ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The common knowledge exception provides that expert testimony is not required to sustain a cause of action against any professional where a reasonable juror could determine that the conduct of a party was negligent without the need for expert assistance.  Hubbard v. Reed, 168 N.J. 387, 390 (2001) (holding that an affidavit of merit is not required in “common knowledge” cases when an expert will not be called to testify “‘that the care skill or knowledge ... [of the defendant] fell outside acceptable professional or occupational standards or treatment practices’”) (citing N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-27)).  When deciding whether expert testimony is necessary, a court properly considers “whether the matter to be dealt with is so esoteric that jurors of common judgment and experience cannot form a valid judgment as to whether the conduct of the [defendant] was reasonable.
[brief] Their lengthy negotiations with [...] eventually culminated with the April 18, 2022 passage of [...] and the adoption of the [...].  As [...] remarked during the hearing on [...], the Committee took its time in this process so as to extract the maximum possible financial benefit from the developer:  We drug our feet for a while for several reasons; some of it was fiscal, until we got what we required, which we did.  And most importantly, we had an agreement – and all of this is contingent on the developer.  This approval, and therefore, anything that would go beyond this is contingent on the developer signing the redevelopment agreement which is the words about the financial agreement, the PILOT payment, and it includes a dedication and commitment for sewer to be brought to that quadrant of our town which is mainly the [...].  (1T, 7:5-16).  The public hearing on [...]’s site plan application occurred several months after [...]’s passage and was met with substantial public opposition.
[brief] ### Statutes - **Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976**, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1988 ................................................................. 38  ### Rules - **R. 4:40-2** ........................................................................ 1, 22 - **R. 4:42-9** ........................................................................ 42 - **R. 4:49-1** ........................................................................ 1, 32 - **RPC 1.5(a)** ...................................................................... 3, 42, 43, 45  INDEX TO TRANSCRIPTS | TRANSCRIPT
[brief] There is no merit regarding [...]’s argument that trial judge should have recused herself.  Therefore, the Appellate Division should reject Plaintiffs’ arguments.  Canon 1 of the Code of Judicial Conduct states that “[a]n independent and honorable judiciary is indispensable to justice in our society. ”  Judges are required to maintain, enforce, and observe “high standards of conduct so that the integrity and independence of the judiciary may be preserved. ”  *Ibid.*  Judges are to “act at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence,” *Id.* Canon 2(A), and “must avoid all impropriety and appearance of impropriety,” *Id.* commentary on Canon 2 (emphasis added).  Indeed, as the Supreme Court recognized nearly a half century ago, “‘justice must satisfy the appearance of justice. ’”  *State v. Deutsch,* 34 N.J. 190, 206 (1961) (quoting *Offutt v. United States,* 348 U.S. 11, 14 (1954)).  That standard requires judges to “refrain … from sitting in any causes where their objectivity and impartiality may fairly be brought into question. ”  *Ibid.*  In other words, judges must avoid acting in a biased way or in a manner that may be perceived as partial.  To demand any less would invite questions about the impartiality of the justice system and thereby “threaten[ ] the integrity of our judicial process. ”  *State v. Tucker,* 264 N.J. Super. 549, 554 (App. Div. 1993), certif. denied, 135 N.J. 468 (1994).  Here, Plaintiff’s basis to recuse [...] has nothing to do with [...]’ alleged bias or impartiality, but fully pertains to Plaintiff’s disagreement with the rulings made against him.  Plaintiff, during numerous times at trial, disregarded decorum in the courtroom, was combative with opposing counsel and disrespected the trial judge and court staff.  (6T:215; 5T:29; 4T:107:23-24).  Plaintiffs’ baseless and unsubstantiated alleged complaint to the FBI about [...], was Plaintiffs attempt to forum shop to get a different judge assigned to his case.  This was further alleged by Plaintiff to further delay the trial, which was done repeatedly by Plaintiff prior to the trial.  If Plaintiff is upset with the rulings made at trial, he has the right to appeal the same.  However, recusal of a trial judge is not warranted simply because a litigant is unhappy with a ruling or with the result at trial.  If the same is permitted, then every litigant that is unhappy with a court ruling can move for a recusal to attempt to obtain a different result, which is nonsensical.  Therefore, the trial judge properly denied Plaintiff’s recusal motion.
