ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Hurricane Sandy struck the Jersey Shore in 2012.  The [...]’ home, the [...], and thousands of other New Jersey properties were heavily damaged.  Following Hurricane Sandy, it fell to the [...] to repair New Jersey’s beaches, including private property such as the [...]’s.  As a condition precedent for undertaking the beach replenishment project, the [...] required the [...] in 2013 “to grant and convey” an “irrevocable, assignable, perpetual and permanent easement” to [...] and [...] via a Perpetual Storm Damage Reduction Easement (“PSDRE”). \(^5\) (Da521-Da530).  The [...]’s PSDRE\(^6\) transferred all rights to “[c]onstruct, preserve, patrol, repair, rehabilitate, and replace a public beach and dune system” to [...] and [...] (Da524), along with the right to “[f]acilitate preservation of the dunes and vegetation through the limitation of access to dune areas. ” (Da524).  In exchange, the [...] (and all property owners with PSDREs) retained the right to “construct a dune overwalk structure” to gain access to the --- \(^5\)  The [...] required all oceanfront property owners abutting the proposed reconstructed dune to provide a PSDRE.  The [...] executed a PSDRE on October 22, 2013.  (Da515-Da519).  \(^6\)  The [...]’s original PSDRE, executed on October 18, 2013, was rescinded in 2016 by [...], and reissued with the exact same granting language.  (Da521-Da530).  Atlantic Ocean below the mean high-water line, provided these access paths complied with federal, state, and local laws and regulations.  (Da525).  Accordingly, [...] and [...] – not the [...] – took control over repair, maintenance, and access to the dune – a right they will have “in perpetuity. ”  (Da521-Da530).  E.  The [...] Installed an At-Grade Dune Walkover and Defendants Took Adverse Action Months Later
[brief] ”  Rules 1:12-1(e) and (g) provide that:  “The judge of any court shall be disqualified on the court’s own motion and shall not sit in any matter, if the judge . . . (e) is interested in the event of the action [or] (g) when there is any other reason which might preclude a fair and unbiased hearing and judgment, or which might reasonably lead counsel or the parties to believe so. ” (emphasis added).  Certainly, an assignment judge in a county where two of the named defendants in a litigation are the county and a municipality in the county has discretion sua sponte to transfer the litigation to another county.
[brief] Claims subject to arbitration include, but are not limited to, any controversies or disputes arising from or relating in any way to your Account .  . . * * *  Also, controversies or disputes about the validity, enforceability, coverage, meaning, or scope of this agreement to arbitrate or any part thereof are subject to arbitration and are for the arbitrator to decide.  Any questions about what Claims are subject to arbitration shall be resolved by interpreting this agreement to arbitrate in the broadest way the law will allow it to be enforced.  (Pa136-Pa146 & Pa168).
[brief] Da031.  Upon receipt of the tentative decision, Appellant’s counsel declined the opportunity for oral argument.  Pa158.  On December 19, 2023, Respondent filed a Reply Brief to the Motion for Offer of Judgment penalties, seeking the penalties to be specifically --- 11 Brief attached, without exhibits, pursuant to R. 2:6-1(c)(2), only to evidence the issue of the verdict amount and/or Offer of Judgment penalties was not raised below.  Ordered against [...], in lieu of Appellant.  Pa159.  On January 4, 2024, Appellant’s current counsel substituted an appearance in lieu of Appellant’s trial counsel.  Pa167.  On January 8, 2024, Notice of the instant Appeal was filed by Appellant.  Pa168.  Also on January 8, 2024, Respondent filed her Case Information Statement in response to the Notice of Appeal, indicating that this matter was not yet final due to the still outstanding Post-Trial Motions.  Pa170.  On January 19, 2024, the Trial Court entered an Order denying Appellant’s Motion for a New Trial.
