ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] One particular area of concern which was raised, but not fully resolved, was the use of canines by police.  1  Notably, the Use of Force Policy incorporates some new limitations on their use.  It prohibits their use against those who are resisting arrest, but do not pose a threat to an officer or someone else.  It also prohibits the visible presence of canines for crowd control purposes at peaceful demonstrations and their deployment against a crowd, except to respond to a threat of death or serious bodily injury to a member of the public or to an officer.  Canines may continue to be used for explosive detection or similar security sweeps at such gatherings.  There is, however, additional work to be done and information to be gathered about the use of canines, including from the Use of Force Portal.
[brief] b.  [...] Should Not Be Allowed to Escape Liability Simply Because of the Classification of “Hospitalist”; [...] is the Most Qualified Expert to Author an Affidavit of Merit Based on the Facts  [...]’s reliance on the Carr decision is unpersuasive and not binding on this Court’s consideration of the issues in this matter.  2015 N.J.Super.Unpub. LEXIS 1484 (App. Div. 2015).
[brief] E. Ins. Co. | 309 N.J. Super. 97, 706 A.2d 785 (App. Div. 1998) | 35 | | Victory Peach Group, Inc. v. Greater New | York Mutual Insurance Company, 310 N.J. Super. 82, 87 (App. Div. 1998) | 48 | | Voorhees v. Preferred Mut. Ins. Co. | 128 N.J. 165, 607 A.2d 1255 (N.J.1992) | Passim | | Wakefern Food Corp. v. Liberty Mutual Fire | Ins. Co., 406 N.J. Super.524, 541 (App. Div. 2009).
[directive] Unlike officers who are responsible for responding to traditional calls for service, these officers are typically assigned the singular responsibility of addressing the aforementioned activities, and they are sometimes referred to as crime suppression units.  The nature of their work is varied and may include being dressed in traditional uniform, modified uniform, or plain clothes.  These officers may work alongside undercover officers, conduct surreptitious surveillance, engage in high intensity enforcement via motor vehicle/pedestrian stops and/or interact with confidential informants or witnesses who wish to remain anonymous.  School.  A public or nonpublic elementary or secondary school within this State offering education in grades kindergarten through 12, or any combination of grades, at which a child may legally fulfill compulsory school attendance requirements.  Subject of the video footage.
[directive] Training.  Every agency shall designate one or more training officers and shall establish a training program to ensure that officers equipped with BWCs and officers and civilian employees who access or handle BWC recordings are familiar with the provisions of this BODY WORN CAMERA POLICY | January 2022  7  Policy, and the policy, standing operating procedure, directive, or order promulgated by the agency pursuant to section 3.1, and all applicable laws of the State.
[brief] ---  2  I/M/O  A New Jerey Solar Transition Pursuant to P.L. 2018, C.17, Order, [...], Docket No. [...], dated December 6, 2019, provided in Appellant’s Initial Appendix.  3  I/M/O  A New Jersey Solar Transition Pursuant To P.L. 2018, C.17, Order, [...], Docket No. [...], dated January 8, 2020, provided in Appellant’s Initial Appendix.  C.
[brief] This is exactly the type of injunctive relief Plaintiff seeks here—to wit, for [...] to cease (in the future) providing New Jersey consumers with a form health club contract that fails to provide the “total payment obligation” in violation of HCSA, 56:8- 42(b), obligates future New Jersey consumers to automatically and perpetually renew their contracts, imposing unreasonable and unduly onerous requirements to cancel their health club memberships, and fails to provide the required items pursuant to RISA, 17:16C-27 or RISA, 17:16C-50.
[brief] ”  In my case none of my foreclosure trial judges enforced the NJ UCC Laws  A copy of the alleged Note fabricated by [...] and submitted by [...] was not authenticated and there was no indorsement from [...] to any party (091a).  There is no assignment of the Note from [...] to any party.  Deutsche Bank Nat. v. Mitchell, 27 A. 3d 1229 - NJ: Appellate Div. 2011, “Long Beach was the original holder of the note that Deutsche Bank would like to enforce, and the copy of that note provided by Deutsche Bank is not indorsed.  Deutsche Bank has not established that it may enforce the note as a 'holder’ as provided by N.J.S.A. 12A:3-301. ”  The NJ Appellate Division said it loud and clear that lack of indorsement on a Note is a show stopper.  In (091a) the alleged copy of the Note, which was used as an attachment to that affidavit of lost Note of 2/12/14 (088a) fabricated by [...] and submitted by [...], did not have indorsement from [...] to any entity.
