ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] That approach is not only textual but logical: this rule would “undeniably serve to underscore the remedial purpose of the LAD,” (Da113), especially in cases where the [...] and the [...] have found an urgent need for emergency relief.  Pursuant to R. 1:36-3, copies of all unpublished opinions cited within this brief are submitted as part of the State’s Appendix (Ra1-5).  the mandatory, involuntary disclosure of transgender, gender non-conforming, or non-binary students’ gender identity or expression will cause significant and irreparable harm to students.  As the court reasoned, “there is no protected group more vulnerable, or more susceptible to physical or psychological harm, than transgender, gender non-conforming, and non-binary youth. ” (Da113); see also, e.g., Doe v. Boyertown Area Sch. Dist., 897 F.3d 518, 528-29 (3d Cir. 2018) (discussing these students’ “extraordinary social, psychological, and medical risks”); John & Jane Parents 1, 622 F.Supp.3d at 139; T.I.C.-C., 470 N.J. Super. at 609; N.J. Pub. L. 2018, c.60 § 1(a), 1(g).  Those harms are exacerbated by any “[m]istreatment,” including discriminatory treatment: if “transgender, gender non-conforming, and non-binary students face discrimination in schools, the risk to their wellbeing cannot be overstated—indeed, it can be life threatening.
[brief] ”  State v. Loftin, 287 N.J. Super. 76, 99 (App. Div. 1996).  The trial court performs a gatekeeping function, ensuring that there is “sufficient indicia of reliability. ”  Mays, 321 N.J. Super. at 628.  This has been described as “a screening process” whereby the trial court “will admit as genuine writings which have been proved prima facie genuine[,] leaving to the jury more intense review of the documents. ”  *State v. Hannah*, 448 N.J. Super. 78, 89 (App. Div. 2016) (citation and internal text alterations omitted).  Because the jury is the ultimate arbiter of authenticity, “[t]he judge does not determine whether the proponent has incontrovertibly proven [authenticity].
[brief] (3T113:8-10).  Plaintiff’s forensic accounting expert, [...], in review of [...]’s records stated in his report that “there are numerous expenses which appear personal in nature” and agreed that these personal expenses were not only Defendant’s, but Plaintiff’s as well.  (2T129:1-8).  [...], in review of credit card records and [...]’s general ledger predominately replied upon Plaintiff’s analysis of credit card details and took Plaintiff’s word for what the information represented, including what Plaintiff alleged were personal expenses of Defendant.  (2T134:2-135:11).  [...] only reviewed expenses Plaintiff challenged that [...] categorized as “major ones” and did not review the challenged “insignificant ones;” he did not review all the expenses Plaintiff alleged were Defendants, yet he still included those amounts in his total only by taking Plaintiff’s word for it.
[brief] The jury charges, and resulting verdict sheet in this case failed to adequately separate Plaintiff’s claims and inform the jury of the law regarding claims of hostile work environment and retaliation under the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination N.J.S.A. 10:5-1 et seq.  As a result, the jurors were confused and returned a verdict completely inconsistent with the evidence presented and patently unjust.  A proper jury charge is a prerequisite for a fair trial.  Reynolds v. Gonzalez, 172 N.J. 266, 288 (2002).  Jury Instructions should correctly state the applicable law in clear and understandable language. ”  Boryszewski v. Burke, 380 N.J. Super. 361, 374 (App. Div. 2005).  “[T]he ultimate responsibility rests with the court to instruct the jury regarding the appropriate law that is applicable to the evidence. ”  Das v. Thani, 171 N.J. 518, 530 (2002), and reversal is necessary only where the charge inadequately conveys the law and confuses or misleads the jury.  Id.  In this case, the Court’s instructions to the jury conflated Plaintiff’s four separate claims of religious discrimination, disability discrimination, retaliation for making complaints and retaliation for seeking legal advice.  The jury should have been instructed to separately determine whether Plaintiff has sustained her burden for each separate allegation:  (1)  Discrimination by creation of hostile work environment on the basis of religion, (2)  Discrimination by creation of hostile work environment on the basis of disability, retaliation for making complaints about discrimination, and retaliation for seeking legal advice.  These are four independent causes of action and the jury was not adequately instructed as to each of them.  Instead, the jury was instructed on hostile work environment based on religion or mental disability and retaliation for making internal complaints about discrimination or seeking legal advice, leading them to believe that Plaintiff’s claims consisted of only two separate allegations.  It is fundamental that the jury charge should set forth in clear understandable language the law that applies to the issues in the case Toto v. Ensuar 196 N.J. 134, 144 (2008).  An accurate charge is critical because it is a “road map that explains the applicable legal principles, outlines the jury’s function and spells out how the jury should apply the legal principles charged to the facts of the case at hand.  Toto v. Ensuar, 196 N.J. 134, 144 (2008)(quoting Viscik v. Fowler Equip. Co. 173 N.J. 1, 18 (2002)).  In this case, the manner in which the instructions were read made it impossible for the jury to properly determine whether the evidence supported each of Plaintiff’s claims separately.  As such, the jury was confused, said confusion resulted in the return of a verdict palpably contrary to the weight of the evidence presented, and the verdict must be set aside.
