ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Lastly, [...] addressed Milltown Planning Objective Six of the Master Plan (“Future land use decisions should carefully consider environmental impacts including local flooding events and broader impacts through a lens of sustainability and resiliency. ”):  And then objective six of the re-examination report calls for addressing -- working to address environmental impacts including local flooding events through a lens of … resiliency and sustainability and calling for additional green space along the … Mill Pond additional … area that could be natural space and certainly act as flood storage furthers that goal as well.  So … and there’s also a -- an obligation to review the plan in the context of neighboring municipalities.  There’s -- there’s no particular … direct impact on neighboring municipalities.  It’s the -- the road network is -- is adjacent to the planned site, is within Milltown properties … not directly impacting … neighboring municipalities.  [Pa 31, 75-76 (3:25-4:15), emphasis added].  [...] summarized his conclusions with respect to the consistency between the Master Plan and the proposed amendment to the Redevelopment Plan:  So I don’t see any … consistency issues there, no immediate impacts.  So that’s the brief rundown of the technical obligations … and some recommendations for findings that the board may make as to … master plan consistency.  And literally nothing else has changed.  Nothing has changed with the plan.  It’s the -- the same as -- as we discussed and reviewed last time.  [Pa 76 (4:16-23)].  In response to a question from the Planning Board Attorney, [...] emphasized that his testimony spells out directly how the Amended Redevelopment Plan is consistent with the Housing Element and Fair Share Plan provisions of the Master Plan.  Pa 77 (5:2-10).  After discussing [...]’s testimony, the Planning Board voted unanimously to recommend the ordinance amending the Redevelopment Plan to the Borough Council.  Pa 81-82 (9:10-13).  No one appeared before the Planning Board to object to that recommendation.  Thereafter, the Planning Board unanimously adopted Resolution No. PB10-2022, dated October 12, 2022 (“Resolution”), setting forth its detailed findings and recommending the Mayor and Council adopt Ordinance 22-1516.  Pa 70-71, 166.
[brief] On April 20, 2020, Appellants acquired [...] (the “Property) for consideration of $163,000.  (92a-93a).  They acquired the Property as an investment, with the intention of renovating the Property and converting the Property from a two family to a three family use.  (92a-93a).  --- \(^3\)  References to the November 15, 2023 Transcript are referred to herein as 3T 11/15/23.  Appellants are the victims of a tragedy in that they lost the Property after an accelerated tax sale for a single quarter of real property tax delinquency followed by an accelerated in rem foreclosure process predicated upon an allegation that the Property was abandoned.  (92a-93a).  A.
[brief] (Da 1-2)  Defendant was arrested on these charges on October 27, 1995, and he was released on December 7, 1995.  (Da 3-4)  On March 26, 1996, defendant pleaded guilty to third-degree unlawful possession of a weapon.  (Da 3-4)  On October 15, 1996, defendant was sentenced on [...] to a flat term of 5 years.  (Da 3-4)  On April 26, 1996, while released on bail pending sentencing on Ind. #1, defendant was again arrested.
[brief] TABLE OF CONTENTS OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT’S APPENDIX – VOLUME 2  STATEMENT OF ITEMS SUBMITTED TO THE COURT ON THE SUMMARY  JUDGMENT MOTION PURSUANT TO R. 2:6-1(a)(1).  Statement of Material Facts submitted by Struxure Outdoor Inc ...............Pa199  Exhibit A submitted by [...] 2018 Executed Proposal ..Pa202  Exhibit B submitted by [...]  Structural Design .............Pa204  Exhibit C submitted by [...]  Final Invoice ....................Pa207  Exhibit D submitted by [...]  Riebel Report .................Pa209  Exhibit E submitted by [...]  Chew Report ...................Pa216  Exhibit F submitted by [...]  Mills Report .....................Pa219  Exhibit G submitted by [...]
[brief] Each and every defendant in the 2020 Action was also named as a defendant in the 2015 Action, with the exception of certain newly named lawyers and their firms, all of whom were already involved in the 2015 Action either as defense counsel or, in the case of [...], as a party.  Both matters also involved the same (or substantially the same) claims and legal issues.  Indeed, each and every paragraph in the Statement of Facts section of the Second Amended Complaint in the 2015 Action also appears, nearly verbatim, in the Statement of Facts section of the Amended Complaint in the 2020 Action.
