ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] In contrast, on the first day of the liability trial in this case, counsel for [...] concluded his opening remarks by stating: “There are no facts, there’s no scientific data, and there’s absolutely no support that they can rely on to help them meet that burden.  *There is no coverage for these claims*, judge.  That’s the case. ”  (Pra 3) (emphasis added).  Having finally retreated from this position [...] now wants to limit its financial exposure by challenging factual determinations made by the trial court – determinations that were properly made in the discretion of the trial court.
[brief] [State v. Frisby, 174 N.J. 583, 594 (2002) (citation omitted) (emphasis added). ]  Here, applying the above strictures, this Court reversed [...]’s prior convictions and remanded for a new trial, at which the video recording of his police interrogation was to be redacted to omit all of [...]’s improper opinions on [...]’s “credibility and guilt.
[brief] The COVID-19 pandemic began in or about March 2020, more than seven months after the collective negotiations agreement expired and the parties were free to negotiate a successor collective negotiations agreement.  During this same period of time, 2019 to 2023, the “City had settled other internal contracts within [...] for two percent raises. ” (Rb11).  These settlements all occurred within the same time period as the [...]’s oversight of the City’s finances.
[brief] **POINT V**  **THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING THE APPELLANT’S MOTION TO RECONSIDER THE FEE AWARD.**  Assuming *arguendo* that the Appellant has standing to challenge the Respondent’s Fee Application, as noted in Point III, the standard for review of a motion to reconsideration is whether the trial judge abused his discretion.  Here, the trial court denied the Appellant’s motion for reconsideration because the Appellant did nothing more than repeat his argument that no fees should be awarded.  But disagreement or dissatisfaction with the trial court’s determination is not a valid ground for reconsideration.  As such, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for reconsideration.  **CONCLUSION**
[brief] IV.  THE REQUESTED RELIEF WAS BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT  [...] does not deny that the appropriate remedy to secure compliance with an Order compelling the construction of affordable housing is an analysis focused on site suitability.  Instead, [...] claims the hearing on site suitability is improper purportedly because “relief they sought [wa]s noticeably absent and completely different from their original notice of Motion and proposed Order. ”  Pb3.  [...] claims [...] only sought “automatic approval” and nothing else.  Id.  Not so.  In [...]’s motion, it noted that the “Court [must] find that the site for affordable housing is ‘suitable,’” and that such decision should involve the “municipal planning board . . . [to] make as much use as they can of the planning board’s expertise and experience so that the proposed project is suitable for the municipality. ”  [...]’s Br. 5 (Trans. ID [...]); see also [...] Original Mot. Reply Br. 10 (“The Court Must Hold A Public Hearing On Site Suitability”) (Trans ID [...]).
[directive] Page 2  1.  Requests for Judicial Review to DismissNacate the Case  Requests for the Superior Court to dismiss a case or to first vacate and then dismiss a case should be filed in the county where the conviction or adjudication of delinquency occurred.  Attorneys should file the motion in eCourts.  Individuals who do not have an attorney should file in the Judiciary Electronic Document Submission (JEDS) system, which is located on the Judiciary's website at  Instructions on filing this motion can be www.njcourts.gov/selfhelp/jeds.html. downloaded from that same site.  For Municipal Court cases, these motions should be filed directly with the municipal court that had original jurisdiction over the case.  This can be done by sending it to the municipal court or by accessing the JEDS system at the above link.  Consistent with the Supreme Court Order, where the court grants the requested relief ( e.g., dismisses the case), where appropriate, the court shall also order the matter to be expunged (excluding N.J.S.A. 39:4-49.1, which is not eligible for expungement) pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:52-6(a).
