ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] THE COURT ERRED IN ITS INTERPRETATION OF THE AIM OF OPRA.  (Pa139-154).  The Court erred in its interpretation of the legislative intent of OPRA.  While Appellant does not dispute that to date, she was unable to cite a New Jersey court case which addresses DNA testing in accordance with OPRA; Appellant specifically argued that the word selection of “examination” chosen by the Legislature as well as the word selection of “inspection” implies that contemporary methods of examination, including DNA testing, should be allowed.  The Legislature specifically added the phrase “for inspection, copying or examination by the citizens of this State…”  See OPRA Chapter 404, N.J.S. C.47:1A-1, for a reason.  DNA technology was unknown at the time the original OPRA was drafted by the Legislature.  DNA was not contemplated by [...] when his Executive Order 110 was enacted in 1981.  (Pa32).  However, applying a modern-day lens to the specific use of the word “examination” or the use of the word “inspection” as it applies to documents, is clearly intended to include DNA testing specifically in the Kidnapping case in which an Executive Order opened the entire case file up to the public and for the public’s “inspection and examination.
[directive] The investigation may involve any type of alleged employee misconduct, as described in Section 4.1.3, and shall be conducted pursuant to INTERNAL AFFAIRS POLICY & PROCEDURES | November 2022 20 Section 6 (Investigation of Internal Complaints).  In such matters, the County Prosecutor or the Attorney General’s Office shall exercise the authority of the law enforcement executive under Sections 1.0.5 and 6.3.11.  At the conclusion of the investigation, the internal affairs investigator and/or the investigating agency shall make factual findings, summarize the matter, and indicate the appropriate disposition (Sustained, Unfounded, Exonerated, or Not Sustained) as to each allegation of misconduct.  See Sections 6.2.3 and 6.3.9.  In cases involving Police Chiefs, factual findings and preliminary notices of discipline shall be forwarded to the appropriate authority.
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT’S REASONING CONCERNING AN “UNFAIR ADVANTAGE” FOR 45 WILLIAM MISINTERPRETS THE CONTRACTUAL RISK ALLOCATION (Raised Below: Da14)  The trial court, in arriving at the conclusion that [...] was entitled to immediately terminate the PSA, relied upon the misplaced reasoning that [...] would have an “unfair advantage” by being allowed to produce the Acceptable Estoppel Certificate at closing.  This reasoning fundamentally misinterprets the PSA’s direct allocation or risk between the parties.  The trial court reasoned that, to read the related provision in the manner claimed by the Defendant is to permit the seller an unfair advantage of taking a chance on securing a cured certificate by the time of Closing, knowing that if it does not do so, it only risked having to return the Down Payment.  Meanwhile, if the Seller were unsuccessful in securing a complaint Estoppel Certificate by the Closing Date, the Purchaser would then be put in the position of having to determine whether to terminate after continuing to incur costs to prepare for Closing without any recourse other than return of the deposit.  Absent text whereby the parties agreed to such a result, such outcome hardly seems to have been within their contemplation.  (Da14.)  However, it was the PSA itself which established the date by which provision of an Acceptable Estoppel Certificate was ultimately required.  The PSA — negotiated between two sophisticated parties — directly provided [...] until the closing date to provide an Acceptable Estoppel Certificate as a closing deliverable.  And the PSA itself provides that [...]’s sole remedy if [...] cannot obtain an Acceptable Estoppel Certificate as of the closing is limited to termination of the PSA and the return of its down payment.  This dynamic is not only present if [...] gets an initial non-compliant estoppel certificate but is present right from the inception of the PSA by its very terms.  As soon as [...] entered into the PSA, it was in the position of having to prepare for closing while [...] only risked having to return the down payments if it could not get an Acceptable Estoppel Certificate.  And the PSA allowed that dynamic to remain in place up until the closing.  [...], a sophisticated commercial entity entering into a $20 million real estate transaction, understood the risks and costs associated with preparing for closing.  [...] entered into a contract that directly provided the potential that it would not receive an Acceptable Estoppel Certificate until the eve of closing and would still needing to prepare for that closing.  This was the allocation of risk that the PSA set forth — not an allocation of risk only when a non-compliant estoppel certificate is received, but under all circumstances.
