ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] Part 3:  Responsibilities of the Division of State Police, Missing Persons Unit  3.1  Initial Response 3.1.1  The Missing Persons Unit shall be the central law enforcement contact and lead law enforcement cases.4 agency in all Safe Haven Infant Protection  3.1.2  At least one representative of the Missing Persons Unit shall be available by pager at all times.  After hours contacts shall be made by calling State Police Headquarters at [...] and requesting the Missing Persons Unit.  3.1.3  Upon receiving notice of a Safe Haven Infant Protection case, the Missing Persons Unit shall immediately contact the local law enforcement agency.  On the next business day the Missing Persons Unit shall inform the Child Abuse Unit of the County Prosecutor’s Office of the receipt of an infant.  No action is required by the County Prosecutor’s Office, absent evidence of abuse, neglect or some other violation of criminal statutes.  3.1.4  If the infant is unidentified, the Missing Persons Unit shall immediately begin an investigation to missing.5 determine whether the infant has been reported 3.1.5  All press or other media inquiries pertaining to a Safe Haven infant shall be directed to the Department of Human Services, Office of Information Services at [...].  3.2  Investigation Procedures  3.2.1  The National Crime Information Center (NCIC) Unidentified Persons File shall be utilized as soon as the individual identifying characteristics of the infant which are necessary for the basic file entry become available.  An offline search shall be conducted and the infant shall be entered in the file.  4This does not include child abuse investigations or cases in which the Safe Haven Infant Protection Act does not apply.  See § 1.2.
[brief] The court merged defendant's convictions on count four, possession of a weapon (knife) for an unlawful purpose, and count six, unlawful possession of a weapon (knife), with his conviction on count one.  The court further merged defendant's convictions on count five, possession of a weapon (metal pipe) for an unlawful purpose, and count six, unlawful possession of a weapon (metal pipe), with his conviction on count two, first-degree robbery of the [...].  On this second robbery conviction, the judge imposed a concurrent prison term of seventeen years subject to the No Early Release Act (NERA), N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2.  This appeal followed.
[brief] For the aforementioned reasons, as well as those set forth in the [...]’ Opening Brief, this Court should vacate the award of attorneys’ fees and remand for consideration by a different Special Master or by the Trial Court independently of the Special Master’s recommendations.  This Court also should reverse the award of punitive damages and compounded interest at an excessive rate. \(^5\)  A remand can be efficiently conducted with clear instructions from this Court.  --- \(^5\)
[brief] PLAINTIFF CANNOT MEET HIS BURDEN TO APPORTION ANY AMOUNTS OWED WITHIN THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS PERIOD | 30 | | Plaintiff’s 2016 and 2017 Checks do not Provide any Clarity on Plaintiff’s Damage | 35 | | II.  PLAINTIFF CANNOT POINT TO ANY EVIDENCE PRODUCED DURING DISCOVERY THAT DEFENDANTS EVER PROMISED TO PAY PLAINTIFF UPON THE SALE OF THE HOSPITAL | 40 | | Plaintiff’s January 30, 2023 Affidavit was a Sham in a Bad Faith Effort to Defeat Summary Judgment | 40 | | III.  PLAINTIFF NEVER PROPERLY FILED A MOTION TO EXTEND DISCOVERY AND THERE ARE NO EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES TO JUSTIFY A DISCOVERY EXTENSION | 47 | # TABLE OF AUTHORITIES  ## CASES | Case | Page(s) | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|---------| | American Sanitary Sales Co. v. State, 178 N.J. Super. 429 (App. Div. 1981) | 30 | | Baer v. Chase, 392 F.3d 609 (3d Cir. 2004) | 42 | | Hackman v. Valley Fair, 932 F.2d 239 (3d Cir.1991) | 42 | | Hirsch v. State Bd. of Med. Exam’rs, 128 N.J. 160 (1992) | 36 | | J.K. v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 247 N.J. 120 (2021) | 36 | | Jiminez v. All Am. Rathskeller, Inc., 503 F.3d 247 (3d Cir. 2007) | 42 | | Kelly v. Berlin, 300 N.J. Super 256 (App. Div. 1997) | 30 | | Lewis v. Read, 80 N.J. Super. 148 (App. Div. 1963) | 31 | | Nieder v. Royal Indem. Ins. Co., 62 N.J. 229 (1973) | 36 | | State v. Cabbell, 207 N.J. 311 (2011) | 36 | | State v. Jones, 232 N.J. 308 (2018) | 36 | | State v. Lawless, 214 N.J. 594 (2013) | 36 | | State v. Robinson, 200 N.J. 1 (2009) | 36 |  ## STATUTES | Statute | Page(s) | |------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------| | N.J.S.A. 2A:14-1 | 32 | ## COURT RULES | Rule | Page(s) | |-----------------------------------------------------------------------|---------| | R. 1:4-8 | 2 | | R. 1:10-3 | 4 | | R. 4:23-2 | 4 | OTHER AUTHORITIES
