ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] This matter involves the straightforward breach of a settlement agreement by Defendant-Respondent [...] (“[...]”).  [...] was the sole tenant at a commercial warehouse located at [...] (the “Leased Premises”) pursuant to a lease agreement with [...].  After numerous payment defaults, [...] filed this action to recover $796,484.39 then due and a companion action to recover possession, both of which were resolved pursuant to a written Settlement Agreement.  [...] ultimately breached four separate settlement obligations without disputing three of them.  Despite this, the trial court entered an Order denying [...]’s motion to enforce the Settlement Agreement, and to enter the monetary consent judgment to which [...] had agreed in the event of a breach, without considering (or even acknowledging) the three undisputed breaches that independently required that relief.  The trial court’s Order should be reversed for several reasons.  First, it should be observed that many of the operative facts before this Court are not in dispute.  Indeed, [...] does not dispute that it consummated a binding Settlement Agreement with [...], or that: (i) it failed to make all required settlement payments; (ii) its subtenant failed to timely vacate the Leased Premises; and (iii) [...] and its subtenant failed to leave the Leased Premises “broom clean,” any one of which constituted a breach.  Nor does [...] deny that it engaged in unauthorized post-settlement dumping at the Leased Premises weeks before its scheduled vacation that has caused [...] significant and unexpected damages – and also constitutes a fourth breach.  The only dispute between the parties concerns the volume of post-settlement dumping that [...] undertook and the cost associated with rectifying it.  While the facts surrounding these post-settlement events are likely to be central to [...]’s environmental and property damage claims that will be the subject of a new action, they have no impact upon [...]’s right to enforce the Settlement Agreement following [...]’s three unrelated contractual breaches that also occurred.  The trial court mistakenly conflated [...]’s post-settlement claims arising from [...]’s unauthorized dumping, yet to be filed, with the present breach of contract claim that was actually before the trial court.  Consequently, the trial court erred when it concluded that “[t]his alleged ‘property damage claim’ is better suited in a separate action” without appreciating that it was not asked to decide a “property damage claim,” but rather a breach of contract claim for which the relief was clear.  [Pa2].  Any one of [...]’s breaches of the Settlement Agreement entitled [...] to present the monetary consent judgment for entry.  The trial court’s failure to enforce this unambiguous contract right, as it was written, was reversible error.  For these reasons, and those expressed below, the Order should be reversed and this matter should be remanded to the trial court for entry of the monetary consent judgment for the full amount due, together with attorneys’ fees and costs incurred to obtain that relief, as the parties agreed.
[directive] Id. at 379.  Rule, “[a] motion may be filed and an order may be entered Under that at any time . . . amending a custodial sentence to permit the release of a defendant because of illness or infirmity of the defendant. ”  R. 3:21-10(b)(2).  “an essential predicate,” “that To obtain relief, inmates must first establish, as a change of circumstances [has] occurred. ”  State v. Priester, 99 N.J. 123, 136 (1985).  As the Court found, the COVID-19 pandemic satisfies that requirement.  Request to Modify, 242 N.J. at 379.  18  The same finding logically extends to section 19(f).
[brief] There was suspected bloodstains on the gloves, which were sent to the New Jersey State Police lab for testing (24T47-1 to 19).  The police found that the gloves pictured in the [...] video were sold at [...] near [...] (21T8-1 to 21T11-5).  [...] had an account at that store (21T160-1 to 7).  The store had no record that he bought the gloves, but said it could have been a cash purchase (21T160-18 to 25).  The police tested the various samples of the duct tape and the blanket used on [...] for DNA evidence (21T162-10 to 17).  The parties stipulated that both defendant and [...] were excluded as contributors to DNA evidence found on the duct tape from the blanket placed over the victim's head (21T162-3 to 21T163-3).
