[brief] THE LAW DIVISION CORRECTLY HELD THAT PLAINTIFF WAS NOT AN “EMPLOYEE” UNDER CEPA BECAUSE HIS LAW FIRM WAS RETAINED BY [...] TO PERFORM LEGAL WORK ON AN AS-NEEDED, INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR BASIS.  The Law Division correctly held that Plaintiff’s part-time role as an external County Counsel rendered him an independent contractor and not an employee for purposes of CEPA.  For an individual to have a valid claim against an employer under CEPA, he or she must be an “aggrieved employee or former employee” of the entity against which such a claim is asserted.  N.J.S.A. 34:19-5.  Under CEPA, an “employee” is defined as “[a]ny individual who performs services for and under the control and direction of an employer for wages or other remuneration. ”  N.J.S.A. 34:19-2(b).  The statutory term “employee[’]” is distinguishable from an individual serving as an “independent contractor,” see, e.g. Pfenninger v. Hunterdon Cent. Reg’l High Sch., 167 N.J. 230, 252 (2007) (“an independent contractor, in contrast to the average employee, contracts to do certain work according to his own methods, without being subject to the control of his employer except as to the product or result of his work” (quotation omitted)), as independent contractors are not entitled to protections under CEPA.  Perlowski v. Elson T. Killam Assocs., 384 N.J. Super. 467, 473 (Law Div. 2005).  In the seminal case of D’Annunzio v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 192 N.J. 110, 122 (2007), our Supreme Court established a three-factor test to analyze whether “a professional person or an individual otherwise providing specialized services allegedly as an independent contractor” can be construed as an “employee” for purposes of CEPA: “(1) employer control; (2) the worker’s economic dependence on the work relationship; and (3) the degree to which there has been a functional integration of the employer's business with that of the person doing the work at issue. ”  Id. at 122.  With respect to the latter factor, the D’Annunzio Court provided guidelines to determine whether there has been a functional integration: [h]as the worker become one of the "cogs" in the employer's enterprise?  Is the work continuous and directly required for the employer's business to be carried out, as opposed to intermittent and peripheral?  Is the professional routinely or regularly at the disposal of the employer to perform a portion of the employer's work, as opposed to being available to the public for professional services on his or her own terms?  Do the "professional" services include a duty to perform routine or administrative activities?  If so, an employer-employee relationship more likely has been established.  [Id. at 123-124].  The Court further adopted a twelve-factor test originally established in Pukowsky v. Caruso, 312 N.J. Super. 171, 182-83 (App. Div. 1998) to determine whether an “independent contractor” may qualify as an “employee” for purposes of CEPA: (1) the employer's right to control the means and manner of the worker's performance; (2) the kind of occupation—supervised or unsupervised; (3) skill; (4) who furnishes the equipment and workplace; (5) the length of time in which the individual has worked; (6) the method of payment; (7) the manner of termination of the work relationship; (8) whether there is annual leave; (9) whether the work is an integral part of the business of the ‘employer;’ (10) whether the worker accrues retirement benefits; (11) whether the ‘employer’ pays social security taxes; and (12) the intention of the parties.