ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] Director TO: ALL COUNTY PROSECUTORS  ALL MUNICIPAL PROSECUTORS FROM: [...], ATTORNEY GENERAL SUBJECT: ATTORNEY GENERAL  GUIDELINE: PROSECUTION OF DWI & REFUSAL VIOLATIONS  DATE: January 24, 2005  8,1  Section 3 of P.L.2004, chapter included a provision that the Attorney General shall promulgate guidelines concerning the prosecution of DWI and DWI refusal violations.  The Legislative purpose for these Guidelines is “to promote the uniform enforcement of [the DWI and refusal statutes.]”  Therefore, pursuant to P.L.2004, c.8, §3, and the authority granted to the Attorney General of the State of New Jersey by the Criminal Justice Act of 1970, N.J.S.A. 52:17B-97 et seq., and N.J.S.A. 2B:12-27, the following Guidelines are issued to All County and Municipal Prosecutors for the Prosecution of DWI and Refusal Violations.
[directive] Fitness for Duty  2.4.1  One of the areas that often involves internal affairs is an employee's fitness for duty.  This is not exclusively an internal affairs issue; an officer's fitness may be impacted for reasons other than misconduct.  For instance, an officer may become unfit for duty because of a medical problem unrelated to the job.  There are occasions, however, when internal affairs may be called upon to assist in determining whether or not an officer is fit for duty.  2.4.2  It is incumbent upon a law enforcement agency to ensure that its members are fit to safely and effectively perform the duties of their profession.  If, for whatever reason, an officer's fitness for duty is questioned, the agency must have the officer evaluated by competent professionals to answer that question.  If a law enforcement executive, commander, supervisor or internal affairs investigator has reasonable concerns about an officer’s fitness for duty, they are obligated to begin the process necessary to obtain that evaluation.
[directive] Printed on Recycled Paper and is Recyclable Page 2 for the general supervision of the County Prosecutors by the Attorney General as chief law enforcement officer of the State.  THEREFORE, I, [...], Attomey General, pursuant to the authority granted to the Attorney General of the State of New Jersey by the Criminal Justice Act of 1970, N.J.S.A. 52:17B-97 hereby issue the attached Guidelines to all County Prosecutors, Police Chiefs and Law et seq., Enforcement Chief Executives in the State of New Jersey, to be applied in accordance with the terms of this Directive:  1.  Adoption of Guidelines  The attached to this Directive "Attorney General Guidelines for the Retention of Evidence" and incorporated by reference into this Directive are formally adopted, with the purpose of providing the basis for procedures to be established to govern the retention of evidence in criminal cases throughout the State of New Jersey by law enforcement agencies.  2.  Implementation  Each County Prosecutor’s Office shall develop and follow its own Evidence Destruction Authorization Policy and Procedures, in accordance with the attached Guidelines, which shall include procedures to be followed both for evidence held by the County Prosecutor’s Office and for evidence being held by local law enforcement agencies within the jurisdiction.  3.  Questions and Controversies  Questions regarding the content of this Directive or the interpretation, implementation or utilization of these Guidelines should be addressed to the [...], [...], at [...].  Page 3 4.  Effective Date  This Law Enforcement Directive shall take effect immediately and shall remain in force and effect, unless and until repealed, amended or superseded by order of the Attorney General.  ~  Given under my hand and seal, this ( day of January, in the year Two Thousand and Eleven, and of the Independence of the United States, the Two [...]
[brief] And defendant raised the factual predicate of [...]’ habeas petition as part of his amended first PCR petition, as demonstrated by this table:  |  September 29, 2021  Brief in Further Support of Amended First PCR Petition (Pa172) |  [...] testified that in 2008, he filed with the Federal District Court for the District of New Jersey a Petition for Habeas Corpus  .  . . .  The Habeas Petition was handwritten by [...] and signed under penalty of perjury, affirming that the petition and everything included in the petition was true and correct.  [...] argued in the petition that he had no knowledge of the Staten Island robbery and kidnapping of [...] (the first of the three home invasions he [and [...]] were convicted of).  | | --- | --- | ---  10  Again, the State submits that this is a mischaracterization of the content of [...]’ habeas petition.  November 1, 2021  Reply Brief in Support of Amended First PCR Petition (Pa184-85)  [...] is a witness who is not worthy of belief.  . . .  He lied to a Federal District Court Judge in his Habeas Petition.  . . . .  [T]he State recognizes that [...] perjured himself before the [United States] District Court for the District of New Jersey in relation to this case and that this was the “sharpest line of attack” against [...] and the conviction.  . . .  Indeed, the State was aware of the perjured statement but, most significantly, did not produce the statement to Mr. [...] before his trial.  January 11, 2022 Brief in Support of Second PCR Petition (Pa197)  Here, one year prior to Petitioner’s trial, the State obtained the sworn Petition for Habeas Corpus of Edwin [...] wherein [...] affirmed that he had no knowledge of the Staten Island robbery and kidnapping of [...].  . . .  Indeed, the State opposed [...]’s Habeas Petition.  As much as defendant seeks to obfuscate his prior PCR claims and the prior decisions of this Court, defendant cannot change the procedural history of this case.
