ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] There is no evidence that the VRDO Data Sources impose a “duty of confidentiality with respect to [their] information,” like in United States ex rel. Maxwell v. Kerr-McGee Oil & Gas Corp., 540 F.3d 1180, 1184–85 (10th Cir. 2008).  Nor must the government or any member of the \(^{18}\) Certainly, Relator has not taken the position that it violated the MSRB SHORT terms of use by conducting its analysis and filing its complaint.  Nor has it asserted that [...] violated EMMA’s terms of use by collecting and analyzing data on roughly 50 VRDOs and their rate changes.
[brief] The Petitioner received monthly benefits of at least $6,200.  These include a VA disability pension since 2003 (current amount $3,600 per month), monthly social security in the amount of $1,800, and a federal pension of $800 per month.  (7T208-18 to 209-21).  These payments were deposited into bank accounts solely in the name of the Petitioner.  (8T10-6 to 10).  During the last ten years that the Petitioner and Decedent were both working, each earned approximately $65,000 per year.  (8T7-17 to 10-5).  H.
[brief] January 3, 2024 /s/ [...]  [...]  [...]  [...]  [...] [...]  *Attorney for Amicus Curiae*  [...]  [...]  Attorney General of New Jersey, & [...], Director of the [...], Plaintiffs-Respondents, v. [...] & [...]  Defendants-Appellants.  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY  APPELLATE  DIVISION CIVIL ACTION  DOCKET NO. [...]  On Appeal  From an Order Entered in the Superior Court, Chancery Division, Granting a Preliminary Injunction  Sat Below: Hon. [...], J.S.C.  Docket No.: [...]
[brief] (Pa16).  Despite [...]’s contention that she was reimbursed for her business expenses (Pb44), she did not provide any proof to substantiate her claim.  The ALJ also reasonably noted that [...] was only provided with incidental office supplies, like a conference room with desk, phone, and copier.  (Pa16).  [...] did not provide [...] with a permanent office or work station, a secretary or assistant, a dedicated phone line, or a unique [...] email.  (Pa16).  The door to the conference room had a sign that said “Municipal Prosecutor,” but did not state [...]’s name.  (1T65:8-12).  There was no evidence that [...] provided any tools or materials for use at [...]’s private law firm where she performed most of her work when outside of court.  With respect to Factor #17 – Working for More Than One Firm at a Time and Factor #18 – Making Services Available to the General Public, the ALJ reasonably found that [...] offered her services as a Municipal Prosecutor to other municipalities in [...] and offered her services as an attorney to the public at her private law firm.
[brief] See N.J.S.A. 56:8-2.  In holding that unlicensed debt collection activity is not an activity covered by the CFA, the trial court relied on two cases: DepoLink Court Reporting & Litig. Support Servs. v. Rochman, 430 N.J. Super. 325, 339 (App. Div. 2013), and Chulsky v. Hudson Law Offices, P.C., 777 F. Supp. 2d 823, 825 (D.N.J. 2011).  The trial court reasoned that “[DepoLink] held that the actions via collection agency who purchased a debt after it was made were not activities in connection with the sale of merchandise or services.  . . .”  T1 55:23-25 (citing DepoLink, 430 N.J. Super. at 339).  However, the trial court failed to consider distinguishing facts in DepoLink, which part DepoLink’s reasoning and holding from the instant action.  In DepoLink, the alleged CFA violations occurred prior to the account being referred to the defendant collection agency—the bad actor in the consumer transaction was alleged to be the merchant as opposed to the collection agency.  See DepoLink, 430 N.J. Super. at 338-39.  In the case at bar, [...] has not alleged that [...] committed any acts of consumer fraud.  Indeed, the violations [...] complains of were committed solely by the Defendants, after the account had been assigned, when Defendants attempted to possess and enforce [...]’s alleged account despite being unlicensed under the NJCFLA—an act which, on its face, constitutes a “crime of the fourth degree.
