ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] In Atalese, a consumer plaintiff signed a 23-page service contract under which she paid over $5,000 to have the defendant settle personal debts with her creditors.  Id. at 436.  She then sued under the Consumer Fraud Act and the Truth-in-Consumer Contract, Warranty and Notice Act for alleged misrepresentations by the defendant about its work.  Id.  The defendant sought to compel arbitration.  Id. at 437.  The New Jersey Supreme Court invalidated the arbitration clause because the clause was not clear enough to be enforceable against a consumer.
[brief] R. 4:42-9(a)(6) was promulgated to both discourage groundless disclaimers and to provide more equitably to an insured the benefits of the insurance policy.  *Kistler v. N.J. Mfrs. Ins. Co.*, 172 N.J. Super. 324, 328-330  To award attorneys’ fees under R. 4:42-9(a)(6), the Court must evaluate the factors outlined in *Enright v. Lubow*, 215 N.J. Super. 306, 313 (App. Div. 1987).  The *Enright* factors governing a court’s discretion are: “(1) the insurer's good faith in refusing to pay the demands; (2) excessiveness of plaintiff’s demand; (3) bona fides of one or both of the parties; (4) the insurer’s justification in litigating the issue; (5) the insured’s conduct in contributing substantially to the necessity for the litigation on the policies; (6) the general conduct of the parties; and (7) the totality of the circumstances.
[brief] Plaintiff and Defendant clearly “touched” each other “physically or sexually. ”  Also, what does “I would start” mean?  Obviously, it means intercourse.  Even the Judge stated that “It appears to me that the plaintiff believes that the standard is that if the parties never engaged in sexual intercourse involving the penis actually entering the vagina with ---with full consummation with an intention of pregnancy that a marriage is not consummated. ” (1T132-20).  The reality is that it is important for Plaintiff, who is traditional in his views, to maintain that he is a virgin as it is believed by him that it is more difficult to get remarried if he had sex with Defendant.  (2T40-17).  That is why he testified at trial as he did.  Likewise, maintaining this position of being a virgin is culturally important to Defendant as well – for the same reasons.  More so, while Plaintiff claims that Defendant’s failure to follow South Asian traditions and “cultural beliefs,” after representing herself as being part of that culture, constitutes fraud as to the essentials of the marriage, no evidence was produced that Defendant lied or made a misrepresentation of any sort to Defendant.
[brief] (2T17:19-22).  Defendant indicated that he had a “neurological issue” but refused to elaborate further.  (2T20:8-10).  Defendant did not mention anything about any lower body issues that would prevent him from maintaining his balance.  (2T20:10-11).  [...] did not recall if defendant had any difficulties keeping that position or following his instructions such as keeping his head still and following certain steps.  (2T17:23 to 2T18:10).
[brief] Bender is not an aberration.  It is fully consistent with a number of other cases dealing with requests for additional discovery not made in accordance with the Court Rules.  See also Szalontal v. Yazbo’s Sports Café, 183 N.J. 386 (2005) (“we affirm the judgment of the Appellate Division.  In doing so, we reject plaintiff’s claim that he was prejudiced by the application of our “Best Practices” which denied plaintiff leave to extend the discovery deadline and barred his late-tendered liability expert from testifying at trial”); accord O’Donnell v. Ahmed, 363 N.J. Super. 44 (Law Div. 2003) (addressing late provided expert reports without authorization, stating: “It is presumptuous to decide to reopen discovery on one’s own without consent of adverse counsel or the court.
[brief] However, because [...] requested that the Zoning Board defer review of the site plan application to a later date, all of the issues related to the physical development of the property, including traffic impacts, storm water management facilities, and all other impacts were properly deferred to the Zoning Board’s review of [...]’s Application for Site Plan Approval.  Any review of such impacts in connection with the Zoning Board’s review of the subdivision would have been limited to rote testimony and the unavoidable conclusion that there are so such impacts related to the subdivision.  The trial court agreed with this argument finding that, because the subdivision application was considered separately, it constituted approval of a picture with different dotted lines showing the new lots being created and which had no adverse effect on the public’s health, safety, or welfare.  (Pa312).
