ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] 1 PROCEDURAL HISTORY .................................................................................................................... 2 STATEMENT OF FACTS ..................................................................................................................... 5 [...] ......................................................................................................6  Plaintiff's Termination and Client Solicitation Disputes .........................................................7  Plaintiff's First Amended Verified Complaint ..........................................................................10  Defendants' Motion to Compel Arbitration and Motion for Reconsideration  .........................11  STANDARD OF REVIEW ................................................................................................................
[brief] [...] then filed a motion for sanctions, and I filed an opposition/cross motion, seeking to reinstate my claims after obtaining the letter of administration of our mom’s estate from the Surrogate’s Office.  On Oct 21, 2022, [...]’s motion for sanctions was granted (without prejudice to another motion seeking more sanctions) and my cross motions were denied.  *(The parties then signed and filed a consent order, but the judge did not sign it). *  This appeal was timely filed on Nov 15, 2022.
[brief] Plaintiff clearly understands the weakness of her argument because she exaggerates the actual language and gist of the CAIR Statements in an attempt to establish that the student’s story was “wholly unbelievable. ”  In reality, “forcefully stripping off the religious headscarf” was the harshest language the [...] used, conveying the child’s lack of consent to the hijab’s removal.  See Opp. at 8 (statement chart).  But Plaintiff argues in her opposition that the Statements were “premised upon a . . . story that [...] physically abused a female Muslim student. ”  Opp. at 2.  Plaintiff further argues that the [...] “parroted…a completely wild tale that…[...] had viciously and violently assaulted a student. ”  Opp. at 22 (emphasis added).  These extreme words are Plaintiff’s words, not the [...]’.  The [...]’ statements focused the “disrespectful” nature and “humiliating” effect of [...]’s actions, not on any alleged physical violence.
[brief] [...]: Sí.  *(Yes)*  [(Pa30-31)]  [...]’s first statement, “So part of this I have to explain I, I am only reading, but this is Spanish,” is confusing at best and misleading at worst.  By saying that she was “only reading” suggested either that (a) she could not answer [...]’s questions about what she was reading because she could “only read” the paper to [...], or (b) that he did not need to ask any questions because all she was doing was reading a paper in Spanish to [...]—downplaying the critical importance of the fact that she was reading him his rights to then ask him to waive those rights.
[brief] VI.  PLAINTIFFS’ CLAIM FOR PUNITIVE DAMAGES SHOULD BE REINSTATED.  (36)  Lastly, the Court should reverse the dismissal of Plaintiffs’ claim for punitive damages.  The trial court dismissed this claim without analysis based solely on its dismissal of Plaintiffs’ other claims, without any specific analysis.  Punitive damages should be awarded when it is proved that the defendant acted with “conscious and deliberate disregard of the interest of others. ”  See Gainer v. Weigher Co. Realtors, 288 N.J. Super. 504, 552 (App. Div. 1996), aff’d 148 N.J. 582 (1997).  The subjective determination of “wrongful motive” is the key to the right to punitive damages.  Id.  Since the determination of punitive damages is subjective, courts rarely dismiss punitive damages claims prior to the end of discovery.  See e.g. Ginsberg v. Bistricer, 2007 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1020 (App. Div. April 4, 2007) (granting summary judgment on punitive damage claim “was premature” since it deprived plaintiff ability to present “[e]vidence, concerning whether defendants’ conduct was malicious, willful and wanton” from jury); see also Manee v. Edgewood Properties, 2007 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 659, *26 (App. Div. Feb. 1, 2007), citing Rendine v. Pantzer, 141 N.J. 292 (1995)); Spragg v. Shore Care, 293 N.J. Super. 33, 59 (App. Div. 1996); Domm v. Jersey Printing Co., 871 F.Supp. 732, 739 (D.N.J. 1994).
[brief] This is an appeal of the decision of the [...] ([...]), denying the appellant, [...]’ request to be re-enrolled in ([...]) based upon his employment with the [...] when he returns to work after a six-month COVID 19 shut down.  [Pa38-40,54]  The appellant was initially employed by South Plainfield in 1984 in the Recreation Department on a part-time basis and was enrolled in the Pension System as a Tier 1 pension employee.  [Pa1,2,5]  He subsequently secured full-time employment with the [...] in the County’s Meals for Wheels Program.  On or about August 3, 2009, he was enrolled in [...] as a Tier 1 multi-pension employee based on his two pension eligible positions pursuant to N.J.S.A. 17:2-2(b).  [Pa2]  The appellant continued to be employed by both the County and the [...] making all appropriate pension contributions up until the unprecedented global health emergency of COVID19.
