ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] [...] claims [...] can only be awarded its past costs incurred, $475,623.87, and not its future costs, because they are punitive, and an insurance contract does not cover punitive costs.  The Verified Complaint stated that, although considerable environmental investigation and remediation work had been undertaken by [...] at the property, “more work is required to address soil and groundwater contamination before an LSRP can issue an unrestricted use Response Action Outcome (“RAO”) to confirm that the Incident has been remediated and is protective of human health, safety and the environment. ” (PPCIa011).  The Verified Complaint further states that, [...]’s environmental consultant, “states that presently the oil spill is continuous and likely to recur in the future by way of migration further and wider than its current location unless it is completely remediated by way of an RAO issued by an LSRP. ” (PPCIa011).  [...] has so far spent $475,623.87 on investigating and remediating the Incident.  More work is required in the LSRP has not yet issued an RAO for the Incident.  The trial judge trebled that award because [...] gave notice to [...] to respond to the Incident (PPCIa369-71); otherwise, [...] would do the work and seek treble damages as permitted by the Spill Act.  N.J.S.A. 58:10-23.11f.a(3).  [...] did not respond, and [...] proceeded with the work.  [...] argues that an insurance policy does not cover punitive damages and cites cases to that effect.  (Br. p. 33).  However, a surety agreement is not an insurance contract.  A surety agreement is a three-way guarantee agreement based on the personal evaluation of the oblige to perform.  A surety ([...]) guarantees to a third party ([...]) that a named oblige ([...]) will perform its obligations.  If the oblige ([...]) does not perform, the surety ([...]) will pay the third-party beneficiary ([...]) on the final judgment and then seek reimbursement from the oblige ([...]).  *Eagle Fire Protection Corp. v. First Indemn. of Am. Ins. Co.*, 145 N.J. 345, 353-54  There is nothing about the MCS-90 surety that is tied into the underlying insurance contract, and insurance contract law does not govern the surety agreement.  There is nothing in the MCS-90 surety endorsement that precludes the payment of a treble damage award, other than the limit of the surety, which here is $750,000.  The trial court did not err in awarding [...] $750,000 because the surety obligation required payment of the [...] Final Judgment regardless of insurance issues.  **POINT VIII**
[brief] Id. at 409.  In order to rebut the presumption of discrimination raised by plaintiff's prima facie case, the employer must come forward with evidence of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action.  Murray v. Newark Housing Authority, 311 N.J. Super. 163, 173 (N.J. Super. 1998); see also Zive v. Stanley Roberts, Inc., 182 N.J. 436, 458 (N.J. 2005) (The defendant then bears the burden of rebutting that presumption by articulating a legitimate and non-discriminatory reason for the termination).
[directive] 4.  (6)  Você entende que se descumprir uma condição da supervisão [Sim/Yes]  [Não/No]  [Não 1o vitalícia de liberdade condicional no dia de julho de 2014 ou após corresponde/NA] esta data e for indiciado e condenado por este descumprimento, você receberá uma sentença de prisão de até 5 anos ou, se o 1o descumprimento ocorreu antes de julho de 2014, você receberá uma sentença de prisão de até 18 meses e a sentença que receber poderá ser em complementação à sentença de prisão que venha a receber do Conselho de Liberdade Condicional pelo descumprimento dos termos da supervisão vitalícia de liberdade condicional?
[brief] Plaintiffs argue that the Trial Court “made numerous errors of facts in its statement of reasons, impermissibly and inappropriately acting as a rebuttal expert to [...]”.  Plaintiffs assertion is misplaced.  [...] was not presented as a fact witness.  [...] did not possess any “facts” relevant to the case.  [...] was presented as an expert witness who issued a report and testified to his “opinions”.  The Trial Court analyzed [...]’s opinions and testimony and found the conclusions to be not reliable and not meeting the standard of establishing damages for a new business with “reasonable certainty”, all for the detailed reasons expressed in the Trial Courts “Statement of Reasons”.
[brief] Page(s) Willingboro Mall, Ltd. v. 240/242 Franklin Ave., L.L.C., 421 N.J. Super. 445 (App. Div. 2011).........................................................10 Statutes N.J.S.A. § 56:8-2..............................................................................................4 Defendant-Respondent [...] f/k/a [...] opposes Plaintiff-Appellant [...]’s appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Hunterdon County’s May 8, 2024 order granting [...]’s motion to reopen this case to enforce a 2015 National Class Action Settlement Agreement and Release (“Settlement Agreement”).
