ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The Standard of Review.  (3T 81:20-91:20, Pa1199).  The Trial Court correctly determined, on motion for reconsideration of the Court’s order denying summary judgment, that no genuine issues of material fact existed so as to preclude summary judgment on Plaintiff’s discrimination and retaliation claims under the NJLAD.  The review of the entry of summary judgment is de novo and this Court applies the same standard as the trial court.  Rios v. Meda Pharm., Inc., 247 N.J. 1, 13 (2021).  When deciding a motion for summary judgment under R. 4:46-2, “the determination whether there exists a genuine issue with respect to a material fact challenged requires the motion judge to consider whether the competent evidential materials presented, when viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party in consideration of the applicable evidentiary standard, are sufficient to permit a rational fact finder to resolve the alleged disputed issue in favor of the non-moving party.
[brief] The trial court’s statement contradicts its prior opinion regarding similar circumstances.  According to the trial judge’s prior ruling, the judge appeared to understand how plaintiff might handle a case dismissed without prejudice based on the order issued on October 22, 2021 (Pa44 – Pa48), which stated:  "Although any subsequent filing under wrongful death or survival actions might be barred by the statute of limitations that governs these actions, the breach of contract causes of action included in the proposed amended complaint would not be similarly prohibited due to the longer limitations period.  If recovery is sought under these causes of action, the plaintiff must bring a new complaint."  As the court acknowledged, both the original complaint filed on May 28, 2021 (Pa3 – Pa6) and the amendment filed on August 16, 2021 (Pa35 – Pa43) were validly submitted and accepted.  Given that the statute of limitations for the three causes of action in this case—breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, and consumer protection statutes under the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act—is six years, plaintiff was permitted to refile her case under these claims after the case was dismissed without prejudice for the second time on May 12, 2023.  This should be allowable until July 14, 2025.  C.
[directive] 4.  Victim and/or Defendant have more than 1 child altogether  SAMPLE QUESTIONS:  How many children do you have?  How many does your current Partner (Defendant) have?  Count the biological or adopted children of the Defendant.  ✔  Count the biological or adopted children of the Victim.  ✔  Count only living children, whether they are minors or adults, and whether they are living with the Victim, Defendant, or elsewhere.  ✔  There must be a total of at least 2 children to score 1 for this Item.  ________________________________________________________________________________________________________
[directive] [Wi/Yes]  [Non/No] c.  Ke w ta kab pase plis tan nan tretman an ke tan ou ta pase si yo ta kondane w a tan nan prizon leta? that you could spend more time in treatment than you would spend if sentenced to state prison?  Dat/Date  Akize a/Defendant LaDefans/Defense Avoka  Attorney Komisè Gouvènman/Prosecutor Fòm Revize Kreye pa Direktif #01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 11080-Haitian Creole paj 2 nan 2 Revised Form Promulgated by Directive #01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 11080-Haitian Creole page 2 of 2
[brief] Put another way, the error must be “sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt as to whether [it] led the jury to a result it otherwise might not have reached. ”  *State v. Williams*, 168 N.J. 323, 336 (2001).  The plain error standard is a “high bar,” to “provide[] a strong incentive for counsel to interpose a timely objection, enabling the trial court to forestall or correct a potential error. ”  *State v. Santamaria*, 236 N.J. 390, 404 (2019) (internal citations omitted).
[brief] Pa61.  Each of these defendants, in addition to Defendants [...] and [...], are collectively referred to as the “Railroad defendants”.  On April 20, 2021, Plaintiff stipulated to dismiss Defendant the [...] without prejudice.  Da1.  On May 11, 2021, Defendant [...] filed an Answer to the Complaint with crossclaims and affirmative defenses.  Da3.  On May 28, 2021, Defendant [...], filed its Answer to the Complaint with crossclaims and affirmative defenses.  Pa79.  On July 23, 2021, the Court dismissed the Complaint against Defendant [...] without prejudice pursuant to R. 1:13-7.  Da16.  Following the exchange of paper discovery, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint on October 8, 2021, adding [...], the operator of the light rail train, as a party to the lawsuit.
