ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] 1T6.  Defendant indicated she could not act anymore in the house she was sharing with plaintiff following their marriage.  1T7.  Defendant noted that she needed to wait until 2024; if Plaintiff did not initiate a fraud case against her, she would receive a 10-year green card.  1T8.  “Do I have to continue staying here?  As I already procured my green card”  1T8.  The record showed that friends from Canada informed Plaintiff and his father that something suspicious was happening behind his back.  But Plaintiff, having a strong affection for Defendant, refused to believe this was true.  Plaintiff’s father continued to investigate, however, and overheard Defendant mention receiving a green card and discussing how accusations of abuse in America could help secure a permanent green card.  1T14.  Plaintiff’s father began observing defendant closely within the home.  1T18.  He continued overhearing defendant questioning how long she would have to stay with the plaintiff, noting that Defendant had obtained her green card by that point.  1T18-19.  The father overheard the defendant noting that she agreed with the plaintiff while they were in India and before Defendant received her green card, but since returning to the United States and obtaining her green card, she no longer felt the need to do so – her goal had been accomplished.  1T20.  “I used to agree with [...] on everything before greencard, but now I have the greencard why do I have to agree?, why will I stay with him, If I don’t have to?”  1T20.  [...], a friend of Plaintiffs Father, testified at trial as well.
[brief] ”  Da248.  [...] never provided [...] with a clearance letter waiving its ROFR so [...] could sell the gas station to a third party.  Da211-Da212.  [...] at first had refused to proceed with closing on the Property with [...] until [...] issued a clearance letter.  Ibid.  When [...] actually exercised its ROFR, however, [...] refused to acknowledge same and announced it would close on the PSA with [...].  Da076.
[brief] [1T93-24 to 94-23.]  Indeed, the trial court correctly determined reasonable suspicion based on the totality of the circumstances: first, [...] and his partner were not at the residence for the purpose of arresting defendant, but surveilling a residence connected to a homicide, for which a search warrant was imminently being signed and on the way.  Second, [...] and his partner were given three photographs of individuals who they were told were the suspects in the homicide, including defendant, whom the officers were told was the shooter.  Furthermore, [...] saw defendant and co-defendant [...] – two suspects in a homicide – enter the surveilled residence – also connected to the homicide.
[brief] 4.  After mediation, the Township entered into settlement agreements with each Intervener, including [...]. (collectively “2017 Settlement Agreements”).  Da43-Da44.  5.  On August 28, 2017, the Hon. [...], A.J.S.C., held a fairness hearing, and on January 10, 2018, issued a Conditional Judgment of Compliance and Repose.  That Conditional Judgment set the Township’s Third Round affordable housing obligations at 1,141 units and, among other things, approved the [...] settlement agreement.  Da43; Da45; Da69-Da70.  6.  On June 24, 2019, after additional litigation with a separate property owner known as [...], the Township, the Intervenors, and [...] entered a Global Settlement Agreement (“GSA”).  Da49-Da66.  7.  On August 29, 2019, [...] considered the Global Settlement Agreement at a second Fairness Hearing, and on September 27, 2019, approved the GSA and issued a Final Judgment of Compliance and Repose without Conditions.
[brief] [...] also cites to *Clark v. Activas Group hf*, 567 F.Supp.2d 711, 714 (D.N.J. 2008) in support of its position.  Again, the court in this case did not preclude a manufacturer from notifying consumers regarding a potential danger related to a product.  The *Clark* case also did not federally preempt *N.J.S.A.* Sec. 2A:58C-4 and the requirement to warn post sale.  Instead, the case involved the plaintiff consumers’ request that the court order defendant manufacturer and distributor of a drug already recalled by the FDA to provide urgent notice to unnamed class members and physicians.  *Id.*  The *R.F. v. [...] Labs.*, 162 *N.J.* 596, 618-20 (2000) case cited by [...] does not preempt *N.J.S.A.* Sec. 2A:58C-4.  Instead, the Court held that it should deny [...]’s claim that it was immunized from state tort law liability for failing to warn users of its blood test regarding the devastating consequences that could result from a false negative test reading of HIV contaminated blood.  *Id.* at 655.  The *R.F. v. [...]* case, as well as the other cases set forth herein, do not support [...]’s arguments and certainly do not somehow lessen or remove [...]’s obligations to act like a reasonably prudent manufacturer/distributor pursuant to *N.J.S.A.* Sec. 2A:58C-4 and warn of the dangerous defects that it learned about in June 2018, after the May 2018 package insert.
