ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Defendant relies on two unpersuasive, non-binding unreported decisions that do not support her argument about default judgment.  See R. 1:36-3\(^1\).  The unreported debt-collection case of Dawson v. Wright, [...], 2007 WL 3376226 --- \(^1\)  In violation of R. 1:36-3, Defendant failed to provide copies of the unpublished opinions she cited.  Plaintiff provides copies in the accompanying Reply Appendix.  (App. Div. Nov. 15, 2007)(Pra8) involved an issue where service was defective and there was no evidence the movant was aware of the suit.  See Id. at *4-7.  But here, there is ample evidence confirming Defendant’s acceptance of service.  (A11, Affidavit of Service).  And, in considering that evidence, the trial court found Defendant was completely aware of the divorce litigation:  The defendant not only signed the MMA and PSA, but the court also finds that she signed an acknowledgment of service for the Summons and Complaint for Divorce which was requesting the incorporation of said documents.
[brief] Had that occurred, summary judgment would have been denied and the negligent operation of the bus that day remained a genuine fact that must be decided by a jury of Plaintiff’s peers.  There was no certification from the bus driver or any evidence for that matter remotely suggesting that the operator of the bus suddenly encountered an emergency situation requiring the driver to bring the bus to an abrupt stop to avoid a collision.  Simply put, the motion record is bereft of any evidence suggesting that the operator abruptly stopped for any reason favorable to the defendant.  The decisions of the trial court must be reversed, and the summary judgment denied so Plaintiff may have her day in court.
[brief] *Woodhouse v. Heartland Resolution Group, LLC*, 2024 WL 1151707, at *2 (App. Div. March 18, 2024).  Specifically, the language at issue provides “accurate warnings to the least sophisticated consumer that the debt is too old to subject plaintiff to legal liability, but if [he or] she chose to take any action with respect to the debt, it could restart the statute of limitations and warned, generally, to proceed cautiously in taking any action. ”  *Id.*  It is not materially deceptive because it “adequately warns plaintiff that if [he or] she does nothing, the statute of limitations will not restart and that other actions could alter the legal status of the debt. ”  *Id.*  This is particularly true here, “when [the disclosure language is] read in context with the last sentence, which states: “You should determine the effect of any actions with respect to this debt.
[directive] Page 3 of 18  Responsibilities at Grand Jury Session  Take attendance to ensure that a quorum is present/follow-up on those grand jurors who are absent Serve as the Judiciary representative at the grand jury session  Make the record of the grand jury session  Prepare the log relating to the grand jury record  Record each grand juror’s vote for each vote taken Assist foreperson with documentation relating to the return of indictments to judge in open court  Assist foreperson/deputy foreperson with required paperwork  Process materials relating to “no bills,” including appropriate notifications in accordance with Rule 3:6-8(b)  Take any legal issues to the supervising judge  Responsibilities
[brief] The use of the word “shall” is a mandatory, imperative command.  There is no discretion afforded in this contract language.  Nowhere in the contract does it state that Troopers' overtime rates shall be calculated based on the number of working days in a fiscal year or the number of working hours in a fiscal year.  Nowhere in the contract does it state that overtime rates will be dictated by annual Treasury Circulars.  Furthermore, nowhere in the contract does it state that the Division can follow the Treasury Circular over the negotiated and agreed upon terms in the contract.  Finally, the contract is devoid of language indicating that the equation for calculating overtime is merely an example or for illustrative purposes.  To the contrary, it is clear that the equation in Article V is prescriptive.
[brief] Plaintiff attempts to equate the facts before the lower court in this case to those reviewed in the unreported decision, *SB Bldg. Assocs., L.P. v. Planning Bd.*, 2017 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 36, at *14-16 (App. Div. Jan. 6, 2017).  However, the case in SB Bldg. did not address a scenario where a redevelopment entity negotiated a redevelopment payment pursuant to its authority to negotiate and collect revenue pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-8.  Rather, the Agency left the question of off-site infrastructure contribution payments to the Planning Board as part of the redeveloper’s site plan application.
