ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] In situations where the highest ranking officer is recused “Law from a matter, then “law enforcement executive” refers to the next highest-ranking officer without a conflict. enforcement executive” also refers to the Attorney General and relevant County Prosecutor in cases of supersession, whether that supersession is in whole or in part.  Even without supersession, the law enforcement executive remains subject to the direction of the Attorney General and relevant County Prosecutor.  12 6.3.11
[brief] [...]’s required local property tax contribution is based on its Local Fair Share (“LFS”), a separate annual calculation within the SFRA that uses the City’s equalized property wealth and household income.  N.J.S.A. 18A:7F–52(a); (Pa1916); Abbott XX, 199 N.J at 155.  The difference between the District’s Adequacy Budget amount and its LFS is made up by the State with Equalization Aid, a category of SFRA formula aid.  N.J.S.A. 18A:7F–52, -53; (Pa1916); Abbott XX, 199 N.J. at 155.  Under SFRA’s funding structure, the LFS represents the amount of local property taxes the State expects [...] to contribute to fund its Adequacy Budget.
[directive] A participant who fails to achieve a passing score on a prescribed qualification course shall receive remedial instruction.  This instruction shall be provided after the supervising firearms instructor analyzes the problems which may have led to the failure.  The time allotted and method of remedial training to be conducted shall be determined by the supervising firearms instructor.  The supervising firearms instructor, in consultation with firearms instructors and the participant, will:  1.  Review factors which may have contributed to or caused a participant's failure to qualify, including a check of the participant's firearm.  2.  Document any subsequent attempts to qualify and the results of those attempts.  If after the remedial training and subsequent attempts to qualify the participant still does not fire a passing score, the supervising firearms instructor shall report this information to the chief or agency executive.
[brief] First, as relevant to the next section and the ultimate outcome of this case if the defect is not material, the court in [...] upheld municipal discretion to waive a defect, but it did not hold that the defect had to be waived.  Ibid. (Da461).  Second, as discussed supra, the [...] classification at issue in this case is required to perform the Project.  Da16, Da110-111; N.J.S.A. 27:7-35.2; N.J.S.A. 27:7-1; N.J.A.C. 16:44-1.1; N.J.A.C. 16:44-2.1.  In [...], the trial court found, and the Appellate Division agreed:  [...]’s failure to provide a current Certificate would not deprive [...] of the assurance that [the bidder] would in fact enter into the contract, or ‘adversely affect competitive bidding by placing a bidder in a position of advantage over other bidders or by otherwise undermining the necessary common standard of competition,’ because the contract in question is not a public works contract subject to prevailing wage requirements under N.J.S.A. 34:11–56.51.  In other words, regardless of whether the Certificate was expired, the bidder's projected labor costs would not be affected.  Therefore, [...]'s acceptance of the bid was not arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable, despite the absence of a current Certificate.  [The trial court] also rejected [...]'s claims on other grounds not relevant to our discussion.  [2014 WL 2131662, at *2-3 (Da456)]  Thus, in [...] the prequalification at issue did not actually impact the bidder’s ability to perform or create a competitive advantage, and that is not true here.  Second, while [...]’s provided registration was out of date, [...] at least provided a document with its bid showing it had the referenced qualification at some point in time.  Id. at *2 (Da455).  Here, [...] provided nothing with its bid to demonstrate that it had the requisite qualification to perform and provided nothing for another twenty-one (21) days.  Da357, Da360.
[brief] I could have negotiated with [...] for that amount owed, then retaken possession of the vehicle.  I could then have chosen to: A) keep it in my backyard as a memorial; and/or B) take parts from it for my own needs; and/or C) sell parts (and/or scrap metal) from it to others.  However instead of proceeding down that path, after my negotiating with its employee, [...] agreed to buy my rights to the vehicle for $400, and they would then be able to keep and sell the vehicle (presumably for the parts and scrap metal).
[brief] Rule 1:12-1(g) of the Rules of Judicial Conduct states “[t]he judge of any court shall be disqualified on the court's own motion and shall not sit in any matter, if the judge (g) when there is any other reason which might preclude a fair and unbiased hearing and judgment, or which might reasonably lead counsel or the parties to believe so. ”  Thus the party need not even move; [...] should have disqualified herself in light of the fact that [...] made allegations of criminal conduct regarding her to the FBI.
