ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Under these fundamental principles, transmitting data to a service provider hired to perform a task—like a letter vendor printing a letter—would not be a third-party communication and would not implicate even the literal, let alone “plain,” meaning of § 1692c(b).  This is particularly true here, because Appellant does not allege that any human being at the letter vendor actually saw his information.  *See Miller v. Americollect, Inc.*, 2022 WL 20470401, at *8 (finding that characterizing a transmission of data to a letter vendor as a “communication” was a dubious proposition where the plaintiff did not allege anyone actually saw the transmitted information.).
[brief] Closing 203T January 16, 2013  Closing 204T January 17, 2013  Closing 205T January 18, 2013  Closing 206T January 23, 2013  Closing 207T January 24, 2013  Closing 208T January 25, 2013  Closing 209T February 6, 2013  Closing 210T February 7, 2013  Closing 211T February 20, 2013 Closing 212T February 21, 2013 Closing 213T February 22, 2013 Closing 214T February 25, 2013 Closing 215T February 26, 2013 Closing 216T February 27, 2013 Closing 217T February 28, 2013 Closing 218T March 1, 2013 Closing 219T March 4, 2013 Closing 220T March 5, 2013 Closing 221T March 6, 2013 Closing 222T August 5, 2013 Decision 223T August 6, 2013 Decision 224T August 12, 2013 Decision 225T August 13, 2013 Decision 226T August 14, 2013 Decision 227T August 15, 2013 Decision 228T August 16, 2013 Decision 229T August 19, 2013 Decision 230T August 20, 2013 AM Decision 231T August 20, 2013 PM Decision 232T August 22, 2013 Decision 233T August 23, 2013 Decision 234T August 26, 2013 Decision 235T August 29, 2013 Telephone Conference 236T September 3 2013 Decision 237T September 9, 2013 Post Trial Proceedings 238T September 17, 2013 Telephone Conference 239T September 19, 2013 Telephone Conference 240T September 22, 2013 Telephone Conference 241T September 23, 2013 Damages Decision 242T October 30, 2013 Attorney Fees Motion 243T November 4, 2013 Post Trial Proceedings 244T November 26, 2013 Attorneys Fees Motion 245T December 11, 2013
[directive] 12.  Efectuará los pagos de cualquier multa, sanción impuesta, restitución u otra obligación económica que estipule la N.J.S.A. orden judicial.  Si no cumple, podrá haber alguna acción judicial adicional, conforme a 2C:46-2b, que incluye el embargo de su sueldo, el registro de un fallo civil y/o la prolongación de su término de libertad a prueba.
[brief] *Morris County Fair Housing Council v. Boonton Twp.*, 220 N.J. Super.  388, 403-404 (Law Div. 1987), aff’d as modified, 230 N.J. Super. 345 (App. Div. 1989) (holding it is the responsibility of a planning board, not a Mt. Laurel judge, to evaluate the appropriateness of a site plan application and a Mt. Laurel judge must give substantial deference to conditions on Mt. Laurel developments imposed by a planning board to promote the health, safety and welfare, as here).
[brief] 63 State v. Savage, 172 N.J. 374 (2002) ....................................................................  34 State v. Scott, 229 N.J. 468 (2017) ...................................................................... 49, 53, 57 State v. Simms, 224 N.J. 393 (2016) ....................................................................  52 State v. Simon, 79 N.J. 191 (1979) ......................................................................  58 State v. Smith, 436 N.J. Super. 556 (App. Div. 2014) ..............................................
[directive] a.  The offense was committed as part of a sophisticated drug-distribution operation involving a hierarchical +3 to +4 structure, or a division of responsibilities, or the use of a corporation or a legitimate business to conduct or conceal the conduct or to launder the proceeds; or, b.  There is a substantial likelihood that the defendant is +3 to +4 involved in organized criminal activity; or, c.  The defendant served as a middle or upper-echelon +3 to +4 participant in a drug-distribution scheme; or, d.  The defendant directed or substantially influenced another person in committing the offense.  (Do not use if +3 defendant is charged with using or employing a juvenile in 2C:35-6); or, violation of N.J.S.A. e.
[brief] (1T97-25 to 1T98-2; 1T98-8 to 16).  He heard the nurse ask defendant who had done him harm or if defendant’s mate had harmed him.  (1T99-1 to 2).  The officer heard defendant answer that he had a knife and he thought he might have stabbed his partner.  (1T99-3 to 4).  [...] Investigator [...] also responded to the hospital.
