ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Elements of an FDCPA Cause of Action. **  Under 15 U.S.C. § 1692k, the FDCPA “grants a private right of action to a consumer who receives a communication that violates the Act. ”  *Jacobson v. Healthcare Fin. Servs.*, 516 F.3d 85, 91 (2d Cir. 2008).  Indeed, “Congress intended the Act to be enforced primarily by consumers. ”  *FTC v. Shaffner*, 626 F.2d 32, 35 (7th Cir. 1980).  The FDCPA is a strict liability statute which provides for damages and attorney’s fees upon the showing of just one violation.
[brief] *Ibid.* (emphasis added).  The plaintiff, a national law firm, sought a declaratory judgment stating that it was exempt from Connecticut’s debt negotiation statute.  On appeal to the Supreme Court, the plaintiff contended that the legislature impermissibly intruded on the judiciary’s exclusive authority to regulate attorney conduct and licensure because the debt negotiation statutes improperly: (1) give the commissioner the authority to determine which attorneys in this state have the “character, reputation, integrity and general fitness” to provide debt negotiation services in conjunction with their practice of law; General Statutes § 36a-671(d)(1); (2) require that Connecticut attorneys obtain additional licenses from and pay hefty licensing fees to agencies outside the Judicial Branch in order to offer traditional legal services; and (3) impinge on the Judicial Branch’s exclusive authority to suspend or disbar attorneys who have engaged in professional misconduct.
[brief] DISCOVERY AND THE COURT’S URGING OF PLAINTIFFS’ COUNSEL TO DISMISS NJ RETINA FROM THE CASE  During discovery, Plaintiffs failed to produce a single document supporting their claims against [...], and their responses to interrogatories failed to identify any facts to support their claims against [...].  (Pa428a; Pa385a-Pa398a).  Specifically, when asked to identify facts to support their allegations that [...] “maliciously” and “without justification” interfered with the relationship between [...] and [...], Plaintiffs asserted the following boilerplate response:  “Since the specifics of the negotiations, discussions, communications, and transactions between the defendants is presently unknown to the plaintiffs, the allegations described are stated on information and belief, in keeping with applicable legal principles. ” (Pa392a-Pa394a, Responses to Interrogatories 14-21, 23-24).  Plaintiffs never amended this interrogatory response.  In October 2020, the trial court heard argument on the Notis’ Defendants’ motion for a protective order.  (Pa429a ¶ 14).  Despite the subject of the motion -- Plaintiffs’ ability to obtain documents concerning [...]’ finances -- the court questioned Plaintiffs’ counsel on why [...] was a party to the case.²  (Ibid.).  The court told him that he “must concede” that Plaintiffs have no claim against [...] if [...] did not execute a letter of intent with [...].  (Ibid.).  The court later commented, when issuing its decision on the motion, that it was “not sure where the case is going” against [...].  (Ibid.).  On November 23, 2020, [...] served Plaintiffs with its written responses to document demands and interrogatories along with a production of ²  By this time, a new judge had replaced the judge who decided [...]’s motion to dismiss. documents.  (Pa430a ¶ 16).  Included in the document production were: (i) a copy of the Draft LOI that [...] never signed; and (ii) contemporaneous emails exchanged between [...] (or his representatives) and [...] regarding their potential transaction.  (Ibid.).  [...] also provided Plaintiffs, as part of its interrogatory responses, with sworn statements confirming once again that [...] did not enter into a transaction with [...] and had nothing to do with Plaintiffs’ dispute with him.  (Ibid.).  Several weeks after producing discovery responses, [...] again demanded that Plaintiffs dismiss it from the case.  (Pa430a ¶ 17).  Plaintiffs, however, refused.  (Ibid.).  V.
[brief] --- \(^2\)  We note that Plaintiff’s brief includes reference to an Order entered by the trial court on September 18, 2024, after the Orders on appeal were entered.  (Pb6, n.2).  The September 18, 2024 Order states that because [...] (“[...]”), another German entity, has been added as a defendant, and [...] has control over [...], [...] may be subject to deposition through a notice to [...].  (Pa374-Pa375).  If [...] can be compelled to appear for a deposition through a notice to [...], there is no basis for Plaintiff’s argument in this appeal that he will be denied a meaningful opportunity to depose [...], further supporting the conclusion that the trial court’s March 25, 2024 and April 19, 2024 Orders should be affirmed.  II.
