ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Furthermore, even if an email was sent to the Certifying Officers on August 8, 2019, it was still outside the timeframe required by the Ricci Act to provide notice to the members of the retirement system.  Moreover, [...] certified that he never received the postcard regarding the Ricci Act.  Pa56.  It is arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable that the Board does not have to abide by the statutory timelines applicable to the Board but is unwilling to relax the timeframes applicable to [...].  The Board has acknowledged that the third-party vendor was not contacted to mail the postcards until more than 30 days after the enactment of the Ricci Act.  The third-party vendor could not mail the notice within 30 days of the enactment of the Ricci Act.  Because this notice was not sent in accordance with the requirements specified in the Ricci Act, the Board should have granted [...]’s request to register outside the timeframe specified in the Act.  The Board failed to consider its power to relax time limits in the interest of justice or in furtherance of a just accommodation.  It is within the Board’s power to relax time limits.  The Board’s initial denial has failed to consider, evaluate, and weigh [...]’s equitable claims.  Most notably, it failed to even mention the approximately one hundred affidavits submitted that support the fact that these postcards were never received by [...] or other members of the pension system.  Furthermore, the Board’s decision inflicts obvious and unnecessary harm upon [...] and fails to advance the legislative purpose of the Ricci Act.  The legislative purpose of the Ricci Act was to provide first responders with the ability to alter their retirement benefits if they have fallen ill as a result of their honorable and heroic service at the largest terrorist attack this country has ever seen, not to unnecessarily and arbitrarily deny sick retired troopers accidental disability benefits.  [...] and ninety-seven (97) other active and retired troopers provided affidavits that they never received notice sent regarding the Ricci Act.  Because the Board failed to fulfill its statutory obligation under the Act to provide notice to all the members of the retirement system within 30 days, and further because it appears that the vast majority never got any notice at all, the Board’s determination was arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable.  As such, in the interest of justice and in the furtherance of a just accommodation, we respectfully request that Board’s determination be reversed and that [...]’s application to register his presence at Ground Zero and his request for amended benefits be granted.
[brief] ”  As discussed in *Alpha Beauty Distribs., Inc. v. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc.*, 425 N.J. Super. 94, 101-04, 39 A.3d 937 (App. Div. 2012), “successive action” means an action brought after an already-concluded terminated, antecedent action: The action the trial judge dismissed here was not "a successive action."
[brief] TABLE OF CITATIONS Cases Garcia v. Fed. Home Loan Mortgage Corp., 3:20-CV-01458-L, 2022 WL 4007984 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 2, 2022) ................................................................. 14 Hatch v. T & L Associates, 319 N.J. Super. 644 (App. Div. 1999) ....................... 15 State v. Jones, 232 N.J. 308 (2018) .................................................................. 11 State v. Pinkston, 233 N.J. 495 (2018) .................................................................. 11 Statutes/Rules Rule 611 (a) ........................................................................................................... 11 SUPPLEMENTAL APPENDIX (attached) Garcia v. Fed. Home Loan Mortgage Corp., 3:20-CV-01458-L, 2022 WL 4007984 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 2, 2022) .................................................................SA1 Courts Orders April 20, 2022 .............................................................................. SA11 Trial Exchange Information Form ........................................................................ SA15 REPLY PRELIMINARY STATEMENT A. Was there structural error in the Chancery Court when the trial judge had Plaintiff proceed first at July 11, 2022 trial when Plaintiff had no claim to try, the claim to be tried was the Defendants’, Eleanor and [...], claim of Quiet Title, and Directed Verdict was granted to Plaintiff prior to Defendants’ presentation of evidence?
