ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] In re: Reisdorf, 80 N.J. 319, 326 (1979)  ...........................................11  In re: Blomer, 37 N.J. Super. 85, 94 (App.Div.1955) .............................12  In re: Trust of Brown, 213 N.J. Super. 489, 501 (Law.Div.1986)  ............13  Estate of Reisen, 313 N.J.Super. 623, 628-31 (Ch.Div.1998)  ...............13  Rendine v Pantzer, 141 N.J. 292, 337 (1995)  ......................................13  Mauro v Owens Corning Fiberglass Corp.,225 N.J. Super 196, 120 (App).  ..17  Wolfe v Malberg, 334 N.J. Super 630, 637 (App.Div.2000) ....................17  Strahan v Strahan, 402 N.J. Super. 418, 428 (Ch.Div.1993) ..................39 Marx v. Marx, 265 N.J. Super. 418,428 (Ch. Div. 1993).  .....................39  Flagg v Essex County Prosecutor, 171 N.J. 561, 572 2002)(Citations Omitted)  .................................................................39  In re: Probate of Willard Codicil of Macool, 416 N.J. Super 298, 314, (App.Div.2010)  .................................................................40  Czoch v Freeman, 317 N.J. Super. 273, 285.  .....................................60  Woehr v Travelers Ins. Co, 134 N.J. Eq. 38, 40-41, 34A 2d 136(Ch.1943)  ..60  [...], [...] (Middlesex County unpublished but provided)  .................................................................60  Rules of Court Cited: Rule 4:42-9(3) .................................................................11  Rule 4:42-9(b) ...............................................................12  Rule 1:7-4 .................................................................15  APPENDIX PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[brief] The Trial Court, at numerous points, stressed the lack of any testimony or evidence in the record contradictory to Plaintiffs’ experts, or in support of the Board’s ultimate resolution:  Despite the absence of any expert or other testimony to the contrary, the [...] nevertheless denied said variance relief, baldly asserting in the Resolution that “The intensity of the proposed development in the developable area of the lot is far too intense as evidenced by the D1 Use Variance, and the two (2) D6 Height Variances, and the number, type, character and extent of the variances requested.
[brief] Nor did [...] diligently or promptly seek to intervene in this matter in her individual capacity.  Instead, [...] engaged in the precise conduct this Court expressly deemed inappropriate: she sat on the sidelines and only sought to intervene when it was clear [...]’s claims were going to fail for lack of standing.  Indeed, [...] – who only sought to intervene after all trial briefing was fully submitted – admitted that she filed her motion to intervene “in response to a claim that the plaintiff in this action lacks standing. ”  (Da491 at ¶1.)  What’s more, [...]’s request expressly stated that she was only requesting to intervene “[i]n the event that the Court determines that [...] lacks standing”.  (Da492 at ¶7.)  By her own admission, [...] waited until the results of the battle were in before seeking to take action.  See 118 N.J. Super. at 143.
[brief] BOTH OF DEFENDANT’S STATEMENTS SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUPPRESSED IN THEIR ENTIRETY BECAUSE HE WAS IN CUSTODY WHEN QUESTIONED WITHOUT MIRANDA WARNINGS ON MARCH 6, WHICH RENDERED INEFFECTIVE THE WARNINGS GIVEN PRIOR TO HIS INTERROGATION ON MARCH 12.  (21T50-23 to 61-17; Da128-130)  ...........................................................................15  POINT II
[brief] (6, 18, 20 23)  Applying the foregoing principles to the Policy Applications precludes the grant of summary judgment.  Factual issues remain, at minimum, concerning (i) the scope of the definitions; (ii) the materiality of responses to the application questions; and (iii) the impact reporting would have had on the issuance of the Policies.  The analysis of Plaintiffs’ obligation to report the OAE Proceedings in the Policy Applications starts with two basic premises.
