ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] ARGUMENT I.  [...] in abuse of authority recklessly deprived [...] of his due process rights (Raised below: Aa2; Aa3 Aa1)  The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution guarantees that no "State [shall] deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law."  United States Constitution amendment XIV, Section 1., Article I, Paragraph 7 of the State Constitution embraces the same guarantee.  State v. Njongo, 247 N.J. 533, 548 (2021); see also Jangochian v. State Parole Bd., 196 N.J. 222, 239 (2008).  The court has "construed the expansive language of Art. I, Par. 1 [of the New Jersey Constitution] to embrace the fundamental guarantee of due process."  Jangochian v. State Parole Bd., 196 N.J. 222, 239 (2008).  AN OVER "Integral part" of that guarantee of due process is the doctrine of fundamental fairness, which "serves to protect citizens generally against unjust and arbitrary governmental action, and specifically against governmental procedures that tend to operate arbitrarily."  Doe v. Poritz, 172 N.J. 1, 108 (1995) (emphasis omitted) (pp. 18-20)  As a state agency [...] cannot violate due process, Supra without a legitimate penological interest.  In this case, [...] has arbitrarily deprived [...] of the liberty to return the falsely advertised food item received from [...] (Aa1).  As a result of [...]'s error [...] was deprived of his property via refund (Aa7).  [...]'s action is in contravention of Due Process State v. Njango, supra and Jamgochian, supra because [...] was wrongfully restricted of his liberty to return the item (Aa1) when there was no rule or regulation established for [...] to unfairly or unreasonably do so.  (Aa2).  As a result, [...] was deprived of his property refund which [...] authorized (Aa7) and (Aa9-10).  Rule 2:10-2[7.2]  Comment states,  The fundamental principle governing review of agency adjudicative actions is that the agency decision will be sustained unless it is arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable, unsupported by substantial credible evidence in the record as a whole, offensive to the federal or state constitution....  Pressler & Verniero N.J. Court Rules (2015).  [...]'s arbitrary action in this matter offends the federal and state constitution  State v. Njango, supra and Jamgochian, supra and should be reversed pursuant to Henry v. Rahway, 81 N.J. 571, 579-80 (1980).  II.
[brief] LEGAL ANALYSIS I.  BERGHOLZ'S STATEMENT WAS ADMISSIBLE SUBSTANTIVELY AND ANY ALLEGED ERROR IN THE FORM OF ADMISSION WAS HARMLESS.  The issue raised by the Defense regarding witness [...] concerns the admission at trial of his prior consistent statement.  The court below found that during [...]’ cross-examination, the Defense had inferred that he had a motive to fabricate his trial testimony.  Accordingly, the court permitted the State to admit a prior consistent statement of [...] pursuant to N.J.R.E. 607, in an effort to show consistency and thus rehabilitate the witness.  Counsel alleges this was improper.  When reviewing such an issue on appeal, "[c]onsiderable latitude is afforded a trial court in determining whether to admit evidence, and that determination will be reversed only if it constitutes an abuse of discretion."
[brief] The State also argues that the Parental Notification Policy compromises students’ “safe spaces” at school, State’s Br. at ACa82, but as pointed out, the District is free to continue to socially transition students under the Parental Notification Policy just as it has done in the past.  The only difference is that, under the Parental Notification Policy parents will be notified, and the State has not remotely demonstrated that the notification requirement will cause transgender-identifying students to be discriminated against at school.  Unlike the Parental Secrecy Policy’s “one size fits all” approach, the Parental Notification Policy’s case-by-case evaluation of the risk of parental harm interposes the State between parents and their children only when such interference is truly needed.  For these reasons, the balance of the equities tips dramatically in parents’ favor, and lifting the injunction is strongly in the interest of parents, their children, and the public.