[directive] Bail Ranges for attempts or conspiracies should generally be the same as the actual substantive crime.  Statute Charge Description  Degree Bail Range 10%  Cash Bail Option  Actor commits, attempts to commit, conspires with another to commit, or threatens the immediate commission of an offense specified in Chapters 11 through 18 of Title 2C of the New Jersey Statutes; 2C:33-4; 2C:39-3; 2C:39-4 or 2C:39-5, (1)  With purpose to intimidate an individual or group of individuals because of race, color, 10% permissible religion, gender, disability, sexual orientation, gender identity or expression, national origin, or 1st Degree $50,000 to $150,000 ethnicity; or 2C:16-1a(1-3)  Bias Intimidation  (2)  Knowing that the conduct constituting the offense would cause an individual or group of individuals to be intimidated because of race, color, religion, gender, disability, sexual orientation, gender identity or expression, national origin, or ethnicity; or.  (3)  Under circumstances that cause any victim of the underlying offense to be intimidated and the victim reasonably believed that (a) the offense was committed with the purpose to 2nd Degree $35,000 to $100,000 10% permissible intimidate the victim or any person or entity in whose welfare the victim is interested because of race, color, religion, gender, disability, sexual orientation, gender identity or expression, 33  Updated December 2, 2013  Bail Schedule 2  STATUTES WHERE BAIL MAY BE SET BY A SUPERIOR COURT JUDGE OR A MUNICIPAL COURT JUDGE OR, IN THE MUNICIPAL COURT JUDGE’S ABSENCE, THE MUNICIPAL COURT ADMINISTRATOR OR DEPUTY COURT ADMINISTRATOR, PURSUANT TO RULE 3:26-2 requires warrants  Rule 3:3-1(c)(1) on the Bail Schedule 2 charges of robbery, criminal sexual contact, second degree aggravated assault, aggravated arson, arson, burglary, first or second degree violations of Chapter 35 (drug offenses), any crime involving the possession or use of a firearm, or conspiracies or attempts to commit such crimes.  Rule 3:3-1(c)(2-6) (indictable offenses) and Rule 7:2-2(b)(1-6) delineate factors regarding whether a warrant or summons should issue for other offenses.  Rule 3:26-1 (indictable offenses) and Rule 7:4-1 (non-indictable offenses) delineate factors to be considered when setting bail and provide for the option of R.O.R. bail where appropriate.  Bail Ranges for attempts or conspiracies should generally be the same as the actual substantive crime.
