ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Appellant’s claims are woefully flawed.  First and foremost, the Planning Board, the body that is the author of the Township Master Plan, did not conclude that Ordinance 2022-15 was inconsistent with the Township Master Plan.  So what Appellant is actually arguing is that the Committee should have: (i) rejected the findings and recommendations of its Planning Board (which was supported by expert testimony); (ii) independently concluded that Ordinance 2022-15 was inconsistent with the Township Master (despite the Redevelopment Law vesting that function with the Planning Board); and (iii) articulated the reasons for proceeding in the face of inconsistencies (which were not actually identified by the Planning Board).  Of course, the Appellant points to no case law to establish such a process or requirement, as Appellant’s argument is baseless.  Yet despite not being statutorily required to set forth its reasons for proceeding with the adoption of the Redevelopment Plan, upon the Appellant’s objection to Ordinance 2022-15, it became clear that Appellant would likely challenge Ordinance 2022-15 and, as a basis for such a challenge, claim that the Redevelopment Plan was inconsistent with the Master Plan.  So as to make clear to both the Appellant and the public that it was intent on proceeding with adoption of the Redevelopment Plan, the Committee introduced and adopted Ordinance 2022-17 which both incorporated certain amendments to the Redevelopment Plan, and also set forth the Committee’s “reasons” for adopting the plan.
[brief] In their presentation below, Defendants used a clever ellipsis relevant to the definition of “Released Claims” at ¶1.29 (Pa0042) to make it appear that the 2015 Settlement goes so far as to encompass future claims “that relate to” the [...] matter.  (See H14:20-H15:6).  Defendant’s surgical manipulation of the language of ¶1.29 is wholly at odds with the Settlement’s purpose statement at ¶2.1, clearly limiting the 2015 Settlement to claims “that were or could have been raised against [...] in the Settled Action.
[brief] ”  Id. at 30, ; see also State v. Nishina, 175 N.J. 502, 514-15 (2003) (stating that “[u]nder Terry … an officer is permitted to pat down a citizen's outer clothing when the officer ‘has reason to believe that he is dealing with an armed and dangerous individual, regardless of whether he has probable cause to arrest the individual for a crime. ’ ” (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 27)).  The protective search must be “confined in scope to an intrusion reasonably designed to discover guns, knives, clubs, or other hidden instruments for the assault of the police officer. ””  Carillo, 469 N.J. Super. 318 (App. Div. 2021); State v. Jackson, 276 N.J. Super. 623, 629 (App. Div. 1994) (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 29).
[brief] CONCLUSION  Based on the foregoing reasons and the authorities cited in support thereof, the State respectfully requests that this Court affirm the trial court’s order denying defendant’s motion to dismiss the complaint.  Respectfully submitted, [...]  [...]  By: [...]  First Assistant [...] NJ  Attorney ID No. 021342012  [...] OF COUNSEL AND ON THE BRIEF  Dated: February 6, 2025 c: [...], Esq.
[brief] Review of the sergeant’s actual testimony on this point makes clear that this opinion was not offered based on the video, but on the sergeant’s own view of the room during his investigation:  Q: What’s in the tool room?  A: Various tools.  Q: Have you seen this tool room?  A: I have.  Q: Close in time to this incident?  A: Yes.  Q: How close?  A: When I initially responded.  Q: Okay, so the day of?  A: Yes.  Q: Was it well organized would you say?  A: Not so much.  Q: What do you mean?  A: Everything didn’t have its own place but there was stuff, you know, where it was – if you were looking – if you knew what was supposed to be there and where it was supposed to be, you would know where it is.  It wasn’t organized to what I would consider my standards.  (9T:32-5 to 32-21).
[brief] Moreover, when Respondents submitted the Certification for *in-camera* review, Appellants did object by letter and included an objection in their supplemental brief.  They did not file a motion seeking to bar submission of the Certification for *in-camera* review.  The Court did review [...] and concluded that *in-camera* review was appropriate.  (T4:13-25).  Most significantly, now Appellants argue, for the first time, that *in-camera* review of the Certification was a denial of due process.  Arguments raised for the first time on appeal should not be given any consideration.
