ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] For nearly thirty years—since 1995—New Jersey has required that in order to assert a viable professional negligence claims against certain licensed parties, a plaintiff has been required to produce an appropriate and timely Affidavit of Merit.  Since the statute’s inception, that requirement has applied to health care facilities like Defendants in this case.  See, 1995 NJ Sess. Law Serv. Ch. 139, §§ 1-2, codified at N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-26 and 27.  The core purpose of the Affidavit of Merit is “to require plaintiffs... to make a threshold showing that their claim is meritorious, in order that meritless lawsuits readily could be identified at an early stage of litigation. ”  Ryan v. Renny, 203 N.J. 37, 51 (2010) (internal quote and cite omitted.)  The statute requires a plaintiff to provide an expert’s opinion “stating the action has merit” although the statute is “not concerned with the plaintiff’s ability to prove the allegation in the complaint. ”  Cowley v. Virtua Health Sys., 242 N.J. 1, 11 (2020).  In this case, [...] did not err in dismissing Plaintiff’s complaint.
[brief] [...], a member of the Congregation and former student of the [...], testified the Congregation utilized the Sixth Street Lot for parking from the mid-1990s while he attended school at the [...].  [...] specifically recalled that when dropped off for an early morning program at the Congregation before school, the Sixth Street Lot was filled with cars belonging to congregants attending morning services at the Congregation.  [...] testified the Sixth Street Lot has always been used for parking by the Congregation as far back as he could remember.  (14T 23:7-24:15)  [...] also testified that during 1990 through 1993 when he attended the pre-school program at [...], he was picked up at the Sixth Street Lot.  (14T 13:2-14:2)  However, the undisputed facts established that pick up would have been after Plaintiff’s morning services were over and before evening services began.  Additionally, [...] testified that when he attended the primary school from 1993 through 2002, he was nearly always dropped off and picked up at the Fifth Street Lot and was only picked up at the Sixth Street Lot on “a couple of occasions. ”  (14T 14:6-16:7; 17:6-19:3)  30.
[brief] ”  Mule, 356 N.J. Super. at 396.  Defendant [...] similarly ignores this Court’s holding in Manole v. Carvellas, wherein this Court found that “If [Defendant] was not yet within the scope of his employment when the vehicles collided, the fact that he was also a [co-employee] would be a mere coincidence without legal significance, and plaintiff would be as free to sue him in a third-party action as anyone else. ”  Manole, 229 N.J. Super. 138, 143 (App. Div. 1988) (emphasis added).  The fact that Defendant [...] does not cite or respond to these cases is telling.
[brief] ”  Id. (emphasis added).  Illustrative is the more recent case of State v. Timmendequas, 161 N.J. 515, 588-589 (1999), in which the prosecutor “contrasted the victim's life and dreams with the terror she felt at the moment of her death.  And . . . depicted the victim as an angel at the mercy of a defendant who was amoral. ”  Ibid.  The prosecutor called the defendant in that case “evil,” “awful,” “depraved,” “despicable,” and “appalling,” described him as “lustful” for a small child, and asked the jury to put themselves in the shoes of the child victim at the moment of her death.
[brief] Ra31  Notice of Motion for judgment out of time and default summary judgement ............................................................................................................................. ..............  Ra34  Notice of Motion for default judgement, file appeal as within time, fee waiver, transcript of appeal tribunal hearing at public expense ..............................................  Ra38  Order denying motion for summary judgement ......................................................  Ra39  Order granting motion to file notice of appeal as within time and denying motion for transcripts at public expense and default judgement ..............................................  Ra40  PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND COUNTERSTATEMENT OF FACTS
[brief] I have been saying that since March, April, May.  All he had to do is just do it.  Why we’re here constantly doesn't make sense. ”  [T38:1-5]  Whether the defendant is or has been on notice of the Complaint, and if so, whether the defendant has had a fair and reasonable opportunity to be heard, were the trial court’s primary concerns regarding fundamental notice of the summons and complaint.  His Honor denied the Defendant’s motion for reconsideration, and reasoned as follows:  The defendant availed herself of a fee arbitration process [at defendant’s request to the court].