[brief] However, these laws are limited to a vehicle’s owner.  See N.J.S.A. 39:6B-1 (“Every owner or registered owner of a motor vehicle registered or principally garaged in this State shall maintain motor vehicle liability insurance coverage [.].”)  See also Huggins v. Aquilar, 246 N.J. 75, 82 (2021) (there is a “statutory requirement that every automobile be insured by its owner, not its driver [.].”)
[brief] In other words, there was no mutual assent to arbitrate the claims before any arbitrator except for [...].  While the parties are free to agree to a new arbitrator voluntarily, a court has no authority to impose another arbitrator upon them.  Even if a court were to look beyond the plain language of the arbitration clause, [...]’s identification in the agreement as the “sole arbitrator” is significant, especially given his history with the parties.  After the filing of the initial lawsuit in 2013 (Pa33), [...] mediated the dispute that gave rise to the settlement agreement whereby [...] would provide [...] with replacement tankers and [...] was appointed to serve as arbitrator if there was any dispute over the implementation of that settlement agreement.  Pa45.  In fact, it was [...] “who drafted the agreement on behalf of the parties. ”  Pa85; see also Pa93 (noting that as part of their settlement agreement the parties “agreed that the attorney who drafted the agreement would serve as the arbitrator” if there was a dispute as to its terms or implementation.)  Accordingly, the parties selected as their “sole arbitrator” the person who had mediated their initial dispute and who himself drafted the settlement agreement at issue.  Thus, in assessing liability and damages from any alleged breach of that agreement, [...] was uniquely suited to both interpret the terms of the agreement—which he wrote himself—and to judge the reasonableness of any claim for damages in light of the parties’ prior settlement discussions.  Thus, beyond the plain language of the agreement itself, the attendant circumstances further demonstrate that the parties’ mutual assent to arbitrate only extended to an arbitration conducted by [...].  Therefore, the trial court erred when it found that it could appoint a substitute arbitrator because “[...] was not as important to the agreement to arbitrate as the agreement itself” and that the parties’ “dominant intent was clearly to arbitrate any disputes not merely to arbitrate before a particular arbitrator” and [...] “was not…central to this agreement. ”  Pa66.  To the contrary, the plain language and surrounding circumstances demonstrate that the arbitration agreement here was for arbitration before a specifically identified arbitrator.  Once he was no longer available, there was no further, binding agreement to arbitrate claims between the parties.  Instead, unless they both agree otherwise, those claims must be pursued in court.  Accordingly, the trial court erred in holding it would appoint a substitute arbitrator and that decision must be reversed.
[directive] In sum, under this graduated plea system, a defendant would retain the right to file and fully litigate pretrial motions, but is offered the opportunity to waive this right in consideration for the added benefits provided by a pre- indictment or initial post-indictment plea offer.  Moreover, the approach taken in these Guidelines is a logical adjunct to the plea cut-off rule, codified at R. 3:9-3g, which provides that in order to achieve a systemic benefit, at some point in the criminal proceedings, a trial court is generally prohibited from accepting a negotiated plea, so that the defendant must plead guilty to all open counts of the indictment and without a recommendation of a reduced sentence by the prosecutor.
[brief] 23 A.3d 338 | 39, 46 | | Aly v. Garcia, 333 N.J. Super. 195, 203-04 (App. Div. 2000), certify. | 41, 45 | | denied.  167 N.J. 87 (2001) | | | Banco Popular No. America v. Gandi, 184 N.J. 161, 876 A.2d 253 (N.J. 2005) | 24 | | Burd v. Sussex Mut. Ins. Co., 267 A.2d 7 (N.J. 1970) | 35, 36, 37 | | Central Nat’l Ins. Co. v. Utica Nat’l Ins. Group.  232 N.J. Super. 467. 470, 557 A.2d 693 (App. Div. 1989) | 32 | | Danek v. Hommer, 28 N.J. Super 68, 77, 100 A.2d 198 (App. Div. 1953), aff’d o.b., 15 N.J. 573, 105 A.2d 677 (1954) | 31, 33 | | Dimitrakopoulos v. Borrus, Goldin, Foley, Vignuolo, Hyman & Stahl, PC.
