ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] (2T 37-15 to 38-15)  [...] found that any effort by [...] to re-Mirandize [...] after he had already unequivocally invoked his rights would have been tainted, but [...] “didn’t even make the effort to do so. ”  (2T 46-20 to 25)  [...] also found that [...] did not inform [...]’s mother that he was on the call until the end, after she had questioned [...] about what happened and [...] had responded with incriminating statements.  (2T 25-21 to 26-17, 54-25 to 55-21)  Because the phone call procedure was the functional equivalent of direct questioning following his invocation, [...] concluded that [...]’s rights were violated and that suppression of the statements was required.  (3T 20-10 to 16)  The State moved for reconsideration on the grounds that [...] included, among his factual findings, that [...] had told [...] he could not call his parents on the [...]’s phones because they were recorded lines.
[directive] E.  The requirement in Section II.G of AG Directive 2018-2 that each County Prosecutor report by January 31 to the Attorney General, through the Division of Criminal Justice's Prosecutors’ Supervision and Training Bureau, those agencies under the County Prosecutor’s supervision that are in compliance with this Directive and those that are not, shall be extended from January 31, 2021 to April 30, 2021 for calendar year 2020 reporting only.  The reporting requirement for January 31, 2022 shall remain in place for calendar year 2021 reporting.
[brief] At its October 27, 2022 public meeting, the Committee voted to adopt Ordinance 2022-15 and the Redevelopment Plan.  The basis for the Committee’s decision was informed by all materials comprising the legislative record, which documents and information were made available for public review and inspection on the Township website and at the Township Municipal Building.  See also https://www.chesterfieldtwpnj.gov/oycc-redevelopment; and https://www.chesterfieldtwpnj.gov/oyccdockets.]  Also at the October 27, 2022 public hearing, the Committee introduced a second ordinance intended to implement certain amendments to the Redevelopment Plan in response to comments received by the Committee.  2T81-94.  The supplemental ordinance, Ordinance 2022-17, was entitled “Ordinance to Amend Ordinance 2022-15 which Adopted the Old York Redevelopment Plan for Certain Property Known as Block 701 Lot 2.01 the Former [...]. ”  Pa151-57.  Among other things, Ordinance 2022-17 evidenced the Committee’s intent to proceed with enacting the Redevelopment Plan even if it was later determined that the Redevelopment Plan was deemed to be inconsistent with the Master Plan.  Thus, Ordinance 2022-17 articulated the Committee’s “reasons” for enacting the Redevelopment Plan, which endowed the Redevelopment Plan with all attributes necessary to override the Master Plan pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-7.e.  With the introduction of Ordinance 2022-17, the Committee made clear its intention to proceed with the adoption of the Redevelopment Plan whether or not the Plan was consistent with the Master Plan.  Ordinance 2022-17 was thereafter referred to the Planning Board and at its public meeting of November 22, 2022, the Planning Board determined pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-7.e, that the Redevelopment Plan as amended by Ordinance 2022-17 was not inconsistent with the Master Plan.  Pa435.  On December 8, 2022, the Township Committee conducted a public hearing regarding the enactment of Ordinance 2022-17.  At the conclusion of that public hearing, the Township Committee voted to adopt Ordinance 2022-17.  Pa296.  No commenter refuted or challenged the validity of the “reasons” for adopting the Redevelopment Plan that the Committee had articulated in Ordinance 2022-17.  Pa296.  With the enactment of Ordinance 2022-17, the Redevelopment Plan was amended to its current form.  Appellant’s Complaint in Lieu of Prerogative Writs challenging the adoption of the Redevelopment Plan for the Property was then filed on December 12, 2022.  On May 15, 2023, after briefing by all Parties, the Trial Court issued its opinion rejecting Appellants’ arguments and dismissing Appellants Complaint.  3T, generally.  The dismissal of Appellant’s Complaint was memorialized by Order dated May 15, 2023.  Pa535.  This appeal followed.
