ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] No-Fault Arbitrators are the clear experts in making these decision as they are required to have at least ten years’ experience in the field, are appointed by an equally balanced advisory panel of representatives for both healthcare providers and insurance carriers as well as a representative of the New Jersey Department of Banking and Insurance.  Most arbitrators are prior No-Fault attorneys or retired judges with decades of experience in the field.  See, Forthright Rules Governing the Advisory Council for Arbitration of No-Fault Disputes In the State of New Jersey.  [...], following the lead of multiple U.S. District Court judges who have addressed the issue of arbitrability in prior cases, made the correct decision by holding that the dispute presented by [...] in its complaint, most of which seeks declaratory relief, constituted a coverage dispute and, therefore, must be arbitrated under the mandatory No-Fault law.  (C.C.Da.150-57).  The Appellate Court is urged to affirm this correct determination based upon the express language of the AICRA statute and strong public policy favoring arbitration over litigation.
[brief] On October 9, 2020, a Complaint was filed in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Burlington County on behalf of Plaintiff [...] against Defendants [...], [...], [...] and a number of fictitiously identified parties.  (Da1 to 9).  In his Complaint, Plaintiff alleged that on December 1, 2018, he was driving a car which was struck from behind while stopped in the drive-through lane of a McDonalds restaurant in Mount Laurel, New Jersey.  The car which struck his was driven by Defendant Huggins, owned by Defendant Byrd and entrusted to Huggins by Byrd’s son, Defendant Forde.  Plaintiff sought compensatory damages for injuries he allegedly suffered in the accident.
[brief] This matter should be remanded for an evidentiary hearing in which the court could assess the credibility of the witness and inquire into the reasons for counsel’s failure to call this witness, who could only have helped petitioner’s case.  CONCLUSION  Based upon the foregoing, petitioner respectfully urges this Court to remand for (1) an evidentiary hearing to determine trial counsel’s reasons for not calling [...] as a witness and whether this omission constituted ineffective assistance of counsel; and (2) for re-sentencing to a different judge who has not already ruled on the legality and fairness of petitioner’s sentence.  Respectfully submitted, [...]
[brief] Plaintiff is Terminated in Retaliation for Protected Activity.  Defendant [...] has a progressive discipline policy, a four-step process including the following steps: 1) verbal warning; 2) written warning; 3) suspension and, finally, 4) termination.  (Pa656).  Prior to September 2020, a group of Defendant [...]’s managers and directors had been caught entering time as time worked when they were, in fact, on vacation.  (Pa669).  As salaried employees, doing so entitled them to significant payouts of unused PTO time when such time was “cashed out. ”  (Pa669).  The employees who had participated in this scheme were not terminated and, instead, were only required to pay the money back to Defendant [...].  (Pa669).  To terminate an employee, Defendant [...] was required to work with Defendant [...].  (Pa664).  Ultimately, however, it is up to Defendant [...] to make a recommendation for termination.  (Pa664).  Despite the fact that Defendant [...] had an open HR complaint pending against her, Defendant [...] did not believe it was a conflict of interest to consult with her regarding the employment decisions made with regard to Plaintiff, [...], and [...].  (Pa118).  Once a request for termination is made, the request proceeds to Defendant’s “termination panel. ” (Pa664).  Defendant [...], working with Defendant [...], recommended immediate termination (skipping all of the stages of the progressive discipline policy) for Plaintiff, [...], and [...] and the action was approved by the panel.  (Pa52).  Plaintiff and [...] were terminated on September 14, 2020, while [...] as terminated on September 17, 2020.  (Pa667).  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I THERE IS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD TO DENY SUMMARY
[brief] No. [...]) (SOICR p. 13) (Staff also listed these as S-4):  .........................  H1281a [...] response to RCR-ENG-15 ...............................  H1285a [...] response to RCR-ENG-16 ...............................  H1286a [...] response to RCR-ENG-17 ...............................  H1287a RC-5: Cover letter dated May 18, 2017 and [...] responses to discovery requests RCR-ENG-18 and -19 (BPU Docket.
