ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] i.  The evidence presented at trial establishes an easement by necessity was created.  (Da13-18; Da166-169; Da948;7T; 8T)............................................. 50  ii.  Should it be determined the [...]’s grant of property rights to Plaintiff is a license, the license granted to the [...] is coupled with an interest and, therefore, is irrevocable.  (Da13-18; Da166-169; Da948; 7T; 8T).........................................................  53
[brief] (Pa0136-Pa0137.)  Although the trial court focused on an AOC-by-AOC analysis to determine the timing of contaminant releases, groundwater contamination – the “property damage” – is not restricted to specific AOCs.  Rather, “[t]his is one site-wide groundwater problem[.]” (Pa0285.)  The entire aquifer underlying the Site has been contaminated with the CVOCs released at each AOC.  (Pa0257-0258.)  Moreover, it is undisputed that all of the groundwater contamination at the Site did not occur simultaneously with CVOC releases.  Instead, active dumping of these pollutants in various areas of the site and at different times and volumes caused the collection and concentration of DNAPL (Dense Non-Aqueous Phase Liquid, a condensed form of DCE, which itself is degraded PERC) which continues to this day passively contaminating the groundwater that flows over it.  [The DNAPL] is lodged in the bedrock and only gradually dissipates.  (Pa0148.)
[brief] Ja47-48, ¶6.  Pursuant to the terms of the settlement Plaintiff’s wife, [...], agreed to voluntarily dismiss her claims for loss of consortium and [...] agreed to assign to Plaintiff its rights under the insurance policies issued by [...] and [...].  Ja48, ¶¶7-8.  Plaintiff further agreed "not to execute the judgment against Defendant, Emil A. [...], Inc. ”  Id. at ¶9.  Through the “WHEREFORE” clause in the Third Count  Plaintiff seeks a declaratory judgment that the insurance policies issued by [...] and [...] to [...] provide coverage for the claims asserted against [...] in the Complaint.  Ja48.  The Fourth Count of the First Amended Complaint addresses the nature of the coverage provided by the respective insurance policies.
[directive] in 6.  Order #5 - Order Releasing Defendant Who Lacks Fitness to Attachment 6  Proceed but Not a Danger under Certain Conditions Is  This order to be used cases where a defendant has been found incompetent, but there is in is no need for commitment because he/she not a danger to him/herself, others, or is property.  Consequently, the defendant may be released certain conditions set by the on court.  accordance with N.J.S.A. 2C:4-6(b), the court may direct the defendant to continue In with outpatient treatment while the case held abeyance.  The order also directs that a is in follow-up examination be conducted by psychologists from the [...] 90 days.  in Order - Order Discharging the Defendant Pretrial Attachment 7 on 7.
[directive] MIDDLE NAME LAST NAME FIRST NAME I I I I SBI#  ACTIVE BENCH WARRANTS  PENDING CHARGES  DETAINERS  FBI# DYES ONO DYES ONO  DYES ONO DISCUSSION OF PRIOR COURT HISTORY AND PENDING CHARGES  COURT HISTORY DATE OFFENSE PLACE COURT DISPOSITION  Revised: 09/2017, CN: 10693  Court History Continued  LAST NAME FIRST NAME MIDDLE NAME COURT HISTORY DATE OFFENSE PLACE COURT DISPOSITION  Revised: 09/2017, CN: 10693 • PTI Recommendation  _______  Superior Court of New Jersey, County  MIDDLE NAME LAST NAME FIRST NAME SBI # INDICTMENT/ ACCUSATION/ COMPLAINT NUMBER  PROMIS NUMBER  DEFENDANT RECOMMENDED FOR ENROLLMENT  DYES  ONO RECOMMENDATIONS AND COMMENTS  CODEFENDANT STATUS INSTRUCTIONS:  Attach Postponement Order and Participation Agreement if recommended.  PROBATION  OFFICER PROBATION OFFICER SIGNATURE DATE SUPERVISOR SUPERVISOR SIGNATURE DATE APPROVED  Revised: 09/2017, CN: 10693  Offense Information
[brief] ” (Pa680).  [...] confronted [...] on March 2, 2016, asking “And by the way, what were you doing under my desk while I was out on vacation?” (Pa680).  [...]’s report stated that [...] was taken aback and responded: “I wasn’t under your desk”, yet at deposition, [...] changed her position and her new version was [...] “didn’t say he wasn’t under my desk.
