ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] While the doctor found this factor applicable because “she believed the defendant was the victim of physical abuse[,]” defendant himself denied any such abuse.  (5T20-2 to 11).  “There are no documents as part of the lengthy record created by the defense in support of its petition for re-sentencing that independently supports any physical abuse of the defendant. ” (5T20-11 to 14).  The judge also found that the record made by the defendant’s family at the hearing… belies the contention that the defendant lacked guidance to ensure positive emotional, intellectual, and social development.  The defendant did and does have a positive male role model in his stepfather who has been involved in the defendant’s life in a positive and consistent manner since the defendant was five years of age.  The fact that [...] rebuked some of that concern and support does not mean that that support did not exist for him.  [...] has remained involved and continues to provide emotional support and guidance to this defendant.  The testimony of defendant’s other family members also made it clear that the defendant was an[d] is loved by his immediate family as well as his stepfather.  [(5T20-15 to 21-5). ]  Although defendant’s biological father was an uninvolved, negative role model in defendant’s life, and defendant grew up poor in a difficult and often violent environment, those facts, “without more and specific information detailing this defendant’s PTSD as relied upon by [...],” were not enough to support finding that Miller factor two applies here.
[brief] For the foregoing reasons, the Court should find that the Trial Court improperly valued Plaintiff’s interest in [...] as de minimus, dismissed Plaintiff’s claims against [...] and [...] and prevented Plaintiff from participating in [...] wind-up of [...].  Accordingly, these aspects of the May 8, 2023 Final Judgment, June 26, 2023 and August 30, 2023  Orders denying Plaintiffs’ motions for reconsideration should be vacated in part, and this case should be remanded.
[brief] B.  The court erred in its application of all five Miller factors.  When imposing a new sentence pursuant to Comer, courts must consider the Miller factors alongside traditional sentencing considerations such as the relevant aggravating and mitigating factors.  Comer, 249 N.J. at 408.  Sentencing courts must, as always, “explain and make a thorough record of their findings to ensure fairness and facilitate review. ”  Id. at 404 (citing to N.J.S.A. 2C:43-2(e) (requiring a statement of reasons on the record) and R. 3:21-4(h) (same)).  Courts may only rely upon “competent, credible evidence in the record” and “[s]peculation and suspicion must not infect the sentencing process[.]”  State v. Case, 220 N.J. 49, 64 (2014).  Courts cannot simply turn a blind eye to evidence in the record that requires mitigation.  Id. at 64 (“Mitigating factors that are called to the court’s attention should not be ignored, and when amply based in the record….they must be found[.]”) (citation omitted).  Comer resentencing courts must also be mindful to disentangle the nature of the incident itself from the juvenile offender’s current character as an adult.
[brief] ”  *Id.* at 340.  “[T]hat question was ultimately for the jury to decide. ”  *Ibid.*  This was especially true because there were “no wounds” for the medical examiner to analyze and he instead based his conclusion on “circumstances leading up to the accident that were within the understanding of the average juror. ”  *Ibid.*  The jury was “as competent as” the medical examiner to analyze these facts and reach a conclusion as to the ultimate issue in the case.
[brief] This Motion was predicated on a Certification from the Defense insurance adjuster, [...], which was dated September 20, 2023 – one day after the Notice of Motion (Da67-68).  Defense counsel argued that the Certification revealed that Plaintiff had stretched at the rear of the courtroom in view of some of the array (7T, at 5:2-7:19).  In denying the Motion, [...] was concerned by the factual inaccuracy of the Certification (7T, at 26:17-27:9).  The Certification insinuated that the courtroom was unsupervised while voir dire was conducted because sheriff’s officers were only located at the end of the hallway (Da62-63; 7T, at 26:21-27:9).  However, the reality was that there were two sheriff’s officers present in the courtroom at all times (7T, at 27:3-9).  [...] also expressed incredulity with the timing of the Certification.  [...] observed the entire trial, but never alerted Defense counsel to any potential prejudice such that Defense counsel could have objected during voir dire (7T, at 27:10-18).  In Her Honor’s own words:  But that was not done on day one of the jury selection.  It was not done on day two, three or four of the trial.  It was never brought to the Court’s attention that there was any concern here.  And, again, none of the Court personnel ever indicated that the plaintiff was potentially doing something, um, impermissible in attempting to in any way influence these jurors.  (7T, at 27:18-25).  From there, [...] reaffirmed how plaintiffs may conduct themselves in the courtroom.  “We have to take parties as they come. ” (7T, at 28:5).  Litigants who are in pain, such as Plaintiff, may limp, or grimace, or require accommodations from the Court; and the Court has no power to rid them of these afflictions (7T, at 28:5-28:24).  Such manifestations of pain, absent any further, inappropriate conduct, are in no way prejudicial (7T, at 28:5-28:24).  And again, in this case, “There was never indication – any indication – I state there’s still no indication that [Plaintiff] was acting inappropriately or acting out before the jurors. ” (7T, at 28:25-29:3).  In concluding her opinion, [...] reminded Defendants that rather than objecting to Plaintiff’s actions or on-stand demeanor, Defendants tried to use them against him in their argument (7T, at 29:3-11).  For these reasons, Her Honor found that the Certification presented no new evidence, and therefore, she reaffirmed her decision to preserve the jury’s verdict in this case (7T, at 29:12-25).