[directive] Mitigating Factor #4 addresses circumstances that suggest reduced culpability by virtue of the defendant’s willingness to accept responsibility for the illegal conduct and to take affirmative steps that will make it less likely that the defendant would return to a life of crime.  Specifically, Mitigating Factor #4 applies when the defendant has enrolled and is participating in an approved drug treatment program.  This factor is designed to provide strong practical incentives for drug or alcohol dependent offenders to overcome denial and to accept responsibility by engaging in the treatment process prior to conviction and sentencing.  This scheme is designed to provide both an opportunity and incentive for drug or alcohol dependent offenders to break the cycle of crime and addiction, thereby reducing the likelihood that these offenders would commit future offenses and endanger the public safety.  Page 82
[directive] Because of particular assignment or particular duties, many police officers will be required to complete one or more of the following types of in-service training:  a.  Officers who may respond to calls for service or handle emergency situations  i.  Bloodborne Pathogens  Under 29 C.F.R. §1910.1030, only those police officers with an occupational exposure or the potential for such exposure are required to complete basic and in-service biohazard training.  Training time varies depending on size of class and methodology, but update in-service training should take one to two hours.  ii.  Hazardous Materials  Under 29 C.F.R. §1910.120 (q) (6), only those police officers who participate or are expected to participate in an emergency response to a hazardous materials situation must receive basic and annual in-service training in hazardous materials.  The amount of in-service training that is required will depend on the level of basic hazardous materials training the officer has completed.  iii.  Right to Know  Under N.J.A.C. 8:59-7.1 (c), only those police officers who are exposed to or have the potential to be exposed to hazardous substances during the course of their work must receive Right to Know training, including annual in-service training.  Officers exposed to just one hazardous chemical need  Revised: 4/00 2 not complete in-service Right to Know training provided their employer complies with the minimal training and notification requirements in N.J.A.C. 8:59-6.3 (f).  b.  Breathlayzer  Recertification  N.J.A.C. 13:57-1.6 and -1.7 require police officers who are certified to operate a breathalyzer to be recertified every third calendar year.  A minimum of eight hours of training is necessary for recertification.  c.  911 dispatcher or call-taker update training  N.J.A.C. 13:81-2.2 requires call-takers and dispatchers for the 911 emergency telecommunications system to complete eight hours of in-service training on an annual basis.  Every police officer who acts as a call-taker or dispatcher must comply with the in-service training requirement.  d.
[brief] (9T96:5-13).  Decedent often expressed her love and affection for Petitioner, writing, *inter alia*, “Thank you for loving me as you do.  You make me very happy & I love you. ” (P377a).  Decedent also wrote “[...], I can't imagine my life without you in it.  Love You.  (P391).  “I’m so glad to have you in my life. ”( P467)  See also (P374a to P465).
