ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] THE TRIAL JUDGE ERROR FOR NOT INSTRUCTING JURY ON ADVERSE INFERENCE, BECAUSE PATerson POLICE, AND STATE FAILURE TO RECOVER, ENHANCE VIDEO OF SHOOTING, WEAPON, LICENSE PLATE IDENTIFICATION (BLACK CAR)  VIDEO, TWO MALES (ALTO RANGO)  IDENTIFICATION, FOOT PRINTS OF FLEEING SUSPECT, CLOTHING OF DEFENDANT AND VICTIM TO CHECK FOR GUNPOWDER RESIDUE MATCH.  [...] missed a magnificent opportunity by not following videos route of the Black car.  The occupants inside car and/or owner of said vehicle could have provided strong clues to [...]’s Murder.  R. 3:13-3.4.  Lost or Destroyed Evidence.  The State had every opportunity to contact the proper authorities (Federal Government) to have the video enhance to prove the identification of shooter that wore dissimilar clothing then defendant the night of Murder.  The State and/or [...] Department refuse to retrieve defendant’s clothing.  Because they [...] and Prosecutor Office were well aware those clothing the night of the murder did not match [...]’s.  This was by means of strategy to pressure innocent defendant (GRANT) to inform on the two males inside Alto Rango, and the occupants inside Black car [whom] [...] did not know.
[brief] Under this allocation method, each triggered policy bears a share of the total damages up to its policy limit proportionate to the number of years it was on the risk [the numerator], relative to the total number of years of triggered coverage [the denominator].  Apportioning costs among all triggered years is compatible with having determined that some injury or damage resulted in all of those years.  Consistent with the contract language, an insurer pays its percentage of loss attributed to its policy period.  The time-on-the-risk method offers several policy advantages, including spreading the risk to the maximum number of carriers, easily identifying each insurer's liability through a relatively simple calculation, and reducing the necessity for subsequent indemnification actions between and among the insurers.  Boston Gas, 454 Mass. 337, 367–68 (internal citations and quotations omitted; alterations in original).
[brief] 50  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES  Cases 62-64 Main St., L.L.C. v. Mayor & Council of City of Hackensack, 221 N.J. 129 (2015)  ........................................................................................................ passim  Angus v. Bd. of Educ. of Borough of Metuchen, Middlesex Cty., 475 N.J. Super. 362 (App. Div. 2023)  .................................................................  19, 20 Berkeley Square Ass'n, Inc. v. Zoning Bd. of Ad. of City of Trenton, 410 N.J. Super. 255 (App. Div. 2009)  .................................................................  29  Borough of Glassboro v. Grossman, 457 N.J. Super. 416 (App. Div. 2019)  .................................................................................................................. 44, 45  Commerce Bancorp, Inc. v. InterArch, Inc., 417 N.J. Super. 329 (App. Div. 2010)  ........................................................................................................  20  Concerned Citizens of Princeton, Inc. v. Mayor & Council of Borough of Princeton, 370 N.J. Super. 429 (App. Div. 2004) ........................................... 17 DePetro v. Twp. of Wayne Planning Bd., 367 N.J. Super. 161 (App. Div. 2004) ........................................................................................................ 30 First Montclair Partner, L.P. v. Herod Redevelopment I, L.L.C., 381 N.J. Super. 298 (App. Div. 2005) ................................................................. 43 Forbes v. Bd. of Trs. of Tp. of S. Orange Vill., 312 N.J. Super. 519 (App. Div. 1998) .................................................................................................... 17 Howell v. Waste Disposal, 207 N.J. Super. 80 (App. Div. 1986) ...................... 36 In re Adoption of N.J.A.C. 17:1-6.4, 17:1-7.5 & 17:1-7.10, 454 N.J. Super. 386 (App. Div. 2018) ................................................................. 29 In re Estate of Fisher, 443 N.J. Super. 180 (App. Div. 2015) .............................
