ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Borough of East Rutherford v. East Rutherford PBA Local 275, 213 N.J. 190, 203, citing Office of Emp. Relations, supra, 154 N.J. at 111-12.  (Emphasis added).  In Held v. Comfort Bus Line, 136 N.J.L. 640, 641-642, the Court noted that there are two classes of cases where “undue means” is concerned: (1) where the arbitrator meant to decide according to law, and clearly had mistaken the legal rule, and the mistake appears on the face of the award or by the statement of the arbitrator; and (2) where the arbitrator has mistaken a fact, and the mistake is apparent on the face of the award itself, or is admitted by the arbitrator himself.  Bell v. Price, 22 N.J.L. 578, 590; Taylor v. Sayre and Peterson, 24 N.J.L. 647; Leslie v. Leslie, 50 N.J. Eq. 103.
[brief] (Pa13-21).  Defendants thereafter filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on April 17, 2024.  (Pa22-23).  [...] filed his opposition on June 12, 2024, (Pa653-54), and Defendants filed a reply on July 1, 2024, (Pa688-709).  The trial court heard oral argument on July 15, 2024 and issued its decision granting Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment at that time, with an Order following.
[brief] Notably, the conduct in this example would constitute a violation of N.J.S.A. 39:4-127.1 and would mean the person was unlawfully present on the crossing at the time of the collision.  The legislature could not have intended damages to be recovered given this type of conduct, yet if [...]’s position is correct, then this would be the result.  Moreover, if [...]’s position is correct, then Plaintiff can recover in this matter because [...] walked from the sidewalk onto the edge of the crossing, but Plaintiff could not recover if [...] instead walked from the sidewalk and onto the pavement just outside the limits of the crossing, which was just two to three feet further north and adjacent to the crossing.
[brief] New Jersey Supreme Court jurisprudence supplies additional support for Defendants’ position.  The Court has explained that the theory behind quo warranto and the public interest in ensuring the proper status of officeholders derives from the fact that “the office is created by the public. ”  In re Fichner, 144 N.J. 459, 470 (1996).  See also Fredericks v. Bd. of Health, 82 N.J.L. 200 --- ³  The plaintiff in Kratovil cited the reference to “office” from Perez in arguing, the same as Plaintiffs here, that a BOG member holds public office.  [...] noted the dicta but, correctly, did not treat it as binding when ruling that BOG members did not hold an “office. ”  Kratovil, 473 N.J. Super. at 503. (1912) (defining public “office” as “a place in a governmental system created or recognized by the law of the state which either directly or by delegated authority assigns to the incumbent thereof the continuous performance of certain permanent public duties”).  Applied here, the BOG and its membership positions were not created by the public, but rather through a contractual agreement between the University and the State.
[brief] Despite the baseless assertion of staff “outing” students, only the Superintendent or her designed Administrator shall notify the parent, and only after the following steps are completed:  - Staff members may not notify parents but must immediately inform a student’s counselor of an accommodation which may trigger notification; - The counselor shall notify the building administrator of a student’s request; - Superintendent shall consult with the Board Attorney, School Counselor, and appropriate administrators and teaching staff members; - Counselor and administrator will determine the level of risk for harm and/or abuse associated with disclosure, which may preclude disclosure; - Inform the student of the intent to disclose; - Offer the student the opportunity to personally disclose; and - Provide supporting measures, such as: counseling; practicing visualization and role playing of conversation with parents; discussing the pros/cons of disclosure; evaluating the feasibility of various disclosure conversation options; collaborating with the student on reasonable and comfortable timeline for disclosure; or offering the student options for other trusted adults to be part of the conversation.  Da163-165.  As specifically stated in the Policy, and as demonstrated above, the Board supports healthy communication between a transgender student and their family.