[brief] (Pa11; Pa58; Pa60; Pa57).  [...]’s affidavit asserted, in relevant part, that he “did not receive any correspondence or post card. ” (Pa56).  The Board considered [...]’s request at its meeting of May 23, 2023, where it voted to deny his request to register under the amended benefits provisions of the Ricci Act.  (Pa24-27).  The Board concluded that [...] was notified as required by the Ricci Act but failed to submit his Eligibility Registration Form by July 8, 2021.  (Pa26).  [...] appealed the Board’s decision by letter dated July 18, 2023.  (Pa16).  He argued that he did not receive the postcard notice from the Division, so the Board should relax the statutory deadline for filing.  (Pa19-20).  At its meeting on July 25, 2023, the Board considered [...]’s arguments, found that there were no material issues of fact in dispute, and therefore directed the Board Secretary to draft findings of fact and conclusions of law for its review and approval at its next meeting.  (Pa9).  The Board issued its Final Administrative Decision on September 27, 2023.  (Pa9).  The Board concluded that the Ricci Act, codified in part at N.J.S.A. 53:5A-10(e)(3), allows members to file for the recalculation of Ordinary Disability, Special, or Service Retirement Benefits to Accidental Disability Retirement Benefits if the member is or becomes totally and permanently disabled due to participation in the rescue, recovery, or cleanup operations at the World Trade Center between September 11, and October 11, 2001.  (Pa10).  The Board also noted the Ricci Act required the Board to provide notice to members and retirees within thirty days of the effective date of the act, and if members or retirees did not file a written and sworn statement with the retirement system within two years of the effective date of the Act they would be ineligible for the presumption or recalculation.  (Pa10).  The Board found it undisputed that the Division had mailed notice of the Ricci Act to [...] and that [...] did not submit his Eligibility Registration Form until approximately one year and one month past the statutory deadline.  (Pa13-14).  The Board also considered the matter under its inherent power to extend the deadline if good cause, reasonable grounds, and reasonable diligence could be demonstrated.  (Pa13-14).  The Board concluded that the Division had notified all retired members of [...] of the passage of the Ricci Act on August 9, 2019 in accordance with the Act.  (Pa13-14).  [...]’s assertion that he did not remember receiving the postcard notice did not establish good cause nor reasonable grounds to allow him to file over one year and one month past the statutory deadline.  (Pa14).  Further, the Board concluded that [...] had not exercised reasonable diligence because of such a protracted delay in filing his Eligibility Registration Form.  (Pa14).  Therefore, the Board concluded that [...] was ineligible to register for amended benefits under the Ricci Act.  (Pa14).  This appeal followed.
[directive] serious bodily injury by the display of a weapon or otherwise, so long as the officer’s purpose is limited to creating an apprehension that deadly force will be used if necessary, does not constitute deadly force.  3.5  Deadly Weapon.  Deadly weapon means any firearm or other weapon, device, instrument, material or substance, whether animate or inanimate, which in the manner it is used or is intended to be used, is known to be capable of producing death or serious bodily injury, or in the manner in which it is fashioned would lead the victim reasonably to believe it to be capable of producing death or serious bodily injury.
[brief] N.J.S.A. 17:29C-10 provides that a cancellation notice will not be effective unless the carrier has sent the notice in accordance with the requirements therein.  The statute would have little meaning without the converse holding true – if a carrier has sent the notice in accordance with the provisions of N.J.S.A. 17:29C-10, the notice will be effective.  Indeed, the Court in Hodges v. Pennsylvania Nat. Ins. Co. on Behalf of NJAFIUA, supra, made clear that if the insurer has produced the requisite statutory proof of mailing, the insured need not even have received the notice of cancellation for it to be effective.  260 N.J.  Super. at 222-23.  Here, the lower court reviewed [...]’s evidence and determined that it sufficed to demonstrate compliance with N.J.S.A. 17:29C-10, resulting in an effective cancellation of the [...] business auto policy covering the car [...] was driving in the accident of July 23, 2020.  There is no genuine basis upon which to dispute the effectiveness of [...]’s cancellation in this matter, other than the representation of [...] that he does not recall receiving the cancellation notice.
[brief] Again, at that exact time that the eviction case was pending, Landlord owed Tenant significantly more in unreimbursed Tenant’s Allowance installments than Tenant owed Landlord in unpaid or overdue rent and additional rent.  Yet the trial judge indicated by his comments that he had already ruled out the possibility of an offset, before having even analyzed that provision of the Lease.  At the hearing held on November 10, 2021, even after having presumably read the Lease, the trial judge still offered no analysis whatsoever of the Rent Offset or Allowance Offset in the Lease (2T6-23 TO 2T7-2).  The order memorializing the trial court’s ruling did not delve deeper, stating simply: “Because the Tenant is in breach of the lease due to nonpayment of five months of rent, the Tenant is not due any refund of fit up costs under Section 4.02 of the lease” (Da1-Da2).  Again, no further legal analysis, statement of reasons, or citation to a single case accompanied the trial judge’s ruling that Tenant was not entitled to the Tenant’s Allowance reimbursement.  The trial judge’s lack of open-mindedness, lack of engagement with Tenant’s claim, and lack of factual or legal support for the ruling denied Tenant a fair hearing in accord with due process of law.