[brief] See Hopkins v. LVNC Funding, LLC, et al., A-1301-23 at p. 14 (App. Div. February 10, 2025) (Approved for Publication) (defendants’ decision to move to compel arbitration after they had already benefited from decisions that benefited them demonstrate litigation strategy).  Fourth, discovery was ongoing and extensive.  Both Parties served substantial paper discovery (two sets of document demands and four sets of interrogatories) and produced a combined over 4,400 pages of documents.  After which [...] ceased cooperating with discovery, electing instead to self-impose a stay of discovery, refusing to cure deficiencies, respond to interrogatories, or produce [...] for her noticed deposition.  This amount of discovery certainly exhibits [...]’s waiver of arbitration.
[brief] Sat Below: Hon. [...], J.S.C. BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF THE APPEAL  On the brief and of counsel: [...], Esq. (042741990)  [...] [...]  [...], Esq. (027982008)  [...]  [...]  [...], Esq. (909162012)  [...]  [...] # TABLE OF CONTENTS – BRIEF | Section | Page | |------------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | TABLE OF CONTENTS - BRIEF | i | | TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS | ii | | TABLE OF TRANSCRIPT
[brief] 31  New Jersey Outdoor Alliance v. NJDEP, No. 0525-18T4, 2018 WL 6005064 (App. Div., Nov.  16, 2018), certif. den., 237 N.J. 191 (2019) .......................  3, 19 New Jersey State Firemen’s Mut. Benevolent Ass’n v. North Hudson Regional Fire & Rescue, 340 N.J. Super. 577 (App. Div.), certif. den., 170 N.J. 88 (2001)
[brief] She was a substitute coordinator, so she was in charge of me if I had a problem or something.  I said, I feel like I asked her to please check my absent management system because it was two days I wasn’t called for work.  I said, that’s not true, I still want to work at -- for the [...].  He said, “You weren’t happy that we hired a female,” and I was quite taken back because I didn’t notify [...] of my EEOC complaint.  The only person I advised of that was [...], and that was only like a few days before that.  His response was that we feel you can’t work with certain people, and my response was, “I’ve been in law enforcement for 29 years, I work security, I can work with anybody. ”  I told him that I was cognizant of the fact why they hired her.  And I was, you know, I wasn’t happy, but that I was over it.  Plaintiff was then asked:
[directive] Upon receipt of satisfactory proof of ownership of the property, and upon presentation of proper personal identification, and with the consent of the County Prosecutor's Office, the property officer may release the property to the person presenting such proof.  7.2.3  The person receiving the property shall be asked to view the photograph taken pursuant to Section 7.2.1 to verify that it accurately depicts the property that is being released to his custody.  The person receiving the property shall sign a sworn declaration of ownership.  This department shall retain the photograph and the sworn declaration.
[brief] (Pa435).  The Board memorialized their findings in Planning Board Resolution 2022-15.  (Da41).  The Board send a memorandum, dated November 23, 2022, along with [...]’s November 11th report to the Committee.  (Da43).  On December 8, 2022, at a public meeting, the Committee opened Ordinance 2022-17 to public hearing and then voted to adopt Ordinance 2022-17.  (Pa46).  On December 12, 2022 Plaintiff-Appellant filed a Complaint in Lieu of Prerogative Writs (Pa1) requesting the Court find [...] Ordinance 2022-15 (Pa16) and Ordinance 2022-17 (Pa46) to be arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable, invalidate Ordinance 2022-15 (Pa16) and Ordinance 2022-17 (Pa46), and invalidate the Old York Redevelopment Plan.
[brief] Such materials are admissible if (1) the writing was made in the regular course of business, (2) it was prepared within a short time of the act, condition or event described, and (3) the source of the information and the method and circumstances of the preparation of the writing must justify allowing it into evidence.  See, e.g., Konop, 425 N.J. Super. at 402.  N.J.R.E. 803(c)(6) references N.J.R.E. 808, which in turn provides that Expert opinion which is included in an admissible hearsay statement shall be excluded if the declarant has not been produced as a witness unless the trial judge finds that the circumstances involved in rendering the opinion, including the motive, duty, and interest of the declarant, whether litigation was contemplated by the declarant, the complexity of the subject matter, and the likelihood of accuracy of the opinion, tend to establish its trustworthiness.
[brief] APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO: [...]  RECIPROCAL  ATTORNEY-IN-FACT, INC. ’S REPLY  BRIEF [...]  [...], Esq. (#024861997)  [...], Esq. (#018591995)  [...], Esq. (#38402022)  [...] [...]  Attorneys for Appellant Reciprocal Attorney-In-Fact, Inc.
