ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The documents themselves were clear.  And while the October 23, 1939 Decree and some of the earlier documents had language that Defendant [...] was trying to argue supported their ownership claim, those referenced documents at best arguably only referenced riparian rights (which is not a fee simple ownership interest).  They clearly did not unequivocally state that there was a transfer of Riparian Grant, and that the only unequivocal and valid transfer of ownership of the Riparian Grant at issue prior to 1939 was from the [...] to [...] Heights Company grant.  The Borough's title expert [...] admitted that "... when one receives a riparian grant, they are acquiring title to the land which is under the water, tidally flowed water ...".  (7T73:15-19)  That is the law.  But when further questioned: "If someone acquires a riparian right, does he also acquire title to land which is lying beneath the water?" where the answer to this question is clearly "no" by virtue of the Supreme Court's holding in Panetta v. Equity, supra, after an uncomfortable period of silence and attempt to avoid the simple question, and unwilling to be the person that put the proverbial "nail in the coffin" of the Borough of [...]'s entire argument, [...] finally answered: "Sitting here today I have no opinion on the question."  (7T74:2-75)  Then when questioned whether the specific phrase "Riparian Right" is found in any of "... the deeds from [...] Heights to [...] and from [...] to [...], Inc...." (the Court could take Judicial Notice under N.J.R.E. 202 that the only correct answer is "NO")  [...] first claimed that it was "possible" that the phrase was there, but when pushed he conceded that "I don't know if they're there.  So, I can't answer your question."  (7T75:8-24)  The witness had the documents in front of him.  So, on the two critical questions in the case, Defendant [...]'s expert witness "had no opinion on the question" and "did not know".  The testimony of Plaintiff [...]'s experts [...] and [...] on these two critical points is unchallenged.  If Defendant [...] never in fact took title to the subject property, then Plaintiff [...] is entitled to a Court Declaration Quieting Title in their favor and monetary damages.  The answer to this disputed question of material fact—the only actual disputed material relevant question at issue in this trial—is the “Expert Opinion” of the expert witnesses from both sides to the single question:  Whether in 1939 when Defendant [...] took title to the subject property by Sheriff’s Deed whether the Deed conveyed to them legal title to the (then) dry land only, or to BOTH the (then) dry land and the riparian grant at issue.  [...] maintains there is still no longer any reasonable dispute as to the answer to this determinative question:  Defendant [...] never took or acquired title.  Therefore, the Borough does not own the subject property.
[brief] To establish the second prong, a defendant must show that he suffered prejudice due to counsel’s deficient performance.  *Strickland*, 466 U.S. at 692-93.  Under this analysis, “[i]t is not enough for the defendant to show that the errors had some conceivable effect on the outcome of the proceeding. ”  *Id.* at 693.  Rather, a defendant must show by a “reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. ”  *Fritz*, 105 N.J. at 52-53.  A reasonable probability has been defined as “probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.
[brief] The State likewise failed to prove to what extent, if any, his childhood neighborhood was crime-ridden, but even if it had, “[j]ust because a location to which police officers are dispatched is a high-crime area does not mean that the residents in that area have lesser constitutional protection. ”  *State v. Goldsmith*, 251 N.J. 384, 400 (2022).  The State’s justification here -- that it was fine for multiple seasoned detectives to harass an uncounseled young adult because they believed he was a criminal -- offends the basic constitutional guarantee of equal protection under the law.
[directive] Reasonable Belief.  A reasonable belief is an objective assessment based upon an evaluation of how a reasonable officer with comparable training and experience would react to, or draw inferences from, the facts and circumstances confronting and known by the officer at the scene.  Serious Bodily Injury.  Serious bodily injury means bodily injury which creates a substantial risk of death or which causes serious, permanent disfigurement or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ.  Serious bodily injury and serious bodily harm have the same definition the purposes of this Policy.
