ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] [This] would mean that [...] and similar companies would have to keep records proving that individuals appearing in photographs or videos are over the age of 18.  Simply put, “[...]” is not for use by anyone under the age of eighteen (18).  To ensure that its users are of legal age, the site requires registration and the obtaining of a passcode.  The main (welcome) page of the site requires the user to acknowledge the following at every log in:  By signing up you agree with the Terms and Conditions and testify that you are 18 years or older[.] [(Emphasis added). ]  To that end, there is no mechanism through which a user can create a profile that indicates that s/he is under the age of eighteen (18).  Underlying Facts
[brief] FDA Approval Was Not Needed to Warn Health Care Providers and Consumers of the Dangerous and Defective Ozurdex Applicators that were in Continued Use by Health Care Providers Despite [...]’s Knowledge of their Defect.  [ISSUE RAISED AND DECIDED (Pa003-Pa012; Pa024-Pa026; Pa033-Pa036: DA0852-Da0853)]  [...] did not raise this argument in its Motions for Summary Judgment or Motion for Reconsideration.
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE GRANTED MR. PENA'S MOTION FOR A JUDGMENT OF ACQUITTAL.  (Ruling at 2T56-17 to 2T59-9)  The R. 3:18-1 standard is well established.  When evaluating motions to acquit based on insufficient evidence, courts must view the totality of evidence, be it direct or circumstantial, in a light most favorable to the State.  More specifically, we must give the government in this setting "the benefit of all its favorable testimony as well as of the favorable inferences [that] reasonably could be drawn therefrom[.]"  Within that framework, the applicable standard is whether such evidence would enable a reasonable jury to find that the accused is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crime or crimes charged.  [State v. Perez, 177 N.J. 540, 549-50 (2003) (alterations in original) (emphasis added) (quoting State v. Reyes, 50 N.J. 454, 459 (1967))].  State v. Jones, 242 N.J. 156, 168 (2020).  But there is a difference between drawing inferences from evidence, and merely speculating in the absence of evidence.  "A jury may not fill a missing element of an offense by resorting to 'conjecture' or 'pure speculation.'"  State v. Lodzinski, 249 N.J. 116, 158 (2021) (quoting Curley v. United States, 160 F.2d 229, 232 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 837, rehearing denied, 331 U.S. 869 (1947)).  [...] was charged with attempted murder, aggravated assault, unlawful possession of a firearm and possession of a firearm for an unlawful purpose.  No gun was connected to [...] and no witnesses testified that they saw him shoot [...] or that he admitted doing same.  The video was not authenticated in any legal sense and the jury should not have been permitted to speculate about nature and content of out-of-court statements made by [...], the bodega owner, or the others.  Throughout its opinion, the trial court reasoned that the State satisfied its burden "if" the jury believed [...] was the person in the video footage.  (2T57-21 to 2T58-25)  Because the three videos (Exhibit S-23 at Da 17) and the screen-shots (S24A and S24B at Da 17) should not have been admitted, and because there was no other evidence identifying [...] as the shooter, he was entitled to an acquittal.
[brief] ”  References to [...]’s initial brief and appendices and reply appendix are cited as “Pb [page]”, “Pa [page]” and “Pra [page].” put in place by the Supreme Court to ensure the continued delivery of the resources and funding assured by the SFRA to remedy the Abbott T&E violation.  In Abbott XX, the Supreme Court conditioned SFRA’s constitutionality in Abbott districts on the State fully funding the formula in its first three years and thereafter reexamining the formula every three years to keep SFRA operating at its “optimal level. ”  Id. at 146 (declaring that SFRA’s “constitutionality is not a moment in time; it is a continuing obligation”).  In the face of prima facie – and undisputed – evidence that the State, for over a decade, operated the SFRA at levels well below [...]’s Adequacy Budget, both the State’s Brief and decision below ignore Abbott XX’s pivotal holding of conditional constitutionality.
