ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] This matter was initiated in May 2017 when [...] submitted a hardship application for a rent increase to the [...].  Over the last 5 years, the Board has held at least ten hearings on this matter, most running late into the night, and several running into the early morning.  The hardship application was initially heard over three evenings in 2017, on September 27th, October 25th, and December 13th.  The Board passed a resolution granting the landlord a hardship increase of $563 per month.  DA47.  The tenant appealed to the Superior Court because the board failed to consider whether the expenses claimed by [...] were a result of the conversion, as required by the Tenant Protection Act.
[brief] Even if the Trial Court’s failure to appoint an expert was an error, it was not a “plain error” that should lead to reversal.  As noted above, at no point did plaintiff object below to the fact that the Court did not seek to appoint an expert.  Contrary to plaintiff’s assertion, plaintiff did not raise the Trial Court’s failure to appoint an expert in her first motion for reconsideration, which plaintiff failed to even include in her Appendix.  Da28.  The Trial Court was given no opportunity to correct this asserted error.  Thus, this alleged error is only cognizable on appeal if it is “clearly capable of producing an unjust result”.  See, Section V.A., supra.  Here, there is no basis to assert that the failure to appoint an expert produced an unjust result because the Trial Court properly found that plaintiff had not proven her claims against defendants [...] and [...], and plaintiff never joined [...]’ estate as a party.  Damages against [...] and [...] were irrelevant if there was no liability.  [...] is indisputably defunct.  No unjust result came of this alleged error.
[brief] State v. Sterling, 215 N.J. 65 (2013)  .................................................................  26  State v. Streater, 233 N.J. Super. 537 (App. Div. 1989) ........................................  19  State v. Torres, 246 N.J. 246 (2021) ................................................................. 6, 38, 40, 41  State v. Walker, 322 N.J. Super. 535 (App. Div. 1999) ........................................  17  State v. Yarbough, 100 N.J. 627 (1985) .............................................................  passim Statutes L. 1978, c. 95 ...........................................................................................................  22 L. 1979, c. 179 .......................................................................................................  22, 23 L. 1992, c. 74 ...........................................................................................................  23, 24 L. 2001, c. 216 .......................................................................................................  24 N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1 ......................................................................................................  1 N.J.S.A. 2C:12-3 .......................................................................................................  29 N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1 .....................................................................................................  1, 29 N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4 ......................................................................................................  1 N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4.1 .................................................................................................  28 N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5 .....................................................................................................  passim N.J.S.A. 2C:39-6 .....................................................................................................  26  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (CONT'D)
[directive] • distribution1  In addition, the following weight thresholds now apply to the possession and of marijuana and hashish:  Possession – 2C:35-10  Marijuana Hashish Subsect. Degree  More than 6 oz.  More than 17 g.  3(b)  Fourth 6 oz. or less 17 g. or less 4(b)  Not a crime  Distribution – 2C:35-5(b)  Marijuana Hashish Subsect. Degree 25 lbs. or more 5 lbs. or more 10(a)  First 5 lbs. or more 1 lbs. or more 10(b)  Second  More than 1 oz.  More than 5 g.  11(b)  Third 1 oz. or less 5 g. or less 12(b)  [See below]  As part of these revised thresholds, the law creates a new framework for individuals who distribute 1 ounce or less of marijuana or 5 grams or less of hashish:
[directive] 3.2  Officers Required to Wear BWCs.  The following officers shall be required to be equipped with BWCs and adhere to the provisions of this Policy when performing their duties:  (a)  All uniformed patrol officers while acting in the performance of official duties, as required by N.J.S.A. 40A:14-118.3 (P.L. 2020, c. 128).  This shall include uniformed officers assigned to traffic law enforcement, as well as Class II Special Law Enforcement Officers (SLEO IIs) assigned to patrol or traffic law enforcement duties.  (b)  All officers assigned to tactical teams as defined in this Policy.  Tactical Teams shall include S.W.A.T. (Special Weapons and Tactics), S.R.T. (Special Response Team), T.E.A.M.S. (Technical Emergency and Mission Specialists), Entry Teams, Rapid Deployment, Fugitive or similar units.  (c)  All officers assigned to proactive enforcement teams as defined in this Policy.  BODY WORN CAMERA POLICY | May 2021
[brief] Plaintiff cites Loew’s, Inc. v. Somerville Drive-In Theater Corp. stating that “the contracts of an unlawful combination, or its members, which are collateral to and independent of the unlawful contract by which the conspiracy was created, and which are not in furtherance of its unlawful purpose, are valid and enforceable. ”  54 N.J. Super. 224, 241 (App. Div. 1959).  In Lowe’s, the plaintiffs included several film distributors who sued a drive-in movie theatre to recoup unpaid admission fees they were owed under individual contracts with the theatre.  The defendant-theatre argued in its defense that its contracts with the distributors were illegal because they collectively conspired to restrict its ability to determine showtimes for each film in violation of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act as a restraint on commerce.  Id. at 231–34.  The court rejected this argument, holding that the theatre’s contracts with each individual film distributor were collateral contracts because the film distributors were not engaged or part of a general plan or scheme that was illegal.  Id. at 237.  Instead, the theatre separately agreed with each film distributor to purchase goods for a set price the parties negotiated and nothing more.  Id. at 242.  Thus, the court found the contracts to be “collateral” and enforceable.
