ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] On February 11, 2020, the federal court entered an order remanding the matter back to the Superior Court.  (Pa112)  The State-related defendants filed their motion to dismiss the Complaint based on R. 4:6-2(e) on February 26, 2020.  (Pa116).  Thereafter on March 13, 2020 the Hon. [...], P.J.Cv., issued a Consent Case Management Order requiring all defendants to file responsive pleadings or motions to dismiss.  (Pa71)  *”T-“ refers to the April 27, 2023 transcript of the hearing on Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss; “Pa-“ refers to the Appendix of Plaintiff-Appellant while “WPa-“ refers to the Appendix of Defendant-Respondent [...].  The Newark defendants filed their motion to dismiss on March 16, 2020, (Pa120) while the County defendants filed their motion to dismiss on March 17, 2020.  (Pa144)  Defendant [...]. filed its motion to dismiss in lieu of an Answer on March 17, 2020.  In September of 2020, plaintiffs filed a request to stay the proceedings pending the outcome of the appeal in the Norman Towers case.
[brief] On April 24, 2023  Defendant, [...] [hereinafter: “[...]”], was charged with operating a motor vehicle during a period of license suspension for a second or subsequent violation of N.J.S.A. 39:4-50 contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:40-26(b).  Summons also were issued for driving while suspended (N.J.S.A. 39:3-40) and failure to stop (N.J.S.A. 39:4-144)(Da 1-7).  On December 7, 2023 the Defendant was indicted for this 2C violation (Da 8).  On February 22, 2024 [...] filed a notice of motion to suppress (Da 9-10).  A suppression hearing was conducted on June 4, 2024 before the Honorable [...], J.S.C..  At the conclusion of this hearing [...] denied this motion, which was memorialized by Order dated June 4, 2024\(^1\) (Da 11).  Thereafter [...] filed an appeal from the denial of this motion, which was --- \(^1\)T refers to the transcript of the June 4, 2024 suppression hearing. dismissed because the appeal was interlocutory (Da 12-15).  On September 24, 2024 [...] entered a guilty plea to N.J.S.A. 2C:40-26(b).  As part of the plea agreement the motor vehicle summons were dismissed (Da 16-20).  On November 8, 2024 [...] was sentenced to six months incarceration.  He was not placed on probation (Da 21-23).  The court below on this date also stayed imposition of the custodial sentence to afford [...] the opportunity to appeal the denial of his suppression motion and also file the appropriate motion to be released on bail pursuant to R. 2:9-4 (Da 21-23).  On November 21, 2024 [...] filed a Notice of Appeal from the denial of his suppression motion (Da 24-25).  A scheduling Order was thereafter entered by this Court (Da 26-27).  On November 26, 2024 [...] filed a motion to be released on bail pending this appeal (Da 28-29) which was granted by the Honorable [...], J.S.C. by Order dated December 3, 2024 (Da 30).  A copy of the MVR is annexed (Da 31).
[brief] It is undisputed that neither of these events occurred.  “The execution of the Agreements” referenced in Paragraph 5 refers to the agreements required for Plaintiff to ensure that [...] could “obtain a second mortgage on the Property in the amount of the Bundled Loan…including without limitation one or more promissory notes in the amount of the Bundled Loan secured by the Property. ” (Da31, Par. D).  Defendants admit that neither of these requirements for termination of the MOU have occurred, as they acknowledge that “[...] never provided proof of financing for her purchase of the Property from [...], never provided [...] with a second mortgage on the Property, never made any of the payments contemplated by the abandoned MOU, and did not pay off the bundled loan with interest by June 1, 2014.
[brief] As has been done in other cases, this Court should remand for a psychological examination and resentencing.  (Da 44-45)  B.  A Psychological Examination Was Also Required, and Could Not Be Waived, Because the Case Involves a Child Endangering Conviction.  While N.J.S.A. 2C:44-6b initially states that a sentencing court “may waive the medical history and psychological examination in any case in which a term of imprisonment including a period of parole ineligibility is imposed,” after “considering all the appropriate circumstances,”\(^9\) it thereafter makes clear that a court does not have discretion to waive the requirement that the presentence investigation include “a report on the defendant’s mental condition” in cases “involving” certain convictions, including child endangering.