[directive] DOMESTIC VIOLENCE Directive  Implementing Procedures for the Seizure of Weapons from Municipal and County Law Enforcement Officers Involved in Domestic Violence Incidents  Issued August 1995 Revised September 2000 TO: DIRECTOR, DIVISION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE  ALL COUNTY PROSECUTORS  ALL LAW ENFORCEMENT  CHIEF EXECUTIVES FROM: [...]  ATTORNEY GENERAL DATE: SEPTEMBER 1, 2000
[brief] And the radio dispatch indicated that the store was robbed by two Black men.  [...] testified that upon seeing three Black males in the vehicle, he inferred that the third was the getaway driver.  While [...]’s inference was reasonable, with the dearth of information available at the time regarding the suspects, it could easily be argued that police would have also been able to stop a single Black man in a car, or on foot, based on the assumption that the robbery suspects split up after the crime.  The reality is that the ambiguous nature of the description could have resulted in Black men in any configuration and using any mode of transportation being stopped because the only descriptors of the suspects were race and sex.
[brief] Similarly, as to “counsel fees and costs for time spent establishing wrongful acts on the part of defendants that pre-dated the time for which the RICO claims could be asserted,” this Court held that, to award such fees, “the court must find that the time devoted to presenting that evidence was reasonably required to establish the RICO claims. ”  Id.  Complying with this mandate requires evaluating whether, and the extent to which, the fees for specific tasks were in fact “reasonably devoted to plaintiffs’ pursuit” of the RICO claims.  Instead of complying with this Court’s mandate, the Special Master and the Trial Court focused on the presence of factual overlap at a high level.
[brief] **  Finally, Plaintiff concedes that he knew the identity of [...] at the time of the accident because he was a patron of the restaurant.  (Plaintiff’s second brief, at 32)  Plaintiff attempts to avoid the logical conclusion that his lawsuit was untimely by arguing that even though he asserted a common-law claim against [...] after the statute of limitations had run, and even though neither the discovery rule nor the fictitious party pleading rule applies, the claim is nevertheless timely because he did not possess [...]’s lease agreement and New Jersey law concerning whether a common-law exists takes into consideration the terms of the lease.  Plaintiff wants to have it both ways.  Plaintiff wants to assert a common-law duty but, at the same time, does not wish to be bound by the fact that he had two years to file a common-law duty claim but failed to do so.
[brief] “Because evidence of a previous misconduct ‘has a unique tendency’ to prejudice a jury, it must be admitted with caution. ”  State v. Willis, 225 N.J. 85, 97 (2016).  Prior-bad-act evidence “has the effect of suggesting to a jury that a defendant has a propensity to commit crimes, and, therefore, that it is more probable that he committed the crime for which he is on trial. ”  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  To make certain that such evidence will be used only for appropriate, limited purposes and not to demonstrate the defendant’s propensity to commit crime, Cofield set out a four-pronged test for the admissibility of evidence under N.J.R.E. 404(b): (1) the evidence of the other crime must be relevant to a material issue in dispute; (2) it must be similar in kind and reasonably close in time to the offense charged; (3) the evidence must be clear and convincing; and, (4) the evidence’s probative value must not be outweighed by its apparent prejudice.
[brief] Instead of staying with [...], the target of the investigation and the only person linked to criminal activity, [...] pursued [...] and [...] pursued [...].  (2T 9-4 to 11; Da 9 at 0:43 to 0:54)  [...] followed [...] across the street and quickly apprehended him.  (Da 9 at 0:47 to 0:54; Da 11 at 0:27 to 0:34)  During the seven second pursuit, [...] sprained his ankle.
[brief] 2.  It Was Plain Error For The Court To Instruct The Jury In The Accomplice Liability Instructions On All Of The Possible Elements Of Second-Degree Robbery And None Of The Elements Of First-Degree Robbery, Which Was The Only Theory Argued By State Based On The Victim's Death, And Then To Allow Defendant To Be Convicted And Sentenced As An Accomplice To First-Degree Robbery, Which Was Not Even A Question On The Verdict Sheet.
