ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Exhibit A - Attachments to Complaint Officer Report of [...] 2/20/2020 (Attached at Pa022)  Discovery Checklist (billing date 7/29/20) (Attached at Pa024)  Evidence Return Receipt 2/20/2023 (Attached at Pa025)  --- 3  [...] used the exhibits from [...] under his own exhibits so there are no duplicate exhibit letters  Lab Report Analysis  4/27/2020 (Attached at Pa026)  Certification of Drug Analysis (Attached at Pa027)  Discovery Checklist (billing date 7/7/20) (Attached at Pa028)  Consent to Search Vehicle 2/20/20-00:47 (Attached at Pa029)  Use of Force Report by [...] (Attached at Pa030)  Use of Force Report by [...] (Attached at Pa031)  Evidence Form (Marijuana) (Attached at Pa032)  Evidence Form (Orange Pill) (Attached at Pa033)  Evidence Form (Money) (Attached at Pa034)  Evidence Form (1 Key and other items) (Attached at Pa035)  Evidence Receipt from Lab (Tab/Marijuana) (Attached at Pa036)  CJIS Transmittal Form (Attached at Pa038)  Wanted Person Request (Mugshot) (Attached at Pa039)  HIT Confirmation Response (Attached at Pa040)  Complaint Summons 2/20/20 (Attached at Pa041)  Return of Service Information (Attached at Pa045)  Affidavit of Probable Cause (Attached at Pa047)  Preliminary Law Enforcement Report (Attached at Pa049)  Complaint Summons (Defendant’s Copy) (Attached at Pa050)  Letter From Police Safety to Hawkins Regarding Outstanding Bill for Discovery, Dated 7/29/2020 (Attached at Pa051)  Exhibit B - Attachments to Complaint Notice of Claim to [...] 2/27/2020 (Attached at Pa053)
[brief] A.  The Lower Court Correctly Identified That, As A Matter Of Law, The City Is Authorized To Collect Redevelopment Payments That Defray Costs And Carry Out And Effectuate A Redevelopment Plan (Pa55 to Pa58)  ..................................................................................21  i.  N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-8(f) Authorized The City To Collect The Redeveloper Payment And To Do So Without Establishing A Nexus Between The Redeveloper Payment And [...]’s Project.  (Pa55 to Pa58)  ...........................................22  ii.  The Purpose Of The LRHL And The Broad Powers It Ascribes To Municipalities To Effectuate Redevelopment Supports The Negotiation And Collection Of The Redevelopment Fee Without Establishing A Nexus Between The Use Of The Redeveloper Payment And A Specific Redevelopment Project (Pa55 to Pa58)  ...........................................24  B.  The Negotiated Redevelopment Payment Was Collected In Order To Carry Out The Purposes Of The LRHL And The Oceanfront-Broadway Redevelopment Plan.  (Pa55 to Pa58)  ...........................................36  POINT II .........................................................................................................................39
[directive] N.J.S.A. organ." or member of function an,~bodily of the impairment unconsciousness (e.g., senses five the of one any of loss temporary the involving injury bodily 2C:11-1(d).  N.J.S.A. injury.  See bodily serious not "significant" bodil~jurv, constitutes only would fistfight during a suspect the stunned temporarily by being of threat the Accordingly, CED.) a firing/discharging for standard the shy necessaril, not offense defining the statutory law Jersey New follows closely now policy revised  The an to offense disorderlypersons the upgrades which 2C:29-2, N.J.S.A. see arrest, resisting of the against violence or force physical use to threatens or "uses suspect the if crime indictable of risk substantial a create to means other any "uses or another," or officer enforcement law and re-affirms approach This another." or servant public the to injury causingphysical in or compliance pain for CED of use a the prohibiting of policy
[brief] Even under the liberal approach of R. 4:42-2, the court finds that good cause has not been shown which warrants reconsideration of the May 12, 2023 Order.  The court finds no basis to compel approval of the Off-Site Project when other avenues of compliance, such as site suitable for between eight (8) and twelve (12) units, are available to the Redeveloper.  The court does not find basis to compel site plan approval for the Off-Site Project which requires multiple variances and is located on an insufficient lot.  POINT VI
[brief] 1.  No retroactivity analysis is required because [...] did not announce a new rule.  The first question in any retroactivity analysis is whether the cited legal ³This Point replies to Point I of the State’s brief.  (Pb 9-16) proposition constitutes “a new rule of law. ”  *State v. G.E.P.*, 243 N.J. 362, 382 (2020) (quoting *State v. Feal*, 194 N.J. 293, 307 (2008)).  When an appellate court has not announced a new rule of law, “retroactivity is not an issue. ”  *State v. Harvey*, 121 N.J. 407, 422 (1990).  To be deemed a new rule of law for retroactivity purposes, a court’s holding must represent “a departure from existing law. ”  *State v. Burstein*, 85 N.J. 394, 403 (1981).