[brief] S-16: Holmdel cover letter and responses to NJNG discovery requests NJNG-HOLM-BLM-1 to -30 dated March 31, 2020 by [...] (see also P-13 to -25) (SOICR p. 9)  ........................................  H1709a  Attachment 1: List of [...]’s service on FERC natural gas transportation and storage matters .........................  H1728a  S-17: Holmdel cover letter and responses to NJNG discovery requests NJNG-HOLM-DM-1 to -29 by [...] (see also P-26) (SOICR p. 9)
[brief] The defendants refused to provide complete information.  In fact, when [...] attempted in late summer 2019 to coordinate with [...] on this, [...] responded: “please never mention [[...]’s] fucking name to me.  I see him in court if he wants to.  He is DEAD to me. ”  (Da7307).  When [...] asked [...] to sign an affidavit to resolve the tax issue in October 2019, [...] responded: “NO fucking way.  No fucking way I sign anything for anyone.  File a fucking suit.  Never ever mention [[...]’s] fucking name to me again if [you] want to stay my CPA. ”  (Da7309).  A few months later, [...] demanded to know if [...] gave [...] the [...] QuickBooks files.  When [...] said that he didn’t, [...] responded that [...] was now suing him for “7.5 million dollars. ” (Da7306).  If that weren’t repudiation enough, the defendants took the position throughout this entire lawsuit that Plaintiffs’ claims were frivolous.  (37T 74:21 to 75:13; Da2548).  But even if Plaintiffs’ demands were not sufficient, any demand requirement should be excused here as futile.
[brief] When those motions were denied earlier this year, discovery began.  From reviewing the parties’ submissions, it is clear that the parties have already expended much time and energy working through various discovery-related issues.  A few weeks ago, the § 10(b) Plaintiffs requested the opportunity to file a supplemental complaint that concerns alleged misstatements beginning September 20, 2019.  The Supplemental Complaint also seeks to extend the alleged § 10(b) class period from December 18, 2017—September 17, 2019 (as originally proposed by Plaintiffs) to December 18, 2017—January 23, 2020.  By separate order, I have granted Plaintiffs leave to file the Supplemental Complaint.  See Dkt. 216.
[brief] "1T" denotes suppression motion dated August 16, 2022.  "2T" denotes reconsideration motion dated February 3, 2023.  "3T" denotes plea transcript dated July 10, 2023.  "4T" denotes sentencing transcript dated September 22, 2023.  contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4a(1) (Count 2), Unlawful Possession of Weapons - First Degree, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5b(1) (Count 3), and Resisting Arrest - Fourth Degree, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:29-2a(2) (Count 4).  (Da6-10).  On that same day (July 10, 2023), defendant pleaded guilty to Count 1 as amended (Aggravated Manslaughter - First Degree) with a recommended 17 year NERA sentence.
[directive] Printed Name Preparer T& of and .- Zip Address.  City. State, Code 3, Fax I Number Number Telephone SigMtwe Preparer of Date County Proseata of Signature tbe Date . - <:6 ~ p s m c . ~ om998 in Page B llof FMTI  N 11  Municipal Forfeiture Program Reports rA: I 0310 1 198  AII  Forfeiture Program Administrators
[brief] In their opposition, Plaintiffs attempt to argue that the issue of conflict of interest was never disputed and that the trial court rightfully found the conflict under the Local Government Ethics Law (LGEL).  This mischaracterizes the record.  The Defendants, from the outset, contended that no conflict of interest exists with respect to their votes on the re-hiring of [...].  While Plaintiffs now focus on the LGEL as the basis of their claim, it is important to underscore that Defendants raised substantive arguments challenging both the existence of a conflict and the jurisdiction of the trial court.  The opposition incorrectly implies that the Defendants’ attack on the complaint was limited to procedural or technical grounds.  On the contrary, Defendants consistently maintained that there is no actual conflict under the law and that the trial court erred in its findings.  Furthermore, the Defendants argued that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, as the LGEL vests the exclusive authority for determining ethical conflicts in the Local Finance Board, not the courts.  Plaintiffs brief ignores these key substantive arguments, instead asserting that the trial court’s ruling should stand based on general principles of conflict of interest without regard to the applicable statutory framework.  As the Defendants have argued throughout, the issue of whether a conflict exists was improperly adjudicated by the trial court, and the resolution of this matter should have been left to the Local Finance Board, which is empowered and uniquely equipped to handle such disputes under the LGEL.  It is also important to note that Plaintiffs never moved to amend their complaint to assert a common law conflict of interest claim.  Despite relying on both statutory and common law principles in their opposition, Plaintiffs did not plead a common law cause of action in the trial court.  This failure is significant, as the complaint solely alleged a violation of the LGEL.  Plaintiffs now attempt to retroactively introduce common law arguments to justify the trial court’s ruling, yet they failed to seek an amendment that would have appropriately placed those issues before that court.  Without such an amendment, the trial court was not presented with, nor did it have jurisdiction to rule on, a purported common law conflict of interest claim.  Defendants have consistently argued that the complaint, as framed, was insufficient to provide the relief Plaintiffs sought, and Plaintiffs’ attempt to reframe the issue on appeal is unavailing.  LEGAL ARGUMENT I.
