ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Pa396-97.  The plaintiff alleged that a height deviation between the floor and the cover constituted a dangerous and unsafe condition.  Pa398.  The plaintiff retained an engineer to establish liability.  After inspecting the premises, the engineer offered an opinion that the cover was not installed in accordance with the architectural plans for the premises and that deviation caused the accident.  Ibid.  At the close of discovery, the defendant moved for summary judgment arguing that the engineer’s opinions were net opinions and that without expert testimony the plaintiff could not establish a prima facie case.  Pa399.  The motion judge granted the motion holding that the opinions offered by plaintiff’s liability expert were --- ²  A true and accurate copy of Turkowski v. [...], [...] (App. Div. March 31, 2014) is attached to Plaintiffs’ Appendix as Pa395-408.  Pursuant to Rule 1:36-3, no adverse unpublished opinions are known to counsel. inadmissible as net opinion and that without expert testimony the plaintiff could not establish that the store owner was negligent.  Pa399-400.  On appeal, the Appellate Division affirmed the order granting summary judgment.  Pa407.  The court held that whether the height deviation created a hazard “sufficient to constitute an unreasonably dangerous condition” required expert testimony.  Ibid.  It further held that because the motion judge properly excluded the plaintiff’s liability expert testimony as net opinion, a reasonable jury could not find that the store owner was negligent.  Ibid.  Here, plaintiff has no liability expert to opine that the condition in the parking lot, albeit controlled and maintained by the Township, posed a dangerous condition.  To the contrary, the Court already found that, as law of the case, that “the condition of the parking lot was not such that any finder of fact could conclude a dangerous condition existed within the lot. ”  Pa9.  Without expert testimony to opine on the objective industry standard to support a finding that the premises constitute an unreasonably dangerous condition, plaintiff cannot establish that [...] was negligent.  POINT IV
[brief] No Countervailing Benefits Justify The Sweeping ESI Order (Raised Below: Da166-68; T3-38)  The trial court offered no “good reason[]” for imposing such a burdensome order or departing from established discovery practice.  Customers Bank, 453 N.J. Super. at 348 (quoting Flagg, 171 N.J. at 571).  Under Rule 4:10-2(g), a trial court must consider whether the “the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit, taking into account . . . the importance of the proposed discovery in resolving the issues. ”  Rule 4:10-2(g).  Here, the trial court identified no countervailing benefits to justify the burdens imposed.  To start, Plaintiffs have no legitimate interest in obtaining irrelevant documents that—by definition—will not assist the Plaintiffs in litigating the case and are not “important[t]” in “resolving the issues” at stake.  See id.  To be sure, New Jersey courts recognize that “essential justice is better achieved when there has been full disclosure so that the parties are conversant with all the available facts” necessary to litigate effectively.  Lipsky, 474 N.J. Super. at 463 (quoting Jenkins v. Rainner, 69 N.J. 50, 57 (1976)).  But “full disclosure” does not mean unlimited disclosure.  Id. at 464.  Information irrelevant to the case is inherently not information needed to be “conversant with all the available facts. ”  Id. at 463; see K.S., 330 N.J. Super. at 291.  Directing the production of legally irrelevant documents therefore does nothing to advance “the purpose and spirit of the discovery practice, namely the pretrial opportunity of litigants to explore every avenue of inquiry in their search for the relevant facts and circumstances. ”  Pressler & Verniero, cmt. 1 on R. 4:10-2(a) (emphasis added).  The trial court ruled otherwise on the ground that ordering production of irrelevant documents would maximize the likelihood that all relevant documents would be produced.  T25:10-14.  As explained above, however, this Court has already rejected similar concerns as a matter of law.  See supra at 26-30.  As the Court held in *Lipsky*, there is a “clear alternative” to mandating production of irrelevant documents—allow Defendants to “undertake searches of their own [] and produce certifications relating to their searches and their search results. ”  474 N.J. Super. at 473-74.  Just as in *Lipsky*, Plaintiffs have made no showing—and the trial court has made no finding—that Defendants have “withheld responsive documents. ”  *Id.* at 474.  Indeed, the trial court never gave Defendants the chance to conduct their own relevancy review.  “On the record presented,” then, “there is nothing suggesting any nefarious behavior on the part of [Defendants] that might warrant more intrusive methods. ”  *Id.* at 475.  The trial court therefore abused its discretion in nevertheless compelling such sweeping production.  See also Rule 4:10-2(g).