[brief] The State Did Not Misread the Plain Language of Factor a(5).  Defendant cites several reasons the State’s interpretation of N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14(a)(5) is erroneous.  Each will be addressed in turn.  First, the defendant contends the State misread the plain language of factor a(5).  (Db9).  The text of factor a(5) is clear.  A defendant is barred from Recovery Court if: (1) “the person did not possess a firearm at the time of the present offense” and (2) “did not possess a firearm at the time of any pending criminal charge.
[brief] *(Pa50-54). *  The RR Ordinance provides for a maximum building height for the triplex and carriage home dwellings to not exceed thirty-five (35) feet and two and a half (2½) stories, and a maximum building height for the stand-alone garage building to not exceed twenty-two (22) feet in height and one and a half (1½ stories).  *(Pa50-54). *  The Settlement Agreement and RR Ordinance are both silent as to the elevations of the grade on the property.
[brief] Although there is a dispute of when the offer was first presented to [...], all parties agree that the contract (either signed or unsigned) was presented to [...] at least by January 17, 2023.  Da84, Da190, Da292.  Everyone agrees that the contract did not mention [...]’s ROFR, however it was in the Fuel Supply Agreement, which the good faith buyer ([...], d/b/a [...]) had also been provided prior to January 17, 2023.  2T.28:17-29:7.  [...]’s representative, [...], expressed to [...] that the failure to mention the ROFR rendered the offer invalid and therefore he/[...] refused to accept it as a good faith offer.  Da.329-332.  It is [...]’s position that [...]’s rejection of the offer as a “bona fide offer” as the language of the contract requires, was at their own peril and had no legal impact on the contractual relationship developing between [...] and Fuel One.  1T.17:10-18:5.  [...]’s silence and the passage of 30 days operated as a waiver.  However, in order to placate [...] and obtain an affirmative waiver of their ROFR, [...] amended the contract to include an explicit mention of the ROFR.  Da214.  The amendment was submitted by Fuel One’s attorney to [...] on May 4th, 2023, although it was not signed by [...], Inc.  Da70.  On May 8th, 2023, [...]’s attorney submitted the amendment, now signed by [...], Inc. and Fuel One, to [...].  Da72.  On June 6th, 2023, [...] attempted to exercise its ROFR.  Da75.  It is [...]’s position that the ROFR was waived as of February 17, 2023 and that the amendment had no effect on that waiver as it did not change the essential and material terms of the proposed contract.  3T.17:11-18:10.  It is [...]’s further position, however, that even if it did have the effect of creating a new offer, that offer was tendered on May 4th, 2023 and waived (by [...]’s silence), as of June 3rd, 2023.  3T. 34:11-22.  The Trial Court disagreed with [...]’s position and on February 20, 2024, granted the Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment.  Da350.  On February 22nd, 2024, Defendant [...], Inc., filed a Notice of Appeal, CIS and Transcript Request.  Da400-414.  Defendant [...] now requests that the Judgment entered by the Trial Court be stayed pending that appeal.
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[directive] The prosecutors, of consisting Group  Advisory Reform Justice Criminal establish a Directive this deems Director the as such persons other coordinator, and avictim-witness executives, police the of implementation to review regular basis on a meet shall Advisory Group  The appropriate. practices, prosecution and best police share identify and to Directive, this and Law Reform Bail positions, uniform develop to practical issues, legal and and problems implementation identify to assist to needed are as materials support other such and forms, motions model briefs, model Reform Bail the under appeals and motions, hearings, detention pretrial handle who prosecutors on General Attorney the Constitution, to advise and State the of 11 paragraph I, Article Law and and/or Court Rules.
