ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] *Pareja v. Princeton Int’l Props*, 246 N.J. 546, 549 (2021).  Without this “reasonable period of time” language, the jury could easily assume that the defendants had an ongoing and continuous duty to remove snow and ice during the storm, and consequently believe that the snow and ice removal should have been done sooner than it was completed in this instance.  Ignoring this reasonable time component is clear error under these factual circumstances.  Therefore, plaintiff’s mere status as invitee should not automatically exclude the application of Model Civil Jury Charge 5.20(B)(2)(b).  Just because plaintiff is an invitee does not automatically trigger the invitee charge nor does it automatically exclude the commercial landowner’s duty to remove snow and ice charge.  Again, a jury instruction must be tailored to the “theories and facts” that were presented in the case.  *Velazquez v. Portadin*, 163 N.J. 677, 689 (2000).  The facts of this case and underlying policies regarding the common law duty to remove snow and ice after the cessation of a storm warrants the use of Model Civil Jury Charge 5.20(B)(2)(b).  Moreover, plaintiff’s reliance upon the ongoing storm rule to discount Model Civil Jury Charge 5.20(B)(2)(b) is entirely misplaced.  Appellants do not argue that plaintiff’s fall down involved an ongoing storm.  The bottom line is that this model civil jury charge provides a framework for examining whether the commercial landowning defendant has a duty to remove snow and ice from its walkways regardless of what time plaintiff fell.  If plaintiff fell during an ongoing storm, then the ongoing storm language of this charge would be added to the jury instruction.  If the adequacy of the defendant’s snow removal efforts is an issue, then the separate language regarding the reasonableness of the defendants snow and ice removal efforts would also be charged.  Ultimately, this reasonable period of time for defendants to remove snow after the cessation of the storm event and the reasonableness of the defendants’ snow removal efforts are key jury instructions and language which are not included in the standard invitee charge.  The importance of this reasonable period of time and the reasonableness of defendants’ efforts cannot be understated.  Again, here the storm dropped 14 inches of snow, the snow ended at 8:30 PM the night before, plaintiff fell at 7:30 AM, the defendants were advised to prioritize the retail tenants for snow removal over the office tenants, and defendants were still on site actively clearing snow from this large commercial property at the time of the fall.  The requested jury charge would have explicitly permitted the jury to consider whether defendants’ actions were reasonable given the significance of the storm, and the state of snow removal in light of when the snow stopped and plaintiff’s fall occurred.  Plaintiff’s conclusory statement that “there is no dispute there was sufficient time for the defendants to make its property reasonably safe” is entirely self-serving and unsupported.  POINT II
[brief] [Jones, *The New Jersey Recording Act -- A Study of its Policy*, 12 Rutgers L. Rev. 328, 329-30 (1957). ]  “Courts have thus held that the integrity of the recording scheme is paramount. ”  Cox v. RKA Corp., 164 N.J. 487, 497 (2000)  "[A]bsent any unusual equity' the stability of titles and conveyancing requires the judiciary to follow that course 'that will best support and maintain the integrity of the recording system.'"
[brief] The PSA provided for the equitable distribution of the only significant asset at issue in the divorce, [...], in which Defendant owned a 25 percent interest through his family's company, [...]  The PSA provided that Olga's was currently listed for sale for $5.8 million and that upon the sale of Olga's, Plaintiff would receive fifty percent of the proceeds received by Defendant.  Plaintiff had been a homemaker during the marriage while Defendant worked in his family business.  The proceeds from Olga's were to be the only equitable distribution Plaintiff would receive under the PSA, other than being able to retain her car.  Unbeknownst to Plaintiff, who had no involvement with Defendant's family business, the Diner was never going to be sold.  Rather, it was already the subject of eminent domain proceedings by the State of New Jersey, a fact well-known to Defendant, who for years had been dealing with the [...] ("[...]") as the representative of [...]  By the time the parties signed the PSA on April 10, 2009, the New Jersey [...] had already successfully obtained a court order allowing it to proceed against the Olga's property through eminent domain.  This happened with Defendant's direct knowledge and involvement, and with no knowledge or involvement by Plaintiff.  There is no dispute about this.
