ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] This adherence ensures that the process is conducted fairly, transparently, and with due respect for the rights of this affected party.  The Township's actions, therefore, merit affirmation by this Honorable Court, recognizing the legality and propriety of the eminent domain proceedings undertaken.  B.  Opportunity for Fair Hearing and Objection  The Township has clearly followed the strict requirements set forth at N.J.S.A. 20:3-1 et seq.  In fact, The Honorable [...], A.J.S.C., specifically held that the Township had complied with all of the requirements in order to proceed with a condemnation acquisition.  (Pa1)  Throughout the process, the defendant was afforded ample opportunity to voice objections and was provided with an opportunity for a fair and transparent hearing.  The trial court's decision to proceed with the condemnation was based on a comprehensive evaluation of the facts, the law, and the public interest, fully satisfying due process requirements.  [...]'s commitment to due process and fairness is further exemplified by the extensive opportunities provided to the property owner to object to both the condemnation itself and the compensation offered.  This approach not only meets the legal requirements but also reflects the Township's dedication to a transparent and equitable eminent domain process.  From the outset, [...] has ensured that the property owner has the right to object to the condemnation proceedings and to seek judicial review of both the decision to condemn and the amount of compensation offered.  This right is a fundamental aspect of the eminent domain process, safeguarding property owners' interests and allowing for the resolution of disputes through the judicial system.  Throughout the eminent domain process, [...] has maintained a transparent decision-making process.  All steps, from initial proposals to final decisions, have been documented and made available to the public, ensuring that the process is open to scrutiny and that the rationale behind decisions is clear and understandable.  The eminent domain proceedings conducted by [...] have been subject to legal and judicial safeguards designed to protect the rights of property owners.  These include the right to legal representation, the opportunity to present evidence and arguments in court, and the possibility of appealing decisions deemed unfavorable.  These safeguards are essential components of a fair and just eminent domain process, ensuring that property owners have access to legal recourse and protection.  The opportunities for fair hearing and objection provided by [...] throughout the eminent domain process exemplify the Township's adherence to the principles of due process and fairness.  By ensuring that the property owner has ample opportunity to voice its concerns and by responding to these concerns in a constructive and fair manner, the Township upholds the highest standards of justice and equity.  These practices not only meet but exceed the procedural requirements for eminent domain proceedings, warranting this Appellate Court's affirmation of the Township's actions.  POINT IV
[brief] [...]’s counsel pointed out, however, that tracking down the information had been more difficult than initially anticipated because, firstly, [...] did not implement the Salesforce program until 2020 and, secondly, [...] “was a division of [...] that was spun off and then separately bought through a capital management company. ” (Id. at 5:1-9.)  But he said [...] was working with their Salesforce representative to track down the documents he understood [...] was seeking – including “the individual e-mails and any other attachments that would be within that data. ”  (Id. at 5:10-21.)  As reflected in the court’s order following the July 7 discovery conference, [...] agreed to supplement its production in response to RFP No. 4 by July 18.
[brief] Here, Plaintiff’s claims against defendants [...] and [...] assert that they violated Plaintiff’s rights through the exercise of discretionary procedural activities, specifically their authorization of an investigation into an employee complaint.  The authorization of the investigation was a discretionary act in the course of their official duties.  Pursuant to N.J.S.A.  59:3-2, public employees are not liable for the exercise of such discretion.  N.J.S.A. 59:3-2 provides:  a.  A public employee is not liable for an injury resulting from the exercise of judgment or discretion vested in him; b.  A public employee is not liable for legislative or judicial action or inaction, or administrative action or inaction of a legislative or judicial nature; c.  A public employee is not liable for the exercise of discretion in determining whether to seek or whether to provide the resources necessary for the purchase of equipment, the construction or maintenance of facilities, the hiring of personnel and, in general, the provision of adequate governmental services; d.  A public employee is not liable for the exercise of discretion when, in the face of competing demands, he determines whether and how to utilize or apply existing resources, including those allocated for equipment, facilities and personnel unless a court concludes that the determination of the public employee was palpably unreasonable.  Nothing in this section shall exonerate a public employee for negligence arising out of his acts or omissions in carrying out his ministerial functions.  [N.J.S.A. 59:3-2]  For the foregoing reasons, defendants [...] and [...] respectfully submit that they are immune from suit for the conduct alleged.
