ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Instead, the September 24, 2021 substitute service order was granted pursuant to *Rule 4:4-4(b)(3)* and, as previously stated, was granted in accordance with the following recitation of facts:  -  On or about February 19, 2021, March 1, 2021 and March 10, 2021, Plaintiff requested that Defendant’s former counsel accept service of process via email.  He did not respond.  -  On February 23 and 28, 2021, after counsel did not initially respond, Plaintiff’s process server attempted to personally serve Defendant at [...].  (Pa140 to 146).  o  Defendant has admitted that 39 Shore Drive is his address.  (Def.’s Br. at 3-4).  -  On March 19, 2021, Plaintiff’s process server attempted to personally serve Defendant with the aforementioned documents at [...], which was an address Plaintiff’s private investigation firm, [...], confirmed.  (Pa16).  o  Defendant has admitted that he is the owner of this property, which he sometimes allows his sister to occupy.  (Def.’s Br. at 4).  --- \(^3\)  As stated by Defendant, the “affidavit of inquiry indicat[ed] that the defendant could not be located despite searching a phone book, records of the Department of Motor Vehicles [DMV], the court tax office, and county voting records. ” (Def.’s Br. at 21).  However, “[t]he [d]efendant in question was, in fact, listed in both the DMV and county voting records. ”  (*Ibid.*)  Defendant’s former attorney, [...], confirmed that B5 Oceanview Terrace was Defendant’s address.  (Da163).  In that same email thread, Defendant himself confirmed that B5 Oceanview Terrace was his address.  (Da165 to 166).  -  On or about March 11, 2021, Plaintiff attempted to personally serve Defendant at [...], which was another address that [...] confirmed as a recent address for Defendant.  (Pa11).  -  On March 16 and 17, 2021, Plaintiff’s process server attempted to personally serve Defendant with the aforementioned documents at the [...], which is one of the properties at issue in the Complaint.  (Pa13).  -  On August 7, 8, and 15, 2021, [...] of [...] attempted to personally serve Defendant with the aforementioned documents at [...] and B5 Oceanview Terrace as well as three (3) other addresses.
[brief] For the sake of clarity, defendant-appellees set forth their individual factual position in the underlying case, some common factual background, and whether plaintiff-appellant suggested any legal error in dismissal of claims against them individually.  **[...]**  Kennedy was an Assistant Commissioner of the DEP.  (Pa246).  **[...]**  Padilla was the Chief of Staff of the DEP.  (Pa246).  **Report of [...] Under [...]’s Desk**  In February 2016, while defendant [...] was away from the office on vacation, defendant DEP employees [...] and [...] reported to DEP supervisor and defendant [...] that they had seen [...] under Doughty’s desk close to Doughty’s computer.  (Pa631; Pa755-756).  Wilson reported it to Doughty when she returned from vacation.  (Pa609).  Doughty reported it to her supervisors and the matter was forwarded to DEP’s Office of Employee Relations.  (Pa256; Pa609).  In the investigation of Doughty’s complaint, [...] wrote he “did not recollect the incident. ” (Pa398).  At deposition, when plaintiff was asked if it was possible that he would be in Doughty’s cubicle on a day she was not in the office, plaintiff said, “It’s possible I would be. ”  (Pa300).  When asked if he had used Doughty’s computer without her permission, [...] said, “It’s possible. ”  (Pa300).  When asked if it was possible he had been under Doughty’s desk, plaintiff responded he did not “remember” or “recollect” being under Doughty’s desk in February 2016.  (Pa300; Pa304).  A proposed five-day suspension for the report of [...] being seen under Doughty’s desk was dropped after [...] retired on May 1, 2016.  (Pa256; Pa311).  It is considered void by the DEP.  (Pa311).  The Privately Circulated Flyer
[brief] [...]’s Remaining Arguments Concerning Due Process And Fundamental Fairness Also Are Without Merit.  [...] similarly fails on its due process and fundamental fairness arguments.  [...] was an interested party who has the right to provide comments on agency permitting decisions under the APA.  N.J.S.A. 52:14B-3.1(b).  Here, [...] availed itself of that opportunity and submitted multiple comments in addition to receiving significant information about the Project from both [...] and [...] and received all the process it was due.  As to fundamental fairness, the doctrine is applied sparingly to “‘those rare cases where’” government procedures that operate arbitrarily “‘will subject the defendant to oppression, harassment, or egregious deprivation. ’”  In re Congressional Dists. by N.J. Redistricting Comm’n, 249 N.J. 561, 575-76 (2022) (quoting Doe v. Portiz, 142 N.J. 1, 108 (1995)).  But similar to the equal protection claim above, [...] identified no facts to establish that [...] treated it – [...] – in a way that was less fundamentally fair while [...] was obtaining its development permits than [...] or any other developer in the relevant portion of Long Branch.  Bare allegations cannot suffice.  Ultimately, [...] has not shown that [...] treated it in a fundamentally unfair or an unequal manner from the other Long Branch developers.
