ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] (Ca018) (“As such, the Commission dismisses the above-captioned matter”).  The Commission essentially invented procedural grounds that did not exist to issue relief it was never asked to issue – converting a non-existent cross-motion from Respondent back into a Motion to Dismiss it had already heard and decided – and improperly dismissed the entire Amended Complaint in doing so.  Further, not only was there no cross-motion for summary decision filed by Respondent – meaning that no party to this matter ever sought the relief the Commission issued – but Respondent *did not even file exceptions* to [...]’s Initial Decision, as is noted in the Commission’s own decision.  (Ca015) (“The parties did not file exceptions to the Initial Decision”).  Respondent never even took issue with [...]’s Initial Decision or the penalty of “censure” she applied.  Quite frankly, it appears Respondent would have been happy to walk away from this litigation with a “censure” if the Commission had not gone rogue.
[brief] *State v. Legette*, 227 N.J. 460, n. 1 (2017); see Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules, cmt. 3 on R. 2:6-2 (2021).  If an issue does not implicate the jurisdictional or public-interest standard, the appellate court should not itself recognize an unpleaded cause of action.  *Johnson v. Roselle EZ Quick LLC*, 226 N.J. 370, 396-97 (2016).  Moreover, [...] does not indicate that these issues were not raised below, in violation of Rule 2:6-2(a)(6).  The new arguments do not meet that standard.  Consequently, this Court should not consider this argument here.  Should the Court choose to address this contention, however, it is contradicted by the summary judgment papers [...] submitted to the trial court, in which [...] stated explicitly that the Ordinance “is a valid exercise of its police power” (Pa015) and “legally permissible use of the Town’s contractual and police power” (Pa003).  Thus, it is not readily distinguishable from Roselle, and [...]’s efforts to change its position after-the-fact should be rejected.  Further, the Supreme Court was clear that N.J.S.A. 48:7-1 only requires “municipal consent where an electric company desires to use public streets for the construction of overhead or underground lines, obviously for service to local residents.
[brief] Atalese held that an arbitration agreement does not exist - - because there is no mutual assent to arbitrate - - when the arbitration clause in a consumer contract merely provides for “binding arbitration” and does not explain that there is a waiver of the right to proceed in court.  The Court held that the phrase “binding arbitration” is not sufficient by itself because it does not convey to the average member of the public that he or she is giving up the right to have a claim adjudicated in court.  The Atalese Court rejected the very argument made here by defendants that everyone understands “binding arbitration” to mean a waiver of the right to proceed in court.  The Atalese Court held that, without the additional waiver of the “right to be in court” language in the arbitration clause, the consumer cannot be held to have assented to arbitration or to have intentionally waived the right to be in court.
[brief] The central disputed issue in this case was whether Section 4.02 of the Lease directed the Landlord to offset unpaid rent owed under the Lease as a deduction against the larger sum of unreimbursed Tenant’s Allowance owed from Landlord to Tenant under the same Lease.  As will be described, the answer under the Lease is yes.  However, the trial judge improperly prejudged the merits of the case and failed to set forth any legal citations, analysis, or statement of reasons to support its bare conclusion of law in the November 10, 2021 ruling that Landlord was excused entirely from liability for missing multiple mandatory installment payments on the Lease.  The trial judge then exacerbated that error by ruling, again without any legal citation, analysis, or statement of reasons that he had no jurisdiction to decide that issue.  Even before diving into the merits of the underlying issues, the totality of the trial judge’s procedural errors deprived Tenant of a fair hearing.
[brief] Moreover, whether there was a State of Emergency during the time of Plaintiff’s fall was not relevant to the facts of this case and could have been highly prejudicial as it could mislead and confuse the jury, and therefore, the trial court properly refused to take juridical notice and barred it from trial.  Defendants failed to show how the State of Emergency was relevant and impacted their duty to keep the property safe.  Prior to trial, multiple statements were made by the respective Defendants that were against their interest in defending their respective positions in this matter, which put into question what work was actually done, if any, and whether [...] believed it was restricted in their ability to complete its services due to the contracts provided by [...] and [...].  Accordingly, the snow removal contract was relevant as it dictates what the property owner expected the snow and ice removal contractors and subcontractors to do and when the work should have been completed.  Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the snow removal agreements to be referenced at trial.
