ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The Court Abused Its Discretion by Admitting the Photocopy Into Evidence (P36a to P37a)  N.J.R.E. 1002, the "Best Evidence Rule," requires an original writing to prove its contents, when the writing's contents are material to the dispute, and production is not otherwise excused.  Here, the contents of the Photocopy are material to Respondent’s claim.  The Photocopy contains the waivers that Respondent relies on to defeat Petitioners right to an elected share of Decedent’s Estate.  See State v. Ruta, 112 N.J.L. 271, 273 (E. & A. 1934) (holding that the best evidence rule required production of conditional sales contract to establish party's right to repossess car sold thereunder); see also 6 Weinstein's Federal Evidence § 1002.05 (2018) (stating generally that "legal transactions that can be reduced to a writing, such as those involving . . . contracts . . . are subject to the best evidence rule because an original is needed to prove content that has legal significance"); JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Rabel, 894 N.Y.S.2d 857, 860 (Civ. Ct. 2010) (holding that a bank employee's testimony concerning terms of contract violated best evidence rule).
[brief] Enrollment in the CCIP was mandatory for subcontractors to begin work on the Project.  Pa588.  [...] continued to perform work at the Project *for months*, reasonably understanding that it could not have performed this work without CCIP enrollment.  Pa588, Pa876-Pa891.  Absent formal notice of cancellation, [...] was entitled to reasonably rely on the documentation it received from [...] confirming its enrollment and the coverage seemingly agreed upon.  See Rider, 42 N.J. at 482 (insureds “were entitled to rely upon and believe that the broker had fulfilled his undertaking to provide the coverage impliedly agreed upon, and that the policy sent to them represented accomplishment of that undertaking”).  [...] is not in the insurance business and was entitled to rely on [...]’s role as program administrator to continue to perform its work.  See Aden v. Fortsh, 169 N.J. 64, 87 (2001) (“Insurance consumers who instruct their brokers to provide coverage are entitled to have those instructions followed without regard to the insured's failure to detect the broker's negligent conduct. ”).  Nor was [...] relieved of its duty because it did not have a direct role in excluding [...] from the CCIP.  Pa2753.  It was still [...]’s duty to administer the insurance [...] was guaranteed in its Certificate of Liability Insurance, and it would have been [...]’s negligence, not necessarily its active role, that caused [...]’s improper unenrollment from the program [...] administered.  Therefore, if the Court finds that [...] and [...] did not owe coverage to [...], [...] would have neglected to administer the CCIP properly and to provide the general liability coverage under the CCIP for those performing work at the Project.
[brief] Fifth, the trial court erred by failing to instruct about blind identification procedures.  As the Court explained in Henderson, “Double-blind administrators do not know who the actual suspect is ….  [D]ouble-blind administration is the single most important characteristic that should apply to eyewitness identification procedures.  Its purpose is to prevent an administrator from intentionally or unintentionally influencing a witness’ identification decision.  Research has shown that … administrators familiar with the suspect” corrupt the identification via the “expectancy effect.
[brief] (1T 9-7 to 9-14).  The State sought to obtain a new buccal swab sample from Defendant to confirm the match but Defendant refused to provide one, even after multiple court orders.  He eventually offered to give a blood sample instead of a saliva sample, which was accepted.  (1T 16-2 to 16-3; 2T 15-20 to 15-24; 5T 6-22 to 7-12).  [...], a radiofrequency engineer expert, analyzed the cellphone data of the phones utilized by Defendant and [...].  Stern’s analysis of the cellphone records essentially verified [...]’s timeline of events.  He testified that both [...]’s and Defendant’s phones were pinging off cell phone towers in the area of the [...] prior to the murder.  Stern further testified that both phones tracked together immediately after the murder, as the two were tracked going to the location where the murder weapon was located in the [...] area of [...], and then back to the [...].
[brief] (Da10); *State v. Suarez*, No. A-800-95 (App. Div. Dec. 1, 1997) (slip op. at 2).  The New Jersey Supreme Court denied defendant's petition for certification on May 20, 1998.  (Pa7); *State v. Suarez*, 154 N.J. 608 (1998).  On July 31, 2019, defendant filed a pro se motion to correct an illegal sentence.
