ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Planning Boards are given over a month to carefully analyze such Ordinances before providing their recommendations to the governing body.  The case at bar addresses the critical issue of what provisions of the Master Plan need to be addressed in the making the consistency determination.  All master plans must have at least 2 elements (1) Objectives Element; and (2) Land Use Plan Element.  The Planning Board in this matter, at best, addressed the Objectives Element of the Master Plan.  The governing body in its resolution claimed to have considered both elements, but it could not have done so because it did nothing other than to rely on the Planning Board’s determination in making its decision and the Planning Board never examined the Land Use Element.  Most objectives of Master Plans are standard broad provisions (providing generally for housing, open space, etc.).  It is in the Land Use Element that the land within the municipality is considered for specific uses (commercial vs. residential, large lots vs. small lots, and location and use of any open space).  The real meaningful issues involving land use are hammered out by each municipality in the Land Use Element of their Master Plan.  The Land Use Element guides the planning board and the governing body as to specific uses for each property in the municipality.  It is the Land Use Element that most concerns the voters of any municipality and establishes the character of each New Jersey municipality.  In the case before the Court, the [...] decided that a proposed ordinance authorizing significant changes to (1) the amount, use and location of open space, (2) the density of the residential units to be built in a Redevelopment Area and (3) the ratio of market units to COAH units (which most importantly determines whether the Redevelopment Project intended to satisfy Milltown’s affordable housing obligation might ever be built) was not inconsistent with the Master Plan.  If the determination of consistency is based solely on the generalizations contained in the Master Plan’s general Objectives Element, but ignores the specific recommendations made in the Land Use Element, then as a practical matter every land use ordinance will likely be deemed to be consistent with the Master Plan because every Master Plan contains such generalizations and every ordinance is likely to impact one of the generalizations.  Consistency determinations are designed for thoughtful consideration by Planning Boards and for public scrutiny and allow for judicial review by ensuring that any such inconsistencies are clearly recognized and rationalized by the governing body.  These objectives are not met when planning boards and governing bodies fail to examine the specifics of the Land Use Element.  Further, in this case, even the Objectives Element of the Master Plan was hurt, as the Planning Board would have discovered if it had really considered the proposed Ordinance, because the Ordinance reduced the chances of the Affordable Housing Objective ever being obtained.  The decision below sends a very bad message to both Planning Boards and Municipal authorities.
[directive] h.  The registered principal of any security brokerage firm selling securities to the local unit shall be provided with, and sign an acknowledgment that the principal has seen and reviewed the local unit's , cash management plan except that with respect to the sale of a government money market mutual fund, the registered principal need only be provided with and sign an acknowledgment that the government money market mutual fund whose securities are being sold to the local unit meets the criteria of a government money market mutual fund as set forth in paragraph (1) of subsection e. of section 8 of P.L.1977, c.396 (C.40A:5-15.1).  Amended 1977, c.281, s.4; 1979, c.315, s.1; 1981, c.196, s.1; 1983, c.8, s.2; 1997, c.148, s.2.
[brief] Da55 [PTA §§ 1.7(a)].  Specifically, by its express terms, the PTA only obligates [...] to share EGP on projects that meet the definition of a Backlog Project—meaning the projects listed on Schedule 1.7(a) of the PTA, and those Pipeline Rights or Additional Pipeline Rights that transform to the status of a Backlog Project (then to be referred to as an “Additional Backlog Project”) by satisfying the six specifically stated conditions for such transformation.
