ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] PROCEDURAL HISTORY  The Department filed its merits brief on November 6, 2023.  On November 20, 2023, [...] filed a motion to appear as amicus curiae, along with its proposed brief.  The court granted [...]’s motion on December 4, 2023.  The Department now moves to reply to [...]’s brief.  COUNTERSTATEMENT OF FACTS  [...] states it “adopts the relevant facts from Appellant’s Brief as if fully set forth herein and, for the sake of brevity, will not repeat them. ”  Further, [...] states it “submits this brief in full support for Appellant [...]  (“[...]”), as attorney-in-fact for [...] (“[...]”)’s appeal, which seeks to invalidate Bulletin No. 22-11 (the “Bulletin”), issued by the Department. ”  The [...] simply repeats the Appellant’s arguments.
[directive] Pursuant to 2C: 4-4(b), the qualified psychiatrist or licensed psychologist shall render an opinion as to whether the defendant has the mental capacity to appreciate his/her presence in relation to time, place and things and whether the defendant's elementary mental processes are such that he/she comprehends: of (a)  He/she a court justice charged with a criminal offense; is in (b) There a judge on the bench; is ( c) There is a prosecutor present who will try to convict him/her; ( That he/she has a lawyer who will undertake to defend him/her; d) of (e)  He/she will be expected to tell to the best his/her mental ability the facts surrounding if him/her at the time and place where the alleged violation was committed he/she chooses to testify and understand his/her legal right not to testify; of jury  There a present to pass upon evidence that adduced as to guilt or innocence (f) is if such charge or, that he/she should choose to enter into plea negotiations or to plead of guilty, that he/she comprehends the consequences a guilty plea and that he/she be able to knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waive those rights which are waived upon of such entry a guilty plea; and of (g)  They he/she has the ability to participate in an adequate presentation his/her defense.
[directive] (11/01/2018), IA)  Directive (Competency #17~18 12324  Published of3 by CN: Order page 2 of  Upon entry this order a case conference scheduled with counsel this matter within 7. in is of of of forty-five (45) days the entry this order review the status the case.  The next court to ____ of date shall be (no longer than days from date this order)
[brief] See [...]’s Br. 10.  Perhaps more importantly, the trial court’s December 12, 2023 Order did not find that [...] had shown detrimental reliance.  The entire portion of the Order addressing estoppel reads:  Lastly, this Court finds that Plaintiff is estopped from avoiding arbitration for her claims against Defendant [...].  A non-signatory to an arbitration agreement may compel a signatory to arbitrate when issues to be litigated are intertwined with the agreement containing the arbitration.  Bruno 388 N.J. Super. at 548 (citing Cf. JLM Indus. V. Stolt-Nielsen SA, 387 F.3d 163, 177-78 (2d Cir. 2004)).
[brief] **  \(^1\)  Incidentally, the plaintiffs in *Froom* also believed that they did not need to sign the engagement letter where the co-client had agreed to pay their legal fees.  377 N.J. Super. at 304.  An attorney has a duty of care to clients and non-client alike where the attorney induces reasonable reliance upon his representation.  Generally, this reliance is demonstrated by the existence of a signed engagement; however, our court do not exalt form over substance.  Reliance may be inferred from the conduct of the parties.  *Palmieri*, 76 N.J. 51, 58-59 (1978).  “[E]ven absent an attorney-client relationship, an attorney owes a fiduciary duty to persons, though not strictly clients, who he knows or should know rely on him in his professional capacity. ”  *R. J. Longo Constr. Co. v. Schragger*, 218 N.J. Super. 206, 209 (App. Div. 1987); see also *Innes v. Marzano-Lesnevich*, 435 N.J. Super. 198, 213 (App. Div. 2014) (“Privity between an attorney and a non-client is not necessary for a duty to attach where the attorney had reason to foresee the specific harm which occurred. ”).  Regardless of whether an attorney-client relationship was formed, the evidence demonstrates that Defendants knew or should have known that [...] was relying upon them.  Defendants were aware that [...] was ordinarily represented by [...] in legal matters.  [...] took the affirmative action of reaching out to [...] to notify him that Defendants are representing [...].  To put it another way, [...] told [...] that he should not take any further action on behalf of [...] to challenge the Will.  Defendants represented to the [...] that they were representing [...].  Defendants have not presented evidence that [...] had rejected their representation.  Call it an attorney-client relationship.  Call it something else.  Either way Defendants should have expected that [...] would rely on them in their professional capacity.  Therefore, they had a duty of care to [...], which they breached by failing to timely contest the Will.  II.