[brief] New Jersey Court Rule 1:7-2 clearly states that:  For the purpose of reserving questions for review or appeal relating to rulings or orders of the court or instructions to the jury, a party, at the time the ruling or order is made or sought, shall make known to the court specifically the action which the party desires the court to take or the party’s objection to the action taken and the grounds therefor….  A party shall only be prejudiced by the absence of an objection if there was an opportunity to object to a ruling, order or charge.  R. 1:7-2.
[directive] [...] 180 06/25/56 1123 (2)  [...] 40 01/09/63 1495 (6)  [...] 180 03/05/64 1557 (1) 06/01/64 1570 (1)  Revoked [...] 95 08/06/62 1475 (3)  [...] 95 10/25/61 1423 (5)  [...] 40 08/25/60 1356 (2)  [...] 80 02/28/66 1667 (3)  [...] 45 02/23/62 1444 (3)  110 07/16/62 1471 (2)  [...] 11/05/38 279 (8)  Revoked [...] 60 12/27/60 1374 (2)  55 04/14/64 1563 (4)  06/06/66 1677 (1)  Revoked [...] 55 04/07/64 1562 (1)  [...] 70 08/11/58 1242 (3)  [...] 178 12/27/54 1045 (6)  [...] 70 07/27/64 1580 (5)  [...] 180 04/20/61 1392 (1)  [...] 100 09/21/64 1587 (1)  License of [...] 12/21/50 892 (2)  Revoked License of [...] 55 07/09/59 1293 (3)  210 12/20/62 1493 (1)  License of [...] 125 01/19/67 1722 (2)  License of [...] 30 06/22/39 326 (1)  License of [...]
[brief] ”  Hagrish v. Olson, 254 N.J. Super. 133, 138 (App. Div. 1992).  In fact, “[w]here the parties agree upon the essential terms of a settlement, so that the mechanics can be ‘fleshed out’ in a writing to be thereafter executed, the settlement will be enforced notwithstanding the fact the writing does not materialize because a party later reneges. ”  Lahue v. Pio Costa, 263 N.J. Super. 469, 475 (App. Div. 1997).  The standard of review of a motion to enforce a settlement is de novo.  Gold Tree Spa, Inc., v. PD Nail Corp. 305 N.J. Super. 240, 245 (App. Div. 2023).  However, a trial court’s findings of facts “‘are considered binding on appeal when supported by adequate, substantial, and credible evidence. ’ ”
[brief] The court in its discretion may make an allowance out of such a fund, but no allowance shall be made as to issues triable of right by a jury.  A fiduciary may make payments on account of fees for legal services rendered out of a fund entrusted to the fiduciary for administration, subject to approval and allowance or to disallowance by the court upon settlement of the account.  “It is well established that under the American Rule, litigants generally are responsible for their own counsel fees unless otherwise authorized by statute, court rule or a contract. ”  Porreca v. City of Millville, 419 N.J.Super 212, 224 (App Div. 2011).