[brief] [...] first addressed the search warrant and stop of the Jaguar.  (2T12-24 to 25).  Specifically, she detailed the exact verbiage in the warrant and supporting affidavit, finding that [...]’s affidavit described with particularity the vehicle to be searched and the grounds for probable cause (2T16-1 to 14):  Further, the search warrant was not limited to execution in the Township of Toms River.  The property to be searched as described in the search warrant was a silver 2002 Jaguar S-Type.  This is unlike a scenario in which officers sought to execute a search warrant on a residence.  A vehicle is inherently mobile and thus, the territorial limitations the search of a residence presents are not present here.  [(2T16-15 to 23). ]  [...] also considered the fact that had defendant turned a different direction in his vehicle, he would have driven into Toms River instead of remaining in Lakewood.  (2T16-24 to 17-3).  The judge refused to “suppress evidence based on the fractional geographical differences between townships in the same county. ” (2T17-1 to 3).  [...] therefore held that the search warrant and the officers’ execution of that search warrant was constitutional.
[brief] (See Appellant Br., 18.)  He is wrong.  [...] “knew he was opening a bank account” (PA007), and “experience and common sense” dictate that “bank accounts are governed by contracts between the bank and its customer. ”  Clay v. Jie-Davis, No. 16-45, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 182536, at *29 (Dec. 9, 2016), report & rec. adopted, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 182436, at *1 (D. Guam Dec. 31, 2016); see also United States v. Markert, 732 F.3d 920, 927 (8th Cir. 2013) (“This contention defies common sense and the realities of commercial banking.  When a bank makes a loan and deposits the proceeds in a customer’s checking account, the customer acquires use and control of the funds, subject to the terms and conditions of the account relationship. ”); Geiger v. Crestar Bank, 778 A.2d 1085, 1090 (D.C. App. 2001) (“The relationship between a bank and a depositor is a contractual relationship that is governed by the written agreement between the parties. ”).  [...] knew or should have known that his relationship with [...] was governed by contract.  (See PA007.)  See also, e.g., Clay, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 182536, at *29.  But he, like the [...] and [...] plaintiffs, failed to ask what he was signing or the effect of his signature.
[brief] On October 18, 2022, Defendant moved to compel the State to provide additional discovery which included a new standard solution report; the Alcotest repair/maintenance records; the testing manual relied upon by the officer, and reports of past administrations of the SFSTs by the officer.  (5T6-2 to 9-25)  After considering the arguments of counsel on each item seriatim, [...] denied Defendant’s motion in its entirety, finding Defendant’s request was “a fishing expedition,” that some of the items were already provided (to the extent that they existed), and that others were not required by Chun\(^3\).  (5T7-3; 9-1 to 9-2; 9-10; 9-24 to 9-25; 10-6; 11-3)  Although samples of Defendant’s breath were obtained, the State moved to exclude those results due to an issue with the 20-minute observation period.
[brief] The standard of review that applies in an appeal from a state administrative agency’s decision is well established and limited.  *Russo v. Bd. Of Trs.*, 206 N.J. 14, 27 (2011)(citing *In re Herrmann*, 192 N.J. 19, 27 (2007)).  This Court does grant a strong presumption of reasonableness to an agency’s exercise of its statutorily delegated responsibility, *City of Newark v. Natural Res. Council*, 82 N.J. 530, 539 cert. denied, 49 U.S. 983, 101 S. Ct. 400, 66 L. Ed. 2d 245 (1980), and defer to its fact finding.  *Utley v. Bd of Review*, 194 N.J. 534, 551 (2008).  The agency’s decision should be upheld unless there is a “clear showing that it is arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable, or that it lacks fair support in the record or that it violated legislative policies.  *In re Musick*, 143 N.J. 206, 216 (1996); *Campbell v. Dep’t of Civil Serv.*, 39 N.J. 556, 562 (1963); *Caminiti v. Bd. of Trs., Police and Firemen's Ret. Sys.*, 431 N.J. Super. 1, 14 (App. Div. 2013) (Citing *Hemsey v. Bd of Trs., Police and Firemen's Ret. Sys.*, 198 N.J. 215, 223-24 2009).
