ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] As stated herein above, and in Appellant's brief, Appellant does argue that she suffered a permanent loss of bodily function that is substantial.  Appellant’s treating doctor, [...], performed the surgery on her ankle, and also provided an expert report.  [...]’s report outlines Appellant’s injuries, including the surgery to her ankle, and he specifically opines in his expert report that those injuries are permanent in nature and are directly and causally related to Appellant’s fall of September 6, 2018.  (Pa314-320)  [...]’s report also states that Appellant’s body parts have failed to return to normal function, nor will they return to normal function with continued care and treatment.  (Pa314-320)  [...] failed to acknowledge that the trial Court did not properly take into account the report of [...] nor the fact that [...] did not have any expert that disputed or contradicted [...]'s findings.  Based on these facts herein and the arguments set forth in Appellant's brief, Appellant respectfully requests this Court find that there is a permanent loss of bodily function that is substantial.
[brief] ”)  Defendant failed to answer or otherwise appear to defend and, based upon this default, Plaintiff moved for entry of default judgment on September 12, 2017.  (Da3)  Judgment in favor of Plaintiff was entered on September 14, 2017.  (Da12).  Almost six (6) years later, on June 7, 2023, Defendant moved to vacate the default judgment.  Defendant’s motion to vacate default judgment was denied by order entered July 7, 2023.  On July 19, 2023, Defendant filed a second motion to vacate default judgment.  This motion was not properly served upon Plaintiff’s counsel.  The motion judgment was granted as unopposed by order entered August 2, 2023.  On August 4, 2023, Plaintiff moved for reconsideration of the court’s August 2, 2023 order vacating default.  On September 6, 2023, Defendant moved to transfer the matter from the Special Civil Part to the Law Division.  (Da13)  On September 8, 2023 Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration was granted, thereby reinstating the default judgment against Defendant.  On September 20, 2023 Defendant filed a third motion to vacate default judgment on.  (Da15).  On October 6, 2023 Defendant’s motion to transfer the matter from the Special Civil Part to the Law Division was granted.  (Da56).  On October 26, 2023  Defendant’s third motion to vacate default judgment was denied by order of the trial court in the Law Division, the matter having been transferred from Special Civil Part to Law Division as noted above.  (Da58).  On December 8, 2023, Defendant filed the instant appeal by filing a Notice of Appeal (Da63), later amending the same on December 13, 2023 to correct the caption.
[brief] Late morning on September 15, 2021, East Hanover Environmental Health Specialist, [...], observed 2 admittedly stray cats on Murray Road.  3T10:19-11; 3T11:17-19; 3T12: 9-12; 3T13:13-15.  Pulling over, she also observed a trap with an attached label which contained the information: [...], a phone number and message "trapping Momma Cat and Kittens".  3T14; 3T15:13-15; 3T26: 9-11  Trap was partially under the guard rail on private property and partially on a sidewalk abutting the private property.  3T34:12-17  Pedestrians routinely traversed the sidewalk.  3T17: 4-6  Trap had food placed in it, was tied open and wrapped in plastic.  3T14:9-18  [...] also observed 4 piles of food on the sidewalk leading to the trap.  3T16:24-25; 3T17:1  [...] did not remove the trap.  3T 36: 6-8  On September 17, 2021 [...] came to Town Hall to ask for her trap which the town did not possess.  3T30:6-11  At no time did [...] observe [...] place the trap on Murray Road.  3T33:5-12  At no time did [...] observe [...] place the food on Murray Road.  3T33:13-19
[brief] Cooper v. Nutley Sun Printing Co., 36 N.J. 189, 199 (1961) (“[T]he court has the broadest equitable power to grant the appropriate relief [and t]he court can and should mold the relief to fit the circumstances [but only with knowledge of] what the circumstances are. ”); Matejek v. Watson, 449 N.J. Super. 179, 183 (App. Div. 2017) (“[A] court's equitable jurisdiction provides as much flexibility as is warranted by the circumstances. ”).
