ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] INTERNAL AFFAIRS POLICY & PROCEDURES | August 2020  5.1.4  The supervisor or other officer receiving the complaint shall complete the appropriate internal affairs report form.  The report form should have adequate instructions for proper completion.  Attached to this directive as Appendix B is a standardized statewide public complaint form that will be available in multiple languages in electronic format on the Attorney General’s website.  Agencies shall make available to complainants versions of the standardized form in all of those languages in their offices and, if the agency has a website, online.  5.1.5  Upon receipt of an internal affairs complaint, the internal affairs investigator can advise the complainant of the importance of providing accurate and truthful information.  However, when providing such advice, internal affairs investigators must remember that it is important to balance the need for receiving complaints of officer misconduct against the danger of discouraging members of the public from coming forward with their complaints.  Therefore, any language that would serve to dissuade or intimidate a member of the public from coming forward should be avoided.  Accordingly, at no point during the initial intake of a complaint should any officer affirmatively warn a complainant that consequences could potentially result from making misrepresentations or a false report.  This does not preclude officers from explaining the potential consequences of false reports to complainants if the officer is specifically asked about this.  5.1.6
[brief] It is required to interpret in a manner that is consonant with the statutory purpose and that does not produce an absurd or nonsensical result.  The Court finds that the plain, ordinary meaning of the term “notes”, as used in this statutory definition, encompasses a debt obligation arising—as here—from an underlying credit card account.  A dictionary definition of “note” is a “written promise to pay a debt. ”  Note, *MERRIAM-WEBSTER* . . .  An open-ended credit card agreement of the type [...] and its predecessor assignees acquired is such a written promise to pay a debt.  But the statute captures within the definitions of “consumer lender” and “consumer loan business” a wide range of other participants in consumer lending.
[brief] Defendants to pay for all of [...]’s attorneys’ fees since the July 2016 decision, stating:  The Court has determined that the defendants must pay for plaintiff’s attorney’s fees and costs reasonably incurred by plaintiff with respect to plaintiff’s efforts – defensively and offensively – regarding security to be posted pending appeal.  However, the court does not agree that the defendants can at this stage of the proceedings be made to pay for all attorney’s fees and costs incurred by plaintiff since the July, 2016 decision in seeking to collect on the judgment that was entered following the July decision.  Attorney’s fees and costs incurred in collection efforts must accordingly be backed out.  [Da156 (emphasis added, except the emphasis of the word “collect,” which was originally provided by [...] in his letter decision on [...]’s fee application)].
[brief] T1, 103:12-19.  In 2011, he joined the Southern Analysis Survey Team and then later became a member of the Cellular Analysis Survey Team in Atlantic City.  T1, 104:4-16.  [...] said that as part of his training, he received instruction from [...].  T1, 107:8-15.  As part of his training from [...], [...] testified that he was taught by [...] how to use per call measurement data.  T1, 111:12-18.  He described [...]’s use of PCMD as follows:
[brief] ”  Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 341 (1997).  See also Mynster, at 480 (“Words, phrases, and clauses cannot be viewed in isolation; all the parts of a statute must be read to give meaning to the whole of the statute. ”).  This is so because, “oftentimes the ‘meaning—or ambiguity—of certain words or phrases may only become evident when placed in context. ’”  King v. Burwell, 576 U.S. 473, 474 (2015).
[directive] Investigators must recuse from cases where they have a conflict of interest that may prevent them from being impartial in the investigation of a subject officer.  One example is if the investigator and the officer are family members or close personal friends.  Additionally, agencies should ensure, if feasible, that the initial investigator of a subject officer is not an officer who is a supervisor within the subject officer’s chain of command.  In rare cases, this requirement may prove difficult to fulfill because an agency is particularly small.  4.2.7  Under no circumstances may a law enforcement agency’s internal affairs investigatory function be contracted or delegated to a private entity.  Instead, when necessary, law enforcement agencies may request that an internal affairs complaint be investigated directly by the County Prosecutor, who shall determine whether to investigate the matter, refer the matter to the Internal Affairs function of another law enforcement entity, or return the matter to the originating law enforcement agency if the County Prosecutor determines that the original agency can appropriately investigate the matter.
