ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Second, the trial court found that [...] controlled the defendants’ finances.  (36T 30:15-19; 33:6-9; 37:1-3; 37T 79:7-16; 88:21-25).  He moved funds where and when he wanted (including to his and [...]’s joint personal account), to the Plaintiffs’ detriment.  A result that apportions liability severally would penalize the Plaintiffs, who have already suffered as a result of the defendants’ bad faith conduct, by requiring them to chase different groups of defendants for different “pots of money”—an illogical outcome given the trial court’s findings as to the defendants’ conduct and the maze of accounts that the defendants established.  Third, the defendants did not seek an allocation of liability amongst themselves at trial, or assert crossclaims for contribution or indemnification.  Nor did they advocate for several liability in the event the lower court declined to dismiss the Plaintiffs’ claims.  Even still, the defendants are free to pursue contribution claims if, upon collection by the Plaintiffs, some of them believe they paid more than their fair share of the judgment.  Fourth, the Court should reject any invitation to diminish the [...]s’ liability for the conduct in question.  At a minimum, each is individually liable for the entire compensatory award based on their conversion of the funds because:
[brief] Initially, the photograph of the U-boat does not reflect it is “overloaded. ”  The U-boats are designed to have a top shelf for placing products.  Plaintiffs also cannot establish actual notice or how long the allegedly dangerous condition existed prior to the subject incident which should result in summary dismissal of Plaintiffs’ claim – a point which Plaintiffs concede.  There is no evidence in the record establishing that any [...] employee observed [...] pushing the alleged overloaded U-boat, but somehow failed to intervene.
[brief] 2.  [...] tried to convince the court that there was no relationship between her extramarital dalliance and the marriage terminating documents, but the trial court concluded:  The court finds this event was a substantial reason among other reasons set forth herein for defendant to resolve the marital issues by way of the MMA and PSA.  The court finds that defendant knew there was a risk that all the parties’ assets including any marital assets were at risk of being lost or substantially decreased in value if the transfers were found to be fraudulent by the bankruptcy court.  The court finds no credibility to defendant’s reasons proffered as to why she was having what she termed as “sex only” with the third party.  Her testimony that plaintiff requested her to have sex with the third party so defendant could describe to plaintiff the particular sexual activity in which they engaged and to describe the third party’s anatomical features is beyond belief and incredible.  [A229, Op. at. 36 (emphasis added)].
[brief] 27  Powell v. Diehl Woodworking Machinery, Inc., 198 F. Supp.3d 628 (E.D. Va. 2016) ....................  17 R.F. v. Abbott Laboratories, 162 N.J. 596 (2000) .......... 28,29 Ramirez v. Plough, Inc., 863 P.2d 167 (Cal. 1993) ............  9  Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312 (2008)
[directive] Sexual Assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2* Luring or Enticing, N.J.S.A. 2C:13-6  Aggravated Criminal Sexual Contact, Criminal Sexual Contact, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-3b if the N.J.S.A. 2C:14-3a* victim is a minor Kidnapping, N.J.S.A. 2C:13-1c(2)* Criminal Restraint, N.J.S.A. 2C:13-2, if the victim is a minor and the offender is not the parent Kidnapping, N.J.S.A. 2C:13-1, if the victim is a False Imprisonment, N.J.S.A. 2C:13-3 if the victim minor and the offender is not the parent* is a minor and the offender is not the parent Endangering the Welfare of a Child, Promoting Child Prostitution, N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4a
[brief] THE JUDGE PROPERLY DENIED DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS THE INDICTMENT WITH PREJUDICE.  The judge properly exercised her discretion in declining to dismiss the indictment with prejudice for the delayed disclosure of the diagram.  Two requirements must be met to dismiss an indictment with prejudice: (1) the State must have acted willfully, and (2) defendant’s alleged prejudice must be irremediable with a lesser remedy.  Neither of those minimal requirements were met here.  The judge ultimately found that the State did not act wilfully or outrageously.  And, as the judge recognized at the motion-to-dismiss hearing, the diagram had been turned over while the motion was still pending, while the case was still being litigated, and at a point “where [the judge] c[ould] deal with it and fix it[.]” (6T47-13 to 48-6).  For these reasons alone, this Court should affirm the denial of defendant’s motion to dismiss.
