ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] c.  Do you understand that if you are permitted to take back your plea of guilty because of the [Yes/Sim] [No/Nao] judge's sentence, that anything you say in furtherance of the guilty plea cannot be used against you at trial?  Voce entende que se obtiver permissao para retirar sua declarac;:ao de culpa em razlio da sentenc;:a do juiz, tudo o que disser parajustificar a declarac;:lio de culpa nlio podera ser usado contra voe€: no julgamento?
[brief] The statutory elements of the crime of robbery are set forth as follows:  a.  Robbery defined.  A person is guilty of robbery if, in the course of committing a theft, he: (1) Inflicts bodily injury or uses force upon another; or (2) Threatens another with or purposely puts him in fear of immediate bodily injury; or (3) Commits or threatens immediately to commit any crime of the first or second degree.  An act shall be deemed to be included in the phrase “in the course of committing a theft” if it occurs in an attempt to commit theft or in immediate flight after the attempt or commission.  b.  Grading.  Robbery is a crime of the second degree, except that it is a crime of the first degree if in the course of committing the theft the actor attempts to kill anyone, or purposely inflicts or attempts to inflict serious bodily injury, or is armed with, or uses or threatens the immediate use of a deadly weapon.  [N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1 (emphasis added)]
[directive] In some areas, the manner in which these agencies must implement these mandates is a decision that is left to the individual law enforcement agency’s discretion.  For instance, every agency must establish an internal affairs function.  But certain aspects of the manner in which the mandate is satisfied are left to the discretion of the individual agencies.  Individual agencies shall decide, based on the characteristics of their jurisdiction and the workload of their agency, whether the internal affairs function is a full- or part-time unit and how many officers are assigned to work in that unit.  1.0.8  Nothing in this document displaces other existing requirements for law enforcement agencies or officers, such as those established by Attorney General Law Enforcement Directives (“AG Directives”), including AG Directive 2018-2 (mandatory random drug testing), AG Directive 2018-3 (mandatory early warning systems), and AG Directive 2019-4 (independent investigations of use-of-force and death-in-custody incidents).
[brief] (See 4T20:9–25.)  The trial court did not conduct an analysis of the doctrine of collateral estoppel because it found the doctrine did not apply.  (See 3T44:4–5, 44:14–17.)  As such, Defendants did not argue the collateral estoppel issue during oral argument on the Motion to Reinstate, and the trial court found it had “enough to make a decision” without considering the collateral estoppel issue.  (See 4T9:20–10:6.)  It makes no difference, however, whether the trial court relied upon the entire controversy doctrine or the doctrine of collateral estoppel in dismissing [...]’s Complaint because both doctrines nevertheless apply.
[brief] 1 LEGAL ARGUMENT ....................................................................................................................  3  POINT I - DEFENDANTS  VIOLATED THE RIGHTS OF PLAINTIFFS TO A FAIR AND UNBIASED CONSIDERATION OF THEIR APPLICATION IN VIOLATION OF PLAINTIFFS’ RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW AS GUARANTEED BY THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND NEW JERSEY STATUTES IN VIOLATION OF 42 U. S.C. § 1983 AND THE NEW JERSEY CIVIL RIGHTS ACT .........................................................................................................................  3  POINT II – PLAINTIFFS HAVE STANDING TO MAINTAIN THE CLAIM AGAINST DEFENDANTS FOR VIOLATIONS OF THE NEW JERSEY LAW AGAINST DISCRIMINATION ON BEHALF OF THE CLASSES AGAINST WHICH DEFENDANTS HAVE DISCRIMINATED, AND SUCH DISCRIMINATION IS APPARENT  ..............................................................................................  9  CONCLUSION ...............................................................................................................................  15
[brief] [...] V. [...], Docket No. [...] ..........................................................................................14, 18  Statutes N.J.S.A. 20:3-6 ..................................................................................................................11, 19 N.J.S.A. 20:3-11 ..................................................................................................................  21 N.J.S.A. 20:3-2(g)..............................................................................................................  17 N.J.S.A. 20:3-2(j)..............................................................................................................  20 N.J.S.A. 20:3-5 ..................................................................................................................  16  N.J.S.A. 20:3-7(a)..............................................................................................................  17 N.J.S.A. 20:3-8 .................................................................................................................. 20 N.J.S.A. 40A:12-5(a).......................................................................................................  10 Rules R. 2:2-3 ............................................................................................................................  20 R. 4:67 .............................................................................................................................  17, 20, 21 R. 4:73-1 ..........................................................................................................................  17, 21 Other Authorities Report of the Eminent Domain Revision Commission 6-7 (1965).................................  15  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
[brief] (6T, 71:11-15).  However, [...] did acknowledge [...]’s testimony that: “I had run some very preliminary models in terms of, you know, how to possibly make it work, but we never really went very far, because it was terminated fairly quickly. ” (6T, 56:20-25; 57:1-5)(emphasis added).  This is precisely why the Appellate Division previously rejected [...] arguments that he could have partnered with other individuals with more experience and completed the projects.  Because nothing was consummated, the potential for such a partnership is only conjecture.