[brief] **STATEMENT OF PROCEDURAL HISTORY**  In August 2018, [...] filed an application to the Zoning Board for a determination as per N.J.S.A. 40:55D-68 as to the legality of the [...] off-site parking facility/use of [...]’s Lot 5 property (Da7-28).  After a hearing on October 15, 2018 (1T)\(^1\), the Zoning Board by Resolution determined the [...] Lot 8 parking use of [...] Lot 5 was not a permitted use currently and had not been demonstrated to be a legally valid or approved non-conforming use (Da1).  [...] filed a timely Complaint to the Law Division challenging that determination (Da89).  After an Amended Complaint was filed (Da112), Answers were duly filed by [...] (Da152), the [...] (Da160), and [...] (Da128).  The case was delayed due to the ongoing then pending Appeal of the Chancery Court Opinion/Order that the Synagogue had an Easement for this parking use.  A Motion filed in April of 2019 (Da177-194) by [...] sought to bar proposed new Exhibits proposed by the Synagogue in Pre-Trial --- \(^1\)  Transcript references are as follows: 1T Transcript of [...] Zoning [...] Hearing on N.J.S.A. 40:55D-68 Application; 2T Transcript of Motion Hearing on Defendant School’s Motion in Limine, Order entered June 2, 2022 (Da224); and 3T Transcript of Trial consisting of Oral Argument on record – September 22, 2022. submissions (Da171) that were not in the record before the Zoning Board.  That Motion was orally argued on May 24, 2019 (2T); however, the Order denying the Motion was belatedly entered on June 2, 2022 (Da214).  Consequently, an extensive number of documents/exhibits not before the Zoning Board were submitted by the Synagogue and considered by the Trial Court (See Da215-218) although the Trial Court never specified which documents it considered.  The case came before the Trial Court on September 12, 2022 for Oral Argument (3T) presumably on the record before the Zoning Board (Da7-88) (Da195-213), the additional Exhibits submitted by the Synagogue (Da195-213) and new Exhibits submitted by [...] to rebut certain claims (Da219-261).  The Court rendered a written Opinion/Order on December 1, 2022 invalidating the Zoning Board determination (Da270).  This Appeal was filed timely (Da289).
[brief] Respondent’s motion to dismiss was granted.  On September 29, 2022, Respondent filed a motion for sanctions (Pa73).  Appellant filed an opposition and respondent filed a reply to the opposition.  On October 10, 2022, Appellant filed a cross motion to vacate the dismissal and file an amended complaint after receiving letters of administration for his mother’s estate (Pa83).  Respondent filed a reply (Pa105).  On October 21, 2022, the trial court heard oral arguments and granted Respondent’s motion for sanctions (Pa110).  The trial court denied Appellant’s cross motions.  On November 10, 2022, the parties signed a modified consent order (Pa113).  The consent order was never signed by the lower court, due to Appellant’s withdrawal of his consent.  On November 15, 2022, Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal (Pa116).  On January 9, 2023, the Appellate Division dismissed the appeal sua sponte, as Appellant had not sought leave to appeal (Pa123).  Respondent filed another motion seeking additional sanctions which was granted on February 28, 2023 (Pa169).  On March 10, 2023, Appellant motioned to have the appeal reinstated which was granted on April 10, 2023 (Pa171).  On April 19, 2023, Appellant filed an amended Notice of Appeal and Case Information Statement (Pa173).  On February 13, 2024, the appeal was reactivated (Pa185).
[brief] The decision of an administrative agency will be reversed by a reviewing court only when the agency's decision is arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable or not supported by substantial credible evidence in the record as a whole.  *Denner v. Bd. of Educ. of Passaic Cty. Regional High Sch.*, 131 N.J. 626, 641 (1993), *Henry v. Rahway State Prison*, 81 N.J. 571,580 (1980).
[brief] Plaintiffs’ claim for attorneys’ fees does not fall within any recognized basis under New Jersey law, and Plaintiffs’ attempt to base their claim on “the interests of equity” and alleged “shenanigans” is not consistent with New Jersey law and would be precedent that would lead to claims for attorneys’ fees in virtually every case in New Jersey.  Likewise, Plaintiffs’ claim for punitive damages fails to meet the high threshold for such a claim required under New Jersey law.  Accepting as true all of the evidence in the motion record proffered in support of Plaintiffs’ claims for such damages, the trial court found that Plaintiffs had not demonstrated a sufficient basis on which to seek such damages.  The trial court’s decision was neither incorrect nor an abuse of discretion, and should be upheld.
