ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] . . .”)  Indeed, our State Constitution is premised upon the sovereignty of the people.  Article I, paragraph 2a.  Our State Constitution recognizes the right of the people to speak, to challenge, to petition and to question arbitrary, capricious, wrongful ultra vires governmental actions.  Article I, paragraphs 5, 6 and 18; Article VI, Section V, paragraph 4.  But here, defendants uniformly claim that their alleged ultra vires actions are not subject to judicial review and remedies.  Here, defendants and the trial court blurred and merged plaintiff’s distinct public wrongdoing allegations, claims and causes of actions.
[directive] 17 to alcohol to $50  1st age months  Required Se Referral  39  N.J.S.A. to 39 VCCB  Per until Title $300  Title of 7 prior privilege of (OVWI) but end alcohol is the or more there attendance at 0.10% driving under Offense begins IDRC  Intoxicated or unless of 0.08% operating than influence  Suspension suspension to $50 1st months  Required Referral months, less Se  VCCB year $250 Per While 3 1 17  Vessel 12:7-46 Suspend/Revoke Suspend/Revoke Privilege under Penalties Serv. Safety a Operator old 12:7-46d 12:7-46e OVWI Operate Course Comm Vessel IDRC
[brief] **Honda LaneWatch™**  New to the CR-V, the EX, EX-L and Touring trims include Honda’s LaneWatch™ display that uses a camera located at the bottom the passenger-side exterior mirror to display a wide-angle view of the passenger side roadway on the Display Audio screen.  The image appears when the right turn signal is activated, or when a button on the end of the turn signal stalk is pressed.  The typical field of view for a passenger-side mirror is approximately 18 to 22 degrees, but the LaneWatch™ display field-of-view is about four times greater, or approximately 80 degrees.  The system helps the driver to see traffic, pedestrians or objects in the vehicle’s blind spot.  To help make judging distance easier, three reference lines are shown.  Drivers should visually confirm roadway conditions prior to changing lanes.  LaneWatch™ can be customized to suit the driver’s preferences.  Turn-signal activation of the LaneWatch™ system can be switched on or off, as can the three on-screen reference lines.  Screen brightness, contrast and black level are also adjustable.
[brief] On July 16, 2019, Lieutenant [...] from the [...] interviewed [...] who owned a 2005 white Honda.\(^1\) (4T12-1 to 9; 4T96-18 to 21; 4T97-21 to 98-1).  He told Ho that on July 6, 2019, he was hanging out with his girlfriend on East Jersey Street when his barber asked him to pay for his haircut.  He left East Jersey Street to pay his barber, and as he returned, making a right onto 6th Street, he heard "either what is to be firecrackers or gunshots."  (4T106-8 to 25; 4T107-25 to 107-25).  Alexander then saw "an individual . . . running . . . with a hoodie on . . . get into a dark colored vehicle."  (4T107-11 to 14).  Alexander noted that "something didn't seem right" because "[w]hy would be he [sic] running."  So he attempted to pursue the car and take a picture of the license plate.  But due to the rain, he could not catch up.  (4T107-14 to 25).  Alexander described the car he was following as a dark, medium-sized four-door car with tinted \(^1\) Alexander's statement was played for the jury following a State v. Gross, 121 N.J. 1 (1990) hearing. windows.  (4T115-17 to 116-16).
