ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] In order to identify additional assets that may be sheltered or otherwise hidden, Plaintiff’s counsel engaged in a number of asset investigation efforts, including depositions of [...] and [...] in September 2017.  (Da22).  Several rounds of information subpoenas were served on Defendants and third-party subpoenas on Defendants’ financial institutions, which revealed, among other things, various additional efforts by Defendants to hide assets from execution, including a $750,000 transfer by [...] in February 2017 just as the stay of execution was being lifted.  (Da22).  At various times applications were filed to collect on miscellaneous assets, including and an order to show cause concerning a $67,000 tax refund [...] was slated to receive in 2018 from the federal and state treasuries, which [...] then unilaterally used for his own benefit.  (Da22).  [...]’s Porsche was sold in mid-2018 under the special fiscal agent’s oversight.  (Da23).  In January 2021, it was revealed that [...] had, without prior notification, entered a contract to sell a property owned by him and [...] in [...] (that was within the constructive trust on his assets).  (Da24).  Plaintiff’s counsel prepared an order to show cause, which resulted in controls being put in place to secure the proceeds of the sale.  (Da24).  Several motions followed concerning the proceeds of the sale (with [...] arguing he should get all the proceeds).  (Da24).  In the end, [...] and [...] each received half of the proceeds (each received $492,000), despite [...]’s efforts premised yet again on his non-disclosure of the funds he was hiding overseas.  (Da24).  A significant amount of time was also devoted to other post-judgment litigation to represent plaintiff’s interests; time which would not have been incurred if Defendants had not engaged in such significant post-judgment obstruction and misconduct premised on the repeated false representation that they did not have $20 million in cash hidden overseas.
[brief] . . .”  Reliance on section 14.13 is misplaced for at least two reasons.  First, it does not establish or enlarge the residency requirement of section 14.  Rather, it serves only as a way of identifying one of eleven members to be appointed to the advisory board.  Thus, Defendants’ arguments on how section 14’s residency requirement is tied to the time of appointment and does not extend beyond that period (see Db25-29), apply with equal force when construing section 14.13.  Second, like section 14, section 14.13 is open to the same differing interpretations, meaning the language is unclear, which under Berg is fatal to Plaintiffs’ proffered construction.
[brief] Other officers who responded broke through the door, entered the store, and arrested defendant, who was “on the floor. ”  [...] grabbed a Glock handgun from the floor.  It “looked jammed” probably caused by the gun being too close to defendant’s body, preventing a round from entering the chamber.  (3T53-18 to 55-12).  Newark Officer [...] was patrolling the area and responded to the dispatch of an armed man.  He saw [...] pointing his gun toward defendant, who was on the floor of the store.  Three other men were in the store, shouting at defendant.  (3T157-22 to 160-11).  Baker saw [...], who was “rolling on the ground in pain,” having been shot in the leg.  As Baker escorted defendant to a patrol car, he noticed that defendant was “bleeding profusely from his back,” and asked if he had been shot.  Defendant answered yes, and Baker put him in a patrol car to take him to the hospital.  While on route, Baker saw an ambulance, and flagged down the emergency service workers, who then transported defendant to the hospital.  Baker drove to, and then remained at the hospital.  (2T78-6 to 9; 3T163-16 to 167-2).
[brief] The proprietor downloaded two copies of the surveillance video to two CDs and printed three still photographs from the surveillance video.  *Id.* at 1003, 1005.  He gave the CDs to the officer, who brought one of them to the station and labeled it as evidence.  The officer testified that the events depicted on the CD were the same events depicted in the recording he viewed at the liquor store.  *Ibid.*  Affirming the trial court’s admission of the CD and the photographs into evidence, the Dennis Court held that “[t]he State presented sufficient proof of the reliability of the process that produced the video recording and photographs for them to be admitted under the silent-witness theory.
