ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] In 1920, [...] conveyed many of the lots shown on the “Map of Keansburg Heights” including property on said Map marked beach to [...] by Deed dated April 8, 1920, (J-5) (Pa923).  That Deed did not convey the Riparian grant acquired by [...], being the substantial majority of area of Lot 3.01.  (d)  [...] conveyed the property acquired in 1920 from [...] to [...] by Deed dated June 18, 1920, and recorded.  No Riparian Grant was conveyed because Keansburg Heights never conveyed its Riparian Grant to P. Licari, Inc.  (J-6, Pa925)  (e)
[brief] I mean, if I was a shareholder in this company in 2000, let's say ‘17 or ‘16, I would pay for a valuation expert to come in and value my shares....  [F]or example, if I was selling 1 percent interest of 40,000 and they said they want to give the book value and I would say no, why don’t we hire, you know, [...] to come in and do a valuation for us and I want fair market value or fair value....  So they would come in and you know, instead of getting 40,000, maybe I can get 100 or—  So I personally would tell anybody who is selling shares in this company prior to 2018 to hire a valuation expert to come in and value the shares because you would more than pay for the valuation expert, based on the increase in value of the sale.  (6T222:8-223:12)  [...] also noted that [...] could have obtained an appraisal every year, which is something [...] has seen other small companies do.  (7T120:6-8)  [...] simply chose not to do so.  (7T12-:9-11)  All experts agreed that if [...]’s interests were purchased by [...] after the Valuation Hearing at some amount other than prior year’s Tax Book Value, he would be the first person ever to receive that valuation.  (5T92:16-21)(7T169:13-18)  [...] agreed it would not make sense to allow someone to purchase shares at book value and sell them at some other value:  it is “common sense” that “if you’re buying shares at book, then you should sell them at book... it’s commonsense... if that’s what the company’s done historically,” regardless of the volume of shares being bought or sold.  (7T118:16-119:11)  On November 18, 2022, the Court issued an Order declaring that [...] held a 29.5% interest in [...] after accounting for all the prior orders voiding certain actions [...] had taken to give himself more, and valuing that 29.5% interest at $1,250,153.95 using the Fair Market Valuation reached by [...].
[brief] (Pa13-14).  While a Board is generally bound by its enabling statutes, it has inherent authority to reopen administrative matters upon a showing of good cause, reasonable grounds, and reasonable diligence.  Minsavage for Minsavage v. Bd. of Trs., Teachers’ Pension & Annuity Fund, 240 N.J. 103, 109 (2019).  A member seeking relief by way of the Board’s inherent powers also “must demonstrate extreme hardship and a clear equity in his favor. ”  Buono v. Bd. of Trs., Teachers’ Pension & Annuity Fund, 188 N.J. Super. 488, 493 (App. Div. 1983).  Contrary to [...]’s assertions, (Pb12-13), the Board considered its inherent power as well as his affidavit and the affidavits of the other troopers that he submitted in support of his contention that he did not receive the postcard.  After considering its equitable power and the affidavits presented, the Board reasonably concluded that “[...] did not exercise reasonable diligence nor demonstrate reasonable grounds for such a protracted delay in filing the eligibility registration form,” where he filed his form approximately one year and seven months past the deadline.  (Pa13-14).  Nor did [...] demonstrate extreme hardship in this matter, as he will continue to receive his Special Retirement benefits with concurrent retiree health benefits coverage.  (Pa86).  It should also be noted that cases involving the use of the Board’s equitable power for reopening proceedings or relaxing deadlines “were bottomed on the inherent power of an administrative agency, in the absence of legislative restriction, to reopen or to modify and to rehear orders previously entered by it.
