ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] [[...]]  Q.  Describe for me, please – you discussed that you were monitoring the pressure on the line and that a change in the pressure on that line would lead you to send somebody out or accomplish some sort of proactive activity.  Would you tell me how that pressurization alarm system or monitoring function works?  [[...]]  A.  On our system we have various pressure points and control points through our SCADA system [Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition, the gathering of data in real time from remote locations in order to control equipment and conditions.]  Our gas control operation system, controls flows and pressures throughout our system – transmission distribution system.
[brief] (Da27-28).  This prejudice was compounded when, without notice from the [...] to [...], the [...] issued a second Interim Order on March 30, 2021 that ordered [...] to “provide responsive records to the current Custodian for review in accordance with the Council’s January 26, 2021 Interim Order. ” (Da140-141).  The [...] made this order even though the [...] provided no notice to [...] or an opportunity to be heard.  The [...] ordered [...] to produce what it had reason to believe was an estimated 45,000 text messages in five business days.  (Ibid.).  When [...] did not comply with the [...]’s March 30, 2021 Interim Order, on May 18, 2021, the [...] held [...] “in contempt of the Council’s March 30, 2021 Interim Order,” without notice and without an opportunity to be heard.
[brief] Russian White House Restaurant v. Village of Ridgewood, 2000 N.J. AGEN. LEXIS 188, *109, OAL DKT. NO. [...] & [...] Consolidated (November 29, 1999).  It has not.  The DOC admitted that the entire “crux of its case” was the surveillance footage and the log entry book.  (1T30.13-17).  However, the DOC relied upon [...] to provide “factual” testimony regarding the entries which appeared in the logbook when he was not even part of the investigation.  (1T37.4 to 38.1; 1T39.8-10; 1T40.2-5; 1T48.7-11; 1T57.13 to 58.14).  Even though the logbook page was deemed to be a business record within the meaning of N.J.R.E. 803(c)(6), that does not automatically convert the document’s inadmissible hearsay into admissible information.
[brief] | 11 | | Medici v. BPRCo., | 107 N.J. 1 (1987) | 5 | | Menlo Park Plaza Associates v. Planning Bd. of Woodbridge, | 316 N.J. Super. 451 (App. Div. 1998), certif. denied, 160 N.J. 88 (1999) | 32 | | Nuckel v. Little Ferry Planning Bd., | 208 N.J. 95 | 24 | | [...] v. [...], | Superior Court, Appellate Division Docket #[...] | 14, 15 | | Rowe v. Bell & Gossett Co., | 239 N.J. 531 (2019) | 12 | Russell v. Bd. of Adjustment, 31 N.J. 58, 155 A.2d 83 (1959) ................................................................. passim
[brief] Discrimination against gender-nonconforming students in school can also lead to negative educational outcomes.  Boyertown, 897 F.3d at 529; Grimm, 972 F.3d at 597.  Students who experience victimization and discrimination based on their gender expression perform less well academically (2.76 v. 3.17 average GPA), are twice as likely to report that they do not plan on pursuing post-secondary education, and feel lower levels of belonging to their school community.  2021 National School Climate Survey, at 35–37.  Additionally, nearly a third of LGBTQ+ youth reported missing a day of school in the past month because they felt unsafe or uncomfortable.  Id. at 12.  Poor educational outcomes lead to lower rates of employment, lower household incomes, and higher rates of poverty.  [...] et al., Sexual Orientation, Gender Expression and Socioeconomic Status in the National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent to Adult Health, J. Epidem. Cmty. Health, at 7, (Nov. 2023), https://jech.bmj. com/content/jech/early/2023/11/28/jech-2022-220164.full.pdf (finding that gender-nonconforming individuals had lower educational attainment and higher household debt when compared to cisgender individuals).  Thus, the discriminatory district policies also threaten to impair transgender students’ educational outcomes and livelihoods.  ii.
[brief] See Cicchetti, 194 N.J. at 587-88.  Similar to Cedeno and Crespo, New Jersey law here plainly barred Plaintiff from providing care to vulnerable individuals with Defendant because she had been previously convicted for multiple drug-related felonies specifically enumerated in the Statute.  (Point I(C) of this Brief; Appx 520-32 ¶¶1-39).  D.