[brief] (Da 7; 1T 52-23 to 69-6)  The officers did not have a valid basis to stop [...].  Nor did they have a valid basis to frisk [...].  Therefore, the gun and drugs recovered from [...]’ person were the product of an illegal stop and frisk and must be suppressed.  U.S. Const. amends. IV and XIV; N.J. Const. art. I, par. 7.  Under both the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, Paragraph 7 of the New Jersey Constitution, "searches and seizures conducted without warrants issued upon probable cause are presumptively unreasonable and therefore invalid."  State v. Elders, 192 N.J. 224, 246 (2007).  "People, generally, are free to go on their way without interference from the government.  That is, after all, the essence of the Fourth Amendment[.]"  State v. Shaw, 213 N.J. 398, 409-10 (2012) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9, 27 (1968)).  Consequently, "the State bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that [the] warrantless search or seizure '[fell] within one of the few well-delineated exceptions to the warrant requirement.'"  Ibid. (quoting State v. Pineiro, 181 N.J. 13, 19-20 (2004)).  The investigatory stop and protective frisk for weapons are two such exceptions.  Under state and federal law, a brief investigatory stop of an individual is permissible if the officer has “reasonable and particularized suspicion" that such individual has just engaged in or is about to engage in criminal wrongdoing.
[brief] The court’s finding of bad faith is unsupported by anything on the record, and was literally a conclusion he pulled out of thin air, only by asking himself: “How could he have not known [that he needed to act as administrator for the estate]?” (2T8:1-3)  But just because he could not think of an answer to his own question, it does not prove (nor even come close to proving) the requisite bad faith.  Further, the court’s finding that my position was "creative" should have been encouraged, not discouraged; and it certainly did not warrant sanctions.
[brief] Long Term Tax Exemption Law P.L. 2002, Chapter 15, Section 10 P.L. 2003, Chapter 125, Section 9  12 P.L. 2003, Chapter 125, Section 13 6,10 P.L. 2021, Chapter 17, Section 6 6,10  N.J.S.A.40A:20-9 12  N.J.S.A. 40A:20-12(b)  2,8  Open Public Meetings Act  N.J.S.A. 10:4-15  11  N.J.S. A. 10:4-16 11  Open Public Records Act N.J.S.A. 47:1A-6 11 REGULATORY N.J.A.C. 5:13-1.1 12 COURT RULES Rule 1:7-4(a)  3  SECONDARY AUTHORITY  [...]  “Failure to Allege Civil Rights Violation Is Fatal to Attorney Fees Claim, Says Appellate Division,” New Jersey Law Journal, 229 N.J.L.J. 2904 (Dec. 4, 2023)  [...]  “New Year’s Resolutions: How we, as lawyers, could make 2024 a better year” (Dec. 29, 2023 at 11:22 am)  [...]  “Why Millburn Wants Out”  The New York Times (Nov. 24, 2002)  Plaintiff/Appellant [...], Esq. respectfully submits this Brief in Reply to the [...] Related Defendants Brief dated December 4, 2023, the [...] Brief dated December 4, 2023, the [...] Related Defendants Brief dated December 27, 2023 and the State Related Defendants Letter Brief dated January 3, 2024.
[brief] In early 2019, Plaintiff [...] (“Plaintiff”) was hired by the Board as a substitute armed security officer.  Pa10 at ¶1; Pa56 at ¶1.  As a “substitute” officer, Plaintiff was not assigned a set schedule of hours, but rather worked specific shifts (known as “details”) on a per diem basis.  Pa10 at ¶2; Pa56 at ¶2.  When an officer with a set working schedule was unavailable for his regular detail due to illness or vacation, substitute officers were free to sign up for the detail on the District’s online “Absent Management” system on a first-come, first-served basis.  Pa11 at ¶6; Pa56 at ¶6.  In late 2020, the District announced a job opening for a full-time security officer.