[brief] Accordingly, the Trial Court properly increased [...]’s monthly management fee to $150 per month.  Moreover, the Board’s earlier action (before the Second Remand) in reducing [...]’s management fee to 5% of the rent was likewise arbitrary and capricious.  As held by [...], [...] presented testimony and records supporting that the management fee was actually incurred, actually paid, and consistent with the market rates.  The Board’s resort to an arbitrary rate of 5% of the rent based on unsupported “board precedent” and “independent research” was baseless.  Further, that [...] and [...] may have common ownership is irrelevant.  As held by [...], “some entity has to provide management services and Julip’s rates were proven to be typically $150 per month for other clients in the same market. ”  Da 20.  There was no showing that [...] did not provide the management services for the Unit, and that a monthly management fee paid by [...] (whether to [...] or some other entity) is an unreasonable charge.  III.
[brief] [...] Statement (vi)  The dilapidated appearances or other condition of the property materially affects the welfare, including the economic welfare, of the residents of the area in close proximity to the property, and the owner has failed to take reasonable and necessary measures to remedy the conditions.  [...] Rebuttal  I do not know how [...] could support this statement.  He did not gain access to the interior of the Property.  An inspection of the exterior of the Property could not support this statement as the Property is reasonably well maintained and structurally intact and apparently fit for habitation.(99a-100a)
[brief] (Db. 11 paragraph 2).  Defense counsel asserts that plaintiff’s counsel was malingering because he did not present a second doctor’s note in support of the adjournment request.  Defense counsel’s ad hominem attack on plaintiff’s counsel ignore the well established fact subject to judicial notice that the effects of Covid 19 can result in permanent injury and symptoms of Covid 19 can often occur for more than two weeks.  New Jersey Rule of Evidence 201(b)(1)  [...] agrees with defendant’s that [...] ruled that defendants were entitled to summary judgment because plaintiff could not establish that his claim that his $255,000.00 claim met the six year statute of limitation of N.J.S.A. 2A:14-1 and that [...]’ Certification in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment indicating that he relied on promises of payment after [...] was a sham certification because it directly conflicted with [...]’s deposition testimony.(1T2 34-7 to 35-21;1T240-2 to 14; 1T2 12-8 to 13-13;1t2 12-8 to 13-13;1T2 16-6 to 19)/
[brief] See *Gramiccioni*, 243 N.J. at 309-10 (“The State’s obligation to defend and indemnify county prosecutors and their employees for actions arising out of their employment stems from the Tort Claims Act (the TCA), N.J.S.A. 59:1-1 to 12-3. ”); *Lavezzi*, 219 N.J. at 178 (“Any allegations of loss or damage incurred at the time of the items’ seizure implicate the defense and indemnification obligations of the State under N.J.S.A. 59:10-1 and N.J.S.A. 59:10A-1.”).  As such, each case noted that the touchstone for determining the scope of the duty is the TCA.  Thus, Gramiccioni and Lavezzi confirm that any duty to defend must arise from the text of the TCA and the case law applying it, and -- as already noted -- both the TCA’s plain terms and judicial precedent negate [...]’s arguments on appeal.
[brief] That is, the means to regulate land which a municipality selects “must bear a reasonable and substantial relationship” to promoting the common good and treating “all property in like circumstances .  . . alike. ”  Katobimar Realty Co. v. Webster, 20 N.J. 114, 122 (1955).  While the nature of the spot zoning analysis may differ under the LRHL from what it is under the MLUL, there is no justification, given the purpose and goals of the spot zoning jurisprudence, to immunize zoning designations under the LRHL from such an analysis.
[brief] [...]  [...]  Attorneys for Defendant-Respondent  UATP Management, LLC [...]  [...]  [...] [...]  [...]  On the Brief: [...]  Attorney ID# 034381990  [...]  Attorney ID# 378302021  Date Submitted: January 13, 2025  #  TABLE OF CONTENTS | Section | Page | |------------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | ii | | PRELIMINARY STATEMENT | 1 | | RELEVANT PROCEDURAL HISTORY | 4 | | STATEMENT OF FACTS | 6 | | LEGAL ARGUMENT | 10 | | POINT I. | | | THE APPELLATE STANDARD OF REVIEW IS DE NOVO, | | | WITHOUT DEFEERENCE TO THE TRIAL COURT, | | | UNLESS ITS INTERPRETIVE ANALYSIS OF THE ISSUES | | | IS PERSUASIVE, AS IS THE CASE HERE | 10 | | POINT II.
