ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Under the equitable doctrine of unclean hands, "[a] suitor in equity must come into court with clean hands and he must keep them clean after his entry and throughout the proceedings. ”  Borough of Princeton v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders of Mercer, 169 N.J. 135, 158, 777 A.2d 19, 32, 2001 N.J. LEXIS 809, *44 (quoting A. Hollander & Son, Inc. v. Imperial Fur Blending Corp., 2 N.J. 235, 246, 66 A.2d 319 (1949)).  Essentially, “a court should not grant relief to one who is a wrongdoer with respect to the subject matter in suit."  Id. (quoting Faustin v. Lewis, 85 N.J. 507, 511, 427 A.2d 1105 (1981)).  Thus, the court should question if the Plaintiff is coming to court without any wrongdoing on Plaintiff’s own behalf.  Where the relief sought by the plaintiff is the result of his own wrongdoing, where the unclean hands of the plaintiff [have] infected the very subject matter in litigation, the plaintiff is barred from relief in a court of equity.  Rolnick v. Rolnick, 290 N.J. Super. 35, 45, 674 A.2d 1006, 1011, 1996 N.J. Super. LEXIS 173, *15 (quoting Pollino v. Pollino, 39 N.J. Super. 294, 298-99, 121 A.2d 62 (Ch.Div.1956)).  If the court determines that the Plaintiff has committed a wrong, then Plaintiff is not entitled to any relief.
[brief] ARGUMENT POINT I THE BOARD’S DENIAL OF LAMARRE’S APPLICATION MADE APPROXIMATELY ONE YEAR AND NINE MONTHS PAST THE STATUTORY DEADLINE TO FILE FOR AMENDED BENEFITS IS REASONABLE AND SHOULD BE AFFIRMED.  The Board’s decision denying [...]’s Eligibility Registration Form under the Ricci Act should be upheld because it is reasonable and supported by the plain language of N.J.S.A. 53:5A-10, and thus is not arbitrary nor capricious.
[brief] See id. at 132-33.  In cases such as this one, where the public’s interest is squarely at issue, the Court should also consider the impact on the public’s interest in determining whether to issue an injunction.  See Waste Mgmt. of N.J., Inc. v. Union Cty. Utils. Auth., 399 N.J. Super. 508, 520-21 (App. Div. 2008).  Equitable remedies are designed to be both broad and flexible, such that they can be tailored to redress even the most complicated grievances:  [C]ourts of equity and their remedies are distinguished for their flexibility, their unlimited variety, their adaptability to circumstances and the natural rules which govern their use.  There is in fact no limit to their variety in application; the court of equity has the power of devising its remedy and shaping it so as to fit the changing circumstances of every case and the complex relations of all the parties.  Banach v. Cannon, 356 N.J. Super. 342, 361 (Ch. Div. 2002) (quotation marks omitted).  Importantly, “a court may take a less rigid view” of the Crowe factors and the general rule that all factors favor injunctive relief “when the interlocutory injunction is merely designed to preserve the status quo.
[brief] LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I THE JUDGE OF COMPENSATION SHOULD HAVE GRANTED RESPONDENT'S MOTION FOR RECUSAL TO AVOID THE APPEARANCE OF BIAS.  (1T12-22 to 1T22-17, Ra66)  The Judge of Compensation should have recused herself from hearing this workers compensation case where she expressed an opinion on a fundamental issue in this case, whether the decedent was an essential employee.  The Judge of Compensation's opinion stemmed from her extrajudicial experience that she gained as an Assemblywoman and a primary sponsor of the "Presumption Bill," and not on any evidence in the record.  A fundamental issue in this claim is whether the decedent was an essential employee as defined by N.J.S.A. 34:15-31.11.  This statute is often referred to as the "Presumption Bill" because it entitles an essential employee to a rebuttable presumption that her COVID-19 disease was related to her employment.  Petitioner filed a motion to declare the decedent to be an essential employee and entitled to that presumption, which the Judge of Compensation granted over respondent's opposition.  That decision is now the subject of the companion appeal, [...] v. [...], Docket Number [...].
[brief] ”  R. 4:46-2(c).  An issue of fact is genuine if, “considering the burden of persuasion at trial, the evidence submitted by the parties on the motion, together with all legitimate inferences therefrom favoring the non-moving party, would require submission of the issue to the trier of fact. ”  Id.  A nonmoving party must oppose a summary judgment motion with more than a mere “scintilla of evidence. ”  Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America, 142 N.J. 520, 532 (1995) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986)).