[directive] Período de Supervisão de Liberdade Condicional por Crime de Primeiro Grau - 5 anos  Período de Supervisão de Liberdade Condicional por Crime de Segundo Grau - 3 anos  Formulário promulgado pela diretiva no 01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 11170-  Portuguese página 1 de 2 Form  Promulgated by Directive # 01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 11170-Portuguese page 1 of 2  Do you understand that because you have pled guilty to these charges the court must impose a year term of parole supervision and that term will begin as soon as you complete the sentence of incarceration?
[brief] Whether the property owner consented to or allowed that use at its inception is not actually relevant as to the issue of whether the use was legal under Zoning, at its inception.  During the Board hearing, the Board Attorney at several points made several legally erroneous comments to the effect that in his opinion the Zoning Board does not have (or should not take) jurisdiction to decide whether this off-site parking use/facility on Lot 5 is a legal nonconforming use (see 1T17-12 to 25-10).  The Board Attorney repeatedly opined that the Zoning Board should defer and the School’s remedy is to pursue zoning enforcement to the Township Police or file a new lawsuit seeking the Court to Order the Township to enforce Zoning Codes (1T40-9 to 50-25; 1T51-11 to 53-4).  The Trial Court Opinion cited the Zoning Board Attorney’s comments in ruling that the Board did not have jurisdiction for its ruling (Da275).  As detailed, the Zoning Board has been charged with the authority and responsibility to make a determination as to whether a use --- the off-site parking use by Lot 8 of the School Lot 5 --- is now a nonconforming use under current Zoning and, if it is, whether it is a legally grandfathered nonconforming use.
[brief] The trial court, following a lengthy review, dismissed [...]’s Complaint as untimely.  The court found [...] filed one-hundred and ninety-one (191) days after the forty-five day appeal period established by Rule 4:69-6(b)(3)\(^2\) to \(^2\)Rule 4:69-6(b)(3) states that no prerogative writs action shall be brought “to review . . . a resolution by the governing body . . . after 45 days from the publication of a challenge the adoption of Ordinance No. 13-2022 expired on May 23, 2023.  In doing so, the trial court considered and rejected all of [...]’s arguments for enlargement, including: (1) the interests of justice required enlargement of the forty-five-day appeal period under R. 4:69-6(c); and (2) the April 8 Notice was defective.  [...]’s appeal of that Order is factually and legally unsupported.  Accordingly, the trial court Order should be affirmed.
[directive] c.  Tendrá que pagar una multa mínima de la Oficina de Compensación a Víctimas de Delitos de [Sí/Yes] [No/No] $50 dólares (un mínimo de $100 dólares si se le condena por un delito violento) por cada cargo de que usted se declara culpable?  (La multa es $30 dólares si la infracción ocurrió entre el 9 de enero de 1986 y el 22 de diciembre de 1991; $25 dólares si la infracción ocurrió antes del primero de enero de 1986.)  You must pay a minimum Victims of Crime Compensation Office Assessment of $50 ($100 minimum if you are convicted of a crime of violence) for each count to which you plead guilty?  (Penalty is $30 if offense occurred between January 9, 1986 and December 22, 1991 inclusive.  $25 if offense occurred before January 1, 1986.)
[brief] Thus, [...] and [...] conducted a valid traffic stop based on reasonable and articulable suspicion that [...] violated N.J.S.A. 39:4-126 when she failed to activate her signal before changing lanes.  1.  Defendant’s construal of the signaling statute does not substantially implicate public interest to be considered for the first time on appeal because the Supreme Court has already found that it applies to lane changes.  Defendant’s challenge to N.J.S.A. 39:4-126 on statutory interpretation and vagueness grounds was not raised in the trial court.  “Generally, an appellate court will not consider issues, even constitutional ones, which were not raised below.
