ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] APPELLANT’S BELATED ATTEMPT TO SEEK AN ADJUDICATORY HEARING FOR THE 2017 WFD PERMIT FAILS BECAUSE IT IS UNTIMELY AND THE COURT’S REVIEW OF [...]’S MARCH 14, 2023 DECISION SHOULD BE LIMITED TO THE DENIAL OF APPELLANT’S THIRD PARTY HEARING REQUEST FOR THE 2019 PERMIT MODIFICATION.  In Appellant’s brief, Appellant fails to address the [...]’s denial of the hearing request for the 2017 WFD Permit surrendering that aspect of this appeal.  [...]’s denial was based, in part, on the fact that Appellant did not file a hearing request for the 2017 WFD Permit within the thirty (30) day time period as required by the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), N.J.S.A. 52:14B-1 to -31 and the CZM Rules at N.J.A.C. 7:7-28.1.  (Aa0132-Aa0136).  Appellant’s hearing request was not filed before Appellant incorporated it into the hearing request for the 2019 Permit Modification on April 23, 2019, nearly two years after the 2017 WFD Permit was issued to [...].  Therefore, the Court should affirm [...]’s March 14, 2023 decision as it relates to Appellant’s belated attempt to include the 2017 WFD Permit in its hearing request and limit the review of [...]’s March 14, 2023 decision to whether [...] properly denied Appellant’s hearing request for the 2019 Permit Modification.
[brief] Defendant’s demeanor was “matter of fact. ” (8T129-15 to 20).  He told the police that twice in his life he heard or seen “stuff that wasn’t there,” but it rarely happened and lasted for only “a few seconds. ” (7T302-23 to 303-4, 303-24 to 304-2).  When he was seven or eight years old, defendant thought he heard a teacher’s and friend’s voices on the stairs of his house, even though they were not there.  (7T303-6 to 12).  He told his grandfather about this.  --- 2  The audio- and video-recorded interview (S-76) was played for the jury.  (7T268-25 to 269-14, 270-20).  incident.  (7T303-19 to 22).  Another time at his neighbor’s house he saw a “inkish” mass, staring through the window before it disappeared. ” (7T304-13 to 21).  Once he was lying in bed falling asleep when he felt a jolt on his chest, like from a defibrillator, and saw a transparent women floating through the ceiling.  (7T304-23 to 305-10).  Another time, he saw a transparent woman with gold lines on his neighbor’s roof.  (7T305-12 to 305-18; 8T137-23 to 138-1).  And once he saw faces on his bedroom wall while he was asleep.  (7T306-5 to 12).  Although defendant “liked everyone,” including his parents, he had thoughts over the past year about hurting his family “like what happened tonight.
[brief] The motion court appropriately relied on the dictionary definition of the term “thereupon” to determine that “the chronology of what happen[ed] takes the sentence that the plaintiff was relying upon out of the equation . . . .” (2T, at 14, 16).  See M.J. Paquet, Inc. v. N.J. Dep’t of Transp., 171 N.J. 378, 396 (2002) (using Webster’s Dictionary to determine the “plain and ordinary meaning” of the terms of an agreement).  Plaintiff opted to declare [...] in default in July 2022, before [...] closed title under the Mack-Cali Agreement in October 2022.  Accordingly, under the plain language of Section 13.1, the specific performance remedy never sprang into existence after Plaintiff terminated the PSA and recovered its deposit in July 2022.  (See 2T, at 15) (“The remedies that the plaintiff had were limited by [Section] 13.1 to a return of the deposit money as of July [2022] which they got. ”).  Indeed, as the first part of Section 13.1 provided, prior to the closing of the Mack-Cali Transaction, Plaintiff’s sole and exclusive remedy was the termination of the PSA and the return of Plaintiff’s deposit.  The motion court’s correct interpretation of Section 13.1 is consistent with the rest of the PSA.
[brief] Enhanced reliability does not mean that reliability is sufficient to establish reasonable merely by the call coming from 9-1-1; the reasonable suspicion inquiry is still a totality of the circumstances inquiry with three prongs.  In fact, in *Golotta* our Supreme Court acknowledged that anonymous 9-1-1 calls are not always equivalent to reports from identified citizen informants; a malicious 9-1-1 caller, for example, might use a public phone to make a report.  *Id.* at 219.  In other words, a 9-1-1 call made by an unidentified caller is still an anonymous tip.  See also *State v. Gamble*, 218 N.J. 412, 429-34 (2014) (declining to determine whether “anonymous 9-1-1 calls” are a sufficient basis for a stop outside of the intoxicated driving context) (emphasis added).  *Golotta* demonstrates that the stop in this case was unlawful.
