ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The State submits that the Defendant’s arguments are meritless as the Appellate Division’s holding in State v. Petrello, 251 N.J. Super. 476 (App. Div. 1991) is controlling in this case.  It is first important to note that Defendant is procedurally barred from post-conviction relief (“PCR”).  In the municipal court, petitions for post-conviction relief are governed by R. 7:10-2.  This Rule, in pertinent part, provides as follows:  “A petition . . . shall not be accepted for filing more than five years after entry of the judgment of conviction or imposition of the sentence sought to be attacked, unless it alleges facts showing that the delay in filing was due to defendant’s excusable neglect. ”  R. 7:10-2(b)(2).  The municipal court post-conviction rule was adopted in response to State v. Laurick, 120 N.J. 1, cert. den. 498 U.S. 967 (1990), which required post-conviction proceedings to determine whether an uncounseled conviction may be used to enhance a multiple offender’s penalty to include incarceration.  See also State v. Weil, 421 N.J. Super. 121, 128-129 (App. Div. 2011).  Subparagraph (g) of the Rule expressly sets forth the criteria for relief from enhanced custodial terms based on prior convictions and adopts the same time limitations for filing petitions for post-conviction relief as set forth in R. 7:10-2(b)(2).  See R. 7:10-2(g); c.f. State v. Bringhurst, 401 N.J. Super. 421, 433 (App. Div. 2008) (holding that, in the Laurick situation of a prior uncounseled conviction, the time limitations of the rule should be liberally relaxed).  The Defendant filed her application for PCR with the [...] on February 8, 2024.  (DA3).  Although the municipal court denied this application for reasons set forth in its decision (DA9-DA11), the application was made more than five (5) years from the Defendant’s prior DWI conviction on January 23, 2014.  As such, it should have been time barred as a matter of law.
[brief] The opposition filed by Defendants echoes the trial court’s ‘no fraud’ argument, but it fails to address a fatal deficiency in the court’s reasoning: the fact that the Master Deed authorized the sale of Unit 74 has nothing to do with whether the Developer committed an unlawful practice as defined by the Consumer Fraud Act (“CFA”). ¹  The crux of Count One’s CFA claim is that Developer committed an unlawful practice in connection with the sale of Unit 74 by misrepresenting its quality of title thereto.²
[brief] Plaintiff’s Counsel’s Summation was Proper  Under the Plain Error Standard (RAISED BELOW: Pa43-Pa49)  Defendants spend nearly one third of their brief arguing that supposedly improper comments made by Plaintiff’s counsel during her summation warrant the granting of a new trial.  See Db at pp. 33-49.  However, once again, the Defendants raise arguments were not preserved via a timely objection, and as such, Plaintiff’s Counsel’s comments must be viewed under the plain error standard.  Under this standard, it is clear Plaintiff’s Counsel’s comments were all proper, and Defendants’ motion for a new trial on the basis of improper comments by Plaintiff’s counsel during summation must be denied.
[brief] [...] offers no such opinion, nor does she opine that breaks in collection, difficulty ejaculating, being hard to catch, or [...]’ deviation from its standard operating procedure in leading [...] to the breeding shed were signs that he might suddenly launch a sustained attack on his handler.  Accordingly, the suggestion that frequent breaks from collection or resistance to being collected create a jury question as to whether [...] might launch a sustained attack while being led to the breeding shed is unfounded.  There is no basis from which a reasonable juror could infer that [...] attacked because he did not want to be collected.  This theory directly contradicts the opinions of [...] as well as the testimony of [...]’s handlers.  In order to create an issue for the jury, Plaintiffs needed to provide expert testimony establishing a link between [...]’s past behavior and the type of behavior exhibited in the attack, whereas [...] has been very clear in stating that [...]’ injuries were caused by a rare form of behavior that cannot be predicted unless the horse previously engaged in a similar attack.
