ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] ..................................21  Jacobson v. Fed. Ins. Co., 95 Civ. 4343, 1999 WL 893045 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 15, 1999)  ........15  Matthew T. Szura & Co., Inc. v. General Ins. Co. of American, 543 Fed.Appx. 538 (6th Cir. 2013)  ............................17
[brief] (6T42:9-43:21).  The trial court denied the motion to strike, finding “it goes to the weight not to the admissibility”.  (6T44:2-4).  The plaintiff’s counsel then had the opportunity to cross examine [...].  (6T52:4-80:22).  The defendant chose not to call [...] as an expert witness and not to play his *de benne esse* video testimony.  (6T66:13-19).  The defendant next called the plaintiff’s daughter, [...], to testify.
[brief] The Administrator’s motion sought leave of court to assign the responsibility for the filing of the United States Non-Resident tax return to Defendant or his agent, if one were required; for an order discharging the Administrator from further duties in the matter; and for additional fees.  Plaintiff’s cross-motion clearly acknowledged on his part that the issues among the parties had not been resolved.  First, Plaintiff’s cross-motion opposed the Administrator’s discharge, arguing that the Administrator had not completed his duties.  Second, Plaintiff’s cross-motion sought affirmative relief, among other things, as follows:  1)  Plaintiff sought a $75,000 payment and the payment of legal fees from an escrow fund that had been established in accordance with a settlement agreement between Defendant and the Administrator.  (Da2486-2487).  The settlement agreement was set forth in the Administrator’s Report which had been approved by the probate court.  The settlement agreement explicitly set forth how the escrow fund would be disbursed.  It did not allow for the disbursement of any funds from the escrow account to Plaintiff with respect to the $75,000 payment or with respect to his legal fees (see Da 1182); and 2) Plaintiff sought an order that the Administrator or a designee should be required to collect account receivables allegedly owed to [...], another issue that had not yet been resolved, at least in Plaintiff’s mind.  (Da 2486-2487).  The June 19, 2023 order entered by the probate court that denied Plaintiff’s cross-motion also evidenced the fact that Plaintiff believed issues remained.
[brief] (Da20-23)¹  The ordinance was adopted May 9, 2023.  (Da21) The preamble suggests the taking is for “the purpose of open space. ”  (Da20)  However, under “Specific Findings,” the ordinance does not state how or why the properties are needed for “open space. ”  (Ibid.)  Instead, it provides only that the proposed acquisition is to “promote and protect the health, safety and welfare of residents of the Township” and that the taking is “necessary for same. ”  (Ibid.)  There is no reference to any studies or reports regarding the need for open space.  Nor is there anything elsewhere in the public record regarding same.  A review of the public record reveals the Township does not intend to use Defendants’ Properties for open space, but rather to flip it to the Developer, along with Township-owned parcels in exchange for other land within the Township owned by the Developer.
[brief] Plaintiffs’ original and amended complaints allege that, during an admission to [...] for rehabilitation after a hip fracture, plaintiff’s decedent [...] contacted COVID-19 and passed away on April 18, 2020, as a consequence.  (Da11-30; Da114-142.)  The complaint specifically alleges that defendants employed “nurses” and “medical personnel” (Da117-118 ¶11; Da129 ¶128) who provided “nursing care” and “medical care” to plaintiffs’ decedent (Da116 ¶5, Da129 ¶128), at defendants’ “nursing home”, “long term-care facility”, “comprehensive rehabilitation facility” or “skilled nursing facility”, (Da116 ¶¶5-6) in a “wanton, willful reckless and/or negligent manner constituting professional negligence,” (Da129 ¶128).5
[brief] The crux of Appellant’s challenge to the Access Road rests upon the isolated citation to N.J.A.C. 7:13-11.1(c)(2)(ii), which states that an individual permit for a channel modification necessary for the construction of a bridge or culvert requires an analysis that “a bridge [be] constructed rather than a culvert, where feasible. ”  According to Appellant, the record is devoid of any determination showing that a bridge was not feasible.  Additionally, Appellant argues that the [...] failed to demonstrate that a circular culvert was warranted as opposed to a bridge or three-sided culvert.  N.J.A.C. 7:13-12.7(f).  However, Appellant improperly separates and misreads both these regulatory provisions, as well as ignores substantial support in the record.  “Regulatory provisions adopted together and addressing the same problem are read and understood together.
