ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] **MUNICIPAL COURT PREPARATION FOR N.J.S.A. 2C:33-2A(1)**  On May 5, 2022, defendant contacted New Jersey Office of Attorney Ethics requesting a historical list of Prosecutors presiding over the defendant’s case, complaint process in efforts to ensure all documents were sent.  The actual filing Prosecutor was [...], however there were multiple changes and without knowledge to the defendant.  On same day, the defendant receives a zoom hearing notice by email captioned, **5/10/2022 Burlington City/Twp. Municipal Court, State vs. [...]**\(^8\).  On May 7, 2022, defendant sends the same letter furthering the motion to dismiss relating to the sadism event mentioned in defendant’s current Appellate cases and adjournment request to Burlington Municipal Court.  The defendant reaches out to confirm the status of the matter and current Prosecutor as of May 9, 2022.  The Supervisor of Screening/Grand Jury Unit of Burlington County’s Prosecutor’s Office informs the defendant, [...] downgraded the defendant’s case to the Municipal Court with a new Prosecutor out of Camden County, [...].
[brief] See U.S. ex rel. Zizic v. Q2Administrators, LLC, 728 F.3d 228, 232 n.3 (3d Cir. 2013) (holding that the public disclosure bar amendment “is not retroactively applicable to pending cases like” plaintiff’s asserting federal FCA claims from 2005 to present); see also Judd, 638 F. App’x at 165 (“There is no indication . . . that Congress intended to make the amendments to the public disclosure bar retroactive.
[brief] (6T 97:19 to 99:8).  As a result, [...] was made the sole franchisee of [...] as of January 22, 2014, giving [...] full authority to develop the franchise.  (Sa130-189).  On April 9, 2014, [...] paid the initial franchise fee to [...] Franchising, Inc. in the amount of thirty thousand dollars ($30,000.00).  (Sa211).  That agreement was renewed on May 7, 2015.
[brief] C.  The Consideration of the EIA Was Not Waived Or Deferred by the Board.  The Board argues that the Environmental Impact Assessment (“EIA”) was waived and/or deferred to review during the site plan.  (BDb11).  Applicant makes a similar argument that a review of the EIA was deferred by the Board.  (ADb16-ADb17).  This is not supported by the record.  The Board’s citation to the transcript of the hearing does not show the Board deferring consideration of the EIA to the Site Plan.  The citation was to the Applicant’s engineer testifying on the subdivision application.  (1T33-1 to 1T34-25).  Applicant does not provide any citations to support this argument, because there is none.  Nowhere in the transcript is there a decision by the Board to waive or defer discussion relating to the EIA.  (See 1T).  The resolution does not show a decision by the Board to waive or defer discussion relating to the EIA.  (Pa245-Pa253).  There was never any waiver or deferral of the EIA.  Furthermore, Defendants misstate the ordinance and leave out the most important part.  “The appropriate Board, upon recommendation of the Environmental Commission, may waive any [requirement of the EIA], if deemed not applicable. ” ([...] Ordinance 142-77(B)(26)(g); Pa261) (emphasis added).  There is nothing in the record that shows any recommendation by the Environmental Commission to waive any provision of the EIA.  Therefore, any waiver or deferral was inappropriately granted.  For these reasons, the Board’s approval of the application for preliminary and final major subdivision approval was arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable, and must be reversed and remanded for further proceedings.