[brief] ” (Pa862).  e)  The statement of [...], taken on March 6, 2015 (but not signed until March 11, 2015) who when confronted with the statement by [...] that [...] announced in [...]’s presence that [...] was “too old” to attend conferences did not outright deny such a statement was made but, instead, responded “I doubt Karen would say that. ”  (Pa880).  f)  The statement of [...] taken on February 27, 2015 (but not signed until April 6, 2015) confirming that [...] may have asked what [...]’s retirement plans were because “Krietzman was losing several employees to retirement. ” (Pa881).  [(Pa664-Pa665).]  Notably absent from the EEO file of [...]’s investigation is a) any statement of [...] who was present when [...] stated and repeated that [...] was “too old” to attend conferences.
[brief] Exhibit 1: Timeline ....................................................................................... 393a  Exhibit 1A: Email dated January 17, 2008 .................................................. 397a  Exhibit 1B: Letter from Borough Engineer dated Sept. 29, 2008 .................................................................401a  Exhibit 1C: Letter from [...] dated October 7, 2008 ......................................................403a  Exhibit 1D: Letter from [...] dated November 3, 2008 .................................................................404a  Exhibit 1E: Resolution dated January 26, 2009 .............................................................................405a  Exhibit 1F: Resolution dated February 4, 2009 .............................................................................410a  Exhibit 1G: Addendum to Developers Agreement ...........................................................................414a  Exhibit 1H: [...] letter dated June 4, 2009 .............................................................................422a  Exhibit 1I: [...] Transmittal dated December 29, 2009 ............................................................423a  Exhibit 1J: [...] Transmittal dated March 26, 2010 .................................................................424a  Exhibit 1K: [...] email dated April 20, 2010 ..................................................................................425a  Exhibit 1L: [...] transmittal dated May 18, 2010 .............................................................................427a  Exhibit 2: [...] Cut Sheet dated March 23, 2009 .............................................................................432a  Exhibit 3: Various Emails and other documents .............................................................................433a  Exhibit 4: [...]s Handwritten notes ...............................................................................................440a Notice of Motion for Summary Judgment filed July 6, 2022 ..................................................441a Statement of Material Facts .............................................................................................................443a
[brief] Under the FELA, “the role of the jury is significantly greater…than in common law negligence actions” and “the right of the jury to pass upon the question of the employers’ fault and causation must be most liberally viewed. ”  *Johnannessen v. Gulf Trading and Transp. Co.*, 633 F.2d 653, 656 (2d Cir. 1980); *Gallose v. Long Island RR*, 878 F. 2d 80, 84 (2d Cir 1989).  Indeed, “trial by jury is part of the remedy. ”  *Johnannessen*, 633 F.2d at 656.  Whereas here, there is credible evidence supporting the contested element of Plaintiff’s case and given the established doctrine under the FELA that summary judgment is only appropriate where there is “zero probability either of employer negligence or that any such negligence contributed to the injury of an employee,” *Pehowic*, supra, summary judgment is not available to Defendant and the trial court granted defendant’s motion erroneously.
