ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] *New Jersey State Bar Ass'n v. State*, 387 N.J. Super. 24, 42 (App. Div. 2006); *Potter v. New Jersey Supreme Ct.*, 403 F. Supp. 1036, 1038 (D.N.J. 1975); see also *Edelstein v. Wilentz*, 812 F.2d 128, 132 (3d Cir. 1987) (“We have previously held that the right to practice law is not a fundamental right for purposes of due process or equal protection analysis. ”)  This is because the United States Constitution does not create fundamental interests in particular types of employment.  *Massachusetts Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia*, 427 U.S. 307, 313 (1976); *Greenberg v. Kimmelman*, 99 N.J. 552, 573 (1985).  Unsurprisingly, against the weight of this authority, Appellants do not cite any contrary authority supporting the existence of a fundamental right to practice law.  (Ab20).
[brief] No average size adult man without any medical condition and in clearly good physical condition would ever get intoxicated from consuming 1 beer.  To suggest otherwise is complete nonsense.  The seasoned officer and seasoned prosecutor had every opportunity to establish what I meant when I said I had one beer.  Did I admit to drinking one 16 oz cup? Did I admit to drinking an 8 oz cup?  Did I admit to drinking a nonalcoholic beer?  Did I drink that beer 3 hours ago or right before leaving?  There simply was no investigation on the cop’s side and no additional investigation on the prosecutor’s side when I decided to testify.  In addition, my admission of having one beer cannot be automatically assumed as a lie and give cause as to probable cause to arrest.
[brief] (465a and 472a).  **STATEMENT OF FACTS**  This matter is a complex legal malpractice action which arises out of a series of complex land transactions involving multiple parties.  The issues raised in the plaintiffs' Complaint implicate the standard of care concerning Defendants' representations of parties; communications as counsel; and allegations pertaining to disbursement of funds from the Cooper, Levenson Trust Account.  On June 11, 2015, plaintiffs filed a Complaint against Defendants [...], Esquire, [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], Esquire, [...], [...] and [...], under docket number [...] (the “2015 Lawsuit”).
[brief] (b)  Significance of my payment of the premiums for my health insurance during my FMLA leave.  After I decided to retire, the [...], [...] and [...] were all aware that I wanted to remain an employee in order to ascertain the 10 years of service to get me life insurance and other benefits.  I paid my health insurance for all these months to ensure my status in the system.  Why would I have hand delivered my health insurance checks (driving to Newark to a Courthouse that was virtually closed down again due to the Omicron variant that was surging at the time) to make sure that I had coverage?  If I wanted to have less than 10 years of service it behooves me to have retired in September or October.  The whole purpose in doing so was to extend my “service time”.
[brief] See, e.g., *Kende Leasing Corp. v. A.I. Credit Corp.*, 217 N.J. Super. 101, 111-13 (App. Div. 1987) (even where a third party was empowered under the terms of the policy to cancel the insurance, it could not cancel absent proper notice, so that policy remained in effect despite nonpayment of premiums).  Moreover, notice obligations are not delegable – they rest on “the insurer, not the broker or agent. ”  *Barbara Corp. v. Bob Maneely Ins. Agency*, 197 N.J. Super. 339, 346 (App. Div. 1984).  In any event, [...] was certainly not authorized to cancel a subcontractor’s insurance on behalf of the CCIP insurer without ever notifying the subcontractor.
[brief] His friend [i.e. [...]] is at [...].  We know that because of location services.  We don’t have location services for this man’s [[...]] phone because he got rid of his phone. ”  (13T154-1 to 7).  Likewise, the prosecutor argued that the extraction of [...]’s phone “showed exactly where [...] is, 2:48 he’s on Bloomfield, the same area where [...]’ phone was hitting at 2:25.  And at 2:58 when that video shows that Durango pulling up to [...], lo and behold, that's exactly where [...]'s phone is.  And we know he wasn’t alone.  There were two people in that car with her that day. ” (13T162-24 to 163-8).  The prosecutor also argued that data from [...]’s phone showed that he ascended a flight of stairs at 3:21 a.m., after the surveillance video showed two individuals entering [...]’s grandmother house.  (13T174-23 to 175-15).  According to the prosecutor, this data therefore reflected that [...] and [...] were returning after committing the murder.  (13T174-23 to 175-15).  The prosecutor also noted that the GPS location data from [...]’s and [...]’s cellphones corroborated the State’s theory of the case for the defendants’ locations at several other times.  (13T182-18 to 185-12).  And the prosecutor specifically contended that the GPS location data corroborated the testimony of [...] and [...]:  “Location services, we know where they were.  We know what they were doing.  It’s all corroborated.  All corroborated because [...] and [...] are telling the absolute God’s honest truth. ” (13T185-9 to 12).
