ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] (Pa198-316, Pa513-518, Pa228-232, Pa178-181, Pa187-188, Pa189-196)  [...] was not notified of the motion and had no opportunity to respond thereto.  (Pa498-499)  The motion was granted, and plaintiff’s second amended complaint was filed on June 12, 2019.  (Pa319-330)  On December 11, 2019, [...] moved for summary judgment based upon plaintiff’s noncompliance with the statute of limitations.
[brief] So, upon his release, the defendant then requested the copies from the court himself.  The fact is that on August 8, 2023, the request for archived records (Pa-1) prior to November of 2017, by the defendant, [...], was for two (2) records: his Affidavit of Service; and, the Final Judgment by Default granted on 5/4/2015.  Nothing else.  He did not know, what he did not know, until he received, on September 15, 2023, a PDF of over 100 pages with more than 40 documents.  NOT what he expected and NOT what he requested.  At first, he suspected that the Affidavits of Service were forged, because of the description of the defendant was taken from public records, an exact match from his driver’s license.  And [...]’s Affidavit of Service, because the business had no physical office space at [...] – it was a virtual office for mail only, no officer or employee of [...] worked at that address.  His suspicion was confirmed by the fact that Affidavits of Service were certified by the Process Server as served on the same day and at the same time at locations miles and minutes apart, which is physically impossible.  That’s why in his letter to the trial judge on September 18, 2023 (Pa-18) he stated that the Affidavits of Service were DEFECTIVE, that is, NOT serving the purpose of delivering the Complaint and the Summons as well as other documents to the defendants.  It was much later, after the court records were examined and researched, the defendants learned what was required by law for a default judgment to be granted by the trial court; that is, to be valid.  The defendants’ brief in support of the motion to Vacate the Final Judgment by Default was then prepared and mailed on 10/13/2023, where violated matters of law were raised.  In the defendants’ brief to the trial court, Plaintiff’s certifications in the court record were identified as bad/improper in the three step process of: (1st) First, the Process of Service; (2nd) Second, the Entry of the Default; and then; (3rd) Third, the Final Judgment by Default, filed with the trial court by the Plaintiff’s attorney, then used by the trial court to grant the judgment.  Based on the facts, discovered in the court records, the defendants were denied Due Process of Law: (a) Notice; (b) Opportunity to be Heard; and, (c) Impartial Tribunal.
[brief] Plaintiffs claim that the relief they seek in this action does not prejudice [...] “because there is no claim against the developer” and because “Plaintiffs accept the developer’s restrictions as imposed. ”  If Plaintiffs “accept the developer’s restrictions as imposed,” however, they are still required by the Genesis Deed to obtain the written approval from [...] prior to beginning construction.  This did not occur, Plaintiffs filed suit against only [...], and the trial court’s order granting them partial summary judgment declared that Plaintiffs need not obtain any form of approval other than zoning.  (Da853).  The stated purpose of the declaratory judgment act “is to settle and afford relief from uncertainty and insecurity with respect to rights, status and other legal relations.
[directive] Czy chce Pan(i) skorzystać z takiej możliwości?  [Tak/Yes]  [Nie/No]  6.  Would you like the opportunity to do so?  Czy po poinformowaniu Pana(i), że Sąd może być zobowiązany wydać w Pana(i)  [Tak/Yes]  [Nie/No]  7.  sprawie wyrok specjalnego nadzoru kuratora sądowego w celu udziału w programie leczenia nadzorowanym przez Sąd („Sąd przeciwnarkotykowy”), nadal chce Pan(i) przyznać się do winy? Having been advised that the court may be required to impose a mandatory period of special probation for the purpose of participating in a court-supervised drug treatment program (“Drug Court”), do you still wish to plead guilty?
