ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] E.  Point I, Section B of Plaintiff’s Appellate Brief does not apply to the [...].  (Pb44-45; not addressed below)  ..............................................36  F.  Plaintiff’s “suggested remedy” is not an issue properly before this Court and, even if were, the “revised SAC” (Pa259-312) still does not correct all the pleading deficiencies that have been identified numerous times by at least three different Judges and at both the state and federal level.  (Pb45-46; Pa259-312; 4/1/21 Transcript @ T57:12 to T59:9)
[directive] INTERNAL AFFAIRS POLICY & PROCEDURES | November 2022 47  8.1.3  Typically, this conflict will become most apparent during subject officer interviews.  As already explained, a subject officer has the right to remain silent during a criminal investigative interview.  But the same officer must cooperate and answer questions posed by their employer during an administrative disciplinary interview.  So while the internal affairs investigator cannot require a subject officer to answer questions during a criminal interview, he or she can require that officer to answer questions during an administrative disciplinary interview.  8.1.4
[brief] *Id.* at 184-85.  \(^{13}\) *Sipko* discussed only the marketability discount, and not the control discount, because the case involved a 50% stake, not a minority stake like [...]’s 29.5%.  As to the particular facts of the case before the *Sipko* Court, it noted that “[w]ith fairness and equity in mind, we certainly cannot ignore the many instances in which defendants took deliberate steps to prevent [plaintiff] from recovering any value he might achieve throughout the course of litigation.
[brief] ”).  At best, [...]’s behavior could have been “an awkward reaction to police presence. ”  See Costa, 327 N.J. Super. at 32.  But it was ultimately “an ambiguous indicator of involvement in criminal activity and subject to many different interpretations. ”  See Nyema, 249 N.J. at 534.  And, in a reasonable suspicion analysis, “[z]ero plus zero will always equal zero. ”  Nyema, 249 N.J. at 534-5 (internal quotation omitted).  [...] had nothing more than a hunch that [...] had a gun.  Reasonable suspicion demands more.  Accordingly, the trial court’s ruling denying suppression must be reversed.
[brief] Civil Action On Appeal from the [...], Resolution No. 24-23 dated March 19, 2024  BRIEF AND APPENDIX OF RESPONDENT  CASINO REINVESTMENT DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY  [...]  [...], Esq.  (Bar No. 029541985)  [...], Esq. (Bar. No. 015652009)  Headquarters  [...] (973)  538-0800  [...]  [...]  Attorneys for Respondent, [...]
[brief] Jefferson Loan Co., Inc. v. Session, 397 N.J. Super. 520 (App. Div. 2008)  11,12  Joe Hand Promotions, Inc. v. Mills, 567 F. Supp.2d 719 (D.N.J. 2008)  10  Johnson v. McClellan, 468 N.J. Super. 562 (App. Div. 2021)  15  Kennedy v. Weichert Co., 257 N.J. 290 (2024)
[brief] Da91-92 (citing Williams v. Bell Telephone Laboratories, Inc., 132 N.J. 109 (1993)).  In Williams, squarely on point, the Supreme Court held that a statute of limitations defense, pled in an answer but “otherwise-unasserted [] through the entire three-and-one-half-year span of the litigation, through preparation for and conduct of a protracted trial, and into a post-verdict submission” had been waived.  Id. at 119.  As the trial court noted, waiver in these circumstances prevents attorneys from withholding evidence and then moving for reconsideration to get a “second bite of the apple. ”  Da92 (quoting Fusco v. Bd. of Ed. Of City of Newark, 349 N.J. Super. 455, 462-63 (App. Div. 2002)).  The trial court found that “at no point before this motion or after defendants’ answer, did defendants raise the defense of the statute of frauds as to [...]’s guarantee of the third loan. ”  Da92-93.  Additionally, on Defendants’ reconsideration motion, the trial court concluded that Defendants failed to present any “new or additional information . . . . which [defendants] could not have provided on the first application. ”  Da93 (quoting D’Atria v. D’Atria, 242 N.J. Super. 392, 401-02 (Ch. Div. 1990)).  The trial court’s finding that Defendants waived the statute of frauds defense should be affirmed.