[brief] Appellant’s Deposition Testimony (Pa211, [...] Deposition) and Appellant’s Affidavit (Pa294) support the position taken that there are material issues in dispute.  Appellant received Performance Evaluations which were scored as effective.  (Pa298, Pa314) and Summative Reports for the school years 2016 through to 2018 which were effective.  (Pa326, Pa327)  Plaintiff testified that in school year 2018-2019, she did not receive the full complement of Observations because she should have had three Observations.  During the Spring 2019, Principal [...] ([...]) testified that he deliberately did not conduct further evaluations of Appellant because she had not signed her second Observation.  (Pa330, [...] Deposition 5/11/2022, T25:4-22)  When [...] sat for deposition in the lawsuit brought by [...], [...] testified differently and said that he did not conduct further Observations of Appellant because he was told to no longer evaluate Appellant by the attorney for the school district.  The failure to complete the Observations resulted in an inability to complete the Summative and the rating of the Plaintiff could not be determined.  This failure to conduct Observations was in violation of the education statutes.  (Pa348, [...] Deposition, 10/28/2022, T32:5-9, T33:14-25, T34:1-7)  In two separate depositions [...] gave inconsistent statements with regard to why he failed to conduct Appellant’s third Observation.  [...] failed to conduct the third Observation of Appellant and then could not complete the Summative Report.  Having not conducted the third Observation and Summative Report made it impossible to claim that Appellant’s job performance was ineffective for school year 2018-2019.  [...] admitted in the deposition held on May 11, 2022, that he had never reprimanded Appellant for work performance nor had Appellant ever been placed on a Performance Improvement Plan.  (Pa330, [...] Deposition 5/11/2022, T26:20-23, T28:14-19)  Appellant received a Notice of Non-Renewal of her position shortly after reporting [...] to the Superintendent of Human Resources for using the word Nigger in her class room with the strong objections of students to use of this language.
[brief] *Id.* at 354.  Plaintiff-Appellant cites to no caselaw or statute, decided after *Green* to support its argument that the statute should not begin to run until a claim is denied.  In addition, in *Peloso v Hartford Ins. Co.*, 56 N.J. 514 (1970), the Court applied the equitable tolling because, in that matter, plaintiff was statutorily barred from filing suit for the first one hundred twenty (120) days.  However, no such bar applies to the instant matter.  As previously stated, the Plaintiff-Appellant, [...], could have simply amended her Complaint against the tortfeasor to add Defendant-Respondent, [...], as a direct party.  However, she chose not to do that.  Instead, Plaintiff-Appellant, [...], chose to dismiss that matter and re-file the instant litigation.  In so doing, Plaintiff-Appellant could have filed the instant litigation, at any time, between May 2, 2022 and May 2, 2023.  Plaintiff-Appellant chose not to do so until May 17, 2023.  In this matter, the lower court correctly held that the policy language is clear and unambiguous.  Plaintiff-Appellant failed to file her lawsuit for underinsured motorist benefits timely and the claim was properly dismissed with prejudice.  CONCLUSION
[brief] ”); R. 1:12-1(g) (judges shall not sit on matters “when there is any ... reason which might preclude a fair and unbiased hearing and judgment, or which might reasonably lead counsel or the parties to believe so”).  “[I]t is not necessary to prove actual prejudice on the part of the court to establish an appearance of impropriety”; recusal is required where “a reasonable, fully informed person” would “have doubts about the judge’s impartiality. ”  DeNike, 196 N.J. at 517 (internal quotation marks omitted).
[brief] See T4 at 5:4-12; 7:3-7.  The trial court based its opinion on the --- \(^3\)  The documents [...] heavily relies on do not mention [...] at all.  Any emails addressed to [...] were from [...], not [...].  Yet, [...] argues that emails discussing a logo from [...], president of [...], which is an unrelated company, somehow bind [...].  In addition, [...] blatantly misrepresents the documents in that the emails are from [...] and not [...].  facts in *Instructional Sys., Inc. v. Computer Curriculum Corp.*, 130 N.J. 324 (1992), and *Lithuanian Com. Corp. v. Sara Lee Hosiery*, 179 F.R.D. 450 (D.N.J. 1998).  The trial court in this case noted that in *Instructional Systems*, the parties had an actual written agreement, so there was obviously a “written arrangement” as defined by the NJFPA.
[brief] (Pa688).  Separately, [...] moved for an award of its attorneys’ fees and costs, arguing that it was the “prevailing party” and entitled to fees under PSA §18.2.  (Pa395-440).  The trial court adhered to the June 9 Order, but stated at oral argument on July 21, 2023 that it would not “decide [[...]’s motion] on the papers[]” and would conduct an “attorney billing hearing.
