ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] In 2009-2010, [...] engaged in litigation with the Borough for the right of [...] to construct multifamily residential apartment buildings on Lots 3.01 and 4.01 and for the Borough to comply with its affordable housing obligations – *River Drive Development, L.L.C. v. [...]*, Law Division, Bergen County, Docket No. [...] – resulting in [...] obtaining the right to build such residential apartments.  On December 8, 2010, the Borough Planning Board entered a resolution (the “2010 Approval Resolution”) granting [...] (an affiliate of [...] to whom [...] deeded Lot 3.01) final site plan and subdivision approval to construct a residential apartment building on Lot 3.01.  (Da201; Da235.)  The 2010 Map, the recording of which perfected the subdivision approval granted by the 2010 Approval Resolution, depicted the roads as public streets.  (Da173.)  Further, the 2010 Approval Resolution contained the following condition: The access road to the premises must be constructed in accordance with Borough standards and . . . the existing access road must be upgraded to Borough standards prior to the same being dedicated to the [...] at the cost and expense of the applicant.  (Da206 at Condition E, emphasis added.)  Pursuant to the 2010 Approval Resolution and the July 25, 2011 Developer’s Agreement entered into between the Borough and [...], [...] posted a performance guarantee for its completion of the improvements, including the construction of the second and final portion of the Boulevard, and the upgrade of the portions of the Roads that had already been built in connection with the construction of Lot 5.01.  (Da60 at ¶ 13; Da214 at § 9; Da231.)  [...] proceeded to build the apartment building and complete the Roads in 2012.  (Da60 at ¶ 13.)  On April 16, 2013, the Borough Council issued Resolution R-151-13 approving the release of [...]’s performance guarantee that it posted in connection with such improvements.  (Da233.)  Lot 3.01, which has a street address of [...], is still owned by [...], and is still in use as a 107-unit residential apartment building.  (Da61 at ¶ 14.)  D.
[brief] Plaintiff contends that the defense’s reliance on the NJDOH’s conclusions in closing arguments improperly influenced the jury’s conclusion that, although [...] deviated from the standard of care, such a deviation did not proximately cause harm to [...].  (See Pb17-20; Pb39-40.)  Plaintiff thus appears to argue that the admission of the conclusion that there was no violation spoiled plaintiff’s proximate cause argument.  That makes no sense.  Under the facts of this case, the alleged regulatory violations relate to the standard of care, not proximate cause.
[brief] (14T 142-6 to 161-20)  Authentication is governed by N.J.R.E. 901, which states that a piece of evidence will be regarded as authenticated “as a condition precedent to admissibility” if there is simply “evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter is what its proponent claims.” (Emphasis added).  The key phrase is the one that is underscored above: “sufficient to support a finding”; the rule requires merely “a prima facie showing that the instrument is genuine and authentic,” In re Blair’s Estate, 4 N.J. Super. 343, 351 (App. Div. 1949), not “absolute certainty or conclusive proof.
[brief] (8T157-22 to 25).  It was only when defendant gave a second statement to different detectives later that day that he mentioned that his sister [...] and his brother [...] were also at Tipps that night.  (9T23-20 to 24; 9T44-23 to 45-17).  But in his second statement, he did not tell the detectives that his father or his brother [...] were there.  (9T55-18 to 56-1).  In the second statement, contrary to the first, defendant said after the shooting started, [...] drove down the block, turned around, and picked him up.  (9T24-25 to 25-18).  Based on the above evidence, the jury found defendant guilty of second-degree manslaughter, possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose, unlawful possession of a weapon, and fourth-degree aggravated assault.
