ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] ...  A.  And somewhere along the way our CFO added a footnote [Hackensack “EGP cannot be determined until Owner changes resolved”].  Now the project is complete and finally gets to a TCO and in addition to not being able to ever reconcile estimated gross profit we continued to incur costs.  And because that new owner wouldn’t act on changes but these changes are now, some of which are, you know, impacted by either the enhancements on the first and second floor or the spray foam issue and then subsequent issues that were brought up by the permitting or inspection authorities that required changes, those subcontractors will not come back to this project and do them.  So I end up prepaying for all those changes because they’re threatening to leave the project, which would have totally compromised [...]’s ability to close out the project.  So in good faith I continued to pay subcontractors without any payment from the owner on any of the change orders in order to get the project to final completion.  Cash flow perspective we are completely upside down by $680,000.  So that footnote was put in there.
[brief] See B & S Ltd., Inc. v. Elephant & Castle Intern., Inc., 388 N.J. Super. 160, 168 (Super. Ct. 2006) (stating that to determine whether “the movant assert[ed] a settled legal right supporting its claim…require[d] the court to engage in an extensive discussion…”).  Indeed, neither Plaintiffs, nor the Court, have cited any legislative or judicial authority regarding a well-settled right to find that a parental notification policy such as the one at issue here could be found violative of the NJLAD.  See Plotnick v. DeLuccia, 434 N.J. Super. 597, 618 (Super. Ct. 2013) (“Plaintiff has not shown that the underlying legal right he seeks to establish through his application is ‘settled. ’ […]  Indeed, plaintiff has cited no legislative or judicial authority to support his conclusion that such a right exists (citing Crowe, supra).”).  The Court’s holding, which rested on simply citing to N.J.S.A. 10:5-14.1 without any analysis of the actual claims or facts, rested on an impermissible basis (Da103).
[brief] THIS COURT SHOULD DECIDE THE APPLICABILITY OF N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14A(5)  AS A NONDISCRETIONARY RECOVERY COURT ELIGIBILITY FACTOR.  (Addressing Defendant’s Point IB)  The Supreme Court in State v. Hyland, 238 N.J. 135 (2019), is silent as to applicability of N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14a(5) as either a discretionary or nondiscretionary eligibility factor.  As previously noted in Point IIB of the State’s merits brief, and briefly reiterated here, the Hyland Court categorized factors a(4) and a(9) as “discretionary” factors, permitting a Recovery Court judge to engage in fact-finding, and even a clear error in judgment in sentencing a defendant into the program will still be upheld.  Id. at 147.  “Nondiscretionary” factors, determined by the Hyland Court as factors a(1), (6), (7), and (8), require objective, per se legal determinations which, if not properly applied, could result in a sentence that is “not imposed in accordance with law. ”  Id. at 148.  The State contends factor a(5) falls squarely into the latter category as a nondiscretionary, objective factor.  The inquiry made by a Recovery Court judge as to this factor is whether the defendant possessed a firearm, either during the offense which forms the basis of the Recovery Court appeal, or at the time of any pending criminal charge, whether it is the underlying offense or during another pending offense.  If the defendant possessed a firearm, he is disqualified under factor a(5).  If the defendant did not possess a firearm, he is not disqualified under factor a(5).  This Court is well within its power and purview to definitively decide this issue as it will provide needed guidance to both future defendants when assessing the viability of applying to Recovery Court as well as Recovery Court judges when determining whether a defendant is eligible for the program under factor a(5).  Defendant requests this Court reserve on making such a determination and poses a hypothetical scenario where a defendant awaiting trial on a pending firearm charge seeks admission to Recovery Court before his trial.  (Db19).  In this scenario, the defendant expressed concern that pretrial fact-finding would occur by a sentencing judge and thus raise Sixth Amendment violations.  However, this concern is unwarranted as a Recovery Court judge, confronted with a defendant charged with firearm possession offenses, may reserve on making a sentencing determination until after a verdict is rendered at trial or a plea to a non-firearm offense occurs, whereas the objectivity of factor a(5), as discussed above, will present itself.  Therefore, this Court should deem N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14a(5) a nondiscretionary, objective factor for the determination of eligibility for Recovery Court Special Probation.  CONCLUSION  WHEREFORE, the State of New Jersey respectfully submits that the lower court’s Order approving the defendant’s application for acceptance into the Recovery Court as a Track One applicant program be REVERSED.
