ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] It would have been error to instruct the jury regarding any purported unreliability of fallibility of fingerprint evidence, as defendant introduced no evidence—testimonial or otherwise—establishing those opinions.  Defendant has not pointed to a single court that has provided a similar instruction, especially an instruction based on reports not acknowledged by the Committee on Model Criminal Jury Charges.  The difference between defendant’s proposed instruction and a Henderson identification instruction is that the Henderson Court relied on a variety of case law from across the country that supported a change based on scientific evidence about memory and existing identification techniques.  208 N.J. at 283-85.  No such support exists here; indeed, as noted, no case has adopted defendant’s position regarding any deficiencies in fingerprint-analysis evidence.  Thus, a jury charge informing the jury of those conclusions would have been inappropriate.  The model jury charge on fingerprints told the jury all it needed to know in order to reach a verdict in this case.  4.
[directive] Cash seizures shall be expeditiously counted, processed and prepared for transfer to the Customs suspense account U.S. in accordance with each agency's procedures and the following two conditions.  The currency will be transported with appropriate security measures to ensure safe transportation to the physical site of the deposit.  Agency personnel shall remain at the site until the currency is recounted if necessary, by the financial facility and a proper receipt is provided for the deposit.  Discrepancies shall be immediately resolved at the financial facility by the agency's representatives and the financial facility's representatives.  Agency representatives will verify the count and retain a receipt for the deposit.  All reports of shortages, overages, or counterfeit currency shall be appropriately resolved before agency representatives leave the facility.  A.
[brief] LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING DEFENDANT’S ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE AND THE RELIEF SOUGHT  A review of the Order to Show Cause denied by [...] on September 25, 2023 (Da 221) shows that the Court was correct in denying the relief sought.  More specifically, the Order to Show Cause requested multiple items of relief.  The first item was that Plaintiff be compelled to provide a statement under oath to the County Sheriff “on parties of interests of the Note” (sic) pursuant to Chapter 225, Laws of New Jersey 1979.  The second was that Plaintiff must provide an assignment of the Note to the County Sheriff.  Third, Defendant sought to stay the Sheriff’s Sale until the foregoing two documents were provided.  Finally, Defendant sought to stay the Sheriff’s Sale until “all five issues on page 7 of the Complaint are resolved”.  In fact, these five issues (demands) were not actually in the Complaint but do appear in the Certification Defendant filed in support of the Order to Show Cause that is the subject of this appeal.  These five issues are as follows: (1) the allegedly forged mortgage Assignment of February 27, 2009, the allegedly forged Assignment of September 28, 2104 and the allegedly forged Affidavit of Lost Note of February 12, 2014; (2) The allegedly forged HAM Agreement of 2015 and allegedly forged notarial journal; (3) A statement under oath from Plaintiff regarding the interests of the parties per NJ Law; (4)  An assignment of mortgage and note from Plaintiff to [...] per NJSA 46:9-9; and (5)  Pain and suffering and punitive damages for Defendant and his family.  Even a cursory review of Defendant’s demands show that these items have either been already considered and rejected or are not required by statutory and/or case law.  More specifically, a Final Judgment of Foreclosure was issued by the Superior Court of New Jersey on September 3, 2019 (Pa 22-24) with respect to the mortgage on Defendant’s residence of [...].  Many of the items Defendant is now demanding in the Order to Show Cause were already litigated and rejected by the court prior to the Superior Court of New Jersey entering the Final Judgment of Foreclosure and should not be reviewed by this court under the principles of res judicata and collateral estoppel as will be discussed more fully below.
