ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] All officers pursuant to this Directive.b law enforcement charging approvals to timelegal advice and pursuant to this Directive on-call duty attorneys general assigned to assistant prosecutors and deputy shall receive required for on-call duty, and perform the functions experience to sufficient shall have charging approvals may be and Section 14 of Directive.  Advice this in accordance with training of person or means general in by deputy attorneys prosecutors and on-call assistant provided by information contact  Prosecutor shall make communication.  The County or other electronic telephonic Director  The within prosecutor's jurisdiction.  operating the all agencies available to procedures and directly contact the or officer should enforcement agency when a law specify circumstances the may Office.  County Prosecutor's Criminal Justice rather than a Division of 1, 2017. than January operational no later become Section shall This Certain for Prosecutor upon Arrest from On-Ca11 Char i~n~Approval Obtain Requirement to 3.2 Offenses.
[brief] For these reasons, the Board’s final administrative determination denying [...]’s request to file his Eligibility Registration Form for amended benefits approximately one year and one month past the Ricci Act’s statutory deadline should be affirmed.  Respectfully submitted, [...]  ATTORNEY GENERAL OF NEW JERSEY  By: /s/ [...]  [...] (ID 276482018)  Deputy Attorney General  [...]  [...]  Assistant Attorney General Of Counsel  cc: [...], Esq.  June 30, 2024  [...], Clerk Superior Court of New Jersey  Appellate Division  Hughes Justice Complex 25 W. Market Street PO Box 006 Trenton, New Jersey 08625  RE: [...] v. [...]
[brief] [T]here need be shown only a substantial nexus between the injury and the use of the vehicle in order for the obligation to provide coverage to arise.  The inquiry should be whether the negligent act which caused the injury, although not foreseen or expected, was in the contemplation of the parties to the insurance contract a natural and reasonable incident or consequence of the use of the automobile, and this a risk against which they might reasonably expect those insured under the policy would be protected.  Penn, 198 N.J. at 240.  Notably, “[t]he act causing the injury need not be actually foreseen but it must be both a reasonable consequence of the use of an automobile and one against which the parties would expect protection. ”  Lindstrom, 138 N.J. at 250.  PIP benefits have been extended to an insured injured while riding in a tow truck which was transporting his vehicle after an accident as the towing of the insured vehicle constituted a “use” of that vehicle.
[brief] On July 4, 2018, at approximately 3:00 o’clock in the afternoon, [...], then aged 70, was picked up by her friend, [...], and driven to [...] where Ms. Jelken had for some time rented a storage unit.  It had been raining heavily that day, and continued as they arrived at the defendant-respondent’s facility.  (2T78-18; 2T82-15 to 21).  Ms. Castello parked close to the entry door of the lobby which led to the area where Ms. Jeiken’s unit was located.  Ms. Jelken took “only maybe” four steps into the lobby when both of her feet slipped out from under her causing her to fall hard onto the concrete floor.  Ms. Castello who had been to plaintiff-appellant’s right, helped lift Ms. Jelken up from the floor.  Ms. Jelken used her cell phone to call the on-site facility’s manager, [...], to report the accident and asked her to come if possible to the location of the fall.  While they waited for Ms. McLaughlin, Ms. Jelken used her cell phone to take pictures of the area.  Ms. McLaughlin arrived shortly after the call, observed the floor and Ms. Jelken.  (2T51-24 to 55-9; 2T82-17 to 85-16).  Ms. Jelken and her friend proceeded through another door at the rear of the lobby that led to Ms. Jelken’s storage unit.  Ms. Jelken was in the process of emptying her unit and terminating her rental.  They removed some items from the unit to be given to Ms. Castello, and placed them on a cart.  As they exited the facility, they again observed Ms. McLaughlin who told them that she would meet them in the main lobby to prepare a report when she was done showing a storage unit to the two potential customers who were with her.  (2T55-19 to 58-1; 2T2T86-9 to 23).  At these points in the plaintiff’s case, counsel had intended to elicit from Ms. Castello and Ms. Jelken testimony that Ms. McLaughlin had attempted to mop up some of the standing pools of water and had placed a bright yellow cautionary slip-hazard sign.
