ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] "No-Knock"  Regulating SUBJECT: Directive a execution residential  The search can to the of warrant dire for lead safety consequences danger of law both the when this law arises and residents  Sometimes, enforcement involved.  forcibly a announcing enter enforcement residence pursuant warrant without to to is permitted a "no-knock" further already-rare a regulates the warrant.  This themselves—often Directive called in application approval  Jersey, of New and no-knock reporting warrants establishes and they are for when used.  instances requirements of Constitution, Article Fourth Section and the of I, The Amendment the States United 7 law obtain awarrant—backed probable cause Jersey require Constitution, enforcement to New by person's law long-required searching ajudge—before police has home. approved the and a And by awarrant—prior themselves—even obtaining after entering a "knock-and-announce" to to adage"  Johnson, a "ancient is castle. that the person's reflecting State their house v. residence, Miller 301, this v. Under also 357 307 608, see States, (1958).  (2001); N.J. 615 168 U.S. United of "reasonable" a into if entry premises, granted the not must wait they period officers are rule, entering.  Robinson, The forcibly time State knocking before N.J. 1, (2009).  200 after v. 18 knock-and- each particular of depends on the case.  The delay circumstances appropriate Id. potential but violence for the and protects requirement privacy, decreases announce also only not destruction of Johnson, forcible entry.  168 N.J. during physical 616. at the property prevents however, in certain limited Supreme circumstances, New Court has out laid The Jersey a a justify apply approval for no-knock warrant.  To of to enforcement may the court which law suspicion" particularized a "reasonable, enforcement officer must have law provision, a no-knock for one entry required reasons: three of forcible that is "to evidence"; destruction of the prevent 1. officer's the or safety"; "to 2. protect of the evidence."  "to seizure or effectuate arrest 3.  pSE yt r:~;~' Equal Is `y~ Employer Recyclable Opporturi,ity Prir~ted ": Jersey • Recycled, ors New Pape~~ a.n,d, Are ~ ~ R /~ ~, ~, ~i )J~ cF'M~lNPL ~~'4S ~a7 total a of fraction only the that, Prosecutors while revealed of County 2020 survey
[brief] Specifically, under a heading entitled “Gaps in Findings” on page 2 of the document, the following language is provided:  The lack of research on temporary transverse HMA tapers is apparent.  With little documented justification behind the wide spectrum of state practices, it is unclear which, if any, represents a best practice.  In addition, our investigation did not reveal the scope of the possible safety issues related to vehicle impacts caused by abrupt temporary NMA tapers, such as personal injury, vehicle accidents, pavement damage and possible related legal issues.  (Pa1863, underline added).  An additional concession by [...] during the second day of his deposition was that [...] had no actual notice of the subject roadway condition prior to the date of plaintiff’s accident.
[brief] ”  Id. at 324 (citing Lindy Bros. Builders v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 540 F.2d 102, 117 (3d Cir. 1976) (Lindy II).  The Court then discussed the United States Supreme Court’s holding in Hensle, 461 U.S. at 426, in which that Court adopted a hybrid methodology, combining the lodestar approach of Lindy Brothers with the twelve-factor test endorsed in Johnson.
[brief] Flagg v. Essex Cty. Prosecutor, 171 N.J. 561, 571 (2002).  As set forth above, the Trial Court impermissibly added a requirement to the NJFPA statute that is plainly not included in the statute, a “written agreement. ”  The Trial Court also did not provide any explanation as to why the multiple writings [...] submitted did not satisfy the “written arrangement” requirement of the NJFPA.  Accordingly, [...] respectfully submits that there are no “good reasons” for the Appellate Division to defer to the Trial Court’s decision.  Accordingly, [...] respectfully requests that the Trial Court’s denial of [...]’s Motion to Amend be reversed.  III.
