ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] R. 2:10-2; U.S. Const. amends. VI, XIV; N.J. Const. art. I, ¶¶ 1, 9, 10.  In addition to the requirement that the State prove every element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt, our constitution requires that the jury unanimously reach a “subjective state of certitude on the facts in issue. ”  *State v. Frisby*, 174 N.J. 583, 596 (2002); *In re Winship*, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970); see also *State v. Parker*, 124 N.J. 628, 633 (1991) (recognizing that the unanimous jury requirement is “an indispensable element in all criminal trials”).  Although the unanimity rule does not require jurors to agree on every detail in the State’s case, it does mandate unanimous agreement on all the elements of the offense.
[brief] These included the age of the case and the complications that would arise if [...] was admitted as an expert.  1T10-24 to 11-2.  The complications included further delays in discovery as well as the near certainty that expert depositions would not be completed by the October 17, 2021, deadline pursuant to the latest case management order.  1T10-18 to 11-18.  The October 17, 2021, deadline was roughly a month and a half away from the date of oral argument.  If [...] had been allowed to be substituted, defendant would have had to depose him, send the transcript and his report to his experts for review, and supplemental defense expert reports would have been needed.  Such reviews and reports cost money; experts charge for their time.  In a case that had been experiencing missed deadlines due to the number of experts involved, as well as the schedules of several attorneys, accomplishing this task [...], there’s an extensive brief that you’ve submitted to this Court [sic] telling me why I should deny [...]’s motion and why [...] is qualified to testify against [...]’s client.
[brief] [...]: Judge, can we see that?  Q  And you’ll see that this is dated May 23rd, 2016, correct?  THE COURT: Counsel? A  Yes.  THE COURT: They’re asking to see it.  (Counsel confer)  BY [...]:  Q  Doctor, you testified to the jury that you had an application for privileges in 2014.  I’m going to show you your testimony from May 23rd, 2016 in the Flowers case.  Then read with me on the bottom, page 86 and you were asked at that time in 2016, May, do you currently have any privileges to practice at any hospital.  The answer was no.  And you were, and you resigned all your privileges at the end of 2010, correct, and that was correct, right?  A  Yeah.  Q  Then you were asked and you haven’t applied to any, and your answer to that question was no?  Was that -- A  I think that factually I must have didn’t remember because I applied and then withdrew relatively quickly so maybe I didn’t consider that a big formal application like I – Q  You said this under -- A -- in 2017.  Q  You testified to this under oath, correct?  A  There’s an inconsistency there.
[brief] This exception shall be narrowly construed to prevent disclosure of information that would be harmful to a bona fide law enforcement purpose or the public safety.  Whenever a law enforcement official determines that it is necessary to withhold information, the official shall issue a brief statement explaining the decision.  The clear import of subsection a is to allow for the limited denial of access of otherwise accessible government records created in the course of a criminal investigation if their release would be inimical to the public interest.  Subsection b differs in that it directs certain information that must be made available in the context of a criminal investigation in progress, regardless of the availability of non-exempt government records amenable to release.  When these various definitions and sections are read in pari materia, Section 3(a) of OPRA only makes sense if considered in the context of ongoing investigations where access to otherwise non-exempt government records that are otherwise subject to release under OPRA, such as body worn police camera footage, use of force reports, accident reports, 911 tapes, etc., may be denied if inimical to the public interest for the integrity of an investigation.
[brief] With the lack of any proofs, the Board determination could really not be otherwise than in this Resolution (Da1).  The burden of proof rests in the proponent of the nonconforming use, here the owner of the purported off-site parking easement ([...]).  The Board action/Resolution had to be analyzed in that context --- that the nonconforming use is not protected and is not legal unless the [...] demonstrated by sufficient proofs that the off-site parking use was legally permitted or approved on Lot 5 at the time of its inception.
[brief] STANDARD OF REVIEW  “[O]rders compelling or denying arbitration are deemed final and appealable as of right as of the date entered. ”  GMAC v. Pittella, 205 N.J. 572, 587 (2011).  The enforceability of arbitration agreements is a question of law, to which a reviewing court need not give deference to the trial judge's interpretative analysis.  Morgan v. Sandford Brown Inst., 225 N.J. 289, 303 (2016) (citing Atalese v. U.S. Legal Servs. Grp. L.P., 219 N.J. 430, 445-46 (2014)).  New Jersey courts review an order granting or denying a motion to compel arbitration de novo.