[brief] "[A]n illegal sentence is one that 'exceeds the maximum penalty . . . for a particular offense' or a sentence 'not imposed in accordance with law.'"  Id. at 45 (quoting State v. Murray, 162 N.J. 240, 247 (2000))(Emphasis added).  Thus, the legality of a sentence is not only determined by its length, but it may also be illegal in its application as well.  Accordingly, while ineffective assistance of counsel can certainly result in the imposition of an illegal sentence upon a defendant, a showing of ineffective assistance is not required to correct an illegal sentence which, if not corrected, is always subject to correction provided the sentence has not already been completed.  See subsection D infra. C.
[brief] Given defendant’s long history of intentionally disruptive behavior, [...] properly removed defendant from the courtroom.  Contrary to defendant’s assertions on appeal, defendant was given opportunities to return.  He was removed from the court on January 24, 2023, only to be brought back on the January 25, 2023.  On January 25, 2023, defendant informed his attorney he would not participate in any of the remaining proceedings.  Defendant was provided multiple opportunities to participate in his trial and declined.  [...] did not err in removing defendant from the courtroom and defendant cannot succeed on this argument.
[brief] A lengthy exchange between the Trial Court and Appellant’s counsel took place.  The Court became understandably frustrated, particularly since Appellant’s counsel’s acknowledged that (1) the matter had been concluded by way of settlement and a Stipulation of Dismissal with Prejudice was filed accordingly, (2) there was no point of having a trial/hearing since the matter was settled, and (3) counsel admitted that if further proceedings were brought, it would be considered frivolous under the circumstances.  (See 2T, page 7, lines 4-9).  Despite the Trial Court’s frustration and statements made on the record that “This case is over.  There is no question about that.  This case is over. ”, (See 2T, page 15, lines 17-18), the matter was nevertheless set down for trial on March 25, 2024.
[brief] On October 22, 2019, the Essex County Grand Jury returned Indictment [...] charging [...] with first-degree attempted murder contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(1) and 2C:5-1(a)(1) (count one); second-degree aggravated assault contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(1) (count two); third-degree unlawful possession of a firearm without a permit contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b)(1) (count three); and second-degree possession of a firearm for an unlawful purpose contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(a)(1) (count four).  (Da 1-5)¹  A jury trial was presided over by the Honorable [...], J.S.C., on June 6-7, 2023.  The jury found [...] not guilty of attempted murder and second-degree aggravated assault, but did find [...] guilty of the lesser-included charge of third-degree aggravated assault, unlawful possession of a firearm and possession of a firearm for an unlawful purpose.  (Da 6-7)  On September 8, 2023, [...] sentenced [...] to five years of imprisonment on his third-degree aggravated assault conviction and a concurrent six years of  ¹  References to the record are as follows:  (Da)  Defendant-Appellant's Appendix to this brief.  (1T)  (Trial)  June 6, 2023 (2T) (Trial)  June 7, 2023 (3T)  (Sentence)  September 8, 2023 imprisonment, subject to forty-two months of parole ineligibility in accordance with the Graves Act (N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(c)) for his second-degree possession of a firearm without a permit conviction.  Count Four was merged into Count Two.  (3T20-16 to 21-8; Da 9-12)  On October 4, 2023, [...] filed his notice of appeal.  (Da 13-16)  This brief now follows.
[brief] ”  Nonetheless, it seems safe to assume that they have been paid a significant percentage of the $21.5 million they have collected for their client to date – almost certainly many millions – not even including the massive amounts they have been paid based on other fee awards in this case.  (Pb2).  Thus, there is no need to mitigate any risk of non-payment by awarding their far higher 2022 rates for all of the work conducted in prior years.  See Rendine, 141 N.J. at 340.  Moreover, any “delay” in payment is of their own doing.  Indeed, they filed two prior “global” fee applications for general collection efforts in April of 2017 and July of 2018, which were denied by [...].  Whether it was “reasonable,” as they claim, for them to wait four years to re-file another “global” fee application, is not relevant to the analysis; but it is manifestly unreasonable for them to expect to receive significantly higher rates because they unilaterally chose to file the Global Fee Application when they did.
