ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] 1T31 8-15.  Despite the Lower Court’s thorough reasoning, Appellant relies on *Allstate Ins. Co. v. Howard Sav. Institution*, 127 N.J. Super. 479, 789 (Ch. Div. 1974) to support its position that laches does not bar Appellant’s requested relief.  In *Allstate*, the court held that “plaintiff’s position would have been no better than it was at any later time . . .  Whatever delay occurred caused no prejudice to plaintiff and resulted at least in part from plaintiff’s acquiescence and contributions thereto. ”  *Id.*, at 491.  Here, the opposite holds true – Appellant, although she became aware of the Collection Action at the latest in 2019, waited until 2024, *after* first commencing a Class Action and following the expiration of the statute of limitations, to raise claims as to Respondent’s licensure status, in the presumed hopes that her Motion to Vacate would be granted, Respondent’s Collection Action would be dismissed, and Respondent would be time-barred from recommencement of the Action to collect on the Debt.  1T31 8-15.  Now, any ability to recommence the Action would be time-barred and, thus, Respondent is significantly prejudiced by Appellant’s conceded delay in moving to vacate his default.  Thus, the Lower Court did not abuse its discretion in determining that Appellant is barred by Laches.  For these reasons, the Lower Court correctly denied Appellant’s Motion to Vacate.  D.  Appellant’s Is Barred from Raising the Alleged CFLA Defense
[brief] Appellant’s insurer, [...], had the opportunity to resolve this matter in the best interest of their insured, but refused to even make a settlement offer; any settlement offer.  The insurer called all-of-the shots relative to the defense of this matter, including to force Respondent and her counsel to incur significant litigation costs and to expend significant attorney hours litigating this issue.  It should further be noted that despite entry of judgment against Appellant, no bond has been posted on his behalf and Respondent continues to suffer from the damages she incurred, without justice and/or compensation.  This Court should not alter a justly determined damages award, which is not excessive or even argued to be shocking of the judicial conscience, based upon an unsubstantiated allegation of financial hardship; where ultimately the insurance carrier will be liable for satisfying the judgment and/or face the potential for Bad Faith.  Based upon the foregoing, Respondent, [...], respectfully requests that this Honorable Court affirm the Jury’s verdict, Order for Judgment, Order to Pay Counsel/Offer of Judgment Fees and the Order denying Appellant a new trial.
[directive] 2.2.4  In addition, the rules and regulations should set forth a schedule of possible penalties an officer might receive when discipline is imposed.  The rules and regulations may incorporate a system of progressive discipline.  Progressive discipline serves an important role in the process by which the agency deals with complaints of misconduct or inappropriate behavior.  In lieu of discipline, counseling, re-training, enhanced supervision, oral reprimand and performance notices can be used as instructional or remedial devices to address deficiencies or inadequate performance.  2.2.5
[brief] Plaintiff-Appellant [...] extended a commercial line of credit to [...] that was personally guaranteed by Defendant-Appellant [...].  Upon default, Plaintiff filed a Complaint alleging breach of contract in 2015.  The Affidavits of Service identify service upon an individual matching Ardolino’s description at Ardolino’s business and residence locations on the same date and time.  After Defendant failed to file an Answer, Plaintiff obtained Default Judgment.  Plaintiff served post-Judgment Information Subpoenas and Orders to Defendant’s residence between 2015 and 2020, including acknowledged certified mail in 2015.  Defendant acknowledges becoming aware of the Judgment as early as 2020, when he submitted multiple filings with the Court in response to Plaintiff’s communications.  In 2023, Defendant moved to vacate the Default Judgment.  The trial court denied the motion, finding Defendant’s failure to take immediate action upon admitted, actual knowledge of the Judgment was fatal to the application.  The trial court also made findings that Defendant failed to present sufficient, credible evidence disputing being personally served.  The trial court’s findings were well-supported by the record.  As Defendant cannot demonstrate any reversible error, the trial court’s findings should be affirmed.
