ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] However, even assuming the admission of [...]’s explanation for why he chose to chase “the man running across the street” was improper, the error was harmless.  Therefore, defendant’s conviction should be affirmed on appeal.  “[A] trial court’s evidentiary rulings are entitled to deference absent a showing of an abuse of discretion, i.e., there has been a clear error of judgment. ”  State v. Nantambu, 221 N.J. 390, 402 (2015) (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Harris, 209 N.J. 431, 439 (2012)).
[brief] (7T:281-25 to 291-9).  When [...] was asked whether he understood his right to remain silent and refuse to answer any questions his initial response was “not exactly, but I’ve heard of it. ” (7T:282-3 to 4).  Next, the detective asked him to read it out loud and then asked the same question.  [...]’s response was “I don’t know how to word it really. ” (7T:282-20 to 21).  When asked what “you have the right to remain silent and refuse to answer any questions” means, [...] couldn’t explain it.  Id.  Throughout his statement, [...] simply goes along with what the police say and agrees with them.  (7T:270-4 to 326-13); (8T:18-7 to 66-9).  Here, it is clear that [...] Kologi did not understand his right to have an attorney present before and during questioning.  (1T:39-18 to 41-1).  [...] testified at the Miranda hearing that when she asked [...] whether he understood his right to have an attorney present [...] said that he believed that he could have an attorney present before or after the “hearing. ”  Id.  However, those advisements were not correct.  [...] had a right to have an attorney present before any questions were asked.  [...] did not ensure that [...] understood that.  (1T:39-15 to 40-6).  Accordingly, because [...] did not understand his Miranda rights the State cannot prove beyond a reasonable doubt that [...] Kologi knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights.  384 U.S. 436, 473-74 (1966).  c.  The Trial Court Inappropriately Shifted The Burden On The Defendant To Establish That His Waiver Was Not Knowing, Intelligent And Voluntary.
[brief] (Pa169)  15  *High St.* supra is quite instructive,  Here, the judge concluded that "[w]hile a board may reject expert testimony, it may not do so unreasonably, based only upon bare allegations or unsubstantiated beliefs."  [...] found the Board failed to present any contrary expert testimony to rebut or challenge plaintiff's expert s' testimony.  He held "[b]y giving short-shrift to the [p]laintiff's experts' unrebutted testimony here, the Board in voting to deny the [a]pplication ignored the greater weight of the evidence in the record that supported a grant."
[brief] *Id.*  As the Supreme Court and other federal courts have made clear, that preemption principle includes “generally applicable state-law rules” that “in practice … have a ‘disproportionate impact’ on arbitration or ‘interfere with fundamental attributes of arbitration and thus create a scheme inconsistent with the FAA. ’”  *Mortensen*, 722 F.3d at 1159 (quoting *AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion*, 563 U.S. 333, 342, 344 (2011)) (cleaned up).  1.  To the extent that *Atalese* created a rule of heightened contract-formation that applies only to arbitration agreements, that rule “singles out arbitration agreements for disfavored treatment” and is preempted by the FAA.
[brief] See *Bankoff*, 613 F.3d at 373; *Wesley*, 798 F.2d at 1155 (the trial court’s discretion “requires a balancing” of the competing factors).  In line with those decisions, this Court should not condone the trial court’s failure to take seriously [...]’s request to exercise a constitutional right.  The State further contends that, because [...] argued in a separate appeal that the trial court improperly granted his request to proceed pro se by failing to engage in the required colloquy, “it defies credulity that” [...] could have “effectively represent[ed] himself” in this case.  (Sb 17)  This results-oriented argument misses the point.  In both cases, [...] is arguing that the trial court failed to carry out its duty to safeguard his Sixth Amendment rights.  In his other appeal, the court granted his request to proceed pro se without ensuring that he understood what he was giving up by waiving his right to counsel.  In this appeal, the court rejected his request to exercise his corresponding right to represent himself without affording it any real consideration.