[brief] (Pa 417 at ¶11, Ex. B.)  On June 29, 2021, borrower was again advised that the payoff was rejected and returned because it was short $3,312.80.  (Pa417 at ¶13.)  It was not until one year later that anyone went to look for, or follow-up with [...] on the wire.  (Pa263 at ¶25, Pa399-413.)  According to Respondent’s counsel, [...] (or its members) can no longer be located.  (Pa 218 at ¶16.)  According to the Tennessee Secretary of State and Florida Secretary of State, [...] appears to no longer be an active entity as of August 8, 2023, and September 22, 2023, respectively.  (Pa218 at ¶16.)  Other entities (like [...] Enterprises, LLC) operated by the managing member of [...] ([...]) also appear to no longer be in business, and the [...] website is no longer operating.  (Pa218 at ¶16.)
[brief] Green, 215 N.J. at 455.  Although plaintiffs prevailed, their victory fell far short of their objective, raising significant doubt regarding the reasonableness of the amount of their attorney fees.  The trial court explicitly acknowledged plaintiffs’ objective, stating, “This case is about the buyout. ”  24T47:4.  All the proofs, legal work and expenses presented were to support the claim that [...] had been fraudulently induced to agree to an artificially depressed value for plaintiffs’ interests in [...] and [...].  Plaintiffs contended they were entitled to nearly $10 million in compensatory damages.  25T85:7-8.  The court rejected this claim and dismissed the Counts 9 and 10, which alleged “fraud in the inducement. ”  24T31:2-10.  The compensatory damages awarded was $2,872,358.93, Da723 less than one-third of the amount plaintiffs sought.  Clearly, this result represents only “limited relief” when compared to the damages plaintiffs set out to prove in their failed claim of fraudulent inducement.  Under the circumstances, it was appropriate for the court to reduce any award to an amount that "was reasonable in relation to the actual relief obtained."  N. Bergen Rex Transp., 158 N.J. at 572.  In conclusion, defendants fully appreciate that "findings by the trial court are binding on appeal when supported by adequate, substantial, credible evidence."
[brief] Each of these cases support the proposition that the existence of a subsequent transaction, or even an economic benefit to the interferer, is not a required element of a claim for tortious interference.  And a rule that required a “subsequent transaction” would make no sense whatsoever.  Such a rule would mean that an intentional tortfeasor could be excused for inducing another to breach a contract with a third party so long as it also broke the promises it made to induce the breaching party to breach.  Under the Trial Courts’ analysis, two wrongs would always make a right.  B.
[brief] 4 STATEMENT OF FACTS ............................................................  5 LEGAL ARGUMENT ..................................................................  5 POINT I – THE TRIAL COURT’S RULINGS  CONTRADICT WELL-ESTABLISHED CONDEMNATION LAW (1T4:9-15) ...........................................................................................................  5  POINT II – RESPONDENT’S APPRAISAL REPORT SHOULD BE BARRED FOR FAILING TO ACCOUNT FOR OBTAINING THE REQUIRED VARIANCES (1T5:15-23)  ...........................................  15  CONCLUSION .............................................................................  25  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS  Order dated June 7, 2024 denying Plaintiff’s in limine motion to Bar  Defendant’s expert report ........................................................................................................ Pa1  1  Appellant relies upon the Appendix filed on or about June 27, 2024 in support of Appellant’s motion seeking leave to file an interlocutory appeal.  TABLE OF APPENDIX  Appellant relies upon the Appendix filed on or about June 27, 2024 in support of Appellant’s motion seeking leave to file an interlocutory appeal
[directive] After releasing any relevant video footage, the Step 6: Completed Independent Investigator shall continue its work to the conclusion of the investigation, at which point the Independent Investigator shall prepare a summary of their factual findings, legal analysis, and preliminary recommendations as to whether any Principal should be criminally charged for their involvement in the LE Incident.  G. Findings.  Upon the conclusion Step 7: Independent Supervisory Review of Investigative of the investigation, the Independent Investigator shall submit their factual findings, legal analysis, and preliminary charging recommendations for an independent assessment by the Independent Supervisory Reviewer.
