ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Respondent violated that public trust.  The Act sets out disciplinary actions which must be imposed uniformly to violations of that public trust.  The caselaw is clear on the penalty that should be applied.  Here the disciplinary action requested by Appellants is merely a reimposition of the penalty of “Censure. ”  [...] in the present matter, and [...] in the companion case now before the Appellate Division\(^2\), each independently reviewed the Commission’s caselaw on penalty, including I/M/O [...], Commission Docket No. [...] (2021), and each independently imposed the penalty of censure.
[brief] That an off-site parking lot serving an active non-residential use on a different adjacent occupied lot required a variance from the Zoning Board is established by cases contemporaneous to this 1962/1963 period.  See Susserman v. Newark Bd. of Adj. 61 N.J. Super. 28 (App.Div. 1960)  Rain or Shine Box Lunch Co. v. Bd. of Adj. Newark, 53 N.J. Super. 252 (App.Div. 1958)  Wazergast v. Broadway Thirty-Three Corp., 66 N.J. Super. 346 (App.Div. 1961)  Given that the School Lot 5 was actively occupied, the use of a portion of Lot 5 as a parking lot for the Synagogue Lot 8 would actually constitute a second use (an off-site parking facility), which would necessitate a use variance for two uses (one being non-permitted) on one lot.  Such a proposal, to be legal, would have certainly required a Board Site Plan and use variance application, both in 1963 and 1972.
[directive] Enfraksyon Klasifikasyon Tan Amann Frè VCCO* Ind./Acc./Comp.# Count Nature of Offense Degree Time Fine  VCCO  Assmt*  Maksimòm/Max Maksimòm/Max Maksimòm/Max Maksimòm/Max Maksimòm/Max Total/Total Pa konsekans de deklarasyon koupab sa a w ekspoze a yon total de:
[brief] See Section II(a); see also State v. Hernandez, 225 N.J. 451, 466-67 (2016) (inadmissible evidence is material if it could lead to the discovery of admissible evidence that could have affected the outcome of a defendant’s trial); State v. Ballard, 331 N.J. Super 529, 538 (App. Div. 2000) (explaining that “[d]iscovery is appropriate if it will lead to relevant and material information”); State v. Stein, 225 N.J. 582, 596 (2016) (recognizing that “[d]iscovery . . . in a criminal case, ‘is appropriate if it will lead to relevant’ information”).  If the State disclosed the existence of the Sworn Statement it possessed, [...] could have investigated further, subpoenaed additional records, and adjusted his trial strategy accordingly.  Thus, [...]’ Sworn Statement still constitutes Brady because it would have led to the discovery of other, admissible evidence in [...]’ possession.  c.
[brief] As articulated above, [...] presents no evidence to support [...]’s claim of maintenance and, even if it could, as the Patton and Caruso Courts find, more than mere property maintenance is required as a matter of law to satisfy this prong for adverse possession.  [...]’s allegation that [...] pays for lighting costs on the Property is equally unsupported.  [...] presents no documentary proof of this other than an incomplete purported utility bill for 2012 and another incomplete purported utility bill from April 17, 2020 to April 20, 2022.  Unfortunately for [...], the incomplete bills themselves indicate that the bills are for [...]’s property at [...] (i.e., Lot 19), and not [...]’s Property at Lot 22 – a fact that was not lost on the trial court:
[directive] That provision provides that a municipality may “by ordinance declare that an all-terrain vehicle or dirt bike operated on any public street, highway, or right-of-way in violation of [N.J.S.A. 39:3C-17] poses an immediate threat to the public health, safety, or welfare and [may] designate such all- terrain vehicles or dirt bikes so operated as contraband subject to forfeiture in accordance with the provisions of N.J.S.A. 2C:64-1 et seq. ”  See, e.g., Holmdel, N.J., Ordinances, ch. 3, § 3-3.2(b)(3) (noting that it is unlawful to operate ATVs, snowmobiles, or dirt bikes on any public street, sidewalk, or bicycle path).  Law enforcement should become familiar with applicable ordinances related to ORV and ATV use within their jurisdictions.
