ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The tenants claim that the plaintiff engaged an investigator in 2017 who had information regarding the tenancy of the strip mall, but failed to reveal this information to [...].  They waited until now to file this motion without detailing when they received this information, thus they have not demonstrated that the Court expressed its decision based upon a palpably incorrect or irrational basis or that it was obvious that the Court either did not consider or failed to appreciate the significance of probative competent evidence.  Moreover, any motion for reconsideration should have been timely filed before [...] upon notice that the plaintiff had the names of the tenants prior to date explained in oral argument.  (3T65-21 to 66-16)  Plaintiffs now appeal the portions of the June 25, 2021 order granting summary judgment in favor of the tenant defendants on liability and denying their cross motion for partial summary judgment on liability.
[brief] a.  A public entity shall be deemed to have actual notice of a dangerous condition within the meaning of subsection b. of section 59:4-2 if it had actual knowledge of the existence of the condition and knew or should have known of its dangerous character.  b.  A public entity shall be deemed to have constructive notice of a dangerous condition within the meaning of subsection b. of section 59:4-2 only if the plaintiff establishes that the condition had existed for such a period of time and was of such an obvious nature that the public entity, in the exercise of due care, should have discovered the condition and its dangerous character.
[brief] 35  State v. Setzer, 268 N.J. Super. 553 (App. Div. 1993); certif. denied 135 N.J. 468 (1993) .............................................................................. 31, 37 State v. Sherman, 230 N.J. Super. 10 (App. Div. 1988) ......................... 33 State v. Slockbower, 79 N.J. 1 (1979) .................................................... 12 State v. Sugar, 100 N.J. 214 (1985) ....................................................... 12 State v. Tilghman, 345 N.J. Super. 571 (App. Div. 2001) ...................... 31, 32 State v. Weeks, 107 N.J. 396 (1987) ....................................................... 19 State v. Wilbely, 63 N.J. 420 (1973) ....................................................... 27 State v. Williams, 113 N.J. 393 (1988) .................................................. 31, 32 State v. Williamson, 138 N.J. 302 (1994) .............................................. 12 United States v. Green, 617 F.3d 233 (3d Cir. 2010) ............................. 21 United States v. Manning, 23 F.3d 570 (1st Cir. 1994) .......................... 32 Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 116 S. Ct. 1769 (1996) ............ 12 Constitutional Authorities Cited U.S. CONST. amend. IV ................................................................. 12, 13 N.J. CONST., Para. 7 ........................................................................... 13 Statutory Authorities Cited N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5 .............................................................................. 1 N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10 .......................................................................... 1 N.J.S.A. 2C:36-3 ............................................................................. 1 N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6 ............................................................................. 38, 40 N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1 ............................................................................. 38 N.J.S.A. 2C:44-7 ............................................................................. 37 N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.51 ....................................................................... 40 Rules Cited N.J.R.E. 401 .................................................................................... 20 N.J.R.E. 404 .................................................................................... 3, 19, 20, 22 Rule 2:10-2 ..................................................................................... 19, 26, 30 PROCEDURAL HISTORY On July 20, 2021, the [...] returned a five-count indictment, [...], against defendant, [...], and a co-defendant, [...].
[brief] Following the altercation, [...] made several statements to police.  He first spoke to [...] at the Woodbury police station, telling him that [...] and [...] were fighting because of a “girl” whom [...] had “never seen,” that [...] tried to stab [...], and that [...] was stabbed.  (11T 61-1 to 2, 61-23 to 62-4, 71-17 to 72-6, 76-12 to 18, 77-20 to 78- 13)  A few days later, [...] was arrested and made statements both during the booking process and after being read his Miranda rights in which he maintained he was not involved in the fight.  (11T 118-24 to 119-5, 121-6 to 137-11, 143-20 to 146-25, 163-22 to 193-14)  After the State presented its case, the court granted the defense motion for an acquittal on the murder and second-degree conspiracy charges.
