ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Consent to Search Vehicle 2/20/20-00:47 (Attached at Pa0029)  Use of Force Report by [...] (Attached at Pa0030)  Use of Force Report by [...] (Attached at Pa0031)  Evidence Form (Marijuana) (Attached at Pa0032)  Evidence Form (Orange Pill) (Attached at Pa0033) Evidence Form (Money) (Attached at Pa0034) Evidence Form (1 Key and other items) (Attached at Pa0035)
[brief] [...] woke [...]; [...] told [...] not to look at him or he would be shot, so [...] turned away and [...] duct taped his hands and eyes.  [...] told them about the money under the mattress.  While [...] and [...] searched the room, [...], who was on the floor covered by a comforter, was able to lift part of the duct tape from his eyes, peek, and see what was going on.  He eventually told [...] and [...] that the rest of the money was downstairs in a friend's room.  Holding the gun to [...]'s head, [...] forced [...] to call [...].  When [...] arrived at the room, he knocked on the door and [...] opened it.  [...] stood behind the door with the gun.  When [...] entered, [...] pointed the gun at his face, [...] reached for the gun, it discharged, and [...] fell dead.  According to the [...] who conducted the autopsy, [...] had stippling on his face and two of his fingers, and a gunshot wound in his mouth.  [...] had died from an intraoral gunshot wound to his head and neck.
[brief] The question of the viability of the recall/stop selling claim in Bartlett reached the United States Supreme Court in Mutual Pharmaceutical Co. v. Bartlett, 570 U.S. 472 (2013), and the Supreme Court held that such claims were necessarily preempted.  In Bartlett the Supreme Court recognized that common-law “stop- selling” claims against FDA-approved prescription drugs are inherently preempted, because they conflict with FDA’s product approval authority.  Initially, Bartlett reaffirmed that “[e]ven in the absence of an express pre-emption provision, the Court has found state law to be impliedly pre-empted where it is impossible for a private party to comply with both state and federal requirements. ”  Id. at 480 (citation and quotation marks omitted).  Bartlett flatly rejected the contention that a drug manufacturer “could escape the impossibility of complying with both its federal-and state-law duties by ‘choos[ing] not to make [its FDA-approved drug] at all. ’”  570 U.S. at 488.  “[T]his ‘stop-selling’ rationale [i]s incompatible with our pre-emption jurisprudence. ”  Id.
[brief] ’”) (citation omitted).  In fact, only five months after being re-sentenced, [...] was denied parole at an August 7, 2023 hearing, and was given an additional 36-month future eligibility term.  (Da86)  In an opinion from the Board, the Executive Director justified the denial by pointing to those precise procedural limitations which this Court identified as “shortcomings” of the parole process in Thomas.  470 N.J. Super at 198.  (Da89-94)  [...]’s principal argument in his administrative appeal of the denial was that the panel had failed to consider [...]’s psychological report finding him “capable of returning to the community and complying with its laws and norms. ”  (Da89)  The Director --- 3  Mr. [...] has filed a separate Notice of Appeal to the Appellate Division challenging the Parole Board’s denial of his parole.  [...] v. NJ State Parole Bd., [...].  As of March 18, 2024, Mr. [...]’s appeal has been docketed but no briefing has been filed.  explained that this oversight was not, in fact, an error, but was rather a feature of the parole board’s limited evidentiary record:  “Since the 2018 psychological evaluation conducted by [...] was not part of the record established at the time of your Board panel hearing, it will not be considered in your appeal. ”  (Da91)  And as was the case in Thomas, the opinion provided cursory explanation for its finding that [...] had not matured, and recurringly discussed the facts of the incident itself, suggesting that the Board had likewise “singularly focused upon the admittedly horrific details” of [...]’s incident.  (Da91-94)  Thomas, 470 N.J. Super. at 198.  