ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] See Mann v. Cnty. Of San Diego, 907 F.3d 1154, 1158–62 (9th Cir. 2018) (concluding that parents’ rights were violated by unconsented physical examination of their minor children involving “a gynecological and rectal exam,” “visual and tactile inspection of the children,” and blood and urine tests); Wallis v. Spencer, 202 F.3d 1126, 1141–42 (9th Cir. 2000) (similar); Mario V. v. Armenta, No. 18-cv-00041-BLF, 2021 WL 1907790, at *1–2, 5 (N.D. Cal. May 12, 2021) (teacher performing finger-prick blood sugar tests of students without parental consent violated parents’ and students’ rights) (Aa160–63, 166–67).  Moreover, [...]’s reliance on *T.F. v. Kettle Moraine School District*, No. 202-cv-1650, 2023 WL 6544917 (Wis. Cir. Oct. 3, 2023) (Aa146–59), is likewise misplaced: in *T.F.*, the student received treatment at a mental health center related to gender identity, and the school consulted with the student’s therapist to determine that it would use the student’s requested name and pronouns over the parents’ objection.  *Id.* at *1–2* (Aa146–49).  In sum, recognizing students for who they are and using the pronouns they request (whether corresponding with sex assigned at birth or not) is part of the basic level of respect necessary for a safe and supportive learning environment.
[brief] Indeed, the Supreme Court has confirmed that N.J.S.A. 17:11C-33(b), when it was embodied in the Consumer Loan Act, “allow[ed] for treble damages by aggrieved consumers. ”  *Lemelledo v. Benefit Mgmt. Corp.*, 150 N.J. 255, 271-72 (1997).  The subsequent statutory revisions provide no support for the conclusion that the Legislature intended to eliminate that private right of action.  The present-day iteration of the NJCFLA originated as the New Jersey Small Loan Law (“NJSLL”), enacted in 1914.  The NJSLL was meant to curtail predatory loan practices widely unregulated at the time.  The small loan business has long been the subject of study, legislation and judicial determination.  *See Gallert, Hilborn and* May, Small Loan Legislation (Russell Sage Foundation, 1932); Hubachek, Annotations on Small Loan Laws (Russell Sage Foundation, 1938); 8 Law and Contemporary Problems (Winter, 1941).  New Jersey was one of the five large industrial states which early adopted general acts designed to regulate and control the business of making small loans.  Thus P.L. 1914, c. 49 provided for the licensing of small loan companies and granted power to the Commissioner of Banking and Insurance to reject an application for license because of lack of character or fitness of the applicant.  In 1916 the Russell Sage Foundation submitted its first draft of a Uniform Small Loan Law which adopted the regulatory philosophy of the New Jersey act and some of its provisions.  Family Fin. Corp. v. Gough, 10 N.J. Super. 13, 19 (App. Div. 1950).  The NJSLL—like the NJCFLA—allowed for enforcement by the Commissioner and was intended to protect consumers from usurious, predatory, and unlawful loan practices by regulating and limiting what entities could enter the consumer loan marketplace.
[brief] *Butler v. Acme Markets, Inc.*, 89 N.J. 270, 283 (1982).  In *Wyatt by Caldwell v. Wyatt*, 217 N.J. Super. 580 (App. Div. 1987) a lay witness testified that he observed brake fluid leaking from the defendant’s car and that the brake pads were worn down on the vehicle after the accident.  The Appellate Division concluded that this testimony was “inadmissible in the absence of expert testimony that [such] observations would support an inference that the brakes were defective at the time of the accident. ”  *Id.* at 591.  The rationale for the ruling was that a jury must never be allowed to speculate on a subject that jurors of common judgment and experience cannot reasonably form a valid conclusion on without the aid of an expert opinion.  *Id.*  Without expert testimony, the jury was not qualified to draw an inference as to whether or not a leak of brake fluid or a worn brake pad could lead to sudden brake failure.  *Id.*  Therefore, the Appellate Division ruled that it was reversible error to allow the jury to draw inferences that it was not qualified to draw.
