ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] [...] Is “At Home” In New Jersey | 4 | | B.  Plaintiff’s Nerve Center is in New Jersey | 5 | | C. [...]’s Long-Standing Relationship with Plaintiff and [...] | 7 | | D.  Defendants’ Multi-Jurisdictional Marketing Attracted Plaintiff | 8 | | E.  Defendants Knew Plaintiff was Based in New Jersey | 9 | | F.  Transaction where Defendants Represented Plaintiff Took Place in New Jersey | 10 | | G. [...] Was a Multi-Jurisdictional Transactional Attorney | 12 | | LEGAL ARGUMENT | 14 | | I.  THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY APPLIED THE LAW GOVERNING TRANSIENT JURISDICTION (Da11–13) | 15 | | II.  THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY FOUND GENERAL AND SPECIFIC JURISDICTION OVER DEFENDANTS THAT DID NOT OFFEND NOTIONS OF FAIR PLAY AND JUSTICE (Da13–15) | 17 | | III.  THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY EXERCISED ITS SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION AS PLAINTIFF NOW SATISFIES N.J.S.A. 42:2C–65(a) (Da15–17) | 27 | | CONCLUSION | 30 | TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS BEING APPEALED
[directive] The purpose of an undercover school operation is to identify and apprehend persons engaged in the distribution of controlled dangerous substances on school property or to juveniles.  It is recognized, however, and in accordance with SNAP Directives 5.7 and 6.10, that any person who violates the Comprehensive Drug Reform Act, including a person who commits a simple possessory, use or being under the influence offense, is subject to eventual arrest and prosecution.  Nothing in this Executive Directive shall be construed to preclude the prosecutor from electing in his discretion to forego formal prosecution in favor of pursuing school disciplinary proceedings or other appropriate criminal justice alternatives, subject to the requirements of law.  See Part II(5).  5.
[brief] A DETECTIVE IMPROPERLY OFFERED LAY OPINION OVER OBJECTION THAT HE BELIEVED DEFENDANT TO BE ACTING SUSPICIOUSLY IN FLEEING AN ACTIVE SHOOTING SCENE AS HE DID AND THAT THE DETECTIVE FEARED, AS A RESULT, THAT DEFENDANT WAS AN ARMED SUSPECT.  (RULING AT 2T 56-6 TO 8)  One of the principal credibility calls that the jury had to make in this case was to decide if police properly detained defendant and properly found his DNA on one of the murder weapons, or whether, in fact, police focused inappropriately on defendant and then, when they did not have any forensic evidence to tie him to the shooting, transferred his blood onto that gun.
[brief] THE C.5 EXCLUSION IS CONSISTENT WITH THE PUBLIC POLICY OF THIS STATE AS EXPRESSED IN THE WORKERS COMPENSATION ACT.  (Ja1-16)  Contrary to Plaintiff’s argument, the revised C.5 Exclusion furthers both the public policy goal of workplace safety and the important objective of controlling the cost of workers compensation and employers liability insurance.  In the leading Supreme Court cases applying the N.J.S.A. 34:15-8 exception for intentional conduct, the employer had allegedly acted or failed to act intentionally for financial and efficiency reasons, and with disregard of workers’ safety.  See Laidlow, 170 N.J. at 620-21 (employer inactivated safety guard for machine for many years, except during OSHA inspections); Millson, 101 N.J. at 165 (employer allegedly exposed employees to asbestos deliberately and the employers’ company physicians allegedly concealed the risks of the exposure); Mull v. Zeta Consumer Prods., 176 N.J. 385, 393 (2003) (employer removed machine’s safety devices to increase production); Crippen v. Cent. Jersey Concrete Pipe Co., 176 N.J. 397, 400 (2003) (employer deliberately failed to correct OSHA violations relating to a piece of dangerous machinery).  In these cases, and many others, the employers prioritized their desire for productivity and cost savings over the health and safety of their employees.  In such circumstances, permitting common law tort claims against an employer creates a financial disincentive from that harmful ordering of priorities and is consistent with the public policy goal of enhancing workplace safety.  Without any evidence, Plaintiff argues that these public policy goals are not advanced by excluding the kind of conduct described in [...]’s Complaint from mandatory insurance coverage.  Pb14-15.  Plaintiff favors providing insurance coverage that would insulate those employers who intentionally fail to prevent workplace hazards against the financial consequences of their wrongful conduct.  But insurance coverage for such actions will encourage unscrupulous employers to disregard the safety of their employees in favor of increased profits and productivity.  It would interfere with the public policy of this State to enhance safe workplaces.  See Paul Revere Life Ins. Co. v. Haas, 137 N.J. 190, 208 (1994) (“insurers should compensate victims to the extent that compensation will not condone and encourage intentionally wrongful conduct”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); Montes, 76 N.J. at 483 (“were a person able to insure himself against the economic consequences of his intentional wrongdoing, the deterrence attributable to financial responsibility would be missing”); Cumberland Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Dahl, 362 N.J. Super. 91, 97 (App. Div. 2003) (“providing insurance coverage for intentional wrongs would encourage such conduct, without regard for pecuniary consequences, and is against public policy”).
