ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] A.  The Probate Action  [...] consulted with an attorney, who prepared a caveat, and on or about August 7, 2017, [...] went to the Bergen County Surrogate to file the caveat.  [...] of the [...] firm prepared the caveat for [...] Miranda, which [...] filed with the Surrogate’s Office.  (T1:10:5-8).  The Will was submitted for Probate by [...] (“[...]”), and Letters Testamentary were issued.  On January 24, 2018, [...], on behalf of [...] (“[...]”), filed the Verified Complaint on Order to Show Cause, together with a filing letter, the Verified Complaint, the Will of [...] of March 5, 2014, together with the Certification of plaintiff [...] of January 24, 2018.  (Da1).  On February 12, 2018, [...] provided his Certification and Verification in support of the Verified Complaint in The Matter of [...], Deceased, under Docket No: [...].  (Da1).  On April 23, 2018, [...], on behalf of [...], filed an Answer to the Verified Complaint, a Brief in opposition to plaintiff’s Order to Show Cause, a Certification of [...] in opposition to the Order to Show Cause, and a proposed Order of Dismissal.  (Da15).  On August 22, 2018, [...] filed a Motion on behalf of [...] to dismiss the Complaint, together with a Letter Brief, the Certification of [...], and a proposed Order.  (Da38).  [...]’s Certification attached the letter of [...] of the [...] firm of August 2, 2017 to [...] and [...], noting that the [...] firm was retained by [...], and requested status of the Estate, including requests for a Will and a Death Certificate.
[brief] It is reasonable for jury to determine that if Defendant [...] had approved the charge pay, either explicitly or implicitly, that the termination justification is pretextual.  If the termination was pretextual, then it is up to the jury to determine what the true reason for termination was, be it retaliation for protected activity or some other reason altogether.  Indeed, [...] testified that Defendant [...] approved the charge pay – disputing the central tenet in Respondents’ justification for Appellant’s termination.
[brief] (Count Four); Aiding and Abetting (Count Five); New Jersey Civil RICO (Count Six); Violation of RICO, 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (Count Seven); Civil Conspiracy (Count Eight); Breach of Contract (Count Nine); and Negligence (Count Ten).  Specifically, Plaintiffs asserted Counts Eight and Ten against [...].  (Ibid.)  On November 8, 2023, [...] moved to compel arbitration and stay the proceeding, asserting Plaintiffs agreed to a pre-dispute arbitration provision in account applications that, on their face, do not contain any indicia of signatures by either Plaintiff (the “Motion to Compel”).
[brief] (Da472; 1T:32:20-35:7).  Further, Pursuant to the [...] Agreement, the Members have the “full, exclusive, and complete discretion, power and authority” to “manage, control, administer, and operate the business and affairs of the Company. ” (Da472, §3.1.1.).  Bylaws of [...] were executed on April 11, 2015 (“Bylaws”).  (Da410).  Pursuant to the Bylaws, “The management of the affairs, property and interest of the corporation shall be vested in the Board of Directors. ” (Da412, §4.1).  Pursuant to the Bylaws, “No loans shall be made by the corporation to the directors, unless first approved by the holders of two-thirds of the voting shares. ” (Da413, §4.13).  An Amended and Restated Operating Agreement for [...] was entered into as of July 1, 2015.  (“Amended Agreement”).  (Da477).  [...] is the 100% owner of [...].  (Da477, §1.3.4).  Pursuant to the Amended Agreement, “The Company shall be managed by an Executive Committee comprised of three Members, one of whom shall be designated as the Manager of the Company. ” (Da479, §3.1).  Pursuant to the Amended Agreement, “The Executive Committee shall manage the day-to-day affairs of the Company. ” (Da479, §3.1.1).  The Executive Committee of [...] was Appellant and Respondents [...] and [...].  (1T:39:12-21).  Pursuant to the Bylaws of [...] and the Amended Bylaws of [...], §3.1.1, approval by the Executive Committee of [...] was required to enter into any loan transaction.  (Da412; Da472; 1T:35:22-39:13).  There was a three-person board for [...] consisting of Appellant, Respondent [...], and Respondent [...], who was the corporate Secretary for [...].  (Pa687:61:16-25).  According to Appellant, there were no formal meetings for [...]; instead, there were formal meetings of [...]—the parent of [...]—during which the business of [...] was addressed.  (Pa688: 62:1-24).