[brief] The 1912 decision construed the legal effect of the 1898 Act as follows:  [T]he intention of the [1898] act was to validate proceedings purporting to be taken to authorize the construction, where the municipalities had, under their charter or other laws, the right to authorize.  It was not, I think, intended to increase the already existing power of the municipality, but to cure defective proceedings purporting to act under the power to authorize.  Public Service Corp., 80 N.J. Eq. at 304 (emphasis added).  Thus, the 1912 decision made clear that the 1898 Act did not transform any municipal act into an act of statutory law.  Instead, the 1898 Act merely cured a defect in a municipal act that would otherwise have had no force and effect as a municipal act.
[brief] The earliest eligibility date was determined by the Department of Corrections to be April 30, 2024 (Da-24).  However, both the sentencing Judge, [...], and the Assistant Prosecutor both believed that the Defendant would be paroled before March 11, 2024.  That did not happen.  On March 11, 2024 (4T)\(^4\), a date that had been agreed upon by all parties including the Civil Assignment Judge, the matter came before the Court below.  On that date, the Defendant was incarcerated in State Prison, and there was a mix-up with getting him to the Court on that date.  On that date, counsel for the Defendant-Counterclaimant indicated to the Court that he believed that [...] would be transported to the Morris County Courthouse (4T; 5:19).  What counsel overlooked was the fact that the transport fee had to be paid in advance.  The first four pages of the transcript reveals that counsel for the Appellant was frank with the Court to --- \(^4\) 4T - Transcript of Conference on 3/11/24. admit that he never realized that the cost of conveying the Defendant to the Courthouse had to be paid in advance.  What caused the problem is that when the Defendant was sentenced by [...] in Sussex County, everyone believed that the Appellant would be released from custody by March 11th.  When [...] sentenced the Defendant, everyone expected that the Defendant would be released and consequently that date was agreed to with the Civil Assignment Judge in Morristown.  The date was March 11th.  However, things changed.  The Appellant was incarcerated, the trial Judge actually arranged for this matter to be tried in a criminal Court so that during any recesses during the trial the Appellant would be placed in a holding cell.  When it was realized that the Appellant would not be released by March 11th, the Civil Assignment Judge, [...], was contacted, but she refused to accommodate the fact that everyone was wrong about March 11th, and counsel for the Appellant was wrong about how the Appellant was to get to the Courthouse.  This case has a history.
[directive] If the official charged with the responsibility of filing shall fail to file such statement within 10 days after the time fixed for filing the same, he shall be subject to a penalty of $5.00 for each day of neglect summary file the same, to be recovered in a proceeding against such official instituted and prosecuted to under the penalty enforcement law (N.J.S.2A:58-1 et seq.).  -- - - Amended 1969,g294; 1977,c.396,s.2; 1991 ,c.75,S,26; 1994,~.72,s. 14.
[brief] And as Mr.  Johnson [defendant] has indicated in this supplemental brief, and then also in my follow-up brief, the argument is that pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:44-3(a)\(^8\), the judge was not supposed to sentence my client to concurrent sentences under those circumstances that are enunciated in the statute.  And if there was an exception, there was supposed to be a statement of reasons as to why this was done.  We, unfortunately, aren’t able to retrieve the sentencing transcript, but I understand from transcription [services] that they have been destroyed and no longer exist.  However, the (indiscernible) of the conviction does not indicate that there was a statement of reasons indicated why the judge would have sentenced my client concurrently since he had committed one of the … offenses while he was out on bail on the other.  So the crux of the argument, Judge, is that because of that error, that illegal sentence, the State, they want to sentence my client on a subsequent offense, did not have requisite two convictions to give him an enhanced penalty under that subsequent arrest.  And essentially, that is our argument….  (1T 3-21 to 4-20)  At the PCR hearing, the State, for its part, did not address the defense’s argument.
