ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE  NEW JERSEY STATE BAR ASSOCIATION OF COUNSEL: [...], Esq., President  [...]  [...]  One Constitution Square New Brunswick, New Jersey  08901  Attorney ID: [...]  ON THE BRIEF: [...], Esq./Attorney ID: [...]  [...], Esq./Attorney ID: [...]  Date Submitted: Feb. 3.  2025  TABLE OF CONTENTS
[brief] *Bender* was not a legal malpractice case.  Certainly, the plaintiffs, by citing *Bender*, are simply grasping at straws to equate the erroneous alleged error of a pharmacist in filling a prescription to the work done by the [...] in the underlying, complex land use/acquisition transactions.  Plaintiffs' reliance upon *Sommers v. McKinney*, 287 N.J. Super. 1 (App. Div. 1996) is also misplaced.
[brief] ”  From this same Facebook account, [...] claimed Black people often fake hate crimes, called [...] a “Tyrannical POS” for extending New Jersey’s School Mask Mandate, and openly told school district teachers to drop out of their union, causing the Board to become ensnared in litigation.  At no time did Respondent’s posts or account contain a disclaimer making clear that she was speaking in her individual capacity and not on behalf of the Board.  As a result, members of the school community protested Respondent at meetings of the Board, which was clearly reflected by news articles, Board minutes, and even Respondent’s own admissions – all of which were in the record.  The Board itself even passed two separate Resolutions condemning Respondent’s Facebook posts and had to set aside significant time at Board meetings to address public complaints specifically regarding Respondent’s social media use.  Consequently, Administrative Law Judge [...] ([...]) found in her Initial Decision that Respondent had violated the Act through her failure to affirmatively disclaim her membership on the Board.
[brief] [...] is relying upon a proscribed discriminatory factor in determining promotional eligibility.  The discriminatory factor in this case is each Firefighter’s actual or perceived disability — and their need to request and take medical leave to recover.  As stated within ¶ 11 (Pa11) of Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint, among many other similar paragraphs citing similar facts:  11.  “On or about July 2022, the City implemented a policy wherein Union members were rendered ineligible for promotion if they avail themselves of any type of injury or sick leave, work related or non work related. ”  (Pa11)  40.  The City has established a policy of refusing the eligibility of firefighters for promotion when they are on paid sick or injury leave regardless of the nature of the illness or disability.  (Pa19)  90.  In this matter Association unit members are either perceived to be or are disabled/handicapped within the meaning of the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination.  (Pa36)  Plaintiff clearly articulated that the Defendant established a policy rendering disabled Firefighters ineligible for promotion and makes it clear that the Defendant placed substantial (if not complete) reliance on this proscribed discriminatory factor in making its decision to take the adverse employment action.  This satisfies the test laid out in Smith, supra.  This case is also similar to the facial policy challenged within Delanoy v. Tp. of Ocean, 245 N.J. 384, 402 (2021)  (“[I]t is apparent that the Maternity SOP applied to Delanoy was facially invalid * * *  [O]n its face, the Maternity SOP constituted a per se violation of the PWFA's prohibition of unfavorable treatment of pregnant employees. ”)  The LAD prohibits any unlawful discrimination against any person because such person is or has been at any time disabled.  The LAD defines disability to include a “physical disability [or] infirmity . . . caused by bodily injury . . . or illness . . . .”  N.J.S.A. 10:5-5(q).  “Illness or bodily injury” is the same criterion which Firefighters assert and claim when they utilize medical or sick leave.  The complaint sub judice is primarily a “direct evidence” case as opposed to the McDonnell-Douglass circumstantial case analysis cited by the trial court.
