ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The record here is entirely lacking in facts to support a legitimate public purpose, unlike the extensive record before this Court in Mt. Laurel v. [...], 188 N.J. 531 (2006).  Before the trial court, the Township here relied on the open space preservation case Mt. Laurel v. [...], 188 N.J. 531 (2006).  (See 1T17-13 to 18-1).  There, the Supreme Court affirmed this Court’s holding in which it reversed the trial court because “Mipro did not present evidence that could support a finding that Mount Laurel’s decision to condemn its property constituted an abuse of the eminent domain power. ”  Mt. Laurel Twp. v. [...], 379 N.J. Super. 358, 368 (App. Div. 2005).  In that case, the Township sought to preserve land for open space, and the trial court found the condemnation was “for a facially valid purpose, namely, the acquisition of Mipro’s tract to be held in perpetuity as a passive open space,” but the Township’s “real purpose” “was to prevent yet another residential development in a township already under severe development pressure. ”  Id. at 367.  But the record before the court in that case was significantly developed, as opposed to the record here.  Mt. Laurel residents had approved several referenda authorizing tax increases to ensure adequate funding for the municipality to acquire Mipro’s land.  Id. at 363, 366.  Additionally, the Planning Board adopted a master plan, “which stated that the goals of the recreation and open space plan included acquisition of ‘the maximum amount of open space remaining in the township that can be achieved with sound use of financial resources’ and reduction of traffic congestion and costs of municipal services. ”  Id. at 367.  The Appellate Division noted the “voluminous factual materials” the parties introduced, id. at 367, and disagreed with the trial court, emphasizing that “Mount Laurel’s residents ha[d] approved three referenda under this legislation authorizing tax levies for the acquisition of property for recreation and conservation purposes. ”  *Id.* at 371-72.  Moreover, the Township had demonstrated “a reasonable basis for concern that additional residential development would aggravate traffic congestion and pollution problems in the municipality and impose added stress on its school system and other municipal services. ”  *Id.* at 376.  Therefore, the Court concluded Mt. Laurel did not bring the condemnation action for an illegitimate purpose such as a discriminatory reason, but for the public purpose of acquiring additional open space.  *Id.* at 377.  There was no such record before the trial court here that could demonstrate a legitimate public purpose.  The record is devoid of any stated public use for Defendants’ Properties.  The Contract between the Township and Developer does not constrain the Developer’s use of the Properties.  (*See* Da30-44)  The Properties may be used for whatever purpose subject to obtaining appropriate land approvals.  Given the lack of a record before the trial court upon which to find a legitimate public purpose, Defendants are likely to succeed on the merits.  **POINT II**
[brief] 24 T.F. v. [...], No. [...], 2023 WL 6544917 (Wis. Cir. Oct. 03, 2023) ...................... 9, 28 Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000) .................................................................................. 8, 21, 28 Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995)
[brief] D.  Plaintiff did not give required information in its notice of motion.  R. 6:3-3 is titled: Motion Practice.  R. 6:3-3(c)(3) and (4) contain language which is too extensive to quote here, but which is required to be stated in Plaintiff’s Notice of Motion.  However, the first three sentences of R. 6:3-3(c)(3) and the entirety of (c)(4) are omitted from Plaintiff’s Notice of Motion Summary for Judgment (Da9).  Hence, Plaintiff failed to give Defendant the vast bulk of notice required under R. 6:3-3.  The lower Court mistakenly accepted the void Notice of Motion for Summary Judgment despite the absence of notice required to be furnished to Defendant.  Defendant was denied due process because of insufficiency of process and insufficiency of service of process.
[brief] See, e.g., Boles v. Wal-Mart Store, Inc., 2014 WL 1266216 (D.N.J. Mar. 26, 2014) (UNPUB DEC.) (disability discrimination/failure to accommodate action brought by former employee who developed large and dangerous ulceration on leg that required extended absence and was terminated some six months later when sought to return to work)(Pizzo v. Lindewold Bd. of Educ., 2015 WL 1471943 (D.N.J. Mar. 31, 2015)(UNPUB DEC.) (FMLA and LAD action brought by former employee who suffered from bipolar disorder, requested and took FMLA leave and extensions to same, and was terminated based on employer’s understanding that she would be out indefinitely; the court noted there was no dispute that the plaintiff was disabled due to her diagnosis or that she was terminated due to her absence as of a given date).  At most, these cases stand for the proposition that a temporary leave of absence can be a reasonable accommodation when requested by a disabled employee and based on the facts and circumstances of the particular case.  That principle does nothing to “save” Plaintiff’s specious claims.  The Court concluded that Plaintiff had failed to adequately plead/identify even the most basic of prima facie elements of a NJLAD claim, i.e., that any member alluded to in the Second Amended Complaint fell within a protected class.
