ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The parties are currently litigating the second and third prongs of the builder’s remedy lawsuit and [...] disputes that the Property is suitable for Plaintiff’s proposed inclusionary residential development.  Plaintiff presented no competent evidence, let alone clear and convincing evidence, demonstrating its likelihood of success on the merits of its builder’s remedy lawsuit – meaning the suitability of the Property.  The court did not explain why it seems to have found in favor of Plaintiff on the likelihood-of-success factor when it expressly did not find that Plaintiff was likely to prevail in the site suitability phase of the builder’s remedy lawsuit.  Instead, the court found it was unclear who would prevail, stating that “[i]t may not be that this property can be developed for affordable housing. ” (1T53:25-54:7).  The trial court appeared to erroneously shift the burden to [...] to disprove Plaintiff’s likelihood of success of the builder’s remedy claim, in other words, that [...] should have presented evidence that the Property was not suitable.  The court stated, “I haven't heard anything indicating, other than that the town wants this to be commercial, that it’s environmentally not appropriate, that nothing can be built here. ” (1T53:19-22).  The trial court appeared to reiterate in its decision on the motion for reconsideration that [...] should have presented evidence that the Property is not suitable.  (2T10:5-16).  However, it is not [...]’s burden to establish each of the Crowe factors by clear and convincing proof; it is Plaintiff’s burden to show a reasonable probability of success on the merits, for which it offered no competent evidence.  Moreover, [...] did not have expert reports at the time that Plaintiff filed its Order to Show Cause.  The trial court’s Case Management Order set the deadline for [...]’s expert reports at November 4, 2024.  Therefore, [...] could not have provided this information to the court at the time of the Order to Show Cause.  Because the trial court abused its discretion by finding that the law was “pretty clear” while also finding that there is no case law on point is lacking in a rational explanation and failing to properly evaluate the likelihood of success on the merits factor, this Court should reverse.
[brief] \(^5\)  The Council is not merely an advisory agency populated by citizens who are expert in areas of conservation and protection of the environment and acting to assist a state department or its department head in environmental and conservation matters.  \(^5\)  Indeed, the Legislature’s use of the term “sportsmen” in N.J.S.A. 13:1B-24 and 25, if it is not tied to membership in the [...], would result in the statute being ambiguous and vague.  Merriam Webster defines a “sportsmen” as (1) “a person who engages in sports (such as hunting or fishing)”, or (2) “a person who shows sportsmanship. ”  www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/sportsman (last visited 4/1/24).  The Cambridge Dictionary defines a sportsman as “a man who plays a sport, especially one who plays it well” and “someone who plays a sport in a way that shows respect and fairness toward the opposing player and team. ”  dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/English/sportsman (last visited 4/1/24).  N.J.S.A. 13:1B-24 and 25 do not define “sportsmen”.  Unless a “sportsman” is construed to be a member of the [...], the statute would be rendered “substantially incomprehensible” and unconstitutionally vague.