[brief] At the conclusion of the oral argument, [...] asked each of the parties if they had the opportunity to provide all the relevant information.  All parties affirmed that they had nothing further to add.  The exchange went as follows:  THE COURT: Any – anything else?  I’m afraid to ask that question again.  [...]: No.  [...]: No.  [...]: Thank you, Your Honor.  [...]: No, Your Honor.  [...]: Thank you, Your Honor.  [...]: Thank you.  See 2T58:20-17.  Additionally, [...] had the following exchange with counsel for the [...]:  THE COURT: . . .  Do you think I have a good com – command of the facts of this case?  [...]: I think you do . . .  See id. at 2T39:11-14.  After a short break, [...] took approximately forty-five (45) minutes to read his entire decision into the record, which ended in [...] denying all the motions for summary judgment.  See 2T58:21-88:22.  Specifically, the Court stated:  So – and I will – I will find that in the totality of the circumstances and facts that have come before this Court in a three-plus-hour oral argument inclusive of many, many, filings and – and the documents put forward.  There’s issues of facts for the Court – for the – for the jury to decide in this case.  And I’m not going to dismiss the – the action on the summary judgment for those reasons.  Id. at 2T:86-15-22.  V.
[brief] The Parties  Appellant/Plaintiff is a private individual who has been residing at [...] in [...] since 1993.  This property is located directly across the street from the property being developed by [...].  [...] (hereafter “Hoboken Zoning Officer”) is the current Zoning Officer of the [...], a position established under Section 196-59 of the Municipal Code of the [...].  [...] (hereafter [...]) is the owner of the property located on [...] in the [...], commonly known as [...], whose principal place of business is listed as [...].  The Zoning Board of Adjustment of the [...] (hereafter “[...]”) is a municipal board created pursuant to the New Jersey Municipal Land Use Law.
[brief] In sum, the decision of the Workers’ Compensation Court should be affirmed.  The Covid 19 virus was raging in New Jersey during the Covid State of Emergency from March 9, 2020, through June 4, 2021.  Thousands of New Jerseyans were seriously sickened and many of those, including the Petitioner’s Decedent, died.  During the State of Emergency, New Jersey needed “essential workers” to report to work to secure “the public’s health, safety and welfare. ”  Decedent, a schoolteacher, was one such “essential employee” who was summoned back for in person instruction by N.J. Executive Order 175.  The Judge of Workers’ Compensation Court correctly ruled on Petitioner’s motion that Decedent was an “essential employee” pursuant to the statute (N.J.S.A. 34:15-31.11), during the period of claimed occupational exposure of January 2021 to Decedent’s Covid-related death on May 18, 2021.  Purpose of the Presumption Statute
[brief] THE TENANCY COURT LACKED JURISDICTION TO DETERMINE ISSUES OF OWNERSHIP AND ERRED IN DOING SO PARTICULARLY WITHOUT THE BENEFIT OF WITNESS TESTIMONY OR CAREFUL EXAMINATION OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE (2T11-25)  The prerequisite to jurisdiction in tenancy court is the existence of a landlord-tenant relationship. N.J. Ct. R. 6:1-2(a)(3); Carr v. Johnson, 211 N.J. Super. 341, 348 (App. Div. 1986); Essex Prop. Servs., Inc. v. Wood, 246 N.J. Super. 487, 491 (1991).  In Carr, the Court recognized that the legislature: “did not intend for the Special Civil Part (as successor to the County District Court) to determine disputed land titles and complex equitable issues in the context of a landlord-tenant dispossess action... since it is a summary proceeding in which discovery is not permitted. ”  Quoting Cahayla v. Saikevich, 119 N.J. Super. 116, 118 (Dist. Ct. 1972), the Court in Carr went further by making clear that “in fact, if proof of title is required in tenancy actions the court loses jurisdiction of the action. ”  211 N.J. Super. 341, 348.  The holding in Carr also makes clear that a defendant does not need title documents to assert a defense that she is an owner in fact or in equity.  Carr, 211 N.J. Super., 345.  