ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] [...], [...], [...], [...], D.O., AND [...], M.D.  [...] (016792012)  [...] (110962014)  [...] (029032007)  [...] (389512022)  TABLE OF CONTENTS  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT  ........................................................................................................1  PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND.................................................................................................2  FACTUAL BACKGROUND..........................................................................................................3  LEGAL ARGUMENT.....................................................................................................................8  I.  [...] does not have standing to seek to disqualify counsel based on alleged conflicts between [...] and [...].........................................................8  II.  [...] is not disqualified from jointly representing the [...] under RPC 1.7(a)(1) based on the CNA.  ..............................................15  A.  [...] never sought to disqualify the Mandelbaum Firm under RPC 1.7(a)(1) in the trial court........................................................................................................17  B.  The Appellate Division does not have authority to create new per se conflict rules.........................................................................................................................18  C.  [...] is not disqualified under RPC 1.7(a)(1) because the joint representation is permissible.  .................................................................19  III.  [...] is not disqualified under RPC 1.7(a)(2), and the [...] waived any conflict under RPC 1.7(b) anyway.......................33  A.  There is no significant risk that the Mandelbaum Firm is materially limited in its course of action for any of the [...].  ............33  B.  [...] and [...] waived any conflict under RPC 1.7(b).  ..........36  IV.  [...] is not disqualified under In re Grand Jury.......................39  CONCLUSION..............................................................................................................................46
[brief] The Roa Court discussed the United States Supreme Court decision in Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006) in which the Burlington Court held that to sustain its burden in connection with a Title VII retaliatory discrimination claim, “a plaintiff must show that a reasonable employee would have found the challenged action materially adverse, ‘which in this context means it well might have ‘dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination. ’”  Roa, 200 N.J. at 575 (internal citations omitted).  The Roa Court continued, explaining that the Burlington Court “purposely used the adjective ‘materially’ because” it is important to separate significant from trivial harms.  Title VII, we have said, does not set forth “a general civility code for the American workplace. ”  An employee’s decision to report discriminatory behavior cannot immunize that employee from those petty slights or minor annoyances that often take place at work and that all employees experience.  The antiretaliation provision seeks to prevent employer interference with “unfettered access” to Title VII's remedial mechanisms.  It does so by prohibiting employer actions that are likely “to deter victims of discrimination from complaining to the EEOC,” the courts, and their employers.  And normally petty slights, minor annoyances, and simple lack of good manners will not create such deterrence.  [Roa, 200 N.J. at 575, quoting Burlington, 548 U.S. at 68]  The Roa Court therefore relied on Burlington in support of its holding that the Roa plaintiff’s retaliatory discharge claim was not actionable.
[brief] (Pa8).  To begin with, Plaintiffs took the position, via their causation expert [...], that the pre-existing massive fetal hemorrhage that occurred a minimum of six hours prior to delivery played no role whatsoever in the ultimate outcome and that the infant’s injuries and subsequent death were caused by hypoxic ischemic encephalopathy (HIE) and the failure to deliver her 25 to 30 minutes earlier than took place.  (Pa333; Pa341).  Defendants argued that where a Plaintiff alleges a delayed diagnosis of a pre-existing condition caused harm, the two-pronged modified increased risk standard set forth in *Scafidi v. Seiler*, 119 N.J. 93 (1990) applies.
[brief] TABLE OF CONTENTS  PROCEDURAL HISTORY .................................................................  1  STATEMENT OF FACTS ..................................................................  1 LEGAL ARGUMENT ........................................................................  1  POINT I  THE COURT SHOULD AFFIRM THE ORDER SUPPRESSING THE EVIDENCE BECAUSE THE MOTION COURT CORRECTLY FOUND THAT THE CIRCUMSTANCES GIVING RISE TO PROBABLE CAUSE WERE NEITHER UNFORESEEABLE NOR SPONTANEOUS AND THUS THAT THE AUTOMOBILE EXCEPTION TO THE WARRANT REQUIREMENT DID NOT JUSTIFY THE WARRANTLESS SEARCH OF DEFENDANT’S VEHICLE..................................................................................  1 CONCLUSION ..................................................................................