[directive] Nicole’s Law Model Order and Notification Procedures  March 2, 2010  Page 2  Municipal Court judge enters a Nicole’s Law restraining order restricting the parent’s contact with the child, but (c) the Family Division judge orders visitation or reunification in a parallel child abuse/neglect proceeding or a dissolution or non-dissolution matter.  Again, the notification procedures set forth below are designed to avoid issuance of any such conflicting orders.  NOTIFICATION PROCEDURE FOR THE ISSUANCE OF NICOLE’S LAW RESTRAINING ORDERS (N.J.S.A. 2C:14-12 AND N.J.S.A. 2C:44-8)
[brief] He was no more or less the object of [...]'s conduct than was [...]. ”  *Id.* at 234.  In this respect, the Appellate Division preliminarily interpreted *N.J.S.A.* 10:5-13, which provides that “‘[a]ny person claiming to be aggrieved by ... unlawful discrimination’ may file a LAD complaint” to include the plaintiff as “such an aggrieved person. ”  *Id.* at 235.  Under the NJLAD, non-protected class members harmed due to their relationship with a protected class member may pursue a civil action against the perpetrator of unlawful discrimination.  *N.J.S.A.* 10:5-13; *O’Lone v. New Jersey Dept. of Corrections*, 313 N.J. Super. 249, 254-55 (1998).  These cases comport with the NJLAD’s directives to liberally construe the NJLAD in combination with other protections available under New Jersey’s laws in order to reflect New Jersey’s strong public policy to fight discrimination against any of its inhabitants.  *N.J.S.A.* 10:5-3; *Hernandez v. Region Nine Hous. Corp.*, 146 N.J. 645, 651-52 (1996); *Fuchilla v. Layman*, 109 N.J. 319, 334, cert. denied, 488 U.S. 826 (1988); Pukowsky v. Caruso, 312 N.J. Super. 171, 177 (App. Div. 1998); Grigoletti v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 118 N.J. 89, 96 (1990).
[brief] | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------| | DeNike v. Cupo, 196 N.J. 501 (2008) | 45, 46 | | Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314 (1999) | 36 | | New Jersey Div. of Youth and Family Services, 103 N.J. 591 (1986) | 46 | | State v. Abdullah, 184 N.J. 497 (2005) | 34 | | State v. Bryant, 288 N.J. Super. 27 (App. Div. 1996) | 27 | | State v. Cabbell, 207 N.J. 311 (2011) | 32 | | State v. Carrero, 229 N.J. 118 (2017) | 19 | | State v. Case, 220 N.J. 49 (2014) | 37, 38 | | State v. Ciuffreda, 127 N.J. 73 (1992) | 21 | | State v. Concepcion, 111 N.J. 373 (1988) | 27 | | State v. Dalziel, 182 N.J. 494 (2005) | 35, 42 | | State v. Fuentes, 217 N.J. 57 (2014) | 33 | | State v. Gentry, 439 N.J. Super. 57 (App. Div. 2015) | 21 | | State v. Hodge, 95 N.J. 369 (1984) | 34 | | State v. Jiminez, 266 N.J. Super. 560 (App. Div. 1993) | 37 | | State v. Jordan, 147 N.J. 409 (1997) | 24 | | State v. Kelly, 97 N.J. 178 (1984) | 22 | | State v. Lester, 271 N.J. Super. 289 (App. Div. 1994) | 44 | | State v. Macon, 57 N.J. 325 (1971) | 23, 25 | | CASES (CONT'D.) | PAGE NOS. | |--------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------| | State v. Mann, 132 N.J. 410 (1993) | 30 | | State v. Marks, 201 N.J. Super. 514 (App. Div. 1985) | 37 | | State v. Mauricio, 117 N.J. 402 (1990) | 39 | | State v. Melvin, 248 N.J. 321 (2021) | 33, 40, 46| | State v. Miller, 205 N.J. 109 (2011) | 44 | | State v. Montalvo, 229 N.J. 300 (2017) | 24 | | State v. Morente-Dubon, 474 N.J. Super. 197 (App. Div. 2022) | 40 | | State v. Poteet, 61 N.J. 493 (1972) | 37 | | State v. Robinson, 165 N.J.
