ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] So long as those members also satisfy the remaining aspects of the statute, including total and permanent disability, they will qualify for accidental disability benefits.  Therefore, the fact that a member is injured while performing his ordinary duties does not disqualify him from receiving accidental disability benefits; some injuries sustained during ordinary work effort will pass muster and others will not.  The crux of the inquiry is whether, during the regular performance of his job, an unexpected happening, not the result of pre-existing disease alone or in combination with the work, has occurred and directly resulted in the permanent and total disability of the member.  [Id. at 213-14 (alteration in original) (final emphasis added). ]  The intent was to eliminate the occupational claim from being able to receive Accidental Disability Pension benefits, not eliminate specific work accidents where the disability is directly caused by the work accident because factually someone had prior training to do the thing they were injured doing.  IF that were the case then the New Jersey Supreme Court would not have granted benefits to [...].  [...] testified he was trained on how to restrain patients and had done it many times but never had a patient who was this combative.  (1T12:20-25).  This case mirrors Moran in that despite being trained and having restrained patients in the past this incident was unique due to the nature of the patient and the assault and is an unexpected happening which constitutes and undersigned and unexpected event.  **CONCLUSION**
[brief] See, Plaintiffs’ Genesis deed.  (Da53).  (1)  The Genesis Deed restrictions governing the Beach Club read as follows:  **BEACH CLUB**  All property owners in this development are required to be members of a property owners’ association known or to be known as “[...]” and to faithfully abide by its rules.  No sale, resale, or rental of any property in Ocean Beach shall be made to any person or group of persons who are, have been or would be disapproved for membership by the [...].  THE use of the bathing beach is for the exclusive use of members of the [...].  Being a private club the [...] shall make such rules as it deems necessary pertaining to the race, color, or creed of person eligible for membership and any other rules or regulations it chooses.  (Da53)  There is no record of the entity “Ocean Beach Club” ever being formed.  A separate entity, the “[...]” (“[...]”) was incorporated on June 5, 1948.  (Da125)  [...] was not in existence at the time of conveyance of the 1947 Genesis Deed.  (Da53).  Of note, the beach club restrictions make no mention of any height restriction or any rules concerning building restrictions, nor do they make any mention of the developer conveying development rights to the [...] or the [...].
[brief] See State v. Grate, 220 N.J. 317, 329-334 (2015) (finding plain error because the trial court failed to instruct the jury that “knowingly” modified all material elements of the offense); Afanador, 151 N.J. at 55-56 (finding plain error where the trial court failed to instruct the jury on an essential element of the drug kingpin statute); State v. Federico, 103 N.J. 169, 176 (1986) (“[W]e recognize that the failure to charge the jury on an element of an offense is presumed to be prejudicial error, even in the absence of a request by defense counsel. ”); State v. Roberson, 246 N.J. Super. 597, 601, 697 (App. Div. 1991) (finding plain error because the jury was not instructed on an essential element, the weight of the cocaine, even though the evidence was “uncontradicted”).  The State argues that the trial court’s fundamental obligation to instruct jurors on the elements of an offense was satisfied by comments made by defense counsel in summation.
[brief] The Superior Court recently analyzed identical facts in Portfolio Recovery Associates, LLC v. Chartonavich\(^{10}\), [...] ([...], Oct. 26, 2023), \(^{10}\)  Notably, Counsel for the defendant in Chartonavich is also Counsel for the Appellant here.  aff’d 2024 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2537 (Sup. Ct. App. Div. Oct. 21, 2024).  In Chartonavich, defendant moved to vacate a default judgment entered six years prior, with the core argument that “the judgment was void ab initio, because plaintiff did not possess a consumer lender license under the New Jersey Consumer Finance Licensing Act (CFLA) at the time [the] judgment was entered. ”  The Superior Court held “Defendant cannot secure a judicial determination that the debt is void, because defendant cannot circumvent the lack of a private cause of action under the NJCFLA by seeking relief under . . . the New Jersey Uniform Declaratory Judgments Law, N.J.S.A. 2A: 16-50, -62. ”  Id. at *3.  Despite this case precedent, Appellant relies on LVNV v. DeAngelo, 464 N.J. Super. 103, 105 (Sup. Ct. App. Div. 2020).