[brief] There is nothing novel or unsettled about the issues raised in [...]’s cross-appeal.  The governing statutes are clear, and longstanding case law affirms their application.  That is why [...] is simply seeking to treat a handful of voters differently from everyone else.  That is not how elections work.  The law applies uniformly to all voters, and exceptions are not permitted based on convenience, oversight, or personal relationships.  Courts are not free to rewrite statutory mandates to save defective ballots, no matter how sympathetic the circumstances.  To permit what [...] requests would undermine the integrity of the electoral process and invite unequal treatment going forward.  The trial court recognized that, and this Court should do the same.
[brief] **[...] PROPERLY DETERMINED CONSISTENCY WITH THE WATER QUALITY MANAGEMENT PLAN AND ITS DECISION IS ADEQUATELY SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD**  Appellant cherry picks select regulatory language to confuse the actual requirements of “consistency assessments” under the Water Quality Planning Act\(^9\) and the applicable regulations for wastewater (i.e., stormwater runoff).  --- \(^9\) N.J.S.A. 58:11A-1 to -16.  Moreover, Appellant improperly raises its objections to the [...]’s consistency assessment for the first time on appeal.  However, there is nothing to indicate that the issuance of the Permit conflicts with an areawide plan.  N.J.S.A. 58:11A-10.  Instead, the permit issuance falls squarely within the scope of the WQMP Rules set forth in N.J.A.C. 7:15-1.1 to -6.8.  A.
[brief] As such, and contrary to [...]’s assertions (Pb10), there is no dispute that Defendants-Respondents made no request that [...] withdraw as their counsel in this consolidated matter.  Thus, the [...] has not determined that an impermissible “positional conflict” exists under the Outside Counsel Guidelines.  Indeed, the indictment against [...] does not create a “positional conflict” under the Outside Counsel Guidelines prohibiting [...] from continuing to represent Defendants-Respondents for several reasons.  First, [...] was indicted strictly in his personal capacity.  (Pa9-119).  [...] performed no substantive work at any point during the defense of this consolidated matter.  (Da7).  His involvement was limited strictly to filing the designated trial counsel notice.  Ibid.  Nevertheless, [...] has withdrawn his appearance as designated trial counsel for Defendants-Respondents.
[brief] Da 41 ¹  This brief is included pursuant to Rule 2:6-1 to establish that [...]’s invocation of his right to counsel was raised below, although it is not directly addressed in the trial court’s Miranda order.  JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS BEING APPEALED  Order  Admitting Statement .................................................................Da 18-27  Ruling Denying Redaction of Statement ...................... 16T:84-25 to 111-14  Ruling Denying Motion for a New Trial .............................  23T:31-4 to 34-17 | CASES | PAGE NOS. | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------| | Bartley v. Commonwealth, 445 S.W.3d 1 (Ky. 2014) | 32 | | Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) | 42 | | Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976) | 23 | | Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981) | 13, 21 | | Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96 (1975) | 13 | | State v. Adim, 410 N.J. Super. 410 (App. Div. 2009) | 47, 49 | | State v. Alston, 204 N.J. 614 (2011) | 14, 16, 20| | State v. Bankston, 63 N.J. 263 (1973) | 42, 43 | | State v. Branch, 182 N.J. 338 (2005) | 42, 44, 45| | State v. Cain, 224 N.J. 410 (2016) | 41 | | State v. Chew, 150 N.J. 30 (1997) | 14 | | State v. Clark, 251 N.J. 266 (2022) | 23, 24, 32, 35| | State v. Corsaro, 107 N.J. 339 (1987) | 46 | | State v. Czachor, 82 N.J. 392 (1980) | 47 | | State v. Feaster, 156 N.J. 1 (1998) | 23-25, 31 | | State v. Figueroa, 190 N.J. 219 (2007) | 46, 47, 49| | State v. Gonzalez, 249 N.J. 612 (2022) | Passim | | State v. Harris, 298 N.J. Super. 478 (App. Div. 1997) | 44, 48 | | CASES (CONT'D.) | PAGE NOS. | |--------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------| | State v. Harris, 457 N.J. Super. 34 (App. Div. 2018) | 48 | | State v. Hartley, 103 N.J. 252 (1986) | 13 | | State v. Herbert, 457 N.J. Super. 