ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] STATEMENT OF FACTS  1.  This matter arises out of a two-vehicle accident occurring on March 2, 2020.  (Da1-Da8, Da49-Da50).  2.  Plaintiff/Respondent, [...] (hereinafter “Respondent”), alleged that she sustained permanent injuries as a result of the accident of March 2, 2020.  (Da1-Da8).  3.  Respondent filed a Complaint in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Burlington County under Docket No. [...] on November 3, 2021.  (Da1-Da8).  4.  Appellant filed an Answer to the Complaint on December 22, 2021 (Da9-Da12).  Among other defenses asserted was the New Jersey Limitation on Lawsuit Option, N.J.S.A. § 39:6A-1.1, et seq. and the Appellant’s position that the Respondent had not surmounted the threshold and had not sustained a permanent injury.  (Da9-Da12).  5.  Trial proceeded in this matter with both Appellant and Respondent testifying regarding the happening of the accident.  6.  Appellant [...] testified that he was unable to prevent his vehicle from coming into contact with the rear of the Respondent’s vehicle as a result of road surface conditions.  Specifically, he testified that he had seen puddled or ponded water earlier in the day as well as precipitation.  He attempted to stop his vehicle but it hydroplaned and failed to stop before coming into contact with the rear of the Respondent’s vehicle.  (T2 187-2 through T2 199-22).
[brief] I.  [...] HAS NO DAMAGES  There is no dispute that [...] paid [...]’s costs of defending the Hood lawsuit, and that [...] and [...] settled the Hood lawsuit on [...]’s behalf.  There is no evidence in the record, and no argument in the Appellants’ Brief, that [...] suffered any damages that can be recoverable against [...].  Pa2754.  II.  EVANSTON HAS NO VIABLE CLAIM FOR DAMAGES AGAINST ALLIANT  This case has always been a coverage dispute between [...] and [...] on one hand, and [...] and [...] on the other.  [...] and [...] contend that, as a matter of law, [...] and [...] are obligated to reimburse [...] and [...] for the amounts spent in defending and settling the Hood lawsuit on behalf [...].  The trial court ruled in favor of [...] and [...], and now this Court must determine if the trial court was correct.  But no matter how this Court rules, [...] has nothing to do with the coverage fight between the insurers.  This was true when the case was in the trial court, and it remains true now.  The trial court found that [...] and [...] owed coverage to [...] related to the Hood lawsuit, and that [...] and [...] did not.  [...]’s coverage obligations have nothing to do with [...].  The only way [...] can prevail in its coverage fight is if this Court reverses the trial court and finds that [...] owed coverage to [...] under the CCIP instead.  [...] had no control over whether [...] was enrolled in the CCIP or not.  The discretion of whether [...] was enrolled in the CCIP rested with [...], not [...].  Pa2753.  [...] has no damages, and [...] cannot be responsible for [...]’s coverage obligations.  This is why the trial court correctly granted [...]’s motion for summary judgment.  III.
[brief] [...]’s testimony at trial, bolstered by the persistent invocation of his expertise as a medical examiner, played a significant role in the State’s case.  In front of the jury, [...] characterized determinations of “cause and manner of death” as “part of the Medical Examiner’s duties. ”  (42T:71-1 to 11)  [...] explained that manner of death can fall into one of five categories: natural death, accident, suicide, homicide, or something undetermined.  (42T:143-8 to 13)
[brief] Indeed, it was Plaintiff’s counsel who initially requested that Defendants provide the interpreter.  Pa28  Moreover, the single perceived inaccuracy in the translation of deposition testimony repeatedly cited by counsel is a.) equivocal at best, and b.) no less common than any number of similar inaccuracies that can occur in transcription regardless of a language barrier.  In an hours long deposition, it is certainly not uncommon for there to be some disagreement between litigants as to a word or two here or there.  The need for an interpreter does not alleviate the concerns about TPO or recording devices.  Following the Supreme Court’s decision, in the case at bar, Defendants re-issued a notice for a Rule 4:19 exam.
