ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Indeed, while the Municipal Court referenced the Defendant’s alleged B.A.C., the only query posed to the Defendant was whether he understood that he was subject to the imposition of the ignition interlock.  The Municipal Court never asked the Defendant whether the B.A.C. that was referenced was accurate, and whether he had any reason to challenge the alleged B.A.C., which are the requirements set forth by the Appellate Division in Vargas.  Perhaps more fundamentally, however, is the fact when the Municipal Court did reference the B.A.C., the Defendant apparently gave no response anyway.  So clearly, the factual basis in the within matter fails because the Court never asked the Defendant to acknowledge the alleged B.A.C., and even if one were to argue that the Court referenced the B.A.C. in the context of mentioning the interlock device installation requirement, the record reveals that the Defendant did not give any audible response.  The Defendant never acknowledged that his guilt with regarding to the B.A.C. element of the DWI offense in the within matter.  He was never asked to acknowledge it, and he never gave any response to the insufficient reference that was made by the Municipal Court.  It must also be noted that the Law Division denied Defendant’s Motion to Vacate predicated, at least in part, upon an evaluation under State v. Slater, 198 N.J. 145 (2009).
[brief] Instead, this Court should look at whether the goal of incapacitation would be furthered by keeping [...] incarcerated beyond the age of fifty-eight, which is how old he will be when he completes his previously imposed twenty-year sentence.  Studies of the rate of criminal offending show that it is not constant over the life span of a person, but rather peaks early on and then “declines sharply with age. ”  Id. at 143-45.  Our Supreme Court has recognized studies showing “that as individuals age, their propensity to commit crime decreases and, in particular, that elderly individuals released from prison tend to recidivate at extremely low rates. ”  Acoli v. New Jersey State Parole Bd., 250 N.J. 431, 469 (2022).
[brief] Defendants assert that the following things matter: (1) [...] was “concurrently represented” by the same firm that prosecuted the tax foreclosure\(^{15}\); (2) the “proximity” in time between the final judgment and the acquisition of the property; (3) an accelerated foreclosure using a private licensed individual’s abandonment certification, rather than one from a municipal official\(^{16}\), and (4) a disparity between the redemption amount and the fair market value of the property.  None of these things are relevant because none of them adverts to any outstanding claim or equity of Defendants.  These are features of many tax sale foreclosures.  They are not exceptional, unusual, or unlawful.
[directive] IDRC N.J.S.A.  N.J.S.A. driver’s to than $100 $100 than N.J.S.A. consecutive to Offfenses) referral less years less  DDEF DDEF $2,000 year under under Other Other N.J.S.A.  No Zone, no 50 2 4 39:4-50 with concurrent School not $1,000 not Zone Refusal, $500 year, concurrent months, a than for School that the in 1 than suspension DWI be Refusal at more more incident  7  Offense Offense to DWI, than or less 39:5-41 39:5-41
[brief] A.  No, it has not.  Again, [...] is not a stupid company operating a risky, unsafe system.  Q.  Since the installation of the temporary regulator, has the Company provided any notice to the [...] or [...] or other emergency preparedness officials of the kinds of risks that are described in these two paragraphs?  A.  Can you repeat your question again?  Q.  Yes.  Since the installation of the temporary regulator, has the Company provided any notification to [...] or [...] or any other police, fire, or emergency preparedness officials of the possibility of these kinds of risks happening?
[brief] On June 20, 2024, [...] filed a Verified Complaint and an Order to Show Cause, seeking injunctive relief to enjoin the Second Arbitration.  Pa74.  On July 18, 2024, [...] filed its opposition and filed cross-motions seeking to dismiss the Verified Complaint with prejudice and to compel the Second Arbitration.  Pa699-700.  The trial court held argument on the parties’ motion on August 6, 2024.  Transcript of Motion (filed Nov. 26, 2024) (“Mtn. Tr.”).  During the hearing, counsel for [...] pointed out the obvious—that “[t]he PTA, the project transfer agreement, subsumed all the parties’ relationship”; that [...] would not have agreed to “have a separate arbitration for each subcontract underneath the PTA”; and that it would be absurd to suggest that “we should have [fragmented] arbitrations,” one for the PTA and one for each project. ”  Mtn. Tr. at 12:11-17.  Counsel for [...] added, moreover:  That’s just plainly not was agreed to.  That’s plainly not what was contemplated.  It’s not what we pleaded in our arbitration demand.  We put all the subcontracts at issue…that made all their counterclaims on the subcontracts compulsory and they brought them.  They brought their [$]2.1 million Hackensack claim and [...] heard the evidence and decided it and set it off against each other.  [Mtn. Tr. at 12:18-13:1.]  In response, counsel for [...] argued, incredibly, that multiple disjointed arbitrations are necessary due to the PTA’s (inapplicable) arbitration-consolidation provision,\(^7\) thus concluding that “yes…there [would] have to be 12 different arbitrations on 12 different projects.