[brief] Pa15.  Through this resolution, the Township Council determined that the “[...]” (the “Redevelopment Area”), which included the Shopping Center, was an “area in need of redevelopment” under the Local Redevelopment and Housing Law (the “LRHL”) (codified as amended at N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-1 to -73).  Ibid.  Upon this determination, the Township Planning Board prepared, and the Township Council later adopted, a redevelopment plan for the Redevelopment Area.  In the years to follow, the Township succeeded in many of its efforts to revitalize the Redevelopment Area, but not with respect to the Shopping Center, which continued to stagnate.
[brief] Ibid.  Instead, he went inside and watched baseball for a while because “I’m a huge baseball fan, so I wanted to see what was going on. ”  Ibid.  Defendant went on to repeat that [...] was on drugs, and claimed that [...] had told him he was diagnosed with schizoaffective disorder after leaving the hospital.  (21T:142-11 to 143-7).  Defendant claimed, however, that [...] also had dissociative identity disorder, an entirely separate disorder.  Ibid.  Defendant further claimed to be scared of [...] because he was a “convicted felon,” was “homeless and begging for money,” and had “been arrested numerous times. ” (21T:143-9 to 144-9, 145-5).  Defendant ended his statement by saying that the first shot was all he intended to fire, aiming low, and that he did not mean for the second shot to go off.
[brief] On January 5, 2023, the parties appeared before the Honorable [...], A.J.S.C. (1T4:20–5:8).  The court highlighted the outstanding procedural deficiencies related to [...]’s complaint, noting that [...] had not submitted her own OPRA requests until after her complaint was filed.  The court expressed concern because no OPRA request or denial existed at the time of [...]’s complaint.  (1T33:17-21; 1T34:20-21).  Later the same day, the court issued a written order denying [...]’s OTSC, and dismissing her complaint with prejudice.  (Pa140).  The court initially found that [...]’s complaint was procedurally improper because she filed her complaint before submitting an OPRA request and receiving a denial.
[brief] See Di Cosala, 91 N.J. at 171 Di Cosala 91 N.J. at 171 (alteration in original) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Agency, § 213, cmt. d) (quoted in Model Civil Jury Charge § 5.76 at fn. 4) (“The dangerous quality of the [employee] may consist of his incompetence or unskillfulness due to his youth or his lack of experience considered with reference to the act to be performed. ”).  For these reasons, the jury charge on negligent training and supervision accurately stated the law.
[brief] (DA393).  Plaintiff [...] e-mailed again on April 10, 2022, again requesting “the last day to settle the purchase of the Unit under the terms of Section 11 SETTLEMENT of [her] SPA[.]” (DA402).  Prior to that, on April 5, 2022, Litigation Counsel for [...] sent a letter via e-mail to Plaintiff [...] correcting the Default Clause and again requesting that Plaintiffs close on the Unit.
[brief] The Subconsultant Agreement between [...] and [...] provided that “[i]f the work to be performed by the Subconsultant is of a professional nature, the work shall be performed under the direct supervision of a licensed professional consultant” (Pa1781).  [...] employee [...], a licensed professional engineer, performed that supervisory function (Pa2627).  Pursuant to the terms of the Subconsultant Agreement, [...] employee [...] served as the Resident Engineer (Id.; Pa1596 at T76:1).  Pursuant to the terms of the Subconsultant Agreement, [...] employee [...] served as the Resident Engineer, and was a NICET Level IV Certified/senior grade engineering technician, in accordance with the [...]’s RFEOI, Order for Professional Services (Id.; Pa1581 at T17:21-18:1; Pa1787).
[brief] ”  4T at 22:10–19; see generally id. at 16–28.  But this reasoning suffers from two fundamental misunderstandings of the NJFCA.  First, this explanation does not have anything to do with whether the amendment is “curative”; otherwise, by this rationale, the NJFCA has, throughout its statutory life, always been “impracticable” by not allowing the AG to block this affirmative defense in relator-led cases.  That is clearly incorrect.  Second, the trial court’s explanation confused the undisputed status of the State as the real party in interest with the AG’s authority to preclude application of the public disclosure bar.