[brief] The error “must be considered in light of the entire charge and must be evaluated in light of the overall strength of the State’s case. ”  State v. Walker, 203 N.J. 73, 90 (2010).  If the charge as a whole is adequate, an isolated omission is not plain error.  State v. Josephs, 174 N.J. 44, 98-100 (2002).
[brief] And maybe he knew they were never going to test his DNA because they didn't bother to test the GSR they took from him because they were saying then he wasn't a suspect at all.  But they want you to buy [...] because he said that might not be in my interest or something along that lines.  Therefore he's guilty because it's not in his interest.  ...  And it's not like he didn't give something.  You heard a blood sample.  We stipulated he gave a blood sample.  His DNA was taken.  It was tested.  It matched the saliva.  If you don't trust the police, do you think you might have been cautious if you know what they want to test the saliva and they want to take saliva, they're going to take them both on buccal swabs, which is basically a Q-Tip of some sort, and that's both of those are going to get sent to the DNA lab, that maybe you want to be cautious because how do you know that what gets sent to the DNA lab when somebody wants you to be the killer.  It's hard to say that sometimes the police are not true and honest, and I'm not saying, a lot of police are very good and honest.  I have relatives who are police officers.  But my point is here we have absolute facts that they had decided he was the murderer when they had no facts to support that.
[brief] “The court's obligation to the litigants was to rule on the motion requests, not defer their disposition. ”  Parish v. Parish, 412 N.J. Super. 39, 52 (App. Div. 2010).  The judge took the arbitrary decision of impounding passports under a misguided belief that the self-represented parties with limited understanding of the law would have no option but to put up with his whimsical order.  Continuing the conspicuous pattern of taking recourse to shortcuts while adjudicating motions, on May 3, 2024, the judge denied (Pa1331-32) the motion to abbreviate transcripts by indolently assuming that a complete trial transcript was needed just because the divorce trial was conducted over several days and JOD decision was 64-pages long instead of thoroughly reading the motion certification and earnestly considering the arguments presented therein as a conscientious judge would do.
[brief] 7  **Garcia V. Lawrence,** No A-3566-18T2, 2020 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1516 (App. Div. July 28, 2020)  ....................  7  Glen Wall Assocs. v. Wall Twp., 99 N.J. 265, 280 (1985)  ...........................................  15  Johnson v. Salem Corp. 97 N.J. 78, 81 (1984) .............................................  14 Lanzet v. Greenberg, 126 N.J. 168, 186 (1991)  ...........................................  14 Lesniak V. County of Bergen, 117 N.J. 12, 31 (1989)  ..............................................  7 Oswin v. Shaw, 129 N.J. 290, 320 (1992) ..........................................  8  Parker v. Goldstein, 78 N.J. Super. 472, 484 (App. Div.), cert. den., 40 N.J. 225 (1963) ...  14 Stanley Co. of America v. Hercules Powder Co., 16 N.J. 295, 305 (1954) .............................................  14  STATUTES AND REGULATIONS
[brief] On August 7, 2019, the [...] processed the car.  (3T50-14 to 19; 3T52-2 to 4; 3T53-5 to 18).  They found an Econo Lodge receipt with the defendant's name in the trunk.  (3T56-19 to 57-10).  After defendant was pulled over in the Chevy Malibu, [...] gave a statement to police.  She was shown a series of photographs in which she identified both herself and defendant.  (3T86-21 to 89-18).  A month or two after he and defendant bought the Malibu, [...] received a call "to go get [the car] out of impound in New York because it was in [his] name."