[brief] N.J.S.A. 56:12-2; see *Kernahan*, 236 N.J. at 321 (endorsing same).  One subsection, N.J.S.A. 56:12-10, lists several “guidelines” also implicated here, “[c]ross references that are confusing[,]” “[s]entences that are of greater length than necessary[,]” “[s]entences that contain double negatives and exceptions to exceptions[,]” “[s]entences and sections that are in a confusing or illogical order[,]” “the use of words with obsolete meanings or words that differ in their legal meaning from their common ordinary meaning[,]” and “[a] table of contents or alphabetical index shall be used for all contracts with more than 3,000 words[,]” among others.  *Morgan*, 225 N.J. at 310 n.8 (quoting N.J.S.A. 56:12-10).  With *Atalese* and these general principles in mind, *Morgan* rejected the arbitration provision at issue.  The Court noted the length and format of the agreement, one paragraph of 750 words across thirty-five lines, slightly less than *Ogunyemi*.  *Id.* at 310.  As for its content, “[t]he best that can be said about the arbitration provision is that it is as difficult to read as other parts of the enrollment agreement. ”  *Ibid.*  In that regard, the agreement lacked all of the words highlighted as absent from [...]’s agreement by the trial court – “waiver, jury, trial, statutory, constitutional and rights” – and did not by “any other manner” adequately secure the plaintiff’s waiver.  (Da303).  Under those circumstances, the provision was plainly unenforceable.  Id. at 310-11.
[brief] ....................................................................................................12  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS  Chancery Division Order in Manalapan-Englishtown Matter, Filed August 18, 2023 .................................................................  Da115-116  Chancery Division Order in Middletown Matter, Filed August 18, 2023 .................................................................  Da117-118  Chancery Division written decision in both matters, and including [...] ([...]), filed August 18, 2023 ........................................ Da119-138  ###  TABLE OF CITATIONS OF CASES  **Cases** - Anspach v. City of Phila. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 503 F3d 256 (3d Cir. 2007) .................................................................12 - Crowe v. De Gioia, 90 N.J. 126 (1982) .........................................................6  **Statutes** - N.J.S.A. 10:5-1 et seq. ...........................................................................6, 7, 8, 10  **Other Authorities** - District Policy 5756 ..............................................................................passim  **Regulations** - N.J.A.C. 6A:32-7.1 to -78 ........................................................................10 - N.J.A.C. 6A:32-7.3 ..................................................................................3 - N.J.A.C. 6A:32-7.3(b)(1) .......................................................................8 - N.J.A.C. 6A:32-7.3(b)(2) .....................................................................10 - N.J.A.C. 6A:32-7.5(a) ..........................................................................9 - N.J.A.C. 6A:32-7.5(e)(1)-(3) ................................................................9, 10  PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[brief] Cf. Branch, 182 N.J. at 347–49, 865 A.2d 673 (emphases added) (noting “The jury was left to speculate that the detective had superior knowledge through hearsay information implicating defendant in the crime” and “when the logical implication to be drawn from the testimony leads the jury to believe that a non-testifying witness has given the police evidence of the accused's guilt, the testimony should be disallowed as hearsay”); Favre v. Henderson, 464 F.2d 359, 364 (5th Cir. 1972) (emphasis added) (right to confrontation violated where “testimony was admitted which led to the clear and logical inference that out-of-court declarants believed and said that [the defendant] was guilty of the crime charged. ”); Hutchins v. Wainwright, 715 F.2d 512, 516 (11th Cir. 1983) (emphasis added) (right to confrontation violated where, “[a]lthough the officers’ testimony may not have quoted the exact words of the informant, the nature and substance of the statements suggesting there was an eyewitness and what he knew was readily inferred”); People v. Vadell, 122 A.D.2d 710, 505 N.Y.S.2d 635 (App. Div. 1986) (emphasis added) (noting that the right to confrontation was violated where “[t]he clear implication of this question and answer ... was that defendant had told his wife that he had participated in the homicide”).
