ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Relationship with [...]  At the time of his arrest, [...] had been seeing two women, [...] and [...], both of whom knew about the other.  (4T117:20).  [...] had been dating Zoe for a substantial period prior to his arrest, but the two never entered into an exclusive relationship because [...] knew that Zoe wanted certain things like children and marriage that he could not give her.  (5T62:2-24).  Against that backdrop, [...] met [...] while out at a local bar in late September 2020.  (5T60:20-23).  [...] described Diana, an older woman more than ten years his senior, as a “party person,” who liked to go out and dance.  (5T63:4-5; 2T5:2).  He never brought her to his house in New Brunswick or introduced her to his friends or family.  (5T63:7-9).  The pair would primarily meet at local bars or lounges and then go back to Diana’s house.  (5T63:10-12).  While [...] wanted something casual, it was clear that Diana did not feel the same way, despite knowing the pair was not exclusive.  Diana would later offer the following at trial when asked about her early relationship with [...]:  Let me put it to you like this, there was a function in my house and I [had] been in a 10-year relationship, 12-year relationship and five-year relationship.  I’ve never been married.  And in that party—in that surrounding with all these people, [[...]] said the magic words that I wanted to hear, you’re definitely marriage material.  I felt special.  I felt loved.  I felt just—appreciated.  (4T117:8-15).  After several months of dating, Diana reconnected with an old friend named “[...]” and began doing hard drugs, such as cocaine and Molly.
[brief] Most coercive of all, the detectives directly threatened both his life and his relationship with his children.  The court correctly found as fact that both threats occurred, though it termed only the one to his life a “threat[],” but it erred by failing to recognize their legal significance.  See Carrion, 249 N.J. at 280-82 (deferring to trial court’s finding that threat was made, though “not called such,” but not its legal coerciveness).
[brief] The Settlement Agreement’s duty “to cooperate” cannot be read to be a duty “to approve”, but this is how the trial court read the Agreement.  [...] argues that the Board’s elevator condition was unreasonable because such elevator is not required under the Uniform Construction Code and, therefore, it argues, may not be a valid condition of the development approval and therefore constitutes a breach of a duty to cooperate.  However, the Uniform Construction Code sets forth only the minimum standards for construction; development approvals may require compliance with higher standards.  See Cherry Hill Towers, L.L.C. v. Township of Cherry Hill, 407 F.Supp.2d 648, 653 (D.N.J. 2006).
[brief] Q.  And was that to the [...] with a memo stating [...]?  A. Yes.  Q.  Was [...] related to the [...]?  A.  No, it was not.  Q.  On April 8th, 2014, was there a transaction with a note Melting Pot royalty in the amount of approximately $2,300?  A. Correct.  2,393.06.  The check is made out to [...] royalty, April 8th.  Q.  Thank you.  On April 9th, 2014, was there an outgoing wire in the amount of $30,000?  A. Yes.  Q.  On April 10th, 2014, was there a transaction for [...] in the amount of $16,000.28?  A. Yes.  $16,028.29 to [...].  Q.  And was that related to the [...]?  A.  No, it was not.  The State went through every transaction relating to that account and [...] was asked whether each related to [...]... except the thirty thousand dollar ($30,000.00) transaction on April 9, 2014, the “beneficiary” of which was “[...]” with the [...] address correctly listed as [...] in [...].  (Sa211).  This convenient omission demonstrates that the State actively, and seemingly purposefully, ignored evidence of [...]’s authority with respect to the Hoboken World of Beer project of in pursuit of a conviction.
[brief] At Paragraph 57, after the Non-Disclosure Agreement was executed, between September 2015 and late 2017, Appellants “disclosed all aspects of its proprietary and confidential information pertaining to [Appellants’] ongoing establishment of a solar farm under the auspices of [...].  [Appellants’] confidential disclosures included plans, applications, contracts, negotiation histories, contact lists, and other proprietary records pertaining to the acquisition of the [...]’ SREC rights and the separate 20-year lease for the land, municipal and state filings and permit applications, and other proprietary materials” (emphasis added).  [FEDa55; Pa3105].  By their own admission in their pleadings, Appellants disclosed this very same information to the [...] as early as September 2015.  Thus, even assuming [...] did disclose information regarding the Lease and Solar Rights to the [...] (which it disputes), such disclosure could not have caused any harm given that the [...] were previously supplied with such information by the Appellants themselves.