[brief] ”  389 N.J. Super. at 63-64.  The plaintiff was a police officer who entered the building with a female victim to accompany her to her apartment to obtain evidence against the victim’s ex-boyfriend.  The victim had to use her key to enter her apartment while her ex-boyfriend had entered the building through its unlocked door and managed to break into her apartment.  When the police officer escorted the victim into her apartment, the ex-boyfriend repeatedly shot the police officer without provocation.  389 N.J. Super. at 64-65.  The Foster Court found:
[brief] And pursuant to the IFPA, the OIFP is obligated to investigate all referrals it receives from insurers, State agencies, or county and municipal governments, and prosecute where appropriate.  N.J.S.A. 17:33A-19.  In fact, most cases investigated by the OIFP are the result of referrals from the Special Investigations Units of insurance companies, which are required by law to refer matters of suspected insurance fraud to the OIFP.  N.J.S.A. 17:33A-9.  If the referral is deemed appropriate for a criminal investigation, the case may be assigned to the OIFP or a County Prosecutor’s Office. \(^3\)
[directive] 2000 USD w przypadku przestępstwa 1. stopnia (1) przestępstwa 2. stopnia (2) 1000 USD w przypadku 750 USD w przypadku przestępstwa 3. stopnia (3) 500 USD w przypadku przestępstwa 4. stopnia (4) wykroczenia naruszenia porządku publicznego lub drobnego (5) 250 USD w przypadku naruszenia porządku publicznego CCPF, łącznie Kara na USD Computer Crime Prevention Fund Penalty, 2C:43-3.8 (L. 2009, c. 143).
[brief] (Pb at 40.)  This argument fails for several reasons.  First, the MBPA was introduced to the New Jersey legislature through two different bills prior to the enactment of the Wholesaler Agreement.  Specifically, New Jersey Senate Bill S2170 was introduced on December 13, 2004, and New Jersey Assembly Bill A3619 was introduced on January 10, 2005.\(^{15}\) Appellants were presumably aware of these bills given their “extensive familiarity with federal and state alcohol beverage control laws”.  (Pa119 ¶ 3.)  Second, even if Appellants did not know that the MBPA had been introduced in the Legislature, the MBPA expressly renewed the Wholesaler Agreement and the arbitration provision.
[brief] Plaintiff also fails to establish that the individual [...] took any “reprisal” against her in violation of N.J.S.A. 10:5-12(d), which prohibits an individual from “taking reprisals against any person because that person has opposed any practices or acts forbidden under this act…”  N.J.S.A. 10:5-12(d).  Indeed, Plaintiff’s transfer can hardly be considered an adverse employment action insofar as her pay, status and terms of her employment with [...] remained the same.  (Pa324, Plaintiff deposition transcript, T106:16-T107:12).  As discussed above at length, there is no evidence which demonstrates any retaliation or “reprisals” of any kind against Plaintiff by the [...], who merely acted to remove and shield Plaintiff from the [...] office that she claimed was a hostile work environment.  Based on the foregoing, there was no basis for the imposition of liability against the individual [...] as a matter of law and the Trial Court was correct in dismissing these claims.
[brief] -----------Continued on next page-----------  Conclusion  I appreciate the prosecutor’s comment that I perfected my appeal (Prb2).  Despite that, I will counter the prosecution’s request of the courts to deny my appeal.  (Prb12)  Because the prosecution filed a letter memorandum/letter brief on 9/30 instead of a Formal respondent brief as required, the prosecution failed to file a timely valid formal respondent brief in accordance with court rules: 2:6-2, 2:6-4, 2:6-11.
[brief] (Pa 1-89)  N.J. Court Rule 2:2-4 allows the Appellate Division to grant leave to appeal from an interlocutory order when it is in the interests of justice.  An appellate court only intervenes “where there is some showing of merit and justice calls for…interference in the cause” and “where some grave damage or injustice may be caused by the order below” or the appellate court’s action “will terminate the litigation and thus very substantially conserve the time and expense of the litigants and the courts.