[brief] 1 Blackstone [*]344 .................................................................................................................  22  1 Chitty's Criminal Law [*]25 .................................................................................................  22  56 Am. Jur., Venue, sec. 40, pp. 44-45.  Cf. .............................................................................  18 Elmer's Digest, page 452 .......................................................................................................  22  Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules, cmt. 2.1 .......................................................  20  I.  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
[brief] Case management conferences are calendared and commence with Plaintiff as Pro Se, September 2022.  On August 24, 2022, Defendants’ Counsel submits Motion to Compel discovery for Plaintiff’s medical history, ten (10) years of medical record with physician access and a new set of Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (45 CFR Part 160 and Subparts A and E of Par 164, “HIPAA”) authorizations, although Defendants initial HIPAA authorizations and consent were current and active.  Plaintiff initiates an oppositional response, informing Defendants already had HIPAA authorizations with Plaintiff’s active medical consent being current\(^3\).  Defendants’ Counsel by way of conference calls, informed she was going to order the ten (10) year medical history request by way of subpoena; Defendant’s motion is calendared with Plaintiff’s oral argument date August 26, 2022.  Court grants Defendants’ Motion to Compel and the renewal HIPAA authorizations without the need of subpoenas.
[brief] The trees had been cleared and an entirely new second structure, designed to house six additional retail stores, had been constructed on the site.  Due to the grading error, the two buildings on site were 2.5 feet out of vertical alignment with each other, throwing the entire site plan seriously out of whack, and prompting the town engineer to require plaintiff to revise and resubmit the entire site plan to the town for reapproval.  From that core grading mistake directly flowed multiple elements of damages.  Most obviously, the town of [...] required plaintiff to file a revised zoning application based on revised engineering, surveying and legal documents, all of which required professional fees to prepare and present.
[brief] On May 10, 2023, plaintiff filed a Rule 4:49-2 and Rule 4:50-1 motion for reconsideration, alteration, amendment and clarification.  (Pa480 to Pa641).  Plaintiff requested oral argument.  By email sent June 21, 2023, Deputy Attorney General [...] advised the trial court that his State employment would end on Friday July 7, 2023.  (Pa642).  On July 10, 2023, the trial court (without any prior notice and without the benefit of requested oral argument) entered an Order with detailed explanatory reasons denying plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration.  (Pa89).  Plaintiff’s Notice of Appeal
[brief] (8T 78-22 to 79-21, 81-23 to 82-6)  Because this act was the cause of [...]’s death and causing the victim’s death is an element of manslaughter, this constituted impermissible double-counting.  Additionally, the prosecutor in summation directed the jury to listen to the Court’s instructions that “pointing a firearm and discharging it in the direction of a human being, when a deadly weapon is used, an inference can be made the Defendant’s purpose was to take a life,” and the Court instructed the jury accordingly. \textsuperscript{4} (Jan24T 112-11 to 15, 156-25 to 157-17)  Thus, [...]’s action of pointing the firearm and pulling the trigger also constituted the element of intent, which is a separate reason to find that the Court’s reliance on this fact in support of two aggravating factors was impermissible double-counting.  Cf. Reed, 211 N.J. Super. at 188 (the defendant’s “reckless handling and pointing of a shotgun” was “an ingredient of the offense” of “reckless manslaughter”).  The Court utterly failed to cite any facts about [...]’s specific act of pointing a firearm and pulling the trigger to distinguish it from any other homicide caused by a firearm, and thus failed to ground its rationale for aggravating factors three and nine on any facts “that differentiate the case at hand from other cases of the same crime or this offender from others.
[brief] ATTORNEY GENERAL OF NEW JERSEY  ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT BY: /s/ [...]  [...] Deputy Attorney General  [...]  SARAH D. BRIGHAM  ATTORNEY NO. 184902016  DEPUTY  ATTORNEY GENERAL  DIVISION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE  APPELLATE  BUREAU OF COUNSEL AND ON THE BRIEF  Dated: October 15, 2024  REPLY BRIEF IN FURTHER IN SUPPORT OF APPELLANT, [...]  On the Brief: [...], ESQ.  (041572006)  [...]  Tel. [...]  Email [...]  Attorney for Defendant [...]  TABLE OF CONTENTS
[brief] Global warming has, and is expected to continue to, result in changes in climate, the type and extent of which vary depending upon locality.  One such change, which is particularly relevant to this rulemaking, is the increase in average global temperature; this change will cause earth's atmosphere to hold more water vapor, which leads to a higher potential for increased and more intense precipitation in certain regions ([...], 2020).  In accordance with the Water Quality Planning Act, the [...] issued the 2024 Statewide Water Supply Plan.  See dep.nj.gov/water-supply-plan/.