[brief] Ja218 16.  Stephen Creek is not located on any portion of Block 24, Lot 12 and is located over 916.99 feet from Maple Avenue.  Ja156, Ja170, Ja217, Ja238, Ja253, Ja275.  17.  The adjoining [...] residence, located upon Block 24, Lot 12.05, maintains a tree lined buffer along Maple Avenue.
[brief] Slightly over a decade after it launched its Choice 2 product in New Jersey, [...] realized that it had severely underpriced its product.  [...] responded to its pricing debacle by adopting a nationwide multiyear plan (“MYRAP”) to obtain rate increases nationwide to support its claims-paying ability.  (T1 61:17 to 62:24).  [...]’s Vice President of its Long Term Care In Force Management division, [...], testified that [...] used MYRAP as an initiative to review rate increases plans for [...]’s largest LTC insurance block of business.  (T1 61:17 to 62:24).  With the MYRAP in place, [...]’s staff and actuary met with the Department to discuss [...]’s plan to increase rates in New Jersey.  (T1 64:10 to 65:4).  In November 2016, [...] requested a 76.8% premium rate increase on its Choice 2 policies.  (Cra1).  [...]’s actuary certified to the Department that its submission was prepared in conformity with ASOPs 8, 18, 23, 25, and 41, and that “the requested rates are not excessive, inadequate, or unfairly discriminatory. ” (Cra20).  The Department approved a rate increase of 33.1% phased in over three years, which [...] accepted.  (Cra25).  In 2017, [...] requested a 66.8% premium rate increase on its Choice 2 policies.  (Cra34).  [...] projected that its lifetime loss ratio without the rate increase for these policies would be 81.2%. (T3 617:1 to 619:23).  [...] noted that its filing was based on its negative experience and changes to its actuarial assumptions about morbidity, voluntary termination rates, and mortality, which were revised from its 2015 and 2016 set of assumptions.  (Cra34-39).  Again, [...] certified to the Department that its submission complied with all actuarial standards and that its rates are “not excessive or unfairly discriminatory. ” (Cra53).  The Department approved a rate increase of 8.68% phased in over two years.  (Cra57-58).  E.
[directive] Mere destroyed absent search does not seizure for a a without necessary warrant, to death imminent prevent unless serious or harm. bodily from of Seizure journalists recording is B. generally prohibited.  enforcement devices  Law a seize should never recording member's device, press except in exceedingly case the rare necessary for or where it a is of the result search public arrest of safety a incident to lawful addition, the journalist.  In delete officers journalist's material from must never a recording such should obtain search device, and obtaining devices after warrants to only approval from the County Prosecutor General.
[brief] Furthermore, it should be noted that the [...] and [...]’s Preliminary Statement provides further evidence that the Appellate Brief filed by Defendants/Appellants clearly appeared to seek only to move the survivorship claim into arbitration, and not to affect the litigation of the Plaintiffs/Respondents’ wrongful death claim.  As the Court is aware, the Trial Court’s March 22, 2024 Order stayed litigation for arbitration of the survivorship claim, while allowing Plaintiffs to file an amended complaint to revise the Wrongful Death Count in the Trial Court (Da070-079).  As per this issue, Defendants/Appellants should not be permitted to bait and switch the Plaintiffs/Respondents in this fashion.  Allowing an appeal on the issue of the wrongful death claim would seem to suggest there are no time restrictions on filing the requisite appeal.  In any event, Plaintiffs/Respondents’ arguments as to the wrongful death claim were set forth expressly on the record in our original briefing on the issue, wherein it was argued that [...]’s heirs are not bound by an arbitration agreement to which they were not a party.
[brief] \(^4\) Da348-49.  Accordingly, the DJ Action was focused on Counts I and III of the Second Amended Complaint, which apply to the duty to defend.  Counts II and IV of the Second Amended Complaint, which apply to the duty to indemnify [...], were stayed for the majority of the case and were never actively pursued until mid-2024 when [...]’s Indemnity Claim became ripe.
