ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] (Appx 526 at ¶27) (admitting she understood her plea to be a criminal conviction); (Appx 528-29 at ¶37; Appx 526 at ¶27) (admitting she understood her plea to be a criminal conviction).  In fact, defense counsel asked Plaintiff at her deposition whether she would answer “yes” if an employer asked whether she had any convictions, and Plaintiff responded she would answer “yes. ”  (Appx 116 at 74:11-14) (“you would have said ‘yes, I have a conviction’?” “Yes”); (Appx 116 at 74:21-75:10) (stating if an employer asked if she had convictions she would have said yes because that is the truth); (Appx 113 at 63:25-64:3) (admitting she had a conviction for heroin); (50:17-19) (admitting she had been convicted of a crime); (Appx 110 at 51:1-4) (same); (Appx 110 at 50:20-24) (same); (Appx 113 at 63:25-64:3) (same).  During her deposition, Plaintiff was asked her over and over as to why she answered as she did to the application questions relating to her criminal history, and not once did Plaintiff claim it was because she did not know she had a conviction.  See id.  Plaintiff’s testimony clearly shows she fully understood what Defendant’s application asked of her and she chose to lie in her responses, concealing her prior disqualifying convictions.
[brief] 2  References are as follows:  Sa refers to the State’s Appendix to this Brief.  1T refers to Transcript of Recovery Court Appeal Hearing dated September 25, 2023.  2T refers to Transcript of Recovery Court Appeal Hearing dated December 4, 2023.  driver’s seat of the BMW and in possession of one of the stolen key fobs was the defendant, who was arrested and charged with Third Degree Receiving Stolen Property on Essex County Complaint-Warrant [...].  (Sa18; Sa41).  Defendant was subsequently released on his own recognizance.  On January 19, 2022, the defendant was arrested in Newark on unrelated charges.  (Sa42-Sa43).  Members of the [...] responded to the [...] and transported the defendant to the [...] to be processed and served with a Complaint-Warrant for charges stemming from the August 6, 2021, incident.  (Sa43).  During processing, the defendant advised he wanted to speak with law enforcement and a recorded interview was conducted.  Ibid.  A stem-to-stern interview was conducted with the defendant after he was advised of and waived his Miranda rights.  Ibid.  During the interview, the defendant admitted to traveling to [...] with other masked individuals and participating in the theft and burglary, including stealing the BMW he was found in possession of thirteen days later in Newark, New Jersey.
[brief] In its brief, [...] admits that “parking lot accidents are a foreseeable fact of life. ”  See [...] brief, Db42.  [...]’s admission regarding knowledge of the risks posed by its parking lot further confirms that a reasonable jury could conclude that [...] was “substantially certain” that injuries would result when it allowed an entire area of its expansive parking lot to have no pedestrian safety or traffic control features at all, in contrast to the abundant crosswalks, markings, and signage that [...] used to protect its own management and physicians in another area of the same parking lot.
[brief] CRIMINAL ACTION ON APPEAL FROM A FINAL JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY, LAW DIVISION (CRIMINAL), MONMOUTH COUNTY  SAT BELOW: Honorable [...], J.S.C., and a Jury  BRIEF AND APPENDIX ON BEHALF OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY  [...]  [...] [...] [...]  [...], 003621987 Of Counsel and On the Brief email: [...] [...], 041202006  Assistant Prosecutor Director Appellate Section On the Brief email: [...] www.mcponj.org TABLE OF CONTENTS Page TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .................................................................................. v COUNTERSTATEMENT OF PROCEDURAL HISTORY ........................................... 1 COUNTERSTATEMENT OF FACTS ..................................................................... 2 LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I THE LOWER COURT PROPERLY DENIED DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO SUPPRESS HIS STATEMENT ......................................................................................... 16 POINT II DEFENDANT’S JURY WAS LAWFULLY EMPANELED .............................................................................................................. 38 POINT III THERE WAS NO PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT AT DEFENDANT’S TRIAL ....................... 45 A. State’s reference on opening to the indicted crimes of murder ......................................................................................... 46 B. State’s questioning of [...] on direct examination ....................................................................................