[brief] They explain that they included the “to,” “from,” and “cc” information on the privilege log “for the most recent communication in a given email chain,” and state that “[i]n many instances, the attorney initiated the conversation to provide legal advice or was the person in the initial ‘From’ line so that others on the conversation could receive legal advice. ” (Id. (emphasis in original)).  Defendants assert that because the primary purpose of these communications was the provision and receipt of legal advice, they have been properly designated as privileged.  (Id. (citation omitted)).  *10  Defendants also argue that to the extent plaintiffs complain that documents on the log “only involve in-house, rather than outside counsel,” it is “indisputable that Defendants are allowed to seek legal advice from their in-house counsel without it being subject to immediate and unquestioned scrutiny from Plaintiffs’ counsel and/or the Court. ” (Id. at 41 (citation omitted)).  Defendants state that they are “more than willing to meet and confer” with plaintiffs with respect to documents on the log for which an attorney is merely cc’d or appears to be missing altogether, as well as to provide further detail on a “reasonable number of documents” as to how the document is privileged.  (Id.).  They note that they “only ask that it be done on a document-by-document basis, as the law requires. ” (Id. (citing Phillips v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 290 F.R.D. 615, 631 (D. Nev. 2013))).  Vague Descriptions
[brief] The trial court did not find that the "information" was prejudicial to petitioners, only that it "may be" prejudicial."  Pa10 (emphasis added).  This is insufficient under O Builders.  That something "may be prejudicial is insufficient as a matter of law to support disqualification.  Moreover, even something that is prejudicial is also insufficient: the information must be "significantly harmful."  Information that is simply detrimental in general is insufficient.  Neither O Builders nor Trupos allow disqualification because the information allegedly imparted "may be" prejudicial.
[directive] 1.  Do you understand you will be required to submit to a psychological examination [Yes] [No] by the Department of Corrections the purpose of which is to determine if your conduct in committing the offense was characterized by a pattern of repetitive and compulsive behavior and if it was, whether you are amenable to (will benefit from) sex offender treatment and you are willing to participate in such treatment?  2.  Do you understand if the examination reveals that your conduct is characterized [Yes] [No] by a pattern of repetitive and compulsive behavior, and you are amenable to (will benefit from) sex offender treatment and willing to participate in such treatment, the judge shall, upon recommendation of the Department of Corrections, sentence you to confinement at the Adult Diagnostic and Treatment Center for sex offender treatment; however, if the sentence imposed is greater than 7 years, you will first be confined at a facility other than the Adult Diagnostic and Treatment Center?
[brief] ”  Watkins v. Resorts Int'l Hotel & Casino, Inc., 124 N.J. 398, 421 (1991).  “[S]tanding to assert the rights of third parties is appropriate if the litigant can show sufficient personal stake and adverseness so that the [c]ourt is not asked to render an advisory opinion. ”  Estate of F.W. v. State of N.J., Div. of Youth and Family Servs., 398 N.J. Super. 344, 353 (App. Div. 2008).
[brief] Please see the appellant’s response to this Motion (Pa192). ²  ---  ²  The trial court gaged the appellant at the haring of this Motion, preventing him from articulating in his defense the errors below, including the blind eye shown by the trial court for need to uphold Duty of Candor against respondents’ attorney.  The trail court went ahead and dismissed the motion.  The following show how the ethical shortcomings by [...] materially attributed to (1) unjust results, *State v. Mohammed*, 226 N.J. 71, 87 (2016), and (2) undermined fairness, *State v. Weaver*, 219 N.J. 131, 15 (2014), below:
[brief] For these reasons, the Board’s final administrative determination denying [...]’s request to file his Eligibility Registration Form for amended benefits approximately one year and six months past the statutory deadline of the Ricci Act should be affirmed.  Respectfully submitted, [...]  ATTORNEY GENERAL OF NEW JERSEY  By: /s/ [...]  [...] (ID 276482018)  Deputy Attorney General  [...]  [...]  Assistant Attorney General Of Counsel cc: [...], Esq.  May 8, 2024  [...], Clerk Superior Court of New Jersey  Appellate Division  Hughes Justice Complex  25 W. Market Street PO Box 006 Trenton, New Jersey 08625  RE: [...] v. [...]  DOCKET NO.: [...]