[brief] Defendant, as mentioned earlier, had a lengthy criminal history that went back to 2004 for his adult history only.  He had juvenile adjudications as well.  Defendant committed two first-degree robberies and was convicted of both offenses.  Defendant’s consecutive sentences are amply supported by the record and by [...]’s reasoning.  Defendant’s sentence is well within the statutory guidelines and does not shock the judicial conscience.  Defendant’s sentences must stand.  CONCLUSION
[brief] (Aa54-55).  Contrary to [...]’s claim that [...] failed to meaningfully consider a catalytic heater for its Project, the record indicates that [...] evaluated the cost and emissions of the catalytic heaters and CWT heaters, which were approximately the same.  (Ab53-54; Aa831-32; 2T82:1-9; 2T82:16-84:6; 2T113:20-114:11; 2T115:17-19).  However, [...] decided against the alternative because the utility experienced reliability issues with catalytic heaters that were installed between 2008 and 2010, such as circuit board and heater panel defects.  (2T73:22-74:9; 2T83:1-84:6).  While [...] addressed its reliability concerns with the alternative catalytic heater, [...] failed to demonstrate why the catalytic heater was a feasible alternative to the CWT heater.  Hackensack, 41 N.J. Super. at 426-27.  Therefore, the [...] reasonably found that the CWT heater is the most reasonable and practical method for heating the proposed regulator.  (Aa54-55).  Furthermore, [...] erroneously argues that the icing issues associated with the temporary regulator are a “non-existent” risk.  (Ab25).  As previously noted in the record, [...]’s temporary regulator regularly experiences icing issues throughout the year, especially in winter, which “increases the outage risk associated with equipment failure. ” (Aa818).  Additionally, in 2014 and 2018, the regulator malfunctioned as a result of two major icing incidents.  (Aa819-20; 1T165:23-166:10; 1T172:2-9) (testifying that during the malfunction, the temporary station was out of service for a whole day).  As the temporary regulator is located underground, the record reflects that during the two major icing incidents, [...] was required to expend significant time and effort to access and repair the equipment.  (1T165:14-166:10; 1T171:8-172:9; Aa818).  Therefore, the record does not support [...]’s contention that icing issues associated with the temporary regulator are a “non-existent” risk, and as a result, [...]’s Project is reasonably necessary to provide safe and reliable service to the public.
[brief] The minimum set aside shall be fifteen percent (15%) of rental units and twenty percent (20%) of ‘for sale’ units.  When calculating the required number of affordable units, any computation resulting in a fraction of a unit shall be rounded upwards to the next whole number.  B.  All affordable units to be produced pursuant to this section shall comply with the Township’s Affordable Housing Ordinance at Chapter 73 of the Township Code, as may be amended and supplemented, and the Uniform Housing Affordability Controls (“UHAC”) (N.J.A.C. 5:80-26.1 et seq.), or any successor regulation.
[brief] The fact that the Department is seeking to accomplish this change through a “bulletin” is irrelevant.  Indeed, the Appellate Division has invalidated similar guidance documents.  For example, in In re Adoption of Reg’l Affordable Housing Dev. Program Guidelines, 418 N.J. Super. 387, 389 (App. Div. 2011), the [...] (“[...]”) adopted “guidelines” for the implementation of an amendment to the New Jersey Fair Housing Act.  The Court concluded these guidelines “set forth specific standards and conditions for regional planning that [...] will find acceptable in its administration of [the applicable statute]” and therefore constitute rules.  Id. at 395.  The Court similarly invalidated [...] (the “[...]”) guidance documents in In re N.J.A.C. 7:1B-1.1 et seq., 431 N.J. Super. 100 (App. Div. 2013) relating to the “waiver” rules excusing certain regulatory compliance.  In doing so, it noted the invalidated guidance document “lists specific procedures and instructions that waiver applicants should follow to prove and satisfy each of the four bases for waivers. ”  Id. at 136.  The Court held that all six of the Metromedia factors applied to these guidance documents and much of the [...]’s website postings concerning the waiver rules.  *Id.* at 137; see also *In re Highlands Master Plan*, 421 N.J. Super. 614, 629-33 (App. Div. 2011) (invalidating a “[g]uidance document” promulgated by the [...] that provided formulas for municipalities to calculate “growth projections” that effectively lowered [...]’s regulatory requirements).  The law has not changed, nor has the Department’s inability to apply the Holding Act or SSAP No. 25.
