ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The Board had the right to consider the expert testimony but not accept it.  See El Shaer, supra, 249 N.J.Super. at 329; Hawrylo v. Bd. of Adj., Harding Twp., 249 N.J.Super. 568, 579 (App.Div. 1991); Allen v. Hopewell Twp. Zoning Bd. of Adj., 227 N.J.Super. 574, 581 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 113 N.J. 655 (1988); Sunrise Development v. Princeton Zoning Bd., 2020 WL 3442856 at 3-4 (2020).  Da387.  As shown above, those determinations were well reasoned and within the Board’s discretion.
[brief] In defense counsel’s opening statement to the jury, he stated  Let me talk to you about liability, the first setting.  That floor, that floor that she claims to have slipped on, you cannot slip on it, can’t slip on it.  [...], the company that has one employee there, that floor is slip-resistant.  You will hear from an engineer that he went out there.  It’s called - - he went out there and he tested the floor for the coefficient of friction.  I never knew what that was until I started doing cases like this.  It’s fancy.  It’s called a coefficient of friction.  Listen carefully when he’s here.  I think it’s gonna be tomorrow.  He’s an engineer.  It’s science.  You cannot slip on that floor when it’s wet.  He has poured water on that floor and he will explain it.  I’m not the engineer, the professional engineer, he is.  And [...] made that floor for that reason.  They’re well aware that water gets brought in, hence, they make a floor you cannot slip on it.  That is why [...] is here today trying this case after five years.
[brief] (Da25-26) (citing to *King*, 44 N.J. at 353 (“‘the existence or absence of one or more of the above factors is not determinative of the issue’").  Most importantly, [...] found that the fact that the officers secured a written waiver to search defendant's premises weighed strongly in favor of consent.  (Da26) (citing to *State v. White*, 305 N.J. Super. 322 (App. Div. 1997) (written waiver validated search of a suspect's home); *State v.* Binns, 222 N.J. Super. 583, 589 (App. Div. 1988) (a defendant's subjective perceptions of coercion does not negate an otherwise valid consent), certif. denied, 111 N.J. 624 (1988).  Here, the New Jersey State Police Consent to Search form signed by defendant indicated that his Old Bridge apartment, New York residence, BMW, and silver and black box were to be searched.  (Da26; accord Pa1-4).  Further, defendant signed these forms, which indicated that he had “knowingly and voluntarily” given his written consent to the searches, and that he had been advised by [...] that he had “the right to refuse giving [his] consent to search” and that he “may withdraw [his] consent at any time for any reason. ”  (Ibid.; Pa1-4).  Defendant signed his initials under each of these locations and statements, making his consent “unequivocal and specific. ” (Ibid.; Pa1-4).  As discussed below, [...] would make similar findings in denying defendant's motion for reconsideration.
[brief] ”  *Ibid.*  Significantly, these gaps can also affect a student’s classification as “the youngest students in a grade cohort are more likely to receive both ADHD diagnoses and special education placements than are the oldest students. ”  *Ibid.*  At least one study found that “the youngest students in a kindergarten cohort are 40% more likely to be placed in special education than are the oldest students. ”  Ibid.  This is particularly problematic in [...]’s case, because while the District has adopted New Jersey’s MTSS Framework, the support systems are not implemented effectively due to the District’s strict structure and pacing of local curriculum.  (Aa12; Ra136; Ra216).  Further, school staff reported that [...] elects to end Tier 3 intervention (individual support) in third grade.  (Ra136; Ra216).  But, as explained above, because the [...]’s policies extend the kindergarten cutoff date, many of the District’s third grade students are still developmentally young and continue to struggle in areas such as reading.  (Ra136; Ra216).  As a result of [...]’s enrollment policies and without the appropriate tiered support and structured intervention time, students face an ever-growing developmental and educational gap, and the risk that these students will later be identified as special needs increases, (Ra136; Ra216), resulting in higher educational costs and further strain on the District’s budget.
[brief] It is important to note, therefore, that Best Practice was not adopted primarily as a means of reducing case backlog or increasing case clearance rates.  While those goals are laudable, it is a misperception to think that Best Practices was principally adopted to give judges a seductive tool to be used chiefly to reduce backlog and increase clearance rates.  A careful review of the Report, the case law, the [...]’s comments, make clear that that is not the case.  Best Practices, rather, is a vehicle that empowers individual trial judges to step in, where appropriate, and manage discovery in a case so that a realistic arbitration and trial date can be set.  That is the reason R. 4:24-1(c) provides that not only may the court for “good cause shown” extend discovery, but if extended, it is to set the date by which the additional discovery is completed and is to describe the discovery to be engaged in and such other terms and conditions as may be appropriate.