[directive] A suspensão da sua carteira de habilitação será obrigatória por um período de 6 a 24 meses, a menos que o tribunal decidir que há circunstâncias convincentes que justifiquem uma exceção?  You will be required to forfeit your driver’s license for a period of time from 6 to 24 months, unless the court finds compelling circumstances warranting an exception?  [Sim/Yes]  [Não/No]
[brief] Pa303.  A bottle of Whiskey was seen lying on top of the floorboard in the trunk area of the black Jeep.  Pa022.  The officers could not see the backpack that Plaintiff had placed into the black Jeep.  When the officers inquired, Plaintiff responded that he had placed the backpack under the floorboard of the rear cargo area where the spare tire is stored.  Plaintiff said that he placed the backpack in that spot because it contained an alcoholic beverage.  Pa303.  As can be seen from the imaging captured by the officers’ body-worn cameras (“BWC”), the two police officers were professional and non-confrontational throughout their inquiry.
[brief] This matter was then transferred to the Office of Administrative Law for discovery and a hearing.  On February 28, 2023, following the exchange of discovery, Appellants filed a Motion for Summary Decision.  (Ca041-Ca060).  Appellants attached a number of Exhibits to this Complaint.  (Ca061-Ca160).  Based on the evidence in the record, Appellants asked [...] to find that Respondent had violated the Act as to the remaining Counts 1 and 4 of the Complaint.  (Ca041-Ca060).  In doing so, Appellants expressly reserved the right to appeal the Commission’s July 26, 2022 decision on Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss pursuant to N.J.C.R. 2:2-3(a)(2) once a final order has issued as to all claims as to all parties pursuant to N.J.C.R. 2:2-3(b).  (Ca058-059).
[brief] However, it declined to order [...] to disgorge its $1,500,000 of ill-gotten gains.  That error was based on the trial court’s sua sponte determination that it could not grant multiple remedies under N.J.S.A. 49:3-69(a)(2) because the statute uses “or” disjunctively and thus limits remedies to restitution or disgorgement, and does not allow for an award of both even where plainly warranted.  The trial court’s reading of section 69(a)(2) results in defendants reaping the benefits of their violative acts.  It means [...] will face no consequences for siphoning at least $1,500,000 of investor funds to [...], an entity that had no entitlement to those funds, and then subsequently misusing those funds for such things as making cash withdrawals topping $400,000, spending $250,000 at auto auctions, paying creditors at least $250,000, and giving money to his brother.  The trial court’s ruling sends the wrong message to the public.  To effectuate the remedial intent of Securities Law and to empower the Bureau to fully and effectively protect the investing public this court must reverse the trial court’s decision and require [...] to disgorge its ill-gotten gains.
[brief] Ratner v. General Motors Corp., 241 N.J. Super. 197 (App. Div. 1990).......4, 5  Torres v. Schripps, Inc., 342 N.J. Super. 419 (App. Div. 2001)....................5  Washington v. Perez, 219 N.J. 338 (2014)..........................................10  Wegner v. Derrico, 2020 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 425 (App. Div. 2020)...........................5, 6, 7  New Jersey Court Rules Rule 2:10-2............................................................................................12  Rule 4:49-1(a).......................................................................................12
[brief] Based on the following case laws  [...] was a debt collector by FDCPA definition.  _Singletary v. NATIONSTAR MORTGAGE, LLC, Dist. Court, D. Maryland_ 2016.  “The FDCPA is violated when (1) the plaintiff has been the object of collection activity arising from consumer debt, (2) the defendant is a debt collector under the FDCPA, and (3) the defendant has engaged in an act or omission in violation of the FDCPA”.  _Stewart v. Bierman_, 859 F. Supp. 2d 754, 759 (D. Md. 2012).  “A "debt collector" is "any person who uses any instrumentality of interstate commerce or the mails in any business the principal purpose of which is the collection of any debts, or who regularly collects or attempts to collect, directly or indirectly, debts owed or due or asserted to be owed or due another."
[directive] 1.  Statutory Prohibitions.  The agency shall not approve a permit if the applicant is subject to any of the disabilities set forth at N.J.S.A. 2C:58-3(c)(1)-(11) that would prevent them from obtaining a permit to purchase a handgun or a firearms purchaser identification card.  2.  Background Checks.  The agency shall not approve a permit unless it confirms that the applicant is qualified to carry.  The application must, among other things, “be endorsed by three reputable persons who have known the applicant for at least three years preceding the date of application, and who shall also certify thereon that the applicant is a person of good moral character and behavior. ”  3.  Firearms Familiarity.  The agency shall not approve a permit unless the applicant demonstrates “that he is thoroughly familiar with the safe handling and use of handguns,” in accordance with N.J.A.C. 13:54-2.4(b).  B.  Regulations.  State law assigns to the [...] the authority to implement the statutory requirements for carry permits.