[brief] Da23, n. 13; 1T62-25 to 64-19.  The trial court found that the testimony of [...] and [...] was credible, rejecting “the fabricated testimony of [...],” and concluding that “the parties agreed [that] the principal sum of the [T]hird [L]oan was $134,759.74. ”  Da25.  outstanding amount due and owing to Plaintiff as of April 30, 2013. \footnote{At trial, Plaintiff also presented evidence of the metadata for both the August 7, 2013 email and the attached Schedule.  The metadata confirmed that the email was transmitted by [...] himself on that date; the Schedule had been created by [...], [...]’s Director of Accounting, and had been attached to [...]’s August 7, 2013 email; and the Schedule was last modified by [...] on August 7, 2013.
[brief] The court quoted and relied on a 1996 FTC Staff Letter involving similar facts which stated:  The **purpose** of the letter is […] to obtain recipients’ telephone numbers so that they can be contacted by a creditor or collector in connection with the collection of debts allegedly owed by them to third parties.  **To the extent that the letter serves a collection function** (albeit an indirect collection function), which we believe it does, it brings your client within the coverage of the FDCPA.  *Id.* at 1147 (italics removed, emphasis added).  Here, the only purpose for Defendant’s conveyance of the information was to prepare and mail Defendant’s dunning letter thereby serving a collection function.  Moreover, the purpose and context of Defendant’s communication was to collect debts.  Consequently, Defendant’s communication was in connection with the collection of debts.
[brief] ”) (citation omitted).  ____________________ ensuring that the state's territory is not used as a basis of operation for purveyors of fraudulent securities”); *Holderman v. Columbus Skyline Sec.*, 660 N.E.2d 427, 429 (1996) (The Ohio Securities Act is remedial in nature, “drafted broadly to protect the investing public from its own imprudence as well as the chicanery of unscrupulous securities dealers,” and “in order to further the intended purpose of the Act, its securities antifraud provisions must be liberally construed”); *Schultz v. Rector-Phillips-Morse, Inc.*, 552 S.W.2d 4, 9 (1977) (“The Arkansas Securities Act . . . is remedial, and remedial legislation should be liberally construed. ”).  Indeed, the legislative history reflects a clear intent to strengthen the Bureau’s authority to protect the investing public in their statements accompanying amendments to the Securities Law.
[brief] To illustrate:  5 cinder blocks @ 8" each = 40 inches  1  Roof Slab @ 8" (see note) = 8 inches  1 two-inch thick board = 2 inches  Total Approximate Height 50 inches  Convert to Feet 4 feet 2 inches  Note: estimate based on the fact that the roof slab appears to be the same width as the cinder blocks
[brief] ”  Hirth v. City of Hoboken, 337 N.J. Super. 149, 161 (App. Div. 2001); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 40A:12A-5.  Those conditions include: b.  The discontinuance of the use of a building or buildings previously used for commercial, retail, shopping malls or plazas, office parks, manufacturing, or industrial purposes; the abandonment of such building or buildings; significant vacancies of such building or buildings for at least two consecutive years; or the same being allowed to fall into so great a state of disrepair as to be untenantable.  N.J. Stat. Ann. § 40A:12A-5(b).  d.  Areas with buildings or improvements which, by reason of dilapidation, obsolescence, overcrowding, faulty arrangement or design, lack of ventilation, light and sanitary facilities, excessive land coverage, deleterious land use or obsolete layout, or any combination of these or other factors, are detrimental to the safety, health, morals, or welfare of the community.  N.J. Stat. Ann. § 40A:12A-5(d).  A governing body’s determination that a property is in need of redevelopment is subject to judicial review to determine whether the body’s factual findings are “supported by substantial evidence” or whether their findings are “arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable” and “contrary to law”.
