ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] (Compare 20T166-21 to 178-11 with Model Jury Charges (Criminal), “Official Misconduct (N.J.S.A. 2C:30-2)” at 1 (rev. Sept. 11, 2006)).  Defendant nowhere argues otherwise.  And the verdict sheet was not misleading.  Question 1(a) under Count Two asked whether defendant was not guilty or guilty.  The jury’s answer to that question, that defendant was guilty of the crime, incorporated all three elements of the offense.  Which the jurors confirmed when the judge received their verdict and polled them on it.  (21T49-19 to 51-14).  With their unanimous agreement in open court, the verdict was recorded as final.  Rodriguez, 254 N.J. Super. at 347-49; R. 1:8-10; see also Ogundipe v. State, 33 A.3d 984, 992 (Md. 2011) (“the contents of the verdict sheet do not constitute the jury’s verdict”), cert. denied, 566 U.S. 966 (2012); People v. Clark, 742 N.Y.S.2d 70, 72 (N.Y. App. Div.) (same), appeal denied, 774 N.E.2d 227 (N.Y. 2002).
[brief] The law recognizes that “[a] lawful search of fixed premises generally extends to the entire area in which the object of the search may be found .  . . .”  State v. Watts, 223 N.J. 503, 515 (2015) (favorably quoting United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 820 (1982)); see also State v. Jackson, 268 N.J. Super. 194, 208-10 (Law Div. 1993).
[brief] In this case, however, [...] seeks compensation not for workers compensation benefits in accordance with the provisions of the Workers Compensation Act, but for an alleged tort that is not within the liability of the employer under the law that applies to such benefits.  The Workers Compensation “chapter” provides two bases for the employer’s liability to an injured employee.  Article 2 of the chapter, N.J.S.A. 34:15-7 to -35.22, is the familiar system of no-fault claims for workers compensation benefits when an employee claims a work-related injury or illness.  Article 1 of the chapter, N.J.S.A. 34:15-1 to -6, allows employers and employees to opt out of the workers compensation no-fault scheme and instead to provide a right of the employee to sue the employer for the employer’s negligent causing of injury or illness to the employee.  See N.J.S.A. 34:15-1 and -7; see also Peck v. Newark Morning Ledger Co., 344 N.J. Super. 169, 179-83 (App. Div. 2001) (explaining the process by which employers and employees can elect Article 1 rights of the employee to sue for negligence rather than agree to Article 2 for no-fault compensation through claims made in the Workers Compensation Court).  Here, [...]’s claim is for compensation outside either of these two Articles of the Workers Compensation Act.  His claim is brought under the common law tort duty of his employer not to engage in intentional conduct that is substantially certain to result in injury to its employees.
[brief] (Da2213)  In fact, Plaintiffs did not even attach a single payment record that [...]’s CFO claimed he “reviewed” when certifying that the company had Paid [...]’s counsel on his behalf and that [...] later received payment from a different entity in reimbursement.  (Pa2034)  The Plaintiffs’ CFO’s certification was also suspect where he claimed an invoice from [...]’s counsel was presented after the date a Consent Order actually had been entered in that separate case confirming a different entity was paying, not [...].  (Pa2544)(Pa2518)  At minimum, [...] was entitled to cross-examine the CFO and to present as a witness the attorney the CFO claimed [...] paid.  However, the Court refused to deem the postponement denial to be arbitrator “misconduct”.
[brief] It was a slow moving storm that took the better part of a week to get here.  The damage she wrought was in evidence on the news every night.  [...] should have learned it’s lesson from 2014 and taken some precautions yet did nothing.  This suit should never have had to be filed and I am respectfully asking the court to reinstate the matter as to do otherwise would result in a miscarriage of justice.  POINT 3.
