ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] He contends that as long as the facts support a coverable cause of action, [...] must provide a defense even if the underlying plaintiff elected not to pursue that coverable claim or the judge in the underlying litigation has dismissed that coverable claim as non-viable.  (Db, p. 19).  [...] cites no case law for this exception.  And none exists.  For these reasons, [...] has not provided this Court with any reason why it should overturn years of precedent and insurance practice.  **POINT 5 - No Dispute Exists Regarding Genuine Material Facts That Would Prevent the Entry of Summary Judgment**
[directive] 1.  You have been arrested for operating a commercial motor 8.  According to N.J.S.A. 39:3-10.24f, if a court of law finds you vehicle with an alcohol concentration of 0.04% or more. guilty of refusing to submit to chemical tests of your breath, then your license to operate any motor vehicle will be revoked 2.  You are required by law to submit to the taking of samples of by the court for a period of no less than six months and no your breath for the purposes of making chemical tests to more than two years.  The Court will also fine you a sum of no determine your alcohol concentration. less than $250 and no more than $500 for your refusal conviction.
[brief] [...], who witnessed the shooting, gave a statement implicating defendant, who he knew as [...], and identified a single photograph of him.  [...] testified that he saw the Audi drive by, heard gunshots and saw flames coming from a gun in the right-side front window.  He later identified co-defendant [...] as the driver.  [...] also identified the Audi on surveillance video.  In contrast, [...] and [...] provided weak alibi testimony for the first time on post-conviction, over a decade after the crime.  Defendant failed to meet the “exacting [prejudice] standard” by showing “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional error, the result of the proceeding would have been different.
[brief] As a preliminary matter, Defendant asserts that Plaintiff’s Certification in Support of Summary Judgment, executed by [...] on May 17, 2022 (hereinafter “Plaintiff’s Certification”) was not made by a person with “personal knowledge” of the facts and by a person competent to testify.  Defendant is mistaken.  Plaintiff’s Certification begins by stating [...]’s position as it relates to Plaintiff.  PA – 47.  Plaintiff’s Certification continues to state that [...] was “familiar with the books and records of the plaintiff in this matter. ”  PA – 47.  In that position of employment she was competent to authenticate Plaintiff’s business records pertaining to Defendant’s defaulted credit card account.
[brief] (Id. at 86:9-89:16, 688a; 409a-412a).  [...] admits that he felt pressure from the public and media during 2017.  ([...] Dep. 93:15-94:4, 689a-690a).  As a result, Mayor [...] communicated via email with fellow Township Committee member [...] and another individual who was running for Township Committee with [...] during the Maplewood 2017 political campaign, [...], about crafting a statement regarding the July 5, 2016 to distribute to the media.  (Id. at 91:8-93:4, 689a; 97:16-101:17, 690a-691a; 414a-415a).
[brief] The Trial Court erred by denying the Defense’s motion to sever (27a).  This trial should have centered around whether [...] attempted to kidnap [...] using an imitation firearm on January 25, 2021.  Instead, this matter was railroaded by the uncorroborated, uninvestigated, implausible allegations of a scorned ex-girlfriend.  The entire trial became about Gary’s tumultuous relationship with [...], her substance abuse issues, who ended the relationship.  While the jury ultimately saw through [...] Perez’s false accusations, the damage had already been done as the Defense was forced to air the couple’s dirty laundry in order to discredit her claims.  Two or more offenses may be charged in the same indictment if the offenses are of the same or similar character, based on the same act or transaction, or on acts or transactions connected together or constituting part of a common scheme or plan.  N.J. Ct. Rule 3:7-6.  “Although joinder is favored, economy and efficiency interests do not override a defendant’s right to a fair trial. ”  State v. Sterling, 215 N.J. 65, 72 (2013).  Relief from prejudicial joinder may be sought according to Rule 3:15-2(b), which provides that a criminal defendant may request that an indictment be severed if it appears that the defendant will be prejudiced by the joinder.  Reviewing courts must generally defer to the trial court’s decision regarding severance, absent an abuse of discretion.
