ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] ”  (1T 64-23 to 65-12)  First, [...] did not testify that the men’s alleged blading was a basis to believe that the men were armed, or that the alleged blading was the reason the men were frisked.  Rather, [...] testified blading is “typically . . . [a] sign[] that they could potentially be on the dangerous – they’re trying to shift their body away from officers” (1T 12-4 to 12-17), and, according to [...], that was the reason the men were handcuffed.  (1T 16-1 to 16-4)  As for the frisk, it was clear from [...]’s testimony that the men were not frisked because the officers believed they were armed, but rather, because it is police policy to frisk anyone who is stopped.  (1T 16-13 to 16-16)  Indeed, [...] and [...] were not frisked because they were observed “blading” or for any other particularized reason; they were frisked simply because they were stopped.  (Da 27-28)  A policy of frisking every person who is stopped is patently improper.
[brief] However, as an arbiter of appraisal standards it is considered to be the “bible” of the profession and certainly in this case it was relied upon by plaintiff’s expert appraiser in defining the property interests that he appraised and upon which the arbitrator relied.  Moreover, the context of the discussion in the Appraisal text, of the definition of the fee simple estate is that while the definition includes the “full bundle of rights,” there are often minor encumbrances like public utility easements or reciprocal access easements that as a practical matter are more or less ignored, “unless one of those encumbrances is a lease” (Pa164).  The fact is, that while legal definitions in some cases may serve a different purpose, such as defining a duration like a life estate, in this case, as in almost all condemnation cases, the issue is the market value of the property rights taken.  Accordingly, the legal definition in this case, i.e., that the property is free and clear of all encumbrances (including leases) of record is the same as the appraisal definition.
[brief] this appeal by resorting to an absurd “Hail Mary” in a last-ditch effort to delay the inevitable entry of a final judgment against them: they claim that they have fallen victim to a grand vendetta of the “New Jersey courts [to] treat[] them unjustly. ”  (Db24.)  The frivolity of this melodramatic allegation is clear from its face, and [...] will not waste much time addressing it here.  But a couple of salient points are worthwhile.  First, the [...]’ “Hail Mary” is nothing but an attempt to relitigate long decided issues related to prior trial court proceedings that are foreclosed from review on this appeal.  Those issues are: (1) the propriety of the Appellate Division’s conclusions on appeal in 2018, (Db22), on which the [...] already sought certification from the New Jersey Supreme Court, and the Court denied their petition, [...] Devs., Inc. v. Wilf, 236 N.J. 47 (2018); (2) the Chancery Division’s decision in 2009 to permit amendment of the pleadings to allow the inclusion of RICO claims, (Db22), which the Appellate Division affirmed, [...] Devs., Inc., 2018 WL 2449133, at *9-10; (3) the purported conflict of interest of former Chancery Division [...], (Db22-23), which the Appellate Division decided adversely to the [...], [...] Devs., Inc., 2018 WL 2449133, at *5-9; and (4) the Chancery Division’s factual findings and conclusions concerning Plaintiffs’ claims against the [...], (Db23-24), which the Appellate Division affirmed, see generally id.
[brief] During her unsuccessful independent CY 2022 reelection campaign, defendant [...] blamed plaintiff and his minions for fermenting distrust throughout the community.  (Pa219-SJCS# 57).  On January 4, 2023, defendant [...] filed a petty disorderly person private citizen municipal criminal complaint against a vocal dissenting resident.  (Pa219-SJCS#64, #65; Pa320).  On March 7, 2023, defendant [...] alleged that plaintiff was responsible for the township’s failure to hire additional uniform police officers.³ (Pa219-SJCS #58).
[brief] The Court has reviewed the Report, Plaintiffs' Objections, Defendants' Response, and Plaintiffs' Reply.  The Court held oral argument on this matter on February 16, 2016 and is duly advised.  I.  BACKGROUND The parties disagree on two issues concerning the protocol governing production of documents and electronically stored information: 1) the procedure for redacting irrelevant information from responsive documents, and 2) whether irrelevant parent documents and other documents that are not attachments, from responsive document families can be withheld entirely.