[brief] ............................................................................ passim Schmitt v. NIC Ins. Co., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81411 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 1, 2007)  .......................... 32, 34 Sherwood v. Kelido, Inc., 2009 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1505 (App. Div.2009), certif. denied 200 N.J. 367 .................................................................. 37, 38 Standard Fire Ins. Co. v. Spectrum Community Assoc., 141 Cal. App. 4th 1117 (Cal. App. 2006)  .............................................
[brief] Furthermore, in contrast to the tort of negligent training and supervision, which has been developed in the common law since \textit{Di Cosala} to address foreseeable harms arising from the potentially dangerous characteristics of an employee, § 317 of the Restatement describes a theory of premises liability based on an employer’s duty to police its premises and prevent harmful misuse of its property.  See cmt. b to § 317 (“A master is required to police his own premises . . . to the extent of using reasonable care to exercise his authority as a master to prevent his servant from doing \textsuperscript{17}  Thus to the extent the tort of negligent hiring, training, or supervision reflects the Supreme Court’s adoption of § 317, the Restatement standard undermines the arguments set forth in Section III(B)(2) of Plaintiffs brief [Pb 35-38].  harm to others.  . . .  Thus, a factory owner is required to exercise his authority as master to prevent his servants, while in the factory yard during the lunch hour, from indulging in games involving an unreasonable risk of harm to persons outside the factory premises. ”).
[brief] ”  Gonzalez, 207 N.J. at 577-78 (citing Jefferson Loan Co., Inc. v. Session, 397 N.J. Super. 520, 538 (App. Div. 2008)).  The holding in Gonzalez is purposefully broad and there is no indication that the New Jersey Supreme Court intended to narrow the holding in Gonzalez based on facts specific to that case.  Despite being decided two years after Gonzalez, [...] does not analyze or even mention the holding in Gonzalez, but rather, cites Chulsky v. Hudson Law Offices, P.C., 777 F. Supp. 2d 823, 848 (D.N.J. 2011), and Joe Hand Promotions, Inc. v. Mills, 567 F. Supp. 2d 719, 723-24 (D.N.J. 2008).  See [...], 430 N.J. Super. at 339.  [...] does not provide any insight as to the reasoning for citing two federal district court cases (as opposed to a later-decided binding case from the New Jersey Supreme Court) when interpreting the application of the CFA—an issue of state law.  Axiomatic principles of jurisprudence dictate that [...] should have looked to the reasoning in Gonzalez, because “a federal court's decision on a question of New Jersey law is not binding on any court in this State. ”  Mathiesen v. Moleski, No. A-0365-10T3, 2011 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2187, at *26 (App. Div. Aug. 12, 2011) (quoting Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules, Comment 3.5 on R. 1:36 (2011)); see also Dewey v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 121 N.J. 69, 80 (1990); Shaw v. City of Jersey City, 346 N.J. Super. 219, 229 (App. Div. 2002), rev'd on other grounds, 174 N.J. 567 (2002).
[directive] An illegal sentence, particularly in a DWI or DWI refusal matter, can be corrected at any time.  State v. Nicolai, 287 N.J. Super. 528, 531-2 (App. Div. 1996), disapproving State v. Decher, 196 N.J. Super. 157 (Law Div. 1984).  See, State v. Burroughs, 349 N.J. Super. 225, 227-8 (App. Div. 2002).  The Supreme Court Guidelines for Plea Agreements, permits, with the consent of the prosecutor, that a DWI refusal can be dismissed in exchange for a guilty plea to a DWI offense.  But, those provisions apply only to a dismissal of a DWI refusal (N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.2a) accompanied by a plea of guilty to the underlying DWI (N.J.S.A. 39:4-50) offense, and do not otherwise contradict or nullify the other statutory requirements regarding non-merger of sentences.  In addition, sentences for second or subsequent DWI refusal convictions must run consecutively to any other sentence.  The Legislative intent for the enhanced sentencing for DWI refusal is intentional.  State v. Tekel, 281 N.J. Super. 502, 507 (App. Div. 1995); State v. Fielding, 290 N.J. Super. 191, 193-4 (App. Div. 1996); State v. Widmaier, 157 N.J. at 488.  Finally, in those cases where a defendant is subject to the enhanced penalties as a second, third or subsequent offender, any challenge to the defendant’s prior convictions can only be made in the Court where the prior conviction was entered.
