ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] ”  N.J.S.A. 33:1-93.15(a), (b).  Further, any determination whether the terms of a contract, agreement, or relationship conform with the MBPA “shall be determined by a court of this State in the contest of a specific case or controversy among wholesalers and brewers only[.]”  N.J.S.A. 33:1-93.15(e) (emphasis added).  On its face, the MBPA confirms that in a circumstance where the MBPA is implicated in a dispute, New Jersey courts are the appropriate forum for disposition.  This will ensure that the disparity in bargaining power between wholesalers and brewers is checked and protected by a state tribunal and the MBPA’s provisions remain in full effect.  Given the clear language chosen by the Legislature, any analysis of a wholesaler agreement must be determined using the laws of this State, by a court of competent jurisdiction in this State.
[brief] After a defendant is indicted, the grand jury may still investigate the matter.  *State v. Francis*, 191 N.J. 571, 590–91 (2007).  “The investigative power of a grand jury does not necessarily end with the return of an indictment.  Rather, a grand jury investigation is not fully carried out until every available clue has been run down and all witnesses examined. ”  *Id.* at 590 (quoting *United States v. Furrow*, 125 F.Supp.2d 1170, 1172–73 (D.Cal.2000)).  After a defendant has been indicted, prosecutors may not use the grand jury’s investigative powers for the “sole or dominant purpose” of obtaining additional evidence to prove the charges against the defendant.  *Id.* at 590-91.  But prosecutors may use the grand jury for other purposes, such as identifying the defendant’s potential co-defendants, testing the legitimacy of the defendant’s possible affirmative defenses, and investigating additional charges against the defendant.  *Id.* at 592.  The return of an indictment thus does not sever the State’s ability to use the grand jury’s investigative powers.  Here, the State was permitted to send [...] the grand jury subpoena in an effort to follow up on the information defense counsel proffered—but did not provide—during the motion to dismiss hearing.  (1T31-3 to 4; Ma2).  Defense counsel represented to the court that the subpoena response from [...] read:  “‘After a complete search, my client could not find any information on their servers pertaining to the account . . . .  Thank you for your patience. ’  And that was it. ”  (1T32-7 to 12).  She insisted this email proved bad faith on the part of the State, (1T31-1 to 5), which became an underpinning of [...]’s ruling.  As the State was not served with a copy of this email, it was permitted to send its own subpoena to confirm this information.  And since the purpose in sending the subpoena was not to secure additional evidence to use against defendant at trial, but to counter claims of intentional bad faith, the State was legally permitted to send it at any time, even if the indictment and case against defendant had not already been dismissed.  CONCLUSION
[brief] Here, the revised lot grade for the property does include “mounding, terracing, or other devices” designed to allow increased building height because it raises the grade for all six (6) buildings.  The Applicant’s site plan shows, among other things, that the revised lot grade slopes upward from the street level on [...] from an elevation of 13’ to an elevation of 18’ as a result of fill proposed by the applicant.  (Pa55-59).  Moreover, the elevated lot grade of the Application includes “mounding, terracing, or other devices” increasing the elevation of the buildings from the original lot grade.  The Ordinance is clear in its language of “mounding, terracing, or other devices,” which means only one of these conditions need to exist to use the original lot grade, not the revised lot grade for building height.  (Pa60-62)(emphasis added).  Nevertheless, the trial court erred in not making any determination whether the revised lot grade was the result of “mounding, terracing, or other devices. ”  The failure of the trial Court to address this issue does not sufficiently provide the proper and thorough interpretation of the Building Height Ordinance under de novo review, and should result in the reversal of the trial court’s opinion.
