ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Plaintiffs’ complaint was filed September 21, 2018 alleging violations of the RETA and CFA.  (Da1).  The complaint was amended on October 17, 2018.  (Da22).  On April 22, 2019, defendant filed an answer.  (Da44).  On July 30, 2020, [...] moved for summary judgment.  (Da63).  The motion was denied without prejudice and the plaintiffs permitted to extend discovery and conduct multiple depositions of [...]’s employees.  (Da65).  On June 11, 2021, defendant moved for summary judgment a second time.  (Da67).  On June 23, 2021, the plaintiffs filed a motion to amend their complaint a second time.  (Da547).  On July 8, 2021, the plaintiffs’ motion to amend was denied.  (Da549).  On August 31, 2021, the plaintiffs filed a cross-motion for summary judgment.  (Da551).  On December 14, 2021, the Hon. [...] heard oral argument and rendered an oral decision denying [...]’s motion for summary judgment and the plaintiffs’ cross-motion.  (2T35:15-38:2) (Da1096).  On January 3, 2022, [...] filed a motion to reconsider and grant summary judgment pursuant to R. 4:49-2.  (Da1097).  The plaintiffs filed a cross-motion to reconsider on January 13, 2022.  (Da1099).  On February 23, 2022, the Court held oral argument on the parties’ motions for reconsideration.  The Court denied [...]’s motion for reconsideration but partially granted the plaintiffs’ motion with regard to technical violations of administrative code regulations.  (Da1101).  On June 24, 2022 and June 26, 2022, the plaintiffs and [...] filed their pretrial memorandums, respectively.  (Da1105 & 1120).  On August 11, 2022, the Court filed the pretrial order.  (Da1134).  Jury selection began on September 12, 2022 and concluded September 13, 2022.  At the close of the plaintiffs’ case, [...] filed a motion for involuntary dismissal pursuant to R. 4:37-2(b) and for judgment at trial pursuant to R. 4:40-1 based on the Parol Evidence Rule.  (Da1140).  On September 29, 2022, the trial court denied [...]’s motion for involuntary dismissal and for judgment at trial.  (Da1144).  On September 30, 2022, the jury found in favor of the plaintiffs.  The approximate $214,000 award was trebled pursuant to the CFA and doubled pursuant to the RETA.
[brief] As set forth in the previous point, [...] requested reconsideration of the May 24, 2024 Order and was denied.  It subsequently sought more re-consideration under different headings, all of which were denied.  (See Orders listed on page vi herein)  All issues with respect to the January 4, 2024 Consent Order have been decided many times and long ago adversely to the arguments that Defendants now seek to resurrect out of time to create an agreement that does not exist.
[brief] [...]  Attorneys for Plaintiff-Respondent, [...]  By: /s/[...], Esq.  [...], Esq.  Dated: June 24, 2024  NEW COMMUNITY CORPORATION  Respondent, v. FIRST ZION HOPE  MISSIONARY BAPTIST CHURCH  Appellant.  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE  DIVISION  DOCKET NUMBER: [...] Civil Action AMENDED
[brief] 1  I.  OLDS V. DONELLY EXEMPTED  “ALL ATTORNEY MALPRACTICE ACTIONS FROM THE ENTIRE CONTROVERSY DOCTRINE. ”  .................................................................................................................................  1  II.  THE APPLICABLE STANDARD OF REVIEW IS DE NOVO.  .........................................................  4  III.  PLAINTIFF’S FAILURE TO JOIN OR DISCLOSE  THE CLAIMS AGAINST PLAINTIFF IN THE LEASE  LITIGATION WAS NOT INEXCUSABLE AND DEFENDANTS DID NOT SUFFER  SUBSTANTIAL PREJUDICE  ...........................................................................................................................................  5  CONCLUSION  .............................................................................................................................  8
[brief] The Trial Court’s simplistic, unnuanced, and curt analysis seems to strain itself in order to achieve a desired outcome, but it comes woefully short of making any sense in fact, law, or reason.  It is a factual, legal, and physical impossibility for Plaintiffs’ new claims, arising solely out of the discovery that [...] was Sole Member of [...] and controlled and operated [...] as a sham entity, to be “identical” to prior, dismissed claims, which never alleged such facts.  The New Jersey Supreme Court in DiTrolio v. Antiles, 142 N.J. 253, 273–74, 662 A.2d 494, 505 (1995) held that “[T]he entire controversy doctrine does not apply to unknown or unaccrued claims. ”  It is a well-established principle of justice and fairness that the Entire Controversy Doctrine is inapplicable to, and does not apply to bar component claims either unknown, unarisen, or unaccrued at the time of the original action.  K-Land Corp. No. 28 v. Landis Sewerage Auth., 173 N.J. 59, 70, 800 A.2d 861, 868 (2002).  See Mauro v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 116 N.J. 126, 138, 561 A.2d 257 (1989) (holding that Entire Controversy Doctrine would not bar toxic-tort plaintiff’s damage claim because plaintiff discovered existence of disease after first litigation); Zaromb v. Borucka, 166 N.J.Super. 22, 27, 398 A.2d 1308 (App.Div.1979) (holding that slander claim was not precluded by Entire Controversy Doctrine because the party was not aware of its existence).