[brief] 2  “Pa” refers to Petitioners’ appendix; “Pb” refers to Petitioners’ brief; and “Ra” refers to Respondent’s appendix.  On the same day, the General Assembly convened at 1:00 p.m., roll was called, and a quorum declared.  (Pa230-231).  A6260, a bill identical to S49, was introduced, given a first reading, and referred to the Assembly Appropriations Committee.  (Pa231).  Pursuant to Assembly Rule 10:9, the Speaker notified the Clerk that the Appropriations Committee was authorized to consider A6260 among other bills on its January 6, 2022 agenda.  (Pa233).  While the public could not attend that Committee’s meeting in person, they were able to view and participate in the meeting via the Legislature’s homepage.  (Pa113).  The public was also advised that the Committee would take oral testimony on bills, by telephone and video, and that they could submit written testimony electronically in lieu of oral testimony.  Ibid.  Petitioner [...] testified regarding A6260.  (Pa162-166).  At the conclusion of the testimony, the Committee reported A6260 favorably to the Assembly, where it received a second reading.  (Pa232).  After concluding their legislative business for that day, the Senate and General Assembly adjourned with the intent to reconvene on January 10, 2022 for voting sessions.  (Pa234, 256).  After notice and the calendar for the Senate and General Assembly sessions were sent to members of the Senate and the Assembly, the Secretary of the State, and the State House Press, and posted in accordance with OPMA, the Senate and General Assembly met again on January 10, 2022.  (Pa234, 256-57).  S49 was given a third reading and passed the Senate by a vote of 23-15, and was then delivered to the General Assembly.  (Pa260).  The Clerk advised the General Assembly that the Senate passed, among other bills, S49, and requested the Assembly’s concurrence with those bills.  (Pa236).  S49 was given a first and second reading in the Assembly.  Ibid.  By way of motion, S49 was then substituted for the Assembly’s identical bill, A6260, pursuant to General Assembly Rule 15:20.  Ibid.  S49 was given a third reading, and after various motions, the bill ultimately passed in the General Assembly on January 10, 2022, by a vote of 45-24 (with nine Assembly members abstaining).  (Pa237-239).  These legislative actions were recorded in the Minutes of the General Assembly and the Journal of the Senate, which are the official record of the proceedings of each legislative body.  (Pa226-28; Pa246-48).
[brief] 1 23T: 10/28/22 vol. 2 24T: 10/31/22 vol. 1 25T: 10/31/22 vol. 2  26T: 11/2/22 vol. 1 27T: 11/2/22 vol. 2  28T: 11/4/22 vol.  1  29T: 11/4/22 vol. 2  30T: 11/16/22 vol. 1  31T: 11/16/22 vol. 2  32T: 11/18/22 vol. 1 33T: 11/18/22 vol. 2  34T: 11/28/22 vol. 1 35T: 11/28/22 vol. 2  36T: 11/30/22 vol. 1  37T: 11/30/22 vol. 2  38T: 12/2/22  39T: 12/12/22  40T: 12/14/22 trial  41T: 12/16/22 trial  42T: 12/19/22 trial  43T: 12/21/22 trial  44T: 12/23/22 trial  45T: 1/4/23 trial  46T: 2/21/23 sentencing  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT [...] was convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment without parole for the murder of her young son, [REDACTED], whose burned remains were found in her backyard.
[brief] THE ALJ IMPROPERLY FOUND APPELLANT GUILTY OF BEING IMPAIRED BY OPIATES WHILE ON DUTY DESPITE THOSE CHARGES HAVING BEEN WITHDRAWN AT THE INITIATION OF THE TRIAL  The Final Notice of Disciplinary Action (“FNDA”) sustained each of the fifty-eight (58) charges issued against Appellant.  Pa0157-Pa0174.  Arguably the most serious of those charges were, no. 4, 25, 51 and 53, which, respectively, found Appellant guilty of conduct unbecoming a public employee, other sufficient cause and misconduct for being in an impaired condition while on duty.  Pa0160, Pa0165 and Pa0171.  During colloquy among counsel and the ALJ wherein the charges and potential witnesses were being discussed prior to the initiation of trial, Respondent explicitly advised that all charges alleging impairment while on duty were being withdrawn.
[brief] ”  (34T86-25 to 89-9)  [...] also authenticated a letter he had given the prosecutor that he alleged Defendant wrote to him.  (Da94-97)  The letter said that [...] killed [...] because [...] had been going to the apartment where [...] lived with [...]’s children and threatening her.  (34T96-5 to 97-1; Da95-97)  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT
[brief] G.  [...] Admonished [...] in the presence of the Jury.  (Not raised below)  Defendants apparently misunderstood, our arguments.  It was not that [...] was not permitted to admonish Plaintiff, it was that she should not have done it in front of the Jury because doing in doing so [...] further contaminated the perception of the jury towards Mr. [...] on the very first day of Trial by getting into a snarky and rhetorical exchange with him right in front of the jury.
