ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] A.  Respondents Met the Requirements for Disclosure of Confidential Information.  Respondents have met the requirements for disclosure of confidential information.  A client’s financial information and attitudes about litigation and settlement are confidential and grounds for disqualification.  The trial court recognized that a client’s attitudes about litigation and settlement are grounds for disqualification.  (1T30:5).  An attorney’s knowledge of a former client’s financial information which can be used in a subsequent lawsuit to the detriment of the former client is grounds for disqualification.
[brief] As [...] Recognized, the Profile was Not Facially Exculpatory, Thus Failing to Satisfy the Second Hollander Factor.  Because defendant could not establish that the State deleted the profile in bad faith, he needed to show the lost evidence was materially and facially exculpatory.  He could not do so.  Materially exculpatory evidence has “an apparent exculpatory value and is of such a nature that comparable evidence could not be obtained by other means. ”  Serret, 198 N.J. Super. at 26.  This threshold “is a high one” as the evidence must negate defendant’s guilt or directly call a witness’s credibility into doubt.  Montijo, 320 N.J. Super. at 490; State v. Russo, 333 N.J. Super. 119, 134 (App. Div. 2000).  Evidence that is only potentially exculpatory does not satisfy this requirement.  Hollander, 201 N.J. Super. at 479.  “Exculpatory evidence is treated differently from merely potentially useful evidence. ”  State v. Robertson, 438 N.J. Super. 47, 67 (App. Div. 2014), opinion after grant of certification on other grounds, 228 N.J. 138, (2017).  Just because evidence is important, or even central, to a case does mean it is exculpatory.  State v. Casele, 198 N.J. Super. 462, 469-71 (App. Div. 1985) (noting there was no indication that failure to preserve blood samples in vehicular homicide involving alcohol “would have been material to the defense” because it may not have called original blood results into question as claimed.).
[brief] (11T 110-9 to 111-4)  Apparently that permission was received, because on October 28th, the judge was expecting [...]’s arrival on the following day.  (13T 118-10 to 12)  October 29th did not bring an appearance by [...], and the record does not indicate why not.  During an informal charge conference at the end of the day, the judge stated her intention to include an adverse-inference charge:
[brief] Transfer and Assignment of the Account  On June 30, 2016, after the Account had been charged off, [...] sold, assigned, and conveyed the rights to a number of consumer credit accounts, including the Account, to [...].  (Pa62-Pa69, ¶ 25; Pa95-Pa107; Pa110-Pa120).  \(^{1}\)  “Pa” refers to Plaintiff-Appellant’s Appendix filed on February 2, 2024.  Thereafter, on July 13, 2016, the Account was sold, assigned, and conveyed, first from [...] to [...], then from [...] to [...], then from [...] to [...], and finally from [...] to [...].  (Pa110-Pa120, ¶ 15; Pa96-Pa107).  C.
[brief] Statutes R. 4:46-1 ..................................................................................................................  1 R. 4:46-2 ..................................................................................................................  2 N.J.S.A. 59: 1-1.............................................................................................................  5 N.J.S.A. 59:2-3..............................................................................................................  14  N.J.S.A. 59:4-1.............................................................................................................  6 N.J.S.A. 59:4-1(a).......................................................................................................  6 N.J.S.A. 59:4-3.............................................................................................................  9 N.J.S.A. 59:9-4............................................................................................................  8  Cases  Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986)  ..................................  3 Boule v. Borough of Bradley Beach, 42 N.J. Super. 159 (App. Div. 1956).  ........ 5 Brill v. Guardian Life Insurance Company, 142 N.J. 520 (1995), ......................... 2 Brown v. Brown, 86 N.J. 565, 575 (1981).  ...............................................................  8  Caicedo v. Caicedo, 439 N.J. Super. 615, 623 (App. Div. 2015)............................  6  Chatman v. Hall, 128 N.J. 394 (1992), ....................................................................  10 Frank Rizzo, Inc. v. Alatsas, 27 N.J. 400 (1958).  ....................................................  3 Friedman v. Friendly Ice Cream Co., Metuchen, 35 N.J. 193, 195-196 (1961).  .........................................................................................................................  2  Gomes v. Cnty. of Monmouth, 444 N.J. Super. 479, 487 (App. Div. 2016)  ..........  5  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
[brief] However, [...] was not just a shareholder who was the subject of a company-wide management decision.  He was directly already a litigant in this action who had the right to fair value of his shares as ordered by the Arbitrator in his Final Award.  (Da3095)  The Arbitrator did not order a valuation hearing subject to any limitations, but that the Court would decide pursuant to N.J.S.A. 42:2c-47(c).