[brief] II.  COUNTERSTATEMENT OF FACTS  This personal injury action arises out of an alleged November 4, 2020 fall down accident.  On that date, [...] was working at a construction site at [...].  (Da001-Da002, Plaintiffs’ Complaint, First Count, ¶2).  Russo alleged that, while in the course and scope of his employment with [...] as a senior fire alarm technician, he was injured after falling into an open floor hatch.  (Da001-Da002, Plaintiffs’ Complaint, First Count, ¶2).  Russo alleges that, as the general contractor for the job site, [...]’s negligence caused his injuries.  (Da001-Da003, Plaintiffs’ Complaint, First Count).  Russo further alleged that, [...] employee, “[...]”\(^3\) was responsible to walk Russo through the job site.  (Da003-Da005, Plaintiffs’ Complaint, Second Count).  Russo alleged that [...] O’Donnel was negligent in failing to close the floor hatch and by failing to warn Russo of the dangerous condition.  (Da003-Da005, Plaintiffs’ Complaint, Second Count).  Plaintiffs’ Complaint contained a Third Count seeking to have [...] O’Donnell’s actions as a [...] employee imputed to [...].  (Da005-Da006, Plaintiffs’ Complaint, Third Count).  Russo answered form interrogatories in this matter.  (Da126-Da127, Plaintiffs’ Answers to Form A Interrogatories).  According to Russo’s answers to interrogatories, his accident occurred as follows:
[brief] On August 17, 2023, Respondents filed their Opposition to Appellant’s Motion and also filed their Reply in further support of their Motion.  On August 31, 2023, Appellant filed a Reply in further support of his Motion.  On October 4, 2023, the Lower Court directed that the parties submit supplemental briefing by October 13, 2023 after reviewing the Lower Court’s decision in Valentine v. Unifund CCR, LLC, et al., [...] ([...], Oct. 4, 2023) (Da³35-57).  On October 13, 2023, Appellant filed its Supplemental Briefing and Respondents filed their Supplemental Briefing.  _____________________  ³  “Da” refers to Defendant-Respondent’s Appendix filed on March 25, 2024.  On October 20, 2023, the Lower Court held oral argument on Respondents Motion and Appellant’s Motion.  During oral argument, Appellant voluntarily withdrew the unjust enrichment claim.  (T41-24-25) (“No, Your Honor, we would voluntarily withdraw the unjust enrichment claim. ”).  By Orders dated October 20, 2023, the Lower Court correctly granted Respondents’ Motion and denied Appellant’s Motion.
[brief] Ibid.  The Court ultimately held that the error had the clear capacity to produce an unjust result because the “State's evidence cannot fairly be described as overwhelming, and defendant's testimony might have influenced the outcome. ”  Ibid.  As in Hedgespeth and R.J.M., reversal is required here because the trial court’s erroneous admission of [...]’s prior convictions likely caused [...] not to testify, and his testimony could have led the jury to reach a different result.
[directive] Page 2 will be charged.  The Expungement Order (Form C) in the prose expungement packet entitled "How to Expunge Your Criminal and/or Juvenile Record" can be used for this purpose.  The pro se packet is available on the Judiciary's website at http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/prose/1 0557 _expunge_kit.pdf.  The prosecutor is required to notify the court of any disqualifying convictions or any other factors related to public safety that should be considered by the court when deciding whether to grant a "drug court expungement."  See N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14m(2).  The court shall grant the expungement unless it finds that the need for the availability of the records outweighs the desirability of having the person freed from any disabilities associated with their availability, or it 'finds that the person is otherwise ineligible for expungement because the person's records include a conviction for an offense barred from expungement under N.J.S.A. 2C:52-2(b) or (c).  If granted, the signed Order should be assigned an expungement reference number by Criminal Division staff.  The law requires that a copy of the "drug court expungement" order must be provided by the Superior Court to the prosecutor, the person, and, to the Public Defender, if the person was represented by that Office.  Thereafter, the person, or the Public Defender, if applicable, must promptly distribute copies of the expungement control of the records specified order to the appropriate agencies who have custody and in the order.