[brief] (Aa22-24).  [...] alternatively requested an evidentiary hearing if the Commission determined there were material facts in dispute.  (Aa24).  On June 7, 2023, [...] submitted its response to [...]’s appeal to the Commission.  (Aa25-36).  On June 27, 2023, [...] submitted to the Commission its reply to [...]’s response. (Aa39-45).  On September 20, 2023\(^4\), the Commission upheld [...]’s determination that [...] had violated the State Policy.  (Aa1-12).  The Commission reasoned that the lack of notice to [...] of the extension request and not informing him of his right to appeal, did not invalidate [...]’s determination given these violations did not impair the integrity of the investigation and its conclusions.  (Aa10).  The Commission further concluded that [...] had jurisdiction to investigate [...]’s complaint given that, despite being on union leave, [...] was still subject to the State Policy under N.J.A.C. 4A:7-3.1(a)1 as [...]’s union duties involved doing business with the State.
[brief] [Pa293].  Here, based on the determinations made in the Prior Action, which are equally applicable here, the trial court recognized that Appellants would not be able present any evidence, let alone clear and convincing evidence, that the purported representations caused any damages to Appellants.  In addition, the reliance on such statements that are outside the parties’ written agreement is prohibited by the integration clause found in Section 10.10 of the Lease, which provides:  **Section 10.10  Entire Agreement. **  This Agreement, together with its attached exhibits and addenda, contains the entire agreement between the Parties with respect to the subject matter hereof, and any prior or contemporaneous agreements, discussions or understandings, written or oral (including any options or agreements for leases and/or easements previously entered into by the Parties with respect to all or any portion of the Property), are superseded by this Agreement and shall be of no force or effect.  No addition or modification of any term or provision of this Agreement shall be effective unless set forth in writing and signed by each of the Parties.  [Pa276].  Likewise, Section 10(a) of the Purchase and Sale Agreement bars such reliance, stating: “This Agreement constitutes the entire agreement of the parties hereto with respect to the subject matter hereof, and supersedes all prior and contemporaneous agreements and understandings, whether written or oral. ”  [Pa113].  By seeking to introduce these alleged statements, Appellants are improperly seeking to introduce parol evidence that goes beyond the terms of the fully integrated agreements between the parties.  Based on the parties’ fully integrated agreements, these belatedly filed claims are without merit and were justifiably dismissed.  As a result of Appellants’ inability to prove damages based on any alleged representations, since the direct and proximate cause of their damages was their own failure to pay rent, and their inability to augment the terms of the Lease and Purchase and Sale Agreement with these newly raised allegations, the claim for fraud was properly dismissed as a matter of law.
[brief] The Supreme Court’s Funding Remedy for the T&E Violation in [...]  To remedy the constitutional violation of T&E found in the Abbott litigation, the Supreme Court directed the State to develop and implement a two-part school funding remedy.  Abbott II, 119 N.J. at 385-389.  First, the State was required to fund comprehensive K-12 curriculum for all students in Abbott districts – termed “regular” education – at a level “substantially equivalent” – or at “parity” -- with the level spent per pupil in affluent suburban districts.  Id. at 386.  Secondly, the State was directed to provide funding for additional or “supplemental” programs and services designed to address and overcome the disadvantages of intense poverty, including preschool.  Id. at 373-375.  Following issuance of these directives in 1990, the State enacted two finance formulas intended to remedy the constitutional violation in Abbott districts.  On review, the Supreme Court found both to be inadequate and inconsistent with the remedial directives in Abbott II for regular education funding parity and additional funding for needs-based supplemental programs.  Abbott v. Burke, 136 N.J. 444 (1994) (“Abbott III”) (Quality Education Act); Abbott IV, 149 N.J. at 188-89 (Comprehensive Education Improvement and Financing Act).  In response to the State’s failures and to avoid further delay, the Supreme Court in 1997 and 1998 ordered State implementation of the Court’s own funding remedy in Abbott districts on an “interim” basis.  Abbott IV, 149 N.J. at 190 (describing “our chosen interim remedy”).  First, the Court directed the State to increase and maintain funding to the parity level, ensuring per-pupil expenditures equivalent to regular education spending in the successful suburban districts.  Id. at 190-91.  Second, following a remand proceeding, the Court approved a package of supplemental programs and services, including high quality preschool for all three-and four-year olds, and authorized Abbott districts to seek additional funding from the State for those programs based on demonstrated need.  Abbott v. Burke, 153 N.J. 480, 510-18 (1998) (“Abbott V”).4  _____________________  4  The Court in Abbott V also directed the State to “fully fund” the “complete cost of remediating the infrastructure and life cycle deficiencies” in district school buildings.  Id. at 524; see also Abbott v. Burke, 164 N.J. 84, 88 (2000) (“Abbott VII”).  To comply with this order, the Legislature enacted the EFCFA, recognizing that “[e]ducational infrastructure inadequacies are greatest in the [Abbott] districts  From 1997 through 2008, the T&E violation in [...] was remediated through the implementation of parity funding for regular education and needs-based funding of supplemental programs and services, as ordered by the Supreme Court in the Abbott litigation.  Abbott v. Burke, 196 N.J. 544, 563 (2008) (“Abbott XIX”).
