ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] That attempt also fails because Defendant failed to provide any proof in support of his assertion as to Defendant’s imminent availability.  As the trial court noted in its Order and Statement of Reasons dated June 7, 2024 (the “June 2024 Order”), while defense counsel attempted to argue that Defendant’s release from prison is a “changed circumstance,” the trial court summarily dismissed that contention because defense counsel’s subsequent letter dated June 6, 2024 “indicates that [Defendant’s] availability for trial is again uncertain due to Defendant’s transfer to a different halfway house. ”  Da38.  “Now, three months after the peremptory trial date, agreed to by Defendant, Defendant remains unavailable for trial due to his personal circumstances.  This again highlights that all these issues could have been avoided had Defendant met his obligations (specifically defined by the court) related to transport for March 11, 2024 trial. ”  Ibid.  Defendant’s motion for reconsideration failed in this regard for the same reason his motion to reinstate failed, which is why the trial court “relie[d] on the statement of reasons in support of the April 26, 2024 order” in its decision to deny his motion for reconsideration.  Ibid.  Setting aside defense counsel’s purported failure to read the trial court’s communications, Defendant’s motion was properly denied as Defendant lacked any legal basis for his application.  While preparing for trial with a client in jail may have been difficult, it was not impossible and defense counsel had several months between remand from the Appellate Division in October 2023 until the trial date on March 11, 2024 to meet with his client to prepare for trial.  The trial court arranged to have Defendant transported for his trial provided Defendant paid the transportation cost.  Defendant had the opportunity to present his case for trial at the peremptory date on March 11, 2024 – a date that Defendant himself agreed to.  Due to no fault of Plaintiff or the trial court, the trial did not proceed because Defendant failed to appear.  Defendant’s appeal lacks any basis in law, his excuse is betrayed by the facts and his appeal should be denied.
[brief] On July 16th 2019, the Trial Court again granted [...]’s motion to dismiss the Complaint for failing to serve an affidavit of merit.  In granting [...]’s motion to dismiss, the Trial Court found that:  “Although it is true that [...] is not a licensed professional engineer, it remains undisputed that his supervisors, [...] and Mr.  Schweppenheiser, were both licensed professional engineers who consistently monitored, directed and reviewed [...]’s performance on the project (Pa29-30)  ……  Plaintiff’s claim against Defendants for negligently supervision the project speaks directly to their obligations as professional engineers” (Pa30)  The Trial Court further noted that the practice of engineering is defined by the New Jersey Administrative Code which includes, as engineering, the administration of construction for the purposes of determining compliance with the drawings and specifications” (Pa28) (N.J.A.C. 13:40-13)  The Trial Court stated:  “In examining these provisions as they apply to the work performed by [...] and [...], it is clear that their supervision of the project to ensure compliance with the [...]’s contractual specifications falls within “professional engineering” (Pa29)  Further the court noted:  “There is no feasible way to separate Defendants standard of care in rendering those professional engineering services from their duties owed to Plaintiff under a simple negligence theory.  In other words, the allegations are founded upon the professional engineering of [...] and [...] provided and the standard of care applicable to them at the time of the incident can only be analyzed as a deviation from the standard of care ordinarily applicable to professional engineers. ”  (Pa30)  Further, the court stated:  “In light of the expert reports of the parties, as well as the deposition testimony, it is clear to this Court that the inspection and oversight duties of HAK and [...] fall squarely within “the practice of engineering…... and [...] provided engineering services on the project, at the direction and supervision of two licensed professional engineers. ”  (Pa31)  As [...] was providing engineering services under the supervision and control of professional engineers, the Trial court ruled that an affidavit of merit was required.  The Trial Court thus again dismissed plaintiff’s complaint against [...].
[brief] Although the trial court did not decide this issue, Plaintiffs’ claim for libel per se was also futile because it was untimely.  The alleged libel was committed on August 6, 2019, when [...] submitted his written complaint to the police containing what Plaintiffs have inaccurately identified as a lie.  Because the statute of limitations for a cause of action for libel per se is one year, Plaintiffs had until August 6, 2020 to file a claim based thereon.
