ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] It constituted three paragraphs which state as follows:  2.  The contribution shall apply to employees for whom the employer has assumed a health care benefits payment obligation to require that such employees pay at a minimum the amount of contribution specified in this section for health care benefits coverage.  An employee on leave without pay who receives benefits under the State Health Benefits Plan shall be required to pay the requisite contributions and shall be billed by the employer for these contributions.  Healthcare benefits coverage will cease if the employee fails to make timely payments.  The parties agree that should an employee voluntarily waive all coverage under the State Health Benefits Plan and provide certification to the City that he/she has other health insurance coverage; the City will waive the contribution for that employee.  3.  The City agrees to pay an incentive payment to any City employee who waives both medical and prescription coverage under the City’s State Health Benefits Program (“SHBP”).  The City agrees to pay an annual incentive payment to any City employee who, at the time of open enrollment, is eligible for and waives both medical and prescription coverage under the SHBP.  The SHBP waiver incentive payment shall not exceed 25% of the amount saved by the City because of the waiver or $5,000, whichever is less.  In order to be deemed eligible for the payment, the employee must waive coverage at open enrollment of each year and the employee’s waiver must remain in effect for the full benefit year.  The employee’s waiver much follow the requirements outlined by the New Jersey Division of Pensions and Benefits.  Should an employee seek reinstatement of health benefits coverage with the SHBP at any time during a benefit year, the reinstatement of coverage with the SHBP will void the employee’s eligibility for the SHBP waiver payment.  The City will issue the payment in full to each eligible City employee at the beginning of the next benefit year.
[brief] The trial court’s suppression of evidence obtained pursuant to judicially authorized search warrants is erroneous and must be reversed.  [...] wrongly suppressed the handgun and CDS recovered by police because he failed to recognize, despite citing applicable law in his oral decision, that fact-scrutiny of a search-warrant affidavit should not take the form of de novo review.  (1T11-4 to 15-15).  [...] decided the issue of probable cause as if he were the only judge to review the search-warrant application, which was clearly not the case.  (Pca1-3).  As the court reviewing the propriety of a warrant’s issuance, [...] did not provide substantial deference to the Middlesex County Criminal Presiding Judge’s determination of probable cause as is required.  State v. Evers, 175 N.J. 385, 381 (2003); State v. Sullivan, 169 N.J. 204, 211-12; State v. Marshall, 123 N.J. 1, 72 (1991), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 929 (1993).
[brief] **The Pierce Claim.**  In the seminal case of *Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp.*, 84 N.J. 58 (1980), the Supreme Court first enunciated a cause of action against an employer for retaliatory termination in violation of public policy.  “The sources of public policy include legislation; administrative rules, regulations or decisions; and judicial decisions. ”  Id. at 72 (emphasis added).  “[E]mployees can bring wrongful discharge claims only if they can identify an expression that equates with a clear mandate of public policy and if they can show that they were discharged in violation of that public policy. ”  MacDougall v. Weichert, 144 N.J. 380, 391 (1996).  The State Legislature partially codified the *Pierce* claim when it ratified CEPA, but it did not abolish *Pierce* claims.
[brief] The Willoughby court went on to instruct municipalities going forward that:  It is apparent that the MLUL gives the master plan a central role in a municipality’s decisions regarding the use and development of the land within its jurisdiction.  Section 62a anchors the master plan’s role by generally requiring not only that amendments to a zoning ordinance be “substantially consistent” with the master plan, but that “all of the provisions of such zoning ordinance” be “substantially consistent” with the master plan.  We conclude that before adopting a zoning amendment inconsistent with the master plan, the governing body must expressly recognize the inconsistency.  This will give effect to the significance the Legislature attached to the master plan.
