ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The Department’s decision to newly seize on the statutory term “excessive” on the fly after [...] brought an adjudication challenging the written ruling starkly and irreconcilably contrasts with how this State’s administrative bodies—including the Department itself—have fulfilled statutory delegations to address related terms.  For instance, the Department’s own automobile insurance regulations have defined the meaning of “excessive” with precise formulas.  See N.J.A.C. 11:3-20.6 (“Excessive subsidization may exist if the number of dollars of excess profit, as calculated pursuant to this subchapter, for an individual insurer within an insurance holding company system, exceeds .5 percent (one half of one percent) of its earned premiums for the three calendar-accident years immediately preceding the year in which the excess profits report is due to the extent that this excess profit has not been refunded or credited to policyholders. ” (emphasis added)); N.J.A.C. 11:3-20.3 (similar).  These regulations implement N.J.S.A. 17:29A-5.7, which requires insurers to file annual profits reports and provides that “that the commissioner may order an adjustment in the combined profits report . . . one or more of the insurers in that system are excessively subsidizing other insurers in that system. ” (emphasis added)); see also N.J.S.A. 17:29A-5.16 (“The commissioner shall promulgate rules and regulations . . . that he deems necessary. ”).  Similarly, regulations governing small employer benefit program insurance provide that “[r]ates will be considered excessive if they are projected to give rise to a loss ratio that is less than the loss ratio for the reference rate filing, increased by an amount that reflects the savings giving rise to the _____________________
[directive] Approval for Access to “Tagged” BWC Recordings.  A BWC recording tagged pursuant to Section 9.3 shall not be accessed, viewed, copied, disseminated, or otherwise used without first obtaining the permission of the County Prosecutor or designee, or the Director of the Division of Criminal Justice or designee.  The County Prosecutor or Director may authorize the law enforcement executive, and one or more superior officers or duty positions (e.g., head of the detective bureau) identified by the law enforcement executive, to grant permission pursuant to this Section to access, view, copy, disseminate, or otherwise use BWC recordings tagged pursuant to Section 9.3.  See also Section 10.1 (specifying the purposes for which access to a BWC recording is permitted).  9.5
[brief] ”  *Id.* at 605.  Further, as in this case, the defendant maintained that “nearly all the system variables discussed in *Henderson* apply to in-court identifications, and that this traditional practice ‘does not comport with the post-*Henderson* legal landscape and must be updated. ’ ”  *Id.* at 605-06.  *16  We rejected that argument, stating that “[t]he relief defendant seeks would represent a significant change to our State's eyewitness identification jurisprudence,” which is contrary to the “well-established precedent, including *Henderson*.”
[brief] ” (Ja122; 5T 80:20-21).  Defendant turned 180 degrees in this matter to conclude the opposite, without any help from the Board Planner (who sat through five of the hearings and all of [...]’ presentation, but neither volunteered nor was asked for her thoughts on this issue), and without any other evidence in the record to allow it to reach this contrary legal conclusion.  Indeed, other than [...]’ testimony, and the Foxdale Resolution itself, the record is silent on the issue.  In a recent opinion that substantially affirmed the trial court’s reversal of a denied density variance, the Appellate Division held that a resolution based on the “personal disagreement of the Board members with plaintiff’s evidence and experts[,]” with “only bald conclusions rather than sufficient findings supported by facts in the record,” was arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable.  [...] v. [...], Dkt No. [...] (App. Div. Oct. 10, 2024) (Pra24).  As noted by the trial court, “Simply saying, I do [not] care what your expert says, I disagree is, by definition, arbitrary and capricious and unreasonable. ”  Id. at 14 (Pra14).  The acceptance or rejection of expert testimony is conclusive on appeal, when reasonably made.  Kramer, 45 N.J. at 288 (emphasis added).  The prerequisite to deference is reasonableness, and Defendant cannot show how its rejection of both these experts was reasonable, or at the very least, that it was not unreasonable.  Like the ET Management decision, the Court should reverse.