[brief] (Pa465).  [...]’s email further stated, “This student has been trying for the better part of a month to make a legal case that we have a hole in our policy.  I suppose that he has moved on to trying to bypass the policy and go straight to applying directly to the MBA.  My major concern is two-fold: first, that we are now going against what we told him and others just a few weeks ago, and second, that the student will end up failing out of both (he is already getting dangerously close in the Pharm.D track alone)  [...] acknowledged that because the dual degree program was new, he was not sure whether a student could apply on the merits of his GRE, PCAT and undergraduate transcript.  (Pa411).  [...] was not aware of any written documentation that existed for the Pharmacy School that advised them of the rules and/or policy if the student failed to get a 3.0 GPA in their first year of Pharm.D classes.  (Pa415).  Subsequently, [...] targeted Plaintiff.
[directive] Statute Charge Description Degree Bail Range  10%  Cash Bail Option Manufacturing, Distributing, Heroin or cocaine, less than 1/2 ounce; or methamphetamine or its analog, less than 1/2 2C:35-5(a)(b)  Dispensing or ounce; or marijuana, 1 ounce or more but less than 5 pounds; or hashish, 5 grams or more 3rd Degree $5,000 to $20,000  10% permissible (continued)  Possessing CDS with but less than 1 pound; or any other substances, or their analogs, in Schedule I, II, III, or IV.  Intent to Distribute (continued)  Marijuana in quantity of less than 1 ounce; hashish in a quantity of less than 5 grams; any 4th Degree $1,000 to $2,500  10% permissible substance, or its analog, in Schedule V.  Employing a Juvenile 2C:35-6 in a Drug Distribution 2nd Degree  $50,000 to $100,000  No 10%  Actor solicits or employs a person, age 17 years or younger, in a drug distribution scheme.  Scheme 70  Updated December 2, 2013
[brief] The other case ruling that the phrase “whether or not” the negligence of the indemnitee caused the loss allows indemnification for one’s own negligence is *Estate of D’Avila v. Hugo Neu Schnitzer East*, 442 N.J. Super. 80 (App. Div. 2015).  Although the *Hugo Neu* Court recognized that a contract requiring indemnification for the indemnitee’s own negligence must be “plain and unequivocal,” *id.* at 114, its analysis focused on whether the phrase “arising out of” permitted indemnification.  *Id.* at 115.  In ruling that the phrase “whether or not” the indemnitee contributed to the loss in whole or in part was not fatal to indemnification, the court considered only *N.J.S.A. 2A:40A-1*’s prohibition against indemnification for one’s sole negligence.  *Id.* at 115.  The *Hugo Neu* opinion did not discuss *Englert* or any of the cases ruling that phrases such as “whether or not” the indemnitee is at fault are ambiguous and therefore unenforceable.  *Ibid.*  *Hugo Neu* cannot be reconciled with *Englert*.  See *Englert*, 398 N.J. Super. at 55-58 (rejecting reliance on *Leitao* and ruling the phrase “regardless of” indemnitor’s fault is ambiguous and therefore unenforceable to require indemnity for indemnitor’s own fault).  The trial court thus erred in relying in *Hugo Neu* to rule that [...]’s contract unambiguously required [...] to indemnify [...] for Double O’s own negligence.  Compare 1T22:7-23:9 with *Englert*, 389 N.J. at 56-58.  As the Appellate Division ruled, drafting an indemnity clause that explicitly stated that [...] was to indemnify [...] for [...]’s liability, even if that liability arose in part from [...]’s own negligence, “would have placed no undue burden” on [...].  Englert, 389 N.J. at 57.  This Court should therefore reverse the judgment below on indemnification for [...]’s own fault.  Ibid.  C.