[brief] ”  Id. (internal quotations omitted).  “The trial court must scrutinize the opposition to summary judgment and deny judgment only if the opponent can demonstrate more than the suggestion of a factual dispute. ”  Delacruz v. Alfieri, 447 N.J. Super. 1, 9, 145 A.3d 695, 699 (Law. Div. 2015); see also Brill, 142 N.J. at 539–40.  “The burden of opponents in response to a summary judgment motion is to show the court: (1) a bona fide dispute, over a (2) material fact, and (3) that enough evidence exists in favor of that position that a rational factfinder could resolve that dispute in their favor by the burden of proof that will be applied at trial. ”  Delacruz, 447 N.J. Super. at 9 (citing Brill, 142 N.J. at 540).  Moreover, in determining the existence of a genuine issue of material fact, “‘conclusory and self-serving assertions’ in certifications without explanatory or supporting facts will not defeat a meritorious motion for summary judgment. ”  Hoffman v. Asseenontv.com, Inc., 404 N.J. Super. 415, 425–26 (App. Div. 2009) (quoting Puder v. Buechel, 183 N.J. 428, 440 (2005)).  Therefore, the nonmoving party must offer “concrete evidence from which a reasonable juror could return a verdict in his favor .  . . .”  Housel for Housel v. Theodoridis, 314 N.J. Super. 597, 604 (App.  Div. 1998).  Appellant’s arguments are inapposite to this requirement as they strictly rely on self-serving certifications to support arguments and Appellant has not, and cannot, point to any concrete evidence which supports any of her allegations.  As such, there is no genuine issue of material fact requiring a trial in this matter and Respondent is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
[brief] To establish a *prima facie* case of retaliation under CEPA, a plaintiff must prove: (1) they had an objectively reasonable belief that the employer’s conduct was violating either a law, rule, regulation, or public policy; (2) they performed a “whistleblowing” activity as described in N.J.S.A. 34:19-3(a) or (c); (3) an adverse employment action was taken against them; and (4) a causal connection existed between the whistleblowing activity and the adverse employment action.  *Klein*, 377 N.J. Super. at 38-40; see also *Feldman v. Hunterdon Radiologoical*, 187 N.J. 228, 237-38 (2006); *Yurick v. State*, 184 N.J. 70, 78 (2005); *Hernandez v. Montville Tp.*, 354 N.J. Super. 467, 473 (App. Div. 2003), aff’d o.b., 179 N.J. 81 (2004).
[brief] See Da68 at 40:9-19.  In paragraph 4, Plaintiff claims “… I was never advised that the reason I was not paid my full salaries was that my patient charts were late. ”  And cites to his transcript at Da73-74 at 60-23 to 61:3 and then Da75 at 67-1 to 12.  Similarly, Plaintiff in paragraph 5 claims that the first time he was made aware that payments could be withheld from him because of his delinquent patient reports was in this lawsuit.  Plaintiff’s contracts explicitly provide that completion of the patient medical charts was a material term of his contracts with [...].
[brief] THERE IS NO DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE REFLECTING A HEIGHT RESTRICTION IN PLAINTIFFS’ GENESIS DEED.  A.  Deed  Restrictions are to be Strictly Construed.  Deed restrictions are strictly construed.  Ambiguous restrictions, therefore, are not enforceable.  Cooper River Plaza East, LLC v. Briad Group, 359 N.J. Super. 518, 532-3 (App. Div. 2003).  An ambiguous restriction will not be enforced in equity so as to impair the alienability or use of property.  Caullett v. Stanley Stilwell & Sons, Inc., 67 N.J.Super. 111, 115, 170 A.2d 52 (App.Div.1961).  As stated there:  It must be remembered that a restrictive covenant is in its inception a mere contract, subject to the interpretative doctrines of contract law which focus on the parties' mutual purpose....  A purported contract so obscure that no one can be sure of its meaning is incapable of remedy at law or equity for its alleged breach ... and therefore cannot constitute a valid impediment to title.  [Id. at 115-16, 170 A.2d 52.]  Strictly construed, our deed unambiguously contains no height restriction.  As to any suggestion that [...] was conferred some power to impose rules on building and zoning, that creates an untenable ambiguity which makes the [...] building rules unenforceable.  It would allow for substantial, unforeseen, and unlimited amendments, and would alter the nature of the covenants to which the homeowners originally agreed.  That is exactly what happened starting in 1989 when [...] first began imposing zoning and building codes, some 40 years after they were formed.  (Da491)(Db22).  Under New Jersey's well-established common law, restrictive covenants are generally disfavored.