[brief] Da40.  The Borough provided the Certification of [...], Project Engineer of [...], engineers for the Borough, to both explain the nature of the typographical error, how the correct information had been attached to the Verified Complaint and Declaration of Taking, and to refute Appellant’s factually-erroneous opposition.  Da69.  Ms. Nastasi’s certification confirmed:  . . .  I inspected the Property and confirmed the seawall repairs on Defendant’s Property were performed in accordance with the original map and at the correct distance of 177.65 from Ocean Avenue.  There was no construction or disturbance at the area of the Defendant’s Property located at “a distance of 117.65 feet from the intersection of the northerly R.O.W. line . . .”.  Ibid.  [emphasis added].
[brief] (Db7, 12).  Specifically, the delegation provision tries to put “any threshold arbitrability issues including interpretation, applicability, enforceability or formation of the arbitration agreement ... including issues relation to whether ‘[...]’s terms are’ unconscionable” in the control of the arbitrator.  (Db7, 12).  [...] is asking for this Court to selectively invoke a specific part of this delegation provision for their advantage, while simultaneously asking this Court to disregard other relevant parts that do not support its position.  [...] is urging this Court to hold unconscionability is for the arbitrator to decide because the delegation provision says so.  Yet, by its own language, the delegation provision would also represent that the trial court did not have the authority to determine this arbitration agreement is enforceable or applicable against the Appellants.  Thus, if this Court is inclined to find the delegation provision enforceable, it must also reverse the trial court’s opinion as to the enforceability and formation of this arbitration agreement.
[brief] Finally, defendant's statement was not rendered inadmissible by any failure to terminate questioning.  Under federal law, "the police are required to stop a custodial interrogation when a suspect unambiguously asserts his right to remain silent."  S.S., 229 N.J. at 382 (citing Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 381-82 (2010)).  Conversely, "under our state law privilege against self-incrimination, 'a request, however ambiguous, to terminate questioning . . . must be diligently honored."  Ibid.
[brief] SET FORTH IN N.J.S.A. 18A:13-47.11 (Aa19 – Aa21)  ...........................................................................  3  A.  SEA BRIGHT IS NOT A CONSTITUENT DISTRICT OF A CONSOLIDATED SCHOOL DISTRICT (Aa19 – Aa21) ..............................................................................................................  4  B.  SEA BRIGHT IS NOT A CONSTITUENT DISTRICT OF A LIMITED PURPOSE REGIONAL SCHOOL DISTRICT (Aa19 – Aa21) .............................................................................................................  5  C.  THE LEGISLATURE OPTED TO NOT INCLUDE ENTITIES SUCH AS SEA BRIGHT IN THE CLASS OF ENTITIES ELIGIBLE TO SEEK WITHDRAWAL THROUGH RESOLUTION PURSUANT TO N.J.S.A. 18A:13-47.11 (Aa19 – Aa21)  ...........................................................................................................  7  1.  The Legislature chose not to authorize municipalities, such as [...], to withdraw pursuant to N.J.S.A. 18A:13-47.11 (Aa19 – Aa21)  .........................  8  2.  The Legislature did not authorize municipalities, such as [...], to submit a question regarding regional school district enlargement to voters (Aa19 – Aa21)………………………………………………………  10  POINT II  THE COMMISSIONER’S DECISION SHOULD BE REVERSED BECAUSE IT ERRONEOUSLY IDENTIFIES SEA BRIGHT AS AN ENTITY COVERED BY N.J.S.A. 18A:13-47.11 (Aa19 – Aa21)  ……………………………………………………………..  11  CONCLUSION
[brief] [...] never saw [...] throw anything out of his window, but surmised [...] could have thrown the folds at some point while [...] was driving behind his vehicle on the Parkway since his main focus was on looking forward.  (1T40-6 to 19; 1T55-6 to 13).  [...] did not appear to be under the influence while speaking to officers and was not arrested for driving under the influence, but he was arrested and charged with Possession of a Controlled Dangerous Substance in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10a(1) and Wandering/Prowling to Obtain a Controlled Dangerous Substance in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:33-2.1b.
