ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] 8.  This court can take notice of the fact that for an extended period of time, and especially during the past six months, there has been a crescendo of commentary from educators, policy experts and legislators raising serious questions about SFRA’s funding formula and urging its updating and improvement. \(^7\)  9.  To provide LSD students with a long overdue remedy for the denial of their fundamental constitutional right to T&E, however, should not have to await an undoubtedly lengthy, complicated and controversial process of addressing SFRA’s application to New Jersey’s approximately 600 school districts.  10.  This court, and everyone else, recognizes Lakewood’s unique demographic situation.  By definition, a unique situation demands a unique remedy, not --- \(^7\)[...] alone has issued at least 12 articles and videos between February 22, 2024, and August 12, 2024, dealing with school funding and state education aid.  Many of these include quotes from legislators, school district administrators and even the commissioner of education recognizing the need for modifications of SFRA.  See www.njspotlightnews.org.  A report issued by the [...], the lawyer for the Abbott plaintiffs, in March 2024, is the most comprehensive “Roadmap for Improving New Jersey’s School Funding Formula. ” dependent on a global solution.  11.  LSD public-school students are unique in another important and relevant way—only they and the Abbott/SDA students have been found, as a matter of law, to have been denied their fundamental constitutional right to T&E.  For that reason, they stand apart from the rest of New Jersey’s public-school students and are entitled to special judicial and legislative solicitude.  Respectfully submitted, s/ [...]
[brief] 20  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS January 24, 2025  Order Denying Motion for Collateral Estoppel ........ Pa1 to Pa3 January 24, 2025  Order Denying Motion for a Stay ......................... Pa4 May 7, 2024  Order Denying Motion to Suppress ....................... Pa37 to Pa53 November 20, 2024  Order Denying Consolidation ..................... Pa63 to Pa64 December 16, 2024  Order Denying Reconsideration Motion .............. Pa65 January 20, 2025  Order Denying Application For Permission to File Emergent Motion .......................................................... Pa88 to Pa89  TABLE OF THE APPENDIX
[brief] BRIEF FOR DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS  [...], [...], [...], [...], AND [...]  [...] (Pro Hac Vice)  [...] (Pro Hac Vice)  Of Counsel [...]  [...] [...]  [...]  [...]  [...]  Attorney ID# 008431991  Of Counsel  [...]  Attorney ID# 165172015  On the Brief  [...]  [...] [...]  [...]  [...]  Attorneys for Defendants-Appellants
[brief] *In re Estate of Stockdale*, 196 N.J. 275, 311 (2008), citing Pressler, *Current N.J. Court Rules*, cmt. 4 on R.1:36-3 (2008).  However, that doctrine is triggered only when the court faces a ruling on the merits made by a different, co-equal court on an identical issue.  *Lombardi v. Masso*, 207 N.J. 517, 539 (2011).  [...]’s ordering of a settlement conference was not ruling a “on the merits. ”  The Law of the Case Doctrine is also discretionary in nature.  *Hart v. City of Jersey City*, 308 N.J. Super. 487, 498 (App. Div. 1998), quoting *State v. Reldan*, 100 N.J. 187, 205 (1985).  A trial court is not obligated to give absolute deference to the interlocutory rulings of a prior judge.  “Thus, [i]f a prior judge has erred or entered an order that has ceased to promote a fair and efficient processing of a particular case, the new judge owes respect but not deference and should correct the error. ”  *Lawson v. Dewar*, 468 N.J. Super. 128, 135 (App. Div. 2021).  Here, there was ample reason for the trial court to conclude under the circumstances of this case that a settlement conference would be unproductive, rather than an efficient way to move the case forward, and that the sealed bidding procedure was the more appropriate way to proceed.
