ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Despotism by public officials undermines the sacrosanct fundamentals of justice and the appellant’s pleadings below was for relief against such despotism by the respondents, but the trial court disposed of the appellant’s case overlooking material evidence.  Appellate review of this case is in the public interest, since reversal and remand of this case shall send a signal below and to the public officials that the bar for rights and privileges of the unprivileged, the elderly, and the disabled remains *The Equal Protection Of The Laws*.  **CONCLUSION**  For all of the forgoing reasons, the case should be reversed and remanded.
[brief] Our courts have long recognized that “appropriate and proper jury charges are essential to a fair trial. ”  State v. Savage, 172 N.J. 374, 387 (2002).  In criminal cases, failure to provide clear and correct jury instructions on material issues – such as the elements of the crime – is presumed to be reversible error.  State v. Jordan, 147 N.J. 409, 422 (1997).  Adherence to the applicable model jury charge is not always enough, and the sufficiency of the model charge for animal cruelty appears to be a matter of first impression for this Court.
[brief] State v. Fort, 101 N.J. 123, 128-129 (1985).  Habit evidence that defendant did not display an official NJSP wallet ID in three other traffic stops directly challenges the State’s assertion that he did so in these four stops.  Indeed, the State introduced habit evidence regarding one of the traffic stops and another matter in its own case.  [...] testified that it is his habit not to accept a business card as acceptable proof that one is in law enforcement (14T 45-3 to 6), and the prosecutor cited that fact in summation.  (20T 138-17 to 19)  [...] testified about his habits in conforming to standard practice when suspending a member of the NJSP.  (11T 146-5 to 9)  As argued in other points, the most important issue before the jury was the credibility of defendant’s version of events versus the State’s.  The habit evidence regarding his conduct at other similar stops supported defendant’s claims that he did not retain and did not display the wallet ID.  It directly bore upon the most important matter before the jury and its improper exclusion thus cannot be deemed harmless beyond a reasonable doubt with respect to any of defendant’s convictions.  Reversal of the resulting convictions is necessarily required where, as here, the error potentially tips the jury’s consideration of the credibility or evidentiary worth of the State’s case.  *State v. Briggs*, 279 N.J. Super. 555, 565 (App. Div. 1995); *State v. W.L.*, 278 N.J. Super. 295, 301 (App. Div. 1995); see also *State v. Hedgespeth*, 249 N.J. 234, 253 (2021), citing *State v. Scott*, 229 N.J. 468, 484-485 (2017) (errors which affect the weight the jury will give the State’s evidence or the State’s arguments in favor of conviction versus the defendant’s arguments in favor of acquittal are reversible and never harmless).  Defendant’s convictions should be reversed, and the matter remanded for retrial.
[brief] ”  First, the CSC’s determination that a union office is per se a State Workplace because State Business is being discussed or conducted had no basis in fact.  The bare written record contains no indication that during the time Complainant was at the local office during the afternoon incident either she or anyone else was discussing or conducting State business.  Rather, the record is undisputed that she was there in connection with union issues – turning in her election petition signatures, seeking to change her name on the petition, and threatening to file a complaint against [...] with the union and/or the National Labor Relations Board.  None of that has anything to do with “State business,” and the status of either [...] or Complainant as State employees is therefore irrelevant.
[brief] Trial counsel’s ineffectiveness could not have been addressed in a direct appeal.  It is based on a host of information outside of the trial record, such as what counsel considered; what research was available; what an expert would have offered if consulted and retained; what training and information was available to attorneys regarding familiarity and litigating eyewitness identification issues; and proof that the type of expert testimony at issue was admitted in cases at the time, and resulting in significantly better outcomes.  Taking the State’s argument at face value, no ineffective assistance claim could ever be raised on PCR when it was at all related to an appellate issue regarding the propriety of a judge’s ruling.  This fundamentally misconstrues the relevant standards, particularly because on PCR, the question is often whether had counsel taken a particular action, would it likely have changed the outcome on the substantive ruling.  Moreover, one of the most significant aspects of this PCR appeal is that [...] was deprived of the opportunity have a fully litigated PCR – which is the first time that ineffective assistance can be properly raised.
