ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] To that end on June 15, 2022, Pa151, the Board’s counsel—just two days after the final Planning Board hearing—sent email to [...]’s counsel, requesting information from [...] for that purpose, Pa151, followed up by a ‘reminder’ emails, on June 20th, Pa153.  [...]’s counsel responded that he “was away last week and had to deal with an OTSC the minute [he] got back—so digging out of a hole still.  “I’ll put all the docs together as soon as possible. ”  Pa156a.  Board counsel sent a follow-up reminder on July 8, 2022, Pa-157a, and was advised that [...] counsel was instead “taking a stab at drafting [the] resolution”, Pa161.  Board counsel responded saying “I always appreciate the help but in the meantime if you could send me that list of exhibits so I could (sic) cross check against what I already have, that would be helpful as well, Pa166.  Board counsel again sent a reminder email on August 4, 2022, following up on a phone call reminder, Pa167.  By August 7, 2022, and as shown in Board counsel’s email to [...]’s attorney, Pa172, the combination of the Township’s and Borad’s planners and attorneys had drafted a revised rezoning ordinance, Pa182, drafted an amendment to the Settlement Agreement, Pa173, had discussed and received the endorsement of the Court’s Mt. Laurel Special Master and had also obtained approval from State Wide intervenor, [...] (‘[...]’)
[directive] 2.  Verificación de su dirección Address  Verification a)  ¿Entiende que si usted se declara culpable de agresión sexual con agravantes, agresión sexual, [Sí/Yes] [No/No] abuso deshonesto con agravantes, rapto conforme a 2C:13-1c(2) o cualquier tentativa de cometer cualquiera de dichos delitos, y al momento de dictarle la pena el juez determina que su conducta se caracterizaba por un patrón de comportamiento repetitivo y compulsivo, usted debe verificar su dirección con la agencia apropiada del orden público cada 90 días, o si el juez determina que su conducta no se caracterizaba por un patrón de comportamiento repetitivo y compulsivo, usted tiene que verificar su dirección una vez al año?
[brief] •  **Protected Activity.**  On November 17, 2014, [...] reported discrimination by [...] to [...] of Human Resources who reported it to [...], [...] and [...].  (Pa428).  [...] made a statement in front of Dillon’s co-workers that he should not attend a 2014 ABC conference because he “was too old. ” (Pa869).  [...] responded to [...]’s discriminatory comment stating that Karen “did not really mean to suggest that [Dillon] was too old to attend a conference” and [...] responded that that was “exactly what she meant. ” (Pa870).  Dillon complained to the Director, [...], at the time but no corrective action was taken.
[brief] [...] was stopped while driving his mother’s car, allegedly because the car had tinted windows.  (1T 11-3 to 4; 4T 29-1 to 5, 38-24 to 39-13)  But violation of the “tinted-windows” statute, N.J.S.A. 39:3-74, which provides that certain car windows must be transparent, is a motor-vehicle infraction, and, as a rule, would not justify the warrantless search of a vehicle. \(^4\)  To conduct a warrantless motor-vehicle search, the police must have “probable cause to believe that the vehicle contains contraband or evidence of an offense and the circumstances giving rise to probable cause are unforeseeable and spontaneous. ”  \textit{State v. Witt}, 223 N.J. 409, 447 (2015).  At the time of this incident, the odor of marijuana could provide probable cause for a warrantless motor-vehicle search. \(^5\)  See \textit{State v. Cohen}, 254 N.J. 308, --- \(^3\)  This argument is raised in Point II of defendant’s plenary brief and replies to Point II of respondent’s brief.  \(^4\)  Point I of defendant’s plenary brief challenged the initial stop on the ground that the state did not establish a violation of N. J.S.A. 39:3-74.  \(^5\)  This incident occurred before February 22, 2021, the effective date of (footnote cont’d)  Consequently, the state sought to defend the warrantless search of [...]’s SUV based on [...]’s testimony that he detected the odor of marijuana in the car.  (2T 83-20 to 24)  [...] had a different theory of the case.  He challenged the officer’s claim that he smelled marijuana and maintained that the police wanted to search the car because they suspected that he was the “young, [B]lack male” who committed an armed robbery the night before in a nearby town.  (1T 35-5 to 6; PSR 1)  Accordingly, counsel made a reasonable, strategic decision to introduce the MVR recording in which, prior to the search, officers at the scene discussed their strong suspicion that [...] was involved in the earlier robbery.  (3T 45-20 to 22).  Counsel maintained that the recording was relevant to “the defense’s theory of the case that this is all about targeting,” “[t]his is all about profiling” (3T 41-20 to 47-10), and that the police would have handled the case very differently and would not have searched the car, if, rather than a young, Black male, “this was a soccer mom” (3T 190-14 to 17).  Counsel argued in his opening statement that the police were “fishing” for a legal reason to search the car without a warrant (2T 49-6 to 12) because they CREAMMA, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10, “which largely decriminalized the possession of … marijuana” and provides that “‘the odor of cannabis or burnt cannabis,’ shall not ‘constitute reasonable articulable suspicion of a crime’ except on school property or at a correctional facility.