[brief] The 2019 Permit Modification concerned only a de minimis change in the location of [...]’s dock not the overall length of the dock and the Court’s review should be limited to that de minimis change alone.  On that basis, it is clear that the 2019 Permit Modification met the requirements of N.J.A.C. 7:7-9.7 (Navigational Channels) and N.J.A.C. 7:7-12.5 (Recreational Docks and Piers).  The 2017 WFD Permit did as well.  Appellant claims that [...] disregarded Appellant’s comments during the permit review process.
[brief] After the close of discovery, the Plaintiff cross-moved for summary judgment as to Counts One, Four, Five and Six of its Amended Complaint.  The Defendants filed a cross-motion for summary judgment.  The trial court granted the Defendants’ motion because it found the sale of Unit 74 was authorized by Section 8(e) of the Condominium’s Master Deed.  This finding was fatal to each of the Plaintiff’s causes of action.  Accordingly, the Plaintiff appeals from this determination, as well as the resulting Orders denying its motion for partial summary judgment and granting Defendants’ cross-motion for summary judgment.  **PROCEDURAL HISTORY**
[brief] CAFRA rules for high rise buildings adjacent to the waterfront are required to be stepped back twice their height from the water, beach or boardwalk and leave a 30% view shed from the site to the waterfront.  DEP permit review staff recognized that these mandatory requirements were plainly not met and denied the permit and later denied [...]’s request that the denial be reconsidered.  Somehow DEP higher ups decided later to play ball with [...] and found “reasons” to waive the Rule for the [...] building and settle [...]’s administrative appeal.
[brief] ”  *CDK Global, LLC v. Tulley Auto Group, Inc.*, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57186, *3 (D.N.J. April 29, 2016). 6  As a preliminary matter, Appellants cannot prove damages as a result of any representations or promises made by [...] in connection with the sale of the Solar Rights by clear and convincing evidence.  The trial court had already concluded, based on the undisputed facts, that the direct and proximate cause of the Appellants’ alleged losses, the same losses alleged in the Second Amended Complaint as against [...], was their failure to pay rent to [...].
[brief] DOCKET NO.: [...]  On Appeal from [...]  Docket No.: [...]  Dear Justices of the Appellate Division:  This office represents the Appellant, [...], in the above captioned matter.  Please accept this reply letter brief in lieu of a more formal brief on behalf of the Appellant, retired Trooper [...].  TABLE OF CONTENTS  REPLY APPENDIX  TABLE OF CONTENTS.........................................................ii  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS, AND RULINGS...............................iii  PROCEDURAL HISTORY......................................................................................2  STATEMENT OF FACTS.....................................................................................2  LEGAL ARGUMENT............................................................................................2  POINT I  THE DECISION BELOW WAS ARBITRARY, CAPRICIOUS, AND UNREASONABLE, AND NOT SUPPORTED BY THE SUBSTANTIAL WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE.  (Not Raised Below) ......................................................................................2  POINT II  ADEQUATE  NOTICE OF THE RICCI ACT WAS NOT PROVIDED AND THEREFORE, WISE SHOULD BE ENTITLED TO RICCI ACT BENEFITS.  (Raised Below.  Pa15. Pa29.) .................................................................6  CONCLUSION..................................................................................................11  REPLY APPENDIX  TABLE OF CONTENTS  VOLUME I  In re Yucht, 2013 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2188…………………………Pra1  In re State and Sch. Emples.  Health Benefits Commissions' Implementation of Yucht, 2017 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1938………………………………………Pra5  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS, AND RULINGS  [...]  Final Decision 9/27/23……………………………Pa9  [...] Initial Decision 6/13/23…………………………Pa23  PROCEDURAL HISTORY  The Appellant, retired Trooper [...], relies on the Procedural History submitted in his original brief as if set forth herein in its entirety.  STATEMENT OF FACTS  The Appellant, retired Trooper [...], relies on the Statement of Facts submitted in his original brief as if set forth herein in its entirety.  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I THE DECISION BELOW WAS ARBITRARY, CAPRICIOUS, UNREASONABLE, AND NOT SUPPORTED BY THE SUBSTANTIAL WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE.