[brief] Beginning in 1924, the Conference sought for the first time to impose uniform traffic laws with the goal of “reduction in loss of life, personal injury and property damage upon our streets and highways. ”  Foreword to Final Text of Unif. Vehicle Code (August 20, 1926).  “In 1951, the Legislature undertook a comprehensive reform of New Jersey’s motor vehicle laws to ‘revise and bring up to date the New Jersey Traffic Act . . . because of the changes in motor vehicle traffic conditions and to bring [the] New Jersey Traffic Act into greater conformity with the ‘Uniform Act Regulating Traffic on Highways.
[brief] On the contrary, the Board required that the building be lowered in height and reduced in regard to the number of living units, thus limiting the extent to which the project varied from the zone and bringing it into conformity with nearby existing buildings to retain consistency with the overall zone plan.  *Id.*  In the subject application, the Board considered the use and the impact of the proposed facility including the significant increase in density, higher than in any zone in the Township, together with the other variances which confirmed that the project was too big for this single-family residential zone.  Indeed, if a senior living mixed-use project was presented in more typical single-family structures, the Board may not have had any issue with the use.  The use and the design of the project are understandably linked, but that does not remove the consideration of additional variances needed from the consideration of a use variance, or the need for the applicant to provide proofs that they should be granted.
[directive] the under assessment mandatory a triggering offenses violence of domestic those cases ODARA in the complete shall officers enforcement  Law  "Victim" and the charged are offenses following the which in 2C:25-19)  N.J.S.A. by defined (as above): defined are terms those (as "Partner" is a 2C:11-1); (N.J.S.A. homicide — 2C:12-lb); (N.J.S.A. assault aggravated — a); 2C:12-1 S.A. weapon (N.J. with a or contact with assault simple — 2C:14-2); (N.J.S.A. assault sexual — 2C:14-3); (N.J.S.A. contact sexual criminal — 2C:13-3); (N.J.S.A. weapon a with or contact with imprisonment false — 2C:13-1); (N.J.S.A. kidnapping — 2C:18-2); (N.J.S.A. weapon with a or contact with degree 2nd burglary, — 2C:12-3); (N.J.S.A. weapon a with or contact with threats terroristic — 2C:15-1); (N.J.S.A. robbery — 2C:25- (N.J.S.A. injury bodily serious or death of risk involving crime other any — 19a(18)).
[brief] **THE APPLICATION**  In its Application, [...] sought a variance so it could construct a building that would be 43’-6” above DFE.  1.  **THE SKETCH (Pa5). **  As part of its site plan application, [...] submitted the Sketch which was one of many documents submitted to the Board.  The other documents included detailed floor plans, side elevation plan, site plan, topographic survey map, etc.  (Pa11).  The Sketch is a simple illustration of the proposed west elevation that clearly indicates it was drawn “NTS” which means “Not-To-Scale”.  The Sketch shows a five (5) story building on the Property with an approximate elevation of “+/- 51’”.  (Pa5).  The Sketch also shows five (5) buildings adjacent to the Property which are all labeled as being five (5) stories at approximate elevations of “+/- 50’” above finished grade.  While all five (5) buildings are indicated to be at or about the same approximate elevation, the heights of the buildings depicted on the Sketch are all different.  (Pa5).  2.  **[...] SIDE ELEVATION PLAN (Da5).**  [...] submitted a side elevation of the Approved Building that was prepared by [...] (“[...] Elevation”).  (Da5).  Unlike the Sketch, the [...] Elevation contained specific measurements drawn to scale which clearly showed the proposed building height as defined by to be 50’-6” from the finished grade to the roof floor with the following exact dimensions:  43’-6”  Dimension from DFE to roof floor (which is the “Building Height” according to City of Hoboken Ordinance §196-6) 7’-0” Dimension from the finished grade to DFE 50’-6”  Dimension from the finished grade to roof floor  More importantly, the parapet height is shown on the [...] Elevation to be an additional 3’-3” (which is not included in the calculation of “Building Height”) above the roof floor so that the top of the parapet would be 53’-9” above finished grade.  This foregoing is depicted on Da5.  3.  **THE AMENDED RESOLUTION (Pa10). **  On August 15, 2023, the Board adopted its Amended Resolution which unanimously approved [...]’s Application to construct the five-story building (“Amended Resolution”).  (Pa10).  In relevant part, the Amended Resolution clearly states the approval of the Application was expressly conditioned on the Approved Building being constructed to the specific Building Height of 43’6” above DFE.  While the zoning requirements limited the Building Height to 40’ above DFE, the Board granted [...] a specific variance to exceed the Building Height restriction in the R2 Zone and construct its building to a height of 43’-6” above DFE.