[brief] *Id.* at 475.  Second, there is no risk of double voting because the candidate is not already on the ballot.  *Id.*  Third, courts, including *Gray-Sadler*, distinguish between voter carelessness or inattentiveness, or when it was because of mistakes beyond the voters’ control.  *Id.* at 475 (quoting Gray-Sadler, 164 N.J. at 477).  A recent trial court opinion reaffirmed this distinction, holding that where a voter fails to follow clear instruction due to their own negligence, and not due to external circumstances beyond their control, the ballot must be voided.  In re General Election Contest of the November 7, 2023 General Election for Atlantic Highlands Mayor and Council, [...] (Law Div. April 10, 2024) (Pa154).  In re Ocean County rejected arguments that the failure to explicitly tell voters an improperly cast personal choice vote would be void should bring the case under the Gray-Sadler analysis and count the vote despite its failure to comply with the law.  The sample ballot instructions here (Pa1) comply with the requirements of N.J.S.A 19:14-4, and contain explicit instructions on how to vote for candidates on the ballot and how to vote for “any person whose name is not printed on this ballot.
[directive] Pregnancy-related conditions may not be singled out for more rigorous procedures to determine ability to work.  VI.  Taking leave  A. required.  Pregnant officers shall be permitted to continue working in Leave not initially either a full or modified duty status as long as they are able to with reasonable accommodation under applicable law.  If a pregnant officer becomes unable to perform the essential functions of a full or modified duty status even with reasonable accommodation, and temporary waiver of the essential function(s) would pose an undue hardship, the officer will be permitted to take leave according to agency policies and applicable law.
[brief] The Global Fee Application sought payment for 5,485.1 hours, which includes essentially everything that [...]’s counsel has done in that time frame except issues which were already adjudicated in prior fee applications (Da7-9, ¶¶5,7); appeals (which they bafflingly claimed required the incurrence of another $1.4 million in fees) (Da8, ¶6); or actions regarding collection efforts pertaining to certain Slovakian properties, which were the subject of a separate fee application (Da16-17, ¶38).  The Chancery Court could not possibly conduct the legally required “critical analysis” of 5,485.1 hours of work when presented in this improper summary fashion, Yueh, 329 N.J. Super. at 467.  That is precisely why [...] required that [...] first establish a legal entitlement to fees, presumably tethered to a specific purported bad act(s), and then, if legal entitlement was established, file a motion for quantification of fees incurred in connection with the specific relevant work.
[brief] By not limiting his testimony to that which is scientifically defensible, and not making the jury aware of the limitations of his own field and analysis, [...] unfairly bolstered the weight of his conclusion.  To make matters worse, [...] implied that fingerprint analysis has a zero error rate.  [...] stated that he “has never been involved in a situation where the verification process resulted in someone refuting the findings of the original examiner,” and that studies reveal that verification “would have caught” any “false positives” that have been noted.  (6T 45-1 to 7, 111-6 to 18)  This testimony amounts to an assertion that fingerprint examinations that contain the final verification step never produce an inaccurate conclusion—a zero error rate.  There is, of course, an error rate to all disciplines, including fingerprint examination.  See United States v. Mitchell, 365 F.3d 215, 246 (3d Cir. 2004) (“[S]ome latent fingerprint examiners insist that there is no error rate associated with their activities.  . . .  This would be out-of-place under Rule 702. ”).  OSAC expressly disapproves of any examiner implying that there is a zero error rate to fingerprint analysis or that it is an infallible method.  As OSAC explains, “A claim of a zero-error rate for the method is demonstrably false; errors have occurred.  Because the friction ridge comparison process takes place within the mind of the examiner, there is no way to separate a method error rate from a practitioner error rate.  Furthermore, as with 100% certainty, the concept of a zero-error rate is incompatible with the practice of science. ”  OSAC, Guideline for the Articulation of the Decision-Making Process Leading to an Expert Opinion of Source Identification in Friction Ridge Examinations 9 (2017) (Da 178-194)  See also Department of Justice, Approved Uniform Language for Testimony and Reports for the Forensic Latent Print Discipline 2-3 (Da 195-197).  (prohibiting DOJ experts from testifying that “two friction ridge impressions originated from the same source to the exclusion of all others,” or from asserting “that latent print examination is infallible or has a zero error rate. ”)  Asserting that a discipline has a zero error rate is misleading and prejudicial.  [...], More than Zero: Accounting for Error in Latent Fingerprint Identification, 95 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 985, 1049 (2005) (“The potential to mislead a fact-finder by saying, ‘My methodological error rate is zero, and my practitioner error rate is negligible,’ is extremely high. ”).  [...] severely downplayed the well-documented risk of error in fingerprint analysis.  Given that this case rose and fell on whether the jury thought his conclusion was correct, his inappropriate testimony requires reversal.
