ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The several errors in the plaintiff’s position and the Trial Court decision is actually very clear and simple, once the law and the burden of proof are properly understood.  The [...] assert the right to operate an off-site parking use for its Lot 8 staff/attendees on the school Lot 5.  That off-site parking use for Lot 8 vehicles is clearly not currently a permitted accessory use on the school Lot 5.  That being the case, the [...] had the burden to prove that at the time that use commenced (in around 1965) that off-site parking use on Lot 5 was permitted by Zoning and/or approved by a proper Board action.  If the proponent of the nonconforming use does not prove that, the nonconforming use is not legal, is not valid or protected, and cannot continue.  The [...] presented no evidence to demonstrate that the now nonconforming off-site parking use on Lot 5 was permitted by Zoning or approved when commenced or actually was ever permitted.  That the illegal use may have commenced with the consent or an easement by the then owner of Lot 5 is not actually relevant on the zoning legality of the prohibited facility/use, nor is it relevant that the illegal use continued in some fashion for many years.  The Zoning Board actually made the only proper determination, given the total lack of proofs by the proponent of the nonconforming use.  That Board decision should be affirmed by this Court.  The Trial Court’s Opinion and acceptance of documents was clearly in error on numerous procedural and substantive points.  The Court’s Opinion/Order should be invalidated.  Respectfully Submitted, [...], Esq.  Attorney for Defendant Congregation
[brief] *Id.*  First, the officer lacked reason to believe that [...] was driving while under the influence.  The driving while intoxicated statute does not specify the quantum of narcotics, hallucinogens, or habit-producing drugs sufficient to satisfy the statute (by contrast, a blood-alcohol level over .08 is a per se violation of the statute).  *State v. Bealor*, 187 N.J. 589 (2006) (quoting *State v. Tamburro*, 68 N.J. 414, 421 (1975)); see also N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.  Instead, “under the influence” has been defined to mean “a substantial deterioration or diminution of the mental faculties or physical capabilities of a person whether it be due to . . . narcotic, hallucinogenic or habit producing drugs,” so as “to render such person a danger to himself as well as to other persons,” and “a condition which so affects the judgment and control of a motor vehicle operator as to make it improper for him to drive on the highway. ”  *Id.*  Although [...] said he suspected [...] might be under the influence because his pupils were small, the officer admitted that he never said that he thought [...] was incapable of safely operating a motor vehicle or ______________________  Relatedly, “an entire section of [the instructor’s] training . . . [was] dedicated to an ‘I Do Not Consent Game,’” during which [the instructor] show[ed] a montage of people refusing to consent in an attempt to illustrate that a motorist’s refusal to consent is a suspicious factor that justifies prolonging an investigative detention. ”  *Id.*  Moreover, multiple instructors encouraged officers to illegally prolong stops by “finger fucking” their computers and “playing Tetris” (pretending to conduct computer lookups) in order to continue investigations and continuing to question individuals after completing the tasks related to the motor vehicle stop.  *Id.* presented a danger to himself or others.
[brief] [...] purchased a property located at [...] in 2002.  He purchased the property in his own name (Pa000138).  As was the case with other properties, [...] financed [...]’s purchase of the property.  [...] ultimately decided to build a two-family house on the property and obtained construction financing.  (Pa000139).  At some point after the house was built, [...] and [...] decided to live at the property.  They needed financing, which they obtained through [...].  (Pa000140).  Once [...] and [...] secured financing from the [...], [...] was added to the deed.  (Pa000141).  [...] knew that [...] was being added to the deed at that time and wanted a mortgage and note to protect his interest.  (Pa000141-Pa000145).  [...]’s dominant plan and purpose under the Will was to leave his estate to his wife and children, [...] and [...].
[brief] \(^1\) \(^{1}\)  Although not the subject of this appeal, [...] contends that Plaintiff’s experts’ reports are inadmissible net opinions under N.J.R.E. 703, and reserve the right to move to strike them should the Court reverse the trial court’s decision on [...]’s motion for Summary  Furthermore, none of the conditions of the worksite were so manifestly unsafe as to constitute a substantial certainty of injury or death.