[brief] Respondents’ attempts to distinguish *Racioppi* and *Vercammen* are not supported by the case law. **  As summarized in *Wollen*, there are numerous types of web designs, including “hybrids” of multiple designs, which provide adequate notice of website terms and conditions.  468 N.J. Super at 495-96.  While such terminology has helped the courts understand this space, the standard is the same: reasonable notice under the facts and circumstances.  *E.g.*, *Wollen*, 468 N.J. Super at 496 (“Regardless of a web-based agreement’s characterization…the pertinent inquiry is whether the user was provided with reasonable notice. ”).  Respondents have attempted to draw a bright line between *Wollen*, on the one hand, and *Racioppi* and *Vercammen* on the other, claiming that *Wollen*’s holding is limited to “browsewrap” web agreements while the other two are limited to “sign-in wrap” web agreements.  (Pb32-33).  This bright line does not exist.
[brief] Accordingly, her identification of the shooter could only have been based upon other facts in evidence: that the person on video appeared to be wearing light colored clothing, and that a person wearing gray was observed near the victim.  Her description of the person as the shooter was thus an inference based on other facts in evidence, in violation of factor four of Watson.  Moreover, the image is so blurry that any description of the person on video – including the Detective’s identification of them as the shooter – was subject to reasonable dispute, in violation of factor three of Watson.
[brief] While this particular fact pattern does not fit neatly within the definition of equity adopted by the [...] (because the investment was transformed), adding in inflation, capital improvements, and market value are in clear contradiction to the ordinance.  The available evidence shows that aside from Unit 11, [...] holds $755,562 in other assets that [...] testified is presumably profit from selling the other units.  1T40:29-42:3 (when queried what those assets were, [...] stated, “we certainly made a profit from the condo-ing of the building, the other ten units.  And I’m assuming that’s where the money came from”); see also 5T45:7-13 ([...]’s representative testifying that it is correct to say that [...]’s sole real estate holding is Unit 11 of [...] and that [...] holds another $871,030 in assets).  It is unknown whether [...] earned the 6% return on its initial investment in the apartment building when it converted the building to condominiums because [...] refused to testify on this point and his attorney objected to the line of questioning.  To the extent this is unsettled it is due to [...]’s decision to withhold this information in its application and subsequent hearings.  Regardless, The available evidence tends to show that [...] made a fair return on its investment and now seeks to escape the regulatory structure that it agreed to when it decided to develop property in Hoboken.  The laws and circumstances that led to this situation were all in place when [...] purchased the apartment building in 1993.  It was part and parcel of the regulatory structure that [...] decided to enter because it was profitable.  [...] made a fair return on the investment, but even if it had not, the New Jersey Supreme Court has been clear that “rent levels may permissibly work hardships on landlords in atypical cases. ”  *Troy Hills Vill. v. Twp. Council of Parsippany-Troy Hills Twp.*, 68 N.J. 604, 628–29 (1975).  This is an atypical case.  [...] invested in an entire building and converted it to condominiums, making a profit in the process.  There was a known caveat to the investment—tenants that qualified for protection under the TPA could not be evicted without good cause for 40 years.  Everyone else could be evicted on three years notice.  That was the deal [...] made when it entered Hoboken to develop the real estate.  [...] now seeks to get out of the deal early so it can escape the regulations to which it agreed.  There is no taking here.  II.
[brief] I.  **The Parties.**  [...], a charitable, non-profit health care organization, is one of southern New Jersey’s leading networks of health care providers with hospitals located in Vineland, Mullica Hill, and Elmer.  (Da1-2).  [...] is currently the Director of Nursing Operations at [...].  (Pa64 at 14:2-3).  [...] is the Director of Labor Relations at [...], (Pa89 at 22:2-3), and acts as the Human Resources (“HR”) Business Partner for [...]’s corporate department, (Pa89 at 22:12-23:3).  [...] began working at [...] in 2005 as a security guard.  He later accepted a position in the staffing office at [...], where he worked until his termination in September 2020.  (Pa162 at 13:22-15:7).  [...] began working at [...] in 2010 as a transporter.  She took a new position in the staffing office in August 2019, where she worked until her termination in September 2020.  (Pa227-28 at 10:14-16:19).  [...] began working at [...] in 2006 in the staffing office, where she remained until her termination in September 2020.  (Pa280-81 at 12:24-13:21; Pa282 at 19:8- [...] was the direct supervisor of [...], [...], and [...] (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) while they were employed by [...] in the staffing office.  (Pa163-64 at 20:20-21:4; Pa231 at 25:20-22; Pa284 at 25:6-10).  II.
