ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] A person whose public duties include the power to act as an officer for the detection, apprehension, arrest, and conviction of offenders against the laws of this State.  Mobile video recording system.  A device or system installed or used in a police vehicle or worn or otherwise used by an officer that electronically records visual images depicting activities that take place during a motor vehicle stop or other law enforcement action.  Proactive enforcement team.  Includes officers who are typically assigned to target vice, drugs, organized street crime, violent crime and/or any other targeted enforcement.  Unlike officers who are responsible for responding to traditional calls for service, these officers are typically assigned the singular responsibility of addressing the aforementioned activities, and they are sometimes referred to as crime suppression units.  The nature of their work is varied and may include being dressed in traditional uniform, modified uniform, or plain clothes.  These officers may work alongside undercover officers, conduct surreptitious surveillance, engage in high intensity enforcement via motor vehicle/pedestrian stops and/or interact with confidential informants or witnesses who wish to remain anonymous.  School.
[directive] Homicide Evidence  a.  In all cases where all defendants have been charged and all of the defendants in the case are deceased, upon proof of death being submitted, a request for destruction authorization may be submitted.  b.  In cases where the defendants were convicted and no appeals or post-conviction relief motions are pending, after a period of 5 years from the date of conviction or upon the defendants expiration of sentence, whichever is later, a request for destruction authorization may be submitted.  c.  In cases where no suspects have been identified but a DNA profile has been obtained and submitted to CODIS, or fingerprint evidence that has been submitted to AFIS, or there is no statute of limitations, the evidence shall be retained indefinitely.  Only the Prosecutor or their designee, may authorize the destruction of this evidence.  2.  Sex Crimes Evidence
[brief] On August 5, 2020, then-Toms River Patrolman [...], submitted an affidavit in support of a motor-vehicle search warrant to the Honorable [...], J.M.C., in the Toms River Municipal Court.  (1T4-6; 1T7-11 to 21; Dca1 to 7).  The affidavit detailed information the police received from a confidential informant (CI) about a controlled purchase of narcotics between the CI and defendant in Toms River.\(^4\) (1T11-6 to 12-5; 1T89-1 to 10; Dca5 to 6).  The affidavit stated that defendant lived in Lakewood and that his vehicle was registered in Lakewood.  (1T11-13 to 15; Dca6 to 7).  On August 5, 2020, Judge Gluck issued a search warrant for a 2002 Jaguar S-Type motor vehicle, acknowledging Patrolman Taranto’s statements that he had probable cause to believe that in and upon a certain vehicle within the TOWNSHIP OF TOMS RIVER . . . to wit: NEW JERSEY REGISTRATION: [Redacted] and more particularly described as[] a Silver 2002 --- \(^4\)  In the affidavit, the information related to the CI was kept vague and only indicated that the controlled buy occurred at a “prearranged location. ” (Dca5).  At the motion-to-suppress hearing, Taranto testified that the controlled buy took place in Toms River.  (1T89-8 to 10).  Jaguar S Type with a VIN of [redacted], registered [in] Lakewood, NJ . . . [t]here has been and now is located certain property . . . consisting of heroin and other controlled dangerous substances, money, . . . [and] firearms . . . . [(Dca8; 1T15-7 to 25). ]
[brief] Plaintiff next blames Defendant and [...] for her failure to comply with the statute.  (Pb9)  While this brief will demonstrate that these arguments are without merit, it is most important to recognize that Plaintiff conceded that the reason she failed to comply with the Affidavit of Merit statute was that her counsel “lost track of the timeline for submitting a timely affidavit of merit,” and “lost track of the timeline required by the affidavit of merit statute. ”  (Pb12, 17)  Consequently, Plaintiff’s arguments should be correctly seen as little more than a post-hoc attempt to avoid the consequences of that inadvertence.