[brief] On June 30, 2009, the Governor signed into law L. 2009, c. 78, which sets forth the procedures for the elimination of school districts that are not operating schools and merging them with other districts.  N.J.S.A. 18A:8-43 to -51; see N.J.S.A. 18A:8-43 (defining a "[n]on-operating district" as "a school district that is not operating schools").  The legislation directed the State’s executive county superintendents to eliminate non-operating districts in accordance with a plan and schedule approved by the Commissioner pursuant to N.J.S.A. 18A:7-8(g).²  See ¹ The procedural history and counterstatement of facts are combined to avoid repetition and for the court’s convenience.  ²  The Department also had regulations setting forth the process for eliminating non-operating districts in an effort to carry out the Legislature’s already-stated goal of N.J.S.A. 18A:8-44 (stating that the executive county superintendent “shall eliminate any non-operating district and merge that district with the district with which it participates in a sending-receiving relationship”).
[brief] [10T92-11 to -15].  [...] texted and spent time with [...] throughout the day on September 17, 2019.  At 2:47 p.m., [...] received text messages from [...], stating that was talking to her cousin, “[...]” and included a picture of a gun.  [10T46-9 to -16; 10T49-10 to -14].  The two departed from [...]’s home in [...], and went to the concert in [...].  [10T51-4 to -15].  After the concert, [...] dropped [...] off at [...] in [...], where she worked on the janitorial staff.  [10T51-23 to 52-2].  [...] then went home and went to bed.
[brief] (Pa 005, Pa 010).  On the date of the accident, the Plaintiff was the named insured of an automobile insurance policy issued by Defendant (Pa 064).  Plaintiff’s insurance policy with the Defendant provided for $250,000 in PIP benefits (subject to a $250.00 deductible and 20% co-insurance on the next $4,750.00), to be paid for any bodily injury the Plaintiff sustained as a result of an incident while occupying, entering into, alighting from, or using the insured automobile (Pa 065).  Pursuant to N.J.S.A. § 39:6A-4, as well as the terms of its own policy, the Defendant was required to provide PIP coverage to the Plaintiff once she sustained injuries as a result of this incident while she was using and/or occupying her vehicle (Pa 124, Pa 132).  Accordingly, the Plaintiff filed a PIP application with the Defendant, and a claim number and PIP adjuster were assigned (Pa 069).  She provided a recorded statement to the Defendant and described how her injuries occurred.  (Pa 060).  On August 20, 2020, the Defendant found that the Plaintiff was ineligible for PIP benefits under its policy, wrongfully claiming that she did not meet the requirements of N.J.S.A. § 39:6A-4 as her injuries were not “caused” by the automobile and refused to extend PIP benefits to the Plaintiff (Pa 069, 071, 074).
[brief] The [...] Defendants  [...] is a non-profit Muslim civil rights advocacy group headquartered in Washington D.C. but with a nationwide presence.  Am. Compl. ¶ 6 (Da 008Click or tap here to enter text.).  [...] NJ is the New Jersey chapter of [...].  Id.  [...] is the Deputy Executive Director of [...] NJ.  Id. ¶ 5 (Da 008).  [...] has known affiliations with antisemitic activities and groups.  Id. ¶ 6 (Da 008-09).  According to the [...] ([...]), members of “[...]’s current leadership had early connections with organizations that are or were affiliated with Hamas .  . . .”  Id.  Additionally, as also documented by the [...], members of [...]’s leadership “have used . . . antisemitic tropes related to Jewish influence over the media or political affairs, or has descended into the vilification of Zionists, which includes the majority of American Jews .  . . .”  Id.  [...] has not been particularly secretive or shy about its antisemitic viewpoints, even at the highest levels of the organization; indeed, in a speech delivered at the 16th Annual Convention for Palestine on November 24, 2023 outside of Chicago, [...], executive director and co-founder of [...], said that he was “happy to see” the October 7, 2023 attacks against Israel, and also stated that “the people of Gaza have the right to self-defense . . .
