ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] .................................................................9 Vizzoni v. B.M.D., 459 N.J. Super. 554 (App. Div. 2019) ...............................................................10 Zaza v. Marquess & Nell, Inc., 144 N.J. 34 (1996) .........................................................................................6, 7, 16 Statutes N.J.S.A. 2A:58C-1 ........................................................................................................11 N.J.S.A. 2A:58C-2 ........................................................................................................7, 8 New Jersey Product Liability Act, N.J.S.A. 2A:58C–1 to –11 ......................................6 Other Authorities [...], Labor Market Information https://www.nj.gov/labor/labormarketinformation/tools-resources/publications-reports/industrysectorfocus.shtml ..................................................2 [...], Member Companies, https://hinj.org/member-companies/ ....................................5 [...], New Jersey’s Life Sciences By the Numbers, https://hinj.org/new-jersey-by-the-numbers/ .............................................................1 [...], About Us, http://www.njbia.org/JoinNJBIA/About.aspx
[directive] One such exception is when one person in a communication decides to intercept (e.g., record) the conversation.  As long as this person is a part of the conversation, such recording is lawful.  But if the person stops being a party to the conversation (e.g., he or she walks away from the group or turns the telephone over to someone else), it is no longer lawful for him or her to intercept the conversation.  7.9.3
[brief] Nothing on the face of the statute supports that shifting definition, and [...] should not be held to a standard of being a mind-reader or code decipherer in order to obtain an approval of its rate increase filings.  The Department has only made clear that there was no way of knowing before the adjudication whether or not a rate was “excessive” in the absence of regulations or other guidance.  And things are no better post-adjudication.  There is still no way of knowing what [...] or another regulated entity would have to propose to avoid an excessive rate finding in the future, particularly given the nebulous public interest considerations that the Department relied on here and those it may apply on a whim going forward if this Court affirms.  The Department’s attempts to justify the result here instead confirm at every turn why rulemaking was needed before a rate increase application could be denied as excessive.  See Matter of Farmers’, 256 N.J. Super. at 621.  Put simply, any action taken under the guise of “excessiveness” is invalid as a matter of law.
[brief] After [...] filed the application below to release insurance funds with a distorted history before the newly assigned Judge, it was clearly necessary for [...] to respond with an accurate account.  [...] May knew that there were insurance policies with her name on them.  When she couldn’t get answers, the Court gave her the power to obtain this information through discovery.  The Interrogatories were served on the [...] for [...] in September 2020 and asked the specific question:  Interrogatory #37.-  What insurance policies of any kind did [...] have?  Please list name of company, contact information, and policy number.  (R-21).  [...] provided her Answers on December 4, 2020.  Her response was:  Answer to #37.-  Decedent had health insurance at the time of his death.  Decedent did not have a life insurance policy at the time of his death.  (R-31)  [...] May’s Notice to Produce requested the following:  38.  **QUESTION:**  “Copies of any and all policies of insurance on the Decedent’s life in effect at the time of the Decedent’s death. ”  (R-43)  [...] responded on December 4, 2020: 38.  **ANSWER:**  “Plaintiff is not in possession of any documents responsive to this Request.  As with all other responses, Plaintiff reserves the right to amend this Response should she discover documentation responsive to this Request. ”  (R-43)  Because of the deceit and false responses, the [...] and [...] were intentionally hiding the mere existence of insurance policies of any kind from [...] May and the Court.  This deception would not have been necessary if the [...] truly believed [...] was entitled to the insurance monies.  The lack of disclosure pertaining to these insurance policies was compounded by the fact that when [...] received the proceeds of the insurance policies, she deposited them into the [...]’s Bank account.
[brief] There, the notice stated that documents were "on file with the . . . Board" (Pa105 * 1); the jurisdictional argument was rejected because "[c]ommon sense dictates that any member of the public concerned about the application could easily find the address of the Board."  In the present case, the public was directed to the wrong address.  ⁸  The Westlaw version is at Pa105 to Pa109.  III.
