ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Pa 98-104.  **STANDARD OF REVIEW**  An Appellate Court reviews an order granting summary judgment in accordance with the same standard as the motion judge.  Bhagat v. Bhagat, 217 N.J. 22, 38 (2014); W.J.A. v. D.A., 210 N.J. 229, 237–38 (2012); Henry v. N.J. Dep't of Human Servs., 204 N.J. 320, 330 (2010).  The purpose of summary judgment is to avoid needless trials and afford deserving litigants immediate relief.  See Judson v. People's Bank & Trust Co. of Westfield, 17 N.J. 67, 74 (1954).  Rule 4:46-2 provides that summary judgment “shall be rendered forthwith” when “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact challenged and … the party is entitled to a judgment or order as a matter of law. ”
[directive] likewise supports the State’s position.  It urges the Court to The CPA find that “delays of criminal trials were rendered necessary by concerns for the spread of the novel coronavirus,” and that “[d]elays engendered by the considered to be excludable time” under the pandemic are properly CJRA.  19  The CPA also submits that prosecutors satisfy their obligation relating to the two-year cap with a good faith declaration that the State is ready for trial.  VI.  defendant’s statutory right to  The pivotal issue in this appeal is whether a speedy trial has been violated.
[brief] Your posts on Facebook have been the subject of criticism during the public comment portion of Board meetings in 2022.  ADMIT __X__ DENY ______ (Ca136-137 at RQAs 2, 3, 5, 8, Ca144-145 at Response to RQAs 2, 3, 5, 8.)  These admissions were specifically raised by Appellants in their Motion for Summary Decision.  (Ca051).  [...] also stated in her Initial Decision “by her own admission, some of Respondent’s Facebook friends – which includes parents, teachers, students, and staff, are aware that she is a Board member” and that “[t]he posting was public and had no disclaimer to the effect that the statements were her own personal opinions, and not that of the Board or Board members. ” (Ca021).  Despite photographic evidence of Respondent swearing in as a Board member, despite Respondent actually typing out that she “was elected onto the central regional board of education,” despite repeatedly campaigning for her seat on the Board from the same Facebook page, and despite Respondent’s own clear admissions that she held herself out as a Board member on her Facebook page, and that she actually compromised the Board, the Commission still shockingly stated:
[brief] First, as mentioned above, Plaintiff opened the door to extensive testimony regarding the RIR.  2T9-14 to 25.  Plaintiff then argues the opposite, specifically that the trial court “rewrote” the PSA which “does not contain a single reference” to an RIR.  Pb3.  Plaintiff spent extensive time presenting “evidence” as to the alleged failure to complete the RIR, despite the fact that an RIR was filed with the NJDEP five (5) months before the filing of the Complaint.  8T45-10 to 14.  However, the fact remains that it was Plaintiff who raised the issues (2T9-14 to 25; 2T12-21 to 25; 2T14-9 to 12), expended several days of testimony on the issues, and now argues that the court should not have allowed the issue to have been raised.
[brief] In New Jersey, an arbitration agreement is not enforceable as to the rights of persons who are not parties to the agreement.  Moore v. Woman to Woman Obstetrics & Gynecology, LLC, 416 N.J. Super. 30, 45 (App. Div. 2010).  In Moore, a medical malpractice case, a husband and wife sued an OB/GYN on the theory that the doctor committed malpractice by failing to advise them of the high-risk nature of the wife’s pregnancy, which ultimately resulted in the birth of a disabled child.  Id.  The plaintiff-mother signed a pre-dispute arbitration agreement, which the court ruled was unenforceable against the plaintiff-father and/or the unborn child, because they were not parties to the agreement.  Id. at 45-46.  The court reasoned that the plaintiff-father and the unborn child had independent claims, they were not derivative of the plaintiff-mother’s, and that they did not accept the terms of the arbitration agreement (the plaintiff-mother was the only one who was presented with and signed the arbitration agreement).  Id.  The court further held that it is “not aware of any legal theory that would permit one spouse to bind another to an agreement waiving the right to trial on his or her claim without securing his consent to the agreement.  Id. at 45 (emphasis added).  In Gershon, the court held that an exculpatory release agreement that was signed by a decedent – did not legally preclude an independent wrongful death action brought by the decedent’s heirs, who had not signed the agreement.  Gershon v. Regency Diving Center, Inc., 368 N.J.  Super. at 237.  Although Gershon deals with an assumption of risk waiver, the analysis is the same because defendant’s arbitration agreement in the within case operates to “contractually limit . . . [plaintiff’s] right to recovery. ”  Id.  This is because the arbitration agreement seeks to waive a constitutional right to a jury trial, effectively limiting plaintiff’s right to recovery.  This is also because [...]’s arbitration agreement affords [...] with the exclusive right to pick the arbitrator (Da122).  [...] and [...] were the only two people involved with the arbitration agreement (Da122).  [...]’s signature on Defendant’s arbitration agreement does not and cannot prevent her heirs from prosecuting a separate, independent wrongful death claim.  Additionally, these arguments were fleshed out and reiterated in [...]’s amicus curiae brief on this appeal.  As such, should the Court be inclined to entertain the improperly brought issue of the arbitrability of the wrongful death claim, it should refer to the arguments therein, as well as those herein, as our position on this issue has been clear from the beginning: all claims must remain in the Trial Court for litigation.  Finally, this Court should not accept Defendants/Appellants’ claim that we have tried to expand the record by informing the Court of [...]’s difficulties with reading and writing in the English language.
