ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] (1)  The interests and welfare of the public.  . . .  (2)  Comparison of the wages, salaries, hours, and conditions of employment of the employees involved in the arbitration proceedings with the wages, hours, and conditions of employment of other employees performing the same or similar services and with other employees generally; (a)  In private employment in general .  . . .  (b)  In public employment in general .  . . .  (c)  In public employment in the same or similar comparable jurisdictions .  . . .  (3)  The overall compensation presently received by the employees, inclusive of direct wages, salary, vacations, holidays, excused leaves, insurance and pensions, medical and hospitalization benefits, and all other economic benefits received.  (4)  Stipulation of the parties.  (5)  The lawful authority of the employer.  . . .  (6)  The financial impact on the governing unit, its residents, the limitations imposed upon the local unit’s property tax levy . . . and taxpayers.  When considering this factor in a dispute in which the public employer is a county or a municipality, the arbitrator or panel of arbitrators shall take into account, to the extent that evidence is introduced, how the award will affect the municipal or county purposes element, as the case may be, of the local property tax; a comparison of the percentage of the municipal purposes element or, in the case of a county, the county purposes element, required to fund the employee’s contract in the preceding local budget year with that required under the award for the current local budget year; the impact of the award for each income sector of the property taxpayers of the local unit; the impact of the award on the ability of the governing body to (a) maintain existing local programs and services; (b) expand existing local programs and services for which public monies have been designated by the governing body in a proposed local budget, or (c) initiate any new programs and services for which public monies have been designated by the governing body in a proposed local budget.
[brief] [...] filed this action on October 5, 2022, bringing claims for defamation per se and false light invasion of privacy against each of the defendants.  Da_153.  On February 6, 2023, [...] and [...] (with [...]) filed separate motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim under R. 4.6-2(e).  Defendant [...] (“[...]”), having been served later than the CAIR Defendants, filed a motion to dismiss or in the alternative for summary judgment on March 22, 2023.  In response to the deficiencies raised in these motions—including arguments --- 2 [...] and [...] are independent entities, and therefore filed separate motions to dismiss in the proceedings below.
[brief] “Under the reasonably debatable standard, a court ‘may not substitute its own judgment for that of the arbitrator, regardless of the court’s view of the correctness of the arbitrator’s position. ’”  Borough of Carteret v. Firefighters Mut. Benevolent Ass’n, Loc. 67, 247 N.J. 202, 212 (2021) (citing E. Rutherford PBA, 213 N.J. at 202).  “Put differently, if two or more interpretations of a labor agreement could be plausibly argued, the outcome is at least reasonably debatable. ”  Borough of Carteret, 247 N.J. at 212 (citing E. Rutherford PBA, 213 N.J. at 206).  “The ‘reasonably debatable’ standard embodies this Court’s deference to the arbitral process for public-sector labor disputes. ”  E. Rutherford PBA, 213 N.J. at 209 (citing Policemen’s Benevolent Ass’n, 205 N.J. at 428-29 (“The well-established standard . . . is that an arbitrator’s award will be confirmed so long as the award is reasonably debatable”) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted) (alteration in original)).
[brief] “The language and spirit of the Sixth Amendment contemplate that counsel. . . shall be an aid to a willing defendant — not an organ of the State interposed between an unwilling defendant and his right to defend himself personally. ”  *Faretta v. California*, 422 U.S. 806, 820 (1975).  [...] had the constitutional right to represent himself.  He asked the court to exercise that right.  The court improperly denied that request by refusing to hold the necessary hearing on the motion.  Thus, [...]’s convictions must be reversed and his case remanded for a new trial.  *Figueroa*, 186 N.J. at 596 (“[B]ecause the violation present is of constitutional dimension, defendant must be returned to the status quo ante and, hence, is entitled to exercise his constitutional rights anew. ”).  **POINT II**
[brief] Pb13, 24.  That argument begs the question.  What matters here is whether [...] timely demonstrated that it was sufficiently NJDOT classified.  If [...] did not do so, and the County was not required to seek out that information itself, the County would never know if [...] was sufficiently classified and never have assurance of performance.  [...] refused to do so until twenty-one (21) days after bid opening, and, if it did not want the Project anymore or was concerned about its bid, could have instead continued to refuse.  [...] also argues that all bidders can withdraw bids if they make a mistake, and thus no competitive advantage arises for [...].  Pb23.  First, that ignores the case law, including binding case law, expressly holding that a bidder’s ability to walk away results in rejection under River Vale.  Db26-27, 32.  Moreover, the statute cited by [...] only permits the bidder to “request” withdrawal in a five-business-day window for “a clerical error that is an unintentional and substantial computational error or an unintentional omission of a substantial quantity of labor, material, or both, from the final bid computation” where requiring performance would be “unconscionable” and the bidder “exercised reasonable care[.]” N.J.S.A. 40A:11-23.3; N.J.S.A. 40A:11-2 (defining “mistake”).