[brief] Said Motion was not a Motion for Reconsideration, and did not contend or contain any argument that the Court made an error in application of the Rules or should consider additional facts.  In an Order dated April 1, 2024, [...] denied Appellant’s demanded relief in its entirety.  (Da 194-202).  As to modification of post-judgment interest, the Court was not persuaded to further listen to debate or address the matter.  The Court held that said motion was not a Motion to Reconsider, but rather a motion merely seeking to relitigate an issue which had already been presented before the Court and of which the Court had already entered a decision.
[brief] That is to say, the traumatic event of being struck by a vehicle was the "essential significant or substantial contributing cause" of [...]'s disability.  Gerba, 83 N.J. at 187.  As already stated, [...] was working as a "street sergeant" without issue before the 2015 incident.  (1T55:4-15; 1T13:10-14:23).  In this capacity, [...] was "in charge of . . . all the operations on the street," which included "assisting the other officers in arrests and [] criminal investigations," and being "the first responder[] to any type of crime that [was] called into the operators."  (1T14:1-5).  The only thing that changed between [...] being fully capable of performing his duties, and becoming totally and permanently disabled, was the traumatic event of getting struck by a car.  It is therefore clear that the 2015 incident was “essential” and “substantial” in relation to [...]’s disability.
[brief] Da50 (SAC) ¶ 1.  The Sixth Street Pier is a concrete pier that runs parallel to a 30-foot-wide underwater easement ("Easement") granted by [...] to [...] to accommodate high-voltage electric cables ("Cables") to transmit power from Jersey City to Brooklyn, New York.  Id. at ¶¶ 44-45.  [...] and [...] owned the Cables, which allegedly were installed under several feet of Hudson River riverbed.  *Id.* at ¶ 2.  The Cables contained dielectric fluid, a refined petroleum product used for insulation purposes.  *Id.* at ¶ 43.  On August 30, 2008, a section of the northern seawall of the Sixth Street Pier collapsed into the Hudson River ("2008 Collapse").  *Id.* at ¶ 46.  Another section of the northern seawall collapsed on July 28, 2009 ("2009 Collapse").  *Id.* at ¶ 47.  The 2008 and 2009 Collapses caused debris from the Sixth Street Pier to fall onto the riverbed.  Approximately eight years ago, on or about October 3, 2016, a dialectic fluid leak was discovered in the Hudson River near the Sixth Street Pier.  *Id.* at ¶ 49.  [...] worked with the Coast Guard to prepare and implement a plan to remove debris from the riverbed as part of the investigation and remediation of the pollution leak.  *Id.* at ¶¶ 58-59.  [...] and [...] entered into a Commercial Real Estate Pollution Legal Liability Policy dated November 18, 2015 ("Policy").  The Policy contains a permissive arbitration clause, entirely drafted by [...] and appearing in a pre-printed policy form section of the Policy providing that disputes among the parties "may" be arbitrated, but if exercised, the arbitration "shall" be litigated in the state of [...]’s domicile before three arbitrators:
[brief] (Pa55-Pa56)  It is axiomatic that a court must follow binding precedents.  The problem here is that there are no published decisions from the United States Supreme Court, the New Jersey Supreme Court, or from the Appellate Division which are the only courts which could issue a binding precedent.  Indeed, there are only a handful or so of published opinions from the Courts of the State of New Jersey applying any provision of the FDCPA, and roughly the same number from the U.S. Supreme Court—but none address § 1692c(b).  But the absence of binding precedent does not mean that the motion court could—as it did—write on an entirely clean slate because there exists non-binding authority from the lower federal courts which includes the circuit courts of appeal and the district courts.
[brief] Following the trial court’s ruling on the motions in limine, the parties reached a settlement of the [...]’ damages on Count 2 of the Amended Complaint (implied easement appurtenant).  (Da2571-Da2572).  However, as the Final Judgment made clear, the settlement agreement (1) did not settle the [...]’ claims for attorney’s fees and/or punitive damages, and (2) did not waive or relinquish any appeal rights that any of the parties may have related to any prior decisions made by the Court, including but not limited to all grants and denials of motions for summary judgment, motions for leave to amend, and motions in limine.  (Da2572).  This appeal followed.