[directive] 6.4.4  The primary responsibility for investigating the domestic violence incident itself, along with any related offenses, belongs to the agency with jurisdiction over the incident.  The processing of domestic violence complaints, restraining orders, criminal complaints, etc., will remain with that agency.  In many cases, this will not be the officer's employing agency.  6.4.5  The employing agency's internal affairs officers will be responsible for receiving the information and documenting the matter as they would any other misconduct allegation.  If the report is that the officer is the victim of domestic violence, it should still be recorded and followed up in case employee assistance is warranted.  6.4.6
[brief] PRE-DISCOVERY DISMISSAL DENIES PLAINTIFF’S RIGHT TO DEMONSTRATE BASIS OF RELIEF (Raised Below (Pa429; 2T5)  The allegations underlying the complaint are unresolved and disputed; and pre-discovery dismissal denies Plaintiff’s right to demonstrate the basis or relief.  The Court has not conducted any findings of fact which prove subjective bad faith or intent to injure.  The Court in SOR did not identify a single date and time of any alleged wrongful conduct.  There are no particulars.  If the Court does not vacate its Orders and complete fact finding and discovery, it will result in an unjust decision.  IX.
[brief] Flanzman v. Jenny Craig, Inc., 244 N.J. 119, 132 (2020), citing Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983).  More specifically, Section 2 of the FAA states that a written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction, or the refusal to perform the whole or any part thereof, or an agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an existing controversy arising out of such a contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.  9 U.S.C. § 2.  “[C]ourts must place arbitration agreements on an equal footing with other contracts . . . and enforce them according to their terms. ”  Flanzman, supra at 132, citing AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 339 (2011).  As the Supreme Court held in Kindred Nursing Ctrs. Ltd. P'ship v. Clark, “[t]he FAA thus preempts any state rule discriminating on its face against arbitration—for example, a law prohibiting outright the arbitration of a particular type of claim. ”  580 U.S. 246, 251 (2017), citing AT&T, supra at 341 (internal quotations and brackets omitted).  Similarly, the “Act also displaces any rule that covertly accomplishes the same objective by disfavoring contracts that . . . have the defining features of arbitration agreements. ”  Id., citing AT&T, supra at 342.  In a similar way, the New Jersey Arbitration Act ("NJAA") is the "affirmative policy of th[e] State, both legislative and judicial, favor[ing] arbitration as a mechanism of resolving disputes."
[brief] (Pa524-Pa525).  b) any reference to the information [...] received from [...] that [...] had already “received discipline last week related to the incident [[...]] described in this complaint. ” (Pa522).  [(Pa665). ]  Also notably absent from the report of [...] is any reference to the following undisputed facts that corroborate [...]’s complaint that he was being discriminated and retaliated against:  a) the determination of the State of New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection Division of Human Resource, Office of Labor Relations, advised [...] that her investigation determined that she engaged in and created a “hostile environment” and engaged in “conduct unbecoming a public employee.
[directive] Pretrial and Offense of Impact fog Accounting 7.6.3 decision,29 detention pretrial the to relevant victim is a on crime of the impact the When and "nature of consideration the of the part as impact such consider shall prosecutor the of relevance (recognizing the 2A:162-20(a) N.J.S.A. See charged." offense the of circumstances in consider court may a factor a as charged offense the of circumstances and nature the seek to whether deciding prosecutor in detention).
[brief] (Da32 to Da34).  [...] attested to the specific retention policy for the TMS logs at issue, which was 8 days.  (Da33 at ¶5).  *(It is salient to mention that Appellant failed to include the Affidavit of [...] in Plaintiff’s Appendix, which was filed as an exhibit to Respondent’s November 1, 2018 Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend Complaint).*  Per [...], the TMS is a piece of software that can schedule many different things.  (Da33 at ¶3).  It sends the schedule to the digital cinema equipment which will interface with another hardware automation system.  (Da33 at ¶3).  It is a scheduling system that is primarily concerned with whether the schedule was created as opposed to accurately showing that the equipment did what was asked.  (Da33 at ¶3).  There is no evidence that the TMS logs produced any information that was not already contained in any of the other logs or anything specifically about whether the lights functioned properly.
