ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] The investigation revealed that at approximately 11:34 p.m., the [...] received multiple 911 calls reporting shots fired in the area of Harrison Street and Myrtle Avenue.  The officer who shot [...] (“[...]”) and three other officers of the [...] were the first officers to arrive at the scene.  They were dressed in plain clothes and arrived together in a single unmarked police vehicle.  As they arrived on scene, but before exiting their vehicle, all four officers observed three men standing on Myrtle Avenue.  Two of the men immediately ran from the scene, while the third man, later identified as Randy [...], pointed a handgun at the officers’ arriving vehicle before running north on Myrtle Avenue in the direction of a fleeing woman.  [...] exited the vehicle and ran after [...].  [...] reported that [...] was still armed with a handgun as he ran after the woman, who fell near the corner of Myrtle and Harrison.  As [...] drew closer, he observed [...] pointing the handgun at the woman, who was on her knees and screaming.  [...] identified himself as a police officer and yelled for [...] to stop.  [...] instead swung the handgun at the woman, appearing to strike her with the weapon.  [...] again identified himself as a police officer and ordered [...] to stop.  Ignoring the order, [...] raised the gun to shoulder level at the woman.  As he did so, he also began to turn his head and body toward [...].  [...] then fired his 9mm service pistol six times at [...].  [...] fell to the ground while still holding the handgun.  [...] approached [...] and kicked the gun, a .32-caliber revolver, from his hands.  [...] was transported to [...] in Passaic, where he was pronounced dead.
[brief] To the fullest extent permitted by law, Contactor shall be responsible for claims to bodily injury and property damage due to Contractor’s negligent snow plowing work that may arise at Customer’s premises while Contractor is physically on premises.  To the fullest extent permitted by law, Customer shall defend, indemnify and hold harmless Contractor, its owners, agents, consultants, employees, and subcontractors from all claims for bodily injury and property damage that may arise from Customer’s premises including and acts or omissions by Customer or Customer’s subcontractors whether employed directly or indirectly [emphasis added] for ice which forms from daytime melting from snow and ice which is removed from, brought in by or in between vehicles.  Da45.
[directive] ,, CASE CKET e<:ORJeMACS JA Iii "-titions "-rmtu Gun Compl,ifnu 1214-Compl,iint 0 at completed wait aaain. cannot complaint time.  minutes on this this  Please 15 and try this complaint  PSA be View Case Jacke t [...]  COMPLAINT 121 4 ITODONOTTOUCH
[directive] To be clear, nothing in this new Directive limits New Jersey law enforcement agencies or officers from enforcing state law – and nothing in this Directive should be read to imply that New Jersey provides “sanctuary” to those who commit crimes in this state.  Any person who violates New Jersey’s criminal laws can and will be held accountable for their actions, no matter their immigration status.  Similarly, nothing in this Directive restricts New Jersey law enforcement agencies or officers from complying with the requirements of Federal law or valid court orders, including judicially-issued arrest warrants for individuals, regardless of immigration status.  For the purposes of this Directive, a “judicial warrant” is one issued by a federal or state judge.  It is not the same as an immigration detainer—sometimes referred to as an Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) detainer—or an administrative warrant, both of which are currently issued not by judges but by federal immigration officers.  See, e.g., U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement Policy Number 10074.2: Issuance of Immigration Detainers by ICE Immigration Officers (Effective Apr. 2, 2017).  Under federal and state law, local law enforcement agencies are not required to enforce civil administrative warrants or detainers issued by federal immigration officers rather than federal or state judges.  Finally, nothing in this Directive prohibits state, county and local law enforcement agencies from imposing their own additional restrictions on providing assistance to federal immigration authorities, so long as those restrictions do not violate federal or state law or impede the enforcement of state criminal law.  This Directive does not mandate that law enforcement Page 3 officials provide assistance in any particular circumstance, even when, by the terms of the Directive, they are permitted to do so.  Pursuant to the authority granted to me under the New Jersey Constitution and the Criminal Justice Act of 1970, N.J.S.A. 52:17B-97 to -117, which provides for the general supervision of criminal justice by the Attorney General as chief law enforcement officer of the state in order to secure the benefits of a uniform and efficient enforcement of the criminal law and the administration of criminal justice throughout the state, I hereby direct all law enforcement and prosecuting agencies operating under the authority of the laws of the state of New Jersey to implement and comply with the following directives.
