ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] R. 1:7-5; R. 2:10-2.  One purpose of this rule is to allow the Trial Court to ameliorate any possible error during the trial.  See, Bradford v Kupper Associates, 283 N.J. Super. 556, 573-574 App. Div. 1995), certif. denied, 144 N.J. 586 (1996) (“[t]he absence of objection suggests that trial counsel perceived no error or prejudice, and, in any event, prevented the trial judge from remedying any possible confusion in a timely manner. ”)  The “plain error” doctrine, cited by plaintiff, creates an exception to this general rule when there is a clear error and the error is “clearly capable of producing an unjust result”.  R. 2:10-2; Pb39.  “The mere possibility of an unjust result is not enough. ”  State v. Funderberg, 225 N.J. 66, 79 (2016).  "Relief [from a not objected to error] under the plain error rule, R. 2:10-2, at least in civil cases, is discretionary and 'should be sparingly employed.'"  Baker v. Nat'l State Bank, 161 N.J. 220, 226 (1999)  Here, under the factual circumstances detailed above, it is unclear whether the Judge’s brief conversation with counsel, including counsel for plaintiff’s one employee, one owner entity, at the outset of the second day of a three-day trial, was error.  However, even if this Court were to view having conducted this conference as error, no evidence has been presented and there is no evidence that this conference was “clearly capable of producing an unjust result. ”  This Court should reject plaintiff’s effort, without any further legal or factual support, to throw out the well-supported and well-reasoned result of this three-day trial because of this brief conference.
[brief] (Da 31-32)  [...] said she needed him to know she did not kill [blacked out] or do anything to hurt him.  (Da 32)  [...] explained that she destroyed [blacked out] remains because did not want [...] to get “in trouble” for “what we were doing to [blacked out] [that] left marks all over his little butt and all over his legs. ”  (Da 42)  [...] said she “couldn’t let anybody see him like that. ”  (Da 32)  The main dispute at trial centered on the timing of fractures to [blacked out] bone tissue, which the State claimed contradicted Ms. [...]’s statements that [blacked out] had died from an accidental fall down the stairs.
[directive] N.J.S.A.  See the overcome sufficient to evidence facie prima consider as may court that a provides 3:4A(b)(5)  Rule 21 not is release defendant's program the that services pretrial the by recommendation a release of presumption  This maximum conditions"). released, if or recommended not "release determination that a (i.e., recommended the AOC. by approved risk-assessment process pretrial objective the on based turn, is in recommendation, 68 Page score.
[brief] There is no absence of future writing.  In fact, as stated, [...] personally requested the future writing.  Second, again by their own admission, the proposed “contract” was never completed in the terms.  Details were not just getting “fleshed out”.  No objection was raised to email correspondence indicating several issues on or about December 27, 2022, or a follow-up email on or about December 29, where it was stated that the redlined agreement “should” be coming shortly, however, counsel also requested additional information for the material terms of the matter.  Some of these material terms were relating to the Sick Time, Vacation Time, and Personal Time that Respondent had accumulated.  While those numbers were provided, [...] still did not object to the notion of various issues on the same email chain a mere two (2) days prior.  Stating that a policy is only paying out a small fraction of what she accrued is clearly one of the several material terms.  Clearly material terms were still in dispute, therefore there was no meeting of the minds.  Notwithstanding the above, [...], states, “A settlement agreement obtained through mediation has a separate set of conditions in order to be enforceable.
[brief] THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE DICTATE THAT THE TIME FOR FILING PLAINTIFF’S CHALLENGE BE EXTENDED  The trial court apparently concluded that Plaintiff’s challenge to the Ordinance 1394-20, the vehicle for the adoption of the original Redevelopment Plan, was time barred because the Verified Complaint was filed more than one year after its adoption, well outside the 45-day time limit established by Rule 4:69-7.  Rule 4:67-6(c), however, allows extension of the time limitation “where it is manifest in the interest of justice. ”  Although plaintiff did not move for an enlargement of time prior to the filing of the Borough’s summary judgment, it was appropriate for the Court to consider the request in the context of dispositive motion practice.