[brief] Marlboro Township, January 20, 2018.  Officer [...] of Marlboro Township was on duty at approximately 8:00 p.m., on January 20, 2018, trying to spot speeding drivers.  (14T56-15 to 21; 14T58-5 to 59-3).  He observed a 2016 Dodge Durango that appeared to be going 80 mph or higher, which he followed and eventually stopped, in a parking lot of a commercial business.  (14T59-4 to 10; 14T105-8 to 19).  Wcislo identified a photo of himself standing next to defendant’s Dodge Durango.  (14T61-3 to 62-2; Pa49\(^{11}\)).  The parking lot was well-lit.  (14T59-23 to 25).  As his body-worn camera recorded, Wcislo approached on the driver’s side; the window was already rolled down.  (14T62-20 to 63-3; S-52).  The male driver had “his wallet up and it was open. ” (14T63-3 to 4; S-52).  He displayed a NJSP ID.  (14T60-3 to 5; S-52; Pa48).  Wcislo had a good view of what was in the driver’s hand because, as the video showed, Wcislo used a flashlight, and the car’s interior lights were on.  (14T68-11 to 22; 14T69-24 to 70-4; S-52; Pa48).  Wcislo identified a still photograph of the driver showing the item to him, when Wcislo was about two feet from the driver, whose face was well-lit.  (14T70-12 to 71-22; Pa48).  Wcislo, who had been shown NJSP IDs by other --- \(^{11}\) The trial exhibit showed the car’s license plate, which has been redacted in the State’s Appendix.  (Pa49).  NJSP members he had stopped before January 20, 2018, recognized the NJSP insignia that this driver was showing, and asked whether the driver was “on the job?” or something similar, by which he meant the driver was a police officer.  (14T60-6 to 7; 14T63-12 to 16; 14T64-1 to 24; S-52; Pa48).  Any doubt regarding what defendant showed Wcislo was eliminated when Wcislo identified four enhanced still photographs from his body-worn camera video.  (14T73-4 to 75-21; Pa40-47).  The driver didn’t deny he worked in law enforcement, but instead apologized, after which Wcislo extended the driver “professional courtesy,” and let him proceed without issuing a ticket.
[directive] Phase IX 5-Yard Line.  One-handed - Support hand.  Each drill, Time: 3 seconds.  2 rounds.  (Total 4 rounds).  •  On command, draw and transfer the weapon to the support hand.  Assume a ready position.  •  On command fire 2 rounds using only the support hand.  Return to ready (The strong arm should be limp along the body).  • Repeat once.  • Reload if required and holster an uncocked weapon
[directive] such cases, if the mental health agency contacts the prosecutor's office regarding non- of or NGRI compliance inadequacy the treatment plan for the acquittee, upon of motion the prosecutor for a psychiatric evaluation, this form order may be used to have the individual evaluated by a screening service.  The court may initiate its own on own proceeding its motion.  of of  It is noted that counties have different means handling transportation of individuals in need emergent psychiatric assessments.  This form order allows of the court to enter the preferred method transportation to the county designated of screening service for psychiatric assessment the individual.  Transportation to the 1 county designated screening service may be by the county sheriff, through local screener.2 police or through a designated mobile of NGRI  The screening service shall evaluate the acquittee under the standards  If N.J.S.A. 30:4-27-1 et seq. the screening service finds civil commitment is medically necessary, then the service shall make application under N.J.S.A. 30:27- et on 1 seq. for inpatient civil commitment.  The screening service should note its application to the court that this individual holds a Krol acquittee status as well.  The county adjuster shall inform the criminal court, prosecution and defense of In counsel the hospitalization.  all cases the screening service will make its findings known to the court and parties so that they may proceed accordingly.  1 of  See the official list designated screening services throughout New Jersey.  2  It is noted that Human Service Police (HSP) do not transport Krol acquittees from the community to the It of of designated screening service.  is outside the scope the responsibility HSP.  See, generally, N.J.S.A. 30:4-14 et seq.  Attorney Name NJ Attorney ID Number ----------- Address Telephone Number of Attorney for State New Jersey/Defendant of of Superior Court New Jersey
