ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Second, Plaintiff’s argument that “three prior backup/crushing incidents” satisfy the “intentional wrong” exception to the Act is without merit.  Pb41.  The prior incidents are all patently, factually dissimilar to the accident that resulted in [...]’s death.  Pa368a-91a.  Indeed, the prior accidents were that, in September 2003, a [...] employee was fatally injured when a milling machine tipped over onto him during a runway resurfacing project at Newark Airport.  See id.  In October 2004, a dump truck driver who as not a [...] employee was fatally injured when he got out of his vehicle and was struck by a water truck driven by a [...] employee on a milling/paving project.  See id.  In October 2008, a New Jersey Department of Transportation inspector was injured when he was struck by a truck driven by a non-[...] employee on a milling/paving project.  See id.  And in August 2010, a nuclear thickness surveyor and non-[...] employee was injured when she was struck by a pickup truck driven by a [...] employee on a miller/paving project.  See id.  Notably, none of the aforementioned accidents involved [...] or [...] or any of the alleged issues that Plaintiff and her experts alleged to be contributing causes (e.g., inadequate lighting, lack of flagmen/spotters, no assigned dump trucks, no written internal traffic plans).  See id.  Where, as here, the prior incidents — the most recent of which was four years before [...]’s accident — are factual dissimilar to the circumstances alleged to have caused the employee-plaintiff’s injuries, the “intentional wrong” exception to the Act is not satisfied.  See Fermaintt ex rel. Est. of Lawlor v. McWane, Inc., 694 F. Supp. 2d 339, 342 (D.N.J. 2010)(finding no intentional wrong where prior injury caused by falling pipes did not occur as a result of the disabled safety mechanism plaintiff alleged caused his injury); Calavano v. Fed. Plastics Corp., No. A-0353-09T1, 2010 WL 3257784, at *6 (App. Div. Aug. 18, 2010) (finding no intentional wrong where two prior injuries occurred on different machines, and one prior injury occurred on the same machine but while performing a different function). 2  Stated simply, Plaintiff failed to present evidence of an intentional act that [...] knew was substantially certain to result in injury or death to Mr. [...].  Therefore, the trial court did not err by granting summary judgment in [...]’s favor, and trial court’s decision should be affirmed.
[brief] This primary role of the parents in the upbringing of their children is now established beyond debate as an enduring American tradition”); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255, 98 S.Ct. 549, 54 L.Ed.2d 511 (1978) (“We have recognized on numerous occasions that the relationship between parent and child is constitutionally protected”); Parham v. J. R., 442 U.S. 584, 602, 99 S.Ct. 2493, 61 L.Ed.2d 101 (1979) (“Our jurisprudence historically has reflected Western civilization concepts of the family as a unit with broad parental authority over minor children.  Our cases have consistently followed that course”); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753, 102 S.Ct. 1388, 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982) (discussing “[t]he fundamental liberty interest of natural parents in the care, custody, and management of their child”); Glucksberg, supra, at 720, 117 S.Ct. 2258 (“In a long line of cases, we have held that, in addition to the specific freedoms protected by the Bill of Rights, the ‘liberty’ specially protected by the Due Process Clause includes the righ[t] ... to direct the education and upbringing of one's children” (citing Meyer and Pierce)).
[brief] (See AA42 (emphasis added). )  As such, the [...] and [...]’s consideration of the significant issues in [...]’s background was consistent with the [...]’s prohibition on considering “negative performance notices, oral reprimands and written reprimands . . . for progressive discipline purposes”.  List bypass and list removal are not disciplinary actions at all, let alone disciplinary actions subject to progressive discipline principles for which the [...] language would be applicable.
[brief] The Parties’ Contentions on the Rule 4:50 Motion before [...]  Plaintiff maintained that the marital settlement agreements culminating in the Final Judgment of Divorce were understood and agreed to fully by defendant and that there was no basis to disturb them or grant defendant relief from them.  Defendant – now armed with legal counsel of her own -- said that the process leading to the March 18, 2015 judgment, and the substantive result, were improper and unfair to her as the dependent spouse.  [...] was an attorney and real estate developer who’d made millions of dollars in various ventures; [...] was a high school educated immigrant.