[brief] The assistant manager, [...], who was working that morning, informed defendant the store would not issue a refund without a receipt.  Defendant claimed to have left the receipt in his car and promised to return with it.  Defendant then left the store with the television and did not return.  The television was priced at $499 “plus tax. ”  Defendant testified he had purchased the television with cash the previous day, but had lost the receipt sometime after exiting the store.  However, upon discovering the television was missing a feature important to him, he sought to return it.  The following day, at approximately 9:00 a.m., defendant robbed a gas station attendant, [...], at a [...] in [...].  Defendant drove into the gas station in a silver Saturn and pulled up to the pump.  Mose requested that defendant open the gas cap.  Defendant instead exited the car and demanded money from Mose.  Mose repeated his request and defendant returned to his car and retrieved what appeared to be a gun, wrapped in a white plastic bag.  Defendant reached into Mose's left pocket and removed a wad of cash, after which he sped away.  Mose immediately called the police and reported the incident.  He described the perpetrator as a light-skinned black man of approximately 160 pounds driving a silver Saturn with a partial plate number of WL13L.  On September 17, at approximately 12:15 p.m., defendant returned to [...] and approached the customer service desk with a larger television priced at $699.  When defendant attempted to return the television without a receipt Kaur recognized defendant and summoned the manager and security.  An argument ensued and defendant ran from the store without the television.  Store employees observed defendant drive off in a silver Saturn, with license plate number WBL13S, and relayed this information to the police.
[brief] Administrative agencies possess wide discretion and authority to select the means and procedures by which to meet their statutory objectives.  *Texter v. Dep’t of Human Servs.*, 88 N.J. 376, 383 (1982).  However, it is axiomatic that an administrative agency possesses only those powers expressly delegated to it by the Legislature or fairly implied from the legislative conferral of authority.  *Bd. of Educ. of Upper Freehold Reg’l Sch. Dist. v. State Health Benefits Comm’n*, 314 N.J. Super. 486, 492 (App. Div. 1998) (quoting *Chopper Express, Inc. v. Department of Insurance*, 293 N.J. Super. 536, 542 (App. Div. 1996)).
[brief] First, because [...] had no personal knowledge of the informant, he was unable to provide “first-hand verification of the informant’s prior veracity. ”  *State v. Williams*, 364 N.J. Super. 23, 33 (2003).  Second, while [...]’s testimony suggested that the C.I. was reliable on 15 prior occasions, it also suggested that the C.I. was not reliable on five others.  Third, [...]’s assertion that the C.I. was “reliable” in the past was a “conclusionary statement” for which [...] provided no basis: [...] provided no details as to the C.I.’s motives or the nature of the information provided by the C.I. in the past; nor did [...] explain how the C.I. was reliable on those prior 15 occasions – it was not even clear if the standard of reliability was arrest, conviction or something else – or, more importantly, how the C.I. was not reliable on the other five.  *Zutic*, 155 N.J. at 111 (finding informant’s veracity had not been sufficiently established where officer offered only a “conclusory statement” that “the informant was ‘reliable’ without indicating what made him think so”).  In *Williams*, 364 N.J. Super. 23, this Court found an officer’s similarly conclusory assertion of reliability insufficient to satisfy the veracity prong.
[brief] Appellants have failed to make that showing here.  They do not identify any facts in the record to support their claim that [...]’s failure to provide T&E is due in significant part from the SFRA.  Instead, Appellants simply declare that because the District is not providing T&E, the SFRA is “not adequate,” (Ab18), and is operating below “its optimal level” (Ab11).  Appellants also take aim at the State’s provision of significant additional financial aid to [...] in the form of loans, asserting that these loans demonstrate that “SFRA funding for Lakewood is insufficient. ” (Ab12).  But Appellants miss the mark.  At no point do Appellants identify what would be “adequate,” “optimal,” or “[sufficient” levels of funding, and Appellants sorely misconstrue the conclusions to be drawn from the State’s provision of loans to the District.  Between FY15 and FY24, the Department provided [...] $215,124,570 in loans on top of its SFRA funding.  (Ra166).  Despite this, Appellants admit that students are still being denied T&E.  Because [...] has received sufficient State aid, plus additional aid in the form of State loans, its inability to provide T&E, taken to its logical conclusion, cannot be a direct result of the SFRA.