[brief] 24, 27 Duncan v. Speach, 162 F.R.D. 43, 44 (E.D.Pa.1995)  14  Farnese v. Bagnasco, 687 F.2d 761, 764 (3d Cir.1982)  15  Feliciano v. Reliant Tooling, Co., 691 F.2d 653, 656 (3d Cir. 1982)
[brief] Any rebuttal?  You don't have to.  [...]:  No, Your Honor, I just wanted to, I guess really wanted to reiterate that [...] does have a right to go to trial if he so pleases as part of having the conditional plea rule now that the evidence against him is different, his sentencing exposure is different.  He may very well wish to exercise that right and that's all tied into the conditional plea rule and why he has a right to withdraw after he was successful on the suppression motion.  [...]:  Thank you very much.  * * * * *
[brief] As properly concluded by the trial court, while the contract is clear and unambiguous, the course of performance and course of dealing further establishes the Township’s entitlement to the connection fees.  As noted by the trial court, the interpretation of a contract is ordinarily a legal question for the court and may be decided on summary judgment unless “there is uncertainty, ambiguity or the need for parol evidence in aid of interpretation. ”  Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Checchio, 335 N.J. Super. 495, 502 (App. Div. 2000).  “The interpretation of the terms of a contract are decided by the court as a matter of law unless the meaning is both unclear and dependent on conflicting testimony. ”  Bosshard v. Hackensack Univ. Med. Ctr., 345 N.J. Super. 78, 92 (App. Div. 2001).  Cases involving contract interpretations are particularly suited to disposition by summary judgment.  Spaulding Composites Co. v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 346 N.J. Super. 167, 173 (App. Div. 2001), rev’d on other grounds sub nom., Spaulding Composites Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 176 N.J. 25 (2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1142 (2004).  New Jersey law is well-settled, when the terms of a contract are clear, “it is the function of a court to enforce it as written and not to make a better contract for either of the parties. ”  Kampf v. Franklin Life Ins. Co., 33 N.J. 36, 43 (1960).  Absent ambiguity, the intention of the parties is to be ascertained by the language of the contract.  Dontzin v. Myer, 301 NJ. Super. 501, 507 (App. Div. 1997).  “If the language is plain and capable of legal construction, the language alone must determine the agreement’s force and effect. ” CSFB 2001-CP-4 Princeton Park Corporate Center, LLC v. SB Rental I, LLC, 410 N.J. Super. 114, 120 (App. Div. 2009) (quoting FDIC v. Prince George Corp., 58 F.3d 1041, 1046 (4th Cir. 1995)).  Notably, the trial court properly determined the “Court’s interpretation of the 1999 Agreement is consistent with the parties’ course of dealings in which [the Township] consistently collected connection fees for properties lying outside the Borough for which sewage was transmitted through mains and lines through the Borough to the Township Treatment Plant.
[brief] Upon questioning by the Court, counsel for [...] conceded on the record that he agreed to the protocol, limiting the withholding of documents to only those which are based on privilege.  See R. Doc. 31–1, pp. 27–28, ¶¶ 5–8.  Therefore, the Court found that because the parties agreed to limit the withholding of documents to only files which may be considered privileged by the parties, [...] had to produce the documents as agreed to in the protocol.  As such, [...]’s request as to production of documents withheld based on relevance is granted.  [...] has until May 8, 2014, to produce those files.  2.
[brief] In both Cole and Marmo a factor that weighed heavily in favor of waiver was the delay in seeking arbitration.  In Cole the party that sought arbitration participated in the lawsuit for twenty-one months before filing a motion to compel arbitration three days before the scheduled trial date and after extensive discovery had occurred.  The Court characterized that delay as “substantial. ”  Cole, 215 at 233.  In Marmo the delay was six months which this Court noted was similar to what had been excused in Spaeth v. Srinivasan, 403 N.J. Super. 508, 516 (App. Div. 2008), but further observed that, unlike Spaeth where the party asserting arbitration was a pro se litigant, Marmo, from the outset, was represented by counsel, “who was better equipped to recognize its right to arbitration and act upon it swiftly. ”  Marmo, 478 N.J. Super. at 611.  Notwithstanding that fact, this Court still found that the delay did not weigh heavily in favor of waiver.  Id.  Comparatively speaking, and despite [...]’s assertions regarding delay, this case is most like Spaeth due to the fact that for the eight months following the filing of his Answer [...] was a pro se litigant.
[brief] [...] Files Motions for Reconsideration and for Leave to Amend the First Action Complaint.  On March 24, 2021, [...] filed a motion for reconsideration and a motion for leave to amend the complaint in the First Action.  (Pa533–36.)  In the post-judgment attempt to amend the complaint, [...] sought to assert a bad faith claim against the [...] based on newly discovered evidence of a purported illicit agreement between the [...] and [...].
[brief] In the wake of the [...] scandal, [...] himself announced that he was committed to uncovering the scope of the problem stating: “I’ve been working to understand exactly what happened and how to make sure this doesn’t happen again. ”  Ex. 14.  [...] asserts that [...]’s “final signoff” on enforcement actions does not show he has unique information.  Opp. at 10.  But the evidence shows [...] [Redacted]  For instance, after [Redacted] Ex. 9 at FB-CA-MDL-00172724; see also Ex. 7 (“[A]ny decision to ban an app” for violating [...]’s policies related to user information “required the personal approval of the chief executive, Mark [...][,]”).  [...] didn’t merely grant final signoff; he was fully briefed on the facts and evaluated them before making decisions.  Documents also show that [...] “took on the role of a wartime leader” in response to the 2018 [...] scandal, locking down [...]’s external communications until he had a grasp of the situation.  Ex. 16.  Wartime leaders are not executives who merely sign off on decisions made by others; they are (as [...] was) the decision makers themselves.  And another recently produced document [Redacted] Ex. 35 at FB-CA-MDL-01950915.  [...]’s custodial files will shed considerable new light, unavailable from other sources, on [...]’s decision-making regarding enforcement with respect to third parties’ access to and misuse of user information, which are critical issues in this case.