[brief] E. [...]’s expert should have been precluded from testifying as not disclosed in discovery (not raised below)  Defendants argue that their expert’s report was provided to Plaintiff.  However, at no time was any CV ever provided.  Indeed except for an extremely very quick statement of his name, which could have very easily been missed, Plaintiff had absolutely no way of knowing that the expert was not the expert whose CV had been provided.  No explanation has been given as to why one person’s CV was provided and another person called to testify.  This certainly has at least the appearance of an attempt to pull the wool over the eyes of someone and a dirty tactic.
[brief] In the language of N.J.R.E. 401, the Trooper’s estimations of the points-of-impact as depicted on the not-to-scale drawing have no “tendency in reason to prove or disprove any fact of consequence[.]”  Lastly, no one prohibited to or objected to the Trooper testifying to his observations at the scene as to the points of impact on the vehicles and final resting points.
[brief] Based on the foregoing, the Court’s denial of Appellant’s demand for compounding post-judgment interest was proper.  Moreover, the Court’s denial of an award of attorney’s fees, whether under R. 4:42-9(a)(2) for a fund in court or under N.J.S.A. 2A:15-59.1 and R. 1:4-8 for frivolous litigation, was proper.  As each of these determinations was in the discretion of the trial judge, such determinations should not be disturbed upon appellate review.
[brief] Adv. Pro. Doc. Nos. 3 and 7.  In its opposition to the Order to Show Cause, [...] correctly noted that the relief sought must be by injunctive relief not an Order to Show Cause.  Adv. Pro. Doc. No. 10.  At the hearing on the Order to Show Cause, the court reminded Debtor’s counsel, that as a result of the court’s rulings in *In re Wright*, 649 B.R. 625 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2023) and *In re Wright*, No. 20-12415-ABA, 2023 WL 3560551 (Bankr. D.N.J. May 18, 2023), *aff’d* Civil No. 2988 (RBK) (D.N.J. May 30, 2024), under his original Complaint, the recovery for the Debtor would be limited.  The court afforded the Debtor an opportunity to amend his complaint to allege a claim under the *Tyler* and *Roberto* cases and to file a proper pleading with regard to injunctive relief.
[brief] The Commission’s May 3, 2023 Decision agreed “with the ALJ’s determinations regarding the charges, which were substantially based on his assessment of the credibility of the witnesses. ” (Pa9-10).  The ALJ’s credibility determinations, however, as to [...] were contrary to the evidence in the hearing record, and predicated upon the City’s portrayal of [...] in a false light, as a drug-addled partier.
[directive] Public Reports  9.11.1  On an annual basis, every law enforcement agency shall provide to the County Prosecutor and publish on its public website a report summarizing the types of complaints received and the dispositions of those complaints.  This report should be statistical in nature.  The County Prosecutor shall submit a summary of the reports from all agencies in its jurisdiction to the Office of Public Integrity and Accountability.  The Annual Internal Affairs Summary attached to Appendix K may be used to satisfy the requirements of this Section.
[brief] 23  Orbea v. Dynamic Recovery Solutions, LLC, et al., [...] (D.N.J.) ..............................................................  4  Orner v. Liu, 419 N.J. Super. 431 (2011)  ........................................................................  11, 12 Portfolio Recovery Assocs., LLC v. Chartanovich, 2024 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2537 (Sup. Ct. App. Div. Oct. 21, 2024)
[brief] [...] began his presentation talking about the schools, --- \(^3\)“Projected School Costs” indicate that the Project will generate 342 new students at a total cost of $4,992,748.  Pa665.  \(^4\)  The Finance Agreement defines both the “Multi-family Component Annual Service Charge” and the “Single-family Component Annual Service Charge” (i.e., PILOT) as the “amount the Entity has agreed to pay the Township . . . pursuant to Article IV for municipal services supplied . . . which sum is in lieu of taxes on the Land and Improvements.  . . .”  Pa609. representing that a PILOT does not have a bearing on the school funding process,”  T1.31:14-15, and affects only how school costs are shared among the school partners:  “[H]ow this school tax is distributed between the towns is determined by the [...].  * * *  [O]ne of the things that we have expressed concern over, over the past couple of years is with the school budget representing just under 60 percent of the total tax bill.  