[directive] defendant's a revoke to prosecutor a of motion on court a authorizes 2A:162-24 N.J.S.A. from released been defendant has the when trial pending detained defendant the order and release while defendant the -22, and or 2A:162-17 N.J.S.A. to pursuant acomplaint-warrant on custody probable of finding upon a or release, of condition or order restraining a violated release on revocation order  To release.  on while crime new a committed defendant the that believe to cause would release of condition no evidence that convincing and clear find must court the release, of safety the protection of the required, when court in appearance defendant's the assure reasonably to attempt or obstruct will not defendant the that or community, or the person other any of process.  justice criminal the obstruct 3o paragraph I, Article detention under preventive initial seeking from precluded been prosecutors have now, Until However, non-capital cases.
[brief] THE COURT:  So, ladies and gentlemen, you're going to see two photographs that have been admitted into evidence, therefore, you're allowed to see them and that's why I'm permitting that.  However, these photographs have been authenticated by this detective only to extent of his testimony, meaning that the current proofs are these are two photographs which he's testified he extracted from certain electronic devices.  **He gave you the testimony that they were created at a certain date and as to at least one of them I believe at a certain place or the phone was in a certain area.  That's the only information you have so far. **  So that's to the extent they've been authenticated.  If later in the case either side produces any additional information, then obviously it will be for you to consider.  But at this point, remember you're the judges of the facts, it's for you to determine what the facts are, but that's the testimony you have thus far with respect to those two photographs.
[brief] Finally, without specifying whether it contends that the ALJ or Commissioner erred on this issue, [...] reiterates its argument that the public access requirement constitutes an unconstitutional taking.  (Ab36-38).  In the Initial Decision, the ALJ noted that [...]’s “as-applied takings claim . . . is not ripe for adjudication because the DEP has not yet determined the extent of public access that will be required on the [Property],” but he did not decide whether the OAL “would have jurisdiction to address the substance of [...]’s as-applied takings claim. ” (Aa102).  Then, in the Final Decision, the Commissioner modified the ALJ’s finding that [...]’s constitutional claim was not ripe, determining instead that [...]’s “takings claim is a facial - rather than as-applied - constitutional challenge and, as such, cannot be adjudicated by the OAL.
[brief] Plaintiffs filed a third amended complaint on September 23, 2019.  [Pa436].  [...] filed a motion to dismiss the third amended complaint in lieu of answer pursuant to R. 4:6-2.  [Pa590].  [...]’s motion was denied, without prejudice.  [Pa11-Pa12].  [...] filed an answer to the third amended complaint.  [Pa558].  Plaintiffs served answers to interrogatories.  [Pa616].  [...] served answers to interrogatories.  [Pa638].  [...] filed a motion for summary judgment.  [Pa594].  That motion was granted in part and denied in part.  [Pa1-Pa2].  Plaintiffs then filed a motion for summary judgment [Pa929].  That motion was denied.  [Pa1-Pa2].  While plaintiffs’ cross motion for partial summary judgment was pending, plaintiffs filed a second cross motion for partial summary judgment for an Order, compelling all co-defendants’ insurers to provide, [...], with insurance coverage.  Plaintiffs’ Notice of Appeal, Case Information Statement, Brief and Appendix make no reference to this cross motion or that plaintiffs seek to address the denial of this cross motion for partial summary judgment as part of their relief sought herein.  Consequently, it is respectfully submitted that the denial of plaintiffs’ cross motion for second cross motion for partial summary judgment for an Order compelling all co-defendants’ insurers to provide, [...], with insurance coverage should not be made a part of this appeal.  STATEMENT OF FACTS
[brief] Instead, the lower court, without any discovery having occurred in the case and at the pleading stage, acted as if it was the trier of fact, and found as follows:  •  “[B]eing reprimanded for failing to comply with the District COVID-19 mask policy, specifically, for allowing her students to take their masks off while seated, does not rise to the level of ‘materially adverse’ because the entire school district, and its teachers, were provided with the mask-regulations far in advance of the alleged violations”  9a; • “Plaintiff cannot establish that enforcing the mask policy is not in and of itself within the purview of the [...] for protection of teachers, students, and staff”  Id.; and • “Even if the Affirmative Action investigation was retaliatory – which is was not – the Board and its members are protected by qualified immunity”  Id.  (emphasis added).  The lower court also found that certain alleged actions by Defendants, such as the sham investigation, constituted “protected conduct. ”  10a.  In doing so, the lower court’s ruling makes it so that an employer’s investigation of an employee complaint can never constitute retaliation under the NJLAD, irrespective of how the investigation is conducted.  That is simply not a finding that is supportable by the case law or the NJLAD.  The lower court erred by failing to presume the truth of Plaintiff’s allegations, contrary to the standard on a motion to dismiss, which is generous to Plaintiff and affords her with all reasonable inferences.