[brief] The Department’s other defenses also fail.  First, while acknowledging that the Legislature expressly required the Department to promulgate regulations to implement the Act, the Commissioner concluded that this mandate was irrelevant because it purportedly was not specific enough.  That is, the Commissioner held that because the Legislature “did not mandate that the Commissioner promulgate regulations directed to the terms ‘excessive’ or the term ‘unfairly discriminatory,’” the Commissioner was under no obligation to do so.  Pa38-39 (emphasis added).  But the Commissioner’s conclusion does not follow from the specificity (or purported lack thereof) of the delegation.  As shown above, in many of the cases reversing agency action, there was no express delegation for the agency to promulgate regulations on a subject at all, let alone a specific aspect of that subject.  Rather, the relevant considerations are whether a regulation is necessary to apprise a regulated entity of all the rules of the game pertinent to what conduct is permitted, to allow agencies to make “fairly predictable decisions,” and to ensure that agencies do not act by hindsight.  All those considerations required regulations here.  Second, the ALJ and Commissioner suggested that this case was distinguishable from Crema, Metromedia, Titan Construction, and other cases requiring rulemaking because “the Department applied a standard from the . . . Act” itself.
[brief] The [...] ([...]) argues that this Court must affirm in Nyema and reverse in Myers because law enforcement impermissibly stopped the defendants on the basis of race.  The [...] reasons that racial profiling has been a historically pervasive problem and that investigative stops based on race are unconstitutional.  Amicus the [...] ([...]) argues that the suspects’ non-reaction, location, and description provided no individualized basis for reasonable suspicion.  Regarding location, [...] reasons that defendants’ location provided no basis for individualized suspicion because the suspects could have driven in any direction away from the 7-Eleven and been anywhere within a fifty-mile radius of the store.  The Center argues that the suspects’ description provided no basis for reasonable suspicion other than identifying Black males, which was an impermissible basis for an investigatory stop.
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO DECIDE, AND SHOULD HAVE GRANTED, THE PORTION OF ALLSTATES’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT WHICH DIRECTLY CHALLENGED THE LEGAL SUFFICIENCY OF EACH CLAIM IN THE COMPLAINT (39a-40a) (this aspect of the summary judgment motion was not decided below)  It appears that, for the sake of judicial efficiency and expedience, the trial court declined to resolve the portion of [...]’ summary judgment motion that directly challenged the legal sufficiency of all claims in the Plaintiff’s Complaint.  Indeed, the Court’s granted the relief sought by [...] based on these contentions.  In order to safeguard its rights, [...] filed its cross-appeal to preserve its direct challenges from its summary judgment motion below.  To the extent this court deems it necessary to consider this aspect of the cross-appeal, it should determine that the trial court erred in failing to find that competent record evidence demonstrated that each of the claims in Plaintiff’s complaint were fatally flawed.
[brief] Plaintiff did *nothing* during or after further discovery and not during or at the two-and-a-half-weeks while on trial before [...].  Plaintiff here, filed a motion to amend the complaint to add claims of fraudulent concealment and spoliation, which was denied.  (Pa185).  Plaintiff was free to present any and all evidence claimed to exist at the time of trial and pursue those specific claims of fraudulent concealment and spoliation.  Spoliation is not even required to be made as a “claim” pled in the Complaint and if evidence of spoliation was adduced at trial, the jury charge still could have been requested.  Instead, Plaintiff sat on the right to take action, until after 21 trial adjournments, two and a half weeks in court for the trial, 8 days of which were spent before a jury of 7 individuals sacrificing their personal time and thousands of dollars spent in litigation costs, to now demand a second bite at the apple by attempting to plead claims for something that could have been pursued further throughout discovery and at trial (Da82).  There is no question Plaintiff received a fair trial.
[brief] (Da001).  Thereafter, on the same date that he was convicted, the Honorable [...], J.S.C. sentenced [...] to an aggregate term of life in prison, plus eighty years, with seventy years of parole ineligibility.  (Da001).  [...] filed a notice of appeal on February 9, 2010.  On February 16, 2010, the Appellate Division issued a per curiam opinion affirming [...]’s conviction and sentence, but remanding the case for entry of an amended Judgment of Conviction, to vacate the imposition of the Law Enforcement Officers’ Training and Equipment Fund fee.