[brief] ” (ECF 65, at 4; see also ECF 65-2, at 2 (July 24 email contending [...] “has produced all responsive documents in its possession, custody, and/or control” and it is “not withholding any responsive documents”).)  [...] does not state whether it is withholding any documents based on relevancy or other objections.  The motion to compel sometimes references six documents and other times references six pages of documents.  The court refers herein to six documents.  [...]’s response provides no explanation as to why the requested Salesforce data is no longer there.  Based on the record currently before the court, it appears unlikely that the six documents [...] produced is the entirety of the responsive information from Salesforce.  [...] herself submitted a declaration in support of her motion to compel in which she describes the types of data she knows are maintained within Salesforce and that [...] should have been able to retrieve from Salesforce.
[brief] [...] also sets up the straw man argument that [...] is claiming that all subcontractors on the project were covered by the CCIP.  (Zb4,7,29)  That is not the case and an irrelevancy.  [...]’ brief specifically notes that certain subcontractors had to enroll, others were excluded, and others were subject to [...]’s whim.  (*See,* Tb15, explaining “Ineligible Parties. ”)  Respectfully Submitted, s/ [...]
[brief] Given this litigation’s length, this Reply Brief will focus on the primary and concrete issues.  The facts did not establish that the [...] met its burden of proof that a permanent easement was established by the 1963 Agreement permitting off-site parking on the then vacant parts of the School’s Lot 5 and use of the School heating systems.  The evidence did not establish that a permanent easement was intended or granted, and the Lot 8 claims of continued permanent easements are not valid.  TABLE OF CONTENTS
[brief] We therefore summarize the physical evidence presented in the matter before us.  The ski mask containing defendant's DNA is relevant and incriminating.  However, it was not found at the crime scene.  Rather, the ski mask was found in the woods near the [...] gas station, which is also near where defendant resided.  Thus, the ski mask, while certainly incriminating evidence, could not be definitively tied to the crime because it could have been dropped near [...] at another time unrelated to the flight from robbery.
[directive] 3.2.1  It is important to note that law enforcement encounters are never static and rapidly evolve.  Thus, officers must continuously assess the effectiveness, proportionality, and necessity of their actions, including their tactical positioning, in order to decrease the likelihood of force being needed for self-protection.  Officers may increase the time 6 USE OF FORCE POLICY | December 2021 available to evaluate the threat by positioning an object between themselves and the subject, being aware of their surroundings, and waiting for backup, when it is available.  3.3
[directive] With purpose to intimidate an individual or group of individuals because of race, color, 10% permissible religion, gender, disability, sexual orientation, gender identity or expression, national origin, or 1st Degree $50,000 to $150,000 ethnicity; or 2C:16-1a(1-3)  Bias Intimidation  (2)  Knowing that the conduct constituting the offense would cause an individual or group of individuals to be intimidated because of race, color, religion, gender, disability, sexual orientation, gender identity or expression, national origin, or ethnicity; or.  (3)  Under circumstances that cause any victim of the underlying offense to be intimidated and the victim reasonably believed that (a) the offense was committed with the purpose to 2nd Degree $35,000 to $100,000 10% permissible intimidate the victim or any person or entity in whose welfare the victim is interested because of race, color, religion, gender, disability, sexual orientation, gender identity or expression, 33  Updated December 2, 2013
[brief] Finally, [...] found Miller factor five, defendant’s possibility for rehabilitation, “clearly supported by the record made by the defense. ” (5T23-14 to 15).  [...] then found aggravating factors (1), (3), and (9), adopting the analyses of both the original sentencing judge and this Court in its opinion.  (5T23-22 to 24-11).  She also noted, but gave no weight to, defendant’s limited juvenile history.  (5T24-12 to 18).  [...] did, however, give “great weight” to mitigating factor (14)—that defendant was under 26 at the time he committed the offenses.  (5T24-19 to 23); see N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1b(14).  Then, “draw[ing] guidance from Miller, Zuber, and Comer,” she found “that the defendant’s sentence for knowing and purposeful murder shall be reconsidered and the defendant re-sentenced to a term of 30 years in New Jersey State prison with a period of 30 years of parole ineligibility subject to NERA with a five-year period of parole supervision upon release.