[brief] (Da132-33).  Finally, the trial court found that remaining equitable factors also weighed in the State’s favor.  (Da134-37).  The court found both that transgender youth already face a heightened risk of mental health challenges, suicide, illicit drug dependency, and infliction of physical or emotional harm by immediate family members—and that mandatory disclosure of their gender identity or expression under the Amended Policy risked exacerbating those harms.  (Da135).  Such harms, especially while the challenge to the Amended Policy was pending in the administrative forum, would be irreparable.  (Da135).  And on the other side of the ledger, the trial court found that Appellants had not made “any compelling argument that adherence to the [Original Policy] governing transgender students while the administrative action is pending will result in any claim, liability or hardship,” especially where the Original Policy had been in place “uneventfully” since 2019.  (Da137).  This absence of hardship, when weighed against “the statistical possibility that even one transgender student affected by the [Amended Policy] should run away from home, or attempt or commit suicide,” was “sufficient to tip the balance of equities in favor of the State. ” (Da137).  This appeal followed.
[brief] See generally, *Baker v. National State Bank*, 353 N.J. Super. 145, 152-154 (App. Div. 2002); Dong v. Alape, 361 N.J. Super. 106, 116-118 (App. Div. 2003).  (Punitive Damages Act requires the Defendant acted maliciously or with will and wonton disregard of the rights of others).  Under LAD, to receive punitive damages, a plaintiff must not only establish discrimination, but must also prove, by clear and convincing evidence, (1) actual participation in or willful indifference to the wrongful conduct on the part of upper management and (2) that the offending conduct was especially egregious.
[directive] Pozwy, wnioski oraz wszelkie inne dokumenty składane w sądzie powinny być w języku angielskim Complaints, motions and other papers submitted to the court should be in English  Sądownictwo w New Jersey New Jersey Judiciary  Dodatkowy formularz oświadczenia w sprawach objętych Ustawą o zakazie zwolnień przedterminowych (N.J.S.A. (ang. NERA) 2C:43-7.2)  No Early Release Act Supplemental Plea Form for (NERA) Cases (N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2)  (Polish)  Na poniższe pytania powinny odpowiedzieć tylko osoby przyznające się do popełnienia przestępstwa pomiędzy 9 czerwca 1997 r. i 29 czerwca 2001 r. pierwszego lub drugiego stopnia z użyciem przemocy
[directive] At that point, the judge should instruct those remaining in the gallery to listen closely and carefully to the questions so that if one of them is called upon to replace an excused juror they will be able to bring to the court's attention the questions to which they would have answered yes.  Then the judge should begin questioning the jurors seated in the box.  As stated, under no circumstances should the questions be posed to the entire array as a substitute for asking the questions to each juror in the box, nor may the asking of each question to each juror in the box be dispensed with before that juror is qualified.  Left to the judge's discretion is the extent to which sidebar discussions are conducted.  Of course, when requested by a juror because of the sensitive or personal nature of the question, sidebar should be utilized.  Sidebar should also be utilized when deemed appropriate to avoid discussion of subject matter that has the capacity to taint the remainder of the panel.  Generally, however, the give-and-take in the process should be conducted in open court.  Challenges for cause should be conducted at sidebar if requested by counsel.  Standards for Jury Selection
[brief] Federal Cases  Greater Boston Television Corp. v. F.C.C., 143 U.S. App. D.C. 383, 444 F. 2d 841 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert den. 403 U.S. 923, 91 S. Ct. 2229, 29 L. Ed. 2d 701 (1971), reh. den. 404 U.S. 877, 92 S.Ct. 30, 30 L.Ed.2d 125 (1971)
[brief] While Plaintiff agrees that a certain level of deference is owed to Defendant’s decision, the record shows that Defendant’s actions far exceed any acceptable application of the law.  Zoning boards are given deference due to their “peculiar knowledge of local conditions[.]”  See, e.g., Kramer v. Bd. of Adjustment, 45 N.J. 268, 296 (1965)(emphasis added).  This deference is an acknowledgment that “that local citizens familiar with a community’s characteristics and interests are best equipped to assess the merits of variance applications. ”  CBS Outdoor, Inc. v. Borough of Lenanon Planning Bd./ Bd. of Adjustment, 414 N.J. Super. 563, 577-78 (App. Div. 2010)(citation omitted)(emphasis added).  This deference is directed to local conditions; issues and concerns peculiar to the locality.  Here, Defendant’s denial, including its rejection of expert testimony, relies entirely upon the unfounded general assumption that building height is, by default, a proxy for intensity of use, especially for traffic generation.  This unsupported belief has nothing to do with local conditions or the community’s characteristics, but rather a preconceived notion that Plaintiff actually disproved.  This general assumption—the lynchpin of Defendant’s decision—is therefore not entitled to any deference.  Plaintiff also agrees that it had the burden to establish the positive and negative criteria, but Defendant transmogrifies this burden into one of requiring Plaintiff to disprove its unfounded beliefs regarding height and intensity.  This is a fundamentally different burden than the law requires.  No case law supports it; nothing in the record corroborates it.  Instead, given the substantial credible evidence in the record proving Plaintiff’s right to the requested relief, Defendant was required to grant the variance.  II.