[brief] Cases  Statutes Rules Rules of Evidence  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT  It would be a terrible thing in this country if law enforcement were permitted to bypass the warrant requirements along with the constitutional protections against unreasonable searches and seizures; this is exactly what occurred here.  The trial court erroneously accepted the State's position that an individual who enters and leaves a premises which is the subject of a soon-to-be-executed search warrant who has no involvement with any offense in the premises nor seen committing any offense while walking can be detained without a warrant and then subjected to a search and seizure.  Here, the judge issuing the warrant to search the premises at [...], did not issue either a search warrant for any of the individuals on the premises, nor did he issue an arrest warrant for any individual.  The trial court, in accepting the State's arguments, violated the constitutional requirements related to arrest and search warrants, as none was issued in this case to justify the detaining and arrest of defendant, with the subsequent seizure of the handgun in defendant's possession.
[brief] “A trial court’s interpretation of the law and the legal consequences that flow from established facts are not entitled to any special deference. ”  Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan Twp., 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995).  With respect to the trial court’s conclusions on issues of law, this Court reviews such conclusions de novo and accords “no deference” to such conclusions.  Borough of Seaside Park v. Comm’r of N.J. Dep’t of Educ., 432 N.J. Super. 167, 201 (App. Div. 2013).  The Appellate Division employs “the same standard that governs trial courts in reviewing summary judgment orders. ”  Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Boylan, 307 N.J. Super. 162, 167 (App. Div. 1998).  The Appellate Division “first decides whether there was a genuine issue of material fact and, if there was not, it then decides whether the trial judge’s ruling on the law was correct. ”  Walker v. Atl. Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 216 N.J. Super. 255, 258 (App. Div. 1987).  I.
[brief] (3T49-1 to 49-6)  CONCLUSION  Based on all of the above it is respectfully submitted that the Defendant’s request for relief be denied.  Respectfully submitted, /S/ [...], Esq.  [...]  Assistant Prosecutor Attorney ID#000602001  [...]  [...]  Chief Appellate Attorney Of Counsel  Attorney ID#038761985  Date Submitted: July 2, 2024  cc: [...], Esq.  APPELLANT/DEFENDANT’S REPLY
[brief] (Da2857).  [...] refused to turn those over.  Instead, he provided a few additional [...] tax returns, but those tax returns raised more questions, because the 2017 return showed significant unexplained retained earnings on which [...] paid taxes but which [...] had refused to distribute.  (16T 77:22 to 78:5; 78:6 to 79:6).  On October 29, 2019, [...] executed an affidavit purporting to memorialize the circumstances of the tax filing that erroneously allocated that nearly $2 million distribution to [...] and [...], instead of just to [...].  (Da2848).  Initially, [...] prepared the affidavit for [...]’s signature, but [...] refused to sign.  In fact, by this time, [...] was so overtly hostile toward [...] that when [...] asked him to sign the affidavit, [...] responded in a series of text messages:
[brief] See Rivkin v. Dover Tp. Rent Leveling Bd., 277 N.J. Super. 559, 569 (App. Div. 1994), aff’d 143 N.J. 352, cert. den. 519 U.S. 911 (1996); Centex Homes, LLC v. Twp. Comm. of Tp. of Mansfield, 372 N.J. Super. 186, 196 (Law Div. 2004); see also R. Neumann & Co. v. City of Hoboken, 437 N.J. Super. 384, 391 n.4 (App. Div. 2014) (finding under similar provision with 45-day planning board recommendation period: “It is important to note that it is the governing body’s, not the planning board’s, determination that a court reviews.  …  To the extent the trial court concluded that the planning board’s action was under review, the court erred. ”) (citing Kane Prop., LLC v. City of Hoboken, 214 N.J. 199, 226-28 (2013)).  In this case, the “record below” is limited to the transcripts and minutes of the First and Second Readings, the Topology Presentation, the Planning Board Report, the Ordinance, and the Redevelopment Plan.