[brief] Da64 [[...]’s RFA Response 13].  The checks and receipts do not indicate to what properties the snow removal applies.  Pa218-21.  [...] admits that [...] is the record owner of the Property (Lot 22).  Compare Pa198 [[...]’s RFA 1] with Da64 [[...]’s RFA Response 1].  However, [...] represents that it owns the Property, despite its admission that [...] owns the Property.  Compare Pa201 [[...]’s RFA 17] with Da64 at Response 17.  Discovery ended on September 29, 2022, and [...] did not produce several documents prior to the end of discovery that it now attempts to rely upon in its appeal: Da125-32 [Affidavit of [...] dated May 24, 2023]; Da 133-34 [Affidavit of [...] dated May 23, 2023]; Da255 [E-mail string dated January 9, 2023]; Da274 [Facebook message]; and, Da283 [purported work permit dated June 10, 1997].
[brief] The language and structure of the trial court’s charge did not leave the jury with confusion on whether self-defense applied to all the offenses before it on counts one and two.  In Point II, defendant belatedly argues that [...] erred in the charge on self-defense by not instructing the jury that if it found defendant had fired a warning shot in the air, he had not used deadly force and thus if this bullet hit [...], it had to acquit defendant of murder.  The State submits that defendant has not demonstrated error, let alone plain, error with the trial court’s instruction on self-defense.  Defendant is hard-pressed to argue error when he had every opportunity to ask [...] for the language he now cites.  As noted earlier, the trial court discussed the jury charge with counsel.  In any event, the prejudice argued by defendant is illusory.
[brief] The State alleged that [...] was the person who caused the shooting death of [...] based primarily on a series of surveillance videos from a bar/liquor store and various scattered properties leading up to the location of the shooting.  (5T 83-5 to 112-1)  [...] presented a mistaken-identity defense: He acknowledged that he had been with Tucker at the bar/liquor store earlier in the evening, but [...] maintained that they split up on the way home when he turned down a side street and that he was not the man depicted in later videos closer to the shooting location.  (5T 70-11 to 82-20)  No witness identified [...] in the later videos or contradicted his alibi, none of the later videos clearly showed the suspect’s face, and no one saw the shooting.  (Da 68)  No gun, DNA, or fingerprints were recovered.  And no motive evidence was presented.  On February 23, 2015, [...] discovered Tucker’s body in the road at [...] following an alert at 2:15 a.m. from their ShotSpotter system, which detects gunshots.
[brief] Id. (quoting Carter v. Reynolds, 175 N.J. 402, 408-09 (2003).  However, there was no evidence in the record that was before the Trial Court to make a factual or legal determination that the Defendant did not employ or have any control over any of the medical providers at issue during the treatment of the decedent.  The only piece of evidence that was produced by the Defendant in the motion record was a license by the Department of Health pertaining to the Defendant for Adult Partial Care Services.  (Pa76).  Furthermore, there may be providers or entities in the case that are not known at this time whom the Defendant is vicariously liable for and thus, why the Complaint contains a “John Doe” fictitious pleading.  (See e.g., P1).  In essence, [...] made a legal and factual determination that the Defendant cannot be vicariously liable without any discovery or evidence.
[brief] Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Boylan, 307 N.J. Super. 162, 167 (App. At Trial, the plaintiff intends to prove that the defendant was negligent in the operation of his vehicle in four ways.  First, the defendant owed a duty to maintain control over his vehicle.  Second, the defendant is required to follow the traffic statute regarding left turns, which requires him to turn into the left lane of Route 280.  Third, the defendant failed to follow the speed statute; more precisely, that the defendant did not travel at an appropriate reduced speed when entering and crossing the intersection.  Fourth, the defendant failed to make proper observations, because he was completely unaware of the plaintiff’s car on the roadway, despite his awareness that she was on his right while they were both stopped at the red light.
[directive] A review of the historical record suggests that [...] used the term as a catchall description of LGBTQ+ individuals, even when describing cisgender gay men.  In one case, the [...] Director justified a Rule 4 violation on the grounds that the mere “presence of female impersonators in and upon licensed premises presents a definite social problem,” noting the “deep-rooted personal contempt felt by a normal red- blooded man. ”  The “mere thought of such perverts is repugnant to the normal person,” the Director continued.  Inc., [...] Bulletin 474, Item 1 (Aug. 7, 1941).