[brief] Specifically, Chapter 92 was enacted in May 2007 to effectuate several recommendations in the Joint Legislative Committee Report.  N.J.S.A. 43:15A-7.2(a).  Section 20 of Chapter 92, codified at N.J.S.A. 43:15A-7.2, responded to Recommendation No. 10 by clarifying that individuals performing professional services under a professional services contract awarded under N.J.S.A. 40A:11-5, 18A:18A-5 or 18A:64A-25.5 (governing local government contracts and school contracts) following the expiration of the term of any existing contract would not be eligible for future PERS service credit.
[brief] N.J.S.A. 25:1-15 applies to guarantees.  However, neither the termination notice of April 11, 2016, or the letter of May 6, 2016, refers to the guarantee.  Neither the termination notice of April 11, 2016, or the letter of May 6, 2016 are signed by the guarantors.  The language of the guarantee remains unchanged, that [...], [...], and [...] “personally guarantee the obligations of the tenant herein”.  As set forth above, the only modification in the May 5, 2016, agreement was the amount of rent of the Lease agreement, for 4 months and the rescission of the termination notice.
[brief] (Ia18).  The tract consists of 3.20 acres.  (Ia161)  The applicant’s engineer and planner, [...], testified that each lot would be improved with a house consisting of three stories and a basement.  (1T6-19 to 1T6-21; 1T13-2 to 1T13-3)  The lots would front on a new street to be called “Charlotte’s Walk”.  (2T10-14)  The subdivision application also proposed to widen Fourteenth Street and construct a new 50’ wide right-of-way terminating with a new cul-de-sac bulb.  (Ia19)  [...] drew the plans submitted along with the application, which depicted two lateral sewer lines for each of the new homes.  (Ia99)  Notably, basement apartments are permitted uses in all residential zones per UDO Sec. 18-910D (Ia212)  While no variance relief was requested or required, the application called for several submission waivers and two design waivers: from proposing street trees along the entire Fourteenth Street frontage, and from providing non-radial lot lines.  (Ia18)  Per UDO Sec. 18-805C (Ia213):  “Insofar as is practical, side lot lines shall be at right angles to straight streets and radial to curved streets. ”  The tract is located in Lakewood’s R-12 single-family district.  (Ia100), of which the use and bulk zoning standards are set forth in the Township’s Unified Development Ordinance (UDO) at Section 18-902E.  (Ia171)  At the initial public hearing on April 5, 2022, the applicant’s attorney stated the following:
[directive] Americans with Act Disabilities # Directive 13-20 30, April 2020  2  Page on or  The court shall state the reasons the record for immediately commencing staying of or commencement the county jail custodial term or commencing deferring juvenile of whether dispositions to a secure placement.  To determine to stay the commencement a judges custodial term during the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic, should consider whether a stay of or or would pose a risk to the safety the public the defendant the juvenile.  In that regard, of of to judges must consider and make findings on the risk danger the public, the risk flight, and of the seriousness the offense, among other factors relevant to public safety.  Judges should also of consider the positions the defendant, defense counsel, juvenile, the prosecution, and any juvenile's or juvenile victims.  delinquency matters, the preferences expressed by the parent(s)  In guardian(s) also should be considered.  or  Unless the court orders otherwise, as otherwise provided by law, certain other of of conditions the sentence will commence upon sentencing or disposition regardless any stay of or the custodial term.  These include, but are not limited to, any monetary court-ordered financial obligations, restitution, no-contact orders, Megan's Law registration obligations, and driver's license suspensions.  The guidance also includes instructions for probation officers to participate in sentencing defendant's juvenile's or hearings, and to capture the contact information (address, phone, and if of email address, applicable) for purposes ensuring that probation supervision begins promptly, of if or including the commencement the custodial sentence disposition is stayed.
[brief] *Bryant v. City of Atlantic City*, supra, 308 N.J. Super. 596.  In *Bryant*, the Appellate Division affirmed that N.J.S.A.  40A:12-7 does not require complete specificity in a redevelopment plan, only that the completed project must be consistent with the redevelopment plan.  See id. at 618-19.  The plan must only contain an “outline” of the development, and the [...] contemplates that a redevelopment agreement might address specificities left out of the redevelopment plan.