[brief] TABLE OF AUTHORITIES  Cases  Avocent Redmond Corp. v. Rose Elecs., 491 F. Supp. 2d 1000 (W.D. Wash. 2007)  .................................................................  18 Cavallaro v. Jamco Prop. Mgmt., 334 N.J. Super. 557 (App. Div. 2000)  ...............  14 City of Atlantic City v. Trupos, 201 N.J. 443 (2010)  ...........................................  17, 18 Greebel v. Lensak, 467 N.J. Super. 251 (App. Div. 2021) ......................................  15, 16 N.J. Div. of Youth Family Servs v. V.J., 386 N.J. Super. 71 (Ch.Div.2004) ............  18 O Builders & Assocs., Inc. v. Yuna Corp. of N.J., 206 N. J. 109 (2011) ....6, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 19, 20, 22, 23, 25, 31, 32 Reardon v. Marlayne, Inc., 83 N.J. 460 (1980) ..................................................... 33 State v. Lucarello, 135 N.J. Super. 347 (App.Div.), aff’d o.b., 69 N.J. 31 (1975) ... 33 Sturdivant v. Sturdivant, 367 Ark. 514, 241 S.W. 3d 740 (2006) ............................ 26 Rules R. 1:2-1 .................................................................................................................. 20 R. 3:13-3(f) .......................................................................................................... 20 R. 4:10-2(e)(1) ..................................................................................................... passim R. 4:10-3 .............................................................................................................. 20 Rules of Professional Conduct 1.16(c) ................................................................. 8 PRELIMINARY STATEMENT This matter emanates from the Verified Complaint and Order to Show Cause filed by the Petitioners on or about October 2, 2023, asserting that Appellants, Respondents below (“Respondents”), unduly influenced the Decedent, [...] (“Decedent”), in the creation of a Last Will and Testament dated October 11, 2022 (“2022 Will”) leaving almost the entirety of her Estate, which is anticipated to be valued in excess of $4,000,000, to the Respondents, two unrelated individuals.
[brief] The oversight is not cursory, but all encompassing.  (September 21, 2023 Tr., 64:10-12)  As explained by the City’s CFO, [...] (“[...]”), the oversight is all panoptic.  Every Tuesday, the City meets with the DCA to go over financial best practices in regard to pending issues.  (October 26, 2023 Tr., 59:20)  The City’s weekly meetings with the DCA generally last between one to three hours.  In these meetings, the City is required to provide all of its financial data to the DCA.  The DCA reviews the information which serves as the basis for the topics discussed during the meetings.  (October 26, 2023 Tr., 59:20-60:15)  Once a month, the City and the DCA will review all the expenditures to date.  [...] supplies all of the City’s accounting information to the DCA.  (October 26, 2023 Tr., 9:11-16)  The DCA’s role is not passive.  The expenditures are approved prior to being included in the budget and presented to the City Counsel.  (October 26, 2023 Tr., 10:17-11:2)  The City cannot include anything in its budget that is not approved by the DCA, who freely exercises its authority to reject items.
[brief] The court found it had personal jurisdiction over the former employee but not the employer corporation.  The court performed an analysis under Daimler, determining general jurisdiction was not appropriate because the defendant had neither incorporated in New Jersey nor maintained its principal place of business there.  It had only three employees in New Jersey and derived less than 1% of its revenue here.  It should be noted too that the court improperly determined that a corporation could not “consent” to jurisdiction by registration in the state, questioning Pennsylvania Fire\(^4\) in light of the Goodyear\(^5\) and Daimler line of cases.
[brief] In Miranda v. Arizona, the Supreme Court held that “an individual held for interrogation must be clearly informed that he has the right to consult with a lawyer and to have the lawyer with him during interrogation. ”  384 U.S. 436, 471 (1966).  These warnings must be given during any “custodial interrogation, which the Court defined as “questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. ”  Id. at 444.  Warning suspects of their rights is necessary due to the pressure inherent in an “interrogation of individuals in a police-dominated atmosphere[.]”  *Id.* at 445.  This is because “any police interview of an individual suspected of a crime has coercive aspects to it. ”  *Oregon v. Mathiason*, 429 U.S. 492, 495 (1977) (per curiam).  New Jersey  Courts have held that “custody” under *Miranda* “does not necessitate a formal arrest, nor does it require physical restraint in a police station, nor the application of handcuffs, and may occur in a suspect's home or a public place other than a police station. ”  *State v. Godfrey*, 131 N.J. Super 168, 175 (App. Div. 1974), *aff'd o.b.* 67 N.J. 267 (1975).  See *Orozco v. Texas*, 394 U.S. 324 (1969) (police must give *Miranda* warnings to defendant arrested and questioned in his own bedroom).