[brief] “[I]n the context of a plaintiff-employee’s negligence claims against other tortfeasors relating to workplace injuries, the jury cannot be asked to apportion fault to the plaintiff’s own employer, even if that seems like a more equitable manner of presenting the matter to the jury.  On the other hand, indemnification of a third party by an employer pursuant to an express contract does not disturb the delicate balance struck by the Legislature in the WCA.  Nothing in the WCA precludes an employer from assuming a contractual duty to indemnify a third party through an express agreement. ” (internal citations omitted)  D’Avila, 442 N.J. Super. at 100.  The D’Avila court ultimately held that it was permissible for the defendant to seek indemnification from the plaintiff’s employer, and noted the only legal bar to such indemnification would be if the defendant was found 100% liable for plaintiff’s damages, as the New Jersey State Legislature has disallowed indemnification agreements imposing liability where the damages in question were caused by the indemnitee’s sole negligence.
[brief] In the same vein, [...] argues that the trial court too heavily weighed [...]’s failure to obtain title insurance.  Pb25.  Although [...]’s expert opined that the failure to obtain title insurance on the Strip contributed to putting [...] on notice that there was a defect in his title to that piece of land, 2Tr. at 102:15 – 104:18, the trial court did not focus on that issue, mentioning it in passing only twice.  4Tr. at 6:13-15; 13:3-13.  Regardless, the trial court was entitled to accord whatever reasonable weight it chose to that fact, and [...] utterly fails to show that the court below abused its discretion on that point.  D.
[brief] In re Guardianship of H.G., 155 N.J. Super. 186 (App. Div. 1977)  30  In Re Miller, 90 N.J. 210, 218-219 (1982)  40  Intervale Homes Inc. v. Parsippany-Troy Hills, 28 N.J. 423, 433 (1958)  46  Janieri v. East Brunswick Zon. Bd., 192 N.J. Super. 15 (Law Div. 1983)  54  J.L. v. J.F., 317 N.J. Super. 418, 438 (App. Div.), cert. den. 158 N.J. 685 (1999)  30  Johnson v. Johnson, 411 N.J. Super. 161, 175 (App. Div. 2009)
[brief] [...] was resolute in his testimony that defendant was not involved in any suspicious conduct prior to stopping and subsequently searching him.  Hence, it is clear that there was no probable cause to justify the warrantless search of defendant who was walking in the area of [...] in [...].  The definition of probable cause was set forth in *Brinegar v. United States*, 338 U.S. 160, 175, 176 (1949).  The Supreme Court held that police have probable cause when the facts and circumstances within the officers' knowledge and of which he had trustworthy information is sufficient in and of itself to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that an offense has been or being committed.  In the instant case, clearly the officer candidly admitted that he did not see the defendant act in any suspicious manner.  He stated that he was told that defendant was a "suspect" and alleged shooter in a murder case about which he had only minimal information.  Obviously, the mere fact that defendant was a "suspect" in a murder is not the equivalent of probable cause or reasonable suspicion.  The officer admitted that he was not conversant with the details of the alleged murder and how it was determined that defendant was the alleged culprit in the murder.  Lastly, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. (1968) is not applicable to the facts in this case.  Terry v. Ohio initially arose in the context of a preventive stop and frisk.  The United States Supreme Court subsequently extended the Terry doctrine to police investigation and detection of previously committed crimes in United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221 (1985).  In Hensley the Supreme Court stated that:  If police have a reasonable suspicion, grounded in specific and articulable facts that a person they encounter was involved in or is wanted in connection with a completed felony, then a Terry stop may be made to investigate that suspicion.  Id. at 229.  (Emphasis added).  In State v. Davis, 104 NJ. 490, 504 (1986) the New Jersey Supreme Court explained that:  An investigatory stop is valid only if the officer has a particularized suspicion based upon an objective observation that the person stopped has been or is about to engage in criminal wrongdoing.  In the case at bar there was no arrest or search warrant for the defendant.  The mere fact that the officer, who had no personal knowledge whatsoever with respect to the defendant's alleged previous conduct, was told by fellow officers that he was a "suspect" in a murder case is clearly not a "particularized suspicion based upon an objective observation."  Hence, the search of defendant cannot be justified by the Terry/Hensley doctrine.  CONCLUSION
