ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] 15 U.S.C. § 1692 .....................................................................................................................  1, 2, 7  15 U.S.C. § 1692(a)..................................................................................................................  11  15 U.S.C. § 1692(e).................................................................................................................. 1, 7, 10, 11  15 U.S.C. § 1692b ....................................................................................................................  16  15 U.S.C. § 1692b(5)..............................................................................................................  23  15 U.S.C. § 1692c(b).............................................................................................................. passim  15 U.S.C. § 1692d ....................................................................................................................  13  15 U.S.C. § 1692d(3).............................................................................................................. passim  15 U.S.C. § 1692f ..................................................................................................................... passim  15 U.S.C. § 1692f(5)..............................................................................................................  23  15 U.S.C. § 1692f(8)..............................................................................................................  23  15 U.S.C. § 1692g ....................................................................................................................  27  15 U.S.C. § 1692i ....................................................................................................................  25  15 U.S.C. § 1692k ....................................................................................................................  2  15 U.S.C. § 6809(3)(A) ..........................................................................................................  29  I.
[brief] The trial court did not state its reasoning when selecting plaintiffs’ judgment order over [...]’s,⁹ but, thereafter, during --- ⁹The trial court heard argument and considered the parties’ supplemental briefing in support of their respective proposed judgment orders, but did not render specific legal conclusions in support of the acceptance of plaintiffs’ judgment order over [...]’s.  R. 1:7-4(a) applies to motions, rather than judgment orders, and, as the hearing on [...]’s Motion to Amend Judgment, provided the basis for its post-verdict reconsideration:  Although I appreciate [...]’s position, I don’t agree.  I think the Court to take the defendant’s position in this case basically vitiates the Joint Tortfeasor Contribution Liability Law which I think I have to read all the laws in --there was a verdict in this case.  It was for more than 60 percent in this particular case or more which by the way triggers that statute which says that the plaintiff can recover the 100 percent of the amount from the 60 percent defendant.  And the defendant obviously has further rights to pursue the contribution from the -- from the other defendants in the case.  That’s for another day.  But in this particular day in reading Moheda [Mejia] which I believe [...] is quoted as saying that I think – I think that’s how the system has to work in order to have make otherwise I have to ignore or not apply the Joint Tortfeasor Contribution Liability Act which is clear I have to.  So that being the case the Court will deny the application to amend the judgement and will file an appropriate order later today.
[directive] Prohibited  Municipal prosecutors—like all prosecutors—must exercise their prosecutorial discretion in COVID-19 related cases as they would in any other matter: on a case-by-case basis.  When exercising their discretion, they must adhere to statutory, constitutional, and ethical restrictions, as well as rules, guidance and case law from the Judiciary.  In addition, they must follow the supervisory instructions of the County Prosecutor and the Attorney General (including this Memorandum).  This means that municipal prosecutors cannot refuse to prosecute cases simply because they are COVID-19 related, or related to the enforcement of the Governor’s Orders.  That would be an inappropriate exercise of prosecutorial discretion.  Also impermissible is a categorical policy or practice of amending COVID-19 related charges to local ordinance violations or dismissing the charges outright.  Unlike most complaints filed in municipal court, COVID-19 related charges are only pursued after a review of available facts by the COVID-19 Prosecutor and with the COVID-19 Prosecutor’s authorization to proceed with the charge.  Indeed, without approval by the COVID-19 Prosecutor, COVID-19 related charges should not be filed.  Categorical policies and practices adopted at the municipal level refusing to enforce these charges will undoubtedly lead to disparate administration of these laws.  II.
[brief] Other weapons, such as brass knuckles and knives were also found among the guns and ammunition.  (5T:103-1 to 25) (emphasis added).  The fact that all of these weapons and ammunition were found in defendant’s vehicle where he fired a handgun that killed a woman is relevant and material evidence to the basic issues of the case.  (6T:65-17 to 21).  More specifically, defendant could have just placed the gun inside a door pocket, the center console, thrown in the backseat or on the floorboards – like the food wrappers and other personal items found inside the vehicle were found.  But, defendant took the time to wrap his guns in a t-shirt and bury them under piles of clothes underneath a liner in a hole within the trunk.  This evidence was very probative to defendant’s knowing and purposeful actions the State was required to prove.
