ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Pennsylvania Fire Ins. Co. of Philadelphia v. Gold Issue Mining & Milling Co., 243 U.S. 93 (1917) .......................................................................................................................  25 Peter Doegler Brewing Corp. v. Spindel, 14 N.J. Misc. 523 (1936) .............................................................................................................  28  Ramer v. New Jersey Transit Bus Operations, Inc., 335 N.J. Super 304 (App. Div. 2000)  .................................................................  26 Rent Stabilization Assoc. of the City of New York v. Dinkins, 5 F.3d 591 (2d Cir. 1993) ..................................................................................  29  Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Investors Insurance Co. of America, 65 N.J. 474 (1974) ...............................................................................................  15 State v. Osborn, 32 N.J. 117 (1960) .............................................................................................  29
[brief] [Pa31-38].  The case proceeded to trial on Plaintiffs’ claims for negligence against [...], and negligent training and supervision and *respondeat superior* against [...]. \(^6\)  At the close of Plaintiffs’ case-in-chief, [...] moved for involuntary dismissal of the negligent training and supervision claims pursuant to Rules 4:37-2(b) and 4:40-1.  [9T 109:12-16].  Specifically, [...] argued that Plaintiffs’ claims must fail as a matter of law, because there was no evidence [...] was ever unfit, incompetent, or possessed any dangerous attributes that created a foreseeable risk of harm in the absence of additional supervision or training.  [9T 109:19-111:20].  The trial court accepted this premise at oral argument.  [9T 113:1-126:24].  Specifically, the court noted that the Supreme Court defines the risk of harm as the employee’s “incompetence or dangerous characteristics[,]” which, to be found liable, the employer must have had knowledge of.  [9T 118:11-20, 120:8-16].  Moreover, Plaintiffs’ counsel admitted that there had been no evidence of [...]’s potentially dangerous qualities:  THE COURT:  [...], the Supreme Court talks about unfitness and dangerous characteristics.  What are the dangerous characteristics of [...] that have been testified to in this case?  MR. VRHOVC: Well that, there’s nothing, Judge.  --- \(^6\)  Via Order date June 5, 2020, the trial was bifurcated so that liability and damages issues would be determined separately.
[brief] ”); Antonucci v. Curvature Newco, Inc., 470 N.J. Super. 553, 566 (App. Div. 2022) (stating that by agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, litigants “do not forgo the substantive rights afforded by statute; [they] only submit[] to their resolution in an arbitral rather than a judicial forum”).  As to the actual content of the MAA, Plaintiff does not dispute that on its face, the MAA includes a waiver of her right to a jury trial on the NJLAD claims asserted in her Complaint and an agreement to arbitrate those claims.  See, generally, Pb22-Pb25.  Rather, Plaintiff, without citing supporting case law, seemingly advocates that for the waiver to be valid in the context of discrimination claims, the waiver must withstand a more heightened scrutiny than other contracts.  See Pb25 (“Unless an employee is explicitly aware of and informed of the very specific rights they are waiving as a result of agreeing to an arbitration provision, it cannot be enforced as a matter of law. ”).  But this position is contrary to well-established law.  1  Plaintiff, without supporting case law, appears to erroneously suggest agreements to arbitrate discrimination claims arising under the NJLAD are per se unenforceable and against public policy.
[brief] POINT 1: THE DEFENDANT’S PETITION WAS UNTIMELY UNDER THE RULE AND DISMISSAL WAS THEREFORE REQUIRED.............................................................3  POINT 2: SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION CANNOT BE WAIVED..............................................................................8  POINT 3:  GOOD CAUSE FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL AND PRIMA FACIE CASE...........................................................9  POINT 4: THE RULE IS NON-RELAXABLE AND THE CITED-TO CASE LAW PREDATES TODAY’S RULE.........................11 CONCLUSION...............................................................................14
[brief] [...] filed her lawsuit in July 2023, asserting employment discrimination claims under the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (LAD) and alleging that she was wrongfully terminated as a result of a disability.  (Pa000001–14.)  [...], a Maryland limited liability company in the business of procuring temporary staffing, procured [...]’s services as a Clinical Research Educator to Co-Respondent [...] (“[...]”).  (Pa000058, Pa000122.)  During her onboarding process, on January 4, 2022, [...] electronically signed a Mutual Arbitration Agreement (“Agreement”) and agreed to privately arbitrate any claims arising out of her employment or termination. (Pa000092–94.)
