ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Next, the Board argues that it properly determined [...]’s equity in the Unit.  It inexplicably and inaccurately asserts that [...]’s equity calculation was based on the entire building and not the specific Unit.  See the Board’s brief, page 43 (“Accordingly, arriving at a correct equity figure required the Board to determine equity in this particular unit, not the building as a whole which [...]’s calculations improperly attempt to establish. ”).  Even more confounding, the Board recites a colloquy by the Board on November 28, 2018 (before the Second Remand by [...]) to apparently support that the Board used the purchase price as the starting point of its analysis.  [...]’s starting point for the return-on-equity component of the Rent Increase Order was the pro-rated purchase price of the Unit, $47,727 (the purchase price of the building divided by 11 units), to which capital improvements of $76,900 were added, both of which were adjusted for inflation to total $197,610.  It is incorrect that [...]’s equity calculation adopted by the Trial Court did not use the Unit’s purchase price.  [...] did not advance a $404,600 purchase price.  Rather, that amount is the unequalized assessed value of the Unit.  The equity adopted by the Trial Court averaged $197,600 and $404,600 (and not any “hypothetical” appraisal as argued by [...] which is irrelevant to the ultimate determination of equity).  Conversely, the Board’s calculation of equity at $12,804 (absurdly less than even the Unit’s pro-rated purchase price) was incomprehensible and remains so despite the Board in its brief attempting to explain how the Board arrived at that number.
[brief] At the December 13, 2017, hearing, the Board determined, after reviewing relevant documents, that the square footage of [...]’s unit was 9.4% of the square footage of the entire building.  See 3T, at 22:1-3.  The board divided $525,000 by 9.4% and concluded that it would use $49,353 to determine equity.  Id. at 37:12-16.  The Board then agreed that they would divide the $49,353 figure by two (in favor of [...]) and multiply that number by .0625%, which equals equity of $1,542.18.  Id. at 63:4-6.  The Board then moved on to a discussion regarding expenses.
[directive] Compare State v. Nwobu, 139 N.J. 236 (1995) (discussing the patent and gross abuse of discretion standard for judicial review of a prosecutor’s decision to deny pretrial intervention, reaffirming that a prosecutor’s decision is entitled to “great deference” and explaining that the issue under such a standard of review is whether the prosecutor considered irrelevant facts or failed to consider relevant ones or committed a clear error of judgment) and State v. Gilmore, 103 N.J. 508 (1986) (holding that on the issue of whether a prosecutor violated defendant’s right to an impartial jury by excluding jurors on the basis of race, the defense must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination that may be overcome if the State articulates clear and reasonably specific explanations of its legitimate reasons for exercising its peremptory challenges and the court is satisfied that the State exercised such peremptory challenges on grounds that are reasonably relevant to the particular case).
[brief] (Da 7; 1T 52-23 to 69-6)  ........................................................................................................15  A.  The Police Did Not Have A Reasonable And Articulable Belief That Defendant And His Three Friends Were Involved In Criminal Activity.  It Is Clear From The Evidence That The Four Men Were Stopped For The Same Reason The Other Two Men Were Stopped: “Due To The Area. ”  ........................................17  B.  The Trial Judge Erred In Finding That The Alleged “Blading” Provided A Valid Basis To Frisk  The Four Men When [...] Did Not Offer “Blading” As A Basis For The Frisk And Specifically Testified That It Is Police Practice To Conduct A Frisk For Weapons Whenever An Individual Is Stopped.  .................................................................................................25  TABLE OF CONTENTS  (CONT'D.)  C.  The Alleged “Blading” Did Not Provide Reasonable Suspicion To Believe That Any Of The Four Men Were Armed And Dangerous.  ..................................26  D.  Conclusion:  Encouraging Judges To Give Uncritical Deference To An Officer’s Suspicions of Criminal Activity and Dangerousness Creates The Potential For Racially Discriminatory Stops and Frisks...........................................................................................................29  CONCLUSION .................................................................................................................................32
[brief] Just compensation is, at its core, an equitable principle designed to place the property owner in the same—but not better—position that he or she was before the taking.  The [...]’ attempt to otherwise convince this Court, as it attempted to unsuccessfully convince the Arbitrator, that it was entitled to ignore a 30-year lease on the biggest space in the Property is not reasonable, not credible, and not just compensation.  For the foregoing reasons, the [...] respectfully requests that the Court affirm the inclusion of the [...] lease in the calculation of Market Value, and reverse: 1) the Trial Court’s February 20, 2019 Order granting the [...]’ motion to set the date of valuation as of January 27, 1994, and 2) the Trial Court’s 8/24/21 Order denying the [...]’s motion to bar Defendants from entering the testimony and expert report of [...] into evidence.
