ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] *State v. Liepe*, 239 N.J. 359, 372 (2019) (quoting *Yarbough*, 100 N.J. at 637).  Looking at the Yarbough factors themselves, this Court has already held that “‘[n]o free crimes’ is always present in convictions for more than one offense, so it cannot stand alone to support consecutive sentences. ”  *Simmons*, [...] (slip op. at 10).  (Da41)  Turning to the remaining *Yarbough* factors, “[f]actors two, four, and five do not relate directly to the facts of the offense and hence have little utility in the threshold assessment of whether to impose consecutive or concurrent sentences. ”  *Torres*, 246 N.J. at 266 (citing *Carey*, 168 N.J. at 423).  Thus, the concurrent/consecutive decision really begins with an assessment of *Yarbough* factor three, which “contains the evaluative core to a Yarbough analysis: it identifies five sub-factors that ‘generally concentrate on such considerations as the nature and number of offenses for which the defendant is being sentenced, whether the offenses occurred at different times or places, and whether they involve numerous or separate victims. ’”  Id. at 266-67 (quoting *State v. Baylass*, 114 N.J. 169, 180 (1989)).  Through evaluating these facts, “a court determines whether [Yarbough factor three] ‘renders the collective group of offenses distinctively worse than the group of offenses would be were that circumstance not present. ””  Id. at 267 (citing Carey, 168 N.J. at 428)).  While the Court has held that “a sentencing court may impose consecutive sentences even though a majority of the Yarbough factors support concurrent sentences,” id. at 427-28, or even where only one factor supports consecutive sentences, State v. Molina, 168 N.J. 436, 442-43 (2001), no court has held that a court may impose consecutive sentences where none of the Guideline 3 factors support a consecutive sentence.
[brief] ##  TABLE OF CITATIONS  ###  Cases  **Crowe v. De Gioia**, 90 N.J. 126 (1982) .........................................................12, 13, 17  **Fawzy v. Fawzy**, 199 N.J. 456 (2009)...............................................................26  **Gruenke v. Seip**, 225 F.3d 290 (3d Cir. 2000)..............................................26, 29  **Guaman v. Velez**, 421 N.J.Super. 239 (App.Div. 2011)..................................12  **Halderman, by Halderman v. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp.**, 707 F.2d 702 (3d Cir. 1983) ...........................................................................................................25  **Iliadis v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.**, 191 N.J. 88 (2007)........................................5  **John & Jane Parents 1 v. Montgomery Cnty. Bd. of Educ.**, 622 F.Supp. 3d 118 (D. Md. 2022) .............................................................................................................15  **M.L.B. v. S.L.J.**, 519 U.S. 102 (1996)...............................................................26  **Mays v. Penza**, 179 N.J.Super. 175 (Law Div. 1980).......................................12  **Moriarty v. Bradt**, 177 N.J. 84 (2003) ............................................................26  **[...] and [...] v. [...] and [...]**, Docket Number [...] .........................................................38  **Prince v. Massachusetts**, 321 U.S. 158 (1944)..................................................25  **Rinaldo v. RLR Inv., LLC**, 387 N.J.Super. 387 (App.Div. 2006) .......................5  **Stanley v. Illinois**, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) ............................................................25  **[...], et al., v. [...]**, Case No. [...] (Waukesha Cty. Wisconsin Cir. Ct. 2023) .................................................................16, 35  **Terranova v. Gen. Elec. Pension Tr.**, 457 N.J.Super. 404 (App.Div. 2019)  .................................................................................................................................5  **Tortorice v. Vanartsdalen**, 422 N.J. Super. 242 (App. Div. 2011)  .....................27  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
[brief] The matter of *Wegner* involved a motor vehicle collision at an intersection where both the plaintiff and the defendant claimed to have had a green light.  *Id.* at 1.  The plaintiff had a prior history of seizures for which she was prescribed medication by a neurologist.  Id. at 3-4.  It was the defendant’s position that the plaintiff must have driven through a red light because of a seizure.  Id.  However, the defendant did not offer an opinion from a medical expert witness that the prior seizure disorder was related in any way to the cause of the collision and attempted to use an accident reconstruction expert to address the issue.  Id. at 4.  The plaintiff sought to bar evidence of her prior medical history at the outset of trial and challenged the accident reconstruction expert’s qualification to address the issue.  Id. at 4-5.  The Trial Court denied the motion and evidence regarding the prior medical condition, prior medical records, medications the plaintiff took for that condition and other conditions, and a bout of pneumonia the plaintiff had prior to the collision was presented at trial.
