ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Even if the court had found that the Design Manual was violated, it should not have mattered for two reasons.  First, the Design Manual is specifically applied to the construction of new roads and the sidewalks abutting them.  This matter deals with neither.  Secondly, the Design Manual does not espouse standards, it espouses guidelines.  This is not the manual of a national or local authority and thus is not evidence of anything.  The Design Manual itself says that deviations from its guidelines do not even require a design exception.  [...]’s entire report is thus founded solely upon hypotheticals.  The Supreme Court addressed these types of reports in the matter of Townsend v. Pierre, 221 NJ 36 (2015).
[brief] (Ra. 031).  Specifically, the order states:  COMPLIANCE WITH RELEVANT LAWS AND REQUIREMENTS.  The Applicants shall ensure compliance with all relevant laws and requirements, including, but not limited to, N.J.S.A. 17:50-1 to -19, N.J.S.A. 17:27A-1 to -14; N.J.A.C. 11:1-35.1 to -35.14; and N.J.A.C. 11:2-39.1 to -39.14; all relevant Statements of Statutory Accounting Principles (“SSAP”), including but not limited to, SSAP NO. 25; submission of all required filings, including but not limited to, financial statements and Risk-Based Capital Reporting; and, consents to the application of proceedings pursuant to N.J.S.A. 17:30C-1 to -31 if the financial condition warrants institution of delinquency proceedings in this State.  The existence of this debate underscores the point that the APA was required to be followed when imposing new requirements on reciprocal exchanges and their AIFs despite the absence of a statutory or regulatory mandate.
[brief] 4  Due to the risks attendant to self-representation, a defendant who requests to represent himself must be made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of doing so.  *Faretta*, 422 U.S. at 835.  The trial court is required to engage in a “searching inquiry”  While a defendant should strive to exercise his right to represent himself in a timely manner, the right does not disappear the moment that trial commences.  See Williams v. State, 56 A.3d 1053, 1056 (Del. 2012) (“Starting a trial with counsel, without more, is not a basis to deny a defendant's right to self-representation. ”).  Rather, a judge considering a mid-trial request to proceed pro se “must weigh the prejudice to the legitimate interests of the defendant against the potential disruption of proceedings already in progress. ”
[brief] ”  Inventiv Health Consulting, Inc. v. Atkinson, Civil Action No. 18-12560 (ES) (SCM), 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 208787, at *12 (D.N.J. Dec. 3, 2019).  “What is actionable is the luring away, by devious, improper or unrighteous means, of the customer of another.
[brief] 32  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS BEING APPEALED  Order granting summary judgment to defendant [...] d/b/a [...] (i/p/a [...]) and [...] (i/p/a [...]), Filed on December 15, 2023 ..........................................................  Pa  1  Order granting summary judgment to defendant [...]; Filed on December 15, 2023 ..........................................................  Pa  13  TABLE OF APPENDIX
[directive] necessarily the outcome that analysis, but does not dictate for case-specific starting point articulate designated supervisory officer, to in certain instances a Rather, requires a prosecutor, or it presumptive outcome.  diverge from a reasons if determination is made to specific the and document officer prosecutor or designated supervisory Directive restricts a  Furthermore, nothing in this automatically trigger not or circumstance, including those that do any relevant fact from considering seek whether apply for acomplaint-warrant or to determining to presumption.  For example, in a offenses that for non-violent adjudications of delinquency juvenile pretrial detention, a defendant's even though those adjudications would not considered, than years ago may be more 10 occurred or presumption subsection a for acomplaint-warrant under 4.5.7, of applying trigger presumption a prior for example, a defendant's subsection 7.4.3.  So too, pretrial detention under moving for of for judicial authority or indication of disrespect considered as an may be probation violations invoke violations do not notwithstanding that such court orders, unwillingness or inability to obey of in this Directive.  Those types specifically referenced not otherwise presumption and are a presumption, rather because they establish but because they a be relevant, not historical facts would of issuing presumption circumstances used to overcome a of of the totality the become part might See presumption seeking pretrial detention.  against subsection 4.5.9, or a acomplaint-summons, see subsection 7.4.6.  standards for police and prosecutors uniform statewide develop
