ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Plaintiff’s physician expert, [...], testified for roughly a day and a half—the first day live and the second by video teleconference.  (See 6T; 8T.)  Both [...] and [...] were permitted to give extensive respiratory care opinions.  (See, e.g., 5T19:6-22:11; 5T63:13-64:22-64:22; 5T143:13-145:19; 6T143:8-151:6; 6T184:25-186:15; 6T196:9-199:15; 6T205:13-214:14; 6T221:6-223:24; 8T6:6-27:20.)  Among other things, [...] and [...] gave the opinion that the standard of care required a respiratory therapist to see [...] every two to three hours.  (See 6T222:9-223:24; 8T6:6-15:8.)  The court allowed the jury to hear expert respiratory therapy opinion testimony from both [...] and [...], over defendant’s objections, although the witnesses were not qualified as respiratory therapy or respiratory care experts.
[brief] Respondent avers that “the action was on notice to Plaintiff, who had an ethical, and perhaps legal, obligation to alert the Intervenor. ”  Rb35.  Appellant does not understand this argument.  First, it is not clear what “action” Respondent even refers to.  Clearly “the action” cannot refer to the foreclosure itself because an argument that the Plaintiff was on notice of its own foreclosure makes no sense.  So what does this refer to, the possibility that someday, somehow, somewhere a motion might be filed?  A motion can always be filed, whether or not timely or meritorious, but since none was filed before closing, neither Plaintiff nor [...] were “on notice” of anything.  Without an explanation of what action they speak of, what was [...] obligated to disclose?  And even if we assumed – without any basis, for that assumption – that [...] knew something, still nothing is shown to question [...]’s lack of notice, i.e. a bonafide purchaser without notice.  Absolutely nothing is shown to have caused [...] any concern about purchasing this property three months’ post-foreclosure.  II.
[brief] (P-59.)  Defendant [...] argues that Defendants’ conduct in failing to remove the illegal, large, makeshift liquor concession stand on the Subject Premises for several months was not “palpably unreasonable,” but this determination should be left to a jury.  *Vincitore v. New Jersey Sports & Expo. Auth.*, 169 N.J. 119, 130 (2001).  The *Roe* Court held that the conduct of New Jersey Transit when it bolted open a gate, thereby inviting the plaintiff to enter a known dangerous area where she was brutally raped, could be found to have been palpably unreasonable.  317 N.J. Super. at 82.  The *Saldana* Court held that a jury should determine whether the City of Camden was palpably unreasonable when it failed to secure dilapidated, abandoned city buildings after a third party started a fire in one of them.  275 N.J. Super. at 488.  The *Foster* Court held that whether the Newark Housing Authority’s failure to provide a lock for the front entrance of an apartment building, enabling a nonresident to enter and shoot a police officer accompanying a tenant, was palpably unreasonable should be left to the jury.  389 N.J. Super. at 87.  Defendant [...] cites [...]’s concurrence in *Garrison*, 154 N.J. at 285, 311, for the proposition that a Court may decide the issue on summary judgment.  Def. [...]’s Brief at 28-29.  But [...] acknowledged that “[h]ad the Township received prior complaints or reports of prior injuries with regard to the alleged dangerous condition, the issue might be viewed differently. ”  Garrison, 154 N.J. at 311.  Plaintiffs adequately pleaded that the presence of the illegal, large, makeshift liquor concession stand caused fighting and mayhem at the Subject Premises for months before Decedent was shot – a very different scenario from the Garrison plaintiff who was injured on a parking lot with an uneven surface of a declivity of just one-and-one-half inches.  Garrison, 154 N.J. at 285.  Similarly, Defendant [...]’s reliance on Polzo v. Cnty of Essex, 209 N.J. 51 (N.J. 2012) is also misplaced.  Polzo involved a fatal accident that occurred when a person lost control of her bicycle while riding across a pothole, which is “a common sight on New Jersey’s roads and highways. ”  Id. at 55.  Whether a public entity’s failure to fix a common sight such as pothole is “palpably unreasonable” is quite different from whether Defendants’ failure to remove an illegal, large, makeshift liquor concession stand is “palpably unreasonable,” and in the instant case, the determination should be left to a jury.  POINT V: PLAINTIFFS ARE ENTITLED TO DISCOVERY REGARDING THE COMPLAINTS ABOUT THE ILLEGAL, LARGE, MAKESHIFT CONCESSION STAND AND THE EXTENT THAT DEFENDANTS’ EMPLOYEES FAILED IN THEIR MINISTERIAL DUTIES TO SHUT IT DOWN.