[brief] ¹  The lower court ruled in error that the individual defendants could not be liable under the NJLAD as an aider and abettor.  Defendants argue that they cannot be individually liable under the NJLAD due to Plaintiff’s failure to adequately plead a cause of action against Defendant [...].  First, the lower court erroneously found that Plaintiff had not adequately pled an NJLAD cause of action against Defendant [...], for the reasons set forth herein.  To the extent that the Individual Defendants’ arguments are premised upon this justification, these arguments necessarily fail.  Secondly, Plaintiff adequately pled that each of the Individual Defendants participated in the retaliatory actions against her, as is clear from a review of her pleadings.  For example, Defendant [...] is the individual behind many of the Plaintiff’s alleged retaliatory actions, and Plaintiff alleges that she knowingly and substantially assisted in various retaliatory actions, including the rotation of grade-level teaching partners, as well as the Disciplinary Meeting and resulting Disciplinary Letter.  219a-231a, 245a.  Additionally, Defendant [...] is the individual behind many of the Plaintiff’s alleged retaliatory actions, and Plaintiff alleges that she knowingly and substantially assisted in conducting the Disciplinary  ¹  As to Defendant [...], Plaintiff reiterates that discovery is warranted to determine if she is an employer under the NJLAD, as opposed to a coworker.  See Tarr v. Ciasulli, 181 N.J. 82-83 (2004).  Meeting, which resulted in the issuance of the Disciplinary Letter.  228a.  Similarly, Defendant [...] is the one who lodged the complaint that raised both the 2016 Lawsuit and three other issues.  235a.  Plaintiff has also argued that Defendants [...] and [...] are liable as aiders and abettors under the NJLAD.  T45:9-14.  In this regard, Plaintiff’s pleadings relate to the method the investigation was conducted, not the investigation itself.  261a, ¶ 133.  Reversal is warranted in this circumstance, as Plaintiff’s allegations as to each of these Individual Defendants must be accepted as true for the purposes of evaluating the motion to dismiss.
[brief] (2T116-8 to 11)  [...] was not able to “remember very much because [she] was very nervous,” but testified that “minutes” after hearing gunshots she “saw a guy running. ”  (2T116-13 to 117-14)  The man ran away from East Jersey Ave., put something in his left pants pocket, and got into a white car parked on 6th St., and drove down 6th St. towards Livingston St., in the opposite direction of the liquor store.  (2T118-6 to 15, 119-3 to 4)  (Da13)  [...] did not see the man’s face but described him as wearing “gray pants” and a “short sleeve, white shirt” with a complexion of a “light brown color,” or, in Spanish, “a little dark. ”  (2T118-5 to 20, 123-16 to 18)  When [...] heard gunshots, she was standing in the doorway of her home at [...], about two and a half blocks away from where police encountered the victim.  (2T126-22 to 23, 127-14 to 128-6)  She “saw a person run” towards the laundromat before making a right-hand turn, running up 6th St., away from East Jersey Ave. (2T128-19 to 21, 132-8 to 9)  (Da13)  Ventura could only see the person for a few seconds and observed them from a distance that she estimated to be greater than the width of the courtroom (about 39 feet, per the Court).  (2T134-3 to 21)  She could not see the person’s face but described them as “tall and skinny” wearing “gray pants and a gray shirt” made of “sporty material” with a complexion that was “darker than [her] skin color. ”  (2T129-14 to 23, 135-9 to 12)  As the person ran, they held something black in their hands and “were putting it in the sweater’s pocket. ”  (2T130-6 to 11)  Prior to the shooting, [...] had been sitting with a number of people, including the victim, [...], on the porch where police later found him wounded.
[directive] 6.1.6  In the rare cases where the agency has not filed disciplinary charges (or decided not to do so) within 180 days of receipt of the complaint, the agency must notify the County Prosecutor.  The County Prosecutor, or their designee, shall investigate the reasons for the extended investigation and shall also examine whether the agency’s internal affairs function faces any systemic issues that require additional resources or oversight.  The County Prosecutor may take any steps necessary to ensure prompt resolution of the pending matter, including supersession of the agency’s investigation.  The agency shall provide further notice to the County Prosecutor every additional 90 days that the investigation remains open (i.e., on or about the 270th and 360th days from the receipt of the complaint).  The chart in Figure 1 provides an overview of that information.  Figure 1.  Timing of Internal Affairs  Investigations  Length of investigation  Special notice required from receipt of complaint 1 to 44 days (“Routine”)  None.  Case resolved in the ordinary course.  45 days (“More complex”)  Law enforcement executive 90 days  Law enforcement executive 135 days  Law enforcement executive 180 days (“Rare cases”)  County Prosecutor  Law enforcement executive 225 days  Law enforcement executive 270 days  County Prosecutor  Law enforcement executive 6.1.7