[brief] Gomez v. Forster & Garbus LLP, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 183099 (D.N.J. Oct. 22, 2019) ....................................................31  Gregory v. Nationstar Mortg., LLC, No. 2:13-6952, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64138 (D.N.J. May 8, 2014) ..................................................17 Hayes v. Turnersville Chrysler Jeep, 453 N.J. Super. 309 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 2018) ..............................................................7 Hoffman v. Encore Capital Group, Inc., 2008 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1627 (N.J. App. Div. Dec. 18, 2008) ..................................................30 Hoffman v. Macy’s, Inc., 2010 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1412 (N.J. App. Div. Jun. 28, 2010) ..................................................32 Hopkins v. Convergent Outsourcing, Inc., No. PAS-L-000342-23 (N.J. Super. L. May 31, 2023) ..............................................10 Huertas v. Galaxy Asset Mgmt., 641 F.3d 28 (3d Cir. 2011) .........................................................................................31 Hunstein v. Preferred Collection & Mgmt. Servs., 17 F.4th 1016 (11th Cir. 2021) .....................................................................................23 Hunstein v. Preferred Collection & Mgmt. Servs., 2022 U.S. App. LEXIS 25233 (11th Cir. Sept. 8, 2022) ..............................................23, 24 Hunstein v. Preferred Collection & Mgmt. Servs., 994 F.3d 1341 (11th Cir. 2021) .....................................................................................23 Jackin v. Enhanced Recovery Co., LLC, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 104273 (E.D. Was. Jun. 10, 2022) ...........................................24, 25 Jasmine Mhrez v. Radius Global Solutions, LLC, Case No. HUD-L-728-22 (N.J. Sup. Ct. Dec. 16, 2022) ([...])...............................10 Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co. v. Melcar Utility Co., 212 N.J. 576 (2013) ........................................................................................................37 Jones v. American Coradius International, No., MRS-L-895-22 (N.J. Sup. Ct. Jun. 15, 2023) ([...])...............................9 Khimmat v. Weltman, Weinberg & Reis Co, LPA, 585 F. Supp. 3d 707 (E.D. Pa. 2022) ............................................................................24, 25 Kunica v. St. Jean Fin., Inc., 233 B.R. 46 (S.D.N.Y.) ..................................................................................................42 Madlinger v. Enhanced Recovery Co., LLC, No. 21-00154, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 109328 (D.N.J. 2022) .......................................11 Maher v. United Collection Bureau, Inc., No. HUD-L-1933-22 (N.J. Sup. Ct. Jun. 26, 2023) .......................................................10 McNemar v. Disney Store, 91 F.3d 610 (3d Cir. 1996) ............................................................................................34, 35 Mhrez v. Convergent Outsourcing, Inc., No. A-3156-22, 2024 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1040 (N.J. App. Div. Jun. 5, 2024) .........................................................8, 9, 10, 26 Misonzhnik v. Alltran Fin., LP, No. 17-cv-6683 (BMC), 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42086 (E.D.N.Y. March 14, 2018)
[brief] ”)  [...] moved for reconsideration of the Court’s June 29, 2018, Order on July 19, 2018.  Argument on the motion for reconsideration was held on October 22, 2018.  (3T.)  The motion was granted on July 30, 2020.  (Pa0199-Pa0209.)  [...] asserts the trial court’s reasons for granting the motion for reconsideration were never fully explained, and that the ruling represented a sudden about-face.  (Pb11.)  This is false.  In a telephone conference held on July 30, 2020 (4T), [...] explained his reasons for reversing his prior holding, including the personal issues that curtailed his ability to devote significant attention to this case at the time he entered his incorrect June 29, 2018, Opinion.  (4T5:20-8:4).  Further, in granting the motion for reconsideration, the trial court correctly held that its prior decision accepting the R&R was “palpably incorrect”[.] (Pa0199.)  Of course, this necessarily rendered the R&R “palpably incorrect”.  The trial court explained that under Boston Gas, a “pro rata time on the risk method for allocating liability . . . is appropriate absent evidence approximating actual distribution of property damage. ” (Pa0202.)  The trial court then cited the evidence which makes “approximating actual distribution of property damage[,]” impossible in this case:  [...], testified that the property damage was ongoing as of the end of the liability trial.  Evidence presented at the allocation trial indicated that the damage continues.  [...] indicated he used dates suggested by [...] counsel to represent the end of operations in the various AOC’s as end dates for the allocation of property damage.  [...] acknowledged these dates do not represent the end of property damage, and that it was a single plume of groundwater contamination, and impossible to determine the timing of the contamination from any one AOC and the relation to the property damage.  (Pa0204.)  Based on this evidence, and the continuing nature of property damage at the Site, the trial court held that the “time-on-risk approach from Boston Gas” should be applied in this case.  (Pa0206-Pa0207.)  Finally, the trial court held that in this case, as in *Boston Gas*, groundwater contamination had continued to present day and would continue into the future.  (Pa0208.)  Accordingly, noting the *Boston Gas* court had held the allocation “end date” was the “end date” of the trial in that case, the trial court held the end date of the allocation period in this case would be the final date of the liability stage of this case, January 31, 2011.  (Pa0207-Pa0208.)  The trial court’s holding reduced [...]’s allocated share of covered costs from approximately 27.5% to approximately 6.4%.  [...] has been allocated approximately 8.96% of covered costs.  [...], who was either uncovered or settled with insurers covering the remaining years of the allocation period, has been allocated approximately 85% of covered costs. \(^4\) (Pa0213-Pa0214.)  **5.