[brief] The original version of S2930 that was introduced on March 4, 2024, Pa001 (attached hereto), which was the Senate version of the Amendments, proposed Amendments that would have retroactively applied the Amendments “to all complaints and appeals pending before the Government Records Council, the Superior Court or the Supreme Court filed prior to the effective date of [this bill].” (See S2930 at pages 31-32, located at Pa031-032 (attached to this Brief ).  Superior Court, Appellate Division September 3, 2024
[brief] (8T13-22 to 14-6)  Proximate cause, clearly, is inextricably tied to the “reasonableness and necessity” of Plaintiff’s medical expenses.  If the Meniere’s was not aggravated or exacerbated by Defendants negligent act – then the medical bills incurred for its treatment and/or lost wages or temporary disability payments for time lost from work are not recoverable as damages.  The Court determined that the Jury’s award of $25,000 (“net” $21,500) clearly evinces that it rejected the alleged causal relationship and for good reason.  Plaintiff’s credibility was shredded on all aspects of the case – from his version of the altercation with Defendant, his claim of a head injury as the causal mechanism for aggravated Meniere’s disease, to the medical history he represented to the medical witnesses and to the jury.  The Jury undoubtedly concluded that Plaintiff’s claim of aggravation of Meniere’s disease due to the incident in question simply was not credible and that finding is reflected in the damages award.  Plaintiff’s argument to the contrary, the damages award was more than fair, even generous, based on Plaintiff’s actual, proven injuries.
[directive] 5.1.11  All complaints should be investigated if the complaint contains sufficient factual information to warrant an investigation.  In cases where the officer’s identity is unknown, the internal affairs investigator should use all available means to determine proper identification.  Where civil litigation has been filed and the complainant is a party to or a principal witness in the litigation, the internal affairs investigator shall consult with legal counsel to determine whether an investigation is appropriate or warranted.  5.1.12
[brief] In *DepoLink*, the defendant—an attorney who utilized plaintiff’s services to take two depositions—refused to pay the invoiced price for two ordered (and delivered) transcripts.  *See DepoLink*, 430 N.J. Super. at 331.  “Subsequently, defendant was contacted by [a] collection agency, which he claims misrepresented that it was a law office and threatened him with an ethics complaint and criminal prosecution. ”  *Id.* at 332.  Defendant then filed counterclaims under, *inter alia*, the CFA, which were dismissed by the trial court.  In affirming the trial court’s dismissal of the CFA counterclaims, the *DepoLink* court reasoned:  Here, the CFA is inapplicable to defendant's claim against the collection agency because any misrepresentations by the collection agency, even if made, were not in connection with the sale of merchandise to defendant.  The alleged prohibited conduct occurred later on, when the collection agency was attempting to collect the debt from defendant.  The collection agency's contacts with defendant were not an offer to sell merchandise, nor did defendant buy anything from the collection agency.  Debt collection activities on behalf of a third party who may have sold merchandise are not unconscionable activities “in connection with the sale” of merchandise.  See, e.g., Chulsky v. Hudson Law Offices, P.C., 777 F. Supp. 2d 823, 847 (D.N.J.2011) (holding that the CFA does not cover the debt collection activities of a third party that purchases consumer debt); Joe Hand Promotions, Inc. v. Mills, 567 F. Supp. 2d 719, 723-24 (D.N.J.2008) (finding that a letter demanding payment of a settlement did not fall within the CFA because plaintiff was not induced to purchase merchandise or real estate).  DepoLink, 430 N.J. Super. at 339.  Despite being decided two years after Gonzalez, DepoLink fails to analyze or even mention Gonzalez.  Moreover, DepoLink did not analyze subsequent performance under the CFA—which Gonzalez says encompasses collection activity.  Indeed, the only time DepoLink mentions subsequent performance is in quoting N.J.S.A. 56:8-2.  See DepoLink, 430 N.J. Super. at 337.  Here, [...] violated the CFA by purchasing [...]’s account despite being prohibited from doing so, then assessing interest on the void account before misrepresenting in a dunning letter and a collection lawsuit to [...] that 1) the void debt was valid, 2) [...] was legally allowed to enforce the void debt, and 3) [...] was legally allowed to continue to assess interest on the void debt.
