ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] *First Options, Inc. of Chicago v. Kaplan*, 514 U.S. 938, 944 (1995).  **A.  THE ENTIRE ARBITRATION AGREEMENT IS INVALID UNDER THE STANDARDS FOR ADHESION CONTRACTS**  Defendants/Appellants concede that the arbitration agreement at issue was an adhesion contract.  As such, the agreement did not meet the standards for an adhesion contract.  "[T]he essential nature of a contract of adhesion is that it is presented on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, commonly in a standardized printed form, without opportunity for the adhering party to negotiate except perhaps on a few particulars."  Rudbart, supra, 127 N.J. at 353 (internal quotations omitted).  A contract of adhesion is "[a] contract where one party . . . must accept or reject the contract . . ."  Ibid. (quoting Vasquez v. Glassboro Serv. Ass'n, 83 N.J. 86, 104 (1980)).  "Such a contract 'does not result from the consent of that party.'"  Ibid.  Consequently, a "distinct body of law surrounding contracts of adhesion" has developed "to determine whether and to what extent such nonconsensual terms will be enforced."  Id. at 353-54.  The Supreme Court of New Jersey addressed unconscionability in the context of adhesion contracts in Muhammad and Rudbart.  Muhammad, supra, 189 N.J. at 18; Rudbart, supra, 127 N.J. at 353-56.
[brief] The Edison Defendants incorporate herein the case law cited in Point II above concerning claims of violation of the New Jersey State Constitution under the NJCRA and their interpretation consistent with established doctrine under our federal Civil Rights Act.  As explained below, the [...] cannot be liable under the NJCRA.  The case law in New Jersey is fully consistent with federal court decisions concerning municipal liability for false arrest and excessive force by law enforcement officers.  Indeed, over four decades ago, the U.S. Supreme Court made clear that plaintiffs may not depend on a theory of *respondeat superior* to support a §1983 claim, but rather need to prove that the municipality supported the alleged violation of civil rights.
[brief] [...] and [...] contributed to the settlement on behalf of [...] and [...] pursuant to the CCIP policies.  After [...] disclaimed coverage to [...] for the suit, [...], which insured [...]’s off-project risks and other liabilities, and [...], which provided [...]’s excess coverage above the [...] policy, paid [...]’s portion of the settlement.  (SSR 4.)  C.  The CCIP  1.  The [...] And [...] Policies
[directive] When the officer no longer reasonably believes that deadly force may be necessary, the officer shall, as soon as practicable, secure or holster the firearm.  (b)  Reporting the pointing of a firearm.  Pointing a firearm, though not a use of force, constitutes a seizure that must be reported as a Show of Force on the Attorney General’s Use of Force Reporting Portal, except in the circumstances described in Section 3.4(c).
[brief] Appellant’s argument as it pertains to the d (5) analysis is that the permitted maximum density of the site is 18 units per acre.  Appellant’s proposed improvements to the site results in an increased density to 20.6 units per acre.  As the site currently exists, Appellant would be permitted, with the addition of the two newly purchased lots, to add 53 units.  Appellants proposal nearly doubles that number by requesting 100 additional units.  N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70(d)(5) permits a zoning board of adjustment to grant density variances only in "particular cases" and only for "special reasons.
[brief] LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I THE TRIAL COURT  IMPROPERLY VACATED THE ARBITRATION AWARDS AS PURSUANT TO N.J.S.A. 2A:23-6 AND THE ARBITRATION FORUMS [...] ARBITRATION AGREEMENT, AN ARBITRATOR SHALL DECIDE WHETHER A CONDITION PRECEDENT HAS BEEN FULFILLED AND WHETHER A CONTRACT CONTAINING A VALID AGREEMENT TO ARBITRATE IS ENFORCEABLE.
