ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Obviously, [...] did not discuss [...]’s financial budget for the build out in order to include a monetary limit on [...]’s financial exposure for the build out, which would have clearly given [...] an out to terminate the Lease based upon the cost of extending the sewer connection to the Property.  [...] did not discuss with [...] the significance of accepting the Property “as is” and that the Lease shifted the burden of obtaining a certificate of occupancy to [...].  [...] did not advise [...] or anyone at [...] that the plans needed to be provided to [...] on or before July 11, 2016, a very short window, and that in order to exercise the right to terminate the Lease [...] had to diligently prosecute the application for approvals, which of course required [...] to in fact file an application for zoning approvals with [...].  [...] failed to advise [...] or anyone at [...] that failure to file a timely application would jeopardize [...]’s right to terminate the Lease.  [...] was provided no counsel by [...] on any of the three contract documents he signed and bound [...] to, including the guaranty that he allegedly signed.  [...] never met with [...] either, and both [...] and [...] became bound as guarantors without ever having the benefit of [...]’s counsel on the consequences of executing the guaranty.  Given [...]’s position that he did not sign any of the contract documents, including the guarantee, [...] requiring a meeting with [...] and [...] to discuss the contract documents would have revealed [...]’s true position with [...] as an investor and would have required [...] to identify the true owners of [...] and counsel them on the consequences of the agreements required to be signed on behalf of [...].  Notwithstanding these clear deviations, [...] failed to timely issue a notice accelerating the termination date of the Lease before September 30, 2016.
[brief] ”  State v. Fortin, 178 N.J. 540, 575 (2004) (citing State v. Williams, 93 N.J. 39, 62-63 (1983)).  A key function of voir dire is to root out those potential biases by inquiring “about a juror’s ability to follow the trial judge’s instructions or to deliberate with an open mind. ”  State v. Little, 246 N.J. 402, 417 (2021) (citing Fortin, 178 N.J. at 577).  New Jersey case law consistently endorses voir dire questions that “probe the minds of the prospective jurors to ascertain whether they hold biases that would interfere with their ability to decide the case fairly and impartially. ”  State v. Erazo, 126 N.J. 112, 129 (1991).  Despite lay jurors’ often unrealistic expectations of conclusive, objective forensic sciences, no forensic technique is infallible.
[directive] USE OF FORCE POLICY | April 2022 Core Principle Two Force as a Last Resort and Duty to De-Escalate.  Force shall only be used as a last resort when necessary to accomplish lawful objectives that cannot reasonably be achieved through verbal commands, critical decision making, tactical deployment or de-escalation techniques.  Force shall never be used as a retaliatory or punitive measure.  2.1  Authority to use force.  Officers are granted the unique authority to use force for lawful purposes, including, but not limited to, the following: (a) effectuating a lawful arrest or detention; (b) carrying out a lawful search; (c) overcoming resistance directed at the officer or others; (d) preventing physical harm to the officer or to another person (including intervening in a suicide or other attempt of self-inflicted injury); (e) protecting the officer or a third party from unlawful force; or (f) preventing property damage or loss.
[brief] 2  “Pa” refers to appellant’s appendix; “Pb” refers to his brief.  3  A Service Retirement is provided for by N.J.S.A. 53:5A-8 for any member who has established twenty years of service in SPRS and also for troopers who were members of the retirement system as of the effective date of L. 1985, c. 175 regardless of their years of service.
[brief] (11T70-15 to 24).  [...] admitted that she was not happy that [...] had gotten her daughter pregnant, that he was unemployed, and that he was planning to move with her and her daughter to live in Section 8 housing in Florida.  (11T89-20 to 90-18).  On September 24, 2017, police officers questioned [...] at [...], and she told them that [...] was home with her on the night of the murder.
[brief] See \textit{Farmers Mut. Fire Ins. Co. of Salem v. N.J. Prop.-Liab. Ins. Guar. Ass’n}, 215 N.J. 522, 543-44 (2013).  \textsuperscript{103}  See \textit{Alexander v. Seton Hall Univ.}, 204 N.J. 219, 234 (2010)(rejecting sea change to wage discrimination claims under the Law Against Discrimination and reversing trial court’s decision to apply Supreme Court of United States caselaw).