[brief] Plaintiffs argue that the city should have inspected all trees bordering its streets.  In the comment to N.J.S.A. 59:2-1, the Report of the Attorney General’s Task Force on Sovereign Immunity, (1972) (Task Force Report) stated:  “[T]he approach should be whether an immunity applies and if not, should liability attach.  It is hoped that in utilizing this approach the courts will exercise restraint in the acceptance of novel causes of action against public entities.  This is such a case.  The city does not have financial resources or the manpower to inspect every tree bordering every street in the city.  The city is allowed to fund and use its resources as it deems best in the face of competing demands.
[brief] U.S. Const. amend.  I .................................................................  12 U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1 ......................................................... 3, 8, 16  Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681 .... 22, 23, 32 N.J. Const. art. I, ¶ 1 .................................................................. 25, 27, 28 N.J.S.A. 2C:21-20 ........................................................................ 19 N.J. Law Against Discrimination, N.J.S.A. 10:5-1 to -50 ............... 23 N.J. Law Against Discrimination, N.J.S.A. 10:5-12(f), 10:5-5(l) .......... 25 N.J.S.A. 18A:36-19 ..................................................................... 43 Emergency Health Powers Act, N.J.S.A. 26:13-1 to -36 .................... 26 REGULATIONS 34 C.F.R. § 99.20(a) ................................................................... 42 N.J.A.C. 6A:32-7.5(e)(1), to (3) .................................................... 42 N.J.A.C. 6A:32-7.7(b) ................................................................ 42 OTHER AUTHORITIES [...] et al., Mental Health and Self Worth in Socially Transitioned Transgender Youth, 56 J.Am. Acad. Child & Adolescent Psychiatry 116 (2017), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5302003/ ...............
[brief] In this regard, N.J.R.E 703 provides:  The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or inference may be those perceived by or made known to the expert at or before the hearing.  If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in evidence.  In the present case, neither the testimony of [...], P.E. nor that of [...], P.E. should have been barred.
[brief] The Trial Court’s conclusion that the absence of any reference in the offer/contract of the Plaintiff’s ROFR was “self defective” was clear error.  The implications of a decision that is otherwise would be long-reaching into every real estate transaction that involved a ROFR.  The modification of any terms in the context of attorney review or inspections would cause the transaction to be held in abeyance and the new matter presented to the ROFR holder in the middle of the pre-closing period even after a signed contract existed.  Litigation in the Chancery Division would expand exponentially with conflicting contractual rights between the ROFR holder and the buyer.  Although the Defendant [...] and the third party buyer could have legally proceeded with the closing any time after February 17th of 2023, they did not do so because [...], the principal of Defendant [...], wanted an affirmative written waiver (which was not legally necessary) before closing and so, the Defendant indulged the demand of the Plaintiff to add in the ROFR language to the proposed contract in the hope of receiving a written waiver (which is not required in paragraph 39 of the MFSA).
[brief] Appellant’s expert mentions that he “has not seen evidence” of [...]’s security protocols.  (Pa 161)  This is not because such procedures do not exist, but because Appellant failed to explore the procedures in depositions and discovery (see Pa 225).  [...] performs regular evaluations of crime reports and statistics and assigns its officers accordingly.  As the statistics show, crime, violent crime in particular, decreased considerably at [...] over the years leading up to this incident.  [...]’s policies are obviously effective at deterring and responding to criminal activity.
[brief] STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff, v. [...], Defendant.  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION APP.  DIV. DOCKET NO.: [...] INDICTMENT NO. [...]  CRIMINAL ACTION ON STATE’S LEAVE FOR APPEAL FROM GRANTING OF NEW TRIAL  Sat below:  Hon. [...], P.J.Cr.  BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT [...] (Sa14-33)
[brief] “[T]he court cannot find that [...] committed a fraud on [...] in any way…”  (4T 24:19-20)  The Appellate Division declined to disturb the trial court’s ruling.  (A49-50)  Not satisfied, Defendant made the same claim in his motion in 2023, in an attempt to convince the trial court to throw out [...]’s Order and the Appellate Division’s decision.  (1T 27:2-28:7)  “I find that defendant is continuing to seek relief based on allegations of fraud from now close to 15 years ago that the trial court has already rejected after a full trial and that the Appellate Division affirmed and said it was not worth talking about. ”  (1T 45:25-46:4)  Apparently, Defendant needs to hear specifically from the Appellate Division that there was no finding of fraud.  II.