[brief] [...] offers additional forms of incentive compensation for certain employees under particular circumstances, with one such incentive being “charge pay. ” (Pa103 at 79:6-17).  Charge pay is an additional dollar per hour on top of a given hourly rate for a given shift.  (Pa165 at 25:13-20; Pa361 at 80:3-11).  The charge nurse, to whom charge pay is payable, is a designated Registered Nurse on a particular shift who assumes additional responsibilities.  (Pa361 at 80:4-11).  Having been rejected for the COVID-19 incentive pay, [...] sought charge pay for the staffing coordinators.  (Pa230 at 21:19-22:21).  While non-nurses could in theory receive charge pay, such a decision required director-level approval.  (Pa361-62 at 80:17-81:16; Pa232 at 29:8-12).  Staffing coordinators were ineligible for charge pay.  (Pa103 at 80:8-13; Pa292 at 60:2-6).  [...] had once mistakenly received charge pay for a single pay period.  It was discovered by [...] after payroll had already been processed.  When [...] advised [...] of her discovery, [...] indicated “we will let it go this time,” because the administrative effort to correct the error was immense.  (Pa362 at 84:2-9; Pa103-04 at 81:20-82:18).  [...] would have approved any ongoing prospective charge pay in writing.  (Pa473).  [...] approached [...] about whether the staffing coordinators could receive charge pay in lieu of their ineligibility for the PIP.  (Pa362 at 83:22-84:9).  [...] expressly denied [...]’s request for prospective staffing coordinator charge pay.  (Pa362 at 83:7-21-84:14; Pa475).  Undeterred, [...] decided she, [...], and [...] were going to take charge pay anyway.
[brief] Pa30.  Pa122-269.  Additionally, other retired Troopers who were not present at the September 11, 2001 attacks and aftermath also submitted affidavits that they did not receive any notice of the Ricci Act in further support of the Petition.  Pa270-280.  President of the [...], [...], submitted an affidavit that he did not receive any correspondence or postcard from the [...] notifying him of the Ricci Act.
[brief] Branch v. Cream-O-Land Dairy, 244 N.J. 567, 582 (2021).  Summary judgment must be granted “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admission on file, together with the affidavits, if any show that there is no genuine issue as to any material facts challenged and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment or order as a matter of law. ”  R. 4:46-2(c).  To avoid summary judgment, the non-moving party must submit properly admissible evidence that creates a genuine issue of material fact for each challenged essential element of her claims.  Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America, 142 N.J. 521, 529, 540 (1995) (citing R. 4:46-2).  The evidence must be “sufficient to permit a rational fact finder to resolve the alleged dispute” in the non-moving parties’ favor.  Id. at 540.  Indeed, “a non-moving party cannot defeat a motion for summary judgment merely by pointing to any fact in dispute. ”  Id. at 529.  Rather, the disputed fact issues must be substantial, “not imaginary, unreal, or apparent only. ”  Id. at 529-30.  B.
[brief] 30 International Shoe Co., v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945)  ..................................................................................................................  18 Jacobs v. Walt Disney World, Co., 309 N.J. Super. 443 (App. Div. 1998)  ......................................................................................  15  Jamar Development, LLC v. Moderate Income Management Co., 2021 WL 1647793 (D.N.J. Apr. 27, 2021)  .............................................................................  28  Lexmark International, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118 (2014)  ....................................................................................................................  29
[brief] In response, the State first attempts to minimize the significant benefit this testimony provided to the State’s case.  The claim that they were “not pivotal to the State’s case” or that any errors were harmless because the jury was “not obligated to accept expert testimony” is belied by the record and case law.  (Sb 7-8)¹ ¹ Sb – State’s brief  First, as laid out at length in [...]’s initial brief, the State greatly relied on these experts in summation to argue that it had met its burden.