[brief] Given the above, Plaintiff urges the Court to consider the legislative backdrop of the NJCFLA—including the NJSLA, NJLLA, and NJCLA, all being remedial consumer protection statutes designed for public benefit—and the practical limitations of prosecutorial resources available to enforce the NJCFLA.  Though the area of law is still developing and there are, at this time, no published cases analyzing this issue on April 26, 2023, the Honorable [...], J.S.C. issued an Order and Statement of Reasons in a case venued in the Law Division of Essex County Superior Court which, 1) analyzed the NJCFLA’s licensure requirements in great depth and, 2) expressly contradicted *Woo-Padva*, 2022 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 96.
[brief] Rather, it was, at the very least, one of several permissible alternatives -- and certainly was “not so wide [of] the mark that a manifest denial of justice resulted. ”  DiFiore, 254 N.J. at 228 (alteration in original) (citation omitted).  The trial court’s decision to impose a discovery protocol precluding the parties from withholding ESI search hits for relevance was well within the bounds of its discretion.
[brief] During oral argument on an evidentiary issue at trial, the trial court likewise reiterated that the [...] were “out” of the case:  “I think -- I think my prior ruling -- I’m certain my prior ruling with regard to the ability to cross-examine based upon -- it was of no moment, because the statute of limitations defendants are out.  They’re out and they stay out. ”  (14T16) (emphasis added).  A claim for contribution requires a money judgment against the contribution claimant.  See Hoelz v. Bowers, 473 N.J. Super. 42, 63 (App. Div. 2022).
[directive] I.  Definitions  A.  “Child” “children” refers to any student, regardless of age, enrolled in pre-school or through twelfth grade at either a public or private school.  B. is a form completed by a law “Handle with Care Notice” or “HWC Notice” enforcement officer after responding to, or encountering, an incident involving a traumatic event where a child is present.  To protect the privacy of affected children, the HWC Notice shall include the following information: the child’s name, age, only grade, school of enrollment, and date and time of the incident.  The HWC Notice shall be sent immediately to the appropriate point of contact at the child’s school of enrollment.  To protect the parties involved, the notice shall include details of never the incident.  2 C.  “Point Contact” refers to a school employee identified by the head of the school or of Board of Education.  This individual will be responsible for receiving all HWC Notices for children enrolled in that school and for disseminating the HWC Notices to the child’s teacher(s).  D.  “Traumatic event” shall be broadly construed and may refer to, but is not limited to, the following incidents when a child is a victim or witness: the arrest of an individual who resides in the home where the child is • present; a search warrant executed at the residence; • drug/alcohol overdose of an individual who resides in the home where the • child is present; suicide, or attempted suicide, of an individual who resides in the home • where the child is present; an incident of domestic violence; • physical/sexual abuse; • violence2; community • a bullied child or a child who is bullying others; • forced displacement from the residence; • involvement with the [...] • ([...]); house fires; • any incident where a child is identified at the scene as being exposed to • trauma (i.e. crime/drug activity at the scene); or the sudden death of an immediate family member or guardian of the child of • which the police are made aware.
[brief] ”  *Ibid.*  As the Court explained, “[t]his continued adherence to the hue and cry in rape cases willfully ignored both its ineffectiveness in every other context, and the possibility that women would keep silent about rape because more than any other violent crime it could shed shame and embarrassment on the victim. ”  *Id.* at 158-59.  Once the hearsay rules developed, the hue and cry rule in rape cases was replaced by the fresh complaint rule, intended “to negate any inference that because the victim had failed to tell anyone that she had been raped, her later assertion of rape could not be believed.
