ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] rejecting the “mailing vendor theory. ”  See Jones v. American Coradius International, No., [...] (N.J. Sup. Ct. Jun. 15, 2023) (granting motion to dismiss and indicating that “nine or ten other judges” in New Jersey have already analyzed the same mailing vendor” theory and have rejected it) ([...]); see also Hopkins v. Convergent Outsourcing, Inc., No. [...] (N.J. Super. L. May 31, 2023) (“The Court herein finds that the legislature did not intend to prohibit the use of letter vendors in the collection of debt when the FDCPA was passed.  A review of the legislative history of the Act reveals that the Senate desired to prohibit the practice of disclosing consumer information to friends, neighbors, and employers and sought to dissuade the disclosure of personal affairs to third persons”) (citing Senate Report No, 95-382(1977) ([...])); [...] v. Convergent Outsourcing, Inc., Case No. [...] (N.J. Sup. Ct. Apr. 19, 2023) (“Plaintiff alleges that [Defendant] used a letter vendor to create a debt collection letter.  That allegation alone does not show that [Defendant’s] conduct was abusive, deceptive, or unfair.  Simply put, this is not the type of conduct that Congress was interested in preventing. ”) ([...]); Maher v. United Collection Bureau, Inc., No. [...] (N.J. Sup. Ct. Jun. 26, 2023); [...] v. Radius Global Solutions, LLC, Case No. [...] (N.J. Sup. Ct. Dec. 16, 2022) (same) ([...]); Rubin v. Transworld Systems, Inc., Case No. [...] (N.J. Sup. Ct. Jan. 20, 2023)([...]); Elshabba v. Jefferson Capital Sys., LLC, No. [...] (N.J. Sup. Ct. April 26, 2023)([...]).
[brief] However, the fact that a search term is relevant does not eliminate the possibility that it will produce irrelevant documents.  Conversely, the fact that a search term will produce irrelevant documents does not mean the term should not be used such that the party seeking discovery will not receive relevant responsive documents merely because the term produced documents that were not relevant.  Thus, the issue is what to do with the documents that are responsive to the search term but irrelevant to the case.  Several courts have held that by running a relevant search term, the responding party does not waive relevance objections to the documents responsive to the search term.  See FlowRider Surf, Ltd. v. Pacific Surf Designs, Inc., 2016 WL 6522807, at *7-8 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 3, 2016) (overruled on other grounds) (finding that a party did not waive its right to conduct a relevance review by agreeing to run search terms); BancPass, Inc. v. Highway Toll Admin., LLC, 2016 WL 4031417, at *3 (W.D. Tex. 2016) (same); Palmer v. Cognizant Tech. Sols. Corp., 2021 WL 3145982, at *9 (C.D. Cal. 2021) (“The Court will not compel defendants to produce any document simply because it contains a search term whether or not it is responsive to the discovery request, or, by extension, whether or not it is relevant and proportional to the needs of the action. ”), O’Donnell/Salvatori Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 339 F.R.D. 275, 277 (W.D. Wash. 2021) (same).2  This Court agrees that agreeing to run search terms does not waive relevance objections to the documents that are responsive to the search terms.
[brief] ## TABLE OF CITATIONS AND OTHER AUTHORITIES | Cases | Brief page number | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------| | Perlmart of Lacey, Inc. v. Lacey Twp. Planning Bd., 295 N.J. Super. 234 (App. Div. 1996) | 6 | | Northgate Condo. Ass 'n v. Borough of Hillsdale Planning Bd., 214 N.J. 120 (2013) | 6 | | Rockaway Shoprite Assocs., Inc. v. City of Linden, 424 N.J. Super. 337 (App. Div. 2011) | 4 | | Twp. Of Stafford v. Stafford Twp. Zoning Bd. Of Adjustment, 154 N.J. 62 (1998) | 7 | | Oliva v. City of Garfield, 1 N.J. 184 (1948) | 7 | | Town of Belleville v. Parrillo's, Inc., 83 N.J. 309 (1980) | 8 | | Urban v. Planning Bd., 124 N.J. 651 (1991) | 8 | | Scully-Bozarth Post v. Burlington Planning Bd., 362 N.J. Super. 296(App. Div.), certif. den. 178 N.J. 34 (2003) | 8, 11 | | Conselice v. Borough of Seaside, 358 N.J. Super. 327 (App. Div. 2003) | 9 | | Bonaventure Int'l v. Spring Lake, 350 N.J. Super. 420 (App. Div. 2002) | 9 | ### Statutes N.J.S.A. 40:55D-1 et seq.
