ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] The following is a sample of what such a notice should contain:  The agency may assign to its members and employees agency-owned vehicles, lockers, desks, cabinets, etc., for the mutual convenience of the agency and its personnel.  Such equipment is and remains the property of the agency.  Personnel are reminded that storage of personal items in this property is at the employee's own risk.  This property is subject to entry and inspection without notice.  7.8.6
[brief] [...] [...]  D/B/A [...] (IMPROPERLY PLED AS NIROAL, LLC)  [...]  [...], Esquire N.J.  Id: 002002002  Email: [...]  [...], Esq. N.J.  Id: 023221988  Email: [...]  [...] [...]  [...] [...]  Attorneys for Respondent/Cross-Appellant, Roberto Arcucci  Niroal LLC d/b/a Amore Ristorante (Improperly Pled As Niroal, LLC)
[brief] We likewise are unpersuaded that the record suffices to establish defendant had apparent authority to allow the officers into this private dwelling.  The United States Supreme Court has applied the apparent authority doctrine “when officers enter without a warrant because they reasonably (though erroneously) believe that the person who has consented to their search is a resident of the premises[.]”  Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 186 (emphasis added); see also Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 109 (2006) (noting that police may reasonably rely upon consent given by “a co-occupant whom the police reasonably, but erroneously, believe to possess shared authority as an occupant. ” (emphasis added)).
[brief] ...................................................................................  20  Mhrez v. Convergent Outsourcing, Inc., 2024 WL 2838327 (App. Div. June 5, 2024) ............................................. passim Michel v. New Jersey Manufacturers Ins. Co., 2018 WL 5985985 (App. Div. Nov. 15, 2018)............................................. 6 Miller v. Americollect, Inc., Case No. ESX-L-6164-21, 2022 WL 20470401 (N.J. Super. L. Aug. 11, 2022) ................................................................. passim Moukengeschaie v. Eltman, Eltman & Cooper, P.C., 2016 WL 1274541 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2016)............................................... 10 New Jersey Dep’t of Env’t Prot. v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 453 N.J. Super. 272 (App. Div. 2018) ....................................................... 34 New Jersey Div. of Child Protec. and Permanency v. K.M., 444 N.J. Super. 325 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 2016) ..................................... 7, 33 Nicholas v. Mynster, 213 N.J. 463 (2013) ................................................................................... passim Nyanjom v. NPAS Solutions, LLC, 2022 WL 168222 (D. Kan. Jan. 19, 2022) ..............................................15, 30 Perez v. Rent-A-Ctr., Inc., 186 N.J. 188 (2006) .................................................................................. 17 Pettus v. Morgenthau, 554 F.3d 293 (2d Cir. 2009) ........................................................................ 16 Presbyterian Home at Pennington, Inc. v. Borough of Pennington, 409 N.J. Super. 166 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 2009) .........................................  11  Pub. Citizen v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 491 U.S. 440 (1989) ....................................................................................17, 18  Quaglia v. NS193, LLC, 2021 WL 7179621 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 12, 2021) ...............................................15, 30
[brief] ”  In *Peralta v. Ragan*, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 234300, at *5-8 (D.N.J. Dec. 30, 2022) (Dra27), the District Court denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss and held that defendant debt buyer’s failure to be licensed under the NJCFLA supported plaintiff’s claims for violations of the FDCPA.
[brief] STATEMENT OF FACTS ......................................................................................................6  A. Subdivision of Original Tract .........................................................................................6  B. Construction and Transfer of Lot 5.01 ..........................................................................9  C. Construction and Transfer of Lot 3.01 .........................................................................10  D. Construction and Transfer of Lot 4.01 .......................................................................11  E.  Approvals to Build on Lot 2.01 ..................................................................................12  F.  Borough's Purported "Rejection" of Dedication of Roads ...........................................14  G.  Easement does not Provide Public Right of Access Over Roads ..................................14  LEGAL ARGUMENT ............................................................................................................15
[brief] After being presented with all the mitigation evidence, the court rejected the first four Miller factors, finding that only the fifth factor, concerning the possibility of rehabilitation, applied.  The court then reduced [...]’s aggregate sentence but resentenced him to a period of parole ineligibility that was nearly identical to that of his original sentence – despite recognizing that the proper focus of a resentencing hearing is “the amount of real time a juvenile will spend in jail. ”  (5T:5-14 to 23, 8-18 to 20)  The court reasoned that the Appellate Division remanded the case solely to address the Miller factors, determining “that the trial judge made findings of facts concerning aggravating and mitigating factors that were based on competent and reasonably credible evidence in the record,” and incorporating both the original sentencing court’s aggravating and mitigating factor analysis and its Yarbough analysis by reference.  (5T:6-13 to 17, 13-11 to 18, 23-22 to 24-3 to 11, 25-7 to 15); See State v. Yarbough, 100 N.J. 627 (1985).