[brief] In the alleged November 2, 2021 incident, he deemed the act of the unidentified woman as, “she’s having a bad day”, non-violent to the fact the woman was posing a serious threat.  For the November 7, 2021, he actually signed complaint on November 8, 2021 stating he does not know who the perpetrator was, waited until [...] approaches him on November 9, 2021 and proclaims she gave him the defendant’s name and then proceeded with the filing that concluded on November 10, 2021; opting for a lackadaisical approach, personal gatherings, other obligations, without regard to amend the documents for solidified identification of the actual perpetrator, and then testifies that his first testimonies are untruthful; that no one else gave him the information, had just obtained the information on the defendant.  **CONCLUSION**
[brief] See R. 2:2-3(a)(2); R. 1:13-4(a); Johnson v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 131 N.J. Super. 513 (App.Div. 1974), certif. den. 67 N.J. 94 (1975)."  [...] v. Keough-Dwyer Corr. Fac 375 N.J. Super. 91 (App. Div. 2005)  Accordingly, we transfer this matter to the Law Division, for further proceedings under R. 4:69-1, actions in lieu of prerogative writs, see R. 1:13-4(a), and dismiss [...]'s appeal pending in the Appellate Division."
[brief] d.  (1)  A person who violates paragraph (1), (2), (3) or (4) of subsection c. of this section shall be guilty of a crime of the fourth degree, except that the person shall be guilty of a crime of the third degree if: (a) the animal or creature dies as a result of the violation; [or] (b) the animal or creature suffers serious bodily injury as a result of the violation[.]  As charged against defendant here, (Da 43), the statute prohibits a person from purposely, knowingly, or recklessly causing or procuring the torment, torture, maiming, hanging, poisoning, or the unnecessary or cruel beating, cruel abuse, or needless mutilation of a living animal or creature by any direct or indirect means, including, but not limited to, through the use of another living animal or creature.  N.J.S.A. 4:22-17c(3).  See also Model Jury Charge (Criminal), “Animal Cruelty – Cause/Procure (N.J.S.A. 4:22-17c(3))” (June 7, 2021).  The three types of culpability above — i.e., purposely, knowingly, and recklessly — are defined in N.J.S.A. 2C:22b(1), (2), and (3), respectively, and nothing offends notions of constitutional due process by including all three types in the statute.
[brief] The Arbitrator reduced Land’s actual value of $616,635 to $163,035 approximately a 75% reduction.  Despite the rather parsimonious award, defendant in an effort to keep this case as simple as possible, did not appeal this issue.  However, most importantly it should be clear as established in Gallant and reiterated by the New Jersey Supreme Court in Liu, FF&E that functions as a unit with the building as devoted to a specific use is compensable as a matter of law.  Whether a pizza oven which bakes the pizza served in a pizzeria is part of a functional unit with the building would seem to be rather self-evident.  The same would seem to be true as to other tenant fit-ups that serve the use of the tenant such as the partitions that separate the waiting room from the clinical areas of a doctor’s office.  In any event, this is the province of the fact finder to determine along with the enhancement value as demonstrated by the evidence and the appropriate inferences that can be drawn from that evidence.
