ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The Planning Board’s determination that the Property meets the requirements for designation as a Condemnation Redevelopment Area was not supported by “substantial evidence” which is required to exist in the record and [...]’s adoption of the Second Condemnation Resolution was arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable.  In *Malanga v. Twp. of W. Orange*, 253 N.J. 291 (2023), the Supreme Court recently revisited the strict requirements for a property to qualify as “blighted,” and thus eligible to be deemed an area in need of redevelopment.  There is no question that [...] woefully failed to satisfy this established precedent, as determined by [...].  New Jersey Municipalities can take “blighted areas” for the purpose of redevelopment.  New Jersey Constitution, Article VIII, Section 3, Paragraph 1.  The LRHL was enacted to provide a framework for redevelopment and give meaning to the term “blighted.
[directive] Crime Scene Query.  a.  A law enforcement agency is authorized to access and use stored non-alert data where such access might reasonably lead to the discovery of evidence or information relevant to the investigation of a specific criminal event as defined in these Guidelines.  Note that if the law enforcement agency has reason to believe that a specific person or vehicle was at or near the location of the specific crime at the time of its commission, non-alert stored data might also be examined under the authority of Section 10.2.1 as part of post-scan BOLO query.  b.  A crime scene query may not be conducted to review stored non-alert data based on general crime patterns to identify persons traveling in or around a "high crime area"), but (i. e., e.g., rather is limited to situations involving specific criminal events as that term is defined in these Guidelines.  c.  The crime scene query of non-alert stored data shall be limited in scope to stored non- alert data that is reasonably related to the specified criminal event, considering the date, time, location, and nature of the specified criminal event.  For example, a crime that reasonably involves extensive planning and possible "rehearsals," such as a terrorist attack, would justify examining stored non-alert data that had been scanned and collected days or even weeks or months before the criminal event, and that may have been scanned at a substantial distance from the site of the crime or intended crime at any point along a highway leading to the intended crime site).  A (e.g., spontaneous crime, in contrast, might reasonably justify examination of stored non-alert data that was scanned and collected on or about the time of and in closer physical proximity to the criminal event.  d.  The law enforcement agency shall document the specific crime or related crimes constituting the criminal event and the date(s) and location(s) of the specific crime(s).  10.2.3
[brief] ”); *State v. Stangle*, 97 A.3d 634, 638 (N.H. 2014) (declining to set forth specific factors for authentication, which “is a determination within the discretion of the trial court”); *State v. Anglemyer*, 691 N.W.2d 153, 162 (Neb. 2005) (authentication “may be made by any evidence that bears on whether the photographic evidence correctly depicts what it purports to represent”); *Kindred v. State*, 524 N.E.2d 279, 298 (Ind. 1988) (stating “it would be wrong to lay down extensive, absolute foundation requirements” because every case is different, and instead requiring a strong showing of the videotape’s authenticity); *Fisher v. State*, 643 S.W.2d 571, 575 (Ark. Ct. App. 1982) (“It is neither possible nor wise to establish specific foundational requirements for the admissibility of photographic evidence under the ‘silent witness’ theory, since the context in which the photographic evidence was obtained and its intended use at trial will be different in virtually every case. ”).
[brief] (8T116-1 to 8).  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I THE EXPERTS TESTIFIED HELPFULLY WITHIN THEIR RELEVANT FIELDS.  The forensic evidence established [...] died from cranial blunt force trauma during two beatings with a wine chiller that had defendant’s fingerprint, and [...]’s blood was on a shirt found in the house and the bra defendant wore.  Notably, there were no objections during the testimony presenting this evidence, and the DNA expert was not cross-examined.  Defendant thus carries the substantial burden to prove the testimony amounted to plain error, a burden she fails to meet.
