ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] In those domains, as seen, both experts are highly qualified to render their opinions.  Not unlike Smith, [...] bases his opinions on the aforesaid evidence categories.  He opined that the intersection illumination, based on IESNA recommendations, should have been 0.9 foot candles, instead of 0.00 foot candles (scientific knowledge and data).  It is immaterial that [...] is a municipality since construction standards are good guides for any municipality, especially since [...] has no guidance from any engineering source for lighting.  He further observes that tree branches blocked the stop sign and the streetlight itself (photograph, video); the streetlight was reported out to [...] (deposition testimony); there was a working streetlight in the background of [...] (Smith’s site observations); the two light sources created a backlight condition (scientific knowledge); “[t]he only light available at the intersection would backlight the pedestrian causing the pedestrian to become a shadow from the perspective of the vehicle operator” (scientific knowledge); [...] should have retained a firm to guide it in lighting selection” and should have been proactive in determining lighting inadequacies (industry standard, experience).
[brief] MATERIAL CONTRARY TO BRADY V. MARYLAND, 373 U.S. 83, (1963)  As noted by the trial court, the testimony of State's witness [...] is a major factor in the prosecution's theory of the case.  [...] was an inmate at [...].  He reached out to the Prosecutor’s Office and claimed he had information in the [...] case.  Wesley claimed he obtained information through multiple conversations with defendant.  Wesley claimed to have spoken to defendant almost every day, sometimes for five minutes, sometimes for more than an hour, from the third week of February 2020 until March 25, 2020, while both men were inmates at the [...].  (28T84-14 to 22)  Wesley wrote a letter to the prosecutor in late February 2020 offering to provide information against defendant in exchange for a benefit to his own case.  On March 9, 2020, Wesley gave his first statement to law enforcement.  Following a trial by jury defendant was found guilty of first degree murder.
[brief] H644a Holm-113: [...] response to discovery request HOLM-[...]-PNL-111 objected to discussing factors BPU might consider in denying eminent domain for [...] or [...] (SOICR p. 12) ............ H645a Holm-114: [...] response to discovery request HOLM-[...]-PNL-112 objected to providing any document on consideration of using eminent domain for this project (SOICR p. 12)
[brief] * * * * * * * * *  Because implementation of the Mandatory Notification Policies would raise serious issues under the equal protection provision of the New Jersey Constitution, the Court should avoid the constitutional problem by affirming the trial court’s decision.  The State has established at least a likelihood of success on the merits of its claim that the Law Against Discrimination prohibits the enforcement of school district policies that single out gender-nonconforming students for mandatory affirmative notice to their parents of how they express their gender identities at school, regardless of the students’ objections.  The State has also shown that gender-nonconforming students would face irreparable harm under the challenged policies, and the other preliminary injunction factors favor the State as well.
[brief] Instead, [...] points to evidence outside of the evidentiary record, including an email obtained from the [...] to support its convoluted theory that [...]’s Property at Lot 22 is actually [...]’s Lot 20.  Setting aside for a moment that [...]’s Da255 is a purported email exchange from the City Surveyor from January 2023, which [...] itself received four months after discovery ended and which [...] did not produce until it filed its summary judgment motion several months later, [...] fails to articulate how such information overcomes the dispositive conclusion of the Court-appointed surveyor, [...], whom [...] confronted at his deposition as if he was somehow biased towards [...] in favor of [...],\(^7\) or its own secret survey from \(^7\)
[brief] “Under that settled principle of law, trial errors that ‘were induced, encouraged or acquiesced in or consented to by defense counsel ordinarily are not a basis for reversal on appeal. ’”  A.R., 213 N.J. at 561 (quoting State v. Corsaro, 107 N.J. 339, 345 (1987); State v. Harper, 128 N.J. Super. 270, 277 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 65 N.J. 574 (1974)).