[brief] POINT  I  ALL REQUIREMENTS OF THE LHRL MUST BE SATISFIED (Pa0074-Pa0098) ...................... 4 POINT II PLAINTIFFS’ DISPUTED EXHIBITS SHOULD HAVE BEEN INCLUDED IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE RECORD (T45-9 to T47-4) (Pa0079-Pa0080) ................................................................. 7 CONCLUSION ......................................................................................................................... 11 TABLE OF ORDERS Trial Court’s Decision and Judgment dated February 26, 2024 ...................... Pa0074-80 Trial Court’s Opinion at pages 4-6 ................................................................. Pa0077-79 ### TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | Cases | Page(s) | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|---------| | **62-64 Main Street v. Mayor,** | 5 | | 221 N.J. 129 (2015) | | | **Downtown Residents for Sane Dev. v. City of Hoboken,** | 4 | | 242 N.J. Super. 329 (App. Div. 1990) | | | **Fieramosca v. Twp. of Barnegat,** | 9 | | 335 N.J. Super. 526 (Law Div. 2000) | | | **Gallenthin Realty Development, Inc. v. Borough of Paulsboro,** | 5 | | 191 N.J. 344 (2007) | | | **Hirth v. City of Hoboken,** | passim | | 337 N.J. Super. 149 (App. Div. 2001) | | | **Levin v. Township Committee of Bridgewater,** | 5 | | 57 N.J. 506 (1971) | | | **Malanga v. Twp. of West Orange,** | 9 | | 235 N.J. 291 (2023) | | | **Wilson v. Long Branch,** | 5 | | 27 N.J. 360 (1958) | | | Statutes: | | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|---------| | **N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-1 et. seq** | 1 | | **N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-3** | 5, 7 | | **N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-5** | 6, 7 | | **N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-5(a)** | 5 | | **N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-7** | 6, 10 | | **N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-14** | 1, 2, 6, 7 | Other Authorities: Rules of Court R. 2:6-1(a)(2) .........................................................................................................................8
[brief] In this case, a government agency seeks the Court’s approval for acting well beyond the detailed regulations it promulgated at the Legislature’s command.  The agency claims to not only have authority to regulate insurers pursuant to those detailed regulations, but to also have unlimited additional authority via a broad, undefined statutory term (i.e., “excessive” rates) that the agency admits is not addressed in any of its regulations and which is susceptible to many different meanings.  Precedents of the Supreme Court and this Court forbid such efforts.  Equally troubling, the agency’s challenged action—denial of an insurer’s premium rate increases—undisputedly was not based on the concept of “excessive” rates.  Rather, the agency settled on that ground as the purported basis for its action only after the denial.  On both fronts, bedrock administrative law and due process principles mandate that regulated entities have advance notice of the rules and standards to which they will be held.  At first blush, this case might seem to be about insurance rate-making or actuarial aspects of the Department’s consideration of rate applications.  It is not.  Putting aside the actuarial jargon, a simple case emerges—one where the agency repeatedly violated cardinal principles of administrative law.
[directive] santans nan prizon de jiska 5 lane  Do you understand that if you fail to notify the appropriate law enforcement agency about your routine access to or use of a computer or device with Internet capability or a change in such use or access, you may (if the be charged with a third degree crime and may receive a sentence of imprisonment of up to 5 years offense was committed on or after July 1, 2014) or you may be charged with a fourth degree crime and (if the offense was committed on or after may receive a sentence of imprisonment of up to 18 months February 25, 2008 but before July 1, 2014)?
