ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The discovery rule is an equitable principle that modifies the statute of limitations only until the date when the plaintiff discovers or by an exercise of reasonable diligence should have discovered that he may have an actionable claim.  *Catena v. Raytheon Co.*, 447 N.J. Super. 43, 52 (App. Div. 2016).  The date of discovery determination is “highly fact-sensitive, and will vary from case to case, and . . . from type of case to type of case. ”  *Id.* at 54.  In this case, the trial court made specific findings not only that [...] did not know what [...] and the defendants had done until [...] forensically analyzed the books and records, but that the defendants took deliberate steps conceal their conduct so that [...] could not have discovered it in timely fashion.  These findings warrant application of the discovery rule, and are entitled to deference on appeal.
[brief] He obtained the form from an unidentified seminar and did not make any changes to the form he was given (Pa34-35).  Defendant [...] does not recall discussing the arbitration agreement with [...], but his policy was that he would not perform surgery without her signing it (Pa21).  The process by which Defendant [...] would routinely introduce patients to the arbitration form was to have staff hand it to them on a clipboard at intake, along with numerous other forms (Pa23-25).  Defendant [...] testified that he was the only person at his office to speak to patients about the arbitration form (Pa20, Pa37).  Upon meeting with the patient at that visit, he would routinely tell the patient to read the form and sign it if they understand (Pa23, Pa26).  Defendant [...] testified that he did not discuss any of the details of the arbitration form with [...] (Pa36).  He was unable to say how he would explain the arbitration form to a questioning patient because he has never had a patient refuse to sign the form (Pa26-27).
[brief] The board of trustees shall promulgate rules and regulations necessary to implement the provisions of this subsection and shall notify members and retirants in the retirement system of the enactment of this act, P.L.2019, c.157, within 30 days of enactment.  N.J.S.A. 53:5A-10(e).  Pursuant to the Ricci Act, the Board was required to provide notice to members and retirants in the system.  A website posting is not sufficient notice to retirees or active members of the retirement system.  In re State & Sch. Emples. Health Benefits Commissions' Implementation of Yucht, 233 N.J. 267, 270, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded the decision of the Appellate Division.  The [...] and the [...] were improperly reducing reimbursements for out-of-network behavioral health services.  In the prior case, the Appellate Division found in favor of Yucht’s appeal which sought reimbursement at the statutory 80% of reasonable and customary charges for behavioral health services.  *In re Yucht*, 2013 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2188.
[brief] *Id.* at 139-140.  This Court held that the “two written warnings the dealership provided to plaintiff are insufficient to establish she suffered an adverse employment action under the LAD. ”  Id. at 140(emphasis added).  While this Court held that a written warning might under certain circumstances be materially adverse (i.e. where there is a formal system of progressive discipline), the Court found that “these particular warnings posed no harm to plaintiff at all”.  They did not constitute adverse actions within the meaning of the NJLAD.  Id.  In so finding, the Court held that the “plaintiff produced absolutely no proof of any tangible injury or harm”.  Id.  The Court also noted that, although “plaintiff undoubtably found the warnings highly distressing, her subjective response to them is not legally significant in assessing whether they were materially adverse. ”  Id (emphasis added).  In Prager, only one of the warnings referenced repercussions to flow from future infractions, and even that noted only the possibility, not the probability, of time off without pay or termination.  Id. at 141.  This Court concluded that because the plaintiff could “show no discernible injury or harm flowing from these two written warnings” the written warnings did not constitute adverse employment actions.  Id.  “Because plaintiff could not show she suffered an adverse employment decision, she failed to establish the third element of her prima facie case of retaliation” and therefore her claim under the NJLAD was properly dismissed.
[brief] PA49-66.  In doing so, this Court held that --- 4 “DA” refers to Respondent-Defendant [...]’s appendix.  Appellant’s claims could not be pursued on a pro se basis and thus would need to be pursued through legal counsel.  PA62-65.  Specifically, this Court ordered:  On remand, plaintiff must be represented by an attorney, who shall draft, file, and serve the amended complaint, which shall set forth the causes of action being pursued and the status of plaintiff’s appointment as administrator ad prosequendum and administrator of decedent’s estate.  Plaintiff must be represented by an attorney throughout the renewed trial court proceedings.  PA64-65.