[brief] Specifically, [...] was questioned regarding language found within page 1 of Attachment B providing that [...]’s construction administration services under the contract were to be provided consistent with the [...]’s Construction Manual.  (3T186:17-187:19 and Pa1271-72).  [...] conceded that he never referred to the [...]’s Construction Manual in developing his opinions related to whether [...]’s services satisfied the governing standard of care.  (3T187:20-189:15 and Pa1265).  By way of follow-up questioning, [...] testified that [...]’s role as the resident engineer was to take steps to ensure that the general contractor, [...], satisfied the project specifications.  (3T190:1-5).  [...] conceded, however, that in developing his standard of care opinion he did not evaluate the manner by which [...] performed its construction management services.  [...] in fact specifically recognized that he paid no attention to the process by which [...] effectuated its construction management services during the course of the project.  (3T190:6-16).  Accordingly, [...] provided no analysis as to the express contractual standard for the performance of construction administration services nor any details associated with the manner by which [...] performed its Project-related services.
[brief] Receiving full indemnity – that is, “just compensation” – for the government’s taking of private property is a fundamental requirement of the federal and state constitutions, and the sole remaining issue for the fact finder in this case is the amount of just compensation owed to [...] (hereafter, “[...]) for the taking of its private property by the [...] (hereafter, “[...]”).  The fact finder did not yet decide just compensation in this case because this appeal has been brought by [...] before a jury trial has occurred.  With that one constitutional issue still outstanding, the Trial Court lawfully denied [...]’s eleventh-hour dispositive motion \textit{in limine} because it found that [...]’s expert opinions should be presented to the trier of fact.  In particular, the Trial Court found that [...]’s expert reports were grounded in market evidence and followed prevailing Supreme Court authority, which holds that the “highest and best use” of private property taken by eminent domain be determined by a wide factual inquiry into all reasonably probable uses.  The admissibility of evidence in condemnation cases is controlled by the following hypothetical: what facts would a willing buyer and a willing seller in the marketplace consider in negotiating a sale of the [...] property on the date of valuation?
[brief] ”)  Both CEPA and Pierce require identification of a “clear public policy. ”  CEPA is no broader in the way it defines public policy.  Mehlman provides lengthy guidance on what generally qualifies as public policy.  There, our Supreme Court recognized, “because the sources and parameters of public policy are not susceptible to hard and fast rules, ‘the judiciary must define the cause of action in case-by-case determinations. ’”  Mehlman, 153 N.J. at 187. (internal citations omitted).  In acknowledging this latitude in identifying sources of public policy, the Mehlman Court confirmed that imminent regulatory authorities should be considered in determining the existence of public policy.  See Mehlman, 153 N.J. at 191 (“Evidence of governmental regulation subsequent to… [the alleged retaliation]… also corroborated Mehlman's testimony that the sale of gasoline with more than five percent benzene was hazardous to human health. ”)  After all, the dynamic nature of public policy, particularly in terms of the quickly evolving public policy on Covid-19 relative to Plaintiff’s termination, demonstrates how future regulatory changes influence our understanding of public policy.
[brief] 21  Pacifico v. Pacifico, 190 N.J. 258 (2007)  . . . . . . . . . . . .  13  Ramos v. Browning Ferris Industries, Inc., 103 N.J. 177 1986)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20, 27 Rommell v. U.S. Steel Corp., 66 N.J. Super 30 App. Div. 1984).
[brief] Defendant-Appellant, [...] (“[...]”), incorporates by reference the Statement of Facts and Procedural History contained in his initial brief in support of his appeal.  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN GRANTING THE FORCED SALE OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTY  BECAUSE IT WAS CONTRARY TO THE APRIL 13, 2022  CONSENT JUDGMENT.  (Da1)  Plaintiff-Respondent argues that “Defendant-Appellant’s Answer and opposition failed to raise any issues of material fact that required the Trial Court to conduct a plenary hearing before rendering a judgment in his favor.