[brief] Order Place In Appendix Order (1) denying R. 4:52 relief to the appellant and (2) ordering the respondents to file their opposition . . . . Pa107 (file dated on August 30, 2023) (this order was issued without a hearing and without opposition).  Order granting respondents’ Motion To Dismiss . . . . . . . . . . Pa111 (file dated on October 20, 2023) (the order was issued after the hearing conducted on the same day).  Order denying the appellant’s Motion For Reconsideration  . . . . Pa112 (file dated on December 15, 2023) (the order was issued after the hearing conducted on the same day).  Order denying appellant’s Motion For Recusal . . . . . . . . . . Pa114 (file dated on December 15, 2023) (the order was issued after the hearing conducted on the same day).  Order denying the respondents’ Motion For Sanctions . . . . . . . . Pa116 (file dated on February 02, 2023) (the order was issued after the hearing conducted on the same day).  ### TABLE OF JUDGMENTS ORDERS AND RULINGS BEING APPEALED | Order Being Appealed | Order Place In Appendix |
[brief] (7T 87:15-23; 90:9-91:14).  Initially, Appellants submit the lower’s court narrow interpretation of *Model Civil Jury Charge* 5.20B(2)(b) is contrary to the plain language of the charge and contrary to our court’s application of a commercial defendant’s duty to remove snow and ice from adjacent walkways.  First, Defendants must address the mistaken notion that this jury charge can only be used when the incident occurs during an active or ongoing snowstorm.  Contrary to Plaintiff’s assertion, this limitation is not found in *Pareja v. Princeton Int’l Props*, 246 N.J. 546, 549, reconsideration den., 247 N.J. 406 (2021) nor does the actual charge language limit its application to ongoing storm events only.
[directive] 1  It is longstanding policy that a municipal court judge must set forth in the record the reason for any stay of of of in the commencement a term incarceration when sentencing a defendant convicted a third time Driving While Intoxicated (DWI) charge (N.J.S.A. 39:4-50(a)(3)).  See October 25, 2006  Memorandum from of Offenders-State Judge [...], "Sentencing Third or Subsequent DWI Luthe and 'Michael's v. Law."' , 1 (The Legislature's stated purpose enacting 'Michael's Law' was to "keep third-time DWI in p. Municipal Sentencing Guidance -- Issued by Directive 13-20 (April 30, 2020)  # Page2 (6)  Sentencing Provisions  Unless the court orders otherwise, or as otherwise provided law, certain other by conditions of the sentence, including but not limited any monetary or court-ordered to financial obligations, restitution, no-contact orders, and driver's license suspensions will commence upon sentencing regardless of whether a stay of the custodial term is ordered.
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE CFLA DOES NOT FURTHER INTERESTS OF PUBLIC POLICY (Raised Below: Da61)  As discussed *supra*, the NJCFLA’s statutory predecessors had nearly the same statutory structure as the contemporary NJCFLA—*to wit*, they provided for a private right of action (including treble damages and voiding of unlawful contracts) in conjunction with the Commissioner’s enforcement.  Nothing in the NJCFLA suggests that the legislature intended the Act’s remedies to be unavailable to private citizens.  To suddenly read private mechanisms of enforcement out of the NJCFLA would be tantamount to legislation by the judiciary.  Interpreting the NJCFLA as the legislature clearly intended requires viewing the NJCFLA in its historical context, *i.e.*, acknowledging that the statute has always afforded private enforcement.
[brief] (Da 23.)  The [...] promptly removed and disposed of the “millings” as conditioned by the Appellant.  (Da 41.)  Further, at the Appellant’s request, a hearing was held before [...] due to their concerns that too much topsoil had been removed when the millings were removed.  (Pa 38a.)  The [...] found that there had been no violation.  Id.  On June 9, 2015, the [...], at the request of the Appellant, filed an eviction action against [...] and [...], who had been tenants on the Property and operating their business, [...], on the Property.
[brief] In 2008, the [...] filed a Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Petition.  \(^3\)It should be noted the 1963 Agreement  Plaintiff attached to the Corporate Action is missing page 2 (Da911).  [...] --- an entity unrelated to either the [...] or [...] --- acquired the School property (Lot 5) for bona fide consideration of $2,200,000 in a Bankruptcy auction sale in August 2010.
