ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] In points I and II of his brief, Defendant raises issues concerning the court’s management of his case.  Point I concerns Defendant’s preference to have had the motion hearing in person rather than by Zoom and Point II concerns his Complaint that Plaintiff should not have been allowed to orally argue the Order to Show Cause.  It is submitted that both of these are determined at the discretion of the court which at all times was reasonable and was not abused.  With respect to the demand that the motion be argued in person, reference must be made to the NJ Supreme Court’s October 27, 2022 Order as to the future of court operations paragraph 4(a), which provides that going forward routine motions should be handled virtually in all trial divisions of the Superior Court.  Since the Order to Show Cause is analogous to a motion, the court did not abuse its discretion in handling it virtually.  With respect to allowing Plaintiff to proceed with oral argument on the Order to Show Cause, the court still retains discretion whether to allow oral argument under NJ Court Rule 1:6-2(a) and even if the court should not have allowed oral argument by Plaintiff’s counsel, which is not conceded, it was harmless error and did not result in any prejudice to Defendant.  In that respect, it must be noted that in the court’s decision denying the Order to Show Cause, it did not reference anything that Plaintiff’s counsel stated during oral argument proving that the oral argument had no effect on the court’s decision and confirmed that Defendant was not prejudiced by Plaintiff’s oral argument.
[brief] Ca346.  The Motion explained that counsel wrote to Defendant [...] shortly after the incident, by correspondence dated August 2, 2021, which preceded the Receiver’s appointment the next month, on September 24, 2021.  The Motion explains that counsel, in connection with the filing of the personal injury action which had just taken place, just became aware of the Law Division Action as well as other actions and activities.  The Motion explains that no notice from the Receiver was received.  Ca350.  Also on July 27, 2023, the Receiver filed a Reply Brief regarding his application to be discharged.
[directive] Nombre del acusado  Defendant’s Name: ante el Juez before Judge:  1.  Enumere los cargos de que usted se declara culpable:  List the charges to which you are pleading guilty:  Máximo estatutario / Statutory Maximum No. de Ac. Formal / Ac./Denun.  Cargo  Naturaleza de la infracción  Grado Tiempo Multa Multa de la VCCO*  Ind./Acc./Comp.# Count Nature of Offense  Degree Time Fine  VCCO Assmt*  Máx/Max Máx/Max Máx/Max Máx/Max Máx/Max Total/Total  Su exposición total como resultado de esta declaración es:
[brief] Appellant/plaintiff [...] was required to maintain New Jersey’s Compulsory Automobile Insurance required by N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.  He failed to do so, and therefore his claims are barred by N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.5.  It is therefore respectfully requested that this Honorable Court AFFIRM the April 29, 2024, Order of lower court granting respondent/defendant [...]’s motion for Summary Judgment and dismissing the Complaint against him with prejudice.
[brief] Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. Thrivent Fin. for Lutherans, 700 F.3d 1044, 1050 (7th Cir. 2012) (recognizing that “the use of the conjunction ‘and’ indicates that the adjective” modifies both subsequent nouns.); cf. Marigrove, Inc. v. Pinto (In re Aereas), 644 F. App’x 959, 962 (11th Cir. 2016) (stating that an adjective at the beginning of a series applies to all items within the list.).  Appellants’ statutory interpretation would render the word “and” in “maintenance and operations” superfluous.  Appellants’ interpretation leads to absurd applications of the exemption as well.
[brief] On May 14, 2019, the Commissioners issued an award of $7,000 as total compensation for the taking of the 3,334-sf easement in the Property.  Da31.  On June 21, 2019, Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal to the Report of Commissioners.  Da35.  On August 21, 2019, the Court scheduled the trial of this matter for November 12, 2019.  Pa8.  R. 4:73-11 required Appellant to serve his appraisal report a minimum of forty (40) days prior to the trial, or no later than October 3, 2019.  Pa8.  Appellant was unable to comply with the deadline imposed by R. 4:73-11, therefore Appellant requested an adjournment of the trial and the scheduling of a Case Management Conference.  Pa8.  Respondent consented to an adjournment of the trial November 12, 2019 trial date.  Pa8.  On October 30, 2019, the trial court conducted a Case Management Conference, setting December 20, 2019 as the deadline for production of Appellant’s appraisal report and rescheduling the trial February 18, 2020.
