ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] ”  At the time the SPA was executed, [...] maintained its office in New York.  The development of the condominium building, [...], in New Jersey involved construction and acquisition of materials and labor.  Furthermore, certain provisions within the SPA define the mortgage financing contingency for the Plaintiffs’ deal that could extend to various institutions.  Moreover, the original Complaint in this action notes that Defendants [...] and [...] (“[...]”) have their offices in New York.  The Citizens Bank v. Alfabco, 539 U.S. 532, 56 (2003) (quoting Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 273 (1995)); see also Crawford v. West Jersey Health Systems, 847 F. Supp. 1232, 1240 (D.N.J. 1994).  The commercial aspect of the transaction is both apparent and verified.  Because the FAA maintains that Arbitration Provisions are fundamentally contracts, courts are required to review their enforceability in accordance with the applicable state law of contract formation and place the parties’ agreement “on an equal footing with other contracts,” and enforce it according to the contract’s terms.  *AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion*, 563 U.S. 333, 339 (2011).  A.
[directive] 1.  A person arrested without a warrant for any offense shall be taken to the police station where a complaint shall be prepared forthwith.  2.  A person arrested without a warrant for one of the following criminal offenses: murder, kidnapping, aggravated manslaughter, manslaughter, robbery, aggravated sexual assault, sexual assault, aggravated criminal sexual contact, criminal sexual contact, second degree aggravated assault, aggravated arson, arson, burglary, violations of Chapter 35 of Title 2C that constitute first or second degree crimes, any crime involving the possession or use of a firearm, or conspiracies or attempts to commit such crimes, shall be taken to a police station.  The police officer shall comply with the criteria of Paragraph 5 below.  3.  A person arrested without a warrant for an offense not listed in Paragraph 2 above, shall be taken to the police station where the (7/95) Strip Search and Body Cavity Search Requirements and Procedures officer in charge shall: a. Complete all post-arrest identification procedures required by law; b. Prepare a complaint-summons (CDR-1); c. Issue the complaint-summons to the person arrested, and d. Release the arrested person in lieu of continued detention.
[brief] Plaintiff claimed, and [...] ruled, that plaintiff had a right to obtain contractual litigation fees under Section 9 of the mortgage agreement, which provides that if “there is a legal proceeding that might significantly affect Lender’s interest in the Property and/or rights under the Security Instrument,” the Lender may obtain “reasonable attorneys’ fees to protect its interest in the Property and/or rights under this Security Instrument[.]”  A359; 11T17-18; 11T21:1-25; 12T9-33.  Upon this provision [...] granted plaintiff a money judgment against the [...].  This was erroneous because Section 9 does not provide plaintiff (which claims to have stepped into the shoes of the “Lender” under the Mortgage Agreement) with a contractual right to obtain a money judgment against the [...].
[brief] [...] admitted that “a lot” of his opinion that death was a “homicide” depended not on the results of the autopsy he performed, but instead on the “circumstances” of how the body was discovered burned and discarded outside of [...]’s home.  (15T:83-6 to 86-25)  The defense and the prosecution both had competing stories about why [...] had disposed of body.  [...]’s defense was that she had destroyed the body in a panic following accidental death.  The State’s theory was that she had committed murder and discarded the body to cover up her actions.  What story deserved to be credited at trial was a question for the jury.  [...]’s testimony that the destruction of the body was “highly suspicious” and was “almost probably enough to say” the death was a homicide was in no way based on science.  (42T:187-2 to 22)  It should not have been admitted in the guise of his medical expertise.  Its admission over defense objection invaded the province of the jury and compels reversal.