[brief] (Pa114-15 at 125:24-126:6).  \(^3\)  At her deposition, [...] claimed that [...] gave her permission “as long as I don’t get in trouble. ” (Pa230 at 22:18-21).  [...] claimed that [...], a nurse supervisor, was present at that time, but Love has no memory of that alleged approval.  (Pa456-57 at 32:17-33:10).  And [...]’s testimony is consistently contradicted by the evidence in the record.  XII.  [...], [...], and [...] are Terminated.
[brief] See Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 429-33 (1984) (no requirement to administer Miranda warnings where defendant is not in custody).  Custodial interrogation is “questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. ”  Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444.  Miranda turns on the “inquisitorial nature of police questioning” and “inherent psychological pressure on a suspect in custody.
[brief] Plaintiffs maintain that as a matter of public policy, proof of receipt by the insured should be required.  However, as plaintiffs acknowledged in the court below, case law from the Appellate Division appears to hold otherwise.  Therefore, as the court noted, Plaintiffs raised the issue below simply for the purpose of preserving it for this appeal.  Looking first at the statute, N.J.S.A. 17:29C-10 states that no notice cancelling an automobile insurance policy “shall be effective” unless sent in a certain manner.
[directive] Upon receipt, the chief executive shall issue a finding on whether the firing and all discharges complied with the Attorney General’s Supplemental Policy on Conducted Energy Devices.  The chief executive shall forward the report to the County Prosecutor within 3 business days of the firing/discharge, unless State Police and other state law enforcement agencies typically report directly to the Division of Criminal Justice on use of force issues, the July 13, 2012 Clarification of CED Incident Reporting Procedures for State-level Law Enforcement Agencies directed that the State Police and other state law enforcement agencies continue to investigate CED discharges in the same manner as required by the 2010 Policy, but forward their reports and findings directly to the Director of the Division of Criminal Justice.  The Director will then perform the review functions that otherwise would have been performed by the County Prosecutor, in addition to the review and reporting functions already required of the Director by the 2010 Policy.  The July 13, 2012 clarification is reflected in this document.
[brief] The right to counsel of one’s choosing is not unlimited.  As our Supreme Court has noted, “a person’s right to retain counsel of his or her choice is limited in that ‘there is no right to demand to be represented by an attorney disqualified because of an ethical requirement. ”  Dewey, 109 N.J. at 218 (citing Reardon, 83 N.J. at 477) (emphasis added).  Nevertheless, the motion judge requested evidence that the defendants wanted [...] to continue representing them.
[brief] Branch v. Cream-O-Land Dairy, 244 N.J. 567, 582 (2021); Kornbleuth v. Westover, 241 N.J. 289, 301 (2020); Hoover v. Wetzler, 472 N.J. Super. 230, 235 (App. Div. 2022); Pitney Bowes Bank, Inc. v. ABC Caging Fulfillment, 440 N.J. Super. 378, 382 (App. Div. 2015).
[directive] First Degree Term of Parole Supervision - 5 years Second Degree Term of Parole Supervision - 3 years Czy rozumie Pan(i), że w przypadku naruszenia warunków nadzoru po zwolnieniu [Tak/Yes] [Nie/No] 3. warunkowym, zwolnienie warunkowe może zostać cofnięte i może Pan(i) wrócić do zakładu karnego i pozostać tam przez cały pozostały okres nadzoru kuratora sądowego po zwolnieniu warunkowym, pomimo zakończenia odbywania poprzedniej kary pozbawienia wolności?  Do you understand that if you violate the conditions of your parole supervision that your parole may be revoked and you may be subject to return to prison to serve all or any portion of the remaining period of parole supervision, even if you have completed serving the term of imprisonment previously imposed?