[brief] BECAUSE COURTS JUDICIALLY ENFORCE UNAMBIGUOUS CONTRACT TERMINATION PROVISIONS, AND HERE THE TERMINATION PROVISION WAS UNAMBIGUOUS, SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON PLAINTIFF’S SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE CLAIM WAS PROPER  Defendant’s Brief at Point One argues the trial court incorrectly decided that delivery of the Estoppel Certificate that did not qualify as an Acceptable Estoppel Certificate permitted immediate termination.  That conclusion was incorrect, the Defendant contends, because the terms of the PSA do not provide for this, and the trial court misconstrued the purpose and meaning of the estoppel provision.  Point Two has Defendant arguing the trial court erred as it did not recognize a condition precedent to termination was the failure to deliver at closing an Acceptable Estoppel Certificate and it did not appreciate an estoppel certificate is not a mechanism for collection of information.  Last, in Point Three Defendant contends the trial court was incorrect when it noted that Defendant’s interpretation gave Defendant an unfair advantage.  Central to its arguments is Defendant’s contention it was obligated to present a defined Acceptable Estoppel Certificate.  To do so it could present multiple disqualifying estoppel certificates provided the last to be delivered as late as the closing was an Acceptable Estoppel Certificate.  This interpretation disregards the express language of the PSA, fundamentally rewrites the estoppel provision, and grants the Defendant rights it did not possess.
[directive] The following revisions address minor technical edits to the December 2021 Non-Substantive Vehicular Pursuit Policy.  1.  Section 1.3: Deleted reference to auto theft being removed from the Policy.  2.  Section 7.2(a):  Deleted reference to pursuits being authorized only for first degree or enumerated violent or serious second degree crimes.  3.  Section 7.2(b): Added a reference to Section 3.2(b) of the Policy.  II.
[brief] Page  May 8, 2024  Order Granting Defendant [...]’s Motion to Reopen Case and Defendant’s Motion to Enforce National Class Action Settlement Agreement and Release .............................................. (Pa000079, Pa000111)  May 8, 2024  Statement of Reasons .......................................................... (Pa000081)  # TABLE OF CITATIONS | Cases | Page(s) | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|---------| | **Baskett v.  Kwokleung Cheung,** | 9 | | 422 N.J. Super. 377 (App. Div. 2011) | | | **Breen v. Peck,** | 26 | | 28 N.J. 351 (1958) | | | **Brundage v. Estate of Carambio,** | 10 | | 195 N.J. 575 (2008) | | | **Conboy v. U.S. Small Bus. Admin.,** | 11, 12 | | 992 F.3d 153 (3d Cir. 2021) | | | **Dando v. Bimbo Food Bakeries Distr., LLC,** | 23 | | No. 14-2956 (NLH/JS), 2015 WL 5770014 (D.N.J. Sept. 30, 2015) | | | **Drinker Biddle & Reath LLP v. N.J. Dep’t of Law & Pub. Safety,** | 12 | | 421 N.J. Super. 489 (App. Div. 2011) | | | **Elrom v. Elrom,** | 10, 14 | | 439 N.J. Super. 424 (App. Div. 2015) | | | **Freeman v. MML Bay State Life Ins. Co.,** | 23 | | 445 F. App’x 577 (3d Cir. 2011) | | | **Gormley v. Wood-El,** | 16 | | 218 N.J. 72 (2014)
[brief] 23  POINT II ...........................................................................................................................................32  THERE IS NO CONFLICT BETWEEN THE CFA AND THE RETA AND THE COURT PROPERLY CHARGED THE JURY WITH BOTH.  (Da1158-1181; Da1421)  POINT III .........................................................................................................................................36  SIMILARLY, THERE IS NO CONFLICT BETWEEN THE RETA STATUTE AND THE REGULATIONS PROMULGATED UNDER ITS AUTHORITY.  (Da1176-77).  POINT IV ............................................................................................................................................38  THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DETERMINED THE ISSUE OF WHETHER [...]’S CONTRACT DOCUMENTS  VIOLATED  N.J.S.A. 45:15-16.80(c) WAS AN ISSUE FOR THE JURY AND PROPERLY INSTRUCTED THE JURY ON [...]’S “EXONERATORY WAIVERS”.  (Da1180-81).  POINT V ..............................................................................................................................................41  THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ADMITTED EVIDENCE OF ADMINISTRATIVE CODE VIOLATIONS OF WHICH [...] WAS ON NOTICE.