[brief] (7T82-3 to -25).  Defendant’s family, which included his wife, ex-partner, mother, and four young children, followed them outside.  (7T82-25 to 83-7).  The officers were on top of defendant and attempting to get him under control.  (7T89-5 to -7).  To resist the officers’ arrest, defendant tightened his body and flailed his arms.  He then tried to punch [...] in the face.  (7T84-9 to -20).  During the struggle, defendant kept asking, “What did I do?”  He also insisted that he did nothing wrong.  (Da14 at 0:00:00 to 0:01:18).  Officers repeatedly told defendant to “stop resisting” and to get on his stomach.  (Da14 at 0:00:14 to 0:00:36).  Defendant proceeded to wrap his arm around [...]’s thigh and reached toward [...]’s firearm.
[brief] ....................  4 Ritter v. Castellini, 173 N.J. Super. 509 , 513, 414 A.2d 614 (Law.Div. 1980) .......................  10 Roa v. Roa, 200 N.J. 555, 567 (N.J. 2010)  ......................................................................  7 Sears, Roebuck and Co. v. Braney, 265 N.J. Super. 362, 366 (App. Div. 1993) .......................  10 [...] v. [...], DOCKET NO. [...], 20-21 (App. Div. Oct. 4, 2018)
[brief] Critically, the defendant “did not require [the] plaintiff to open, scroll through, or acknowledge the terms and conditions. ”  Wollen, 468 N.J. Super. at 503 (emphasis added).  In light of *Wollen*, the Appellate Division later clarified the difference between enforceable and unenforceable hyperlink contracts/waivers.  See *Santana*, 475 N.J. Super. at 291-292.  In *Santana*, the Appellate Division found an arbitration agreement enforceable because, while the agreement was contained in a hyperlink that the plaintiff would need to open himself, the plaintiff needed to click a box which specifically stated that he agreed to the defendant’s terms and conditions (i.e., the hyperlinked agreements).  *Id.* at 290.  Had the plaintiff left the box unclicked, he could not have created an account with [...].  *Id.* at 291.  Thus, without affirmatively agreeing to the arbitration agreement, the plaintiff could not proceed with or access the website’s services.  *Ibid.*  Here, according to [...], when the SAM account was created by whoever accessed and used [...]’s website, the user was required to open the “Account Registration” page.
[brief] **Notwithstanding Its Lack Of Relevancy To The Instant Appeal, Appellant Mischaracterizes How New Jersey’s State Courts Have Dealt With The New Jersey Consumer Financing Law Act As Related To Debt Collection**  The New Jersey Federal District Court decisions included by Appellant, where the arguments were made that a lack of a license pursuant to the New Jersey Consumer Financing Law Act, (“NJCFLA”) N.J.S.A. 17:11C-33(b) created a violation of the Federal Fair Debt Collections Act, (“FDCPA”)
[brief] For the following reasons, this court should uphold the trial court’s ruling.  As outlined earlier, the issue of whether there was a rational basis for a passion/provocation manslaughter charge is a fact sensitive one where the “precise sequence of events” is critical.  Galicia, 210 N.J. at 380.  There had to be a rational basis of adequate provocation such that defendant’s loss of self-control was a reasonable reaction, and that defendant did not have time to “cool off” between the provocation and the killing.  In short, the issue was whether defendant was “not the master of his own understanding. ”
[brief] As a result, the Township appointed [...] as the independent hearing officer, and hearings were conducted on August 7, 2019; September 20, 2019; September 24, 2019; October 16, 2019; November 14, 2019; November 15, 2019; December 12, 2019, January 23, 2020, January 28, 2020, and February 14, 2020.  See 1T – 10T.  By decision dated June 12, 2020, Hearing Officer Verry sustained the aforementioned charges.  Pa288.  On appeal to Superior Court before the Honorable [...], A.J.S.C. considered the record below comprised of testimony and evidence presented at the aforementioned local hearing as well as supplementation of the record.  The supplemental testimony began on May 23, 2022, and was conducted over a three-day period.  See 11T – 16T.  On or about October 19, 2022, Judge Porto issued his decision sustaining the charges imposed by the Township and affirming the dismissal and termination of employment within the [...].