[brief] Sears, Roebuck and Co. v. Braney, 265 N.J. Super. 362, 366 (App. Div. 1993)  Under N.J.S.A. 22A:4-17, all monies received by the sheriff for services "shall be for the sole use of the county and shall be accounted for regularly to the county treasurer."  The quarters in which the sheriff operates are supplied by the county and situate in the county.  All of the funds necessary for the operation of his office are supplied by the county.  N.J.S.A. 40A:9-105, 117.
[brief] First, the trial court did not grant the parties direct access to each side’s IT systems.  Instead, the court ordered the parties to perform searches of their own systems using mutually agreed to search terms -- negotiated after the parties knew that there would be no further relevance review -- and to produce the resulting information to the requesting parties in a usable format.  (Da167-68.)  That is entirely consistent with Rule 4:18-1.  Next, the producing parties in this case are all parties to the litigation, rather than third-party subpoena recipients.  Third, unlike Lipsky, the trial court here permitted the parties to review their own documents prior to production and to withhold privileged information and highly sensitive “business proprietary” information.  (Da167-68.)  Finally, this dispute does not involve any individuals’ personal electronic devices, with their attendant privacy concerns.
[brief] On June 10, 2021, the Division posted a news item on its website advising members that the statutory eligibility period to register under the Ricci Act was expiring soon and that members must submit the Eligibility Registration Form by July 8, 2021.  (Pa11).  The website further advised that failure to do so by that date would render the member ineligible to apply at a later date.  (Pa11).  On March 3, 2023, the Board received [...]’s Eligibility Registration Form, completed on October 21, 2022, and a Request for Amended Benefits Form, completed on October 14, 2022, as well as a sworn affidavit from [...] dated October 14, 2022.
[brief] [...] and his District Court colleagues are not alone in their reasoning.  The Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA"), 9 U.S.C. §2, further supports the conclusion that the coverage claims raised in [...]’s complaint belong in arbitration.  The FAA "creates a body of federal substantive law of arbitrability applicable to arbitration agreements . . . affecting interstate commerce."  Ragone v. Atl. Video at Manhattan Ctr., 595 F.3d 115, 121 (2d Cir. 2010).  Federal policy strongly favors arbitration.  E.
[brief] CRIMINAL ACTION  On Appeal from an  Judgment of the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Burlington County.  Sat Below: Hon. [...], J.S.C., and a jury.  BRIEF AND APPENDIX ON BEHALF OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY  [...]  [...] [...] [...]  [...]  Assistant Prosecutor  [...] OF COUNSEL AND ON THE BRIEF  Attorney ID#: 061632013  DEFENDANT IS CONFINED  TABLE OF CONTENTS  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES  ...........................................................................................................iii  TABLE OF APPENDIX ..................................................................................................................iv
[brief] Our Supreme Court has made clear that in imposing a sentence, the trial court “should address both general and specific deterrence,” recognizing that “[i]n the absence of a finding of a need for specific deterrence, general deterrence has relatively insignificant penal value. ”  State v. Fuentes, 217 N.J. 57, 79, 81 (2014) (quoting State v. Jarbath, 114 N.J. 394, 405 (1989)).  Furthermore, in order to justify the imposition of aggravating factor nine, the record must disclose some “special need for deterrence” that differentiates the case from other cases in its class.  See State v. Martelli, 201 N.J. Super. 378, 385-86 (App. Div. 1985).  Here, instead of finding any special need for deterrence that would justify finding aggravating factor nine in this case, the court repeatedly noted that this case was “the classic first-degree robbery.
[brief] For the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully requested that the Court enter an order denying [...]’s request for a hardship increase.  [...]  Attorney for Appellant, [...]  BY: s/[...]  DANA WEFER, ESQ.  Dated: January 27, 2023  [...], Plaintiffs, vs. RENT LEVELING AND STABILIZATION  BOARD OF THE CITY OF HOBOKEN AND JEFFREY TRUPIANO, Defendants.  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE
[brief] B.  JURISDICTION OF THE COURT IS IMPLICATED; THE UNAUTHORIZED TRANSFER WAS RETALIATORY; PLAINTIFF CHALLENGED CHANCERY DIVISION JURISDICTION BELOW; SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY RECORDS DEMONSTRATE THAT THERE WAS NO ORDER TRANSFERRING THIS LAW  DIVISION MATTER TO THE CHANCERY DIVISION JUDGE; CHANCERY DIVISION JUDGE FAILED TO COMPLY WITH THE CLEAR MANDATES OF R. 1:13-4, R. 4:3-1 AND R. 4:3-4; PLAINTIFFS’ QUESTIONS RAISED ON APPEAL GO TO THE JURISDICTION OF THE CHANCERY DIVISION JUDGE OR CONCERN MATTERS OF GREAT PUBLIC IMPORTANCE.