[brief] As Respondent illustrated below, after the sixty-day filing deadline expired on September 13, 2021, the parties’ only avenue for resuscitating the claims they asserted (or for pursuing claims they could have asserted) in the Chancery Action was an application to vacate the Consent Order pursuant to Rule 4:50-1.  Appellants failed to file a motion to vacate the Consent Order as required by Rule 4:50-1 and have failed to present any circumstances at all to vacate or modify the Consent Order, let alone those extraordinary circumstances that Appellants would have to show to vacate or modify the Consent Order pursuant to Rule 4:50-1(f).  It is, in fact, impossible for Appellants to satisfy this burden.  Even if Appellants made such an application in the Union County Chancery Division as of the time the Complaint was filed on March 23, 2023, it would undoubtedly have been denied on account of (a) the over four-year period that elapsed following the November 14, 2018 filing of the Consent Order and March 23, 2023; (b) Appellants’ wholesale failure to try to explain or otherwise justify their extraordinary delay; (c) the Consent Order and its September 13, 2021 filing deadline were mutually drafted in November of 2018 while Appellants, at least as of March 16, 2021 and as acknowledged in paragraphs 72 and 73 of the Complaint, were fully aware of the restrictions placed on the parties’ ability to pursue a Refiled Action, and (d) Respondent would sustain substantial prejudice.  The most substantial element of prejudice is established by Appellant [...]’s continued pattern of concealment and spoliation of numerous relevant and material audio recordings of conversations between Appellant [...], Respondent, and others that occurred during the relevant and material time period of 2014 and 2015 but which Appellant [...] admits are inaccessible because they are on a locked iPhone that, as of December 2019, he can no longer unlock.
[brief] [...] noted that even if [...]’s statement were true, defendant would still be guilty under accomplice liability.  *Id.* at 6.  The court did not address defendant’s *Graham* arguments because it anticipated that defendant would file an application under *Miller v. Alabama*, 567 U.S. 460 (2012).  *Id.* at 7-8.  However, the court took “no position as to the applicability of *Miller*.  Defendant does have the possibility of parole, albeit not until the age of seventy-seven, the approximate end of his life expectancy. ”  *Ibid.*  Defendant filed for certification, which was denied on June 7, 2013.  *Baker*, 214 N.J. at 116.
[brief] Da66.  Ordinance No. 17-2017 now constitutes [...]’s entire noise regulatory scheme and is the sole subject of this litigation.  Da67.  Ordinance No. 17-2017 states in part:  It shall be unlawful for any person to make, continue or cause to be made or permitted any unnecessary and unreasonable loud, disturbing noise which is plainly audible and either annoys, injures or endangers the comfort, repose, health or welfare or otherwise within the limits of the [...].  Such unlawful activity shall be considered a “noise nuisance” as further defined in §146-7 of this Article.  Da67; Da110.  The Ordinance goes on to set forth “Proof of violation” as being determined by “plainly audible means as detected at more than fifty (50) feet from the property lines from which the noise nuisance is emanating[.]”  See Da67; Da113.  The court below found Ordinance No. 17-2017 preempted by the Commission’s Ordinance No. 2, finding the [...] subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission in matters of public health and that the Commission’s Ordinance addressed noise nuisance.  Da88.  The court also found Ordinance No. 17-2017 to be unconstitutionally overbroad.  Da88.  The [...] files the within Appeal seeking Appellate review of the lower court’s decision.  Da90.  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I THE LEGISLATURE DID NOT PREEMPT THE HOME RULE PROVISIONS DEALING WITH NOISE REGULATIONS BY ENACTING THE STATUTORY PROVISIONS ON LOCAL BOARDS OF HEALTH.
[brief] First, the State dismisses the detectives’ repeated aggressive shouting, swearing, name-calling, table-slapping, pointing, and waiving as merely “normal human behavior. ” (Pb 10)  But police detectives interrogating an isolated, unrepresented suspect are not normal disinterested parties in a private quarrel; they are agents of the State exercising enormous power with an incentive to cross the line to solve crime and, for that reason, they have a constitutional duty to refrain from employing psychological coercion.  *State v. L.H.*, 239 N.J. 22, 41-47 (2019); *Miranda*, 384 U.S. at 442-67.