[brief] 114 N.J. 383 (1989).  The Division noted in their statement of reasons on remand that the lower court “‘had properly applied the appropriate factors to arrive at a proper custodial term’ . . . however, despite defendant’s substantial criminal record, ‘the imposition of a long term with a 5-year minimum on a 24-year old who never received a significant custodial sentence was so clearly unreasonable as to shock the judicial conscience.
[brief] “We never voluntarily slept on our rights”.  1T, P. 11, line 9.  “We certainly could not knock on people’s doors”.  1T, P. 11, line 15-16.  “We’re attorneys we have to be ethical and upfront”.  1T, P. 11, line 17-18.  “We just have to demonstrate that we are engaged in diligence sufficient to demonstrate that we are actively pursuing the information”.  1T, P. 12, line 19-22.  “It’s what did you do, not what could you have done better”.  1T P. 12, line 24-25.  “The question then is did we do diligence sufficient so that the Court would make a determination we didn’t voluntarily sleep on our rights”.  1T, P. 13, line 17-21.  “But what we did do is what this Court has to look at”.  1T, P. 15, line 2-3.  “All we have to do is prove to this Court that we engaged in diligent due diligence sufficient to so that the Court can make a finding that there was no voluntary or involuntary decision to sit on rights”.  1T, P. 29, line 15-19  “I submit to you it’s impossible on this record to find anything other than diligence and proper diligence”.  1T, P. 34, line 24-25.  It is respectfully submitted that had plaintiffs disclosed to [...] that [...] had undertaken a significant investigation of the accident and issued two (2) reports of his findings to plaintiffs, all before the statute of limitations expired, then [...] would have, at minimum, had a comprehensive basis to determine that plaintiffs’ counsel’s representations at oral argument were inaccurate and did not provide the necessary credibility and evidentiary foundation upon which the Court could find that, prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations, plaintiffs acted with due diligence in determining whether [...] was a tenant of the premises and should have been named as a defendant and served with a complaint in the action.
[brief] The court disagreed, based on the following factual findings: • [...] was unsupervised and unrestrained on the front porch.  •  Defendant said [...] has “high prey drive with small dogs. ”  •  Defendant’s expert “tacitly admitted” that [...] was “aggressive toward other, smaller, animals” and was “interested in chasing small animals. ”  •  The Court found that the expert’s testimony was “fraught with inconsistencies,” negating his credibility.  •  The ACO testified that the dog “stiffened at attention on seeing movement” (e.g., prey drive).  •  There was no evidence that [...] was the aggressor.  •  The State presented medical evidence that [...] killed [...] with several bites to [...]’s neck and chest.  In contrast, the evidence in the case at bar was that: • [...]’s owners always supervised him in a fenced yard and walked him on a leash; • [...] has no prey drive (three lay witnesses and an evaluator); • [...] is gentle with cats, small dogs, puppies and children; • [...] did not react to the neighbor’s large dog; • The trial court found that [...]’s training and discipline was “meticulous”; • The ACO observed [...] acting “calm” when impounded; • The ACO heard of no incidents in the 6-month impound; • [...] was antagonistic and aggressive to [...] for years prior to the incident; • There was no expert regarding [...]’s cause of death, and no expert testimony regarding “escalation” of injuries; • There was no factual or expert evidence of a serious threat to people or other domestic animals; and • Defendant’s yard is “like a big fortress;” of fencing and double, locked gates, preventing future incidents.  Even without the “serious threat” standard, the Herold court likely would have reached the opposite conclusion if it had been presented with the same evidence as [...]’s case.  POINT THREE:
[brief] law firm’s work, as long as the financial benefit is not paid by the law firm itself and the fee award is not directly paid to the law firm.  But the whole point of the broad catch-all language in Rule 3.17, requiring disqualification “in proceedings in which [judges’] impartiality or the appearance of their impartiality might reasonably be questioned,” not just when required by one of the specific provisions of the rule, is to recognize that recusal is required in “scenarios that cannot be neatly catalogued.