[brief] However, none of those categories actually describe [...].  The first two categories above do not apply, as [...] is a municipality, not a board of education.  As set forth below, the third category and fourth categories, including subparagraphs (a) (b) and (c), also do not apply.  Therefore, [...] cannot avail itself of the procedures set forth in N.J.S.A. 18A:13-47.11.  Regarding category three, it does not apply because there is no extant non-operating school district in [...].  Therefore, there cannot, as a matter of law, be a school board or a governing body for a district that does not exist.  Prior to 2009, a non-operating school district existed in [...], and that district was engaged in a send/receive agreement with [...].  However, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 18A:8-44, the non-operating [...] School District was eliminated on July 1, 2009, and merged with [...], creating a new local school district known as the [...] School District.
[directive] Ponadto w pewnych okolicznościach skazanie za to przewinienie po raz pierwszy, drugi, trzeci i kolejne może spowodować cofnięcie Pana(i) prawa do rejestracji pojazdu silnikowego i/lub dodatkowy okres zawieszenia Pana(i) prawa jazdy.  In addition, under certain circumstances, conviction for a first, second, third or subsequent offense could result in revocation of your motor vehicle registration privilege and/or an additional period of your driver’s license suspension.
[brief] The New Jersey Supreme Court has been clear that the presence of other non-arbitrable parties and claims to a dispute does not immunize a party from waiving its arbitration rights.  *Cole*, 215 N.J. at 283 ("Our analysis is not affected by the fact that non-arbitrable claims initially were present in the lawsuit as [plaintiff] asserted claims against [another defendant], who was not a party to the arbitration agreement.")  If [...] had the right to arbitrate claims against [...], it must timely exercise or preserve that right.  It does not get to unilaterally toll its arbitration right - without notice - in order to unilaterally pursue claims against other parties.  It does not get to first "wait and see" what develops for years with respect to other parties.  Here, [...] argues that it was "impossible" to compel arbitration prior to settlements being reached between [...] and other insurer defendants.  Not so.  As the *EPIX* case demonstrates, the pending litigation claims against the other insurers here were no excuse even if the arbitration clause were mandatory.  *EPIX*, 410 N.J. Super. at 480-81.  However, whereas the mandatory *EPIX* clause required that disputes "must" be arbitrated, the permissive clause here provides only that disputes "may" be arbitrated.  *A fortiori*, [...] should have moved promptly to arbitrate the claims against it in this forum.  Having failed to do so for six years, [...] waived arbitration and its motion respectfully should be denied.
[brief] Defendant's pre-trial release on personal recognizance also required that defendant remain offense-free awaiting trial.  (PSR at 1-2).  Lastly, the trial court found that the decriminalization of marijuana was unpersuasive since the Legislature had not reduced certain marijuana offenses from first-degree offenses, with the presumption of incarceration, to a lesser offense.  (15T31-11 to 32-1).  In sum, the sentencing court’s findings and proper balancing of aggravating factors 1, 3, 5, and 9 and mitigating factors 7 and 9 were “substantially influenced” by its opportunity to hear and see the witnesses and to have the “‘feel’ of the case, which a reviewing court cannot enjoy.
[brief] The trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that these overwhelming harms supported a preliminary injunction to temporarily protect the preexisting status quo. \(^7\)  For another, the State would also experience an irreparable harm without this relief.  See David v. Vesta Co., 45 N.J. 301, 327 (1965) (finding “prevention of unlawful discrimination” vindicates a “vital interest of the State” because the act of discrimination is “a public wrong and not merely the basis of a private grievance”); N.J.S.A. 10:5-3 (Legislature finding “the State suffers a grievous \(^7\) Appellants do not dispute any of these points; Appellants simply protest the trial court’s decision to cite certain evidence.  But as the State explained above, Appellants’ quibble with these references to published studies and surveys fails on this posture.  See supra at 22-23.  Moreover, the court’s mention of studies in assessing the equities was passing at best, (Da112), and simply bolstered the conclusions this court and a range of other jurists have already reached. harm” from discrimination).  Indeed, the Legislature gave the Attorney General and the Director the authority to “prevent and eliminate” all the “discrimination” the LAD prohibits.  N.J.S.A. 10:5-6.  And it gave them the authority to file an administrative complaint against entities that violate the LAD.  N.J.S.A. 10:5-14.1.  But absent preliminary relief to prevent the ongoing or future violations of the LAD, the State cannot stop this discrimination until the proceeding ends.