[brief] A person obtains a license to “sell, solicit or negotiate insurance” by passing a written examination, N.J.S.A. 17:22A-31, and meeting the application requirements set forth in N.J.S.A. 17:22A-32.  In addition, insurance brokers must comply with the Insurance Producer Standards of Conduct promulgated by the Department of Banking and Insurance.  N.J.A.C. 11:17A-1.1 to 17D-2.8.  These standards proscribe various “unfair trade practices,” N.J.A.C. 11:17A-2.1 to -2.11, delineate an insurance producer’s fiduciary duties to insured, see N.J.A.C. 11:17A-4.1, -4.3, -4.5, -4.10, set forth requirements regarding commissions, N.J.A.C. 11:17B-2.1, fees, N.J.A.C. 11:17B-3.1 to -3.3, and management of funds, N.J.A.C. 11:17C-1.1 to -2.6, and provide penalties for violations, N.J.A.C. 11:17D-1.1 to -2.8.
[directive] Crime Trend Analysis  a.  A law enforcement agency may access and use stored non-alert data for purposes of conducting crime trend analysis, as that term is defined in these Guidelines, when such access and analysis is approved by a designated supervisor and where such analysis is undertaken to produce analytical products that are intended to assist the agency in the performance of its duties.  A designated supervisor may authorize one or more authorized users to conduct a method or methods of crime trend analysis on a repeated or continuous basis, in which event such authorization shall remain in force and effect unless and until modified or rescinded by the supervisor.  A designated supervisor may also approve the use of an automated software program to analyze stored data to look for potentially suspicious activity or other anomalies that might be consistent with criminal or terrorist activity.  -11- b.
[brief] There’s nothing for this Court to believe that at the time it was expressly waived that that was not the intention.  So with regards to that issue, reconsideration is denied.  [4T46:10-49:21, emphasis added].  Defendants argue that the Trial Court’s earlier statement about prejudice, including the “[t]he only factor in Cole that would be relevant to your [Defendants’] argument is the prejudice,” [Db17, citing 4T40:7-12] somehow is contradicted by the Trial Judge applying Cole and still finding waiver.  Contrary to Defendants’ argument, the Trial Judge did not contradict herself.  [...] went on applying each of the Cole factors, as urged by Defendants, and nonetheless, found that Defendants had expressly waived their right to arbitrate.
[brief] M730-735.  As the trial court correctly pointed, the New Jersey Supreme Court in Rivkin v. Dover Tp. Rent Leveling Bd., 143 N.J. 352, 366 (1996) found that “[i]n light of the clearly evident trend of the Supreme Court to limit substantive due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment, we believe that the denial of a property right in the context of municipal governance rarely will rise to the level of a substantive due process violation.
[brief] The considerations of imposing liability upon a resident do not apply – because the property owner was engaged in improving the property, not living there.  As a matter of simply fairness and equity the appellant should have an opportunity to seek redress for her injuries where a property owner makes a decision to be absent from and engage in construction on what is essentially vacant property for such an extended period of time.  To this end, one of the most important considerations by our Supreme Court in *Luchejko* was the fact that commercial properties make a profit in their operations.  Here, we submit that is precisely what the respondents were doing – renovating the property which, necessarily increasing the value of the property.  The issue begs the question – if the respondents were contractors who had been rehabilitating and renovating the property for resale, then would the Court accept that the activities on the property were commercial in nature?  We submit that in that circumstance, the issue would not be debatable.  In the matter before the Court the question should be, respectfully, whether or not it is fair to deny an appellant/pedestrian, who is injured while trying to walk in front of a woefully maintained construction, from seeking redress of her injuries.  We submit that it is unfair, and a commercial standard should be applied, or a hybrid of the two should be created, which would have required the respondents to make the premises safe for pedestrians.
[brief] What is more, the Parental Secrecy Policy harms children.  It keeps children who may be experiencing psychological distress from seeing a competent mental health practitioner.  It results in children receiving a “one size fits all” form of psychological treatment in a situation that demands individualized evaluation.  It results in children persisting in a transgender identity when they might otherwise desist.  And it cuts parents out of their children’s lives, isolating children from their main source of support and driving a wedge into the heart of the parent-child relationship just when children need it most.