[brief] Therefore, the Board must look to the Land Use Element of the Master Plan for guidance when an applicant requests a variance.  As held by the Court in *Leimann v. Bd. of Adj.*, Cranford, 9 N.J. 336, 340 (1952):  The power [to issue a variance] must be exercised consonant with the duty laid upon the local board to protect the integrity of the general scheme from substantial impairment.  A grant of variance which has the effect of frustrating the general scheme and is tantamount to a usurpation of the legislative power reserved to the governing body of the municipality to amend or revise the plan cannot be sustained.  (emphasis added).  See also *Victor Recchia Residential Constr., Inc. v. Zoning Bd.*, Cedar Grove, 338 --- \(^8\)
[brief] Da26 ¶¶ 32–33.  By email to Plaintiff dated September 14, 2016, [...] warned that the “key with using [Attorney] [...] is to be certain that he cannot be duped into prematur[e]ly releasing your money.  You need to be certain that only a legitimate email (or maybe an old school fax?), and maybe followed by a confirmatory call with you[r] banker, will result in the release. ”  Da26 ¶ 32; Da92.  On September 28, 2016, [...] emailed [...] proposing an authentication process whereby Plaintiff’s bank would send an email to [...] when it had received the initial funding, and would include in that email a phone number and contact person at the bank who [...] must then call to confirm that the funds were in fact received by the bank before [...] would release the escrow payment to [...].
[brief] The law of the case is inapplicable here as this case is ripe for appeal.  The imposition of any penalty on the Defendant is unwarranted as previously discussed.  However, this penalty was imposed without any facts or legal theory considered by the Judge to support the imposition.  Certainly, the fraud of the Plaintiff was not considered.  Without a basis for a decision it is impossible to adequately contest the Court’s Order.  It is interesting to note that [...] rudely dismissed the inquiries of my counsel into the reasons for arriving at his decision.  On two (2) occasions he inappropriately commented that Defendant should sue the lawyer that he believed was involved in the negotiation of the subject agreement.  Respectfully, he should have been more concerned about the facts of the case and the wrongful and devastating financial impact of his rulings than the inadequacy of the agreement.  4.
[brief] . . ."  (emphasis added).  Additionally, a public entity is not liable for a dangerous condition of its property if "the action the entity took to protect against the condition or the failure to take such action was not palpably unreasonable."  Id.  To overcome a public entity's immunity under this section, a plaintiff must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that: (1) a dangerous condition existed on the property at the time of the injury; (2) the dangerous condition proximately caused the injury; (3) the dangerous condition created a foreseeable risk of the kind of injury that occurred; (4) the public entity had actual or constructive notice of the condition in sufficient time prior to the injury to correct the dangerous condition; and (5) the action or inaction taken by the entity to protect against the dangerous condition was palpably unreasonable.
[brief] Indeed, the matter is most akin to Riverside Chiropractic, as [...] “did not commit any glaring errors that would frustrate the Legislature's purpose in enacting the APDRA [and] correctly applied the relevant provisions of the statute to the facts at issue and clearly supported its finding that the DRP's award should not be reversed. ”  Riverside Chiropractic, 404 N.J. Super. at 240.  The present case, like Riverside Chiropractic, “is clearly not an incident where the trial court failed to decide the case by applying the principles dictated by the Legislature. ”  Id. (internal quote omitted.)  Accordingly, this Court simply has no jurisdiction and this appeal should be dismissed.
[brief] Morton, 155 N.J. at 453-54; Short, 131 N.J. at 61; see also Blanton, 166 N.J. Super. at 72-73.  B.  The Arguments Made by the State in Summation were Proper, Thus There was No Prosecutorial Misconduct.  Defendant claims that the prosecutor made improper remarks in summation which infringed on his constitutional rights to due process and a fair trial.
[brief] The assertions made in defense counsel’s opposition to plaintiff’s fee application have no bases in fact or law.  (Pa160-175; Pa169); cf. Balducci v. Cige, 240 N.J. 574, 599 (2020) (it is well-settled that “[a] reasonable attorney's fee may exceed the value of the recovery by the plaintiff” in a statutory fee-shifting case); Rendine, 141 N.J. at 322-337, 345.  A defendant’s counsel is not entitled to dictate the amount of an adverse counsel’s fee award under the MMWA based on its own subjective and self-serving beliefs.  New Jersey law requires that the Rendine standards be followed in evaluating fee applications under federal and state statutes.  See Rendine, 141 N.J. at 322-337, 345.  Most importantly, the underlying objectives of fee-shifting statutes must be preserved, i.e. ensuring equal access to the courts by providing citizens with both the right and the resources to access same.  JHC Indus. Services, LLC, 469 N. J. Super. at 313; Coleman, 113 N.J. at 597-98.  Accordingly, reversal is required.