[brief] *Id.* at 441.  The Court reasoned that at no time prior to the officer’s questions was defendant “subjected to restraints comparable to those associated with a formal arrest” or “informed that his detention would not be temporary. ”  *Id.* at 441-42.  The Court additionally emphasized the “short period” between the stop and defendant’s eventual arrest.  *Id.* at 441.  Of course, that is not to say that *Miranda* warnings are never required following an automobile stop.
[brief] On July 24, 2023, defendant filed a Notice of Motion to Suppress the statement he made to law enforcement.  (Pa3).  On August 6, 2024, the parties appeared before the Honorable [...], J.S.C., for an evidentiary hearing on defendant’s motion.  (1T).  The motion was continued on August 8, 2024.  (2T).  On August 14, 2024, the court granted defendant’s motion.  (Pa4 to 25).  This Motion for Leave to Appeal follows.
[brief] .............................................................................  24  Fenyak v. St. Peter’s Univ. Hosp., No. A-2014-21, 2024 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 115 (App. Div. Jan. 25, 2024)  ...................................................................... 25-26  Fernandez v. Costco Wholesale Corp., No. A-6466-06T1, 2009 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 46 (App. Div. Jan. 8, 2009)
[brief] Unfortunately, as represented by the recent letter sent by plaintiff to the Administrator (Exhibit N to the Supplemental Certification filed herein) it appears that plaintiff has different goals for this ancillary probate proceeding that do not align with the goals of “compromise,” “fairness,” or “finality. ”  Rather, plaintiff’s mantra to the Administrator and the court seems to be “keep on searching…without consideration to the expense to the Estate, until you reach a conclusion that I find acceptable.  When I agree with your conclusions, I may speak with you about resolving the identified issues. ”  Appellate Division Decision, March 23, 2021, Da229 at 242-243.  In addition, the Administrator told the court that Plaintiff appeared to want to turn this ancillary proceeding into a “never-ending circular chase to prove a construct/thesis of his own creation so that he can continue to strategically exert pressure on his family and stepmother in the probate proceedings pending in the Republic of Korea”; and that “plaintiff failed to take into consideration the substantial costs the estate would incur if the investigation were to continue.
[brief] In its July 15, 2022 decision, this Panel made clear:  “We address the issue solely in the context of whether the habeas petition, along with the testimony of [...], the affidavits referenced in [...] IV, and now the testimony of [...] combine to meet the standards justifying a new trial based on newly discovered evidence. ”  Mr. [...]’s brief indicates his intention to ‘file a [future] separate PCR related to’ the State’s alleged violation of its obligation to turn over exculpatory evidence prior to defendant’s trial.’  See, e.g., State v. Nash, 212 N.J. 518, 544 (2013) (explaining prosecutor’s obligation to produce exculpatory information, including impeachment evidence, to defendant). ”  Because the standard for a new trial based on the State’s violation of its obligation to turn over exculpatory evidence prior to trial is different from the standard for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence, the prior rulings by the PCR Court and this Court do not preclude the Court from granting the relief now sought.
[brief] Now, to the nature and the strength of that claim, I also believe those fall under the nature and strength of my claim and my reasons of why I pled guilty and why I feel I have grounds under State v. Slater.  Not only that, when the State says under the fourth prong of if it would hamper the State's case, reading from what I actually wrote, the passage of time has not and cannot hamper the State's ability to present important evidence.
[brief] POINT I DEFENDANT WAS DENIED A FAIR TRIAL WHEN THE PROSECUTOR, APPARENTLY WITHOUT ANY NOTICE TO DEFENSE COUNSEL, ASKED PORSHA WILLIAMS TO IDENTIFY DEFENDANT IN COURT, EVEN THOUGH SHE HAD SELECTED ANOTHER MAN'S PHOTO IN A PRETRIAL PHOTO LINEUP.  THE ERROR WAS EXACERBATED BY THE TRIAL COURT'S FAILURE TO GIVE A MEANINGFUL CORRECTIVE INSTRUCTION.
