ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Finally, [...] misrepresents the law, claiming the court lacks authority to “disregard and usurp” the power of the municipality to zone.  Not so.  As the trial court explicitly recognized, upon a finding of a municipality’s failure to comply with its obligations—as here—courts are empowered to set aside cost generative measures that frustrate the constitutional goal, including provisions of a municipal zoning ordinance.  Once the trial court found noncompliance, a remedy should have followed.
[brief] Pa451  Proposed Order, [...], filed August 26, 2022 ...........................................................................  Pa458  Submission by [...]: Notice of Motion for Summary Judgment, [...], filed August 30, 2022 ...........................................................................  Pa460  Statement of Material Facts, [...] filed August 30, 2022 ...........................................................................  Pa462  Brief in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, [...], filed August 30, 2022 (partially redacted by Plaintiff-Appellant) ...........................................  Pa477  Certification of [...], Esq., filed August 30, 2022 ..............................................................................  Pa491  Exhibit A - Plaintiffs Complaint.................................................................  Pa494  Exhibit B - Design Guidelines Handbook 6.............................................  Pa514  Exhibit C - Transcript of deposition of City Planner, [...]..................................................................................  Pa524  VOLUME IV
[brief] “[A]  ‘defendant cannot beseech and request the trial court to take a certain course of action, and upon adoption by the court, take his chance on the outcome of the trial, and if unfavorable, then condemn the very procedure he sought and urged, claiming it to be error and prejudicial. ’  State v. Pontery, 19 N.J. 457, 471 (1955).  Thus, when a defendant asks the court to take his proffered approach and the court does so, we have held that relief will not be forthcoming on a claim of error by that defendant. ”  State v. Jenkins, 178 N.J. 347, 358 (2004).
[brief] For instance, the State erroneously contends that “[t]he error in Tyler was wholly concerned with the fact that the medical examiner relied on statements of the defendant relayed to him and the veracity of which was challenged at trial. ”  (Sb 22)  But Tyler itself makes clear that it was reversible error to admit the expert’s opinions on cause and manner of death because they “were not sufficiently based on scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge so as to assist the jury. ”  867 N.W.2d at 163.  This is equally true whether the expert’s opinion was based on a defendant’s statements or any other “information obtained through police investigation,” id. at 164-65, such as the “circumstances” in which the body in this case was found burned and “placed outside of the home,” which [...] acknowledged “played a very large role . . . the ruling of homicide. ”  (42T:206-23 to 207-12)  The inferences that might be draw from [...]’s destruction of the body “were within the understanding of the average juror,” and should have been left for the jury’s evaluation.  Jamerson, 153 N.J. at 340.  ____________________
[brief] ...........................................  H661a Holm-132: [...] response to discovery request HOLM-[...]-OTT-140, was objected and did not state whether the regulators existence was a factor to be disclosed to buyers (SOICR p. 12) ........  H662a Holm-133: [...] response to discovery request HOLM-[...]-OTT-141, was objected to and stated disclosure to buyers is a legal question (SOICR p. 12) ...........................................  H663a Holm-134: [...] response to discovery request HOLM-[...]-OTT-142, described the basis for his matched pairs analysis, attaching (SOICR p. 12) ...........................................  H664a Attached chart of regulators not used in analysis ..................  H665a Holm-135: [...] response to discovery request HOLM-[...]-OTT-143, that [...] selected the stations in the analysis (SOICR p. 12) ...........................................  H666a Holm-136: [...] response to discovery request HOLM-[...]-OTT-144, that [...] performed other analyses and provided List of Outlier Sales Pairings (SOICR p. 12)  ...........................................  H667a Holm-137: [...] response to discovery request HOLM-[...]-OTT-146, that [...] requested and obtained a list of all regulator stations constructed for periods of time (SOICR p. 12)  .................  H668a Holm-138: [...] response to discovery request HOLM-[...]-OTT-147, objected to disclosing whether matched pairs analyses were conducted for repeat sales (SOICR p. 12)  ...........................................  H669a Holm-139: [...] response to discovery request HOLM-[...]-OTT-148, objected to disclosing matched pairs analyses prepared for court or regulatory proceedings (SOICR p. 12)  ...........................................  H670a Holm-140: [...] response to discovery request HOLM-[...]-OTT-149, disputed that analyses of repeat sales require adjustment (SOICR p. 12)
[brief] Not only does [...] fail to reveal this material information, it misrepresents the report to this Court.  On page 11 of its brief, [...] states that [...] testified that the appraised value was $622,500 “even with a protected tenant. ”  See also brief at pg. 50 (representing that the appraisal “account[ed] for [...]’s protected status”).  This is in direct contravention to the plain language of the appraisal and [...]’s actual testimony.  F.
