ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Upon learning of the possible Bankruptcy and future sale of the School property to a third party, on June 1, 2007 [...] of the [...] unilaterally had created by its attorney a notarized “Corporate Action” document (Da907).  In this document, the [...], in a self-serving assertion, "certified" that the non-recordable January 7, 1963 Agreement created an “easement”.  The “Corporate Action of Congregation [...]” was then attached to the non-recordable 1963 Agreement\(^3\) and June 5, 1972 memo, and the collective document was then recorded by the [...] in the [...]’s property records.  (Da907-912) (8T-1 to 13-23)  Neither [...], its predecessor in title or the trustee signed that “corporate action” nor is there any evidence any of them then were aware of it being filed.
[brief] Unbeknownst to Appellants, Counsel for the [...], and the [...] Secretary, who were all aware of Appellants’ intention to appeal the decision of the [...], Counsel for Applicants published the decision independently and without any prior notification on December 2, 2022.  The affidavit evidencing that such publication was made 20 days earlier was also provided in the same email.  (Pa764)  On January 20, 2023, Appellants filed their Complaint, which was within 45-days of the [...]’s publication of December 8, 2023, but 49 days after the Applicants’ publication.
[brief] In *Dunkin Donuts v. Tp. North Brunswick*, 193 N.J. Super. 513 (App. Div. 1984), the Appellate Division affirmed the reversal of the denial of the site plan, but conditioned the approval on the applicant withdrawing the request for bulk variances, or obtaining the required bulk variances from the Board on remand.  The trial court in that case had directed approval of the entire application without remand, and the appellate court remanded the matter to the Board for approval of the site plan, while specifically preserving the Board’s ability to grant or deny the variances requested.  In *Urban v Planning Bd.*, 124 NJ 651 (1991), the Supreme Court affirmed that the Board had applied prior case law incorrectly and remanded the application to the Board to reconsider the subdivision application and variances.  Similarly, if the trial court found that the inherently beneficial use must be approved, it should have limited the decision to that legal finding and then remanded the case to the Board to consider the imposition of all appropriate mitigating conditions as required by *Sica*.  The Board has the local knowledge needed to appropriately craft conditions to address the negatives created by a use variance.  The local Board, not the court, is best suited to do the weighing and determine which conditions will balance the positive and negative impacts.  By so restricting the Board on remand, the trial court improperly removed its ability to appropriately apply the last prong of the Sica test by the imposition of conditions.  **Point III**
[brief] ”).  [...] contends that he reasonably and objectively believed that [...] criminally harassed him in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4.⁴ (See Pb17).  On this point, our Supreme Court has noted that “it is critical to identify the evidence that an aggrieved employee believes will support the CEPA recovery with care and precision. ”  Chiofalo v. State, 238 N.J. 527, 544 (2019) (quoting Battaglia, 214 N.J. at 559).  However, in support of his argument, [...] can point only to [...]’s self-serving deposition testimony.  (See Pb.18-19).  [...]’s testimony cannot support [...]’s belief on this point.
[brief] (11T124-22 to 125-5; Sa1 at 10:45:40 to 10:45:53; Da47).  Defendant nevertheless provided two more explanations over reminders from [...] and [...] that they would talk with him after booking was completed.  (11T125-6 to 126-18; Sa1 at 10:46:10 to 10:46:56; Da48 to Da49).  Rather than engaging defendant, [...] asked defendant his height, weight, and place of birth.  (11T126-19 to 127-2; Sa1 at 10:46:56 to 10:47:21; Da49 to Da50).  In between and over [...]’s booking questions, defendant provided yet another extended account of the fight.
[brief] (2T169-1 to 10; 2TT170-21 to 171-9)  He was contradicted by [...]’s notes regarding an office visit on February 20, 2013.  [...]’s note states “[p]re-op, he is complaining of increasing symptoms of his Meniere’s disease. ” (2T170-16 to 18).  Plaintiff claimed he did not recall saying that to [...].  (2T170-18 to 20).  Plaintiff returned to [...] on August 7, 2013 and August 19, 2013.