That the plaintiff gives rent receipts, marked rent, to a defendant and the defendant is aware that the plaintiff is marking payments from the defendant to the plaintiff as rent is not dispositive of a landlord tenant relationship.  Carr. 211 N.J. Super, 344-345; Howard v. Diolosa, 241 N.J. Super. 222, 227 (App. Div. 1990).  Further, equitable defenses and remedies directed to title of the property are substantial issues, which necessitate transfer or dismissal.  Carr, 211 N.J. Super. 341, 348.  According to Carr, a trial court in tenancy actions does not have the power to include a determination regarding equitable defenses or counterclaims that relate to questions of ownership and doing so would be to permit counterclaims affecting title of property.  Id.  Therefore, the matter must be transferred as the court lacks jurisdiction to hear the matter.  Id.  In the case at bar, counsel for [...] at the pre trial hearing on the Defendant’s motion to transfer made clear that the Defendant had equitable defenses and affirmative causes of action all of which would point to Ms. Soto’s claim of ownership to the property.  Counsel also stressed that documentary evidence including the HUD-1 and the entries therein pointed to the [...] having been victims of a foreclosure rescue scam.  Despite this, the Court, ignoring the holding in Carr, nevertheless proceeded to rule on the merits on the issues of ownership and did so in the context of a pre trial motion without the benefit of any witness testimony or a careful examination of the documentary evidence.  Defendant submits that this failure by the trial Court to adhere to precedent or to have provided Defendant with a plenary hearing before deciding ownership violated Defendant’s right to due process.  Accordingly, Defendant submits that the trial Court’s findings of fact and entry of judgment must be vacated.  CONCLUSION
[brief] This is bolstered by the information the Township (through its CFO [...] on 3/17/14) supplied to the Division of Pension and Benefits through a series of Answers by the Township to the IRS 20 Factor Questionnaire surrounding [...] was annexed at trial as P-7 (Pa130-143).  The information supplied in response had over 40 replies of “No knowledge” in response to the 20 questions and subparts.  Exhibit P-7 includes the payroll register history in response to question 4 (of the 20 Factor Questionnaire) supplied by Township through [...].  (Pa130-143)  In Exhibit P-7, question 5c specifically asks whether a personnel file was maintained for the Member.  The response by [...] is “yes. ”  Why would there be a personnel file for an Independent Contractor.  Exhibit R-4 is a professional services contract dated 4/14/2015 (Pa166-173).
[brief] (*quoting Jantausch v. Borough of Verona*, 41 N.J. Super. 89, 96 (Law Div. 1956); see also *388 Route 22 Readington Realty Holdings, LLC v. Township of Readington*, 221 N.J. 318, 338, 113 A.3d 744 (2015) (“In construing the meaning of a statute, an ordinance, or our case law, our review is de novo. ”).  Here, the trial court erred in deferring to the Board and applicant’s professionals’ definition and interpretation of the Building Height Ordinance, rather than making a legal interpretation of the ordinance under de novo review.
[brief] Respectfully submitted, [...], Esq. [...]  Dated: July 22, 2024  BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF APPELLANT, [...]’S NOTICE OF APPEAL TO SET ASIDE A DECISION OF THE POLICE AND FIREMEN’S RETIREMENT  SYSTEM  [...]  [...], ESQ.-ATTORNEY ID# 019402007  [...]  Tel. [...] · Fax [...]  E-Mail Address: [...]  Attorneys for the Appellant
[brief] (Db17.)  Yet, the State admits that state law excludes distributing PILOT payments to school districts.  (Db17; see also Da8, 22 and 24.)  Thus, if there is any fault from excluding PILOT payments from school funding, “[t]he State should tend to its own house. ”  Abbott XXI, 206 N.J. at 367.  Moreover, the simplistic argument that [...] could tax its way out of year-to-year deficits in its Adequacy Budget stands in sharp contrast to the record evidence that several elements of SFRA’s structure and operation not only caused this significant underfunding, but also lock-in that underfunding in future years.