[brief] (Pa000864–871).  Each of the Plaintiffs (except Plaintiff [...] and Plaintiff [...], who retired a day earlier) were members of the [...], and represented by the [...], at the time the Unions commenced the First Police Matter.  (Compl. ¶¶ 21, 30, 38, 46, 54, 62, 67, 77, 83, 91, Pa000016–28).  By Order dated May 23, 2017, in a 57-page opinion by the Honorable [...], A.J.S.C. (the “First Police Decision”), the Superior Court upheld the constitutionality of the MSRA, as well as the Director’s right to implement the majority of the collective bargaining agreement modifications at issue.
[brief] Respectfully submitted, [...]  Attorneys for Defendant/Respondent, [...]  By: /s/ [...]  [...], Esq.  Dated: May 28, 2024  [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], and [...], Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. [...], d/b/a [...], d/b/a [...], d/b/a [...], d/b/a [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], d/b/a [...], d/b/a [...], d/b/a [...], [...], [...], d/b/a [...], [...], SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. [...]
[brief] (14T 139-15 to 139-24)  With respect to the letters, [...] adamantly denied that he wrote them, and explained why it was unsurprising that his fingerprints would be on them: he and [...] had joint access to each other’s papers while they were in jail, because all their paperwork was mixed together – something [...] did not deny (10T 234-8 to 234-9; 14T 162-17 to 162-22); one of the letters was written on a piece of discovery that belonged to [...] – something [...] did not deny (11T 229-10 to 229-20; 14T 162-17 to 162-19); [...] handed him the letter that read like a confession and told him to sign it, but he refused and handed it back.
[brief] ”  State v. M.B., 471 N.J. Super. 376, 382-83 (App. Div. 2022) (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Hollander, 201 N.J. Super. 453, 479 (App. Div. 1985)).  The State would contend, firstly, that the thermometer was not exculpatory evidence but at most, simply potentially useful evidence.  The thermometer does not exculpate the defendant from being responsible for the victim’s death; at best, it disputes the time at which the defendant dumped [...]’s body on the roadside.  Defendant all but concedes this, characterizing the evidence merely as “potentially exculpatory evidence.
[brief] Order Denying Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration and Attached Statement of Reasons ........................................Da52 | Cases | Page(s) | |-------------------------------------------|--------------------------| | Branch v. Cream-O-Land Dairy, | 8 | | 244 N.J. 567 | | | Capital Fin. Co. of Del. Valley, Inc. v. Asterbadi, | 9 | | 398 N.J. Super. 299 (App. Div. 2008) | | | Cummings v. Bahr, | 9, 10 | | 295 N.J. Super. 374 (App. Div. 1996) | | | Customers Bank v. Reitnour Inv. Props., LP, | 13 | | 453 N.J. Super. 338 (App. Div. 2018) | | | Hayes v. Turnersville Chrysler Jeep, | 13 | | 453 N.J. Super. 309 (App. Div. 2018) | | | Hinton v. Meyers, | 8 | | 416 N.J. Super. 141 (App. Div. 2010) | | | Hoover v. Wetzler, | 8 | | 472 N.J. Super. 230 (App. Div. 2022) | | | Iliadis v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., | 10 | | 191 N.J. 88 (2007) | | | In re Belleville Educ. Ass’n, | 9 | | 455 N.J. Super. 387 (App. Div. 2018) | | TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CONTINUED Jatczyszyn v. Marcal Paper Mills, Inc., 422 N.J. Super. 123 (App. Div. 2011) .........................................................16 Kornbleuth v. Westover, 241 N.J. 289 (2020) .....................................................................................8 Pitney Bowes Bank v. ABC Caging, 440 N.J. Super. 378 (App. Div. 2015) ............................................................8 U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass’n v. Guillaume, 209 N.J. 449 (2012)
[brief] Camreta v. Greene, 563 U.S. 692, 709 n.7 (2011) (“A decision of a federal district court judge is not binding precedent in either a different judicial district, the same judicial district, or even upon the same judge in a different case. ” (citation omitted)).  Furthermore, the Federal Rules contain no requirement for a “relevance log,” and [...]’s decision ordering such a log in Russell is distinguishable from the facts here.