[brief] The defense called a total of four witnesses.  The first to testify were defendant's sister and niece, [...] and [...].  Each stated that in July 2003, defendant had short hair, rather than the cornrows or braids that [...] and [...] indicated was the hairstyle of defendant the night they saw him shoot [...].  [...] produced a photograph depicting defendant with short hair which she claimed was taken on July 4, 2003, the day before [...] was shot, but the photograph was not marked with a date indicating when it had been taken.  Defendant's third witness was his girlfriend [...], who testified that at the time [...] was shot defendant was with her at the [...].
[brief] ”  (Aa5).  Addressing [...]’s request for an increased TREC factorization from 0.6 to 1.0, Staff found that [...] failed to show that the project merited the change based on its diligent review of the project’s costs and revenues as well as its experience with floating solar technology in New Jersey and the country.  *Ibid.*  Staff relied on a report (“[...] Report”) it previously developed in consultation with [...]\(^6\), (“[...]”) to determine that [...]’s proposed project did not warrant a TREC factorization of 1.0.  *Ibid.*  The [...] Report was developed for the Board’s ADI program, which employed modeling using System Advisory Model (“SAM”), which can determine a solar project’s anticipated internal rate of return, or alternatively, an incentive level required to provide a given incentive rate of return.  (Aa6).  [...] performed an analysis of floating solar costs as compared to ground-mount solar costs, modeling representative cases for floating solar in each of the state’s electric distribution company service areas.  *Ibid.*  [...] concluded that despite additional costs associated with floating solar, floating solar projects in New Jersey “do not warrant a full 1.0 TREC factor. ” (Aa6).  Staff therefore recommended denial of [...]’s petition and encouraged [...] to consider its project for the Board’s CSI program.
[brief] A.  THE AGREEMENT’S RETURN TO WORK TERMS WERE NOT DETERMINED ILLEGAL, INEFFECTIVE OR UNENFORCEABLE.  The Chancery Division failed to distinguish the Parties’ rights and obligations under Agreement from those under those under the PFRS pension statutes, N.J.S.A. 43:16A-1.  Further, Plaintiff once again misconstrues the Township’s argument as to the [...]’s capacity as a legal forum under the Agreement and in doing so consumes several pages justifying the [...]’s legal authority to determine pension matters.
[brief] The application to vacate a judgment, particularly, when a property owner faces the draconian forfeiture of a real property interest considers the principles enunciated in *Mancini v. Eds ex rel N.J. Auto Full Ins. Underwriting Ass’n*, 132 N. J. 330, 334 (1993) that in balance the two goals, “a court should view the opening of default judgments . . . with great liberality and should tolerate every reasonable ground for indulgence.  . . to the end that a just result is reached.  Further, to implement the principle recited in *Mancini*, at p. 334, that a court should resolve “all doubts. . . in favor of the part[y] seeking relief.  Equitable principles “should . . . guide a court’s decision to vacate a default judgment.  *Housing Authority of Morristown v. Little*, 135 N. J. 274, 283 (1994).  The applicable Rules of Court and legal standard are well established.
