ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Id. at 8.  As such, it contends that [...]’s requests should be denied.  *8  The Court will address the alleged production failures as set forth in [...]’s motion:  1.  Several thousand files improperly withheld for “relevance”  [...] contends that [...] has improperly withheld thousands of files based on relevance, which is not supported by the terms set forth in the Protocol.  Specifically, [...] contends that the Protocol does not allow files containing the agreed-upon search terms to be withheld for “relevance,” and unambiguously states that “[...] and [...] can only withhold documents based on ‘privilege’. ”  See R. Doc. 103–1, p. 10; citing R. Doc. 31–1, pp. 27–28, ¶¶ 5, 8.  Therefore, [...] contends that nowhere in the protocol is there a provision which allows for the unilateral withholding of files containing the agreed-upon search terms based on relevancy.  As such, [...] seeks an Order from this Court compelling [...] to comply with the protocol by producing all non-privileged documents being withheld for “relevance. ”  During oral argument, counsel for [...] represented to the Court that the parties had agreed in their protocol that files would only be withheld based on a party’s assertion that these documents were privileged.  As such, [...] contends that [...] now improperly asserted relevance as a basis for withholding documents.
[brief] The issue before the lower court in this declaratory judgment action was whether the personal liability coverage of [...]’ condo-owners policy applied to require [...] to provide a defense and indemnification for any liability assessed against the pro se plaintiff in this matter, for the allegations of the underlying lawsuit.  Relying on the policy language in conjunction with the allegations of the underlying complaint, the lower court appropriately determined that no coverage was owed in this instance.  The lower court’s findings in that regard are fully supported, and should be affirmed in every respect.
[directive] The three approved statements are:  DWI Refusal Statement - New Jersey Motor Vehicle Commission (NJ ! MVC) Standard Statement for Operators of a Motor Vehicle - N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.2(e), Revised & effective, April 26, 2004 [P.L.2004, c.8, §4].  CDL/DWI Refusal Statement - DMV Standard Statement For Operators ! of a Commercial Motor Vehicle, N.J.S.A. 39:3-10.24e, Revised, February 1, 2001 to conform to State v. Widmaier, 157 N.J. 475, 498-499 (1999).  OVWI Refusal Statement - New Jersey Motor Vehicle Commission (NJ ! MVC) Standard Statement for Operators of Vessels - N.J.S.A. 12:7-55e, Revised & effective, July 1, 2004 [P.L.2004, c.80, §4].
[brief] (Da107).  It found that the officers were lawfully at the scene investigating the car crash and injuries, the Impala car doors had been left open by its occupants, and from outside the car the officers could see the tire iron.  (Da108).  It further ruled that the officers had probable cause to associate the tire iron with the assault on [...], as they had been told that [...] was struck with a tire iron and they could see his head injuries.  (Da108).  The court concluded that based upon the record the seizure of the tire iron was equally justified by the plain view doctrine.  (Da108).  It ruled that the conclusion then was that any motion to suppress the tire iron would have been unsuccessful and the failure to file a meritless motion was not ineffective assistance of counsel.  (Da108).  The PCR court also rejected defendant’s challenge to trial counsel’s failure to have an expert testify that the State’s assertion that the tire iron could not be tested for fingerprints was not credible or argue inconsistencies in the State’s explanation of the reason as to why the tire iron was not tested for fingerprints.
[brief] [...]:  We're changing it for, for one reason.  You said you weren't here at the last meeting.  We did discuss it.  We're changing – the ordinance was written by my office.  The modifications were written by my office for the specific purpose of making sure that this ordinance is a noise nuisance ordinance and not a noise ordinance subject to the approval of the NJDEP, which is why the only changes relate to the elimination of the decibel readings and, and measures, and the ordinance – [...]: So it still eliminates the decibel reading?  It still eliminates it?  [...]: It eliminates the decibel level...  And we're going – what we're going to do is we're going to revisit that in a separate noise ordinance, so that that would be subject to DEP approval.  We want to make sure this ordinance is not subject to DEP approval.  [Pa63-64.]  The clear language of the Noise Ordinance, as well as its context within the Borough’s Code, also suggest that this is a nuisance ordinance.  The Noise Ordinance adds an “Article II” entitled “Noise Nuisances” to the presently existing Chapter 146 of the Borough Code, entitled “Nuisances”.