[brief] 2.  THE STATE IS OBfuscATING THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF MR. PFEISTER’S PROSECUTION BY WRONGLY STATING THAT HE IS CHALLENGING THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE STATUTE ITSELF  If this Court decides not to reverse and remand, it must then decide the actual issue for which [...] conditionally pled guilty.  [...] never challenged the constitutional basis for passing the statute that limits hunters within 450 feet of an occupied dwelling.
[brief] Discovery  The Honorable [...], J.S.C., assigned to the Gloucester County Complex Business Litigation Program, has presided over the proceedings in this case.  (T1-1 to 38-9; see also Da89.)  The history of discovery disputes between [...]-affiliated practices and [...] in other cases informed Judge Swift’s approach to discovery here.  (T18-19 to 19-2.)  On April 3, 2023, the trial court entered an Electronic Discovery Stipulation and Order (“eDiscovery Order”) to “govern discovery of --- 6  See, e.g., [...] in the Eighth Judicial District Court for Clark County, NV; [...] in the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit Court for Hillsborough County, FL; [...] in the [...] States District Court for the Southern District of NY.  (Da125 n.4; Da136.)  Electronically Stored Information (‘ESI’).”  (Da79.)  In addition, on April 21, 2023, the court issued an Amended Discovery Confidentiality Order (“Protective Order”) featuring extensive protections for materials marked Confidential or Attorneys’ Eyes Only.  (Da89.)  The eDiscovery Order provided that privileged documents “may be withheld from production, provided each privileged email is identified on a Privilege Log. ”  (Da84.)  That order also directed the parties to label highly sensitive materials “Confidential” or “Attorneys’ Eyes Only” before production.  (Da84.)  The Protective Order described Confidential Information as including “trade secrets, competitively sensitive technical, marketing, financial, sales or other confidential business information” or “private or confidential personal information. ”  (Da89.)  It described “Attorneys’ Eyes Only” information as including “highly sensitive business or personal information, the disclosure of which is highly likely to cause significant harm to an individual or to the business or competitive position of the Producing Party. ”  (Da89.)  On April 25, 2023, the trial court conducted a discovery hearing with counsel for all parties.
[brief] Exhibit 9, Civil Case Information Statement and Track Assignment Notice, dated October 10, 2014, filed June 27, 2019  Exhibit 10, [...]’s Answer to Second Amended Complaint, Case Information Statement and Stipulation, dated April 1, 2016, filed June 27, 2019  Exhibit 11, [...]’ Answer to Second Amended Complaint, Case Information Statement and Stipulation, dated April 21, 2016, filed June 27, 2019 (omitted here – see 1740a)  Exhibit 12, Affidavit of [...], P.E., dated August 23, 2017, filed June 27, 2019 (omitted here – see 2324a)  Exhibit 13, Affidavit of [...], P.E., dated August 22, 2017, filed June 27, 2019 (omitted here – see 2333a)  Exhibit 14, Deposition of [...], P.E., dated June 12, 2018, filed June 27, 2019 (omitted here – see 2185a)  Exhibit 15, Deposition of [...], P.E., dated September 10, 2018, filed June 27, 2019 (omitted here – see 2068a)  Exhibit 16, Deposition of [...], dated July 11, 2018, filed June 27, 2019 (omitted here – see 1947a)  Exhibit 17, Deposition of [...], P.E., dated April 26, 2019, filed June 27, 2019 (omitted here – see 2504a)  Exhibit 18, Deposition of [...], P.E., dated April 10, 2019, filed June 27, 2019 (omitted here – see 2485a) Exhibit 19, Report of [...], P.E., dated April 19, 2018, filed June 27, 2019 Exhibit 20, Deposition of [...], P.E., dated April 9, 2019, filed June 27, 2019 Exhibit 21, Deposition of [...], dated April 12, 2017, filed June 27, 2019 (omitted here – see 1912a) Exhibit 22, Excerpt from N.J.A.C. 13:40 State Board of Professional Engineers and Land Surveyors, dated November 16, 2015, filed June 27, 2019 Exhibit 23, Estate of Alexander v. Northeast Sweepers, A-1123-17 (App. Div. Apr. 19, 2018) (unpublished), filed June 27, 2019 (omitted here – see 2303a)  Exhibit 24, Report of [...], P.E., dated February 22, 2019, filed June 27, 2019 (omitted here – see 2365a)  Exhibit 25, Report of Examination of [...], P.E., dated January 18, 2018, filed June 27, 2019 (omitted here – see 289a)  [...]’ Response to Plaintiff’s Statement of Material Facts, filed August 17, 2019
[brief] A CFA claim requires proof of three elements: “1) unlawful conduct by defendant; 2) an ascertainable loss by plaintiff; and 3) a causal relationship between the unlawful conduct and the ascertainable loss. ”  Bosland v. Warnock Dodge, Inc., 197 N.J. 543, 557 A.2d 741 (2009); Cox v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 138 N.J. 2, 647 A.2d 454 (1994).  As the trial court concluded, Appellant failed to plead any of these elements sufficiently.