[brief] It is the intent of [...] and [...] that controls; a third party beneficiary like [...] need not even know about the terms of the contract “in order to be bound by the rights and liabilities created therein. ”  Allgor v. Travelers Ins. Co., 280 N.J. Super. 254, 264 (App. Div. 1995).  But this case is even easier because [...] knowingly benefitted from his wife’s use of [...]’s services on January 8, 2022—and likely other times before.  He certified that he and his wife “decided” to request a ride through [...] on both of their behalf on March 31, 2022.  (Da277.)  Based on the unequivocal language of the Third-Party provision in [...]’s contract, courts across the country have enforced [...]’s arbitration agreement against passengers like [...].  See, e.g., Snow v. [...], No. 23-STCV-10027, (Cal. Super. Ct. L.A. Cty. Oct. 10, 2023) (“[E]ven if Plaintiff did not use 5  This is a two-way street: the contract also confers on [...] the right to enforce the arbitration agreement against [...].  (Da85 (“To the extent that any third-party beneficiary to this agreement brings claims against the Parties, those claims shall also be subject to this Arbitration Agreement. ”).) his own [...] app to order the [...], Plaintiff received [...] transportation to meet his needs and interest as a third-party beneficiary and co-rider …  Thus, the contract containing the [arbitration] agreement was intended to benefit and cover both Ferguson, the application user, and Plaintiff, another passenger who also benefited from use of the [...] application. ”); Kearns v. Sadat, No. 22-CV-017881 (Cal. Super. Ct. Alameda Cty. June 14, 2023) (holding passenger was required to arbitrate claims because she “voluntarily entered a motor vehicle she knew had been summoned by [the [...] account holder] with the assistance of the [...] Services”); Fathollah, v. [...] Techs., Inc., No. 22-STCV-22014 (Cal. Super. Ct. L.A. Cty. Sept. 30, 2022) (holding plaintiffs’ daughter was compelled to arbitrate as a third-party beneficiary because she “benefitted from the use of [...]’s rideshare services” by being a passenger).  Indeed, just recently a federal court in New York, applying the same third-party beneficiary principles that exist under New Jersey law, enforced the arbitration agreement in the December Terms against a guest rider whose friend had requested the ride via the [...] App for his use on the grounds that he “benefitted from [his friend’s] agreement with [...]. ”  Hamilton, 2023 WL 5769500, at *5.  If this Court were to reach [...]’s threshold challenge to arbitrability, it should enforce the plain terms of [...]’s contract and require [...] to arbitrate his claims as a third-party beneficiary of that contract.
[brief] [...] v. [...], [...], 2019 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1250 (App. Div. May 31, 2019)  ............................................................Da383  Final Judgment in [...] Litigation, dated October 29, 2019, [...] .......................Da385  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT  In 2015, [...] went to court to make sure that its affordable housing plan was constitutional.
[brief] Ibid.  Paragraph 4 specifically limits [...]’s indemnity obligations to bodily injury and property damage that may arise from [...]’s premises, including acts or omissions of [...] or its “subcontractors. ”  Ibid.  Contrary to [...]’s argument, Opp. br. 16-17, the term “subcontractor” does not include [...].  The contract refers to [...] as the “Contractor. ”  See Da44-46.  Further, Paragraph 2 did not contain that language requiring indemnity “to the fullest extent permitted by law. ”  See Da45, ¶ 2.  Paragraph 2 and Paragraph 4 thus contained different indemnity obligations, and the trial court’s ruling that those provisions were consistent with each other, 1T19:22-22:6, was unsupported by the record.