[brief] When the United States Supreme Court applies a rule of federal law to the parties before it, that rule must be given retroactive effect by all courts.  Harper, 509 U.S. at 90.  In Harper, the Supreme Court considered the retroactive effect of its previous ruling in Davis v. Mich. Dep’t of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803 (1989), which had invalidated certain taxes on federal retirement benefits.  Harper, 509 U.S. at 89.  After Davis was decided, the Harper petitioners brought claims seeking a refund of pre-Davis taxes.  Id. at 91; see Harper v.  Va. Dep’t of Tax’n, 18 Va. Cir. 463 (1990).  The Court held that when it “applies a rule of federal law to the parties before it, that rule is the controlling interpretation of federal law and must be given full retroactive effect in all cases still open on direct review and as to all events, regardless of whether such events predate or postdate” the decision announcing the rule.  Harper, 509 U.S. at 97 (emphasis added); see also Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190, 198 (2016) (as revised Jan. 27, 2016) (“[C]ourts must give retroactive effect to new substantive rules of constitutional law. ”).  Harper’s reference to cases “still open on direct review” must not be read as an endorsement of pipeline retroactivity; rather, it is meant to clarify that cases which have already reached a final judgment and exhausted all appeals are not to be reopened.
[brief] State v.  Kettles, 345 N.J. Super. 466 (App. Div. 2001); State v. Tucker, 264 N.J. Super. 549, 554 (App. Div. 1993), cert. den. 135 N.J. 468 (1994).  A Judge "shall be disqualified if, among other things, there is any reason which may preclude a fair and unbiased hearing and judgment, or which might reasonably lead counsel or the parties to believe so."
[brief] It should be noted that the statement “to the parking area” and “other common areas” are separated by commas with none in between.  however that any such repairs are not necessitated as a result of negligence, damage or abuse by lessee, its agents, servants and/or assigns.  ***  45.  Control of Common Areas.  The common areas shall be subject to the exclusive control and management of the lessor and the lessor shall have the right to establish, modify, change, enforce reasonable rules and regulations with respect to the common areas and lessee agrees to abide by and conform with such rules and regulations.
[brief] The instant Appeal stems from the assertion that the Trial Court erred by denying Appellant’s request for a non-standard jury instruction pursuant to Mockler v. Russman, 102 N.J. Super. 582 (App. Div. 1968); and the assertion that the Trial Court erred by instructing the jury as to Aggravation.  With respect to Appellant’s negligence, the jury considered Appellant’s actions and/or inactions in the context of the model civil jury instructions relating to negligence in a motor vehicle collision; and adjudicated Appellant as negligent under the reasonable and/or ordinary person standard, unanimously.  With respect to the Aggravation charge, evidence of the Aggravation diagnosis was already placed in evidence without objection, at the time Appellant first raised the objection; which is as to the alleged lack of comparative analysis necessary to apportion damages.  Nevertheless, the undisputed evidence is that Respondent was asymptomatic relative to the potentially pre-existing degenerative disc issues viewed upon MRI and had never sought medical care for any similar issue; thereby making it impossible to conduct a comparison to that which never existed in the first place.
[brief] No, but I'm asking you, 2 is it on a country road?  3  [...]:  It is on 30ft off of 4 an intersection that is bigger than this intersection 5 and as commercialized as that property.  There 6 absolutely every corner commercialized, yes.  That 7 particular sign is almost looked at, from what I 8 understand.  I didn't do the application, but it's 9 kind of like the gateway to the town type thing.  But 10 it is way higher, three sided.  It has digital on all 11 three sides with way larger face areas.  It's an 12 interesting one to Google when you look at it.  So 13 anyway, I looked at that, and unfortunately, I 14 couldn't give you the detail because I got that out of 15 testimony rather than seeing the study itself.  But it 16 geed up with what we found in the TPD studies.  THE CHAIRMAN:
[directive] Each agency should establish its own protocol for reviewing and purging performance notices and oral reprimands from an employee's personnel file.  Written reprimands should remain permanently in the employee's personnel file.  27  INTERNAL AFFAIRS POLICY & PROCEDURES | August 2020  6.2.7  A letter shall be sent to the complainant explaining the outcome of the investigation.  If the allegation was unfounded or the officer was exonerated, this conclusion shall be stated and defined for the civilian complainant.  If the allegation was not sustained, the letter shall provide the complainant with a brief explanation why the complaint was not sustained (e.g., insufficient proof, lack of witnesses, etc.).  If the allegation was sustained and discipline was imposed, the letter shall state that the allegation was sustained and that the officer has been disciplined according to agency procedures.  See Appendix E.
[brief] The evidence against [...] in the felony murder case is also weaker, as the N.J.R.E. 404(b) evidence that was going to be introduced at his felony murder trial came from the dismissed armed robbery case.  (3T 10-19 to 11-23)  Put simply, the negotiating positions of the parties changed because of [...]’s successful appeal.  It is for this reason that the conditional plea rule permits defendants in [...]’s position to withdraw from their plea agreements.  [...] respectfully requests that this Court reconsider its decision affirming the trial court’s denial of his withdrawal motion under the inapplicable Slater standard.  Respectfully submitted, [...]
