ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Expert testimony was not required to support the client’s cause of action against an attorney who: 1) inadequately prepared the client’s case by failing to submit a legal argument in the trial brief in support of the client’s claim for tenure in an employment action; 2) failed to report to the client settlement discussions accurately and recommend disposition of the case based on an accurate rendition of each party’s position; and 3) failed to tell the client that the adverse parties had no defense to one of her claims thereby affecting her decision to accept their settlement offer.  See Sommers v. McKinney, 287 N.J.Super. 1, 8-12, 670 A.2d 99 (App.Div.1996).  Expert testimony was not required to support the client’s cause of action against an attorney for the attorney’s failure to protect the client’s claim against the running of the statute of limitations by not conducting any investigation into when the statute of limitations began to run.  See Brizak v. Needle, 239 N.J.Super. 415, 431-32, 571 A.2d 975 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 122 N.J. 164, 584 A.2d 230 (1990).  Expert testimony was not required to support the seller’s cause of action against their attorney where the attorney sacrificed client’s creditor priority by failing to ensure that a bond and mortgage were properly recorded.  See Stewart v. Sbarro, 142 N.J.Super. 581, 591-92 (App.Div.) certif. denied 72 N.J. 459, 371 A.2d 63 (1976).  No affidavit of merit was required where application for a trial de novo from an adverse arbitration decision was not timely filed.  See Popwell v. [...], 363 N.J.Super. 404, 410, 833 A.2d 102 (Law Div.2002).  Finally, in [...] v. Ezekwo, 345 N.J. Super. 1, 13, 783 A.2d 246, 253 (App. Div. 2001) the Court stated that:
[brief] STATEMENT OF AGENCY DECISIONS APPEALED FROM.................................................4  INTRODUCTION..............................................................................................................................5  STATEMENT OF FACTS & PROCEDURAL HISTORY.........................................................8  LEGAL ARGUMENT: POINT I: THE BOARD FAILED TO FOLLOW THE LEGAL STANDARD FOR APPEAL OF AN AGENCY DECISION..................................................20 (Raised below at Pa74, Pa124-130, Pa137-145)  POINT II: THE BOARD’S REFUSAL TO ALLOW [...] TO APPLY FOR ACCIDENTAL PERMANENT DISABILITY WAS ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS AND WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE FACTUAL RECORD........................................................................................................25 (Raised below at Pa1-151)  CONCLUSION.............................................................................................................................38
[brief] [...] relies on the legal argument from his initial brief and adds the following. (Db 11 to 39)  REPLY POINT I³  THE SUPREME COURT DID NOT ANNOUNCE A NEW RULE IN FAIR, BUT IF IT DID, PIPELINE RETROACTIVITY IS REQUIRED, AND CONSTITUTIONALLY DEFICIENT JURY INSTRUCTIONS ON THE ELEMENTS OF AN OFFENSE ARE REVERSIBLE ERROR.  In Point I of his plenary brief, [...] explained that his terroristic threats convictions must be reversed because the jury was never instructed on the objective element of a true threat: that a reasonable person similarly situated to the victim would have interpreted the words as threatening violence.  The State responds that the Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Fair announced a new rule that should not be enforced retroactively.  256 N.J. at 239.  (Pb 9-13)  In addition, the State argues that any deficiency in the jury instructions was harmless error.  (Pb 13-16)  These arguments are fundamentally flawed.
[brief] The State still has failed to provide this Court with an explanation (valid or otherwise) as to what exactly constitutes an “unnecessary” or “cruel” “beat[ing]” “of a living animal or creature” as opposed to a perfectly legal and socially acceptable “necessary” or “un – cruel” “beat[ing]” of a “living animal or creature” for the purposes of N.J.S.A. 4:22 – 17(c)(1).  The State was also silent on whether the statute criminalizes “necessary” but “cruel” “beat[ings]” “of a living animal or creature. ”
[brief] To the contrary, the United States Supreme Court has noted that due process rights of persons serving time behind bars are different from those of free persons or persons merely charged with a crime.  *Wolff v. McDonnell*, 418 U.S. 539, 555-56 (1974).  Our own State Supreme Court has recognized that in New Jersey, "the administrative rules and regulations that govern the fulfillment of due-process rights for the prisoners are balanced against the needs and objectives of the prison."  *McDonald v. Pinchak*, 652 A.2d 700 (N.J. 1995) (citing *Avant v. Clifford*, 341 A.2d 629 (N.J. 1975)).  Under the Fourteenth Amendment, constitutional rights are abridged to the extent necessary to accommodate the institutional needs and objectives of prisons.  *Id.* In short, the Plaintiff has not set forth any cause of action that is not barred by the Tort Claims Act, because she has not alleged how she was harmed by not being allowed to file a grievance, being denied the right to call her attorney's cell phone (noting that she was offered the chance to call his office), or that witness statements were used against her, or that any of these actions were ministerial in nature.  These are conclusory statements without any factual support whatsoever.  As such, the Court must affirm the dismissal the Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint as a matter of law.
