ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] **  On January 9, 2023, oral argument was held on the motion in Ship Bottom Municipal Court.  1a.  On or about January 19, 2023, Hon. [...], JMC, the current judge presiding in Ship Bottom Municipal Court, denied defendant’s motion to correct the sentence, essentially ruling that ‘defendant’s argument runs contrary to the plain language of the DWI statute,’ NJSA 39:4-50, in that the “revocation or suspension imposed shall commence as of the date of the termination of the existing revocation or suspension period.
[brief] Cox & Koenig, § 29-2.2 at p. 424; N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70(c)(1).  Undue hardship refers solely to the particular physical conditions of the property as those are described in subsection (c)(1) of the statute.  Lang v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment of Borough of North Caldwell, 160 N.J. 41, 56 (1999).  It does not refer to personal hardship, financial or otherwise.  See Smith v. Fair Haven Zoning Bd., 335 N.J. Super. 111, 122 (App. Div. 2000).  A (c)(1) variance “requires proof of the ‘positive criteria,’ which are predicated on ‘exceptional and undue hardship’ because of exceptional shape and size of the lot. ”  Lang, 160 N.J. at 55, quoting Bressman v. Gash, 131 N.J. 517, 522-23 (1993).  An applicant for a (c)(1) variance must also satisfy the negative criteria, which requires a showing that the variance can be granted without substantial detriment to the public good and the variance will not substantially impair the intent and the purpose of the zone plan and zoning ordinances.
[brief] The Green Court noted, “The grounds on which any plaintiff may pursue a malpractice claim against an attorney with whom there was no attorney-client relationship [remain] exceedingly narrow. ”  Green, 215 N.J. at 458.  As noted by the Court in Green:  We have recently reiterated that [w]e have judicially been reluctant to permit a non-client to sue an adversary’s attorney, and with good reason.  Lobiondo v. Schwartz, 199 N.J. 62, 100 (2009).  As we explained, our reluctance to prevent non-clients to institute litigation against attorneys who are performing their duties is grounded on our concern that such a cause of action will not serve its legitimate purpose of creating a remedy for a non-client who has been wrongfully pursued, but instead will become a weapon used to chill the entirely appropriate zealous advocacy on which our system of justice depends.  Whether a duty exists is a question of law.
[brief] While unpublished, the recent opinion in [...] v. [...], [...] (App. Div. October 5, 2023), Ia253 to Ia28, reaffirms the standard.  There, the developer gave notice of a proposed hotel and bank, "both permitted uses" (slip op. at 4).  Because the notice did not disclose that the hotel would have an 833-person banquet facility, the approval was nullified.
[brief] GO TO THE JURISDICTION OF THE CHANCERY DIVISION JUDGE OR CONCERN MATTERS OF GREAT PUBLIC IMPORTANCE  ..............................................  7  C. DEFENDANTS ARGUMENT THAT THE COMPLAINT IS NOT ONE CHALLENGING AN ACTION BY MUNICIPAL BODY OR STATE ACTION IS CONTRARY TO N.J.S.A. 22A:4-17, N.J.S.A. 40A:1-1; N.J.S.A. 40A:5-22, N.J.S.A. 40A:9-94, N.J.S.A. 40A:9-105, 117 AND STEVENSON V. DEPT OF LAW & PUB.
[brief] [...]’s entire appellate position is premised on a strawman argument and supported by inapplicable precedent.  [...] never contended that the original arbitrator’s award on the issue of liability should be “abandoned” or that “the matter be re-litigating as to all issues. ”  Rb2.  To the contrary, [...] recognized both before the trial court and the Appellate Division that “the only remaining issue was damages. ”  Pb9; T24:7-12 ([...] Counsel: “Liability has been established, Your Honor.  That has been litigated…So, the issue that’s left is damages. ”)  [...]’s mischaracterization of [...]’s position is significant because the case law [...] relies upon is focused on that non-existent position.  [...] and the trial court relied upon *Trade & Transport, Inc. v. Natural Petroleum Charters, Inc.*, 931 F.2d 191 (2d. Cir. 1991) as the basis for compelling arbitration before a substitute arbitrator.