[brief] Appellants do not – because they cannot – dispute that they are sophisticated.  They have distributed beer for approximately 50 years.  (Pa24 ¶ 2.)  They admit that their executives “have extensive familiarity with federal and state alcohol beverage control laws, particularly the state laws of the states that are relevant to [...]’s business. ”  (Pa119 ¶ 3.)  Appellants’ Vice President, [...], who cosigned Appellants’ October 11, 2022 response to [...]’s Notices (Pa82-Pa86), is a member of the bar of New York and Florida.  (Pa119 ¶ 3.)  Instead, Appellants claim they were “not contracting as equals. ”  (Pb at 31.)  But the law does not require “equality”; it requires sophistication enough to understand that each party was agreeing to arbitrate.
[directive] Sample Response Letters  Complaint Acknowledgment  This will acknowledge receipt of the complaint made by you on [date of complaint] concerning the actions of a member of this department occurring on [date of incident].  A thorough investigation will be conducted into the allegations contained in your complaint and you will be advised of the results of the investigation upon its conclusion.  In the meantime, if you have any questions, please feel free to contact this office by calling [telephone number], Monday through Friday, between the hours of ____a.m. and ____p.m.  Officer Exonerated  The Internal Affairs Unit of this department has completed its investigation of your complaint concerning the conduct of [name of subject officer].  The investigation and a review of all information currently available to this office indicates that the officer followed the appropriate department policies and procedures.  More specifically, department policies and procedures permit the officer to [give details of the policy or procedure]…  If you have any additional information which you believe should be considered, please contact the Internal Affairs Unit at [telephone number].  Thank you for bringing this matter to our attention.  Not Sustained
[brief] V.  The Doctrine of Mootness Applied Here.  41 (Pa80,Pa82,2T,3T)  VI.  The Doctrines of Equitable Estoppel and Turning Square Corners Supported Reconsideration, Vacation, Amendment and Alteration of the September 22, 2023  Pre-Discovery Dispositive  Summary Judgment  Dismissal in Favor of All Defendants.  44 (Pa79,Pa80,Pa82,1T,2T,3T)  VII.  The Trial Court Failed to Exercise Its Powers and Jurisdiction  Under the Prerogative Writs Clause and Rule 4:69-4.  46 (Pa79,Pa80,Pa82,1T,2T,3T)  Conclusion
[brief] *The Trial Court Overlooked that [...] is Entitled to a Protective Order due to Respondents Seeking Confidential Information (819a-821a)*  [...] spent considerable time addressing concerns regarding a confidentiality order.  However, [...] sought a protective order to avoid “annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden and expense” related to the subpoena.  R. 4:10-3.  The protective order was not being sought solely related to concerns over potentially confidential information being sought.  To the extent [...] intends on seeking information from [...] related to confidential business information related to his relationship with [...], [...] or [...], that is clearly confidential and cannot be sought through a deposition.  In fact, [...] and [...] have filed a separate motion on this basis in the Underlying Litigation, in part, due to the fact that confidential information may be disclosed by virtue of [...]’s deposition, to the extent it takes place.  (510a-692a)  Further, [...] stated that [...] is a “competitor equity firm”.  (403a-404a)  This is a valid concern given the claims in the Underlying Litigation and [...]’s past conduct.  Additionally, any argument that the parties can simply enter into a confidentiality order misses the basis for [...]’s request for a protective order and that he has no relevant information and therefore any deposition is solely for purposes of harassment, annoyance, oppression and unduly burdensome.  The Court ordering that the parties enter into a confidentiality order does not resolve the fact that there is no basis for the third-party subpoena to [...].  Therefore, it is respectfully submitted that the trial court’s order should be reversed.
