ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] ARGUMENT  The Plaintiff appeals the Trial Court’s Orders, in part, given significant errors of the Trial Court during the bench trial and subsequent failure to grant reconsideration.  As set forth more fully below, with regard to the May 8, 2023 Final Judgment, Plaintiff appeals the improper de minimus valuation of Plaintiff’s membership interest and failure to appoint an expert.  Further, the Plaintiff appeals the Trial Court’s denial of Plaintiff’s request for appointment of a receiver or special fiscal agent for [...].  The Plaintiff also appeals the Trial Court’s dismissal of claims against Defendants [...] and [...], who failed to fulfill their fiduciary obligations and should have been subject to personal liability.  The Plaintiff also appeals the Trial Court’s denial of Plaintiff’s first and second motions for reconsideration in their entirety.  Last, Plaintiff highlights concerns related to the Trial Judge’s substantive *ex parte* communications in addition to aggressive colloquies during the bench trial which resulted in dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims and restriction of Plaintiff’s abilities to consult with co-counsel regarding trial strategy.
[brief] Surely not, because the Legislature surely intended all sections of the LRHL to be construed and applied consistently to any redevelopment plan.  The Trial Court asserted in its Opinion that the issue of the exhibits was not properly briefed.  (Pa0079-80).  However, page 8, footnote 1, of Plaintiffs’ reply trial brief explicitly stated that Plaintiffs were relying upon the brief submitted to oppose intervenor’s motion to settle the record.  (Pa0131).  Attached to that reply brief is an itemized chart establishing the basis for each exhibit to be included in the administrative record.  (Pa0112).  Under these circumstances, there was no need to submit an additional trial briefing about these exhibits, because the justification for each of Plaintiffs’ exhibits was explicitly and previously identified for the convenience of the Trial Judge in Plaintiffs’ previous brief in opposition to defendant’s pretrial motion to settle the record.
[directive] I certify as part of this request:  1.  Copies of this request have been provided to: Pretrial Services on .  Assigned Prosecutor on .  2.  The prosecutor the request.  3.  Defendant understands this is a one time exception to leave their residence and they are not permitted to leave at any time other than the above or for any reason not otherwise ordered by the court.  Defendant Attorney's Name s/ Defendant Attorney's Signature Date s/ Prosecutor's Signature Date
[directive] An agency’s supervisory personnel should always consider the need for training when officers engage in inappropriate behavior or misconduct.  The question should be, “Could training have prevented this behavior and can training prevent it from happening in the 11 INTERNAL AFFAIRS POLICY & PROCEDURES | August 2020 future?”  Perhaps a particular officer or group of officers needs a refresher course in a certain subject.  In addition, changes in the law, the agency or even within the community may trigger the need for a type of training never before given to the officer or agency.  Training in this sense can be anything from informal counseling of an officer about a particular policy or procedure to formal agency-wide training.  The agency may also take advantage of training offered by other agencies, including police academies, the County Prosecutors, the Division of Criminal Justice, other public or private entities or web-based programs.  3.3
[brief] Defendants are not asking this Court to review the credibility and demeanor of witnesses during malpractice trial.  Defendants are asking this Court to review a legal proposition whether a plaintiff can create damages in any legal malpractice case just by commencing an action in the underlying matrimonial (being specific here) or other kind of case (being general otherwise) to incur legal fees so long as there are some evidences that the defendant has breached the duty in providing legal services to the plaintiff.  Incurring legal fees alone per se is not the damages suffered by the Plaintiff.  In order to consider legal fees incurred in the underlying matrimonial case to be the damages suffered by the Plaintiff for the malpractice case, those legal fees must be a “mere portion” or a part of the total damages suffered by the Plaintiff in the underlying matrimonial action.  See In re Estate of Lash, 169 N.J. 20, 26 (2001).  Plaintiff must prove that she had suffered other damages first before she can be awarded legal fees in the underlying matrimonial case.  The legal fees incurred in the underlying matrimonial case cannot stand by itself as the damages sustained by the Plaintiff, because Plaintiff had failed to prove the causation and the actual damage sustained as a result of the negligence on the part of the attorneys in underlying matrimonial case.  When Plaintiff failed to prove that she had suffered any actual damages, she failed to successfully prove that the negligence on the part of the Defendants had caused any damages to her in the underlying matrimonial case.  *See Lovett v. Estate of Lovett*, 250 N.J.Super. 79, 593 A.2d 382 (CDAC 1991) (Even if attorney was negligent and breached his duty in his representation, plaintiffs must demonstrate that they suffer a loss proximately caused by attorney’s negligence).  *Lovett* is on point and it is one of the two cases relied on by the Appellate Division to render its prior opinion that Defendants are responsible for Plaintiff’s legal fees to vacate the PSA and judgment of divorce.  Appellate Division had misapplied law in the prior opinion.