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BECAUSE IT FOCUSED SOLELY ON THE ORIGINS OF THE INCOMPLETE AGREEMENT WHILE IGNORING VITAL TESTIMONY THAT RECOGNIZED AN ENFORCEABLE ARBITRATION PROVISION (1a, 2T at 56:20-25)  The Court almost exclusively focused on the Incomplete Agreement (that was located in [...]’s office and to which only she controlled) to deny the motion, while ignoring the testimony of [...], [...] and Drukpa.  Indeed, when Defendants identified this issue to the trial Court, the Court continued to belabor the origins of the Incomplete Agreement.  2T at 51:19-56:8.  As previously noted, [...] testified that all [...] employees enter into employment agreements containing arbitration provisions.  [...] testified to signing an employment agreement that contained an arbitration clause.  Further she did not challenge the authenticity of the November 2019 email.  Instead of viewing these facts in favor of compelling arbitration, the trial Court instead repeatedly questioned where the Incomplete Agreement came from.  The overwhelming evidence presented during the hearing, including the Operative Agreement executed by the parties, the email sent by [...] herself knowing it was being provided to and would be relied upon by a governmental agency, that [...] signed a number of agreements, both before and after the date she signed her agreement, on behalf of the College containing the same arbitration clause, and also witnessed the signature of others to agreements with the same arbitration clause, clearly and convincingly proved that the Operative Agreement controlled and that the arbitration clause contained therein was binding on the parties.
[brief] (Pa665-666; Pa1717).  As for any alleged “vague” entries, the undersigned takes issues with such characterization and, as the Certification of Counsel and its attachments (i.e., the legal billing) (Pa804) shows and certifies, Defendant’s counsel has entered time entries concurrently with work being done and in detail sufficient to inform the client of the tasks completed.  Many entries as submitted upon this instant motion were redacted to protect the attorney/client privilege and/or the work product doctrine, but counsel attempted to leave-in enough unredacted information, where possible, to inform its viewer as to the task at hand.  Unredacted versions can be made available for *in camera* review if the Court desired to entertain such an exercise.  For the foregoing reasons, Defendant respectfully requests that the Court should affirm the trial court’s March 11, 2024 identifying Defendant as the prevailing party in the action below and awarding Defendant attorney’s fees and costs.
[brief] On February 23, 2022, the Jury found Appellant guilty of Count One, Murder, first degree, contrary to the provisions of N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3a(1), with a sentencing enhancer pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(c); Count Murder, first degree, contrary to the provisions of N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3a(1), with a sentencing enhancer pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(c); Count Three, Murder, first degree, contrary to the provisions of N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3a(1), with a sentencing enhancer pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(c); Count Four, Murder, first degree, contrary to the provisions of N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3a(1), with a sentencing enhancer pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(c); and Count Five, Possession of a Weapon for an Unlawful Purpose, second degree, contrary to the provisions of N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(a).