[brief] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT  This negligence lawsuit arises from plaintiff's allegation that on February 16, 2021, he was injured due to a snow and ice condition on the premises of an apartment complex, known as [...], owned by defendant/appellant [...].  On February 16, 2021, a snow removal contract for the winter season 2020-2021 was in effect between defendant/respondent snow removal contractor [...] (hereinafter “[...]”) and defendant/appellant customer [...] d/b/a [...] (hereinafter “[...]”).  On June 10, 2024, The Honorable [...], J.S.C., granted [...]’s motion for summary judgment thereby compelling [...] to defend and indemnify [...].  The court below accurately interpreted the language of the contract and did not commit reversible error in its ruling that the defense and indemnification language clearly obligated [...] to defend and indemnify [...] for its own negligence.  The contract does not contain any conflicting indemnity provisions.  [...] agreed to the two (2) indemnity provisions which complement the other in favor of [...].  In paragraph two (2) [...] agreed to indemnify and save harmless [...] whether or not the claim arose from the negligence of [...], [...] or any other party.  [...] also agreed to the terms of paragraph four (4) of the contract.  The terms inuring to the benefit of [...] are moot as the facts of this case do not support their being owed indemnification.  The applicable and pertinent language of the paragraphs obligated [...] to defend and indemnify [...], to the fullest extent permitted by law, from all claims of negligence that may arise from any act or omission of [...].  [...] agreed to the terms of the contract which, under the facts of this case, obligate them to defend and indemnify [...].  The argument that the terms of the contract are inconsistent are without merit.  The contract, read holistically, realizes a consistent theme, to wit, the intentions of the parties are abundantly clear.  Therefore, the court below having addressed the clear language of the contract and the agreed upon intentions of the parties, appropriately ruled that [...] defend and indemnify [...] and, accordingly, did not commit reversible error.  Accordingly, this Honorable Court should affirm the Honorable [...], J.S.C.’s ruling that [...] defend and indemnify [...].
[brief] Under N.J.A.C. 4A:7-3.1(a)1, the State Policy applies to conduct that occurs in the workplace or “at any location that can be reasonably regarded as an extension of the workplace,” including “any facility where State business is being conducted and discussed. ” (emphasis added).  Thus, all State employees are subject to the State Policy at qualifying offsite locations, and here, the front of a state building and a local Union office certainly qualify as off-site locations “where State business is being conducted and discussed.
[brief] The trial court failed to make any findings of fact or conclusions of law regarding [...]’s detrimental reliance on [...].  [...] has completely controlled the defense of the Underlying Action, and it is disputed that [...] did so pursuant to a reservation of rights.  While [...] alleges to have issued a reservation of rights letter on July 20, 2017, regarding the initial complaint in the Underlying Action, [...] does not recall receiving such a letter and no proofs have been provided to show the letter was actually sent or actually received.  Moreover, upon filing the amended pleading in the Underlying Action, [...] alleges to have sent a second reservation of rights letter in October 2017, which was not produced until [...] filed its reply papers in further support of its motion for summary judgment.  Obviously, no discovery could have been taken at that point on whether the letter was actually received, and [...] testified at his deposition that he was not familiar with the letter.  Thus, [...] had no reason to know that [...] would deny him coverage as to the newly added cause of action for tortious interference.  Under such circumstances, [...] should have been estopped from disclaiming coverage.  The test to determine whether an insurer should be estopped from disclaiming coverage due to prejudice is whether the insurer’s conduct “constitute[s] a material encroachment upon the rights of an insured to protect itself by handling the claim directly and independently of the insurer.