[directive] Definitions  The following words and terms, as used in this subchapter, shall have the following meanings, unless the context clearly indicates otherwise.  of in "Annual budget" or "budget" means the annual budget the municipality as described the Local Budget Law.  & Financial Reporting Audit Report  1-  Annual Debt Statement = days 30  Due after close of the fiscal year.  3.5% limit  Debt shall exkeed of 3-year average equalized valuation.  not = limit exceed the debt the governing body must apply to the Local Finance Board.  To = limit if School districts can absorb "unused" municipal capacity they exceed their own 4%).  - (which varies by type of district maximum of = do Self-liquidating utilities not affect the net debt.  2.  Annual Financial Statement  40  Due days after close of the fiscal year.  as Annual Financial Statement presents the financial position of the municipality of the close the fiscal year, provides closing amounts surplus, collection of tax I t of rate, results operations, and outstanding debt and required maturities.  Also of includes municipal utilities. = preparation, introduction and adoption annual municipal budget.  Vital of for 3.  Audit Report = 6  Due months after close fiscal year. of = body. by (RMA)  Filed a Registered Municipal Accountant appointed by the governing 45  Governing body is required review and sign Group Affidavit within days of t o receipt audit. of 4.  Audit Opinions and Management Letter = with Governing body should meet the Auditor to discuss findings and recommendations.  5.  Corrective Action Plan = body. days 60  Due after the filing the Audit Report with the governing of = will Requtres the Chief Financial Officer to file and describe how the local unit I$ in correct the problems identified the Audit.  The governing body should follow up with appropriate officials.  For more information contact: [...]
[brief] ”  N.J.S.A. 2A:28-3.  By application of N.J.S.A. 2A:28, the appointment of the Commissioners was a final order as to the remedy for resolution of the subject boundary dispute.  The statute directs that “the commissioners shall file a report thereof with the court within such time as the court shall prescribe and, unless otherwise ordered by the court, the report shall be final and conclusive against all of the parties and their heirs and assigns. ”  N.J.S.A. 2A:28-2.  The language of the statute, specifically the use of the word “shall” and establishing the report as “final and conclusive” establishes the presumption of irrevocability with respect to the Report of the Commissioners.  N.J.S.A. 2A:28-2.  The statute also provides the sole authority with respect to review of the Commissioners’ Report, as N.J.S.A. 2A:28-3 provides that a party may apply to “set aside the report. ”  The statute does not provide for any substantive changes to the Commissioners’ Report, nor does it provide for a partial adoption of the Report with respect to certain findings and a rejection as to other findings.  Thereby, the Trial Court was constrained with respect to its ultimate rulings upon the Commissioners’ Report, given it had the discretion only to either accept the Commissioners’ Report as final and conclusive as to all parties to the suit, or completely set the report aside.
[brief] [...] is a debt collector and forged five documents to cash in full price.  N.J.S.A. 12A:3-202 and N.J.S.A. 12A:3-203 govern debt collectors in NJ.  [...] Resubmitted the Recycled Forged Mortgage Assignment of 2/27/2009  On 2/27/2009  [...] forged the mortgage assignment of 2/27/2009 from [...] to [...] (065a).  On 3/10/2009 [...] filed its first foreclosure against my house ([...]).  On 12/20/10 Hon. [...] issued his order that the Mortgage Assignment of 2/27/2009 robo-signed by [...] and he ordered [...] to withdraw that mortgage assignment and cure its deficiencies and re-file it (068a).  [...] suspended the Foreclosure Complaint Of 3/10/2009 and added my name to the Group 3 List (087a).  [...] suspended the Foreclosure Complaint of 3/10/2009 because of the forged assignment of 2/27/2009 (065a).