[brief] We acknowledge that there are other statutes in which residency requirements are stated expressly to apply at the “time of appointment. ”  See, e.g., N.J.S.A. 5:5-23 (providing with respect to the Racing Commission, each member “at the time of appointment and qualification, shall . . . be a resident of the State” among other qualifications).  The trial court referred to such statutes (see T76:25-77:10), including a statute explicitly requiring that members of a certain body (the Council on Local Mandates) be New Jersey residents both “at the time of appointment and while serving on the council. ”  N.J.S.A. 52:13H-5 (emphasis added).  But reliance on those examples is misplaced.  They do not negate the examples cited above in which courts have relied on language expressly requiring continuing residency as a condition to remain in a position.  Overlooking that caselaw, the trial court mistakenly believed that Defendants were seeking to “add this element” to the statute.  If that criticism were merited, then the same is true with respect to Plaintiffs who are seeking to add a “continuous residency” condition to the statute.  Also, the fact that some statutes require residencies at the “time of appointment” does not alter the fact that in this statute—the Rutgers Act—the residency requirement is stated as a present-tense condition, connected directly to the act of appointment.  The qualifying condition of residency is complete once the appointment is made and does not extend beyond that point.  The specific words “time of appointment”—need not appear in the statute for us to discern the Legislature’s intent.  That intent is apparent from the statute’s overall syntax and architecture as well as its legislative history, a subject to which we now turn.
[brief] To further compound the inherent lack of logic in this position, municipalities such as [...] are those most in need of the ability to withdraw from a regional or consolidated school district.  Without that power, they stand at the mercy of the district in which they have merged.  Simply put, it defies all logic and belief that the Legislature would permit some municipalities to withdraw, but would leave the most vulnerable behind.  See Frye, 217 N.J. at 575 (holding that courts “have the responsibility to avoid” a statutory interpretation that would “create a manifestly absurd result, contrary to public policy, [such that] the spirit of the law should control. ” (alteration in original)).  The Commissioner thus reached the appropriate result by interpreting the plain statutory language and harmonizing the overall statutory scheme.  By doing so, the Commissioner correctly concluded that the statute permits a municipality such as [...] to withdraw from a regional or consolidated school district.  That conclusion is entitled to substantial deference from this Court because the Commissioner brings her own experience and specialized knowledge in interpreting the school laws, particularly with regard to a complex statutory scheme such as school regionalization.  See E. Bay Drywall, 251 N.J. at 493.  Given the nature of the overall statutory scheme, which specifically contemplates that “merged” districts such as [...] and [...] are subject to the school regionalization laws, including the withdrawal provisions of the regionalization statute, it is beyond doubt that the Commissioner’s decision and interpretation of the statutory provisions at issue not only was reasonable, but conclusively gives effect to the Legislature’s design and intent as evidenced by the complete statutory scheme.  Accordingly, this Court should affirm the Commissioner’s decision.
[brief] The lower court overlooked all of the other paperwork and communications between the parties which laid the groundwork for [...]’s misunderstanding of question 4.  Especially grievous to this case was the Quote he received which listed numerous Exclusions but said nothing about 12-15 passenger vans.  (Ia140), and the fact that the Master policy also did not contain such an Exclusion.  It is well settled in New Jersey that ambiguities in an insurance contract are construed against the insurance company.
[brief] The law does not engage in speculation over what might have happened even if the C-section had been timely called.  Instead, the law holds with ultimate finality that a C-section not called until 10:12 p.m. cannot possibly be completed within fifteen minutes of 9:48 p.m.  Yet even engaging the hypothetical world – a hypothetical world the New Motion Judge conceded that she was operating it [Pa8: “In a hypothetical world where [...] did call for the c-section at 9:48 …. ”] – the facts of record show [...] could have timely performed the procedure, if it had been called in a timely fashion.  In addressing whether [...] “would have” been available if the C-section had been timely called, Plaintiff does not concede that this matter is relevant or material under the facts of this case.  In fact, this Court should not consider this hypothetical world at all.  Conceivably, [...]’ availability to perform the C-section might have been relevant – as an affirmative defense – if the C-section had been properly called.  But cases are not decided on hypotheticals.  The C-section was not timely called; it is not really possible to know what might have happened if it had been called.  All that is known is that the C-section was not called until it was far-too-late to complete it within fifteen minutes of the 9:48 p.m. deceleration.
