ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] [...], *Children and Adults as Intuitive Scientists*, 96 Psych. Rev. 674 (1989).  Psychologists accept that people’s preexisting beliefs, knowledge, and expectations will bias any subsequent judgments or decisions about relevant information.  This effect takes many names, including “confirmation bias” ([...], *Confirmation bias: A ubiquitous phenomenon in many guises*, 2 Rev. Gen. Psych. 175 (1998)), “top-down processing” ([...] & [...], *Heuristic Processing Can Bias Systematic Processing: Effects of Source Credibility, Argument Ambiguity, and Task Importance on Attitude Judgment*, 66 J. Personality & Soc. Psych. 460 (1994)), “heuristics”, and “System 2 processing. ”  [...], *Thinking, Fast and Slow* (2011).  In the context of forensic science, these effects are ubiquitous.  [...], [...], & [...], *The forensic confirmation bias: Problems, perspectives, and proposed solutions*, 2 J. Applied Rsch. in Memory & Cognition 42 (2013).
[directive] *Although the following statutes are provided for convenience, please consult the authority directly to ensure accuracy, as statutes are always subject to change.  N.J.S.A. 2C:14-1(c).  Definitions  ACTOR  A person accused of an offense proscribed under this act.  VICTIM  A person alleging to have been subjected to offenses proscribed by this act.  SEXUAL PENETRATION  Vaginal intercourse, cunnilingus, fellatio or anal intercourse between persons or insertion of the hand, finger or object into the anus or vagina either by the actor or upon the actor’s instruction.  The depth of insertion shall not be relevant as to the question of commission of the crime.  SEXUAL CONTACT  An intentional touching by the victim or actor, either directly or through clothing, of the victim’s or actor’s intimate parts for the purpose of degrading or humiliating the victim or sexually arousing or sexually gratifying the actor.  Sexual contact of the actor with himself must be in view of the victim whom the actor knows to be present.  INTIMATE PARTS  Means the following body parts: sexual organs, genital area, anal area, inner thigh, groin, person.  buttock, or breast of a SEVERE PERSONAL INJURY  Means severe bodily injury, disfigurement, disease, incapacitating mental anguish, or chronic pain.  PHYSICALLY HELPLESS  That condition in which a person is unconscious or is physically unable to flee or is physically unable to communicate unwillingness to act.  A- 5  ATTORNEY GENERAL STANDARDS FOR PROVIDING SERVICES TO VICTIMS OF SEXUAL ASSAULT
[brief] In Jones v. Borough of Bogota, 2008 W.L. 4648455 (App. Div. Oct. 10, 2008), the Appellate Division further: “conclude[d] that the legislative intention was to allow sufficient latitude for resourceful and imaginative management of public resources while affording relief to those injured because of capricious, arbitrary, whimsical or outrageous decisions of public servants. ”  *Id.* at * 6 (also holding “the duty of care, the breach of which is termed negligence, differs in degree from the duty to refrain from palpably unreasonable conduct.  The latter standard implies a more obvious and manifest breach of duty and imposes a more onerous burden on the plaintiff. ”).
[brief] The City also receives grants from violent crimes, identified by the Arbitrator as $35 million in Federal aid.  (Id.)  The City may also bond for capital improvements, appropriating $36.7 million in 2022 and $8.3 million in 2023.  (Aa119).  Other sources of revenue for the City include interest and costs on delinquent taxes (estimated at $1.9 million in 2023), and cannabis revenue of an estimated $2 million in 2023.  (Aa118-119).
[brief] TABLE OF CONTENTS  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ........................................................................................................ iii  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT .................................................................................................  1  PROCEDURAL HISTORY .......................................................................................................  4  COUNTER STATEMENT OF FACTS ....................................................................................  4  A.  The Property and TLE Commercial Lease .................................................................  4  B.  The Property Sale Agreement and Amendments ......................................................  5  C.  The Estoppel Provision in the Property Sale Agreement .................................  6  D.  What Plaintiff Knew on Signing the PSA; Closing Delayed to June ..................................................  10  E.  On the Eve of the June Closing Defendant Delivered the Estoppel that Disclosed Defaults; Plaintiff Terminates and Files Suit ...........................................................................................................  11  F.  Plaintiff’s Partial Summary Judgment Motion; Defendant Intentionally Argues Only Plaintiff’s Construction is not Reasonable; and Court Grants the Motion Certifying it as Final .............................................................................................................................................  16 ARGUMENT ..............................................................................................................................
