ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] M4-7.  The October 15, 2020 Opinion further entered judgment in favor of Plaintiffs on the Second Count of the Complaint, which asserted that the Zoning Board’s denial of the Amended Application was arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable and contrary to the Municipal Land Use Law, thus reversing the Zoning Board’s denial and approving the variance relief sought in the Amended Application.  M3.  The October 15, 2020 Opinion also dismissed without prejudice the Third Count of the Complaint (asserting a violation of the Township’s Mount Laurel obligation), subject to the Township’s implementation of its continuing obligations with respect to Plaintiffs’ property under the Settlement Agreement, the Housing Element and Fair Share Plan (“HEFSP”), along with all implementing ordinances and resolutions, and the Judgment of Compliance and Repose in the Township’s prior Mount Laurel declaratory judgment action (“DJ Action”).
[brief] It stated, “identity theft and insurance fraud, often involve the shifting of money and other illicit dealings that are documented by bank records.  See, e.g., N.J.S.A. 2C:21–17 (criminalizing impersonation of another person to obtain benefit by fraud).  Finally, bank transfers can reveal the funding of terrorist activity.  See [...], U.S. Seeks Access to Bank Records to Deter Terror, N.Y. Times, April 9, 2005, available at 2005 WLNR 5598007 (quoting former 9/11 Commission member: “The idea is for the government to make it more difficult and more risky for terrorists to move money....”).  Crimes involving corruption and fraud depend on secrecy and misinformation.  Those who commit them, when confronted, hide behind walls of silence, making detection difficult.  See Addonizio, supra, 53 N.J. at 135, 248 A.2d 531 (recognizing that “a direct inquiry” of offender “is not likely to be productive”); United States v. Alexandro, 675 F.2d 34, 43 (2d Cir.) (acknowledging need for “special investigative techniques to uncover insidious corruption”), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 835, 103 S.Ct. 78, 74 L.Ed.2d 75 (1982).
[brief] The MOU is a definite agreement to transfer an interest in a corporate entity in exchange for monetary consideration.  (Da7-8).  “A contract arises from offer and acceptance, and must be sufficiently definite ‘that the performance to be rendered by each party can be ascertained with reasonable certainty. ’”  Weichert Co. Realtors v. Ryan, 128 N.J. 427, 435 (1992) (quoting West Caldwell v. Caldwell, 26 N.J. 9, 24-25 (1958)).  “If the parties agree on essential terms and further manifest an intention to be bound by those terms, they have created an enforceable contract. ”  Graziano v. Grant, 326 N.J. Super. 328, 339-340 (citing Weichert Co. Realtors, 128 N.J. at 435).  By its express terms, the MOU unequivocally states the parties’ intention to be bound, and all essential terms of the agreement are contained therein.  The MOU states the exchange of consideration in clear and definite terms: [[...]] shall pay $1.00 for one hundred percent (100%) of the interests in [[...]].  In addition, [[...]] shall be entitled to a payment of $3,000,000 upon the granting of enforceable final zoning approvals.  . . .  The transaction described herein shall be evidenced by an assignment of interests and an amendment of the LLC Agreement.  . . .  Attached hereto as Schedule A is a list of all litigation to which [[...]] is a party, thereby comprising a full disclosure by [...] of liabilities to be assumed by [[...]] as part of the transaction contemplated hereunder.  [(Da28-29). ]
[brief] MS. GIFFORD: [...], Assistant Deputy Public Defender for [...].  [...]: Good morning.  MS. REIN: [...], Assistant Prosecutor on behalf of the State.  [...]:  Good morning to you.  All right.  Ms. Gifford, we'll hear from you first.  MS. GIFFORD:  Good morning, Your Honors, and may it please the court.  [...] was denied his right to withdraw from a plea agreement pursuant to Rule 3:9-9 also known as the conditional plea rule, which permits withdrawal when a defendant successfully appeals from a pretrial ruling.