[brief] Curry v. Curry, 108 N.J. Super. 527, 530 (App. Div. 1970)(emphasis added).  Here, Defendant never moved to vacate default judgment.  Instead, she waited two-and-half years to vacate final judgment under R. 4:50-1 (an entirely different procedural concept).  Her opportunity to vacate default lapsed as soon as [...] affixed his signature to the Final Judgment of Divorce.
[brief] *4  For the second prong, the court focuses on the witness' reliability.  To determine whether or not the witness is reliable and the procedure resulted in a very substantial likelihood of misidentification, the following factors must be weighed: “‘[T]he opportunity of the witness to view the criminal at the time of the crime, the witness' degree of attention, the accuracy of [the witness'] prior description ..., the level of certainty demonstrated at the confrontation, and the time between the crime and the confrontation.
[brief] There is significant overlap between the causation prong of the prima facie case and the third stage of the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework, as the same evidence used to demonstrate pretext can also establish a causal link between the protected characteristic and the adverse employment action.  See Zive v. Stanley Roberts, Inc., 182 N.J. 436, 449-50 (2005) (“The evidence of pretext may also be sufficient to satisfy the plaintiff's burden of proving the prima facie case causation prong.  In other words, the same evidence that demonstrates a question of fact as to whether the employer's proffered reason for the adverse employment action is pretextual can also be used to establish that the adverse action was taken for a discriminatory reason. ”)  Here, Plaintiff has presented evidence to support this connection and from which a jury could determine that the stated reason given for Plaintiff’s termination is unworthy of credence.  It is reasonable for jury to determine that if Defendant [...] had approved the charge pay, either explicitly or implicitly, that the termination justification is pretextual.  If the termination was pretextual, then it is up to the jury to determine what the true reason for termination was, be it retaliation for protected activity or some other reason altogether.
[brief] For these reasons, the Board’s final administrative determination denying [...]’s request to file his Eligibility Registration Form for amended benefits approximately one year and nine months past the statutory deadline of the Ricci Act should be affirmed.  Respectfully submitted, [...]  ATTORNEY GENERAL OF NEW JERSEY  By: /s/ [...]  [...] (ID 276482018)  Deputy Attorney General  [...]  Dated: July 3, 2024  July 11, 2024  [...], Clerk Superior Court of New Jersey Appellate Division  [...]  RE: [...] v. [...]  DOCKET NO.: [...]  On Appeal from [...]  Docket No.: [...]  Dear Justices of the Appellate Division:  This office represents the Appellant, Michael [...], in the above captioned matter.  Please accept this reply letter brief in lieu of a more formal brief on behalf of the Appellant, retired Trooper Michael [...].
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY HELD THAT ARBITRABILITY SHOULD BE DECIDED BY THE ARBITRATION PANEL  Finally, the trial court correctly determined that “[b]ecause the arbitration agreement here is so broad and states merely that any claim arising from the Agreement is arbitrable under the AAA rules, ultimately, ‘[w]here parties agree that the AAA rules will govern, questions concerning the scope and validity of the arbitration agreement, including issues of arbitrability, are reserved for the arbitrators. ’” (Pa7) (citing *Flintlock Constr. Servs., LLC. V. Weiss*, 991 N.Y.S.2d 408, 410 (1st Dep’t 2014)).  Appellants argue that the question of arbitrability should be decided by the court.