[brief] Ultimately, on July 30, 2018, the Trial Court entered an order approving the Administrator's report and making other determinations.  (Da118).  (Da161).  Subsequently, on January 14, 2019, the Trial Court issued an order granting Defendant a sum of $978,157.99 in fees.  (Da212),  However, this decision was later reversed by the Appellate Court on the grounds that Defendant was not entitled to counsel fees from Estate assets on March 23, 2021.  (Da229).  (Da260).  On the same date, the Trial Court's order awarded Plaintiff a sum of $1,049,589.14 in fees.  (Da212).  This aspect of the order was vacated by the Appellate Court, which remanded the case back to the Trial Court for further proceedings regarding Plaintiff's motion for counsel fees under Rule 4:42-9(a)(2).
[brief] Defendants deficiencies in their discovery obligations requested prior to the discovery end date, the extremely limited nature of the discovery requested by [...] and the court’s inability to provide a trial date at the time the discovery was sought constituted good cause to extend discovery.  The motion courts’ rulings quashing a deposition subpoena, denying the motion to extend discovery and barring the use of discovery undertaken by the parties does not serve [...]’s goal of providing litigants with credible trial dates.
[directive] All questions regarding a petition for expungement under N.J.S.A. 2C:52-7 should be directed to the sitting CountyNicinage Criminal Division.  The effective date of the statute predates by several weeks the promulgation of the Instructions and Forms for Expungement of Arrest or Charge Records.  For that reason, a·nd in the interest of justice, persons with an eligible dismissal/acquittal/discharge that occurred between the legislation's April18, 2016 effective date and the promulgation date of these forms will be able to use the forms to seek an expungement.  For eligible dismissals/acquittals/discharges that occur after the promulgation date, potential will Applicants be required to request the at the· time of disposition.
[brief] 5.  Economic Benefits  Beyond the immediate environmental and recreational benefits, the land exchange has the potential to positively impact the local economy.  Increased access to high-quality open spaces can enhance property values, attract tourism, and stimulate local businesses, especially those related to outdoor recreation and eco-tourism.  By investing in the community's natural and recreational assets, [...] sets the stage for sustainable economic growth that benefits all residents.  In conclusion, the land exchange arrangement between [...] and [...] is a strategic action that leverages the Township's eminent domain powers to secure tangible, long-term benefits for the public.  This initiative exemplifies responsible and innovative municipal governance, aiming to enhance the quality of life for residents, preserve the community's environmental heritage, and guide sustainable development.  The clear public benefits of this exchange underscore its legality and the appropriateness of the Township's approach, firmly justifying the support of this Honorable Court.
[brief] ........................................................................................................ - 20 - A.  The Standard of Review ................................................................................................. - 20 - B.  There Were No Material Facts In Dispute That Precluded The Entry Of Summary Judgment In Defendant’s Favor ......................................................................................... - 21 - POINT II.  THE TRIAL COURT’S HOLDING THAT DEFENDANT WAS LIABLE FOR CONVERSION WAS MANIFESTLY UNSUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENTIAL RECORD (13T51-21 to 56-22) (36T28-1 to 52-25)  ..... - 26 - A.  Plaintiffs’ Failure To Make A Demand For The Return Of The “Converted” Property Was Fatal To Their Claims And The Trial Court’s Failure To Recognize This Requirement Constitutes Reversible Error As A Matter Of Law  ......................................................................................................................... - 26 - B.  The Trial Court’s Judgment Against Defendant For Conversion Was Manifestly Unsupported by the Evidential Record And Based On Net Opinion Expert Testimony ......................................................................................................................... - 28 - POINT III.