[brief] For [...]  [...] APPELLANT  [...] [...]  #  TABLE OF CONTENTS TO APPENDIX | Appendix Document | Appendix Page Number | |-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------| | Transcript of Trial before ALJ (September 28, 2023) | T 1-80 | | Initial Decision of [...], ALJ (June 28, 2023) | Pa81-92 | | Decision of Board of Trustees of the [...] (August 17, 2023) | Pa 93 | | Exhibit P1  Petitioner letter to PERS, 12/13/13 | Pa94-96 | | Exhibit P2  Petitioner letter to Office of Pension and Fraud Abuse, 2/28/14 | Pa97-103 | | Exhibit P3  Petitioner letter to Division of Pensions and Benefits, 6/17/19 | Pa104-112 | | Exhibit P4  Petitioner letter PERS Board of Trustees, 2/21/21 | Pa113-118 | | Exhibit P5  Pay stubs from Berkeley Heights | Pa119-124 | | Exhibit P6 W-2 Forms | Pa125-129 | | Exhibit P7  IRS 20 Factor Questionnaire | Pa130-143 | | Exhibit R1  Resolutions of Berkeley Heights appointing Petitioner public defender, 2007 through 2019 | Pa144-157 | | Exhibit R2 PERS letter to petitioner, 1/7/20 | Pa158-161 | | Exhibit R3 PERS letter to petitioner, 7/14/20 | Pa162-165 | | Exhibit R4 Professional Services Contract, 4/14/15 | Pa166-173 | | Exhibit R5 Professional Services Contract, 2016 (unsigned) | Pa174-181 | | Exhibit R6 Professional Services Contract, 1/1/17 | Pa182-190 | | Exhibit R7 Professional Services Contract, 2018 (unsigned) | Pa191-199 | | Exhibit R8 Request for Proposal for Public Defender for 2015 | Pa200-214 | | Exhibit R9 Request for Proposal for Public Defender for 2016 | Pa215-226 | | Exhibit R10 Berkeley Heights letter to Division of Pension and Benefits, 8/13/12 from [...] | Pa227 | | Exhibit R11 Municipal Salary Ordinance | Pa228-311 | | Exhibit R12 Legal Notices petitioner appointed public defender | Pa312-325 | | Exhibit R13 Resolution of Berkeley Heights appointing petitioner public defender, 1998 | Pa326 | | Exhibit P8 Petitioner’s Trial Summation Brief | Pa327-335 | | Exhibit P9 Respondents Trial Summation Brief | Pa336-362 | # TABLE OF CONTENTS | Section | Page | |------------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | PRELIMINARY STATEMENT | Pa 1 | | PROCEDURAL HISTORY | Pa 1 | | STATEMENT OF FACTS | Pa 3 | | STANDARD OF REVIEW | Pa 10| | ARGUMENT | | | I. THE ALJ IMPROPERLY DETERMINED THAT [...] WAS INELIGIBLE FOR PENSION
[brief] Contrary to [...]’ regurgitation of the same argument that failed in its motion for summary disposition, the Doctrine of Invited Error clearly does not apply to the facts of the instant matter.  The New Jersey Supreme Court has explained the doctrine of “invited error” as “errors which were induced, encouraged, or acquiesced in or consented to by defense counsel. ”  State v. Corsaro, 107 N.J. 339, 345 (1987).  In State v. Jenkins, the Supreme Court of New Jersey held that the doctrine of “invited error” is implicated only “[W]hen a defendant in some way has led the court into error…Some measure of reliance by the court is necessary for the invited-error doctrine to come into play. ”  State v. Jenkins, 178 N.J. 347, 359 (2004).  Here, just as this Court found in [...]’ Motion for Summary Disposition, there is no evidence that demonstrates that the Law Division’s ruling on ambiguity was induced, encouraged, acquiesced in, or consented to by [...], and, moreover, [...] failed to assert a single argument in favor of the notion that the Law Division relied upon [...]’s non-existent arguments in favor of finding ambiguity in the indemnification clause when it ultimately ruled as such.