[brief] The level of the ceiling lights and the playback of digital content on the screen operate in tandem by computer.  Current and former [...] employees testified to the frequency of the ceiling lights being off in the auditoriums when they should be on - once or twice a month prior to the plaintiff’s accident.  They attributed the failure of the ceiling lights to operate properly to “cues not signaling,” “a lack of cues,” “cue issues,” “automation errors,” “some sort of SPL error,” “some sort of disconnect,” and/or “just a connection error. ”  Such testimony also casts serious doubt on whether, subsequent to the plaintiff’s accident, [...] actually determined that there were no errors in the operation of the Theater Management System software that automatically controlled the level of the ceilings lights and the playback of commercials ads, movie trailers, and the movie itself in Auditorium 5 on August 13, 2016.  In short, [...] had a duty to preserve the Theater Management System software logs at issue in this case and [...] breached this duty by not preserving the Theater Management System logs for inspection by the plaintiff, thereby substantially and irreparably interfering with the discovery process.
[brief] 2  “Ia. ” refers to the putative Intervenor’s appendix, included with this brief.  Exchanges, that will address the issue regarding the relations between an Attorney-in-Fact and its affiliates.  To date, the decision has not been resolved and the Department is still waiting for legislative approval. ”  (Aa.365-66)  Not only has no such legislation ever passed but, even more telling, the Department never sought to apply the Holding Act to [...] or [...] in the course of five subsequent financial examinations, which are required by statute to assess compliance with existing statutes and regulations, as well as statutory accounting principles.
[brief] The Arbitrator explained his rationale for the opinion as follows:  Lot 18  [...] ("[...]"), [...]'s appraiser and [...] ("[...]"), the [...]'s appraiser, each employed the Sales Comparison Approach to value vacant Lot 18.  I have determined that the most appropriate comparable land sale to determine the market value of Lot 18 is the sale of the property located at the N.E. Corner Lakehurst and Ridge (Block 857, Lot 21), [...], New Jersey.  This property sold for $112,500.00 on \(^2\)  The Township adopts the [...]s’ designation of transcripts for the sake of continuity:  1T Motion 02/20/2019 2T Motion 10/14/2020 3T Motion 08/18/2021  4T Arbitration Hrg.02/07/2022  5T Arbitration Hrg.02/08/2022  6T Arbitration Hrg.02/10/2022  7T  Arbitration Hrg.02/18/2022  May 31, 1994.  I employed an overall 15% adjustment because of this site's superior physical character and larger size when compared to Lot 18.  I therefore conclude that the market value for Lot 18 is $95,625.00.
[directive] Directive 2016-6 v3.0: General Law Enforcement  SUBJECT: Attorney  Interim Procedures  Establishing Policies, Practices, and Modification of Directive P.L. c. 31.  Criminal Justice Reform  Pursuant to 2015, to Implement Administrative Director of the Courts criminal justice reform, the At outset of the (PSA) pretrial risk assessment Assessment as the the Public Safety approved and designated N.J.S.A. 2A:162-25(c).  Pretrial Program pursuant to Services instrument to utilized by the be appear in defendant's risk of to risk factors pertinent to a failure  The to assess PSA was designed on pretrial release.  The PSA does not, danger the community while defendant's to court and a of violence.  widely recognized as predictors domestic for risk factors that are however, account Director of with research consultation key stakeholders, the after extensive and As result, and a Domestic Risk Assessment  Ontario  Assault of Criminal designated the the Division Justice throughout tool by law enforcement officers risk assessment be utilized ("ODARA") the to as partners. of assaults against intimate in identifying the risk future  New assist Jersey to an on an who has committed an assault that arrestee ODARA predicts the likelihood  The evidence-based actuarial risk assessment is again future.  This partner will so in the intimate do in tool for officers as frontline use by police was developed a statistically and it and validated, victim and a through an interview with the by an officer ODARA administered The is the field. consists of information.  The assessment criminal history related offender's and review of the approximately minutes to complete.  ten and takes thirteen items  Recycled Paper and is Recyclable Employer ~Printec~ on Egual Opportunity ~'~•.  ~~~~ Jersey Is Arr New .~ ~.
[brief] Specifically, the Owens Court held: Deferred compensation ‘was not conditioned upon the employee’s discharge from service within the term of the collective bargaining agreement. ’  The Court reasoned that ‘once the right came into being it … survive[d] the termination of the agreement. ’  In contrast, the Court concluded that the plaintiffs’ claims for severance pay allegedly earned in the intervening period between expiration of the collective --- 6  See also NJ Ass’n of School Business Officials v. Davy, 409 N.J. Super. 467 (App. Div. 2009) (distinguishing Caponegro from statutorily authorized regulation at bar which had no impact on any contractual right to payments for unused leave accumulated under prior contracts).  bargaining agreement and their respective discharge was ‘ill-founded. ’”  20 N.J. at 348-49.  The above cases stand for the proposition that Defendants cannot unilaterally revoke vested deferred compensation in the form of accumulated sick days.