[brief] Because S-41 was recovered from the same camera and showed the same exact image as S-37, the prejudice of the detective’s lay opinion testimony as to S-37 likewise intruded upon the jury’s role of drawing their own conclusions as to what S-41 depicted.  nearly indistinguishable.  The State therefore needed the detective’s improper narration testimony in order to make out its case beyond a reasonable doubt.  Indeed, in summation, the State cited to the detective’s narration as a crucial component of its case:  “So as [police were] tracking this car, they get to an area right by the shooting.  And we know that this camera, [...] testified that the car comes up into this area, the upper portion of the screen.  I submit that you can see it’s the same black car that those other stills were. ”  (7T84-8 to 13)  The importance of these videos was also clear in the jury’s request to re-watch only seven of the fifty total videos, four of which were those tainted by improper narration: S-37, S-38, and S-39, and S-41.  (8T3-8 to 11)  Moreover, police officer opinion testimony such as this runs the risk of being accorded undue weight by virtue of the tacit authority accorded to law enforcement.  See Neno v. Clifton, 167 N.J. 573, 583 (2001); Commonwealth v. Wardsworth, 124 N.E.3d 662, 685 (Mass. 2019) (recognizing the risk that testimony about what the jury was going to see on a video – “priming” – “risked creating a cognitive bias” that was particularly significant because “the recording was of poor quality”).  It is likely that the jury interpreted the amorphous light-colored shape as being the shooter, and interpreted the half-obscured, blurry image of a dark sedan as the Chevy, because they expected to see the shooter and the Chevy after hearing the detective’s testimony.  But, as discussed, there was no legitimate evidentiary basis for her opinions, and the jury had equal access to the facts that she relied upon to draw her conclusions.  Under these circumstances, the improper admission of [...]’s narration testimony was plain error requiring the reversal of the convictions.
[brief] As the Court explained in *Alpha Beauty v. Winn–Dixie Stores*, 425 N.J. Super. 94, 102 (App. Div. 2012):  Our Court Rules, from their inception, have been understood as “a means to the end of obtaining just and expeditious determinations between the parties on the ultimate merits. ”  *Ragusa v. Lau*, 119 N.J. 276, 284 (1990).  As a result, the Supreme Court has recognized a “strong preference for adjudication on the merits rather than final disposition for procedural reasons.
[brief] [...] follows:  [The State]: Were there cell phone records obtained for defendant's phone?  [[...]]: Correct.  [The State]:  And did those records place him in the area of the Menlo Park T-Mobile robbery where he was arrested as well as the AT&T robbery in Edison and the Radio Shack?  [[...]]: That's correct.  [The State]: And it was the cell phone towers basically that his phone was hitting off of, were within a mile or two of those locations; correct?  [[...]]: Correct.  (13T 29-30-15 to 9)  In spite of the testimony of Det. [...] indicating that the maps placed defendant at the robbery locations, it was later determined that the maps (Da 5-9) the State and Det. [...] presented to the grand jury weren't the correct cell sites pursuant to the call detail records.
[directive] 6.2.1  Following the principle that the primary goal of internal affairs and discipline is to correct problems and improve performance, management in the subject officer's chain of command should handle relatively minor complaints.  Complaints of demeanor and minor rule infractions should be forwarded to the supervisor of the subject officer's unit because it is often difficult for an immediate supervisor to objectively investigate a subordinate.  In addition, that arrangement might obscure the possibility that part of the inappropriate conduct was the result of poor supervision.  While the structure of each law enforcement agency is different, it is recommended that minor complaints be assigned to and handled by a commanding officer at least one step removed from the officer's immediate supervisor.  Often Human Resources may need to be notified and involved.  26
[brief] (“[...]”), [...] (“[...]”), [...], and [...] (collectively, “Defendants”) for violating New Jersey’s Malt Beverage Practices Act (N.J.S.A. § 33:1-93.12 et seq.), New York’s Alcoholic Beverage Control Law (“ABC”) § 55-c, breaching the parties’ Wholesaler Agreement (defined below), and other common law claims.  This case arises from [...]’s bad faith attempt to terminate Appellants’ distribution rights to Sapporo products, despite the parties’ 45-year relationship.  Although a productive relationship, Appellants have had to withstand and reluctantly accept [...]’s discriminatory and abusive policies, demands, and tactics through the years: (1) despite broad territorial rights to distribute Sapporo products, Appellants are largely restricted to sell to only Asian-owned businesses, (2) [...] encourages its distributors to violate antitrust laws, (3) [...] long restricted Appellants from utilizing sub-distributors, even though other Sapporo distributors were permitted to do so, and (4) representatives of [...] were caught rummaging through Appellants’ offices copying confidential material.
[brief] The January 5th, 2012, [...] robbery, the state placed heavy reliance on [...] testimony that a phone found in defendant's mother car was stolen from the store, in which Hamer testified that his knowledge was limited to a police report filed by [...].  (12T 34-7 to 15) which excludes any evidence that defendant committed armed robbery himself.  When Hamer conveyed information concerning the January 5th, 2012 robbery to the grand jury from Det Kenney who did not testify violated defendant's rights under New Jersey Constitution article I para 10 and the Six Amendment under the federal constitution.