[brief] ###  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | Cases | |-------| | **Mulford v. Abbot,**<br>42 N.J. Super. 509 (App. Div. 1956) | 10 | | **Palamarg Realty Co. v. Rehac.**<br>80 N.J. 446 (1979) | 4 | | **Patton v. N. Jersey Dist. Water Supply Comm’n,**<br>93 N.J. 180 (1983) | 9 | | **Stump v. Whibco,**<br>314 N.J. Super. 560 (App. Div. 1988) | 9 | | **Yellen v. Kassin,**<br>416 N.J. Super. 113 (App. Div. 2010) | 3, 9 | | Statutes | |----------| | **N.J.S.A. 40:55-1.17** | 6 | | **N.J.S.A. 45:26A-1, et seq.** | 1, 4 |
[brief] (APPEALING THE ORDER DATED MAY 17, 2023 FOUND AT PA000337 AND ORDER DATED MAY 26, 2023  FOUND AT PA000351)  As said forth above, the Probate Court made no findings as to whether or not [...]’s negligence caused the attorneys fees in the Probate Action expended by the Plaintiffs or as to his negligent advice regarding the provision of the mortgage.  It was error for the Court to dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint in the entirety without addressing these allegations.  CONCLUSION
[brief] See generally, Paff v. Ocean Co. Pros. Office, 235 N.J. 1 (2018)(Mobile Video Recorders, or “MVRs” qualify as exempt criminal investigatory record under OPRA as they are not required by law to be made or maintained); North Jersey Media Group, Inc. v. Tp. Of Lyndhurst, 229 N.J. 541 (2017)(Use of Force Reports are not exempt criminal investigatory records as they are required by law to be made and maintained).  On remand, the criminal record at issue in this case was identified by the trial court as a criminal investigatory record, as indeed, it was an investigation report related to an alleged criminal matter and was not required by law to be made or maintained.  See Bent v. Tp. of Stafford, 381 N.J.Super. 30, 39 (2005), where the Appellate Division acknowledged finding “no requirement in the law concerning ‘the making, maintaining or keeping on file the results of an investigation by a law enforcement official or agency into the alleged commission of a criminal offence. ’”  As such, it is a record that is exempt from access.  In accordance with the statute, and as buttressed by privacy interests expounded upon in *North Jersey Media Group, Inc. v. Bergen Cnty. Pros. Office*, 447 N.J.Super. 182 (App.Div. 2016) and *Fuster v. Tp. of Chatham*, _____ N.J.Super. ____ (App.Div. 2023)(reproduced at Da127), the Township custodian properly denied access to this criminal investigatory record.
[brief] Can you tell based on this photograph whose handwriting is on line 36?  A.  No, I cannot.  It may be [...] -- I am not saying........ Q. [...] who?  A. [...] Struble.  Q.  What we are seeing right now in this photograph which is marked King 143, to the best of your recollection is that what it looked like up until the time you retired from the company?  A. Yes....... Q.  I am not asking you to speculate.  If you were standing in front of this panel and you opened the door and looked at the label and went to line 36, assume you didn't know what it controlled, would you be able to read what was written on line 36?
[directive] Annual review of overall department use of force.  The law enforcement executive shall also conduct an annual review of use of force incidents in their department.  The review shall include, at a minimum, the following: (a) analytical reports from the Attorney General’s Use of Force Portal; (b) an audit of body worn cameras and other videos on a risk-based and randomly selected basis; (c) any internal affairs complaints; and 21  USE OF FORCE POLICY | December 2021
[brief] State v. Marshall, 148 N.J. 89 (1997) ..........................................................11  State v. Martini, 160 N.J. 248 (1999) .......................................................12-13  State v. Morrison, 188 N.J. 2 (2006) ...........................................................27  State v. Morrison, 215 N.J. Super. 540 (App. Div. 1987) ..............................26 State v. Nash, 212 N.J. 518 (2013) .............................................................11  State v. O’Neal, 190 N.J. 601 (2008) ..........................................................23  State v. Petrozelli, 351 N.J. Super. 14 (App. Div. 2002) ...............................18  State v. Pillot, 115 N.J. 558 (1989) ............................................................24  State v. Powell, 294 N.J. Super. 557 (App. Div. 1996) .................................14, 20 State v. Quixal, 431 N.J. Super. 502 (App. Div. 2013) ..................................13  State v. Rountree, 399 N.J.  Super. 190 (App. Div. 2006) .............................24  State v. Savage, 172 N.J. 374 (2002) ...........................................................15  State v. Schenkolewski, 301 N.J. Super. 115 (App. Div. 1997) ......................27  State v. Scherzer, 301 N.J. Super. 363 (App. Div. 1997) ...............................28-29  State v. Smith, 269 N.J. Super. 86 (App. Div. 1993) ......................................27-28  State v. Studrivant, 31 N.J. 165 (1959) .......................................................15  State v. Taccetta, 351 N.J. Super. 196 (App. Div. State v. Worlock, 117 N.J. 596 (1990) .........................................................