[brief] Counter-Statement of Procedural History .........................................................6  Counter-Statement of Facts ..............................................................................6  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT  I  Defendant’s animal cruelty conviction should not be reversed because the jury instruction did not fail to define the central element of the offense .........................................................7  POINT  II  The Court did not err in denying the Defendant’s motion for acquittal because the State presented sufficient evidence to defeat an acquittal motion ........................................13  POINT III  The sentence given to the Defendant was not illegal ..........................................................17  A.  The sentencing court did not lack jurisdiction to impose conditions of parole ...........................................................................................................19  B.  The sentencing court imposed a sentenced that was authorized by statute ........................................................................................................22  1.  Ex post facto .........................................................................................23  Conclusion ........................................................................................................25
[brief] Even still, Appellants failed to comply with R. 1:6-2(d).  Assuming arguendo that Appellants’ motion was not “directly addressed to the calendar,” the motion judge was still not required to hear oral argument before deciding on the written filings.  While R. 1:6-2(d) provides that a request for oral argument as to all other motions “shall be granted as of right,” “a trial court may decide a motion on the papers when there are no contested facts that would otherwise require an evidentiary hearing. ”  *Delgado v. Yourman-Helbig*, 2022 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1266, *14 (App.Div.2022), citing Pressler & Verniero, *Current N.J. Court Rules*, cmt. 5 on R. 1:6-2(d)(2022).  In *Delgado*, the Court determined that the motion judge improperly denied oral argument since, *inter alia*, the matter under review involved contested facts.  *Id.* at 15.  The Court concluded that the “absence of certified and admissible evidence require[d the Court] to vacate the motion judge's . . . order and remand the matter so that respondents [could] submit affidavits or certifications [supporting] their factual representations, thereby providing the motion court with a proper basis to make sufficient factual findings. ”  *Id.*  This case is distinguishable from *Delgado* for several reasons.  First, the case here features a straightforward contractual dispute: Appellants entered into an agreement with [...] for the installation of cameras at their property.  Through a series of agreements, the work was completed.  However, Appellants alleged that the cameras were incorrectly installed causing damage to the Property, as well as various economic losses and injuries.  This is not a complex matter of litigation requiring voluminous sources of evidence or particularly niche expertise.  Plus, whereas in *Delgado* there was an “absence of certified and admissible evidence,” here, Appellants included the Certification of [...], Esq., the Certification of [...], the Contract, and several other pieces of documentary evidence.  Accordingly, the motion court had a proper basis to make sufficient factual findings in rendering its decision.  Therefore, Appellants’ conclusory argument that an evidentiary hearing could have been “warranted” should be given no weight.  **CONCLUSION**
[brief] In Hudson Circle, supra, the property owner, defendant, appealed from the verdict of a jury trial involving the taking of property, a portion of which was leased to "[...], which operated the gas station.  The lease provided that in addition to the rent and other charges, the tenant would buy the supplies designated by this owner and pay to the owner, the posted "tank wagon price."  The lease incorporated within its terms the contract referable to the gallonage and a 2 cent per gallon additional rental payment.  A witness from [...] was barred from testifying that in the market, [...] paid tenants usually up to 2 cents a gallon for leases.  The Appellate Court reversed the trial court's ruling excluding the evidence saying that the evidence was admissible and was not an attempt to prove business profits, but rather was relevant to the question of "valuation."  Thus, the opinion certainly does not support the position that the condemnor can substitute an appraisal of a "leased fee" for this taking of the entire property interests represented by the fee simple estate, by basing its value on a 30 year old lease that was negotiated as essentially a land lease instead of a lease representing market rent.
[brief] See, e.g., Meadowbrook, 138 N.J. at 322 (noting authority to request information on financial capacity, describing financial capacity as a material part of identifying the lowest responsible bidder, and explaining the provision of information related to the same “should be understood to enhance the municipality's ability to determine the lowest responsible bidder, thereby minimizing the risk of default by the successful bidder. ”); Terminal Const. Corp. v. Atl. Cnty. Sewerage Auth., 67 N.J. 403, 412 (1975) (“[T]he delivery of certificate demonstrating a present ability to perform, [has] been found to be so material as to not be the subject of waiver. ”) (internal citations and quotations omitted).  Second, “[c]ourts should not casually transform the mandatory requirement in . . . specifications. . . into a polite request. ”  Meadowbrook, 138 N.J. at 324 (internal quotation omitted).  In short, the bidder is responsible for providing responsive documents demonstrating its qualification; it is not the government body’s obligation to independently investigate that qualification.