[brief] Furthermore, Plaintiff conceded that even if such language was missing from his agreements, under each contract Plaintiff was required to abide by the Hospital’s policies and procedures, which included the timely submission of patient charts. \(^{23}\)  It was [...]’s policy to not release checks if physicians are delinquent with patient reports.  See Da74-86 at 64:1-69:25.  \(^{23}\)  “Q  It says that one of your responsibilities is to, quote, "counsel, advise and admonish individual department members in instances of disregard for department rules and bylaws, lack of respect for co-workers and others, inefficient practice, suspected impairment for practicing outside the limits of hospital privileges that have been awarded"; did I read that correctly?  A  Correct.
[brief] The primacy of statutory language cannot be overstated.  [T]he authoritative statement is the statutory text, not the legislative history or any other extrinsic material.  Extrinsic materials have a role in statutory interpretation only to the extent they shed a reliable light on the enacting Legislature’s understanding of otherwise ambiguous terms.  Not all extrinsic materials are reliable sources of insight into legislative understandings, however, and legislative history in particular is vulnerable to two serious criticisms.
[brief] In *New Century Fin. v. Trewin*, the Chancery Division analyzed a motion to vacate a default judgment obtained by the plaintiff debt collector.  2018 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1688 (Ch. Div. May 24, 2018).  The *Trewin* court acknowledged its obligation to “consider the entirety of the circumstances under which the judgment was obtained” and vacated a years old default judgment due to violations of the NJCFLA, like the violations [...] committed here.  See Trewin, 2018 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1688 at *7.  The Trewin court further reasoned that “defendant is not seeking to utilize the CFLA as a sword, by asserting a private right of action under the statute.  Instead, defendant is asserting the right to utilize the CFLA as a shield against enforcement of a judgment which defendant contends was void ab initio. ”  Id. at *6-7.  By that rationale, the court determined that a private right of action under the NJCFLA was of no consequence in a motion to vacate and held that it was “satisfied that the judgment obtained by plaintiff’s predecessor is void, by virtue of [the loan assignor’s] unlicensed status.  N.J.S.A. 17:11C-33(b).”  Id. at *8, 9-10.  Thus, the trial court’s determination regarding the viability of [...]’s ability to bring offensive claims, if allowed to answer, has no effect on whether [...] met the standards for vacatur under R. 4:50-1(d) or R. 4:50-1(f).
[brief] TABLE OF CONTENTS .................................................................................................................. ii  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS, AND RULINGS .................................................................  iv  TABLE OF TRANSCRIPTS ..............................................................................................................  iv  TABLE OF PARTIES .....................................................................................................................  v TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ..........................................................................................................  vi  COMPLETE INDEX TO APPENDICES BY VOLUME .................................................................  viii  I.  TRIAL, POST-TRIAL, MOTION TO ENFORCE LITIGANTS’ RIGHTS ........................................ viii II.  SUMMARY JUDGMENT (COUNT VI) AND DISMISSAL OF [...] ........................................ x III.  INITIAL & AMENDED PLEADINGS .................................................................................... xiii  IV.  SUMMARY JUDGMENT (COUNTS II & III) AND RELATED CASES ........................................ xiv  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT .......................................................................................................
[brief] (Aa477). with the State officials who will make the ultimate permitting decision. ”  In re Riverview Dev., 411 N.J. Super. at 425.  Neither the WFD Act nor the CZM rules include any further provisions regarding procedures [...] must follow in considering public comments.  In re Issuance of Access Conforming Lot Permit No. A-17-N-N040-2007, 417 N.J. Super. 115, 127 (App. Div. 2010).  [...] “voice[d its] concerns with the State officials ultimately making the permitting decision. ”  N.J.S.A. 52:14B-3.1(a); In re Riverview Dev., 411 N.J. Super. at 425.  [...] considered, but ultimately rejected the Trust’s objections when it approved the Technical Modification Permit.
[brief] Instead, it provides an “option” that “carries no requirement or recommendation. ”  Section 2C.33 also provides “support,” which “does not convey any degree of mandate [or] recommendation. ”  Indeed, the MUTCD “option” and “support” address situations where there exists some known and identifiable road condition such as grooved or textured street or highway, which do not exist here.  Consequently, Plaintiffs’ expert provides no support for the argument that Section 2C.33 -- or even the MUTCD -- sets forth a generally accepted standard of care for construction inspectors or engineers under similar circumstances.
