ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] ”  *Torres v. Pabon*, 225 N.J. 167, 191 (2016); *State v. Burney*, 255 N.J. 1, 29 (2023).  When taken together, these numerous claims of error cannot be explained away as harmless.  They are not simply a litany of minor or inconsequential matters of no substance or significance.  Rather, they represent real and repeated errors that accumulated so as to unfairly tilt the balance in favor of plaintiffs and to deprive defendants of a fair trial.  *Pellicer*, 200 N.J. at 56-57 (2009).
[directive] This Order is vacated effective on the date of the no bill by the grand jury or the date of the administrative dismissal or downgrade of the complaint by the prosecutor or acquittal at trial.  (Date)  (Judge’s Signature)  Notice to Defendant: Violation of the provisions of this Order may constitute criminal contempt pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:29-9(a) and will result in your arrest and criminal prosecution and, if convicted, may result in a custodial term of up to 18 months in prison.
[brief] R. 2:10-2 provides:  “Any error or omission shall be disregarded by the appellate court unless it is of such a nature as to have been clearly capable of producing an unjust result, but the appellate court may, in the interests of justice, notice plain error not brought to the attention of the trial or appellate court. ”  See also State v. Macon, 57 N.J. 325, 330-35 (1971) (“we will neither reverse on an assumption that there was error nor remand the matter to explore that possibility;” “whether the error is reason for reversal depends finally upon some degree of possibility that it led to an unjust result”; this is true even for constitutional issues).  Not only was this issue not raised on appeal to [...], but the information was never sought by the Union in the underlying proceeding.  That is because the Union was in possession of all of the information regarding its members.
[brief] ” (Da76-77).  Defendants’ emphasis on the Restructuring Act’s initial, but ultimately rejected goals, only acts to further support the logical conclusion that one of the main purposes of the statute, among which includes the preservation of Rutgers-Camden’s unique identity within the University system.  There is a separate statutory reason, unique to [...]’s role as the BOT’s Middlesex County representative, that confirms that she (or her successor) must be a Middlesex County representative throughout the duration of their term.  As part of the Restructuring Act, Rutgers and the State agreed, at N.J.S.A. 18A:65-14.13, to create a campus advisory board for New Brunswick.  One of its members must be “the member of the board of governors of Rutgers, The State University who is appointed by the board of trustees and who is, pursuant to N.J.S. 18A:65-14, required to be a resident of Middlesex County. ” (emphasis added).  That statute only confirms what’s just been said about the absurdity of understanding N.J.S.A. 18A:65-14(b)(ii) to mean that residency is only required on the date of appointment.  The campus advisory board could not lawfully operate and conduct its periodic meetings without the presence of the trustee-appointed governor who “is” required to be a Middlesex County resident.  Lastly, the trial court’s decision does not trespass on Rutgers’ autonomy.
[brief] Both issues involve the interpretation and understanding of medical data and the relationship, if any, between that data and the cause of an accident and/or the injuries a plaintiff alleges to have been caused by the accident which are esoteric issues that are beyond the ken of the average juror.  “[E]xpert testimony is needed where the factfinder would not be expected to have sufficient knowledge or experience and would have to speculate without the aid of expert testimony. ”  *Torres v. Schripps, Inc.*, 342 N.J. Super. 419, 430 (App. Div. 2001).  While *Allendorf* involved evidence of the plaintiff’s prior medical history in regard to the seizure disorder the plaintiff alleged to have sustained as a result of the incident, the Appellate Division cited to *Ratner v. General Motors Corp.*, 241 N.J. Super. 197, 203-206 (App. Div. 1990) in support of its ruling that expert medical opinion was required to establish a relationship between the prior history and an issue on the case.  *Allendorf*, 266 N.J. Super. at 672-673.
[brief] ...........................................  8  A)  [...], [...], [...] and [...] .................................................................................................................................  13  B)  [...] .....................................................................................................................  14  C)  [...], [...] and [...] .................................................................................................................................  15  Issue III)  [...] Did Not Err By Determining That The Plaintiff’s CEPA Claims Were Barred By The Statute Of Limitations.......  15  Issue IV)  [...] Did Not Err In The Manner In Which He Decided This Case.  .................................................................................................................. 18  Conclusion ............................................................................................................................
