ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] This includes devising new policy, making new and existing policies more accessible to law enforcement, revising policy to address gaps and/or shortfalls or enhancing policy for best practices, modernizing existing policy, and minimizing or eliminating conflicting and/or obsolete policy.  The Director of the Bureau of Policing Policy shall work with the other constituent units to develop policies that support their respective missions and shall work with OPSI to translate their recommendations into concrete policy.  F.  Coordination with the Police Training Commission.  The Administrator and staff of the Police Training Commission (PTC) in the DLPS, established pursuant to the Police Training Act in et seq., 1961, N.J.S.A. 52:17B-66, shall coordinate with the OPSI.  The functions, duties, and responsibilities of the PTC shall continue unchanged, except that the Administrator and the Counsel to the PTC shall report to the Executive Director of OPSI.
[brief] ”  *The Sedona Principles, Third Edition: Best Practices, Recommendations & Principles for Addressing Electronic Document Production*, 19 Sedona Conf. J. 1, 118 (2018).  The commentary to Principle 6 further explains:  > [A]s a general matter, neither a requesting party nor the court should prescribe or detail the steps that a responding party must take to meet its discovery obligations, and there should be no discovery on discovery, absent an agreement between the parties, or specific, tangible, evidence-based indicia (versus general allegations of deficiencies or mere “speculation”) of a material failure by the responding party to meet its obligations.  *Id.* at 123.  1  Created by a leading group of judges, lawyers, and academics, the Sedona Principles are recognized as a foundational guide for courts and lawyers confronting the challenges of e-discovery.  All that said, I want the parties to work together in a cooperative fashion to conduct the needed discovery, which all parties recognize will be time consuming and expansive.
[brief] ”  State v. Blanca, 100 N.J. Super. 241, 249 (App. Div. 1968).  An inference cannot be sustained “if the inference of the one from proof of the other is arbitrary because of lack of connection between the two in common experience. ”  Ingram, 98 N.J. at 549; see also State v. Thomas, 132 N.J. 247, 255 (1993) (“To be constitutional, the elemental fact must bear a rational connection, in terms of logical probability, to the evidentiary fact. ”).  The necessary logical link is missing between the use of a wine chiller to strike someone and an intent to kill or to cause serious bodily injury that an actor is practically certain will result in death.  Therefore, the use of the inference was inappropriate.  Our courts “have long accepted that the use of a deadly weapon raises an inference that there was an intent to kill.
[brief] BECAUSE THE COURT PROPERLY FOUND THAT THE CLAIMS AGAINST THE PUGLIA RESPONDENTS WERE BARRED UNDER THE DOCTRINES OF JUDICIAL ESTOPPEL, RES JUDICATA, AND COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL (Order: Pa 1a-2a) ...... 15  A.  The Trial Court Correctly Dismissed [...]’ Complaint Because the Claims Against the [...] Were Barred Under the Doctrine of Judicial Estoppel  ........................................  15  B.  The Trial Court Correctly Dismissed [...]’ Complaint Because the Claims Against the [...] Were Barred Pursuant to the Doctrine of Res Judicata.  ........................................  20
[brief] While the Report does not attach the [...] Survey, Exhibit I to the Report (Pa136) clearly shows the proposed boundary shift moving the [...]’ southern boundary onto Lot 12 and moving its southern line well on to the property identified as Lot 13, contrary to the [...] Survey.  [...] testified at trial about the shift required by the Report versus his survey.  See 1T45, l.5-T46, l.21.  As the Report is now recorded pursuant to the Final Order, any new accurate survey will cause a boundary line shift in all of the affected properties as demonstrated by Exhibit I to the Report (Pa136).  Adopting the [...] line causes the property line of the Respondents to shift within 5.6 feet of the Patierno’s home.  The Respondents give up commensurate footage on the north side of their property to Lot 9.  The [...] pick up significant footage from Lot 12 leaving a very small gap between that line and the house on the property purchased based upon the [...] Survey.  As explained above, the Lot 12 line then shifts to encompass a stone wall hedge which now forms the boundary between Lots 12 and 13.  Lot 13 not being part of the original 1956 subdivision.  All of these lots form part of a typical residential street.  See, e. g., Montville Tax Map, Pa102.  The accuracy of the Report’s survey and the work behind has never been at issue.  The problem is that its recommendation results in creating a larger problem than the one presented based upon circumstantial evidence.  Does the evidence justify the result?