[brief] Addendum A – Appraiser Qualifications ..............................................Pa 151  Addendum B – [...] Specialty Practice Brochure .................................Pa156  Hearing Exhibit A-27 – Emergency Generator and Trash Compactor Sound Study prepared by [...], dated September 15, 2020 ........................................................................Pa161  Appendix A – Sound Measurement Technology .....................................Pa166  Appendix B – Manufacturer’s Sound Data ..............................................Pa170  Hearing Exhibit A-33 – Revised Architectural Plans prepared by [...], dated March 12, 2021 .................................................................Pa172  Hearing Exhibit A-40 – Revised Planning Report prepared by [...], last revised May 10, 2021 ........................................................................Pa180  Hearing Exhibit A-45 – [...] Powerpoint Presentation ..............Pa226  Hearing Exhibit A-46 – Revised Site Plan Layout C-301, prepared by [...], last revised June 29, 2021 ..............................................Pa256  Board Engineer Review Letter, dated April 17, 2020 ..............................Pa257  Board Engineer Review Letter, dated July 28, 2020 ..............................Pa265 Board Engineer Review Letter, dated April 3, 2021 ..............................Pa272 [...] Land Use and Development Ordinance (excerpt) ..................................................................................Pa278 Letter of [...], dated July 9, 2022 ......................................Pa348 Complaint in Lieu of Prerogative Writs filed by [...], September 17, 2022
[brief] The Applicant sought approval for seventeen residential units, to be contained in three buildings.  See 1T33-8 to 1T33-17 ([...]).  Several variances were sought.  (At Pa49, the trial court incorrectly states that a "use" variance was requested).  For multifamily residential use, Borough Ordinance Sec. 246-36B(2)(b)[1] requires a minimum of 1,200 sf per unit.  Developing seventeen units would result in 1,062 sf per unit.  See 1T37-19 to 1T37-21 ([...]).  According to Mr. [...], "[t]he most obvious problems" associated with excess density "would be traffic and parking" (1T40-13 to 1T40-14).  [...] claimed that the Applicant "mitigated those issues" by providing two parking spaces per unit "per the Borough ordinance" (1T40-14 to 1T40-17).  However, that off-street parking is not for the public but for the private residents; the complex would replace an off-street parking lot used by the public (including persons enjoying the boardwalk and beach on the other side of Ocean Terrace).
[brief] Plaintiff filed his complaint with the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Passaic County, on November 17, 2021.  (Ra1; Pa68.)  The following day, the Court issued a Track Assignment Notice, assigning it to Track 2 for 300 days of discovery.  (Ra8.)  The original discovery end date was October 11, 2022.  (Ra1.)  Defendant, [...], filed its Answer on January 28, 2022.
[brief] In *State v. Mirault*, for instance, a returning homeowner called police from outside her home after noticing that her front door was ajar and the molding was torn off.  92 N.J. at 456.  The responding officer entered the home to investigate and engaged in a violent struggle with the defendant, who was committing a theft inside.  *Ibid.*  The Supreme Court held that the defendant used force against the officer “in the course of committing a theft” because the theft and assault “were clearly part of a continuous transaction.
[brief] The Defendant’s appeal should be rejected.  III.  THE JURY’S CONCLUSION THAT THE DEFENDANT’S ACTIONS WERE PALPABLY UNREASONABLE IS SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE.  While there is no appeal concerning the Court’s instructions relating to the concept “palpably unreasonable” and the Jury's conclusion in that regard, the evidence concerning the Defendant's actions supported the Jury’s conclusion that the Appellant’s actions were probably unreasonable.  The long-standing rule is as follows, “whether or not a public entity’s actions were palpably unreasonable is a jury question... except in cases where reasonable men could not differ. ”  May v. Atlantic City Hilton, 128 F. Supp. 2d 195, 202 (D. N.J. 2000) (quoting, Polyard Terry, 148 N.J. Super. 202, 208 (Law D. 1977) (summary judgment for the city was precluded when plaintiff raised a “credible inference” of palpable unreasonableness when plaintiff presented evidence that the city ignored recognized safety standards in the construction and maintenance of a handicap ramp).  The evidence here included: - It was a dark road [5T52:17to 53:6]; - The height of the overpass was less than 14 feet six inches [5T63:14-17]; - A New Jersey Statute required that the height of the overpass was to be marked on the overpass, but this was not done [4T150:1to 152:6 & 5T4:10-13]; - A New Jersey Statute required that the Defendant place a sign at the last point where a truck driver could detour around the low over pass warning that a low over pass was on the route, but this was not done [Id.]; - The top of the overpass in the Plaintiff’s direction of travel was deformed from vehicles/objects striking it [5T62:3 to 63:20 & 66:21 to 67:18 & see Pa14-16]; - The top of the overpass on the other side of the overpass where there was a low overpass warning sign was not deformed.  [Id.] and; - The dark road has no curbs and there were several work orders showing the sign placed on the road (by statute a sign should have been on the overpass and at the last opportunity for a driver to detour around the low overpass), showing the sign was not properly placed and not properly maintained [5T4:15 to 23:17 & 5T35:6-10 & Pa14-16].  The jury was charged concerning the meaning of the palpably unreasonable requirement and by jury interrogatory was specifically asked if the [...] acted palpably unreasonable and the jury said that it did.  The Trial Court was correct.  [8T17:18-24].  Accordingly, the Defendant’s appeal should be denied.