[brief] This is, however, the only factor that was cited by the Trial Court as the basis on which it imposed sanctions, repeatedly:  - They “had discourse between counsel that they provided a certification showing A[.] that there was . . . never any transaction, [and B.] a Letter of Intent that was never signed. ” (2T 14:5-8).  •  “[T]he first time that I had a chance to speak to the parties and I was questioning why -- why [...] was even in the case that there was never any deal.  . . .” (2T 17:18-20).  •  “[O]nce the plaintiff knew that there was no deal[,] despite [...]’s feeling [that] the Court is wrong, I don’t find there was any conceivable cause of action for intentional infliction -- intentional infliction -- for intentionally interfering with a prospective economic opportunity and I do find that further pursuing the litigation was frivolous. ” (2T 18:8-14).  •  “Obviously, I do find that he had the right to bring the complaint.  He had the right to do some discovery[,] but at some point I think that the litigation became frivolous in nature[.]” (2T 18:15-18).  •  “They . . . ha[d] . . . these basically that you have to call conversations with [...] and [...] was interested in coming in and apparently buying out the practice or the assets of the [...]; that there was probably due diligence and then offer was made which was rejected and so against that, I don’t -- it’s difficult for me to see and the same reason I’ve said in the past, if there was ever a commutable cause of action for this interference with the prospective economic opportunity or in any event as I said, the transaction never took place. ” (3T 20:22-21:7).  Relying on the absence of a transaction alone to impose sanctions demonstrates a clear error in judgment.  Indeed, the Trial Court issued both the Sanctions Order and the Reconsideration Order without applying the appropriate legal standard, and while ignoring the facts presented before it.  Consequently, as the Trial Court has not articulated any other factor that went into its consideration, the decision to impose sanctions was an error in judgment and necessitates overturning the Sanctions Order and Reconsideration Order.  Therefore, reversal is warranted.
[brief] Since July 14, 2017, when the Township entered into a court-approved settlement agreement incorporating the settlement between the Township and the predecessors in interest to [...], the Appellants had nearly five years to participate in the fairness and compliance hearing process.  They chose not to.  In November 2017, the Township submitted its HEFSP and implementing ordinances, including the redevelopment plan for this site, and as per the trial court’s order, provided the required public notice prior to the December 14, 2017 compliance hearing.  The Appellants did not object during this time despite the review process for the Township being highly public and drawing other objections.  On December 14, 2017, the compliance hearing took place and [...] approved [...]’s HEFSP.  Two years later, [...] and [...] entered into redevelopment agreements that explicitly stated that the parties anticipated a PILOT on the site.  On August 29, 2019, the court again had a fairness and compliance hearing and approved a Final Judgment of Compliance and Repose with adequate public notice given.  The Appellants again chose not to object during this time or appeal the redevelopment agreements or subsequent site plan approvals.  Following these redevelopment agreements and the introduction of the PILOT to finance the redevelopment project, the [...] committee held public meetings on Jan. 24, 2022 and February 22, 2022 regarding ordinance No. 22-1766.  The committee subsequently adopted the ordinance at a public hearing on February 22, 2022.  The Appellants offered only testimony in these hearings, but did not present evidence or request additional information.  The Appellants have chosen to sit out at every appropriate opportunity given to them to bring an objection prior to this.  If what the Appellants had sought was a fundamental change to the Township’s right to enter into a PILOT as part of this project, they should have brought objections to the passage of a redevelopment plan or execution of a redevelopment agreement providing for such.  It is not a surprise at all that the Township is now implementing long-ago approved plans and agreements within the discretion accorded to a municipality that uses the statutory tools of redevelopment.