[brief] Second, the [...] is empowered to “require information deemed necessary to demonstrate that the applicant is qualified to be licensed and possesses the necessary financial resources to sustain its operation” and prescribe --- \(^3\)  See N.J.S.A. 17:16G-3.  \(^4\)  Unless exempted from licensure, acting as a debt adjuster without a license is a crime of the fourth-degree.  N.J.S.A. 2C:21-19(f).  forms for application for a debt adjustment license.  N.J.S.A. 17:16G-3.  The [...] is also statutorily authorized to “promulgate procedures and standards for the issuance or denial of licenses, [] promulgate grounds for and procedures under which licenses may be revoked, suspended, or reinstated, and [] establish fees necessary to meet administrative costs under [the NJDACCA].”
[brief] Conclusion  For all of the foregoing reasons, defendant [...], respectfully request that this Court affirm the judgment in the defendants’ favor.  Respectfully Submitted, [...]  [...], Esquire N.J. Id: 002002002  [...], Esq. N.J. Id: 022141990  [...]  P.O. Box 5429  [...] [...]  Attorneys for Respondent, [...], M.D., Ph.D.  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY  APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. [...]  [...], Plaintiff-Appellant, v. DR. ASIT SHAH, M.D., PhD; [...]; [...]; [...], M.D.; [...], M.D.; [...], M.D.; [...], M.D.; JOHN DOES 1-10 (fictitious names) and JANE DOES 1-10 (fictitious names), Defendants-Respondents.  CIVIL ACTION ON APPEAL FROM SUPERIOR COURT, LAW DIVISION BERGEN COUNTY  [...]  Honorable [...], J.S.C.  Sat below PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF REVERSAL OF THE VARIOUS TRIAL COURT  ORDERS DISMISSING THE APPELLANT’S COMPLAINT WITH PREJUDICE
[brief] Municipalities should not be permitted to lead the public to believe it will proceed in one manner while it actually proceeds in another.  On this record, the Court has no way to know how the Borough proceeded or why it proceeded in the manner it did.  The Court should reverse the trial court’s order and remand this matter to be reviewed consistent with the process adopted by the Borough in the “public interest and [to engender] public’s perception that the process [was] fair, competitive and trustworthy. ”  In the Matter of the Application for Medicinal Marijuana Alt. Treatment Ctr. for [...] (“In re Pangaea”), 465 N.J. Super. 343, 383 (App. Div. 2020).  **CONCLUSION**
[brief] 167 N.J. 573, 579 (2001).  The Court noted that N.J.R.E. 803(a)(2) allows for the admission of a prior statement of a witness to refute a recent charge of fabrication, but only after there has been an allegation or inference of fabrication or similar.  Id. at 580.  The testimony was ultimately deemed inadmissible, not because it was being admitted through the officer, but “because there was no charge of improper influence or motive in [the] case. ”  Id. at 581.  In State v. Muhammad, the Appellate Division provided further guidance on when prior statements may be admitted for purposes of rehabilitation.
[brief] Further, the cases cited in Actavis that Plaintiffs now rely upon are not persuasive and in no way displace the New Jersey precedent that compels reversal.  In Consumer Fin. Pro. Bureau v. [...] Corp., 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 215146 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 21, 2018) (cited in Actavis at *8), the court ordered the [...] to produce all documents that mentioned the terms “[...]” or “[...]. ”  But this directive was not given in a vacuum; rather, the Court limited the time period for production, and out of a total of 336,000 documents, roughly 15% were to be produced – 32,000 containing the word --- 4 [...] refers to codefendant [...] Credit Recovery, Inc. “[...]” and 23,000 containing the word “[...]. ”  *Id.* at *8*.  Further, [...] had claimed that in prior productions, “[...] has defined relevance in such a narrow way, so that issues that relate to [[...]’s] defenses were not produced. ”  *Id.* at *9*.  As such, the court found it appropriate to order [...] to produce those documents containing the defendants’ names.  *Id.*  There are no analogous facts in this matter.
[brief] Estate of Lasiw v. Pereira, 475 N.J. Super. 378, 404 (App. Div. 2023).  Thus, even if a search term hits a document, a party may still withhold the document if it is not relevant to the subject matter at issue, just as it could withhold physical documents stored in a “filing cabinet. ”  Lipsky v.  N.J. Ass’n of Health Plans, Inc., 474 N.J. Super. 447, 468 (App. Div. 2023).  That simple principle—affirmed by courts across the country—decides this case.