[brief] This argument was based upon, among other things, a series of text messages and emails between the two wherein it was clear that [...] knew that [...] was soliciting investments for the project and, in fact, encouraged it.  The trial court did not definitively rule that [...] did not testify falsely, but rather ruled that the defense had the means to refute the testimony at trial and thus it was not a basis for a new trial.  (Sa27-28).  [...]’s propensity for falsehoods is only relevant to the issue before this Court in that he claimed that [...] lacked the authority that the newly-discovered evidence demonstrates [...] to have.  license was controlled by [...], in which [...] was in an excellent position to effectuate that transfer as the head of the company.
[brief] As to whether the condition is hazardous, that is a fact issue to be resolved at trial.  Plaintiff has produced sufficient evidence in the form of fact and expert testimony, photographs, measurements, codes and guidelines from which a reasonable juror could find that the slope of the sidewalk exceeded proper limits and was therefore dangerous.  Defendants dispute that conclusion.  The factfinder is charged with resolving that disputed issue of material fact.  See Model Jury Charge (Civil) 6.10 “Proximate Cause – General Charge” (Nov. 2019); Model Jury Charge (Civil) 1.13 “Expert Testimony” (Apr. 1995).  There is no dispute that defendants caused the location to be modified during their ownership of the property.  How long ago they claim to have done that is immaterial; the current condition of the property presents a dangerous condition created by defendants.  It is dangerous without precipitation and becomes more dangerous in the presence of ice and snow.
[brief] At trial, Defendant [...] denied ever viewing Plaintiff’s FMLA leave paperwork, or having personal knowledge of Plaintiff’s alleged anxiety disability before the filing of this lawsuit.  3T:152:1-25-153:1-25; 155:1-5.  Plaintiff’s trial testimony that Defendant [...] allegedly ridiculed her for taking FMLA leave does not establish that harassing conduct for hostile work environment based on disability discrimination.  The cardinal purpose of a hostile work environment claim is that the work environment was made hostile because of or based on the Plaintiff’s alleged protected characteristic, such as a disability.  Plaintiff presented no evidence at trial that Defendant [...] knew she had an alleged anxiety disability and committed acts or made statements because of Plaintiff’s alleged anxiety disability.  Likewise, Plaintiff presented no evidence that Defendant [...]’s alleged acts or statements were because of her alleged anxiety disability.  In fact, Defendant [...] testified that he did not know Plaintiff suffered from any alleged anxiety disability.  4T:20:1-25.  Defendant [...] denied that he disclosed the underlying health reason asserted in Plaintiff’s FMLA leave paperwork to anyone in the Township.  4T:25:6-11.  Accordingly, the jury’s verdict is against the weight of the evidence, and the trial court committed reversible error by denying Appellants’ motion for a new trial.
[brief] Out of the other sixteen Factors, while in their view, Petitioner is an independent contractor, Respondent concedes that half of those Factors are not a strong indicator of independent contractor status.  The lack of any real investigation conducted by Respondent, the uncontradicted testimony of Petitioner and the actual statutory officials delegated with the responsibility of making this determination, all lean heavily in favor of Petitioner being an employee.  While Petitioner does concede that one or two of the Factors would be indicative of independent contractor status, the overwhelming evidence established at the time of the OAL Hearing, largely uncontracted by Respondent, establishes that at least 18 of the 20 Factors in the Test established Petitioner as an employee of [...] for the period of 2015 to the present.  III.
[brief] Nielsen v. Walmart Store #2, 2171, 429 N.J. Super. 251 (App. Div. 2013) .............................................29  People v. Keechler, 194 111. 235.  62 N. E. 525.................................................................22  Stewart v. 104 Wallace St., Inc., 87 N.J. 146, 432 A.2d 881 (1981)......................................................29  United States v. St. Anthony It. Co., 192 U. S. 524, 24 Sup. Ct. 333, 48 L. Ed. 54S.....................................22  Washington Const. Co. v. Spinella, 8 N.J. 212 (1951)..............................................................................19, 25 Westville Land Co. v. Handle, 112 N.J. Law 447, 171 A. 520...............................................................19  Wormley v. Wright County, 108 Iowa, 232, 78 N. W. 824.................................................................22  Yard v. Ocean Beach Association, 49 N.J.Eq. 306 (1892)........................................................................22  Yuba County v. Kate Hayes Min. Co., 141 Cal. 3G0, 74 Pac. 1049.................................................................22
[brief] 1.  Petitioner’s COUNT ONE of the Amended Complaint requesting appointment as Administrator of the Estate is DENIED.  2.  Petitioner’s COUNT THREE of the Amended Complaint requesting that the Will dated October 16, 2014, is null and void as being the subject of undue influence or duress is DENIED.  4.  Petitioner’s COUNT FOUR of the Amended Complaint requesting that Petitioner be awarded one-third of Decedent’s augmented Estate is DENIED.  5.  Petitioner’s COUNT FIVE of the Amended Complaint requesting that the “Ante-Nutial” [sic] Agreement, dated November 21, 1992, be declared null and void is DENIED.  The Petitioner respectfully requests that the Appellate Division reverse the Chancery Division’s Order granting the Petitioner a life estate in the Decedent’s home via the imposition of a constructive trust.  Respectfully Submitted, // [...] // MICHAEL D. WEINRAUB, ESQ.