[brief] A JURY INSTRUCTION ON DIMINISHED CAPACITY WAS NOT REQUIRED.  Defendant next argues that the trial judge committed error by failing to charge diminished capacity because defendant’s “severe mental health issues” were “uncontested” as “it was understood by all parties and the court that [defendant] would be making an issue of his psychological problems at trial with an eye towards a diminished capacity defense. ”  He further contends that the basis for the instruction was clearly indicated in the record.  (Db 16-17).  First, defendant’s understanding of the record misplaced.  The State never agreed, nor ever stipulated that defendant suffered from any type of mental health issues.  And while the State recognized that defendant may present evidence that he suffered from a mental illness at trial, this in no way equates to a concession that he had a mental illness.  Second, defendant wholly failed to present a single shred of reliable evidence that he suffered from a mental disease or defect that caused the inability to form the required mental state – purposeful -- as required by law.  As such, this argument has no merit.  A diminished capacity defense, recognized in N.J.S.A. 2C:4-2, provides in pertinent part that "[e]vidence that the defendant suffered from a mental disease or defect is admissible whenever it is relevant to prove that the defendant did not have a state of mind which is an element of the offense."  For diminished capacity to go to the jury, the record must contain competent, reliable evidence of the predicates for diminished capacity.  *State v. Breakiron*, 108 N.J. 591, 617 (1987).  Thus, a defendant asserting diminished capacity must present a diagnosis of an underlying mental disease or disorder.  *State v. Reyes*, 140 N.J. 344, 364-365 (1995).  Further, the mental disease or disorder must be of a kind that can prevent or interfere with the ability to form the mental state required for the offense.  *State v. Galloway*, 133 N.J. 631, 647 (1993).  Not every mental disease or disorder affects the ability to form the required state of mind.  *State v. Nataluk*, 316 N.J. Super. 336, 344 (App. Div. 1998).  A jury instruction on diminished capacity is required only when (1) the defendant "has presented evidence of a mental disease or defect that interferes with cognitive ability sufficient to prevent or interfere with the formation of the requisite intent or mens rea," and (2) "the record contains evidence that the claimed deficiency did affect the defendant's cognitive capacity to form the mental state necessary for the commission of the crime."
[brief] A.  The Regulator Station will be located on a small portion of a 33.3 acre site that is already improved with a solar farm.  Exhibit P-4 attached to the Petition, which was presented to the Zoning Board, contains the site plans for the Facility at this location.  [...] proposes to construct the Facility within a 100 foot-by-85 foot easement area located outside the fence of the solar farm.  This site is of sufficient size and it is a natural fit to co-locate the station with another energy company’s facility, especially since the Proposed Site allows [...] to locate the Facility adjacent to the transmission line.  Significantly, the Proposed Site is located at the southern end of [...]’s Holmdel transmission line, which (as explained above) will minimize the risk of customer exposure to outages.  Moreover, the zoning for the site is non-residential and conditionally permits public utilities.  There are no environmental constraints that would impact the development of a regulator station at this site.  The site is not encumbered with Green Acres or Farmland Preservation restrictions.  There are no low elevations in the easement area.  And [...] is not required to clear a significant number trees.  Finally, as discussed below, [...] has been able to obtain an easement for the Proposed Site.
[brief] It was entirely consistent for the judge to find both aggravating factor six and mitigating factor one.  While mitigating factor one asks whether the conduct for which a defendant has been convicted caused or threatened serious harm, aggravating factor six refers to a defendant’s prior record.  Thus, the fact that there was no physical harm in this instance does not conflict with the fact that defendant has an extensive prior record which includes drug offenses, multiple lewdness and trespassing adjudications, giving alcohol to a minor, a trespassing conviction, and a criminal sexual contact conviction, all of which justify placing great weight on aggravating factor six.
[brief] In addition to the claims not falling within the scope of the arbitration language, the 1991 provision which Defendants rely upon is unenforceable since it fails, like in Garfinkle, supra, to advise Plaintiff that he is waiving his statutory and constitutional rights to seek regress in court, including a jury trial and appellate rights.  “An effective waiver requires a party to have full knowledge of his legal rights and intent to surrender those rights. ”  Knorr v. Smeal, 178 N.J. 169, 177 (2003).  Additionally, the arbitration clause here is woefully deficient since it does not indicate who has to pay for the arbitrator’s fees/costs and does not even indicate it is binding.
[brief] Pa15  Statement of Items Comprising the Record on Appeal  Dated June 11, 2024 ..................................................................................  Pa19 Face Sheet Report ......................................................................................  Pa25 Progress Notes Report ...............................................................................  Pa30  Assignment, Disciplinary and Transfer Progress Report, dated 1979 - 1986 .....................................................................................  Pa47  Judgment of Conviction, [...], Indictment No. [...], dated June 26, 1978 ............................................................
[brief] ”  Defendant also argues it did not convey any information “in connection with the collection of any debt. ”  Endorsing the motion court’s view, Defendant admits, at Db17 (citing to Pa52), “the debt collector transmitted the data to enable preparation of a letter to the debtor, which letter, when issued by or for the debt collector, was a communication in connection with collection. ”  A core function of a debt collector is communicating with the debtor.  One way a debt collector performs that function is by mailing dunning letters like the letter here (Pa26).  The step-by-step tasks involved in the preparation and mailing of Defendant’s dunning letters is in the context and for the purpose of collecting a debt.  As explained at Pb29-Pb30, a communication is in connection with the collection of a debt when its context and purpose is to collect debts.