[brief] At the time of the June 10, 2022 Order, the Defendants were still residing in the Boonton Property without payment while the Trust continued to incur expenses for taxes and insurance; the trial court observed in its Statement of Reasons supporting its decision that it was for that very reason that the Trustee had filed suit:  …[T]he Court will emphasize that defendants are presently living in the Boonton property, without paying rent…It is precisely because defendants ceased rent payments and continued to reside at the Boonton Property after decedent passed away that the present litigation ensued. (Da29).  The Defendants’ utter lack of a legal right to occupy the Boonton Property had been made perfectly clear to them months before, during the January 10, 2022 hearing before [...]:  …[Y]ou don’t have a right to be living there.  There is no right to live there right now.  You are not on the deed.  You don’t have a lease.  Legally there is no right to anyone being there.  The property has to get sold…If I hear that you are interfering with the sale of the property, I am going to have to eject you, because you don’t have a legal right to be there.  You are not on the deed, you don’t have a lease.  (1T9:11-21).  [...] had herself suggested either listing the Boonton Property and giving [...] and [...] a right of first refusal, or doing a sealed bid process.
[brief] The State had ample opportunity to gather evidence whether [...] poses a serious threat to people or companion animals.  The dog was impounded under the auspices of the [...] for six months, but no agent of the Township visited [...] at the kennel or observed him.  The State did not retain a behaviorist, trainer or other expert witness to examine or perform tests on [...], despite ample opportunity to do so.  There were no reported incidents of any troubling behavior at the kennel.  Ironically, the only time [...] was evaluated was after the verdict, by order of [...] (see Subsection 2, supra), and [...] passed it with stellar performance.  B.  The State did not prove that [...]’s injury was unprovoked.  (Da7; 5T8:15-5T10:15)  The Potentially Dangerous Dog Act was first amended in 1994.
[brief] With respect to the instant appeal, Appellants seek a determination that the circumstances of this incredibly unique case satisfy the standards in *Rule* 4:69-6(c) and that the interest of justice warrant enlargement of the forty-five-day period.  In this way the matter can return to the capable hands of the motion judge who can then make determinations as to how to best proceed.  While Appellants believe that the failure of the [...] to create a verbatim record is fatal, any other conclusion would require additional evidence to confirm that the transcript of August 22, 2022 in no ways represents what occurred on May 23, 2022.  The so called “re-do” served only to provide Applicants with the unfair advantage of restriking all testimony and responses to cross-examination having had sight of Appellants’ questioning and proofs three months prior.  Fairness dictates that the motion judge’s denial of Appellants’ motion below be reversed.  Respectfully submitted, [...]
[brief] “In returning the Office of the County Counsel to part-time attorneys, the Freeholders\(^1\) have created the opportunity for us to utilize the special skills and services of multiple local counsels on an as needed basis. ” (Da120-Da121).  During Plaintiff’s tenure as part-time County Counsel, he was compensated by payments made from [...] to [...].  To this end, Plaintiff signed purchase orders that were made payable to [...], --- \(^1\)  On January 1, 2021, the [...] Board of Chosen Freeholders became the [...] Board of County Commissioners pursuant to P.L. 2020, c. 67. not him personally.  (Da220-Da376).  In turn, [...]’s payments for Plaintiff’s services as part-time County Counsel were made in checks payable to [...], LLC.  (Da167-Da220).  Prior to the June 30, 2021 expiration of Plaintiff’s three-year term, on June 23, 2021, the Board considered the appointment of a part-time County Counsel for a term that would commence on July 1, 2021 and end on June 30, 2024.  (Da124).  As indicated in the transcript of the June 23, 2021 meeting (Da145), the Board decided to follow past practice and seek bids for part-time County Counsel.  (Da152).  This time, [...] expressed a desire to procure a law firm with a wider breadth of experience, in order to avoid hiring special County Counsels for specific matters, which it had been doing during Plaintiff’s term as County Counsel.  Specifically, the Director of the Board stated that:  [w]e were specifically looking for a large firm with a very, very wide and deep bench in order for us to access professionals to be able to service the County.  We wanted to make sure that we always had counsel available to us in any case of crisis.  COVID really opened our eyes for need for solid counsel.  So, again, we were specifically seeking a large – larger firm with a deep bench.  [(Da145-Da146)].  This contrasted with the approach set forth in Plaintiff’s initial proposal by [...], in which he himself had referenced the possibility of using multiple local counsels on an as needed basis.  (Da121).  At the meeting, the Board voted to appoint another law firm and individual employed by that law firm to serve as part-time County Counsel, (Da132 and Da143), and thanked Plaintiff for his service:  I want to specifically thank [...] because although the structure that we had in place and the size of [...]’s firm was not what we were looking for, we do appreciate his hard work on behalf of the County.  We hope to maintain a strong relationship with him.  [(Da145)].  The Board took no action with respect to Plaintiff at the June 23, 2021 meeting.  (Da132).  As a result, pursuant to statute, Plaintiff’s term as part-time County Counsel expired on June 30, 2021.
