ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Plaintiff(s)  Preservation Issues (if any):  Defendant(s)  Preservation Issues (if any):  g)  In addition to the agreements above, the Parties agree data from these sources (a) could contain relevant information but (b) under the proportionality factors, should not be preserved:  (enter text)  5.  Custodians  The Parties agree that in providing R. 4:103-1  Initial Disclosures, or earlier if appropriate, they have met and conferred about methods to search ESI in order to identify data sources that are likely to contain relevant documents.  The Parties have agreed to (number) custodians and/or data sources each for the purposes of this litigation.
[directive] USE OF FORCE POLICY | December 2021 2.7  Dealing with persons in a behavioral or mental health crisis or other factors affecting compliance.  Officers should consider an individual’s mental, physical, developmental, intellectual disability, or other conditions, such as age of the suspect, that affect the person’s ability to communicate or comply.  This includes, when feasible, considering the following factors related to the individual: (a) behavioral or mental health crisis; (b) drug interaction; (c) medical condition; (d) mental impairment; (e) physical limitation; (f) developmental disability, including autism spectrum disorder; (g) cognitive impairment or intellectual disability; (h) hearing loss or impairment; (i) communication disorder, including speech impairment; (j) language barrier; (k) visual impairment; (l) age; or (m) other factors beyond the individual’s control.  2.8
[directive] GRAND JURY STANDARDS  Standard  1.  Selection / Term of Service  The term of grand juror service shall be established by the Assignment Judge.  That term shall not be more than one day a week for 20 weeks (or the equivalent number of days where grand jurors serve two days per week).  The term that is established should require that citizens, in accomplishing the important functions of the grand jury, serve as few days of grand jury service as is practical.
[directive] b.  Within 90 days of the effective date of this Law Enforcement Directive, any law enforcement agency in the State of New Jersey, including any State Police and County Prosecutor’s Office, may develop its own training instruction on the Safe Return Program and Alzheimer’s disease.  Such training instruction program must include the information required under section one of this Law Enforcement Directive as further detailed in the curricula developed by the Division of Criminal Justice, and can include, but not be limited to, a training seminar on the subject, and/or a written curricula and/or video presentation.
[brief] **POINT I**  **RAS’S UNCLEAN HANDS SHOULD PRECLUDE ANY RELIEF TO HIM IN THIS COURT.**  Parties have an obligation to comply with unstayed trial court orders even when the orders have been appealed.  *McNair v. McNair*, 332 N.J. Super. 195, 198 (App. Div. 2000); *R.*  2:9-5.  Failure to obey an unstayed order may result in the dismissal of the appeal from that order.  *D’Arc v. D’Arc*, 175 N.J. Super. 598, 601 (App. Div.) (finding that an appellant “had an obligation to comply with the [post-judgment] order . . . since no stay was issued pending appeal,” and that given appellant’s willful non-compliance, the Court “would be fully justified in dismissing his appeal”), certif. denied, 85 N.J. 487 (1980), cert.  denied, 451 U.S. 971 (1981).  \(^{10}\)  Although there had been extensive post-judgment proceedings in connection with which Plaintiff had been awarded attorneys’ fees, [...] identified only a single transcript in his notice of appeal, and subsequently filed 2 additional transcripts.  Plaintiff moved to settle the record to include the transcripts of the additional post-judgment proceedings to illustrate the efforts that have been undertaken over the last six years, but this Court denied that motion by order dated December 7, 2023.  (Pa193).  [...]’s never-ending defiance of court orders and ongoing fraud on the courts is incredible.  [...] has repeatedly lied to the courts about his finances.  He comes to this court asking to condone what has been determined to be a massive fraud on the court in order to avoid payment of the judgment.  *Triffin v. Automatic Data Processing, Inc.*, 411 N.J. Super. 292, 298 (App. Div. 2010) (“a fraud on the court occurs where . . . a party has sentiently set in motion some unconscionable scheme calculated to interfere with the judicial system’s ability impartially to adjudicate a matter by improperly influencing the trier . . . .” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)).  [...] comes to this Court with unclean hands, and it is therefore inequitable for the Court to entertain his appeal.  Cf. *In re Indus. Inc. v. Transamerica Corp.*, 437 N.J. Super. 577, 612-13 (App. Div. 2014) (doctrine of unclean hands “permits the court to refuse equitable relief to a wrongdoer with respect to the subject matter of the suit” in circumstances “where the party is guilty of bad faith . . . in the underlying transaction”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)).  The Court’s analysis can and should stop at this point, and an order dismissing the appeal should be entered.