[directive] One handed - strong hand  Each drill, Time: 4 seconds.  2 rounds.  (Total 6 rounds).  •  On command, draw and fire 2 rounds using only the strong hand.  (The support hand may be occupied with an extra magazine, identification wallet or some other object)  •  Reholster an uncocked weapon  • Repeat twice •  Reload if required and holster an uncocked weapon.  9-38 Revised (5/03)  Semi-Annual Firearms Qualification and Requalification Standards  Phase IX 5-Yard Line.
[directive] Attorney of local unit may appear its behalf  40A  Whenever an investigation shall have been ordered to be made pursuant to this chapter, and the a or governing body of the local unit shall pass resolution directing its attorney, counsel other legal representative, as it may choose, to appear and act on its behalf or on the behalf of any of its officials, such attorney may appear at the investigation and on behalf of the local unit or any of its officials, present evidence, examine witnesses and take part in the investigation.
[brief] **[...] Actively Participated in Litigation and Dispositive Motion Practice**  The second *Cole* factor is the filing of any motions, particularly dispositive motions, and their outcomes.  *Cole*, 215 N.J. at 280-281.  [...]’s involvement in the case was not as a mere spectator and could hardly be described as passive.  As [...] noted from his own experience with this case, “this matter was heavily litigated before the Superior Court … before me and also before my predecessor, [...]”.
[brief] (8T 72-5 to 75-4)  The State argued in summation that the videos showed [...], wearing a gray sweatsuit, walking towards the area where the shooting happened.  (9T 88-3 to 98-20)  On October 15, a little over two weeks after the shooting, police arrested [...] for the murder.  (7T 150-19 to 151-8, 151-25 to 152-1)
[brief] (Da343-346).  The deed was recorded in the names of [...] and [...].  Specifically, on the deed, it stated that “[...], the Grantor herein, is the same person as [...].  The Within Deed Correctory deed executed and recorded in order to vest title in the Grantee’s proper name. ”  On the Affidavit of Consideration, it stated “Correctory Deed executed to vest title in the Grantee under his correct name for which no consideration was paid. ” (Da344).  The transferring documents contained signature blocks for both [...] and [...].  (Da344).  With respect to the [...] signature, Richard concedes that he signed the name [...] pursuant to the advice and guidance of [...].  (3T 61:23-62:5, Jan. 9, 2023).  [...] was not even present when the deed was signed.  Further, at no point in time did Richard advise his brother about the contents of the December 1998 Deed.  (3T 63:6-21, Jan. 9, 2023).  No evidence was adduced at trial to establish that [...] personally signed the deed.  Moreover, Richard specifically testified that he did not intend this deed to transfer title of the Property to [...].  (3T 56:1-57:3, Jan. 9, 2023).  The deed dated December 10, 1998 was re-recorded by the County Clerk for the second time due to clerical error on January 25, 1999.
[brief] On April 17, 2006, [...] and [...] executed an Operating Agreement that governed the Operations of the Project Garage in conjunction with the Redevelopment Agreement.  Da238; 5T10:8-13.  The Operating Agreement generally provided that [...] would manage and operate the Project Garage with [...] paying all expenses.  Da238, et seq.; 3T123:8-16 ([...] testifying to that arrangement).  Any revenues generated by the Project Garage, pursuant to the Redevelopment Agreement, were to be retained by [...] unless the joint revenue of the Project Garage and [...] Garage exceeded a $1.6 million threshold.  Pa110 (§ 8.6).  B.
[brief] In response to Plaintiff’s Request Nos. 1 through 6, defendants submitted the following certified answer:  “On Friday, February 9, 2024, I personally contacted the three possible banking institutions [...], [...], and [...], I was informed by the banks’ representative that no accounts are found in these banks as it relates to [...].  I have searched all electronic and hard copy records to determine if and what banking intuition was utilized by the LLC, there are none.  The Property in question was sold in 2019, the closing records that were retained in reference to the LLC were in possession of [...], which was provided to the Plaintiffs.