[brief] (Pa022)  [...] who does not have x-ray vision, stated that after observing plaintiff placing something in the area where the spare tire was kept, he exited his patrol vehicle in which he had been sitting, and made contact with the plaintiff.  (Pa022).  Plaintiff was standing outside of the black jeep with the driver's door open.  (Pa93, Pa022).  Plaintiff stated that the jeep belonged to his friend and had the two sets of keys in his hand.  (Pa093, Pa053, Pa022)  When officer Geist inquired as to who the two vehicles belonged, plaintiff stated [...].  (Pa303).  [...] inquired as to what [...] placed in the trunk.  (Pa022).  Plaintiff stated that an alcoholic beverage was in the trunk and officer Kohut stated that he observed a bottle of whiskey on top of the floorboard in the trunk.  (Pa022, Pa054).  Plaintiff stated that he wanted to make sure that the opened bottle was unobtainable to avoid repercussions during the transit home.
[brief] (2T 63:11-15)  The assets that Defendant now expects her to have utilized were her lifetime savings and a 401(k) retirement account, against which she could only have taken a loan, and which had taken a hit following the 2008 financial crisis.  (2T 77:14-79:6)  She never stated that she did not have $70,000 in aggregate.  [...] never asked about [...]’s savings accounts, checking accounts, or retirement accounts, only about whether she could pay $70,000 towards the down payment.  (2T 60:1-13)  It would, in fact, have been wholly irresponsible for Plaintiff to have spent approximately one-third of her assets on a down payment, given the overall circumstance at the time.
[brief] In this case, the court found aggravating factors (3), the risk that defendant will commit another offense, (6), the extent of defendant’s prior record, and (9) the need for deterrence.  N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a).  (8T 43-13 to 20)  It also found mitigating factor (1), the defendant’s conduct neither caused nor threatened serious harm, and (6), the defendant will compensate the victim.  (8T 41-19 to 22).  N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b).  After considering these factors, but not explicitly assigning weight to each, the court set an extended-term sentence with a discretionary parole disqualifier.  The sentence is too long for the offense and the offender.  As a threshold matter, the trial court wrongly believed that because [...] met the predicates for an extended term, the relevant sentencing range was only the extended range, 10 to 20 years.
[brief] (Pa87).  The lower court “considered the report submitted” by Plaintiff’s expert but did not accord substantial weight to [...]’s conclusions.  *Ibid.*  In dismissing Count IV, the lower court reasoned that the Plan Amendment modified existing regulations rather than add a new permitted use or conditional use to the underlying zone and, moreover, promoted the overall goals of redevelopment and effectuation of the master plan rather than promote the private interests of Defendant [...].  *Ibid.*  An Amended Notice of Appeal was thereafter filed by Plaintiff on January 12, 2024.  (Pa94 to Pa97).  **APPELLATE STANDARD OF REVIEW**
[brief] ”  Rosenberg, 169 N.E.3d at 461 (quotation marks omitted).  Indeed, the trial court in this action has itself held that [...] is “news media” under the NJFCA, a conclusion from which it has not retreated.  See 1T at 14:21–25.  No court has addressed whether [...] is an FCA “news media” source, but it would plainly qualify under all the precedents discussed above.
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING [...]’S MOTION TO ASSERT A COUNTERCLAIM FOR SETOFF BECAUSE EQUITY MANDATES THE AMOUNT OF THE AWARD BE REDUCED TO REFLECT [...]’S OFFSETTING OBLIGATION TO [...] [DA32-33]  The Trial Court erred in denying Arc’s motion for leave to file a counterclaim for a setoff of the Award in the amount Arc is owed by [...] for the Hackensack Project.  See Rule 4:67-4(a); Perretti v. Ran-Dav's Cnty. Kosher, Inc., 289 N.J. Super. 618, 624 (App. Div. 1996) (“[I]t is evident that leave [to assert a counterclaim] must be obtained so as to afford the trial court an opportunity to manage the litigation between the necessary parties, providing for expeditious resolution of those issues that can be addressed quickly, and more thorough development of those that require plenary treatment.