[brief] The CBA provides:  A.  The Authority hereby retains until itself all powers, rights, authority, duties and responsibilities conferred upon and vested in it prior to the signing of this Agreement by the laws and Constitution of the State of New Jersey and of the United States, including:  . . .  4.  To hire all employees, and subject to the provisions of law, to determine their qualifications and conditions of continued employment, or assignment, and to promote and transfer employees.  5.  To suspend, discharge or take any other appropriate disciplinary action against any employee for just cause according to law.  ***  7.  To make such changes as it deems desirable and necessary for the efficiency and effective operation of the Authority.  (Pa43-44)  (emphasis added)  The CBA further provides that an arbitrator is bound by its terms:  2.  The arbitrator shall comply with and be bound by the provisions of this Agreement.  The arbitrator shall have no power to add to, delete or modify any provisions of this Agreement.  3.  The arbitrator shall be without power or authority to make any decision contrary to or inconsistent with or modifying or varying in any way the terms of this Agreement, or applicable law or rules or regulations having the force or effect of law.  4.  The arbitrator’s decision shall not usurp the functions of power of the Authority as provided by law.  (Pa44-45 (emphases added).)  Given these express terms, the Arbitrator would not have reached the just cause issue had he actually interpreted the CBA’s plain language because the CBA grants [...] the express and unfettered authority to determine its employees’ “qualifications and conditions of continued employment.
[brief] 23.  In a very real sense, [...], in fact, had the $70,000.00.  She held onto/kept the funds that were due to [...] and did so by misrepresentation and deception.  24.  Essentially, the Trial Court rewarded [...]’s lies and deception by penalizing Defendant in the amount of $108,300.00.  Further, the Court rewarded [...] for what the Appellate Division characterized as an “egregious” breach of the Agreement.  25.  Defendant understands that since the Appellate division did not comment on this issue that there may be an objection from Plaintiff that Defendant is attempting to re-litigate this issue in violation of the rule on “the law of the case” re: the initial penalty).
[brief] ”  92 N.J. at 279-280.  The trial court in the instant action emphasized that [...] had not raised any issues about environmental or other planning concerns, and that it was clear that [...] wanted to build something on the property – just not affordable housing (see IT53:19-23).  All these observations are components of the trial court’s finding as to likelihood of success.  about a suit’s merits does not entirely preclude the entry of an interlocutory injunction designed to preserve the status quo,”  Waste Management of New Jersey, Inc., 399 N.J. Super. at 535, and continued:  So long as there is some merit to the claim, a court may consider the extent to which the movant would be irreparably injured in the absence of pendente lite relief, and compare that potential harm to the relative hardship to be suffered by the opponent if an injunction preserving the status quo were to be entered.  If these factors strongly favor injunctive relief, the status quo may be preserved through injunctive relief even though the claim on the merits is uncertain or attended with difficulties.
[brief] --- \(^2\) *Shepard v. United States*, 544 U.S. 13 (2005).  [Id. at 1856 (alteration in original) (quoting Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 578 (1986))].  Our Supreme Court anticipated that reasoning in State v. Franklin, 184 N.J. 516 (2005), where the Court “reject the State’s argument that defendant’s trial admissions and his attorney’s trial concessions were a sufficient basis for the judge to impose an extended Graves Act sentence. ”  Id. at 536.  The Court determined that those concessions -- unless in the context of a plea -- were an insufficient substitute for submission of those questions to a jury.  Id. at 536-37.  Erlinger applies directly to New Jersey’s persistent-offender statute, which allows the court to sentence a defendant to an extended term only if certain criteria are met.
[brief] However, the court must find that the time devoted to presenting that evidence was reasonably required to establish the RICO claims. ”  *Id.* at *29* (emphasis added).  E.  The Remand Rulings  As noted, the trial court was directed to resolve three issues on remand: (1) a determination of the RICO and non-RICO damages in their respective appropriate time periods; (2) a reconsideration of whether any punitive damages should be awarded and, if so, the amount; and (3) a new analysis and recalculation of the amount of attorneys’ fees and costs to award to Plaintiffs, limited to the work reasonably required in presenting evidence on their four RICO claims.
