ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] (a)  Plea Discussions Generally:  The prosecutor and defense counsel may engage in discussions relating to pleas and sentences and shall engage in discussions about such matters as will promote a fair and expeditious disposition of the case, but except as hereinafter authorized the judge shall take no part in such discussions.  (b)  Entry of Plea.  When the prosecutor and defense counsel reach an agreement concerning the offense or offenses to which a defendant will plead on condition that other charges pending against the defendant will be dismissed or an agreement concerning the sentence that the prosecutor will recommend; or when pursuant to paragraph (c) the defendant pleads guilty based on indications by the court of the maximum sentence to be imposed, such agreement and such indications shall be placed on the record in open court at the time the plea is entered.  (c)  Disclosure to Court.  On request of the prosecutor and defense counsel, the court in the presence of both counsel may permit the disclosure to it of the tentative agreement and the reasons therefor in advance of the time for tender of the plea; or, if no tentative agreement has been reached, the status of negotiations toward a plea agreement.  The court may then indicate to the prosecutor and defense counsel whether it will concur in the tentative agreement or, if no tentative agreement has been reached and with the consent of both counsel, the maximum sentence it would impose in the event the defendant enters a plea of guilty; assuming, however, in both cases that the information in the presentence report at the time of sentence is as has been represented to the court at the time of the disclosure and supports its determination that the interests of justice would be served thereby.  If the agreement is reached without such disclosure or if the court agrees conditionally to accept the plea agreement as set forth above, or if the plea is to be based on the court's conditional indication about the sentence, all the terms of the plea, including the court's concurrence or its indication concerning sentence, shall be placed on the record in open court at the time the plea is entered.  Nothing in this Rule shall be construed to authorize the court to dismiss or downgrade any charge without the consent of the prosecutor.
[directive] Pretrial Seeking of Presumption the Overcoming 7.4.6 pursuant detention pretrial seeking of presumption rebuttable a is there where case any  In pretrial for motion a file shall prosecutor the 7.4.5, or 7.4.4, 7.4.3, 7.4.2, 7.4.1, subsection to (1) that: determines 7.8  Section pursuant to designated prosecutor supervisory a unless detention release imposing by adequately controlled be can release defendant's by posed risks the be not would justice of interests (2) the or program, services pretrial the by monitored conditions -the overcome to made is determination the If detention. pretrial for applying by served the document shall prosecutor supervisory the detention, pretrial for applying of presumption 62  Page file. case in the decision for that reasons)
[directive] 1.  Czy rozumie Pan(i), że z powodu przyznania się do: [Tak/Yes] [Nie/No] Do you understand that because of your plea of guilty to (Podać listę przestępstw pierwszego i drugiego stopnia objętych ustawą NERA) (List First or Second Degree Violent Crime(s) to Which Applies) NERA Wchodzi w życie z dniem 01/08/2018, opublikowano w załączniku do Zarządzenia #04-14, CN 11171-Polish strona 1 z 2 Revised Form Effective 01/08/2018, Promulgated by Supplement to Directive #04-14, CN 11171-Polish page 1 of 2 będzie Pan(i) podlegać wymogowi odbycia 85% wyroku wydanego za takie przestępstwo(a) przed uzyskaniem możliwości ubiegania się o zwolnienie warunkowe w związku z takim(i) przestępstwem(ami)?