[brief] The owner purchased the Property containing 11 units, including the subject Unit, in 1993 for $525,000.  [...] properly adjusted the pro rata purchase price of the Unit equal to $47,727 ($525,000/11 units) for inflation based upon the CPI.  Limiting the owner’s equity to the initial $47,727 purchase price from 1993 without any adjustment for inflation defies the reality of the value of that investment (in today’s dollars) and artificially lowers the owner’s equity preventing any “reasonable return”.  Moreover, that the Ordinance permits an automatic inflationary increase on rent does not bar a separate “fair return” premised upon an inflationary adjustment to the owner’s equity.  An automatic CPI increase to rent is not the same and does not substitute for a fair return relating to an owner’s equity.  Indeed, in Mayes, the two ordinances considered by the Supreme Court permitted automatic inflationary increases, tax surcharges for tax increases and a hardship increase.  Despite the automatic inflationary increase to rent, the Supreme Court still held that an owner is entitled to a “fair return” after an inflationary adjustment to the owner’s equity.  Plainly, an automatic inflationary increase to rent may not preserve a fair return.  The owner’s right to apply for a rental increase premised upon a fair return in an entirely separate right based upon an analysis specific to the determination of a “fair return”.
[brief] When Applying the Standard in Beukas v. Bd. of Trustees of Fairleigh Dickinson University (3T81-3T88)  The trial court and the Defendant improperly relied on Beukas v. Bd. of Trustees of Fairleigh Dickinson Univ., 255 N.J. Super. 552, 558, (Law. Div. 1991), aff’d, 255 N.J. Super. 420, 605 A.2d 708 (App. Div. 1992), in support of its determination that Plaintiff failed to set forth any cause of action.  (3T81:3-T:82:1).  In Beukas, students brought claims against [...] for closing their college as a result of budget cuts.  Beukas, 255 N.J. Super. at 558-559.  While the factual pattern in Beukas is clearly distinguishable, there, “the court fashioned a new standard: When students bring claims against a university for closing a program, it held, courts should ask, ‘Did the university act in good faith and, if so, did it deal fairly with its students?’”  Dougherty v. Drew Univ., 534 F. Supp. 3d 363, 374 (D.N.J. 2021), reconsideration denied sub nom (citing Beukas, 255 N.J. Super. at 566.)  However, that inquiry was, “the most efficient and legally consistent theory to resolve a university-student conflict resulting from an administrative decision to terminate an academic or professional program. ”  Beukas, 255 N.J. Super. at 566.  New Jersey courts have suggested that the breach of contract standard that applies “depends on context. ”  Dougherty v. Drew Univ., 534 F. Supp. 3d 363, 374 (D.N.J. 2021), reconsideration denied sub nom.  Dougherty v. Univ., No. CV2100249KMESK, 2021 WL 2310094 (D.N.J. June 7, 2021).  For example, “In disciplinary contexts, which implicate the need for academic autonomy, the standard requires a showing not just that the university departed from its rules, but that it departed in a “substantial way. ”  Mittra, 719 A.2d at 698 (dismissal of a student for academic reasons); Napolitano, 453 A.2d at 276 (disciplinary proceeding for plagiarism).  Similarly, in other contexts ill-suited for judicial decision making, the Appellate Division has applied this deferential substantial-departure standard.  Dougherty, 534 F. Supp. 3d at 374.  Thus, the proper standard to apply within this context is whether [...] substantially deviated from its own rules and regulations.
[brief] In the Final Judgment Order, the trial court cited to the Empower decision and indicated that it was applying a “time necessary to litigate” approach, but the court did not actually employ that approach.  Application of the “time necessary to litigate” approach would have required a line-by-line analysis of the thousands of pages of invoices submitted to determine what entries were actually related to [...], and to the issues on which [...] was “successful”.  E.g., Universal-Rundle Corp. v. Com. Union Ins. Co., 319 N.J. Super. 223, 247 (App. Div. 1999) (holding “the trial judge mistakenly exercised his discretion in the award of counsel fees” by failing to make deductions for fees related to other insurers).  Such an analysis would have been the only way to properly apply the “time necessary to litigate” approach because [...] failed to carry its burden to isolate compensable legal services.  Ricci v. Corp. Express of The East, Inc., 344 N.J. Super. 39, 48 (App. Div. 2001).  [...]’s counsel admitted in deposition that “relative culpability” approach in a naked attempt to inflate its fee claim after the insurers’ “relative culpability” was drastically reduced when the court granted [...]’s motion for reconsideration and lowered [...]’s allocated share of costs.