[brief] APPELLANTS AND [...] VOLUNTARILY ENTERED INTO A BINDING CONTRACT THAT INCLUDED VALID, LEGAL, AND ENFORCEABLE WAIVER AND ARBITRATION PROVISIONS, AMONG OTHERS.  Here, the Superior Court properly denied Appellant’s motion to vacate the Superior Court’s January 4, 2024 Order and invalidate the arbitration and waiver provisions of the Contract as the parties entered into a contract with an enforceable arbitration provision.
[brief] The Court appears to have overlooked this critical point in its Orders of 3/30/2023 and 5/12/2023, and in this manner erred.  3.  Further, Appellant also stated in the same letter dated 10/24/2022 that he had not yet been advised of any decision by the Court as to his Motion for Reconsideration of the Order of 4/4/2022 filed 4/22/2022.  The Court apparently overlooked its own failure to promptly provide Appellant with the Court’s decision of 5/27/2022 and failed to address its error for many months!  In this manner, the Court’s dysfunction and error continued.  Appellant should not be held responsible for the Court’s dysfunction.
[brief] **  On appeal, Plaintiff now tries to back into damages by totaling the checks Plaintiff produced and then subtracting that from the total due under the contracts for the same periods.  At the outset, this argument was not made before the trial court and should not be considered on appeal.\textsuperscript{26}  Ignoring this glaring deficiency, Plaintiff’s logic raises more questions for his case than it answers.  At his deposition, Plaintiff was specifically asked how he was coming up with the alleged $255,000.00 in unpaid services in the context of his produced checks in 2016 and 2017.  At no point did Plaintiff say, as he is now, that he added up the totals of the checks and subtracted it from the amount owed under the agreements.  What he said was he came up with $255,000.00 because that was what a “Russian girl” at [...] told him, though he could not identify who until after the discovery period ended.
[brief] PLAINTIFF’S CLAIMS ARE NOT TIME-BARRED AS A RESULT OF THE DISCOVERY RULE (T8)  The Respondent/Defendant in its brief argues two (2) points regarding Plaintiff’s claims being time-barred.  The first point is that Plaintiff’s claims surrounding the swimming pool are time-barred because the applicable statute of limitations is six (6) years.  The second point is that the Plaintiff’s claims are barred under the New Jersey Tort Claims Act (“TCA”) because Plaintiff did not present her claim within ninety (90) days of accrual.  Defendant relies upon Plaintiff’s admissions during her deposition and contained in her Notice of Tort Claim that the water problems on the Property go back to 1990 and 2004.  Accordingly, Defendant argues that claims are facially time-barred pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:14-1.  However, that position overlooks the “discovery” rule.  As previously indicated, the accrual date of Plaintiff’s claim does not begin to run until the Plaintiff knew or should have known of her claim.  In the present matter, Plaintiff may have known for years that water and drainage issues existed on the Property.
[brief] Additionally, in proceedings below the Township made multiple requests for modifications to the Regulator site.  The Township does not appear to appreciate the potential increase in [...]’s rates despite that the Township residents are included within [...]’s territory.  Many of these previous requests for modifications, if adopted by [...], would have added costs to the project.  For example, the Township argued that the Company did not adequately consider use of the catalytic heater as an alternative to the combustion heater that the Company already purchased back in 2013 despite testimony that the catalytic heater was more expensive.  1T82:L5-9.  The Township also argued that the Company should have pursued condemnation proceedings to potentially place the Regulator further back from [...].  RCa74.  Condemnation proceedings would have added significant time and legal expenses to the cost of the Regulator as they are inherently adversarial and generally reserved as a last resort.  Also, moving the Regulator further back from [...] would have increased the cost of the project due to the associated increase in cost per foot for the inlet pipe.  In the present matter, the Township revives its initial argument that the Company “do nothing” i.e., continue using only the temporary regulator.  Hb at p. 49.  Yet, the Board has affirmed the OAL’s decision which found that the Regulator is in fact necessary because “without a heater, ice encasement could cause station failure, resulting in gas service outages to customers, and devastating consequences to scores of affected customers, especially in the winter.
[brief] Plaintiff stated that the initial project was purely commercial - "a combination of office buildings, a hotel a bank and a restaurant".  (Pa38)  Additionally the major subdivision document indicated that it was: "subject to any required resolution or establishment of utilities easements (existing or to be established) and the ownership and maintenance of the internal roadway".  (Pa91, par"L")  The major subdivision plan document clearly left open the question of ownership of the internal roadway.