[directive] A law enforcement officer involved in the application for or execution of a search warrant shall be strictly prohibited from disclosing to a non-law enforcement officer any facts contained in or concerning the application for the warrant, or the fact that a search warrant will or has been sought or executed, unless such disclosure is expressly authorized by the Director of the Division of Criminal Justice or his designee, or a County Prosecutor or his designee.  No law enforcement officer shall advise or invite any non-law enforcement officer to attend, participate in or witness the execution of a search warrant, and no law enforcement officer shall permit a non-law enforcement officer to enter a premises during the execution of a warrant, unless the attendance or participation of such non-law enforcement personnel is necessary to ensure the safe and efficient execution of the warrant.  (Example: civilian personnel who may be necessary to the safe and efficient execution of a warrant might include Page 9 landlords, building managers or custodians; locksmiths, child welfare officials (to take custody of minor children who may be present at the scene); or animal control officers (to assist in the control of guard dogs or other animals at the premises to be searched).
[brief] ”  In re Hum. Tissue Prod. Liab. Litig., 488 F. Supp. 2d 430, 432-33 (D.N.J. 2007).  “Congress clearly vested the FDA with the regulatory authority to assess and manage the communications regarding product recalls. ”  Id. at 433; see also Clark, 567 F. Supp. 2d at 714 (“[T]he FDA ‘reviews the adequacy of a proposed recall strategy developed by a recalling firm and recommends changes as appropriate. ” (citing 21 C.F.R. § 7.42(a)(2))). \textsuperscript{12}  FDA’s comprehensive recall regulations occupy the entire field, foreclosing any State from using its law to regulate prescription-drug recalls, such as Plaintiff’s state-law claim seeking to require an earlier recall or earlier warning to U.S. healthcare providers about the recall issue.
[brief] As to reconsideration, the defendants argued: (a) the trial court miscalculated the judgment amount by $9,885.92; and (b) the trial court should amend the judgment to apportion liability severally, but not jointly.  (27T4:16-18).  The trial court granted reconsideration solely as to the miscalculation issue and modified the principal amount of the judgment to $2,872,358.93.  (27T72:4-25).  It denied reconsideration on the joint and several liability issue, concluding that the facts and equities supported that result:  These are these webs and these mazes and conduit accounts and these co-mingled accounts, were in the control of [...].  I know his wife had 51 percent in one of the entities, and these monies are being moved around.  Monies maybe are still being moved around.  That is not before the Court, I have no idea.  But to say that when the music stops playing, well, this one and that one didn’t have any – bottom line, is, there are all woven out of the same cloth and they are all controlled by the same person.  . . .  So now I am going to, at this point in reconsideration, I am going to apportion percentages to people and then lo and behold when the music stops playing, the money won’t be there, it will be somewhere else.  So I reject that.  It has to be joint and several.  And the way this was set up is the classic case that would warrant that.  And to apportion it the way it is being suggested [by the defendants], just cannot be done.  . . .  There is no other way to parse this without it becoming inequitable to the plaintiff.  So I am not going to reconsider that . . .  I don’t think . . . the facts of this case would warrant such conclusions.  So I will deny that.  (27T79:7 to 80:14).  The trial court agreed to stay the judgment pending appeal, conditioned on the posting of a bond.
[brief] Mandel, N.J. Appellate Practice § 34:3-2 (2023)..............................................  23 Model Jury Charges (Criminal), "Third Party Guilt Charge" (approved Mar. 9, 2015)..................................................................................  28  RULES  N.J.R.E. 602 ...........................................................................................................  12, 13 N.J.R.E. 701 .......................................................................................................... 10, 11, 12, 13 R. 2:10-2 ............................................................................................................... 25, 26 Rule 403 ..................................................................................................................  12  TABLE OF CITATIONS  Db - Defendant's brief.  Da - Defendant's appendix.  PSR - Defendant's Presentence report 1T – February 10, 2021, motion transcript 2T – May 31, 2022, trial transcript 3T – June 1, 2022, trial transcript 4T – June 2, 2022, trial transcript volume I 5T – June 2, 2022, trial transcript volume II 6T – June 7, 2022, trial transcript 7T – June 8, 2022, trial transcript 8T – June 9, 2022, trial transcript 9T – October 6, 2022, sentencing transcript
[directive] Page I of 4  The Court anticipated such a request in 2017 and asked the Legislature to of consider amending the statute to provide for a review juvenile sentences with of NJ.  lengthy periods parole ineligibility.  Comer (slip op. at 5), State Zuber, 227 v. of 422, 451-53 (2017).  However, in the absence legislative action after four plus years, the Court determined that it was necessary to address this significant constitutional issue, noting that courts have the authority to act in order to save a statute from constitutional infirmity.
