ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] There is no evidence that [...] conveyed or assigned any development rights to this [...] prior to the 1947 Genesis Deed.  There is no evidence that [...] conveyed or assigned any development rights to this [...], LLC.  Finally, assuming arguendo that [...], LLC retains development rights, they are not prejudiced by the ruling which only pertains to the club.  If there is a developer in existence retaining rights, that developer would have had constructive notice of the litigation and could have sought intervention.  In addition, feasibility is an issue where the developers, [...], are deceased, leaving no assignment nor successorship.  “When this comprehensive joinder cannot be accomplished ... the case should be examined pragmatically, and a choice made between the alternatives of proceeding with the action in the absence of particular interested persons and dismissing the action. ”  See, Advisory Committee notes to Ct. R. 4-28-1.  The Advisory Comments to the Court Rule lend further guidance:  Even if the court is mistaken in its decision to proceed in the absence of an interested person, it does not by that token deprive itself of the power to adjudicate as between the parties already before it through proper service of process.  But the court can make a legally binding adjudication only between the parties actually joined in the action.  See, Advisory Committee comments to Court Rule 4:28-1.  The Court below already considered the matter and did precisely what the Advisory Committee recommended by properly adjudicating the matter as between Plaintiffs and the Defendant, [...], as the offending actor.
[brief] 1.  **[...]’s terms are not substantively unconscionable. **  Plaintiffs do not meaningfully contend that [...]’s terms are substantively unconscionable.  Plaintiffs note that substantive unconscionability “pertains to the fairness of the contract terms themselves,” (Pb6), but they do not argue that [...]’s terms are “so one-sided as to shock the court’s conscience,” *D.M.C. v. K.H.G.*, 471 N.J. Super. 10, 27–28 (App. Div. 2022) (quoting *Est. of Cohen ex rel. Perelman v. Booth Comput.*, 421 N.J. Super. 10, 27–28 (App. Div. 2011)).  Nor could they.  Substantive unconscionability “generally involves harsh or unfair one-sided terms. ”  *Muhammad v. Cnty. Bank of Rehoboth Beach*, 189 N.J. 1, 15 (2006).  The Arbitration Agreement in [...]’s terms is mutual; both Plaintiffs and [...] agree to arbitrate claims within the scope of the Arbitration Agreement and to waive their jury trial rights with respect to those claims subject to arbitration.  See (Pa063) (“You acknowledge and agree that you and [...] are each waiving the right to a trial by jury” (emphasis added)).  Moreover, Plaintiffs have not identified anything “harsh or unfair” about the Arbitration Agreement in [...]’s terms, and New Jersey’s public policy favors arbitration.  See, e.g., Atalese v. U.S. Legal Servs. Grp., L.P., 219 N.J. 430, 311–312 (2014) (“The FAA and the nearly identical New Jersey Arbitration Act enunciate federal and state policies favoring arbitration. ” (emphasis added) (citations omitted)); Hojnowski, 187 N.J. at 342 (“[A]rbitration … is a favored means of dispute resolution. ”).  Plaintiffs have not shown that [...]’s terms are substantively unconscionable.
[brief] The Court’s February 3, 2023, denial was based on events that occurred before the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law by the District Court for the District of Massachusetts.  The Pisano Opinion of April 30, 2014, declined to address either [...]’s or [...]’s Findings of Facts.  (Pa263).  As of January 11, 2006, two officers of the court conspired to seize a highly protected government document through a fraud upon the court including a false police report and a false statement to the FBI, a federal offense pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 1001.
[brief] [...]’s virtual office at [...] WAS CLOSED at the end of April 2014.  In February of 2015, the Plaintiff uses that address to file the Complaint (Pa8-12) and to issue the Summons (Pa13).  And then, the Process Server uses that address to serve the defendant, falsely claiming that he: “Left a copy with a person authorized to accept service. ”  Fact One (1), it WAS NOT served on an officer of the business defendant, [...] Systems, Inc.  Fact Two (2), it WAS NOT served on an authorized agent of the business defendant.  Fact Three (3), the Plaintiff’s Request to Enter Default and Proof of Mailing at the end of March of 2015 (Pa16) was sent certified mail to [...] 08540 that NO LONGER EXISTED.  Four (4), the Plaintiff’s Request for Final Judgment by Default and Proof of Mailing at the end of April of 2015 (Pa17) was also sent certified mail to [...] 08540 to an office that NO LONGER EXISTED, where an attempt by USPS to deliver certified mail to that business address in March of 2015 and again in April of 2015, to a virtual office that was closed since April 2014, WERE NOT accepted by [...].  And Fact Five (5), The business defendant, [...] Systems Inc., Affidavit of Service (Pa6) **CONFLICTED** with the Affidavit of Service (Pa7) of the individual defendant, [...], because they were certified to be served by the Same Process Server, on the Same Day, February 13, 2015 and at the Same Time, 2:15 p.m. at addresses physically miles and minutes apart.