[brief] The Assembly Appropriations Committee reports favorably Assembly Bill No. 2100.  Assembly Bill No. 2100 makes fiscal information on bills available to Legislators and the public in a more timely manner.  The bill changes the review period by a sponsor of a fiscal note from 10 business days to three business days.  By shortening the sponsor’s review period, this bill will expedite the availability of fiscal notes.  The bill also updates the law to reflect current practices and ensure that fiscal notes are available to members of the Legislature and for general review before a bill is considered by a committee or House.  The bill allows the Legislative Budget and Finance Officer to call for the production of a fiscal estimate if the officer does not receive a fiscal note from the Director of the Division of Budget and Accounting “by a date consistent with legislative consideration,” rather than “after 30 business days,” so that the processing of fiscal information can be harmonized with the scheduled legislative review of bills.  Similarly, the bill changes the Legislative Budget and Finance Officer’s response time to a fiscal note sent by the director from “10 business days” to “a date consistent with legislative consideration. ”  The bill deletes language requiring the Legislative Budget and Finance Officer to sign a statement certifying a determination that a bill does not require a fiscal note.  The bill also deletes language requiring the officer to forward a statement to the sponsor if a fiscal note is required.  Instead of awaiting a request for a fiscal note, if the Legislative Budget and Finance Officer determines a bill has fiscal impact, the bill requires the officer to immediately forward a request for a fiscal note to the Director of Division of Budget and Accounting.  In addition, the bill requires that a fiscal note be made available to the Legislature and the public when it is printed.  Section 7 of P.L.1980, c.67 (C.52:13B-12) is repealed in light of this addition.  Lastly, the bill makes technical revisions to the fiscal note law, changing the “introducer” of a bill to “sponsor” and the “Legislative Budget Officer” to the “Legislative Budget and Finance Officer,” making all references to the Director of the Division of Budget and Accounting and the Legislative Budget and Finance Officer gender neutral, and removing an archaic reference to the Division of Budget and Program Review, as that division no longer exists.  FISCAL IMPACT:
[brief] ”  N.J.S.A. 18A:13-47.11(a) (emphasis added).  As previously established, [...] is not a constituent district of [...], and is not a part of a consolidated school district.  1.  The Legislature chose not to authorize municipalities, such as [...], to withdraw pursuant to N.J.S.A. 18A:13-47.11.  (Aa19 – Aa21)  Elsewhere in P.L. 2021, c. 402 the Legislature amended the statute describing the ability of school districts to form regional schools.  See N.J.S.A. 18A:13-34.  This provision includes two categories which are similar to those identified in N.J.S.A. 18A:13-47.11(a)—local district boards of education and boards of consolidated school districts—but it also includes a category specifically not found in the N.J.S.A. 18A:13-47.11(a): the board of education of “a district comprising two or more municipalities. ”  See N.J.S.A. 18A:13-34.  This new category is different from a consolidated school district, but does not appear in the list of entities eligible to withdraw from a consolidated district or regional school district under N.J. S.A. 18A:13-47.11(a).  The implication for this new class of entity being included in one section of the Act, but not in another is unmistakable: the Legislature had the means to include entities other than those specified in N.J.S.A. 18A:13-47.11(a), but it affirmatively chose not to do so.  The inescapable conclusion is that any entities not enumerated in N.J.S.A. 18A:13-47.11(a), such as [...], were intentionally left out.
[brief] **CONCLUSION**  For the foregoing reasons, and those set forth in Defendant’s moving brief, the Court should vacate the trial court’s Judgment against Defendant in its entirety and deny Plaintiffs’ cross-appeal.  Respectfully Submitted, [...]  By: /s/ [...]  [...], Esq.  [...]  Tel: [...]  Fax: [...]  [...]  Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant, [...] [...] and [...], Plaintiffs-Respondents / Cross-Appellants, v. [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...] and [...], Defendants-Appellants / Cross-Respondents.