[brief] [...]  Signed August 17, 2023  Attorneys and Law Firms  [...], [...], Boston, MA, [...], [...], Glastonbury, CT, [...], Gordon Rees Scully Mansukhani LLP, New York, NY, for Plaintiff-Counter Defendant [...].  [...], [...], Boston, MA, for [...], [...]  [...], [...], Morristown, NJ, for Defendant-Third-Party Plaintiff-Counter Claimant/Defendant.  ORDER
[brief] The trial court’s October 6, 2023 order denying plaintiff’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict should be affirmed.  Even if the Court were to reach the merits of Plaintiff’s Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict, which, given the above, it should not, Plaintiff fails to present clear and convincing evidence that any trial decisions constituted a miscarriage of justice under the law.  A jury verdict should not be undone merely because reasonable minds might have reached different conclusions based on the evidence.  See Besler v. Bd. of Educ. of W. Windsor-Plainsboro Reg’l Sch. Dist., 201 N.J. 544, 572 (2010); see also, Dolson v. Anastasia, 55 N.J. 2, 5 (1969).  A motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict should be granted only: if, having given due regard to the opportunity of the jury to pass upon the credibility of the witnesses, it clearly and convincingly appears that there was a miscarriage of justice under the law ....The purpose of [a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict] is to correct clear error or mistake by the jury, and not for the judge to substitute his judgment for that of the jury merely because he would have reached the opposite conclusion.  Barber v. ShopRite of Englewood & Associates, Inc., 406 N.J. Super. 32, 51-52 (App. Div. 2009) (emphasis added, internal citations and quotations omitted).  The test to be applied by the trial court on a judgment notwithstanding the verdict is whether the evidence, together with the legitimate inferences therefrom, could sustain a judgment in favor of the party opposing the motion.  Finnegan v. Haver Mfg. Corp., 60 N.J. 413 (1972).  The trial court is not concerned with the worth, nature, or extent of the evidence, but only with its existence.  Dolson at 6 (1969).  On a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, it is not within the province of the court to speculate upon the course of deliberations of a jury but merely to determine whether, as matter of law, any one possible theory of liability is substantiated by evidence taken as a whole in order to support verdict.  Lamendola v. Mizell, 115 N.J. Super. 514, 527 (Law Div. 1971).  A court “must accept as true all evidence supporting the position of the party defending against the motion and must accord that party the benefit of all legitimate inferences which can be deduced from the evidence. ”  Besler, 201 N.J. at 572 (citing Lewis v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 155 N.J. 544, 567, 715 A.2d 967 (1998))  This approach respects the jury’s singular role in resolving “disputed factual matters. ”  Id.  Here, and as described in depth under Point II below as relating to Plaintiff’s Motion for a New Trial, there is no clear and convincing evidence of a miscarriage of justice under the law.  The jury had the opportunity to assess the credibility of the witnesses, including Plaintiff’s expert, to consider the extensive evidence before it, and render a verdict accordingly.  Giving all favorable inferences to the Defendant in this matter, the trial court’s October 6, 2023 order denying Plaintiff’s Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict must be affirmed.
[brief] Cox & Koenig, New Jersey Zoning and Land Use Administration, (GANN, 2023) § 19-6.2 (citations omitted).  “[A] condition may become unreasonable through changed circumstances or may be revealed as unnecessary and may be reconsidered by board in later years. ”  Id. (citing Cohen v. Fair Lawn, 85 N.J. Super. 234 (App. Div. 1964)).  This is acknowledged by the Respondents in their Opposition Brief.  ROB at 58.
[brief] 1T Transcript of Motions in Limine Dated July 11, 2023  2T Transcript of Trial Dated July 12, 2023  3T Transcript of Trial Dated July 13, 2023  4T Transcript of Trial Dated July 14, 2023  5T Transcript of Motion for New Trial Dated September 7, 2023  6T Transcript of Motion for Reconsideration Dated December 1, 2023  7T
[brief] *Doggett v. United States*, 505 U.S. 647, 651 (1992); *Barker v. Wingo*, 407 U.S. 514, 532-33 (1972); *State v. Szima*, 70 N.J. 176, 201 (1976); *State v. Tsetsekas*, 411 N.J. Super. 1, 8 (App. Div. 2009).  If applied literally, the principle would forbid the State from delaying the trial for any reason.  However, the United States Supreme Court has established a four-part inquiry for determining whether the right was violated.
[brief] *Dzwonar v. McDevitt*, 177 N.J. 451, 464 (2003).  “The evidentiary burden at the *prima facie* stage is ‘rather modest …. ’”.  *Zive v. Stanley Roberts, Inc.*, 182 N.J. 436, 447 (2005) (emphasis added).  Moreover, “[t]hese requirements must be liberally construed to effectuate CEPA’s important social goals. ”  *Maimone v. City of Atlantic City*, 188 N.J. 221, 230 (2006).