[brief] Moreover, Defendants/Appellants incorrectly accuse the Honorable [...], J.S.C. of “misstat[ing] the factual record” in three areas (*See* Appellant’s Brief at 24).  First, Plaintiff/Respondent disputes that [...] reviewed a copy of the arbitration agreement because, as shown in Point II, there is simply no documentary evidence that she did, and the circumstantial evidence regarding the Booklet strongly suggests that she did not.  Second, Plaintiff argued that the agreement was ambiguous and should be construed against the drafting party on page 11 of our Supplemental Brief in Defendants’ motion to stay the case in favor of arbitration (omitted as tangential).  Third, even if Defendant [...]’s testimony regarding formation were taken alone, this would be sufficient to invalidate the agreement for a multitude of reasons as argued in Point II.  **B.
[brief] ......................................................... (Da32)  Statement of Reasons for Denial of Motion for Reconsideration (12/10/2021)  ............................................ (Da33 - Da43)  Judgment of Conviction (10/21/2022)  .......................................................................................................... (Da44 - Da46)  Trial Court Order Denying Bail Pending Appeal (10/7/2022)  ................................................................. (Da47)  App. Div. Order Denying Bail Pending Appeal (12/29/2022)  ................................................................. (Da48)  Notice of Appeal (11/17/2022)  ..................................................................................................................... (Da49 - Da53)
[brief] Why?  Because the record contains no valid finding of guilt on the charge of second-degree “certain persons” not to have a weapon.  *N.J.S.A. 2C:39-7b(1)*.  Obviously, defendant has a Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial unless he waives it and either has a bench trial or pleads guilty.  *Schneckloth v. Bustamonte*, 412 U.S. 218, 237 (1973); see also *State v. Jackson*, 272 N.J. Super. 543, 550 (App. Div. 1994); R. 1:8-1(a).  The record presently indicates that there simply was never a jury waiver here, never a trial held on that count, and defendant never pled guilty to this charge.  Consequently, his conviction on that count violates the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial, the Fourteenth Amendment right to due process, and defendant’s corresponding state-constitutional rights, and that conviction should be reversed and the matter remanded.  The “ordinary” manner for adjudicating this type of offense is to hold a “second” trial on this count after the first trial on all the other counts, in order to prevent the jury at the first trial from learning about defendant’s prior conviction.  See State v. Ragland, 105 N.J. 189, 193-196 (1986).  Here, when the first trial concluded on the other counts, the parties seemed to agree that defendant would plead guilty to the “certain persons” charge, thereby avoiding a Ragland trial.  (10T 29-15 to 17)  But there is no plea on the record.  The February 1, 2023 transcript ends with no resolution of the certain-persons charge.  (10T 32-16)  The judgment of conviction indicates the matter was adjudicated by a “jury trial” that simply did not happen, and defendant was sentenced on that charge.  (Da 10 to 12)  Thus, the present record requires a reversal of the “certain persons” conviction and a remand for other proceedings.  There appears to be no valid finding of guilt on that charge.  POINT V THE SENTENCE IMPOSED IS MANIFESTLY EXCESSIVE.