[brief] 15  I.  THE TRIAL COURT APPROPRIATELY EXERCISED ITS BROAD DISCRETION TO MANAGE DISCOVERY (Da166-68)  ........  15  A.  To Ensure That All Relevant Discovery Is Produced, The Inherent Tradeoff Is That Some Irrelevant Materials Will Be Produced As Well ........................................................................................................  18  B.  The Trial Court Reasonably Sought To Ensure That The Parties Could Not Withhold Relevant Discovery Materials (Da159; Da183 ¶ 9; T26-10 to -13)  .........................................................................................  21  II.  [...]’S OBJECTIONS DO NOT PROVIDE A BASIS TO REVERSE THE TRIAL COURT’S DISCOVERY ORDER (Da166-68)  .........................................................................................................................  29  A.  The Trial Court Did Not Misapply Rule 4:10-2(a) (Da159; Da183 ¶ 9; T26-10 to -13)  .........................................................................................................................  30  B.  The Trial Court Did Not Unduly Burden United Without Justification (T5-1 to -8, T21-8 to 23-7, T24-11 to 25-14)  ..........  37  CONCLUSION
[brief] Specifically, the [...] Assignment defined the “Collateral” as follows:  a.  The Term “Collateral” means i. [...].  **All of Pledge’s rights, title and interest, in and to all money,** directly or indirectly, recovered (ie settlement, collections on judgments, et.), net of Pledgor’s attorneys fees and litigation costs incurred for that action (“net Settlement”), in the civil action filed or about to be filed in the New Jersey Superior Court entitled [...] et als v. [...], Esq. Et als., Dkt NO. [...], upon the terms and conditions set forth herein (The “Pledged Interest”); upon the receipt of the Net Settlement by Borrower’s Law Firm (defined below), so much of the Net Settlement necessary to pay-off the satisfy the Loan shall be forthwith paid to the Lender by the Law Firm;).  (emphasis added).  The [...] Assignment then ‘transfers’ the Plaintiff’s ‘right, title and interest” in the Collateral (ie. the [...] Legal Malpractice Lawsuit) to [...] in full under the following provision.  2.  Collateral Pledge:  **PLEDGOR hereby assigns, transfers and pledges to Lender and grants to Lender a continuing security interest in and lien on all of the Pledgor’s right, title and interest in and to the Collateral to secure the prompt payment, satisfaction, and discharge of the Liabilities. **  Nothing in this instrument shall be construed as affecting the Security Agreement; the failure of the Collateral to satisfy the Security Agreement shall not affect the Security Agreement.  (emphasis added).  The [...] Assignment also permits [...] to **sell** the “Collateral” (ie the [...] Legal Malpractice Lawsuit”) in the event that Plaintiff fails to make any payments to [...] when ‘due’.  4.  Collateral & Default.  If PLEDGER fails to make any payment to Lender in reduction of the Liabilities when due, Lender may seize, sell or otherwise dispose of any or all of the Collateral at any time and from time to time at public or private sale, upon issuance of prior written notice to PELEDGOR, which, due to the nature of the Collateral and to the possibility of changes in value of the Collateral, PLEDGOR hereby acknowledge and agrees said notice to be sufficient, commercial reasonable, and proper, with or without advertisement of the sale, and may apply the proceeds of any such sale to the expenses of such sale, and or the liabilities, in such order as Lender shall determine in hits sole and absolute discretion.  The fact that [...] can “sell” the Collateral indicates that it is not just the proceeds but also the “right” and “title” to the lawsuit that [...] now possesses.
[brief] Defense counsel requested an adverse inference because [...] was in the building, but the State did not call him to testify.  (3T9:3-23.)  Counsel argued [...] was the officer with the proper training in DWI investigations, he conducted the field sobriety tests, including the horizontal gaze nystagmus test, and he made observations that [...] appeared tired.  (3T9:3-10:20, 3T11:12-19.)  Defense counsel summarized all of [...]’ credibility issues prior to even conducting the field sobriety tests: identifying a different make and model of the vehicle that crossed the grass median, not recording that the vehicle crossed over the median in his report, and the initial impression that [...] was tired, not intoxicated.  (3T11:24-12:4.)  Defense counsel further argued that the law requires a driver to maintain the lane as nearly as practicable, and due to the rain, time of night, road conditions, and size of [...]’s large Chevrolet Silverado, he maintained his lane as best he could, which is consistent with [...] failing to activate his overhead lights or the MVR.