[brief] actions taken at public meetings during the period of time that the [...]'s self proclaimed "supportive" and "good administration" was in power.  [95a]  On December 6, 2016, the Mayor and council discussed [...] during the public section under Unfinished Business, Section VII.  At that meeting, the Borough was then a party to a contract of sale for the purchase of an easement in the front of the said property required for the Kinderkamack Road widening project, at a cost of $55,000.  [484A]  For an additional sum of $395,000.00 (total $450,000.00, the appraised value) the property could be purchased under an option expiring at the end of the year.  Id.  The minutes of that discussion are reproduced below, as included in the copy of the December 6, 2016 minutes of the Meeting of the Mayor and Council.  The Governing Body debated if the purchase was necessary, and if purchased, what the Borough would do with it.  Options included turning it into a park or for commuter parking.  [...] was opposed to the purchase of the property on the grounds that it was fiscally irresponsible.  Members of the Governing Body agreed.  In addition, they noted that there was a lack of clear vision for its purpose, the small number of parking spaces it would allow, and a preference to use the funds for another purpose.  There was general agreement that it was an eyesore and a less than ideal spot for a park due to its location next to Kinderkamack Road and the railroad tracks.  [...] asked [...] to sketch out the number of parking spaces that could be placed there.  Accordingly, [...] was not purchased.  At that same meeting, the Borough proceeded with its First Reading of Ordinance 1535-16, which is described earlier, to amend the Redevelopment Plan and add the restrictions discussed concerning multifamily housing and ground floor retail, and which [...] now seeks to disregard.
[brief] See N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-7.a  At its public meeting on September 8, 2022, the Committee introduced Ordinance 2022-15 entitled “Ordinance of the [...], County of Burlington, State of New Jersey Adopting the ‘Old York Redevelopment Plan’ For Certain Property Known as Block 701, Lot 2.01, the Former [...]” (hereinafter the “Ordinance 2022-15”).  Pa398-402.  Appended to proposed Ordinance 2022-15 is the “Redevelopment Plan” for the Property prepared by the Township Planner (hereinafter “Redevelopment Plan”).  Pa403-32.  The Committee also established a public hearing date of October 27, 2022 for the Redevelopment Plan, which public hearing would follow a referral of the Redevelopment Plan to the Planning Board for a “master plan consistency determination.
[brief] [...] was a residential property owned by [...].  1T20:17-22.  [...] paid $6,800.00 towards a contract of $13,500.00, 1T21:1–13, P4, P5, yet Defendants did no work, not even showing up.  1T22:1–9.  In response, [...] stated that he did all the work and that he was, in fact, owed $7,800.00, 1T52:3–9.
[brief] On February 17, 2022, the Division wrote [...], requesting a copy of his official layoff notice.  (Pa13).  On June 22, 2022, however, [...] informed the Division that there was no “actual” layoff notice, and instead referred to the March 24, 2020 email wherein [...] informed [...] of various options regarding his employment.  (Pa15).  Then, on September 29, 2022, [...] confirmed that [...]’s employment “was terminated in April 2020,” and that he was “reinstated” in September 2020.
[brief] TABLE OF AUTHORITIES  Cases  Battaglia v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 214 N.J. 518 (2013) ...........................................  7 Burlington Northern and Sante Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006) ..............................................................................................................  9,10 Campbell v. Supreme Court of New Jersey, 2014 WL 7343225 (D.N.J. 2014) ..................................................................................... 11,12 Clarke v. Atlantic City Bd. of Educ., 2010 WL 4107750 (App. Div., 2010) .................................................................................. 17,18 Coward v. Englewood, 2019 WL 570080 (App. Div. 2019) .................................................. 15 El-Sioufi v. St. Peter’s University Hospital, 382 N.J. Super. 145 (App. Div. 2005) ............................................................................... passim Energy Rec. v. Dept. of Env. Prot., 320 N.J. Super. 59 (App. Div. 1999) aff’d o.b. 170 N.J. 246 (2001) ............................... 6,7 Enourato v. New Jersey Building Authority, 182 N.J. Super. 50 (App Div.), aff’d 90 N.J. 396 (1982) .................................................... 6 Hernon v. Webb-McRae, 2018 WL 4204440 (D.N.J. 2018) .................................................. 12 Horton v. American Inst. for Mental Studies, 145 N.J. Super. 550 (Law. Div. 1976) ................................................................................. 6 Jamison v. Rockaway Twp. Bd. of Educ., 242 N.J. Super. 