[brief] PLAINTIFFS’ DISCUSSIONS OF NECESSITY OF THE DRIVEWAY LOCATION AND THE STATUS OF FLORENCE-COLUMBUS ROAD AS A COUNTY ROAD ARE IRRELEVANT TO THE ISSUES BEFORE THE COURT  Plaintiffs Brief includes a review of the testimony concerning the design choices that lead to the proposed site plan and the location of the proposed driveway in Florence.  Pb40- Pb42.  That testimony does show that these designs are likely good ways for the Plaintiffs to place their desired development on the [...].  The Board’s Resolution did not question these site design choices or the driveway location proposed by Plaintiffs in the Board’s review of the variance proofs concerning the proposed development.  It is therefore unclear why any of this discussion in Plaintiffs’ Brief is relevant to the issues now before the Court.  The Board’s variance denial decision was not a quibble about the physical layout of the site.
[brief] [...], as manager, could bind the company only on the authority of the members.  o (1T 33:18-35:5; 38:22-39:11; 39:25-40:  •  She also testified as to the by-laws of [...], which she signed as corporate secretary. o (1T 35:21-36:5).  •  Pursuant to section 4.1, the Board of Directors appoints an Executive Committee to make decisions.  At the time, the Board of Directors consisted of [...] as president, [...] as vice president, and her as corporate secretary.  o (1T 36:13-19; 36:24-37:11).  •  She testified she never saw any of the intercompany loan documents entered into by [...] with his five companies before the lawsuit began and was unaware of any loans to these companies until entities doing business with the [...] companies began filing liens against [...].  She testified credibly the loans were never presented to the executive board.
[directive] Actor drives a vehicle or vessel while in violation of N.J.S.A. 39:4-50 (DWI) or N.J.S.A. 39:4- 50.4a (Refusal to Submit to Breath Sample); third degree if serious bodily injury results; fourth 10% permissible Aggravated Assault by degree if bodily injury results.  3rd Degree $5,000 to $15,000
[directive] ATTORNEY GENERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT DIRECTIVE NO. 2004-1 - APPENDIX A - GUIDELINES FOR POTENTIAL LIABILITY WARNING - N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.22 (Rev. 2-20-2004)  FORM (4)  Hand the pre-prepared POTENTIAL LIABILITY WARNING - N.J.S.A. 39:4- 50.22 (Rev. 2-20-2004)  Form to the summoned person.  Ask that person to read the Form.  Then instruct that person:  (a)  To fill in the information on the Form, just below the Warning statement paragraph, labeled “Person Acknowledging Receipt;” (b) Put their signature on the line for “Signature of Person Acknowledging Receipt;” and (c)  Return the completed Form to the officer for copying.  (5)  Once the summoned person has read the POTENTIAL LIABILITY WARNING - N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.22 (Rev. 2-20-2004) Form, signed the Acknowledgment of Receipt, and returned the Form, the law enforcement officer shall complete the line labeled “Date & Time of Acknowledgment,” and sign the Form on the line labeled “Signature of Law Enforcement Officer. ”  (6)  In the event the summoned person refuses to put their signature on the line for “Signature of Person Acknowledging Receipt,” the officer is to retrieve the Form and complete the information under the section “Refusal to Acknowledge, in Writing, Receipt of Potential Liability Warning. ”  In that section, the officer is to print the name of the summoned person on the appropriate line, complete the line labeled “Date & Time of Refusal to Acknowledge,” and then the officer is to sign his/her name on the form on the line labeled “Signature of Law Enforcement Officer. ”  (7)  Once the receipt of the POTENTIAL LIABILITY WARNING - N.J.S.A. 39:4- 50.22 (Rev. 2-20-2004)  Form has been acknowledged by the summoned person, or the law enforcement officer has recorded that the summoned person refused to acknowledge receipt of the Form, the law enforcement officer shall make at least one (1) copy of the original.  The copy, or copies shall be retained in the law enforcement agency file for that case.  The original of the signed POTENTIAL LIABILITY WARNING - N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.22 (Rev. 2-20-2004)  Form is to be given to the summoned person, not the arrestee.  -5-