[brief] 6  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES  Page(s)  Cases  DiFiore v. Pezic, 254 N.J. 212 (2023)  ................................................................................................................ passim DiFiore v. Pezic, 472 N.J. Super. 100 (App. Div. 2022)  .........................................................................................  1 Green v. N.J. Mfrs. Ins. Co., 160 N.J. 480 (1999) ......................................................................................................................  5 Rowe v. Bell & Gossett Co., 239 N.J. 531 (2019) .....................................................................................................................  5  Wellmann ex rel. Wellmann v. Rd. Runner Sports, Inc., 458 N.J. Super. 373 (Law Div. 2018)
[brief] Honorable Judges of the Superior Court of New Jersey  Appellate Division  R.J. Hughes Justice Complex  25 W. Market Street P.O. Box 006 Trenton, NJ 08625-0006  Re: [...], Plaintiff-Appellant, V. [...]  Defendant-Respondent.  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY, APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. [...]; ON APPEAL FROM ORDER ENTERED BY THE SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY, CHANCERY DIVISION-GENERAL EQUITY PART, MERCER COUNTY ([...]); CIVIL ACTION; SAT BELOW: HON. [...], P.J.Ch.; SUBMITTED: JUNE 28, 2024
[brief] (PA007.)  Cf. *Santana v. SmileDirectClub, LLC*, 475 N.J. Super. 279, 286 (App. Div. 2019) ("[A] party may not claim lack of notice of the terms of an arbitration provision for failure to read it.").  Like the plaintiff in *Blocker*, [...] electronically signed an account application through which he acknowledged receiving and agreed to the DAA’s terms, including the arbitration agreement.
[brief] On April 7, 2021, defendant-appellant [...] was charged in [...] with Murder - First Degree, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3a(1)(2) (Count 1), and Possession of a Weapon for Unlawful Purpose - Second Degree, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4 (Count 2), Unlawful Possession of Weapons - First Degree, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(1) (Count 3), and Resisting Arrest - Fourth Degree, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:29-2a(2) (Count 4).  (Da1-5).  Defendant entered a "not guilty" plea and on June 4, 2021 moved to suppress evidence (the firearm and other items seized from defendant's person) as the search was conducted without a search warrant and without probable cause.
[directive] See, e.g., Attorney General Directive Prohibiting Municipal Court Plea Offers to “No Point” Violations for Graduated Drivers Licensees (Sept. 17, 2008) (“Nothing in this Directive should be construed to limit the authority of the prosecutor to dismiss any charge(s) where the prosecutor represents to the court on the record, either in camera, or in open court, that there is Page 7  While insufficiency of the evidence “usually” will be the basis for an amendment or dismissal, other reasons might justify amendment or dismissal of a complaint.  The relevant statutes and Court Rules do not specifically address what other circumstances might constitute “good cause. ”  To the extent permitted by law, however, a municipal prosecutor should consider the impact of adverse collateral consequences of a conviction based on the specific circumstances or factors presented by the defendant or elicited by the court.  Such circumstances or factors may include, but are not limited to: a. The age of the defendant, and the nature and extent of the defendant’s prior criminal record; b. The nature and circumstances of the offense and the arrest; c. Adverse employment or military enlistment consequences (including hindering or precluding future employment, access to professional/occupational licensing, or ability to enlist in the armed services); d. Adverse immigration consequences; e. Adverse educational consequences (including potential removal from school or student housing and hindering or precluding access to student financial assistance); f. Adverse housing and other government benefit consequences (including hindering or precluding future access to public housing and monetary benefits from the government); g. Adverse familial consequences (including parenting/family status changes and financial or other burdens for family members); and h.
[brief] Despite an affiliation or overlap in ownership between the two facilities pursuant to the holding of *Hargett*, [...] is not on notice of vicarious liability claims, as the affiants do not reference any care provided at [...].  Therefore, [...] properly denied Plaintiff’s application to deem the two Affidavits of Merit sufficient.  Further, contrary to Plaintiff’s claim that [...] found that [...] cannot be vicariously liable (see, Pb15), [...] determined that “[...] is not on notice for the reason I’ve stated of potential vicarious liability claims as the affiants do not reference any care provided at [...] nor any of the individual defendants being employed there.