[brief] ”  Abbott XX, 199 N.J. at 172.  Declaring that the SFRA funding formula’s constitutionality “is not an occurrence at a moment in time” but “a continuing obligation” upon the State, Abbott XX, 199 N.J. at 146 (emphasis added), the Court conditioned its determination of SFRA’s constitutionality with express mandates to ensure the State operates the SFRA formula in Abbott districts at its “optimal level” to remedy the T&E violation in those districts on a going forward basis.  Id. at 146 (emphasis added).  The decision below recognized [...] is “an original Abbott district. ” (Pa9.)  But it then examines the claim of SFRA’s unconstitutional implementation under the usual deference afforded legislative enactments.  This deferential review may be appropriate for districts not subjected to a violation of T&E of longstanding duration and grave severity as in the Abbott litigation.  But it was grave error to do so in determining [...]’s claim.  In Abbott XX, the Supreme Court did not conclude that the State had fully remediated the T&E violation in [...].  Nor did the Court hold that if [...] sought judicial intervention to remediate a claim that the State had failed to operate the SFRA at its optimal level in contravention of Abbott XX’s mandates, the formula would be given the deference accorded statutory enactments generally (Pa39-Pa43), and that, even worse, District students would be compelled to prove a constitutional violation of T&E all over again.  (Pa43.)  Simply put, the Supreme Court in Abbott XX allowed the State to implement the SFRA in [...] as its chosen remedy for the T&E violation previously found in the Abbott litigation.  The record below demonstrates that the SFRA formula was allowed to operate at funding levels substantially below [...]’s Adequacy Budget for over a decade.  The mandates imposed by the Supreme Court on the State in Abbott XX to ensure the formula’s continuing operation at its optimal level comprise the proper legal framework for evaluating [...]’s claim of SFRA underfunding.  B.
[brief] Ridge at Back Brook, LLC v. Klenert, 437 N.J. Super. 99, 102 (App. Div. 2014) (Emphasis Added).  Equitable tolling serves to “stop the statute of limitations from running where the claim’s accrual date has passed. ”  Weis-Buy Services, Inc. v. Paglia, 411 F.2d 415, 424 (3d Cir. 2005).  In general, the equitable tolling principle applies where the plaintiff has actively misled the defendant.  Irwin v. Dept. of Veteran Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 96 (1980).  As discussed in Section IV above, pages Db7, Db8, Db13 and Db14 through Db18, the Plaintiff misled Defendant as to Defendant’s right to oral argument and Plaintiff’s principal place of business.
[brief] We believe the facts of this case are more analogous to the facts in Branch than Medina.  Certainly, the hearsay testimony regarding [...]’ role was far more direct and detailed than the testimony in Medina concerning the role played by the anonymous woman who refused to give a formal statement to police.  The Court in Medina stressed that there was no implication that the anonymous woman gave police any incriminating information.  242 N.J. at 416, 231 A.3d 689.  In contrast, there is a plausible implication that [...] provided incriminating information to [...]—as in fact she did.  Considering the totality of the circumstances, and viewed through the lens of the prosecutor's opening statement that “through the investigation talking to other people, [the police] learn that it's possibly this individual named [...],” we conclude that the jury “was left to speculate that the detective had superior knowledge through hearsay information implicating defendant in the crime. ”  See Branch, 182 N.J. at 347–48, 865 A.2d 673; Bankston, 63 N.J. at 271, 307 A.2d 65.  We are thus satisfied that even though Sergeant [...] did not specifically repeat any incriminating information learned from a non-testifying source (e.g., that [...] was aware of defendant's criminal record), the officers’ testimony created an inescapable inference that a non-testifying source implicated defendant in contravention of defendant's Confrontation Clause rights.  See Medina, 242 N.J. at 415–16, 231 A.3d 689.  Indeed, [...]—a non-testifying source—explicitly implicated defendant by identifying him as a suspect in the robberies.  Compared to other cases where the Supreme Court found a constitutional violation based upon far more neutral testimony, see e.g. Branch, 182 N.J. at 352, 865 A.2d 673 (referring to “seemingly neutral language”), we think the Confrontation Clause violation in this case is particularly obvious and egregious.  Cf. State v. Watson, —— N.J. Super. ——, —— (App. Div. 2022) (slip op. at 58) (finding that “while the [officer's] testimony [about consulting with another law enforcement agency] technically crossed the line under Confrontation Clause analysis, it was by no means an obvious and blatant violation of defendant's right to confront the witnesses against him”).  We add that any harm associated with the violation in this case was compounded by the prosecutor's reference to inadmissible hearsay in his opening argument which referenced non-testifying sources.  Cf. Id. at —— (slip op. at) (concluding that “the prosecutor's summation neither exploited nor reinforced the testimony that violated the Sixth Amendment[,]” and therefore did not compound the prejudice flowing from the Confrontation Clause violation).  B.