[brief] The Commission typically finds a violation of section (e) where a board member takes some form of official action for no reason other than a personal benefit or to carry out a private promise or assurance to another person, and which therefore compromises the board’s integrity.  See In re Roman and Thomas, SEC Dkt. No. C28-20 (Comm. Ed. Jan. 25, 2022) (discussing section (e)) (Ra29-41.)  Petitioner has pled no such facts that would constitute a cognizable cause of action under section (e).
[brief] (6T, Pg. 236, line 21 – pg. 237, line 7).  *[...] repeatedly Admonished [...] in front of the Jury*  During his testimony, [...] wanted to explain to the Jury that the opening statement of [...]’s attorney was “false” and “incorrect”.  A lengthy colloquy between [...] and [...], in front of the jury and over three pages of transcript shows [...] repeatedly asking [...] seemingly rhetorical questions such as “who decides the law in this case?” and when [...] answered “Okay.  Okay”, [...] repeats the question to [...] again in front of the jury: “No, why don't you answer my question?  Who decides the law that applies to this case?”.  A short while later, [...] stated, still in front of the jury, “I decide the law.  And what I'm telling you is as a matter of law, your statements with reference to the attorney who represents the adversary are inappropriate”  See colloquy between [...] and [...], (2T, Pg. 155, line 16 – Pg. 158, line 18).  It is notable that the above happened as indicated as a result of [...] wanting to say that [...]’s attorney’s opening statement was “false” and “incorrect. ”  Another related event happened also slightly earlier than that where [...] specifically instructed [...] to use those words rather than say [...]’s attorney was a liar.  (2T, Pg. 142, line 18 – pg. 143, line 5).  Specifics of that admonishment, in front of the jury, included [...] being rhetorical again with [...] by saying: that anyone who has little children knows the difference between saying someone's a liar versus the information is incorrect.  Id.  Which suggested to the jury that [...] was no better than a child.  However, despite [...]’s apparent concern for character attacks from witnesses, [...] apparently had a different view when [...] was the subject of snide and insulting remarks.  [...] permitted [...]’s witness to say of [...] from the stand, “he’s not a good guy.  He’s a bad guy” (5T, Pg. 102, lines 22-23).  Also “[...] is a con artist. ” (5T, Pg. 101, line 18).  All with no admonishment of [...]’s witness by [...] at all.
[brief] ”  State v. Smith, 269 N.J. Super. 86, 92 (App. Div. 1993), certif. denied, 137 N.J. 164 (1994).  “In seeking an indictment, the prosecutor’s sole evidential obligation is to present a prima facie case that the accused has committed a crime. ”  Hogan, 144 N.J. at 236.
[brief] LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I:  AS EARLEY ESTABLISHED A PRIMA FACIE CASE OF TRIAL COUNSEL’S INEFFECTIVENESS, THE COURT ERRED WHEN IT DENIED HIS PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF WITHOUT CONDUCTING AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING.  (Da335-77)  [...] destroyed hundreds of hours of potentially exculpatory video footage, but trial counsel never demanded his own examination of the hard drive, even once he learned it had not been totally overwritten as previously claimed.  That drive is now lost.  Counsel did not obtain [...]’s relevant policies, causing his motion to dismiss to be denied.  Among counsel’s other devastating errors were: his failure to retain an expert to testify about how familiar identifications are as susceptible to misidentification as stranger ones; his reckless vow to prove [...]’s innocence, opening the door to prosecutorial comment on his unkept promise; and his failure to marshal compelling evidence that right before and after the shooting in Atlantic City, [...] was actively posting on Facebook from his phone in Mays Landing.  It has also come to light that he represented the victim of this crime and his brother in numerous prior criminal matters.  [...] demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits of his PCR.  However, the PCR court disposed out of hand his many cognizable claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, denying them without an evidentiary hearing.  As discussed below, the court repeatedly applied an incorrectly onerous legal standard, ignored its obligation to view facts in the light most favorable to [...], and speculated that counsel acted strategically.  The Court must reverse and remand for an evidentiary hearing on [...]’s PCR petition.