[brief] The court reasoned that because the initial stop was supported by reasonable and articulable suspicion, the retrieval of the clothing from the interior of the vehicle was permitted under the plain view exception to the warrant requirement and the money was lawfully seized incident to defendants' arrest.  However, the trial court found that the full warrantless search of the vehicle, including the trunk and hood, which yielded the handgun, could not be justified by exigent circumstances because the vehicle's occupants were already securely in custody and the vehicle was located in a residential neighborhood shortly after midnight.
[brief] Thus, [...] could not opine conclusively as to any substances found in the defendant’s system, let alone a cocaine metabolite.  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I.  THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY PRECLUDED DR. PAPSUN’S TESTIMONY AS TO BZE ALLEGEDLY FOUND IN THE DEFENDANT’S SYSTEM BECAUSE THIS EVIDENCE HAD VERY LITTLE PROBATIVE VALUE, WOULD MISLEAD THE JURY, AND WOULD GREATLY PREJUDICE THE DEFENDANT.
[brief] During the plenary hearing, the applicant’s attorney cherry picked certain statements made by the Board chairman during the course of the three hearings in an attempt to argue that the application was conforming despite the request for the design waivers.  This appellant submits that the deliberative comments of the Board members are not the ruling of the board.  During the plenary hearing, the Court spent a significant amount of time questioning the rationale behind the design waivers for radial lot lines and street trees, and more specifically how a non-radial lot line might adversely impact the neighborhood.  (4T16-12 to 4T-17-25; 4T22-2 to 4T26-11)  The trial Court also ultimately opined that the Board overreached in recognizing that the density of this subdivision would create undesirable off-tract issues.  (4T38-3 to 4T38-5)  It is this appellant’s position that the Court’s inquiry into this question was erroneous.
[brief] Per R. 2:6-1(a)(2), briefs submitted to the trial court on the “motion for summary judgment” are not included in the appendix.  2  This was not in fact a summary judgment motion.  It was a “motion to dismiss. ”  3  Per R. 2:6-1(a)(2) the copy of the complaint has not been reproduced here because it can already be found at 1a.  4  Found at 139a.  5  Found at 110a.  6  Found at 162a.
[brief] Therefore, the admission of these statements constituted plain error.  R. 2:10-2.  The surveillance footage capturing the altercation inside the restaurant was ambiguous, as evidenced both by the footage itself and the jury’s questions during deliberations.  (See 9T:15-2 to 17-9, 21-17 to 22-20, 54-19 to 56-7; Da 12) (Jury question asking to see video again multiple times, and follow-up requests for screen to be brought closer to jury box, to be able to shift in the jury box to see better, and to change playback speed).
[directive] Addendum C | August 2024 Barricaded Individuals 7 Training Integrated Training.  7.1  Tactical Teams and Crisis Negotiation Teams shall conduct regular training with the mental health professionals associated with their teams.  It is suggested that this training occur at least quarterly.  The training should provide an opportunity to clarify the roles for each member of the team and to explore the processes for mental health professionals to provide real time input during the course of an incident involving a barricaded individual.  Familiarity and trust among team members must be established prior to the response to an incident.  Training may include classroom presentations, table top exercises and live scenario-based exercises.
[directive] Strict Home Detention  B.  A defendant who not allowed to leave the residence for any reason except is for the standard exceptions set forth section above shall be ordered to Strict in LB. of  If HD. a defendant permitted out the home for any other reason, then the is defendant cannot ordered to Strict HD.  Defendants ordered to Strict HD shall be be of provided the Notification Expectations for Defendant Ordered to Strict Home Detention (CN 12872), which automatically appended to the Pretrial Release is if Order completed in Order Module.
[brief] Appellant filed the within appeal on August 18, 2023.  --- \(^1\)  The “partial” designation in the July 25, 2023 Order (Da202-Da203) concerned the fact that Respondent’s issue of damages in the complaint had not yet been addressed by the Court under the July 25, 2023 Order – (these were not denied by the Court as Appellant notes at Db10).  Subsequently, on September 8, 2023, Appellant moved to stay the proceedings, denied by the Court at Da214.  The [...] reviewed the Trial Court Orders in this matter (Da195-Da205) and on October 18, 2023 remanded Respondent’s appeal from the OAL to the Board level for an immediate vote on the merits of the Involuntary Disability as contemplated by the Separation Agreement (Pa5-Pa6).