[brief] The estoppel doctrine may be invoked against a municipality “where the interests of justice, morality and common fairness clearly dictate that course. ”  Gruber v. Mayor & Tp. Comm., 39 N.J. 1, 13 (1962).  The courts have further held that a plaintiff need not even prove that an actual statement was made upon which he/she relied upon to prove the element of misrepresentation.  *See Ridge Chevrolet-Oldsmobile, Inc. v. Scarano*, 238 N.J. Super. 149, 154 (App. Div. 1990).  ("'[A] party asserting equitable estoppel may rely upon inaction, representation of the actor, misrepresentation, silence or omission.'" (quoting *Fairken Assocs. v. Hutchin*, 223 N.J. Super. 274, 280 (Law Div. 1987)).  Thus, principles of equitable estoppel may be applied to actions of the agency as well as to actions of a municipality."  *Id.* at 59.  Of further note:  More general equitable principles, however, may be at play here.  In numerous circumstances, the courts have said that the government must ‘turn square corners’ in its dealings with others, and ‘comport itself with compunction and integrity.
[brief] Respondent, via discovery responses, physician/expert reports and pre-trial submissions, had placed Appellant upon notice of a claim for Aggravation in this case.  Respondent’s filed pre-trial submissions contained a request to charge the jury as to Aggravation.  Respondent called [...] for trial testimony via *de bene esse* deposition two (2) months prior to trial, who explicitly opined that Respondent aggravated pre-existing but asymptomatic degenerative changes in her cervical spine; corroborated by objective evidence including both physical exam and an EMG finding of acute radiculopathy at a level [...] called an Aggravation.  This evidence was admitted without objection; no objection at the time the testimony was proffered, not *in limine* prior to trial and not prior to or even after the presentation of the evidence to the jury, at trial.  Respondent represented to all of her physicians and at the time of trial, to have never had injuries, pain or problems to her cervical spine, such that would warrant medical treatment or testing.  Appellant’s medical expert, [...], reviewed Respondent’s primary care physician’s records pre- dating the subject collision and acknowledged they were devoid of any relevant history to the cervical spine.  Appellant alleges legal error in charging the jury as to Aggravation, because [...] did not perform a comparative analysis of prior medical records.  Not only is such an objection waived by not making it at the time the evidence was presented; the objection is meritless based upon the established evidence that there was nothing to compare.  Appellant further argues prejudice in the timing the charge was ruled to be given, in that closing arguments had been completed and the request was made immediately prior to the jury charge.  As previously indicated, there was no surprise that the Aggravation charge was being requested and a part of this case.  The charge was mistakenly missed by the parties and the Court during the charge conference.  The Court further provided the parties with supplemental closing argument to address the charge.
[brief] The Board concluded that the Ricci Act, codified in part at N.J.S.A. 53:5A-10(e)(3), allows members to file for the recalculation of Ordinary Disability, Special, or Service Retirement Benefits to Accidental Disability Retirement Benefits if the member is or becomes totally and permanently disabled due to participation in the rescue, recovery, or cleanup operations at the World Trade Center between September 11, and October 11, 2001.  (Pa10).  The Board also noted the Ricci Act required the Board to provide notice to members and retirees within thirty days of the effective date of the act, and if members or retirees did not file a written and sworn statement with the retirement system within two years of the effective date of the Act they would be ineligible for the presumption or recalculation.  (Pa10).  The Board found it undisputed that the Division had mailed notice of the Ricci Act to [...] and that [...] did not submit his Eligibility Registration Form until approximately one year and one month past the July 8, 2021 statutory deadline.  (Pa13).  The Board also considered the matter under its inherent power to extend the deadline if good cause, reasonable grounds, and reasonable diligence could be demonstrated.  (Pa13-14).  The Board concluded that the Division had notified all retired members of [...] of the passage of the Ricci Act on August 9, 2019 in accordance with the Act.  (Pa13).  [...]’s assertion that he did not remember receiving the postcard notice did not establish good cause nor reasonable grounds to allow him to file over one year and one month past the statutory deadline.  (Pa14).  Further, the Board concluded that [...] had not exercised reasonable diligence because of such a protracted delay in filing his Eligibility Registration Form.  (Pa14).  Therefore, the Board concluded that [...] was ineligible to register for amended benefits under the Ricci Act.  (Pa14).  This appeal followed.