[brief] It has been held that “An issue of fact is genuine only if, considering the burden of persuasion at trial, the evidence submitted by the parties on the Motion, together with all legitimate inferences therefrom favoring the non-moving party, would require submission of the issue to the trier of fact. ”  R. 4:46-2(c); see also, Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520, 540 (1995).
[brief] Paragraph 24(F) is the only provision in the Settlement Agreement that addresses with specificity [...]’s rights and interests concerning the Palm Beach Property.  Paragraph 24(G) on the other hand—which by no coincidence immediately follows Paragraph 24(F)—is nothing more than a general “catchall” provision that preserves [...]’s rights to “other” assets distributable to her under [...]’s Will or [...]’s Revocable Trust.  (See Da094a-96a.)  The Trial Court agreed that [...]’s logic was simply untenable, noting: (i) that “[n]othing in Paragraph 24(F) is limited to [...]’s Revocable Trust nor [...]’s Revocable Trust,” and; (ii) that “Paragraph 24(G) of the Settlement Agreement does not even mention the Palm Beach Property. ”  (Da274a-75a.)  The Trial Court further noted that Paragraph 24(F) “clearly states that ‘[for] the avoidance of doubt [Defendant] . . .’ is ‘not to assert any further Claims, rights, or interests with respect to the Palm Beach Property,’ again, outside what is necessary to enforce the rights and interests, which entitles her to twenty-one (21) days personal usage each year. ”  (Da274a.)  That interpretation is abundantly clear from the face of the document.  The Trial Court’s determination can, and should, be affirmed on that basis alone.  Put plainly, adopting [...]’s interpretation would render Paragraph 24(F)’s restriction a meaningless nullity, which runs counter to the basic principle that courts should strive to give meaning to all parts of a written instrument and avoid “render[ing] one of its terms meaningless. ”  Porreca, 419 N.J. Super. at 233 (quoting Cumberland Cty. Improvement Auth., 358 N.J. Super. at 497)).  The only way to harmonize both provisions is to conclude, as the Trial Court did, that [...] gave up any claim to [...]’s Estate’s 21.5% share of the Palm Beach Property in Paragraph 24(F) and, therefore, that interest is not one of the distributable assets that [...] preserved her right to receive under Paragraph 24(G).  (See Da274a-75a.)
[brief] Instead, the basis for the court’s decision came from oral argument.  “The purpose of these rules is obvious, that is, to afford the party against whom relief is sought notice of the application, together with a meaningful opportunity to respond. ”  Klier v. Sordoni Skanska Const. Co., 337 N.J. Super. 76, 84 (App. Div. 2001).  --- 4  On February 14, 2024, Defendants’ Motion for Due Process Violation and Other Relief was deemed frivolous and sanctions were imposed.  Defendants also appeal that decision argued in Point #6 of this brief.  Additionally, the trial court’s mention of “Defendants’ papers filed prior to the hearing” needs further clarification.  It should be emphasized that these documents were filed in relation to a completely separate motion for partial summary judgment for the Trustee’s removal, which was fully briefed and previously scheduled for hearing on June 8, 2022, along with Plaintiff’s motion for ejectment.  Thus, these papers were written prior to the events and circumstances that unfolded surrounding the temporary injunction application, which was granted on May 27, 2022.  (16a)  Moreover, the trial court’s abbreviated notice period of just 12 days falls significantly short of the minimum timeframes prescribed for filing and serving motions.  This deviation from established procedural rules undermines the integrity of the legal process and compromised Defendants’ ability to fully and fairly engage in their defense, thereby infringing upon their rights to due process and a fair hearing as protected under the law.