[brief] No. [...]) (SOICR p. 13) (Staff also listed these as S-5):  ............  H1288a [...] response to RCR-ENG-18 ............................... H1292a [...] response to RCR-ENG-19 ...............................  H1293a RC-6: Cover letters and [...] responses to discovery requests RCR-ENG-1 to -14 (BPU Docket. No. [...]) (SOICR p. 13) (Staff also listed these as S-6): ........................................ H1294a [...] response to RCR-ENG-1 (2018) .................................. H1297a Attachments: Site Plan, Cover Sheet ................................. H1298a Existing Conditions Plan .............................................. H1299a Overall Plan ............................................................... H1300a Site Plan & Grading Plan .............................................. H1301a Landscaping Plan ....................................................... H1302a Landscaping Plan Details ............................................. H1303a Details ................................................................. H1304a [...] response to RCR-ENG-2 (2018) ............................... H1305a [...] response to RCR-ENG-3 (2018) ............................... H1306a Attachment: [...] response to RCR-ENG-18 in BPU Docket No. [...] .............................................. H1307a [...] response to RCR-ENG-4 (2018) ............................... H1308a [...] response to RCR-ENG-5 (2018) ............................... H1309a [...] response to RCR-ENG-6 (2018) ............................... H1310a [...] response to RCR-ENG-7 (2018) ............................... H1312a Letter from Holmdel’s [...] requesting [...]’s professionals reports March 26, 2018 ............................. H1314a Holmdel’s Engineering Report by [...] dated March 26, 2018 ...................................................... H1315a Letter from Holmdel’s [...] forwarding [...]’ Correction to his report March 28, 2018 ......................... H1322a -xxx- Holmdel’s Engineering Report correction by [...] dated March 28, 2018 .................................................. H1323a Letter from Holmdel’s [...] forwarding [...]’ preliminary letter on environmental impacts dated April 9, 2018 ............................................. H1325a Email from [...] May 10, 2018 to Holmdel’s [...] of submission of the Potential Air Quality Study and attachments May 10, 2018 ............................................. H1327a Potenta May 10, 2018 Air Quality Study with Attachments ............................................. H1328a
[brief] Here, the precise error cautioned against in Watson occurred.  During [...]’s testimony, the State admitted all the surveillance videos and asked him to explain the accuracy of the various timestamps, point out each camera location, and name the intersecting streets.  For the key video from the [...] and the related still-shots, the State further prompted Petrazzuolo to identify [...] and [...] (based on [...]’s self-identification in his police interrogation).
[brief] (Da2)  The terroristic threats statute provides that a threat of violence that would otherwise be a third-degree offense is a second-degree offense when the threat “occurs during a declared period of national, State or local emergency. ”  N.J.S.A. 2C:12-3(a).  In a superseding indictment, the State charged [...] with uttering the same threats, but divided them into two separate counts and upgraded both counts to second-degree offenses on the basis that the statements were made during the COVID-19 pandemic, after [...] had declared a state of emergency.  (4T 28-13 to 23; 53-5 to 8)  The threatening statements bore no relation to the public health emergency whatsoever.  Nonetheless, [...] was convicted of the second-degree offenses and received consecutive eight-year terms on each count.  In the absence of a nexus between a threat of violence and a public emergency declaration, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-3(a)’s second-degree emergency enhancement is not reasonably related to a legitimate state purpose.
[brief] Even though it is important to locate the Regulator Station as far south as possible, [...] examined the entire transmission line corridor between Route 35 (at the northern end) and Newman Springs Road (at the southern end) for potential locations.  As the below discussion demonstrates, [...]’s analysis revealed very few possibly suitable locations for the Regulator Station.  To aid in that discussion, Exhibit P-3 to the Petition is a map depicting the transmission line corridor and adjacent zoning/environmental restrictions that was presented to the [...].