[brief] Pensions for public employees serve a public purpose.  A primary objective in establishing them is to induce able persons to enter and remain in public employment, and to render faithful and efficient service while so employed.  3 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations (3d Ed. Rev. 1963) § 12.141.  They are in the nature of compensation for services previously rendered and act as an inducement to continued and faithful service.  Being remedial in character, statutes creating pensions should be liberally construed and administered in favor of the persons intended to be benefited thereby.
[brief] Defendant allegedly told [...] that when [...] asked for the laptop, he said: “It was collateral,” and “We don’t owe you anything.  If anything, we’re even. ”  (28T 134-1 to 6)  In addition to [...]’s significant criminal history, defense counsel’s focus on cross examination was on: the extraordinarily lenient treatment [...] was given by Somerset prosecutors, especially when he committed a new offense and missed court as a result (28T 142-2 to 155-22); [...]’s long history of “snitching” on many others in case after case, in exchange for lenient treatment.  (28T 159-16 to 212-17; 29T 13-9 to 21-5); and [...]’s repeated letters to prosecutors in this case offering information about defendant, which culminated in his statement to them on March 9, 2020.  (29T 23-18 to 46-1)
[brief] 1.  Based inter alia upon new information presented to the Court regarding efforts by the Township to comply with its Mt. Laurel constitutional obligations, the Court grants the Township’s motion for reconsideration and finds that the [...] is not determined to be constitutionally non-compliant.  2.  The Order dated November 10, 2020 is set aside nunc pro tunc.  3.  Temporary immunity from builder’s remedy suits is hereby restored nunc pro tunc as of November 10, 2020 and will continue on condition that the Township complies with the terms of this Order.  This provision shall not affect the claims and defenses in the builder’s remedy suit instituted by [...] on August 5, 2020.  4.  Notwithstanding the provisions appearing in the Settlement Agreements with [...] and [...], which call for the introduction, consistency review and second reading (“Passage”) of the zoning ordinances intended to implement and effectuate those Settlement Agreements to occur after the Court conducts a Fairness Hearing thereon, the Township and the Planning Board, by stated consent, shall introduce the zoning ordinances prior to the Fairness Hearing; if the second reading(s) shall occur prior to the Fairness Hearing, such Passage shall remain subject to the Fairness Hearing.  5.  The Court will conduct a Fairness Hearing as to the settlements with [...]; [...] Communities, Inc.; and [...] on March 23, 2021 at 10:00 a.m., the particulars for which will be addressed by a separate Order.
[brief] [...] then set up the monitoring room.  (1T22-14 to 23-16).  She and [...] then transported defendant to the statement room.  (1T23-17 to 25).  They then took a statement from defendant.  (1T47-10 to 15; Pa26 to Pa129; Pa131).  She spoke in Spanish because that was defendant’s preferred language.  (1T28-4 to 11).  [...] began the statement by reintroducing herself.