[brief] 1  STANDARD OF REVIEW  It is well-settled that on appeal deference is given to credibility findings.  “A reviewing court must accept the factual findings of a trial court that are ‘supported by sufficient credible evidence in the record. ’”  State v. Mohammed, 226 N.J. 71, 88 (2016) quoting State v. Gamble, 218 N.J. 412, 424 (2014).  In furtherance of this, “appellate courts should ‘not disturb the factual findings and legal conclusions of the trial judge’ unless convinced that those findings and conclusions were ‘so manifestly unsupported by or inconsistent with the competent, relevant and reasonably credible evidence as to offend the interests of justice. ’”  Griepenburg v. Twp. of Ocean, 220 N.J. 239, 254 (2015) quoting Roya Farms Resort, Inc. v. Invs. Ins. Co. of Am., 65 N.J. 474, 484 (1974).  Appellate courts also apply that deferential standard of review to a trial court’s fact-finding based on video or documentary evidence.  McNeil-Thomas, 238 N.J. 256, 271 (2019); State v. S.S., 229 N.J. 360, 379 (2017); State v. Hubbard, 222 N.J. 249, 270 (2015).  In addition, when interpreting a statute, the standard for New Jersey Courts is to determine the “intent of the Legislature[,]” Hardy v. Abdul-Matin, 198 N.J. 95, 101 (2009) and must first consider the plain language of the statute because that is the best indicator of legislative intent.
[brief] The petition was denied on October 10, 2018 without an evidentiary hearing.  (Da028).  Approximately two weeks later, on October 26, 2018, [...] filed a motion for reconsideration which was largely unopposed by the State.  The court granted an evidentiary hearing.  (Da050).  The evidentiary hearing — which was limited to the testimony of [...] with respect to [...]’s recantation— was held on March 21, 2019.  (16T).  Subsequently, on May 21, 2019, the court denied [...]’s petition, having found that the testimony did not constitute “newly discovered evidence,” warranting a new trial.  (Da052).  On November 7, 2019, [...] filed a notice of appeal arguing, in part, that the PCR Judge should have afforded him an opportunity to examine [...] at an evidentiary hearing.
[brief] The *Olds* Courts set forth:  With transactional malpractice, such as negligence in drafting a contract or will or performing a real estate closing, the need for an exception to the entire controversy doctrine is not as compelling.  The attorney is not saddled with the conflicting roles of advocating on behalf of the client in the underlying litigation and representing his or her own interests as a defendant.  Moreover, a legal-malpractice claim alleging transactional negligence is a claim against a primary tortfeasor.  As such, the entire controversy doctrine's purposes are served by requiring plaintiffs to notify the trial court of their potential malpractice claims.  The attorney, like the other defendants, is a potential cause of a plaintiff's damages.  See *Circle Chevrolet*, supra, 142 N.J. at 286–87, 662 A.2d 509 (characterizing attorneys' negligence as involving an erroneous interpretation of a lease clause); *Mystic Isle*, supra, 142 N.J. at 320–21, 662 A.2d 523 (describing plaintiff's allegations that its attorneys inappropriately represented plaintiffs in the attorneys' attempts to obtain sewage permits).  The line between transactional and litigation representation, however, is not always clear.  Often, the same law firm or even the same attorney may represent a client in both transactional and litigation matters.  Thus, transactional attorneys and their firms often have an ongoing relationship with their clients.  Requiring a client to notify a trial court of a potential malpractice claim relating to one transaction when the attorney or firm continues to represent the client on other matters can intrude unduly on the attorney–client relationship.  Basing the application of the entire controversy doctrine on the nature of the alleged malpractice would be difficult to administer.  The better response is not to distinguish litigation malpractice from other kinds of malpractice, but to exempt all attorney-malpractice actions from the entire controversy doctrine, Olds v. Donnelly, 150 N.J. 424, 442, 696 A.2d 633, 642–43 (1997).