[directive] (4)  Èske w konprann ke restriksyon sa yo sou kote w gendwa abite [Wi/Yes]  [Non/No] [pa aplikab/NA] kab gen ladann tout restriksyon konsènan abite nan kay kote gen timoun minè?  Do you understand that the restrictions on where you can live may include restrictions on residing in a home with minor children?  (5)  Èske w konprann ke si w ta vyole youn nan kondisyon sipèvizyon [Wi/Yes]  [Non/No] [pa aplikab/NA] kondisyonèl a vi yo, yap revoke sipèvizyon kondisyonèl la epi yo ta kab mete w nan prizon pou 12 a 18 mwa pou chak revokasyon ki ta fèt pandan ke w sou sipèvizyon epi tou tèm prizon ou ta resevwa pap gen rediksyon sou tèm prizon a oswa kredi pou travay?  Do you understand that if you violate a condition of parole supervision for life, your parole may be revoked and you can be sent to prison for 12 to 18 months for each revocation that occurs while you are being supervised and that the prison term you receive cannot be reduced by commutation or work credits?  (6)  Èske w konprann ke si w vyole youn nan kondisyon sipèvizyon [Wi/Yes] [Non/No] [pa aplikab/NA] kondisyonèl a vi yo le ou aprè le 1ye jiyè 2014, epi yo akize w fomèlman oswa kondane w pou vyolasyon sa a, wap resevwa yon kondanasyon nan prizon de jiska 5 lane si vyolasyon an te komèt le ou aprè le 1ye jiyè 2014, wa va resevwa yon kondanasyon nan prizon de jiska 18 mwa epi tou yo ta kab ajoute santans la sou nenpòt ki tèm prizon ou resevwa nan men Konsèy Sipèvizyon kondisyonèl la pou vyolasyon tèm sipèvizyon kondisyonèl a vi a?  Do you understand that if you violate a condition of parole supervision for life on or after July 1, 2014, and you are indicted and convicted for that violation, you will receive a sentence of imprisonment up to 5 years or if the Fòm Revize Kreye pa Direktif #01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 10080-Haitian Creole paj 5 nan 7 Revised Form Promulgated by Directive #01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 10080-Haitian Creole page 5 of 7 violation occurred before July 1, 2014, you will receive a sentence of imprisonment of up to 18 months and that the sentence you receive could be in addition to any prison term you may receive from the Parole Board for a violation of parole supervision for life?
[brief] Moreover, the penalty is permissible and valid under the law.  Accordingly, Defendant has failed to meet its burden and the statute must be upheld.  Lastly, even if the penalty section was deemed invalid, that part alone would be severable and not violative of the entire ordinance.  In State v. McCormack Terminal, Inc., the court held that the invalid part of the ordinance providing for a minimum fine is severable and therefore its invalidity does not require striking down the whole ordinance.  State v. McCormack Terminal, Inc., 191 N.J. Super. 48, 51 (App. Div. 1983).  In light of the above, it is respectfully submitted that §201 is clear and enforceable.
[brief] 1(g) in Count 10; Respondent [...], Respondent [...], Respondent [...], and Respondent [...] violated N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(e), N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(f), and N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(g) in Count 13, and violated N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(e) and N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(f) in Count 17; and Respondent [...] violated N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(e) in Count 16.  On November 24, 2021, Respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss in Lieu of Answer (“Motion to Dismiss”).  The Motion Dismiss’s legal argument fell into three broad categories, that the allegations against the Superintendent and/or Board as a whole should be dismissed, that complaints against “the board” should be dismissed because it failed to allege facts that demonstrate an ethical violation, and that similarly the complaints against individual members should be dismissed on the same grounds.  On December 21, 2021, [...] filed a Response to the Motion to Dismiss and in support of Motion to Amend Complaint (“Response”).  On January 27th, 2022, the Commission informed all parties that this matter was put into abeyance pending a related matter pending in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Hunterdon County involving a contest of the referendum results (“Referendum Contest”), a contest brought by the [...] and a number of Township residents, including [...].
[brief] . . . . . . . .  Da071 Exh I (Email of [...] to [...] dated May 8, 2023 forwarding appended Second Addendum of even date)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Da072 Exh J (Plaintiff’s Letter to Defendant, [...] dated June 6, 2023)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Da075 Exh K (Letter of [...], Esq. to [...], Esq. dated June 14, 2023).
[brief] [...]’s adverse employment history falls squarely within the ambit of that heightened scrutiny for law enforcement officers with a sustained finding for untruthfulness and a lack of candor.  As such, the concerns arising from that major disciplinary incident alone would have justified her list removal as the Commission recognized.  [...]’s prior promotion to the lower sergeant position before 2019 does not alter that analysis.  Indeed, although [...] attempts to distinguish the Commission’s prior decisions, the Commission has long recognized that law enforcement lieutenants must “present a personal background that exhibits respect for the law and rules.