[brief] .............................................- 44 - Lembaga Enters., Inc.  v. Cace Trucking & Warehouse, Inc., 320 N.J. Super. 501 (App. Div. 1999)  .................................................................-  29 - Litton Indus., Inc. v. IMO Indus., Inc., 200 N.J. 372 (2009)  ............................-  49 - Lopez v. Swyer, 62 N.J. 267 (1973)  .................................................................-  43 -, - 44 - Marsellis-Warner Corp. v. Rabens, 51 F. Supp. 2d 508 (D.N.J. 1999)  ...........- 27 - Meisels v. Fox Rothschild LLP, 240 N.J. 286 (2020)  .......................................-  27 -, - 28 - N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. v. Ventron Corp., 94 N.J. 473 (1983)
[brief] The [...] accepted and adopted the ALJ's findings and conclusions, concluding that the County's determination to remove Appellant from her employment as a Correction Officer.  (Pa208).  For this Court to reverse this determination, Appellant must demonstrate that the [...]'s decision was "arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable, or that it lacked fair support in the evidence, or that it violated legislative policies expressed or implicit in the [enabling legislation]."  *Aqua Beach Condominium Association v. Dept. of Community Affairs*, 186 N.J. 5, 15-16 (2006).  See also *Campbell v. Dept. of Civil Service*, 39 N.J. 556, 562 (1963).  Appellant has not and cannot do so.
[brief] The determination of whether a plaintiff’s injury satisfies the aforesaid two-part test depends on a fact-sensitive analysis.  Gilhooley, supra, 164 N.J. at 541.  It is “the nature or degree of the ongoing impairment that determines whether a specific injury meets the threshold requirement under the Tort Claims Act. ”  Knowles at 331.  (citation omitted).  To meet the threshold, a permanent loss need not be total, but it must be substantial.  Gerber v. Springfield Bd. of Educ., 328 N.J. Super. 24, 35 (App. Div. 2000) (citation omitted).  A plaintiff must present objective evidence of permanent injury because damages for temporary injuries are not recoverable.  Id. at 35.  (citation omitted).  In Fine v. City of Margate, 48 F. Supp. 3d 772 (D.N.J. 2014), the plaintiff fell on a beach access ramp and sustained an injury to his knee, which later required surgery to repair a torn tendon.
[brief] N.J.S.A. 26:2C-38, et seq.  .........................................................  31  Table of Contents  [...], Appellant’s Appendix Vol. 1 Pages H1a through H161a  Page  Appellate Division Disposition Sheet denying the [...]’s Application for Permission to File Emergent Motion [seeking stay of construction activity], in Docket [...], issued May 30, 2023 ...........................................
[directive] (a) captures the image of a victim of a criminal offense; BODY WORN CAMERA POLICY | May 2021  20  (b) captures the image of a child; (c) was made in a residential premises (e.g., a home, apartment, college dormitory room, hotel/motel room, etc.), a school or youth facility, a healthcare facility or medical office, a substance abuse or mental health treatment facility, or a place of worship; (d) captures a conversation with a person whose request to de-activate the BWC was declined; (e) captures a special operations event or execution of an arrest and/or search warrant where confidential tactical information (e.g., verbal codes and hand signals used to give direction to officers, techniques for interior movements and clearing rooms during execution of a warrant, techniques for convincing persons to open doors during warrant execution, etc.) may have been recorded; (f) captures the image of an undercover officer or confidential informant; or (g) captures the screen of a police computer monitor that is displaying confidential personal or law enforcement sensitive information.  See also Section 7.1 (requiring notice to the prosecutor when a BWC captures the image of a patient at a substance abuse treatment facility).  Subject to the provisions of Section 12 of this Policy, an agency’s policy, standing operating procedure, directive, or order issued pursuant to Section 3.1 may specify additional circumstances when a BWC recording will be “tagged. ”  9.4  Approval for Access to “Tagged” BWC Recordings.  A BWC recording tagged pursuant to Section 9.3 shall not be accessed, viewed, copied, disseminated, or otherwise used without first obtaining the permission of the County Prosecutor or designee, or the Director of the Division of Criminal Justice or designee.