[brief] The police collected numerous fingerprints from the Lexus; seventeen prints were deemed suitable for comparison, but none matched [...].  (10T 38-21 to 25, 109-12 to 118-2 to 6)  Around 12:20 a.m. that night, a bar fight broke out between [...]’s ex-girlfriend and the sister of another man, [...]; both [...] and Johnson helped break up the fight, but Johnson was later ruled out as a suspect.  (7T 164-5 to 169-25; 9T 41-25 to 44-2, 112-3 to 130-2, 138-6 to 165-17)  [...] was not at the bar that night and had nothing to do with the fight.
[brief] [...], who was under [...]’ watch for that shift, exited the wing at 3:16 a.m.  *Ibid.*  Thus, Inmate [...] was not in her bed at 3:30 a.m., 4:00 a.m. or anytime until she was discovered on the fire escape.  *Ibid.*  Also, [...]’s surveillance camera footage revealed that [...] failed to perform his inmate counts at the times in question.  (1T72:13-16).  Officers also saw [...] in the food preparation room on the night in question, watching television and napping during the times he was required to perform his counts.  (Pa123a).  Yet, [...] wrote in the logbook that he performed his counts at 2:00 a.m., 2:30 a.m., 3:00 a.m., 3:30 a.m., 4:00 a.m., and 4:30 a.m. and told [...] during his interview the same.  (Ra1; Pa022a).  All of these facts are uncontroverted.
[directive] 2.  County Prosecutor:  •  To implement the Attorney General's policy on automatic and semi-automatic assault weapons , police carbine and scoped rifle qualification and ensure compliance within the county jurisdiction, including reviewing programs conducted by agencies within the respective county jurisdiction for consistency with statewide standards, conducting qualification programs as required, and maintaining proper records.  •  To maintain a record of those persons identified by local agencies who carry an automatic or semi-automatic assault weapon pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:39-6.  •  To provide assistance to agencies within the county jurisdiction to 9-27 Revised (5/03) Semi-Annual Firearms Qualification and Requalification Standards enable them to conduct training and qualification programs in accordance with the standards established within this policy.  •  To develop additional programs for specialized training to augment the Attorney General's policy to meet the particular needs of the county.  •  To provide assistance to agencies within the county jurisdiction to enable them to conduct training in accordance with the standards established within this policy.  3.
[brief] Asserting the same arguments that were twice rejected by the Trial court, [...] insists again here that the parties’ prior arbitration arising from a dispute under the parties’ commercial contract called the Project Transfer Agreement (“PTA”) either should have or did include [...]’s nonpayment claims against [...] arising from [...]’s performance on the Hackensack Project under a completely separate agreement with a separate and substantively different dispute resolution provision.  The Trial Court correctly concluded on two separate occasions that the fully adjudicated PTA controversy that was the subject of the PTA Arbitration and the unadjudicated controversy arising from the Hackensack Project under a separate contract do not share common questions of fact or law and are governed by two distinct dispute resolutions provisions under two separate contracts dealing with entirely different commercial transactions.  Further, even assuming arguendo that these two controversies (one dispute arising under a contract for the transfer of rights to perform certain construction contracts and one dispute arising under a subcontract for the performance of construction work on a particular project) had overlapping facts and law (which they did not), the controversy arising from the Hackensack Project was not ripe for disposition at the time of the PTA Arbitration was conducted.  Importantly, although the Trial Court undoubtedly reached the correct substantive result—that the entire controversy doctrine does not apply and [...] is entitled to pursue its nonpayment claims in the Hackensack Arbitration—the application of the doctrine is a question of jurisdiction to be decided solely by the arbitrator.
[brief] Of course, “[i]f a settlement agreement is achieved through coercion, deception, fraud, undue pressure, or unseemly conduct, or if one party was not competent to voluntarily consent thereto, the settlement agreement must be set aside. ”  Peskin v. Peskin, 271 N.J. Super. 261, 276 (App. Div. 1994).  Furthermore, a written release is not necessary to enforce a settlement as it is “a mere formality, not essential to formation of the contract of settlement. ”  Hagrish v. Olson, 254 N.J. Super. 133, 138 (App. Div. 1992).  In fact, “[w]here the parties agree upon the essential terms of a settlement, so that the mechanics can be ‘fleshed out’ in a writing to be thereafter executed, the settlement will be enforced notwithstanding the fact the writing does not materialize because a party later reneges.