[brief] Kaminskas v. Off. of the Attorney Gen., 236 N.J. 415, 422, 200 A.3d 389 (2019).  Courts "turn to extrinsic tools to discern legislative intent . . . only when the statute is ambiguous, the plain language leads to a result inconsistent with any legitimate public policy objective, or it is at odds with a general statutory scheme."  Shelton v. Restaurant.com, Inc., 214 N.J. 419, 429, 70 A.3d 544 (2013).  The statute, in this case, is not ambiguous insofar as OPRA only applies to government records.  Plaintiff suggests in a footnote that Defendants could have satisfied his OPRA request by producing email “logs” cut and pasted from screenshots of cloud-based email pages.  Pb at 9, n. 4.  Plaintiff made a similar argument during the August 18, 2023 oral argument below in which his attorney stated that it would be “very easy to merely printout those in-boxes, out-boxes and take a Sharpie to them. ”  1T6:10-13.  The underlying OPRA request, however, does not seek printouts but rather “[e]mail logs”, which have a fixed definition established by the Galloway case.  (Pa4).  Defense counsel at oral argument responded to Plaintiff’s “printout” argument as follows:  Really briefly, before I forget, this notion that while if it’s so hard to get email logs on [G]mail, Yahoo, what have you, [then the Board should just] print [it] out[.]  [T]hat’s been used in my experience as a . . . way to kind of settle a case, because an email log [] from your OPRA setting, everyone is thinking Paff versus Galloway Township.  . .  [I]f [...] had requested a printout of private [] [G]mail pages, et cetera, that would be a different request.  That’s not what [he] requested.  [He] requested a log, and a log has the meaning as decided by the Supreme Court in the Paff versus Galloway Township case, and that’s, I think, how everybody took it and how everybody takes it statewide when you get those requests.  [1T15:21-16:14].  Plaintiff alternatively suggests in his reply brief that the individual Board members may be able to “subpoena” private email services to obtain email logs.  Pb at 12.  New Jersey courts have made clear that “OPRA does not require records custodians to conduct research”.  MAG Entertainment, LLC v. Div. of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 375 N.J. Super. 534, 546-47 (App. Div. 2005).  That being the case, courts could not conceivably require that to fulfill an OPRA request a jurisdiction must issue a subpoena to a technology company to force it to generate an email log that a trained IT Director is unable to construct due to proprietary limits instituted by the company on its proprietary technology.  Plaintiff requests relief that, based on the legal research of both parties, has never been ordered by any New Jersey court in a published decision and should not be ordered here.  POINT II
[brief] During the pendency of the appeal, the municipality amended its ordinance to clarify that determination as it pertained to the proposed use.  This Court ruled that the board’s decision was correct, but that even if it was incorrect, it would have been absurd to require the developer to reapply for approval from the planning board under the new ordinance when that same board had already approved the application.  Instead, there was recognition that the developer could have, if it needed to, taken advantage of the favorable zoning adopted during the litigation.  Here, by contrast, [...] needed a conditional use variance on the day it applied to the Board, on the day its application was considered by the Board, on the day the Board adopted the Resolution, the day [...] filed the Complaint, on the date of trial, on the day it filed its notice of appeal, on the day it filed its appeal brief and even today.
[directive] Do you understand that if you fail to register or re-register you may be charged with a third degree crime and receive a sentence of imprisonment of up to 5 years?  d) Èske w konprann ke w fèt pou founi ajans fòsdelòd ki koresponn la enfòmasyon konsènan [Wi/Yes] [Non/No] abitid pou jwenn aksè pou oswa itilize yon konpitè oubyen nenpòt ki aparèy ki gen (si zak la te komèt swa le ou aprè le 25 fevriye 2008) kapasite pou entènèt? Do you understand that you must provide the appropriate law enforcement agency with information about (if the offense was committed your routine access to or use of a computer or device with Internet capability? on or after February 25, 2008) e) Èske w konprann ke si w pa notifye ajans fòsdelòd ki koresponn la konsènan abitid w pou [Wi/Yes] [Non/No] jwenn aksè pou oswa itilize yon konpitè oubyen nenpòt ki aparèy ki gen kapasite pou entènèt, oswa ou ta fè yon chanjman nan fason ou itilize oswa rantre sou entènèt la, yo ta kab akize w de yon enfraksyon klasifikasyon penal 3yèmd degre epi w ta ka resevwa yon (si zak la te komèt le ou aprè 1 jiyè 2014)?