[brief] N.J. Const. art. VIII, § 4, ¶ 1 .............................................................................................................4 P.L. 2004, c. 61, § 1 .........................................................................................................................5 P.L. 2010, c. 44, § 4 .......................................................................................................................20 P.L. 2010, c. 44, § 12......................................................................................................................20 P.L. 2018, c. 67...............................................................................................................................17  RULES R. 4:46-2(c) ...................................................................................................................................25  REGULATIONS  N.J.A.C. 6A:13-3.4(a).....................................................................................................................21  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
[directive] Cash Bail Option  Actor purposely or knowingly causes the death of another; minimum 30 years before parole  2C:11-3a  Murder 1st Degree $250,000 to $1,000,000  No 10% eligibility and up to life in prison.  Actor commits or attempts to commit robbery, sexual assault, arson, burglary, kidnapping, carjacking, criminal escape or terrorism and, in the course of such crime or of immediate 2C:11-3a(3)  Felony Murder  1st Degree $250,000 to $1,000,000  No 10% flight therefrom, any person causes the death of a person other than one of the participants; minimum 30 years before parole eligibility and up to life in prison.  Aggravated  Actor recklessly causes death under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the 2C:11-4a  1st Degree $200,000 to $500,000  No 10%  Manslaughter value of human life, or actor causes death while eluding a police officer.  Actor recklessly causes death of another or purposely or knowingly causes death while in 2C:11-4b  Manslaughter  2nd Degree $100,000 to $200,000  No 10% the heat of passion resulting from a reasonable provocation.  1st Degree $200,000 to 400,000  No 10%  Actor unlawfully confines or removes another for various criminal purposes as set forth in statute; second degree if victim is released unharmed and in a safe place prior to 2C:13-1  Kidnapping apprehension; otherwise first degree; requires life with 25 years parole ineligibility if child under age 16 is sexually assaulted or delivered to another for pecuniary gain.  2nd Degree  $100,000 to $200,000  No 10%  14  Bail Schedule 1 STATUTES WHICH REQUIRE BAIL TO BE SET BY A SUPERIOR COURT JUDGE PURSUANT TO RULE 3:26-2
[brief] (31a ¶103); (212a).  In this March 13, 2017 notice, [...] proclaimed that several contractual modifications would be implemented on March 15, 2017.  (212a).  Most significant to this litigation, [...] stated that “[e]ffective March 15, 2017, all pending and prospective Terminal Leave payments shall be eliminated for all employees. ”  Ibid.  (emphasis added).  Notably, both Plaintiff [...] (retirement date February 1, 2017) and Plaintiff [...] (retirement date March 14, 2017) retired before [...]’s proposed Notice of Changes in the Terms and Conditions of Employment was planned to go into effect and before [...]’s lawsuit.  (28a ¶91 & 23a ¶54).  Before [...]’s Notice Implementation could go into effect, attorneys on behalf of [...] filed a Superior Court lawsuit on March 15, 2017 (the "First Police Matter").