[brief] [...] only received authorized workers’ compensation treatment because of the October 17, 2015, accident.  (1T44).  [...] was told he sustained a serious neck injury in the October 17, 2015, accident.  (1T45).  [...] had neck surgery.  (1T45).  [...] had two discs removed and replaced with two artificial discs.  (1T45).  [...] had a 4–5-inch scar on his neck from the surgery.  (1T45).  Following surgery, [...] was told by his doctors he would never be a police officer again.
[brief] However, that cannot be the end of the inquiry inasmuch as the true value of an owner’s equity is necessarily influenced by improvements to the property, market conditions, re-assessments and inflation.  The ordinance allows for a rate of return of 6.25% after operating costs.  These are the parameters within which the Board must determine the equity.  In this instance the Board compared the [...] property to the one that the Board considered years ago.  In the prior case, a protected tenant’s unit was bought and sold, and the Board deduced that a property with a rent-protected tenant gains about 30% as much equity as one without.  Board Member [...] suggested that 30% would be a benchmark to use in determining the equity of any building with a protected tenancy as compared to one without.  Unfortunately, this is the epitome of arbitrary.  This reasoning ignores the uniqueness of the [...] property, the market and inflation fluctuations.  Such a flat deduction is done in a vacuum without any nexus to the property itself, and without any comparison between the two properties in terms of modernization, etc.  For this reason, this portion of the case is also remanded for further determination on the equity interest of [...] in the subject property.
[brief] Super. 209 (App. Div. 2007)  21 State v. Hupka, 203 N.J. 222 (2010)  31 State v. Seven Thousand Dollars, 136 N.J. 223 (1994)  16  Stiefel v. Bayly, Martin & Fay, Inc., 242 N.J. Super. 643 (App. Div. 1990)  19 Swede v. City of Clifton, 22 N.J. 303 (1956)  39  Texter v. Dep’t of Human Servs., 88 N.J. 376 (1982)  30  Thorpe v. Bd. of Trustees, Pub. Employees’ Ret. Sys., A-0689-20, 2023 WL 2395067, at *1 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Mar. 8, 2023)  22  Tomaiuoli v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 75 N.J. Super. 192 (App. Div. 1962)  19 Totaro, Duffy, Cannova & Co. v. Lane. Middleton & Co., 191 N.J. 1 (2007)  24 STATE STATUTES N.J.S.
[brief] ”  T.I.C.-C., 470 N.J. Super. at 609 (quoting Boyertown, 897 F.3d at 522)).  Without this injunction, Appellants’ transgender, gender non-conforming, and non-binary students would suffer under an Amended Policy that specifically targets them for mandatory disclosure, and that uniquely infringes their privacy interests.  See id. at 611 (emphasizing their interest in privacy to protect against “violence, harassment, and discrimination because of their gender identity”).  If a student is involuntarily outed, or if a student now declines to candidly express their gender identity at school for fear of mandatory reporting, the harm will be tremendous—and that bell can never be un-rung.  See (Da135) (concluding that the Amended Policy will threaten serious injuries on transgender, gender non-conforming, and non-binary students, including “mental health issues, suicide, illicit drug dependency, and infliction of emotional harm by immediate family members,” which “constitute[] irreparable injury which may result if restraints are not imposed preliminarily”); John & Jane Parents 1, 622 F.Supp.3d at 139 (explaining that a transgender student “could hardly feel safe in an environment where expressing their gender identity resulted in the automatic disclosure to their parents, regardless of their own wishes”).
[brief] [Pa322a-325a]  Question 10(a) of the 2018 Application asked: “Have there been any new bar complaints, investigations or disciplinary proceedings against any attorney?”  The Firm answered “No” to Question 10(a).  [Pa324a]  Relying on the 2016 Application, 2017 Application, and 2018 Application, [...] issued *[...]* Lawyers Professional Liability Insurance Policy No. [...] to the Firm for the Policy Period July 3, 2018 to July 3, 2019 (the “2018 Policy”).