[brief] [...]’s longtime attorney, [...], was apparently unaware of the existence of the ROFR until [...] provided that information directly to him.  Da261 ¶46.  On February 8, 2023, [...] had calls with Hendricks and his legal assistant, [...], whereby he informed them that [...] had a ROFR under the MFSA and that the PSA needed to be corrected to account for this material term.  Da191 ¶46, Da262 ¶46.  That same day, per their request, [...] emailed them the language from Amendment Number 1 of the MFSA, containing Section 39, which included the ROFR requirement, the amortization table and termination costs.  Da191 ¶47, Da262 ¶47.  On March 27, 2023, [...] again sent Shields the First Amendment to the MFSA, which contains Section 39 and the ROFR language.  Da191 ¶48, Da262 ¶48.  Incredibly, as of March 29, 2023, Hendricks and [...]’s attorney, [...], apparently still did not believe that [...] had an existing ROFR on the Premises or that [...] would exercise it.
[brief] Indeed, mail vendors are not subject to “the FCC’s heavy-handed regulatory regime. ”  FCC v. FCC (In re MCP), 124 F.4th 993 (6th Cir. 2025).  Further distinguishing mail vendors is that, unlike Defendant’s secret use of its unidentified and unregulated mail vendors, the consumer knows the identity of the telephone or telegraph company when answering the debt collector’s operator-assisted call or receives a telegram.  Defendant contends no human viewed the information, there was no other use of the information, and the recipient’s use was limited to a “rote task. ”  Db2, Db21.  There is nothing in the record to support those contentions and the R. 4:6-2(e) standard bars considering them.
[brief] [...], inspected the building, accompanied by the owner [...], and appraiser [...] on May 28, 2018.  He examined the trade fixtures for the commercial ventures which were operating at [...] in January of 1994.  [...] has been President of Sidney [...] Inc. located in [...] since 1966 and engaged in field inspection, estimating and pricing commercial and industrial personality, furniture, fixtures, and equipment for over fifty years and has testified innumerable times in Eminent Domain cases.
[brief] Id. at 565.  In Warnig, petitioner [...] was injured in a motor vehicle accident, while a passenger on a bus owned by the respondent, and her employer, [...].  When the accident occurred, petitioner carried a policy of insurance for her personal automobile with [...] ("[...]") that provided $250,000 in PIP benefits and $10,000 in Med Pay benefits.  Id.  After the worker's compensation benefits had ended, petitioner sought the available PIP benefits from the [...] policy.  Id. at 565.  [...] determined that petitioner was not entitled to PIP coverage because she was a passenger on a commercial vehicle at the time of the accident, and instead provided $10,000 in Med Pay to the petitioner for chiropractic treatment.  Id.  [...] then intervened in petitioner's pending worker's compensation action, seeking reimbursement of the $20,000 Med Pay benefits it had paid out.  Id. at 566.  Respondent filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that [...] was not entitled to reimbursement of the Med Pay benefits under the collateral source rule, N.J.S.A. 39:6A-6.  Id.  The Judge of Compensation granted Respondent's motion under that rationale.  Id.  [...] appealed the decision of the Compensation Court, asserting that the Judge of Compensation reached the incorrect holding that [...] was not entitled to recover the Med Pay benefits under the collateral source rule.  Id.  Specifically, it is argued that "benefits paid under the Med Pay portion of a personal automobile policy are no different from PIP benefits and should receive the same treatment under the collateral source rule..."  Id.  The Appellate Division upheld the decision of the Compensation court that Med Pay benefits are not included within the ambit of the collateral source rule.  Id. at 569.  It noted that N.J.A.C. 11:3-7.3(b) "requires some medical expense benefits to be provided for injuries resulting from accidents not otherwise qualifying for PIP medical expense benefits."  Id. at 567.  The court then held that 'Iglus Med Pay benefits are not of statute but of a regulation promulgated under legislative authority by the Commissioner of Insurance."  Id. at 568.  (citing Ingersoll v. Aetna Cas. And Surety Co., 138 N.J. 236 (1994)).  The court held that "Med Pay benefits are expressly not available in cases where a party is entitled to basic PIP benefits or where other PIP coverage applies," and that the Supreme Court in Ingersoll established that "benefits paid under the Med Pay Portion of an automobile policy do not fall within the purview of N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4 or N.J.S.A. 39:6A-10."  Id.  The views expressed by the Appellate Division in Warnig were again upheld in an unpublished opinion by the Appellate division eight years later in the unreported decision of [...] v. [...], et als, 2011 WL 1135186 (N.J. Super. A.D.), Similar to the facts of Warnig.
