ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] See, e.g., State v. Koskovich, 168 N.J. 448, 483-485 (2001).  And it was clearly not dispositive in this case.  The trial court here placed the most emphasis on the fact that the State had not proven with clear and convincing evidence that [...] had committed the April 20 robbery and without strong evidence connecting him to that robbery the minimal (if any) probative value was outweighed by its prejudice.  Thus, even if the trial court erred in its finding with respect to prong two of Cofield, this would have no bearing on the soundness of the Court’s ultimate decision to deny joinder and bar introduction of evidence of the April 20 robbery into the April 23 carjacking.  The State quarrels with the trial court’s balancing of prejudice and probativity, arguing that “it is imperative that the State be able to prove defendant was one of the masked carjackers on April 23 by admitting the evidence that he stole the Audi-getaway car three days prior. ”  (Sb16)  But the trial court appropriately found that there was not sufficient evidence linking [...] with the April 20 robbery.  The State argues that the judge erred in finding that “the only connection between [the April 23 carjacking] and the [April 20] Armed-Robbery charge is the Audi” because the “jacket inside the carjacked Mercedes that defendant abandoned in this case matched the description of one of the individuals that stole the BMW M4 and Audi, and thus links the identity of defendant to both crimes.
[brief] PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND STATEMENT OF FACTS  The now late [...] approached Plaintiff, [...], to serve as the Chief Information Officer for [...] in November 2014.  Simmons offered Plaintiff $150,000.00 salary per year and a 10% equity stake in the company.  1T:194:18-24; (Aa526).  [...] and [...] each also held 10% shares in equity originally, and Simmons held the remainder.  3T29:21-30:4; (Aa30-Aa31).  While Plaintiff worked to build [...] through legitimate means, and sourced clients to build the company revenues, Simmons operated [...] in unconventional ways.  (Aa23); 2T183:5-185:5.  Plaintiff was solely responsible for bringing in all revenues during these periods, which she generated from her own preexisting contacts and connections, due to the self-proclaimed inability of [...].  2T183:5-21.  The Trial Court found that Plaintiff was the sole reason for which [...] was profitable.  (Aa22).  Beginning in the Fall of 2014, Simmons rented a residential home located at [...] in [...] (“[...]”).  [...] operated out of the finished basement.  Plaintiff’s living quarters was a separate apartment over the garage.  1T119:9-13.  Although Plaintiff resided in [...], with her husband and family, Simmons insisted that she stay in New Jersey.  Defendant [...] lived at the property for a period of time as well, but was not required to do so.  --- 1  “Aa______” refers to the Appendix filed concurrently herewith by Appellant.  so.  (Aa23).  Jennings traveled back and forth from New Jersey to Florida.  1T120:1-13.²  Plaintiff was solely responsible for [...]’ success and profitability as she brought in all clients, which was not her primary role for [...] (Aa22-Aa23).  Plaintiff’s connections through her previously established network and personal connections aided her in achieving success for [...].  In late 2017, Plaintiff learned Simmons planned to sell all [...] contracts and residual streams to [...] and cash out [...]’ contracts, without knowledge or approval of Plaintiff, [...] or [...].  Plaintiff was concerned that Simmons was acting unilaterally on a decision of major importance and without partner approval and directly confronted Simmons about this improper conduct on December 11, 2017.  (Aa26).  Plaintiff opposed the plan and threatened to inform Mr. [...] and Mr. [...].  (Aa26).  When Plaintiff tried to leave the conversation, Simmons grabbed Plaintiff’s purse and car keys and prevented her from leaving.  (Aa26).  When Plaintiff continued to leave the building, Simmons pushed Plaintiff and pinned her to the ground.  Plaintiff suffered contusions on her lip, arms, and leg from the physical assault.  (Aa26).  (Aa504-Aa509).  Simmons only had small dime --- ² “1T” denotes the transcript of January 11, 2023; “2T” will denote the transcript of January 12, 2023; “3T” will denote the transcript of January 13, 2023; and 4T will denote the transcript of July 21, 2023.