[brief] PROCEDURAL HISTORY  On July 18, 2023, Plaintiff filed suit to enforce a Memorandum of Understanding between [...], [...], and [...] regarding the transfer of ownership of Appellee [...] (the “MOU”).  (Hongkun Defendants’ Appendix 19 - 33) (hereafter, the Hongkun Defendants’ Appendix is referred to as “Da”).  On September 15, 2023, the trial court entered an Order stating that “the [MOU] between the parties is an enforceable agreement and directing Defendants to specifically perform their obligations under the March 13, 2023 Memorandum of Understanding …. ” (Da7 - 8).  On November 27, 2023, the trial court entered an Order that directed the execution of an Assignment of Interest in Appellee [...] in the form propounded by Plaintiff (the “Assignment”) and awarded Plaintiff counsel fees under the MOU.  (Da9 - 11).  The November 27, 2023 Order also stated, among other things:  “Plaintiff has no obligation to indemnify any guarantors of any debt against the Property or against --- 1  The volumes of the transcript cited in this brief are as follows:  1T – Transcript of the September 15, 2023 Hearing before the Hon. [...], P.J.Ch.  2T – Transcript of the November 17, 2023 Hearing before the Hon. [...], P.J.Ch.  The transcript of the January 11, 2024 Hearing before the Hon. [...], P.J.Ch., is not cited herein.  any of the Defendants. ”  (Da10).  The Assignment was provided to Plaintiff’s counsel on December 6, 2023.  (Da124).  On January 11, 2024, the trial court denied the Hongkun Defendants’ request for a limited stay of the November 27, 2023 Order.  (Da12 - 13).  On February 5, 2024, the trial court granted Plaintiff’s fee application.  (Da14 – 18).  The Hongkun Defendants filed a timely Notice of Appeal on February 8, 2024.  (Da1-5).  **STATEMENT OF THE FACTS**
[directive] DWI  DWI Jail 5 AND including 1 supervised & than service, OR of or certificate ignition condition leased the suspension, violation less after (a)(1) community convictions not in owned, of 39:4-50(a)(2)  Offense registration participation years for a installation previous 39:3-40.1 either of vehicle every 3 period of 2nd foreign than as form of on revoke program operated years order years more order the device a of or 10 shall shall 10 nor may expiration probation for regularly visitation interlock
[brief] *Bos. Gas*, 910 N.E.2d at 316.  Under the time-on-the-risk method, each triggered policy bears a share of the total damages [up to its policy limit] proportionate to the number of years it was on the risk [the numerator], relative to the total number of years of triggered coverage [the denominator]."  Id. at 313 (quoting 23 [...], Appleman on Insurance § 145. 4[A][2][b], at 24 (2d ed. 2003).  The Court described the time-on-the-risk method as a “probable fiction,” that should only be used when it is not possible to estimate the quantum of property damage that occurred during each policy period.  Bos. Gas, 910 N.E.2d at 314, 316.  “[I]f the evidence permits an accurate estimation of the quantum of property damage in each policy period,” then proration by time-on-the-risk is inappropriate.  Id. at 316.  In this case, after seven days of evidentiary hearings, the SAM determined that it was possible to make an accurate estimation of the property damage that occurred during each policy period and thereby apply the preferred fact-based pro-rata allocation method under Massachusetts law.
[brief] But a model jury charge “is not considered a long-standing practice for purposes of the reliance argument. ”  Afanador, 151 N.J. at 58; see also Burgess, 298 N.J. Super. at 270 (noting that model jury charges provide poor grounds for reliance given they are “entirely unofficial” and “[do] not have the weight of law”).  As to the third factor, the effect that pipeline retroactivity would have on the administration of justice is likely insignificant, given that the ruling would apply to a very narrow subset of criminal defendants: defendants convicted of making true threats, who were convicted after a jury trial rather than a guilty plea, and who have not yet completed their appeals.  Thus, marginal reliance interests or administration-of- justice considerations are easily overwhelmed by the first factor – that the ruling’s purpose is to protect defendants from unconstitutional convictions.  In sum, because *Fair* did not announce a new rule of law, there is no need for this Court to proceed to a retroactivity analysis.
