ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] I  [...] and [...] were Both “Employees” (Pa-32)  The Supreme Court decided *D’Annunzio v. Prudential Ins. Co., et al.*, 192 N.J. 110 (2007) which totally changed the perspective in connection with determining the independent contractor/employee status as it applies to CEPA.  For the first time, the Supreme Court sanctioned what the Appellate Division determined in the same case at 383 N.J. Super. 270 and that is, that CEPA is remedial legislation and must be liberally construed.  Prior cases limited their decisions to just employee/independent contractor and never asserted the “remedial legislation and liberal interpretation” to that relationship.
[brief] When police realized the extent of the [...]’ falsities, and received information that defendant and his parents had visited David’s workplace several times after the shooting, they wanted to search the dumpsters located at [...].  (18T:161-24 to 167-21; 19T:174-5 to 175-14).  However, that search did not occur until January 17, 2019, and the dumpsters at David’s workplace are emptied three to four times per week.  Thus, by that time, the dumpsters had been emptied and nothing could be recovered from the night in question.  Ibid.  [...]’ family maintains that defendant had a laptop and items of clothing that he had left behind, and which the [...] would not return.  (22T:215-3 to 9).  Notably, when [...] had reported [...] missing in 2017, and police responded to [...]’ bedroom in her house, they observed the laptop in question in his room.  (17T:168-13 to 17).
[brief] (Pa67).  “[...] also noted that the property currently is a private parking lot having little aesthetic value (T31:9-10; T39:21-24) and that with the properties proximity to the boardwalk, pedestrians are seeing it every day (T32:7-8) and it is highly visible by motorists (T40:2-5). ” (Pa67).  Importantly, the Court noted that [...] testified “he saw no detriment in the project and that and that the benefits of the deviations substantially outweigh any detriment.  (T38-39:23-25; 1-11). ” (Pa68).  [...] also testified that the balconies are designed to be open-air so as not to infringe upon the light, air and space of adjoining properties.  The setback to the building façade on Porter Avenue is 9 feet and is 5 feet to the open-air balconies.  The setback on Ocean Terrace to the building façade is 5 feet.  Applicant clearly presented sufficient testimony addressing the benefits and/or detriments to the zone and therefore, meets its burden in establishing cause for the grant of variance relief.
[brief] Other laws and regulations ensure debt collectors, their agents, and service providers implement robust privacy and security safeguards to protect consumer information.  For example, the FTC’s Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act Safeguard Rule requires debt collectors to safeguard consumer information.  See 15 U.S.C. § 6809(3)(A); 16 C.F.R. § 314.1(b).  To comply with the Safeguard Rule, debt collectors must oversee service providers by selecting and retaining service providers capable of maintaining appropriate safeguards for the consumer information at issue, requiring servicing providers to implement appropriate safeguards, and overseeing service providers to ensure continued maintenance.
[brief] [...]’s appeal rests on the faulty premise that the State is constitutionally required to bear the financial burden for a district that is not meeting its local obligation to contribute to its students’ education.  It repeatedly claims that the State failed to fund the District at its “optimal” level, which it claims to mean that the State must fully fund the District’s adequacy budget when there is a shortfall or funding gap between its local contribution and the adequacy budget.  (Ab29-31).  There is no such requirement.  It is true that the State Constitution requires the Legislature to provide for “a thorough and efficient system of free public schools. ”  N.J. Const. art. VIII, § 4, ¶ 1.  But that does not constrain the State from establishing a system that includes a local responsibility to contribute, so long as the local districts have the tools to meet that obligation.  See Robinson v. Cahill (Robinson IV), 69 N.J. 133, 142 (1975) (explaining the State can meet its T&E obligation “by financing education either on a Statewide basis with funds provided by the State, or in whole or in part, by delegating the fiscal obligation to local taxation”).  The SFRA does just that.
[brief] The Arbitration Agreement is written in plain English with no obsolete or foreign-language words.  See N.J.S.A. §§ 56:12-10(a)(5)-(6).  Plaintiffs identify no double negatives or exceptions to exceptions.  See id. § 10(a)(3).  The sections and sentences are logically ordered and captioned.  See id. §§ 10(a)(4), (b)(1).  Plaintiffs also assert that the choice-of-forum provision in Section 7 is “contradictory.