[brief] POINT FOUR THE JOB FAD FAILED TO RULE UPON THE CLAIMS BROUGHT AND PRESERVED IN THE VERIFIED PETITION (Addressed Below at Pa48-Pa49)  In the Verified Petition, [...] alleged that:  3:  Respondent’s summary termination of Petitioner’s employment was premised solely upon an Order of Suspension issued by the Department of Education, State Board of Examiners, as against Respondent’s Teaching Certificates, captioned *In the Matter of the Certificate of [...]*, [...] (hereinafter the “Order”).  4:  The Order was arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable, contrary to and in violation of law, and has and is entitled to no legal force or effect.  5:  Petitioner has Appealed the Order to the Commissioner of Education, said appeal being docket at [...] (hereinafter the “Appeal”).  The Appeal is currently pending before the Commissioner of Education.  6:  Petitioner, by way of the Appeal, seeks to overturn and vacate the Order.  7:  Since the Order was arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable, contrary to and in violation of law, and without legal force or effect, and Respondent’s termination of Petitioner was based solely upon the Order, Respondent’s termination of Petitioner was, consequently, arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable, contrary to and in violation of law, and without legal force or effect.  See Pa35.
[brief] ..................................................................................15  I.  THE TRIAL COURT CONCLUDED THAT PLAINTIFFS DID NOT PROVE BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE THAT “A WRONGFUL ACT” HAD OCCURRED WHICH IS A NECESSARY ANTECEDENT TO IMPOSING A CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST (6T,15:25).  ..............................................15  1.  The Court below found that no wrongful act had Occurred (7T, 17:14-16)  ........................................................................16  2.  While the Court did find the existence of a confidential relationship, Defendants were able to rebut the presumption of undue influence by clear and convincing evidence(6T, 31:4-5)  ............................................................18  II.  THE TRIAL COURT FOUND THAT [...] LEGALLY AND EQUITABLY BELONGS TO DEFENDANT [...].
[brief] Courts have consistently required arbitration when one set of claims is governed by an arbitration agreement but another set of claims is not.  Waskevich v. Herold Law, P.A., 431 N.J. Super. 293, 300 (App. Div. 2013); Epix Holdings Corp. v. Marsh & McLennan, Inc., 410 N.J. Super. 453, 479-80 (App. Div. 2009), overruled on other grounds; Hirsch v. Amper Fin. Servs., LLC, 215 N.J. 174, 193 (2013); Angrisani v. Financial Technology Ventures, L.P., 402 N.J. Super. 138, 145-46 (App. Div. 2008).
[brief] [...] Accepts Plaintiffs’ Offer to Sell Their Distribution Rights and Plaintiffs Respond by Filing Suit  Because Appellants stated that were willing to sell their distribution rights to another distributor, [...] approached other distributors to determine if they were interested in buying those rights.  (Pa43 ¶¶ 78; Pa85; Da38-Da51.)  By letter dated November 30, 2022, [...]’s counsel advised Appellants’ counsel that two distributors were willing to purchase Appellants’ distribution rights.  (Da38.)  Appellants responded by filing this lawsuit on December 14, 2022.  Appellants falsely claimed (among other things) that, despite the clear invitation to [...] to obtain an offer from another distributor to buy Appellants’ Sapporo distribution rights at a specific industry-standard multiple, [...] had improperly shared Plaintiffs’ sales information with other distributors to obtain offers.  (Pa43-Pa44 ¶¶ 79-84; Pa82-86; Da27 ¶ 59.)  Appellants also asserted that the offer was “insultingly low” and made no counteroffer.  (Pa43 ¶ 78.)  G.
[brief] This case revolves around a dispute between the three parties to a Purchase and Sale Agreement (“PSA”), executed on August 13, 2021, involving certain commercial real estate in Hudson County.  At its essence, the PSA provided that, at a closing originally scheduled to take place in October 2021, Plaintiff would take title to the real property directly from the fee owner, and Defendant [...] would take title to the improvements thereon.  Plaintiff would then lease back the real property to [...] under a 98-year ground lease.  Defendant [...] (“[...]”) was to serve as the title company and escrow agent for the transaction.
[brief] The complaint alleges that defendants and [...], as a physician, is not qualified to offer standard of care opinions against the nursing staff at [...], including registered nurses, licensed practical nurses and certified nursing assistants.  Notably, plaintiff had not identified the specific individuals alleged to be negligent and provided an AOM against them, as required by N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-27, Fink and Hargett.  Instead, plaintiff has merely claimed that “CareOne and its staff” deviated from the standard of care.  (Da215; Da217-218.)  The case law, including Haviland, makes it quite clear that the type of licensed professional issuing the AOM and presenting an opinion as to deviation from the standard of care must be licensed in the same profession as the licensed staff persons or employees who are alleged to have been negligent.  [...], as a physician, cannot offer standard of care opinions against the nursing or other medical professional staff at [...], for example for failure to provide a COVID test to [...] until March 24, 2020, failure to transfer [...] to a higher level of care, any purported their professional employees were negligent in allowing [...] to contract COVID-19.  (Da11-30; Da114-142.)