[brief] So long as the contract makes clear reference to the document and describes it in such terms that its identity may be ascertained beyond doubt, the parties to a contract may incorporate contractual terms by reference to a separate, non-contemporaneous document, including a separate agreement to which they are not parties, and including a separate document which is unsigned….  (Emphasis supplied.)  [Alpert, Goldberg, Butler, Norton & Weiss, P.C. v. Quinn, 410 N.J. Super. 510, 533 (App. Div. 2009) (quoting 4 Williston on Contracts §30:25 (4th ed. 1999)).]  Here, the Addendum sufficiently comports with the standard for incorporation by reference, as it describes the Partnership Agreement in express terms such that there is no ambiguity as to what document the Addendum incorporates and amends.
[brief] The St. \[\text{Mackenzie, the injuries in this case were attributable solely to the delayed delivery.  [Pa333-334, Deposition of [...], 39:23-42:17].}\]  \(^5\)  There is a good reason why the movants did not move for summary judgment based on the report of [...].  Not only are [...]’s opinions thorough and supported with detailed explanations, but [...]’ report is conclusory and will be, before trial, subject to an \textit{in limine} motion based on net opinion.
[brief] As discussed above on page 2, ¶4, there are numerous uses related to senior living and nursing home use that are recently permitted.  Notably, adult community housing, assisted living and nursing homes are all permitted in the OB-1A zone, and adult community housing and elder care centers are permitted in many zones.  Any of the zones where senior citizen housing, assisted living or nursing home uses are permitted would have been better choices for the senior living mixed-use project proposed.  Even if technically all three uses, as defined by [...], were not listed as permitted in the same zone in the Township, any of the locations where some of the uses were permitted would be far more conforming with the master plan and zone ordinance.  Instead, [...] chose a zone that did not permit any of the uses proposed.
[brief] What is troubling is how the Trial Court reached this conclusion despite acknowledging the TPDs’ bad-faith actions, stating “[t]here was no attempt by [...] to transfer title to [...] which would have resulted in one entity owning the mosque not two,” (5T9: 12-14), and “[t]hey acted in the interest of a subsequent mosque in order to obtain more influence and more control over the operations of the mosque. ” (5T10: 11-13).  Plainly put, the TPDs used [...] to purchase the Share so they could extort “more influence and more control” away from [...]’s other directors.  Despite being of the same faith and hitherto in the same congregation as [...]’s other directors, TPDs wanted to force [...] and its congregation to their way of practicing the faith.  Although [...] is also a Muslim mosque, the TPDs used the Share to attack [...]’s ability to provide religious services to [...]’s congregation as the action underlying this appeal was commenced by [...] filing an order to show cause to exclude [...]’s congregation from unfettered use of its sacred prayer space.
[directive] a.  Item number.  3  b.  Date the property is being transferred from one person to another.  c.  The printed name and signature of the person relinquishing custody of the property.  d.  The printed name and signature of the person receiving the property.  e.  The specific purpose of the change of custody, such as "Court," "Returned to Owner," etc.  In cases with many transfers of custody of an item, it may be necessary to attach a chain of custody continuation page to the property report.  Each item listed above should be reflected on this chain of custody continuation page.  Many departments use multi-part forms which are separated soon after the preliminary information is entered.  It is essential that all later entries are consistently made on one part of the form.  Photocopies can be made of the new, updated property report and distributed as necessary.  The dated entry will allow the reader to identify the most recent update.  Model Property Description Report (Short Form), Property Description Report (Long Form), Chain of Custody continuation page, and Victim Property Loss Report are found in the model Property S.
[brief] [...] as a party where named in the body of the Complaint, but not in the caption.  |  3.7 hrs. | $1,406.00 | $1,406.00 | | 2 | 2/1/21 |  Call client regarding . . .  [redacted]  Also, touch base regarding . . .  [redacted]  | .3 | $114.00 | $1,520.00 | | 3 | 3/8/21 | Research . . .