[brief] Pa 6T, 43:19-24.  [...] confirmed that, in his report, the word “possibilities” was used in connection with the range of profit-sharing.  Pa 6T, 49:17-22.  Also, [...] confirmed that when he wrote his report of August 15, 2017, with regard to the Affordable Housing Project, that this would have been a new business for [...].  (6T, 49:25; 50:1-3; and 51:6-14).  [...] recognized that Mr.  \(^5\) [...] relied on the deposition testimony of a fact witness, [...], for the “possibility” that Schwartz could have joint ventured with an experienced developer.  Pa 274.  But [...]’s testimony related to a single occasion when, as a consultant, he helped a church partner with an experienced affordable housing developer where the church retained 60% of the development fees.  (Pa 1003; 18:13-19:10).  \(^6\)  [...] was previously known as “[...]” for its founder ([...]).  Schwartz was not “specifically in the business of developing affordable housing …” (6T, 51:10-12).  When questioned about [...], [...] did not know whether [...] ever entered into a Retainer Agreement with [...] to provide professional services.  (6T, 52:6-10).  [...] did not know if [...] ever provided [...] with any documents pertinent to the Monroe project.  (6T, 52:8).  [...] also did not know whether [...] ever looked at whether there were any project plans for the development.  (6T, 53:12).  [...] confirmed that there was nothing in the [...] deposition where [...] looked at any of [...]’s financial statements.  (6T, 53:24-25; and 54:1-2).  Likewise, [...] did not see in the [...] deposition that he [[...]] reviewed tax returns for [...].  (6T, 54:2-6).  [...] did not see anything in the Bershstein deposition where [...] reviewed any of [...]’s bank statements.  (6T, 54:7-10).  [...] was questioned at length about [...]’s lack of involvement in this project and acknowledged [...]’s deposition testimony, wherein he testified: “I had run some very preliminary models in terms of, you know, how to possibly make it work, but we never really went very far, because it was terminated fairly quickly. ”  (6T, 56:20-25; and 57:1-5)(emphasis added).  [...] recalled reading from the [...] deposition that [...] could not tell us off the top, in connection with tax credits, what they would be, because his analysis was preliminary.
[brief] The State plainly has every interest in avoiding “discrimination” against transgender, gender non- conforming, and non-binary students.  See Boyertown, 897 F.3d at 528-29; John & Jane Parents 1, 622 F.Supp.3d at 139; T.I.C.-C., 470 N.J. Super. at 609.  The preliminary injunction directly advances these interests in eradicating discrimination.  As explained above, the blanket notification regime at the heart of Appellants’ Amended Policy discriminates against transgender, gender non-conforming, and non-binary students under a disparate-treatment or disparate-impact lens, see supra at 14-22; enjoining enforcement while the administrative proceeding unfolds ameliorates that discrimination.  And the Amended Policy would likely cause some students not to disclose their gender identity at school for fear of involuntary outing, see John & Jane Parents 1, 622 F.Supp.3d at 139 (finding a transgender student “could hardly feel safe in an environment where expressing their gender identity resulted in the automatic disclosure to their parents, regardless of their own wishes”), their schools would be hindered from “creating a support system and providing counseling” for them, id. at 138.  The injunction thus “ensure[s] that transgender children feel safe and well at school,” ibid., while Appellants’ approach does precisely the opposite.  Finally, the preliminary injunction is carefully tailored.  As laid out above, the injunction is exclusively focused on communications from the school based on a protected characteristic, while leaving intact the student’s ability to disclose their gender identity to their parents (and the order certainly does not counsel students against doing so).  It has no bearing on parents’ ability to communicate regarding any matters of gender identity to their children.  The Original Policy this injunction reinstates also allows the school to notify parents of the student’s gender identity if the student does not object or if the school has a compelling (nondiscriminatory) need—e.g., to discuss “the health and safety of a student or an incident of bias-related crime. ” (Ra9; Da259).  And, of course, the order is temporary: it lasts only until [...] resolves the administrative proceeding, again tailored to the State’s interest in preventing discrimination while its action proceeds.  See (Da137) (emphasizing that court is merely granting “preliminary injunctive relief”; is “not rendering any final judgments or determinations as to the merits”; and is leaving further merits analyses “to the sound determination of the [[...]] after a full development of the factual and legal record”).  Appellants never identify another approach the court could have taken that would have more narrowly achieved the same compelling goals in eradicating discrimination.  Their blanket notification policy—which discriminates on the basis of a protected characteristic and includes only an undetermined exception for “credible” risks—certainly does not.  It is difficult to see how the court’s pause, which maintains the very status quo that Appellants saw no need to alter for four years, now undermines parents’ federal constitutional rights.  POINT II
[brief] Plaintiff Trial Exhibit P-21 Email from [...] to [...] with attached Loan Chart/Schedule, dated August 7, 2013.................................Da196 Plaintiff Trial Exhibit P-23 Transcript of Audio Recording¹…………………………Da0203  Plaintiff Trial Exhibit P-24, Photograph……………………………………………………Da0209 Notice of Appeal and Case Information Statement filed by [...], filed on November 8, 2023 ………………………………………………………………………Da0210 Flynn v. Sevastakis, No. A-3263-04T2, 2006 WL 664180 (App. Div. Mar. 17, 2006)…………………………………………………………………………………Da0222²
[brief] Also, [...] explained in his letter brief, that the order required him to take over the liquor license.  [...] contacted an insurance agent to determine the cost of liquor liability coverage, which was a necessity.  [...] was informed that it was approximately $12,000.00, which he did not have.  (Ca141).  He relayed that to [...] asking that [...]’s client permit [...] to be added as an additional insured on the policy that [...] had covering the liquor license.  However, the principal of the ownership refused to allow [...] to be added as an additional insured.  (Ca141).  [...] then decided that the liquor license was not necessary.