[brief] (Pa293).  And yet, these same groundless allegations were brought forth again in the underlying complaint.  (Pa293).  Of note, the underlying complaint was not supported by a certification from [...].  (Pa293).  The transcript from Municipal Court is relevant as it demonstrates that [...] did not intend to harass [...] and his email communications with [...] were done in a cordial and professional manner.  (Pa298, Pa321, Exhibits “D-1” through “D-5” shows emails to/from [...].  (Pa298, Pa309, Pa313, Pa316, Pa317, Pa417).  As to [...]’s harassment allegations, [...]’ attorney summarizes (Pa338-339):  Speaking to someone about snow removal moving your parking space – two grown men having an argument where one says lazy, another says idiot is not criminal harassment.
[brief] The Trial Court Improperly Relied on an Unrecorded Subdivision Map and the Hypotheticals Presented by Defendant’s Expert to Justify Its Decision that It Would Be Inequitable to Allow the Plaintiff to Retain Ownership of the Strip (Raised Below: 4T14).  The trial court improperly placed a significant amount of weight on the evidence presented by the Defendant regarding the purported 1967 subdivision to determine that the Plaintiff was not entitled to ownership of the Strip.  Defendant’s expert opined at length regarding the Plaintiff’s obligation to do extensive research of the ownership of the Strip prior to his purchase of the Property, regardless of standard title searcher’s practices, and provided detached from reality hypothetical conclusions to what Plaintiff might have discovered if he had performed those inquiries prior to his purchase of the Property.  Ironically, in its decision, the trial court stated:  “[...] [sic] seemed very objective in his explanation of the inquiry notice and his conclusion that based on all of this subjective evidence one could not just make assumptions without a further explanation of all relevant facts. ”  4T13:15-19.  The court added:  For example, with respect to the subdivision and the lack of any recordings to memorialize the transfer of the – portions of the properties, [...] presented a very objective and reasonable explanation grounded in recorded deeds, and reflected in the conduct of the parties, to reach the conclusion that the most reasonable explanation is that the parties treated the subdivision as a done deal and that the defendants has equitable title to the strip in his – conclusion.  4T14:1-10.  The court further stated: “Overall, the Court has given significant weight to [...]’s testimony. ”  4T14:24-25.  While it is within the trial court’s discretion to evaluate witnesses and determine the creditworthiness of their testimony, the trial court’s final decision is flawed by the conclusions it reached: (1) that the parties to the purported 1967 subdivision thereafter properly perfected the subdivision; (2) that the Plaintiff would have been able to make this discovery had he performed the inquiries suggested by Defendant’s expert; and (3) that the inquiries suggested by Defendant’s expert were reasonable.  These conclusions are contrary to the recorded documents presented at trial, the testimony presented, and applicable law.
[directive] Certain marijuana charges shall not be considered by the Public Safety Assessment as of risk factors relevant the risk failure to appear in court when required and the to the community while on pretrial release.  danger to of  Under the Criminal Justice Reform Act (CJRA)  "[t]he Administrative Director the Courts shall establish and maintain a Statewide Pretrial Services Program which shall provide of pretrial services to effectuate the purposes [this] section[]."  N.J.S.A. 2A:162-25(a).  This of includes the creation and use a risk assessment instrument "approved by the Administrative of Director the Courts."  N.J.S.A. 2A: 162-25( c ).  2021, made changes to N.J.S.A. 2A:162-25.  These changes restrict the PSA from L. 19 c. of considering certain marijuana charges in determining a defendant's risk failing to appear and new criminal activity.
