed to by Respondent and her counsel.
[brief] In *State v. Hester*, 449 N.J. Super. 314, 325 (App. Div. 2017), affirmed, 233 N.J. 381 (2018), the court stated: "Facial invalidation is, manifestly, strong medicine that has been employed by the Court sparingly and only as a last resort."  *J.B., supra*, 433 N.J. Super. at 344, 79 A. 3d 467 (quoting *Binkowski v. State*, 322 N.J. Super. 359, 375-76, 731 A.2d 64 (App. Div. 1999)).  "[A] statute . . . is facially unconstitutional only if the constitution is necessarily violated every time the law is enforced."  In considering facial challenges to an enactment, courts should not strike them down in anticipation that particular applications may be invalid.  *Ran-Dav's Cty. Kosher v. State*, 129 N.J. 141, 174 (1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 952, 113 S. Ct. 1366, 122 L.Ed.2d 744 (1993).  “On a facial challenge, a statute should be deemed constitutional if it operates constitutionally in some instances. ”  *Matter of M.U.'s Application for a Handgun Purchase Permit*, 475 N.J. Super. 148, 191 (App. Div. 2023).
[brief] Conveyances of title and permanent easement/property rights are customarily done by Deed - the formality intended to allow it to be recorded so as to achieve the intent of preserving permanent title rights.  Here, the Deed to convey the permanent title rights of Lot 8 was executed on December 31, 1962.  (Da166)  Certainly, if there had been an intent to convey with Lot 8 any permanent easement rights in the School's Lot 5, that easement would have logically been included in the contemporaneous Deed.  That it was not - but was part of an agreement in non-recordable form as one "Permission" among a number of temporary cooperations or permissions-is certainly substantial evidence that the "permission" granted was not intended as a permanent easement or title right.
[brief] TABLE OF AUTHORITIES  STATUTES  N.J.S.A. 53:5A-10..................................................................................................................2, 9  COURT RULES  R. 2:2-3(a)(2)..............................................................................................................................6  R. 2:5-5(b).................................................................................................................................9  CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS  N.J. Const. art. VI, § 5, para. 4.....................................................................................................6  CASES  Bartley Healthcare Nursing & Rehab. v. New Jersey Dep't of Health & Senior Servs., 2011 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 329 (App. Div. Feb. 15, 2011).........................................................7  Blackwell v. Dep't of Corr., 348 N.J. Super. 117, 123 (App. Div. 2002).................................................................6 In re Carter, 191 N.J. 474, 482-83 (2007).................................................................8 Ensslin v. Board of Trustees, Police and Firemen’s Retirement System, 311 N.J Super 333 (App. Div. 1998).......................9, 10, 11 Figueroa v. N.J. Dep't of Corr., 414 N.J. Super. 186 (App. Div. 2010)....................15 Henry v. Rahway State Prison, 81 N.J. 571 (1980)..........................................................7 In re Issuance of Permit by DEP, 120 N.J. 164 (1990)..................................................8 Mayflower Sec. Co. v. Bureau of Sec., 64 N.J. 85 (1973)...........................................6, 7 Mazza v. Bd. of Trs., 143 N.J. 22 (1995).................................................................8 N.J. Civil Serv. Ass'n v. State, 88 N.J. 605 (1982).........................................................6 N.J. Soc'y for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v. N.J. Dep't of Agric., 196 N.J. 366 (2008).........................................................7  SMB Assocs v. Department of Envtl. Prot., 264 N.J. Super 38 (App. Div. 1993), aff’d, 137 N.J. 58 (1994)..................11  State v. Atley, 157 N.J. Super. 157 (App. Div. 1978)...............................8  In re State & Sch. Emples. Health Benefits Commissions’ Implementation of Yucht, 233 N.J. 267 (2018).....................8, 9 Vas v. Roberts, 418 N.J. Super. 509 (App. Div. 2011)..................................6  In re Virtua-West Jersey Hosp. Voorhees, 194 N.J. 413 (2008)......................................................................................7  Williams v. Department of Corrections, 330 N.J. Super. 197 (App. Div. 2000) ....................................................6, 7  APPENDIX TABLE OF CONTENTS
[brief] In reviewing summary judgment motions, appellate courts review an order granting summary judgment in accordance with the same standard as the trial court.  Bhagat v. Bhagat, 217 N.J.  Thus, on appeal of a summary judgment motion, this Court must first review the “competent evidential materials submitted by the parties to identify whether there are genuine issues of material facts and, if not, whether the moving party is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. ”  Id. (citing Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520, 540 (1995); R. 4:46-2(c)).  “In conducting this review, the Court must keep in mind that ‘an issue of fact is genuine only if, considering the burden of persuasion at trial, the evidence submitted by the parties on the motion, together with all legitimate inferences therefrom favoring the non-moving party, would require submission of the issue to the trier of fact. ’”  Id. (citing R. 4:46-2(c)).  “If there is no genuine issue of material fact, [this Court] must ‘decide whether the trial court correctly interpreted the law. ’”  DepoLink Ct. Rep. & Litig. Support Servs. V. Rochman, 430 N.J. Super. 325, 333 (App. Div. 2013) (quoting Massachi v. AHL Servs. Inc., 396 N.J. Super. 486, 494 (App. Div. 2007)).  Motions for summary judgment require trial and appellate courts to review the motion record against “the elements of the cause of action, [and] the evidential standard governing that cause of action. ”  Bhagat, 217 N.J. at 38.  As set forth below, the trial court correctly applied the foregoing standard to the undisputed material facts and concluded [...] was entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.  As a result, this Court should affirm the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of [...].