[directive] detention pretrial the to relevant information.  as expeditiously as prosecutor the to reports such submit and complete shall agency enforcement to authorized Justice Criminal of Division the of (Director 10.4 Section also See possible. disputes resolve officer to enforcement law chief State's as authority General's Attorney exercise reports).  required of completion timely order and Analysis.  Laboratory for Requests of Submission Timely 10.2  Testing.  Forensic for Evidence  Submitting for'  Limit Time 10.2.1  Division or Prosecutor County the trial, before detained is defendant the where cases  In forensic for evidence submit shall Division the by prosecuted cases in Justice Criminal of possible. promptly as as analysis a justifying circumstances compelling Absent Science.
[directive] b.  Amendments and dismissals  The Guidelines’ prohibitions on certain drug- and alcohol-related plea agreements do not “affect in any way the prosecutor’s discretion in any case to move unilaterally for an amendment to the original charge or a dismissal of the charges pending against a defendant. ”  Part VII Guideline 3; see also Part VII Guidelines Comment (“Plea agreements are to be distinguished from the discretion of a prosecutor to charge or unilaterally move to dismiss, amend or otherwise dispose of a matter. ”).  Municipal court complaints charging marijuana-related offenses are subject to the usual rule that a municipal prosecutor may move to amend or dismiss all or part of the complaint “for good cause.
[brief] ”)  This does not mean that municipalities may be held liable under *respondeat superior*, but only where the governing body “under the color of some official policy, ‘causes’ an employee to violate another’s constitutional rights. ”  *Id.* at 691-92.  Therefore, in order to sustain a Section 1983 claim against a governing body, Plaintiffs must prove a causal link between an official policy, practice or custom and the constitutional violation.
[brief] The Intervenor’s citation to Wawa Food Market v. Planning Bd. Of Ship Bottom, 227 N.J. Super.  29, 34 (App. Div. 1988) is similarly misplaced.  That case involved a request for a waiver from the parking space requirement, which the court found was more properly a variance request, as same was located within the Zoning Ordinance, not the Subdivision Ordinance.  UDO § 18-805 is located within Chapter 18, Article 8, which reads “design standards. ”  As such, there can be no serious argument that the lot line angle is anything but a design waiver.  There is further, nothing whatsoever inherent to these requested design waivers that warranted the denial of the application.  Regardless of the Defendants’ arguments regarding the design waivers, neither waiver is of any consequence to the issue at hand.  The Resolution, not the Board’s trial brief, is the document that sets forth the Board’s reasoning for their denial of Plaintiffs’ application.
[brief] **Neither the Application nor Deposit Agreement Presented by the Bank were Properly Authenticated.  (Raised below in Brief - Not Decided by Trial Judge)**  There is a question of the authentication of the documents attached to the Bank employee’s certification which is silent on how the Bank created, acquired, maintained and preserved, if at all, the electronically created and electronically stored document making that testimony insufficient to establish that the proffered document is what it purports to be.  Without this, it cannot be authenticated.  The authentication of electronically stored records and information generally requires consideration of the ways in which such data can be manipulated or corrupted US v. Browne, 834 F.3d 403, 412 (3rd Cir. 2016).  The Bank employee’s certification does not state that the document was presented to the Plaintiff in the same format as shown and was preserved without alteration or change.  She has no idea and did not certify how the document came into existence, just that it was found in a computer.  Authenticity can be established by direct proof such as testimony by the author admitting authenticity or circumstantial evidence demonstrating the statement or document divulged intimate knowledge of information which one would expect the author or participant to have.  State v. Hannah, 448 NJ Super 78, 90 (App. Div. 2016).  We have neither of those circumstances in this case.  Producing such proof does not impose any excessive burden on the Bank.  The only thing known is the Bank employee printed the document from a computer.  The application is offered as a business record.  While records of regularly conducted activity can constitute an exception to the hearsay rule, NJ Evid R. 803 (c)(6), the rule states the exception doesn’t apply if the source of information or the method, purpose or circumstances of preparation indicate that it is not trustworthy.  Plaintiff presented a prima facie case satisfying that exception.  The source of the information and the method and circumstances of the preparation of the writing must justify allowing it into evidence.  *State v. Matulewicz*, 101 NJ 27, 29 (1985).  The Bank presented none.  A judge should examine the proffered records and hear the manner of their preparation explained before determining whether they merit the general acceptance of trustworthiness accorded to such records or whether instead he entertains serious doubt as to their dependability.  *Id.* at 29-30.  A business record is not self-authenticating under NJ Evid. R. 902.  The application and deposit agreement were improperly considered by the court.
