ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] *Klug v. Bridgewater Twp. Planning Bd.*, 407 N.J. Super. 1, 12 (App. Div. 2009).  Thus, a board’s decision regarding a question of fact “will not be overturned unless it is found to be arbitrary and capricious or unreasonable[.]”  However, “[a]lthough courts defer to the expertise of municipal agencies in reviewing discretionary exercises of an agency’s statutory powers, the interpretation of an ordinance is primarily a question of law. ”  *Wyzkowski v. Rizas*, 132 N.J. 509, 518 (1993).  Therefore, “a board’s decision regarding a question of law . . . is subject to a *de novo* review by the courts, and is entitled to no deference since a zoning board has ‘no peculiar skill superior to the courts’ regarding purely legal matters. ”  *Dunbar Homes, Inc. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment of Tp. of Franklin*, 233 N.J. 546, 559 (2018) (quoting *Chicalese v. Monroe Twp. Planning Bd.*, 334 N.J. Super. 413, 419 (Law Div. 2000) (citations omitted)); see also *388 Route 22 Readington Realty Holdings, LLC v. Township of Readington*, 221 N.J. 318, 338 (2015) (“In construing the meaning of a statute, an ordinance, or our case law, our review is de novo. ”).  This case poses a question of law: whether the Applicant’s request for preliminary and final major subdivision approval comported with the requirements of [...] Ordinances §§ 142-77 and 142-78.  Therefore, the Board’s decision to approve the application is subject to a *de novo* review and is entitled to no deference by this Court.  *Dunbar Homes, Inc.*, 233 N.J. at 559.  [...] Ordinances §§ 142-77 and 142-78 apply to applications seeking preliminary and final subdivision approval and set forth various proofs that must be met by an applicant.  However, Applicant did not present evidence or testimony on the various topics required under the MLUL and the township ordinances.  Furthermore, Plaintiffs were not permitted to present testimony or cross-examine applicant’s witnesses on the full application materials in violation of the Municipal Land Use Law.  For the reasons set forth herein, the Board’s approval of the application for preliminary and final major subdivision approval was arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable, and must be reversed and remanded for further proceedings.
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[brief] The defendant testified at oral argument that she had to review the docket online as a guest every now and then because the plaintiff previously made false filings of judgment against her, so she had to watch for future false filings.  That the defendant learned of the suit by circuitous means does not excuse non-compliance with the rules of service.  *Epos, Inc. v. Pantelopoulos*, No. A-2365-08T1, 2009 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2922 (App. Div. Dec. 1, 2009); *Days Inn Worldwide, Inc. v. Buja Investments, Inc.*, Civ. No. 11-355, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7011, 2012 WL 194397, at *3 (D.N.J. Jan. 20, 2012) (finding that defendant's letter to plaintiff's counsel and copied to the court did not waive service under Rule 4:4-6 even though he acknowledges that he had received the "lawsuit file").  Yet the lower court improperly holds that it is sufficient that whenever someone files a lawsuit and a defendant somehow knows about it then that is service of process.  Also, Rule 6:2-3(e) mandates a general appearance filing to create jurisdiction.  That too was never filed.  Defendant always objected under the condition of a special appearance objecting to this court’s jurisdiction.
[brief] [...] recommended that “despite the changed statute of limitations window for Plaintiffs’ NJRICO claims, Plaintiffs’ NJRICO and non-RICO claims still shared the same common core of facts, and therefore the previous fee award should not be reduced for trial-level work. ”  (39064a)  However, in recommending the original fee award not be reduced, [...] did not, as [...] disingenuously assert on this appeal, simply award [...] fees for “everything Plaintiffs did to establish contract … and non-RICO claims” at trial.  (Db39)  To the contrary, and as memorialized in his original 2013 Reports and Recommendations, [...] expressly recommended a “$100,000 reduction [of [...]’s lodestar amount] for time spent on non-RICO issues …. ” (14598a-99a).  •  **Opposing [...]’ Appeal was Necessary to Preserve [...]’s Successful NJRICO Claims During the SOL Period**
[brief] ¹  “Da” refers to the City’s appendix.  Rather, in reviewing a motion for summary judgment, the court must determine “whether the competent evidential materials presented, when viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party in consideration of the applicable evidentiary standard, are sufficient to permit a rational factfinder to resolve the alleged disputed issue in favor of the non-moving party. ”  Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520, 523 (1995).  Similarly, in reviewing a motion for a directed verdict, the court must determine whether, “accepting as true all the evidence which supports the position of the party defending against the motion and according him [or her] the benefit of all inferences which can reasonably and legitimately be deduced therefrom, reasonable minds could differ. ”  Verdicchio v. Ricca, 179 N.J. 1, 30 (2004) (quoting Est. of Roach v. TRW, Inc., 164 N.J. 598, 612 (2000)); see also Smith v. Millville Rescue Squad, 225 N.J. 373, 397 (2016) (explaining that a motion for directed verdict should “be granted where no rational juror could conclude that the plaintiff marshaled sufficient evidence to satisfy each prima facie element of a cause of action” (quoting Godfrey v. Princeton Theological Seminary, 196 N.J. 178, 197 (2008))).  As the City explained in its opening brief, the trial court wrongly concluded Plaintiff produced sufficient evidence to survive the City’s motions for summary judgment and directed verdict.