[brief] In doing so, the Committee is satisfying the requirements of the LRHL to the extent that may be necessary to do so.  g.  These changes do not have any material impacts on the redevelopment plan’s consistency with the Township Master Plan, and should not change the Board’s previous finding that the plan is not inconsistent with the Township Master Plan.  With the only substantive amendment being the stronger protections for the historic Black Horse, the plan is not somewhat more consistent with the goals of the Master Plan.  (Da38-39).  At the November 22, 2022 public meeting of the Board, the Board considered Ordinance 2022-17.  (Pa435).  Despite allowing for public comment, no comments were made.  (Pa435).  The Board passed a motion finding that Ordinance 2022-17 was not inconsistent with the Master Plan and referred the matter back to the Township Committee.
[brief] (4T:39-21 to 25).  A trial was conducted before [...] on February 7, 2023, March 7, 2023, and March 14, 2023.  (2T to 4T).  On March 14, 2023, [...] issued his opinion finding that the State proved by clear and convincing evidence (and also beyond a reasonable doubt) that [...] is a potentially dangerous dog under N.J.S.A. 4:19-23 and also violated [...] Ordinance 6-5, dog at large.
[brief] Id.  The “originator” is “the sender of the first payment order in a funds transfer. ”  N.J.S.A. 12A:4A-104(3).  A “‘sender’ is the person giving the instruction to the receiving bank,” N.J.S.A. 12A:4A-103(1)(e), and a “payment order” is “an instruction of a sender to a receiving bank . . . to pay, or to cause another bank to pay, a fixed or determinable amount of money to a beneficiary . . . .”  N.J.S.A. 12A:4A-103(1)(a).  In Deutsche Bank Nat'l Tr. Co. v. Vezeriannis, No. A-1376-11T1, 2013 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1588 (Super. Ct. App. Div. June 27, 2013), this Court affirmed a trial court’s ruling that the aforementioned provisions of the UCC apply when a mortgage lender received a funds transfer from a refinancing lender.⁴ Id. at 10-11.
[brief] [Pa673 and Pa662 ([...] Deposition) at 111:14-22, and Pa663 at 112:6-12].  At his deposition, [...] examined photographs and identified the location where he allegedly slipped and fell while carrying the birthday cake.  [Pa671 and Pa660 ([...] Deposition) at 74:22-25 and Pa661 at 75:12-13 and 23-25, and Pa666 at 222:24-25 and Pa667 at 223:1-3 and Pa735).  At no time prior to the alleged slip and fall on March 16, 2017 did [...] walk on the sidewalk in front of [...]’s leased premises.
[directive] 2.  Law Enforcement Notice of Restraining Order  The second new form is the “Law Enforcement Notice of Restraining Order. ”  This form is to be used only in those cases in which a person is charged as a juvenile and released without being detained.  2C:35-5.7d.  Unless the juvenile applies to stay or modify the Order, the Family N.J.S.A. Court will enter a Drug Offender Restraining Order on the first court day following the release of  The first court day following the release of the juvenile must be filled in as the the juvenile.  effective date of the order.  The acknowledgment at the end of the Order should be signed by both the juvenile and a parent or guardian.  Other Amendments
[brief] SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY  APPELLATE  DIVISION DOCKET NO. [...]  CRIMINAL ACTION STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. [...], Defendant-Appellant.  On Appeal from a Judgment of Conviction of the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Camden County  Camden County Indictment No. [...]  Sat Below: Hon. [...], J.S.C. BRIEF AND APPENDIX
[brief] (Aa17; Aa33-34).  As noted above, [...] had more than one opportunity to provide such information: first to [...] during its investigation, and then again to the [...] on appeal.  (Aa17).  His choice not to do so does not invalidate the [...]’s decision.  For these reasons, the [...]’s decision was not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable and was fully supported by the credible evidence in the record.  Having found that the [...] was a workplace for purposes of enforcing the State Policy, as discussed in Point II below, the [...]’s decision is also consistent with the State Policy’s overarching goal of providing a workplace free from discrimination and harassment.  N.J.A.C. 4A:7-3.1(a).  Accordingly, the September 20, 2023 final agency decision should be affirmed.
[brief] [...] advised the Court:  **[...]:**  We only got one -- we only saw one letter from [...] saying that they received the change of beneficiary for the one policy, but there was no similar second letter for the second policy.  (13T 44)  **THE COURT:**  Right.  **[...]:**  And that I find highly suspicious, Your Honor.  Now, if I saw documentation from [...] which showed that the payout occurred after they made the claim, then I probably would not have any issue, but we have never seen any paperwork regarding the payout of these three policies from [...] to the [...], Your Honor.