[brief] Unlike all of the cases [...] relies on, there is no evidence that [...] sent the Arbitration Agreement to either Plaintiff.  Even assuming arguendo that Plaintiffs received “written quarterly account statements,” (Db17), [...] utterly fails to explain how those statements apprise the Plaintiffs that they were waiving any of their rights as no statement references arbitration or any such agreement.  There could not have been manifest assent to the terms of the agreement.
[brief] 7  In its request for an adjudicatory hearing, the Trust argued that it submitted objection letters, dated March 23, 2017, and April 3, 2017, respectively, and attached copies of those letters as exhibits.  (Aa378-79).  [...] has no evidence of having received the April 3, 2017 letter, and in any event it met none of the requirements of an adjudicatory hearing request; and the March 23, 2017 letter for which Appellant later submitted a fax confirmation does not pertain to or mention the Jibsail 2017 Modification Permit application and pre-dates that application.  (Aa301).  The court’s review of agency decisions is limited.
[brief] ”); Cedar Ridge Trailer Sales, Inc. v. Nat’l Community Bank of New Jersey, 312 N.J. Super. 51, 62-63 (App. Div. 1998) (“[T]he construction and effect of that agreement is a matter of law which must be resolved by the court and not the jury. ”).  “The polestar of contract construction is to discover the intention of the parties as revealed by the language used by them.  The interpretation, moreover, should accord with justice and common sense. ”  Borough of Princeton v. Board of Chosen Freeholders of County of Mercer, 333 N.J. Super.  310, 325 (App. Div. 2000), aff’d, 169 N.J. 135 (2001) (internal citations and quotations omitted).  Furthermore, “the document…must be read as a whole, without artificial emphasis on one section, with a consequent disregard for others.  Literalism must give way to context. ”  Id.  A contract should not be interpreted so as to render one of its terms meaningless or superfluous.  See Cumberland County Improvement Authority v. GSP Recycling Co., Inc., 358 N.J. Super. 484, 497 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 177 N.J. 222 (2003).  Giving effect to all of the provisions in the POA and accompanying corporate resolution of the surety, the only rational reading of the document is that the operative POA language excludes by implication authority to execute the Consent of Surety.
[brief] (Ca032).  Respondent campaigned for her seat from this account.  She announced that she took her seat.  She stated clearly that she was a sitting member of the Board with photographic and written evidence of same.  That is why it is all the more inexplicable that the Commission erred so grievously in stating in its Final Decision that her account does “not mention respondent’s membership on the Board nor does she advertise or rely upon her Board membership when publishing material on her social media page. ” (Ca017).  This was simply not true.  The Commission’s outcome determinative finding that “there is no factual evidence” tying Respondent’s Facebook account to her Board membership was demonstrably false.