[brief] TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS  Order Granted Motion to Waive Defendant to Adult Court ................................Da1-2  Order Denying Miranda Motion dated 3-25-21.........................................................Da7  Decision Denying Miranda Motion ...........................................................................2T Order Denying Interlocutory Appeal dated 5-13-21 ...............................................Da8  JOC and Order of Commitment dated 6-30-22 .......................................................Da16-19  Amended JOC Order of Commitment dated 7-14-22..............................................Da20-23  Decision Denying Miranda Motion .................................................................(2T:3-20 to 80 – 18)  Sentencing Hearing on June 30, 2022 ......................................................... (17T:111-25 to 238-4)  INDEX TO APPENDIX
[brief] Dzwonar, 177 N.J. at 463.  a.  Plaintiff’s reliance on N.J.A.C. § 10:44A-2.8(b) “closely relates” to her complained of conduct regarding consistent understaffing at Defendant [...].  (PA000006).  (PA000089-PA000090).  Despite Plaintiff’s identification of authority applying to Defendants’ activities in their group homes, Defendants reiterate the need for Plaintiff to precisely state in her Complaint that “Defendants failed to justify reductions in staff coverage to a licensing agency or the Regional Assistant Director’s office” under the requirements of N.J.A.C. § 10:44A-2.8(b).  See Resp. Br. 9.  The details of what steps Defendants must take for understaffing should have held no moment to the Trial Court in its decision, and should hold no moment to this Honorable Court today, as the regulation is unambiguous that staff reductions require several additional steps, including: (1) documented approval by Interdisciplinary Team for modifications of coverage; (2) joint approval by both the Regional Office and licensing agency before implementation; and (3) a written response within fifteen (15) working days documenting conditions which must be met for the staff reduction.
[brief] Filmlife, Inc. v. Mal “Z” Ena, Inc., 251 N.J. Super. 570 (App. Div. 1991).  “There is a distinction between fraud regarding matters expressly addressed in the integrated writing and fraud regarding matters wholly extraneous to the writing. ”  Id. at 573.  In that regard, “where a contract contains an integration clause, the parol evidence rule bars the introduction of evidence of extrinsic negotiations or agreements to supplement or vary its terms.
[brief] --- \(^3\)  The State relies exclusively on federal and out-of-state cases to support its abandonment argument.  (Sb 20)  But it is New Jersey caselaw -- and not federal or out-of-state caselaw -- that is controlling here.  “For standing purposes, Article I, Paragraph 7 provides broader protection to the privacy rights of New Jersey citizens than the Fourth Amendment. ”  See Brown, 216 N.J. at 528.  Accordingly, even if [...] would not have standing to challenge the search under federal law, he does under New Jersey law.  B.
[brief] As articulated in prior submissions, the Board attempted to carefully consider the voluminous factual record developed between May 2017 and June 2021 in reaching its determination on [...]’s hardship rent increase application in August 2021.  While the Board certainly appreciates the parties’ requests for a rent increase calculation, the Board respectfully waives submitting a position at this stage since it contends that it did not act arbitrarily, unreasonably, or capriciously in its consideration of [...]’s application to date.
[brief] 91 N.J. at 144-45.  Indeed, there, as here, the Senate bill was substituted for the identical Assembly bill and given a third reading without the intervention of a calendar day.  The Supreme Court held that the requirements of N.J. Const. art. IV, § 4, ¶ 6 were satisfied because, “[t]here was, in constitutional effect, one bill that was properly acted upon by each legislative house,” and the substituted bill “validly emerged from each house of the Legislature according to the prescribed constitutional path and was duly enacted into law.
[brief] ***  If the present controversy arose, without more, only out of plaintiffs' failure to give notice, unaffected by other considerations, the foregoing principles would mandate dismissal of their suit.  But that is not the case here.  It is well settled that the notice requirements, being in the nature of limitations provisions, are subject to the application of estoppel principles.  Hence, even if there is no substantial compliance with the notice provisions of the Tort Claims Act, a public entity will be estopped from asserting this defense "where the interests of justice, morality and common fairness dictate that course."...
[brief] 2C:12-1(b)(7) | 2 | | N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1 | 42 | | N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a) | 41 | | **RULES** | | | R. 2:10-2 | 29, 30, 35, 41 | | **CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS** | | | N.J. Const. art. I, ¶ 1 | 17, 30, 35 | | N.J. Const. art.  I, ¶ 9 | 17, 30, 35 | | N.J. Const. art.  I, ¶ 10 | 12, 17, 30, 35 | | U.S. Const. amend. V | 17 | | U.S. Const. amend. VI | 12, 17, 30, 35 | | U.S. Const. amend. XIV | 12, 17, 30, 35 | TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (CONT’D.)