[brief] COUNTER-STATEMENT OF FACTS  A week before February 26, 2017, [...] (“[...]”) from [...], made arrangements with defendant, who he knew as “[...],” to meet at the [...] to discuss transportation of marijuana to the East Coast.  (11T33-4 to 8; 11T37-10 to 17).  [...] identified defendant as ---  1  The trial court restructured the counts of the indictment on the jury verdict sheet to allow for “ease in terms of ultimately following the charge and reaching a verdict.
[brief] She explained that due to Carver Hall video’s poor quality, it’s “difficult to identify somebody specifically as being a certain person,” and color is distorted in freeze frame and stills.  [...] also testified the shooter’s face was visible in only five frames.  (12T198-2 to 200-12; 13T12-1 to 2, 19-6 to 22, 24-14 to 16, 28-2 to 21, 45-2 to 4, 123-12 to 125-24, 127-13)  [...] said though [...] told her he went to a store before [...] came, she never investigated if one existed in [...].  In fact, one of the houses on [...] operated as an unofficial store selling things like soda, chips, and ice cream.  [...] admitted one of the cameras covered [...].  She also admitted [...] had been adamant it was not him, told her he had posted on Facebook right before leaving with [...], and gave police his password.  (11T123-10 to 124-5; 13T88-1 to 90-8, 100-5 to 101-5)  The preserved clips were played.
[brief] Id., at 82.  It read:  The LESSOR covenants and agrees that it shall maintain the common areas of the shopping center in good operating condition and repair … [and t]he LESSOR shall resurface the sidewalk, parking and driveway areas when the same shall be reasonably necessary together with the restriping of the parking areas.  [Id.]  The testimony from managers and employees of both the lessor and tenant indicated that the lessor had responsibility for repairs and maintenance and that the tenant would notify the lessor if any danger or safety issues arose.  Id., at 82-83.  In determining whether [...] owed a duty, the Court first reviewed the law which applied to commercial enterprises to maintain the sidewalks adjacent to their properties and any walkway along the expected route between the parking provided and the entry to the store.  *Id.*, at 85.  The Court then recognized that the imposition of a duty does not extend to “tenants in a multi-tenant mall that do not have control or maintenance responsibilities for a common area and have no contractual obligation to maintain such areas.
[brief] See Derry, 250 N.J. at 634.  By improperly presenting this testimony though a lay witness, the State avoided these important requirements to ensure that only reliable technical or scientific evidence is presented to the jury.  Indeed, our Court has long emphasized “that the measurements derived from the device are admissible at a criminal trial only when they are shown to have sufficient scientific basis to produce uniform and reasonably reliable results and will contribute materially to the ascertainment of the truth.
[brief] This exception, if triggered, plainly modifies the exclusion at issue, which bars coverage for “liability, damage, loss, cost or expense” caused by “ingestion of… fungi or bacteria. ”  It is well established that “ingestion” – that is, “eating” – of toxic mold, including mold containing trichothecene mycotoxins, is a principal (but not the only) means of exposure to mold-related illness.  The exception provides that the very broad exclusion for loss, harm, or damage arising from the “ingestion of, contact with, exposure to, the existence of, or presence of any fungi or bacteria” simply “does not apply” if the exception for mold “on or contained in” an edible good is triggered.  The Trial Court refused to apply the exception – even though there is no \(^5\) Courts in other jurisdictions considering similar exceptions in cases involving harm from contaminated water have not required proof that the claimants actually consumed the water by drinking it.
[brief] As such, the undersigned filed a motion to dismiss, which was granted, and then moved for sanctions for filing a frivolous suit.  This motion was also granted by the trial court without prejudice to seek additional sanctions as the court found that the amount sought for sanctions was more than reasonable and actually lower than standard (Pa2T, 11:7 – 12:4).  Respondent motioned for additional sanctions, which were also granted in its favor.  Appellant filed this appeal to reconsider the dismissal of his complaint and sanctions imposed.