[directive] Table of Contents  1  Introduction ................................................................................................ 1  2  Fundamentals of the Disciplinary Process ...................................................  6  2.1  Policy Management System ....................................................................................................  6  2.2  Rules and Regulations ..............................................................................................................  7  2.3  Responsibility for Discipline .....................................................................................................  9  2.4  Fitness for Duty ......................................................................................................................  10  3  Prevention of Misconduct ......................................................................... 11  3.1  Recruitment and Selection ....................................................................................................  11  3.2 Training .................................................................................................................................. 11  3.3  Supervision ............................................................................................................................  12  3.4  Early Warning and Risk Management ...................................................................................  12  3.5 Staff Inspections ....................................................................................................................  14  3.6  Community Outreach ............................................................................................................  14  4 Internal Affairs Unit or Function ................................................................ 15 4.1 Duties and Responsibilities ....................................................................................................
[brief] Statutes: N.J.S.A. § 2A:14-3 ..............................................................................................................  22 N.J.S.A. § 2A:15-59.1 ........................................................................................................  27 N.J.S.A. § 2C:41-6(c) .......................................................................................................  27 N.J.S.A. § 10:5-27.1 ..........................................................................................................  27 N.J.S.A. § 20:3-26 ..............................................................................................................  27 N.J.S.A. § 34:11B-12 .........................................................................................................  27 N.J.S.A. §§ 34:19-5 to -6 ...............................................................................................  27 N.J.S.A. § 56:8-19 ..............................................................................................................  27  Court Rules: Rule 1:4-8 ..................................................................................................................27  Rule 4:9-1 ..................................................................................................................14  Rule 4:9-3 ..................................................................................................................23  Rule 4:14-8 ..................................................................................................................27  Rule 4:23-1 to -5 ........................................................................................................27  Rule 4:25-8(a)(1) ......................................................................................................25  Rule 4:37-1(b) ..........................................................................................................27  Rule 4:42-9(a) ..........................................................................................................27  Rule 4:86-4(e) ..........................................................................................................27  Rule 5:5-5 ................................................................................................................27  Other Authorities: Restatement (Second) of Torts § 654 .................................................................15,16  Restatement of the Law (Third) Liability for Economic Harm § 21 .....................16  Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes § 2.13 ............................................11
[brief] The officer then entered the residence.  (2T28-8 to 10).  When he entered, he walked into a “mud room” where there was a set of stairs leading up to the living area of the townhouse.  (2T28-17 to 2T29-3).  The officer immediately saw evidence of blood on the wall of the staircase, which was a blood smear at the bottom of the railing.  (2T30-20 to 21; 2T31-16 to 17).  As he ascended the stairs, he noticed more blood marks on the wall.  (2T31-16 to 20).  He also heard sound from a television.  (2T32-14 to 16).  When he reached the landing at the top of the stairs, he heard a telephone off its hook.  (2T32-20 to 24).  He also saw blood streaked on the carpet.  (2T34-4 to 9).  The officer saw the living room where there was a sofa that had heavy soiling of blood and slash marks in it.  (2T37-17 to 25).  There was a coffee table with two glasses on it and a beer can.  (2T38-12 to 18).  When he approached the dining room and the kitchen area, he saw the body of the victim, 63-year-old [...], on the floor.
[brief] 2T133:2-15; 3T25:17-20, 27:21-28:13, 65:14-67:9, 72:1-10, 72:10-73:13, 80:6-81:19, 107:2-7, 117:15-16.  As part of the deal, [...] purchased back the contracts that [...] was servicing for [...] (eliminating any future income stream to [...]).  1T90:18-22.  The remaining relationships [...] had were also terminated.  2T146:12-21; Da70, 71([...] and [...] letters).  [...] and [...] tried, but were unable, to generate significant new business.  2T177:1-179:3, 206:16-22.  In Spring 2022, in the midst of this action, [...] died.
[brief] [...] alleged that Petitioner did not assist Decedent around the house, including one occasion where, during a snowstorm, Decedent shoveled snow while Petitioner remained inside.  Db at 15.  Petitioner had open heart surgery in 2002 and 2019 and had a cardiac history and was found to be disabled.  (7T60:6-8; P509a).  Petitioner was physically unable to do vigorous cardiac exercises, like shoveling snow.  [...]’s claims that Petitioner never help around the house is belied by the handwritten notes in the Cards that Decedent gave to Petitioner, including two that expressly thanked him for “all you do and for being a great Dad and Grandpop” (P383a) and “Thanks for all you do. ”  P387a 4.  Decedent Never Contemplated Divorce.