[brief] Thus, without any factual basis or documentary support, [...] interpreted without any reasoning or analysis that the proposed development does not exceed the [...]’s Building Height Ordinance.  (Pa156;69:9-14).  [...] simply stated that the applicant did not exceed the height requirements of the RR Zone under the Building Height Ordinance, but provided no explanation whatsoever.  [...] further found that [...]’s proposed development did not raise the original grade for the purpose of raising the height of the buildings, but rather the grading was in association with the overall site plan layout which includes stormwater management amongst other features.
[brief] I.  **PIVNICK V. BECK**  DEALT WITH AN INSTRUMENT THAT THE COURT FOUND UNAMBIGUOUS; THE COURT HERE FOUND THE INSTRUMENT DRAFTED BY DEFENDANT WAS AMBIGUOUS.  The *Pivnick v. Beck*, Appellate Court set forth that “in this case, Plaintiff attempted to prove malpractice by contradicting a solemn document that was clear on its face (emphasis added).  326 N.J. 474 at 491.  The Supreme Court described the *Pivnick* case “Plaintiff undertook to have an unambiguous Will and Trust agreement reformed. ”  *Pivnick v. Beck*, 615 N.J. 670 (2000).  Thus, in addition to relying on a case that did not involve an ambiguous document, the Defendants completely ignore the Plaintiff’s argument that the giving collateral estoppel effect when a Court applies the doctrine of probable intent to construe an ambiguous instrument thereby immunizes negligent attorneys for liability for drafting ambiguous testamentary instruments.  There is no sound basis in policy or law or fairness for such immunity.  II.  THERE IS ABSOLUTELY NO EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD THAT DEFENDANTS SUFFERED  SUBSTANTIAL PREJUDICE  As below, Defendants do not identify a single way in which they are prejudiced nevermind substantially prejudiced by the failure to bring to the Trial Court’s attention the potential litigation against the Defendant in the probate matter.  The party asserting the entire controversy doctrine as a defense bears “the burden of establishing both inexcusable conduct and substantial prejudice. ”  *Hobart Bros. Co. v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co.*, 354 N.J. Super. 229, 242 (App. Div. 2002).  Substantial prejudice in this context means substantial prejudice in maintaining one's defense. ”  *Mitchell v. Charles P. Procini, D.D.S., P.A.*, 331 N.J. Super. 445, 454 (App. Div. 2000).  Typically, this requirement is met where there has been a loss of witnesses, evidence, and the passage of time such that memories have faded.  *Ibid.*  An undisclosed party must proffer “specific difficulties in mounting a defense” to claims that are “significantly different from that normally encountered. ”  Id. at 456.  Ultimately, “[t]he phrase ‘substantial prejudice’ is used in [R.] 4:5-1(b)(2) as a limitation on the court's exercise of the power of dismissal as a sanction” and is therefore, “consistent with our general preference for addressing disputes on the merits and reserving dismissal for matters in which those lesser sanctions are inadequate. ”  *Kent Motor Cars, Inc.*, 207 N.J. at 447.  Indeed, the holding below is at odds with *Old v. Donnelly’s* holding that all legal malpractice claims are exempt from the entire controversy doctrine.
[brief] [...] CANNOT DEMONSTRATE IRREPARABLE HARM.  Irreparable harm exists when money damages cannot adequately compensate the movant’s injuries.  See e.g., Crowe, 90 N.J. at 132-33; Board of Educ. of Union Beach v. New Jersey Educ. Ass’n., 96 N.J. Super. 371, 391 (Ch. Div. 1967), aff’d, 53 N.J. 29 (1968).