[brief] The facts of this case are straightforward and uncomplicated.  Plaintiff is an authorized Caterpillar dealer with a principal place of business located at [...].  (Pa 10, Pa 19, Pa 53, Pa 57)  Defendant maintains a principal place of business located at [...].  (Pa 19, Pa 57)  The project at issue in this lawsuit concerns a combined heat and power equipment (generator set) for [...], [...].  (Pa 20)  Defendant issued Plaintiff its purchase order for the generator set on September 11, 2019.  (Pa 19)  The total value of the purchase order is $2,015,253.00.  (Pa 19)  Defendant added purchase order specifications dated September 3, 2019.  (Pa 20, Pa 52)  Plaintiff's lawsuit seeks payment of $198,066.38 which amount is adjusted retainage for the generator set sold and delivered as ordered by Defendant.  (Pa 53)  This fact is certificated by Plaintiff's Executive Vice President and uncontested by Defendant.  (Pa 10-11, Pa 55, Pa 57.  Pa 58, Pa 59)  The amount claimed is reflected on Plaintiff's invoice, less agreed credits.  (Pa 53, Pa 57, Pa 59, Pa 10)  Plaintiff delivered the generator set to [...] and received payment, except for the retainage involved in this lawsuit.  Plaintiff filed the within lawsuit after voluntary efforts for payment were unsuccessful.  (Pa 54)  Plaintiff's efforts toward resolution are evident through a series of e-mails between Plaintiff's Executive Vice President and [...] of Defendant, amongst others.  (Pa 54, Pa 59-Pa 80)  E-mails contain detailed recitations and explanations between the parties for credits and request for release of the retainage.  Id.  The exchanges occurred between October 12, 2022 and July 20, 2023.  Defendant concluded Plaintiff's "retainage invoice has not been processed due to a credit invoice stuck in the system."  (Pa 59)  Defendant requested a revised invoice for payment and promised to "follow thru the system."  Id.  Plaintiff conducted the revision which is reflected on the statement of account (Pa 10 and 11)  Notwithstanding the promise and following the extensive efforts toward resolution, Defendant failed, refused, and neglected to make payment.  Thereafter, the within lawsuit was filed on September 15, 2023.  (Pa 6)
[brief] Therefore, given that the Trial Court’s decision was one based in equity, the Appellate Court should review the Orders for abuse of discretion.  While the Trial Court’s ultimate decision that the entire controversy doctrine does not bar [...]’s Hackensack Project claims is correct, it was not the Trial Court’s decision to make.  Given that the Trial Court accepted [...]’s arguments in total in denying in all respects the injunctive relief sought by [...], [...] has not appealed the Trial Court’s determination.  Nevertheless, this Court is faced with the threshold issue of whether or not it has jurisdiction to resolve arbitrability, or whether that issue must be referred to the arbitrator.
[brief] On April 1, 2020, John and [...] filed a complaint against Respondents, [...] (“[...]”) and Salny, Redbord and [...], Counsellors at Law alleging legal malpractice for the Respondents’ failure to timely file the complaint within the time limitations set forth in Rule 4:85-1.  Pa002-Pa007.  On June 16, 2020, the Respondents filed their Answer.  Pa009.  On May 24, 2022, the Respondents filed a motion to bar the plaintiffs’ expert testimony.  Pa025.  On June 2, 2022, the John and Victor filed a cross motion to extend discovery.  Pa053.  Thereafter, on June 7, 2022, the lower court entered a consent order finding plaintiffs’ expert report to be filed timely.  Pa057.  On June 24, 2022, the Respondents filed a motion for partial summary judgment seeking to dismiss the complaint of [...].  Pa060.  On September 14, 2022, the lower court entered an order (the “Order”) granting partial summary judgment in favor of the Respondents and against [...] dismissing [...]’s complaint and finding that Respondents had no duty to John.
[brief] Also, on April 12, 2016, numerous altered and derogatory retirement posters were placed throughout the NJDEP workplace with [...]’s photograph, stating:  HELP US CELEBRATE (WELL REJOICE OVER) [...]’S HASTY, UNSCHEDULED AND DOWN-RIGHT EMBARRASSING DEPARTURE FORM DEP TO AVOID PENSION SANCTIONS AND OTHER FURTHER DISCIPLINARY ACTIONS FOLLOWING A SCANDOLUS END TO A 30 YEAR CAREER OF DISREPUTABLE BEHAVIOUR, ALIENATING COLLEGUES AND ABUSING REGULATEES.  [(Pa644; Pa888). ]  Thus, the derogatory poster disclosed facts that were discussed at an April 11, 2016 communications among [...], [...] and [...].  The next day, on April 15, 2016, [...] asked [...] whether the disciplinary action and five (5) day suspension taken against Alan [...] would “delay his retirement” and [...] stated he could not answer that as he did not know what “Pensions will do.