[brief] First and foremost, whether the property is in a “dangerous condition” is a question for the fact-finder.  *Vincitore v. Sports & Expo.  Auth.* , 169 N.J. 119, 123 (2001).  Thus, the decision by the Trial Court that, as a matter of law, the subject condition was not dangerous was a critical error.  Not only did the court’s decision that the settlement was not a dangerous condition ignore and contradict the facts but it also acted as a spring-board for the court’s remaining errors.  Had the trial court viewed the facts and favorable inferences in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff, as it was required to do, then the court would have recognized that there is overwhelming evidence that independently provides a basis to establish that the settlement at the subject expansion joint was a dangerous condition.  First, [...] [...] agreed that settlement along the abutment joint would be a dangerous condition to users of the roadway.  (Pa0801 at 28:3-16).  Second, the recommendation from the Biennial Bridge Inspection that the settlement area at the abutment joint be fixed creates the inference that the condition was a hazard and dangerous.  (Pa1350).  (Pa1367).  Third, the T&M Inspection Memo which identified the condition as “significant settlement” and recommended that it be “repaired immediately” creates the inference that the condition was dangerous (Pa1191).  Fourth, defense expert, [...], P.E, agreed in his report that pavement elevation changes in the roadway are recognized as causing operational problems for motorcycle operators.  (Pa0625).  Fifth, the paving records confirm that the settlement identified by Plaintiff required temporary paving is admissible as evidence that a dangerous condition existed at that location.  (Pa1396); (Pa1397).  Sixth, Urban engineer [...] conceded that if the settlement at issue was not causing a problem for the traveling public then it would not have needed to be repaved.  (Pa0698 at 100:5-13).  Finally, Plaintiffs’ expert, who reviewed and relied upon these reports, documents, testimony, as well as his own experience, concluded that the subject condition was a dangerous condition.  (Pa0020).  Here, not only did the trial court error by determining that the [...]’s opinions as to the dangerousness of the subject condition were inadmissible “net opinions”, but that error was exacerbated when the court chose to view the facts in the light most favorable to the Defendants.  When viewing the facts and evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, not only do the aforementioned facts provide the “why and wherefore” for the opinions of Plaintiffs’ expert, but these facts also provide an independent basis from which a reasonable jury could conclude, without the assistance of expert testimony, that the condition was dangerous.  (1)
[brief] The collision occurred on Track 1 of [...]’s York Street Pedestrian Crossing for the [...] in Jersey City, New Jersey.  Compare Pa154, ¶17 with --- ³  These are screen shots taken from the videos recorded by the head-end camera on the train, the interior camera showing the operator of the train, and the security camera at the [...] Exchange Place Station, located just north of the crossing.  Each of the videos has a time stamp on the bottom, showing that two seconds elapsed from the moment [...] stepped onto the crossing until the moment of impact with the train.  Pa762, ¶17.  The York Street Pedestrian Crossing is located just south of York Street and approximately one block north of Grand Street.  Compare Pa154, ¶18 with Pa762, ¶18; See Pa392-396 (overhead images of the location) and Pa543-550 (photos of the area).  The train tracks in the area where the incident occurred run adjacent to Hudson Street and are located on [...]’s dedicated railroad right of way for the [...], meaning cars and pedestrians may not enter onto the right of way except at a designated crossing.  Compare Pa154, ¶19 with Pa762, ¶19; Pa338; Pa361; Pa543-550; 579:15-580:11.  The movement of the train in the area of the incident, including the crossing, is governed by a system of bar signals.  Compare Pa154, ¶20 with Pa762, ¶20.  When the train has a proceed signal it has the right of way and is permitted to operate up to the track speed, regardless of whether it is going over a crossing.  Compare Pa155, ¶21 with Pa762, ¶21.  