ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] A GUIDELINES FOR POTENTIAL LIABILITY WARNING - N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.22 (Rev. 2-20-2004)  FORM  POTENTIAL LIABILITY WARNING - N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.22 (Rev. 2-20-2004)  FORM  Pursuant to Attorney General Law Enforcement Directive No. 2004-1, and under the provisions of N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.22, the content and form, in American English, and in an official Spanish translation from American English, of the written statement and acknowledgment of receipt of the written statement of potential criminal and civil liability for permitting or facilitating the arrestee's operation of a motor vehicle while the arrestee remains intoxicated, hereafter referred to as the “POTENTIAL LIABILITY WARNING - N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.22 (Rev. 2- 20-2004) Form,” are found on the last pages of this Appendix.
[brief] Parties cannot conduct a do-over of recently decided motions each time there is a change in judicial assignment.  To the contrary, such practice is strongly disfavored under New Jersey law.  See Lewis, 237 N.J. Super. at 422; Brach, 345 N.J. Super. at 14; Cineas, 270 N.J. Super. at 208.  By simply repeating the same arguments and authorities, Defendants failed to satisfy the “interest of justice” standard under Rule 4:42-2(b).  E.g., Lawson, 468 N.J. Super. at 136 (warning against repetitious motions to reconsider, or attempts to take advantage of a change in judge); Lombardi v. Masso, 207 N.J. 517, 537 n.6 (2011) (disapproving of repetitive motions for reconsideration); Wolf v. Edison Props., No. [...], 2019 WL 2396994, at *1–2 (N.J. Super. L, Middlesex Cnty. Jan. 28, 2019) (rehash of prior arguments and disagreement with court’s decision not a basis for reconsideration and cannot establish that the “interest of justice” requires reversal).
[brief] COUNTERSTATEMENT OF FACTS  For purposes of this brief, the State will rely upon and incorporate by reference the facts delineated in the Appellate Division’s per curiam opinion of the defendant’s direct appeal of his conviction and sentence.  Da37-61.  On December 8, 2011, [...] opened the [...] store located on Route 1 South in Edison.  According to Soni, shortly after opening, two men entered the store.  Soni described one man as “mixed Spanish African American” and of a lighter complexion, and the other man as African American and of a darker complexion.  Soni stated one of the men sat in a chair and asked Soni to help him find the cheapest cell phone because he had lost his.  Soni stated he attempted to look up the man’s cell phone number, but could not find the account.  Then, the other man “took out a gun ... [h]ad it up to his chest and told [Soni] ‘You know what it is? Go to the back. ’”  The man with the gun instructed Soni to go to the back room of the store and ordered him to lay face down on the ground.  Soni testified the men asked him where the cash and tablets were, and Soni pointed at the safe where there was approximately $1300 in cash.  Soni testified: [then the third person came in and they just started filling up bags with the phones that were in here, and prepaid cards.  Whatever they could find, they were just filling up.  They also asked me where are the bags.  And I told them the [...] shopping bags are in the front of the store.  So they grabbed some of those bags, which ... I could just see from the corner of my eye they were putting phones in there.  I had a brown bag, which I had some food[ ] from the day before.  They emptied that out, put the phones in there, and then they also ... grabbed ... garbage bags and they started putting phones in there too.  In total, the men stole approximately $40,000 worth of merchandise and prepaid cards.  The robbery was captured on videotape and played for the jury.
[brief] ”  [Pb14]  Notably, [...] did not rescind the Policies as to any “Innocent Insureds” and no “Innocent Insureds” have submitted a claim for coverage or been denied a claim for coverage under the Policies.  As discussed, [...] only rescinded the Policies as to [...] and [...] based on their material misrepresentations in the Applications.  Not surprisingly therefore, the “Innocent Insureds” have not appealed the trial court’s dismissal of their claims against [...].