[brief] See Estate of Doerfler v. Federal Ins. Co., 2020 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 920, at *10 (App. Div. May 14, 2020) (“caused by” provision, defined to mean loss that is contributed to, made worse by, or in any way results from that peril, fulfilled the purpose of an anti-sequential cause); Garmany of Red Bank, Inc. v. Harleysville Ins. Co., 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50985, at *13 (D.N.J. Mar. 18, 2021) (interpreting phrase in an exclusion barring coverage for loss caused ‘directly or indirectly’ by COVID-19 to be an “anti- concurrent clause”).  But even if [...] did eliminate the ACC clause, there remains no language within the [...] insuring grant or Mold Exclusion that supports the radical expansion of Appleman’s rule to a policy that does not confer coverage based on a specified cause of loss.  See Garvey, 48 Cal. 3d at 406 (discussing the distinction between liability and property insurance).  In sum, [...] has offered no authority or intelligible rationale to expand Appleman’s rule to a third-party CGL policy, particularly where there is no policy language supporting its application.  New Jersey law demonstrates that the type of policy at issue and particular policy language controls which interpretive tool applies, if any.  See, e.g., Auto Lenders Acceptance Corp. v. Gentilli Ford, Inc., 181 N.J. 245 (2004) (holding that Appleman’s rule was appropriate for evaluating coverage under a first-party employee dishonesty policy that requires a “direct loss”).  There is ample support in New Jersey, nationwide, and in the [...] Policies for rejecting expansion of Appleman’s rule to this case.  Accordingly, this Court should affirm the trial court’s ruling that the Mold Exclusions in the [...] Policies bar coverage.  III.
[brief] Ibid.  Plaintiff’s first argument for a limited exception is based on the alleged pre-existing deterioration of the surface on the steps.  Of significance, Plaintiff’s expert, [...], inspected the subject property on June 26, 2023¹.  (Pa486).  [...] report does not casually relate any alleged deterioration to the slip and fall; instead, he makes a blanket statement “the design and maintenance defects together with the low coefficient of friction caused by the icy conditions, directly resulted in [...]’s slip and fall. ” (Pa471).  This, plainly, ignores the fact that the Plaintiff stated, unambiguously, that accumulated ice caused his fall.  (Pa315; Pa329, 17:8-17).  There is simply no argument that the alleged deterioration would have caused an icy condition to ¹ Date was determined by date on included photographs. be more likely - as freezing rain was falling from the sky at the time of the fall.
[brief] **Boonton Property. **  Again, contrary to the required compliance of [...]’s Order, Plaintiff initiated a sealed bidding process to decide which brother, [...] or [...], would acquire the Boonton Property, proceeding without [...]’s consent.  (8T 35)  During the trial, it was established that [...] sought to purchase the Boonton Property with [...] below-market value, which violated the Trustee’s fiduciary duties of loyalty and impartiality, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 3B:31-55(a) and N.J.S.A. 3B:31-56.  (8T 35-37)  Furthermore, [...] ultimately sold the Boonton Property to [...] for $601,000, which was a deeply discounted price.  (145a)  In fact, just 15 days after recording the deed, [...] flipped the Boonton Property for a profit of $149,000.  (151a)  This transaction contravened the Trust’s explicit directive for a purchase at fair market value, pursuant to Trust Article 4, Paragraph 4.1(A)(a).  Thus, [...] violated her fiduciary duty to administer the Trust “in accordance with its terms and purposes,” pursuant to N.J.S.A. 3B:31-54.  Furthermore, this transaction violated [...]’s fiduciary duty of loyalty, which inherently includes securing the “best” possible price for the sale of the Boonton Property.  Moreover, [...] violated her fiduciary duty of impartiality, as the Trustee favored one beneficiary over the other.  Finally, it was established that [...] failed to disclose the [...]’ ongoing interest in purchasing the Boonton Property for $800,000, an omission which constituted a breach of her fiduciary duty to provide full disclosure to [...], pursuant to N.J.S.A. 3B:31-67(a).  (8T 99-100)  **Misappropriation.**
[brief] It was error to include the special assessment  There has not been a special assessment on the unit since November 2016.  It is not an ongoing expense of operating the unit, so should not have been passed on to [...].  [...] held that “[t]he special assessment discussion is the only discussion on the record where it seems that reason and logic prevailed.  If a special assessment is charged on a one-time basis, and is not an annual, monthly regularly-occurring expense, it should not be passed on to the protected tenant.  DA14.  In addition, the evidence shows that the special assessment was to replenish condominium association reserves, a cost that would not exist but for the conversion to condominiums.