[brief] Plaintiffs devote most of their motion to arguing that [...] and [...] are likely to possess relevant documents.  But they make no serious effort to show that any such documents are unlikely to be captured by the current, broad scope of [...]’s collection and production.  Plaintiffs cannot possibly make that showing.  [...] has collected documents and data from—in addition to various non-custodial sources—81 custodians and run more than 140 search strings against those custodial documents.
[brief] (21T 175-23 to 176-6)  On the stand, [...] conceded that officers had conducted an out-of-court identification procedure, but that he had not been able to identify the person captured by [...]’s cameras at the crime scene.  (21T 175-23 to 176-6)  Investigators also seized two knives from [...]’s apartment, including a serrated knife on a table that had blood on it (22T 214-18 to 19; 219-1 to 4), and a straight edge knife on the floor.  (22T 223-19 to 23)  Investigators photographed shoe imprints in the blood stains, and took swabs.  (22T 226-21 to 23; 236-11 to 237-17; 237-25 to 238-1)  Finally, investigators located a safe in [...]’s home which still had over $10,000 inside.  (22T 235-5 to 236-3)  An autopsy subsequently confirmed what [...]’s cameras and investigator’s photographs showed, that the cause of death was multiple blunt and sharp force injuries to the head and neck.
[directive] # OF AGENCIES a kit, 180 agencies indicated that a Victim declined to ﬁle a complaint 95 documented reason is required, most Prosecutor advised it was not 44 frequently recorded in a police necessary officer’s report.  When asked to Victim informed police the crime 40 specify reasons for why a SAFE kit did not occur would not be tested, 146 agencies Investigator suspected the act 35 response.19 provided a Most was consensual frequently, reasons for not testing DNA evidence was not needed to 20 reflected the victim’s preference or convict the exercise of prosecutorial Investigator had no suspects 19 discretion.  Unknown due to age of SAFE Kit 15  The SAFE Kit is scheduled to be 10 sent to the lab  Victim ﬁled complaint against 9 spouse/partner, former spouse/partner  Other 40  19  The reasons for not testing a SAFE kit were taken from the OLS survey, which included a list of pre-defined reasons for responding agencies to select from.
[brief] Indeed, the creator of the document whose signature was the one notarized, [...], was at trial and he testified and confirmed first-hand (as he had done during deposition) that it was his document and his signature, so the attack as to the notarization had minimal impact, if any.  Note was also made of the fact that the name “[...]” was not the actual name of [...] – who claims she never used the nickname [...] and always used her full name [...].  But again, [...] testified that he only writes what he learns through his communications with the person served, and that he had no prior knowledge of her or her name.  T4 33:6-20; T4 30:3-11; T4 32:3-6.  He wrote on the Affidavit what he heard or what he thought he heard.  The Trial judge accepted this and affirmatively addressed it in his decision, that either the server heard the name incorrectly, or that a possible nickname was used quite close to the actual name.  T4 98:22 to 99:16.  The judge found this to be consistent, that both were telling the truth: [...] likely said her proper name Lyudmila, and [...] heard and recorded “[...]”.  T4 98:22 to 99:16.  It was also clear that as a result of [...] being on the Affidavit, an amendment was made to the original complaint to replace the Jane Doe “[...]” with the actual name of [...] Milov, wife of [...].
[brief] \textit{See Case}, 220 N.J. at 67 (“court [must] give a reasoned explanation for its conclusion that this first-time offender presented a risk to commit another offense”).  The sentencing process was further tainted by the court’s accusation that [...] “lied on the stand. ”  In the court’s view, the jury’s finding that [...] acted “in the heat of passion resulting from a reasonable provocation,” N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4b(2), rather than self-defense, as [...] maintained, meant \textsuperscript{21}  “[T]here is evidence that certain types of shame are tied to an increased likelihood of future criminal activity. ”  Bandes, \textit{Remorse and Criminal Justice}, Vol. 8, at 15 (italics in original).  Thus if remorse is related to a decreased likelihood of criminal activity, it is essential to be able to distinguish it from shame.