[brief] (A3)  To resolve Defendant’s breach of his promises made to Plaintiff during their relationship, the parties entered into a Settlement Agreement fully executed on November 16, 2011, referenced in the Complaint.  (A1)  Paragraph 23 of the Settlement Agreement acknowledges that the “Agreement shall be considered a contract by the parties duly enforceable in the Superior Court of New Jersey under the concept of this being a palimony case and same having been settled by the terms and conditions contained herein. ”  (A11)  Because the matter was settled and there were no outstanding issues at the time, and although Defendant did not file an Answer or otherwise respond, Plaintiff allowed the Complaint to be administratively dismissed.  Following Defendant’s breach of the Agreement in June 2017 and failure to cure the breach, Plaintiff brought suit against Defendant.  (A33)  On February 16, 2018, Plaintiff filed a Complaint in Law Division, seeking enforcement of the Settlement Agreement.  (A33)  On August 16, 2018, Defendant filed an Amended Answer and Counterclaim, alleging that the Agreement was void due to violation of the Statute of Frauds and fraud in the inducement, but also that Plaintiff had breached the contract.  (A33-34)  On March 13, 2019, the Presiding Judge of the Civil Division ordered the transfer of the matter to the Family Part.  A Motion and Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment were heard and denied on October 25, 2019.  (A34)  Despite attending an Early Settlement Panel and Mediation, the parties were unable to resolve the issues and the matter was set down for a plenary hearing on the threshold issue of whether the Settlement Agreement is enforceable.  Trial was held on March 9 and 10, 2020.  (2T, 3T)  The trial court gave its oral decision through a virtual court proceeding on June 22, 2020, (4T) and entered an Order on June 30, 2020, enforcing the Settlement Agreement and calculating damages as of the date of the Order.  (A25)  That Order was erroneously not served on counsel for the parties until February 10, 2021.  A subsequent Order was entered on April 16, 2021, correcting an error in the calculation of interest from the June 2020 Order and confirming the April 16, 2021 Order as the final Order.  (A17)  Defendant thereafter appealed, and Plaintiff cross-appealed.  (A27)  The Appellate Division released its published decision on May 6, 2022.  (A27)  Defendant filed a motion with the trial court on August 16, 2023, essentially asking the trial court to overturn much of the Appellate Division’s confirmation of the initial trial order.  (1T)  Plaintiff filed opposition and a cross-motion.  (Pa001)  The Court entered an Order on October 13, 2023.  (A51)  Defendant thereafter filed the instant appeal.  STATEMENT OF FACTS
[brief] See Moticka v. Weck Closure Systems, 183 Fed. Appx. 343, 353 (4th Cir. 2006) (explaining that where an employer gave an employee favorable treatment after the employee engaged in protected activity, “the inference of retaliatory motive is undercut”); Ameen v. Merck & Co., Inc., 226 Fed. Appx. 363, 376 (5th Cir. 2007) (finding “positive reviews and discretionary bonuses in the year following [Plaintiff’s protected activity] . . . is utterly inconsistent with an inference of retaliation.
[brief] *Entech Corp. v. City of Newark*, 351 N.J. Super. 440, 459 (Law Div. 2002).  “The rationale of such a holding is that one cannot endeavor to take advantage of a contract to be awarded under illegal specifications and then, if unsuccessful, seek to have the contract set aside. ”  *Waszen v. City of Atlantic City*, 1 N.J. 272, 276 (1949); see also N.J.S.A. 40A:11-13 (requiring prospective bidders under the Local Public Contracts Law to challenge bid specifications prior to the opening of bids).
[brief] [...] then emailed [...] on March 19, 2018 and explained the technical background of the installation of the vapor intrusion mitigation system to which they attained authorization from [...] and his manager.  (Da418-Da422.)  This email correspondence of March 19, 2018 had also attached again the November 14, 2017 correspondence.  As was with the initial sharing of this communication with [...] on November 14, 2017, [...] again did not object to, question, or seek further clarification as to these details when it was subsequently given to him again on March 19, 2018.  Instead, [...] consented again.  (Da418-Da422.)  Then, [...] emailed [...] again on April 2, 2018 with regard to installation of the sub slab depressurization system.  (Da423.)  Again, [...] did not question, object or seek clarification and instead acknowledged that he received the April 2, 2018 email and that he had authorized [...] to proceed.  (Da213 pg. 117, Lines 1-12.)  The fact that [...] failed to ask questions, failed to read communications sent to him, or failed to care whatsoever does not constitute the Authority, [...], or [...] falsely representing any of the scope of services to be performed, or tricking [...] into giving uninformed consent.  Instead, [...] was ignorant to all information being shared, but nonetheless, provided consent.  **CONCLUSION**
[brief] [...] also challenged the trustworthiness of [...]’s claim that [...] received information from the C.I. on 20 prior occasions and found the C.I. to be reliable 75 percent of the time, because, again, that information was not contained in [...]’s report.  As [...] pointed out, the offense report did not even indicate that the information about the male in the Kia came from a known informant.  Despite the compelling arguments advanced by [...], the trial court found [...]’s testimony entirely credible.