[brief] The State had the knowledge of foot prints the night of the murder but decline to extract a mold and/or take pictures to compare to defendants’.  This behavior is inexcusable for a murder investigation.  R. 4:6-2.10  Spoliation of Records (Evidence) - Petitioner requested and ask for all “Documents and Evidence” before trial.  It obvious the State concealed and omitted exculpatory evidence.  Legal Officials given the impression that the State had in there proprietorship [pictures] of foot prints that will exonerate defendant of all charges.  The State refuse to submit these pictures, License plate videos, and any evidence in favor of defendant’s incorruptibility (guilt).  The [...] is a part of the State team, they should have known about all exculpatory evidence favorable to defense.  The deliberate withholding of evidence is against Brady v. Maryland.  The defense cannot put on an appropriate defense under these circumstances.  In Addition, Arizona v. Youngblood, the State of New Jersey honor the language in this great case.  (1) although the defendant was denied the opportunity to present a full defense by what may have been nothing more than police ineptitude, that ineptitude deprived the defendant of his right to Due Process of Law, since (a) police actions taken in bad faith are not the only species of police conduct that can result in a violation of Due Process, (b) where no comparable evidence is likely to be available to a defendant, the police must preserve physical evidence and forensic evidence of any type that they reasonably should know has the potential, if tested, to reveal immutable characteristics of the criminal, and hence to exculpate a defendant charged with the crime, and (c) under the standard set forth in (d), the failure of the prosecution to preserve the gunpowder residue on defendant’s clothing deprived the defendant of a fair trial, and (2) even under the standard articulated by the majority in “Youngblood”, the case should have been remanded for consideration of whether the police did act in good faith.
[brief] More specifically, [...] Ordinance defines “principal use” as follows:  A use which is the main or principal use of the lot; it is the lot’s first, chief or most important use.  While commercial or industrial developments and multifamily housing developments may have more than one principal building per lot, they may have only one principal use; however, mixed uses of more than one principal commercial or industrial use may be located on one lot if the Planning Board finds that the uses are part of a single site plan, with cross easements for utilities and stormwater management, and access, ingress and egress utilizing shared, common driveways.  [[...] Ordinance § 250-4 (emphasis added) (Pa3-13).
[brief] [...] has been a corrections officer for 22 years.  (1T85).  On the date of the incident, an inmate became upset, and [...] asked [...] for assistance.  [...] asked for assistance on two separate occasions.  [...] heard both requests for assistance, but did not respond to the scene because [...] allegedly omitted his supervisory title when sending the communications.  [...] testified that the radio cut off the beginning of her communications, and that she addressed [...] with the proper title.  Instead of responding to the scene, [...] decided to give [...] “hints” on the proper way to address him.  [...] and [...] communicated thereafter, and gave conflicting accounts of what they stated.  [...] should not lose a 22 year position because a radio cut off certain parts of her communications.  Moreover, considering the circumstances, it might be understandable that [...] forgot to wait the proper amount of time before speaking into the radio. \(^2\)  It might even be understandable if [...] forgot to use a proper title.  An inmate was screaming that he wanted to leave the Medical Department, and [...] was the only law enforcement member present.  Indeed, [...] repeatedly testified that [...] “absolutely” should have called a code, and that doing so would have resulted in the physical response of multiple officers and supervisors.  (1T48-49).  If this was the proper course of action, why did [...] not respond to provide assistance?  Why did he use the situation as an opportunity to give passive-aggressive feedback to his subordinate?  If the situation required calling a code, then [...] should have responded to the scene, and dealt with any counseling or reprimands afterward.  Instead, he left [...] alone based on the (quite possibly incorrect) belief that she failed to use a proper title.  [...] proceeded to ask [...] why he did not respond to the scene, and acknowledged that her questions could have been misconstrued as insubordination.  Here, the penalty of removal is “shocking to one’s sense of fairness. ”  \textit{In re Carter}, 191 N.J. at 484 (quoting \textit{In re Polk}, 90 N.J. at 578).
[brief] Pa4.  While I was on FMLA/disability leave, I no longer had access to my work emails.  I filed my retirement application on November 24, 2021, with a proposed retirement date of February 1, 2022.  Pa11 to Pa13.  By letter dated December 28, 2021 (sent to my home address), I was notified by the [...] that my service credit, based on information supplied by my employer, would be 10 years and 1 month based on my proposed retirement date of February 1, 2022.  Pa16.  The December 28, 2021 letter from the [...] stated that my retirement benefits “may be recalculated in the future due to an audit based on new information received from [my] employer or a discrepancy in [my] account. ”  Pa16.  On January 31, 2022, I had my remote exit interview.  Pa28 to Pa31.  By letter dated February 28, 2022 (sent to my home address), the [...] confirmed the date of my retirement (February 1, 2022), my monthly retirement benefit ($677.02) and my life insurance benefit ($9,952.12).  Pa36.  By letter dated July 19, 2022 (sent to my home address), I was notified by the [...] that a “post-retirement audit of [my] account” revealed that my monthly retirement benefit ($677.02) had been “overstated” and had been reduced to $652.77.