[brief] To that end, N.J.S.A. 39:6A-5.1 and its implementing subchapter N.J.A.C. 11:3-5.1 and 5.2 provided for the Commissioner of Banking and Insurance to establish a forum for the resolution of “a dispute concerning the payment of medical expenses and other benefits provided by the personal injury protection coverage in policies of automobile insurance. ”  N.J.A.C. 11:3-5.1(a)  “The goal of PIP is to provide prompt medical treatment for those who have been injured in automobile accidents without having that treatment delayed because of payment disputes. ”  Selective v. Hudson East, 210 N.J. 597, 609 (2012).
[brief] I.  STANDARD OF REVIEW  The interpretation of a contract is subject to de novo review by an appellate court.  See Kieffer, 205 N. J. at 222-23.  II.  THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY DENIED OLD REPUBLIC’S MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES (Pa688; T5)  The trial court incorrectly denied [...]’s motion for an award of attorneys’ fees by ignoring the plain and unambiguous language of the PSA and relying on cases that applied the law of other jurisdictions inconsistent with New Jersey law and/or that are factually distinguishable from this case.
[brief] Rather, it is “apparent [that] the purpose of the motion is for the movant to express disagreement with the Court’s initial decision,” because defendant simply “recapitulates the arguments or cases” that were already considered and rejected\(^4\) by the trial court.  D'Atria, 242 N.J. Super. at 401-02.  \(^4\) Compare (Db48-Db50) with (Ca137-Ca139).  The trial court first considered whether its decision was based on a “palpably incorrect or irrational” basis and found that defendant failed to point to “anything that [the court] did nor did [the court] hear any argument today that would persuade that I was palpably incorrect or irrational concerning that decision.
[directive] A Order 1 - Mandating  First Post-Acquittal Psychiatric Evaluation as to the NGRI Acquittee's Dangerousness  Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:4-8 * * *  This order ([...]) is to be used to obtain the first post-acquittal psychiatric 1 evaluation required by N.J.S.A. 2C:4-8(a) and State v. Krol, 68 N.J. 236 (1975).  Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:4-8(a) the acquittee shall undergo a psychiatric of examination by a psychiatrist the prosecutor's choosing.  of  In cases where the Department Health is to provide the psychiatrist, this order of may be used.  For the examination to occur by a psychiatrist in the Department of Not Health the Guilty by Reason Insanity (NGRI) acquittee will need to be of of committed to one the State psychiatric hospitals for the purposes observation and evaluation, and to provide the court with an opinion as to current dangerousness and recommendations for disposition.  N.J.S.A. 2C:4-8(b) requires that the psychiatric evaluation provide an opinion as to whether the NGRI of if acquittee is dangerous to self, others or property as a result mental illness and so, whether the acquittee requires inpatient hospitalization or can be managed in the community with or without clinical conditions.  of  This order requires the prosecutor to provide the Office the Court Coordinator at of the designated State hospital with a copy the court order and the examining psychiatrist with discovery in the matter.  If the examination is to be done by the State, there will be a need to transfer the if acquittee to the institution so that the examination can proceed the acquittee is not already in a State psychiatric hospital.  Medical clearance will need to be of coordinated with the Department Health prior to an admission into a State psychiatric hospital and this order so provides.  1 of State  Krol states that "Following acquittal by reason insanity, the defendant may, at the v. of of request the State, be confined in a suitable mental institution for a period 60 days for observation and examination."  68 N.J. at 256.  See also N.J.S.A. 2C:4-8(a) for a NGRI acquittee who is unwilling to participate in the examination, and citing to N.J.S.A. 2C:4-5( c ), which provides for the court to commit such persons for observation for a period not exceeding 30 days on except on good cause shown; N.J.S.A. 2C:4-9(a) provides for the examination and report the NGRI committee's discharge or release on conditions to be provided to the court within 30 days, "or such longer period as the court determines to be necessary."  Attorney Name ----------- NJ