[brief] Next, in the record before the Commission was an Unfair Practice Charge filed against the Board on behalf of the [...] and the [...] in direct response to the post that constituted Count 1 of the present matter, which told teachers to drop out of their unions.  (Ca094-102; Ca165-166; Ca180).  This post – which stated “Teachers ... OPT OUT OF THE [...]!!!” – was made mere days after Respondent had posted the picture of her swearing in to the Board and typed out that she was a member.  (Ca108-Ca115).  That is why [...] found:  >  It is clear that Respondent’s unilateral actions in sharing a post that lobbied teachers to “rise up” and “opt out of the [...],” not only had the ability to compromise the Board, but it did compromise the Board.  This is evidenced by the litigation filed against it – specifically, the Unfair Practice Charge filed by the [...] and [...].  Respondent’s actions also brought into question the Board’s ability to fairly and impartially negotiated its labor contract in accordance with WDEA.
[brief] TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, RULINGS AND ORDERS BEING APPEALED ...........................................................................................................iii  TABLE OF CITATIONS ..................................................................................................................iv  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT .................................................................................................1  PROCEDURAL HISTORY .......................................................................................................3  FACTUAL BACKGROUND .....................................................................................................15  I.  The Insurance Policy Sold to [...] by [...] ......................................................15  II.  [...]’s Operations at the [...] .................................................................16  III.  [...]’s Discovery and Investigation of the Property Damage at the [...] .........................................................................................................................17  IV.  [...]’s Notice and Updates to its Insurance Companies and the Insurance Companies’ Lack of Action ........................................................................................................21  V. AOCs  Where the Trial Court Found Property Damage During [...]’s Policy Period .........................................................................................................................22  A. AOC 5 .........................................................................................................................23  B. AOC 16 .......................................................................................................................23  C. AOC 22 .......................................................................................................................24  D. AOC 26 .......................................................................................................................24  E. AOC 30 .......................................................................................................................25  VI.  [...]’s Costs Incurred to Remediate Property Damage Originating at Each AOC .........................................................................................................................25  ARGUMENT ............................................................................................................................28
[brief] Defendants ask this court to kick a preclusive effect issue down the road, even though another Mount Laurel Declaratory Judgment trial court has declined to address this issue.  In CY 2021, a constitutional civil rights act violation occurred at each meeting when plaintiff and others were denied the right to be heard on all agenda action items prior to consideration and official action.  This was akin to a continuous and ongoing constitutional tort with a new cause of action arising with each successive violation.  Ironically, Res. 21-064 buttresses and strengthens plaintiff’s civil rights act violation claim.
[directive] Notice When Using BWCs with an Apparent Crime Victim.  When interacting with an apparent crime victim, a law enforcement officer shall, as soon as practicable, notify the apparent crime victim that he or she is being recorded by the BWC and, if the apparent crime victim requests the officer to discontinue use of the BWC, the officer shall immediately discontinue use of the BWC.  A request to discontinue the use of a BWC made to a law enforcement officer pursuant to this Section and the response to the request shall be recorded by the recording system prior to discontinuing use of the recording system.  4.6
[brief] (Da3; Da119).  That same day, on May 17, 2023, Appellants confirmed that the Original Policy “requires that staff members ‘say something to the parents and appropriate school administrators,’ if they ‘see something that could adversely affect the social/emotional well-being of a child,’” including a student’s “sexual orientation; transitioning; [or] gender identity or expression. ” (Da117).  On May 18, 2023, the trial court temporarily enjoined and restrained Appellants from implementing the Original Policy and from otherwise giving effect to the aspects of the Original Policy that violated the LAD—including its specifications based on sexual orientation, gender identity, or gender expression.  (Da119-22).  After full briefing, a hearing on the application took place on May 30, 2023, during which Appellants maintained that the Original Policy did not offend the LAD.  (Da38; 1T18:12-19).  At the end of the hearing, the court noted that “some of the language [of the Original Policy] is undefined and vague” and “imposes … a subjective obligation with no discretion whatsoever on school officials,” and the court urged the parties to work toward an amicable resolution while it prepared its written opinion.  (1T58:19-59:21).  Appellants represented that they would be “glad” to negotiate with the State.  (1T59:22-60:4).  C.