[brief] ...........................................................................  20 Sullivan v. Port Auth. of NY & NJ, 449 N.J.  Super. 276 (App. Div. 2017), certif. denied, 232 N.J. 282 (2018)  ..........................................................................  14  Templo Fuente De Vida Corp. v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, 224 N.J. 189 (2016)
[brief] And, as a regulatory agency, the Council is subject to the Administrative Procedure Act, N.J.S.A. 52:14B-1 et seq., and judicial review, as demonstrated by the extensive case law challenging CBBMPs and related Game Code provisions as cited above.  See also N.J. Animal Rights Alliance, 396 N.J. Super. at 370.  In short, the Council is subject to a system of checks and balances where it is “circumscribed by other agencies [] and existing statutory norms” and must condition its regulations on the “essential purpose [it is] designed to serve.
[brief] Applying this rationale to the case at bar, this Court finds the MSRA is to be interpreted liberally and was intended to supersede all prior agreements or contracts, including the 2016 MOAs.  (Pa000026-27).  The Superior Court’s Order and Decision is consistent with both this Court’s prior decisions concerning the MSRA and basic jurisprudence regarding statutory interpretation.  The New Jersey Supreme Court has held that the basic rule of statutory construction is to ascribe to plain language its ordinary meaning.  Bridgewater-Raritan Educ. Ass’n v. Bd. of Educ. of Bridgewater-Raritan Sch. Dist., Somerset Cty., 221 N.J. 349, 361 (2015).
[brief] THE PRINCIPLES GOVERNING SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTIONS AND THE INTERPRETATION OF INSURANCE CONTRACTS REQUIRE REVERSAL OF THE TRIAL COURT’S ORDER.  (6)  The trial court and Defendants have tortured the well-settled principles at play on Defendants’ motion for summary judgment that, when taken to their basest level, require that Plaintiffs be afforded all favorable inferences and result in an unavoidable determination that: (i) Defendants cannot evade the very definition of Disciplinary Proceeding they crafted and under which Plaintiffs properly responded to the Policy Application questions, and (ii) the trial court’s attempt to define bar complaint and investigation from the dictionary, instead of from the context of attorney discipline, fails to justify a finding that Plaintiffs improperly responded to the questions in the Policy Applications.  The applicable legal principles are well settled.  First, Plaintiffs were entitled to the benefit of all favorable inferences as the non-movant for summary judgment.  Brill v. Guardian Life Insurance Company of America, 142 N.J. 520, 540 (1995).  Second, the same principle applies to disputes between an insurer and insured—the policy and application must be read favorably for the insured.  Gibson v. Callaghan, 158 N.J. 662, 671 (1999) (“Insurance policies must be construed to comport with the reasonable expectations of the insured. ”); Mazzilli v. Acc. & Cas. Ins. Co., 35 N.J. 1, 7 (1961).  In granting Defendants summary judgment, the trial court ignored these principles.  Instead, the court improperly substituted its own judgment as to the veracity of [...]’s statements—holding that [...] had dishonestly responded to the policy application questions.  Such determination by the court was improper because (i) as addressed above, Plaintiffs, including [...], were entitled to all favorable inferences; and (ii) it is not the province of the court, but of a jury, to make credibility determinations.  Conrad v. Michelle & John, Inc., 349 N.J. Super. 1, 13 (App. Div. 2007).  II.
[brief] The first element of fictitious party practice is that the identity of the defendant be "unknown" to the plaintiff.  Marion v. Borough of Manasquan, 231 N.J. Super. 320, 334 (App. Div. 1985)  The word "unknown" as used in R. 4:26-4 has been defined by case law.  Its meaning is not only that the plaintiff has no actual knowledge of the putative defendant's identity.  Rather, "unknown" means that the plaintiff had no knowledge of or reason to know of the identity of the defendant.  "If a plaintiff does not know of the identity of a defendant he or she will still be precluded from using R. 4:26-4 if, through the use of due diligence, he or she could have known of the defendant's identity prior to the running of the statute of limitations."  See Cardona v. Data Sys. Computer Centre, 261 N.J. Super. 232, 235 (App. Div. 1992); Younger v. Kracke, 236 N.J. Super. 595, 600 (Law Div. 1989)
[directive] TRAINEE NOTICE AND ACKNOWLEDGMENT  I, ________________________, understand that as part of the program of training at the _________________________________, I will undergo unannounced drug testing by urinalysis either through a random drug testing procedure or where there is reasonable suspicion to believe I am illegally using drugs or am under the influence of a controlled dangerous substance or cannabis during work/training hours.  I understand that a negative drug test result is a condition of my continued attendance at the above listed training program.  I understand that if I refuse to undergo the testing, I will be dismissed from the training program and from my law enforcement position.  I understand that if I produce a positive test result for illegal drug use, I will be dismissed from the academy.  I understand that if I produce a positive test result for illegal drug use, the academy will notify my employer of the positive test result.  In addition, I will be permanently dismissed from my law enforcement position.  I understand that if I produce a positive test result for illegal drug use or refuse to take the test, that information will be forwarded to the Central Drug Registry maintained by the [...].  Information from that registry can be made available by court order or as part of a confidential investigation relating to employment with a criminal justice agency.  I understand that if I produce a positive test result for illegal drug use, I will be permanently barred from serving as a law enforcement officer in New Jersey.  I have read and understand the information contained on this "Trainee Notice and Acknowledgment" form.
