ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] (39970a-39989a).  A trial court’s award of punitive damages is a legal determination subject to de novo review.  Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Grp., Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 436 (2001); Rusak v. Ryan Auto., L.L.C., 418 N.J. Super. 107, 118 (App. Div. 2011).  As such, there is no deference to the trial court’s award of punitive damages.
[brief] See also *Wilson v. Brick Twp. Zoning Bd.*, 405 N.J. Super. 189, 202 (App. Div. 2009) (board not bound by expert's opinion when "there was no detail given to support th[e] conclusion").  The Board Chairman knew from personal experience that the traffic is substantially greater than the rates that [...] seemingly pulled from thin air.  See 2T20-6 to 2T20-23.  A board does not have to accept expert testimony, see, e.g., *Klug v. Bridgewater Plan. Bd.*, 407 N.J. Super. 1, 13 (App. Div. 2009), *Clifton City Bd. of Educ. v. Clifton City Zoning Bd. of Adjustment*, 409 N.J. Super. 389, 434 (App. Div. 2009), and in this case the Planning Board was unpersuaded by an expert who did not even appear in defense of his 'research.'  The Board "rejected the application on the basis of significant public safety concerns regarding the lack of street parking coupled with the substantial proposed density particularly in light of the basement apartments noted on the plans."
[directive] A system of progressive discipline can include the following elements:  (a)  Oral reprimand or performance notice; (b) Written reprimand; (c) Monetary fine;2  (d)  Suspension without pay;  Agencies operating under Civil Service Commission statutes (N.J.S.A. 11A:2-20) and regulations may only assess a fine in 2 lieu of a suspension where loss of the officer from duty would be "detrimental to the public health, safety or welfare" or if the assessment is restitution or is agreed to by the employee.  8  INTERNAL AFFAIRS POLICY & PROCEDURES | August 2020 (e)  Loss of a promotional opportunity; (f) Demotion; and (g) Discharge from employment.  2.2.7
[directive] Standard Exceptions to Home Detention  With or Without Electronic Monitoring  A defendant who is ordered to home detention with or without EM must be permitted to leave the residence for the following reasons: • To appear for court; • To attend in-person monitoring or supervision appointments with Pretrial Services or Probation; and, • To attend in-person attorney visits.  o  Before a defendant will be permitted to leave the home to meet with defendant's attorney, the appointment must be confirmed with counsel.  These conditions are hereafter referred to the "standard exceptions."  The as court shall not restrict these exceptions.
[brief] Moreover, *In re Resolution of State Com. of Investigation*, supra, addressed and analyzed a statute that explicitly disallowed a private right of action, i.e., N.J.S.A. 52:9M-15(a).  *See In re Resolution of State Com. of Investigation*, 108 N.J. 35, 36-37 (1987).  *In re Resolution* did not analyze an implied private right of action because there was no need to—improper disclosures of information related to investigations into crime by the [...] (“[...]”) were and are explicitly within the purview of the [...], as per the black letter language of the statute.
[directive] 종신 사회 내 감독(범죄가 년1 월14 일 전에 발생한 경우에만 4.  a) 2004 작성하십시오).  (범죄가 년1 월14 일 이후에 발생했으면, 피고인은 질문 2004 종신 가석방 감독을 작성해야 합니다).  4b, (only complete if the offense occurred before January 14, 2004).  Community Supervision for Life (If the offense occurred on or after January 14, 2004, the defendant should complete Question 4b, Parole Supervision for Life).  [예/Yes]  [아니요/No]  귀하가 가중 성폭행, 성폭행, 가중 범죄적 성접촉에 대한 범죄, (1)  2C:13- 1c(2)에 의한 유괴, 에 의한 아동의 도덕성을 손상 또는 2C:24-4a 타락시키는 성행위에 관여함으로써 아동의 복지를 위태롭게 하는 행위, 유인, 또는 그러한 범행의 미수로 유죄를 인정하는 경우, 판사는 다른 선고에 추가하여 종신 사회 내 감독의 특별 선고를 내리게 된다는 것을 아십니까?
[brief] 41 State v. Scriven, 226 N.J. 20 (2016) ....................................................................... 20 State v. Singleton, 211 N.J. 157 (2012) ..................................................................  39 State v. Taylor, 350 N.J. Super. 20 (App. Div. 2002) ............................................. 13 State v. Teat, 233 N.J. Super. 368 (App. Div. 1989) ..............................................