[brief] Further amendment was imposed in 2014 which served as the basis for denial on Plaintiffs’ plans.  (Da636).  Defendant suggests that both the developer and [...] had the power to pass upon all building alterations.  (Da525-526).  (Db7).  Let us assume that this fact is true.  The practice referred is the mere passing upon or approving plans which serves to assure that deed restrictions have been adhered.  It does not empower the developer, nor the club, to change or alter those deed restrictions.  There are no facts reflecting that [...] was given carte blanche to take over the developer’s role\(^1\) and even assuming same, there are no facts or document which suggest that [...] had any --- \(^1\)
[brief] Accordingly, the Trial Court correctly held that irrespective of the Settlement Agreement, consideration of [...]’s overall estate plan eliminates any notion that [...] has a viable claim to the Palm Beach Property through [...]’s Estate or [...]’s Revocable Trust.  (Da277a.)  Based on the standard for finding probable intent, “[i]t is clear [[...]] did not intend for [[...]] to receive the Palm Beach Property,” as the property was expressly “excluded from the other properties bequeathed to [[...]] which were specifically stated in Section 3.3(A) of [...]’s Revocable Trust. ”  (Id.)  The Trial Court characterized [...]’s argument that the Palm Beach Property somehow immediately passes to her under the residuary clause notwithstanding the exclusionary language in Section 3.3A as “wholly illogical and contradictory to [[...]’s] intent. ”  (Id.)  That holding was sound and substantiated, and no basis in law or fact exists to overturn that decision.  (Id.)  A.
[brief] Plaintiff-Appellant further seeks to have this Court determine that [...] breached that purported implied contract.  New Jersey’s Model Jury Charges provide the following explanation of a “implied” contract:  An implied contract is one in which the parties show their agreement by conduct.  For example, if someone provides services to another under circumstances that do not support the idea that they were donated or free, the law implies an obligation to pay the reasonable value of services.  Thus, an implied contract is an agreement inferred from the parties’ conduct or from the circumstances surrounding their relationship.  In other words, a defendant may be obligated to pay for services rendered for defendant by plaintiff if the circumstances are such that plaintiff reasonably expected defendant to compensate plaintiff and if a reasonable person in defendant’s position would know that plaintiff was performing the services expecting that defendant would pay for them.  Model Jury Charges (Civil), 4:10 E, “Bilateral Contracts Express or Implied” (approved 5/98).  See also, Wanaque Borough Sewerage Auth. v. West Milford, 281 N.J. Super. 22, 30 (App. Div. 1995).  Because precedential New Jersey case law establishes that the relationship between student and university should not be viewed in strictly contractual terms, a Court should be very cautious in imposing an “implied” contract between a student and a university.
[brief] ”  Id.  When the Board decides to reject a mail-in ballot based on a missing or discrepant signature on the inner envelope’s certificate, the Board must issue a “Cure Letter” informing the voter that their ballot is being rejected, why it is being rejected, and how to cure the alleged or actual deficiency.  N.J.S.A. 19:63-17(b)(1).  As the statute’s plain language states, the Board’s obligation to permit a mail-in voter to cure their ballot relates only to a “deficiency involv[ing] the signature of the voter. ”  Id. at (b)(2).  The inner certificate, however, requires more than just the voter’s signature.  The inner certificate requires the voter to print the voter’s name and address and to complete the assistor information, if applicable.  See N.J.S.A. 19:63-13(a).  Therefore, the Board correctly rejected this ballot, as the certification submitted by [...] was not only missing her signature but was left completely blank.
[brief] [Id. at Trans. ID: [...]]  On April 6th, 2022, Defendant filed an objection to Plaintiff’s motion, filed four letters with [...], and also improperly filed a letter with the Honorable [...], A.J.S.C.  [Da12; T19:16-18]  On May 26th, 2022, Defendant filed an additional brief in opposition to Plaintiff’s motion.  [Pa5; Trans. ID: [...]]  Oral Argument was held on May 27th, 2022, and the Court granted Plaintiff’s motion to reinstate the case and enter judgment.