[brief] The APS complaint was “quickly” resolved and dismissed via a phone call the following day  No investigation was conducted.  (11T134-11 to 135-10).  At this time, the Petitioner, who was not a subscriber or connected in any way to the Respondent’s cell phone contract\(^5\), managed to cancel the Respondent’s [...] phone contract (11T122-25 to 126-15).
[brief] Rules  New Jersey Court Rule 2:2-4 ..............................................................................6, 7 New Jersey Court Rule 2:5-6 .............................................................................6  New Jersey Court Rule 4:10-2(a) .......................................................................8, 19 Statutes N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-27 .........................................................................................4, 8, 9, 14 N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-41 .........................................................................................10, 12  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
[brief] Cf. In Re Norrell’s Estate, 139 N.J. Eq. 550, 553 (E&A 1947); Borough of Paramus v. Block, 1527, Lots 1-2, Assessed to Ridgewood Park Estates, 42 N.J. Super. 369, 375 (App. Div. 1956).  In the Lloyd case, this court referred to [...]’s well-known remark that “there is no surer way to misread any document than to read it literally. ”  Guiseppi v. Walling, 144 F.2d 608, 624, 155 ALR761.  2 Cir. 1944 (affirmed sub nom Gemsco, Inc. v.Walling, 324 U.S. 244, 65 S. Ct. 605, 89 L.Ed. 921 (1945)).  In the Merrill case, the court noted that where a literal reading of the statute leads to absurd consequences “the court must restrain the words” and seek the true legislative intent …”  29 N.J. at 230-231.  Under the circumstances, [...] followed the Supreme court’s decision in Schierstead.  Based on the circumstances in question, Covid, etc., and the work performed by [...], the court read the statute sensibly, and properly granted [...]’s motion to be discharged.  The literal interpretation advanced by [...] and [...] would have led to an absurd result.  Accordingly, this court should affirm the orders of the trial court.
[directive] Taking into account the timing of the plea, see Section 4, the prosecutor must then determine the “presumptive” authorized plea offer for the appropriate cell.  This number appears in boldface at or near the midpoint of the range of authorized plea offers for the appropriate cell.  Unless otherwise expressly noted, all numbers in the Tables of Authorized Plea Offers refer to months (or years in the case of Table #6) of parole ineligibility imposed as part of a state prison sentence.
[brief] This is correct.  Plaintiffs do not, and cannot, deny that the [...] fence in front of the [...] property was broken through, nor that they, or members of their household, were responsible for breaking through the fence and/or for crossing the [...] property – against [...]’s wishes – to reach the beach.  Moreover, in order to fashion an alleged basis for their claim against [...], Plaintiffs accuse him of saying and doing things that he neither said nor did.  For example, contrary to Plaintiffs’ assertion (Pb13), [...] never “swor[e] in the criminal complaint he personally witnessed John [...] ‘continuously’ walk over [...]-owned property over a nine-month period. ”
[brief] Moreover, [...] testified that he is not an expert in the field of accident reconstruction.  (See Pa0074-0080 at 48:22-54:9; Pa 86-87 at 60:11-61:2; Pa0201 at 175:1-17; Pa0216 at 190:10-20; Pa0276-78 at 38:22-25, 39:6-40:22).  24.  [...] also testified at the 104 Hearing that the Biannual Bridge Inspection Report did not state the condition was dangerous or in need of repair.