[brief] To be sure, this Court has affirmed the denial of a defendant’s request to proceed pro se where it appeared that the request was made solely for the purpose of postponing trial.  In *State v. Pessolano*, for instance, the defendant expressed dissatisfaction with his lawyer for four to five months leading up to trial and had consulted with other attorneys.  343 N.J. Super. 464, 473 n.4 (App. Div. 2001).  Yet, the defendant did not seek to obtain new counsel until the day trial commenced, at which point he moved for an adjournment.  *Id.* at 473.  When the judge ruled that counsel could be substituted only if immediately ready to proceed, the defendant requested to proceed pro se.  *Ibid.*  The judge denied the request, concluding that it was made “simply for purposes of delay,” and this Court affirmed.  *Id.* at 473 n.4.  See also *State v. Roth*, 289 N.J. Super. 152, 164-165 (App. Div. 1996) (trial judge properly denied defendant’s application to proceed pro se where defendant indicated he would seek an adjournment and the application “may have been nothing more than an attempt to postpone trial”).  Unlike in *Pessolano*, [...]’s request to represent himself was not a delay tactic.
[brief] ”  *Lajara*, 222 N.J. at 142.  The Court in *Lajara* found that a private-party’s right to a jury trial is triggered “because the IFPA provides legal relief in the form of compensatory and punitive damages and because an IFPA claim is comparable to common-law fraud. ”  *Id.* at 151.  The Court found that the defendants had a right to a jury trial due to claims brought by the insurance company plaintiffs under the IFPA.  *Id.* at 134-135, 151.  In contrast, in *Endo Surgi Ctr.*, 391 N.J. Super. at 594, the court found that “there is no right to a jury trial in an action for unpaid PIP benefits.
[brief] ”  State v. Gonzalez, No. A-3760-13T3, 2015 WL 9491939, at *2 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Dec. 31, 2015) (quoting and citing State v. Afanador, 151 N.J. 41, 52 (1997)).  Here, [...] filed a petition for post-conviction relief on April 28, 2017, related to newly discovered evidence: a recantation that [...] made to a fellow inmate, [...].
[brief] 30  Watkins v. Resorts Int’l Hotel & Casino, Inc., 124 N.J. 398 (1991)  ..............................................................................  30  Wisniewski v. Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co, 290 F.App’x 153 (3d Cir. 2010) ...............................................................  31  Wohlegmuth v. 560 Ocean Club, 302 N.J. Super. 306 (1997) .................................................................. 17 Woo-Padva v. Midland Funding, 2023 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1550, 2023 WL 6157245 (Sup. Ct. App. Div. Sept. 21, 2023) ......................................................... passim Woo-Padva v. Midland Funding, LLC, 2019 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1735, 2019 WL 3540494 (N.J. App. Div. Aug. 5, 2019) ............................................................................. passim Statutes N.J.S.A. 17:11C-33 ........................................................................................................... 33, 37 N.J.S.A. 2A: 16-53 .............................................................................................................. 12, 35 N.J.S.A. 2A:16-50 to 62 .................................................................................................... 33, 34 Rule 5:2-3 .......................................................................................................................... 25 Rule 6:2-3 ......................................................................................................................... passim COUNTER PRELIMINARY STATEMENT This appeal seeks to reverse the Decisions and Orders of the Honorable [...], J.S.C., of the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Special Civil Part, Bergen County (“Lower Court” or “trial court”), dated April 8, 2024 (“Denial Order”).