[brief] [...]  [...], Esq. (I.D. No. 058411994)  [...] [...]  [...]  Phone: [...]  Fax: [...]  [...]  Attorneys for Respondent [...]  i/p/a [...]  Our File No. [...]  TABLE OF CONTENTS  Table of Authorities  ........................................................................................................ iii  Statement of Facts .........................................................................................................  1  Procedural History .........................................................................................................  6  Standard of Review .......................................................................................................  7  Legal Arguments ..........................................................................................................  10  I.  Summary Judgment Was Appropriately Granted Based On The Appellant’s Inability To Establish Notice Of The Alleged Hazard.  ..................................................  10  II.  The Appellant’s Contention That She Has No Obligation To Prove Notice Is Erroneous...........................................................................................................  14  Conclusion ....................................................................................................................  18  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
[brief] Da323  Certification of [...], Esq.  In Opposition to Motion to Bar and In Support of Cross-Motion Filed 07/28/21 ………………………………………………………………..  Da325  Certification of [...], Esq.  In Opposition to Motion to Bar and In Support of Cross-Motion Filed 07/28/21 ………………………………………………………………..  Da327  Exhibit A  [...] preliminary review 12/29/20....  Da331  Exhibit B  [...] Cost to Cure Estimate 04/21/21  Da336  Exhibit C  Defendant’s Appraiser’s Supplemental Report Dated 07/28/21 .........................  Da340  Exhibit D  Vibrations Monitoring Pre-Construction Inspection 09/07/18..............................  Da344  Exhibit E  [...] Cost Proposal Dated 07/24/20....  Da321  * * *  Supplemental Certification of [...], Esq.  In Further Support of Motion to Bar Filed 08/02/21 .............
[brief] (Pb 36-37)  In so doing, the State concedes that the temporal factor—the first factor in the three-factor attenuation test—favors [...].  (Pb 36; see Db 15-16)  But the State’s analysis on factor two (the presence of intervening circumstances) and factor three (the flagrancy of the police conduct) is unpersuasive.  As to factor two, the State cites to *State v. Williams* (*Williams I*), 192 N.J. 1, 15 (2007), to argue that a defendant’s flight from a police command --- \(^3\)  The State also attempts to distinguish *State v. Rivera*, 276 N.J. Super. 346 (App. Div. 1994), where defendants were illegally searched because of their proximity to another suspicious person.  The State argues that, unlike *Rivera*, [...] was “pursued because of his own suspicious conduct. ”  (Pb 31-32)  But this is belied by the record, as the officers repeatedly testified that they did not suspect [...] of criminality and that he was stopped so that the officers could identify [...], the target of their investigation, among the three men standing on the corner.
[directive] False Public Alarms places or causes to be placed any false or facsimile bomb in a building, place of assembly or facility or public transport or in a place likely to cause public inconvenience or alarm: first degree if it occurs during a declared period of national, state, or county emergency.  Section (c) – Second degree: if, in addition to acts committed under subsection a, such violation results in serious bodily injury to another person or occurs during a declared period of national, state, or county emergency: first degree if a violation results in death.
[brief] 6.  As a natural gas “public utility” as that term is defined in N.J.S.A. 48:2-13, [...] is subject to regulation by the Board for the purpose of assuring that it provides safe, adequate and proper natural gas service to its customers pursuant to N.J.S.A. 48:2-23.  As a result, the Company is obligated to, and does, maintain its public utility infrastructure in such condition as to enable it to meet its regulatory obligations to provide the requisite service.  That infrastructure consists of the property, plant, facilities and equipment within [...]’s natural gas distribution and transmission system throughout its service territory.