436 (App. Div. 1990) ............................................................................... 17 Paradisis v. Englewood Hospital and Medical Center, 2016 WL 4697337 (D.N.J. 2016) ....................................................................................... 11 Prager v. Joyce Honda, Inc., 447 N.J. Super. 124 (App. Div. 2016) ................................. 12,13 Printing Mart v. Sharp Electronics, 116 N.J. 739 (1989) ..................................................... 6 Roa v. Roa, 200 N.J. 555 (2010) ................................................................. 16 Royster v. N.J. State Police, 2007 WL 4441103 (App. Div. 2007) .................. 18,19 Shepherd v. Hunterdon Development Ctr., 174 N.J. 1 (2002) ....................... 15 Spinks v. Township of Clinton, 402 N.J. Super. 465 (App. Div. 2008) ........... 1,11 Tarr v. Ciasulli, 181 N.J. 70 (2004) ............................................................. 22,23 Watkins v. Nabisco, 224 F. Supp. 2d 852 (D.N.J. 2002) .............................. 20 Victor v. State, 401 N.J. Super. 596 (App. Div. 2008) ................................. 8,17 TABLE OF APPENDIX November 19, 2021 Correspondence to Court ..............................................Da1
[brief] THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES  DENIAL OF THE APPELLANT’S REQUEST FOR A REFERRAL TO THE OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW WAS ARBITRARY AND INCONSISTENT WITH ESTABLISHED LAW (Pa38,39-40; Pa54,57)  This case presented disputed issues of fact and law, requiring a referral to the Office of Administrative Law for an administrative hearing.  N.J.S.A. 52:14B-1.  The Board of Trustees’ refusal to do so requires a reversal.
[brief] ”  The court believed it “ha[d] no information for any post of this juncture that might have a rational tendency to engender a reasonable doubt with respect to an essential element of the State's case, an essential feature of the State’s case. ” (9T76-13 to 17).  The court therefore barred defense counsel from making “any reference specifically to any third-party guilt in his opening statements. ” (9T76-18 to 20).  The court noted that it would have to consider the State’s objections to “the emergence of any proofs that a third person committed the act during testimony. ” (9T77-2 to 8).  But it made clear that it was barring the defense from mentioning third-party guilt in opening statements because it viewed the proffered evidence to be insufficient, stating that “there is really no evidence” to support third-party guilt.  (9T77-9 to 78-1).  Later during the trial, the defense sought to recall [...] in its case-in-chief.
[brief] ”  Jenkins v. Rainner, 69 N.J. 50, 57 (1976).  Our courts are committed to, among other things, fairness and quality service.  Estate of McClenton v. Carbone, 2019 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2632, *6 (App. Div. 2019).  The judiciary must strive to follow a policy in favor of generally deciding contested matters on their merits rather than based on procedural deficiencies.  See Woodward-Clyde Consultants v. Chemical & Pollution Sciences, Inc., 105 N.J. 464, 472-74 (1987).  In his decision, [...] accepted as true - without any support in the record - the Defendant’s argument that it did not employ the co-defendants and did not have any control over them.  (2TR45:14-24).  In essence, the Trial Court made legal and factual conclusions without allowing the parties to explore if they are correct.  [...]’s ruling is inconsistent with an abundance of case law holding that matters should be decided on their merits after there has been a complete exchange of information from all parties.  This is also articulated in New Jersey Court Rule 4:10-2(a), which permits discovery on any claim or defense that is raised.  The purpose of discovery is a search for the truth so that cases may be decided on their merits.  Indeed, the Plaintiffs’ Complaint contains a notice to produce intended to obtain discovery on, *inter alia*, the relationship between each of the parties, including their employment status, contract agreements, control and the like.  (Pa16-20).  At the time of the Trial Court’s decision on October 11, 2024, these issues remain unknown and no responses were received to the Plaintiffs’ notice to produce.  Based upon forthcoming responses to the notice to produce, along with interrogatory responses and deposition testimony, it will be revealed as to the extent of the Defendant’s involvement in this case and whether it had a substantial role in the care or treatment of the decedent.  Yet, the entity is now dismissed with prejudice and so the Plaintiffs are wholly precluded from developing a legal theory against the Defendant regardless of what may be produced or learned during discovery.  Fundamentally, [...]’s decision to outright dismiss the Defendant with prejudice improperly precluded the Plaintiffs from conducting discovery on whether the entity can be held vicariously liable and deciding this case on the merits.
