ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] For the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully requested that this matter be remanded for a new trial before a different trial judge and that: (a) the police officers' opinions and conclusions be redacted from the *de bene esse* testimony of [...]; (b) evidence relevant to damages, including [...]'s texts and family snap-shots, not be used nor even mentioned in the liability phase of the trial; (c) that the defendants' liability not be limited to [...] acting negligently in self-defense, and the jury instructions and argument of counsel exclude any mention that the defendants are liable only if [...] acted negligently in self-defense; (d) that [...] may be both directly and vicariously liable; (e) that the jury be instructed as to the Restatement (2d) of Torts, §317; (f) that evidence and argument that plaintiff did not allege assault and battery against [...] be precluded; and (g) if [...] once again fails to appear after being noticed to do so, plaintiffs may comment on his absence.
[brief] I.  ORDER ENTERED ON NOVEMBER 30, 2018  A.  The motion judge’s order is at Pa185 to Pa186.  B.  The motion judge’s oral opinion (statement of reasons) is at T54:2 to T57:16.  C.  There were no intermediate decisions.  II.  AMENDED ORDER ENTERED ON JANUARY 11, 2019  (A)  The motion judge’s order is at Pa293 to Pa294  (B)  The motion judge’s statement of reasons is at Pa295.  (C)  There were no intermediate decisions.  | Case Law | Page | |------------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | **Banks. v. Wolk** | 15 | | 918 F.2d 418 3d Cir. 1990 | | | **Brill v. Guardian Life Insurance Company of America** | 17 | | 142 N.J. 520 (1995) | | | **Cockerline v. Mendez** | 8, 9 | | 411 N.J. Super. 596 (App. Div. 2009) | | | **DiCristofaro v. Laurel Grove Memorial Park** | 16 | | 43 N.J. Super. 244 (App Div. 1957) | | | **Independent Dairy Workers Union v. Milk Drivers Local 860** | 17 | | 23 N.J. 85 (1956) | | | **Interchange State Bank v. Rinaldi** | 15 | | 303 N.J. Super 239 (App. Div. 1997) | | | **Kernan v. One Washington Park Urban Renewal Associates** | 18, 24| | 154 N.J. 437 (1968) | | | **Manorcare Health Services v. Osmose Wood Preserving, Inc.
[brief] ” (Pa355).  [...] was also ordered not to discuss fracking during his presentation to the attendees at the Rutgers Safe Drinking Water annual course at which he was presenting.  (Pa540).  The defendants, of course, have an interest as employers in promoting the efficiency of the public services they perform.  The United States Supreme Court in Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968) confirmed the constitutional right of public employees to speak out on matters of public concern and established the Pickering balancing test to balance the interests of a public employee, as a citizen, in commenting on matters of public concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees.
[directive] In addition, all agencies must comply with the time limitations established by N.J.S.A. 40A:14-200 et seq. regarding the imposition of discipline.  Lastly, agencies operating under the purview of Title 11A must comply with the deadlines for disciplinary action imposed by Civil Service Commission Rules.  See N.J.A.C. 4A:1-1.1, et seq. 6.2
[brief] In an exchange dated December 31, 2015, [...] asked [...] whether he still goes to [...], to which [...] replied, “LOL.  No.  I would have but the -- really pissed me off when I heard through the grapevine [...] didn’t want me in the building.  If it is after 15 years working for them, that’s just foul. ”  (9T 62-21 to 63-8)  At trial, [...] explained that he thought Ganley had heard the same rumor [...] had heard—that [...] was not welcome back—and that Ganley was “messing with” him; [...] said he was not sure how true the rumor was but thought Ganley might be able to clear up whether it was true because Ganley had introduced [...] to [...]. \(^5\) (11T 29-9 to 30-7)  In an exchange dated January 30, 2016, [...]’s phone contained the following text exchange between him and Ryan [...], [...] Sr.’s younger son:
[brief] TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS BEING APPEALED  Chancery Division Order in Manalapan-Englishtown Matter, Filed August 18, 2023 ................................................................. Da115-116 Chancery Division Order in Middletown Matter, Filed August 18, 2023 .............................................................. Da117-118 Chancery Division written decision in both matters, and including [...] ([...]), filed August 18, 2023 ........................................ Da119-138
[brief] See Hassan, 467 N.J. Super. at 207-08 (citing Parker, 440 N.J. Super. at 19-20).  [...]’ counsel then used the officers’ opinions to impeach [...]’s credibility.  See N.J.R.E. 611(b).  Specifically, [...] testified that he only takes cases if he agrees with the theory of the case.  [8T 100:21-24].  [...] further acknowledged that he did not consider Hassan’s version of events in forming his opinions.  [101:20-102:7].  He did not because [...]’s causation theory was premised upon Hassan becoming frustrated (pursuant to [...]’s version), an opinion that is undermined if Hassan calmly walked away and only responded after being attacked while his back was turned.