[brief] ”  Lak. Muni. Code §18-200.  Appellant relies on Bell Atlantic New Jersey, Inc. v. Riverdale Zoning Bd., 352 N.J. Super. 407 (App. Div. 2002), and Nuckel v. Boro of Litle Ferry Pl. Bd., 208 N.J. 95, 101-103 (2011), in support of its argument that an offsite parking lot as an accessory use ordinarily requires a use variance (Ab25).  Appellant contends it is “clearly wrong and absurd” for Respondent to use Lot 5 for an accessory use to its house of worship on a different lot (Ab27).  Appellant is mistaken and the cases it cites are distinguishable.
[brief] 30 State v. W.B., 205 N.J. 588 (2011) .................................................................. 49 State v. Wakefield, 190 N.J. 397 (2007) .................................................................. 34 State v. Walker, 203 N.J. 73 (2010) .................................................................. 35, 44, 48 State v. Wilbely, 63 N.J. 420 (1973) .................................................................. 35 State v. Williams, 467 N.J. Super. 1 (App. Div. 2021) ........................................... 83 United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985) .................................................................. 69 United States v. Pelullo, 14 F.3d 881 (3d Cir. 1994) ....................................................... 68 United States v. Perdomo, 929 F.2d 967 (3d Cir. 1991) ....................................................... 68 Statutes N.J.S.A 2C:11-1 ................................................................. 74 N.J.S.A. 2C:1-8(e) .............................................................. 22, 24 N.J.S.A. 2C:1-8(d), and (2) .................................................. 22 N.J.S.A. 2C:3-4(c) ............................................................
[directive] - Prohibited weapons and devices - destructive devices (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-3(a)) (non- Graves Act)  Prohibited weapons and devices - defaced firearms (N.J.S.A. 2C:39- 3(d)) of Possession firearm while committing CDS/bias crime (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4.l(a)) of or Poss. weapon for unlawful purpose (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(a)(l) (2)) of ), )(1 Unlawful possession a weapon (N.J.S.A. 2C: 39-5(b 2C:39-5( c )(1) or (2))  If yes, the preliminary recommendation from Step 9 or the revised preliminary recommendation from Step 10 is increased to the final recommendation as follows: = ROR Release Release with PML 1 c = Release with PML 1 Release with PML 2 c = Release with PML 2 Release with PML 3 c = + Release with PML 3 Release with PML 3 EM/HD c = + No EM/ HD Release with PML 3 Release Recommended c If Step 12.
[brief] (Da114).  Here, defendant failed to show that his counsel was deficient on these grounds.  Counsel cross-examined a State witness, who had testified as an expert in fingerprinting in the past, and who testified that he was not involved in any fingerprinting of any of the evidence in this case.  (5T90-3 to 10).  Counsel also cross-examined another witness who testified that he did not fingerprint the tire iron because he believed there was DNA evidence on it.  (5T189-15 to 190-2).  Thus, counsel questioned the State’s witnesses regarding the absence of fingerprint testing.  Counsel further highlighted the absence of fingerprint and DNA testing to the jury in summation, and noted the contradiction between detectives on whether DNA analysis and fingerprint testing could both be done on a piece of evidence.  (9T123-18 to 125-11).  Given counsel’s questioning and argument regarding the absence of testing and contradictions, defendant failed to show how counsel was deficient.  Further, the PCR court properly concluded that defendant failed to show that the outcome of the trial would have been different had a defense expert been presented.  (Da115).  The court found that the absence of fingerprints and DNA evidence connecting defendant to the tire iron was established during trial and counsel argued that there was no blood and that the existence of fingerprint or DNA were unknown because the State “never bothered to check”.  (Da115).  The court found “[t]he jury considered the evidence, heard the arguments of counsel, and was unpersuaded about their impact on the defendant’s guilt. ” (Da115).  Further, it properly found that even if an expert had been called, the jury still heard [...]’s and [...]’s testimonies identifying defendant as the person who attacked [...] with the tire iron.  (Da115).  