[directive] 2.3  Divided Highway.  A road which includes a physical barrier between traffic traveling in opposite directions.  2.4  Heading Off.  An attempt to terminate a pursuit by pulling ahead of, behind, or toward a violator's moving vehicle to force it to the side of the road or to otherwise come to a stop.  2.5  Law Enforcement Officer.  Any person who is employed as a sworn member of any State, county, or municipal law enforcement agency, department, or division of those governments who is statutorily empowered to act for the detection, investigation, arrest, conviction, detention, or rehabilitation of persons violating the criminal laws of this State.
[brief] ”  (1T 30-6 to 10)  [...], who also testified at the hearing, and [...] responded.  (1T 30-12 to 15)  The officers drove a nondescript vehicle and were in plainclothes so that only their badges, body-worn cameras, and holstered weapons were visible.  (2T 6-15 to 21; Da 9 at 0:40 to 0:49)  Londono exited his vehicle around the corner from [...], and [...] and approached them on foot.  (1T 46-7 to 9, 46-23 to 47-3; Da 10 at 0:14 to 0:40)  Arias stopped his vehicle feet away from the three men and quickly exited with his hand on his holster.  (1T 53-13 to 14)  Arias ordered the trio to stop.  (1T 30-20 to 23; 2T 8-23)  Simultaneously, Londono rounded the corner and yelled “don’t fucking move. ”  (1T 47-9 to 11; Da 10 at 0:41)  Arias testified that he did not know who of the three men was [...] because all three were “wearing all black. ” (2T 8-12 to 24, 19-25 to 20-5, 23-1 to 7)  He therefore needed to “assess[] the situation” and told “all parties to stop moving.
[brief] By their very nature, redevelopment projects occur in challenging areas that, for a variety of reasons, offer unattractive development opportunities.  Redevelopment designations allow municipalities to incentivize developers to develop in areas-in-need of development, rather than in areas where development is likely to be more profitable and less risky.  One tool to incentivize redevelopment is to assure those who assume the risks of the early projects that they will not see their investments diminished in the event that a redevelopment plan is later modified for the benefit of those who seek to build on the accomplishments of their predecessors who took the initial risks.  In order to do so, a municipality may, as [...] did here, allow the early developers the right to approve changes in a redevelopment plan.  To accomplish this goal, Ordinance § 345-98 (Pa979) and the 1996 Redevelopment Plan allowed for amendments of the Redevelopment Plan provided that, if the plan is “amended after the disposition of any land in the Redevelopment Area, the modification must be consented to in writing by designated developers. ” (Pa156; emphasis added).  It is undisputed that [...] did not consent to any change in the redevelopment plan which removed density and other limitations from the [...].  The elimination of those requirements which bound others confers a financial advantage on the one competing developer who had not taken the same financial risks as [...] and other early developers.  (Pa1106)  The Court determined that the City was not required to obtain [...]’s consent because, in its view, [...], having completed its project, was “no longer a designated developer under the Redevelopment Plan. ” (Pa59 to Pa60).  As discussed in Point II below, that conclusion is irreconcilable with the language of the Ordinance and the Redevelopment Plan.  It is also incompatible with any conceivable goal intended to be achieved by the protection afforded to redevelopers by the approval requirement.  (Pa1106).  This is so because, once an early redeveloper invests all of the funds needed to complete its project, it is at greater financial risk for the success of its project than at any earlier time.  And were [...], after construction, to have proposed a change incompatible with the Redevelopment Plan, the City would rightly have forbidden it.  [...] remained a developer and there is no language in the Ordinance or the 1996 Redevelopment Plan, and no conceivable policy which is promoted by the Court’s interpretation of those documents.
[brief] *Pacifico v. Pacifico*, 190 N.J. at 265-66 (2007), quoting *Harrington v. Harrington*, 281 N.J. Super. 39, 46 (App.Div.1995) (citing *Petersen v. Petersen*, 85 N.J. 638, 642 (1981); *Massar v. Massar*, 279 N.J. Super. 89, 93 (App.Div.1995), and quoting *Guglielmo v. Guglielmo*, 253 N.J. Super. 531, 542 (App.Div.1992).  The *Pacifico* Court went on to provide the following guidance for contract interpretation:  As a general rule, courts should enforce contracts as the parties intended.  *Henchy v. City of Absecon*, 148 F. Supp. 2d 435, 439 (D.N.J.2001); *Kampf v. Franklin Life Ins. Co.*, 33 N.J. 36, 43, (1960).  Similarly, it is a basic rule of contractual interpretation that a court must discern and implement the common intention of the parties.  *Tessmar v. Grosner*, 23 N.J. 193, 201 (1957).