[brief] Trial Court Failed to Address Whether [...] Breached Its Duty to | | | Appeal Adverse Rulings of the Vermont Trial Court.  (Pa3) | 19 | | II.  As Conceded by [...] in Defending the HCH Action, the Complaint in | | | the HCH Action Alleged Negligent Acts Which Triggered [...]’s Duty | 27 | | to Defend.  (Pa1 and Pa3) | | | A.  The Vermont Trial Court’s Summary Judgment Ruling Did Not Cut Off | | | the Possibility of Indemnity Coverage, Which Is All That Is Necessary| | | for a Duty to Defend to Continue in Existence.  (Pa1 and Pa3) | 28 |  B.  Insurance Companies Must Exercise Good Faith in Withdrawing Coverage Provided Under a Reservation-of-Rights Letter; They Cannot Withdraw Coverage in Violation of Applicable Law, Which Is What [...] Did Here.  (Pa3)  ...........................................32  III.  Under Relevant and Binding Insurance Law, the Underlying Judgment Awarded “Damages” Against [...].  (Pa3)  ..................................................................................................................36  IV.  Under Relevant and Binding Insurance Law, the Underlying Judgment Did Not Impose a “Fine” or a “Penalty” and Is Therefore Not Excluded From Coverage.  (Pa3)  ........................................................................................................................................42  V.  Because the HCH Action Plaintiffs Sued in Their Individual Capacity and Not as Board Members, the “Insured v. Insured” Exclusion Does Not Apply.  (Pa3) ...............44  VI.  [...]’s Decision to Settle the HCH Action by Paying Off the Judgment After [...] Improperly Withdrew Its Defense Was Made in Good Faith, and [...] Is Therefore Liable for the Settlement as Well as Unreimbursed Defense Costs.  (Pa1 and Pa3)  .........................................................................................45  Conclusion ..............................................................................................................................................49
[brief] [...] testified as to the terms of his plea agreement and admitted that testifying against [...] was a condition of the agreement.  [...] also admitted that he was indicted for, among other things, felony-murder.  [...] understood that, under that the law, he could be convicted of felony-murder if he committed an armed robbery with another, and during the commission of the robbery someone was fatally shot, even if he was not the shooter and did not intend for anyone to be shot.  He testified that he could have been sentenced to life in prison if he had gone to trial and been convicted of felony-murder; instead, in exchange for his testimony against [...], he can argue for a sentence as low as five years in prison.  (10T 38-4 to 39-16; 10T 183-14 to 183-23)  [...] gave the following account of the shooting.  He heard the barbershop was “a gambling spot” and went there with [...] “[t]o rob it. ”  (10T 17-3 to 18-4)  He did not have a gun, but [...] did.  (10T 18-14 to 18-21)  They walked in, told everyone to get down, grabbed money from the pool table, and “[a] shot went off” from [...]’s gun.  (10T 18-22 to 19-7)  They ran out of the shop, got back in the car and drove away.  (10T 19-12 to 21-6)  He did not expect [...] to fire the gun and did not know [...]’s reason for doing so.  (10T 19-6 to 19-11)  [...] testified that after leaving the barbershop, he drove back to a hotel with [...], stopping for gas and cigarettes along the way.  (10T 21-4 to 21-13)  [...] admitted that he stopped to pick up [...] before returning to the hotel, and that [...] had to carry [...] inside because [...] was drunk.  (10 45-15 to 45-18; 10T 50-14 to 50-23)  [...] also admitted that he dropped [...] in Newark to see family earlier in the day (10T 143-8 to 143-17); and that [...] had gone to a party and a bar, and had been drinking the whole day.