[brief] The holding in Olds v. Donnelly, 150 N.J. 424, 443 (1997) exempting all legal malpractice claims from the entire controversy doctrine was not overruled by Dimitrakopoulos v. [...] 237 N.J. 91 (2019).  That case simply dealt with the issue of when a client is sued by an attorney for fees whether the client has a duty to assert as a counterclaim for legal malpractice.  The Court held that when a client is sued by a lawyer for fees, the Court must look to see whether or not the entire controversial doctrine requires a client to assert his or her claim against a former attorney when they are already adversaries in a lawsuit.  Certainly, that is not the case here.  Indeed, the Dimitrakopoulos Court reiterated it’s holding in *Olds v. Donnelly*, 150 N.J. 424, 443 (1997) that “the entire controversial doctrine does not require an attorney’s current or former client to assert a legal malpractice claim against that attorney in the litigation that gave rise to the malpractice claim even if the two claims arise from the same or related facts and otherwise would be subject to mandatory joinder.
[brief] Two to four Gang Unit officers transported [...] in a police car to the prosecutor’s office, where multiple homicide detectives told him to sit in a small interrogation room and blocked his only exit. \(^{14}\)  The police seized his cell phone and never told him that he could leave.  \(^{14}\)  The State failed to prove that the Gang Unit transportation was voluntary, but See Sutton v. Metro. Gov’t Nashville & Davidson Cnty., 700 F.3d 865, 875-78 (6th Cir. 2012) (holding police seizure of suspect’s phone indicates de facto arrest (citing Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 494, 501 (1983) (plurality op.))).  He was questioned for over two-and-a-half hours and held for over seven hours.  Though he was permitted water and coffee, he was evidently not provided food despite being held during dinner hours between 3:29 and 10:40 p.m.  Although [...] claimed that [...] was only a “person of interest,” the facts known to the detectives and their questions show that he was objectively treated as a suspect.  The detectives interrogated him for hours about every detail of his alibi, including where he had been and why.  They confronted him with evidence -- both real and fabricated -- that they said implicated him as the shooter, including the surveillance videos, the Facebook post, and the false eyewitness identification.  They repeatedly accused him of the murder and urged him to confess.  They threatened him; shouted, swore, and pointed at him; leaned toward him; and clapped, knocked, and slapped the table.  And they ignored his multiple requests to “go home” and numerous silent responses.  As in Hubbard, their objective conduct and “targeted questions reflect[ed] a clear attempt on the part of the detective[s] to cause defendant to incriminate himself. ”  222 N.J. at 272.  Finally, the video suggests that [...] was in fact locked inside the even if it had, Hubbard shows that any police transportation indicates custody. room during the breaks, which this Court may consider de novo because the motion court made no factual finding either way.  In all, a twenty-five-year-old in [...]’s position -- isolated for seven hours in a police interrogation room and berated by multiple homicide detectives -- would not have felt free to leave.  Therefore, [...] was in custody for the entirety of the interrogation, and the Miranda protections applied throughout.
[brief] Rather, the applicant only sought a waiver from planting them along the entire frontage.  Specifically, [...] stated: we're requesting a partial design waiver on the street trees, because there's a stormwater facility there and the recommendation from the Board engineer is, we recommend shade trees be proposed to the southwest of the stormwater management facility and we'll put in all these street trees that the Board and the professionals say fit.  Wherever a street tree fits, we'll put a street tree in.  We can't do the typical every 50 feet because of the unique circumstances, but if we have 30, 30, and 60 you're going to have the same thing. ”  (T2: p28, ln 10-14)  As the Court can see, the Board’s own professionals had no concerns regarding the design waivers’ effects on drainage and any supposed hazards created by it.