[brief] The second element requires Plaintiffs to have taken a series of steps to comply with the requirement of producing an expert report during the discovery period.  The “series of steps” requirement required Plaintiffs to produce the report in a timely manner.  See, e.g., Corcoran v. St. Peter's Med. Ctr., 339 N.J. Super. 337, 339 (App. Div. 2001) (defendant substantially complied with court rule service requirement by mistakenly serving demand for a trial de novo upon plaintiff's original counsel instead of substituted counsel); Stegmeier v. St. Elizabeth Hosp., 239 N.J. Super. 475, 483 (App. Div. 1990) (holding that when motion papers are placed with a reputable independent messenger service for delivery within the time limitation of the rule, that limitation is satisfied when there has been timely filing, despite a short delay in effecting service.)  In this case, Plaintiffs took no steps during the discovery period to produce the expert report, other than to send some records to his expert for review.  Indeed, the report, itself, has not even been drafted, and the most Plaintiff could offer is that it would be produced if a further four month extension were granted.  Because Plaintiffs failed to take the series of steps to comply with the discovery rules, the second requirement is not met.
[brief] ”  (1T 35:20-36:6).  “[...] also did not challenge [...]’s summary judgment motion against [...], which resulted in the final judgment.  That is the basis of this current motion to enforce the MCS-90 surety.  [...] told the court it would file opposition papers to that motion, but for some unknown reason, it never did file opposition to the [motion] papers. ” (1T 36:7-13).
[brief] On September 13, 2023, Plaintiffs filed a motion in aid of litigants rights seeking an order compelling the [...] to reinstate its voluntary Policy 5756.  On September 14, 2023, the [...] filed its Answer to the Supplemental Complaint (Da363-392).  On September 28, 2023, the [...] filed its opposition to Plaintiffs’ motion in aid of litigants rights.  On September 29, 2023, the court entered an order preliminarily enjoining and restraining the [...] “from enforcing, implementing, or otherwise giving effect to … [the Original] Policy … or Revised Policy 8463, until resolution of the litigation arising from a separate administrative complaint filed with the [...] on May 17, 2023 and amended on August 10, 2023.
[brief] Plaintiff’s expert [...] was on the stand for nearly two days of trial, March 22 and 28, 2023.  (See 5T; 8T.)  Plaintiff’s physician expert, [...], testified for roughly a day and a half—the first day live and the second by video teleconference.  (See 6T; 8T.)  Both [...] and [...] were permitted to give extensive respiratory care opinions.  (See, e.g., 5T19:6-22:11; 5T63:13-64:22-64:22; 5T143:13-145:19; 6T143:8-151:6; 6T184:25-186:15; 6T196:9-199:15; 6T205:13-214:14; 6T221:6-223:24; 8T6:6-27:20.)
[brief] The subsequent with prejudice dismissal is indicative of the trial court’s intent that the claims sought to be added by way of the proposed Second Amended Complaint were barred.  Appellants contend that the presentation of materials outside the First Amended Complaint required [...]’s motion to be treated as one for summary judgment, relying on Rule 4:6-2, which provides that “[i]f, on a motion to dismiss based on defense (e) [failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted], matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided by R. 4:46…”
[brief] SECTION 9.02  Importance of Tax Exemption.  In accordance with the Long Term Tax Exemption Law, specifically N.J.S.A. 40A:20-11(b), the Township has reviewed the Application and accompanying financial information and it has determined that this Agreement is a critical incentive for the Entity to undertake the Project in the Township due to the extraordinary costs associated with the development of the Property.  The tax exemption permits the development of underutilized property and provides a stream of revenue in the form of the Annual Service Charges.  The Annual Service Charge will allow the Units to be sold at marketable prices and leased at marketable rates, which will ensure the likelihood of the success of the Project and ensure that it will have a positive impact on the surrounding area.  The tax exemption permits the development of the Project in an area that cannot otherwise be developed in its proposed scope by reducing the expenses associated with the ownership or operation of the Project.  Reduced expenses allows for more competitive purchase prices and rents, thus helping to ensure the Project’s success.  As a result, the locational decisions of the probable residents and tenants will be influenced positively by the tax exemption.  Considering current market conditions, economic factors and development costs impacting this Project, it is not financially feasible to undertake the development of this Project in the absence of the tax exemption provided for herein.