[brief] Plaintiffs/Respondents/Cross-Appellants, [...] and [...] (“Plaintiffs”), submit this Reply Brief in support of Plaintiffs’ cross-appeal.  The Trial Court below has adjudicated that the Defendant/Respondent/Cross-Appellant [...], at the instigation of the Mayor, unlawfully denied Plaintiffs’ development application.  Thus, it has been held that Defendants have engaged in arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable actions taken contrary to the terms of the applicable statutes set forth in the Municipal Land Use Law and the case law cited by the Trial Court.  That denial of Plaintiffs’ development application has cost the Plaintiffs an inordinate amount of money consisting of damages, attorney’s fees and costs of suit.  The Trial Court’s reversal of the denial does not make Plaintiffs whole.
[directive] It is the duty of all law enforcement agencies in the State to report bias incidents to the New Jersey Attorney General’s designees.  DCJ and NJSP have designated an electronic reporting system for this purpose -- the Electronic Uniform Crime Reporting (eUCR) portal.  When a bias incident report is submitted through the eUCR portal, the information is automatically forwarded to the Bias Crimes Unit at DCJ, the NJSP, the New Jersey Office of Homeland Security and Preparedness, and the appropriate County Prosecutor.  Local law enforcement agencies shall report all confirmed or suspected bias incidents through the eUCR system as soon as is practicable, but not more than 24 hours from the initial law enforcement response.  Under current eUCR procedures, each law enforcement agency in New Jersey receives a single log-in for the eUCR system.  Chief Subsection (3) was ruled unconstitutional in State v. Pomianek, 221 N.J. 66, 91 (2015).  1  Page 3 of 16 law enforcement executives must plan accordingly to ensure their agencies meet the reporting requirements of this guideline.2  In cases of suspected or confirmed bias incidents involving: (1) homicide, aggravated sexual assault, sexual assault, aggravated assault, or arson; (2) a law enforcement officer as the alleged perpetrator; (3) an organized hate group as the perpetrator; or (4) a potential to generate large-scale public unrest, the local law enforcement agency shall also immediately notify the Bias Crimes Unit at DCJ.
[brief] [...] was in court willing to proceed on the contents of the ticket – that is, that Defendant was within 450 feet of two structures, a residence and a pump house, as reflected by the ticket.  Defendant claims before this Court that the only issue now is whether the pump house falls within the scope of the statute – and not the other residence listed on the ticket.  He claims that the pump house was the only structure to which he pled guilty – while the Law Division Judge found he pled guilty to being within 450 feet of a structure, and that there was “no distinction” between the two buildings, and that “both structures were included. ”  (1T 38-7 to 38-11)  Indeed, there was never a doubt in the municipal court that the prohibition was having a loaded weapon within 450 feet of “a structure.
[brief] The DOE has determined that [...] has no recourse, even if he is right.  It is the most fundamental principle of our jurisprudence that where there is a legal right, there must also be a remedy by suit or action at law where that right is invaded.  *Marbury v. Madison*, 1 Cranch 137, 163, 5 U.S. 137, 163, 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803).  Through its contravention of this basic principle, the Job FAD is rendered an arbitrary and irrational act of government; a violation of [...]’s right to Due Process, and an affront to the principles of Fundamental Fairness that obtain in our legal proceedings.  For these, and all the reasons set forth herein, this Court must reverse the Job FAD, and Grant [...]’s Appeal.
[brief] Section 12.1  It provides:  Redeveloper agrees to proceed in good faith and at its own cost and expense to obtain all Governmental Approvals to develop and construct the Project in accordance with the Redevelopment Project Schedule.  Redeveloper agrees that it shall not seek any use variances pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70(d) in connection with its applications for the Governmental Approvals.  CONCLUSION
[brief] See generally Fed. R. Civ. P. 26.  Finally, Plaintiffs express concern that the attorney reviewers will improperly train the TAR tool by making incorrect responsiveness determinations or prematurely ending the review.  (Id. at 7-8.)  But these concerns are present no matter which methodology is employed.  In traditional manual review for example, reviewers may have different interpretations of whether a particular document is responsive.  Even a single reviewer may make a different relevancy determination based on his or her knowledge about the case at the time of the determination.  In short, uncertainty in determining responsiveness is not unique to TAR.  In any event, [...] has a variety of quality control applications that [...] intends to employ with its review.  (See R. 300, Def.’s Resp. at 8-9.)  Those applications negate Plaintiffs’ concerns.  In the absence of any compelling argument from Plaintiffs, the court agrees with [...] that as the responding party it is best situated to decide how to search for and produce emails responsive to Plaintiffs’ discovery requests.