[directive] The exact discipline imposed is confidential, but you will be advised of the ultimate finding, namely :  a.  Sustained: A preponderance of the evidence shows an officer violated any law; regulation; directive, guideline, policy, or procedure issued by the Attorney General or County Prosecutor; agency protocol; standing operating procedure; rule; or training.  b.  Unfounded: A preponderance of the evidence shows that the alleged misconduct did not occur.  c.  Exonerated: A preponderance of the evidence shows the alleged conduct did occur, but did not violate any law; regulation; directive, guideline, policy, or procedure issued by the Attorney General or County Prosecutor; agency protocol; standing operating procedure; rule; or training.  d.  Not Sustained:  The investigation failed to disclose sufficient evidence to clearly prove or disprove the allegation.  6.  If our investigation shows that a crime might have been committed, the county prosecutor will be notified.  You might be asked to testify in court.  7.  If our investigation results in an officer being charged with a violation of department rules, you might be asked to testify in a departmental hearing.  8.  If our investigation shows that the complaint is unfounded or that the officer acted properly, the matter will be closed.  9.  Internal affairs investigations are confidential and all disciplinary hearings shall be closed to the public unless the defendant officer requests an open hearing.  10.  You may call the (INSERT INTERNAL AFFAIRS INVESTIGATOR) at (INSERT PHONE NUMBER) with any additional information or any questions about the case.
[brief] The specific bulkheads at issue in this case protect the [...] in the [...], New Jersey, which is situated along a tidal waterway adjacent to Barnegat Bay.  The Department contends that a 2019 statute, the “Public Access Law”, N.J.S.A. 13:1D-150 through -156, authorizes it to require public access across [...]’s property.  Appellant [...] (“[...]”) recognizes and supports the broad public access rights afforded by New Jersey’s Public Trust Doctrine but, for the reasons set forth below, nevertheless contends the Department cannot impose a public access requirement either as a matter of law or on the facts presented.  PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND STATEMENT OF FACTS¹
[brief] [...]’ further assertion that “[...][]’s and [...][]’s [purported] inaction does not permit an award of punitive damages” (Db50-51) must be rejected.  As set forth in this Court’s 2018 Opinion (which is law of the case):  The record does *not* support defendants’ claim that [...] and [...] only performed ministerial functions and essentially acquiesced in [...]’s management of the partnership.  *Rather, the record supports the trial judge’s finding that [...] and [...] engaged in conduct that warrants imposition of liability upon these defendants.*
[brief] Indeed there was never even an attempt to accommodate, let alone a failure to “adequately accommodate” as the Trial Court suggested.  But the Trial Court fell short in even recognizing the individual which the Association presented as a representative Plaintiff of the entire Association, namely, [...], who indeed, was directly discriminated against, retaliated against and not even considered for reasonable accommodation.  [...], like all other Firefighters, was never even considered for possible accommodation, as the policy contemplates complete disqualification from any possibility of promotion.  The policy, as applied, simply will not accommodate Firefighters who are on medical leave.
[brief] . . .”)  Indeed, our State Constitution is premised upon the sovereignty of the people.  Article I, paragraph 2a.  Our State Constitution recognizes the right of the people to speak, to challenge, to petition and to question arbitrary, capricious, wrongful, ultra vires actions.  Article I, paragraphs 5, 6 and 18; Article VI, Section V, paragraph 4.  But here, defendants uniformly claim that their alleged ultra vires actions are not subject to judicial review and remedies.
[brief] N.J.S.A. 59:1-4. ”).  For example, the Supreme Court refused to bar an insurance contract benefit claim via the TCA.\footnote{Prudential Property & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Monmouth County Mun. Joint Ins. Fund, 141 N.J. 235 (1995)(because UM claims are contractual obligations, the TCA was inapplicable).}
[brief] See Da50.  The Court rejected this argument advising that the hearing date would remain and noted that “Summary Judgment was properly filed” and --- \(^8\) T1 refers to the August 5, 2022 transcript on Defendant’s Motion to Quash.  T2 refers to the February 28, 2023 transcript of Motion for Summary Judgment.  T3 refers to the April 14, 2023 transcript of Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration. that “oral argument will be heard on January 17, 2023 at 11:30 am as previously scheduled…”
[brief] Accordingly, this Court should affirm the denial of summary judgment and the judgment for conversion after trial.  Appellant argues that the Plaintiffs lack standing because they did not bring their claims derivatively on behalf of [...] and [...].  However, Plaintiffs had the right to bring their conversion claims directly because they suffered a special injury.  And, even if this Court believes that the Plaintiffs did not suffer a special injury, the trial court properly exercised its equitable discretion to waive the requirement that these claims be pursued derivatively because [...], [...], and their wives – directly or via other party-entities to this case – are the only shareholders or members in [...] and [...].  As our case law makes clear, the possible prejudice to the entities in such cases is minimal, and treating this case as a direct action still permitted the trial court to afford complete relief.  1.