[brief] He further signed a statement confirming he “had been working the northeast corner of the job site” doing “cutting with an electric wire saw to demo concrete north face – wall north face. ”  (Pa99, [...] Tr., 36:8-21, and Statement, Pa1298.)  Additionally, Plaintiffs admit that “it was left to higher contractors to designate whether [...]’s saw cutting constituted demolition work[.]” (Pb 8.)
[brief] Id. at 81.  “Even when doubt is entertained as to the wisdom of the action, or as to some part of it, there can be no judicial declaration of invalidity in the absence of clear abuse of discretion by the public agencies involved. ”  Charlie Brown of Chatham, Inc. v. Board of Adjustment for Chatham Tp., 202 N.J. Super, at 321.  "The deference accorded to a board's denial of a variance is greater than that given to its decision to grant a variance.
[brief] Honorable Judges of the Superior Court of New Jersey  Appellate Division  [...] [...]  RE: STATE OF NEW JERSEY (Plaintiff-Respondent) v. [...] (Defendant-Appellant)  App. Div. Docket No. [...]  Criminal Action: On Appeal From a Judgment of Conviction of the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Middlesex County.  Sat Below: Hon. [...]., J.S.C.; Hon. [...], J.S.C.  Honorable Judges:
[brief] POINT III  THE PRESENTATION OF AN ILLEGALLY INCORRECT BASIS TO FIND DEFENDANT GUILTY, COMBINED WITH JURY INSTRUCTIONS THAT WERE INSUFFICIENT TO GUIDE THE JURY IN ITS DELIBERATIONS, REQUIRES REVERSAL OF DEFENDANT’S CONVICTIONS.  (Partially raised below at 13T 57-12 to 71-10; 14T 8-4 to 13-15)⁷  The State’s theory of the case was that [...] was the person on the bicycle who shot [...]; in other words, he was the principal.  Yet, in summation, the State suggested for the first time that [...] could have been an accomplice and presented to the jury an incorrect version of accomplice liability: that a person who helps conceal evidence of a murder after the fact is an accomplice in the murder itself.  The court then instructed the jury on accomplice liability, despite its inapplicability in this case.  This presentation of a theory of accomplice liability, combined with the failure to give instructions that fully ⁷ Subsection A was not raised below.  The failure to issue an alibi charge, which is part of the issue in subsection B, was raised below.  explained the defense case—identification and alibi—denied [...] his rights to due process and a fair trial.  *U.S. Const.* amend. XIV; *N.J. Const.* art. I, ¶¶ 1, 9, and 10.  [...]’s convictions must be reversed.
[brief] STATEMENT OF PROCEDURAL HISTORY  On November 16, 2023, Appellant filed a Verified Complaint in Lieu of Prerogative Writ with Order to Show Cause.  Appellant then filed an Amended Verified Complaint In Lieu of Prerogative Write with Order to Show Cause on November 30, 2023.  In Lieu of an Answer, Defendant [...] filed a Motion to Dismiss the Complaint pursuant to R. 4:6-2(e), on January 31, 2024.  Appellant filed Opposition to that Motion on February 9, 2024.  A video hearing to hold oral argument regarding that January 31, 2024, Motion was conducted on March 6, 2024.  (1T).  The Trial Court scheduled a subsequent hearing for in-person oral argument to be held on March 27, 2024.  (2T)
[brief] For the reasons set forth herein, Appellant respectfully submits that this Court should reverse the [...]’s March 14, 2023 denial of its adjudicatory hearing request so that a full record can be established before the Office of Administrative Law.  Moreover, Appellant respectfully submits that the [...]’s grant of the 2019 WFD permit modification to [...] should be reversed and the permit modification should be rescinded.