[brief] Cadre v. Proassurance Cas. Co., 468 N.J. Super. 246, 257 (App. Div. 2021), cert. denied, 249 N.J. 338 (2021), reconsideration denied, 250 N.J. 99 (2022) (“We owe no deference to the motion judge’s legal analysis or interpretation of a statute.  Similarly, we review legal determinations based on an interpretation of our court rules de novo. ”)  Thus, much like a trial court’s interpretation of a statute, the trial court’s interpretation of the Court Rules and other similar legal standards is not entitled to deference.  Occhifinto, 221 N.J. 443, 453 (“[a]s an interpretation of law the trial court’s judgment is not entitled to deference; we review legal determinations based on an interpretation of our court rules de novo”).  Here, the trial court accepted [...]’s argument that it is a “successful claimant” despite the fact that [...] did not prevail on virtually every substantive issue it raised before the trial court.  In doing so, the trial court interpreted the “successful claimant” requirement under R. 4:42-9(a)(6) to require that a party only nominally succeed on the merits of its claim, despite its failure to obtain the benefit it sought when filing the litigation.  Cf. Occhifinto, 221 N.J. 443, 450.  This Court should reject the trial court’s interpretation of what it means to be a “successful claimant”, especially in light of the unique facts present in this case.  B.
[brief] Written Decision, dated April 5, 2023 ........................................Pa72  Final Order, dated April 10, 2023 ...........................................Pa102  Order  Dismissing Plaintiff’s Complaint with Prejudice, dated October 27, 2023 ........................................Pa104  ###  TABLE OF CITATIONS  ####  Cases - **Anastasio v. Planning Bd. of Tp. of West Orange**, 209 N.J. Super. 499, 522 (App. Div.), cert. denied 107 N.J. 46 (1986)  .........................................................  16 - **Cell S. of N.J., Inc. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment**, 172 N.J. 75, 89 (2002)  ...........................................................................  17, 18 - **Grasso v. Borough of Spring Lake Heights**, 375 N.J. Super. 41, 48-49 (App. Div. 2004) ...........................................  18, 20 - **Grubbs v. Slothower**, 389 N.J. Super. 377, 388 (App. Div. 2007) ............................................................................. 19, 20, 22, 28, 29, 30, 31 - **Medici v. BPR Co.**, 107 N.J. 1 (1987) .................................................. 19, 20 - **Rowatti v. Gonchar**, 101 N.J. 1, 50-51 (1985) ........................................ 17 - **Ten Stary Dom Ptp. v. Mauro**, 216 N.J. 16, 30 (2013) ....................... 32, 33 #### Statutes - **N.J.S.A. 40:55D-2** ............................................................................ 20, 23, 25, 33 - **N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70(c)(2)** .................................................................. 32 - **N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70(d)(5)** .................................................................. 3, 17, 19 APPELLANT’S APPENDIX TABLE OF CONTENTS Resolution of Denial (2022-23) by the [...], dated April 28, 2022 .........................Pa1 Amended Resolution of Denial (2023-37) by the [...], dated June 8, 2023 ..Pa16
[brief] “Generally, a decision to vacate a default judgment lies within the sound discretion of the trial court guided by principles of equity”  *Coryell, L. L.C. v. Curry*, 391 N.J.Super. 72, 79 (App. Div. 2006).  To grant or deny a motion to vacate judgment will be left undisturbed unless it represents a clear abuse of discretion.  *Housing Authority of the Town of Morristown*, supra, at 298.  The decision to vacate and allow Defendant to redeem is an exercise within the delegated authority of a trial judge ’s equitable powers.
[brief] (20T 168-23 to 184-20)  Instead, those duties were solely the subject of testimony from fact witnesses.  While the jurors are told, as here, that they must follow the legal instructions in the jury charge (20T 154-3 to 4), and they are presumed to do so, *State v. Savage*, 172 N.J. 374, 394 (2002), they are also told that the jurors are the exclusive judges of the credibility of factual witnesses (20T 158-1 to 9), and they have full rein to believe or disbelieve those witnesses as they see fit.  *Ernst*, 32 N.J. at 583.  Thus, this jury made findings on an element -- whether defendant violated the legal duties of a trooper -- without ever having received a legal explanation of the scope of those duties from the judge.  Those duties were not a factual matter, and factual witnesses could not explain their scope to the jury; only the judge could do that.  Such a verdict cannot stand, under *Grimes*, *Brady*, --- 11
[brief] *Skeete*, 184 N.J. at 9.  See, *Morrison v. American Intern. Ins. Co.*, 381 N.J. Super. 532, 542 (App.Div.2005) (proper "placement" of notice also necessary).  In this case, as a matter of law, [...]’s affirmative decision to provide no notice whatsoever ran afoul of this venerable principle that requires insurers to provide notice of coverage changes.