[brief] When they obtained the aforementioned long-term financing and when [...] was being placed on the deed, [...] wanted to protect his interests.  [...] and [...] consulted with Defendant [...] who prepared a mortgage and mortgage note in [...]’s favor.  The mortgage note required payment on demand in the event [...] and [...] divorced. ”  (Id. at ¶¶s 7-8.)  Critically, [...] and [...] did not divorce while [...] was alive and at no time did [...] demand repayment in any amount.  (Pa000081-Pa000082.)  [...] states that in 2014, again while still married to [...], “[...] was diagnosed with a life-threatening condition…which prompted him to have a will prepared.
[brief] (8T 24- 15 to 18, 31-2 to 18, 42-5 to 44-18, 79-12 to 18)  The Court failed to connect the underdeveloped prefrontal cortex of a nineteen-year-old with the impulsive, reckless act of pulling the trigger, specifically rejecting any connection between that youth and that act.  (8T 79-12 to 18)  And the Court failed to acknowledge the connection between adolescent brain development, the age-crime curve, and the corresponding reduction in criminality between ages nineteen and twenty-five in considering the likelihood that [...] would commit another offense.  (8T 79-12 to 80-1)  Because the Court’s reasoning in finding and weighing aggravating factors three and nine and mitigating factor fourteen and in declining mitigating factor nine failed to address the extremely relevant adolescent brain science and age-crime curve that counsel presented to the Court—failing even to give an explanation for rejecting its relevance—its findings were not “supported by competent, credible evidence in the record.
[brief] Defendants contend, without any legal authority to support their position, that because Plaintiff elicited testimony regarding the RIR and “opened the door to extrinsic evidence,” the trial court’s reliance thereon was proper.  (Db30-31, 35.)  Defendants miss the mark.  The issue, as clearly stated in Plaintiff’s Brief, is that the trial court improperly relied on extrinsic evidence to alter the terms of the PSA.  Rather than meaningfully address the issue, Defendants instead offer misguided and unsupported legal and factual assertions insufficient to rebut Plaintiff’s argument.  The polestar of contract construction is to discover “the intention of the parties to the contract as revealed by the language used, taken as an entirety. ”  Conway v. 287 Corp. Ctr. Assocs., 187 N.J. 259, 269 (2006) (quoting Atl. N. Airlines v. Schwimmer, 12 N.J. 293, 301 (1953)) (emphasis added).
[brief] .......................  H576a Holm-56: [...] response to discovery request HOLM-[...]-PNL-53, re service interruptions caused by the Temporary station (SOICR p. 12)  ...........................................  H577a Holm-57: [...] response to discovery request HOLM-[...]-PNL-54, re injury caused by operation of Temporary station (SOICR p. 12)  ....  H578a Holm-58: [...] response to discovery request HOLM-[...]-PNL-55, re any risk of injury to the public from the Temporary station (SOICR p. 12)  ...........................................  H579a Holm-59: [...] response to discovery request HOLM-[...]-PNL-56, any risk to public from the temporary regulator and any notice to [...] officials (SOICR p. 12).  ...........................................  H580a Holm-60: [...] response to discovery request HOLM-[...]-PNL-57, any risk to property from the temporary regulator and any notice to [...] officials (SOICR p. 12).  ...........................................  H581a Holm-61: [...] response to discovery request HOLM-[...]-PNL-58, any risk to any person from the temporary regulator and any notice to [...] officials (SOICR p. 12).  ...........................................  H582a Holm-62: [...] response to discovery request HOLM-[...]-PNL-59, re any incidents in system where icing resulted from high pressure gas delivered into a low pressure system and any notice of such incident (SOICR p. 12)  ...........................................  H583a Holm-63: [...] response to discovery request HOLM-[...]-PNL-60, re 1994 incident, provide details and describe any notice to officials (SOICR p. 12)  ...........................................  H585a Holm-64: [...] response to discovery request HOLM-[...]-PNL-61, re current operating system placing burdens on surrounding regulators (SOICR p. 12)