[brief] In *Mayes v. Jackson Township Rent Leveling Board*, 103 N.J. 362 (1986), the Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of two rent control ordinances that, like Hoboken’s, used a “return-on-equity” standard and investment-based approach to determine fair return.  The Court cited [...]’s *Guidelines for Drafting Rent Control Laws: Lessons of a Decade*, 35 Rutgers L. Rev. 723 (1983) to describe the various methods that towns and cities could adopt to determine what constitutes a fair return.  *Id.* at 367.  Those methods include return on value, return on equity, return on gross rent, percentage net operating income, cash flow, and maintenance of net operating income.  The Court cited Baar’s analysis that “[t]here are substantial differences in the manner in which each of these formulas operates and in the landlords and tenants which they benefit. ”  *Id.*  Ultimately, the Court held that the ordinances using a return on equity and investment-based approach to fair return are constitutional because they protected landlords from confiscatory takings through measures that the Hoboken RCO also contains, including: automatic inflationary increase for base rent, tax surcharges for increases in municipal property taxes, and hardship increases if a landlord cannot meet operating expenses or receive a fair return on investment, defined as six percent above available passbook interest rates in one of the challenged ordinances, which is the same way Hoboken defines a fair return on investment.  The City of Hoboken adopted a method of calculating rent control and hardship increases that the Supreme Court has recognized as constitutionally valid and the method adopted by the City should not be disregarded by the Board or the Courts, especially absent a finding that the current rent is confiscatory.
[brief] [...] RAISES AS TO THE COURT’S FAILURE TO ACT WITHIN THE LIMITS OF R. 1:10-3.  Plaintiffs apparently agree that the, “scope of relief in a motion in aid of litigants' rights is limited to remediation of the violation of a court order. ”  Abbott v. Burke, 206 N.J. 332, 371 (2011).  However, Plaintiffs recount in their opposition all of the conduct that predated the June 7, 2016 restraining Order, which were not the violations raised in their November 2017 Motion in Aid of Litigants’ Rights.  (Pb25)  Those other actions which led to the June 7, 2016 restraints are not relevant to the November 2017 R. 1:10-3 motion, because those violations were remedied by the June 7, 2016 Order of restraint.  None were alleged to have been repeated as part of Plaintiffs’ November 2017 R. 1:10-3 motion; only that [...] filed a pleading that alleged facts that were opposite of the Court and arbitrator findings in this case for the change in management control.  (1T20:24-21:3(1T35:8-18)  Thus, Plaintiffs cannot dispute that, despite almost 1.5 years passing after the June 2016 restraining order, Plaintiffs did not allege any actual interference with the management or operation of the Company in November 2017.  Plaintiffs alleged only that the federal pleadings violated the June 2016 Order and that the cost to defend the federal filings was hurting the Company’s finances.  (1T24:11-21)  However, in November 2017 the Arbitration proceedings were still ongoing and Plaintiffs were still pursuing [...]’s expulsion from the Company.  They were voluntarily incurring legal fees anyway and could not fairly argue that any fees were destroying the Company’s ability to operate.  The Chancery Court also did not find any actual interference with operation or management of the Company.  The Court stated that the Plaintiffs’ 2017 motion in aid of litigant’s rights was based on the SDNY complaint violating the June 7th restraint, and that Plaintiffs sought attorneys’ fees and an Order requiring withdrawal of that pleading.  (1T20:24-21-3) (1T35:8-18) (1T32:16-24) (Da1899)
[brief] Nothing the Chiropractors say undermines the ironclad application of those principles to this case: AICRA’s dispute-resolution provision must not be applied to Plaintiffs’ (and other insurers’) fraud claims for damages to avoid rendering the statute in violation of the constitutional right to a jury trial on those claims.  Finally, the Chiropractors are incorrect that *Lajara* does not control this case because there was no waiver issue in *Lajara*.  Plaintiffs did not waive a right to a jury trial on their fraud claims, so there is no waiver issue here either.
[brief] A counteroffer is a repudiation of a contract.  Berbarian v. Lynn, 355 N.J. Super. 210, 217 (App. Div. 2002)(emphasis added)(holding that a --- \(^4\)  As evidence of this agreement to reduce the terms to a formal writing is the provision of the formal writing by counsel for Appellant.  See Pa41-44.  “counteroffer operates a rejection because it implies that the offeree will not consent to the terms of the original offer and will only enter into the transaction on the terms stated in the counter offer. ”)  Accordingly, there is no settlement agreement to be enforced and Appellant’s appeal should be denied.
[brief] His non-corroborated contention that he informed the Decedent when he was leaving a party was contradicted by the credible testimony of [...]:  There were times when [...] and [...] would go to parties and [...] would just leave [...] by herself, just sneak out.  Last time she told me that he did that, she said she was there by herself, and he thought it was a joke.  He thought it was funny that he would leave her at parties.  They were just opposite people, just – it was just odd.  He would leave the relationship, abandon her for long periods of time.  It was upsetting to her that he would do that.  (5T8-1 to 10).  The Petitioner repeatedly hangs his hat on alleged cards and notes sent to the Decedent.  However, the record overwhelmingly demonstrates the marriage as a troubled one, accompanied by extended periods of separation and discord.