[directive] Superior Court of New Jersey Law Division – Criminal Part State of New Jersey County  Plaintiff, Municipality v. Complaint Number: Promis/Gavel Number: Defendant.  FACTS Number: Notification of Expectations for Defendant ordered to Strict Home Detention  You are receiving this notice because you were ordered to Strict Home Detention as a condition of your pretrial release.  This notice provides what you must do to ensure your compliance with this condition:  You are on Strict Home Detention, you must remain in your residence at all times 1. other than appearing at the courthouse for a scheduled court event, or to attend a scheduled in-person appointment with Pretrial Services or Probation, or to attend an in-person appointment with your attorney with 48-hour advance notice to Pretrial services Program (PSP).  You must reside at the address provided for on the record and indicated in your Pretrial 2.  Release Order.  You shall not reside at any other address absent a motion made to the court and a new court order being entered.  When applying for a change of address, you must explicitly state the reasons for the address change and prove all minimum requirements necessary for such address change.  A new screening form will be required.  A change of address is not valid until a new written release order is issued by the court.  A change of address does not change other conditions of the original release order, and those conditions shall remain as set forth in the original release order.  If you require a modification to this condition or your court order, even if it is for a 3. previously approved reason, you must submit to the court for said leave through counsel, or if you are unrepresented using the “Request for Leave from Home Detention” form.  pro se  You may not leave your residence unless approval is granted by the court.  You will be required to periodically answer random, unscheduled video calls from 4. Pretrial Services, or provide contemporaneous photo proof to Pretrial Services, of your These calls or requests for location during the periods of confinement to your home.  proof may occur at varying times throughout your ordered period of confinement.  Revised Form Promulgated by Directive #19-23 (10/17/2023), CN 12872 page 1 of 2
[brief] Kimmel v. Dayrit, 154 NJ. 337,343 (1998).  Based on the circumstances and timing of Plaintiff’s motion, these are all clearly considerations made by [...] and included in her reasoning for denying the Plaintiff’s motion in this case.  (T54-3 to 57-16).  Another simple point demonstrated by all of the case law is that the law allows for motions to amend the pleadings to be denied and if Appellant’s reasoning were correct, every single denial of a Motion to Amend the Pleadings would be on appeal.  In the case at bar, the Honorable [...] stated the Court was not obligated to permit a pleading to be amended when a subsequent motion to dismiss must be granted and this is in light of the factual situation existing at the time each motion is made (T54-12-17).
[brief] STANDARD OF REVIEW.  Appellate courts review the trial court’s grant or denial of a motion for summary judgment de novo, applying the same standard used by the trial court.  Samolyk vs. Berthe, 251 N.J. 73 (2022); Stewart vs. N.J. Tpk. Auth./Garden State Parkway, 249 N.J. 642, 655 (2022); Branch vs. Cream-O-Land Dairy, 244 N.J. 567, 582(2021).
[brief] *Williams* is analogous to the case at bar in that it involved a plaintiff’s violations of the NJCFLA and a subsequent motion pursuant to *R. 4:50-1(d)* and *R. 4:50-1(f)*.  However, PRA erroneously states that the defendant in *Williams* moved to vacate a default judgment obtained in violation of the NJCFLA “[s]even years after the entry of judgment. ”  PRA’s Br. 24.  In actuality, the defendant in *Williams* moved to vacate the unlawful default judgment eleven years after it was entered—making the default judgment in *Williams* nearly twice the age of the default judgment here.  *Id.* at *1-2*.  Thus, with respect to timeliness, *Williams* is entirely distinguishable from the instant action.  Moreover, unlike the case at bar, *Williams* did not involve a defendant suffering from psychiatric illness, which must inform the Court’s analysis into [...]’s excusable neglect here.  See PRA’s Br. 25.  Thus, for all the foregoing reasons, the October 26, 2023 Order (Da58) denying Defendant’s Motion to Vacate should be reversed.
