ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Nonetheless, Defendant signed the PSA which said nothing about eminent domain, but which instead promised Plaintiff half his proceeds from the sale of Olga’s, listed for $5.8 million.  Da282.  At trial, the Court asked Defendant directly whether he knew, prior to entering into the PSA, that the State was pursuing a claim for the land through eminent domain.  Defendant answered yes.  2T163.  Defendant added, “[t]hey’ve been trying to take the [land] since 2004 to be quite honest with you. ”  Da167.  Defendant testified that he understood that in the PSA, he was promising that Plaintiff would receive half of his net proceeds from the sale of Olga’s.  2T165-66.  Sometime during the first two weeks of April 2009, the very timeframe of signing the PSA, Defendant attended a meeting with [...] and its subcontractor, at which the construction plans and their impact on Olga’s Diner were hashed out in detail.  A sketch was presented showing how [...]’s subcontractor intended to use a portion of the Olga’s property as a construction yard and staging area.  Da38.  On April 15, 2009, [...]’s subcontractor moved onto the State lot and cut off access to Olga’s Diner through both Routes 70 and 73, setting up a construction yard/staging area on Olga’s property.  Da38.  Olga’s easement access to Route 73 was terminated no later than September 2009.  Da38.  In November, 2010, there was a Commissioners’ hearing as to the State’s condemnation action, from which the State and [...] both appealed in December 2010.
[brief] The suggestion in an email from the motion judge’s law clerk to plaintiff that the court was required to “check on-line the status of delivery” (Pa1246) has no basis in law and exposes the judge’s ignorance of Rule 1:5-4(b) which provides that “service shall be deemed complete on mailing of the ordinary mail. ”  New Jersey courts "have recognized a presumption that mail properly addressed, stamped, and posted was received by the party to whom it was addressed."  SSI Medical Services, Inc. v. State, Dept. of Human Services, 146 N.J. 614, 621 (1996).  “Pursuant to Rule 1:6-3(c), . . .If service is by ordinary mail, receipt will be presumed on the third business day after mailing. ”  Murray v. Comcast Corp., 457 N.J. Super. 464, 469 (App. Div. 2019).  No court rule required the judge to verify online the delivery of plaintiff's mail serving the motion to defendant by navigating to some website on the internet.  Significantly, Rule 1:5-3 provides inter alia that “Failure to make proof of service does not affect the validity of the service, and the court at any time may allow the proof to be amended or supplied unless an injustice would result.
[brief] For the foregoing reasons, the Authority respectfully request that the Court enter an order denying Plaintiffs’ Appeal as to the Trial Courts March 6, 2024 and May 7, 2024  Orders specific to the relief afforded in favor of the Authority.  **[...]**  By: /s/ [...]  Dated: August 28, 2024  [...] [...] and [...], Plaintiffs, v. [...], a public body corporate and politic of the State of New Jersey, [...]; [...]; [...]; [...]; and [...]  d/b/a [...]  Defendants.  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY  APPELLATE DIVISION  DOCKET NO. [...]  CIVIL ACTION  On Appeal
[brief] Dolson v. Anastasia, 55 N.J. 2, 6 (1969).  “The courts allow wide latitude to the jury, restricting their sphere sparingly, and on an ad hoc basis, where one conclusion only seems warranted by the facts. ”  Carrino, supra, 78 N.J. at 365 (quoting Schaublin v. Leber, 50 N.J. Super. 506, 510 (App. Div. 1958)).  A trial judge's responsibility on a motion for a new trial is “to correct clear error or mistake by the jury.  Of course, the judge may not substitute his judgment for that of the jury merely because he would have reached the opposite conclusion[.]”  Dolson, supra, 55 N.J. at 6.  “Jury verdicts should be set aside in favor of new trials only with great reluctance, and only in cases of clear injustice. ”  Boryszewski v. Burke, 380 N.J. Super. 361, 391 (App. Div. 2005) (emphasis added), certif. denied, 186 N.J. 242 (2006).  In this trial, Plaintiff did not present evidence that Defendant [...] engaged in any act or made any statement evincing disability discrimination.
[brief] N.J.S.A. 40:55D-53.e(1).  Despite that clear evidence, the Borough somehow makes the outrageous argument that “[t]here is no evidence that the municipal engineer inspected and approved the roadways in question. ”  (Db27.)  However, contrary to the Borough’s assertions, [...] (through [...]) was the municipal engineer at the time. \(^8\)  Accordingly, the Borough’s counsel’s assertions in this regard are nothing more than baseless obfuscation, unsupported by a single sworn statement from a representative of the Borough with actual factual knowledge.  It is beyond dispute that the municipal engineer approved the Roads for public dedication.