[brief] Further, although the Trial Court found that a dispute existed as to whether the louvered system constitutes merchandise for purposes of the CFA, the Trial Court correctly concluded that no issue of material fact existed as to whether [...] could sustain its burden of proof of ascertainable loss, which is required to succeed on its CFA claim.  There is no expert report or opinion pertaining to damages, documentation showing out of pocket expenses causally connected to the allegedly defective louvered system, or other evidence to show that [...] suffered an ascertainable loss.  Although [...] asserts that a jury should determine the amount of damages, a jury should not be tasked with guessing an arbitrary number when a plaintiff has submitted absolutely no proof whatsoever as to any loss or damages.  As stated by the Trial Court, “To permit plaintiff to assert that damages were generally incurred and leave the amount of said damages to the discretion of the jury would be an injustice to the defendants. ” (Pa131).  In addition to failing to submit proof of damages in connection with its claim for violation of the CFA, [...] failed to sustain its burden of proof as to compensatory damages on its claims for breach of contract, breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, unjust enrichment, and breach of warranty.  It is well established that the purpose of compensatory damages is to compensate a plaintiff for an actual loss.  See Nappe v. Anschlewitz, Barr, Ansell & Bonello, 97 N.J. 37, 48 (1984).  A plaintiff always has the burden of proving damages.  Caldwell v. Haynes, 136 N.J. 422, 436 (1994).  No expert report as to damages, documentation containing an estimate for the cost to repair or replace any alleged deficiencies in the louvered system, or other quantifiable damages have been provided by [...] in order to show it sustained financial loss for which it seeks compensation.  [...] even admits that it was able to mitigate its alleged damages and continues to use the space for events such as weddings as well as a location for outdoor dining.  (Pb14).  Therefore, no genuine issue of material fact exists on the issue of damages.  Moreover, there is no testimony, documentation, or other evidence that substantiates [...]’s allegation, made for the first time on appeal, that the entire system would have to be demolished, removed, and replaced.
[brief] ”  N.J.S.A. 13:1B-30 (emphasis added).  [...] may disagree with the Legislature’s decision to allow for the utilization and take of game animals specifically as it relates to black bears, (Pa130), but “such disagreement cannot satisfy the high burden required to invalidate on constitutional grounds,” *Gangemi v. Berry*, 25 N.J. 1, 10 (1957).  The trial court properly concluded that [...]’s bias allegations have no bearing on the validity of the underlying counts of the complaint.  (Pa125).  noting that “[e]ven delegation of legislative authority to private parties may withstand constitutional challenge if sufficient safeguards exist to prevent an arbitrary concentration of power in persons or groups [m]otivated by self interest. ”  70 N.J. at 579; see also Male v. Renda Contracting, 64 N.J. 199, 201 (1974) (“The test is whether the particular delegation is reasonable under the circumstances considering the purpose and aim of the statute. ”); Ridgefield Park Ed. Ass’n v. Ridgefield Park Bd. of Ed., 78 N.J. 144, 163 (1978) (same).  Time and again, the Supreme Court has found such “sufficient safeguards” in place for the Council.  See U.S. Sportsmen's Alliance Found. v. New Jersey Dep't of Env't Prot., 182 N.J. 461, 474 (2005) (“[The] Council clearly does not function as a completely autonomous body, unaccountable to the department head.  Rather, the Commissioner must approve the . . . Council's comprehensive policies.  It is the Commissioner’s approval that, in turn, insures that those policies comport with department-wide goals for environmental protection. ”); Humane Soc’y, 70 N.J. at 579 (“[T]here does not reside [] the potential for such aggrandizement of the Council members’ interests as would be repugnant to due process. ”).  Case law recognizes that the Legislature circumscribed the Council’s authority through definitive standards.  See N.J. Bell Tel. Co. v. Comme’ns Workers, etc., 5 N.J. 354, 370 (1950); supra at 2-4 (describing the Council’s enabling statutes).  Each and every Council member, including those recommended by the [...], must possess “knowledge of and interest in the conservation of fish and game” and be appointed by the Governor with advice and consent of the Senate.