[directive] DELETION OF RECORDS IN CRIMINAL CASE MANAGEMENT  DATABASE  In accordance with the attached expungement order regarding ______________ _________ and dated _________________, I have searched the Criminal Case Management database for any corresponding documents covered by this expungement order.  No documents were found  The following documents were found and deleted  Indigency Application and/or Bail Report  Pretrial Intervention Program Report  Presentence Investigation Report  Prior to deleting the document(s)  I made one hard copy of each such document and placed it in the case file secured in accordance with the terms of the order.  ______________________________________  _____/ _____/ _____  PRINT NAME DATE [Form Promulgated by Directive # 02-12 (April 16, 2012).
[brief] N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2.2(a).  A cause of action accrues on the first date that a right to institute and maintain an action arises.  Burd v. N.J. Telephone Co., 76 N.J. 284, 292 (1978)  The “right to institute and maintain an action” arises when the claimant becomes aware of ” the existence of that state of facts which may equate in law with a cause of action.
[directive] Sentence- v. [...]/ State State v. [...] N.J. _ (2022))  2022  Date: February 15, in and  This Directive provides guidance for courts litigants accordance with in Court's [...]/State the Supreme decision  State v. v. [...] (referred to of on hereinafter as [...]), decided January 10, 2022, regarding the review juvenile 2C:l l-3(b), sentences under N.J.S.A. which requires a mandatory minimum of 30 to [...] sentence years without eligibility for parole.  Motions made pursuant be to must submitted electronically through eCourts pursuant the December 5, 2016  The must Supreme Court order mandating electronic filing in criminal matters.  filer the use motion type entitled: "Sentence Reconsideration."  analyzed two two  In [...], the Court consolidated cases involving juvenile of of [...]'s At offenders that were tried as adults and convicted murder.  the time he was he was felony murder offense, 17 years old.  Following an appeal, sentenced of 30 to years in prison without the possibility parole.  [...] was almost 15 years of at was to old the time his murder offense and, after multiple appeals, sentenced of in with the No 50 years prison an 85-percent period parole ineligibility under that Both [...] Early Release Act. and [...] argued their sentences amounted to to Court cruel and unusual punishment and asked the find that the sentencing of requirement the murder statute, as it applies to juveniles, was unconstitutional under both the U.S. and State Constitutions.  ADA rm ENSURING TO DOOR  AN OPEN JUSTICE  Americans with Disabilities Act
[brief] (14T50-3 to 25).  She knew “very little” about defendant, other than his street name.  (19T6-18 to 22).  She had no contact with him after May 27, 2012, and even though she claimed she was maybe dating him, she never inquired about what happened to him.  She did not know he had been arrested just two months later, or that he was convicted and incarcerated two years later, and it was only happenstance that someone outside a bodega mentioned him seven years later.  (14T74-4 to 75-2; 14T57-10 to 58-16; 14T59-11 to 60-14; 14T77-24 to 78-5; 19T6-23 to 7-9; 19T6-24 to 8-11).
[brief] A.  Applicability of Section 9 of the Mortgage First, pursuant to Section 9(a) of the Mortgage, Appellant had the right to “require immediate payment in full of all sums secured by” the Mortgage, where the Borrowers were in default.  (Pa276 at ¶9(a). )  At oral argument the Court questioned whether it was Appellant’s argument that if Appellant had “accepted the payment it would have been considered a short sale,” and Appellant agreed that the short payment made by a non-borrower, purchaser of the Property, was akin to a short sale.