[brief] Div. 2013) ......................................................... 42 | Authority | Page | |--------------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | In re Eisenberg, | 27 | | 75 N.J. 454 (1978) | | | In re LiVolsi, | 24, 28| | 85 N.J. 576 (1981) | | | In re Stein, | 27 | | 97 N.J. 550 (1984) | | | JK Harris Fin. Recovery Sys. v. Dept. of Fin. Insts., | 38, 39| | 718 N.W. 2d 739 (Wis. Ct. App. 2006) | | | Knight v. City of Margate, | passim| | 86 N.J. 374 (1981) | | | Lee v. First Union Nat’l Bank, | 28 | | 199 N.J. 251 (2009) | | | Matter of Primus, | 47, 48| | 436 U.S. 412 (1978) | | | National Assn. for Advancement of Colored People v. Button, | 47 | | 371 U.S. 415 (1963) | | | Persels & Assocs., LLC v. Banking Comm’r, | 25, 37, 39| | 122 A.3d 592 (Conn. 2015) | | | Planned Parenthood of Cent. N.J. v. Farmer, | 21 | | 165 N.J. 609 (2000) | | | Siegler Co. v. Norton, | 23 | | 8 N.J. 374 (1952) | | | State v. Higginbotham, | 42, 48| | 475 N.J. Super. 205 (App. Div. 2023) | | | State v. Packard-Bamberger, | 41 | | 123 N.J.L. 180 (1939) | | | State v. Rogers, | 33 | | 308 N.J. Super. 59 (App. Div. 1998) | | | TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (cont’d) | PAGE | |-------------------------------|------| | Templo Fuente v. Nat’l Union Fire, | 19 | | 224 N.J. 189 (2016) | | | Toxaway Hotel Co. v. J.L. Smathers & Co., | 44 | | 216 U.S. 439 (1910) | | | United Prop. Owners Ass’n of Belmar v. Borough of Belmar, | 45 | | 343 N.J. Super. 1 (App. Div. 2001) | | | United Transp. Union v. State Bar of Michigan, | 47 | | 401 U.S. 576 (1971) | | | Vort v. Hollander, | 27 | | 257 N.J. Super. 56 (App. Div. 1992) | | | Winberry v. Salisbury, | 23 | | 5 N.J. 240 (1950) | | **STATUTES** | 42 U.S.C. § 1983 | 49 | | N.J.S.A. 10:6-2(c) | 49 | | N.J.S.A. 10:6-2(f) | 49 | | N.J.S.A. 17:16G-1 | passim | | N.J.S.A. 17:16G-1(c) (2) (a) | 6 | | N.J.S.A. 17:16G-2 | 6 | | N.J.S.A.
[brief] The Duties of a Policeman  Every police officer has an inherent duty to obey the law and to enforce it.  That duty is essential to the preservation of a free society.  Its absence makes the law enforcer lawless, permitting violence, oppression and injustice.  Thus, in State v. Cohen, supra, the court said:  A police officer has the recognized duty to use all reasonable means to enforce the laws applicable to his jurisdiction, and to apprehend violators.  . . .  A police officer may not himself violate the laws he is sworn to enforce applicable in his jurisdiction . . . , and such officer is criminally responsible under a charge of misconduct in office when either he himself commits, or he solicits others to commit, the crimes which defendant attempted to persuade the meter collectors and repairman to execute.  Such acts, carried to a conclusion, would be criminal per se, and we perceive a clear duty incumbent upon a police officer not to act in such a manner.  [32 N.J. at 9-10]  Driscoll v. Burlington Bristol Bridge Co. Inc., 8 N.J. 433 (1952), held that public officers have a duty "to serve the public with the highest fidelity . . . to be diligent and conscientious, to exercise their discretion not arbitrarily but reasonably, . . . to display good faith, honesty and integrity, . . . to be impervious to corrupting influences.  . . ."  Id. at 474-476.  State v. Stevens, 203 N.J. Super. 59, 65-66 (Law Div. 1984) (Pa 323-327)  On one hand the Chancery Division acknowledges they refused but, on the other hand, promotes that the granting of adjournments after compelling plaintiff to file suit or seek judicial relief somehow stops the accrual of the violations of the NJCRA (N.J.S.A. 10:6-2) (Pa 175-176).  Plaintiff maintains that the Chancery Division Judge was not competent enough to properly interpret the rules pertaining to actions of in lieu of prerogative writs, nor the Civil Rights Acts.  Plaintiff maintains that the denial of his statutory right on more than one occasion in turn denied his State Constitutional right to be free from harassment, discrimination, and retaliation.  Plaintiff maintains that the Law Against Discrimination also secures the same rights under statutory law, and that these State laws were ignored by the Chancery Division Judge, demonstrating that she relied on irrelevant factors in her decision.  Thus, based on the foregoing reasons and facts one (1) through thirty (30), the court should reverse because chancery division judge was not competent to adjudicate the action in lieu of prerogative writs.