[brief] 1T14:4-7.  The trial prosecutor’s argument, although forced by the circumstances, is inaccurate – in fact, the 911 call should have been admitted substantively pursuant to New Jersey Rules of Evidence, which permit substantive admission of hearsay during suppression hearings.  [The trial court is not bound by evidence rules when deciding preliminary questions of admissibility, except those on privilege and Rule 403.  See N.J.R.E. 104(a)(1)].  But the hearing had already begun at the time that the trial court made this ruling, and, as such, the trial prosecutor was forced to make this argument in a desperate attempt to admit the relevant evidence despite the trial court’s error.
[brief] Some months later, after being permitted to proceed pro se, [...] filed a motion to reconsider [...]’s order denying suppression.  The Honorable [...], J.S.C., held a hearing (3T3-17 to 27-15) and issued an order denying the pro se reconsideration motion on March 28, 2023 (Da 87-101).  ---  3  The following abbreviations to the record will be used:  Da – Appendix to Defendant-Appellant’s Brief  Dca – Confidential Appendix to Defendant-Appellant’s Brief  1T – June 30, 2022 Transcript (hearing on suppression motion)  2T – July 28, 2022  Transcript (oral decision on suppression motion)  3T – March 28, 2023  Transcript (hearing on motion to reconsider; plea)  4T – June 2, 2023  Transcript (hearing on sentencing)  On March 28, 2023, after his pro se motions\(^4\) were denied, [...] pled guilty to two counts pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement: third-degree possession with intent to distribute fentanyl, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5a(1) and 2C:35-5b(5) (Count Six); and second-degree certain persons not to possess a firearm, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:39-7b(1) (Count 13).
[brief] **CERTIFICATION**  I hereby certify that the aforesaid statements are true.  I understand that if they are willfully false, I am subject to punishment.  Date: 11/6/2023  [...]  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY, APPELLATE DIVISION, DOCKET NO. [...]  CIVIL ACTION ON APPEAL FROM: SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY CHANCERY DIVISION – FAMILY PART  MORRIS COUNTY DOCKET NO. [...]  CERTIFICATION OF SERVICE
[brief] CRIMINAL ACTION  On Appeal from a Judgment of Conviction of the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Essex County.  Indictment Nos. [...]; [...]; [...].  Sat Below: Hon. [...], J.S.C., and [...], J.S.C.  REPLY  BRIEF ON BEHALF OF DEFENDANT-APPELLANT  [...]  Public Defender  Office of the Public Defender  Appellate Section [...]  [...] [...]  [...]  Assistant Deputy Public Defender  [...]  Attorney ID: 446232023  Of Counsel and on the Brief  Dated: December 23, 2024  DEFENDANT IS CONFINED
[brief] However, the very next year our Supreme Court decided Dolson v. Anastasia, and held a jury’s verdict to have been against the weight of the evidence where the defendant acknowledged the presence of the plaintiff on the highway, in front of the defendant and coming to a stop; yet the jury found no negligence as to the defendant who testified that he had attempted to stop and for ‘some reason’, maybe an oil slick, he was unable to stop before contacting the plaintiff’s vehicle.  Dolson v. Anastasia, 55 N.J. 2, 11 (1969).
