ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] “Packard-Bamberger makes clear that the fact that a person owes another a fiduciary duty, in and of itself, does not justify an award of fees unless the wrongful conduct arose out of an attorney-client relationship. ”  In re Estate of Lash, supra, 169 N.J. at 34.  The Supreme Court in Lash also continued to hold that, “Such an award is directly contrary to the American Rule's prohibition, but was authorized in [Packard and Saffer v. Willoughby] due to the significance of the attorney-client relationship. ”  Id. at 33.  In re Estate of Vayda, 184 N.J. 115, 122 (2005) also reaffirmed that when it held, “we specifically limited the reach of In re Estate of Lash to attorney breach of fiduciary duty malfeasance only”, and explained that, "the fact that a person owes another a fiduciary duty, in and of itself, does not justify an award of fees unless the wrongful conduct arose out of an attorney-client relationship."
[brief] The CFA provides that *both* a private attorney general and the Attorney General of New Jersey can seek “injunctive relief”.  Further, the CFA does not differentiate between the type of injunctive relief either a private attorney general and the Attorney General of New Jersey may seek.  If the legislature intended to exclude “public injunctive relief” from private attorney’s general it would have done so.  As previously stated, public injunctive relief has been defined as: “…relief that ‘by and large’ benefits the general public…and that benefits the plaintiff, ‘if at all,’ only ‘incidental[ly]’ and/or as ‘a member of the general public’” see McGill v Citibank, N.A., 393 P. 3d at 89 cited by DiCarlo, 988 F.3d at 1152; see also Beture, 2018 U.S. LEXIS 121801, *28-29 (Ja59)
[brief] [...] improperly and unlawfully removed [...] as a sewerage authority commissioner, an arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable action.  The controlling statute, N.J.S.A. 40:14A-5(c), does not recognize a commissioner’s private behavior as a legal basis for removal by the governing body.  Inherent in the statutory standard for removal for “misconduct in office” is a connection between the offending behavior and the duties, powers, and role of the sewerage authority commissioner.
[brief] PLAINTIFFS PROOFS SHOWED THE ORDINANCE WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE  On the record before the Trial Court, all that the Township offered to defend the exemption were the conclusory findings in the Financial Agreement and the belatedly revealed sewer costs which it continued to assert were excessive.  In granting defendants’ motion to quash discovery, the Trial Court relied on its view that the LTTEL only requires a municipality to adhere to the law’s procedural steps and to make findings that nod to the exemption criteria.  Accordingly, plaintiffs efforts to discover more robust information that would reasonably elucidate the findings were rebuffed.
[brief] The Court should therefore reject [...]’s attempt to expend the scope of indemnity that it drafted in its favor.  Kieffer, 205 N.J. at 225.  Likewise, the trial court’s ruling that Paragraph 4 was “broad and consistent with the other verbiage of paragraph two, indicating that the indemnification would apply even against the contractor’s own negligence,” 1T21:5-:9, failed to distinguish between the terms ‘subcontractor,’’ for which [...] owed indemnity, and “Contractor,” for which [...] did not.  See Da45, ¶ 4.  The Court should therefore reject the trial court’s ruling and [...]’s argument in favor of it.
[brief] If the hazard is larger and covers a greater distance, then there is going to be a greater risk that the hazard is going to be exposed.  It’s going to be exposed to the traveling public and there could be crashes as a result of that.  It doesn’t change the fact that whether it’s one little spot that has a two-inch [select], and then it’s tapered out and there’s, it’s still dangerous, period.  It’s in the travel lane.  (Pa126 at 3-17).  The Trial Court continues this attack on Plaintiff’s expert when it criticizes [...]’s response to a question about one of the photographs that he was shown on the second day of his deposition.
[brief] [State v. Brown, 236 N.J. 497, 518 (2019).]  Evidence is material for Brady purposes “if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different. ”  Marshall, 148 N.J. at 156 (quoting United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985)).  Giglio simply expanded the scope of Brady to include impeachment evidence.  405 U.S. at 153-55.  A.