[brief] We submit the query to this Court -- how can the owner of a residential, occupied property have the identical legal rights and protections that as the owner of a vacant property under renovation?  How is that construction of the law fair to an innocent pedestrian?  We respectfully submit that the law should protect the innocent pedestrian exposed to unreasonable risks of harm, and in this circumstance the law should permit the claim.  As we argued in our initial papers, on the date of the accident, if the property can be characterized as occupied to any extent, it was only “occupied” by a paid contractor who was making the property habitable for the defendants.  In the alternative, we submitted that if the court does not agree that the subject property was commercial-like and a higher duty must be imposed, the appellant alternatively argues that the respondents failed to remove the snow to create a safe walking surface, and instead creating a much more dangerous condition on the walkway.  If the Court were to accept that the law regarding residential properties applies, we respectfully submit it is that dangerous undertaking and creation of an unnatural hazard that creates culpability on the part of the respondents/defendants.  In either event, we respectfully submit that factual disputes existed below that required a jury’s consideration and resolution.
[brief] Prior to Plaintiff’s crash, on April 22, 2015, a bridge inspection identified roadway settlement at the abutment joint and it was recommended that the [...] fix it.  (Pa1349);(Pa1350).  Approximately two months later, another inspection took place.  That inspection also identified “significant settlement” at the same location and recommended that it be repaired “immediately”.  (Pa1193).  The settlement constituted a dangerous condition.  In fact, the [...]’s Chief Engineer [...] agreed that the settlement that Plaintiff identified would be dangerous to users of the roadway.  (Pa801 at 28:3-16).  In addition to that admission, the recommendation to fix the condition contained in both the Biennial Inspection and the T&M inspection creates the inference it was unsafe.  Defects in the travel lanes should be fixed immediately; no matter who identified it.  (Pa0799 at 19:1-16).  The settlement at the abutment joint should have been milled and repaved.  (Pa0599).  At a minimum, warning signs should have been used pursuant to the MUTCD.  (Pa1337).  Here, the record is void of any evidence to suggest that warning signs were used or that the condition was fixed until November 17, 2015.  (Pa1396).
[brief] The Appellate Division discussed the elements of an unjust enrichment claim:  To demonstrate unjust enrichment, ‘a plaintiff must show both that defendant received a benefit and that retention of that benefit without payment would be unjust’ and that the plaintiff ‘expected remuneration’ and the failure to give remuneration unjustly enriched the defendant. \(^{45}\) \(^{45}\) *EnviroFinance Grp., LLC v. Env’t Barrier Co., LLC*, 440 N.J. Super. 325, 350 (App. Div. 2015), quoting *VRG Corp. v. GKN Realty Corp.*, 135 N.J. 539, 554 (1994)  Here, the Counterclaim admits that [...] did not perform services during the period it seeks payment for.  [...] admittedly did not work in April 2020 and the beginning of July 2020, so the Board did not receive any benefit to justify a public school district forking over $699,000+ of taxpayer money to a for-profit private company on a no-show contract.  Without identifying a contractual agreement where the Board agreed to (gratuitously and illegally) pay [...] on a no-show contract, [...] cannot also satisfy the “expected remuneration” element.  Count Two for unjust enrichment therefore fails.
[brief] STATEMENT OF FACTS  Plaintiffs [...] and [...] are the record owners of the improvements only located on Block 247, Lot 13, otherwise known as [...], in [...], [...], New Jersey  which area has been registered as a National Historic District in the National Register of Historic Places, noted for abundant examples of Victorian architecture.  Plaintiffs lease the underlying land located at [...], by Assignment of Lease (in perpetuity) under Original Jurisdiction of the [...] Camp Meeting Association.  Appellant’s conducted work on the lot adjacent to their lot (Lot 1), which lot was owned by the [...] Camp Meeting Association and commonly known as “[...]” by fully removing and abandoning two pre-existing, non-conforming undamaged concrete walkways (Pa122a) and installing multiple paver (3) walkways (Pa 111a-113a) (where only ONE walkway in the Historic Flare is allowed by Ordinance) without a zoning permit or a Certificate of Appropriateness from the Historic Preservation Commission, which Commission regulates architectural features on the exterior of every property located in [...] in order maintain the designation on the National Historic Register.  As a result of the unauthorized work, municipal court violations were issued.  Upon information and belief, Appellant was advised in Municipal Court proceeding to go through the process to obtain a Certificate of Appropriateness prior to the determination of [...].