[directive] Promulgation of Investigation and Intelligence Collection Procedures  a.  The Division of Criminal Justice, in consultation with the Office of Counter-Terrorism, the New Jersey State Police, and the County Prosecutors, and subject to the approval of the Attorney General or his/her designee, shall within 90 days of the effective date of this Directive prepare revisions to the 2004 Attorney General Guidelines on the Collection, Handling, Storage and Dissemination of Intelligence in New Jersey (“the Revised Attorney General Guidelines”).
[brief] The Chiropractors ask the court to ignore those arguments and affirm on the alternative ground, not addressed below, that Plaintiffs purportedly agreed by contract to arbitrate their damages claims through their Decision Point Review Plan (DPRP), therefore waiving the right to a jury trial.  That argument is meritless.  First, as Plaintiffs explained in their reply brief, their DPRP requires healthcare providers that are assigned patients’ rights to no-fault insurance benefits to agree, as a condition of assignment, to submit disputes to PIP ADR when those disputes fall within the PIP regulation cited in the DPRP.  Under AICRA and DOBI’s PIP regulations, assignee healthcare providers have the option to submit, to PIP ADR, disputes about whether they are entitled to PIP benefits.  The DPRP provision on which the Chiropractors rely simply converts that option into an obligation to raise disputes about unpaid or denied PIP benefits to PIP ADR rather than in court.  The DPRP’s assignment provision tracks DOBI’s regulation permitting insurers to require providers to submit to PIP ADR as a condition of the assignment of PIP benefits to them.  The assignment provision in Plaintiffs’ DPRP is much different from the DPRP provision that the Third Circuit held in [...] v. [...] contractually required arbitration of fraud damages claims.  [...]’s DPRP did not merely incorporate the PIP ADR regulations but was written more like a traditional arbitration clause requiring arbitration of “any issue arising under [the DPRP], or in connection with any claim for [PIP] benefits. ”  Second, this court should not bypass the issue of statutory interpretation presented by this case.  That issue is of such importance that DOBI and OIFP urge this court to correct the Law Division and Third Circuit’s erroneous interpretation of AICRA because it will cause serious harm to the public.  Their message is critical because DOBI promulgated the dispute-resolution regulations at issue and is tasked with civil enforcement of the Insurance Fraud Prevention Act (IFPA), and OIFP is charged with investigating and prosecuting insurance fraud.  The court should reverse the Law Division’s decision to ensure that insurers and the State retain essential tools to protect the public from insurance fraud.  ARGUMENT I.
[brief] DEFENDANT’S DENIAL OF THE HEIGHT VARIANCE MUST BE DEEMED ARBITRARY, CAPRICIOUS, AND UNREASONABLE BECAUSE IT UNREASONABLY REJECTS CREDIBLE AND UNREBUTTED EXPERT TESTIMONY, AND IS NOT SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL CREDIBLE EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD.  (Raised Below: 7T 7:18-25 through 14:1-7; 37:14-20; 46:2-25 through 52:1-21)  In addition to its misapplication of the legal standard (Medici, Grasso, Coventry Square, Randolph Town Center Associates, L.P., TSI, etc.), the Resolution reaches conclusions not supported by substantial credible evidence.  In an attempt to manufacture reasons for a denial, it ignores the evidence outlined above, through a conclusory rejection of unchallenged expert testimony.  To further justify the denial, the Board draws conclusions unsupported by any evidence in the record, never mind substantial credible evidence.  A.
[brief] Volume I (Pa1 to 200)  Notice of Appeal/Application, filed January 12, 2023 ......................  Pa1 P.L. 2021, c. 375, legislation sought to be reviewed, attached to Notice of Appeal  .....................................................................  Pa5  Civil Case Information Statement, filed January 12, 2023 ..............  Pa10  Filing Time Exemption, filed January 12, 2023 ...........................................  Pa14  Plaintiffs’ Application Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 1:7-1 and -4  Seeking Original Jurisdiction to Invalidate P.L. 2021, C. 375 and for Thirty Days to File a Responsive Brief, filed January 12, 2023 ...................... Pa16 Notice of Docketing, filed January 17, 2023 .............................................. Pa27 Amended Notice of Appeal, filed January 30, 2023 ................................. Pa29 Amended Case Information Statement, filed January 30, 2023 ............. Pa33 Court Transcript Request, filed January 30, 2023 ................................. Pa37 Respondent’s Case Information Statement, filed February 17, 2023 .