[brief] Prejudice must have ensued.  Dennis v. Secretary, Penns. of Dept. of Corr., 834 F. 3d 263 (3rd Cir. 2016); Here the evidence at issue is favorable because it is impeaching in nature.  In State v. Feaster, 156 N.J. 29, a death penalty case, [...] tried to frame [...] for the murder of a gas station attendant.  Wesley, claimed while he was in Salem County Jail on unrelated charges, on October 5, 1993, [...] confessed to him that he did the gas station robbery and he shot the clerk in the face and killed him.  However, it was later determined that [...] was responsible for the gas station killing.  [...] falsely accused [...] of murder.  The State failed to disclose this potent impeachment material.  156 N.J. 29 (1998)  In August 2022, four months after the conclusion of defendant's trial, the [...] provided defense counsel with additional discovery.  Specifically, a 1990 Essex County Murder case, State v. [...],  In that case, [...] provided information and testified against Lance, who was found "Not Guilty" of Murder.  The State also failed to disclose this impeachment material.  Lastly, the [...] excluded discovery regarding the Final Disposition of State v. [...], a Camden County double murder case in which [...] claimed he had information against [...].  Hill was eventually convicted of the Double Murder but later exonerated by the [...].  It was determined that Hill was innocent of the double murder.  These three instances of [...] testifying for the State is most certainly favorable to defendant as powerful impeachment material.
[brief] I understand that the Court questioned everybody and I understand that all of them except number four said that they didn’t seem to have any difficulties with proceeding further.  (11T19-10 to 20-25)  The prosecutor added that:  Every juror committed to the fact that they could continue with deliberations, that they could be fair and impartial.  And that what happened with juror 12, there were some that did not even know about it.  And then there were some that did know about it and the ones that did know about it said it would have no effect.  (11T25-24 to 26-5)  Notably, defense counsel’s recitation at the motion differs from juror 12’s statement on what transpired.
[directive] I have reviewed the attached fi Request for Forfeiture Fund have reviewed the attached Request for Fodeiture - - - Law  Non Non Law Distribution to Enforcement Agency, /Form a Distribution to Enforcement Agency, /For a and have determined that the expenditure of forfeiture DI of and have determined that the expenditure forfeil DI funds in in is appropriate the manner detailed this request is in funds not appropriate as detailed this request. of with and is not inconsistent the provisions the New Jersey Constitution, applicable Statutes, Administrative Code or Forfeiture Program Administration Standard Operating Procedures.
[brief] [...] AND [...]  POLICE DEPARTMENT  [...]  [...] (306612019)  56 E. Main Street, Suite 301, Somerville, New Jersey  08876 [...]  [...]  Of Counsel and On the Brief: [...]  TABLE OF CONTENTS  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT ........................................................................................................1  STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURE ..............................................................................2  STANDARD OF REVIEW .............................................................................................................4  LEGAL ARGUMENT  .......................................................................................................................5  I.  The trial court correctly determined that plaintiff’s complaint was time-barred and appropriately dismissed the complaint.  .................................................................5  CONCLUSION  ..................................................................................................................................7  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
[brief] In opposition to this appeal, [...] does not dispute that it breached the parties’ Settlement Agreement when it: (i) failed to make its fourth settlement payment, (ii) failed to vacate by October 31, 2023, and (iii) failed to leave the Leased Premises “broom clean. ”  While [...] goes on to claim that dumping thousands of cubic yards of solid waste at the Leased Premises should not constitute a fourth event of default, it does not actually dispute that it was.  Nevertheless, [...] argues that the trial court correctly relieved it of the consequences its breaches because its unauthorized dumping was well-intended and should have been permitted to continue.  