[brief] (Da95).  That Will of March 5, 2014 was also witnessed by staff members.  (Da95).  That Will contained the statement that the Testator signed willingly and voluntarily, was of sound mind, and not under undue influence.  (Da95).  The witnesses were members of the firm.  (Da95).  [...] signed the acknowledgment of the witnesses’ signatures for the March Will.  (Da97).  [...] testified that he never received a call from [...] to discuss any of the Wills with him.
[brief] After years without any funds for facilities improvements in Jersey City, as mandated in the Abbott litigation, the Legislature recently approved $1.85 billion for school construction and capital maintenance projects for all Abbott districts.  The only commitment of these funds to Jersey City is to construct a preschool facility housing 360 children.  (See 2022 Statewide Strategic Plan for SDA Districts, Pa1762.)  The State estimates over $5 billion is required to replace aged, outmoded buildings, Jersey City's most pressing need, and the State has no permanent funding mechanism for emergent repairs and capital maintenance in these buildings.  See Abbott v. Burke, 253 N.J. 591 (2023) (denying the Abbott plaintiffs’ motion seeking additional school construction funding); see also Abbott v. Burke, 249 N.J. 346 (2021) (appointing Special Master to conduct detailed analysis of cost estimates needed for facilities improvements in Abbott districts); and Special Master’s Report to Supreme Court, March 29, 2023 (detailing facilities needs in Abbott districts.) (Pa2307-Pa2393.) toilets, elevators or any type of handicap accessibility, functioning kitchens, specialized classrooms, and adequate air conditioning and/or functioning mechanical ventilation systems.  (Id.; Pa2061, ¶ 18.)  Many of these buildings require roof replacements.  (Pa1030, ¶ 255; Pa2058-Pa2059, ¶ 9.)  Because of overcrowding, the District uses temporary classroom trailers on school property.  (Pa2056, ¶ 5.)  The roof had to be replaced in the [...], causing all of its students—who have special needs—to be merged with classrooms in other schools.  (Pa2050; Pa2058; see also Pa2069) (noting the disruption of student learning caused by the building emergency).  The District had no choice but to pay for the roof replacement project from its operational budget.  (Pa2065-Pa2066.)  These and other emergent repair projects have—and will continue to—directly undermine and weaken Jersey City’s capacity to provide the essential staff, programs and services required for students to achieve the NJSLS and remedy the District’s T&E violation.
[brief] INDEX TO APPENDIX  [...] ........................................Da1-2 Notice of Alibi ........................................................................................................Da3-5 Notice of Motion to Suppress Identifications ................................................Da6 Pages from Defendant’s Brief in Support of Motion to Suppress Identifications ................................................................................................. Da7-8¹ [...] Officer Report ......................................................Da9 [...]’s Report .............................................................................Da10-11 Statement of [...] ..................................................................................Da12-15  Order Denying Defendant’s Motion to Suppress Identifications.................................................................Da16-17  Defendant’s Second Motion to Suppress Identifications ...............................Da18  Pages from Defendant’s Brief in Support of Motion to Suppress Identifications  .................................................................................................Da19-22²  Order Denying Defendant’s Second Motion to Suppress Identifications ....................................................Da23  Order Granting the States 404(b) Motion .........................................................Da24-25  ¹  Pages from Defendant’s trial court brief are included to demonstrate that “an issue was raised in the trial court. ”