[brief] Id.; see also, Feliciano v. Faldetta, 434 N.J. Super. 543, 549, 85 A.3d 1006, 1009 (App. Div. 2014).  Defendant does not view the unsuccessful motion to dismiss the initial Fraud cause of action as baseless.  Defendant’s September 2, 2020 motion selectively sought to dismiss only one (1) of the then six (6) causes of action (as the Complaint was later amended to include thirteen (13) causes of action), which was fraud.  There, Defendant asserted fraud had not been plead with specificity required of Rule 4:5–8(a).  Said motion was not successful, but it was also not frivolous and made in good faith believing Count Three (fraud) of Plaintiff’s initial Complaint was insufficiently pled as a matter of law.  The fees relating to discovery should also be deemed recoverable.  Plaintiff engaged in extensive discovery, deposing [...] for approximately 7.5 hours, producing thousands of documents, propounding eighty-five (85) (plus the sub-parts) interrogatories in his first set of interrogatories, followed by supplemental requests and numerous requests for documents and multiple subpoenas to third-parties, including to numerous banks (even those relative to Defendant’s husband and an account for an unrelated business formed during the pendency of the litigation), to a credit card processing company, to CVS, to the accountant for the LLC, all producing an additional and substantial amount of documentation as well as the creation of a consent protective order after Defendant sought to quash certain (not all) of the numerous third-party subpoenas.  As such, the Court should not reduce the fee award by the amounts suggested (for Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss the Fraud Count, for discovery efforts, and for the motion opposing Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend the Complaint).
[brief] STANDARD OF REVIEW  At primary issue during this appeal is an Order dismissing Plaintiff’s Complaint on summary judgment.  Appellate review of a Motion for Summary Judgment is *de novo*.  *Coyne v. N.J. Dep't of Transp.*, 182 N.J. 481, 491, 867 A.2d 1159 (2005).  New Jersey Court Rule 4:46-2(c) states, in pertinent part, that a motion for summary judgment should be granted when:
[brief] The proposed Project is also not a “stranded asset. ”\(^{22}\) (Ab53).  Even as the State pursues EMP’s goals of reduced emissions and the electrification of buildings, the Project remains necessary as it reduces pressure between the transmission and distribution lines and increases the reliability of the existing natural gas distribution system, consistent with EMP’s goals.  (Ra4; Aa71; Aa837); see also (Aa490) (describing EMP Goal 5.4, which aims to “[m]aintain existing gas pipeline system reliability and safety”).  Additionally, [...] and the [...] recognized that the Project will have a useful life of at least twenty years and will operate into the foreseeable future.
[brief] Ketcherick v. Borough of Mountain Lakes Bd. of Adj., 256 N.J. Super. 647, 655 (App. Div. 1992) (internal citations omitted).  Courts have also found that laches and estoppel are not acceptable defenses to the failure of a municipality to enforce its zoning ordinance, “except in the clearest and most compelling circumstances. ”  Universal Holding Co. v. N. Bergen, 55 N.J. Super. 103, 111 (App. Div. 1959).  “[A] property owner may not, by unilateral action, ‘secure a valid nonconforming use based on a violation of the zoning ordinance. ’  No estoppel may arise against a municipality in such a case ‘by reason of reliance on the part of the property owner or of acquiescence and laches by the municipality. ’”  Twp. of Fairfield v. Likanchuk's, Inc., 274 N.J. Super. 320, 331-332 (App. Div. 1994) (internal citations omitted).
[brief] Here, even assuming for the sake of argument that Allowance Offset was not automatic and mandatory under the Lease, there is no dispute that at the very least the Allowance Offset was available to the Landlord in its discretion.  And if it was available why not take advantage?  Had Landlord simply taken the reasonable step of deducting the rent owed from Tenant’s Allowance in August 2020 as the Lease permitted, by exercising that simple step Landlord would have instantly mitigated all of Landlord’s damages in total without any additional cost or burden.  Any short-term costs borne the Landlord from the delinquent rent would have been washed away 1:1 within year’s end by virtue of the setoff.  If only both parties were loyal to the Lease’s simple and efficient built-in reconciliation mechanism, everyone would have been made whole by September 1, 2020, the day the Gym Closure ended.
[brief] Rather, the State argues that, even though the jury did not receive the Third-Party Guilt model charge, it was nonetheless adequately instructed by the trial court’s generic instructions.  Specifically, the State argues that the jury received all the guidance it needed for third-party guilt when the court instructed them that the “burden of proving the identity of the person who committed the crime is upon the State” and that the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that [...] “is the person who committed” the crime.  (Sb27-28)  In support of this argument, the State cites to State v. Cotto, where the Supreme Court held that although a jury was not provided with the model jury charge on “identification” they nonetheless had received sufficient instruction through the court’s generic jury instructions.  182 N.J. 316, 326-27 (2005).  (Sb26)  Specifically, the omitted model jury charge and the given generic instructions both “emphasize[d] the same common denominator: the State bears the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is the wrongdoer. ”
[brief] As previously stated, the calculation of [...]’s equity was based upon the average of (i) the $47,727 purchase price of the Unit, combined with $76,900 in capital improvements to the Unit, adjusted for inflation over a twenty-four (24) year period (1993-2017); and (ii) [...]’s unequalized assessment of the Unit.  It was not at all based upon any appraised market value of the Unit, as erroneously stated by [...], although [...] presented an unrebutted appraisal to the Board that the Unit, accounting for [...]’s protected status, had an appraised value of $622,500.  Although not used to calculate [...]’s equity, the appraisal underscored that [...]’s equity was substantially less than the appraised value.