[brief] (Pa283).  Among the five sections of the Plan amended by Ordinance 2022-17, new Section 3.1.1 sets forth the Township Committee’s reasons for adopting the Redevelopment Plan, regardless of master plan consistency.  (Pa47-Pa50).  After voting to introduce Ordinance 2022-17, and following required public notice, the Committee held a public hearing on December 8, 2022.  (Pa295-Pa297).  At this hearing, Ordinance 2022-17 was adopted by a majority of the Committee.  (Pa296).
[brief] Accordingly, the Council has been delegated substantial independent authority to act as the agency primarily enforcing hunting rules and regulations, despite being controlled by a majority membership of private self-interested hunters and trappers.  (1963), the legislative delegation of licensing power to the State Medical Society, which had to approve the plaintiff corporation’s trustees as a condition of receiving a certificate of authority, was deemed to be an unconstitutional delegation of licensing power.  Although the Court in Howell concluded that the delegation of authority violated due process under the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution, it primarily relied on the New York case of Fink v. Cole, 302 N.Y.  216, 97 N.E.2d 873 (Ct. App. 1951), which concluded that the delegation of licensing power to the [...], a private organization, was such an abdication as to be an unconstitutional relinquishment of legislative power and violation of the provision in the New York Constitution which (similar to New Jersey) provides that “the legislative power of this State shall be vested in the Senate and Assembly. ”
[brief] In Park v. Park, 309 N.J. Super. 312 (App. Div. 1998) the Appellate Division addressed the ability to recover “bus PIP” payments made pursuant to N.J.S.A 17:28-1.6.  In that matter the Court recognized that bus PIP payments made pursuant to N.J.S.A. 17:28-1.6 were not PIP payments pursuant to N.J.S.A 39:6A-4 but were nonetheless recoverable.  The court in Park v Park did not rule that the payments which were not PIP payments made pursuant to N.J.S.A 17:28-1.6 were barred by the collateral source rule.
[brief] On September 25, 2023, oral argument on the Recovery Court appeal was heard.  The lower court requested additional briefing on the issue of N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14a(5)’s applicability and set another hearing date of December 4, 2023.  (1T66-23 to 1T68-16).  On December 4, 2023, additional oral argument was heard, specifically addressing whether N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14a(5) barred the defendant’s admission into Recovery Court.  On December 11, 2023, the lower court issued its written Order Approving Defendant’s Application for Acceptance into the Recovery Court Program, Track One, finding the defendant clinically and legally eligible as a Track One candidate for sentencing into Recovery Court.
[brief] On the motion return date of August 18, 2023, the trial court denied the motion to abbreviate transcripts without prejudice on grounds of procedural error of serving defendant by email.  (Pa1056)  Plaintiff emailed a copy of the trial court order on abbreviation of transcript along with Form C, the transcript order form on August 18, 2023 to the Appellate Division case manager.  The transcript request form ordered the abbreviated transcripts which were delivered to the Appellate Division by the transcriber on September 25, 2023.  (Pa1042)  On October 23, 2023, plaintiff filed a motion in the Appellate Division for temporary remand to renew the motion for abbreviated transcript.  The Appellate Division denied the motion for temporary remand on November 13, 2023.  (Pa1057)  On November 21, 2023, plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration of the November 13, 2023 order.  The Appellate Division denied the motion for reconsideration on December 4, 2023.  (Pa1058)  On December 18, 2023, plaintiff filed in the Supreme Court of New Jersey a motion for leave to appeal (MLA) the November 13 and December 4, 2023 orders of the Appellate Division.  While plaintiff’s motion for leave to appeal was pending in the Supreme Court, plaintiff submitted via email the appellant’s brief and multiple volumes of appendices on December 20, 2023.  A physical copy of the documents was delivered to the Clerk’s Office of Appellate Division on December 22, 2023.  However, the Clerk’s Office returned plaintiff’s submissions unfiled citing the outstanding issue of completion of transcripts.  On December 27, 2023, plaintiff filed a motion for admission of the appellant’s brief and appendix.  The Clerk’s Office notified plaintiff on January 5, 2024 that the motion ([...]) had been filed but not scheduled.  On January 9, 2024 plaintiff submitted a letter to the Clerk seeking the scheduling of the motion.  The Clerk did not respond to plaintiff’s letter.  Plaintiff filed another motion for admission of appellant’s brief and appendices on July 1, 2024, which was denied by the Appellate Division on July 17, 2024.  (Pa1354).  In its order (Pa1267) on plaintiff’s MLA, filed on March 22, 2024, the Supreme Court of New Jersey effectively reversed the denial of remand by the Appellate Division by summarily remanding the matter to the trial court for consideration of a renewed motion to abbreviate the transcript.
