ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND COUNTERSTATEMENT OF FACTS  A.  General Background.  [...] is the owner of vacant property designated as Block 216, Lots 11, 12, and 24 on the tax map of the [...] (the “City” or “[...]”), [...] (the “Property” or “[...] Property”).  Aa29.  The Property is “bounded on the east by Ocean Avenue and on the west by Ocean Boulevard,” Aa31, and “abutted by high-rise multi-family residential buildings to the north and south.”  2Ra3; see 2Ra210.  The Property is separated from the beachfront boardwalk by an unimproved right-of-way, Ocean Avenue (a public street), and an associated public sidewalk.  Aa31; see 2Ra210.  “The Property is only one of two vacant properties within this area of [...] where the [p]roperty is separated from the boardwalk by a public road (Ocean Avenue). ”  Aa32.  [...] has been pursuing the governmental approvals necessary to construct a residential apartment building on the Property, including approvals from the Department.
[brief] 1T – motion dated 6/19/18 2T – motion dated 10/9/19 3T – motion dated 3/10/20 4T – motion dated 6/16/20 5T – motion dated 8/11/21 6T – motion dated 3/31/22 7T – trial dated 4/11/22 8T – trial dated 4/14/22 9T – trial dated 4/18/22 10T – trial dated 4/19/22 11T – trial dated 4/20/22 12T – trial dated 4/21/22 13T – trial dated 4/25/22  \(^1\)  Pages Da 1 to 12 are in the Confidential Appendix.  Pages Da 13 to 27 are in the appendix attached to this brief.  14T – trial dated 4/26/22 15T – trial dated 4/27/22 16T – trial dated 4/28/22 17T – trial dated 5/2/22 18T – trial dated 5/3/22 19T – trial dated 5/6/22 20T – trial dated 5/9/22 21T – trial dated 5/10/22 22T – sentencing dated 3/15/23  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
[brief] 2  Argument  I.  [...] in abuse of authority, recklessly deprived [...] of his due process rights (Raised below: Aa1, Aa2, Aa3)  5  II.  State Officials Acting Under Color of State law, in Abuse of Authority  Recklessly Disregarded [...]'s Due Process Rights with the Evil Intent to Cause Harm (Raised Below: (Aa1, Aa2, Aa3))  7  III.  Punitive Damages  As Treble Should Be Awarded for [...]'s Employees  Willful and Wanton Misconduct (Not Raised Below)  9  Conclusion  12
[directive] COURT  Range setting 3:26-2 to to to to $100 $100 or Bail crime.  $500 $500  MUNICIPAL warrant when RULE offenses substantive considered TO  Disorderly Disorderly a OFFENSES whether Degree  Disorderly PURSUANT  Persons  Persons Persons Degree included THE 4th Petty Petty actual IN be regarding PERSONS OR, lesser to appropriate.
[brief] Similarly, with the dearth of any clear video or photographic evidence of exactly what was displayed in any of the four traffic stops, did all 12 jurors ever agree that there was a particular incident where they were convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant violated subsection (a) of N.J.S.A. 2C:30-2 by displaying an official ID while suspended to get out of a ticket?  Maybe they all agreed on the fundamentals of what defendant did.  But the likelihood is far greater that this was a hodgepodge verdict with various jurors believing various things, but all of them merely vaguely believing that defendant did one of the five things he was accused of doing without actually reaching unanimous agreement on what that thing was.  This Court is then left with a verdict on Counts Two and Three that is so generic that no one could possibly determine what it is that the jury thought defendant did wrong, or, even more importantly, whether the jury unanimously agreed on whatever that thing was.  As in Gonzalez, the “instructions were inherently ambiguous because the judge failed to explain in clear English what the jurors were required to decide and, as a result, generated numerous ways in which the jury could have convicted without a shared vision of what defendant did. ”  444 N.J. Super. at 77.  Defendant’s convictions for Counts Two and Three should be reversed and the matter remanded for retrial of those counts.
[brief] It is well established that “[c]ross-examination should not go beyond the subject matter of the direct examination and matters affecting the witness’ credibility. ”  N.J.R.E. 611(b).  See also, State v. Loftin, 146 N.J. 295, 344 (1996) (“Cross-examination is generally limited to the scope of direct examination”).  The DOC did not elicit a single shred of evidence or ask [...] any questions regarding the August 16, 2019 incident even though there was plethora of testimony regarding [...]’s presence on Stowe 2 North and South during that evening.