[brief] 37  Lawrence v. State, 269 P.3d 672 (Alaska Ct. App. 2012) ..................................  67  Ogundipe v. State, 33 A.3d 984 (Md. 2011), cert. denied, 566 U.S. 966 (2012)  .............................................................................................................  32  People v. Clark, 742 N.Y.S.2d 70 (N.Y. App. Div.), appeal denied, 774 N.E.2d 227 (N.Y. 2002) .................................................................
[brief] This case involves a one-year fixed price contract between [...] and Defendant/Respondent [...] (“[...]”).  The contract required [...] to provide very specific types, gauges and quantities of Schedule 40 steel pipe at specified and predetermined prices.  When [...] canceled the contract as a result of various performance issues, [...] promptly filed a lawsuit.  The gravamen of [...]’s allegations was that it had been compelled “to order replacement materials from other vendors at significantly higher costs in order to meet project deadlines. ”  If this were true, [...]’s measure of damages should have involved the simple calculation of what it cost to obtain the replacement goods matching the items previously ordered within the same one-year time period from another party.  But [...] never provided any cognizable connection between its paltry provision of supporting documents and its outlandish and entirely unsupported claims of damages.
[brief] Plaintiff filed the Proof of Service as part of its Motion, which is all that was required of Plaintiff.  R. 1:5-3.  Defendant was served as evidenced by his opposition.  What Defendant appears to argue is that he should have received a "proof of filing".  The rules do not contain a requirement for service of such paper.  Moreover, Defendant’s receipt of a proof of service would have had no bearing on the notice to him of Plaintiff’s motion in time to respond and defend his interests.  This argument must fail.
[brief] On March 31, 2023, [...] submitted a Safety Review prepared by [...], [...] to the Planning Board.  (Pa163-165).  The Shropshire report is three pages, with attached an October 16, 2018, [...] (“[...]”) traffic study.  (Pa166-170).  This study provided a “crash analysis” as to crashes at the locations of four existing off premises signs, “two (2) of which reside at signalized intersections. ” (Pa168).  The four sites of the study were in Chester, Delaware and Montgomery counties, in Pennsylvania.  (Pa169).  The Shropshire report referred to the [...] study and Shropshire’s otherwise undocumented review of one intersection in Quakertown, Pennsylvania, which appears to have not been an intersection controlled by a traffic light or signal.  (Pa163).  The Shropshire report referred to the 2003 Virginia Tech report which had been mentioned at the March 20, 2023, meeting and a 2013 apparent traffic safety report, for which the geographical area studied is not indicated nor information about any of the relevant characteristics of the locations of the signs studied.