[brief] Any person who has been deprived of any substantive due process or equal protection rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or any substantive rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of this State, or whose exercise or enjoyment of those substantive rights, privileges or immunities has been interfered with or attempted to be interfered with, by threats, intimidation or coercion by a person acting under color of law, may bring a civil action for damages and for injunctive or other appropriate relief.  [N.J.S.A. 10:6-2(c) (emphasis added). ]  Article 1 para 7 of the New Jersey State Constitution provides for: "the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue except upon probable cause, supplied by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the papers and things to be seized."  Pursuant to 42 U.S.C.§ 1983, which provides in relevant part:  "Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory ... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress ..."
[directive] 7.4.3  In cases not otherwise covered under Section 7.3, unless the presumption of seeking pretrial detention is overcome pursuant to subsection 7.4.6, the prosecutor shall apply for pretrial detention if the present charge is for a first- or second-degree crime and the Failure to Appear (FTA) or New Criminal Activity (NCA) score determined by the automated pretrial risk assessment is 4, 5, or 6 and the defendant as a juvenile had been adjudicated delinquent within the preceding ten years for a crime involving a firearm, or a crime that if committed by an adult would be subject to the No Early Release Act, N. J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2, or an attempt to commit any of the foregoing offenses.  Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to preclude a prosecutor from considering other adjudications of delinquency (e.g., adjudications for violent or firearms- related crimes that occurred more than ten years ago, or adjudications for offenses other than firearms-related or NERA crimes) as may be relevant as part of the totality of the circumstances 26  Rule 3:4A(b)(5) provides that a court may consider as prima facie evidence sufficient to overcome the presumption of release a recommendation by the pretrial services program that the defendant’s release is not recommended (i.e., a determination that “release not recommended or if released, maximum conditions”).  This recommendation, in turn, is based on the objective pretrial risk-assessment process approved by the AOC.  Page 61 when determining whether to overcome the presumption against seeking pretrial detention in Section 7.2 or the presumption against seeking revocation of release in Section 8.2.  See also subsection 7.6.1.  Serious Indictable Crimes Committed While on Pretrial Release for Another 7.4.4 Offense or While on Any Form of Post-Conviction Supervision.
[brief] In any event, [...] is wrong; the account application properly incorporated the DAA by reference because both elements of the Alpert, Goldberg, Butler, Norton & Weiss, P.C. v. Quinn test are met here: (1) “the document to be incorporated” is “described in such terms that its identity may be ascertained beyond doubt”; and (2) “the party to be bound by the terms” (i.e., [...]) had “knowledge of and assented to the terms. ”  410 N.J. Super. 510, 533 (App. Div. 2009).
[brief] (Da023).  The court granted [...]’s request for a preliminary injunction and entered an Order requiring the parties to rotate the use of the prayer space on a weekly schedule.  (Pa005; Da108).  On June 8, 2021, the Honorable [...], P.J.Ch. entered an Order denying [...]’s motion for summary judgment against [...] and Third-party Defendants alleging they had usurped [...]’s corporate opportunity by purchasing [...]’s share of the property.
[brief] Importantly for this lawsuit, the Redevelopment Plan required a minor subdivision of the [...] site into a “Commercial Tract” fronting Route 35 and a “Residential Tract” behind the Commercial Tract.  (Da111).  The Redevelopment Plan contemplated 320 townhouse units and 80 multifamily units with a 20% set-aside for affordable multi-family housing on the Residential Tract.  (Da117).  The Commercial Tract was to be developed with commercial uses, highlighting the importance of a pedestrian-friendly, walkable, bikeable area offering food and beverage, entertainment, grocery, restaurants, cafes, and essential services to complement the Residential Tract, including its affordable housing, as well as nearby neighborhoods.  (Da114-Da116, Da121).  To be clear, [...] adopted the Redevelopment Plan requiring commercial uses on the Commercial Tract five years before Plaintiff proposed to build an inclusionary residential development on the Property.