[brief] Reading N.J.S.A. 19:49-5 *in pari materia* with N.J.S.A. 19:48-1(d) and (e), as well as N.J.S.A. 19:53A-3(d), (f), and (h), makes it clear that the purpose is not to create a mechanism to disqualify otherwise valid votes, but simply to prevent voters from casting double votes.  There is no risk of that here; in fact, Appellant even admitted that there was no double voting.
[brief] But through the investigation talking to other people, they learn that it's possibly this individual named [...].  [(emphasis added). ]  [...] subsequently testified regarding his interaction with Mr. and [...], neither of whom testified at trial.  [...] told the jury that he immediately discounted [...] as a suspect because he did not match the description given by the witnesses.  Czepiel testified that he then provided the suspect's description to Mr. and [...].  Czepiel told the jury that [...] “made a statement that she has an idea of who she believed the suspect was. ”  The sergeant then told the jury that [...] named defendant and provided police the number of the room at the [...] at which defendant resided.  The State at trial presented yet additional testimony explaining why defendant's photo was placed in the array.  [...] told the jury that he included defendant's photo in the array based on [...]'s and [...]'s representation that “they developed” defendant as a suspect.  [...] testified that he chose photos for the array “resembl[ing] the suspect in characteristics that were [developed] both by the description given by the witnesses and by any other investigative means” available.  (emphasis added)  On further questioning by the prosecutor, Jacoby repeated that “during the investigation” Sergant Czepiel and [...] had “developed a name.
[brief] ARGUMENT  [...]  APPROPRIATELY ISSUED THE HAD DETERMINING THAT [...]’S PROJECT IS EXEMPT FROM THE HIGHLANDS ACT, AND ITS DECISION IS ENTITLED TO DEFERENCE.  ............  11  A.  [...] Properly Issued the HAD, Finding Exemption #11 Applicable to [...]’s Project and that the Project is Consistent with the Goals and Purposes of the Highlands Act.  (Responds to Appellants’ Brief Point II A-F)..................................................  14
[brief] N.J.A.C. 17:1-6.4 provides in pertinent part:  “(a)  Each disability retirement applicant must prove that his or her retirement is due to a total and permanent disability that renders the applicant physically or mentally incapacitated from performing normal or assigned job duties at the time the member left employment; the disability must be the reason the member left employment.  “(b)  Members who have involuntarily or voluntarily terminated service for any of the reasons listed below will not be permitted to apply for a disability retirement: “1.  Removal for cause or total forfeiture of public service; “2. Settlement agreements reached due to pending administrative or criminal charges, unless the underlying charges relate to the disability;….”  [...] cannot deny that he left employment with [...] pursuant to a Settlement Agreement that settled pending administrative/disciplinary charges.  [...]’s repeated argument that the only purpose of the Settlement Agreement was to secure a settling of monies due to Petitioner under his contract, and that there was no quid pro quo agreement designed to avoid disciplinary charges (Pet. Br., pp. 6, 9-10, 12-13, 25-26, 29) is meritless.  The Settlement Agreement makes very clear that in exchange for Petitioner’s resignation and debarment from further employment with [...], the disciplinary proceedings against him would be withdrawn (RA38).
[brief] (4T 17-10 to 15)  Because none of this video statement should have been admitted because it was taken in direct violation of defendant’s asserted right to remain silent, the defendant’s Fifth Amendment right to silence, his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process, and his state common-law right against self-incrimination, and because admission of that video clip was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, defendant’s convictions should be reversed and the matter remanded for a retrial in which the statement is excluded from evidence.