[brief] THE ORDER GRANTING THE DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD BE REVERSED BECAUSE THE DEFENDANTS OWED THE PLAINTIFF AN AFFIRMATIVE DUTY TO PROVIDE HER WITH A REASONABLY SAFE PREMISES AND THE INFERENCE OF FACT WEIGHED IN THE PLAINTIFF’S FAVOR WOULD ALLOW A JURY TO FIND THAT THE DEFENDANTS BREACHED THAT DUTY (Pa40-Pa41; Pa44-Pa48; 1T5:21-13:18).  The plaintiff was a business invitee of the defendants’ retail establishment when she was caused to trip and fall on the foot of a temporary barricade that was bent and protruded in a raised condition into the pedestrian walkway along the means of ingress/egress to the store.  (Pa61 at 11:15-17; Pa62 at 13:3-4; Pa63 at 20:12-20; Pa64 at 22:10-14; Pa78 at 77:17-78:19; Pa78 at 79:19-23 Pa228-Pa233).  It is not disputed that the feet of the barricades erected at the entrance of the [...] store were supposed lay flat on the ground or that the raised foot of the barricade that protruded into the pedestrian walkway and caused the plaintiff to trip and fall was a tripping hazard.  (Pa105 at 26:2-4; Pa125-Pa126 at 46:10-47:15; Pa228-Pa233).  [...] opined that the failure to abate the tripping hazard violated accepted standards and defendant [...]’s own policies and procedures.  (Pa234).  He further opined that defendant [...] failed to exercise due care for the safety of its customers by maintaining the unreasonably hazardous condition within an areas foreseeably used by its customers which caused the plaintiff to trip, fall, and become injured.  (Pa234).  Although the defendants owed the plaintiff an affirmative and non-delegable duty to discover and eliminate any potentially dangerous condition or circumstance on the property and to avoid creating any conditions that would render the premises unsafe, *Jerista v. Murray*, 185 N.J. 175, 191 (2005), the Trial Court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment and denied the plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration on the grounds that the defendants were essentially relieved of this duty because it found that the tripping hazard created by the raised barricade foot was open and obvious as a matter of law.
[directive] third or second either the under fall not do that cases all includes category category.  first under the fall will cases of majority large a that expected be will State the where crimes serious especially with deals category second  The or Prosecutor, Assistant or First Prosecutor County the unless detention pretrial seek to expected the by prosecuted matters in Justice Criminal Division of the Director of Deputy or Director a the justify to exist circumstances extraordinary and compelling determines that Division, to applies category second  This 7.3.
[brief] [(12T 91-23 to 92-5) (emphasis added). ]  That reference was to the following portion of [...]’s statement in which he expressly invoked his rights just after the detectives confronted him with the video of the alleged perpetrator running away:  DETECTIVE:  When the homicide happened, you just happened to be outside running on that block.  At the time there was quite a bit of chaos, you’re on the block, (indiscernible) you’re there, pretty much.  But you’re running away.  Did you hear shots?  Did you hear shots?  You didn’t hear no shots?  DETECTIVE: Mr. [...], we’re speaking to you.  DEFENDANT: I have nothing else to say.  [(9T 34-2 to 10) (emphasis added). ]  That portion of his statement should never have been admitted in the first place because it came after all but the last of his invocations.  Clark, 251 N.J. at 275 (reversing where trial court’s failure to redact defendant’s invocations “was compounded when the prosecutor commented on that portion of the statement that should have never been before the jury in the first place”).  But even after it was admitted, the prosecutor was not permitted to argue that [...] “d[id]n’t even respond” in the face of police accusations “because he kn[e]w[ ] the evidence [wa]s there. ”  Those were textbook unlawful comments on silence.  See Hyde, 292 N.J. Super. at 162-67 (reversing where prosecutor said of defendant’s silence after being confronted with charges, “What’s his reaction?  No reaction whatsoever.  He knew what he did. ”).  And those comments were particularly prejudicial because they exploited his silence to argue that he tacitly admitted -- “he kn[e]w[ ]” -- that it was “him. ”  See State v. Greene, 242 N.J. 530, 553 (2020) (“Because prosecutors hold a position of great prestige with jurors, [t]heir statements . . . have a tendency to be given great weight by jurors. ”).  Considered together, the trial court’s failure to redact any of [...]’s invocations, and the prosecutor’s comments on his silence, were plain error -- especially because the court failed to provide any curative instruction.  See Clark, 251 N.J. at 298-99 (finding plain error where, as here, both errors occurred, and the State’s case was “circumstantial” with “no eyewitnesses,” “no murder weapon,” and “defendant never confessed”); Tung, 460 N.J. Super. at 93-95 (finding plain error in part because the trial court failed to “excise[]” defendant’s invocations or “provide[] a cautionary instruction”).