[brief] Id.  That application was approved after a single meeting and memorialized in a Resolution of the [...] dated December 28, 2018.  The resolution of approval states in ¶10 that “the Settlement Agreement requires twenty nine (29) affordable units, seven (7) of which may be provided off site. ”  Clearly, the quoted language permits, but does not mandate, that seven (7) of the affordable units be located off site, and is completely absent of any mention of [...].
[brief] In addition to the fraudulent conduct outlined above, the record properly shows that Appellant also prepared fraudulent corporate resolutions for [...], falsely certifying that he was the “only officer,” the “sole owner,” and the “corporate secretary. ”  He was none of those things and used these forged resolutions to obtain loans for his personal companies, who then defaulted on the loans causing [...] hundreds of thousands of dollars in losses.  The true reason Appellant hid from the trial here might be as a result of the undisputed evidence that, after he was removed by the original injunction in 2018 that stopped his theft of the company, he went into [...]’s QuickBooks accounting program and made 1,208 changes to incriminating transactions in the 24 hours before he had to produce the QuickBooks file by Court Order.  Only after making the 1,208 changes did Appellant print the fraudulent accounting reports and file them with the Court.
[brief] Case Management Conference | | Certification of Defendants’ Counsel (July 2, 2024) in support of Motion for reconsideration filed below  Exhibit A: June 12, 2024  Order Attached as A3  Exhibit B: June 12, 2024  Order Granting Default Attached as A3  Exhibit C: Second Amended Complaint Attached as A32  Exhibit D: December 16, 2022  Order Attached as A14  Exhibit E: September 8, 2023  Order Attached as A20  Exhibit F: September 8, 2023  Order Attached as A20  Exhibit G: November 9, 2023  CMO Attached as A27
[brief] [...] and [...] Surreptitiously Closed the Deal with the Fee Owner  On or about October 7, 2022, [...], with the active participation of [...], secretly completed the acquisition of the Real Property and the Improvements from the Fee Owner.  In breach of the terms of the PSA, [...] took title to both the Real Property and the Improvements thereon, and [...] and [...] failed to facilitate the transfer to Plaintiff of fee title to the Real Property, as contemplated by the PSA.  (Pa12, Complaint ¶¶ 49-50).  [...] and [...] actively colluded to keep Plaintiff in the dark about the transaction, depriving Plaintiff of the opportunity to take immediate, additional steps to protect its legal interests to prevent the closing from going forward in Plaintiff’s absence.  (Pa11-12, Complaint ¶ 46; Pa345, ¶¶ 13-16).
[brief] ”  174 N.J. at 597.  In Parker, all of the allegations of inappropriate behavior, viewing of pornography with the students and inappropriate physical contact were all of a single type in front of the same students, whereas in Frisby, the theories of guilt were independent of one another; in one, the defendant was charged with physically assaulting the child, but the other was a charge of neglect, and the jury well could have been split on which was proven.  Frisby, 174 N.J. at 596-600.  The case law follows that distinction, from Frisby, each time.
[brief] Moreover, the Court agrees with the Magistrate’s findings that the... “Clock In/Clock Out Summaries” during the months in which Plaintiff worked at [...] may reasonably lead to relevant evidence regarding Plaintiff’s alleged harassment and therefore should be produced without redactions.  (Letter Order at 2).  Thus, her decision is affirmed in this respect, as well.  *3  •  [...] did not abuse her discretion in denying Plaintiff’s request for the last known addresses of current and former employees so that Plaintiff may contact them for oral depositions.  In reaching her decision, the Magistrate correctly balanced the privacy interests of Plaintiff’s former coworkers against the relevance and need for the information, in accordance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b).  Ultimately, [...] rebuked Plaintiff’s request as a “fishing expedition,” as Plaintiff failed to identify which, if any, of his former co-workers may have relevant information.  Moreover, since Plaintiff could not identify same, the Magistrate found that oral depositions were not “the most effective way to discover the information he seeks” (Letter Order at 2); but still afforded Plaintiff an opportunity to issue written deposition questions to current employees who worked the same shifts as Plaintiff to detect discoverable information.