[directive] A score of 80% or higher on firing a prescribed automatic/semi-automatic assault weapons qualification course (ASQC or ARQC) as contained in Appendices E, G .  Qualification Score--Automatic/Semi-Automatic Subgun Night Firing.  A score of 80% or higher based on firing of the prescribed course (ASNQC) as contained in Appendix F.  Qualification Score--Police Carbine.  A score of 80% or higher on firing the police carbine course day or night (PCQC or PCQNC) as contained in Appendices H and I.  Qualification Score–Scoped Rifle.
[brief] This is now the new cap.  And that gets filed appropriately. ” (4T16:9 to 17:2, 141:10 to 142:6 (“[T]hose documents would basically say, in layman’s terms, we took the old building, removed it, put a new building here.  This is the new cap. ”), 219:18 to 221:8; 6T47:24 to 48:4.)
[brief] Following testimony from [...] on behalf of an objecting party, [...] stated the following:  Mr. Chairman, I think it's even more straightforward than that.  The way we have always viewed this, and I think the way this application is presented, they're not saying they're putting in basement apartments.  They're saying they reserve the right to go to the zoning official and the building official and get a permit for downstairs apartments.  This Board is not approving this as -- you're not approving this as -- you're approving single family residences and if they want to go get a permit to put an apartment downstairs, they can get a permit for the apartment.
[brief] “[t]he continued presence and proliferation of these vacant, abandoned, and other problem properties in the communities of this State has a negative effect on the public health and welfare, reduces property values and municipal revenues, and impedes the economic development and revitalization of the State’s municipalities, particularly its older cities…”  [...] was concerned with the negative impact that the vacancy at the Property was having on its community.  As explained at the Borough Council meeting, “there’s a contaminated site that’s been there for a very long time, and there has been no remediation.
[brief] This fact alone, separate and apart from the terms of the orders, must be judicially taken as it is mandatory under N.J.R.E. 201(d).  While the State of Emergency may also relate to the wrangling or martialing of resources and agencies, this does not necessarily mean that the State of Emergency and its declaration as a matter of fact is rendered irrelevant in its entirety.  The fact of the matter is that the State of Emergency was declared from March 6, 2018 through the date of loss and for several days thereafter.  This is a neutral fact, not in dispute, and the court’s wholesale exclusion of any reference to the State of Emergency was clearly overbroad.  For these reasons, the lower court’s refusal to take judicial notice of the State of Emergency was a clear abuse of discretion.
[brief] And he [[...]] said ‘don’t worry.  The new owners have six years to pay us and we’ll pay you. ’”  See Da79 at 83:19-25.  (quotations added for clarity)  Ignoring the fact that no amount is mentioned in this conversation and subsequent to this conversation [...] did pay Plaintiff $10,000.00 in 2018, nowhere in the above interaction did [...] say that payment is contingent upon anything occurring.  At best, [...] mentioned that [...] would be receiving money from the new owners, but this is a far cry from satisfying the standards for equitable estoppel.  Regardless, as [...] highlighted in his opinion, even if [...]’s comment did rise to the level of equitable estoppel for statute of limitations purposes, it doesn’t save Plaintiff from his problem of allocation because 2010 and almost all of 2011 would remain barred by the six-year limitations period.
[brief] Defendant argues that the prosecutor improperly testified as to the plea agreement process during summation and directly contradicted the evidence by asserting that [...] did not leverage information about defendant for his own benefit.  (Db28 to 29; see 5T:76-25 to 79-3 and 109-11 to 111-1).  First, the prosecutor did not engage in misconduct because his comments on the plea agreement process were in direct response to defense counsel’s attack of [...]’s credibility.  (See 5T:77-3 to 79-3).  During summation, counsel referred to [...] as “not an honest person,” called his statement against defendant a “self-serving” method to “get . . . out of jail,” and further characterized his statement as a “tall tale. ” (Id.).  Defense counsel had previously implied on cross that because [...] received the minimum sentence for his unlawful possession of a handgun conviction despite having twelve prior criminal convictions, he only testified against defendant to secure a favorable plea deal for the unlawful possession charge.  (See generally 2T:125-10 to 132-20; Db27).  The State responded accordingly to “right to scale,” and made a reasonable inference from the plea agreement in evidence by stating that it did not require [...] to testify against defendant and that plea agreements are limited to the “four corners of the contract. ” (5T:109-16 to 110-4; see Engel, 249 N.J. Super. at 379).  Further, this remark did not unduly prejudice defendant where, at the conclusion of summation, the trial court reminded jurors that any comments by counsel were “not controlling” and that “summations . . . are not evidence and must not be treated as evidence. ” (5T:121-1 to 14).