[brief] (Pb7-8.)  To clarify, while an [...] form, it was completed by [...] and then sent to [...].  (ACC Tr. 78:24-79:8 at Pa1036; Faust Tr. 54:17-55:4 at Pa2192.)  Although the form states “[n]o hired tier sub may commence work until they are properly enrolled,” the subcontractors must still be eligible to enroll in the CCIP before enrolling.
[brief] Richardson, 192 N.J. at 210.  Indeed, "a basis for an accidental disability pension" exists when "the disability directly result[s] from the combined effect of a traumatic event and a preexisting disease."  Cattani v. Bd. of Trs., PFRS, 69 N.J. 578, 586 (1976); see also In re Sigafos, 143 N.J. Super. 469, 474 (App. Div. 1976) ("The proofs here clearly show that petitioner's disability directly resulted from the combined effect of a traumatic event and a preexisting disease [and therefore] he is entitled to an accidental disability retirement allowance.") (citation omitted) (internal quotations omitted); Korelnia v. Bd. of Trs., PERS, 83 N.J. 163, 170 (1980) ("[A]n accidental disability may under certain circumstances involve a combination of both traumatic and pathological origins.").
[brief] Transcript of the Deposition of [...]  Filed as Exhibit B to the Certification of [...], Esq. on Behalf of the Plaintiff on March 18, 2024 in Opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment…………Pa147  Photograph Marked as WM000003  Included in Exhibit C Filed to the Certification of [...], Esq. on Behalf of the Plaintiff on March 18, 2024 in Opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment…………Pa215  Photograph Marked as WM000004  Included in Exhibit C Filed to the Certification of [...], Esq. on Behalf of the Plaintiff on March 18, 2024 in Opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment…………Pa216  Photograph Marked as WM000005  Included in Exhibit C Filed to the Certification of [...], Esq. on Behalf of the Plaintiff on March 18, 2024 in Opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment…………Pa217  Photograph Marked as WM000006  Included in Exhibit C Filed to the Certification of [...], Esq. on Behalf of the Plaintiff on March 18, 2024 in Opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment and Filed as Exhibit C to the Certification of [...], Esq. on Behalf of the Defendants on February 28, 2024 in Support of the Motion for Summary Judgment  .........................................................Pa218  Photograph Marked as WM000007  Included in Exhibit C  Filed to the Certification of [...], Esq. on Behalf of the Plaintiff on March 18, 2024 in Opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment........Pa219  Correspondence Dated June 30, 2023
[brief] Additionally, the record did not support the trial court’s finding that there were numerous officers on scene which would have allowed them to approach defendant after observing the first hand to hand transaction.  In fact, [...] explained that there were no other law enforcement units in the area to assist in the investigation and that their car was a non-descript vehicle and was not equipped with lights and sirens to stop the car.  (1T5-14 to 6-2; 1T33-3 to 6).  Further, throughout his testimony, [...] clearly suggested that they could not conduct an investigatory stop until they had back up units nearby as there were only three officers in the unmarked surveillance vehicle.  Given the multiple and significant factual errors in the court’s findings, it necessarily follows that the court’s likening of the facts in this case to the circumstances in Smart is flawed and erroneous.
[brief] Coincidentally, the Exhibit to [...]’s Certification omitted the email attachment containing the December 2, 2022 Notice of Approval – the precise document at issue.  (Pa775-776).  Accordingly, counsel submitted the Certification based on facts of record and with full copies of the relevant documents appended in accordance with R. 1:6-6.  (Pa803-805).  Addressing the allegation that the Homeowners’ Resolution of Approval was obtained by fraud, the Certification, based upon personal knowledge of the attorney who cross-examined the Objectors, clearly demonstrated that the Homeowners did not make any fraudulent or potentially fraudulent proffers to the ZBA.  On the contrary, the statements at issue regarding the existence of a wooded-lot owned by the [...] and located between the Subject Property and the Objectors’ property were adduced on cross-examination and made by the Objectors themselves.  (Pa675; Pa698-699; Pa711).  Moreover, those statements were elicited in response to statements made by Objector, [...], to the effect that the Subject Property was right across the street from her home and leering down on her.  (Pa675).  Additionally, the Objectors’ statements about the ownership and characteristics of the interceding lot were factually accurate both when made and when the motion was briefed and argued before the Trial Court.  (Pa675, Pa698-699; Pa711).  Clearly, the Homeowners cannot be said to have obtained an approval by fraud when they were not the declarants of the statements and when the statements at issue were factually accurate.  Because the Certification was made by the attorney that cross-examined the Objectors based upon evidence in the record in the form of the excerpts from the certified transcripts of the hearings before the ZBA with the transcript excerpts appended to the Certification, the Certification was proper under R. 1:6-6.  Moreover, the Trial Court refused to expand the record below or grant discovery because, “[n]o evidence has been presented that would allow [ ] [the] court to conclude that the [...] obtained the ZBA approval by fraud.