[brief] By way of another example and representing a document that [...] offers for the first time on appeal more than 18 months after discovery ended, [...] alleges the [...] granted it a permit in 1997 to perform sidewalk work in front of the lots.  App. Brf. at p. 32; Da283.  While clearly out-of-time, the document itself states the permit is for [...], which, as the trial court observed with respect to the utility bills “they are for 253 Bergen Street, which is [...]’s Lot 19. ”  Pa175.  [...] must not be permitted to rely upon documents not properly in the record.
[brief] Here [...] also seeks speedy and secure (can’t get “lost”) processing of PTI Applications, Motions, and ADA (or other) Administrative Complaints according to the Judiciary’s own Rules.  Also, in both, the brunt of the illegal procedure would mainly fall on the impecunious or people with disabilities, or both.  In *Pasqua* even non-mentally challenged people could not competently fill out the Financial Form, let alone people with mental disabilities.  In *Pasqua*, the main excuse was that the judges would help people without counsel.  We are sure the judges did screen out most of the people who were just “broke” and not contemptuous.  In this case, the State really does not have such an excuse because the Judiciary has kneecapped its own Rules by giving extreme deference to the prosecutor, leaving people with mental disabilities to the whims, prejudices, and stereotypes of the prosecutor.
[directive] The proceeds from these sales shall be distributed to any agency which in participated an investigation resulting forfeiture, at the discretion in the of Attorney General or the county prosecutor.  Law  For SOP 12  Purpose, complete definition  Enforcement a of see - - State Forfeiture Program Administration Standard Operating Procedure  3 06 Page: of New Jersey of  No office-holder, employee other agent any law enforcement or 4. nor agency shall purchase forfeited property, shall their spouses or dependent children purchase or otherwise acquire through sale title to forfeited property.
[brief] In addition, the Lemelledo Court stated, the catch-all portion of the definition of "merchandise" (anything offered directly or indirectly to the public) "is more than sufficiently broad to include the sale of credit."  *Lemelledo v. Beneficial Management*, 150 N.J. at 265.  And see *Gonzalez v. Wilshire Credit Corp.*, 207 N.J. at 578-579 (relying on those definitions and on Lemelledo to reach the conclusion that "[e]xtending credit and loan packing are covered by the CFA"); *Paley v. Bank of America*, 420 N.J. Super. 39, 49 (App. Div. 2011) (citing *Lemelledo* and stating that Supreme Court has extended sweep of CFA to consumer loan transactions).
[brief] Pa24 ¶ 2.  Defendant [...] served as the President and Chief Executive Officer of [...] for over 20 years until he retired from his position in or around mid-2022.  Pa30, Pa44 ¶¶ 55, 206.  The crux of Plaintiff’s allegations is that, in October of 2021, Mr. Gunnarsson requested that [...]’s then-Chief Operating Officer (“COO”), [...], pay an invoice to a “personal friend” of Mr. Gunnarsson’s for consulting services on behalf of [...].
[brief] Plaintiff’s simple disagreement with this conclusion does not demonstrate any abuse of discretion.  Nonetheless, Plaintiff blithely claims—without citation to any case law or court rule—that control “is not an issue in this matter because plaintiff seeks to depose a director of three corporate defendants, not a director of a non-party” and a “corporation’s control over its own director is presumed. ” (See Pb16).  Again, Plaintiff has not identified any binding New Jersey authority for the concept that control over directors is presumed.  Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claim that the trial court’s “ruling is irreconcilable with D’Agostino” and the other authorities he cites is incorrect (Pb16), and the trial court’s Orders should be affirmed.