Even if this were plausible – and it is not – there is nothing to explain its three remaining events of default, any one of which should have compelled the trial court to enforce the parties’ Settlement Agreement as written, and to enter the Money Judgment, regardless of its views of [...]’s dumping.  The trial court’s failure to do so was reversible error.  \(^1\)  Capitalized terms shall have the same meaning ascribed to them in [...]’s Appellate Brief filed on June 7, 2024.  On appeal, [...] presents three principal reasons that it should be relieved of its contractual obligations, all of which lack merit.  First, [...] argues that because [...] installed security to prevent it from importing even more solid waste (as it attempted to do), it was not required to comply with the Settlement Agreement because it was “locked out” – even though it had vacated the Leased Premises two months earlier.  But even if this were not the case, because [...] and its Subtenant retained continuous and uninterrupted access to the Leased Premises throughout, to equate non-exclusive security measures with a lockout is as absurd as it is meritless.  [...] also claims that dumping and dispersing thousands of cubic yards of debris and millings was intended to “clean up” the Leased Premises prior to its departure.  [...]’s motivation in breaching its settlement obligations is irrelevant, however, particularly after it was advised of its breach and directed to stop, but it refused.  [...]’s final contention is that the Money Judgment should be construed as “pre-judgment attachment,” although it not only consented to that relief, but also agreed to the amount and the terms of enforcement.  And because the Money Judgment memorialized a past-due obligation, and not a future liability yet to be liquidated, pre-judgment attachment is inapposite to these issues.  In the end, it is the plain language of the Settlement Agreement that controls.  There is no dispute that settled law requires the parties’ Settlement Agreement to be enforced as written and that trial courts cannot re-write settlement agreements to suit their own notions of fairness.  For this reason, and those expressed in [...]’s opening brief, the trial court’s Order should be reversed and this matter should be remanded to the trial court for entry of the Money Judgment for the full amount due, together with attorneys’ fees and costs incurred to obtain that relief, as the parties agreed.
[brief] This is not an allocation to an individual carrier, your Honor, or to an individual policy.  That's really beyond the scope of what I was doing.  It is more focusing on -- if we 14 [...] described [...] as “one of the most knowledgeable and articulate expert witnesses the SAM has had appear before him over the last 42 years. ” (Pa 0148).  look, for example, at the period when [...], for lack of better example, was providing insurance, *how would we allocate the costs that they have incurred dealing with the site-wide groundwater problem to that policy period.*  How that ultimately then flows down to individual policies really is up to the Court and others to determine.  That wasn't the scope of what I was trying to do.  (Pa 290-91) (emphasis added).  Contrary to [...]’s argument, while [...] did not allocate [...]’s damages to individual policies, he did allocate damages to policy periods –.
[brief] In holding he had not, the trial court stated as follows:  The question is was there proximate cause?  In — in this case, um, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to produce any evidence suggesting that, um, something — whatever — what it was that caused him to fall.  We have lots of conjecture, lots of things.  It could have been the snow, it could have been the cardboard, it could have been the plywood, it could have been — that's not enough.  We don't allow juries to speculate and to say, okay, you know what, we think it was — we think it was — we don't allow that.  There is not enough facts in this case — most unfortunately — to go to the jury.
[brief] ”  Maudsley v. State, 357 N.J. Super. 560, 560 (App. Div. 2003) (citing Leimgruber v. Claridge Assocs., Ltd., 73 N.J. 450, 454 (1977)).  “Generally punitive damages are a limited remedy and must be reserved for special circumstances. ”  Id. at 590-91 (citing Cochetti v. Desmond, 572 F.2d 102, 106 (3d Cir. 1978)).  The New Jersey Punitive Damages Act, N.J.S.A. 2A:15-5.9 et seq. (the “Act”) provides that punitive damages can be awarded: only if the plaintiff proves, by clear and convincing evidence, that the harm suffered was the result of the defendant’s acts or omissions, and such acts or omissions were actuated by actual malice or accompanied by a wanton and willful disregard of persons who foreseeably might be harmed by those acts or omissions.