[brief] [...] remained the owner of the land upon which [...] was situated following the settlement of the inverse condemnation lawsuit until the property was sold at sheriff sale on September 12, 2014 as the result of the foreclosure action filed by [...]  And [...] for the non payment of a mortgage granted on December 15, 2003 in the amount of $2,262,274.87.  [...] never received any money from the sheriff sale of his property and, therefore, no money is due to Plaintiff pursuant to the terms of the PSA.  II.
[brief] There, as here, the Defendant denied the existence of the pleaded defect (there the structural defect of a stairway, here the slippery nature of the Defendant’s wet floor), and the Defendant’s engineering expert witness testified that the conditions that existed at the time of the accident did not require the type of remedial repairs that had been made.  Defendant’s alternate reliance on Evid. R. 403 that the probative value of evidence of Defendant’s subsequent remedial measures would have been substantially outweighed by the prejudice to the Defendant is also misplaced.  (See Db, page 7).  There was no weighing analysis conducted below.  Indeed, while the trial Court would have been entitled to this Court’s deference had the trial Court done so before making its ruling, such a determination adverse to the admissibility of the evidence of Defendant’s remedial actions in the case at bar, which constituted significant probative value on determining the issue of whether the Defendant’s floor was slippery when wet would have been a “clear error of judgment. ”  See Hassan v. Williams, 467 N.J. Super. 190, 214 (App. Div. 2021).  To be sure, any perceived prejudice to the defense would have been appropriately addressed by the Court’s charge as to the use of the evidence.  Ryan v. Port of New York Authority, 116 N.J. Super. 211, 219 (App. Div. 1971).  B.  USE OF SUBSEQUENT REMEDIAL MEASURES AND LAY WITNESS TESTIMONY FOR IMPEACHMENT OF EXPERT WITNESS WAS IMPROPERLY EXCLUDED
[brief] Therefore, defense counsel’s claim that he failed to read [...]’s letters from February 16th and February 27th strains credulity.  Defense counsel, like \(^3\)  Although the undersigned has not obtained a copy of the transcript, at the hearing on March 6th, it is the undersigned’s recollection that after [...] read Her Honor’s opinion into the record, defense counsel added that the trial would not be able to proceed on March 11th because defense counsel represented he was going to be on trial in two different criminal matters.  In response, Her Honor advised all counsel that Her Honor had consulted with both of the judges in defense counsel’s criminal matters and confirmed that defense counsel’s criminal matters were not proceeding on March 11th and defense counsel would be available to proceed with Defendant’s trial on March 11th.  all members of the bar, used eCourts as a means for communicating with the court and all counsel, and the procedural facts here unfortunately suggest the failure to pay the prisoner transportation fee so that the trial would not proceed was intentional, a reasonable conclusion the trial court referenced in the April 2024 Order:
[brief] If the defendant’s criminal record renders him statutorily eligible, “whether the court chooses to use the full range of sentences opened up to the court is a function of the court’s assessment of the aggravating and mitigating factors, including the consideration of the deterrent need to protect the public. ”  State v. Pierce, 188 N.J. 155, 168 (2006).  In imposing the extended term, the judge explained that defendant’s “prior record certainly establishes that he has been unable to remain out of criminal trouble for any period of time. ” (10T57-4 to 6).  Having reviewed the presentence report, [...] gave substantial weight to aggravating factors three (risk of re-offense), six (prior record), and nine (need for deterrence), and slight weight to mitigating factor six (restitution), and found that the aggravating factors “substantially outweigh[ed] the mitigating factors. ” (10T55-7 to 56-7).