[brief] In this appeal, Plaintiff/Appellant again attempts to thwart these undisputed facts and obfuscate the law by asserting two theories in less than two pages: (1) [...] had “apparent authority” from [...] and (2) [...] was a “borrowed employee. ”  Plaintiff woefully tries to establish “apparent authority” based upon [...]’s use of [...]’s Restaurant Depot’s card after he shopped on the day of the incident.  However, the apparent authority cannot be established solely by proof of the conduct of the supposed agent.  *Mercer v. Weyerhaeuser Co.*, 324 N.J. Super. 290, 318 (App. Div. 1999).  Rather, Plaintiff must show reliance on the appearance of authority in order to invoke the doctrine.  In this case, to succeed on such a theory, Plaintiff must offer facts that she relied upon [...]’s presentation of [...]’s card to her detriment to establish such a claim.  Those facts simply do not exist in this case, thus making the theory of apparent authority inapplicable to this case.  Nor can Plaintiff establish that [...] was not a “borrowed employee” of [...].
[brief] The application of [...] contained the following question #17:  Has any application of any type ever been made to the Planning/Zoning Board of adjustment of the [...] in connection with the lot in question?  Ja241.  If so, please state the following:  1.  Nature of application: Response-Variance application of [...].  Ja241  2.  Board before which application presented: Response- [...].  Ja241  3.  Decision of Board and date of decision: Response- see resolution, attached.  Ja241  “One of the reasons for the existence of this question is to determine if the same parties or their privies have previously sought essentially the same relief” from the Planning Board.
[brief] (3T180:4-15).  [...] further agreed that by way of the email, [...] directed [...] to pave four areas of the southbound Parkway other than the portion of the roadway where plaintiff’s accident allegedly occurred.  (3T180:16-181:11).  [...] also agreed that [...]’s email provided that “if time permits” the approaches to the bridge should also be paved.  [...] agreed that “if time permits” is not language typically associated with remediating a dangerous emergent condition.  (3T181:12-19).  [...] also agreed that [...] communicated a reasonable position when Wood testified at his deposition that he included the bridge approaches in the paving scope on an “if time permits” basis.  [...] agreed that it made sense to pave the approaches “if time permits” as the cost of mobilization would have already been incurred in connection with paving the other locations identified by Wood as appropriate for paving.  (3T181:20-182:16).  Accordingly, [...] expressly recognized the irrelevance of multiple documents upon which plaintiff continues to rely.  Finally, plaintiff’s liability expert Richard [...] has completely failed to provide an admissible expert opinion supporting the position that the subject alleged roadway condition actually caused plaintiff’s accident.
[brief] ”  (5T 89-14 to 90-3)  Most significantly, although during the evidence the prosecutor had not rebutted the defense’s exhibits showing only one person reappear from behind the truck near the intersection of East 16th and Governor, in summation the prosecutor replayed the electric company video and claimed for the first time that one angle showed “movement . . . . a second person” after Governor, who the prosecutor claimed was [...].
[brief] 194 N.J. 563, 585, 590 (2008) (finding that “unlike the facts of *Cedeno*, we are not confronted with an individual who was statutorily disqualified from being hired at all. ”).  Rather, the *Cicchetti* plaintiff’s prior offense occurred twenty years earlier, had since been expunged, and the record was devoid of evidence that the employer had a policy of not hiring applicants with a prior expunged offense.  *See id.*  The *Cicchetti* Court found it significant that nothing in the record suggested that the plaintiff would not have been hired had he revealed his expunged conviction to his employer.  *See id.* at 586.  Accordingly, after-acquired evidence in *Cicchetti* limited the plaintiff’s claims, but did not serve as a complete bar.
[brief] Hardy ex rel. Dowdell v. Abdul-Matin, 198 N.J. 95, 103 (2009).  If the policy does not protect the insured from common-law suits alleging intentional wrongs, it is illusory.  Insurance companies do not get to collect insurance premiums only to refuse to pay their insured when they need it most.  That type of conduct, as [...] aptly noted, gives rise to the insurance industry’s “unholy mantra” of “we collect premiums, we do not pay claims. ”  Lehroff v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Ins. Co., 217 N.J. Super. 340, 346-47 (App. Div. 1994) (citing Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. United Ins. Co., 264 N.J. Super. 460, 491 (App. Div. 1993)).  Defendants’ position seems to be exactly that.  For the foregoing reasons and those stated in plaintiff’s Opening brief, the C5 exclusion is contrary to the legislative intent and the comprehensive statutory scheme for “seamless coverage” of workplace injuries.