[brief] SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY  APPELLATE DIVISION  DOCKET NO. [...]  Submitted: November 1, 2024  ON APPEAL FROM A FINAL ORDER OF THE SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY, LAW DIVISION, [...]  Sat  Below: Hon. [...], J.S.C.  REPLY  BRIEF OF APPELLANT INTERESTED  PARTY  [...]  URBAN RENEWAL  SEEKING ENFORCEMENT OF THE TRIAL COURT’S CONDITIONAL JUDGMENT  COMPELLING THE [...] TO BUILD AFFORDABLE HOUSING
[brief] Further, as the PCR court found, even if the disparity claim was not raised previously, it could have been.  Defendant could have raised such a claim at his original sentencing, direct appeal, resentencing hearing, or the appeal of his resentencing.  Accordingly, the PCR court properly found the claim procedurally barred.  Nevertheless, the PCR court considered and properly found defendant’s disparate sentence claim was meritless.  Defendant was not similarly situated to his co-defendants.  As that State argued on appeal from his resentencing and below in opposition to his PCR petition, the co-defendants were not facing the same charges as defendant.  Contrary to defendant’s claim, co-defendant [...] was not named in any of the counts from the Gola incident.  (Db40, 42-55).  Defendant alone was indicted for the crimes related to the Gola home invasion, which accounted for 46 years of his aggregate sentence and 39.1 years of his parole disqualifier.  (Da42-55, 192-96).  Similarly, defendant alone was indicted for the crimes related to the March 29, 2011 motor-vehicle stop, which accounted for an additional six years of his aggregate sentence and forty-two months of his parole disqualifier.  (Da8-9, 192-96).  Further, defendant was not similarly situated to his co-defendants because he was not acquitted of all the charges and did not plead guilty or cooperate.  Instead, defendant proceeded to trial where the jury convicted him of, as the PCR court found, multiple first- and second-degree crimes, many with periods of mandatory parole ineligibility.  (21T14-18 to 23).  Co-defendant [...], however, was acquitted of all his offenses following the jury trial with defendant.  (18T32-25 to 40-10).  Co-defendant [...] pled guilty to one count of second-degree conspiracy to commit kidnapping and received a five-year sentence with 85% to be served without parole.  (Da286-89).  Co-defendant [...] pled guilty to one amended count of third-degree conspiracy to commit theft, received a five-year flat prison sentence, agreed to provide a truthful statement at trial, and received the benefit of mitigating factor (12).  (Da290-92; see N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1b(12)).  At the time of defendants’ trial, the charges against [...] for his involvement in the crimes in this case has been dismissed pursuant to a federal plea agreement and he was not charged under the same State indictment with the defendants.  (8T89-2 to 4, 90-24 to 92-18).  Accordingly, defendant was not similarly situation to his co-defendants.  Based on the foregoing, the State submits that the PCR court properly denied defendant’s disparate sentencing claim.  The State respectfully requests that this Court affirm.  POINT II: THE PCR COURT PROPERLY DENIED DEFENDANT’S INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF SENTENCING COUNSEL CLAIM.
[brief] ”  *Id.* at 698.  Animals”); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-18-9A(1) (“Dog fighting and cockfighting; penalty); N.Y. C.L.S. Agr. & M. § 351(4)(b), (5)(b) (“Prohibition of animal fighting”); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-362 (“Cockfighting”); N.D. Cent. Code, § 36-21.1-07(2) (“Cockfights, dogfights, and other exhibitions prohibited – Penalties”); O.R.C. Ann. 959.15(C) (“Animal fights”); 21 Okl. St. § 1692.6 (“Spectators”); O.R.S. § 167.431(1)(a) (“Participation in cockfighting”); 18 Pa.C.S. § 5543(6) (“Animal fighting”); 5 L.P.R.A. § 1671(b)(1) (“Fights”); R.I. Gen. Laws § 4-1-11 (“Attendance at bird or animal fight”); S.C. Code Ann. § 16-27-40(b) (“Acts constitution misdemeanors . . . felonies”); S.D. Codified Laws § 40-1-10.1 (“Dog fighting – Penalty”); Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-14-203(a)(4) (“Cock and animal fighting – Cock fighting paraphernalia”); Tex. Penal Code § 42.10 (“Dog Fighting”); Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-301.5 (“Spectator at organized animal fighting exhibitions”); 13 V.S.A. § 364 (“Animal fights”); Va. Code Ann. § 3.2-6571(A)(2) (“Animal fighting; penalty”); Rev. Code Wash. § 16.52.117(1)(b) (“Animal fighting – Prohibited behavior – Penalty – Exemptions”); W. Va. Code § 61-8-19b(a) (“Attendance at animal fighting ventures prohibited; penalty”); Wis. Stat. § 951.08(3) (“Instigating fights between animals”); Wyo. Stat. § 6-3-1003(b) (“. . . attending fowl or dog fights . . . ”).