[brief] Dkt. No. 588 at ¶ E.  Notably, [...] recently relied on [...]’s public statements about ADI in ordering production of those documents.  Dkt. No. 742.  [...]’s statements regarding privacy and [...]’s failure to prevent data misuse by app developers are core to Plaintiffs’ case, and Plaintiffs should be allowed to access discovery related to these statements.  [...] also substantially overstates its production.  While literally true that [...] has produced more than 500,000 documents (515,092 to be exact), approximately 252,000 of the documents comprise information about the activity of current and former named plaintiffs on the platform that was already directly available to plaintiffs; approximately 113,000 lack meaningful content, including .bmp or embedded images spun off from other documents and “document[s] that cannot be converted”; and approximately 74,000 comprise documents previously produced to governmental investigators.  Relatedly, [...] states that it has produced more than 100,000 documents in the last three months.  Opp. at 15.  The exact number is 120,258—but approximately 96,000 lack any meaningful content for the same reasons identified above (e.g., .bmp or embedded images).  In total, [...]’s custodial production resulting from the application of search strings total only 166,000 documents with any substantive content.  *22  It has taken [...] almost a year and a half to produce these documents.  After the 81 initial custodians were finalized on May 15, 2020, [...] insisted on negotiating specific search strings to apply to each custodian.  This process significantly delayed production, causing a years-long negotiation over the search strings to apply to the 81 custodians that was completed on June 7, 2021.  Yet, [...] still has not completed production from their files.  Past being prologue, and contrary to [...]’s suggestion, it is unlikely [...] would be able to quickly complete production from [...]’s and [...]’s custodial files.  Thus, the suggestion that [...] and [...] be further deferred as custodians is impractical, as it is highly unlikely that [...] would be able to produce, and Plaintiffs would have the opportunity to take further discovery based on information generated from this production, within [...]’s discovery deadlines.  III.
[brief] A.  The Summary Judgment Standard (Pa27-Pa28)  Pursuant to Rule 4:46-2(c), summary judgment shall be granted in favor of the movant only “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact challenged and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment or order as a matter of law. ”  In Brill v. Guardian Life Insurance Company, 142 N.J. 520 (1995), the New Jersey Supreme Court adopted the federal standard for granting summary judgment set forth in the United States Supreme Court trilogy of decisions: Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Video Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 106 S. Ct. 1348 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 106 S. Ct. 2505 (1986); and Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S. Ct. 2548 (1986).
[brief] [1T]  Plaintiff argues that the Chancery Division’s failure to transfer this action in lieu and civil rights action back to a Law Division Judge is a reversible error.  "The failure to grant a change of venue, initially because the trial court applied the wrong test for such a motion, is reversible error under the standard established in State v. Williams, 93 N.J. 39 (1983).  The majority's comments concerning the enhanced standard of review are problematic because even under conventional standards of review the guilt conviction here should be reversed.  The failure to grant a change of venue, initially because the trial court applied the wrong test for such a motion, is reversible error under the standard established in State v. Williams, 93 N.J. 39 (1983).  Further, the prosecutor's egregious misconduct should be reversible error under the dictates of the majority's opinion in State v. Ramseur, supra, 106 N.J. at 320-24.  Thus, I am strongly of the view that under a conventional standard of review the errors mentioned herein were sufficiently prejudicial to warrant reversal."
[brief] T1.  The Assistant Prosecutor conceded during oral argument that it was still the State’s position that [...] remained sufficiently dangerous to the community to warrant detention.  T1.  The State then withdrew its motion to reopen detention and, instead, announced that it would escalate its global plea offer—from an effective 12 years in prison across both matters to an effective 24 years—unless [...] consented to delaying the suppression hearing.