[brief] (Pb21).  Defendant provides no evidentiary support for this claim.  Further, [...] testified that they sought out defendant after questioning all individuals observed on the [...]’s surveillance cameras.  (2T:41-4 to 42-14).  Defendant reiterates his arguments as to [...]’s credibility in support of his assertion that there “were too many factual inconsistencies to support the verdict. ” (Pb21).  For reasons argued above, the trial court considered all the evidence and properly concluded that a reasonable jury could have found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt regarding both the motion for acquittal and the motion for a new trial.  (4T:95-6 to 97-20; 8T:23-9 to 24-10).  POINT IX
[brief] PROCEDURAL HISTORY ....................................................................................5  STATEMENT OF FACTS ....................................................................................7  LEGAL ARGUMENT ...........................................................................................10  1.  Appellant had no legal authority to sell his late mother’s car at the time of the events underlying the claim.  As such, there was no contract, and he has no standing to bring a breach of contract suit.  ...10  2.  The case should remain dismissed because appellant clearly does not understand the issues in this suit and is frivolously arguing to argue, as evidenced by his misinterpretations of the authorities he cites to argue he has standing.  .................................................................11  3.  The case should remain dismissed because appellant’s unjust enrichment claims are not viable.  .........................................................16  4.  The case should remain dismissed, and sanctions should be upheld because appellant is clearly aware that he had far better options for making use of the car than pursuing this suit.  ..............................................18  5.  The appellant’s reading of the frivolous litigation statute N.J.S.A. §2A:15-59 is incorrect and does not indicate a burden of proof for bad faith.  The statute clearly states that the judge has the authority to make that determination on the basis of the pleadings and the record.19  6.  The Appellate Division is required to apply an abuse of discretion standard of review when assessing the reasonableness of sanctions awarded, and there is no abuse of discretion...........................................21  CONCLUSION
[brief] The record is bereft of any such evidence, and that is because it is the Applicant's greed in creating more residential lots -- not any peculiar parcel conditions -- which causes irregular lot lines and the loss of street trees.  The Applicant presented a classic case of self-created hardship which the Board had no record basis to approve.  At Pb15, plaintiffs argue that Lakewood Ord. § 18-805(c) (produced at Ia213), regarding side lot lines, includes the word "practical" and that this trumps the "peculiar conditions pertaining to the subject parcel"/hardship waiver provision in § 18-601.  First, even if plaintiffs were correct, that does not change the fact that § 18-601 governs the other waiver (street tree requirement).  The Applicant would have plenty of room for the street trees with eight residential lots and a stormwater detention facility -- it is the profit-driven desire for nine residential lots which self-creates the need to sacrifice the street trees in order to accommodate drainage.  Second, and regarding § 18-805(c), it is the number of lots which makes regular side lot lines 'impractical.'  Third, the word "impractical" does not appear in the Planning Board hearing transcripts -- the Applicant failed to meet its burden to justify waiver relief regardless of the applicable standard(s).  At Pb15, plaintiffs urge that "[t]he applicable regulations are those of Lakewood's, and as such, only those of Lakewood matter."  Precisely.  N.J.S.A. 40:55D-51(a) does not apply to a "major" subdivision.  Lakewood requires "peculiar conditions"/hardship relief for the street tree waiver (if not both waivers).  The Applicant's proofs failed and thus the Board's denial is unassailable.
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DISMISSED THIS MATTER AFTER FINDING THAT PLAINTIFF ASSIGNED HIS RIGHTS TO THIS LAWSUIT TO THIRD PARTIES AND IN FINDING THAT PLAINTIFF LACKED STANDING TO BRING THIS LAWSUIT AS A RESULT OF THE ASSIGNMENTS.  The Trial Court correctly dismissed this case because the Plaintiff improperly assigned his rights to the lawsuit, and because of the assignments he lacked standing to be a plaintiff in this lawsuit.