[brief] On December 16, 2021, the [...] auctioned tax sale certificate no. [...] (the “Certificate”) to [...] for the amount of $1,314.28 plus statutory interest of $29.57, for a total payment by [...] of $1,343.85.  (30a,34a).  Holding this Certificate, [...] proceeded to pay subsequently accruing real property taxes for the first and second quarters of 2022, and on June 22, 2022, initiated an in rem foreclosure action against the Property (the “Foreclosure Action”) (28a-34a).  C.  Appellants’ Contemporaneous Efforts to Obtain a Variance and Renovate the Property
[brief] However, defendant’s argument is substantively without merit.  Under R. 7:6-2(a)(1):  A defendant may plead not guilty or guilty, but the court may, in its discretion, refuse to accept a guilty plea.  Except as otherwise provided by Rules 7:6-2, 7:6-3, and 7:12-3, the court shall not, however, accept a guilty plea without first addressing the defendant personally and determining by inquiry of the defendant and, in the court’s discretion, of other, that the plea is made voluntarily with understanding of the nature of the charge and the consequences of the plea and that there is a factual basis.
[brief] And under the strong public policy in favor of arbitration, the Lower Court Order should be affirmed.  Respectfully submitted, /s/ [...]  [...], Esq. NJ ID No. 418342023  Dated: September 9, 2024  September 9, 2024  Via eCourts  Honorable [...], P.J.A.D. [...] [...], [...] [...]  Re: [...] v. [...], et al.  Case No.: [...]  Dear Judge Sabatino:  This firm represents Plaintiff-Appellant [...].  As per the Court’s directive, please accept this Letter Brief addressing the Court’s recently published opinion in *Marmo & Sons Gen. Contracting, LLC v. Biagi Farms, LLC*, 478 N.J. Super. 593 (App. Div. 2024).
[brief] It is respectfully submitted that this Court should review and correct the Motion Judge’s conclusions of law and interpretation of the Federal 4th Amendment’s controlling authority in *United States v. Jones* and its progeny and also confirm, if necessary, New Jersey’s separate State constitutional analysis to remedy any future trial level errors by confirming controlling Federal law and establishing State constitutional principles as expressed herein, same at least equal to the federal standard in *Jones* with its clarification in *Jardines* and *Collins*.  Respectfully submitted  [...]  Dated: December 13, 2024  January 23, 2025  STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent v. [...], Defendant-Appellant.
[brief] (T41:8-T41:19).  In fact, appellant’s own OSHA expert, [...] after reviewing the entire factual record could not provide an exact cause as to how appellant was caused to fall.  Asking the untrained members of a jury to do so would be entirely speculative.  Appellant’s entire argument has been that from the circumstantial evidence, “there is virtually no other conclusion a jury could reach given the undisputed evidence”.  However, the Trial Court addressed this exact argument during the January 6, 2023 oral argument, and immediately came up with multiple potential scenarios that could have caused [...] to fall during the January 6, 2023 oral argument.