[brief] It is reasonable to assume that the Legislature and/or DOBI would have resolved these issues if [...] was intended to replace the courts as the venue for Fraud Act claims.  Instead, it is far more reasonable and consistent with the language of the statutes and regulations to read the Fraud Act and AICRA as applying “each in its own particular sphere of action”, with the [...] process resolving disputes over the payment of overdue No-Fault Benefits to claimants and courts of competent jurisdiction resolving disputes over whether, in part, a claimant knowingly misrepresented material facts to the carrier in connection with a claim for payment and/or conspired with others to do so entitling the carrier to an award of compensatory and, potentially, treble damages.  Moreover, by its own terms, a dispute under the Fraud Act is not a “PIP dispute. ”
[brief] *Ibid.*  But the trial court did not consider that Certification.  In makeweight arguments, petitioners contend that since "[...] had the disqualifying conversations with the Affiant [sic]... he should have been able to respond to Petitioners' motion without [...]'s Certification."  *Id.* at 3.  "Mr. [...] was a participant in the conferences with [...] and should know full well what was discussed."  *Id.* at 12 n.13.  But [...]'s position is and always has been he had no such conversations – or at worst, has no recollection of such conversations.  Petitioners necessarily assumes that they occurred – an assumption that appellants do not accept and this Court should not accept.  Petitioners necessarily admit that the trial court did not consider the Knoll Certification.  But that admission is belied by their continuing, if oblique, references to it.  [...]'s Certification was of no consequence to the trial court, so there is no reason to highlight it before this court.  They do so in order to obfuscate the reality that otherwise, the only information before the trial court did consider was the [...] Certification and the now-admittedly benign emails.
[brief] The burden to establish pension eligibility is on the applicant, not the Board.  Patterson v. Bd. of Trs., State Police Ret. Sys., 194 N.J. 29, 50-51 (2008).  Nevertheless, with this appeal, [...] argues that the Board improperly applied the PERS Correction of Errors statute, N.J.S.A. 43:15A-54, to recalculate and correct her retirement benefits, claiming it is a remedial statute in nature and she should benefit from the liberal construction of pension statutes.  (Pb9-10).  It is true that pension laws “should be liberally construed and administered in favor of the persons intended to be benefited thereby. ”  Geller v. Dep’t of Treasury, 53 N.J. 591, 597-98 (1969).  “However, ‘[i]n spite of liberal construction, an employee has only such rights and benefits as are based upon and within the scope of the provisions of the statute. ’”  Francois v. Bd. of Trs., Pub. Emps.’ Ret. Sys., 415 N.J. Super. 335, 349 (App. Div. 2010) (quoting Casale v. Pension Com. of the Emp. Ret. Sys. of Newark, 78 N.J. Super. 38, 40 (Law Div. 1963) (alteration in original)).  Therefore, “eligibility is not to be liberally permitted.  Instead, in determining a person’s eligibility to a pension, the applicable guidelines must be carefully interpreted so as not to ‘obscure or override considerations of . . . a potential adverse impact on the financial integrity of the [f]und. ’”  Smith v. State, Dep’t of Treasury, Div. of Pensions & Benefits, 390 N.J. Super. 209, 213 (App. Div. 2007) (alterations in original) (quoting Chaleff v. Tchrs’ Pension & Annuity Fund Trs., 188 N.J. Super. 194, 197 (App. Div. 1983)).  In fact, “[a]n inappropriate allowance of benefits tends ‘to place a greater strain on the financial integrity of the fund in question and its future availability for those persons who are truly eligible for such benefits.
[brief] The doctrine “operates to bar a disappointed litigant from arguing on appeal that an adverse decision below was the product of error, when that party urged the lower court to adopt the proposition now alleged to be error. ”  Brett v. Great Am. Recreation, Inc., 144 N.J. 479, 503 (1996) (emphasis added).  [...] has never argued that the Burt defendant characterization was error—quite the opposite.  [...] is not claiming the Burt rulings were “unfairly prejudicial,” as plaintiffs’ incorrectly state.  (Pb. 31).  The error was not in classifying [...] and [...] as Burt defendants, but in entering judgment on the jury’s verdict.