[brief] 32  N.J.S.A. 42:1A-34 ..................................................................................43  9 U.S.C. sec. 5 .......................................................................................24  Rules R. 1:10-2 .................................................................................................16, 17, 20 R. 1:10-2(a) ............................................................................................18 R. 1:10-3 .................................................................................................16, 17, 18, 19, 20 R. 4:42-9 ................................................................................................. 2, 32, 39, 40
[brief] [...]’s reliance on *Ace-Manzo, Inc. v. Twp. of Neptune*, 258 N.J. Super. 129 (Law Div. 1992), is equally unavailing.  There, unlike here, the bidder failed to execute the bid form which contained a provision providing that the bidder would forfeit its bid bond as liquidated damages if the bidder was awarded the contract and failed to execute same.  Thus, non-execution of the bid form gave the bidder an unfair advantage because it could wait until after the bid opening, examine all other bids, and decide whether to sign the bid form or, alternatively, escape the bid without the public entity having recourse against the bid bond as liquidated damages.  *Id.* at 137.  Here, unlike in *Ace-Manzo*, it is undisputed that [...] provided a valid and enforceable bid bond.
[brief] ” (Pa38, 132:3-14).  Even if the Court is inclined to find that some duty was owned by the Township, Plaintiff has failed to establish the next element of negligence, causation.  The water intrusion on Plaintiff’s Property was not caused by any act or omission on the part of the Township.  Plaintiff testified that she was told that the Property upon which the cul-de-sac, and eventually her dwelling, was developed was formerly a farm with a stream running through the property.  (Pa35).  Further, based on testimony of Township employee, [...], the drainage issues on the property were caused by pre-existing conditions of the soil, specifically that it was composed of clay.
[brief] [...]’s reliance on Matter of Protest of Award of On-Line Games Production and Operation Services Contract, Bid No. 95-X-21075, 279 N.J. Super 566 (App. Div. 1995), is entirely misplaced and is illustrative of the flaws in [...]’s arguments.  There, unlike here, the post-bid modification related to representations that were not objectively discernable and could be (and, in fact, were) altered after bid-opening.  Specifically, the Solicitation in that matter required that all bidders supply video lottery machines with displays that were visible from fifteen (15) feet.  Id. at 587.  The low bidder’s initial bid proposed to use a type of machine that was not visible from fifteen (15) feet and, after bids were opened, identified a different machine that was readable at a minimum distance of fifteen (15) feet.  Id. at 597-98.  The court concluded that this post-bid modification was improper because it completely changed the bidder’s pre-bid representations.
[brief] See 5T147 to 5T148; 5T161; 5T208.  The report of the Board Traffic Engineer identified and questioned [...]’s position concerning the ability to secure NJDOT approval for the Route 33 Signal.  It should be clear that the underlying decision by the NJDOT on the issues regarding the Route 33 Signal will not occur until an application is filed.  To date, the Respondents never filed the application to the NJDOT.
[brief] “For an opinion to be admissible under N.J.R.E. 702, the expert must utilize a technique or analysis with ‘a sufficient scientific basis to produce uniform and reasonably reliable results so as to contribute materially to the ascertainment of the truth. ’”  *State v. J.R.*, 227 N.J. 393, 409 (2017) (emphasis added) (quoting *Kelly*, 97 N.J. at 210).  “[O]ne of the criteria under N.J.R.E. 702 for the admissibility of expert testimony is that the testimony be based on reasonably reliable scientific premises. ”  *State v. Raso*, 321 N.J. Super. 5, 17 (App. Div. 1999) (internal quotation marks omitted).  At the time of trial, New Jersey courts assessed the admissibility of evidence under the *Frye* standard, which placed the burden on the proponent of the evidence to clearly establish that the theory or technique has “gained general acceptance in the particular field in which if belongs.