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY DISQUALIFYING BALLOTS BECAUSE OF LATE POSTMARKS DESPITE BEING TIMELY MAILED ON A HOLIDAY WEEKEND (2T54:11-55:18)  The trial court further erred by disallowing the ballots of Marci and [...] and [...].  All three individuals mailed their mail-in ballots prior to 8:00 p.m. on Election Day, and the fact that it was postmarked and received late is not their fault but simply a fluke of the election calendar.  Even though the trial court refused to count their ballots, it agreed that all three were credible witnesses and that “they did mail [their ballots] on Election Day or before. ” (2T76:16-21).  Because Election Day was held on the Saturday of a holiday weekend, it was not possible for the USPS to timely postmark the ballots.  Instead, it did so immediately upon opening the following Tuesday and promptly delivered the ballots to the Board.  Had the USPS not postmarked the ballots at all, they would have been counted.  It is fundamentally unfair to the voters to disenfranchise them for that reason.  11.
[brief] 1T43:9 and 15.  Despite having elicited this testimony, defense counsel still contended that evidence related to the 9-1-1 call was inadmissible hearsay.  1T43:22-44:13.  [...] agreed.  1T43:18-21.  [...] agreed that two seconds elapsed on the video (9:24:19 – 9:24:21) between the time when the squad car came to a stop and when he wrapped his arms around Defendant.
[brief] [...] testified that GPS location data from [...]’s phone reflected that his phone was at the following locations: [...] at 12:51 a.m.; [...] from 1:34 to 1:41 a.m.; [...] at 1:41 a.m.; [...] at 1:54 a.m.; [...] at 2:48 a.m.; [...] at 2:58 a.m.; and [...] at 3:09 a.m.  (12T129-3 to 130-15; 12T133-1 to 135-7; 12T100-12 to 101-11).  Similarly, [...] testified that GPS location data from [...]’s phone reflected that the phone was at the following locations: [...] between 12:45 and 1:08 a.m.; 61 [...] between 1:33 ¹ [...] retains the abbreviations and transcript designations used in his previous briefs.  ²  After being qualified as an expert in these fields, [...] testified about the historical cell site analysis and the maps he created regarding the approximate location of [...]’s cellphone, as discussed in Point II of [...]’s opening brief. and 1:42 a.m., and 61 [...] between 1:55 a.m. to 7:07 a.m. (12T149-23 to 153-21).  [...] also testified that two “activity screens” from [...]’s cellphone showed that he walked 122 steps around 3:09 a.m., the approximate time that the surveillance video captured two unidentifiable individuals exit the Durango and enter [...]’s grandmother’s home.  (12T135-12 to 20).  [...] further testified that there was no activity on [...]’s phone from 3:09 a.m. to 3:19 a.m., which was “indicative of the phone being laid down and not moved for a period of time.
[brief] [...], Esquire, and [...]..........................................................................................................1095a  1/30/2019  Statement of Undisputed Material Facts in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment of Defendants, [...], Esquire and [...]................................................................1097a  1/30/2019  Affidavit of [...], Esquire, in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment of Defendants, [...], Esquire and Cooper Levenson, April, Niedelman & Wagenheim........................................................................1100a  Exhibit A, 12/21/2012  Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint...................(omitted, see 1a)  Exhibit B, 1/30/2013  Answer and Separate Defenses of Defendants [...], Esquire, and Cooper Levenson, April, Niedelman & Wagenheim, P.A...........................................................................................................(omitted, see 18a)  Exhibit C, 3/28/2012  [...] Deposition Excerpts ............(omitted, see 1020a)  1/30/2019  Defendants [...]’ and [...]’s Notice of Motion for Summary Judgment..................................................................................1102a
[brief] **  On May 8, 2024, Plaintiffs moved to enter default judgment against Defendants.  Da10, ¶31.  On May 28, 2024, Defendants cross-moved to reinstate their answers, which Plaintiffs opposed on June 3, 2024.  Da10, ¶ 32.  Notably, Defendants motion to reinstate their respective answers did not state what they had done since the trial court denied [...]’s motion to reinstate her answer on March 6.  Instead, Defendants merely asserted that their responses to Plaintiffs’ discovery in connection ---  5  In the June 12 Orders, [...] noted that [...] was already in default and, as such, the motion is denied as moot only this respect to the [...].  Da5. with that previous motion were sufficient to have had their answer restored.  See Da91-109.  The trial court, now under the auspices of [...], held oral argument on Defendants’ motion on June 12, 2024.