[directive] Rule 3:3-1(c)(1) on the Bail Schedule 2 charges of robbery, criminal sexual contact, second degree aggravated assault, aggravated arson, arson, burglary, first or second degree violations of Chapter 35 (drug offenses), any crime involving the possession or use of a firearm, or conspiracies or attempts to commit such crimes.  Rule 3:3-1(c)(2-6) (indictable offenses) and Rule 7:2-2(b)(1-6) delineate factors regarding whether a warrant or summons should issue for other offenses.  Rule 3:26-1 (indictable offenses) and Rule 7:4-1 (non-indictable offenses) delineate factors to be considered when setting bail and provide for the option of R.O.R. bail where appropriate.  Bail Ranges for attempts or conspiracies should generally be the same as the actual substantive crime.
[brief] N.J.S.A. 40A:14-147 reads:  A complaint charging a violation of the internal rules and regulations established for the conduct of a law enforcement unit shall be filed no later than the forty-fifth day after the date on which the person filing the complaint obtains sufficient information to file the matter upon which the complaint is based.  The forty-five-day time limit shall not apply if an investigation of a law enforcement officer for a violation of the internal rules or regulations of the law enforcement unit is included directly or indirectly within a concurrent investigation of that officer for a violation of the criminal laws of the state.  The forty-five-day limit shall begin on the day after the disposition of the criminal investigation.  The forty-five requirement of this paragraph for the filing of a complaint against an officer shall not apply to a filing of a complaint by a private individual.  A failure to comply with said provisions as to the service of the complaint and the time within which a complaint is to be filed shall require a dismissal of the complaint.
[brief] Instead of recalling [...], the parties agreed that [...]'s attorney would read a stipulation to the jury.  As agreed, [...]'s attorney read the following stipulation:  [COUNSEL]:  Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, it [is] stipulated by and between the parties, [...] on behalf of the [...], and people of the State of New Jersey, and the defendant Kelvin [...] through his counsel, myself [...][, t]hat on May 30[.]  2007 the State moved the entry of Giselle Nie[e]s into the P.T.I. program and that during those proceedings [...] (phonetic), a prosecutor in the [...], stated on the record:  *19  “It's my understanding that the defendant will be enrolled for a period of three years.  And as a condition of her enrollment the defendant agrees to cooperate fully with the [...] and to testify if necessary in two cases involving docket [...] and [...]. ”  Despite the stipulation, [...] maintains that he was denied a fair trial.
[brief] PRELIMINARY STATEMENT  Amicus Curaie have joined in the Appellant’s argument that N.J.S.A. 2A:14-1(a) is the controlling law pertaining to the statute of limitations for filing a uninsured or underinsured motorist claim; and argues that the suit limitation clause in Respondent’s policy of insurance conflicts with well settled state law.  However, as noted by the Court in Port Authority of New York v Ingram, 232 N.J. Super. 401 (App. Div. 1989) “[n]o New Jersey statute creates a limitation period specifically applicable to UM claims.