[brief] And [...] has “many of these vaults” in its system.  [[...]]  Q.  You said that you actively visit the site.  How often does that take place?  [[...]]  A.  I would say – I can't give you a hard number, but I would say a half dozen or so times.  It depends.  Our crew – our crews have the discretion to stop by stations.  But several times during the winter period they may stop by to take a look to see if there are any issues with the condition of the regulator itself from an access standpoint.  Q.  What about in the other three seasons?  A.  I'm sorry?  Q. I'm sorry.  What about visits during the non-winter seasons?  A.  We wouldn't proactively visit that site unless we had an issue that was recognized from our monitoring point.  So during the non-winter seasons, if we were doing an inspection, each regulator station is inspected annually.  So during that inspection the inspections typically occur during the non-heating season, so to speak.  And we would visit that site for inspection, but typically, unless there's an issue, we wouldn't routinely visit that site.  [1T151:20-25, -152:1-16.]
[directive] Form, the defendant may be transported or accompanied by the summoned person from the police station or facility.  -6-  POTENTIAL LIABILITY WARNING - N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.22 (Rev. 2-20-2004)  FORM  Case # Defendant Information Name: Last, First, M.I. DL# & State Arresting Officer Information  Street Address  Birth Date Name: Last, First, M.I. Rank Town, State ZIP Arrest: Date & Time Badge #  Violation(s)  Charged: [ ]  N.J.S.A. 39:4-50(a), DWI (Check appropriate boxes)  [ ]  N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.2, Refusal to submit to chemical breath testing  You have been summoned by, or on behalf of, the person whose name appears above as “defendant,” to transport or accompany the defendant from this law enforcement agency.
[brief] POINT V APPELLANT PLED THE CAUSE OF ACTION OF AGE DISCRIMINATION  WHICH WAS SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD.  THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO ACKNOWLEDGE SUPPORT IN THE RECORD AS PRESENTED BY APPELLANT  ILLUSTRATING AGE DISCRIMINATION AND DISMISSED THE PROPERLY SUPPORTED CAUSE OF ACTION FOR AGE DISCRIMINATION  The cause of action of age discrimination was satisfied by the Appellant because Appellant was in a protected category based on age as she was beyond 40 years of age, she was performing her job satisfactorily as addressed at the cause of action of racial discrimination, she was subjected to adverse employment action as she was terminated from employment and Appellant was replaced by [...] who was less than forty years of age and Caucasian.  Victor supra at 30.  [...] testified at deposition that [...] replaced Appellant and had several years of experience working as a Vice Principal in Paterson.  (Pa348, [...] Dep 10/28/2022, T93)  Appellant having supported the position taken that the adverse acts noted above were discriminatory has satisfied the first parts of the burden-shifting requirements set forth under McDonnell Douglas.  Appellant has shown that she was a member of a protected category based on age, she was performing her job satisfactorily, she was subjected to adverse employment action as she was terminated and she was replaced by someone not in her protected category based on age who was less qualified.  The record supports the fact that the Appellant satisfied all factors for discrimination based age.
[brief] ---  3  Freshwater wetlands permits are not subject to the same ninety-day timeframe.  N.J.S.A. 13:1D-29(b) (“construction permit” definition does not include freshwater wetlands permits).  Throughout [...]’s permit application consideration, [...] submitted numerous comments to [...], though it never raised most of the issues now on appeal.  On July 26, 2022, [...] sent [...] a copy of a one-page public comment to the [...] voicing a general concern about Project flooding.  (Aa105).  On September 22, 2022, at [...]’s request, [...] virtually met with [...] to hear [...]’s Project concerns.  (Ra62; Ra69).  Then, on October 12, 2022, [...] provided [...] with a OneDrive folder containing the deficiency letters [...] sent to [...] and [...]’s Project plans.  (Ra77).  The Project plans show a culvert for the proposed U.S. Route 1 access road, (Ra81), and the April 8 deficiency letter and October 3, 2022 response discuss Water Quality Planning Act consistency, (Ra3; Ra31).  Even so, [...] later submitted an October 17, 2022 comment discussing site remediation, air quality, site inspections, flooding, stormwater management, wetlands hydrology, and historic preservation.  (Aa43-48).  [...] directly responded to [...]’s concerns about site remediation, air quality, site inspections, and historic preservation, (Ra75-76; Aa44-46), and [...]’s remaining concerns were addressed through [...]’s rigorous permit review and in [...]’s environmental report and engineering report that followed, (Aa12; Aa24).  [...] submitted its final comment on December 1, 2022 regarding stormwater BMPs’ effect on wetlands and riparian zone disturbance.