[brief] Initial drafts of the proposed Noise Ordinance were mailed to the [...] in both 2015 and 2017 as required under the NCA, but neither was approved by the [...].  The Defendants then, apparently relying on the [...]’s “Noise Ordinance versus Nuisance Code” guidance, concluded that removal of decibel measurements would result in the Noise Ordinance being considered a “Nuisance Code”, and thus would not require [...] approval.
[brief] Defendants [...] and [...] filed their Answer and Affirmative Defenses to the Amended Complaint on November 19, 2020.  Pa30.  In this pleading these defendants deny any liability for the obligations of [...] under the lease and seek a dismissal of Count Two of the Amended Complaint.  On November 19, 2020 Defendants [...] and [...] filed their Answer and Affirmative Defenses.  Pa38.
[directive] Addendum B | December 2020  Vehicular Pursuit Policy presumption against the initiation of vehicular pursuits based solely on motor vehicle violations.  Both supervisors and officers shall ensure that only in rare cases will a vehicular pursuit be initiated or continued for motor vehicle violations.  3.3  In the event that one of the authorization requirements is satisfied, a pursuit shall not be automatically undertaken.  An officer must still consider the following factors: (a) likelihood of successful apprehension; (b) whether the identity of the violator is known so that later apprehension is possible; (c) degree of risk created by pursuit: (1) volume, type, speed and direction of vehicular traffic; (2) nature of the area (residential, commercial, school zone, open highway, etc.); (3) population density and volume of pedestrian traffic; (4) environmental factors, such as weather and darkness; and (5) road conditions (construction, poor repair, extreme curves, intersections controlled by traffic signals or signs, ice, etc.); and (d) police officer characteristics: (1) driving skills; (2) familiarity with roads; and (3) condition of police vehicle.  3.4  The pursuing officer shall terminate the pursuit under the following circumstances: (a) if instructed to do so by a supervisor; (b) if a supervisor has not affirmatively authorized the continuation of the pursuit after being notified and given an opportunity to assess the situation; (c) if the officer believes that the danger to the pursuing officers or the public outweighs the necessity for immediate apprehension of the violator; (d) if the violator’s identity is established to the point where later apprehension may be accomplished and where there is no imminent threat to the safety of the public or police officers; (e) if the pursued vehicle’s location is no longer known or the distance between the pursuing vehicles and the violator's vehicle becomes so great that further pursuit is futile; (f) if there is a person injured during the pursuit and there are no police or medical personnel able to render assistance; (g) if there is a clear and unreasonable danger to the police officer or the public.
[brief] They found ten shell casings that had been ejected presumably from a semi-automatic weapon.  (9T 77-4 to 7).  No weapon was recovered.  (9T 77-15 to 22).  Similarly, no physical or forensic evidence was recovered to assist the investigation in identifying the assailants.  (7T 80-13 to 18, 101-9 to 11, 110-5 to 7, 137-5 to 10).  Even a surveillance camera used by a nearby business failed to provide any helpful information.  (6T 27-8 to 28-10; 7T 20-11 to 14, 120-24 to 121-17).  Although the camera’s video footage captured the Audi on Taylor Street, it was not of any assistance in identifying the car’s occupants or for that matter its license plate number.  (7T 20-22 to 25, 31-2 to 13).  Two days after the homicide, (6T 90-22 to 91-23), without advanced notice [...], a detective with the [...], --- 2
[brief] Thus, it will not permit [...] to ask these questions of [...]. by [...] could be properly asked of [...]: “How many borrowers have you interviewed for the [...] investigation?” and “For how many borrowers have you served as a point of contact?” (Doc. 112-1 at 243:14-18).  To the extent the answers to these questions would reveal work product, the Court notes that they would not constitute core, opinion work product, and that [...] has a need for the materials and would not be able to obtain this information by other means.  See *Cendant*, 343 F.3d at 663 (“noting that there are two “tiers of protection” for work product”); Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(A)(ii).  [...] will be permitted to reopen its deposition of [...] to ask these questions, or if the parties find it more efficient, [...] can seek these answers through written discovery.