[brief] Pa 49.  There is nothing in the record to support the Plaintiffs’ claim speculation the development as permitted in the Amended Redevelopment Plan is economically infeasible.  Plaintiffs also omit that the Amended Redevelopment Plan includes a commercial component, which permits the redeveloper to defray the cost of the affordable housing units even further.  In light of the fact that the prior iteration of the Redevelopment Plan already had an open space component, consisting of space along the Mill Pond perimeter of the Property, plus an additional buffer provided in connection with the proposed development, the revision to the Redevelopment Plan is consistent with the Master Plan.  See Pa 5.  That revision simply expands the open space buffer into the Property.  The revision also brings the redevelopment into closer compatibility with the zoning of the adjacent property in [...], which is zoned “Rural Preservation. ”
[brief] POINT II  THE IFPA AND NO-FAULT STATUTES – SIMILAR LEGISLATIVE GOALS WITH TWO SEPARATE AND DISTINCT PATHS  “The Legislature’s intent is the paramount goal when interpreting a statute and, generally, the best indicator of that intent is the statutory language. ”  Diprospero v. Penn, 183 N.J. 466, 492 (2005)(citing Frugis v. Bracigliano, 177 N.J. 250 (2003)).  The court's analysis therefore begins with the statute’s plain language, Miah v. Ahmed, 179 N.J. 511 (2004) and such language should be given its ordinary meaning.  Town of Morristown v. Woman’s Club, 124 N.J. 605, 610 (1991).  It is the obligation for the court to “effectuate the legislative intent in light of the language used and the object sought to be achieved. ”  Merin v. Maglaki, 126 N.J. 430, 435 (1992)(citing State v. Maguire, 84 N.J. 508 (1980).  To that end, and when faced with seemingly disparate but unambiguous statutes, courts should work to harmonize the statutes advancing their manifest purposes.  *State v. Gomes*, 253 N.J. 6 (2023).  Therefore, the court is to give effect to the plain and unambiguous statutory language as written while harmonizing the statutes to give effect to the Legislative goal in aggressively pursuing insurance fraud.
[brief] Doe v. Irwin, 615 F.2d 1162 (6th Cir. 1980) ..................................................................................33  Flagg v. Essex Cnty.  Prosecutor, 171 N.J. 561 (2002)  .................................................................................................13  Gallo v. Salesian Soc’y, 290 N.J. Super. 616 (App. Div. 1996) ....................................................................38  Garden State Equality v. Dow, 216 N.J. 314 (2013) .................................................................................................45  Gerety v. Atl. City Hilton Casino Resort, 184 N.J. 391 (2005) ...........................................................................................................17
[brief] RC-1: Cover letter dated March 9, 2017 and [...] responses to discovery requests RCR-ENG-1, -2, -5 to -9 ([...]) (SOICR p. 12) (Staff also listed these as S-1): .........  H1086a [...] response to RCR-ENG-1 ........................................... H1089a [...] response to RCR-ENG-2 ...........................................  H1090a [...] response to RCR-ENG-5 ...........................................  H1091a [...] response to RCR-ENG-6 ...........................................  H1092a [...] response to RCR-ENG-7 ...........................................  H1093a [...] response to RCR-ENG-8 ...........................................  H1094a Attachment: “Pipeline Impact to Property Value and Property Insurability,” by [...], 2016 ...... H1097a Attachment to RCR-ENG-8: “Pipeline Impact to Property Value and Property Insurability,” by [...], 2016, pages Ha1210 to Ha1241 [...] response to RCR-ENG-9 ........................................  H1242a  [...]  Cover letter dated March 24, 2017, enclosing the attachment to [...] response to RCR-ENG-5 .....................  H1243a  Attachment: [...] response to RCR-ENG-5 .....................  H1247a  Attachment: Map showing locations of pipelines ...............  H1248a  RC-2: [...]  Cover letter dated March 16, 2017 and [...] responses to discovery requests RCR-ENG-3, -4, and -10 (BPU Docket.  No. GO17010023) (SOICR p. 13) (Staff also listed these as S-2):  ..........  H1249a [...] response to RCR-ENG-3 ........................................  H1253a  [...] response to RCR-ENG-4 ........................................  H1254a [...] response to RCR-ENG-10 ......................................  H1255a  RC-3: Cover letter dated April 12, 2017 and [...] responses to discovery requests RCR-ENG-11 to -14 ([...]) (SOICR p. 13) (Staff also listed these as S-3): ..........  H1256a  [...] response to RCR-ENG-11 ......................................  H1260a  Attachment: Depiction of proposed plantings ....................  H1262a  Attachment: Sketch showing planting plan .......................  H1263a  Exhibit A-7: Cross section display .................................  H1264a  Exhibit A-8: Cross Section Display with fence .................  H1265a  Exhibit A-9: North Approach Exhibit .............................  H1266a  Exhibit A-10: South Approach Exhibit ...........................  H1267a  Letter to [...] from [...] April 14, 2016, enclosing plans ...........................................  H1268a  Cover Sheet of Plans .............................................