[brief] R. 2:10-2.  When conducting this analysis, the comments should not be considered in isolation but instead considered together with the substantial trial errors.  *Comprehensive Neurosurgical, P.C. v. Valley Hosp.*, 257 N.J. 33, 85 (2024).  This is because the cumulative effect of small errors may be so great as to result in prejudice even if the individual errors in isolation would not require a new trial.  *Pellicer v. St. Barnabas Hosp.*, 200 N.J. 22, 53 (2009).
[brief] (2T:19-22 to 21-8).  Yet, he continued to make incriminating statements whether alone or in the presence of law enforcement without any questioning.  (1T:24-14 to 32-15); (1T:103-6 to 105-23); (1T:149-2 to 149-13).  His request to speak with his parents and girlfriend occurred after he invoked his Miranda rights.  (1T:68-8 to 69-2).  He also stated explicitly the reasons for the calls – to let his mother, who is in Maine, and his girlfriend know where he is, Ibid., and he wanted an attorney to be contacted on his behalf.  (1T:90-2, 93-1 to 93-7).  It is clear that not only was defendant advised of his right to remain silent, he did not need his mother to act as a buffer to explain these rights to him.  Indeed, he clearly understood his Miranda rights when he invoked them, thereby terminating [...]’s questioning and requesting to speak with his mother and his attorney.  (2T:19-22 to 21-8).  The matter at bar is more akin to Arizona v. Mauro, 481 U.S. 520 (1987).
[brief] Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant  [...], Plaintiff(s)-Appellant(s), -vs- [...], [...], [...], John Does 1-10 (fictitious names representing unknown individuals) and/or XYZ Corps. 1-10 (fictitious names representing unknown corporations, partnerships and/or Limited Liability Companies or other types of legal entities), Defendant(s)-Respondent(s)  Superior Court of New Jersey  Appellate Division
[brief] LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT ONE  The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion in Entering a Protective Order Because Defendants Did Not Show Good Cause to Deny Recording of Plaintiff’s Defense Medical Examination (“DME”).  (Pa149-50.)  This matter should be reversed because Defendants failed to meet the burden to show good cause to restrict the recording of the “inherently adversarial” defense medical examination.  See DiFiore v. Pezic, 254 N.J. 212, 233-34 (2023).  Because Plaintiff has substantial cognitive limitations, memory issues, anxiety issues, and a language barrier, he should be entitled to record his neuropsychological exam.  The Supreme Court noted, “Even for people without such limitations, impairments, or barriers, the Appellate Division correctly recognized that ‘the stress and anxiety of the exam itself with an unfamiliar doctor or other professional may’ diminish a person's ability to ‘absorb and recall what occurred at [a] DME. ’”  Id. at 232 (quoting DiFiore v. Pezic, 472 N.J. Super. 100, 123 (App. Div. 2022)).  The Supreme Court noted that especially for plaintiffs with alleged cognitive limitations, psychological impairments, or language barriers, a DME reflects a profound power imbalance between the plaintiff and a medical professional with ---  1  The term “Pa” refers to Plaintiff-Appellant [...]’s Appendix in Support of Appeal; the term “Db” refers to Defendants-Respondent’s Brief in Opposition to Plaintiff-Appellant’s Interlocutory Appeal.