[brief] ”  *State v. J.R.*, 227 N.J. 393, 411 (2017) (alterations and quotation marks omitted).  In other words, our courts do not just assume that “[t]he jury could have thus listened to [the expert’s] testimony with skepticism,” because that is the opposite of what courts have recognized jurors do with expert opinion.  (Sb 21)  Moreover, it is not the jury’s job to discern that it must reject unreliable expert testimony that should never have been admitted in the first place:  “Reliability is critical to the admissibility of expert testimony.  Indeed, an expert opinion that is not reliable is of no assistance to anyone. ”  *State v. Olenowski*, 253 N.J. 133, 150 (2023) (alterations and quotation marks omitted).  These convictions cannot be saved with the bare hope that the jury might have not believed the testimony the State asked them to believe.  In terms of the substance of the testimony itself, [...] relies on her previously filed brief and adds only a few comments about the fingerprint expert.  Contrary to the assertions in the State’s brief, [...] is not arguing that no fingerprint testimony was admissible.  She is not arguing that the expert was “constrained by out-of-state caselaw” (Sb 10) or that the verification stage should have somehow been shielded from the jury.  [...] is arguing that the fingerprint examiner’s testimony overstepped the bounds of his own community’s well-established consensus on appropriate testimony and relayed information that is clearly inadmissible hearsay under New Jersey’s own hearsay case law.  If the State’s position is now that the fingerprint examiner had to testify about verification in order to demonstrate the reliability of his method, (Sb 17) the State needed to bring in the people who conducted that verification.  No hearsay exception allows the expert to just relay it.  Although the State claims to rely on a hearsay exception that allows an expert to convey hearsay that was the basis of his opinion, “while the expert may not have been able to testify to his conclusions regarding the fingerprint without verification, it does not follow that the opinion of the other examiner forms a part of the basis for the testifying expert's opinion. ”  *State v. Connor*, 937 A.2d 928, 932 (N.H. 2007).  Nor does the Confrontation Clause allow the expert to relay this clearly testimonial hearsay.  Relying on a pre-*Crawford v. Washington* case to argue otherwise misses the last 20 years of Confrontation Clause jurisprudence that governs this case.  (Sb 15)  Ultimately, the State’s response to the errors its own experts repeatedly made is to argue that the defense is responsible for not stopping these experts from making these mistakes.  At bottom, the question of whose “fault” it is that this unreliable testimony was set forth by the State’s experts is irrelevant.  The lack of objection means this Court must review the errors for plain error, not that the convictions are immune from reversal.  The injection of unreliable and inappropriate scientific testimony into this trial rendered it unfair.  This Court has the ability to recognize that unfairness and reverse [...]’s convictions.
[brief] Arbitration Would Have Been Futile Before 2024  The relevant passage of time here is approximately five weeks:  June 24, 2024 (the date the Law Division lifted the fourth stay following [...]’s settlements) through August 1, 2024 (the date of [...]’s motion to compel arbitration).  [...]’s position that [...] could have moved to compel arbitration (but intentionally did not) before 2024 distorts the nature of the litigation and ignores the undisputed fact that [...]’s Indemnity Claim was not ripe until [...]’s settlements with the Utilities.  If a claim is not ripe, ipso facto, it is futile to seek to arbitrate it.
[brief] (Da186-188)  However, none of this occurred as expected.  (Id.)  The February 15 closing date in the second amendment was delayed because the Defendant failed to fulfill certain obligations under the PILOT agreement.  (Da185 at ¶6)  The PILOT originally required Defendant to build affordable housing units, but Defendant was seeking a modification or alternative to that requirement.  Ultimately, in June 2022 the Defendant negotiated a deal with the [...] to make a lump sum payment instead.
[brief] The ordinances relevant to the historic districts are found at Middletown Planning and Development Regulations, § 540-944 (the “Historic District Ordinances”).  Section C(c) of the Historic District Ordinances defines “regulated activities” within a historic district to include a “change in the exterior appearance of any building, structure or improvement by addition, reconstruction, alteration, replacement or maintenance. ”  There is no dispute that the Applicants seek to change the exterior appearance of their home that exists within a historic district.  Nothing in the Historic District Ordinances distinguishes between a regulated activity to a “contributing” home versus a “no-contributing” home within a historic district.  The inquiry is initially around the nature of activity and then whether it is in a historic district.  Period!  Furthermore, the Historic District Ordinances make clear that the Landmark Commission’s function is advisory and makes recommendations to the ZBA.  Substantial and Novel Constitutional Questions
[brief] (Da228-Da259, Plaintiffs’ Deposition Transcript, 58:14-59:5).  [...] testified that [...] was following the ceiling wires with [...] into the utility room when [...] stepped backward and fell into the open hatch.  (Da261-Da275, [...]’s Deposition Transcript, 8:14-9:7, 46:16-47:2).  They did not intend to access the hatch or crawl space that day.  (Da261-Da275, [...]’s Deposition Transcript, 9:22-10:3).  Neither [...] nor [...] opened or shut the hatch.  (Da261-Da275, [...]’s Deposition Transcript, 10:4-10, 17:10-20).  [...]—the general contractor—opened the hatch without being specifically asked to do so.