[brief] 19, 20 Fallone Properties, L.L.C. v. Bethlehem Twp. Planning Bd., 369 N.J. Super 552, 561 (App. Div. 2004) (quoting Burbridge v. Mine Hill Twp., 117 N.J. 376, 385 (1990)  16  Gandolfi v. Town of Hammonton, 367 N.J. Super. 527, 530 n. 1 (App. Div. 2004)  23  Green Meadows at Montville, L.L.C. v. Planning Bd., Montville, 329 N.J. Super. 12, 18-19 (App. Div. 2000)
[brief] Settlement Agreement, § 5.2 (emphases added) (Pa000061).  The *Gannon* claims fit neatly into Section 5.2; they are premised on [...]’s fees and its right to amend its agreements with the settlement class members.  Plaintiff argues that the *Roma* class released only claims that existed before or at final judgment.  Pb21–Pb22.  But accepting Plaintiff’s narrow interpretation of the timing of Released Claims would require the Court to again ignore the meaning of “Released Claims,” which is nested within Section 5.2.  For the reasons explained above, “Released Claims” in Section 5.2 encompasses not just claims at final judgment but “all claims” “related to” *Roma*, including those that could be brought “in the future” or were otherwise “unknown” but related.
[brief] For these reasons, the court should affirm the Attorney General’s final agency decision that declined to defend [...] in the prerogative writ action brought by [...].  Respectfully submitted, [...]  ATTORNEY GENERAL OF NEW JERSEY  By: /s/ [...]  [...] Deputy Attorney General (ID #328902021) ([...])  [...]  Assistant Attorney General Of Counsel  [...], Appellant, v. [...], Respondent.
[brief] [...], the Petitioner-Appellant in this matter, valiantly and selflessly served as a Paterson police officer for 12 years in what we all know is a high crime area where, without fail, he always acted bravely and heroically to defend and protect the citizenry and his brother police officers.  [...] was one of the unspoken heroes and foot soldiers that tirelessly and quietly preserved and enforced the laws of New Jersey, and he respected and defended the rule of law and the U.S. and New Jersey Constitutions.  They say heroes are made when nobody’s looking.  [...] never asked for accolades and applause and recognition, but his commendations and awards for bravery are impressive.  As a member of the [...] [“[...]”], hereinafter referred to as “Respondents” or as the “Board,” [...] deserved and is still entitled to the protection of the [...] and to be treated fairly when and if the unfortunate prospect ever occurred where he became injured and disabled.  Unfortunately, that day came when [...] while off duty discharged his service weapon three times in order ward-off a deadly attack by an unknown perpetrator who appeared to have a gun and was moving rapidly in a menacing manner towards his vehicle.  When this near-death encounter occurred [...]’s life flashed before his eyes and the driver of the vehicle escaped.  [...]’s use of lethal force was never questioned by the [...] [“[...]”].  However, the [...] did charge [...] with technical internal charges for leaving the scene, although he returned when the scene was safe to report the incident to the [...] and was fully cooperative.  [...] pled not guilty to the charges and was suspended under his SOA contract pending the outcome of the internal affairs [IA] process.  [...] and the [...] both agreed that [...] suffered from severe post traumatic syndrome and flashbacks after the shooting incident.  The [...] believed [...] was unfit for duty as did Appellant.  An agreement which was reached amicably between Appellant and the [...] occurred in late 2019 and its only purposes and design was to secure for the Appellant a settling of monies owed him under his SOA contract since he was totally disabled and could no longer work in the high crime area of Paterson.  The [...] in recognizing that the IA process would not be necessary unilaterally in the agreement did not pursue the IA charges.  There was no *quid pro quo* agreement entered designed to avoid a minor technical administrative charge.  However, despite an avalanche of evidence and support in the factual and legal record made before the Board of Trustees for the [...], the Board ruled that it would not even allow [...] to file his application for retirement disability with the [...].
[brief] Super. 383 (App. Div. 1995) (plaintiff’s complaint dismissed as sanction for failure to appear at trial); Georgis v. Scarpa, 226 N.J. Super. 244 (App. Div. 1988) (“dismissal of defendant’s answer” imposed as sanction for delay in answering interrogatories); Johnson v. Mountainside Hosp., Respiratory Disease Associates, 199 N.J. Super. 114, 118–20 (App. Div. 1985) (plaintiff’s complaint dismissed for failure to comply with discovery order and for counsel’s failure to appear at trial).  But the issue in this case is not a whether this plaintiff was improperly sanctioned for a discovery violation.