[brief] The appellants argue that [...] paid administrative expenses out of the owner’s proceeds.  The certification in support of the motion to be discharged, confirms that [...] paid for wages, utilities, professional fees to the accountant, insurance, and food so that he could operate the diner.  [...] only paid those vendors that would be able to keep the diner open, and insure the property in case there was a fire or some other issue that could happen, including a slip and fall, and the wages of employees, which had to be paid or else there would be no employees to operate the diner.
[brief] When they arrived at the door, [...] told both women: “just go in, I’m just gonna have you sign something. ”  (BWC4-A 38:15 to 38:35)  [...] was thus instructed by police to go inside her apartment, not asked by them if she would permit them to enter.  Once inside, the officers asked [...] for identification, and when she asked why they needed it, she was told: “because it’s your apartment. ”  She responded in an exasperated tone, “I know, but what’s going on first?”  (BWC4-A 38:50 to 39:09)  The record thus reveals that police kept [...] in the dark about what was occurring until they were already inside her home -- and essentially mid-search.
[brief] State v. O’Donnell, 117 N.J. 210, 216 (1989).  Eight:  Defendant argues that the court “completely misapplied the application of mitigating factor” 14 (defendant was under 26 years of age at the time of the commission of the offense) by focusing strictly on the nature of the offense.  (Db86).  The judge gave this “some weight” due to defendant’s chronological age.  (17T214-15 to 216-21).  In any event, the judge carefully considered the five Miller factors (17T217-3 to 224-14) in imposing sentence and nothing in those findings suggest that mitigating factor 14 is entitled to any greater weight than what the court gave it.  C.  The lower court properly applied the Miller factors.
[brief] [...] testified on cross-examination that she wrote a letter to defense counsel (S-81), informing them that “I reviewed the report of Prosecution expert [...], M.D., dated 10/18/21.  The report submitted by [...] does not alter my opinions in the matter. ” (11T79-16 to 81-18).  [...] would have necessarily familiarized herself with the reports included in [...]’s report before she could reject [...]’s conclusion that defendant did not meet the legal definition of insanity.  It was in this context that the AP questioned [...] on cross-examination about the findings of [...], [...], and [...] and [...], all of which were included in [...]’s report.  As the judge found in denying defendant’s motion for a new trial, there was no bad faith in asking [...] about reports outlined in the State’s expert’s report which [...] testified she considered and rejected.
[brief] The NJSLA, NJCLA, and NJLLA were all enacted to, *inter alia*, curtail predatory and usurious lending practices, limit what property could be held as collateral, and ensure that only qualified, regulated, licensed entities would enter the marketplace as consumer lenders or sales finance companies in New Jersey.  The NJCLA, “which prohibit[ed] deceptive lending practices generally,” “as incorporated in the Licensed Lenders Act . . . allow[ed] for treble damages by aggrieved consumers, N.J.S.A. 17:11C-33b, and summary revocation of a lender's license, N.J.S.A. 17:11C-48a. ”  *Lemelledo v. Benefit Mgmt. Corp.*, 150 N.J. 255, 271-72 (1997).  Though the “typical remedy” was a “*voiding of the contract*” by “*individual consumers.*”  *Id.* (emphasis added).  The entire legislative history of every iteration of the NJCFLA has allowed for a private right of action by individual consumers *in addition to the enforcement remedies of the Commissioner*.  Indeed, the NJCLA’s statutory mechanism of enforcement by which an individual consumer voided an unlawful loan contract and/or pursued treble damages was N.J.S.A. 17:11C-33(b)—*the same provision of the same statute* which [...] asserts has voided his unlawful contract in the instant action.  Additionally, though N.J.S.A. 17:11C-18 codifies the Commissioner’s authority to oversee licensure under the NJCFLA, it does not disallow private actions by aggrieved consumers—nor did any of its predecessors, despite their also providing for the Commissioner’s authority to oversee licensure and pursue independent prosecutions.  In fact, N.J.S.A. 17:11C-33(b) continues to explicitly allow for treble damages—a remedy not included under the Commissioner’s authority in N.J.S.A. 17:11C-18.  N.J.S.A. 17:11C-18(i) further limits the Commissioner’s authority to civil penalties “not exceeding $25,000. ”  Therefore, in the absence of a private right of action, an unlicensed consumer lender could limit liability on consumer loans exceeding $25,000 since penalties are capped at $25,000.  Notwithstanding superfluous remedies in the absence of a private right of action, if the legislative intent and history of the NJCFLA are the polestars for an implied private right of action, then there must exist a private right of action under the NJCFLA.  Even assuming arguendo that no private right of action exists under the NJCFLA, said assumption does not foreclose asserting the NJCFLA as an affirmative defense to vacate an unlawfully obtained default judgment.  In sum, the trial court erred by conflating an offensive application of the NJCFLA with a defensive application.