[brief] [...] opined that poor maintenance of the facility attracts crime.  (147a).  [...] admitted to not following industry standards, failing to adhere to the American Public Transportation Association recommendations, which [...] also opines fell below the standard of care.  (767a; 162a).  Both [...] and [...] police officers testified that vagrants are known to loiter at the [...], and illicit drug use at that location is a problem and had been for years.  (55a; 239a).  This evidence creates a genuine issue of material fact for the jury.  The trial judge erroneously invaded the province of the jury by determining that this was not evidence of negligence, rather than recognizing the presentation of this evidence was a question for the jury.
[brief] See Hedgespeth, 464 N.J. Super. at 437 (holding court abused its discretion when “judge erroneously admitted [defendant’s prior] convictions under N.J.R.E. 609(a)'s less stringent standard, … did not consider the N.J.R.E. 609(b)(2) factors and did not analyze the admissibility of the prior convictions under N.J.R.E. 609(b)(1)'s more stringent standard. ”)  Rule 609(b)(2) instructs trial courts to consider four factors in weighing the prejudicial effect of admitting a remote conviction against its probative value: (i) whether there were intervening convictions for crimes or offenses, and if so, the number, nature, and seriousness of those crimes or offenses; (ii) whether the conviction involved a crime of dishonesty, lack of veracity, or fraud; (iii) how remote the conviction is in time; and (iv) the seriousness of the crime.
[brief] (3T11:3).  The trial court allowed for no offset whatsoever, for the $2,000-$3,000 benefit that [...] had reaped from the car (a vehicle which [...] hadn’t paid a penny for).  As a result, [...] was awarded a total of $8,900.49 in sanctions, plus --- \(^7\)  My sister agreed to pay $2,430 (i.e. half of the then-awarded sanctions), forfeit her rights on appeal, and in return the judgment against her was supposed to be vacated.  Although she fully honored her end of the settlement agreement, ultimately the judgment against her was not vacated.  (3T5:17)  So to date, [...] has received the full benefit of that settlement agreement with my sister, while conversely she has not received any benefit at all.  [...] also got to keep our mom’s car for free.\(^8\) (3T14:17, Pa169).  Long before I filed this small claims case, I was familiar with many authorities pertaining to the issue of standing.
[brief] This case was filed more than 10 years ago as a contested matter with the New Jersey Department of Education (NJDOE) and was referred to the Office of Administrative Law (OAL), where it remained for almost seven years until Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) [...] filed a lengthy and detailed initial decision on March 1, 2021.  Her decision, and its many findings of fact, were based on a lengthy hearing.  She concluded that [...] public-school students were being denied their fundamental constitutional right to T&E, mainly for fiscal and budgetary reasons, but she nonetheless adopted the State’s assorted arguments for why SFRA, the State’s primary vehicle for funding the public schools, was not the cause of that denial.  In a brief Final Agency Decision (FAD) on July 16, 2021, the Acting Commissioner (AC) accepted all the ALJ’s findings, but rejected the ALJ’s conclusion based on those findings that the students had been denied T&E.  Because the AC found no T&E violation, she did not address SFRA’s constitutionality as applied to [...].  She did, however, recognize that the [...] had significant educational problems and ordered NJDOE to conduct a comprehensive review of the district.  The AC’s FAD resulted in an appeal as of right to this court by the student-appellants and a unanimous decision on March 6, 2023, overturning the AC’s FAD regarding T&E.  Because the AC had not addressed SFRA’s constitutionality as applied to [...], this court decided to remand the case to the AC for her to “consider the substantive arguments pertaining to the SFRA in light of our Supreme Court's directive in Abbott ex rel. Abbott v. Burke (Abbott XX), 199 N.J. 140, 146 (2009)."