[brief] *Id.* at 382.  The requirements of the Affidavit of Merit Statute may not be avoided merely by labeling a claim as something other than professional negligence/malpractice.  See *Highland Lakes Country Club and Community Ass’n v. Nicastro*, 406 N.J. Super. 145, 151 (App. Div. 2009); *Couri v. Gardner*, 173 N.J. 328, 340 (2002).  The Court in Haviland reviewed the legislative history of the Affidavit of Merit statute and emphasized that N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-27 requires the Affidavit of Merit only for claims, “resulting from an alleged act of malpractice or negligence by a licensed person in his profession or occupation”  Id. at 382.  In Haviland, a radiology technician allegedly asked the plaintiff to “hold weights contrary to the [ordering physician’s] instructions. ”  The radiology technician was not a “licensed person” as defined by the statute.  Id. at 383.  Plaintiff, in Haviland alleged that the allegations against the medical center were not “founded on the acts of the licensed professional and were based solely on the conduct of its non-licensed employee”.  Id. at 383.  In Haviland, there was an affirmative act, by a non-licensed professional, not condoned, permitted or suggested by the licensed professional which caused the plaintiff’s injury.
[brief] Pa313.  The Board Engineer concluded that the Subdivision and Site Plan Applications met "the intent of the Township design standards."  Transcript of 11.1.23 hearing, page 37.  The Board's Resolution included a specific finding that the requested subdivision does not adversely affect the public's health, safety, or welfare.  Pa250.  Further, the EIS was included in Exhibit A-1 entitled "Complete Application Package" which was introduced by the Board Secretary in advance of the hearing.
[brief] [...] was charged with two different Preliminary Notices of Disciplinary Action (“PNDA”) dated September 27, 2019 and October 16, 2019, respectively, regarding incidents that allegedly occurred on the successive dates of August 16 and 17, 2019.  (Pa109a-112a).  On the September 27, 2019 PNDA, [...] had a Loudermill hearing before [...] and [...].  (Pa113a-P116a)  At the time, [...] was suspended “WITHOUT pay effective immediately”.  (Pa113a-Pa116a).  [...]’ petition for a stay was not addressed by [...].  (Pa113a-P116a).  Otherwise, [...] did not have any administrative hearings with respect to these two PNDAs.  [...] was issued two Final Notice of Disciplinary Actions on October 25, 2019 and January 14, 2020 that mirrored the September 27, 2019 and October 16, 2019, respectively PNDAs.  (Pa113a-Pa119a).  On November 9, 2019, [...] filed an appeal with the Civil Service Commission asserting the lack of a hearing for the first PNDA.  The DOC terminated him effective October 17, 2019.  (Pa110a; Pa119a).  The First FNDA was transmitted to the Office of Administrative Law, where it was filed on December 2, 2019, for determination as a contested case.  (Pa3a).  The second FNDA was transmitted to the Office of Administrative Law, where it was filed on May 4, 2020, for determination as a contested case.  (Pa3a).  A hearing was held at the Office of Administrative Law on February 9, 10, 11, and March 15, 2021.  (Pa3a)¹.  On October 5, 2022, [...], A.L.J., issued his decision.  (Pa1a-32a).  The record closed on April 19, 2022.  (Pa125a).  The decision was sent to the Civil Service Commission.  (Pa30a).  [...] filed timely exceptions to the October 5, 2022 decision by October 17, 2022.  (Pa124-136a).  The DOC did not file its exceptions until October 24, 2022 – beyond the thirteen day statutory deadline of October 18, 2023.  (Pa137a).  N.J.A.C. 1:1-18.4.  The DOC had not request any extensions.  N.J.A.C. 1:1-18.8(d) and (e).  The Civil Service Commission issued a Final Administrative Action on November 2, 2022.  (Pa33a-67a).  Final Administrative Action of the Civil Service Commission was served upon [...] by email on November 4, 2022.  A timely Notice of Appeal was filed.  ¹T refers to the transcript of February 9, 2021.  ²T refers to the transcript of February 11, 2021.  ³T refers to the transcript of March 15, 2021.  STATEMENT OF FACTS