[brief] Pa37.  Contrary to the trial court’s findings, Plaintiff’s expert, [...], demonstrated that the Second Application would have no or minimal impact on traffic conditions in the surrounding area as it would, on average, increase additional traffic volume by only a second or two.  Pa238, at 78:5-81:24.  Indeed the trial court failed to give deference to [...]’s testimony which stated that the mixed-use building proposed in the Second Application only would generate six (6) entering vehicles and twelve (12) exiting vehicles in the morning and twelve (12) entering vehicles and ten (10) exiting vehicles during the evening.  Id., at 78:5-12.  Along the same vein, [...] further testified that the proposed use would be significantly less intense than other uses permitted under the Zoning Ordinance.
[brief] 0014a.  This was a mere clerical error as the Affidavit of Service was amended with the correct date.  0016a.  More importantly, [...] – the Affiant – testified at the bench trial as to the facts in the Affidavit of Service.  T4 8:18-21.  Appellant ignores the fact that [...]’s Affidavit of Service matches the physical appearance of [...].  0016a; T3 40:3-4; T3 24:5-8.  Moreover, the Affidavit of Service states that [...] is “[...]” – i.e., the spouse of Co-Appellant [...].  0016a.  The Affidavit of Service is consistent with [...]’s testimony that it is standard practice to contemporaneously capture the physical appearance at the time of personal service and inquire of the person being served as to their relationship with the subject entity.  T4 32:19-25, 33:1-20.  Accordingly, the record fully supported Trial Court’s finding that [...] was personally served.
[directive] At the conclusion of the internal affairs investigation, the investigator shall submit a written report consisting of an objective investigative report recounting all of the case’s facts and a summary of the case, along with conclusions for each allegation, and recommendations for further action.  (a)  Investigative report.  The first part of the report will be an objective recounting of all the relevant information the investigation disclosed, including statements, documents and other evidence.  This part of the report is similar in all respects to a standard law enforcement investigative report, and should contain a complete account of the investigation.  (b)  Summary and Conclusions.  The investigator should summarize the case and provide conclusions of fact for each allegation.  These conclusions of fact should be recorded as exonerated, sustained, not sustained or unfounded.  9.1.2
[brief] Compare Cineas v. Mammone, 270 N.J. Super 200, 208 (App. Div. 1994) (finding that “[t]here must be a clear showing of fundamental error in law or the submission of new factual material” for a trial court to reconsider an interlocutory order), with Lawson, 468 N.J. Super. at 136 (“We observe as well there is nothing in our jurisprudence to suggest reconsideration of an interlocutory order is prohibited unless the movant can provide something ‘new’ or unless the prior judge acted in an ‘arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable’ manner. ”).  “lateral appeal. ”” (Pb13).  Defendants appropriately sought reconsideration of the January 23 Orders because [...] “erred” and “entered . . . order[s] that [did not] promote a fair and efficient processing” of this case.
[brief] But rather than base its decision on (or even cite to) the [...], the court instead endeavored to interpret unidentified emails:  Based on the email exchange between Petitioners and Counsel prior to the matter being initiated, there is evidence to indicate that Counsel and Petitioners had communications involving Petitioners' potential claims which also involved Petitioners providing to Counsel documents regarding their claims.  [Pa9-10.]  The only evidence of what those communications were is in the [...]  It is unknown what the "documents relating to their claims" were – or if the trial court considered those (unauthenticated) documents.  Again, the only documents provided by petitioner to the [...] are those outlined in the Statement of Facts.