[brief] 8  N.J.S.A. 13:1B-32(a), (b) ........................................................................  6  N.J.S.A. 13:1D-1 .......................................................................................  4  [...], “The Private Nondelegation Doctrine: Preventing the Delegation of Regulatory Authority to Private Parties and International Organizations”, 105 Calif. L. Rev. 539 (2017) .................................................................
[brief] To the contrary, the trial court ordered the production of 68,000 irrelevant documents (recognizing that the irrelevant documents outnumbered the relevant documents by two-to-one), many of which were known to contain highly sensitive and proprietary business information.  Da125-26 ¶ 22.  See also *Purdue Pharm. Products v. Actavis Elizabeth*, 2015 U.S. Dist. Lexis 111363, at *2* (D.N.J. Aug. 24, 2015) (recognizing party’s interest in protecting information where “revealing the confidential business information to the public and competitors to the parties to this action would injure the parties’ business interests”); *In re Gabapentin Patent Litig.*, 312 F. Supp. 2d 653, 658 (D.N.J. 2004) (“[t]he presence of trade secrets or other confidential information weighs against public access and, accordingly, documents containing such information may be protected from disclosure.
[brief] See Kimball Int’l, Inc. v. Northfield Metal Prods., 334 N.J. Super. 596, 606-07 (App. Div. 2000), certif. denied, 167 N.J. 88 (2001); see also Ali v. Rutgers, The State Univ. of N.J., 166 N.J. 280, 287-88 (2000); Cummings v. Bahr, 295 N.J. Super. 374 (App. Div. 1996).  “[A] party to litigation will not be permitted to assume inconsistent or mutually contradictory positions with respect to the same matter in the same or a successive series of suits. ”  Scarano v. Cent. R.R. Co. of N.J., 203 F.2d 510, 513 (3d Cir. 1953).  Further, judicial estoppel is a valid defense to a Spill Act claim brought by a party.
[brief] (Da20).  The police remaining on scene later learned that a bullet was lodged in defendant’s foot.  (1T7-21 to 22).  [...] directed [...] and [...] to speak with a security officer for the housing complex, to determine whether video had recorded the incident, which they did.  (1T8-5 to 8; Da20; Da23).  That process involved review of many videos from different angles; between about 2:43 a.m. and 3:00:15 a.m., [...] and private security failed to locate defendant on video.  (Dca 1, clip three.)  [...] went out to the street, reported to Sergeant [...], and returned to the courtyard of the housing complex at about 3:04:25 a.m. (Dca 1, clip three).  She then encountered [...] at about 3:04:55 a.m., and asked Gross for her identifying information.  (Dca 1, clip three).  Gross told [...] that Gross’s daughter lived in Apartment 2A, but that she was from [...].  (Dca 1, clip three, 3:05:48 a.m. to 3:05:55 a.m.).  Gross, then still not detained, began to explain what had happened.  (Dca 1, clip three, 3:06:15 a.m.).  Gross said defendant asked her to call 911 because he got shot in the foot, but she mentioned nothing about taking anything from defendant, never mind a gun.  (Dca 1, clip three, 3:06:10 a.m. to 3:07:25 a.m.).  When Officer [...] asked for Gross’s telephone number (she had a cell phone in her hand), Gross provided a number in area code 336, not the 973 area code common to Newark.  (Dca clip three, 3:07:25 a.m. to 3:08:06 a.m.).  After that, [...] thanked Gross, and allowed her to depart.