[brief] Ex. B: Thomasian v. N.J. Inst. of Tech., 2009 WL 260791 (D.N.J. Feb. 3, 2009) | Cases | Page | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., | 16 | | 477 U.S. 242 (1986) | | | Bhagat v. Bhagat, | 16 | | 217 N.J. 22 (2014) | | | Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., | 15 | | 142 N.J. 520 (1995) | | | Brunson v. Affinity Fed. Credit Union, | 23 | | 199 N.J. 381 (2009) | | | Burks v. United States, | 26, 27, 28 | | 437 U.S. 1 (1978) | | | Cabakov v. Thatcher, | 20 | | 27 N.J. Super. 404 (App. Div. 1953) | | | Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, | 16 | | 477 U.S. 317 (1986) | | | Cowell v. Palmer Twp., | 20 | | 263 F.3d 286 (3d Cir. 2001) | | | DeBenedictis v. State, | 34 | | 381 N.J. Super. 233 (App. Div. 2005) | | | Do-Wop Corp. v. City of Rahway, | 32 | | 168 N.J. 191 (2001) | | | Earl v. Winne, | 20 | | 14 N.J. 119 (1953) | | | Est. of Smith v. Marasco, | 23 | | 318 F.3d 497 (3d Cir. 2003) | | | Estate of Lagano v. Bergen Cnty. Prosecutor’s Off, | 18 | | 769 F.3d 850 (3d Cir. 2014) | | | Genty v. Resol. Tr. Corp., | 22 | | 937 F.2d 899 (3d Cir. 1991) | | | Gilborges v. Wallace, | 13 | | 153 N.J. Super. 121 (App. Div. 1997) | | Greene v. Massey, 437 U.S. 19 (1978) ........................................................................................................... 26, 27, 28 H.C. Equities, LP v. Cnty. of Union, 247 N.J. 366 (2021) .............................................................................................................. 30 Hayes v. Delamotte, 231 N.J. 373 (2018) .............................................................................................................. 32 Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994) .............................................................................................................. 24, 26 Helmy v. City of Jersey City, 178 N.J. 183 (2003) .............................................................................................................. 23 In re Carton, 48 N.J. 9 (1966) .................................................................................................................... 33 Johnson v. Knorr, 477 3d. 75 (3d Cir. 2007) ..................................................................................................... 23 Judson v. Peoples Bank & Tr. Co. of Westfield, 17 N.J. 67 (1954) .................................................................................................................. 16 Land v. Helmer, 843 F.Supp.2d 547 (D.N.J. 2012) ......................................................................................... 24 Lanzet v. Greenberg, 126 N.J. 168 (1991)
[brief] ”  Ibid. (quoting State v. Brown, 170 N.J. 138, 147 (2001)).  The "decision whether to admit a prior conviction for purposes of attacking the credibility of a witness rests within the sound discretion of the trial court."  *State v. Leonard*, 410 N.J. Super. 182, 187-88 (App. Div. 2009).  A trial court’s “discretion is a broad one.  . . .  Ordinarily evidence of prior convictions should be admitted.  . . ”  *Id.* at 441 (quoting *State v. Sands*, 76 N.J. 127, 144 (1978)).  This is in keeping with the precept that, “Our Evidence Rules generally promote admissibility of all relevant evidence, *N.J.R.E.* 402, and ‘evince a more expansive approach to the admission of evidence. ’”  *Ibid.* (quoting *Muhammad*, 359 N.J. Super. at 388).  Given this Court’s deferential standard of review, defendant cannot show the trial judge abused his discretion in admitting defendant’s sanitized convictions should he have testified.
[brief] ¹  A trial was held before the Hon. [...], J.S.C. [...] was acquitted of first-degree murder, but the jury found him guilty of passion/provocation manslaughter, as well as the remaining offenses.  (Da5-7; 6T5-11 to 6-10).  At the initial sentencing, the Court merged Count 2 (possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose) and Count 4 (aggravated assault) into the ¹  The following abbreviations are used:
[brief] This issue was not an issue that was before the appellate court or the trial court at any time in the previous pleadings for [...]’s case and was the reason for the filing of the motion for reconsideration that was denied and appealed here.  The appellate division since the time of the Tyler decision has been remanding cases back to the trial courts to rule on pending/pipeline cases in light of the Tyler decision.  The trial court denied the motion for reconsideration because the court stated:  “I do not believe that this court has the authority or the jurisdiction to modify and/or vacate the findings of the appellate division. ”  (1M18-12)  The appellate division however did not enter findings related to the Tyler mandate and only addressed that the trial court did not make an error in its ruling entered prior to the Tyler case, i.e. the trial court’s January 7, 2022 order and the February 18, 2022 order denying the previous motion for reconsideration.  Therefore, the trial court would not have been vacating the findings of the appellate division by ruling on the March 5, 2024 motion for reconsideration.  filed after [...] learned that the judgment in his case was actually unconstitutional and state governments were federally barred by entering such judgments before his appellate decision was entered.