[brief] The Judge next confirmed that Defendant was pleading guilty to DWI with the understanding that the balance of the charges against him would be dismissed.  (1T8-3 to 8-8)  [...] explained the fines and penalties Defendant faced as a result of his plea specifying, “You’re going to receive a 10-year loss of your driving privileges. ”  (1T8-9 to 11-5; 9-9 to 9-10)  The following colloquy then occurred:
[brief] Appellant offers no alternative evidence of an improper motive supporting his termination.  Appellant merely asserts—without any evidence (as found by the Trial Judge)—that his mere mention of reports in 2018 about Respondents’ prior marketing issues, was the reason for his termination.  In short, the record evidence is one-sided and confirms it was his use of the company PCard that led to his termination.  See, Terry v. Town of Morristown, 446 Fed.Appx. 457, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 20053, at *12 (3d Cir. 2011) (affirming summary judgment based on legitimate nondiscriminatory reason that plaintiff’s “aggressive behavior, inability to follow orders, and difficulty interacting with the community” were not pretextual); Arenas v. L’Oreal USA Products, Inc., 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 2933 (3d Cir. 2012) (affirming summary judgment because the “record fails to cast any doubt on [the employer’s] legitimate non-discriminatory reason for terminating [plaintiff]”); Finn v. J.B. Hunt Transport Services, Inc., 437 Fed.Appx. 91, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 14459, *6 (3d Cir. 2011) (summary judgment upheld because “subpar job performance that is documented adequately” was legitimate non-discriminatory reason for termination).
[brief] ”  "The threshold to prove a party's standing is `fairly low.'"  EnviroFinance Grp., LLC v. Envtl. Barrier Co., LLC, 440 N.J. Super. 325, 340 (App. Div. 2015) (quoting Reaves v. Egg Harbor Twp., 277 N.J. Super. 360, 366 (App. Div. Thus, where "the proceeding serves the public interest" and the "plaintiff is not simply an interloper," standing will likely be found.  *N.J. Citizen Action v. Rivera Hotel Corp.*, 296 N.J. Super. 402, 415 (quoting *In re Quinlan*, 70 N.J. 10, 34-35 (1976)).  When the question of standing is analyzed, a court must decide whether the case implicates a “substantial public interest.
[directive] Attorney General Brimage Guidelines 2 (2004 Revisions) referred to as “the grand total”) to determine whether the prosecutor may tender a plea offer above or below the presumptive offer displayed in the Table.  See Section 10.3.  At this point in the calculation process, the prosecutor must apply any applicable “Special Application and Enhancement Features,” such as the one based on N.J.S.A. 2C:35-8, which requires that adult defendants who distribute drugs to children receive twice the custodial sentence that would otherwise apply, or where the present offense was committed while the defendant was on parole or probation.  See Section 11.  Next, the prosecutor must determine whether to make a “downward departure” considering the proofs available for trial and the likelihood of obtaining a guilty verdict.  See Section 12.  Finally, prosecutors are authorized to make a “downward departure” from the plea offer that must otherwise be tendered pursuant to these Guidelines where the defendant provides “substantial cooperation” to law enforcement.  See Section 13.  By following the preceding steps, a prosecutor can determine an authorized plea offer, which (except for certain cases involving a small amount of marijuana) will be expressed as a specific term of parole ineligibility.
[brief] “A person acts purposely with respect to the nature of his conduct or a result thereof if it is his conscious object to engage in conduct of that nature or to cause such a result. ”  N.J.S.A. 2C:2-2(b)(1).  “A person acts knowingly with respect to a result of his conduct if he is aware that it is practically certain that his conduct will cause such a result. ”  N.J.S.A. 2C:2-2(b)(2).  A person acts recklessly when they “consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk” that death will occur from their conduct, and disregarding the risk “involves a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a reasonable person would observe” in the same situation.
[brief] (Db11-13).  Regardless, the Rutgers Act expressly “transferred” the Trustees’ powers to the BOG, a body that the consummated contract itself identifies as “public. ”  N.J.S.A. 18A:65-12.  Despite Defendants’ effort to note that the Trustee-appointees constitute “nearly half” of the BOG (Db11), “nearly half” is not a majority, and it is the gubernatorial appointees that make up the majority.  N.J.S.A. 18A:65-14; see also Richman, 41 N.J. Super. at 266 (“Since the majority of voting members of the Board of Governors are appointed by the Governor of New Jersey with the advice and consent of the Senate, the public is granted major control over the policies and administration of the university. ”)  It has been well understood that Rutgers is a hybrid institution, as the State, in exchange for providing significant financial support to a once private university, was vested with a greater voice in the management of the University; and therefore, was empowered—by both the “consummated contract” and the statutory law itself—to delegate authority previously held by the BOT to the BOG, the majority of whom are appointed by the Governor with the advice and consent of the senate.