[brief] ”  Da7.  [...] was not seriously injured; even if [...] had reported the incident, [...] would not have been charged.  The injury to [...] proves nothing, least of all that [...] “poses a serious threat of death” to another domestic animal.  [...] provoked his injury, as the Township concluded by not charging [...].  This also fails to prove that [...] “poses a serious threat of death or serious bodily injury to a human. ”  Point Four:
[brief] In the trial court’s ruling, the Court stated that the “better practice” would be to allow the juvenile to consult with his parent or guardian in private.  (2T:56-22 to 5).  It was clear that did not occur in this case.  The trial court clearly erred when the Court found the few second consultation where [...] asked [...] if he was “okay with that” and [...] said “I think, pretty much” was what was the consultation envisioned by the New Jersey Supreme Court.
[brief] Cases  State v. Lefurge, 101 N.J. 404, 418 (1986)  .................................................................37  Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 688 (1984) .........................................................26, 27, 52, 53  Keeble v. United States, 412 U.S. 205, 212-13, 93 S. Ct. 1993, 1997-98, 36 L. Ed. 2d 844, 850 (1973)  .................................................................34  Sanders v. Ratelle, 21 F.3d 1446, 1457 (9th Cir. 1994)  ..................................................53  Estelle v. Gamble, U.S. 97, 106 (1979)  ........................................................................2  Hanes v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, (1972)  .......................................................................1  Lewis v. Attorney General, 878 R.2d 714, 221 (3rd Cir. 1989) ........................................1
[brief] The burden of proof in establishing the ethical violation under the SEA resides with the accusing party.  N.J.S.A. 18A:12-28(b).  The facts must “establish the truth of the charges by a preponderance of the believable evidence. ”  In re Polk License Revocation, 90 N.J. 550, 560 (1982)(quoting Atkinson v. Parsekian, 37 N.J. 142, 149 (1962)).  Under the preponderance standard, the proving party must establish that a desired inference is more probable than not.  “If the evidence is in equipoise, the burden has not been met. ”  Liberty Mut. Ins. Con. v. Land, 186 N.J. 163, 169 (2006)(quoting Biunno, Current Rules of Evidence, comment 5a on N.J.R.E. 101(b)(1)(2005)).  Respondent does not cite any case law that supports the agency’s decision on this set of facts.  Respondent cites to case law involving direct conflicts of interest where the record demonstrates a reasonable relationship, or nexus, between the Board member’s act and the unwarranted advantage or benefit.
[brief] POINT I: THE COMMISSION’S FINAL DECISION WAS SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL CREDIBLE EVIDENCE AND WAS NOT ARBITRARY, CAPRICIOUS, OR UNREASONABLE  ..........11  A.  The ALJ’s Decision is Supported by the Credible Evidence .........................11  B.  The ALJ’s Decision was Supported by Legally Competent Evidence  ...14  POINT II: THE COMMISSION PROPERLY UPHeld THE ALJ’S DECISION TO REMOVE [...]  BECAUSE REMOVAL IS THE ONLY APPROPRIATE PENALTY FOR [...]  EGREGIOUS MISCONDUCT  ..................................................................................................................19  CONCLUSION ...........................................................................................................................23
[directive] 35.  DISPOSITION OF ITEM - Enter the disposition of the property from the Disposition Code Table, located in the center right portion of the report.  36.  PRINT RANK/OFF.  NAME - PRINT the rank and name of the officer doing the report.  37.  BADGE NO. - Enter the badge number, if used, of the officer doing the report.  38.  REPORT DATE - Enter the date of the report, month, day, year.  39.  PAGE NO OF PAGES - If additional page(s) are needed to describe property relating to the case, indicate which page and the total number of pages that are being submitted.