[brief] (1T59:9).  [...] testified the reason he did that was because he, "just wanted to make sure that [[...]] didn't forget how to do a property check."  (11T59:15-17).  So, [...] testified that is why he checked how [...] did a check before and then how [...] was doing property checks after he came back from injury leave.  (11T59:19-20).  [...] testified he identified nineteen (19) incidents where [...]'s property checks had issues.  (11T60:5).  [...] testified that a list of seven (7) incidents in his report consisted of property checks that were performed, but according to [...], were not performed correctly.  (11T61:3).  [...] also indicated eight (8) other property checks called in by [...] which [...] alleged were not done at all.  (11T62:2).  [...] conceded that "apparently" some HT Officers did not know what a property check was.  (11T102:23).  **Facts Specific to the 45-Day Rule at Departmental Hearing**
[brief] The webpage included information for active members, retirees, and employers about qualifying dates, locations, health conditions and impairments, the Eligibility Registration Form, the Request for Amended Benefits Form, a sample postcard to be mailed to retirees, and materials for employers about dissemination of information to employees.  (Pa10-11).  On August 8, 2019, the Division sent a letter to the Certifying Officers of the [...], the [...], and the [...].  (Pa11).  The subject of the letter was “New Legislation Notice – P.L. 2019, c. 157” and it served to notify active employees of the newly enacted law.  (Pa11).  All Certifying Officers were advised of their responsibilities to distribute the information and to certify that they had done so.  (Pa11).  The Division hired [...] to mail postcards to all 200,647 [...] retirees at their home addresses on file with the Division.  (Pa64-65).  These postcards included notice of the enactment of L. 2019, c. 157, how to file for Accidental Disability Retirement Benefits under the new law, the deadline for filing for such benefits, and the ramifications for missing the deadline.  (Pa66).  A postcard with this information was sent to --- 4  Also available at: https://www.nj.gov/treasury/pensions/ricci-ch157.shtml.  (Pa10).  [...]’s home address on August 9, 2019.  (Pa14; Pa66).  On June 10, 2021, the Division posted a news item on its website advising members that the statutory eligibility period to register under the Ricci Act was expiring soon and that members must submit the Eligibility Registration Form by July 8, 2021.
[brief] Rogers, 124 N.J. at 121; State v. Carey, 168 N.J. 413, 424 (2001).  Here, the court in its oral and written decisions failed to consider all the Yarbough factors and improperly weighed the only two it did consider.  (15T 39-11 to 20; Da 188-93)  First, the offenses stemmed from the same criminal event: using a gun to shoot [...].
[brief] U.S. Const., amends. VI, XIV; N.J. Const., art. I, 18  In contrast to the court’s failure to incorporate [...]’s reasons for his flight in the flight charge, the court incorporated the witnesses’ reasons for giving inconsistent statements in its charge on whether the jury should draw an adverse inference from their inconsistent statements.  (27T 136-20 to 137-1: “Among the reasons given by [...] to explain the inconsistencies were….”; 27T 17-2 to 8: “Among the reasons given by … [...] to explain the inconsistencies … w[ere]….”)  ¶¶ 1, 9, 10; R. 2:10-2; State v. Cabbell, 207 N.J. 311, 338 (2011) (requiring reversal for constitutional error, even in absence of objection, if capable of producing unjust result).  POINT IV
[brief] ”  (1T:35:4-7; 44:13-14.)  [...]’s prior counsel did not object or disagree with the Trial Court’s observations and noted only that discovery may be warranted in the event the Trial Court found any “ambiguity” in the Settlement Agreement’s terms.  (1T:44:17-21.)  The Trial Court ultimately held another round of oral argument concerning [...]’s application on December 16, 2022.  (See generally 2T.)  Once again, at no point in any of the supplemental briefing did [...] request discovery, nor did [...]’s prior counsel waver in its position that the Settlement Agreement was unambiguous.