[brief] In 2015, Plaintiff, a settlement class member in this action, released the very claims he asserts here against [...] – specifically, that [...] violates the law by amending its agreements to modify the fees it charges for processing credit and debit card transactions.  Pa000084.  Yet, on August 11, 2023, Plaintiff filed the *Gannon* action in the District of New Jersey alleging those same claims.  Pa000017.  So [...] moved in October 2023 in the Superior Court of Hunterdon County—the court with exclusive jurisdiction over *Roma’s* class settlement—to reopen this case and enforce the parties’ Settlement Agreement to bar the *Gannon* action.  See Pa000011–Pa000014.  Meanwhile, the parties jointly moved to stay *Gannon*.  Order Granting Mot. to Stay, *Gannon*, No. [...], Dkt. 14.  On May 8, 2024, after briefing and argument, [...] (who presided over and approved the *Roma* settlement) granted [...]’s motions and held that Plaintiff had released his *Gannon* claims in the *Roma* settlement.  Pa000079–Pa000111.  The parties notified the *Gannon* court of the trial court’s decision.  *See Gannon*, No. [...], Dkt. 15.  On June 19, 2024, Plaintiff appealed.  Pa000001.  *Gannon* remains stayed.  **III.
[brief] ”  Blakney, 189 N.J. at 92.  In other words, there was no dispute that the officers were discussing [...]’s possible involvement in an armed robbery from the night before.  Rather, the relevant issue in dispute was the officers’ state of mind.  Defense counsel argued that the officers’ statements and testimony about the robbery showed that they made assumptions about [...], which contributed to an inadequate investigation that precluded the State from meeting its burden of proof.
[brief] “The right against self-incrimination is guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and this state’s common law, now embodied in statute, N.J.S.A. 2A:84A-19, and evidence rule, N.J.R.E. 503. ”  State v. S.S., 229 N.J. 360, 381 (2017) (quoting State v. Nyhammer, 197 N.J. 383, 399 (2009)).  See also State v. Andrews, 243 N.J. 447 (2020); State v. Muhammad, 182 N.J. 551, 567 (2005).
[directive] Extended Term of Imprisonment for Repeat Drug Offenders Charged with a Present Violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7.1 (500 Foot Drug-Free Public Park/Housing Zone)  These Guidelines and Attorney General Directive 1998-1 make clear that a prosecutor must seek an extended term under N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6f in all cases where that statute applies unless there is a basis for waiver in accordance with these Guidelines.  Technically, the second-degree crime defined in N.J.S.A.  2C:35- 7.1 (public park/housing/building zone offense) is not one of the predicate crimes expressly listed in N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6f.  (The mandatory extended term feature was part of the original Comprehensive Drug Reform Act and was adopted years before the public park/housing/building offense was enacted; this sentencing feature was never amended to incorporate the new 500 foot zone offense.)  However, the basic drug distribution-type offense defined in N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5 is always a lesser- included offense of N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7.1; one cannot violate the public park/housing/building zone offense without also violating the basic offense of manufacturing, distribution, or possessing with intent to distribute a controlled substance in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5, which offense is expressly referenced statute.7 in the extended term
[brief] 11  II.  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS, AND RULINGS BEING APPEALED  Order, filed March 1, 2024, granting Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment.  (PA303)  Order, filed April 12, 2024, denying Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration (Pa318)  III.  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES  Cases  Deberjeois v Schneider, 254 N.J. Super. 694, 703 (Law Div. 1991) ............ 7, 8 Dupree v. City of Clifton, 351 N.J. Super. 237, 246-247 (App. Div. 2002)...... 7 Estate of Hanges v. Metropolitan Property & Ca. Ins. Co., 202 N.J. 369 (2010) ................................................................. 5 Gentile v. National Newark & Essex Banking Co., 53 N.J. Super. 35 (App. Div. 1958) ........................................................................... 7 Luchejko v. City of Hoboken, 207 N.J. 191, 201 (2011) ............................................. 6 Saco v. Hall, 1 N.J. 377 (1949) ........................................................................... 6 Taggart v. Bouldin, 111 N.J.L. 464 (E. & A. 1933) ........................................... 8, 9 Other Authorities New Jersey Model Jury Charge 5.20B(2)(a)) .................................................. 9, 10 PRELIMINARY STATEMENT This appeal arises out of an incident that occurred on February 23, 2021, wherein Plaintiff-Appellant, [...], during her walk to work, was walking on the sidewalk affronting the property owned and maintained by Defendant-Respondents [...] and [...] (hereinafter referred to collectively as “Defendants”), when she suddenly slipped on ice on the sidewalk, lost her balance, and fell.
