ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Trial included testimony from thirteen State witnesses, six defense witnesses, including defendant, video evidence of four traffic stops, and other evidence.  The jury convicted defendant of the theft of the wallet ID, and the counts of official misconduct, and pattern of official misconduct, related to that theft, necessarily concluding defendant had been untruthful when he reported the wallet ID stolen, had kept it, and had used it to avoid traffic tickets.  This decision was unsurprising, for during his approximately five hours of testimony, defendant claimed (1) that he actually presented some officers, but not all, with a “business card” that NJSP permitted, except that defendant’s was non-conforming to NJSP rules, and looked suspiciously like the wallet ID that was clearly visible in two of the traffic videos; (2) that prior to being accused by his NJSP co-worker of calibrating instruments with a non-functioning thermometer, defendant and his accuser had had a dispute that caused NJSP to tell the men to communicate through a third trooper for approximately three to four months, which assignment the third trooper could not recall; (3) that defendant’s own reports to NJSP and the police department of the town in which he claimed to have lost his wallet ID included the wrong date he lost it; and (4) that the officer who reported him to NJSP had called him “Trooper” not because he showed the officer the wallet ID, but because the officer, who saw defendant at night for less than twenty seconds, remembered defendant from a training course defendant taught many years earlier.
[brief] Defendant also raised an ineffective assistance of counsel claim on the premise that “defense counsel” was ineffective by failing to uncover [...]’ habeas petition earlier.  (Pa199-200).  In an April 21, 2023 reply brief, defendant also raised arguments under Giglio and Jencks.8 (Pa204-06, 209-10).  On June 22, 2023, [...] denied defendant’s second PCR petition without an evidentiary hearing.
[brief] Secondly, the Plaintiffs seek the entry of an Order compelling Defendants to disgorge the monies which Plaintiffs previously paid to them.  See, e.g. complaint at Count Two.  It is undisputed that this claim for restitutionary relief is equitable and does not give rise to a jury trial.  See Wanaque Borough Sewerage Auth. v. Township of West Milford, 144 N.J. 564, 575 (1996).  C.  Lastly, the Plaintiffs similarly seek restitution plus an award of attorneys’ fees under the New Jersey Insurance Fraud Prevention Act.
[brief] [...], Plaintiff/Appellee, -v.- [...], [...], COMPANY/CORPORATION 1-5, AND JOHN/JANE DOES 1-5, Defendants/Appellants.  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY  APPELLATE  DIVISION  DOCKET NO.: [...]  CIVIL ACTION  On Leave to Appeal from an Interlocutory Order of the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Monmouth County
[brief] E-Discovery is THE Discovery (/file/document/e-discovery-discovery).  (pdf)  Electronic Discovery and Other Problems (/file/document/electronic-discovery-and-other-problems) (pdf)  Elements of a Preservation Rule (/file/elementsofpreservationrulepdf) (pdf)  Preservation and Spoilation Revisited: Is it Time for Additional Rulemaking (/file/document/preservation-and-spoilation-revisited-it-time-additional-rulemaking)  (pdf)  A Proposal to Implement a Cost-Effect and Efficient Procedural Tool into Federal Litigation Practice (/file/document/proposal-implement-cost-effect-and-efficient-procedural-tool-federal-litigation)  (pdf)  Sanctions for E-Discovery Violations: By the Numbers (/file/document/sanctions-e-discovery-violations-numbers) (pdf)  Walking the Plank, Over Your Shoulder, Fearing Sharks Are in the Water: E-Discovery in Federal Litigation (/file/document/walking-plank-over-your-shoulder-fearing-sharks-are-water-e-discovery-federal) (pdf)  Zublake Revisited: Pension Committee and the Duty to Preserve (/file/document/zublake-revisited-pension-committee-and-duty-preserve) (pdf)  Issues With the Current State of Discovery: Is There Really Excessive Discovery, and if so, What are the Possible Solutions?
[brief] Aa0129 v. Exhibit E – East 300 Upgrade Project, Draft Spill Prevention and Control Plan, June 2020.  . . .  Aa0143 vi.  Exhibit F – East 300 Upgrade Project, Plan for Unanticipated Discovery of Contaminated Soils or Groundwater, June 2020.  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Aa0154 vii.  Exhibit G – Geotechnical Engineering Report, [...], [...] – prepared for [...], prepared by [...], June 12, 2020.