[brief] It is not a departmental hearing or other adjudicative arena where the subject of the investigation is presented with the purported evidence against him or has the opportunity to directly challenge his accuser.  Rather, a State department’s EEO Office investigates a complaint of a State Policy violation, makes a recommendation, and a department official issues a letter of determination.  The department may direct some remedial action, which for department employees could mean disciplinary action.  [...] and the [...] argue that because no disciplinary action was taken against [...], [...]’s findings and conclusions can be adopted and upheld without any need for review of the purported evidence by an impartial factfinder.  (R2b10 ([...] stating its “general practice of determining other types of appeals on a written record”)).  That position works a manifestly unjust result in this case because it permits [...] – which the record shows has an axe to grind against [...] – to make formal determinations about him that are damaging to his character without any meaningful due process protections.
[brief] *In re Salmon, Inc.*, 68 F.3d at 557-558 (internal alterations omitted).  For example, in *[...], supra*, the plaintiff agreed that “disputes between her and her payday lender [[...]] would be resolved by arbitration before the [...] (‘[...]’). ”  835 F.3d. at 262.  Specifically, the arbitration clause in their contract stated:  *Arbitration of All Disputes*:  You and we agree that any and all claims, disputes or controversies between you and us, any claim by either of us against the other ... and any claim arising from or relating to your application for this loan, regarding this loan or any other loan you previously or may later obtain from us, this Note, this agreement to arbitrate all disputes, your agreement not to bring, join or participate in class actions, regarding collection of the loan, alleging fraud or misrepresentation ... including disputes regarding the matters subject to arbitration, or otherwise, shall be resolved by binding individual (and not joint) arbitration by and under the Code of Procedure of the [...] (“[...]”) in effect at the time the claim is filed....  *Id.*, at 262-263  However, when [...] sought to arbitrate her claims the [...] refused to accept the case.
[brief] The WQMP Rules define a “wasteload allocation” as “the portion of a receiving water's total maximum daily load[13] [“TMDL”] for a specific pollutant that is allocated to one of its existing or future point sources[14] or categories of point sources of pollution (. . .).”  N.J.A.C. 7:15-1.5 (emphasis added).  In fact, [...] states that to the extent regulatory measures are utilized that are necessary to address TMDLs, those measures include effluent limitations or additional measures that are incorporated into wastewater or stormwater permits issued pursuant to the New Jersey Pollution Discharge Elimination System (“NJPDES”) program.[15]  The NJPDES program involves the issuance of discharge permits under the New Jersey Water Pollution Control Act, N.J.S.A. 58:10A-1 to -73, and --- 13  As set forth in Appellant’s brief, the “total maximum daily load” or “TMDL” is a “calculation of the maximum amount of a pollutant that a water body can receive and still meet water quality standards or a different target where the water quality is better than the water quality standard.  It is the sum of the allowable loads of a single pollutant from all contributing point and nonpoint sources and includes a margin of safety and consideration of seasonal variations. ”
[brief] Nuveen Mun. Trust v. WITHUMSMITH BROWN, 692 F. 3d 283 - Court of Appeals, 3rd Circuit 2012.  “*Indeed, a district court has an independent obligation to determine whether subject matter jurisdiction exists, even if its jurisdiction is not challenged.  See Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514, 126 S.Ct. 1235, 163 L.Ed.2d 1097 (2006). *”  In my foreclosure case, none of the trial judges examined the subject matter jurisdiction of their courts over the Foreclosure Complaint of 5/12/16 filed by [...] (141a).
[brief] *Schumann*, 769 F.3d at 845 (quoting *Atkinson*, 473 F.3d at 520).  “A relator is said to have direct knowledge of fraud when he saw [it] with his own eyes. ”  *U.S. ex rel. Barth v. Ridgedale Elec., Inc.*, 44 F.3d 699, 703 (8th Cir. 1995) (quotation marks omitted).  Requiring direct and independent knowledge serves to “encourage persons with first-hand knowledge of fraudulent misconduct . . . to come forward. ”  *Glaser*, 570 F.3d at 919 (quotation marks omitted).  Relator is not an insider whistleblower and has no “direct” knowledge regarding how Defendants reset rates.
