ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] N.J.S.A. 2A:14-1.  See [...] v. [...], 859 F. Supp. 2d 706, 715 (D.N.J. 2012).  Under New Jersey law, a cause of action accrues when “a plaintiff knows or should know the facts underlying [the elements of the claim], not necessarily when a plaintiff learns of the consequences of the facts. ”  Id. (quoting Circle Chevrolet Co. v. Giordano, Halleran & Ciesla, 142 N.J. 280, 296 (1995).  A claim for professional malpractice accrues when (1) the claimant suffers an injury or damages, and (2) the claimant knows or should know that its injury is attributable to the professional negligent advice.  Id.  In [...], the court discussed claims of a professional corporation’s breach of fiduciary duty and professional negligence under the six-year statute and held that those claims began to accrue when, after relying on defendants’ tax advice, the plaintiff received notices of deficiency from the IRS.  Id. at 716.  In its analysis, the court found that “a cause of action may accrue when a party should know of an alleged injury or, more specifically, when that party has sufficient information of possible wrongdoing to place it on ‘inquiry notice’ or to excite ‘storm warnings’ of culpable activity. ”  Id. (internal citation omitted).  In brief, New Jersey law provides that “[a] cause of action does not accrue until an injury or damage attributable to the professional negligence occurs.
[brief] I.  **[...] Clearly Breached Its Duty to Defend the Underlying Suit.**  [Pa1, Pa3]  The [...] Policy provides in part:  “We will have the right and duty to defend any ‘suit’ seeking those damages. ”  Pb4–5 (emphasis added).  The central liability issue in this appeal is therefore whether the [...] constituted “any ‘suit’ seeking those damages,” when [...] abruptly withdrew its defense of the [...] on March 5, 2021, and refused to continue support of an appeal that [...] had previously authorized.  See Pb13–17.  [...] argues that it ceased to have a duty to defend the [...] as of March 5, 2021, because (i) “the judgment” of the [...] purportedly “was not covered” (Db12); and because (ii) “the underlying plaintiffs” purportedly “abandoned their claims for damages. ”  Db3 (emphasis added); Db25.  [...]’s argument is erroneous, because (i) the [...] did not cease to be a “suit,” as defined in the [...] Policy, by reason of appealable rulings of the [...]; and (ii) the record is devoid of evidence that the [...] “abandoned” (Db3) all of their claims “seeking those damages” (Pa783) such that “injunctive and ancillary relief” (Db19) was the only relief they were “seeking” as of March 5, 2021.
[brief] This argument, advanced in extreme bad faith, lacks merit on several obvious grounds.  First, the Respondent misquotes the Rule.  The actual Rule 608(a) -- which contains nothing about specific instances of conduct -- states the following:  (a)  A witness' credibility may be attacked or supported by evidence in the form of opinion or reputation that relates to the witness' character for truthfulness or untruthfulness, provided that evidence of truthful character is admissible only after the witness' character for truthfulness has been attacked by opinion or reputation evidence or otherwise.  The principle of specific instances of conduct is contained in subsection (c) of the Rule, which states:  (c)  Except as otherwise provided by Rule 609 and paragraph (b) of this Rule, extrinsic evidence is not admissible to prove specific instances of a witness' conduct in order to attack or support the witness' character for truthfulness.  This subsection, however, applies solely to criminal cases, as noted by a leading authority.  *[...], Current N.J. Rules of Evidence*, Comment 3 on N.J.R.E. 608 (2023) (“Subsection (c) is limited to criminal cases”).  **Second,** the Petitioner’s meritless argument was not raised below, and is barred from consideration by the Appellate Division on appeal.
[brief] U.S. Const. art. I, § 10, cl. 1; N.J. Const. art. IV, § 7, ¶ 3.  An ex post facto law is one which increases, or “makes more burdensome,” the punishment for a crime after it has been committed.  Riley v. State Parole Bd., 219 N.J. 270, 284-85 (2014) (quoting Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167, 169-70 (1925)).  Ex post facto laws have two elements: they are retrospective, and “they ‘disadvantage the offender affected by’ the law. ”  State v. O’Donnell, 255 N.J. 60, 83 (2023) (quoting State v. Bailey, 251 N.J. 101, 122 (2022)).  The new law elevates the possible punishment for a fourth-degree animal cruelty conviction above the ordinary penalties defined in Chapter 43 for fourth-degree offenses.