[brief] Here, the Board’s determination was reasonable and complied with the governing statute.  The unambiguous language of the Ricci Act provides:  A member or retiree shall not be eligible for the presumption or recalculation under this subsection unless within two years of the effective date of this act, P.L.2019, c.157, the member or retiree files a written and sworn statement with the retirement system on a form provided by the board of trustees thereof indicating the dates and locations of service.
[brief] During this time, although Estranged Wife had zero involvement in the [...], Estranged Wife still received medical benefits through their marriage.  Neither [...] nor the [...] received anything in return.  Estranged Wife sought to formally end the marriage and filed a divorce action in the Camden County Superior Court on February 11, 2020 (Docket No. [...]).  [...]’s only opposition during the course of this action was during multiple attempts by Estranged Wife to obtain financial relief through pendente lite motions, with the most recent motion being filed with the court on February 11, 2020.  These motions were filed by lawyers who charge approximately $400.00 per hour and Estranged Wife expected [...] to pay for such legal fees as part of the relief sought in said pendente lite motions.  Plainly stated, Estranged Wife desired to end the marriage with [...] through divorce.  Plainly stated, [...] desired to end the marriage with [...] through divorce.
[brief] ............... 36 Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm., 140 N.J. 366, 392 (1995) ............. 51 Manchester Township Bd. of Education v. Thomas P. Carney, Inc., 199 N.J. Super. 266, 274-275 (App. Div. 1985) ......................... 47 Mandell v. Reeve, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 114804, *12-13, 2011 WL 4585248 (S.D.N.Y.) ..................................................  43  Maul v. Kirkman, 270 N.J.Super. 596, 614, 637 A.2d 928 (App.Div.1994) ..............................................................  14  McGuire v. Jersey City, 125 N.J. 310, 326 (1991) .................................  13  Minkowitz v. Israeli, 433 N.J. Super. 111, 133, (App. Div. 2013) ...............
[brief] (2T 9-2 to 10-3).  N.J.S.A. 39:4-129 (d) states:  The driver of any vehicle which knowingly collides with or is knowingly involved in an accident with any vehicle or other property which is unattended resulting in any damage to such vehicle or other property shall immediately stop and shall then and there locate and notify the operator or owner of such vehicle or other property of the name and address of the driver and owner of the vehicle striking the unattended vehicle or other property or, in the event an unattended vehicle is struck and the driver or owner thereof cannot be immediately located, shall attach securely in a conspicuous place in or on such vehicle a written notice giving the name and address of the driver and owner of the vehicle doing the striking or, in the event other property is struck and the owner thereof cannot be immediately located, shall notify the nearest office of the local police department or of the county police of the county or of the State Police and in addition shall notify the owner of the property as soon as the owner can be identified and located.  Any person who violates this subsection shall be punished as provided in subsection (b) of this section.  In *State v. Feintuch*, 150 N.J. Super. 414 (App. Div. 1977), this Court held that the purpose of the leaving the scene of an accident statute is “to prohibit the automobile driver involved in an accident from evading his responsibilities by escaping or departing before his identity is made known.
[brief] (Ra59)  Since then, counsel have exchanged correspondence over nine proposed substitute arbitrators and have been unable to come to an agreement over who can arbitrate the remaining issues of damages and legal fees.  On October 6, 2023, Plaintiff filed a Verified Complaint and Order to Show Cause as to why the Court should not appoint a substitute arbitrator and the Order to Show Cause hearing was set for November 30, 2023.  (1a)  On November 1, 2023, Defendant filed a Motion to stay proceedings until money was paid into the Superior Court Trust Fund pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A: 15-67 (13a) and on December 19, 2023, an Order was entered permitting Plaintiff to deposit $200 into the Superior Court Trust Fund.(56a)  On February 12, 2024 the Court entered an Order and Memorandum of Decision to Appoint Arbitrator.
[brief] In any event, the statute requires that, in any landlord-tenant proceeding, if Landlord cannot show the right to possession of the premises under the Lease and other evidence, “the cause shall be dismissed. ”  N.J.S.A. 2A:18-52.  Therefore, under the statute, because the trial judge has jurisdiction to dismiss based on the failure to present proof within the Lease, the trial judge necessarily also had jurisdiction to read the entire Lease to determine whether it supported Landlord’s claim.  The trial court’s holding to the contrary was inconsistent with the statute, with Rule 6:1-2(a)(3), and with due process.