[brief] ”  Ibid. (emphasis added).  Contrary to the [...]’ suggestion, the panel did not foreclose the possibility that [...] may recover fees for time spent on the accounting and non-RICO claims, so long as [...] proved that such time “can[] be deemed part of the pursuit of the ultimate result achieved. ”  Id. at *28.  The panel also affirmed all of the trial court’s factual findings, which were “binding on remand. ” (Id. at *26.)  In sum, the Appellate Division authorized the Chancery Division to engage in the same “common core of operative fact” analysis called for under New Jersey law that it employed the first time around, so long as it found the time spent on [...]’s accounting and non-RICO claims “was reasonably required to establish the RICO claims. ”  See id. at *29.  The [...] do not dispute this directive.  (Db37.)  It is this remand mandate, and not the distorted one offered by the [...], that must guide this Court’s the analysis whether the [...]’ appeal presents the “rare occasion” when a trial court’s fee award was a “clear abuse of discretion.
[brief] It was conducted in such a manner where the evidence could be preserved for the Court’s review and for the public to engage in this process and to understand how we got here and how we got to the situation where the vote tally changed by one.  The guiding principle for the Court is to make sure that this is not a sham election, that the process was adopted, was faithful, abided by certain principals of law.  And the Court’s stratified that that, in fact, has occurred.  (2T80:6-18).  Despite Appellant casting baseless aspersions on the legitimacy of the counting process and his implications that the election was illegitimate, the Court is bound by the factual findings of the trial court in this respect.
[brief] Courts ascribe to the statutory words their ordinary meaning and significance and read them in context with related provisions so as to give sense to the legislation as a whole.  DiProspero, 183 N.J. at 492.  See also In re Plan for Abolition of the Council on Affordable Hous., 214 N.J. 444, 468 (2013).  The Legislature is presumed to have knowledge of its existing legislation and long-standing enactments.
[brief] (AA0035-AA0108)  On April 19, 2023, the Respondent [...] filed a reply brief.  (AA109-AA0117)  On June 7, 2023, the Commission issued a decision that the No. 1 candidate was not eligible for promotion and Appellant was properly the No. 1 candidate for promotion.  (AA0001-8)  As such, the Appellant should have been the first ranked eligible on [...] (AA0006)  Appellant was successful on her appeal that the action by the Respondent [...] in using the Rule of Three to by-pass her proper promotion was improper.  However, the Commission did not order Respondent [...] to promote Appellant.  (AA006-7)  Instead, the Commission improperly decided that Appellant was ineligible for this promotion based upon inaccurate information and without properly allowing Appellant to address this issue.  (AA0006-7)  On July 19, 2023, Appellant filed a Request for Reconsideration of the decision by the Commission.
[brief] *Had the Legislature intended to impose the “rational nexus” requirement upon municipalities and/or redevelopment agencies in the redevelopment context, it certainly would not have expressly permitted these entities to negotiate revenue, but rather would have used the same or similar language as it did within the MLUL when it codified that requirement some forty (40) years ago.*  Section 42 of the MLUL provides that if the governing body seeks contribution from a developer, it must “adopt regulations [which are] based on circulation and comprehensive utility service plans ... and shall establish reasonable standards to determine the proportionate or pro-rata amount of the cost of such facilities that shall be borne by each developer or owner within a related and common area, which standards shall not be altered subsequent to preliminary approval.
[brief] The Board’s initial denial has failed to consider, evaluate, and weigh [...]’s equitable claims.  Most notably, it failed to even mention the approximately one hundred affidavits submitted that support the fact that these postcards were never received by [...] or other members of the pension system.  Furthermore, the Board’s decision inflicts obvious and unnecessary harm upon [...] and fails to advance the legislative purpose of the Ricci Act.  The legislative purpose of the Ricci Act was to provide first responders with the ability to alter their retirement benefits if they have fallen ill as a result of their honorable and heroic service at the largest terrorist attack this country has ever seen, not to unnecessarily and arbitrarily deny sick retired troopers accidental disability benefits.  [...] and ninety-seven (97) other active and retired troopers provided affidavits that they never received notice sent regarding the Ricci Act.  Because the Board failed to fulfill its statutory obligation under the Act to provide notice to all the members of the retirement system within 30 days, and further because it appears that the vast majority never got any notice at all, the Board’s determination was arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable.  As such, in the interest of justice and in the furtherance of a just accommodation, we respectfully request that Board’s determination be reversed and that [...]’s application to register his presence at Ground Zero and his request for amended benefits be granted.