[brief] \(^9\)  Fees had been denied because “[t]he [...] Group incurred legal fees to defend against legitimate claims brought by [...]. ”  Pa65.  There is also no evidence of record that, as plaintiff suggests (Pb2), plaintiff was “forced” to proceed pro se because [...] had to have counsel.  For example, presumably, they could have had the same counsel.  May 8 Judgment on May 28, 2023 (20 days later), plaintiff had the remaining 25 days of the original appeal period to file her appeal of the Judgment after her 5/28 motion was denied.  Thus, plaintiff’s time to file her Notice of Appeal of the Judgment expired on July 21, 2023, 25 days after the 5/28 motion was denied by the 6/26 Order. \(^{10}\)  The appeal of the Judgment should be dismissed because it was filed on September 21, 2023, which was 62 days out of time.
[brief] (Pa162-165).  Attempting to prove he was not ineligible under (b), in no way proves his eligibility under (a).  The W-2’s [...] relies upon for his position, are only pertinent to a determination of whether [...] is an independent contractor, not whether his work was done under a professional services agreement.  (Pb12).  Similarly, the “ABC test” [...] cites, is simply another method for analyzing employment status and not relevant to the actual issue on appeal, namely whether the Board erred finding [...] ineligible for PERS under subsection (a).  (Pb15-16).  Doubling down on his confusion, [...] cites the unpublished decision *Lanza v. Board of Trustees, Public Employees’ Retirement System*, No. A-2685-16, (App. Div. Mar. 5, 2019), slip op. at 19 (affirming the Board’s determination that appellant was not eligible for PERS service credit after effective date of Chapter 92 based on a finding that municipal resolutions created a binding contract for professional services) (Pb14).  [...] argues that in *Lanza* the ALJ “developed the record and the Board of Trustees completed a full investigation and made a full determination of whether or not Lanza was an independent contractor. ”  *Ibid.*  What [...] misses is, unlike his own case, the Board found ineligibility under both subsections (a) and (b) in *Lanza*.  (Ra1).  Both the ALJ and this court affirmed the Board’s determination under both subsections.  *Ibid.*  In fact, *Lanza* actually supports the Board’s determination in this matter because this court affirmed that municipal resolutions “demonstrating that Lanza’s appointment as municipal prosecutor met the definition of a ‘professional services contract,’ under the LPCL as prescribed by --- 8 [...] fails to attach this unpublished decision and provide contrary opinions as required under Rule 1:36-3.  The Board has provided a copy in its appendix.  (Ra1-20).  N.J.S.A. 43:15A-7.2(a). ” (Ra6).  This directly supports the ALJ’s finding that, while no formal written contract existed until 2015, [...] was indeed working pursuant to a contract for a professional services, awarded by yearly resolutions.
[brief] On the other hand, as described in the sections below, once the Borough took title to the Property in 1939, it took numerous actions showing its ownership of the entire Property (which has been listed for many decades on the Borough tax maps as Borough-owned land).  In addition to all of the other flaws in [...]’s arguments regarding the ownership of the Property, one final flaw is that its argument is internally inconsistent.  [...] argues that [...] did not convey the Quinlan Tract to [...] in 1920 because the Quinlan Tract was not expressly included in the deed of conveyance and, based upon the holding in Panetta, riparian grants do not automatically pass with the uplands.  What [...] fails to recognize, however, is that the Quinlan Tract was not expressly mentioned in any of the deeds of conveyances in this chain of title, and yet [...] contends that the Quinlan Tract was conveyed in the “Quinlan to [...]” deed.  [...] cannot have it both ways.  Either the Quinlan Tract passed with the uplands despite not being expressly delineated within the deeds or it did not.  By arguing that it passed with the uplands in the “Quinlan to [...]” deed, but not in any of the later deeds in the chain of title, [...] is making an internally inconsistent argument which should be rejected by this Court.