[brief] (111a).  The Council discussed the relative positives and negatives of each applicant, including the proposed location for each applicant.  (111a).  Various Council Members expressed concern that [...]’s location entrance was around a curve and lacked a shoulder, which could result in a dangerous flow of traffic.  (111a).  The Council also considered the size of the applicants.  While Council Member [...] expressed a preference for midsized organizations, Council Member [...] opined that working with larger companies was not a concern to her, based on her personal experience working with international companies.  The Council voted 5-1 to issue a resolution of support in favor of [...] (the “Resolution”).
[brief] Accordingly, her comment could only have been based upon other facts in evidence: that the person in video S-37 appeared as a light-colored image, and that certain eyewitnesses had described a person observed near the victim as wearing gray clothing.  From this evidence she drew two *inferences*: (1) that the light-colored image on video depicted the person observed near the victim; and (2) that the person observed near the victim was, in fact, the shooter – despite no eyewitness observation of the shooting itself.  Comments like this that are based upon inferences drawn from other facts in evidence are prohibited under the fourth *Watson* factor.  The detective’s testimony also violated the third *Watson* factor because the image in question was so unclear that it was difficult to decipher, making any evaluation of what the image depicted subject to reasonable dispute.
[brief] “Here, the Bank’s loan analyst provided substantial testimony regarding the records.  According to her testimony, she did not create the records, but she was trained on how these records were created and stored.  . . .  This testimony provided a sufficient foundation to admit the records. ”  Id. at 891.  (Emphasis Added).  The Polanco court stated: “Nevertheless, an exhibit admitted under the business records exception is not presumed to be accurate, and its credibility remains a question for the trier of fact.
[brief] (Da29)  The owner served his expert planning and appraisal reports for the then imminent trial based on the taking as described.  (Da37-38)  The planning report relied on the description and identified a difference between the legal description and the map.  (Da121, ¶29)  Subsequent to the owner having served his expert reports, and on the eve of the then scheduled trial, plaintiff moved to amend its complaint on the basis of an error in the description.
[directive] Facilities for temporary storage of property should be available when the property officer is unavailable.  For instance, a series of airport type metal lockers could be used by department personnel until the property officer can assume custody of the property.  5  These lockers can either stand alone outside of the vault, or be installed in one wall of the vault.  By installing them, the property officer has access to items placed in temporary storage from the inside the vault itself.  Keys to the lockers must be a type that can not be reproduced without proper written authorization.  Procedures for temporary storage of property should require the officer to place the property into a locker compartment, lock the locker and retain possession of the key.  The property officer, upon coming on duty, would remove the property from the sealed locker by using a master key.  The property officer would then place the property items in the vault after following proper inventory and logging procedures.  The property officer should prepare and issue a receipt to the officer that recovered the property when the officer appears to turn in the key to the locker used for temporary storage.  PROPERTY OFFICER
[brief] N.J.S.A. § 18A:26-2 provides in pertinent part: “[n]o teaching staff member shall be employed in the public schools by any board of education unless he is the holder of a valid certificate” to teach public school students; see also N.J.A.C. § 6A:9B-5.1(a)(“[p]ursuant to N.J.S.A. 18A:26–2, any person employed as a teaching staff member by a district board of education shall hold a valid and appropriate certificate”).  On November 9, 2021, consistent with this law, [...] Superintendent [...] sent [...] a letter advising him that he was no longer eligible to work for the [...].  (Pa33).  Superintendent Massimino advised that he would recommend [...]’s termination to the full board at its next meeting and that the termination would be retroactive to the date of the State Board’s decision.  (Id.).  On November 18, 2021, the board voted to approve [...]’s termination retroactive to October 28, 2021.  (Pa41).  E.  [...] Appeals The [...]’s Decision, Demands Reinstatement And Backpay.