[brief] In support of Appellant’s belated attempt to now include the 2019 Permit Modification in this appeal, Appellant relies solely on this Court’s decision in Musconetcong Watershed Ass'n v. N.J. Dep't of Env't Prot., 476 N.J. Super. 465 (App. Div. 2023), issued after Appellant filed its Notice of Appeal.  The facts of that case are distinguishable from the current appeal.
[brief] Indeed, a malicious prosecution action “may be predicated upon the institution of other than a judicial action, at least where such proceedings are adjudicatory in nature and may adversely affect legally protected interests. ”  Toft v. Ketchum, 18 N.J. 280, 284 (1955).  Moreover, as a policy matter, it should make no difference when the criminal complaint was judicially found to be meritless.  The trial court’s reliance on the Restatement (Second) of Torts §654 comment c was misplaced, because (1) no New Jersey case had followed that comment, and (2) the comment is inconsistent with the precedential cases cited --- 18
[brief] Defendant further requests that the offending sentence of the arbitration provision be severed and the rest of the provision left intact.  That cannot be done.  The legal doctrine of severability permits a provision an agreement to be severed, and the rest of the agreement to be performed, if the agreement remains viable after the severance of the provision.  However, the law does not permit a sentence from a provision to be deleted, and then allows that provision, as now re-written, to be enforced for the benefit of one party.  *Washington Const. Co. v. Spinella*, 8 N.J. 212, 217 (1951) (citing, *Herbert L. Farkas Co. v. N.Y. Fire Ins. Co.*, 5 N.J. 604, (1950).  The arbitration provision, as written, is not enforceable.  It must be severed in full.  This Court is not in the business of re-writing contractual provisions for the benefit of one party, and to the detriment of another.  Defendant also asks for the mediation text to be enforced.  For the reasons expressed above, the arbitration clause must be stricken in full, including the mediation text.  **CONCLUSION**
[brief] Respondents were “free to accept or reject the terms proposed” in the SPA.  See Dixon Mills Condo. Ass'n v. RGD Holding Co., LLC, 2018 N.J. Super. LEXIS 464, *6-7 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 2018) (agreeing with the lower court's conclusion that the arbitration provisions were not adhesive because the unit owners “were free to accept or reject the contract terms proposed by the sellers of [the units],” and there was “[a]bsolutely no proof . . . that the terms of the [SPA] were in any way non-negotiable. ”).  B.
[directive] A system of progressive discipline can include the following elements:  (a)  Oral reprimand or performance notice; (b) Written reprimand; INTERNAL AFFAIRS POLICY & PROCEDURES | November 2022  8  (c)  Monetary fine;2 (d)  Suspension without pay; (e) Loss of a promotional opportunity; (f) Demotion; and (g)  Discharge from employment.  2.2.7
[brief] Kindly accept this Reply Letter-Brief on behalf of respondent-appellant pursuant to R. 2:6-2(b).  TABLE OF CONTENTS  PROCEDURAL HISTORY ........................................................................................................1  STATEMENT OF FACTS ......................................................................................................1  LEGAL ARGUMENT ...........................................................................................................2  POINT I THE PETITIONER DECEDENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN SUMMARILY DECLARED TO BE AN ESSENTIAL EMPLOYEE.
[brief] THE ARBITRATION AGREEMENT IN THIS CASE IS UNCONSCIONABLE AND UNENFORCEABLE.  The subject agreement is unenforceable due to unconscionability and undue influence.  Procedural unconscionability is unfairness in the formation of the contract, it “can include a variety of inadequacies, such as age, literacy, lack of sophistication, hidden or unduly complex contract terms, bargaining tactics, and the particular setting existing during the contract formation process. ”  Sitogum Holdings, Inc. v. Ropes, 352 N.J. Super. 555, 564 (Ch. Div. 2002).  Substantive unconscionability is excessively disproportionate contract terms so that “the exchange of obligations is so one-sided as to shock the court’s conscience. ”  Id. at 564-65.  The arbitration agreement in this case is procedurally and substantively unconscionable.