ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] N.J.S.A. 2CD:35-5B(13).............................................................................................................15  N.J.S.A. 39:4-105.......................................................................................................................27  RULES  N.J.R.E. 105 ...............................................................................................................................44  N.J.R.E. 403 ...............................................................................................................................passim N.J.R.E. 609 ...............................................................................................................................17, 29, 30 N.J.R.E. 609(a)............................................................................................................................17, 33, 35 N.J.R.E. 609(a)(1).......................................................................................................................17  TABLE OF ABBREVIATIONS  Pb Plaintiff-Respondent, [...]’s, brief Pa Plaintiff-Respondent, [...]’s, appendix  Db Defendants-Appellants, [...], [...], and [...]’s, brief  Da Defendants-Appellants, [...], [...], and [...]’s, appendix 1T  Transcript of hearing on motions in limine, dated September 26, 2023  2T Transcript of trial, dated October 3, 2023 3T Transcript of trial, dated October 4, 2023, Vol. I 4T Transcript of trial, dated October 4, 2023, Vol. II 5T Transcript of trial, dated October 5, 2023 6T Transcript of hearing on motion for new trial, dated November 16, 2023  STATEMENT OF ORDERS AND DECISIONS APPEALED
[brief] Asb18.  Appellants admit that the number of gallons of effluent to be expected to flow into the septic system is “a key determination for a Consistency Assessment” but is “insufficient standing alone. ”  Asb21.  Appellants’ rationale is that the Project will significantly increase GHG emissions that will exacerbate global climate change and would be “the proximate cause of dramatic changes in precipitation and stormwater runoff in the Highlands Preservation areas. ”  Asb19.  These are the same arguments that Appellants made in connection with [...]’s determination of [...]’s consistency with the goals and purposes of the Highlands Act and should be rejected for those same reasons.
[brief] There’s no evidence that [...] is [...]ir Mason.  There’s absolutely no evidence that you’ve shown this Court that there was even a drug rivalry amongst the parties in this area.  If you look at inner cities . . . and some suburban communities, there are different facets of people that sell drugs.  But it does not mean there’s a drug rivalry unless you have evidence to come in the courtroom with.  Not speculation, but evidence.  [9T74-1 to 9.]
[directive] Defendant  This matter having been opened to the Court by way of a Petition for Compassionate Release filed on (insert date) to release the defendant pursuant to N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.51e (“Compassionate Release for Certain Inmates”); and The Court having considered the petition, Certificate of Eligibility for Compassionate Release, the release plan submitted by the State Parole Board, any testimony, and any related information, and for the reasons set forth on the record; , 20 that the Petition for IT IS HEREBY ORDERED on this day of Compassionate Release of the defendant is ☐  The Court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant is so Granted. debilitated or incapacitated by a (choose appropriate) ☐ terminal condition, disease or syndrome, ☐ permanent physical incapacity, as to be permanently physically incapable of committing a crime if released, and, in the case of a permanent physical incapacity, the conditions established by the State Parole Board under which the inmate would be released would not pose a threat to public safety.  Additional Reasons (Optional) that the release of the defendant shall not proceed any sooner IT IS FURTHER ORDERED than 10 days from the date of entry of this order and shall be in accordance with the Department of Corrections policies for compassionate release.  that the defendant shall comply with the release conditions IT IS FURTHER ORDERED established by the State Parole Board and shall be subject to sanctions for a violation of a condition of compassionate release pursuant to N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.51e(a).  ☐  The Court does not find by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant is Denied.
[directive] These standards shall be designed to enhance the thoroughness, timeliness, quality, and coordination of human trafficking investigations and prosecutions, and shall include:  A detailed description of specific circumstances that are relevant to a possible violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:13-8, which specified relevant circumstances must be investigated to the extent feasible; Guidelines on the specific questions to be posed during an investigation so as to obtain evidence or information concerning the relevant circumstances specified in the Page 4 investigation standards and protocols promulgated pursuant to paragraph (1) of this subsection; and A detailed description of the methods of investigation to be used to ensure the integrity and effectiveness of the investigative process.