[brief] No private interest or advocacy group should be specially elevated by the Legislature to a favored status to control a regulatory agency, particularly, as in the case of the [...], having an opportunity to recommend members to constitute the majority membership of the Council with the ability to control the Council.  Even if hypothetically the [...] recommended a non-member for appointment, such as an animal rights advocate who also identifies himself or herself as a sportsmen (which would never realistically happen for the reasons discussed below), the Legislature has placed the right to effectively control the membership of the Council in the hands of a private organization in violation of the Art. III, Par. 1 and Art. IV, Sec. 1, Par. 1 of the New Jersey Constitution.
[brief] ”  *Id.*  The Court determined that the N.J.S.A. 48:7-1 municipal consent requirement does not apply to high-capacity transmission power lines, which provide electricity to multiple jurisdictions.  *Id.*  For all of these reasons, the trial court properly applied the Supreme Court’s decision in *In re [...]*, and its order granting summary judgment to [...] on preemption grounds should be affirmed.  C.  The trial court properly granted summary judgment as a matter of law.  The trial court’s determination that [...]’s Ordinance is preempted by state law ended the summary judgment inquiry and compelled the grant of summary judgment in favor of [...] on this basis alone.  Accordingly, the trial court’s Opinion and Order should not be overturned.
[brief] In accordance with a well-established principle of New Jersey law, all claims arising related to the same controversy must be joined.  R. 4:30A.  As far as liability is concerned, the survivorship and wrongful death claim are likely to be identical in this case.  Only the damages will differ.  By allowing one claim to be tried by a jury and the other claim to be arbitrated, the Court would risk inconsistent and contradictory rulings from arising as to the very same facts at the same standard of proof.  B.
[directive] The identification and examination of collateral issues is critically important to the internal affairs process.  Internal affairs investigators are in the unique position of examining law enforcement operations from the inside.  Their insight, if properly used, can be extremely helpful to management.  In contrast, the failure to use this resource can deprive the law enforcement agency of the ability to identify and correct problems with personnel and procedures through self-critical analysis.  It can also lead to an erosion of community support for the agency.  An internal affairs process that is objective and complete is critical to the credibility and reputation of the law enforcement agency within the community.  INTERNAL AFFAIRS POLICY & PROCEDURES | November 2022 44  8
[brief] It bears repeating that the DEP is required to construe the exemption from the Act narrowly, in favor of a precautionary approach towards the legislative intent.  If the Project will enable further sprawling development in and around the Highlands region then the DEP should have scrutinized that issue with regard to the legislative scheme for proper planning purposes, rather than allowing the development to move forward without specifically addressing the legislature’s concerns.  The RMP clearly requires an in-depth proactive planning approach towards developments of this size and scope in the Preservation area, rather than just allowing them via an exemption.
[brief] (Pa50-Pa52)  Plaintiff retained the undersigned to represent her in January 2020, approximately eight (8) months after the incident took place at [...]’s store.  (Pa198-Pa200)  Plaintiff, in her certified answers to interrogatories, states that [...] had video of [...]’s filled U-boat, though no video of the actual moment of contact.  (Pa9)  [...], in its certified answers to interrogatories, provided various documents, along with color photographs taken of Plaintiff and the overloaded U-boat on the date of incident, but failed to mention that video surveillance footage existed on the date of incident and that no efforts were made to retain and preserve such footage.  (Pa143-Pa197)  During the course of discovery, on September 2, 2022, the undersigned sent a letter to [...], counsel for [...], informing him that [...]’s answers to interrogatories deny the existence of a surveillance tape regarding the incident, despite Plaintiff’s deposition testimony refuting such claims.  (Pa201)  Plaintiffs requested that they be provided with a copy of the surveillance footage, but Plaintiffs were subsequently informed that such surveillance footage had not been preserved.  (Pa201)  **PROCEDURAL HISTORY**
[brief] October 20, 2021 and November 24, 2021.  He also provided testimony with respect to his opinions at a 104 Hearing on May 9, 2022.  (See Pa0027; Pa0239; 3T).  23.  [...] testified that he possessed no information memorializing any prior accidents in the area of Plaintiff’s accident; he did not perform any calculations concerning the physical forces associated with the accident, nor did he inspect the motorcycle following the accident.