[brief] The Court accepted [...] and [...]’s subjective descriptions of their injuries.  [...] refused to show his injuries and [...] is suing the Defendant for pain and suffering.  Indeed, [...] suffered only a “laceration and bruising” on the back of his leg and was bleeding “only slightly, if at all” according to the responding officer.  Serious bodily injury is injury that “creates a substantial risk of death, or which causes serious, permanent disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ.
[brief] BRIEF OF APPELLANTS  [...] AND [...]  [...] [...]  [...]  Tel: [...]  Fax: [...]  [...]  [...]  Of Counsel: [...], Esq. (ID: 016521986)  On the Brief: C.  Michael Gan, Esq. (ID: 229302016)  [...], Esq. (ID: 409672022)  Dated: October 16, 2023
[directive] Record Live initial the in used been had that one the than Directive.  upon of issuance immediately this operational become shall subsection This Initiating without for Certain Offenses Complaint Filing of Prohibition 2.2.2 Assessment Process. Risk Pretrial Automated been has defendant cases the subsection where in 4.5.6, by authorized be may as Except the of any where involving domestic violence offense an crime, indictable any for arrested which other for apply,s offense any (4) or to 2C:25-21(a)(1) N.J.S.A. in specified grounds law a by shall be issued complaint-summons 4, no note see statute, by required is fingerprinting law a submitted shall acomplaint-warrant by be for application no and officer, enforcement complaint- to a officer authorized approve judicial other or judge a to officer enforcement pretrial has the making automated initiated arrest the agency enforcement law the unless warrant, AOC. the by approved process risk-assessment persons violence disorderly only domestic not to applies Law Reform Bail the that Note all (4), to also 2C:25-21(a)(1) but N.J.S.A. to in specified grounds the of any involving offenses indictable all includes of Section Directive (scope 1.6 also See offenses. persons disorderly other Reform Law Bail disorderly The persons offenses). petty and disorderly persons all and crimes not fingerprinting which for is offense disorderly petty or persons disorderly a to apply may thus is which arrested for is offense a defendant serious most the If 4.
[brief] [...]: Yes, sir.  Def. Atty.: And I explained to you that’s called an aggravated assault and that’s why you are pleading guilty to a third-degree aggravated assault?  [...]: Yes.  [Da249-250 (17:7-18:5) (emphasis added). ]  Brown then testified that he saw [...] kick [...] in the face “several times”.  Da250 (18:6-19).  Based on Brown’s sworn testimony, [...] accepted his plea to aggravated assault.  Da251 (19:13-23).  E.  Brown Is Admitted To PTI And Confirms That His Guilty Plea Was Not Conditioned On Receiving A Civil Reservation
[brief] For instance, the Arizona Court of Appeals ruled that the 1987 version of the above-referenced provision created a valid indemnity claim.  MT Builders, L.L.C. v. Fisher Roofing, Inc., 197 P.3d 758, 764 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2008).  In MT Builders, the Court held “[t]he indemnification provision at issue here obligated Fisher to ‘indemnify and hold harmless’ MT Builders ‘from and against all claims, damages, losses and expenses’ under certain specified conditions.  This wording constitutes an agreement to indemnify for loss. ”  Id. at 763 (emphasis added).  The Kansas Court of Appeals has also upheld a similar version of this provision.  Sw. Nat. Bank v. Simpson & Son, Inc., 799 P.2d 512, 520 (Kan. Ct. App. 1990).
[brief] This utility, in particular, operates a great many motor vehicles on New Jersey roads.  A great deal of the litigation arising out of motor vehicle accidents involve subrogation claims.  Shielding [...] from civil liability for property damage, personal injury and even loss of human life caused by its negligent operation of its motor vehicles, in what obviously would involve such broad application, is "unthinkable".  See C.J. Vanderbilt. dissent, [9 N.J. at 149, 87 A.2d 325.]  The failure to attach accountability to the wrongdoer under these circumstances would detract from the public perception of the justice system.  Indeed, it reasonably might be expected to spawn some irresponsibility on the part of [...] drivers.
[brief] [...] suggests that in or around 2012 (approximately eight (8) years before the incident occurred) there was sidewalk work done next to the tree, and at this time the tree’s roots may have been affected.  (Pb16-Pb17; Pb21-Pb22.)  It must be noted that the Wikipedia article for Hurricanes affecting New Jersey from 2012 to November 2020 reflects that there were twenty-seven (27) such storm events to hit the State, and the tree remained standing notwithstanding --- 1 [...]’s report constitutes an inadmissible net opinion, since he never examined the tree at issue.  See e.g. Johnson v. Salem Corp., 97 N.J. 78, 81 (1984) (“The weight to which an expert opinion is entitled can rise no higher than the facts and reasoning upon which that opinion is predicated’); Vuocolo v. Diamond Shamrock Chem., 240 N.J. Super. 289, 300-01 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 122 N.J. 333 (1990) (“New Jersey has followed the majority rule and has declined to admit expert opinion without a proper factual foundation”; prohibiting a medical expert from giving an opinion who never examined the decedent). being subject to intense winds.  (Pa203-Pa205.)  [...]’s report makes no mention of these compelling facts.  (Pa250-Pa256.)  Rather, [...]’s improper net opinion imposes strict liability on the City, if the City did any repairs in the vicinity of this particular tree at any point in time.