[brief] As to the first, this was the second sentencing proceeding in this case, and the judge relied on previous findings by both the original sentencing judge and this Court on direct appeal.  There was nothing wrong with her doing so.  The original sentencing judge’s conclusions were supported by the trial record, as this Court conclusively determined, and so there was no need to re-sentence defendant on a blank slate.  Of course, the re-sentencing judge had to consider things the first judge did not—the Miller factors and new mitigating factor (14)—and she did.  Defendant is just displeased with the result.  So too with the second.  Distilled to its essence, defendant’s entire brief on appeal is simply a request that this Court second-guess the sentencing judge’s conclusion and replace it with what defendant hopes this Court’s will be.  In other words, while [...] did consider each of the Miller factors and new mitigating factor (14), as she was required to do, and notwithstanding that she did so to the ultimate benefit of defendant in the form of a lower sentence, she should have, in defendant’s estimation, gone lower.  Defendant is entitled to that opinion, but again, defendant’s displeasure with the result does not equate to an abuse of discretion warranting reversal.  So, this Court should affirm defendant’s new, shorter sentence.
[brief] The undisputed material fact that the trial court properly analyzed was the defendant’s conduct in compelling non-management employees to park in an area farther from the hospital entrance than others were permitted to park.  Second, there is nothing in the record to show that the defendant knew that additional safeguards needed to be placed in the non-management employee parking area.  In the depositions taken of the defendant corporate representatives, none were ever asked about this.  See, Pa499-Pa644, Deposition Transcript of [...].  See, Da88-Da109, Deposition Transcript of [...].  See, Da110-Da135, Deposition Transcript of [...].  Likewise, none of the non-management employees ever testified that they felt they had to walk an inordinate distance from the parking area to the hospital entrance, or that they felt like second-class citizens.  See, Pa300-Pa370, Deposition Transcript of [...].  See also, Pa790-Pa900, Deposition Transcript of [...].  Accordingly, subjectively characterizing something as “distant” and “expansive” does not make it so.
[brief] [...]  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE  DIVISION  Docket No. [...] ([...])  [...] [...], [...], [...], [...], (For Continuation of Caption  See Inside Cover)  Submission Date: August 6, 2024  On Appeal from an Interlocutory Order of the Superior Court Law Division, Complex Business Litigation Part, Gloucester County dated September 12, 2023  Sat Below: Hon. [...], J.S.C. Trial Court  Docket No. [...]  APPENDIX OF UNPUBLISHED CASES AND WEB PAGES TO BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE  LAWYERS FOR CIVIL JUSTICE IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS
[brief] (Da127).  At the time of [...]’s passing, in June of 2017, [...] had been living with [...] for approximately 12 years.  (Da127).  [...] did not know that [...] was not in [...]’s office when [...] signed the Will.  (Da126).  [...] did not know that [...] did not take [...] to Riccardi’s office to sign a Will.  (Da126).  [...] was not aware of the fact that the Will that was being challenged was the March 5, 2014 Will, which was signed four years after [...]’s surgery in 2010.
[directive] (preencher somente se o crime ocorreu antes de 14 de 4. a)  Supervisão comunitária vitalícia janeiro de 2004).  (Se o crime ocorreu em 14 de janeiro de 2004 ou após esta data, o réu deverá responder à Pergunta 4b, Supervisão vitalícia de liberdade condicional). (only complete if the offense occurred before January 14, 2004). (If the Community Supervision for Life offense occurred on or after January 14, 2004, the defendant should complete Question 4b, Parole Supervision for Life).