[brief] [...] presented several witnesses, on multiple dates with multiple reports, including; [...]- [...]’s director, [...] P.E.- professional engineer, [...] - architect, [...] P.E. - traffic engineer, [...] - appraiser, [...] - a marketing analyst, and [...], P.P.- professional planner.  The Board also had its own professionals who provided reports and assisted the Board in its review and questioning of [...]’s witnesses.  The Board’s experts included [...], P.P. - professional planner, [...], P.E. - professional engineer, and [...], P.P. - professional planner.  [...] proposed one building with 165 units on three floors with three levels of care -- 81 apartment units, 58 assisted living units, and 26 memory care units.  1T 20-21, 28.  The proposed facility was 170,000 SF in one building, 1T 43:21-44:7, the recycling, trash and generator area are to the north side, 1T 53:21-54:12, and the sanitary sewer was proposed to discharge to an existing easement piped to the [...].  1T 59:7-12.  As proposed, the stormwater would also discharge through that easement, although the easement was designated as being for sanitary sewer only.  1T 42:14-23.  The Board Engineer questioned the handling of emergency calls (1T 76 :10-15), the use and storage of the transport van for residents (1T 777:15-19), and the placement of the recycling, garbage and generator to the north side adjacent to R-20 residential sites (1T 78:8-17).  He questioned the mass, length and scale of this building as completely different than a single-family home and that simply complying with a 15-feet setback designed for a single-family home was not adequate for the proposed facility (1T 80:11 -81:22).  [...] also questioned the parking provided and the failure to meet the Residential Site Improvement Standards ("RSIS").
[directive] In addition, the State will also be required to establish that the blood sample was drawn in a medically acceptable manner, by a person qualified to perform that function.  If the police officer observed the blood sample being drawn by another person, such as a medical professional, it is not required that the medical professional appear and testify.  Nor is it required that the medical professional comply with the affidavit provisions of N.J.S.A. 2A:62A-10 or -11.  State v. Casele, 198 N.J. Super. 462, 467-8 (App. Div. 1985), citing with approval State v. Rypkema, 191 N.J. Super.  388, 392-3 (Law Div. 1983); State v. Burns, 159 N.J. Super. 539, 544 (App. Div. 1978); State v. Woomer, 196 N.J. Super. 583, 585-7 (App. Div. 1984).  A defendant has no right to refuse to allow blood to be drawn as long as the police or law enforcement officer has probable cause to believe that the blood sample will contain evidence of alcohol and/or drugs.
[brief] The applicable statute of limitations on a breach of contract claim not subject to equitable tolling is six years.  N.J.S.A. 2A:14-1; Metromedia Co. v. Mountain Associates 139 N.J. 62 (1995)(tenant who filed suit against landlord for breach of contract to reimburse the tenant for office cleaning services for a seven year and one month period is limited to a recovery of six years pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:14-1).
[brief] (Id. (citing, among other cases, Cannata v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 2011 WL 3495987, at *3 (D. Nev. Aug. 10, 2011)) (noting that “plaintiffs seek answers concerning what has actually happened in this case, i.e., when and to whom the litigation hold letter was given, what kinds of categories of ESI were included in defendants’ litigation hold letter, and what specific actions defendants’ employees were instructed to take to that end,” and that although the litigation hold letters “may be privileged, the basic details surrounding the litigation hold are not”)).  Defendants respond that they have reviewed nearly 300,000 custodial documents and produced nearly 156,000 such documents.  (Id. at 17-18 (citing [...] Decl. Exs. 1, 4)).  They state that 20,000 pages of documents were produced on January 11, 2021, and more than 200,000 pages were produced on April 2, 2021.  (Id. (citing [...] Decl. Exs. 1, 2)).  On April 9, 2021, they produced nearly another 200,000 pages, “almost all of the remaining custodial ESI, save for documents still undergoing or related to a final privilege review and documents for three final custodians, about whom there were separate discussions between the parties. ”  (Id. at 18 (citing [...] Decl. Ex. 3)).  On May 4, 2021, they produced their privilege log and the remainder of the custodial ESI, “including those [documents] partially redacted for privilege.