[brief] Prior to the video recording of defendant’s interrogation being played for the jury, see Da41, (17T:24-1 to 124-14), defendant moved to redact from the video recording – and to hide from the jury – all portions of the interrogation in which defendant refused to answer the detectives’ question, arguing that the failure to do so would amount to commentary on his invocation of his right to silence.  (16T:84-24 to 114-1).  While the State objected to any redactions that could make the statement unclear or lead to speculation as to the quality of the investigation, it made clear that it did not intend to cross-examine defendant with regard to his decision not to answer specific questions, nor would any such commentary appear in its closing presentation to the jury, statements to which the State abided.  (16T:96-18 to 98-18; 98-25 to 99-4).  The trial court denied defendant’s request for redactions:
[brief] Throughout the Statement of Facts section of Plaintiff’s brief, Plaintiff boldly asserts that the District Mask Policy was disproportionately applied to her.  Pb5.  Particularly, Plaintiff alleges that “other teachers, including Defendant [...], had been the subject of multiple reports to the administration … for failure to wear a mask … but Defendant [...] was not disciplined as a result of these reports,” (Pb6), “the ultimate issuance of a discipline letter was retaliatory, given that other teachers did not receive the same treatment,” (Pb6), and that “Defendant [...] openly conceded that Plaintiff and Defendant [...] were not treated similarly in response to violations of [the District Mask Policy].”  Pb8-9.  However, review of the Amended Complaint reveals that such allegations were simply pled “upon information and belief” and do not constitute actual tangible facts, but rather Plaintiff’s subjective beliefs and innuendo.
[brief] When detectives told [...] that he had the “right to consult with an attorney at any time and have him present during questioning,” [...] asked a series of follow up questions about the kind of attorney he could access.  (1T:41-22 to 46-23)  [...] expressed concern that an attorney based in Virginia, where the interview was taking place, may not be able to practice in New Jersey, where he was charged.  (1T:42-1 to 19)  The detectives ⁴  Pursuant to Rule 2:6-1, [...]’s brief in connection with the Miranda motion is included in the appendix.
[brief] (See 5T; 6T).  A trial de novo was initially scheduled to be held before the Honorable [...], J.S. C., on January 27, 2023.  (5T).  On that date, Judge Hanna adjourned the trial de novo in order to give Appellant additional time to prepare his arguments.  (5T31:20-23).  The previously adjourned trial de novo was then held before Judge Hanna on February 17, 2023.  (6T).  On April 3, 2023, Judge Hanna entered an Order Including Verdict Upon Trial De Novo, finding Appellant guilty of driving while intoxicated under N.J.S.A. 39:4-50(a), and scheduling a sentencing hearing for April 17, 2023.
[brief] On February 25, 2022, a probable cause hearing on Appellant’s pre-trial motions was held in the Denville Municipal Court before the Honorable [...], J.S.C. (2T).  At that hearing, Judge Smith found that there was probable cause for Appellant’s arrest on November 5, 2019.  (2T28:8-30:13).  A trial was then held before Judge Smith on April 29, 2022 in the Denville Municipal Court.  (3T).  On May 27, 2022, Judge Smith found Appellant guilty of driving while intoxicated under N.J.S.A. 39:4-50, but not guilty of reckless driving under N.J.S.A. 39:4-96, or careless driving under N.J.S.A. 39:4-97.  (4T13:8-17; Aa001).  Appellant then appealed Judge Smith’s decision to the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Morris County.
[brief] ]  In turn, subsection (b) states:  A person shall not be eligible for special probation pursuant to this section if the person is convicted of or adjudicated delinquent for: (1) a crime of the first degree; (2) a crime of the first or second degree enumerated in subsection d. of section 2 of P.L.1997, c. 117 (C.2C:43-7.2), other than a crime of the second degree involving N.J.S.2C:15-1 (robbery) or N.J.S.2C:18-2 (burglary); (3) a crime, other than that defined in section 1 of P.L.1987, c. 101 (C.2C:35-7), for which a mandatory minimum period of incarceration is prescribed under chapter 35 of this Title or any other law; or (4) an offense that involved the distribution or the conspiracy or attempt to distribute a controlled dangerous substance or controlled substance analog to a juvenile near or on school property.
