[brief] *Id.* at *4-5.  The Church contended that counsel’s representation of [...] was directly adverse to his representation of [...].  *Id.* at *5.  In affirming the decision of the trial court, this Court found that the record before it established that the positions of [...] and [...] were not “directly adverse” to each other as is required to find a conflict under RPC 1.7(a)(1).  This Court reasoned that [...]’s position was that the Church was liable for the damages she suffered when it created the websites to obtain information regarding her and other critics of the Church, and then hacking into her email accounts.  *Id.* at *7.  And that [...]’s position was that the Church, through coercive tactics, effectively forced him to participate in the hacking.  *Ibid.*  In holding that no conflict existed, this Court specifically noted that [...] did not *assign fault* to [...].  *Ibid* (emphasis added).  The Court held further that there was also no “significant risk” that [...]’s or [...]’s representation would be “materially limited” by counsel’s responsibility to the other.  *Id.* at *8.  Similarly in this case, neither [...], nor [...], is assigning fault to the other.  Furthermore, there is nothing in the record before this Court that establishes that the positions of [...] and [...] are “directly adverse. ”  To the contrary, both [...]’ and [...]’s positions, and legal strategies, are directly aligned, that being to limit the apportionment of liability attributed to [...], and to establish the comparative negligence of the Decedent.  A miscommunication, or factual discrepancy, between two employees of the company, about which cut-through was to be utilized prior to the crash, does not establish a conflict between the company and one of the employees.  Likewise, there is nothing in the record before this Court which establishes that there is a “significant risk” that Evan’s or [...]’s dual representation by [...] will be “materially limited” by [...]’s responsibility to one client over the other.  When identifying whether a “significant risk” will exist, the court must determine the likelihood that a difference in interests will arise, and if it does, whether such a difference will materially interfere with counsel’s independent professional judgment in considering alternatives, or whether courses of action that reasonably should be pursued on behalf of one client will be foreclosed upon due to the interests of another client.  In re Opinion No. 17-2012, supra, 220 N.J. at 469.  In this matter, the trial court has failed to identify any “significant risk” of a difference in interests definitively arising between [...] and [...], or how such a difference would hinder [...]’s ability to effectively represent both parties.  And that is because no such significant risk exists.  Accordingly, no direct, concurrent conflict exists between [...] and [...] which would warrant the disqualification of [...] from the joint representation of each.  Without such a conflict, [...] and [...] are entitled to their counsel of choice, that being [...], to represent them in this litigation.  Accordingly, the trial court’s Order of February 28, 2024, disqualifying [...] should be reversed.