[brief] PROCEDURAL HISTORY ..................................................  4  STATEMENT OF FACTS ..................................................  5  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I  THE TRIAL COURT’S STATEMENT OF REASONS FAILED TO CONFORM WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF RULE 1:7-4 .............................................................  6 (Pa82)  POINT II  PLAINTIFF’S CHALLENGE TO ORDINANCE 1394-20 SHOULD BE PERMITTED TO PROCEED ALTHOUGH FILED OUT OF TIME .................................................................  10 (NOT RAISED BELOW)  POINT III THE OPMA REQUIRES PUBLIC BODIES TO ACT IN GOOD FAITH IN COMPLYING WITH ITS NOTICE  OBLIGATIONS ............................................................ 12 (Pa82)  POINT IV THE "LAW OF THE CASE" DOCTRINE IS INAPPLICABLE TO INTERLOCUTORY ORDERS .................................. 16 (NOT RAISED BELOW)  CONCLUSION .............................................................. 19  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE ENTERED JANUARY 24, 2022 ............ 23a ORDER VACATING TEMPORARY RESTRAINTS ENTERED JANUARY 27, 2022 ............................................. 29a ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE ENTERED MARCH 4, 2022 ...........................................
[brief] A584, A589.  Statement of Facts  The parties met in 2002-2003, while defendant was working as a casino dealer and plaintiff was a well-known high roller.  Plaintiff was 58 years old.  He was an attorney\(^1\) and real estate developer in addition to his professional poker playing, and a multi-millionaire (stating he had a net worth of about $30 million when the parties married in 2004, 17T28:8-11).  Defendant was 32 years old.  She immigrated from Vietnam when she was 11 and learned to speak English as she moved through school in Pennsylvania.  She had been working in the casino industry since 1992.  Though separated in age by many years and half a world, the pair quickly fell in love.  Defendant left her job and moved to Maryland to live with plaintiff in his home.  They lived a lavish lifestyle and were constant companions, formally marrying on September 7, 2004 and working together in all aspects of their lives.  The couple’s partnership included various real estate and business ventures that plaintiff was pursuing – one of which was a major project called the Reserves, in Delaware.  [...] handled all legal issues and development plans for the project, while [...] did the office work and physically cared for the properties.  --- \(^1\)  In or around 1988, plaintiff was suspended from practicing law in Maryland for allegedly forcing firefighter clients to sign Powers of Attorney that increased plaintiff’s contingency interest in their claims to 75 percent.  17T14:4-16:25.  The parties also executed reciprocal wills, and [...] executed a durable power of attorney naming her husband as her attorney in fact.  Some assets that [...] held before the parties’ marriage were transferred to [...], or to holding companies (such as [...] and [...]) which were in [...]’s name ([...] so noted: “The court finds the transfer of assets to defendant, STL and [...] as part of the asset protection plan made these assets part of the marital estate,” Op43).  This included property at [...]; Lot 6 in Ocean View, Delaware; 105 lots from the Reserves development; property at [...]; and about five to eight million dollars in cash.  A427.  By 2012, however, things took a downturn.  [...] was failing.  [...] individually, and [...], filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy in December 2012, which the bankruptcy judge converted to Chapter 7 in July 2013 (after finding [...] not credible; the assigned bankruptcy trustee initiated fraudulent transfer charges in the case, A241).  **The events leading to the 2015 Judgment of Divorce**
[brief] See Wanaque Borough Sewerage Auth. v. Township of West Milford, 144 N.J. 564, 575 (1996).  Defendants do not seriously argue that they are entitled to a jury trial on these claims for restitution.  In Count Three, Plaintiffs assert a cause of action under the Fraud Act.  In accordance with the equitable goals of the Fraud Act, Count Three’s ad damnum clause states that Plaintiffs seek the entry of a judgment “Awarding [...] and [...] compensatory damages . . . in an amount equal to all PIP medical services benefits [...] and [...] paid.  . . .”  See Count Three, ad damnum clause, ¶(g) at Da 70a.  [...] also seeks treble damages and attorney’s fees as permitted by the Fraud Act.  Thus, [...]’s claim for relief in Count Three is, essentially, for statutory disgorgement and other damages as permitted by the Fraud Act.  The Legislature has specifically stated that the remedies available under the Fraud Act are equitable in nature.