[brief] The Watermen Report first notes the “Pre-Construction Seawall Geometry” as being a “gradual, curved return at the southern limit of the Subject Property . . .”  (Da313) then compares the “Post-Construction Seawall Geometry” as having “eliminated the Seawall’s gradual, curved southern return and its relief-valve functionality in favor of a continuous Seawall to the south” which created a “pocket in the seawall geometry. ”  Da314.  The Watermen Report concludes this results in “increased vulnerability of the Subject Property to wave-induced storm damage. ”  Da315.  The Watermen Report makes the following unsupported conclusion:  The result of these changes is a condition where wave energy from the north can no longer be released via the Valentine Street ROW and waves from the south are directed toward the lower Seawall elevations on the Subject Property.  These conditions increase the likelihood of wave overtopping onto the Subject Property.
[brief] CEPA provides a cause of action for employees who reasonably believe that activity may be “an actual violation of a law or regulation” which is a much broader view than under the application of the *Pierce* standard as discussed above and as such the court’s analysis in *[...]* has limited value here.  *Est. of Roach v. TRW, Inc.*, 164 N.J. 598, 613 (2000).  Appellant’s argument that future regulatory authorities could be considered in determining the existence of public policy is misplaced, and without specific citation, however, in *[...]* not only was the court considering the application of a far more expansive statute in the context of widely accepted scientific standards (as well as nine other sources of policy), the court was discussing [...]’s belief regarding existing Japanese regulatory standards.  This point is moot however, as again, *[...]* was considering the application of a statute with a far broader application than a common law *Pierce* claim which is limited to protection “from wrongful discharge when the discharge is contrary to a clear mandate of public policy.  *Id.* at 610; see also Arterbridge, 2022 WL 577956, at *5 (quoting Dzwonar v. McDevitt, 177 N.J. 451, 461 (2003)).  Unlike in CEPA claims, a litigant asserting a Pierce claim must point to an actual (not reasonable belief of a) violation or contravention of a specific and clear mandate of public policy in effect at the time of the complained of action, Appellant cannot therefore point to a public policy that did not exist.
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO CONSIDER WHETHER THE REVISED LOT GRADE OF THE PROPOSED DEVELOPMENT WAS THE RESULT OF “MOUNDING, TERRACING, OR OTHER DEVICES” DESIGNED TO ALLOW INCREASED BUILDING HEIGHT.  *(SEE APPENDIX – OPINION Pa15). *  The trial court failed to consider whether the revised lot grade was the result of “mounding, terracing, or other devices” designed to allow increased building height as stated in the Building Height Ordinance.  The word “mounding” as defined in the Merriam-Webster Dictionary means “an artificial bank or hill of earth or stones. ”  *Mounding*, Merriam-Webster Dictionary, 2022, merriam-webster.com/dictionary/mounding.  *(Pa192). *  The word “terracing” as defined in the Webster Dictionary has several meanings as follows “(a) one of usually a series of horizontal ridges made in a hillside to increase cultivatable land, conserve moisture, or minimize erosion, (b) a raised embankment with the top leveled, or (c) a row of houses or apartments on raised ground or a sloping site.  *Terracing*, Merriam-Webster Dictionary, 2022, merriam-webster.com/dictionary/terracing.  *(Pa193).*  The word “devices” as used in the proper context of this Application is defined in the Merriam-Webster Dictionary as a “piece of equipment or a mechanism designed to serve a special purpose or perform a special function. ”  *Devices*, Merriam-Webster Dictionary, 2022, merriam-webster.com/dictionary/devices.  *(Pa194).*  Here, the trial court failed to even determine and address whether the revised lot grade of the proposed development was the result of “mounding, terracing, or other devices” designed to allow increased building height.