[brief] Turning to the second purpose, the certain persons statute enhances the penalty for possession of a firearm by a person with a predicate conviction in several ways.  First, unlawful possession of a rifle or a shotgun is only graded as a third-degree crime, whereas possession of a rifle or shotgun by a certain person is a second-degree crime.  Compare N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(c) with N.J.S.A. 2C:39-7(b)(1).  Second, a conviction for possession of a handgun without a permit or possession of a handgun for an unlawful purpose carry a mandatory minimum period of parole ineligibility of forty-two months, while a conviction for certain persons not to possess firearms carries a mandatory minimum period of parole ineligibility of five years.  Compare N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(c) with N.J.S.A. 2C:39-7(b)(1).  Thus, viewing the certain persons statute in light of the legislative history and in the context of the Legislature’s “carefully constructed scheme” of firearms regulations, State v. Lee, 96 N.J. 156, 160 (1984), its purpose is clearly to (1) criminalize and (2) punish more harshly mere possession of a firearm by a defendant with a predicate conviction.
[brief] Regardless, we address the common knowledge exception argument in this section in the event that this Court is inclined to consider it in the analysis of the appeal.  The common knowledge exception to the Affidavit of Merit Statute provides that no affidavit is required to support a malpractice claim where a person of reasonable intelligence can use common knowledge to determine that there was a deviation from the acceptable standard of care.  Cowley v. Virtua Health System, 242 N.J. 1, 9 (2020).  The exception therefore is not triggered by the type of claim being brought, but rather, by the simplicity of the required analysis of whether there was a deviation from the standard of care.  In other words, the common knowledge exception applies when an expert is no more qualified to attest to the merit of a plaintiff’s malpractice claim than a non-expert.  Id.  The common knowledge exception applies only in exceptionally rare cases and only when the “carelessness of the defendant is readily apparent to anyone of average intelligence. ”  Id. at 17 (citing Rosenberg v. Cahill, 99 N.J. 318, 325 (1985).  Specifically, it only applies where it is apparent that “the issue of negligence is not related to technical matters peculiarly within the knowledge of [the licensed] practitioner[].”  Id. (citing Sanzari v. Rosenfeld, 34 N.J. 128, 142 (1961); See also Hubbard v. Reed, 331 N.J. Super. 283 (App. v. 2000) (common knowledge exception existed where the doctor pulled out the wrong tooth from his patient’s mouth); Palanque v. Lambert-Woolley, 168 N.J. 398, 400 (2001) (common knowledge exception applied where identification numbers on a pregnancy test were mistaken twice for actual readings that indicated whether the patient was pregnant or not); and Estate of Chin v. Saint Barnabas Medical Center, 160 N.J. 460 (1999) (common knowledge exception applied where a gas line was connected to a patient’s uterus rather than a fluid line).
[brief] The following class action cases were consolidated into [...]: Chernyakhovskaya v. [...], [...] (D.N.J.), Betancourt v. [...], [...] (D.N.J.), Espinal v. [...], [...] (D.N.J.), Martinez v. [...], [...] (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div.), Rodriguez-Ocasio v. [...], [...] (D.N.J.), Burgos v. Resurgent Capital Services, L.P., et al., [...] (D.N.J.), Henriquez v. [...], et al., [...] (D.N.J.), Lugo v. [...], et al., [...] (D.N.J.), Orbea v. [...], et al., [...] (D.N.J.), Uriarte v. [...], [...] (D.N.J.), Ferreira v. [...], et al., [...] (D.N.J.), Gomez v. [...], et al., [...] (D.N.J.), Little v. [...], [...] (D.N.J.), Jackson v. First National Collection Bureau, Inc., [...] (D.N.J.), Delgado v. LVNV Funding, LLC, [...] (D.N.J.). a final approval hearing on July 9, 2020 (the “Settlement Order”).
[brief] The Default Rate Post-Judgment Was Properly Awarded by the Arbitrator.  (January 22, 2024 T15; Da47-48)  The Arbitrator properly awarded interest through the date of payoff at the default rate under the Mortgage.  Not only did Defendants not challenge that; the Award Judgments (court judgments) confirmed that Plaintiff was entitled to post-judgment interest at the default rate.  Defendants cannot now challenge Arbitrator’s award of post-judgment interest at default rate.  Defendants improperly attempt to challenge the Arbitration Awards, which were stipulated to by both parties and have been confirmed by a federal court through the Award Judgments.