The Board concluded by telling [...] to take two steps going forward: (1) “remain infraction free” while in prison, and (2) direct any further “concerns regarding your sentence…to the sentencing court. ”  (Da88, 93)  [...] was thus left stranded in a legal limbo: the sentencing court sent him to the Board to obtain release, and the Board sent him right back to the sentencing court.  And that sentencing court continually refuses to consider the precise conduct which the Board advised [...] to take: behave well in prison.  The court’s reliance upon parole eligibility as sufficient to satisfy the requirements of Comer was thus not only a legal error, but it was an error that put [...] in the exact position that this Court sought to avoid in Thomas, wherein his “confinement seems to have no end[.]”  470 N.J. Super. at 200.  A remand for resentencing is required.  POINT II
[brief] On behalf of plaintiff, in his August 9, 2019 report, [...], P.E., an electrical engineer, presents the following facts and opinions:  the recommended IESNA\(^7\) illumination level is 9 lux or 0.9 foot candles for local roadways, when the measurements --- \(^7\)IESNA is an acronym for Illuminating Engineering Society of North America.  taken on May 23, 2018 were 0.0 foot candles (Pa380); tree branches obscured the stop sign (Pa381); the subject streetlight was reported out several times to [...] prior to the incident (Pa381); the only working streetlight was at the northeast corner of the intersection, which would have been behind [...] (Pa381); the untrimmed tree blocking the stop sign would make it difficult for the driver to stop even going at 25 MPH, as it would take approximately 85 feet to stop allowing for human reaction time (Pa381); the light operating in the northeast corner of the intersection “would create a back-lighting effect which would be observed as a shadow from the vehicle’s perspective” (P381); “[b]ased on criteria Lighting Form 7, intersection lighting is required at the intersection (Pa381); these factors “caused a significant decrease in the ability to observe obstacles, hazards or objects such as pedestrians within the intersection” (Pa382); the overgrown trees “interfered with the required sight distance required under New Jersey DOT” (Pa382); “[t]he only light available at the intersection would backlight the pedestrian causing the pedestrian to become a shadow from the perspective of the vehicle operator (Pa382);” and the lights were not property maintained by [...] after requests that they be maintained (Pa382).
[brief] Prior to the MLUL, such objectors had to bring that action in Superior Court.  See e.g Heagen v. Borough of Allendale, 42 N.J. Super. 472 (App. Div. 1956) and cases cited Db 28-29.  The MLUL established an administrative appeal process and forum by 40:55D-68 for such non-conforming use legality issues --- that process/forum to be used by either an applicant for a certificate of valid non-conforming use or an objector to an on-going use as being non-conforming and not legal.
[brief] Defendant had the key to the luggage lock on the backpack on his belt loop and in his pocket.  [4T67-16 to -17; 4T136-8 to -12].  Defendant disclaimed any drug use in his statement to the police post-arrest.  Contrary to defendant’s argument, the State was not required to prove that defendant possessed the drugs with the intent to distribute them to [...].  The instructions correctly stated that the jury had to find that defendant possessed the drugs with the intent to distribute them.  Unlike in Lopez, the jury was not asked to find that defendant possessed the drugs with the intent to distribute them to [...].
[brief] ”  *A.S.*, 203 N.J. at 147-52 (finding the 14-year-old\(^4\) juvenile’s adoptive mother abdicated this role, rendering the juvenile’s confession involuntary and inadmissible, where she effectively served as an agent of the police by incorrectly advising the juvenile of her *Miranda* rights and actively interrogating the juvenile and directing her to talk); *Presha*, 163 N.J. at 314-15; *A.A.*, 240 N.J. at 354-57.  Acting with the “interests of the juvenile in mind” does “not … say that a parent cannot advise his or her child to cooperate with the police or even to confess to the crime if the parent believes that that child in fact committed the criminal act. ”  *A.S.*, 203 N.J. at 148; *State in the Interest of Q.N.*, 179 N.J. 165, 177 (2004); *State in the Interest of A.W.*, 212 N.J. 114, 132-33 (2012).