[brief] It is irrelevant whether fraudulent transactions could be found only with great difficulty after an investigation or whether it is unlikely that the government would have discovered the relevant documents.  See U.S. ex rel. Solomon v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 878 F.3d 139, 146 (5th Cir. 2017) (rejecting argument that no one “would ever think to search for [a] model contract” for fighter aircraft posted on a government website); U.S. ex rel. Oliver v. Philip \textsuperscript{16} See A-1 Ambulance Serv., Inc. v. California, 202 F.3d 1238, 1245 (9th Cir. 2000) (use of “expertise” to develop theory of fraud is “irrelevant” to whether “material transactions giving rise to the alleged fraud were already disclosed”), superseded by statute as recognized in Silbersher v. Valeant Pharm. Int’l, Inc., 89 F.4th 1154 (9th Cir. 2024); Mistick, 186 F.3d at 383 n.3 (distinguishing “the statutory concept of ‘public disclosure’ with the different concept of ‘public accessibility,’” where information “may appear buried in an exhibit that is filed in court without fanfare in an obscure case” and yet be publicly disclosed); U.S. ex rel. Atkinson v. Penn. Shipbuilding Co., 255 F. Supp. 2d 351, 388–89 (E.D. Pa. 2002) (“[R]elator’s argument that his knowledge was not generally attainable, as is that of an engineer or a cryptographer, is irrelevant.
[brief] And while Appellant concedes that the federal decisions he cites in his brief are “non-binding authority,” he insists the Superior Court was in error because such decisions “may have significant persuasive effect. ”  Id., at 7-8.  In fact, Appellant even boldly asserts that every federal case to reach the merits concluded that the use of letter vendors by debt collectors violates the FDCPA.  Id., at 6.  This proposition, however, is misleading for two primary reasons.  First, it ignores the fact that many more federal courts never had the opportunity to reach the merits on the proposed letter vendor theory of liability because they found that the plaintiff lacked standing as no injury-in-fact could be established.  See infra and e.g., In re FDCPA Mailing Vendor Cases, 551 F. Supp. 3d 57 (E.D.N.Y. 2021); Quaglia v. [...], 21 C 3252, 2021 WL 7179621 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 12, 2021); Barclift v. [...], 585 F. Supp. 3d 748; [...], V. [...], 2022 WL 168222 (D. Kan. Jan. 19, 2022).
[brief] ”  Pa0089.  Then, in **bold**, Section 7 states “It is expressly acknowledges, understood, and agreed that; arbitration is final and binding; the parties are waiving their right to seek legal remedies in court including the right to a trial by jury; pre-arbitration discovery generally is more limited than and different from that available in court proceedings; the arbitrator’s award is not required to include factual findings or legal reasoning; and any party’s right to appeal or vacate, or seek modification of, the arbitration award, is strictly limited by law.
[brief] (1) a material misrepresentation [or omission] of a presently existing or past fact; (2) knowledge or belief by the defendant of its falsity; (3) an intention that the other person rely on it; (4) reasonable reliance thereon by the other person; and (5) resulting damages.  Gennari v. Weichert Co. Realtors, 148 N.J. 582, 610 (1997) (citing Jewish Ctr. of Sussex County v. Whale, 86 N.J. 619, 624–25 (1981)).
[brief] 126  See Delguzzo v. Kenny, 266 N.J. Super.169, 185 (App. Div.1993).  127 Laufer v. U.S. Life Ins. Co. in N.Y., 385 N.J. Super. 172 (App. Div. 2006).  128  Laufer v. U.S. Life Ins. Co. in N.Y., 385 N.J. Super. 172 (App. Div. 2006).  129  Laufer v. U.S. Life Ins. Co. in N.Y., 385 N.J. Super. 172 (App. Div. 2006).  members, and it is based on the same legal theory. ”\textsuperscript{130}  “[T]he threshold for satisfying the typicality prong is a low one. ”\textsuperscript{131}  Even relatively pronounced factual differences won’t preclude a finding of typicality where there is a strong similarity of legal theories' or where the claim arises from the same practice or course of conduct. \textsuperscript{132}  Plaintiff demonstrated that plaintiff shares common issues of law and fact with the other class members. \textsuperscript{133}  6a-10a; 31a-110a.  Plaintiff’s claims arise from the same course of events as those facing the class and plaintiff must make the same – or effectively the same – arguments to prosecute their claims as would be made by members of the proposed class in any individual cases.