[brief] Appellant has failed to demonstrate any causation on the part of the Borough for any alleged physical damage to the residence.  The Engineering Evaluation relied upon by Appellant fails to meet the criteria set forth by R. 4:17-4(e) as it fails to draw any causal relationship between Respondent’s construction activities and alleged damage to Appellant’s residence; only attempting to call into question the conclusions reached by Respondent’s inspection reports without providing any conclusions or opinions of its own.  As the New Jersey Supreme Court has held, the court’s function is to distinguish scientifically sound reasoning from that of the self- validating expert, who uses scientific terminology to present unsubstantiated personal beliefs.  *Landrigan v. Celotex Corp.*, 127 N.J. 404, 414 (1992).  The Supreme Court states, “those factual determinations [of the trial court] are amply supported by substantial credible evidence in the record. ”  *Rohrer*, supra at 464.  Appellant produced no such credible evidence that any physical damage to the residence was caused by vibrations from the construction activities near the residence.
[brief] *Bullcoming v. New Mexico*, 564 U.S. 647, 652 (2011).  Throughout the trial, forensic experts violated these rules by giving opinions that were scientifically unreliable, beyond the scope of their expertise, or consisted of testimonial hearsay.  These errors inappropriately strengthened the State’s evidence that [...] was the killer, putting a thumb on the scale in the State’s favor in a case with no direct evidence of guilt: no eyewitnesses, no surveillance of the act, and no confession directly from [...] herself.  The State used the unreliable forensic testimony to great effect, claiming that each of the four forensic experts presented the core of the State’s case against [...].  Stripped down to only scientifically supportable claims within the experts’ actual expertise, the evidence of guilt is significantly weaker.  The inappropriate and seemingly scientific testimony violated our rules of evidence, case law, and deprived [...] of her rights to due process and to a fair trial.  *U.S. Const.* amend. XIV, *N.J. Const.* art. I, ¶¶ 1, 9, and 10.  [...]’s convictions must be reversed.
[brief] On May 30, 2021, defendant [...] was arrested in [...] and charged with Driving While Intoxicated ("DWI"), in violation of N.J.S.A. 39:4-50; Failure to Maintain Lane, in violation of N.J.S.A. 39:4-88; and Reckless Driving, in violation of N.J.S.A. 39:4-96.
[brief] Putting aside the question of what is the “application for development,” the trial court found the Board’s two determinations of incompleteness “destroyed” any claim that the TOA Rule insulated [...] from the change wrought by the Ordinance.  [3T at 19-18 to 20-8].  This is because the application checklist for conditional use applications like the one [...] required, many documents that the CRB application does not require, in addition to lacking much of the information that the Land Use Application Form also requires.  [Compare Pa35-36 with Pa52-60].  In particular, [...]’ untimely April 29, 2022 filing failed to include several “documents required by the checklist”, namely, Checklist Item 3 (Certification of Taxes Paid), Checklist Item 5 (Contribution Disclosure Statements from applicant and professionals), and Checklist Item 10 (Floodplain administrator review letter).  [Pa25].  [...]’ Certification of Taxes Paid is dated May 10, 2022.  [Pa38].  Its principal signed, and had his own Contribution Disclosure Statement notarized on May 10, 2022, while its professionals’ disclosure forms bear the dates of June 9, 2022 ([...]), June 10, 2022 ([...]), and June 16, 2022 ([...]).  [Da407, 415, 417, 419].  [...] submitted the Floodplain administrator’s review letter on or after May 19, 2022.  [Da403].  The application was complete on June 16, 2022, which is why the Board deemed it complete on July 7, 2022.