[brief] They also argue that the CCIP enrollment status reports show [...]’s exclusion, and that [...] did not have dedicated payroll for employees and was not added as an insured by separate endorsement.  [...] Db27-Db28.  [...] and [...] are again wrong.  First, the CCIP Policy itself, in its Named Insured – Contractor Controlled Insurance Program Endorsement – defines its “named insureds” as contractors “enrolled in the Contractor Controlled Insurance Program” and performing at a “designated project.
[directive] # Page 1 a practical basis, matters which probation is imposed, the municipal court (b)  On in in must ensure that:  The defendant receives the sentencing order.  i.  The municipal court staff collects the defendant's contact information ii. (address, phone, email) and provides it to the Probation Division.  iii.  The defendant is advised by the municipal court to update Probation when there is any change to defendant's contact information.  If iv. for any reason a defendant's contact information (address, phone, email) not collected at the sentencing hearing and the defendant was pretrial on is monitoring, the Pretrial Services Unit will share the defendant's contact information with the probation officer.  (4)  County Jail Sentences of For sentences that include a term incarceration, judges should consider whether of of stay commencement the custodial portion a sentence term until a later date.
[brief] (Appx 536 at ¶61).  Onlookers called [...] security and the police came.  (Appx 536 at ¶62).  [...] reported the incident to the state of New Jersey.  (Appx 536 at ¶63).  [...] reached out to Plaintiff multiple times as part of its investigation, but Plaintiff failed to respond.  (Appx 536 at ¶63).  On May 12, 2020, [...] emailed and sent via FedEx a letter to Plaintiff letting her know that [...] needed to speak with her.  (Appx 536 at ¶64).  [...]’s letter detailed the efforts that had been made to get in touch with her.  (Appx 536 at ¶64).  The letter gave Plaintiff until May 18, 2020 at 5:00 p.m. to respond.  (Appx 536 at ¶64).  Plaintiff did not respond and did not participate [...]’s investigation of this matter.  (Appx 536 at ¶65).  On May 19, 2020, [...] terminated Plaintiff’s employment in connection with the incident at [...].
[brief] ”).  Woo-Padva v. Midland Funding, LLC, No. A-1996-21, 2023 WL 6157245 at 4.  Further support for this position can be found in the two unreported cases upon which the Defendant relies: New Century Fin. v. Trewin, 2018 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1688 (Ch. Div. May 24, 2018) (Da71), where the court begins its analysis of this issue by first “...acknowledging that no private right of action exists under the CFLA,” Trewin at 8, (Da73a); and Veras v. LVNV Funding No. 13-1745 (RBK/JS), 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34176 (D.N.J. Mar. 17, 2014) (Da74), where the court noted “A review of the NJCFLA reveals that the Legislature did not provide for a private right of action in order to enforce the requirements of the Act.
[brief] This case was tried for seven non-consecutive days in the Monmouth County Chancery Division.  At trial, [...] presented title experts who testified as to why they believed the deeds of conveyance in the chain of title did not include the transfer of certain riparian lands abutting the shoreline at those times, while the [...] presented a title expert who testified as to why the deeds of conveyance in the chain of title did include the transfer of these riparian lands.  The Trial Court ultimately found that the [...]’s witnesses were more credible than those presented by [...] and that [...]’s argument that the deeds of conveyance in the chain of title intended to exclude these riparian lands “defies reason”.
[brief] The Court Did Not Err in Providing an Aggravation Charge Under Model Civil Jury Charge 8.11F  Appellant next raises the issue of the Aggravation Charge, Model Civil Jury Charge 8.11F, having been read over objection.  Appellant first objects meritoriously, on the alleged basis that Respondent did not provide the necessary comparative analysis to warrant the Aggravation Charge.  Appellant further objects relative to the timing the Trial Court agreed to give the Aggravation Charge, based upon alleged prejudice.  Both arguments fail.