[brief] (Pa227, Par. 2)  In terms of the decision to transfer Plaintiff, [...] HR Direction [...] explained:  I can’t leave [...] in an environment where she’s suggesting she’s being sexually harassed by a person I have no authority over.  I can’t suspend him.  I can’t change his shift.  I can’t do anything to him, but if I don’t do something to her, I’m leaving her in harm’s way.  So I have to do something.  (Pa655, Defendant [...] deposition transcript, T119:3-10)  Plaintiff herself acknowledged that she would accept the transfer if [...] had “no control or ability” to remove [...] from the [...].  (Pa324, [...] deposition transcript, T103:20-T104:3, T106:2-9).  Just as significant, Plaintiff admitted that her job responsibilities and salary were not changed due to the move to the [...].  (Id., T106:16-T107:12)  As a result of the Plaintiff’s allegations, the [...] through the [...], performed an investigation into the Plaintiff’s claims.
[directive] 6.  The prosecutor must determine whether any Special Application and Enhancement Features(s) apply to the defendant’s conduct.  See Section 11.  (For example, in the event that the defendant’s conduct involved distribution of a controlled dangerous substance to a minor or to a pregnant female, the prosecutor must tender a plea offer fixed at twice that otherwise prescribed pursuant to the preceding steps in the calculation.  If the defendant committed the present offense while on probation, the prosecutor must add six (6), or in some cases twelve (12), months of parole ineligibility to the plea offer.  See Section 11.5.
[brief] [...] her Facebook page did not make any reference to the Board nor her membership on the same (Ca016-017) (emphasis added).  This assertion is directly contrary to abundant evidence in the record, it altogether ignores [...]’ factual findings, and it is demonstrably factually incorrect.  Respondent posted a photograph of herself swearing in to the Board on her Facebook page, she stated in plain language that she was now a Board member, and within 5 days, while the prior posts were still up, made both posts that were the subject of Appellants’ Motion for Summary Decision.  (Ca199-202; Ca214-226).  It is difficult to imagine better evidence that Respondent held herself out as a Board member when she made those posts.  As a result, the Board itself issued two Resolutions denouncing her posts—following protest against the Board directly caused by Respondent.  (Ca072, Ca075-076).  It is frankly absurd to say there is “no factual evidence” tying her Facebook account to her Board membership, and that her page “did not make any reference to the Board of her membership on same. ” (Ca016-017).  She made repeated references to her Board membership.  The Commission’s finding to the contrary was at least clear error, and was most certainly not supported by substantial evidence in the record at the time.
[directive] 26-2 requires warrants  Rule 3:3-1(c)(1) on the Bail Schedule 2 charges of robbery, criminal sexual contact, second degree aggravated assault, aggravated arson, arson, burglary, first or second degree violations of Chapter 35 (drug offenses), any crime involving the possession or use of a firearm, or conspiracies or attempts to commit such crimes.  Rule 3:3-1(c)(2-6) (indictable offenses) and Rule 7:2-2(b)(1-6) delineate factors regarding whether a warrant or summons should issue for other offenses.  Rule 3:26-1 (indictable offenses) and Rule 7:4-1 (non-indictable offenses) delineate factors to be considered when setting bail and provide for the option of R.O.R. bail where appropriate.  Bail Ranges for attempts or conspiracies should generally be the same as the actual substantive crime.  Statute Charge Description Degree Bail Range 10% Cash Bail Option commerce; or conspires to do so.  2C:41-2  Racketeering  If pattern of racketeering activity involves a crime of violence, or a crime of the first degree or 2nd Degree 50,000 to 200,000  No 10% (continued) (continued) the use of firearms, first degree.  All other violations, second degree.  Violation of Community  Actor knowingly commits violation of conditions of Community Supervision for Life / Parole 2C:43-6.4d  Supervision for Life / 4th Degree $2,500 to $7,500  10% permissible Supervision for Life.  Parole  Supervision for Life  Non-Compliance with Actor who is monitored under Sex Offender  Monitoring by the State Parole Board fails to N.J.S. 30:4-123.94  Sex Offender 3rd Degree $25,000 to $50,000  10% permissible comply with requirements.  Monitoring 82  Updated December 2, 2013  Bail Schedule 2
[directive] “Sustained finding” refers to any finding where a preponderance of the evidence shows an officer violated any law, regulation, directive, guideline policy or procedure issued by the Attorney General or County Prosecutor; agency protocol; standard operating procedure, rule or training, following the last supervisory review of the incident(s) during the internal affairs process where the deadline for appeal has passed or following a ruling by a hearing officer, arbitrator, Administrative Law Judge, Civil Service Commission, or the Superior Court where the deadline for any subsequent appeal has passed.  Allegations that cannot be sustained, are not credible, or have resulted in the exoneration of an employee, including where the previous finding has either been vacated, or overturned on the merits in any subsequent action, generally are not considered to be sustained findings subject to the disclosure requirements of this Policy.