[brief] Defendant/Appellant [...] was misled by his attorney, the prosecutor, and the Court into pleading guilty to a third DWI\(^1\) by believing he would receive a 10-year loss of license that would start from the day he was sentenced on February 8, 2013, meaning he would get his license back on February 8, 2023.  Instead, [...] later found out he was given a 20-year loss of license and would not be getting his license back until February of 2033, which is essentially a death sentence to his driver’s license.  The serious penal consequence of receiving a 20-year loss of license, instead of a 10 year loss of license, was material to his sentence, and [...] did not contemplate he would be receiving a sentence that resulted in a 20 year loss of license.  Because “…the responsible arms of the judicial and law enforcement establishment, together with defendant's own counsel, have misinformed [the defendant] as to a material element of a plea negotiation, which the defendant has relied thereon in entering his plea, . . . it would be manifestly unjust to hold defendant to his plea. ”\(^2\)  Here, not only was [...] misinformed, but he was also misled.  Accordingly, this matter must be remanded to the trial court and defendant must be given the option to (1) renegotiate the plea agreement, or (2) withdraw his guilty plea and proceed to trial  Sheil v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 244 N.J. Super. 521, 529 (App. Div. 1990).  --- \(^1\) Driving While Intoxicated (DWI).  \(^2\)  State v. Kiett, 121 N.J. 483, 488 (1990) citing State v. Nichols, 71 N.J. 358, 361, 365 A.2d 467 (1976) (citation omitted).  STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY.
[brief] Fou v. [...], 251 N.J. 192 (2022).  When defendants were unsuccessful with the New Jersey Supreme Court, they attempted to seek relief from the United States Supreme Court.  They filed a motion for leave to file a petition for writ of certiorari with an appendix under seal on August 29, 2022.  The motion for leave was granted, and the petition was accepted, but the petition was \(^1\) “Da” refers to defendants’ appendix on appeal. denied by the US Supreme Court on January 23, 2023.
[brief] The Supreme Court's reasoning follows the Second Restatement of Contracts, which states, "[i]f the breach caused no loss or if the amount of the loss is not proved under the rules stated in this Chapter, a small sum fixed without regard to the amount of loss will be awarded as nominal damages."  Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 346 (1981).  The comment clarifies that, "[a]lthough a breach of contract by a party against whom it is enforceable always gives rise to a claim for damages, there are instances in which the breach causes no loss.  . .  In all these instances the injured party will nevertheless get judgment for nominal damages .  . . ."  Id.  Whether the damages must be nominal or measured, that issue is not ripe for consideration until trial.  See also Norwood Lumber Corp. v. McKean, 153 F.2d 753, 755 (3d Cir. 1946) (citing Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 346); Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Elizabethtown, Inc. v. Coca-Cola Co., 988 F.2d 386, 409 (3d Cir. 1993); City of Trenton v. Cannon Cochran Mgmt. Servs., Inc., Civ. No. A-5576-09T1, 2011 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2076, 2011 WL 3241579 (App. Div. Aug. 1, 2011) ("[L]iability for breach of contract does not require proof of damage beyond the breach itself."); Gray v. Serruto Builders, Inc., 110 N.J. Super. 297, 315, 265 A.2d 404 (Ch. Div. 1970) ("While actual damages will be awarded when they can be proved, nominal damages will be presumed from the encroachment of an established right.").
[directive] 1.  The provisions of this Executive Directive and any discretionary powers conferred by the provisions of this Executive Directive upon any law enforcement officer or agency shall be liberally construed to further the general purposes and policies set forth in Parts I and II.  2.  Any question by a county prosecutor, the chief executive officer of a law enforcement agency, or a school official concerning the intended meaning or applicability of any provision of this Executive Directive may be addressed to the Office of Narcotics Enforcement Coordination and Planning in the Division of Criminal Justice, which is hereby designated to receive and respond to such inquiries.  Where appropriate, that office shall consult with representatives in the Division of Law concerning the interpretation of any civil law or rule or regulation.  Copies of all written responses to inquiries concerning any interpretation or construction of any provision of this Executive Directive shall be forwarded to the Commissioner of Education or his designee for their information and dissemination to other interested school officials.