[brief] On April 11, 2019, the [...] (hereinafter, “the City”) served Police Officer [...] (hereinafter “[...]”) with a Preliminary Notice of Disciplinary Action (“PNDA”), Civil Service form 31-A. (Pa64).  A Final Notice of Disciplinary Action (“FNDA”) was issued by the City on April 18, 2019 terminating [...]’s employment without a hearing.  (Pa82).  [...] filed his Civil Service Appeal and a trial was conducted on October 19, 2020, October 20, 2020, October 21, 2020, October 29 and November 10, 2020.  When no decision was issued for over two years, [...]’s attorney began contacting the trial court and, ultimately, the [...] as to the inordinate delay.  Ultimately, [...], *sua sponte*, entered fifteen (15) *nunc pro tunc* forty-five (45) day extensions covering the period of the inordinate delay.  (Pa265).  By decision dated March 6, 2023, the Court upheld [...]’s termination.  (Pa12).  [...] filed exceptions on March 17, 2023.  On May 3, 2023, the [...] (“CSC”) adopted the Court’s findings and affirmed [...]’s termination (Pa9).  [...] filed an Amended Notice of Appeal on May 17, 2023 (Pa1).  STATEMENT OF FACTS
[brief] TABLE OF CONTENTS  COUNTER-STATEMENT OF PROCEDURAL HISTORY .............  1 COUNTER-STATEMENT OF FACTS  ..................................  2  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I  DEFENDANT’S CLAIMS OF INSTRUCTIONAL ERROR  DO NOT CONSTITUTE PLAIN ERROR.  (NOT RAISED BELOW)  .......  20  POINT II  DEFENDANT’S SENTENCE IS MANIFESTLY PROPER.  (30T47-23 TO 30T63-11)  ......................  31  CONCLUSION ......................................................... 42 TABLE OF JUDGMENTS  Trial court’s sentencing decision ........................................ 30T47-23 to 30T63-11 TABLE OF APPENDIX Model Jury Charge on Murder, Passion/Provocation and Aggravated/Reckless Manslaughter (Revised 6/8/15) ....................... Sa1-12 Model Jury Charge on Attempted Murder/Attempted Passion/Provocation Manslaughter (Revised 6/13/11) ................................. Sa13-16 Model Jury Charge on Justification-Self Defense (Revised 6/13/11) .... Sa17-20 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CASES CITED Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314 (1999) ......................... 39, 40 State v. R.B., 183 N.J. 308 (2005) .................................. 20 State v. Bolvito, 217 N.J. 221 (2014) ............................... 37 State v. Carrero, 229 N.J. 118 (2017) ............................... 24 State v. Carey, 168 N.J. 413 (2001) ............................... 38, 41 State v. Case, 220 N.J. 49 (2014) ............................... 37 State v. Chew, 150 N.J. 30 (1997) ...............................
[brief] P596a.  No competent proofs were presented that supported Respondent's contention that an Original of the Photocopy existed that was destroyed by the Petitioner.  The Respondent also asserts that "[...] testified credibly that Petitioner most likely initiated the Antenuptial Agreement with the Decedent due to the pending litigations to assure that the award was separate from marital assets.  Db at 9.  Respondent presents no citations to the record support that contention.  That is obviously because [...] presents nothing more than an unsupported lay opinion that is not based on any fact, in contravention of N.J.R.E. 701.  [...] also testified that she did not know who initiated the prenuptial agreement.  10T 102:5-9.  Yet, [...] was questioned as to who she thought initiated the prenuptial agreement and Petitioner objected.  10T102:2-17.  The Court permitted [...] to answer and stated it was her assumption that it might have been Petitioner\(^8\).  10T102:9-10.  [...]'s testimony is devoid of a factual basis, consisted of conjecture, and should not have been considered by the Court.  N.J.R.E. 701.  No competent proofs support the findings made by the Court as they relate to the Photocopy and rather, they are based on speculation and conjecture.  Admitting the Photocopy into evidence is inconsistent with N.J.R.E. 1003 and constituted a miscarriage of justice.  --- \(^8\)[...] made her assumptions after the Respondent talked to her about the litigation two to three times, advised her of Respondent's positions, emailed a copy of the Photocopy to her and sent her a number of texts.  10T113:9-114:10; 10T115:19-24; 10T113:6 to 113:14; 10T128:5-17.  POINT SIX THE PHOTOCOPY VIOLATED THE UNIFORM PRE-MARITAL ACT
[brief] PRELIMINARY STATEMENT ...........................................................................................................1  PROCEDURAL HISTORY ..................................................................................................................3  STATEMENT OF FACTS  ....................................................................................................................6  LEGAL ARGUMENT ........................................................................................................................20  POINT I DEFENDANT'S CONVICTION MUST BE REVERSED BECAUSE THE COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT PERMITTED THE STATE TO PLAY THE VIDEO OF CO-DEFENDANT  [...]'S STATEMENT  SEVENTEEN DAYS AFTER [...] HAD TESTIFIED AT TRIAL  BECAUSE THE VIDEO, MADE THE DAY HE PLEADED GUILTY TWO YEARS EARLIER, FAILED TO MEET THE ADMISSIBILITY REQUIREMENTS AS A PRIOR CONSISTENT STATEMENT UNDER N.J.R.E. 607 AND BECAUSE ITS ADMISSION WAS NOT HARMLESS (17T4-5 to 17T12-11).  ..............................................................................20  POINT II
[brief] The clear evidence of good faith and compliance makes the trial court’s decision to suddenly and swiftly invoke an extraordinary remedy all the more vexing.  The trial court lacked any legal authority to fashion the remedy it did.  No amount of citations to the trial court’s objections to the Mayor’s comments create any factual scenario that supports the appointment of a SHO.  For these reasons, the Appellants respectfully request that this Court reverse those findings of the trial court.