[brief] ”).  legal standard of creating the possibility of reasonable doubt that defendant committed the crime here, especially when considered in light of the weight of the State’s evidence in this case. ” (Sb21).  To be sure, a jury might have been persuaded by the State’s argument that it was unlikely that [...] would have known of [...]’s whereabouts because she was not following her normal work schedule on the night of the murder.  Perhaps the State would have presented evidence that they had adequately investigated [...] as a suspect.  But the jury might have alternatively credited [...]’s first-hand testimony regarding the previous shooting, found that [...] had longstanding problems with his [...] and [...], and concluded that there was a reasonable possibility that [...] murdered [...].  Indeed, [...] would not merely testify that [...] generally had problems with [...] and [...].  [...] would testify that [...] actually shot at [...] within the weeks or months prior to the murder.  The proffered testimony was therefore more than mere conjecture about a prior, hostile event.  Ultimately, “the issue is not whether the State presented sufficient evidence for the jury to return a guilty verdict, but whether [the defendant] was denied the opportunity to present a full defense -- to present evidence that would have allowed the jury to return a not-guilty verdict. ”  State v. Hannah, 248 N.J. 148, 190 (2021).  “That standard does not require a defendant to provide evidence that substantially proves the guilt of another, but to provide evidence that creates the possibility of reasonable doubt. ”  *State v. Cotto*, 182 N.J. 316, 333 (2005).  [...]’s proffered testimony might not have substantially proved that [...] committed the murder, but the proffered testimony created the possibility of reasonable doubt.  As such, the trial court erroneously restricted the defense from arguing third-party guilt.  This unfair limitation on the defense allowed the jury to hear only conclusory testimony from the lead detective that all the other leads that the police had investigated “turned out to be dead ends. ” (11T229-16 to 22).  As a result of this prejudicial restriction on the defense’s presentation of third-party guilt, [...]’s convictions should be reversed.
[directive] Upon receipt of the Application and accompanying Expungement Order, Criminal Division staff will assign an expungement reference number to the Order and calendar the matter within 14 days for signature of the ex parte order by the Superior Court judge designated to handle expungements.  2.  Superior Court Proceedings Where the proceedings were dismissed, the person was acquitted, or the person was discharged without a conviction or finding of guilt on or after April 18, 2016 in the Superior Court, that court must, upon application by the person, order the expungement of all records relating to the arrest or charge at the time of the dismissal, acquittal, or discharge.  See N.J.S.A. 2C:52-6a.  The provisions of N.J.S.A. 2C:52-7 through N.J.S.A. 2C:52-14 (i.e., verified petition, service, and denial) do not apply.
[brief] Plaintiff is not arguing that there was a clerical error; Plaintiff is arguing that the plain language above the signature line binds [...], [...] and [...] to personal liability.  The court in Herz did not require a separate line for a personal guarantee.  In Herz, the court simply stated that under the facts of that case the signature of [...] did not create personal liability because a clerical mistake cannot create liability.  [...] also introduced evidence that the parties never intended to personally obligate him.  Id at *3.  In the second case cited, [...] vs [...], the court found that the signatures on the sublease were contained within the space between the typed headings “[...]” and “Guarantors”; no signatures appeared beneath the word “Guarantors”.  In the present case, the signatures of [...], [...] and [...] all appear below the guarantee language on page 11 of the Lease.  Therefore, Herz and Lawyers Guild are inapplicable on their facts in addition to not being binding under R.1:36-3.
[brief] [...] told the Law Firm that [...] was a Bergen County resident at his death.  Pa003.  Despite this, on September 14, 2017, the Law Firm sent correspondence to the Morris County Surrogate advising the Surrogate that the Firm represented both [...] and [...] and inquiring whether a Will had been probated on behalf of [...].  Pa133.  Indeed, the September 14th letter reads:  Dear Sir or Madam:  Please be advised that this law firm represents Mr. [...] Miranda and Mr. [...] Miranda with regard to their deceased father, [...] Miranda.  Pa133.  This September 14, 2017 letter was signed by Respondent, [...], Esquire.  Pa133.  Two months after receiving no response from the Morris County Surrogate, on December 11, 2017, the Law Firm telephoned the Morris County Surrogate to inquire if a Will for [...] was probated.  Pa003.  The Morris County Surrogate told the Firm no Will was probated in Morris County.  Pa003.  On February 13, 2018, the Firm filed a Verified Complaint in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Probate Part, Bergen County, Docket No.: [...] (the “underlying action”).
[brief] The [...] Zoning Ordinances Permit Mixed Uses Of More Than One Principal Use On Property In The Industrial Zone.  (5T 25-11 to 28-7).  [...] Ordinance § 250-4 expressly permits “mixed uses of more than one principal commercial or industrial use . . . on one lot if the Planning Board finds that the uses are part of a single site plan. ” (Pa3-Pa13) (emphasis added).