[brief] # TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | Cases | Page | |--------------------------------------------|------| | Acevedo v. Flightsafety Int'l, Inc., | 29 | | 449 N.J. Super. 185 (App. Div. 2017) | | | Andersen v. Exxon Co., | 31 | | 89 N. J. 483 (1982) | | | Barone v. Gardner Asphalt Corp., | 45 | | 955 F.Supp. 337 (D.N.J. 1997) | | | Bosshard v. Hackensack Univ. Med. Ctr., | 28 | | 345 N.J. Super. 78 (App. Div. 2001) | | | Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America,| 16,17| | 142 N.J. 520 (1995) | | | Budhun v. Reading Hosp. & Med. Ctr., | 43 | | 765 F.3d 245 (3d Cir. 2014) | | | Calabotta v. Phibro Animal Health Corp., | 32 | | 460 N.J. Super. 38 (App. Div. 2019) | | | Carmichael v. Bryan, | 17 | | 310 N.J. Super. 34 (App. Div. 1998) | | | Cerracchio v. Alden Leeds, Inc., | 18 | | 223 N.J. Super. 435 (App.Div. 1988) | | | Cloews v. Terminix Int’l, Inc., | 27 | | 109 N.J. 575 (1988) | | | Domurat v. Ciba Specialty Chems. Corp., | 33 | | 353 N.J. Super. 74 (App. Div. 2002) | | | Edwards v. Schlumberger-Wall Servs., | 46 | | 984 F.Supp. 264 (D.N.J.1997)
[brief] Respondents attempt to impose a waiver concept often found in federal environmental laws, e.g., 15 U.S.C.S. 717r(b) (Natural Gas Act requirement that objections not raised in rehearing before FERC cannot be appealed to DC Circuit), but New Jersey’s FHACA and APA contain no analogous provisions that expressly give notice of the potential for waiver and preclusion.  Nor is this a process in which there is a draft permit made available for public review and comment followed by a final permit.  E.g. 40 C.F.R. 124.10 (requiring public notice of draft NPDES permit and at least 30-day comment period); 40 C.F.R. 124.19 (limiting petition for review to persons who filed comments or participated in a public hearing on NPDES draft permit).  The permit that Appellant timely appealed was the first opportunity to review the agency’s final decision and reasoning.
[brief] (6T 181-17 to 183-9)  [...] pointed out that he said “not one word to these guys the whole night” (23T 177-25 to 178-1) and that he did not resort to gunfire until after he heard gunshots and then only fired a warning shot in the air (23T 173-12 to 14, 174-6 to 7; 24T 203-8 to 10, 206-20 to 21).
[brief] (Da1-14).  ---  1T refers to the September 27, 2016 trial transcript.  2T refers to the September 28, 2016 trial transcript.  3T refers to the September 29, 2016 trial transcript.  4T refers to the October 4, 2016 trial transcript.  5T refers to the October 5, 2016 trial transcript.  6T refers to the October 6, 2016 trial transcript.  7T refers to the October 13, 2016 trial transcript.  8T refers to the October 18, 2016 trial transcript.  9T refers to the October 19, 2016 trial transcript.  10T refers to the October 20, 2016 trial transcript.  11T refers to the October 21, 2016 trial transcript.  12T refers to the October 24, 2016 trial transcript.  13T refers to the January 20, 2017 sentencing transcript.  14T refers to the February 17, 2023 post-conviction relief hearing transcript.  “Da” refers to the appendix to defendant’s brief.  “Db” refers to defendant’s brief.  “Pa” refers to the appendix to the State’s brief.  On September 27, 2016, defendant’s jury trial commenced with the Honorable [...], J.S.C., presiding.\(^2\) (1T).
[brief] Relevant evidence is defined as evidence that has "a tendency in reason to prove or disprove any fact of consequence to the determination of the action."  State v. Darby, 174 N.J. 509, 519 (2002).  In the liability phase of this trial the extent of plaintiff's injuries and ability to work was not a fact of consequence to the determination of that part of the action.  Only the liability of the defendants was a fact of consequence in that part of the case.  If the evidence on liability and damages were going to overlap, which they do not, then the trial should not have been bifurcated in the first place.  But, having previously bifurcated the trial, the trial judge should not have permitted evidence of the latter to be admitted in the trial of the former, as doing so caused undue prejudice to the plaintiff and confused the issues in contravention of NJRE 403.