[brief] LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I THE INDICTMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED  A.  [...]’s conduct was Willful and Outrageous  Respondent argues that the trial court properly denied Appellant’s motion to dismiss the Indictment because [...]’s conduct was neither willful nor outrageous.  In assessing this issue the trial court stated:  “It is clear that [[...]] testified twice before the court that [Appellant’s] door to his third-floor apartment was closed and unlocked.  It is now clear, from [[...]’s] own notes, that [Appellant’s] door was to his third-floor apartment was breached.  The Court is troubled by the fact that [[...]’s] notes only came to light after [...]’s admission of them during his testimony.  This provides further evidence that [[...]’s] disclosure was at the very least negligent as they were his notes and he on one occasion under oath stated there was no breach.  This court cannot allow the State to withhold information from a Defendant that goes directly to the issue this Court has stated it finds dispositive to prevent an unfavorable outcome.  While the circumstances are concerning, a dismissal of the Indictment is not warranted.  The Court cannot say the conduct was willful or outrageous. ”
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED A MISCARRIAGE OF JUSTICE BY PERMITTING A ‘FAILURE-TO-TIMELY-RECALL’ CLAIM THAT IS NOT RECOGNIZED BY NEW JERSEY LAW AND IS PREEMPTED BY FEDERAL LAW.  [(DA0785; DA0816; DA0846); COURT DID NOT ADDRESS PREEMPTION  ALTHOUGH IT WAS RAISED IN THE BRIEFING]  A.  The PLA Does Not Recognize a ‘Failure-to-Timely-Recall’ Claim.  [ISSUE WAS RAISED (Da0785; Da0816; Da0846)]  Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges that [...] “failed to recall the Subject Product in the United States even after they were certainly aware of the defect. ”  (Da0001, ¶ 48)⁹  Such a ‘failure-to-timely-recall’ claim is not cognizable under the PLA, which recognizes only defective design, manufacturing, or warning claims.  N.J.S.A. § 2A:58C-2.  A claim that a product should have been recalled sooner is not based on its design, manufacture, or warnings.  The Trial Court’s erroneous refusal to grant summary judgment on this non-actionable claim constitutes an unprincipled expansion of the New Jersey PLA—never recognized by the Legislature—that this Court should immediately correct.
[directive] Do you understand that if the offense was committed on or after July 1, 2014, as a result of your guilty plea you may be required to pay a Sex Offender Supervision Penalty of $30 per month?  10.  Amann pou Fon Tretman Viktim Zak Seksyèl (S.C.V.T.F.)  Sex Crime Victim Treatment Fund Penalty (S.C.V.T.F.)  Èske w konprann ke si zak la te komèt le ou aprè le 26 avril 2005, swit a deklarasyon koupab ou [Wi/Yes] [Non/No] an wap oblije peye yon amann egzijib ba Fon pou Tretman Viktim Zak Seksyèl la jan li enimere anba la a pou chak zak ke w plede koupab?
