ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Appellant Misconstrues the Trial Court’s Order Denying Appellant’s Cross-Motion  Because the Trial Court dismissed the Complaint for failure to state a claim, the Trial Court did not reach the merits of Appellant’s Cross-Motion to Vacate Default Judgment, Transfer, and Consolidate.  Appellant’s Cross-Motion sought to vacate the Judgment in the Collection Action, transfer the Collection Action to the Trial Court, and consolidate the Collection Action within the instant action.  The Trial Court could only consider vacating the Collection Action after its transfer and consolidation.  Because the Trial Court dismissed the instant action, transfer and consolidation was not possible.  Thus, the Trial Court held that the Cross-Motion was moot and directed any argument for vacatur to be raised before the Collection Court.
[brief] After being served with the Plaintiff-Appellant’s Complaint, the matter was referred to defense counsel for the filing of Answer.  On June 1, 2023, Plaintiff received defense counsel’s letter of representation.  (Da049).  On July 2, 2023, an Answer was filed on behalf of [...].  (Pa23).  Although Plaintiff-Appellant asserts that the “suit limitation clause” defense was not invoked, Plaintiff-Appellant candidly states that the Affirmative Defenses: “Plaintiff’s claims are barred by the Statute of Limitations in such cases made and provided” and “Plaintiff has failed to comply with the terms of the policy from which he (sic) seeks benefits” were asserted.
[brief] His first claim that the PCR court erred when it did not consider his petition under Rule 3:21-10(b)(5) is meritless because the record clearly shows that the court did in fact address his illegal sentence argument in its written opinion.  (Da45).  Second, his claim that the PCR court erred by applying the time bar to his petition is also unconvincing.  Because his sentence was not illegal, he was required to file his PCR petition within the five-year deadline mandated by Rule 3:22-12.  Alternatively, defendant could have attempted to establish excusable neglect and that a fundamental injustice would result if his petition was not heard on the merits to seek a relaxation of the time-bar.  Because he did neither, the PCR court properly found his petition to be time-barred.  His third, fourth, and fifth claims regarding the consequences of vacating his illegally lenient sentence are meritless because, as discussed above, his sentence was not illegal.  For the above reasons, the State urges this Court to affirm the PCR court’s denial of his petition.
[brief] The Court below said that it used a “qualitative test” in evaluating whether the changes from [...] to [...] amounted to an illegal expansion of [...]’s pretexting non-conforming use.  (T4 at 24:11).  The Court should use a “qualitative test” and look at the impact of the change on the area.  Avalon Home and Land Owners Ass’n v. Borough of Avalon, 111 N.J. 205 (1988); Town of Belleville v. Parillo’s, Inc., 83 N.J. 309 (1980); Grundlehner v. Dangler, 29 N.J. 256 (1959); Conselice v. Borough of Seaside Park, 358 N.J. Super. 327 (App. Div. 2003); Shire Inn, Inc. v. Borough of Avon-By-The-Sea, 321 N.J. Super.  462 (App. Div. 1999).  It is clear that the quality and character of the use has changed since 1984.  The menu choices no longer make this a “pizza parlor” like that run by [...].  It is now a full take-out Italian restaurant.  In addition, the hours of operation have increased from twenty-four to sixty-four hours per week, or an increase of forty hours or almost 170%.  Food is now consumed on the premises.  Large truck deliveries are made multiple times during the week beginning at 5:00 a.m., where no deliveries at all were made under [...].  Traffic has increased under [...].  The appliances necessary to produce [...]’s menu have increased.  Noise and odors from the trucks and traffic to the store has also increased.  The negative impact of [...]’s use is substantially greater than the [...] operation.  It is beyond doubt that the quality and character of [...] is substantially different from [...]’s.  As such, the Court below erred in concluding as a matter of law and fact that the use approved in 1984 had not expanded.  POINT VI
[brief] The Trial Court incorrectly imposed an unworkable and newly-created burden upon a plaintiff in order to establish employer liability under CEPA, akin to that which is required in a civil rights claim under §1983 or under the New Jersey Civil Rights Act, N.J.S.A. 10:6-1 et seq., pursuant to Monell v. Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978).  In such cases, liability to a public entity may attach where the challenged action was “taken pursuant to a policy adopted by the official or officials responsible under state law for making policy in that area of the city’s business.