[brief] ”  [...], writing for the United States Supreme Court, emphasized the importance of appellate review in the context of collateral estoppel:  In significant part, preclusion doctrine is premised on “an underlying confidence that the result achieved in the initial litigation was substantially correct. ”  *Standefer v. United States*, 447 U.S. 10, 23, n. 18, 100 S.Ct. 1999, 64 L.Ed.2d 689 (1980); see Restatement § 29, Comment f, at 295.  “In the absence of appellate review,” we have observed, “such confidence is often unwarranted.
[brief] C.  When plaintiffs amended to name Respondents, the fictitious pleading requirement under NJ R. 4:26-4 was satisfied Rule 4:26-4 allows for the “fictitious name practice” to be utilized by allowing a plaintiff to name fictitious parties as “John Doe” defendants, when the identity of a potential defendant is unknown.  This pleading device allows the plaintiff to take discovery from the known defendants in an effort to determine whether additional defendants should be joined to the lawsuit.  The rule aids plaintiffs, who may not have been aware of the names of responsible parties, by tolling the running of the statute or by permitting them to institute suit prior to the running of the Statute.  The purpose of this rule is to allow a plaintiff faced with a time limitation to institute his or her action, and thereafter, upon learning the true name of his “John Doe” defendant, amend his or her Complaint to specifically name that individual or entity even after the running of the statute of limitations.
[brief] \(^2\)  And, whereas [...] said \(^2\)  The other cases cited by the State are inapposite for that same reason.  See *State v. Kenyon*, 651 N.W.2d 269, 274 (S.D. 2002) (finding a “sufficient” basis for reasonable suspicion where “[the defendants] were sweating, had constricted pupils and slurred speech, all of which are physical symptoms of stimulant use” and had given the police inconsistent answers about where they were going while traveling “a known drug corridor for methamphetamine traffic”); *State v. Cantalupo*, No. A-4142-16T2, 2019 WL 149654, at *7-8 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Jan. 8, 2019) (finding reasonable suspicion the defendant was driving while intoxicated, justifying field sobriety testing, where the defendant was slurring, moving slowly, swaying, having trouble standing had constricted pupils and smelled of a strong chemical order); *State v. Mauro*, No. 09-03-266, 2011 WL 2307256, at *1-2, 5 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2011) (finding probable cause to believe drugs were inside the car where the police had received a call about a suspicious driver and observed the driving swerving, and where the defendant, his medical condition could not explain the symptoms he was exhibiting, [...] told [...] that his pupils were constricted due to his medical condition.
[brief] The satisfaction of those elements guarantees that the underlying purpose of the statute is met and that no prejudice is visited upon the opposing party.  In each case, the court is required to assess the facts against the clearly defined elements to determine whether technical non-conformity is excusable.  The Court can assess this matter under the same principles.  See *Galik, supra*, 167 N.J. at 352, 771 A.2d at 1148 (“It is a doctrine based on justice and fairness, designed to avoid technical rejection of legitimate claims.