[brief] **[...] Discovers [...]’s Accounting Antics**  In April 2019, [...] received a tax notice from the New Jersey Department of the Treasury.  An audit of his 2015 tax return revealed that he owed an additional $98,038 to the State.  (Da2837-38).  [...] then reached out to [...] (who at the time was still his personal accountant) and [...] to discuss the situation.  [...] also engaged CPA [...] to assist.  To avoid further penalties, [...] made a payment in about July 2019.  (16T 69:4 to 70:18; 72:7-15).  Although Prajapati had known [...] for about 20 years, Prajapati did not begin providing accounting services for him or for [...] until sometime in 2019.  (19T 79:7 to 80:1).  Prajapati had no role in negotiating the purchase price for [...]’s interest in [...] or for [...]’s interest in [...], nor was Prajapati paid in connection with discussions relating to the sale of those interests.  (19T 80:23 to 81:25).  [...] engaged Prajapati in about the summer of 2019 to review certain [...] business records that [...] had received in response to inquiries prompted by the tax deficiency notice from the State.  (19T 82:17-24).  However, the records that [...] provided were insufficient, and Prajapati asked [...] to request a complete set of the books of account for [...].  (19T 83:12 to 84:20).  [...] attempted to coordinate discussions with Myers, [...], and Prajapati to figure out what happened and why he owed the money.  Myers and [...] suggested a “quick fix” to correct what they described as an error on the 2015 tax return.  They proposed an amended return to address the issue, but [...] was not convinced that would resolve the matter, and Prajapati requested to review the backup documentation to support the return.  (16T 71:13 to 72:10; Da54-64).  Prajapati was concerned because the “quick fix” scheme concocted by Myers and [...] was to recharacterize the [...] transactions from membership interest sales to asset sales, which, in Prajapati’s view, was inappropriate and could constitute tax fraud.  (19T 84:21 to 85:24).  Compounding matters, despite requests, [...] refused to turn over the full set of backup documentation that [...] had been seeking.
[brief] He testifies he looked at numerous Deeds, numerous record surveys, filed maps anything he could get his hands on that would help strengthen the boundaries or understanding of the boundaries and the plotting (5T22:19).  He testifies that a good three quarters of the property of the go-cart track is on the property that the Borough has identified as Lot 3 (5T15:25).  The balance of it is on Lot 3.01 (5T23:8).  The fourth document in on J-1 shows the various mean high-water lines.  To the best of his understanding, the mean high-water line in 1939 would have been in this case what it was in 1918 (5T34:23).  He testifies to various actions which the Borough undertook to show its “assertion” of ownership.
[directive] N.J.S.A. 52:17B-2.  The general principle of this Directive is that communications about matters within the Attorney General’s jurisdiction should be coordinated through the Attorney General’s Executive Leadership Team, except where the Attorney General has authorized contacts as described in this Directive.  In addition, consistent with longstanding practice, any communication with legislators or their staffs must be cleared through the Attorney General’s Director of Legislative Affairs.  The Directive outlines specific procedures for different types of communications, with the guidelines depending in part on whether the Attorney General is acting in the capacity of chief law enforcement officer, legal advisor to client agencies, and/or department head.  To be clear, these procedures are not intended to wall off LPS personnel from appropriate communication with the Governor’s Office and the Legislature, or to limit employees’ ability to exercise their constitutional or statutory rights, including by contacting their elected representatives in their personal capacity as constituents.
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[brief] “[S]cienter extends to the trait or propensity which has caused the damage, and knowledge by the owner that the disposition of the animal is such that it is likely to commit a similar injury to that complained of, be it in anger or play. ”  Jannuzzelli v. Wilkens, 158 N.J. Super. 36, 41-42 (App. Div. 1978) (emphasis added).  Moreover, [...] opines that all stallions are capable of a sudden sustained attack.  She writes that “[p]ersons regularly involved with breeding stallions should be aware of every stallion’s potential to engage in the type of sustained attack exhibited by [...] on the day of the attack. ”  [Pa 900].  Thus, Plaintiffs urge this Court to extend the scope of common law strict liability to include injuries caused by an inherent trait common to all stallions, without any evidence of past behavior that indicated that [...] was abnormally dangerous.
[directive] Notwithstanding the foregoing general rule prohibiting the recording of an undercover officer or confidential informant, in the event of a planned arrest/search warrant execution where it is expected that an undercover officer or confidential informant would be present (e.g., a raid where the undercover operative will be arrested to preserve his or her cover), BODY WORN CAMERA POLICY | May 2021  15  the County Prosecutor or designee, or the Director of the Division of Criminal Justice or designee, may provide specific instruction to any BWC-equipped officers participating in the operation on whether to activate their devices.  7.2.2  The BWC shall be activated/re-activated as soon as it is safe and practicable to do so if and when the risk of capturing the image of an undercover officer or confidential informant no longer exists.  7.3