[brief] That particular dictionary and ASOP do not even have the same definition of “excessive. ”  Compare Excessive, Merriam-Webster.com (“exceeding what is usual, proper, necessary, or normal” (emphasis added)), with ASOP 8 § 3.12.2 (“Rates may be considered excessive if they exceed the rate needed to provide for payment of claims, administrative expenses, taxes, regulatory fees, and reasonable contingency and profit margins” (emphasis added)).
[brief] I.  THE DEP FAILED TO MAKE AN ADEQUATE CONSISTENCY ASSESSMENT (Aa001)  The DEP failed to make an adequate Consistency Assessment in violation of the Water Quality Planning Act (“WQPA”) and Rules, because the DEP “shall not issue a permit or approval that conflicts with an adopted areawide plan or this chapter. ”  N.J.A.C. 7:15-3.2(a); N.J.S.A. 58:11A-10.  Areawide Water Quality Management (“WQM”)  Plans address both wastewater and surface water quality/TMDL components, N.J.A.C. 7:15-2.3, and a Consistency Assessment must consider both.  The DEP argued that “nowhere does [...] allege that DEP did not adhere to a specific rule requirement. ”  DEP Rb40.¹  But as Appellant argued, see Ab 17, 19-20 & n.16, a Consistency Assessment that does not make findings regarding any TMDLs with wasteload allocations in the Areawide WQM Plan, or consistency with “this chapter,” is a violation of the Rules.
[brief] In his complaint, the Plaintiff stated: “The contest rules were not fully disclosed in any of the defendants’ promotional materials, nor anywhere on any of the defendants’ websites.  Particularly with respect to the limitation of "only 1 prize per player", the defendants completely omitted any mention of this contract term. ”  Pa4 (emphasis added).  The Plaintiff argues the Defendants should have referenced the rule in question that impacted him.  The Plaintiff argues that omission harmed him.  However, to prove a CFA claim that an advertisement omitted material information, you have to prove the omission was intentional.
[brief] (Da 034-039).  [...] signed this petition on November 18, 2019.  (Da 031).  In referring this petition to the Office of the Public Defender’s Conviction Integrity Unit, the Court determined that [...]’s petition constituted “good cause” for assignment of counsel.  (Da 0590-060).  [...]’s first PCR appeal was not decided until March 11, 2020.  State v. Jackson, No. A-0708-18T4, 2020 WL 1170797, (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Mar. 11, 2020)(Da 040-058).  The Appellate Division affirmed the denial of his first PCR.
[brief] BECAUSE THE TRIAL COURT, IN THE INTEREST OF JUDICIAL EFFICIENCY, DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION BY RULING ON THE MERITS INSTEAD OF RENDERING A DECISION BASED ON A MINOR PROCEDURAL DEFECT WHICH HAD NO PREJUDICIAL EFFECT ON [...].  ..............................................................................................................................................  5 POINT III.  THIS COURT SHOULD AFFIRM THE TRIAL COURT’S ORDER  BECAUSE [...] MAY COMPEL ARBITRATION UNDER THE DOCTRINE OF EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL.  ..............................................................................................................................................  7 POINT IV.
[brief] The arbitration award specifically denied the claims for reimbursement with respect to [...], [...], [...], [...], and [...] as Plaintiff did not demonstrate that they were medically necessary.  (Pca140)  However, that finding was not appealed by Plaintiff.  The arbitrator awarded reimbursement for three dates of service for treatment by [...]—August 25, 2020, September 15, 2020, and October 5, 2020—as [...] only billed one CPT code for those dates of service, so the amount billed for the CPT could be determined for those visits.