[brief] A redeveloper’s agreement does not equate to, and is fundamentally different from, a developer’s agreement.  Performance under a redevelopment agreement is not tethered to the actual realization or completion of a particular redevelopment project, whereas a developer’s agreement is dependent upon, and typically a condition of, a particular project’s approval and construction.  Id. (emphasis added).  Ultimately, the court recognized that the absence of the rational nexus requirements is not an oversight and flaw in the LRHL but, rather, a logical mechanism to empower municipalities as the Legislature intended to carry out the purpose of redevelopment:
[brief] Pa63-64.  The trial court concluded that the amendments did not add a new permitted use or conditional use to the underlying zone and were not aimed at promoting the private interests of [...], but rather at the overall goal of redevelopment and effectuating the master plan, and therefore did not constitute spot zoning.  Pa64.  With regard to Count V of the FAC and Plaintiff’s contention that the Amended Redevelopment Plan was inconsistent with the City’s Master Plan, the trial court found that [...], the City’s planner, detailed how the amendments were consistent with the Master Plan, including the fact that “the height limitation increase maintains existing residential neighborhoods as attractive high-quality areas compatible with existing neighborhood character and maintain a balanced stock of quality housing for all generations, income, and lifestyles.
[brief] Based on the record in this case, it is clear Plaintiff, at best, is merely making complaints of “subjective feelings of discomfort” for which she is unable to recover.  Brooks, 150 N.J. at 402-03; see also Hammer v. Twp. of Livingston, 318 N.J. Super. 298, 305 (App. Div. 1999) (finding that subjective complaints of pain coupled with fully healed fracture did not amount to permanent impairment).  By Plaintiff’s own admission, her only lingering ailments include “very quick” ankle pain that locks up, an occasional “dull pain” when she goes up the stairs, and an inability to wear heels.  [Pa72, ¶ 34-36].  Despite Plaintiff’s complaints of same, Plaintiff testified she last sought medical treatment almost three years ago in October 2019.  [Pa72, ¶ 37].  As such, there is no record evidence that shows Plaintiff suffered a loss of a bodily function that is substantial, and given Plaintiff’s deposition testimony, the trial court, properly found no reasonable trier of fact could find in the Plaintiff suffered a loss of a bodily function that is substantial.  Therefore, Plaintiff cannot overcome the stringent requirements of the TCA and it is respectfully submitted the Appellate Division should affirm the trial court’s Order in its entirety.
[brief] See State v. Schubert, 212 N.J. 295, 308 (2012)  (“There are two categories of illegal sentences: (1) those that exceed the penalties authorized by statute for a particular offense and (2) . . . those that include a disposition that is not authorized by our criminal code. ”)  The illegal components of his sentence must be vacated.  1.  Sentencing courts lack jurisdiction to impose conditions of parole.
[brief] Ibid.  A similar situation exists here.  In the case at hand, there is no dispute that the handwriting on defendant’s Miranda form is his.  The disputed writings, the letters, were admitted into evidence over the defense and trial court’s objection by order of this Court, as well.  The jury was always, therefore, going to be able to assess each of these items of evidence.  The absence of an expert, here, is of no moment.  Like in Carroll, the jury was more than equipped to compare pieces of writing in evidence before them.
[brief] [...] argues that in *Crawford v. Washington*, 541 U.S. 36, 68–69, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 1374, 158 L. Ed.2d 177, 203 (2004), the United States Supreme Court abrogated its former “reliability” approach to the admissibility of hearsay evidence and held that out-of-court statements that are “testimonial” violate the Sixth Amendment.  However, the Supreme Court did not apply its holding in *Crawford* to the co-conspirator exception to the hearsay rule.
[directive] Do you have any existing opinions or strong feelings one way or another about such cases?  8.  Have any of you or members of your immediate family ever suffered any complications from [specify the medical field involved]?  9  Do you have any familiarity with [specify the type of medical condition involved] or any familiarity with the types of treatment available?  10.  Are you, or have you ever been, related (by blood or marriage) to anyone affiliated with the health care field?  11.  Have you or any relative or close personal friend ever had a dispute with respect to a health care issue of any kind with a doctor, chiropractor, dentist, nurse, hospital employee, technician or other person employed in the health care field?