[directive] II.  Requirements for Submitting SAFE Kits for Testing  The requirements previously imposed in Section II of the March 2023 Directive that allowed the Director of the Division of Criminal Justice or a County Prosecutor to determine that a SAFE kit need not be tested in certain instances where the results would have no bearing on the outcome of the case, are no longer in effect and are replaced by the provisions herein.  This Amended Directive establishes a new mandate to prospectively and retroactively test all SAFE kits submitted to law enforcement, when the victim consents.
[brief] In Carty, 170 N.J. at 635, the Supreme Court held that police cannot seek consent to search a stopped car without reasonable and articulable suspicion that a search of the car will yield evidence of a crime.  This “prophylactic” measure, the Court explained, is intended to stop police from converting a roadside encounter into a “fishing expedition for criminal activity unrelated to the stop. ”  Id. at 635, 647.  It also recognizes that, “[i]n the context of motor vehicle stops, where the individual is at the side of the road and confronted by a uniformed officer seeking to search his or her vehicle, it is not a stretch of the imagination to assume that the individual feels compelled to consent. ”  Id. at 644.  Four years later, in *State v. Birkenmeier*, 185 N.J. 552 (2006), the Court assumed, without deciding, “that the requirements of *State v. Carty*” also “apply to a request for consent to search something other than a motor vehicle addressed to a party in custody” after a roadside car stop.  *Id.* at 564 n.3.  This Court should apply that standard here, and require that, before asking [...] for consent to search his home, the officers possessed reasonable suspicion that contraband would be found there.  To hold otherwise would create an illogical standard: officers conducting a car stop would be barred under *Carty* from seeking the driver’s consent for a suspicionless search of his car, but could still push for consent to a suspicionless search of his home.
[brief] The Global Warming Response Act  The Legislature enacted the GWRA in 2007 in order to help curb global climate change by establishing goals to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases in the State: to 1990 emissions levels by the year 2020, and to 80 percent below 2006 levels by 2050. L.2007, c. 112, codified at N.J.S.A. 26:2C-38, et seq.  As amended in 2019, the Legislature found among other things that [I]t is in the public interest to establish a greenhouse gas emissions reduction program that includes a comprehensive strategy to reduce short-lived climate pollutants and to limit the level of Statewide greenhouse gas emissions, and greenhouse gas emissions from electricity generated outside the State but consumed in the State, to the 1990 level or below, of those emissions by the year 2020, and to reduce those emissions to 80 percent below the 2006 level by the year 2050.  [N.J.S.A. 26:2C-38, emphasis added.]  C.
[brief] Dated: November 11, 2024  TABLE OF CONTENTS  TABLE OF DECISION BEING APPEALED ........................................  i  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .........................................................  ii  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT .....................................................  1  STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY ..................  4  LEGAL ARGUMENT  I.  THE DEP ERRONEOUSLY FOUND THIS PROJECT TO BE CONSISTENT WITH THE BROAD POLICIES OF THE HIGHLANDS ACT AND THE REGIONAL MASTER PLAN.  (Aa0001)  ..............................................................................  6  II.  THE DEP FAILED TO MAKE AN ADEQUATE WATER QUALITY MANAGEMENT PLAN  CONSISTENCY DETERMINATION.  (Aa0001)  ..............................................................................  18
[brief] ” (Db37).  Defendant further contends the State shifted the burden through commentary, in the State’s summation, on the defendant’s cross-examination of [...].  These contentions similarly lack merit.  Although defendant complains of three purported problematic comments, the State notes only one was objected to below.  Thus, the State addresses the objected to remarks first, followed by the remarks defense counsel had no issue with at trial.  Defendant first takes issue with the State’s response to the defendant’s attacks of [...]’s credibility on cross-examination.  (Db39).  As noted, one of defendant’s issues as to the State’s response to the credibility was not objected to below and will thus be addressed in turn.  The objected to remark, “where was the got you moment,” (9T86:13-21), was in direct response to defendant’s own admission “defense counsel sought to cast doubt on [...]’s identification of [...] in part by pointing to testimony from [...]’s girlfriend from [...] that she had spoken to someone in the building in which [...] lived. ” (Db39).  “[I]t is well-established that prosecuting attorneys, within reasonable limitations, are afforded considerable leeway” in closing arguments.  State v. Wakefield, 190 N.J. 397, 443 (2007) (quoting State v. DiFrisco, 137 N.J. 434, 474 (1994)).  “‘A prosecutor may comment on the facts shown by or reasonably to be inferred from the evidence.  There is no error so long as he confines himself in that fashion.  Ultimately it was for the jury to decide whether to draw the inferences the prosecutor urged. ’”  State v. R.B., 183 N.J. 308, 330 (2005) (quoting State v. Carter, 91 N.J. 86, 125 (1982)).