[brief] _Id._ at 15.  Here, the court did not abuse its discretion by excluding what was marked at a deposition as “Marino-3”.  (Da28).  While it is accurate that Plaintiff provided the photograph with a series of photographs with her written discovery, when she was asked about it during her deposition, she stated she did not in fact take the picture, but that she believed her boss, [...], took it, but was not completely sure when, and therefore could not authenticate the photograph.  (Da14, 22).  Defendants knew [...] as she was named in discovery and even testified at trial.  Yet Defendants failed to ask her a single question about the photograph.  (7T)  The photograph was brought up during [...]’s cross examination along with [...]’s cross examination by defense counsel in an attempt to show that the photograph somehow showed that the snow removal process was still in progress.  Despite defense counsel’s efforts, both parties testified that they were not present on the day of the incident and therefore had no personal knowledge as to what the conditions were at the time Plaintiff fell.  Therefore, basic logic would prevent either [...] or [...] from being able to testify truthfully about the conditions depicted in the photograph.  Accordingly, as no one was able to authenticate the contents of the photograph and specifically when it was taken in relation to Plaintiff’s fall, the trial court did not abuse its discretion and it was not so wide of the mark to deny any justice to the defense.
[directive] To effectuate subparagraphs (e), (f), and (g) of this Section, the member of the public, parent or legal guardian, or next of kin or designee shall be permitted to review the BWC recording to determine whether to request a three-year retention period, in accordance with the provisions of the Open Public Records Act, N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1 et seq., to determine whether to request a three-year retention period.  BODY WORN CAMERA POLICY | May 2021 18 8.4
[brief] 3  [...] ([...]) purchases a 100% interest in [...] ([...]) through a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU).  ..................................................................................................................  3  The Parties Entered the MOU Because Their Prior Purchase and Sale Agreement (PSA) was Terminated Due to Outside Interference by a Mortgagee.  .............................................................................................................  5  Appellants Repudiate the MOU ...............................................................  6  The MOU Contains a Provision for Attorney’s Fees  ...................................  8  PROCEDURAL HISTORY ......................................................................
[brief] Defendants argue there is no “threshold requirement” they must meet before the Court applies the separation of powers test in Knight v. City of Margate, 86 N.J. 374 (1981).  Defendants ignore Knight’s clear language establishing the threshold issue that must be satisfied that it described immediately before announcing the “two-prong test”: whether the Supreme Court’s authority over the subject matter “must invariably foreclose action by the other branches of government” and whether “the judicial power has not been exercised or fully implemented. ”  Id. at 389-90.  Nowhere in Defendants’ opposition do they address the myriad of ways in which the Supreme Court has fully exercised, and continues to fully exercise, its constitutional authority over the practice of law in this State.
[brief] B.  Supplemental Briefs.  1.  Respondent’s Brief.  On August 29, 2024, Respondent submitted its Supplemental Brief.  (294a).  Respondents cited O Builders & Associates Inc. v. Yuna Corp., 206 N.J. 109 (2011) and informed the Court that they were submitting a supplemental Certification signed by [...] which they asked that the Court review in-camera.  (297a-301a).  2.  Appellant’s Brief.  Following submission of Respondents’ Supplemental Brief, [...] directed a letter to the Court objecting to the in-camera review of [...]’ Certification.  (Pa53).  Appellants did not raise due process or the Fourteenth Amendment in that letter.  [...]/[...] responded to Appellants’ objections on that same day.  (Pa56)  On September 30, 2024, Appellant filed its Supplemental brief.  (324a).  Appellant’s brief objected to the in-camera review, but never raised due process or the Fourteenth Amendment as a basis for not permitting in-camera review.  (324a).  Legal Argument I raised the issue: “[...] Failed to demonstrate That an In-Camera Review is Warranted. ”  (324a-330a).  D.  Oral Arguments of November 7, 2024 and Court’s Decision.  Oral arguments on the Supplemental Briefs were conducted on November 7, 2024 at which time the court differentiated between the representation of [...] and the representation of [...], individually.  (T20:25 to T21:1-3 and T23:6-16; T25:20 to T26:1-17).  The court found that the dispute involving [...] in the prior litigation was nothing more than a business dispute.  (T20:25 to T21:1-3).  The Court found, however, that the representation of [...] was different, it involved a personal relationship.  (T23:6-16; T25:20 to T26:1-17).  The Court recognized that the attorney-client privilege is within [...]’ purview to assert.  (T25:22-24).  It also recognized that the information contained in the Certification met the criteria and warranted disqualification under 1.9.  (T26:8-11).  Accordingly, it was proper to disqualify [...].  (T26:8-11).