The court ruled, “The evidence tending to prove that defendant used the tire iron to assault [...] was substantial. ” (Da115).  It found that any limited expert testimony to point out inconsistencies in two witnesses’ testimonies would have done little to change the outcome of the trial.  (Da115).  The State submits that the PCR court properly addressed and concluded that defendant failed to establish any prejudice.  As the State argued below, defendant failed show he was prejudiced by counsel not having an expert testify that the State could have performed both fingerprint and DNA analysis on the tire iron when counsel presented this to the jury on summation to undermine the State’s witnesses and pointed out the alleged inconsistencies in the State’s witnesses’ testimonies as to the absence of both testing procedures.  Based on the foregoing, the State submits that the PCR court properly denied defendant’s claim and respectfully requests that this Court affirm.  CONCLUSION
[brief] Decedent worked for [...] recruiting and supervising sales representatives in a territory that went from Cape May County to Tuckerton.  (7T56:5 to 57:25; 7T58:1-18).  Petitioner worked at a nightclub as a manager and bartender, and during his three days off each week, he assisted the Decedent with her [...] position.  (7T56:13 to 58:6; 7T59:4-9).  Before the internet was widely used, Petitioner drove hundreds of miles throughout Decedent’s territory collecting and then delivering [...] sales orders to its headquarters in Newark Delaware, assisting with monthly meetings, delivering campaign catalogs and products to the sales representatives.  (7T56:13 to 58:6; 11T9155:20 to 156:12).  Petitioner was not paid by [...] for any of the services he performed but rather, Decedent received all the pay from [...] which she deposited in her account.  (7T58:7-15).  Petitioner also improved their Home over the years and in doing so, it was essentially remodeled.  (7T71:4-22; 7T73:18 to 74:3; 7T65:9 to 66; 7T112:16 to --- 8 12T means Transcript of Trial dated September 19, 2022.
[brief] However, Defendant’s entire property is on a slope, angled downwards to the sidewalk.  (Pa301).  In addition, the ice in question was due to the .54 inches of precipitation which ended at 7pm on February 22, 2021, followed by below freezing temperatures beginning at 12:51am on February 23, 2021, just hours before Plaintiff’s fall.  (Pa136).  Plaintiff’s expert report does not explain how the subject ice could have been present during the above freezing temperatures and rain the day before plaintiff’s fall.  They also fail to establish why the .54 inches of precipitation (snow turning to rain) the day before the incident was not the cause of the ice, rather than mounded snow.  Most importantly, Plaintiff has also failed to establish a new danger or hazard caused by the Defendants aside from the natural process of precipitation, melting snow and freezing conditions which would impose liability to the Defendants.
[brief] A.  Plain Language.  The question whether Section 40A:20-11 of LTTEL vests a municipality with the final unreviewable say on whether tax exemption provisions are “appropriate” is a question of statutory interpretation that is reviewed de novo.  e.g., MEPT Journal Square Urban Renewal, LLC v. City of Jersey City, 455 N.J. Super. 608, 622-23 (App.Div. 2018); 388 Route 22 Readington Realty Holdings v. Twp of Readington, 221 N.J. 318, 338 (2015).  The objective of statutory interpretation is to “determine and effectuate Legislature’s intent,” Id., at 623.  (citations omitted) and the “best indicator of that intent is the statutory language,” DiProspero v. Penn, 183 N.J.477, 492 (2005).  The words of a statute are normally given their generally accepted meaning, Spade v. Select Comfort Corp., 232 N.J. 504, 514-15 (2018) (quoting N.J.S.A. 1:1-1) and are construed “in context with related provisions” to give sense to the legislation as a whole.
[brief] The trial court also failed to address or acknowledge a decision from the Connecticut Supreme Court on a virtually identical statute where that Court held that the statute violated the Separation of Powers doctrine.  Furthermore, the Limited Attorney Exemption sweeps in constitutionally protected conduct, and does not advance any legitimate purpose of the Act of protecting consumers from abusive practices because the Act would prohibit the most experienced and most ethical debtor/creditor attorney from representing a client if that attorney is deemed to be “principally engaged” in that area of the law by some unknown standard.  Accordingly, this Court should reverse the trial court’s Orders.