[brief] Da014 at Da015-16.  In anticipation of trial, Respondent noticed and completed the *de bene esse* depositions of [...] (2T: 75:22 – 144:04)⁹ on August 10, 2023, [...] (1T: 75:24 – 129:25) on August 15, 2023 and [...] (2T: 146:05 – 184:05) on August 16, 2023.  Dr. Shah explicitly opined as to his opinion regarding Aggravation, without objection.  (T2: 163:18 – 164:03, 164:19 – 166:14).  A Pre-Trial Conference was held before the [...], J.S.C., on August 18, 2023; in anticipation of Trial to commence August 21, 2023.
[brief] The NJCLA’s espoused goal was to “prohibit[] deceptive lending practices generally, N.J.S.A. 17:10-13 (replaced by N.J.S.A. 17:11C-20). ”  \textit{Lemelledo v. Benefit Mgmt. Corp.}, 150 N.J. 255, 271 (1997).  “If a violation of the CLA [was] proven, the typical remedy, obtainable by the [...] or \textit{by individual consumers, is voiding of the contract},” though the NJCLA also provided for awards of damages to aggrieved consumers.  \textit{Lemelledo}, 150 N.J. at 272 (emphasis added).  \textsuperscript{4}  “[T]he Small Loan Law was intended to and does afford to the Commissioner power to limit the number of licenses in a community. ”  \textit{Gough}, 10 N.J. Super. at 21.  Between 1962 and 1983, the NJCLA was amended seven times—many of the amendments added mortgage-based provisions, such as the Secondary Mortgage Loan Act of 1970.  “On January 8, 1997, the Governor signed the New Jersey Licensed Lenders Act, which combines the [NJ]CLA with two mortgage-related statutes.\(^5\) L. 1996, c. 157 (codified at N.J.S.A. 17:11C-1 to -49).
[brief] ”  Mass. Mutual Ins. Co. v. Manzo, 122 N.J. 104, 115 (1991); see also Longobardi v. Chubb Ins. Co. of N.J., 121 N.J. 530, 542 (1990) (finding that a misrepresentation is material if, when made, “a reasonable insurer would have considered the misrepresented fact relevant to its concerns and important in determining its course of action”).  To establish a claim for rescission based on material misrepresentations in a policy application, an insurer needs to prove equitable fraud, but not legal fraud.  See Ledley, 138 N.J. 627, 635.  To find equitable fraud, “[u]nlike legal fraud, there need not be proof that the statement was made with knowledge that it was false. ”  Liebling v. Garden State Indem., 337 N.J. Super. 447, 453 (App. Div. 2001) (citing Jewish Center of Sussex Cty. v. Whale, 86 N.J. 619, 624 (1981)).
[brief] WP8a, WP10a, WP12a, WP14a.  On October 27, 2020, Plaintiffs-Appellants submitted a reply requesting that the pending motions be stayed.  WP15a.  The trial court seemingly granted the stay on the pending motions because no activity occurred on the case thereafter.  Then, by way of letter dated May 31, 2022, Plaintiffs requested a case management conference to discuss a supplemental briefing schedule in light of the Appellate Division’s decision in the Norman Towers Appeal, which was decided on the same date.  WP32a.  On August 4, 2022, the Court issued a Supplemental Case Management Order permitting the parties to file supplemental materials.  Pa77.  Oral argument on the pending motions was conducted on April 27, 2023.  On the same date, the Court issued orders granting the Motions to Dismiss and denying the Motion to Designate Trial Counsel.  Pa80, Pa82, Pa84, Pa86, Pa88.  On May 10, 2023, Plaintiffs-Appellants filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied by way of Order dated July 10, 2023.  Pa480, Pa89.