[brief] First, the word “indemnify” in the phrase “the parties agree to indemnify” in Section 17.1(b) is not limited to third-party claims, but refers to all claims. ”  Dansko Holdings, Inc. v. Ben. Tr. Co., 991 F.3d 494, 502 (3d Cir. 2021) (“The plain, unambiguous meaning of ‘indemnify’ is not ‘to compensate for losses caused by third parties,’ but merely to compensate. ”) (quoting Atari Corp. v. Ernst & Whinney, 981 F.2d 1025, 1032 (9th Cir. 1992)); Dammann, 594 F.3d at 255 (defining the “expansive meaning” of indemnity as “[a] duty to make good any loss, damage, or liability incurred by another” when allowing a first-party indemnification claim) (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 783 (8th ed. 2004)); Indemnify, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) (“To reimburse (another) for a loss suffered because of a third party or one’s own act or default”) (emphasis added).  Second, the use of the words “any and all” in the phrase “to indemnify [[...]] and hold [[...]] harmless from any and all claims, damages, losses or expenses” demonstrates that the obligation to indemnify [...] in Section 17.1(b) is not limited to third-party claims.
[brief] [...] complained of corruption, (1T, Pg. 15, Lines 16-17), bias, (1T, Pg. 15, line 21), continuous and harassment and inappropriate judicial conduct including allowing the other side to use the court as a weapon.  (1T, Pg. 16, lines 15-22).  [...] reiterated that he has informed federal authorities of [...]’s harassment and corruption (1T, Pg. 17, lines 2-6).  [...] invited [...] to contact the federal field office in Newark New Jersey, and ask for the Corruptions Unit, if she wanted to confirm that they are investigating her.  (1T Pg. 17, lines 11-14).  [...] again complained of the bias and said it was not “justice” (1T Pg. 18, lines 6-8).  He put his foot down, saying to [...], “I did nothing wrong, and all you to is harass me.  It stops today. ”  (1T, Pg. 18, lines 22-23.)  As stated above, another major concern of [...]’s during the 9/16/2022 hearing was how the Sheriff’s department was being used against him.
[brief] (Pa915, ¶ 29.)  As a result, from the outset of the SFRA implementation, [...] experienced a deficit in local revenue to fund the cost of education at its Adequacy Budget level.  This deficit, called a “local levy gap,” occurs in SFRA’s operation because the actual local levy falls below the annual LFS calculation, or expected property tax contribution, from year-to-year.  (Pa913, ¶ 20 - Pa915, ¶ 29.)  Central to SFRA’s implementation in [...] is that the State does not compel the City to provide property tax revenue in the amount required to fund spending at the level set in the Adequacy Budget.  The SFRA only requires the City to provide the District with the amount of local revenue provided in the prior year.  N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-5(b); Abbott XX, 199 N.J. at 155, 165.  This structure means that the SFRA’s calculation of the expected -- not actual -- contribution of local tax revenue from the City determines the State’s share of funding the Adequacy Budget, even where the expected local revenue is below what the District actually receives.  This also means that, when the SFRA’s calculation of the expected local share -- the LFS – increases from year-to-year, the amount of state Equalization Aid to fund the Adequacy Budget decreases.  N.J.S.A. 18A:7F–52(a); (Pa913, ¶¶ 20-22; Pa1001, ¶ 56 - Pa1002, ¶57.)  Consequently, when [...]’s LFS rises, the District receives less aid from the State to fund its Adequacy Budget.  This occurs even when the District has a funding shortfall that prevents the delivery of essential resources to students at the level prescribed by SFRA’s Adequacy Budget.  3.