[brief] Documents produced by [...] in response to Defendant [...] Subpoena . . . . . . . .  Da365 Order dated October 23, 2023  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Da4 Summary Judgment Motion, [...] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Da489 Exhibit “1” Plaintiff’s Verified Complaint . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Da495 Exhibit “2”  Certification of Counsel in Support of Verified Complaint . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Da506 Exhibit “3”  Certification of [...] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Da362  Exhibit “4”  Documents produced by [...] in response to Defendant [...] Subpoena . . . . . . . .
[brief] Pursuant to the NJ Supreme Court-upheld ‘site suitability’ regulations of the Council on Affordable Housing (“COAH”), I do find that the proposed location of the seven (7) off-site affordable units appears to be approvable, available, developable and suitable as those terms are defined.  . .  The site proposed for seven (7) multi-family affordable housing units also appears ‘suitable’ as the multi-family use will be adjacent to compatible land uses.  . .  The Borough has found that at least preliminarily, the site is not ‘approvable’ due to a previously adopted Redevelopment Plan and resulting Ordinance 1535-16 which requires commercial uses on the first floor of a mixed-use (commercial/residential) building.  As the Developer has proposed no commercial use on the first floor of the proposed multi-family residential structure, the Borough believes the Developer would first need Borough approval for a revision in the Redevelopment Plan  . . .  In my analysis of the site’s approvability, it’s important to note that COAH’s regulations state that a site may be ‘approvable’ for affordable housing although not currently zoned for low and moderate income housing.  356a.  The Special Master further offered the opinion to the Implementation Monitor that compliance with the ordinary approval process would interpose “impediments to the Developer’s off-site affordable housing production proposal” that may frustrate the ability to “move the proposal ahead in a timely, efficient way. ”  358a.  The Special Master concluded:  I am guided by the Court’s stated charge to assist in eliminating impediments to the Developer’s off-site affordable housing production proposal in a timely, efficient way to assist in the production of much needed affordable family rental housing in the Borough.  This is especially true in light of the fact that [...] approved [...]’s Housing Element and Fair Share Plan by Order dated January 25, 2019 and, more than three years later, there remain significant outstanding conditions of compliance for the Borough to address.  As discussed below, I would recommend that Your Honor provide the Developer with site-specific relief to permit the site to be developed solely as multi-family residential affordable housing without the requirement for first floor commercial uses.
[brief] On March 1, 2013, an Essex County Grand Jury returned [...] charging defendant [...]\(^1\) with the following offenses: first-degree conspiracy to commit murder, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2 and 2C:11-3a(1), (2) (count one); first-degree murder of [...], in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3a(1), (2) (count two); first-degree attempted murder of [...], in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:5-1 and 2C:11-3a(1), (2) (count three); first-degree attempted murder of [...], in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:5-1 and 2C:11-3a(1), (2) (count four); third-degree unlawful possession of a weapon, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5c (count five); and second-degree possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4a (count six).  (Da1-7). \(^2\)  Count four was later dismissed on the State’s motion before trial.  (3T44-3 to -8).  On January 24, 2014, the Honorable [...], J.S.C., denied the defendants’ joint pre-trial motion for a Wade\(^3\) hearing.  (2T24-5 to -9).  The --- \(^1\) Co-defendant [...] was charged in all counts of the indictment.  \(^2\)  Da – appendix to defendant’s brief.  Db – defendant’s brief.  The State adopts defendant’s transcript designation code.  (Db3 n.1).  \(^3\) United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967).  State agreed to sever defendant’s trial from Watford’s, who later pled guilty to count one.