[brief] Here, [...], as a pro se defendant, did not raise arbitration as an affirmative defense in his Answer, but did, as discussed above, promptly pursue arbitration once [...] committed itself to reliance on the document that contains the arbitration provision.  f.  The proximity of the date on which the party sought arbitration to the date of trial.  As of March 13, 2024 -, i.e., the date when [...] initiated arbitration in the manner dictated by the Arbitration Act- no trial date had been scheduled.  g.  The resulting prejudice suffered by the other party, if any.  The prejudice to be suffered by [...] in being ordered to arbitration will be zero.  Indeed, [...] would realize a benefit since arbitration will be a cost-effective, expeditious means of resolving the disputes that the Parties have raised in their pleadings.  Additionally, it is noted that this Court has observed that prejudice is not generally shown through “simply wasting a party-opponent’s time and money.
[brief] Firearms and Tool Mark Examination – A Primer  Firearm and tool mark examination (FTE) is the practice of purporting to determine what tool left a mark on another object.  [...], Firearms Identification in the Forensic Laboratory at 7 (2010) (Da 67-101).  At issue in this case is the subspecies of FTE when the tool at issue is a firearm (this is often referred to as “ballistics” evidence or examination).
[brief] Other than the fact that [...] transferred the title to [...] in 2019, there is nothing in the record with respect to any alleged conspiracy among the defendants.  There is no evidence whatsoever in the record with respect to how Appellants/Defendants formed any sort of agreement among themselves to commit any wrongdoing against [...].  [...] failed to prove the existence of any such agreement, the content of such an agreement, or exactly which Appellant(s) were involved in such an agreement.  The Court cannot conclude there was any conspiracy based on vague and conclusory allegations.
[brief] (Id.).  [...] based his decision on the Plaintiff’s demand, Plaintiff’s arbitration submissions with attachments, [...]’s arbitration submissions with attachments, and the March 15, 2022 hearing.  (Id.)  In calculating his Award, [...] found that “the only instance where reimbursement would be supported is where it is clear as to what [CPT] code and amounts were reimbursed. ” (Pca141).  [...] further stated that for “[a]ny dates of service where there were multiple codes billed, Claimant has not provided sufficient documentation for reimbursement, and this DRP is unable to substantiate any amount to be awarded without documentation of the specific codes and amounts previously paid. ”  (Id.).  This appeal concerns billing for two providers—[...] and the [...]—where insufficient documentation was provided, because on a number of dates of service (occasionally, “DOS”) for those providers, the lien stated that a single lump sum was paid for several CPT codes, without distinguishing how much was paid on each code.
[brief] We’re just addressing what the facts and the evidence are, and I’m asking you not to ignore the clear evidence that she had issues with her balance and issues walking.  We asked her about the numbness and the tingling in her legs and how severe is the tingling on a scale from 1 to 10.  Her testimony was, it’s like an 8.  I don’t know if you ever had a situation when you’ve been sitting too long and you get ready to stand up and you realize that your legs have fallen asleep and there – there’s some numbness.  You have to stretch and get yourself together.  That’s the type of numbness and tingling, that if you take a step, you – you’re going to fall.  You have to get yourself together, get the numbness out.  And she says that she had severe numbness and tingling.  On a scale from 1 to 10, it was like an 8.  So when you consider the issues with respect to balance, you have to think about the fact that she said that she had a fall before she even started using a cane, which necessitated it.