[brief] ”  Washington, 453 N.J. Super. at 190.  Here, none of the minimal requirements for a dismissal of the indictment, with prejudice, was met.  The judge found that the State did not act willfully or outrageously.  And, as the judge recognized, the delayed diagram was disclosed while they were “still in the middle of the motion,” while they were “still litigating the case,” and while they were still at a point “where [the judge] c[ould] deal with it and fix it[.]” (6T47-13 to 48-6).
[brief] The State contends that [...]’s prior attacks are highly relevant and indicative of future behavior.  Even if [...] is the most trained dog in the world and understands sign language, all of that training has failed to stop his behavior from escalating to the point that he has now killed a dog and permanently injured a second human being.  Defendant further asserts that an expert was required to assess the escalating nature of [...]’s attacks.  However, expert testimony is only required when the subject matter is “so esoteric that jurors of common judgment and experience cannot form a valid judgment. ”  Butler v. Acme Markets, Inc., 89 N.J. 270, 283 (1982).
[brief] The Property is currently underutilized.  The Project will redevelop the site with a mix of approximately 1,077 residential units consisting of apartments, townhomes, stacked townhomes, condominiums and single family homes, subject to Article IITI of the Redevelopment Agreements, at least the lesser of 20% of the total residential units or 216 of such units will be Affordable Units, to be sold or leased at market rates and affordable rates, as applicable, in accordance with the Redevelopment Plan, the redevelopment Agreements and Site Plan Approval.  The Project will create approximately 2,410 construction jobs and 10 permanent jobs.  The Project will generate significant amounts of new (otherwise unavailable) municipal revenues through the Annual Service Charge, construction permit fees and water/sewer fees.  More importantly, the Project will help the Township fulfill its constitutional obligation to provide housing opportunities for households with limited incomes.  Considering current market conditions, economic factors and development costs impacting this Project, it is not financially feasible to undertake the development of this Project in the absence of the tax exemption provided for herein.
[brief] N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-7(d) does not contemplate a scenario where a redevelopment plan can be both consistent and inconsistent with a municipality's master plan.  Yet, that is exactly what Defendants did here.  The Plan explicitly states, "the development of the Rehabilitation Area with a warehouse facility is not inconsistent with the goals and objectives of the Master Plan," and "the adoption of this Redevelopment Plan [] does not conflict with the Township's planning objectives relative to farmland preservation, environmental protection, historic preservation and sustainability, and in this regard can be considered consistent with the Township's Master Plan."  (Pa39).  Ordinance No. 2022-17, purporting to amend the Plan instead states, "it has been suggested by some members of the public that this Redevelopment Plan is not consistent with the Township's Master Plan and/or is not designed to effectuate the Master Plan."
[brief] Similarly, [...]’s arguments fail to address the public policies motivating the NJCFLA, especially in the context of *DeAngelo*.  Considering the trial court’s reasoning with respect to *DeAngelo* and the FDCPA, the trial court erred by failing to acknowledge and/or analyze the cases in this jurisdiction and our federal sister court for the District of New --- 3 See, e.g., *Midland Funding LLC v. Thiel*, 446 N.J. Super. 537 (App. Div. 2016).  Jersey which stand for the proposition that violations of the NJCFLA also give rise to violations of the FDCPA.  Though the area of law is still developing and, at this time, there are no published cases analyzing this issue, the Honorable [...], J.S.C. issued an Order and Statement of Reasons on April 26, 2023 in a case entitled *[...] v. [...]*, [...], 2023 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 640 (Law Div. April 26, 2023) (Dra21), which analyzed the NJCFLA’s licensure requirements and the application of the same in great depth.
[brief] What we stress again is that it is pivotal that the law requires that the burden of proof be shifted to the donee, as was stated in Pascale, supra.  That would be “donee” in this case was [...].  We know that no documents exist that detail the nature of the transaction or agreement or understanding, if any, between [...] and [...].  (6T-13, 21-22).  [...] admitted that he was supposed to use the $50,000.00 to buy a home for [...].  (T2 34-37).  How can this be turned into a scenario where he becomes an owner of the house paid for by [...], especially when the Court found that no donative intent existed?  Suppose you give a friend a credit card, and say that you don’t know how to buy the right computer, and tell her to go pick it out, but you will pay.  The computer is still yours, not hers.  Why is this any different?  It shouldn’t be.  [...] took advantage of [...], an old man with a 6th grade education.  If [...] has the burden of proof, he can’t prevail because he cannot come up with anything to corroborate his self-serving testimony.  He cannot be the rightful owner because he was at most an agent, and because there was no paperwork detailing his deal with Francisco.  There was no use of a lawyer or a real estate broker or a mortgage broker to educate [...] on the nature of the deal.  Most importantly, [...]’s “gift” argument was rejected by the lower Court.  In other words, when we parse out the difference between [...] claiming he had to buy a house for Franciso, with [...]’s money, and the notion that that same house would belong to [...], we see that his only claim that the house was to be his, was his self-serving testimony that the money and the house was to be a gift for him.  Yet, the lower court correctly rejected that notion.  A fortiori, therefore, the Defendants should lose their cause in its entirety and the house must go to [...], the rightful owner.