[brief] [...] sold a Comprehensive General Liability ("CGL") Insurance Policy, including a Directors and Officers ("D&O") part, to the [...] (the “[...]”), located in Vermont, with a policy period of January 27, 2019, to January 27, 2020 (the “Policy”).  Pa479–80; Pa780–87.  The Policy provided a $1 million liability limit for each “Wrongful Act,” with an aggregate limit of $2 million.  Pa780.  The Policy defined “‘insured’” to include the following (Pa479–80; Pa785):  The ‘directors and officers’ of the insured collectively, and each ‘director and officer’ individually, are insureds while acting within the scope of their duties on behalf of the insured.  [...], a longtime resident of New Jersey and an active member of the New Jersey Bar, was elected to the Board of Directors of the [...] on October 31, 2019.  Pa471.  [...] was an “insured” under the Policy at all relevant times.  [...] did not challenge [...]’s status as an “insured” in the proceedings below.  The Policy provides its insureds with litigation insurance.  Specifically, the Policy requires [...] to cover litigation-related “loss” and to defend its insureds in litigation, as follows:  We will pay those sums that the insured become legally obligated to pay because of a ‘loss’ due to ‘wrongful acts’ committed by the insured’s ‘directors and officers’ solely in the conduct of their management responsibilities.  . . .  We will have the right and duty to defend any ‘suit’ seeking those damages. ”  Pa479–80; Pa783 Section I (emphases added).  The Policy defines “wrongful acts” to include “any negligent act(s), error(s), or omission(s) directly related to the operations of the condominium property of the Named Insured. ”  Pa787.  “Suit” is defined as “a civil proceeding(s) in which ‘loss’ because of ‘wrongful acts’ to which this insurance applies are alleged. ”  Id. (emphasis added.)  “Loss” is defined to mean “damages, settlements, and/or defense costs. ”  Id.  “Claim” is defined as “a demand received by an insured for money, including the service of a ‘suit. ’”  Id.  The Policy does not define the term “damages. ”  Certain exclusions contained in the Policy were cited in the Challenged Decision and are therefore relevant to this appeal.  Section 2 of the Policy, entitled “Exclusions,” provides in part as follows:  “This insurance does not apply to . . .  (g)  ‘Losses’ based upon or attributable to the insured gaining any personal profit, remuneration or advantage which is not shared equitably by the condominium association or to which the insured is not legally entitled .  . .  (o)  Fines or penalties imposed by law.  . . .  [or]  (q)  Any ‘claim’ or ‘suit’ that is brought by or on behalf of any insured or any person or organization which is controlled by, controls, or is under common control with you. ”  Pa783–84.  The Policy includes no choice-of-law or choice-of-venue provision.  II.
[brief] The law gives more than a month for the Planning Board to carefully consider its determination, but the Planning Board took less than 15 days to make its determination in an apparent attempt to appease the [...] which had no authority to cut the time under the law for the Planning Board to seriously consider the Ordinance.  October 12, 2022 meeting.  The minutes state that [...] at the beginning of the meeting stated that the planning board’s review of the Second Ordinance is merely a “formality” of reviewing what they already approved.
[brief] (Pa01-Pa06).  [...] filed an answer, and the parties proceeded with discovery.  (Pa07-Pa19).  After the close of discovery, [...] moved for summary judgment, arguing that: (1) the ordinary “jerks and jolts” associated with the operation of an [...] bus were not negligence; and (2) [...] failed to meet the threshold for recovery of non-economic damages as set forth in the New Jersey Tort Claims Act (TCA).  (Pa20-Pa25).  On March 31, 2023, the trial court heard oral argument and granted [...]’s motion for summary judgment.  (Pa64-Pa65).  Applying the common-carrier standard as set forth in *Maison v. New Jersey Transit Corp.*, 245 N.J. 270 (2021), the trial court found that [...] failed to present sufficient evidence to establish negligence on the part of [...] or its bus operator.
[brief] In fact, [...] concedes as much: “According to SSAP No. 25, the AIF for a reciprocal exchange is considered a related party to the Exchange, and therefore transactions between the Exchange itself and the AIF may be subject to SSAP No. 25. ” (Ab14 and n.9).  On March 6, 2023, the Department filed its Statement of Items Comprising the Record on Appeal (“SICRA”) pursuant to Rule 2:5-4(b).