[brief] On August 16, 2022, the Honorable [...], J.S.C., conducted a hearing on defendant’s motion to suppress evidence.  (1T1, et seq.).  Camden County Sheriff’s Department Investigator [...] testified that he was working on a narcotics task force in cooperation with the Camden County Prosecutor’s Office when he was asked to assist in a homicide investigation.  (1T16-20 to 17-2).  Inv. Pickard advised that on September 28, 2020, he and a detective from the Prosecutor’s Office were sent to surveil [...], a residence connected to a homicide investigation, while the department waited for a search warrant for the residence to be imminently signed.  (1T17-1 to 20).  Inv. Pickard testified that were told to report “anything we saw coming or going from the home” and were given three photographs of the homicide suspects: [...], [...], and defendant, who was specifically identified as the shooter.  (1T17-4 to 19-25).  Inv. Pickard advised that they started surveillance at approximately 1:45 p.m. and received notice that the search warrant was approved less than five minutes after they arrived.  (1T21-19 to 22-5).  Inv. Pickard testified that they continued to watch [...] while they waited for the search warrant team to arrive, and observed defendant and co-defendant [...] approach the residence on foot, enter, and leave approximately 20 minutes later.  (1T24-9 to 19).  When he reported such to his supervisors, Inv. Pickard was told that the search warrant team was still preparing and that they needed to detain defendant and [...].  (1T26-6 to 12).  Inv. Pickard testified that the officers followed the two individuals for a few blocks via vehicle before he got out to follow the men from behind on foot, while the other officers circled around in the vehicle before exiting their vehicles, wearing marked police identifiers, to affect a stop on Kenwood Avenue.  (1T26-14 to 28-21).  [...] was apprehended “very shortly” after the officers exited the vehicle, but defendant fled on foot back down the alley towards Inv. Pickard, who stopped him by tackling him by his legs.  (1T28-18 to 29-16).  Inv. Pickard testified that the officers were all wearing tactical vests, identified themselves as police, and were giving commands to defendant to stop and comply.  (1T29-19 to 24).  Inv. Pickard testified that defendant consented to a pat-down search and when the officer asked if he had “anything I need to know about,” defendant advised that he had a firearm near the left ankle of his pants.  (1T32-1 to 25).  Officers recovered a black and green firearm from defendant’s pants.  (1T33-1 to 4).  The trial court first found that Inv. Pickard was “credible,” finding that inconsistencies in his testimony “were really due to perhaps memory and the age of the case as opposed to a lack of credibility on the matter.
[brief] (V:17:01:08 to 02:44).  The officer then requested that [...] exit the vehicle and he asked her if there were any other illegal items inside of the car.  (1T31-18 to 19).  She told that the officer that a loaded needle with methamphetamine was inside of her purse.  (1T31-22 to 23).  [...] retrieved the drugs and placed her under arrest.
[directive] 1.  Under the provisions of P.L. 2001, c. 69, §1, N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.22, (John’s Law) the content and form of the written statement and acknowledgment of receipt of the written statement of potential criminal and civil liability for permitting or facilitating the arrestee's operation of a motor vehicle while the arrestee remains intoxicated, [hereafter referred to as the POTENTIAL LIABILITY WARNING - N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.22 (Rev. 2-20-2004)  Form], is established pursuant to this DIRECTIVE.2  2.  The POTENTIAL LIABILITY WARNING - N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.22 (Rev. 2-20- 2004)  Form shall be used by all law enforcement agencies in, and of, this State, and replaces the form distributed under Attorney General Law Enforcement Directive No. 2001-5.  The POTENTIAL LIABILITY WARNING - N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.22 (Rev. 2-20-2004) Form is contained in Appendix A, attached to this DIRECTIVE.  3.  All previous versions of the POTENTIAL LIABILITY WARNING - N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.22  Forms are to be discarded.  1
[brief] [...] and [...] and the [...], on the other hand, stood to gain from defeating the Derivative Action.  Pa471–72 ¶¶ 6–7; Pa475–76 ¶ 14.  Concurrently with its summary judgment decision, the Vermont Trial Court issued an order for “voluntary” dismissal of the Derivative Action with prejudice, based solely on a request made by the court-appointed Litigation Receiver.  Pa461 ¶ 48; Pa1043 ¶ 48; Pa479 ¶ 22; Pa777–78.  IV.
[brief] Here, the Appellant maintains that the grant of the height variance is not supported by the evidence.  The application here was made under N.J.S.A. 40:55d-70(d)(6) which allows variance for structures that exceed the maximum height permitted in the relevant zone provided that (1) the applicant can show special reasons for the increased height and (2) the increased height will not cause substantial detriment to the public good and will not substantially impair the intent and the purpose of the zoning plan and zoning ordinance.  That is *Grasso v. Borough of Spring Lake Heights*, 375 N.J. Super. 41 (2004).