[brief] (9T 42-8 to 17)  [...] testified that based on his investigation, the book bag did not belong to anyone in [...].  He testified that at time stamp 4:25 a.m., the book bag appeared to be full.  (9T 42-19)  The prosecutor’s next question elicited [...]’s opinion as to where “the book bag came from. ”  (9T 42-24 to 25)  The prosecutor’s goal was to establish that the suspect must have had the book back on him under his jacket when he entered [...].  (9T 43-20 to 25)  The Court sustained the objection, so the prosecutor instead elicited that: the suspect was wearing loose fitting clothing; the backpack that the suspect was holding is flat when it is empty; and, accordingly, the backpack could fit underneath something loose fitting.  (9T 44-16 to 45-9)  Finally, directly on par with Watson’s example of impermissible opinion testimony that a suspect opened a door with his elbow to avoid leaving fingerprints, [...] testified that the suspect appeared to be shielding his face from the camera, which led [...] to conclude that the suspect knew where that camera was located.  (9T 32-22 to 33-3)  [...] also later testified that “the suspect appear[s] to be covering his face” because of “the presence of the camera. ”  (45-19 to 46-2)  [...]’s play-by-play narration, subjective interpretations of what the suspect was doing and why he was doing it, and inferences “based on his investigation” clearly violates N.J.R.E. 701 and was inadmissible.  Watson, 254 N.J. at 569.  Moreover, it was plain error clearly capable of producing an unjust result.  R. 2:10-2.  Put together, [...]’s inadmissible opinion testimony improperly bolstered the State’s theory that the suspect’s actions supported the conclusion that the suspect must have been an employee who knew his way around [...], which suggested [...] as a likely candidate.  Indeed, the prosecutor relied heavily on this theme in his opening statement, arguing that “Kelly’s was robbed by somebody that used to work there, somebody that knew where the surveillance cameras were, somebody that knew where the money was secured, and somebody that knew where the manager’s key to the downstairs office was. ”  (7T 28-17 to 22)  He also argued that the suspect “knows where to go if he needs a tool to break the downstairs door. ”  (7T 30-12 to 14)  He repeated these arguments in his summation. \(^{10}\) (11T 79-20 to 80-20)  \(^{10}\)  “The question is who did it?  . . .  It was somebody that knew Kelly’s.  They knew exactly where to go.  . . .  It was someone who knew where the surveillance cameras are .  . . .  Somebody who knew when to look down, and cover his face from the cameras.  Someone who knew where the surveillance cameras were even in the dark.  While the prosecutor’s inferences and deductions were appropriate in “closing argument,” it was absolutely inappropriate and inadmissible for [...] to offer those inferences and opinions to bolster the State’s theory.  Watson, 254 N.J. at 604.  Because this testimony went to the heart of the State’s theory of the case, its erroneous admission was clearly capable of producing an unjust result and it deprived defendant of due process and a fair trial.  **POINT III**
[brief] Chapter 230 “Land Use and Development Regulations”, Article XVIII “Regulations Governing Certain Conditional Uses”, Section 230-171 “Retail Uses and Restaurants in I-2A Industrial District” of the Code of the [...] is hereby amended as to title and sub-section A only, to read as follows: §230-171  Retail, Service and Restaurant uses in I-2A Industrial District.  A.  For retail and personal service establishment uses in the I-2A Industrial District, the following conditions shall be met:  (1)  The requirements applicable to the I-2A Industrial District, as contained in Schedule D, Schedule of Area and Bulk Requirements, included at the end of this chapter, shall be complied with, except that the minimum lot area shall be 80,000 square feet.  (2)  The maximum size of any building shall be 12,000 square feet.  Any individual retail store or shop shall be a maximum of 5,000 square feet of floor area.  (3)
[directive] In the event that the from officer shall prohibited decision.  An be making request of that inform person the the 6.1 or 6.2 into believing pursuant to section making de-activation request misleading the person the Prosecutor or County when in it is operating unless the been turned off fact that the BWC has expressly has or designee authorized Division of Criminal Justice Director of the designee or the recording.  covert  14 Page Discussions.
