ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] C.  The requirement that any modifications must be in writing was waived.  (Not raised below)  Defendants may raise Paragraph 17 of the Lease, which provides “this Lease contains the entire agreement between the parties hereto and may not be modified or terminated except by agreement in writing signed by both of the parties hereto. ”  However, it has long been the law of the State of New Jersey that provisions requiring any changes to be made in writing can be waived.
[brief] To be sure, the Supreme Court has held that defendants facing IFPA claims are entitled to a jury trial.  [...] N.J. Ins. Co. v. Lajara, 222 N.J. 129, 134 (2015).  Lajara, however, does not preclude the arbitration of IFPA claims.  Rather, Lajara analyzes, as a general matter, whether IFPA claims seek relief that is equitable or legal in nature to determine whether a right to a jury trial applies.  Id. at 144-46.  Ultimately, the Court concluded that the monetary remedies afforded by the IFPA, compensatory damages, treble damages, and attorneys’ fees and costs, were legal in nature, justifying a right to a jury trial.  Id. at 146.  But, even despite that conclusion, Lajara does not address the intersection of the IFPA and the No-Fault Law.  That issue was not in front of the Court.  And the IFPA applies to myriad types of insurance policies and claims, not only to motor vehicle policies and PIP benefits.  [...] wants this Court to apply *Lajara* broadly without any consideration of the provisions adopted by the Legislature in the No-Fault Law, but this Court should decline to do so and should not provide insurers with a loophole to avoid arbitration. \(^3\)  **CONCLUSION**
[brief] This was their absolute right to do with informed consent and full disclosure.  See RPC 1.7(b)(1); State v. Hudson, 443 N.J. Super. 276, 289 (App. Div. 2015).  They received full disclosure and waived any conflict both when they retained the [...] and again in response to the motion.  Pa319-20 ¶¶ 6, 14; Pa322-23 ¶¶ 6, 14; SDa47-52.  Accordingly, the [...] is not disqualified from representing the [...] under RPC 1.7(a)(2).
[brief] The [...] property was undeveloped and located in the I-2 “intensive industrial” zone which allowed warehouses and other industrial uses.  [...] acquired the [...] property to convert the warehouse to high-density office and residential mixed use as part of the Harsimus Cove South Redevelopment Plan.  [...]’s expert opined the subject property’s Highest and Best Use to be industrial development, however [...]’s expert opined the property’s Highest and Best Use was high-rise, residential and office development based on the surrounding properties.  In the alternative, [...]’s expert opined the property could be developed as an office building that complied with the existing I-2 zone.  The [...] court reiterated the holding of the Kugler Court:
[brief] (Pa80).  As a special condition of the Resolution, in number 10, it references the Applicant’s obligation to meet with the Borough Engineer in good faith to evaluate the overall stormwater collection system and alternative components in an effort to reduce proposed finished grades at the front section of the tri-plex buildings facing [...] without compromising the efficiency of the proposed stormwater collection system.  *(Pa83)*.  There is no evidence in the record that the Applicant meet with the Borough Engineer in a good faith effort to reduce the proposed finished grades.  There is no record of any Amended Site Plan or other documentation showing any reduction or modification in the revised lot grade approved by the Board.
[brief] At sentencing, defense counsel argued in favor of concurrent sentences of five years in prison for counts one and two, arguing that while the jury found defendant unlawfully possessed the gun, it found he was not the first aggressor based upon the video evidence.  (30T9-1 to 30T12-6).  Defense counsel highlighted defendant’s lack of a prior record and his ties to the community in arguing for the minimum sentence.  (30T6-19 to 23; 30T7-12 to 13).
[brief] RA0045-46.  However, the trial court extended the deadline for Appellant to comply with this Court’s December 2, 2022 Order and the March 3, 2023 Order to retain counsel until April 17, 2023.  See id.  Appellant failed to comply.  Accordingly, on April 17, 2023, [...] filed a motion to dismiss for failure to comply with the trial court’s March 31, 2023 Order, which [...] joined.
[brief] “And they kept saying it, like ya don’t want no smoke. ”  (23T 157-15 to 158-4)  [...]’s suspicion that they had guns was confirmed when one of them “lifted his shirt and showed … a weapon. ”  (23T 151-10 to 155-16)  [...] did not say “anything back” (23T 158-16 to 18), but he “put his hand in [his] pocket” “to send a signal” that he also had a gun and “to back off” (23T 156-9 to 157-14, 167-22 to 168-15, 197-13 to 18).