[brief] A “model identification charge should be given in every case in which identification is a legitimate issue,” *Davis*, 363 N.J. Super. at 561, “even when” — unlike in [...]’s case — “defendant’s misidentification argument is ‘thin. ’”  *Cotto*, 182 N.J. Super. at 326.  Trial courts are “not at liberty to withhold an instruction, particularly when that instruction addresses the sole basis for defendant’s claim of innocence and it goes to an essential element of the State’s case. ”  *Davis*, 363 N.J. Super. at 562.  The “complete absence of any reference to identification as an issue or as an essential element of the State’s case is improper.
[brief] The New Motion Judge did not comply with the requirement that, when assessing a motion for summary judgment, the court must accept the plaintiff’s version of the facts along with all --- \(^7\)  This is not to say that it could never have been an affirmative defense that a doctor was not available to perform this procedure.  In another case, one in which a c-section had been actually called, if the defendants plead, as an affirmative defense, unavailability of staff due to other unforeseen or emergency circumstances, then Plaintiff would have had proper notice of the defense and discovery would proceed on that basis.  Here, though, unavailability cannot be a defense, because the c-section was not called.  It bears highlighting that nothing remotely suggesting discretionary use of existing staff to address other medical concerns or emergencies was set forth as an affirmative defense in Defendant’s answers.  \([See Pa84-85; Pa90-93; Pa266-267; Pa153-154; Pa162-165]\).  If proper notice of this defense had been given, Plaintiff would have taken discovery directed at issues such as whether staffing was not available due to that other emergency.  Of course, contrary to the opinions below, it would have been the burden of Defendants to prove this defense.  The decisions below placed Plaintiff under the improper burden of establishing proofs tending to show that a doctor was available, when the law places no such burden on Plaintiff at all.  Even without notice of this so-called “issue,” Plaintiff did show that a doctor likely would have been available to perform the procedure, assuming the New Motion Judge’s speculation that the c-section had been called at 9:48 p.m.  Without a hint of irony, the New Motion Judge dismissed Plaintiff’s efforts as speculation insufficient to defeat the court’s own speculative fact pattern. reasonable inferences flowing from those facts.  The September 29, 2023 decision, most notably, is replete with factual “findings” that are plainly disputable through competent evidence.  Additionally, along these same lines, assuming the occurrence of a fact, which in fact did not occur, so as to create a hypothetical differing from the actual facts, is an explicit renunciation of the court’s obligation to assess the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.  **POINT I**
[brief] 3  Templo Fuente De Vida Corp. V. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co., 224 N.J. 189 (2016)  3 D'Agostino v. Maldonado, 216 N.J. 168 (2013)  3 Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366 (1995)  4 Murphy v. New Milford Zoning Comm'n, 402 F.3d 342, 347 (2d Cir. 2005).  Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148, 87 S. Ct. 1507, 1515, 18 L. Ed. 2d 681, 691 (1967)  Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 97 S. Ct. 980, 51 L. Ed. 2d 192 (1977)  K. Hovnanian Cos. of N. Cent. Jersey, Inc. v. N.J. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 379 N.J. Super. 1, 9-10 (App. Div.) certif. denied, 185 N.J. 390 (2005).  Gonzalez v. Stabley Morland Little Friends Etc. Docket No. A-5004-11T3 (App. Div. 2013).  COURT RULES R. 4:42-7
[brief] (7T246-14 to 247-6).  Once in a while when defendant had a bad day in school, he would tell [...] he wanted to be put on medication or talk to a school therapist because he was having bad thoughts about hurting a neighborhood kid.  (7T152-12 to 155-7, 216-2 to 9).  [...] told defendant “no” out of concern defendant would be placed in a “looney bin. ” (7T211-22 to 216-1, 241-8 to 25, 248-4 to 23, 251-8 to 25).  Defendant had a “flat personality” and did not show emotion.