[brief] 23  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES  Cases Accountemps Div. of Robert Half, Inc. v. Birch Tree Grp., Ltd., 115 N.J. 614 (1989) .................................................................................. 21 Allstate Ins. Co. v. Howard Sav. Institution, 127 N.J. Super. 479 (Ch. Div. 1974) .......................................................... 10 Arroyo v. Stoneleigh Recovery Assocs., LLC, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 138287 (D.N.J. Aug. 14, 2019) .............................. 18 Baumann v. Marinaro, 95 N.J. 380 (1984) .................................................................................... 5, 16 Berger v. Paterson Veterans Taxi Serv., 244 N.J. Super. 200 (App. Div. 1990) ......................................................... 7, 8, 9 Chance v. McCann, 405 N.J. Super. 547 (App. Div. 2009) ....................................................... 9 Court Inv. Co. v. Perillo, 48 N.J. 334 (1977) ................................................................................... 15 Finley v. United States, 130 F. Supp. 788 (D.C.D.N.J. 1955) ......................................................... 11 Foster v. New Albany Machine & Tool Co., 63 N.J. Super. 262 (App. Div. 1960) .........................................................
[brief] *(In re Princeton Office Park, L.P. v. Plymouth Park Tax Services, LLC,* 218 *N.J.* 53, 62 (2014)).  In return, the investors obtain the right to receive interest on their investment if the property owner redeems . . . and the right to acquire title by foreclosure if it does not *Varsolona v. Breen Capital Services Corp.*, 189 *N.J.* 605, 618 (2004).
[brief] At the Initial Hearing, Appellant presented the testimony of three (3) witnesses in support of the Application: (1) [...], one of the owners of [...] (“Ms. Gartino”); (2) [...], P.E., P.P., of [...] (“Mr. Sciullo”); and (3) [...], Managing Partner of [...] (“Mr. Gallo”).  Ms. Gartino testified that she has extensive experience in the retail cannabis business, providing a thorough summary of the Project, including the site selection process and operational details of the proposed development.  (T1/13:15-17; 16:7-18:9)³.  She discussed hours of operation, number of employees, anticipated customer volume, customer flow, and queuing.  ³  “T1” denotes the transcript of the July 6, 2023 hearing before the Land Use Hearing Officer; “T2” denotes the transcript of the January October 5, 2023 hearing before the Land Use Hearing Officer.  Ms. Gartino explained that before deciding to purchase the Property for the Project, [...] consulted with City officials and reviewed Ordinances that confirmed the proposed development was a permitted use in the CBD Zone.
[brief] A&C Investment Gp., LLC v. Zurich-American Ins. Co., 2006 WL 8457335 (D.N.J.2006)..................................................8  American Wrecking Corp. v. Burlington Ins. Co., 400 N.J.Super. 276 (App.Div.2008)..............................................9  Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 91 L.Ed. 21 202 (1986).......1  Bauman v. Royal Indem. Co. 36 N.J. 12 (1961)....................................8  Bright v. T.W. Suffolk, Inc., 268 N.J.Super. 220 (App.Div.1993)..................6  Burd v. Sussex Mut. Ins. Co. 56 N.J. 383 (1970)...................................20  Calderon v. Jiminez, 356 N.J.Super. 513 (App.Div.)...............................5  Carolina Cas. Ins. Co. v. Burlington Ins. Co., 951 F.3d 1199 (10thCir.2020).................................................................................15  Catton v. N.J.A.F.I.U.A, 242 N.J.Super. 5 (App.Div.1990)......................18  City of Asbury Park v. Star Ins. Co., 242 N.J. 596 (2020).......................16 Corcoran v. Hartford Ins Co., 132 N.J.Super. 234 (App.Div.1975).............19 Enright v. Lubow, 215 N.J.Super. 306 (App.Div.1987)............................20 Erie Ins. Exch. v. Lobenthal, 114 A.3d 832 (Pa.Super.2015)....................8 Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. v. Security Ins. Co., 72 N.J. 63 (1976)...............17 General Ins. Co. v. New York Marine & Gen Ins. Co., 320 N.J.Super. 546 (App.Div.1999)..................................................17 Grinnell Mut. Reins. Co. v. Central Mut. Ins. Co., 658 N.W.2d 363 (N.D.2003).........................................................17 Harr v. Allstate Ins. Co., 54 N.J. 287 (1969)..............................................10 Harvester Chem. Corp. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 277 N.J.Super. 421(App.Div.1994).........................................................10 Iafelice ex. rel. Wright v. Arpino, 319 N.J.Super. 581 (App.Div.1999).......................................................19
[brief] That is exactly the argument plaintiff makes at bar.  Defendants cite to Jones v. Heymann, 127 N.J. Super. 542, 547 (App. Div. 1974), as support for their position that [...]’s approval of the C5 exclusion means that it is consistent with public policy and is enforceable.  DNJMb39.  Jones was overruled on that point and is not good law.