[brief] Defense counsel filed a Motion to Sever on December 14, 2021, contending that it would substantially prejudice the Defense to have to litigate the allegations of a scorned ex-girlfriend made months after the alleged incident together with the accusations made by [...].  The Parties appeared before [...] on February 17, 2023 to address the Defense’s motion.  (1T).  Defense counsel reiterated his argument that the allegations made by [...]’s ex-girlfriend, who had a drug problem, could not be heard together with the other matter without this becoming a trial within a trial.  (1T3:18-24).  He explained that he would be forced to present additional testimony and witnesses regarding the former couple’s relationship to expose her motivations for making these allegations.  (1T3:25-4:6).  He further explained that the prejudice in this matter would be substantial.  As a “he said, she said” case, the verdict would likely come down to who the jury found more credible, and allowing this trial to become about [...]’s tumultuous relationship with his ex-girlfriend would be detrimental.  (1T4:7-23).  The State countered that it believed the ex-girlfriend’s statement would be admissible in the kidnapping trial regardless, making severance unnecessary.  (1T4:25-5:9).  [...] indicated that she felt a Rule 104 hearing would be appropriate to determine whether the ex-girlfriend’s statement would be otherwise admissible as evidence of consciousness of guilt under Rule 404(b), which required analysis of the factors set forth in *State v. Cofield*, 127 N.J. 328 (1992).  (1T7:5-14).  [...] stated that she felt the additional hearing necessary to address whether the ex-girlfriend’s statement met the third prong, that evidence of the other crime was clear and convincing.  (1T7:12-14).  [...] presided over the Rule 104 hearing on March 17, 2023.  (2T).  The State presented the testimony of [...].  (2T4:4-41:25).  The trial court ultimately denied the Defense’s motion to sever, finding that [...]’s statement would have been admissible in the kidnapping trial, and it would be up to the jury to decide whether she was credible.  (2T47:1-25).  The trial court determined that this evidence was relevant to the defendant’s motive in the context of the underlying offenses.  (2T47:22-24).  It found that the evidence satisfied the clear and convincing standard based on the fact that [...]’s story remained substantially consistent, despite the fact that [...] admittedly reviewed her statement with the prosecutor the previous day.  (2T48:11-49:9; 2T17:9-20).  The trial court finally determined that the Defense would not be unduly prejudiced, because [...] could be cross-examined regarding her motive to fabricate and sobriety.  (2T50:6-11).  b.
[brief] [Da475-476 (emphasis added). ]  The [...] reviewed [...]’ application – which contained all the requirements identified in Hoboken City Ordinance § 196-33.1(M) – and deemed it complete as of February 2022.  Accordingly, the [...] correctly found that the Ordinance, which did not go into effect until April 28, 2022, did not apply to [...]’ application.  III.
[brief] CIVIL ACTION ON APPEAL FROM THE FINAL ORDER OF THE SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY, LAW DIVISION, BURLINGTON COUNTY DOCKET NO. [...]  Sat Below: HON. [...], A.J.S.C.  BRIEF AND APPENDIX ON BEHALF OF DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT  [...]  [...]  Attorneys for Defendant-Respondent Township of Chesterfield Planning Board  On the Brief: [...], Esq.  Attorney ID# 026241996  [...], Esq.  Attorney ID# 376922021  [...] [...] [...]  [...]  Date Submitted: November 22, 2023
[brief] E. The Declaratory Judgment Action.  [...] commenced this litigation in 2005.  This case initially involved 15 insurers that issued policies to [...] from 1958 through 1985.  (Pa0001.)  Choice of law was the pivotal issue early in the case because [...] was primarily based in New Jersey while the [...] is in Massachusetts.  Insurance policies commencing after the expiration of the [...] Policy contained “sudden and accidental” pollution exclusions, which were unenforceable under New Jersey law but were enforceable under Massachusetts law.  (Pa0066.)  On or about March 23, 2010, the trial court rejected [...]’s choice of law arguments and held that Massachusetts law applied to the claims and that the “sudden and accidental” pollution exclusion barred coverage under Massachusetts law.  (Pa0061-Pa0090.)  As a result, all but three insurers were dismissed from the case either through summary judgment or settlement.  The three remaining insurers, including [...], whose policies did not contain pollution exclusions, remained in the case.
[directive] 7.9.2 One such exception is when one person in a communication decides to intercept (e.g., record) the conversation.  As long as this person is a part of the conversation, such recording is lawful.  But if the person stops being a party to the conversation (e.g., he or she walks away from the group or turns the telephone over to someone else), it is no longer lawful for him or her to intercept the conversation.  7.9.3  Another exception exists where a person, acting at the direction of an investigative or law enforcement officer, gives prior consent to intercept a wire, electronic or oral communication and is a party to the communication.