[brief] ”  Complete quote at 1T-52-18 to 53-4.  Then she immediately denies leave to amend.  1T-53-5-6.  (This is, ironically a major point of agreement; yet the filing, which would have been amended (or have sections stricken), was not allowed.)  Basically, Her Honor blamed me for all the delay in the case.  1T-53-17 to 56-14.  My recollection is there was never a ruling on the Federal 4th Amended Complaint.  1T-56-15-19.  Instead, we came up with a “deal” to strip out all the Federal actions in a 5th Amended Complaint – the one examined by [...].  2T(May)-20-13-23.  Leave was granted to file the 5th Amended Complaint after it was examined as having no Federal Actions, then it was remanded.  Her Honor makes the mysterious comment, “That Complaint was never filed. ”  1T-56-19.  Yet this “remand” Complaint is one [...] examined.  The 5th AC was not substantively examined except for confirming its lack of Federal actions.  On removal in 2017, The denial of filing the New Jersey FAC was like shooting fish in a barrel – it was never drafted to comply with Iqbal.
[brief] ” (1T88:8-11).  Due to [...]’s actions in this matter, the [...] was not required to appoint a personal attorney for him to investigate whether or not he should comply with an order from a state agency.  (1T90:12-14).  On February 9, 2022, the Trial Court entered an order granting the order to show cause.  (Da333-334).  On March 1, 2022, [...] filed for a stay of the February 9, 2022 Order. (Da335-356) and for leave to file an interlocutory appeal from the February 9, 2022 Order.  (Da389-390).  On March 21, 2022, this Court denied the motion for leave to file an interlocutory appeal.  (Ibid.).  On March 14, 2022 the Trial Court denied [...]’s motion to stay the February 9, 2022 Order.  (Da391-392).  [...] then produced the documents which, although he had alleged on numerous occasions numbered over 45,000, constituted a total of 73 pages of responsive documents, substantially below his exaggerated estimate.
[brief] Appellate review of a trial court’s decision on a suppression motion is well established.  *State v. Washington*, 475 N.J. Super. 292, 300 (App. Div. 2023).  Review of a trial court’s decision to suppress a defendant’s custodial statement to police is limited.  *State v. Francisco*, 471 N.J. Super. 386, 409 (App. Div. 2022).  When reviewing a motion to suppress, appellate courts defer “to the trial court’s factual findings that are supported by sufficient credible evidence in the record and will not disturb those findings unless they are ‘so clearly mistaken that the interests of justice demand intervention and correction. ’”  *State v. Rivas*, 251 N.J. 132, 152 (2022) (quoting *State v. S.S.*, 229 N.J. 360, 374 (2017)).  However, the trial court’s legal conclusions are reviewed *de novo*.  *State v. Hubbard*, 222 N.J. 249, 263 (2015).
[brief] This term shall include such ridesharing arrangements known as carpools and vanpools.  "Medical services, medical treatment, physicians' services and physicians' treatment" shall include, but not be limited to, the services which a chiropractor is authorized by law to perform and which are authorized by an employer pursuant to the provisions of R.S.34:15-1 et seq. (cf: P.L.1999, c.383, s.1)
[brief] 1T:63-22 to 67-8.  [...] then requested a K-9 to conduct an exterior sniff of the vehicle.  1T:67-13.  While waiting for the K-9 to arrive, [...] ran a check of the Defendant’s driver status which revealed that he was suspended for prior driving while intoxicated convictions pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:40-26.  1T:68-6 to 68-18.  Shortly thereafter, [...] received a call on her cellphone from [...] advising her that he had probable cause to arrest Defendant, who was then arrested.  1T:70-24 to 70-8.  A search of Defendant’s vehicle was then conducted which revealed clear capsules containing white residue, a syringe and cash.  1T:71-12 to 73-19.  The Defendant was subsequently charged with third-degree possession of a controlled dangerous substance, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10(a)(1) and fourth-degree operating a motor vehicle during a period of license suspension, N.J.S.A. 2C:40-26(b).