[brief] THE COURT SHOULD REMAND THIS MATTER BACK TO THE COMMITTEE.  (3T37:4-9).  Plaintiff once again emphasizes that the Committee has the discretion to adopt a redevelopment plan that is not consistent with [...]'s master plan.  However, it must still follow the statutory requirements to do so.  Here, the Committee did not do so.  The government has a duty to behave with integrity and transparency when dealing with the public.  See F.M.C. Stores Co. v. Borough of Morris Plains, 100 N.J. 418, 426 (1985) ("In dealing with the public, government must 'turn square corners."); Auto-Rite Supply Co. v. Mayor & Twp. Committeemen of Woodbridge, 25 N.J. 188, 196 (1957) ("Municipalities are bound to act in good faith in the pursuance of the common good and welfare of their citizens.").
[brief] DEFENDANT’S REJECTION OF [...]’ PLANNING TESTIMONY WAS UNREASONABLE (Raised Below in Plaintiff’s Brief, Not Addressed by the Trial Court)  Even though there were no challenges to [...]’ qualification as an expert in professional planning, to his substantive testimony, nor to his credibility in general, the Defendant’s Resolution retrospectively rejected his testimony for lack of credibility.  Ja040-Ja041; Ja043.  This wholesale denial of [...]’ testimony based on lack of credibility was unreasonable.  “While a board may reject expert testimony, it may not do so unreasonably, based only upon bare allegations or unsubstantiated beliefs. ”  New York SMSA v. Bd. of Adjustment, 370 N.J. Super. 319, 338 (App. Div. 2004).  A board also cannot rely upon net opinions unsupported by any studies or data to reject expert testimony.  Bd. of Educ. of City of Clifton v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment of City of Clifton, 409 N.J. Super. 389, 434–35 (App. Div. 2009) (citing Cell South, 172 N.J. at 88).  While a board “may choose which witnesses, including expert witnesses, to believe[,]” “that choice must be reasonably made. ”  Id. (citations omitted).  “In addition, the choice must be explained, particularly where the board rejects the testimony of facially reasonable witnesses. ”  Id. (citing Kramer, 45 N.J. at 288).  The choice to accept or reject witness testimony must be reasonably made to be conclusive on appeal.  Kramer, 45 N.J. at 288.  Defendant’s rejection of [...]’ professional planning testimony was unreasonable.
[brief] The invoices provided for [...]’s September 22, 2022 fee application reveal that the defense lawyers never conducted the management committee meeting nor the reasonable investigation promised in the firm’s fee letter before filing a motion to set aside.  Based on those invoices produced (Pa124), in the 66 days that passed from defense counsel being retained until the October 27, 2017 Motion to Set Aside filing, did they do any of the following:  •  Find and contact the notaries to test the veracity of [...]’s claims about the signatures on the operative documents.  Had they done so they would have learned all notaries followed standard protocol; [...] had the complete documents, and signed the documents.  •  Review [...]’s name change petition which she filed two days before the firm’s initial meeting with her and which relied upon the Final Judgment of Divorce.  Defense counsel did nothing to stop the name change, which was granted on September 19, 2022.  (Pa58, Pl’s. Trial Ex. P-22).  • Consult with attorneys [...] or [...] concerning [...]’s involvement in the bankruptcy case and her representation by [...] and not by [...].  •  Read [...]’s March 23, 2016 deposition during which she swore she was divorced and got what she wanted, gave a very clear explanation and acknowledgment of her December 3, 2008 Power of Attorney, and stated she knew what the Asset Protection plan was.  (See Pa30 Pl’s. Trial Ex. P-19)  •  Check whether [...] had notice of the divorce.  This was confirmed in discovery by a certified green mail return receipt signed by [...].  (Pa33 Pl’s. Trial Ex. P-45).  [The trial court found incredible and astounding [...]’s claims about the date being 2013 as opposed to 2015.  (A229, Op. at 24)]  • Consult with their partner [...], Esq. about the contradictory claims [...] made in the personal injury case he handled (which began a year before the motion to set aside in October 2016).  On October 27, 2016, Mr. Sandman personally made the initial medical appointment and provided the intake information to the medical receptionist named [...].  Documents in that personal injury case, ultimately subpoenaed by [...] in this litigation through the insurance companies, revealed that the firm had in possession medical records and intake records that completely contradicted [...]’s claims in this litigation.  On April 18, 2019, the defense firm further became aware that [...] testified she was divorced in her personal injury case deposition. (Pa45, Pl.’s Trial Ex. P-38).