[brief] The New Jersey Rules of Court provide that:  For the purpose of reserving questions for review or appeal relating to rulings or orders of the court or instructions to the jury, a party, at the time the ruling or order is made or sought, shall make known to the court specifically the action which the party desires the court to take or the party's objection to the action taken and the grounds therefor.  See R. 1:7-2.  To preserve an issue for appeal, there must be a reasonable opportunity to present the issue to the trial court.  See State v. Robinson, 200 N.J. 1, 20 (2009) (“A party shall only be prejudiced by the absence of an objection if there was an opportunity to object to a ruling, order or charge. ”).  Here, there was a reasonable opportunity for [...] to either renew its application to bar the testimony of [...] at trial or to object to the scope of his testimony.  Indeed, [...] expressly noted that her ruling was without prejudice and that the application to bar [...]’s testimony could be renewed by [...] at trial.  As [...] had the reasonable opportunity to either renew its motion to bar [...]’s testimony at trial or to object to the scope of the testimony at trial, and did neither, it waived its right to assert that [...] should have been barred from providing testimony as it never presented this issue to [...] for a ruling.  For these reasons, the arguments raised in Point II of [...]’s brief should be disregarded by this Court.
[directive] The officer be permitted to carry a department issued handgun during on duty hours (duty hours means an officer’s daily active duty shift) but not carry a handgun off duty, and 2.  The officer be directed not to enter his or her residence which is shared with the complainant while on duty and armed, or meet with the complainant or any other person covered by the restraining 4 (9/00) Seizure of Weapons from State Law Enforcement Officers order, while armed.  3.  The department-owned weapons are to be issued by the department to the officer at the beginning of the officer’s daily active duty shift and the weapons are to be returned to the custody of the department at the end of the officer’s daily active duty shift.  D.  When a weapon has been seized from a state law enforcement officer involved in a domestic violence offense but no criminal charges, court order or warrant has been issued or is pending regarding possession of weapons, [...] may authorize the return of the seized weapons subject to conditions, if any, the [...] determines necessary.
[brief] Tellingly, Plaintiff’s statements reflect only that she chose not to carefully read what she was signing, which is not a legally cognizable basis for avoiding a contract.  Skuse, 244 N.J. at 53; Rudbart, 127 N.J. at 353 (quoting Fivey v. Pa. R.R. Co., 67 N.J.L. 627, 632 (E. & A. 1902)) (“A party who enters into a contract in writing, without any fraud or imposition being practiced upon him, is conclusively presumed to understand and assent to its terms and legal effect.
[brief] 22, 24, 26 State v. Purnell, 126 N.J. 518 (1992) .................................................... 27, 30 State v. R.B., 183 N.J. 308 (2005) .................................................... 36, 48, 55 State v. Robinson, 136 N.J. 476 (1994) .................................................... 23, 24 State v. Roth, 95 N.J. 334 (1984) ....................................................  80  State v.  Sanchez-Medina, 231 N.J. 452 (2018) ....................................................  48 State v. Sanders, 467 N.J. Super. 325 (App. Div. 2021) ............................. 38, 39 State v. Shelley, 205 N.J. 320 (2011) .................................................................
[brief] *Fair* did not set forth a new rule of law.  Contrary to the State’s view, the *Fair* Court’s critical pronouncement was not that jurors must be given a particular instruction on the elements of a terroristic threat, but rather that, as a matter of constitutional law, any prosecution for true threats – a narrow exception to constitutional free speech guarantees – requires an objective inquiry into whether a reasonable person similarly situated to the victim would have understood the defendant’s words as threatening violence.  In other words, *Fair* clarified the elements of the crime of terroristic threats, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-3(a), so that prosecutions under that statute would comport with the free speech protections of both the Federal and State Constitutions.  That a jury must be accurately instructed on those elements is not new, nor is it a rule that comes from *Fair* – it is a longstanding, elementary principle of criminal prosecutions.  *State v. Burgess*, 298 N.J. Super. 254, 261 (App. Div. 1997) (“It is . . . clear that a charge which fails properly to define the substantive elements of the offense is ordinarily fatal to the ensuing conviction. ”).  And, in any case, a decision that clarifies the elements of an offense that “had not been properly charged to the jury . . . [does] not create a new rule of law.