The operational design speed limit for [...] Track 1 in the block prior to the crossing and the area including the crossing where the incident occurred is 25 mph and was approved by [...] when the [...] was designed.  Compare Pa156, ¶29 with Pa763, ¶29.  Access to the crossing for pedestrians and vehicles is controlled by pedestrian signals and traffic lights.  Compare Pa155, ¶22 with Pa762, ¶22.  Pedestrians are not permitted to enter the crossing against the pedestrian signal.  Compare Pa155, ¶23 with Pa762, ¶23.  Pedestrians are not intended to use the crossing when a train is imminently approaching it, or when a train is already present on the crossing.  Compare Pa155, ¶24 with Pa762, ¶24.  “WATCH FOR TRAINS” was painted in large black letters on a yellow background on the pavement in the area where [...] entered the crossing on the right of way.  Compare Pa155, ¶25 with Pa762, ¶25; See Pa543-550 (photos showing the warning signs).  **Ownership of the Right of Way and Crossing**
[directive] The assault partner to is abusive an likely how indicate scores ODARA  Its field. in the by police use for developed was that tool actuarial validated evidence-based, violence domestic validated for reported size effect predictive highest the is accuracy predictive assessment, ODARA an administer to required is expertise clinical  No tools. assessment risk an during 13 items ODARA's scoring the for information necessary obtain can officers and records and related history criminal defendant's of the review a and victim the with interview accomplished can Training be etc.).  reports, Dispatch Aided Computer reports, police prior (e.g., fashion. straightforward and swift relatively in a ODARA.
[brief] Through hundreds of paragraphs, [...] tried to impute liability on all the named defendants, through one service or another, even though many defendants had no involvement with processing, submitting, reviewing, or collecting on the claims.  [...] even included real estate holding companies in the complaint as somehow conspiring to commit insurance fraud.  Further, [...] claims these fraud allegations based on its lay opinion, with no medical background, regulatory background on the corporate practice of medicine, and no information provided in the Complaint.  (C.C.Da.1-100).  Pursuant to the New Jersey No-Fault laws, insurers, including [...], are required to adopt a Decision Point Review (“DPR”) Plan, providing insurers oversight to the payment of PIP benefits to medical providers.
[brief] POINT IV  THE PROSECUTOR’S ATTEMPT TO ENLIST  JURORS IN THE WAR ON DRUGS AND THE REPEATED INFLAMMATORY CLAIM THAT RINES WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR HIS CO-DEFENDANT’S DRUG ADDICTION DENIED RINES A FAIR TRIAL.  (Not Raised Below)  The prosecutor’s opening and summation included claims about [...] that were designed to outrage jurors.  The State told the jury that [...] was responsible for keeping [...] addicted to drugs, tricked her into using fentanyl in place of heroin, and was “a threat to everyone suffering with addiction in this country battling the opioid pandemic. ”  (4T 28-25 to 29-7; 5T 49-10 to 25)  These remarks could have led jurors to convict [...] not based on his actual conduct on April 10, 2021, but because they were told they could hold him accountable for the harms of the national opioid crisis and for keeping a young woman addicted to drugs.  That unfair commentary denied [...] a fair trial.  U.S. Const. amends. VI & XIV; N.J. Const. art. I, ¶¶ 1, 9, & 10.  [...]’s convictions must be reversed.
[brief] (1T5-9 to 5-10; 8-22 to 8-23)  [...] confirmed that Defendant had ample opportunity to review his case with counsel and was satisfied with counsel’s advice.  The Judge also confirmed that Defendant understood he had a right to trial but was waiving his rights by entering the plea; that he was entering the plea freely and voluntarily; and that nobody was forcing him to do so.  (1T7-16 to 8-2)
[brief] The Court relied on the case of US Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation, 363 U.S. 574 (1960) and Barcon v.  Tricounty Asphalt, 86 N.J. 179 (1981), which the Court ruled require minimal interference by Courts in the arbitration process.  The Court also cited Tretina Printing v. Fitzpatrick and Assocs., 135 N.J. 349 (1994) and Linden Bd. Of Educ. v. Linden Educ. Assn, 202 N.J. 268 (2010) for the proposition that the law limits a Court’s ability to vacate an arbitration decision to certain delineated issues, ignoring that “exceeding powers” is one of those delineated.