[brief] The decision fails to assess the Agreement’s validity within the context of the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) and explicitly applies to the Agreement - a fact no party has denied.  By overlooking the FAA, the trial court improperly relied upon Atalese and rejected a factual record that demonstrates the tenets of mutual assent—sophistication and equal bargaining power—even in this commercial context.  The record before the trial court, and now on appeal, is devoid of any competent evidence asserting that Plaintiffs did not know what “binding arbitration” was or that they had waived a right to relief in Court.  In fact, the record demonstrates the opposite.  Plaintiffs have never disputed their education level, sophistication as buyers, retention of competent counsel to review and negotiate the Agreement, ability to negotiate the purchase of the Unit, explicit execution of the Agreement, initialing of the conspicuous broad-form Arbitration clause, incorporation of the AAA rules and explanation of Arbitration in the Purchase Offering Statement, or the failure to cancel after the statutory-afforded extended periods for “attorney study” and diligent review.  And even when a demand for Arbitration was filed by the Defendants-Appellants, Plaintiffs did not object.  Rather, Plaintiffs hired new Counsel in the appropriate arbitral forum who submitted both an Answer and Counterclaim in the American Arbitration Association.  This is not the consumer setting in Atalese.  Plaintiffs were not forced to accept the term of Arbitration without any negotiating power through a contract of adhesion.  The trial Court’s decision was incorrect.
[brief] Pa10a (“This Court finds, accepting all facts and inferences as stated by Plaintiff, that a reasonable trier of fact could not find Defendant Committed an intentional wrong .  . . .  Taking all Defendant’s conduct, as stated by Plaintiff, there is no showing of intentional conduct substantially certain to cause the particular injury suffered by [...]. ”) (emphasis added).  A.  The Trial Court Correctly Concluded that Plaintiff Failed to Adduce Evidence [...] Knew that any of its Conduct Was Substantially Certain to Result in [...]’s Injury or Death (Pa3a).
[brief] (PA073-077; PA079-080; PA085, 4:30-4:40).  Appellant/plaintiff [...]’s [...] policy was written using an insured address in [...].  (PA073-077; PA079-080).  Appellant/plaintiff [...]’s [...] policy insured two vehicles: a 1999 Toyota Corolla and a 2002 Kia Sportage.  (PA079-080).  The 1999 Toyota and the 2002 Kia insured under appellant/plaintiff [...]’s [...] policy were identified as having a “garaging zip code” of [...] (a zip code from North Carolina).  (PA073-077; PA079-080).  The [...] policy provided “Medical Payments” coverage in the amount of $1,000.  (PA079-080).
[brief] (Pa022-Pa023; Pa533; Pa053; Pa534; Pa093-Pa096; Pa505; Pa469)  A class of one violation occurs when one has been (1) intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated (2) there is no rational basis for the difference in treatment, or that he was treated differently because of the Defendants' "totally illegitimate animus" toward him.  See Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000).  Plaintiff made a cognizable class-of-one equal protection claim by showing that he had been intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated by the [...] and there was no rational basis for the difference in treatment.  (Pa505; Pa469; Pa053; Pa093-Pa096).  Plaintiff, a young black man wearing a hoodie in the [...], was stopped by the police while transferring items from one car trunk to another.  (Pa022-Pa023).  Plaintiff was picked up from the ground then thrown to the ground again, beaten and choked by the Edison Police, warranting that he be treated in an Emergency room for injuries because he not give [...]’s car keys to the police who had no warrant to search her car.  (Pa053; Pa469; Pa093-Pa096)  Plaintiff made a cognizable class-of-one equal protection claim by showing that he had been intentionally treated differently (without rational basis) from other similarly situated litigants by the [...] and [...] wherein he was not provided with an order from which he could appeal his conviction after he filed a Notice of claim against the [...].