[brief] THEREFORE, THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY SUPPRESSED THE RESULTING EVIDENCE.  There was no reasonable suspicion to justify the unlawful stop of [...] for walking down the street with his hand in a bag near the scene of a fight.  All the resulting evidence must be suppressed.  Thus, the trial court’s factual and legal conclusions are sound, and the order granting the motion to suppress must be affirmed.  This Court’s review of a decision on a motion to suppress is deferential.
[brief] Appellant’s Br., at 31.  A simple review of the court transcript, however, reveals this is simply untrue.  In fact, the Superior Court directly addressed Appellant’s contention that the letter was confusing, finding, rather, that it was, in fact, “not false, deceptive, or misleading” as to the offers to resolve the debt and the effect a payment may have on the enforceability of the debt.  T23:8-10; T27:14-19; T28:16-20; T29:8-24; T30:12-18.  First, the Superior Court explained that Appellant’s suggestion that the letter’s use of the words “savings” and “resolve” in connection with the offered payment options could somehow mislead a consumer into believing that the debt could be legally enforced is directly undermined by the clear language of the time-bared debt disclosure.
[directive] •  Accomplishments posted • Reduce community service hours • Wallet cards I • Participant specific donation gift ordered prior to drug court • Keychains voucher toward activity • Vacate supervision fees • Connect participant with vocational • Leave court early • DEDR Reduction resources • Phase advancement certificate 3b.  Therapeutic Response Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 Phase 4 • Behavior chain • Behavior chain • Behavior chain • Behavior chain • Cost/benefit Analysis • Cost/benefit analysis • Continuing care • Continuing care • Change in LOC frequency frequency • Re-evaluate • Re-evaluate Pharmacological Pharmacological interventions interventions
[brief] The portion of the amendments that is germane to this litigation is contained in paragraph 39 of Amendment #1, which provides:  39.  Preemptive right.  If Purchaser is the owner or lessee of the Premises, Seller shall have the following preemptive rights:  If, at any time during the term of this Agreement  Purchaser shall receive a bona fide offer from a third party (the "Offer") to purchase or otherwise acquire the Premises, Purchaser shall, before accepting said Offer, promptly send a copy of the Offer to Seller which shall have the preemptive right to purchase or otherwise acquire the Premises on the same terms and conditions as set forth in the Offer.  If Seller elects to exercise its preemptive right under this Section 36(a) (1), it shall do so by providing written notice to Purchaser within thirty (30) days following receipt of the offer and the closing shall take place within ninety (90) days thereafter (or at such later date as provided in the Offer).  If Seller does not exercise its preemptive right within the foregoing thirty (30) day period, Purchaser shall have the right to sell to the third party from whom it received the offer (and no other party, without again first giving Seller its preemptive right as provided in this Section 36(a)(1), on the same terms and conditions as set forth in the Offer (but not on different terms or conditions, without first giving Seller its preemptive right as provided in this Section 36(a)(1)).  If during the term, Purchaser is actively negotiating with a third party to sell the Premises, and within six (6) months following the expiration of the term, Purchaser enters into a definitive transfer agreement with said third party, Seller shall have a preemptive right to purchase or otherwise acquire the Premises, in accordance with the provisions contained herein, as though the definitive transfer agreement had been executed during the term and had constituted the Offer received by Seller on the last day of the term.  Da38 (emphasis added).
[brief] Plaintiff adjudicated the [...] through binding arbitration.  Plaintiff and [...] submitted the [...] to binding arbitration before retired Judge [...].  Pa46, ¶ 31, Pa330, ¶ 31; accord Pa181.  In the arbitration, plaintiff contended that the extension of [...]’ driveway “caused water to flow toward the [...],” causing property damage.  Pa46, ¶ 32; Pa330, ¶ 32; accord Pa162-3.  In his written award, dated January 10, 2012, [...] found that plaintiff claimed that [...] had changed the elevation and slope of the driveway, which caused water to run off from [...]’ property on his property.  Pa46, ¶ 33; Pa330, ¶ 33; accord Pa189.  [...] rejected that claim.  Pa46, ¶ 34; Pa330, ¶ 34; accord Pa189.  Instead, he ruled that:
[brief] On February 22, 2022, [...] adopted the Ordinance.  (Da32a-60a; Da532a, ¶39).  The Ordinance imposes numerous requirements on the physical placement of utility poles (as well as the maximum allowed height of poles) within existing public rights of way.  (Da532a, ¶40).  The Ordinance requirements prevent [...] from installing poles that are required to continue to provide safe, adequate, and proper service in New Jersey.  See Ordinance Sections 17-3.1(a), (b), and (c).  (Da038a-039a; Da532a-33a, ¶¶40-45).  Section 17-3.1(b) states, in relevant part, that no poles shall be taller than 35 feet.  However, as noted above, taller poles are mandated by the NESC Section 23, with which [...] is obligated to comply.  (Da533a, ¶45).  E.