[brief] For the foregoing reasons, the Trial Court correctly granted Respondents’ Motion to Dismiss and denied Appellant’s Cross-Motion to Vacate Default Judgment, Transfer, and Consolidate.  Accordingly, the Orders should be affirmed.  Dated: New York, New York April 2, 2024  [...] /s/ [...]  [...] (NJ Bar No. 163342015)  [...] (NJ Bar No. 400342022)  [...] [...]  [...]  [...]  Attorneys for Defendants-Respondents, [...] and [...]  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE  DIVISION  Docket No. [...] [...], on behalf of himself and those similarly situated, Plaintiff-Appellant,: CIVIL ACTION ON APPEAL FROM THE FINAL JUDGMENT OF THE SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY v. LAW DIVISION, BERGEN COUNTY [...]; MHC RECEIVABLES, LLC; [...]; [...]; [...]; and JOHN DOES 1 to 10, Defendant-Respondents.: Trial Court Docket No. [...] Sat Below: HON. [...], J.S.C. DATE: April 15, 2024
[brief] Can the system handle increasing the town’s capacity of units to this magnitude?  [...] (Borough Planner):  (Board Member) [...], we are going through that.  So right now the impact for this Beachway property, Lot 3.02 was already analyzed several years ago so there is a capacity for the parking lot property.  When it comes to the other future development potentially along Carr Avenue that we’ve all been hearing about, the walk-in boys, et cetera, my office is currently doing an analysis of that and we’ll be working with [...] (phonetic) over the next several weeks to determine any water allocation requirements, sewer upgrades, et cetera.  [...]:  Thank you.  [...]: Okay, anyone else from the Board?
[directive] If [No/No] the offense occurred on or after August 2, 1993 you must pay a $75 Safe Neighborhood e.  [Yes/Si] Services Fund assessment for each conviction?  Si la infraccion ocurrio el 2 de Agosto de 1993 o despues de esa fecha, tiene que pagar una contribucion obligatoria de $75.00 al Fondo de Servicios para una Comunidad Segura (Safe Neighborhood Services Fund) por cada sentencia condenatoria? Revised Form Promulgated by 12/31/2019 Supplement to Directive #01-18, CN 10079-Spanish Defendant's Initials
[directive] It is also available, in an Adobe Acrobat PDF format, on the Division of Criminal Justice internet website at www.njdcj.org or at www.state.nj.us/lps/dcj, under the heading Attorney General Guidelines, DWI Enforcement, “NJMVC Standard Refusal Statements. ”  Accordingly, this Letter-Memorandum superceded the Letter-Memorandum dated January 22, 2004 entitled, “New DWI 0.08% Per Se Offense, Revised Standard Refusal Statement. ”  "  New Jersey Is An Equal Opportunity Employer Printed on Recycled Paper and is Recyclable Revision, Standard DWI Refusal Statement, Effective April 26, 2004  Page 2  Effective immediately ALL law enforcement officers in this State who place a person under arrest for a DWI violation (N.J.S.A. 39:4-50) are required to use the attached April 26, 2004 revised Standard Statement.
[brief] For this reason, the Court should reverse the Commissioner’s decision and find that N.J.S.A. 18A:13-47.11(a) does not provide a vehicle for [...] to seek withdrawal from either [...] or [...].  Such a conclusion is consistent with the general principle that statutes should be interpreted by first examining the plain language of the act.  See Point Pleasant Borough PBA Local No. 158 v. Borough of Point Pleasant, 412 N.J. Super. 328, 334-335 (App. Div. 2010).  If the statute is clear and unambiguous, then the statute should be interpreted as written.  Ibid.  Any consideration of external sources is only appropriate when the statute is ambiguous.  Ibid..  Overall, N.J. S.A. 18A:13-47.11(a) provides a simplified process for certain, enumerated entities to withdraw from consolidated or regionalized school districts for the purpose of creating or expanding another regional school district.  However, because [...] does not meet the definition of any of the entities permitted to take the actions described in the statute, the Commissioner’s holding that [...] has standing to pursue withdrawal from [...] and [...] pursuant to N.J.S.A. 18A:13-47.11 does not survive scrutiny.