[brief] As proposed, a use variance is required.  2.  The applicant must demonstrate sufficient “special reasons” why the proposed use carries out a purpose of zoning, or how the refusal to allow the project would impose on the applicant an undue hardship.  In addition, the applicant must demonstrate that the requested use variance can be granted without substantial detriment to the public good and will not substantially impair the intent and purpose of the zone plan and zoning ordinance.  (Da8 to Da11(emphasis in original)).  Based on the application materials, photographs, evidence submitted, testimony of the [...] and the Plaintiffs, and the applicable law, the Zoning Board made the following findings of fact and conclusions of law as memorialized in its Resolution:
[brief] In rejecting this argument, the Trial Court noted that as early as 1988, the Borough’s master plan had recognized the need to guide waterfront development of the Borough’s bayfront in order to advance economic development.  The Trial Court also indicated that the plan amendment: . . . is directly on-point with that 2015 recommendation to commit to a major economic re-development of the area.  Suffice it to say that implicit in a substantial mix-use development would be an increase to density in the area.
[brief] The court below dismissed this concern with a statement that shows how it did not fully appreciate the history of the Property, the MLUL or the master plan process.  The trial court’s reasoning was, [r]ecently the governing body rejected a zone change to make this proposal a permitted use.  The governing body did designate several parcels for this purpose.  But the zoning was not changed to reflect this.  This fact is not relevant and is not a basis to deny this application. ”  Da356.  It was plain error to conclude that the governing body’s denial of a rezoning request for the same use (and even less intensive) on this site and the exclusion of this site from the Master Plan update are not relevant to a use application to the Board of Adjustment for the exact same use on the same Property.
[brief] See also State v. Tillery, 238 N.J. 293, 326 (2019) (stating, in the context sentencing, that in K.S. the Supreme Court found the “practice” of “drawing inferences from the mere fact that charges have been brought “improper”).  Improper consideration of these arrests tainted the trial court’s assessment of both aggravating and mitigating factors and requires a resentencing.  --- 9  Allowing such a use of unproven prior allegations of criminal activity is inherently discriminatory against defendants who are part of groups that have traditionally been the subject of systemic mistreatment in the criminal justice system.  People of color, such as [...], are more likely than whites to have contacts with the police and less likely to receive “curbside” or “stationhouse” adjustments, more likely to be charged (and charged more seriously) than whites, likely to receive harsher plea offers than whites, more likely to be convicted at trial than whites, and likely to be sentenced more severely than whites.  See Josephine Ross, Warning: Stop-And-Frisk May Be Hazardous To Your Health, 25 Wm. & Mary Bill of Rts. J. 689, 704-705 (2016).  Second, the court failed to consider [...]’s advanced age upon release, even if he were sentenced to the minimum sentence.  As our Supreme Court has recently emphasized, “[a] defendant’s age is doubtlessly among the information that courts should consider when calibrating a fair sentence. ”  *State v. Torres*, 246 N.J. 246, 273 (2021).  That information is necessary to consider the need for deterrence and incapacitation.  [...] was 50 years old at the time of sentencing.  (17T 14-4)  Even if sentenced to the minimum term — 30 years in prison with 30 years of parole ineligibility — he would not be parole eligible until he was 76.  (17T 18-14 to 15)  The life sentence is longer than necessary to serve a deterrent or incapacitative purpose; the minimum possible sentence of 30 years with a 30-year period of parole ineligibility would have been sufficient.