[brief] [...] went to trial in the belief that the Report of the Boundary Commissioners had to be set aside as it affected parties not before the trial court, and that alternative remedies could be considered.  In addition to presenting evidence for an alternative remedy, the Patiernos had [...] testify in order to underscore the ultimate impact of the Report.  Although the trial court understood the consequences of adopting the Report, it determined not to set aside the Report.  See 2T3, ll.19-23; 2T5, l.13-2T6, l.2 & 2T10, ll.4-15.  It introduced a procedural fudge in an attempt to retroactively justify the consequences of the Report.  After trial, the court directed notice to be given to affected property owners (Pa95).  The Respondents consider this novel approach to be satisfactory.  No justification for it exists.  The trial had taken place.  Notice after trial did not adequately inform the affected neighbors of the consequences of the Boundary Commissioners’ Report.  When at the hearing subsequent to the trial the trial court made it clear that it was going to enforce the Worley Line but not follow the Report’s recommendation, the Patiernos sought time to join the other owners which the trial court denied.  See lT 179-80, & 2T 9-18.  Whether such post-trial joinder would have been an appropriate remedy remains to be seen, but the failure to join the neighboring property owners in the litigation clearly leaves them affected by the recordation of the Report without having had due process.  However well intentioned, the trial court’s post hoc effort to make the Report and the affected neighbors fit together failed.  The failure to follow the recommendation of the Report compounded that failure and created the untenable current situation wherein the boundary lines of all affected properties are unsettled.  This circumstance leaves the only current remedy to be further litigation among the neighbors.
[directive] Monday - Friday [...] x [...] 1104  Wednesday 2200 [...] 1105 [...] 2nd Thursday (609)  737-1035 x [...] 1106 Tuesday 6210  Monday, Tuesday, [...] 1107 [...]  Wednesday [...] 1108 [...]  1st & 3rd Thursday [...] 1110 [...]  Monday & Tuesday [...] x [...] 1111  Monday - Friday 623 [...] x 2nd & 4th -Tuesday, [...] 1112 2200  Thursday [...] x [...] 1113
[brief] Thus, the mandatory re-examination by the planning board of the master plan and zoning ordinance, at least every six years, is intended to inform the governing body of the need for revisions in the plan and ordinance based on significant changes in the community since the last such re-examination.  Similarly, the annual reports by boards of adjustment summarizing variance requests throughout the year and recommending amendments to the zoning ordinance are designed to avoid successive appeals for the same types of variance by encouraging the governing body to amend the ordinance so that such appeals will be unnecessary.  When an informed governing body does not change the ordinance, a board of adjustment may reasonably infer that its inaction was deliberate.
[brief] For a deliberate indifference claim based upon indifference to medical care, “the alleged deprivation must be sufficiently serious, in the sense that a condition of urgency, one that may produce death, degeneration, or extreme pain exists. ”  Hathaway v. Coughlin, 99 F.3d 550, 553 (2d Cir. 1996) (internal quotation marks omitted).  This objective prong of the test is focused also on the delay in treatment rather than on the underlying medical condition alone.  See Smith v. Carpenter, 316 F.3d 178, 185 (2d Cir. 2003).  In this matter, the Plaintiff has not pled a serious medical need, and cannot satisfy this requirement.
[brief] Cases  Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 90 S. Ct. 1463, 25 L. Ed. 2d 747 (1970) .........................  11  Brundage v. Estate of Carambio, 195 N.J. 575 (2008).............................. 7, 8 Byrd v. Manning, 253 N.J. Super. 307, 601 A.2d 770 (App. Div. 1992)............................  15 Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 69 S. Ct. 1221, 93 L.Ed. 1536 (1949) ............................. 9 Eaton v. Eaton, 119 N.J. 628, 575 A.2d 858 (1990).................................. 14 Fid. Union Bank v. Hyman, 214 N.J. Super. 177, 518 A.2d 764 (App. Div. 1986)............................ 8 Hamilton v. Letellier Constr. Co., 156 N.J. Super. 336, 383 A.2d 1168 (App. Div. 1978)........................... 8 in Re Guardianship of Gotson, 72 N.J. 112 (1976) .................................. 9 In re Pennsylvania R.R., 20 N.J. 398 (1956) ........................................ 9 Klimowich v. Klimowich, 86 N.J. Super. 449, 207 A.2d 200 (App. Div. 1965).............................. 8 Maida v. Kuskin, 221 N.J. 112, 110 A.3d 867 (2015)............................... 14 North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 91 S. Ct. 160, 27 L. Ed. 2d 162 (1970) ..............................