[directive] Addendum A | December 2020 CEDs and Other Less-Lethal Devices and Ammunition 2 Policy  2.1  The Use of Force Policy formally recognizes four distinct types of force: physical force; mechanical force; enhanced mechanical force; and deadly force.  2.2  Enhanced Mechanical Force is an intermediate force option between mechanical force and deadly force, generally requiring a greater level of justification than that pertaining to physical or mechanical force, but a lower level of justification than that required for the use of deadly force.  Unlike deadly force, enhanced mechanical force does not require an imminent threat of death or serious bodily injury.  Examples include CEDs and less-lethal devices and ammunition.  2.3  As with any type of force, officers shall exhaust all other reasonable means to gain compliance before resorting to enhanced mechanical force, if feasible.  Thus, if a safe alternative would achieve law enforcement’s objective, enhanced mechanical force shall not be used.  Officers shall, therefore, use verbal commands, critical decision making, tactical deployment and de-escalation techniques to gain voluntary compliance, when feasible.  Officers shall never engage in unnecessary, overly aggressive, or otherwise improper actions that create a situation where force becomes needed.  2.4  In situations where officers are justified in using force, officers shall use only that degree of force that is reasonable, necessary and proportional considering the totality of the circumstances, including the subject’s mental and physical condition, the nature of the offense, and the level of resistance or threat known to the officer at the time.  2.5  The decision to use force and the appropriate amount of force requires careful attention to the facts and circumstances of each incident.  2.6  Any deployment of a CED or less-lethal device against a person, except as authorized by this policy, is prohibited.  Any intentional misuse or reckless abuse of any such device will not be tolerated and will result in administrative action, discipline, or criminal prosecution.  2  USE OF FORCE POLICY  Addendum A | December 2020  CEDs and Other Less-Lethal Devices and Ammunition  3
[brief] (*See Order, Pa69*) (“After reviewing the papers submitted to the Court, and oral arguments having taken place, the Court finds that there are no questions of fact that prevent the Court from granting [[...]’] motion to dismiss. ”)  The absent notice of motion and proof of service neither prejudiced [...] nor the proceedings; [...] was not prevented from timely submitting – or exhaustively drafting – her opposition to [...]’ motion.  [...]’ assumption that the trial court “failed to address” the “fatal” procedural defect must be viewed with skepticism.  Indeed, [...] did not raise the procedural argument in her opposition papers, but rather briefly during oral arguments.
[brief] See R. 2:5-1(f)(2)(ii) (requiring appellants in civil cases to designate “the judgment, decision, action, or rule, or part thereof, appealed from”).  One of the obvious purposes of the notice of appeal is to put the court and opposing parties on reasonable notice of the issues and lower court rulings on appeal.  Pressler & Verniero, *Current N.J. Court Rules*, cmt. 5.1 on R. 2:5-1(f)(1) (2025).  Courts have concluded that only the judgments, orders, or parts thereof designated in the notice of appeal are subject to the appellate process and review.  *Campagna v American Cyanamid*, 337 *N.J. Super.* 530, 550 (App. Div.), certif. den. 168 *N.J.* 294 (2001); *Pusco v. Newark Bd., of Educ.*, 349 *N.J. Super.* 455, 461-462 (App. Div.) certif. den. 174 N.J. 544 (2002); *1266
[directive] N.J.S.A.  1.  [예/Yes]  [아니요/No]  법정이 귀하가 마약 중독자라고 판결했거나  판결할 수도 있다는 것을 아십니까?  Do you understand that the court has determined or may determine that you are a drug dependent person?  2.  [예/Yes]  [아니요/No]  2C:35-14  법정이 귀하를 마약 중독자라고 판결하고, 또한 귀하가N.J.S.A. 에 규정된 기준을 충족시킨다고 판단하는 경우, 귀하는 법원 감독 마약 치료 프로그램(“마약 법정”)에 참가하기 위한 목적으로 특별 보호관찰에 대한 의무적 기간을 선고  받을 자격을 얻을 수 있다는 것을 아십니까?  이 기준은 다음 사항들을 포함하지만 이에 국한되지는 않습니다:  귀하가 (1)  마약 또는 알코올에 중독된 사람이고, 현재의 범죄를 저지를 때 마약 또는 (2)  알코올에 중독된 상태였고, 현재의 범죄를 저지르거나 기소가 계류 중일 (3)  때 총기를 소지하지 않았고, 이전에 자격 박탈의 대상이 되는 어떤 (4)  유죄판결을 받지 않았고, 귀하에게 적합한 치료 프로그램이 있고, (5) (6) 않습니다.  “마약 법정”의 선고를  복역함으로써  지역사회에 위험을 초래하지  Do you understand that if the court determines that you are drug dependent and also finds that you meet the criteria in 2C:35-14, you may be eligible to be sentenced to a mandatory period of N.J.S.A. special probation for the purpose of participating in a court-supervised drug treatment program (“Drug Court”)?  This criteria includes, but is not limited to, a finding that: (1) you are a drug or alcohol dependent person, and (2) that you were drug or alcohol dependent at the time of the commission of the present offense, and (3) that you did not possess a firearm at the time of the present offense or any pending charge, and (4) that you do not have certain prior disqualifying convictions, and (5) there is suitable treatment available for you, and (6) no danger to the community will result from your serving a “Drug Court” sentence.