[brief] There is no basis for abjuring that duty in the context of discovery.  If anything, the discovery posture should make it easier to apply relevancy standards, because a court has additional tools not always available in the trial context.  Most prominently, a court can appoint a special master to review documents and resolve disputes in the first instance.  Indeed, the trial court here had already invoked that mechanism, appointing a Special Discovery Master pursuant to Rule 4:41-1 “to hear and recommend resolution of all discovery disputed between the parties. ”  Da97.
[brief] (ECF 63-1, at 3.)  On May 15, [...] followed up on that supplement by asking [...] whether the supplemental response meant “there were no hits that are privileged, or there were hits for which [...] is claiming privilege. ”  (ECF 73-6, at 2.)  The next day, [...]’s counsel responded, “I intend to produce a privilege log.  I also intend to roll out the remainder of the production to this RFP, which resulted in thousands of documents. ”  (ECF 73-6, at 2.)  [...]’s productions, however, were riddled with problems—proper load files were not initially included, custodial metadata was missing, and email attachments were not associated with the parent emails.
[brief] On the Brief TABLE OF CONTENTS  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES  ........................................................................................................ iii  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT ......................................................................................................1  COUNTERSTATEMENT OF FACTS .........................................................................................4  I.  Oceanfront-Broadway Redevelopment Plan .................................................................4  II.  Amendment of the Oceanfront--Broadway Redevelopment Plan ........................................5  III.  290  Ocean Is Designated as Redeveloper .....................................................................11  IV.  The Redevelopment Agreement ....................................................................................11  PROCEDURAL HISTORY .......................................................................................................13  STANDARD OF REVIEW .......................................................................................................18
[brief] The level of the ceiling lights and the playback of digital content on the movie screen in Auditorium 5 operate in tandem by computer.  In reply to the plaintiff’s Request for Admissions, [...] admitted that the playback of commercial ads and movie trailers in Auditorium 5 was automatically controlled by the Theater Management System software used by [...] in the [...] theater in [...] on August 13, 2016.  [...] also admitted that the dimming of the ceiling lights in Auditorium 5 was automatically controlled by the Theater Management System software used by [...] in its movie theater complex in [...] on August 13, 2016.  [...] finally admitted that the brightness of the ceiling lights in Auditorium 5 for the playback of commercial ads and movie trailers in connection with the August 13, 2016, 8:00 p.m., showing of the movie “Star Trek: Beyond” was automatically controlled by the Theater Management System software used by [...] in its movie theater complex in [...] on August 13, 2016.
[brief] Order at 6.  (006a.)  This “restriction” occurs nowhere in the Board’s prior orders, was never once mentioned by Staff during the two years of discovery, and that the Project was designed to be grid-supply was never hidden, disguised, or otherwise not disclosed by Petitioner.  The Board knew the entire time that the [...] was grid supply, and yet never once let the developer know about this concern.  In fact, the Board notes, in a footnote, that “Although Lacey’s submission of a petition may be considered a formal expression of interest in the program, Staff notes that a registration would have been rejected due to the project being grid-supply.
[directive] In Directive, of this 3.2 Section with accordance in consulted general attorney deputy or prosecutor the whether consider shall 3.3.2, subsection to pursuant designated officer supervisory or a might acomplaint-warrant of issuance from automatically resulting detention mandatory otherwise prosecution, or with the cooperating or charge the pursuing from victim discourage a officer the offenses, sexual of nature repetitive the Given justice.  of interest the serve not would be would whether it consider may also general attorney deputy or prosecutor assistant and/or by charged is defendant if the recognition that in acomplaint-warrant for apply to appropriate prosecutor the release, pretrial on while crime new a commits thereafter and complaint-summons 30.  Cf. note release. revoke to 2A:162-24 N.J.S.A. to pursuant move cannot the reflecting acomplaint-summons), issuing of presumption a overcoming for standard general forth the consider shall still prosecutor or officer police
[brief] The purpose of the comparison is clear:  “So, again, bottom line in this instance, building height, in my opinion, can't be viewed as a proxy for more intense -- intensive use or development.  And I think that opinion is consistent with the Board’s prior findings that I shared on that 2019 Foxdale application as well. ” (5T 74:14-19).  The 2019 Foxdale resolution also confirmed [...]’ interpretation of the 1999 Master Plan and SM Zone.  The Foxdale applicant’s planner provided nearly identical testimony to [...]’ testimony in the current matter.  See Ja120-Ja121.