[brief] **THE CUMULATIVE IMPACT OF THE ERRORS DENIED DEFENDANT DUE PROCESS AND A FAIR TRIAL.  (Not Raised Below)**  Each of the errors cited above is sufficient alone to require a new trial.  However, even if this Court concludes that none of the errors on its own is sufficient to warrant a new trial, “the probable effect of the cumulative error was to render the underlying trial unfair. ”  *State v. Wakefield*, 190 N.J. 397, 538 (2007); *U.S. Const.* amends. VI and XIV; *N.J. Const.* art. I, ¶¶ 1, 9, 10.  Recently, in a case with extremely strong proofs, the Supreme Court nonetheless held that a new trial was required because the judge erroneously admitted two significant pieces of inadmissible evidence, and “the cumulative error impacted and prejudiced the fairness of defendant's trial. ”  Burney, 255 N.J. at 29-31.  Likewise, the three errors set forth in Points I, II, and III all went to the heart of the State’s case and Defendant’s challenge to the State’s proofs—the identification of the perpetrator.  POINT V BECAUSE THE SENTENCING COURT FAILED TO ASSESS DEFENDANT’S FINANCIAL MEANS AND HIS ABILITY TO PAY THE $12,443.56 IN RESTITUTION AND $1,500 IN PROBATION SUPERVISION FEES, THIS COURT SHOULD REVERSE THESE AMOUNTS AND REMAND FOR CONSIDERATION OF DEFENDANT’S FINANCIAL MEANS.
[directive] It shall be the law enforcement policy of this State, consistent with the provisions of the Comprehensive Drug Reform Act and the Code of Juvenile Justice, to aggressively enforce this State's penal statutes against all drug offenders.  By arresting all drug offenders, including juveniles suspected of use and simple possession, law enforcement will serve a vital intervention function, and will thereby initiate the juvenile justice process so that the courts and appropriate substance abuse professionals can provide necessary evaluation, treatment and counselling services for drug using and drug dependent juveniles.  6.
[directive] As per a directive issued by the Attorney General (AG) and Commissioner of Health, if a COVID-19 positive laboratory result has been reported to the local health department (LHD) in your county or municipality, the county/regional public health agency (aka “County LINCS Agency”) provides that information to your County Prosecutor’s Office (CPO) so a confidential flag can be placed in the computer-aided dispatch (CAD) system used by law enforcement, emergency medical services (EMT) and firefighters (referred to collectively as “First Responders” in this document).  This information sharing allows First Responders to take all necessary precautions when responding to a situation involving a COVID-19 positive person.  However, even with this process in place, there is no way to know for sure if you are responding to a situation that may involve a COVID-19 positive person.  Not everyone who has COVID-19 will be tested for it.  Some people may not have symptoms, and some people may have mild symptoms and do not need or seek health care.  In addition, there may be people who were tested elsewhere (e.g., Pennsylvania or New York) and are not in the New Jersey data system, or non-residents who are working in or visiting New Jersey and were tested in their home state.  As such, you should always assess your surroundings when you respond to a situation and, whenever possible, follow COVID precautions such as social distancing, use of personal protective equipment (PPE) and good hand hygiene.  More information about COVID precautions can be found at www.nj.gov/health/coronavirus.  Q:
[brief] Hackensack v. Winner, 82 N.J. 1, 32 (1980) (quoting Hinfey v. Matawan Reg’l Bd. of Educ., 77 N.J. 514, 531-32 (1978)).  It is thus irrelevant to this HAD whether FERC uses the term “routine upgrade. ”  [...] does not consider whether the proposed project ultimately serves new or existing customers for Highlands exemption purposes.  [...]’s HAD is a separate and distinct determination subject to New Jersey’s statutes and [...]’s rules, which focus on whether the project is a “system” “upgrade. ”  N.J.S.A. 13:20-28(a)(11).  For all of these reasons [...] correctly determined that [...]’s Project is exempt from the Highlands Act as an “upgrade” to [...]’s existing natural gas transmission “system[.]”