[brief] (5T35:17-19).  A [...] employee, [...], heard screaming outside as she was closing up the restaurant.  (3T47:1-23).  She went outside and found the woman, [...], hysterical.  (3T48:2-5).  Ms. Hodges brought Ms. Contreras into the restaurant and called the police.  (3T48:2-49:4).  Ms. Hodges reported to the 911 operator that Ms. Contreras told her that a white male in a red truck pulled a gun on her and tried to pull her into the car.  (3T53:23-54:11).  [...] (hereinafter, “[...]”) of the [...] reported to the scene and took a statement from Ms. Contreras.
[directive] 7  Discovery records.  Stored ALPR data shall be treated as “criminal investigatory  Criminal investigatory records” within the meaning of N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1 et seq., and shall not be shared with or provided to any person, entity, or government agency other than a law enforcement agency, unless a subpoena or court order authorizes such disclosure or unless such disclosure is required by court rules governing discovery in criminal matters.
[directive] g g %'ir.  01 o] ~¾oJl "O}Y.ll."i:Q-Jl 'g-~..Q..'i:! 17b-17f9.]  ~¾-g oJl 1iri>U ~ycj-, ~¾oJl "o!]"tj-Jl 1= 0 \l 1ti 1 ~oJl t" 18 ¾ ..Q..,£. 7}1)  Al .2.. o-j ~ b.  Do you understand that if you are not a citizen of the United States, this guilty plea may result [Yes/"11] [No/0}1...]..8..] in your removal from the United States and/or stop you from being able to legally enter or re- enter the United States?
[brief] None is confidential.  With the possible exception of the Power of Attorney, all were public records.  Nevertheless, the trial court continued:  In one of the emails, Counsel informed Petitioners that "to the extent there are non-probate assets ... there is a strong argument the 4 month window does not apply."  [Pa10.]  This is hardly detrimental to petitioners.  [...] provided free legal advice.  That advice was general.  It does not indicate consideration (or even receipt) of privileged information.  It does not even indicate that petitioners had advised that there were non-probate assets, much less that this potential information was somehow prejudicial.  Advising prospective clients that non-probate assets might not be subject to the time limits of R. 4:85-1, and petitioners might not be under such a time crunch, is neither a confidential communication nor detrimental to petitioners.  The court then went even farther afield: Counsel also indicated that he and Petitioners had a telephone conversation regarding "a potential claim from California."  The Court finds that based on such, the information provided to Counsel by Petitioners may be prejudicial to Petitioners in the matter.  [Ibid.]  The presence and identity of out-of-state petitioners is not and was not confidential.  However, their presence, as advised by [...], would trigger the six-month time limit of R. 4:85-1 and remove the time crunch altogether.  It would be anything but prejudicial to petitioners.  Indeed, it appears petitioners used that advice, by enlisting many non-New Jersey residents and extending the time to file by two months.  In the absence of the Knoll Certification, there were no disputed issues of fact.
[brief] .................................................. 15 Vitale v. Schering-Plough Corp., 447 N.J. Super. 98 (App. Div. 2016) ...................................................... 23 Zentz v. Toop, 92 N.J. Super. 105 (App. Div. 1966) ..................................................... 15 Statutes & Other Authorities: 1 Modern Tort Law: Liability and Litigation § 3:79 (2d ed. 2024) ............... 21 N.J. R. 4:46-2(c) ......................................................................................... 12 N.J. R. Evid. 701 ....................................................................................... 22, 23 N.J.S.A. 46:8B-3(d)(ii) ............................................................................ 14 N.J.S.A. 46:8B-14(a) .............................................................................. 14 Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules Governing the Courts, cmt. 2.3.2 on R. 4:46-2 (2019) ................................................................. 13 PRELIMINARY STATEMENT The Plaintiff-Appellant [...] brought suit against the Defendants for negligence and premises liability in their acts and omissions in allowing or creating a dangerously unsafe condition on the front entry stairs of the building at [...].
[brief] Prior to resentencing, defense counsel submitted a brief to the trial court arguing that it would have been “a serious injustice to sentence [defendant] to a significantly longer sentence than his equally culpable co-defendants” and attached copies of the co-defendant’s judgments of convictions.  (Da271; see Da272).  At the resentencing hearing, counsel also argued proportionality and the sentences of the co-defendants.  (20T22-4 to 24-9).  At sentencing, the trial court noted defendant’s proportionality argument and ruled that it “want[ed] it to be clear that not every defendant was charged in every incident in this indictment. ” (20T34-4 to 25).  The court found that the co-defendants either pleaded guilty or were acquitted, and defendant was not in the same position.  (20T62-25 to 63-4).  It noted defense counsel’s brief regarding the disparity of the sentence, responding to that argument by ruling that the issue of disparity of sentence was not addressed by the Supreme Court and the sole issue on remand was for the court to reconsider consecutive sentences pursuant with Yarbough.