[brief] DeNike v. Cupo, 196 N.J. 502, 516 (2008) (alteration in original).  Under both Canon 3(C)(1) and Rule 1:12-1(g), "'it is not necessary to prove actual prejudice on the part of the court' to establish an appearance of impropriety; an 'objectively reasonable' belief that the proceedings were unfair is sufficient."  Id. at 517 (quoting State v. Marshall, 148 N.J. 89, 279 (1997)).
[directive] Most serious Brimage-eligible offense: N.J.S.A. 2C:35-  Special Offense  Characteristics: Firearm possessed? (Do not use if defendant will also plead to 2C:39-4.1 based on the same 9  9 9 Yes No Unk conduct.)  Non-firearm weapon used? (Do not use if defendant will also plead to 2C:39-4.1 based on 9  9 9 Yes No Unk the same conduct.)  Will defendant be required to also plead to 2C:39- 9 9 Yes No 4.1?  If appropriate, select the aggregate amount of drugs involved from the list below.  9  9  9  Second Degree Amount  First Degree Amount  Substantial Quantity Amount (ten (10) times first degree amount)  If charged with N.J.S.A. 2C:35-6, was defendant less than 3 years older than the juvenile used or employed?  9  9  Yes No  Enter Criminal History Category (See Schedule I)
[brief] The undisputed facts establish that Respondent engaged in conduct, utterly degrading to women, that adversely affects the morale and efficiency of the Borough and has a near certainty to destroy public respect for municipal employees, as well as confidence and trust in the operation of governmental services.  As a public official, Respondent breached his fiduciary duty to the public by violating the duties of fidelity, honesty, and integrity.  For the foregoing reasons, the Borough did not act arbitrarily, capriciously or unreasonably, or in violation of N.J.S.A. 40:14A-5(c), as Respondent neglected his duties as a public official and engaged in misconduct in office.  For these reasons, Respondent’s removal must be upheld.
[brief] While the court appropriately considered the Yarbough factors in deciding to impose a consecutive sentence, see 100 N.J. 627, 643-44 (1985), it failed to conduct a Torres fairness analysis.  (6T 14-15 to 19)  Under Torres, a sentencing court that imposes consecutive terms must provide “[a]n explicit statement, explaining the overall fairness of [the] sentence. ”  246 N.J. at 268.  The fairness evaluation is “the necessary second part to a Yarbough analysis,” and its omission necessitates resentencing.  Id. at 268, 270.  Here, the court did not consider the fairness of imposing an overall term of 27 years with a nearly 23-year parole disqualifier.  This matter must be remanded for an explicit consideration of the fairness of the sentence.  **CONCLUSION**
[brief] Pa76.  At trial, the multi-page, unnumbered, unauthenticated document was marked D-6 for identification.  Neither D-5 nor D-6 were moved into evidence.  Moreover, no witness involved in the creation of the documents testified.  At oral argument, on July 12, 2022, on the various motions in limine filed by the parties, [...] unequivocally found that the documents were hearsay and could be used at trial only “if you lay a proper foundation. ”
[brief] Lay opinion testimony is permissible “if it falls within the narrow bounds of testimony that is based on the perception of the witness and that will assist the jury in performing its function. ”  *State v. McLean*, 205 N.J. 438, 456 (2011).  Pursuant to *N.J.R.E.* 701, “[i]f a witness is not testifying as an expert, the witness’ testimony in the form of opinions or inferences may be admitted if it: (a) is rationally based on the witness’ perception; and (b) will assist in understanding the witness’ testimony or determining a fact in issue.