[brief] Chassen, 836 F.3d at 303.  In addition, there is a legal distinction because the Chassen court defines “futility” very differently than [...].  Futility does not mean “ripeness”, as [...] argues.  See, e.g., Db22.  Instead, the Third Circuit explained that futility means that a motion for arbitration “was almost certain to fail”.  Chassen, 836 F.3d at 297, 299.  In that case, the Third Circuit found that the law at the time the complaint was filed in 2009 precluded arbitration of those types of claims, so a motion to arbitrate was certain to fail.  However, a change in the law pursuant to a 2011 Supreme Court decision subsequently allowed arbitration of such claims.
[directive] Acquittee  Having Found that the NGRI acquittee continues to no longer be so dangerous to self, others, or of property, as a result mental illness to require hospitalization, and as Having Found that there is a substantial likelihood that the acquittee will be dangerous to self, if of others, or property, a result mental illness the acquittee does not receive appropriate as services available in the community, __ of It Ordered is on the day - that:
[brief] Cf. (Pa16-21; Pa163-175; Pa164; Pa169); Sullivan, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2503 at *4-*21; Stitsworth, 1996, U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1657 at *1-*8.  (Pa232-242; Pa285-289).  Indeed, Sullivan, in particular, involved claims brought by the plaintiff under New Jersey’s Lemon Law, N.J.S.A. 56:12, et seq.  Sullivan, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2503 at *1; (Pa233).  The case was removed to federal court based on the diversity of the parties.  Ibid.  In its opinion, the Sullivan court quoted N.J.S.A. 56:12-42, as follows:  In any action by a consumer against a manufacturer brought in Superior Court or in the division pursuant to the provisions of this act, a prevailing consumer shall be awarded reasonable attorneys fees, fees for expert witnesses and costs.  [Ibid.]  However, despite the plain language and meaning of this statutory provision, and the plaintiff having prevailed at trial, the court reduced the fees and hourly rate in her counsel’s fee application from “nearly $20,000 in counsel fees for 130 hours of work and over $400 in out-of-pocket costs” to $7037 in counsel fees and $265.47 in costs, including a denial of expert fees.  Id. at *1, *19; (Pa233; Pa240).  Although the case was decided two years after Rendine, there is no mention of this seminal New Jersey case anywhere in the opinion.  Id. at *1-*23; (Pa.232-242).  Also, the court cited numerous published and unpublished federal cases involving the law of other federal circuit and district courts as well as other states, such as New York, Pennsylvania (citing Stitsworth) and Mississippi, to support its drastic reduction or elimination of the counsel fees and costs submitted in plaintiff’s counsel’s fee application.
[brief] Specifically, [...] engaged in improper colloquies with Plaintiff by asking her if she wanted to dismiss each of her claims several times.  [...] first questioned Plaintiff on the first day of trial following her opening statement, prior to Plaintiff questioning any Defendants.  1T8:1-1T9:19.  The following day during the second day of trial, [...] engaged in a more aggressive colloquy after improper ex parte communication with counsel in Chambers that morning.  Specifically, the Court questioned Plaintiff on the stand for several hours.  Then, prior to Plaintiff having the opportunity to question any of the Defendants, the Trial Court again proceeded to question Plaintiff about her claims in a checklist like manner, repeating many of the questions she asked Plaintiff the day before.  2T88-91.  This included probing whether Plaintiff intended to drop claims against the deceased [...] and questioning her remaining claims.  Plaintiff expressed confusion during this process, evident in both the transcript and audio recording, showing she didn’t knowingly and intelligently dismiss these claims.  2T88:4-91:15.  During this interaction Plaintiff, is clearly confused by the Court.  She is not an attorney, and it is apparent that she was uncertain about the legal jargon used, along with the implications of the interaction between her and the Judge.  2T90:1-25.