[directive] A.  Whenever an act of domestic violence as defined in 2C:25-19 N.J.S.A. has been alleged to have been committed by a state law enforcement officer all weapons, department issued and personal, possessed by that officer shall immediately be 1.  Seized by the law enforcement officer responding to the domestic violence call if the responding officer reasonably believes that the presence of weapons would expose the victim to a risk of serious bodily injury, or 2.  Surrendered by the officer involved when served with a domestic violence restraining order, search warrant or bail condition which requires the surrender of weapons.  B.  Whenever an act of domestic violence as defined in 2C:25-19 N.J.S.A. has been alleged to have been committed by a state law enforcement officer resulting in the seizure of the officer’s weapons, or the officer has been served with a domestic violence restraining order or a domestic violence warrant for the seizure of weapons or there is a bail condition which requires the surrender of weapons, the officer must:  1.  Immediately report that fact to the state officer’s departmental supervisor who must promptly notify the Prosecutor’s Office in the county where the officer is employed and also notify the Division of Criminal Justice, Prosecutors and Police Bureau;  2.  Voluntarily surrender all weapons to the law enforcement officer responding to the domestic violence call or in response to a requirement in a domestic violence restraining order or a domestic violence warrant for the seizure of weapons or in a bail condition.  C.  Where weapons have been seized from a state law enforcement officer, a report shall immediately be made to the arresting officer’s departmental supervisor who must notify the Division of Criminal Justice, Prosecutors and Police Bureau.  2 (9/00)  Seizure of Weapons from State Law Enforcement Officers  III.  CUSTODY AND CONTROL OF SEIZED OR SURRENDERED WEAPONS
[brief] In the 2019-2020 contract, the Board was required to pay [...] for actually performing work.  [...]’s Counterclaim does not point to any contractual provision in the 2019-2020 or 2020-2021 contract that required the Board to pay [...] for not working – that, of course, would be an illegal no-show contract.  --- 43 Goldfarb v. Solimine, 245 N.J. 326, 338 (2021)  [...]’s Counterclaim admits that [...]’s executive orders caused the school closures and stay at home orders.  Without any work performed, [...]’s Counterclaim does not cite to any contractual language where the Board was required to pay [...] for not working.  Thus, the Counterclaim does not establish that the Board “did not do what the contract required them to do”, meaning that [...]’s Counterclaim fails to establish the third element of a breach of contract claim.
[brief] He concluded that the applicant in this case, complied with all of the requirements of § 18-902(e) which was confirmed by the boards professionals.  (T2: p128-130)  The Board then asked if the applicant would agree to a deed restriction against basement apartments.  [...] again indicated that he would not.  The Board then asked its engineer about the waiver for non-radial lot lines.  [...] indicated that the non- radial lines were preferred in this instance.  A Board Member then inquired further, asking if they had any “leverage” to deny that.  (T2: p136, ln 13)  The Board then deliberated and made a motion to deny the application based upon the increase of offsite traffic and potential offsite parking problems.  (T2: p 144, ln 9)  On July 11, 2022, Plaintiff transmitted a letter to the Board seeking reconsideration of the vote.
[brief] Defendant/Respondent, [...] hereby adopts, relies upon and incorporates herein, as if set forth at length Defendant/Respondent, [...]’s procedural history.  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY EXERCISED ITS DISCRETION IN ADMITTING TESTIMONY OF THE INVESTIGATING OFFICERS FOR THE PURPOSE OF IMPEACHING THE CREDIBILITY OF PLAINTIFF’S EXPERT, [...]