[brief] AP: You are aware that [there] was a report created much like your 2020 report, at the request of the defense?  [...]: It was my understanding that it was created for the purposes of the waiver hearing.  AP: So the answer to my question is yes.  It was prepared for the defense in a matter similar to yours?  [...]: Not in the matter similar to mine.  It was prepared for the defense for the purposes of the waiver hearing.  It’s a different evaluation, it’s a different type of evaluation.  (12T119-13 to 24).  Defendant neither objected to Santina’s unsolicited responses, nor requested a curative instruction.
[brief] 18.  Since the 2012 Holmdel transmission line upgrade, [...] has been managing the transmission to distribution pressure reduction using a temporary regulator station at a different nearby location.  That temporary station, however, is not a long-term solution and must be replaced because it does not and cannot include a heating unit (because of its size and location).  Because the temporary regulator station does not have a heater, it experiences incidents of severe icing, and thus requires close monitoring and frequent thawing, and presents a higher risk of service interruption.  In addition, the Company has to operate this portion of its system at sub-optimal gas pressures and flows, due to the absence of a permanent regulator station in this area of Holmdel.  IV.
[brief] *Id.* at 76 (quoting *Singer v. State*, 95 --- \(^6\) Argument 3 and 5 both argue it was error to deny [...] attorney's fees.  Argument 3 (pb29) argues an award was warranted as a sanction and Argument 5 argues an award was warranted as a catalyst to the Board's belated compliance.  N.J. 487, 494-96 (1984)).  "The party does not need to obtain all relief sought, but there must be a resolution that 'affect[s] the defendant's behavior towards the prevailing plaintiff.'"  Smith v. Hudson Cnty. Reg., 422 N.J. Super. 387, 394 (App. Div. 2011) (quoting Teeters v. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs., 387 N.J. Super. 423, 432 (App. Div. 2006)).  Such action includes a "change (voluntary or otherwise) in the custodian's conduct."  Spectraserv, Inc. v. Middlesex Cnty. Utils. Auth., 416 N.J. Super. 565, 583 (App. Div. 2010).  "A plaintiff is considered a prevailing party 'when the actual relief on the merits of the claim materially alters the relationship between the parties by modifying the defendant's behavior in a way that directly benefits the plaintiff.'"  Teeters, 387 N.J. Super. at 432 (quoting Warrington v. Vill. Supermarket, Inc., 328 N.J. Super. 410, 420 (App. Div. 2000)).  Here, it was error for the lower court to deny [...] prevailing party attorney's fees because it was [...]'s 7/18/22 motion (1a) to enforce resulted in the successful enforcement order (60a).  The Lower Court abused its discretion when it denied the prevailing party attorney's fees, as it denied such without providing any rational explanation and it inexplicably departed from established policies.  See *US Bank Nat. Ass’n v. Guillaume*, 209 N.J. 449, 38 A. 3d 570 at 467-68 (2012).  Here, the Board not only failed to comply with the 8/28/20 Order (8a) after it was affirmed on 5/18/22 (12a), but it continued to fail to comply after the 7/18/22 Motion to Enforce (1a) was filed two months later and then it failed to comply with the 8/29/22 Enforcement Order “within 7 days” (60a).  It was only after the 9/13/22 Order to Show Cause was filed did the Board on 9/14/22 belatedly pay the $78,646 attorney fee award.  (204a)  **CONCLUSION**
[brief] Caselaw has further explained the notice requirements for zoning ordinances, indicating that a “summary” is a short, clear discussion of the main points of the zoning ordinance.  “‘The notice required by statute must reasonably apprise the public or parties interested of the essence of the regulations to be adopted, that is the changes to be made. ’”  Rockaway Shoprite Assoc., Inc. v. City of Linden, 424 N.J. Super. 337 (App. Div. 2011).  (Emphasis added).  The cases cited by Plaintiff (Pb30-Pb32) discuss the notice requirements for zoning ordinances.
[brief] **Da-6a.**  Plaintiff’s excuses of using various addresses, none of which were Defendant’s residence, and using email as service do not comport with R 1:20A-6’s jurisdictional mandates and his excuses do not vitiate the 2019 orders finding R 1:20A-6 service never occurred.  It is objectionable that Plaintiff falsely accuses that “[...] evaded service” when it was Plaintiff who deliberately used false addresses to insure she did not receive notice of whatever he purportedly sent or filed.