[brief] For the foregoing reasons, [...] respectfully requests that the Court affirm the trial court’s decision granting [...]’s motion for summary judgment.  [...]  Attorney for Defendant, [...]  [...]  Dated: August 2, 2024  [...], BY HIS GUARDIANS  AD LITEM, [...], [...], Plaintiff, vs. [...], [...]  A.K.A. [...], [...], [...], [...], JOHN DOES 1-100, JANE DOES 1-100, ABC COMPANIES 1-100, XYZ PARTNERSHIPS 1-100 (being fictitious parties), Defendant(s).  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
[brief] ’”  *Elders*, 192 N.J. at 244 (quoting *State v. Johnson*, 42 N.J. 146, 162 (1964)).  Defendant cannot make such a showing here, as the credible evidence before the judge was more than sufficient to support his findings.  1.  **Valid Consent Was Given by the Daughter, [...]**  Consent to search in this case was provided by not one, but two, third-parties – [...], and her daughter, [...], who defendant ignores entirely.  For good reason, because [...]’s consent was valid and conclusive by itself, and that consent is unassailable.
[brief] POINT II .........................................................................................................  12  THE TRIAL COURTS DECISION WAS NOT BASED SOLEY ON THE ABSENCE OF OBJECTIVE RADIOLOGICAL STUDIES  POINT III ...........................................................................................................  14  PLAINTIFF’S EXPERT OPINION IS A NET OPINION  POINT IV ..........................................................................................................  16  PLAINTIFFS’ CLAIMS FOR UNPAID MEDICAL EXPENSES AND PROPERTY DAMAGE WERE PROPERLY DISMISSED BY THE TRIAL COURT CONCLUSION
[brief] Here, the Trial Court’s threshold determination that, based on its interpretation of the applicable arbitration rules, it must decide the arbitrability of the dispute is incorrect and should be reviewed de novo.  The rules applicable to this dispute state in no uncertain terms that the arbitrator must determine his own jurisdiction.  Whether or not the entire controversy applies to preclude [...] from pursuing its claims is a question of jurisdiction, and even though the Trial Court reached the correct result, it did not have the jurisdiction to do so.  If, however, the Appellate Court determines that the Trial Court was vested with the power to determine arbitrability despite the above cited AAA Rule stating otherwise, then the Appellate Court should review the Trial Court’s Orders denying [...]’s request for a permanent injunction (which consequently lead to the dismissal of the Complaint) only for abuse of discretion.
[brief] The scientific community has long understood that addiction is a disease of the brain that affects behavior.  See National Institute on Drug Abuse, Drugs, Brains, and Behavior: The Science of Addiction 5 (2007), available at https://nida.nih.gov/sites/default/files/soa_2014.pdf (“Addiction is defined as a chronic, relapsing brain disease that is characterized by compulsive drug seeking and use, despite harmful consequences. ”)  Drug abuse changes the structure of the brain and how it works; specifically, “[b]rain imaging studies of people with addiction show physical changes in areas of the brain that are critical to judgment, decision making . . . and behavior control. ”  Id. at 5, 11.  It is no surprise, then, that “[d]rug addiction erodes a person’s self-control and ability to make sound decisions, while producing intense impulses to take drugs. ”  Id. at 20.  Amongst the public at large, there is also a growing recognition that addiction is an illness, rather than evidence of a moral failure.  See National Institute on Drug Abuse, Neurobiology of Addiction, in Pocket Guide to Addiction Assessment and Treatment 5 (2016) (“It has been a great struggle, unfolding for over several decades, to change the public’s perception of addiction from one of moral failure to the disease model now accepted by physicians. ”).  Given this improved understanding of addiction, there is an increased emphasis on rehabilitation programs rather than incarceration.
[brief] Specifically the Union’s September 12, 2023 Final Offer stated, “Change the healthcare provisions to mimic Article VII of the PFA Local 2 MOA entered into with the City on May 31, 2022 (a copy of which is attached). ”  (Aa246)  The Firefighter MOA was attached the final offer which MOA stated “Health Benefits”  Replace this Article with the following” and then set forth specific language.  (Aa246)  This is exactly what [...] awarded the Union.