[directive] Training of Internal Affairs Personnel  4.3.1  Each agency shall ensure that officers assigned to the internal affairs function complete training as mandated by the Division of Criminal Justice.  4.3.2  Each County Prosecutor shall ensure that each agency within the Prosecutor’s jurisdiction implement and maintain a system of ensuring appropriate training for all personnel involved in the agency’s internal affairs function.  4.3.3  The Division of Criminal Justice shall conduct periodic “train-the-trainer” courses for all persons assigned responsibility for internal affairs training within the County Prosecutor’s Offices.  These trainers shall be responsible to train the internal affairs officers of agencies within their jurisdiction of the County Prosecutor.  INTERNAL AFFAIRS POLICY & PROCEDURES | November 2022 18  5  Accepting Reports of Officer Misconduct  5.0.1  Every law enforcement agency shall establish a policy providing that any complaint from a member of the public is readily accepted and fully and promptly investigated.  Allegations of officer misconduct or complaints of inappropriate behavior can alert the law enforcement executive to problems that require disciplinary action or identify the need for remedial training.  In addition, executives must also recognize that complaints from the public provide them with an invaluable source of feedback.  Such complaints, whether substantiated or not, increase the executive's awareness of both actual or potential problems and the community's perceptions and attitudes about police practices and procedures.  The executive should use complaints from the public as one means of determining whether the agency is falling short of its intended goals.
[brief] The Attorney General too can obtain injunctive relief primarily intended to benefit just a discrete class of individuals who have been harmed.  8  Not only did these cases involve statutes expressly authorizing claims for “public injunctive relief,” but they also involved false advertising claims, which, by their very nature, typically involve advertising disseminated to the general public at large.  See c.f. DiCarlo, supra; McGill v. Citibank, N.A., 2 Cal. 5th at 956-57 (“[b]y definition, the public injunctive relief available under the UCL, the CLRA, and the false advertising law…is primarily for the benefit of the general public”); Stevenson v. Sirius XM Radio Inc., 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 201781, * 16-18 (N.D. Cal. November 9, 2023) (claims under the UCL, the FAL, and the CLRA that sought to “protect the general public by putting an end to SiriusXM’s unlawful advertising scheme” constituted claims for “public injunctive relief”).  A private membership agreement is, of course, not akin to a claim of false advertising to the general public and, again, there are no statutes authorizing any such “public injunctive relief” on plaintiff’s claims.
[brief] Under these circumstances, the court cannot find that defendant has met her burden by a preponderance of the evidence that the PSA was patently unfair in that no reasonable person not acting under compulsion or out of necessity would accept its terms.  [A271]  With regard to the waiver of alimony, [...] acknowledged that [...] likely would have been entitled to limited duration alimony of some amount.  A272.  But [...] “was capable of earning an income and had prior experience in the casino gaming industry” while [...] was near retirement.  A275.  [...] had been “out of the employment market since at least 2004” but “had the requisite skills in 2014-2015 to earn at least $30-$40,000 as a casino employee. ”  A277.  And [...] had provided “de facto” support while the parties’ continued living together until August 2017.  “The court finds the plaintiff’s income in the four years preceding the PSA was not significantly greater than defendant’s earning capacity at that time. ”  A277.  Finally, [...] noted [...]’s “extra marital affair” and her “concern” about being able to reunify with her husband in “determining whether she should agree to the terms of the MSA, PSA and Final Judgment” as a factor showing she was not entitled to Rule 4:50 relief.  A278.  “Although the court certainly understands that fault is typically not a substantial factor when determining that person’s rights to equitable distribution and spousal support, the court finds defendant’s state of mind was such that she considered the ramifications of the affair and her planned reunification efforts as part of the reasons for executing the PSA.  The court finds this fact scenario did not provide sufficient facts which would require the vacation of the PSA or Final Judgment of Divorce.  Despite these factors the court finds that her guilt and reunification plans do not overcome that she voluntarily and knowingly entered into the PSA and also knowingly waived her right to counsel concerning such.  The court finds these choices were consciously made by defendant with the intent and hope that she would convince plaintiff to reunify and potentially remarry in the future.  The court finds her choice to do this was done freely and voluntarily.  The court finds defendant accepted the risks involved that the reunification process would not be successful after the execution of the PSA and after the entry of the Final Judgment of Divorce. ”  A278-279.  ARGUMENT
[brief] At 74 years old, Plaintiff/Respondent’s decedent [...] became a patient of Appellant [...], M.D., and underwent surgery on May 15, 2013, to remove his gallbladder.  (5T172:19-23).  Plaintiff/Respondent was initially advised that it would be a same-day procedure and would take about one-half hour.  (5T168:11-22).  During this surgery, however, Appellant became concerned that [...] may have been at risk for potential bowel injury due to abdominal adhesions and the difficulty of performing the surgery.  (8T23:14-20).  For this reason, he ordered [...] admitted to the hospital for “close observation. ” (5T175:3-6; 13T66:18-22).  Despite signs and complaints consistent with a bowel injury and perhaps perforation – no passing of flatus, a hard and distended abdomen – Appellant neither examined the patient nor requested that another physician do so.  (7T51-7T52; 7T59; 8T66).  Plaintiff/Respondent’s liability expert, [...], M.D., testified at great length and offered opinions regarding deviations from accepted standards of care by Appellant.  (7T42; 7T51-7T52; 7T59; 8T23-8T24; 8T66).  He testified that [...] had developed an ileus, and that the most common cause of ileus was bowel perforation.  (7T49-7T50; 8T41; 8T46; 9T18:8-12).  ---  1  The Statement of Facts and Procedural History have been combined for the convenience of the Court due to the complex procedural and factual background of this matter.