[brief] (Pb40).  Plaintiff further argues that this issue implicates its ability to move forward with its builder’s remedy claim.  (Pb41-Pb42).  But Plaintiff never presented any evidence to the lower court that it needed financing from lenders for its proposed project or that financing would be jeopardized if an injunction were not granted.  Accordingly, the court’s decision was an abuse of discretion as it did not rely on facts in the record.  The court’s finding is “‘so manifestly unsupported by or inconsistent with the competent, relevant and reasonably credible evidence as to offend the interests of justice. ’”  See Griepenburg v. Twp. of Ocean, 220 N.J. 239, 254 (2015) (quoting Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Investors Ins. Co., 65 N.J. 474, 484 (1974)).  Moreover, Plaintiff cannot dispute that the court abused its discretion in finding imminent, irreparable harm based on speculation and hypothetical scenarios.  The court found that, *if* [...] takes steps toward condemnation, it *may* affect Plaintiff’s ability to secure lending – *if*
[brief] ”  (2T12-4 to 6; 39-3)  Given his propensity to adopt the behavior of his peers, [...] began to “act out” and was suspended twice in ninth grade, and seven times in tenth grade.  (2T11-13 to 12-3)  [...] noted that when [...] was charged with vandalism, his behavior should have served as a “warning flag…[which] indicates that you’re dealing with a person who’s extremely disturbed and needs remedial help immediately. ” (2T12-11 to 17)  Despite this urgent need, “this [help] is not provided. ”  (2T12-17)
[brief] In Victory Peach Group, Inc. v. Greater New York Mut. Ins. Co., 310 N.J. Super. 82, 87 (App. Div. 1998), the Court explained the distinction between an “all-risks” policy and a “named peril” policy:  An “all-risk” policy creates a “special type of insurance extending to risks not usually contemplated, and recovery under the policy will generally be allowed, at least for all losses of a fortuitous nature, in the absence of fraud or other intentional misconduct of the insured, unless the policy contains a specific provision expressly excluding the loss from coverage. ”  43 Am.Jur.2d Insurance § 505 (1982).  Moreover, even if the [...] policy’s liability coverage was somehow considered to be an “all-risks” endorsement, the courts have made clear that the fact that a policy is considered to provide “all-risks” coverage does not mean that every risk is automatically covered.
[brief] Plaintiff's counsel pointed out that plaintiff, then 26 years old, had a life expectancy of 55 years.  4T70.  Here, in denying Defendants’ motion for a remittitur, the Trial Court examined the damages evidence heard by the Jury over the course of 8 pages in its Memorandum of Decision including the testimony of [...], the dash-cam video, the property damage photos, Plaintiff’s testimony, body photos showing Plaintiff’s scarring, and the expert medical testimony of [...] including the operative photos and medical illustrations.
[brief] PROCEDURAL HISTORY  Appellant filed the initial Complaint in this matter with the Hudson County Superior Court Law Division, Civil Part, on or about November 11, 2021.  Pa001–Pa009.  On February 11, 2022, Respondent moved to dismiss the Complaint.  Pa010.  In response, Appellant filed an opposition and motion to amend the Complaint.  Pa013–Pa016.  Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss was heard on May 13, 2022.  Id.  The Honorable [...], J.S.C, denied the Respondent’s motion and simultaneously granted Appellant’s Motion to Amend the Complaint.  Id.  Following the close of discovery, Respondent filed a motion for summary judgment on all counts on June 12, 2023.  Pa043.  On July 25, 2023, Appellant filed an opposition brief.  Pa163–Pa572.  On July 31, 2023, Respondent filed a reply brief and response to counter statement of facts.  Pa573–Pa576.  Oral argument was conducted on August 14, 2023, at the conclusion of which the Honorable [...], J.S.C. granted Respondent’s motion as to all counts and dismissed Appellant’s Complaint in the entirety with prejudice.  T1-46.  Appellant filed a notice of appeal on September 27, 2023, as to the counts directed at [...].