[brief] Sat Below: Hon. [...], J.S.C.  Honorable Judges:  Please accept this letter brief in lieu of a formal brief under Rule 2:6-2(b) and Rule 2:6-5 on behalf of the State of New Jersey.  TABLE OF CONTENTS  STATEMENT OF PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND FACTS  ...........................................  1  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT  I  .........................................................................................................................  1  DEFENDANT WAS NOT ENTITLED TO A NEW TRIAL BASED ON NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE.
[brief] See State v. Grunow, 102 N.J. 133, 145 (1986) (assigning the burden of disproving passion/provocation to the State in a murder case).  There was ample evidence, from the defendant’s statement and elsewhere, that defendant was attacked by the decedent, whether the decedent was armed or not, and that the defendant immediately over-responded by arming himself and shooting the decedent dead.  Both of the objective prongs of the Mauricio test were met, and, thus, as in Carrero, the lesser-included-offense instruction on passion/provocation manslaughter should have been given, and the two subjective elements left for the jury to decide.  229 N.J. at 129, citing Mauricio, 117 N.J. at 413.  Defendant’s murder conviction should be reversed and that count remanded for retrial.
[brief] Above question 4 in bold were the words “Hired Auto Liability”.  (Ia012).  Without any definition or explanation provided in the form, [...] assumed that “hired auto” meant hiring a driver to transport campers in a commercial vehicle such as a van, bus, or limousine service.  (Ia012; 344-345).  So when asked the first part of question 4, “Do you hire or rent vehicles during your fair/festival/event,” (emphasis added) [...] responded “No”.  (Ia337; 344-347).  [...] testified, however, that he did not believe question 4 was referring to vans he had already rented for the 2019 summer camp season.  (Ia338).  Because his answer was “No” to the first part of Question 4, [...] responded “N/A” to the second part of Question 4 – “If yes, please describe vehicle types, estimated number, duration and usage” (emphasis added) (Ia338).  Likewise, [...] provided no response to the third part of Question 4, which asks, “If yes to #4, are any of these vehicles 12 or 15-passenger vans?” (emphasis added).  (Ia012).  Again, [...] made no response to that question because asked, “If yes to #4….”  In checking off “No”, [...] was not trying to mislead [...] or his broker or anyone else when answering the question, nor was he attempting to hide the fact that he was renting 15-passenger vans.  (Ia337; 344-347).  To the contrary, [...] testified that he believed the purpose of the application and Questionnaire was “to get insurance on it for people that are going to be driving my rented vehicles”.  (Ia338).  Indeed, his sole purpose in filling out the Questionnaire and spending an additional $850 in premiums was only to obtain liability coverage for the 12-15 passenger vans he had rented from [...].
[brief] We apply well-known principles and tenets of statutory construction to guide our review.  "When we interpret a statute, we strive to effectuate the Legislature's intent."  Finkelman v. Nat'l Football League, 236 N.J. 280, 289 (2019) (citing Cashin v. Bello, 223 N.J. 328, 335 (2015); DiProspero v. Penn, 183 N.J. 477, 492 (2005)); see also Correa v. Grossi, 458 N.J.Super. 571, 579 (App. Div. 2019) ("[O]ur basic rules of statutory interpretation recognize that not every statute is clear, and in case of ambiguity, our guiding light is the Legislature's intent.").  "[T]he best indicator of that intent is the statutory language," which should be given its "ordinary meaning and significance."  DiProspero, 183 N.J. at 492 (first citing Frugis v. Bracigliano, 177 N.J. 250, 280 (2003), then citing Lane v. Holderman, 23 N.J. 304, 313 (1957)).  "We construe the words of a statute 'in context with related provisions so as to give sense to the legislation as a whole.'"  Spade v. Select Comfort Corp., 232 N.J. 504, 515 (2018) (quoting N. Jersey Media Grp., Inc. v. Twp. of Lyndhurst, 229 N.J. 541, 570 (2017)).  "If the plain language leads to a clear and unambiguous result, then [the] interpretative process is over."  Finkelman, 236 N.J. at 289 (alteration in original) (quoting Johnson v. Roselle EZ Quick LLC, 226 N.J. 370, 386 (2016)).