[brief] In *Walid*, the Appellate Division reaffirmed a long-held and broad version of the “fraud exception" to the parol evidence rule.  This exception permits introduction of extrinsic evidence to prove fraud in the inducement, regardless of whether the alleged misrepresentation regarded a matter expressly addressed in the contract.  Under *Walid’s* formulation of the fraud exception, “[A] party to an agreement cannot, simply by means of a provision in the written instrument, create an absolute defense or prevent the introduction of parol evidence in an action based on fraud in the inducement to the contract.
[brief] ..................................................  63  A.  Breach of Contract Claims  ...........................................  63  1.  Plaintiffs failed to prove a breach of contract based on any of the subject transactions ....................  67  2.  The conclusions of plaintiffs' expert constituted net opinions and were erroneously relied upon by the trial court as proven facts.  B.  Unjust Enrichment and Breach Of Covenant Of Good Faith And Fair Dealing Claims  POINT VI
[brief] (41T:99-17 to 100-2).  [...] said she could not provide any description of the attackers.  (41T:87-7 to 21).  [...] gave [...] a photograph of [...] to help the police search for him.  (41T:90-18 to 91-17).  [...] searched for surveillance cameras in the nearby area, and, with the consent of the owners, reviewed footage from cameras located [...], [...], and [...] that captured [...] walking with the stroller.
[brief] 31 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964)  28 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438,485 (1928)  47 Panitch v. Panitch 339 N.J. Super 63, 67 (App. Div. 2001)  34  Piscitelli v. City of Garfield Zoning Board of Adjustment, 237 N.J. 333 (2019)  34,35,37  Quick Chek Food Stores v. Springfield Tp., 83 N.J. 438 (1980)  6  RSI Bank v. Providence Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 234 N.J. 459 (2018)  4 Samolyk v. Berthe, 251 N.J. 73 (2022)  4 S.B.B. v. L.B.B., 476 N.J. Super. 575(App. Div. 2023)  40 Scago v. Bd. Of Trustees, Teachers’ Pension and Annuity Fund, __N.J. ___ (May 22, 2024)
[directive] The Division of Criminal Justice, in cooperation with the County Prosecutors Association Page 47 of New Jersey, the State Police, and the New Jersey Association of Chiefs of Police, shall within 60 days of the issuance of this Directive develop a training program for police officers, made available through the NJ Learn system or by other electronic means if feasible, to explain the policies established under the Bail Reform Law and the requirements of this Directive as they pertain to police agencies and officers.  The Division also shall within 60 days of the issuance of this Directive prepare an instruction card for dissemination to police officers that concisely summarizes the key features of this Directive that pertain to police agencies and officers.  The Division, in cooperation with the County Prosecutors Association of New Jersey, the State Police, and the New Jersey Association of Chiefs of Police, may develop a special training program for supervisory officers designated pursuant to subsection 3.3.2.  This amended Section shall become operational immediately upon issuance of this Directive.
[brief] Plaintiff seeks to correct certain inaccurate statements advanced by Amicus that underlie its flawed position.  Fundamentally, Amicus contends that the Trial Court’s Order increasing the rent obligation of defendant, [...] (“Defendant”) by $1,717.18 (the “Rent Increase Order”) is based upon an increase in Plaintiff’s equity in Defendant’s unit (the “Unit”) resulting from the conversion of the Unit to a condominium.  See, e.g., page 15 (“[...]’s return on equity approach, which the lower court largely adopted, effectively aims to achieve a return on the value of Mr. Trupiano’ dwelling unit as a condominium, not as a rental unit encumbered by rent control protections”); page 5 (“[...] received a rent increase that it could not have received had the Appellant’s building not been converted to condominiums”).  That premise is false.  Like Defendant, Amicus erroneously asserts that Plaintiff’s equity in Defendant’s Unit was based upon the Unit’s market value as a condominium.  Plaintiff’s equity in the Unit was determined by the inflation-adjusted purchase price and capital improvements attributable to the Unit, and the Unit’s unequalized assessed value based upon the Unit’s replacement cost (6T:21:21) with an approximate thirty-five percent (35%) discount due to Defendant’s protected tenancy.