[brief] There is no dispute that the defendant, [...], mislabeled and marketed pens that were alleged as “made in America”, when they were in fact made in China, and that the plaintiff complained to his supervisor in 2018 about this.  Pa17; T7-1-9.  Counsel for the plaintiff correctly advised the trial court at oral argument of the fact that the plaintiff continued to complain to his supervisor, [...], about this continued practice in the beginning of 2020, and then suddenly “all communications stopped” with the plaintiff and [...].  T22-19-24.  Two months later the plaintiff was terminated for the alleged unauthorized use of company credit cards.
[brief] As with most agency action, there is room for debate over what is reasonable.  To be reasonable, an agency's choice of action for providing notice does not require adoption of a perfect practice.  Here, the intended purpose of the action challenged—the Commissions' attempted notice—was to reach persons who might have been affected by the wrongfully calculated reimbursement rate, to notify those persons of the availability of supplemental reimbursement, and to inform them of the procedures for requesting supplemental reimbursement.  (pp. 16-19)  3.  The problem in this dispute over the adequacy of notice is that the evidence thus far produced has the capacity to support the claim that the methods of notice—the letter and website link—were not reasonably designed to likely reach the categories of members who may have been affected by the erroneous reimbursement rates.
[brief] A person is guilty of aggravated manslaughter when he “recklessly causes death under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to human life[.]”  N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4a(1).  Recklessly is defined in the Criminal Code:  A person acts recklessly with respect to a material element of an offense when he consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material element exists or will result from his conduct.  The risk must be of such a nature and degree that, considering the nature and purpose of the actor’s conduct and the circumstances known to him, its disregard involves a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a reasonable person would observe in the actor’s situation.  [N.J.S.A. 2C:2-2b(3). ]  Aggravated manslaughter is distinguished from reckless manslaughter based on “the difference in the degree of the risk that death will result from defendant’s conduct. ”  *State v. Curtis*, 195 N.J. Super. 354, 364 (App. Div. 1984).  Whereas reckless manslaughter requires only the possibility of causing death, aggravated manslaughter entails a probability that death will occur.  *State v. Bakka*, 176 N.J. 533, 550 (2003).  A defendant manifests extreme indifference to human life when his conduct demonstrates that he "does not care whether the victim lives or dies[.]"
[brief] [...] testified that he downloaded surveillance video from the time of the shooting from both the [...] and from [...], located next door to D&A on Stuyvesant.  (10T:99-8 to 107-3).  Those videos and videos from pole cameras maintained by the police were played at trial.  (10T:110-18 to 115-5; 10T: 156-11 to 160-21).  [...] testified that he maintained the 60 to 80 “pole cameras” in use in Trenton at the time, but that no one was live-monitoring those cameras, and that the system overwrites itself in a period of about two weeks.  (10T:148-17 to 152-23).  He testified that there is a pole camera, at Oakland and Hoffman, a long block north of the site of the shooting, but he does not know if it was functioning at the time.  (10T:170-25 to 171-6).  He also noted that there are “skips” in the footage from the cameras at Stuyvesant and Hoffman where the shooting occurred.  (10T:173-2 to 174-19).  When asked if there were pole cameras near 33 and 35 Ellsworth, near where defendant was arrested, Detective Cunningham first said he did not know, but then, when shown a photo of those cameras, Cunningham said that even if he “guessed” that there were such cameras there, those cameras were not “operational” in 2019 and that he could not recall if anyone in law enforcement requested footage from those cameras.
[brief] These include "[f]alse promises of leniency -- promises 'so enticing' that they induce a suspect to confess."  Id. at 27 (quoting Hreha, 217 N.J. at 383).  It is also improper for an officer to minimize the severity of a crime under investigation or falsely promise help "as a substitute for jail."  Id. at 52.  Here, the detective's words and conduct during the interview did not overbear defendant's will, such that any part of defendant's statement was involuntary.