[brief] LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I DEFENDANTS’ SATISFACTION OF THE COLE CRITERIA PRESENTS A COMPELLING BASIS TO PERMIT ARBITRATION (DA1-2)  Plaintiff’s opposition seeks to muddy the waters and misdirect this Court towards the erroneous conclusion that an express waiver of arbitration at the early stages of a case forever binds the waiving party without consideration of how that waiver has impacted the proceedings or other relevant factors.  In other words, under Plaintiff’s analysis, a verbal, express waiver can never be changed or reconsidered at any time\(^1\).  Given the presumption against waiver of arbitration and Defendants’ satisfaction of the fact-sensitive criteria in Cole, the explicit nature of the waiver by Defendants’ former counsel is far from the type of inconsistent conduct that warrants depriving parties from the arbitration forum they bargained for.  In sum, Plaintiff’s opposing arguments fail to refute the conclusion that Defendants have viable grounds to pursue arbitration of Plaintiff’s partnership-related claims, notwithstanding the express waiver made during the incipient stages of this matter.
[brief] Nothing in Plaintiff’s Merits Brief refutes the conclusion that the Trial Court erred in ignoring undisputed evidence that use of the Property had been discontinued.  Plaintiff admitted during oral argument before the Trial Court and in its Merits Brief that the Property’s use was discontinued.  Despite uncontroverted evidence that the Property is no longer being used, Plaintiff asks this Court to accept the Trial Court’s tortured legal interpretation of N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-5(b) which ignores the statute’s plain language.  Substantial evidence existed to prove that there was a discontinuance of use.  The Trial Court improperly substituted its own judgment for that of the [...] and failed to give the Borough deference.  Thus, the Trial Court’s decision below should be overturned.  LEGAL ARGUMENT
[brief] On Brief: M.  James Maley, Jr. (019561982)  [...] (030861993)  [...] (019222003)  TABLE OF CONTENTS  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT .................................................................................. 1 LEGAL ARGUMENT ...........................................................................................................  1  I.  Plaintiff Disingenuously Argues that Issues were “not Raised Below” and cannot be Considered on Appeal.  .........................................................  1  II.  The Trial Court’s Decision Clearly Shows that the Trial Court Mixed and Matched Legal Concepts to Reach its Conclusion that Criterion (b) was not Supported by Substantial Evidence............................  4  A.  Other Statute’s Definitions of Abandonment Cannot be Used to Interpret “Discontinuance of Use” Because Those Words have Different Plain Meanings.  .............................................................................  5  B.  Vacancy and Illegal Occupancy are not the Same as Discontinuance of Use.  ..............................................................................................................  8  C.  The Property was Untenantable Because of the Remediation, not Because of the Code Violations...........................................................................11  III.  The Mere Fact that NJDEP Requires Remediation Demonstrates a Detriment to the Public Health and Safety.
[brief] *State v. Pineiro*, 181 *N.J.* 13, 22 (2004).  Here, [...] held that the sniff delayed the stop beyond the time it would take to issue a summons or inquire about the stop, so he proceeded to whether the officer had a reasonable and articulable suspicion to conduct the canine sniff.  In *State v. Nelson*, 237 *N.J.* 540 (2019), the Supreme Court examined a traffic stop that was prolonged by a canine sniff by approximately one half-hour.
[brief] *In re Taylor*, 158 N.J. 644, 656-57 (1999) (quoting *Close v. Kordulak Bros.*, 44 N.J. 589, 599 (1965)).  An appellate court is not bound by an agency's statutory interpretation or other legal determinations, which it reviews de novo.  *Mount*, 233 N.J. at 418-419; and see *Mayflower Sec. Co. v. Bureau of Sec. in Div. of Consumer Affs. of Dep't of L. & Pub. Safety*, 64 N.J. 85, 93 (1973).
[brief] During the hearing, the court addressed the Defendants’ occupancy of the Boonton Property:  …[Y]ou don’t have a right to be living there.  There is no right to live there right now.  You are not on the deed.  You don’t have a lease.  Legally there is no right to anyone being there. ”  (1T9-11-15).  [...] ordered date-of-death appraisals of the “fair market value” of both the Boonton and Florida Properties, and that upon receipt of the appraisals the parties were to have a settlement conference with the Deputy Surrogate.