[directive] The decision to activate or de-activate a BWC is a police action subject to the rule established in Attorney General Law Enforcement Directive (“AG Directive”) No. 2005-1, which strictly prohibits any form of racially-influenced policing.  3.8  Training.  Every agency shall designate one or more training officers and shall establish a training program to ensure that officers equipped with BWCs and officers and civilian employees who access or handle BWC recordings are familiar with the provisions of this Policy, and the policy, standing operating procedure, directive, or order promulgated by the agency pursuant to section 3.1, and all applicable laws of the State.
[brief] In Hill v. Board of Adjustment, 122 NJ Super 156 (App. Div. 1972), the court considered a case in which Eatontown residents, named [...], built an addition onto their home.  The addition came to within 4 feet of the property line between their home and that of their neighbors.  The neighbor sued claiming that the ordinance required a structure to be a minimum of seven feet from the property line.  The Borough’s code official had, admittedly, made a mistake in not advising the [...]s that they needed a variance because of the restrictions of the ordinance.  Then when the [...]s sought the variance, it was granted.  The neighbors argued, and then appealed when they lost the argument, that the ordinance was clear.  No interpretation was needed.  The Appellate Division affirmed.  In doing so the Court noted that when a permit is mistakenly issued by an official “within the purview of his jurisdiction” an estoppel may apply.
[brief] [Pa17]  The trial court granted [...]’ motion and dismissed the claims against [...], finding that: (1) the Incident was caused by [...]’s assault of [...]; (2) Plaintiffs failed to show Lowe's’ alleged negligent conduct was the proximate cause of [...]’s actions; and (3) [...] was not vicariously liable for [...]’s conduct outside the scope of his employment.  *Ibid.*  After the trial court granted [...]’ motion for summary judgment, in May 2020, [...] moved for summary judgment to dismiss Plaintiffs’ negligence claims against him.  [Pa19].  The trial court granted [...]’s motion, leaving Plaintiffs to pursue their battery claim against [...].  [Pa19-20].  However, rather than proceed to trial on their claim that [...] intentionally assaulted [...], Plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed the remaining claim for battery with prejudice so that they could appeal the trial court’s dismissal of the claims for negligence against [...] and [...].
[brief] Pa6-7; (1T:42-11 to 42-19).  Discussion of this right concluded with the detective going back to the form and again asking the defendant, “you have the right to consult with an attorney at any time and have him present before and during questioning, do you understand that?”  Pa8; (1T:45-11 to 45-14).  Defendant responded, “Yeah, totally. ”  Pa8; (1T:45-15).  Discussion of counsel continued with question “number four,” which asked defendant if he understood that, “[i]f you cannot afford an attorney one will be provided if you so desire prior to any questioning. ”  Pa8; (1T:45-16 to 45-19).  Defendant acknowledged that this was “an extension off of what we were all just talking about” and meant that he “can speak to you without an attorney,” but had the right to consult with an attorney. ”  Pa8-9; (1T:45-20 to 46-12).  Defendant confirmed that he was “making sure that [the detectives] understand that I understand” his right to counsel.  Pa9; (1T:46-17 to 46-23).  Before waiving his rights and speaking with the detectives, defendant told the detectives that he “underst[ood] what my rights are,” and was “going to sign” the Miranda Waiver Form and speak with detectives.  Pa10, 12; (1T:49-15 to 49-16; 51-9).  See also Da40.  After hearing the “clear, candid, [] convincing,” and “uncontroverted” testimony of the detectives, see (1T:5-6 to 116-13; 2T:3-15 to 95-24)([...]); (3T:5-2 to 28-18) ([...]), and reviewing the video recording of defendant’s statement, [...] found “that Detectives properly advised defendant of his Miranda rights, and that Defendant’s waiver was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.