[brief] The overall detriment associated with the Applicant’s proposal in increasing an already non-conforming, over-dense apartment complex.  The proposal would have a significant detrimental impact on the existing traffic conditions on any of the adjacent properties.  Finally, the Board found that the Applicant’s use exceeds the density allowed in the zone as it currently exists, and the development proposal is inconsistent with the stated purpose of the EMF-18 and EMS-10 Zones.  As such, the Board finds that the proposal does substantially impair the intent and purpose of the Master Plan or the Ordinance and is tantamount to spot zoning.
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DISMISSED COUNT  ONE OF THE PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT ALLEGING CONSUMER FRAUD AND CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THE 1983 MASTER DEED AUTHORIZED THE DEVELOPER TO SELL UNIT 74 TO THE ASSOCIATION.  The Trial Court correctly concluded the 1983 Master Deed specifically authorized the Developer to sell Unit 74 to the Association, pursuant to the express language in the 1983 Master Deed.  Paragraph 8(e) of the Master Deed specifically provides the following:  [t]he Board shall designate at least one but not more than three unsold Units for use by building personnel.  Said Unit or Units shall be considered part of the Common Areas and shall be maintained by the Association and shall be part of the Common Expense.  By the affirmative vote of not less than three-fourths of the votes of Unit Owners present at a meeting duly called for that purpose, the Association may elect to purchase one or more Units or other residential quarters for building personnel.  (emphasis added)  ***  See Pa 148-149, “Master Deed,” Paragraph 8, “The Condominium Association and Operation of the Property,” Section (e), “Apartments for Building Personnel. ”  As plainly stated, the Master Deed explicitly contemplated the sale of one or more units at the Association’s election for building personnel, which shall be part of the Common Areas.  Pursuant to the New Jersey Supreme Court, a plaintiff must prove an “unlawful practice” by the defendant; an ascertainable loss by the plaintiff and a causal relationship between the unlawful conduct and ascertainable loss.
[brief] **  On December 2, 2022, [...] filed a verified complaint seeking vacatur of the interim award.  (Pa4)  [...] subsequently informed the Arbitrator that it had filed an action to appeal the interim award.  (Pa50)  One day after receiving notice of the vacatur action, and without response or warning, the Arbitrator closed the record and issued a related remedial award and final order, arbitrarily denying to [...] the opportunity to dispute the [...]’s claim to economic remedial relief.  (Pa50)  The final award continued [...]’s obligation to comply with the interim award.  (Pa60-61)  In response, [...] filed a two-count verified complaint on March 10, 2023, seeking a judgment vacating the awards under the New Jersey Arbitration Act.  (Pa41)  After filing an answer, the [...] moved in July 2023 to confirm and enforce the Awards.  (Pa62-120)  [...] cross-moved to vacate the awards, arguing that the Arbitrator exceeded his authority and that the awards were procured through undue means.  (Pa121-127)  Both parties submitted briefs to the trial court and the matter proceeded to oral argument.  Both in its briefing to the trial court and during oral argument, [...] stressed that [...]’s decision was fatally flawed for two principal reasons: (1) he created a new work rule subverting and contradicting the [...]’s managerial prerogative set forth in the CBA, providing that [...] cannot discharge an employee who is on temporary disability; and (2) he faulted [...] for the actions it took subsequent to [...]’ termination, despite the absence of any language in the CBA requiring that [...] reconsider a termination decision.