[brief] First, Defendants argue that Plaintiff was obligated to seek a stay in the trial court prior to commencing this appeal, but Defendants fail to identify any legal authority to establish that Plaintiff was required to do so.  Moreover, Defendants’ request for relief on this issue—that this Court confirm the finality of the Final Judgment—simply defies logic.  The second issue raised by Defendants on cross appeal pertains to the trial court’s denial of Defendants’ motion for involuntary dismissal, but Defendants’ arguments are incoherent and riddled with misstatements of law and unsupported factual assertions.  Nevertheless, Defendants’ condition precedent argument is nothing more than a red herring that falls flat given the express language of the PSA.  As a final point, Defendants’ Brief warrants a reminder: lawyers have an obligation to discharge their responsibilities “ever mindful of our ethical duty to uphold the highest possible standards of the legal profession.
[brief] The Purchase and Sale Agreement  In 2019, Plaintiff’s then-counsel, [...], provided an initial draft of the PSA to Defendants, and over the next several months, [...] and [...] revised and exchanged several drafts of the PSA.  (4T242:20-25, 244:4-12; 5T112:21 to 113:8, 161:10-23.)  The parties executed the PSA on September 19, 2019, pursuant to which Defendants agreed to sell the Property to Plaintiff for the purchase price of $1,000,000.
[brief] The first is Leitao v. Damon G. Douglas Co., 301 N.J. Super. 187 (App. Div. 1997).  In Leitao, the general contractor contracted with the plaintiff’s employer to perform electrical work on a construction project.  *Id.* at 190.  The plaintiff tripped over wire mesh that a mason used to pour concrete floors.  *Ibid.*  The injured worker sued the site owner and the general contractor, and the jury determined that the general contractor was 51% liable and the plaintiff was 49% liable.  *Ibid.*  The indemnity provision required the employer to indemnify the general contractor for losses arising out of the employer’s work, “regardless of whether it is caused in part by a party to be indemnified hereunder. ”  *Id.* at 191.  The court focused on whether the accident arose out of the employer’s work.  *Id.* at 194.95.  The *Leitao* court also rejected the regiment that the general contractor was being indemnified for its sole negligence in violation of N.J.S.A. 2A:40A-1, because the employer was not solely negligent.  *Id.* at 105-198.  However, the *Englert* Court criticized reliance on *Leitao* for determining whether the phrase “regardless of whether” the indemnitee was negligent required indemnification for the indemnitee’s own negligence.
[brief] On the contrary, other than the lots of land in the Reserves, we retained everything else which was due in large part to [...]’s testimony in the Bankruptcy that the assets transferred to me, were in fact mine.  Despite [...]’s reliance on that position, in the matrimonial matter, he divested me from everything.  The probative and competent evidence before the Court shows that [...] received everything from the Bankruptcy, as he and I both testified to, and he retained all of the assets which were not subject to the Bankruptcy as well. ”  A296.  [...] testified that the Mid-Marriage Agreement and Power of Attorney, which the divorce judgment effectuated, transferred the interests of [...] and [...] solely to him.  Conversely, [...] received a $200,000 lump sum payment for her share of equitable distribution, a Mercedes Benz, payment of attorney’s fees in the amount of $25,000, and a $57,000 payment to her mother – nowhere near the millions that her husband received – and zero alimony to boot.