[brief] 323 N.J. Super. 118, 122, 125 (App. Div. 1999).  The plaintiffs “were free to scroll through the various computer screens that presented the terms of their contracts before clicking their agreement. ”  Id. at 125.  Conversely, in Hoffman v. [...], this Court reversed the dismissal of a consumer’s complaint, determining that reasonable notice was not provided of the at-issue forum selection clause contained within a disclaimer on the defendant’s website.
[brief] Da315 [emphasis added].  The [...] includes the statement, “waves with a high southerly angle of incidence now have the opportunity to travel up the vehicle ramp, over the new vertical wall, and onto the Subject Property. ”  Da315.  However, the [...] fails to provide an opinion that such overtopping would not have occurred prior to the taking of the easement; no opinion is given as to whether such overtopping (even if accepted as true) has occurred based upon the pre-existing damaged seawall or in the after condition; or whether such overtopping would result in damage to the Property.
[brief] See also Borrello v. Bd. of Trs., Pub. Emps. Ret. Sys., 313 N.J. Super. 75, 78 (App. Div. 1998).  To this end, this Court determined that the appellant’s criminal conviction arising out of appellant’s driving while intoxicated charges and subsequent removal from employment on account of the same was unrelated to her work and had an insufficient nexus to warrant the forfeiture of deferred retirement benefits.  Ibid.  While what constitutes “conduct related to employment” as it pertains to deferred retirement benefits has not been explored in a published opinion since Hess, Courts have discerned from the words themselves that there must be a relationship or nexus between the employment and the conduct leading to the termination.  *In re Jacalone*, 2015 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1576 (App. Div. 2015) (Aa62-65).
[brief] [...] d/b/a [...] (“[...]”) respectfully submits this brief in opposition to the appeal of [...] and [...] (together, “Plaintiffs”).  **INTRODUCTION**  Plaintiffs employed a quintessential “file-first-and-ask-questions-later” approach to litigation, which caused [...] to unnecessarily incur more than $150,000 in attorneys’ fees defending against claims that Plaintiffs never had any legal or factual basis to pursue.  The trial court correctly granted summary judgment in [...]’s favor and appropriately exercised its discretion in sanctioning Plaintiffs for their continued pursuit of frivolous claims.  The trial court’s decisions should be affirmed in all respects.
[directive] Also, a bargaining unit representative should not be permitted to represent more than one witness or subject in a single investigation, in part to avoid potential conflicts of interest.  Although a witness/subject is entitled to a representative, he/she is not necessarily entitled to a  In order to maintain the integrity particular representative. and confidentiality of investigations, any witness and representative present at an interview shall be required to sign and adhere to a non-disclosure agreement.  Witnesses shall be required to sign the form attached as Appendix I.  Representatives shall be required to sign the form attached as Appendix N. II.  Other Provisions
[brief] THE QUESTIONS ON APPEAL CONCERN MATTERS OF GREAT PUBLIC INTEREST  A.  Interpretation of a statute is a matter of general public interest.  i.  Expressed policy of U.S. Congress is matter of “public interest. ”  B.  New Jersey  Courts have cited “public policy” of the U.S. Congress and “public question” in deciding that recoupment or set-off applies in promissory note and foreclosure suits.