[brief] (1T88-14 to 20).  At 24:21 on the video, depicting the interior of the grocery store, defendant enters the frame and walks behind a customer.  As he does so, he turns to his right, exhibiting his profile to the camera.  A tattoo of red lips can be seen on the right side of defendant’s neck, below his ear.  At 13:05, in the first camera angle, which depicts the entrance to the grocery store from outside, [...] enters the frame, opens the door to the store, and goes inside.  At 13:30, [...] leaves the store, followed seconds later by defendant.  [...]’s leaving the store followed by defendant is depicted in the third camera angle, beginning at 54:43, when [...] enters the frame.  The two men begin arguing.  As they do so, defendant has his right hand inside the right pocket of his shorts.  At 54:58, defendant removes a black handgun from his right pocket and points it at [...] before returning the gun to his pocket.  After another male tries to separate defendant and [...], [...] moves out of view as he and defendant continue arguing.  At 55:22 defendant appears to sustain a blow, the force of which causes him to fall back, out of camera view.  A second later, at 55:23, [...] hurriedly re-enters the frame, hunched over and holding the left side of his face with his left hand.  He walks into the street and around a Range Rover parked at the curb, removing his baseball cap and tossing it over the hood of the vehicle.  At 55:45, [...] picks up his baseball cap from the sidewalk and walks down the sidewalk, accompanied by another male.  That male and [...] enter the frame of the first camera angle, depicting the entrance to the grocery store from outside, at 14:34.  [...] and the male walk toward a silver-colored sedan parked at the curb, where [...] enters the front passenger seat.  Another male leaves the grocery store, enters the driver seat of the silver-colored sedan, makes a K-turn, and drives away at a high rate of speed.  Police later found [...] at the hospital, where he was treated for a gunshot wound to his face.  (2T26-25 to 28-8).
[brief] Klein by Klein v. Caterpillar, Inc., 2023 WL 4760707, at *5 (E.D. Mich. July 26, 2023); The Kentucky Supreme Court reached the same conclusion, rejecting liability “by judicial fiat” for alleged failure to recall products in *Ostendorf v. Clark Equipment Co.*, 122 S.W.3d 530, 534 (Ky. 2003).  Product recalls “are properly the province of administrative agencies, as the federal statutes that expressly delegate recall authority to various agencies suggest,” and courts should not “arrogate to themselves a power equivalent to that of requiring product recall. ”  *Id.*  As Congress has recognized, administrative agencies have the institutional resources to make fully informed assessments of the marginal benefits of recalling a specific product.  *Id.* at 434-35 (citation and quotation marks omitted).  The Kansas Supreme Court agreed:  [P]roduct recalls are properly the business of administrative agencies as suggested by the federal statutes that expressly delegate recall authority....  The decision to expand a manufacturer’s post sale duty beyond implementing reasonable efforts to warn ... should be left to administrative agencies and the legislature.  These institutions are better able to weigh the benefits and costs involved in locating, recalling, and retrofitting products.  *Patton v. Hutchinson Wil-Rich Manufacturing Co.*, 861 P.2d 1299, 1315-16 (Kan. 1993) (citations omitted).  Accord  *Loredo v. Solvay America, Inc.*, 212 P.3d 614, 632 (Wyo. 2009) (quoting and following *Ostendorf*); __________________________
[brief] ”  Id. B: Post-Judgment Motion for Reconsideration  The Appellate Division reviews motions for reconsideration under the abuse of discretion standard.  Fusco v. Board of Educ. Of City of Newark, 349 N.J. Super. 455, 462 (App. Div. 2002).  Motions for reconsideration are granted only under very narrow circumstances.
[brief] (5T 106-23 to 114-18; 8T 64-18 to 79-16, 118-22 to 126-9)  In addition, because [...] unambiguously invoked his right to counsel partway through the Mirandized statement, the court suppressed everything that followed the invocation.  (5T 54-20 to 63-8)  \(^5\)  Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).  that statement.  The improper admission of one or both of these statements was harmful error because the State exploited inconsistencies in the statements to undermine [...]’s version of events and because the jury repeatedly heard about [...] invocation of his right to counsel.  [...]’s conviction must be reversed.