[brief] (2T 51:8-14)  Per Ordinance 412.22 (C) which directs specifically to 413.06 (F)  “Yard Requirements ”  “All buildings and porches shall be so located that the roofs, steps or extensions of the same shall not extend upon or overhand any public street, public avenue, public sidewalk, or any other lot unless permission is granted by that lot owner. ”  (Ra2-3)  Any applications on Block 247, Lot 1 required the Consent of the Landlord by Ordinance 413.06 (F).  (Id.)  Appellant denied obtaining same.  (2T: 25-26).  Plaintiff’s application to the Zoning Board was for the appeal of the HPC Denial and contained no plea for alternative relief or relief from zoning, interpretation of ordinance or variance request.  The Resolution of Denial from the Zoning Board of Adjustment was memorialized on March 2, 2022 and provided to Plaintiff (Pa134a).  The Resolution specifically noted the appeal of the Decision of the Historic Preservation Commission was denied.
[brief] the worker doctors to perform unnecessary diagnostic tests on patients or to bill for services irrespective of clinical need to exhaust patients’ insurance benefits.  There are allegations about how the [...] “whip[ped]” [...] “into shape” to comply with their scheme; how [...] decided what patients the worker-doctors treat and how; and how [...] convinced patients to have procedures that maximize insurance revenue and ignored worker-doctors’ complaints about unethical practices.  Pa033-034; Pa039.  Accordingly, it would be in some defendants’ interests to assert that they were coerced, or believed that they would lose their jobs if they did not participate in their superiors’ wrongful acts.  Legally and practically, it is impossible for one attorney to adequately represent all defendants, particularly the subordinates whose defenses differ materially from their superiors and who almost certainly have indemnification and cross-claims against each other, third-party claims for fraud, misrepresentation and malpractice against professionals hired by their codefendants, or may wish to settle with Plaintiffs – courses of action they will likely be forced to forego because their superiors (positioned to control or influence their decision making) are financing their legal fees for their shared counsel.
[brief] As such, Plaintiff has waived the following issues as a matter of law: (i) the trial court’s determination Plaintiff’s October 11, 2022, affidavit was a sham; (ii) the trial court’s determination the Township had no actual nor constructive notice of any allegedly dangerous condition; (iii) the trial court’s determination the Township did not act palpably unreasonable; (iv) and the trial court’s determination Plaintiff failed to demonstrate a valid loss of consortium claim. \(^1\) ### III.  PLAINTIFF’S WAIVER OF NECESSARY ELEMENTS OF THE TORT CLAIMS ACT RENDERS THE APPEAL MOOT.
[brief] Appellant is a residential mortgage lender that, through its predecessor-in-interest, negligently mismanaged the application of $177,887.35 payment it received.  Under contract law, state and federal statutory law, Appellant was required to apply the funds it received to the consumer loan at issue.  Instead, in an error that the Trial Judge categorized as a “ridiculous” business decision, the predecessor, in possession of the payment, sent $177,887.35 to a third party.  The third party then absconded with the funds.  Appellant believes that irrespective of its violation of the law and negligent business practice, it can nonetheless disavow its legal obligations, treat the loan as unpaid and foreclose on the home.  In short, Appellant takes no accountability for its conduct and continues to believe that the innocent defendants in this action should be responsible for Appellant’s illegal conduct.  The material facts are not in dispute and are irrefutable.
[brief] G. CONCLUSION.  For the foregoing reasons and based upon the above cited authorities, Appellant respectfully submits that this Court should enter an Order that (1) reinstates Appellant’s complaint; (2) reverses the trial court’s denial of the Second OTSC; (3) imposes a temporary injunction on [...]’s enforcement of the Restrictive Covenant as it pertains to [...]; (4) blue pencil’s the Restrictive Covenant to compress the Restricted Area by one mile; (5) invalidates the Indirect Competition Clause as it relates to [...]; and (6) remands the matter back to the trial court to proceed accordingly.
[directive] a in values NCA point and FTA the juxtapose to necessary not is it complaint-warrant, presumption a trigger to sufficient be may value NCA elevated an or value FTA elevated an either Directive, this an program services pretrial the provide would then which acomplaint-warrant, for apply will police that NCA the but low is FTA score the if words, other In release. of conditions appropriate recommend to opportunity sought.  be should acomplaint-warrant offense), the of degree on the (depending high or moderate, elevated, is score prosecutor's a guiding (presumptions 7.4.3 7.4.2.b, and 7.4.2.a, subsections also See 4.5.1.  subsection e.~., See, high or moderate or score, a NCA FTA or high either a by triggered are that detention pretrial seek to discretion automatically flag NVCA a Directive, this that under noting bears also It score).  FTA the of regardless score NCA also and 4.5.1, subsection see acomplaint-warrant, for apply will enforcement law that presumption a triggers 7.4.5.