[brief] The deed recited, “[t]he purpose of this deed is to relinquish the curtesy rights of the grantor pursuant to statute. ”  *Id.* at 1013.  Years later, the wife learned the deed transferred nothing because she and her husband had owned the property as tenants by the entirety, such that each would inherit upon --- \(^1\)  See Respondent’s Brief at 1 (“Shortly after acquiring their property and recognizing the error.  . .”); Trial Court Opinion at 720a (“Defendants’ former counsel admits that Defendants discovered the error during the zoning and permitting process”). the other’s death, and no such rights existed.  Id. at 1014.  With regard to constructive notice of a subsequent purchaser, the District Court explained:  The record of an incorrect instrument does not constitute notice of such inaccuracy to a purchaser or encumbrancer, thereby depriving him of any right to protection as against reformation, unless the nature of the inaccuracy is such as to put him upon notice or require him to make inquiry with regard thereto . . .  The question which ultimately must be addressed in the present case is whether a prospective purchaser . . . would have had ‘[clues]’ which were ‘so easily followed that to have failed to do so charges [the prospective purchaser] with [his] own neglect’.  If there were such ‘clews’ a purchaser of a tenancy in common interest from the debtor could not have become a bona fide purchaser who would take as against plaintiff.  Id. (quoting Garden of Mem., Inc. v. Forest Lawn Mem. Pk. Assn., 109 N.J. Super. 523, 535 (App. Div. 1970)) (emphasis added).
[brief] As Appellant noted in the Summary Judgment brief and in this brief, [...] used the word nigger in January of 2019 and at that time students complained to [...] and [...] was written up.  In May of 2019, [...] again used the racial slur nigger in her class to her students who could be seen and heard in the audio/video objecting to [...] using the word nigger.  It was on the date of May 1, 2019 that Appellant and [...] notified [...], Superintendent of Human Resources of the actions of [...].  The Court then appears to justify the use of racial slurs and cites to Taylor v. Metzger and notes that the racial slur used must be repeated to be actionable which is inconsistent with the position noted in Taylor with regard to racial slurs.  Taylor v. Metzger supra at 490.  In Taylor it is noted that uttering a racial slur just once creates a hostile work environment.  Id. at 499.  With regard to [...] telling students that she was happy that [...] was going to build a wall, it is noted that Appellant did not believe that this statement was discriminatory.  That is not accurate, as Appellant did believe that the statement was discriminatory because the students that it was stated to were Mexican and Hispanic.  It is requested that the Appellate Court reverse and remand this matter to the trial court so that the record can be completed.
[directive] The investigation. of and type information, contact 24/7 name, officer's number, case agency, the Page 10 Information.  Event 2.  date/time end and start the shall include operation planned a query regarding deconfliction  A or activity event of type operation, the and the of address/location the operation, of date/time the etc.).  undercover buy, execution, warrant search surveillance, (ems.,, Information.  Target/Suspect 3. the known, when include, shall query the target/suspect, aspecific to pertains query  When a number, BCI State number, FBI number, security social birth, of date aliases, name, person's and person, the with associated numbers phone affiliation, gang/group address, description, physical number).  color, VIN and (brand/model/year, person the with associated vehicles  Resolution.
[brief] A trial court’s ruling as to summary judgment is reviewed de novo on appeal.  Town of Kearny v. Brandt, 214 N.J. 76, 91 (2013).  A trial court may enter summary judgment only if “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with any affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact challenged and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. ”  R. 4:46-2(c).  “The Court determines ‘whether the competent evidential materials presented, when viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, are sufficient to permit a rational factfinder to resolve the alleged dispute in favor of the non-moving party. ’”  Manahawkin Convalescent v. O’Neill, 217 N.J. 99, 115 (2014).  “[G]enuine issues of material fact preclude the granting of summary judgment. ”  Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America, 142 N.J. 520, 530 (1995).  “As does the motion judge, [this Court must] first decide if there is a genuine issue of material fact, and if none, whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. ”  Simonetti v. Selective Ins. Co., 372 N.J. Super. 421, 427 (App. Div. 2004).  B.