[brief] ” (Pa22-23).  In his report, [...] lumps all defendants together and never specifically addresses or analyzes their distinct contractual roles on the Project, their individual professional duties, or the individual professional standards that they allegedly failed to maintain.  (Pa157-58).  He never inspected the 2” change in grade that he claims to have been a dangerous condition.  (Pa89 at T64:13 – Pa90 at T65:10).  Rather, he just assumes that it existed on the day of the accident.  He bases his assumption primarily on a bridge inspection report that was prepared for [...] in April of 2015 by non-party [...] (“Arora Report”).  This report was not provided to [...] until after [...] was added to this litigation.  The Arora Report is ambiguous at best, and [...]’s reliance on it proves, to the extent there was any dangerous condition, it was a pre-existing condition already known to the [...].  In other words, the condition that [...] describes did not arise during construction and was not something [...] would have known about during the course of its performance on the Project.  Mr. [...] admitted the same during his deposition.  (Pa341 at T103:18 – Pa342 at T104:12 (Mr. [...] explaining that the engineers on the project had a “proactive responsibility” to identify “pre-existing conditions” not related to construction)).  Noticeably missing from Plaintiffs’ Expert Report is any explanation of [...]’s role on the Project and any citation to a written standard or generally accepted practice in the engineering industry.
[brief] In direct contradiction to the sworn testimony of the [...]’s attorney and engineer and Plaintiff’s expert, one of Defendant’s experts, [...], testified unconvincingly and incredibly that as of 2012, there was no legal curb cut on the Sixth Street Lot and no such curb cut was present in the 1993 Site Plan.  (9T 68:20-69:12)  Defendant’s second expert, [...], testified there was nothing on the 1972 Site Plan explicitly permitting parking on the Sixth Street Lot but admitted that the absence of the word “parking” on a site plan “doesn’t meant it’s specifically excluded.
[brief] The ignored the plain language of Board Policy 0174 that authorizes Appellant as Board President to request the Board Attorney to investigate ethics violations committed by [...] during the election.  Sg048-Sg050.  The Agency’s subsection (e) finding is unsustainable without relying on its flawed and unreasonable conclusion that Appellant’s and [...]’s prior contentious political relationship caused, at least in part, Appellant’s investigation request.
[brief] On December 23, 2022, the court entered an Order Granting the Appellees Cross Motion for Summary Judgment, dismissing the Appellants Complaint against [...]; [...], and [...] in its entirety and with prejudice.  AA088.1 XXVIII.  On January 11, 2023, Appellant filed a Motion to Reconsider the December 23, 2022, Order. XXIX.  On January 26, 2023, Appellee filed an Opposition to the Motion.  XXX.  On February 02, 2023, Appellant filed a Reply Brief.  1 December 16, 2022 Hearing, 1T: Motion for Summary Judgment and Cross Motion for Summary Judgment  XXXI.  On February 03, 2023, the court entered an Order Denying the Appellants Motion to Reconsider the December 23, 2023, Order. AA110.\(^2\) XXXII.
[brief] ”  Appellant’s Br., at 16.  However, by law, even where the statutory language is “plain,” courts decline to apply the “plain” meaning where it is either at odds with Congress’s intent or would lead to absurd results.  *Pub. Citizen*, at 455 (“Looking beyond the naked text for guidance is perfectly proper when the result it apparently decrees . . . seems inconsistent with Congress’ intention, since the plain-meaning rule is ‘rather an axiom of experience than a rule of law, and does not preclude consideration of persuasive evidence if it exists. ’”).  Under such circumstances, a court should decline to apply the literal interpretation of the statute and presume “the legislature intended exceptions to its language [that] would avoid results of this character. ”  *Id.*  See also *Nicholas v. Mynster*, 213 N.J. at 480 (rejecting a statute’s “plain” meaning and resorting to extrinsic evidence, such as legislative history, “if a plain reading of the statute leads to an absurd result or if the overall statutory scheme is at odds with the plain language. ”); *Matter of C.P.M.*, 461 N.J. Super. at 582–83 (statute should not be construed with plain meaning if it would yield an absurd result.); *Bergen County PBA Loc. 134 v. Donovan*, 436 N.J. Super. 187, 197 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 2014) (courts should consider extrinsic evidence (*e.g.* legislative history) if “a plain reading of the statute leads to an absurd result or if the overall statutory scheme is at odds with the plain language. ” [quoting *DiProspero*]).  With these principles in mind, it is clear for many reasons that the Superior Court correctly found that Appellant’s suggested plain reading of the statute – whereby the FDCPA would outlaw the use of a letter vendor – must be set aside as a matter of law.