[brief] ”); *Amalgamated Transit Union, Local 880 v. N.J. Transit Bus Operations, Inc.*, 975 A.2d 403, 409-410 (2009) (holding courts ought not intrude on the merits of an issue the parties have agreed would be determined through arbitration, and should only determine whether the issue is facially subject to arbitration); *Standard Motor Freight, Inc. v. Local Union No.560*, 228 A.2d 329 (1967); *Clarke v. Alltran Fin., LP*, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29011, 2018 WL 1036951 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 22, 2018) (holding an arbitration provision subjects arbitration to any “[c]laims regarding the application, enforceability or interpretation” to the arbitrator) (Da10-Da17).4  Motions to compel arbitration on identical claims and circumstances were granted by the court and upheld on appeal in both Williams-Hopkins v. LVNV Funding, LLC, 2019 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 957, 2019 WL 1873155 (N.J. App. Div. Apr. 26, 2019) and Maisano v. LVNV Funding, LLC, 2019 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2421 (N.J. App. Div. Nov. 27, 2019).
[brief] By Plaintiff’s own admission, her counsel somehow simply lost track of the timing for filing the Affidavit of Merit.  (Pb12, 17)  However, “a good faith mistake does not satisfy the ‘reasonable explanation’ requirement of the substantial compliance doctrine. ”  State Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., Bureau of Cty. Envtl. & Waste Compliance Enf’t v. Mazza & Sons, Inc., 406 N.J. Super. 13, 27-28 (App. Div. 2009).
[brief] On December 2, 2022, the appellate court reversed the trial court’s decision and remanded plaintiff to retain an attorney to pursue wrongful death and survivor actions (Pa49 – Pa66).  On February 4, 2023, the trial court issued a Lack of Prosecution Dismissal Warning (Pa67).  On February 7, 2023, defendant [...] filed a Motion to set a schedule for plaintiff to retain counsel (Pa68 – Pa73).  On March 3, 2023, the trial court ordered plaintiff to retain an attorney by April 3, 2023 (Pa72 – Pa73).  On March 10, 2023, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Demand documents, and requested to extend the date to retain an attorney to 30 days after the delivery of the documents (Pa74 – Pa87).  On March 23, 2023, both defendants, [...] and [...], filed motions to oppose plaintiff’s motion to demand (Pa88 – Pa96), and defendant [...] submitted a “Client Notes Report” to the court (Pa92).  On March 31, 2023, the trial court held an oral hearing (2T). ³  On March 31, 2023, Plaintiff filed a brief to support the Motion to demand documents (Pa97 – Pa102).  The court considered plaintiff’s request for documents as pretrial discovery and issued an order rejecting plaintiff’s motion.  The court also extended the date for plaintiff to retain an attorney to April 17, 2023 (Pa103 – Pa104).  On April 17, 2023, defendant [...] filed a motion to dismiss (Pa105 – Pa113).  Defendant [...] joined the motion on April 20, 2023.  On May 12, 2023, the court granted defendants’ Motion to dismiss and dismissed plaintiff’s case without prejudice since plaintiff was not able to comply with the prior court order issued on March 31, 2023 (Pa114 – Pa115).
[directive] Czy rozumie Pan(i), że z powodu przyznania się do winy odnośnie ww. zarzutów sąd [Tak/Yes] [Nie/No] 2. może wydać wyrok nadzoru kuratora sądowego po zwolnieniu warunkowym przez lat i ten wyrok rozpocznie się natychmiast po zakończeniu odbywania okres przez Pana/Panią kary pozbawienia wolności?  Nadzór kuratora sądowego po zwolnieniu warunkowym, przestępstwo I stopnia - 5 lat  Nadzór kuratora sądowego po zwolnieniu warunkowym, przestępstwo II stopnia - 3 lata  Do you understand that because you have pled guilty to these charges the court must impose a year term of parole supervision and that term will begin as soon as you complete the sentence of incarceration?
[directive] SUBJ: - CRIMINAL REVISED  MAIN PLEA FORM 31, 2019  DATE: DECEMBER  This promulgates for use as soon as practicable a revised Main Plea Form as recommended by the Supreme Court Criminal Practice Committee.  The attached plea form supersedes the Main Plea Form that was appended to Directive #01-18 as Attachment 1.  All other attachments to Directive #01-18 (Attachments 2 through 13) remain in effect as issued.