[brief] (Raised Below: 7T, at 24:13-30:2)  Defendants begin their next argument with an allusion to the “feel of the case” doctrine cited in Plaintiff’s Standard of Review.  This is puzzling, first, because [...] made her feel of the case so undeniably clear when she repeatedly denied Defendants’ post-trial motions.  And it is puzzling, second, because of how thoroughly [...] analyzed the Defense adjuster’s Certification in doing so.  [...] disregarded the Defense adjuster’s Certification for three reasons: (1) it was factually incorrect regarding the location of sheriff’s officers in relation to the courtroom; (2) it was suspiciously timed; and (3) it was uncorroborated by the accounts of anyone else who was present in the courtroom at the time, none of whom reported any improper conduct by Plaintiff (7T, at 26:17-27:25).
[brief] Thus, the invited-error doctrine surely applies here.  Testimony of an officer suggesting police have superior knowledge than what is presented to the jury is subject to the invited-error doctrine.  State v. Kemp, 195 N.J. 136, 153-56 (2008).  The alleged error here, which the State does not concede, see Point VI(2), below, an officer opining on guilt, see, e.g., State v. McLean, 205 N.J. 438, 460-61 (2011), should likewise come within the doctrine.
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY ENTERED FINAL JUDGMENT AGAINST [...].  (36T 4:1 to 56:13; 37T 71:25 to 97:1).  [...] and the entity defendants bizarrely contend in Point VII of their brief that the trial court erred in failing to dismiss the claims against [...] Hedvat, even though she filed her own separate appeal and is not an appellant in this matter, [...].  (Db79).  In fact, appellants here opposed Plaintiffs’ motion to consolidate the two appeals.  To the extent a response is warranted in these circumstances, in addition to the arguments in this brief, Plaintiffs incorporate herein by reference the facts and arguments presented in their brief in [...]’s separate appeal, [...], which the Court ordered be calendared back-to-back with this case.  VIII.
[directive] Rule 3:3-1(c)(1) on the Bail Schedule 2 charges of robbery, criminal sexual contact, second degree aggravated assault, aggravated arson, arson, burglary, first or second degree violations of Chapter 35 (drug offenses), any crime involving the possession or use of a firearm, or conspiracies or attempts to commit such crimes.  Rule 3:3-1(c)(2-6) (indictable offenses) and Rule 7:2-2(b)(1-6) delineate factors regarding whether a warrant or summons should issue for other offenses.  Rule 3:26-1 (indictable offenses) and Rule 7:4-1 (non-indictable offenses) delineate factors to be considered when setting bail and provide for the option of R.O.R. bail where appropriate.
[brief] ”  The court took into account [...]'s ability “to observe the defendants at the scene of the crime,” the accuracy of her descriptions of defendants prior to trial, and the fact that [...] identified both defendants without having viewed them in shackles prior to his testimony.  We concur that regardless of any shortcomings in courtroom management, [...]'s identification of defendants in the presence of the jury was sufficiently reliable to have been properly received and considered by the jury.
[brief] POINT II  THE ERRONEOUS DETERMINATION OF THE COURT THAT THERE WAS NO DANGEROUS CONDITION ONLY APPLIED TO THE TORT CLAIMS ACT AND DOES NOT PRECLUDE A FINDING OF NEGLIGENCE AS TO RESPONDENT [...] (2T, Pa20-34)  Respondent [...] argues in their brief that since the trial Court found that there was no dangerous condition in the November 16, 2022 Order and Reasoning, that Appellant cannot prove negligence against Respondent [...].  (Pa1-19)  First, the trial Court found that the determination as to a dangerous condition was only applicable to Respondent [...].  (Pa20-34)  In the Order dated March 28, 2023, the trial Court states, "This Court found in its November 16, 2022, Order and Statement of Reasons that the record demonstrated that the parking lot defects alleged by Plaintiff were "minor, trivial or insignificant" and were not a dangerous condition under the TCA.  Such finding was applicable to Defendant [...] only as appropriate under the TCA."  (Pa28)  Second, a dangerous condition is an element of the TCA, not a requirement to prove a duty owed by Respondent [...].  As such, it is very clear from the record that the trial Court did not make a determination as to a dangerous condition with regard to the claims against Respondent [...], nor is it an essential element of proving duty owed by Respondent [...].