[brief] ”  103 N.J. at 372.  Whether an inflationary adjustment, or the inclusion of a capital improvement, to an owner’s equity, this same fundamental principle resonates.  Disregarding capital improvements for calculating the owner’s investment in the Unit is not only illogical, it turns upside down an owner’s constitutional right to a “just and reasonable return”.  A capital improvement is part of an owner’s investment and resulting equity (otherwise, the owner would lack incentive to make a capital improvement).  The only proper way to calculate an owner’s equity for ensuring a “fair return” to the owner is to include the owner’s entire cash investment that would necessarily include capital improvements.  As a matter of law, denying the cost of a capital improvement to deprive an owner of a “fair return” on the owner’s total cash investment is constitutionally impermissible.
[brief] In order for you to find the defendant guilty, the State is required to prove each of the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt: [listing just the three ordinary elements, i.e., causing death, recklessly, under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to life].  (6T 124-21 to 125-2)  (emphasis added)  * * * *  If after consideration of all of the evidence you are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant recklessly caused [...]’s -- [...] Demko’s -- death under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to human life, then your verdict must be guilty of aggravated manslaughter.  (6T 126-19 to 24)  (emphasis added)  The jury was then given similar instructions regarding the lesser-included offense of reckless manslaughter.
[directive] Confidential Sexual Violence Advocate: Confidential Sexual Violence Advocates (CSVAs) are individuals that have completed the statutory (N.J.S.A. 2A:84A-22.14) minimum forty (40) hours of [...] ([...]) and [...] ([...]) approved Sexual Violence Advocacy training and are under the supervision of a Sexual Violence Service Organization that is funded by the [...].  The CSVAs shall assist with safety planning and ensure victims are educated and connected to additional domestic and sexual violence services, as well as community resources.  III.
[brief] First, Defendants’ desire to preclude subdivision cannot sway any of the equities because, based on the documents they claim to rely on, they would have understood Lot 2 to have 120’ of frontage based on the Subdivision Plan and thus be subdividable by right.  Ja148, Ja679, Db16.  In other words, it is not possible that Defendants believed Lot 2 was 120’ yet not subdividable by right.  If Defendants’ thought Lot 2 was not subdividable by right, it was because they understood the deeds and Subdivision Plan were in error.  Moreover, Defendants adjusted their construction plans to ensure their structure would comply with the minimum side-yard setback of 10.00’ based on a 65.00’ frontage.  Ja275; Ja354; Ja373.  Second, reformation is not precluded by a party’s contribution to the mistake.  See Wallace, 380 N.J. Super. at 510 (“A party's negligent failure to know or to discover the facts that resulted in the mutual mistake does not preclude the rescission or reformation of the contract. ”); Edgerton, 203 N.J. Super. at 173 (even a negligent mistake does not preclude reformation).  Third, while it is true that Plaintiffs objected to subdivision by [...], the issue arose shortly after they purchased Lot 2, and they felt compelled to prevent the construction of two or three single-family homes on undersized lots, which is entirely different from a subdivision that creates two conforming lots.  Ja601-02.  In addition to the factors discussed above, the trial court explained its rationale for granting reformation:
[brief] Sat Below: Honorable [...], J.A.D. (ret. & t/a)  Honorable Judges:  Please accept this letter memorandum, pursuant to R. 2:6-2(b), in lieu of a more formal brief submitted on behalf of the State of New Jersey.  http://mcponj.org  TABLE OF CONTENTS Page  COUNTERSTATEMENT OF PROCEDURAL HISTORY ...........................................  1 COUNTERSTATEMENT OF FACTS ........................................................................  3  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I  DEFENDANT’S ALLEGATIONS OF INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL DO NOT A BASIS FOR APPELLATE RELIEF .........................................................  5 POINT II  DEFENDANT IS NOT ENTITLED TO A TRIAL BY JURY FOR DWI ..............................................................................................................  9 CONCLUSION .............................................................................................................