ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] ”  4T.156:17 to 157:5.  Counsel then argued that despite their obligation “the defendants did nothing but make light of this situation and about the idea of accountability as a whole. ”  *Id.*, at 157:6 to 8.  Continuing, counsel said:  They started this trial with the jokes and doodles frankly, I think [...] is right to be outraged.  He’s been waiting five years for his chance to get in the courtroom.  Weathered a pandemic like we all have, just to get here.  Five years for his chance at accountability.  *Id.*, at 157: 8 to 14.  Addressing Plaintiff’s nervousness on the stand, counsel attributed it in part to the “hostility by nature of the courtroom environment,” but said “I think that can largely be explained by this idea that again, [...]’s been waiting for his chance at accountability and then he shows up in court and is shown things he has cause to see in his medical records and is told that everything that he’s been led to believe about his treatment is a lie. ”  Id., at 157:15 to 22.  Recounting the proofs in Plaintiff’s favor and addressing the defense’s arguments concerning Plaintiff’s ability to continue with his ordinary activities, counsel argued that “[i]n that world (i.e., the defense’s “world”), no one is entitled to accountability because they try and live your (sic) life,” id., at 192:4 to 16, arguing thereafter that “[w]e’re here for accountability for the ways his life has changed. ”  Id., at 193:15 to 20.  Counsel’s “theme” was repeated once more in his final remarks to the jury:  [So, I have to end on it, accountability.  We live in a world governed by the idea that when you do something wrong, you take steps to make it right.  That is the long and short of why we are here.  Regardless of any distractions about what [...] can and can’t do or should or should not do, the reality is that the defendant should and must be held accountable for this collision, because as a direct result of that collision, [...] Lamothe has permanent injuries which he will suffer from for the rest of his life.  Id., at 203:9 to 20.  In Jackowitz v. Lang, 408 N.J. Super. 495, 504-05 (App. Div. 2009), the Court considered “the limits of advocacy as the trial and jury system achieves resolution of disputes.
[brief] The judgment or order sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact challenged and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment or order as a matter of law.  An issue of fact is genuine only if, considering the burden of persuasion at trial, the evidence submitted by the parties on the motion, together with all legitimate inferences therefrom favoring the non-moving party, would require submission of the issue to the trier of fact.  Rule 4:46-2(c).  As observed by the court in *Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America*, 142 N.J. [A] court should deny a summary judgment motion only where the party opposing the motion has come forward with evidence that creates a ‘genuine issue as to any material fact challenged. ’  That means a non-moving party cannot defeat a motion for summary judgment merely by pointing to any fact in dispute.  . . .  [I]f the opposing party in a summary judgment motion offers . . . only facts which are immaterial or of an insubstantial nature, a mere scintilla, ‘fanciful, frivolous, gauzy or merely suspicious,’ he will not be heard to complain if the court grants summary judgment, taking as true the statement of uncontradicted facts in the papers relied upon by the moving party, such papers themselves not otherwise showing the existence of an issue of material fact.  Brill, 142 N.J. 520, 529 (1995)(emphasis in original), citing Judson v. Peoples Bank & Trust Co. of Westfield, 17 N.J. 67, 75 (1954).  A responding party may not rely upon “bare conclusions” in her pleadings to overcome a motion for summary judgment.  Rather, she must produce credible factual support showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.  Sullivan v. Port Auth. Of NY & NJ, 449 N.J. Super. 276, 279-280 (App. Div. 2017).  Further, self-serving assertions without more do not suffice to create a genuine question of material fact.  Fargas v. Gorham, 276 N.J. Super. 135 (Law Div. 1994).  In order to stave off summary judgment a respondent must present credible evidence showing a significant dispute in the factual record as to substantial facts.  Investors Bank v. Torres, 457 N.J.Super. 53, 64-65 (App. Div. 2018), aff’d 243 N.J. 25 (2020)(a litigant may not defeat a motion for summary judgment by “the identification of a disputed fact of an insubstantial nature”); [...], Current N.J. Court Rules, Rule 4:46-2, comment 2.2. (2024) (“the respondent must do more than show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts”).