[brief] ”) (Pra051); Delso v. Trs. for Ret. Plan for Hourly Emps. of Merck & Co., No. 04–3009 (AET), 2007 WL 766349, at *5 (D.N.J. Mar. 6, 2007) (“In addition to clients, adversaries have standing to raise conflict of interests issues”) (Pra055); Schiffli Embroidery Workers Pension Fund v. Ryan, Beck & Co., No. 91-5433, 1994 WL 62124, *2 (D.N.J. Feb. 23, 1994) (disqualification motions not limited to current or former clients; “attorneys are required to come forward and report actual or potential ethics violations”) (Pra067); Tibbott v. N. Cambria Sch. Dist., No. 16-5, 2017 WL 2570904, at *3 (W.D. Pa. June 13, 2017) (Pra073).  Standing is best characterized through the lens of [...]’s reduction of the inquiry to the “rude question sometimes posed when one person challenges another’s actions: ‘What’s it to you?’”  [...], The Rude Question of Standing in Attorney Disqualification Disputes, 25 Am. J. Trial Advoc. 17, 22 (2001) (quoting [...], The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation of Powers, 17 Suffolk U.L. Rev. 881, 882 (1983)).
[brief] Withholding Irrelevant Documents From Responsive Families  As noted by the Special Master, the ruling allowing certain irrelevance redactions largely moots the second issue: whether the producing party can withhold irrelevant parent documents from responsive families.  Indeed, it would make little difference if the producing party provides a fully redacted document or does not provide the document at all.  Thus, the Court adopts the Report as it pertains to allowing the producing party to withhold irrelevant documents from responsive families.  The parties shall follow the Bates-numbering procedure set forth in the Report and shall produce a list or slip sheet for the removed documents, as set forth in the Report.  Further, the producing party shall provide contextual information for any withheld parent document, as provided in the Report.  An irrelevant document is a document falling within one of the seven categories listed above, so long as it contains no information related to airbags.
[brief] II.  THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY GRANTED DEFENDANT’S CROSS-MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS UNOPPOSED.  (Order at Pa27 to Pa28; Opinion at T14-15 to T15-18).  The trial court’s decision to grant Defendant’s cross-motion for summary judgment as unopposed constitutes a significant error, potentially resulting from an overemphasis on procedural technicalities to the detriment of substantive justice.  This decision ignored the substantive opposition presented by Plaintiff during oral arguments, which highlighted significant disputes over material facts essential to the resolution of the case.  This section will elaborate on the errors involved and reinforce the need for this decision to be reversed.
[directive] Procedure  In accordance with Rule 2:11-3(c) the Appellate Division opinion shall be transmitted to the clerk of the court.  The Trial Court Administrator in his or her capacity as Deputy Clerk of the Superior Court will receive copies of all opinions.  Copies are also to be transmitted to the Criminal Division Manager, the Criminal Presiding Judge, and the trial judge.  The Criminal Division Manager shall consult with the Criminal Presiding Judge and determine what, if any, action is needed in order to adhere to the decision of the Appellate Division.  Directive # 5-06 April 13, 2006
[brief] The authority involved in the regulation of noise in New Jersey spans multiple statutes and regulations.  While statutes *in pari materia* are to be read together, it is well-recognized that “[w]hen there is a conflict between a general and specific act on the same subject, the latter shall prevail. ”  *Kingsley v. Wes Outdoor Advertising Co.*, 55 N.J. 336, 339 (1970).  In other words, “where there is any conflict between a general and specific statute covering a subject in a more minute and definite way the latter will prevail over the former and will be considered an exception to the general statute[.]”  *State v. Hotel Bar Foods*, 18 N.J. 115, 128 (1955)(quoting *Hackensack Water Co. v. Division of Tax Appeals*, 2 N.J. 157 (1949)).