[brief] Pra at 5.  New Jersey law is consistent with Arizona on this point.  The existence of a duty is a given for a product manufacturer, i.e., the duty is to produce a product that is reasonably fit, suitable and safe.  Whether defendant has discharged that duty is a matter of fact, not law, and must be determined by a jury pursuant to the controlling caselaw, NJPLA, New Jersey Constitution and Rules of Court.
[brief] ’”  In re Estate of Folcher, 224 N.J. 496, 506-07 (2016)  (citing In re Estate of Stockdale, 196 N.J. 275, 307 (2008))  As [...] concluded, the broad equitable powers of the Chancery Court do not provide a legal basis for awarding [...] fees for all of his collection efforts in this case.  The prior fee applications granted by the Chancery Court, including those granted by [...], were each tied to specific purported bad acts, which the Chancery Court found served as a basis for the shifting of fees.  (Da7-9, ¶¶5,7).  Indeed, for those specific purported bad acts, [...] has already been sanctioned more than $2.7 million dollars in attorneys’ fees/costs and has been incarcerated for nearly 800 days.  Notably, the Global Fee Application included fees incurred prior to the Chancery Court’s February 13, 2017 Order lifting the stay of execution.  (See Da13, ¶26).  Fees incurred prior to that date would have related strictly to standard post-judgment collection efforts.  For all of these reasons, the Chancery Court erred in granting the Global Fee Application.
[brief] ”  Romano v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 284 N.J. Super. 543, 551 (App. Div. 1995) (quoting Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759, 764-65 (3d Cir. 1994)).  To defeat a motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff must point to evidence in the record that could “allow a factfinder reasonably to infer that each of the employer's proffered non-discriminatory reasons ... was either a post hoc fabrication or otherwise did not actually motivate the employment action (that is, the proffered reason is a pretext).  [To do so,] the non-moving plaintiff must demonstrate such weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contradictions in the employer's proffered legitimate reasons for its action that a reasonable factfinder could rationally find them unworthy of credence, ... and hence infer that the employer did not act for [the asserted] non-discriminatory reasons.
[brief] In *Pickering*, the Supreme Court rejected the notion that a public employee has forfeited his or her right to free speech by accepting public employment firmly establishing that a public employee does not relinquish his or her First Amendment right to comment on matters of public interest, otherwise available to citizens, simply as the result of the fact of public employment.  The Supreme Court established a balancing test between the interests of the public employee, as a citizen, in commenting on matters of public concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees.  *Pickering*, 391 U.S. at 568.  The *Pickering* test is the classic balancing approach taken to evaluate First Amendment rights of public employees.  See *Waters v. Churchill*, 511 U.S. 661 (1994); *Rankin v. McPherson*, 483 U.S. 378 (1987); *Connick v. Myers*, 461 U.S. 138 (1983); *Sanjour v. EPA*, 984 F.2d 434 (D.C. Cir. 1993); *Baird v. Cutler*, 883 F. Supp. 591 (D. Utah 1995).
[brief] Here, the ZBA took immediate and appropriate action to correct the problem: it permitted the testimony to be re-presented.  See (Pa787; Pa499-502).  Making the Homeowners start from square one and to re-present proofs for which a verbatim record already exists makes no sense.  The Objectors moved for a remand and rehearing based upon an audio system failure at the May 23, 2022 hearing before the ZBA.  (Pa847-848).  The Trial Court acted properly in declining to remand the matter for a rehearing because the ZBA promptly discovered the audio malfunction during the pendency of the application and conducted a full rehearing sua sponte over two (2) nights to make the required verbatim transcript under N.J.S.A. 40:55D-10 f. (Pa787; Pa499-502).  On the Objectors’ motion, the Trial Court received evidence that: a) following the May 23, 2022 hearing, the Board Secretary learned that the hearing audio was not recorded; b) the Board Attorney immediately disclosed the audio malfunction to the Homeowners’ attorney and the Objectors’ attorney; and c) the Board Attorney took appropriate curative action to facilitate a rehearing where, "[t]he witnesses would again be subject to cross-examination and the evidence, and the witnesses presented by the objector would also have to re-testify [sic].” (Pa787).  Over the course of two (2) separate nights – August 22, 2022 and September 12, 2022 – the ZBA conducted a rehearing and maintained a verbatim record of those proceedings pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40:55D-10 f. (Pa499-502; Pa584-585).  The recorded rehearing took place before the ZBA received any further testimony, cross-examination, public comment, or summations on the application.