[brief] In his January 31, 2011 Opinion and Order [...] relied extensively on the testimony of [...]’s environmental expert, [...].  (Pa 91-137).  Among other things, [...] relied on Dr. Powell’s testimony to make its findings concerning the nature, extent, and timing of the environmental damages at the Plainville facility.  (Id., pp. 27-40).  Similarly, the Special Allocation Master (“SAM”) – the Hon. [...] - relied extensively on Dr. Powell’s testimony to allocate the damages among the parties.  (Pa 152) (noting that “the SAM has relied principally on Dr. Powell’s reports and his allocations. ”).  The applicable authority allows for taxation of expert fees when necessary to a resolution of the issues.  In this case, expert testimony was absolutely necessary.  That same authority allows for the taxation of deposition expenses.  Consequently, it was not an abuse of discretion for the trial court to tax them against [...].  IV.
[directive] Drug Courts and Applications for Treatment in Lieu of Imprisonment  Under N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14 Attorney General Directive 1998-1, § 12 expressly authorizes prosecutors to agree to a defendant’s application to be sentenced to treatment in lieu of imprisonment pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14, provided that the prosecutor is satisfied that all of the criteria and conditions specified in that statute have been met.  That statutory provision is the legal cornerstone for New Jersey’s Drug Court Page 22 Attorney General [...] Guidelines 2 (2004 Revisions) Program, which is among the most important and promising initiatives designed ultimately to protect public safety by helping to break the vicious cycle of crime and addiction.  If a defendant charged with a [...]-eligible offense has been found to be clinically ineligible for sentencing pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14 by a [...] (Treatment Assessment Services to the Courts) evaluator or other person or entity assigned by the court to perform the diagnostic assessment required by N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14a(1) (i.e., a determination by the court-appointed assessor that the defendant is not a drug or alcohol dependent person, or that the defendant would not benefit from treatment services that are actually available), the prosecutor must interpose an objection pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14, which objection may only be overruled by a court upon a finding of a gross and patent abuse of prosecutorial discretion, unless the prosecutor is satisfied that the court- appointed diagnostic assessor was unqualified to make the determination, or otherwise made a clear error in judgment.  When a defendant is found to be eligible for rehabilitative treatment pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14 by satisfying all of the statutory criteria, the prosecutor may tender a “conditional” offer under these Guidelines, affording the defendant the option to choose either the [...] offer or to be sentenced to rehabilitative treatment pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14.  Notwithstanding the foregoing, when a defendant is eligible for a standardized “open” plea offer pursuant to Section 6, a prosecutor shall not tender a conditional offer that would give the defendant the option to accept the “open” offer instead of offered treatment pursuant to N.J.S. A. 2C:35-14 unless the standardized “open” offer includes as a condition that the defendant will participate in any treatment program that may be ordered by the court.  See Section 6.5.4 (encouraging prosecutors to empower sentencing courts to use the leverage of the criminal justice system to convince addicted offenders to accept the rigors of clinically appropriate treatment interventions).  If the prosecutor for any reason objects to a [...]-eligible defendant being sentenced pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14 and the court admits the defendant to special probation over the prosecutor’s objection, the prosecutor shall immediately notify the Director of the Division of Criminal Justice or his designee, and shall, unless the Director instructs otherwise, appeal the court’s decision and shall seek to stay the imposition of the sentence in order to permit the appeal.
[brief] In actual fact\(^6\), the C-section was not called at that time.  [Pa618-624].  In actual fact, [...] was not delivered within fifteen minutes thereafter.  [Pa618-624].  In actual fact, no one notified the attending physician of the alarming and abnormal strip reading until about 10:12 p.m. – long after it was possible to deliver [...] within fifteen minutes.  [Pa285].  At about 10:12 p.m., the charge nurse, possibly by the name of [...], approached the attending physician, [...], and expressed concern over the [...] situation and readings.  Dr. Balazs asked the nurse to call up the [...] readings on a screen as he completed another C-section at about 10:12 p.m. --- \(^6\) Plaintiff will use the words “in actual fact” before an event that actually happened.