[brief] *Trautmann ex rel. Trautmann v. Christie*, 211 N.J. 300, 305 (2012) (quoting *Doe v. Poritz*, 142 N.J. 1, 94 (1995)).  Due Process similarly ensures “that ‘a law shall not be unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious, and that the means selected shall bear a rational relation to the legislative object sought to be obtained. ’” (First Police Decision at 36 (quoting *Robson v. Rodriguez*, 26 N.J. 517, 522 (1958)), Pa000299).  In the context of the MSRA, courts have already considered and rejected Plaintiffs’ claim that the MSRA grants “exclusions arbitrarily and irrationally target[s] [P]laintiffs’ contractual and statutory rights constituting differential treatment, and therefore, violate [P]laintiffs’ Due Process and Equal Protection rights under the New Jersey Constitution. ” (Ibid.).  In the First Police Decision, [...] explained that the fact that the MSRA was “enacted to satisfy the important public purpose of stabilizing Atlantic City . . . weighs heavily against any constitutional challenge to the [MSRA]” under Article 1, Paragraph 1 of the State Constitution.  (Id. at 38, Pa000301).  [...] recognized that “Atlantic City is in a very difficult financial position and has been for many years.  The State Legislature’s passage of the [MSRA] was to protect the public interest.  As this court has previously stated, the [MSRA] was enacted to satisfy the important public purpose of stabilizing Atlantic City. ” (Ibid.).  While the financial stability of Atlantic City is an important public purpose, Plaintiffs do not allege that have been singled out for special treatment based upon the exercise of a right, and are not a protected class, which is essential for finding such a violation.  See Cnty. of Warren v. State, 409 N.J. Super. 495, 512 (App. Div. 2009) (dismissing equal protection and due process claims), certif. denied, 201 N.J. 153, cert. denied, 561 U.S. 1026 (2010).  Instead, Plaintiffs’ claim relates to the distinction in terminal leave pay for those that retired before November 9, 2016 (pre-MSRA retirees) versus those that retired after the implementation of MSRA in Atlantic City on November 9, 2016.
[brief] APPROPRIATE PURSUANT TO R. 4:50-1 (d) of (f)  IN LIGHT OF TYLER v. HENNEPIN COUNTY, 143 S.Ct. 1369 (2023) AND [...] v. ROBERTO, 477 N.J. SUPER 339 (APP. DIV. 2023)  (Issue Addressed Below, a–a)  ......................  22  A.  Relief Appropriate under Tyler as the Appellants’ Forfeiture of Equity is Extreme ....  23  B.  Appellants’ Timely Motion to Vacate Has Been “In the Pipeline” Since Initiated.  Appellants are Thus Entitled to Retroactive Application of Tyler .  25 (i)  Tyler Applies to the New Jersey Tax Lien Law and to Private Investors in Tax Sale Certificates ..........  26 (ii)  Roberto Determined to Apply “Pipeline Retroactivity” to Cases Eligible for Relief Under Tyler .............  26  (iii)  Roberto Established the Applicability of Tyler to Appellants’ Pending Motion to Vacate  28 POINT III
[brief] (Da32-43).  Having presided over the Miranda hearing, and after having an opportunity to see and hear the witnesses and review the evidence, [...] found that the crux of the issue, in this case, was whether defendant voluntarily consented to a search of his property.  (Da42).  [...] appropriately found, just as [...] had previously twice found, that the interests involved in Miranda, to be free from self- incrimination are “fundamentally distinct from the interest of being free from unreasonable search and seizures. ” (Da41-42) (citing to Chappée, 211 N.J. Super. at 321).  “‘The absence of Miranda warnings does not vitiate consent to a seizure of personal property, because the Miranda protections are addressed to constitutional rights that are distinct from Fourth Amendment rights. ’”  Id. at 333 (quoting Hubbard, 653 F.2d at 103).  [...], as [...] had in his prior denials of defendant's motion to suppress, properly found that the King factors militated in favor of finding that defendant had voluntarily consented to a search of his property.  (Da42-43).  [...] found the same King factors, which militated for and against voluntariness, as [...] had.  See Discussion of King factors, above.  (Da43; accord Da25-27).  Like [...], [...] concluded that “defendant properly gave consent to search his dwellings and property and that, therefore, the search was constitutional as an exception to the warrant requirement.