[brief] The exclusion of the POS from the list of “Governing Documents”, and the fact that it was never signed by plaintiffs, precludes the Appellants from relying on the missing waiver language contained therein.  Defendants do not cite a single case holding that the language required by Atalese can be inserted into a huge tome of a document which is separate from the arbitration clause and unsigned by the parties.  It is clear from Atalese and Kernahan that the language informing the consumer that the consumer is waiving his or her right to proceed in court must be in the arbitration clause itself and not in some separate, unsigned document, and that the consumer must “clearly assent” to the waiver of right to proceed in court.  This was the law even before Atalese.
[brief] When the State doesn’t put forward the information necessary to meet its burden, the evidence must be suppressed.  See State v. Nyema, 249 N.J. 509, 534 (2022) (suppressing evidence found in a search following a car stop in part because the State failed to put in the record how long after long after a robbery a 9-1-1 call was made and how far after that call the officers arrived).  Further, it is the State, when asked how it was using the 9-1-1 call, who argued that it was not being used for the truth of the matter asserted.  (1T 13-5 to 11)  This response is arguably a waiver of any reliance on the 9-1-1 call as substantive evidence on the part of the State.  Nonetheless, the trial court considered it substantively.  The court explicitly wrote in its opinion that it considered the call, explaining that “[t]he dispatcher call, which the officer relied on, was not enough to justify the stop. ”  (Pa 65)  The court explained plainly that “the 9-1-1 call has no corroboration,” which is why evidence must be suppressed.
[brief] .................................................................  28  A. [...] Should be Reinstated .................  28 B. CEP  Defendants Should Be Reinstated ....................  42  II  BECAUSE THE "AFFIDAVIT OF MERIT" ACT IS INAPPLICABLE TO THE CLAIMS AGAINST THE ENGINEERS AND ARCHITECTS, FOR THEFT OF CLIENT WORK PRODUCT, THE GRANT OF SUMMARY  JUDGMENT IN THEIR FAVOR WAS ERRONEOUS AS A MATTER OF LAW [Pa641–966]  .............................................................  54  III  THE REMAINING DEFENDANTS SHOULD BE REINSTATED UPON REMAND SINCE THE SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT STATES REASONABLE, VALID CLAIMS AGAINST THESE DEFENDANTS [Pa3334]  .......... 61  CONCLUSION .....................................................
[brief] This Court’s 2019 Opinion (Da751) determined that the 1963 Agreement does not itself “definitively establish an easement”, stating (at Da760):  “Although the term “easement” need not be included, the terms “permission” is ambiguous as to whether the interest may be something other than an exclusive grant.  In addition, consideration of the surrounding circumstances leaves doubt as to whether an easement was intended. ”  The Appellate Court further found that the asserted permanent duration of the alleged right --- that must be in clear and peremptory terms --- was unspecified in the 1963 Agreement referencing *In Re Miller*, 90 N.J. 210, 218-219 (1982).  After a summary of Law as to easement and licenses, the 2019 Appellate Opinion remanded for a Trial for the Plaintiff to provide sufficient evidence of the “surrounding circumstances” to establish the intention and documentation of the parties in 1963 to create a permanent easement, and as to whether that easement/license or permission had been abandoned, terminated or expired.
[brief] THIS APPEAL IS NECESSARY TO GIVE THE APPELLATE DIVISION  A CHANCE TO CORRECT AN UNJUST RESULT WHERE [...]’S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS HAVE BEEN VIOLATED.  THE NEW LEGAL STANDARD SET BY THE TYLER CASE WAS NOT ADDRESSED AS PART OF THE PRIOR APPELLATE DECISION AND THE TYLER DECISION MANDATED VACATING THE JUDGMENT IN [...]’S CASE.
[brief] (Pa122a).  [...] was responsible for inmate counts in that unit during his shift.  *Ibid.*  [...] testified that during third shift inmate counts, officers needed to ensure a human body was alive in each bed by kicking the bed, as taught at the police academy and Edna Mahan.  *Ibid.*  On the night in question, [...] spoke to [...] in the food preparation room for a little while and saw [...] watching television and napping during the shift.  (Pa0122a-Pa123a).  Around 5:15 a.m., [...] was informed by an inmate that someone was on top of the fire escape in Stowe Two.  (Pa123a).  [...] asked [...] to look around.  Ibid.  [...] identified [...], who was housed in a housing wing under his purview.  Ibid.  [...] went to look at [...]’s bed and saw that it was made and vacant.  Ibid.  [...] was not at Edna Mahan the night of the incident.