[brief] I.  AN AGREEMENT TO ARBITRATE A MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CLAIM IS ENFORCEABLE UNDER NEW JERSEY LAW  A.  State Law and Public Policy Favor Arbitration  The [...] argues that because the New Jersey legislature has not enacted a statute that makes arbitration of a medical malpractice claim enforceable, it “reflects the public policy [of New Jersey] against arbitration in medical malpractice cases. ”  See [...] brief at p. 5.  However, the case cited by the [...] for this proposition states the opposite.  Namely, that the absence of such legislation reflects public policy in favor of arbitration.  See Curtis v. Cellco P'ship, 413 N.J. Super. 26, 34 (App. Div. 2010) (“Only ‘if a statute or its legislative history evidences an intention to preclude alternate forms of dispute resolution will arbitration be an unenforceable option’’)(internal citations omitted); see also Moore ex rel. Moore v. Woman to Woman Obstetrics & Gynecology, LLC, No. A-0683-11T1, 2013 N.J. Super. Unpub. WL 4080947 (App. Div. 2013) (“no inherent harm to the doctor/patient relationship flows from the agreement to substitute one forum for another in the event of future claims”; “public policy favors arbitration agreements, including in health care settings”) (Da067) citing Moore 416 N.J. Super. at 45 (App. Div. 2010)(emphasis added).  Additionally, the [...]’s argument seeking to invalidate every doctor/patient agreement to arbitrate a malpractice claim would violate the Federal Arbitration Act.  See Kindred Nursing Centers Ltd. P'ship v. Clark, 581 U.S. 246, 251–52 (2017) (“[a] court may invalidate an arbitration agreement based on “generally applicable contract defenses” like fraud or unconscionability, but not on legal rules that ‘apply only to arbitration or that derive their meaning from the fact that an agreement to arbitrate is at issue’…The FAA thus preempts any state rule discriminating on its face against arbitration—for example, a “law prohibit[ing] outright the arbitration of a particular type of claim”).  “When state law prohibits outright the arbitration of a particular type of claim, the analysis is straightforward: The conflicting rule is displaced by the FAA. ’”  Marmet Health Care Ctr., Inc. v. Brown, 565 U.S. 530, 533 (2012); AT&T Mobility, LLC, v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 341(2011)(FAA pre-empts a state law invalidating nursing home admission agreement to arbitrate personal injury and wrongful death claims); Estate of Ruszala ex. rel. Mizerak v. Brookdale Living Communities, Inc., 415 N.J. Super. 272 (App. Div. 2010) (New Jersey statute prohibiting arbitration agreement in nursing home contract pre-empted by FAA).  Nor is the [...]s citation of proposed federal legislation related to nursing home admissions relevant to this matter.  See [...] brief at p. 3.  The instant matter does not concern nursing home malpractice and the proposed legislation is not binding and must comply with the FAA in any event.  Accordingly, the [...]’s proposition – that there should be a per se ban on arbitration agreements in the medical malpractice context is not just bad policy, it is also trumped by the state and federal policy favoring arbitration.
[brief] (1T22-24 to 23-2; 1T26-18 to 28-5; 2T42-6 to 46-16; 5T24-18 to 28-10)  A.  Plaintiff-Appellant Should Have Been Permitted Through the Testimony of the Plaintiff and Plaintiff’s Witness, [...], to Introduce Evidence in Her Case in Chief as to the Defendant’s Actions to Mop and Place a Hazard Sign at the Location of Plaintiff’s Fall Immediately After Plaintiff’s Fall but While Plaintiff Remained on the Defendant’s Premises and Where to Exit the Premises She Needed to Traverse the Exact Location She Had Just Fallen.