[brief] In making a determination regarding the statute of limitations, our courts take an objective approach.  *Id.* at 149.  [...] is *Predham v. Holfester* stated:  “The statute of limitations is not a club in the hands of the wrongdoer, whether a willful or an unintentional one; it is a prod in the back of the victim, the prod being powered by the conspicuous nature of the adverse use. ”  *Predham v. Holfester*, 32 N.J. Super. 419 (App. Div. 1954).  The party that claims title via adverse possession has the burden of proof.  Patton v. North Jersey *supra* at 187.  In application of the Statute of Limitations in this matter, what is clear is that [...] purchased the property [...] from [...] on June 30, 1976.
[directive] Rule  Specifically, history.  criminal juvenile defendant a as the years ten preceding the within "whether considering without issued be complaint-warrant would adult an by committed if that or crime a firearm, a involving crime a for escape, delinquent adjudicated was offenses."  foregoing the of any to commit attempt an or Release . . .  Act  Early No the to be subject 40 Page aComplaint-Warrant.  Applyingfor' of Presumption the Overcoming 4.5.9 to pursuant acomplaint-warrant for applying of presumption a is there where case any In acomplaint-warrant apply for shall agency enforcement law a 4.5.8, through 4.5.1 subsections Section with accordance in consulted general attorney deputy or prosecutor assistant an unless is who 3.3.2 subsection to pursuant designated officer supervisory or a Directive, 3.2 this of this of 4  Section under presumptions overcome to Prosecutor County the by authorized of interests nor the victim safety or of public interests neither the that determines Directive, the determination, making this In acomplaint-warrant. for applying by be served would justice whether, consider shall.  officer supervisory or general, attorney deputy prosecutor, assistant are there release, of conditions monitor to program services pretrial the of ability the without she or acomplaint-summons, he by charged be to were defendant if that assurances reasonable be will community person the or any other of safety the required, when in court appear will process.  justice criminal the obstruct to attempt or obstruct not will defendant the and protected, acomplaint-warrant, for applying of presumption the overcome to made is determination  If the decision for reasons) that the document shall general attorney deputy or prosecutor assistant the file.  case the in Sexual and Violence Domestic in Procedures and Notifications, Considerations, Special 4.6 Cases.
[brief] The School Ethics Commission was created by action of the Two Hundred Fourth Legislature of the State of New Jersey, as approved by the Governor of the State of New Jersey, and enshrined in the School Ethics Act as Public Law 1991, Chapter 393 during its Second Annual Session of the 1991 Legislative Session.  In creating the School Ethics Commission, the Legislature found and declared:  a.  In our representative form of government it is essential that the conduct of members of local boards of education and local school administrators hold the respect and confidence of the people.  These board members and administrators must avoid conduct which is in violation of their public trust or which creates a justifiable impression among the public that such trust is being violated.  b.
[brief] Respondent is barred from arguing that Appellant has not exhausted administrative remedies due to her failure to cross-appeal.  Respondent argues in Point I of her brief that this appeal should be denied as Appellant has “not exhausted administrative remedies. ” (Rb8-Rb10).  Specifically, she contends that Appellant “could have and should have petitioned the Civil Service Commission for relief. ” (Rb10).  Appellant urges Your Honors to reject this contention because Respondent failed to file a cross-appeal on this very issue.  While respondents in an appeal are permitted to raise issues without filing cross-appeals, they are limited to “argue any point on the appeal to sustain the trial court’s judgment.