ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] “When reviewing a motion to dismiss on the pleadings, [the Court] must give the plaintiff the benefit of ‘every reasonable inference of fact’ and read the complaint in the light most favorable to plaintiff. ”  Jenkins v. Region Nine Hous. Corp., 306 N.J. Super. 258, 260 (App. Div. 1997) (quoting Printing Mart-Morristown v. Sharp Electronics, Inc., 116 N.J. 739, 746 (1989)).  Moreover, on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, the Court must accord a plaintiff a meticulous and indulgent exam.  Cusseaux v. Picket, 279 N.J. Super. 335, 338 (App. Div. 1994).  A motion made under Rule 4:6-2(e) is based on the pleadings themselves.  Sellers v. Schonfeld, 270 N.J. Super. 424 (App. Div. 1993).  In reviewing a complaint under R. 4:6-2(e), a Court’s inquiry is limited to examining the legal sufficiency of the facts alleged on the face of the complaint.  *Reider v. State Dep’t of Transp.*, 221 N.J. Super. 547, 552 (App. Div. 1987).  A complaint should not be dismissed under this rule where a cause of action is suggested by the facts and a theory of actionability may be articulated by way of amendment.  *Printing Mart*, 116 N.J. at 746.  At this preliminary stage of the litigation, the Court is concerned merely whether a cause of action is “suggested” by the facts alleged.  *Leon v. Rite Aid Corp.*, 340 N.J. Super. 462, 466 (App. Div. 2001)  “If a generous reading of the allegations merely suggests a cause of action, the complaint will withstand the motion. ”  *F.G. v. MacDonell*, 150 N.J. 550, 556 (1997).  If the complaint states no basis for relief and discovery would not provide one, dismissal of the complaint is appropriate.  *Camden County Energy Recovery Assocs.*, L.P. v. N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 320 N.J. Super. 59, 64 (1999), aff’d *Camden County*, 170 N.J. 246 (2001).  Ordinarily, as the lower court acknowledged, if a complaint is not sufficiently specific, a dismissal under Rule 4:6-2(e) should be without prejudice with an opportunity for leave to amend.  [11/17/23 Transcript of Motion (“Tr.”), 12:25-13:3.]  With great respect to the lower court, for the reasons set forth herein, the lower court should be overturned on the dismissal of Plaintiffs’ complaint with prejudice and remand the matter back to the lower court to allow Plaintiffs to engage in discovery to prove their claims.
[brief] 15.  Representatives of the Respondent [...] filed an Answer to the subject Trial Court Complaint.  16.  Representative of the Respondent [...] also filed an Answer to the Trial Court Complaint.  17.  The Trial Court Trial occurred, before the Honorable [...], J.S.C., on or about February 27, 2023.  18.  The Trial Court issued a Final Order and accompanying Opinion, dated on or about February 28, 2023.  19.  The Trial Court Decision essentially a) affirmed the relevant actions of the [...] and b) affirmed the action of the Respondent [...] (relative to Amendment No. 2 to the Redevelopment Plan) and c) denied the Plaintiff’s / Appellant’s requested relief.  20.  Representatives of the Plaintiff / Appellant have now filed the within Appeal to the Appellate Court.
[brief] After the evidence has been presented at such a trial, the court should issue carefully-crafted jury instructions, addressing the pivotal factual issues that the jury must decide.  The verdict form will likewise need to be carefully designed, so as to only have the jurors address the question of the employer's potential fault when it is absolutely necessary to do so.  For example, the jury must be instructed that they should only consider the employer’s negligence if they first determine that the conduct of the defendant seeking indemnity is not the sole cause of the accident.  Jurors will be presumed to follow such instructions faithfully.  See Belmont Condo. Ass’n, Inc. v. Geibel, 432 N.J. Super. 52, 97 (App. Div. 2013).  In this way, the unified trial process will not subvert the policies and objectives underpinning the exclusive remedy provision of the WCA.  This unitary fact-finding model avoids discordant results and may conserve the resources of the parties and the court.