[brief] Based on this CVOC removal process, [...] concluded, on reconsideration, that it was not possible to estimate the quantum of property damage that occurred during [...]’s policy period.  (Pa0208).  Under Boston Gas, the key inquiry is how much property damage took place during any given period.  Bos. Gas, 910 N.E.2d at 312.  Whether or not groundwater is “continuing” to be “damaged” in 2023 - through remediation efforts - is irrelevant to a determination of how much property damage occurred during the 1970s, when [...]’s policy was in effect.  This “continuing contamination” is a misnomer and fails to consider the actual facts at the site.  The only contamination occurring is a result of the operation of the GSM.  The GSM relies on the flow of groundwater from Turnpike Lake to remove the CVOCs trapped in the soil and bedrock.  (Pa0313-15).  As the water passes under the Site, it flushes the trapped CVOCs and is then captured, treated, and discharged.  (Id).  No new CVOCs are being added to the groundwater, and the GSM operations actually reduce the total CVOCs at the Site.  (Pa0314).  Although in Boston Gas, the District Court ultimately applied a time-on-the-risk allocation method, using the date of trial as the end date for the allocation period, *Bos. Gas Co. v. Century Indem. Co.*, 793 F. Supp. 2d 511, 519 (D. Mass. 2011), the court reached that conclusion because the “verdict was not specific enough to constitute a fact-based allocation of property damage to Century's policy period. ”  *Id.*, 793 F. Supp. 2d at 517.  This case is different and has a fully developed detailed factual record.  As discussed in the following section, the evidence of record and [...]’s factual findings in the Jan. 31, 2011, Opinion and Order make a fact-based allocation of [...]’s damages, as described in *Boston Gas*, possible, and therefore mandated.  *Bos. Gas*, 910 N.E.2d at 312.  Consequently, the court erred by allocating [...]’s damages based on a superficial time-on-the-risk analysis.
[brief] ”  There is nothing in the plain language of the applicable law suggesting that [...] is foreclosed from regionalizing with another school district just because it consolidated with a district once before – and the law does not draw any telling distinction between consolidation and mergers.  And in any event, N.J.S.A. 18A:8-50 declares that, “[u]nless otherwise provided in this act, a new district formed pursuant to [N.J.S.A. 18A:8-44] shall be governed by the provisions of [N.J.S.18A:13-1 et seq.] . . . .” (emphasis added).
[brief] In this case a Governor ordered a State of Emergency which required all nonessential employees to remain out of the workplace.  There was very little guidance provided by the Governor’s Office and essentially employers like the [...] were feeling around in the dark, unsure how to handle the situation.  There is no question that a member can be re-enrolled in the pension system if there is no break in service.  A break in service has a specific legal definition and certain specific statutory exemptions.  N.J.A.C. 43:15A-7.  The fact that there is some confusion concerning how South Plainfield classified this temporary absence from the workplace should not have any effect on [...]’ eligibility for his pension.  In addition, the [...] distributes a Members’ Guide, explaining various legal issues with respect to benefits.  [Pa53]
[directive] Evidence  A.  All vehicles and evidence will be collected, stored and housed by the Division of State Police pursuant to State Police internal Standard Operating Procedure.  B.  The Division of State Police will submit evidence to the Division of State Police Laboratory, as required.  C.  Evidence and any reports shall be promptly made available for inspection by the County Prosecutor’s Office, as may be required.  D.  No vehicles and no evidence shall be released without prior written approval from the County Prosecutor’s Office.  VIII.
[brief] Specifically, this Court previously remarked the following:  Defendant claims he presented a reasonable explanation for the delay in filing his motion.  He contends that he ‘had funding available after extraordinary circumstances prevented him from satisfying the tax [sale] certificate sooner. ’  Despite that representation in defendant’s merits brief, and before the motion court, he produced no legally competent evidence to support his contention.  Moreover, defendant did not certify as to why he waited eighteen months to move for relief and failed to provide competent proof he had the funds necessary to redeem the certificate.  *Kemp* at 10, 13.  Certainly, lodging the same arguments nearly four (4) years subsequent to the Final Judgment cannot generate a different result.  As enumerated in the trial court’s opinion, if the Defendant was not satisfied with the Appellate Division’s Order and Opinion, then his only recourse was to file a motion for reconsideration under R. 2:11-6.