[brief] *  June 7, 2023 ruling on admissibility of hearsay  Ruling at 2T33-5 (no opinion)  No intermediate decision *  June 7, 2023 failure to give limiting instruction on identification  No instruction given (issue not raised below)  No intermediate decision *  June 6, 2023 ruling on admissibility of video  Admitted in evidence over objection at 1T88-14 to 1T88-20  Oral opinion is at 1T70-21 to 1T72-2  No intermediate decision *  June 7, 2023 denial of motion for acquittal  Ruling and opinion are at 2T56-17 to 2T59-9  No intermediate decision *  June 7, 2023 failure to strike portions of summation Not raised below
[brief] Perhaps most damning to [...]’ claim, in response to [...]’s request to revise the proposal, [...] provided Proposal Three, adding back insurance costs based on its unenrollment from the CCIP.  (TRVa1488.)  As the trial court observed in its Supplemental Statement of Reasons, [...] employees admitted nine times, without objection, that its work at the Project was not covered by the CCIP.  (SSR p.30-31, TRVa1360-1361.)  Moreover, [...]’s understanding that it was not enrolled based on its demolition work is supported by the fact that, upon receipt of the Hood Lawsuit, it tendered its defense and indemnity to its direct liability carriers, and not to the CCIP.  Welcome v. Just Apts., LLC, 2008 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2466 (App. Div. July 11, 2018) (deriving intent based on which carrier a contractor forwarded a claim).
[brief] In language that, as shown below, fits like a glove given what the ALJ and the Commissioner did here, the Supreme Court has explained that “[p]ersons subject to regulation are entitled to something more than a general declaration of statutory purpose to guide their conduct before they are restricted . . . by an agency for what it then decides was wrong from its hindsight conception of what the public interest requires in the particular situation. ”  *Id.*  In other words, agency rulemaking is “necessary both to inform the public and guide the agency in discharging its authorized function.
[brief] (Pa20).  On October 28, 2021, the State Board issued a written decision.  (Pa17-Pa20).  In its written decision, the State Board found [...]’s “conduct in drinking alcohol at work, along with bringing alcohol to school clearly indicates a serious lapse in judgment. ”  (Pa19).  The State Board rejected [...]’s argument that it was bound by the penalty assessed by the arbitrator.  (Pa20).  The State Board noted that [...]’s position “would essentially hamstring the Board from exercising its responsibility and statutory authority on revocation/suspension of educator certificates, usurping the Board’s expertise and authority on these matters. ”  (Id.).  The State Board emphasized it “is a separate body and applies its own, independent decision as to whether the specific conduct established in the tenure proceedings warrants action on an educator’s teaching certificates. ”  (Id.).  [...] appealed the State Board’s decision to the Commissioner.
[brief] [...]’s July 27, 2023 Answers To Form C Interrogatories  On July 27, 2023, [...] submitted joint interrogatory answers on behalf of the [...] and [...] in which [...]’s own clients accused each other of negligent conduct.  See Da282-4.  For example, [...]’s interrogatory answers contained admissions that the [...] did not ensure that [...] received any written or oral instructions regarding the protocol he was supposed to follow while driving a dump truck on the job in question.  See Da282 (admitting that “[...], being new to [...] and new to the Parkway job did not receive any written and or oral instructions re the protocol for the truck drivers to follow on the job”).  The interrogatory answers also contained the allegation that [...] “started too late and missed a meeting at the Toms River staging area and no one from Earle gave him any written job instructions and orally gave him no instructions regarding the safety and use of cut-throughs”.  Da283.  The answers further stated that “[...] did not receive any specific instructions on the designated cut through […]”, Da284, which contradicts the testimony of Earle foreman [...] that he repeatedly gave specific instructions to use the grass cut-through.  See Da225 (87:7-21); Da226, (89:3-25); Da219 (62:7-63:6); Da229, (101:17-24).  These interrogatory answers, in which [...]’s own clients make statements that conflict with each other’s testimony and which accuse each other of negligent conduct, clearly demonstrate the conflict of interest between Defendant [...] and the [...].  See Da282-4.  3.