[brief] Since the principal structure will be located in Mansfield, Plaintiff was obligated to seek a use variance under N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70(d)(1) to permit the accessory uses without a principal use located in Florence.  Ja025; Ja097.  No height variance was needed, but as mentioned above, Plaintiff also requested a bulk variance under N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70(c) to reduce the number of parking spaces required under Florence’s ordinance from 1,148 to 604.  Ja029-Ja030; 1T 36:12-19.  The reduction of parking spaces reduced the permitted lot coverage ratio from seventy percent (70%) to twenty-six percent (26%), would result in four (4) acres less of impervious coverage, and would reduce stormwater runoff by 330,000 gallons for a twenty-five (25) year storm.  (1T 35:8-13; 37:1-13).  Plaintiff was not required to seek a height variance under N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70(d)(6), and no relief requested from Florence sought deviations for height.  Ja029; Ja097; Ja146; 4T 9:10-25.  --- \(^4\)
[brief] Pa274.  The Trial Court below reviewed all of the evidence in a light most favorable to the Appellant, and correctly determined that the Defendant committed no violation in instructing Plaintiff to call her attorney's office, rather than a cell phone.  In fact, Plaintiff makes no allegation that any of the Defendants denied her the right to contact her attorney.  Lastly, the Plaintiff cites to no caselaw (published or unpublished) because this right to call a certain phone number does not exist.  Defendants gave permission to Plaintiff to make a phone call to her attorney.  That is what is required under the law.  As set forth at numerous times in the Court’s history of this case, unless the Plaintiff can cite to well established constitutional rights, the Defendants are protected by qualified immunity.
[brief] II.  The Trial Court’s dismissal of Plaintiff’s Complaint with prejudice must be reversed because it promotes gamesmanship of the Affidavit of Merit Statute.  (Transcript, 19:11–25).  “The [Affidavit of Merit] Statute was not intended to reward defendants who wait for a default before requesting that the plaintiff turn over the affidavit of merit. ”  Ferreira, supra 178 N.J. at 154.  Mandatory dismissal of a plaintiff’s complaint “thwarts the stated aim of allowing meritorious cases to go forward[,] that was never the intention of the Legislature when it enacted the Affidavit of Merit statute. ”  Ferreira, supra 178 N.J. at 157 (Long, J., concurring and dissenting).  Here, it is evident that Defendants are attempting to game the Affidavit of Merit statute, using it as both a sword and shield to unjustly have Plaintiff’s meritorious claim be dismissed.
[brief] Not only does this include the rent, it includes Tenant’s obligation to surrender the premises at the end of the term (Paragraph 3) to maintain, repair the premises and building and keep same in good repair and condition (Paragraph 6), payment of water and sewer rents, municipal improvement assessments, and any other charges made by any public authority (Paragraph 7).  Such a wide ranging guarantee was necessary because the landlord was giving possession of a $2 million dollar building to a LLC with no assets, and his only security for the tenant meeting the obligations of the Lease and returning the property to the landlord was the personal guarantees of [...], [...] and [...].  Deposition of [...].  Pa90-91.  F. [...] was not a holdover tenant.
[directive] Reasonable Suspicion  Agencies must undertake drug testing when there is reasonable suspicion to believe a law enforcement officer is engaged in the illegal use of a controlled dangerous substance, or is under the influence of a controlled dangerous substance, including unregulated marijuana, or cannabis during work hours.  Reasonable suspicion "requires objective facts which, with inferences, would lead a reasonable person to conclude that drug-related activity is taking or has taken place and that a particular individual is activity."2 involved in that drug
[brief] ”  (14T 11-19 to 24)  Where she went so wrong was in finding a relevant “pattern” of lawbreaking to satisfy the State’s burden of proof when that “pattern” was so remote -- 18-plus years earlier; indeed, the same exact “pattern” existed in Higgs, but was not enough to carry the State’s burden under Rule 609(b).  253 N.J. at 370.  Moreover, while harmless-error analysis is proper in such a situation, it will rarely result in a finding of harmlessness when the defendant’s testimony – had it happened – would have resulted in a much better explanation of the facts relevant to defense claims than what the jury heard.  State v. Hedgespeth, 249 N.J. 234, 252-253 (2021).  