[directive] [Promulgated by Directive #12-06 (July 20, 2006)]  Page 4 of 7  Under New Jersey law, any unauthorized disclosure of information concerning Grand Jury proceedings with the intent to injure another is a crime punishable by up to 18 months imprisonment.  If you are approached by anyone soliciting information concerning the proceedings before you as Grand Jurors, you are to report such attempts at once to the court.  Likewise, if during your service anyone should attempt to influence you in the performance of your duties, it would be a violation of the law on the part of that person.  Bring any such conduct to the attention of the clerk of the Grand Jury immediately, so that those making such an attempt may be dealt with properly.
[brief] (2T 95-2 to 6)  [...] received a text message from a phone number ending in 8662, registered to [...], at 10:41 a.m. that said “go ahead and do it. ”  (2T 96-3 to 97-8)  [...] testified that he never received the text, (2T 95-16 to 22) and his cell phone call details records do not reflect it.
[brief] Pa439.  In that case, the plaintiff redeveloper sought to void its redevelopment agreement with the [...] ("[...]") on the grounds that the $300,000 "Upfront Redevelopment Payment" required under the agreement was unlawful.  Conversely, [...] sought to enforce such provision.  Since there were no material facts in dispute, [...] resolved the legal question as the validity of the $300,000 payment by way of summary judgment.  Specifically, [...] was called upon to adjudicate, as a matter of first impression, whether the “rational nexus” cost requirements regulating municipal exactions and developer contributions under § 42 of the Municipal Land Use Law ("MLUL"), *N.J.S.A. 40:55D-42*, and *Divan Builders v. Planning Bd. of Wayne*, 66 *N.J.* 582, 600 (1975), are applicable to any of the redeveloper agreement’s bargained-for contributions and/or payments.  *Genon, supra*, 2015 WL 10986475, at *1, Pa439-440.  The court held that the “rational nexus” requirement “neither applies to, nor controls enforcement of, a redevelopment agreement entered into voluntarily and as the result of arms’ length negotiations between a municipality (or its redevelopment agency) and its properly designated redeveloper.
[brief] Where a first-filed case is an anticipatory declaratory judgment action like this one, which runs parallel to a later-filed coercive action encompassing the facts and claims at issue in the first-filed case, the usefulness of the declaratory judgment action is significantly curtailed.  See Century Indem., 398 N.J. Super. at 438 (affirming dismissal of first-filed declaratory judgment action in favor of a later-filed action in Pennsylvania on the basis of comity).  This is particularly true, where, like here, New Jersey is neither the place of incorporation nor principal place of business for the party filing the anticipatory declaratory judgment (or, here, any of the parties).  See id. at 440 (finding no deference needed to be given to the plaintiff’s choice of forum through an anticipatory declaratory judgment because New Jersey is “neither its place of incorporation or principal place of business”).  B.  The Trial Court Acted Well Within Its Discretion When It Dismissed This Case On Comity Grounds In Favor Of The Missouri Action.
[brief] *The Agency Lacked the Requisite Evidence and Fatally Misread N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24(b), 18A:12-24.1(e), and 18A:12-24.1(f) (Sg001-Sg007; Sg164-Sg183; Sg186-Sg191; Sg192-Sg201; Sg206-Sg236).*  The SEC and the Commissioner erroneously and summarily concluded that Appellant’s prior political relationship with [...] was the only credible evidence necessary to find violations of *N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24(b), 18A:12-24.1(e), and 18A:12-24.1(f).
[brief] The Policies provide:  By acceptance of this Policy, all Insureds affirm or reaffirm as of the Inception Date of this Policy that: 1. the statements in the Application are true and accurate and are specifically incorporated herein, and are all Insureds’ agreements, personal representations and warranties; 2. all such communicated information shall be deemed material to the Insurer’s issuance of this Policy; 3. this Policy is issued in reliance upon the truth and accuracy of such representations.  As the trial court held, “Thus, the policy which [...] agreed to with [...] confirmed that all the representations contained in the application are truthful, which clearly they were not, that all communicated information in the policy would be deemed material for the issuance of the insurance policy.  Again, the Court cannot ignore the plain, unambiguous language of the policy and re-write a better policy for [...] because he chose not to be candid when seeking professional malpractice insurance. ”  While this Court need look no further than the plain language of the Policies to find materiality and reliance, the certification of [...]’s underwriter, [...], confirms the trial court’s conclusion.  In his certification, [...] testified “unequivocally and without qualification that [...] would not have issued the 2016 Policy had the Disciplinary Action Complaint been disclosed. ”  The Disciplinary Action Complaint “stands out as unquestionably disqualifying the Firm as a potential Insured for two reasons.