[brief] Under the abuse of discretion standard, reversal is only warranted where the decision was “‘manifestly unjust’ under the circumstances. ”  Newark Morning Ledger Co. v. N.J. Sports & Exposition Auth., 423 N.J. Super. 140, 174 (App. Div. 2011).  “[I]t is not the appellate function to decide whether the trial court took the wisest course, or even the better course’ as we do not substitute our judgment for that of the trial court…”  Id. at 174-175.  II.
[brief] (5T19-7 to 11; 5T76-9 to 10).  [...]’s approximate 15-minute interview with defendant was video-recorded (“first interview”).  (5T23-18 to 23; 5T53-19 to 54-7).  At the beginning of this interview, [...] read defendant his Miranda rights pursuant to a Miranda rights card.  (Da37; Pa5; 5T20-2 to 9; 5T24-20 to 25-13).  After having been read the warnings, the defendant signed the back of the Miranda card, admitted into evidence at the Miranda Hearing as “S-1. ” (Pa5; 5T20-1 to 23).  During this video-recorded interview, defendant admitted that he and his girlfriend had been sharing Apartment B for a year.  (5T26-5 to 27-1); that he placed the two duffel bags into the apartment, as the officers had observed and that he knew that there was marijuana in those duffel bags.  (5T27-10 to 19); and he admitted to knowing that the six duffel bags that he placed in his leased white BMW were full of marijuana.  (5T27-20 to 28-8).  Defendant further admitted to possessing cocaine.  (5T33-14 to 34-1).  A short while later, at approximately 11:00 p.m. that same evening, DEA officers [...] and [...] interviewed defendant (“second interview”).
[brief] In fact, this is not Appellant’s counsel’s first time appealing this very issue.  This Court should continue to uphold the trial courts’ proper dismissal of these allegations and find that “the use of a letter vendor was not abusive, deceptive, or unfair . . . [or] the type of conduct that Congress was interested in preventing when it enacted the FDCPA. ”  Asmad-Escobar v. Phoenix Fin. Servs. LLC, 2024 WL 2839329, at *3 (App. Div. June 5, 2024).  See also Mhrez v. Convergent Outsourcing, Inc., 2024 WL 2838327 (App. Div. June 5, 2024).
[brief] [...]’ contention on summary judgment is that such a determination is sufficient for the court to determine the contract for sale is not unenforceable by Plaintiff in this case.  It is black-letter law that New Jersey courts will not enforce an illegal transaction, and instead, will leave the plaintiff as it found them.  See Marx v. Jaffe, 92 N.J. Super. 143, 146 (App. Div.) certif. denied, 48 N.J.140 (1966) (the law will not assist a party to an illegal contract but will leave them where it finds them); Paley v. Barton Save & Loan Ass’n, 82 N.J. Super. 75, 82 (App. Div.) certif. denied, 41 N.J. 602(1964) (same); Naimo v. Fianza, 146 N.J. Super. 362, 368–69 (Ch. Div. 1976) (illegal contracts are unenforceable and a third party may raise illegality as a defense).
[brief] The inapplicability of summary judgment to punitive damages claims is particularly true when discovery is not completed and depositions—which most effectively elicit facts relating to subjectivity and intent—have not yet been started, much less completed.  Discovery is necessary for Plaintiffs to establish the intent and subjective reasoning behind Defendants’ improper rescission of the Policies, misrepresentation of the Policies’ premium refund, and wrongful termination of the Policies as to the Innocent Insureds.  Plaintiffs have alleged that Defendants acted wantonly and recklessly by, among other things, erroneously rescinding the Policy as soon as coverage was requested for the [...] matter.  A *prima facie* case for punitive damages has been plead as to Defendants’ failure to follow the plain language of the Policies and to follow their own Underwriting Guidelines bespeaks wanton and malicious conduct – especially where the end result was to save Defendants more than $300,000 in legal fees in the [...] matter.  [Pa575, ¶ 98]  Accordingly, the trial court’s Order dismissing Plaintiffs’ claim for punitive damages should be reversed.