[directive] Upon notification, the Property Management will A make an appointment with the bank.  representative of the [...] will accompany [...] sworn personnel to or cash All the bank and witness the counting and verification process.  in deposits will be counted by the bank and verified.  Any differences occur in mn cash amounts shall be noted.  Differences ifthere counts are counterfeit bills found by bank personnel.  counterfeit bills  All shall be turned over the [...] and to deducted from the actual seizure amount.  - -  Every deposit willhe accompanied with a deposit slip.  Every deposit slip shall include the name, account number and any other case the information required bank.  The [...] by shall be provided by the seizing entity with sufficient information in required to accurately record the seizure its records.  of 2.  Establishment Accounts
[brief] The MBPA states that agreements “existing prior to the effective date of this act that are continuing in nature, have an indefinite term or have no specific duration shall be deemed for purposes of this act to have been renewed 60 days after the effective date of this act. ”  N.J. Stat. Ann. § 33:1-93.15(b).  Thus, the Wholesaler Agreement and its arbitration provision renewed 60 days after the MBPA’s effective date, which means that the renewed arbitration clause applies to all of Appellants’ claims, including the statutory claims.  See [...] v. [...], [...], 2020 WL 3864974, at *3 (N.J. Sup. Ct. App. Div. 2020) (Da79-Da84) (finding that arbitration provision need \(^{15}\) Bill S2170, 211th Legislature (2004), available at https://pub.njleg.state.nj.us/Bills/2004/S2500/2170_I1.PDF; A3619, 211th Legislature (2005), available at https://pub.njleg.state.nj.us/Bills/2004/A3500/3619_I1.PDF.  (Da67-Da76.).) not state that plaintiffs waived their statutory right to sue in court because the plaintiffs were not an “average member of the public” and “are sophisticated”).
[brief] _Id._ at 481.  In addition, [...] noted in its brief that under the New Jersey Tort Claims Act, “immunity from tort liability is the general rule [for a public entity] and liability is the exception. ”  *Polzo v. County of Essex*, 196 N.J. 569, 578 (2008).  These cases and the Tort Claims Act are directly on point, and Plaintiff offers no argument or contradictory law to suggest otherwise.
[brief] New Jersey Rule of Evidence 404(b) sharply limits the admission of evidence of other crimes or wrongs.  This limitation is essential to guard against the risk “that the jury may convict the defendant because he is a ‘bad’ person in general” rather than because of the evidence adduced at trial.  *State v. Cofield*, 127 N.J. 328, 336 (1992).  “Because evidence of a previous misconduct ‘has a unique tendency’ to prejudice a jury, it must be admitted with caution. ”  *State v. Willis*, 225 N.J. 85, 97 (2016).  Prior-bad-act evidence “has the effect of suggesting to a jury that a defendant has a propensity to commit crimes, and, therefore, that it is more probable that he committed the crime for which he is on trial. ”  *Ibid.* (internal quotation marks omitted).  To make certain that such evidence will be used only for appropriate, limited purposes and not to demonstrate the defendant’s propensity to commit crime, *Cofield* set out a four-pronged test for the admissibility of evidence under N.J.R.E. 404(b): (1) the evidence of the other crime must be relevant to a material issue in dispute; (2) it must be similar in kind and reasonably close in time to the offense charged; (3) the evidence must be clear and convincing; and, (4) the evidence’s probative value must not be outweighed by its apparent prejudice.  *Cofield*, 127 N.J. at 338.  As the *Cofield* court emphasized, admitting evidence of other bad acts is the exception, not the rule.  *Id.* at 337.  As such, N.J.R.E. 404(b) is a rule of exclusion, not a rule of inclusion.  *Willis*, 225 N.J. at 100.  The evidence in this case failed to meet prongs (1) and (4) of the *Cofield* test.  Moreover, the failure to give any instruction to the jury to not consider the choking as evidence of [...]’s bad character exacerbated the prejudice from the inappropriate admission of the other-bad-act evidence.  The evidence presented at trial was not relevant to any material issue in dispute, which is a prerequisite for admission of other-bad-act evidence.  *Willis*, 225 N.J. at 98.
[brief] ³ 2T refers to the transcript dated January 17, 2023.  ³ 3T refers to the transcript dated July 5, 2023.  ³  The [...] was not aware of the OPRA request to or a response by the DCJ until it reviewed the response in May 2022.  (Pa115)  Litigation [...] in contempt, and requesting permission to file an Amended Complaint.  (Da4)  On June 2, 2022, the trial court entered an Order denying [...]’s request for relief but permitted [...] to amend his Complaint.