[brief] Against those decisions, Defendant cites several unpublished New Jersey court decisions which never considered the reasoning in those published federal decisions and concluded that no claim was stated.  But Defendant failed to acknowledge that, unlike the federal decisions, the unpublished decisions are not consistent.  Defendant fails to address the decision from the Honorable [...], J.S.C. (now J.A.D.) in *Mhrez v. [...]*, Docket No. [...] (June 9, 2023) (Pa71).
[brief] [...] responses to Holmdel 1-22 are included in this Appendix at Ha313 to 536.  [...] responses to HOLM-[...]-PNL-42 to 77 are included in this Appendix at Exhibits Holm-45 to 80 at Ha561to Ha610.  [...] responses to HOLM-[...]-PNL-79 to 115 are included in this Appendix as Exhibits Holm-81 to Holm-115 at Ha611 to Ha647.  [...] responses to HOLM-[...]-PNL-122 to 125 are including in this Appendix as Exhibits Holm-118 to Holm-121 at Ha649 to Ha652.  (SOICR p. 9)  [...] response to discovery request HOLM-[...]-PNL-23 . . . .
[brief] On November 1, 2022, the Board held a public hearing for preliminary and final major subdivision approval for the application.  (1T\(^1\)).  On November 1, 2022, the Board approved the application.  (1T100-13 to 1T100-14).  On December 13, 2022, the Board adopted a Resolution of Memorialization (the “Resolution”).  (Pa245-Pa253).  On November 29, 2022, Plaintiffs [...] and [...] (“Plaintiffs”) filed an action in lieu of prerogative writs, challenging the Board’s decision to approve the major subdivision approval.  (Pa270-Pa279).  On January 4, 2022, Defendants filed an answer to the complaint.  (Pa280-Pa291; Pa292-Pa300).  --- \(^1\)  The following references will be used throughout the brief:  “1T” shall refer to the [...] Hearing held on November 1, 2022.  “2T” shall refer to the Transcript of Prerogative Writ Oral Argument held on May 23, 2023.  “Pa” shall refer to Plaintiffs’ Appendix.  On March 31, 2023, Plaintiffs filed its Brief in Support of Action in Lieu of Prerogative Writ.  On April 21, 2023, the Board filed its Brief in Opposition to the Action in Lieu of Prerogative Writ.  On April 21, 2023, the Applicant filed its Brief in Opposition to the Action in Lieu of Prerogative Writ.  On May 8, 2023, Plaintiffs filed its Reply Brief in Further Support of the Action in Lieu of Prerogative Writ.  On May 26, 2023, the Superior Court of New Jersey, Mercer County Law Division entered an Order Dismissing Plaintiffs’ Action in Lieu of Prerogative Writ and dismissed the complaint with prejudice.  (Pa301-Pa313).  On June 27, 2023, Plaintiffs filed the instant appeal.  (Pa314-Pa321).  **STATEMENT OF FACTS**
[brief] Defendants' dismissal motion on this ground is denied. ”).  6  *Henebema v. Raddi*, 452 N.J. Super. 438 (App. Div. 2017).  In entering summary judgment, the judge should nevertheless have resolved whether defendants waived the new defenses, especially because he contemplated the issue would remain outstanding if we disagreed with him that Royster controlled.  One cannot rely on a waived affirmative defense.  Expressing a desire that we resolve the waiver issue in the first instance does a disservice to this court and the parties because "both Rule 1:7–4 and Rule 2:5–1(b) ... state that the court ‘shall’ set forth the facts and make conclusions of law to support the order or judgment."  *Allstate Ins. Co. v. Fisher*, 408 N.J. Super. 289, 300–01 (App. Div. 2009).  Compliance with these rules enables our full review of the judge's ruling.  ***
[brief] In addition, even if an appropriate disclaimer is used, a school official must never negate the import of the disclaimer by proceeding, under the purported protection of the disclaimer, to discuss or comment on Board business or matters in a way that leads a member of the public to believe that the individual is speaking on behalf of, and as a representative of, the Board.  Advisory Opinion A02-22 (2022) (Ca233) (citing *I/M/O Treston, Randolph Board of Education*, Commission Docket No. C71-18, at 12) (emphasis added)).  Despite campaigning for the Board from her public Facebook account, announcing she won her seat, and sharing pictures of herself swearing in from this same account, Respondent’s account contained no disclaimer.  She then made every public post that was the subject of the Commission’s August 22, 2023 Decision within 5 days, and from the very same public account.  Pursuant to the Commission’s decisional law for well over a decade, and based on the clear and direct evidence presented, Respondent held herself out as a Board member from this same Facebook account.  The Commission’s finding in its Final Decision that “there is no factual evidence” tying Respondent’s Facebook account to her Board membership was made in error, was contrary to the factual findings of [...], and was contrary to all evidence in the record.  As a result, the Commission’s August 22, 2023 must be reversed as being arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable, and unsupported by the evidence in the record.