[brief] ”  (9T 50-17 to 52-18)  The court’s findings were not supported by credible evidence.  Its finding that [...] had no minor dependents or “any” dependents was directly contradicted by the presentence report in which he claimed two dependents and by his cousin’s letter in which she attested that he “has minor children. ”  Moreover, under the court’s rigid interpretation requiring an unspecified level of “uniqueness,” no defendant could ever meet the test for mitigating factor eleven.  That was not the Legislature’s intent.  [...] submitted uncontradicted evidence that he loved and supported at least two children, one of whom was nineteen and another who, according to his cousin, was a “minor. ”  In addition to the obvious loss of one parent’s income, social science has demonstrated that children with incarcerated parents have significantly worse outcomes in education, behavioral development, and physical and mental health. \(^7\)  That is particularly true here where [...] received the maximum sentence of life imprisonment.  Therefore, mitigating factor eleven was “amply based in the record,” and the court was required to apply it.
[brief] See *Macedo v.* Dello Russo, 178 N.J. 340, 345-46 (2004) (physician’s advertisement in respect of the rendering of professional services are insulated from the CFA); Blatterfein v. Larken Assocs., 323 N.J. Super. 167, 175 (App. Div. 1999) (architect providing professional architectural services may not be covered by the CFA); Hampton Hosp. v. Bresan, 288 N.J. Super. 372, 383 (App. Div.) (services performed by hospital not encompassed by the CFA because hospitals are heavily regulated by the state), certif. denied, 144 N.J. 588 (1996); Vort v. Hollander, 257 N.J. Super. 56, 62 (App. Div.) (professional services rendered by attorneys regarding their clients’ rights as owners of real estate were not covered by the CFA), certif. denied, 130 N.J. 599 (1992).
[brief] The State Court Action arose out of personal injuries being claimed by Appellee from a motor vehicle accident caused by Appellant on January 27, 2018.  On May 14, 2021, in the midst of discovery, Appellant filed for Chapter 7 Bankruptcy (“Bankruptcy”) and listed Appellee as a creditor and identified the State Court Action as within Appellant’s Voluntary Petition.  Along with the Bankruptcy, an Automatic Stay was instituted and was applicable to the State Court Action.  On July 7, 2021, Appellant made formal application for a Motion to Stay the State Court Action, citing Appellant’s Bankruptcy and the Automatic Stay.  Da25-31.
[brief] As Guenther and A.O. both stated, to do so would be a distracting sideshow that would “become a second trial, eclipsing the trial of the crimes charged. ”  Guenther, 181 N.J. at 157; A.O., 198 N.J. at 93.  The trial court was right to decline to delve into that digression when the testimony already adequately addresses [...]’s credibility.
[brief] Anything less is an insult to the students and parents of [...].*  | | Date/Time | Defendant(s) / Citation | Statement | |-------------------|-------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | Oct. 8, 2021 at | [...], Am. Compl. | **[...] Statement #2** | | 11:34 and | ¶¶ 59 - 62 (Da 020) | *Forcefully stripping off the religious headscarf of a Muslim girl is not only exceptionally disrespectful behavior, but also a humiliating and traumatic experience.* | | 11:49 a.m. | | *Muslim students already deal with bullying from peers, it’s unthinkable that a teacher would add to their distress.  Islamophobia in our public schools must be addressed in NJ.  Classrooms are a place for students to feel safe and welcome, not fear practicing their faith.*  | | Eastern Time | | | | October 8, 2021 | [...], Am. Compl. | **[...] Statement #4** | | | ¶ 63 (Da 023) | *The teacher not only put her hands on her, removed her headscarf.  And this is, of course, humiliating for any Muslim woman to be exposed this way, in public.*  | | October 9, 2021 | [...], Am. Compl. | **[...] Statement #5** | | | ¶ 64 (Da 023) | *Clearly she's demonstrated she cannot be trusted around students.* | | October 9, 2021 | [...], Am. Compl. | **[...] Statement #6** | | | ¶ 65 (Da 023) | *Anything less than removing her from the classroom would be unacceptable.  If she can't respect the religious practices of her students, then she shouldn’t be teaching.*  |
[brief] We are unable to agree.  It is well-settled that “[p]rosecutors ‘are afforded considerable leeway in making opening statements and summations. ’”  *State v. Echols*, 199 N.J. 344, 359–60 (2009) (quoting *State v. Williams*, 113 N.J. 393, 447 (1988)).  However, while prosecutors are expected to be zealous in enforcing the law, “‘[t]he primary duty of a prosecutor is not to obtain convictions, but to see that justice is done.