[brief] 7.  On August 19, 2020 [...] filed a Medpay arbitration which was assigned Docket Number [...] as a result of a motor vehicle accident which occurred on May 17, 2019 involving the injured party [...] and the [...] insured, [...].  On or about September 20, 2022, the Arbitrator entered an award in favor of [...] NJ Insurance Company in the amount of $4,877.24.  See arbitration award (Da165 – Da171).
[brief] The 2019 Complaint Was Never Served and the Trial Court Lacked Personal Jurisdiction to Reinstate It.  Plaintiff’s entire Point 4 is another nullity.  He claims he served Defendant by mail to a New York address in 2019 that he states was her office, then he patently misrepresents at his brief page 28 that “[...] never submitted a certification in the underlying matter objecting to the “signature” on the certified mail return card.
[brief] 1.  [...] found that the Petitioner meets the definition of independent contractor.  (Pa95)  2.  Petitioner testified that while she does have a private law practice, the services that she provides as municipal prosecutor to [...] are not offered to the public.  Rather, she only prosecutes individuals who commit a violation within the jurisdiction of the municipal court in [...].  3.  [...] conceded that the Division and the Board have found that Petitioner is an employee for pension purposes in [...] for many years.  (T178-18 and T179-1)  FACTOR 19 – RIGHT TO DISCHARGE
[brief] “THE COURT: Right.  So -- so, that -- so, that the intent of the parties, I believe, was both parties acknowledge that he has a disability.  Okay?  Now -- and I understand that there were -- there were disciplinary actions pending or about to occur, but -- but both parties recognize that the disciplinary actions -- it’s just -- it’s in the agreement were -- were related to his underlying disability or his claimed disability and you allowed him to go then through this process.  The parties thought it was in the best interest of both parties to allow him to go through this disability process, but he can’t do that because he signed this letter so that -- you know, it made the whole point of the agreement between you and the employee unachievable.  You know, because he was “cooked” because he signed this -- this resignation letter and (indiscernible) which kind of defeated the whole purpose of the agreement; right?”
[brief] Therefore, for the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully submitted that the order of the trial court should be vacated and the matter remanded back to the trial court.  Respectfully submitted, [...], Esq.  Superior Court of New Jersey  Appellate Division  Docket No. [...]  [...], and [...], Plaintiffs-Appellants, vs. [...], Defendant-Respondent.  CIVIL ACTION ON APPEAL FROM AN ORDER OF THE SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY, LAW DIVISION, ESSEX COUNTY DOCKET NO.: [...]
[brief] 2T34-24 to 37-11.  This information was a relief to Defendants who were inexperienced, having acquired the property through inheritance.  Indeed, several witnesses at trial discussed Plaintiff’s anticipated redevelopment plans for this site - plans that even pre-dated the PSA.  The initial meeting between the parties was held at the diner across from the property in question (5T88-15 to 18); present were [...], [...], [...], and [...].  5T88-15 to 18.  Subsequently, there were additional meetings between the parties.  One such meeting was at Vincent’s office.  5T89-11 to 12.  The next meeting also occurred in Vincent’s Bayonne office, (5T90-10 to 12) in which Plaintiff’s contract attorney, [...], was in attendance.  5T90-13 to 23.  Subsequent to these meetings, discussions regarding the environmental conditions continued directly between the parties, with [...] giving Lockwood “the lead” as to the environmental specifics.  5T93-7 to 17.  In 2019, before Defendants retained a transaction attorney, the parties had agreed upon the price.