[brief] TABLE OF CONTENTS  TABLE OF CONTENTS.........................................................  i  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES......................................................  iii TABLE OF TRANSCRIPTS.....................................................  iv TABLE OF ORDERS............................................................  v APPENDIX TABLE OF CONTENTS...........................................  vi  STATEMENT OF PROCEDURAL HISTORY.................................  1  STATEMENT OF FACTS.......................................................  3  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT ONE............................................................................. 50  THE TRIAL COURT’S DECISION IS CONTRARY TO THE LAW IN NEW JERSEY THAT WITHOUT SPECIFIC MENTION IN THE DEED OR OTHER EVIDENCE THAT THE PARTIES INTENDED  INCLUSION OF AN ABUTTING RIPARIAN GRANT, A RIPARIAN GRANT WILL NOT PASS APPURTEnant TO ANOTHER DISTINCT PARCEL (Pa1088; 9T9-11)  1)  THE RIPARIAN GRANT QUINLAN RECEIVED IN 1879 WAS NEVER CONVEYED TO THE BOROUGH OF KEANSBURG:  QUINLAN JR.  CONVEYED THE RIPARIAN GRANT TO KEANSBURG HEIGHTS COMPANY IN 1909.  .................. 58  POINT TWO ..................................................................................................................69  THE EASTMAN REPORT IS AN IMPERMISSIBLE LEGAL OPINION THAT SHOULD HAVE BEEN BARRED ALONG WITH EASTMAN'S TESTIMONY AT TRIAL (Pa131; 8T28:13)  CONCLUSION
[brief] Manalapan Twp. Comm.,** | 13 | | 140 N.J. 366 (1995) | | | **Matter of Integrity Ins. Co.,** | 30 | | 240 N.J. Super. 480 (App. Div. 1990) | | | **McKelvey v. Pierce,** | 14 | | 173 N.J. 26 (2002) | | | **Metro Storage Int’l LLC v. Harron,** | 15, 16| | 275 A.3d 810 (Del. Ch. 2022) | | | **Namerow v. Pediatricare Assocs., LLC,** | 14 | | 461 N.J. Super. 133 (Ch. Div. 2018) | | | **NCP Litig. Trust v. KPMG LLP,** | 29 | | 187 N.J. 353 (2004) | | | **Stranseburgh v. Straubmuller,** | 22 | | 146 N.J. 527 (1996) | | | Statutes | Page | |----------|------| | 26 U.S.C. §170(c)(2)(B) | 19 | | N. J.S.A. 2A:25-1 | 27 | | Treatises | Page | |-----------|------| | Restatement (Second) of Torts § 874 | 14 | INDEX TO APPENDICES VOLUME I ORDERS ON APPEAL
[brief] (Pa000204) (Pa000207)  It is widely understood that the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. (the “FAA”) is not designed to “federalize” state contract law.  Rather, the FAA was only designed to “overrule the judiciary’s longstanding refusal to enforce agreements to arbitrate. ”  Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 219-20 (1985).  Or, as Congress explained at the time, the purpose of the Act was to place arbitration agreements “upon the same footing as other contracts. ”  H.R. Rep. No. 96, 68th Cong. 1st Sess., 1, 2 (1924).  Thus, the FAA is intended “to make arbitration agreements as enforceable as other contracts, not more so. ”  Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 404 n.12 (1967) (emphasis added).  Under the FAA, in determining the enforceability and scope of an arbitration clause, state courts can and should apply ordinary contract principles under state law so long as they do not give arbitration agreements disfavored treatment.
[brief] In opposition to the motion, defendants argue that plaintiffs motion for relief under Rule 4:50-1 is improper, and really is a motion for reconsideration in the guise of a motion for relief under Rule 4:50-1.  Defendants argue that none of those predicate circumstances are present here.  They contend that both the motion and the order were properly served and that plaintiff has failed to establish that newly discovered evidence exists or that reversal is justified, because of fraud mistaken, inadvertent surprise, or excusable neglect.  Substantively, defendants argue that the court correctly decided the motion asserting that an affidavit of merit was required under these circumstances, and that an affidavit of merit was required for all of the causes of action, regardless of how labeled, because all of them are based on alleged acts of legal malpractice.  (SDa13-SDa15).