[brief] [The Wilfs’ expert] reached his conclusion by: - Adjusting the partnership’s financials to include a management fee of 5% on rental income; - Adding in overhead costs for rent, office space, payroll and benefits; - Adding a general contractor and/or construction manager fee of 10% of the construction costs under the assumption that [[...]] acted as general contractors for [...]; - Adding a development fee of 10% of development costs under the assumption that [[...]] acted as developers for [...]; and - Adding interest for loans provided by defendant-related parties.  ([1651a; 1669-70a; 3108a; 3114-16a; 3108a; 3152-55a])  Those adjustments were applied from 1985-2009.  A defense against these arguments required producing evidence: (1) to rebut the presumption that [[...]] solely acted as the general contractor, and were therefore owed general contractor / construction manager fees from the years 1987 to 1999; (2) to rebut the presumption that [[...]] solely acted to develop [...], and were therefore owed developer fees from the years 1985 to 1999; (3) to determine if the rent, office space, and payroll being added for the years 1986 and 1989 through 2009 were for costs that actually benefitted the partnership.
[brief] After the Company’s initial Site Analysis, the Original Proposed Site was identified as the most suitable location for the Regulator Station.  The Original Proposed Site is of sufficient size, presents a natural fit to co-locate [...]’s station with another energy company’s facility (the [...]), and allows [...] to locate the Facility adjacent to the transmission line.  Significantly, the site is located at the southern end of [...]’s Holmdel transmission line, which will minimize the risk of customer exposure to outages.  Moreover, the zoning for the site is non-residential and conditionally permits public utilities.  There are no environmental constraints that would impact the development of a regulator station at this site.  The site is not encumbered with Green Acres restrictions.  There are no low elevations in the easement area, and thus no flooding concerns, and [...] is not required to clear a significant number of trees.  Moreover, [...] successfully obtained an easement from the relevant parties.  25.
[directive] defendant’s request 6.  The Court declines to amend Rule 3:25-4(i) and eliminate exclusions of time for interlocutory review of orders excluding time.  To do so states that “[t]he time from the filing to the would conflict with the CJRA, which final disposition of a motion made before trial by the prosecutor or the eligible defendant” “shall be excluded in computing time in which a case shall be indicted or tried. ”  N.J.S.A. 2A:162-22(b)(1)(c) (emphasis added).  But the Court adopts an expedited approach for motions for leave to appeal an order about speedy trial calculations.  Going forward, the Appellate Division should decide the motion within 5 days.  If the court grants the motion for leave to appeal, it should direct the parties to file briefs -- and transcripts, if necessary -- on an expedited basis, and render a decision within 5 days of getting those materials.  Parties can ask the Court to review the Appellate Division’s judgment on an emergent basis.  (pp. 31-33)
[brief] ...............26  Statutes  N.J.S.A. 40:55D-2 .........................................................................................26  N.J.S.A. 40:55D-2(i) ...................................................................................29  N.J.S.A. 40:55D-2(a) ..................................................................................28  N.J.S.A. 40:55D-2(c) ..................................................................................29 N.J.S.A. 40:55D-2(e) ..................................................................................15 N.J.S.A. 40:55D-2(e)(g) ..............................................................................28 N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70 ....................................................................................19, 20, 31 N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70(d)(1) ..........................................................................25, 26 Other Authorities Code, §240-6.5I(1)(a) .................................................................................................................. 25 Code, §240-6.5I(1)(a) and (b), and §240-6.5G(1)(e)................................................................. 25 N.J.A.C. 5:80-26.3(b)(1)............................................................................................................. 28 Ordinance No. 19-02...................................................................................................................... 5, 6, 9 PRELIMINARY STATEMENT The plethora of evidence wholeheartedly establishes that Defendant-respondent, the [...]’s (“Zoning Board”) denial of plaintiff-appellant, [...]’s (“[...]” or “Plaintiff”) second application for site plan approval and variance relief to permit the redevelopment of the vacant lot located at [...] Road, Oradell, into a modern mixed-use building was arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable, and otherwise without basis in law or fact and contrast to the fundamental principles of sound planning in violation of the Municipal Land Use Law (“MLUL”), N.J.S.A. 40:55D-1 et seq.
[brief] (BWC3 at 27:00 to 27:10; BWC4-B at 1:15 to 1:24)  The State’s failure to call [...], the central witness to whether or not her own consent was voluntary, further deprived the court of crucial facts regarding her mental state.  Cf. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 286 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“Where, as in this case, the person giving consent is someone other than the defendant, the prosecution may require him to testify under oath. ”), cited with approval in State v. Johnson, 68 N.J. 349, 354 n.3 (1975) (citing “ways by which the State could satisfy [its] burden” of proving voluntary consent).  Not only did the court get those critical facts wrong, but it also failed to properly apply the law by not analyzing the mandatory King factors, which overwhelmingly indicated that [...]’s consent was involuntary.