[brief] When invoking the power of eminent domain, government is obligated to “turn square corners. ”  F.M.C., supra, 100 N.J. 418, 426 (1985).  Our courts have long held that when implicating its condemnation power, “government has an overriding obligation to deal forthrightly and fairly with property owners. ”  Ibid. (citing Rockaway v. Donofrio, 186 N.J. Super. 344 (App. Div. 1982).  This maxim is especially true in the context of a public agency’s taking of private land for redevelopment.
[brief] In this case, plaintiff was forced to reopen the divorce litigation against [...] because of the wrongful conduct of defendants, thus plaintiff is entitled to recover from defendants the attorney’s fees and costs incurred in reopening the divorce.  Other jurisdictions have the same rule as New Jersey.  See Rudolf v. Shayne, 8 N.Y. 3d 438, 443 (2007); Gefre v. Davis Wright Tremaine, LLP, 306 P.3d 1264 (Alaska 2013).  In *Rudolf v. Shayne*, 8 N.Y. 3d 438 (2007), the Court of Appeals of New York reaffirmed that the direct consequential damages from malpractice cases include the “legal and expert witness fees and related expenses. ”  “Damages in a legal malpractice case are designated ‘to make the injured client whole. ’  A plaintiff’s damages may include ‘litigation expenses incurred in an attempt to avoid, minimize, or reduce the damage caused by the attorney’s wrongful conduct.
[brief] As alleged in the Fourth Amended Complaint (the “4AC”) (Ja4-1312), Defendants defrauded [...] in connection with a type of municipal bond known as a Variable Rate Demand Obligation (“VRDO”).  VRDOs are variable-rate, tax-exempt bonds that state and local governments issue to finance long-term projects for local communities.  VRDOs allow the State to borrow money for long periods while paying lower, short-term interest rates.  VRDOs are attractive to investors because they are low-risk, high-liquidity, and tax-free.  Ja9-10, 13-15, 17 (¶¶ 1-6, 23-28, 32).  The role of Defendants in setting rates on VRDOs is what led to this action.  VRDO issuers hired Defendants to act as remarketing agents (“RMAs”).  As RMAs, Defendants were contractually required to reset the interest rate for a VRDO at the lowest rate that, in their judgment, would enable the bond to be sold at par, i.e., face value.  Every time they reset rates, Defendants had to consider “prevailing market conditions. ”  VRDO issuers also hired Defendants to buy back an issuer’s bond if investors redeemed the bond and new investors could not be found by the RMA.  Ja9-10, 13-18, 40, 102-07 (¶¶ 2, 4-6, 23-33, 119, 162 n.2, 255-70).  Relator’s central allegation is that Defendants intentionally failed to set the lowest possible rate for each VRDO in light of prevailing market conditions.  Instead, Defendants mechanically reset rates with no consideration of a bond’s individual characteristics or prevailing market conditions.  Defendants also ignored the very investors that Defendants knew would accept the lowest interest rates, thus failing to discover what the lowest rate might be.  Relator also identified pricing patterns that, but for Defendants’ fraud, should not have occurred.  Ja2, 9, 32-41, 49-50, 107-12 (¶¶ 2, 87-119, 126(d), 271-84).  Relator alleged a pervasive and consistent pattern of rate inflation.  Ja106-18 (¶¶ 268-306).  Defendants’ conduct defrauded the State of more than $100 million via inflated interest rates, fees for RMA services that Defendants did not provide, fees for letters of credit that issuers needlessly incurred.  Ja10 (¶ 6), 41 (¶ 120), 118-22 (¶¶ 307-20).