[brief] If a holdover statutory appointee was stripped of all his powers in office, and the Court did not find that to be actionable under CEPA, it follows that a county counsel cannot state a CEPA claim as a matter of law premised upon his or her nonrenewal without any right to holdover.  A contrary interpretation would render CEPA as granting statutory employees with an implied tenure right and bind governing bodies to renew the terms of statutory appointees under certain circumstances, which cannot possibly be the law.  For these reasons, the trial court correctly concluded that Plaintiff did not suffer a retaliatory action as a matter of law.
[directive] This in turn can trigger the LEA to reach out to, or be prepared to receive contact from, the CBVI and/or HVIP organization.  It is critical that notification to the LEA be accompanied by training and context to ensure a smooth initial connection.  Additionally, the DLPS can consider convening local stakeholders— including both the local law enforcement agency, CBVI provider, HVIP provider, and others—in communities where relationships have not begun yet.
[brief] A trial court's "sentencing determinations are entitled to substantial deference" on appeal.  State v. Jaffe, 220 N.J. 114, 124-25 n.1 (2014) (quoting State v. Pagan, 378 N.J. Super. 549, 558 (App. Div. 2005)). "Appellate review of a criminal sentence is limited; a reviewing court decides whether there is a 'clear showing of abuse of discretion.'"  State v. Bolvito, 217 N.J. 221, 228 (2014) (quoting State v. Whitaker, 79 N.J. 503, 512 (1979)).
[brief] LEGAL ARGUMENT I.  THE TRIAL COURT’S DECISION GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT TO [...]  DISMISSING PLAINTIFF’S CLAIMS SHOULD BE AFFIRMED.  A.  Standard of Review  The Appellate Division's review of a trial court's grant of summary judgment is de novo, using the same standard employed by the trial court under Rule 4:46 as enunciated in Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America, 142 N.J. 520, 540 (1995).
[brief] The process itself warrants relief – only more so in light of the substantive result providing the absent wife, who was always dependent on her far more sophisticated, older, and powerful husband, with only a token share of the marital assets with zero alimony.  At bottom, no New Jersey court should tolerate what [...] and his divorce lawyer did to obtain the default judgment against [...] in this case.  It’s not right.  It’s the complete opposite of what our courts have stressed must be an open, aboveboard, and transparent divorce process.  [...] must be provided with a fair opportunity to be heard on the equitable distribution and alimony issues that will impact her life moving forward.  Due process and the most fundamental concepts of fairness require this – a process that any ordinary observer would see as fair to both spouses.  Even if the same substantive result occurs at the end, no matter; it will be a result premised on full and fair participation by both spouses -- not one premised on a lie, on ethically conflicted counsel, and on an absent wife bullied and duped by her previously protective, wealthier, powerful, older, and more capable husband.
[brief] As originally formulated, it stated the following:  Proof of mailing of notice of cancellation, or of intention not to renew or of reasons for cancellation to the named insured at the address shown in the policy, shall be sufficient proof of notice.  Indeed, that was the full text of the statute in 1978, when the New Jersey Supreme Court decided *Weathers v. Hartford Ins. Group*, 77 N.J. 228 (1978).  In *Weathers*, the insurer relied, as it does here, on a Certificate of Mailing and on evidence of the usual and customary procedure of the insurance company, not on the basis of an employee with any actual personal knowledge of the act of mailing.  ---  2  In Point III of this brief, Plaintiff will be arguing that the [...] panel misinterpreted *Weathers* in holding that evidence of an insured’s non-receipt of a Cancellation Notice is irrelevant. itself.
[directive] For decades, New Jersey has treated a police department’s internal disciplinary files— generally known as “internal affairs” records—as highly confidential, in line with the way that personnel records for all public employees are usually treated.  This Directive establishes an important and necessary exception to that practice for serious cases of law enforcement officer discipline.  There are good reasons why internal affairs records are not generally disclosed to the public, including the need to protect those who report and witness police misconduct.  Complainants might be unwilling to report misconduct if they knew that their names would ultimately be disclosed publicly.  Similarly, witnesses—including officers asked to testify against a colleague—might be unwilling to cooperate in an inquiry if they knew that their statements would be available for public inspection.  These are among the reasons why, even within police departments, internal affairs records are closely guarded and generally not shared outside the agency’s internal affairs unit.  Moreover, a number of misconduct complaints against law enforcement officers are ultimately determined to be unsubstantiated or unfounded.  In cases where these complaints were thoroughly and objectively investigated by the appropriate authorities, it would be unfair to publicly disclose unproven allegations against officers—particularly given that such complaints against other public employees are not typically disclosed absent extenuating circumstances.  At the same time, however, law enforcement officers are entrusted with extraordinary responsibility and it is imperative that all officers maintain the highest standards of good New Jersey Is An Equal Opportunity Employer • Printed on Recycled Paper and is Recyclable Page 2 discipline and conduct.