[brief] A.  Plaintiff’s Claims Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and/or the New Jersey Civil Rights Act are Time Barred by the Statute of Limitations.  “Federal law determines when a § 1983 cause of action accrues.  A cause of action under that statute accrues when the plaintiff knows or should know that his or her constitutional rights have been violated. ”  3805 Kennedy Realty Co. v. Tax Assessor of the City of Jersey City, 287 N.J. Super. 318, 323 (App. Div. 1996) (citations omitted) (internal quotations removed) (emphasis added).  Therefore, our Appellate Division, citing to the Supreme Court of the United States, held that “[e]very § 1983 claim is subject to the statute of limitations applicable to personal injury claims in the state where the cause of action arose.
[brief] Therefore, [...] is unable to certify or testify to the accuracy of PCMD records.  It is important to understand that the tool used to provide PCMD records was created as a tool for [...] to oversee the network.  It was not created as a tool to identify customer location, pursuant to exigent circumstances or legal demand...  Additionally, [...], a licensed professional engineer and electronics analyst offered by the defense as an expert witness in this matter, offered his written opinion prior to trial that the use of PCMD data is not reliable as a means of determining the location of a cell phone at any given point in time.
[directive] a recently developed on is h diversionary program entitled the Veterans Diversion Program, enacted 2017, by 42, and c. codified at N.J.S.A. 2C:43-23 to -31.  The Veterans Diversion Program, effective December 1, 2017, a prosecutorial program developed divert eligible military service members into to is appropriate case management and mental health treatment services early as possible, thus as avoiding criminal records, sanctions stigma, while expediting the person's recovery and and wellness.  The law provides prosecutors with the sole discretion to determine if eligible service an member qualifies for and admitted to the Veterans Diversion Program (hereinafter program), is rather than just providing the court with a recommendation for admission like other diversionary programs, such as the Pretrial Intervention Program or the Conditional Dismissal Program.  Therefore, interested defendants should contact the prosecutor's office where they are charged for information applying to this program.  on  Because this a prosecutorial program to conform with the statutory requirements, and is the [...] ([...]) has developed a webpage with information this on program.  The [...] webpage also includes a directory of the County Prosecutors' Offices, as well other resources for service members, located at https://www.nj.gov/oag/vdp.  The and as is Judiciary's website has also been updated include the internet addresses for the [...] to webpage and the [...] for additional resources for service members.  This information located the Criminal Practice Division on is webpage at https://www.njcourts.gov/courts/criminal/criminal.html, the Municipal Courts and webpage at https://www.njcourts.gov/courts/mcs.html.
[directive] The issuance of a complaint-warrant is the triggering event for many of the provisions of the new law defining the universe of so-called “eligible defendants” under the statute.  See N.J.S.A. 2A:162-15 (defining the term “eligible defendant” as used throughout the Bail Reform Law as a person “for whom a complaint-warrant is issued”).  One of the significant practical consequences of the initial charging decision is that when a complaint- warrant is issued by a judge or other authorized judicial officer, the defendant must be taken to a hours.7 county jail, where he or she will be held for up to 48  See N.J.S.A. 2A:162-16(a).  During that period of statutorily-mandated confinement, the new pretrial services program will have an opportunity to prepare a recommendation to the court as to appropriate conditions of pretrial release and the level of monitoring the court should impose at the time of defendant’s first appearance.  The decision whether to charge by complaint-warrant rather than complaint-summons has other legally-significant consequences besides the initial incarceration of the defendant pending completion of the recommendation process conducted by the pretrial services program.  A prosecutor cannot file a motion to have the defendant preventively detained pending trial unless the defendant has been charged by complaint-warrant.  So too, if the defendant is charged by complaint-summons rather than complaint-warrant and thereafter commits a new crime while on pretrial release, the prosecutor cannot move pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:162-24 to revoke release and hold defendant preventively on that initial charge.  Cf. note 30.  The Bail Reform Law provides that a defendant should be released on the least restrictive conditions necessary to assure his or her appearance at court proceedings and to prevent defendant from committing new crimes.