[brief] The New Jersey Recording Act -- A Study of its Policy, 12 Rutgers L. Rev. 328 (1957)............................................................................................14  Statutes and Rules 11 USC 502(h)......................................................................................................................12  N.J.S.A. 46:21-1 ..................................................................................................................15  N.J.S.A. 46:22-1 ..................................................................................................................15  N.J.S.A. 46:26A-12..............................................................................................................15  Rule 4:6-2 .............................................................................................................................18  Rule 4:9-1 ...........................................................................................................................16-17  Rule 4:6-2(e) .......................................................................................................................6-7  Rule 4:27-1 ..........................................................................................................................8
[directive] Page 2 of 7  7.  Have you ever served on a jury before today, here in New Jersey or in any state court or federal court?  8.  Have you ever sat as a grand juror?  9.  Do you know anyone else in the jury box other than as a result of reporting here today?  10.  Would your verdict in this case be influenced in any way by any factors other than the evidence in the courtroom, such as friendships or family relationships or the type of work you do?  11.  Is there anything about the nature of the charge itself that would interfere with your impartiality?  12.  Have you ever been a witness in a criminal case, regardless of whether it went to trial?  13.  Have you ever testified in any court proceeding?  14.  Have you ever applied for a job as a state or local police officer or with a sheriff’s department or county jail or state prison?  15.  Have you, or any family member or close friend, ever worked for any agency such as a police department, prosecutor’s office, the FBI, the DEA, or a sheriff’s department, jail or prison, either in New Jersey or elsewhere?  16.  As a general proposition, do you think that a police officer is more likely or less likely to tell the truth than a witness who is not a police officer?  Model Criminal Jury Voir Dire Questions Revised as Promulgated by Directive #4-07 Page 3 of 7
[brief] *See McNemar v. Disney Store*, 91 F.3d 610, 622 (3d Cir. 1996).  To meet the requirement of “publicity” the private information must be communicated “to the public at large, or to so many persons that the matter must be regarded as substantially certain to become one of public knowledge . . .  Thus it is not an invasion of the right to privacy . . . to communicate a fact concerning the plaintiff’s private life to a single person or even to a small group of persons.
[brief] Did I read that correctly?  A.  Yes.  Q.  And how many of these panel failures and replacements were covered by the manufacturer; all of them that you've identified or some subpart?  A.  The 32 panels were covered.  And what I mean by that is they were either replaced and/or rebuilt to our specifications.  Q.  So all of that--and when was that work completed, the manufacturer replacing or rebuilding?  Do you know when that was completed?  Was it done right away?  Did it take years?  A.  Within a year or so of the actual failures themselves-- the entire process took about a little over a year to replace the panels out.
[brief] ”  Rb9.\footnote{Rb references the Respondent’s Brief.}  Under the Ricci Act, members who seek to amend benefits thereunder are not required to produce witness verification statements.  Additionally, there has been no suggestion that the dates that [...] was at ground zero (or other similarly situated members) need verification by the Division.  Neither is required under the Ricci Act.  Furthermore, almost two decades had passed since the September 11\textsuperscript{th} terrorist attacks when the Ricci Act was signed into law.  The assertion by Respondent that the two-year registration window was to rectify a fleeting memory is erroneous.  Respondent’s argument lacks merit.  The determination below was arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable and against the substantial weight of the evidence.  It should therefore be reversed, and retired Trooper [...] should be permitted to register his presence at 9/11 and granted accidental disability benefits.
[brief] To be exact, the trial court held:  THE COURT: “It doesn’t matter.  Acceptance is acceptance.  It's like when you cash a check, you may be writing on it under protest, but once you cashed that check, your case is over”.  (1T23:16-19)  Therefore what the Respondents argued on D16 and Db17 is not only disingenuous, but further I believe that it is down right offensive and appalling.