[brief] The Order Should Be Affirmed On Additional Grounds of: the Consideration of Parole Evidence, Waiver, Estoppel, and Appellants’ Failure to Seek to Vacate the Consent Order Under R. 4:50-1………………27  A.  The Trial Court’s Interpretation of the Consent Order Is Further Supported By Parole Evidence………………………………………………27  B.  The Doctrine of Waiver Supports Dismissal……………30  C.  The Doctrine of Judicial Estoppel Justifies Dismissal of the Complaint………………………………………………32  D.  Appellants Failed to File a Motion to Vacate Required By Rule 4:50-1 Because the Application Would Have Been Denied…………………………………………………34 Conclusion……………………………………………………………..37 TABLE OF APPENDIX Supplemental Certification of [...] in Support of Notice of Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Rule 4:6-2 (filed below 9/19/2023) .........................................................Da01 Ex. A to 9/19/2023 Supplemental Certification – Relevant Excerpts from March 16, 2021 [...] Arbitration Hearing..............................Da03 Ex. B to Supplemental Certification – Dec. 16, 2019 Order & Opinion in Separate Action Between Appellant [...] and Respondent [...] then pending in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida.........................................................Da09 Amended Reply Brief of Defendant, [...], In Support of Motion to Dismiss With Prejudice Pursuant to Rule 4:6-2 (filed below 09/19/2023).................................................................Da19** ** note – only portions submitted in accordance with Rule 2:6-1(a)(2) | CASES | PAGE | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | Arena v. Borough of Jamesburg Middlesex County, ....................... | 24, 25 | | 309 N.J. Super. 106 (App. Div. 1998) | | | Caruso v. Ravenswood Developers, Inc., .................................. | 14 | | 337 N.J. 499 (App. Div. 2001) | | | Cole v. Jersey City Med. Ctr., ........................................... | 31 | | 215 N.J. 265 (2013) | | | Community Realty Mgmt., Inc. for Wrightstown ................................ | 25, 33, 36 | | Arms Apartments v. Harris, ................................................................ | 155 N.J. 212 (1998) | | Conway v. 287 Corporate Ctr. Assoc. ....................................... | 30 | | 187 N.J. 259 (2006) | | | Daus v. Marble, ............................................................................ | 20 | | 270 N.J. Super. 241 (App. Div. 1994) | | | DEG, LLC v. Township of Fairfield, ......................................... | 33, 36, 37 | | 198 N.J. 242 (2009) | | | Deutsche Bank Trust Co. Ams. v. Angeles, ................................... | 37 | | 428 N.J. Super. 315 (App. Div. 2012) | | | Garvey v. Township of Wall, .................................................. | 24 | | 303 N.J. Super. 93 (App. Div. 1997)
[directive] 6.1.9  When an agency can conduct an internal affairs investigation and file disciplinary charges within 45 days of the receipt of a complaint, the 45-day rule does not become an issue.  In many instances this will be possible.  However, if an agency cannot do so, the burden is on the investigator and ultimately the agency to identify the point at which "sufficient information" was developed to initiate disciplinary action.  Therefore, it is important that a detailed chronology be maintained of each investigation so that critical actions and decisions are documented.
[brief] 317 N.J. Super. at 79 (emphasis added).  Roe’s holding, which was inapposite to several cases cited by the lower court, was not even acknowledged by the lower court at all.  [Tr., 11:23-12:16.]  In Roe, a twelve-year old girl took a shortcut to a swimming pool through a [...] train station gate that was bolted into an open position.  The gate opened onto park land under a highway overpass.  The area was poorly lit, surrounded by thick vegetation, and had a history, known to the authorities, of criminal assault.  The [...] route into the park was regularly taken by the public.  On the day in question, a man dragged the twelve-year old girl off as she crossed the gate and brutally raped her.  317 N.J. Super. at 82.  The Roe Court concluded that a jury could determine that by bolting its gate open, [...] invited the public “to traverse the perilous foot path under the I-280 overpass, thereby substantially enhancing the public’s risk of harm. ”  Id.  Similar to the open gate in Roe, for several months before [...] was murdered, the presence of the illegal, large, makeshift liquor concession stand on the Subject Premises enticed residents and the public to become intoxicated near a basketball court and a playground well into the night and early morning hours, resulting in frequent physical fighting and similar mayhem, thus creating a known dangerous area.