[brief] The de novo court here rejected the request for an adverse inference for failing to call [...] based on *State v. Hill*, 199 N.J. 545, 550, 974 A.2d 403, 406 (2009).  But in *Hill*, the adverse inference would have benefited the State that had the burden of proof while here, the adverse inference would protect the accused, who has the constitutional right to remain silent.  See U.S. Const. amend. V.
[brief] Defendant first claims that the officers’ suggestion that they would “tear [his] house apart” was a threat resulting in involuntary consent.  Not so.  Instead, officers were providing defendant with an accurate description of the scope of a search when conducted with a warrant versus with consent.  Throughout the interaction with police, defendant was concerned about the hardship an invasive intrusion would have on his family.  Knowing this, the officers explained that a consent search would result in a more limited intrusion, and they could execute the search in a more orderly manner if defendant cooperated.  See (Da15 3:14:54 to 3:15:39; 1T72-9 to 15).  As explained at the hearing, typically, a search warrant involves a search of “every crevice, every drawer[,] every part of the house[.]” (1T66-13 to 16).  Conversely, when police conduct a search based on consent, the scope of the search is more limited, and officers may be a “bit more tact[ful],” knowing that the suspect could tell them where the evidence is located, but he or she could also stop the search at any point.  (1T67-1 to 5).  The understanding of the juxtaposition between the limited consent search — as opposed to a more disruptive and intrusive warrant-based search — may have been enough to sway defendant’s decision to agree to the consent search.  Then, as promised, upon arriving at defendant’s house, [...] and his colleagues abided by the understanding to limit any disturbance at the residence.  Only three of the eight officers present during the vehicle stop went into the house, and those officers had defendant lead them to the evidence.  (1T70-16 to 72-4).  Officers limited the ten-minute search to only those areas that defendant indicated contained contraband.  (1T72-16 to 25; 1T74-3 to 5).  Here, the officers reasonably informed defendant of his options and let him choose.
[brief] “*Those policies must cover not only claims for* compensation prosecuted in the Workers' Compensation court, but also claims for work-related injuries asserted in a common law court. ”  Schmidt, supra, 155 N.J. at 48-49 (citing to N.J.S.A. 34:15-72) (emphasis added).  No one can dispute that intentional wrongs are asserted in a common law court and not the workers compensation court.  Stripped of their convoluted arguments, there is no explanation of what the Employer Liability insurance insures and no legitimate reason why it should not cover any work-related claims not covered by workers compensation insurance, as the statutory scheme and Schmidt mandate.
[brief] **Mitigating factor #10-  The defendant is particularly likely to respond affirmatively to probationary treatment. **  The trial court additionally erred in not finding Mitigating Factor #10, or alternatively minimizing [...]’s record of appearance and compliance with his pretrial monitoring.  As argued below, [...] “was fully compliant with his pre-trial monitoring,” remained “offense free” and “appeared each and every time on time for court” providing his commitment to the conditions set and the requirements set forth by the court.  (T3 8:17 through 20).  The lower court erred by not finding mitigating factor #10 or providing any weight towards [...]’s compliance with Pretrial Monitoring, as evidence that [...] would respond positively to probation, if the sentence called for such.
[brief] He was released from prison only three months before the [...] and [...] robberies.  9  We note the trial court properly instructed the jury that the opening and closing arguments of counsel are not evidence and should not be considered as such.  10  We are not addressing an appeal from the denial of a motion for a judgment of acquittal notwithstanding a guilty verdict.  Cf. State v. Lodzinski, 249 N.J. 116, 144, 265 A.3d 36 (2021) (emphasis added) (citing State v. Williams, 218 N.J. 576, 594, 95 A.3d 721 (2014)) (a court reviewing denial of a motion for a judgment of acquittal notwithstanding a guilty verdict pursuant to Rule 3:18-2 “must view the entirety of the direct and circumstantial evidence presented by the State and the defendant and give the State the benefit of all the favorable evidence and all the favorable inferences drawn from that evidence, and then determine whether a reasonable jury could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
[brief] For these reasons, [...] respectfully requests that this Court affirm the trial court’s Decision and Judgment and deny this Appeal in its entirety.  [...]  *Attorneys for Plaintiff-Respondent*  [...] __________________________  [...] 89  Headquarters Plaza North Tower, Suite 1201 Morristown, New Jersey 07960  Telephone: [...]  Facsimile: [...]  Dated: January 7, 2025  APPELLANT
[brief] “A trial judge not only has the right but, moreover, has the obligation to recuse himself on his own motion if he is satisfied that there is good cause for believing that his not doing so might preclude a fair and unbiased hearing and judgment, or... might reasonably lead counsel or the parties to believe so. ”  State v. McCann, 919 A. 2d 136, 142 (App. Div. 2007).