[brief] [...]’s “complaints” cannot constitute “whistle-blowing activity. ”  [...] next argues that “[t]here is also evidence in the record that Plaintiff engaged in protected whistleblowing activity. ” (Pb20).  [...] argues that he reported [...] to her supervisor, [...], as well as [...].  (Ibid.).  Moreover, he contends that he made “multiple complaints” to [...]’s Chief People Officer, [...], following the June 24, 2020 argument.
[brief] Are Civil Jury Trials Going the Way of the Dodo?  Has Excessive Discovery Led to Settlement as an Economic and Cultural Imperative?: A Response to [...] and [...] (/file/document/are-civil-jury-trials-going-way-dodo-has-excessive-discovery-led-settlement-economic) (pdf)  Judicial Case Management: Caught in the Cross-Fire (/file/document/judicial-case-management-caught-cross-fire) (pdf)  The Present Plight of the United States District Courts: Is the Managerial Judge Part of the Problem or of the Solution? (/file/document/present-plight-united-statesdistrict-courts-managerial-judge-part-problem-or-solution) (pdf)  Presentation for the Judicial Management Panel (/file/document/presentation-judicial-management-panel) (pdf)  Observations from Those Involved in the Rule Making Process over the Years
[brief] The lot is 16.51 acres and includes an 80,000 square-foot office complex, parking lot, and an over 100-foot-tall cellular communications tower.  (Aa789; Aa796; Aa859).  The regulator station would be situated on the southeastern side of the lot, which measures about 40 feet by 150 feet, and at the southern end of the Holmdel transmission line.  (Ra12; Aa780; Aa789).  The station would be located between the office complex and Holmdel Road.  (Aa780).  A solar farm is located south of the proposed site.  (Aa789).  To “obscure visibility of the [Project] to the general public,” [...] proposed covering the regulator station and associated equipment with fences and various landscaping, such as 12- to 14-foot-high trees and shrubs, and multiple evergreen trees planted about sixty feet from Holmdel Road’s right-of-way, which is “approximately midway between the [Project] and Holmdel Road.
[brief] The trial court denied all of [...]’s requested relief but allowed amendment of the Complaint.  [...] attempted to serve discovery, typically unavailable in a summary proceeding, to obtain the same records from the [...] and [...] which the trial court determined were properly withheld under OPRA.  The [...], again, responded that no responsive records existed.  [...] filed a Motion to Compel and the [...] filed a Motion to Quash.  The court below entered Orders on January 17, 2023 denying [...]’s Motion and granting the [...]’s request to quash the discovery requests.  After [...] moved for summary judgment, the [...] cross-moved, arguing that [...] has no entitlement to the requested records under the common law right of access.  On July 5, 2023 the trial court denied [...]’s Motion and entered an Order granting summary judgment in favor of the [...], finding that the records requested were not “public records” subject to disclosure under the common law right of access.  On appeal, [...] challenges the dismissal of his Complaint on July 5, 2023, as well as the intermediate January 17, 2023 Orders quashing his discovery requests.  The trial court properly concluded that any email communications regarding the investigation were not “public records” subject to disclosure under the common law right of access, and even if they were, [...] cannot show that his interest in disclosure of the records outweighs the [...]’s interest in non-disclosure/maintaining confidentiality.  [...] was not entitled to discovery in a summary proceeding, and the trial court properly denied his Motion to compel.
[brief] POINT III  THE TRIAL COURT’S ORDER GRANTING STATE RESPONDENTS’ MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION AS TO [...]’S NJLAD CLAIM SHOULD BE AFFIRMED (3T81:20-95:21).  The trial court’s order granting State Respondents’ motion for reconsideration should be affirmed because it correctly applied the law to the undisputed facts of this case upon reconsideration.