[brief] Prescription Counter v. AmeriscourceBergen Corp., 2007 WL 3511301 (D.N.J. Nov. 14, 2007) ...........................................  25  Quigley v. KPMG Peat Marwick, LLP, 330 N.J. Super. 252 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 165 N.J. 527 (2000)  .......37, 40
[brief] ”  Schwartz v. Menas, 251 N.J. 556 (2022).  However, it rejected the NBR as a *per se* ban on claims by new business for lost profits damages.  Instead, it held that the “reasonable certainty” standard applied, while maintaining a distinction between the proofs required for a new business to meet that standard versus an established business.  The Supreme Court remanded the matter “solely for the purpose of ensuring that the trial court evaluates Plaintiffs’ lost profits claims in accordance with the governing test.
[brief] “Two discrete inquiries” are involved: first, the circumstances surrounding the interrogation, and second, “would a reasonable person have felt he or she was at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave. ”  Ibid.; see also Hubbard, 222 N.J. at 267 (“The relevant inquiry is determined objectively, based on ‘how a reasonable person in the suspect’s position would have understood his situation. ’”) (quoting Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 442 (1984)).  A defendant is in custody for Miranda purposes if “a reasonable person in defendant’s position, based on the nature of the police encounter, would not have believed that he was free to leave. ”  *O’Neal*, 190 N.J. at 616.  Where the police convey their suspicions to the suspect, that is relevant to whether a reasonable person would feel that he or she was free to leave.
[brief] 119.  (5T88:12-89:7)(9T50:6-51)(5T89:20-24) (7T118:16-119:11)  Every one of those transactions was presided over by [...] himself (a fact which the trial court failed to acknowledge).  (5T88:12-89:7)  Despite this, [...] did not dispute that all 119 for which records existed were conducted at book value.  Of those that the court-appointed expert reviewed, all were conducted at book value.  Some of these transactions were [...]’s own transactions, where [...] himself purchased additional interests for book value.  (5T91:24-92:1).  [...] further disregards the fact that all of these transactions occurred while [...] was CEO of the Company, meaning they all occurred at a time when [...] had significant (if not exclusive) control over how the transactions occurred.  (5T91:6-14; 88:3-5; 91:19-92:1) (9T105:5-8).  And [...] ignores that [...] himself admitted tax book value had essentially always been the method for transacting equity in the Company, even in the years before the 119 for which there were records.  (5T88:12-89:7).  Not one of the parties involved in these prior transactions who sold at book value had ever been adjudicated to have harmed his own company and forced to dissociate from it.  [...], of course, is the only member of [...] ever to have been forced to dissociate because he harmed his own company.  It is clearly inequitable to ignore (1) an implied agreement, and (2) these prior transactions, and award the only member ever to be dissociated the highest standard of value ever applied to this company.  How is this not especially so when one considers that, under the Court’s ruling, [...] himself is being permitted to buy in at book value, damage his company so much that he is dissociated therefrom, and then sell at a value higher than book value?  There are no extenuating circumstances in [...]’s favor; in fact, aggravating circumstances abound to suggest that [...] should be paid at most what others would be, if not less.  It would be impossible for almost anything to be inequitable to [...] under the entire circumstances of this particular case.  Buy low, sell high, is an investment strategy; it should not be a court-imposed remedy for a dissociated member who almost destroyed his own company, redomiciled it to Belize, got sanctioned half a million dollars, stole [...]’s servers, and engaged in all the myriad other shenanigans replete in this extensive record.  The trial court did not find that it would somehow be inequitable to apply the implied agreement to use book value in the particular circumstances of this case.  It simply ignored the issue.  Accordingly, this Court should reverse the November 14, 2022 Order valuing [...]’s shares using Fair Market Value, and remand with instructions to Order [...]’s shares be valued using Tax Book Value as of 2017.  **CONCLUSION**
[brief] In his brief, [...] first ignores [...].  (Pa1-Pa43).  [...] then seeks to evade [...]’s statement that the NJCRA carries a two-year statute of limitations by dismissing it as “dicta” and a holding “without explanation. ” (Pa18).  [...] fails to explain, however, how the court’s two published and considered statements as to a two-year statute of limitations for NJCRA claims is not controlling here.  Ibid.; but see State v. Hild, 148 N.J. Super. 294, 296 (App. Div. 1977) (“[T]he parties may not escape their initial obligation to justify their positions by specific reference to legal authority. ”).  For these reasons, this court should also hold that [...]’s NJCRA constitutional malicious prosecution is subject to a two-year statute of limitations.
