ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] Evaluation of Defendant's Criminal Responsibility at the Time of the Crime (Sanity Evaluation) - (Defendant not Detained) of Order #51 - Order Mandating a Psychiatric Evaluation  Defendant's Criminal Responsibility at the Time of the Crime (Sanity Evaluation) - (Defendant not Detained)  The text of the following proposed order has been drafted for use when the court needs expert report pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:4-1 the prosecutor defense counsel and and an having agreed that professional staff from the Department of Health should perform a sanity evaluation due to questions regarding a defendant's state of mind at the time of the offense.  This form of order to used for defendants who are not detained at the time be is the order entered and are the community.
[brief] (15T 172-7 to 173-8)  The prosecutor argued that because he had personally prosecuted [...] in the recent past, resulting in his current prison sentence, it was “questionable” that [...] would be “truthful” in his dealing with the State.  (15T 168-11 to 169-8)  He further argued that [...] was equally available or unavailable to both sides.  (15T 169-14 to 24)  The trial court denied counsels’ request.  In so doing, she observed for the record that “interestingly, that did not go well when the Court tried to get Mr. – Mr. [...] here.
[directive] This includes investigators' reports, transcripts of statements, and copies of all relevant documents.  The file should also include all related material from other agency incidents that may be applicable.  For instance, if an allegation is made of excessive force during an arrest, the internal affairs investigation file should contain copies of the reports from that arrest.  9.3.3  Where an internal affairs investigation results in the filing of criminal charges, the file shall be made available to the prosecuting agency.
[brief] ”).  Forthright promulgated specific rules to ensure fairness and due process under this delegated authority.  The rules provide for either party to request an independent review by a Medical Review Organization doctor whose opinion is “presumed to be correct by the DRP, which presumption may be rebutted by a preponderance of the evidence. ”  Id. at R.14.  The Rules provide for multiple levels of review of an arbitrator’s determination – both through a modification/clarification mechanism (R.24), as well as a formal appeal to an independent panel of three arbitrators (R.25).
[brief] Moreover, there is no evidence that police suspected the men had a connection to the gun on the tire, e.g., the men were not questioned about the gun on the tire and none of the men were charged in connection with the gun on the tire.  See supra, n.6. the sidewalk of Leonard [Avenue] with ski masks, and darkly dressed.  [T]here was heavy pedestrian traffic in the sense that those -- those unknown pedestrians would approach in particular one of the four males and then one would go in and lea[d] the pedestrian [] in between the two vehicles.  * * *  [T]his is suspicious behavior on this street known for, as he called it the open air market sale of narcotics.  The detectives observed the males, those four, concealing themselves in between the two vehicles at times and as explained, the law enforcement who were conducting surveillance noticed one of the four males in the all dark, all black clothing being approached by unknown pedestrians in the area and then going in between those two vehicles.  The [NGU] then coordinates with other officers to do and conduct a pedestrian stop.
[brief] At trial and on this appeal, Appellants incorrectly argued that Section 7 of the LRHL “specifically requires that any redevelopment plan meet the requirements of Section 5, that is the provision which controls a redevelopment study. ”  (Pb12.)  Appellants also quote Section 14(a) of the LRHL in their brief and contend, without explanation, that the Trial Court’s failure to have “analyzed” Sections 5 and 14 warrants reversal.  There is no support for this contention as Sections 5 and 14 do not apply to redevelopment plan approvals, which is a separate determination governed by Section 7.  What Appellants suggest is that at the time of redevelopment plan approval, a Governing Body must again re-designate the redevelopment area as in need of redevelopment or rehabilitation.  This is contrary to clear statutory construction, which does not require any second designation, and has been squarely rejected by this Court.  Section 7 of the LRHL provides, in relevant part, as follows:  No redevelopment project shall be undertaken or carried out except in accordance with a redevelopment plan adopted by ordinance of the municipal governing body, upon its finding that the specifically delineated project area is located in an area in need of redevelopment or in an area in need of rehabilitation, or in both, according to criteria set forth in section 5 or section 14 of P.L.1992, c.79 (C.40A:12A-5 or 40A:12A-14), as appropriate.  Sections 5 and 14, while referenced in Section 7, address entirely distinct municipal actions, neither of which are implicated in this lawsuit.  There is no legal basis to contend that adoption of a redevelopment plan under Section 7 requires a governing body to re-designate properties that had already been designated pursuant to prior municipal action.  Designations for areas in need of redevelopment are governed by Sections 5 and 6 of the LRHL, and designations for areas in need of rehabilitation are governed by Section 14 of the LRHL.  Having failed to challenge these designations below, Appellants may not do so now on appeal.