[brief] Final Judgment and Statement of Reasons of the Honorable [...], J.S.C., Superior Court of New Jersey, Somerset County, Law Division, Docket No. [...] (May 8, 2023)  ..................................................................................................................  8a  Order Denying Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration and Request to Restore Control of [...] of the Honorable [...], J.S.C., Superior Court of New Jersey, Somerset County, Law Division, Docket No. [...] (June 26, 2023)  ...........................................................................................................................................  66a  Order Denying Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsiderations and Statement of Reasons Under R. 1:6-2(f) of the Honorable [...], P.J.Cv., Superior Court of New Jersey, Somerset County, Law Division, Docket No. [...] (August 30, 2023)  ...........................................................................................................................................  87a
[brief] (Pa0349 and Pa0350 at 111:20-112:5).  Further, [...] admitted during the second day of his deposition that he has no concept of the status of construction associated with the Project as of the date of plaintiff’s accident and was specifically unaware as to whether any work had been performed in the vicinity of plaintiff’s accident prior to the date of the accident.  (Pa0291 – Pa0293 at 53:9- 55:12).  Rule 104 Hearing
[brief] (Pa270).  The trial court suggested that [...]’s actions in this regard essentially amounted to an exercise in political self-preservation: The crowd also likely impacted [...]’s premature public announcement of his intentions to vote “No” to [...]’s application.  After all, the Mayor voted “Yes” to the underlying Redevelopment Plan that permitted construction of these warehouses.  It does not make sense that the Mayor would then say he is a “No” vote before the hearing is completed, unless his purpose was to appease the crowd.  (Pa281).
[brief] ”  18.  Plaintiff submitted NJ Records request for a copy of an order changing venue from the Law Division to the Chancery Division.  The Superior Court Clerk’s Office replied:  “A search has been conducted within the Judiciary case jacket systems, based on the information provided above.  However, no records related to an Order transferring your case from the Camden County Law Division to the Camden County Chancery.  Also, there does not appear to be any Camden County Chancery Division matter associated to your name.  As such, no records can be provided at this time.
[directive] Each to basis 24/7 on available a general be to attorneys deputy and prosecutors assistant on-call to pursuant officers enforcement law to approvals charging and advice legal real-time provide duty on-call to assigned general attorneys deputy and prosecutors assistant  All Directive.6 this for required functions perform the to experience sufficient shall have Directive this to pursuant Advice Directive. of this 14  Section with accordance in training receive shall and duty, on-call attorneys deputy and prosecutors assistant on-call by provided be may approvals charging and County communication.  The electronic other or telephonic of means by or person in general operating agencies all to available procedures information and contact make shall Prosecutor law a when circumstances specify the Director may  The jurisdiction. prosecutor's the within rather Justice Criminal of Division the contact directly should officer or agency enforcement Office.  Prosecutor's County a than agent prosecutor's a prosecutor" include may "assistant term the Directive, this 4 of and 3 Sections in used  As 6 County the by writing in designated specifically been has who office  Prosecutor's County the of employee other or this of 4 Sections and pursuant 3 to functions approval and review, advice, legal on-call perform to Prosecutor attorneys assistant includes general" attorneys "deputy term the Directive, this throughout used As Directive. Justice. Criminal of Division in the general 22 Page 1, than January 2017.  later no operational become shall Section This for Arrest Prosecutor upon On-Call from Approval Charging Obtain to Requirement 3.2
[brief] [...] testified that there was an agreement for [...] for $170,000.00, 1T13:16-24, P-1, and he paid $53,000.00, P2, 1T14:10-17, as a result of which defendants performed minimal demolition work.  1T15:17–24.  After promises to complete the job, a second payment of $53,000.00 was made, P3, 1T18:6–20, but Defendants did not return.  1T19:9-13.  As a result, Defendants were paid $106,500.00 for approximately $10,000.00 worth of work.