[brief] For his part, [...] had only “[o]ne little shot” all night.  (14T 203-14 to 204-12)  [...] confirmed that he told the police that a fight broke out after, “I guess[,] the guys on the stage, I guess they throw enough champ … you know, threw it to the crowd. ”  (14T 202-9 to 203-13)  And while [...] maintained at trial that he had not seen any gang activity at the party (13T 138-4 to 11), in his statement to police, he assumed that the shooting was gang related (9T 154-6 to 18; 13T 76-2 to 77-20).  According to [...]’s investigation, [...] appeared to “pay[] for everybody to get in[.]” (12T 83-10 to 84-8)  [...] initially denied that he had any gang affiliation, but eventually admitted that both he and [...] had been in gangs “in the past” (13T 75-3 to 16) and acknowledged his own history of being “in the streets … [selling] drugs, shooting, all that” (13T 72-12 to 14).  When confronted with the assertion in his statement that [...] had also been in a gang, [...] claimed he “never said none of that.
[brief] 9.  Further, the garnishment of my social security benefits under a false NJ child support account number not belonging to me, the denial of my motion for discovery, the oversight or failure to consider Probation’s violation of the Orders of 10/25/2021 and 4/4/2022 by the trial Court constitute a denial of due process and unreasonable seizure of my personal property which needs be considered by the Appellate Court.  10.  The Court’s reluctance to challenge Probation as to its account record has, in essence, served to acquiesce to Probation’s continued inability to maintain an accurate account record and permitted Probation to remain unaccountable for its errors for decades.
[directive] • am separately directing [...] to continue its work with law enforcement and community stakeholders and provide further recommendations to me by March 31, 2021.  Page 4 I.  Summary of the Use of Force Policy  Although officers are necessarily granted the authority to use force to accomplish lawful objectives, force must only be used as a last resort.  The Fourth Amendment further requires that an officer’s use of force be “objectively reasonable. ”  Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989).  Graham v. This provision, however, provides a constitutional “floor” for officer use of force that all officers must meet.  The Use of Force Policy sets standards that go beyond the minimum constitutional requirements set forth in Graham.
[brief] The Trial stated on the record the following:  [...]: "I should have gotten them without going this far and having the Court to intervene."  [1T Line 23-24, Pg. 7]  THE COURT: “I’m not answering any questions right now for you, sir.  I asked you question.  I was hoping just to get a simple answer.  And it was you did receive your statutory adjournment; is that correct?  [...]: After the fact of the suit was filed.  THE COURT: So, yes.  [1T Line 16-22, Pg. 7]  “Okay.  I didn’t intervene”  [1T, Line 24, Pgs. 7-8]  “Okay.  All right.  Thank you.  I had an opportunity to review the paperwork and listen to the arguments made.
[brief] Throughout their brief, Plaintiffs repeatedly recognize that the Genesis Deed “reserves” to the “developer” rights to regulate building on the Property and the hundreds like it.  (Pb2, Pb17, Pb25).  Furthermore, Plaintiffs acknowledge that, under the Genesis Deed, the “developer” has the right to “pass upon” building permits within the community.  (Pb11).  The Genesis Deed specifically references “[...]” as having authority to “pass upon” building permits within the community, and the incomplete historical record is nonetheless replete with evidence from which a reasonable factfinder could conclude that [...] was the “developer” operating through the name “[...]” (Da527; 607; 391-2; 882-4).  In fact, the 1984 certificate of limited partnership for [...], [...]’s widow and children expressly recognized that [...] conducted business under the name “[...]” (Da392).
[directive] I.  INFORMATION  A.  Communication to orient victims and witnesses to the criminal justice process shall commence at the same time the case is reported to the Prosecutor's Office and shall continue throughout the entire prosecution process.  1.  Information concerning directions, parking, courthouse and courtroom location, transportation and how to obtain witness fees shall be made available to victims and witnesses in an introductory letter.  2.  A pamphlet which provides a general description of the prosecutorial process and the victim's and witness's role must be forwarded to the victim or witness with an introductory letter.  3.  Orientation information about prosecutorial procedure should be provided through verbal communications.  4.  Re-enactments and courtroom walk-throughs shall be provided for victims with special needs and for all child victims and witnesses.  COMMENTARY