[brief] There are too many miscalculations, too many errors, too many deviations from accuracy towards [...]’s innocence.  This “INADEQUATE INVESTIGATION” has cause defendant one decade of his life.  For purposes of the due process clause of the United States Constitution's Fourteenth Amendment, in a criminal prosecution the presence or absence of bad faith on the part of the police with regard to the loss or destruction of possibly exculpatory evidence must necessarily turn on the police's knowledge of the exculpatory value of the evidence at the time it is lost or destroyed.  Under the due process clause of the United States Constitution's Fourteenth Amendment, the good or bad faith of the state is irrelevant when the state fails to disclose material exculpatory evidence to the defendant in a criminal prosecution.
[brief] A.  The [...] Found [...] Unsuitable For Promotion To The Rank Of Lieutenant Due To Her Adverse Employment History Including Insubordination And Untruthfulness Resulting In Major Disciplinary Action And Properly Sought Her Removal.  Perhaps recognizing the severity of her disciplinary history, [...] repeatedly asserts that she should have been automatically promoted without consideration of her past untruthfulness and disciplinary history on the false premise that the [...] never requested the removal of her name from the certification.  See Ab26-27 & Ab30.  Her assertion is unsupported by the record, as the [...] made clear that she was unsuitable for promotion and should be removed from the list rather than promoted if the Commission removed [...] from the certification.
[directive] Range  MUNICIPAL RULE setting to to to to to to to to to $1,000 $1,000 $1,000 $35,000 $35,000  Bail $5,000 $5,000 $5,000 $500 or crime.  TO warrant when PURSUANT  THE substantive considered a  Degree  Degree IN Degree Degree Degree Degree Degree Degree Disorderly whether Persons Degree OR, 2nd 2nd ADMINISTRATOR, 3rd 3rd 3rd 4th 4th 4th JUDGE actual be regarding to appropriate.  second to the degree factors COURT or a such used check; or degree make be lost as underage to factors on; possesses be uses same fourth purports to of delineate third draw could MUNICIPAL materials amount degree; where COURT $75,000; beverage the documents, delineate to which falsely actor 2 account be upon Schedule fourth or offenses) bail agency generally than if devices DEPUTY which alcoholic another; depending R.O.R. A no offenses) cards; such #9-05 less $200.
[brief] If hypothetically, the first sentence of N.J.S.A. 2A:15-97 stated "In any civil action brought for personal injury or death, except actions brought pursuant to the provisions of P.L. 1972, c.70 (C. 39:6A-1 et. seq.) or N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-27…”, then medical bills paid as a result of a medical malpractice claim would be recoverable, even though N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-27 does not specifically address the recovery of medical bills.  At the time of the enactment of the PIP statute in New Jersey in 1973 and in the years following that enactment Medpay payments were subrogable as a common law right of recovery which was supported by the subrogation provision contained in every automobile policy of insurance.  See Da 236-254.  Clearly the [...] was aware of the ability to recover Medpay payments as of their 1973 opinion.  As set forth above and in our prior brief nothing in the enactment of the collateral source rule or Perreira v. Rediger, 169 N.J. 399 (2001) impacted the recoverability of Medpay payments.  The consistency of this position is highlighted by the [...] bulletin number 1-11 dated July 5, 2001 (Pa 19).  That bulletin was issued in response to Perreira v. Rediger, 169 N.J. 399 (2001), and directed health insurance companies, health maintenance organizations, health service corporations, hospital service corporations, and medical services corporations to cease all subrogation and recovery efforts pursuant to the subrogation provisions of group or individual health insurance contracts or policies.  Clearly that bulletin was not directed at automobile or motor vehicle insurance companies.  It can be presumed that the [...] was aware of their prior position on the recovery of Medpay benefits and did not take the position the Medpay benefits authorized by various New Jersey motor vehicle policies were prohibited by the Supreme Court’s ruling in Perreira v. Rediger, 169 N.J. 399 (2001).