[brief] Although the New Jersey Supreme Court in State v. Williamson, 138 N.J. 302 (1994), considered under what circumstances a motorist may be pulled over for failing to signal a lane change, the Williamson Court was not presented with the question of whether the statute’s signaling requirement applies to lane changes in the first instance.  It appears that neither party raised this issue in Williamson, and thus the Court assumed that the requirement applies without expressly deciding or even considering it.  In State v. Jones, 326 N.J. Super. 234 (App. Div. 1999), the Appellate Division applied the holding of Williamson, but it similarly appears that the Jones Court was not asked to consider the issue raised here.  Given this lack of precedent, the Court must be guided by settled principles of statutory interpretation.
[brief] That wasn't before the jury.  The jury never considered [...]' testimony…So why are we arguing it today?” (8T12:2-15).  The plaintiff argues that because the defendant did not announce that it would not be calling [...] until the end of the case (Pb6, footnote 3), the trial court’s denial of these motions to bar the testimony of [...] “forced the plaintiff to have to address the evidence with her witnesses and resulted in the unrelated evidence being repeatedly broadcast before the jury” and prejudiced the plaintiff.  (Pb21).  The trial court's ruling to permit into evidence evidence and testimony regarding the plaintiff’s prior medical conditions, falls and use of a handicapped placard, however, was correct, was not an abuse of discretion and was not “so wide of the mark that a manifest denial of justice resulted.
[brief] It is clear from the record that the Planning Board did not approach its task with any seriousness or vigor as it was told by its Chairman that their review was “merely a formality of reviewing what they have already approved. ”  The only basis for the Board’s determination of consistency was the testimony from the Borough Planner that amending the Redevelopment Plan to provide for an 11 acre park is consistent with Objective 2 of the Master Plan, i.e., providing more parks and open spaces.
[brief] PROCEDURAL HISTORY.....................................................3  STATEMENT OF FACTS......................................................4  POINT I  THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT PROPERLY CHARACTERIZE OR CONSTRUE  PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT CONCERNING THE CHALLENGED PROMOTIONAL POLICY (Pa5)..........................12  POINT II  THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY APPLIED  THE WRONG LEGAL TESTS TO PLAINTIFF’S CLAIMS (Pa5).............................22  POINT III  THE TRIAL COURT NEVER ADDRESSED  PLAINTIFF’S CAUSE OF ACTION CONCERNING THE UNLAWFUL POLICY OF PENALIZING PROTECTED LEAVES (Never Addressed by Trial Court)(Pa50)................................................................30  POINT IV  PREVIOUS APPELLATE HOLDINGS HAVE FOUND SIMILAR  NO FAULT POLICIES TO BE ARBITRARY AND UNREASONABLE (Pa52)......................................................37  POINT V THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT INDISPENSABLE PARTIES WERE NOT NAMED (Pa6)........................39  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULING BEING APPEALED
[brief] It was no mere “tweak” for [...] to correct its palpable misrepresentations to the potential buyer of the property.  The first Addendum, presented to [...] on May 2, 2023, modified the environment disclosures of the PSA and assigned indemnification rights granted by [...].  Environmental issues can often impose significant liabilities for a motor fuel station.  Addendum I created a significant change to the PSA, as without this term the indemnification rights remained with [...] and not the potential buyer.  The second Addendum similarly modified the PSA.  The October 14, 2022 PSA executed by [...] and [...] omitted key terms – terms that [...] knew existed, but materially misrepresented in the contract.