[brief] Pandolfo v. D & C Chevy/Honda, No. A-4037-12T3, 2014 WL 7236788, at *1 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Dec. 22, 2014) (“[W]e are constrained to dismiss this appeal. ”); Special Police Org. of N.J. v. City of Newark, No. A-4168-19, 2022 WL 2912038, at *8 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. July 25, 2022), cert. denied, 253 N.J. 600 (2023) (“Our standards of review, and our role as an appellate court, does not require that we forage through the record to determine whether the court committed errors plaintiffs fail to expressly identify or provide legal argument. ”); Drinker Biddle & Reath LLP v. N.J. Dep’t of Law & Pub. Safety, 421 N.J. Super. 489, 496 n.5 (App. Div. 2011) (explaining issues not briefed on appeal are abandoned).  Because Plaintiff failed to identify what the lower court did wrong or why, the Court should dismiss this appeal.  ______________________ explain what the [lower court] did wrong,” which “is not proper appellate advocacy”).
[brief] The burden of proof must be sustained by proof of circumstances from which defendants’ want of due care is a legitimate inference.  An inference of negligence must be established from proven facts and cannot be based upon the foundation of pure conjecture, speculation, surmise, or guess.  Long, 35 N.J. at 54; Rivera v. Columbus Cadet Corps. Of America, 59 N.J. Super. 445 (App. Div. 1960), cert. denied 32 N.J. 349 (1960).  Here, Plaintiff is unable to establish that the Defendants owed a duty to the Plaintiff for the ice located on a public sidewalk, which occurred from rain, snow melt and a natural freezing event.  They also failed to establish any duty owed under the local municipal ordinance.  (Pa128).  Accordingly, summary judgment was entered.  B.  The Defendants Do Not Have A Common Law Duty to Remove Snow and Ice from a Public Sidewalk
[brief] **THE PARTIES**  **Plaintiff**  Plaintiff [...] resides in the [...] ("Millburn").  (Pa1-Compl. #26; Pa219-SJCS #1, #2; Pa234-SJ Opp Cert #3, #4).  Plaintiff is also an attorney duly authorized to practice law in the State of New Jersey.  (Pa1-Compl. #27; Pa219-SJCS #3; Pa234-SJ Opp Cert #5)).  As such, plaintiff is a --- 1
[brief] O.D.A.-C., 250 N.J. at 421.  Those factors "include the suspect's 'education and intelligence, age, familiarity with the criminal justice system, physical and mental condition, . . . drug and alcohol problems,' how explicit the waiver was, and the amount of time between the reading of the rights and any admissions."  Ibid. (citations omitted); see also Erazo, 254 N.J. at 301 (noting that additional considerations include "statements and behaviors by the police which tend to contradict the Miranda warnings, or otherwise render them ineffective"); State v. A.M., 237 N.J. 384, 398 (2019) (listing additional factors such as "advice as to constitutional rights, length of [the] detention, whether the questioning was repeated and prolonged in nature and whether physical punishment or mental exhaustion was involved" (quoting State v. Miller, 76 N.J. 392, 402 (1978))).
[brief] (Aa53).  May 31, 2006 was not the first time that Petitioner was subjected to a random urinalysis.  (Aa4).  The urinalysis report, dated July 12, 2006, revealed Petitioner tested positive for the metabolite of cocaine, which is present in the body after ingesting cocaine and after the body starts processing its disposal.  (Aa3; Aa53).  Thereafter, the County served Petitioner with a Preliminary Notice of Disciplinary Action (hereinafter “PNDA”) (Aa4), and a Notice of Immediate Suspension (Aa5) on July 26, 2006.  The PNDA referenced Petitioner’s urinalysis result of “Cocaine-positive”, and cited six employment charges:  1)  N.J.A.C. 4a:2-2.3(A)1  Incompetency, inefficiency or failure to perform duties; 2)  N.J.A.C. 4a:2-2.3(A)2  Insubordination  3)  N.J.A.C. 4a:2-2.3(A)3  Inability to Perform Duties  4)  N.J.A.C. 4a:2-2.3(A)6  Conduct Unbecoming of a Public Employee 5)  N.J.A.C. 4a:2-2.3(A)7  Neglect of Duty 6)  N.J.A.C. 4a:2-2.3(A)11 Other Sufficient Cause (Aa4).  A departmental hearing was thereafter conducted with regard to the charges set forth in the PNDA (Aa54).  The charges were thereby sustained during the hearing on June 30, 2008, and Petitioner was removed from his position pursuant to a Final Notice of Disciplinary Action (Aa6; Aa54).  The effective date of his termination was July 16, 2008, at which time Petitioner had fifteen (15) years and nine (9) months of service and/or credit in the PFRS, and he had not yet reached age fifty-five (Aa54).