[brief] ”  Branch, 182 N.J. at 354, 865 A.2d 673.  We emphasize that the seriousness of the constitutional violation—or in this case, the combined effect of two distinct Sixth Amendment violations—is an important consideration in determining the appropriate remedy.  We also reiterate and stress that the State shoulders the burden to convince us beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury verdict would have been the same in the absence of the Confrontation Clause violations.  Ibid.; Irving, 114 N.J. at 447, 555 A.2d 575.  The beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard is a formidable threshold to mount.  In view of that demanding standard, we cannot declare our belief that the repeated Confrontation Clause errors did not have the capacity to cause an unjust result.  *Branch*, 182 N.J. at 354, 865 A.2d 673 (citing R. 2:10-2); cf. *Watson*, —— N.J. Super. at ——— (slip op. at 64) (concluding that because the officer's “fleeting hearsay testimony—essentially a three-word answer to the prosecutor's problematic question—[had not] ‘tipped the scales’ as in *Branch* ... [,]” the Confrontation Clause violation was harmless constitutional error).  We are thus constrained to vacate defendant's convictions and remand for a new trial.
[brief] **CONCLUSION**  Justice [...] of the New Jersey Supreme Court wisely cautioned that the law is “not simply a minuet scored for [litigants] to prance through on pain of losing the dance contest should they trip. ”  Stone v. Township of Old Bridge, 111 N.J. 110, 125 (1988).  To paraphrase Justice Clifford’s words, I was never even permitted to hear the music or invited to the dance contest before I was told by the [...] that I had lost.
[brief] The trial court correctly concluded that [...] is precluded from enacting an Ordinance regulating high-capacity 69kV transmission lines pursuant to In re PSE&G. (Da007a).  [...] cannot rely on the authority of N.J.S.A. 48:7-1 as a basis to defend the validity of its Ordinance as applied to high-capacity power lines.  Pursuant to In re PSE&G, the Ordinance provisions are invalid as a matter of law.  The [...] Ordinance provisions precisely implicate — and run afoul of – the statutory and public policy concerns identified by the Supreme Court.  As with the Roselle ordinance, [...]’s Ordinance “specif[ies] standards for such installation as well as the requirement of filing plans and specifications and the obtaining of a municipal permit before any such line could be lawfully constructed or maintained. ”  35 N.J. at 363.  As posited by the trial court, preemption of the [...] Ordinance is required because the consent authority conferred by N.J.S.A. 48:7-1 does not, as a matter of law, apply to high-capacity power lines.  Hence, the [...] Ordinance is preempted for this reason alone.  B.
[brief] Appellant set forth details regarding the retaliation claim which are included in the record and documented in the Appellant’s Brief which support this claim.  As noted previously, on May 2, 2019, [...] and students from [...]’s class came to speak with Appellant and Ms.  Shelton because [...] was using a racial slur, the N Word.  Per Taylor v. Metzger, the use of a racial slur creates a hostile work environment.  Taylor v. Metzger, 152 N.J. 490 (1988).  On May 2, 2019, the actions of [...] were video recorded by the students with details documented in a letter to [...], the Superintendent for Human Resources.  The video of [...] using the N word was also sent to [...].  After the letter from Appellant and [...] was received by [...], [...] gave the letter and video to [...].  Seven days later, both [...] and Appellant were provided with written notice that their contracts would not be renewed.  On the document that lists all of the persons being non-renewed, adjacent to Appellant’s name, the reason for the non-renewal is not documented.  The area on the form adjacent to [...]’s name also lacks documentation of the reason for the non-renewal.  There is a causal nexus between the Appellant and [...] engaging in protected activity by making a complaint about the use of the racial slur by [...] in a letter to [...] which was sent with the video of [...] using the N word and the non-renewal of their contracts for the next school year.  There was no legitimate reason provided for the non-renewal of the contracts for the next school year, therefore, the non-renewal was retaliation for engagement in protected activity which was notification to [...] of Costlow using the N Word.  It is requested that the Appellate Court find that the claim of retaliation is satisfied and reverse and remand for completion of deposition and trial.