[brief] That appeal, from a July 20, 2020 decision of the [...] ([...]) affirming its $76.9 million mortgage financing commitment for the [...] in [...]  captioned  In re Approval of a Financing Commitment for the Project Known as Norman Towers, (Norman Towers)  [...], (unpublished) was decided May 31, 2022 by the Appellate Division.  (Pa267)  While there is no record that this matter had been formally stayed, it appears that as a result of the Covid-19 pandemic which in 2020 greatly impacted New Jersey, along with the nation, action on this matter was nevertheless delayed.  In or about June of 2022, this case was transferred to the Hon. [...], J.S.C.  On August 4, 2022, the Court issued a Supplemental Case Management Order allowing the parties to file supplemental briefs, (Pa77), thereby giving them the opportunity to brief the significance of the Norman Towers decision on the pending motions to dismiss.  On April 27, 2023 the Trial Court heard oral argument on the motions to dismiss and on that date issued four Orders dismissing with prejudice the Complaint against the State-related defendants, the County defendants, the Newark defendants and defendant [...]. based on plaintiff’s lack of standing.  (Pa80, Pa82, Pa84, Pa86)  Also on that date the Court issued an Order denying plaintiffs’ motion to designate trial counsel on grounds of mootness.  (Pa88)  On May 10, 2023, plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration, alteration, amendment and clarification, (Pa480), which was denied by Order dated July 10, 2023, (Pa89), accompanied by the Court’s written Statement of Reasons.
[brief] We next apply the legal principles gleaned from the foregoing precedents to the facts in the case before us.  The prosecutor in his opening statement set the table for the testimony concerning how police initially identified defendant as a suspect in the robbery.  The prosecutor explained to the jury, [s]o the police go and speak with this [...] individual and you're going to hear the officers testify.  Immediately they knew it wasn't him.  Maybe a little similar facial features but he had just woken up, was there with his girlfriend or wife.  He was shorter.  They knew right away after talking to this guy this is not him [the robber].
[directive] 7.1.2  If the investigation involves a criminal charge against the complainant, an initial interview should be conducted with the complainant.  However, the investigator must realize that the complainant is simultaneously a criminal defendant arising out of the same incident and must be accorded all of the appropriate protections.  Thus, all further contact with the complainant should be arranged with and coordinated through the County Prosecutor and the complainant's defense attorney.  7.1.3
[brief] Defendant claimed these statements would have been admissible at trial and would have been exculpatory, because [...] and [...] allegedly told [...] that they framed defendant.  On page forty-seven of defendant’s brief in support of his PCR petition, defendant acknowledged the existence of a petition for habeas corpus filed by [...] in 2008:  [...] was . . . confined at the New Jersey State Prison since 1999.  [...] and Mr. [...] became friends.  Approximately three years after the death of [...], [...] asked Mr. [...] to help prepare his Petition for Habeas Corpus to be filed in the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey.  [(Pa55). ]  Defendant did not make a legal argument premised on the existence of [...]’ habeas petition and seemingly mentioned it to provide background as to the relationship between [...] and [...].  The Honorable [...], P.J.Cr., granted defendant a PCR evidentiary hearing, which was held on March 21, 2019.
[brief] The court noted that the PSA, which was executed only twelve days after the Chinese Agreements of February 15, 2009, did not mention a division of the company assets. ” (See Da132 and Da432-433)  The court pointed out the critical differences between the Chinese Agreements and the PSA, which showed that defendant had deceived and manipulated the divorce proceedings to plaintiff’s disadvantage.  The record shows at no time upon learning that the false information was presented to Court, Plaintiff’s attorney [...] and his associates had made any effort to inform the Court that material misleading information was made to the court.