[brief] [...] was properly granted summary judgment because he was unlawfully removed from the [...] by [...]’s arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable conduct.  .....................7  A.  [...] was properly granted summary judgment because an appointed public official's private conduct cannot constitute misconduct in office under N.J.S.A. 40:14A-5(c).  .......................9  B.  [...] was properly denied summary judgment because the undisputed facts show that [...] did not commit “misconduct in office,” the only basis for removal of a sewerage authority commissioner.  .........................17  Conclusion
[directive] Criminal Sexual 2C:14-3b and actor is related by blood or affinity to third degree; or actor has supervisory or 4th Degree $1,000 to $2,500 10% permissible  Contact disciplinary power over victim; or actor is parent or stands in loco parentis within the household; or victim is age 13 to 15 and the actor is at least 4 years older.  Actor exposes his intimate parts for his own sexual gratification under circumstances where 4th Degree $1,000 to $2,500 10% permissible the actor knows or reasonably expects that he is likely to be observed by a child under age 13 and the actor is more than 4 years older; or is likely to be observed by a person who 2C:14-4 Lewdness because of mental disease or defect is unable to understand the sexual nature of the actor’s conduct, fourth degree; or any other flagrantly rude or offensive conduct likely to be observed  Disorderly Persons
[directive] All Treasury law enforcement agencies will implement the following procedures to ensure the uniformity of procedures of within the administration the Treasury Forfeiture Fund.  Three forms have been developed to implement these procedures in providing disposition instructions for monies held in the Customs Service Suspense Account and/or U.S. the Treasury Forfeiture Fund.  These forms are generic in substance, but agency specific by name.  Their purpose is to allow the Treasury Forfeiture Fund to more efficiently - and effectively control the disposition of funds on deposit in the Customs Suspense Account and/or the Treasury Forfeiture Fund.
[brief] POINT VI  THE COMMISSION DID NOT ERR IN STATING THAT ITS FINAL DECISION WAS APPEALABLE TO THE APPELLATE DIVISION RATHER THAN THE COMMISSIONER OF EDUCATION.  The Commission stated that its Final Decision "is a final agency and is appealable to the Superior Court-Appellate Division.  See N.J.A.C. 6A:28-10.11 and New Jersey Court Rule 2:2-3(a)."  Cal 7.  Despite Complainants' argument that appeal of the Final Decision should be to the Commissioner of Education ("Commissioner"), the Commission's statement is correct.  N.J.A.C. 6A:28-10.11 has been recodified as N.J.A.C. 6A:28:9.10.  N.J.A.C. 6A:28:9.10(b) reads as follows:  A determination to dismiss a complaint shall constitute final agency action, and shall be appealable directly to the Appellate Division of the Superior Court.  Complainants cite N.J.A.C. 6A:28-10.12 and N.J.A.C. 6A:28-ll.l. Cb34.  These regulations have been recodified as N.J.A.C. 6A:28-9.11.  N.J.A.C. 6A:28- 9.11(c) provides for review by the Commissioner only if the Commission recommends a sanction.  The same is true as to N.J.S.A. 18A:12-29-29c.  Thus, the Commission correctly stated that its Final Decision was appealable this Court rather than to the Commissioner.
[brief] This conclusion is further buttressed by the fact the jury acquitted defendant of all the counts that concerned his alleged failure to use the NIST thermometer when calibrating certain Alcotest instruments.  (21T47-15 to 49-18 (Count One); 21T53-6 to 54-20 (Count Four); 21T57-21 to 59-10 (Count Six)).  See Parker, 124 N.J. at 640 (noting jury verdicts that included some acquittals showed jury “carefully sifted through all of the evidence”).  And this case is far stronger than Parker, because the jury convicted defendant both of the theft of the wallet ID (21T54-21 to 56-9), and of engaging in a pattern of official misconduct (21T51-15 to 53-5), which required the jury to find defendant “knowingly committed two or more acts” of official misconduct (20T178-12 to 180-19).  The acts from which the jury could choose included the acts charged in Counts One, Four, and Six, of which defendant was acquitted, and the acts charged in Counts Two and Five.  Clearly, the jury concluded defendant displayed his stolen ID at least once, to arrive at the “two or more acts” required for conviction under Count Three.  Cf. Parker, 124 N.J. at 640-41 (rejecting argument defendant could not have committed official misconduct because jury acquitted of other criminal acts alleged in indictment).