[brief] It is in no way “illegal” for the contracted service provider to apply the payment received to fixed expenses other than wages.  And in any event, the Statute does not charge the board of education with policing how the funds that it is required to pay its contracted service providers are applied.  The other purported "factual issue" raised by [...] is its contention that it is entitled to discovery to "check the veracity" of [...]'s contention that while the parties' contract required the production of certified payrolls prior to payment issuing, for the period that [...]'s schools were closed and [...] was not rendering services, [...] could not provide certified payrolls as they did not exist.
[brief] Further, no court ever sought to supplement the record with regard to any law with regard to the matters brought to the bar.  Motion on for declaratory judgment with regard to the right to trial by jury was made on October 28, 2022.  Motion for declaratory judgment was dismissed in error by [...] on November 17, 2022.  The illegal dismissal order was based on an unrelated and unpublished [...] order filed on March 9, 2012.  Timely appeal of the illegal Mizdol order was made on November 28, 2022.  Oral argument was made with regard to appeal made via docket #: [...].  No decision was made by the appellate court in the matters appealed via docket #: [...].  Motion for judgment was made in the matters at the bar of circa December 4, 2023.  Motion for judgment was dismissed in error by the Honorable [...] on December 12, 2012, - the Pro Se plaintiff was never served with the erroneous notice of dismissal.  Brief in support of motion for judgement was resubmitted to the [...] (in order to have a time received stamped copy) on January 5, 2024.  Another brief supporting amendments relating back to the original filing date of the claim was filed in the [...] on January 5, 2024.  Timely appeal was made on February 2, 2024.  Brief in support of request for oral argument in the matters at the bar was submitted to the appellate court on March 1, 2024.  Brief in support of appeal in the matters at bar was submitted to the appellate court within the time limitations of the appellate court order.
[directive] 3.  No case involving a provable violation of a Brimage-eligible offense shall be dismissed, downgraded, or disposed of by means of a negotiated disposition except in accordance with the requirements of either the original Brimage Guidelines (in the case of Brimage-eligible offenses committed before September 15, 2004) or the revised Brimage Guidelines appended hereto (in the case of Brimage-eligible offenses committed on or after September 15, 2004).  4.  The provisions of Attorney General Directive 1998-1 and any supplemental Directive interpreting or amending Attorney General Directive 1998- 1 shall remain in full force and effect, provided, however, that any provision of Attorney General Directive 1998-1 or supplemental Directive interpreting or amending Attorney General Directive 1998-1 that is inconsistent with the provisions of the revised Brimage Guidelines appended hereto shall be deemed to be superseded by this Directive with respect to any offense committed on or after September 15, 2004.
[directive] It is on the day , that: ______  The defendant shall be transferred to the Correctional Facility to await a 1. [detention hearing/trial), and coutt~--- IT IS FURTHER ORDERED [ any additional conditions as ordered by the 2.  _____  3.  The next hearing in this matter will held on _ be of of  A copy this Order will be forwarded to the County Adjuster's Office by the Clerk the of Court within two (2) days its signing.  of2  I page #17-18 (l l/01/2018), 6B)  Directive Published (Competency 12331  CN: Order by Judge Date  Defendant's Attorney: Prosecutor's Office: ---------------- ----------------- Name Name --------------- --------------- Address Address ___________  Telephone Number _ -------------  Telephone Number ----------------- ----------------- Fax Fax ----------------- -----------------  Em ail ail Em _________  If D No yes, language _ Interpreter needed? D Yes _________  D No yes, describe _  If ADA accommodation needed?  D  Yes of2 by 2  Published Directive #17~18(11/01/2018), CN: (Competency Order 6B) page 12331  Attachment 9  Order #7 - Order Mandating the Transfer of of Defendant from the Care and Custody the Commissioner of Health to the Correctional Facility
[brief] Respondents take no issue with [...]’s recitation of the procedural history, with the exception of her improper argument contained therein—namely, where she asserts she “seeks to reverse the Superior Court’s Orders erroneously dismissing Appellant’s Complaint and compelling this matter to arbitration without consideration of her meritorious arguments advanced in Opposition to Respondents’ motions. ”  (Pb5–6.)  The trial court fully considered [...]’s arguments, as its orders reflect.  (Pa000204–08.)  STATEMENT OF FACTS