[brief] Costello, supra, 252 N.J. Super. at 257.  A municipality may not conduct itself so as to achieve or preserve any kind of bargaining or litigational advantage over the property owner, F.M.C, supra, 100 N.J. at 427; Costello, supra, 252 N.J. Super. at 257.  In the [...] matter, the court did not adjudicate this condemnation matter; Defendants have every right under the law to challenge this condemnation action.  The Township may not circumvent the requirement of adjudicating a condemnation action as required by the Eminent Domain Act.  The [...] court did not render any determination as to whether the Township complied with all statutory condemnation requirements.  Moreover, it has “an overriding obligation to deal forthrightly and fairly with property owners.
[brief] On or about April 15, 2022, [...] moved to withdraw from his global conditional plea agreement under Court rule 3:9-3(f) conditional pleas, and Myers asserts that:  (1)  He would have went to trial if the illegally obtained evidence from the unlawful search and seizure was not, in error, wrongfully and illegally admitted into [...] murder trial, Myers definitely would have went to trial, (2)  Myers only accepted the plea deal because HIS 6TH Amendment Right to a fair trial was not "offered," to him and was violated when the illegally obtained evidence prejudiced was admitted (3)  He is innocent (4  The agreement pertaining to the global conditional plea deal was not upheld by the trial court, the State or his attorney from what [...] understood the conditional plea deal to be (5)  404-B evidence that was overwhelmingly prejudice that was improperly admitted and unlawfully obtained was admitted into Myers homicide trial was suppressed.  On or about March 3rd, 2023, [...] stood before [...] for a hearing for Myers motion to withdraw his plea.
[brief] N.J.S.A. 40:48-1 .................................................................................................................. 19, 20, 27, 29, 31 N.J.S.A. 40:48-2 .................................................................................................................. 19, 29 N.J.S.A. 40:145-1 ..................................................................................................................  27  N.J.S.A. 40:145-13 ..............................................................................................................  27, 28  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS
[brief] ”  *Id.* at 262; accord *Parents United for Better Schs., Inc. v. Sch. Dist. of Phila. Bd. of Educ.*, 148 F.3d 260, 275 (3d Cir. 1998) (condom distribution program in high schools did not “intrude” on the “strong parental interest in deciding what is proper for the preservation of their childrens’ [sic] health” because “[p]articipation in the program is voluntary”); *Doe v. Irwin*, 615 F.2d 1162, 1168 (6th Cir. 1980) (“We can find no deprivation of the liberty interest of parents in the practice of not notifying them of their children’s voluntary decisions to participate in the activities of [a --- 5 Cf. *Gruenke v. Seip*, 225 F.3d 290, 303–07 (3d Cir. 2000) (finding student was coerced into a course of action she objected to and that her mother’s parental liberty interest was violated when a school swim coach, without the student’s invitation and against her wishes, spoke with her regarding his suspicion that she was pregnant, asked other school officials to speak with her to confirm the pregnancy, paid for a pregnancy test, and discussed the pregnancy with other school officials and parents of other students, but never with the student’s mother).
[directive] 3. is Page8of 10 - of Schedule Findings and Recommendations if none, state “None” e. f.  Prior Summary Schedule of Year Audit Findings and Status. to Notes  Financial Statements g. in  The supplemental exhibits listed this paragraph are required.  Suggested 6  Note: formats  Tabs andsupplementalexhibits are includedin through  Auditors need 10  1 Z a not use suggested format, so long the infirmation presented.