[directive] This order continues the commitment under N.J.S.A. 2C:4-6 for a defendant who is not of competent and continues to be dangerous a result mental illness after the three as (3) month review form Order #3.  This order continues hospitalization for the defendant for in six (6) months.  This order further requires the court to hold a hearing pursuant N.J.S.A. to 2C:4-6c and make a determination as to whether to hold the charges abeyance.  The in charges may be dismissed only if the court finds that "continuing the criminal prosecution under the particular circumstances of the case would constitute a constitutionally significant injury to the defendant attributable to undue delay being brought trial."  Ibid. in  This order extends the time of commitment to no more than six months.  As form (6) in Order #3, clinical staff must provide the court with a report regarding the competency of the defendant and whether or not the defendant continues to be dangerous as a result of of mental illness.  the case a defendant who remains incompetent, the clinician to In is provide opinion as to whether the defendant likely to regain competency the an is in foreseeable future.  At any time before the six (6) month period has expired, the treating clinician to inform the court if the defendant becomes competent and/or is longer a no is danger to self, others, or property as a result of mental illness.  --------------
[brief] Appellant incorrectly asserts that qualified immunity is not applicable to claims brought under the LAD.  (See Pb35).  The cases cited by Appellant do not support her assertion.  In Brown v. City of Bordentown, 348 N.J. Super. 143 (App. Div. 2002), the court held that “legislative immunity ‘has long been recognized in Anglo-American law’ and has ‘a venerable tradition.
[brief] Plaintiff Has No Expert Proof of Manufacturing Defect.  [ISSUE WAS RAISED (Da0785; Da0816; Da0846)] ............  25  2.  Plaintiff Cannot Backfill Her Lack of Expert Proof on Manufacturing Defect with Circumstantial Evidence.  [ISSUE WAS RAISED (Da0785; Da0816; Da0846)]  .............  27  a.  Ozurdex® Is a Complex Product, Requiring Expert Testimony to Prove a Defect.  [ISSUE WAS RAISED (Da0785; Da0816; Da0846)] ..................................................  27  b.  Plaintiff Lacks Evidence Negating the Likely Causes of Her Injuries Other Than a Manufacturing Defect.  [ISSUE WAS RAISED (Da0785; Da0816; Da0846)] .................. 29  3.  Plaintiff’s Experts Fail to Offer Independent—Much Less, Reliable—Opinions that the Ozurdex® Unit at Issue Had a Defect.  [ISSUE WAS RAISED (Da0785; Da0816; Da0846)]  .................................................................  30  IV.  DENYING SUMMARY  JUDGMENT WAS A MISCARRIAGE OF JUSTICE BECAUSE PLAINTIFF’S EXPERTS FAILED TO OFFER ANY GENERAL-CAUSATION OPINIONS AND THEIR SPECIFIC-CAUSATION OPINIONS ARE INADMISSIBLE “NET OPINIONS.
[brief] ”  Sussex Commons Assocs., LLC v. Rutgers, 210 N.J. 531, 540-41 (2012) (citing Allen v. V & A Bros., Inc., 208 N.J. 114, 127 (2011)).  “[T]he best indicator of that intent is the statutory language[.]”  Richardson, 192 N.J. at 195 (first alteration in original) (quoting DiProspero v. Penn, 183 N.J. 477, 492 (2005)).  “A court should ‘asccribe to the statutory words their ordinary meaning and significance, and read them in context with related provisions so as to give sense to the legislation as a whole. ’”  D’Ambrosio v. Dep’t of Health & Senior Servs., 403 N.J. Super. 321, 334 (App. Div. 2008) (citing DiProspero, 183 N.J. at 492).  Here, the Legislature clearly intended a limitation period of eligibility for the presumption or recalculation provided under the Ricci Act, as the plain language of the statute sets a two-year deadline ending July 8, 2021, after which a “retiree shall not be eligible” for such benefits.  N.J.S.A. 53:5A-10(e)(4).  Under [...]’s argument, any member of [...] who was unaware of the Ricci Act could apply at any arbitrarily distant point in the future.  This would nullify the two-year time limitation created by the Legislature, extend the presumption beyond its intended time frame, and diminish the ability of the Division and the Board to verify applicants’ dates and locations of service as witnesses and memories inevitably continue to become unavailable and fade.  Ignoring the plain language of the statute, which imposes a two-year deadline, would not further the Act’s legislative purpose.  Even if the statutory language were not clear, [...]’s position would lead to an absurd result which would render the two-year statutory limitation superfluous.  In this regard, “[w]hen construing a statute, ‘legislative language must not, if reasonably avoidable, be found to be inoperative, superfluous or meaningless. ’” State v. Regis, 208 N.J. 439, 449 (2011) (quoting Franklin Tower One, LLC v. N.M., 157 N.J. 602, 613 (1999).  Accordingly, the Board reasonably denied [...]’s request to apply for amended benefits under the Ricci Act because he failed to file his Eligibility Registration Form within the required statutory timeframe.