[directive] In addition to Disclosure Statements and Separation Statements, municipal prosecutors shall provide such additional information as the Division of Criminal Page 4 Justice or County Prosecutor’s Office may from time to time require.  Such information may be necessary, for example, to facilitate oversight and policymaking involving municipal court prosecutions.  For instance, in evaluating policy proposals concerning prosecutorial independence in municipal court prosecutions, the Division may find it appropriate to solicit from all or some municipal prosecutors information regarding outside employment, political activity, and the sources and amounts of their income from the municipality and other sources.  B.
[brief] Evidence of remedial measures taken after an event is not admissible to prove that the event was caused by negligence or culpable conduct.  However, evidence of such subsequent remedial conduct may be admitted as to other issues.  The defendant’s photographs depicting the scene after having placed the slip-hazard sign and the condition of the floor after the defendant’s attempt to mop the water had been attached to a three page Incident Report provided by the defendant in its Certified Answers to Interrogatories.  (Pa33 – Pa35).  At that point in the proceedings, when asked for a response by the court, defense counsel stated that “I -- I - - Judge, I don’t know quite what I am responding to, but as far as a report with the photos, they can submit the report with the photos.
[directive] 1.  (1)  2000 USO w przypadku przestt;pstwa stopnia (2)  1000 USO w przypadku przest<;pstwa 2. stopnia (3)  750 USO w przypadku przest<;pstwa 3. stopnia (4)  500 USO w przypadku przestt;pstwa 4. stopnia (5)  250 USO w przypadku wykroczenia naruszenia porziJdku publicznego lub drobnego naruszenia porz!fdku publicznego Kara na CCPF, l4cznie $ --------  Do you understand that in its discretion, impose a minimum time in 6. the court could, [Yes/Tak] [No/Nie] confinement to be served before you become eligible for parole, which period could be as long as one half of the period of the custodial sentence imposed?
[brief] (Pb 19)  [...]’s request to make the phone calls, however, does not bear on the ultimate inquiry.  Here, an officer was present and recording [...]’s calls made after his invocation and without the benefit of a re-warning.  The statements were made in response to his mother’s questions, which an officer should have known were at least reasonably likely to occur, making this the functional equivalent of an interrogation.  [...] had more than enough record support for his finding that police should have known this would elicit a response.  [...] even found that [...] knew the phone call process would result in incriminating responses.  (2T 55-6 to 25)  His measured legal analysis, however, acknowledged that the officer’s actual state of mind is not what matters—the Innis test asks whether officers should know their actions are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response.  (3T 12 to 21-3)  [...] not only applied the correct legal test, but he found that the facts went beyond what was required to find the functional equivalent of interrogation.  The State’s argument that “the interests of justice demand intervention and correction” of [...]’s decision to suppress requires looking past the uncontested factual finding that [...] had already invoked his rights and indicated that he did not want to answer more questions about the case.
[brief] Appellant filed a Motion for Reconsideration on March 20, 2023, particularly related to the molding of the verdict in light of the August 18, 2021, Bankruptcy Court Order limiting Appellee’s recovery to the policy limits ($200,000).  Da55-61.  On April 14, 2023, a hearing was held in which the trial court permitted Appellant to apply in bankruptcy court on the issues of molding.  5T.  The trial court specifically ruled that the Judgment was valid unless limited by the bankruptcy court which the trial court left to the jurisdiction of the Bankruptcy Court.