[brief] ”  Pra007 (¶2).  Those remand submissions can be judicially noticed as records of our state’s courts.  N.J.R.E. 201(4).  \(^6\)  Although fault would be apportioned amongst all defendants, both individuals and entities, Plaintiffs do not suggest that each alter-ego entity owned and operated by the same practitioner must obtain separate counsel, absent discovery of other facts.  The court should reject the [...]’ attempt to distinguish the “specific facts and context of In re Grand Jury” (SDb39), and unconvincing plea not to apply “a strict reading of In re Grand Jury to this case” (SDb42).
[brief] Order to Show Cause  Denying Application to Vacate And Confirming Arbitration Award  2/9/2024.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Pa8 Arbitration Award  [...] and [...], Docket No. [...] (Arbitrator [...]).  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Pa186  PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[brief] As explained above, [...] produced documents resulting from the searches, but then discovered it had run the searches incorrectly, so it ran the documents through a second search (with all agreed-upon custodians) and found that the resulting hits included irrelevant and nonresponsive documents.  [...] withheld these documents from production based on relevance, overbreadth, and proportionality objections (as well as an attorney-client privilege objection).  [...]’s second supplemental response to RFP No. 7 identifies the categories of documents being withheld: “documents concerning company-wide furloughs in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, sales and/or employee bonus information not related to Plaintiff, reporting information regarding job openings not related to Plaintiff’s position, payroll documents detailing company-wide salaries, [and] documents relating to other employees and customers not in Kansas. ”
[brief] In general, New Jersey disfavors the shifting of attorneys' fees.  *N. Bergen Rex Transp., Inc. v. Trailer Leasing Co.*, 158 N.J. 561, 569 (1999).  Here, the fee shifting provision contained in the parties’ Operating Agreement provides the Court with discretion to determine who is the prevailing party and the amount of any fee award that the prevailing party is entitled to receive from the non-prevailing party.  See P15, [...] at ¶ 10.5.  Plaintiff brought this lawsuit in good faith and was successful in establishing his entitlement to reimbursement of the $10,660 accounting mistake that Defendant acknowledged that she made in her own favor.  (3T162:15)  Plaintiff also established his entitlement to 49% of the profits that [...] earned in 2016, which Defendant improperly kept all to herself.  (3T122:11-18)  Plaintiff further established that Defendant breached the parties’ operating agreement by (1) vacating the $100,000 [...] judgment and dismissing [...]’s lawsuit with prejudice without consulting Plaintiff, and by (2) using [...]’s funds to establish [...] as a competing Pharmacy.  As such, Plaintiff should be deemed the prevailing party as to these issues and he is entitled to an order reversing the $119,256.40 fee award in Defendant’s favor, and entry of a fee award in Plaintiff’s favor as the prevailing party.
[brief] Each count suggests a substantive and procedural due process violation.  The trial court’s decision of March 10, 2023 dismissed both substantive and procedural due process claims.  Respondents’ cross-appeal brief does not make a specific argument about the dismissal of its procedural due process claims.  Appellants contend that such claims are therefore waived.  Nevertheless, the Appellants will brief the issue in the event this Court disagrees on whether it has been waived by Respondents.