[brief] Although the Superior Court lacks jurisdiction to hear [...]’s school law claims under Title 18A reserved for the Commissioner of Education, for the sake of argument, the only conceivable way that [...]’s Counterclaim seeking to enforce compliance with N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-9(e)(3) can be properly brought before the Superior Court is under R. 4:69-1, et seq. by filing a complaint in lieu of prerogative writ.  Under that scheme, R. 4:69-6(a) (“Limitation on Bringing Certain Actions”; “General Limitation”) states, “No action in lieu of prerogative writs shall be commenced later than 45 days after the accrual of the right to the review, hearing or relief claimed”.  Thus, [...]’s Counterclaim filed over 2-years after the non-payment of the April / May / June 2020 invoices are barred by the statute of limitations.  Also, with the 90-day statute of limitations under N.J.A.C. 6A:3-1.3(i) to bring disputes under Title 18A statutes before the Commissioner, and being that [...] admittedly never sent a notice of breach of contract or sought redress through the Commissioner, the doctrine of laches bars [...]’s suit.
[brief] WHETHER THE PUBLISHING BY THE DEFENDANTS OF INFORMATION SEIZED THROUGH A VIOLATION OF THE SEARCH AND SEIZURE CLAUSE WITHOUT A WARRANT REGARDING FALSE CRIMINAL CONDUCT WAS DEFAMATORY PER SE  Raised below (Pa145; The trial Court declined to address the issue)  One of the republications was by the Honorable [...] U.S.D.J. on April 14, 2010, refusing to remand the case back to the trial court based on Fraudulent Joinder.  Joinder is fraudulent “where there is no reasonable basis in fact or colorable ground supporting the claim against the joined defendant, or no real intention in good faith to prosecute the action against the defendants or seek a joint judgement. ”” (citing Boyer v. Snap-On Tools Corp., 913 F.2d 108, 111 (3d Cir.1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1085, 111 S.Ct. 959, 112 L.Ed.2d 1046 (1991) (quoting Abels v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 770. F.2d 26, at 32 (3d Cir. 1985)).  [...]’s filing a lawsuit against [...] and its lawyer, [...] for republishing the false and inaccurate FHR when that content was sealed and stricken in 2006 was not fraudulent.  The removal itself by [...] was fraudulent.  But, “[i]f there is even a possibility that a state court would find that the complaint states a cause of action against any one of the resident defendants, the federal court must find that joinder was proper and remand the case to state court. ’  Boyer, 913 F.2d at 111 (quoting Coker v. Amooco Oil Co., 709 F.2d 1433, 1440-41 (11th Cir. 1983)).  [...] found that “[...] was authorized by law to publish said criminal history because the information was not subject to a sealing order at the time of its publication” id at 7.  The criminal history report was stricken and sealed in 2006, by [...] and remains sealed and stricken to this day.  (Emphasis Supplied)  Furthermore, we recently have held that “where there are colorable claims or defenses asserted against or by diverse and non-diverse parties were fraudulently joined based on its view of the merits of those claims or defenses."  Boyer, 913 F.2d at 113 (citing Chesapeake & O. RY. Co. v. Cockrell, 232 U.S. 146 34 S.Ct. 278, 58 L.Ed 544 (1914))  In the instant case, both [...], its lawyers and [...] were all residents of New Jersey and the [...] complaint had been sealed and stricken since 2006 stripping the District Court for the District of New Jersey of both subject-matter and personal jurisdiction over the defamatory statements republished by [...].
[brief] **Scope:**  Daily rates for saw cutting to expose steel reinforcement and breaking 150’ concrete wall at property line of [...] will include all union labor, equipment and materials to complete.  (Pa878-879.)  The Purchase Order describes three types of work for [...]: (A) “Hand sawing, chipping & breaking pockets x concrete slab to expose steel reinforcement” (*sic*); (B) down time; and (C) “Shaving of vertical wall ‘high’ spots to create clean edge at property line of [...], limits and flush cut wall sawing concrete slab overhang to match vertical wall limits.
[brief] The prosecutor knows this as well since she cited case law in her own brief.  The sole limit to this deferential standard is review of “purely legal issues,” which are owed no deference and are reviewed “plenary. ”  (Prb(5-6))  I also have legal grounds for an appeal based on reasonable and articulated suspicion to pull me over for “New Jersey Statute 39:4-92.2 - Procedure for motorist approaching certain stationary vehicle.