[brief] The PSA refers to any proceeds of the “sale” of the business only, not a State “taking” of any parcel(s) of land upon which the business itself was situated.  Almost fourteen years after the entry of the Final Judgment in Divorce, Wife filed a Motion to Enforce the Property Settlement Agreement because she believed that the business in question was sold in 2014 and she never received her one-half share of Husband’s interest in the business.  The property in question was subject to an Eminent Domain proceeding even before the execution of the Property Settlement Agreement and it was never Husband’s intent that Wife receive any share of the monies received from the [...] as just compensation for the Eminent Domain proceeding because the “taking” did not constitute a sale of the business as was the intent of the Property Settlement Agreement.  While Husband’s family did receive just compensation from the [...] for the Eminent Domain taking, it is the compensation from Husband’s Inverse Condemnation Lawsuit that the Superior Court determined Wife should receive a fifty percent share of Husband’s interest therein.  Husband disputes Wife’s entitlement to any of the monies received from the Inverse Condemnation lawsuit as this money was payment because Husband was deprived of all or substantially all of the beneficial use of the totality of his property, no title or transfer of property was made in exchange for this payment and, in fact, the property in question was sold via Sheriff Sale resulting in no payment of funds to Husband.  Husband is requesting that the Superior Court’s Order awarding Wife a 50% of Husband’s interest in the Inverse Condemnation lawsuit be reversed.  **PROCEDURAL HISTORY**
[directive] The training provided to law enforcement officers pursuant to Section VI of this Directive shall instruct officers to be watchful at all times for indicators of human trafficking activity, and especially whenever police go to places that, past experience has shown, are more frequently associated with human trafficking activity sexually (e.g., oriented businesses, massage parlors, nail salons, etc.).  The training shall also instruct officers to be watchful for the indicators of human trafficking activity when present at premises where Page 5 legitimate as well as illegitimate commercial activity is occurring, and when investigating other forms of unlawfifl activity, including but not limited to sexual assault, domestic violence, assault, and robbery, and fire/housing code and labor law violations.  C.
[brief] Obviously we cannot believe it and implore the high Court to reverse this decision.  Therefore, the logic is that as a gift was never made or intended by [...], the Court should have been following the logic of Moses v Moses, supra, such that a constructive trust was the only way to explain why Francisco paid for everything except for a few thousand dollars in HOA fees, but indeed paid the downpayment, paid the mortgage through defendants, paid the taxes and all via a $1500 a month payment for almost 8 years.  That is because he thought the home, which he was paying for, would be his.  Yet his own daughter and son-in-law violated and betrayed the confidential relationship they had with their Father/Father-in-law.
[brief] THE HONORABLE [...] ABUSED HIS DISCRETIONARY POWER IN HIS INTERPRETATION OF THE MEANING OF THE WORD “SALE” AS IT RELATED TO EMINENT DOMAIN OF THE PROPERTY IN QUESTION  (Da 1)  The property in question was actually parcels of land leased from the State of New Jersey which granted [...] access to Route 70 with Old Marlton Pike on the South side and Route 73 to the East.  On April 1, 2009, the DOT issued a letter to [...] cancelling [...]’s access to Route 70, which became effective April 15, 2009 and “taking” these parcels of land under eminent domain.  After engaging in a lawsuit to determine the amount of just compensation that should be paid to Stavros, Inc, a jury awarded [...] $998,400.00.  It is Defendant’s position that his “taking” was not a sale of the [...] as agreed to in the parties’ PSA as Defendant was not the actual owner of the parcels of land originally taken under Eminent Domain.  It is further Defendant’s position that Plaintiff was not entitled to any share of the settlement funds received by [...] from the State of New Jersey in settlement of his inverse condemnation lawsuit as the proceeds of the settlement also do not fall under the purview of the PSA.  It is important to understand that the diner itself ceased operations and permanently closed in or about November, 2008 due to numerous business complications rendering the day-to-day operations impossible.  LSD Law defines “sale of land” as “…the transfer of ownership of a piece of real estate from one person to another through a contract of sale.  It is also known as a conveyance”  Hofmann, A. (2019).  LSD.  Oxford University Press.  In this case, there was no transfer of ownership of real estate through a contract of sale, but rather a “taking” of certain parcels of land under eminent domain.  There was no “contract” or “agreement of sale” between the State of New Jersey for the sale of any portion of the land or business known as [...].  It was never the intent of the Defendant that the eminent domain taking would constitute a sale of [...].