[brief] Plaintiff, moreover, had not simply made mistakes; it refused to correct the wrongful information and notations indicating default and foreclosure for years – causing the potential lenders to deny refinancing to the [...] and increasing their financial loss with more interest and fees.  The wrongful notations of default and foreclosure are evidenced by numerous documents presented below, see A791-815, including, ➢ Exhibit A, all collateral sent to [...] on October 8, 2004, including a modification that was never presented to [...], and that they thus never signed; ➢ Exhibit B, a mortgage commitment from [...] on October 4, 2004; the [...] did not close on October 4, 2004, were never before a notary on October 4, 2004, and only obtained mortgage commitment on October 4, 2004; ➢ Exhibit C, response by [...] that they been custodian/collateral holder since year 2000; ➢ Exhibit D, by [...] produced logs sent to the [...] in January 2020, stating that the [...] “collateral” was sent to [...] on June 15, 2006 with “Bailee Request on Hold. ”
[brief] Q …  So what about his clothes, the clothes that [...] was wearing at the time of the offense?  Did you ever examine his clothes?  A  No, I did not.  Q  Did you ever look into whether or not his clothes were available for examination?  A  No, I did not.  Q  Did you ever consider whether or not there could have been any kind of a gun powder residue issue?  A  I don’t know if I did cause it might have been something that I thought about, but I -- I can’t say for sure whether or not that was something that I -- I pursued.  Q  Is that something you ever pursued in any other case before in any of your trials?  A  I recall it being an issue one -- one or two times.  It’s not -- doesn’t come up very often.  1T46  Q  So if you had gotten the shirt or the clothes or whatever he was wearing at the time, right, the time of the event, and you had gotten an expert, is it -- it’s possible, right, that you could have had some kind of an argument there on gun powder residue?  A  Certainly possible I suppose.  Q  At the trial did you try to present any other alternative version about who fired it then?  A  Burden’s not on the defense, so no, we didn’t.  1T48-49
[brief] I can’t leave [...] in an environment where she’s suggesting she’s being sexually harassed by a person I have no authority over.  I can’t suspend him.  I can’t change his shift.  I can’t do anything to him, but if I don’t do something to her, I’m leaving her in harm’s way.  So I have to do something.  (Pa655, Defendant [...] deposition transcript, T119:3-10)  Perhaps the fallacy of Plaintiff’s claims in this regard is the reliance on the argument that there were “potential” measures, short of transferring Plaintiff out of the allegedly sexually harassing workplace.
[directive] USE OF FORCE POLICY  Addendum A | December 2020  CEDs and Other Less-Lethal Devices and Ammunition  10.8  Maximum effective distance/range for deployment of specific projectiles shall not exceed the specifications approved by the Attorney General.  10.9  Intentionally aiming approved less-lethal impact ammunition at the head, neck, chest, or groin shall be avoided unless deadly force is justified, necessary, and appropriate.  10.10  No ammunition designed to be skip-fired and/or non-target specific will be deemed to be acceptable.  10. 11  Approved less-lethal devices or ammunition shall not be used in a crowd management situation except against specific threatening assailants or active assailants, in strict compliance with Section 3.8 of the Attorney General’s Use of Force Policy.  10.12  Less-lethal devices or ammunition shall not be used to prevent a person from causing property damage.  10.13  A less-lethal device shall not be directed against a person who is situated on an elevated surface (e.g., a ledge, scaffold, near a precipice, etc.) unless reasonable efforts have been made to prevent or minimize a fall-related injury (e.g., deploying a safety net).  10.14  Suspects who are struck by less-lethal ammunition shall be transported to a medical facility for examination if they suffer bodily injury or request medical treatment.  14  USE OF FORCE POLICY