[brief] Paragraph 2 of the [...] Contract obligated [...] to indemnify [...] for losses arising out of the use of [...]’s property during or after [...]’s operations, “whether or not such claim [for] damage, injury or death results from negligence of Customer, Contractor or others. ”  Da44-45, ¶ 2.  That clause is analogous to the indemnity clause that the Appellate Division considered in Englert, 389 N.J. Super. 44, and Mautz, 298 N.J. Super. 13, and is unenforceable in respect of [...]’s own negligence.  Englert, 389 N.J. at 56-58.  The phrase “whether or not” the claim or loss results from [...]’s negligence in Paragraph 2, Da45, ¶ 2, renders it ambiguous and this unenforceable for indemnification for [...]’s own negligence.  It does not distinguish between indemnification for [...]’s own negligence and the negligence of [...] or other entities.  Englert, 389 N.J. at 56.  It “can be read simply to eliminate” the common-law requirement that [...] be free from fault to recover indemnification.  Ibid.  Thus, courts read the phrase “whether or not caused by” the fault of the party to be indemnified to mean that indemnity is available even if the indemnitee is at fault, but only to the extent that the loss was caused by entities other than the indemnitee.  Mautz, 298 N.J. Super. at 21.  Two cases hold that the term “regardless of whether” the loss is caused by the indemnitee required indemnification for the indemnitee’s own negligence.
[brief] That includes when [...] predecessors were operating the pizzeria as well as [...].  The pictures showing large trucks making deliveries, found at Pa-145-153, were all taken in 2019 and 2020, when [...] was preparing to open.  Thus, a large Coca-Cola truck delivered a cooler for soda to replace an old one that had been there.  [...], who was subpoenaed by defendants, and who testified that the traffic complaints by the [...] was a gross exaggeration.  As [...] testified, the pizzeria’s volume was too small for any large deliveries and he went to either Shop-Rite or Restaurant Depot to purchase soda for the business.  (T.1 at 124:2-125:19)  As for the traffic complaint, not only was it minimized by the Borough’s Police [...], but, as Gambella testified, it has been diminished by the advent of delivery services such as Door Dash and Uber Eats, which lessened the need for separate individuals to pick up their orders.
[brief] 1991) | 32 | | **State v. Roth**, 289 N.J. Super. 152 (App. Div. 1996) | 12 | | **State v. Roth**, 95 N.J. 334 (1984) | 42 | | **State v. Spivey**, 122 N.J. Super. 249 (App. Div. 1973), reversed on other grounds, 65 N.J. 21 (1974) | 16, 17 | | **State v. Stuart**, No. A-5060-06T4, 2010 WL 1190538 (App. Div. Mar. 30, 2010) | 17, 18 | | **State v. Thomas**, 188 N.J. 137 (2006) | 44 | | **State v. Thomas**, 362 N.J. Super. 229 (App. Div. 2003) | 10, 13 | | **State v. Tindell**, 417 N.J. Super. 530 (App. Div. 2011) | 35, 39, 40| | **State v. Torres**, 246 N.J. 246 (2021) | 42, 50 | | **State v. Trinidad**, 241 N.J. 425 (2020) | 40 | ### TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (CONT'D)
[brief] Plaintiff-Appellant, [...]  (“[...]”), submits this brief in further support of its appeal from an Order of the Superior Court of New Jersey, Bergen Vicinage (Hon. [...], J.S.C.) dated July 24, 2023, which granted reconsideration of prior orders of Judge [...] and, upon reconsideration, dismissed the case on comity grounds in favor of Defendants-Respondents’ second-filed action in Missouri.  (Pa056-57).  The Court should reverse the Order and reinstate [...]’s Complaint.  ARGUMENT POINT I DEFENDANTS FAILED TO ESTABLISH PROPER GROUNDS FOR RECONSIDERATION OF JUDGE WILSON’S ORDERS (Pa56)
[brief] “By its very nature, an agreement to arbitrate involves a waiver of a party’s right to have her claims and defenses litigated in court. ”  NAACP, 421 N.J. Super. at 425.  “But an average member of the public may not know—without some explanatory comment—that arbitration is a substitute for the right to have one’s claim adjudicated in a court of law. ”  *Atalese*, 219 N.J. at 442.  Directly above [...]’s electronic signature was her acknowledgment that she had carefully read and understood the Agreement and entered into it voluntarily, and that she was “giving up the right to have Covered Claims decided by a court or jury.