[brief] I.  APPELLATE REVIEW OF SUMMARY  JUDGMENT  The Appellate Division applies the same standard under Rule 4:46-2(c) that governs the motion court.  Sashihara v. Nobel Learning Communities, Inc., 461 N.J. Super. 195, 205 (App. Div. 2019).  That is, summary judgment should not be granted unless the record reveals “no genuine issue as to any material fact” and “the moving party is entitled to a judgment or order as a matter of law. ”  R. 4:46-2(c).  R. 4:46-2(c).  Where a matter proceeds on cross-motions, the Appellate Division need not address whether there was a genuine dispute as to material facts, and need only decide whether the motion judge’s application of the law was correct.  *St. Peter’s Univ. Hosp. v. New Jersey Bldg. Laborers Statewide Welfare Fund*, 431 N.J. Super. 446, 453 (App. Div. 2013).  The appellate court’s review is *de novo*, and it need not defer to the trial court’s conclusions.  *Qian v. Toll Bros. Inc.*, 223 N.J. 124, 135 (2015).  Purely legal questions, such as the interpretation of insurance contracts, are questions of law particularly suited for summary judgment.  *Badiali v. New Jersey Mfrs. Ins. Group*, 220 N.J. 544, 555 (2015).  **II.
[brief] In its 2018 Opinion, this Court affirmed [...]’s findings of fact and conclusions of law as to liability, holding, pursuant to Rule 2:11-3(e)(1)(E), that the [...]’ “arguments regarding the trial judge’s findings of fact on the RICO claims,” as well as their “contentions” with regard to [...]’s “non-RICO claims … lack[ed] sufficient merit [even] to warrant discussion.
[brief] The record is also clear that [...] herself retired the same year as plaintiff, 2016, worked at the DEP a year longer than [...]’s thirty-year career, and was born in 1957, making her at least fifty-six years old when the alleged remark was made in 2014.  (Pa719-720).  The record is also clear that despite the claim that he was told he was “too old” to go to a conference in 2014, [...] continued to attend conferences with [...]’s approval in 2014 and 2015.  (Pa359; Pa361; Pa363; Pa365-366; Pa368; Pa385-386; Pa782-784; Pa786; 3T19:8-20).  [...]’s reference to his own internal complaint (Pa869-870), not verified by either of the alleged witnesses, is not the type of competent, reliable, non-hearsay evidence required to defeat summary judgment.
[brief] Following this Order, the Appellant moved for reconsideration a full year after the initial decision in the matter before [...].  [...] denied the motion for reconsideration.  (Da 149.)  In the September 17, 2018, Statement of Reasons, [...] reiterated why the Appellant’s claims were futile under the legal principles of judicial estoppel:  In regards to the Spill Act claims against plaintiffs [Brian and [...]/Respondents], as stated above, and in the Court’s Statement of Reasons attached to the June 22, 2018 Order, [the Appellants/[...]] have not presented any new information with regards to these claims.  Rather, [the Puglia Respondents] have presented proofs and presented before [...], J.S.C. at [the Puglia Respondents’] hardship stay hearing that there were no further environmental issues.  Now [the [...]] appear to take a different stance.  This Court finds that the Spill Act claims against plaintiffs are barred by Judicial Estoppel.  (Da 154.)  [...] also dismissed the claims against the Estate, including the Spill Act claim, citing the doctrines of collateral estoppel and res judicata.  6.  **May 2022 Settlement Agreement**
[brief] At the same time, the standards are to be applied with discriminating care so as not to defeat a summary judgment if the movant is justly entitled to one.  Judson v. Peoples Bank and Trust Company of Westfield, 17 N.J. 67, 74 (1954).  Thus, it is the movant’s burden to exclude any reasonable doubt as to the existence of any genuine issue of material fact, Judson 17 N.J. AT 74 (citing 6 Moore's Federal Practice, par. 56.15(3)).