[brief] (Pa57)  A.  There is a strong presumption in favor of the first-filed action and defendants did not establish any “special equities” to justify departing from that presumption.  As discussed above, Defendants failed to establish any reason why, three weeks after [...] had denied their comity arguments for the third time, [...] should have reconsidered and reached a different result.  But even if [...] reconsidered the prior orders, [...] was correct on the merits: Defendants failed to overcome the strong presumption in favor of this first-filed action.  This Court should reverse the decision below.
[brief] (g) unilaterally modifying, amending, or terminating any collective negotiations agreements, except those related to school districts, to which the municipality is a party, or unilaterally modifying, amending, or terminating the terms and conditions of employment during the term of any applicable collective negotiations agreement, or both, provided that the director determines that the modifications, amendments, or terminations are reasonable and directly related to stabilizing the finances or assisting with the fiscal rehabilitation and recovery of the municipality in need of stabilization and recovery; (h) acting as the sole agent in collective negotiations on behalf of the municipality in need of stabilization and recovery; (i) with respect to any expired collective negotiations agreement to which the municipality in need of stabilization and recovery is a party, unilaterally modifying wages, hours, or any other terms and conditions of employment; N.J.S.A. 52:27BBBB-5 (emphasis added).  The new MSRA also amended the EERA, N.J.S.A. 34:13A-5.4, for a second time which restored EERA and [...] enforcement rights.  g.  […]The provisions of this subsection shall no longer be applicable on and after the first day of the sixth year next following the determination by the [...] that the municipality shall be deemed “a municipality in need of stabilization and recovery” pursuant to section 4 of P.L.2016, c.4 (C.52:27BBBB-4); however, actions taken pursuant to this subsection prior to the effective date [June 24, 2021] of P.L.2021, c.124 (C.52:27BBBB-4 et al.) shall be final and shall not be subject to reconsideration.  N.J.S.A. 34:13A-5.4.  Pursuant to this amendment, the ability of the State to unilaterally make changes to labor agreements is subject to the terms of the Civil Service Act and the EERA.  Unilateral modifications of terms and conditions of employment, such as wages, by a New Jersey public employer violate the duty of good faith negotiations and are a *per se* violation of the EERA, *N.J.S.A.* 34:13A-5.4(a)(5).  See, *Township of Middletown*, 24 *NJPER* 28, 30 (¶29016, 1997), *aff’d per curiam*, 334 N.J. Super. 512 (App. Div. 1999); *aff’d o.b.*, 166 N.J. 112 (2000).
[brief] If [...] had a physical illness instead of a mental illness, this factor would not be debatable.  There were adults in [...] Kologi’s life that let him down.  However, the Court failed to acknowledge it and placed one hundred percent of the blame on the mentally ill sixteen-year-old boy.  (17T:220-16 to 20).  The Court stated, “It is unfortunate the defendant did not receive the help he asked for. ” (17T:220-16 to “However, the failing of his dependent mother and grandfather and understanding the mental health, does not overcome the rest of the defendant’s supportive home environment. ” (17T:220-17 to 20).  The Court engaged in an oversimplified analysis of what transpired.  Id.  [...] did not need a supportive home environment; he needed mental health counseling.  [...] needed the same mental health counseling he in the Youth Detention Center where he’s caused zero problems.  (Da112-194).  This entire case is a result of the failing of his family to provide the help that [...] asked for.
[brief] On May 31, 2022, after a series of public hearings, the Board denied the application of [...] seeking a use variance pursuant to NJSA 40:55D-70(d)1 to permit construction in [...] of uses accessory to a warehouse to be constructed by [...] on adjoining lands in [...].  T4 146:18 through T4 148:5.  The Board’s use variance denial decision was memorialized in [...] which was adopted on September 1, 2022.  Ja023-Ja046.  On October 20, 2022, [...] filed a Complaint in Lieu of Prerogative Writs to appeal the Board’s use variance denial decision.  Ja001-Ja009.  The Trial Court heard oral argument on October 27, 2023, and issued a bench opinion denying Plaintiff’s requested relief.  5T 47:24 through 5T 54:10.  The Trial Court’s oral decision upholding the Board’s variance denial decision and denying the relief requested by Plaintiffs was confirmed by way of an Order dated October 27, 2023.  Ja222.  This appeal followed.