[brief] The trial court further took issue with the Mayor’s comments because he apparently failed to mention that the Amended Application provided affordable units that were already approved for the site.  Frankly, though, this is irrelevant.  No comment from the Mayor suggests that the affordable housing units were to be affected in any way.  The comments from the Mayor solely mention housing units and reduced density.  Not a word is mentioned about a desired reduction of affordable housing units.  Indeed, the Amended Application included 203 total housing units.  The plain language of the Mayor’s comments demonstrates that the reduction he suggests could have come from the non-affordable units.  But, in order to make the Mayor’s comments “incendiary”, the trial court suggested and the Respondents argue that the Mayor was suggesting the opposite – the reduction of affordable housing units in contravention of the Township’s Housing Element and Fair Share Plan.  This is entirely unsupported by the record.  It is a telling mischaracterization because it purposefully confuses the language of the Mayor’s press release to create a basis deeming the comments “inappropriate.
[brief] Jersey City [P.B.A.] v. Jersey City, 257 N.J. Super. 6,14 (App. Div.1992)  ....12,25  Kubiak v. Allstate Ins. Co.,198 N.J. Super. 115, 119 (App. Div.1984)  ..........12,25  Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Land, 186 N.J. 163, 173-74 (2006)
[brief] (4T 113-12 to 21).  [...] claimed that defendant was this man.  (5T 119-4 to 122-16).  The gun "looked like a Glock," [...] said, and it had an “extended clip. ” (5T 114-6 to 24).  [...] denied that defendant fired that gun while they held him down on the floor of store, but, he testified, defendant had fired it once earlier when running toward the front of the store -- a significant difference from the account police gave.  (5T 137-19 to 138-10).  [...] told police that the gun was a Glock and had an extended clip – a description so specific for an eyewitness that it indicated that [...] was actually the owner and possessor of the gun.  (5T 142-19 to 24).  [...] testified at trial that the robbery took three to five minutes, but, in his statement to police, he said that the robber occurred in “two seconds" after the man demanded money.  (5T 146-12 to 147-2).  [...] testified that he seized four guns at the scene: the Newark Police Sig Sauers carried by [...], [...], and [...], and the Glock recovered from the store.
[brief] *Conrad v. Michelle & John, Inc.*, 394 N.J. Super. 1, 13 (App. Div. 2007).  As the Appellate Division explained:  The slightest doubt as to an issue of material fact must be reserved for the factfinder, and precludes a grant of judgment as a matter of law.  Any issues of credibility must be left to the finder of fact.  That is so even where a witness’s testimony is uncontradicted, as long as, when considering the testimony in the context of the record, persons of reason and fairness may entertain differing views as to its truth.  Summary judgment should be denied unless the right thereto appears so clearly as to leave no room for controversy.
[brief] The State failed to uncover corroborative proof of guilt.  Thus, [...]’s case is not one of the minority of cases where, given admission errors and instructional errors of this magnitude, the presumption of reversal is overcome.  Rather, as in Sanchez-Medina, “looking at all of the proofs together, the evidence against defendant was not overwhelming. ”  231 N.J. at 469.  Weaknesses in the State’s case include:
[brief] Defendant argues that the PCR court erred in denying his claim that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to move to suppress the tire iron found in the Impala driven by [...], specifically that Diaz did not give valid consent to search that car.  (Db20-25).  Defendant’s claim fails because he did not establish that such a motion to suppress would have been meritorious had it been filed and, therefore, did not establish a prima facie claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.  When asserting that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a suppression motion, the defendant, in addition to establishing both parts of the Strickland test, must also prove that his Fourth Amendment claim is meritorious.  State v. Goodwin, 173 N.J. 583, 597 (2002) (citing State v. Fisher, 156 N.J. 494, 501 (1998)).  Counsel’s failure to file a motion to suppress is not a circumstance under which prejudice concerning the denial of assistance of counsel can be presumed.