[brief] See, Public Service Coordinated Trans. V. State, 5 N.J. 196, 222 (1950).  In 2012, the Board analyzed the reasonableness of the cost where an upgraded transmission line was proposed to traverse multiple municipalities within New Jersey. \(^6\)  The Board stated that it “must consider the cost that New Jersey electricity customers will bear in connection with the Project. ”  Id. at p. 28.  Project costs, regardless of the nature of the project, are crucial to any evaluation of reasonable necessity because the cost will ultimately be borne by the Company’s ratepayers if the project is later deemed prudent by the Board.
[brief] In *Tucci v. Tropicana Casino & Resort, Inc.*, 364 N.J. Super. 48, 53 (App. Div. 2003), this Court ruled that the motion judge erred by precluding an expert report the party submitted 39 days after the discovery deadline passed.  If the motion judge in *Tucci* erred, [...] erred, since plaintiffs served [...]’s report and moved for permission to name him as their expert well within the discovery end date and where no trial date was set, cf. *Castello v Wohler*, 446 NJ Super I, 20, (App. Div. 2016) (though plaintiffs' expert was not qualified and the affidavit of merit was invalid, discovery deadline should have been extended to permit plaintiffs time to obtain another expert).
[brief] Second, Plaintiff incorrectly argues that the “control factor” is regulated by the New Jersey Rules of Professional Conduct governing attorneys, warranting a finding that he was an employee for purposes of CEPA.  A closer review demonstrates that Plaintiff’s attorney status militates in favor of finding him to be an independent contractor.  “[E]mployer control” is analyzed under CEPA pursuant to the twelve-factor Pukowsky test – which is a hybrid approach adopted by our courts incorporating both the common law right-to-control test and the relative nature of the work test.
[brief] ”  Red Devil Tools, 50 N.J. at 573.  In Red Devil Tools, the plaintiff sold painting tools (except paint brushes) under a “Red Devil” trademark it had used for decades.  Id. at 565-66.  The defendant began selling paint brushes using the “Red Devil” trademark and selling in the same stores as the plaintiff, deliberately making no attempt to distinguish the brands in order to benefit from the plaintiff’s reputation.  *Id.* at 566-68, 572-75.  The Court determined the equities demanded the plaintiff be entitled under the common law to its attorney’s fees because the defendants engaged in “shenanigans” and was “deliberat[e],” “willfull[,] and calculated,” in choosing to use the plaintiff’s trademark and sell in the same stores.
[brief] The parameters of an insurance company’s duty of good faith and fair dealing are reflected in the Unfair Claims Settlement Act (“UCSPA”), N.J. Stat. Ann. § 17:29B-4(9), which “declare[s] state policy. ”  *Pickett v. Lloyd’s*, 131 N.J. 457, 468, 621 A.2d 445, 451 (1993).  Under UCSPA, insurance companies must resolve claims in accordance with “facts or applicable law. ”  N.J. Stat. Ann. §17:29B-4(9)(n).  Vermont law with respect to the good faith expected of insurance companies is identical.  *See* Vt. Stat. tit. 8 § 4724 (insurance companies must “promptly provide a reasonable explanation on the basis in the insurance policy in relation to the facts or applicable law for denial of a claim or for the offer of a compromise settlement”).  Here, the facts were clear.  [...] initially supported and authorized an appeal of the Vermont Trial Court’s summary judgment rulings but then, after a monetary award was made against its insureds, [...] suddenly professed to realize for the first time that the Vermont Trial Court’s summary judgment decision issued six months previously, on August 3, 2020, had purportedly terminated [...]’s duty to appeal that decision.