[brief] The trial court’s decision to send [...]’s IFPA complaint to PIP no-fault arbitration will profoundly impact civil and criminal insurance fraud cases, and limit the [...]’s and the [...]’s ability to protect the public.  The [...] and the [...] seek to ensure that the court has a full understanding of the case’s stakes, and to offer the perspectives of the [...] and the [...] on the proper forum for litigation of IFPA cases.  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
[brief] In *Linden v. Solomacha*, 232 N.J. Super. 29 (App. Div. 1989), plaintiff was driving a vehicle while employed as a New Jersey State Police officer when he was struck by a vehicle operated by a New Jersey State employee with the Department of Treasury.  Plaintiff sued defendant for general negligence.  The trial Court granted defendant’s summary judgment motion based on defendant’s workers’ compensation co-employee immunity under *N.J.S.A. 34:15-8*.  In affirming the dismissal of plaintiff’s complaint based on defendant’s co-employee immunity, the Appellate Division held, “[i]n holding, as we do, that the bar of *N.J.S.A. 34:15-8* applies to co-state employees regardless of where and for what department they are engaged in performing State duties, we express a view that is consistent with that espoused by other jurisdictions.
[brief] First, DEP’s notice of violation established a “demonstrated need” for [...]’s mislocated dock to meet the basic permit requirement that a permittee’s activity must be taking place within the permitted area.  N.J.A.C. 7:7-27.2.  DEP reasonably found that a technical modification was the appropriate way to rectify the deviation because it entailed “a change in the design or layout of a project, including any associated change to an approved site plan or other document, which [did] not result in new or additional impacts to any special area. ”  N.J.A.C. 7:7-27.5(d).  (emphasis added).  Given the less than two-foot difference between the originally permitted activity—which is not before this court—and the modified permit, DEP appropriately determined there were no new impacts and approved the permit.  (Aa123-128).  DEP previously approved the dock extension to a length to meet the four-foot minimum water depth requirement, therefore satisfying both the SAV Rule and the “need” requirement.  (Aa466-470).  Finally, DEP included a determination that the proposed development in this “highly developed area” was not within fifty feet of a navigational channel.  (Aa93).  Appellant challenges DEP’s decision on grounds that the Trust “is unable to safely maneuver its watercrafts in or out of its waterfront facilities due to the location” of the [...] Technical Modification Permit.
[brief] Again, the factual allegations against [...] and [...] were limited to them being involved in an alleged meeting where a $250,000 check was given to a supposed impostor of [...].  Yet, Appellants did not adduce any facts to actually connect this outlandish allegation to a damages claim.  At paragraph 70 of the Third Amended Complaint, Appellants alleged that the $250,000 check was intended to serve as payment to [...] towards the [...]-[...] assignment, and that it was being paid to [...] as [...]’s designated representative.  789a at ¶ 70.  Though Appellants claimed that the individual who received the check was an impostor, there was no allegation (let alone competent factual material) suggesting that the check was not, in fact, deposited into the “real” [...]’s bank account.  To the contrary, and as detailed above, Appellants admitted that it was.  Since Appellants alleged that [...] was the intended recipient of their check, and since the check was indisputably deposited into the account of its intended recipient, Appellants were unable to come forth with any facts demonstrating that the alleged actions or inactions by [...] and [...] Hamilton caused them to suffer any damages.  In a similar vein, Appellants alleged that the $250,000 check was meant to serve as payment towards the amount [...] agreed to pay for the assignment of the [...] from [...].  Moreover, and as set forth above, Appellants also conceded that the $250,000 payment was applied to the assignment purchase price and that they ultimately obtained the assignment of rights to purchase the McTague property for which they had paid.  Thus, though Appellants painted the picture of a shady meeting with an impostor, the record was devoid of facts that, if proven to be true, could link [...]’s or [...] Hamilton’s alleged (and nebulously articulated) misconduct to any actual damages.
[brief] Mass. Gen. Laws, ch. 176(d), §3 ..............................................................................................41 Rules R. 2:2-3(a) ..................................................................................................................................14  Treatises 23 [...], Appleman on Insurance § 145.4[A][2][b]  (2d ed. 2003) .................................................................31  [...] & [...], Allocation of Losses in Complex Insurance Coverage Claims § 4.3[b] (2d ed. 2008)) .........................29, 30 Other Authorities  [...], An Introduction to Insurance Allocation Issues in Multiple-Trigger Cases, 10 Vill. Envtl. L.J. 25, 37-38 (1999)  ...............29
[brief] (11T:33-18 to 34-18; 48-10 to 49-7; 34-13 to 36-5).  The video evidence and defendant’s presence with [...] after the shooting was the overwhelming evidence that convicted defendant, not the State’s summation and not any error in the limiting instruction.  Clearly, the jury did not believe defendant’s witnesses or their defense, in general.  The State’s summation and this result does not now equate to error requiring reversal.  In sum, defendant’s arguments are as unpersuasive as they are POINT II THE STATE DID NOT TESTIFY ABOUT THE BALLISTIC EVIDENCE.