[brief] Sat Below: The Honorable [...], J.S.C. REPLY  BRIEF ON APPEAL OF DEFENDANT/APPELLANT, [...]  Of Counsel and On the Brief: [...], Esq. (023881981)  [...]  On the Brief: [...], Esq. (020531993)  [...]  [...]  [...]  [...] [...]  Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant, Mt. Arlington Holdings, LLC
[brief] ###  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | Case | Page(s) | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|---------| | **Cases** | | | *Century Indem. Co. v. Viacom Int’l, Inc.*, | 9, 11 | | No. 02 CIV. 2779(DC), 2003 WL 402792 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 20, 2003) | | | *Chassen v. Fidelity National Financial, Inc.*, | passim | | 836 F.3d 291 (3d Cir. 2016) | | | *Cole v. Jersey City Medical Center*, | passim | | 215 N.J. 265 (2013) | | | *Del. River Partners LLC v. R.R. Constr.*, | 13 | | 2022 N.J.Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1134 (App. Div. June 24, 2022) | | | *EPIX Holdings Corp. v. Marsh & McClennan Cos., Inc.*, | 6 | | 410 N.J. Super 453 (2009) | | | *Fasano v. Li*, | 6, 7 | | No. 16 CIV. 8759 (KPF), 2023 WL 6292579 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2023) | | | *Herrera v. Paramount Freight Sys. Inc*, | 11 | | No. A-0424-23, 2024 N.J.Super. Unpub. LEXIS 951 (App. Div. May 24, 2024) | | | *J.L. Davis & Assocs. v. Heidler*, | 12 | | 263 N.J. Super. 264 (App. Div. 1993) | | | *Marmo & Sons Gen. Contr., LLC v. Biagi Farms, LLC*, | 9, 10 | | 478 N.J. Super. 593 (App. Div. May 24, 2024) | | | *Potomac Ins. Co. of Illinois ex. Rel. OneBeacon Ins. Co. v. Pennsylvania Mfrs. Ass’n Ins. Co.*, | 5 | | 215 N.J. 409 (2013) | | | *PPT Research, Inc. v. Solvay USA, Inc.*, | 13 | | 2021 U.S.Dist. LEXIS 127031 (E.D.Pa. July 7, 2021) | | Other Authorities Commercial Arbitration Rules & Mediation Procedures (2022)..................................10 Rule 4:5-1(B)(2)......................................................................................................................10, 11 PRELIMINARY STATEMENT [...]’s Opposition boils down to the argument that [...] waived its right to arbitrate [...]’s Indemnity Claim because of the sheer amount of time that elapsed between commencement of the DJ Action and [...]’s motion to compel.
[brief] (Da6)  The trial court also noted expressly in its Rider that “Plaintiff shall continue to serve legal papers at the P.O. Box that was addressed on the record on August 27, 2019. ”  Ibid.  (emphasis added).  The Defendant [...] next argues that the complaint was void *ab initio* and the $4,600.00 judgment is void.  (Db10)  In support of that argument, Defendant [...] relies solely on a number of unpublished opinions, including *Crusader Servicing Corp. v. Demarzino*, A-2930-04T2, 2006 WL 280519 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Feb. 7, 2006), *African Am. Data & Research Inst., LLC v. Hitchner*, A-1592-20, 2023 WL 3014833 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Apr. 20, 2023), *Wiss & Bouregy, P.C. v. Bisceglie*, No. A-3228-15T3, 2017 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 619 (App. Div. Mar. 13, 2017), and *Grabowski v. Baskay*, A-2785-21, 2023 WL 3862761 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. June 7, 2023).
[brief] In other words, that he was on the suspended list is not suppressible, nor is the fact that the car was seen being driven the car prior to the stop.  The New Jersey Supreme Court has ruled similarly where a defendant was improperly seized to check for open warrants.  See State v. Shaw, 213 N.J. 398, 422 (2012).  The Court clarified that although the physical evidence seized as a result of a search incident to arrest for an open parole warrant must be suppressed due to the illegal initial stop, Shaw still had to answer for the open parole warrant for which he was arrested, as well as charges arising from another open municipal warrant.  Ibid.  In other words, the execution of the parole warrant issued for a preexisting violation itself was not suppressed, only the drug evidence seized incident to its execution after an illegal stop.  Ibid.  Likewise here, regardless of the legality of the stop for suspected drug activity, defendant should still have to answer for driving despite his preexisting suspension for a prior drunk-driving offense.
[brief] [...] may also point to *Jorge v. Travelers Indem. Co.*, 947 F.Supp. 150 (D.C.N.J. 1996), for the proposition that it may pursue reimbursement of the settlement amount it paid based on either: (1) conventional subrogation; or (2) equitable subrogation.  The *Jorge* court held that an insurer, which paid a judgment on behalf of its insured, was allowed to pursue recovery for the payment from another carrier via conventional subrogation based on policy language, as well as equitable subrogation based on principles of equity (with the VPD applicable only to the latter).  *Jorge*, at *6-7.  However, equitable subrogation does not apply given [...]’s notice it was unenrolled and because it paid no premiums toward the CCIP.  Importantly, *Jorge* is an outlier that has never been cited by a single New Jersey State Court since its ruling more than 25 years ago.