[directive] Prior non-domestic:  The Defendant previously assaulted any person who is not a Partner or a Partner’s child, and it is recorded in a police report or criminal record.  This Item differs from Item 10 only in who the assaulted person is.  The incident must include physical contact, the use or attempted use of a weapon to contact the victim’s body, or a threat of harm ✔ made while displaying a weapon.  If you do not have a detailed description of the incident, count a charge of assault or other violent offense against someone other than a Partner or a Partner’s child as a non-domestic incident.  (Note: a charge is not required.)  The incident must have been reported to the police.  ✔  The incident must have occurred on a separate occasion, before the Index Assault.  If the Index Assault is part of a cluster of ✔ assaults documented in 1 police report, count any non-domestic assault that occurred at least 24 hours before the Index Assault as a prior non-domestic incident.  Incidents involving only pets or property do not count for this Item.  ✘ ________________________________________________________________________________________________________ ________________________________________________________________________________________________________ ________________________________________________________________________________________________________  12.  Prior custodial sentence of 30 days or more
[brief] These topics were discussed in detail during the trial.  The trial court considered all the testimony and the documents and ruled against the Plaintiff.  The trial court ruled:  “No, because I am listening to both of you go back and forth.  And it’s giving me a lot of good information.  And I find that the rules are available, whether convenient or not, but they’re available.  And maybe you have to spend some time and money to get them if you want them physically in your hand.  But they’re available.  They’re not hiding anything from anybody.  And if they are, they’re hiding it nationwide, which I find not credible. ”  T15: 20-25, T16:1-2  The Plaintiff was allowed to argue at length.  After the trial court’s ruling, the Plaintiff kept arguing.  At that point the Plaintiff said he should have been awarded “straight breach of contract damages. ”  T16: 22  The court rejected that argument as well and ruled:  “No, no, you don’t.  Because the rules were available? I am.  I’ll grant you, they’re not the easiest thing to get to.  But I think if you, and I don’t hear any dispute, that if you go to the tournament and ask…the tournament director, he would answer any questions you would have.  So they’re not trying to hide anything.  So I find you’re entitled to one prize, sir. ”  T16:23-25, T17: 1-6  The Plaintiff is essentially arguing the factual determinations the trial court made are wrong.
[brief] (1T15-18 to 16-4).  The frisk revealed a Glock firearm on defendant’s person.  (1T16-22 to 23).  A subsequent search incident to arrest revealed narcotics and cash.  Simultaneous to the stop and frisk, [...] approached the vehicles where the males had been concealing themselves during the suspected CDS activity and discovered a firearm in plain view on top of the driver-side front tire of a blue Hyundai.