[brief] The Ruling on the Motion to Suppress  When considering the consent search of defendant’s residence, [...] first rejected defendant’s “fruit of the poisonous tree” argument because she previously held that execution of the search warrant was valid.  (2T18-7 to 11).  The judge then considered the facts surrounding defendant’s consent, including a review of the MVR of the stop, and found that [d]efendant was advised of his Miranda rights, placed under arrest, officers searched his person and advised him of the warrant to search his vehicle and officers searched his vehicle.  The officers then advised [d]efendant they would apply for a search warrant for his home, but stated that if he consented to a search, they would permit him to show them where he stored the CDS rather than perform a more comprehensive search that would result from a warrant.  [...] then read the consent form out loud and advised the [d]efendant he had a right to refuse consent.  Defendant then signed the Consent to Search Form.  . . .  Defendant was present for the search and assisted officers in locating the evidence.  . . .  Nothing about the interaction demonstrated that officers acted inappropriately or inappropriately coerced [d]efendant into signing the consent form.  [(2T18-12 to 19-9).]  Based on the above findings, [...] concluded that defendant voluntarily consented to a search of his residence in [...].  (2T19-10 to 11).  This ruling should be affirmed.
[brief] Defendant [...] was never interviewed regarding the most recent complaint about her for harassment related to the June 2020 incident with [...].  (Pa667).  Despite receiving multiple complaints, [...] was never interviewed regarding Defendant [...]’s harassment.  (Pa667).  Defendant [...] combined the two investigations, interviewing members of the staffing department about Defendant [...]’s behavior and the charge pay issues together.  (Pa107.)  Defendant [...] permitted Defendant [...] to be present for interviews during the investigation.  (Pa109 – Pa110).  Plaintiff was interviewed with Defendant [...] present and she truthfully described the incident between Defendant [...] and [...].  (Pa667).  Defendant [...] ultimately advised her supervisor, [...], that the incident with [...] was out of character for Defendant [...].  (Pa667).  During the same conversation, [...] inquired about the “charge pay” investigation.  (Pa667).  D.  Plaintiff is Terminated in Retaliation for Protected Activity.
[directive] B.  a detaining for in questioning  1. prohibits officers  Nothing or from this Directive individual committed, is suspect time reasonable period reasonably they of has any or is or a to others committing, about commit incite violate crime to the law.  bystander 2. recording a bystander to entitle that The device the has does fact not a area a police line, enter area an any public, that closed enter cross or to to the to is scene. crime a as designated incident i. closer access media Credentialed personnel be granted may to law or enforcement scenes relevant lines allowed police cross with to be agency approvals. extend not right not to This has does anyone who such received approval. a bystander If is 3. recording police activity position materially from a impedes that with or or of ability the interferes safety officers perform their their duties, or to threatens the an officer safety that members public, may of of direct the the a However, move position that bystander to to not interfere. officer will shall the the bystander recording. order not to stop N.J.S.A. 2C:29-1 a purposely i. continues prohibit to conduct person whereby (a) or "obstructs other of administration impairs law perverts the or function," "prevents government or (b) or public attempts to prevent a servant an lawfully official performing from flight, function means of by intimidation, or force, violence, physical interference or or obstacle, by means of act."
[brief] Those harms are exacerbated by “[m]istreatment”: if “transgender, gender non-conforming, and non-binary students face discrimination in schools, the risk to their wellbeing cannot be overstated—indeed, it can be life threatening. ”  T.I.C.-C., 470 N.J. Super. at 609 (quoting Boyertown, 897 F.3d at 522)).  Without this injunction, Appellants’ transgender, gender non-conforming, and non-binary students would suffer under an Amended Policy that specifically targets them for mandatory disclosure, and that uniquely infringes their privacy interests.  See id. at 611 (emphasizing their interest in privacy to protect against “violence, harassment, and discrimination because of their gender identity”).  If a student is involuntarily outed, or if a student now declines to candidly express their gender identity at school for fear of mandatory reporting, the harm will be tremendous—and that bell can never be un-rung.  See (Da135) (concluding that the Amended Policy will threaten serious injuries on transgender, gender non-conforming, and non-binary students, including “mental health issues, suicide, illicit drug dependency, and infliction of emotional harm by immediate family members,” which “constitute[] irreparable injury which may result if restraints are not imposed preliminarily”); John & Jane Parents 1, 622 F.Supp.3d at 139 (explaining that a transgender student “could hardly feel safe in an environment where expressing their gender identity resulted in the automatic disclosure to their parents, regardless of their own wishes”).