[directive] 1.  Technical assistance shall also be rendered to the County Offices of Victim-Witness Advocacy on the delivery of the above-stated services.  Office space for the County Office of Victim-Witness Advocacy shall be provided by the County Prosecutor's Office, as available and by each municipality at minimal or no cost.(23)  1.  Revised Homicide and Sudden Death Survivor Guidelines, April 18, 1986.
[brief] Next, Plaintiff argued that the trial judge erred because Plaintiff is allegedly excused from the Affidavit of Merit requirement, under N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-28, due to the alleged failure to supply medical records.  First, Plaintiff could not take advantage of the benefit of N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-28, because her counsel did not file the certification envisioned by N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-28 during the time set out in the statute for filing the Affidavit of Merit.  Plaintiff argues that the statute does not require that the certification under N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-28 must be filed within the time frame set out for providing an Affidavit of Merit, but [...] concluded that it must be timely filed.  That is in keeping with the language in N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-28 that the attorney certification is “in lieu of” the affidavit.  N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-28.  A sworn statement which is not filed under the same time requirements is not a replacement for the Affidavit of Merit.  This must be so, otherwise a party can sidestep the failure to file an Affidavit of Merit after the filing of a motion to dismiss by merely filing a N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-28 certification.  Since an affidavit filed after a motion to dismiss is filed cannot prevent the dismissal of the complaint, so, too, should a sworn statement filed be ineffective to preclude such a dismissal.  See, Ferreira, 178 N.J. at 154 (When plaintiff “serves the affidavit on defense counsel outside [the 120-day] time frame but before defense counsel files a motion to dismiss, the defendant shall not be permitted to file such a motion...
[brief] 6  In *Barnett Bank*, the defendant bank encouraged the plaintiff to place $90,000 with a bank client as a tax shelter, while failing to disclose either (1) that its client was check kiting, or (2) its account was overdrawn.  The bank then used the plaintiff’s deposit to “zero out” the fraudster’s account for the bank’s benefit.  In *Capital Bank*, the bank’s loan officer actively misrepresented facts to encourage the plaintiff to purchase equipment from a bank customer.  Once the plaintiff’s purchase monies were deposited, the bank used them to offset its customer’s debts to the bank.  See *Kensey*, 306 N.J. Super. at 555-56.  beliefs do not give rise to a fiduciary relationship (and [...] cites no authority suggesting otherwise).  (See PA008-009.)  See also, e.g., Argabright v. Rheem Mfg. Co., 201 F. Supp. 3d 578, 603 (D.N.J. 2016) (“The mere fact that Plaintiff trusted and relied on Defendant is insufficient to show a special relationship requiring a duty to disclose.” (citation and quotation marks omitted)).  Indeed, if a plaintiff’s subjective beliefs were sufficient, then every non-fiduciary relationship could be converted to a fiduciary one based solely on the plaintiff’s say-so.  That would not be fair or equitable, and it is not the law.
[brief] Because the right to represent oneself is of constitutional dimension, a violation of the right amounts to structural error.  Thomas, 362 N.J. Super. at 244.  In the words of the United States Supreme Court, “[t]he right is either respected or denied; its deprivation cannot be harmless. ”  McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 177 n.8 (1984).  Accordingly, [...]’s conviction must be reversed.
[brief] TABLE OF CONTENTS  STATEMENT OF FACTS/PROCEDURAL HISTORY  2  LEGAL ARGUMENT  3  POINT  I DESPITE THE RESPONDENT’S ASSERTIONS TO THE CONTRARY, [...] WAS NOT REMOVED FOR CHARGES OF MISCONDUCT RELATED TO HIS EMPLOYMENT (Aa61; Aa52-60; Rb6-11).  3  POINT II  ASSUMING [...] IS FOUND ELIGIBLE FOR DEFERRED RETIREMENT BENEFITS, HE IS UNDOUBTEDLY ENTITLED TO AN HONORABLE SERVICE ANALYSIS (Ab9; Ab16; Rb12-14).  7  CONCLUSION