[brief] Judges must avoid actual conflicts of interest as well as the appearance of impropriety in order "to promote confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the Judiciary."  DeNike v. Cupo, 196 N.J. 502, 507 (2008) (Pa 365-380).  Rule 4:3-2 (Pa 187-191) provides venue "shall be laid in the county in which the cause of action arose, or in which any party to the action resides at the time of its commencement, or in which the summons was served on a nonresident defendant."  Rule 4:3-3(a)(2) (Pa 187-191) states the Assignment Judge may order a change of venue "if there is a substantial doubt that a fair and impartial trial can be had in the county where venue is laid."  Thus, based on the foregoing reasons and facts one (1) through thirty (30), the court should reverse because the chancery division venue defects constituted trial error which requires vacatur of the chancery division order filed in the law division docket.
[brief] While the Court determined in its March 1, 2024 Order, “The Department of Public Works does not do sidewalk repair. ” (Pa13-20), this testimony resulted in the court moving directly to whether defendant [...] had actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition.  The Court in its Order failed to appreciate that this was not an ordinary sidewalk repair but a sidewalk repair that involved tree root.  In these circumstances, “Okay.  No.  If the sidewalk - if it was an issue, the homeowner or the company or whatever, if they wanted to do the sidewalk, they would have to get a permit from the engineer.  Then after, then they would contact DPW to go check it out, check out the roots or anything like that.  And then either we take down the tree or they can work around the roots.  We might shave it down a little bit, maybe an inch or so.  But besides that, they have to call the DPW if there's a tree in front of it. ”  Pa172-193, Tr 36:3-13  While the Court correctly asserted that the Department of Public Works does not handle mere sidewalk repairs, [...] established the fact that when a sidewalk repair involved a tree root, the Department of Public Works is involved.  (Pa172-193, Tr 22:2-3).  The Courts decision was made based upon a palpably incorrect basis, focusing solely on it being a sidewalk repair but ignoring the impact of the tree root on the situation resulted in the Court incorrectly deciding to deny plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration.  The Department of Public works will either issue permits needed to work on the tree or determine if the work can be done around the tree root or even shave the tree roots themselves.  The question remains as to whether the defendant [...] caused and created the dangerous condition of the shaved tree root, as opposed to just having notice, which ultimately resulted in the tree falling upon plaintiff’s car resulting in his catastrophic injuries.  As such, plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration should have been granted, and the Court erred in denying it.
[directive] Street Address  Birth Date Name: Last, First, M.I. Rank Town, State ZIP Arrest: Date & Time Badge #  Violation(s)  Charged: [ ]  N.J.S.A. 39:4-50(a), DWI (Check appropriate boxes)  [ ]  N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.2, Refusal to submit to chemical breath testing  You have been summoned by, or on behalf of, the person whose name appears above as “defendant,” to transport or accompany the defendant from this law enforcement agency.
[brief] 15.  Prior to the ZBA’s November 19, 2018 adoption of the ZBA Resolution and immediately following the October 15, 2018 hearing on Defendant’s Application, Defendant contacted the [...] and applied for a fence permit.  (Da649-653)  Upon receipt of Defendant’s request for a fence permit, Plaintiff notified Defendant that should it attempt to erect any barrier interfering with the [...]’s easement rights and in violation of the 2017 Judgment, it would file an emergent application for relief.  (Da654)  The Township attorney authorized the Township to grant Defendant its fence permit, “with the understanding that any building is at risk. ”  (Da653)  Undeterred, Defendant proceeded with its efforts to install a fence across the Sixth Street Lot in direct contravention of the 2017 Judgment.  (Da645-659)  Then, on October 19, 2018, Plaintiff filed a third OTSC with the Trial Court seeking injunctive and monetary relief resulting from Defendant’s violations of the 2017 Judgment (“Third OTSC”).