[brief] (Db37.)  There is absolutely nothing in the record to establish that Plaintiff “violated the doctrine of unclean hands in the most offensive of fashion. ”  (Ibid.)  Defendants claim that such violation began “with the constant verbal abuse by [...]” yet, again, there is nothing in the record to support this claim.  (Ibid.)  Defendants otherwise refer to a few voicemails from [...] to Defendant [...], which occurred after the parties’ relationship began to sour.  (Ibid.)  However, upon a full reading of the transcripts of these voicemails, Defendants’ characterization of same as “harassment” and “bullying,” let alone a violation of the doctrine of unclean hands, is absurd.  (See 5T140:4-21, 141:6-17, 142:6-21, 143:6-25, 144:8 to 145:13, 146:2-4.)  Lastly, the Court should disregard Defendants’ unsupported and wholly improper claim that Plaintiff is acting “in a manner meant to do nothing more than harass [Defendant] [...] and force her to continue to litigate this matter for the expressed reason that he did not get his way. ”  (Db37.)  Again, there is absolutely nothing in the record to support Defendants’ claim.  See Pressler & Verniero, cmt. 1 on R. 2:5-4(a).  POINT III
[brief] By order dated January 27, 2021, the Hon. [...], J.S.C. admitted Decedent [...]’s June 4, 1999 Last Will and Testament to probate and appointed [...] Administrator C.T.A. of the Estate.  (Pa95).  Since that time, Appellant has been involved in or been the cause of at least six lawsuits involving [...]’s assets.  Appellant demands he be provided a formal accounting yet ignores that he has been told numerous times that the vast majority of Estate expenses were legal fees occasioned by his conduct.  After over a year of litigation during which time Appellant ignored every order issued by the Court (Pa394-Pa397), judgment was entered directing Appellant to repay the Estate $2,440,702.00 that he misappropriated (the “February 4 Judgment”).  (Pa43-Pa56).  To date he has failed to make any payments towards that debt.  The February 4 Judgment further required Appellant to pay legal fees to the Estate and to his sister, [...].  (Pa43-Pa56).  To date, no portion of any of those sums has been paid.  Appellant is now a squatter, paying no rent in the two properties owned by the Estate and preventing sale of those properties to meet the Estate’s tax obligations.  In one of those properties, located on the Upper East Side of New York City, (the “UES Property”), in direct violation of court orders, Appellant has been collecting and keeping rents.  1T11:6-1T11:9.
[brief] The Parental Secrecy Policy—which the lower court ordered the District to reinstate—infringes the rights of parents in the District in four ways.  1.  Right to Consent to Psychological Treatment  First, the Parental Secrecy Policy violates parents’ right to consent when the State performs psychological treatment on their children.  *Parham*, 442 U.S. at 602; see also *Parents United For Better Sch., Inc. v. Sch. Dist. of Phila. Bd. of Educ.*, 148 F.3d 260, 275 (3d Cir. 1998) (recognizing that “parental consent must be secured before medical treatment is obtained” by children); *Kanuszewski v. Michigan Dep’t* of Health & Hum. Servs., 927 F.3d 396, 418 (6th Cir. 2019) (noting parents have the “right to direct their children's medical care”); Mann v. Cnty. of San Diego, 907 F.3d 1154, 1160–61 (9th Cir. 2018) (holding state violates parental right by performing healthcare treatment on children “without notifying the parents . . . and without obtaining either the parent’s consent or judicial authorization”).
[directive] Criminal New or (FTA) within delinquent adjudicated been had juvenile a as defendant the or and 6 5, 4, is assessment adult an if by crime committed that a or firearm, a involving for crime a years ten preceding the any commit to an attempt or 2C:43-7.2, N.J.S.A. Act, Release Early  No the to subject would be prosecutor preclude a to construed be shall subsection this in Nothing offenses. foregoing the of firearms- or for violent adjudications (e.g., delinquency of adjudications other considering from than other for offenses adjudications or ago, years ten than more occurred that crimes related circumstances of the the totality of part as relevant be may as crimes) NERA or firearms-related in detention seeking pretrial presumption against the overcome to whether determining when also See 8.2. in Section release of revocation seeking against presumption the or 7.2 Section 7.6.1. subsection o~ Offense for Another Pretrial Release on While Committed Crimes Indictable 7.4.4 Supervision.
[brief] a.  The municipal court shall declare a dog to be potentially dangerous if it finds by clear and convincing evidence that the dog: (1) caused bodily injury to a person during an unprovoked attack, and poses a serious threat of serious bodily injury or death to a person; (2) caused serious bodily injury to another domestic animal or killed another domestic animal, and (a) poses a serious threat of serious bodily injury or death to a person, or (b) poses a serious threat of death to another domestic animal; or (3) (Deleted by amendment, P.L.2019, c. 82).
[brief] THE CASE LAW RELIED UPON BY [...] DOES NOT SUPPORT FACT-BASED ALLOCATION ON THE RECORD HERE.  The primary decision cited by [...] for the application of fact-based allocation is an unreported trial court decision in Maestranzi Bros. v. American Employers' Insurance Company, 2010 WL 1427352 (Mass. Super. Apr. 9, 2010).  Maestranzi is entirely distinguishable on the facts.  Further, the allocation calculation applied in Maestranzi bears no similarity to the “weighted by AOC” calculation invented by [...] in this case.  (Pb25-26.)