[brief] The present appeal challenges the dismissal of the latest of a series of complaints that Plaintiff-Appellant, [...], has repeatedly filed against numerous defendants, including Defendants-Respondents, [...]; [...]; [...]; [...]; [...]; [...], A.J.S.C.; and [...], J.A.D (collectively “State Defendants”).  State Defendants below attempt to distill, as best they can, the chronology of events involving [...] to contextualize his claims against State Defendants.  1  The statement of facts and procedural history are combined for efficiency and the court’s convenience.  2  This brief refers to Plaintiff-Appellant and his father (who is Plaintiff-Appellant’s attorney in this matter) by their first names to avoid confusion because they share the same last name.  No disrespect is intended.  3  The vast majority of [...]’s appeal brief appears to concern his claims against the [...] and persons [...] asserts are responsible for the actions of that department (collectively “Absecon Defendants”).  This brief does not delve into the specifics of the allegations against those defendants, or the legal claims against them, except to the extent that they are relevant to [...]’s claim against State Defendants.  A.
[brief] Also, the deed transferring any interest that [...] had as receiver to [...] was recorded in the clerk’s Offices on June 30, 2022 and August 2, 2022.  [...] purchased the assets through the entity [...], and requested that [...] remain under the bank’s employ to continue to operate the diner.  As noted in his letter brief, [...] was paid by [...] on an hourly basis, $300.00 an hour, which was below his normal hourly rates.  (Ca141).  Also, the order appointing [...] indicated that he would be paid 15% from the proceeds collected from the operation.  [...] did not feel that was a fair way to pay the receiver since 15% would be a large amount of money to be paid over.  So the bank assumed the responsibility of payment of [...]’s fee.  (Ca141).  [...] never retained an attorney to represent him.  His relationship with the [...] was that they were in agreement with certain issues and, in order to reduce the cost, they filed jointly, and were successful as they moved forward.  (Ca141).
[brief] Likewise, [...]'s reliance on Cochran v. [...], 97 N.J.L 480 (E&A 1922) is misplaced for the same reason, to the extent [...] interprets this case to mean that [...] has no duty to provide safe lighting, in the context of a negligence action.  In the end, [...] seeks to escape liability claiming some form of immunity, which was abrogated in Weinberg, supra, which imposes a common law duty on any utility company (as established in Weinberg's progeny), regardless of regulation, Tariff or contract.  [...] may rely on its Tariff to show compliance with it.  However, in the domain of a negligence action in which it is demonstrated that it installed zero foot candle lighting in a dangerous intersection that caused a driver not to see what it struck, when its streetlight was historically defective, and when a jury could find that it had notice of the defective streetlight, it is the common law of premises liability that applies to its conduct, and not its Tariff or contractual relationship with [...].  POINT II
[brief] [...] specifically found that the agreement of the 8.875% compounded interest “wasn’t agreed to for the purposes of” post-judgment interest beginning December 20, 2013.  251T at 13:25-14:1.  [...] confirmed that “nobody agreed that, forgive me if I missed this in your papers, but I don’t think anybody, any defendant or representative of defendant agreed that 8.875% was going to be the post-judgment rate of interest, did they. ”  251T at 35:20-24.  [...] stated that the agreement “was a very special and limited agreement” on the rate of interest – and its compound nature – until December 20, 2013.
[brief] Along these same lines, it is important that there is no delay between the conclusion of the investigation by the assigned investigator, and the decision to file charges by the person who has that responsibility.  Although the 45-day clock begins at the time the person who has the responsibility to file charges has sufficient information, an agency would have a difficult time justifying an extensive bureaucratic delay once any member of that agency has established sufficient information . . .  Aristizibal at 427 (quoting the Internal Affairs Policies and Procedures promulgated by the Attorney General).  (Emphasis added).  The Court also concluded:  Considering (1) the judicial and administrative case law discussed above, (2) the Guidelines, and (3) the plain language of the statute, the following principles emerge regarding the intent of the 45-day rule:  ... extensive bureaucratic delay in conducting investigations and bringing disciplinary charges is unacceptable.  ...  The intent of the statute is to protect law enforcement officers from an appointing authority unduly and prejudicially delaying the imposition of disciplinary action.  Aristizibal at 427-428.  (Emphasis added).  The New Jersey Attorney General Guidelines have the force of law for police entities.