[brief] 17  TABLE OF JUDGEMENTS, ORDERS, AND RULINGS  01/22/2024  Order Granting Summary Judgment  Pa1 TRANSCRIPT KEY 01/22/2024  Transcript of Motion  1T # TABLE OF CONTENTS FOR PLAINTIFF’S APPENDIX | Date | Document Description | Page | |---------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | 01/22/2024 | Order Granting Summary Judgment | Pa1 | | 02/29/2024 | Notice of Appeal | Pa2 | | 03/04/2024 | Certification of Transcript Completion and Delivery | Pa6 | | 11/20/2020 | Complaint and Jury Demand | Pa7 | | 12/08/2020 | Answer | Pa13 | | 09/29/2021 |  Deposition of plaintiff [...] | Pa17 | | 08/10/2022 | Substitution of Attorney and Designation of Trial Counsel | Pa110| | 05/12/2023 | Deposition of defendant [...] | Pa112| | 12/07/2018 | Police Report | Pa51 | | 11/07/2023 | Marked Satellite image | Pa53 | | 11/07/2023 | Plaintiff’s Affidavit | Pa54 | | 10/09/2023 | Notice of Motion for Summary Judgement | Pa56 | | Troiani v. Dicker, Unpublished Case Docket No. A-5176-16T1 (App Div. 2018) | | Pa58 | | 06/07/2024 | Index of Exhibits Submitted to the Court on the Motion Below | Pa61 | | 10/09/2023 | Motion for Summary Judgement: Statement of Facts | Pa63 | | 08/10/2021 | Motion for Summary Judgement Plaintiff’s Answers to Form A Interrogatories | Pa65 | | 10/09/2023 | Motion for Summary Judgement Defendant’s Google Image of the Intersection | Pa76 | | Rybkin v. Twp. Of North Bergen: Unpublished Case Docket No. A-3773-09T4 (App. Div. 2012) | | Pa77 | ## TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ### Cases - **Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co.**, 142 N.J. 520, 540 (1995) 5, 14 - **Prudential v. Boylan**, 307 N.J. Super. 162, 167 5 - **Philips v. Scrimente**, 66 N.J. Super, 157, 163 (App. Div. 1961) 9, 10 - **Mattero v. Silverman**, 71 N.J. Super. 1, 9 (App. Div. 1961) 10 - **Beck v. Washington**, 149 N.J. Super. 569, 572(1977) 11 - **Michaels v. Brookchester, Inc.**, 26 N.J. 379, 386 (1958)
[brief] (Da261-Da275, [...]’s Deposition Transcript, 10:4-10, 11:16-19, 25:9-26:7).  When [...] opened the hatch, there was a light on inside of the crawl space.  (Da261-Da275, [...]’s Deposition Transcript, 11:1-15, 25:1-4).  [...] assumed [...] closed the hatch, as he re-entered the hatch room after showing the Plaintiff and [...] the hatch.  (Da261-Da275, [...]’s Deposition Transcript, 12:5-13, 28:17-24, 51:10-23).  While [...] did not close the hatch, [...] testified [...] shut off the light inside the crawl space, as when the Plaintiff fell into it, it was dark.  (Da261-Da275, [...]’s Deposition Transcript, 12:5-18).  Neither Plaintiff nor [...] shut off the light inside the crawl space.  (Da261-Da275, [...]’s Deposition Transcript, 17:10-20).  At the time [...] stepped into the hatch, both he and [...] were looking up to follow the ceiling wires.  (Da261-Da275, [...]’s Deposition Transcript, 14:16-15:3).  At that point, because the light was shut off inside the crawl space, there was no way to notice the hatch was open, which was a dangerous condition.  (Da261-Da275, [...]’s Deposition Transcript, 15:4-15, 17:21-24).  Plaintiff was not walking backwards when he fell, he was stationary examining overhead wires, but stepped backward into the open hatch while looking up.  (Da261-Da275, [...]’s Deposition Transcript, 8:14-9:7, 14:16-15:3, 31:23-32:3, 38:1-7, 46:24-47:22).  The general contractor followed [...] and [...] the entire time during their work and was present when the [...] fell.