[brief] ”  *State v. Cordero*, 438 N.J. Super. 472, 490 (App. Div. 2014), certif. denied, 221 N.J. 287 (2015) (quoting *State v. Frost*, 158 N.J. 76, 83 (1999)); see also, *State v. McGuire*, 419 N.J. Super. 88, 139 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 208 N.J. 335 (2011); *State v. Wakefield*, 190 N.J. 397, 437-38 (2007), certif. denied, 552 U.S. 1146 (2008).  Even where a remark is improper, reversal of a conviction is not mandated.  “Not every instance of misconduct in a prosecutor’s summation will require a reversal of a conviction.  There must be a palpable impact.
[brief] [...], Plaintiffs/Respondents/ Cross-Appellants, v. [...], [...], Defendants/Appellants/Cross-Respondents and [...], Defendant/Respondent.  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION  DOCKET NO. [...]  CIVIL ACTION  On Appeal from Order of the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Ocean County  Docket No. [...]  Sat Below: Hon. [...], P.J.Ch.  REPLY
[brief] See. Leal eagle  Had I been afforded a fair trial, I could have proven that I was not guilty of the alleged violation, as evidenced by the law itself.  By plain fact, the statute at issue, N.J. Title 39 Section 39:4-92.2 was erroneously misapplied in my situation.  The statute mandates the lane change but explicitly includes the clause, “absent any other direction by a law enforcement officer."  Be it noted that all reports show that [...] was gesturing at me at the time of the incident and stated “I signaled for driver to move over” (Pa8); I could not read his mind and interpreted his gesturing as "other direction by a law enforcement officer" to simply slow down—which I did, to the best of my understanding as abiding by traffic law.  Furthermore, N.J. Title 39 Section 39:4-92.2 as referred to in my case was misapplied because it was out of date.  Please note that the copy of the statute, inadvertently sent along to me by my then-attorney [...], was the version dated 2013.  (Pa6-Pa10).  However, I have learned that the same statute had been revised by the time of my citation in 2021, including but not limited to, the notable addition of this clause:  "A motor vehicle operator shall not be assessed motor vehicle penalty points unless the stationary vehicle is displaying flashing, blinking, or alternating lights in accordance with this section at the time of the third or subsequent violation."  In addition to not being a violation due to the above-stated facts, this incident most certainly did not constitute my third or subsequent violation of any sort.  As such, I was never at (risk?) to receive points on my record.  In light of these facts, [...]'s plea offer, to was made on false premises...  Matter of principle…
[directive] USE OF FORCE POLICY Addendum A | December 2020 CEDs and Other Less-Lethal Devices and Ammunition  7  Deployment Techniques for CEDs 7.1  An officer issued a CED shall determine and record on an appropriate log, prior to field deployment, that the device, including the video recording function, is functional.  If the officer is equipped with a body worn camera as defined in Attorney General Law Enforcement Directive No. 2015-1 that will be used to record the circumstances of the firing/discharge of the CED in lieu of an internal video camera, the officer shall determine and record on an appropriate log that the body worn camera is functional.  7.2
[brief] the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act, N.J.S.A.  2A:16-50 to 62. ”); Excel Pharmacy Servs., LLC v. Liberty Mut. Ins., 825 F. App’x 65, 70 (3d Cir. 2020) (“[b]ut it is well settled that parties cannot bring a declaratory judgment under a statute when there is no private right of action under that statute. ”); In re Resol. Of State Comm’n of Investigation, 108 N.J. 35, 46 (1987) (dismissing cause of action seeking a judgment declaring a party violated a statute because plaintiffs did not have a private right of action under the statute); Ass’n of N.J. Chiropractors, Inc. v. Horizon Healthcare Servs., Inc., 2013 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2677 (Sup. Ct. App. Div. Nov. 4, 2013) (“plaintiffs are not entitled to use the declaratory judgment as a substitute for a private right of action.