[directive] Strengthens procedures for accepting reports of alleged misconduct.  To standardize • reporting of complaints, the revised includes a standardized civilian complaint form IAPP that must be made available in multiple languages in all department offices and websites.  § 5.1.4.  Appendix C.  The revised also clarifies that agencies must accept See IAPP complaints from undocumented immigrants and should establish systems for the receipt of complaints by telephone or email, and that officers are prohibited from affirmatively warning complainants that they may face consequences for filing a false report.  §§ 5.1.1, 5.1.2, 5.1.5.  Alleged violations of directives issued by the Attorney General or relevant County Prosecutor must also be handled through the Internal Affairs process.  § 4.1.3.
[brief] On March 20, 2023, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Verified Complaint in this case.  Da36-158.  At the March 23, 2023 hearing for both Chancery cases, all parties appeared before the Honorable [...], who confirmed on the record an earlier discussion off the record in which Defendants, through their new counsel, informed the court that they were waiving their right to arbitrate, as follows:  [...]:…I want to confirm on the record—there had been a previous request that there was going to be a motion filed for, the matter to go to arbitration.  I believe that it’s been established that that’s been waived and arbitration is no longer an issue.  Correct?  [...] [for Defendants [...] et al]: That’s correct, Your Honor.  [...] [for the Plaintiff [...]]: Correct, your Honor.  [2T6:12-19, emphasis added].  That same date, March 23, 2023, the Court entered an Order denying Defendants’ OTSC.  Da159.  On March 24, 2023, the court entered Orders transferring both Chancery lawsuits to the Law Division.
[brief] [...]  [...]  Attorneys for Defendant-Respondent  One Ocean Terrace, LLC [...]  [...] [...]  [...]  Of Counsel: [...]  Attorney ID# [...]  Date Submitted: September 16, 2024  #  TABLE OF CONTENTS | Section | Page | |------------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | APPENDIX  TABLE OF CONTENTS | ii | | TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | iii | | PROCEDURAL HISTORY | 1 | | STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS | 1 | | LEGAL ARGUMENT | 8 | | POINT I | | | THE DECISION TO GRANT THE VARIANCE WAS NOT ARBITRARY, CAPRICIOUS OR UNREASONABLE | 8 | | DENSITY | 14 | | POINT II | | | ADEQUATE NOTICE | 15 | | CONCLUSION | 23 | APPENDIX
[directive] N.J.R.E. 503(a) states that "no person has the privilege to refuse to submit to examination for the purpose of discovering or recording his corporal features and other identifying characteristics or his physical or mental condition."  Evidence that may be obtained or procedures that may be used to obtain evidence under this rule include: (a) Breath sample; (b) Blood sample; (c) Buccal swab; (d) Requiring suspect to speak; (e) Voice recordings; (f) Participation in a lineup; (g) Handwriting samples; (h) Hair and saliva samples; (i) Urine specimens; (j) Video recording; and (k) Field sobriety tests.  7.5.3
[brief] In 1998 an Essex County grand jury indicted [...] with conspiracy, kidnapping, attempted murder, and murder charges relating to the deaths of two gang members.  Mr. Manso was indicted with six co-defendants.  A pretrial motion to sever the cases was denied, and the matter proceeded to trial before the Honorable [...], J.S.C. on January 24, 2000.  The trial continued for seven weeks until March 17, 2000.  After deliberations the jury returned a verdict finding Mr. Manso guilty on all counts of the indictment.  Mr. Manso was sentenced on April 25, 2000, to a term of sixty years imprisonment, without parole for the two first degree-murder convictions.  The sentences on the remaining counts were set to run concurrent to the sentences on the murder convictions, or were deemed to have merged with the other convictions.  On September 13, 2000, appeal was timely taken.  The Appellate Division affirmed Mr. Manso’s conviction on March 8, 2004.  A notice of petition for certification was timely filed with the New Jersey Supreme Court.  The certification was denied on September 21, 2004.  A first petition for post-conviction relief was filed in this matter on April 25, 2005.  A non-testimonial hearing was scheduled in the matter for September 18, 2009.  On June 14, 2012, the Defendant’s request to compel witness testimony and declare certain plea agreements illegal was denied.  On January 7, 2013, the first post-conviction relief motion was denied.  A notice of appeal was timely filed on January 15, 2013.  On August 26, 2015, the Appellate Division affirmed the denial of the first post-conviction relief motion.  Mr. Manso filed a second petition for post-conviction relief on August 6, 2018.  That petition was denied on November 7, 2018.