[brief] \(^8\) *Third*, the law is clear that a civil cause of action for aiding and abetting requires an allegation of the commission of an underlying tort.  McCormac, 387 N.J. Super. at 482-83 (explaining that a claim for aiding the commission of a tort requires proof of the underlying tort); Shah v. Shroff, No. CAM-L-2934-20, 2023 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 527, at *47-48 (Law Div. Apr. 6, 2023) (illustrating that aiding and abetting requires proof of the underlying *tort* of breach of fiduciary duty); Judson v. Peoples Bank & Tr. Co., 25 N.J. 17, 29 (1957) (same).  Here, Plaintiff has not alleged any tort claims against [...]; it only alleges a breach of contract and breach of good faith claim.
[brief] A.  New Jersey Law Allows For Contractual Indemnification For First-Party Claims (Pa688; T5)  New Jersey  Courts regularly uphold indemnity provisions contained in a contract.  See Leitao v. Damon G. Douglas Co., 301 N.J. Super. 187, 198 (App. Div. 1997), certif. denied, 151 N.J. 466 (1997).  Moreover, Courts routinely award legal fees pursuant to indemnity provisions.  Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. K. L. O. Welding Erectors, Inc., 132 N.J. Super. 496, 500 (App. Div. 1975); see also Serpa v. N.J.  Transit, 401 N.J. Super. 371, 382 (App. Div. 2008) (holding that indemnification provision allowing counsel fees entitled defendant to counsel fees for its efforts in enforcing the indemnification provision).  No New Jersey Supreme Court or Appellate Division case has held that contractual indemnifications provisions automatically do not apply to first party claims.  See Boyle v. Huff, Nos. A-1965-21, A-2046-21, 2023 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 85, at *16 (App. Div. Jan. 20, 2023) (“[n]either the New Jersey Supreme Court nor this court has ever held that indemnification provisions will not apply to first-party claims. ”); Travelers Indem. Co. v. Dammann & Co., Inc., 594 F.3d 238, 255 (3d Cir. 2010) (“[W]e cannot hold that first-party indemnification claims . . . are categorically barred as a matter of law in New Jersey absent direct authority to that effect. ”).  Moreover, no New Jersey Supreme Court or Appellate Division case has required a contract to contain specific language in order for a first-party indemnification obligation to arise.  See Boyle, 2023 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 85, at *16 (“Neither the Court nor this court has required an indemnification provision to include express language covering a first-party claim for the indemnification obligation to be triggered. ”).  To the contrary, New Jersey Courts have applied contractual indemnity provisions to require one party to a contract to indemnify another party for first-party claims.  See Boyle, 2023 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 85 at *14-15; Fid. & Deposit Co. of Md. v. Stamateris, No. A-5407-09T3, 2011 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2015, at *17 (App. Div. July 25, 2011).  B.
[directive] each in denied granted and motions ofrelease-revocation number the shall include: also reports  The guilty of timing the and on rates plea  Reform Law Bail the of impact of the an analysis escalating of effectiveness the and cases, non-detention and detention both for pleas each county; in policies plea release; on while persons by committed significant crimes of discussion a the undercuts offer that plea facto de a tenders court a where instances of discussion a 12.7); Section (see offer plea prosecutor's Justice of Criminal Division of the Director information the as or additional data such Reform Law Bail the of impact and implementation evaluating the relevant to deems Directive. this and County on burdens administrative minimal impose to designed be will evaluations