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[brief] Id. at 537-42.  Over the course of two non-consecutive days, the officers had conducted several hours of surveillance during daylight hours, and observed the defendants use a key to unlock the padlocked front door of the house to enter and retrieve a small item, presumably drugs, and hand it to a presumed buyer.  Id. at 538-39.  The house was in a “deplorable condition,” in that there were broken windows, it was littered with trash bags filled with old clothes and soda cans, and other items, and had a missing electric meter.  Id.  at 540.  However, both the front and back doors to the house were secured to keep intruders out; the front door was padlocked and the back door, although off its hinges, was propped shut from the inside.  *Id.* at 540.  Further, there was no reliable or first-hand testimony regarding the long-term condition of the house, nor any reasonable attempt by law enforcement to contact the owner or conduct a records check, which the Court found, would not have “been difficult or unduly cumbersome. ”  *Id.* 540-42.  Based on that evidence, the Court determined the trial court's finding that the house was not abandoned for standing purposes was supported by the record.  *Id.* at 542.  The Court held that “[t]he question to be answered is not whether the police have a subjective, good-faith belief that a building is abandoned, but whether they have an objectively reasonable basis to believe so.
[directive] Background investigations must include a review of the prior internal affairs files of any candidate.  3.1.2  New Jersey law enforcement agencies are required by this policy to disclose the entire internal affairs file of a candidate to prospective law enforcement employers.  See Section 9 (“Internal Affairs Records”).  Candidates with out-of-state law enforcement experience must sign waivers of confidentiality regarding their internal affairs files so that they may be reviewed by the prospective employer, where legally permissible.  These procedures may also be used for promotional testing, and assignment to especially sensitive responsibilities or those that pose the greatest opportunities for abuse or wrongdoing.  Each agency should establish policies and procedures for recruitment, oral and written examinations, selection and the promotional process.
[brief] ## CASES  **Anderson v. Creighton**, 483 U.S. 635, 639 (1987)  28  **Baker v. McCollan**, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n. 3 (1979)  13  **Baxter v. Palmigiano**, 425 U.S. 308, 309 (1976)  25  **Bernstein v. State**, 411 N.J. Super. 316, 335 (App. Div. 2010)  38  **Bielevicz v. Dubinon**, 915 F.2d 845, 850 (3d Cir. 2007)  24  **Bounds v. Smith**, 430 U. S. 817 (1977)
[brief] The legal standard for determining probable cause is the "totality of the circumstances" test.  Simply put, the officer must have more than a mere hunch that a person is intoxicated.  Essentially, in determining guilt or innocence, the judge must consider the totality of the circumstances to determine if the state proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the officer reasonably had more than a mere hunch that my mental faculties and physical capabilities were substantially diminished and deteriorated.  A summary of the "totality of the circumstances" in my case is that:  1)  The officer admitted to improperly administering the standardized field sobriety test.  The officer admitted to making one pass during the maximum deviation nystagmus test instead of the minimum of 2 as required by the standardized field sobriety test manual.  2)  The municipal judge acknowledged that the officer didn’t administer the SFST properly.  3)  The municipal judge has stated my performance on the SFST wasn’t bad.  4)  The municipal prosecutor has stated that my performance on the SFST wasn’t bad.  5)  I did NOT commit any traffic violations as determined by the superior court judge.  6)  The officer admitted I didn’t cross the road lines in violation of N.J.S.A 39:4-88 "failure to maintain lane".  7)  The officer lied in court and on the police report about me not maintaining my position during the walk and turn part of the SFST and lied about telling me to get back into position.  Unfortunately, the judge erred when she interrupted and didn’t allow the officer to admit it stating, "I’ll look at the video and determine it".  8)  The municipal judge didn’t seem to care about whether the officer lied or not, despite me trying to prove it via bodycam.  A necessary element of the refusal offense – proof beyond a reasonable doubt whether the arresting officer had probable cause to believe that the person had been driving or was in actual physical control of a motor vehicle on the public highways or quasi-public areas of this State while under the influence of intoxicating liquor – was not established beyond a reasonable doubt as required.
[brief] [Pa41].  [...] engaged new counsel who, by letter dated October 10, 2023, objected to the entry of the Consent Judgments and requested additional time to respond further.  [Pa160].  By letter dated October 20, 2023, [...] provided the trial court with additional information that it had obtained concerning the damage that [...] had caused, including evidence that “[t]he volume of unknown and unauthorized material is so extensive that the elevation of the 2.5 acre parking area has been raised by three feet in certain areas, and is believed to consist of tens of thousands of cubic yards of new, unsourced material that would be alarming even if it did not also obstruct the loading docks. ”  [Pa162].  By letter dated October 30, 2023, [...] disputed the volume of materials that had been dumped (without disputing that dumping had occurred), but admitted that it failed to pay the fourth settlement payment to which it agreed, thus confirming at least one of the breaches that had been alleged.  [Pa167].  The trial court did not address the parties’ letter submissions after more than three months, although it entered the Consent Judgment for Possession on January 4, 2024.\(^1\) [Pa228].