[directive] 10  A.  It is clear that due process concerns impose limits on how long a defendant may be held in custody before trial.  Pretrial detention schemes necessarily balance the liberty interest of individuals presumed innocent against public safety concerns posed by high- risk defendants.  See Salerno, 481 U.S. at 748-51; Robinson, 229 N.J. at 68.  The process is constitutional so long as it serves regulatory rather than punitive purposes.  Salerno, 481 U.S. at 746-48; Bell, 441 U.S. at 535-40.  But if pretrial detention under a regulatory scheme is significantly prolonged, a defendant’s confinement may become punitive.  United States v. Theron, 782 F.2d 1510, 1516 (10th Cir. 1986).  Whether the length of detention violates due process in that way “requires assessment on a case-by-case basis” because due process is a flexible concept that “does not necessarily set a bright line limit for length of pretrial confinement. ”  United States v. Orena, 986 F.2d 628, 630 (2d Cir. 1993) (quoting United States v. Gonzales Claudio, 806 F.2d 334, 340 (2d Cir. 1986)); see also United States v. Accetturo, 783 F.2d 382, 388 (3d Cir. 1986) (“Because due process is a flexible concept, arbitrary lines should not be drawn regarding precisely when defendants adjudged to be flight risks or trial. ”).  dangers to the community should be released pending 11  The CJRA contains various time limits designed to move cases toward trial.
[brief] State v. Ahmad, 246 N.J. 592, 611 (2021) (quoting State v. P.Z., 152 N.J. 86, 103 (1997)).  But "simply because someone is questioned at a police station, by police officers, does not mean they are 'in custody.'  Nor is it dispositive whether police consider someone a 'suspect,' 'person of interest,' or 'witness.'"  Erazo, 254 N.J. at 299 (citations omitted).  "The inquiry is an objective one, determined by 'how a reasonable [person] in the suspect's position would have understood his situation.'  The inquiry is not based 'on the subjective views harbored by either the interrogating officers or the person being questioned.'"  Bullock, 253 N.J. at 533 (alteration in original) (quoting Hubbard, 222 N.J. at 267).  Here, defendant was advised of and waived his Miranda rights at the outset of his interview with police, thus rendering largely superfluous any question of when during the interview his presence rose to the level of custody.
[brief] Interestingly, however, not only does [...] not explain why it is a “red-flag” but it is also complete misrepresentation of [...]’s testimony.  [...]’s actual response to the question referenced by [...] was that he did not recall the “exact phase” of the project.  (Pa0292).  Finally, Defendant highlights that during cross-examination at the Rule 104 Hearing, [...] conceded that Defendant did not have “actual notice” of the condition.  This argument ignores [...]’s testimony as a whole.  Plus, shortly after testimony referenced by [...], [...] testified that [...]’s receipt of the T&M memo established actual notice.  (Pa0350);(Pa0352).  (b)  [...]’s Argument that [...]’s Opinion Lacks Support Requires that the Record and the Summary Judgment Rules be Ignored
[brief] Plaintiff argues that statutory sections of New Jersey’s Workers Compensation Act, namely, N.J.S.A. 34:15-72 and -87, require that the Employers Liability Policy issued by [...], to which the [...] policy follows form, cover [...]’s claim against [...].  Pb8-9.  Plaintiff also argues that the public policy of this State does not support exclusion of coverage in the circumstances of his claims.  Pb14-17.  Plaintiff misreads the statutes and discounts the contrary public policy of this State as established by legislation, case law, and regulation of workers compensation and employers liability insurance policies.  Plaintiff has not and cannot point to a single case that has agreed with his arguments and found Exclusion C.5, as adopted in 2007 by [...], to be in violation of any statute.  Plaintiff’s personal injury tort claims arise out of commonly-encountered allegations regarding injuries in the workplace.  The absence of on-point legal authority, despite the frequent occurrence of similar accidents, reveals that Plaintiff’s argument lacks merit.  The statutes Plaintiff cites pre-existed the adoption of the revised Exclusion C.5 language, but, in the seventeen years that the challenged exclusion has been required in standard employers liability policies, no other injured worker has successfully obtained a favorable judicial decision on the grounds raised by Plaintiff.  A.  Statutory Sections of the Workers Compensation Act Do Not Require Insurance Coverage for the Employer’s Alleged Intentional Wrong That Caused Injury.