[brief] D.A.B., slip op. at 2, 4-8.  Plus, at the time of the appeal, the prosecutor still had yet to provide the letter to defense counsel.  D.A.B., slip op. at 5 n.5.  Nothing of the sort happened here.  D.A.B. is an outlier, unpublished decision, where the panel concluded that the prosecutor’s conduct during plea negotiations compromised the integrity of the criminal-justice process.  D.A.B., slip op. at 15-16.  In turn, the panel there deferred to the trial judge’s fact-findings and affirmed the judge’s exercise of discretion that the dismissal of the indictment was warranted.
[brief] Herbert v. Haytaian, 292 N.J.Super. 426, [...] previously represented [...] in the matter *[...] v. [...]*, filed under docket no. [...]. (Pa63) and in the Complaint against Lortech’s principal entitled *[...] v. [...] and [...]* filed under docket no. [...].  (Pa66-74).  Notably, the Answer filed in the Lortech Case and the Complaint filed in the Longo matter both have Certifications signed by counsel from [...] pursuant to R. 4:5-1 certifying the matters as being “related. ” (Pa65 and Pa74).  Parenthetically, inexplicably, Appellants continue to misrepresent Respondents’ argument and incorrectly state that Respondents argued that the Rodriguez matter was substantially related.  At page 16 of their brief, Respondents cited the Rodriguez case as another case in which Ansell represented Atlas.  (Db16).  However, Respondents never argued that the matters were substantially related.  (125a-126a; See also, 1T8:4-21).  When Respondents brought to the Court’s attention the inaccuracy of Appellants’ arguments on August 2, 2024, the Court acknowledged that it had seen that in Respondents’ brief and agreed that Respondents were not arguing the Rodriguez case was substantially related.  (1T8:22-24).  Respondents respectfully request that the Court take notice that on June 1, 2023, a mere 2 days after the Ansell law firm filed an OTSC on behalf of [...], Van Saders filed a Certification in which he expressly stated: “I have indicated to the Ansell firm that I do not waive any conflict. ” (Pa38; 1T19:18).  He further stated: “Nor has the Ansell firm provided any response to my claim that there is an unwaivable conflict of interest. ”  (Pa40).  It is interesting to note and Respondents respectfully request that the Court also take notice that nowhere in their brief do Appellants even mention the fact that [...] signed his first Certification two (2) days after [...] & Aaron entered their appearance.  Indeed, since the commencement of this action, [...] have not addressed the Certification and continue to assert the fallacious claim that Van Saders waived any conflict by an alleged delay.  In disqualifying the Ansell law firm, the court differentiated between the Ansell’s representation of a corporate entity, i.e., Atlas and the representation of [...], an individual, in the prior litigation.
[brief] Rule 4:3-3(a) states a change of venue can be ordered for various reasons, including "substantial doubt" that a fair trial may be had in a given location.  Plaintiff argues that there is no order (Pa 14) transferring the Law Division matter to the Chancery Division and that the Law Division matter could not be tried fairly in the Chancery Division as a result of judicial bias and prejudice.  That unordered assignment of the matter to the Chancery Division or adjudication by the General Equity Presiding Judge was improper under N.J. Const. Art. VI, § II, par. 3 (Pa 160-163), R. 1:13-4 (Pa 180-186), R. 4:3-1(a)(1) (Pa 187-191), R. 4:3-1(5) (Pa 187-191) and R. 4:69-1 (Pa 195-197).
[brief] Plaintiff's description of [...] being in the unit was “never” (1T; 100:12).  He never taught her anything, so she learned by herself (1T; 100:15).  Plaintiff was asked to do a “train the trainer” and asked [...], since he was now the Admin Officer, to do that (1T; 102:3).  Plaintiff felt that she was being retaliated against because she had been transferred to the Academy as the Admin Officer (1T; 103:24).
[brief] This court should affirm the preliminary injunction.  Respectfully submitted, [...]  ATTORNEY GENERAL OF NEW JERSEY  Attorney for Plaintiffs-Respondents  By: /s/ [...]  [...]  Deputy Attorney General Attorney ID No. 281382018  [...]  Date: May 30, 2024  [...] AND [...], Defendants-Appellants, v. [...], ATTORNEY GENERAL OF NEW JERSEY, AND [...], DIRECTOR, [...]