[brief] Page TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .................................................................................. ii  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT ..............................................................................  1 ARGUMENT ...........................................................................................................  1 POINT I DEFENDANTS FAILED TO ESTABLISH PROPER GROUNDS FOR RECONSIDERATION OF JUDGE WILSON’S ORDERS (Pa56)  .........................................................................................................................  1  A.  Defendants’ motion to reconsider was a lateral appeal, intended to take advantage of the change in judicial assignment .....................  1  B.  Defendants fail to address that [...]’s immediate reversal of [...] was an abuse of discretion .........................  4  C.  Defendants’ motion to reconsider was merely a rehash of their thrice-rejected arguments, citing the same authorities ...............  5  POINT II  DEFENDANTS FAIL TO ESTABLISH THAT SPECIAL EQUITIES SUPPORTED THE DISMISSAL OF THIS FIRST-FILED ACTION (Pa57)  .........................................................................................................................  8  A.  Defendants’ attacks on [...]’s decision are divorced from context and without merit ............................................................  8  B.  The rule favoring retention of the first-filed action should not have been disregarded because Defendants did not establish “special equities” required to overcome that presumption ..........  9  1.  The “significant state interests” special equity requires denial of Defendants’ motion .................................................................  12  2.  [...] did not race to the courthouse or deprive Defendants of a reasonable opportunity to file first .............  13  CONCLUSION ...........................................................................................................
[brief] *Id.* at 326.  In other words, the *Matthews* decision provides the template for determining when public access across private property might be required, but nothing more.  The New Jersey Supreme Court has interpreted and applied the *Matthews* test in only one decision to date: *Raleigh Avenue Beach Association v. Atlantis Beach Club*, 185 N.J. 40 (2005).  In *Raleigh Avenue*, the Court determined that the public has a right of access to the shoreline across an upland area occupied by a newly constructed condominium and private beach club in [...], [...].  The Court, noting that the beach area in question had been open and free to the public for decades prior to construction of the condominium and beach club, determined that application of the *Matthews* factors required public access to the beach.  In particular, the Court observed that the beach in question had already been used by the public for decades and there was an absence of public beach access nearby; furthermore, the Court upheld the imposition of a public access requirement due to the upland structure’s use as a business enterprise (*i.e.*, as a beach club), rather than merely as a residence, as is the case with [...] in the matter at hand.  See Raleigh Avenue, 185 N.J. at 59-60.\textsuperscript{10}  The Matthews and Raleigh Avenue decisions reflect the state of Public Trust Doctrine in NJ as it applied to the use of private property when the Public Access Law was enacted in 2019.
[brief] And he explained that State aid is fundamentally based on a district’s ability to contribute to its budget.  Ibid.  He also pointed out that Chapter 67 implemented a series of measures to “equitably allocate resources across the State .  . . .” (Aa39).  The judge concluded, therefore, that the SFRA was not unconstitutional as applied to [...].  He reasoned that “[t]here is nothing inherently unfair or unconstitutional about calculating State aid based on a district’s LFS[,]” and that the State is not responsible for making up the difference when the district does not raise its local fair share.  Ibid.  The judge offered seven separate reasons why [...]’s claims failed.  First, relying on Supreme Court precedent, he concluded that it is “constitutional for the State to expect [...] to contribute to its budget” and to delegate fiscal obligations to the District.  (Aa40).  Second, reasoning that the SFRA defines equalization aid as the difference between a district’s adequacy budget and LFS, he held “it is not the State’s constitutional obligation to subsidize the district’s local faire share .  . . .”  Ibid.  Third, the judge concluded that adjustment aid was always intended to be a temporary measure, pointing to the gradual schedule for eliminating adjustment aid under N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-68(b).  (Aa40-41).  Fourth, he found that [...] was capable of contributing its local share, but had been “under-contributing” by virtue of the fact that its ability to contribute increased, and its actual contribution did not rise proportionate to its “dramatic[]” rise in wealth.  (Aa41).  Fifth, the judge concluded the amendments to the SFRA are constitutional because “distribut[ing] the cost of education so that it falls more heavily on those districts with the ability to contribute more locally” was an “approach that our Supreme Court found to be constitutionally permissible in Abbott XX. ” (Aa42-43).  Sixth, the court held that the payroll tax under N.J.S.A. 40:48C-15(d)(3) helped to provide assistance to [...] while it transitioned off of adjustment aid.  (Aa43).  And seventh, the court concluded that [...] failed to show that its students were not receiving T&E, as required under Abbott II and Stubaus v. Whitman, 339 N.J. Super. 38, 56 (App. Div. 2001), particularly given the District’s “high performing” NJQSAC rating and its return to full control.  (Aa43-44).  This appeal followed.