[brief] “The standard of review on appeal from decisions on motions for a new trial is the same as that governing the trial judge—whether there was a miscarriage of justice under the law. ”  Risko v. Thompson Muller Auto. Grp., Inc., 206 N.J. 506, 521 (2011); see R. 2:10-1 (“The trial court’s ruling on such a motion shall not be reversed unless it clearly appears that there was a miscarriage of justice under the law. ”)  “This standard applies whether the motion is based upon a contention that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence, or is based upon a contention that the judge’s initial trial rulings resulted in prejudice to a party. ”  hr v. N.J. Dep’t of Corrections, 342 N.J. Super. 273, 302 (App. Div. 2001) (citing Crawn v. Campo, 136 N.J. 494, 510-12 (1994)), certif. denied, 171 N.J. 338 (2002).
[brief] Thus, according to [...], subcontractor-related issues in-the-field at the Hackensack Project ultimately reduced [...]’s profit share on the Hackensack Project down to $0, despite being contractually set by Schedule 1.7(a) of the PTA.  Pa125.  Further, [...] flatly contradicts the record when it states that its “role as subcontractor…was not and could not have been presented or considered at any point during the [First] Arbitration. ”  Opp. at 29.  This is wrong for many reasons, such as (1) [...]’s role as a subcontractor on the Project was introduced and testified to at length \textit{by [...]’s principal};\(^2\) (2) [...] entered its subcontract for Hackensack, and other project correspondence, into evidence during trial;\(^3\) and so (3) [...] clearly had a “fair and reasonable opportunity” to litigate the Hackensack Project claims in the First Arbitration (including the $2.1M offset it pleaded in its counterclaim).
[brief] The PCR court in addressing the defendant’s claims on the one hand stated the defendant failed to offer certifications or affidavits in support of his claims concerning trial counsel’s ineffective representation for failing to investigate and obtain experts.  (Da 89 to 94)  On the other hand, the PCR court goes on to address the certifications presented in support of defendant’s claims and to make credibility assessments and determinations (Da 110 to 113), which is prohibited by State v. Porter, supra.
[brief] The benefits of such an arrangement are manifold, directly serving the public interest in several key areas:  1.  Enhanced Recreational Opportunities  By acquiring land more suited for parks, trails, and recreational facilities, the Township directly responds to the community's need for accessible and diverse recreational options.  This exchange ensures that residents have ample space for outdoor activities, contributing to the overall health and wellness of the community.  The creation or expansion of public parks and recreational areas fosters a sense of community, encourages physical activity, and provides a sanctuary for residents to enjoy nature.  2.  Environmental Preservation  The properties acquired through the exchange are selected based on their ecological value, offering opportunities for habitat conservation, biodiversity preservation, and the protection of water resources.  By prioritizing lands with significant environmental attributes, [...] commits to the stewardship of its natural resources, ensuring these lands are preserved for future generations.  This strategic conservation effort aligns with broader environmental goals, including climate resilience and the mitigation of urban sprawl.  3.  Strategic Urban Planning  The land exchange facilitates smarter urban planning by allowing the Township to direct development in a manner that balances growth with conservation.  Through this arrangement, [...] can ensure that development occurs in areas best suited for it while preserving critical open spaces.  This approach to urban planning enhances the livability of the Township, reduces environmental impact, and supports sustainable growth patterns.  4.  Community Engagement and Public Support  The process leading to the land exchange has involved significant community engagement, ensuring that the public's voice is heard and that the resulting benefits align with the community's desires and needs.  This transparent process builds trust in municipal decisions, fosters community support for public projects, and ensures that the outcomes of the swap reflect the community's values and priorities.
[brief] (Ja338-361).  The next day, the court convened a management conference at which it requested supplemental briefing regarding Tyler’s effect, if any, on this matter.\(^6\) (2T11:1-13:12).  Shortly thereafter, Defendants raised the issue of retroactivity, and the court permitted supplemental briefing on that as well.  (Ja362).  The cross-summary judgment motions were argued on July 20, 2023, and the court reserved.  (3T66:10-11).  On December 4, 2023, this court published [...] v. Roberto, 477 N.J. Super. 339 (App. Div. 2023) (Roberto), which concluded that Tyler did apply to New Jersey’s Tax Sale Law (TSL).  Based on Roberto’s pronouncement that Tyler only applied to tax foreclosures with “pipeline retroactivity,” the trial judge granted Defendant’s motion for summary judgment, and denied Plaintiff’s cross-motion by order and statement of reasons entered in March 2024.