[brief] AN ACT providing for the ordering and making known that certain laws and joint resolutions have become inoperative and void, and amending sections 1:7-1 to 1:7-7, inclusive.  1  BE IT ENACTED by the Senate and General Assembly of the State of New Jersey:  1.  Section 1:7-1 of the Revised Statutes is amended to read as follows:  1:7-1.  If, at any time within one year after any law or joint resolution has been filed with the Secretary of State pursuant to sections 1:2-5, 1:2-6 or 1:2-7 of this Title, the Governor, or person administering the government, has reason to believe that any such law or joint resolution was not duly passed by both houses of Legislature, or approved by the Governor or otherwise made effective as law in the manner required by the Constitution, he may direct the Attorney-General to present a petition to the Appellate Division of the Superior Court, setting forth the facts and circumstances and praying that the law or joint resolution may be decreed adjudged to be null and void, whereupon the Attorney-General shall prepare, sign, present and prosecute the petition.
[brief] For over twenty years, New Jersey’s courts and legislature recognized that "insurance fraud is a problem of massive proportions that currently results in substantial and unnecessary costs to the general public in the form of increased rates."  *Merin v. Maglaki*, 126 N.J. 430, 436 (1992).  That is one reason why New Jersey law is cemented in its requirement that individuals, such as Appellant, are under an obligation to provide honest and truthful information to [...].  *See Ferrante v. N.J. Mfrs. Ins. Grp.*, 232 N.J. 460, 468 (2018) ("Our case law has routinely emphasized the importance of candor by insureds and the obligation to act in a forthright, open, and honest manner with their carriers throughout the entire process of their claim").  New Jersey’s Supreme Court has remained steadfast in that "[t]he right rule of law . . . is one that provides insureds with an incentive to tell the truth.  It would dilute that incentive to allow an insured to gamble that a lie will turn out to be unimportant."  *Citizens United Reciprocal Exch. v. Perez*, 223 N.J. 143, 151 (2015) (citing *Palisades Safety & Ins. Ass'n v. Bastien*, 175 N.J. 144, 148, 814 A.2d 619 (2003)).
[brief] While we appreciate and recognize Appellant’s recounting of the legal history of Title 19 in arguing that, going back to at least 1856, no corrections may be made to the results, it is curious that he stops in 1937.  Perhaps that is because in 1938, Title 19 was amended to include what is now N.J.S.A. 19:19-6.  This subchapter, N.J.S.A. 19:19-1, *et seq.*, deals with meetings of the Board of County Canvassers (i.e., the Board of Elections) to canvass and tabulate the results of an election.  In a Fire District election, the Board of Elections is only responsible for mail-in and provisional ballots, while the Fire District itself is responsible for machine ballots.  N.J.S.A. 40A:14-75; N.J.S.A. 40A:14-77.  However, in terms of responsibilities, the Fire District’s role is comparable to that of the Board of County Canvassers in that it is responsible for canvassing certain results.  *Id.*  After describing how the county canvassers may adjourn their meetings, the statute states—**without qualification**—that “the board is hereby authorized to reconvene **at any time** for the purpose of correcting any errors.
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[brief] This matter arises from an accident that occurred during the course of a roadway resurfacing project on the New Jersey Turnpike.  On July 11, 2014, plaintiffs’ decedent, [...], was acting in the course of his employment as a milling foreman for [...], the general contractor on the project, when he was involved in a fatal accident with a sweeper truck operated by codefendant [...] of [...].  On December 16, 2013, the [...] (“[...]”) issued a Request for Expressions of Interest relating to a project providing for the supervision of construction services (Pa1787).  In April 2014, [...], an architectural/engineering firm, was awarded a contract by the [...] to provide the professional engineering service contemplated by the Request for Expressions of Interest.  The contract was entitled, “[...]” --- \(^3\)  Portions of the lengthy procedural history of this matter unrelated to JMT have been omitted.  However, it is noted that the trial court proceedings did not terminate until plaintiffs’ claims against [...] and [...] were resolved in December 2023.  (Pa2280).  The [...] sought the “professional services required to provide supervision of construction services” for three construction projects “to ensure that the subject contracts are constructed in accordance with the Plan and Specifications” (Pa1787).  The subject construction work consisted primarily of the resurfacing of portions of the New Jersey Turnpike roadway (Pa1800).  B.