[brief] (1T11:23-12:12).  The Defendants rejected the Court’s suggestion (which was supported by the Trustee), that the properties simply be listed for sale and that the beneficiaries be provided the opportunity to match any offer that was received: THE COURT:  Why don’t we just list both properties?  Why don’t we just list both properties and if someone wants to match an offer, they can match an offer?  [...] [Attorney for the Plaintiff]:  Your Honor, we are amenable to that,,,”I think, Your Honor, that putting it on the market and seeing what the market will bear based on what we already know is going to get by far the best price for the property.  THE COURT: Mr. [...], do you disagree with that?  [...]:  …I am not agreeable to that.  (1T13:9-24).  Prior to the hearing, on November 24, 2021, the Trustee had advised the Defendants through their second attorney, [...], Esq., that a written offer had been received from Thomas and [...] (the “[...]”) to buy that property, “as is,” for $800,000.
[brief] An act is considered to be “in the course of committing a theft” if it occurs in an attempt to commit the theft, during the commission of the theft itself, or in immediate flight after the attempt or commission.  Model Jury Charges (Criminal), “Robbery in the First-Degree (N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1)” (rev. Sep. 10, 2012).  Where a defendant threatens a victim with injury if the victim does not relinquish money, the threat is considered to have been made in the course of committing the theft.  In addition, where a defendant uses force against an individual in an effort to flee from the scene or avoid apprehension, that force is considered to have been carried out in the course of committing the theft, regardless of whether the force is used against the theft victim or someone else.  See State v. Mirault, 92 N.J. 492, 498-99 (1983).  In this case, there was no evidence that the perpetrator threatened [...] or put her in fear of immediate bodily injury in an attempt to cause her to relinquish money.  [...] testified that she immediately put money on the counter in response to hearing the man say, “[g]ive me all your money. ”  (3T 95-8 to 11)  [...], on the other hand, did not put any money on the counter at that time, prompting the man to say, “[g]ive me all your money or I’ll shoot. ”  (3T-14 to 16)  When asked to whom the latter statement was directed, [...] responded, “it was obviously directed either to me or [[...]].  I’m going to say it was directed to [[...]] because I had already given him money. ”
[brief] On November 21, 2023, [...] opposed the motions to dismiss and filed a cross motion for summary judgment arguing that private control of the Council was a novel issue before the court.  (Pa89-93).  On January 10, 2024 the Honorable [...], A.J.S.C. ruled in favor of Respondents, dismissing [...]’s complaint with prejudice for failing to state a claim, and likewise denied [...]’s cross-motion for summary judgment.  (Pa113-132).  [...] agreed with Respondents that each of [...]’s claims were foreclosed by controlling case law establishing that the Council is not a private entity nor has the potential to be controlled by one and that thus, there was no violation of the constitutional doctrines of separation of powers and private nondelegation.
[brief] [...] filed an inverse condemnation action on March 22, 2013.  Da39.  On May 30, 2014, a jury awarded [...] $998,400 as just compensation for the value of the property the State acquired through eminent domain.  Da39.  Defendant testified that his share of the verdict would have been $7,544.93.  He received nothing from that verdict, after payment of attorney’s fees and other obligations.  **2T142.**  He did not tell Plaintiff about this jury verdict.  (“No, she was not involved in the process. ”)  **2T94.**  In a separate bench trial on [...]’s inverse condemnation claim, the court found that [...] had been deprived of access to the [...] for two and a half years, from April 2009 to November 2011.