[brief] THIS COURT NEEDS TO UNDERSTAND THE FACTS.  Plaintiff had the $70,000.00 in her possession.  How can she ask for penalties related to her allegation of non-receipt of those funds.  Again, this is a situation where there is evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that plaintiff committed fraud.  Plaintiff should be penalized for her immoral, dishonest behavior.  Instead the Courts below have rewarded the plaintiff for her criminal behavior.
[brief] To the extent that the [...] alleges that the WQMP Rules do not require that surface water quality be addressed in the Consistency Assessment required as a prerequisite for this permit, that is inconsistent with the plain language of the WQPA statute.  The Rules do not limit consideration solely to wastewater. \(^3\)  The 2016 WQMP rule proposal and adoption made clear that if an areawide “WQM plan has additional requirements, or a wasteload allocation in an adopted TMDL has been established”—criteria that relate to surface water quality—“these must also be addressed in order for the proposal to be consistent. ”  47 N.J.R. 2531(a) (Oct 19, 2015) (rule proposal); 48 N.J.R. 2244(a) (Nov. 7, 2016) (rule adoption).  The purpose was not to eliminate surface water quality from consideration, but to shift the analysis from the areawide planning stage to the “permitting stage, when \(^3\) [...] asserted that Appellant “ignores” the rebuttable presumption, BP Rb15, but Appellants explained the proper role of the rebuttable presumption in its opening brief.  Ab21-22.  And contrary to [...]’s assertion, BP Rb20 n.16, stormwater conveyed via pipes or channels such as stormwater outfalls is a textbook example of a point source discharge, which requires a permit under the Clean Water Act.  detailed site specific information is available. ”  47 N.J.R. 2531(a).  Respondents also claim that Appellant should have pointed to a specific violation of the Areawide WQM Plan.  [...] Rb44; BP Rb17.  Here, Appellant challenges the [...]’s failure to make a sufficient Consistency Assessment as required under the WQPA and Rules.  To prevail on such a claim, Appellant must show only that the [...]’s Consistency Assessment did not rest on adequate findings or an adequate record.  E.g. Musconetcong Watershed Ass’n v. N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 476 N.J. Super. 465, 488 (App. Div. 2023).  II.
[brief] 11, 12 Tully v. Wu, 457 N.J. Super. 114 (App. Div. 2018) ........................................  15  Velasquez v. Franz, 123 N.J. 498 (1991) ..........................................................  15  Viviano v. CBS, 251 N.J. Super. 113 (App. Div. 1991)  ................................. 27, 28  Voellinger v. Dow, 420 N.J. Super. 480 (App. Div. 2011)  ...............................  27  Watkins v. Resorts Int’l Hotel & Casino. Inc., 124 N.J. 398 (1991)
[brief] The tradeoff at issue in this case is not new to our civil justice system.  Every day, during a deposition, a lawyer may want to object to a question that will -- in the lawyer’s mind -- elicit irrelevant information but is prohibited from doing so by Rule 4:14-3(c).  The drafters of that Rule understood that allowing objections on the ground of relevancy would undermine the efficiency and efficacy of a deposition -- and the securing of relevant evidence.  The relevance issue is preserved for the court if there is a challenge to the admissibility of the evidence at trial.  *Ibid.*  The question here is not whether a party should be arbitrarily compelled to produce irrelevant materials -- [...] and the [...] (and the trial court) all agree that it should not.  Instead, the critical questions are whether this Court should impose an ironclad rule that producing parties *always* get to decide which documents are relevant and responsive by means of a pre-production relevancy review.  Or whether this Court should allow trial courts to exercise their sound discretion and decide whether, in a particular set of circumstances, the parties should be directed to agree on search terms for the culling of relevant ESI information so that neither party has the final word in designating evidence as relevant or irrelevant.  Stated differently, the issue is whether trial courts must *always* adopt discovery protocols geared towards minimizing the production of irrelevant documents (and, by doing so, empower the parties to withhold relevant evidence).  Or whether, at times, it is permissible for trial courts to prioritize the fulsome production of relevant materials (resulting in the production of some irrelevant evidence).