[brief] She was shown a corporate resolution signed by [...] on February 7, 2017 as corporate secretary, stating "I certify I am the only officer in said corporation."  [...] was never the corporate secretary of [...] and never the sole officer of [...].  This corporate resolution was drafted to obtain financing for directional drilling equipment, although [...] never used drilling equipment in the performance of its work.  ○ (1T 61:22-65:1; 65:16-66:8).  •  She testified that she and [...] went to [...] the Friday before they were fired, where [...] learned he was not a signatory on any of [...]'s three bank accounts.  They asked the bank to freeze [...]'s accounts, but they did not have the authority as only [...] was a signatory.  They went back to the office and [...] assured them the bank was mistaken and [...] was a signatory on the accounts.  He also stated there was $200,000 total in the three accounts.  ○ (2T 100:13-101:15).
[directive] The panel shall consist of subject matter experts from the New Jersey State Police, the Division of Criminal Justice, the Office of Public Integrity and Accountability, the Police Training Commission, the New Jersey State Association of Chiefs of Police, the County Prosecutors’ Office Chiefs Association, the County Prosecutors Association of New Jersey, the Sheriff’s Association of New Jersey, and other law enforcement officers and member(s) of the community appointed by the Attorney General or their designee.  The panel shall solicit and receive applications and review, test, and submit a report with recommendations to the Attorney General concerning whether a CED or less-lethal device or ammunition should be approved.  Moreover, the Panel will provide specific guidance concerning when and how the device or ammunition may be deployed.
[brief] $75,500 transferred from [...]’s MR line of credit account on August 22, 2014 to [...]’s bank account ending in #8309.  (36T 11-16).  - [...] was shown extracts of the [...] bank account from the company’s QuickBooks software and was able to tie the transfer of $75,500 from that account to a bank statement for the company for August 2014, which showed the funds were transferred to an account ending in 8309, which Plaintiffs established belonged to [...].  (23T 25:18 to 26:19).  -  When cross-examined, [...] could not identify a similar $75,500 distribution paid to [...].  (28T 111:24 to 113:4).  **Misappropriation #9:**
[brief] On May 14, 2024, Plaintiff/Appellant, [...] (“Plaintiff” or “Kondak”) filed a Class Action Complaint alleging that Defendant/Respondent, [...]’s (“Defendant” or “[...]”) form New Jersey health club “Membership Agreement” (offered to any, and all, of the New Jersey public) violated New Jersey’s Consumer Fraud Act, N.J.S.A. 56:8-1, et seq. (“CFA”); Health Club Services Act (“HCSA”), N.J.S.A. 56:8-42 et seq.; Retail Installment Sales Act (“RISA”), N.J.S.A. 17:16C-1 et seq., and, the Truth-in-Consumer Contract Warranty and Notice Act (“TCCWNA), N.J.S.A. 56:12-14 et seq. (Ja13-Ja43)  As more fully set forth in the Complaint, Plaintiff alleged:  •  Defendants have violated the CFA through the use of cancellation policies and billing practices which have the primary effect of discouraging and impeding their customers from cancelling what are otherwise perpetual and automatically self-renewing monthly contracts.  Specifically, it is decisively unclear when the consumer needs to cancel the Membership Agreement in order to avoid having to pay additional monies beyond the “Initial Period”.  Alternatively, and although 30 days’ notice is allegedly required for the consumer to cancel the Membership Agreement to avoid having to pay additional monies beyond the “Initial Period”, it is further decisively unclear when the 30 days’ notice begins if a consumer cancels the Membership Agreement more than 30 days before the Initial Period ends, 1  For judicial economy purposes as the procedural history in the case merely consists of an initial Class Action Complaint, and motion to compel arbitration or exactly 30 days before the Initial Period ends.  (Ja14); • Defendants have violated the HCSA by failing to provide Plaintiff’s total payment obligation.  HCSA, 56:6-42(b).  Specifically, the sales tax allegedly due by the consumer during the “Initial Period” and/or the fee (including the alleged sales tax) for a “Select Monthly” membership is not included in the “Total Annual Payment” for the Membership Agreement, which is part of Plaintiff’s total payment obligation.  (Ja14-Ja15); and, •  Defendants have also violated the HCSA by using minimum term Membership Agreements, usually for twelve months that automatically renew each month at the end of the initial term in perpetuity until and unless the customer cancels the contract and by imposing unreasonable and unduly onerous requirements for customers to cancel their health club contracts.  HCSA, 56:6-42(i).  (Ja15)  Critically, and in addition to class certification, a declaratory judgment, actual damages, statutory damages, treble damages, attorney fees and costs, and pre/post judgment interest, Plaintiff’s Complaint seeks injunctive relief\(^2\) (i.e. “public injunctive relief” (infra Section I[C]) enjoining [...] from engaging in future violations of the HCSA, CFA, TCCWNA, and RISA.  (Ja27-Ja28)
[brief] \(^5\)  Curiously, Defendants acknowledge that [...] is an “instrumentality of the State” under N.J.S.A. 18A:65-2, but nevertheless remain resolute in --- \(^5\)  Defendants’ argument that an expedited press inquiry was once deferred to [...] by the Governor’s Office (see Db24) proves nothing.  More tellingly, the Attorney General is absent from this litigation.  Neither that absence or the account of the press inquiry can give rise to an inference that the State supports [...]’ legal positions in this case.  denying its public nature.  (Db13).  Our Supreme Court has previously defined the term instrumentality as “a thing used to achieve an end or purpose” or as “a means or agency through which a function of another entity is accomplished, such as a branch of a governing body. ”  *Fair Share Hous. Ctr., Inc. v. N.J. State League of Municipalities*, 207 N.J. 489, 503 (2011).  The BOG is a body that is responsible for the performance of certain public duties, which in this case is the “provision of higher education” in the State.  N.J.S.A. 18A:64M-2(c); N.J.S.A. 18A:64M-2(k) (“The goals of this legislation are to create and enhance the essential higher education opportunities for the residents of the State and to create vibrant educational institutions and communities[.]”).  It is undisputed that “[i]n the United States, public education, indicating that of elementary, high school, or college grade, is universally recognized as a public or governmental function of the state. ”  *Thompson v. Bd. of Educ., City of Millville*, 20 N.J. Super. 419, 422 (App. Div. 1952), aff’d, 11 N.J. 207 (1953).  Moreover, our courts have long determined that [...], by statutory mandate, is . . . entrusted with a vital State function–operating the State University.  “The education of youth is a fundamental public policy and is an essential governmental function.  The promotion of public higher education is the logical extension of this basic policy. ”  *[...] State Univ. v. Piluso*, 113 N.J. Super. 65, 71 (Law Div. 1971), aff’d, 60 N.J. 142 (1972) (emphasis added).  The term “office” as used by the quo warranto statute is not as limited as Defendants argue.  An officeholder need not be elected, have a direct role in the governance of the state, or be part of the State’s Executive Branch.  Thus, the trial court correctly determined that “[i]t is beyond dispute that the board has fiduciary obligation to the students of [...], as well as to the employees of [...], but also overall to the State of New Jersey” (1T70-71), and that the [...] board members discharging that fiduciary obligation are rightly subject to the quo warranto statute.