[brief] Courts in this District have invoked that part of the NJCFLA—the part reading: “directly or indirectly engag[es] . . . in the business of buying, discounting or endorsing notes”—when classifying debt collection practices as falling within the “consumer loan business. ”  This Court will do the same and find that as a purchaser of debt, [...] meets the definition of “consumer lender” required to obtain a license under the NJCFLA.  Valentine v. Mullooly, Jeffrey, Rooney & Flynn LLP, No. 2:20-cv-14152 (WJM), 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 118399, at *13-14 (D.N.J. July 6, 2022) (internal citations omitted) (Pra24).  The reasoning in Woo-Padva 1 was also criticized in the Superior Court: The Court must interpret and apply statutory text according to the plain, ordinary meaning of its terms.  It must also construe such text in the context of relevant definitions or other provisions of the statute examined in their entirety.  It is required to interpret in a manner that is consonant with the statutory purpose and that does not produce an absurd or nonsensical result.
[brief] There was no evidence cited to support this inference.  On the other hand, witnesses confirmed that [...] was experienced and capable of assisting customers on his own, and that he had done so countless times without complaint, and certainly without violence.  In similar fashion, the trial court relied on Plaintiffs’ allegation that [...]’s ID badge was not properly displayed and/or did not properly designate him as a trainee.  [See 10T 6:13-15] (“Plaintiff bases also [sic] on a supposed lack of ID or ID that said training and the nature or extent of the training .  . . .”).  This reasoning is also flawed because there was no evidence to suggest that the status of [...]’s ID badge made him unfit, incompetent, or dangerous to [...] customers in a manner that would have foreseeably resulted in a physical altercation.  The placement of [...]’s ID badge is not suggestive of his disposition interacting with customers or his knowledge of the products in the flooring department.  There is no evidence that [...] had reason to know [...] posed a foreseeable danger to customers because he affixed his ID badge anywhere other than on his chest.
[brief] Such briefs have been omitted from this Reply Brief according to this Court’s deficiency notice of December 23, 2024, pursuant to R. 2:6-1(a)(2), but they can be supplied immediately upon the Court’s request for proof that such arguments were indeed raised from the beginning of this issue.  As to precedent, these arguments relied in large part on the rulings in Moore v. Woman To Woman Obstetrics & Gynecology, L.L.C., which held that an arbitration agreement is not enforceable as to the rights of persons who are not parties to the agreement.
[brief] (See Drb at 9-10).  That is only true where certain prerequisites are met.  First, the litigant in Curry moved to vacate default within a mere two months of default having been entered.  Id. at 529 (noting “the judgment Nisi was entered February 18, 1969.  On April 16, 1969 defendant obtained an order to show cause why the judgment should --- 3  This case relied upon by Defendant was decided before the New Jersey Divorce Reform Act of 1971, which overhauled the divorce system in New Jersey.  The legislature eliminated procedural concepts such as a “Judgment Nisi” to account for the societal shift in favor of dissolving marriages.  C.f. Mani v. Mani, 183 N.J. 70, 82 (2005). not be vacate…”).  Second, the trial court permitted the litigant to answer only because she did so before the Final Judgment was entered:
[brief] In the instant matter, [defendant] plead guilty pursuant to the second Indictment on May 22, 1997, and was sentenced on June 30, 1997.  His first petition for PCR was filed on August 8, 2022.  The State correctly submits that there was no explanation provided for this twenty-year delay in either [Defendant’s] initial August 8, 2022, petition, [defendant’s] April 1, 2023, supplemental argument, or [defendant’s] counsel’s June 1, 2023, supplemental brief.  Therefore, Petitioner has failed to demonstrate any excusable purpose for the delay which exceeds the five-year statutory limitation . . . as required to circumvent the Rule 3:22-12(a)(1) time bar.  [(Da43). ]  Indeed, defendant provided no explanation for the twenty-year delay in filing his petition.  Moreover, in his brief submitted by counsel, he concedes that his “first and only PCR application was grossly out-of-time.  (Db13).  Under these circumstances, because he filed his petition over twenty years after the expiry of the deadline; and, because he did not demonstrate excusable neglect and that not hearing the petition on the merits would result in a fundamental injustice, the PCR court properly denied his petition as time-barred.  For the above reasons, the State urges this Court to affirm the PCR court’s ruling finding defendant’s PCR petition as time-barred.