[directive] DATE: SUBJECT: ATTORNEY GENERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT DIRECTIVE NO. 2000-5  TEMPORARY SUSPENSION OF ENFORCEMENT OF 39:3-33 FOR N.J.S.A. VEHICLES EQUIPPED WITH EXTERIOR MOUNTED E-ZPASS TAG  In an effort to enhance the flow of traffic on the various toll roads and bridges in the Northeast and Mid-Atlantic Region, the toll transportation agencies in this State and the States of New York, Massachusetts, Delaware, Maryland and West Virginia and the related bi- State toll authorities formed a regional consortium to offer the E-ZPass Electronic Toll Collection technology.  The introduction of this technology has proven to be extraordinarily successful in reducing delays and congestion on our roads and highways.  Most E-ZPass subscribers are issued an interior mounted E-ZPass tag that is affixed to the front windshield of the vehicle.  The E-ZPass tag records the toll transactions for the vehicle, as it passes through the various participating toll facilities.  However, effective February 2000, the operators of the E-ZPass Consortium began issuing an exterior mounted E-ZPass tag, rather than the interior mounted tag.  These exterior mounted E-ZPass tags are issued to a specific group of vehicles equipped with special windshields containing glass that prevents the E-ZPass tag from being read properly through the windshields.  The exterior mounted E-ZPass tag is designed as a license plate bracket to be affixed to the front license plate of a vehicle.  When installed, a portion of the tag covers the words "New Jersey" at the top of the license plate.  As a result, a vehicle equipped with an exterior mounted E-ZPass tag on the front license plate is in violation of N.J.S.A. 39:3-33, which prohibits the operation of a motor vehicle which has a license plate frame or identification marker holder that conceals or otherwise obscures any part of any marking imprinted upon the vehicle's registration plate.  THEREFORE, in order to accommodate those members of the motoring public who are issued the exterior mounted E-ZPass tag, I, [...], Attorney General of New Jersey Is An Equal Opportunity Employer
[brief] (Pa498-99; Pa593-601; Pa610-59).  [...] warehoused many of its PCB products in facilities in Kearny and Elizabeth, New Jersey.  (Pa608-09).  During all of this time, [...] knew the risks and hazards of PCBs, but continued to market them for a wide variety of uses.  At the same time, [...] concealed those risks and hazards from [...] and others in order to preserve its sales and related profits.  (Pa003-008).  In fact, [...] developed a coordinated strategy to conceal those risks from customers and government regulators, including the [...].  (Pa005-009).  By 1972, as a part of its strategy to prolong its sale of PCBs, [...] began to require its customers to execute so-called “Special Undertakings.
[brief] Said motion must be filed “within 10 days after the verdict or finding of guilty.”  R. 3:20-2.  “The jury verdict will be upheld where there is sufficient evidence to support the conviction on that charge. ”  State v. Terrell, 452 N.J. Super. 226, 269 (App. Div. 2016) (citing State v. Brooks, 366 N.J. Super. 447, 454 (App. Div. 2004)).  In this case, the motion was timely filed.  Trial courts are afforded a great deal of discretion in the consideration of new trial motion, as Appellate Courts are averse to overruling such decisions.  “The trial court’s ruling on [] a motion [for a new trial] shall not be reversed unless it clearly appears that there was a miscarriage of justice under the law. ”  R. 2:10-1.  Further, “a motion for a new trial is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial judge, and the exercise of that discretion will not be interfered with on appeal unless a clear abuse has been shown. ”  State v. Russo, 333 N.J. Super. 119, 137 (App. Div. 2000); see also State v. Henries, 306 N.J. Super. 512, 529 (App. Div. 1997); State v. Conway, 193 N.J. Super. 133, 172 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 97 N.J. 650 (1984); State v. Artis, 36 N.J. 538, 541 (1962).  “In reviewing a trial judge's decision, [an Appellate Court] give[s] deference to his feel for the case because he had the opportunity to observe and hear the witnesses as they testified. ”  State v. Petrozelli, 351 N.J. Super. 14, 23 (App. Div. 2002) (citing Carrino v. Novotny, 78 N.J. 355, 360 (1979)).  ARGUMENT
[brief] His discretionary decision was made in plain error, where "in General Electric Co. v. jointer, 522 U.S. 136 (1997), the Supreme Court held that abuse of discretion is the proper standard to use when reviewing evidentiary rulings..."  If there is bad service, there is NO time limit for asking the court to vacate a default judgment (Please see POINT 1.  THE TRIAL COURT ERROR IN GRANTING THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT for court cases cited in support of NO time limit.)  When the hearing began on October 19, [...] requested to be sworn in.  The trial judge responded: "I'm not – this is not – this is not an evidentiary hearing so I'm going to decline your request."  (See Transcript Page 3, Lines 21-23)  Later on in the hearing, he said: "But in fairness to you, if you should file an appeal, I am not making a factual determination that – that what – what you just represented to me is false."  (See Transcript Page 12, Lines 24-25 and Page 13, Lines 1-2).  And then later he said:  "But in this particular situation, I am not making a determination that [...] was, in fact, served in 2015.  In order for me to do that... I probably would hold an evidentiary hearing. ”  (See Transcript Page 16, Lines 1-13).  An Abuse of Discretion occurred when the trial court judge DID NOT hold an evidentiary hearing, but instead forced the defendants to file an appeal.