[brief] In related litigation, Plaintiff herein challenged Planning Board approval under the original Redevelopment Plan of a multi-family development on [...] in [...], an area identified as Subdistrict 5 in the Plan.  Ordinance 1423-21 amended the development regulations governing Subdistrict 5 to, *inter alia*, permit more than one principal building on a lot.  (Pa 205, ¶8.)  As discussed in the previous section of this Brief, the Planning Board found this amendment (among others) inconsistent with the Master Plan.  (Pa 270-273.)  The related Action in Lieu of Prerogative Writs, encaptioned [...] v. Planning Board of the Borough of [...], *et al.*, Docket No. [...], filed on October 22, 2021, before the introduction of Ordinance 1423-21, asserted that the Planning Board’s approval of the [...] development was invalid because (i) it occurred at a special meeting noticed in the same manner as the meetings challenged herein; (ii) the application needed a use variance because it contemplated the merger of two lots already developed with multi-family dwellings with a third lot proposed for a new multi-family dwelling, thereby permitting a substantial increase in density for the new development, but the merger would result in more than one principal building on a lot, a condition not permitted under the Redevelopment Plan; and (iii) the Planning Board improperly delegated review and approval of the stormwater management plan to the municipal engineer.
[brief] *State v. Basil*, 202 N.J. 570, 591 (2010), citing *Crawford*, supra, 541 U.S. at 591.  The Confrontation Clause permits a defendant to explore, on cross-examination, a prosecution witness's alleged bias.  As the United States Supreme Court has observed, “the exposure of a witness' motivation in testifying is a proper and important function of the constitutionally protected right of cross-examination. ”
[brief] (Da 1– Da27)  [...] argues that the arbitration awards obtained in this matter were outside the contractual scope of the inter-company Arbitration Agreement.  [...] does not dispute that both [...] and the [...] Companies involved in this matter were signatories to the [...] Medical Payments Subrogation Arbitration Agreement, which is a nationwide agreement.  This is a voluntary agreement under which the parties agree to forego litigation and resolve Medpay subrogation claims in the forum.  [...] admits it is a signatory to the agreement and raises jurisdictional arguments surrounding the Article Second Exclusion which states that no company shall be required to arbitrate a claim for reimbursement of medical payments in a jurisdiction where medical payment subrogation claims are prohibited by statute or judicial decision.  [...]’s Brief cites to a number of cases discussing the arbitrator’s powers and states “the powers of the arbitrator are limited by the agreement of the parties and the arbitrator may not exceed the scope of the powers granted to him/her by the agreement”.  (PB-19).  As set forth in Point I of Appellant’s Brief (DB 8-13), the contractual obligations of the intercompany arbitration agreement provide specific actions which must be taken within the contractual framework to remove the matter from the jurisdiction of Arbitration.  The procedure followed in this matter is exactly that set forth in the inter-company Arbitration Agreement.  [...] filed an arbitration and briefed their position providing supporting evidence.  [...] likewise briefed their position and raised a jurisdictional exclusion alleging that the matter was outside of the jurisdiction of [...].  The rules and regulations created by the [...] require the arbitrator to conduct a hearing to decide the objection to jurisdiction.  Counsel for [...] and [...] appeared at the hearing and presented their arguments and evidence.  The arbitrator thereafter entered a ruling indicating that [...] did not prove that medical payments subrogation claims were prohibited by statute or judicial decision.  At no point did [...] file an action in the Superior Court seeking to bar the inter-company arbitrations but allowed the matter to proceed before the arbitrator.  [...] voluntarily allowed the arbitrator to rule in accordance with the agreement.  [...] has offered no argument which would support a ruling that any grounds exist in law or equity to revoke the terms on the inter-company Arbitration Contract.