[brief] SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY  APPELLATE DIVISION  DOCKET NO. [...]  Appeal from court orders dated February 17 / April 28 / June 9, 2023, granting reconsideration and summary judgment, by Hon. [...], J.S.C., Superior Court of New Jersey, Passaic County, Law Division, Civil, Dkt. No. [...]  Submitted to Appellate Division on April 24, 2024  PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT’S REPLY
[brief] As Plaintiffs did not retain a liability expert, the jury would have been left to speculate as to the proper standard of care with regard to customer use of shopping carts, known as “U-boats”, and speculate as to what constitutes an ‘overloaded’ U-boat.  More importantly, there was never any video surveillance capturing the subject incident to be preserved.  Plaintiffs never sent any notices of preservation letters and should not now be allowed to retroactively impose what amounts to a super duty on [...] over four years after the fact.  Notwithstanding the foregoing, a photograph depicting the U-Boat utilized by [...] at the time of the subject incident, along with the items he intended to purchase, was taken and exchanged as part of the discovery process was preserved.  Irrespective of the polish Plaintiffs have now put on their case, the truth remains inviolate, as it must.  Summary judgment was properly entered below in favor of [...].  This Court should now affirm its entry and deny Plaintiffs the relief they seek.
[brief] In *State v. Roberson*, this Court reversed the defendant’s conviction for second-degree possession of more than one-half ounce but less than five ounces of cocaine with intent to distribute because of a failure to properly instruct the jury on grading.  246 N.J. Super. 597, 607 (App. Div. 1991).  The statute at issue raised the crime to the second-degree only if the State could prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the amount of cocaine defendant possessed included at least 3.5 grams of pure cocaine.
[brief] The opposing brief further clarifies that the parties broadly agree on at least part of the answer to one of the central issues in the case: what happens in the event that both parties in the Lease owe each other money at the exact same time?  Landlord agrees with Tenant that in that situation Landlord gets to use the missed rent to take a deduction against the aggregate amount Landlord owes Tenant, thereby reducing the total amount due.  Where the parties disagree is whether the Landlord gets to take that deduction even after it has accepted 100% of the missed rent payments curing the Tenant default that justified the deduction to begin with.  Landlord insists, without pointing to any supporting language in the Lease, that it is entitled to both the default-curing rent and the deduction.  Landlord is mistaken.
[brief] ”  Cole, 215 N.J. at 281.  Here, [...] did not even assert arbitration in its Answer, much less take other additional measures.  Rule 4:5-4 requires that “[a] responsive pleading shall set forth specifically and separately . . . [each] affirmative defense. ”  Rule 4:5-4.  Although [...] asserted 86 separate and specific affirmative defenses in its Answers, [...] never referenced the arbitration clause, “arbitration and award,” or an intent to arbitrate.  See Da199-205; Herrera, 2024 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 951, at *14-15 (Affirming waiver where “Defendants asserted more than two dozen affirmative defenses with their answer, none of which mentioned a lack of jurisdiction due to the binding arbitration provisions. ”)  Pa72([...] Cert. Exh. F).  This omission is significant because it failed to provide notice to [...] \(^5\)  [...]’s citation to Century Indem. Co. v. Viacom Inter., Inc., 2003 WL 402792 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) to support such cryptic references is inapposite.  Db35, Da242.  It is an unreported federal decision from another state that is not binding on this Court.
[brief] Hayes v. Delamotte, 231 N.J. 373, 385-86 (2018) (quoting Risko v. Thompson Muller Auto. Grp., Inc., 206 N.J. 506, 521 (2011)).  "The standard of review on appeal from decisions on motions for a new trial is the same as that governing the trial judge—whether there was a miscarriage of justice under the law."  Hayes v. Delamotte, 231 N.J. 373, 386 (2018) (quoting Risko v. Thompson Muller Auto. Grp., Inc., 206 N.J. 506, 522 (2011)).  See Twp. of Manalapan v. Gentile, 242 N.J. 295, 304 (2020).  "[A] 'miscarriage of justice' can arise when there is a 'manifest lack of inherently credible evidence to support the finding,' when there has been an 'obvious overlooking or under-valuation of crucial evidence,' or when the case culminates in 'a clearly unjust result.'"  Hayes v. Delamotte, 231 N.J. 373, 386 (2018) (quoting Risko v. Thompson Muller Auto. Grp., Inc., 206 N.J. 506, 521-22 (2011)).  In the case of hand, there was no miscarriage of justice.