[brief] ..................................................................................................................  30  Jacobs v. Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co., 452 N.J. Super. 494, 502 (App. Div. 2017)  ..................................................................................................................  29  Lehmann v. Toys 'R' Us, 132 N.J. 587, 603-04 (1993)  .............................................................  32  Lockley v. Dep't of Corr., 177 N.J. 413, 433 (2003)
[brief] Moreover, Defendant’s testimony included an analysis and assumptions related to an unrecorded 1967 subdivision map.  Pa0086.  Unrecorded documents are beyond the scope of responsibility imparted by the Recording Act.  In addition, both experts eventually testified that the unrecorded 1967 subdivision map was beyond the scope of documents title agents typically locate and review.  On December 20, 2023, the trial court rendered its decision orally.
[brief] THE RELIEF SOUGHT VIA APPEAL UNEQUIVOCALLY HAS NOT BEEN GRANTED.  Via its §V, pp. 23-24, the Response argues that “plaintiff's appeal is moot,” because “the relief sought has already been provided. ”  This argument is materially flawed, because (1) it violates Rule 2:5-4.(a) and (2) is grounded upon misrepresentations of material existing facts:  A.  VIOLATION OF RULE 2:5-4(a)  This is explained via Violation of Rule 2:5-4(a) of §I above, pp. 1-2.  B.  MISREPRESENTS OF MATERIAL EXISTING FACTS  This was explained via §II(D) of Correction of Misstated Facts, pp. 4-5.  VI.
[brief] 3  STATEMENT OF FACTS  .......................................................................  4  A.  There was no written arrangement between the parties and there was no granting of a license from [...] to [...]..............................................  4  B.  There was no community of interest between [...] and [...].............  6  C.  [...]’s Motion to Amend failed to demonstrate it met the requirements of the NJFPA.  .................................................................  10  LEGAL ARGUMENT ............................................................................
[brief] (4T, p. 45, line 9, to p. 46, line 14).  As I also pointed out, Judge should know Appellate guidelines state Appeals must NEVER be based on dissatisfaction w/rulings.  He disregarded the substantiated evidence and arguments that proved my Motions, which substantiated the contradictions with the Court’s false claims & wrong Rulings.  “As such, the trial court [ABSOLUTELY did] abuse its discretion when it denied the [Appellant’s 2] motions for reconsideration [Oct. ‘22 & May ‘23].
[brief] [...]  [...]  Attorney ID No.: 014791974  190 North Avenue East Cranford, New Jersey  07016 [...]  Attorneys for Defendant/Respondent [...]  On the brief  [...] [...]  TABLE OF CONTENTS  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ...........................................................................................................iii  TABLE OF CONTENTS TO APPENDIX .....................................................................................vi  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT .................................................................................................1  COUNTERSTATEMENT OF PROCEDURAL HISTORY .........................................................3  COUNTERSTATEMENT OF FACTS .......................................................................................4  STANDARD OF REVIEW ......................................................................................................9 ARGUMENT ............................................................................................................................12
[brief] The Trial Court Improperly Shifted The Burden Of Proof To Defendants On Plaintiffs’ Conversion Claims And Failed To Consider Material Evidence Against Those Claims  The central premise underlying Plaintiffs’ conversion claims was that the Disputed Transactions were unauthorized distributions to [...].  Da00001 – Da00043.  However, the trial court did not make factual findings regarding the elements of conversion that Plaintiffs purportedly established against Defendant and instead solely focused on the adequacy of the explanations provided by her husband regarding the Disputed Transactions.  36T28-17 to -20.  By doing so, the Court improperly shifted the burden of proof on Plaintiffs’ conversion claims to Defendant to disprove them rather than explaining how Plaintiffs established a prima facie case for conversion against Defendant.  Id. at 28-1 to 52-25.  The trial court’s improper burden shifting constitutes reversible error requiring the dismissal of Plaintiffs’ conversion claims as a matter of law.  See Lembaga Enters., Inc. v. Cace Trucking & Warehouse, Inc., 320 N.J. Super. 501, 508 (App. Div. 1999).  The trial court also inexplicably ignored the following material evidence, which directly refuted Plaintiffs’ conversion claims and established that [...] had knowledge of, and authorized, the Disputed Transactions: (1) [...]’ (the parties’ accountant) affidavit and deposition testimony; and (2) [...]’s expert testimony establishing [...]’s possession and knowledge of [...] and [...]’s accounting records (including QuickBooks files), which he stored on his [...] work computer.  25T60-24 to 74-20; 26T25-17 to 26-14; 36T13-19 to 14-3; 31T44-19 to 99-1; 36T13-19 to 21-23; Da07299, Da07364 – Da07386, Da07179 – Da07180, Da07712 – Da07746, Da07387.  Had the trial court properly evaluated and considered the foregoing evidence, it could not have found Defendant liable for conversion because transactions that [...] knew about it and authorized cannot be simultaneously wrongful.  As such, the trial court’s failure to consider this crucial evidence produced a clearly unjust result, requiring the reversal of the Judgment against Defendant on Counts 5 and 6 of the Amended Complaint.