[brief] ”  Pa1024-1029; Potter v. Charles V. Finch & Sons, 76 N.J. 499, 502 (1978) (quoting N.J.S.A. 48:12-152); N.J.S.A. 48:12-152 (current version).  This shows that the legislative intent for the statute, in addition to its plain language, is that it will bar claims for damages arising out of the blatant misuse of a crossing, such as walking onto it without first looking, while the pedestrian signals prohibit entry onto it, and while an oncoming train, is openly, obviously, and imminently about to enter it.  It should also be noted that if [...]’s position is accepted, this would led to absurd results.  For example, if [...] is correct, then the statute would not apply to bar recovery of damages when a person is injured or killed because they collided with a train after driving around a lowered railroad gate and entering a crossing in disregard of flashing red lights and an obviously approaching train.
[brief] ’”  Citing Jersey City Police v. Jersey City 257 N.J. Super 6, 14 (App. Div. 1992).  [311 N.J. Super. at 678.]  In Ohio Casualty v. Garzon-Cardenas, Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division, Docket No. [...] (Dec’d July 15. 2005), the court held that “A PIP arbitrator [sic] lacks the requisite authority to award damages pursuant to the Fraud Act, which awards special remedies to insurance companies.
[directive] As ações, petições e outros documentos entregues ao tribunal deverão estar em inglês Complaints, motions and other papers submitted to the court should be in English  Poder Judiciário de Nova Jersey  Condado New Jersey Judiciary County Formulário de Declaração Judicial No do Processo da Promotoria Prosecutor File Number  Plea Form (Portuguese)  Nome do réu: Defendant’s Name: perante o juiz: before Judge:
[brief] As detailed above, the shooting occurred at 12:11pm in [...].  [...] told police that throughout the morning and into the midafternoon, he was at [...] about a half an hour drive away.  The [...] moved quickly to collect footage from all Oakcrest’s 18 surveillance cameras, totaling over 200 hours of footage, and including video showing Oakcrest’s entrances and exits, and download it on a portable hard drive.  [...] detective [...] unilaterally decided that just two short clips were relevant, and [...] deleted the rest of the footage, without ever affording the defense a chance to inspect it.  When counsel discovered almost all the footage was erased, he moved to dismiss the indictment for spoliation; the defense had wanted to determine what cars entered and left the complex at various important times.  During the February 24, 2014 hearing, [...] IT worker [...] testified that in July 2013, the footage was deleted and drive wiped clean to make available for other cases.  He testified this process would obliterate everything on the drive, unlike a simple deletion that would have left all or part in a recoverable state.  Counsel apparently accepted the assertion the footage was gone forever and did not demand production of the drive for analysis.  The court refused to dismiss the case but agreed to give a permissive adverse inference charge.
[directive] Notice When Using BWCs with a Person Seeking to Remain Anonymous.  When interacting with a person seeking to anonymously report a crime or assist in an ongoing law enforcement investigation, a law enforcement officer shall notify the person that they are wearing a BWC and, if the person requests that the officer discontinue use of the BWC, the officer shall evaluate the circumstances and, if appropriate, discontinue use of the BWC.  A request to discontinue the use of a BWC made to a law enforcement officer pursuant to this Section and the response to the request shall be recorded by the recording system prior to discontinuing use of the recording system.  BODY WORN CAMERA POLICY | January 2022
[brief] Starting with the Planning Board “consistency” review, that issue/presentation was before the Planning Board at its Public Meeting on February 8, 2021.  The Transcript of that Hearing/presentation was Exhibit J4 (2T) and the summary of the review and Planning Board recommendation, written by Board Attorney [...], was Exhibit J5 (Pa573).  At the Hearing, the “consistency” justification was presented to the Planning Board by Planner [...], the drafter of the Redevelopment Plan (2T10).
[brief] ”  *Jarwick*, 2018 WL 2449133, at *29.  This Court did not affirm, expressly or by implication, the prior findings by the Trial Court or the Special Master about which fees were compensable.  It vacated the entirety of the attorneys’ fee award.  Hence, it required the Trial Court to reconsider the fees by applying a different standard from the one the Trial Court previously had used.