[directive] [...] shall be authorized to call upon the expertise and assistance of every division, agency, office, bureau, and unit within [...], in order to carry out its mission.  Such entities are hereby required, to the extent not inconsistent with law, to cooperate with the Office and to provide such assistance as the Office may require to accomplish the purposes of this Directive.  II.  Other Provisions parties.  A.  Non-enforceability by third  This Directive is issued pursuant to the Attorney General’s supervisory authority over [...] and the statutory authority to ensure the uniform and efficient enforcement of the laws and administration of criminal justice throughout the State.
[brief] Even the State’s citation to *State v. Morton*, 39 N.J. 512 (1963), does not further its argument that this Court should affirm Defendant’s conviction.  (Sb18.)  Instead, in *Morton*, the Supreme Court affirmed the Appellate Division’s reversal of a DWI conviction where the officers provided conclusory statements as to the results of the administration of field sobriety tests.  *Id.* at 514.  The Court distinguished between an officer providing testimony based upon training and experience from a lay person providing a lay opinion of intoxication.  *Id.*  Here, the State is attempting to equate [...], who conceded there are standard scoring factors but that he did not know what they were, to a lay person without training.  Under *Morton*, the Court held “where the significance of results of tests depends upon a conclusion of the witness as to whether the motorist's reaction is a departure from the normal or standard, such conclusion may not be given unless the examiner is shown to have some skill or training which will qualify him to make an evaluation. ”  *State v. Morton*, 39 N.J. at 514.  The State’s reliance on *Morton* is misplaced because [...] was not providing lay opinion testimony – he was attempting to rely upon the results of standardized field sobriety tests, but he did not know the standard scoring factors.  (1T62:1-63:12.)  The State then obtained an advantage in not calling as a witness [...] who could have been cross-examined if called.  This result is unfair, and should be remedied by this Court.
[brief] My contract-based claims were valid and should have proceeded, given that [...] had made a contract directly with me to pay me $400 to keep my mom’s car (once I brought in the car’s title, which [...] knew was still in my mom’s name).  There never was an issue of whose name was on the title, until just one day before trial when [...] first tried to use this as a technicality to allow his client to be unjustly enriched.  Even to the extent the contract should have been viewed as being made on behalf of our mom, it is undeniable that both [...] and our mom intended that I was an intended beneficiary of the sale of the vehicle (i.e. my mom’s signature on the title, and [...] statements to me that he would give me the $400 for the car).  Thus we had more-than-ample standing to bring our contract-based claims, as well as our extra-contractual / quasi-contractual claim for unjust enrichment, especially after I went and obtained the paperwork from the Surrogate’s Office (which I was following the trial court’s rulings that: “And the Plaintiffs haven’t shown it, that either of them is the executor or executrix, the administrator or the administratrix of the Estate of [...].  And without that they have no authority to act. ” (1T8:1-4)  Yet even after I went obtained that “authority to act”, the trial court then stated that it still wasn’t enough; as during the second motion hearing he denied my cross motion to reinstate my claims, stating that: “He and the other Plaintiff, his sister, still don’t have ownership. ”  (2T6:2-3)  This was error not to at least allow my unjust enrichment claim to go forward at that point in time, even if the prior lack of documentation was a sufficient basis to nullify the May 12, 2022 verbal contract.
[brief] 3.  The 9-1-1 Call, Considered Alongside the Other Evidence, Established Reasonable Suspicion.  Even if the 9-1-1 call were determined not to be sufficient to establish reasonable suspicion, [...]’s investigation justified the stop.  Even absent a 9-1-1 call from a citizen, reasonable suspicion can still exist if “there has been some independent corroboration by the police of significant aspects of the informer’s predictions. ”  State v. Williams, 381 N.J. Super. 572, 584 (2005).  Here, before making the investigatory stop, [...] corroborated “significant aspects” of the 9-1-1 caller’s report including Defendant’s appearance and location.  In addition, [...] observed Defendant carrying a fanny pack that was weighed down, and that Defendant was startled by police and fled.  The confirmation of all details of the report, coupled with the subsequent observations, make it “objectively reasonable” for [...] to have concluded that the fanny pack was weighed down by the handgun described by the 9-1-1 caller.  Rather than consider the totality of the circumstances, [...] erred by analyzing each fact of the case in isolation.  [...] stated that, even if Defendant did appear nervous, “mere nervous or furtive gestures are insufficient, standing alone, to rise to the level of an articulable suspicion. ”  2T48:5-7.  [...] also stated that, even if Defendant did flee, “(f)light alone is not enough without any to her articulable suspicion of criminal activity. ”  2T49:7-9.  The totality of the circumstances does not call for such an analysis.  Rather, [...] should have considered whether these factors considered together, alongside the other facts of the case, established reasonable suspicion.  When the facts are considered in their totality, more than sufficient reasonable suspicion to justify the investigatory stop.