[brief] New Jersey Builders Ass’n v. New Jersey Council on Affordable Housing, 390 N.J. Super. 166, 179 (App. Div. 2007).  [...]’s request did not meet any measure of reasonability, specificity, or clarity.  The scope of the request was so broad, it encompassed any text message sent to any person who was in any way connected with [...] or with the [...] for thirty months.  We submit that this Court should reject the [...]’s claim that “the request contained sufficient information for record identification. ” (Da21).  The only way for specific records to be identified would be to conduct a manual search of all text messages, collating, reviewing, cataloging, and copying every communication on Defendant’s electronic devices to even make the preliminary determination regarding whether any communications are “relating to fire commissioner business, discussions, etc. ”  The request is so broad, the only way to respond to it would be to manually search every single potentially responsive text message and pick out which ones are responsive and which ones are not.  OPRA is “not intended as a research tool litigants may use to force government officials to identify and siphon useful information.
[brief] Unjust enrichment rests on the equitable principle that a person shall not be allowed to enrich himself unjustly at the expense of another.  A plaintiff must show proof that the defendant received a benefit and retention of that benefit without payment would be unjust.  *Iliadis v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.*, 191 N.J. 88, 110 (2007).  Unjust enrichment may arise “outside the usual quasi-contractual setting. ”  *Goldsmith v. Camden Cty. Surrogate’s Office*, 408 N.J. Super. 376, 382 (App. Div. 2009).  A court need not find a contract between plaintiff and defendant to conclude that a party was unjustly enriched.  *See, Insulation Contractor & Supply v. Kravco, Inc.*, 209 N.J. Super. 367, 376 (App. Div. 1986).  As the Supreme Court has explained in the context of an unjust enrichment claim: “equities arise and stem from facts which call for relief from the strict legal effects of given situations. ”  *Thieme v. Aucoin-Thieme*, 227 N.J. 269, 288 (2016).  This is why “cases must ultimately be decided on facts” and “rules of law are not applied in the abstract but must be considered in light of the facts in individual cases. ”  *Hanover Ins. Co. v. Franke*, 75 N.J. Super. 68, 74 (App. Div. 1962); *A.W. v. T.D.*, 433 N.J. Super. 365, 370 (Ch. Div. 2013).  That is what the trial court did here.
[directive] Strict additional requirements must be met before an officer may shoot from a moving vehicle.  Every discharge of a firearm by an officer creates risk to the public and to other responding officers.  Firearms discharges from moving vehicles by law enforcement officers have proven to be inaccurate and ineffective, generally creating unacceptable levels of risk.  Due to these risks, law enforcement officers shall not discharge a firearm from a moving vehicle except in the following extraordinarily rare circumstance: (a) when the suspect is driving a vehicle toward persons other than the officer in a manner creating an imminent threat of death or serious bodily injury, such as in a terrorist attack; and (b) no other means are available at that time to avert or eliminate the danger.
[brief] 2.  **The Trial Court Relied Correctly on Prior Decisions Holding that There is No Private Right of Action**  The trial court did not have the benefit of the Court’s recent decisions discussed above.  Yet, the trial court still decided the question correctly based on ample prior case law that there is no such private right of action.  Likewise, the trial court decided correctly that, because there is no private right of action, Appellant “cannot circumvent the lack of a private cause of action under the NJCFLA by seeking [declaratory and injunctive] relief under the NJUDJL. ”  Statement of Reasons at p. 11 (Pa47), citing *In re Resol. of State Comm’n of Investigation*, 108 N.J. 35, 46 (1987) (dismissing action for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief because there was no express or implied private right of action under the statute); *Excel Pharmacy Servs., LLC. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co.*, 825 F. App’x 65, 70 (3d Cir. 2020) (“But it is well settled that parties cannot bring a declaratory judgment action under a statute when there is no private right of action under that statute”).  Appellant argues that the trial court’s reliance on *In re Resolution* is misplaced.  The Appellate Division’s decisions in *Jefferson Cap. Sys., LLC* and the other three cases decided since May 2024 moot Appellant’s argument.  Nonetheless, as to *In re Resolution*, Appellant mischaracterizes the case.  Contrary to what Appellant argued at p. 14-15 of her Brief, the statute at issue did not explicitly disallow a private right of action.  (Pb14-Pb15).  As in the case at bar, the statute simply did not contain language that would expressly sanction a private right of action.  *In re Resolution*, 108 N.J. 35, at 40-42.  In fact, plaintiffs in that case argued that there was an implicit private right of action even though there is no statutory language that would expressly sanction such an action.  *Id.*  That is identical to what Appellant argues here.  Accordingly, *In re Resolution* is on point, and the trial court’s reliance is appropriate.