490 (App. Div. 2019) | 33, 34 | | State v. J.R., 227 N.J. 393 (2017) | 34 | | State v. Kucinski, 227 N.J. 603 (2017) | 26, 27, 30| | State v. McLean, 205 N.J. 438 (2011) | 36 | | State v. Medina, 242 N.J. 397 (2020) | 42, 43 | | State v. O.D.A.-C., 250 N.J. 408 (2022) | 21, 32 | | State v. Presha, 163 N.J. 304 (2000) | 23 | | State v. Reed, 133 N.J. 237 (1993) | 14 | | State v. Sanchez, 247 N.J. 450 (2021) | 36, 40 | | State v. Sanchez-Medina, 231 N.J. 452 (2018) | 49 | | State v. Valenzuela, 136 N.J. 458 (1994) | 47 | | State v. Winter, 96 N.J. 640 (1982) | 33 | | STATUTES | | |---------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------| | N.J.S.A. 2A:84A-19 | 13 | | N.J.S.A. 2C:17-1a | 1 | | N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4a | 1 | | N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5b | 1 | | TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (CONT'D.) | PAGE NOS. | |-------------------------------|-----------| | **RULES** | | | R. 2:6-1 | iii, 12 | | R. 2:10-2 | 36, 50 | | R. 701 | 39, 40 | | **RULES OF EVIDENCE** | | | N.J.R.E. 503 | 13 | | N.J.R.E. 701 | 36, 37 | | **CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS** | | | N.J. Const. art. I, ¶ 1 | 13, 41, 42, 45, 46 | | N.J. Const. art.
[directive] If the crime involves a N.J.S.A. violation of 2C:24-4b(3) (causes or permits child to engage in sexual act that is to be photographed or N.J.S.A. exhibited), if the crime was committed on or after February 1, 2018, 2C:24-4b(4) (photographs or N.J.S.A. films a child in sexual act), if the crime was committed on or after February 1, 2018, 2C:24-4b(5)(b) N.J.S.A. (knowingly possessing or knowingly viewing child pornography), 2C:24-4.1 (leader of a child N.J.S.A. pornography network), if the crime was committed on or after February 1, 2018, 2C:34-3 (selling, N.J.S.A. distributing or exhibiting obscene material to a person under age 18) or an offense involving computer criminal activity in violation of any provision of Title 2C, chapter 20, you will be assessed a mandatory penalty as listed below for each offense for which you pled guilty?  (1)
[brief] 4  On August 17, 2022, the court entered an amended order correcting a clerical error in the civil monetary penalties, thereby assessing a corrected total of $1,505,000 against [...] and $1,505,000 against [...].  The trial court found that “[...] and [...] are two distinct entities both controlled by [...] [and that] [...] is a for-profit entity while [...] is a non-profit entity. ” (Pa83).  The trial court also found defendants diverted $1,500,000 of investor funds to [...], misused those funds for personal expenses and other non-business expenses, and never informed investors that their funds were going to [...].  (Pa84).  Despite those findings of diversion and misuse of investor funds by [...], the court denied the Bureau’s request to require defendant [...] (against whom no monetary relief was awarded) to disgorge the $1,500,000 of its ill-gotten gains.
[brief] In addition to the terms of the conveyance of the property from the [...] to [...] in exchange for the promise to construct a synagogue and operate it in accordance with Orthodox Jewish tenets, the 1963 Agreement specifically states that the [...] “agrees to permit [[...]] to utilize for parking purposes the vacant lands [the [...]] owns on Madison Avenue [Fifth Street Lot] and also on Sixth Street and to permit use of lands on Sixth Street for boiler room use and for a water cooling tower. ”  (Da13-18)  The description of the easement is specific, and the uses provided serve and benefit [...].  (Da13-18)  In accordance with the 1963 Agreement, the [...] agreed to convey “the southwest corner of Sixth Street and Madison Avenue” to [...] on the condition [...] erect a synagogue on the granted property.
[brief] ”  Dutch Run, 450 N.J. Super. at 604.  But regardless, maintaining a small office in the State and servicing a limited number of clients with New Jersey addresses—which collectively accounted for less than 5% of the firm’s total revenue, Da286—falls well short of establishing that [...]’s contacts with New Jersey are so pervasive such that the firm can be deemed “essentially at home” in New Jersey even though it was formed and has its principal place of business elsewhere—a showing that Plaintiff concedes is limited to “exceptional cases.