[brief] See TAD Associates, supra (defining subcontractors in terms of contractual privity).  Consistent with the DOL’s interpretation as set forth in TAD Associates, the Solicitation expressly defined the archaeologist to be a subcontractor on its Bidder’s Proposed Subcontractor’s Form.  In doing so, the archaeological subcontractor was listed along with the other subcontractors (plumbing, electrical, structural steel, and HVAC) required to be identified in all bids by the LPCL.  N.J.S.A. 40A:11-16.  Given that the LPCL defines “subcontractor” in terms of privity (N.J.S.A. 40A:11-16), and that the Solicitation identified the archaeologist as a “subcontractor”, it is clear that the term “subcontractor” is defined in terms of privity, as it was in TAD Associates, and that the archaeologist here is a subcontractor as contemplated by PWCRA.
[brief] Asmad-Escobar, at *4.  Moreover, Appellant has not alleged any “actual damages” as is required for all negligence claims.  Townsend v. Pierre, 221 N.J. 36, 51 (2015).  While Appellant insists he has alleged “actual damages and ascertainable loss” due to the “economic impact of the impermissibly disclosed information” (see Appellant Br., at 32; Appx., at Pa8, ¶48), a simple examination of his pleading shows he has not.
[brief] N.J.A.C. 11:3-5.1(a)  The fact that an insurance carrier cannot even assert a claim for damages on [...]’s DOBI approved forms strongly suggests that carriers cannot recover any Fraud Act damages in an NFADR process.  As is stated above, the Legislature stated in 1983 that it is the purpose of the Fraud Act to “confront aggressively the problem of insurance fraud in New Jersey by facilitating the detection of insurance fraud, eliminating the occurrence of such fraud through the development of fraud prevention programs, requiring the restitution of fraudulently obtained insurance benefits, and reducing the amount of premium dollars used to pay fraudulent claims. ”  N.J. S.A. 17:33A-2.  Nine years after the Fraud Act was enacted, the Supreme Court stated, “Insurance fraud is a problem of massive proportions that currently results in substantial and unnecessary costs to the general public in the form of increased rates.  In fact, approximately ten to fifteen percent of all insurance claims involve fraud.  New Jersey Dep’t of Ins. 1989 Annual Report, at 62–63. ”  Merin, 126 N.J. at 436.  AICRA was enacted in 1998, six years after the Merin decision.  In passing AICRA, the Legislature declared, “Whereas, It is generally recognized that fraud, whether in the form of inappropriate medical treatments, inflated claims, staged accidents, falsification of records, or in any other form, has increased premiums, and must be uncovered and vigorously prosecuted, and while the pursuit of those who defraud the automobile insurance system has heretofore been addressed by the State through various agencies, it has been without sufficient coordination to aggressively combat fraud, leading to the conclusion that greater consolidation of agencies which were created to combat fraud is necessary to accomplish this purpose.
[brief] *Id.*  The claims by [...] against [...] based upon the allegation that [...] knew that Brian and [...] were contaminating the Property, yet did nothing to stop the contamination, and for strict liability, were known by [...] at least as early as February 8, 2016.  24a.  Yet, (i) he chose not to assert any claim against [...] in the Chancery Complaint that was filed, despite alleging the facts forming the basis of such a claim, and (ii) he later chose not to assert any claim against [...] when he filed his Answer, Counterclaim and Third-Party Complaint in the Law Division action.  Da87.  The failure to join and assert any claim against [...] or the [...] when filing his Answer, Counterclaim and Third-Party Complaint in the Law Division action was especially egregious, because in his Law Division action [...] asserted that Brian and [...] owed a duty to the [...] as tenants, that their conduct at the Property including paving a portion of the Property damaged the [...], and that they had dumped fuel oil, chemicals and other tox substances on the property.