[brief] There are no equities inherent in the Defendants’ position or the trial court ruling.  Should the ruling stand, government officials, particularly the ones with ill motives or a deceitful heart (and whom should be under greater scrutiny) will simply cease using government-issued accounts.  There is no legitimate reason for officials to be communicating about government activities or business outside of the official government-issued email channels.  However, even without an intent of malfeasance, government records will simply be beyond the public reach and lost or destroyed in violation of the records destruction laws.  OPMA, OPRA and the First Amendment Right to Petition Government are rendered worthless if one does not know what the government is doing.  Paff v. Galloway was not fact-specific to government-issued email account logs.  The current, long-standing and litigation-tested practice inherent in the use of Paff certifications means that all [...] had to do was ask and the onus shifted - properly - to Board members using their personal email accounts to produce logs for them.  The trial court ruling in this matter cannot stand and must be reversed.  Respectfully submitted, [...]  [...], Esq.  DEFENDANTS/RESPONDENTS
[directive] Bail Range 10%  Cash Bail Option 2C:12-1c(4)  Aggravated Assault (continued) by Auto or Vessel (continued)  4th Degree $10,000 to $25,000  10% permissible  Actor employed by public or private facility or institution, which offers health or health related 2C:12-1d  Aggravated Assault services for the institutionalized elderly, commits a simple assault upon an institutionalized 4th Degree $2,500 to $5,000 10% permissible elderly person, age 60 or older.  Actor commits a simple assault in the presence of a child under age 16 at a school or 2C:12-1f 4th Degree $1,000 to $2,500 10% permissible  Aggravated Assault community sponsored youth sports event.  22  Updated December 2, 2013  Bail Schedule 2  STATUTES WHERE BAIL MAY BE SET BY A SUPERIOR COURT JUDGE OR A MUNICIPAL COURT JUDGE OR, IN THE MUNICIPAL COURT JUDGE’S ABSENCE, THE MUNICIPAL COURT ADMINISTRATOR OR DEPUTY COURT ADMINISTRATOR, PURSUANT TO RULE 3:26-2 requires warrants
[brief] ____________________  The Redevelopment Agreement contemplated a phased redevelopment project, which included the construction of a shopping mall (the “Center City Mall”), and an underground parking garage (the “Project Garage”), residential and commercial buildings (the “Residential Component” and the “Office Component,” respectively) and parking facilities (the “Authority Garage”) to service the customers, residents and occupants of these buildings and the surrounding Central Business District of the City (collectively, the “Project”).
[brief] First, an employee may pose a risk of harm to others due to their lack of skill or incompetence in performing the assigned work:  “The dangerous quality in the [employee] may consist of his incompetence or unskillfulness due to his youth or his lack of experience considered --- 8  There is no separate Model Civil Jury Charge that explicitly covers claims of negligent training or supervision; however, § 5.76 “Negligent Hiring” defines liability for an employer’s negligence for “the manner in which the employer hired, supervised, or retained an inappropriate or unfit employee. ” with reference to the act to be performed. ”  *Di Cosala* 91 N.J. at 171 (alteration in original) (quoting *Restatement (Second) of Agency*, § 213, cmt. d) (quoted in *Model Civil Jury Charge* § 5.76 at fn. 4).  For example, an employee may pose a danger due to inexperience or incompetence to perform tasks requiring specialized skills.  Someone who directs an employee to perform roofing or tree removal without ensuring that they have the requisite experience or training to ensure that others are not harmed may be found liable for an injury caused by the employee’s lack of skill.  See *Mavrikidis v. Petullo*, 153 N.J. 117, 137 (1998) (finding no evidence of negligent hiring of contractors who were skilled and experienced in performing the type of work asked of them); *Di Cosala*, 91 N.J. at 169-70 (citing *Nivins v. Sievers Hauling Corp.*, 424 F.Supp. 82 (D.N.J. 1976), which found evidence of a crane operator’s lack of training admissible to support a claim for negligent hiring).