[brief] “Where application is made to the governing body of any municipality or county for permission to erect, construct and maintain poles, wires, conduits or other fixtures for any local line in the municipality or county, the governing body shall designate by ordinance or resolution a feasible route in the municipality or county for the local line under regulations and restrictions as aforesaid .  . . .”  N.J.S.A. 48:17-12.  All of these statutes bespeak of and confer authority upon a municipality to impose reasonable regulations upon the placement of poles and lines by utilities in its right-of-way.
[brief] Leasee shall also maintain in good condition such portions adjacent to the premises, such as sidewalks, driveways, lawns and shrubbery, which would otherwise be required to be maintained by leasor.  [Pa973]  The portions of the lease setting out the process for handling expenses for the common areas reads:  17.  **Common Area Expenses. **  In the event the demised premises are situated in a shopping center or in a commercial building in which there are common areas, leasee agrees to share his pro rata share of maintenance, taxes and insurance for the common area.  [Pa975]
[brief] In *Gruenke*, the Third Circuit found a violation of constitutional parental rights, repeatedly faulted the school for failing to notify parents of their daughter’s suspected pregnancy and expressed “considerable doubt about” the school’s decision “to withhold information of \(^1\) Plaintiffs also rely on *Regino v. Staley*, 2023 WL 4464845 (E.D. Cal. July 11, 2023) which is to the same effect. this nature from the parents. ”  Id. at 307.  Plaintiffs also fail in their attempt to dismiss Mirabelli v. Olson, 691 F.Supp.3d 1197 (S.D. Cal. 2023) as an “outlier” and dicta (Pb35).  First, our Supreme Court holds that “parental notice and consent are qualifications that typically may be imposed … on a minor's right to make important decisions” and parents are “entitled to the support of laws designed to aid [them in the] discharge” of their “guiding role” which “justifies limitations on the freedoms of minors” and “State deference to parental control over children....”  Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 640, 639, 637.  Second, Mirabelli’s analysis of parental rights was not dicta.  The court held that the plaintiff/teachers showed a likelihood of success on the merits precisely because the school’s policy of parental exclusion would require them to act “in derogation of the constitutional rights of parents. ”  Id. at 1215.  POINT III
[brief] ”).  At the trial, the State made much of [...]’s homelessness and poverty, again using those facts as part of its tableau of presenting [...] as disturbed and deranged.  The prosecutor elicited testimony from witnesses that [...] was homeless, was living out of his car, that he worked out in parks every day, that he had trouble finding work and maintaining a job, and that he would often drive around aimlessly.  Then, when it directly addressed the jury, the State repeatedly dwelled on these facts to denigrate [...] by painting him as a disturbed person more likely to commit the shooting because he was homeless and living in poverty.  In its opening, after discussing the facts of the tragic incident, the State said, “Now why would a person do such a thing.  Well the life of [...] at that point in time was certainly not going that well.  . . . ” (3T32-21 to 23).  The State then went on to go into detail about how [...] was homeless, had difficulty holding jobs, and suffered from paranoid delusions.  (3T21 to 34-20).  Later in its opening, the State discussed [...]’s homelessness in disparaging terms, saying, “Well the defendant’s car may be typical of a person who is living out of it, is cluttered with liter [sic], debris and items of clothing in the passenger compartment as well as in the trunk. ” (3T46-22 to 25).  In closing, the State covered similar grounds: we’ve heard testimony that he drove and he drove and he drove some more.  Unfortunately for him at that point in time that was his life.  He was a road warrior.  He was in his car all the time.  And unfortunately for him at that time he was unemployed and he was homeless.  A sad thing to have to say.  We learned from him through [...], we’ll talk about her in a bit, he exercised daily.  He used marijuana daily and he ended up after the summer of 2017 using Adderall daily.