[brief] Page  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT .................................................................1  PROCEDURAL HISTORY ..................................................................3  STATEMENT OF FACT .....................................................................4  LEGAL ARGUMENT ...........................................................................16  POINT I SUMMARY  JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT BE GRANTED WHERE, AS HERE, THERE ARE GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT....16  POINT II  PLAINTIFF  IDENTIFIED CLEAR PUBLIC POLICY IN SUPPORT OF HER COMMON LAW  RETALIATION CLAIM (T35:3-45:6)  .......................................................................18  POINT III  PLAINTIFF SUFFERED FROM A “DISABILITY” AS DEFINED BY THE NJLAD.  IN HOLDING OTHERWISE, THE TRIAL COURT APPLIED  THE RELEVANT CASE LAW TOO RESTRICTIVELY AND FAILED TO VIEW THE FACTS IN A LIGHT MOST FAVORABLE TO PLAINTIFF (T22:2-30:11; T32:20-35:6)  ..................27  A.  Legal standard of defining “disability” under the NJLAD ..............27  B.  Plaintiff’s generalized anxiety qualifies as a “disability” under the NJLAD  ........................................................................32  C.  Obesity, particularly rendering plaintiff in a high-risk category as it relates to Covid-19, also qualifies as a “disability” under the NJLAD.........................................................35  POINT IV  THE TRIAL COURT REPEATEDLY FAILED TO CONSIDER RELEVANT FACTS SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD (T15:21-25:16).................................................................40  POINT V THE OVERWHELMING WEIGHT OF EVIDENCE  DEMONSTRATES THAT TERMINATION WAS PRETEXTUAL (T33:5-13 & T34:1-8).........................................................43  CONCLUSION.................................................................47
[brief] A.  There is No Evidence that Plaintiff Was Harassed Because of her Race or Age ..............................................  28  B.  Plaintiff Cannot Establish that the Alleged Conduct at Issue Was Severe or Pervasive or That Her Work Environment Became Hostile or Abusive .................................................................  33  POINT V  PLAINTIFF’S RETALIATION CLAIM [COUNT III] WAS APPROPRIATELY DISMISSED BECAUSE SHE WAS NOT ENGAGED IN ANY PROTECTED ACTIVITY AND SHE CANNOT ESTABLISH ANY CAUSAL NEXUS ........................................................................  37
[directive] $50,000 to $150,000  10%  Permissible c.  Possesses a rifle or shotgun without firearm purchase identification card, third degree.  (1)  Possession of a rifle or shotgun without obtaining firearm purchaser identification card, third degree.  (2)  Unless otherwise permitted by law, possesses a loaded rifle or shotgun, third degree.  75  Updated December 2, 2013
[brief] For the same reason, we reject plaintiff's contention that N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.5(a) bars the claims of only the "culpably uninsured."  Although the term has been employed in cases applying N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.5(a), it has not been used to suggest the statute includes a scienter requirement.  Instead, it has been used to identify individuals who, under varying circumstances, were deemed to be uninsured within the meaning of the statute.
[directive] comparable include court, municipal in the considering after complaint-summons of by charging presumption the overcome to officer judicial other or judge factors: following to failed and for offense prior has indictable any summons a with served been.  has defendant the (1) appear; of safety danger or a self the pose to dangerous will is to defendant the that believe to reason is there (2) on summons; a released if community the or person other any defendant; the for warrants outstanding more or one is there (3) to defendant is to necessary the subject a and known warrant not is address or identity defendant's the (4) court; of the jurisdiction the justice criminal or to the attempt obstruct will defendant obstruct the that believe reason to is there (5) summons; on a released if process in appear response summons; will a to not defendant the that believe to reason is there (6) services pretrial conditions pretrial the release by of monitoring the that believe reason to is there (7) other witness, victim, to necessary any protect N.J.S.A. is 2A:162-25 to pursuant established program community. the or person, specified 38 Page Exception.