[brief] Under the liberal construction required of pension statutes, his eligibility for the benefit is not in question.  In other words, [...] suffers from a 9/11 illness and is disabled as a result.  He qualifies for accidental disability benefits under the Ricci Act standard.  [...] was denied the ability to register his presence at the September 11th terrorist attacks and therefore also denied accidental disability benefits based on an unsupported finding that Division mailed a post card notifying him of his requirement to register.  This finding is arbitrary, capricious, and against the substantial weight of the evidence.  The Division alleges that the two-year time frame for registration requires strict implementation to “verify applicants’ dates and locations of service as witnesses and memories inevitably continue to become unavailable and fade. ”  Rb9.\(^1\)  Under the Ricci Act, members who seek to amend benefits thereunder are not required to produce witness verification statements.  Additionally, there has been no suggestion that the dates that [...] was at ground zero (or other similarly situated members) need verification by the Division.  Neither is required under the Ricci Act.  Furthermore, almost two decades had passed since the September 11\(^{th}\) terrorist attacks when the Ricci Act was signed into law.  The assertion by Respondent that the two-year registration window was to rectify a fleeting memory is erroneous.  Respondent’s argument lacks merit.  The determination below was arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable and against the substantial weight of the evidence.  It should therefore be reversed, and retired Trooper [...] should be permitted to register his presence at 9/11 and granted accidental disability benefits.
[brief] (Da20).  The Defendant did not have the requisite monies to redeem the Tax Lien and make Plaintiff whole when he filed his second motion for reconsideration on March 5, 2024.  See T17-17-18 (The trial court remarked that there was still no competent proof or evidence that the Defendant had the necessary funds to redeem); See, Malinowski v. Jacobs, 189 N.J. 345, 514 (2007) (confirming that a lender acquiring a mortgage interest may not redeem a tax lien without first complying with N.J.S.A. 54:5-89.1 and N.J.S.A. 54:5-98).
[brief] (89a, 84:20–22).  The HUD-1 settlement statement shows $42,123.79 of the purchase price was used to satisfy the debt underlying the Foreclosure Action, as well as the $38,943.94 in outstanding unpaid municipal taxes on the Property.  (Da-ALL0246; 82a, 54:13–18).  These funds reflected in the HUD-1 Statement were disbursed from the closing on April 5, 2019.  (Da-ALL0296–97).  Ms. [...], another employee of [...], testified that she received specific instructions from [...] to disburse the funds even though a deed executed by [...] conveying title to the Property to Plaintiff had not been received.  (210a, 39:16–23).  [...] instead, according to her testimony, told her “I will get you the second deed.  I will drop it off or [...] will, and that was it.  They took their checks and left. ”  (210a, 39:24–40:2).  No second deed ever materialized.  LEGAL ARGUMENT I.
[brief] Specifically, in addition to voting for [...] and [...], the individual filled in the bubble in the “PERSONAL CHOICE” section of the ballot to signify a write-in vote and did so immediately next to [...]’s name.  Critically, they did not actually write in the name of anyone else, and so a third vote was not actually cast.  (Da9).  “Not every improper mark on a ballot renders the vote invalid, only those placed there with the intent to identify or distinguish the ballot or which have that effect.  The purpose of these statutes is to avoid marking or defacing a ballot in a manner which will either destroy the anonymity of the voter or will cause speculation as to the voter’s intent. ”  Matter of Gen. Election Held in Tp. of Monroe, Gloucester Cty., N.J. on Tuesday, Nov. 6, 1990, 245 N.J. Super. 70, 73-74 (App. Div. 1990) (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added).  None of that will occur by counting this individual’s vote.  Indeed, the only thing that will happen if this vote is counted is that the true will of the people will be effectuated.  Courts are required to enfranchise voters at nearly any cost, not disenfranchise them for technical violations.  See Kriso, 276 N.J. Super. at 344.  In failing to consider the merits of the proposed pleading, and in holding [...] to a legal standard that not only has no support but is contradicted by every available case, the trial court abused its discretion in denying the Motion for Leave to Amend.
[brief] Sat Below: [...], J.S.C. BRIEF AND APPENDIX FOR PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT-CROSS-APPELLANT WINDELS  MARX LANE & MITTENDORF, LLP  Attorneys for Plaintiff-Respondent-Cross-Appellant  [...]  [...] [...]  [...]  On the Brief: [...], Esq.  Attorney ID# 033652010  Date Submitted: August 5, 2024  #  TABLE OF CONTENTS | Section | Page | |------------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS ON APPEAL | iii | | TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | iv | | TABLE OF CONTENTS FOR APPENDIX | vii | | PRELIMINARY STATEMENT | 1 | | PROCEDURAL HISTORY | 4 | | I.