[brief] TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | Cases | Page | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | Bender v.  Walgreen Eastern Co., Inc., 399 N.J. Super 584 (App. Div. 2008) | 12, 14 | | Ghandi v. Cespedes, 390 N.J. Super 193, 195 (App. Div. 2007) | 14 | | Rider v. Lynch, 42 N.J. 465 (1964) | 11 | | Sobotor v. Prudential Property & Cas. Ins. Co., 200 N.J. Super. 333 (App Div. 1984) | 11 | | Rules | | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | R. 2:6-1(2) | 8 |  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I
[brief] The email chain was between Plaintiff, [...] and [...] (1T; 31:18).  The treatment by [...] was violative of the principles of the State Police because it’s supposed to be very cordial and respectful (1T; 32:10).  Also, the Plaintiff was the Admin Officer, and it was her job to deal with [...] (1T; 32:1 to 32:24).  The accusation by [...] was false (1T; 33:11).  Plaintiff considered the email to be abusive (1T; 34:12 to 35:10).  There were further problems with [...] where he became involved with communications between the Plaintiff and [...] (1T; 36).
[brief] 131a-132a.  In the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Counts, Plaintiffs-Appellants alleged that the defendants conspired with and aided and abetted each other in the alleged fraudulent concealment or withholding of evidence in the 2015 Action.  132a-134a.  Neither the Complaint nor the Second Complaint in the 2020 Action, however, identified any document or other tangible evidence that [...] allegedly knew about but concealed (let alone falsified or “forged”) at any time during the course of the several years of discovery that had been conducted to date in the 2015 Action.
[brief] On the Brief: [...], Esq., Bar ID: [...]  [...]  On the Brief: [...], Esq., Bar ID: [...]  [...]  Dated: November 29, 2023  TABLE OF CONTENTS  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ........................................................................................................ iii  LEGAL ARGUMENT ..................................................................................................................1  I.  [...] IS REQUIRED TO PROVE MORE THAN MERE ALLEGATIONS.  (1T at 22:4 to 23:18)  .................................................................1  II.  THE POLICY EXCLUSIONS DO NOT APPLY TO BAR COVERAGE FOR ALLEGATIONS OF A TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE CLAIM.  (1T at 22:4 to 23:18)  ......................................................................................................................5  III.  [...] DID NOT WAIVE HIS AMBIGUITY ARGUMENT.  (1T at 22:4 to 23:18)  .................................................................................................................................6  IV.  AS A MATTER OF PUBLIC POLICY, [...] CANNOT DISCLAIM COVERAGE FOR A CLAIM BASED ON THE SAME SET OF FACTS THAT REQUIRES COVERAGE.  (1T at 22:4 to 23:18)  ...............7  V.  MATERIAL ISSUES OF FACT EXIST REGARDING [...]’S SUBJECTIVE INTENT.  (1T at 22:4 to 23:18)  .........................................................................................8
[brief] (3) the determination of whether the document or any part thereof is confidential and the source of the confidential information; (4) a statement of the agency's document retention and destruction policy and the last date on which documents that may have been responsive to the request were destroyed.  These Paff certifications are required of all the “moving parts” of the OPRA process.  The Records Custodian is often not in control or possession of records that are sought as the police department has their materials, the building department has their records, etc..  What records a custodian may actually routinely exercise dominion over (either by law or in practice) is very often limited\(^6\); the Paff certification acts to protect the custodian by demonstrating that whomever has the records has conducted an adequate search for them.  And commensurately, liability, sanctions or penalty potential shifts from the custodian to Board members, police chief or building code official if documents are not provided and the search is inadequate.
[brief] It found that “the property was leased and in use until the ongoing remediation required access to areas under and around the building that prohibited continued use ....  [W]ork was continuing, construction was continuing which prevented the continued commercial use for this period of time. ” (T3, 44:11-19) (emphasis added).  Moreover, the Trial Court found that “the property is actively undergoing remediation and was leased until -- up until 2023 when it was determined that remediation would require access to areas that would make it untenable to continue to rent. ” (T3, 51:11-15).  Essentially, the Trial Court’s conclusion was that because the Property was not abandoned, the lack of abandonment prevented a finding of discontinuance of the commercial use, despite the fact that the evidence established that all commercial use was, in fact, discontinued as of January 31, 2023.  Because there was substantial, credible evidence on the record to conclude that the commercial use of the building on the Property had been discontinued, the Trial Court erred in concluding that criterion (b) had not been satisfied.  4.