[brief] 9  N.J.S.A. 18A:7F–52(a) ..................................................................................................................10, 11, 16  N.J.S.A. 18A:7F–52-53 ..................................................................................................................10  N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-58..........................................................................................................................12  N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-58(b) ..................................................................................................................17  N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-59..........................................................................................................................20  N.J.S.A. 18A:7G-1 to -48 ..............................................................................................................2  N.J.S.A. 18A:7G-2(c) ....................................................................................................................8  N.J.S.A. 40:48C-15.......................................................................................................................18, 19  OTHER AUTHORITIES
[brief] Clearly, the conduct complained of in this matter (and in which the jury found to exist) happened not simply because of negligent supervision but based on actual participation and/or deliberate indifference on the part of [...] and [...].  In light of Defendants’ concession that these two positions constitute upper management (see Db at p. 31), there can be little doubt that there is sufficient evidence of egregious upper management conduct to justify an award for punitive damages.
[brief] A HUD-1 Settlement Statement (the “HUD-1”) executed in connection with [...]’s purchase includes a line item for “Payoff of Mortgage to [...]” (Line 504) in the amount of $177,276.75.  (Pa185 at ¶5 & Pa198).  The HUD-1 also includes a line item for “Per Diem Interest for Mortgage Loan Payoff (18 days)” (Line 505) in the amount of $549.54, as well as an “Escrow hold – payoff” (Line 506) in the amount of $500.00.  (Id.)  Notably, the payoff amount listed on the HUD-1 (Line 504) matched the payoff amount listed on the Rushmore Loan Payoff Statement dated April 9, 2021, exclusive of the per diem interest (the “Payoff Statement”).  (Pa198 & Pa201).  Rushmore’s \(^2\)
[directive] These restrictions are in most instances comparable to the current restrictions imposed on the use of less-lethal ammunition, but are adapted in this supplemental policy to address the unique characteristics, practical utility, and potential for abuse of conducted energy devices.  In certain circumstances, such as when a conducted energy device is directed against a person who is restrained by handcuffs, or when the device is used in “drive stun mode” (i.e., held in direct physical contact with the suspect rather than being fired from a distance), this policy imposes additional restrictions that are comparable to those that apply to the use of deadly force.  4.
[brief] Finally, even the fees charged by the [...] for its subscription services are subject to review and approval by the [...].  See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 78o-4(b)(2)(J), 78o-4(b)(3)(B)(ii); [...] Notice 2011-25, Fee Change for Historical Transaction Data Product (Apr. 27, 2011) (available here).  There is no news media that must ask the government for permission to raise prices.
[brief] NO decision was made or NO thought was given, prior to receiving the trial court records on 9/15/2023, to challenge the validity of the Final Judgement by Default granted on 5/4/2015; to assert to this court, otherwise, is simply FALSE.  POINT  1.  THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT  There are two (2) defendants in this case that are considered by law separate entities with equal rights under the law.  A Final Judgment by Default was ordered by the Court against both defendants.  The defendant, [...] was the “Borrower” of the Business Line of Credit with [...] and [...] was the personal “Guarantor.
[brief] “Abandoned” means “to give up with the intent of never again claiming a right or interest in…”  https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/abandon, last visited 11/15/2024.  By contrast, “discontinue” means to “break the continuing of: cease to operate … [or] use…”  https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/discontinue, last visited 11/15/2024.  By conflating abandonment and discontinuance of use, the Trial Court’s legal analysis violated the admonition to avoid interpretations that “‘render any language inoperative, superfluous, void[,] or insignificant. ’”  Sanchez v. Fitness Factory Edgewater, LLC, 242 N.J. 252, 261 (2020).  If “discontinuance of use” was meant to be equivalent to abandonment, the Legislature would not have identified abandonment as a separate basis for designation under criterion (b).  By interpreting “discontinuance of use” to be equivalent to abandonment, it renders one of those two provisions superfluous and insignificant.