[brief] **A.  *Omar* Is Distinguishable And Not Dispositive of Whether Appellant Was Required to Accept the Short Payment. **  *Omar* involved a refinance transaction where the mortgagee errantly returned the refinance funds to the borrower instead of the refinance lender because the funds were insufficient to satisfy the loan in full.  *Omar*, 2008 WL 2050834 at *2-3.  In *Omar*, the “note gave the borrower the right to prepay the loan without penalty,” and included specific language that the “Note Holder will use [borrower’s] Prepayments to reduce the amount of Principal that [borrower] owe[s] under this Note. ”  *Id.* at *1*.  The cover letter that accompanied the refinance funds specifically requested that the funds be applied to the loan as a prepayment in the event they were insufficient to pay it off in full.  *Id.*  The *Omar* Court ultimately held that the mortgagee should have accepted the funds because the mortgage in that matter permitted prepayment.  *Id.* at *4-5*.  It reasoned that “[t]he mortgage stated that a payment was deemed received when sent to the designated location, which is what occurred here, and the note contained a clause giving the borrower the right to prepay at any time without penalty. ”  *Id.* at *5*.  The *Omar* Court stated that “[u]nder these circumstances, [the lender] was obligated under the terms of the loan documents to accept the check . . . and apply it against the balance due on the loan. ”  *Id.* (emphasis added).  The *Omar* Court also discharged the mortgage on equitable grounds.  *Id.* at *6*.  It held that the mortgagee was in the best position to have avoided the loss because the mortgagee chose to return the check (and sent it to the borrower), despite its obligations under the Note regarding pre-payment rights.  *Id.* at *1*, 6.  There are several key distinguishing facts that demonstrate the holding in *Omar* should not have been extended to the circumstances here.
[brief] There is nothing—and as a matter of public policy there can be nothing—in the Settlement Agreement that mandated the Planning Board act as a mere rubber stamp and approve the [...] project as presented.  In fact, to further underscore that concept, the Settlement Agreement itself acknowledged that the project plan attached to the Agreement was not “fully engineered” and that the project was subject to Planning Board review.  Said the Agreement:  The Parties recognize that the Concept Plan is not fully engineered at present and will only be fully engineered and submitted as part of the site plan application (SPA) process, which will likely result in variations from the Concept Plan prior to the SPA (as hereinafter defined).  Pa048  The Agreement further provides that the “cooperation” would be limited to “the extent permitted under any applicable state or federal law, rule or regulations”  Agreement, ¶ 10 (Pa058).  There is nothing, and should be nothing, in the Settlement Agreement that requires the Planning Board to compromise its view of the safety and welfare of the community, of its first responders or of the future residents and guests of Building “E”.