The allocations of these monies do matter, and with the current formula, [...] is currently paying 34 percent more per student for its students enrolled in the [...] than the boroughs, which amounts to $3.8 million in additional costs for Township residents. ”  T1.32:12–33:6 (emphasis added)  The related presentation by Township expert [...] at public hearing confirmed these data.  Pa663.  Comments by the Township’s Deputy Mayor [...] further stressed the link between the tax exemption/PILOT issue and the distribution of school costs affecting the Boroughs.  He confirmed with Mr. [...] the basis for [...]’s remarks that Township residents “already paid $3.3 million more per year in taxes given the way the formula’s set for schools. ”
[brief] **Appellant Unilaterally Transfers Money to [...]**  8 Quaker Road, LLC was formed to purchase the property located at [...].  (Pa676:17:7-15).  At the time it was formed, Defendant [...] and Appellant were each 50% members of [...].  (Pa678:23:18-22).  Appellant prepared a document titled, “Intercompany Loan Agreement” between [...] and 8 Quaker Road, LLC (“8 Quaker Loan”).  (Pa686:57:11-22; Da814).  Appellant signed the 8 Quaker Loan on February 2, 2016 for [...] and 8 Quaker Road, LLC.  (Pa687:60:3-8; Da818).  Appellant did not show the 8 Quaker Loan to anyone at [...] prior to its execution.  (Pa687:60:19-22).  After executing the 8 Quaker Loan, Appellant did not discuss it at any formal or informal meetings of [...].  (Pa688:64:4-7).  After executing the 8 Quaker Loan, Appellant did discuss it at any meeting of [...].  (Pa688:64:4-7).  Appellant did not discuss the 8 Quaker Loan with any of the other members of [...].  (Pa688:64:11-13).  Appellant drafted, negotiated, executed, and approved the 8 Quaker Loan without consulting anyone else from [...] or [...].  (Pa686: 65:1-14).  At the time of the 8 Quaker Loan, 8 Quaker Road, LLC’s sole business was owning Appellants and [...]’s marital residence. (Pa693:82:2-9).  Appellant prepared financial statements for [...] and never itemized any amount owed by 8 Quaker Road, LLC pursuant to the 8 Quaker Loan.  (Pa692:79:24-80:5).  The 8 Quaker Loan required interest to be paid to [...]; Appellant never caused 8 Quaker to make any interest payments.  (Pa537:260:11-17).  On January 17, 2020, a judgment was entered in favor of [...] and against 8 Quaker for the outstanding amount under the 8 Quaker Loan, $136,759.83.  (Da820).
[brief] Second, the nature of the risk was significant in that [...] provided heavy duty equipment on its premises, namely the use of its industrial grade flatbed U-boats that could easily be overloaded.  Third, [...], as the operator of the premises and given the nature of its business, had an opportunity to and ability to exercise care.  Fourth, the public interest commands that [...] be found to owe a duty of care to Plaintiff because the public interest is served by requiring [...] to maintain its premises in a safe condition for its invitees.
[brief] She produced a copy of the motel registration certificate that she had signed.  [...] acknowledged that it takes approximately ten minutes to drive from the motel to the corner of Rutherford and Hoffman, where [...] was shot.  Although the motel registration certificate indicated that two people would be occupying the room, the name of the person sharing the room with her was not specified.  [...] acknowledged that on July 5, 2003, the day [...] was shot, she owned a station wagon.  *6  Defendant's final witness was [...], the investigator who had, along with defense counsel, shown the photo array to [...] the day before he testified.  Alvarez described [...]'s failure to select defendant's photo from the six that were shown to him.  The jury retired to deliberate, and returned a verdict finding defendant guilty of the three crimes we have described.
[brief] Any error or omission shall be disregarded by the appellate court unless it is of such a nature as to have been clearly capable of producing an unjust result, but the appellate court may, in the interests of justice, notice plain error not brought to the attention of the trial or appellate court.  At the end of a case, it is important that “[a]ppropriate and proper charges to a jury” are given by the trial judge.  *State v. Green*, 86 N.J. 281, 287 (1981).  At this time, the trial judge should explain to the jury its function by detailing “a comprehensible explanation of the questions that the jury must determine, including the law of the case applicable to the facts that the jury may find. ”  *Id.* at 287-88.