[brief] [...] claims that DEP should have used “the new precipitation data” from the Cornell Studies for [...]’s permit application.  (Ab34).  This argument fails.  To begin, it is unclear what “precipitation data” [...] is referring to.  [...] does not indicate if “precipitation data” means: (1) the raw precipitation data from 1950 to 2019 the Cornell Studies used; (2) the multiple adjustment factors and change factors the Cornell Studies created; or (3) something else entirely.  This distinction matters.  If [...] is referring to historical precipitation data, the Cornell Studies do not include this raw precipitation data.
[brief] Further, the Court erroneously denied [...]’s motion for leave to file counterclaims which directly relate to the disputes surrounding the sale of the Subject Property to [...], as will be discussed more fully below.  In his opposition to the Order to Show Cause, [...] presented sufficient and specific factual evidence demonstrating the objections and disputes surrounding the proposed sale of the Subject Property to [...] for $500,000.  This included evidence that the price was unauthorized by the siblings and in contravention of the Consent Order of April 13, 2022.  [...] provided a Certification in support of his opposition which outlined the objections to the sale of the Subject Property to [...] and set forth reasons why summary disposition of the matter was improper.  (Da383).  It is evident from the Court’s Orders and conclusions during oral argument that it overlooked [...]’s Certification and/or failed to consider it.  Based on the factual record before the Court, the matter could not have and should not have been disposed of summarily.  Instead, the matter should have proceeded by way of a plenary action under the Court Rules.
[brief] Dra17.  These serious reporting obligations imposed a duty upon [...] to exercise reasonable diligence in reviewing [...]’s records.  3.  Plaintiffs are not permitted to delay the accrual of their causes of action until they received the advice of their expert, [...].  Although every single transaction was included in the business records, it is argued that plaintiffs could not have appreciated their loss until [...] conducted his analysis, an argument accepted by the trial court.  Pb51.  Plaintiffs’ argument and the trial court’s conclusion rest upon legal error.  Where the facts of the transactions were present in the records and available to plaintiffs, the accrual of the cause of action is not delayed until a professional confirms the existence of a cause of action or the plaintiff understands the legal significance of the facts.  See, Kendall, 209 N.J. at 193 (“a plaintiff may not delay his filing until he obtains an expert to support his cause of action. ”); Lapka v. Porter Hayden Co., 162 N.J. 545, 555-56, (2000); Burd, 76 N.J. at 291.  The application of this legal principle is particularly appropriate here because the premise for labeling the transactions as losses was that [...] did not authorize them.  Plainly, he did not need an expert to inform him that he did not authorize a transaction on the books.  It is, therefore, clear that, in the exercise of reasonable diligence and intelligence, [...] could have “discovered” the facts he contends are the basis for his claims and he should not enjoy the indulgence of the discovery rule.  C.
[brief] [L]eave to file an interlocutory appeal of a trial court’s order is permitted only ‘in the interest of justice. ’  R. 2:2-4.  …  As our Appellate Division has recognized, an interlocutory appeal is not appropriate to ‘correct minor injustices …. ’  Romano v. Maglio, 41 N.J. Super. 561, 567, 125 A.2d 523 (App. Div.), denied, 22 N.J. 574, 126 A.2d 910 (1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 923, 77 S. Ct. 682, 1 L. Ed. 2d 720 (1957).  Rather, when leave is granted, it is because there is the possibility of ‘some grave damage or injustice’ resulting from the trial court’s order.  Id. at 568, 125 A.2d 523.  …  Regardless of the specific basis asserted, however, the moving party must establish, at a minimum, that the desired appeal has merit and that ‘justice calls for [an appellate court’s] interference in the cause. ’  Romano, supra, 41 N.J. Super. at 568, 125 A.2d 523.  The Appellate Division enjoys considerable discretion in determining whether the ‘interest of justice’ standard has been satisfied and, as a result, whether to grant a motion for leave to file an interlocutory appeal.
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