[brief] Tenant hereby expressly grants to Landlord an offset and deduction against Tenant’s Allowance for all costs, payments and expenses Tenant is obligated to pay to Landlord pursuant to this Lease or otherwise due and owing to Landlord, at the time an installment of Tenant’s Allowance shall be due or at the time Landlord otherwise elects to pay the Tenant Allowance.  (Da17-18, Lease at § 4.02).  Tenant’s contention that this elective remedy should be deemed mandatory and Landlord should be forced to grant Tenant an “automatic deduction” each August of all amounts Tenant unilaterally decides not to pay during the applicable Lease Year is not in accordance with New Jersey law or the express terms of the Lease.
[brief] *Zentz v. Toop*, 92 N.J. Super. 105, 112 (App. Div. 1966) (explaining people can hurt themselves on almost any condition of premises, and it takes more than that to make condition unreasonably dangerous), aff’d, 50 N.J. 250 (1967).  Plaintiff’s appeal essentially seeks to impose a heightened duty on defendant to *guarantee* its patrons’ safety while using the bathtub.  [...] found a similar argument in *Mendler* unpersuasive.
[brief] [...] merely argues that because he and [...] sold their interests to [...] they were no longer responsible under any lease guarantee.  He does not affirmatively say he revoked or is now revoking the guarantee.  Thirdly, Defendants rely on letter of March 27, 2019 from counsel for [...] and [...] to Plaintiff.  In that letter counsel states that [...] and [...] revoked their guarantee by reason of the alleged lease termination of April 2016.
[brief] (16T 182-9 to 183-16)  He also told police that that incident occurred in 2018, but he testified that he was mistaken about that.  (16T 200-17 to 25)  [...] claimed on cross-examination not to know of any incidents where [...] “showed up at the [[...]’] house uninvited and threatened the family. ”  (16T 206-23 to 207-2)  Danielle [...], aunt of the decedent, testified that [...] showed up at her door in Texas in December 2018, stayed nearby at her sister’s house for “three weeks” and left on a plane to New Jersey “the week after New Year’s” in 2019.