[brief] (Pa000296 at 111:19 to 112:8).  Further, the plans were a matter of public record and were available for review following a public notification.  (Pa000275 at 28:4 to 29:10).  At his deposition, a [...] representative stated that he believed the Property to be part of the redevelopment project based on the preliminary site plan [...] had prepared at [...]’s direction.  (Pa000237 at 17:4-11).  As noted above, however, the preliminary site plan prepared by [...] did not call for any remediation efforts, nor did anyone from [...] direct anyone from [...] to perform remediation activities in accordance with the site plan.  (Pa000390).  In fact, the [...] representative testified that he never had any conversations with anyone at [...] during his involvement with the project.  (Pa000237 at 14:11-14).  As conceded by the [...] representative, [...], not [...], was the entity “responsible for obtaining permission…to enter the [P]roperty. ” (Pa000215 at 32:9-12).  (b)  Revisions to the Final Site Plan
[brief] Pa0047 at 55:8-22.  The trial court stated that the purpose of the Act “is to avoid having debtors further burdened by for-profit entities that may not be qualified and may not have a purpose to foster responsible use of credit and debt management and instead may be looking to profit from the debtor’s situation. ”  T. at 12:19-25.  The Limited Attorney Exemption, however, prevents debtors from retaining attorneys who are qualified and bound to foster responsible use of credit and debt management under the Rules of Professional Conduct, and therefore unlikely to engage in any abuses in the consumer debt industry that the Legislature is seeking to curtail.  The trial court then heavily relied upon Furman, supra, and asserted that Plaintiffs’ arguments in this case were rejected in that case.
[brief] **  Although the sentencing court found that mitigating factor fourteen applied, it did not attribute sufficient weight towards mitigation in consideration of [...]’s youth.  [...] was twenty-five years old at the time of the offense, so the sentencing court applied mitigating factor fourteen which instructs sentencing courts to consider a defendant’s youth as a mitigating circumstance when they are younger than twenty-six years old at the time of the offense.  N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)(14).  However, the sentencing court attributed “minuscule” weight to factor fourteen because [...] was “3 months away from being 26” and “there appear[ed] to be very little applicability to this factor. ”  (9T22-22 to 23-10)  By attributing minuscule weight, the court failed to consider the insights concerning the unique status of youthful defendants that the Legislature intended for courts to consider when it created factor fourteen.  In *Miller v. Alabama*, the United States Supreme Court explained that newly available findings in brain science and developmental psychology have led to the understanding that youthful brains are fundamentally different from the brains of adults.  567 U.S. 460, 471-72 (2012).  These insights, according to the Court, “lesse[n] [the] moral culpability” of youthful offenders and “enhance[e] the prospect” that they will mature out of reckless youthful behavior.  *Id.* at 472.  Prompted by this decision, the Legislature added mitigating factor fourteen to ensure that courts properly consider that youthful defendants have a reduced moral culpability and a reduced likelihood of reoffending. \(^5\)  Each of these insights should have applied to [...].  Instead, the sentencing court supplanted the judgment of the Legislature with its own view of maturation and responsibility, reasoning that “a 25-year-old man is of an age when he knows right from wrong, and he knows the significance of his actions when they’re done knowingly or purposely. ” (9T23-7 to 10)  By disregarding the Legislature’s intent in creating mitigating factor fourteen and relying instead on its own understanding of maturity in order to attribute only minuscule weight towards mitigation, the sentencing court abused its discretion.
[brief] Government officials are presumed to act in good faith, and it requires well-nigh irrefragable proof to induce the court to abandon the presumption of good faith dealing. ”)  Having identified the defect, [...] is now obligated to rigorously adhere to the case law and governing principles.  To do otherwise would be forevermore accept deficient bid security, which would obviously undermine the public interest and the agency’s interest in ensuring that construction projects are delivered on time, on target and at the lowest possible cost to the public.