[brief] 274a.  Plaintiff [...] paid legal fees, other professional fees, property taxes, and governmental fees in pursuit of the real estate transaction and development of the affordable housing project.  274a; 6T, 107:5-7.  Plaintiff [...] was also a real estate investor, having among other things, purchased and rehabbed various real estate.  6T, 70:10-13.  However, all these alleged issues of the need of investment capital, prior construction or affordable housing development experience, etc., are all imaginary issues which have no application in this matter.  The Trial Court erroneously failed to accept these uncontroverted facts established in the record and by [...] and [...].  The facts are that [...] did not expend $1.00 ultimately to purchase [...].  6T, 65:17-22.  [...] did not expend $1.00 to construct the affordable housing development on [...].  6T, 65:17-22.  Whatever money [...] expended, if any, in pursuing the affordable housing development project – land cost, property taxes, governmental fees, legal fees, other professional fees, and whatever costs expended for the application process for the financing of the affordable housing project and its development – were all covered by the financing provided by the [...] and through the 9% tax credit scheme.  This would have been the case irrespective of whoever was the developer, whether [...], Plaintiff [...], or anyone else, and whether a first-time “novice” developer or an experienced developer.  6T, 65:23-66:18.  That is the uncontested testimony and expert opinion of [...] and [...].  [...]’s expert report and [...]’s deposition testimony were never refuted in the record or at the Rule 104 Hearing.  Only the Trial Court chose to refute them, without any authority to act as a rebuttal expert and contestor of uncontested facts.  First, but for the actions of Defendants [...] and [...], Plaintiff [...] could have commenced the application process with the [...] in April/May 2007 upon [...]’s rezoning of the [...] to 100% affordable housing.
[brief] ” (12T137-18 to 138-18).  The phone’s display turned back on at 3:19 a.m., the same time that the surveillance video captured two unidentifiable individuals enter [...]’s grandmother’s home.  (12T138-1 to 12).  [...] also stated that the “health activity” application on [...]’s iPhone registered him climbing one set of stairs at 3:21 a.m. (12T119-17 to 122-8; 12T138-9 to 139-8).
[brief] Model Jury Charges (Criminal), “Causation (N.J.S.A. 2C:2-3)” (approved Jun. 10, 2013).  First, the jury must determine whether the State has proved “but-for” causation beyond a reasonable doubt, or in other words, that “without defendant’s actions, the result would not have occurred. ”  Ibid.  Second, depending on whether the mens rea of the offense charged is purposeful/knowing conduct, or reckless conduct, the jury must respectively determine either that the actual result of the defendant’s conduct was within his design or contemplation, or that the defendant was aware of the risk that the actual result would occur.  If the jury determines that the defendant neither contemplated the actual result, nor was aware of the risk that it would occur, then it must determine either that the actual result “involve[s] the same kind of injury or harm as that designed or contemplated” (where the mens rea of the offense charged is purposeful/knowing conduct), or that it involves “the same kind of injury or harm as the probable result” (where the mens rea of the offense charged is recklessness), and that the actual result is not “too remote, too accidental in its occurrence or too dependent on another’s volitional act to have a just bearing on the defendant’s liability or on the gravity of his/her offense. ”  Ibid.  Where the relationship between the defendant’s conduct and the resultant harm is “genuinely at issue based on the trial evidence,” the trial court’s failure to give “full” jury instructions on causation constitutes plain error.
[directive] USE OF FORCE POLICY  Addendum A | December 2020  CEDs and Other Less-Lethal Devices and Ammunition  7.10  A CED shall not be used in any environment where an officer knows or has reason to believe that a potentially flammable, volatile, or explosive material is present that might be ignited by an open spark, including but not limited to pepper spray with a volatile propellant, gasoline, natural gas, or propane.  7.11  While officers must at all times respect the seriousness and potential lethality of a CED, an officer shall use particular care when considering whether to use a CED against an individual who is particularly vulnerable due to age (either elderly or young), developmental disability, or a known or reasonably apparent medical condition (e.g., a pregnant female).  7.12  Law enforcement agencies are not permitted to use aerosol spray devices that emit a flammable substance to eliminate the possibility that the electric spark from a CED dart/electrode could inadvertently ignite a flammable substance contained in some OC sprays or similar aerosol spray devices, thereby resulting in injury or death.