[directive] Make daily determinations of how many priority groups can receive scarce  Hospital leaders and triage officers should make determinations twice critical care resources. daily, or more frequently if needed, about what priority scores will result in access to critical care services.  These determinations should be based on real-time knowledge of the degree of scarcity of the critical care resources, as well as information about the predicted volume of new cases that will be presenting for care over the near-term (several days).  For example, if there is clear evidence that there is imminent shortage of critical care resources (i.e., few ventilators available and large numbers of new patients daily), only patients with the highest priority (lowest scores, e.g., 1-3) should receive scarce critical care resources.  As scarcity subsides, patients with progressively lower priority (higher scores) should have access to critical care interventions.  There are at least two reasonable approaches to group patients: 1) according to their raw score on the 1-8 multi-principle allocation score; and 2) by creating 3 priority categories based on patients’ raw priority scores (e.g., high priority, intermediate priority, and low priority).  Using the full 1-8 scale avoids creating arbitrary cut-points on what is a continuous scale and allows all the information to be used from the priority score.
[brief] 2.  The [...], [...], and [...]  All Qualify As Statutory “News Media” Sources.  (4T)  All three VRDO Data Sources also qualify as “news media” sources under the NJFCA, a term that “the [U.S.] Supreme Court has acknowledged . . . has a ‘broad sweep. ’”  U.S. ex rel. Kraxberger v. Kan. City Power & Light Co., 756 F.3d 1075, 1079 (8th Cir. 2014) (quoting Schindler Elevator Corp. v. U.S. ex rel. Kirk, 563 U.S. 401, 408 (2011)).  Under the federal FCA public disclosure bar, “news media” include any sources whose aim is to distribute information to the public, no matter how small the audience and whether or not the source resembles a traditional news organization.  See U.S. ex rel. Green v. Serv. Cont. Educ. & Training Tr. Fund, 843 F. Supp. 2d 20, 32 (D.D.C. 2012) (“[C]ourts that have considered the issue have construed the term [news media] to include readily accessible websites. ”) (collecting cases); see also, e.g., U.S. ex rel. Osheroff v. Humana Inc., 776 F.3d 805, 813 (11th Cir. 2015) (collecting cases holding that information-distributing websites are news media); U.S. ex rel. Oliver v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 101 F. Supp. 3d 111, 125 (D.D.C. 2015) (publicly available and searchable websites designed “to give the public an accurate account of those entities’ contracting requirements” were news media), aff’d, 826 F.3d 466.  “[T]he ordinary meaning of the words ‘news media’ is quite broad and includes information shared through means of communication that reach or influence people widely. ”  Rosenberg, 169 N.E.3d at 459.  Just like other “news media” sources, the VRDO Data Sources are designed to collect information and then distribute it to the public.
[brief] Part One covers an employer’s statutory obligations under the Act to pay benefits to an injured worker.  See Pa78-82.  Specifically, Part One provides, “We will pay promptly when due the benefits required of you by the workers compensation law. ”  Pa79.  Plaintiff’s civil action does not assert a claim against [...] for benefits under the Act.  Therefore, there can be no coverage under Part One for the claims asserted against [...] in Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint.  Part Two covers certain legally recognized liabilities of an employer to its employees but does not provide coverage and/or a defense for civil suits improperly brought against the employer.