[brief] [...], A MINOR, BY HIS GUARDIAN AD LITEM PENNYANNE SIMONS-JACKSON IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT  ALEX BROWN-ESKENGREN’S MOTIONS (1) FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL AND (2) FOR A STAY [...]  [...] [...]  Attorneys for Plaintiff [...] Of Counsel and On the Brief: [...], Esq.  (Atty. ID No. 001321996)  Date of Submission: 8/18/2024  #  TABLE OF CONTENTS | Section | Page | |------------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | TABLE OF APPENDIX (Pa1-Pa11) | iii | | TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS, AND RULINGS | iv | | BEING APPEALED | | | TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | v | | PRELIMINARY STATEMENT | 1 | | STATEMENT OF PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL HISTORY | 3 | | A. The May 21, 2024 Attack And Beating Of Minor Plaintiff [...] | 3 | | B. The Claims Set Forth In Plaintiff’s Complaint | 4 | | C. The Criminal Charges Against Defendants [...] And [...] | 5 | | D. [...]’s Sworn Statements At The Time Of His Guilty Plea | 5 | | E. [...] Is Admitted To PTI And Confirms That His Guilty Plea Was Not Conditioned On Receiving A Civil Reservation | 8 | | F. [...]’s Legal Representation In This Civil Matter | 9 | | G. [...] Contradicts His Prior Testimony During His Deposition | 10 | | H. The Trial Court’s Telephonic May 13, 2024 Ruling | 12 | | I.
[directive] 3.  ¿Entiende que si se determina que usted es una persona que depende de drogas y si usted por otra parte reúne las condiciones necesarias para la libertad a prueba especial según 2C:35-14, entonces como resultado de esta declaración de culpabilidad se le N.J.S.A. considerará “una persona que necesita tratamiento” que reúne las condiciones necesarias para que le impongan una condena de un período obligatorio de libertad a prueba especial con el propósito de que participe en un programa de tratamiento contra drogas supervisado por el tribunal (“Tribunal de Drogas”)?  Do you understand that if you are found to be a drug dependent person and if you are otherwise eligible for special probation under 2C:35-14, then as a result of this guilty plea you will be deemed “a N.J.S.A. person in need of treatment” who is eligible to be sentenced to a mandatory period of special probation for the purpose of participating in a court-supervised drug treatment program (“Drug Court”)?  [Sí/Yes]  [No/No]
[brief] Defendant, [...], retained [...] as an expert witness in this matter.  Mr. Moskowitz prepared a report dated, April 19, 2018; he was deposed on April 9, 2019.  Pa2805.  Mr. Moskowitz opined in his report that “[...] entered into a contract with [...] for construction oversight of this project, which sets forth the duties and obligations of [...].  [...], in turn, subcontracted with [...] to have [...] provide some of these construction oversight services. ”  Pa2769.  Mr. Moskowitz opined that “[...] delegated the responsibility of oversight of this project to [...] and [...].
[brief] The Trial Court improperly granted summary judgment by making numerous inferences that favored Defendants rather than granting all reasonable factual inferences to Plaintiff.  Here, the Motion Court strayed from the Brill standard by accepting Defendants' narrative without allowing Plaintiff the entitled benefit of the doubt in several key areas and in connection with each CEPA prong.  First, the Trial Court minimized the severity of Defendant [...]'s actions both before and during the June 2020 incident and failed to analyze it under the harassment statute, describing it as “just disagreements within the workplace, not very nice, uncomfortable disagreements” (T33-5).  However, Plaintiff’s belief that the conduct was unlawful should have been viewed through the lens of a reasonable employee, and the plain language of the statute.  A jury could reasonably infer that Defendant [...]'s conduct – berating people in close proximity, using profanity, slamming doors and file cabinets – created a work environment that violated the plain language of the harassment statute.  The Trial Court also improperly weighed the veracity of the testimony by Plaintiff, [...], and [...], stating “Yes, of course, in their depositions they’re going to say well we felt that this was harassment.” (T28-13).  This statement indicates that the court dismissed this testimony, treating it as self-serving rather than viewing it in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.  The Trial Court’s decision also relied on the absence of corroborating testimony from other staff regarding Defendant [...]’s approval of charge pay and its own interpretations of Defendant [...]’s actions and motives.