[brief] While petitioner had some degenerative and osteoarthritic changes which predated the Incident, these were age-related degenerative disc disease, being normal changes that people all go through in life; petitioner’s prior workers’ compensation injuries of 2000 and 2004, even though they involved his neck and MRI studies showed both bulges and herniations, were remote factors; despite these pre-existing changes, it was the Incident that directly caused Petitioner’s disability and made him totally and permanently disabled from being a police officer in the state of New Jersey; petitioner was asymptomatic from his return to work after the 2004 incident through the date of the Incident; there was no injury report from any incident in 2009.  (Pa82).  (Emphasis added).  Even if the Court were to use January 1, 2005, as the operative date that [...] returned to work following the 2004 incident (although [...] testified it was some time in the calendar year 2004), January 1, 2005, through October 16, 2015 (the day prior to the critical incident) represents 3,939 days, not including leap years.  That is 3939 days [...] had no neck pain.  That is 3,939 days [...] had no manifestation of symptoms in the neck.  That is 3,939 days [...] sought no medical treatment for his neck.  That is 3,939 days [...] played sports, went to the gym, continued being a police sergeant on the street, ran the Junior Police Academy, and lived his life without neck pain.  In other words, neither the 2000 nor 2004 workers’ compensation accidents should have been, or should be, impediments to this Court reversing Respondent and, like [...], recommending that [...] receive an ADR.  Both 2000 and 2004 were remote enough to have no significant role in [...]’s total disability.
[brief] APPELLANT’S REPLY  BRIEF  On appeal from the November 17, 2023  Dismissal Order of the Honorable [...], J.S.C. in the Superior Court, Law Division, Atlantic County, Docket No. [...]  [...], Esq. ID No. 083862013  [...]  [...] [...]  [...]  [...], Esq. ID No. 154592016  [...] [...] [...]  [...]  Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant  Dated: May 7, 2024
[brief] [...] initially defaulted under the Lease when it subleased the Leased Premises without Landlord consent, when it failed to pay all Rent due in March 2022 and thereafter, and when it transmitted “habitually late” payments on more than two separate occasions within a 12-month period.  [Pa6 at ¶¶ 6-7].  [...] provided [...] with written notice of its default in a Default Notice and Demand for Payment, dated September 14, 2022, in which [...] demanded payment of all sums due within five (5) days from the date of the Notice, including the restoration of its security deposit in the amount of $55,204.04 (the “Notice of Default”).  [Pa12].  As of that date, more than $175,000 was due and outstanding.  [Pa12].  [...] did not satisfy the amounts outstanding or respond to the Notice of Default.  [Pa7 at ¶ 20].  Instead, [...] continued to disregard its payment obligations, materially increasing its indebtedness in the months that followed.  [Pa7 at ¶ 21].  Accordingly, [...] provided [...] with a written Notice of Default and Termination, dated January 26, 2023, in which [...] repeated its demand for payment of all Rent and other sums due under the Lease, including the restoration of the security deposit, within five (5) business days from the date of that Notice (the “Notice of Default and Termination”).  [Pa17].  The Notice of Default and Termination cautioned that if [...] failed or refused to cure its default within the time prescribed, the Lease would terminate without further notice or a right to cure.  [Pa17].  As of that date, more than $144,000 was due and outstanding.  [Pa17].  On or about January 30, 2023, [...] transmitted a partial payment to [...] in the amount of $95,000.00 (the “Partial Payment”) that was insufficient to cure [...]’s payment defaults.  [Pa7 at ¶ 24].  More than five (5) business days passed after the Notice of Default and Termination was served without [...] curing (or disputing) its events of default, and without it vacating the Leased Premises.  [Pa7 at ¶ 25].  Consequently, the Lease terminated by its own terms, together with any right to possession that [...] (or its unauthorized Subtenant) previously held, although [...] remained liable for all sums due thereunder.  [Pa7 at ¶ 25].  By letter dated February 3, 2023, [...] reminded [...] that: (i) the Partial Payment did not cure [...]’s events of default, (ii) its Lease automatically terminated on February 2, 2023, and (iii) [...] was required to immediately vacate and relinquish possession of the Leased Premises to [...] (the “Notice to Vacate”).  [Pa20].  [...] also demanded payment of all sums due, or that may become due, including Accelerated Rent of $765,260.42 ($27,602.02 per month for three months, $28,154.06 per month for twelve months, and $28,717. 14 per month for twelve months).  [Pa20].  Despite demand, [...] (and its Subtenant) did not vacate the Leased Premises and remained in unlawful possession as a holdover tenant.  [Pa28 at ¶ 29].  Consequently, [...] filed the Money Judgment Action and the Dispossession Action on February 7, 2023.  [Pa3; Pa23]  C.