[brief] Ibid.  In reviewing this colloquy, our Supreme Court held that the defendant’s responses to the officer’s clarifying questions showed that the defendant was not, in fact, invoking his right to counsel.  But the Court reaffirmed that it is critically important for an officer to ask clarifying questions to determine whether a suspect is invoking her rights or not.  When “a suspect’s statement ‘arguably’ amount[s] to an assertion of Miranda rights, . . . the officer must clarify with the suspect in order to correctly interpret the statement. ”  Id. at 622 (emphasis added).  This obligation to clarify applies to ambiguous or equivocal requests for counsel: if the suspect’s “words amount to even an ambiguous request for counsel, the questioning must cease, although clarification is permitted. ”  *Id.* at 624.  Indeed, when a suspect’s “statements are so ambiguous that they cannot be understood to be the assertion of a right . . . clarification is not only permitted but needed. ”  *Ibid.* (emphasis added).  Last year, in *Gonzalez*, our Supreme Court reviewed a situation, like here, where detectives failed to cease questioning and clarify a defendant’s ambiguous invocation of his right to counsel.
[brief] [...] properly determined that there would be no discovery in this prerogative writ action.  He had the authority to do so.  R. 4:10-3(a).  His decision must be reviewed for abuse of discretion.  See Section I(C).  [...]’s 31-page written decision explains his reasoning, and we will not reargue the matter here, other to note that discovery aimed at determining the motives of the governing body members for enacting the legislation, or determining whether a different financial agreement could have been struck, or determining the effect the Financial Agreement would have on a regional school funding formula, was irrelevant.  As a matter of public policy, tax exemptions granted under the LTTEL are designed to be implemented without delay.  See Comm. Amendments to S. Cty. & Mun. Gov’t Comm. Statement to S. 291 (L. 1991, c. 431).  As a matter of public policy, tax exemptions granted to help provide for affordable housing must be predictable and certain.  Discovery would needlessly delay the construction of affordable housing and give its opponents an additional weapon to fight affordable housing projects.  --- \(^9\)
[brief] “Context matters” because “an act that would be immaterial in some situations is material in others. ”  Burlington, 548 U.S. at 69 (internal citations omitted).  According to Defendants [...] and [...], Plaintiff takes the phrase “context matters” out of context.  Def.’s Br., pg. 24.  Funnily enough, Defendants’ application of the case law to the facts in this case does not provide any context at all, given that they never factor in the Injunction.  For example, Defendants argue that the cases relied upon by Plaintiff are distinguishable because the retaliation in those cases are far more egregious than the retaliatory acts pled by Plaintiff.  Def.’s BOE and Restel Br., pg. 18.  In doing so, Defendants conceal the critical point that there are certain actions that they were legally prohibited from taking against Plaintiff.  What is more, the cases relied upon by Plaintiff are merely examples of instances where the Appellate Division applied the facts of the pleadings to the prevailing standard and reversed dismissals of pleadings at the motion to dismiss stage.  See, e.g., Clarke v. Atlantic City Bd. of Educ., 2010 WL 4107750, *5 (N.J. App. Div. Dec. 8, 2009); see also Nead v. Union County Educ. Services Com’n, 2011 WL 166245 (N.J. App. Div. Jan. 20, 2011); see also Royster v. New Jersey State Police, 2007 WL 4441103 (N.J. App. Div. Dec. 20, 2007).  But those cases are not intended to provide an exhaustive list of materially adverse actions.  Instead, the Appellate Division in those cases does exactly what Plaintiff is asking to be done here: an application of the prevailing standard to the unique facts of her case.  In contrast, what Defendants are really saying is that the presence of the Injunction, which requires them to maintain the status quo as it relates to Plaintiff’s employment, shields them from any further NJLAD scrutiny.