[brief] A.  Equitable Estoppel…………………………………………………………..38  B.  Common Law Fraud…………………………………………………………..39  i.  Material misrepresentation of a presently existing or past fact……………………………………………………………..40  ii.  Plaintiff knew the representations were false………………40  iii.  Plaintiff intended [...] to rely upon the Misrepresentation……………………………………………………………..41  iv.  Reasonable reliance by the other party…………………………41 v. Resulting damages……………………………………………………………..41  C. Unclean Hands……………………………………………………………………42  CONCLUSION………………………………………………………………………………….49 ### TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | Cases | PAGE(S) | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|---------| | **A. Hollander & Son, Inc. v. Imperial Fur Blending Corp.,** | 43 | | 2 N.J. 235 (1949) | | | **In re Advisory Committee on Professional Ethics,** | 27 | | 162 N.J. 497 (2000) | | | **Barclays Bus. Credit, Inc. v. Four Winds Plaza Partnership,** | 29 | | 938 F.Supp. 304 (D.Vi. 1996) | | | **Berkowitz v. Haigood,** | 23, 25, 28 | | 256 N.J. Super. 342 (Law Division 1992) | | | **Bosland v. Warnock Dodge, Inc.,** | 34 | | 197 N.J. 543 (2009) | | | **In re Bowker,** | 45, 46 | | 245 B.R. 192 (Bankr. N.J. 2000) | | | **Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am.,** | 14 | | 142 N.J. 520 (1995) | | | **Cain v. Hyatt,** | 47 | | 101 B.R. 440 (E.D.Pa. 1989) | | | **Cherilus v. Fed. Express,** | 24 | | 435 N.J. Super. 172 (App. Div. 2014) | | | **Chimers v. Oritani Motor Hotel, Inc.** | 37 | | 195 N.J. Super. 435 (App. Div. 1984) | | | **Cohen v. Radio-Electronics Officers,** | 26 | | 275 N.J. Super. 241 (App. Div. 1994) | | | **Costanzo v. Costanzo,** | 23, 24, 28 | | 248 N.J. Super. 116 (Law Div. 1991) | | | **Country Chevrolet, Inc. v. North Brunswick Planning Board,** | 38 | | 190 N.J. Super. 376 (App. Div. 1983) | | | **Cronin v. McKim-Gray,** | 21, 28 | | 353 N.J. Super. 127 (App. Div. 2002) | | Davis v. Brickman Landscaping, Ltd., 219 N.
[brief] On March 27, 2019, [...], a non-civil service jurisdiction, served a Notice of Charge and Hearing on [...].  (Pa5-Pa8).  [...] entered a plea of “not guilty” and requested a departmental hearing, which took place on ten diverse dates; namely, August 7, 2019, September 20, 2019, September 24, 2019, October 16, 2019, November 14, 2019, November 15, 2019, December 12, 2019, January 23, 2020, January 28, 2020, and February 14, 2020.  (1T-10T).  Following a Departmental Hearing, the assigned Hearing Officer\(^1\) sustained the charges and recommended a penalty of removal.  (Pa288-Pa402).  [...] took the Hearing Officer’s Decision under advisement and ultimately voted to accept his recommendations as to charges and penalty.  (Pa9).  A Final Notice of Disciplinary Action (“FNDA”) was issued against [...] on June 30, 2020.
[brief] (Pa 6T at 20, 24, 27, 31)  The Court ordered a restitution of the unjust enrichment, but failed to consider that the rest of the transaction was wrong as well.  The house was never meant to be [...]’s.  In *Pascale v. Pascale*, 549 A. 2d 782, 113 N.J. 20 (1988)
[brief] II.  THE TRIAL COURT’S FINDING THAT THE PLAINTIFF IS OWED $8,000 IN BACK RENT HAS NO BASIS IN FACT  In Point I of her brief, Plaintiff/Respondent asks that this Court uphold the validity of the judgment amount on the basis that the $8,000 figure represented a downward revision for the purpose of potentially assisting the tenant in remaining in the leased premises.  Defendant submits that the court’s adjudication of this matter including how it arrived at the conclusion that there was $8,000 in unpaid rent, has absolutely no basis in fact if for no other reason than that the court failed to consider payments made in cash.  Far from a choice between two figures, the judgment amount must be one that is based on findings that are clear and definite.  Defendant submits that in the absence of clear and definite findings that rent is owed, the court below lacked jurisdiction to enter judgment.  CONCLUSION
[brief] 2.  The undisputed facts demonstrate the corporate defendants’ control over [...]  The evidence before the trial court conclusively demonstrated that [...] and [...] have control over [...] for deposition purposes.  The most telling evidence is that in response to plaintiff’s notice of subpoena, [...] and [...] offered to produce [...] for deposition.  Their counsel’s January 22, 2024 email stated:  I can offer Mr. [...] to appear for deposition in my New York City office on Friday, February 2.  Please confirm you will proceed on this date as soon as possible as he is rearranging work travel plans.  Please also advise how many hours you intend to need for his deposition.  Pa352.  April 12, 2024  Transcript at T:4-10.  Defendants’ offer to produce [...] for deposition was in response to plaintiff noticing [...]’s deposition for January 10, 2024.  By offering to produce [...] for deposition, [...] and [...] acknowledged both their control over [...] as well as the effectiveness of the notice of deposition and the authority it represented.  Additional evidence of record further refutes any suggestion of lack of control over [...].