[brief] [...] [...]  [...]  [...]  Attorneys for Defendants-Appellants  [...], [...] Smith Barney LLC, [...] & Co., LLC, and [...] Capital Group, Inc.  (For Continuation of Appearances  See Inside Cover)  Date Submitted: February 22, 2024  [...], CITIGROUP  GLOBAL MARKETS HOLDINGS INC., AND [...], [...], [...], [...], AND [...], its predecessor by merger, [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], AND BANK OF AMERICA  MERRILL LYNCH, and MORGAN STANLEY, MORGAN STANLEY SMITH BARNEY LLC, MORGAN STANLEY & CO., LLC, AND MORGAN STANLEY CAPITAL GROUP, INC., Defendants-Appellants.
[brief] T17-18 to T17-22.  Boilers are typically located in the basement of a building and necessitate a lot of stairs and climbing.  T13-20 to T13-21.  [...]’s work was physically intensive and required him to constantly be bending down, kneeling down, lifting, and --- \(^2\) The transcript does not have numbered lines; therefore, counsel cited lines by manually counting as one count per line of text.  carrying heavy materials.  T16-9 to T16-10.  [...] commonly had to carry boiler tubes that were 16 to 18 feet long and weighed 125 to 150 pounds.  T14-3 to T14-6.  He repaired boilers and the pipes inside the boilers, which required him to spend the whole day kneeling down in a space that was 2.5 feet high.  T16-13 to T16-19.  In addition to his boiler work, his position also often required him to work on an elevated platform on top of a roof and climb a ladder to drill holes inside a building.
[brief] (See N.J.R.E. 201).  As outlined in [...]'s Appellate Brief, at the time of Trial [...] called witnesses [...] and [...] as expert witnesses in the field of title.  Defendant [...] called [...] as an expert witness in the field of title.  The three witnesses agreed there is a significant factual and legal difference and distinction between a Riparian Right and a Riparian Grant.  This is significant because (as was demonstrated with Maps and aerial photographs) what today is the dry land that makes up the subject property was formerly land that was underwater, but subject to a Riparian GRANT.  It is land artificially filled.  Each witness also agreed with the distinction explained by the New Jersey Supreme Court in Panetta which is the governing legal precedent:  Unlike a riparian right, which is a license or a privilege, a riparian grant is a conveyance in fee simple of real property.  As such, without specific mention in the deed or other evidence that the parties intended its inclusion, a riparian grant will not pass as appurtenant to another distinct parcel.  (Emphasis added).
[directive] - of in 0  1. if real estate, for as,-long as the property exists the form real . property;, if a motor vehicle, for at least years from the date of forfeiture or two 2. purchase with funds from AGLEFA; 3. the all other property with a fair market value of five case in of - of hundred dollars more, for at least one year from the date or AGLEFA.  forfeiture or purchase with funds from law enforcement agency seeking dispose transfer property held for B. to or A less than the periods stated above for the applicable property shall dispose the property in accordance with all other applicable law and shall obtain of - - Page: 5 02  State of New Jersey Forfeiture Program Administration Standard Procedure  Operating on for of reimbursement for the property full market vaiue the property the or be date of transfer.  The proceeds such disposal transfer shall from in deposited AGLEFA.  C. of law enforcement agency disposing or transferring property held beyond A or for the periods stated above the applicable property shall dispose transfer property from the in accordance with all other applicable law.
[brief] Id.  Relative to negligence, foreseeability and proximate cause, the jury was instructed pursuant to the Model Civil Jury Instructions.  (4T: 113:05 – 119:18).  The jury returned a Verdict in favor of Respondent; determining Appellant to have been causally negligent, Respondent to have overcome the Verbal Threshold and assessing non-economic damages of two hundred forty thousand dollars ($240,000.00).
[brief] # TABLE OF CONTENTS | Case Name | Page(s) | |---------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------| | Alabama Aircraft Industries, Inc. v. Boeing Company | 001a | | BancPass, Inc. v. Highway Toll Administration, LLC | 009a | | Chen-Oster v. Goldman Sachs & Co. | 013a | | Consumer Financial Protection Bureau v. Navient Corporation | 014a | | Cunningham v. New Jersey Mfrs. Ins. Co. | 019a | | D’Agostino v. Domino’s Pizza Inc.