[brief] See Plaintiff/Appellant’s deposition transcript, Appx 401 at 52:2-4.  Appellant testified that if the forms asked if she was ever convicted of a crime, she might not think a plea deal applied.  Id. at 52:5-8.  During her deposition, Appellant was asked to review her application paperwork with the [...] where it asked her to disclose her criminal history.  She testified that she found the paperwork “misleading,” and she thought the list of crimes provided did not include her crimes.  See Appx 415 at 76:13 to 77:3.  Appellant testified: “The way the question was worded was tricky in my eyes and misleading.  So that could be the reason why I put ‘no,’ ma’am. ”  Id. at 77:10-12.  When confronted with the list of crimes provided on the form, and asked why she did not include her crime, Appellant stated: “the wording is what I was going off of, and it just didn’t specify the crime itself that I’ve done.  So that was the only reason.  But it does state that I get a criminal background check.  So I agreed to that.  So wouldn’t that have come up. ”  See Appx 416 at 82:21 to 83:2.  Appellant testified that she thought she told the truth based on how she interpreted the documents.  Id. at 83:16-17.  Appellant further testified: “So, again, I just interpreted wrong.  That was it.  There was nothing that I was trying to hide when they were going to do a criminal background, that they could clearly see what was going on. ”  See Appx 417 at 91:4-8.  [...] acknowledged in her testimony that Appellant’s fingerprinting was completed and that The [...] had a receipt of it being done.
[brief] The most recent case, McCarthy, supra, has similarities to the case at bar.  There, an Ill. Supreme Court Rule imposes sanctions of attorney fees to compensate defending against a frivolous claim.  New Jersey has the equivalent Rule 1:4-8 which affords the same remedy.  There, the parties were experienced licensed attorneys.  Here, we have the plaintiff executrix/attorney, plaintiffs’ counsel & the Appellant attorney, whom in the aggregate have over 80 years of experience.  There, the lower court dismissed the tort claim based on res judicata.  Here, plaintiffs’ claim to the fund in court was dismissed on long-standing state law doctrines.  If necessary, the court would have likewise dismissed the claim on other doctrines raised in the motions.
[brief] The Law Division Ordered [...] to conduct specific searches, obtain all available evidence, and certify to its finalization.  The depositions of both Shallan [...] and Joann [...] clearly and explicitly establish that what the Court Ordered was never done in good faith, as the most basic Court Ordered discovery was not even searched for, much less produced.  [...] only deigned to provide ineffectual noncompliance (to the unlikely extent that any pertinent records may have ever existed), with the inevitable and inexorable consequence of a summary judgment dismissal.
[brief] The resentencing court fundamentally misunderstood the law, as well as this Court’s instructions for remand, when it found that because “[t]he Appellate Division … determined that the sentencing judge did take into consideration [...]’ age as well as any lack of any significant previous criminal and juvenile history,” there was “no basis to second guess the court’s findings with respect to the statutory aggravating and mitigating factors. ”  (5T:13-21 to 14-3)  (internal citations omitted)  The resentencing court simply adopted the original sentencing court’s finding and weighing of the aggravating factors without considering [...] as he stood before the court, and it did not weigh those factors in harmony with the Miller factors.  The court neglected to order a new presentence report (PSR) – though the resentencing took place nearly eight years after the original sentencing.  And it failed to consider the mitigating factors argued at [...]’s resentencing entirely.  All sentencing decisions must involve a qualitative analysis, wherein the court states its reasons for finding and weighing aggravating and mitigating factors.