[brief] For the reasons stated here and in the opening brief, the Court should reverse the orders that (1) denied [...]’s requests for discovery and sua sponte vacated pre-existing orders; (2) denied adjournment to complete investigation and preparation of his PCR petition; (3) denied dismissal or rehearing based on newly discovered evidence of bad faith; (4) denied reconsideration; (5) denied recusal; (6) denied his PCR petition; and (7) denied his motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence.  To the extent the Court believes the current record does not yet establish that PCR and a new trial should be granted, the case must be remanded for an evidentiary hearing before a new judge on all issues raised below, and to provide [...] the opportunity to add any additional claims once counsel is permitted to complete investigation and submissions.
[brief] ”  Justice [...].  When viewed under any light, the facts in this case establish that [...]’s (“[...]”) appeal appears to be an apparent effort to rewrite history and create an alternative set of facts upon which to argue.  [...] creates an imaginative tale with no factual basis in the record and asserts irrelevant legal argument in an effort to support its motion for reconsideration for damages despite its own admission that [...] did not pay any amount, whatsoever, to acquire [...]’s share of the property.  [...]’s brief is replete with misrepresentations of the trial court’s stated reasons and holdings yet absent any citation to the record where these can be found.  By conflating fantasy with facts, [...]’s brief weaves a false narrative designed to persuade this court that the trial court erred in its finding that [...] suffered no damages by alleging that the trial court reached that decision through “erroneous conclusions” and holdings, none of which appears in the record below.  The facts in this case refute [...]’s unsupported fabrications asserted in its brief and instead, fully support the trial court’s finding that [...] failed to meet its burden to establish damages by a preponderance of the evidence.  [...]’s appeal fails to present any basis in fact or law for this court’s review or consideration and [...]’s legal arguments mistakenly rely upon legally insignificant Delaware shareholder derivative case law that contain facts so distinguishable, that even if the cases were relevant, and they are not relevant, the cases are inapposite.  [...]’s “Statement of the Issues Presented” is nothing more than inaccurate conclusory statements that misrepresent the trial court’s findings and holdings and are unsupported in the record below.  There is only one issue [...] should have presented in this appeal: whether the trial court’s decision is wholly unsupported by the facts in the record that a denial of justice occurred.
[brief] The NJCLA’s espoused goal was to “prohibit[] deceptive lending practices generally, N.J.S.A. 17:10-13 (replaced by N.J.S.A. 17:11C-20). ”  Lemelledo v. Benefit Mgmt. Corp., 150 N.J. 255, 271 (1997).  “If a violation of the CLA [was] proven, the typical remedy, obtainable by the [...] or by individual consumers, is voiding of the contract,” though the NJCLA also provided for awards of damages to aggrieved consumers.  Lemelledo, 150 N.J. at 272 (emphasis added).  Between 1962 and 1983, the NJCLA was amended seven times—many of the amendments added mortgage-based provisions, such as the Secondary Mortgage Loan Act of 1970.  See 1996 N.J. ALS 157; 1996 N.J. Laws 157; 1996 N.J. Ch. 157; 1997 N.J. A.N. 2513.  “On January 8, 1997, the Governor signed the New Jersey Licensed Lenders Act, which combines the [NJ]CLA with two mortgage-related statutes.\(^2\) L. 1996, c. 157 (codified at N.J.S.A. 17:11C-1 to -49).
[brief] The Court determines [...] is entitled to $511,005 in counsel fees from [...].  The Court reaches this figure by holding [...] responsible for every dollar [...] incurred in litigating against [...] from 2005 to 2015, but subtracting from the total fee share for [...]’s ultimate failure on the allocation issue.  The total fee – $1,193,281 – is multiplied by 36.4 ([...]’s initial allocation for remediation costs) and then divided by 85 ([...]’s ultimate allocation for remediation costs).  (Pa0054.)  Utilizing this calculation was in error because it is not supported by New Jersey law; it is not one of the approaches for calculating fees recognized by our courts.