[brief] [...] is a rapidly expanding municipality, growing from a population of 92,843 in 2010 to an estimated 139,506 in 2023.  (Ra165).4  As a result, it is now New Jersey’s fifth largest municipality.  Ibid.  Approximately 50,000 school-aged children live within the District, but only 4,600 of those students are enrolled in Lakewood’s public schools.  Ibid.  The remaining 45,400 students (84% of the school-aged children) are enrolled in non-public schools, most of which are private religious schools.  Ibid.  By last count, there were 9 public schools and over 170 non-public schools located within the District.  Ibid.  --- 3
[brief] Long Branch has had a well-developed ocean front since before 1870 (Ra70-71)  ⁴  [...]’s building step back analysis claims that the third building to the south is not stepped back sufficiently, saying in part that its height on Ocean Avenue (35.34’) should be stepped back 70.68’ whereas it is only 69.90’ from the boardwalk.  (2Ra151).  This appeal would not have been filed if the proposed [...] building only missed the mark so ever slightly.  sided apartment building to crowd this part of Long Branch’s ocean front constructed after 1994.
[brief] Da44.  Section 2 of the Rent Concession or other Discount Rider included second section with the caption, “Concession Cancellation Charge-Back,” that stated, in relevant part, *Concession Cancellation Charge-Back.*  The concession and discounts indicated above are provided to you as an incentive and are with the understanding that you will fulfill your obligations under the Lease through the entire term.  This Concession/Discount Agreement will be immediately terminated, and you will be required to immediately repay to the Landlord the amounts of all concessions or discounts that you have actually received without further notice, which will hereinafter be deemed additional rent, if any of the following has occurred in the Landlords [sic] sole opinion:
[brief] In Hargett, the plaintiff sued named defendant facilities for the negligence of unnamed “nursing and administrative staff” at those facilities.  Id. at 393.  The plaintiff served a single Affidavit of Merit in support of all of her claims, which stated:  [T]here exists a reasonable probability that the care, skill, or knowledge exercised in the treatment provided by [...] . . . and [...], and the members of their nursing and nursing administrative staff, fell outside acceptable professional standards and was the cause of harm . . . to [...].  Id. at 394 (second alteration in original).  The trial court found that the Affidavit of Merit was deficient because failed to provide specific notice as to a specific employee as to a specific claim of negligence and failed to provide notice as to who may have violated the applicable standard of care.
[brief] When the trial court then instructed on self-defense, the court began by instructing the jury that self-defense was a “complete defense” to aggravated manslaughter and reckless manslaughter.  (6T129-1 to 4).  It was a “complete justification” to both manslaughter charges and to the weapons-related offense.  --- 6  The trial court instructed the jury that self-defense also applied to count two, possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose, however, the court told the jury that the court’s instructions on self-defense and the elements of that charge would come later in the charge.  (6T129-6 to 9).  The court’s charge on the elements of the weapons-related offense and self-defense followed its instructions on self-defense as it applied to the manslaughter charges.  (6T134-8 to 6T139-4).  Defendant lodges no objection to the trial court’s jury instructions on count two.
[directive] Bail Ranges for attempts or conspiracies should generally be the same as the actual substantive crime.  Statute Charge Description Degree  Bail Range 10%  Cash Bail Option  Actor: a.  Possesses a machine gun without a license; second degree.  b.  Possesses a handgun , including any antique handgun without a permit to carry same (unless an air gun, spring gun or pistol or other weapon of a similar nature as described in 2C:39-5(a-j) Unlawful Possession statute), second degree;  Possesses a handgun without a permit to carry and handgun is air of  Weapons gun, spring gun or pistol or other weapon as described in the statute, third degree.  1st Degree  $50,000 to $150,000  10%  Permissible c.  Possesses a rifle or shotgun without firearm purchase identification card, third degree.  (1)  Possession of a rifle or shotgun without obtaining firearm purchaser identification card, third degree.  (2)  Unless otherwise permitted by law, possesses a loaded rifle or shotgun, third degree.  75  Updated December 2, 2013