[brief] ”  (T3, 53:1-3)  This conclusion is not an error of law as Subsection 5(b) of the LRHL requires that a property exhibit “significant vacancies of [a] building or buildings for at least two consecutive years” in order to be properly designated as an area in need of redevelopment.  N.J. Stat. Ann. § 40A:12A-5(b).  The trial court looked at the evidence in the record showing that the Property had been leased and used by the tenant for storage and determined that this evidence did not support a finding of “significant vacancy”.
[brief] ........................................................................ 35  #  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | Cases | Page | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | **Aldrich Nine Associates vs. Foot Locker** | | | Speciality Inc. | 28 | | 2005 WL 3005715 (App. Div. 2005) | | | (unpublished) | | | **Anderson vs. Liberty Lobby, Inc.** | 14 | | 477 U.S. 242, 251-52 (1986) | | | **Association Group Life, Inc. vs. Catholic War Veterans** | 25 | | 120 N.J. Super. 85, 95 (App. Div. 1971) | | | **Associated Realties Corp vs. Million Dollar Pier, etc., Co.** | 19 | | 6 N.J. Super. 369 (App. Div. 1950) | | | **Balsham vs. Koffler** | 19 | | 8 N.J. Super. 48 (App. Div. 1950) | | | **Barila vs. Bd. of Education** | 26, 27| | 241 N.J. 595, 616 (2020) | | | **Branch vs. Cream-O-Land Dairy** | 14 | | 244 N.J. 567, 582 (2021) | | | **Brill vs. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am.** | 14, 15| | 142 N.J. 540, 523 (1995) | | | **Calcaterra vs. Calcaterra** | 34 | | 206 N.J. Super. 398, 403-404 | | | App. Div. 1986) | | Center 48 Ltd. Partnership vs. May Dept. Stores Co. ...........................................
[brief] In pre-filed written testimony [...] claimed that the current regulator presented very serious safety and service issues and the proposed combustion fired regulator was essential to avoid these consequences.  The same [...] witnesses conceded on cross-examination that these claims were overblown and inaccurate, and that the current regulator presented no safety or reliability issues.  The ID and the [...] found these conflicting testimonies “credible,” which is arbitrary and capricious, based not on the complete record but only on the carefully lawyered written testimony.  Both testimonies cannot be credible.  The ID and [...] expressly declined to comply with the State’s climate laws and the 2019 Energy Master Plan, which by law must be applied by the [...] “to the maximum extent practicable and feasible. ”  The climate laws and EMP set out an ambitious and achievable reduction in carbon fueled emissions by 2050, with interim objectives such as prohibiting any new natural gas connections starting in 2025.  The ID and [...] Decision also arbitrarily and capriciously allowed [...] to evade its legal obligation to consider alternatives to its proposed regulator, including continuing the status quo and considering a catalytic regulator.  Here again, the ID and [...] “credited” the written pre-filed testimony about problems with catalytic heaters and ignored and never mentioned the extensive cross-examination which proved the “problems” to be virtually non-existent.  Finally, based on no binding law, the ID and [...] ignored the detailed findings of the [...] on why the [...] proposed regulator was inconsistent with the Township’s zoning and master plan.  Instead of crediting the [...], which by law is charged with being expert on the local conditions and zoning, the ID and [...] credited the paid testimony of an [...] expert.  II.
[brief] 1.  THE SUPERIOR COURT ERRED WHEN IT DECIDED TO IGNORE THE FACTUAL BASIS OF MR. PFEISTER’S CONDITIONAL GUILTY PLEA AT THE MUNICIPAL COURT IN ORDER TO FIND HIM LIABLE FOR VIOLATING N.J. S.A. 23:4-16(d)(1) ON AN ALTERNATIVE GROUND (1T37-1 to 5)  R. 7:6-2(c) authorizes a municipal court to accept a defendant’s conditional guilty plea.  If the defendant is successful on appeal to the Superior Court, the defendant reserves the right to withdraw his guilty plea that was entered at the municipal court.  [...] accepted a conditional plea in order to appeal the municipal court’s denial of his motion to dismiss the citation.  2T17-13 to 15.  The sole issue to be decided in that appeal would be whether the municipal court got it wrong that a pump house is an occupied building under N.J.S.A. 23:4-16(d)(3).  2T17-21 to 25.  Conservation officer [...], on behalf of the State, did not object to the conditional guilty plea being suggested by the municipal court or [...] accepting it.  Municipal prosecutor [...] did not make an appearance on the record at the time of the conditional guilty plea being suggested or [...]’s acceptance of the conditional guilty plea.  In other words, all of the parties and the municipal court agreed to dispose of [...]’s matter by way of a conditional guilty plea with an appeal to the Ocean County Superior Court to decide the sole issue whether a pump house is an occupied building under N.J.S.A. 23:4-16(d)(3).