[brief] Defendant’s charges pertained to the robbery and murder of the victim, [...], as well as several weapons and CDS offenses.  (Da 1-2).  On June 4, 2019, superseding Indictment [...] was issued containing the same offenses but including several additional weapons offenses.  (Da 10-22).  On June 24, 2019, the Court granted the State’s motion to sever the Defendant’s trial from the trial of co-defendant [...].  (Da 23).  On December 11, 2019, superseding Indictment [...] was issued against Defendant, charging him with first-degree murder, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3a (Count One); first-degree conspiracy to commit murder, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3a or b, and 2C:5-2 (Count Two); second-degree unlawful possession of a weapon, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5b(1) (Count Three); 37T – June 23, 2020, vol. 2 (trial)  38T – June 24, 2020 (trial)  39T – June 25, 2020 (deliberations)  40T – June 26, 2020 (deliberations)  41T – June 29, 2020 (verdict)  42T – Aug. 29, 2020 (sentence) second-degree possession of a firearm for an unlawful purpose, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4a (Count Four); and second-degree possession of a weapon by a convicted person, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:39-7b (Count Five).
[brief] (Pb11-Pb17).  Indeed, [...] gives dispositive weight to the fact that October 17, 2018, is when the trial judge entered its amended judgment of conviction in the criminal action on the date.  (Pa226-Pa227, Pa229-231).  However, [...] does not cite any authority to explain why that specific date would have greater weight here than March 6, 2018.  (Pb11-Pb17).  For example, [...] cites no controlling or persuasive New Jersey authority that a reversal on appeal only triggers the relevant statute of limitations upon entry of an amended judgment of conviction.  Ibid.\(^7\)  For these reasons, on appeal, [...] has seemingly abandoned the argument that his malicious prosecution claim began to accrue when the amended judgment of conviction was entered.
[directive] New Jersey  The 2C:1-14(g).  N.J.S.A. association. unincorporated an or corporation Page 4 PASPA's constitutionality, joined in the leagues' arguments, stating that "nothing in the statute requires New Jersey to maintain or enforce its sports wagering that prohibitions," and "PASPA also allows a state to ...modify or repeal its prohibitions."  U.S. Br. at 29.  Summarizing and accepting those the Third arguments, Circtut noted that "no one contends that PASPA requires the states to enact any laws, and have we held that it does not require states to maintain existing laws."  730 F.3d at 235.  Indeed, United Constitution the States clearly forbids Congress from requiring a State to criminalize conduct under state law.
[brief] This court “review[s] a trial court’s order granting or denying a motion to compel arbitration de novo because the validity of an arbitration agreement presents a question of law. ”  Santana v. SmileDirectClub, LLC, 475 N.J. Super. 279, 285 (App. Div. 2023); see also McGinty v. Zheng, No. A-1368-23, 2024 WL 4248446, at *5 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Sept. 20, 2024) (not reported) (same); Williams v. Ysabel, No. A-1391-22, 2023 WL 5768422, at *3 (N.J. Super. App. Div. Sept. 7, 2023) (not reported) (same).  I.
[brief] Plaintiff vs. [...], [...], [...] ADMINISTRATOR OF THE [...] AND [...] Defendants SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION: DOCKET NO: [...] CIVIL ACTION On Appeal from a Final Judgment of the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Monmouth County, Docket No. [...] Sat Below: Hon. [...], J.S.C. Hon. [...], J.S.C. REPLY BRIEF ON BEHALF OF DEFENDANT/APPELLANT [...] [...] [...] [...]
[brief] In the begging of cross examination, the Prosecutor asked [...] if she “edited out what [she] thought was important for the report and what wasn’t. ” (11T:37-22 to 23).  [...] replied that “I edited out things in the beginning such as … how is the food here, things like that. ” (11T:37-24 to 25).  “You … typically, when you start …” (11T:37-23 to 38-1).  Without an objection from the Prosecutor, the Court stated: Doctor, he just asked you whether you edited out certain things.  He didn’t ask you what you edited out.  He asked you if you edited it out.  That’s the question being asked of you.  Answer the questions that are being asked please. ” (11T:38-2 to 6).