[directive] Phase I 15-Yard Line.  6 rounds.  20 seconds each command  Standing to kneeling.  •  On command utilizing a handheld or gun mounted light, from a secured holster position, draw and fire 1 round from a standing point shoulder position, assume a kneeling position and fire 2 rounds.  •  Decock, holster and assume a standing ready position.  • Repeat once Phase II 10-Yard Line.  6 rounds.  (Instills shooting then moving from firing point)  5 seconds each command  Standing Point shoulder position.  •  On command, draw and assume a ready position.  •  On command utilizing a handheld or gun mounted light, fire 2 rounds, turn light off and step to the right.  •  Decock and reassume a ready position.  •  On command fire 2 rounds (on the same target) utilizing a handheld or gun mount light, turn light off and step back to the left.  •  Decock and reassume a ready position.  •  On command fire 2 rounds (on the same target) utilizing a handheld or gun mount light, turn light off and step to the right.  •  Reload if necessary, decock, holster and step back to the left to the original shooting position.  Phase III 7-Yard Line.  4 rounds.  6 seconds each command  Point shoulder position.  •  On command, draw and come to a ready position.  9-46 Revised (5/03)  Semi-Annual Firearms Qualification and Requalification Standards
[brief] Exhibit Q to 8/25/23  [...] Cert. (2023 Annual Mortgage Statement from [...])...  Pa136  Exhibit R to 8/25/23 [...] Cert.  (Master Deed for [...])...  Pa139  Items Submitted by Defendants in Support of Opposition and Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment: Defendants’ Notice of Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment dated September 12, 2023..........................
[brief] The trial court’s admissibility rulings arose through a series of Rule 104(c) hearings and an objection by defense counsel at trial.  First, after a Rule 104(c) hearing, the judge admitted defendant’s post-arrest formal interview with [...] until defendant’s invocation of counsel.  The judge credited [...]’s repeated, clear explanations to defendant—that he could not trade a statement for dismissal of his charges—toward a conclusion that defendant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights.  (5T59-1 to 60-19).  The judge ruled that defendant unequivocally invoked his right to counsel and suppressed that portion of the interview.  (5T60-20 to 63-13).
[brief] The Court directed litigants that the trial briefs would “only be based on the hearing below for arbitrary and capricious issues and the documentation provided. ”  4T:32:10-18 with no objection from [...].  At no time did Appellant, by and through their counsel, request the opportunity to file an Interlocutory Appeal of the Summary Judgment Decision or request [...] to advise if said Decision was a Final Order for purposes of appeal.  In point of fact, Appellant’s agreed to the Briefing Schedule on specified issues.  (4T:31).  With a Summary Judgment decision rendered on April 28, 2023, an Amended Notice of Appeal filed on August 31, 2023 to include the Summary Judgement disposition on April 28, 2023 is clearly filed out of time, requiring dismissal.