[brief] (4T 41-21 to 24, 43-12 to 18, 44-19 to 48-20)  Newark Police Sergeant [...] was dispatched to the scene and found the body of a deceased man.  (4T 88-3 to 4, 89-8 to 14, 99-1 to 6)  He testified that there was a black and white blanket over the decedent’s body, and the decedent’s pants were unbuttoned and pulled down below his hips and groin.
[brief] [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], and [...], Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. [...], d/b/a [...], d/b/a [...], d/b/a [...], d/b/a [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], d/b/a [...], d/b/a [...], d/b/a [...], [...], [...], d/b/a [...], [...], [...], SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. [...]
[brief] \(^{14}\)  When [...] filed its Original Motion in July 2020, [...], like [...], agreed that the best method for allocating fees and costs is the “relative culpability” approach.  (Da21-23.)  This method is the only approach that makes sense in this case.  Going back and reviewing over a decade of block billing invoices (Da55-178) to verify the amount claimed by [...] under the “time necessary to litigate” approach is truly unworkable.  However, [...] then abandoned the clear Appellate Division precedent establishing only two methods for allocating fees, the trial court followed neither of these approaches and, thus, abused its discretion in calculating the fees recoverable by [...].
[brief] ”  See Department’s Opposition Brief, at p. 19.  As support for that statement, the Department points to three orders that it contends put [...] and other reciprocal exchanges on notice that they are subject to the provisions of the Holding Company Act.  Those orders are: (i) [...] (dated September 12, 2014), (ii) Order its [...] (dated December 29, 2020), and (iii) [...] (dated December 22, 2022).
[brief] In that remand hearing, both the form and substance of the notice may be examined.  (pp. 19-23)  In re State & Sch. Emples. Health Benefits Commissions' Implementation of Yucht, 233 N.J. 267, 270.  (Emphasis added).  In the within matter, adding information to a website cannot be construed as notice of the Ricci Act’s enactment or the requirements to register within a certain timeframe.  The statute required the Board to promulgate rules to provide notice to active and retired members of the State Police Retirement System.  The Certifying Officer Letter is proof that the website posting is not sufficient notice.  Pa62.  The notice of the Ricci Act to the Certifying Officers advises the Certifying Officers that they must distribute the information to employees pursuant to N.J.A.C. 17:5-1.4.  It also required that the Certifying Officers to provide a certification that the information was distributed.  The Respondent claims that the mailing of the postcard to a correct address establishes a presumption that the postcard was received.  This presumption is rebutted by the fact that [...] and 98 others certified via affidavits that they did not receive said postcard.  Additionally, the claim that postcards were mailed out to all “200,647 SPRS retirees” is a misstatement of fact.  Rb12.  New Jersey State Troopers are assigned a badge number upon successful completion of the academy and these badge numbers are never repeated.  Currently, the New Jersey State Police badge numbers only reach the 9,000s; meaning that in the entire history of the New Jersey State Police, there are less than 10,000 New Jersey State Troopers, which includes all active or retired members of the State Police Retirement System.  Failure to provide any notice, adequate or actual, is reasonable and equitable grounds for relaxing the deadline for registration under the Ricci Act.
[brief] VOLUME II (Da152 – Da298)  Defendant [...]’s Answer to Amended Complaint (12/18/2018)  Da152-160  Defendant [...] Zoning Board Answer to Amended Complaint (12/28/2018)  Da161-170  Pretrial Order, note: paragraph 8 as to documents and Motion to be filed to limit documents to record below (3/14/2019)  Da171-173  Plaintiff’s list of additional documents outside of Board  Hearing record proposed for inclusion by Plaintiff [...] for Trial (Exhibits A to Exhibit EEE) (3/14/2019)  Da174-176  Defendant [...]’s Notice of Motion to Limit Exhibits/Record to Record before Zoning Board (4/9/2019)  Da177-178  Certification of [...] in Support of Motion to Limit Exhibits/Records (4/9/2019) with Index to Documents before Zoning Board and proposal to be submitted by [...] identified as Exhibit A (4/9/2019)  Da179-194  Plaintiff [...]’s Reply Certification in opposition to Motion in Limine and Response to Index of Documents (5/10/2019)  Da195-213  Court Order denying Motion in Limine (6/2/2022)  Da214  Appendix/Certification submitted with Trial Brief of Defendant [...] with Defendants Trial Exhibits to include all Exhibits before the Zoning Board (Da7-88 above), continuing objecting to Plaintiff’s submission of documents not in record before the Board, and listing additional documents responding to Plaintiff’s new documents/submission (submitted 9/20/22 with Trial Brief to Court)
[directive] 27.  ITEM NO. - Enter the item of each piece of property, recovered or seized, relating to the case.  28.  PROPERTY CODE - Enter the Property Description Code number from the code table located in the center of the report.  29.  PROPERTY STATUS - Enter the Property Status code number from the code table located in the center right portion of the report.  30.  ESTIMATED/QUANTITY - Enter the quantity or the estimated quantity of items.  31.  UNIT OF MEASURE - Enter the appropriate Unit Of Measure code if necessary, from the code table located in the center portion of the report.  32.  DESCRIPTION/O.A.N. - Enter a description of the property and any Owner Applied Numbers that may exist.  33.  SERIAL NUMBER - Enter the full serial number of the property if it exists.  34.  ESTIMATED VALUE - Enter the estimated value of the property.