[brief] ”  Meadowbrook Carting Co. v. Borough of Island Heights, 138 N.J. 307, 314-15 (1994) (adopting River Vale Twp. v. R. J. Longo Const. Co., 127 N.J. Super. 207, 216 New Jersey’s public bidding laws “exist for the benefit of taxpayers, not bidders, and should be construed with sole reference to the public good.
[brief] 17T116-1 to 119-17, 131-20 to 135-10; 25T57-19 to 74-20; 31T44-19 to 99-1; Da03033 – Da03039, Da07364 – Da07386, Da07179 – Da07180, Da07387.  Despite [...]’s testimony at trial that he did not review or access these records prior to this lawsuit, the metadata in the files found on [...]’s computer proved otherwise as the dates of the files ranged from 2007 to 2017.  Id. E.
[brief] **  During the hearing conducted by the Trial Court on March 27, 2024, the Appellant refused to accept the Court’s factual finding that the Board did not rely on the Sketch to establish the building’s approved height.  Instead, the Appellant ignored the Court’s ruling and repeatedly argued that the building was not constructed to the proper height based solely on the Sketch.  The Appellant pointed to no other document or evidence to support his contention.  Notwithstanding the Trial Court’s factual finding, the Appellant requested that the Sketch be moved into evidence.  [...] objected to the admission of the Sketch into evidence on the grounds that the Sketch was not relevant because it was not considered by the Board.  The Trial Court sustained [...]’s objection and denied the admission of the Sketch into evidence.  (2T20:24 to 21:5, 2T23:1-10, 2T23:20-21, 2T30:19-24, 2T32:13-18, and 2T33:14-16).  Despite the Sketch having been excluded from evidence, the Appellant then attempted to move the [...] Ad into evidence.  The proffer for the [...] Ad was to show the cinder block dimensions depicted in the advertisement demonstrated that the constructed building height exceeded the +/- 51’ building height shown on the Sketch.  As the Sketch had already been ruled irrelevant and therefore inadmissible, the Trial Court held that the [...] Ad to prove the building was not built in accordance with the Sketch was likewise irrelevant and therefore inadmissible.  (2T36:24 to 39:14).  The Appellant’s burden was to prove that the actual building height exceeded the approved building height of 43’-6” above DFE as shown on the approved plans and not the Sketch.  (2T39: 4-25).  The Trial Court gave the Appellant numerous opportunities to introduce relevant evidence to support his claim that the actual building height exceeded the building height shown on the approved plans.  (2T40:12-16).  Instead of introducing evidence that the building exceeded the height shown on the approved plans, the Appellant repeatedly attempted to introduce the Sketch and [...] Ad to prove his claim.  Given the complete lack of relevant evidence introduced by the Appellant, the Trial Court appropriately dismissed the Complaint with prejudice as the Appellant failed to carry his burden of proof.  (2T40:20 to 42:8).
[brief] Instead, the Trial Court inexplicably held that [...]’s directors either lacked sufficient agency to know what was best for [...] and its congregation, or somehow colluded with [...] to transfer the Property to [...].  As no [...] director or congregant has ever raised such a concern in the two years since [...] transferred title for the Property to [...], those with legal standing to challenge any personal interest in the transfer clearly do not believe the transfer was adverse to [...]’s interests.  Finally, the timing of [...]’s transfer of the Property has no relation to the damages [...] suffered from [...]’ breach.  [...]’s damages were quantified the moment that [...] paid the Purchase Price to [...].  Anything [...] did with the Property after that moment was to avoid future damages as opposed to somehow mitigate those damages that had been inflicted by the [...]’ actions.  Whether the subsequent transfer occurred an hour, a week, a month, a year, or five years from the date of Closing makes no difference.  Would there be no damages if [...] had merged with [...]?  Would [...] have suffered no damages if it had sold the Property for more than the Purchase Price?  The answer for each is “no”.  To hold otherwise would only reward the TDPs and absolve them for their egregious breach of fiduciary duty.  Such a result should not be countenanced and the Court’s decision in this regard should be reversed.