[brief] [(17T:224-7 to 16)]  The undeniable implication of this testimony was that [...] possessed “superior knowledge, outside the record, that incriminate[d] defendant [[...]]” and cleared his brother [...], who shared his same motive and lived closer to the location of the incidents.  Branch, 1832 N.J. at 351.  [...] did not disclose the source of this information, but categorized it as the total sum of “all the information and evidence” he had received.  This characterization implied there were non-testifying witnesses that supported [...]’s belief in [...]’s guilt and his brother [...]’s innocence.  Given the weaknesses of the State’s case and the critical importance of the third-party guilt defense to [...]’s case, the erroneous admission of this testimony was clearly capable of producing an unjust result and compels reversal.
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[brief] Id., ¶ 57.  During the January 22, 2023 call, Plaintiff reminded Defendant [...] that there had been no client complaints about Plaintiff’s accessibility, no issues had been raised by anyone about Plaintiff’s job performance and he continued to thrive professionally.  Among other things, Plaintiff noted the continued growth and prosperity of the Firm throughout the COVID pandemic while other law firms struggled despite Plaintiff [...] working remotely as Litigation Manager.
[brief] ” (1T58-11 to 60-21; Da15 3:25:58 to 3:26:14; Da52).  After signing the form, the officers continued their conversation with defendant, engaging in congenial banter; it also appeared that defendant laughed at one point.  (Da15 3:27:35 to 3:28:47).  Upon entering the police vehicle, defendant said something inaudible to an officer, to which the officer responded, “I like you too. ” (Da15 3:28:55 to 3:28:57).  B.
[brief] ”  E. Brunswick Sewerage Auth. v. E. Mill Assocs., Inc., 365 N.J. Super. 120, 125 (App. Div. 2004).  The court has no right “to rewrite the contract merely because one might conclude that it might well have been functionally desirable to draft it differently” nor may it “remake a better contract for the parties than they themselves have seen fit to enter into, or to alter it for the benefit of one party and to the detriment of the other. ”  Karl’s Sales, supra, 249 N.J. Super. at 493.  Here, Appellants contractually agreed to surrender the Property upon termination of the Lease.
[brief] Plaintiff-Appellee [...] admits she has no direct proof the prescription drug she received was defective.  She nonetheless claims it had a manufacturing defect that caused her injuries based solely on the fact the drug was part of a recalled lot.  She alleges Defendant-Appellant [...] should have recalled the drug sooner.  The problem for Plaintiff, however, is that (i) a ‘failure-to-timely-recall’ claim is both unrecognized by the PLA and preempted by federal law, (ii) her manufacturing-defect claim lacks the required expert (or any other) proof that the specific product at issue had a defect, and (iii) she has no admissible general-causation evidence that the alleged defect was even capable of causing her injuries, and her experts’ specific-causation opinions are nothing but speculative, inadmissible “net opinions. ”  The Parties’ briefing on whether the Court should accept this interlocutory appeal reveals that even Plaintiff agrees her ‘failure-to-timely-recall’ claim is not actionable.  The briefing also demonstrates that Plaintiff cannot overcome a more fundamental deficiency with her case: New Jersey law requires proving defect and causation for complex prescription drugs and medical devices through experts, and *Plaintiff has no expert opinions on manufacturing defect or general causation*.  While her experts offer specific-causation opinions, they are inadmissible “net opinions” that are not based on a reliable methodology or sufficient facts and data.  Under the Trial Court’s decision, these fundamental failings can be ignored and summary judgment denied whenever injury is alleged in temporal association with exposure to a product from a recalled lot.  But recalls do not abrogate federal or New Jersey law.  Recalls do not eliminate a court’s gatekeeping duty to exclude unqualified experts who fail to apply reliable methodologies.  