[brief] Attorney ID #015092008  [...], Plaintiff/Appellant, v. [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], JOHN DOE PROSECUTOR(S), JANE DOE PROSECUTOR(S), JOHN DOE POLICE OFFICER(S), JANE DOE POLICE OFFICER(S), JOHN DOE(S), JANE DOE(S), UNKNOWN PERSON(S), Defendants/Respondents.
[brief] Even in response to this appeal, the Respondents do nothing more than offer this Court assertions and allegations that are unsupported by the record, information that is taken out of context, and bold, baseless assumptions.  Contrary to the Respondents’ arguments, neither [...] nor [...] have “blamed” the other for the happening of the accident.  Rather, [...] and [...] have different recollections of the communications that occurred just prior to the accident.  [...] supervisor, [...], testified that he specified in calls over CB radio to drivers, including [...], that they were to use a grass cut-through that was marked by cones.  Da249, 181:24 – 183:5.  [...], however, has testified that he simply heard [...] use the term “cutoff,” and that his use of the paved cut-through was simply a miscommunication between him and [...].  Da46-47, 29:15-30:3.  Nowhere within the record does [...] blame [...] for his use of the paved cut-through.
[directive] 3.3.2  Officers face a dynamic environment in which interactions with individuals can escalate very quickly from one level of resistance to another.  For example, a passive resistor may become an active assailant in an instant.  In responding to the level of resistance, the officer may use the level of force that corresponds to the level of resistance the officer is facing, and need not use lesser levels of force that will not address the threat that the officer faces at the time.
[brief] POINT SIX APPELLANT’S ARGUMENT (DB33) THAT ALL SEPARATION AGREEMENTS UNDER N.J.A.C 17:1-6.4  AUTOMATICALLY BAR ELIGIBILITY FOR DISABILITY BENEFITS IS COMPLETELY WRONG (Raised below at 1T 5:4-7, 1T 7:3-16, 1T 17:20-25)  Appellant is wrong in the assertion that Separation Agreements are an automatic bar to pension proceedings.
[brief] [...] Has Never Admitted Any Wrongdoing.  In addition to not being an issue on appeal, Appellant’s argument that Respondents have admitted wrongdoing in prior trial court submissions is wrong.  Although Appellant appears to allege that Respondents have admitted certain wrongdoing relating to the concealment of documents, she notably does not reference a single statement made by [...] in the lower court where it admitted any such allegations.  See Br., at 17.  That is because it never did.  C.
[brief] J-16 1999 Revocable License/Lease between [...] and [...] recorded June 10, 1999, in the Monmouth County Clerk’s Office in Deed Book 5830, Page 309 [KEANS 281- KEANS 285]  J-17 Tidelands License between the [...] and the [...] from May 1, 2019, to May 1, 2034, with retrospective rights from 1967 to present [KEANS 84 - KEANS 87]  J-18 Subdivision Deed dated February 11, 2019, subdividing Lot 3 into Lots 3.02 and 3.03 [KEANS 89 - KEANS 100]  J-19 February 22, 2012, Amended Lease Agreement between the [...] and [...] and Resolution 12-53 authorizing the Amended Lease [KEANS 53 - KEANS 58]  J-20 Borough 2012 Planning Analysis [KEANS 645-KEANS 681]  J-21 1918 Tax Map of area where subject properties are located.