[directive] Fecha/Date  Acusado/Defendant Abogado Defensor/Defense Attorney Fiscal/Prosecutor Formulario promulgado por la directriz #01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 11170- Spanish página 2 de 2 Revised Form Promulgated by Directive # 01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 11170-Spanish page 2 of 2
[brief] [...], Plaintiff-Appellant, v. [...]; [...]; JOHN DOE #1-10 AND ABC CORP. #1-10, Defendants-Respondents.  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE  DIVISION  DOCKET NO.: [...]  CIVIL ACTION  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY LAW  DIVISION – ESSEX COUNTY DOCKET NO.: [...] Sat Below: Hon. [...], J.S.C. PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT’S AMENDED BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF APPEAL
[brief] Kane v. Hartz Mountain Industries, Inc., 143 N.J. 141 (1996).  In a later tort case, *Leitao v. Damon G. Douglas, Company*, 301 N.J. Super. 187 (App. Div. 1997), the Appellate Division noted that the Law Division had severed at trial a defendant general contractor’s third-party complaint for contractual indemnification against the plaintiff’s employer.  After the jury found the contractor 51% negligent and the employee 49% negligent, the trial court addressed the indemnification questions.  The court ruled that the plaintiff’s employer was obligated to fully indemnify the defendant, despite the plaintiff’s comparative fault.  The court did so because the accident “arose out of” the employer’s subcontract and was not caused by the defendant indemnitee’s “sole negligence. ”  *Id.* at 190.  Ultimately, in *D’Avila*, the Appellate Division noted the quandary of pursuing indemnification against an injured party’s employer and the complications that arise in light of the “sole remedy” of the Workers’ Compensation Act (*N.J.S.A.* 34:15-1 et seq.).
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY GRANTED  [...]’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT  BECAUSE [...] CANNOT BE HELD VICARIOUSLY LIABLE FOR THE INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR’S NEGLIGENT ACTS AS A MATTER OF LAW  The New Jersey Supreme Court consistently holds that a principal is not liable for the negligent acts of an independent contractor.  *Puckrein v. ATI Transp., Inc.*, 186 N.J. 563, 574 (2006).  The Court reasons that the central difference between an employee and an independent contractor is that one who hires an independent contractor “has no right of control over the manner in which the work is to be done. ”  *Baldasarre v. Butler*, 132 N.J. 278, 291 (1993).  Instead “it is regarded as the contractor’s own enterprise, and he, rather than the employer, is the proper party to be charged with the responsibility for preventing the risk ....”  *Id.*  See also *Majestic Realty Assocs., Inc. v. Toti Contracting Co.*, 30 N.J. 425, 430-31 (1959) ([O]rdinarily where a person engages a contractor...he is not liable for the negligent acts of the contractor in the performance of the contract).  The undisputed nature of [...] and Vida Café’s relationship warrants summary judgment in favor of Vida Café.  In this case, there is no factual dispute that [...] always operated as an independent contractor retained by Vida Café on an as-needed basis.  The undisputed testimony of both [...] and Vida Café’s manager [...] confirms that [...] was not an employee of Vida Café, but instead was hired as an independent contractor who shopped at Restaurant Depot one to two times a week, on Mondays and Thursdays.  (Pa00066, Pa00069, Pa00074, Pa00075, Pa00085)  The nature of the relationship is further exemplified with [...]’s IRS Form 1099 from Vida Cafe, which is used specifically by a person who is not an employee for services, and instead is an independent contractor.  (Ra00006)  Thus, Vida Café and Miguel [...] understood and intended the scope of the relationship to be that of an independent contractor and principal.  Therefore, Vida Café cannot be responsible for any alleged negligence on [...]’ part and remains entitled to summary judgment.  Not surprisingly, Plaintiff’s brief does not even address the undisputed fact that [...] is an independent contractor for Vida Café.