[directive] 2C:39-3(a-f)  Prohibited Weapons  Actor possesses destructive devices or sawed off shotgun; third degree; defaced firearm, and Devices certain knives and other listed weapons, stun guns, dum-dum bullets; fourth degree.  4th Degree  $1,000 to $2,500 10% permissible 73  Updated December 2, 2013  Bail Schedule 2
[brief] Appellate Court Docket No.: [...]  Order to Show Cause with Restraints filed by [...] on November 13, 2012  Da1  Verified Complaint filed by Plaintiff, [...] on November 13, 2012.  Da4  EXHIBIT  A Agreement dated January 7, 1963 (unrecorded)  Da13  EXHIBIT B June 5, 1972  Document (unrecorded)  Da19 EXHIBIT C Order Authorizing Sale of Debtor’s Property dated August 11, 2010  Da20 EXHIBIT D Correspondence from [...], Esq.  To [...], Esq. dated May 18, 2012  Da24 EXHIBIT E Correspondence from [...], Esq.  To [...], Esq. dated June 1, 2012  Da26  EXHIBIT F November 13, 2012  Restraining Order  [...] Da32  November 28, 2012  Consent Order Da34  December 12, 2012 filed  Certification of [...] in Opposition to Order to Show Cause  Da36  EXHIBIT  1  Two aerial photographs of the subject Property  Da38  EXHIBIT 2  Report of [...], PE, PP dated December 6, 2012 with attached photographs Da41  December 12, 2012 filed  Certification of [...] in Opposition to Order to Show Cause  EXHIBIT  A Aerial photograph  EXHIBIT  B Street Opening Permit March 28, 2011  Answer and Counterclaim filed by Defendant on December 12, 2012  First Amended Answer and Counterclaim filed by Defendant filed December 19, 2012
[brief] Plaintiff cites to a statement made on YouTube by the Mayor of [...] wherein he said that [...] was “careful ‘to balance what is good for the town and what can be an increase in revenue” and that “if we wanted to just completely sell out for tax ratables we’d be building warehouses all over the place like you see in Logan. ” (Pb5).  These words, however, do not say that there would be no warehouses in [...].  The careful balance relating to warehouses is explained in the Township’s Master Plan.  In the Redevelopment Plan, it analyzes the goals of the Master Plan and notes that one of the Employment Goals is to:  [D]irect its [the Township’s] efforts toward the location and development of planned office industrial warehouse areas in the immediate vicinity of the major regional traffic arteries in order to take advantage of the regional transportation network and to limit impacts within the critical portion of the Township.  (Pa97).  Similar language is used in the Economic Goals discussed in the Redevelopment Plan.  (Pa97).  Through this Redevelopment Plan, the Township did carefully balance the need for tax ratables with the good of its residents by keeping the warehousing in the C-57 Zone, and cluster such uses near the Exit 2 entrance to the New Jersey Turnpike, which is a major regional traffic artery.
[brief] In other words, a plaintiff must produce expert testimony upon which the jury could find that the consensus of the particular profession involved recognized the existence of the standard defined by the expert.  Id.  It is insufficient for plaintiff's expert simply to follow slavishly an “accepted practice” formula; there must be some evidential support offered by the expert establishing the existence of the standard.  Id.  A standard which is personal to the expert is equivalent to a net opinion.  Id.  “Qualified expert opinion is admissible to assist the jury, N.J.R.E. 702, but there must be factual and scientific basis for an expert’s opinion. ”  Jimenez v. GNOC, Corp., 286 N.J. Super. 533, 540 (App. Div.) certif. den’d 145 N.J. 374 (1996).
[brief] Order of the Hon. [...], J.S.C. Docket No.: [...] ......................................................... Pa439 August 7, 2023  Order of the Hon. [...], J.S.C. Dismissing Complaint as to [...]: Docket No.: [...] ............ Pa378 August 7, 2023  Order of the Hon. [...], J.S.C. Dismissing Complaint as to [...]: Docket No.: [...] ........... Pa398 October 11, 2023
[brief] By letter dated May 22, 2024 (“Protest Letter”), [...] protested the bids submitted by [...] and [...], asserting that each bid must be rejected as non-responsive because they each identified archeological subcontractors who were not registered under the PWCRA at the time the bid proposals were submitted.  By letters dated June 7, 2024 (“Protest Response Letters”), [...] and [...] responded to [...]’s Protest Letter, asserting that their bids should not be rejected by the [...], arguing that they were not obligated to identify an archaeological subcontractor registered under the PWCRA (despite the explicit obligation to do so under the Solicitation and PWCRA).  0213a and 0227a.  By letter dated June 10, 2024 (“Reply Letter”), [...] responded to the Protest Response Letters, refuting each of the arguments made therein.  1398a.  By letter dated July 22, 2024, the [...] issued a written decision rejecting the bid submitted by [...] (for reasons unrelated to its failure to list a PWCRA-registered archeologist) and recommending award of the Anticipated Contract to [...].  0274a.  Thereafter, [...] passed a resolution awarding the Anticipated Contract to [...].  0269a.  **PROCEDURAL HISTORY**
[directive] Currently, the eCourts Expungement System electronically facilitates: (1) the filing of expungement petitions; (2) the petitioner's ability to withdraw and submit an amended petition and proposed order; (3) the transmittal and service of petitions to the county prosecutor and other law enforcement authorities; ( 4) the submission of an objection by the county prosecutor within 60 days of the filing of the initial petition; ( 5) the transmittal to the Office of the Public Defender of a county prosecutor's objection; (6) the transmittal of a petitioner's reply to an objection within 30 days of the filed objection; and (7) the dissemination of the expungement order.  The System incorporates all of the statutory requirements as well as additional enhancements.  Access to eCourts Expungement System .