[brief] Plaintiff’s appeal should be rejected as it was not timely filed, except as to plaintiff’s second motion for reconsideration.  The appeal of that denial must also be rejected, since, as the Trial Court found, the second reconsideration motion itself was not timely filed in the Trial Court.  The Trial Court issued its Judgment on May 8, 2023.  Thereafter, plaintiff filed her 5/28 motion for reconsideration.  --- 7  The standards for “plain error” and its applicability will be discussed in the further body of the Brief where applicable.
[brief] LEGAL ARGUMENT I.  STANDARD OF REVIEW (NOT RAISED BELOW)  Although reviewing courts generally “defer to an agency’s expertise and superior knowledge of a particular field,” courts reverse administrative agency decisions “upon a clear showing that (1) the agency did not follow the law; (2) the decision was arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable; or (3) the decision was not supported by substantial evidence. ”  In re Application of Virtua-West Jersey Hosp. Voorhees for a Certificate of Need, 194 N.J. 413, 422 (2008); In re Carter, 191 N.J. 474, 482-82 (2007) (citing Mazza v. Bd. of Trs., 143 N.J. 22, 25 (1995)); Henry v. Rahway State Prison, 81 N.J. 571, 579-80 (1980).  Here, the [...]’s denial of [...]’s request for a hearing failed to follow the law and constitutes an abuse of its discretion.  Further, [...]’s jurisdictional determination, under the circumstances, that a local union office was a State Workplace was arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable.
[brief] D.  The $2,000,000 Payment is Not Permitted Under the LRHL in the Absence of a Nexus 1.  N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-8  Does Not Authorize the $2,000,000 Payment  Defendants did argue – but the Court did not seem to find – that the $2,000,000 payment was authorized by N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-8, a provision of the LRHL.  Based upon the language of N.J. S.A. 40A:12A-8, well settled principles of statutory construction, the purpose of the nexus test, and case law which limits a municipality’s authority to extract such contributions, Defendants erred.
[directive] 5.5  Special Activation Rules Governing Certain Use-of-Force Incidents, In-Custody Deaths, and Other Exigent Circumstances Where Officers Are in Danger.  Notwithstanding any other provision of this Policy, when an officer equipped with a BWC is dispatched to or otherwise goes to the scene of a “Law Enforcement Incident” as defined in AG Directive 2019-4, the officer shall activate the BWC before arriving at the scene when feasible.
[directive] Other Provisions A. parties.  This Directive is issued pursuant to the Attorney Non-enforceability by third General’s authority to ensure the uniform and efficient enforcement of the laws and administration of criminal justice throughout the State.  This Directive imposes limitations on law enforcement agencies and officials that may be more restrictive than the limitations imposed under the United States and New Jersey Constitutions, and federal and state statutes and regulations.  Nothing in this Directive shall be construed in any way to create any substantive right that may be enforced by any third party.  B.  Severability.  The provisions of both this Directive and the Use of Force Policy shall be severable.  If any phrase, clause, sentence or provision of either this Directive or the Use of Force Policy is declared by a court of competent jurisdiction to be invalid, the validity of the remainder of the document shall not be affected.  C.  Questions.  Any questions concerning the interpretation or implementation of this Directive or the Use of Force Policy shall be addressed to the Director of the Office of Public Integrity & Accountability, or their designee.  D. deadline.  This Directive shall take effect on December 31, Effective date and training 2021.  The provisions of this Directive shall remain in force and effect unless and until it is repealed, amended, or superseded by Order of the Attorney General.  The Use of Force Policy appended to this Directive supersedes all prior versions of the Use of Force Policy and other relevant policies and directives.
[brief] Moreover, summary judgment on Count One was not yet ripe for adjudication.  Whether the adoption of the contested flex parking removal/911 memorial capital bond ordinance was arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable hinged, in part, upon whether [...] had a disqualifying statutory or common law conflict of interest and appearance of impropriety.  This issue presented a contested material fact that could not be resolved in the context of a summary judgment motion.  See, Town of Morristown v. Morris County Board of Taxation, __ N.J. Tax__ (Tax July 24, 2024) (finding whether adoption of the 2024 final Morris County equalization tabled was arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable, incorrect, or plainly unjust and impressed upon Morristown a substantially excessive share of the county tax was a disputed material fact, not ripe for summary judgment) (slip op at p. 14 n12.