And recalls cannot be used as a substitute for required evidentiary proof of product defect and causation.  This is especially true here, where the undisputed evidence establishes that *only 2.2%* of medications from the lot used in Plaintiff’s procedure manifested the purported manufacturing defect, and Plaintiff has *no* admissible evidence that the specific drug she received was one of those 2.2%.  By denying summary judgment based solely on the existence of a recall, the Trial Court invites plaintiffs from across the country to flock to New Jersey any time a drug is recalled because ‘recall-plus-injury’ is enough to reach a jury in this State.  The ruling eliminates a plaintiff’s burden to prove defect and causation in cases involving a complex product, like a prescription drug, with reliable expert opinions that satisfy NJRE 702 and 703.  Allowing a recall to serve as a substitute for this required proof contravenes the purpose and letter of the PLA and presents the precise grave injustice that warrants immediate appellate reversal.  The issues on appeal are case dispositive, and, thus, reversing now will avert waste of precious resources on an unnecessary multi-week trial on the Trial Court’s already overburdened docket.  **STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY**
[brief] Instead of following the New Jersey Recording Act, N.J.S.A. 46:26A-1, et seq., the trial court based its decision on information gleaned from an unrecorded and unperfected subdivision maps (the “1966-1969 Unrecorded Subdivision Maps”).  Relying on this unconfirmed and unratified document, the trial court inappropriately imputed Plaintiff with actual and inquiry notice of the contents of the 1966-1969 Unrecorded Subdivision Maps as they pertain to his claim to title to the Strip.  The trial court reached this decision despite testimony provided by both parties’ experts that the 1966-1969 Unrecorded Subdivision Maps were never contained in the chain of title to Plaintiff’s Property, and Plaintiff would be unlikely to discover the unrecorded subdivision maps in any reasonable title search of the Plaintiff’s or Defendant’s properties.  Moreover, the evidence presented to the trial court showed that, even if there was knowledge (which there was not) of the 1966-1969 Unrecorded Subdivision Maps, neither Plaintiff’s nor Defendant’s expert could explain how the Strip magically appeared in 1971 in the chain of title to Defendant’s Property, especially given that the Strip continuously has been part of the chain of title to Plaintiff’s Property.  Further, the trial court committed reversible error by failing to properly place the burden of proof on the Defendant to demonstrate all the elements of adverse possession, and for failure of the Defendant to meet its burden of proof, including that the Defendant’s use of the Strip had been adverse or hostile, notorious, and continuous for thirty (30) years.  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I THE TRIAL COURT MISAPPLIED
[brief] [...], Esq. Of Counsel: [...], Esq.  \(^2\)  To the extent that [...] has any complaint about being responsible for a back pay award under these circumstances, its remedy is to seek recommence at the end of the day from the Examiners—not to foist the penalty upon [...].  In any event, the determination of back pay is separate and severable from [...]’s right to be reinstated in his tenured teaching position with [...], once the OOS is invalidated by and through the License Appeal.
[brief] Here, the Board’s determination is reasonable and complies with the governing statute.  The unambiguous language of the Ricci Act provides:  A member or retiree shall not be eligible for the presumption or recalculation under this subsection unless within two years of the effective date of this act, P.L.2019, c.157, the member or retiree files a written and sworn statement with the retirement system on a form provided by the board of trustees thereof indicating the dates and locations of service.  [L. 2019, c. 157 (codified at N.J.S.A. 53:5A-10(e)(4)).]  Thus, under the plain language of the statute [...] is ineligible for the presumption or recalculation provided under the Ricci Act because he failed to file by July 8, 2021.