[brief] (1T 25-10 to 26-3)  The Court found that the evidence connecting [...] to the carjacking of the Mercedes was “fairly strong” because [...] was seen jogging from the location where the Mercedes was abandoned Jersey City shortly after it was abandoned, had the Mercedes key fob on his person, and a handgun with a green laser matching the description given by the victims was found in [...]’s flight path from the Mercedes.  (1T 26-5 to 26-22, 28-19)  However, the Court found that the evidence connecting [...] to the robbery of the Audi and the BMW “doesn’t rise even close to that level” as the only description of the suspects of the robbery was a clothing description—no witness identified any of the suspects.  (1T 27-3 to 9; 2T 15-19 to 20)  [...] agreed with the Court that although there was evidence from [...]’s phone of a black Audi Q5 between the April 20 robbery and the April 23 carjacking, the photo did not depict the license plate and so there was no proof that this Audi Q5 was the same Audi that was used in the carjacking.  (1T 28-22 to 29-25)  Thus, the Court found that the State had not presented clear and convincing evidence that [...] committed the April 20 robbery.
[brief] Pursuant to the Cross Motions for Summary Judgment filed by Defendant-Respondent, [...], Defendant-Respondent, [...] and Defendant-Intervenor, [...], the Honorable [...], A.J.S.C. dismissed Plaintiff-Appellant’s Complaint in Lieu of Prerogative Writs.  Appellant’s Brief addresses [...]’s ruling in favor of the [...], the [...] Committee and [...], which is supported by the record below.  Defendant-Respondent, Board, submits that the Trial Court’s ruling with regarding to the Redevelopment Plan and adoption of Ordinance 2022-15 and Ordinance 2022-17 was correct and should be affirmed.  PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[brief] Defendants then attempt to differentiate this rule from the present case by continuing to argue that plaintiff did not establish proximate cause, but for the reasons set forth above, this argument fails.  The awarding of attorney’s fees lies in the discretion of the trial judge.  A “fee determination by trial court will be disturbed only on the rarest of occasions, and then only because of a clear abuse of discretion. ”  Packard-Bamberger & Co. v. Collier, 167 N.J. 427, 444 (2001)(quoting Rendine v. Pantzer, 141 N.J. 292, 317 (1995)).  “That deferential standard of review guides [this Court’s] analysis.
[brief] *Ixcopal v. Crown Equip. Corp.*, [...], 2017 WL 1456965, at *3 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Apr. 25, 2017) (unpublished) (granting summary judgment where plaintiff failed to prove that a forklift was defectively designed) (attached at Pa280).  Here, the undisputed evidence reflects that Plaintiff failed to meet his burden to show that there was a defect in the subject vehicle.  A.  The Subject Vehicle Was Not Defective As A Matter Of Law.
[brief] (a)  No person or appointing authority shall violate the provisions of Title 11A, New Jersey Statutes, or Title 4A, N.J.A.C.  (b)  No person or appointing authority shall fail to comply with an order of the [...] or the Chairperson of the Commission or designee.  (c)  No person or appointing authority shall obstruct a person's lawful opportunity to participate in the selection and appointment process or a person's lawful pursuit of any remedy or appeal under Title 11A, New Jersey Statutes, and Title 4A, N.J.A.C.  (d)  No person shall make any false statement or perform any fraudulent act in connection with any examination, certification, appointment, or other personnel transaction under the provisions of Title 11A, New Jersey Statutes, and Title 4A, N.J.A.C.  (e)  No person shall pay, offer, solicit, or accept any compensation, service, or other consideration to affect any appointment or other personnel transaction under the provisions of Title 11A, New Jersey Statutes, and Title 4A, N.J.A.C.  1.  No person shall pay or offer any compensation, service, or other consideration to induce the retirement or resignation of an employee in order to gain a promotion or the opportunity for a promotion, or an advancement appointment or the opportunity for an advancement appointment.  2.  No person shall solicit or accept any compensation, service, or other consideration as an inducement to retire or resign in order to allow an employee to gain a promotion or the opportunity for a promotion, or an advancement appointment or the opportunity for an advancement appointment.  (f)  Appointing authorities shall timely supply all information, documents, and other materials requested by the [...] or an appropriate representative of the Commission for the purpose of efficiently and accurately administering the merit system.  N.J.A.C. 4A:10-1.1 (emphasis added)  Appellant has established violation of the afore regulatory provisions by the City which compel Appellant’s promotion to be retroactively effectuated.