[directive] (It is not Disorderly Persons  $500 to $1,000 10% permissible  Hypodermic unlawful to possess such items if obtained by a valid prescription issued by a licensed Syringe or Needle physician, dentist or veterinarian and it is used for its authorized purpose.)  Discarding Actor discards, in a place accessible to other persons, a hypodermic needle or syringe Petty  Disorderly 10% permissible 2C:36-6.1  Hypodermic without destroying the hypodermic needle or syringe, or owner or lessor or person in control  $100 to $500  Persons  Needle or Syringe of property knowingly allows said items to remain.  90  Updated December 2, 2013  Bail Schedule 2  DISORDERLY PERSONS OFFENSES AND PETTY DISORDERLY PERSONS OFFENSES  Note:  Some of these offenses are listed elsewhere in Bail Schedule 2 as lesser included offenses  STATUTES WHERE BAIL MAY BE SET BY A SUPERIOR COURT JUDGE OR A MUNICIPAL COURT JUDGE OR, IN THE MUNICIPAL COURT JUDGE’S ABSENCE, THE MUNICIPAL COURT ADMINISTRATOR OR DEPUTY COURT ADMINISTRATOR, PURSUANT TO RULE 3:26-2 (Rule 3:3-1(c)(1) (indictable offenses) and Rule 7:2-2(b) (non-indictable offenses) delineate factors regarding whether a warrant or summons should issue.
[directive] 4.1.3  An internal affairs function also has an obligation to investigate or review any allegation of employee misconduct that is a potential violation of an AG Directive or Guideline, a Directive issued by a County Prosecutor in that jurisdiction, the agency's rules and regulations, or any allegation that indicates the employee is unable, unwilling or unfit to perform their duties.  The obligation to investigate includes not only acts of misconduct that are alleged to have occurred while the subject officer was on-duty, but also acts of misconduct that are alleged to have occurred outside the employing agency's jurisdiction or while the subject officer was off-duty.  INTERNAL AFFAIRS POLICY & PROCEDURES | November 2022 15  4.1.4  An internal affairs function may conduct an internal investigation on its own initiative or upon notice to or at the direction of the law enforcement executive or the internal affairs supervisor.  Internal affairs may refer investigations to the employee's supervisor for action as permitted by agency policy and procedures.  4.1.5  Internal affairs investigations must be considered as important to the agency as any criminal investigation.  Members of the internal affairs function therefore should have the authority to interview any member of the agency and to review records and reports of the agency relative to their assignment.  In addition, the agency's personnel should be instructed that the internal affairs function acts at the behest of the law enforcement executive in all internal affairs investigations.  The agency's personnel should be further instructed that during an internal affairs investigation, every member of the agency, regardless of rank, shall treat an order or a request from a member of the internal affairs function as if the order or request came directly from the law enforcement executive.  4.1.6  The internal affairs function shall maintain a comprehensive central file on all complaints received, whether investigated by internal affairs or assigned to the officer's supervisors for investigation and disposition.  In addition, internal affairs should establish protocols for tracking all complaints received by the agency and the conduct of all officers.  The protocols must include criteria for evaluating the number of complaints received by the agency and the number of complaints filed against individual officers.  4.2
[brief] SCOPE OF REVIEW  In reviewing a determination of a municipal board, the role of the judge is limited to ascertaining whether the action of the board is arbitrary.  As set forth by the Supreme Court in Bressman vs. Gash 131 N.J. 517, 529 (1993)  “ . . . our role is to defer to the local land use agency’s broad discretion and to reverse only if we find its decision to be arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable” citing Charlie Brown vs. Board of Adjustment 202 N.J. Super 312, 321(App. Div. 1985).  “. . . the Trial Court cannot substitute its own judgment for that of the Municipal Board vested with the power and duty to pass upon the application”  Farrell vs. Estell Manor Zoning Board of Adjustment 193 N.J. Super 554, 556 (Law Div. 1984)  This principle was recognized by our Supreme Court in Bressman Supra. at pg. 527 when the Court noted “. . . the question is not whether a reviewing Court would have reached a different conclusion if it had initially decided the matter, but whether the . . . board was arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable.  . .”  Thus, the Court must sustain the approval of an application in the absence of an affirmative showing that the approval was arbitrary capricious or unreasonable.  As set forth in *Shell Oil vs. Zoning Board of Adjustment of Shrewsbury*, 127 N.J. Super 60, 63 (1974), the conclusive consideration is not whether the Board could properly have denied the Plaintiffs application in this situation.  Instead, it is whether the evidence was such that it was arbitrary and unreasonable for the Board to find otherwise.  *Shell Oil* Supra at pg. 63, 64 and 66.  Thus, the Court’s review of the determination of the municipal authority is limited to whether the Board could reasonably reach the conclusion that it did.  In the instant case it is respectfully submitted that [...]’s proofs were thorough, credible and supported the approval granted and the Planning Board’s decision to approve the application is amply supported by the record below.  **RELIANCE ON EXPERT TESTIMONY**