[brief] _____________________  7  Notably, and evidential of the fact that the Defendants did not notify [...] of their alleged interest in the Property or that [...] was somehow working with or on behalf of [...] to manage the Property, the subject lawsuit was initially filed against [...] despite the fact he had already passed away.  [...] was not made aware of the fact that his brother had died until later on in the litigation, at which point he amended the Complaint to name [...]’s estate.  Even if the Court were to conclude that the Statute should run from the signing of the December 1998 Deed, not the October 2019 Deed, the discovery rule would nonetheless act to toll the applicable statute of limitations until spring 2020 when [...] learned about the challenge to his ownership after discovering the transfer to [...].
[brief] [...] per the Meccia Title Survey owned part of Lot 22 since the early 1909.  (Da118)  The Doctrine of Adverse Possession was not properly applied to this case by the Trial Court.  Had the standard been followed which is set out in Plaza v. Flak, the decision reached on Summary Judgment would have been favorable for [...].  Plaza v. Flak, 7 N.J. 21 (Decided May 28, 1951).  The standard to satisfy the prongs for Adverse Possession are also located at our statute, N.J.S.A. 2A:14-30.
[brief] *See*  Hoboken City Ordinance §36.  Specifically, Section 36-1(a) provides, as follows:  There is hereby created a City of Hoboken Cannabis Review Board (‘Review Board’) which shall serve as an advisory committee to the City of Hoboken whose duty it shall be to review applications for cannabis wholesaler, cannabis retailer, medical cannabis dispensary and cannabis delivery operations based within the City of Hoboken.  At the time of [...]’ application (described below), the CRB was comprised of three members, including the Mayor of Hoboken (or his/her designee), a City Councilmember, and the Director of Health and Human Services.  See Hoboken City Ordinance §36-1(B).  “The purpose of the Cannabis Review Board is to assure the public health, safety, and general welfare of the City of Hoboken and its residents, business establishments and visitors. ”  See Hoboken City Ordinance §36-1(C).  In order to obtain site plan approval for a cannabis-related use, an applicant must obtain approval (i.e., an endorsement) from the CRB, and it must do so prior to proceeding to the Planning Board.  See Hoboken City Ordinance §§196-33.1(M)(1), 36-4(A).  In order to obtain approval from the CRB, an applicant must first submit a complete application to the CRB.  (Da469-477.)
[directive] 2C:29-2B  Eluding a Law Enforcement Officer 2C:29-3A(5), Hindering Apprehension or Prosecution 3B(2), 3B(3)  2C:29-9  Criminal Contempt (Violation of Restraining Orders, Domestic Violence Orders, Etc.) Appendix A | Page 2 2C:39-3, Manufacture, Transportation, or Possession of 2C:39-5, Weapons 2C:39-7, 2C:39-9 2C:40-3B
[brief] Count 2 of the Complaint alleges that Respondent posted pictures of herself with her family as she was being sworn in as a member of the Board on January 7, 2022 without wearing a mask.  Ca200.  Count 3 alleges that Respondent did not wear a mask at a January 20, 2022 meeting of the Board.  Ca200-Ca201.  In dismissing Count 2, the Commission correctly found that: there are absolutely no facts from which the Commission could possibly conclude that the taking of a family photograph, even without a mask, exceeded the scope of Respondent's duties and responsibilities as a Board member and/or had the potential to compromise the Board.  Ca172.  In dismissing Count 3, the Commission correctly found that Complainants provided no evidence that Respondent's personal decision at a meeting of the Board for which she, and she alone, could face consequences related to her duties as a Board member or could have impacted the Board.