[brief] First, N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-3 defines a “redeveloper” to [m]ean[] any person, firm, corporation or public body that shall enter into or propose to enter into a contract with a municipality or other redevelopment entity for the redevelopment or rehabilitation of an area in need of redevelopment, . . under the provisions of this act, or for any construction or other work forming part of a redevelopment or rehabilitation project.  The characterization of a “redeveloper” depends upon “entry into a contract,” not the status of the construction.  Second, a redeveloper’s obligations do not end with completion of its project.  *N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-9*, addressed to “Agreements with Redevelopers,” requires that all agreements include covenants that “run with the land,” limiting the redeveloper to constructing only “uses established in the current redevelopment plan,” as well as limitations on the sale, lease or transfer of a project irrespective of when the construction is completed.  Thus, a redeveloper, such as [...], remains a “redeveloper” notwithstanding the fact that its project has been completed.
[brief] Although [...] argued in the Arbitration, again in the Trial Court, and implausibly argues again here, that these were mere “forecasts submitted by [...] that were not prepared or identified as amendments to the PTA,” App. Br. at 22, the Arbitrator expressly found:  “I do not find persuasive ARC’s argument that the updates were mere ‘forecasts’ and that the payments mere conditional advances. ”  Da138.  Thus, [...]’s argument—despite obtaining multiple projects from [...] and paying [...] quarterly EGP installments on those projects as required under Section 3.1 of the PTA for more than two years—that it should have its payment obligations to [...] reversed and returned (with an additional $8 million in “highly speculative” damages added in)—was appropriately tried, considered, and rejected multiple times below.
[brief] For the reasons set forth above, Respondents respectfully request that the Court affirm all of the Orders and the Judgment below.  **[...]**  *Attorneys for Respondents*  By: s/ [...]  [...]  Dated: May 24, 2023  IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY  APPELLATE DIVISION  [...], [...], [...], [...], [...] and [...], Individually, and as Members on Behalf of [...], Plaintiffs-Respondents, v. [...], Defendant-Appellant, & [...], Defendant.
[brief] ### TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | Cases | Page(s) | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|---------| | **Ameen v.  Merck & Co., Inc.,** | 40 | | 226 Fed. Appx. 363 (5th Cir. 2007) | | | **Camp v. Jeffer, Mangels, Butler & Marmaro,** | 26 | | 35 Cal. App. 4th 620 (1995) | | | **Cedeno v. Montclair State University,** | passim | | 163 N.J. 473 (2000) | | | **Chaudhry v. Mobil Oil Corp.,** | 26 | | 186 F.3d 502 (4th Cir. 1999) | | | **Chemtall, Inc. v. Citi-Chem, Inc.,** | 49 | | 992 F.Supp. 1390 (S.D.Ga. 1998) | | | **Cortes v. Univ. of Med. & Dentistry,** | 45 | | 391 F. Supp. 2d 298 (D.N.J. 2005) | | | **Davis v. Devereux Found,** | 17, 19, 27 | | 209 N.J. 269 (2012) | | | **Davis v. Supervalu, Inc.,** | 35 | | No.
[brief] Ptaszynski\(^3\) said experts can cite specific federal and state statutes as support for opinions on applicable standard of care.  --- \(^3\)  Ptaszynski v. Atlantic Health Systems, Inc., 440 N.J. Super. 24 (App. Div. 2015), certif. denied, 227 N.J. 357, 227 N.J. 379 (2016).
[brief] *Michel v. New Jersey* Manufacturers Ins. Co., 2018 WL 5985985, at *2 (App. Div. Nov. 15, 2018).  However, “conclusory allegations” are not entitled to the presumption of truth and are insufficient to survive a motion to dismiss.  Id.  “In evaluating motions to dismiss, courts consider allegations in the complaint, exhibits attached to the complaint, matters of public record, and documents that form the basis of a claim. ”  Banco Popular N. Am. v. Gandi, 184 N.J. 161, 183 (2005) (citations and quotations omitted.).  Where a “complaint states no basis for relief and . . . discovery would not provide one, dismissal of the complaint [under Rule 4:6–2] is appropriate. ”  Cnty. of Warren v. State, 409 N.J. Super. 495, 503 (App. Div. 2009).  B.  Standard of Review  On appeal, the Court engages in a de novo review of the trial court’s decision to grant or deny a motion to dismiss.