[directive] "2  The "Exclusion Zone Alert" is an automated email and text message that is sent automatically to 2  If the monitoring .officer(s) on duty when the defendant enters a prohibited zone.  after a short of period time, the monitoring officer fails to acknowledge the alert using the link provided in the automated email, then the monitoring officer will receive an escalation telephone call from a live vendor representative.  of 7  Page 12  The Court Must Find the Defendant Meets the Following ii.  Residence Parameters for HDEM
[brief] The plaintiff went to the [...] store located at [...] on May 30, 2019 with her daughter [...] to buy flowers from the garden center.  (4T227:8-12; 6T119:3-13).  While in the garden center, the plaintiff was walking along Aisle 58.  (Pa157; 4T245:1-6; 6T120:9-11).  There is a roof support column in the middle of Aisle 58 which had nothing around it on May 30, 2019.  (Pa147-Pa149; Pa157; 4T75:17-76:3; 4T246:7-10).  The roof support column was four inches by four inches.  (4T86:13-20).  It sat on a baseplate that was eight inches by eight inches and three-quarters of an inch thick with one portion being lifted one inch off the walking surface.  (4T86:13-20).  Bolts then extended about three-quarters of an inch above the top of the baseplate.  (4T86:23-87:5).  The highest point of the baseplate and bolts was about two inches above the walking surface.  (4T86:23-87:5).  The width of Aisle 58 from the roof support column to the merchandise racks was six feet eight inches.  (4T78:7-18; 4T82:10-18).  However, the width of the aisle was narrowed by the placement of a glove hut display across from the column.  (Pa147-Pa149; 4T77:19-78:3).  The plaintiff was walking with her rollator while in the [...] store.
[brief] No amount of compensation to Plaintiff will bring [...] closer to compliance and allow for the development of housing of which the protected class has been deprived.  [...] is intent on moving forward with condemnation and the commercial redevelopment of the Property, despite its significant constitutional violation.  Allowing the Township to proceed down that path flies in the face of everything the Mount Laurel doctrine supports, including the need for a strong hand in judicial management of builder’s remedy cases, and would create a chilling effect on inclusionary zoning litigation.  If [...], or any municipality without immunity which is judged to be significantly non-compliant, were simply able to condemn a property while facing a builder’s remedy lawsuit, thus effectively mooting that lawsuit, then a disastrous precedent would be established.
[brief] \(^7\)  Second, the trial court ignored the fact that [...]’s motion was untimely and, by [...]’s own admission, was pursued for an improper purpose.  Third, the trial court erred by enlarging the statute of limitations applicable to [...]’s proposed claims and permitting her to file untimely claims.  Those errors warrant reversal. \(^8\) --- \(^7\)  For the sake of brevity, [...] respectfully refers to and incorporates by reference the argument set forth in Section I, infra, for this point.  \(^8\)  The trial court’s erroneous decision to grant [...]’s untimely motion for leave to intervene was of critical importance.  Had the trial court properly denied that motion, [...] – an entity that was not even formed until after the Planning Board voted to approve [...]’ conditional use application – certainly would not possess standing on its own.
[directive] 7.9.2  One such exception is when one person in a communication decides to intercept (e.g., record) the conversation.  As long as this person is a part of the conversation, such recording is lawful.  But if the person stops being a party to the conversation (e.g., he or she walks away from the group or turns the telephone over to someone else), it is no longer lawful for him or her to intercept the conversation.  7.9.3
[brief] The issue is not [...] seeking a “rubber stamp” of the approval, but rather, [...]’s deviation from its contractual obligations by imposing unnecessary, cost-generative conditions against [...] and failing to promptly act—all of which constitute a failure to cooperate and to use commercially reasonable efforts.  The Board’s assertion that they cannot compromise the safety and welfare of the community, while being permitted to impose conditions greater than those required by the UCC not only misstates the issue on appeal—which, instead, relates to the imposition of additional conditions that were not included in the Original Resolution and [...]’s significant delays—but also reflects a fundamental misunderstanding of law.  The Board cannot impose conditions greater than those required by the UCC.
[brief] Arbitration is "a creature of contract."  *Fawzy v. Fawzy*, 199 N.J. 456, 469 (2009) (quoting *Kimm v. Blisset, LLC*, 388 N.J. Super. 14, 25 (App.Div.2006), *certif. denied*, 189 N.J. 428 (2007)).  An agreement to arbitrate is "valid, enforceable, and irrevocable except upon a ground that exists at law or in equity for the revocation of a contract."  *N.J.S.A. 2A:23B-6a*.  Under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), arbitration agreements are considered on an equal footing with other contracts.
[brief] (Jarwick_Pb 16-17).  That is not the applicable test.  The case Jarwick cites explains that there is “review de novo” of “whether the proper legal standard was applied,” and reversed the denial of the recusal motion at issue because “the municipal court judge mistakenly focused on whether [the moving party] had suffered any prejudice,” which need not be present for recusal to be required.  State v. McCabe, 201 N.J. 34, 45 (2010).  As the [...] explained in their Opening Brief, both the Special Master and the Trial Court made similar errors.