[brief] A.  The Detective Improperly Identified The Shooter And Described Him Exiting The Vehicle Of Interest.  [...] responded to the scene at 8:00 p.m., about an hour after the shooting occurred.  (4T141-7)  She did not witness the shooting; did not observe anyone believed to be the shooter; and did not see the Chevy.  She thus had no “firsthand knowledge” of the event beyond her review of the surveillance footage.
[brief] When the chiropractor was not paid after the case settled, he sued the patient and the attorney.  The trial court granted chiropractor’s summary judgment motion and ruled that N.J.S.A. 2A:25-1 “provides that judgments are assignable and, therefore, by clear implication, any proceeds derived from a settlement of a claim for personal injuries must also be assignable. ”  Berkowitz, supra. at 346.  Here, the Trial Court also cited N.J.S.A. §2A:25-1, which states:  All contracts for the sale and conveyance of real estate, all judgments and decrees recovered in any of the courts of this State or of the United States or in any of the courts of any other state of the United States and all choses in action arising on contract shall be assignable....  [emphasis added by the Trial Court](Da011)  In addition to a statutory basis for assignment, the Supreme Court has approved of assigning proceeds without overturning Weller or Goldfarb.  In Weller, the Court ruled that a prejudgment assignment of 50% to Weller as an attorney fee was invalid.  Subsequent to *Weller*, the New Jersey Supreme Court created N.J. Court Rule 1:21-7(c) which established the amount of contingent fees and attorney may charge in a personal injury case.  The Court was able to do this because our “Supreme Court has the exclusive constitutional responsibility as to admission to the bar, the practice of law, the conduct of attorneys and the attorney-client relationship.
[brief] In the Humane Society of U.S. v. N.J. State Fish and Game Council, 70 N.J. 565 (1976), the Court held that N.J.S.A. 13:1B-24, which, among other things, authorizes the [...] (“[...]”) and the [...] to recommend the appointment of sportsmen and farmers as members to the Council, did not violate the environmental and animal rights groups’ due process and equal protection rights.  The Court held that allowing these private farmers, commercial fisherman and sportsmen to become members of the Council, did not violate the due process and equal protection rights of the plaintiff environmental and animal rights organizations in that the latter could be considered 446 (5th Cir. 2022), cert. granted in Securities and Exchange Comm. v. Jarkesy, 143 S.Ct. 2688 (2023).  As indicated earlier, Articles III and IV of the New Jersey Constitution are predicated on comparable provisions in the United States Constitution, so federal decisions should be instructive in New Jersey.
[brief] Unlike the notice which preceded Ordinance No. 13-2022’s passage, the notice published and served prior to the site plan hearing made explicitly clear what the new development regulations established by the [...] portended, particularly in terms of the sheer size and intensity of the development which it enabled.  The public interest and coinciding backlash apparently surprised [...].  As the trial court observed in its decision reversing the [...]’s denial of [...]’s site plan application, [...] essentially reversed his position after the first JLUB meeting:  After closing the public comment period, the Board carried [...]’s application to December 1, 2022, which date was ultimately postponed to December 15, 2022, and relocated in order to accommodate the large number of members of the public who wished to attend.  Prior to the meeting, [...] (“[...]”), despite having voted in favor of the Redevelopment Plan, as well as the financial agreements entered into with [...], and attended the hearing on [...]’s application on November 17, 2022, publicly announced his intention to vote “No” on the application.