[brief] As [...] failed to apportion damages between each responsible party (i.e. the pre-existing conditions and the March 3, 2020 motor vehicle accident), he does not meet the standard as required in Polk, or Davidson.  Polk requires that a diagnosis of aggravation of a pre-existing injury or condition be based upon evaluation of the medical records of a patient prior to the trauma with objective medical records that exist post-trauma.  [...] did not testify that he reviewed any prior medical records other than the records of Dr.  Dworkin who had referred Respondent to [...].  Thus, [...] did not even have the ability to perform a comparative analysis.  As Respondent did not provide the appropriate analysis of pre- and post-accident treatment and causation, an aggravation charge was improper.  Accordingly, a new trial is warranted.
[brief] Due to the fraudulent proffering of the alleged Collateral Assignment following discovery of the Mortgage, the new claims arising out of the new evidence that [...] was the sole member of [...], developed over time.  Although Plaintiffs claimed in their Motion to Vacate that [...] was the sole member of [...], the Court denied that motion because of the Collateral Assignment.  It was only upon obtaining the checks that refuted the Collateral Assignment, overcoming years of misrepresentations, perjury, and fraud on the Court, that the new claim that [...] was the sole member of [...] was established.
[brief] I.  **RESPONDENTS’ ARGUMENTS SUPPORTING THE TRIAL COURT’S DENIAL OF APPELLANTS’ MOTION TO ENLARGE PURSUANT TO R. 4:69-6(c) IGNORES WELL SETTLED CASE LAW**  Setting aside the holding in *Hopewell Valley Citizens' Grp., Inc. v. Berwind Prop. Grp. Dev. Co.*, 204 N.J. 569 (2011), it is well settled law that enlargement pursuant to R. 4:69-6(c) must be granted in circumstances where there are either substantial and novel constitutional questions, or an important public rather than a private interest that requires adjudication or clarification.
[brief] (10T101-5 to 18).  [...]’s report, dated October 18, 2021, included detailed summaries of the mental health records he reviewed, including post-event evaluations by clinical social worker [...] (Da289-291), psychiatric nurse practitioner [...] (Da291-327), [...] (Da338-342), [...] (Da350-369), and Drs. [...] and [...] (Da356-369).
[brief] Pl. Br. 18-19; see, e.g., In re Urethane Antitrust Litig., 267 F.R.D. 361, 364 \(^5\)  Notably, Plaintiff fails to cite to any other New Jersey case in support of the proposition that, under New Jersey law, a corporation can be compelled to produce a particular director through the service of a notice of deposition.  Plaintiff’s reliance on federal case law—which interpret the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, not the New Jersey Court Rules—is unavailing.
[brief] Thus, the State produced no evidence that the landlord knew that the police wanted to search the surveillance cameras, that he was informed of and understood his right to refuse to consent to a search of those cameras, and that he voluntarily consented.  Nor did the landlord’s absence in any way imply consent to search his property in his absence.  The trial court erroneously found the State’s failure to prove the landlord’s consent was “somehow ameliorated” by the fact that the landlord “could have remained on the scene if he had concerns about anybody entering the property. ”  (4T 74-10 to 12)  But the landlord was not required to affirmatively object to protect his property against warrantless entry; warrantless searches of homes for personal property are not presumptively consensual.  Rather, the State was required to prove that the landlord affirmatively gave knowing, voluntary, and intelligent consent in order to meet its “particularly heavy” burden.  *State v. Koedatich*, 112 N.J. 225, 262-65 (1988); *State v. Legette*, 227 N.J. 460, 472 (2017).