[brief] In its complaint, Relator alleged that its analysis of historical VRDO transactional data showed that Defendants failed to meet their “remarketing agent” obligations to VRDO issuers, thereby violating the NJFCA.  See Ja1984 (Compl. ¶ 2), Ja1989 (¶ 26), Ja1991 (¶ 36), Ja1996–98 (¶¶ 62, 68); Ja9 (4AC ¶ 2), Ja15–16 (¶ 30), Ja62 (¶ 164), Ja90 (¶ 231), Ja93 (¶ 239).  Relator claims that the analysis shows that Defendants engaged in a “Robo-Resetting” scheme in which Defendants “mechanically set [VRDO] rates en masse” by “bucketing” dissimilar bonds “without any consideration of the individual characteristics of the bonds or the associated market conditions or investor demand. ”  Ja1984 (Compl. ¶ 2), Ja1991 (¶ 36); see also Ja9 (4AC ¶ 2), Ja62 (¶ 164).  3  “Robo-Resetting” is not a term used in the securities industry; but is, instead, a term that Relator invented for the purpose of this litigation.  Commonwealth ex rel. Rosenberg v. JPMorgan Chase & Co., No. SUCV2014-03323-BLS1, 2019 WL 3643035, at *2 n.4, *4 (Mass. Super. Ct. July 23, 2019), aff’d sub nom. Rosenberg v. JPMorgan Chase & Co., 169 N.E.3d 445 (Mass. 2021).  Relator’s expert who conducted the analysis used raw data obtained from the Short-term Obligation Subscription Service (“MSRB SHORT”) offered by the [...].
[brief] In New Jersey, the Appellate Court's de novo review applies to the validity and enforceability of arbitration agreements, as well as the applicability and scope of such agreements.  *Hirsch v. Amper Financial Services, LLC*, 215 N.J. 174 (2013).  Essentially, the Appellate Court reviews the trial court's legal determinations with no special deference to the trial court's conclusions.  *Id.*  This standard is consistent across various cases, emphasizing that the Appellate Court does not defer to the trial court's interpretative analysis but instead conducts its own independent review.  *Id.*  For this appeal, the Order entered by the trial judge is a final order.  See R. 2:2-3(a).  **II.
[brief] Moreover, Plaintiffs could not and did not state any legal malpractice claims against [...] arising out of their failure to advise Plaintiffs that [...] was the sole member of [...].  Through the long, often-obstructed, often-delayed, and hard-fought pursuit of discovery, Plaintiffs uncovered that [...] was the sole member of [...] at all times relevant to this matter, first by way of a Mortgage dated May 7, 2008 (570a), executed by [...] as sole member of [...].  Upon discovery of the Mortgage, Plaintiffs filed a Motion to Vacate the Orders of November 16, 2016, and December 20, 2016.  In response to said Motion, counsel for [...], [...], Esq., and counsel for [...], [...], Esq., continued to maintain that [...] was owned solely by Teddy [...].  In their arguments to the Court, [...] and [...] pointed to the deposition testimonies of [...], [...], [...], and [...] in another matter and proffered for the first time in this litigation the Collateral Assignment (96a), to support their representation that [...] was solely owned by Teddy [...] (52a)².  Based on the aforesaid misrepresentations, the Collateral Assignment was alleged to be the only reason [...] executed the Mortgage, and the Trial Court erroneously denied Plaintiffs’ Motion to Vacate on April 3, 2018.
[brief] *Shaler ex rel. Shaler v. Toms River Obstetrics & Gynecology Associates*, 383 N.J. Super. 650, 662 (App. Div. 2006), certif. denied, 187 N.J. 82 (2006); *F.S. v. L.D.*, 362 N.J. Super. 161, 166 (App. Div. 2003); *Sears Roebuck and Co. v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins.  Co.*, 340 N.J. Super. 223, 234 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 169 N.J. 608 (2001).  Moreover, the courts have made clear that policy terms setting forth coverage that are clear and unambiguous must be enforced as written, in accordance with their “plain, ordinary meaning,” rather than writing for the insured a better insurance policy than the one purchased.  *Harleysville Ins. Cos. v. Garitta*, 170 N.J. 223, 231 (2001); *Zacarias v. Allstate Ins. Co.*, 168 N.J. 590, 595 (2001); *Gibson v. Callaghan*, 158 N.J. 662, 670 (1999).
[brief] (BTG Cert. Exhibit M is a copy of an email August 22, 2017 which was sent from [...] to the Borough Administrator at the time, [...].)  [...]’s interest in the property was completely unrelated to the Redeveloper.  In it, [...] states that he “wanted to share the Concepts Sketch based upon the CADD plans."  In fact, it was [...] who engaged the engineer firm, [...] and commissioned the sketches to be done not by the Borough, as stated by [...].