[brief] No claim accruing on Feb. 21, 2015, or any time thereafter, could have been alleged on behalf of the [...] class because by that point, the complaint had been dismissed with prejudice.  This is further made clear by ¶5.2, “Waiver of Unknown Released Claims”, which states that “each Class Member, upon the Effective Date [of final judgment, Feb. 20, 2015], shall be deemed to have, and by operation of the Final Settlement Order and Judgment shall have, fully, finally, and forever settled and released any and all Released Claims, . . . which then exist, or heretofore have existed upon any theory of law . . . .” (Pa0059) (italics added).  “A settlement acts as a release only in respect of those claims that the parties actually released, or intended to release. ”  Goncalvez ex rel. Goncalvez, 188 N.J. Super. 620, 629 (App. Div. 1983).  Strikingly absent from ¶5.2 is any mention of “claims that do not yet exist”, or “claims that might exist in the future”, or simply “future claims. ”  See, e.g., Witasick v. Minn. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 803 F.3d 184, 192 (3d Cir. 2015) (plaintiff’s complaint was barred by an earlier settlement expressly releasing defendant insurance company from “any future claims, either known or unknown”) (italics added); Monaco v. Mitsubishi Motors Credit of Am., Inc., 34 F. App'x 43, 45 (3d Cir. 2002) (dismissing complaint where an earlier class settlement had previously released defendants from “any other claims of any kind, known, or unknown, that class members had, have or may in the future have arising out of the class members' vehicle leases”) (italics added).  When read in conjunction with ¶1.29, the waiver provision at ¶5.2— together with the purpose statement at ¶2.1— compels the conclusion that the 2015 Settlement Agreement extinguished only the claims that had accrued to the [...] class members on or before Feb. 20, 2015; not claims arising on or after that date.
[brief] Based on the last three years of litigation with Appellant, it is not surprising that his arguments on appeal contain blatant lies.  Appellant claims that he requested information on Estate assets and their disposition and was denied that information.  He first received a complete list of items contained in [...]’s Englewood, New Jersey home (the “Englewood Home”) and their collective value over two years ago.  (Pa297-Pa298).  Thereafter, Appellant and/or his counsel were advised on numerous occasions that the personal property belonging to [...] was sold.  Appellant also knows that the Englewood Home was sold, and for what price.  Further, he unquestionably knows the nature of [...]’s remaining two properties as he is currently defendant in litigations with the Estate, wherein the Estate is seeking his removal from both properties as he has no legal rights to reside in same.  In sum, Appellant has all relevant information regarding the Estate.
[brief] ”  [...], the only identification eyewitness, was permitted to identify [...] at trial as the suspect he saw in Kelly’s Tavern even though he had never identified a photograph of [...] as the suspect.  Dunn had only ever seen [...] approximately two or three times and did not know his name; he merely told police that the suspect was a man he had seen working at Kelly’s Tavern who had red hair and a chest tattoo.  The police never presented Dunn with an array containing [...]’s photo to see if Dunn would identify [...] as the suspect; instead, the State waited until trial to ask Dunn whether he saw the suspect in the courtroom, when there was only one option—the defendant sitting at the defense table.  Because there was no good reason to allow Dunn to identify [...] in court for the first time without a prior valid out-of-court identification, the admission of Dunn’s first time in-court identification deprived defendant of due process and a fair trial and requires reversal.  U.S. Const. amends. VI, XIV; N.J. Const. art. I, ¶¶ 1, 9, 10; N.J.R.E. 701.