[brief] (Da 12-13)  This arrest led to the return of [...] (Ind. #3) charging defendant with: first-degree armed robbery, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1 (Count One); second-degree kidnapping, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:13-1b (Count Two); fourth-degree unlawful possession of a weapon, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5db (Count Three); third-degree possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4d (Count Four)\(^6\); and fourth- --- \(^5\) Count Seven predates the Legislature’s amendment which made this offense a second-degree crime.  See L. 2007, c. 284, sec. 1)  \(^6\) Count Four was amended to a crime of the fourth degree.  (Da 3-4) degree resisting arrest, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:29-2a (Count Five) (Count Seven) (Da 12-13)  On this indictment, defendant elected to be tried to a jury.  (Da 12-13)  On September 30, 2003, defendant was found guilty as charged.  (Da 12-13)  On or about October 3, 2003, the State filed a motion to sentence defendant as a persistent offender pursuant to R. 3:21-4e, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7 and 2C:44-3(a).  (1T 4-7 to 9, 5-17 to 24)  On February 6, 2004, the State’s motion to sentence defendant as a persistent offender was granted (1T 10-17 to 11-22, 41-24 to 42-13) and defendant was sentenced to an extended term of 50 years with an 85% parole bar on Count One (armed robbery).
[brief] Although the interests of judicial economy counsel a “preference for joinder, Rule 3:15-2(b) vests a trial court with discretion to order separate trials if joinder would prejudice unfairly a defendant. ”  State v. Chenique-Puey, 145 N.J. 334, 341 (1996) (citing State v. Oliver, 133 N.J. 141, 150 (1993)).  “The decision whether to sever an indictment rests in the sound discretion of the trial court,” ibid., “is entitled to great deference on appeal. ”  State v. Brown, 118 N.J. 595, 603 (1990) (emphasis added).
[brief] ….  [The] policy appears to undermine [parents’] constitutional rights while it conflicts with knowledgeable medical opinion.  Id. at *18.  The same concerns arise in this case where the trial court’s decision empowers the State to decide what is appropriate for parents to know about their minor children and when it is appropriate for them to know it – in derogation of parents’ Constitutional right to be actively involved in their children’s development and to decide what is best for their children.  As the Supreme Court explained, “Simply because the decision of a parent is not agreeable to a child or because it involves risks does not automatically transfer the power to make that decision from the parents to some agency or officer of the state….  Most children, even in adolescence, simply are not able to make sound judgments concerning many decisions….  Parents can and must make those judgments. ”  *Parham v. J.R.*, 442 U.S. 584, 603 (1979).  The Supreme Court affirmed parental “authority to decide what is best for the child” and that “Neither state officials nor federal courts are equipped to review such parental decisions. ”  *Id.* at 604.  **POINT III**
[brief] APPELLEE’S COUNSEL’S MISCHARACTERIZATION OF APPELLEE’S INJURIES IN SUMMATION REQUIRE A NEW TRIAL (Raised below: 3T44:7-46:14)  In summation, counsel’s comments at closing must be confined to the facts shown or reasonably suggested by the evidence introduced during the course of trial.  *Colucci v. Oppenheim*, 326 N.J. Super. 166, 177 (App. Div. 1999).  When summation commentary transgresses the boundaries of the broad latitude otherwise afforded to counsel, a trial court must grant a party's motion for a new trial if the comments are so prejudicial that it clearly and convincingly appears that there was a miscarriage of justice under the law.