[brief] Even if, arguendo, Plaintiff could establish a prima facie case was sufficiently pled for all claims asserted, all claims in Count IV and V for negligence, barred by the doctrine of Qualified Immunity.  The doctrine of qualified immunity was adopted in New Jersey as a basis for immunity from suit for the actions of government officials brought under the New Jersey Civil Rights Act, which is analogous to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  Officials may be shielded from liability for civil damages if their discretionary acts “do not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known. ”  Ramos v. Flowers, 56 A.3d 869 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 2012) (citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)).  Whether a government official is entitled to protection under the doctrine of qualified immunity is a legal question.  Rogers v. Powell, 120 F.3d 446, 454 (3d Cir. 1997).  A court, using a flexible approach, applies either or both of the two-prongs: first, whether "taken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, . . . the facts alleged show the officer's conduct violated a constitutional right"; and second, "whether the right was 'clearly established' at the time of defendant's alleged misconduct."  Id. at 28 (citing Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001) and Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009)).  In determining "whether a right is clearly established, the court ought not engage in "broad, abstract reasoning, but, rather, [its decision] should be based upon 'particularized' considerations in light of information the officer possessed at the time."  Bernstein v. State, 986 A.2d 22 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 2010).  The contours of the right must be sufficiently clear so that a "reasonably competent officer" would have understood that he was violating a clearly established right.  Id.  If "officers of reasonable competence could disagree on this issue, immunity should be recognized."  Id.  An official's entitlement to qualified immunity based on probable cause or a reasonable belief that probable cause existed is a question of law that should be decided as early in the case as possible.  Wildoner v. Borough of Ramsey, 744 A.2d 1146 (N.J. 2000).  [Emphasis added.]
[brief] THE NJDEP’S DENIAL OF APPELLANT’S ADJUDICATORY  HEARING REQUEST WAS ARBITRARY, CAPRICIOUS, AND UNREASONABLE AND SHOULD BE REVERSED.  [Aa132-Aa136.]  As noted in Appellant’s initial brief, the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) recognizes that “[p]ersons who have particularized property interests or who are directly affected by a permitting decision have constitutional and statutory rights and remedies. ”  N.J.S.A. 52:14B-3.1.  The APA affords hearing rights to persons “who has a particularized property interest sufficient to require a hearing on constitutional or statutory grounds. ”  N.J.S.A. 52:14B-3.2.  The APA recognizes that a party other than the applicant has a right to obtain an adjudicatory hearing based on a “particularized property interest. ”  The APA does not limit a person’s rights to appeal a permit decision directly to the Appellate Division and affords an adjudicatory hearing to provide complete facts to those that qualify under the Act.
[brief] CONSIDERATIONS OF ADEQUATE AND ACTUAL NOTICE DO NOT COMPEL A DIFFERENT RESULT.  Notwithstanding the clarity of the applicable statute, [...] argues that he should be permitted to file beyond the statutory deadline because the Board did not provide adequate notice of the Ricci Act.  (Pb9).  This argument fails because the Board provided adequate notice of the law.  The only express notice requirement contained in the Ricci Act provides that the Board must “notify members and retirants in the retirement system of the enactment of this act, P.L.2019, c.157, within 30 days of enactment.  N.J.S.A. 53:5A-10(e)(4).  On August 7, 2019, the [...] satisfied this notice requirement when it added information about the Ricci Act to its website.  (Pa10).  That notice satisfied the Ricci Act, which requires only that the Board notify members of the enactment of the statute.  The Legislature is well aware of how to create specific notice requirements and has done so with other statutes.  See N.J.S.A. 43:15A-50(a) (“Notification shall be by certified mail to the spouse’s address as provided on the form by the member. ”); e.g., Hammond v. City of Paterson, 145 N.J. Super. 452, 456 (App. Div. 1976) (holding that the Legislature, in requiring “actual receipt” of notice in the Tort Claims Act when certified mail is not used, “clearly did not mean to leave proof of actual receipt to a presumption. ”).  When “the Legislature has carefully employed a term in one place and excluded it in another, it should not be implied where excluded. ”  GE Solid State, Inc. v. Director, Div. of Taxation, 132 N.J. 298, 307-08 (1993); see also State v. Hoffman, 149 N.J. 564, 579 (1997).  Nowhere in the Ricci Act is there a requirement that the Board send notice, through a postcard, by certified mail or other means, or otherwise require actual receipt of notice.  Thus, in accord with the statutory canon of *expressio unius est exclusio alterius*, the expression of one thing suggests the exclusion of another left unmentioned, this court should reject [...]’s request to create a requirement where the Legislature has chosen not to.