[brief] [...] is a professional engineer licensed in the State of New Jersey, and project manager for [...], who works primarily in construction inspection services (Pa2612 at T10:8-11:21).  Pursuant to the professional engineering services agreement between [...] and the [...], he reported to [...], P.E. of [...].  Id. at T17:7-17.  Mr. Fink’s responsibilities included coordinating between [...] and [...], monitoring the operation of the project for conformance with contract plans and specifications, documenting quantities of materials placed by the contractor and preparing monthly estimates and progress reports that involved inspection of pavement, material in the pavement, radiation in the asphalt, milling depths and locations.  Mr. Fink would also visit the job site.  Id. at T19:6-20:2, T25:10-20.  [...] oversaw all the work done by [...] in connection with the project and would report back to the [...] engineer (Pa1919 at T29:3-32:7).  Specifically, [...] of [...] ensured that [...] was providing full-time construction supervision, that the contract was built per the plans and specifications approved.  Id. at T51:11-23, T62:2-10.  To that end, Mr. Schweppenheiser was in “constant communication” with [...] on the subject project and would review reports submitted by [...] to the Cap Ex system that documented what was done, when it was done, staff performing the work, quantity of work done.  Id. at T49:8-23, T53:1-17.  C.
[brief] Defendant’s late implementation of the GPA requirement, without notice, and creation of two new policies for its inaugural class, including the inability to select/opt-in to the dual degree program at any time after the first professional year, which prevented Plaintiff from applying to and/or matriculating into the dual degree program, were severe deviations from its own rules and regulations.  (Pa262- Pa263; Pa357; Pa454; Pa461-Pa467).
[brief] [...], who acknowledges that he negotiated and drafted the MOU on Appellants’ behalf, and who failed to include this purportedly routine and essential term, sought to correct his omission in the trial court through his own “expert” testimony.  Id. (¶¶ 5, 11-13).  This unabashed run for cover speaks for itself, and any detriment to defendants from its omission may not be laid at [...]’ feet.
[brief] ”  (1T 35-17 to 26-10; Da 20 at 10:45 to 11:30)  The State did not introduce any photographs of the allegedly tinted front windows at the suppression hearing.  [...] testified that photographs of the Suburban were taken at the scene but “I don’t have them with me today. ”  (1T 46-2 to 9)  Thus, the only evidence of the tinted windows came from [...]’s testimony.
[brief] That process has been upheld below.  The Borough has already applied its insights and efforts as a municipality to a process whereby it would select a cannabis retailer to support in the Highway Commercial District.  That decision making process is predicated upon a substantial, credible record and should not be disturbed.  To have that all undone simply because [...] subjectively believes it, and not [...], is entitled to a Resolution of Support, would be the height of inequity with respect to the Borough’s exercise of its right to determine what is in its best local interests based upon its knowledge of local conditions respecting cannabis licensing.
[brief] I found transactions were diversions or misappropriations.  So to say that the plaintiffs caused delay, it was like pulling teeth to get these QuickBooks.  And then [the defendants] want to limit the scope when the defendant[s] knew that there were transactions after the fact.  So that is why he wanted to limit it, because you knew that.  Well, the plaintiffs didn’t know that, the Court didn’t know that.  (37T 75:7-21).
[brief] [...] does not disagree.  Rather, he seeks to circumvent the exclusion entirely by advocating for a groundbreaking expansion of the efficient proximate cause rule, also known as Appleman’s rule.  [...] erroneously claims that because [...]’s negligence in permitting water to enter his condo is covered under the insuring grant of the [...], and that negligence set in motion the chain of causation that led to his mold-caused injuries, it is immaterial that his injuries were excluded under the Mold Exclusions.  The trial court ([...]) rejected this misguided argument.