[brief] On May 2, 2023, Judge [...], J.S.C., held an evidentiary hearing.  (1T)  On August 15, 2023, Judge Zunic issued a written order and opinion denying the motion.  (Da 25-33)  On March 1, 2024, pursuant to a global plea deal, [...] pleaded guilty before Judge [...], J.S.C., to count one of Indictment [...] (second-degree aggravated assault) and count one of Indictment [...] (second-degree certain persons).  (2T 5-13 to 18-4; Da 34-41)  In exchange, the State agreed to recommend concurrent five-year sentences with a five-year parole bar on the certain-persons count and an 85% parole bar on the aggravated-assault count pursuant to the No Early Release Act (NERA), N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2.  (2T 5-13 to 25; Da 37)  On April 19, 2024, Judge Gizzo sentenced [...] in accordance with the plea and dismissed the remaining counts.  (3T 8-12 to 13-4; Da 42-48)
[brief] See R. 2:10-2; State v. Singh, 245 N.J. 1, 13 (2021) (finding “[w]hen a defendant does not object to an alleged error at trial, such error is reviewed under the plain error standard”); see also, State v. Ates, 426 N.J. Super. 521, 535 (App. Div. 2011), certif. granted, 213 N.J. 389 (2013) (“Comments during summation to which there is no objection are generally not considered prejudicial”).  “[A]n unchallenged error constitutes plain error if it was ‘clearly capable of producing an unjust result,’” Singh, 245 N.J. at 13 (quoting R. 2:10-2), and “raise[s] ‘a reasonable doubt . . . as to whether the error led the jury to a result it otherwise might not have reached,’” State v. Funderburg, 225 N.J. 66, 79 (2016) (quoting State v. Jenkins, 178 N.J. 347, 361 (2004)).  “The mere possibility of an unjust result is not enough. ”  Ibid.  When applying the plain error standard, this Court evaluates an error “in light of the overall strength of the State’s case.
[directive] 10.1  An officer authorized to use a less-lethal device pursuant to this policy may fire or discharge the device during an actual operation, only against: (a) an active assailant; (b) a threatening assailant who will not voluntarily submit to custody after having been given a reasonable opportunity to do so considering the exigency of the situation and the immediacy of the need to employ law enforcement force; or (c) a person who is attempting to cause death or serious bodily injury to him/herself; or (d) a fleeing suspect if clear and convincing evidence exists to believe the suspect has committed a crime in which the suspect caused or attempted to cause death or serious bodily injury.  10.2  Officers shall reevaluate the situation and reassess the need to use force before any second or subsequent firing or discharge of a less-lethal device against the same person.  Any second or subsequent firing or discharge of a less-lethal device must be necessary and justified by the circumstances at that moment.  10.3  Less-lethal instruments, ammunition, or impact projectiles shall not be used at a lesser or greater distance than that specified and approved by the Attorney General.  10.4  When it can be reasonably accomplished without increasing the danger to officers or others, an officer about to discharge a less-lethal device should advise other law enforcement officers at the scene prior to the discharge of the less-lethal weapon.  This is to minimize the possibility that the firing of a less-lethal platform or ammunition would provoke other officers to discharge their weapons.  10.5
[brief] (2T8-9 to 9-7).  On March 1, 2017, the police placed the marijuana into [...]’s and [...]’s Ford truck, marked the truck, and placed a GPS unit into one of the duffel bags.  (2T9-23 to 11-16).  At approximately 1:00 p.m., surveillance was set up at the CVS parking lot.  (2T11-9 to 16).  [...] was equipped with a “KEL” device to record and transmit conversations to the surveillance team.  (2T16-8 to 10).  [...] and [...] parked, remained in the truck, and waited for defendant while the police set up surveillance.