[brief] In contrast, the model jury charge very specifically instructs the trial court to define “purposely, knowingly, or recklessly. ”  Defendant argues that the New Jersey Supreme Court has defined the words “cruel” in other instances, such as in child abuse cases prosecuted under N.J.S.A. 9:6-1.  Under N.J.S.A. 9:6-1, the model jury charge defines cruel several different ways.  Most notably it defines “cruel” as “inflicting on (him/her) unnecessarily severe corporal punishment or inflicting on him/her unnecessary suffering or pain either mental or physical. ”  As this is not a child abuse case, the definition for cruel under N.J.S.A. 9:6-1 is not relevant to the present case.  The word “cruel” in child abuse cases has legal significance as corporal punishment is not a violation under N.J.S.A. 9:6-1 (and because it is specifically defined in the statute).  Corporal punishment becomes “cruel” and thus a violation when it is unnecessarily severe.  Defining “cruel” in that instance is imperative because the jury cannot rely on its plain meaning.  Even if the definition of cruelty to a child were relevant, defendant seems to be suggesting that closed fist punching a child two times, kicking a child, and then dragging a child by their neck does not equate to cruelty, which is remarkable.
[brief] ”  M733.  Further, the Supreme Court observed “substantive due process is reserved for the most egregious governmental abuses against liberty or property rights, abuses that ‘shock the conscience or otherwise offend…judicial notions of fairness… [and that are] offensive to human dignity. ’”  Ibid; see also Chainey v. Street, 523 F.3d 200, 219 (3d. Cir. 2008); United Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc. v. Twp. of Warrington, 316 F.3d 392, 399 (3d. Cir. 2003).  This heightened standard replaced the previous “improper motive” test established in Bello v. Walker. 840 F.2d 1124 (3d. Cir. 1988).
[directive] The Civilian Review Board may not override any finding or decision made as part of the internal affairs process, impose discipline, require that another official impose discipline, or render any finding or decision that requires deference from any other official.  If a law enforcement agency declines to re-open an investigation at the request of the Civilian Review Board, the Board may issue a final public report regarding the complaint or incident after appropriately redacting the report in accordance with instructions from the law enforcement executive.  The personal identity of specific subject officers, complainants, or witnesses may not be disclosed to the public.  Under no circumstances may a Civilian Review Board immunize any person from prosecution or take any other action that would have the effect of conferring immunity on any person.  (b)
[brief] McElwee v. Borough of Fieldsboro, 400 N.J.Super. 388 (App. Div. 2008).  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3  New Jersey Statutes Annotated N.J.S.A. 40A:14-128.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2, 3 N.J.S.A. 40A:14-1147.
[brief] ’”); [...], \textit{Standard for Friction Ridge Examination Conclusions} (hereinafter “OSAC Report”) at 6 (“An examiner shall not assert that a source identification is the conclusion that two impressions were made by the same source or imply an individualization to the --- \(^4\)  These issues are addressed at length in the defendant’s Appellate Division brief.  [...] adopts and incorporates by reference the discussion of these issues contained in Point I of the defendant’s brief.
[brief] ”  See, e.g., In re Estate of Lash, 169 N.J. 20, 26, 776 A.2d 765, 769 (2001) (“Those [attorney] fees are merely a portion of the damages the plaintiff suffered at the hands of the tortfeasor”); Fleury v. Kessel/Duff Constr. Co., 149 Vt. 360, 264, 543 A.2d 703, 705 (Vt. 1988) (“Although Vermont adheres to the ‘American rule’ as a matter of policy, we have long recognized the power of the Legislature by statute to make attorney’s fees an item of recoverable damages or costs.
[brief] On March 11, 2020, Plaintiffs filed a Motion to Consolidate the present action with the 2015 action.  (Da551-555)  Plaintiffs’ letter brief in support of the Motion to Consolidate conceded that the two actions addressed identical matters, stating that “[t]here can be no doubt that this matter and the Related Matter involve common questions of law or fact and arise out of the same transaction or series of transactions. ”  (Da554, emphasis added)  [...] heard oral argument on Plaintiffs’ Motion to Consolidate and denied the motion by order dated April 24, 2020.