[directive] With the approval of the Attorney General, the Executive Organization of Director may organize the work of the Office into any bureaus or other organizational units as may be necessary for the efficient and effective operation of the Office.  The Executive Director may delegate to employees in the Office and its constituent organizational units such powers as the Executive Director deems appropriate, to be exercised subject to the supervision and control of the Executive Director.  The Attorney General shall assign to the Office such employees of the Department of Law & Public Safety as may be necessary to assist the Executive Director in the performance of his, her, or their duties.
[brief] ”  (Zoning Transcript 41:19-25 and 42:13-25)  The matter as presented is neither insubstantial nor immaterial.  Plaintiff simply disregarded every Ordinance and procedure disingenuously in order to obtain an approval they were not entitled to.  As for the Trial Court, [...] reiterated all of the points made by Plaintiff throughout the transcript and addressed them independently, to acknowledge the Board decision.  However, [...] did not err in the application of the Standard of Review for a Zoning Board determination on a Prerogative Writ trial.  [...] clearly stated that Plaintiff’s contention that the ZBA “denial of the appeal” by the Historic Preservation Commission to not provide a CofA was arbitrary and capricious, was “unsubstantiated by the record. ”  7T:35-36.  The Court noted that “The issue being that ultimately the Historic Preservation Commission and the Zoning Board of Adjustment ultimately agreed, that the walkways that were constructed even if constructed with concrete pavers, were not of a character that were consistent with the character of the historical flared area….they are not appropriate…There is no visible record or historical photograph that suggests the sort of paving was ever used. ”  7T:36-37 (emphasis added).  The Court recognized the clear issue in that the pavers were NOT historically appropriate, the Plaintiff did NOT meet their burden of proof to carry litigation and the Zoning Board of Adjustment did NOT act in an arbitrary and capricious manner which was the Standard of Review for the prerogative writ action in upholding the HPC decision, not just the violation of the land development ordinance, which had Plaintiff requested additional relief, perhaps could have been discussed during the hearing.  Since there were no further requests, only the appeal of the HPC decision was heard and forms the basis of this action, despite Appellant’s numerous attempts to direct the court’s attention elsewhere.
[brief] 08626  Re: State of New Jersey (Plaintiff-Respondent) v. [...] (Defendant-Appellant)  Appellate Division  Docket No. [...]  Municipal Appeal No. [...]  Misc. Case.  No. [...]  Criminal Action: On Appeal  From a Final Judgment of Conviction in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division (Criminal), Monmouth County  Sat Below: Honorable [...], J.A.D. (ret. & t/a)  Honorable Judges:  Please accept this letter memorandum, pursuant to R. 2:6-2(b), in lieu of a more formal brief submitted on behalf of the State of New Jersey.  http://mcponj.org  TABLE OF CONTENTS Page  COUNTERSTATEMENT OF PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND FACT...........1  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I THE LOWER COURT PROPERLY DENIED DEFENDANT’S CLAIM SHE WAS ENTITLED TO ADDITIONAL DISCOVERY..................................................5  CONCLUSION.................................................................................................9  TABLE OF APPENDIX State v. [...], written opinion, filed September 13, 2022...............Sal COUNTERSTATEMENT OF PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND FACTS
[brief] The Court held that while BMW “introduced the consideration of ratios between compensatory and punitive damages … mathematical formulae alone cannot encapsulate the multiple facets of the Due Process Clause or address all of its concerns....”  Id. at 112 (citing BMW, 517 U.S. at 582).  Thus, “courts must ensure that the measure of punishment is both reasonable and proportionate to the amount of harm to the plaintiff and to the general damages recovered. ”  Ibid. (citing State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 425-26 (2003)).  Punitive damage awards with a single-digit ratio, i.e., less than ten, generally do not violate due process.  Id. at 112-13 (citing State Farm, 538 U.S. at 425).  [...], 2022 WL 17491290 at *6.  The trial court in [...] had determined that an appropriate punitive damage ratio in that case to be 2.3 times compensatory damages.  Affirming on appeal, this Court held: “the punitive damage amount Inc., 419 N.J. Super. 244, 266-67 (App. Div. 2011); and McConkey v. AON Corp., 354 N.J. Super. 25, 56 (App. Div. 2002). was well within the bounds of the single-digit ratio.  Given defendant’s conduct, the award amount did not violate due process.