[brief] The Motions for Leave to Appeal.  On June 6, 2024, the State filed a Notice of Motion for Leave to Appeal, Docket No. [...], in this Court, challenging the judge’s suppression of the evidence seized under the warrant that quashed the majority of the evidence against defendant.\(^{17}\) (Ra17).  On June 10, 2024, defendant also filed a Notice of Motion for Leave to Appeal, in this Court, separately challenging the judge’s denial to dismiss the indictment with prejudice for the inadvertently delayed discovery of the location diagram.  (Ra18 to 19).  On July 15, 2024, this Court granted both the State’s and defendant’s motions for leave to appeal, calendaring the cases back-to-back.  (Ra20 to 23).  \(^{17}\)  The State filed its appellant’s brief for Docket No. [...], addressing the suppression of the evidence seized under the warrant, on September 23, 2024.  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I
[brief] The Law Division needed to examine more than one photograph, though, because other pictures in the record show that the handicap access walkway, next to the handicap parking spot near the spot where [...] fell, is also abutting the parking lot and is likewise asphalt.  [Pa787, photograph 28; Pa788, photograph 29].  As this Court can see, this walkway is similarly inviting the customer to park and walk directly toward the front of the premises, just as the parking spots on the side are laid out.  Plainly the Law Division’s holding that any blacktop surface that abuts the parking lot is not a walkway, but part of the parking lot, is contradicted by other photographs of record.  Would the Law Division have called the handicap walkway part of the parking lot?  Of course not.  It is no sensible to claim that any asphalt surface is, by definition, a “parking lot” area.  --- 1  It is not true that Plaintiffs’ claim of the location of the accident has been “fluid,” as charged by the Restaurant.  Plaintiffs have never wavered from the spot where the accident happened.  There have been rare occasions when Plaintiffs, in the haste of the moment, may have said that [...] fell in the “parking lot. ”  In contrast, Plaintiffs have properly indicated that [...] fell on a walkway adjacent to the premises hundreds of times.  Plaintiffs’ very infrequent mistaken use of words is no more binding on this Court than what Plaintiffs submit is their hundreds of accurate descriptions.  The Court can see the location and determine for itself.  A.
[brief] I need to be reimbursed for my damaged rugs.  I prefer to settle this but if I need to take this to court, I will.  (Pa135, 47).  The problem with Appellant’s representations, as [...] later discovered, is that none of them were true.  (Pa135, 48).  In fact, one of the rugs that Appellant claimed as damaged was not even in her unit at the time of the loss.  [...] learned this in the underlying litigation when it deposed one of Appellant’s tenants, [...].  [...] testified that one of the rugs was in an upstairs hallway from the date he moved into the unit in 2018 until around 2020.  (Pa136, 50).
[brief] In *Manson*, the United States Supreme Court identified five reliability factors to be considered by the trial court: (1) whether the witness had the opportunity to view the criminal at the time of the crime; (2) the witness's degree of attention; (3) the accuracy of the witness's prior description of the criminal; (4) the witness's level of certainty at the time of the identification confrontation; and (5) the amount of time between the crime and the confrontation.  432 U.S. at 114.  At the hearing, "the ultimate burden remains on the defendant to prove a very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification."  *Henderson*, 208 N.J. at 289.  If after evaluating those factors the court is convinced that, notwithstanding the suggestive nature of the procedure, the witness's identification is reliable, then the identification may be admitted into evidence.  *Manson*, 432 U.S. at 114.  However, our Supreme Court has noted that a *Wade* hearing is not required for a "confirmatory" identification because such an identification "is not considered suggestive."  *State v. Pressley*, 232 N.J. 587, 592 (2018).
[brief] **APPELLEE’S TESTIMONY THAT APPELLANT FLED THE SCENE OF THE ACCIDENT WAS IRRELEVANT, IMPROPER AND WARRANTS A NEW TRIAL (Raised below: 1T42:7-21)**  At trial, over Appellant’s objection, Appellee testified that Appellant fled the scene of the accident.  1T42:7-21.  Appellee’s counsel also insinuated the alleged hit-and-run nature of the accident in his summation.  3T23:23-24:25.  Liability was stipulated to prior to trial so the only substantive issue the jury decided was an assessment of causation and damages.  The allegation that Appellant fled the scene of the accident was irrelevant and was obviously fraught with the potential to inflame the jury to impermissibly punish the Appellant for having allegedly fled the scene of the accident rather than determine causation and damages.  Clearly, such evidence should have been excluded under N.J.R.E. 403(a) as it’s introduction serves to cause undue prejudice and confuses/misleads the jury from focusing on the true assessment at hand.  See, also, Reider v. Allstate N.J. Ins. Co., 2009 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 626, *3-5 (Court disallowed testimony concerning the hit-and-run nature of an accident).  The undue prejudice caused during trial by the introduction of such evidence is immeasurable and warrants a new trial.