[brief] ”  Jacobson v. Healthcare Fin. Servs., 516 F.3d 85, 91 (2d Cir. 2008).  Indeed, “Congress intended the Act to be enforced primarily by consumers. ”  FTC v. Shaffner, 626  The FDCPA is a strict liability statute which provides for damages and attorney’s fees upon the showing of just one violation.  *McMahon v. LVNV Funding, LLC*, 807 F.3d 872, 876 (7th Cir. 2015) (strict liability); *Allen ex rel. Martin v. LaSalle Bank, N.A.*, 629 F.3d 364, 368 (3d Cir. 2011) (strict liability citing, in footnote 7, supporting authorities from the Second, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits as well as the Seventh); *Taylor v. Perrin, Landry, deLaunay & Durand*, 103 F.3d 1232, 1238 (5th Cir. 1997) (single violation); *Bentley v. Great Lakes Collection Bureau*, 6 F.3d 60, 62-3 (2d Cir. 1993) (single violation).  At 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a), the FDCPA mandates a debt collector’s liability for any actual damages, limited statutory damages, and attorney’s fees to a “person” when the debt collector violates “any provision […] with respect to that person. ”  Consequently, courts have generally enumerated four elements: (1) [the plaintiff] is a consumer, (2) the [defendant] is a debt collector, (3) the…challenged practice involves an attempt to collect a “debt” as the Act defines it, and (4) the [defendant] has violated a provision of the FDCPA in attempting to collect the debt.  *Midland Funding LLC v. Thiel*, 446 N.J. Super. 537, 549 (App. Div. 2016) (quoting Douglass v. Convergent Outsourcing, 765 F.3d 299, 303 (3d Cir. 2014)).  The first three elements determine whether the FDCPA applies to the debt collector’s conduct and the last element determines whether that conduct violates the consumer’s statutory rights.  Here, Defendant does not challenge that the Plaintiff is a consumer, Defendants are debt collectors, and that Defendant’s conduct involves an attempt to collect a covered debt.
[directive] Advising Promptly II.  Charges  Criminal Results in Whether Case be should agencies law enforcement sexual assault, reports a a victim moment  From the I am requires. services he or she if any, support what, determine victim to working with the victim of each promptly agency advise enforcement investigating law directing that the therefore Prosecutor's Office whether the County of regardless such resources, of the availability services these outlined in the Standards, case.  As criminal charges in the ultimately pursues psychological medical and with obtaining victims assisting limited to, include, but are not protective for her ability to apply a of his or be advised victim should addition, the treatment.
[brief] (1T18:15-19).  [...] would know if [...] was of the mind-set to settle and the reasons why.  (1T18:15-19).  The Court agreed with Respondents and stated that:  You’re making the technical argument, which I would expect and I agree with and I understand fully.  The metamorphous argument is litigation strategy, settlement posture, ability – financial ability to pay.  They’re all things that have been recognized by the court as a potential basis for exclusion.  (1T30:5-11).
[brief] ]  [...]’s “careful evaluation of the specific case[,]”  Torres, 246 N.J. at 269, demonstrated an appreciation for the vulnerability of the innocent infant whose life defendant took after he had abused his baby boy.  “Crimes involving multiple deaths or victims who have sustained serious bodily injuries represent especially suitable circumstances for the imposition of consecutive sentences. ”  Carey, 168 N.J. at 428.  Because [...] found that the aggravating factors substantially outweighed the mitigating factor, he appropriately sentenced defendant to 30 years in prison for defendant’s aggravated manslaughter of his infant daughter, Kiriakakis, 235 N.J. at 442, to be served consecutively to defendant’s sentence for endangering the welfare of his baby son.