[directive] 4.5.9  In any case where there is a presumption of applying for a complaint-warrant pursuant to subsections 4.5.1 through 4.5.8, a law enforcement agency shall apply for a complaint-warrant unless an assistant prosecutor or deputy attorney general consulted in accordance with Section 3.2 of this Directive, or a supervisory officer designated pursuant to subsection 3.3.2 who is authorized by the County Prosecutor to overcome presumptions under Section 4 of this Directive, determines that neither the interests of public or victim safety nor the interests of justice would be served by applying for a complaint-warrant.
[brief] In its decision, the Trial Court isolates a portion of the transcript that involves questions (over Plaintiff’s objection) regarding a photograph that had been admittedly altered from the original.  According to defense counsel, the photo that was used for the questioning was taken from photos received in response to a subpoena sent to [...]; the engineering consultants that performed the Biennial Bridge Inspection for the [...].  However, the photo that was used for the questioning was not the original photo received from the subpoena.  Rather, defense counsel represented that the photo he was using for the purposes of his questions was a “zoomed in” snapshot that he created from one of the original photos.
[brief] As the said violation carries serious consequences for my record, including but not limited to points on my license, I trust that this is a fair and reasonable request.  I then respectfully requested an adjournment of my matter for two cycles to allow sufficient opportunity for me to receive this discovery and seek new counsel, and ask that I may appear in person before the Court, as I myself did not have the adequate technical capabilities for a virtual appearance.  I further asked that any and all subsequent documentation and/or correspondence regarding my matter please be sent to me at the above address and/or email.  I can also be reached at [...].  APPELLANT’S PRO SE STATUS
[brief] 7.  Section 1:7-4 of the Revised Statutes is amended to read as follows:  1:7-4.  Any two or more citizens of the State may, within the time prescribed by section 1:7-1 of this Title, present to the Appellate Division of the Superior Court an application, such as is authorized by said section 1:7-1 to be presented by the Attorney-General, and the court shall proceed thereon in the manner provided by sections 1:7-2 and 1:7-3 of this Title.
[brief] The court stated that while a party claiming ownership by adverse possession can satisfy the thirty-year requirement by “tacking” the periods of adverse use by its predecessors-in-title, tacking was permitted provided the predecessors’ uses satisfy all of the elements for adverse possession.  *Id.*, at 567 (Emphasis Supplied).  James and [...], principals of Defendant, purchased Lot 3 on July 30, 1999.  Da73.  Plaintiff filed his Complaint on or about July 7, 2022, twenty-three years later.  While Defendant seeks to tack on the period of use of its predecessors-in-title to satisfy the thirty-year requirement, Defendant did not put forth any testimony or evidence from, or as to, those predecessors-in-title.  Instead, Defendant improperly relied on incomplete testimony provided by the Plaintiff to attempt to demonstrate that Defendant’s predecessors had satisfied the elements of adverse possession.  Db26.  Defendant cites to Plaintiff’s testimony at 2T17:12-20.  Plaintiff testified that from the time that he purchased the property, the owners of occupants of Lot 3 had been using the strip with his permission.  This testimony does not remotely satisfy the Defendant’s burden of proving that its predecessor in title’s use of the Strip was adverse, hostile, visible, open and notorious for a consecutive thirty year period.  Defendant did not introduce competent, let alone any, evidence to satisfy this burden.  The trial court’s determination as to adverse possession must be reversed.
[directive] A clear and unreasonable danger exists when the pursuit requires that the vehicle be driven at excessive speeds or in any other manner which exceeds the performance capabilities of the pursuing vehicles or police officers involved in a pursuit; or (h) if advised of any unanticipated condition, event, or circumstance that substantially increases the risk to public safety inherent in the pursuit.  3.5  When a vehicular pursuit is terminated, officers shall immediately cease all emergency vehicle operations, including turning off all emergency warning lights and audible devices (sirens), and disengaging from the violator’s vehicle.