[brief] POINT II: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE NINTH COUNT THROUGH THE ELEVENTH COUNT OF PLAINTIFFS’ COMPLAINT FOR LEGAL MALPRACTICE AGAINST [...] (183a) ........................................................................32 POINT III: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE THIRTEENTH COUNT THROUGH THE FIFTEENTH COUNT OF PLAINTIFFS’ COMPLAINT PURSUANT TO RES JUDICATA AND THE ENTIRE CONTROVERSY DOCTRINE (179a) ..................................................................................37 POINT IV: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE SIXTEENTH COUNT THROUGH THE NINETEENTH COUNT OF PLAINTIFFS’ COMPLAINT FOR LEGAL MALPRACTICE AGAINST THE [...] AND THE [...] (184a – 185a)  ............39  POINT V: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN SANCTIONING PLAINTIFFS FOR FILING THE COMPLAINT AND GRANTING DEFENDANTS  [...] ATTORNEY FEES (190a – 203a; 209a – a232a)  ........................................................................45  CONCLUSION
[brief] See, e.g., In re Joint E. & S. Dists. Asbestos Litig., 737 F. Supp. 735, 737 (E.D.N.Y. 1990) (Special Master not conflicted from asbestos litigation despite prior representation of “other asbestos manufacturers in connection with public education and legislative efforts aimed at promoting alternative compensation systems to mass tort litigation”); Nuckel v. Borough of Little Ferry, No. A-4940-11, 2013 WL 4104100, at *20 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Aug. 15, 2013) (finding no conflict where special master in case against municipality also served as counsel to [...] and holding that because special master “did not have a lawyer-client relationship” with party-municipality, “his role as special master did not create an appearance of impropriety”); Fuhrmann v. Wolf, No. A-6031-07, 2009 WL 4255529, at *7 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Nov. 19, 2009) (no appearance of impropriety where special master’s law firm was client of defendant’s counsel’s law firm while case was ongoing).  Moreover, the [...]’ position, if accepted, would mean that no retired judge (or any private attorney) could ever handle more than one ADR engagement involving the same law firm at the same time, even if the matters have no parties in common.
[brief] POINT I: PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT WAS PROPERLY DISMISSED ON SUMMARY JUDGMENT BECAUSE THE FACTUAL UNDERPINNING OF PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT, TO THE EFFECT THAT HE WAS UNABLE TO APPEAL, WAS PATENTLY FALSE..................................................................................................................12  POINT II: DEFENDANT HIGHLAND PARK WAS PROPERLY GRANTED SUMMARY JUDGMENT BECAUSE THE UNDISPUTABLE FACTS SHOW THAT THE JUDGE OF THE HIGHLAND PARK MUNICIPAL COURT ENTERED A JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION AND THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR OF THE HIGHLAND PARK MUNICIPAL COURT RETURNED THE COURT FILE TO THE EDISON MUNICIPAL COURT, WHERE THE CASE ORIGINATED........................................18 POINT III: EVEN IF THE ALLEGATIONS OF PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT WERE FACTUALLY CORRECT, PLAINTIFF’S CLAIMS AGAINST THE BOROUGH OF HIGHLAND PARK WERE BARRED BY JUDICIAL IMMUNITY..............................................22  POINT IV: DEFENDANT BOROUGH OF HIGHLAND PARK WAS PROPERLY GRANTED  SUMMARY  JUDGMENT ON PLAINTIFF’S CLAIMS UNDER THE NEW JERSEY CONSTITUTION AND THE NEW JERSEY CIVIL RIGHTS ACT (COUNTS I AND II)  ........................................................................................................................................25
[brief] U.S. Const., amends. VI, XIV; N.J. Const., art. I, ¶¶ 1, 9, 10; R. 2:10-2; see State v. Macon, 57 N.J. 325, 336 (1971) (plain error is reversible if “sufficient to raise reasonable doubt as to whether [it] led the jury to a result it otherwise might not have reached”); see also State v. Rodriguez, 195 N.J. 165, 175 (2008) (holding, where instruction failed to apply self-defense to all lesser-included offenses of murder, that “(e)rrors impacting directly upon … sensitive areas of a criminal trial are poor candidates for rehabilitation under the plain error theory”).