[brief] In continuation of the same strategy and theme, defense counsel for [...] went further and insinuated that the State not only hampered justice, but also withheld evidence to mislead the jury.  Defense counsel for [...] stated:  *We didn’t hear the rest of the story from the State...and now we’re going to talk about the rest of the story, which is the whole story.  I’ll talk about [...] in a moment, who I agree with [...].  He is the young man shot in the face, has absolutely nothing to gain, you can imagine would have no sympathy or bias in favor of someone who just shot him in the face.  And he comes in here, knows [...], recognizes [...].  I looked in the car, I saw the guy that shot me, and I’m telling you it’s not [...].*  [16T:54-7 to 19][Emphasis and bolding added].  Both defense attorneys, during their summation, vouched for and put the truthfulness of Perry’s testimony at issue, not the State.  However, in doing so, defense counsel took specific aim at the State and suggested to the jury that because the State did not call Perry, it was hiding valuable evidence that the defense had to bring forth to effectuate justice.  In sum, the defense told the jury what the State should have done and suggested a dubious motive in the State’s presentation of evidence.  Therefore, in response to these direct attacks, the State was permitted to rebut defense counsel’s accusations and skewed sermon about the State’s motives.
[brief] It simply does not.  With respect to the second *Knight* factor, Defendants argue that the Limited Attorney Exemption does not regulate any conduct of courts or attorneys, but rather, only “regulates the business of debt adjustment. ”  This is patently false, as debt adjustment *is* considered the practice of law, which is exclusively regulated by the Supreme Court, and therefore the Limited Attorney Exemption encroaches on a judicial prerogative interest.  E.g., Furman, 67 N.J. Super. at 143; Ferguson, 372 U.S. at 732; Appell v. Reiner, 43 N.J. 413, 416 (1964).  Defendants further argue that the fact that the [...] ("[...]") opened the investigation, which is an "arm of the Court" that assists the Court with the Court’s exclusive “authority and obligation to oversee the discipline of attorneys,” demonstrates no encroachment upon judicial prerogatives.
[brief] Respondent will first address Appellant’s contention regarding the authority of the Court to enter a judgment for Declaratory Relief.  Although it was fully briefed below and incorporated herein by reference (See Memorandum of Law at RA-68 through RA-78), Appellant’s argument is completely misplaced and must be addressed.  Appellant argues that declaratory relief was not initially pled by Respondent and therefore Respondent should not have been permitted to request same from the Court.  However, declaratory relief is not a cause of action itself nor is it an affirmative defense.  It is a power granted to the Court by statute to be exercised when the circumstances warrant the entry of a judgment that would “terminate the controversy or remove an uncertainty”.  That is exactly why Respondents filed their cross-motion.  In light of the comments on the record by Appellant’s counsel that “new claims” may be brought, Respondents were compelled to request the Court enter a judgment declaring Appellant had no further right to pursue them further for any reason whatsoever.  In light of all they have been through in this litigation, Respondents did not view the comments made by Appellant’s counsel as idle threats.  Respondents reached a settlement with Appellant without any further discovery because Appellant represented to them that the payment of the $1,096.00 would resolve the matter forever.  Now Respondents were faced with the prospect that after paying a judgment, defending a claim for an unconscionable lease term, including an appeal, and reaching a final resolution, the statements by Appellant’s counsel regarding “new claims” was unimaginable and had to be addressed.  The Court most certainly had the authority to address Respondent’s concerns and it did so by entering a judgment barring Appellant from asserting any future claims.
[brief] (14T 7-24 to 11-8)  [...] testified, “I really don’t write a lot of tickets, period,” and that he exercises discretion in that regard whether or not the driver is a police officer showing police identification.  (14T 13-9 to 21)  [...], however, believed he was shown an NJSP billfold (or “bifold”) ID, not some other form of NJSP ID, during that stop, but agreed that he was not sure.  (14T 29-11 to 30-21; 14T 19-7 to 24-23)  He also admitted that he could not say that he had ever seen an NJSP ID prior to this stop.  (14T 26-13 to 27-2)  [...] testified that his November 18, 2017 stop of defendant in Berkeley lasted only 14 seconds, because, he believes, he was shown “some form of ID or badge that showed [defendant] was law enforcement,”\(^4\) but he was not familiar with NJSP ID at the time and he could not say what he was shown.