[directive] (a) the use of a roadblock must be authorized by a supervisor; (b) at no time will a roadblock be established until all pursuing police vehicles are made aware of the roadblock and its location and have acknowledged this awareness; 5.12.1  Once a roadblock has been established and a vehicle or barricade has been positioned in the roadway, there shall be: (a) adequate distance to see the roadblock; (b) an avenue of escape; and (c) no one in the blocking vehicle(s).  5.13
[brief] Da17.  Defendant never told Plaintiff about the eminent domain, nor his belief that Olga’s was never going to sell.  He did not tell her that the $5.8 million sale price identified in the PSA was “meaningless” in his view.  The evidence was clear that Defendant, as a principal of [...], was the company representative throughout the eminent domain proceedings.  By contrast, Plaintiff had no involvement.  Defendant cites Plaintiff’s deposition testimony to argue that she must have known about the eminent domain proceedings, but she testified credibly to the opposite.  She knew only that “they were going to file a lawsuit...I think he told me property damage and because the diner was losing money and they blamed the State for it. ”  Plaintiff was asked if she had any idea what the basis for the lawsuit was, other than what she was told by Defendant, and she responded “No. ”  Db17-18, citing Da42.  This testimony is consistent with Defendant’s as to Plaintiff’s lack of a role in [...], and her limited knowledge of its dealings.  Hearing rumblings about an intention to file a lawsuit is far different from learning of a jury verdict or settlement.  As noted, Defendant’s argument as to timeliness under Rule 4:50-2 is moot, since the Trial Court did not find for Plaintiff on that basis.  Moreover, the body of law cited above allowing contract reformation in the marital context based on fraud or mistake was not decided under Rule 4:50, and does not adhere to a one-year time period within which to seek reformation.
[directive] This with supervision are in compliance this Directive those that are not.  County Prosecutor's that and II.  Confidentiali  Public and Accessibility adopted law enforcement agencies shall be available to All EW System policies by made the upon and shall be posted on the agency's website.  Annual reports from the public request generally, focused on corrective to remediate 2  This EW Systems are actions Directive, and officer. and EW officer behavior to assistance to the This Directive, Systems and provide an
[brief] The Hoboken Rent Control Ordinance requires the Board to consider the presence or absence of efficient management in considering hardship applications.  Here, there is ample evidence that the apartment has been totally neglected in [...]’s testimony, [...]’s testimony, the landlord’s admission that no routine maintenance is done for the unit, and the shocking neglect of the intercom, which the Board saw play out over five years.  The Board discussed the $1,800 management fee expense in great detail for all three rounds of hearings.  In 2018, the matter was discussed thoroughly as reflected in pages 227-249 of the November 2018 Transcript.  6T227-249.  The Board granted the Landlord a management fee equal to 5% of its operating income.  In so doing, the Board articulated a number of rational bases for finding that the management fee should be a percentage of income rather than a flat rate, including board precedent (6T228:6-13) and independent research showing that the range was in the 5-12% (6T231:12-15).  The Board additionally set forth a multitude of reasons why it settled on 5% rather than a higher percentage.  Board members were skeptical of the management fee because of the appearance of self-dealing, especially coupled with the evidence that the unit was neglected by the landlord.  Members of the board expressed concerns about the murkiness between the two companies as well as doubts that the unit was efficiently managed.  6T241:3-6 (a board member noting the "cloudiness" between the two companies); 6T242:24-25 (board member stating "I don't think that it is passing the test of being reasonably efficiently managed ... ").  The Board ultimately passed a motion granting the landlord 5% of the income in management fees.  On remand, the Board felt constrained to grant at least $100 a month in maintenance fees due to [...]’s finding that they had been arbitrary and capricious before in suspecting [...] of self-dealing.  However, there is an appearance that [...] was padding expenses for the hardship application.  [...] claims it paid $150 a month, or $1,800 a year, to “manage” the unit, for which the records shows very little work was done.  Moreover, the evidence submitted to the Board shows that [...] did not actually pay [...] any of those monies in 2016.  Indeed, the entire lump sum of $1,800 was not paid until February 2017- right before [...] submitted its hardship application and claimed the $1,800 as an expense.  1T15:9-17:7.  Moreover, there is significant evidence that [...] and [...] are functionally the same entity.  In addition to sharing the same ownership, they also have the same physical address, telephone number, and email address.  1T29:26-1T30-3.  The Board was rational.  **CONCLUSION**
[brief] The Special Allocation Master’s Report & Recommendation.  The SAM issued his R&R on August 3, 2015, after the conclusion of the Allocation Trial.  (Pa0144-Pa0161.)  The SAM described the nature of the damage at issue in this case, stating that “[i]ntense active dumping\(^2\)” of CVOCs “in various areas of the Site and at different times and volumes” caused the collection and concentration of DNAPL, which continues to slowly contaminate the groundwater to present day.