[brief] B.  [...]’s decision not to take advantage of multiple opportunities the Arbitrator provided for his submission of a summary judgment opposition is nobody’s fault but [...]’s, and does not require reversal.  A litigant is not entitled to have every conceivable argument or every conceivable piece of evidence considered in an arbitration.  As the trial court correctly observed, “a party may not... successfully vacate an arbitration award... if they were presented with... the opportunity to present evidence. ”  Rock Work, 396 N.J. Super. at 255; see also (Da3171)  [...] did not merely have an opportunity to file his opposition; he had three opportunities.  The trial court correctly found that the Arbitrator “acted within his discretion to determine at what point [[...]] had gone beyond the bounds of his rules. ”  (Da3173)  The trial Court elaborated that the Arbitrator was “well within his authority to preclude submissions from [[...]] after he blatantly disregarded the prior extensions,” and that “[i]t would be folly for this court to second guess the Arbitrator on a procedural question where [the Arbitrator’s] involvement in the case went on for years. ”  (Da3173)  [...] argues the trial court’s reliance on Manchester Township Bd. of Educ. V. Thomas P. Carney, Inc., 199 N.J. Super. 266, 275-75 (App. Div. 1985) “should have actually led to a finding in favor of [...] that he had to the right to the postponement. ”  App. Brf. at 47.  [...]’s reliance on that case is entirely misplaced.  Manchester addressed whether an arbitration award may be vacated due to the arbitrator refusing to consider or receive evidence from a party at all.  That court held that an arbitrator improperly refused to consider evidence when he arbitrarily ended an arbitration with one side not being afforded an opportunity to respond to evidence.  Id. at 270-71.  Critically, the affected party in that case was denied the opportunity to present “pertinent and material evidence. ”  Id. at 272.  This case is completely different.  The record establishes that [...] had three opportunities to oppose the summary judgment motion: first, by October 3, 2018 (Da2095), then, by October 15, 2018, (Ibid) and finally, an unrequested final adjournment to October 18, 2018, at 5:00 pm.  (Da2096)  [...] choosing to ignore these opportunities does not mean he was *denied* any opportunity.  *Manchester* has nothing to do with a party who was given the opportunity to present evidence, but *chose* to disobey multiple deadlines.
[brief] As demonstrated by the Final Award, the Arbitrator concluded that the EGP was not “set in stone,” but “moved at times,” and due to unspecified “serious issues with the projects,” the amount due to [...] was $191,381.00, which [...] had already paid.  Pa574.  While the Arbitrator did reference a “credit” due back to [...], his decision to deny [...]’s $899,051.20 claim for unpaid EGP payments on the Hackensack Project was, obviously, only a decision on the unpaid EGP payments on the Hackensack Project and not a decision regarding the money owed to [...] in its role as subcontractor for [...], which was not and could not have been presented or considered at any point during the PTA Arbitration.  In other words, the Arbitrator’s denial of [...]’s claim for unpaid EGP on the Hackensack Project was due to the fact that the parties could not agree on an EGP for such a problematic project and, therefore, [...] was not liable to make any EGP payments to [...] (and overpaid by the amount of payments [...] did make); the denial of [...]’s claim was not a determination of lability on [...]’s part for the amount owed to [...] for its work under the separate completion subcontract with [...] as prime contractor.
[brief] 178 N.J. at 173-74.  Instead, fourteen months later, after discovery was essentially complete, defense counsel filed a motion to dismiss the complaint based upon plaintiff’s failure to produce a timely affidavit of merit.  Ibid.  The Court found defense counsel’s delay inexplicable.  Yet, it declined to apply the doctrine of waiver, id. at 178, observing, “The party waiving a known right must do so clearly, unequivocally, and decisively. ”  Id. at 177.  The Court concluded, “We cannot find on this record that defendant intentionally elected to forgo his right to seek the remedy of dismissal by his tardy filing of the motion. ”  Ibid. (emphasis added).  Plaintiffs have identified nothing in the record to support the necessary finding that there was a clear, unequivocal and decisive abandonment of the right to have plaintiffs’ claims limited by the statute of limitations.  And, most important, the trial court’s reference to the statute of limitations and the discovery rule in determining which transactions to include in the judgment makes it evident the trial court did not view the defense as waived.  See 1T57:8-15; 24T52:7-10.  One reason for treating an issue as waived is that the party’s failure to raise the issue deprived the trial court of the opportunity to address the issue and cite the reasons for its decision.  Because the trial court applied the discovery rule, even if erroneously, that rationale for treating an issue as waived is absent here.  B.