[brief] [...]’s waiver provides alternative ground in which this Court could stake affirmance of the Order dated November 22, 2023.  For this reason, and because the record on this point is fully developed and without disputed issues of material fact, this issue is different in kind than the others not reached by the trial court.  As our case law notes, a respondent may argue “any point on appeal to sustain the trial court’s judgment” because “appeals are taken from judgments, not opinions. ”  *State Fireman’s Mut. Benev. Ass’n v. N. Hudson Reg’l Fire & Rescue*, 340 N.J. Super. 577, 590 (App. Div. 2001).  This argument is captured within that wide net, but plaintiffs will endeavor not to belabor the point.
[brief] As noted by [...], three reasons prompted the Decedent to leave her entire estate to the Respondent.  First, she wanted to take care of her daughter.  Second, the Decedent did not want the Petitioner to inherit because he had not provided either the financial or emotional support that the Decedent sought in the marriage.  Third, the Decedent was concerned because the Petitioner was a very litigious person, and felt that the Petitioner would sue to try to prevent the probate of the Will.  (9T220-8 to 25; 9T225-11 to 226-2).
[brief] >  You have asked me to assess the profits that would have likely been earned by Plaintiffs in the event that their development goals and objectives in connection with the development of the Project has not been frustrated by the alleged negligence and breach of fiduciary duty of Defendants to Plaintiffs as set forth in the Amended Complaint.  Therefore, I have prepared an analysis of the profits that would likely have been earned *by a development team which would have included Plaintiffs as principals*, in connection with two alternative projects on the Property.
[brief] So, we have an EEOC complaint; we have the Appellant being barred from the high school; we have [...] telling the Appellant that he is a good worker; and then, he states, “I hope you stay on. ”  All of those facts have to be considered as the Appellant’s case against the Defendants.  The time sequence may be confusing, but the facts are the same: complaint and retaliatory action which is clearly the basis for a CEPA case.  Whether the [...] information was before or after the conversation with [...] is immaterial.  Either [...] knew that the Plaintiff was barred from the high school or he anticipated that it was going to happen.  For either one, before or after, there is no denying that he was in fact removed from the high school and clearly, according to [...], not for his work ability; and since [...] mentioned, “female,” a Jury would have a right to determine that the EEOC complaint is the basis for the Appellant being removed from the high school where he regularly worked.  Then, we have to realize that the Plaintiff testified that his work assignments dried up and that is probably because his usual work assignments were the high school.  That ended, and he did “stay on,” but the work assignments ended.  All of the above demonstrates a factual dispute which should not give rise to an Order granting summary judgment.
[brief] (12T:119-10 to 12).  The defense tried to object, and the Court refused to allow a sidebar and interrupted defense counsel mid-sentence and did not allow an objection.  (12T:119-1 to 9).  The State then asked [...] if she was aware of the report.  (12T:119-13 to 14).  At this point, [...] responded that “It was my understanding it was created for the purposes of the waiver hearing [...] was originally facing a waiver to adult court. ”  (12T:119-15 to 17).  Due to the Court not allowing a sidebar and overruling defense’s objection, the jury learned that there was a hearing that waived [...] to adult court.  This information is prejudicial and irrelevant and should’ve never been presented to the jury.  N.J.R.E. 401; N.J.R.E. 402; N.J.R.E. 403.
[brief] See, e.g., Nat’l Rsrch. Council, Comm. on Identifying the Needs of the Forensic Scis. Cmty., *Strengthening Forensic Science in the United States: A Path Forward* (August 2009) (hereinafter “NAS Report”); PCAST Report; Am. Ass’n for the Advancement of Sci., *Latent Fingerprint Examination: A Quality and Gap Analysis* (2017) (hereinafter “AAAS Report”).  Indeed, this research has demonstrated that error rates are inherent to fingerprint analysis because it is a subjective technique: it relies on the judgment and experience of an individual examiner.  Moreover, latent --- 2 https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/228091.pdf.  3  https://www.aaas.org/sites/default/files/s3fs-public/reports/Latent%2520Fingerprint%2520Report%2520FINAL%25209_14.pdf?adobe_mc=MCMID%3D42160555506902829962476536102252964462%7CMCORGID%3D242B6472541199F70A4C98A6%2540AdobeOrg%7CTS%3D1716495408 fingerprint evidence is only as good as the examiner analyzing the evidence and the examiner’s application of the technique in a particular case. \(^4\)  Based on these advancements, the scientific community, including the latent fingerprint community, has \textit{unanimously rejected individualization testimony}, i.e., “source attribution to the exclusion of all others in the world. ”  Nat’l Inst. of Standards & Tech. & Nat’l Inst. of Just., \textit{Latent Print Examination and Human Factors: Improving the Practice through a Systems Approach} (Feb. 2012) (hereinafter “NIST Report”)\(^5\) at 72, Recommendation 3.7;\(^6\) see also AAAS Report at 63 (“Because there is no scientific basis for estimating the number of people who might be the source of a particular friction ridge print, we recommend that latent print examiners stop using the terms ‘identification’ and ‘individualization.