[brief] The Statute provides that the receivership action may be discontinued “at any time when it is established that cause for the action no longer exists”.  **N.J.S.A. 14A:14-19. **  The Court has supervisory power over a receiver and can direct the receiver to discontinue engaging in certain conduct.  *See, e.g., Fleming v. Fleming Hotel Co.*, 70 N.J. Eq. 509 (Ch. 1905)  (Where a hotel corporation in the hands of a receiver was hopelessly insolvent, and during the delay necessary to properly advertise and dispose of it as a going concern it was run by the receiver at a loss, it was not proper for the Court to continue the business.)  The circumstances of the within matter demonstrate why the Statute and the Rule contemplate and require interaction with and by the Court, as well as with involved parties, including creditors such as the [...] and [...].  They further demonstrate the reason for the benchmark set forth in **N.J.S.A. 14A:14-19.**  A Statutory Receivership, which comes with substantial and in fact enormous power and latitude, also requires, including for those precise reasons, the “reigning in”, limited scope and supervision that are part of the Statute and Rules.
[brief] The Final Decision criticizes [...] for having sought to use only one of those provisions and only once, in 2016.  (Final Decision at 13).  What the Final Decision fails to indicate is that one of those statutory provisions, 18A:7F-39, by its express terms, cannot be used to provide T&E funding and that the 2016 referendum pursuant to the other provision, N.J.S.A. 18A:22-40, was defeated by a vote of 99% to 1%.  Commenting on that singular effort, State monitor [...] testified that, “The Department and local leaders and state leaders, and everybody was saying...that any separate questions are not going to be passed, so don’t even bother holding the referendum and spending the money [on it]. ”  5T 113-8 to 13.  \textsuperscript{21}
[brief] But even if the test invoked by the trial court (Victor v. State, 203 N.J. 383, 409 (2010)) was fairly applied Plaintiff would still prevail.  (1)  Plaintiff asserted that its impacted members were in a protected class - they were known to be or perceived to be disabled when they requested medical leave (2) Plaintiff asserted that its impacted members engaged in protected activity known to the employer - which was requesting and taking leave for a disability or illness; (3) Plaintiff’s impacted members were subjected to an adverse employment consequence - ineligibility for promotion and/or discipline; and (4) that there is a causal link between the protected activity (leave based on perceived disability) and the adverse employment consequence - ineligibility for promotion or discipline.
[directive] The court shall place on the record the reasons supporting its decision or to grant deny the order .  of  If Contents  Order ordered by the court, a temporary extreme risk .(Ql .. protective order (1) shall prohibit the respondent from possessing, purchasing, owning, or or receiving firearms ammunition, or from securing or holding a firearms purchaser or identification card or permit to purchase a handgun pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:58-3, a permit to carry a handgun pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:58-4 during the period the order is in effect, and (2) shall order the respondent to surrender to law enforcement any firearms or and any ammunition which the respondent possesses owns, and any firearms or purchaser identification card, permit to purchase a handgun, permit to carry a or handgun held by the respondent.  Any such card permit issued to the respondent shall be immediately revoked pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:58-3(f).  The order shall state the of time, date, and place the hearing for a final extreme risk protective order . of Service Order.