[brief] ....................................................................................................  12, 13, 14 Highland Lakes Country Club and Community Ass’n v. Nicastro, 406 N.J. Super. 145 (App. Div. 2009) ........................................................................  17 Hubbard v. Reid, 168 N.J. 387 (2001) ........................................................................  27  Majestic Realty Associates, Inc. v. Toti Contracting Co., 30 N.J. 425 (1959) ..............
[brief] Two more officers arrived just as [...] was exiting his patrol car.  All three approached the vehicle with their weapons drawn.  [...] ordered the driver to turn off the engine and told all occupants to place their hands on the roof.  Before he approached the vehicle, [...] learned from one of the other officers that the robbery suspects had been wearing dark or black clothing or jackets.  As he approached, [...] observed "some dark jackets" on the unoccupied rear passenger seat and on the floor of the vehicle.  [...] spoke with the driver, who was later identified as co-defendant [...], a/k/a [...].  [...] was sitting in the passenger seat and [...] was in the rear passenger-side seat.  The dispatcher asked [...] to confirm the license plate number and when he did, the dispatcher advised [...] that the vehicle had been reported stolen.  All three occupants were then removed from the vehicle and placed under arrest.  More officers arrived on the scene, and while several officers secured the arrestees, others assisted [...] in searching for a weapon.  First, [...] retrieved the clothing he had observed from the backseat of the vehicle.  Then, he and the other officers searched other parts of the vehicle, locating additional clothing in the trunk and a black semi-automatic handgun wrapped in a red bandana under the hood.  Searches of the men themselves yielded just under $600 cash.  Approximately $600 was reported stolen from the 7-Eleven robbery.  The vehicle was then impounded, and police transported the three men to the police station.
[brief] Plaintiff-Respondent [...] (“Respondent”) defers to the Court whether some sanction beyond mere defeat should fall on Appellants and their counsel.  In what follows, Respondent will discuss the chances Appellants and their counsel had to seek appropriate relief in an appropriate form from the appropriate court.  In support of Respondent’s conclusion that Appellants are not operating in good faith, there will additionally be some discussion of the deeply misleading arguments made in Appellants’ merits brief.  In sum, Appellants write as though they have stipulated to vicarious liability and that the [...] have contractually agreed to indemnify [...], but they have done neither.  Instead, the [...] seek a resolution that preserves their ability to contest vicarious liability without the inconvenience of conflict-free counsel for [...] having a say in the matter.  Indeed, in the absence of conflict-free counsel, it is hard to see how this Court can even have confidence that [...] has made an informed decision to seek appellate review.  Finally, Respondent hereby joins in the more comprehensive opposition filed by co-counsel, [...], (“[...]”) on behalf of Plaintiff-Respondent [...] (“co-Respondent”).
[brief] PLAINTIFF CONFLATES THE APPROPRIATE STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR THIS COURT; THE “SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE” STANDARD DOES NOT APPLY IN A REVIEW OF A MUNICIPALITY’S REDEVELOPMENT PLAN (RAISED BELOW: 3T.45:1-20; 60:15-20; 63:6-9)  The adoption of a redevelopment plan, like all municipal actions, is vested with a presumption of validity.  Downtown Residents, 242 N.J. Super at 332.  Plaintiffs acknowledge this “presumption of validity” early in their brief (Pb15); but then waste no time conflating the standard of review of a redevelopment plan adopted by municipal ordinance with that of a blight determination, and of land use board quasi-judicial decisions.
[brief] They cross-examined him over two days.  (21T-22T).  [...] also responded to [...]’s analysis, and the defendants presented their own accounting expert, [...].  Unlike [...], however, Fuentes did not review financial records from the defendant entities to determine whether the balance sheets provided to [...] for negotiation were manipulated by hiding and disguising transactions.  Nor did Fuentes review the QuickBooks files for the business entities in the case or confer with his expert report co-author, [...] (who did not testify), the accountant who maintains the entity-defendant books and records, about their contents.  (30T 27:21-23; 30:10-13).  Fuentes admitted on cross-examination that he refused to review records necessary to validate or debunk [...]’s conclusions.