[brief] (Ja5-Ja12a)  The trial court stated the following, in relevant part, as to both the issues of arbitrability (i.e. whether a New Jersey judge, or arbitrator, should interpret the scope of the arbitration provision in [...]’s Membership Agreement), and also whether Plaintiff pleaded the type of “public injunctive relief” specifically excluded from [...]’s arbitration provision:  "...Under paragraph 7.4, the parties include a delegation clause that states that disputes over the scope of the agreement should be decided by an arbitrator.  Further, the parties also agreed as part of the membership agreement that arbitration will be before either the [...] or [...], both of which have rules that explicitly state that issues of an arbitration provision’s scope and interpretation must be decided by an arbitrator.  This means that the issue of whether plaintiff’s claims are for public injunctive relief must be decided by an arbitrator rather than by this Court…" (Ja10); and "Even if the issue of whether plaintiff has a claim for public injunctive relief is decided by this Court, this case would be stayed in favor of arbitration.  Injunctive relief is considered ‘private’ when it offers relief to an individual plaintiff or a group of individuals similarly situated to the plaintiff.  See, e.g., Hodges v. Comcast Cable Communs., LLC, 12 F.4th 1108, 1115 (9th Cir. 2021).  Injunctive relief is ‘public’ when it is relief that benefits the general public and benefits an individual plaintiff only incidentally or as a member of a class.  DiCarlo v. MoneyLion, Inc., 988 F.3d 1148, 1152 (9th Cir. 2021); Jack v. Ring, LLC, 91 Cal. App. 5th 1186, 1202 (2023).  (Ja10)  Plaintiff is seeking to remedy alleged violations of consumer law that she is claiming on behalf of herself and others similarly situated as part of a class action.  The relief she is seeking relates to her own membership in a fitness club.  Plaintiff is seeking money damages in addition to the injunctive relief.  It cannot be said that any relief she is seeking would only incidentally benefit herself.  The relief plaintiff is seeking is for herself and members of the [...] Fitness Club…  …The statutes under which plaintiff is seeking relief—New Jersey’s HCSA, the CFA, the RISA, and the TCCWNA—do not authorize plaintiff to act as a private attorney general and assert a “public injunctive relief” claim on behalf of the general public.
[brief] 6T4-30.  After a half hour delay in the start of presentation, the court determined “we’ll deal with what we have to deal with during trial as it comes up. ”  6T30:16-17.  After plaintiff’s counsel proceeded with voir dire and proffered [...] as an expert, defense counsel immediately objected yet again to testimony regarding nursing home standards of care.  6T72:24 to 73:7.  Remarkably, the trial judge took the position that [...] could not be qualified as an expert on nursing home standards of care.  “You know, to me, someone’s not an expert specifically on standards of care.  Standards of care is what they apply. ”  6T76:7-9.  The court, with defense counsel’s prompting, had difficulty with the concept of a person being an expert on the very topic that [...] had ruled on pretrial.  “I think you need to call it something different.  You can’t call him an expert on nursing home standards of care. ”  6T76:11-13.  Instead, [...], who had 50 years of experience in this area of practice, had to be qualified as an expert in nursing home “operations” and a specific foundation had to be laid for each subcategory that he would address.
[brief] Therefore, the Appellant has clearly established two avenues of meeting the requirements of N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-41(a) under subsections (a)(1) and (a)(2).  The Appellant timely filed the AOM of [...] on December 27, 2021, prior to [...]’s Answer, filed March 16, 2022.  38a-39a.  This Court should reverse the trial court’s August 26, 2022, Order dismissing [...] with prejudice for failure to serve an AOM, as [...] was qualified to draft the AOM and it was timely filed by the Appellant.  2.
[directive] 5.  Afich sou Entènèt Internet Posting a)  Èske w konprann ke swit a kondanasyon ou an, non ou, laj ou, ras ou, seks ou, dat de [Wi/Yes] [Non/No] nesans ou, wòte w, pwa w, koulè zye w, ak nenpòt ki siy ki ta kab distenge w kankou sikatris oswa tatwaj ou ta geneyen, pòtre w, mak, modèl, koulè, ane ak nimewo plak machinn ou kodwi a, adrès kay w, kòd postal, minisipalite ak konte kote w abite a ansanm ak deskripsyon zak pou ki w plede koupab la, kab disponib pou piblik la sou entènèt?
[brief] [...] testified that his gross sales in 2021 were approximately $750,000.00, and in 2018 approximately $740,000.00.  (Da160-Da161 pg. 64, Line 16 through pg. 65, Line 5.)  [...] testified that he did not document any increases in electrical costs based upon the installation of the system, and while he testified that he would supply electrical bills from one year prior to installation through installation, such records were never produced.  (Da211 pg. 115, Lines 3-21.)  [...] also testified that he never determined, nor discussed with his management team, as to how or even if the environmental clean-up impacted business operations and does not possess any information evidencing how the building, either inside or outside, was adversely impacted by the activities occurring.  (Da215-Da216 pg. 119, Line 4 through pg. 120, Line 24.)  [...] did not identify any operational disruptions whatsoever, no closures, no late openings, no early closings, no loss in revenue – simply nothing.