[brief] (1T 37:5-11).  For building height, 41 feet is permitted, and 48.83 feet is proposed.  [...] testified that all elevations are relative to the curb line adjacent to the building, which is how the Borough measures building height.  (1T 37:14-18).  For density, [...] testified the Applicant proposed a lot area of 1,092 square feet per unit where 1,200 square feet per unit is required.  He explained it is “a slight increase in the density, 9 percent . . .” (1T 37:19-22).  As to the proposed front yard setbacks, [...] testified the proposed development is consistent with other structures in the neighborhood:  I shared page three of the Exhibit A-5 to sort of show the prevailing setbacks in the area.  As you can see, as you go up along Ocean Terrace on the west side of the road and along Porter Ave., again, on the north side of Porter Ave., all of the existing uses are pretty much built up to the property line.  So, there is a pretty well established prevailing setback for all the existing structures in this area.  [1T 38:1-9]  [...] explained that the surrounding uses “are essentially built up to the property line.  So, we’ve set our structures back slightly to just provide a little bit of room for landscaping and to provide a little bit of room for architectural façade elements that sort of provide depth to the property or to the building.  We don’t want it to feel like a blank wall that is sort of overwhelming to the property. ” (1T 38:11-19).  [...] further explained that the proposed development required two front yard setbacks because under the Borough’s zoning ordinance the property is a corner lot, “it has two front yards and two side yards.
[brief] Two sophisticated parties entered into a fully integrated and unambiguous agreement (the PTA), and the Arbitrator far exceeded his powers by completely disregarding that agreement in finding that certain projects were magically elevated to Additional Backlog Project status for which [...] is due to [...].  The Trial Court, in turn, blindly deferred to the Arbitrator’s ultimate conclusions, taking upon itself to remedy the obvious deficiencies of the Award by assuming the Arbitrator relied on evidence upon which he did not (and which doesn’t exist) and by ignoring the multiple mathematical and form issues with the Award.  [...] does not seek relief from the Court because it is simply dissatisfied with the outcome of the Arbitration.  Dissatisfaction could arise only if the Arbitrator was required to resolve some ambiguity in the parties’ PTA and in doing so rejected the interpretation argued by [...].  That is not the case here.  The PTA’s terms are not ambiguous as it clearly lays out the necessary steps for a project to become subject to the parties’ [...]-sharing agreement.  It is undisputed that those contractually required steps were not satisfied.  It is also undisputed that the Arbitrator made clear errors when calculating the interest and transcribing the [...] figures into the Award.  For the reasons set forth above, [...] respectfully requests that the Court reverse the Trial Court’s incorrect legal and factual determinations and vacate the Award or, alternatively, remand this matter to the Trial Court to modify the Award accordingly.  Dated: [...]  October 17, 2024  [...]  By: __/s/ [...]__  [...]  Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant  [...] New Jersey, LLC  One Canalside 125 Main Street [...] 14203-2887  Telephone No. [...]  [...]  [...], Plaintiff/Respondent, v. [...], Defendant/Appellant.
[brief] ’  *N.J.S.A.* 40A:9-22.4; see also *Grabowsky v. Twp. of Montclair*, 221 N.J. 536, 554 (2015)(‘it is essential that municipal offices be filled by individuals who are thoroughly familiar with local communities and concerns. ’). ”  *Id.* at *23-24.  The Appellate Division reviewed the trial court’s application of conflict of interest principles under the MLUL, Local Government Ethics Law, and common law to the enjoining of the mayor and found:  The mayor’s comments, while showing his disregard for affordable housing, are not tantamount to a conflict of interest regarding plaintiff’s complex or nay other development pending before the Planning Board due to his direct or indirect pecuniary or personal interest having a likely capacity to tempt him to depart from his sworn public duty.  *Id.* at *24.  In the instant matter, there is no evidence that the Mayor improperly influenced the Board.  As an elected public official and a resident of the Township, [...] had the right to express his opinion on the Respondents’ Amended Application.  That much is true, even when the opinion is antagonistic to the application.  Moreover, as the Appellate Division found in Cent. 25, LLC, these opinions can be expressed even on official municipal letterhead.  Without any reference to legal precedent and failing to provide comment on how the Mayor’s press release differs from the other forms of allowable public comment, the trial judge instead focused almost thirteen (13) pages of the 53-page Opinion on the effectiveness of the press release in engaging members of the public and admonished the Mayor for having “ginned-up” opposition to the application.