[brief] It is also true that the principles which underlie the Law Division’s proper finding that [...] had no contractual duty to clear snow and ice from the location where [...] was allegedly injured apply equally to support the Law Division’s proper finding that [...] had no common law duty to maintain the location where [...] was allegedly injured.  The principles set out in Kandrac v. Marrazzo's Market at Robbinsville, 65 A.3d 263 (App. Div. 2013) are on all fours with the instant action and it is respectfully submitted that the decision in Kandrac is dispositive and affirms [...]’s entitlement to summary judgment in this case.
[brief] Rather, the trial court properly considered the “detrimental to the welfare of the community” criterion only in relation to its analysis of N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-5(d).  In its analysis of whether the Property satisfies the criteria in N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-5(b), the trial court properly considered only whether the record contained substantial evidence to support the Township’s argument that the Property was subject to redevelopment designation based on discontinuance of use or significant vacancies and found that these criteria had not been met.  Defendants’ argument that the trial court committed an error of law is unavailing.
[brief] Plaintiff’s papers in support of his cross-motion, however, contain numerous references to a “recorded easement. ”  In its letter brief in support of its motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff states that the facts and circumstances demonstrate that he “has a right of access through the [...] property to his own property which access is *undisputed* (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).  This statement does not reflect the facts based on the evidence presented to the Court.  Defendants strongly dispute Plaintiff’s right of access through their land.  Even if Plaintiff amended his complaint to include a claim to an express easement, the evidence still supports a finding that Defendants are entitled to Summary Judgment.  First, it is clear that a driveway exists; Defendants admit as much.  Second, the driveway route, as alleged by Plaintiff, crossed other properties, including the [...] land.  Express easements are created by grant and the language of the grant is controlling (citations omitted).  In Leach, the Appellate Division concluded that no express easement existed for an adjoining neighbor to use a roadway where, “[t]he several references to the right-of-way as a ‘roadway’ in the various deeds are only for the purpose of describing the property and its boundaries and do not constitute a grant of a right to use the adjoining property” (citation omitted).  Similarly, no language exists in any deed brought to the Court’s attention that purports to grant any right to use of enjoyment in that part of the driveway that runs from the boundary of Defendant’s property to [...].  Defendants’ deed is subject to existing rights in the driveway if any.  Thus, it does not purport to create an easement, nor does it acknowledge any right in the Respondent or his predecessors.  Additionally, Defendant James [...]’s statements to the [...] clearly do not amount to a grant of an affirmative easement under state law.  At most, he acknowledges the existence of a driveway and its use by others.  At no time does he make any statements acknowledging a grant made to Respondent or his predecessors (Da106 (emphasis supplied)).  Obviously, neither the 1955 [...]-to-[...] Deed nor the 1966 [...]-to-[...] Deed were placed before [...] by either party during the [...] case.  Moreover, Appellants admit that they failed to record any document in the [...] land records to place the world on notice of the result reached in [...]’s lawsuit (Da221 at ¶59).  Simply put, there was nothing in record title to place Respondent on notice of any prior lawsuit, concerning access to the [...], the existence of which was unnecessary in the first instance given the express easements contained in, among others, the [...]-to-[...] Deed (Da480).  For the reasons set forth herein, Respondent respectfully requests that the Court affirm [...]’s grant of summary judgment to the Respondent in all respects.  STANDARD OF REVIEW
[brief] Rule 4:24-1(c) permits an initial extension of discovery for sixty days by consent of all parties.  After the initial extension, if an additional extension is not agreed upon by all parties, then a motion for relief is required.  Ibid.  The New Jersey Supreme Court has observed that such a motion is required; a party may not simply assume that “there would not be a problem. ”  Bender v. Adelson, 187 N.J. 411, 430 (2006).  Plaintiffs never filed a formal motion to extend discovery before [...] on August 28, 2021, as required by the Court Rules.
[brief] [...]  [...]  Formed in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania  Attorneys for Defendant-Appellee, Blaze Keyport, LLC [...]  Tel: [...]  Fax: [...]  On the Brief: [...], Esquire  NJ Bar Id.  No.: 02311989  [...], Esquire NJ Bar Id. No.: 374132022  Submitted on: June 21, 2024  #  TABLE OF CONTENTS | SECTION | PAGE | |------------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | PRELIMINARY STATEMENT | 1 | | PROCEDURAL HISTORY | 2 | | I.