[brief] [(3T11:8–21, 12:24–13:9.)]  In light of the pending First Appellate Action, the trial court dismissed [...]’s Complaint without prejudice due to lack of jurisdiction, concluding that “[d]epending on the Appellate Division ruling, [the] entire controversy doctrine would apply. ”  (3T44:4–5.)  The trial court stated:  So if the Appellate Division rules on a strict procedural rule that [...] was correct, there was no open case; therefore, the second case couldn’t be filed, then after that Decision the plaintiff can refile a second Complaint and can come in front of the Court on that bad faith argument only.  Now if the Appellate Division rules that [...] was correct, the . . . Motion to Amend the second Complaint was properly denied for some other reason, well then the plaintiff will be barred from filing the second Complaint.  So that’s the reason why I’m doing it.  So since that issue is up on appeal in front of the Appellate Division, I am buying the movant’s argument that *I don’t have any jurisdiction at this time on this Complaint to let this case proceed.*  We have to wait to see what the Appellate Division will do.  [(3T42:16–43:8 (emphasis added).)]  The trial court made clear that [...]’s bad faith claim against Defendants would turn on whether the claim would be barred by the entire controversy doctrine.  (3T43:24–44:22.)
[brief] Defendant elaborated on the details of his restitution plan during his sentencing allocution:  I just prequalified for [...], so I got a – we just got to finalize it for schooling, but as soon as I get through that, that I see – I see as a real way with a light at the end of the tunnel.  Once I get into the schooling, my wife and I can switch [childcare responsibilities].  She could downgrade her hours so that I can start working.  But, you know, it will take a little while before that can happen …  Like I said, with trucking school, I could see a real – a way forward, getting everything paid, fulfilling all the obligations, whatever you determine they are.  (13T:8-17 to 9-8) (emphasis added).
[brief] Following the hearing on the matter, the court issued an order and oral decision rejecting defendant’s motion to suppress items seized during the automobile search and partially rejecting his motion to suppress his oral statements.  As a starting point, the court found the officer’s testimony credible and consistent with the body-camera footage.  (2T5-2 to 13).  The court found that the officer conducted a lawful stop based on reasonable suspicion after he witnessed defendant conduct an illegal U-turn on Route 46.  (2T11-13 to 23).  The court found that the officer’s subsequent observations of defendant’s nervousness, trembling, and constricted pupils established reasonable suspicion that defendant was under the influence of narcotics and justified a more intrusive line of questioning.  (2T13-12 to 20).  Once defendant indicated that there were drugs in the car, the officer had probable cause to conduct an automobile search under State v. Witt, 223 N.J. 409 (2015).  (2T15-7 to 15).
[brief] ’”  *Akhtar v. JDN Properties at Florham Park, LLC*, 439 N.J. Super. 391, 399 (App. Div. 2015).  “Thus, a trier of fact ‘is free to weigh the evidence and to reject the testimony of a witness, even though not directly contradicted, when it . . . contains inherent probabilities or contradictions which alone or in connection with other circumstances in evidence excite suspicion as to its truth. ’” *D’Amato by McPherson v. D’Amato*, 305 N.J. Super. 109, 115 (App. Div. 1997) (alterations in original); see also *Panko v. Grimes*, 40 N.J. Super. 588, 594 (App. Div. 1956) (“Where the particular circumstances reasonably give rise to conflicting inferences as to testimonial trustworthiness, the evidence is not conclusive merely because it is uncontradicted by direct testimony”).
[brief] Even [...] was very hesitant not only to apply Iqbal but also Heck to LAD claims.  (“I’m not convinced though that Heck would bar the LAD claim. ”  1T-50-1-2.)  Even if the two Iqbal attempts do “count,” the New Jersey SAC is still only a third try to make a complex complaint, with an 10 (or 14, with prior retaliations) or more-year history of disability harassment, understandable to judges who have never experienced anything remotely close to such harassment.  Bottom line, the Defendants removed the case “to Iqbal” the Complaint.  The fact is they partly succeeded (Federal actions dismissed by consent).
[brief] Likewise, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 59:7-2 neither a public entity nor a public employee is liable for an injury caused by “(b) An act or omission in the interpretation or application of any law relating to a tax. ”  In any event, since the County cannot sue for service charges collected by [...] pursuant to a tax exemption given pursuant to [...], it follows that Count One of the Complaint does not give rise to a cognizable cause of action.