[brief] [...] was exonerated, and the implication that this was solely because of [...]’s recantation.  [...]’s recantation was not the sole or even main reason for [...]’s exoneration.  To present that fact to the jury as if it were a certainty, that [...] and [...] alone was the reason for exonerating [...], would be a gross misstatement of the truth.  Moreover, it would necessitate digging deeply into [...]’s facts to debunk that claim, as was just done ante, with testimony and evidence on extraneous issues in that case that have nothing to do with defendant’s case.
[brief] [...] did not file for the benefit within the time permitted by the statute, so even under a liberal construction, the statute expressly states he is ineligible for the benefit he now seeks.  Nevertheless, [...] argues that the limitation period in the statute should not be strictly applied because it “fails to advance the legislative purpose of the Ricci Act. ” (Pb13).  But this is a misinterpretation that contradicts the Legislature’s actual intent, as explicitly stated in the statute it enacted.  “The Court’s obligation when interpreting a law is to determine and carry out the Legislature’s intent.
[brief] “The privilege of engaging in the practice of law is strictly confined to individual attorneys who have been duly licensed upon a proper showing of character and competency, and who are at all times subject to rigid rules of conduct. ”  Appell v. Reiner, 81 N.J. Super. 229, 236 (Ch. Div. 1963).  “Such regulation is designed to serve the public interest by protecting the unwary and ignorant from injury at the hands of persons unskilled or unlearned in the law. ”  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
[brief] Indeed, a cursory review of the document shows that this template employment agreement contains an even more expansive arbitration provision than the one within the Operative Agreement.  381a-383a.  [...] presented this email all while acknowledging that her employment agreement had an arbitration provision with enforceable language, while maintaining that she had doubts about the Operative Agreement’s authenticity.  1T at 51:2-18, 55:7-19.  [...] submitted this December 2019 Agreement in an attempt to correlate the previous employment agreements prior to December 2019 to the [...] arbitration agreement held unenforceable in *Ziner v. Micro Tech Training Center, Inc.*, Docket No.: HUD-L-004926-19, Trans ID LCV2020784234.  1T at 49:22-50:10.  In Ziner, the Court held that the arbitration provision within the employment agreement between those parties was invalid because it did not contain any language indicating that plaintiff was “waiving [his or] her statutory right to seek relief in a court of law....”  See *Ziner v. Micro Tech Training Center, Inc*, Docket No.: HUD-L-004926-19, Trans ID LCV2020784234, at p. 3-4.  Around the same time of this ruling, [...] amended its arbitration clause.
[brief] ”  Usdin v. State, Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., Div. of Water Res., 173 N.J. Super. 311, 331 (Super. Ct. 1980).  The legislature made clear that the FHACA “shall be liberally construed to effectuate the purpose and intent thereof. ”  N.J.S.A. 58:16A-64.  This clearly expressed legislative policy must not be violated when DEP reviews and approves permits, In re N.J. Pinelands Com’n Resolution, 356 N.J. Super. at 372, particularly for developments of this magnitude.
[brief] PROCEDURAL HISTORY  Plaintiff filed the complaint April 17, 2019.  Pa1.  Following service, venue was transferred to Ocean County July 12, 2019.  Pa16.  An answer was filed September 13, 2019 and discovery commenced.  Pa17.  On March 24, 2020, Defendants moved to strike Plaintiffs’ pleadings for discovery which was denied when discovery was provided.  Pa22.  Defendants’ counsel moved to be relieved on May 18, 2020, granted July 10, 2020.  Pa24.  On August 31, 2020, Plaintiffs moved for default against the unrepresented L.L.C., which was withdrawn when counsel re-entered the case on Defendants’ behalf.  The parties appeared virtually for trial in October, 2021, but were adjourned when Defendant could not appear due to a family medical issue.  Trial was held in person May 23, 2022.  Plaintiffs’ representative testified.
[brief] Instead of simply admitting that the court got it wrong, however, the New Motion Judge instead created even more new purported reasons to rule against Plaintiff in the September 29, 2023 Order.  Appellant likewise had no notice or opportunity of the new issues raised and decided by way of the September 29, 2023 Order.  Essentially, because of the New Motion Judge’s willingness go beyond the issues actually framed -- to the point of even ignoring explicit concessions that had been for purposes of the motion -- the opinions below devolved into a “fact-finding” free-for-all during which the New Motion Judge and Respondents were no longer bound by those concessions.