[directive] Official Misconduct performing a duty which is imposed by law or is clearly inherent in the nature of his office.  Second degree unless the benefit obtained or sought to be obtained, or of which another is deprived or sought to be deprived, is of a value of $200 or less.  It is then third degree.  3rd Degree $10,000 to $35,000  10% permissible 60  Updated December 2, 2013
[directive] A Municipal Prosecutor May Not Adopt a Categorical Policy or Practice of Refusing to Seek Convictions for Statutory Offenses Related to Marijuana.  Prosecutors necessarily exercise some discretion in carrying out the duties of the office.  A prosecutor’s discretion is not unlimited, however, and when a municipal prosecutor exceeds the scope of his or her discretion, the County Prosecutor or the Attorney General may intervene.  See N.J.S.A. 2B:12-27; see also N.J.S.A. 2A:158-5; N.J.S.A. 2B:25-7.  It would exceed the scope of a municipal prosecutor’s discretion to adopt a policy or practice of refusing to seek convictions for statutory offenses related to marijuana, notwithstanding the particular facts and applicable law in the individual case before the prosecutor.  By categorically suspending enforcement of a State law, a municipal prosecutor impermissibly assumes a role that properly belongs to the Legislature.
[brief] See Weinberg v Sprint Corp., 173 N.J. 233, 250 (2002)  Conversely, the Attorney General of New Jersey can bring \(^5\)  The words “private attorney general” are not even stated in Paragraphs 7.2, 7.4 or 7.5 of [...]’s arbitration provision but separately concerning a class action waiver in Paragraph 7.3. (Ja36-Ja37) an action solely for injunctive relief and, therefore, does not have the ascertainable loss requirement.
[brief] Any damages sustained shall be diminished by the percentage of negligence attributable to the person recovering.  In all negligence actions in which the question of liability is in dispute, the trier of fact shall make the following as findings of fact:  a.  The amount of damages which would be recoverable by the injured party regardless of any consideration of negligence, that is, the full value of the injured party’s damages to the extent permitted under this act.  b.  The extent, in the form of a percentage, of each party’s negligence.  The percentage of negligence of each party shall be based on 100% of the total of all percentages of negligence of all the parties to a suit shall be 100%.  c.  The judge shall mold the judgment from the findings of fact made by the trier of fact in accordance with the provisions of this act.
[brief] Trial Court Oral Opinion date August 6, 2021 .............................................1T¹ 21:5-25:8  Trial Court Oral Opinion dated November 19, 2021 ....................................2T 13:21-19:1  Trial Court Oral Opinion dated February 4, 2022 .......................................3T 19:22-25:5 ¹ 1T = transcript of August 6, 2021.
[brief] On September 13, 2023, during a motion hearing, [...] testified that [...] was seeking over $50,000 in unpaid rent from Defendants for the Boonton Property, along with over $100,000 in legal fees and costs.  (6T 4-5)  Meanwhile, [...] permitted [...] to rent the entire Florida Property for just $2,500 total.  Therefore, Plaintiff was appropriating Trust funds for litigation to potentially benefit herself and [...], at [...]’s expense, which violated her fiduciary duties of loyalty and impartiality.  (6T 4-5)  On December 6, 2023 and December 14, 2023, the trial court conducted a 2-day plenary hearing to determine if Plaintiff had proven her case for mesne profits and legal fees.  Defendants raised multiple defenses, primarily involving Plaintiff, in her capacity as Trustee, violated her fiduciary duties coming into and throughout the instant litigation.  However, the trial court omitted specific findings and conclusions with regard to Plaintiff’s breaches of trust.
[brief] Rather than establish the identity of a specific fund already owned by any plaintiff, this argument merely sets the groundwork for a potential claim for breach of contract if plaintiffs could prove such a breach.  B.  Defendants did not waive the argument that plaintiffs were required to make a pre-suit demand.  Plaintiffs argue that defendants waived the argument that their conversion claims fail because they did not make a pre-suit demand.  Contrary to plaintiffs’ assertion, these defendants did argue in their summary judgment motion that a derivative action was the proper way to pursue these claims and that plaintiffs were required to issue a demand upon the corporation to take action pursuant to N.J.S.A. 14A:3-6.3. Dra8-10.  Therefore, defendants did not “clearly, unequivocally, and decisively” waive this argument.  Knorr, 178 N.J. at 177.  C.
[brief] 31  **Other** Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, *The Constitution of the United States of America – Analysis and Interpretation*, at 2317 (2013), *available at* www.gpo.gov/constitutionannoted..................................................  26 L.1962, c. 198, § 95...........................................................................  33 L.1945, c. 231, p. 747, § 1...............................................................  34  [...] & [...], Current N.J. Court Rules, cmt. 3 on R. 2:6-2 (2021).................................................................