[brief] ..............................................................................29, 31  McCarthy v. John T. Henderson, Inc., 246 N.J. Super. 225 (App. Div. 1991)  ..................................................................................27  O Builders & Assocs., Inc. v. Yuna Corp. of NJ, 206 N.J. 109 (2011)  .............................................................................................................13, 26-27  Richardson v. DeFazio, 2016 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 497 (App. Div. March 7, 2026)  ......................... 10, 32  Twenty-First Century Rail Corp. v. N.J. Transit Corp., 210 N.J. 264 (2012)  .................................................................................................................10  Other Authorities
[brief] BRIEF OF APPELLANT  [...], Esq.  Attorney for Appellant &  On the Brief  [...], Esq. [...] [...] [...]  [...]  TABLE OF CONTENT  PROCEDURAL HISTORY .................................................................1  STATEMENT OF FACTS ..................................................................3  ARGUMENT .....................................................................................5  Standard of Review ........................................................................5  Motion to Dismiss ..........................................................................5  Motion for Reconsideration ............................................................6  Motion for Summary Judgment .......................................................7
[brief] This Court conducts plenary review of an appeal from a Rule 4:6-2(e) order.  Rezem Fam. Assocs., LP v. Borough of Millstone, 423 N.J. Super. 103, 114 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 208 N.J. 366, 368 (2011).  The Court reviews de novo the trial court’s decision to grant a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.  Baskin v. P.C. Richard & Son, LLC, 246 N.J. 157, 171 (2021).  On such an appeal, this Court evaluates the challenged pleading by the same standard as the trial court.  Sickles v. Cabot Corp., 379 N.J. Super. 100, 106 (App. Div), certif. denied, 185 N.J. 297 (2005).  The Court must search the allegations of the pleading in depth and with liberality to determine whether a cause of action is “‘suggested’ by the facts. ”  Printing Mart-Morristown v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 116 N.J. 739, 746 (1989) (quoting Velantzas v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 109 N.J. 189, 192 (1988)).  A pleading should be dismissed if it states no basis for relief and discovery would not provide one.  Camden Cnty. Energy Recovery Assoc., L.P. v. N.J. Dep’t of Env’t Prot., 320 N.J. Super. 59, 64 (App. Div. 1999), aff’d, 170 N.J. 246 (2001).  In addition to the Complaint, the Court “may consider documents specifically referenced in the complaint. ”  Myska v. N.J. Mfrs. Ins. Co., 440 N.J. Super. 458, 482 (App. Div.), appeal dism., 224 N.J. 523 (2015) (quoting E. Dickerson & Son, Inc. v. Ernst & Young, LLP, 361 N.J. Super. 362, 365 n.1 (App. Div. 2003), aff’d, 179 N.J. 500 (2004)).  In Banco Popular North America v. Gandhi, 184 N.J. 161, 183 (2005), the Supreme Court listed the types of information that a court may review in ruling on a motion to dismiss under Rule 4:6-2(e): “allegations in the complaint, exhibits attached to the complaint, matters of public record, and documents that form the basis of a claim. ”  Here, the trial court appropriately considered the insurance policies that were referenced in Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint and compared them to the allegations of Plaintiff’s pleading.  In addition, the court was alerted to and could properly consider matters of public record that pertain to the disputed exclusionary provision in those insurance policies, namely, their approval and adoption by [...], and appellate briefs in prior related cases before the New Jersey Supreme Court as evidence of arguments that were previously presented before that Court.  There is no dispute presented on this appeal regarding the trial court’s consideration of appropriate evidence and information in ruling that Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant insurance providers fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, and so, should be dismissed.
[brief] (See 2T100:20-103:3; 2T103:19-106:18; 2T112:11-119:2; 2T124:23-128:9; 2T128:12-132:5, 2T197:10-203:15 ([...]); 2T219:14-222:5; 2T229:18-256:7 ([...]); 2T39:5-43:15; 2T75:3-92:8 ([...]); 2T111:7-115:10, 2T137:3-142:6 ([...], LNHA); 2T145:1-148:2; 2T152:10-161:10; 2T164:22-177:14; 2T177:15-197:17; 2T252:2-254:11 (respiratory therapist [...]); 2T21:19-39:19, 2T108:11-110:12 (Director of Nursing [...], RN).  Plaintiff’s expert [...] was on the stand for nearly two days of trial, March 22 and 28, 2023.  (See 5T; 8T.)