[brief] In \textit{Jones}, the defendant filed a brief in accordance with \textit{Rule} 3:5-7(b), which offered a starkly contrasting version of events than that proffered by the State.  The brief also asserted that defendant was entitled to a rebuttable presumption pursuant to \textit{N.J.S.A.}  40A:14-118.5(q).  Among other disputed \textsuperscript{10}  To the extent that defendant intimates in his preliminary statement that [...] wrongly turned the body-camera audio off while speaking with other officers, the State notes that the procedure is permissible.  See \textit{N.J.S.A.}  40A:14-118.5(c)(2)(c).  factual contentions, the defendant asserted that the body-worn camera worn by one of the officers, which the State conceded could not be located, would have shown that the officer did not see a gun in plain view through the car windshield and that the officer only saw the gun once he ordered defendant out of the car and searched his person.  *Id.* at 525.  Despite these contrasting proffers as to the facts and the missing body camera footage, the trial court denied the defendant’s motion to suppress without conducting an evidentiary hearing.
[brief] The Committee Was Not Required To State Its “Reasons” In The Meeting Minutes and Did Not Err in the Manner it Amended the Redevelopment Plan  As a final set of procedural claims, Appellant argues the Committee violated a “duty” to state its “reasons” in both the Redevelopment Plan and its meeting minutes.  Pa23.  Appellant again misstates the applicable law.  The “reasons” are set forth in the Redevelopment Plan, as amended by Ordinance 2022-17, and were also read into the record at the October 27, 2022 meeting.  2T87-93.  “Reasons” are required to be recorded in the meeting minutes only when the governing body has decided not to follow the recommendation of the Planning Board.  N.J.S.A. 40A:12-7.e.  Here, the Committee followed the Planning Board’s recommendation.  The “reasons” were not included in the Redevelopment Plan based on any rejection of or disagreement with the Planning Board’s recommendation.  Accordingly, the Committee had no duty to also state the “reasons” in the meeting minutes.  Appellant also maintains that the Committee failed to properly amend Ordinance 2022-15 because Ordinance 2022-17 differed in the manner in which changes to the Redevelopment Plan were implemented.
[brief] See Graziano v. Grant, 326 N.J. Super. 328, 349 (App. Div. 1999).  In Graziano, an appeal was taken from a Chancery Division action involving specific performance by a physician in a medical practice following the court’s grant of summary judgment.  The Appellate Division found certain questions of fact should have precluded summary judgment and therefore remanded the matter for an evidentiary hearing.  Regarding the remand, the Appellate Division specifically noted that although it had authority to assign the case to a different judge, such authority should be sparingly exercised, and the case did not call for the assignment of the matter to another judge who would have to become acquainted with the matter.  The within matter was initiated over seven (7) years before the remand and has been before three (3) Chancery judges during its history.  There have been multiple pre-trial motions and proceedings, a full trial, and post-trial proceedings all before [...].  Given the absence of a showing of bias or prejudice or any other basis for recusal, there is no question it would have been counterproductive to require a new judge to handle this matter.  Defendant failed to demonstrate any objectively reasonable basis requiring [...] to recuse himself or be otherwise disqualified from hearing any proceedings on remand from the Appellate Division.
[brief] (Da24-27)  This indictment charged him with first-degree murder-for-hire, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a) (count 1); first-degree conspiracy to commit murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)/N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2 (count 2); second-degree unlawful possession of a handgun (9mm Ruger), N.J.S.A. 2C:39-59(b)(1) (count 3); second-degree possession of a firearm (9mm Ruger) for an unlawful purpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(a) (Count 4); and second-degree possession of a weapon by a certain person, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-7(b) (Count 5).  (Da24-27)  The State moved before the Honorable [...], J.S.C., to admit Defendant’s two statements recorded at the police station: March 6, 2018 (Da138-152) and March 12, 2018 (Da153-399).  The Court reviewed the statements and heard testimony on February 27, March 3, and March 5, 2022.  (13T; 14T; 21T)  The Court entered an order admitting the March 6 statement in full, admitting the first half of the March 12 statement, and suppressing the second half of the March 12 statement after Defendant invoked his right to silence halfway through this statement.  (21T50-23 to 61-17; Da128-130)  The State tried Defendant by himself on [...], commencing before [...] on March 11, 2020.