[brief] N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. v. Alloway Tp., 438 N.J. Super. 501, 512 (App. Div. 2015)  Twp. of Pennsauken v. Schad, 160 N.J. 156, 174 (1999)  Federal law: 15 U.S.C.S. 717r(b)
[brief] Such cases include matters involving statutory notice violations.  See e.g., Dolente v. Borough of Pine Hill, 313 N.J. Super. 410 (App. Div. 1998) (involving out-of-time challenge filed by Township counsel [...] following municipality’s failed compliance with the Open Public Meetings Act).  Courts have also granted significant extensions of time in cases where the “full nature and extent” of the government’s action “did not become apparent” until a subsequent application was filed on which the initial action was based.  See Adams v. DelMonte, 309 N.J. Super. 572, 582 (1998) (permitting nine month late challenge to zoning board’s determination that septic tank cleaning business was “home occupation” qualifying as a conditional use where subsequent site plan application to planning board revealed full aspect of the enterprise); Gregory v. Borough of Avalon, 391 N.J. Super. 181, 191 (App. Div. 2007) (enlarging time to contest governing body’s resolutions authorizing agreements to permit encroachments on municipal property required for land use application subsequently granted by planning board for motel expansion).
[brief] #  TABLE OF CITATIONS  ## CASE LAW | Citation | Pages | |-----------------------------------------------|-------| | Collins v. Virginia, 138 S. Ct. 1663 (2018) | 1,2,8,10,11,15 | | Florida v. Jardines, 135 S.Ct. 1409 (2013) | 3,8,9,10,11,15 | | Katz v. United States, 88 S.Ct. 507 (1967) | 3,8 | | Lawson v. Dewar, 468 N.J. Super. 128 (App. Div. 2021) | 4 | | State v. Adkins, 221 N.J. 300 (2015) | 12 | | State v. Caronna, 469 N.J. Super. 462 (App. Div. 201) | 1 | | State v. Earls, 214 N.J. 564 (2013) | 9,12 | | State v. Ingram, 474 N.J. Super. 522 (App. Div. 2023) | 10,11,12,14 | | State v. Johnson, 171 N.J. 192 (2002) | 11,12 | | State v. Missak, 476 N.J. Super. 302 (App. Div. 2023) | 14 | | State v. Wilson, 543 P.3d 440 (2024) | 12 | | State v. Wright, 221 N.J. 456 at 477 (2015) | 8,9,13,14 | | United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012) | 1,2,8,9,14,15 | | Wilson v. Hawaii, 604 U.S. ___ (2024) | 12 |
[brief] Plaintiff-Appellant, rather transparently, has tried to argue that a simple sidewalk apron constitutes a dangerous condition.  Plaintiff-Appellant argues that the Court below incorrectly concluded that there was no way to know what Defendants had done when they “rebuilt the sidewalk. ”  Plaintiff’s misconstrue, and misrepresent the colloquy held by the court, which was premised on the fact that because [...] had no documentary evidence upon which to rely for the proposition that the project was done negligently, his opinion defined a net opinion and was utterly baseless:  The Court: [[...]] has information that defendant worked on the sidewalk about 25 years ago on the sidewalk about 25 years ago.  Is there anything in this motion record, any rational evidence that the jury will hear as to what the defendant did or didn’t do 25 years ago?  [...]: No, Your Honor.  …  THE COURT: Was there any other facts presented to the expert as to what the defendant did or didn’t do to the sidewalk 25 years ago?  [...]: No, Your Honor.  There are no records available about the construction.  …  THE COURT: All right.  And there will be no -- and there will be no such facts induced at the time of trial, I would assume.  [...]: That is correct.  THE COURT: All right.  Is -- is Mr. [...]’s opinion that what the defendant did or didn’t do 25 years ago somehow contributed to the slope and the leak and the -- and the flowing of the wat -- the melting ice across the sidewalk?  Is that his opinion?