[brief] THE LOWER COURT IMPROPERLY ENGAGED IN FACFINDING IN GRANTING RESPONDENTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AGAINST [...] (T 4:17-17:16).  The lower court went beyond the scope of its review in reaching its decision and failed to apply the proper standard for summary judgment.  To prevail on a motion for summary judgment, that moving party must demonstrate that “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact challenged and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment or order as a matter of law. ”  R. 4:46-2.  “[W]hen deciding a motion for summary judgment under Rule 4:46–2, the determination whether there exists a genuine issue with respect to a material fact challenged requires the motion judge to consider whether the competent evidential materials presented, when viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party in consideration of the applicable evidentiary standard, are sufficient to permit a rational factfinder to resolve the alleged disputed issue in favor of the non-moving party. ”  Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520, 523 (1995) (emphasis added).  In determining a motion for summary judgment, “[t]he judge’s function is not himself or herself to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial. ”  Id. at 540.  “All inferences of doubt are drawn against the movant in favor of the opponent of the motion . . .  The papers supporting the motion are closely scrutinized and the opposing papers indulgently treated.  . . .”  Judson v. Peoples Bank & Trust Co., 17 N.J. 67, 75 (1954).  Summary judgment will only be granted “when the evidence is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law. ”  Id.  The lower court granted Respondents’ motion for summary judgment finding as a matter of law that the Respondents had no duty to John Miranda.
[brief] See In re Carter, 191 N.J. 474, 481-82 (2007).  In addition, the trial court erred in looking to the enabling statutes to determine whether any specific process was required to evaluating the applications.  To be sure, NJCREAMMA does not enumerate specific factors that a governing body must consider in granting a resolution of approval.  But that is the wrong inquiry.  The relevant inquiry is whether the governing body adopted a process and standards to assess applications before granting a resolution of approval.  In this case, the Borough did but failed to follow its own process and requirements.
[brief] On February 10, 2021, Vermont Trial Court issued an order (Pa370–37) holding [...] liable to pay monies in amounts equal to attorneys’ fees that the [...] had paid to their own attorneys in filing and pressing the HCH Action.  The Vermont Trial Court grounded its award in Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 27A, § 4-117(a) and Section 12.1(d) of the SCCA Declaration of Condominium (Pa480 ¶ 26; Pa370–37), both of which authorize recovery of attorneys’ fees incurred by “prevailing” parties without any showing of bad faith or fault.  On March 5, 2021, more than three (3) months after authorizing an appeal of the Vermont Trial Court’s summary judgment decision, [...] abruptly reversed field and withdrew its defense of the HCH Action.  Pa462 ¶ 60; Pa1044 ¶ 60.  In a letter dated March 5, 2021 (the “Denial Letter”), [...] asserted that certain “orders and decisions” of the Vermont Trial Court operated to terminate [...]’s obligation to continue supporting a then-pending appeal challenging the correctness of those very orders and decisions.  Pa480 ¶ 27; Pa357–58.  By issuing its Denial Letter, [...] repudiated its legal duty “to bring an appeal on its insured’s behalf when there are reasonable grounds to believe that the insured’s interests might be served by an appeal.
[brief] (Db15).  This argument ignores completely the nine statutory and code violations the jury found were violations of the CFA and the RETA, which are not impacted by [...]’s parol evidence argument.  (Da1192-1207).  Even if this Court were to agree with [...] on the parol evidence rule, the jury’s verdict should still be upheld because of the nine claims the jury found that did not rely on statements made by [...]’s salespeople.  (Da1190).  These claims were ample evidence of [...]’s violations of the CFA and the RETA.  At the February 23, 2022, reconsideration hearing on both parties’ summary judgment motions, [...] again chose not to argue lack of notice and instead addressed the allegations in the Second Amended Complaint substantively.