[brief] A.  Plaintiff’s accident  On March 8, 2018 at approximately 7:30 AM, plaintiff was walking in the parking lot of her workplace when she slipped and fell to the ground.  (Da 45).  Plaintiff admitted that it snowed overnight and that the parking lot had been plowed, but that it was still icy and had not been salted.  (Da 45).  This slip and fall occurred at [...], [...] at a commercial property known as [...].  (Da 20-24).  Plaintiff in her certified answers to interrogatories attached seven color photographs which, by plaintiff’s own account, were taken on the date of loss by plaintiff herself on March 8, 2018 at 7:35 AM and reportedly showed the weather conditions on the date of loss.  (Da 44-63).  B.
[brief] There was a 2017 Agreement that was executed between the [...] and the [...] that the Township relied upon during the Motion for Summary Judgment with the lower court.  Da120.  That 2017 Agreement arose from litigation between the [...] and the [...] in which the Borough was neither a named party, nor an interested party, and was part of a settlement agreement between those public entities.  The Borough was not involved in the negotiations surrounding the 2017 Agreement and did not consent to it.  Accordingly, the 2017 Agreement has no binding effect upon the Borough, and no bearing upon the relationship between the Borough and the Township as to connection fees.
[brief] ”  *Ibid.* role envisioned in *Presha*.  And, in those cases where a parent is truly conflicted, another adult – not necessarily an attorney – may be able to fulfill the parental assistance role envisioned by *Presha*.  Moreover, when it is apparent to the interrogating officers that a parent has competing and clashing interests in the subject of the interrogation, the police minimally should take steps to ensure that the parent is not allowed to assume the role of interrogator, and, further, should strongly consider ceasing the interview when another adult, who is without a conflict of interest, can be made available to the child.
[brief] 3T49:5-20.  [...] stated that casually accounting for funds in one business that may be in another account is normal, that he normally would not have done a lot of different things, and that there were personal expenses on the books that he normally would not have approved.  3T123:10-25.  He stated that normally he would have separated business and personal expenses.  3T123:10-25.  [...] stated that he loaned the company funds totaling $93,455.65 after interest, which he was reimbursed for following [...]’s settlement with [...].
[brief] SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY  APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. [...]  Indictment No. [...]  STATE OF NEW JERSEY, : CRIMINAL ACTION  Plaintiff-Respondent, : On Appeal From A  Judgment v. : Of Conviction  Entered In The Superior Court, Law Division, Union County.  [...], : Defendant-Appellant.  : Sat Below: Hon. [...], J.S.C., and a jury.
[brief] It concisely consists of the following in its entirety:  a.  A person who shall:  (2)  Be present and witness, pay admission to, encourage or assist therein;...  ...Shall be guilty of a crime of the third degree.  The statute, as written, criminalizes being “present and witness[ing]” or “pay[ing] admission to” or “encourage[ing]” or “assist[ing]” in anything… even childbirth!  There is a strong public need and public policy for these statutes to be declared unconstitutional at this time before the anyone else is ensnared with charges of this nature.  N.J.S.A. 4:22 – 24(b) and N.J.S.A. 4:22 – 17(c)(3) criminalizes common every day occurrences involving which a prosecutor deems in his or her discretion to constitute “torment, torture, maim[ing], hang[ing], poison[ing], unnecessarily or cruelly beat[ing], cruelly abus[ing], or needlessly mutilate[ing]” any “living animal or creature” and “Be[ing] present and witness[ing], pay[ing] admission to, encourage[ing] or assist[ing]” any activity a prosecutor wants to criminalize.