[brief] Rather, by his own affidavit, Plaintiff’s counsel merely stated that in a phone call to Defendants’ counsel, he “require[d] Defendants’ Answers to Form C Interrogatories. ”  (Pa44)  Furthermore, there was absolutely no indication in Plaintiffs’ counsel’s affidavit that this supposed discussion with Defense counsel discussed or mentioned the Affidavit of Merit in any way.  Thus, Plaintiff’s suggestion that Defendants “were aware that Plaintiff needed the records… to obtain an Affidavit of Merit” (pb26) is unsupported speculation.  Furthermore, the request for Form C Interrogatories cannot stand in place of the specific request required by Scaffidi.  Form C Interrogatories go well beyond requesting specific “medical records or other records or information having a _____________________  4  Defense counsel denied that the conversation occurred. substantial bearing on preparation of the affidavit” and requests all manner of information and evidence, from the identities of witnesses, and details concerning the defendant’s theory in the case, to insurance information, and “all documents that may relate to this action....”  (See, Form C Interrogatories, at ¶14)  The breadth of that request specifies exactly why Scaffidi places the onus on the plaintiff to identify the specific documents they need.  Consequently, because Plaintiffs did not specifically identify the documents needed to prepare the Affidavit of Merit, N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-28 is inapplicable.  Furthermore, N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-28 is also inapplicable in this case, because for that statute to apply, Plaintiff must demonstrate that the documents allegedly withheld were “medical records or other records or information having a substantial bearing on preparation of the affidavit...”  N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-28, (emphasis added.)  Here, however, Plaintiff cannot establish that any supposedly withheld records had a substantial bearing on the production of the affidavit, because even in the absence of those alleged documents, Plaintiff was still able to produce an Affidavit of Merit authored by [...] on April 18, 2023.  The fact that Plaintiff was eventually able to produce an affidavit of merit—albeit one which was out of time and therefore incapable of satisfying the statute—even in the absence of the Defendants’ medical chart, indicates that the chart did not have a substantial bearing on the preparation of the affidavit, as Plaintiff argues.  Plaintiff, however, did not explain why the Wall affidavit could not have been produced within the 60-day time frame set out in the Affidavit of Merit statute, even without Defendant’s medical chart.  The obvious conclusion given the contents in her brief is that the Wall affidavit was not produced during the statutory period because her counsel simply lost track of the time mandated by the statute to comply.  (Pb12, 17)  Therefore, there is no merit to Plaintiff’s argument that N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-28 applies to excuse her non-production of the Affidavit of Merit.
[brief] [...]’s agreement with [...]’s counsel that [...] “overpaid [[...]] on Hackensack,” was because [...] did overpay [...] for [...] payments on the Hackensack Project.  As explained by the PTA Arbitrator and the Trial Court, [...] inherited many issues from [...] when it took over the project, which forced the parties to rethink the [...] (as was allowed for this particular project under the PTA).
[directive] Statute Charge Description Degree  Bail Range 10%  Cash  Bail Option national origin or ethnicity, or (b) the victim or the victim’s property was selected to be the 2C:16-1a(1-3)  Bias  Intimidation target of the offense because of the victim’s race, color, religion, gender, disability, sexual 3rd Degree  $10,000 to $50,000  10% permissible (continued) (continued) orientation, gender identity or expression, national origin, or ethnicity.  Grading – fourth degree if the underlying offense referred to in subsection a. is a disorderly persons offense or petty disorderly persons offense.  Otherwise bias intimidation is a crime one degree higher than the most serious underlying crime referred to in subsection a; if underlying crime is a crime of the first degree, then bias intimidation is a crime of the first 4th Degree  $1,000 to $2,500 10% permissible degree.  Actor starts fire or causes an explosion thereby purposely or knowingly placing another in danger of death or bodily injury, or with the purpose to destroy a building, or with the purpose 2C:17-1a  Aggravated Arson 2nd Degree $35,000 to $75,000  No 10% to collect insurance and recklessly places any person in danger of death or injury, or to destroy forest.  34  Updated December 2, 2013  Bail Schedule 2
[brief] [Certifications of [...], Esq., at A57, A77, A91 (incorporated by reference)]  B.  Whatever discovery responses remained deficient after the February 8, 2024 Case Management Conference, it was not sufficient ground on which to maintain default against defendants as [...] did in her June 12 Orders (A3; 3T15-19).  The “ultimate sanction of dismissal” is to be used “only sparingly. ”  Abtrax Pharm., Inc. v. Elkins-Sinn, Inc., 139 N.J. 499, 514 (1995) (quoting Zaccardi v. Becker, 88 N.J. 245, 253 (1982)).  “If a lesser sanction than dismissal suffices to erase the prejudice to the non-delinquent party, dismissal of the complaint [or, here, suppression of answers to a complaint with counterclaims] is not appropriate and constitutes an abuse of discretion. ”  Georgis v. Scarpa, 226 N.J. Super. 244, 251 (App. Div. 1988).