[brief] News articles and produced documents offer glimpses of [...]’s core role in the issues central to this litigation: privacy, consent, friend sharing, whitelisting, business partner access, and enforcement.  His custodial files, including emails sent and received, are certain to be probative of Plaintiffs’ claims.  For example, [...] decided whether to enforce [...]’s policies against apps taking users data.  According to former Platform Operations Manager [...], who led privacy and policy compliance in 2011-12, “any decision to ban an app” for violating [...]’s policies related to user information “required the personal approval of the chief executive.
[brief] 5  Petitioner asserts that “In the present matter, respondent argues that petitioner’s claim does not satisfy the *Richardson* standard because the incident was not an unanticipated consequence of qualifying [sic] and not extraordinary or unusual in common experience, therefore not undesigned or unexpected” (Resp. Br., pp. 7-8).  Petitioner provides no reference to the Appendix to support his attempt to restrict Respondent’s position, and in fact, Respondent’s arguments below were not so restricted (IT43-IT44).  The ALJ correctly applied those principles here to find that Petitioner failed to meet the undesigned and unexpected prong of Richardson.  Petitioner’s own testimony shows that he was performing his “usual work in the usual way” on the date of the incident.  Richardson, 192 N.J. 189, 201.
[brief] See generally, Berninger v. Board of Adjustment, 254 N.J. Super. 401 (App. Div. 1991); aff'd o.b., 127 N.J. 226 (1992) ; Aldrich v. Schwartz, 258 N.J. Super. 300, 311 (App. Div. 1991); Urban v. Planning Board, 124 N.J. 651, 661 (1991).  Further, a board is “required to lay down adequate protective conditions and safeguards where it appears proper to grant a variance and at the same time further one of the zoning objectives."  Alperin v. Mayor and Township Com. of Middletown Township, 91 N.J. Super. 190, 196 (Ch. Div. 1966) citing Kramer, supra.  Obviously, there are, however, limits on what conditions a board may properly apply.  See Orloski v. Planning Board, 226 N.J. Super. 666 (Law Div. 1988).  Based on the foregoing legal authorities, a court can only set aside a condition in a land use approval if it is unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious.  The trial court made no finding that the condition was unreasonable, arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to the Mt. Laurel doctrine, because it was not.
[brief] For the above-stated reasons, Respondents respectfully request that Appellants appeal be denied and that the trial court’s disqualification of [...] on the basis of the Van Saders Certification be affirmed.  Respectfully submitted, [...]  [...], Esq.  Attorneys for Respondents: [...] and [...]  April 16, 2025  [...]  [...], Esq. (117682014)  [...], Esq. (301742021)  [...] [...]  [...] [...]  Attorneys for [...] and [...]  ATLAS SEPTIC INC. and ROBERT VAN SADERS, Plaintiffs/Counterclaim  Defendants, v. PETER CHRISTOPHER GERHARD, II, Defendant/Counterclaim Plaintiff.  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. [...]  On Appeal from: SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY MONMOUTH COUNTY – LAW
[brief] When Plaintiff filed her Complaint on November 28, 2020, her vehicle (the “Santa Fe”) had already had the engine replaced, but had still had defects requiring seven more repair attempts and being out of service for 75 days.  See Complaint ¶¶22-34, Exs.9-17 (Pa55-57).  Because Defendant was unable to repair the vehicle, Plaintiff sought declaratory, equitable, and injunctive relief canceling the transaction and requiring Defendant to buy back the vehicle, cancel the Retail Installment Sale Contract, pay off the loan balance to the holder of the installment contract, and return her payments.  Id., ¶¶58-59 and Prayer for Relief.  (Pa58).  The Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act (“MMWA”), 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-2312, provides for “damage and other legal and equitable relief. ”  15 U.S.C. § 2310(d)(1).  Since the vehicle came with only a limited warranty, Plaintiff could be entitled to this relief only if the limited warranty “failed of its essential purpose. ”  GM Acceptance Corp. v. Jankowitz, 216 N.J. Super. 313, 329 (App.Div.1987).  As the Appellate Division stated in Jankowitz, if circumstances cause the limited warranty to fail in its essential purpose or operate to deprive a buyer of the substantial value of the bargain, the limitation of warranty clause may not be invoked.  In that event, a buyer, such as Jankowitz, may seek remedy under the provisions of the UCC.  One of those remedies is the right of a buyer to revoke acceptance of the goods or property.  Under 15 U.S.C.A. § 2310(d)(1) a consumer who is damaged by a breach of a written or implied warranty or service contract may bring suit for damages and other legal and equitable relief, including attorneys’ fees.