[brief] ”  *Id.* at 497.  Our Supreme Court has explained “[t]he knock-and-announce rule renders unlawful a forcible entry to arrest or search ‘where the officer failed first to state his authority and purpose for demanding admission. ’”  *State v. Robinson*, 200 N.J. 1, 13-14, (2009) (quoting Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 308 (1958)).  “A necessary corollary of the knock-and-announce rule is that when ‘the police announce . . . their presence and [are] greeted with silence . . . a reasonable time must elapse between the announcement and the officer's forced entry. ’”  Id. at 16 (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Johnson, 168 N.J. 608, 621(2001)).  This Court has held that the “exclusionary rule bars the admission of evidence seized following an unreasonable entry into a dwelling in violation of a knock-and-announce requirement contained in a search warrant.
[brief] ”  Dzwonar, 177 N.J. at 462.  Whether a plaintiff’s belief is reasonable is evaluated using an objective standard.  Id. at 464.  A threshold requirement then, is the identification of a statute, regulation, rule, or public policy that relates closely to a plaintiff’s complained-of conduct.  Chiofalo v. State, 238 N.J. 527, 541 (2019).  “[W]hen no such law or policy is forthcoming, ’ judgment can and should be entered for the defendant. ”  Id. at 541-42 (quoting Dzwonar, 177 N.J. at 463).  In determining whether a plaintiff’s belief is a reasonable one, courts analyze whether a substantial nexus exists between the complained-of conduct and the law or public policy that plaintiff believes that the conduct violates.  *Tegler v. Global Spectrum*, 291 F. Supp. 3d 565, 580 (D.N.J. 2018).  Without a substantial nexus between the plaintiff’s complained-of conduct and any identified law or public policy, summary judgment must be granted.
[brief] See Da96-124 at 13:9-11, 19:15-18; and 125-157 at 31:17-33:24.  Plaintiff even admits that he had an issue with his paperwork being delinquent, because when asked whether he had an issue with completing the medical records, Plaintiff stated “I'm sure.  I had times I was delayed with my paperwork due to the -- I mean, I had a busy schedule at the hospital.  Uh, with all the jobs that I had to do.  So yes, I was behind. ”  See Da58-95 at 58:20-59:4 (emphasis added).  Plaintiff was routinely given notice that his records were delinquent.  See Da96-124 at 34:2-5;¹¹ and 125-157 at 34:6-35:10.¹²  Every year he was working for [...], Plaintiff failed to meet his contractual obligations of timely completing his patient records, as well as failing to properly supervise his direct reports to timely complete their patient records.  See Da133-134 at 31:1-35:25.  Plaintiff was aware that his habitual failure to comply with his contractual obligations contributed to substantial financial damages to [...].
[brief] For the reasons stated above, and for the reasons stated in Appellant’s merits brief, Appellant respectfully requests that this Court reverse the decision of the Law Division, vacating the judgment of conviction entered by the Law Division against Appellant for driving while intoxicated under N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.  In the alternative, Appellant respectfully requests that this Court remand for re-sentencing consistent with the version of N.J.S.A. 39:4-50 in effect at the time of Appellant arrest and Appellant’s indigence.
[brief] C.  [...]  Had the Authority to Review Appellant’s Proposed Loading Operations Without Rulemaking.  (Aa236-45).  Appellant’s rulemaking argument is a red herring.  (See Ab25-29).  Appellant focuses on a single statement in the Hearing Officer’s Report regarding the Authority’s “established practice” of “reviewing loading operations for all cannabis operations within the Tourism District” (Aa244) and argues that the Authority was required to undertake rulemaking regarding loading.  Appellant, however, ignores the fact that the Hearing Officer acknowledged that the Authority’s land development regulations do not require a loading area for Appellant’s application.  Id.  Accordingly, this appeal does not turn on whether a loading area was required, but instead on the Authority’s sound determination that Appellant’s application created an unsafe and inefficient condition related to on-site access and circulation and the potential for vehicular and pedestrian safety hazards under Dunkin’ Donuts and related case law.  (Aa236-45).  As discussed more fully supra, the Authority’s consideration of these on-site impacts was in its discretion and its decision to deny Appellant’s application based on these factors is well supported by the record.  II.
[brief] Faustin v. Lewis, 85 N.J. 507, 511, 427 A.2d 1105 (1981).  The equitable maxim "[a party] who comes into equity must be with clean hands" has limitations: It does not repel all sinners from courts of equity, nor does it apply to every unconscientious act or inequitable conduct on the part of the complainants.  The inequity which deprives a suitor of a right to justice in a court of equity is not general iniquitous conduct unconnected with the act of the defendant which the complaining party states as his ground or cause of action; but it must be evil practice or wrong conduct in the particular matter or transaction in respect to which judicial protection or redress is sought.