[brief] “Based upon the attached the Sheriff's office will not issue the deed for the property in question until there is a further order of the court. ”  Da247.  The “attached” was an attachment to an email that included a letter from counsel for Borrower and [...] and, inter alia, copies of the Sale Objection Order and the Second Stay Continuation Order.  Da250.  On March 26, 2024, Plaintiff filed a motion with the court below for an order to compel the Sheriff to deliver the Deed or in the alternative, declare that there is no stay (the “Motion to Dissolve the Stay”).
[brief] ¹  The Supreme Court has recognized that the doctrine serves three fundamental purposes: (1) the need for complete and final disposition through the avoidance of piecemeal decisions; (2) fairness to parties to the action and those with a material interest in the action; and (3) efficiency and the avoidance of waste and the reduction of delay.  Bank Leumi USA v. Kloss, 243 N.J. 218 (2020) (quoting DiTrolio v. Antiles, 142 N.J. 253, 267 (1995).
[brief] Plaintiff Trial Exhibit P-2 Record of $50,000 Outgoing Wire Transfer from [...] to [...], dated June 25, 2008 ........................................Da0154  Plaintiff Trial Exhibit P-4 [...] Promissory Note, dated July 7, 2008 (INTENTIONALLY OMITTED)  Plaintiff Trial Exhibit P-5 [...] Guarantee, dated July 8, 2008 (INTENTIONALLY OMITTED)  Plaintiff Trial Exhibit P-6 Closing Statement, dated July 8, 2008 .................Da0155  Plaintiff Trial Exhibit P-7 Collateral Mortgage, dated July 7, 2008 (INTENTIONALLY OMITTED)  Plaintiff Trial Exhibit P-8 Correspondence from [...] to [...], dated August 28, 2009.................................................................Da0158  Plaintiff Trial Exhibit P-9 Letter from [...] to [...], dated September 18, 2009.................................................................Da0160  Plaintiff Trial Exhibit P-10 Text Message from [...] to [...], dated September 18, 2009 .................................................................Da0162  Plaintiff Trial Exhibit P-11 Text Message from [...] to [...], dated September 18, 2009 .................................................................Da0164  Plaintiff Trial Exhibit P-12 Email from [...] to [...] and [...], dated September 22, 2009 ......................................................Da0166  Plaintiff Trial Exhibit P-13 Email from [...] to [...] with attached schedule, dated August 6, 2010.......................................................Da0171 Plaintiff Trial Exhibit P-14 Email from [...] to [...] (two-email chain) with attachment, dated August 19, 2010........................................Da0173 Plaintiff Trial Exhibit P-15 Correspondence from [...] to [...] with attachments, dated October 12, 2010 ........................................Da0176 Plaintiff Trial Exhibit P-16 Correspondence from [...] to [...] with attachment, dated November 10, 2010........................................Da180
[brief] As the Trust language concerning the two properties is identical with respect to valuation, there was not the slightest basis to draw that distinction other than that it would have enabled [...], as a beneficiary, to extract from [...] his share of any appreciation in the value of the Florida Property since the Decedent’s date of death, without having to pay his share of any such appreciation if he acquired the Boonton Property.  As long as it suited them to do so, the Defendants continued to fully accept the date-of-death Boonton Appraisal as determinative of fair market value.  In his bid submitted to the Court on July 14, 2022, [...] stated: “Please be advised that I am hereby exercising my right to purchase the property at fair market value, which was determined to be $575,000 by a licensed appraiser. ” (Da307).  As that page shows, he actually offered only $501,000, an amount $74,000 less than what he acknowledged to be the fair market value.  [...] admitted at the plenary hearing that he had actually arrived at his bid of $501,000 because “that was all we could afford. ” (8T71:20-72:3).  Thus, their earlier resistance to having the Boonton Property listed, or sold to the [...], or sold to [...] following the bidding for an amount $100,000 above their offer, was not tied to any legal principle.
[brief] In *Lott*, the Court addressed whether plaintiffs’ equitable claim to correct an erroneous deed could be governed by a statute of limitations addressing actions at law.  *Id.* at *9*.  In ruling that it could not, the Court, on its own, held that actions to correct a clear mistake/error in a deed are governed by the equitable doctrine of laches in the absence of a statute of limitations applicable to an analogous remedy at law.