[directive] Acuerdo de Participaci6n en el Programa del Tribunal de Tratamiento de Drogas para Adultos of  I understand that I accepted participate  State New Jersey Court a been Drug have Program.  the to  As in of condition participation, I will required enter a guilty a sentence I will plea imposed. and will be to be be of under the supervision the Court Judge the Probation Division.  I will required enter into, Drug and and to be if successfully complete drug treatment directed.  I further understand that I terminated the program, from am as I sentenced accordance with the plea agreement if there plea agreement, accordance or, may with be no is in in the allowable sentence authorized
[brief] The [...] does not take issue with legal principles set forth at the inception of the Plaintiffs’ brief regarding the standard of review and the application of the de-novo standard with respect to interpretations of law.  However, in this case the Ordinance in question is clear and unambiguous on its face.  It does not require interpretation.  Instead, the question of from what point “building height” is measured required a finding of fact by the Planning Board as to whether the revised lot grade on a subdivision, site plan or plot plan is designed to allow increased building height.  If so, building height is measured from the original pre-development grade.  If not, it is to be measured from the revised grade shown on the approved site plan, subdivision or plot plan.  In this case the Planning Board, after considering all of the evidence, made a finding of fact that the revised lot grade shown on the Applicant’s plans were not designed to allow increased building height, but were designed to comply with applicable stormwater management and sanitary sewer regulations in accordance with standard subdivision and site plan practice.  Their factual findings and conclusion must be evaluated under the arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable standard.  As noted in New Jersey Zoning and Land Use Administration, 2024 Edition, [...] and [...], Section 42-2.1 at pg. 618 “the factual determination of the board is presumed to be valid.  Its exercise of its discretionary authority based on such determinations will not be overturned unless arbitrary and capricious or unreasonable, and the burden of proof that the action of the board was arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable is upon the plaintiffs”, citing Dunbar Homes, Inc. v. Zoning Board, 233 N.J. 546,558 (2018).  PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[brief] Page TABLE OF CONTENTS TO REPLY APPENDIX  ..................................................  ii  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS BEING APPEALED ........................................................................................ iii  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ..............................................................................  iv  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT .........................................................................  1 LEGAL ARGUMENT .......................................................................................  2  I.  THE TRIAL COURT HAD NO BASIS FOR EXERCISING PERSONAL JURISDICTION OVER DEFENDANTS (Da10–15) ...........  2  A.  The Trial Court Erred in Concluding That Transient Jurisdiction Was Obtained Over Defendants (Da11–13) ..................  2  B.  The Trial Court Erred In Concluding That Defendants Are Subject to General Jurisdiction In New Jersey (Da13–14) .............  5  C.  The Trial Court Erred in Concluding That It Has Specific Jurisdiction Over Defendants (Da14) ..............................................  9  D.  Exercising Personal Jurisdiction Over Defendants Would Also Offend Traditional Notions of Fair Play and Substantial Justice (Da14–15) ............................................................  11  II.  THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT IT HAS SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION (Da15–17) ..................................  13  CONCLUSION ...............................................................................................
[brief] As noted in defendants’ initial brief, this count should have been dismissed by the trial court when it concluded that plaintiffs failed to prove defendants had fraudulently induced them to accept an inaccurate value in the sales.  Db71.  Once again, plaintiffs do not cite evidence in the record to show that this claim survived the trial court’s rejection of their fraudulent inducement claims, but merely cite statements by the trial judge.  Pb72-73.  The trial court’s statements are not the equivalent of evidence.  As to the unjust enrichment claim, plaintiffs again identify no evidence in the record that established the elements of the cause of action.  Pb73-75.  Instead, curiously, plaintiffs posit that [...]’s control of the various entities and involvement in transactions justified the imposition of joint and several liability.  Ibid.  That novel legal theory lacks merit and fails to show that the unjust enrichment claim was proven by competent evidence.  POINT VI
[brief] After months passed, Defendants filed their Motion for Summary Judgment on December 9, 2022, which set Plaintiff’s opposition due date for December 27, 2022.  As more fully set forth in Defendants’ Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion to File his Appellate Brief as within time, Plaintiff failed to respond to Defendants’ summary judgment motion entirely, instead filing a correspondence on January 8, 2023 alleging that Defendants’ motion for summary judgment was non-compliant and asking the Court to disregard the motion.