[brief] No one identified [...], either from the videotape or at the scene, and the police did not bother to check for any information that would corroborate or disprove that [...] was the perpetrator.  Police did not seek a search warrant for [...]’s house—in which proceeds from the burglary or the clothing shown on the video could be searched for—or for [...]’s phone—which could reveal his location history at the time of the entries.
[directive] The Court re-emphasized the “dominance, if not paramountcy, of uniformity as one of the Code’s premier sentencing goals. ”  153 N.J. at 21 (citation to earlier Supreme Court cases omitted).  As in all plea offers, the Court added, the individual characteristics of the crime and of the defendant, such as whether the defendant is a first or second-time offender, must be considered.  Finally, the Court held that to permit effective judicial review, prosecutors must state on the record their reasons for choosing to waive or not to waive the mandatory minimum period of parole ineligibility specified by the statute.
[brief] Maxim Sewerage v. Monmouth Ridings, 173 N.J. Super 84, 90 (Law Div. 1993).  ..................  17  Merchants Indem.Corp. Of N.Y. v. Eggleston, 37 N.J. 114, 129 (1962).  .....................................  22 Miller v. Wact, Saxt 214.
[brief] In *Witt*, the Supreme Court held that a defendant could not challenge the unlawfulness of a stop on appeal where trial counsel only challenged the lawfulness of the search.  223 N.J. at 419.  The Court explained that courts should generally decline to consider issues not presented to the trial court when defense counsel had “the opportunity for such a presentation” because:  [I]t would be unfair, and contrary to our established rules, to decide the lawfulness of the stop when the State was deprived of the opportunity to establish a record.  . . .  The trial court, moreover, was never called on to rule on the lawfulness of the stop.  By contrast, here, trial counsel argued that [...] violated law and policy by failing to properly use his body worn camera, and that the missing evidence would have supported his arguments that the detention was prolonged without reasonable suspicion and shown the officer was not credible.  The State had the opportunity to respond to this argument, but failed to do so.  Defense counsel did enough to preserve the argument.  Defense counsel did not have to cite to the statute or use the magic words to preserve the argument about the body-worn-camera footage.  See State v. Robinson, 200 N.J. 1, 19 (2009) (“The important fact is that the trial court was alerted to the basic problem[.]” (citation omitted)); State v. Watson, 472 N.J. Super. 381, 439 (App. Div. 2022) (finding that, even though defense counsel had not specifically cited the Confrontation Clause, “[c]onsidering the totality of these circumstances, although counsel might have done more to articulate an objection based on Sixth Amendment grounds, as distinct from N.J.R.E. 404(b) principles, we do not believe that defendant impliedly waived his Confrontation Clause rights”), rev’d on other grounds, 254 N.J. 558 (2023).  As a final, related note, [...]’ argument that the Street Cop conference evidence supports the defense’s theory that the stop was unconstitutionally prolonged and calls into question [...]’s credibility is not the kind of argument that can be waived.  First, Witt does not apply because there was no opportunity to present this argument below, as the Office of the Comptroller Report was not released until December of 2023.  Second, the Street Cop argument is not a standalone argument, unlike arguing for the first time on appeal that a stop was unconstitutional.  *Witt* should not be extended to arguments that are made in support of suppression claims that were raised below.  As the argument is not waived, [...] does not have to withdraw his plea to advance it. \(^5\)  [...] is filing, along with this brief, a motion to expand the record to include this relevant and new Street Cop information, so that this Court can consider the information on appeal.  In alternative, if this Court remands for a new suppression hearing, [...] should be permitted to introduce this new evidence.  **D.