[brief] [...] has stated that at no point has he retained an attorney to represent him.  Ca141.  He stated “My relationship with [...] was that we were in agreement with certain issues and in order to reduce the costs, we filed jointly and we were successful as we moved forward. ”  Ca141.  [...] does not elaborate on what he means by “we were successful”, including relative to his position as appointed Statutory Receiver.  Notwithstanding the foregoing, [...] submitted profit and loss statements to the Trial Court which it prepared and which show that monies were paid to professionals with no explanation.
[brief] ”  State v. Roth, 95 N.J. 334, 363 (1984); see State v. Bolvito, 217 N.J. 221, 228 (2014).  As our Supreme Court has explained:  Appellate courts must affirm the sentence of a trial court unless: (1) the sentencing guidelines were violated; (2) the findings of aggravating and mitigating factors were not “based upon competent credible evidence in the record;” or (3) “the application of the guidelines to the facts” of the case “shock[s] the judicial conscience.
[brief] (Pa84).  He was out of work for 2-3 months for the first injury, and 1-2 months for the second injury.  (1T17-19; Pa119, 163).  He received treatment both times, but never had surgery.  (1T24:1-30:24).  He also returned to his full duties each time, without any restrictions.  (1T27:5-24; 1T30:8-14).  In 2006, [...] saw two doctors due to discomfort in his back and neck.  (Pa124-35).  Thereafter, [...] did not have any problems with his back or neck.  (1T31:13-32:5; 1T51:12-52:2).
[brief] TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS  Order Entering Judgment dated 6/7/2024……………………………  Pa 64  PROCEDURAL HISTORY  On August 16, 2022, Plaintiff-Appellant (Plaintiff) filed a complaint in the Bergen County Special Civil Part bearing Docket No. [...] alleging breach of lease.  (Pa 1 to Pa 3).  On September 8, 2022, Defendant-Respondent (Defendant) filed an Answer with Separate Defenses and Counter-Claim.  (Pa 4 to Pa 7).  On the same date, Plaintiffs filed an Answer to Counterclaim.  (Pa 9 to Pa 11).  On November 2, 2022, an order was entered transferring the matter to Superior Court, Law Division, Bergen County bearing Docket No. [...].  (PA 12).  On August 10, 2023, Defendants filed a Notice of Motion for Summary Judgment.  (Pa 13 to Pa 14).  Defendants filed a certification in support of its motion.  (Pa 15 to Pa 52).  Plaintiffs filed an Answering Certification in opposition thereto. (Pa 53 to Pa 56) and a Counterstatement of Material Facts (Pa 57 to Pa 58).  On September 22, 2023, an order was entered denying Defendants’ motion for summary judgment.  (Pa 59 to Pa 60).  Trial was held on May 6, 2023 via stipulated facts.  Prior thereto, Plaintiffs submitted their Proposed Findings of Facts.  (Pa 61 to Pa 64).  On June 17, 2024, the court entered an order in favor of Defendants on their counterclaim and against the Plaintiffs in the amount of $101,553.93 plus costs (Pa 65 to Pa 66).  On July 18, 2024, Plaintiffs filed the within Notice of Appeal.
[brief] Moreover, Defendants are precluded from challenging the propriety of the underlying Award Judgments, which included default interest as the lawful interest rate, under res judicata and collateral estoppel.  “Res judicata…serves the purpose of providing finality and repose; prevention of needless litigation; avoidance of duplication; reduction of unnecessary burdens of time and expenses; elimination of conflicts, confusions and uncertainty; and basic fairness.  The principle contemplates that when a controversy between parties is once fairly litigated and determined it is no longer open to relitigation.
[directive] Draft LPS rulemaking actions, including proposal and adoption notices, are transmitted to Counsel’s Office for review before they are sent to the Office of Administrative Law for publication.  The Division of Administration manages such correspondence with Counsel’s Office for all LPS Divisions, after the Attorney General’s Executive Leadership Team has cleared each rulemaking action for transmittal.  Other than routine transmittals of draft rulemaking actions between the Division of Administration and Counsel’s Office, LPS personnel should not communicate with the Governor’s Office regarding pending or contemplated regulations without the prior approval of a member of the Attorney General’s Executive Leadership Team.    Budgeting and administrative matters.