[brief] Indeed, as the Millison court stated:  "[a]lthough defendants' conduct in knowingly exposing plaintiffs to asbestos clearly amounts to deliberately taking risks with employees' health, as we have observed heretofore the mere knowledge and appreciation of a risk—even the strong probability of a risk—will come up short of the "substantial certainty" needed to find an intentional wrong resulting in avoidance of the exclusive-remedy bar of the compensation statute."  Millison, supra. at 179.  Finally, as to the context prong, parking lot accidents and pedestrian injuries, tragic as they may be, are not unusual.  (Da151).  But there is nothing in the record here by which one could look at the context in which this injury occurred and conclude it was the result of an intentional wrong by the defendant.  There is no evidence showing that the parking lot as designed was inherently more dangerous than the obvious danger inherent in any parking lot in which vehicles and pedestrians share limited space.  See, Pa11.  See also, Da36 and Da151.  Likewise, there is no evidence in the record to demonstrate that the manner by which [...]’s tragic death occurred was "plainly beyond anything the legislature could have contemplated as entitling the employee to recover only under the Compensation Act."  Millison, 101 N.J. at 179.  This is because for better or worse, parking lot accidents are a foreseeable fact of life.  Most importantly, [...] admitted to police that she was not distracted prior to the accident, nor was she aware of any obstructions blocking her view and could offer no explanation for why she never saw [...].  Under those circumstances, this Court should not conclude that the trial court failed to properly consider all facts in a light most favorable to plaintiff, or that the trial court misapplied the standard for reviewing summary judgment motions.  Rather, this Court should conclude that even in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the totality of the record is devoid of any evidence by which one could reasonably conclude that the conduct of the defendant, and the context in which it was exercised rose to the level of an intentional wrong.  Accordingly, the order granting summary judgment must be affirmed.
[directive] JOINT CRASH INVESTIGATIVE PROTOCOL DIVISION OF STATE POLICE & COUNTY PROSECUTORS as may be deemed necessary by the Division of State Police and/or the County Prosecutor’s Office, a debriefing with the investigating State Police Trooper(s) and investigator(s) and/or detective(s) from the County Prosecutor’s Office, and assigned Assistant Prosecutor(s) or Assistant or Deputy Attorneys General shall be conducted at a mutually agreed upon location.
[brief] 6T145:12-23.  [...] agreed, as [...] argued, that an attorney can limit the services he is going to provide to a client in a matrimonial matter, but if that limitation is going to take place it has to be in writing and that was not present in [...]’s representation of [...].  6T148:8-12; 6T149:12-22.  All of [...]’s opinions on [...]’s failure to comply with the requirement for a proper retainer agreement were confirmed by [...] himself when he testified that he did not provide [...] with a retainer agreement and he did not even know the Rule that required the retainer agreement.
[brief] N.J.R.E. 702 specifically states that a witness qualified as an expert is required if technical knowledge will assist the trier of fact in determining a factual issue.  In general terms, a jury should not be allowed to speculate without the aid of expert testimony in an area where laypersons could not be expected to have sufficient knowledge or experience.  *Kelly v. Berlin*, 300 N.J. Super. 256, 268 (App. Div. 1997).  Similarly, expert testimony has been found indispensable to a plaintiff’s burden of showing a breach, where “the matter to be dealt with is so esoteric that jurors of common judgment and experience cannot form a valid judgment as to whether the conduct of a party was reasonable. ”  *Butler v. Acme Markets, Inc.*, 89 N.J. 270, 283 (1982).