[brief] In *Rodriguez v. [...]*, A-2079-22, slip \(^5\)Notably, the *Tejada* court affirmed the trial court’s order granting [...]’s motion to dismiss the employer’s Third-Party Complaint seeking a declaratory judgment that the [...] Policy provided coverage for the plaintiff’s claim of intentional wrongdoing for failure to state claim upon which relief may be granted.  op. (N.J. App. Div. December 22, 2023), this Court held that the plaintiff’s employer was not entitled to a defense and indemnification against plaintiff’s claims of intentional wrongdoing.  D[...]a30.  The Court affirmed the trial court’s conclusion that, assuming that all of the plaintiff’s factual allegations were proven true, there was no resulting liability that would be covered by the workers’ compensation policy, and therefore, no coverage and no duty to defend.  D[...]a38, D[...]a46.  The Court also rejected the contention that Exclusion C.5 as amended by the Department of Banking and Insurance was contrary to public policy.  D[...]a49-52.  The Court noted that the new exclusionary language followed the dictates of the Supreme Court’s decision in Beseler, and therefore, was not contrary to public policy.  D[...]a50-51.6  There is nothing in the Act or the public policy of New Jersey that requires an employer to maintain insurance coverage for an allegation of intentional wrongdoing made pursuant to N.J.S. A. 34:15-8.  Indeed, New Jersey’s established public policy contradicts such an assertion and favors the enforcement of insurance policy exclusions that exclude coverage for intentional torts.  Harleysville Ins. Cos., 170 N.J. at 231.  Moreover, neither the plain language of the Act nor the public policy the Act promotes mandate insurance coverage for an injured worker’s claim.  6The Supreme Court has granted the employer’s motion for leave to appeal and the case is now pending before the Supreme Court awaiting an oral argument date.  Rodriguez v. Shelbourne Spring, LLC, 257 N.J. 247 (2024). of intentional wrongdoing.  In fact, [...] respectfully submits that to conclude that a workers’ compensation insurer is obligated to insure both the statutory benefits awarded to an injured worker under the Act and damages recovered based on a theory of intentional wrongdoing by the employer would undermine and obliterate the even-handed and balanced approach to compensation established by the Act.  What Plaintiff perceives as inadequate compensation for [...]’s work-related injuries, is the very foundation of the “trade-off” on which the Act rests.  [...] is not entitled to indemnification, reimbursement of litigation costs, or a defense under the [...] Policy for Plaintiff’s claims of intentional wrongdoing or conduct substantially certain to cause injury, and Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint against [...] was properly dismissed with prejudice for failure to state a claim.  CONCLUSION
[brief] At the inception of the proceedings, the Honorable [...], J.M.C. announced his understanding that the matter was going to be resolved by way of a plea to N.J.S.A. 39:4-50 (DWI) with the remaining charges being dismissed.  (T1:3-4 to 3-7).  The Court then advised the Defendant of the potential penalties for a violation of N.J.S.A. 39:4-50 (DWI), depending upon which number of DWI offense it was.  (T1:3-10 to 4-15).  The Court then engaged in colloquy with the Defendant regarding whether he wanted to continue with his plea without the benefit of counsel and Defendant indicated that he did.  It should be noted that the Court indicated that Defendant had previously demonstrated an intent to get private counsel, but it does not appear, at least from this colloquy, that the Court ever provided Defendant with the steps necessary to apply for a public defender:  THE COURT:  As I indicated back in September, you have the right to be represented by an attorney.  You indicated back in March of 17 that you intended to retain private counsel, and then when we rescheduled it for the 27th you failed to appear.  I take it you wish to waive both the private counsel and the public defender and wish to plead guilty today, is that correct?  [...]: Yes.  Yeah -- (T1:4-16 to 4-24).  After several more questions regarding the knowing and voluntary nature of the plea he was about to enter, the Municipal Court then returned to the issue of whether the Defendant had “spoken” with private counsel:  THE COURT: And did you get a chance to talk with private counsel?  [...]: No, -- I was homeless and I messed up and take the penalties and – stand up.  THE COURT: All right.  And again, you wish now to waive that right to appointment of the public defender and to plead guilty today, is that correct?  [...]: Yes.  (T1:5-10 to 5-17).  Thereafter, the Municipal Court set about obtaining a factual basis in the within matter, which is set forth below:
[brief] (Da274, Rev Teabout Message on Messenger).  [...] came into ownership of [...] in 1976.  (Da264, [...] Deed)  [...] came into possession of [...] in 1985.  (Da278, Deeds to [...])  The Statute of Limitations ran based on [...]’s Deed in June of 2006.  (Da264, [...] Deed)  As a result of this, Adverse Possession applies and via operation of law, all of [...] is owned by [...] via Adverse Possession.  N.J.S.A. 2A:14-30.  (Da264, Deed of [...])  It is requested that the Appellate Court vacate the Summary Judgment Order entered by the trial Court.