[brief] Example: (Da8-Da10)=Defendants/Appellant’s appendix pages 8,9&10.  TRIAL COURT TRANSCRIPT  KEY  Transcript of April 26, 2024 motion for reconsideration  Example(1M8-3)= April 26, 2024 motion transcript page 8; line 3.  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS | Order | Appendix Page No. | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------| | 4/26/24  ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION AND GRANTING CROSS MOTION TO DISCHARGE LIS PENDENS | Da59 | | 4/26/24  ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION AND MOTION TO VACATE JUDGMENT AND PERMIT TIME TO REDEEM | Da60 | TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | Authority | Brief Page Number | |--------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------| | Rule 4:50-1 | 4,5,7,11,14,17 | | 257-261 20th Ave. Realty LLC v. Roberto 2023 N.J. Super LEXIS 121 | 8-10,14 | | Alberti v. Civil Service Com., 78 N.J. Super. 194 | 17,18 | | In re ESTATE OF NUOSE, 15 N.J. 149 | 17 | | Mancini v. Eds ex rel. N.J. Auto. Full Ins. Underwriting Ass'n. 132 N.J. 330 | 17 | | Roik v. Roik, 477 N.J. Super. 556 | 14 | | Rutherford Education Asso. v. Board of Education, 99 N.J. 8 | 14 | | State v. Lodzinski, 248 N.J. 451 | 17,18 | | State v. Vanness, 474 N.J. Super. 609 | 17,18 | | State v. Covil, 240 N.J. 448 | 13 | | State v. Earls, 214 N.J. 564 | 13 | | Tyler v. Hennepin County | | | 598 U.S. 631, 143 S. Ct. 1369, 215L.Ed. 2d 564 (2023) | 4,5,6,8,10-12,13-16,19,20 | | Virella v. TLOA of NJ, LCC (In re Virella), 23-12179 | 14 | PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
[brief] New Jersey was represented by the Attorney General’s Office.  In Paragraphs I.A.2., 3. and 4. of the Settlement Term Sheet, [...] agreed as follows:  2.  Servicer shall ensure that affidavits, sworn statements and Declarations are based on personal knowledge....  3.  Servicer shall ensure that affidavits, sworn statements and Declarations executed by Servicer’s affiants are based on the affiant’s review and personal knowledge of the accuracy and completeness of the assertions in the affidavits, sworn statements and Declarations, set out facts that Servicer reasonably believes would be admissible in evidence, and show that the affiant is competent to testify on the matters stated.  4.  Servicer shall have standards for qualifications, training and supervision of employees.  Servicer shall train and supervise employees who regularly prepare or execute affidavits, sworn statements or Declarations.  Each such employee shall sign a certification that he or she has received the training.  Servicer shall oversee the training completion to ensure each required employee properly and timely completes such training.  Servicer shall maintain written records confirming that each such employee has completed the training and the subjects covered by the training. ” (Emphasis Added).  Thus, the New Jersey Attorney General as well as the other Attorneys General set the standard for the admission of hearsay documents.  There must be (a) an affidavit, (b) personal knowledge and (c) proof that the affiant is “competent to testify. ”  In order to demonstrate competency to testify, the affiant must be trained in executing affidavits; the affiant must certify such training; the servicer, here [...], must oversee such training and maintain written records that the affiant has received such training.  There is no evidence that Declarant received any training for competency.  Thus, Declarant’s certification fails all three tests for the application of the business record exception.  C.
[brief] PROCEDURAL HISTORY  On January 14, 2022, the [...] filed unfair practice charges against the [...], claiming that the [...] violated the NJEERA by insisting on having the Bargaining Council members of its negotiations team attend and participate in the negotiation sessions for the successor to the 2019-2022 CNA.  Despite the fact that the [...] had already repeatedly stated to the [...] that the Bargaining Council was part of its negotiations team, the [...] in the unfair practice charges inaccurately referred to the [...]’s Bargaining Council as “separate and apart from the Association’s Negotiations Committee”.  (Pa001-Pa002).  On February 9, 2022, the [...] filed cross-unfair practice charges against the [...].  The charges explained how the [...] was refusing to meet with the [...]’s preferred composition for its negotiations team, instead insisting on ground rules to limit the size of the [...]’s negotiations team before it would move forward with any substantive negotiations.  (Pa003-Pa009).  Both parties submitted position statements to [...] in support of their filings and in opposition to the other party’s unfair practice charges.  (Pa017-Pa035); (Pa092-Pa196, Pa199-Pa213).  [...] proceeded to issue a Complaint and Notice of Pre-Hearing for both sets of charges, consolidating them into a single action.
[brief] Regardless of whether the substance of Respondent’s post may have violated the cited provision of the Code, because the conduct at-issue occurred before Respondent was a school official within the meaning of the Act (as her term had not yet officially begun), the Commission is compelled to dismiss the allegations in this Count.  (Ca172).  As the Advisory Opinion on this issue was unquestionably clear, and as Appellants had every reason to rely on the Commission’s outlining of its own jurisdiction, it was unnecessary to point out what is obvious from the record: that the post that is the subject of Count 5 was still public and available well into Respondent’s term as a Board member.
[directive] I.  collection.  On a quarterly basis, each state, county, and local Quarterly reporting and data law enforcement agency shall report to the Director of the Division of Criminal Justice and County Prosecutor in their jurisdiction the following anonymized information about each stationhouse adjustment in effect with that agency in the prior quarter (See Appendix B): 1. The juvenile’s age at the time of the unlawful conduct; 2. The juvenile’s self-reported race, ethnicity, and gender; 3. The unlawful conduct; and 4.