[brief] ”  (Pb17).  He complains that the regulation compelled him to challenge the [...]’s actions before the *State Board Appeal* was resolved, thereby effectively depriving him of a remedy even if he prevails in the *State Board Appeal.* (Id.).  He argues that a “party who timely invokes and preserves his rights cannot be punished by the delays inherent in the legal process.  That, however, is exactly what has occurred here. ” (Id.).  Respectfully, this argument lacks merit when the Court examines it in the context of the rules governing stays of administrative orders.  N.J.A.C. § 6A:9B–4.16 expressly sets forth a party’s right to seek a stay of a decision suspending or revoking his teaching certificate.  The rule provides a 30-day time limit for such applications.  N.J.A.C. § 6A:9B–4.16(a)(2).  Denials of a stay application are appealable to the Commissioner.  See N.J.A.C. § 6A:9B-4.18.  From there, a party dissatisfied with the Commissioner’s ruling may apply to the Appellate Division for a stay under Rule 2:9-7.  In emergent cases, Rule 2:9-8 permits for a temporary stay.  Here, [...] failed to make timely use of these procedural remedies.  The State Board issued its written decision suspending [...]’s teaching certificate on October 28, 2021 and mailed it to him on November 3, 2021.  (Pa17-Pa20).  Considering N.J.S.A. § 18A:26-2’s plain terms, [...] should have anticipated the [...] would have to take action as to his employment.  Any doubt about such action was removed on November 9, 2021, when [...] advised [...], in writing, that he would recommend his termination to the [...] because he no longer possessed a valid teaching certificate.  (See Pa33).  Yet, despite this explicit notice, [...] apparently did nothing until December 6, 2021, when he filed an untimely motion for stay with the State Board, which was subsequently denied.  (Ra40).  This was almost three weeks after the [...] made its decision.  [...]’s failure to abide by timelines, not N.J.A.C. § 6A:3-1.3(i)’s 90-day timeline for challenging board actions, is the cause of any procedural unfairness he now perceives.  This failure is not a basis for deeming the [...]’s actions arbitrary and capricious.
[brief] The deposition transcript of [...] provided the needed information for the Appeal.  There is nothing shocking about not including the survey and [...] counsel was free to include that document and any other documents that he viewed as important.  During the deposition of [...], he had an opinion about the Property Identification Form which differed from the interpretation of this information by the drafters at the [...] who told [...] and [...] when they went to the [...] that the property that [...] thought was owned by [...] was actually owned by [...].  Further, [...] did not perform the survey as was expected and admitted at his deposition that he looked at documents in his office from the persons that actually performed the survey.  The surveyors were not deposed as it was believed that [...] had performed the survey.  [...] did not say that [...] owned the property in dispute.  His role was to conduct a Title Survey which required that he research and document the history of ownership of the property.
[brief] The orders transferring this case to arbitration preserved this issue for appeal.  (Da110;Da113;Da123)  The relevant issue before the Arbitrator was the determination of the market value of the total of the interests making up the fee simple estate including any furniture, fixtures and equipment (FF&E) integrally related to the use of the property as of the date of the taking but valued as of January 27, 1994.  There is no appeal from the award as to Lot 18 or the FF&E issue.  The arbitration award was rendered March 22, 2022 (Da115); Order for Final Judgment was entered 6/21/22 (Da123)  Defendant, [...] filed a Notice of Appeal.  (Da209)  STATEMENT OF FACTS
[brief] The lower court did not view this requirement in the abstract, but in the context of the totality of the circumstances.  Thus, the lower court took note of [...]’s interactions with [...] prior to defendant’s interrogation.  The lower court noted [...], expressing his desire to assist the defendant.  Relying upon its own review of [...]’s casual, appropriate pre-interrogation conversations with the detective, the lower court was able to find that despite being only 20 years old and despite what had occurred earlier that evening, [...], was fully capable of providing the defendant with the support required by New Jersey law.  In the face of this, the lower court correctly refused to speculate on whether others would have been better or more “right” than [...]  Importantly, the lower court was also able to view the obvious care, concern and support provided to the defendant by [...], both physically and verbally.  After the defendant was brought into the room and throughout the Miranda warnings, the lower court noted that [...], put his arm around the defendant and hugged the defendant.  The lower court found that [...], treated the defendant as a big brother would treat a little brother; he did not treat the defendant as the person who had just murdered four family members.  [...]’s physical demonstrations of care and support for the defendant were mirrored by what he said to the defendant.  After the defendant expressed his desire to waive his Miranda rights and speak with the detectives, the lower court found that [...], first checked with the defendant to ensure defendant was “OK with that?”, before [...], signed off on the waiver.  Once defendant confirmed his decision, but before any questions were asked by the detectives, [...], was allowed to speak with the defendant, though admittedly not alone.  That this consultation was not private was a factor appropriately considered by the lower court and found not to outweigh for the substance of the consultation.  See A.A., 240 N.J. at 358-59; State in the Interest of M.P., 476 N.J. Super. 242, 293 (App. Div. 2023).  [...], told the defendant that he was loved, not to worry, and that, “[w]e all got your back buddy. ”  He advised the defendant to tell the detectives “everything. ”  Defendant responded by telling [...], “I know. ”  The lower court correctly found that the totality of the circumstances before it proved beyond a reasonable doubt that [...], was an appropriate helper as defined by Presha and its progeny.  With [...]’s assistance, the defendant knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived his Miranda rights.  Defendant’s arguments to the contrary – that [...] was too conflicted to serve the role of a trusted adult during the interrogation – failed both factually and legally for the lower court and should continue to do so before this Court.
[brief] There was no plain error here.  In short, defendant cannot hide from his objective, undisputed, plain lies during an interrogation by accusing his interrogator of an improper opinion.  Defendant knew his statement could be used against him, and when he chose to lie about something so plainly obvious, and something he did not dispute at trial, it is fair evidence for the jury to consider when judging his overall credibility.  But even if not, this was not plain error because the evidence of his guilt, with his self-identification, was overwhelming.  Accordingly, the State respectfully asks this Court to affirm.
[brief] [...]’S ROLE AT THE PROJECT AND CCIP COMMUNICATIONS** | | | A. [...]’s Initial Retention for the Project and CCIP Submissions | 7 | | B. [...]’s Confirmation That [...] Was Excluded | 11 | | C. Communications Confirming [...]’s Unenrollment from the CCIP | 14 | | D.  [...]’s Subsequent Acknowledgments That Its Work Was Unenrolled from the CCIP | 16 | | **III.  THE [...]IDENT, THE HOOD LAWSUIT AND [...]’S TENDER OF COVERAGE TO TRAVELERS AND EVANSTON** | | | A. The Accident | 18 | | B.
[brief] It provides a framework to obtain a consumer lending license, N.J.S.A. 17:11C-7, and for the management of same.  Among other regulatory details, it governs how long the license lasts, N.J.S.A. 17:11C-11, how to transfer a license, N.J.S.A. 17:11C-12, whether a branch office of the lender needs a separate license, N.J.S.A. 17:11C-9, and the recordkeeping requirements of lenders.  N.J.S.A. 17:11C-19.  The NJCFLA also contains enforcement and penalty provisions.  Critically, and Plaintiff asserts, dispositively, all authority to invoke or enforce those provisions is vested solely in the Commissioner of the Department of Banking and Insurance.  See, N.J.S.A. 17:11C-18.  Under this statute section, the Commissioner of the Department of Banking and Insurance has authority to refuse to issue a license and may revoke, suspend or refuse to renew a license, N.J.S.A. 17:11C-18(a), may “access and examine books, accounts, records and other documents” N.J.S.A. 17:11C-18(f), and conduct investigations, which may include the subpoena of witnesses and documents. ”  N.J.S.A. 17:11C-18(g).  The remedies available to the Commissioner against persons engaging in prohibited practices or transactions are broad, thorough, and can be harsh.  The Commissioner may impose a civil penalty of up to $25,000, N.J.S.A. 17:11C-18(i), and may bar the wrongdoer from acting as a lender, owner, or employee for up to ten years.  N.J.S.A. 17:11C-18(j).  There is also a penalty provision in N.J.S.A. 17:11C-33 which provides that violations of certain provisions of the NJCFLA constitute a crime of the fourth degree.  The complete regulatory structure places the ability and right to enforce the Act solely with the Commissioner of Banking and Insurance.  There is no private statutory cause of action created, explicitly, or implicit in the statute and therefore Defendant cannot avail himself of the NJCFLA to have the judgment declared void.