[brief] [...] readily acknowledges that this Court’s scope of review is limited.  This Court is bound to uphold the factual findings underlying the trial court’s decision “so long as these findings are supported by sufficient and credible evidence in the record”.  State v. Ahmad, 246 N.J. 592, 609 (2021), quoting State v. Elders, 192 N.J. 224, 243 (2007).  Nevertheless, the trial court’s legal conclusions “and the consequences that flow from established facts” are reviewed de novo.  State v. Hubbard, 222 N.J. 249, 263 (2015).
[brief] First, as to place of performance, the Restatement states that a substantial relationship “will be the case, for example, when this state is that where performance by one of the parties is to take place.”  Restatement § 187, cmt. f.  That requirement is plainly met as 90% of Appellants’ [...] sales are in New York.  In addition, the primary case on which Appellants rely, Instructional Systems, Inc. v. Computer Curriculum Corp., 130 N.J. 324, 342 (1992), is easily distinguished.
[brief] 568 U.S. at __, 133 S.Ct. at 1042.  Accordingly, “[o]nce an individual has left the immediate vicinity of a premises to be searched, ... detentions must be justified by some ... rationale” other than the Summers rule.  Id. at ___, 133 S.Ct. at 1043.  In Bailey, detectives conducting surveillance in an unmarked police car outside an apartment (while the police prepared to execute a warrant to search for a handgun), observed two men ([...] and [...]) leave the gated area above the apartment, get in a car, and drive away.  The detectives followed the car approximately one mile before stopping it.  They found keys during a patdown search of Bailey, who initially said he resided in the apartment but later denied it when informed of the search.  Both men were handcuffed and driven in a patrol car to the apartment, where the search team had already found a gun and illicit drugs.  After arresting the men, police discovered that one of Bailey's keys unlocked the apartment's door.  *Id.* at ___; 133 S.Ct. at 1034.
[directive] 1.  Registration  a)  Do you understand that you must register with certain public agencies?  [Yes]  [No]  b)  (1)  Do you understand that if you change residence you must notify the law [Yes] [No] enforcement agency where you are registered, and must re-register with the chief law enforcement officer of the municipality in which you will reside, or the Superintendent of State Police if the municipality does not have a chief law enforcement officer, no less than 10 days before you intend to reside at the new address?  (2)  Do you understand that if you change employment or school enrollment status you [Yes] [No] must notify the appropriate law enforcement agency no later than 5 days after the change?  (3)  Do you understand that if you fail to notify the appropriate law enforcement agency [Yes] [No] of a change of address or status you may be charged with a third degree crime, and (if the offense was may receive a sentence of imprisonment of up to 5 years committed on or after July 1, 2014) or you may be charged with a fourth degree (if the crime and may receive a sentence of imprisonment of up to 18 months offense was committed before July 1, 2014)?  c)  Do you understand that if you fail to register or re-register you may be charged with a [Yes] [No] third degree crime and receive a sentence of imprisonment of up to 5 years?  Revised Form Promulgated by Directive #01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 10080 page 1 of 5
[brief] ⁵  “*Only* where the facts of the particular case are so ‘unusually suggestive of retaliatory motive’ may temporal proximity, on its own, support an inference of causation. ”  *Ibid.* (emphasis added) (quoting *Krouse*, 126 F.3d at 503).  **First**, [...]’s self-serving deposition testimony is not a genuine dispute of --- ⁵ [...] does not argue that the temporal proximity of her termination is indicative of causation, other than arguing that [...] interfered with [...]’s investigation of her conduct.
[brief] The Department tacitly concedes that its disapproval letters did not provide notice of an “excessiveness” issue invented in adjudication.  The Department says that its denial letter rejected [...]’s rates on excessiveness grounds, but it does not and cannot cite any page of the record to support this argument.  In straining to contend that “excessiveness” was at issue all along, the Department chides [...] for focusing on the last disapproval letter rather than the parties’ many exchanges leading up to that denial.  See, e.g., Db1.  But that focus changes nothing.  It confirms [...]’s position, because none of the Department’s over eight disapproval letters and other correspondence stated that [...]’s rate increase was “excessive.
[directive] Time: 4 seconds.  3 rounds.  Standing point shoulder position.  •  On command, from a secured holster position, draw and fire 3 rounds in 4 seconds from a standing point shoulder position.  ---STOP TIME--- 9-37 Revised (5/03)  Semi-Annual Firearms Qualification and Requalification Standards  • Reholster an uncocked weapon.  Phase VI 7-Yard Line.  Time: 15 seconds.  6 rounds.  Standing point shoulder position.  Mandatory reload  •  On command, from a secured holster position, draw and fire 3 rounds from a standing point shoulder position.  • Reload and fire 3 more rounds within the 15 second time period.  ---STOP TIME--- •  Reholster an uncocked weapon  Phase VII 7-Yard Line.  Time: 4 seconds.  3 rounds.  Standing point shoulder position.  •  On command, from a secured holster position, draw and fire 3 rounds in 4 seconds from a standing point shoulder position.  ---STOP TIME--- •  Reload if required and holster an uncocked weapon.  • Reload loading devices.  Phase VIII 5-Yard Line.