[directive] New Jersey State Board of Cosmetology and Hairstyling State Board of Court Reporting  State Board of Creative Arts  New Jersey State Board of Dentistry  State Board of Dietetics and Nutrition Board of Examiners of Electrical Contractors  Electrologists Advisory Committee  Elevator, Escalator, and Moving Walkway Mechanics Licensing Board  Fire Alarm, Burglar Alarm and Locksmith Advisory Committee  Genetic Counseling Advisory Committee  Hearing Aid Dispensers Examining Committee  State Board of Examiners of HVAC & Refrigeration Contractors  Home Inspection Advisory Committee  Interior Design Examination and Evaluation Committee  Joint Committee of Architects and Engineers  Licensed Master Hearth Specialist Advisory Committee  State Board of Marriage and Family Therapy  Examiners  New Jersey Board of Massage and Bodywork Therapy
[brief] “The length of time during which the hole existed as well as its alleged size create a reasonable inference that the defendant employees had either actual or constructive notice of the hole, as does the affidavit of a neighbor who reported the hole. ”  *Id.* at 418 (emphasis added).  It was not merely the length of time that led the Court in *Chatman* to find there was constructive notice – it was the totality of the circumstances, including the affidavits, which led to this determination.  The totality of the circumstances also led to the *Chatman* Court’s finding that the issue of palpably unreasonable should be addressed by a jury.  This will be further evaluated in Point III, infra.
[brief] The facts set forth in the Bernards opinion reflect that the [...], a defendant, transmitted notices of a December 9, 1985, special meeting by letter dated November 20, 1985, nineteen days before the meeting.  The notices were not published, with no hint of [...] responsibility evident in the opinion.  Id. at 26.  Thus, Bernards simply restates the legislative intent set forth in N.J.S.A. 10:4-6.  Interestingly, the opinion attempts to distinguish between the notice necessary to provide “Adequate Notice” and the phrase “advanced published notice as required by law” used in N.J.S.A. 10:4-15(a).  Section 15(a) permits a court to void any action taken by a public body in violation of the OPMA unless “advance published notice of at least 48 hours is provided as required by law,” which publication excuses the “failure to conform with any notice required by this act. ”  Id.  The Bernards court attempted to distinguish the different terms this way:  This “adequate notice” standard of N.J.S.A. 10:4–9(a), which limits the matters that may lawfully be considered, is not the same as the “advanced published notice” which may be required by law for specific governmental actions in N.J.S.A. 10:4–15(a).  [...], however, cannot claim the protection of N.J.S.A. 10:4–15(a), since it gave no “published notice,” but only “adequate notice” of the meeting, and such publication was not “required by law. ”  Bernards, 233 N.J. Super. at 26.  This provision of the OPMA does not, however, save the Borough’s defective notices because none of the actions challenged by Plaintiff were properly noticed.  The nod by the Bernards court to the Worts decision suggests an approval of the trial court’s analysis that answers the municipal culpability question not addressed directly by the Appellate Division.
[directive] Defendant Was Recently Adjudicated Delinquent for a Violent Crime.  4.5.7  A law enforcement agency shall apply for a complaint-warrant if within the last ten years the defendant as a juvenile was adjudicated delinquent for a crime involving a firearm, or a crime that if committed by an adult would be subject to the No Early Release Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2, or an attempt to commit any of the foregoing offenses, unless an assistant prosecutor or deputy attorney general consulted in accordance with Section 3.2 of this Directive, or a supervisory officer designated pursuant to subsection 3.3.2 who is authorized by the County Prosecutor to overcome presumptions under Section 4 of this Directive, determines that the presumption of 4.5.9.20 charging by complaint-warrant is overcome pursuant to subsection
[directive] The resolution shall specifjr those types of charges, taxes, fees, assessments, fines, or other obligations approved for card based or electronic funds transfer payment, except that credit card payment shall not be authorized for the payment of delinquent local unit obligations or for the redemption of local unit liens.  L. 1995,c.325,s.3.  Service charges; collection, assessment 4OA 5-46.  4.  Notwithstanding the provisions of any other law to the contrary and if not legally prohibited by an association or by an issuer, local units are authorized to assess and collect service charges related to obligations owed to or collected by the local unit when credit cards, debit cards or electronic funds transfer systems are utilized.