[brief] Just two (2) days after the Board’s June 13th hearing, the Board’s attorney contacted [...]’s attorneys saying “On the above, I’ll be sitting down to draft the resolution shortly.  To that end, I would invite you to send me your list of submissions (Application, plans (including latest revision date), approvals and other documents and your list of hearing exhibits (Date, exhibit number, brief description), so that nothing is left out. ”  (Pa150)  A coordinated effort was required to accomplish what was intended, as admitted by [...] counsel in his August 9, 2022, email to the Court Master:
[directive] Entiendo las reglas y condiciones de libertad a prueba que figuran más arriba y que me aplican a mí, y entiendo además que mi incumplimiento constituirá una infracción de la libertad a prueba y causará que yo vuelva al tribunal.  Si me arrestan o detienen en cualquier otro estado o jurisdicción dentro de los Estados Unidos mientras cumpla este plazo de libertad a prueba, mi firma que figura más abajo se considerará una renuncia a la extradición.  I have received a copy of the rules and conditions of probation which have been read and explained to me.
[brief] It did not file a counterclaim or a third-party claim.  (Ra126-135).  On December 20, 2023, [...] filed a reconsideration motion/second order to show cause again seeking to invalidate the Restrictive Covenant.  (Pa49).  ¹  Reference to “1T” refers to the December 1, 2023 transcript of the oral argument on [...]’s initial application.  Reference to “2T” refers to the January 24, 2024 transcript of the oral argument on [...]’s second application, and “3T” refers to the January 26, 204 transcript of the Court’s decision on the second application.  Although [...] tried to disguise what was actually a motion for reconsideration, he merely relied on his initial briefing and claimed “changed circumstances” warranted the Court’s reconsideration/issuance of the preliminary injunctive relief that [...] initially requested.  (Ra 136-138, Ab6).  That is by definition a motion for reconsideration as the Chancery Court properly noted.  [...]’s purported changed circumstance was a letter [...] had sent to [...] two months earlier advising it of the terms of [...]’s Employment Agreement.  Because [...] had not taken any action with respect to that letter, [...] included in his arguments that he had allegedly forfeited his incentive bonus.  (Ra140-41).  The Practice opposed the application and moved to dismiss the Complaint because the claims were moot.  (Pa52-53).  The Chancery Court held oral argument on January 24, 2024, and on January 26, 2024, it denied [...]’s second application and expressly dismissed his Complaint without prejudice.  (3T10:15-11:7).  The Chancery Court found that [...]’s retraction of the employment offer rendered issues related to that employment and the Restrictive Covenant moot.  (3T9:13-10:1; 3T10:15-25).  The Chancery Court did however note that Dr.  Ondik failed to demonstrate irreparable harm (3T8:2-17; 3T10:2-14) and that there were equitable interests on both sides.  (3T6:7-10).  The Chancery Court entered its order on April 24, 2024 ("2024 Order").  (Ra3).  [...] filed his appeal on May 6, 2024.  (Pa57).  On May 13, 2024, the Chancery Court filed an "amplification" of its April 24, 2024 Order, emphasizing that it had dismissed the Complaint without prejudice, although that was apparent from the decision itself.
[brief] Pa262-272.  President of the [...], [...], submitted an affidavit that he did not receive any correspondence or postcard from the [...] notifying him of the Ricci Act.  Pa266.  Upon notice by another retired Trooper, Wren underwent a massive polling of the [...] to ascertain whether his membership received notice of the Ricci Act.  Pa266.  Of the fifty-nine (59) [...] members (retired troopers) who responded to the polling, fifty-seven (57) did not receive any notice of the Ricci Act by letter, correspondence, or postcard.
[brief] \(^4\)  The initial discussions to abandon the MOU in favor of [...]’s purchase of the property included [...] owning 10% of [...], but same was rejected by [...] as reflected in the Operating Agreement.  Da121-36, 319-20.  Da38, 51-56.  In or about 2020, [...] obtained an “offer of $5MM from [...]” that [...] “did not accept. ”  Da72.  In 2020 and 2021, [...] contends that there were additional conversations about her desire to purchase the Property, but again, same never came to fruition.  Da187-89.  In March 2022, [...] obtained a letter of interest from [...] to loan her $4.2 million and [...] “told [her] that this offer was not acceptable. ”  Da62-68.  On May 21, 2022, in furtherance of her efforts to repurchase the Property, [...] sent a document entitled Addendum to Promissory Note Agreement between [...] Goenaga and [...] [...] (the “2022 Addendum”), which purports to amend the 2017 Unexecuted Agreement.