[brief] Respondent’s argument that [...] is looking for greater rights than state employees is a misplaced.  [...]’s position is that when a prosecutor’s office stands in the shoes of the [...] on a law enforcement issue, it is entitled to representation.  It cannot be over emphasized that in the present matter, pursuant to the IAPP and Directive 22-14, either the [...] or the [...] was required to conduct the IA investigation because the subject of the IA was the Deputy Chief of the police department.  Clearly, under those circumstances, both the [...] and the [...] stood on an equal footing as either of them could have done the investigation.  The fact that the [...] routinely has the local prosecutor handle those investigations, does not detract from the equal status shared under Directive 22-14 and the IAPP.  The need for the [...] to provide coverage is especially critical when the underlying lawsuit directly challenges Directive 22-14 and the IAPP and argues for a remedy not afforded by either—a remedy that [...] could not provide even if it wanted to because it is bound by the [...]’s Directive and IAPP.  Despite that, rather than defend its own Directive and IAPP, the [...] walked away and has taken the position it does not have to defend [...], or its own Directive and IAPP.  To use a euphemism, the [...] left the [...] “holding the bag” for the [...]’s actions.  To be clear, the [...] is not arguing that it has greater rights, rather [...] is asserting that when it stands in the place of the [...], it should be treated as if the [...] was the real party in interest.
[brief] Finally, the Commissioner’s brief worries that, if [...] were not able to withdraw it would be “beholden to the district with which they merged. ” (Cb15).  [...] raises a similar argument when it asserts that adoption of Appellants’ position would cause [...] to effectively surrender its autonomy with regard to public education.  (SBb14).  However, the people of [...] are not helpless outcasts who are subject to the whims of a school board in which they have no voice.  Rather, members of the [...] are elected at large from both [...] and [...].  See N.J.S.A. 18A:8-47(a).  The people of [...], like any other constituency within the geographic boundaries of a school district can put forth candidates and elect members who share their policy goals.  The fact that this may be an uphill battle is not a basis to expand the withdrawal statutes beyond their express language.  Rather than frustrate the Legislature’s intent, it represents the finality inherent in the Legislature’s instruction to eliminate non-operating school districts.
[brief] Town of Kearny v. Brandt, 214 N.J. 76 (2013) .......................................................................................15  United Hearts, L.L.C. v. Zahabian, 407 N.J. Super. 379 (App. Div. 2009)......................................................... 28, 36  Van Horn v. Van Horn, 56 N.J.L. 318 (E. & A. 1894)....................................................................18  Varrallo v. Hammond Inc., 94 F.3d 842 (3d Cir. 1996)...........................................................................19  Velantzas v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 109 N.J. 189 (1988) ....................................................................................24 Wellington v. Est. of Wellington, 359 N.J. Super. 484 (App. Div. 2003)..........................................................24
[brief] *State v. Gonzales*, 227 N.J. 77, 82, 101 (2016).  consistent with the caselaw, that to establish counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion to suppress, defendant must prove that such a motion would have been granted had it been filed and a failure to raise unsuccessful legal arguments does not constitute ineffective assistance.  (See Da105 (citing Worlock, 117 N.J. at 625).
[brief] Specifically, counsel for the City stated that “the charges of impairment on the job we are going to withdraw. ” (T1 9:15-18; T1 11:4-12).  [...], OAL DKT. NO. [...], 2009 WL 1425165, at p.4-5 (May 15, 2009) (Pa238) the subject officer was charged with nine (9) separate specifications, primarily predicated upon [...]’ failure to report various information to his superiors at the [...]. \(^6\)  This included failure to report a threat made against a fellow officer by an unknown male who had approached appellant on March 15, 2007.  On or about March 30, 2007, the [...] was advised by another officer about the threat made and [...]’ knowledge of who issued the threat.  [...] was charged with violating several department regulations based upon his failure to contact Central Communications or Internal Affairs immediately after the incident.  Charges against [...] were sustained based on a finding he was obligated to report the incident to a supervisor and should have detained the individual who issued the threat.  \textit{Id.}  Despite the multiple charges of neglecting to report information to the Department and/or his superiors, [...]’ removal was overturned by an ALJ and a suspension was imposed.  [...]’s conduct was not as egregious as Officer [...]’ since there was no threat of harm to another officer caused by his alleged failure to report information.  The charges against [...] consist of:  failure to report unlicensed  \(^6\)  The officer was separately charged with an inability to perform the duties of a police officer under N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.3(a)(3).  drivers being pulled over in his vehicle (for which he was not charged with any crime or wrongdoing); failure to report his legitimate use of lawfully prescribed medications; failure to report leaving his residence while on sick leave; and, permitting unlicensed drivers to operate his vehicle.  While [...] vigorously disputes the veracity of these charges in the event any or all were sustained, [...]’s termination would still be unjustified.  By way of further example, [...] faced criminal charges and was charged by the [...] with false swearing and perjury.