[brief] In relevant part, the email reads:  Re: Plan Board Reso.  Please be sure to send me your draft [...] Reso asap, so I can review your’s.  Re: The extra 10 units for Bldg E.  We’ve drafted a proposed Amendment to Settlement Agreement which is attached for your review.  We’d like to get this in front of the Planning Board at the same time as the [...] Reso, then send it over to the Council.  The Agreement is ‘short and sweet’ and contains the proposed revised zoning ordinance.  . . .
[brief] If Respondent’s argument that sponsoring a Bill would preclude a judge from sitting on a case that involved the statute that was promulgated by that Bill, it would create chaos.  [...] sponsored Assembly Bills Nos. 782 and 4134, which involved an increase and clarification of the effective dates of awards for hand and feet claims in workers’ compensation cases.  (See copy of Bills at Pa18-21).  According to Respondent’s argument in the present case, [...] sponsorship of the hands & feet bills, that were passed into law, would mean that she should recuse herself from any workers’ compensation case involving a hand or a foot!  [...]’s reasoning in denying the motion for recusal was based on Rules of the Court, the Code on Judicial Conduct, and the applicable case law and there is no factual or legal basis for supporting a recusal in this matter.  CONCLUSION  The decision of the Workers’ Compensation Judge, denying the Recusal Motion should be affirmed.
[brief] [...] argues that the ALJ and the Commissioner’s decisions are in error because of the lack of formality of the Department’s disapproval letter.  (Ab15).  [...]’s chief complaint is that the Department’s December 2021 letter, which stated that the rate requests “remained disapproved,” did not explicitly use the word “excessive” and that the disapproval was based on a completely different rationalization.  (Ab16-17).  [...]’s position elevates form over substance.  1.  **The Department’s Disapproval Letters Adequately State the Grounds for the Department’s Determination.**  As required by N.J.A.C. 11:4-34.18, the Department’s decision was informed by the review of all information and data [...] submitted via SERFF.  [...]’s premium rate increase filings triggered the Department’s authority to review whether or not [...] submitted “sufficient information for review and approval of the premium rate schedule increase by the Commissioner.
[brief] (A15).  [...] received the benefit of her bargain in the March 18, 2015 Final Judgment Divorce (and related agreements).  She admitted so under oath in a deposition in another case one year later:  \begin{quote}  A:  WE ARE NOW STILL FRIENDS.  WE’RE DIVORCED, I ASK WHAT I WANT, I GOT WHAT I WANT AND THAT’S IT.  [Pa30, Pl’s. Trial Ex. P-19, Def. Dep. at 59:19- 21, Mar. 23, 2016 (EMPHASIS added)].  \end{quote}
[brief] The Removal Proceedings Against [...]  [...] was employed by the [...] as an assistant prosecutor for over 15 years prior to her appointment as a Superior Court judge in 2008.  October 24, 2017 Presentment, In re Liliana DeAvila-[...], [...] ("ACJC")  Docket No.: [...] ("ACJC Presentment").  In 2010, [...] became the Presiding Judge of the Criminal Part of the Bergen County Vicinage of the Superior Court.
[brief] LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I COUNSEL FOR RESPONDENT  LACKED A GOOD FAITH BASIS UPON WHICH TO ARGUE THAT PEARSON WAS INVOLVED IN AN INCIDENT OR ACCIDENT IN 2009 BASED ON THE TOTALITY OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES.  (Pa103-Pa106).  One of the most important tenets of New Jersey Jurisprudence is that an attorney must have a good faith basis in order to ask questions of a witness at trial or make legal arguments to a tribunal.  As described by the Appellate Division:  [I]n putting questions to witnesses it is improper and unprofessional for an attorney to allude to prejudicial irrelevancies and matters which he has no reason to believe will be supported by admissible evidence.  Matter of Ungar, 160 N.J.Super. 322, 331 (App. Div. 1978).  (Emphasis added).  In the case at bar, in his exceptions to [...]’s ID, counsel for Respondent did not have a good faith basis to allege that [...] was involved in an incident or an accident in 2009.  (Pa95-Pa101).