[brief] Cuff, 239 N.J. 321.  On January 24, 2020, following briefing, [...] resentenced defendant in accordance with the New Jersey Supreme Court’s remand.  (20T, Da192-96).  After running some sentences concurrent, rather than consecutive, and reducing the term of one of the sentences, the trial court resentenced defendant to an aggregate of 70 years with 57.9 years to be served without parole.  (20T71-21 to 72-21).  On December 8, 2020, the New Jersey Supreme Court issued an order relinquishing jurisdiction and providing that any challenge to the sentence imposed on remand could be filed with the Appellate Division.  (See Da204).  On March 31, 2022, this Court affirmed defendant’s new sentence.
[brief] [259A]  The mere fact that the [...] acquiesced to the proposal does not mean that the redeveloper does not have to comply with the Borough’s Zoning Ordinances.  The Court should also be aware that the Ordinance which the Redeveloper now objects to, namely Ordinance 290-68 C (2), was actually the product of recommendations by both the Borough and the Redeveloper, which were made after the redeveloper was chosen and after the redevelopment agreement was executed.
[brief] The Court addressed Medpay benefits and stated:  Here, it is clear the statute does not expressly cover Med-Pay benefits.  We note that the Legislature recently revisited the statute and made amendments in 2003.  However, the Legislature made no provisions for Med- Pay under the amended version of the collateral source rule.  The Legislature was put on notice of the Court's interpretation that Med-Pay benefits did not fall within the purview of the collateral source statute by its 1994 decision in Ingersoll.
[brief] Defendant’s Miranda Waiver and Statement as a Whole Were Not Voluntary.  To admit a defendant’s custodial statement at trial, the State must establish beyond a reasonable doubt that he knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights.  State v. L.H., 239 N.J. 22, 42 (2019).  Due process separately requires the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the statement itself was voluntary and not the product of coercion.\(^{17}\) Id. at 42; State \(^{59}\) (App. Div. 2015).  That case does not hold that a suspect’s response to continued police questioning after invoking his rights constitutes reinitiating, nor that he must make a specific request to “cease questioning. ”  Unlike here, the suspect in Faucette “never invoked his right” in the first place.  Id. at 258-59.  \(^{17}\)  Because [...]’s voluntariness challenge is also based in due process, suppression is required regardless of his custody status for Miranda purposes.
[brief] In his two separate depositions, plaintiff testified that before the [...] bought their property, stormwater runoff from the driveway on [...] damaged his property..................................................................................................................  5  C.  Plaintiff adjudicated his property-damage suit against the [...] through binding arbitration..................................................................................................................  6  II.  In the Dwyer Action, plaintiff alleged in part that stormwater runoff from the driveway on [...] damaged his property and that the [...] trespassed onto his property...........................................
[brief] When [...] signed the consent form, she had already been released from a brief detention, of about twelve minutes.  Any possible coercion arising from her short arrest period had dissipated by the time – about a quarter of an hour later – that the Consent to Search form was read to her, in a familiar place, among persons known to her.  Any remaining pressure was further diminished by the words appearing on the form and read to [...], especially the form’s reminder that she had the right to refuse consent.  But she gave no indication of reversing her earlier decision to cooperate with police.  Whether consent has been validly made is assessed by the totality of the circumstances.
[directive] As multas compulsórias são as seguintes:  The mandatory penalties are as follows:  $ 500 crime/1st 1º Offense $ 750 crime/2nd 2º Offense  $ 1.000 subsequente/3rd 3º ou crime or Subsequent offense total/Total $  Multa  Penalty no Formulário promulgado pela diretiva 01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 11168-Portuguese página 1 de 2 Form Promulgated by Directive #01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 11168- Portuguese página 1 de 2 3.  Você entende que se você se declarar culpado por mais de um crime referente a roubo de [Sim/Yes] [Não/No] automóvel ou apropriação ilícita de veículo motorizado as suspensões da carteira de habilitação e as multas compulsórias podem ser consecutivas?  Do you understand that if you plead guilty to more than one theft of an automobile or unlawful taking of a motor vehicle that the license forfeitures and mandatory penalties imposed can be consecutive to each other?