[directive] (d)  If an emergency appropriation is being funded by ordinance, adopted pursuant to the Local Bond Law, the funding shall be for the net amount reflected in the deferred charge and shall represent the total subject to bonding, plus not more than one percent of the amount of the deferred charge for the costs of issuing the bonds.  5:30-5.2 (Reserved)  5 :30-5.3 (Reserved)  5:30-5.4 through 5:30-5.11 (Reserved)  5:30-5.12 (Reserved)  5:30-5.13 (Reserved)  530-5.14 (Reserved)  ANNUAL, SUBCHAPTER AUDIT
[brief] PUBLIC POLICY AND PRECEDENT STRONGLY SUPPORT THE RIGHT TO TIMELY RETRACT A WAIVER OF ARBITRATION WHERE A PARTY HAS SATISFIED THE COLE FACTORS (DA1-2)  New Jersey “has recognized arbitration as a favored method for resolving disputes. ”  Garfinkel v. Morristown Obstetrics & Gynecology Assocs., P.A., 168 N.J. 124, 131 (2001).  In addition, waiver is “never presumed. ”  Cole, 215 N.J. at 276.  Where a party waiving arbitration must do so “clearly, unequivocally, and decisively,” Knorr, 178 N.J. at 177, here, the parties’ colloquy on the record regarding arbitration during the March 23 Chancery hearing is hardly supportive of an unequivocal waiver.  The “express waiver” occurred prior to any legal argument on the matter before the Chancery Court and was not formalized in any manner.  [2T6:12-19].  Further, election of remedies is not irrevocable unless and until either a court proceeding goes to judgment or an arbitration proceeding consummates in an award.  See McKeeby v. Arthur, 7 N.J. 174 (1951).  A court has the power to refer the dispute to arbitration at any time prior to judgment.  Wasserstein v. Kovatch, 261 N.J. Super. 277, 290 (App. Div. 1993).  Here, while the transcript from the March 23, 2023 Chancery hearing references off the record discussions in chambers regarding arbitration, the subsequent Order denying Defendants’ order to show cause does not contain any reference or explicit ruling regarding arbitration, or any waiver thereof.  [Da159-63].  While the reason for discussing arbitration during the March 23 Chancery proceedings remains unclear, off the record discussions in chambers and the subsequent colloquy do not formally memorialize a verbal waiver of Defendants’ right to arbitrate.  Above all, neither party took any action or measure in reliance on or in response to [...]’s reply to [...]’s question.  Where the March 23, 2023 Order did not express a final judgment as to the Defendants’ waiver and the parties have not proceeded in reliance on the waiver, the arbitration agreement between Plaintiff and Defendants continues to be valid and enforceable.
[brief] Letter From [...] to [...] 6/22/2020 (Attached at Pa078)  Communication Result Report 7/7/2020 (Attached at Pa076)  [...]’ Letter to [...] and Court Administrator 9/25/2020 (Attached at Pa056)  Letter from [...] to [...] Dated 9/30/2020 (Attached at Pa068)  Email to [...] from Prosecutor Regarding no Further Discovery 11/12/2020 (Attached at Pa089)  Notice of Motion to Suppress and Dismiss by [...] 10/13/2020 (Attached at Pa059)  [...] Letter to [...] and [...] 12/24/2020 (Attached at Pa108)  Certification of Eldridge [...] to Motion to Dismiss and suppress 10/14/2020 (Attached at Pa229)
[brief] On April 29, 2022 – five (5) business days after it obtained the necessary approval from the CRB – [...] submitted its application for conditional use approval to the Planning Board.  (Da316-361.)  Because it was a conditional use application, [...] did not apply (nor did it need to apply) for a variance.  (f)  On September 15, 2022, the Planning Board unanimously voted to approve [...]’ conditional use application.  (Da311-313.)  On October 13, 2022, the Planning Board adopted the “Resolution of Approval – Application of [...] LLC – Approval of Conditional Use” (the “Resolution”).  (Da454-458.)  The first Whereas Clause in the Resolution makes clear that [...] “requested approval of its conditional use for [the Property]”.
[brief] State v. Basil, 202 N.J. 570, 585 (N.J. 2010) ("Probable cause cannot be defined with scientific precision, ...because it is a "practical, nontechnical conception" addressing "the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act.'”  "[P]robable cause is a fluid concept – turning on the assessment of probabilities in particular factual contexts – not readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules. ”  ...Although probable cause is more than a mere suspicion of guilt, it is less than the evidence necessary to convict a defendant of a crime in a court of law.