[brief] Defendant filed the Objection on or about November 3, 2022.  See PA – 225 to 227.  The Objection consisted of a Certification of [...] dated October 31, 2022 that requested that Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment be denied for reasons set forth in an attached legal brief.  PA – 226.  That certification did not certify to any facts.  PA – 226.  More importantly, Defendant did not file a response to Plaintiff’s Statement of Material Facts as required by R. 4:46-2(b) and pertinent precedent.  PA – 226.  [...] expressly noted this in the Order in stating that:  Because plaintiff’s SOUMF is not contested by defendant in compliance with R. 4:46-2(b), plaintiff’s 23 (twenty-three) paragraph SOUMF is deemed admitted.  Here, it is not disputed that defendant maintained a credit account with plaintiff [...].  It is further undisputed that defendant is in default the amount of $21,432.55, which is subject to credit of $2.10, for a total amount due and owing of $21,430.45.
[brief] CASES  Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981) ................................................................. 25, 28  Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975) ............................................................ 11, 13, 14  Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) ............................................................... passim Mogull v. CB Com. Real Est. Grp., Inc., 162 N.J. 449 (2000) ..............................  40  Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980) .............................................................. 22, 27  State ex rel. A.S., 203 N.J. 131 (2010) ........................................................................
[brief] N.J.S.A. 42:2C–65(A) (Da15–17)  Although Plaintiff did not have a certificate of authority to transact business in New Jersey when it commenced this action as required by N.J.S.A. 42:2C–65(a), Plaintiff has since remedied this issue.  Da324.  Having cured that defect, Plaintiff now can proceed with its case against [...].
[brief] Neither party noted the issue with the verdict.  It bears noting that the inability of this particular jury to follow instructions is not surprising.  At several points, the jury had to be admonished for using cell phones during the trial and wandering the hallways when they were supposed to be in the jury room.  (4T106-14 to 107-17; 6T22-8 to 22-25, 106-12 to 107-6).  Several jurors also complained about how much they would be paid for participating in the trial.  (5T210-15 to 215-7; 7T223-1 to 226-2).  At the close of trial, when the judge was considering asking if any jurors were unavailable to deliberate the Friday before the holiday weekend, the judge --- 4  Except for one juror who erroneously replied “here. ” (10T11-20 to 12-23).  expressed his fear that this jury would take the opportunity “to come up with a reason why they can’t sit on Friday,” saying he “just [has] a gut feeling about this jury. ” (8T71-6 to 72-12).  After the trial court finished its final instructions on the Thursday before the holiday weekend, the judge gave the jury the option to come in the next day to start deliberations or to put it off until the following Tuesday.  (9T177-3 to 18).  The jury of course took the latter offer and started its deliberations five days after receiving the lengthy instructions.  (9T18-3 to 6).  The jurors then deliberated for only about an hour and a half before finding [...] guilty in a trial that lasted seven full days.  (10T7-23 to 8-10).  While the apparent lack of rigor with which this jury approached its function might not necessarily rise to the level of a reversible issue in and of itself, it does warrant a greater scrutiny of the verdict sheet issue because it casts further doubt on whether the jury effectively understood the nature and purpose of the lesser-included offenses.
[brief] Plaintiff’s citation to N.J.S.A. 34:15-87 is also incorrect and based on a mischaracterization of the statute.  Like N.J.S.A. 34:15-71, section 87 applies exclusively to liability imposed by the Act.  A workers’ compensation policy may not limit the amount or scope of the coverage provided by the policy such that an employer’s liability under the Act is left uninsured.  N.J.S.A. 34:15-87 (“No policy of insurance against liability arising under this chapter shall contain any limitation on liability of the insurer to an amount less than that payable by the assured on account of his entire liability under this chapter .  . . .” (emphasis added)).  An intentional wrong claim falls outside of the Act and is liability imposed on an employer for egregious, intentionally wrongful conduct that is in addition to the liability imposed on an employer by Article 1 or Article 2 of the Act.