[brief] Instead, Disputes are decided by a neutral third-party arbitrator in a process that is less formal than court” (Dr97).  Then later, in plain, bold, capitalized language, the Clause outlined that **IF EITHER PARTY ELECTS TO ARBITRATE A DISPUTE, [...] AND CUSTOMER WAIVE THE RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL AND TO OTHERWISE LITIGATE THE DISPUTE IN COURT.  BY AGREEING TO ARBITRATE, THE PARTIES MAY ALSO WAIVE OTHER RIGHTS THAT WOULD OTHERWISE BE AVAILABLE IN COURT.  FURTHER, IF EITHER PARTY ELECTS TO ARBITRATE A DISPUTE, CUSTOMER WAIVES ITS RIGHT TO PARTICIPATE IN A REPRESENTATIVE CAPACITY OR TO PARTICIPATE AS A MEMBER OF ANY CLASS ACTION RELATING TO THE DISPUTE.**  (Dr168).
[brief] [2T P48-59]  The Appellants seek to deny the Respondent her constitutional right to a jury trial based upon what the trial court concluded was a false document.  Without question, the court should assume the Respondent did not sign this arbitration agreement, which is substantiated by all of the evidence in the record and, therefore, deny the defense motion to dismiss this matter and transfer this to arbitration.  The trial court’s ruling does not compromise the Appellants’ rights to defend themselves.  The Respondent still needs to prove her case in Court.  The Appellants simply failed to prove that the Respondent knowingly waived her right to a jury trial.
[brief] [Id. at 549-50.]  In Bent, 381 N.J. Super. 30, the requestor sought the “entire file” of a criminal investigation into him by the [...] ([...]), the [...], and the [...], as well as “the factual basis underlying documented action and advice to third parties to act against my interest [having] been credited to SPD under a Federal Grand Jury credit card investigation. ”  Id. at 33-34.  Contrary to [...]’s assertion, the Appellate Division suggested that the request for the “entire file” was valid, but it noted those records had already been produced by the agency to him and thus there was no OPRA violation.
[brief] Not only does the phrase “otherwise turn from a direct course” encompass a lane change, but so does the phrase “move right or left upon a roadway,” and is thus one of the turning movements to which the signaling requirement also applies.  On this point, the manner of use of “turn” is different in the first and second sentences.  In the first sentence, the various “turns” are modified by the specific kind of turn described (i.e., turn “at an intersection,” turn “to enter a private road or driveway,” turn “from a direct course”).  Conversely, by including the word “so” before “turn” in the second sentence, the statute refers generally to all the turning movements just specified in the first sentence, including “move[s] right or left. ”  See Norman v. New Jersey State Parole Board, 457 N.J. Super. 513, 520 (App. Div. 2019) (noting that “courts should avoid a construction that would render ‘any word in the statute to be inoperative, superfluous or meaningless’”).  And because the portion of the second sentence requiring signals “in the manner hereinafter provided” indicates that subsequent portions of N.J.S.A. 39:4-126 set forth the specifics on how to signal, lane changes—as one of the types of movements falling under “so turn” as used in the second sentence—necessarily fall within the third sentence of the statute regulating “[a] signal of intention to turn right or left when required.