[brief] Cf. \textit{Liberty Ins. Corp. v. Techdan, LLC}, 253 N.J. 87, 117 (2023), as revised (Mar. 23, 2023) (holding that the trial court’s failure to follow the procedure mandated by the Comparative Negligence Act when it did not charge the jury to allocate fault  \textsuperscript{4}  Facially, the invited error doctrine is inapplicable.  Still, it should be noted that plaintiffs flatly misstated the holding in \textit{Carrino v. Novotny}, 78 N.J. 355 (1979) in service of the misguided contention that [...] “invited” the rulings challenged on appeal.  Plaintiffs stated the Supreme Court found an “induced error” when one defendant sought dismissal of another defendant at trial, contrary to the terms of \textit{R. 4:37-2}.  This was not the fact pattern of \textit{Carrino}.  In actuality, in \textit{Carrino}, one defendant, [...], obtained an involuntary dismissal after openings, and a co-defendant, [...], challenged that dismissal on appeal given that the terms of \textit{R. 4:37-2} required a request for dismissal to be held in abeyance until the close of the evidence.  \textit{Carrino}, 78 N.J. at 367.  The Supreme Court held that, on retrial of the cross-claim, the Choo-Choo club would be bound by the jury’s earlier determination of joint tortfeasor status and the amount of liability.  \textit{Id.} at 368-69.  \textit{Carrino} held that the Choo Choo club was bound by the jury’s findings based upon its procurement of a defective dismissal \textit{on its own behalf}.  In this case, [...] and [...] filed their own motions for dismissal, and [...] (properly) requested \textit{Burt} defendant treatment as a component of that dismissal.  Contrary to plaintiffs’ characterization, the circumstances are not comparable.  consistent with the act in an Insurance Fraud Prevention Act matter was a miscarriage of justice, requiring a new trial in which a new jury allocated the percentages).
[brief] For the foregoing reasons, Defendant-Appellant [...], née [...], respectfully requests that the Order denying the Motion to Vacate Bank Levy, to Vacate Wage Execution, and to Vacate Default Judgment be reversed.  Respectfully submitted, /s/ [...]  [...]  [...] [...]  Tel. & Fax: [...]  Dated: December 4, 2024  Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant [...], : CIVIL ACTION : ON APPEAL FROM THE Plaintiff-Respondent, : FINAL JUDGMENT OF THE : SUPERIOR COURT : OF NEW JERSEY, : LAW DIVISION, vs. : SPECIAL CIVIL PART : BERGEN COUNTY : DOCKET NO. [...]  [...], : Sat Below: : HON. [...], Defendant-Appellant.  :
[brief] ”  Tabieros v. Clark Equipment Co., 944 P.2d 1279, 1298 (Haw. 1997) (quoting Gregory v. Cincinnati, Inc., 538 N.W.2d 325, 333-34 (Mich. 1995)).  --- 5  [...] also approvingly cited Modelski v. Navistar International Transportation Corp., 707 N.E.2d 239 (Ill. App. 1999), which held:  The consequences of imposing upon manufacturers an extrastatutory duty to recall ... would be the equivalent of mandating that manufacturers insure that their products will always comply with current safety standards.  This we are unwilling to do.  Id. at 247.  6  Gregory “did not recognize any theory that would impose a postmanufacture duty to ... recall a product. ”
[brief] III.  "A motion to vacate default judgment implicates two oft-competing goals: resolving disputes on the merits[] and providing finality and stability to judgments."  BV001  REO Blocker, LLC v. 53 W. Somerset St. Props., LLC, 467 N.J. Super. 117, 123, 249 A.3d 236 (App. Div. 2021) (citing Manning Eng'g, Inc. v. Hudson Cnty. Park Comm'n, 74 N.J. 113, 120, 376 A.2d 1194 (1977)).  In balancing the two goals, "[a] court should view 'the opening of default judgments . . . with great liberality,' and should tolerate 'every reasonable ground for indulgence . . . to the end that a just result is reached.'"  Ibid. (alteration in original) (quoting Mancini v. EDS ex rel N.J. Auto. Full Ins. Underwriting Ass'n, 132 N.J. 330, 334 (1993), 625 A.2d 484).  Subsection (f) authorizes the court to "relieve a party . . . from a final judgment or order [*11] for . . . any . . . reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment or order."  As the Court explained more than fifty years ago and has reiterated time and again, "No categorization can be made of the situations which would warrant redress under subsection (f).  . . .  [T]he very essence of (f) is its capacity for relief in exceptional situations.  And in such exceptional cases its boundaries are as expansive as the need to achieve equity and justice."  DEG, LLC, 198 N.J. at 269-70 (alteration in original) (quoting Ct. Inv. Co. v. Perillo, 48 N.J. 334, 341, 225 A.2d 352 (1966)).