[brief] The discovery rule only applies to two classes: “those who do not know that they have been injured and those who know they have suffered an injury but do not know that it is attributable to the fault of another. ”  *Martinez*, 163 N.J. at 53.  “[P]ursuant to the discovery rule, a professional malpractice claim accrues when: (1) the claimant suffers an injury or damages; and (2) the claimant knows or should know that its injury is attributable to the professional negligent advice. ”  *Vision Mortgage Corp. v. Patricia Y. Chiapperini Inc.*, 156 N.J. 580, 586 (1999).  “The limitations period begins to run when a plaintiff knows or should know the facts underlying those elements, not necessarily when a plaintiff learns the legal effect of those facts. ”  *Grunwald v. Bronkesh*, 131 N.J. at 493.  Courts will “impute discovery if the plaintiff is aware of facts that would alert a reasonable person to the possibility of an actionable claim … legal certainty is not required. ”  *Lapka v. Porter Hayden Co.*, 162 N.J. 545, 555-556 (2000).  Here, the Appellants maintain that the Trial Court committed error by failing to properly consider the Appellants’ position regarding when the cause of action accrued.
[brief] *See Team Indus. Servs. v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co.*, 2023 U.S. App. LEXIS 31491 (10th Cir. Nov. 29, 2023) (OCIP sponsor designates which contractors are eligible); *Maxim Crane Works, L.P. v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co.*, 642 S.W.3d 551, 553 (Tex. 2022) (CCIP sponsor has discretion to exclude entities from coverage).  This is how CCIPs work.\(^{15}\) (*See* 4/16/15 CCIP Manual, Pa589, stating “Sponsor reserves the right to terminate or modify the CCIP or any portion thereof. ”)  Within five hours of [...] being sent the July 30, 2015 Welcome Letter, [...] was advised that it “will not be able to enroll into the CCIP” because the CCIP “cannot enroll subcontractors into the CCIP who are performing structural demolition. ”  (Pa2390.)  A few days later, on August 3, 2015, when [...] requested a revised proposal from [...], [...] also included Project Requirements that contained a notification that “[...] is also an excluded party under the CCIP[,]” which must “comply with all insurance requirements set forth in the CCIP Insurance [] Manual and Schedule ‘B’ as an excluded party.
[brief] “It is a well-settled principle that our appellate courts will decline to consider questions or issues not properly presented to the trial court when an opportunity for such a presentation is available unless the questions so raised on appeal go to the jurisdiction of the trial court or concern matters of great public interest. ”  Nieder v. Royal Indem. Ins. Co., 62 N.J. 229, 234, 300 A.2d 142, 145 (1973); see also Abbott v. Burke, 119 N.J. 287, 390 (1990).  Plaintiff’s bald assertions that he “was a member of the Collective Bargaining Agreement,” and “was not afforded the notice or protection of the Union”, (Pb21), are unsupported by the record as Plaintiff never pled any such allegation in his Complaint.  Additionally, whatever Plaintiff’s argument is with respect to the Collective Bargaining Agreement, the trial court also properly found that even if there was an agreement that afforded Plaintiff any protection, his claim would nonetheless fail “because plaintiff failed to employ and exhaust the CBA’s grievance procedure and is, thus, barred from maintaining a cause of action on these grounds.  (T63:14-18) (citing Snitow v. Rutgers Univ., 103 N.J. 116, 124 (1986)).  To this, Plaintiff offers no meaningful assertion of error.  II.
[brief] (Da1 to 3; Da7).  The Honorable [...], J.S.C., presided over defendant's jury trial.  (1T\(^1\)).  On February 10, 1995, the jury found defendant guilty on all counts.  (Da5 to 6; 1T9-15 to 10-20).  On March 24, 1995, defendant appeared before [...] for sentencing.  (2T).  On count one, murder, [...] sentenced defendant to life imprisonment with a thirty-year period of parole ineligibility.  (Da7; 2T15-7 to 11).  Count two, felony murder, merged with count one.  (Da7; 2T15-12 to 13).  On count three, armed robbery, the judge imposed a sentence of twenty years with a ten-year period of parole ineligibility.  (Da7; 2T14-20 to 23).  On count four, armed burglary, the judge sentenced defendant to ten years, with a five-year period of parole ineligibility.  (Da7; 2T14-24 to 15-3).  Counts five and six merged with count four for sentencing purposes.  (Da7; 2T15-4 to 6).  The murder sentence was ordered to run consecutively to the robbery sentence, and the burglary sentence was ordered to run concurrently with the robbery sentence.  (Da7; 2T14-24 to 15-3; 15-9 to 11).  Therefore, the aggregate sentence imposed was life imprisonment plus twenty years, with a forty-year \(^1\)  Defendant did not produce the trial transcripts aside from the verdict and sentencing transcripts.  period of parole ineligibility, to run consecutive to the sentence defendant was already serving for a Monmouth County armed robbery. \(^2\) (Da7; Da18; 2T15-14 to 18).  Defendant filed a direct appeal, and this Court affirmed defendant's convictions and sentence.