[directive] B.  When a trainee tests positive for illegal drug use, or is found to have been consuming or being under the influence of cannabis or marijuana while at work/training or during work/training hours, subject to rules adopted by the Police Training Commission or New Jersey State Police:  1.  The trainee shall be immediately dismissed from basic training subject to rules adopted by the Police Training Commission or New Jersey State Police and suspended from employment by his or her appointing authority.  2.  Upon final disciplinary action by the appointing authority, the trainee shall be terminated from employment as a law enforcement officer.  3.  The trainee shall be reported to the Central Drug Registry maintained by the Division of State Police.  4.  The trainee shall be permanently barred from future law enforcement employment in New Jersey.
[brief] Plaintiff makes no mention of account xxx8 in the Complaint.  There certainly appears to be an irregularity with respect to Defendant’s billing statements.  According to Plaintiff’s documents (Exhibit GG) (Da118), for approximately 2 1/2 years, Plaintiff claimed purchases were made in account number xxx8 and then for no apparent reason were made in account number xxx3.  Moreover, for the period of April 27, 2017 to May 26, 2017, Plaintiff claimed purchases were made by Defendant in different dollar amounts in two different account numbers (Exhibit HH) (Da125).  Declarant’s certification mentions only account number xxx3 (Exhibit FF) (Da115).  Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges nonpayment only of account number xxx3 (Exhibit A) (Da2).  It appears that Plaintiff included dollar amounts from account number xxx8 and added them to account number xxx3.  Plaintiff’s Complaint is void because, while claiming payment for account number xxx3, it added account number xxx8 dollar amounts to account number xxx3.  Thus, there are facts which raise the questions of whether Defendant was properly billed, and on which account totals is Plaintiff alleging default.
[directive] Rule or Statute Description  This Rule provides that a summons rather than an arrest warrant shall be issued if the defendant is a corporation, partnership or unincorporated association.  If the defendant is an individual, a summons rather than an arrest warrant shall be issued unless the judge or duly authorized municipal court administrator or deputy Rule 7:2-2(b) municipal court administrator finds that the defendant has failed to respond to a summons; or there is reason to believe that the defendant is dangerous to himself Determination of Whether or herself, to others or to property; or there is one or more outstanding arrest warrants for the defendant; or the address of the defendant is not known and an to Issue a Summons or Warrant. arrest warrant is necessary to subject the defendant to the jurisdiction of the court; or there is reason to believe that the defendant will not appear in response to a summons.
[brief] The trial court erred in finding that there would be no appropriate basis for rejecting [...]’s bid if the defect was not material.  On the contrary, [...] would have had significant and varied justification for rejecting [...]’s bid even if the defect was not material. \(^3\)  First, as discussed extensively above, the Court’s only bases for finding that [...] could not, in the exercise of sound business judgment, reject [...]’s bid, was the price difference between [...] and [...]’s bids and the Court’s insistence of measuring the circumstances as of August 20, 2024, and not considering the possible and potential issues as they existed on July 30, 2024.
[brief] 48  C. State’s reference on summation regarding [...]’s failure to record her forensic examination of defendant .........................................................................................  51  D. State’s reference on summation to defense expert witness [...] ....................................................................................  53  E. State’s reference at trial to the juvenile waiver hearing ........................................................................................................  55  F. State’s reference on summation to defendant’s veracity (not raised below)  ...........................................  58  POINT IV  THE TRIAL COURT TREATED BOTH PARTIES’ EXPERTS EVEN-HANDEDLY; THE JURY WAS NOT MISINFORMED ABOUT THE LEGAL DEFENSE OF INSANITY ..................................................  61  A.  The trial judge exercised sound discretion in reining in [...]’s answers to “yes” or “no” questions .................................................................  61  B.  The jury was not misinformed on the legal standard of insanity .................................................................  63  POINT V THE COURT’S INSTRUCTIONS INSURED THAT THE JURORS UNDERSTOOD THEIR ROLE IN EVALUATING HEARSAY STATEMENTS REPLIED UPON BY BOTH THE STATE AND DEFENSE EXPERTS IN REACHING THEIR RESPECTIVE CONCLUSIONS ..................................................