[brief] .......................................................  16 - **Tully v. Mirz**, 457 N.J. Super. 114 (App. Div. 2018)  .................................................................................. 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 25  ##  COMPLETE INDEX TO APPENDICES BY VOLUME | VOLUME/DOCUMENT | Da# | |---------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----| | **I. TRIAL, POST-TRIAL, MOTION TO ENFORCE LITIGANTS’ RIGHTS** | | | NOTICE OF APPEAL | 1 | | FINAL JUDGMENT | | | August 26, 2022 | 4 | | ORDER & OPINION | | | June 23, 2022 | 6 | | PLAINTIFFS’ POST-TRIAL SUBMISSION | | | October 21, 2020 | 33 | | DEFENDANT [...]’S POST-TRIAL SUBMISSION | | | June 22, 2022 | 59 | | DEFENDANT [...]’S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION | | | July 7, 2022 | 85 | | [...] CERTIFICATION IN SUPPORT | | | EXHIBIT A – Opinion | 150 | | EXHIBIT B – Order | 153 | | EXHIBIT C – Case Jacket | 154 | | EXHIBIT D – Arbitration Award against [...] | 157 | | EXHIBIT E – Letter to Court | 168 | | EXHIBIT F – Summary Judgment Order | 168 | | EXHIBIT G – Transcript 3T | 168 | | EXHIBIT H – Transcript 1T | 168 | | EXHIBIT I – Transcript 2T | 168 | | EXHIBIT J – [...] Order & Judgment | 169 | | EXHIBIT K – [...] Deposition | 170 | | EXHIBIT L – Letter from Pf. Counsel to Court | 222 | | EXHIBIT M | 224 | | EXHIBIT N | 224 | | EXHIBIT O – Arbitration Awards against [...] | 225 | | ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE | | ## II.
[brief] [...] and [...] Colluded to Keep Plaintiff in the Dark about the Rescheduled Closing and to Cut Plaintiff Out of the Transaction  \(^4\)  In this same time period, the principals of [...] and Plaintiff were in discussions directly, and [...] had offered to pay Plaintiff’s expenses, including millions of dollars in interest costs that had been incurred through that date (Pa327; Pa344-345); however, [...] never followed through on that promise and, instead, proceeded to close the deal surreptitiously with [...] and the Fee Owner behind Plaintiff’s back, in breach of the PSA.
[brief] 9T – Nov. 19, 2019 (Compel Disc’y) 10T – Dec. 16, 2019 (Discovery) 11T – Jan. 27, 2020 (Discovery) 12T – Feb. 12, 2020 (Discovery) 13T – Feb. 27, 2020 (Miranda) 14T – Mar. 3, 2020 (Miranda) 15T – Mar. 3, 2020 (Jury Selection) 16T – Mar. 4, 2020 (Jury Sel. AM) 17T – Mar. 4, 2020 (Jury Sel. PM) 18T – Mar. 4, 2020 (In Limine) 19T – Mar. 5, 2020 (Jury Sel. vol. 1) 20T – Mar. 5, 2020 (Jury Sel. vol. 2) 21T – Mar. 5, 2020 (Miranda) 22T – Mar. 10, 2020 (Jury Selection) 23T – Mar. 10, 2020 (Mot. Tattoos) 24T – Mar. 11, 2020, vol. 1 (trial) 25T – Mar. 11, 2020, vol. 2 (trial) 26T – Mar. 12, 2020 (trial) 27T – Mar. 17, 2020, vol. 1 (trial)  28T – Mar. 17, 2020, vol. 2 (trial)  29T – Mar. 18, 2020, vol. 1 (trial)  30T – Mar. 18, 2020, vol. 2 (trial)  31T – Mar. 19, 2020, vol. 1 (trial)  32T – Mar. 19, 2020, vol. 2 (trial)  33T – Mar. 23, 2020 (adjournment)  34T – June 22, 2020, vol. 1 (trial)  35T – June 22, 2020, vol. 2 (trial)  36T – June 23, 2020, vol. 1 (trial)  37T – June 23, 2020, vol. 2 (trial)  38T – June 24, 2020 (trial)  39T – June 25, 2020 (deliberations)  40T – June 26, 2020 (deliberations)  41T – June 29, 2020 (verdict)  42T – Aug. 29, 2020 (sentence)  After Defendant had been arrested, but prior to the indictment, the State filed a motion to compel a buccal swab on April 30, 2018.