[brief] *Id.* at ¶46 and 55.  He also admitted that he received significant support from his platoon.  *Id.* at ¶26 and 30.  In *Dunkley*, such evidence was considered a demonstration of the policy’s effectiveness.  Same can, and should, be said here.  [...] personally lauded Plaintiff for his willingness to come forward with the internal complaint.  *Id.* at ¶32.  The trial court noted that consideration of these arguments were missing within its summary judgment denial.  Pa280.  On reconsideration the trial court reviewed these very facts and concluded:  [I]n cases where no tangible employment actions have been taken against the Plaintiff, the employer has an affirmative defense to vicarious liability, requiring proof that (1) the employer exercise reasonable care to prevent and to correct promptly any harassing behavior; and (2) that the employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to otherwise avoid harm.
[brief] In balancing the scope these facts that would be considered by market participants (i.e., a local/regional developer/investor), [...] determined “a reasonable probability existed on the effective date that the City would approve development of an 8 story, mixed-use building with a gross floor area of 125,000+/- sf (6.58 FAR) that facilitates 95 residential units (90 market-rate units and 5 affordable housing units), and is complimented by ground floor commercial space, attractive amenities and secure parking i.e., the ideal improvement for the subject site. ”  Pa112.  Based on [...]’s analysis of Jersey City’s master plan and land use policy, observations as an active local market participant, as well as his extensive interactions with local market buyers, sellers, brokers and professional planners, he concluded that “a prospective buyer would acquire the subject property without approvals based on the reasonable probability that an as of right (AOR) development plan requiring modest deviations and variances would be approved by the [...] on the effective date.
[brief] Specifically, the Court found that “[a]n agreement to arbitrate, like any other contract, ‘must be the product of mutual assent . . . [and] [m]utual assent requires that the parties have an understanding of the terms to which they have agreed. ”  *Id.* at 442.  The Court then held that an arbitration clause in a consumer contract “in some general and sufficiently broad way, must explain that the plaintiff is giving up [his] right to bring [his] claims in court or have a jury resolve the dispute. ”  *Id.* at 447.  The Court elaborated that no specific magic words are required:  We emphasize that no prescribed set of words must be included in an arbitration clause to accomplish a waiver of rights.  Whatever words compose an arbitration agreement, they must be clear and unambiguous that a consumer is choosing to arbitrate disputes rather than have them resolved in a court of law.[ ]
[brief] Defendant asks the Court to compel Plaintiffs’ responses and document production, in response to Interrogatory No. 1 and RFP Nos. 1-3.  Mot. at 2, 5-7.  Defendant also seeks document production in response to its ESI requests without further culling for relevance.  Id. at 2, 5, 7-9.  The Court will address each category of requests below.  I.
[brief] SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY  APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. [...]  STATE OF NEW JERSEY, : CRIMINAL ACTION  Plaintiff-Respondent, :  On Appeal from a Judgment of v. : Conviction of the Superior Court of [...], : New Jersey, Law Division, Burlington  Defendant-Appellant. : County.  Indictment No. [...] Sat Below: Hon. [...], J.S.C., and a Jury.