[brief] ”  N.J. Const. art. I, ¶ 18 (Pa103 at ¶ 21).  Moreover, when the Chair says there were “a number,” it was only six people from the public testifying on one of the most controversial subjects in America; the small number is due to the lack of public notice.  (Pa154.)  The Chair even commented, “This [bill], as rightfully expected, is always emotional because people care so deeply. ”  (Pa201 at 50:14-20.)  [...] explained in her testimony that she and her husband had organized protests to stop S. 3030 and A. 4848 – the bill for which [...] originally believed she was testifying.
[brief] R. 4:69-1, et seq.  John E. Long, Inc. v. Borough of Ringwood, 61 F. Supp. 2d 273, 278-79 (D.N.J. 1998) aff’d 213 F.3d 628 (3d. Cir. 2000) (quoting DeBlasio, supra, 53 F.3d at 597).  The trial court cited to the Rivkin Court which noted that “[p]ost-deprivation remedies are most likely to be deemed satisfactory substitutes for pre-deprivation process when a meaningful pre-deprivation hearing is impracticable and property rather than a life or liberty interest is at stake…”
[brief] In that case, the arbitration agreement provided, in pertinent part:  All disputes, complaints, controversies, claims and grievances arising between the Employer and the Union ... shall be adjusted in accordance with the following procedure:  ...  The parties designate [...] and [...] as permanent arbitrators to alternately hear and decide every other grievance, beginning with [...].  The decision of the arbitrator shall be final, binding and exclusive upon both parties and shall be fully enforceable in law, or in equity.  It is expressly understood and agreed, however, that the arbitrator shall not have the power to amend, modify, or alter, or in any way, add to or subtract from this Agreement or any provision thereof.  The cost of arbitration shall be shared equally by the Employer and the Union.  Id., at *2.  --- \(^5\)  The cited decision is the report and recommendation of magistrate judge, however it was subsequently adopted by the district court judge as the final decision of the District Court.  See Local 355 United Serv. Workers Union, Int'l Union of Journeymen & Allied Trades v. Dual-Purpose Corp., 2018 WL 1445575 (E.D.N.Y. 2018) (Pa144-148).
[brief] Moorestown v. Armstrong, 89 N.J. Super. 560 (App. Div. 1965), cert. denied, 47 N.J. 80 (1966); Moore v. Youth Corr. Inst. at Annandale, 230 N.J. Super. 374 (App. Div. 1989).  As an initial matter, it is extremely inappropriate for Appellant to imply that the charges against Appellant related to impairment on the job were “abandoned by the City prior to trial due to lack of evidence.
[brief] Defendant appealed the decision, and on June 25, 2019 the Appellate Division reversed the Trial Court’s prior partial summary judgment order and order for judgment, as well as certain other orders on appeal, and remanded the case for further proceedings.  Following remand from the Appellate Division, as well as various pre-trial motions, the Trial Court sitting as the fact finder conducted a bench trial.  After judging the credibility of the witnesses and considering all competent evidence, the Trial Court properly concluded (“2022 Judgment”) that in the early 1960s express easement rights were granted to the [...] by the [...] a/k/a [...] (“[...]”).  The Trial Court determined the attendant circumstances surrounding the granting of the property rights establish the [...] received an easement to utilize the Subject Property for parking and to connect the [...]’s HVAC system to the boiler room on the Subject Property.  As established during Plaintiff’s case in chief, these rights were continuously utilized by Plaintiff without interference by the grantor from the 1960s, through the 70s, 80s, 90s and up to 2010, when Defendant purchased the Subject Property.  The evidence also establishes that the [...]’s easement rights were never waived, terminated or abandoned.
[directive] DETERMINATION OF APPROPRIATE CRIMINAL HISTORY CATEGORY  8.1  General Description of Criminal History Categories  A defendant falls under the highest Criminal History Category for which he or she is eligible pursuant to the following table:  Page 57  [...] Guidelines 2 (2004 Revisions)  Criminal History Category  Criminal History Points or Criteria I (Minor)  0 to 9 II (Significant)  10 to 19 III (Serious)  20 or more  IV (Extended Term)  Defendant is eligible for an extended term of imprisonment pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6f by virtue of having previously been convicted of distributing or possessing with intent to distribute CDS, regardless of the degree of the prior drug distribution-type offense or the number of criminal history points.