[directive] Incident Enforcement Law Preliminary  A the at report preparing the officer the known to information basic document only to intended decision inform the and/or to cause probable establish to needed be may that arrest of time the that fact  The acomplaint-warrant. apply for or acomplaint-summons issue to whether acheck-off check not does Report  Incident Enforcement Law Preliminary a preparing officer rather but exist, does not circumstance or fact such that mean to construed be not should box sufficient have not does report preliminary the completing of time the at officer the only that circumstance or such fact of non-existence or existence the indicate to need, immediate or basis, more are that reports subsequent supplemented by be may that report preliminary initial, an in in documented information the understood that clearly be should It detailed. and comprehensive arrest/booking of the time the prepared at is Report
[brief] As the New Jersey Constitution states, “Government is instituted for the protection, security, and benefit of the people,” N.J. Const., Art. 1, § 2a.  If the Board honestly believed that it was unable to grant the Petition on its face, the process of seeking discovery and looking for additional information was, at best, a farce.  Likewise, and as the Board itself acknowledges, this Petition functions as a waiver request, if needed.  See Order, at 5. (005a.) (“Were Petitioner’s project granted for a waiver so that this general grid-supply project could enter the TI Program…”).  No analysis was provided for a review of a waiver.  In fact, the “analysis” provided by the [...] in this Order is so cursory and shallow as to essential qualify as no analysis at all.
[brief] Respondent argues that dismissal is not warranted because the trial court “wholly cured any prejudice” in granting Appellant’s motion to suppress.  Respondent makes this argument while at the same time arguing in its cross appeal, see, [...], that the trial court erred in granting the motion to suppress.  Respondent’s parallel arguments are insincere, contradictory and further demonstrate the bad faith with which this matter is being litigated.  Equally as baffling is Respondent's argument that the undisputed fact [...] withheld his notes and took the stand twice and perjured himself is neither willful nor outrageous.  It is hard to imagine more egregious conduct than an officer taking an oath before a court and flat out lying to try and justify an unlawful search.  It is the willful and outrageous conduct that is generally saved for Hollywood fiction, and which is rarely seen in actual courts.  Respondent further argues that no Brady violation occurred because [...]’s notes were immaterial and were provided in time for their effective use at trial.  First, [...]’s notes were material.  Appellant’s motion to suppress was premised on the notion Appellant’s door was breached.  The trial court even unequivocally told the parties that the only issue which would be dispositive was proof that Appellant’s apartment door was locked.  Second, it is irrelevant that the notes were provided prior to trial.  Under Respondent’s theory the State could withhold evidence that is material to motion practice with impunity so long as they provide such information prior to trial.  Respondent’s position is illogical and contrary to our well settled laws and rules.
[brief] The NJSLL was enacted in 1914 to address the widely predatory and substantially unregulated consumer loan industry in New Jersey, primarily focusing on small loans to natural persons.  See Family Fin. Corp. v. Gough, 10 N.J. Super. 13, 19 (App. Div. 1950); see also Ryan v. Motor Credit Co., 132 N.J. Eq. 398, 401 (1942) (“The underlying reason for the drastic provisions of the act for the protection of the borrower is his credulity and susceptibility to oppression by reason of his necessitous circumstances. ”).  The NJSLL—like the NJCFLA—was meant to police the consumer credit industry and allowed for enforcement by the Commissioner as well as individual consumers.
[brief] See U.S. ex rel. Integra Med Analytics LLC v. Providence Health & Servs., No. CV 17-1694 PSG (SSx), 2019 WL 3282619 (C.D. Cal. July 16, 2019), rev’d on other grounds, 854 F. App’x 840 (9th Cir. 2021).  Two have applied that erroneous legal standard to [...] (but not [...] or [...], either one of which is sufficient to trigger the bar).  See Ja3873–77 (State ex rel. [...] v. [...], No. 2017 L 000289 (Ill. Cir. Ct. June 13, 2023)); *State ex rel. [...] v. [...]*, 307 Cal. Rptr. 3d 750, 776 (Ct. App. 2023).
[directive] DRUG TEST RESULTS  A.  The Laboratory will provide written test results for every specimen submitted for analysis.  All efforts will be made to deliver these reports within 15 working days of the submission.  Reports will be addressed to the contact person listed on the specimen submission record.  Positive test results will be sent to the contact person by certified mail.  B.  In some cases, the Laboratory will report that a specimen tested positive for a particular substance and that the information on the Drug Testing Medication Information form explains the test result.  For example, the Laboratory may report that a specimen tested positive for barbiturates and a prescription for that barbiturate was listed on the form by the officer.  At this point, it is the responsibility of the submitting agency to determine whether the officer, trainee, or applicant had a valid prescription for that drug.  Officers who do not have a valid prescription are subject to disciplinary action including termination by the agency.  C.