[brief] Without citing to any case, to any law, or to any undisputed fact, the Trial dismissed, in one fell swoop, all of Appellant’s claims against all Defendants while allowing her male co-plaintiff, who was not a victim of sexual harassment but suffered retaliation for supporting Appellant, to proceed to trial.  In overruling itself, the Trial Court held that no one in this case was, or could ever be, held liable because Appellant and [...] were not technically paid by the same organization.  Infra § II (“This Court can’t find that the [...] actions taken were within the control of the [...] defendant.  It is for that reason that I don’t believe that [...] is an appropriate defendant in this case, and I’m going to grant the motion for summary judgment as to the [...] Defendants. ”)
[directive] Timely information gathering and sharing is critical to our ongoing efforts to combat gun violence.  This Office has long recognized the importance of intelligence-driven violence suppression efforts, as evidenced by the establishment of the Statewide Gun Violence Reduction New Jersey Is An Equal Opportunity Employer • Printed on Recycled Paper and Recyclable June 14, 2023 Page 2 Task Force, pursuant to AG Directive 2021-10.  The reality is, a firearm trafficked into New Jersey may cross various county lines and pass through many hands before it eventually becomes a murder weapon.  The work of the Gun Violence Reduction Task Force improves and expedites critical information sharing across the State between local, county, and state law enforcement agencies, thereby advancing law enforcement’s ability to identify and hold accountable violent recidivist offenders.  The success of our gun violence reduction efforts depends on effective information-sharing and the timely entry and analysis of ballistics evidence.  Thus, based on recommendations from law enforcement chief executives, I have determined that a revision to AG Directive 2008-1 is appropriate in order to improve law enforcement’s response to gun violence in this State.
[brief] There has been no sale to a third party or subsequent mortgages to any other lender.  T11.9-12.  In keeping with the Single Controversy Doctrine,  On August 4, 2023, Appellant filed the instant Complaint (Pa1) seeking (1) reinstatement of the 2012 [...] note and mortgage and foreclosure of the mortgage based on the $60,000 loan deficiency (Pa3; T5.14-19), (2) foreclosure of the 2022 mortgage (Pa44) under that loan’s cross-default provision (Pa44; T5.20-24); and (3) stating a claim for unjust enrichment as a result of the $60,000 windfall being received by the [...]s as a result of the Bankruptcy Court’s clawback of the mortgage payments made by [...], together with counsel fees and costs.
[brief] In support of this argument, defendant submitted a statement signed by [...].  (Pa44-52).  In this statement, [...] claimed that he, defendant, [...] met at [...]’s house on the day of the incident and planned the robbery.  (Pa47¶8).  Once they reached the McLoughlins’ house, defendant gave [...] a wire cutter, which [...] used to cut what he believed were alarm wires.  (Pa47¶10).  [...] was staying behind meanwhile, and after waiting for him for some time, defendant told him “come on. ” (Pa47¶10-12).  [...] responded “hold on,” and defendant “grabbed the gun from [...] and put it to [[...]’s] head and repeated ‘come on. ’” (Pa47¶12).  The three participants then observed [...] inside the house, but they did not see anyone else.  (Pa47¶12).  [...] broke a window, but the participants then waited for [...] to leave before taking the next step.  (Pa48¶¶13-15).  Following entrance, [...] killed [...], and defendant broke a table in the living room.  (Pa50¶23).  When [...] announced that [...] had pulled into the driveway, defendant “took the gun with him, first saying he did not think he could shoot [...] then said ‘fuck it. ’” (Pa50¶¶24-25).  He then shot [...] with “the remaining two bullets. ” (Pa50¶25).  While [...] was running away, [...] grabbed a knife and stabbed him as he passed by.  (Pa50-51¶26).  After defendant caught up with [...], [...] and defendant beat him until he was unconscious and carried him into the house with [...]’s help.  (Pa51¶¶27-28).  Defendant then went “into the kitchen and punched the microwave when he noticed it was nearing 6:00 pm,” his curfew time.  (Pa51¶29).  Shortly thereafter, defendant and [...] left, while [...] was trying to flush the bullet casings down the toilet.  (Pa51¶¶29-30).  When [...] came out of the bathroom, he realized he was left alone in the house.  (Pa52¶37).  Overwhelmed with panic, he grabbed a couple of knifes, stabbed [...]’s side a couple of times, dropped the knives, and ran out of the house.  (Pa51-52¶32).  When he caught up with defendant and [...], “they just laughed. ” (Pa52¶33).  [...] concluded his statement by claiming that he alone caused [...]’s death, and that defendant and [...] should not be held accountable as “if they themselves stabbed [...]. ” (Pa52¶36).  [...] denied PCR and defendant pursued an appeal pro se.