[brief] The IFPA is the more specific statute concerning insurers’ causes of action and remedies for fraudulent insurance claims, see N.J.S.A. 17:33A-2 (stating that a purpose of the IFPA is “requiring the restitution of fraudulently obtained insurance benefits”), and the IFPA is primarily aimed “at the areas of automobile and health insurance, where fraud has been most rampant. ”  Chi. Title, 388 N.J. Super. at 558.  Even if that were not true, this court has held that the IFPA’s broad remedial purpose mandates its application rather than an arguably more specific statute.  See id. at 556-59 (rejecting general/specific canon “[i]n light of the broad purpose of the IFPA” and reconciling apparent conflict with arguably more specific statute by holding that IFPA controlled due to its remedial purpose).
[brief] Though those numbers are higher than—and I’m not comparing you to the landlord that represents apartment complexes.  I’m comparing you to landlords that represent large commercial tenants, with complex leases.  I think the highest I can allow is 425 an hour.  I guess [...], 395, I’ll reduce that to 325.  And the paralegal rate I’ll reduce that from 395 to 200.  That’s more in line with what I’ve seen in these types of substantial commercial cases that have been before me in recent months.  [3T18-4 to 3T18-23.]
[directive] i.  The presenting attorney should ask the foreperson if a majority of the grand jury wishes to pursue charges, consistent with the deliberation instructions described in Section II.E.1.  ii.  If the grand jury foreperson states that the grand jury wishes to pursue charges, the foreperson will identify on the record which charges the majority of the grand jury is requesting to pursue.  iii.  The grand jury hearing will be adjourned until the next available session to allow for the drafting of a proposed indictment.  iv.  The assigned prosecutor will then immediately draft an indictment that includes the charges identified by the grand jury.  6 v. At the next available session, the assigned prosecutor will present the grand jury with the draft indictment, which must include all of the charges that the grand jury indicated it wished to pursue.
[brief] The appellate court is not bound by the trial court’s application of the law to the facts.  See Wilson, 209 N.J. at 564; State v. Hudson, 209 N.J.  513, 529 (2012); Gere v. Louis, 209 N.J. 486, 499 (2012); see also State v. Ugrovics, 410 N.J. Super.  (App. Div. 2009), cert. den., 202 NJ. 346 (2010); Edwards v. McBreen, 369 N.J. Super. 415, 421-422 (App. Div. 2004).  Therefore, an appellate panel’s review of a trial court’s decision on a motion for summary judgment, or on an Order to Show Cause as is the case here, is de novo.
[brief] 15  State v. Hupka, 203 N.J. 222 (2010) ...................................................................................................................  21, 22 State v. Robinson, 217 N.J. 594 (2014) ...................................................................................................................  21, 22 State v. Twiggs, 233 N.J. 513 (2018) ...................................................................................................................  21 Thompson v. Bd. of Ed., City of Millville, 20 N.J. Super. 419 (App. Div. 1952) .........................................................................................  19 Trs. of Rutgers Coll. v. Richman, 41 N.J. Super. 259 (Ch. Div. 1956) ............................................................................................  16, 18 Wilson v. Thompson, 83 N.J.L. 57 (Sup. Ct. 1912) .....................................................................................................  13 Wolff v. Wolf, 122 N.J. Eq. 243 (Ch. 1937) .....................................................................................................  13 Public Session Laws P.L. 2012, c.45 (Medical and Health Sciences Restructuring Act) ......................... 4, 5 Statutes N.J.S.A. 2A:66-6 ......................................................................................................................... 6, 12, 15 N.J.
[brief] * * *  Employees were exposed to the hazard of being struck by construction vehicles within a highway construction zone.  The employer did not establish a pre-planned traffic pattern for pedestrian and construction traffic and provide a guide/spotter for the construction vehicles when operating in reverse in order to ensure the safety of the employees working and walking within the construction zone.  The employer did not instruct each employee in the recognition and avoidance of unsafe condition(s) and the regulation(s) applicable to his work environment to control or eliminate any hazard(s) or other exposure to illness or injury:  * * *  Employees engaged in highway work zone construction activities were not provided training in the recognition and avoidance of unsafe conditions, such as but not limited to: training employees to not walk and/or work in close proximity to moving construction vehicles, recognizing vehicle and equipment blind areas, instructing sweeper operator(s) and driver(s) on proper communication methods to communicate with workers who are on foot, providing instruction on proper backing procedures and training employees on the employer’s traffic control plan.  Pa1677-78.