[brief] Yes, the purpose of discovery is indeed to produce relevant documents, but if fifty percent of the documents produced are not relevant, there certainly is a harm, both to the producing party and to the system more generally.  (Br. of [...] at 6-12; Br. of the [...] and the [...] at 13-18; Br. at 17-20).  And no, as to the relevancy touchstone, ESI discovery is not fundamentally different from “the old days of going through the documents. ”  In particular, ESI discovery is not uniquely subject to a rule that only the requesting party should conduct relevance reviews because “relevancy is in the eye of the beholder. ”  Differing views of relevancy is not a matter unique to ESI discovery, and the rules already have multiple mechanisms for parties to identify their differences, to implement solutions, and to compel compliance.  The same mechanisms apply to ESI discovery and paper discovery alike, and nothing in those rules justifies a broad mandate to produce massive amounts of irrelevant documents in the absence of any actual finding of discovery misconduct.
[directive] Further, when a juvenile is waived to adult court, the prosecutor must ensure that a complaint-summons or complaint-warrant is filed.  5:22-2(f).  R.  Fingerprinting is also required when a juvenile, age thirteen or under, is adjudicated delinquent in Family Court on the basis of an act which, if committed by an adult, would constitute a crime.  N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-61(c); N.J.S.A. 53:1-15.
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY NOT GRANTING A DIRECTED VERDICT  BECAUSE PLAINTIFF STILL DID NOT PRODUCE ANY SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE PROVING THAT THE CITY HAD CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE OF THE MISSING SIGN.  *(Raised Below: Da003; Da005; 5T103:3-24; 6T78:16-86:4)*  Motions for a directed verdict at the close of plaintiff’s case-in-chief, Rule 4:40-1, are governed by the same standard as motions for involuntary dismissal, pursuant to Rule 4:37-2(b).
[brief] The scope of the requisite WQMP consistency determination in this case is set forth and envisioned by the DEP’s regulation that specifically implements the WQPA, as follows:  For projects or activities in the Highlands preservation area, a complete application for a consistency determination review shall include all relevant information identified pursuant to N.J.A.C. 7:38-9.2 or 9.5.  The Department shall perform consistency determination reviews for projects and activities in the Highlands preservation area in accordance with N.J.A.C. 7:38-11.2, 11.3, and 11.7.
[brief] In the retaliation setting, a series of smaller actions, including actions that were not actionable on their own, can be combined to constitute an adverse employment action.  See Green v. Jersey City Bd. of Educ., 117 N.J. 434, 446-447 (2003).  In Green, our Supreme Court explained that a hostile work environment in particular often cannot hinge on a single act, but can instead be based on continuous conduct that occurs over a period of time.  Id.  Therefore, actions that are smaller and less significant than a traditional adverse employment action can combine to constitute a material action that can be the basis of a suit.  *Id.*  In *Green*, the plaintiff faced a series of smaller actions that included being told she was on a “sh— list”, denial of additional programs, being put in a dilapidated classroom, being told she could not make copies, being denied supplies, and being denied a key to the science lab.  *Id.* at 440.  While none of these actions alone would constitute an adverse action, the New Jersey Supreme Court held that together, these combined to constitute a hostile work environment.  *Id.*  Further, retaliation occurs whenever an employer takes action that would “dissuade a reasonable employee” from engaging in protected activity.