[brief] Despite the [...]’ repeated (and, at times, meandering) discourse, no New Jersey Court has ever held, as a matter of law, that an appraiser must ignore all long-term leases on a condemned property in favor of a so-called “fee simple” valuation.  Naturally, the Township would take the Property as fee simple when the taking is completed (an outcome that did not occur until May of 2018).  However, the value of the Property as fee simple is determined by “the fair market value of the property…determined by what a willing buyer and a willing seller would agree to, neither being under any compulsion to act. ”  City of Asbury Park v. Asbury Park Towers, 388 N.J. Super. 1, 9 (App. Div.2006).  The [...] fail to set forth why the Trial Court erred, as a matter of law, in leaving it to the discretion of the Arbitrator in his role as factfinder as to whether the [...] lease should be factored into market value.  Condemnation cases in New Jersey hold that potential purchaser of the property would consider a long term lease in the value of the property.  Casino Reinvestment Dev. Auth. v. Katz, 334 N.J. Super. 473, 485–87 (Law. Div. 2000).  The inherent flexibility in that approach refutes any gross oversimplification of market value to that merely determined under a “fee simple” taking.  Put another way, the [...]’ position would invalidate the holdings of State by Com'r of Transp. v. Silver, 92 N.J. 507, 514–15 (which acknowledged that the market value is impacted by normal market conditions based on all surrounding circumstances at the time of the taking), Vill. of S. Orange v. Alden Corp., 71 N.J. 362, 368 (1976)(ascribing value to the nearby availability of parking facilities), and Katz.
[brief] Notice obligations are not delegable, and rest on “the insurer, not the \(^5\)  Pursuant to the policy, enrolled contractors “qualify as a Named Insured,” so [...] would qualify as a “named insured,” not an “additional insured. ”  Pa148. broker or agent. ”  Barbara Corp. v. Bob Maneely Ins. Agency, 197 N.J. Super. 339, 346 (App. Div. 1984) (emphasis added) (in the context of notice of nonrenewal of fire and casualty insurance: “The obligation has been placed on the carrier by the regulation to give the required notice.  Failure to do so requires automatic renewal regardless of the conduct of brokers or agents. ”); see also Insinga v. Hegedus, 231 N.J. Super. 562, 567 (App. Div. 1989) (“our reference to nondelegability in Barbara was intended to make clear that the insurer cannot avoid responsibility for the insured’s failure to receive notice … by claiming that it is the broker who is primarily responsible for sending such notices to the insured”).
[directive] TOTAL  S.C.V.T.F.  Penalty: $ Fecha/Date  Acusado/Defendant  Abogado defensor/Defense Attorney Fiscal/Prosecutor Formulario enmendado promulgado por la directriz #01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 10080-Spanish página 7 de 7 Revised Form Promulgated by Directive #01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 10080-Spanish page 7 of 7
[brief] The [...] injected several new justifications for the missing feasibility determination in its brief, including that the “[...] was aware that spanning the channel could result in adverse environmental impacts,” and that “compared to a pipe culvert, constructing a bridge span would disturb more area beyond the channel due to its spanning requirements,” and “could result in more erosion and sediment transfer within the tributary. ”  [...] Rb18.  Each of these justifications is entirely missing from the record and permit decision, and the [...]’s attempt to fill the gap in the record with post hoc argument makes the record’s deficiency even more plain.  The [...]’s decision may be upheld solely on the basis it articulated in the record, “[n]or are ‘appellate counsel’s post hoc rationalizations for agency orders’ an adequate substitute for administrative factfinding.
[brief] The Council has previously determined that a request failing to contain all appropriate criteria set forth in Elcavage, GRC 2009-07, was invalid.  See e.g., Verry v. [...], GRC Complaint No. 2009-124 (April 2010) (invalid request omitting the “subject and/or content”).  Your request is similarly invalid under the common law right of access to government records.  “A person seeking public records under the common law right of access ‘must explain why he seeks access to the requested documents’ and the person's interest in obtaining the documents “must be balanced against the State's interest in preventing disclosure.