[directive] 2.) liens to retain vehicles for official use; 3 . ) establishment of a uniform motor vehicle appraisal methodology using the N.A.D.A. Blue Book "low retail value.  "  Pre-Seizure Evaluation 11.  A.  Criteria for Seizure  Prior to the seizure of any vehicle for forfeiture, the seizing officer should ensure that the subject vehicle meets either the criteria for seizure or one of the exceptions to those criteria outlined in EOAF --DPiPrective dated September (copy 1994 20, 23, attached).
[brief] (Da1; Ra1 to 3).  On June 21, 2022, defendant filed a pre-indictment motion to suppress the evidence seized under the warrant.  (Da2; 7T13-9 to 16; 7T16-22 to 17-20).  On October 13 and 18, 2022, the Honorable [...], P.J.Cr., held an evidentiary hearing and heard testimony on the motion.  (1T; 2T).  Following argument on September 22, 2022, January 5, 2023, and January 31, 2023, (3T; 7T; 8T), [...] denied the motion to suppress on January 31, 2023, in an order and written opinion.
[brief] Point III: [...]’s Reliance on the Lajara, Jersey Central Power & Light and Second Circuit Caselaw Is Misplaced.  [...] in its appellate brief relies heavily upon Second Circuit case law which is not binding upon this court nor persuasive as it does not address the specific New Jersey statutes at issue: AICRA, NJIFPA, and NJRICO.  Rather, it addresses New York No-Fault laws completely irrelevant to this matter.  [...] further relies upon the New Jersey Supreme Court cases of *Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co. v. Melcar Utility Co.*, 212 N.J. 576 (2013) and *[...] v. Lajara*, 222 N.J. 129 (2015), both of which are distinguishable to the present matter.
[directive] those writing in specify sha11 department, police the of chief the of authorized are (1) who Directive and this of purposes the supervisory for officers as designated are after presumption, a overcome authorized to are (2) and decisions, charging approve review to and considering decision-making functions perform those to qualified such are officers that determining the in or addition In training. and judgment, demonstrated experience, assignment, their duty of head (e.g., department within position the duly a specify Prosecutor may County the alternative, highest-ranking procedures, booking of in charge on duty division, officer detective or patrol the be may position duty that in officer the event which in etc.), station, police the on in or duty officer charging decisions. approve and review to authorized directive a issues Prosecutor County the if Police, Jersey State New the to respect With State the of those members writing in specify sha11 Superintendent 3.3.1, the subsection to pursuant (1) are who and Directive this of purposes for supervisory officers as designated are Police who overcome a to authorized (2) are and decisions, charging approve and review to authorized those perform qualified to are members Police State such that determining after presumption, judgment, demonstrated experience, assignment, duty their considering functions decision-making within position duty specify a may Superintendent the alternative, in the or addition In training. and in member the event which in etc.), detective, station station, the of charge in officer station (e.g., a this in Nothing charging decisions. approve and review to authorized be may position duty that approval on the limitations or conditions impose to authority
[directive] Each county prosecutor and each law enforcement agency having patrol jurisdiction shall designate a person or persons to serve as a liaison between that law enforcement agency and local and county school officials.  Where appropriate, each law enforcement agency should designate as school liaison the agency's juvenile bureau supervisor, juvenile officer or officer assigned to handle juvenile matters.  For this arrangement to work, the local superintendents of each school should similarly designate a person to serve as a liaison to the respective law enforcement agencies.  The roles and functions of these liaisons are to:  Facilitate communication and cooperation; Identify issues or problems that arise in the implementation of this Executive Directive and facilitate the resolution of any such problems; Act as the primary contact person between the schools and the affected law enforcement agencies; Act together in developing joint training and other cooperative efforts, including information exchanges and joint speaking engagements.  Coordinate intervention and prevention efforts.  Part V - Law Enforcement Operations