[brief] (Not Raised Below)  Defendant asserts he was denied a fair trial by the cumulative effect of the alleged errors.  (Db28-31).  “Even if an individual error does not require reversal, the cumulative effect of a series of errors can cast doubt on a verdict and call for a new trial. ”  State v. Sanchez-Medina, 231 N.J. 452, 469 (2018) (citing State v. Jenewicz, 193 N.J. 440, 473 (2008)).  Contrary to defendant’s argument, this case was not entirely circumstantial.  Rather, by defendant’s own admission he was one of the two people who went into the business to rob the victim.  Moreover, the victim sat on the witness stand and told the jury he was 100% sure both assailants beat him when his money was taken.  The jury heard that eyewitness testimony and saw the images of the victim’s injuries.  So long as defendant’s statement does not offend Miranda, which the State adamantly argues it does not, no other alleged error individually or cumulatively overcomes the overwhelming evidence of defendant’s guilt.  POINT V:
[brief] Finally, on February 20, 2024, the Debtor filed his single Count Complaint in the Adversary Proceeding seeking to set aside the Final Judgment as a fraudulent transfer to [...] under Section 548 of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 548.  Adv. Pro. Doc. No. 1.  Incredibly, despite having direct knowledge of the \textit{Tyler} and \textit{Roberto} cases, the Debtor failed to allege a cause --- \(^9\) \textit{Roberto} had not been decided yet, the court was unaware that any such case was pending, and counsel to the Debtor provided no compelling argument.  \(^10\)  Astonishingly, as lately as the hearing on May 28, 2024, counsel to the Debtor still claims that [...] should not be paid its full claim because it did not file a proof of claim — as if the issue had not already been decided!  \(^11\) \textit{Roberto} still had not been decided yet and the court was still not unaware of it pending. of action in his Complaint under the Takings Clauses as established in those cases!  Then, through an improper Order to Show Cause, the Debtor sought to enjoin any eviction action that [...] may undertake with regard to its Final Judgment.
[brief] Despite the PWCRA and the requirements of the Solicitation, [...]  (“[...]”) submitted a bid to [...] that identified an archaeologist who was not PWCRA-registered at the time of bidding.  [...], on the other hand, submitted a bid that identified a PWCRA-registered archaeologist in accordance with the mandates of the PWCRA and Solicitation.  Yet, [...] awarded the contract to complete the Project (“Anticipated Contract”) to [...].  Instead of enforcing the strict mandates imposed by the PWCRA and the language of the Solicitation, the trial court improperly countenanced [...]’s wrongful award of the Anticipated Contract to [...].
[brief] *Ibid.*  In another context, *this Court described a reasonable hourly rate as being one “that would be charged by an adequately experienced attorney possessed of average skill and ordinary competence—not those that would be set by the most successful or highly specialized attorney in the context of private practice. ”*  Id. at 132-33 (quoting Singer v. State, 95 N.J. 487, 500-01, cert. denied, 469 U.S. 832 (1984))(emphasis added).  Trial courts that “accept passively’ the submissions of counsel” to support the lodestar amount have repeatedly been “admonished” for doing so.
[brief] The court thus committed legal error in granting the Counterclaim.  In the federal courts, where the New Jersey law on whether a litigant has a private right of action is derived from, the Third Circuit reasoned, “even when Congress creates rights or obligations (including personal rights), it does not necessarily follow that private parties can enforce them or obtain a direct remedy through the judicial process”.  --- 25  *Three Rivers Ctr. for Indep. Living v. Hous. Auth. of City of Pittsburgh*, 382 F.3d 412, 420 (3d Cir. 2004) action where the Legislature has not expressly provided for such action. ”\textsuperscript{26}  The Appellate Division concluded, “In other types of regulatory statutes, the Legislature has also \textbf{expressly} conferred private causes of action when it wanted members of the public to have access to the civil courts for violations of remedial statutes”.\textsuperscript{27}  [...]’s Counterclaim is essentially an attempted claim for enforcement of an alleged violation of \textit{N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-9(e)(3)}.  But the Legislature has not expressly created a private right of action to sue school districts for enforcement or violations of \textit{N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-9(e)(3)}.  If they did, then surely [...] could have cited it in their Counterclaim and summary judgment motion – but they cannot because there is no express private right to a cause of action.  Hence, even if the court were to assert jurisdiction over [...]’s Counterclaim, the court should dismiss the Counterclaim because the Legislature did not expressly confer a private right to a cause of action for [...] to sue the Board in Superior Court.  Without [...]’s private right to a cause of action to sue the Board in Superior Court, the Counterclaim should have been dismissed.