[brief] [...], [...], and [...] Repeatedly Sought More Pay  All staffing coordinators received the same base wage, save for [...] (“[...]”), another staffing coordinator, given her years of service.\(^1\) (Pa361 at 78:14-79:13; Pa283-84 at 24:24-25:2).  [...], “fixated” on his misconception that other staffing coordinators earned more than him, repeatedly complained about his wages.  (Pa299 at 85:3-15; Pa361 at 77:5-15).  [...], too, believed the staffing coordinators were underpaid.  (Pa163 at 19:24-20:8; Pa361 at 78:17-79:2; Pa230 at 21:8-23).  In response, in early September 2020, [...] confirmed that only \(^1\)  [...] admitted both [...] and [...]—another staffing coordinator employed alongside Plaintiffs—had longer tenures than him.  (Pa164 at 21:14-22:21).  [...] earned more.  (Pa361 at 79:3-13).  In an attempt to secure a higher wage, [...] petitioned [...] for COVID incentive pay, sometimes referred to as “PIP” or “premium incentive pay. ” (Pa230 at 21:8-22:17; Pa365 at 95:12-17).  During the COVID-19 pandemic, [...] offered financial incentives like PIP to its frontline employees, such as nurses.  (Pa361 at 77:16-78:2).  These “direct patient care staff” members received an additional amount per shift.  (Pa361 at 77:16-78:2).  Staffing coordinators were not eligible for this COVID-19 incentive pay as determined by senior leadership.  (Pa361 at 78:3-13).  [...] thought the staffing coordinators should have received “paid incentives” to work during the pandemic.  (Pa361 at 77:16-78:2).  [...] sought extra incentive pay for her employees during the pandemic, but was denied.  (Pa361 at 78:14-21).  According to [...], [...] sought this incentive pay for her employees “several times” but was denied on each occasion by senior management.  (Pa106 at 90:7-23; Pa111-12 at 113:11-114:8).  X.
[brief] July 31, 2019 – [...] informs [...] that if [...] wants $1 million in coverage, he would have to complete a supplemental questionnaire (the “Questionnaire”).  (Ia124).  [...] completes the Questionnaire which makes no mention that 12-15+ passenger vans are excluded from coverage.  (Ia143).  August 1, 2019 – [...] submits the Questionnaire to [...].  (Ia124).  August 6, 2019 - Camp opens and the 12-15+ passenger vans pick up campers in the morning to bring them to camp.  [...] sends a 4-page price quotation to [...] for a $1 million policy.  (Ia101-104; 147).  Later that day, coverage is bound.  (Ia147).  After August 6, 2019 - [...] receives a Certificate of Coverage stating that he has $1 million Hired/Non-owned Automobile coverage (“HNOA”).  The Certificate does not state 12-15+ passenger vans are excluded or otherwise ineligible for coverage.  (Ia151).  A.  That [...] Was Never Notified that 12-15+ Passenger Vans Were Excluded or Otherwise Ineligible for Coverage
[brief] Whether defendant was carrying a non-conforming business card was not relevant to any material issue in dispute, which is a prerequisite for admission of other-bad-act evidence.  _Willis_, 225 N.J. at 98.  The other-bad-act evidence “cannot merely be offered to indicate that because the defendant is disposed toward wrongful acts generally, he is probably guilty of the present act. ”  _Id._ (internal citation omitted).  No relationship existed, and none was proffered, between the SOP formatting violation and the allegations against defendant of official misconduct and theft.  Because the other-bad-act evidence had zero probative value, the prejudice of its admission also outweighed its non-existent probative value under prong four of *Cofield*.
[brief] Ignorance standing alone can never be the basis of a legal right. ”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); State v. Moran, 408 N.J. Super. 412, 425, 975 A.2d 480 (App.Div.2009) (reiterating legal maxim that “every person is conclusively presumed to know the law, statutory and otherwise” (quoting Graham v. N.J. Real Estate Comm’n, 217 N.J. Super. 130, 138, 524 A.2d 1321 (App.Div.1987))).  Further, our creation of a tickler system [i.e., the Ferreira conference] to remind attorneys and their clients about critical filing dates plainly cannot trump the statute.  In other words, the absence of a Ferreira conference cannot toll the legislatively prescribed time frames.  [Paragon Contractors, Inc. v. Peachtree Condo. Ass’n, 202 N.J. 415, 424–25 (2010) (emphasis added.)]