[brief] ”  (Sb12-13)  The State appears to take the position that so long as a sentencing court considered the evidence and arguments of defendant and explained the reasons for its sentence, this Court must defer to the trial court and affirm the sentence.  (Sb11-12)  The State is mistaken in its characterization of this Court’s role as so deferential that it is constrained to affirm a sentence so long as a sentencing --- ²  The following abbreviations will be used:  Sb – State’s Response Brief Db – Defendant-Appellant’s Initial Brief 8T – Feb. 1, 2023 (Resentencing) court considered all relevant evidence and gave reasons for its decision.  When the Supreme Court describes “[a]ppellate review of sentencing [a]s deferential” and cautions appellate courts “not to substitute their judgment for those of our sentencing courts,” the Court is principally referring to the length of the sentence.  State v. Case, 220 N.J. 49, 65 (2014).  Indeed, the Court has specified the conditions under which an appellate court “must affirm the sentence and not second-guess the sentencing court”: “[w]hen the aggravating and mitigating factors are identified, supported by competent, credible evidence in the record, and properly balanced. ”  Ibid.  But it is this very condition in which lies the heart of appellate review.  Appellate courts are empowered “to review findings of fact by the sentencing court in support of its findings of aggravating and mitigating circumstances,” N.J.S.A. 2C:44-7, and are “expected to assess the aggravating and mitigating factors to determine whether they ‘were based upon competent credible evidence in the record.
[brief] The Directive states:  “The decision to electronically record an encounter is not discretionary.  Officers shall activate their BWC without unnecessary delay upon being dispatched, and in the case of self-initiated events—prior to citizen engagement, and/or immediately upon observing circumstances supporting constitutional justification; when feasible.  [...], Written Directive on Body Worn Cameras, “Standard Operating Procedure” (May 28, 2021), §3.1 (first emphasis in original; second emphasis supplied).  The Directive also states: “When a BWC is activated, officers shall state the time and shall provide narration where practical and appropriate in an effort to augment the value of the recording and to provide clarity for the viewer. ”  Id. at §3.2.  Again, in this case, none of the BWC footage captured the conduct alleged to have been “consistent with narcotics distribution” or [...]’s narration of that alleged conduct.  The prosecutor argues that the “high crime” nature of [...] must be considered because it provides “context” for [...]’s “articulated observations.
[brief] In consultation with the [...] (the “City”), the Land Development Rules govern the review and approval or denial of site plans and development proposals for development on and improvements to land within the Tourism District, and the [...] reviews such applications applying the standards set forth in the Land Development Rules and the Municipal Land Use Law, which would otherwise be performed by the City planning or zoning boards.  N.J.S.A. 5:12-220(b).  On August 17, 2022, the City introduced Ordinance No. 8-E, which, subject to the [...]’s consent, proposed a Green Zone Redevelopment Plan (the “Redevelopment Plan”) to allow recreational cannabis retail and consumption operations as permitted uses within the Redevelopment Area.
[brief] Doing so is an option of last resort.  In the end, the Court must determine whether, under the totality of the circumstances, any election irregularities were so significant as to warrant a new election.  “Simple deviance from statutory election procedures, absent fraud or misconduct, will not vitiate an election” unless it can be demonstrated that the “free expression” of the people has been circumvented.  Wene, 13 N.J. at 196; In re Hackensack Recall Election, 31 N.J. 592, 595 (1960) (holding that if election results are unaffected by alleged error, election should not be overturned).  Only if irregularities “are such that the court cannot with reasonable certainty determine who received the majority of the legal vote,” may an election be set aside.  In the Matter of Mallon, 232 N.J. Super. 249, 270 (App. Div. 1989) (citing In re Bonsanto’s Application, 171 N.J. Super. 356, 360 (App. Div. 1979)).
[brief] According to the trial testimony, that did not occur until 2019.  (12T7:15-8:14, January 27, 2023).  The Court went to describe how [...]’s peaceable possession of the Property and [...]’s lack of involvement in the Property were integral to the Court’s conclusion:  A word about peaceable possession.  [...] Wu was in peaceable possession in the legal sense from 1997, and was not made aware of any claim against his ownership interest until, as I have said, at the earliest, his conversation with [...], and certainly not until the purported transfer to [...].  For these reasons, I find there to be no impediment or time barred claim here that the statute of limitations issue is not a real one.