[brief] See, e.g., Stohrer Brothers, Inc. v. New Jersey Turnpike Authority, 2007 WL 1362733 (App. Div. 2007 (“We defer to the Authority’s expertise” with regard to its application of the experience requirements of the towing services prequalification specifications) (Ra 23-26); I/M/O Protest of Nick’s Towing Service, Inc., 2010 WL 5186013 (App. Div. 2010) (upholding [...]’s decision to deny prequalification to contractor that lacked relevant subject matter experience)(Ra 13-17); I/M/O John’s Main Auto Body, 2011 WL 51578 (App. Div. 2011) (Ra 6-12); Michael Risoldi Auto Repair, Inc. v. New Jersey Turnpike Authority, 2008 WL 926581 (App. Div. 2008) (upholding [...] final agency decision disqualifying towing contractor from procurement)(Ra 18-22).  Although an appellate court is “in no way bound by the agency’s interpretation of a statute or its determination of a strictly legal issue,” *Mayflower Sec. Co. v. Bureau of Sec.*, 64 N.J. 85, 93 (1973), if substantial evidence supports the agency’s decision, “a court may not substitute its own judgment for the agency’s even though the court might have reached a different result,” *Greenwood*, supra, 127 N.J. at 513.  “The burden of demonstrating that the agency’s action was arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable rests upon the person challenging the administrative decision. ”  *In re Arenas*, 385 N.J. Super. 440, 443-44 (App. Div. 2006).  Here, [...] cannot overcome the substantial deference owed [...] in issuing its final agency decision as well as the weight of controlling legal authority and the decision below should be affirmed.
[brief] After reviewing the entire record in this matter, including Appellants and [...]’s responses to the Comprehensive Report, Assistant Commissioner [...] issued a final agency decision on April 1, 2024, finding that “[[...]’s] failure to provide T&E to its students does not derive, in significant part, from the provisions of the SFRA. ” (Aa21).  In reaching this decision, the Assistant Commissioner rejected [...]’s argument that the SFRA fails to take into consideration its unique demographic situation and the fact that it bears extraordinary costs in providing transportation and special education services to --- 10 Commissioner [...] replaced [...] as Commissioner of Education on February 12, 2024.  The final decision on remand was then delegated to Assistant Commissioner Booker pursuant to N.J.S.A. 18A:4-34. more than 30,000 nonpublic school students.  (Aa11).  Rather, the Assistant Commissioner concluded that “[[...]’s] own choices and management issues have resulted in the unavailability of funds that could and should have been used to provide T&E to its students. ” (Aa11-12).  More specifically, the Assistant Commissioner found that [...] has “chosen not to require its tax base to further support its schools,” in accordance with N.J.S.A. 18A:22-40 and N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-39, “and suffers from local mismanagement regarding its transportation and special education costs. ”  (Aa12).  The Assistant Commissioner concluded that these issues, rather than infirmities in the SFRA, are significant contributing factors in the District’s inability to provide T&E.  (Aa21).  Furthermore, he explained that other laws, such as those affecting local tax levies and annual appropriations, play as much of a role in [...]’s finances as the SFRA.  (Aa13-14).  And he concluded that the District’s ongoing and pervasive fiscal mismanagement have led to inefficient use of funds that otherwise could have been used to ensure students were receiving T&E.  (Aa14-15).  For example, the Assistant Commissioner found that [...] failed to keep track of expenditures, including failing to have any purchase orders in place for students sent to out of district placements.  (Aa14).  [...] also did not keep proper documentation for special education students and had “significant data discrepenc[ies] and reporting issues related to special education. ” (Aa15).  Further, the Assistant Commissioner noted that transportation and special education services were recognized as areas of concern since 2009, yet [...] never took significant steps to address those concerns.  (Aa16-17).  For these reasons, and in light of the information contained in the administrative record and comprehensive report, the Assistant Commissioner rejected [...]’s claim that the SFRA was unconstitutional as applied to the District.  (Aa21).  This appeal followed.
[brief] Examples of this conduct include:  To prove my case, I do not have to tell you that that was the only reason they treated my client this way.  I just have to show you that that was one of the reasons they treated her that way.  (7T:58-59:23-1).  All you have to do is believe that the conduct happened…the conduct is inappropriate and he [[...]] should be punished for it.  (7T:61:23-1).  So, you’ll get to the question…Has the Plaintiff proven, by a preponderance of the evidence, that she was discriminated against based on her disability?