[brief] Staffing Coordinator Office Dynamics and the Impact of COVID-19.  The staffing coordinator office is relatively small, with only two or three staffing coordinators (out of six total) present on any given workday.  (Pa67-68).  The staffing coordinators sit in an open office suite, with four computers that sit atop an L-shaped desk.  [...]’s office is located to the left of that L-shaped desk and to the right of that desk lies the nursing supervisor’s office.  (Pa67-68).  [...] testified that she “had a great relationship with Barbara [[...]. ” (Pa232 at 28:2-8).  [...] and [...] regularly socialized outside of work—[...] even attended [...]’s baby shower.  [...] further described the two as “close. ” (Pa240-41 at 60:23-61:3).  Despite the friendliness of the group, [...] described the staffing coordinator office as a “very stressful environment. ” (Pa359 at 66:24-67:8).  Those already-high stress levels only amplified during the COVID-19 pandemic.  (Pa359-60).  The staffing coordinators were the gatekeepers of the personal protective equipment.  (Pa360).  Employees’ morale began to drop during the COVID-19 pandemic as employees became increasingly nervous about spending extra time working at the hospital.  (Pa167).  Unlike others in hospital administration, the staffing coordinators could not work from home during the COVID-19 pandemic, increasing frustrations.  (Pa360).  The stress also impacted [...].  [...], one of the nursing supervisors who worked with [...], described [...] as more anxious during the COVID-19 pandemic.  (Pa455 at 23:14-24).  [...], one of [...]’s staffing coordinators for years, testified that as the COVID-19 pandemic wore on, [...] grew “angry at the world it seemed like. ” (Pa434 at 17:3-18).  [...], [...], and [...] testified that [...] sometimes “belittled” and “degraded” them during this time, and that her management style was not always “professional. ” (Pa176 at 67:13-68:6; Pa177 at 70:10-12; Pa185 at 101:22-102:3; Pa195 at 143:22-144:22; Pa241 at 61:18-62:12; Pa241 at 64:10-18; Pa242 at 65:6-17; Pa286 at 30:23-31:5; Pa287 at 35:1-7; Pa306 at 109:6-110:7).  [...] admitted that [...]’s treatment of the staffing coordinators was not targeted at anyone and “stemmed from frustration. ” (Pa244 at 75:3-76:18).  Plaintiffs routinely vented about [...]’s conduct to each other, as well as to others.  (Pa176 at 67:22-68:6; Pa177 at 70:10-12; Pa238-39 at 49:1-55:25; Pa241 at 61:25-62:12).  V. [...]’s Chronic Complaints and Improper Behavior.
[brief] On March 3, 2016, the Appellate Division issued a per curiam opinion reversing and remanding the matter for a new PCR hearing.  The Appellate Division concluded that, given the limitations [...] imposed on PCR counsel, [...]’s attorney “was unable to fully investigate and assess the trial record for potential claims for relief. ”  (Da024).  On April 28, 2017, [...] filed his second petition for Post-Conviction Relief predicated on a recantation made by [...] to another inmate, [...].
[directive] Sistèm Jidisyè New Jersey New Jersey Judiciary Kesyon Adisyonèl pou Sèten Zak Delenkans Seksyèl (Itilize fòm sa a sèlman si enfraksyon te komèt sou oswa aprè le 1ye desanm 1998) Additional Questions for Certain Sexual Offenses (Haitian Creole) (Use if committed on or after December 1, 1998)  Ou fèt pou reponn kesyon adisyonèl sa yo lè wap plede koupab de zak oswa tantativ pou komèt agresyon seksyèl agrave, agresyon seksyèl, kontak seksyèl kriminèl agrave, kadejak daprè 2C-13-1c(2), lè w angaje w nan konpòtman seksyèl ki mete byenèt yon timoun an danje ki ta degrade oswa konwonp moral timoun la konfòm a 2C:24-4a, mete an danje byenèt yon timoun konfòm a 2C:24-4b(4), mete an danje byenèt yon timoun konfòm a 2C:24-4b(5) (si enfraksyon an te komèt le ou aprè le 1ye fevriye 2018), oswa w se lidè yon rezo pònografi timoun konfòm a 2C:24-4.1 (si enfraksyon an te komèt le ou aprè le 1ye fevriye 2018).  These additional questions need to be answered if you are pleading guilty to the offense of or any attempt to commit the offense of aggravated sexual assault, sexual assault, aggravated criminal sexual contact, kidnapping under 2C:13-1c(2), endangering the welfare of a child by engaging in sexual conduct which would impair or debauch the morals of the child 2C:24-4b(4), endangering the welfare of a child pursuant to under 2C:24-4a, endangering the welfare of a child pursuant to 2C:24-4b(5) (if the offense was committed on or after February 1, 2018), or leader of a child pornography network pursuant to 2C:24-4.1 (if the offense was committed on or after February 1, 2018)