[brief] “[a]bandonment is a matter of intent. ”  The access walkways at the Property are composed of two (2) components, the excavation and the surfacing material.  Plaintiffs-Appellants replaced the damaged surface material but the excavations of both walkways remained the same.  2T19 – 14 to 15.  The clear intent of the plaintiffs-appellants was to repair both walkways, not to abandon them.  **Point Four**
[brief] PLAINTIFF'S FORCLOSURE  PURSUANT TO THE IN REM ACT DEVIATED FROM STATUTORY REQUIREMENT AND THE RULES OF COURT AND WAS DISQUALIFIED IN THE USE OF AN ACCELERATED PROCESS AND IS VOID AND NO EFFECT.  (Raised below T7-20 to 15-18)  The Defendant challenges the right of Plaintiff to have pursued the foreclosure under the Abandoned Property Rehabilitation Act, N.J.SA 55:19-78, 83 and accelerated its foreclosure under N.J. S. A. 54:5-86(b).
[brief] ” (internal quotation omitted)).  The State’s other contention\(^3\) regarding third-party guilt confuses the standard for admissibility of evidence of third-party guilt with the potential weight that the jury would ultimately accord to that evidence.  Specifically, the State argues that “[e]ven assuming arguendo that [...] had fired shots in an area where [...] was present on some prior occasion, it does not meet the --- \(^2\)  The trial prosecutor proffered that “[...] in his statement doesn’t even know when that happened.  It was some weeks or months before; doesn’t even know the exact date. ” (9T66-7 to 10).  \(^3\)  On appeal, the State has not briefed an argument that it received insufficient notice of defense’s intention to argue third-party guilt, so that issue is waived.  See Sklodowsky v. Lushis, 417 N.J. Super. 648, 657 (App. Div. 2011) (“An issue not briefed on appeal is deemed waived.
[brief] It is an error, and prejudice for evidence of any kind from another case/indictment that has been illegally obtained, to lawfully be used under 404-B or any other lane of admission into a defendant’s trial; [...] was *never offered* a fair trial.  [...] argues that the deal was a *global conditional* plea deal.  [...] asserts that his understanding, that was given by the trial courts (Da 6, box 10, lines 3-9, and by his attorney (Da 6, box 10, lines 9-15, and Da 6, box 11, lines 1-15).  [...] understanding that it was all together (the robbery case and the murder case) and if [...] prevailed on appeal the whole plea and sentence would be reversed, and remanded back to the trial court.  The defendant must stress the courts that [...] would NOT have taken any plea deal, and stress that he was readily willing to go to trial.  Furthermore, sadly on April 19, 2022, at three a.m. in [...], [...] mother was shot in her head and face and [...] younger brother who now suffers from brain damage was shot in his neck and was practically paralyzed.
[brief] Defendant’s Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Attorneys’ Fee Motion ...............................  Pa91*  * R. 2:6-1(a)(2) allows a party to submit relevant portions of briefs submitted to the trial court if the question of whether the issue was raised in the trial court is germane to the appeal.  That is the case here and counsel has only attached relevant portions of Defendant’s trial briefs.  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS, AND RULINGS
[directive] d.  (1)  Except as provided in paragraph (2) of this subsection, a person is guilty of a crime of the fourth degree if that person purposely or knowingly violates any provision in an order entered under the provisions of P.L.2015, c.147 (C.2C:14-13 et al.) or an order entered under the provisions of a substantially similar statute under the laws of another state or the United States when the conduct which constitutes the violation could also constitute a crime or a disorderly persons offense.