[brief] • The language of SFRA clearly placing ultimate responsibility on the Commissioner;\textsuperscript{23}  • The State assignment to the [...] continuously for the past 10 years of multiple State monitors, who have broad statutory powers and duties to “oversee the fiscal management and expenditures of school district funds…; oversee the operation and fiscal management of school district facilities…; ensure development of an acceptable plan to address the circumstances…which resulted in the appointment of the State monitor…[and which] shall include measurable benchmarks and specific activities to address the deficiencies of the school district; oversee all district staffing…; have authority to override a chief school administrator’s action and a vote by the board of education on any of the matters set forth in this subsection…; and shall report directly to the commissioner or his designee on a weekly basis…[and] monthly to the board of \textsuperscript{23}Among many relevant SFRA provisions, one stands out:
[brief] THE DEPARTMENT’S BULLETIN CONSTITUTES IMPROPER RULEMAKING AND IS NOT ENTITLED TO DEFERENCE BECAUSE IT IS NOT PROCEDURALLY REGULAR  The Department’s issuance of the Bulletin was far from “procedurally regular,” and, for that reason, it is not entitled to deference.  In Matter of Repeal N.J.A.C. 6:28, 204 N.J. Super. 158, 160 (App. Div. 1985), the Appellate Division stated that:  “A regulation adopted by a state agency is presumed to be reasonable and valid.  If procedurally regular, it may be set aside only if it is proved to be arbitrary and capricious or if it plainly transgresses the statute it purports to effectuate, or if it alters, the terms of the statute or frustrates the policy embodied in it. ”  (Internal citations omitted) (emphasis added).
[directive] Selection of Personnel for the Internal Affairs Function  4.2.1  Personnel assigned to conduct internal affairs investigations should be energetic, resourceful and committed to the agency's mission and the internal affairs function.  They must display a high degree of perseverance and initiative.  The internal affairs investigator must maintain an appropriate balance between professional commitment and personal and group loyalties.  Internal affairs personnel must be of unquestioned integrity and possess the moral stamina to perform unpopular tasks.  It is important that these investigators possess the ability to withstand the rigors and tensions associated with complex investigations, social pressures and long hours of work.  The investigator must possess the ability to be tactful when dealing with members of the agency and the community.  It is recommended that personnel assigned to the internal affairs function provide the agency with the opportunity to access all segments of the community.  For example, if a particular community has a significant proportion of the population that speaks a foreign language, the law enforcement executive may wish to consider assigning an officer to the internal affairs function who speaks that language.  4.2.2  Law enforcement executives should assign personnel to internal affairs who have sufficient experience and rank to effectively handle sensitive investigations that may include investigations of supervising officers.  In addition, law enforcement executives should INTERNAL AFFAIRS POLICY & PROCEDURES | November 2022
[directive] 1, January than later no operational become shall Section This for Arrest upon Prosecutor On-Call from Approval Charging Obtain to Requirement 3.2 Offenses.  Certain officer enforcement law when a Section 3.3, to pursuant provided otherwise as Except any for arrest an makes Jersey New of State the of laws of the authority under the operating of any where violence domestic involving offense persons disorderly for a or crime, indictable contact shall officer the note 5, see apply, (4) to 2C:25-21(a)(1)  N.J.S.A. in specified grounds the where Justice Criminal of Division or the Office, Prosecutor's County appropriate the prosecutor may with the consultation  The so. do to feasible and safe is it as soon as appropriate, may as Except communication.  electronic other or telephonic of means by or person in made be indictable any for complaint-summons no Section 3.3, to pursuant authorized otherwise be grounds the of any where violence domestic involving offense persons disorderly for a or crime, for a application no issued, and be shall apply, (4) to 2C:25-21(a)(1)
[brief] ”  (6T:91-14 to 92-24)  [...] stated that he told the men that he would pay the sum himself through Cash App, and that he was looking at his phone to try to transfer the money, but was unable do so because “he was spending too much money” on his account and could not make any transfers.  (6T:92-25 to 93-25)  (Da 16 at 17:30:27 to 17:31:42)  [...] subsequently denied telling anyone that he would pay the sum himself on Cash App.  (6T:94-5 to 15)
[brief] The Committee formally designated the Property as “in need of rehabilitation,” and no appeal of that designation was ever filed.  At the time of the rehabilitation designation and since, Defendant/Respondent [...] (“[...]”) has been the contract purchaser of the Property.  [...]’s intention to develop the Property for warehouse/distribution uses has been publicly known since February 2020.  [...] has appeared as needed at public meetings and responded fully to all inquiries of the public, Committee, and Planning Board regarding [...]’s development concept for the Property.  During the two-plus years following the rehabilitation designation, redevelopment of the Property was studied extensively and discussed and considered at approximately two dozen public meetings of the Committee, plus multiple meetings of the Planning Board.  A substantial public record of the process was maintained and made available to the public on the Township’s website.  Representatives of Appellant [...] (“Appellant”) were regular attendees and commenters at the public meetings, and Appellant even presented the testimony of an expert planning consultant before both the Planning Board and Committee.  This case involves Appellant’s challenge to a Redevelopment Plan (hereinafter defined) for the Property that was eventually adopted by the Committee in October 2022 and amended in December 2022.