[brief] No objection. ” (1T11-1 to 15).  Following completion of jury selection, the court again addressed the issue of the admissibility of the measures taken by defendant’s agent, [...].  The significance to plaintiff’s case in chief cannot be overemphasized.  In response to plaintiff’s telephone call, [...] had come to the lobby.  She had immediately recognized the hazardous, slippery conditions and taken steps to make certain that no one would be permitted to enter the lobby until she was able to ameliorate the danger.  She mopped the floor and took the added precaution of placing a bright yellow sign with a specific depiction warning that the area was a slip-hazard.  It was only after these tasks had been completed that plaintiff and [...] as well as [...] and two prospective customers were permitted to safely traverse the lobby.  Importantly, these actions were not taken by just anyone, but rather by the defendant’s on site manager in furtherance of her responsibilities to make certain that the facility was safe and that due to the conditions customers and others persons would not be placed in jeopardy.
[brief] *State v. Radel*, 249 N.J. 469, 493 (2022).  Our federal and state constitutions both guarantee “[t]he right of the people to be secure . . . against unreasonable searches and seizures[.]”  *U.S. Const.* amend. IV; *N.J. Const.* art. I, par. 7.  “No right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded . . . than the right of every individual to the possession and control of his own person, free from all restraint or interference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law. ”  *Terry v. Ohio*, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968).  To that end, the warrantless seizure of one’s person is presumptively invalid.  *State v. Edmonds*, 211 N.J. 117, 129-30 (2012).  The State bears the burden to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the stop was justified by one of the few “well-delineated exception[.] to the warrant requirement. ”  *Ibid.*  The exception at issue in this case is an investigatory stop.
[brief] During the due diligence period, Plaintiffs were provided access to the Property by the superintendent at the time, non-party [...], to perform routine and customary inspections.  Pa46.  Mr. Phillips told Plaintiffs that he had intimate knowledge of the building because he worked for Defendants while the Property was being renovated in 2017, and that there were no known issues with the Property.  Id.  Mr. Phillips showed Plaintiffs various apartments during the inspection period, including Apartment 101 in which he resided.  Id.  Once Plaintiffs closed on the Property, however, Mr. Phillips advised Plaintiffs that there were serious mold issues with his apartment, as well as others.  Pa47-48.  Mr. Phillips told Plaintiffs that, although these issues were known to him and Defendants, he was instructed by Defendants to conceal the issues before the sale of the Property, and he did so out of fear of being fired if discovery of those issues lead to the sale fell through.  Pa48.  Specifically, Mr. Phillips stated that he had informed the property manager at the time, Defendant [...], just months prior to the closing.  Id.  Mr. Phillips informed Plaintiffs that Tracy [...] instructed him to clean up the obvious mold from his apartment prior to Plaintiffs’ site inspection and not to say anything that may interfere with the closing.  Id.  Mr. Phillips also said that Defendants purchased him a dehumidifier to alleviate the issues, and that he had scrubbed his apartment before the inspection of the Property so that Plaintiffs would not discover the mold.
[brief] a.  Objective 2 provides that “Future plans should provide for more parks and opens paces [sic], within the Borough:” and the Amended Redevelopment Plan is fully consistent with this objective, in that it increases the amount of park and open space within the Borough; b.  Objective 3 provides that the Borough’s housing obligation is satisfied through the provision of low and moderate affordable housing…; and c.  The Amended Redevelopment Plan substantially addresses environmental impacts … as provided for in Objective 6 …. ” (Pa 69-70).  (emphasis added).  ³  The Chairman’s reference to the Second Ordinance having already been approved the Planning Board is presumably to the action taken with respect to the First Ordinance amending the Redevelopment Plan, which the Borough rendered moot by adopting the Second Ordinance after Plaintiff filed the Prior Action challenging the validity of the First Ordinance.  The main reason underlying the need for the Second Ordinance was to authorize three major changes in the Redevelopment Plan as the result of the new plan for Plaintiff’s Property under the Four Party Purchase Agreement.