[brief] The [...] (“[...]” or the “Authority”) offers the following to supplement the Statement of Facts and Procedural History set forth in Appellant [...]’s (“Appellant”) Brief to focus the Court on the specific considerations underlying the Authority’s denial of Appellant’s application.  At hearing, the Hearing Officer and [...] professionals raised legitimate concerns regarding the loading and unloading of cannabis product and cash having an adverse impact on on-site considerations.  These concerns were shared by an adjacent property owner [...] (“[...]”), a regional medical center.  While a loading space is not required for Appellant’s intended use, the Authority nonetheless appropriately reviewed Appellant’s proposed loading operations and determined that Appellant’s application created an unsafe and inefficient condition related to on-site access and circulation and the potential for vehicular and pedestrian safety hazards.  (Aa236-45).  1
[brief] (6)  The duration of each tent and/or parking lot sale shall be limited to a maximum of thirty (30) days per calendar year.  The thirty (30) day period shall be inclusive of any time for set up and dismantling/removal of any temporary structures prior to the commencement and at the end of any such sale.  (7)  Tent and/or parking lot sales may operate from dawn until dusk or during the regular business hours of the principal use of the property, whichever timeframe is more restrictive.  (8)  Tent and/or parking lot sales shall be permitted in all non-residential zones and on lots containing a permitted non-residential use within a residential zone, provided the following criteria are met:  (a)  Tent and/or parking lot sales shall not be located within one hundred feet (100’) of a lot developed with a residential use.  (b)  Tent and/or parking lot sales shall not be located within thirty feet (35’) of adjacent buildings, property lines; burnable materials, grass or vegetation.  (c)  Tent and/or parking lot sales shall not be located within one hundred feet (100’) of any gasoline pump or distribution point.  (d)  Tent and/or parking lot sales shall not be located within ten feet (10’) of any public roadway, or public sidewalk.  (e)  Temporary sales tents shall meet the following design requirements:  (a)  Height.  Temporary sale tents shall not exceed a maximum height of 20 feet.  (b)  Footprint.  Temporary sale tents shall not exceed a maximum footprint of 500 square feet.  (c)  Lighting.  Temporary tents shall not be illuminated by an artificial lighting source.  (10)  Temporary signs advertising the temporary tent and/or parking lot sale may be installed in accordance with an approved sign plan as part of the permit.  Signs shall be limited to 40 square feet in area, affixed directly to the tent and non-illuminated.  One such sign is permitted per street frontage of the lot or site upon which the tent is erected.  (11)  In addition to any other penalties or remedies authorized by the State of New Jersey, any person or establishment who violates any provisions of this section shall be subject to a penalty of up to $2,000 for each violation.  The Zoning Officer may bring this action in either the Municipal Court or Superior Court, as the summary proceeding under the "Penalty Enforcement Law" of 1999 (N.J.S.A. 2A:58-10, et seq.) and any penalty monies collected shall be paid to the Chief Financial Officer of the Township.
[brief] [...]  [...] (#042741990)  [...]  #  TABLE OF CONTENTS – BRIEF | Section | Page | |------------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | TABLE OF CONTENTS - BRIEF | i | | TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS | ii | | TABLE OF TRANSCRIPT DESIGNATIONS | ii | | TABLE OF CONTENTS - APPENDIX | iii | | TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | v | | PRELIMINARY STATEMENT | 1 | | PROCEDURAL HISTORY | 4 | | STATEMENT OF FACTS | 5 | | LEGAL ARGUMENT | 7 | |
[brief] TABLE OF APPENDIX 12/21/2012 Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint.........................................................1a 1/31/2013  Answer to Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint, Separate Defenses, Demand for Affidavits of Merit, Demand for Statement of Damages, Crossclaims, Answer to Crossclaims, and Demand for Jury on Behalf of Defendants, [...], Esquire and [...], [...] ..................18a 11/3/2017