[brief] THE AWARD OF ATTORNEY’S FEES IS APPROPRIATE PURSUANT TO THE EXPRESS LANGUAGE OF THE MOU.  (Da14-15).  Because the MOU is enforceable at law, the trial court appropriately applied its attorneys’ fees provision and awarded [...] $34,426.50 for professional services rendered and costs incurred in seeking to enforce [...]’ rights.  This award should remain in force as a result of the MOU’s continued enforceability.  Pursuant to the plain language of the MOU clause regarding attorney’s fees providing for fees “through all appeals” (Da30), [...] is entitled further to fees incurred in connection with this appeal and will submit a fee certification as necessary.  CONCLUSION
[brief] In fact, the opposite is true.  As detailed above, the record before the trial court painted a disturbing picture.  Plaintiffs abused the judicial system by filing a Complaint against [...] despite having no good-faith reason to believe [...] was liable in law or fact.  [...] did precisely what it was supposed to do -- afford Plaintiffs an opportunity to dismiss their Complaint against it.  But when pressed to dismiss the Complaint, Plaintiffs refused.  When provided with evidence undercutting the only substantive fact in the Complaint -- an alleged sale by [...] to [...] -- Plaintiffs still refused to dismiss the Complaint.  When urged by the trial court to dismiss the Complaint and when provided with additional evidence demonstrating the absence of a sale, Plaintiffs once again refused to dismiss the Complaint.  These circumstances plainly evidence Plaintiffs’ bad faith and their intent to keep [...] in the case, cause it to incur attorneys’ fees, and pressure it into paying money to them.  Plaintiffs were warned repeatedly, chose to proceed at their own risk, and the trial court appropriately made them suffer the consequences for pursuing claims in bad faith and for the purpose of harassing and injuring [...].
[brief] No variance or other relief may be granted under the terms of this section, including a variance or other relief involving an inherently beneficial use, without a showing that such variance of other relief can be granted without substantial detriment to the public good and will not substantially impair the intent and purpose of the zone plan and zoning ordinance.  N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70.  The zone plan must be created, in the first instance, by the master plan and then kept up with periodic reexaminations of that plan.  The fact that the implementing update ordinance has not been enacted, is immaterial.  Based on the Master Plan update, the ordinance that would flow from the update would not permit senior housing at the Property, and that is the point.  The master plan is the device the MLUL provides for creating and updating the “zone plan” for a municipality.  The recently reexamined Master Plan does not call for a change in zoning to this property even after a formal request was made and after the Planning Board specifically considered where senior housing should be added.
[brief] As [...] explained in his multiple certifications, the validity of the practice of neuropsychological testing is threatened by Plaintiff’s proposed recording thereof.  As set forth previously and as elaborated by [...] in his certifications: a.) The field of neuropsychology admonishes its members to refuse to perform an IME if a recording device is to be employed; and b.) [...] adheres to this admonition and will not perform an IME if Plaintiff plans to record it based upon ethical, integrity and validity implications; and c.)  Allowing a subject to record a neuropsychological evaluation could invalidate the test results.
[brief] Blackwell v. Dep't of Corr., 348 N.J. Super. 117, 123 (App. Div. 2002).................................................................6  In re Carter, 191 N.J. 474, 482-83 (2007).................................................................8  Ensslin v. Board of Trustees, Police and Firemen’s Retirement System, 311 N.J Super 333 (App. Div. 1998).........................9, 10, 11  Figueroa v. N.J. Dep't of Corr., 414 N.J. Super. 186 (App. Div. 2010)..................15  Henry v. Rahway State Prison, 81 N.J. 571 (1980).........................................................7  In re Issuance of Permit by DEP, 120 N.J. 164 (1990)..................................................8  Mayflower Sec. Co. v. Bureau of Sec., 64 N.J. 85 (1973).................................6, 7 Mazza v. Bd. of Trs., 143 N.J. 22 (1995).................................................................8  N.J. Civil Serv. Ass'n v. State, 88 N.J. 605 (1982).........................................................6  N.J. Soc'y for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v. N.J. Dep't of Agric., 196 N.J. 366 (2008).........................................................7  SMB Assocs v. Department of Envtl. Prot., 264 N.J. Super 38 (App. Div. 1993), aff’d, 137 N.J. 58 (1994)..................11  State v. Atley, 157 N.J. Super. 157 (App. Div. 1978).................................8  In re State & Sch. Emples. Health Benefits Commissions’ Implementation of Yucht, 233 N.J. 267 (2018)....................8, 9  Vas v. Roberts, 418 N.J. Super. 509 (App. Div. 2011)..................................6  In re Virtua-West Jersey Hosp. Voorhees, 194 N.J. 413 (2008)......................................................................................7  Williams v. Department of Corrections, 330 N.J. Super. 197 (App. Div. 2000)  .....................................................6, 7  ##  APPENDIX TABLE OF CONTENTS