[brief] The loss of gas service to a segment of Holmdel could prove devastating to the affected customers, especially in the winter when heat and hot water are critical.  If, for example, a regulator failure resulted in the loss of service to dozens or even a hundred homes, there would be a significant delay in service restoration.  That is because once gas service is interrupted, [...] cannot simply flip a switch to instantaneously turn service back on after the regulator is thawed and repaired (a process that itself would take some time).  Rather, before service could be restored, [...] personnel would have to visit each of the affected premises to manually turn off the gas at each service line.  Once [...] accomplished that task, it could re-pressurize the gas mains, but would have to return again to each individual affected property in order to turn the gas back on manually and re-light the pilot for each appliance and furnace.  If [...] did otherwise—if it simply turned the gas back on en masse without visiting each property—each premises with unlit pilot lights would slowly fill up with gas, which could result in a dangerous, potentially, life-threatening condition.  If 50 or 100 houses lost service due to a regulator station failure, the restoration process could leave homes without heat for days, which in the winter months could lead to significant damage to homes (through freezing pipes, etc.) and/or the health and well-being of residents.  17.
[directive] In determining whether to apply for a complaint-summons or a complaint-warrant in domestic violence cases, the police officer or assistant prosecutor or deputy attorney general consulted in accordance with Section 3.2 or supervisory officer designated pursuant to subsection 3.3.2 shall give special consideration to the following circumstances relevant to the risks that would be posed to the victim if defendant were to be released on a complaint-summons: 1) whether the victim exhibited signs of injury, and the extent of such injury; 2) whether any type of weapon was used against the victim, or was threatened to be used; 3) whether the defendant has at any time previously violated a temporary or final restraining order, cf. subsection 4.5.2 (creating a presumption of applying for a complaint-warrant if the present offense was committed in violation of a restraining order or release condition), and the nature and seriousness of such previous violation(s); 4) there is reason to believe that the defendant possesses one or more firearms that for practical or other reasons cannot be seized or surrendered pursuant to the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act before the defendant’s release from custody on a complaint- summons (e.g., a firearm kept at a location other than the place of arrest such as another residence, or an office or business premises);  The foregoing circumstances shall be considered in determining whether there is a basis to overcome a presumption of issuing a complaint-summons pursuant to subsection 4.3.1.  See also subsection 4.6.3 (requiring an application for a complaint-warrant when one or more special pretrial release conditions that can be imposed only on a complaint-warrant are necessary to reasonably assure the immediate safety of a domestic violence victim).  Situations Where Law Enforcement Must Apply for a Complaint-Warrant and 4.6.3 Seek Special Conditions to Protect Domestic Violence Victims.
[brief] Plaintiff has waived his right to appeal from the trial court’s dismissal of Plaintiff’s complaint as against defendant [...] and this court should deem the issue abandoned.  Plaintiff’s Notice of Appeal specifically waives his right to appeal from any Order in favor of [...] by its failure to include any mention of the [...] Orders and instead, specifically states that Plaintiff is appealing from the trial court’s August 7, 2023 and October 11, 2023 Orders in favor of [...].  Moreover, Plaintiff further waived any potential appeal from the Orders in favor of [...] by failing to brief any issue in the Appellate brief related to the dismissal of [...].  Accordingly, those issues are waived and should be deemed abandoned.  Plaintiff’s Notice of Appeal and brief are specific to [...] and fail to include any request for relief from the trial court’s August 7, 2023 or October 11, 2023 Orders in favor of [...].  Moreover, Plaintiff listed the August 7, 2023 [...] Order for the first time in his revised brief and appendix only after he was instructed to do so by the Court Clerk.  Plaintiff’s focus solely on requesting relief from the Orders in favor of defendant [...] demonstrate Plaintiff’s intentional and voluntary waiver of any appeal from the Orders in favor of [...].  PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[brief] STATEMENT OF PROCEDURAL HISTORY  This is an appeal of the decision rendered in [...]’s action seeking (1) damages from Appellant’s directors resulting from their respective breaches of their fiduciary duties to [...], and (2) contribution from [...] for one-half of the cost of capital improvements made to the property that had been jointly owned by [...] and [...].  [...] commenced this litigation on January 14, 2020, by filing a Complaint and order to show cause in the Superior Court, Chancery Division seeking joint control of the mosque, for an accounting and for partition.  (Da23)  [...] filed its Answer and asserted a Counterclaim against [...] for accounting and for partition.  (Da55).  In addition, on February 27, 2020, [...] filed a Third-Party Complaint against the [...] for their breach of fiduciary duty.  (Da55).  By Order dated July 13, 2020, the Court ordered the parties to alternate weeks using the prayer sanctuary.  That Order was amended on October 4, 2021, to address issues that arose between the parties.  (Da108)  On November 16, 2021, the Court ordered the parties to commence the process of petitioning the property located at [...] (“Property”) by sale of same.  (Da116).  By Order entered on March 25, 2022, the Court ordered the appointment of a broker for the sale of the Property.  (Da121).  By Order entered May 25, 2022, the Court set forth the procedures for the sale of the Property.  (Da131).  Based on the bids made by [...] and [...], the Court-appointed broker listed the Property for $1,100,000.  This price included both [...]’s and [...]’s shares of the Property.  While the sale was open to the public, [...] and [...] were the only parties who sought to buy the mosque Property.  [...] and [...] submitted a series of bids and counterbids that increased the total proposed purchase price to Two Million Dollars ($2,000,000.00) or One Million Dollars ($1,000,000.00) for each of the two half interests.  Given the prolonged back and forth bidding, the Chancery Division ordered the parties to simultaneously submit last and final sealed bids.  [...] prevailed with a bid of $1,500,050.55 for [...]’s Share in the mosque Property.  With the partition action complete, the Chancery Division transferred this matter to the Law Division on September 1, 2022, for the adjudication of the remaining causes of action.  (Da133).  The parties filed trial briefs and trial was scheduled before the Honorable [...], J.S.C. which commenced on July 24, 2023.
[directive] At present, all firearm purchase identification cards and permits to purchase a handgun are maintained within the Firearms Application & Registration System (FARS) operated by the New Jersey State Police (NJSP).  To ensure consistency with permits to carry handguns, NJSP will create and implement a centralized web portal for the issuance of permits to carry handguns, as well as collecting relevant data related to same.  Until such time that the statewide web portal for permits to carry a handgun is active, it is critical that law enforcement agencies tasked with issuing permits to carry immediately begin providing the Office of the Attorney General with anonymous information related to all permit to carry applications the agency has approved or denied since December 1, 2019, three years prior to the enactment of the new law and just prior to the global COVID-19 pandemic.  Providing this information will assist in creating data-driven policy to strengthen public safety, inform necessary New Jersey Is An Equal Opportunity Employer • Printed on Recycled Paper and is Recyclable Page 2 personnel and resource allocation, and mitigate risks associated with an increase in handguns carried in public places throughout our state.  Therefore, pursuant to the authority granted to me under the New Jersey Constitution and the Criminal Justice Act of 1970, N.J.S.A. 52:17B-97 to 117, which provides for the general supervision of criminal justice by the Attorney General as chief law enforcement officer of the State in order to secure the benefits of a uniform and efficient enforcement of the criminal law and the administration of criminal justice throughout the State, I hereby direct all law enforcement agencies operating under the authority of the laws of the State of New Jersey to implement and comply with the reporting procedures outlined below.
[brief] Da21.  Two further amendments extended the fuel supply agreement.  Da37, Da40.  The amendments added a right of first refusal (ROFR) and extended the MFSA to December 31, 2027 with penalties attached for early termination.  Da37, Da40.  In late 2022, a good faith buyer (former Defendant [...], d/b/a [...]) made an offer to buy the gas station for $2.5 million.  Da49.  The parties arrived at terms which were memorialized in an agreement that was signed in or about October 14, 2022.  Da49.  The principal of [...], recognizing that [...] had to be given the opportunity to exercise their right of first refusal (hereinafter, “ROFR”), presented the contract to [...].