[directive] Cases Where a Motion for Revocation of Release Must Be Filed Absent Compelling and Extraordinary Circumstances.  In any case where there is probable cause to believe that a defendant has committed a crime subject to the No Early Release Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2, while on release for any first- or second-degree indictable crime charged by complaint-warrant, the prosecutor shall file a motion seeking revocation of release pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:162-24 unless the County Prosecutor or First Assistant Prosecutor, or the Director or a Deputy Director of the Division of Criminal Justice in cases prosecuted by the Division, finds that there are compelling and extraordinary reasons not to seek revocation of release.  8.4  Cases Where the Prosecutor Is Presumed to Seek Revocation of Release.  Presumption of Seeking Revocation of Release When Serious a New Crime Is 8.4.1
[brief] Although [...] addresses this issue in Point 2 of her appellate brief, no response to same is provided herein because the trial court found in [...]’s favor on this point and [...] did not file a cross-appeal. argument, the trial court denied the motion.  (Pa73-Pa74).  Noting that reconsideration should only be granted where the court’s prior decision was made on a palpably incorrect or irrational basis, or where the court failed to consider probative competent evidence, the trial court concluded that the granting of summary judgment was proper.
[brief] Is that correct?  A: It was 2012.  Q: I’m going to show you what has been produced as your response to Defendant’s Request for Admissions.  I’m going to ask is that your signature on the final page?  A: Yes, it is.  Q: Okay.  And I’m going to read the - - I’m going to read the request.  I’m going to have you read your answer, okay?  A: Uh-huh.  Yes.  Sorry.  Q: Request No. 13, Plaintiff was not given permission to use a [...] purchasing card for personal purchases before March of 2020.  What is your answer?  A: There is no answer.  Oh.  Admit.  [ * * * ]  Q: Request No. [1]4, Plaintiff used a [...] purchasing card for personal purchases prior to January 1, 2020.  Your answer?  [ * * * ]  A: Oh. Denied.  (Pa41-42, dep. tr. 22-29; Pa88-Pa89 at paragraph 43).  Appellant failed to bring forth any documents or witnesses corroborating his account of the facts pertaining to this litigation.
[brief] **A.  Defendant’s FDCPA Violation is an Abusive Collection Practice. **  Supporting the motion court’s decision, Defendant argues Plaintiff must show that the conduct was abusive in addition to the four elements under *Thiel*.  “Abusive” first appears in a heading within the first FDCPA section, 15 U.S.C. § 1692.  That heading was added by the Office of the Law Revision --- \(^1\) *Hunstein v. Preferred Collection & Mgmt. Servs.*, 17 F.4th 1016 (11th Cir. 2021); *Khimmat v. Weltman, Weinberg & Reis Co, LPA*, 585 F. Supp. 3d 707 (E.D. Pa. 2022); and *Jackin v. Enhanced Recovery Co., LLC*, 606 F. Supp. 3d 1031 (E.D. Wash. 2022).  Counsel to the codification but is not in the adopted statute (see P.L. 95-109).  Mangum v. Action Collection Serv., Inc., 575 F.3d 935, 939 (9th Cir. 2009).  The term “abusive debt collection practices” appears three times in § 1692 but does not appear elsewhere in the FDCPA.  The Senate Report explained, “This legislation expressly prohibits a host of harassing, deceptive, and unfair debt collection practices. ”  Senate Report at *4.  The “abusive debt collection practices” phrase is merely another way of saying “a host of harassing, deceptive, and unfair debt collection practices. ”  Both are a general description for the body of FDCPA’s debt collection regulations.  If that phrase were construed to limit the breadth of all FDCPA provisions, then the entire statute—except for § 1692d—would be surplusage because it is the only section which prohibits abusive conduct.  There is nothing to suggest that Congress intended all but § 1692d to be surplusage.  B.  The Senate Committee Report Does Not Change the Meaning of the Unambiguous Statutory Language.  Statutory interpretation enforces the legislature’s intent.  If “the plain language leads to a clear and unambiguous result, then our interpretative process is over. ”  State v. Courtney, 243 N.J. 77, 86 (2020).
[brief] \(^7\)  For example, an eyewitness in *State v. Kay*, 151 N.J. Super. 255 (Cty. Ct. 1977) saw the defendant driving; and the defendant in *State v. Hanemann*, 180 N.J. Super. 544 (App. Div.), certif. den. 88 N.J. 506 (1981) had injuries consistent with being in an accident.
[brief] This step requires a court to “identify the aggravating and mitigating factors and balance them to arrive at a fair sentence. ”  *State v. Natale*, 184 N.J. 458, 488 (2005).  In order to ensure proper balancing of the relevant factors, at the time of sentencing, a court must “state the reasons for imposing such sentence, including . . . the factual basis supporting a finding of particular aggravating and mitigating factors affecting sentence.