[brief] [...] testified at deposition that he could not recall whether he ever lied to [...] about the business of [...] and [...].  (13T78:6-21).  5  P-48 and P-50 together are colloquially known in this litigation as “Exhibit S. ”  [...] described P-48 and P-50 to [...] as balance sheets for [...], [...] and another entity, [...] (which held the Cottage Street property in Jersey City).  [...] had not previously seen these documents and did not participate in preparing them.  (5T72:25 to 73:11; 73:25 to 74:6).  In fact, [...] testified that [...] was not even supposed to have seen these documents.  (13T69:2 to 70:25).  This marked the first time that [...] had shown [...] balance sheets for [...] and [...].
[brief] Cell phone tracking data was acquired for [...], [...], and defendant’s phones for the night of January 9, 2019.  (20T:43-21 to 44-6).  This data showed that defendant’s cell phone was located in the area of [...] between 5:09 p.m. and 6:09 p.m. (20T:47-21 to 49-13).  Defendant’s phone was also in the area of his father’s workplace, [...], at 7:07 p.m. and travels back towards [...] by 7:31 p.m.  Ibid.  [...]’s cell phone data shows that her phone was at or near [...] between 5:56 p.m. and 6:15 p.m., at [...] between 6:35 p.m. and 6:45 p.m., and then back at [...] by 7:20 p.m.  (20T:51-16 to 52-23).  Between 5:13 p.m. and 6:30 p.m. [...]’s phone is at [...], but 6:58 p.m. shows his phone being at or near [...].  (20T:53-4 to 54-8).  At 7:04 p.m. and 7:06 p.m., [...]’s cell phone is by [...], and then goes back to [...] by 7:21 p.m.  Ibid.  These movements line up with the surveillance videos.
[directive] Admissibility of immigration evidence.  In most instances, evidence of a defendant’s immigration status is not relevant to the crime charged or to a witness’s credibility and therefore may not be presented to a jury.  State v. Sanchez-Medina, 231 N.J. 452, 462-63 (2018).  In the rare cases where proof of a person’s immigration status is relevant and admissible at trial, the prosecutor should not seek to admit such evidence without first raising the issue with the Court outside of the jury’s presence, under N.J.R.E. 104, and requesting that the Court give an appropriate limiting instruction.  D.  Charging, resolving, and sentencing cases.  As in all cases, the prosecutor should be mindful of potential collateral consequences and consider such consequences in attempting to reach a just resolution of the case.  Nothing in this Directive shall be construed to require any particular charge or sentence, to limit prosecutorial discretion in reaching a just resolution of the case, or to prevent the prosecutor from making any argument at sentencing.  VI.