[brief] Notwithstanding the arguments of counsel, there are clear and undisputed facts relating to this matter.  There is no question that the [...] med-pay subrogation agreement does not apply to disputes arising out of a jurisdiction where med-pay subrogation is prohibited.  N.J.S.A. 2A:23B-1 et seq. allows a party to see to have an intercompany arbitration award vacated under certain circumstances, one being that the arbitrator acted beyond the scope of his/her authority.  The question of whether a dispute is within the scope of an arbitration agreement is a decision for the court, not an arbitrator in accordance with N.J.S.A. 2A:23B-6.  There is no authority in New Jersey which specifically allows for med-pay subrogation.  N.J.S.A. 2A:15-97 prohibits recovery of health benefits and has been interpreted to prohibit med-pay subrogation.  Multiple trial courts under identical facts have concluded that based on the existing case law and N.J.S.A. 2A:15-97, med-pay subrogation is prohibited in New Jersey.  Accordingly, it is clear that [...]’s decisions on [...]’s motions for summary judgment were proper, procedurally and substantively and should be affirmed by this Court.  Respectfully submitted, [...]
[directive] Shooter will start standing 2 yards behind the barricade.  On command the shooter will move Strong side of forward and fire 4 rds from the strong side of 4 cover 30 sec. cover kneeling.  Remain behind cover in a kneeling ready position with visual focus towards the threat area.  On command fire 4 rds over the top of cover.  25 yds  Over the top 3  Remain behind cover in a ready position with 25 sec. of cover visual focus towards the threat area.  On Command fire 4 rds with the strong hand  Support side (supported is recommended) from the support of cover, 3 side of cover kneeling or standing.  25 sec. kneeling or Reload if necessary decock and holster.  standing  Replenish loading devices (Strong hand)  Draw and fire 3 rds standing, decock and 15 yds  Standing 5 sec. holster  10  Standing & Draw and fire 3 rds standing, assume a 15 yds 25 sec. kneeling kneeling position and fire 4 rds kneeling  Standing, From the ready position fire 2 rds on each 3 sec.  10 yds  6  Ready command to fire (3X)  7 yds  Standing Draw, fire 3 rds, decock and holster 4 sec.  Draw, fire 3 rds make a magazine change, fire 7 yds  12  Standing 15 sec. 3 rds, decock and holster 7 yds  Standing Draw, fire 3 rds, decock and holster 4 sec.  Standing one Draw fire 2 rds one-handed with the strong 4 sec.  5 yds hand, strong hand, decock and holster (2X) side 8  Weapon should be in the support hand at the Standing one ready.  Fire 2 shots one-handed with the 3 sec.  5 yds hand, support support hand each command, return to the (2X) hand ready.  Standing, Assume an interview stance position.  Draw 2 sec.  1 yd 4 weapon and fire 2 rds from the weapon retention (2X) retention position, decock and holster.  End course, score targets (40 hits = 80% - 2 points per hit)
[directive] A. concerning: information account charged; offense the of circumstances and nature the (a) ity I admissibi consider the may court the that except defendant, eligible the against evidence ofthe weight the (b) excluded; be to sought evidence any of including: defendant, eligible the of characteristics and history the (c) employment, ties, family condition, mental and physical character, defendant's eligible (1) the history conduct, community past ties, community, the in of length residence resources, financial court at appearance concerning and record history, criminal abuse, alcohol drug or relating to and proceedings; probation, on was defendant eligible the arrest, or offense current the of the time at whether, (2) offense an for sentence of completion or appeal, sentencing, trial, pending release other or parole, state; other any or of this law the or law, federal under the by posed be would that community or other the person any danger to the of seriousness and nature the (d) applicable; if release, defendant's eligible 64 Page circumstance or every fact specific identify to attempt Directive not does this that should noted