[brief] Appellant  [...] (“[...]”) submitted an application to Respondent the [...] (“[...]” or “Planning [...]”) in its capacity as a planning board, seeking Preliminary and Final Site Plan Approval (“Application”) to construct two industrial warehouse/distribution buildings on the Pew Farm in [...]’s Industrial Zone (“I-Zone”).  After thorough review, the Application was found administratively complete, and four public hearings were held on August 4, 2021, September 1, 2021, December 1, 2021 and April 6, 2022.  Opposition raised during these meetings was largely focused on possible traffic congestion, all of which were addressed and resolved by applicable traffic engineering experts.  The majority of the other objectors simply opposed the warehouse development despite the fact the Property was expressly zoned for that use.  Almost one year after the Application was submitted, counsel for objectors interjected a suggestion, challenging the [...]’s jurisdiction.  However, at no time during its review of the Application or its public hearings had [...] professionals or [...] counsel raised a question regarding the [...]’s jurisdiction.  In part, this likely resulted because Westampton Ordinances make clear the [...], sitting as a planning board, has jurisdiction to consider an application such as the one in the instant matter noting a use variance is not required under the plain language of the Ordinances.  Nevertheless, on April 6, 2022, the [...] issued a Resolution that denied the Application, including a statement that it lacked jurisdiction to consider the substance of the Application.  The trial court’s review of [...]’s complaint for an action in lieu of prerogative writs challenging the [...]’s arbitrary and erroneous Resolution was erroneous.  Without analysis of the applicable ordinances obviating the need for any use variance, the trial court erred by merely concluding that the [...] could not grant use variances, and remanded the matter to the Zoning [...] to determine whether a use variance was necessary and if so, whether that use variance should be granted.  For the reasons set forth herein, this Court is requested to reverse the trial court’s December 8, 2022 Order.
[directive] Speedy with Comply to Needed When Examinations with a comply fails to State if the released be may offenders dangerous  Recognizing that 2A:162- N.J.S.A. defendant, see detained trying a or indicting for prescribed deadline statutory any law request prosecutor may trial, the pending detained is defendant a where case any 22, in report any prepare (1) investigation to supporting the or in involved agency enforcement (2) and/or information, discoverable documenting otherwise or investigation the concerning basis priority thereon, a on report a submit examination and forensic or physical test any conduct statutorily- meet the to State the permit will that prosecutor the by specified date a by and trial. and/or indictment for deadline prescribed submission/ electronic establish an may Science Forensic of Office Police State
[brief] POINT THREE CONTRARY TO THE ARGUMENT OF THE DEFENDANTS, THE DECISION OF THE PLANNING BOARD CAN ONLY BE MADE BASED ON THE RECORD BEFORE IT.  (Pa 118-121, 129-130)  On Page 31 of the Defendants’ Brief, the Defendants argue:  As the lower court recognized, the Planning Board members were not required to ignore the history of litigation concerning the property or prior attempts to redevelop it.
[brief] Specifically, and without limitation, the verdict should be reversed, and the fee award should be vacated in its entirety, because, among other reasons, Defendant admitted at trial that she improperly charged Plaintiff more than ten thousand dollars ($10,000.00) for her personal expenses.  For example, Defendant unequivocally admitted at trial that she improperly charged Plaintiff $6,273 for Defendant’s own car payments to [...] (3T166:11-25) and $4,387.20 for her own insurance payments to [...] (3T162:11-19), as listed on page 103 of the [...] bank ledger (Pa170).  Defendant also acknowledged that it was her mistake to charge Plaintiff these amounts.