[brief] The Planning Board granted conditional use and site plan approval to [...] on September 15, 2022, which approval was memorialized in a Resolution adopted by the Planning Board on October 13, 2022 (Da454).  [...] filed a Complaint in lieu of prerogative writs on October 21, 2022 challenging the Planning Board’s grant of approval.  The matter was tried before the Honorable [...], J.S.C. and the Court reversed the decision of the Planning Board (M-Da7) and entered an Order vacating the Resolution for the reasons placed on the record of September 26, 2023 which Order was entered on September 26, 2023 (M-Da21).  On October 24, 2023, [...] filed a Notice of Appeal and Case Information Statement with the Court (M-Da533-545).  On October 25, 2023 [...] filed a Notice of Motion for a Stay pending appeal with the Trial Court.  (M-Da19).  On November 17, 2023 the Trial Court denied the Motion for a Stay pending appeal.  (M-Da21).  The Planning Board filed a Case Information Statement with the Appellate Division on November 8, 2023.  [...] next filed a Motion for a Stay pending appeal with the Appellate Division on December 13, 2023.  (M-Da23).  The Appellate Division entered an Order granting a stay of the Trial Court decision pending appeal on January 4, 2024.  (M-Da26).  The Appellate Division entered a further Order on February 29, 2024 denying a Motion for Reconsideration, and/or clarification of the January 4, 2024 Order or in the alternative, to accelerate the appeal which Motions were filed on behalf of [...].  STATEMENT OF FACTS
[brief] People must be deterred from killing each other, even if done in the heat of passion.  The sentencing judge found mitigating factor 8 (circumstances unlikely to recur) and 9 (the character and attitude of the defendant indicate that the defendant is unlikely to commit another offense).  These findings were not inconsistent with the aggravating factors; a finding of a need to deter is not inconsistent with a finding that the circumstances are unlikely to recur, but the need to deter will be entitled to less weight.  Id.  In sum, the court found aggravating factors 3 and 9 and mitigating factors 3, 4, 5, 7, and 9.  Although the amended Judgment of Conviction says that “the aggravating factors substantially outweigh the mitigating factors,” that finding was not made on the record and should be removed from the Judgment of Conviction.  Regardless, the judge arrived at a fair sentence after evaluating the aggravating and mitigating factors.
[directive] After the issuance of a temporary or final order specifying custody, joint custody rights or parenting time, takes, detains, entices or conceals a minor child from the other parent in 3rd Degree $5,000 to $25,000 10% permissible violation of the custody or parenting time order.  Grading of Sections 1 through 4 – crime of the second degree if the child is taken, detained, enticed, or concealed outside of the United States or for more than twenty-four hours; otherwise crime of the third degree
[brief] However, this case has never concerned [...]’s May 2018 package insert warning.  Instead, the case involves [...]’s failure to warn after it became aware of the Ozurdex defect on June 21, 2018, which months before [...] was injured.  [...] and her board-certified ophthalmologist, [...], were never warned about the defect, nor was anyone else in the U.S. until after [...] was blinded.  New Jersey Product Liability Act Sec. 2A:58C-4.
[brief] ”  Dutch Run, 450 N.J. Super. at 602.  Indeed, Plaintiff cites no authority to suggest that an individual can be deemed to be “at home” in New Jersey based upon business-related contacts with the State.  See Koch v. Pechota, 744 F. App’x 105, 110–11 (3d Cir. 2018) (“Consideration of business activities to find general jurisdiction has not been applied to individuals. ”).  But even if such authority existed, Plaintiff’s recitation of [...]’s random purported “contacts” with New Jersey fall far short of the extensive contacts with New Jersey required to “approximate physical presence” in the State.  See Wilson v. Paradise Vill. Beach Resort And Spa, 395 N.J. Super. 520, 528 (App. Div. 2007).  3  Many of Plaintiff’s purported “facts” have no bearing on the jurisdictional inquiry, from [...]’s “multi-jurisdictional” practice and [...]’s “multi-jurisdictional services,” to non-party, non-client [...]’s New Jersey contacts.  Pb6–14.  C.
[brief] Application of the Law to the Facts of Each Plaintiff’s Transaction on Summary Judgment.  [...] submitted 174 paragraphs of undisputed material facts in its motion for summary judgment filed June 11, 2021.  Just like *Filmlife* and *Winoka*, supra, paragraphs 13 through 174 detailed the alleged oral misrepresentations claimed by each plaintiff and the particular provisions of the contractual documents expressly contradicting those claims.  Simply put, the facts alleged by the plaintiffs on fraudulent inducement were simply a denial of the express written terms of the contract; none of the fraud claimed was wholly extraneous to the contracts.  The plaintiffs did not allege any evidence that was relevant to prove the meaning or interpretation of any ambiguous term in the contract or integrated documents, nor to discern the parties’ intent.  (See Section C within this Point Heading below).