[brief] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30  ### TABLE OF ORDERS/JUDGMENTS
[brief] In so holding, we reject [...]’s reliance on Jones and Burt.  In Jones, the relevant defendant was a public entity dismissed pursuant to a statutory time bar not applicable here.  See N.J.S.A. 59:8-8; Jones, 230 N.J. at 164, 165 A.3d 769.  In Burt, one of two defendants against which a plaintiff brought suit was dismissed from the case because the plaintiff failed to serve on it an affidavit of merit.  See 339 N.J. Super. at 301, 771 A.2d 683.  The other defendant had filed a cross-claim against the dismissed defendant seeking contribution or indemnity.  Id. at 302, 771 A.2d 683.  The Appellate Division held that the other defendant's claim should not be vitiated by the plaintiff's failure to comply with the Affidavit of Merit Act.  Id. at 304, 771 A.2d 683.  The appellate court therefore held that fault should be allocated to the dismissed defendant even though the plaintiff could not recover from that defendant.  Id. at 307, 771 A.2d 683.  As a result, only the plaintiff was penalized for her failure to comply with the Affidavit of Merit Act.  [Id. at 375].
[brief] I.  [...] IS ENTITLED TO A NEW TRIAL UNDER BRADY, GIGLIO, AND/OR JENCKS .........................................................................................................................3  a.  [...]’ SWORN STATEMENT IS MATERIAL EVIDENCE AND ENTITLES  [...] TO A NEW TRIAL UNDER BRADY AND GIGLIO ......................................................................................3  i.  A FINDING THAT [...]’ SWORN STATEMENT IS IMMATERIAL WOULD BE INCONSISTENT WITH WELL-ESTABLISHED AUTHORITY IN THIS JURISDICTION AND OTHERS .........................................................6  b.  [...]’ SWORN STATEMENT IS BRADY MATERIAL REGARDLESS OF ITS ADMISSIBILITY AT TRIAL ........................................7  c.  JENCKS IS ENCOMPASSED AND TRIGGERED BY RULE 3:13-3 AND COMPELLED THE PRODUCTION OF THE SWORN STATEMENT PRIOR TO [...]’S TRIAL .......................9  d.  [...]’S ARGUMENT THAT THE PCR JUDGE FAILED TO CONSIDER THE SWORN STATEMENT AS GIGLIO IS UNOPPOSED AND WARRANTS REVERSAL  ............10  II.
[directive] 귀하가 다음의  제1 급 및 제2 급 범죄들 중 하나, 또는 그런 범죄의 미수  또는 모의에 유죄시인을 하는 경우에만 다음의 질문들에 답변해야 합니다:  2001 년6 월29 일 이후에 발생한 살인, 가중 살인, 차량에 의한 살인, 가중 폭행, 법집행관의 무장해제, 유괴, 가중 성폭행, 성폭행, 강도, 차량 강탈, 다른 사람을 사망 또는 심한 신체적인 상해 위험에 처하게 하는 가중 방화, 주거침입 절도, 어떤 사람에게 신체적인 상해를 입히겠다고 위협하거나, 또는 신체적인 감금 또는 다른 범죄를 저지르겠다고 위협함으로써 다른 사람의 재산을 취득하는 강요에 의한 절도, CDS 설비의 제조 및 판매에 사용하는 부비 트랩 또는 약물 유발성 사망에 대한 엄격책임, 또는 2002 년6 월18 일 이후에 발생한 테러리즘, 또는 화학무기, 생물학적 작용제,핵 또는 방사선 기구들의 생산 또는 소지, 또는 2008 년1 월13 일 이후에 발생한 제1 급 갈취, 또는 2013 년8 월14 일 이후에 발생한 아동 포르노그래피, 또는 2013 년11 월1 일 이후에 발생한 총기 밀매.