[brief] The provision does not explain what arbitration is, nor does it indicate how arbitration is different from proceeding in a court of law.  Nor is it written in plain language that would be clear and understandable to the average consumer that she is waiving statutory rights.  *Id.* at 446.  The Court went on to say that while “no prescribed set of words must be included” for an arbitration clause to be valid, it must have some words which “explain that the plaintiff is giving up her right to bring her claims in court or have a jury resolve the dispute”.  *Id.* at 447.  In citing a long line of New Jersey cases, the *Atalese* Court noted:
[brief] ”  (1T:50-10 to 23)  During the interrogation, when [...] declined to speak with detectives about certain subjects during the interrogation, he referenced “Miranda” specifically, making clear he meant to invoke the right to silence that detectives assured him he would not compromise by agreeing to speak with them.  (17T:59-10 to 12; 95-20 to 22; 96-18 to 97-4; 115-3 to 10)  This case is therefore not like Kucinski, where the defendant waived his right to silence and never indicated a wish to invoke it in response to particular questions.  Before signing the waiver form, [...] secured a guarantee from detectives that he could invoke the right to silence on a question-by-question basis.
[brief] [...] is located at [...] in [...].  (Da264, Deed from [...] to [...])  [...] occupies Lot 19 and has an additional lot which is [...] and it is Lot 20.  (Da262, Newark Tax Assessor Property Identification Document)  The Lot 20 which is misidentified by [...] as Lot 22 is located next to the church and Lot 22 is next to Lot 20 and is [...].  (Da275, Deed for [...])  [...] has occupied the present location since June 30, 1976 when the church purchased this property from Marjorie [...].
[brief] \(^5\)  N.J.A.C. 7:15-1 to -6.8.  \(^6\)  N.J.A.C. 7:8-1 to -6.3.  drainage ditch crossed by the U.S. Route 1 Access Road was thoroughly considered and is adequately supported by the record; and (iii) the [...] used the best flooding data available authorized by the FHA Rules at the time the Permit was issued.
[brief] Second, in furtherance of the principle that the law will not enforce a better agreement than the one actually executed by the parties, the law additionally holds that the parties’ statements as to an agreement’s meaning are excluded from evidence.  Deerhurst Estates, 64 N.J.Super. at 149.  To the extent that this “intent” is not expressed in the writing, it is irrelevant:  The cardinal rule, in the interpretation of contracts, is to ascertain and give effect to the common intention of the parties, so far as it may be effectuated without infringing legal principles.  Basic Iron Ore Co. v. Dahlke, 103 N.J.Law 635, 137 A. 423; Dixon v. Smyth Sales Corp., 110 N.J.Law 459, 166 A. 103; Westville Land Co. v. Handle, 112 N.J. Law 447, 171 A. 520.  But where, as here, the parties have made a memorial of their bargain, or a writing is required by law, their actual intent unless expressed in some way in the writing is ineffective, except when it may, in accordance with established principles, afford the basis for a reformation of the writing.
[brief] TABLE OF CONTENTS  PAGE NOS.  REPLY PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND STATEMENT OF FACTS  ............  1 LEGAL ARGUMENT  .........................................................................................  1 POINT I  THE POLICE INTERROGATION OF DEFENDANT  VIOLATED NUMEROUS WELL-ESTABLISHED PROHIBITIONS AGAINST AFFIRMATIVE POLICE DECEPTION, PSYCHOLOGICAL COERCION, AND THREATS.  (Response to State’s Point I)  ...........................................  1 POINT II  DEFENDANT WAS DENIED A FAIR TRIAL BY THE TRAIL COURT’S FAILURE TO REDACT NUMEROUS IMPROPER REFERENCES FROM HIS POLICE INTERROGATION AND BY THE COURT’S PRECLUSION OF PROPER CROSS EXAMINATION.  (Response to State’s Point II)  .........................  14 CONCLUSION
[brief] Similarly, the DEP argued that “rulemaking was required to use the adjustment and change factors from the Cornell Studies. ”  DEP Rb30.  But this Court should reject the DEP’s attempted sleight of hand here because the DEP was required, by the statute itself, N.J.S.A. 58:16A-52(a), and the regulations which provide for Method 6 flood forecasting, to protect the public health and safety from reasonably anticipated flooding situations.  Here, the Cornell Studies were scientifically accepted, highly relevant, and available to the DEP during its review of [...]’s permit application.  Thus, the DEP was required to consider the Cornell Studies in relation to its assessment of [...]’s unique engineering calculations and flood elevation forecasts.  It was arbitrary and capricious for the DEP to ignore the Cornell Studies when it assessed [...]’s Method 6 calculations, see Aa012, and issued this permit, see Aa001.