[brief] Defendants state that [...] testified that the process for obtaining the RAO could take several years (see Db19), but Defendants fail to indicate that [...] made that statement with the assumption that redevelopment would be occurring during that same time period.  (6T48:21 to 49:9 (“Well, it depends on the construction schedule, first of all . . . .”)).  Defendants state that throughout this litigation and at trial, “Plaintiff stated that the DEP would never accept the RIR as filed. ” (See Db20.)  However, the testimony cited by Defendants provides as follows: “So now we have to now accept this inferior document, which ultimately will be rejected or potentially, you know, further questioned or further scrutiny from the DEP. ” (2T160:2-13.)  In fact, the DEP did precisely that, both questioning and scrutinizing Defendants’ RIR filing over the course of approximately eleven (11) months through at least one of the last days of trial (and perhaps continuing).
[brief] Because it ruled that [...] was not enrolled in the CCIP at the time of the Accident and that the Code did not apply to mandate coverage for [...], the trial court did not address [...]’s further argument that rescission would be appropriate if coverage were found.  However, as an alternative ground for affirming the trial court’s judgment, even if it is determined that [...] was enrolled in the CCIP at the time of the Accident, rescission is appropriate as to [...] due to [...]’s material representation in the enrollment process.  “‘[A] representation by the insured, whether contained in the policy itself or in the application for insurance, will support the forfeiture of the insured's rights under the policy if it is untruthful, material to the particular risk assumed by the insurer, and actually and reasonably relied upon by the insurer in the issuance of the policy. ’”  First Am. Title Ins. Co. v. Lawson, 177 N.J. 125, 137 (2003).  A misrepresentation is material if, when made, “a reasonable insurer would have considered the misrepresented fact relevant to its concerns and important in determining its course of action. ”  Longobardi v. Chubb Ins. Co. of N.J., 121 N.J. 530, 542 (1990).  To be material, the false statement must have “‘naturally and reasonably influence[d] the judgment of the underwriter in making the contract at all, or in estimating the degree or character of the risk, or in fixing the rate of premium.
[brief] Our Supreme Court has applied the general rules of statutory construction to the FDCPA:  When interpreting a statute, the Legislature’s intent is paramount and, generally, the statutory language is the best indicator of that intent.  Statutory words are ascribed their ordinary meaning and are read in context with related provisions, giving sense to the legislation as a whole.  This Court’s duty is clear: construe and apply the statute as enacted.  *Hodges v. Sasil Corp.*, 189 N.J. 210, 223 (2007) (internal cites and quotation marks omitted).  Thus, when “the plain language leads to a clear and unambiguous result, then our interpretative process is over. ”  *State v. Courtney*, 243 N.J. 77, 86 (2020) (quoting *Johnson v. Roselle EZ Quick LLC*, 226 N.J. 370, 386 (2016)).  See, *Comm’r v. Brown*, 380 U.S. 563, 571 (1965) (applying the same principle to interpreting federal statutes).  “When that intent is revealed by a statute’s plain language—assigning to the words used ‘their ordinary meaning and significance’—we need look no further. ”  *Wilson ex rel. Manzano v. City of Jersey City*, 209 N.J. 558, 572 (2012).  Under those circumstances, a court may not resort to any extrinsic sources, such as legislative history, when construing a statute.  When the statute’s plain language read in the context of related statutory provisions leads to an unambiguous result, that language is the conclusive evidence of the legislature’s intent.  Hence, it is improper for a court to consider “extrinsic evidence, including legislative history, committee reports, and contemporaneous construction” suggesting a different result unless it first concludes the statutory words are ambiguous or the plain meaning of the unambiguous statutory language leads to an absurd result because the result frustrates the statute’s purpose.  *Courtney*, 243 N.J. at 86; and see *Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Services, Inc.*, 545 U.S. 546, 568-69 (2005) (addressing the limitations on the use of legislative history).  Here, the statute is 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(b), which states:
[brief] [...]’s material misrepresentation was actually in conjunction with the Certification of [...] dated September 28, 2011 made in support of her motion to set aside the PSA. \(^{32}\) \(^{32}\)  On September 30, 2011, said certification was filed with the Court.  *(See Da221-239)*  This certification was deceptively drafted by the attorneys for [...] and adopted by [...].