[brief] [...] testified that between October 26 and 28, 2019, defendant’s phone and [...]’ phone were both using a tower near Bowens’ home in [...]. (20T 55-4 to 56-11)  Defendant’s call data showed him on January 9, 2019 to be at or near: his [...] home between 5:09 and 6:09 p.m. (20T 47-21 to 23), and [...] (David’s place of business) on Route 22 at 7:09 p.m. and then back home from 7:31 to 7:42 p.m. (20T 48-1 to 49-13).  According to [...], [...]’s phone that same day was at or near: [...] from 5:11 to 5:15 p.m. (20T 49-17 to 50-4); home in [...] from 5:25 p.m. to 5:47 p.m., but “moving during that time frame” (20T 51-9 to 15); “in the general area of home,” but possibly “away from there at certain times’ from 5:56 to 6:15 p.m. (20T 51-16 to 52-12); back at [...] from 6:35 to 6:45 p.m.  (20T 52-17 to 18); and back home from 7:20 to 7:58 p.m. (20T 52-19 to 20)  David’s phone on that same day was at or near: [...] from 5:13 to 6:30 p.m. (20T 53-4 to 5); moving “toward the area of home” at 6:58 p.m. (20T 53-4 to 10); “heading back towards” [...] at 7:04 p.m. and then there at 7:06 p.m. (20T 53-11 to 54); and back home from 7:24 to 7:53 p.m. (20T 54-6 to 8)  [...] also testified that another phone associated with defendant was using a cell site in [...] on February 8, 2019.  (20T 56-18 to 57-7)  [...] agreed that he was never asked by police to check [...]’ locations.  (20T 58-25 to 59-2)  [...] testified that police obtained a wiretap order for defendant’s main phone from January 23 through February 12, 2019, and for defendant’s secondary phone from January 29 through February 18, 2019.  (21T 17-21 to 18-1; 21T 22-10 to 16)  [...] testified that on the night of January 9, 2019, after reading defendant his rights, he interrogated defendant about the death of [...].
[brief] SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY  APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. [...]  STATE OF NEW JERSEY : CRIMINAL ACTION  Plaintiff-Respondent, : On Appeal from a Final Order Denying Post-Conviction Relief v. : of the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Hudson County.  Ind. Nos. [...]; [...], : [...]; [...]  Defendant-Appellant. : Sat Below: : Hon. [...], J.S.C. BRIEF AND APPENDIX (Da 1-54)
[brief] Namerow, 461 N.J. Super. at 140.  In this instance, contrary to Plaintiff’s assertions, the PSA clearly states:  “[Plaintiff] acknowledges that, at Closing, [[...]] shall cause [the Seller] to convey directly to [Plaintiff] by bargain and sale deed the Real Property in the form attached hereto as Exhibit J (the ‘Deed’).” (Pa104, § 6.1 (emphases added)).  Promptly following Closing, [[...]] shall cause the Deed and the Improvements Deed to be duly recorded in the Office of the Register of Deeds and Mortgages of Hudson County, New Jersey. ” (Pa105, §6.3 (emphases added)).  Plainly, the PSA imposed an obligation on [...], not [...] to ensure that title was conveyed to Plaintiff.
[brief] The question [...] is asked is the following leading question:  Q: But just so we are on the same page, there is not a two-inch immediate elevation change, correct?  [...]’s complete answer begins, “I cannot say that. ”  However, this sentence is completely left out by the Court.  When quoted correctly and the read in context along with the rest of [...]’s testimony, he is explaining that based on the distorted and zoomed-in photo he cannot say that the elevation change is “exactly 2 inches” and if does depict a taper, then that taper would be inadequate.
[brief] See Everbank v. Tierney, 2020 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1414, *9-10, 2020 WL 3980393 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. July 15, 2020) (a litigant who is not a party to the agreement, nor a third-party beneficiary, lacks standing to challenge the agreement) (Da25) (citing Rajamin v. Deutsch Bank Nat’l Trust Co., 757 F.3d 79, 88-90 (2d Cir. 2014) (holding that mortgagors lacked standing to complain that the assignment of their mortgages to the defendant violated the terms of a pooling agreement in which the mortgagors' original lender was a party); Correia v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co., 452 B.R. 319, 324 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2011) (stating that debtors lacked standing to object that an assignment of their mortgage violated a pooling and servicing agreement because they were neither parties to, nor third-party beneficiaries of, the agreement); *Livonia Prop. Holdings, LLC v. 12840012976 Farmington Rd. Holdings, LLC*, 717 F. Supp. 2d 724, 736-737 (D. Mich. 2010) (stating "a litigant who is not a party to an assignment lacks standing to challenge that assignment’), aff’d, 399 F. App’x 97 (6th Cir. 2010)”).  Any transfer is voidable not void and only the beneficiaries, of which Plaintiff is not one, can call into question the issues of an assignment.  *See Rajamin*, 757 F.3d at 90.  Thus, as Appellant was neither a party to nor third-party beneficiary of the assignment, he lacks standing to challenge the validity of the assignments.  Any argument as to the validity of the assignment to [...] would be between [...] and [...].  *See id.* at 90.  As a result, Plaintiff lacks standing to contest any transfer from [...] on the grounds that the transfer is in contravention of the terms of the trust or the alleged trustees lack of authority.  *Id.*  As a result, Respondents are covered by the Arbitration Agreement and, as such, the Lower Court correctly referred the matter to arbitration.