[brief] In State v. Mason, 164 N.J. 1 (App. Div. 1979), for example, after the police received information that a woman at a bar had drugs on her person and was trying to sell them, they removed her from the bar, and placed her in an unmarked police vehicle containing three officers.  When asked if she had any drugs, the Defendant initially replied she did not know, but then physically produced a plastic bag containing drugs.  *Id.* at 3.  The trial court concluded that the Defendant had been subject to custodial questioning without the administration of *Miranda* warnings, and the Appellate Division affirmed.  *Id.* at 2-4.
[directive] Other Provisions  A.  This Directive is issued pursuant to the Attorney Non-enforceability by third parties.  General’s authority to ensure the uniform and efficient enforcement of the laws and administration of criminal justice throughout the State.  This Directive imposes limitations on law enforcement agencies and officials that may be more restrictive than the limitations imposed under the United States and New Jersey Constitutions, and federal and state statutes and regulations.  Nothing in this Directive shall be construed in any way to create any substantive right that may be enforced by any third party.
[directive] When conduct to the need considering practicable, as soon as jail county the to transported requiring procedures identification witness defendant, of interview (e.g., activities investigative the and transport resources of availability the and participation) or presence defendant's to as recommendations preparing program is services pretrial the which during hours operating 2A:162-16.  S.A. with N.J. accordance in conditions release Reports.  Investigative Available  Forward Obligation to 4.13 available "all issued complaint-summons is when a that provides :2-1(c) 3 Rule hours."
[brief] The failure of the State to provide sufficient evidence to authenticate this video matters.  [...] works at the supermarket that this camera was apparently filming in and around.  If it is [...] on the video, it is quite possible that the footage is from July 17 and not July 16—after all, he works at the supermarket.  It is quite possible he had a conversation, or even an altercation, with a person outside of the supermarket on July 17.  But it was on July 16 that [...] was shot.  If the footage is from July 17, there is no connection between [...] being outside with a person, as depicted in the footage, and [...] being shot.
[brief] [...] explained to [...] in his letter brief that the order appointing him did not require a bond.  (Ca141).  In addition, [...] explained that he did not distribute funds to any creditor from the operation proceeds of the diner.  He did not know of any creditors other than the [...], which was owed in excess of $128,000.00.  [...] did contact the [...], and [...] and the landlord were aware of the activities of [...] as receiver.  (Ca141).  [...] was in contact with [...] until it was clear that the landlord would not communicate with him, the president of [...], or the attorneys for [...].  (Ca142).
[brief] Therefore, as the Appellate Division has already concluded, [...] lacked standing to pursue this matter, and the trial court acted appropriately in dismissing the case.  While [...] may disagree with certain taxes administered by the State Parties, the Supreme Court has been clear that “[t]here must be a limit to individual argument in such matters if government is to go on. ”  Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441, 445 (1915).  The trial court's decision should be affirmed as [...] did not have standing to bring this suit challenging an ordinance in a city in which he does not reside or own business or property.
[brief] ”  (Sb16-17; 1T28-20 to 21)  The State’s assertion is incorrect.  The trial court did consider the State’s assertions regarding the jacket, noting that the State’s motion brief asserted that the jacket found inside the Mercedes matched the description of one of the individuals that stole the BMW M4 and the Audi.  (1T 12-16 to 25, 25-16 to 25, 27-6 to 9)  But after reviewing all the evidence the State submitted, the Court was not persuaded by the State’s argument.  (1T 25-16 to 26-3, 27-6 to 19)  It does not appear that the State submitted any surveillance video to the Court to review; rather, the State simply relied on police reports.  (Ca34-59)  On appeal, the State did not support its assertion that the “jacket inside the abandoned carjacked Mercedes Benz . . . matched the description of the jacket worn by one of the individuals that stole the BMW M4 and Audi” with any citation to the record below.  (Sb8, 17)  The one page of the report authored by [...] that is cited in the preceding sentence of the State’s brief, which contains descriptions of various articles of clothing of various actors, does not claim that the jacket found in the Mercedes matched the jacket worn by a perpetrator of the April 20 robbery.  (Ca55-56)  Thus, the trial court appropriately considered and rejected the State’s contention that the jacket found in the Mercedes after [...] was apprehended strongly linked [...] to the April 20 robbery.