[brief] Plaintiff’s LSRP explained, “[w]hat will dictate the length of time for the remediation will be the results of that groundwater monitoring.  We expect that to go for at least two years with samples collected on a quarterly basis. ” (T1, 18:15-18).  The reason for the two years is that NJDEP requires a minimum of two (2) years of data to determine if the proposed remediation technique, such as natural attenuation, is effective.  (T1, 18:24-19:3).
[brief] ”  N.J.S.A. 2C:58-4.2; see also Wade, 476 N.J. Super. at 510 (“the Legislature designed the gun-permit statutes to address several safety concerns”).  Further, there are myriad differences between the two state’s regimes, each reflecting a policy decision by the respective state’s legislature.  To note a few examples, NJ Carry Permits must be renewed every two years, N.J.S.A. 2C:58-4(a), whereas PA Carry Licenses need only be renewed every five years, 18 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 6109(f)(1), and NJ Carry Permits, but not PA Carry Licenses, require applicants to submit references with their applications, N.J.S.A. 2C:58-4(b), and to complete a State-approved firearm safety course, N.J.S.A. 2C:58-3(c).  Contrast 18 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 6109.  The Constitution allows Pennsylvania to make those policy choices, just as it allows West Virginia and New Jersey to make their own.  Cf. State v. Hatch, 64 N.J. 179, 188 (1973) (regardless of whether defendant “had fulfilled the licensing and other requirements of his home state,” he could be charged with unlawful possession for carrying in New Jersey without a NJ Carry Permit because, “[w]hen he came into New Jersey, … he subjected himself to New Jersey’s gun control regulations”).  Adopting defendant’s view would undermine those policy choices by leaving New Jersey able only to enforce its regime against its own residents, while forcing it to allow out-of-state residents to carry when in-state residents could not.
[brief] Here, plaintiff alleges that the dangerous condition of the property itself enhanced her exposure to the criminal attack.  317 N.J. Super. at 79.  The Roe Court concluded that a jury could determine that by bolting its gate open, [...] invited the public to traverse a perilous foot path, thereby substantially enhancing the public’s risk of harm, and could be liable for the criminal activities of their parties against members of the public invited to traverse the perilous foot path.  *Id.*  As in *Roe*, Plaintiffs alleged that the dangerous condition of the property itself enhanced Decedent’s exposure to criminal attack.  *Id.*  Similar to the open gate in *Roe*, a jury could determine that by failing to remediate the presence of the illegal, large, makeshift liquor concession stand on the Subject Premises for several months before [...] was murdered, Defendants enticed residents and the public to become intoxicated near a basketball court and a playground well into the night and early morning hours, resulting in frequent physical fighting and similar mayhem, thus creating a known dangerous area.
[brief] In fact, the circumstances presented here by [...]’s permit application are more egregious than those in Cedar Point; namely, [...] is requiring [...] to open its property to the public indiscriminately, rather than only to a specific subset thereof (e.g., union organizers).  Additionally, the U.S. Supreme Court found a per se taking where the plaintiff was required to open its private property to the public for a total of 360 hours per year, while the public access that [...] is now requiring [...] to provide at its property would allow any member of the public to enter and enjoy [...]’s property at any time of day, 365 days per year.  Meanwhile, [...] is easily distinguishable from the plaintiffs who unsuccessfully alleged per se takings in Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 82 (1980) and Englewood Hosp., supra.  Even when accounting for New Jersey’s public trust principles concerning public access to the shoreline, the presence of the public is in no way a natural element of the [...] residents’ ownership and quiet enjoyment of their homes.  Compare Pruneyard, supra, at 87-88; Englewood Hospital, supra, at 645.  The right of exclusion is “one of the essential sticks in the bundle of property rights,” see Pruneyard, supra, at 82, citing Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 179-180 (1979), and the essentiality of the right of exclusion is particularly pronounced in residential contexts.  The residents of [...] continue to assert theirs unambiguously, making this more consistent with the facts presented by Cedar Point than those of Pruneyard or Englewood Hospital.  In sum, the public access requirement that [...] now attempts to impose on [...] goes beyond the agency action that the U.S. Supreme Court found to be a per se taking in Cedar Point.  Application of Cedar Point to the matter at hand, as well as the clear distinction between the circumstances presented by [...] and those presented by plaintiffs whose takings claims were denied in Pruneyard and Englewood Hospital, renders the inescapable conclusion that [...] has engaged in a per se taking of [...]’s property through its flawed and premature implementation of the Public Access Law.