[brief] This is consistent with other arbitrable statutes that, like the IFPA, call for treble damages and fee shifting.  See N.J.S.A. 56:8-19.  Moreover, the power to provide all relief undermines the argument that an arbitrator “cannot award damages to insurance companies.” (Br. of [...] at 14).  The Arbitration Plan also must empower the dispute resolution professional to hear “emergent matters” and provide “[e]mergent or expedited relief . . . upon a demonstration that immediate and irreparable loss or damage will result in the absence of such relief. ”  N.J.A.C. 11:3-5.4(b)(3)(i).  In other words, the Arbitration Plan must grant the dispute resolution professional the power to grant equitable relief or injunctive relief in a manner similar to that of a court.
[directive] *Defendants who have been detained for at least six months, and can make a preliminary showing that they are entitled to relief based on one or more of the above factors, have the right to reopen their detention hearings under section 19(f).  Trial judges have discretion to resolve motions that do not meet both conditions without holding a hearing.  Hearings should be conducted on an expedited basis in the trial court, and reviewed in the same manner on appeal.  Defendants subject to a presumption of detention -- those charged with murder or facing a sentence of life imprisonment -- will likely not be eligible for new hearings.
[brief] D.  Partial Summary Judgment in Favor of Defendants and Voluntary Dismissal of Additional Claims  Defendants subsequently moved for summary judgment on all remaining claims.  Following briefing and oral argument, the trial court entered an Order on January 28, 2022, granting Defendants’ motion in part and dismissing Counts 1, 5, 7, 8, 9, and 10 of the Amended Complaint.\textsuperscript{12} (Pa254-Pa255; Da2568-Da2572).  Following that Order, Counts 2, 3, 4 and 6 of the Amended Complaint remained.  On January 28, 2022, the parties stipulated to the dismissal of Count 4 of the Amended Complaint.  (Pa256-Pa257; Da2568-Da2572).  On April 29, 2022, Plaintiffs’ counsel advised the [...] would proceed to trial as to damages only on Count 2 of the Amended Complaint and would voluntarily dismiss Counts 3 and 6 of the Amended Complaint, which the trial court formally dismissed in the Final Judgment.  (Pa260; Da2568-Da2572).  E.
[brief] Because the track was closed for the off season, they were not guarded by flashing lights or crossbucks.  However, the Authority had installed sliding metal gates, which decedent drove through.  Once on the tracks, an approaching train collided with [...]’s car, and he died from his injuries.  [...], 169 N.J. at 122.  The [...] Court determined that decedent’s activity was reasonable as he was familiar with the operation of the gates at the crossing and could have approached the crossing and interpreted the open gates to mean that it was safe to cross.  *[...]*, 169 N.J. at 129.  The Court concluded that the railroad crossing exposed the objectively reasonable member of the general public to a substantial risk of injury.  Additionally, the Court found that since the Authority knew of the risk, knew that having guards to operate the gate eliminated that risk and knew that people who ordinarily traversed the crossing during the racing season would have believed the open gate meant it to be safe, that their conduct in not eliminating the dangerous condition was palpably unreasonable.
[brief] This is not a case where Plaintiff would “prefer” a different product to increase profitability; Plaintiff simply cannot finance and market a product built to the Township’s height standards.  These universal—and wholly unrebutted—conclusions reached by Plaintiff’s witnesses illustrate that the 30 foot building height, established in 1991, prohibits the use of the Property as a warehouse.  [...], a professional planner, testified that if the ordinance permits warehouse distribution uses, which it did at the time of application, it should logically follow that building height should be realistic for the use.  (5T 65:5-9; 72:24-25; 73:1-4).  Therefore, the unrealistic height limitation poses “obvious practical difficulties and undue hardship for the Applicant[.]” (5T 72:15-25; 73:1-10).  Despite Defendant’s failure to consider hardship altogether, the 30 foot height limitation clearly constitutes an undue hardship sufficient for Grasso’s positive criteria.  Its failure to consider the undue hardship proofs was arbitrary, unreasonable and capricious.