[brief] Defendant claims the following testimony was improper:  Q  And how many people did you see running across the street at that point?  A  At that point, I only observed one person running across the street.  Q  Now, what if anything did you do at that point?  A  So -- Q  I’m going to put this down.  It will be more comfortable for you to face this way.  A  I appreciate it.  Q  This way you talk to the jury instead of over your shoulder.  So what if anything did you do?  A  So having observed the individual running away from the direction of the barbershop through the yards, we proceeded down the block, down Jackson Avenue, where then my attention was drawn to what appeared to be gun smoke -- a plume of gun smoke underneath one of the lampposts closer to the intersection of Jackson  Q  Now, was there something about the fact that he was running into yards that was different from what other people were doing?  A  Yes.  Q  Why did you focus on this person?  A  The reason I focused on the individual running across the street through the yards was due to the fact that having just heard shots being fired and being familiar with the area and knowing that there were two businesses that were open, well-lit businesses, I find it suspicious that someone would choose to run through rear yards as opposed to seeking shelter, whether it’s inside the businesses or the house.  […]  Q  So your attention was drawn to this individual.  Now, what did you do at that point?  A  At that point I continued my way directly to the area where I observed the individual running towards the yard and I pulled my police vehicle over to the side of the road closest to that yard, at which point I exited my vehicle and gave chase after the individual.  [2T54-9 to 57-1 (emphasis added)].  Contrary to defendant’s claim, [...]’s testimony that he focused on the man running across the street because he thought the man’s actions were “suspicious” did not exceed the bounds of permissible lay opinions.  The testimony was rationally based on [...]’s perception and served to inform the jury why he chose to pursue that specific individual.  The testimony consisted of what he saw, what he did during his investigation, and why he took those steps.  Moreover, the testimony was the “product of reasoning processes” familiar to the jury, as they were later able to view the videos, which corroborated what [...] stated occurred.  [...]’s testimony was not offered to provide an opinion on defendant’s guilt, but to explain why [...] followed that specific individual as part of his investigation.  Accordingly, it was properly admitted in accordance with N.J.R.E. 701 and it did not offend McLean.
[brief] All emphasis is added unless otherwise indicated. are designed to be a backstop for when the driver inevitably isn’t paying attention or needs additional assistance with the driving task.  Q.  But they’re definitely not automated systems that would take over the driving task, correct?  A.  These systems are not, Hey, human, you can start reading a book; I’ve got this.  Pa220-21.  C.  **[...]’s Motion For Summary Judgment**
[brief] \(^8\) [...] never listed an EGP for the [...], and therefore, the unique errors associated with computation of this EGP are addressed infra.  |  Project Name | EGP Forecasted by [...] but Not Accepted by [...] ([...] Ex. Nos. 5-12) | EGP Listed in [...]’s Statement of Claim and Adopted by Arbitrator | Difference Between [...]’s Admitted EGP and [...]’s Demand | |-------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------| | [...] | $1,000,000.00 | $1,247,401.00 | $247,401.00 | | [...] | $1,404,371.00 | $2,784,288.00 | $1,379,917.00 | | [...]| $501,000.00 | $565,701.04 | $64,701.04 | | [...] | $976,424.00 | $1,254,739.00 | $278,315.00 | | **SUM** | | | **$1,970,334.04** | Da137-139; Da276; Da291-345.
[brief] 34 New Jersey Practice, Local Government Law § 9:13 (4th ed. 2024).  The powers of a local ethics board are severely limited, and prohibit the kind of injunctive and other relief sought by the Plaintiffs here.  N.J.S.A. 40A:9-22.7, entitled “Powers of Local Finance Board,” provides as follows:  With respect to its responsibilities for the implementation of the provisions of this act, the Local Finance\(^3\) Board shall have the following powers: a. To initiate, receive, hear and review complaints and hold hearings with regard to possible violations of this act; b. To issue subpoenas for the production of documents and the attendance of witnesses with respect to its investigation of any complaint or to the holding of a hearing; c. To hear and determine any appeal of a decision made by a county or municipal ethics board; d. To forward to the county prosecutor or the Attorney General or other governmental body any information concerning violations of this act \(^3\) As noted above, the LGEL allows municipalities the option of creating a local ethics Board or allowing the New Jersey Local Finance Board the act as the local Board. which may become the subject of criminal prosecution or which may warrant the institution of other legal proceedings by the Attorney General; e. To render advisory opinions as to whether a given set of facts and circumstances would constitute a violation of this act; f. To enforce the provisions of this act and to impose penalties for the violation thereof as are authorized by this act; and g. To adopt rules and regulations pursuant to the “Administrative Procedure Act,” P.L.1968, c. 410 (C.52:14B-1 et seq.) and to do other things as are necessary to implement the purposes of this act.  Thus, the local ethics or finance board for the [...] has no power, for example, to enjoin the Defendants from voting in any matters involving [...] until the resolution of his lawsuit against them ([...]).