[brief] This is an appeal by Plaintiff, [...], from a summary judgment entered in favor of defendants [...], Edison Police Officer [...], and Edison Detective [...] (the “Edison defendants”) on December 1, 2023.  While plaintiff has cured most of the numerous procedural deficiencies noted by the Court after plaintiff filed his initial Brief and Appendix, other deficiencies remain.  Moreover, plaintiff has included in his amended Brief and Appendix significant substantive additions (which were not authorized by the Court), including the presentation of issues not previously raised.  At a minimum, these portions of plaintiff’s amended Brief and Appendix, relating primarily to belatedly raised conflict of interest and venue issues, should be stricken.  Plaintiff also argues for the first time in his amended Brief that summary judgment was premature because discovery was not complete.  Finally, plaintiff’s amended Brief and Appendix demonstrate the inadequacies of his response to the Edison defendants’ particularized and documented Statement of Material Facts, which plaintiff does not seriously challenge.  On the merits, plaintiff’s arguments challenging the grant of summary judgment in favor of the Edison defendants is based on a mischaracterization of the pleadings and misstatements of the applicable law:  •  Plaintiff did not assert a malicious prosecution claim in his Complaint.  •  In any event, the applicable statute of limitations for a malicious prosecution action is two years, not six years, and plaintiff has abandoned any such argument.  •  This case does not involve a continuing violation.  •  The trial court properly applied the law of the case doctrine to the accrual of plaintiff's claims.  •  Accrual occurs when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of his action.  •  Finality exists for malicious prosecution accrual when there is a direct appeal and no remand.  Here, there was no remand.  •  Plaintiff erroneously conflated malicious prosecution analysis and double jeopardy analysis.  Moreover, plaintiff's double jeopardy analysis is flawed.  •  Plaintiff's libel and slander claims should be dismissed for failure to timely file a notice of tort claim.  ***  The trial court's Order granting summary judgment in favor of the Edison defendants should be affirmed.
[brief] [...]’s interpretation of the Settlement Agreement begins with Paragraph 23.  However, contrary to [...]’s assertion, [...] did not “suggest[ ]” that the term “Claims” in Paragraph 23 is “limited to claims involving Robert’s Revocable Trust. ” (See Pb11 (citing Db10, which actually and correctly described Paragraph 23 as including “a standard general release and waiver by [...] as to several [...] family trusts and estates. ”))  There is no dispute that “Claims” is broadly defined in Paragraph 23, but that is beside the point.  The parties agree that Paragraph 24 includes exceptions to Paragraph 23’s broad and general release, and it is the interpretation of Paragraph 24 that underlies the parties’ dispute.
[brief] (Da81).  Plaintiff discussed the problems with [...].  (Pa0062).  Plaintiff ultimately directed [...] to cancel the Construction and Purchase Agreements, and [...] cautioned Plaintiff of the risks of cancellation, including that he would have to sue [...] for any chance of recovery of any money paid to [...] and his companies.  (Pa0062 – Pa0063).  On July 27, 2010, [...], at the request of Plaintiff, sent [...] a letter terminating the Purchase and Construction Agreements and requesting that [...] return the advanced payments per the Purchase Agreement.  (Pa0063).  Mr. [...] responded on behalf of [...] stating that the site engineering firm retained by Plaintiff, [...], was to blame for the delays and that [...] had done all he could to facilitate the project.  (Pa0063).  On February 11, 2011, Plaintiff closed on a purchase of another home in [...].
[brief] This insurance coverage dispute has its genesis in a special meeting of the Association’s unit owners that took place on December 19, 2019.  See Pa452–56 (Plaintiff’s Statement of Undisputed Material Facts); Pa1041–42 (Defendant’s Response to Plaintiff’s Counterstatement of Material Facts); Pa470–76 (Certification of [...]).  On that date, the Association’s unit owners voted 6-3 to terminate the services of an insurance-company appointed attorney, [...] (“[...]”) of the law firm of Clark, Werner & [...] (“[...]”).  Pa454 ¶ 16; Pa1041 ¶ 16; Pa 472–74 ¶¶ 9–12.  [...] had appeared for the Association in a Derivative Action (also known as the “774 Case” based upon the first three digits of its docket number) which had been brought on behalf of the Association against [...] (“[...]”) (formerly the association’s liability insurance company) and certain former officers of the Association.
[brief] Kindly accept this Letter-Brief on behalf of respondent-appellant, [...], pursuant to R. 2:6-2(b).  TABLE OF CONTENTS  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT .................................................................1  PROCEDURAL HISTORY ........................................................................3  STATEMENT OF FACTS .......................................................................5  LEGAL ARGUMENT ..............................................................................7  POINT I  THE PETITIONER DECEDENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN SUMMARILY DECLARED TO BE AN ESSENTIAL EMPLOYEE.  (2T71-2 to 2T94-25, Ra28)  ..................................................................................7  CONCLUSION ..........................................................................................19