[brief] Appellants/plaintiffs respectfully submit this brief on appeal from the Law Division’s various Orders dismissing all defendants named in the first amended complaint, either before amendment or after amendment, along with an Order denying Appellants’ leave to file a second amended complaint.  The Orders adverse to Appellants were chronologically entered in the Table of Orders and Judgment Appealed from and are restated as follows:\(^1\) (1)  Order filed 8-30-2019, granting dismissal and/or summary judgment in favor of defendant [...] and defendant [...], Pa972, Pa984 (2)
[brief] The Record Does Not Support The Assertion That The Board Was Permitted To Review All the Application Materials.  Finally, the Board relies upon the resolution as support that the Board did review the full application materials and thoroughly considered all the application materials.  (BDb13).  Applicant again makes the same argument.  (ADb23).  The transcript does not support that finding and in fact contradicts it.  When board members tried to ask questions on the application materials, such as the stormwater management issues, the Board Attorney prohibited the cross-examination on topics outside the limited testimony provided by Applicant’s witnesses on the subdivision lines.  (1T40-19 to 1T40-24).  The Board Attorney stated “we really need to keep this separate and apart from the site plan and all those issues that will occur then. ” (1T40-19 to 1T40-21).  The Applicant’s attorney also responded and stated “that is part of site plan.  Let me answer your, your question sir.  Number one, that is part of site plan review.  That’s in the file for that…  That is not part of this application. ” (1T41-16 to 1T41-23).  Applicant’s attorney further stated that “we’re not going to testify about [the development that will be reviewed as part of the site plan].  (1T42-3 to 1T42-20).  Plaintiffs argued during the hearing that the language of [...] Ordinances §§ 142-77 and 142-78 required a full review of the application materials and not just a limited review of the proposed new lot lines.  (1T56-6 to 1T61-17).  The Board Attorney refused to allow such discussions and stated, “all of that is going to be dealt with at site plan. ” (1T57-16 to 1T58-2).
[brief] ”  *Williams v. Dep't of Corr.*, 330 N.J. Super. 197, 204 (App. Div. 2000), citing *State-Operated School District of the City of Newark v. Gaines*, 309 N.J. Super. 327, 332 (App.Div.), *certif. denied*, 156 N.J. 381 (1998); *Chou v. Rutgers*, 283 N.J. Super. 524, 539 (App.Div. 1995), *certif. denied*, 145 N.J. 374 (1996).  “The scope of our appellate review of judgment entered in a non-jury case, as here, we note that our courts have held that the findings on which it is based should not be disturbed unless ‘…they are so wholly insupportable as to result in a denial of justice,’ and that the appellate court should exercise its original fact finding jurisdiction sparingly and in none but a clear case where there is no doubt about the matter.
[directive] Czy rozumie Pan(i) również, że zgodnie z tym samym Międzystanowym Porozumieniem b. [Tak/Yes]  [Nie/No] przeniesienie nadzoru do innego stanu może zostać odrzucone lub ograniczone przez ten stan w dowolnym momencie po wydaniu wyroku, jeśli stan ten ustali, że musi Pan(i) zarejestrować się jako przestępca seksualny w tym stanie lub jeśli stan New Jersey wymaga Pana(i) rejestracji jako przestępcy seksualnego?
[brief] ### TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | Cases | Page(s) | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|---------| | Barsel v. Woodbridge Tp. Zoning Bd. Of Adjust., | | | 189 N.J. Super. 75 (App. Div. 1983) | 19 | | Brill v. Guardian Life Insurance Company, | | | 142 N.J. 520 (1995) | 32 | | Cavanaugh v. Morris, | | | 273 N.J. Super. 38 (App. Div. 1994) | 33 | | Cohen v. W.B. Assocs, Inc, | | | 380 N.J. Super. 436 (App. Div. 2005) | 10, 11, 25, 35 | | Coleman v. Martinez, | | | 247 N.J. 319 (2021) | 13, 25, 35 | | David v. West Jersey & S.R.Co., | | | 84 N.J.L. 685.