[brief] In this case, the police officer was injured at an unlawful incident that arguably resulted, in part, from the Housing Authority’s negligent conduct in failing to provide a working lock for the building’s outside door….Unquestionably, a jury could find that the failure to provide a lock for the front entrance of a building was a dangerous condition of the property….And the jury could also find that [the police officer’s] injuries were proximately caused by the dangerous condition; that in the context of this case this was a reasonably foreseeable risk; that the dangerous condition was the result of the public entity’s negligence; and that the public entity had actual notice of the dangerous condition for a sufficient period of time to have corrected it.  389 N.J. Super. at 67, 68-69 (internal citations omitted).
[brief] The municipality pays for unmetered service on the light (they are charged per light and not by usage).  (Pa375-79).  The design, location and choice of lighting is solely controlled by the municipality.  (Pa255-56).  [...] does not set requirements for luminance at intersections.  (Pa275).  There is no obligation set forth by the [...] making [...] responsible for lighting design.  (Pa292-323).  E.
[brief] The subdivision application sought subdivision approval for the creation of a total of three (3) lots, including two (2) new lots, each of which would be the location for one of the new proposed warehouse-distribution-office buildings (which would be reviewed in the context of the companion Application for Site Plan Approval submitted at the same time), with one (1) remaining lot that would contain the existing office building.  Since no improvements were proposed as part of the subdivision application and, therefore, no resulting environmental impacts, there was no need for in depth review by the Zoning Board of any issues raised within the Environmental Impact Assessment (or in the other technical reports) in connection with its consideration of the subdivision.
[brief] Police may not randomly detain individuals to identify the target of an investigation without individualized suspicion that each person stopped committed a crime.  Here, when members of the [...] stopped [...], they admitted that there were “no facts linking [him] to criminality. ”  Nonetheless, officers ordered Pearson not to move so that they could identify and arrest a suspected drug dealer named [...].  But neither the two officers who testified at the suppression hearing nor any of the other sixteen surveilling officers near [...] on February 10, 2023, reported seeing Pearson buy drugs, sell drugs, participate in a transaction, or engage in any other activity that could reasonably be characterized as criminal or suspicious.  Without any particularized suspicion that Pearson committed a crime, the police’s stop plainly violated Pearson’s constitutional rights.
[brief] *Id.* at 1-2.  The defendant sought to present evidence related to a subsequent accident to attack the plaintiff’s credibility.  *Id.* at 6.  The Trial Court barred the evidence and the Appellate Division affirmed noting that the defendant was required to present expert testimony establishing the logical relationship under *Allendorf*.  *Id.* at 7.  As it explained, “[d]efendant was obligated to adduce some competent evidence that the subsequent accident caused the injuries or otherwise generated plaintiff’s existing complaints of pain.  Absent such expert testimony, consideration of evidence regarding a subsequent accident would constitute an open invitation to the jury to engage in speculation. ”  *Id.* (internal citation omitted).  The defendant argued that the evidence of the other accident was admissible to challenge the plaintiff’s credibility in the absence of expert opinion.  *Id.*  This argument was rejected because it was likely to mislead the jury and cause them to speculate that there was a relationship with the complaints the plaintiff alleged were caused by the subject accident and was an impermissible use of the evidence in the absence of expert testimony.  *Id.* at 8.  The matter of *Lintao v. Livingston*, 2011 WL 2935052 (App. Div. 2011) is also instructive in this matter.
[brief] See R. 4:46-2(b) (all material facts in the movant’s statement which are sufficiently supported will be deemed admitted for purposes of the motion only, unless specifically disputed by citation conforming to the requirements of paragraph (a) demonstrating the existence of a genuine issue as to the fact.)  In any event, as to the proffered fact as to lack of an oral or written statement by Defendant [...] that Plaintiff was a misogynist, in this appeal  Plaintiff has abandoned any claim of defamation.  (Pb28)  In sum, the material facts in the motion record were undisputed and summary judgment was appropriate.