[brief] These cases – including Plaintiff’s efforts to broaden the holding in *Sinclair* – were also before the trial court when it issued its decision granting summary judgment to [...].  The trial court analyzed the competing law cited by both parties before ultimately concluding that “[P]laintiff seeks to expand the law and the potential liability of the … regulated public utility.  The Court is unaware of any statute, rule, or case law that requires a public utility providing streetlights to undertake the responsibility to assure their adequacy as distinct from their operation of statute the plaintiff. ”  (1T34).  Plaintiff’s appeal fails to present any basis for disturbing the trial court’s ruling.  Its order granting summary judgment to [...] should thus be affirmed.
[brief] For example, Defendants argue that *Firoz v. Kolaranda*, No. A-2886-05T1, 2007 WL 685447 (App. Div. Mar. 8, 2007) did not involve a motion to reconsider under Rule 4:42-2, but their argument misses the forest for the trees.  In *Firoz*, though not presented as a motion for reconsideration, the defendant filed successive motions to bar certain evidence at trial.  The first motion was denied, but at trial, before a different judge, the defendant made the same motion and succeeded.  This Court noted that the defendant did not move pursuant to Rule 4:42-2, but had “presented nothing different in support of the pre-trial application than she did in support of the earlier motion.
[brief] This ruling reflects a fundamental misunderstanding of CFA precedent.  A CFA claim asserting abusive or “unconscionable commercial practices” does not require any sort of predicate statutory violation, as the trial court suggests.  Rather, the CFA’s prohibition against “unconscionable commercial practices” was enacted to reflect a broader and more flexible concept than simple rulebreaking, as explained by the New Jersey Supreme Court:  The phrase "unconscionable commercial practice" is not defined in the Act.  Acknowledging that "unconscionability" is an "amorphous concept obviously designed to establish a broad business ethic," we have defined the term as "[t]he standard of conduct contemplat[ing] * * * good faith, honesty in fact and observance of fair dealing."  Kugler v. Romain, 58 N.J. 522, 544 (1971).  We anticipated that courts would "pour content" into the concept on a case-by-case basis.  Id. at 543.
[brief] Brill, supra, 142 N.J. at 540; Judson v. Peoples Bank & Trust Co. of Westfield, 17 N.J. 67, 75 (1954); R. 4:46-5.  Summary judgment should not be granted where the decision of such a motion would constitute what is in effect a trial by pleadings and affidavits involving issues of fact.  Shanley & Fisher, P.C. v. Sisselman, 215 N.J. Super. 200, 211-12 (App. Div. 1987).  Summary judgment is not a substitute for a full plenary trial.  United Advertising Corp. v. Metuchen, 35 N.J. 193, 195-96 (1961).  Accordingly, summary judgment should be denied unless the right thereto appears so clearly as to leave no room for controversy.  Sisselman, supra, 215 N.J. Super. at 212.
[brief] Under N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-7(d), a municipality "may adopt a redevelopment plan which is inconsistent with or not designed to effectuate the master plan," but it must do so "by an affirmative vote of a majority of its full authorized membership with the reasons for so acting set forth in the redevelopment plan."  It is undisputed that neither Ordinance No. 2022-15 nor the Plan contained any reason whatsoever for adopting the ordinance, despite its inconsistency with the master plan.  See (Pa16-17); (Pa18-Pa45).  Accordingly, the trial court correctly determined that the adoption of Ordinance No. 2022-15 was deficient.  However, the trial court incorrectly found that the Committee's adoption of Ordinance 2022-17 "cured any possible defect" with Ordinance 2022-15.  (3T63:11-14).  Although the trial court found the Plan was inconsistent with the Township's master plan, neither the Planning Board nor the Committee ever made such a finding.  As noted above, N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-7(d) states a redevelopment plan "shall" be consistent with the master plan or, in the alternative, be approved by a majority vote "with the reasons for so acting set forth in the redevelopment plan."