[brief] ”  Cole, Shotz, Berstein, Meisel & Forman, P.A. v., Owens, 292 N.J. Super. 453, 461 (App. Div. 1996).  In this matter, [...] never represented [...] in this legal malpractice matter against [...], and therefore, his agreement is not an Attorney Charging Lien, but merely an assignment of [...]’s rights to this legal malpractice action.
[brief] [Appeal of failure to exhaust administrative remedies issues]  (Argued at Pa373 – Pa374)  Courts have held that the existence of administrative remedies obviates the need for a private right to a cause of action to sue in Superior Court.  Courts therefore require the exhaustion of administrative remedies to prevent circumvention of procedures to redress alleged violations against public entities.  Administrative remedies before the Commissioner of Education existed for [...] to seek redress of the Board’s alleged violations of N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-9(e)(3).  Thus, the existence of the administrative remedies obviates the need for a private right to a cause of action, and [...] is legally prohibited from suing the Board in Superior Court for violations of N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-9(e)(3) without having exhausted its administrative remedies.  Thus, the court committed legal error when it granted the Counterclaim without [...] exhausting its administrative remedies.  POINT FIVE
[brief] The Honeywell Decision Is Directly On Point and Explains Why [...] Cannot be a Successful Claimant (Pa0050-51).  This Court has addressed the “successful claimant” issue in a context that is very similar to this case.  In Continental Insurance Company v. Honeywell International, Inc., 2016 WL 3909530 (App. Div. July 20, 2016), aff’d, 234 N.J. 23 (2018), this Court affirmed the trial court’s complete denial of fees because, as is the case here, “[the insured] was successful on certain issues and [the insurance carriers] were successful on other issues. ”  Id. at *22.  Honeywell, like the present case, was a complex insurance case with a lengthy procedural history, multiple substantive rulings, and a variety of novel legal issues that had not yet been addressed by New Jersey’s courts.  The court found that the insured’s varying level of success on the numerous issues presented in the case did not render it a successful claimant entitled to fees.  *Id.* at *21-22.  The trial court in this case concluded that this case is distinguishable from *Honeywell*, despite the fact that *Honeywell* is entirely on point with the facts of this case.
[brief] The Trial Court Found that the Defendants Violated the Respondents’ Civil Rights under the Federal and New Jersey Civil Rights Acts and Therefore Damages are Warranted  The unlawful actions taken by the Defendants amount to a violation of the Federal Civil Rights Act ("FCRA"), 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the New Jersey Civil Rights Act ("NJCRA"), N.J.S.A. 10:6-1 et seq.  It is clear that the Defendant Mayor took numerous actions designed to interfere with the Zoning Board’s processing of Plaintiffs’ Application, including a publicity campaign designed to intimidate the Zoning Board members into bending to the Mayor’s will, and generating public opposition to the Amended Application.  It is also clear that the Zoning Board unlawfully denied Plaintiffs’ Amended Application, with both the Mayor and a Zoning Board member making plain that they acted to thwart Plaintiffs’ inclusionary development because they were hostile to the Mount Laurel doctrine.  As noted above when discussing the merits, Zoning Board are independent, quasi-judicial bodies, created by statute, and it is a violation of the statutes and constitutional precepts to interfere with the independence of a Zoning Board.  See {12200984; 2} e.g., *Dolan v. DeCapua*, supra, 16 N.J. at 612; *Diller*, supra, 246 N.J. Super. at 367–68; *Paruszewski*, supra, 154 N.J. at 53–54.