[brief] Further, between FY2010 and FY2018, in part because of tax levy caps, [...] radically under-taxed compared to its LFS.  (Aa10-11; Aa1110-12; Aa1459-60; Aa1873).  Due in large part to its continued receipt of adjustment aid, [...] received more aid than it would have received under the SFRA formula.  Specifically, from FY2009 through FY2016, [...] received aid well over 30% more than its SFRA calculated aid.  (Aa1106-08; Aa1458-59; Aa1872).  And from FY2017 to FY2022, that percentage steadily increased to over 100%. (Aa1108-09; Aa1458-59; Aa1872).
[brief] NEITHER CONICELLO NOR LAMBRECHT RETALIATED AGAINST KARNUK  There is no basis, and [...] has not articulated any to this Court, on which to hold [...] or [...] personally liable for her termination.  [...] convened a termination panel, as noted above, that concluded [...] should be terminated.  This particular terminal panel included [...], [...], in-house counsel, and the assistant-Vice Present of Human Resources.  Critically, no singular termination panel member has final, decision-making power, including [...].  [...]’s function was limited to consulting on underlying facts.  [...] testified that she knew she had to escalate the charge pay issue to Human Resources once she learned that [...] was entering the charge pay without authorization.  [...] “had to support the decision that was made” by the panel to terminate [...]’s employment.  (Pa369 at 109:12-110:10).  [...], meanwhile, merely acted as an arm of the Human Resources department.  [...] only investigates an employee when a manager contacts Human Resources.  She has no final, decision-making power.  [...] interviewed each and every staffing coordinator in connection with the allegations that [...] had stolen [...] time and money, and she participated in the termination panel that ultimately decided to terminate his employment—not as the decision maker, but as a Human Resources representative.  Finally, [...]’s brief is clear: [...]’s conduct was never the basis for her retaliation claims.  The trial court recognized the importance of the termination panel.  (See 1T 31:12-18) (“But in any event, she’s not the terminator anyway.  These people were brought up in front of – these three plaintiffs were brought up in front of the termination panel. ”).  On this record, there is no basis upon which either [...] or [...] can held to have personally retaliated against [...].  **CONCLUSION**
[brief] With regard to Appellant’s Point Three and Four of their Brief, it is best to be reminded of the Zoning Board hearing.  As Zoning Board Planner [...] so eloquently stated, Appellant essentially improperly installed historically inappropriate pavers in the Historic Open Flare of a District which is a key designation for [...]’s place on the National Historic Register on a lot he did not own or lease, without Landlord consent; installed additional walkways where only one is permitted in contravention of the ordinance, without proper municipal approvals, without obtaining an approved zoning permit and without HPC approval for appropriate materials despite being a 4th generation owner in [...] and having dealt with the HPC and municipal processes throughout the course of their ownership.  (2T:28-29 and 41-43)  It was the Appellant who failed to seek all appropriate approvals prior to the improper installation of expanded walkways in the Historic Flare Open Area in violation of the zoning ordinances and historic design guidelines.  The Plaintiff upon receipt of the violation notices, agreed to file for a Zoning Permit and received a denial.
[brief] 6.  **Proximity to the Date of Trial**  The sixth *Cole* factor considers the proximity of the date on which the moving party sought arbitration to the date of trial.  Although the initial discovery end date was set for November 30, 2019, indicating a trial in 2020, no trial date has been set.  It should be noted, however, that we are six years closer to trial than we were at the outset of the case.  Accordingly, as [...] concedes, and the Law Division found, this factor weighs neither in favor nor against arbitration.