[directive] Judicial decisions shed light on the difference between prosecutorial discretion and abdication.  For example, in State v. Winne, 12 N.J. 152 (1953), the Supreme Court sustained the indictment of the Bergen County Prosecutor for criminal nonfeasance in office due to his alleged failure to enforce state laws against gambling.  A county prosecutor, the Court concluded, does not “have it within his power to cripple or nullify the enforcement of the criminal law in his county or to choose at his pleasure the portion of the criminal law he would enforce.
[brief] .................................................................  Pa113 (B)  Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law ..............................................  Pa115 | Cases | Page | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | A.L.A. Schecter Poultry Corp. v. United States, | 25 | | 295 U.S. 495, 55 S.Ct. 837, 79 L.Ed. 1570 (1935) | | | Animal Protection League of New Jersey, et al. v. New Jersey Fish and Game Council, et al., | 10, 19 | | 477 N.J. Super. 145 (App.
[brief] 2T:25-(22-25), 2T:26-(1-3)  Any admission of improperly administering a SFST should be considered automatic grounds for dismissal otherwise it would lead to absurd results.  2T:25-(22-25), 2T:26-(1-3).  It cannot be allowed that an officer improperly administer SFST and arrest people.  This would lead to absurd results such as people paying thousands in lawyer fees and if found guilty, also pay thousands in court fees and surcharges.  Whereas if the charges are challenged on the improperly administered SFST, the officer can simply respond with “oops”.  This is ridiculous.
[brief] ”  433 N.J. Super. at 237.  Rather, it found that [...]’s project would be exempt “even if the exemption is interpreted as requiring that an upgrade be ‘routine[.]’”  *Ibid.* (emphasis added).  Its characterization of a routine upgrade is nothing more than dicta and not precedential.  Appellants similarly mistakenly proclaim that the [...] case stands for the proposition that a “routine upgrade” is one based upon “reliability need” and not “market need. ” (Ab17-19).  However, the court did not discuss “market need” or “new customers,” let alone incorporate those terms as limitations to Exemption #11.  The court instead quoted [...]’s HAD for the project, noting [...] sought to “maintain regular and uninterrupted electric service to its customers[.]”  433 N.J. Super. at 229, 237.  That HAD explained that [...] “does not have the expertise to assess statements concerning the need to expand existing electrical systems, and defers to the [...] or other appropriate agency, to make a final determination in this regard. ”  Id. at 229.  Notwithstanding Appellants’ argument that because [...] uses the term “routine upgrade” in its orders, [...] should use it too (Ab16-17), [...]’s position that natural gas need determinations are beyond the scope of its Highlands Act responsibilities is well-founded.
[directive] Promulgated by Directive #21-06 (December 11, 2006)  Page 11 of 29 7.  Have you ever served on a jury before today, here in New Jersey or in any state court or federal court?  If yes:  Was it a Civil or Criminal trial? When?  What type of case was it?  Were you a deliberating juror?  Was there anything about the trial, the jury deliberation process or anything you may have learned afterward that would interfere with your ability to be fair and impartial as a juror in this trial?  8.  Have you ever sat as a grand juror?  When?  If the answer is yes:  Do you realize that the duties as a member of a petit jury are vastly different from those of a member of a grand jury?  Do you feel that your prior experience as a grand juror would in any way affect or prevent you from sitting on this jury as a fair and impartial juror?  9.
[brief] Gentile v. National Newark & Essex Banking Co., 53 N.J. Super. 35 (App. Div. 1958), represents an application of this principle.  There a pedestrian was injured when he fell while attempting to negotiate a mound of snow blocking the sidewalk, created when the owner shoveled the snow from the sidewalks.  The court there held that the jury could find that the owner's agents, in causing the mound of snow, created a new element of danger or hazard which was a proximate cause of the fall and the consequent injuries.  Deberjeois v Schneider, 254 N.J. Super. 694, 703 (Law Div. 1991) applies a similar principle.
[brief] The Court further noted that an “agency has inherent power to waive de minimis violations of objective standards. ”  Id., citing SMB Assocs v. Department of Envtl. Prot., 264 N.J. Super 38, 59 (App. Div. 1993), aff’d, 137 N.J. 58 (1994).  The Court reversed the decision of the Board, noting that even though the letter was never received by [...], even if it had been, the notice was improper and late.