[brief] (Da11-Da16).  On June 9, 2022, defendant was sentenced to an aggregate term of 75 years with 85% NERA parole ineligibility.  (17T40-2 to 5; Da17-Da20).  Defendant was sentenced to a life sentence/75 years with 85% parole ineligibility for Count One (first-degree murder); concurrent ten-year sentence with 85% NERA parole ineligibility for Count Four (second-degree aggravated assault of [...]); a concurrent ten-year sentence with five-year parole ineligibility for Count Six (second-degree unlawful possession of a weapon); a concurrent ten-year sentence with five-year parole ineligibility for Count Seven (certain persons not to possess a weapon); and a concurrent twenty-year term with ten-year parole ineligibility for Count Eight (first-degree unlawful possession of a weapon).  (17T42-9 to 44-12).  For sentencing purposes, Count Two merged with Count One and Count Five merged with Counts One and Four.  (17T42-9 to 44-12).  The trial court applied aggravating factors three, six, and nine and did not apply any mitigating factors.  (17T31-10 to 38-6).  This appeal follows.
[brief] Defendant argues that the judge placed too little weight on mitigating factor four (substantial grounds tending to excuse or justify defendant’s conduct, though failing to establish a defense).  (Db84-85).  Here, the judge found that while defendant’s diagnosis of Autism “may have some effect on his emotions, there’s nothing before me that shows that that rose to any level that forced him or pushed him into doing this. ” (17T207-11 to 17).  That defendant attended a school for students with learning disabilities does not establish that defendant suffers from a significant mental health issue tending to excuse or justify his conduct in killing four family members with a semi-automatic rifle.  Again, the judge found that mitigating factor four existed, although not to the degree that defendant prefers.
[brief] THE PLAINTIFF’S POSITION AND THE COURT’S RULING WAS INCORRECT AND INVALID (IN SUPPORT OF Db Pt. III AND IN RESPONDING TO Pb Pt III)  A further critical error in the [...]’s position --- and the Trial Court ruling -- was as to the burden of proof.  The [...] in the hearing and in its Resolution got it correct --- that the burden to prove the pre-existing legality of a current nonconforming use rests upon the proponent of the use.
[brief] 7  POINT HEADINGS  I.  PLAINTIFF’S CLAIMS ARE NOT TIME-BARRED (T8)  II.  PLAINTIFF HAS ESTABLISHED A VALID CLAIM FOR NEGLIGENCE (Pa382)  III.  PLAINTIFF HAS ESTABLISHED A BREACH OF CONTRACT CLAIM (Pa385)  IV.  PLAINTIFF HAS A VALID CLAIM FOR MISREPRESENTATION (Pa386)  TABLE OF JUDGMENT, ORDERS AND RULINGS
[brief] See N.J.S.A. 40:55D-25 (listing powers of planning board); N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70 (listing powers of board of adjustment).  The MLUL prohibits the governing body or other officials from infringing on those powers that are expressly reserved to the planning and zoning boards.  See N.J.S.A. 40:55D-20 ("Any power expressly authorized by this act to be exercised by [the] (1) planning board or (2) board of adjustment shall not be exercised by any other body, except as otherwise provided in this act.").
[brief] There was no reliance on any action of any party, outside of the express terms of the contract.  The facts supporting a lien of the “special” nature of any equitable lien are simply not present in this case.  In *Ladenheim*, the plaintiff provided services of value, and absent the imposition of an equitable lien, the defendant attorney would have been unjustly enriched.  The injured plaintiff in the underlying suit ([...]) made no representations, no assertions, and no commitments to the plaintiff.  The defendant did.  The Appellate Division decision in *Ladenheim* is based on reasoning concerning the imposition of an equitable lien, an involuntary transfer pursuant to a court order, not a voluntary sale or assignment of an interest in the proceeds of the prejudgment suit.
[brief] ”).  As it had on thirteen prior occasions, [...] prepared the Power of Attorney and filled out the Consent of Surety with the knowledge that its customer contractor would submit same to [...], and that [...] would rely upon that Consent of Surety to award the project.  [...] would be estopped based on its prior conduct and [...]’s reliance on same.  To get around this, [...] mischaracterizes several key points.  First, [...]’s August 27, 2024, and August 29, 2024 letters were not attempts to “cure” a defect.  There was no defect to cure.  It was simply an effort by [...] to reassure [...] that as it had on thirteen prior occasions that [...] intended to be and indeed would be bound by the Consent of Surety.  Second, [...] misdirects the Court by attempting to make the issue about waiving a defect – this reframing is intended to distract the Court from the true issue - there is no defect in [...]’s Bid.  [...] misrepresents to the Court that its sole and rational option was to disqualify [...]’s Bid.  As demonstrated above, disqualification of [...]’s Bid was neither [...]’s sole option nor was it a rational option.  [...] improperly implemented a “concern” to artificially create a problem.  [...]’s most rational option would have been to award the Project to [...], and save $10,000,000 in the process.  II.