[brief] Defendant further claims that [...]’s statement to the court later at trial that her husband had told her she might know members of the victim’s extended family because they attended a church which the couple occasionally had visited.  However, the record reflects that her husband did not inform [...] who those family members were, she did not recognize any of [...]’s family members who attended the court proceedings, and she affirmed that it would not affect her impartiality:  THE COURT:
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[brief] (2T178-1 to 4; 4T52-15 to 23).  There was a second stab wound on the victim’s back.  (4T50-1 to 3).  This stab wound was to the right of the midline, passing through muscles and into the right chest cavity and the right lung.  (4T50-3 to 6).  The wound was seven centimeters in depth or two and three-quarters of an inch.  (4T50-7 to 9).  The knife recovered at the crime scene in the victim’s hand also was consistent with causing this stab wound.  (4T50-20 to 22; 4T79-25 to 4T80-3).  The medical examiner was not able to discern the sharp and blunt end of the direction of this stab wound.  (4T68-1 to 8).  The wound could have been inflicted while the victim and the assailant were face to face, however, it would have been hard to reach over and cause the wound.  (4T68-9 to 13).  There was on the victim’s shoulder a superficial, incised wound, which was caused by the cutting edge of a knife being dragged on the surface of the skin, creating a wound but not as deep as a stab wound.  (4T44-21 to 25; 4T45-5 to 9; 4T45-1 to 4).  There was another incised wound on the left forehead and just above the left eyebrow.  (4T59-8 to 11).  The medical examiner found incised wounds on the face.  (4T59-23 to 15).  There was an abrasion on the nose and on the left shin, which were incurred at the time of the stabbings.  (4T59-22 to 23; 4T63-3; 4T63-6 to 8).  There also were defensive wounds on the victim’s left hand.
[brief] ....Death; dismemberment; significant disfigurement or significant scarring; displaced fractures; loss of a fetus; or a permanent injury within a reasonable degree of medical probability, other than scarring or disfigurement  To defeat the motion under the Brill standard, plaintiffs were required to produce credible medical evidence sufficient that a rational factfinder could resolve the alleged disputed issue in their favor.  In the absence of competent expert opinion, Plaintiff cannot prove that the accident caused any permanent injuries.  See Espinal v. Arias, 391 N.J. Super. 49, 58 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 192 N.J. 482 (2007); Garcia v. Lawrence, No. A-3566-18T2, 2020 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1516 (App. Div. July 28, 2020); Asuncion v. Farrell, No. A-2258-08Tl, 2009 N.J Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1681 (App. Div. June 25, 2009).
[brief] The legislation also contains more guardrails to protect against municipal overburden.  For instance, it provides that SDA districts spending below adequacy and located in municipalities in which the equalized total tax rate is greater than the Statewide average equalized total tax rate will not be subject to a reduction in State aid.  N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-68(c).  And because those districts experience no reduction in aid, they are not required to increase their levies over the prior year by 2%.  N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-5d.  Also, SDA districts spending above adequacy with an equalized total tax rate in excess of the Statewide average equalized total tax rate will be subject to a proportionate aid reduction that does \textsuperscript{13}
[brief] Ibid.  Appellant, under any metric, failed to satisfy that burden.  Necessarily, before demonstrating that a nonconforming use preceded the ordinance that made the use nonconforming, the applicant must first show that the enacting of an ordinance caused a previously authorized and conforming use to be nonconforming to the new ordinance—a showing that, as the trial court correctly found, Appellant failed to make in the proceedings below (Aa278-Aa279).  That ruling was correct and should not be disturbed on appeal.