[brief] RESPONDENT VIOLATED  TILA REQUIREMENTS  A.  Governing Law provision is not conspicuous.  The Governing Law provision in the Agreement is on page 3 of a 4-page document and in the same font and print as the body of the Agreement.  Da46.  The court in Discover Bank v. Shea, 362 N.J. Super. 200, 208 (Law Div. 2001), construed the Uniform Commercial Code (“UCC”) as requiring that choice of law provisions be “conspicuous. ”  Although TILA and the UCC are different statutes, the intent of both is the same: Governing or Choice of Law provisions must be conspicuous.  Respondent failed to make the Governing Law provision conspicuous in the Agreement.  B.  Respondent violated Minimum Payment Due terms.  For the period October, 2016 through December, 2017, Respondent demanded payments of amounts greater than the amounts required by the Agreement.  Da28, and Da67 through Da93.  An example is the Account Statement for the period May 27, 2017 to June 26, 2017.  Da86.  The Agreement specifies the Minimum Payment Due calculation as follows: any Past Due Amount plus the greater of $35, or 2% of the New Balance or $20 plus any fees.  Da44.  The calculation is as follows: Past Due Amount is $0, plus 2% of New Balance of $3,482.68 equals $70.  The Minimum Payment Due stated on Da86 is $125.  Appellant did not receive the required advance written notice that Respondent effectively changed the Minimum Payment Due rules when it failed to use the proper calculation.  Such Agreement changes were “significant changes” under 12 C.F.R. Section 226.9(c)(2)(ii).  C.  “Finance charge” and “annual percentage rate” not in bold text.  15 U.S.C. Section 1632(a) requires that the terms “finance charge” and “annual percentage rate” shall be made conspicuous by using a contrasting type size or boldness.  The court in Grey v. European Health Spas, Inc., 428 F. Supp. 841, 844 (D. Conn. 1977), held that “finance charge” and “annual percentage rate” are conspicuous when prominently displayed in boldface type.  CFPB TILA Examination Procedures, Section 1026.7f.(i), 78 (April 2015), contains an example of the bold text required by 15 U.S.C. Section 1632(a).  Exhibit JJ, Da135.  Respondent did not comply with the requirement.  CONCLUSION
[brief] 4T, 91:18-92:20.  Also, [...] explained that in addition to said 15% developer fee, Plaintiff [...]’s lost profits also include, after the mandatory 15-year hold period, profits generated by the sale of the affordable housing development or refinancing of the balance of the [...] mortgage.  274a; 4T, 66:1-18; 91:18-92:20.  Based on the analysis of the real, certain, actual data and information of the affordable housing project submitted by [...] to the [...] to obtain the financing for the affordable housing development, and utilizing commonly used analytic standards and methodology in the industry of affordable housing developments and capital markets by developers, investors, advisors, and the [...], to determine the value and profits of a 100% affordable housing project, Plaintiff [...]’s lost profits discounted to present value is $8.2 million.
[directive] Decision Framework {DMF) 2022]  [August DMFMATRIX  1 NCA NCA 2 NCA 3 NCA 5 NCA6 NCA 4 A1 H Level Light Level Light Risk Risk Risk Level Yellow - Green- Orange - FTA2 Recommendation Recommendation Recommendation L 2 PM PMll PML3 Level Light Risk Level Light Risk Level Light Risk Rislc Level Yellow - Green- Green- Orange - FTA3 Recommendation Recommendation Recommendation Recommendation L 2 PM PMLl l PML3 PML Light Level Level Risk Light Risk light Level Risk Yellow Risk Level - Green- Green - Orange - A4 H Recommendation Recommendation Recommendation Recommendation L 2 PM PMLl PMLl PML3 Level Light Risk Dark Level Risk Yellow- Level Risk Level Yellow - Risk - Orange Orange- FTAS Recommendation Recommendation Recommendation Recommendation PML2 PM L 2 PML3 3 EM/HD PML + FTA6 OFFENSES INVOLVING A FIREARM 2C:39-16 1 TRAFFICKING NETWORKS FIREARMS LEADER OF