[brief] Such selective interpretation of its definitions by Defendants should not be countenanced and Plaintiffs submit that the definition of Legal Services, as determined in *Blackburn*, is binding on [...] here.  It follows that, because the allegations and findings in the OAE Proceeding did not involve any client—but only [...]’s personal actions involving Firm money—it cannot reasonably be concluded that the OAE Proceedings related to any Legal Service performed “for others. ”  To the extent the issues originated with the deposit of a $100,000 settlement check received for a client, it is undisputed that the funds were promptly disbursed to the client and no allegations were made in that regard.  Rather, the issues in the OAE Proceeding focused on the remaining $30,000, which were the Firm’s fees, and [...]’s attempt to disguise the disbursement of those fees from his sister-in-law, the firm’s bookkeeper, including the alteration of bank records, to avoid a potentially devastating familial issue.  The OAE alleged in its complaint, and the DRB found, that (i) “the $4,595.83 balance in the SMA did not represent client funds” (Pa353); (ii) [...] held personal funds in the SMA for many years (i.e., commingling of funds) (Pa361); (iii) [...] failed to disburse the Firm’s fees to its business account (Pa361); and (iv) [...] admitted that bank records had been altered to avoid a disclosure “which would prove to be extremely embarrassing to him. ” (Pa349-Pa350).  The allegations and findings in the OAE Proceedings did not involve services “for others” and, by Defendants’ definition, as held in Blackburn, were not Legal Services.  Since there were no Legal Services involved, the OAE Proceedings were not a Disciplinary Proceeding (or an investigation or bar complaint).
[brief] Count IV - Violations of Article I of the New Jersey Constitution for Depravation of Plaintiff's Substantive and Procedural Due Process Rights  The Plaintiff's Amended Complaint provides no facts or legal argument as to how this allegation meets any legal standard.  Plaintiff wholly disregards the requirement to identify of what constitutional rights were allegedly violated, and rather asserts mere conclusions without any facts that are critical for a viable claim to exist.  To bring a substantive due process claim, a plaintiff must allege "that the government has abused its power in an arbitrary manner that 'shocks the conscience.'"  Mammaro v. New Jersey Div. of Child Protec. and Permanency, 814 F.3d 164, 169 (3d Cir. 2016), as amended (Mar. 21, 2016), as amended (Mar. 21, 2016), as amended (Mar. 21, 2016) (citing Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 846-48 (1998)).  To state a substantive due process claim, "a plaintiff must prove the governmental authority acted to 'infringe a property interest encompassed by the Fourteenth Amendment.'"  Acierno v. Cloutier, 40 F.3d 597, 616 (3d Cir. 1994).  Plaintiff's allegation that her substantive due proves rights have been violated are without basis, as Plaintiff failed to plead a number of necessary facts critical to assert a viable claim.
[directive] A law crime firearm, involving a or a crime for delinquent a adjudicated was juvenile a as defendant the 2C:43-7.2, N.J.S.A. Act, Release Early the No to subject be would adult an by committed if that deputy prosecutor or assistant an unless offenses, foregoing the of any commit to attempt an or supervisory or Directive, a Section of this 3.2 with accordance in consulted general attorney to Prosecutor County authorized the by is who 3.3.2 subsection to pursuant designated officer of presumption that the determines Directive, this of 4 Section under presumptions overcome this in Nothing 4.5.9.14 subsection to pursuant overcome is complaint-warrant by charging delinquency of other adjudications of consideration preclude to construed be shall subsection ago, than ten years occurred more that crimes firearms-related or violent for adjudications (e.g., as relevant be may crimes) NERA as or firearms-related than other offenses for adjudications or presumption the whether overcome to determining when circumstances of the totality the of part Section 4.3. to pursuant acomplaint-summons issuing of Convictions/Charges.  Out-of-State 4.5.8 or convictions for account does not process risk-assessment pretrial automated  The that indicate system will electronic Judiciary's the However, other states. from charges pending prosecutors police and provide may also history, and criminal of-state an out has defendant the of presumption Notwithstanding the offenses.  such any concerning information limited with apply agency enforcement may a apply, law otherwise would that acomplaint-summons issuing conviction or pending charge an out-of-state that appears reasonably it if acomplaint-warrant for event, In that firearm. a or of possession use unlawful or violence threatened or actual involves or prosecutor assistant an unless acomplaint-warrant for applying of presumption shall a be there a or Directive, of this 3.2 Section with accordance in consulted general attorney deputy the by authorized is 3.3.2 who subsection to pursuant designated specially officer supervisory that determines Directive, of 4 this Section under presumptions overcome
[brief] In support of this argument, Plaintiff cites to the fact that the Trial Court used the facts set forth in [...]’s Statement of Undisputed Material Facts and failed to consider Plaintiff’s denial of some of those facts.  Plaintiff’s argument is without merit and mischaracterizes the Trial Court’s use of Defendant’s Material Statement of Facts (“DSOMF”).  To begin, the “Factual Background” is not verbatim and does not rely on “every fact as stated” by [...].