[brief] N.J.S.A. 43:15A-7.2(a).  Following the enactment of Chapter 92, the [...] (the “Division”) and the [...] issued more specific guidance to local governments concerning the proper enrollment of individuals performing professional services, many of whom were not full-time employees and were engaged by multiple entities.  In July 2012, the [...] (“OSC”) conducted an extensive audit of PERS local employer locations and found that, in violation of Chapter 92, a significant number of professional services providers remained enrolled in PERS after January 1, 2008, even though many were engaged through professional services contracts awarded under the Local Public Contracts Law (the “LPCL”), N.J.S.A. 40A:11-1 thru -60, or were not “employees” but rather independent contractors.  Improper Participation by Professional Service Providers in the State Pension System at 9 (July 17, 2012).  The OSC Report found that many employers failed to review these situations or took no action after Chapter 92’s enactment, and as a result, many professional services providers, including attorneys who provided legal services to local governments under publicly bid contracts, remained in PERS after January 1, 2008, though ineligible for credit based on this service.  Id. at 10-13.  The examples cited in the OSC Report included municipal attorneys, municipal prosecutors and municipal public defenders.  Ibid.
[directive] HIGHLIGHTS OF THE 2004 BRIMAGE GUIDELINES  The revised Guidelines apply only to cases where the Brimage-eligible ! offense occurred on or after September 15, 2004.  Cases involving Brimage-eligible offenses committed before this date remain subject to the original Brimage Guidelines.  See Section 1.2.  The revised Guidelines employ a new numbering system designed to ! make it easier to locate and cite to applicable provisions and features.  The revised Guidelines also incorporate all relevant Application Notes that had interpreted the original Brimage Guidelines.  These original Application Notes need not be consulted with respect to any case that is subject to the provisions of the revised Guidelines.
[brief] Plaintiffs further argue that because the trial court found [...] and [...] credible, the court’s conclusion that Defendant wrongfully converted funds from Plaintiffs is legally sound (Pb60).  Not so.  A trial court’s legal conclusions, as here, require evidential support.  *Griepenburg v. Twp. of Ocean*, 220 N.J. 239, 254 (2015) (citations omitted).  [...]’s testimony that he agreed with his expert’s damage analysis is not synonymous with direct evidence that the Disputed Transactions were improper, unauthorized or that Defendant engaged in wrongful conduct.  Likewise, the court’s finding that [...] and [...] were credible witnesses is irrelevant when there is no testimony from [...] that the Disputed Transactions were unauthorized or wrongful to begin with.  Plaintiffs cannot rely on the trial court’s credibility findings in the absence of evidence in the record supporting the court’s legal conclusions.  Indeed, this is not a “he hit me” or “he didn’t hit” me situation where witness credibility would be paramount, because there is no evidence of anyone being “hit” to begin with.  In other words, Plaintiffs still had to prove their conversion claims against Defendant even if the trial court did not find that there was “meat” to her husband’s explanations regarding the nature and purpose behind the Disputed Transactions (36T33-13).
[brief] There, the property was in a residential zone since the first zoning in 1929.  The first floor had been used as a restaurant prior to zoning and was a legal nonconforming use.  At some point, the second floor residence had morphed into use for dining and dancing with music.  Being pre-MLUL, there was no administrative process for such nonconforming use disputes.  The neighbors filed this suit against the restaurant/bar and Borough seeking the halting of the nonconforming second floor use.  The Appellate Court --- the distinguished Judges [...], [...], and [...] --- analyzed the burden of proof, stating:  A word might be said as to the burden of proof which rests on the respective parties in an action such as this.  Plaintiffs make out a *prime facie* case with respect to the second floor by establishing that the present zoning ordinance prohibits the use of that floor for dining and dancing.  It then falls upon the defendants, the owners and the public officials, to establish that the use, though nonconforming, nevertheless existed at the time of the passage of the ordinance; and where (as here) ordinances and amendments thereto have been adopted, which place a property from time to time in various zones in all of which, however, the use has been prohibited continuously over a period, then defendants must establish that this use existed when the first of these ordinances was adopted.  This places a heavy burden on defendants in situations such as that before us, where (of course, it is happening increasingly more often) the applicable zoning ordinance was adopted over 20 years ago.  However, a rule such as this, under which he who claims a nonconforming use is compelled to establish his claim, comports with the policy of the law in this State not to favor such a use.  That the burden of proof rests upon the proponent of the non-permitted use has been followed in numerous cases.