[directive] Eligible defendants may apply to reopen their detention hearings under section 19(f) at this time.  I.  On December 4, 2020, the [...] and the [...] jointly applied to this Court to enter an Order to Show Cause.  Movants seek two types of relief: 5 (1) the release of all defendants detained under the CJRA for six months or longer whose most serious charge is a second-degree offense or lower.  If the State objected, it would have to demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that no conditions would reasonably assure against the serious and imminent risk of non- appearance, danger, or obstruction.  Judges or special masters from a county other than where the case is assigned would preside over matters in which an objection is raised; and (2) new detention hearings under N.J.S.A. 2A:162-19(f) for all defendants detained for six months or longer who are charged with a first-degree offense and entitled to a presumption of release.
[brief] ”  *Andersen v. Exxon Co.*, 89 N.J. 483, 494 (1982) (Internal citations omitted).  Rather, the Court found that “(t)he paramount purpose of the statute is to secure to handicapped individuals full and equal access to society, bounded only by the actual physical limits that they cannot surmount. ”  *Andersen*, 89 N.J. at 495.  In so holding, the Court noted that “it would be ironic indeed for the individual only slightly handicapped to be denied coverage under the act while more restricted individuals are accorded protection. ”  *Id.*  NJLAD’s definition of handicap or disability does not require that the condition result in permanency or a substantial limitation on a major life activity.
[brief] Nor did the non-extraditable out-of-state warrant justify prolonging the detention or seeking consent to search.  [...] himself testified that he was not going to arrest [...] based on the warrant because it was non-extraditable. \(^{11}\) (1T 114-6 to 116-2, 132-1 to 7)  See United States v. Hight, 127 F. Supp. 3d 1126, 1129-30, 1134 (D. Colo. 2015) (noting that the officer acknowledged that he could not arrest the suspect for the out-of-state warrant because it was non-extraditable and finding no basis to prolong the detention \(^{11}\) [...] also conceded that he could not even remember the basis for the out-of-state warrant.
[brief] ..................................................................................  11  a.  The delay in seeking the arbitration request ..................................................  14 b.  The filing of any motions, particularly dispositive motions, and their outcomes .................................................................  16  c.  Whether the delay in seeking arbitration was part of the party’s litigation strategy .............................................................  16 d.  The extent of discovery conducted .................................................................  17 e.  Whether the party raised the arbitration issue in its pleadings, particularly as an affirmative defense or provided other notification of its intent to seek arbitration ..................................................................................  17 f.  The proximity of the date on which the party sought arbitration to the date of trial........................................18  g.  The resulting prejudice suffered by the other party, if any..................................................................................18  Conclusion .................................................................................................................................................................24  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS BEING APPEALED
[brief] “[T]he word ‘dispute’ is unqualified” in the statute and thus encompasses entitlement to PIP benefits under the statute.  *Ibid.*  Building on Molino, this Court, in State Farm Ins. Co. v. Sabato, 337 N.J. Super. 393, 396 (App. Div. 2001), explained that “that the language of [N.J.S.A. 39:6A-5.1] should be read as broadly as the words themselves indicate. ”  Thus, insurers are “not empowered” to avoid the arbitration mandate merely “by characterizing PIP disputes” in a certain way to be able to seek resolution in court. ”  Id.  at 396-97 (quoting Molino, 289 N.J. Super. at 411).  Second, N.J.S.A. 39:6A-5.1(c), which governs the scope of arbitrable PIP benefits disputes, is extremely broad.
[brief] In affirming the dismissal of plaintiff’s complaint based on defendant’s co-employee immunity, the Appellate Division held, “[w]e think it obvious that paid travel to and from an out-of-state professional meeting is so integral to attending the meeting itself as to constitute a part of the overall special mission. ”  Ehrgott, 208 N.J. Super. at 398.  The Appellate Division further held:  Since both plaintiff and his coemployee were in the course of their employment when the accident occurred, we must conclude that plaintiff’s tort action in negligence against his coemployee is barred.