[brief] By virtue of their immaturity, juveniles are less likely to grasp the complexities of the legal system, less trusting of authority figures, and unable to appreciate the long-term consequences of their decisions.  Graham, 560 U.S. at 78.  They are also “less likely than adults to work effectively with their lawyers to aid in their defense. ”  Ibid.; (See 3T:65-8 to 18) ([...]’s testimony that adolescents tend to trust peers more than adults, undermining their ability to work with their attorneys).
[brief] (Id.).  [...] denied Plaintiffs’ application citing the height restrictions contained in the rules to which all [...] members, including Plaintiffs, agreed to “faithfully abide. ” (Da238).  Plaintiffs then filed suit.  Before the close of discovery, Plaintiffs filed a motion for partial summary judgment on Counts 1 and 2 of their Complaint against [...].  In granting Plaintiffs summary judgment on Count 1, the trial court found, among other things, that when [...] was formed “it did not appear that it had any enforcement powers over the restrictive covenants created by [...],” 1T44:16-18, and at the time of the Genesis Deed’s conveyance there “was no entity formed at that time” as a “homeowners association that was part . . . of that whole development scheme. ”  1T47:15-23.  The trial court further found that there is no language in the Genesis Deed to place a purchaser “on notice that ‘new restrictions may be imposed. ’”  1T48:49.  Since the Genesis Deed did not expressly include any building height restrictions, the trial court found that Plaintiffs were not subject to [...]’s rules imposing a height restriction because it was “outside the plaintiffs’ chain of title. ”  1T49:21-24.  Despite this ruling, the trial court purported to exercise “judicial restraint” and limit its ruling only to Plaintiffs without directly addressing whether [...] “has a right to enforce any restrictions related to building within the Ocean Beach community. ”  1T50.  In sum, the trial court wrongly granted Plaintiffs summary judgment on Count 1 of their Complaint alleging *ultra vires* action on the part of [...]. (Da853).
[brief] N.J.S.A. 19:49-5 expressly states that personal choice ballots cast for candidates whose names already appear on the machine “shall not be counted. ”  The statute is direct and mandatory – such ballots are void, period.  This clarity is grounded in a long evolution of the law.  The right to cast a personal choice vote was not always a given in New Jersey.  Courts in the early twentieth century debated whether voters even had a right to write in a candidate of their choosing.  See Carlough v. Ackerman, 74 N.J.L. 16, 19 (1906) (discussing the dictum in the concurrence of State v. Black, 54 N.J.L. 446 (Sup. Ct. 1892), regarding the voter’s asserted right to write in a candidate’s name).  That right now exists, but it is narrowly drawn.
[directive] The defendant'). the confine those of date the effective prior to pretrial release revoke to existing authority court's the affect to construed be would pretrial of denial the authorize to 11 paragraph I, Article to amendment of the date effective the on depend [that sections added).  (emphasis 31, 2014) (June 216th Reprint, Lee.  Second 946, S. to Statement release]."  69  Page or community, or person any the other danger will a to (ii) pose threaten, injure, or process, criminal justice the or obstruct attempt to will obstruct (iii) or prospective witness a intimidate, threaten, or injure, to or attempt intimidate, or juror.  Compelling Absent Filed Be Must of Release Revocation for Motion a Where Cases 8.3 Circumstances.
[brief] ____________________  4  Notably, bad faith and flagrancy are not synonymous—indeed, if the police were acting in bad faith, then a defendant who failed to obey police orders could not be convicted of obstruction at all, and there would be no need to determine if there was an intervening circumstance.  See State v. Crawley, 187 N.J. 440, 460-61, 461 n.8 (2006) (stating that a prerequisite for a conviction of obstruction is “that the police officer act in good faith”).  CONCLUSION