[brief] 48.  Court's ruling (p. 15) (32a) that "[...] lacks standing to file exceptions to the Intermediate Account" is totally lacking in credibility, logic, facts, reality, NJ statutes, and relevant, legal case precedence.  Court's illegitimate ruling can only be explained based on Court's extreme bias against [...], as evidenced by its reliance and/or highlighting of illegitimate, misleading, & false claims, w/o recognizing that [...] refuted them with substantiated facts, by [...] in responses to [...]' Exceptions, and denial & disregard of substantiated facts & Exceptions by [...].  Based on substantiated facts, this Certification refuted all Court misleading & false claims related to [...]' Exceptions, and has pointed out [...]' overwhelming filed Exceptions that further supported his positions, and refuted positions by [...] and the Court.
[brief] Instead of modifying the fee award in light of this Court’s directive, the Special Master disregarded the Court’s opinion and affirmed his own prior decision, again recommending Plaintiffs be awarded all the fees he previously had recommended.  (39056a-39058a).  The trial court accepted the Special Master’s recommendation in full.  (39994a; 39996a; 40001a).  This award is inconsistent with this Court’s directive and also suffers from multiple independent flaws.
[brief] Additionally, most instruction in [...]’s high school “uses a SMART Board, a District provided PowerPoint and a Chromebook with Google Classroom installed. ” (Ra186).  In most instances, students do not have traditional textbooks, but instead use digital textbooks or supplemental instructional materials on their district-issued Chromebooks during class time.  Ibid.  And in addition to in-class assignments, students are typically assigned homework using personalized Google Classroom accounts.  Ibid.  In short, technology is a critical component of students’ ability to learn and complete assignments.
[brief] We . . . reject the Board’s argument that the exclusivity principle set forth in section 5.3 of the Act somehow prohibits the [...]’s use of the [...].  Section 5.3 provides, “Representatives designated or selected by public employees for the purposes of collective negotiation by the majority of the employees in a unit . . . shall be the exclusive representatives for collective negotiation,” and “shall be entitled to act for and to negotiate agreements covering all employees in the unit. ”  N.J.S.A. 34:13A-5.3.  There is no indication here that the designation of the [...] as part of the [...]’s team was or is unsupported by a majority of employees in that unit.  Nor do any facts suggest that the size of the [...]’s negotiations team (or its potential size), standing alone, renders it unable “to act for and to negotiate agreements covering all employees in the unit. ”  Id. [50 NJPER 226, 232 (¶50 2023)(footnote omitted) (Pa237, 240-231). ]  On appeal, the Board does not address or show that the reasoning and conclusions of the Commission were arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable.  Instead, the Board largely repeats the same arguments it made below, and otherwise cites additional authority that is inapposite or not controlling.  Contrary to the Board, the New Jersey Supreme Court’s interpretation of the word “designate” as used in N.J.S.A. 18A:16-1.1 (in a dispute over that education statute’s notice provisions as applied to a teacher’s tenure eligibility\(^4\)), does not control the interpretation of the word “designated” in Section 5.3 of the Act, as applied to representatives chosen by public employees for the purposes of collective negotiation by a majority of employees in a unit.  This is made plain by the Supreme Court’s decision directly construing Section 5.3 in a case cited by the Commission in its final agency decision, Lullo v. International Ass’n. of Fire Fighters, 55 N.J. 409 (1970).