[brief] On August 4, 2023, Defendants’ Motion for Leave to Appeal was denied.  (80a)  On October 4, 2023, the trial court denied Defendants’ Motion to Determine Controlling Law.  (81a)  This motion challenged the Trustee’s authority to commence and continue litigation for mesne profits, arguing that Plaintiff’s legal duty of impartiality precluded an award exceeding $2,500.  (6T 4-5)  The basis for this argument centered on the Trustee’s demand that [...] pay over $50,000 in rent, while allowing [...] a significantly lower rent of just $2,500, despite evidence showing that both the Boonton and Florida Properties had the same approximate fair rental value.  (6T 4-5)  Additionally, on October 4, 2023, the trial court denied Defendants’ Motion for Due Process Violation and Other Relief.
[brief] Defendant alleges that the trial court erred in failing to charge the jury with proper instructions, specifically, that it gave the jury the incorrect law for accomplice liability and failed to charge the jury on alibi and identification.  (Db32-Db39).  However, defendant failed to prove that the jury heard instructions with improper law and failed to present evidence that would make alibi and identification instructions necessary.  In the context of challenges to jury charges, plain error is: “legal impropriety in the charge prejudicially affecting the substantial rights of the defendant and sufficiently grievous to justify notice by the reviewing court and to convince the court that of itself the error possessed a clear capacity to bring about an unjust result.
[brief] (Ab38).  First, [...] calls into question [...]’s testimony regarding the nature of the EMP since “he had no role of any kind [i]n the development of this EMP. ”  Ibid.  Second, [...] contends that [...]’s testimony on the EMP constituted an opinion on an “ultimate legal issue. ” (Ab38-39).  The [...] may not “reject or modify any findings of fact as to issues of credibility” unless the ALJ’s findings are “arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable or are not supported by sufficient, competent, and credible evidence in the record. ”  N.J.S.A. 52:14B-10(c).
[brief] He testified that within the last three (3) years he reported the light out once to [...] and [...] fixed the light the following day.  (SOF, Point E, supra).  [...] confirmed, upon review of the call records, that he reported the light being out on October 4, 2018, a year after the subject accident.  (Id.).  There is no testimony or reports by any witness that the light was ever inoperable prior to the subject accident.
[brief] Rule 3:5-5 provides, in pertinent part:  A search warrant may be executed by any law enforcement officer … .  The warrant must be executed within 10 days after its issuance and within the hours fixed therein by the judge issuing it, unless for good cause shown the warrant provides for its execution at any time of day or night.  The officer taking property under the warrant shall give to the person from whom or from whose premises the property is taken a copy of the warrant and a receipt for the property taken or shall leave the copy and receipt at the place from which the property is taken.  The return shall be made promptly and shall be accompanied by a written inventory of any property taken.  The inventory shall be made and verified by the officer executing the warrant in the presence of the person from whom or from whose premises the property is taken or, if such person is not present, in the presence of some other person.  …  The executing law enforcement agency shall upon request deliver a copy of the inventory to the person from whom or from whose premises the property was taken.  [Rule 3:5-5(a)].
[brief] Plaintiff claims that on specific dates, namely 1/15/15, 3/13/15, 4/14/16, and in December of 2017 he asked [...] for payments.  See Plaintiff’s Affidavit at paragraph 8.  Plaintiff similarly claims he met with [...] after the sale of the hospital and now claims that she made promises to Plaintiff to pay him the regarding unpaid amounts.  Except for alleging one meeting at a Christmas party in December of 2017, Plaintiff never identified any dates or promises made by the Defendants in his deposition or in his interrogatory answers, or in any other discovery prior to the discovery end date.  This is because the actual record reflects:
[brief] *Ibid.*  Instead, the Board found [...] was only entitled to the return of his accumulated pension contributions.  *Ibid.*  [...] appealed the Board’s determination, requesting that the matter be declared a contested case and transmitted to the OAL for adjudication.  (Aa50).  The Board granted [...]’s request and the matter was eventually assigned to [...].  (Aa51).  After several telephonic prehearing conferences took place, the Board filed a Motion for Summary Decision seeking to dismiss [...]’s appeal.  (Aa53).  Specifically, the Board argued [...] did not qualify for deferred retirement benefits as a matter of law given the undisputed nature of the misconduct for which he was removed from public employment.  (Aa52-53).  [...] filed opposition to the same.  (Aa53).  After the Board filed a reply brief and [...] filed a sur-reply, oral argument was conducted before the ALJ on August 22, 2023.  *Ibid.*  In an initial decision dated September 29, 2023, [...] granted the Board’s Motion for Summary Decision, thereby dismissing [...]’s appeal.  (Aa52-60).  Specifically, [...] determined [...] was removed from employment on charges of misconduct directly related to his employment.  (Aa58).  Consequently, the ALJ concluded he is ineligible for deferred retirement benefits as a matter of law pursuant to N.J.S.A. 43:16A-11.2.  *Ibid.*  Subsequently, [...] filed exceptions to the initial decision and the Board replied to the same.  (Aa61).  On November 13, 2023, the Board met to review the record and the ALJ’s initial decision.  *Ibid.*  After doing so, the Board voted to adopt the ALJ’s decision to dismiss [...]’s appeal in its entirety.  *Ibid.*  Consequently, [...] filed a Notice of Appeal with this Honorable Court on December 11, 2023.  (Aa66-68).  **STANDARD OF REVIEW**
[brief] [...] also made telephonic contact with an individual who is believed to be Defendant’s daughter [...].  She agreed to forward a message to Defendant.  (Pa146).  o  Moreover, [...] also left a telephonic message on Defendant’s voicemail machine.  (See id.)  Therefore, Defendant’s arguments regarding service are baseless.  As a matter of law, service was effectuated on the Defendant on September 24, 2021.
[directive] In this way, prosecutors can, through the exercise of their inherent charging discretion, effectively ensure imposition of a State Prison sentence absent a judicial finding of exceptional circunastances that would justify overcoming the strict presumption of imprisonment established in N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1d.  See State v. Jabbou~, 118 N.J. 1 ~ N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1d was amended by L~. 2007, c_. 341 (effective January 13, 2008) to extend the presumption ofimprisormaent to third-degree convictions where the court finds that the aggravating circumstance set forth in N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1a(5) (substantial likelihood that the defendant is involved in orgartized crh’rtinal activity) applies.
[brief] (Pb17-18).  Plaintiff’s argument in Point One of his Brief is frankly ridiculous.  How Plaintiff can even make such an argument when the transcript of that hearing, which took place on October 20, 2023, is before this Court (see generally 1T) as well as the papers in support and opposition of [...]’s Motion to Dismiss (see generally Pa137-Pa158, Pa233-Pa300; Da012-Da019) defies all logic and is entirely without evidentiary support.  Accordingly, Plaintiff’s “procedural” argument is entirely baseless and without merit.  B.  Plaintiff’s Argument Regarding the Trial Court Not Mediating or Otherwise Employing Some Type of Alternative Dispute Resolution Proceeding is Without Merit.
[brief] See id.  As for the Defendants’ purported lack of knowledge regarding Plaintiff’s disability and/or mistreatment, the record contains more than sufficient evidence to contradict any such claim.  For example, Plaintiff testified that her anxiety issues were well known around the office based on the very public symptoms she displayed.  See id. at 147:21-148:7.  It should also go without saying that [...]’s and other’s insults towards her indicating that she needed to be on medication would inherently imply that they knew about her disability condition.  See id. at 129:1-13; 155:14-22.
[directive] SS. County of _____________ )  I, _____________________________, solemnly swear (or affirm) that I shall keep secret the proceedings of the grand jury, in accordance with N.J.S.A. 2B:21-10, Court Rule 3:6- 7, and any other statutes, court rules, or requirements of the State of New Jersey.  _________________________________________  (Signature)  __________________________________________  __________________________________________  (Address)  Sworn and subscribed before me this ______ day of _________  A.D. _______ __________________________________ (signature of witness)  __________________________________ (printed/typed name of witness)  Grand Jury Standards
[directive] Where the arrest involves a student enrolled in the school, the building principal shall, wherever feasible, be notified before the student is taken from school grounds.  b.  When effecting any spontaneous arrest on school property during operating school hours, every reasonable precaution should be taken to minimize the disruption of the school environment to the greatest extent possible consistent with the requirements of public safety.  Accordingly, the policies and procedures set forth in subsection 1 of this section shall be complied with wherever it is feasible to do so.