[brief] **CONCLUSION**  Procedurally, the action now on appeal can perhaps best be summed up by referring to the record as a “nightmare. ”  Between 2018 and 2019, the case languished as [...] departed for his retirement.  [...] picked up the case in 2019.  Then, after taking nearly two years to reach trial in September 2020, [...] “misplaced” the box containing her notes\(^{95}\) and did not render a final decision until nearly two years later in June 2022.  In the interim, the case was marked as “closed” and “dismissed by court \(^{95}\) See Da14 footnote 2. with prejudice” according to ACMS.\footnote{See generally Da271 (Order to correct docket).}  Days after entering her post-trial order and judgment, [...] was reassigned and replaced by [...].  [...] was faced with the unenviable task of entering a final judgment and deciding other post-trial issues – all two years after the trial, and having not been a participant in the trial himself.  The missing trial notes?  It is not clear if they were ever found, as [...]’s post-trial order seems to mirror in form, language, and fact the post-trial submission of Plaintiffs’ counsel.  What the record is clear on, however, is that Plaintiffs (1) lacked standing, (2) did not suffer any personal damages, and (3) failed to join [...] as a party.
[brief] Indeed, this case is very similar to *State v. Pitcher*, 379 N.J. Super. 308 (App. Div. 2005).  In *Pitcher*, officers checked the license plate number of the defendant’s vehicle and the mobile data terminal showed that the license of the registered owner was suspended.  *Id.* at 312.  It subsequently determined that the information was incorrect.  *Id.* at 313.  The defendant argued denial of his motion to suppress would require a “good faith” exception to the exclusionary rule.  *Id.* at 316.  The appellate division rejected defendant’s argument.  *Id.*  \(^3\)
[brief] 1T ..................................  Trial Transcript - July 24, 2023  2T ..................................  Trial Transcript – July 25, 2023  3T ..................................  Trial Transcript – July 27, 2023  4T ..................................  Trial Transcript – August 21, 2023  5T ..................................  Trial Transcript – August 24, 2023  6T ..................................  Motion for Reconsideration Transcript – October 6, 2023  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
[brief] For example, in *Horizon Healthcare Services, Inc. v. MD-X Solutions, Inc.*, No. BER-L-8463-08, 2009 WL 833333 (N.J. Super. L., Bergen Cnty. Mar. 13, 2009), the Court criticized a party for bringing a motion to reconsider that merely repackaged “still moribund old-wine-in-new-bottles arguments” that were previously made to the Court.  The Court observed that motions for reconsideration occupy increasingly scarce judicial resources, and should be reserved for those rare cases where the Court’s expressed decision is based on a palpably incorrect or irrational basis, or it is obvious that the Court failed to consider significant probative evidence.  “A motion for reconsideration should not be an invitation to experience déjà vu all over again.  A difference of opinion with the court’s decision should be dealt with through the normal appellate process. ”  *Id.*  New Jersey courts have repeatedly warned against motions to reconsider that are merely repetitious, or which simply is an unwarranted attempt to reverse matters previously decided solely because the prior judge is no longer available. ”  *Lawson v. Dewar*, 468 N.J. Super. 128, 136 (App. Div. 2021); see also Lombardi, 207 N.J. at 537 n. 6 (disapproving of repetitive motions for reconsideration by a disappointed litigant).  Here, Defendants’ motion to reconsider simply repeated the same arguments and cited the same authorities that had been fully briefed to the Court three times previously.  Compare (Pa487-96) (excerpt of September 2017 motion to dismiss), with (Pa514-24) (excerpt of September 2022 renewed motion to dismiss); (Pa758-69) (excerpt of November 2022 stay motion); and (Pa305-14) (excerpt of February 2023 motion to reconsider).8  “[M]otion practice must come to an end at some point, and if repetitive bites at the apple are allowed, the core will swiftly sour. ”  D’Atria, 242 N.J. Super. at 401.  Defendants did not identify anything palpably incorrect or irrational about [...]’s decisions.  Rather, Defendants simply disagreed with his conclusions and the exercise of his discretion not to dismiss or stay this first-filed action in favor of a later-filed case in Missouri, and presented the same tired arguments to a new judge.  Defendants’ disagreement with [...]’s January 20, 2023 Orders is not a proper basis for reconsideration (and, as discussed below, [...]’s Orders were properly made and a provident exercise of his 8  Relevant excerpts of the cited memoranda are included within the Appendix pursuant to Rule 2:6-1(a)(2), as the arguments and authorities repeatedly briefed by Defendants are germane to this appeal. discretion).  [...] should have declined to reconsider Defendants’ comity arguments when raised for the fourth time.