[brief] Table of Judgments, Orders and Rulings  Order Dated 9/14/22  Granting Defendants’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and Dismissing Plaintiff, [...]’s, Complaint….Pa214  [...]’s Opinion Set Forth in Transcript of 9/13/22  Granting Defendants’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and Dismissing Plaintiff, [...]’s, Complaint……………………………………………………………..T001  #  Table of Authorities  ##  Cases  Baen v. Farmers Mut. Fire Ins. Co. of Salem Cty., 318 N.J. Super. 260 (App. Div. 1999)  .........................................................................................................................9  Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520 (1995)  .............................................8  G.A.H. v. K.G.G., 238 N.J. 401 (2019).  ..............................................................................13  Hernandez v. Velez, 267 N.J. Super. 353 (Law Div. 1993) ..............................................10  Hoppe v. Ranzini, 158 N.J. Super. 158 (App. Div. 1978) ..................................................20  Judson v. Peoples Bank & Trust Co., 17 N.J. 67 (1954)  ....................................................8  Petrillo v. Bachenberg, 139 N.J. 472 (1995) .......................................................................11 room v. Perel, 377 N.J. Super. 298 (App. Div. 2005)  .......................................................10  ## Rules R. 4:46-2..................................................................................................................................8  Rule 4:50-1(f)..........................................................................................................................5  Rule 4:85-1...............................................................................................................................5  ## Treatises Section 73, *Restatement (Third) of the Law  Governing Lawyers*  .........................13  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT  This matter comes before the Court on appeal from an improper grant of summary judgment in favor of the Defendants/Respondents, [...] and [...], dismissing the Appellant’s Complaint.
[brief] Ibid.  [...] later revealed that defendant had called him after killing [...], to “let him know” that defendant shot [...].  (25T:154-10 to 157-1).  This changed the narrative in a significant way.  Defendant was no longer an unarmed victim, accosted by [...] in his own home.  Defendant admitted on wiretapped calls that he had the gun and lied to police about that fact as well.  (23T:71-16 to 72-1).  Instead, defendant had been the one to fatally shoot an unarmed visitor.  When police searched the [...], nothing belonging to [...] was found on the premises, in either the carriage house or the main residence.
[brief] As to the supposed “fraud, corruption, and wrongdoing” standard, while [...] cites Tretina Printing, Inc. v. Fitzpatrick & Assocs., Inc., 135 N.J. 349 (1994) repeatedly for this proposition,\(^1\) a closer look at this 1994 case along with the applicable statute at the time, reaffirms that “fraud, corruption, or any \(^1\)  Notably, while the Trial Court cited Tretina and Perini, it was in the context of describing [...]’s arguments.  Da10, Da24-25.  The Trial Court did not otherwise discuss Tretina or Perini anywhere in its opinion.  wrongdoing” is but one of several reasons a Court may vacate an arbitration award.
[brief] The court’s findings in support of that consecutive sentence were limited to a comment that “[t]he elements of this offense are separate and distinct from the charges of kidnapping.  The defendant possessed the weapon and did not have a permit for it, and there can be no free crimes. ”  . . .  On remand, the court should reconsider its determination that defendant’s sentence for unlawful possession of a weapon in that incident should be consecutive to his sentences for other crimes committed on the same date.
[brief] The 2018 application was for “[...], Block 120, Lot 2.01, application for final site plan approval for construction of 3 Phases of a mixed use development”.  (See Transcript attached to Certification of [...], Esq., Exhibit “A” p.4)  Notably, Lot 2.01 is immediately adjacent to what has been described on the maps as “Riverfront Boulevard” which also notably serves as the driveway access to Lot 1.01.  (The church lot)  This is the same driveway and easement access and egress for Lot 1.01 referred to in Plaintiff’s brief as a “driveway” for the church.  Plaintiff has clearly indicated that they do not own this parcel.  Mr. [...], Esq., was the attorney for the Applicant, [...]., during the 2018 application before the planning board.
[brief] They have mischaracterized the deposition testimonies of Plaintiff’s experts, [...], M.D. (“[...]”) and [...], M.D. (“[...]”).  This is consistent with the proceedings below.  The New Motion Judge, who had never handled any aspect of this case before, accepted these mischaracterizations, many of which found their way into the decisions of July 21, 2023 and September 29, 2023.
[brief] On November 2, 2023, Plaintiffs filed a Notice of Appeal seeking review of the Court’s September 26, 2023 Order denying Plaintiffs’ Order to Show Cause application to dismiss the Arbitration and the October 24, 2023 Order denying Plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration.  (DA1058).  In conjunction with the same, on November 8, 2023, Plaintiffs filed a Motion to Stay the Arbitration pending appeal.  (DA1066).  On November 22, 2023, Defendants cross-moved to Stay the Trial Court Docket pending resolution of Plaintiffs’ appeal.  (DA1115).  The trial court issued an Order granting the stay on January 4, 2024.  (DA1069).  Also, on January 11, 2024, the Appellate Division dismissed Plaintiffs’ Appeal.