[brief] \(^6\)  The Trial Court asserts that the issue of the exhibits was not properly briefed (Pa0079-80).  However, page 8, footnote 1 of plaintiffs’ reply trial brief sets forth their reliance on the brief submitted to oppose intervenor’s motion to settle the record.  (Pa0131).  Attached to that reply brief is an itemized chart establishing the basis for each and every exhibit offered.  (Pa0112).  Under these circumstances, there was no need to submit additional briefing as the justification for the offer of
[directive] Promulgated by Directive #21-06 (December 11, 2006)  Page 19 of 29  If the answer to Question No 11 is affirmative, ask the following question at sidebar:  If so, what are your feelings?  Note:  If the defendant is a corporation, the following should be asked:  (b)  The defendant is a corporation.  Under the law, a corporation is entitled to be treated the same as anyone else and is entitled to be treated the same as a private individual.  Would any of you have any difficulty in accepting that principle?  12.  The court is aware that there has been a great deal of public discussion [in print and in the media] about something called Tort Reform (laws that restrict the right to sue or limit the amount recovered).  Do you have an opinion, one way or the other, on this subject?  If the answer to Question No. 12 is affirmative, ask the following question at sidebar:  If so, what are your feelings?  13.  If the law and evidence warranted, would you be able to render a verdict in favor of the plaintiff or defendant regardless of any sympathy you may have for either party?  14.  Based on what I have told you, is there anything about this case or the nature of the claim itself, that would interfere with your ability to be fair and impartial and to apply the law as instructed by the court?
[brief] Comer, 249 N.J. at 388-89 (discussing Zuber, 227 N.J. at 451-52).  At the time, this Court asked the legislature to consider providing for later review of lengthy juvenile sentences.  *Comer*, 249 N.J. at 389 (discussing *Zuber*, 227 N.J. at 452-53).  In the subsequent *Comer* decision, the Court observed that the legislature had failed to enact such a law in the intervening five years, although a bill to allow resentencing of juvenile offenders after twenty years in prison was pending.  *Comer*, 249 N.J. at 389.  The Court compared statutes from various other states that entitled juvenile offenders to resentencing or parole consideration after approximately twenty years.  *Id.* at 390-91.  The Court also highlighted court decisions from two other states that held all mandatory minimum sentences to be cruel and unusual punishment for juveniles.  *Id.* at 391-93.  With that background, the Court considered whether New Jersey’s sentencing scheme for murder -- which requires a thirty-year parole -- is cruel and unusual punishment for a juvenile under the State Constitution.  A punishment is unconstitutional if any one of the following three propositions is true: (1) the punishment does not “conform with contemporary standards of decency”; (2) the punishment is “grossly disproportionate to the offense”; or (3) the punishment goes “beyond what is necessary to accomplish any legitimate penological objective.
[brief] ”  (1T 10-7 to 9)  [...] responded, “Completely tinted, yes. ”  (1T 10-10)  It was nearly 11:00pm and dark outside.  (1T 7-24 to 8-1, 44-5 to 6)  On cross examination, when asked about the degree of tint on the front windows, [...] responded, “His were dark.
[brief] (Db46-47.)  In addition, with respect to this cross-appeal issue, Defendants’ Brief contains just one (1) citation to the record, which, as with many other citations throughout Defendants’ Brief, does not support the proffered statement.  (See Db45-47.)  Defendants not only fail to provide citations to the record, but also attempt to introduce new “facts” that are not found anywhere in the record.  See Pressler & Verniero, cmt. 1 on R. 2:5-4(a).  For example, Defendants assert that “Plaintiff has decided that it cannot or will not obtain an RAO . . . .” (Db47.)  Other than Plaintiff’s assertion that Defendants are responsible to obtain the RAO in accordance with the PSA, the record is devoid of any facts to support such a claim.  Turning to the merits, or lack thereof, again, Plaintiff presumes for purposes of this argument that Defendants’ cross-appeal is directed at the trial court’s denial of their motion for involuntary dismissal under Rule 4:37-2(b).