[brief] Cases  AC Ocean Walk, LLC v. Am. Guarantee & Liab. Ins., 256 N.J. 294 (2024)................................................................. 11, 13  Barrett v. New Jersey Mfrs. Ins., 295 N.J. Super. 613 (App. Div. 1996)...........................................  17 Boritz v. New Jersey Mfrs. Ins., 406 N.J. Super. 640 (App. Div. 2009)...........................................  17 Branch v. Cream-O-Land Dairy, 244 N.J. 567 (2021)......................................................................  9  Burnett v. Gloucester Cnty. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 409 N.J. Super. 219 (App. Div. 2009)...........................................  9  Carter-Wallace, Inc. v. Admiral Ins., 154 N.J. 312 (1998)....................................................................  19 Cypress Point Condo. Ass’n, Inc. v. Adria Towers, L.L.C., 226 N.J. 403 (2016)....................................................................  10 Doto v. Russo, 140 N.J. 544 (1995)....................................................................  16 Eagle Fire Prot. Corp. v. First Indem. of Am. Ins., 145 N.J. 345 (1996)....................................................................  13  Flomerfelt v. Cardiello, 202 N.J. 432 (2010)....................................................................  11 Green v. Selective Ins. Co. of Am., 144 N.J. 344, 354 (1996).............................................................  10 Griggs v. Bertram, 88 N.J. 347 (1982)....................................................................  17, 22 Harr v. Allstate Ins., 54 N.J. 287 (1969)....................................................................  16 Henebema v. Raddi, 452 N.J. Super. 438 (App. Div. 2017) ..................................................  19 Ill. Farmers Ins. Co. v. Glass Serv. Co., 683 N. W.2d 792 (Minn. 2004) ..............................................................  12  Krohn v. New Jersey Full Ins. Underwriters Ass’n, 316 N.J. Super. 477 (App. Div. 1998) ....................................................  13  Longworth v. Van Houten, 223 N.J. Super. 174 (App. Div. 1988) ...................................................  14  Manahawkin Convalescent v. O’Neill, 217 N.J. 99 (2014)  .................................................................................  9  Notte v. Merchants Mut. Ins., 185 N.J. 490 (2006) ..............................................................................  19 Peloso v. Hartford Fire Ins., 56 N.J. 514 (1970) .............................................................................. 20, 21 Price v. New Jersey Mfrs. Ins., 182 N.J. 519 (2005) ............................................................................. 10, 15, 17 Rutgers Cas. Ins. Co. v. Vassas, 139 N.J. 163 (1995) .............................................................................  15  State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Riddell Nat. Bank, 984 N.E.2d 655 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) ....................................................... 11 Weinroth v. New Jersey Mfrs. Ass’n Fire Ins., 117 N.J.L. 436 (1937) ...........................................................................
[brief] So, we have both cases and a variety of violations of probation that were all being rolled in together and the plea form is signed on the same date.  The plea is taken on all the cases including the violations and there is the preservation of the right to appeal the 404(b) decision, as well as the motion to suppress and that is explicit in the plea forms.  And then the plea is also concurrent not only to the sentences amongst everything that's on here so  And if properly suppressed at the trial level, would there have been a different outcome?  Would there have been a different offer, you know, because of these 404(b) implications as it relates to the homicide case?  Coupled with that is also a realistic fear that I will say had to do with threats that [...] was feeling, was receiving and what he thought he wanted to do because he thought he had no other choice but to protect his family.
[brief] The second count of Plaintiff’s Complaint (Pa1) thus sought to foreclose on the 2022 Mortgage based upon the foregoing cross-default provision.  Defendants argument that because the 2012 Mortgage was cancelled and the “second mortgage was issued while the Plaintiff was in the litigation with the trustee”, there “cannot be a basis for a default on the second mortgage” (T8.15-23) is without merit.  It goes without saying that Plaintiff’s claim for cross-collateralization of the 2012 and 2022 mortgages was based on the granting of the relief sought in the first count of Plaintiff’s Complaint; i.e., reinstatement of the 2012 note and mortgage that was cancelled in error.  Moreover, the fact that the 2022 mortgage was issued during the bankruptcy litigation is irrelevant.  The facts are that the [...] qualified for the $97,000 equity loan.  The Bank was correct in not attributing any negative inferences to [...] as a result of the pending bankruptcy litigation, and the pending litigation simply did not provide any basis for the Bank to deny the loan.  The 2022 loan remains in full force and effect and the cross-default provision is enforceable.
[brief] *New Jersey State Ass'n of Nurse Anesthetists, Inc. v. New Jersey State Bd. of Medical Examiners*, 372 N.J. Super. 554, 560-561 (App. Div. 2004).  In the environmental field, this is because [...] has expertise involving scientific and technical decisions necessary to protect the State's public health in subject matters such as hazardous waste cleanup, pollution discharge standards or the like.  *In re N.J.A.C. 7:26 B*, 128 N.J. 442, 451 (1992).