[brief] Plaintiff minimally had to set forth a *prima facie* case as to any members advanced herein and who allegedly suffered discrimination in this regard since, as set forth above, “the determination of whether an employer has failed to make reasonable accommodation will be made on a case-by-case basis. ”  If such instances did exist, Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint, like its predecessor, failed to satisfy the most basic of notice pleading requirements and deprived the [...] of the ability to effectively respond and defend against such allegations.  See R. 4:5-2 ("a pleading which sets forth a claim for relief...shall contain a statement of the facts on which the claim is based, showing that the pleader is entitled to relief"); Hoffman, 405 N.J. Super. at 112; Rieder, 221 N.J. Super. at 552; Spence-Parker, 656 F. Supp.2d at 505; Scheidt v. DRS Tech., Inc., 424 N.J. Super. 188, 193 (App. Div. 2012).
[brief] In the years since the agreed-upon, special-master recommended, and court-ordered settlement with [...], [...] has refused to even consider redeveloper’s application for the off-site units.  While the court found violations of other components of the judgment by [...] and appointed an implementation monitor, it denied any relief on the off-site units.  The 2019 judgment is clear on [...]’s affordable housing obligations; the Borough’s violations of the off-site component are uncontested; and the court should have imposed a remedy.  Its failure to do so was error.
[brief] *State v. Gentry*, 183 N.J. 30, 33 (2005).  The failure to properly instruct jurors as to unanimity leaves the door open for an unacceptable “patchwork verdict” and requires reversal of a defendant’s convictions.  *State v. Tindell*, 417 N.J. Super. 530, 551 (App. Div. 2011).  Although a general unanimity instruction is usually sufficient to ensure a unanimous jury verdict, in certain cases a more-specific instruction on unanimity is required.  For example, in *Frisby*, the general unanimity instruction was deficient because “[d]ifferent theories were advanced based on different acts and entirely different events” in the State’s case for endangering the welfare of a child.
[brief] The letters read:  Yo, [...], I need you to chill.  I knew you'd be mad at me, that's why I didn't tell you.  They still don't have anything crazy.  I know that if you think anything crazy, let me know.  I told you I will take a 15 and free you.  You're not going to have to wear this with me.  Don't get paranoid.  It's been almost ten months, I still ain't implicate no one.  It's going to stay that way.  We'll talk face-to-face, but real shit, on my mom, no reason for not telling you had nothing to do with the case.  It was just I didn't want you to be mad at me.  (Da 56; 10T 27-12 to 27-24)
[brief] One Gatehall Drive, Suite 103 Parsippany, New Jersey  07054 [...]  [...]  On the Brief: [...]  ID# [...]  Date Submitted: November 22, 2024 (representing presently unknown health care providers or health care providers with regard to which negligence is not presently suspected, including but not limited to doctors, surgeons, emergency medicine doctors, anesthesiologists, hospitalists, physician assistants, nurses, nurse practitioners, nurse anesthetists, technicians, and others); and [...] (representing presently unknown facilities or entities who rendered care to the plaintiff who deviated from the standard of care or facilities or entities with regard to which negligence is not presently suspected), Defendants-Respondents.
[brief] The benchmarks for finding consistency with the Highlands Act, and specifically addressing exemptions, are provided at N.J.A.C. 7:38-1.1(i) and (j).  These regulations are in addition to those expressly listed at N.J.A.C. 7:38-9.2 or 9.5 and N.J.A.C. 7:38-11.2, 11.3, and 11.7, as required for the DEP to make the requisite consistency determinations as set forth by the DEP’s regulations that implement the WQMA, at N.J.A.C. 7:15-3.2.  Therefore, the regulatory web, or layered approach, to consistency determinations under both the WQMA and the Highlands Act, ought to persuade this Court that absolutely no stone is allowed to be left unturned in the administrative record here, including information about changes in stormwater runoff from climate change, TMDLs, and potential impacts to sensitive water bodies.
[brief] [...]’s claim that testimony on the Hackensack Project, “spanned seven separate hearing days” [[...]’s App. Br. at 40 n.2] is not supported by any citation to supporting proof in the record.  There is none.  The only issue before the Arbitrator in the PTA Arbitration was the amount of the Hackensack Project’s EGP and whether, pursuant to the terms of the PTA, [...] owed [...] any further payments toward that amount.