[directive] 사용하겠다고 협박한 성범죄가 포함됩니다.  흉기란 활성 또는 비활성 여부에 관계없이, 사용하거나 사용할 의도에 따라서 사망 또는 심한 신체적 상해를 발생시킬 수 있다고 알려진 총기 또는 다른 무기, 기구, 도구, 재료 또는 물질들을 의미합니다.  심한 신체적 상해란 중대한 사망의 위험을 발생시키거나, 심각한, 영구적 손상을 유발하거나, 또는 신체의 부분이나  장기의 기능을 장기적으로  상실 또는 손상시키는 신체적 상해를 의미합니다.  A violent crime means any crime in which you caused death, serious bodily injury, or you used or threatened the immediate use of a deadly weapon.
[brief] The Limited Attorney Exemption is thus overbroad and should be stricken to allow attorneys to perform debt adjustment services absent a “principally engaged” restriction.  F.  The Trial Court Did Not Even Address Plaintiffs’ Contention that the Limited Attorney Exemption Violates Attorneys’ First Amendment Rights.  (T. at 3:1-32:23).  Left entirely unaddressed by the trial court, the Limited Attorney Exemption impermissibly infringes upon an attorney’s First Amendment rights.  The United States Supreme Court has frequently rejected governmental efforts to proscribe the First Amendment-protected speech of attorneys (i.e., legal advice to their clients).  See Matter of Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 432 (1978); United Transp. Union v. State Bar of Mich., 401 U.S. 576, 580 (1971); Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Va., 377 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1964); National Assn. for Advancement of Colored People v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 429 (1963).  Specifically, the Supreme Court has held that “[t]he First and Fourteenth Amendments require a measure of protection for advocating lawful means of vindicating legal rights . . . including advis[ing] another that his legal rights have been infringed. ”  Matter of Primus, 436 U.S. at 432.  In Button, the Supreme Court found constitutionally protected, as modes of expression and association, lawyers’ advice to clients “of their constitutional rights, [and] urging them to institute litigation of a particular kind. ”  Button, 371 U.S. at 447.  Similarly, the Supreme Court concluded in Primus that an attorney’s letter communicating an offer of free legal assistance by attorneys to a woman seeking redress for an allegedly unconstitutional sterilization procedure was a form of protected expression.  Matter of Primus, 436 U.S. at 432.  The Limited Attorney Exemption impermissibly bars attorneys (when “principally engaged”) from exercising their First Amendment right to advise clients on adjusting their debts.  Notably, this Court has struck down statutes as unconstitutionally overbroad in violation of First Amendment rights as recently as a few months ago in Higginbotham, supra, 475 N.J. Super. at 221.
[directive] We granted defendant’s motion for leave to appeal on February 8, 2022.  250 N.J. 107 (2022).  We also granted leave to appear as amicus curiae to the the [...], the [...], and the [...] and [...], who submitted a joint brief.  V.  Defendant contends that trial courts are granting “excessive and unwarranted” amounts of excludable time “in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic,” contrary to the language, purpose, and intent of the CJRA.
[brief] ”  7T 61:8-9.  He noted detriments related to traffic, height of the building, scale of the project and the setback to Changebridge Road.  7T 61:10-15.  He also cited the 18 months of construction disturbance, the issue of light, air and open space, the time for landscape buffers to fill in, the environmental impacts to steep slopes, excess impervious coverage, as well as municipal service demands.  7T 61:16-23.  He opined that facilities in the report with over 8 acres generally had a density less than 20 units per acre.
[brief] ..................................................15  A.  The Operative Complaint and Proposed Amended Complaint Fail to State a Claim Under the NJCRA Because State Defendants Are Not “Persons” Subject to Suit Thereunder .........................................................................................18  B.  The Operative Complaint and Proposed Amended Complaint Fail to State a Claim Under the NJLAD Because There Is No Indicia of Discrimination .........................22  C.  The Operative Complaint and Proposed Amended Complaint Fail to State a Claim Under the NJDJA Because There Is No Justiciable Controversy  ...............................27  D.  Plaintiff’s Claims Are Barred by Immunity Principles .........................................................................................29  II.  THE LAW DIVISION DID NOT ERR BY DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR CORRECTION OF A CLERICAL ERROR AS THERE WAS NO ERROR TO CORRECT .........................................................................................35  CONCLUSION ....................................................................................................................37