[brief] The purpose so to do must be free from all reasonable doubt.  Repeals by implication are not favored in the law; and where the statutory provisions may reasonably stand together, each in its own particular sphere of action, there is not the repugnancy importing the design to repeal the earlier provision. ”  Reading AICRA as compelling resolution of Fraud Act disputes through NFADR not only ignores the plain language of N.J.S.A. 17:33A-7 and N.J.A.C. 11:3-5.1(a), but it also gives rise to the numerous procedural and constitutional issues discussed below which will serve to only weaken the insurance industry’s ability to “confront aggressively the problem of insurance fraud in New Jersey” which is the goal of both the Fraud Act and AICRA.
[brief] Pa46.  Thereafter, the Township Planning Board conducted further investigation into whether the Redevelopment Area continued to meet the criteria for an “area in need of redevelopment” under the LHRL, and on August 7, 2013, the Township Council adopted Ordinance No. 14-2013, which again authorized the Township to pursue the acquisition of the Shopping Center by negotiated purchase or eminent domain for the purposes of redevelopment.
[brief] It should be noted that there was nothing afoul with our assertion of both contractual and non-contractual claims.  See e.g. Caputo v. Nice-Pak Products, Inc., 300 N.J. Super. 498, 504-505 (App.Div. 1997), holding that "Plaintiff correctly contended before the trial court that, if the jury found that there was no valid contract, the jury could then consider whether plaintiff nonetheless might recover for unjust enrichment, a cause of action that does not depend on there being an express contract."  See also Power-Matics, Inc.  v. Ligotti, 79 N.J. Super. 294, 306 (App.Div. 1963), holding that a plaintiff may attempt to prove both unjust enrichment and breach of contract without also showing rescission of the alleged contract.  As I argued to the trial court, even though neither I nor my sister was an “owner” of the vehicle, nonetheless we still had standing - due to our financial interest in its disposition.
[brief] [...], ABC COMPANIES 1-10 (names for fictitious entities), JOHN DOES 1-10 (names for fictitious individuals), ABC COMPANIES 11-20 (names for fictitious entities) and JOHN DOES 11-20 (names for fictitious individuals), Defendants-Respondents.  CIVIL ACTION ON GRANT OF MOTION FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL FROM THE INTERLOCUTORY ORDERS OF THE SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY, LAW DIVISION, PASSAIC COUNTY  Docket No. [...]  Sat Below: HON.  [...], J.S.C.  REPLY BRIEF ON BEHALF OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT
[brief] “The broad statutory framework set forth in N.J.S.A. 2A:50–1 to –68, establishes the basis for foreclosure of mortgages. ”  *Highland Lakes Country Club & Cmty. Ass’n v. Franzino*, 186 N.J. 99, 106 n. 2, 892 A.2d 646 (2006); see also R. 4:64–1 to –8 (establishing rules specific to foreclosure proceedings including R. 4:64–5’s limitation on joinder of claims in foreclosure).  Although [...] is able to raise potential defenses against [...], the foreclosing party, in the foreclosure proceeding, as a result of the arbitration agreement she is forced to bring her third-party counterclaims against [...] in arbitration.  [...]'s defenses to the foreclosure action track her affirmative claims against [...]; thus, she is forced to litigate those substantively similar claims in two different forums.  That result is burdensome; however, it is not unconscionable.  Other courts that have found similar provisions not unconscionable have noted the unique nature of the judicial remedies of foreclosure and similar actions.  See Walther v. Sovereign Bank, 386 Md. 412, 872 A.2d 735, 749 (2005) (stating that “foreclosure proceedings ... do not act solely to protect the interests of the mortgage lender against a defaulting debtor but instead provide protections for both sides. ”); see also Conseco Fin. Servicing Corp. v. Wilder, 47 S.W.3d 335, 343 (Ky.Ct.App.2001) (stating that claims involving security interests “have come to be heavily regulated by statute, allowing for streamlined procedures and effective protections for both sides.