[brief] **PRELIMINARY STATEMENT**  There was no injustice whatsoever in the trial of this matter.  Rather, justice was served.  This matter arises from a slip and fall incident which took place on July 4, 2018 at a [...] facility located in [...] wherein Plaintiff-Appellant [...] (hereinafter “Plaintiff”) alleges she suffered injury.  As a result, Plaintiff filed a Complaint against Defendant-Respondent [...] (hereinafter “Defendant”) on June 24, 2020.  Defendant filed an Answer on July 30, 2020.  Pa8.  The matter was tried to a Jury before the Honorable [...], J.S.C. from October 10, 2023 through October 13, 2023.  During the trial Judge Franzblau properly ruled in prohibiting Plaintiff from introducing evidence that is in contravention of the New Jersey Rules of Evidence.  Specifically, Judge Franzblau properly excluded evidence pursuant to N.J.R.E. 407 a subsequent remedial measure.  Additionally, Judge Franzblau properly ruled pursuant to N.J.R.E. 901 in excluding unauthenticated evidence.  At the end of trial, a seven-person jury returned a unanimous “no cause” verdict in a mere forty-two minutes.  The Jury unanimously responded “NO” to the first question of the verdict sheet: “Did Plaintiff Jelken prove that Defendant [...] was negligent?”  The first question posed was simple, clear and conformed to Plaintiffs’ claim and the evidence put forth at trial.  The first question clearly and correctly set forth the first issue for the Jury to decide.  The negligence charge provided by the Court adequately conveyed the law for the jury to apply when deciding the first question.  Plaintiff now appeals the verdict on the basis that the Trial Court improperly denied admitting evidence of subsequent remedial measures and hearsay evidence that did not fall into an exception.
[directive] NOTE:  If you are pleading guilty to a violation of a condition of community supervision for life, pursuant to 2C:43-6.4 and the violation occurred on or after July 1, 2014 you should answer Question 4b.  N.J.S.A.  These additional questions need to be answered if you are pleading guilty to the offense of aggravated sexual assault, sexual assault, aggravated criminal sexual contact, kidnapping under 2C:13-1c(2), endangering the welfare of a child by engaging in sexual conduct which would impair or debauch the morals of the child under 2C:24-4a, endangering the welfare of a child pursuant to 2C:24-4b(3), (4) or (5)(a), endangering the welfare of a child pursuant to 2C:24-4b(5)(b)(i) or (ii) (if the offense was committed on or after February 1, 2018), leader of a child pornography network pursuant to 2C:24-4.1 (if the offense was committed on or after February 1, 2018), luring or enticing a child pursuant to 2C:13-6, criminal sexual contact pursuant to 2C:14-3b if the victim is a minor; kidnapping pursuant to 2C:13-1, criminal restraint pursuant to 2C:13-2 or false imprisonment pursuant to 2C:13-3 if the victim is a minor and the offender is not the parent, promoting child prostitution pursuant to 2C:34-1b(3), (4), or any attempt to commit any such offense.
[brief] See State v. Carrero, 229 N.J. 118, 128-29 (2017) (“‘(a) homicide which would otherwise be murder ... [but] is committed in the heat of passion resulting from a reasonable provocation,’ N.J.S.A. 2C:11–4(b)(2), is a well-established lesser-included offense of murder”).  But the court didn’t only fail to instruct that p/p manslaughter and attempted p/p manslaughter were lesser-included offenses.  It never explicitly stated that self-defense applied to p/p manslaughter and attempted p/p manslaughter.
[directive] The supervisor shall permit a pursuit to continue only under the following circumstances:  (a)  There is a reasonable belief that the violator has committed, or is engaged in a conspiracy or attempt to commit, any crime of the first degree or one of the violent or serious crimes of the second degree enumerated in Section 3.2 of this Policy; or (b)  There is a reasonable belief that violator poses an imminent threat to safety of the public or other police officers.  This determination shall be made based upon the violator’s actions or operation of the vehicle prior to the initiation of the attempted motor vehicle stop.
[directive] (FTA)  Appear to Failure the of or Higher.  S of Score Assessment  Risk Assault  Domestic Ontario 7.4.2.c not cases ODARA in of and completion the the require that cases violence domestic  In detention is seeking`pretrial of presumption the unless 7.3, Section under covered otherwise the if detention pretrial apply for shall prosecutor the subsection 7.4.6, to pursuant overcome scores. of PSA higher—regardless the or 5 proration) is any after (i.e., score final defendant's the with conjunction in considered scores be to are ODARA the cases, violence domestic
[brief] "A reviewing court must accept the factual findings of a trial court that are 'supported by sufficient credible evidence in the record.'"  *New Jersey Standards For Appellate Review* (*citing* State v. Mohammed, 226 N.J. 71, 88 (2016) (*quoting* State v. Gamble, 218 N.J. 412, 424 (2014)).  "Reviewing appellate courts should 'not disturb the factual findings and legal conclusions of the trial judge' unless convinced that those findings and conclusions were 'so manifestly unsupported by or inconsistent with the competent, relevant and reasonably credible evidence as to offend the interests of justice.'"  *Griepenburg v. Twp. of Ocean*, 220 N.J. 239, 254 (2015) (*quoting* Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Invs. Ins. Co. of Am., 65 N.J. 474, 484 (1974)).