[brief] The motion judge never analyzed whether the actions taken by the employer against [...], independently or collectively, would dissuade a reasonable person from complaining about discrimination as required by New Jersey Supreme Court precedent.  Further, throughout its analysis, the motion judge decided disputed issues of fact in favor of the employer and against [...] and decided that the employer had met its burden of proving a legitimate reason for the disciplinary actions taken against [...] on the grounds that [...] failed to follow DEP protocol and procedure justifying the discipline, only by ignoring evidence to the contrary, including facts contradicting the employer’s basis for taking the numerous disciplinary actions, the timing of the retaliatory actions being taken shortly after Alan [...]’s protected activity, the employer’s failures to comply with its own policies, a finding by the employer in 2012 that [...], a person who retaliated against Alan [...], had earlier created a hostile environment, a 2015 investigation by the employer finding no discrimination and retaliation that was deeply flawed because it ignored important evidence, the posting of a derogatory retirement flyer throughout the [...] headquarters that depicted Alan [...] in a false and unflattering light alleging criminality that even the defendants described as “inappropriate,” “derogatory,” “meanspirited,” “mean,” “hateful,” and “hurtful. ”
[directive] Czy rozumie Pan(i), że ograniczenia dotyczące miejsca (3) [Tak/Yes] [Nie/No] [Nie dotyczy/NA] zamieszkania mogą obejmować ograniczenie prawa do zamieszkania pod jednym dachem z nieletnimi?  Do you understand that the restrictions on where you can live may include restrictions on residing in a home with minor children?  Czy rozumie Pan(i), że w przypadku naruszenia warunków (4) [Tak/Yes] [Nie/No] [Nie dotyczy/NA] dożywotniego nadzoru społecznego, oskarżenia i skazania za to naruszenie, może Pan(i) otrzymać karę pozbawienia wolności do lat 5 oraz wyrok specjalny w postaci formalnego dożywotniego (jeżeli takie naruszenie warunków miało nadzoru kuratorskiego lipca 2014 r. lub później), lub może być Pan(i) miejsce 1 oskarżony(a) o przestępstwo czwartego stopnia i otrzymać karę (jeżeli takie naruszenie pozbawienia wolności do 18 miesięcy warunków miało miejsce przed 1 lipca 2014 r.)?
[directive] For the purpose of this Executive Directive, the term "arrest" shall include the taking into custody of a juvenile for an offense which if committed by an adult would constitute a crime or disorderly persons offense.  1.  Requests by School Officials  a.  All requests by any school official to summon a law enforcement officer for the purpose of making an arrest on school property, whether for a suspected violation of the Comprehensive Drug Reform Act or for a suspected violation of any other criminal statute, should be directed to the designated police liaison or to the chief of the department having patrol jurisdiction.  b.  It is understood that agreements or memoranda of understanding shall be entered into between school officials and local law enforcement agencies, and that these agreements or memoranda of understanding should prescribe the preferred procedures for entering school premises for the purpose of effecting arrests.  c.  It shall be the general policy of every law enforcement agency effecting an arrest on school grounds to minimize the disruption of the school environment to the greatest extent possible consistent with the requirements of public safety.  Accordingly, substantial weight should be given by the law enforcement officer assigned to make the arrest to the specific recommendations of the building principal or local superintendent as to the place and manner for effecting the arrest.  d.  So as to minimize any disruption of the educational environment, every reasonable effort should be made to effect the arrest in the building principal's office, or in some other designated area away from the general student population.  e.
[brief] Pa119, ¶¶ 38, 39.  Even though Holder Respondents were not specifically referenced in the Agreement or Order, Appellant’s claims arise out of LVNV’s collection actions with respect to the Account and its licensure status.  Appellant will likely attempt to argue that the Settlement Agreement and Order only released claims under the FDCPA.  However, when the language is considered in its entirety, it is clear that the release also covered all potential claims relating to licensure under the NJCFLA, given the specific release of claims “arising out of, or in connection with the collection of a debt on behalf of [...] … when they were not licensed under New Jersey Consumer Finance Licensing Act (‘NJCFLA’).