[brief] [...] even cited to I/M/O Treston, Randolph Board of Education, Commission Docket No. C71-18 (2021) (Ca400), as affirmed by Advisory Opinion A02-22 (2022) above, in determining the appropriate penalty.  (Ca037).  As the Commission made clear in I/M/O Treston, “there is a robust body of decisions and advisory opinions which school officials can utilize to determine when, and how, a disclaimer must be used on social media when speaking in their personal/private capacity in order to avoid running afoul of the Act. ”  Id at 9.  It is clear from this well-established body of caselaw that – pursuant to the Legislature’s mandate in creating the Commission – there is an affirmative duty to disclaim when school board members make social media posts from an account they campaigned from which might otherwise compromise the board.  This is especially true where – as here – “[p]eople in [Respondent’s] community are aware of [her] status as a Board member and would likely attribute any statement from [her] in [her] capacity as a Board member. ”  Advisory Opinion A02-22 (2022) (Ca399).  These cases were cited extensively by the parties and [...] as they are clearly the gold standard on this issue.  However, this line of cases was inexplicably nowhere to be found in the Commission’s analysis in the present matter.
[brief] Declarant does not explain what the requirements and functions of a Litigation Support Coordinator are.  A Google search discloses the typical requirements for a Litigation Coordinator.  Familiarity with computerized records as a user or familiarity with computerized record-keeping is not required.  See Exhibit II (Da128) as an example of the Specialized Experience Requirement for a Litigation Coordinator.  Declarant states, “I am familiar with the books and records of the plaintiff in this matter. ”  Unlike the witnesses in the Shawmut Bank and HSBC Bank cases, Declarant does not state that Declarant was familiar with the procedures or methods by which data is entered into Plaintiff’s computer system; does not outline those procedures; and does not state that Declarant or other of Plaintiff’s employees found the procedures reliable.  In the American Oil Co. case, cited in the Shawmut Bank case, the Court stated that a witness must have personal experience with record keeping procedures.
[brief] In *Farthing*, the defendant's claim of diminished capacity was presented through the testimony of [...] and [...].  Both witnesses asserted that defendant was unable to harbor the requisite *mens rea* because she was suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder.  *Id.*  However, the witnesses differed in the manner in which they arrived at their conclusions.  *Id.*  [...] testified that the facts surrounding the crimes were not significant in arriving at his diagnosis.
[brief] The Appellant-Defendant in this matter, [...] (“[...]”), is an Ivy League-educated homeowner who acted as the General Contractor during construction of his own Ocean City home, and who shorted Respondent-Plaintiff, [...] (“[...]”) $40,000.00 of the $120,000 worth of wood-trim installed therein.  The parties thereafter proceeded through approximately 400 days of discovery wherein [...] consistently denied the existence of a contract between the parties, even though in his April 3, 2023 Answer [...] admitted that he prepared it.  On March 13, 2024, counsel for [...] asserted for the first time that the contract his client admitted to having prepared included an enforceable arbitration provision.  This was approximately 400 days after the filing of the Complaint in this matter.  [...] still claims he never signed the contract.  Put simply, Counsel for [...] is petitioning this Panel to enforce a contract which [...] does not acknowledge exists and/or claims he never signed.  Consider the following colloquy between the trial court and counsel for [...] during oral argument on the motion to Stay the Proceeding below:  THE COURT:  Is it going to be your position at trial, [...], that this document is not the contract?  [...]:  I doubt it.  But I don’t know that for sure.  I – I think it’s going to largely depend on the deposition of his – of—the testimony at depositions.  Because it was not – the contract, the document, was not executed by my client…  T41, 1-8.  In this appeal, [...] seeks to enforce a clause in a document which his attorney doubts is the contract between the parties, and which counsel for [...] told the trial court [...] did not sign.  If the contract does not exist, or if it does but [...] never signed the contract, there is no arbitration clause to be enforced.  As the trial court opined, the motion which is the subject of this appeal borders on silly and frivolous.