[directive] Enter the applicable Table of Authorized Plea Offers, Row Letter and Column  Table # Row Column  From the appropriate cell and accounting for the timing of the plea (pre- indictment, initial post-indictment or final post-indictment), enter the minimum, presumptive and maximum terms  Enter the Grand Total from the Aggravating and Mitigating Factors  (Must complete and attach Schedule II)  If the Grand Total is 3 or more, enter a plea offer above the presumptive term.  If the Grand Total is 7 or more, enter the maximum term.  If the Grand Total is negative 3 or more (e.g. -3, -4, etc.), enter a plea offer below the presumptive term.  If the Grand Total is negative 7 or more (e.g. -7, -8, etc.), enter the minimum term.  4/04
[brief] These arguments about “no evidence” are only possible because no discovery has been taken from [...], [...], LLC, or the successors-in-interest to the [...].  “A party opposing a motion for summary judgment on the grounds that discovery is incomplete, however, must ‘demonstrate with some degree of particularity the likelihood that further discovery will supply the missing elements of the cause of action. ’”  Branch v. Cream-O-Land Dairy, 459 N.J. Super. 529, 541 (App. Div. 2019).  [...] has done so here and in its opening merits brief.  At most, [...] or its successors-in-interest are necessary and indispensable parties that must be named in this matter.  At a minimum, the trial court’s grant of partial summary judgment to Plaintiffs was premature because there is likely a litany of additional historical evidence about the workings of [...] through [...], the scope of authority he intended to retain through the Genesis Deed, and the scope of authority he intended to confer upon [...] as the “property owner’s association. ”  The trial court’s failure to allow for additional discovery, inclusion of indispensable parties, and a hearing on the Genesis Deed’s intent are all reversable errors, which should be cured by this Court in the interests of justice.
[brief] See arbitration award (Da172 – Da177).  10.  On August 29, 2022 [...] filed a Medpay arbitration which was assigned Docket Number [...] as a result of a motor vehicle accident which occurred on September 1, 2020 involving the injured party [...] and the [...] insured, [...].  On or about October 31, 2022, the Arbitrator entered an award in favor of [...] NJ Insurance Company in the amount of $500.00.  See arbitration award (Da187 – Da209).
[brief] ...................................... 16 Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) .................................................................................................... 22, 23 Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) ............................................................. 20, 22 Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978) .................................................................................................... 23 Rinaldo v. RLR Inv., LLC, 387 N.J. Super. 387 (App. Div. 2006) ......................................................................... 8 Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982) ..................................................................... 23, 30 Schiavo v. Marina Dist. Development Co., LLC, 442 N.J. Super. 346 (App. Div. 2015) ........................................................................ 18 Smith v. Org. of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816 (1977) .................................................................................................... 21 Soto v. Scaringelli, 189 N.J. 558 (2007) ..................................................................... 16 Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) ........................................................................ 21, 22 State v. Davila, 443 N.J. Super. 577 (App. Div. 2016) ................................................ 38 Stoney v. Maple Shade Twp., 426 N.J. Super. 297 (App. Div. 2012) ......................... 6 Stop & Shop Supermarket Co., LLC v. County of Bergen, 450 N.J. Super. 286 (App. Div. 2017) ........................................................................ 40 Tortorice v. Vanartsdalen, 422 N.J. Super. 242 (App. Div. 2011) ............................... 25 Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000) ....................................................................... 21, 22, 23, 30 Twp. of Berkeley v. Cent. Reg’l Bd. of Educ., 2017 WL 3427254 (App. Div. 2017) .......................................................................... 39 Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997) .......................................................... 21, 23 Waste Mgmt. of New Jersey, Inc. v. Union County Utilities Auth., 399 N.J. Super. 508 (App. Div. 2008) ....................................................................... 6, 7, 10, 11, 36 Watkins v. Nelson, 163 N.J. 235 (2000) .................................................................................................... 25 PRELIMINARY STATEMENT This brief is submitted on behalf of the defendants-appellants, [...] and [...] (collectively, the “Board”), in support of their appeal from the trial court’s September 29, 2023 order granting the application for preliminary restraints filed by the [...] and [...] (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) and restraining the Board’s Original and Revised Policy 8463 providing for notification to parents of matters adversely impacting their children’s health, safety and/or social/emotional well-being.