[brief] However, what Appellants seem to ignore is the fact that the new CS 327 will be constructed along and will be connected to [...]’s existing 300 Line pipeline system.  In fact, approximately 300 feet of piping and 1,400 feet of suction and discharge piping will be constructed to tie CS 327 into [...]’s existing 300 Line pipeline.  Aa0054.  [...] is only proposing to add compression to its existing system.  No new mainline pipe is proposed to be installed.
[brief] The Supreme Court long ago determined that when a zoning board exceeds its authority, such action threatens the public's interest.  See Stafford.  Hopewell  Applicants request that the Court narrowly construe Hopewell, based on specific facts of that case versus the instant case.  However, the holding in Hopewell was to abandon the “three-part standard" in favor of a more dynamic inquiry.  In the instant case, the Addition is ultra-modern and will be the first home built in [...] in over 20 years.  (Pa259-Pa319)  Contrary to Applicants’ arguments, concealment is not required in order to justify the extension.  See Hopewell.  Counsel for Appellant did not rely on a non-legally trained contractor to determine his client’s statute of limitations time requirements.  From the vote of the ZBA granting the application on September 13, 2022 until the ZBA informed Appellants that the Resolution was published on December 22, 2022, exactly 100 days transpired during which time Counsel for Appellants regularly and diligently communicated with the ZBA Secretary.  Excluding the Christmas holiday break from December 23, 2022 until January 3, 2023, Appellants were provided with ten business days to submit their Complaint on Monday, January 16, 2023.  Applicants indeed filed that week, but on Friday—four days later.  Counsel for Appellants concedes that the ZBA Secretary attached the affidavit of publication by Counsel for Applicants in an email sent minutes before the beginning of the Christmas weekend.  Counsel for Appellants conceded that there was a comedy of errors around internal communications in his office.  However, we do not believe that the holding of *Hopewell* should be read so narrowly as to fall outside of the circumstances of the instant case, which are otherwise on all fours with the set of circumstances in *Hopewell*.
[brief] I.  Intervenor’s Appeal is Not Barred by the Direct-Action Statute.  [...] filed a Motion to Dismiss Intervenor’s Appeal and Motion for Summary Disposition on July 7, 2023, arguing that Intervenor’s appeal is prohibited by the Direct Action Statute and that Intervenor does not have standing to appeal.  Intervenor opposed this motion on July 24, 2023 and this Court denied the motion on August 14, 2023.  As this Court has denied [...]’s motion, this Court should reject [...]’s argument for that reason and the reasons argued in Intervenor’s July 24, 2023 opposition.
[brief] Cf. *Midland Funding LLC v. Thiel*, 446 N.J. Super. 537, 549 (App. Div. 2016) (listing the elements).  Plaintiff may recover “additional” (15 U.S. C. § 1692k(a)(2)) or statutory damages up to $1,000 and attorney’s fees (15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(3)) without having actual damages.  *Phillips v. Asset Acceptance, L.L.C.*, 736 F.3d 1076, 1083 (7th Cir. 2013) (“Proof of injury is not required when the only damages sought are statutory. ”); *Gonzales v. Arrow Fin. Serv., L.L.C.*, 660 F.3d 1055, 1067 (9th Cir. 2011) (“Statutory damages under the FDCPA are intended to ‘deter violations by imposing a cost on the defendant even if his misconduct imposed no cost on the plaintiff’”); see also [...], *Fair Debt Collection* § 11.9.4 (10th ed. 2022) (updated at www.nclc.org/library) (collecting cases).
[directive] Degree Bail Range 10%  Cash Bail Option a.  Actor previously convicted in this state or elsewhere of a designated offense in the 2nd Degree $25,000 to $100,000 10% permissible statute, or who has previously been committed for a mental disorder to any hospital, mental institution or sanitarium or who has previously been convicted for indictable use, possession or sale of CDS who purchases, owns, possesses or controls a weapon other than a firearm, fourth degree.  Certain Persons  Not 2C:39-7(a)(b) to Have Weapons 3rd Degree $7,500 to $20,000 10% permissible b.  (1)  Actor previously convicted in this state or elsewhere of a requisite offense who purchases, owns, possesses or controls a firearm, second degree.  (2)  Actor previously convicted in this state or elsewhere of a disorderly persons offense involving domestic violence, who purchases, owns, possesses or controls a firearm, third 4th Degree $1,000 to $7,500 10% permissible degree.  79  Updated December 2, 2013