[brief] See Sections 7.2, 7.4 and 7.5 (Ja36-Ja37); supra Plaintiff specifically pleaded the following relief sought in its Class Action Complaint alleging violations of the CFA, HCSA, TCCWNA and RISA:  “For injunctive relief, enjoining Defendants from engaging in future violations of the HCSA, CFA, TCCWNA, and RISA”.  (Ja27)  Although the specific California claims in McGill and DiCarlo provide for “public injunctive relief” whereas the CFA, HCSA, RISA, and TCCWNA do not specifically use that term, the “injunctive relief” sought by Plaintiff in the case sub judice (and the relief provided by the CFA, NJSA 56:8-19 and TCCWNA, NJSA 56:12-17 supra) mimics the definition of “public injunctive relief”, and corresponding examples, from McGill and DiCarlo.  See Weinberg, 173 N.J. at 253  Plaintiff and the putative class have already been provided with [...]’s form New Jersey health club contract that (Plaintiff alleges in her Class Action Complaint) violates New Jersey law.  (Ja13-Ja43)  Accordingly, and similar to that stated by the DiCarlo court, what would enjoining [...] from using its form New Jersey health club contract do for Plaintiff (or the putative class) as she already knows that [...] violated the CFA, HCSA, RISA, and TCCWNA?  Alternatively, enjoining [...] from using the form New Jersey health club contract (provided to Plaintiff and the putative class) would be “public injunctive relief” because it directly affects the general public of future New Jersey consumers who will sign [...]’s form health club contract.  The cases it is anticipated [...] will rely on concerning this issue are inapposite.
[brief] Accordingly, and as found below, any argument of preemption of a nuisance ordinance by the NCA is misplaced.  “NJDEP guidance and case law make it clear that defendants were not required to enact an ordinance under the Noise Control Act. ”  Da82.  Indeed, a municipality need not comport to the NCA decibel requirements in enacting noise nuisance ordinances.  State v. Clarksburg Inn, 375 N.J.Super. 624, 637-639 (App. Div. 2005).  Respondents’ decision to include an argument of preemption based on the NCA is prejudicial to the Borough as the Borough does not have an opportunity in a reply brief to respond fully to what should have been a cross-appeal.  See R. 2:6-7 (Reply briefs shall not exceed 15 pages while Appellant/Cross Respondent Reply shall not exceed 50 pages).  The lower court entered a final decision as to preemption pursuant to the NCA and Respondents failed to cross-appeal.  As such any reference to the NCA and preemption should be disregarded by this Court.
[brief] Plaintiffs file this Brief:  (1) in opposition to the appeals filed by Defendants-Appellants [...] (the “Township”) and Mayor [...] (the “Mayor”), in his official capacity as Mayor of the [...], and the Zoning Board of the [...] (“Zoning Board” or “Board” (collectively “Defendants”); and (2) in support of Plaintiffs-Respondents/Cross-Appellants’ cross-appeal.
[brief] *2  The police determined that the silver Saturn was owned by [...] and had been rented to Hackensack resident [...] on September 12.  The Saturn was found parked near Smith's apartment on September 18.  The day before the police located the vehicle, Smith had reported to police that the Saturn had been stolen by defendant, her boyfriend, who had disappeared with the vehicle “going into [September] 12th[,] into the 13th[,]” and had not been seen since.  The police knocked on Smith's apartment door and defendant answered.  The police informed defendant they were investigating shoplifting incidents at [...].  Defendant replied that “he thought [they] were [there] investigating an incident that took place at the [...] [in] which he ... slapped a man because he took his money. ”  Police took defendant into custody.  Police searched the trunk of the Saturn, finding a multi-colored toy cap gun next to a plastic bag.  At trial, Smith testified defendant took the car “going into [September] 12th [,] into the 13th[,]” and did not return until the morning of September 18.  Defendant offered an alibi witness, [...], who testified defendant spent the entire day with him in New York on September 16, the day of the robbery.
[brief] (Ab18; Ab24-25).  Additionally, [...] contends that [...] did not provide “meaningful consideration” to catalytic heaters, which [...] characterized as a “superior heat source. ” (Ab53-54).  However, it is well-settled that “[i]f there is any fair argument in support of the course taken or any reasonable ground for difference of opinion among intelligent and conscientious officials, the [agency’s] decision is conclusively legislative, and will not be disturbed unless patently corrupt, arbitrary or illegal. ”  Flanagan v. Dep’t of Civ. Serv., 29 N.J. 1, 12 (1959).  [...]’s arguments fall short of meeting this high standard.  A.