[brief] Defendant [...] failed to comply with the Court's case management order entered on November 9, 2023, which included a punch list or highlighted specific requests of any outstanding paper discovery to be served by November 13, 2023, answers to the punch list or highlighted requests of any outstanding paper discovery to be provided by November 20, 2023, and depositions of existing parties’ fact witnesses to be conducted by December 1, 2023.  Defendants did not fulfill their discovery obligations as identified on the record.  More specifically, Defendants, for the first time during oral argument, identified three banks that Defendants had failed to identify in interrogatories or supplemental interrogatories for Plaintiffs.  [Pa1-2]
[directive] County Prosecutors should conduct reviews of agencies with concerning patterns, as well as instituting a process for random reviews of the internal affairs functions of agencies in their jurisdiction.  For instance, a County Prosecutor might direct a randomly selected agency to share all internal affairs files for cases that were closed in the previous quarter, so that the prosecutor can ascertain whether the internal affairs guidelines are being rigorously observed both in the procedures being employed and in the substance of the results.  Likewise, if excessive force complaints are never sustained by an agency, the County Prosecutor may elect to review the body worn camera footage of force incidents to make an independent assessment.  Even if the County Prosecutor’s Office finds that there have been no substantive errors in an agency’s dispositions or disciplinary decisions, periodic reviews might uncover procedural deficiencies that, if allowed to continue, might 65 INTERNAL AFFAIRS POLICY & PROCEDURES | June 2021 result in serious errors in the future.  In instances where a County Prosecutor reviewed a matter for potential criminal prosecution, declined prosecution and referred back for administrative action, the County Prosecutor must review the ultimate disposition of those matters.  66
[brief] PCAST Report at 113; A Path Forward at 153.  The examiner in this case did discuss any supposed subclass characteristics. characteristics the examiner must find in agreement to declare a match.  *PCAST Report* at 60.  Instead, firearms examiners utilize a subjective pattern matching methodology that allows each examiner to set his or her own criteria based on training and experience.  See *ibid.*; see also National Research Council, *Ballistics Imaging* 54 (2008) [hereinafter *Ballistics Imaging*] (Da 581-891).  The [...] ([...]), the leading proponent of the validity of firearms examination, states that “the interpretation of individualization/identification is subjective in nature, founded on scientific principles and based on the examiner’s training and experience. ”  *[...] Theory of Identification*.  Put differently, there is no standardized guideline informed by empirical research that defines “sufficient agreement” such that an examiner can identify the firearm which expelled a particular bullet or casing.  “Sufficient agreement” means whatever the examiner believes it to be in any given case.  **C.  There Is No Scientific Basis For The Claim That Firearms Examiners Can Definitively Determine That Ammunition Came From A Specific Gun.
[brief] [...] further alleged that “the mold exclusions in those policies do not bar Larry [...]’s claims for bodily and mental injury resulting from his consumption of edible food that was contaminated by mold spores released by the extensive toxic mold contamination in his condominium. ”  *Id.*  [...] pled this interpretation before fact discovery in this case conclusively demonstrated that he suffered no injury by eating mold-contaminated food.  He modified that sensible interpretation to the outlandish theory he proffered at trial and here.  The trial court rejected it.  So should this Court.
[brief] “[A]ny attempt by an insurance company to dilute or diminish statutory provisions applicable to its contract of insurance is contrary to public policy. ”  *Ibid.*  For that proposition, the *Pasterchick* court relied on the New Jersey Supreme Court case of *Motor Club of Am. Ins. Co. v. Philips*, 66 N.J. 277 (1974), another case where the [...] approved an illegal endorsement.
[directive] A judge allowing bail may at any time revoke the order admitting the defendant to bail.  This Rule provides that a summons shall issue unless the defendant is charged with murder, kidnapping, aggravated manslaughter, manslaughter, robbery, aggravated sexual assault, sexual assault, aggravated criminal sexual contact, criminal sexual contact, second degree aggravated assault, aggravated arson, 351 Rule 3:3-1 of Title 2C that constitute first or second degree crimes, or any crimes involving possession or use of a firearm, or arson, burglary, violations of Chapter Determination on Whether to Issue a conspiracies or attempts to commit such crimes; or the defendant has been served with a summons and has failed to appear; or there is reason to believe that the Summons or Warrant defendant is a danger to self, other persons or property; or there is an outstanding warrant for the defendant; or the defendant’s identity or address is not known and a warrant is necessary to subject the defendant to the jurisdiction of the court; or there is reason to believe that the defendant will not appear in response to a summons.