[brief] The numerous particulars are set forth in the Plaintiff’s Planner [...] incorporated by reference here (Pa300).  Focusing on the clear and important “inconsistencies”, the 1988 Master Plan calls for the relevant area to be zoned for and developed by mixed use development not exceeding $2 \frac{1}{2}$ to $3 \frac{1}{2}$ stories in height, with a residential density not exceeding 16 units per acre.  The Redevelopment Plan authorizes mixed use buildings of 6 to 7 stories, with a density of 50+ units per acre.  The 1988 Master Plan calls for the existing public parking area (on Lot 3) of about 300 spaces available to the public to be refurbished and expanded to serve the existing amusement area, beach, pier and recreation.  The Redevelopment Plan authorizes building condominiums on the existing public parking, replacing it with public parking of only about 150 spaces and other parking dedicated only to the new buildings/residences.  The relevant cases established that the Planning Board and Governing Body are required to carefully review the actual Master Plan, and in particular its Land Use Plan element, to determine and assess its “substantial consistency” with the Rezoning Ordinance or Redevelopment Plan.
[directive] Forfeiture Program CPA Audit Standards 5 .......................................................  Section A. Basis Accounting 5 of ..................................................................  Section B. Audit Standards 5 -- -.:- .~ ’? .......................................................  Section C.  Audit Report Content 6 ............................................  D.  Section Standardized Terminolom 9 .................................  E.  Section Financial Statement Presentation 9 i ....................................................................................................  Enclosures  Forfeiture Program CPA Audit Standards Authority  Tab # No. 1.  Attorney General Law Enforcement Directive 2004-4  This directive the authority for the implementation of the audit procedures as is outlined in the manual.
[brief] (27T155-7 to 156-5; 29T120-13 to 178)  [...] asked Defendant to come with him to the [...] to give a statement.  (27T153-7 to 16; 29T123-15)  When asked to give a rundown of his day, Defendant said he and [...] had spent most of the day in the room except for going out to get lunch and alcohol.  (27T166-24 to 167-2)
[brief] These observations were corroborated by [...], a friend of the Decedent since 1963, her freshman year in high school.  [...] and the Decedent maintained a close relationship, confiding in each other during their long relationship.  (10T88-17 to 89-25).  [...] characterized the marriage of the Decedent and the Petitioner as “kind of strange” (10T95-3) and noted that (1) the Petitioner never appeared at the Decedent’s high school reunions, even though Decedent was on the event committee (10T93-18 to 21); (2) the Petitioner and Decedent had previously broken up their relationship and had been living apart, with [...] moving away (10T95-9 to 96-13); (3) the Decedent told her about another woman with whom Petitioner was romantically involved (10T97-16 to 22).
[brief] (Ia050).  On November 16, 2022, [...] filed a motion seeking to have the trial court’s summary judgment Order certified as a final judgment, or in the alternative to sever [...]’s third-party action against [...].  (Pa025).  While this motion was pending, [...] wrote to the trial court on December 14, 2022, requesting [...]’s motion for final judgment be adjourned to allow [...] and [...] to negotiate a settlement of [...]’s third-party broker malpractice action.  (Pa027).  On January 19, 2023, [...] filed a “dismissal of third-party complaint by stipulation” which represented that [...] and [...] had settled the third-party broker malpractice action.  (Ia054).  [...] filed an objection to this dismissal, asserting that he had an interest in the property that was the subject matter of the third-party broker malpractice action.  (Ia056).  The trial court dismissed the third-party action, and granted [...]’s motion for final judgment on January 20, 2023.  (Ia052).  On March 2, 2023, [...] filed a notice of appeal of the January 20, 2023 Order.  (Ia058.)  On June 1, 2023, [...] filed a letter with this Court advising that it will not participate in the [...]’s appeal.  (Pa009).  To date, [...] has not participated in [...]’s appeal.  LEGAL ARGUMENT
[brief] ”  Ibid.  And even if such “credible evidence” could be identified, the Amended Policy still does not expressly preclude disclosure.  Nor can Appellants find refuge in a separate putative “district regulation” purportedly issued after the State filed suit.  (Db30-32).  There is nothing in the record to show that this purported regulation was ever enacted.  The certification Appellants introduced from Manalapan Superintendent [...], dated nearly a month after the inception of the instant suit, states only that she “intend(s) to enact the Regulations attached hereto as Exhibit E concerning the implantation (sic) of Policy 5756. ”  (Da235).  The certification does not explain why the Amended Policy did not use the more limited language of the purported district regulation, or why it was proposed after the Amended Policy.  And a search of Appellants’ website reveals no public or available regulation. \(^4\)  With no record evidence to show the regulation was enacted or that it could somehow supersede or even materially impact the express terms of the Amended Policy, any attempt to belatedly redefine the Amended Policy fails.