[brief] **STATEMENT OF FACTS**  A.  **Defendant [...] Is Unique In Our Law. **  Established in 1766, [...] is a leading national public research university.  It operates three principal campuses in New Jersey and educates more than 67,000 students from all fifty states and over 120 countries.  Over 27,000 individuals are employed by [...] as faculty and staff.  See [...], By The Numbers, https://www.rutgers.edu/about/by-the-numbers (last visited October 8, 2024) (Da122-23.)  [...] is the flagship state institution of higher education and has footprints globally.  See About [...], https://www.rutgers.edu/about-rutgers (last visited October 8, 2024) (Da134-47.)  [...] is an entity unique in our law.
[brief] (Da60).  In denying Plaintiff’s cross-motion for sanctions, the trial court characterized the Defendant’s motion for reconsideration almost a year after [...] and almost a year after the decision by the Appellate Division as “a very tough pill for anyone to swallow”.  T326-19-23.  In addition, the trial court suggested that Plaintiff renew its application for fees to the Appellate Division.  T27-12-14.  On June 10, 2024, the Defendant filed a notice of appeal of the April 26, 2024 Orders.  (Da62).  On June 17, 2024, the Plaintiff filed a notice of cross-appeal of the April 26, 2024 order with respect to the trial court’s denial of Plaintiff’s cross-motion for sanctions.  (Pa155).  On June 19, 2024, Plaintiff served the Defendant and his counsel with a frivolous litigation letter pursuant to R. 1:4-8 and N.J.S.A. 2A:15-59.1 as a demand that the Defendant and his counsel withdraw the frivolous second appeal.  (Pa153).  The Defendant’s continued prosecution of his frivolous claims has caused the Plaintiff to incur additional attorney’s fees and costs in the sum of $7,486.40 since the Plaintiff’s service of the frivolous litigation letter on June 17, 2024 and in response to the Defendant’s second notice of appeal.  (Pa159).  In light of the foregoing, and for the reasons set forth more fully hereinbelow, the trial court’s order denying Defendant’s motion for reconsideration be affirmed, and that an order granting the Plaintiff’s cross-appeal be entered.
[brief] PETITIONER CLEARLY SHOWED VIOLATIONS OF N.J.S.A. 18A:120-24.1(e) THAT HAD POTENTIAL TO COMPROMISE THE BOARD.  [...]  Respondents claim that the plaintiff does not provide any “particularized allegations that Respondents made “personal promises” or “compromised the board” in any way” ([...]-Db22).  We note that the statute does not require evidence that actions “compromised the board”, but instead indicates board members may not “any private action that may compromise the board”.  N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(e).  Plaintiff specifically claims the indicated board members took private action that had the potential to compromise the board.  Plaintiff does not claim Respondents made “personal promises”.  IV.
[brief] The Failure to fix the Condition for Almost 7 Months was “Palpably Unreasonable”  "Palpably unreasonable" conduct contemplates more than mere negligence.  Coyne v. DOT, 182 N.J. 481, 493 (2005).  The concept "imposes a steep burden on a plaintiff," and "implies behavior that is patently unacceptable under any given circumstances[,]” as well as behavior from which "it must be manifest and obvious that no prudent person would approve of its course of action or inaction."  Ibid.  (quoting Kolitch v. Lindedahl, 100 N.J. 485, 493 (App. Div. 1985)).  Here, as of April 22, 2015, the [...] was aware of a defect in the roadway which needed to be fixed.  (Pa1343).  According to [...] engineer [...] it should have been fixed within 24hrs. (Pa0799).  However, as the record has revealed, it was not fixed until November 17, 2015; approximately 7 months later.  (Pa1396).  Although the palpably unreasonableness of entities conduct is a fact question for the jury, the seven month delay in responding is patently unacceptable under any circumstances.