WEAP/DEVICES PROHIBITED COVERT/UNDETECTABLE FIREARMS 2C:39-3(M) 3 - AND WEAPONS SAWED-OFF SHOTGUN PROHIBITED  2C:39-3B  DEVICES 3 - AND WEAPONS  PROHIBITED FIREARMS DEFACED  4  2C:39-3D  DEVICES - WITHOUT NUMBER WEAPONS  PROHIBITED FIREARM SERIAL 3  2C:39-3N  COMMITTING WHILE CDS/BIAS CRIME FIREARM OF 2C:39-4.1A  2  POSSESSION  UNLAWFUL WEAPON  2C:39-4A(1)  PURPOSE-FIREARM-ANYONE OF 2  FOR POSS  UNLAWFUL PURPOSE-COMMUNITY GUN  WEAPON  2C:39-4A(2)  2 OF FOR POSS  UNLAWFUL MACHINE WEAP- GUN  2  2C:39-SA POSS WITHOUT UNLAWFUL WEAPON-HANDGUNS PERMIT  1  2C:39-SB(1)  POSS WITHOUT 2C:39-SB(1)  UNLAWFUL WEAPON-HANDGUNS PERMIT  2  POSS - 2C:39-SB(2)  UNLAWFUL AIR/SPRING/PISTOL HANDGUNS WEAPON  3 POSS - UNLAWFUL  2C:39-SC(1)  3  WEAP RIFLES/SHOTGUNS  POSS WEAP- UNLAWFUL  2C:39-SC(2)  RIFLE/SHOTGUN  3  LOADED POSS 2C:39-SE(1)  UNLAWFUL AT 3  WEAPONS INSTIT. OF EDU POSSESSION  WEAPONS-ASSAULT  UNLAWFUL 2C:39-SF 2
[brief] 1.  **The POS.**  Uncontroverted testimony at trial established both that [...] failed to provide the POS to any Plaintiff prior to execution of the contract or agreement in violation of N.J.S.A. 45:15-16.80(b) and also failed to afford any Plaintiff a reasonable opportunity to read the POS before they signed the contract or purchase agreement in violation of N.J.C.A. 11:5-9A.6.  Indeed, delivering the POS to the Plaintiffs only after the contracts were signed and then only on a CD which they could not access was [...]’s standard practice.  (11T 28:16-31:6; 12T 93:15-19).  And the deeders, who are assigned to explain the contract terms to the buyers as they close, testified they have never read the POS because it is so long.  (11T36:22-37:22).  A contract can only be binding if it has been mutually agreed upon by the parties.  *Hoffman v. Supplements Togo Management, LLC*, 419 N.J.Super. 596, 606 (App.Div.2011).  For mutual assent to exist, there must have been a meeting of the minds of the parties.  *Pop’s Cones, Inc. v. Resorts Int’l Hotel*, 307 N.J.Super. 461, 467-68 (App.Div.1998).  A meeting of the minds requires “that each party to the contract must have been fairly informed of the contracts’ terms before entering into the agreement.  *Hoffman* at 606.  Given that [...] actively prevented each Plaintiff from learning the contractual terms in the POS, the parol evidence rule cannot apply to any of the POS’s contents.  2.
[brief] 19  POINT I THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE GRANTED SUMMARY  JUDGMENT IN APPELLANT’S FAVOR ON THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE CLAIMS: (5T 30:-20-25; 6T 12:5-15:18; Pa1718-1729).  .........................  19 POINT II  THE TRIAL COURT’S DISMISSAL OF COUNTS I, II & III OF THE COMPLAINT SHOULD BE REVERSED (Pa11718, 1729):  ...........................................  28 POINT III  THE TRIAL COURT WAS IN ERROR IN NOT CONCLUDING THAT THE REDEVELOPMENT PLAN WAS INCONSISTENT WITH THE 1988 MASTER PLAN, AND THAT INCONSISTENCY WAS NOT RECOGNIZED OR ADDRESSED AS REQUIRED (APPEALING THE FINAL OPINION/ORDER (Pa1733).  .........................................................  30  CONCLUSION .................................................................
[brief] Numerous witnesses testified to Bella’s “constant confrontation” of Koda.  She chased and nipped at him once a week.  She often marked his territory with urine and feces.  [...] testified that when dog “behavior keeps repeating over and over again” it “becomes antagonistic. ”  4T10-24:25:11-1.  The Court cut off this line of questioning and dismissed the testimony as “opinion” evidence to predict the future.  4T9:24 – 4T11:1-15.  But [...]’s personal knowledge and experience with [...] should have qualified her to testify to opinion as a lay person, because her opinion was “rationally based on the witness’s perception” and would assist the court “in determining a fact in issue. ”  See N.J.R.E. 701, supra.  [...] apologized to [...] and [...] and offered them a bottle of wine for their trouble.