[brief] : [...], J.S.C. BRIEF AND APPENDIX FOR LYSHRON STATTEN, AS ADMINISTRATOR  AD PROSEQUENDUM OF THE ESTATE OF KENNETH L. DANTZLER, DECEASED, PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT  [...], Esq.  Attorney ID: 019481986  [...]  [...] [...]  [...]  [...], Esq.  On the Brief  ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT
[brief] In Scalza v. Shop Rite Supermarkets, Inc., 304 N.J. Super. 636 (App. Div 1997), the plaintiff appealed as of right from an order, obtained by defendants pursuant to R. 4:23-2(b)(3), dismissing her complaint without prejudice for failure to comply with an earlier order requiring more specific answers to interrogatories.  As a preliminary matter, the Appellate Division dealt with the defendant’s contention that the appeal should be dismissed as interlocutory, arguing that the plaintiff had no right to appeal because the dismissal was without prejudice.  Id. at 638.  On the issue of finality of an Order, the Court noted that where an order is in effect "similar to a dismissal of a complaint," the order is final and appealable as of right.  Ibid., quoting In re Application of Tiene, 19 N.J. 149, 160 (1955).  Accordingly, the Scalza Court held that the actual dismissal of a complaint, when the only other pleading is an answer, should generally be considered a final judgment for purposes of appeal.  Scalza, 304 N.J. Super. At 638.  Furthermore, even the Court’s expressed intent that dismissal of a complaint would be without prejudice to permit the plaintiff to bring a new action does not preclude the dismissal’s finality and the right to appeal.  *Morris County v. 8 Court Street Ltd.*, 223 N.J. Super. 35, 38-39 (App. Div.), certif. den. 111 N.J. 572 (1988).  An order that resolves final outstanding issues but is labeled “without prejudice” is still appealable as of right.  See *Devers v. Devers*, 471 N.J. Super. 466, 472-475 (App. Div. 2022).  In the case sub judice, the Trial Court’s Order is labeled “without prejudice” but it nonetheless disposed of all issues as to all parties in the case.  When reciting his decision on the record, the Trial Judge noted that he was granting [...]’s Cross-Motion to Dismiss “because there is simply no claim left…”.  (2T10:21-25).  The “without prejudice” aspect of the Order simply means that if at some point in the future [...] begins employment with a different practice or for himself inside the restricted area, he is not precluded from bringing a new action against [...] to challenge the reasonableness of [...]’s Restrictive Covenant as it pertains to that new employment position.  That, however, would be an entirely different case from the case currently before the Court.  On the facts of this case, the dismissal of [...]’s Verified Complaint is final.  There is nothing [...] can do under the current set of facts to amend his pleading to change the result.  Any amendment would present the exact same set of facts and would result in another dismissal based upon the same flawed reasoning expressed by the Trial Court.  The fact that [...] is not precluded from bringing a different case, with entirely different facts, before the Court to challenge [...]’s Restrictive Covenant in some other context does not strip the finality from the Trial Court’s April 24, 2024 Order nor its appealability as of right.
[directive] 1 U.S. Attorney General, May 30, 2002, pp. 12 and 13; at www.usdoj.gov/olp/generalcrimes2.pdf.  It is also understood that “criminal investigatory records” which are the primary information entered into intelligence systems, are exempted from public access in the Open Public Records Act, P.O. 2001, Chapter 404 N.J.S. 47:1A-3, Executive Order #26, Executive Order #9 ([...] 1963), and as affirmed by the Government Records Council final decision #2002-30 dated February 13, 2003.  II.
[brief] Specifically, our Supreme Court has held that residential property owners do not have a common-law duty to clear snow or ice from a public sidewalk and the failure to do so does not expose them to liability.  *Luchejko*, supra, 207 N.J. at 211; *Qian v. Toll Brothers, Inc.*, 223 N.J. 124, 136 (2015).  Unquestionably, this is the legal standard that we now see in the Model Jury Charge.  Recently, the legal landscape changed, but not for residential property owners.
[brief] See Century Indem., 398 N.J. Super. at 441.  In Century Indem., this court found that “many of the concepts that informed the Court’s decision in Sensient are relevant” to a motion to dismiss a first-filed declaratory judgment lawsuit “in that they provide a useful framework for analysis of a circumstance in which to competing actions are pending, and a court is called upon to determine which should prevail. ”  Id. at 428.  This court started its analysis from the premise that New Jersey courts have the discretion to dismiss “first-filed preemptory declaratory judgment actions instituted to obtain a forum advantage, so as to permit the ‘natural plaintiff’s’ action to proceed in the plaintiff’s chosen court.
[directive] Over time, the [...] may identify other resources to support one or both parties.  As part of this assistance to law enforcement agencies, the [...] can also conduct outreach to educate law enforcement about the value of coordinating with [...] and opportunities to do so.  Finally, the Report recognizes that, building on the significant work the [...] has already undertaken, there are further steps that my office can take to continue to foster the growth of the community violence prevention (see ecosystem system statewide Part II, Section 4 of the Report).