[brief] The MBPA Contains Strong Protections For Wholesalers, Including Safeguards Against Unreasonable Or Bad Faith Brewers  The sale of malt alcoholic beverages in New Jersey “vitally affects” its economy and public welfare and, as a result, the MBPA was established, in part, to “protect beer wholesalers from unreasonable demands and requirements by brewers…”  N.J.S.A. § 33:1-93.13(c) (emphasis added).  To ensure protection to wholesalers, the MBPA requires all wholesaler agreements for the sale of malt beverages in New Jersey to “conform to State law and the terms of [the MBPA]”  N.J.S.A. § 33:1-93.15(a).  The MBPA goes on to state that:  The provisions of this act may not be waived or modified by written or oral agreement, estoppel or otherwise, and any provision of a contract or ancillary agreement that directly or indirectly requires or amounts to a waiver of any provision of this act, or that would relieve any person of any obligation or liability under this act, or that imposes unreasonable standards of performance on a wholesaler, shall be a violation of this act and shall be null, void and of no effect.  N.J.S.A. § 33:1-93.15(a) (emphasis added).  The MBPA prohibits brewers from “terminat[ing]…a contract…with a wholesaler…except where the brewer establishes that it has acted for good cause and in good faith. ” (Pa33); N.J.S.A. 33:1-93.15(c)(1).  “Good Cause” is defined as “failure to substantially comply with reasonable terms contained in a contract or agreement. ” (Pa33); N.J.S.A. § 33:1-93.14.  The MBPA also prohibits brewers from terminating or refusing to renew a contract with a wholesaler “because the wholesaler refuses to accept an unreasonable amendment to the contract, agreement or relationship. ” (Pa33); N.J.S.A. § 33:1-93.15(c)(2).  At its core, the MBPA requires brewers to act “in a manner consistent with the covenant of good faith and fair dealing implicit in State Contract law. ”  (Pa33); N.J.S.A. § 33:1-93.15(c)(11).  Should a conflict arise under the MBPA, the Act requires such conflicts and controversies be brought in State Court, stating that “[w]hether the terms of a contract, agreement or relationship conform with the provisions of this section shall be determined by a court of this State…”  N.J.S.A. § 33:1-93.15(e) (emphasis added).  Accordingly, any conflict or controversy concerning the terms of a wholesaler agreement or the relationship between a brewer and wholesaler must be brought in New Jersey courts.  III.
[directive] In accordance with the Working Group’s recommendations, these Guidelines encourage relevant law enforcement agencies to undertake these practices, and, in several limited areas, these Guidelines indicate steps the law enforcement agency shall take.  2  The Working Group also made two other sets of recommendations that the [...] has adopted.  First, they recommended my office encourage State-funded CBVI providers to adopt the Report’s recommendations with respect to their work, and second, that the Department take action to advance best practices identified in the Report.  I.
[brief] Appellant had a set number of staff that reported to her.  It became common for [...] to allow [...] who is Caucasian to discipline staff that reported to Appellant with Appellant having no knowledge of this.  In one instance, [...] was terminated by Lugo for a comment he made about the inappropriate way that some female students dressed and Appellant learned of this termination later.  Lugo with [...]’s blessing had a problem with a statement made by a Hispanic teacher which resulted in him quickly being terminated from employment, whereas a Caucasian teacher freely repeating the N word had differential treatment as her contract was renewed and she continued to work in the [...].  [...] was reported on two separate dates in 2019 for using the N word.
[directive] August 5, 2020  Page4  Order 9 - Converting the Status of NGRI Committee to the Status of Civil Committee  {Attachment J)  This court order would be used when an NGRI committee has reached the maximum term of commitment under N.J.S.A. 2C:4-8(b)(3), but the court finds the person remains a danger to self, others or property as a result of mental illness.  The court will convert the status of the NGRI committee to an involuntary civil committee under N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.15.  As such, the jurisdiction over the committee will be transferred to the Superior Court of New Jersey, Civil Part.  Periodic review hearings would then be held pursuant to R. 4:7 4-7 to determine if the committee continues to be dangerous to self, others, or property as a result of mental illness and whether the committee continues to require involuntary confinement in an institution.  These form orders will be posted on the Criminal Forms page of the Judiciary's Internet website at https://www.njcourts.gov/selfhelp/catalog.html and the Criminal Division Forms page of the Judiciary's lnfoNet.