[brief] “This testimony suggested” that the method of fingerprint analysis performed by most analysts “is a time-tested scientific methodology leading to an objective conclusion, as opposed to a framework that includes subjective aspects and as to which the [National Academy of Sciences] report has raised concerns. ”  *Ibid.*  The testimony that the “methodology itself was error-free . . . suggested that an examiner, who was faithful to the methodology, could come to an infallible conclusion[,]” and was false and inappropriate.  Ibid.  The same error is present in this case.  [...]’s testimony that fingerprint examination is an objective task that never generates disagreement among examiners laid the groundwork for presenting the “match” [...] found as a true fact rather than an opinion.  Recognizing this danger, other courts have held that “[t]estimony to the effect that a latent print matches, or is ‘individualized’ to, a known print, if it is to be offered, should be presented as an opinion, not a fact, and opinions expressing absolute certainty about, or the infallibility of, an ‘individualization’ of a print should be avoided.
[brief] Defendant argues that he could not have been convicted of fourth-degree animal cruelty because the State did not present sufficient evidence that the he acted unnecessarily or cruelly.  (Db16).  Defendant contends that the State was required to prove that he inflicted unnecessary pain or suffering, or prolonged torment, upon the animal.  That is not correct.  The State presented evidence that the defendant kicked, dragged and punched [...] multiple times.  This caused [...] to whimper, cry, and become very skittish.  The State was also not required to present evidence that the Defendant inflicted unnecessary pain or suffering; or prolonged torment, upon the animal, as per the statute, this is not a requirement.  It is only a requirement for the State to present evidence that the defendant unnecessarily or cruelly beat [...].  As discussed ante, the New Jersey Supreme Court has not defined unnecessarily or cruelly in the model jury charges.
[directive] This Directive shall apply to every law enforcement agency and officer operating under the authority of the laws of the State of New Jersey.  This Directive shall take effect on May 27, 2011, and shall remain in force and effect unless and until repealed, amended or superseded by Order of the Attorney General.  Every police department and law enforcement agency shall take such steps as may be necessary and appropriate to implement this Directive, and every department and agency shall review and, as necessary, revise its rules, regulations, standing operating procedures, and/or training programs to ensure compliance with this Directive.
[brief] Good morning, Your Honors, may it please the Court.  I do think counsel hit the nail on the head when she said, plea negotiations are similar to contract negotiations and one thing that the State would like to highlight is that the defendant, the appellant in this case, got the benefit of his bargain.  Counsel stated the facts very well when she stated there were multiple different indictments, there were different cases, even so far as this defendant had a pending case in [...] that was intertwined with his plea to run concurrent.  The defendant did get the benefit of the bargain when he made that plea deal, he got the minimum, 30/30.  There's nothing manifestly unjust about his sentence.  Additionally, although counsel argues that bargaining positions have changed, the law hasn't.  If the defendant pled guilty to first degree murder, again, he would still have to be sentenced to the mandatory minimum 30/30.  As such, we think that the only party that would be prejudiced here is the State.  The reality is, it's been 13, almost 13 years, since this incident has happened.  [...]: Do you have your witnesses?
[brief] Price v. Himeji, LLC, 214 N.J. 263 (2013)....................................................44, 45, 46  Statutes N.J.S.A. 40:55D-10 f ........................................................................................................ passim N.J.S.A. 40:55D-10 i ...........................................................................................................  6, 18, 19, 26 N.J.S.A. 40:55D-2 ...............................................................................................................  52  N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70 c. (1) .................................................................................................  51  Rules N.J. Ct. R. 1:3-1 .................................................................................................................. 19 N.J. Ct. R. 1:6-6 .................................................................................................................. 37, 38, 39 N.J. Ct. R. 2:10-5 ................................................................................................................
[brief] ”  Pa65.  The trial court accordingly found that “[[...]] did not have a ‘fair and reasonable opportunity to have fully litigated’ its claim for damages as a subcontractor in the First Arbitration. ”  Pa65-66 (“applying the entire controversy doctrine would be inequitable when considering that [[...]] did not have the opportunity to litigate its claim”).  Second, without any analysis, the trial court incorrectly concluded that “[[...]’s] claim was not ripe at the time of the First Arbitration since [[...]] had not yet obtained a final judgment in the arbitration against the owner [of the [...]] until after the First Arbitration concluded.