[brief] On June 27, 2013, [...] filed a foreclosure action captioned Kim Ahn [...] v. [...], [...] and [...] Cust [...], [...], and the [...] ([...]) before the Superior Court of New Jersey, Monmouth County, Chancery Division, Docket Number [...] ("[...] Foreclosure Action") seeking to foreclose the [...] Mortgage in the alleged principal amount of $120,000.00 and to recover attorney’s fees and interest.  During the pendency of the [...] Foreclosure Action, [...] and the underlying title insurance carrier entered into an agreement to resolve the claims of [...].  Thereafter, the Honorable [...], P.J.C. entered an Order, dated September 26, 2014, permitting the deposit into court of $92,000.00 in satisfaction of [...]'s claimed mortgage interest in the Property and thereby dismissing [...]'s Foreclosure Action.
[directive] As used in these Guidelines:  "Automated License Plate Reader" or "ALPR" means a system consisting of a camera, or cameras, and related equipment that automatically and without direct human control locates, focuses on, and photographs license plates and vehicles that come into range of the device, that automatically converts digital photographic images of scanned license plates into electronic text documents, that is capable of comparing scanned license plate text data with data files for vehicles on a BOLO (be on the lookout) list programmed into the device’s electronic memory, and that notifies police, whether by an audible alert or by other means, when a scanned license plate matches the license plate on the programmed BOLO list.  The term includes both devices that are placed at a stationary location (whether permanently mounted, or portable devices positioned at a stationary location) and mobile devices affixed to a police vehicle and capable of operating while the vehicle is in motion.  "BOLO (Be on the Lookout)" or "BOLO situation" refers to a determination by a law enforcement agency that there is a legitimate and specific law enforcement reason to identify or locate a particular vehicle, or, in the case of a post-scan BOLO, there is a legitimate and specific reason to ascertain the past location(s) of a particular vehicle.
[brief] This appeal arises out of the trial court’s denial of the Motion for New Trial filed by Defendant/Appellants [...] (“the Township”), [...] (“Amato”), [...] (“Winogracki”), and [...] (“Camera”) (collectively, “Appellants”) in connection with the May 25, 2023 jury verdict.  Plaintiff is an employee in the Recreation Department at [...].  Plaintiff’s Complaint, filed on November 20, 2018, alleges that the Appellants committed acts of religious and disability discrimination and retaliation against her.  After an eight-day trial, the jury returned a verdict, finding that Appellants did not commit religious discrimination, even though such allegations constituted the lion’s share of Plaintiff’s allegations, but they did commit disability discrimination and retaliation under the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (“LAD”).  The jury awarded Plaintiff: (1) $500,001 in emotional distress damages, (2) $110,000 in economic loss damages, and (3) $1,000,002 in punitive damages.  Despite the evident incongruity and injustice of the verdict, the trial court judge, the Honorable [...], J.S.C., denied Appellants’ Motion for a New Trial on August 23, 2023, issuing a written opinion in support of the order.  The trial court erred in denying the Appellants’ Motion for New Trial in the following respects.  First, the jury’s verdict finding liability against Appellants for disability discrimination and retaliation under LAD is not supported by the weight of evidence presented at trial.  Critically, Plaintiff offered no evidence at trial that Appellants took any adverse employment action against her because she had an actual or perceived mental disability.  Second, Judge Den Uyl’s written opinion conflates the religious and disability components of Plaintiff’s allegations as intertwined.  The facts presented at trial demonstrate a timeline that makes it impossible for the Township to have taken adverse employment action against Plaintiff because of an actual or perceived disability.  Third, Judge Den Uyl’s written opinion constitutes reversible plain error by permitting Plaintiff’s testimony to materially deviate from the allegations pleaded and the discovery relied upon until the time of trial.  Although Plaintiff’s Complaint nebulously used the words “disability,” “disability discrimination,” and “retaliation,” Plaintiff’s material deviation testimony had a clear capability of producing an unjust result.  Fourth, the jury’s damages awards were excessive and constitute a miscarriage of justice based on the dearth of evidence presented at trial.  Fifth and finally, Plaintiff’s counsel made comments in summation that exceeded the bounds of the proofs presented to the jury at trial and were capable of producing an unjust result.  Accordingly, the trial court’s ruling should be reversed, this matter should be remanded for a new trial, and this appeal should be granted for the reasons set forth below.