[brief] (Pa37).  [...] asserted that the impacted unit members were qualified to perform the essential functions of the position because they had been deemed eligible for promotion but suffered an adverse employment action because of their sick/injury leave status.  (Pa40).  [...] claimed that the City violated the NJLAD by failing to conduct individual assessments in investigating each employees’ health status so that it could determine whether or not a reasonable accommodation could be made.  (Pa41).  [...] similarly claimed that the particular General Order 19-16, has been responsible for issuing violations for excessive absenteeism under it’s policy provisions.  [...] has claimed that the policy is arbitrary and capricious as the standards “of a short period of illness” are unknowable.  [...] asserted that the Department established a sick leave policy which punishes Firefighters for the legitimate use of medical or sick leave.  (Pa54).  [...] asserted that the sick leave policy disciplines employees simply based upon a mathematical amount of sick leave utilized in violation of the NJLAD.  (Pa55).  [...] also asserts that Firefighters were penalized for the proper use of sick leave based upon an arbitrary mathematical formula which was arbitrary and capricious.  (Pa57-Pa58).  [...] requested in its prayer for relief that the policies related to medical leave be declared unlawful and enjoined.  (Pa58)¹ ¹  The foregoing are the most relevant facts in this matter.
[brief] (Sa45-  These charges resulted from conduct which occurred on July 1, 2022.  (Sa52).  On July 8, 2022, a Notice of Clinical Eligibility was issued, finding the defendant clinically ineligible for Recovery Court as he failed to appear for a TASC evaluation.  (Sa55).  On January 30, 2023, the defendant pleaded guilty to Second Degree Unlawful Possession of a Firearm, Third Degree Prohibited Weapons – Firearm Without Serial Number, and Fourth Degree Resisting Arrest in Essex County.
[brief] Jerista v. Murray, 185 N.J. 175, 190-91, 883 A.2d 350 (2005)  ............................18  Jimenez v. Gnoc. Corp., 286 N.J. Super. 533, 540, 670 A.2d 24 (App. Div.) .........16  Katz v. Schachter, 251 N.J.Super. 467, 473-474, 598 A.2d 923 (App. Div. 1991).
[brief] 4.  The Court incorrectly found the legal and equitable title belonged to [...] because it failed to impose a constructive trust as warranted by law (6T31:17-18).  This topic was addressed in the Appellants’ main brief.  See discussion there about *Moses v. Moses*, 140 N.J. Eq. 575 (*Court of Errors and Appeals, 1949*).  What we want to add here is that the lower Court was somewhat on the right track, as it identified unjust enrichment, but missed the big picture, which was that [...] paid for everything, and [...] did him a disservice by usurping title, when he was only supposed to act as an agent for purchase.
[brief] Because an indemnity clause must be construed against both the indemnitee and the drafter, the Appellate Division ruled that the general contractor could not be indemnified for its own negligence.  Englert, 389 N.J. Super. at 57-58.  In Mautz v. J.P. Patti Co., 298 N.J. Super. 13 (App. Div. 1997), the Appellate Division also rejected a claim for indemnification for the indemnitee’s own negligence in the absence of an unequivocal intent to require such indemnity.
[brief] ...........................................  34  A.  The Trial Court’s Unsubstantiated Belief That Plaintiff’s FAR Was Driven Solely By The Remediation Cost Was Not Valid (Pa37-39)  .........................................................................................  37  B.  The Trial Court Erred By Ruling That The Second Application Would Not Create A Desirable Visual Environment And Be Aesthetically Pleasing (Pa37-39)  .................................................................  39  C.  The Proposed Development Was Not Too Large Or Intense For The Proposed Site (Pa37-39)  .........................................................................................  40  CONCLUSION ..................................................................................................................