[brief] The Defendant specifically argued that aggravating factor nine, the need for deterrence, and mitigating factor eight, that defendant’s conduct was “the result of circumstances unlikely to recur” could not both be found by a sentencing court.  *Id.* at 69.  The Court declined to find as much.  *Id.* at 79.  Instead, it noted that,  In exceptional cases, even if the record demonstrates that the offense at issue arose in circumstances unlikely to recur, thus supporting a finding as to mitigating factor eight, a defendant could nonetheless pose a risk of recidivism, requiring specific deterrence within the meaning of N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(9).  While such a case will be rare, we decline to hold that aggravating factor nine and mitigating factor eight can never apply in the same sentencing.
[brief] As argued in Points I and II, [...]’s motions and PCR petition should have been granted (or at the very least he established a prima facie case).  To the extent the Court disagrees on the current incomplete record, the entire matter must be remanded so PCR counsel can complete investigations and submissions, supplement the existing record, complete motion practice, and present argument, thus protecting [...]’s constitutionally-guaranteed meaningful opportunity to present his case and effective assistance of PCR counsel.
[brief] See *Hoover*, 472 N.J.Super. 230.  In *Hoover*, this Court faced a similar issue regarding an AOM’s compliance with *N.J.S.A.* 2A:53A-41(a) in a case for medical malpractice.  The plaintiff claimed, due to the negligence of the defendants during a total knee replacement, that she suffered a damaged popliteal artery and vein, causing blood to pool and leading to permanent injuries.  *Id.* at 233-234.  The plaintiff filed a single AOM prepared by a board-certified orthopedic surgeon against the defendant doctor and assisting nurse.  *Id.*  The defense objected to the AOM, arguing that the AOM was not sufficient against the nurse because it was not prepared by a similar nurse.  *Id.*  The trial court agreed and dismissed the plaintiff’s complaint with prejudice.  *Id.*  The trial court further denied the plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration as to the dismissal.  *Id.* at 235.  On appeal, this Court reversed the trial court’s denial of the plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration.  This Court reasoned that the plaintiff did in fact comply with *N.J.S.A.* 2A:53A-27.  Here, the Appellant has also provided substantial evidence and arguments how she did in fact comply with the AOM statutes.  The trial court similarly denied the Appellant’s Motion for Reconsideration of the issues.  144a-157a.  Based on *Hoover*, this Court has a clear basis to reverse the trial court’s denial of the Plaintiff’s Motion.  Therefore, the Appellant respectfully requests that this Honorable Court reverse the trial court’s October 7, 2022, Order denying the Appellant’s Motion for Reconsideration.
[brief] POINT 1 ...........................................................................................................  1  The Court Erred in Deciding Not to Enforce [...]’s Order (Da18)  POINT 2 ...........................................................................................................  3  The Court Violated Defendants’ Right to Fairness and Due Process (Da18)  POINT 3 ...........................................................................................................  5  The Court Overlooked Controlling Law with Regard To Trust Interpretation (Da18)  POINT 4 ...........................................................................................................  12  The Court Reformed the Trust Without Clear and Convincing Evidence (Da18)  POINT 5 ...........................................................................................................  13  The Court Erred in Denying Leave to File Supplemental Complaints (Da60, Da62)  POINT 6 ...........................................................................................................  14  The Court Erred in Awarding Sanctions For Frivolous Litigation (Da91)  POINT 7 ...........................................................................................................  14  The Court Overlooked New Evidence Supporting Defendants’ Claims (Da91)  LIST OF PARTIES | Name | Designation | Trial Court Role | Trial Court Status | |---------------|-------------|------------------|-------------------| | [...] | Appellant | Defendant | Participated Below | | [...] | Appellant | Defendant | Participated Below | | [...] | Respondent | Plaintiff | Participated Below | | [...] | Respondent | Co-Defendant | Participated Below |
[brief] In Moore v. Woman To Woman Obstetrics & Gynecology, LLC, 416 N.J. Super. 30 (App. Div. 2010), this court rejected the argument made there, and in the within appeal, by the amicus [...] (“[...]”):  Plaintiffs and [...] urge us to hold that all pre-dispute agreements to submit medical malpractice claims to binding arbitration are unenforceable.  Their arguments are fairly summarized as follows: pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate medical malpractice claims are necessarily unconscionable contracts of adhesion; the waiver of rights of access to the court entailed in pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate medical malpractice claims cannot be knowing and voluntary; and the "undemocratic character" of arbitration's flexible rules and its closed proceedings will lead to distrust in the courts [Moore, 416 N.J. Super., at 35].  *******************  Considering the breadth of the foregoing principles relevant to enforcement of an agreement to arbitrate, the policies upon which plaintiffs and [...] rely to urge adoption of a per se rule barring pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate claims of medical malpractice are reasonably addressed by the case-by-case approach the Legislature has directed.  For that reason, we see no justification for judicial action imposing an absolute bar to enforcement of agreements to arbitrate such claims.  The question is best left to the Legislature.  [Id. at 40.]