[brief] For the moment, however, it merely bears noting that the New Motion Judge ruled against Appellant on an issue that the Respondents \textit{had conceded}, for purposes of the summary judgment motions.  [Pa208: “for purposes of this motion only, Defendants will accept [...]’s opinion”].  [...]’s Defendants do not address the issue at all. \(^6\)  On the other hand, the [...] argues that Appellant had an “opportunity to be heard” on these issues through Appellant’s motion for reconsideration.  [Vitale Defendants’ Brief, pp.25-31].  This argument ignores that the New Motion Judge, realizing that its first order could not withstand appellate review, withdrew the most critical aspect of the July 17, 2023 Order.
[brief] *Flomerfelt v. Cardiello*, 202 N.J. 432, 447 (2010) (“New Jersey courts have generally considered questions about how to evaluate multiple or concurrent causes of damages only in the context of first-party claims against insurers for coverage. ”); Ostrager & Newman, *Handbook on Insurance Coverage Disputes*, (14th ed. 2008), § 21.02(c), pg. 1455.  In “first-party coverage decisions,” New Jersey has “adopted the approach known as ‘Appleman’s rule,’ pursuant to which the loss is covered if a covered cause starts or ends the sequence of events leading to the loss. ”  *Flomerfelt*, at 447.  “Commercial property insurance can generally be divided into two categories: ‘all risk’ or ‘named perils. ’”  Ostrager, (14th ed. 2008), § 21.02, pg. 1447.  “Coverage, in turn, is commonly provided by reference to causation, e.g., 'loss caused by . . .' certain enumerated perils. ”  *Garvey*, 48 Cal. 3d at 406.  “The term 'perils' in traditional property insurance parlance refers to fortuitous, active, physical forces such as lightning, wind, and explosion, which bring about the loss.  Thus, the 'cause' of loss in the context of a property insurance contract is totally different from that in a liability policy.  This distinction is critical to the resolution of losses involving multiple causes. ”  Ibid. (italics in original).
[brief] Petitioner does not allege that Respondents took action at the request of any particular special interest group.  Rather, Petitioner alleges merely that Respondents supported the referendum and that some Respondents belong to a grassroots organization within the community.  Indeed, it is not even clear whether any of the groups with which certain Respondents are affiliated supported the referendum, much less that any Respondents surrendered their independent judgment to any special interest group.  At most, Petitioner has alleged that certain Respondents are involved with a local organization, which Respondents have a First Amendment right to join.  Petitioner has not alleged with any particularity that any Respondents were beholden solely to a private interest, or obtained a pecuniary interest in exchange for pursuing the objectives of that private interest.  Respondents here voted in favor of placing the referendum on the ballot.  Some of the Respondents belong to local political or other organizations which favor certain objectives which may or may not relate to the referendum.  Nothing about that is unlawful or unethical.  Indeed, on the contrary, as described above, it is expected that school board members may be politically active, may pursue certain objectives, and may be affiliated with certain political beliefs or ideologies.
[brief] (Da0080-Da0081; Da0083-Da0084; Da0190-Da0191).  By registering for this access, Respondents were able to access information about their accounts 24 hours per day at www.shareholder.primerica.com.  (Da0103-Da0104).  In signing up for this service, Respondents agreed to a number of terms and conditions including (again) an arbitration agreement.  Specifically, to sign up for online account access, [...] navigated to the webpage www.shareholder.primerica.com.
[brief] There is no evidence the subject vehicle was defective.  There is no duty to include every possible technology on every vehicle.  Plaintiff’s own expert recognizes this, and he opines that there was nothing mechanically wrong with the subject vehicle.  A vehicle that was otherwise reasonably fit, suitable, and safe as designed, does not become unreasonably unsafe simply because the driver was required to control it.  Based on the foregoing, [...] respectfully requests that this Court affirm the order granting its motion for summary judgment.
[directive] 16 justifying de-activation no longer exist (e.g., the interview of the person requesting de- activation is completed), and the officer would otherwise be required to activate the BWC (e.g., where the officer proceeds to other investigative activities that are required to be recorded pursuant to this Policy).  6.8  Re-Activation When Actual Law Enforcement Force is Authorized.  Notwithstanding any other provision of this Policy, in any instance where a BWC was de-activated pursuant to Sections 6.1, 6.2, 6.5, 6.6, or any other provision of this Policy, or de-activated pursuant to any policy, standing operating procedure, directive, or order issued by a department, in situations where an officer reasonably believes that the officer or another person is likely to use force, the BWC shall be re-activated as soon as it is safe and practicable to do so.