[brief] “[I]ncidental legal errors” necessarily “creep into” proceedings.  State v. Orecchio, 16 N.J. 125, 129 (1954); see also State v. Marshall, 123 N.J. 1, 169 (1991), cert. denied, 507 U. S. 929 (1993).  Where they do so in a manner that --- 3  This POINT is responsive to POINT IV of defendant’s brief.  Db33-34. does “not prejudice the rights of the accused or make the proceedings unfair,” “an otherwise valid conviction” will not be disturbed.  Ibid.  Only where “the legal errors are of such magnitude as to prejudice the defendant’s rights or, in their aggregate have rendered the [proceedings] unfair,” do “fundamental constitutional concepts dictate” the grant of relief.  Ibid.  Despite having failed to establish that any reversible error exists, see POINT I and II, supra, defendant argues this Court should aggregate these non-reversible errors into a cumulative effect that together render his conviction reversible.
[brief] .........................................................  27  First Atl. Fed. Credit Union v. Perez, 391 N.J. Super. 419 (App. Div. 2007)  ......................................................... 27, 28  Furst v. Einstein Moomjy, Inc., 182 N.J. 1 (2004)  ....................................................................................... 38, 39  Giantonnio v. Taccard, 291 N.J. Super. 31 (App. Div. 1996)  .........................................................  32  Gooch v. Choice Entertaining Corp., 355 N.J. Super. 14 (App. Div. 2002)  .........................................................  29  Grow Co., Inc. v. Chokshi, 424 N.J. Super. 357 (App. Div. 2012)  ......................................................... 39, 40  Hansen v. Rite Aid Corp., 253 N.J. 191 (2023) .................................................................................. 40  Iannone v. McHale, 245 N.J. Super. 17 (App. Div. 1990) ......................................................... 28, 29, 34  K.D. v. Bozarth, 313 N.J. Super. 561 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 156 N.J. 425 (1998) .......... 28 Litton Industries, Inc. v. IMO Industries, Inc., 200 N.J. 372 (2009) .................................................................................. 38, 39, 40 Masone v. Levine, 382 N.J. Super. 181 (App. Div. 2005) ......................................................... 26 McKeown-Brand v. Trump Castle Hotel and Casino, 132 N.J. 546 (1993) .................................................................................. 28 Meehan v. Antonellis, 226 N.J. 216 (2016) .................................................................................. 30 Rendine v. Pantzer, 141 N.J. 292 (1995) .................................................................................. 39 United Hearts, LLC v. Zahabian, 407 N.J. Super. 379 (App. Div. 2011) ......................................................... 26 Statutes N.J.S.A. § 2A:15-29.1 ................................................................. 15, 26, 28 N.J.S.A. § 2A:15-59.1(b)(1) ......................................................... 28 N.J.S.A. § 2A:53A-27 .................................................................. 4, 13 Rules Rule 1:4-8 .................................................................................... 5, 15, 26 Rule 1:4-8(a) .................................................................................. 19, 26, 27
[directive] Prosecutor and/or OPIA, pursuant to AG Directive 2019-4, also known as the “Independent Prosecutor Directive,” and other state law.  If the firearm discharge occurs while the agency employee is on duty, then the County Prosecutor must be notified.  If the firearm discharge results in a fatality, the matter shall be investigated by OPIA or another entity pursuant to the Independent Prosecutor Directive.  7.11.3  Any public statements by a law enforcement agency about the conduct of law enforcement officers involved in a firearm discharge require approval by the County Prosecutor or the Attorney General’s Office, depending upon which entity is supervising the investigation.  7.11.4  Agency law enforcement officers including internal affairs personnel will participate in the initial investigation only if directed to do so by the County Prosecutor, OPIA, or other designee of the Attorney General.  In the general course, employees of the same agency as the subject officer shall not participate in the investigation or attend any investigative activities.