[brief] Viewed objectively, a reasonable person in defendant's position would have felt free to leave the interview.  The interview took place in the early evening and lasted only about an hour.  Defendant -- after having agreed to give the detectives a voluntary statement as a witness to the incident -- did not so much as hint at a desire to leave the interview at any point while it was taking place.  Indeed, defendant was quick and seemingly eager to detail his account of what he did on the night of the murder.  And the detectives were not particularly accusatory or unrelenting in their questioning of defendant, who was not handcuffed.
[brief] The Trial Court Did Not Err In Excluding the WARD Memo and Would Not Have Erred In Excluding the Transcript If That Issue Had Been Before It  As Appellants acknowledge, appellate courts ‘typically’ review evidentiary rulings under a “deferential standard. ”  (Pb25 (citing State v. Appellants also submit that absent a showing of an “abuse of discretion,” the Trial Court’s evidentiary ruling should be upheld.  (Id.)  Appellants point to no reason that the exclusion of the WARD Memo and Transcript were incorrect, much less an abuse of discretion.  Even if Appellants had sought to admit the Planning Board Transcript into evidence, neither the Planning Board Transcript nor the WARD Memo were part of the record before the Governing Body, and they would have been properly excluded at trial here.
[brief] Exhibit G to Certification, Excerpts from the Deposition of [...] dated August 17, 2021, filed October 25, 2022  Exhibit H to Certification, Excerpts from the Deposition of [...] dated August 17, 2021, filed October 25, 2022  Exhibit I to Certification, Crash Data Retrieval Report, filed October 25, 2022 Exhibit J to Certification, Excerpt from 2016 Honda CR-V Owner’s Manual, filed October 25, 2022 (omitted here – see Pa159)
[directive] Incarceration on Sexual Assault of Mandatory Impact 4.6.5 and/or an assistant arrest officer making the 'the police sexual assault, cases involving a In of Directive, or Section 3.2 this in accordance with consulted attorney general or deputy prosecutor mandatory whether the 3.3.2, shall consider subsection pursuant to designated supervisory officer a victim might discourage a acomplaint-warrant of from issuance resulting automatically detention the not serve prosecution, or otherwise would cooperating with the or pursuing the charge from officer and/or assistant the of sexual offenses, nature Given the repetitive interest of justice.  for apply would be appropriate to whether it general consider also may or deputy attorney prosecutor complaint-summons and is charged by defendant recognition that if the in complaint-warrant a pursuant to prosecutor cannot move on pretrial release, the while new crime thereafter commits a release.  Cf. note 30.
[directive] 5.2  Thus, all officers who observe another officer about to use force that is illegal, excessive, or otherwise inconsistent with this Policy must, if feasible, do whatever they can to interrupt the flow of events before the fellow officer engages in an improper use of force.  Officers can serve each other and the public by simply saying or doing the right thing to prevent a fellow officer from resorting to force illegally or inappropriately.  5.3  Officers shall use signaling, verbal intervention, or physical intervention, if necessary, to stop any improper use of force.  It is important to note that the duty to intervene does not stop at one officer.  It is the responsibility of all officers to ensure use-of-force compliance.  If officers observe a situation where another officer is attempting to intervene in an improper use of force, officers shall assist in that effort.  5.4  Duty to report illegal and inappropriate uses of force by other officers.  Any officer who observes or has knowledge of a use of force that is illegal, excessive, or otherwise inconsistent with this directive or department policies must (a) notify a supervisor as soon as possible and (b) submit an individual written report to a supervisor before reporting off duty on the day the officer becomes aware of the misconduct
[brief] On Appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Hudson County  DOCKET NO.: [...]  [...], J.S.C. Sat Below REPLY BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT, [...]  [...], ESQ. (ID # 011871979)  [...], ESQ. (ID #025922007)  [...]  [...] [...] [...] (FAX)  EMAILS: [...]  [...]  Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant  [...]  On the Brief: [...], Esq. [...], Esq.