[brief] See Pa0925-Pa0926.  Approximately nineteen years later in 1939, the Borough initiated a foreclosure action against [...] which resulted in the issuance of a Final Decree in the foreclosure entering judgment in favor of the Borough.  See Pa0927-Pa0949.  While the Final Decree, like all of the previous deeds within the chain of title, included a legal description of what was being acquired which was limited to the uplands portions of these lands, the Final Decree expressly indicated that the acquisition of these property rights was “. . . together with all riparian rights adjoining the above described premises”.  See Pa0949.  [...] testified that the Borough’s foreclosure judgment resulted in the acquisition of all of the riparian rights held by [...], including its rights in the Quinlan Tract as follows:  Q: So your conclusion was when the Borough acquired this property, through foreclosure, it acquired the uplands, whatever they were as of 1939, plus all of adjoining riparian rights?  A: Yeah, that’s correct.  Q: And those riparian rights would include the area that we’ve been describing as the Quinlan grant. A: Right.  See 6T, p. 47, lines 10-17.  Based on its review of the documents in the chain of title expert testimony, the Trial Court found [...]’s testimony more credible than that of [...]’s experts, and determined that the Borough has owned the entire Property (including both the uplands and the riparian Quinlan Tract) since the date of the entry of 1939 foreclosure.
[brief] ACPO’s policies, procedures, trainings, audits, and compliance issues by staff during her employment as section chief were necessarily front and center, especially once [...] finally received ACPO’s polices in response to an OPRA request.  It was evident they were not followed when critical evidence pertaining to [...]’s alibi was destroyed, calling into question the actions of the individuals who handled [...]’s evidence, as well as their training and supervision, or lack thereof.  It also implicated the candor of the ACPO detective-witnesses and the prosecutors handling the matter, as ACPO’s evidence retention and destruction policies are fundamental to the very function of the office, should have been easily produced, but were withheld on the purported basis they would be too onerous to locate.
[brief] (9T18-22 to 22-1)  It is uncontested that, if [...] committed the underlying offenses, his severe mental health issues played a significant role.  It is no doubt partly for this reason that the trial court had [...] explicitly place on the record his waiver of the insanity defense before the trial.  (3T10-3 to 13-6).  Despite that waiver, however, it was always understood by all parties and the court that [...] would be making an issue of his psychological problems at the trial with an eye towards a diminished capacity defense.  Although electing not to call a doctor or admit psychological records at the trial, defense counsel did elicit substantial lay testimony with regards to [...]’s delusions, erratic behavior, and hospitalizations.  Nonetheless, at the close of trial, the trial court erroneously refused to provide a diminished capacity charge to the jury.  Because the trial court erred in foreclosing one of [...]’s most important defenses, his convictions must be reversed, and the matter remanded for a new trial where the jury is appropriately instructed on diminished capacity.  U.S. Const. amends.
[brief] Although [...] accuses [...] of favoritism or bid shopping, in fact, [...] acted in good faith to faithfully uphold the law.  [...] would certainly have preferred to save itself and its patrons from the added expense of the [...] bid, however, unfortunately, [...] or its insurance agent made a mistake and submitted a defective bid that was properly rejected.  If there is a grievance to be had by [...], it lies elsewhere and not with [...].  In a comprehensive final agency decision, [...] received [...]’s protest and determined that under binding Supreme Court precedent, it was without discretion to waive the irregularity.  Further, one additional, beneficial outcome of the hearing process is that it brought to light a historical administrative oversight whereby [...]’s internal bid review process had not identified other, defective consents of surety using the same, or a similar power of attorney form.  Consequently, while [...] cannot rewind history, it is nevertheless obligated to correct those deficiencies that are before it now and to scrupulously follow the law going forward.  As [...] points out in its brief, [...] has already changed its specifications to ensure that future bidders do not make the same mistake, and personnel have been retrained and are now focused on this issue.  For present purposes, however, and whether the parties like it or not, the decision below is the only result permitted under the case law and it should accordingly be affirmed in all respects.
[brief] Pa60.  The Court further ordered the Plaintiffs to submit a proposed Order for post-judgment interest.  Pa60.  On September 16, 2022, the Court awarded Plaintiffs post-judgment interest from July 20, 2022 to August 29, 2022 in the amount of $338.80.  Pa180.  On September 6, 2022, Defendants complied with the Court’s August 29, 2022 Order by providing all responsive records in their possession with respect to the requested special education documents.