[brief] Here, the municipality determined to invoke the conformity standard with some degree of strictness, and not to award the contract to the non-conforming bidder.  In the circumstances, especially in the light of the nature of the alterations made and the sections of the bid proposal involved, we do not regard that decision to have been attended by arbitrariness, unreason or caprice; nor has plaintiff met its burden of proving that the decision made was motivated by the types of considerations the Local Public Contract Law was enacted to prevent, i. e., frustrating the policies of “securing [the] most economical result by inviting competition in which all bidders are placed on equal basis ... [and] promoting competition on an equal footing and guarding against ‘favoritism, improvidence, extravagance and corruption.
[directive] Nicole’s Law Model Order and Notification Procedures  March 2, 2010  Page 3  Judge or designee modifies an order, copies of the modified order shall be distributed in accordance with paragraph 1 above and forwarded to Criminal and Family Divisions and to the municipal court (if the Nicole’s Law order was issued by a Municipal Court judge).  Any questions or comments regarding this Directive, or the appended form, may be directed to Assistant Director [...] at [...] (Criminal), Assistant Director [...] at [...] (Family), or Assistant Director [...] at [...] (Municipal).
[brief] The jury was unable to reach a verdict as to [...].  (8T:4-24 to 8-17); (Da 8-9)  He identified two of the three men involved in the incident in the courtroom, pointing to [...] and to [...].  (6T:30-20 to 33-12)  [...] testified that the man standing closest to him on the video, wearing a black jacket and red headphones, was [...].  (6T:37-11 to 38-4)  (Da 16 at 17:24:46)  He stated that he was familiar with [...], who had texted him the day before the incident asking for money that he believed [...] owed him.  (6T:81-2 to 24)  [...] testified that [...] was the man wearing the red jacket on the video, explaining that he knew him as “[...],” and that he was a friend of a friend.  (6T:31-5 to 25, 43-4, 43-24 to 44-8, 89-10 to 25)  [...] confirmed that the man wearing the green jacket on the video was involved in the incident, but was unable to identify the man in the courtroom.  (6T:32-11 to 33-8, 33-13 to 34-6, 52-19 to 20)  [...] testified that after the men walked into the store, they began asking him where the money was, while he denied having it.  (6T:54-22 to 55-20)  (Da 16 at 17:24:26 to 17:26:52)  [...] agreed that there was a “lot of talking” at the beginning of the incident, and that [...] subsequently took his phone.  (6T:36-2 to 25)  (Da 16 at 17:26:52 to 17:29:28)  [...] initially testified that he did not have his wallet with him that day and that [...] did not take it.  (6T:37-1 to --- 4  At the time of the trial, [...] had six third-degree pending charges in Essex County.
[brief] \(^6\)  And commencing an action over a specific dispute entitles the plaintiff only to discovery of information about that dispute, nothing else.  Even a clawback procedure — were one in place that applies to irrelevant materials — would not cure or mitigate this error.  Clawback procedures, presuming they work perfectly, still do not protect against the risk of hacks or malicious use by third parties that are not under a protective order or subject to the clawback procedure.  **B.
[directive] 1.  기재하십시오.  귀하의 형량에 관한 판사의  모든 약속과 진술을  List any promises or representations that have been made by the judge as to what your sentence will be.  2.  [예/Yes]  [아니요/No]  선고 시 판사가 약속한 형량보다  낮은 형을 부과하는 것이 정의구현에 경우, 기여하지 못한다고 판사가 판단하는 판사는 귀하의 인정을 허용하고, 무효하도록  명령하거나  귀하의  인정을 철회할 수 있도록 이해하십니까?  귀하의  사건은  재판으로  진행된다는 것을  Do you understand that if the judge determines at the time of sentencing that imposing a sentence no greater than that which he or she promised would not serve the interests of justice, then the judge may order your plea be vacated or you will be allowed to withdraw your plea, and your case will proceed to trial.