[brief] Map of Parking Lots, etc.  -2010  Aerial Photo Da900 P-3 1972  Minutes attached to [...] Letter Da901 P-4  1973  Minutes – attached to [...] letter Da902 P-5(a)  January 15, 1974 minutes attached to [...] Letter Da903 P-5(b)  1974 Minutes Da904 P-6  Corporation Action of [...] dated June 1, 2007 (excluded at Trial); June 5, 1972 document (recorded); Notice of Hearing dated September 22, 1972 (recorded); January 7, 1963 Agreement (incomplete/recorded – missing pages)  Da907 P-9  1993 Site Plan Da916 P-10 July 30, 2013 letter from [...] to [...] Da917 P-11 August 1, 2013 letter from [...] to [...]  Da919  DEFENDANT’S TRIAL EXHIBITS: D-1 1972 Variance Application and Approval Da926 D-2 1972 Site Plan Da934 **D-4
[brief] STATEMENT OF FACTS  [...] pled guilty to [...] in violation of N.J.S.A. 39:4-50 on February 21, 2018.  [...] was represented by [...], Esq., at the time of her guilty plea.  The following is an excerpt from the plea colloquy elicited by the Court and then counsel for [...]:  [...]: Your Honor, based upon my knowledge of the facts, if I were to take the factual basis, because I know there’s a part that she doesn’t recall, but I don’t want the Court to think we’re evading responsibility.  THE COURT:  Sure, if you want to - if you want to do it, counselor, and then ill follow up, if I need to.  [...]:  [...], I’m going to turn your attention back to the in question and that is - August 11 of 2017.  On that night in question, at some point you had an interaction with Lawrence Township Police, correct?  [...]: Yes.  [...]: And they came to your vehicle, you were found in your vehicle at the location on [...], correct?  A: Yes.  Q: Now, I know were not (indiscernible) together.  You’re not denying you were intoxicated that night, correct?  A: No.  Q: In fact, you went out knowing you were going to drink, correct?  A: I did, yes.  Q: And at some point, and we’ve reviewed the evidence here, unfortunately the person that you thought was supposed to be your designated driver left you, correct?  A: Yes.  Q: And as a result, you admit that on that date and time, you did, in fact, operate your motor vehicle, correct?  A: Earlier in the night, yes.  Q: And you admit that you were intoxicated, correct?  A: Yes, but I was not driving.  THE COURT: I'm sorry what?  [...]: I said, but I was not - I said "I was not driving."  [...]: Okay.  [...]: But earlier in the night I was.  (Attorney/Client discussion)  . . .  [...]: And even though you don't recall leaving the party, based upon the evidence where the vehicle was, where you were located, statements given, and all the review of the evidence you're admitting that you operated the motor vehicle while intoxicated, correct?  [...]: Yes.  1T 7:18-25; 8:1-25; 9:1-18; 10:18-25.  [...] was ultimately found guilty and sentenced as a first offender to a 3 month suspension of her New Jersey driving privileges, and 12 hours in the Intoxicated Driver Resource Center (IDRC), as well as the associated fines and court costs.
[brief] \(^8\)  As this Court already knows, all of that happened in two to three minutes during the [...]’ delivery, which was started at 10:25 p.m. with a delivery at 10:27 p.m.  This Court should also note that Respondents use the terms “non-elective” and “emergency” interchangeably.  They contend the other procedure was “obviously” non-elective because of the time of night.
[brief] The United States Constitution and the New Jersey Constitution each protects an individual’s right from unreasonable searches and seizures.  U.S. Const. amend. IV; N.J. Const., art. 1, ¶ 7.  As always, the touchstone of the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and the New Jersey Constitution, is reasonableness.  State v. Zapata, 297 N.J. Super. 160, 171 (App. Div. 1997), certif. denied, 156 N.J. 405 (1998).  Nonetheless, both the United States and New Jersey Supreme Courts have found that “‘carrying out an immediate search without a warrant’” based on probable cause is “reasonable” under the Fourth Amendment.  State v. Witt, 223 N.J. 409, 447 (2015) (quoting Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 52 (1970)).  Of course, any warrantless search is prima facie invalid, and the invalidity may be overcome only if the search falls within one of the specific exceptions created by the United States Supreme Court.