[brief] The City argues at page 25 of its brief that Appellant made its own “redevelopment contribution. ”  That contribution consisted of a $50,000 payment to fund the cost of roadway improvements adjacent to the [...] project which is a normal off-site improvement, and a $100,000 “administrative fee,” which is the type of payment authorized by N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-8(f) and was presumably used by the City to pay for administrative costs of the [...] redevelopment project.  (Pa1133 to Pa1134).  These are typical development fees and are far different from a $2,000,000 payment made to fund an unrelated senior citizen project before the developer even has site plan approval for its apartment project.  Nor can the payment be justified under the authority granted by N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-8(f) to “furnish property and services in connection with a redevelopment area. ” (City brief, p. 38).  That authority does not include the right to make unregulated assessments from developers in order to do so.  B.
[brief] Co. v. Mine Safety Appliances Co.** | | | 398 N.J. Super. 422 (App. Div. 2008) | 16, 19| | **Cineas v. Mammone,** | | | 270 N.J. Super. 200 (App. Div. 1994) | 10, 11| | **Cogen Techs. NJ Venture v. Boyce Eng’g Int’l, Inc. ** | | | 241 N.J. Super. 268 (App. Div. 1990) | 15 | | **D’Atria v. D’Atria,** | | | 242 N.J. Super. 392 (N.J. Super. Ch. 1990) | 13, 14| | **Firoz v. Kolaranda,** | | | No. A-2886-05T1, 2007 WL 685447 (App. Div. Mar. 8, 2007) | 11 | | **Grey v. Indep. Order of Foresters,** | | | 196 S.W. 779 (Mo. App. 1917) | 20 | | **Horizon Healthcare Services, Inc. v. MD-X Solutions, Inc.** | | | No. BER-L-8463-08, 2009 WL 833333 (N.J. Super. L., Bergen Cnty. Mar. 13, 2009) | 13, 14| | **Lawson v. Dewar,** | | | 468 N.J. Super. 128 (App. Div. 2021) | 14 | Lewis v. Preschel, 237 N.J. Super. 418 (App. Div. 1989).........................................................
[brief] (Da1929-1930)  F.  [...] continued to claim that the February 8 meeting was valid and improperly sought to collaterally invalidate the Arbitration.  At the May 23, 2018 argument, [...] was defiant as ever, and his arguments that day continued to violate the trial court’s injunction.  For example, [...] continued to try to justify behavior that the trial court had already called “outrageous,” saying that on February 8, 2016, “I [[...]] considered that I was still in control at that point…. and there was a possibility that some other court would say that the new election would supersede.
[directive] Internal affairs personnel must be of unquestioned integrity and possess the moral stamina to perform unpopular tasks.  It is important that these investigators possess the ability to withstand the rigors and tensions associated with complex investigations, social pressures and long hours of work.  The investigator must possess the ability to be tactful when dealing with members of the agency and the community.  It is recommended that personnel assigned to the internal affairs function provide the agency with the opportunity to access all segments of the community.  For example, if a particular community has a significant proportion of the population that speaks a foreign language, the law enforcement executive may wish to consider assigning an officer to the internal affairs function who speaks that language.  4.2.2
[brief] Rather, it stands for the principle that liability is presumed to be joint and several unless there are either distinct harms or a reasonable basis upon which to determine the contribution of each cause of a single harm. ”).  This phrase, which speaks of the allocation “between tortfeasors,” does not support the application of joint and several liability to all defendants here.  It hardly needs to be argued that the trial court’s role here was to enter a judgment reached by applying the law to the facts, not to fashion a judgment that would be easier for plaintiffs to collect.  Even if the court harbored a suspicion that defendants might move funds to avoid collection, the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (UFTA), N.J.S.A. 25:2-20 to -34, provides “broad” remedies to a successful claimant.  See, Banco Popular N. Am. v. Gandi, 184 N.J. 161, 176 (2005).  The court overstepped in its effort to secure collection of the judgment by plaintiffs.  Quite remarkably, the trial court found all defendants liable for all damages awarded on all counts, without regard to whether a defendant was even named in the count.