[brief] Rule 1:4-8  13  Rule 1:7-4(a)  4 Rule 1:36-3 10  Rule 2:5-4(a)  10  Rule 2:6-1(a)(1)  10  Rule 2:6-3  10  Rule 4:69-6(a)  11  Rule 4:69-6 (c)  12  RULES OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
[brief] A plaintiff can also show “reckless publication” (and thus actual malice) where the defendants “fabricate[] a story, publish[] one that is *wholly unbelievable*, or relies on an *informant of dubious veracity*, or purposely avoids the truth” *Id.* at 392 (internal citations omitted).  That is exactly the case here—Plaintiff plead that the [...] republished an utterly absurd story about a grandmotherly teacher assaulting a second-grader, a story that was “wholly unbelievable” on its face.  With this second path in mind, [...] was most certainly on target when he noted that the facts in *Neuwirth* “pale[] in comparison” to the facts presented by [...]; the statements made by [...] about the plaintiff in *Neuwirth* were not particularly noteworthy or hard-to-believe, indeed, the Governor was merely discussing the mundane subject of dual employment and alluding to the possibility that the plaintiff may have engaged in unapproved dual employment.  *Neuwirth*, 476 N.J. Super. at 385-386.  In contrast, the outrageous story that the [...] parroted to their hundreds of thousands of social media followers was *anything but* mundane: they claimed as true a completely wild tale that a grandmotherly second-grade teacher—[...]—had viciously and violently assaulted in a student in a sudden fit of racially motivated pedagogical abuse.
[directive] Justice Criminal of Division the of Director the by 3:9-3(c), Rule under required as prosecutor the from consent without court, a that event the In of term lesser a will impose court the guilty pleads defendant the if that defendant a advises 80 Page the to pursuant prosecutor the by tendered offer plea the by than contemplated that imprisonment and promptly advise shall who superiors, her or shall his alert prosecutor policy, the plea escalating  Such remedies.  appropriate consider Criminal to Justice of Division of Director the with consult the Court Rule the with non-compliance reporting to: limited need be not include, but might remedies or Prosecutor, the County by the submissions issuing written authorities; judicial appropriate to judicial to that consent cases particular confirming in Division, the by prosecuted in Director cases attorney or deputy prosecutor the assistant that and given bargaining not is in participation plea prosecutor an assistant instructing or consent; such give to authority case no the has handling general proceeding.  3:9-3(c)  Rule a in participate otherwise or to attend general not deputy attorney or immediately.  operational become shall Section This LAW REFORM BAIL OF INTERPRETATION
[brief] Here, unsubstantiated and disputed allegations bear little if any relevancy to the issues in this case, and their probative value, if any, is clearly outweighed by the undue prejudice that would be suffered by [...] if the jury were to hear or read about these mere allegations.  Further, not only does the prejudicial value these collateral litigations greatly outweigh any slim probative value – if Defendants are allowed to introduce this evidence, they will also mislead the jury into thinking this is a trial about whether or not the Plaintiff has been involved in a number of litigations and bankruptcies, rather than whether or not the Defendants breached their professional duties to the Plaintiff.  See *N.J.R.E.* 403, relevant evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the risk of under prejudice, confusions of issues or misleading the jury or if it risks undue delay or the waste of time.
[brief] That was part of why the trial court did not award Plaintiffs the full quantum of damages they originally sought.  (36T 23:8 to 28:5).  But what the trial court did find, based on [...]’s analysis, other testimony, and documentary evidence, was that there were specific instances when [...] and the other defendants diverted funds from the [...] and [...] accounts to their own accounts that were beyond the Plaintiffs’ control.  The trial court made clear that it was “troubled with many of these transactions that just made no sense and the explanations made no sense.  And [for] some of them, there was no explanation. ” (36T 28:13-20).  Ultimately, the appellant is dissatisfied with the way the trial court resolved a battle of the experts between [...] and [...], but that is not a basis to reverse the trial court’s judgment.