[brief] In granting summary judgment, the trial court simply disregarded the insurance policy’s conformity to law provision and tolling under *Peloso*.  [...] now offers a different, albeit equally erroneous, approach.  [...] would have this Court ignore the policy’s plain meaning and its own decision in *Azze*.  The Appellate Division should instead hold that the six-year statute of limitations controls under the policy’s conformity to law provision.  Alternatively, the Appellate Division should hold that the policy’s limitations period was tolled until [...] denied coverage.  Or the Appellate Division should hold that [...]’s conduct precluded it from denying coverage in litigation.  No matter the route it takes, this Court should vacate dismissal.  Respectfully submitted by: /s/ [...]
[brief] On the Brief: [...], ESQ.  [...], ESQ.  Dated: January 10, 2024 #  TABLE OF CONTENTS | Section | Page | |------------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | ii | | PRELIMINARY STATEMENT | 1 | | PROCEDURAL HISTORY | 2 | | COUNTERSTATEMENT OF FACTS | 3 | | LEGAL ARGUMENT | 10 | | I.
[brief] (Emphasis added).  Pa204.  The Appellate Division confirmed the Superior Court’s decision to vacate the award, holding that “the arbitrator’s resort to past practices was a mistake of law” and therefore constituted an award procured by undue means pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:24-8(a).  Pa209.  In the within matter, the Employer admitted that it has utilized a different divisor than the one present in the parties' contract.  Additionally, the Division’s witnesses admitted that they rely on the collective bargaining agreement for essentially everything compensation-related except the overtime equation, which they continue to disregard.  For the overtime equation, they instead consult the annual Treasury Circulars, which basically only serve to memorialize the number of working days in the fiscal year.  Pa242.  In the Treasury Circulars, overtime is referenced solely to specify which pay period is to be charged to which fiscal year, since the fiscal year does not coincide with a calendar year.  Pa242.  The [...] acknowledges that the Division violated the contract through holding that the Division followed the Treasury Circulars instead of the contract.  There is no contractual support for the Arbitrator’s determination to follow Treasury Circulars over plain language in the contract.  Because the language was plain and clear on its face, there was no reason to look at outside documents.  For this reason alone, the [...] was procured by undue means and is not reasonably debatable.  The [...] was procured by undue means and is not reasonably debatable because it resorted to a past practice where the contract language is clear.  The [...] acknowledged the contract language is “plainly and simply clear. ”  Pa192.  Furthermore, the Court below also acknowledged the language was clear, stating “the Court can find that it’s a strong argument that the time and a half language, which is also abundantly clear, from the parenthetical. ”  T23-10.  The [...] ignored the plain language and in doing so committed a mistake of law.  Furthermore, the [...] is not a reasonably debatable interpretation of the contract.  The [...] must be vacated because the arbitrator ignored the express terms of the contract and substituted an alleged past practice for express contract provisions applicable to the calculation of overtime compensation.  It also replaced negotiated clear language with an external document not negotiated by the parties.  We respectfully request that the [...] be vacated because it was procured by undue means and not a reasonably debatable interpretation of the language collective bargaining agreement.
[brief] **[...]’s tenancy and the creation of the misfit unit, 1993-2017**  The events involved in this case began in 1990 when [...] moved into the apartment building located at [...].  In 1993, [...], through his company [...] (“[...]”), purchased the 11 unit apartment building for $525,000.  At the time [...] purchased the building both the Hoboken Rent Control Ordinance and the Tenant Protection Act of 1992 were already in place.  [...]’s sole owner through most of this litigation was Mr. [...], a real estate developer.  In 2001, [...] filed the paperwork to convert the apartment building to a condominium building, and the individual apartments to condominiums.  [...] remained in the building through construction, until Hoboken authorities made [...] relocate him from the construction zone.  When he returned, the other units had been renovated, but he testified that his unit was largely the same as it was prior.  For the 16 years following the conversion, from 2001 through 2017, [...] continued to pay his rent on time.