[brief] During the municipal court trial, [...] testified seeing his brother’s parked car in the street in front of the house when he left at around 8:00 p.m. on March 3rd.  He saw the damage when he returned home at about 2:45 a.m. (1T.7-8).  Upon arriving at the scene, the police had limited knowledge about the vehicle involved in the accident.  The police searched the immediate area for any vehicle possibly involved in the crash.  The colloquy portrayed on the body worn camera footage shows that as the police officers were approaching [...]’s house, seeing his damaged car parked in the driveway, they had already decided to charge him before speaking with him or conducting further investigation into the driver’s identity.  ---
[brief] This Reply Brief additionally relies upon the following appendices supplied to the Appellate Division in support of the appellant’s Appellate Brief:  | Appendix | Pages | |----------------|-----------| | Appendix A | Pa1 - Pa83| | Appendix B | Pa84 - Pa136| | Appendix C | Pa137- Pa232| | Appendix D | Pa233- Pa300| *)  This was not a paper filed below.  **)  Reply Brief relies on the Appendices A-D, which were previously supplied.
[brief] First, the Trial Court misapplied the entire controversy doctrine by implicitly overruling Olds v. Donnelly based upon an unpublished case of the Appellate Division.  Second, the Probate Action failed to consider the requirements of substantial prejudice and inexcusable failure to join legal malpractice claims when dismissing Plaintiff’s claims with prejudice.  Third, the Court improperly applied the doctrine of collateral estoppel to the Probate Actions’ construction of an ambiguous testamentary instrument and thereby substituted the Probate Action Judge’s conclusions as to proximate cause on an issue that was not before the Probate Judge and which should rightly be decided by a jury.  Finally, the Court ignored Plaintiff’s claims with regards to drafting of the mortgage as to [...].  Additionally, the Court ignored the damages caused Plaintiffs by the expense of litigation occasioned by the ambiguous instrument and adopting a holding which essentially immunizes scriveners from negligent drafting of wills.  These errors require a reversal of the Trial Court’s order of remand of this matter for discovery and Trial.  ARGUMENT I.
[brief] There are several entities who believed they properly created a subdivision “by right. ”  Defendants should have discovered the mistake through the exercise of reasonable diligence.  Defendants were put on constructive notice of the subdivision and that Plaintiffs purchased the extra land from the Grantor for the sole purpose of having a lot that could be subdivided “by right” without a variance. \[14\]  Plaintiffs paid valuable consideration for the footage.  Plaintiffs deserve to receive the benefit of their bargain.  But for a scrivener’s error, Defendants would have had an “opportunity” to claim ownership because the disputed property was already sold.  This court should not allow the property to be resold to Defendants from the same Grantor.  Defendants’ assertion that the land can be secured from taking from the neighbor on the other side is pure speculation, and not realistic or viable.  Plaintiffs acquired the land from [L]ot 3 for a specific negotiated purpose.  But for the scrivener’s error, this case would not exist.  Plaintiffs are the rightful owners.
[brief] 6  [...]’s mortgage authorized pre-payments without penalty and included the following provision regarding payment:  “Payments are deemed received by Lender when received at the location designated in the Note or at such other location as may be designated by Lender in accordance with the notice provisions in Section 15”. rejected it a second time.  Instead of returning the check to [...], [...] returned the check directly to [...] who endorsed the check, deposited it into a fraudulent account, and then absconded with the funds.  Thereafter, [...] asserted the position that the loan was in default for non-payment and commenced a foreclosure action.
[brief] (Pa000207).  On September 1, 2017, [...] failed to make the annual rent payment due under the Lease in the amount of $206,045.00.  (Pa002135 – 002136; Pa002154 – 002155).  On September 5, 2017, counsel for [...] sent a notice to [...] that it was in default of its payment obligations under Section 1.2 of the Land Lease dated September 1, 2015.