[brief] (2T 59-25 to 60-2)  [...] admitted that the morning of the robbery, he sent a text message to a person listed as “[...]” in his phone, telling him, “Yo, all I got was AT&T phones and Verizon. ”  (2T 60-13 to 23)  [...] also admitted that he sent a text message to the 2078 number associated with [...], stating “They didn’t have cameras.
[brief] [N]one of the School Board defendants refutes the State’s data or presents alternate evidence sufficient to negate or call into question that data or the methodology by which the data was compiled.  On this preliminary record, **the court is constrained to find that the State’s studies and reports constitute clear and convincing evidence of a reasonable probability of success on the State’s disparate impact claims. **  [Emphasis added].  (Da107).  As the Board explained in its initial brief, it would have been virtually impossible for the Board to “refute the State’s data or present alternate evidence sufficient to negate or call into question that data or methodology by which the data was compiled” because Plaintiffs did not identify any methodologies or information regarding how the “excerpts” of surveys that they provided, which the trial court relied on to render its determination, were created (Db14).
[brief] Despite these clear and undisputed facts, [...] continues to suggest that he did nothing wrong because his directive to the Board attorney “was [a] legitimate Board action and fell within his authority as Board president” under Board Policy 0174, which designates only three individuals, including the Board president, as “contact persons” who are authorized to unilaterally “request services or advice from contracted legal counsel. ” (Ab12; Ab19; Aa169; Aa202; Aa233).  Moreover, he continues to suggest that “there are grave issues of fact which preclude the conclusion” that he used school resources for personal gain in violation of N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24(b) and N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(e) and (f).  (Aa177; Aa235; Ab15-18).  But [...]’s arguments are wrong.
[brief] The Court Below Did Not Violate the Court Rules.  (Pb29-Pb31).  As to exactly what Plaintiff is arguing in Point Eight of Plaintiff’s Brief counsel for [...] is mystified.  Orders to Show Cause, after being executed by the Court, and other attendant documents are to be served in the manner prescribed by R. 4:4-3 and R. 4:4-4 at least 10 days before the Return Date.  See R. 4:52-1(b).  On August 30, 2023, Plaintiff filed with the Court a proof of service which did not include the Order to Show Cause executed by the Court Below.  (Da003).  Not being privy to the conversation between Plaintiff and the Court Below, which it can be fairly assumed was most likely a simple courtesy to Plaintiff as a pro se litigant regarding his obligations under the Court Rules, [...] is intuiting that Plaintiff was informed that he needed to serve the docketed Order to Show Cause upon [...] and to further file a proof of service of same with the Court.  Plaintiff did so on September 20, 2023.  (Da006).  Since the OTSC was provided less than “10 days before the return date” the Court Below properly adjourned the date to October 4, 2023 pursuant to the Court Rules.  (Da009-Da010).  Accordingly, Plaintiff’s argument has no basis in law nor fact and is thus without merit.