[brief] ”  Id. at 600 (emphasis added); accord State v. Williams, 471 N.J. Super. 34, 47-48 (App. Div. 2022) (reversing where prosecutor commented in summation on previously unpublished portions of video admitted into evidence because “video-recorded evidence often is unclear and needs narration to place the scene in context” and permitting new commentary at the end of the trial would “prevent[] defendant from any opportunity to rebut the ‘evidence. ’”); cf. McNeil-Thomas, 238 N.J. at 274-81 (upholding argument about surveillance video based on several extraneous items of evidence, including police photos, defendant’s admissions, and witness testimony about the specific car at issue).
[brief] ”  DiFiore v. Pezic, 254 N.J. 212, 228 (2023) (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Stein, 225 N.J. 582, 593 (2016)).  An abuse of discretion occurs if “a decision is made without a rational explanation, inexplicably departed from established policies, or rested on an impermissible basis. ”  US Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Guillaume, 209 N.J. 449, 468 (2012) (citation omitted); see also Del. River Joint Bridge Comm’n v. George Harms Constr. Co., Inc., 475 N.J. Super. 317, 361 (App. Div.), certif. granted, 254 N.J. 523 (2023) (holding that trial court, which “painstakingly examined records and gave detailed analyses of its determinations,” did not abuse its discretion in issuing discovery orders).
[brief] Statement of Facts  Plaintiff filed a complaint against Defendants, [...], and [...], on August 14, 2023, alleging nursing home malpractice.  (Pa2-10)  Defendants answered the Complaint on November 17, 2023 and, in that Answer, made a demand for an Affidavit of Merit, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-26, et seq., as Defendants are parties covered by the statute.  (Pa16-25)  After Defendants filed their Answer, Plaintiff took no action for over one-hundred twenty days, at which point, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim.
[brief] Order of January 21, 2022, Denying Plaintiffs’ Motion to Reconsider the Order of December 9, 2021 …………………………………………………..463a–465a (7T83:12-13)  #  TABLE OF CONTENTS FOR APPENDIX | Date | Document Description | Page | |------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | 6/11/15 | Plaintiffs’ Complaint | 1a | | 7/7/15 | [...] Answer to Complaint | 26a | | 11/24/15 | [...] Motion to Dismiss Complaint | 39a | | 1/19/16 | Order Dismissing Complaint | 41a | | 8/29/16 | Certification of Counsel | 43a | | 8/29/19 | Plaintiffs’ Motion to Vacate the Order of January 19, 2016 | 47a | | 11/10/16 | Order Denying Motion to Vacate | 50a | | 3/20/17 | [...] Brief | 52a | | | Exhibit S to 3/20/17
[brief] The amount of interest accrued has been contested, and on 8/29/22, [...] erroneously denied Plaintiffs’ interest from the date of the 8/28/20 Final Order, disregarding \textit{R. 4:42-11(a)}, which provides that interests begins accruing on the day an order is entered; in this case, on 8/28/20.  Defendants do not contest that post-judgment interest runs from when the judgment has been entered, not from when all the appeals have been disposed of.  \textit{Baker v. National State Bank}, 353 N.J. Super. 145, 173-74 (App. Div. 2022).  Similarly, Defendants provide no evidence that an exception is apparent in this case according to \textit{R. 4:42-11(a)}.  Given Defendants’ abject lack of rationale to support the claim that post-judgment interest in the amount offered by Plaintiff is not applicable, this Court should not only order that the Board pay the $4,964.53 interest denied minus the $338.80 interest granted ($4,625.73), but this Court should also remand for an award of interest on the $4,625.73 unpaid interest since the 8/29/22 Order was entered.
[brief] The State also clarified that in felony murder, the resulting death does not have to be intended by the participants.  (26T73:20-74:16.)  3  Note that during the charging conference, the court specifically referenced this charge, and the Defense expressly agreed to its use.  (25T80:10-22).  This was distinct from the situation in *Whitaker*, where the prosecutor suggested that even if the Defendant did not have the intent to commit the Robbery, he could still be convicted of the same if he thereafter aided in hiding the weapon used.  Here, the Assistant Prosecutor made no such assertion.  Additionally, the court’s expressed instruction that the Defendant had to have the purpose of committing the “particular” underlying offense clearly shows that a jury charge consistent with the ruling in *Whitaker* was given.  That instruction was clear, unambiguous, and served the very purpose that Appellate Counsel notes is required; to ensure that the jury did not convict the Defendant based on conduct occurring after the underlying offenses or based on some other purpose.