[brief] 37  State v. Santamaria, 236 N.J. 390 (2019) ...............................................................................  22 State v. Sherman, 230 N.J. Super. 10 (App. Div. 1988) ......................................................... 32, 33, 34 State v. Sims, 250 N.J. 189 (2022)  ..........................................................................................  14, 15 State v. Timmendequas, 161 N.J. 515 (1999) ..........................................................................  31, 32, 33, 34 State v. Tung, 460 N.J. Super. 75 (App. Div. 2019) ............................................................... 22, 23, 24 State v. Williams, 168 N.J. 323 (2001)  .....................................................................................  22 State v. Vincenty, 237 N.J. 122 (2019) .....................................................................................13  COUNTERSTATEMENT OF PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[brief] (Pa000876-Pa000877).  The trial court instead relied on Cedar Point’s reference to Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan, 458 U.S. 419, 102 S. Ct. 3164 (1982) in concluding that Plaintiffs had no right to exclude the [...] and its contractors from engaging in [...]’s environmental remediation obligations, and therefore, no taking had occurred.  (Pa000877).  The trial court’s reliance on Cedar Point’s reference to Loretto is misplaced.  Loretto at that time discussed the heightened concerns about the permanence and absolute exclusivity of a physical occupation in contrast to temporary limitations on the right to exclude.  The Court, therein, stated that “[n]ot every physical invasion is a taking. ” (458 U.S. 419, 435, n. 12).  Loretto, however, was addressing the claim of a permanent taking.  In contrast, Cedar Point, subsequently decided, determined that unauthorized temporary physical takings can also constitute per se takings as well.  Cedar Point did recognize three categories of governmental entry onto private property that would not constitute a taking: 1) a trespass based upon isolated entry; 2) entry based on longstanding common law background restrictions on property rights (e.g., to abate a nuisance, or to avert an imminent public disaster, or to make a criminal arrest); and 3) a property owner’s having to grant access as a condition of receiving a permit, license, or registration under governmental health and safety regimes (e.g., pesticide, hydroelectric project, and pharmaceutical inspections).  None of these exceptions is applicable here.  Rather, [...] simply invaded and appropriated Plaintiffs’ Property in derogation of the Constitution and the applicable statute.
[brief] (1T 93-6 to 94-4; Da 109, 03:47:27 to 03:48:34)  The unidentified detective promised to “change [his] life”; told him to “grow up”; and threatened that he could be removed from his children’s lives and another man could raise them, stating, “Stop thinking about yourself.  You got five kids and you sitting here being selfish?” and, “You don’t want some other cat raising your kids .  . . .  Four months, they real impressionable.  Let some dude start giving that baby toys when they get six or seven months.  That’s gonna be daddy to them .  . . .  You’re a fool if you let that happen. ”  (1T 94-1 to 95-9)
[brief] ”  Rev. SAC, Pa273, ¶106.  Of particular interest here is “piling on” of the bogus knife charge, when Heck does permit, at least, an abuse of process (or similar) claim based on the CRA or LAD.  Due to the false charge, PTI Factors 1, 2, 14 & 17 (Pa131-132 – Conf.), relied on by the prosecution, cut against [...].  They even go out of their way to flip pro-treatment Factor 5 on its head (those in need of medical treatment, should get “supervisory treatment”).  Cf. Pa131(#5) to Pa132 (mid-page) (Conf.).
[brief] --- ²  [...] faults [...] for the 234 pages and 430 billing entries related to choice of law in [...]’s appendix.  (Prb 9.)  To be clear, [...] spent five years litigating choice of law and [...] has identified 430 billing entries related to the issue.  [...] has calculated the value of these billing entries at $288,480.50 – a significant amount of money – and those are just the choice of law billing entries submitted by the [...] firm that expressly use the phrase “choice of law. ” (Da0293-526.)  That figure does not include amounts charged by the [...] on the issue or billing entries related to choice of law that do not use the term “choice of law” in the billing narrative.  [...] bore the burden of identifying compensable legal fees (Ricci v. Corp. Express of The East, Inc., 344 N.J. Super. 39, 48 (App. Div. 2001); Shuttleworth v. City of Camden, 258 N.J. Super. 573, 598 at n. 17 (App. Div. 1992)) and cannot now complain after it failed to do so by refusing to take deductions for choice of law.