[brief] (7T21-21 to 24; 7T25-7 to 23; 7T26-10 to 7T27-5; 7T27-22 to 7T28-11; 7T29-3 to 16; 7T30-4 to 18; 7T31-6 to 23; 7T32-22 to 7T37-23; 7T34-19 to 7T35-9; 7T36-22 to 7T37-17; 7T38-7 to 7T39-7; 7T40-1 to 24).  [...] denied defendant’s motion for a mistrial.  The judge ruled that the conversation with the jurors was about food and tea and was not a long conversation.  (7T47-14 to 18; 7T48-14 to 25).  The conversation was “innocent” and there was no evidence the conversation could influence the verdict.  (7T49-2 to 5).  The jurors had been forthright in alerting the court to the encounter, and all the jurors told the court they could be impartial.  (7T47-24 to 7T48-6).  The trial court properly denied defendant’s motion for a mistrial.
[brief] According to defendant’s plea allocution, on March 2, 1994, defendant went with [...] and [...] to the victims’ house to “rob them” of money and guns.  The three participants had planned the crime at [...]’s house, which was within walking distance.  “To protect [them] in case anything happened,” [...] brought along a gun.  Defendant was aware that [...] was holding a gun, which he described as “[a] little revolver with white handles. ”  When the participants reached the victims’ house, [...] acted as a lookout while defendant and [...] made entry.  Defendant knew that [...] was inside the house, but nonetheless “went through the back door. ”  [...], meanwhile, “went through the window. ”  The back door led to two staircases: one going up, and one going down into the basement.  Defendant and [...] went down into the basement.  At some point thereafter, [...] “came to the back door. ”  Defendant and [...] came up the stairway, and [...] shot [...] four times from three feet away.  After she fell, defendant and [...] dragged her down into the basement to hide her.  Defendant then “went through the house looking for stuff” and found some money, but no gun.  Thereafter, [...] informed defendant and [...] that [...] had pulled into the driveway.  participants “scattered through the house and waited for him to come inside. ” (1T22:3-6).
[brief] ..................................................................  9  Correia v. Deutsche Bank Nat'l Tr. Co., 452 B.R. 319 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2011)  ............................................................  7 Dig. Equip. Corp. v. Desktop Direct, 511 U.S. 863 (1994)  ...............................................................................  3 Everbank v. Tierney, No. A-2435-18T2, 2020 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1414 (App. Div. July 15, 2020)  .......................................................................  6 GMAC v. Pittella, 205 N.J. 572 (2011)  ...............................................................................  3 Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Alabama v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79 (2000)  ...............................................................................  3 Hirsch v. Amper Fin. Servs., LLC, 215 N.J. 174 (2013)  ...............................................................................  3 Hoxworth v. Blinder, Robinson & Co., 980 F.2d 223 (3d Cir. 1992) ..................................................................  8  In re Almeida, 417 B.R. 140 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2009) ....................................................... 7 In re Estate of McManus, 417 N.Y.S.2d 55 (1979) ....................................................................... 7 In re Mirant Corp., 613 F.3d 584 (5th Cir. 2010) ................................................................. 10 In re Pharmacy Benefit Managers Antitrust Litig., 700 F.3d 109 (3d Cir. 2012) ........................................................................ 3 John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Olick, 151 F.3d 132 (3d Cir. 1998) ........................................................................ 2, 3 Livonia Prop. Holdings, L.L.C. v. 12840-12976 Farmington Rd. Holdings, L.L.C., 717 F. Supp. 2d 724 (E.D. Mich. 2010).................................................. 7 Lloyd v. Hovensa, 369 F.3d 263 (3d Cir. 2004) ........................................................................ 3 Morgan v. Sundance, Inc., 596 U.S. 411 (2022) .................................................................................... 10, 12 Rajamin v. Deutsche Bank Nat'l Tr. Co., 757 F.3d 79 (2d Cir. 2014) ..........................................................................