[brief] Next, defendant argues that [...]’s reference to “secondary gain” was both “indecipherable” and improper speculation.  (Db21).  To the extent it is unclear what the judge meant by the term, defendant did not ask him to explain.  But it is clear from context that [...] was concerned that defendant may have been behaving himself in prison because it was to his benefit to do so rather than because he had changed in any real way, and thus the only true indicator of his risk of recidivism was how he behaved when he was last in the real world.  Despite claiming not to understand the reference, defendant, relying on State v. Rivera, 249 N.J. 285 (2021), argues that it was impermissibly speculative.  Defendant’s reliance on Rivera is misplaced.  In that case, the sentencing court speculated that Rivera had not had enough time to begin a history of criminal activity, and thus gave great weight to the risk that she would commit another offense.  *Id.* at 302.  In vacating the sentence, the Supreme Court stressed that a finding of aggravating factor three must be based on evidence in the record, whether it be the facts of the crime, “expert testimony, or the defendant's criminal history, lack of remorse, premeditation, or other competent evidence. ”  *Ibid.*  Here, [...] based the finding of that factor, and aggravating factor nine, on defendant’s behavior at the time of his crime—a permissible basis under Rivera—and rejected defendant’s arguments about how his maturity and post-arrest conduct would change his future behavior as speculation.  Finally, defendant claims that the sentencing judge erred in declining to consider his evidence of adolescent brain science and the age-crime curve in finding aggravating factors three and nine and rejecting mitigating factor nine.  But, as defendant acknowledges, [...] considered the evidence in finding mitigating factor fourteen, which he gave moderate weight, finding that while defendant was an adult, he “lacked a level of maturity, which is where the mitigating factor is most applicable. ” (18T87-18 to 19).  Mitigating factor fourteen was adopted by the legislature in response to a series of Supreme Court cases recognizing that youth and its characteristics should be considered at sentencing.  *Rivera*, 249 N.J. at 301-02.  Thus, it was proper for the sentencing judge to consider defendant’s evidence of characteristics of youth as it related to that sentencing factor.  Defendant nonetheless claims that [...] believed that the science was limited to offenders under the age of eighteen.  To the contrary, the Judge made clear that he had no issue with consideration of youth, including the brain science defendant now cites, in this case, but he did not want defense counsel to refer to his client, who was an adult when he killed [...], as a juvenile.  (18T34-15 to 35-2).  [...] here found that any suggestion that defendant had matured sufficiently to no longer be a risk to commit another crime was speculative, given that the only evidence of how he would behave in the real world rather than in the controlled environment of prison was what he had done when he was last at liberty, the night of the homicide.  In light of the fact that defendant did not have a single infraction in prison from the time of his arrest the night of the crime, rather than improving his behavior over time as he matured or availed himself of prison programs, this was a reasonable concern supported by the evidence.  Thus, the record supported his finding of aggravating factors three and nine and rejection of mitigating factor nine.