[brief] (Pa12).  Subsequently, [...]’s employer issued a Certification of Service and Final Salary, which certified that she would be resigning on January 31, 2022, and that her last pension contribution would be made on pay period “#4” of 2022 (covering January 29, 2022, through February 11, 2022).  (Pa14).  On or about December 28, 2021, [...] requested and was provided by the Division a quotation of retirement benefits, which reflected her selection of service retirement and effective retirement date of February 1, 2022.  (Pa16).  As stated in that quotation, she would have ten years and one month of service credit if she continued to work until January 28, 2022; and she would be entitled to life insurance benefits in the sum of $9,952.12 after retirement.  Ibid.  The beginning of the quotation letter also advised [...] that “[t]his Quotation of Retirement Benefits was prepared based on current information available in our system and projected information reported by your employer,” and that “[y]our benefit may be recalculated in the future due to an audit based on new information received from your employer or for a discrepancy in your account. ”  Ibid.  At its meeting of January 19, 2022, the Board approved [...]’s application for service retirement, effective February 1, 2022.
[brief] ”  (1T 24-23 to 24)  When [...] tried to confirm why he was under arrest, [...] again replied, “whatever you did today is what you’re under arrest for, but I can’t speak to you, because you’re under arrest for that.  . . .  [s]o I have to read you your rights at this point. ”  (1T 25-11 to 17)  [...] then read [...] his Miranda rights, and [...] signed a standard waiver form.  (1T 26-19 to 28-12)
[brief] It cited *Hopkins v. Fox & Lazo, Realtors*, 132 N.J. 426 (1993) as providing the basis for its ruling.  (Pa47-Pa48).  In *Hopkins*, the Supreme Court was addressing the issue of the duty that is owed to a plaintiff for a condition of a premises when the relationship between the plaintiff and defendant do not fit within the common law classifications, specifically the duty a real estate broker owes to a visitor of an open house that the broker is hosting for the sale of the property.  *Hopkins*, 132 N.J. at 432; 434-435.  It ruled that a real estate broker has a duty to conduct a reasonable broker’s inspection when such an inspection would comport with the customary standards governing the responsibilities and functions of real estate brokers with respect to open house tours which would impose a limited duty on the broker to warn visitors of discoverable physical features or conditions of the property that pose a danger to the visitors.  *Id.* at 444-445.  The Supreme Court noted the owners of the property remains primarily liable for the safety of all invitees on the property and they owe their invitees a duty “to make reasonable inspections of the property and to remedy any reasonably discoverable defects. ”  *Id.* at 441.  It is respectfully submitted that *Hopkins* is not controlling in this matter.
[brief] *State v. Whitaker*, 200 N.J. 444, 465 (2009) (quoting *R.* 2:10-2).  “Not any possibility of an unjust result will suffice as plain error, only ‘one sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt as to whether the error led the jury to a result it otherwise might not have reached. ’”  *State v. Coclough*, 459 N.J. Super. 45, 51 (App. Div. 2019) (quoting *State v. Macon*, 57 N.J. 325, 336 (1971)).  [...]’s testimony was proper and its admission did not amount to error at all, let alone plain error.
[brief] **B.  People believe that forensic results are very rarely inaccurate. **  Most people believe that the error rate associated with forensic disciplines is negligible or very, very low.  Some may even believe some well-known disciplines, such as DNA and fingerprint evidence, are infallible.  This is due to the questionable information sources ordinary people draw on for information about forensic techniques (*see supra*, Point I and Point II, A) as well as the fact that forensic analysts used to claim that mistakes were extremely rare or impossible without evidence to support those claims.
[brief] (7)  The cost of living.  (8)  The continuity and stability of employment including seniority rights and such other factors not confined to the foregoing which are ordinarily or traditionally considered in the determination of wages, hours, and conditions of employment through collective negotiations and collective bargaining between the parties in the public service and in private employment.  (9)  Statutory restrictions imposed on the employer.  [Emphasis supplied.]  The arbitrator’s decision must be accompanied by a written report explaining how each of the statutory criteria played into the arbitrator’s determination of the final award.