[brief] In an area well known for a large volume of CDS transactions, [...], a specialized and experienced detective, saw [...] drive into the parking lot, but not leave his car or enter any of the surrounding businesses.  He then saw defendant drive into the parking lot and [...] get out of his vehicle, get into defendant’s vehicle, and drive around the parking lot with him before returning to a different parking spot and aisle away from [...]’s car.  The pair then drove out of the lot separately without ever entering any store or business.
[brief] The trial court should not have dismissed [...] from the case and should have submitted its negligence to the jury for purposes of the indemnification provision in the Subcontract.  In order for the indemnification provision of the Subcontract to be triggered, N.J.S.A. 2A:40A-1 mandates that [...]’ share of comparative fault must be one percent or greater.  Under N.J.S.A. 2A:40A-1, the indemnification clause may not “[purport] to indemnify or hold harmless the promisee against liability for damages arising out of bodily injury to persons or damage to property caused by or resulting from the sole negligence of the promise. ” (emphasis added).  Because [...] was erroneously and prematurely dismissed from the case, the jury was not afforded the opportunity to reach a determination as to [...]’ comparative fault of one percent or more.  Should this Court reverse the trial court and remand consistent with [...]’s arguments, [...] will contend at trial that there is no question that [...]’ employee, [...], was negligent on November 4, 2020, thereby contributing to Plaintiff’s accident to the extent of at least one percent fault.  Upon remand, [...] will contend that there is no question that Prescott had actual knowledge of the open hatch and that he considered an “open hatch on the floor as being a dangerous condition. ” (Da275).  Prescott testified that he “had asked [[...]] about it and he had brought us to that room, he had opened up the crawl space. ” (Da264).  According to Prescott, after O’Donnell opened up the hatch, he, O’Donnell, and plaintiff “basically had walked out of the room” (Da264).  There is no question that Prescott knew of the unsafe condition, the open hatch, and yet he admitted that “I assumed [[...]] closed the hatch at that point. ” (Da264).  At trial, [...] will demonstrate that Prescott: (1) knew the hatch was left open; (2) knew that an open hatch on the floor was a “dangerous condition”; (3) was plaintiff’s supervisor and responsible for “setting up” the work site; and (4) he simply assumed that someone else closed that hatch.  Under these facts, [...] will show that Prescott was acting within the scope of his employment and his more than one percent (1%) negligence is imputed to his employer, [...], under the doctrine of respondeat superior.  Haviland v. Lourdes Med. Ctr. of Burlington Cnty., Inc., 466 N.J. Super. 126, 132 (App. Div. 2021), aff’d, 250 N.J. 368 (2022).  Therefore, had [...]’s fault been submitted to a jury, in all likelihood, [...] would have been found to be at least one percent negligent, triggering the indemnity provision of the Subcontract in favor of [...].
[brief] Isaac v. NRA Grp., LLC, 377 F. Supp. 3d 211 (E.D.N.Y. 2019) .................................................. 26  Jablonowska v. Suther, 195 N.J. 91, 948 A.2d 610 (2008) .........................................................  11  Jacobson v. Healthcare Fin. Servs., Inc., 516 F.3d 85 (2d Cir. 2008) .................................................................. 1, 7
[directive] Page 5 of 11  Omnibus Qualification Questions (Two)  1.  Is there anything, whether or not covered in the previous questions, which would affect your ability to be a fair and impartial juror or in any way be a problem for you in serving on this jury?  2.  Is there anything else that you feel is important for the parties in this case to know about you?  Model Civil Jury Voir Dire Questions Revised as Promulgated by Directive #4-07