[brief] Id. at 342, 865 A.2d 673.  That testimony was deemed to be inadmissible hearsay.  Ibid.  The Court found that because there “was no trial testimony or evidence” other than the victim's identification of defendant from the photo array “that could have led [police] to focus on defendant as a suspect ... the jury was left to speculate that the detective had superior knowledge through hearsay information implicating defendant in the crime. ”  Id. at 347–48, 865 A.2d 673.  That was particularly problematic [b]ecause the nameless person who provided the ‘information’ to [the detective] was not called as a witness, the jury never learned the basis of that person's knowledge regarding defendant's guilt, whether he was a credible source, or whether he had a peculiar interest in the case.  Defendant never had an opportunity to confront that anonymous witness and test his credibility in the crucible of cross-examination.  [Id. at 348.]  The Court concluded, “when the logical implication to be drawn from the testimony leads the jury to believe that a non-testifying witness has given the police evidence of the accused's guilt, the testimony should be disallowed as hearsay. ”  Id. at 349, 865 A.2d 673 (quoting Bankston, 63 N.J. at 271, 307 A.2d 65).  The Court added that although a police officer “may testify that he went to the scene of a crime based ‘upon information received,’ ” id. at 351, 865 A.2d 673 (citing Bankston, 63 N.J. at 268, 307 A.2d 65), the Court expressly rejected the use of such “seemingly neutral language” to explain why a defendant's photo was added to a photo array.  Id. at 352, 865 A.2d 673 (rejecting dicta approving such language in Irving, 114 N.J. at 447, 555 A.2d 575).  The Court thus announced a clear rule, explaining, “[w]hy the officer placed the defendant's photograph in the array is of no relevance to the identification process and is highly prejudicial. ”  Ibid.  “What counts[,]” the Court added, “is whether the officer fairly arranged and displayed the photographic array and whether the witness made a reliable identification. ”  Ibid.  Going forward, the Court permitted police to use the phrase “based on information received” outside of the photo array context, “but only if necessary to rebut a suggestion that they acted arbitrarily, and only if the use of that phrase does not create an inference that the defendant has been implicated in a crime by some unknown person. ”  Ibid.  The Court then turned to whether the admission of such testimony rose to the level of plain error requiring the reversal of [...]'s convictions.
[brief] Plaintiff must show that the “notice was fatally deficient. ”  Concerned Citizens of Livingston v. Twp. of Livingston, 2018 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1356, at *1, *5 (App. Div. 2018).  A “technical violation” is insufficient.  Bonnabel v. Twp. of River Vale, 2013 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1598, at *10 (App. Div. 2013).
[brief] The jury would have heard, while [...] was in the County Jail he spoke to [...] over the phone, and [...] told him he was response for the gas station shooting.  See State v. [...], 156 N.J. 29(1998); However, further investigation revealed [...] was responsible for the gas station shooting.  When [...] discovered that [...] provided this false information against [...], [...]'s attorney called [...] as a witness in the defense case to advance a third party guilt defense.
[brief] ”  And a special statutory provision dealing with the particular subject prevails over general statute on the same subject.  Zoning Board of ADJ v. Service Electric Cable TV, 198 N.J. Super. at 370, 381 (App. Div. 1985).  Second, the Plaintiff/Respondents recite Bandler v. Landry’s, 464 N.J. Super. 311 (App. Div. 2020) at PB 34-35.
[brief] Requiring these complex fraud litigations where there are multiple parties and non-parties involved, with tens of thousands of documents, where co-conspirators have secreted records and documents in an attempt to avoid being \textsuperscript{11}  The Certifications of [...] and [...], which were produced in the Allstate v. Lajara and Allstate v. Bandy litigations, are truly shocking in their description of the breadth of insurance fraud in New Jersey and are a prime example of what would have been a continuing criminal enterprise but for the filing of a civil fraud action, where there is a broad and meaningful exchange of discovery, and the State could then use that discovery and other information to indict and criminally prosecute insurance fraud criminals.  found out to be adjudicated in the Forthright ADR forum, where the exchange of meaningful discovery with parties and non-parties is not available, where there is no ability to subpoena third parties or compel testimony, where there is no right to a jury trial or the statutory right to attorney’s fees and costs of suit, investigation costs and treble damages, is unequivocally contrary not only common-sense and logic, but also in direct contravention of the Legislature’s express language seeking to aggressively combat insurance fraud.