[brief] B.  [...]’s decision improperly found that the Defendant cannot be vicariously liable in this case (2TR45:20-46:3)  In his decision to deny the Plaintiffs’ motion, [...] ultimately found that the Defendant cannot be vicariously liable in this case based upon the opinion that they did not employ any of the medical providers at issue and the care and treatment did not occur at their facility.  Specifically, [...] relied upon the holding in Moschella v. Hackensack Meridian Jersey Shore Univ. Med. Ctr., 258 N.J. 110 (2024) which states that: “[t]o establish vicarious liability, a plaintiff must demonstrate an employment relationship and that the alleged tort occurred in the scope of that employment. ”
[brief] *Cypress Point*, 226 N.J. at 415 (“[w]hen the terms of an insurance contract are clear, it is the function of a court to enforce it as written and not to make a better contract for either of the parties”) (citations omitted).  [...] relies in its Opposition Brief, as it did at trial, extensively on the testimony of its medical expert, [...].  Pb15-22.  [...] could (and should) have presented this testimony in the underlying case.
[brief] SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION  DOCKET NO.: [...]  [...]  PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS BLOCK 270, LOT 14; [...], [...]; STATE OF NEW JERSEY; ASSESSED TO [...], [...] and [...], DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS, [...], INTERVENOR-APPELLEE :CIVIL ACTION :ON APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT OF :SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY :CHANCERY DIVISION :ESSEX COUNTY :Docket No. [...] :SAT BELOW :HON.
[brief] St Barnabas Medica Center v. County of Essex, 111 N.J. 67.  (1988).  Taxpayers are responsible for a County’s negligent [or reckless] conduct that causes injuries to inmates.  St Barnabas Medica Center v. County of Essex, 111 N.J. 67 n3.  Here, defendants’ failure to provide plaintiff with her psychiatric medication for six (6) days without consideration of the consequences causing severe emotional distress is failure to provide medical care (prescribed treatment) and constitutes deliberate indifference or recklessness.  The defendants recklessly failed to exercise the high degree of care required for the plaintiff over whom they maintained control.
[brief] Transcript of Proceedings  [...] Monmouth County March 8, 2022 (1T) and April 13, 2022 (2T)  Honorable [...], J.M.C reset discovery see March 8, 2024 (1T) transcript referenced below.  As of this date I never received complete discovery……………………………2T page3, line 19-20 and out of sequence 2T page6 lines 13-20  Subsequently, on page 3 of the April 13, 2022 transcript (lines 22-24), I was crying and Your Honor stated, “You Know what I could do, just ask you to escort her over to the Centra State for an evaluation”.
[brief] There is nothing unconstitutional about calculating State aid based on the assumption that a district will contribute its proportionate local share.  [...] simply objects to that constitutionally-sound obligation.  But it does not dispute the State’s calculation of its LFS; it does not dispute the State’s calculation of equalization aid; and it does not deny that the City’s property and income wealth has dramatically increased over the last decade-plus, which has led to an increase in the District’s local obligations.  Moreover, the tools the Legislature provided to [...] to offset any decrease in State aid while it raised its local tax levy have worked.  A.  There Is No Constitutional Mandate That the State Fully Fund an Adequacy Budget.
[brief] Affordable housing is not built overnight.  But the groundwork for building such housing—and for enforcing the Mount Laurel obligation more generally—follows a methodical process so that affordable homes are actually built.  The Supreme Court in *Mount Laurel II* set forth the consequences of allowing towns to evade their *Mount Laurel* obligations: “unless a strong judicial hand is used, *Mount Laurel* will not result in housing, but in paper, process, witnesses, trials and appeals” (92 N.J. at 199).  Each step along the process plays a critical role in ensuring that affordable housing actually gets created, and that each municipality in the state of New Jersey provides a realistic development opportunity for its fair share of affordable housing in accordance with the original principles set forth in *Mount Laurel I*.  Here, the parties were turning toward the “suitability” phase of a builder’s remedy case; a discovery schedule had been set for the court to determine whether the Property was suitable for affordable housing.  The irreparable harm from [...]’s actions here inures not only to low- and moderate-income households – who would continue to face “process, paper, and interminable delay” based on the Township’s actions – but also to the entire *Mount Laurel* process statewide.  As discussed further *infra*, the seriousness of the chilling effect cannot be overstated.