[brief] In the present action, [...] who saw Respondent only once, provides an opinion that as a result of the accident she suffered an aggravation of a pre-existing degenerative condition.  Nowhere in his report or his trial testimony, however, did he apportion what injury, symptom or condition was pre-existing versus that which was specifically caused by the March 3, 2020 motor vehicle accident.  That counsel for the Respondent argued below that [...] was asymptomatic prior to the subject accident is insufficient to meet the Respondent’s burden of producing competent expert opinion in the form of a comparative analysis.
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[brief] Because [...] obtained the amendment to the Redevelopment Ordinances for the Project, [...] did not seek to proceed with the development pursuant to the Long Branch Redevelopment Zone Permit, and instead, applied for a CAFRA Individual Permit in accordance with N.J.A.C. 7:7-7.1(g).  See 2Ra78; 2Ra83.  The Department’s interpretation of the Long Branch Rule such that the Redevelopment Ordinances (as may be amended) apply to a development in the Redevelopment Area regardless of whether CAFRA approval was sought pursuant to the Long Branch Redevelopment Permit or an individual permit is rational and reasonable when considering the goals and policies underlying CAFRA and the CZM Rules, which promote comprehensive planning for coastal communities.  See N.J.S.A. 13:19-2; N.J.A.C. 7:7-1.1(c).  The Department’s decision to issue the Permit for the Project should be upheld based on the language of the Long Branch Rule, the regulatory history of the Long Branch Rule, the stated rationale of the SRD Rule, the recognized need for liberality in applying the CZM Rules based on the policy considerations thereunder, and the deference afforded to the Department.
[brief] That argument is also contradicted by the record, because while [...] contends it should have unrestricted use of a straight-line path from its mooring area out to the navigational channel—based on some theory of rights to that path—[...] provides no evidence of why it should be entitled to that path, or why that particular path is necessary for [...]’s safe navigation.  “The Department determined there is adequate room to navigate and access adjacent water areas,” and that contention remains undisputed in this record.
[brief] Plaintiffs filed their initial Complaint on March 18, 2018, naming as Defendants, [...], MD, [...], MD, [...], DO and their respective employers, [...] and [...].  (Pa60).  Defendants filed their respective Answers on March 28, 2018 and April 10, 2018.  (Pa82; Pa89).  Following the infant Plaintiff’s death in November 2018, Plaintiffs filed an Amended Complaint on June 27, 2019, asserting claims on behalf of her estate pursuant to the wrongful death and survivor statutes.  (Pa138).  Defendants filed their respective Answers to the Amended Complaint on July 3, 2019 and July 11, 2019.  (Pa150, Pa158).  On December 11, 2019, [...] moved for summary judgment when Plaintiffs’ expert reports failed to offer any opinion he deviated from the standard of care, which Plaintiffs initially opposed pending the completion of further discovery.
[brief] In response, the [...] also filed an Order to Show Cause and Verified Complaint, seeking the following injunctive relief: compelling specific performance of the real estate contract that provided for the sale of the Property to the [...]; compelling [...] to complete environmental inspections and remediation efforts at the Property; and myriad other items.  No legal relief was sought.  [...] issued an Order on April 8, 2016 that granted the [...]’ request for specific performance of the real estate contract.  (32a).  [...] declined to direct Administrator [...] to perform environmental inspections or undertaken remediation efforts at the property, simply finding that [...] was not obligated to perform those tasks.  However, [...] never addressed the issue of legal responsibility for the damages arising out of the environmental issues; she simply denied the [...]’ request for injunctive relief related to inspections and remediation work.