[brief] Drafting and Execution of the Will Judge  [...] was an attorney in private practice in 2014, having opened up his own firm in 1999, which included his wife and attorney, [...].  [...] served as a solicitor at various points for the cities of Brigantine, Ventnor, and also for Mullica Township.  He also served as counsel for various planning and zoning boards.  In 2015, [...] was appointed as a Municipal Court judge in Brigantine, and in 2022, was selected as the chief judge of the central Municipal Court of Atlantic County.  (9T211-2 to 213-10).  As part of [...]’s private practice, he prepared Wills for his clients.  [...] first met the Decedent when she was his 7th grade teacher.  The Decedent became a client of [...] over a decade ago.  In 2014, the Decedent asked [...] to prepare a Will for her.  (9T214-16 to 216-4).  [...] identified Exhibit R-9 as the Decedent’s original Will, which he prepared and which was signed by the Decedent on October 16, 2014.  (Pa 105-109).  (9T216-20 to 217-2; 9T227-7 to 21).
[brief] N.J.S.A. 53:5A-10(e)(4).  On August 7, 2019, the [...] satisfied this notice requirement when it added information about the Ricci Act to its website.  (Pa10).  That notice satisfied the Ricci Act, which requires only that the Board notify members of the enactment of the statute.  The Legislature is well aware of how to create specific notice requirements and has done so with other statutes.  See N.J.S.A. 43:15A-50(a) (“Notification shall be by certified mail to the spouse’s address as provided on the form by the member. ”); e.g., Hammond v. City of Paterson, 145 N.J. Super. 452, 456 (App. Div. 1976) (holding that the Legislature, in requiring “actual receipt” of notice in the Tort Claims Act when certified mail is not used, “clearly did not mean to leave proof of actual receipt to a presumption. ”).  When “the Legislature has carefully employed a term in one place and excluded it in another, it should not be implied where excluded. ”  GE Solid State, Inc. v. Director, Div. of Taxation, 132 N.J. 298, 307-08 (1993); see also State v. Hoffman, 149 N.J. 564, 579 (1997).  Nowhere in the Ricci Act is there a requirement that the Board send notice, through a postcard, by certified mail or other means, or otherwise require actual receipt of notice.  Thus, in accord with the statutory canon of *expressio unius est exclusio alterius*, the expression of one thing suggests the exclusion of another left unmentioned, this court should reject [...]’s request to create a requirement where the Legislature has chosen not to.  The Ricci Act simply required that the Board provide notice within thirty days of its enactment, without specifying in what manner.  The Board complied with this requirement when it posted information about the Ricci Act on its website.
[brief] Finally, there can be no question that a direct connection exists between Defendants’ improper conduct and Plaintiffs’ loss.  Defendants did not simply fail to perform under the Policy.  Rather, Defendants—facing the prospect of insuring Plaintiffs for a likely, costly litigation in the Kentos matter (post-Claim legal fees exceed $300,000 when the matter settled [Pa575, ¶ 98])—improperly rescinded the Policies and deceptively claimed its rescission was proper despite the clear, unambiguous language of the Policies.  As noted above, Defendants acted fraudulently and unconscionably in the performance of the Policies when it rescinded the Policies—despite the clear, unambiguous language of the Policies Defendants drafted—and refused to fulfill their obligations thereunder.
[brief] (78a-79a).  [...] noted that [...] had experience in complex regulatory businesses, was familiar with the relevant regulations, planned to utilize online ordering to help the flow of business and traffic, and sought to hire local residents and become active participants in the community.  (79a).  Moreover, at an October 18, 2022 Council meeting, [...] explained to the Council:  In addition to forming a sub-committee there were discussions about the application process itself.  What forms, procedures, considerations, input, review, process, public comment and so much more would we need to develop and collect, without the guidance of the state.  ...  In its deliberations, the subcommittee was guided by the evaluation criteria, the applications, interviews and public hearings.  The two councilmembers that were part of the subcommittee shared their determination of what facility they deemed most favorable, based on these factors.  The council voted 5 to 1 recently to issue a resolution of support the [...], one of the three Highway Corridor applicants.