[brief] Respectfully submitted, [...]  Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant /s/ [...]  NICHOLAS D. NORCIA  Date: June 5, 2024  [...], Plaintiff-Respondent-Cross-Appellant, vs. WHIBY 13  WOODBRIDGE LLC, Defendant-Appellant-Cross-Respondent.  CIVIL ACTION ON APPEAL FROM AN ORDER OF THE SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY, LAW DIVISION–SPECIAL CIVIL PART, LANDLORD-TENANT DIVISION, MIDDLESEX COUNTY DOCKET NO. [...]
[brief] [...] seems to either disagree with the COVID Statute’s mandate or be unable to comprehend this.  [...]’s schools reopened in early July 2020, and [...] then resumed providing services.  Consistent with the COVID Statute, in August 2020, [...] issued payment to [...] for May and June 2020, but not for April 2020, or the period of July 2020 preceding the reopening of its schools.  [...] anticipated receiving those payments as well, but before they were received, [...] demanded the return of the payments it had made for May and June, claiming that they were made in error, the Statute notwithstanding.
[brief] [...]’s supervisor at [...], [...] (also referred to as “[...]” and “[...]”), testified that, on the night of July 20, 2022, he broadcasted three to four detailed radio messages to all of the drivers that were working on the GSP, including [...], and instructed them that they were to use a designated grass turnaround/cut-through marked by cones and that they were not to use the paved police turnaround.
[brief] (8T 64-18 to 79-16; 5T 56-23 to 61-19; 11T 139-11 to 141-10, 160-2 to 22)  The State moved to admit two statements by [...] following his arrest: an un-Mirandized “booking” statement, followed by a Mirandized statement. \(^4\) (8T 49-13 to 50-15)  Both statements should have been suppressed for several reasons.
[directive] Date Time Law Enforcement Officer to Whom You LEO Agency Called Spoke Dispatched?  Yes 1  No Description of Event Date Time Law Enforcement Officer to Whom You LEO Agency Called Spoke Dispatched? Yes 2  No Description of Event Date Time Law Enforcement Officer to Whom You LEO Agency Called Spoke Dispatched? Yes 3  No Description of Event [...] (10/10/2023), Form Promulgated by Directive CN:12999 page 1 of 5
[brief] LEGAL ARGUMENT  THIS COURT SHOULD AFFIRM THE TRIAL COURT’S DECISION BECAUSE THE ARBITRATION AWARD IS REASONABLY DEBATABLE.  It is well established that a court “may not substitute its own judgment for that of the arbitrator, regardless of the court’s view of the correctness of the arbitrator’s position. ”  Borough of E. Rutherford v. E. Rutherford PBA Local 275, 213 N.J. 190, 201-02 (2013); N.J. Transit Bus Operations v. Amalgamated Transit Union, 187 N.J. 546, 554 (2006); Policemen’s Benevolent Ass’n v. City of Trenton, 205 N.J. 422, 432-33 (2011); Linden Bd. of Educ. v. Linden Educ. Ass’n ex rel. Mizichko, 202 N.J. 268, 276-77 (2010).  “[T]o ensure ‘finality, as well as to secure arbitration’s speedy and inexpensive nature, there exists a strong preference for judicial confirmation of arbitration awards. ”’  Middletown Twp. PBA Local 124 v. Twp. of Middletown, 193 N.J. 1, 10 (2007) (quoting N.J. Tpk. Auth. v. Local 196, I.F.P.T.E., 190 N.J. 283, 292 (2007)).  As the New Jersey Supreme Court observed, arbitration is not a springboard for additional litigation, especially in public-sector disputes.  E. Rutherford PBA, 213 N.J. at 209; see also Cnty. Coll. of Morris Staff Ass’n v. Cnty. Coll. of Morris, 100 N.J. 383, 390 (1985) (finding that “arbitration should spell the conclusion of the litigation rather than the beginning of it”).  Even if a court disagrees with an arbitrator’s decision, such disagreement alone is an insufficient basis for vacating an arbitration award.  N.J. Tpk. Auth. v. Local 196, 190 N.J. at 293 (citing W.R. Grace & Co v. Local Union 759, Int’l Union of the United Rubber, Cork, Linoleum & Plastic Workers of Am., 461 U.S. 757, 764 (1983)).  Therefore, parties who choose to submit their disputes to arbitration agree to ordinarily be bound by the award rendered, no matter how disappointing it may be.  Int’l Ass’n of Machinists Lodge 1292, Ind. v. Bergen Ave. Bus Owners’ Ass’n, 3 N.J. Super. 558, 566 (Law Div. 1949).