[brief] ”  Pitney Bowes, supra, 440 N.J. Super. at 382 (citing Hous. Auth. of Morristown v. Little, 135 N.J. 274, 283 (1994)).  A reconsideration motion is primarily an opportunity to seek to convince the court that either 1) it has expressed its decision based upon a palpably incorrect or irrational basis, or 2) it is obvious that the court either did not consider, or failed to appreciate the significance of probative, competent evidence.  See R. 4:49-2.  There is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the bus stopped suddenly, abruptly, violently, and with enough force to throw [...] to the floor of the bus and cause multiple herniations in her spine.  Plaintiff’s deposition testimony coupled with the sworn statement from an eyewitness, together with all beneficial inferences therefrom, created a genuine issue of material fact making summary judgment on liability a question of fact for the jury to determine.
[directive] If a firearm was possessed, answer questions 1 a, b and c.  If a firearm was not possessed, mark question 1a not applicable [NA] and answer questions 1b and c.  1.  Entiende que si Ud. se declara culpable de cualquiera de los siguientes actos criminales: líder de una red de tráfico de narcóticos (2C:35-3); operación de una instalación de producción de una sustancia peligrosa regulada (2C:35-4); fabricación de una sustancia peligrosa regulada (2C:35-5); distribución, posesión o fabricación de gamma hidroxibutirato (2C:35-5.2); distribución, posesión o fabricación de flunitracepam (2C:35-5.3); utilización de un menor en la distribución de drogas (2C:35-6); distribución, preparación o posesión de una sustancia peligrosa regulada con la intención de distribuirla dentro de 1.000 pies de distancia de la propiedad de una escuela o colegio (2C:35-7); distribución, preparación o posesión de una sustancia peligrosa controlada dentro de 500 pies de distancia de una instalación de viviendas subvencionadas, un parque o edificio público (2C:35-7.1); o distribución, posesión o fabricación de una imitación de una sustancia peligrosa regulada (2C:35-11)  Do you understand that if you plead guilty to any of the following offenses: leader of a narcotics trafficking network (2C:35-3); operating a controlled dangerous substance production facility (2C:35-4); manufacturing a controlled dangerous substance (2C:35-5) distribution, possession or manufacture of gamma hydroxybututyrate (2C:35-5.2); distribution, possession or manufacture of flunitrazepam (2C:35-5.3); employing a juvenile in drug distribution (2C:35-6); distributing, dispensing or possessing with intent to distribute a controlled dangerous substance within 1,000 feet of school property (2C:35-7); distributing, dispensing or possessing a controlled dangerous substance within 500 feet of a public housing facility, park or building (2C:35-7.1); or, distribution, possession or manufacture of an imitation controlled dangerous substance (2C:35-11) Y/AND Formulario promulgado por la directriz # 01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 11169-Spanish página 1 de 2 Form Promulgated by Directive #01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 11169-Spanish page 1 of 2 [Sí/Yes] [No/No] [No aplica/NA] a. también se declara culpable de poseer un arma de fuego cuando cometió, trató de cometer o conspiró para cometer cualquiera de esos actos criminales, Ud. recibirá una sentencia consecutiva por poseer el arma? you also plead guilty to possessing a firearm while committing, attempting to commit or conspiring to commit any of these offenses you will receive a consecutive sentence for possessing the weapon?
[brief] 11  THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT THE STRONG PUBLIC POLICY IN PROTECTING EVERY CITIZEN’S RIGHT TO VOTE AND HAVE THEIR VOTE COUNTED IS PARAMOUNT  ....................................................................................................................  11  1.  Legislative History of the Irregular Ballot Statute ......................................................  11  2.  The Ballot Failed to Contain Proper Warnings ............................................................  15  3.  The Ocean County Case is an Outlier and Significantly Different Compared to the Situation Here .........................................................................................  20 CONCLUSION ..................................................................................................................