[brief] “[U]ltimately, the admissibility of this thing, of this testimony, would be decided later, but I don’t see a basis under the court rule for not allowing the questions. ”  2T17:24-18:2.  [...] made clear that “I’m not deciding admissibility here.  […]  I’m deciding do they get to ask the questions and I don’t see Lavrik as saying they can’t ask the questions because”  Lavrik deals with admissibility, not discoverability.
[brief] [State v. Derry, 250 N.J. 611, 632-33 (2022) (quoting Torres, 183 N.J. at 567-68). ]  “Those requirements are construed liberally in light of Rule 702’s tilt in favor of the admissibility of expert testimony. ”  State v. Jenewicz, 193 N.J. 440, 454 (2008).  In addition to these requirements, “a court must ensure that the proffered expert does not offer a mere net opinion. ”  *Ibid.*  The net opinion rule, a corollary of *N.J.R.E.* 703, “forbids the admission into evidence of an expert’s conclusions that are not supported by factual evidence or other data. ”
[brief] On August 17, 2019, [...] returned to work and was in line up where he learned that there may have been a false posting alleging that [...] had some “involvement in [...]’s” attempted escape.  The posting was made on a members’ only Facebook web page entitled “[...]” to which a number of Corrections Officers belong.  [...] was given affirmative permission to address his colleagues at the end of the line up.  [...] interrogated [...] about the attempted escape.  [...], a close friend of [...], interrogated [...] with the goal of having him confess to inappropriate behavior which he refused to do.  [...]’s investigation was more akin to an inquisition wherein the accused must prove his innocence and not an unbiased fact finding investigation.
[brief] Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699 (1996) ("We therefore hold that as a general matter determinations of reasonable suspicion and probable cause should be reviewed de novo on appeal.")  The rule of deference is less compelling where, such as here, the municipal and Law Division judges made opposite findings.  State v. Singh, DOCKET NO. [...], 10 (App. Div. Nov. 1, 2018) ("The rule of deference is more compelling where, such as here, the municipal and Law Division judges made concurrent findings...  "Under the two-court rule, appellate courts ordinarily should not undertake to alter concurrent findings of facts and credibility determinations made by two lower courts absent a very obvious and exceptional showing of error.")  The 2-court rule has failed in my case because the judges made opposite determinations in the failure to maintain violation.  In addition, both judges errored in not changing the refusal violation from 39:4-50.2 to 39:4-50.4a.(Da la) (5T)  Finally, both judges errored when neither made any remarks regarding the 3 elements of the proper refusal statute 39:4-50.4a.(Da la)(5T)  This tells me and the courts that the 3 elements of refusal where never considered and that the determination to find me guilty of refusal was made solely on 39:4-50.2, which simply would be if the person refused or not.  *State v. Kuropchak, 221 N.J. 368, 389 (N.J. 2015)* ("An appellate court should engage in a "searching and critical" review of the record when it is faced with a trial court's admission of police-obtained statements to ensure protection of a defendant's constitutional rights."
[brief] (Aa19 – Aa21)  [...] is not a constituent of a consolidated school district.  Throughout the briefing by Respondents, and at the heart of the Commissioner’s decision on appeal, is their assertion that [...] and [...] were “consolidated” following the 2009 elimination of the non-operating [...] School District.  However, the term “consolidated school district” as used in N.J.S.A. 18A:13-47.11 is a term of art which refers to districts created and operated pursuant to N.J.S.A. 18A:8-25 et seq.  This is wholly separate from the statutory provisions which apply to districts created after the elimination of a formerly non-operating district.  See generally N.J.S.A. 18A:8-43 et seq.; N.J.S.A. 18A:13-1 et seq.  [...] School District is a single local school district, responsible for making the educational decisions for both [...] and [...] students.  State aid for [...] students is paid directly to [...], and [...] has at-large board seats available to either [...] or [...] residents.  It is one school district and one board of education.  The creation, supervision, and naming of consolidated school districts, as well as the apportionment of board membership and appropriations, tax levies, and redemption of bonds, for consolidated school districts are all governed by separate statutory articles than govern [...] precisely because [...], and by extension [...], is not a consolidated school district as contemplated by N.J.S.A. 18A:13-47.11.