[brief] TABLE OF CONTENTS  TABLE OF CONTENTS  .................................................................................................................. i  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ........................................................................................................... iii  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT .......................................................................................................1  BACKGROUND ON SOCIAL TRANSITIONING  .............................................................................3  I.  Youth should receive a careful professional assessment before socially transitioning.  .................................................................3  II.  Social transition is a significant psychotherapeutic intervention.  ......................4  III.  Parental involvement is essential at every stage in the social transition process.  ........................................................................5  IV.  Schools should not socially transition students in secret from their parents.
[brief] Even though the [...] made no objections to [...]’s application of compounded interest in 2013, they now request that this Court review the complete prejudgment interest award to [...], including the $19,435,326 that the prior panel affirmed in 2018.  (Db58 n.9.)  The [...] acknowledge that the 2018 panel affirmed this award.  That affirmance was binding on remand and is not subject to this appeal.  Superior Court of New Jersey  APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET No. [...]  [...], [...] and [...], AS EXECUTRIX OF THE ESTATE OF [...], Plaintiffs-Respondents, —against— [...] and THE ESTATE OF [...], deceased, individually and as partners in the partnership known as [...]; [...]; [...]; [...]; [...]; [...]; [...], a partnership and [...], a partnership, Defendants-Appellants, —and— [...] and [...] (f/k/a [...]), Defendants.
[brief] As reflected in the Board’s Meeting Minutes\(^9\), Pa356, and in the written Resolution itself, Pa106, the Board accepted the proposed form of Resolution, but only with imposition of condition that Building E contain an elevator, and, with advice of counsel, directed that a written supplemental resolution be drafted for presentation to the Board embodying that condition.  A supplemental form of resolution, [...] was duly drafted, presented to the Board and accepted and adopted by the Board at its January 23, 2023, meeting, Pa123.
[directive] A. Officer who performs strip search or has body cavity search conducted must report the reason for this search on the record of arrest.  The report must include:  1.  A statement of facts indicating the reasonable suspicion or probable cause for the search.  2.  A copy of the search warrant, if appropriate.  3.  A copy of the consent form, if appropriate.  4.  The name of the officer in charge who authorized the search.  5.  The names of the persons conducting the search.  6.  An inventory of any items found during the search.  B.  If exigent circumstances were the basis for the search, the officer who conducted the strip search must file a separate written report stating the reasons for the immediate search.
[brief] This matter is before the Appellate Division on the appeal of Plaintiffs/Appellants [...] and [...]  ("Plaintiffs") and the cross-appeal of Defendant [...] ("[...]" or "Cross-Appellant").  This brief is being submitted in opposition to the cross-appeal of [...] and in further support of Plaintiffs appeal against [...] and the [...] ("[...]").  In [...]'s appellate brief, and in the underlying litigation, [...] argues Plaintiffs engaged in bad faith by filing and maintaining this lawsuit against it.
[brief] If the illegal sentence was imposed following a negotiated guilty plea, then the sentence and the plea are vacated, and the matter is remanded with the parties returned to their original pre-plea positions.  Njango, supra 463 N.J. Super. at 6 (“If the court cannot justify a concurrent sentence in compliance with the statute, then the plea, which was based upon concurrent sentences, must be vacated and the charges reinstated. ”)
[directive] Prioritization with Compliance 10.4 with complying satisfactorily not is agency an believe that reason to has prosecutor a  If requested a submit to means available all using not is or Section, this of requirements of the any deadline meet prosecutor a to the enable to test/examination requested a conduct and/or report of Director the with consult and notify prosecutor may the Law, Reform Bail the under imposed Attorney the exercise to authorized hereby  Director is The Justice.  Criminal of Division the are as actions such take to State and the of officer enforcement law chief as authority General's and prepared reports are requested that ensure to and dispute any resolve to necessary reasonably no that ensure to possible expeditiously as as conducted are tests/examinations requested deadline trial a by to proceed or indict to failure a of because custody from released is defendant Law.