[brief] We have repeatedly stated that [t]he point is to assure that the parties know that in electing arbitration as the exclusive remedy, they are waiving their time-honored right to sue. ”  Id at 444.  The Supreme Court observed that the arbitration clause providing only for “binding arbitration” was not enforceable because it does not convey to the average member of the public that he or she is giving up “the right to have one’s claim adjudicated in a court of law.
[brief] Da137 (“The EGP for these projects were either formally agreed to in the PTA (i.e., Backlog Projects only) or were included time and time again in the update calculations provided by [...] to [...] which set forth the EGP, amounts paid, and amounts owed. ”).  --- 11  The “update calculations” referenced by the Arbitrator throughout the Award are those marked at the Arbitration as [...] Exhibit Numbers 5-12, which list the EGP POINT II  THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY DENYING [...]’S  MOTION TO MODIFY THE AWARD BECAUSE THE AWARD CONTAINS MANY ERRORS IN THE CALCULATION OF INTEREST AND DESCRIPTION OF THE PROJECTS AT ISSUE  [DA32]  In addition to exceeding his power, the Arbitrator made several mathematical miscalculations and errors to form, which do not affect the merits of Arbitrator’s finding (that Arc owes [...] payments of EGP despite the parties not agreeing to an EGP for any project other than those listed in the PTA).
[brief] The Award purportedly replaces the above comprehensive Article with 2 pages of language the Arbitrator copied and pasted from the [...]’s MOU with the [...], which contained a waiver incentive provision but was never written to replace an entire Health Benefits Article, and which contains terms that would adversely affect retirees, their families, and widows of [...] members.  The Arbitrator awarded the following regarding the health benefits proposal:  The [...]’s offer is granted.  There is no sound reason [...] and [...] members should have different health benefits language in their respective agreements when the [...] has an obligation to uniformly apply its health benefits plans and programs to both groups.  The waiver provision is admittedly an economic item; however, it is an economic item benefiting both parties.  (Aa156).  While the arbitrator recognized that the [...] sought to incorporate the medical and prescription waiver incentive payment language, his Award includes language which goes beyond what the [...] sought in its Revised Final Offer.  This is a material mistake of fact which violates the arbitrator’s obligation to make a reasonable determination of the issues.  Therefore, the arbitrator exceeded his authority requiring that the Award be vacated and remanded.
[brief] B.  THE PCR COURT DID NOT ERR IN REQUIRING COUNSEL TO PROCEED..............................................39  C.  THE PCR COURT DID NOT ABUSE HER DISCRETION IN NOT RECUSING HERSELF..................................41  D.  THE PCR COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR DISMISSAL OR REHEARING BASED ON ALLEGED NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE OF BAD FAITH.......................47  CONCLUSION...........................................................................................................................................48
[brief] Additionally, [...] overlooked the Trustee’s non-compliance of [...]’s Order.  Upon receipt of both appraisals, instead of scheduling a Settlement Conference, the Trustee chose to conduct a sealed bid process, without [...]’s consent.  (142a)  Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 3B:31-54, the Trustee was obligated to adhere to “applicable law,” which encompasses adherence to court orders.  Therefore, Plaintiff’s failure to comply with [...]’s Order constituted a breach of this essential duty, meriting serious consideration for her removal.  [...] raised concerns about the Trustee’s non-compliance.  On May 27, 2022, during the first hearing with [...], [...] testified that:  [W]e had our first hearing on the 10th of January.  At that hearing, [...] set forth instructions for all of us, and what the trustee is doing right now is not what the [...] instructed us to do.  She said that after we get two appraisals done, that we would have settlement discussions with the Deputy Surrogate [...].  (2T 9-10)  With this approach, Defendants argue that [...] disregarded [...]’s Order, providing no explanation for his decision.  This violates the principle of judicial continuity, which requires the enforcement of orders throughout the lifecycle of a case, irrespective of changes in judicial assignments, to ensure fairness and maintain consistency in legal proceedings.  Thus, [...] departed from established policies without justification.  Moreover, the trial court’s decision was manifestly unjust.  Defendants believed that the controversy would be resolved through settlement discussions, as per [...]’s guidance.  Contrary to these expectations, [...] entered an Order abruptly changing direction.  Instead of settlement discussions, [...] was compelled to relinquish his property shares at reduced values and participate in a bidding procedure which he strongly opposed.  2.