[brief] [...] admitted [...] and other beachfront homeowners had an easement right to use the boardwalk and bathroom had they been built because they were shown on the map.  (Da1982-1983).  [...] further admitted that because the beach is also on the map, the beachfront homeowners “can use the beach. ” (Da1983).  Ironically, [...]’s reasoning supports the [...]’ position, i.e., the [...] would have had an easement right to the boardwalk and bathrooms (had they been built) because they are on the 1925 Plan.
[brief] See Reliance Nat. Ins. Co., 376 N.J. Super. at 550 (“Ordinarily, a conclusion that [defendant] lacked sufficient minimum contacts with New Jersey to be subject to the jurisdiction of our courts would conclude the matter. ”).  But if it does, the second step provides another basis for reversal, as exercising personal jurisdiction over Defendants in New Jersey would also offend “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. ”  Interlotto, Inc. v. Nat’l Lottery Admin., 298 N.J. Super. 127, 136 (App. Div. 1997).  Just as this Court concluded in Interlotto, “New Jersey simply has no interest in the outcome of the litigation,” id. at 137, brought by a North Dakota LLC against a Virginia-domiciled, D.C.-barred lawyer and a Texas-based law firm and premised on transactional work that indisputably did not involve any travel to New Jersey or implicate any issues of New Jersey law.
[brief] ’  Instead, the acts of assault and harassment are not acts that constitute an accident under the policy. ”  Plaintiff/Appellant asserts the trial court’s reasoning is flawed.  See Pa284 for “Comparison to Voorhees”.  The trial court also cited Harleysville v. Garitta (2001) which relied on the principles articulated in Voorhees (1992) and SL Industries, Inc. v. American Motorists Insurance, 128 N.J. 188 (1992).
[brief] Absent any indication in the Law that the Legislature intended to broaden the scope or application of the Doctrine relative to the common law, the Public Access Law allows the Department to require public access across private property only when the Matthews test dictates that such an outcome is required.  The wording of Section 4 of the Public Access Law further clarifies that the Department may require public access on private property only if (i) the public already has access to the shoreline; (ii) the applicant proposes a change in the existing footprint of a structure or a change in the use of the property; and (iii) only if the imposition of a new access requirement is “… consistent with the public trust doctrine. ”
[brief] Furthermore, Plaintiff’s counsel cannot be forced to respond to a phantom argument that is not properly presented.  See e.g., Dougherty v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 325 N.J. Super. 549, 553 (App. Div. 1999) (refusing to address an inmates claims for damages which were not properly briefed, and holding that respondent “should not be require to respond to a claim for damages” that has been improperly raised).  Furthermore, similar to their faultily presented argument on the jury charge, the Defendants should not be permitted to raise these arguments for the first time in reply, as that would be prejudicial to the Plaintiffs, who would have no opportunity to respond to a properly raised argument.  See BIS LP, Inc., 26 N.J. Tax at 581.  In fact, the Defendants’ defective argument in this regard is particularly unforgivable as they also failed to support this claim with any argument before the trial court.  See Pa54-Pa55.  In short, based on their utter failure to support their argument that Plaintiff’s retaliation claims are against the weight of the evidence with any sort of factual or legal argument, the Defendants must be deemed to have waived that argument irretrievably.  As such, the Defendants appeal on the grounds that Plaintiff’s claims for LAD retaliation are against the weight of the evidence must be rejected, and the verdict affirmed.