[brief] The standards for granting a variance have been discussed by New Jersey's courts extensively.  As a matter of background, the comments of the Appellate Division in the case of Puleio v. North Brunswick Township Board of Adjustment, 375 N.J. Super. 613, 619-620 (App. Div. 2005) are instructive.  That court observed:  A variance is generally allowed because, although not in compliance, it is not offensive to the zoning ordinance.  Funeral Home Management, Inc. v. Basralian, 319 N.J. Super. 200, 207, (App. Div. 1999).  A zoning board may grant a variance to accommodate individual situations that require relief from restrictions otherwise applicable to the zone.  Ibid.  A variance relaxes the general rule of the ordinance to alleviate conditions specific to the particular piece of property.  Moriarty v. Pozner, 21 N.J. 199, 210-211 (1956).  Such an accommodation balances public and private interests and is in keeping with the principles of zoning principles.  See id. at 211.  Nevertheless, there is also case law suggesting that the expansion of a non-conforming use is less favored than the grant of a use variance.  Because of their incompatibility with the "objectives of uniform zoning, the courts have required that consistent with the property rights of those affected and with substantial justice, they should be reduced to conformity as quickly as is compatible with justice."  Town of Belleville v. Parrillo's, Inc., 83 N.J. 309, 315 (1980).  Expansion of the nonconforming use is not favored.  Urban v. Planning Bd., 124 N.J. 651 (1991); Accord, Scully-Bozarth Post v. Burlington Planning Bd., 362 N.J. Super. 296, 315 (App. Div.), certif. den. 178 N.J. 34 (2003); Conselice v. Borough of Seaside, 358 N.J. Super. 327, 333 (App. Div. 2003); Bonaventure Int'l v. Spring Lake, 350 N.J. Super. 420, 432 (App. Div. 2002).  Thus, not only is it the policy that nonconforming uses should not be expanded, such uses should, in fact, be limited or extinguished.  By allowing the expansion of the nonconforming use the Board actually made it less likely that the use should be reduced to conformity as quickly as is compatible with justice."  Town of Belleville v. Parrillo's, Inc., 83 N.J. 309, 315 (1980).  Specifically, "there exists a 'strong legislative policy favoring land use planning by ordinance rather than by variance.'"  Funeral Home Managements, Inc. v. Basralian, supra, 319 N.J. Super. at 207, (quoting Elco v. R.C. Maxwell Co., 292 N.J. Super. 118, 126, (App. Div. 1996)); See Also Kohl v. Mayor and Counsel of Fair Lawn, 50 N.J. 268, 275, (1967) (use variance should be granted "sparingly and with great caution since they tend to impair sound zoning.").  Liberally granting variances without adherence to the strict standards required for granting them as the Board did in the case before the Court, violates sound planning practices and adherence to the dictates of the Master Plan.  A. D VARIANCES
[brief] On October 22, 2019, a Grand Jury Indictment was returned against Defendant which charged him with the following: Luring, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:13-6(a), a crime of the Second Degree; Attempted Sexual Assault, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(c)(4)/2C:5-1(a), a crime of the Second Degree; and Attempted Endangering the Welfare of a Child, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a)/2C:5-1(a), a crime of the Third Degree.
[brief] The first major complaint against [...] related to bias, harassment, and corruption on her part for which he had reported her to the FBI.  (1T Pgs. 15 – 17).  The second major complaint related to how he had been targeted by the Sheriff’s officers.  (beginning at 1T Pg. 9).  More specifically, already in that other matter on September 16, 2022 over 2 months before trial in this matter, [...] indicated very clearly on the record that:  “Your Honor…  You continue to rule against me no matter what happens…  You are unfair.  You are not objective.  (1T Pg. 7, Lines 14-19).  [...] further complained to [...], that he had just spoken with the FBI field office in New Jersey and that they will be investigating this entire matter, including [...] (1T. Pg. 13, Line 16 - pg. 14, Line 2).  [...] continued, to Complain to [...] that she made every possible ruling against him and he had never seen a judge act like that in his life.  (1T Pg. 14, lines 17-20).  [...] reiterated that [...] will be hearing from the FBI field office in Newark, New Jersey because she allowed plaintiff/counsel for plaintiff in that action to weaponize the courts.  (1T Pg. 15, Lines 2-7).