[brief] Both prohibit the adoption of any law impairing the obligation of contract”). defective product\textsuperscript{105} but rather money paid for contaminated water.  The complaint’s claims exist outside the PLA\textsuperscript{106} and dismissal before discovery’s conclusion based on the PLA is premature.\textsuperscript{107}  Another argument frequently used against suits such as the complaint appears to be couched in terms of subsumption and preemption via another statutory scheme purportedly consuming the field of water supply sales, e.g., the Safe Water Drinking Act or the County and Municipal Water Supply Act.
[brief] Further, as additional support for the fact that the location of the settlement in the memo was accurate as originally stated, “emergency paving” records confirm the location of the settlement at the north abutment joint in the left lane.  (Pa1396 and Pa1397).  These emergency paving records specifically identify that emergency paving was performed in the southbound left lane at the north approach to correct settlement and return to proper grade.  (Pa1396 and Pa1397).  After all, as the resident engineer on the project conceded, if the settlement in the southbound north approach at abutment was not causing a problem for the traveling public then it would not have needed to be corrected.  (Pa698 at 100:5-13).  As this Court is aware, although subsequent remedial measures are not admissible to prove negligence, as pointed out earlier, a subsequent remedial measure is admissible to prove, among other things, the existence of a defective condition at a particular point in time.
[brief] To explain, in their brief, the Defendants argue in general terms that the Court’s charge conflated Plaintiff’s causes of action, and potentially created confusion, but offer no citations to, or 5  It bears noting that none of these objections are raised in Defendants brief, so they are not addressed here.  See Db at pp. 21-24 (setting forth Defendants’ arguments concerning allegedly improper charge).  quotations of, the supposedly offending language in the charge.
[brief] Plaintiffs next contend the trial court acted in an arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable manner when she found there was no evidence that even if Defendants called for a C-Section at 9:48pm, it could be accomplished within that 25 to 30 minute period.  [...] correctly noted [...] admitted that to make the calls and prepare the patient, the earliest the delivery would have occurred would have been between 10:05 and 10:10pm, or approximately 17 to 22 minutes earlier than occurred.  (Pa233).  But as previously discussed, [...] correctly found there was zero evidence to support Plaintiffs’ repeated claims that [...] would have started the [...]’ C-Section prior to the one he was engaged in, if only he had been contacted sooner.  (Pa7-Pa8).  Indeed, there was no evidence he would have had the opportunity to do so, let alone that he would have made that decision.  [...] was not wrong to focus on this point in addition to the testimony of the medical experts.
[directive] The investigator should not even suggest to the officer that a polygraph examination would be appropriate or that it "might clear this whole thing up."  However, the subject officer may voluntarily request to take a polygraph examination.  7.7.2  Polygraph tests of civilian complainants and witnesses should only be used when a reasonable suspicion exists that their statements are false.  Polygraph examinations should not be used routinely in internal affairs investigations.  Under no circumstances should polygraph examinations be used to discourage or dissuade complainants.  In addition, a victim of sexual assault cannot be asked or required to submit to a polygraph examination.
[brief] A court can and should rely on extrinsic evidence to identify a possible latent ambiguity (an ambiguity not clear from the four corners of the document).  For example, in *Nelson*, this Court held that the trial court should have considered extrinsic evidence demonstrating that the decedent had a definition of “grandchildren” that was personal to her.  454 N.J. Super. at 164-65.  The Court held that extrinsic evidence can be used to identify such “latent” ambiguities.  *See id.*  But, *Nelson* does not endorse the wholesale redrafting of a trust absent a patent (obvious) ambiguity or extrinsic evidence identifying latent ambiguities.