[brief] What about -- THE COURT: If at some point in the future it becomes apparent that there is a conflict, maybe at that point then he can retain his own counsel.  [...]: Well -- THE COURT: But you're asking me at this point to declare the firm to say you can't represent this defendant -- all these multiple defendants who have all agreed to have their firm represent them, all said, look, we don't believe there's a conflict.  In the event there is a conflict, we waive that, we've been advised of it.  We want to forge ahead with one attorney.  You're saying I have to step in and say no, you can't do that . . . (T.45-46).
[brief] During the three-day bench trial that was conducted before the Honorable [...], J.S.C. on September 5, 2024, September 6, 2024, and September 7, 2024, Plaintiff put forth the expert testimony of [...] (hereinafter “[...]”), an attorney at law in the State of New Jersey, and a licensed title insurance producer and title insurance instructor.  [...] testified regarding the documents recorded in Plaintiff’s chain of title, and was able to trace the Strip throughout Plaintiff’s chain of title to December 15, 1933, thereby establishing Plaintiff’s ownership of the Strip.  During cross-examination, [...] recognized that the Strip “mysteriously” shows up in the chain of title for Defendant’s Lot 3 in 1971.
[brief] On June 9, 2022, an Ocean County Grand Jury returned Indictment No.  [...] charging defendant with fourth-degree operating a motor vehicle during a license suspension for a second or subsequent drunk-driving violation contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:40-26(b) (count one) and third-degree possession of a controlled dangerous substance contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10(a)(1) (count two).  (Da 8 to 10).  On September 20, 2022, defendant filed a motion to suppress the evidence seized during the search of his vehicle, which the Honorable [...], J.S.C. heard on March 8, 2023.  (Pa1); (1T).  On April 20, 2023, [...] denied the motion in a written opinion.  (Da11 to 22). ¹  Defendant entered a negotiated plea agreement wherein he would plead guilty to count two, driving with a suspended license, in exchange for the State recommending 180 days in jail.  (Pa2 to 7).  On March 8, 2024, the Honorable [...], J.S.C., sentenced defendant in accordance with the negotiated plea.  (Da23 to 25).  Defendant filed his Notice of Appeal on April 19, 2024.  (Da27 to 30).  ¹  Co-defendant [...]’s charges were dismissed.  (1T30-19 to 20).  COUNTERSTATEMENT OF FACTS
[directive] These relevant factors may include but need not be limited to: (1) whether in a school zone case the offense occurred near the outer boundaries of the zone and within the uncertainty of the map that will be used to establish the location element; (2) difficulties in proving that the defendant possessed the drugs found in his or her possession with the requisite “intent to distribute” based upon the type, quantity, purity and packaging of the drugs involved and the existence or relative absence of other indicia of drug-distribution activities, such as cash proceeds, scales, packaging materials, and other distribution paraphernalia, observed transactions, or incriminating statements; (3) whether there is a realistic possibility that essential physical evidence or inculpatory statements will be subject to the exclusionary rule; (4) problems associated with proving the chain of custody of physical evidence, or with the forensic analysis of seized controlled substances; (5) the effort expended and costs incurred in pretrial litigation and in providing discovery; (6) whether an important witness may refuse to cooperate or may otherwise be unavailable for trial; (7) legal and logistical complications inherent in a multi- defendant trial; (8) the possibility that an important State witness will not be believed by the jury based upon his or her criminal record or cooperation agreement, or was found not to be credible by another jury in a related trial; or (9) whether there is a realistic possibility that the identity of a confidential informant or the location of a surveillance site provided by a private citizen may be required to be disclosed if the prosecution proceeds to trial.  Page 99