[directive] 2C:25-31 provides that when a defendant is arrested on a charge of contempt of a domestic violence restraining order, the law enforcement officer shall conduct a search of the Domestic Violence Central Registry.  This statute provides that when a person is charged with any of the designated offenses in 2C:35-5.6c, and the person is released from custody on bail or recognizance, or is otherwise issued a summons, the court may, upon application of a law enforcement officer or prosecuting attorney, issue a written restraining 2C:35-5.7 order prohibiting the person from entering the designated area surrounding the place of the alleged offense.  This order shall provide a prohibition on the person Drug Offender Restraining Order Act from entering an area up to 500 feet surrounding the place unless the court rules that a different buffer zone would better effectuate the purposes of this Act.  The court has discretion to permit the person to enter the area during specified times for specified purposes, such as attending school during regular school hours.  2A:160(1-25)  Uniform Criminal  The court may withhold bail or grant bail to a fugitive charged in another state; if the person is charged with a crime punishable by death or life imprisonment, no Extradition Act -Extradition
[brief] Daily wage earners, or others who cannot serve on a jury for long because of salary or wage deprivation, may not be excluded categorically”).  In *Dangcil*, 248 N.J. at 144, our Court declined “to determine … whether … financial means … might be a cognizable group for purposes of a challenge to a jury venire” where defendant “failed to make a showing that any cognizable group – however identified or classified – has been excluded from the jury venire in this case” simply because of the use of the hybrid jury selection procedure put in place to address the COVID pandemic.  Defendant similarly fails here.  There is simply no support in this record for defendant’s current claim that excluding jurors unable to sit for the ten to 12 specifically identified trial dates scheduled over a two-month period in early 2022 during a global pandemic and resulting jobs/economic crisis resulted in the categorical exclusion of the specific, cognizable group of “daily wage earners. ”  A prospective juror’s unavailability on specifically identified dates could have a range of supporting reasons, particularly in early 2022, which while inclusive of the financial hardships related to missing work, could also have included childcare or other familial responsibilities, other work-related responsibilities, vacations, scheduled medical procedures, health concerns, etc.
[brief] 19  Malick v Seaview Lincoln Mercury, 398 N.J. Super. 182, 187 (App.Div. 2008) ....................................  15  Monmouth Lumber Co. v. Indemnity Ins. Co. of N. Am., 21 N.J. 439, 452 (1956) .........................................................  14, 23 Mount Holly State Bank v. Mount Holly Washington Hotel, Inc., 220 N.J. Super. 506 (App.Div. 1987) ........................................  21 Nat’l Westminster Bank N.J. v. Lomker 277 N.J. Super. 491 (App.Div. 1994) .......................................  14  Peoples Nat’l Bank v Fowler, 73 N.J. 88, 101 (1977) ..........................................................  14, 23 Swift & Co. v. Smigel, 115 N.J. Super.  391, 394 (App.Div. 1971) ..................................  28, 29 RULES AND STATUTES R. 4:46-2(c) .............................................................................
[brief] See, Jeremy Baratta v. City of Perth Amboy, A-3560-21 (App. Div. Sept. 6, 2024) (Pra94) ([...] and [...] noting: “A governmental policy can be established “when a ‘decisionmaker possess[ing] final authority to establish a municipal policy with respect to the action’ issues an official proclamation, policy or edict. ”)  In addition, defendants' Rule 4:69-6(a) limitations of actions argument is faulty.  Typically, the Rule 4:69-6(a) limitations of actions commence upon published notice of adoption of a legislative discretionary ordinance and not an administrative ministerial resolution.  Moreover, Rule 4:69-6 (c) contains an enlargement provision, which courts exercise in the interests of justice.  See, Botteon v. Borough of Highland Park, 478 N.J. Super. 452, 461-62 (App. Div. 2024) ([...], together with [...] and [...], reversing trial court and enlarging time to file prerogative writ facial action challenge beyond 45 days and acknowledging in an accompanying unpublished opinion plaintiffs’ surviving right to allege individual civil rights act violations as municipal legislation applied to them).