[brief] CIVIL ACTION ON APPEAL FROM A FINAL ORDER OF THE SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY, LAW DIVISION, MORRIS COUNTY  DOCKET NO.: [...]  Sat Below: HON. [...], J.S.C. REPLY BRIEF AND APPENDIX ON BEHALF OF PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS  On the Brief: [...], Esq.  Attorney ID # 051951996  [...], Esq. Attorney ID # 057772013  [...]  Attorneys for Plaintiffs-Appellants  [...]  [...] [...]  [...]  [...] Date Submitted: April 17, 2024  #
[brief] (Da11-14)  [...] began by analyzing the language.  (Da11.)  He reasoned the purpose for requiring prompt delivery of any estoppel received was to enable Plaintiff to exercise “its immediate right to terminate the agreement if the certificated [sic] recorded adverse information. ”  (Id.)  This requirement allowed Plaintiff “to learn from the tenant, in a formal manner, the status of a leasehold” and that “provides additional protection to the [Plaintiff], beyond reliance on the [Defendant’s] representations concerning the status of leases”.  (Id.)  The language that refers to delivery of ‘an’ Acceptable Estoppel Certificate as opposed to ‘the’ did not mean the Defendant could deliver multiple estoppels.  (Da12)  “As an initial matter, the use of the article “an” was necessary as a syntactical matter, because if the certificate delivered by the tenant were not acceptable, there would be no Acceptable Estoppel Certificate. ”  (Id.)  More fundamentally had the parties agreed a prior deficient Estoppel Certificate could be corrected by a later one, or if the parties agreed it was proper to wait to closing for delivery of the certificate, they would (i) not have provided for prompt delivery and (ii) would have provided for the right to deliver a further estoppel up to closing.  (Id.)  Since the former point was included, and the latter was not, accepting Defendant’s argument would “impermissibly re-write the parties’ agreement in a manner as to confer a right on the [Defendant] that it did not secure in negotiations. ”  (Id.)  The trial court then examined the practical aspects of Defendant’s position which, it said, exposed the “logical flaw” in its “textual argument”.  (Id.)  If after delivering a certificate revealing a landlord default Defendant could, up to closing, deliver an Acceptable Estoppel Certificate, that “would require the [Plaintiff] – in a state of obvious uncertainty – to continue to prepare for such Closing, including incurring the expense of such preparation, such as legal expense and arranging for title work, insurance and other customary steps, on the possibility the Seller would be able to cure and deliver an Acceptable Estoppel Certificate”.  (Id.)  That would defeat the purpose of and negate the obligation to promptly deliver a certificate “which purpose was to permit an immediate termination and avoidance of such expense and uncertainty”.  (Da13)  The trial court considered the claim that the termination was due to changed economic conditions, which were disputed.\(^5\)  (Da13-14)
[directive] Purpose of Policy ................................................................................................................................... 1  2 Definitions ............................................................................................................................................. 2  3 Deciding Whether to Pursue .................................................................................................................  4  4 Role of the Pursuing Officer .................................................................................................................. 7  5  Vehicular Pursuit Restrictions ...............................................................................................................  8  6  Authorized Tire Deflation Devices ......................................................................................................  10  7  Role of the Supervisor .........................................................................................................................  12  8  Role of Police Communications ..........................................................................................................  13  9  Reinstating Pursuits ............................................................................................................................  13  10  Interjurisdictional Pursuits .................................................................................................................. 13  11  Vehicular Pursuit Reporting ................................................................................................................ 14  12  Vehicular Pursuit Review ....................................................................................................................  15  13  Training ...............................................................................................................................................  17  14  Individual Agency Policies ...................................................................................................................  17
[brief] ” (the “PI Case”).  IX.  In 2016, during the pendency of her personal injury case, plaintiff/appellant entered into an agreement with [...] using the personal injury suit as collateral, contrary to the law of New Jersey.  Plaintiff/appellant borrowed $920.00 after the deduction of fees to [...].  X.  In 2018, during the pendency of her personal injury case, plaintiff/appellant entered into an agreement with defendants/appellee’s using her personal injury suit as collateral, contrary to the law of New Jersey.  Plaintiff/appellant borrowed $2,620.00 after the deduction of fees to [...].  AA009 XI.  In 2019, during the pendency of her personal injury action, plaintiff/appellant entered into a second agreement with defendants/appellee using her personal injury case as collateral, contrary to the law of New Jersey.  Plaintiff borrowed $5,215.00, after deduction of fees to [...].  AA016 XII.  The first part of plaintiff’s personal injury suit settled, and funds were disbursed in January 2019, $7,043.92 was disbursed to defendants in partial compensation for the transactions from 2018 and 2019, paying outstanding “accrual” charges.  AA024 XIII.  The second part of plaintiff’s/appellants personal injury suit settled in 2021, and funds were disbursed.  [...] sought $12,067.91, as compensation for the remaining outstanding transactions.  AA026 XIV.  A total of $8,755 of funding was provided by [...], for which it sought $19,111.83 in accrual fees and $840 in processing fees, for a profit of $11,196.83.  A 127% profit over 6 years.