[brief] In Bickham, the warrant authorized a search of the described apartment between 10:00 a.m. and 10:00 p.m., but the police executed the warrant at 9:21 a.m.  The court determined that this technical violation did not infringe upon defendant's privacy rights.  warrant."  Here, exacerbating this irremediable defect is that the accompanying incident/arrest report issued by the arresting officer is totally devoid of any articulation as to the basis or legal grounds for having stopped and searched defendant in the first place, other than the fact that defendant was observed exiting [...], a good distance from where defendant was stopped and arrested.
[brief] A.  The Prosecutor Did Not Testify as to Previously Unexplored Portions of the Surveillance Video.  ..................................................................................................................18  B.  The Prosecutor did not Testify or Directly Contradict the Evidence During Summation.  .................................................................................................................................19  C.  The Prosecutor Did Not Improperly Bolster the Credibility of its Key Witness During Summation.  .................................................................................................................................22  D.  The Prosecutor Did Not Improperly Vouch for the Thoroughness and Completeness of the Police Investigation.  .................................................................................................................................22  E.  The Prosecutor’s Opening and Closing Statements, Including the Goodfellas Quote, Lacked Any Inflammatory or Highly Emotional Appeals.  .................................................................................................................................24  POINT III – THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT DEPRIVE DEFENDANT OF HIS RIGHT TO BE PRESENT AND ALL EXHIBITS WERE PROPERLY PRESENTED TO THE JURY...........................................29
[brief] However, importantly, Appellee completely omitted to cite the same portion of the statute above, which also provides an approval process for Appellant to hold her job even in light of her criminal record.  This highly pertinent portion of the statute sets forth the following provision whereby an individual with a criminal record can maintain employment:  "  f.  Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection b. of this section to the contrary, no individual shall be disqualified from employment on the basis of any conviction disclosed by a criminal history record background check performed pursuant to sections 2 through 7 of P.L.1999, c.358 (C.30:6D-64 through 69) if the individual has affirmatively demonstrated to the community agency head, or the community agency board if the individual is the community agency head, clear and convincing evidence of the individual's rehabilitation.  In determining whether an individual has affirmatively demonstrated rehabilitation, the following factors shall be considered: (1) the nature and responsibility of the position which the convicted individual would hold, has held or currently holds, as the case may be; (2) the nature and seriousness of the offense; (3) the circumstances under which the offense occurred; (4) the date of the offense; (5) the age of the individual when the offense was committed; (6) whether the offense was an isolated or repeated incident; (7) any social conditions which may have contributed to the offense; and (8) any evidence of rehabilitation, including good conduct in prison or in the community, counseling or psychiatric treatment received, acquisition of additional academic or vocational schooling, successful participation in correctional work-release programs, or the recommendation of those who have had the individual under their supervision."
[brief] Her letters and objections to jurisdiction do not constitute an appearance under Rules 4:4-6 or 6:2-3(e).  *Epos*, supra.  "The requirements of the rules with respect to service of process go to the jurisdiction of the court and must be strictly complied with.  Any defects . . . are fatal and leave the court without jurisdiction and its judgment void."  *Driscoll v.  Burlington-Bristol Bridge Co.*, 8 N.J. 433, 493, 86 A.2d 201, cert. denied, 344 U.S. 838, 73 S. Ct. 25, 97 L. Ed. 652 (1952).
[directive] Psychosexual evaluation CMO worker to appear at next court event DCF, Sex offender evaluation □ Medication assessment  Drug and alcohol evaluation □ DCF, CMO to DCP&P, Fire setter evaluation □ efforts for JISP referral and evaluation  Child study team evaluation to be completed JJC referral for residential community home consideration / □ interviews Retention evaluation  Child study team evaluation to be provided to court Referral for DCF out of home placement  Refer to Referral for residential drug and alcohol placement  Refer to electronic monitoring program  Predisposition Report: Psychological evaluation  Substance abuse screening  Psychosocial evaluation  Report from regarding Biopsychosocial evaluation  Psychiatric evaluation  Other Sealing: –  Notice of this sealing order shall be provided to: (1) the Attorney General, This matter is sealed (N.J.S.A. 2C:52-5.2) county prosecutor, or municipal prosecutor handling the case; and (2) the State Police and any local law enforcement agency having custody of the files and records. will be entered as a civil judgment.