[brief] **State v. Burkert**, 231 N.J. 257 (2017) ..........................................................................................  12  **State v. Nasir**, 355 N.J. Super. 96 (App. Div. 2002) ................................................................. 7 **State v. S.N.**, 231 N.J. 497 (2018) .......................................................................................... 5 ### Statutes N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:15-59.1(a)(1) ........................................................................ 5 N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:53A-50(b)(3) ....................................................................... 10, 13 N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:53A-50(c) .................................................................11 N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:53A-53........................................................................8 N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:53A-55(b) ..................................................................1, 14 N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:53A-58........................................................................5 Other Authorities [...], *Coercive Control Amendments Offer Potential Relief to Agunot*, THE JEWISH LINK (Jan. 18, 2024) ......................................................13 [...], *Unwilling to Allow His Wife a Divorce, He Marries Another*, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 21, 2024).........................................................13
[brief] First, as opposed to the guilty plea that was entered into by the defendant in *Ciancaglini*, in this case [...] entered into a conditional guilty plea.  The municipal court in *Ciancaglini* stayed the sentence, not defendant’s guilty plea/conviction while defendant in that case appealed his enhanced sentence under the DWI statute to the Law Division-Superior Court.  *State v. Ciancaglini*, 986 A.2d 1, 2, 411 N.J. Super. 280 (App. Div. 2010).  Staying a conviction pending appeal to the Law Division is completely different than staying a sentence pending appeal to the same Law Division.  A conditional guilty plea at the municipal court compels the Law Division to address the merits of the issue for which the defendant conditionally pled guilty, irrespective of the Law Division’s de novo standard of review.
[brief] (16T119-19 to 126-7).  He denied learning from [...] that [...] had told [...] “they think you have a card,” so that he had no advance knowledge that he, his car, and his house would be searched.  (16T121-6 to 13; 16T124-4 to 125-5).  As these facts show, counsel argued throughout the case defendant had no advance knowledge of the searches [...] conducted, so their failure to find the wallet ID proved he did not possess it or show it when stopped by the officers.
[brief] \(^3\)  At the class certification stage, the focus is on whether the Rule 23 prerequisites have been satisfied.  In conducting this inquiry, the Fifth Circuit has held that “the zeal and competence of the representatives’ counsel” are relevant to determining whether the adequacy prong has been met.  *Berger v. Compaq Comput. Corp.*, 257 F.3d 475, 479 (5th Cir. 2001) (cleaned up).  I do not, however, believe that the discovery of fee arrangements between lead counsel and other firms has any bearing on whether lead counsel is qualified, experienced, and able to actively pursue the litigation.  Because I conclude that fee agreements between Plaintiffs’ counsel are not relevant to the issue of class certification, I deny Defendants’ request to obtain such documentation.
[brief] See Malanga, 253 N.J. at 314.  To designate a property for redevelopment under subsection (d), a municipality must demonstrate that certain specified problems exist and that they cause actual detriment or harm. Malanga, 253 N.J. at 297.  The Malanga Court emphasized that “subsection (d) does not presume harm; it requires a showing of actual detriment. ”  Id. at 313.  The Court defined the term “[d]etriment” as “any loss or harm suffered by a person or property. ”  Id. at 319 (quotation marks and alteration marks omitted).  As was the case in Malanga, in which the property at issue was an operating public library, the Property at the time [...] adopted the Second Condemnation Resolution contained an operating liquor store and some occupied single-family homes, with a majority being vacant land, and was in the process of being privately redeveloped by Plaintiff as contract purchaser which, in and of itself, should have vitiated or even eliminated any legitimate suggestion that the Property could be blighted.
[directive] Preparation of the Certification portion of the standardized form to obtain a Warrant of Impoundment  The standardized form to obtain a Warrant of Impoundment consists of two parts.  The upper half is a Certification statement to be completed by the law enforcement officer.  This Certification must be completed, in full, before it is presented to the Court.  On the exemplar attached to these Guidelines, each of the fields to be completed by the law enforcement officer has been numbered, e.g., â.  Those numbers correspond to the explanations below.  In the upper left-hand box, under “State of New Jersey v.”, the full name of the â defendant, as identified on the Complaint-Summons (Traffic Ticket), charged with a violation of N.J.S.A. 39:3-29, is to be placed on the line marked “defendant. ”  In the first paragraph on the first line, insert the numeric date, Month, Year, and time ã in the appropriate blank fields.  Circle the “a.m.” or “p.m.,” designation following the time entry.  On the second line insert the number of the Complaint-Summons (Traffic Ticket) ä issued to the defendant.  Next, and of critical importance, all of the fields for the Model Year, Make, Model, å License Plate #, and the VIN number of the vehicle, identified on the Complaint- Summons (Traffic Ticket) must be completed.