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[brief] On October 3, 2023, plaintiff filed a motion for the entry of an Order (pursuant to Rules 1:1-2, 1:4-8(a), 1:6-5, 1:7-4, 1:13-1, 4:5-3, 4:9-2, 4:9-3, 4:9-4, 4:49-2, 4:50-1(b), (c) and (f), the Judiciary’s Mission Statement\(^4\) and the court’s --- \(^4\) “We are an independent branch of government constitutionally entrusted with the fair and just resolution of disputes in order to preserve the rule of law and to inherent equitable powers) reconsidering, altering, amending and vacating the September 22, 2023 Pre-Discovery Final Summary Judgment  Dismissal in favor of all defendants and granting such other further relief as the trial court deemed just and equitable.  (Pa350).  Plaintiff sought entry of an amending and superseding Order:  (1)  Dismissing Count One on the grounds of mootness.  (2)  Granting Summary Judgment in favor of all defendants on all Counts Two to Five claims or causes of actions arising from or relating to the June 15, 2021 capital bond ordinance and statements made by defendants about plaintiff on June 15, 2021.  (3)  Due to post commencement curative actions taken by defendants, dismissing all Counts Two to Five CY 2021 claims or causes of actions arising from or relating to defendants denying plaintiff his right to be heard on all non-ordinance agenda action items prior to consideration and official action on the grounds of mootness.  (4)  Explicitly stating and clarifying that the trial court did not consider or rule on the procedural due process and [...] validity of the July 30, 2021 fair share housing settlement under State law.  Defendants and the reconstituted CY 2024 TC rejected plaintiff’s proposal.  On March 5, 2024, the trial court declined to “squeeze Justice out of the Law. ” (Pa82; 3T).  On March 5, 2024, the trial court denied plaintiff’s motion.  But on ______________________ protect the rights and liberties guaranteed by the Constitution and laws of the United States and this State. ”e March 5, 2024, the trial court acknowledged that plaintiff had effected change restoring his right to be heard on all posted agenda action items prior to consideration and official action.  Also on March 5, 2024, plaintiff caused the trial court to rule on his post final judgment Rule 4:50-1(b), (c) and (f) alteration, amendment and vacation arguments.  (3T, 88, ln 8-95, ln 2).  **The Instant Appeal**
[brief] The [...] identified six factors that played a part in its Recommendation to award to [...]:  a.  No archaeologist or archaeology practice is required to register under the PWCRA.  b.  Of the five bids received, four of them named a proposed archaeology subcontractor that was not registered under the PWCRA.  c.  The reasonable meaning of “registered archaeologist” is an archaeologist that is registered with the Register of Professional Archaeologists, a nationally-renown professional organization.  See rpanet.org.  d.  It is believed that a large construction entity that has among its various departments an archaeology practice (e.g., [...]—the Appellant’s proposed “archaeologist”), might be able to apply for and register under the PWCRA, but that does not make the entire entity, or the archaeology section thereof, a “registered archaeologist” under the PWCRA.  e.  Any “defect” here was not the result of an error or omission by [...] or failure by [...] to construe the true intent of the [...]’s bid instructions.  f.  The difference in cost between retaining an archeologist from a PWCRA-registered construction entity versus an archaeologist without this registration is probably negligible and would not have given [...] an advantage in bidding over [...].  See 0274a-0277a, 0010a.  These factors, and other points, are explored below in greater detail.
[brief] Prior to entering the crossing, [...] never looked to see if a train was coming on Track 1.  Compare Pa162, ¶67 with Pa764, ¶67; Pa257-299 (stills from the head end camera); Pa582:14-19; Pa1152 at 16:33:28 to 16:33:35.  Moreover,  At the time [...] stepped onto the crossing: - Train 81 had the proceed signal and the right of way to enter and pass through the crossing; T8:4-9:1; - the pedestrian signal was indicating that she was not permitted to enter the crossing, and she did not have the right of way; \textit{Ibid.}; - the traffic light for vehicles on [...] was red, indicating that they could not enter the crossing, and a car was stopped at the traffic light on the same side of the crossing as her; Compare Pa162, ¶¶69 and 70 with Pa764, ¶¶69 and 70; Pa257-299; Pa344, 349, 354, 361 at ¶9, and 362 at ¶13; Pa679:16-683:5; and Pa1152 at 16:33:28 to 16:33:35; and - another [...] train travelling in the opposite direction on Track 2 had just left the [...] and was blocking her path across the crossing; Compare Pa163, ¶71 with Pa764, ¶71; Pa214-256; Pa257-299; Pa342-343; Pa1152 at 16:33:28 to 16:33:35; Da51 at 4:33:10 to 4:33:14 (video from security camera).