[brief] “To be sure, we cannot ascribe significant blame to [Defendant] for this failure of notice because neither the Court Rules, as presently written, nor the present case law in our State explicitly requires the doctrine of frustration of purpose to be pleaded as an affirmative defense.  …  … we are loathe to declare that [Defendant] waived these defenses here by omitting them from its responsive pleading, in light of the dearth of precedent mandating such a pleading. ”  J.B Pool Mgmt., LLC v. Four Seasons, 431 N.J. Super. 233, 250-251 (App. Div. 2013).  R. 4:5-4 does not mandate that recoupment or set-off shall be raised in the pleadings.  Defendant, accordingly, was not required to raise the affirmative defense of recoupment or set-off in the pleadings.
[brief] *See Leeder v. Feinstein*, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 108810, 2019 WL 2710794 (D.N.J. June 28, 2019) (dismissing the NJCFA claim where it was not alleged that services were marketed to the public and, thus, it does not fall within the purview of the statute).  Indeed, neither [...] (a debt buyer) nor any of the Respondents engaged in any consumer-facing sales or extended any credit to Plaintiff (or other consumers, for that matter).  (Pa108-109).  In fact, the sole allegation is that “by purchasing and taking assignment of Plaintiff’s account, Defendants acted as “sales finance Compan[ies]” as defined at N.J. Stat. Ann. § 17:16C-1(f). ”  But, no different than *Boyko, Chulsky and Gomez*, the NJCFA does not apply to Respondents.  Thus, the Lower Court correctly held:  And the Court reviewed the Consumer Fraud Act, *N.J.S.A.* 56:8-2.  The Court does not agree with Plaintiff that these actions constitute subsequent performance of a sale of merchandise, notwithstanding that loans can be covered by the C.F.A.  The Court does not find that Plaintiff has alleged that, looking at 56:8-2, the definition of C.F.A. merchandise includes services.  To state a cause-of-action under the U.C.F.A., the Plaintiff must allege the commission of deception, fraud, misrepresentation, et cetera, in connection with the sale of merchandise or services.  (T55-3-15).
[brief] The fee shifting provision contained in the parties’ Operating Agreement provides:  In the event of any suit or action to enforce or interpret any provision of this Agreement (or that is based on this Agreement), the prevailing party is entitled to recover, in addition to other costs, reasonable attorney fees in connection with the suit, action, or arbitration, and in any appeals.  The determination of who is the prevailing party and the amount of reasonable attorney fees to be paid to the prevailing party will be decided by the court or courts, including any appellate courts, in which the matter is tried, heard, or decided.  (Pa15, [...] Operating Agreement at ¶ 10.5).  Defendant’s fee application seeks $6,897.00 for unsuccessfully moving to dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint:  | # | Date | Description | Time Billed | Amount Charged | Subtotal | |---|---------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------|----------------|----------| | 1 | 8/27/20 |  Analyze Fraud and Punitive Damages claims for possible motion on the pleadings.  Research partial Motion to Dismiss based upon . . .  [redacted]  . . .  Review proofs with regard to . . . [redacted] | 2.75 hrs.  | $1,045.00 | $1,045.00 | | 2 | 8/31/20 |  Call with and email to [...].  Draft notice of motion to dismiss count three (common | 3.10 hrs. | $1,178.00 | $2,223.00 | | Date | Task Description | Hours | Rate | Total | |--------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------|-------|--------| | 9/1/20 |  Work on Memorandum of Law and pull case law supporting Plaintiff’s lack of pleading fraud with specificity as required by the Rules of Court.  | 2.8 | $1,064.00 | $3,287.00 | | 9/2/20 |  Finalize Motion to Dismiss Fraud Claim.  Finalize Memorandum of Law supporting the same.  Draft Order.  Draft Certification of Service.  Email counsel.  File the same.  Email counsel.