[brief] For example, a plaintiff could file a SLAPP complaint that he or she knows is completely meritless solely to harass the defendant.  The SLAPP plaintiff could then wait until after the defendant filed a motion to dismiss under UPEPA, allowing the plaintiff to assess the strength of the defendant’s arguments in favor of dismissal.  To the extent the defendant’s arguments in favor of dismissal are weak, the SLAPP plaintiff could choose to maintain the action (despite having lacked any desire or expectation that the lawsuit would succeed in the first instance).  If, by contrast, the defendant’s arguments in favor of dismissal are strong, the SLAPP plaintiff could choose to voluntarily dismiss the lawsuit.  And to the extent the court grants the voluntary dismissal without prejudice before the defendant has an opportunity to seek attorneys’ fees—as the trial court did here—the defendant’s ability to seek attorneys’ fees under UPEPA would be extinguished, and the dismissal unreviewable.  At that point, however, the defendant will already have invested considerable time, energy, and resources in finding and retaining counsel and moving for dismissal—the exact burdens UPEPA and similar anti-SLAPP statutes were meant to guard against.  See Da10 ([...] remarking, “This legislation will protect residents against frivolous, ill-intentioned lawsuits and insulate them from the financial hardships these cases can produce. ”).  Such a result would contravene the essential legislative purpose of UPEPA, which was to make it “more difficult to use the legal system as a weapon, with the intent to bully individuals into silence.
[brief] ”  Ibid.; see also N.J.S.A. 40:55D-5 (similarly defining “major division”).  The trial court correctly determined that the Applicant applied for a preliminary and final major subdivision approval and [...] included numerous reports, including an EIS.  Pa311.  The Board’s Planner, Engineer, the Board Traffic Engineer, and various other Township departments reviewed the EIS and the trial court determined that the application was complete.  Ibid.  Ultimately, the trial court found that the Applicant’s representatives testified that it did not intend any site work or disturbance before the Board considered the Applicant’s Site Plan Application, which was reflected in the resolution.  Court order p. 12.  Thus, the Board’s consideration of the subdivision application consisted of a “picture with different dotted lines, reflecting the subdivision’s new lots. ”  Court order p. 12.  Artfully stated by the trial court, “[a]lthough a picture saves a thousand words, it has no adverse effect on the public’s health, safety, or welfare. ”  Ibid.  Therefore, the court specifically found that the application has no environmental impact.  In conclusion, the trial court properly held that the Board did not act arbitrarily or capriciously when approving the subdivision, based on substantial credible evidence in the record and recorded so in the resolution set out to memorialize its decision.
[brief] In this case, [...]’s residential address at [...] was well known to [...].  That was the address set forth in Paragraph 8 (“Notices”) of the settlement agreement [...] drafted in 2020 (D126), and as well as on each of the partial statements of account (Da36 & Da37) that [...] attached to its Complaint and later offered in support of its application to enter judgment.  Why, then, did [...] spend six months directing its process servers to attempt service at every other conceivable address?
[brief] Plaintiffs claim that they may nonetheless be entitled to “attorney’s fees and costs” of this action.  (Pb at 50.)  Yet, ironically, Appellants unnecessarily continue to run up their own and Appellees’ legal expenses by pursuing this appeal after the Notices were withdrawn.  In any event, as Appellants recognize, they may be entitled to fee shifting only if New Jersey law applies and if they prevail on their MBPA claim.  (Id. at 27-28.)  As discussed above, New Jersey law does not apply.  For this reason, Appellants’ cite to *Navigators Specialty Ins. Co. v. Sarancini & Hollenbeck, LLC*, No. 09-4317 (WHW), 2010 WL 1931239 (D.N.J. May 12, 2010), is inapposite.  It arose from a dispute over an insurance policy “which would allow Plaintiff to recover the disputed costs from Defendants. ”  Id.  Here, Appellants do not identify any authority allowing them to recover attorneys’ fees and costs aside from the inapplicable MBPA.  Thus, if the trial court’s ruling below is not affirmed – which it should be – then this appeal should be dismissed as moot.  **CONCLUSION**