[brief] Upon the filing of a motion for the hearing of an objection pursuant to R. 4:65-5, the right of redemption is expanded beyond the rule’s 10-day period until the entry of an order confirming the sale.  Id. at 513.  Courts have the inherent equitable power to determine the correct redemption amount.  See Morsemere Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n. v. Nicolaou, 206 N.J. Super. 637, 645 (App. Div. 1986); Little Falls Sav. and Loan Ass’n. v. Chas. O. Holmberg & Sons, Inc., 165 N.J. Super. 93, 95 (Ch. Div. 1978).  N.J.S.A. 2A:17-34 mandates that sheriffs’ published notices and advertisements “shall state the approximate amount of [plaintiff’s] judgment.
[brief] On February 3, 2023, Plaintiff filed his Class Action Complaint in the Superior Court.  Pa1.  On April 3, 2023, Defendant filed its motion to dismiss the Complaint pursuant to R. 4:6-2(e).  Pa209.  On May 31, 2023, the motion court filed its Order dismissing the Complaint without prejudice for the reasons attached to the Order dismissing the Complaint.  Pa27.  Plaintiff appeals that Order.  STATEMENT OF FACTS
[brief] See State v. Olivero, 221 N.J. 632, 639 (2015)), certif. denied, 224 N.J. 528 (2016).  [...] argues in its opposition brief that it did not exceed the eighteen (18) feet of the existing residential dwelling, and by raising the grade on the eastern portion of the property, [...] “effectively flattened most of the property where development was going to occur.  That is certainly not a mound. ”  This logic is defective on two fronts.  First, the building height is measured from the highest point of a building as the definition does not provide for the ability to substitute the original lot grade of one building for another.  Secondly, [...] continues to focus solely on the word(s) mound(ing), ignoring the fact that the Building Height definition includes the words “terracing, or other devices”.  The trial court did not address whether the revised lot grade included terracing or other devices resulting in plain error as indicated above.  Furthermore, [...]’s footnote 2 of its opposition brief stating that the [...] did not have any multifamily residential zones prior to the [...] Settlement is misleading and inaccurate.  Notwithstanding that this information was not provided on the record below and irrelevant to the issue in this case, the developments [...] refers to on [...] and [...] which are multifamily zones, are developments with more dwelling units than buildings, i.e. eighteen (18) units in nine (9) buildings at Bingham and fourteen (14) units in six (6) buildings at [...].  There are at least two other developments dating back to 1986 and 2010 in the [...] where there are multiple dwelling units per building, which is what the [...] development is doing.  There are no mounding, terracing or other devices raising the elevation of the buildings on these two pre-existing developments as is proposed at the [...] development.  Regardless, the Appellate Division cannot consider this information presented by [...] since there was no factual record of the [...] not having any multifamily residential zones in the record below.
[brief] TABLE OF CONTENTS | SECTION | PAGE | |------------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | PRELIMINARY STATEMENT | 1 | | STATEMENT OF FACTS | | | A. The Parties | 4 | | B. History of the [...], 2004-2019 | 4 | | C. Modification of the County Agreement | 7 | | D.  First Attempt at the 2022 Amendment to the Redevelopment Plan | 8 | | E. 2022  Adoption of amendment to the Redevelopment Plan | 9 | | PROCEDURAL HISTORY | 18 | | STANDARD OF REVIEW | 19 | | LEGAL ARGUMENT | 23 | | POINT I | 24 | |
[brief] (1)  “We start with the well-established tenet that our courts adhere to the American rule that litigants bear their own fees unless otherwise provided by court rule, statute, or contract. ”  (Da250); (2)  The “only arguable basis for an award in this matter rests with Rule 4:42-9(a)(2), which authorizes an award of fees to a litigant from a ‘fund in court’. ”  (Da251); (3)  “The Supreme Court has cautioned that ‘trial courts should not accept passively the submissions of counsel to support the lodestar amount’ but should instead inquire as to what a reasonable amount of time expended should have been, as opposed to the hours actually expended by counsel. ”  (Da258); (4)  “The judge fixed plaintiff’s fee by adopting a date suggested by the administrator as the moment when plaintiff ceased providing a benefit to the estate and then adopting a dollar amount in the most conclusory of fashions by rigidly utilizing that date as the cut-off without analyzing the reasonableness of the various services occurring within that time frame. ”  (Da259); (5)  The Court cited the Administrator’s finding of Plaintiff’s obstinate nature and that there was no evidence of any transfers over and above the initial $900,000.  The Court observed that: “plaintiff could have inquired into these matters himself before he moved for summary judgment in 2014. ”  (Da242; and (6)  The Court instructed that, “Because the rule does not permit an award of fees for services that did not benefit the estate, 7A Clapp & Black, § 1547, at 97, the judge should focus on those steps taken by plaintiff that actually benefited the estate....”