[brief] Under either a breach of contract or violation of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing claim, the traditional remedy is an award of expectation damages "is to put the injured party in as good a position as if performance had been rendered."  Therefore, clearly, the TCA, predicated as it is on tort damages for personal injury type claims, doesn’t apply to this contract case.  This case also involves a promissory estoppel claim – another claim aligned with contract claims as shown by the grouping of that claim with the other contract Model Civil Jury charges.  Promissory estoppel is well established in New Jersey.  The allegations that plaintiff was promised uncontaminated water and didn’t receive it meet the requirements for a promissory estoppel claim.  The Supreme Court rejects the view that, in the absence of an unwritten contract and in the face of a comprehensive statutory scheme, a promissory estoppel claim is untenable:  "Key to defendant’s argument that plaintiff may not bring an action based on an unwritten contract is the present Securities Law, New Jersey's 'comprehensive statutory scheme of securities regulation and investor protection.'"  57 Goldfarb v. Solimine, 245 N.J. 326 (2021)(citation omitted).  See also Model Civil Jury Charge 8.45.  58 Pop's Cones, Inc. v. Resorts Intern. Hotel, Inc., 307 N.J. Super. 461 (App. Div. 1998).  59 Model Civil Jury Charge 410K (citations omitted).  60 Goldfarb v. Solimine, 245 N.J. 326 (2021)(citation omitted).  sums paid to defendant:  "If a promisee proves those elements of a promissory estoppel claim, the promisee may be awarded reliance damages so as to restore him or her to the position he or she was in before the parties met."  Therefore, the TCA doesn’t apply to the promissory estoppel claim.  Per our Supreme Court, a municipality’s sale of water to its residents is an issue of contract:
[brief] See Ace-Manzo, Inc. v. Tp. of Neptune, 258 N.J. Super. 129, 132–38 (Law. Div. 1992) (“The competitive advantage that inheres in such a situation is obvious, for it would give such a bidder the option of waiting until it has had the benefit of knowing the other bidders’ prices before deciding whether to sign and be bound or not sign and walk away. ”) (emphasis added).  That same advantage could have been used by [...] to submit a lower bid knowing it would have the opportunity to walk away if it ultimately decided not to perform or that another project would be more lucrative.  We hasten to reiterate that [...] provided its supplementation twenty-one (21) days after bid opening and thirteen (13) days after its bid was rejected.  That was plenty of time for [...] to reevaluate its bid on the Project, wait for other bid openings, or otherwise consider whether it still made business sense to proceed with the Project.
[brief] •  Being caught in recorded “voicemail messages and lengthy phone conversations” about opening an Autoclear Jordanian bank account after control had been transferred, (Da2005-2006), with [...] having sent “a $59,500 check from the company” dated February 6, 2016—after the award had been confirmed and two days before the stay was lifted—as “an advance in salary” to the employee whom he planned to have set up the bank account (Ibid).
[brief] State v. Moore, 273 N.J. Super. 118, 125 (App. Div. 1994).  The reasoning behind such claim preclusion is discussed in State v. Mitchell, 126 N.J. 565, 584 (1992):  “The State has a strong interest in achieving finality.  Without procedural rules requiring the consolidation of issues, litigation would continue indefinitely in a disconnected and piecemeal fashion.  Each time a petitioner brought forward a new issue, attorneys and courts would waste their limited resources acquainting themselves with all of the complex details necessary to adjudicate it.  When the grounds for challenging a conviction are consolidated, that investment need occur only once, and judicial resources can be more efficiently used to decide cases in a timely fashion.  Moreover, relevant issues in a case are often interrelated.  Adjudicating them separately would impair a court's ability to reach a result that fairly synthesizes all of the relevant factors into a just and reasoned outcome. ”  Mitchell, at 584.  This rule renders a significant quantity of Defendant’s application moot.
[brief] Exhibit 6, Deposition Transcript of Battalion Chief [...].  Exhibit 7, March 2020 witness statement of [...].  Exhibit 8, March 2020 witness statement of [...].  Exhibit 9, March 2020 witness statement of [...].  Exhibit 10, March 2020 witness statement of [...].  Exhibit 11, March 2020 witness statement of [...].  Exhibit 12, March 2020 witness statement of [...].  Exhibit 13, March 2020 witness statement of [...].  Exhibit 14, March 2020 witness statement of [...].  Exhibit 15, Defendant Deputy Chief [...]’s answers to Plaintiff’s interrogatories.  Exhibit 16, Deposition Transcript of Defendant Deputy Chief [...].