[brief] [...] specifically acknowledged this, saying, “It’s certainly potentially exculpatory.  It’s certainly potentially inculpatory.  But we don’t know that. ” (2T10-19 to 21).  Once he determined the evidence lacked an apparent exculpatory nature, [...] should have ended his inquiry on this prong.  He did not, however, and then went on to apply an incorrect legal standard.  He said, “Really, the . . . evidence that we’re dealing with here certainly is relevant and probative with respect to proving or disproving facts in the case. ” (2T10-16 to 19).  While acknowledging that the profile may not actually exculpate defendant, he noted that nonetheless, “it is significant and material to the defendant’s defense, and critical to the defense -- to the defendant’s right to confront the witnesses against him. ”  (2T10-16 to 24).  He elaborated, “And this Court agrees with the defense in this case that the [...] profile information is crucial to the defense in this case.  This is essentially the bait with which the undercover detective lured and ultimately captured and charged [defendant] with. ” (2T12-21 to 13-1).  While the profile is certainly important, the law requires defendant show the evidence was materially exculpatory.
[brief] [Pa1, Pa3]  [...] concedes that it agreed to defend [...] in the HCH Action subject to a reservation of rights.  Db6.  “By reserving rights and providing defense costs on covered claims, an insurer fulfills its defense obligations. ”  *Passaic Valley Sewerage Comm’rs v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co.*, 206 N.J. 596, 616, 21 A.3d 1151, 1162 (2011) (citing *Burd v. Sussex Mut. Ins. Co.*, 56 N.J. 383, 267 A.2d 7 (1970)).  But [...] also argues that the express terms of the Policy were subject to an extra-contractual right to refuse to defend the HCH Action if [...]’s duty to indemnify [...] was “uncertain. ”  Db24.  The argument is insupportable.  In the first place, [...] has argued that Vermont law governs this case.  Db12.  Insofar as [...] is asking this Court to reject *Pharmacists* in favor of some radically different legal rule that purportedly finds support in *Passaic Valley* or *Burd*, [...]’s argument is meritless.
[directive] Satisfactory completion of K-9 training equivalent to that set forth herein.  Five years experience as a police specialty dog handler.  Must be either a full-time law enforcement officer assigned to trainer's duties by his/her employing law enforcement agency, or a former law enforcement officer who had previously been assigned canine trainer’s duties by his/her employing law enforcement agency, and is retained by a law enforcement agency as a trainer.  Satisfactory completion of a Methods of Instruction Course approved by the Police Training Commission or an equivalent course.  Must have assisted a supervising K-9 trainer in the delivery of one or more basic K-9 training courses satisfying the requirements set forth herein or courses having substantially equivalent requirements, during which a minimum of ten K-9 teams were successfully trained and qualified.  The prospective trainer must have been present for and assisted with the majority of training time.  Supervising K-9 Trainers - Patrol
[brief] See Randolph Town Ctr. Assocs., L.P. v. Twp. of Randolph, 324 N.J. Super. 412 (App. Div. 1999) ((d)(4) floor area ratio variances); Grubbs v. Slothower, 389 N.J. Super. 377 (App. Div. 2007) ((d)(5) deviations from density requirements); see also Burbridge v. Mine Hill Twp., 117 N.J. 376 (1990) ((d)(2) variances for minor expansion of a pre-existing non-conforming use).  Grasso v. Borough of Spring Lake Heights extends [...]’s less intensive standard of review to (d)(6) height variances.  Grasso, 375 N.J. Super. at 49, 52–53.  Under Grasso, an applicant can establish the positive criteria by demonstrating (1) undue hardship, or (2) that the structure will not offend the purpose of the height restriction and will be consistent with the surrounding neighborhood.  Grasso, 375 N.J. Super. at 51-53.  Contrary to Defendant’s decision, Plaintiff met both tests.
[brief] "I will be on the job site today but am looking for the DWG data for Rt 10, Morris Plains job.  Thanks for your help."  (Pa230).  There is no evidence that [...] received any digital files from [...].  (It is impossible to specifically cite the absence of an action or event in the file.)  On March 23, 2009, at 4:15 p.m. a Fax with attached two-page document was sent from [...] Associates to [...], entitled "Cut Sheet for Building Stakeout" dated March 23, 2009, for [...].