[brief] However, the Bank sought such relief instead by filing a motion including an Attorney Certification within the existing Law Division Action, which motion was noticed only to the the motion to intervene denied, even as the Court was aware of a pending action against the Receiver instituted by [...], and presumably one of the reasons, if not the reason, that [...] was accompanied at the oral argument by counsel.  In addition, the Court made suppositions regarding potential claims by the [...] as to [...], yet proceeded as it did nonetheless.  Further, the Court proceeded as it did notwithstanding absence of a bond, and with [...] having previously argued to the Court in its prior motion to intervene that there should be ability and/or opportunity for a party to commence an action against a Receiver prior to discharge.  In that setting of oral argument, the Court stated that [...] was being discharged, even though the Statute provides that “Any person aggrieved by the proceedings or determination of the receiver in the discharge of his duties shall be entitled to a review of the receiver's action in a summary manner in only other parties in that action – [...], [...] and [...], who did not oppose the motion.  The foregoing calls into question whether there was even the required “receivership action” in the first instance.  Further, although the Statute explicitly only applies to “corporations”, as defined in the Statute, and although [...] and [...] are not “corporations”, the Bank sought in its motion and proposed Order a Receivership over these individuals, and the Court entered the proposed form of Order so providing.  While the Statute does allow a Court to impose conditions, restrictions, etc. on officers and the like, it does not provide for appointment of a Receiver as to such persons.  As such, the moving papers, including the proposed Order, and the entry of the same Order, given all of the foregoing, raise various further concerns.  the Superior Court. ”  N.J.S.A. 14A:14-18.
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[brief] The Supreme Court’s Determination That the School Funding Reform Act Is Constitutionally Sound.  In Abbott XX, 199 N.J. at 175, the New Jersey Supreme Court conducted a thorough evaluation of the newly enacted SFRA and determined that “[t]he legislative and executive branches of government have enacted a funding formula that is designed to achieve a thorough and efficient education for every child, regardless of where he or she lives. ”  Thus, it concluded the “SFRA is a constitutionally adequate scheme. ”  Ibid.  In reaching this conclusion, the Court acknowledged the many concerns and objections to the formula made by the Abbott plaintiffs.  In particular, the Court considered the argument, raised by [...] in this matter, that statutory limits on annual local levy increases “will prevent the Abbott districts from reaching their LFS in order to fund their Adequacy Budget. ”  Id. at 165.  The Court responded that in addition to adjustment aid, the SFRA “provides for periodic review measures, specifically requiring that the Commissioner study the limitations on growth levels in the districts and their abilities to meet the LFS. ”  Ibid.  Thus, the Court contemplated that further statutory adjustments might be necessary once the SFRA was implemented.  But it concluded that “[t]he political branches of government. . . are entitled to take reasoned steps, even if the outcome cannot be assured, to address the pressing social, economic, and educational challenges confronting our [S]tate. ”  Id. at 175.  A few years later, the Court revisited SFRA in Abbott v. Burke (Abbott XXI), 206 N.J. 332, 370 (2011), due to funding shortages.
[brief] 10  POINT I THE DETECTIVE'S COMMENTS  WERE PROPER RULE 701 TESTIMONY THAT HELPED EXPLAIN THE POLICE'S INVESTIGATION OF A "VEHICLE OF INTEREST."  .............................................................................................................  10  A.  The pointing testimony was helpful to the jury to know which car to look at to evaluate the police's investigation and decide if it was, in fact, the same car in each clip that was involved in the shooting.  ..................................................  11  B.  Any identification testimony from [...] either occurred after the jury had already heard that defendant was identified in the same footage by his girlfriend or was immediately cured by the judge.  ..........................................  20 POINT II  THE JURY WAS PROPERLY INSTRUCTED THAT THE STATE HAD TO PROVE DEFENDANT WAS THE ONE WHO COMMITTED THE CRIMES BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT.......................................................................................