[directive] 28  At the time, the State submitted that the CJRA “does allow for superseding indictments to get basically 180 days to restart the clock. ”  Defendant objected, asked the State to make a formal application, and observed that the new charges were based on a statement a codefendant made in May 2020.  In response, the assistant prosecutor explained the [...] took the position that it would not present “murder first-degree cases” to a jury.8 cases or virtual grand Multiple pages in the hearing transcript address the effect of the court’s ruling superseding indictment, but the trial neither referred to nor relied on the new charges.
[brief] On November 17, 2023, Defendants filed their Answer.  On April 12, 2024, Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint for failure to submit an Affidavit of Merit, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-27.  However, per N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-28, Plaintiff is not required to submit an affidavit of merit when defendants have failed to provide requested medical records for 45 days from the date the records were requested.  From the date that Defendants filed their Answer, November 17, 2023, their timeframe to provide Plaintiff with the requisite medical records per N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-28 began to run.  Thus, Defendants had until January 1, 2024, to provide the requisite medical records and have failed to do so.  At the time Plaintiff’s Counsel filed their Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, one-hundred-fifty (150) days had elapsed since Plaintiff requested medical records and Defendant has still failed to provide any medical records or answers to interrogatories.  Thus, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-28, the Affidavit of Merit requirement is excused.
[directive] Do you understand that if you violate a condition of parole supervision for life on or after July 1, 2014, and you are indicted and convicted for that violation, you will receive a sentence of imprisonment up to 5 years or if the violation occurred before July 1, 2014, you will receive a sentence of imprisonment of up to 18 months and that the sentence you receive could be in addition to any prison term you may receive from the Parole Board for a violation of parole supervision for life?
[brief] The defendant -- I sat in Mercer County Corrections for seven years awaiting trial which gave the State seven years to obtain any and all possible evidence it could find.  Furthermore, within those seven years the State had not found any credible evidence, they found the physical evidence.  The only thing the State has is four individuals who claim I confessed -- two individuals within the jailhouse who claim I confessed to them, and two other individuals, one [...] (phonetic) who came out three years later after the crime was committed once he caught a drug and weapons possession case and claimed I confessed to him although some of his facts that he claimed was contradicted to the evidence of the actual case when he claimed that I confessed to him that I robbed the pharmacy for pills.
[directive] The officer also shall retain any original contemporaneous notes made of his or her personal observations of the crime scene.  Transmittal of Notes of Witness Interviews and Crime Scene Observations to Prosecuting Agency  Whenever a law enforcement officer transmits to the prosecuting agency a report concerning a witness interview that the officer conducted or participated in, or concerning a crime scene observation made by the officer, the officer shall also transmit to the prosecuting agency a printed or electronic copy of any contemporaneous notes of the interview and/or crime scene observation that had been taken by the officer.  For ease of identification, the copy of the contemporaneous notes shall be labeled with the case number on the report.  3.  Notice to Prosecutor of Material That May be Confidential or Privileged  Whenever a law enforcement officer provides a copy of contemporaneous notes to a prosecuting agency pursuant to paragraph 2 of this Section, the officer shall alert the prosecuting agency if the officer believes that the contemporaneous notes may include or otherwise reveal confidential or privileged information, or where the officer believes that further disclosure of the Page 3 contemporaneous notes or any portion thereof may endanger any person or interfere with an investigation.