[brief] 37  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDER AND RULINGS  Order of Disposition, filed October 13, 2023  Pa51  Oral Decision (December 1, 2023)  5T24-18 to 34-7  Order Denying Motion for a New Trial, filed December 1, 2023  Pa100 – Pa101 | Authority | Brief page number | |---------------------------|-------------------| | Court Rules: | | | R. 2:10-2 | 3, 33, 37 | | R. 4:16-1(a) | 32 | | R. 4:16-1(b) | 32 | | R. 4:17-1 | 36 | | R. 4:17-4(a) | 36 | | R. 4:17-8 | 31 | | R. 4:17-8(a) | 32 | | R. 4:49-1 | 37 | | Rules of Evidence: | | | Evid. R. 403 | 2, 18, 19 | | Evid. R. 407 | 2, 14, 17, 18, 19, 20, 23, 28 | | Evid. R. 701 | 24, 26, 27 | | Evid. R. 803(b)(1) | 33 | | Evid. R. 803(b)(4) | 26 | | Evid. R. 803(c)(6) | 32 | Case Law: Dolson v. Anastasia, 55 N.J. 2 (1969)
[brief] ”  State v. Miller, 76 N.J. 392, 403 (1978).  Our constitutional standards governing interrogation “gives officers leeway to tell some lies during an interrogation[,]” although “[c]ertain lies” such as “false promises of leniency” may undercut voluntariness if they, “under the totality of circumstances, have the capacity to overbear a suspect’s will. ”  L.H., 239 N.J. at 44.  Here, the relevant factors overwhelmingly support the court’s finding that defendant’s will was not overborne when he admitted that the drugs were in his car.
[brief] Finally, though not under the language of Torres, which had not yet been decided, [...] did consider the whether the significant overall term was fair.  And there can be no doubt that it was given the multitude and brutality of defendant's crimes.  As the judge recognized throughout his sentencing, defendant's ambush and murder of the helpless victim was exceedingly vicious, each of his individual offenses were independent of one another, and, as he noted in the context of the aggravating factors, "a significant term of imprisonment" was appropriate.
[brief] *Toll Brothers v. Township of West Windsor*, 173 N.J. 502 (2002)  ……………………………………………………..  18  *Tolls Brothers vs. Township of West Windsor*, 303 N.J. Super 418, 574 (Law Div. 1996)  ………………………………  18  *Midtown Properties, Inc. v. Madison T.*, 68 N.J. Super. 197 (1961)  ………………………………………………  22
[brief] And the defendants did not (and could not) explain why they simply did not add that one extra sentence: (e.g. “If a player wins more than one prize in any given event, only one prize will be awarded. ”) anywhere – not on any of their multiple website pages, nor within any of their multiple (and numerous) advertisements.  For example, the Respondents failed to explain why they had made no mention made of this prize limitation at all, not even in the “Continental Chess Prize Information” page of their website (i.e. where they specified numerous other prize terms and conditions, see Pa17), nor even within their “Prize limits” paragraph, which was on the main event page of their website (see Pa15, top of page).  This should have constituted sufficient proof of a CFA violation, as "it has been recognized that one's state of mind is seldom capable of direct proof and ordinarily must be inferred from the circumstances properly presented and capable of being considered by the court."  *Wilson v. Amerada Hess Corp.*, 168 NJ 236, 254, 773 A.2d 1121 (2001) (citing *Amerada Hess Corp. v. Quinn*, 143 N.J.Super. 237, 249, 362 A.2d 1258 (Law Div.1976)).  Thus, the undisputed facts here more than sufficiently preponderated that their omission (of the prize limitation) was in fact an intentional one.
[brief] *Young v. Schering Corp*, 141 N.J. 16, 27 (1995).  Indeed, CEPA expressly includes the following election of remedies clause:  Nothing in this act shall be deemed to diminish the rights, privileges, or remedies of any employee under any other federal or State law or regulation or under any collective bargaining agreement or employee contract; except that the institution of an action in accordance with this act shall be deemed a waiver of the rights and remedies available under any other contract, collective bargaining agreement, State law, rule or regulation or under the common law.  [N.J.S.A. 34:19-8.]  Moreover, sources and parameters of public policy are not susceptible to hard and fast rules, as "the judiciary must define the cause of action in case-by-case determinations."  *Pierce*, 84 N.J. at 72, 417 A.2d 505.