[brief] It is [...]’s position that “prior to execution” as stated in the RETA statute and as defined by Black’s Law Dictionary means: The act of carrying out or putting into effect; Validation of a written instrument, such as a contract or a will, by fulfilling the necessary legal requirements.  Execution, Black’s Law Dictionary, (11th Ed. 2019) (emphasis added).  In addition, the word execute is defined by Black’s Law as: To perform or complete (a contract or duty); To bring (a legal document) into its final legally enforceable form.  *Execute*, *Id.*  In addition to all that, [...]’s contractual documents that each Plaintiff/Respondent reviewed, acknowledged and signed make clear that it is not until the expiration of the three-day attorney review/cool off period that the contract becomes legally binding:
[brief] ”  *N. Bergen Rex Transp., Inc. v. Trailer Leasing Co.*, 158 N.J. 561, 569 (1999).  Awarding counsel fees pursuant to R. 4-42-9(a)(6) is not mandatory for a successful claimant on a liability policy.  *Enright v. Lubow*, 215 N.J. Super. 306, 313 (App. Div. 1987).  Instead, the “trial judge has broad discretion as to when, where, and under what circumstances counsel fees may be proper and the amount to be awarded. ”  *Iafelice ex rel. Wright v. Arpino*, 319 N.J. Super. 581, 590 (App. Div. 1999).  The exercise of that discretion should respectfully result in a rejection of Plaintiffs request for recovery of their inflated attorneys’ fees and costs.
[brief] 10 POINT I THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY DENYING THE SUPPRESSION MOTION BECAUSE IT IS UNREASONABLE TO INITIATE A TRAFFIC STOP BASED ON A POSSIBLE OUTSTANDING WARRANT BEFORE CONFIRMING THE WARRANT’S ACCURACY.  (Da13-40)..................................................10  POINT II  THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY GRANTING THE STATE’S MOTION TO COMPEL BUCCAL SWABS BECAUSE THE SIGNIFICANT DELAY IN SEEKING FORENSIC TESTING WAS UNREASONABLE.  (Da60-68)..................................................................15  CONCLUSION ......................................................................................  19  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, RULINGS, & ORDERS BEING APPEALED  Order Denying Motion to Suppress .................................................................  Da40  Opinion Denying Motion to Suppress .........................................................  Da13-39  Order Granting Motion to Compel Buccal Swab ...........................................  Da59  Opinion Granting Motion to Compel Buccal Swab ................................. Da60-68  INDEX TO APPENDIX
[brief] TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ........................................................................................................ ii  TABLE OF CONTENTS – APPENDIX .................................................................................. iv  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT .................................................................................................  1  PROCEDURAL HISTORY .......................................................................................................  3  COUNTERSTATEMENT OF FACTS .....................................................................................  5  LEGAL ARGUMENT ..............................................................................................................  15  POINT I  THE TRIAL JUDGE PROPERLY EXERCISED HER DISCRETION TO RECONSIDER  THE INTERLOCUTORY ORDERS PURSUANT TO R. 4:42-2 IN THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE.  ...........................................................................................................................................  16  POINT II  THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY GRANTED SUMMARY JUDGMENT WHERE PLAINTIFF FAILED TO PRESENT SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE UPON WHICH A JURY COULD FIND PROXIMATE CAUSE.  ........................................................................................................  21  POINT III  THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE HER DISCRETION IN DENYING PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION.  ........................................................................................................  32  CONCLUSION ..........................................................................................................................  35  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
[brief] 16 State v. Santamaria, 236 N.J. 390 (2019) .................................................................................................................. 11 State v. Simms, 224 N.J. 393 (2016)  .................................................................................................................. 13, 14 State v. Singh, 245 N.J. 1 (2021) .......................................................................................................................  10 State v. Stull, 403 N.J. Super. 501 (App. Div. 2008) ....................................................................................  24 State v. Trinidad, 241 N.J. 425 (2020) .................................................................................................................. 9, 11, 12, 13 State v. Villanueva, 373 N.J. Super. 588 (App. Div. 2004) .....................................................................................  18
[brief] (1T 17:14-21).  The court merged counts two and four with count one and imposed a concurrent ten-year term on count three.  (1T 17:24-18:13).  On [...], which was the certain persons not to possess a weapon, the court sentenced defendant to a consecutive term of ten years with five years parole ineligibility.  (1T 18:14-19).  On appeal, this Court affirmed defendant’s convictions and sentence, but remanded the case for the trial court to reconsider its determination that the ten-year sentence imposed on [...] was to be served consecutively to the sentences imposed on [...]; the ¹ The State adopts defendant’s transcript designation codes at (Db1 n.1).