As noted in Point I, reversal of the resulting convictions is necessarily required where, as here, the error potentially tips the jury’s consideration of the credibility or evidentiary worth of the State’s case.  State v. Briggs 279 N.J. Super. 555, 565 (App. Div. 1995); State v. W.L., 278 N.J. Super. 295, 301 (App. Div. 1995).  In Hedgespeth, 249 N.J. at 252-253, citing State v. Scott, 229 N.J. 468, 484-485 (2017), the Court made clear that when a Rule 609 error is made regarding the defendant’s remote prior convictions, that error will not be harmless if the defendant’s testimony could have affected the weight the jury would give the State’s arguments in favor of conviction versus the defendant’s arguments in favor of acquittal.  The State will likely tell this Court that defendant’s defense was implausible and that any testimony in favor of that implausible defense would not have been accepted by a reasonable juror, but Hedgespeth and Scott are clear that such an appellate argument must be rejected, every time.  It is not for a reviewing court to determine implausibility of a defense when evaluating harmless error.  “Determining implausibility ‘is in the sole province of the jury.  Judges should not intrude as the thirteenth juror. ’”  Hedgespeth, 249 N.J. at 253, quoting Scott, 229 N.J. at 485; see also State v. R.J.M., 453 N.J.Super. 261, (App. Div. 2018).  The jury could have accepted this defense, and, as in Hedgespeth, where that defendant’s testimony could have “cast doubt” on the State’s version of the facts, 249 N.J. at 252, the defendant’s testimony here certainly could have helped the jurors rule in his favor by clarifying factual claims like, for instance, how he got into the backyard of [...] and why he ran when he saw a detective brandishing a gun.  The Rule 609 error was, thus, not harmless.  The judge should not have admitted the six prior remote convictions to impeach defendant, and, therefore, defendant’s resulting convictions should be reversed, and the matter remanded for retrial.  CONCLUSION
[brief] [...] knew that the terms of the Original PSA were wrong, as the contract stated that there was no existing ROFR, yet [...] signed it anyway.  Da216.  For reasons unknown, [...] withheld the Original PSA from [...] and did not provide notice that a PSA had been executed for an extended period of time.  Da152, ¶9, Da190 ¶39- ¶40, Da261 ¶39-¶40.  On January 17, 2023, [...], whose official title is [...]’s District Development Manager for the region, went to the Premises and was given a copy of an unsigned PSA by [...].
[brief] Pa56.  [...] retired from the New Jersey State Police on a Special Retirement on or about July 1, 2010.  Pa56.  Pa75.  While employed by the New Jersey State Police, [...] responded to the World Trade Center attacks at Ground Zero on September 13, 2001.  Pa58.  On or about July 8, 2019, “The Bill Ricci World Trade Center Rescue, Recovery, and Cleanup Operations Act” was signed into law (hereinafter referred to as the “Ricci Act”).
[brief] Rather, the trial court found that defendant had “not a scintilla of corroborating information” that the victim sold drugs, that [...] and the victim were apparent drug dealing rivals, that [...] had a motive to kill the victims, or that [...] killed the victims because of this alleged rivalry.  In fact, the trial court properly acknowledged that defendant could not even prove that the individual he identified as “[...]” was even [...].  As such, the \(^6\)  While the *Hannah* decision was found through the lens of ineffective assistance of counsel, the State respectfully submits that the Court’s analysis of third-party guilt is instructive to this case.
[brief] [...]’s Testimony as to the Value of the FF&E was Consistent with N.J.R.E. 703.  N.J.R.E. 703 says:  The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or inference may be those perceived by or made known to the expert at or before the proceeding.  If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in evidence.  We can agree that the “net opinion” rule is a corollary of N.J.R.E.703.  That the equipment was there as of the date of taking in 2018, was established by the owner, [...] and [...], all eyewitnesses.  The equipment value was established by [...] based upon his personal inspection, and cost manuals and catalogues of a type reasonably and usually relied upon by experts in the field of appraising FF&E, as well as product valuations dating back to 1994.  [...], who relied upon his own inspection of the property and his understanding of the uses of the equipment he viewed and upon his forty plus years of experience observing the behavior of buyers and sellers in commercial transactions testified.  (3T178,12-25;237,6-25)  Plaintiff at (Pb 34) still does not accept that the intent and meaning of the controlling statutes discussed in Point II is that the “property” taken in 2018 is the “property” that is to be valued as of the market as it existed in 1994.