[brief] [...] indicated that one of the prescribing doctors, [...], should have been suspicious about appellant using more than one kind of opioid, and about appellant travelling great distances and using many doctors and pharmacies to obtain drugs which were indications of a person “doctor shopping” in order to receive additional drugs.  Pa48-49.  In addition to neither being a medical doctor nor having the authority to prescribe medication, [...] also conceded that he had no information as to the basis for Appellant being legally prescribed opioids.  T2 48:16-52:6, T2 71:16-73:25 and T2 48:10-25.  Nevertheless, the ALJ relied upon [...]’s opinions in reaching a variety of conclusions regarding Appellant’s opioid use when, based upon the ALJ’s own ruling, those opinions should have been disregarded.
[brief] 22  A.  The Alleged Dying Declaration Was Too Unreliable To Be Admissible.........................................................  23  TABLE OF CONTENTS  (CONT'D)  B.  The Failure To Instruct The Jury On How To Assess The Alleged Dying Declaration Requires Reversal.  .................................................................  26  POINT III  THE COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING IMPLIED  HEARSAY FROM NON-TESTIFYING WITNESSES THAT IMPLICATED DEFENDANT.  (8T 18-7 to 24, 34-9 to 17, 35-8 to 19, 49-4 to 11)  ..................................................  31  POINT IV  THE PROSECUTOR’S IMPROPER BURDEN-SHIFTING AND NAME-CALLING IN SUMMATION  REQUIRES REVERSAL OF DEFENDANT’S CONVICTIONS.  (Partially Raised Below: 9T 105-18 to 106-14)  ...........................................................................................................  37  POINT V  EVEN IF ANY OF THE COMPLAINED-OF ERRORS WOULD BE INSUFFICIENT TO WARRANT REVERSAL, THE CUMULATIVE EFFECT OF THOSE ERRORS WAS TO DENY DEFENDANT DUE PROCESS AND A FAIR TRIAL.
[brief] Thus, the claims in the present complaint brought by [...] in Superior Court must fail in favor of arbitration.  In the present matter, there are express arbitration agreements in both [...]’s Decision Point Review Program as well as the Assignment of Benefits form that the healthcare provider enters with the [...] insured to become a beneficiary of the automobile policy and arbitration clause.  (C.C.Da.131-48).  Thus, based upon the strong public policy of New Jersey, the express provisions of AICRA that mandate coverage disputes to the arbitration forum and supersedes the NJIFPA/NJRICO civil cause of action, as well as the NJAA and the FAA, the underlying decision to remand [...]’s claims to No Fault arbitration was correct and must be affirmed on appeal.
[brief] [...] respectfully requests that this Court reverse and remand with directions to (i) exclude the unqualified and unreliable opinions of Plaintiff’s experts and (ii) enter summary judgment for [...].  ---  9  Plaintiff abandons (Opp 46) her experts’ ‘this-time-is-different’ rationale cited by the Trial Court (Da0796), apparently recognizing it is not an accepted and reliable methodology to establish causation.  Respectfully submitted, By: /s/ [...], Esq.  [...], Esq. (007541981)  [...], Esq. (025732005)  [...]  [...]  Phone: [...]  [...]  [...], Esq. (admitted pro hac vice)  [...] [...]  [...] (admitted pro hac vice)  [...] [...]  [...] (admitted pro hac vice)  Jamboree Center  5 Park Plaza, Suite 1600  Irvine, California 92614 [...]  [...] (admitted pro hac vice)  Citigroup Center, Suite 3200  201 South Biscayne Boulevard  Miami, Florida 33131 [...]  Counsel for Defendant-Appellant  [...] USA, Inc.  IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE  DIVISION  [...]  [...], Plaintiff-Respondent, v. ALLERGAN USA, INC., [...], F/K/A [...], [...], [...], AND DOES 1 THROUGH 100, INCLUSIVE  Defendant-Appellant.
[brief] ” (1T91-5 to 8; 1T94-22 to 1T95-1).  [...] did not observe any wound on defendant that would explain the blood he saw on him.  (1T95-4 to 11).  When the ambulance arrived to take defendant to the hospital, [...] called the [...].  (1T94-16 to 20; 1T96-8 to 9; 1T96-15 to 19; 4T26-1 to 2; 4T26-7 to 13).  The sergeant was informed that Sayreville was investigating a possible homicide at a townhome complex.