[brief] (1T19-2 to 11, 22-9 to 17, 49-22 to 50-1; Da4).  Both officers smelled marijuana emanating from inside the sedan.  (1T23-2 to 22, 50-2 to 8).  [...] began speaking to [...] and explained “the reason we’re --- 3  The body-worn camera videos were admitted at the hearing and are appended as Pa1 and Pa2.
[brief] ”  (67a)  With regard to Defendants’ Second Supplement Complaint, the Statement of Reasons explained that (1) there can be no finding that Plaintiff acted improperly in purchasing the Florida Property for $360,000 because the Florida Property was appraised for that value; (2) Defendants’ allegations that Plaintiff breached her fiduciary duties with respect to distributions are unsupported because “[a]ny delay in outright distributions from the Trust was a result of the instant litigation, which was dragged out in part by Defendants’ lack of cooperation and continued motion practice” and (3) therefore, “there is no basis to allow the filing of the Supplemental Complaint or Second Supplemental Complaint. ”  (67a)  Seeking clarification, Defendants filed a motion for reconsideration (491a) which was denied on June 19, 2023.  (69a)  Again, there was no hearing or explanation as to why oral argument was denied.  Defendants argue that the trial court was required to “find the facts and state its conclusions of law” with regard to their applications, pursuant to Rule 1:7-4(a).
[directive] 것을  Do you understand that by pleading guilty and admitting that you used or were in possession of a firearm that is a , (type of firearm) while in the course of committing or attempting to commit one of the crimes, you are waiving your right to have a jury determine, beyond a reasonable doubt, that you used or possessed a firearm during the course of committing or attempting to commit one of the crimes?  3.  [예/Yes]  [아니요/No]  [해당없음/NA]
[brief] The Zoning Officer literally compiled a report including a photograph of a purported height measurement in which one end of the tape measure used for taking the measurement does not actually reach the other end of the space being measured (112a, 113a).  Appellant could add additional details.  The implications are troubling.  More recently, both the [...] and the [...] – on appeal -- ruled that the Municipal Land Use Law precluded them from considering the public good when granting variances.
[brief] He performed all of the SFSTs unsatisfactorily, smelled of the odor of an alcoholic beverage, had slurred speech, and had bloodshot and droopy eyes.  (2T21:16-20; 2T24:1-15; Aa42-Aa43).  Defendant also admitted that he had one martini, though [...] was skeptical that defendant had truthfully disclosed the extent of his drinking that evening.  See State v. Moskal, 246 N.J. Super. 12, 21 (App. Div. 1991) (“[T]he yardstick for making [an] arrest for driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor . . . is whether the arresting officer ‘had reasonable grounds to believe’ that the driver was operating a motor vehicle in violation [of N.J.S.A. 39:4-50].” (alteration in original) (quoting Strelecki v. Coan, 97 N.J. Super. 279, 284 (App. Div. 1967))).  Thus, based on the totality of the circumstances as well as their training and experience, [...] believed that defendant drove his vehicle while under the influence.  POINT II
[brief] Nor is this a matter involving a monetary dispute over the transition to virtual higher education during the COVID-19 pandemic, such as Mitelberg v. Stevens Inst. of Tech., No. CV211043SDWMAH, 2021 WL 2103265, at *1 (D.N.J. May 25, 2021).  Unambiguously, the Court failed to determine whether Defendant “acted in good faith” or whether it substantially deviated from its own rules and regulations.
[brief] Cases  AC Ocean Walk, LLC v. Am. Guarantee & Liab. Ins., 256 N.J. 294 (2024)  .................................................................  4  Ambassador Ins. Co. v. Montes, 76 N.J. 477 (1978)  ........................................................................  2  Azze v. Hanover Ins., 336 N.J. Super. 630 (App. Div. 2001)  ...........................................  1, 5, 6, 7, 8  Cypress Point Condo. Ass’n, Inc. v. Adria Towers, L.L.C., 226 N.J. 403 (2016)  ....................................................................  4  Green v. Selective Ins. Co. of Am., 144 N.J. 344 (1996) .................................................................... 6, 7 Liberty Surplus Ins. Corp. v. Nowell Amoroso, P. A., 189 N.J. 436 (2007) ....................................................................  2, 3 Morrison v. Am. Int’l Ins. Co. of Am., 381 N.J. Super. 532 (App. Div. 2005) ..........................................  4  Peloso v. Hartford Fire Ins., 56 N.J. 514 (1970) .....................................................................  1, 5, 6, 7, 8  State v. Horne, 463 N.J. Super. 224 (App. Div. 2020) ..........................................  2 Villa v. Short, 195 N.J. 15 (2008) ....................................................................  4 Statutes N.J.S.A. § 2A:14-1 .......................................................................  1 Rules Rule 2:6-1 ..................................................................................  2 Other Authorities