[brief] POINT I ..............................................................................................................................................12  THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DENYING APPELLANT’S MOTION TO SUPPRESS HIS STATEMENT(2T:4-1 to 29-8); (1T:3-17 to 91-12); (2T:3-20 to 80 – 18)  .............................................12  A.  THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DENYING APPELLANT’S MOTION TO SUPPRESS HIS STATEMENTS  BECAUSE [...]  HAD A CLEAR CONFLICT OF INTEREST AND COULD NOT SERVE AS DEFENDANT’S GUARDIAN UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES (1T:29-23 TO 30-7); (1T:31-14 TO 32-1); (2T:50-4 to 54-11)  .............................................................................................................12  B.  THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT AFTER ASSESSING THE TOTALITY OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES THAT [...] GAVE A KNOWING, INTELLIGENT AND VOLUNTARY WAIVER (2T:62-17 to 72-16)  .........................................................................................................................................................................................17  a.  The Trial Court Erred in Finding that the Defendant’s Waiver was Knowing, Intelligent, and Voluntary and did not put Appropriate Weight on the Fact that the Defendant did not have an Opportunity to Consult with his Guardian in Private Prior to the Interrogation (2T:55-4 to 57-14)  .........................................................................................................................................................................................17  b.  The Trial Court Erred in Finding that Defendant’s Waiver was Knowing, Intelligent, and Voluntary and did not put the Appropriate Weight on the Fact that the Detectives Gave Incorrect Miranda Warnings to Scott Kologi.(1T:37-1 to 42-9); (2T:12-17 to 14-23); (2T:69-1 to 73-1) (17T:75-25 to 78-21)  .........................................................................................................................................................................................19  c.  The Trial Court Inappropriately Shifted The Burden On The Defendant To Establish That His Waiver Was Not Knowing, Intelligent And Voluntary.  (2T:63-5 to 64-21)  .........................................................................................................................................................................................21  d.  The Trial Court Erred in Finding That Scott Kologi Did Not Make An Ambiguous Assertion Of His Right To Remain Silent Prior To Questioning (2T:68-18 to 80-18).  ...........................................  23 POINT II ..................................................................................................................
[directive] Additional Questions for Certain Drug and Weapons Offenses Committed on or After June 24, 1998 (Haitian Creole)  Ou fèt pou reponn kesyon swivan sa yo si w ap plede koupab de sèten enfraksyon dwòg ak plede koupab de posesyon zamafe oswa lòt zam pandan w ap komèt, eseye komèt oswa konplote pou komèt nenpòt nan enfraksyon swivan sa yo.  Si w te gen zamafe sou w, reponn kesyon 1 a, b ak c.  Si w pat gen zamafe sou w, make kesyon 1 a pa aplikab [NA] epi reponn kesyon 1b ak c.  The following questions need to be answered if you are pleading guilty to certain drug offenses and also are pleading guilty to possession of a firearm or other weapon while committing, attempting to commit or conspiring to commit any of the following offenses.
[directive] Americans with Disabilities Act Supplement Directive #23-06 to 2020 May 15, Page2 be  Questions or comments regarding this Directive Supplement should directed to the of Office the Administrative Director at [...].  Attachments:  (1)  COVID-19 Supplement to the Charge for Grand Juries Convening in a Virtual Format of in (2)  COVID-19 Supplement to the Oath Secrecy for Grand Juries Convening a Virtual Format  Chief cc: Justice [...]
[brief] [...] relies on the legal arguments from his initial brief and adds the following:  POINT I  MR. CORREA HAS A PARTICIPATORY INTEREST IN THE EVIDENCE SEIZED FROM MOYA’S CAR AND THEREFORE HAS STANDING TO CHALLENGE THE WARRANTLESS STOP OF THE CAR.  In his initial brief, [...] argued that the narcotics seized from [...]’s car must be suppressed because police lacked a legal basis to initiate a traffic stop.
[brief] Defendant testified that he went to the doctor’s office on New Year’s Eve and was “certain” he lost his wallet there.  (16T78-20 to 80-13).  When he realized later that day it was missing, defendant returned to the office, which was already closed, and searched garbage cans and the parking lot.  (16T81-9 to 82-13).  Defendant’s fiancée, [...], testified that defendant told her no later than New Year’s Day that he had lost the NJSP wallet identification.  (15T39-13 to 40-6; 15T45-24 to 46-2).  [...] called and emailed the doctor’s office to which defendant had gone.  (15T46-7 to 17).  She drove there on New Year’s Day, and looked around the parking lot herself, without success.  (15T49-7 to 20; 15T50-25 to 51-1).  While [...] testified that she called the doctor’s office but got no answer because it was New Year’s Day, defendant presented another story.