[brief] Defendants-appellants [...], [...], and [...] (collectively, the “[...]”) respectfully request that this Court reverse the entry of a series of trial court orders that allowed plaintiff-appellee [...] (“Plaintiff”) to buy for $1.00 the same commercial property – [...] (the “Property”) – that Plaintiff was willing, little more than one year ago, to buy for $45,000,000.  Aside from the blatant inequity of such a result, Plaintiff’s position, adopted wholesale by the trial court, is fundamentally flawed as a matter of law.  The Memorandum of Understanding at issue, on which the trial court relied in transferring ownership of the Property, is unenforceable in that it lacks multiple terms essential to an obligation of this magnitude and illusory in that it does not obligate Plaintiff to do anything at all (other than pay $1.00).  This has led to a result that is simply absurd and should not be countenanced; a windfall on the one hand and no benefit whatsoever on the other.  Therefore, the [...] respectfully request that the trial court orders requiring the transfer be reversed.
[brief] The Competing Physician Amends His Complaint to Include a Claim for Tortious Interference with Business  The trial judge dismissed any claims pertaining to defamation and false light arising out of the October 2015 letter because the statute of limitations had lapsed.  (Da69).  The trial judge permitted the [...] to amend their complaint but barred them from repleading any defamation or false-light claim arising from the October 2015 letter.  (Da70)  The [...] then amended their complaint asserting a count for tortious interference with business.
[brief] See (Pa2148-Pa2156) Order Granting Plaintiff’s Motion For Entry Of Final Judgment By Default As To Defaulting Defendants  Pursuant To Rule 4:43-2(b) at 6-7 in Grewal v. Masselli, Docket No. [...] (Monmouth Cnty., March 19, 2021) (entering final judgment for restitution and disgorgement against defendants and nominal defendants); (Pa2157-Pa2164) Amended Final Judgment by Default and Order at 5-6 in Hoffman v. [...], Docket No. [...] (Passaic Cnty., March 31, 2015) (entering final judgment for restitution and disgorgement against defendants and nominal defendants); (Pa2056-Pa2071) Final Judgment by Default and Order at 6-7 in Hoffman v. [...], Docket No. [...] (Passaic Cnty., February 23, 2015) (same); (Pa2072-Pa2084) Order at 9-11 in Hoffman v. Zuck, Docket No. [...] (Hudson Cnty., May 9, 2014) (entering final judgment for restitution and disgorgement against defendants and relief defendants); (Pa2085-Pa2114) Consent Order And Final Judgment As To Defendants [...] And [...] at 10 in Chiesa v. Miller, Docket No. [...] (Essex Cnty., May 7, 2012) (allowing the Bureau Chief to commence an action upon the occurrence of a “Triggering Event” to collect a judgment of restitution, disgorgement, and a civil penalty); (Pa2115-Pa2139) Final Judgment and Consent Order at 16 in Dow v. Lucchetto, Jr., Docket No. [...] (Union Cnty., May 4, 2011) (entering a final judgment and consent order that includes restitution to be paid for investors and disgorgement to be paid to the Bureau of Securities); (Pa2140-Pa2147)
[directive] Intelligence is key to effective law enforcement.  As noted in the U.S. Attorney General’s Guidelines on General Crimes, Racketeering Enterprise and Terrorism Enterprise Investigations, “Members of groups or organizations acting in concert to violate the law present a grave threat to society...guidelines establish safeguards for group investigations...including 1 tighter management controls and higher levels of review. ”  Within New Jersey, the Division of State Police has long been a leader in the intelligence field.  Today’s environment requires that all law enforcement agencies understand and use generally-accepted policies relating to intelligence.  The most common standard in state and local law enforcement is 28 CFR Part 23, the Criminal Intelligence System Operating Policies.  In the past, these policies have only been mandatory for multi-jurisdictional intelligence systems that were established or operated with the assistance of federal funding through the U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Assistance.  Today, these policies are the accepted standard for many intelligence systems, involving thousands of agencies across the country.  As the result of many factors, agencies large and small are either establishing or re- dedicating their intelligence efforts.  It is therefore appropriate that, at this time, the Attorney General, as Chief Law Enforcement Officer in the State of New Jersey, promulgate guidelines that apply to all agencies in or supervised by the Department of Law and Public Safety, including county and municipal agencies with law enforcement powers.