[brief] See L.W. ex rel. L.G. v. Toms River Reg’l Sch. Bd. of Educ., 189 N.J. 381, 410 (2007) (holding that the matter must be remanded to the Director on Civil Rights after the Supreme Court articulated the proper standard under which a public school’s liability under the LAD can be established, as a matter of fundamental fairness, because the parties were unaware of the standard the Court adopted and must be afforded an opportunity to be heard on that standard).  Put simply “the opportunity to be heard contemplated by the concept of due process means an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner. ”  Klier v. Sordoni Skanska Const. Co., 337 N.J. Super. 76, 84 (App. Div. 2001) (emphasis added).  These circumstances are more compelling than in McKenney.  [...] learned of the Court’s abrupt change in position after the conclusion of the trial and briefing was completed on post-trial motions, with no fair opportunity to move for a mistrial or new trial on that basis.  By definition, there was no opportunity for him to be heard on the controlling legal framework “at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner. ”  Klier, 337 N.J. Super. at 84.  [...] maintains that the Burt framework applied to the trial was indeed correct and must apply to mold the judgment.  However, if this Court were to accept plaintiffs’ position that Burt does not apply to this matter secondary to Mejia, then the matter must be remanded for a new trial, with active participation of [...] and [...] as parties to the case.
[brief] Defendant’s lack of objection below makes clear that, at least then, he too did not see any abuse of discretion or discrimination in the judge’s pre-screening of the venire panel.  Defendant’s post-conviction change of heart does not provide a basis for reversal of his conviction.  By utilizing pre-screening questions on defendant’s venire panel, [...] similarly and appropriately exercised the discretion afforded to him by our Court.  In its May 11, 2021 Notice to the Bar, which “provide[d] a comprehensive update on the resumption of in-person jury trials,” (Da101), the section titled, “Protocol for Virtual Jury Selection,” contained the following direction:  Other aspects of the voir dire process will remain consistent with in-person practices, with judges exercising substantial discretion as to how to question jurors.  Among other matters, hardship requests will be handled as provided in Section 4.7.2 of the Bench Manual (“The questions regarding disqualification of a juror may be reviewed at the outset along with hardship issues.  Jurors determined by the court to have reasons why they cannot serve can be excused immediately. ”)  In the virtual setting, this means that where a judge grants a hardship excuse (whether in the presence of the panel or during individual questioning in a sidebar breakout room), the juror may be permitted to log out of the virtual session.  Consistent with Section 4.8 “judges in their discretion may alter the sequence and wording of the questions as they deem appropriate, as long as the substance is not materially modified. ” (Da106)(emphasis added).  This language gave [...] the authority to pre-screen out of the venire panel prospective jurors that were unavailable for the scheduled trial dates or could not be fair and impartial in light of the nature of the case.  Following this pre-screening process, to which defendant did not object, [...] assiduously followed the hybrid jury selection protocol, individually reviewing the jury questionnaire with prospective jurors (who had been broken down into groups of 30) and seeking input from counsel on responses to these biographical and case-specific questions that gave counsel pause.  Nothing about the procedure employed warrants the reversal of the defendant’s conviction.
[brief] Ever since then, Defendant [...], a victim of the fraud upon the court, had to spend his time and effort to defend various proceedings against him and his law firm, while the attorney who had committed the fraud upon the court is unpunished and in fact is awarded with attorney fees of $1,311,832.94 in the instant case.  During the past eleven (11) years, Mr. [...] has sustained reputational damages and financial damages in defending the false claims against --- 36  An attorney owes to his client the duty of fidelity, but he also owes the duty of good faith and honorable dealing to the judicial tribunals before whom he practices his profession.  He is an officer of the court—a minister in the temple of justice.  His high vocation is to correctly inform the court upon the law and the facts of the case, and to aid it in doing justice and arriving at correct conclusions.  See id. at 249.  An attorney owes his first duty to the court.  He assumed his obligation toward it before he ever has a client.