[brief] Plaintiff has and will claim that the Defendant is estopped from litigating the issue of the imposition of the First Penalty of $108,000.00 based on the Doctrine of the Law of the Case.  Her reliance on that doctrine is misplaced under the facts of this case.  In this case, the initial Trial Court never considered the effect of Plaintiff’s intentional misrepresentation as it related to the imposition of the penalty on Defendant.  The facts are very clear that Plaintiff did not pay Defendant the $70,000.00 that she owed.  She lied and said she didn’t have the funds when she clearly did possess same.  She held onto the money and claimed that she never received these monies.  HAD THE TRIAL COURT CONSIDERED THESE LIES AND THE INTENTIONAL CONTINUED WITHHOLDING OF THESE FUNDS THE PENALTY WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN IMPOSED.  SHE HAD THE MONEY AND, THEREFORE, COULD NOT CLAIM THAT SHE WAS NOT PAID.  The initial Court’s decision was characterized by the Appellate Court as “not made … (with) robust findings”.  The sum and substance was that this issue was for all intents and purposes not litigated.  This same issue, i.e. the effect of Plaintiff’s intentional misrepresentation as it related to the imposition of the penalty on Defendant was, likewise, never discussed in the Appellate Decision despite the fact that the issue was and is the most devastating financial issue in the case.
[brief] Not surprisingly, the record cited by Defendant (see Db65 and 8T 96:18-110:25) is devoid of any proofs supporting Defendant’s unsubstantiated claims of an increase in membership of the synagogue.  While [...] testified as to the additional morning services, there is nothing in the record cited by Defendant supporting its claim Plaintiff increased the number of evening services or the synagogue has “far more daily attendance”.  Additionally, as set forth in detail in Plaintiff’s Counter Statement of Facts, Defendant’s claim there was no curb cut until 2013 is also false.  (Db56; 8T 34:16-35:8; 13T 107:22-110:24; 122:10-125:4)  Thus, Defendant’s claim Plaintiff expanded its use of the Fifth Street and Sixth Street Lots “in the early 2010s” is baseless.
[brief] On December 30, 2021, [...] filed a Petition of Appeal challenging the [...]’s decision, claiming it was “arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable, contrary to and in violation of law, and without legal force or effect. ” (Pa34-Pa37).  In his Petition of Appeal, [...] alleged that, because he had appealed the Commissioner’s decision upholding the State Board’s decision to suspend his teaching certificate, the [...] somehow acted arbitrarily and capriciously in terminating his employment.  (Pa35).  It’s undisputed that the State Board’s decision to suspend [...]’s teaching certificate was never stayed.  [...] sought reinstatement and backpay, including his salary and benefits.  (Id.).  The Commissioner transferred the matter to the OAL.  F.
[brief] [...] was a firefighter who but for the sudden and emergent circumstance of having to enter a burning building which was initially thought to be vacant but wasn’t sustained injuries when he was forced to break in a door as part of his job duties.  The Board in Moran held that the kicking in a door or intentionally using one’s back to gain entry did not constitute an unexpected happening and that the job duties included rescuing people and hence Moran performed “a duty within the scope and performance of his regular duties for which he had been specifically trained. ”  The Moran Court held that the Board misconstrued Richardson and reached a result at odds with the legislative intent in adopting the “traumatic event” standard.
[directive] The electronically filed be to Cause Probable of Affidavit an allow that procedures and practices supplement acomplaint-warrant to and for application an support system to eCDR the through complaint- for applying officer the enforcement law the oath under by made statements oral any to officer allowing the acheck-box shall include Cause  Probable of Affidavit  The warrant. aware is affiant that acknowledging the and true, are Affidavit the in statements the that certify punishment.  to her or him subject would statements willfully false filing that and of description facts relevant concise a include shall Cause Probable of Affidavit The that and committed was offenses) that believe the to cause probable support that circumstances to as statement concise a shall include Affidavit  The it. committed who one the is defendant the officer's (e.g., the offenses) the committed defendant the that believing for basis officer's the shall indicate admission, etc.), and defendant's eyewitnesses, of statements observations, personal submitting officer known the to injury the of extent the so, if and, injured was victim a whether to as statement and circumstances and relevant facts of description foregoing  The Affidavit. the supplemented, or established, be may exists cause probable that believing for basis officer's the also 5.2. to Section