[brief] The court conducted an analysis, and looking at factor 3A, whether the crimes and their objectives are predominantly independent of one another, stated, “[t]his could be argued both ways, but if the possession of the gun was to fulfill the robbery, then it would be the same. ” (4T 17:14-19).  The court then found the other facts relating to the crime under factor 3 did not apply.  (4T 17:20-18:4).  The court then went “back to part one, there should be no free crimes in a system for which the punishment shall fit the crime. ” (4T 18:5-7).  The court then stated, “the legislative purpose of the certain persons not to have weapons, 2C:39-7, was to create [an] enhanced penalty for those who had certain convictions -- and it’s not every indictable conviction, but certain convictions, not to possess a firearm. ” (4T 18:8-12).  The court reasoned that while there are circumstances where it would be appropriate to run the sentence concurrently, the court noted that “if I didn’t rule in this manner for this particular case, for this particular crime, it would render that statute -- that is the certain persons to have a weapon, moot,” and found a consecutive sentence was appropriate.
[brief] Plaintiff confirmed that he filed an I-130 petition for Defendant, which was granted, allowing her to come to the United States.  (2T30)  For the first two to two-and-a-half months after Defendant arrived in the United States, the couple enjoyed activities together, such as going to beaches, boardwalks, and movies.  However, Plaintiff was keenly aware that Defendant was anxiously awaiting her green card, checking the mailbox daily until its arrival.
[brief] The facts in *[...]* are instructive: there, police stopped the defendant’s car based on a CI tip.  185 N.J. at 562.  \(^8\)  This Point responds to Point IV in defendant’s brief.  (Db45 to 48).  approaching the vehicle, an officer observed a large laundry bag on the front seat and smelled a strong odor of marijuana.  *Ibid.*  The Supreme Court confirmed that those observations, combined with the corroboration of the tip, established probable cause sufficient to trigger the automobile exception to the warrant requirement and permit a lawful warrantless search of the vehicle.  *Ibid.*  Those same facts establishing finding of probable cause also authorized the police to ask for [...]’s consent to search his home.  *Id.* at 564.
[brief] The purpose of a stipulated damages clause is not to compel the promisor to perform, but to compensate the promisee for non-performance .... [a] clause is unreasonable if it does more than compensate plaintiffs for their approximate actual damages caused by the breach. ”)  137 N.J. at 253 (emphasis added).  .  “In other words, liquidated damages are an ‘estimate in advance [of] the actual damage that will probably ensue from the breach,’ while a penalty is ‘a punishment, the threat of which is designed to prevent the breach. ’”  Holtham, 460 N.J. Super at 317 (citing Westmount Country Club, 82 N.J. Super. at 205)(emphasis added).  [...]’s attempt to downplay the coercive nature of its Rent Concession Rider and embedded charge-back be characterizing them as “a rent concession credit…conditioned upon Defendant Tenants making all rent payments on time…” (Da2, ¶ 7) is a well-worn drafting tactic, and similar provisions that have been treated as unlawful “disguised penalties” by courts and other authorities, applying substance-over-form principles.
[brief] In the very early stages of this litigation, Appellant [...] took the position that the waiver did not apply to him, only to his son.  Therefore, Respondents needed to conduct discovery, including taking [...]’s deposition, on his understanding of the waiver at the time he signed it.  Appellant [...] testified that he read the Agreement prior to purchasing admission, and understood the risk of potential injury by participating in the activities conducted on the premises.  T122:4-25.  [...] testified that he understood that the Agreement he signed applied to both his son and himself.  T125:24-26:3.  This testimony was necessary in order for Respondents to determine their ability to file the motion to stay the matter and compel arbitration.
[brief] C.W.H., 465 N.J. Super. at 589-93.  Despite a timely curative instruction, this Court found plain error because the detective “conveyed the impression to the jury that defendant was being deceptive during questioning, [which] impermissibly colored the jury’s assessment of defendant’s credibility” and because the final jury charge did not address the detective’s accusations “during the interrogation. ”  Id. at 595-98.  Similarly, in Tung, this Court reversed a murder conviction in part because, during playback of the defendant’s police interview, the interrogating detectives “expressly stated they knew defendant was lying and firmly believed in his guilt,” and one detective testified that he believed the defendant was not telling the truth.
[brief] If you do not like it, take it up.  1T30-31.  I know the complaints that [...] had contending that the court did not follow the statute, that the receiver is not entitled to discharge, but what was telling, was for all of the work that both sides, both the [...] and [...], were seeking [...] to perform relative to his position as receiver before he would be discharged, neither of them are in a position willing to compensate him for that, and that is telling in the case before the court, and that is part of the basis.