[directive] See 1.0.6  County and municipal law enforcement agencies must also recognize that they conduct internal affairs investigations, particularly those that involve allegations of criminal conduct, under the direct supervision of the County Prosecutors.  County and municipal law enforcement agencies must inform the appropriate County Prosecutor when allegations of police misconduct involve potential criminal conduct.  In addition, county and municipal law enforcement agencies must confer with and follow the instructions given by the County Prosecutor at all critical points in the investigative process.  This is particularly true when the agency is in the process of gathering evidence, including the taking of statements, concerning allegations of criminal conduct.  References to County Prosecutors throughout this document should also be understood to refer to the Office of the Attorney General appropriate, such as when the Attorney wherever such an interpretation would be General has superseded the County Prosecutor or the law enforcement agency.  1.0.9
[brief] ”  (Ordinance 1535-16 §6a).  Therefore, the Borough submits that, even a determination of site suitability would not be sufficient to permit the development of [...] that [...] is requesting.  Rather, what the appeal actually seeks is, as set forth in the Borough’s brief herein, the Court disregard and usurp the following from the Borough: · Authority to adopt Ordinances pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40A:6-6; · Authority of the governing body to Zone pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40:55D-62; · Authority to designate areas in need of redevelopment pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40A:12a-1 to 89; · Authority to enter Redevelopment Agreements pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40A:12a-1 to 89; and, · Authority of local land use board to hear and approve site plan applications pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40:55D-25.  Lastly, [...]’s application for a “use” zoning variance before the Borough’s Land Use Board is a breach of contract pursuant to Article 12.
[brief] CONCLUSION  For all these reasons, the provisions of the March 15, 2024 Order of the trial court granting reformation of the Redevelopment Agreement and Operating Agreement and ordering payment by the Authority to [...] in the amount of $499,007.77 in retroactive fees as a result of said reformation, respectfully, must be reversed.  /s/ [...]  [...] (018292011)  [...]  75 Livingston Avenue Roseland, New Jersey  07068 [...] [...]  Attorneys for Defendant, [...]
[brief] THERE WAS NO ABUSE OF DISCRETION; THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY EXCLUDED SUBMISSION OF THE DIAGRAM ON THE POLICE REPORT  The standard for appellate review of evidentiary rulings is set forth above.  In the case at hand, [...] correctly excluded the submission of the diagram of the accident contained in the police report.  In ruling that the diagram would not be admitted into evidence, [...] reasoned that the diagram showed the Appellee [...] vehicle moving while it appeared that [...] testified that he was stopped 3T:101-20 to 25; 3T:102-1 to 4; That the officer did not observe the accident and does not know how far the vehicles were or were not from the intersection before the impact 3T:102-15 to 23; that the diagram showing the path of travel of the vehicles up until the point of impact was not based on anything the police officer observed or had knowledge of; 3T:103-4 to 8 and that the diagram is not an accurate depiction of what the officer observed and that will confuse the jury; 3T:105-8 to 23.  This well-reasoned decision was within the trial Judge’s sound discretion and there simply is no evidence of any abuse of discretion.  CONCLUSION