[brief] Although the trial court focuses on this deed as a fact which placed Plaintiff on inquiry notice because this deed was not recorded until February 15, 1990, Defendant’s expert did not find that circumstance to be unusual:  Q.  Okay.  And what is this document?  A.  This is a deed from the trustee – excuse me – the trustee and dissolution of [...] and [...]  So, this is the same – well, the trustee is the successor in interest to the prior grantor of J-23 to the same grantee – as J-23.  So, now according to this deed the – the strip now has been conveyed back to – looking only at the deed, taking the deed at face value, the strip has now been reunited, so to speak, with Lot 4.
[brief] The MAA Expressly Covers [...], a Client of [...].  By acknowledging the MAA, Plaintiff agreed that the following claims, defined as “Covered Claims,” were subject to arbitration:  ... including contract claims; tort claims; discrimination and/or harassment claims; retaliation claims; claims for wages, compensation, penalties, or restitution; and any other claim under any federal, state, or local statute, constitution, regulation, rule, ordinance, or common law, arising out of and/or directly or indirectly related to my application for employment with the Company, and/or my employment with the Company, and/or the terms and conditions of my employment with the Company, and/or termination of my employment with the Company (collectively, “Covered Claims”).  (Pa92).  Importantly, the MAA defined not only claims against [...] as “Covered Claims,” but also claims against any of [...]’s “subsidiaries, affiliates, officers, directors, employees, agents, and/or any of its clients or customers.
[directive] 12.3  Review of CED and Less-Lethal Device Deployments: (a)  For municipal and county law enforcement agencies, the law enforcement executive shall forward the report to the County Prosecutor within 10 business days of the firing/discharge, unless the County Prosecutor grants the law enforcement executive’s request for a reasonable extension of time within which to forward the report, for good cause shown.  The County Prosecutor shall review the matter for compliance with this Policy.  If the County Prosecutor finds the firing or discharge of a CED or less-lethal device to not be in compliance with the Attorney General’s Use of Force Policy, the matter shall be forwarded to the Director of the Office of Public Integrity and Accountability or their designee.  (b)  For statewide law enforcement agencies, the law enforcement executive shall forward the report to the Director of the Division of Criminal Justice within 10 business days of the firing/discharge, unless the Director grants the law enforcement executive’s request for a reasonable extension of time within which to forward the report for good cause shown.  The Director shall review the matter for compliance with this Policy.  If the Director finds the firing or discharge of a CED or less-lethal device to not be in compliance with the Attorney General’s Use of Force Policy, the matter shall be forwarded to the Director of the Office of Public Integrity and Accountability or their designee.  12.4
[brief] Plaintiff’s project necessitated six separate variances, which included significant d(1) use and d(4) floor area ratio variances.  To secure approval, it was therefore incumbent upon [...] to demonstrate through competent, credible evidence that the magnitude of the relief being sought was appropriate and warranted under the MLUL.  As the applicant, Plaintiff alone bore the burden to show that the statutory criteria for each of the variances requested was satisfied to justify relief from zoning criteria.  It alone had to meet every layer of proof for every one of the six variances sought.  The Board ultimately determined that Plaintiff did not meet its burden of proof to support the grant of any of the requested variances, and therefore denied the subject application.  It adopted a comprehensive resolution memorializing its denial which provides factual and legal support for its decision.  Plaintiff nonetheless commenced a civil action challenging the Board’s decision.  On review, the Trial Court affirmed the Board’s denial of the [...] application as more than amply supported by the record, and therefore not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable.  In doing so it applied the correct highly deferential standard of review and legal standards to assess whether the Board acted properly and within its authorized discretion.  The Trial Court’s Opinion is devoid of any indicia of reversible error.  Its September 22, 2023 Order affirming the Board’s denial of Plaintiff’s application as memorialized by resolution adopted on December 19, 2022 must accordingly be sustained.