[brief] Plaintiffs assert that they should have been allowed to pursue the Law Division action based on a single, vague allegation contained in paragraph 16 of their complaint.  (Appellant’s Brief at 32).  Paragraph 16 of the complaint provides:  16.  [...] failed to give [...] the appropriate advice at the time of the execution of the mortgage or the deeding of the property to [...].  [Pa000003.]  Notably, nowhere in plaintiffs’ 34-page submission do they describe the alleged basis for this claim or why it has any substantial merit.
[brief] Lastly, there was no legal justification for the trial judge to award Plaintiffs their attorneys’ fees and costs.  The record evidence did not support the finding that Defendant breached a contract containing a fee shifting provision.  The 2017 [...], which is the only contract that Defendant was party to that arguably contained such a provision, required Defendant to indemnify [...] for losses only if she breached her covenants under the contract or if she delivered [...] a materially inaccurate document required by the contract.  There was no rational or credible evidence in the record to support a finding that Defendant did either of these things.  Thus, the trial court erred by entering a fee award against Defendant under the applicable contracts.
[brief] (Pa681.)  [...]’s Affirmative Defenses include: [...] was not enrolled in the CCIP at the time of \(^{12}\) Plaintiffs’ have not challenged the trial court’s finding against [...]’s promissory estoppel claim and, thus, have waived it.  Therefore, it is not address it in this appeal.  the Accident; and the CCIP is void *ab initio* as to [...] because of misrepresentations made by [...] in the CCIP application process.  (Pa696.)  On June 21, 2019, [...] filed an Answer, with Crossclaims, including the projected “realignment” Crossclaims against [...].  (Pa703.)  [...] amended its Answer in 2022, to add several affirmative defenses, including: [...]’s, [...]’s and [...]’ awareness that [...] was not enrolled in the CCIP at the time of the Accident; [...]’s and [...]’ determination that coverage for the Accident was not excluded based on their policies’ Wrap-Up Exclusions; and the [...] Policy’s Sole Agent for Insured Endorsement.  (Pa772.)  **LEGAL ARGUMENT**
[brief] DA at 100a.  [...] did not explain the difference between the baseline and supplemental projects or that the goal of b2933 was simply to add a third level of redundancy.  DA at 100a.  Initially, [...] presented a route that involved going from the Front Street substation to a planned but unconstructed substation on Walnut Avenue in Cranford before going to the Springfield Road substation.  DA at 101a, 347a.  The proposed route wound through largely residential streets within Westfield and is designated as the purple “original route. ”  Id.  After discussion about the proposed route with Town officials, [...] conducted a public meeting in April 2019, at which point the plan met significant public resistance.
[brief] Instead of adopting 2005 as the starting point for interest calculations, the trial court held that interest incepted in 1989, when the court believed the limits underlying the [...] were exhausted.  (Pa0057.)  In so holding, the trial court overlooked that only 6.4% of covered costs can be applied to the limits underlying the [...].  To explain, while the trial court is correct that “[...]’s damages had exceeded $200,000 by 1989,” (Pa0057) only 6.4% of this amount was applicable to the US Fire policy period, and the policies underlying the [...] during this period. \(^{15}\)
[brief] Further, it could be argued that [...] is no longer subject to the immunities of a public entity as they are acting as a private party as they entered into a lease with a private party, specifically bargained for that private party to have designated parking spaces included in the premises, included the responsibility of maintenance of those spaces within the lease terms for the premises.  [...]’s actions pierce the veil of the immunities provided to a public entity as they have entered into a transaction in which they bargained for and benefitted from the allocation and designation of specific parking spots thereby exposing themselves to the same laws that an ordinary private entity would have.  [...] is essentially trying to obtain the benefit of both the TCA and common law which would give them complete and total immunity which is contrary to the law and why there is a higher standard for public entities in the first place.  [...] has tried to extend their immunity to [...] by contracting the specific parking spaces out, and the trial Court, in essence, found that [...] is entitled to the same tort threshold as [...].  These findings are inconsistent with public policy.  A review of the allegations in the Complaint, the marked photographs submitted by Appellant, the fact that the parking lot was repaved and the testimony of [...] all provide competent evidence that a dangerous condition existed and were sufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment.  Additionally, the trial Court found that there was no actual or constructive notice because there was no dangerous condition, and also that [...] did not act palpably unreasonable because there was no dangerous condition.  (Pa11-12)  Since the trial Court based it’s determination of these two factors on it’s erroneous determination that there was no dangerous condition, we submit that these factors should be remanded due to the reasoning set forth herein above as there was sufficient evidence to show a material question of fact as to the dangerousness of the condition.  For the foregoing reasons, Appellant submits that the decision below was erroneous and incorrect and must be reversed.