[brief] First, the REA, under which [...] was created, excludes the applicability of any other statute unless specifically noted; reference to the Holding Act is glaringly absent from the REA, even though the REA does expressly incorporate other statues, such as the Rehabilitation and Liquidation Act.  N.J.S.A. 17:50-1, -5.  Next, the Holding Act specifically describes what entities fall under its scope, and it does not include reciprocal exchanges.  See id.  Therefore, neither the Court, nor the Department, should append “reciprocal exchanges” to the defined terms, nor should they speculate as to whether the Legislature intended this term to be included.  Furthermore, [...] is not and cannot be both a reciprocal exchange and a corporation because as this Court has held, a reciprocal exchange does not have a corporate existence.  *In re Reorganization of Med. Inter-Ins. Exch. of N.J.*, 328 N.J. Super. at 355.  The Legislature was clearly aware of reciprocal exchanges when it passed the Holding Act and was clearly capable of drafting statutory language ensuring the applicability of the Holding Act to “reciprocal exchanges,” but it purposefully did not include them in its scope. \(^{11}\)  Not only is the Holding Act not incorporated into the REA, but the Department has also repeatedly admitted for the last two decades that the Holding Act does not apply to reciprocals and cannot absent the Legislature passing a new statute, which it never did.  See Reciprocals Working Group Report of Special Insurance Issues (E) Committee, NAIC Proceedings – 1991 Vol. IIB at 1091-1096.  This rogue action by the Department in attempting to apply the Holding Act through the Bulletin is clearly unlawful on procedural and substantive grounds.  II.
[directive] Police Specialty Dog.  A police dog used specifically for specialty work or specialized scent work such as detection and tracking in law enforcement, that is, narcotics detection, arson accelerant detection, explosive detection, tracking, article and cadaver detection.  Supervising K-9 Trainer.  Supervising K-9 trainers, conduct basic and in-service K-9 training and qualifying exercises.  They are responsible for supervising K-9 handlers who assist with any K-9 training, and for certifying qualified prospective handlers as K-9 trainers.  Supervising K-9 trainers must meet the qualification requirements set forth herein.  Walking Control.  While heeling alongside the police officer handler, the police dog will sit, down or stand upon the command of the officer and remain in that position as the officer walks away from the dog.  4 7/2002 K-9 Training Standards and Qualification Requirements
[directive] ● Check box “SBI # Not Immediately Available – Awaiting Fingerprints. ”  ● Immediately fax referral to DYFS using the procedure described in Steps 5 and 6 below, without attaching the Promis-Gavel “Statewide Defn/Case List. ”  ●  When court staff receives the SBI # from law enforcement, complete a Promis-Gavel inquiry using the Statewide SBI # Inquiry Search (see attached sample).  Screen print the “Statewide Defn/Case List” (see sample).  Note: please include screen print of this page even if no records are found.  ●  Immediately fax the Promis-Gavel “Statewide Defn/Case List” to DYFS under separate cover.  Option Three: SBI #/Fingerprints Not Provided by Law Enforcement:  ●  In Section III, check box “SBI #/Fingerprints not Provided by Law Enforcement” and immediately fax referral to DYFS without the Promis-Gavel “Statewide Defn/Case List” using the procedure described in Steps 5 and 6 below.
[brief] Second, in order to apply the exemption, there must be a “direct and unavoidable conflict” between application of the CFA and application of other regulatory schemes.  *Lemelledo v. Beneficial Mgmt. Corp.*, 150 N.J. 255, 270 (1997).  No such conflict exists.  Third, in *Lemelledo* the New Jersey Supreme Court has already ruled that the CFA covers “the sale of insurance policies as goods and services that are marketed to consumers. ”  150 N.J. at 265.  In the nearly three decades since *Lemelledo* was decided the legislature has chosen to leave intact this decision and not grant an exemption to insurance professionals.  Finally, if there is any question as the applicability of the CFA to insurance professionals, we only need to look at the position taken by the Attorney General who was invited by the Appellate Division in *Shaw* to weigh in on whether there should be a judicially created exemption for semi-professionals.  There, the court gave substantial deference to the Attorney General’s position and agreed that semi-professionals were not exempt under the CFA.  *Shaw*, 460 N.J. Super. at 618-619.