[brief] It is not disputed that a public school is a public accommodation under the LAD; however, it is equally significant for this Court to recognize that a public school is not a traditional public accommodation, such as a restaurant or bakery.  Schools are built on transparency with parents and, to that end, have legal obligations to parents and students, alike.  In recognition of the LAD’s protection of gender identity and expression, the Policy requires District to recognize and honor a student’s gender identity.
[brief] (Da44).  In addition, in the [...] Certification of July 18, 2018, Mr. [...] certified that he received a letter from [...], counsel for [...], on July 16, 2018, indicating that he would not consent to intervention by [...] based on R. 4:85-1.  [...] certified that, on July 20, 2018, he responded to the July 16, 2018 letter from [...], asking Mr. Quinn to reconsider.  (Da44).  [...] provided Mr. [...] with a form of Consent Order, which he signed on behalf of [...].  (Da44).  Accordingly, all of the correspondence in and among the attorneys confirmed that the [...] was counsel to [...] Miranda.
[brief] But “many [of [...]’s] high school students . . . do not have a computer in their home,” and the District “does not allow students to take home district-purchased devices. ”  Ibid.  As a result, students who do not have equitable access to a computer must resort to “using their personal cell phones to complete homework assignments, which may not be conducive to producing quality work,” or they just do not complete computer-based assignments.  Ibid.  [...] also requires all teachers to adhere to strict scripts and pacing guidelines for curriculum.  (Ra136; Ra207).  Because of this, “even if students are struggling, [teachers] have to move on to keep up with the pacing guidelines.  There is not time to pause to ensure” that students have comprehended or retained the lesson.  (Ra212).  This has a profound impact on ELL students where “even though some scripts and instructional frameworks may have suggestions for differentiating [] ELL students, there is no time to incorporate those ideas” as teachers “have to rush through their lessons to ensure they are on track. ”  Ibid.  As a result of the mandated adherence to pacing guidelines, as well as constant changes to curriculum, there is “little room for differentiating to support the needs of individual students. ” (Ra136; Ra203).  These policies directly explain this court’s finding that the “quality of education in [...] . . . is deficient.
[brief] 11  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS, AND RULINGS BEING APPEALED  1.  Flood Hazard Area Verification & Flood Hazard area Individual Permit, [...], [...], dated August 14, 2023.  (Aa5-Aa45).  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES  Cases  In re Stormwater Management Rules, 348 N.J. Super. 451, 457 (App. Div. 2006)  ..................................................................................................................  1  Other Authorities  BMP Manual, Chapter 10.4 .................................................................................................  2 BMP Manual, Chapter 12 .....................................................................................................  5, 7 BMP Manual, Chapter 13 .....................................................................................................  5, 7, 8 Rules N.J.A.C. 7:8-5.9 ....................................................................................................................  1 Regulations N.J.A.C. 7:13-11.6(e) ...........................................................................................................  11 N.J.A.C. 7:13-18.8(b) ...........................................................................................................  11  PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND STATEMENT OF FACTS
[brief] Pa169.  On September 1, 2015, independent of the WMPA sale/purchase transaction, the same parties, [...], as lessor, and [...], as tenant, entered into a written “Land Lease” for the Hughesville Mill Site’s 70 acres.  Plaintiffs intended to install and operate a solar energy facility on that land.  The lease called for a 20 year term, in consideration of an annual rent of $200,000.00 per year, triple net with an annual escalation of 1.5% of the prior year’s rent amount, due on each September 1.  Pa169-70.  On September 21, 2015, [...] and Fiberville Estates prepared a Closing Statement, apparently in anticipation of closing title to the assignment of SREC and commencement of the Land Lease.  The Closing Statement showed a balance due to [...], in the sum of $1,006,000.00.  As shown by the Bill of Sale, the consideration was paid, and the closing of title was concluded.  Pa170.  At a meeting on May 8, 2017, the Planning Board granted preliminary and final site plan approval to the applicant [...] Project LLC to construct and operate the Solar Project at the Project Site (the "Approval".)
[directive] The supervisor or other officer receiving the complaint shall complete the appropriate internal affairs report form.  The report form should have adequate instructions for proper completion.  Attached to this directive as Appendix B is a standardized statewide public complaint form that will be available in multiple languages in electronic format on the Attorney General’s website.  Agencies shall make available to complainants versions of the standardized form in all of those languages in their offices and, if the agency has a website, online.  5.1.5