[brief] * * *  [I]t is this Court’s conclusion that the parties intended the 1963 Agreement to create an easement for Plaintiff to have parking privileges for as long as the synagogue is operating on the site.  Similarly, the parties intended an easement as to the Defendant’s boiler room for HVAC.  The Court comes to this conclusion after examining the plain language of the instrument and examining surrounding circumstances.  Those circumstances include themes within the Agreement that demonstrate an intent that the synagogue remain independent and operate indefinitely.  Other circumstances include an examination of the physical plan referenced in the Agreement and the concomitant needs for the synagogue’s successful operation.  Finally, the Court considered the conduct of the parties after executing the Agreement and later after the Agreement was recorded.  * * *  Defendant contends that evidence of Plaintiff’s abandonment can be found in the [[...]]’s 1972 site plan…Defendant asserts that the omission of the Sixth Street lot as available parking is proof that neither party used the Sixth Street lot for parking at the time…  This Court is not persuaded that this evidence constitutes evidence of either abandonment or supports Defendant’s argument that there was never an easement for parking on Sixth Street.  * * *  Lastly, Defendant has asserted that Plaintiff has unlawfully expanded its easement rights by conducted more services since 1963…The evidence showed that the school did not need to make use of the Sixth Street lot for parking—the evidence showed that the buses and parents were able to drop the children at the curb on Sixth Street as well as Fifth…Based on the totality of the evidence, this Court finds that the parking rights were not limited to one morning service.  The parties surely intended for the synagogue to thrive and recognized that the number and hours of the services would change and increase.  It is the Court’s conclusion that in those limited times when the synagogue and the school’s use of the Sixth Street lot is conflicted, the synagogue would receive priority for parking.  * * *  In conclusion, this Court has found from the credible evidence adduced at trial that the 1963 Agreement constitutes an express easement that conveyed parking rights to Plaintiff which permitted them to park on lots located on both the Fifth Street and Sixth Street lots and access the Sixth Street boiler room to maintain its HVAC; and further, those rights were intended to run with the land and continue until such time as there is no longer a synagogue that maintains Orthodox Jewish [Tenets] on the location; and finally, the easement was not extinguished or abandoned.
[brief] SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY, APPELLATE  DIVISION DOCKET NO. [...]  CIVIL ACTION  On Appeal from August 17, 2023  Order Granting Partial Summary Judgment to Plaintiffs and January 22, 2024  Order Denying Defendants’ Motion for Reconsideration  Docket No. [...]  Sat Below: Hon. [...], P.J. Ch. APPELLANT
[brief] [...] therefore has an incentive to withdraw and attempt to negotiate a new plea or proceed to trial. \(^7\)  [...]’s sentencing exposure has also changed because of his successful appeal.  On the day of his guilty plea, [...] was ready to go to trial on the Pharmacy Case, but he pleaded guilty after the State emphasized the amount of prison he was facing due to a combination of the indictments against him.  The State told [...] that if he went to trial on the Pharmacy Case and was acquitted, it would seek an extended term on the 7-Eleven Case, which would subject [...] to life in prison.  (1T 4-11 to 25, 5-24 to 6-7, 9-3 to 10)  The State further threatened to seek consecutive sentences on all cases if [...] proceeded to trial (1T 5-24 to 6-7, 9-10 to 15), and the judge stated that he would in fact impose consecutive sentences.  (1T 8-11 to 23)  \(^7\)  At the SOA, this Court asked, “what can [[...]] get better than a 30 with 30?”  (4T 4-11 to 5-20)  If [...] chooses to withdraw, the State may offer him the opportunity to plead to a lesser charge in the indictment (Da 1-13), or [...] could go to trial and receive an acquittal.