[brief] Date Submitted: July 3, 2024  [...]  ATTORNEY GENERAL OF NEW JERSEY  R.J. Hughes Justice Complex  P.O. Box 106 Trenton, New Jersey 08625  Attorney for Respondent [...] (609) 815-2696  Matthew.melton@law.njoag.gov  [...]  Assistant Attorney General Of Counsel  [...] (ID:276482018)  Deputy Attorney General  On the Brief  TABLE OF CONTENTS
[brief] The Defendant entered a “Not Guilty” Plea to all charges.  The Defendant filed a motion to recuse and transfer the matter based on a conflict of interest.\(^1\) (1T Pg. 11, Ln. 11-14).  The Municipal Court denied the motion on April 7, 2022 finding there was no conflict of interest.  (1T Pg. 18, Ln. 18).  The Defendant also filed a motion to dismiss.
[brief] *11  Our “standard of review on a motion to bar an out-of-court-identification ... is no different from ... [a] review of a trial court's findings in any non-jury case. ”  State v. Wright, 444 N.J. Super. 347, 356 (App. Div. 2016) (citing Johnson, 42 N.J. at 161).  “The aim of the review at the outset is ... to determine whether the findings made could reasonably have been reached on sufficient credible evidence present in the record.
[brief] (Pa0094).  [...], a longtime employee of [...], testified that in 1986 or 1987, as part of [...]’s early investigation, he reached the conclusion that the size of the plume of contaminated groundwater had stabilized and was no longer expanding.  (Pa0260).  [...]’s investigations at the Site have shown that CVOCs were discharged in an undiluted, oil-like form, known as a dense non-aqueous phase liquid (“DNAPL”) and also as aqueous solutions.  (Pa0257-58).  CVOCs that are released in DNAPL form tend to be more “persistent” and difficult to clean up.  (Id).  Conversely, CVOCs released diluted in wastewater are “relatively easier to clean-up. ”  (Id).  On September 9, 1993, [...] and the [...] entered into an Administrative Order on Consent (the “1993 Administrative Order”).
[brief] If, as here, the public access requirement is triggered, then the Law requires the DEP as a next step to consider three factors to determine “the public access that is required at a property. ”  Ibid.  On appeal, [...] contends that DEP failed to satisfy the “analytical obligations” under N.J.S.A. 13:1D-153(a) to determine the degree of public access on the Property.  (Ab21; Ab23-25).  Although the record contains information about public access near the Property for background purposes (Ra207-10), the extent of public access “that is required” at the Property is not an issue in this appeal.  The only regulatory issue considered at the OAL and by the Commissioner is whether the DEP properly imposed the public access condition in [...]’s permit at all.
[brief] Plaintiff’s heavy reliance on the 1990 decision in D’Agostino v. Johnson & Johnson, 242 N.J. Super. 267 (App. Div. 1990) for the proposition that [...] has control over [...] and therefore must produce him for a deposition is misplaced.  Pl. Br. at 11-15.  \(^4\) “Pl. Br.” refers to Plaintiff’s Brief in support of his appeal, dated October 17, 2024.
[brief] The entire thrust of [...]’s response is based exclusively on whether the trial court “abused its discretion in denying the Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration as untimely” and, as [...] argues simultaneously, because it lacked jurisdiction after the complaint was removed to federal court by [...].  [...] does not dispute that the trial court never addressed any of the issues before it on the merits.  [...] conveniently avoids the uncontested facts and settled law in this case, that proves that [...]’s violation of [...]’s Forth Amendment Rights and Due Process Rights resulted in a fraud upon the court.  Both the trial court and [...] completely ignore the Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgement Pursuant to 4:46 filed December 5, 2022, which also addressed this fraud upon the court and is not a motion for reconsideration.  While the RPCs may not support a cause of action, the acts by [...] in this case clearly violate the framework of Rule 3.3 which resulted in a knowing fraud upon the court (infra 11).  Judicial discretion does not support violations of law.  No litigant, including counsel, is permitted to publish legally protected and confidential information that is prohibited from being disseminated by law.