[brief] He did not know defendant.  [T21-1 to -8].  On November 7, 2021, his nephew called him and let [...] know that a woman, later identified as defendant, was yelling at [...]’ nephew and had almost hit him with her car.\(^3\) [T21-23 to 22-3].  [...] left church and returned to his house.  He arrived at his house right after the police had left.  His nephew called the police and spoke to them after he was threatened.  [T23-26 to 24-8].  Defendant was not at the scene.  [T24-4].  [...] started mowing his lawn.  [T24-12 to -14].  While he was mowing his lawn, defendant came back to her father’s house and began using racial epithets and yelling at [...].  [T24-15 to -20].  She told defendant, “I’m going to kill your black ass, you fucked with my father. ”  [T24-21 to -22].  She threatened to have her “boys from Brooklyn” come to [...] to kill [...] if he harassed her father.  [T25-1 to -4].  [...] denied knowing her father.  [T24-23 to -26].  [...] phoned the police and filled out a complaint.  He could not identify defendant, but he could identify her car and license plate at the time he filed the complaint.  [T25-10 to -17].  On cross-examination, defendant questioned [...] if he was mistaken about her identity.  [T26-25 to 27-9].  He stated that he learned who she --- \(^3\)  Defendant objected to what the nephew told [...] as hearsay.  Initially, the court sustained the objection but later admitted it as an excited utterance as defendant had almost hit the nephew with her car.  Furthermore, the State was not offering the statement as a part of the matter asserted, but to inform the court about the next steps taken by [...].  [1T22-4 to 23-23].  was after defendant’s stepmother informed him that defendant was her stepdaughter.  [...], whose first name was not given at trial, knocked on [...]’ door approximately three days after the lawn-cutting incident.  [T27-10 to -16; T27-22 to -24].  [...] identified defendant in court as the person who issued the threats and used the racial epithets.  [T28-1 to -18].
[brief] EVEN IF THE POLICE OFFICERS' OPINIONS WERE VALID IMPEACHMENT MATERIAL, THEY SHOULD HAVE BEEN EXCLUDED UNDER NJRE 403 AS BEING UNDULY PREJUDICIAL.  (1T62:5-11)  NJRE 403 provides that relevant evidence may be excluded if "its probative value is substantially outweighed by the risk of [] undue prejudice."  For the reasons stated above, evidence that the police disbelieved the plaintiff's version of events was not relevant to the issue of the expert's bias because he testified that the officers' opinions did not impact his opinion.  (8T52:18-20).  However, even if relevant, such evidence should have been excluded as being unduly prejudicial.  Here, the trial judge erred on both counts: first, by ruling that the evidence was relevant as to bias and, second, that its probative value outweighed the risk of undue prejudice.  (1T61:1-9).  The admission of the hearsay testimony of the officers had the effect of distracting the jury from the true import of [...]'s testimony, which was that [...] breached the standard of care.  It was an abuse of discretion for the trial judge to admit this evidence because it had the potential to, and, it is submitted, did, "divert jurors from a reasonable and fair evaluation of the basic issue," State v. Moore, 122 N.J. 420, 467 (1991), which was whether [...] breached its duty.
[brief] The trial court correctly dismissed of Counts Six and Seven of the Complaint as a matter of law pursuant to Rule 4:6-2(e) as to defendants [...] and [...] finding that they are shielded from liability for Plaintiff’s claims based on qualified immunity because “the actions of these Defendants were required responses to a complaint of another employee which, by the very nature of their jobs, they were required to investigate. ” (See Pa11a-Pa12a).  These defendants respectfully submit that this Court should affirm dismissal of all claims against Defendants [...] and [...] on Qualified Immunity grounds.
[brief] Thus, an affirmative defense can be raised by motion, for example, so long as it is done in a timely manner. \(^6\)  The case law that [...] cites confirms that a Tort Claims Act immunity defense raised in an early motion is timely.  Those cases hold only that a Tort Claims Act immunity defense is untimely when raised years into a case, after completion of discovery and on the eve of (or after) trial.
[brief] c.  [...]’s Implication in [...]’s AOM  While [...]’s AOM does not mention [...] by name, it describes with sufficient particularity Appellant’s administration of medications and conditions that go directly to the bases of the Complaint, of which [...] was directly involved with.  Again, the discharge summary by [...] made on May 17, 2019, shows that he was responsible for Appellant’ medications and diagnosis of her conditions.  The first page of the discharge summary includes a section titled “Discharge Diagnoses. ”  The second page of same includes a section titled “Hospital Course,” which makes specific note of Appellant’s administration of Lovenox and Xarelto, which go directly to the bases of the Complaint.  These sections unequivocally show that [...] was in fact responsible for Appellant’s medications and diagnosis of her conditions.  Therefore, [...]’s AOM describes the negligent acts with such specificity to implicate [...] in the AOM.