[brief] The Report does not attach the [...] Survey, but clearly shows the proposed boundary shift moving the Lot 12 line well onto the present property identified as Lot 13, contra the [...] Survey (denoted as the [...] boundary on Exhibit G of the Report (Pa132)).  [...] testified at trial as to the shift required by the Report versus his survey.  See 1T45, l.5-46, l.21.  The next time one of these lots are surveyed, the surveyor will be confronted with the recorded trial court’s Final Order and Report.  As things now stand, the [...] line causing the boundary line shift for all four lots will have to be accepted.  The penultimate exhibit to the Report (Exhibit I) readily demonstrates the problem with its conclusion (Pa136).  The [...]’ property line shifts to within 5.6 feet of the [...]’ home, but the [...] in turn, give up commensurate footage on the side with Lot 9.  Likewise, the [...] pick up significant footage from Lot 12 leaving a very small gap between that line and the house on that property recently purchased in 2017 based upon the [...] Survey.  As explained above, the Lot 12 line then shifts to encompass a stone wall and hedge which now forms the boundary between Lots 12 and 13.  Lot 13 is not part of the original 1956 subdivision.  Putting aside what these shifts do with regard to setback requirements, etc., none of these other parties were before the court, or participated in the N.J.S.A. 2A:28-1 proceedings.
[brief] The *Bailey* Court ruled that defendant's detainment was invalid under *Summers* because it was untethered from the three justifications of preventing flight, officer safety, and orderly completion of the search.  *Id.* at 195-99.  The Court also reasoned that "[w]here officers arrest an individual away from his home ... there is an additional level intrusiveness.  A public detention, even if merely incident to a search, will resemble a full-fledged arrest."  *Id.* at 200.  Thus, the *Bailey* Court held that "[a] spatial constraint defined by the immediate vicinity of the premises to be searched is ... required for detentions incident to the execution of a search warrant" because "[l]imiting the rule in *Summers* to the area in which an occupant poses a real threat to the safe and efficient execution of a search warrant ensures that the scope of the detention incident to a search is confined to its underlying justification.
[brief] 20 CONCLUSION .....................................................................................................  31  # TABLE OF AUTHORITIES  ## Cases | Case | Page | |-------------------------------------------|------| | California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121 (1983) | 4 | | Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) | passim | | Reyes v. State, 292 A.3d 416 (Md. App. Ct. 2023) | 17 | | Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980) | 5 | | State ex rel. A.A., 240 N.J. 341 (2020) | 5 | | State v. A.L.A., 251 N.J. 580 (2022) | 10 | | State v. Ahmad, 246 N.J. 592 (2021) | 4 | | State v. Bolvito, 217 N.J. 221 (2014) | 24 | | State v. Bullock, 253 N.J. 512 (2023) | 3, 5 | | State v. Burns, 192 N.J. 312 (2007) | 11 | | State v. Carrero, 229 N.J. 118 (2017) | 10 | | State v. Clark, 251 N.J. 266 (2022) | 2, 3 | | State v.
[brief] [...] appeals from four (4)  Orders stemming from two applications of Plaintiff [...]: the first by way of a June 4, 2018 Order to Show Cause to Enforce Litigant's rights (Sixth Street Violation) (Da295) (1T,3T) asserting among other things that the school was in violation of the June 27, 2017 Order (which at the time was under appeal) in allowing its students to walk or assemble in the Sixth Street courtyard while synagogue vehicles are parked (Da295-297, 508)  The other, an Order to Show Cause with Restraints entered October 19, 2018 in relation to a fence installed by [...] on its property pursuant to a permit issued by the Township after the Zoning Board ruling that off-site parking by the Synagogue on the School Lots was not a legal nonconforming use.(Da643) ("Fence Violation").  The Court entered a February 21, 2019 Order (Da965) for the Sixth Street Violations awarding sanctions of $2,500 and an award of attorney fees – later determined in a May 29, 2019 Order to be $32,966.96 (Da971).  The Fence Violation resulted in a February 21, 2018 Order (Da969) awarding temporary restraints and an award of attorney’s fees later determined in the amount of $11,257.50 by Order entered May 29, 2019 (Da969).  As set forth more fully below, all of these Orders should be vacated.