[brief] [N.J.S.A. 2C:2-6(c)(1)-(2). ]  Furthermore, “whether a defendant is a principal or an accomplice, the State must prove that he possessed the mental state necessary to commit the offense. ”  State v. Whitaker, 200 N.J. 444, 458 (2009); N.J.S.A. 2C:2–2(a).  “An accomplice is only guilty of the same crime committed by the principal if he shares the same criminal state of mind as the principal. ”  *State v. Fair*, 45 N.J. 77, 95 (1965).  On the other hand, an accomplice who does not share the same intent or purpose as the principal may be guilty of a lesser or different crime than the principal.  *State v. Bielkiewicz*, 267 N.J. Super. 520, 528 (App. Div. 1993).  To be found guilty as an accomplice, a defendant must not only share the same intent as the principal who commits the crime, but also must “at least indirectly participate[ ] in the commission of the criminal act. ”  *Ibid.*  Two persons who conspire to commit a crime and participate in some way in its commission are joint principals.  *In re In re State in Interest of A. B. M.*, 125 N.J. Super. 162, 309 A.2d 619 (App. Div.), aff’d 63 N.J. 531 (1973).  “If the State's theory is that a defendant acted as an accomplice, the trial court is obligated to provide the jury with accurate and understandable jury instructions regarding accomplice liability even without a request by defense counsel.
[brief] The first requirement is a lack of prejudice to Defendants.  Plaintiff argues that she meets this element, because Defendants have not pointed to any particular prejudice.  (Pb11)  However, it is the Plaintiff who has the burden of proving each of the elements, so Defendants’ arguments on the point, or lack thereof, are irrelevant.  A plaintiff does fulfill her burden to establish a lack of prejudice simply because the defendant did not address the point.  However, as [...] found, there is prejudice, if for no other reason that Defendants would be otherwise forced to defend, and potentially suffer liability, in a case where Plaintiff was unable to meet the statutorily mandated 2
[brief] The NJDEP clearly did not interpret the Highlands Act as requiring it to establish substantive standards related to air quality.  NJDEP’s Highlands Act Rules define "Highlands resource area" as “those features of the Highlands that merit special protection pursuant to N.J.S.A. 13:20-32b, such as Highlands open waters; flood hazard areas; steep slopes; forested areas; rare, threatened or endangered species habitat; rare or threatened plant habitat; areas with historic or archaeological features; and unique or irreplaceable land types. ”  N.J.A.C. 7:38-1.4.  The substantive standards related to these resources are set forth under N.J.A.C. 7:38-3 et seq.  Notably, NJDEP did not establish substantive standards related to air quality.  While NJDEP has authority to regulate emissions pursuant to the Air Pollution Control Act, N.J.S.A. 26:2C-1 et seq., and implementing rules at N.J.A.C. 7:27-1.1 et seq., that permitting scheme is separate and apart from the process under the Highlands Act.  As such, NJDEP was not required to review the impacts of [...] on air quality in reviewing [...]’s HAD application.
[brief] Ibid.  Fifth, based on the “plain text of N.J.S.A. 13:1D-153(a),” the Commissioner concluded that there was “no room for the [DEP] to consider alternative arrangements, such as monetary contributions” in lieu of onsite access, as [...] had urged.  (Aa138).  Finally, as to [...]’s claim that the public access requirement constitutes an unconstitutional taking, the Commissioner modified the ALJ’s decision that [...]’s claim was not ripe “[w]ithout deciding whether the OAL would have jurisdiction to address the . . . as-applied takings claim,” finding instead that “the OAL lacks jurisdiction to adjudicate [[...]’s] facial constitutional challenge.
[brief] S. Law & Pub. Safety Comm. Statement to S. 1504 (Mar. 15, 2001).  (Da96)  The Committee described the purpose of the bill and the amendments as follows:  As amended and released by the committee, this bill would impose a mandatory minimum sentence of five years imprisonment, without eligibility for parole, on a person who is convicted of purchasing, owning, or possessing a firearm and who had previously been convicted of a violent crime or certain crimes involving controlled dangerous substances.  According to the sponsor’s statement, federal legislation known as “Project Exile” would provide $100 million in firearms enforcement grants to states that require a mandatory minimum sentence of five years without parole to be imposed on persons who use or carry firearms during violent crimes.  It is the committee’s understanding that the purpose of this bill is to ensure that this State qualifies for any Project Exile funding that may become available under federal law.  As introduced, the bill increased the mandatory minimum term of imprisonment currently required under the “Graves Act” (N.J.S.2C:43-6) for using or possessing a firearm in the course of committing certain violent crimes.  The committee amended the bill to ensure that it would fulfill its stated objective.