ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] He did not.  (6T111-16 to 24).  Nor would it have changed the result had defense counsel objected to [...]’s testimony.  While he now argues that [...] testified by implication that his conclusions were verified by an independent examiner, defendant had the opportunity to—and did, in fact—cross-examine [...] regarding the verification step of the ACE-V process.  This included questioning on the absence of evidence of another analyst’s verification of his conclusion, discussion of the PCAST report, introduction of the fact that [...] worked with the prosecutor and was only given one set of exemplar prints—defendant’s—after defendant had been indicted, and the reliability of fingerprint analysis techniques generally and the ACE-V method specifically.  Defendant’s counsel posed numerous questions to [...] in an attempt to cast doubt on the validity of his opinion.  The jury apparently decided that [...]’s testimony was credible, and, quite simply, reasonably found defendant’s attempt at cross-examination unpersuasive.
[brief] Police and Fire Interest Arbitration Can Only Be Performed by Arbitrators Who Are Specially Trained and Selected and Then Monitored by PERC.  It also needs to be emphasized that the Legislature did not want police and fire interest arbitrations to be performed by inexperienced arbitrators.  N.J.S.A. 34:13A-16e provides that the Commission has to specially screen and select the individuals who can perform interest arbitration.  The individuals have to be “chosen based on their professional qualifications, knowledge and experience, in accordance with the criteria and rules adopted by the commission,” as well as on the basis of their “knowledge of local government operations and budgeting. ”
[brief] (Da334).  On April 18, 2022, [...] informed the GRC of the denial of [...]’s motion to stay and requested that the [...] be referred to the OAL.  (Da484).  The GRC Complaint was transmitted to the OAL on June 1, 2022.  (Da485).  On March 1, 2023, while the GRC Complaint was pending before the OAL, [...] and the [...] reached an agreement regarding prevailing party counsel fees that resolved [...]’s claims for counsel fees in the GRC Complaint and in the 2021 Trial Court Proceedings.
[brief] The Trial Court further stated:  To the extent [...] takes umbrage the development that will occur on the Bayshore, such is premature.  At issue in this action is the propriety of [...]’s adoption of the Plan.  The court cannot consider any prospective, future approval of development – which may never come to fruition.  Challenges to those are for a future day, in a future litigation, following a future municipal action – if such future events ever occur.  To be sure, such development may never occur in the manner authorized by the Plan (Pa1746).
[brief] See also *McClellan*, 468 N.J. Super. at 577-78 (quoting *Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment* § 51 cmt. A (Am. L. Inst. 2011) (“The Restatement indicates disgorgement is a form of restitution, stating ‘[r]estitution measured by the defendant’s wrong gain is frequently called disgorgement. ’”).  Thus, disgorgement targets profits made from the proceeds a defendant gains in an unlawful transaction, including profits from a defendants’ subsequent use of the proceeds it receives.  Even prior to the 1997 amendment of the Securities Law, this court has recognized the inherent authority of the Chancery Division to disgorge unlawful gains in actions involving securities fraud.  State v. Darby, 246 N.J. Super. 432, 447 (App. Div. 1991) (“The authority to order disgorgement of unlawful gains is inherent in the historic equity jurisdiction of the Superior Court, Chancery Division. ”).  Subsequently, the Legislature included disgorgement as one of the non-exclusive remedies that a court could award in an action brought for a violation of the Securities Law.
[brief] Plaintiff’s liability expert altogether ignores [...]’s involvement in this case.  (Pa470-71).  More than this, Plaintiff would ask the jury to draw a connection between paint and a slip and fall on ice over 30 days later.  As [...] put it in the court’s statement of reasons, “A surface covered in ice is slippery. ” (Pa6).  An expert is needed to elucidate the complex question of how the paint made the ice in question more slippery in a way that materially contributed to the fall.  Finally, Plaintiff has not shown that [...] breached a standard in the industry.  One of the prototypical reasons why expert testimony is required is to establish a prima facie case when the issue “involves the standard of care against which to measure a defendant’s conduct.
[directive] If a person charged with a violation of this section can exhibit his driver's license, insurance identification card and registration certificate, which were valid on the day he was charged, to the judge of the municipal court before whom he is summoned to answer to the charge, such judge may dismiss the charge.  However, the judge may impose court costs.  P.L. 2003, c. 89, §§ 78, 79, eff. June 9, 2004 N.J.S.A. 39:3-29.1a.
[directive] Roadblock.  A restriction or obstruction used or intended for the purpose of preventing free passage of motor vehicles on a roadway in order to effectuate the apprehension of a violator.  An avenue of escape is a gap in a roadblock which requires the violator to decrease the vehicle's speed to permit the violator to bypass the roadblock.  A blocking vehicle is a motor vehicle, often a law enforcement vehicle, which is placed perpendicular to a roadway or angled in such a way as to create a roadblock.  2.10
[brief] ”  Ja043.  The MLUL categorizes “use” variances into six categories under Sec. 70(d): (1) a use different than permitted in the zoning district; (2) an expansion of a nonconforming use; (3) a deviation from a conditional use standard; (4) an increase in the permitted floor area ratio; (5) an increase in permitted density; and (6) height variances which exceed the maximum permitted height by 10 feet or 10% of the maximum permitted height.
[directive] 8.2.4  If the subject officer agrees to voluntarily provide a statement or waives his rights, the interview may then continue.  Unless the officer specifically waives their Fifth Amendment rights, any incriminating statements obtained under direct order will not be admissible in a criminal prosecution but will be admissible in an administrative hearing.  The subject officer should be afforded the opportunity to consult with an attorney prior to a compelled interview.  8.2.5  If the officer has invoked their Miranda rights but the agency deems that it must have the answers to specific questions to properly conduct its investigation, the agency must contact the County Prosecutor to request use immunity for the interview to continue.
[brief] Appellant Failed to State a Claim for Relief Under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act – 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq.  | 7 | | a)  Appellant’s Letter Vendor Theory Is Contrary to the FDCPA’s Purpose | 10 | | b)  Appellant’s Letter Vendor Theory is Contrary to Congressional Intent Concerning Third Party Communications | 13 | | c)  Appellant’s Letter Vendor Theory Is Contrary To Proper Statutory Construction And Interpretation | 15 | | 1.  Appellant’s “letter vendor” claim is an exercise in “uncritical literalism” that fails under fundamental principles of statutory construction | 15 | | a.  Transmitting data to an agent or contractor is not a “third-party” “communication” and is not an attempt to collect a debt | 20 | | b.  Appellant’s Theory is at Odds with Other FDCPA Provisions, Which Permit the Use of Service Providers under Many Circumstances, and would Lead to Absurd Results | 21 | c.  Appellant’s theory is contrary to decisions from the agencies tasked with implementing and enforcing the FDCPA........26  2.  Appellant’s Reliance on Federal Decisions is Contrary to New Jersey Law and Fails to Consider that Numerous Federal Courts Have Dismissed Cases with Similar FDCPA Letter Vendor Claims.........................................................29  D.  In The Alternative, Appellant’s Claim Must Be Dismissed For Lack Of Standing Under New Jersey Law ..................................33  V. CONCLUSION ..................................................................................................................37  ## TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | Cases | Page(s) | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|---------| | **Abdelfattah Mhrez v. Convergent Outsourcing, Inc.,** | passim | | Case No. [...] (N.J. Sup. Ct. Jan. 6, 2023) | | | **Asmad-Escobar v. Phoenix Fin. Servs. LLC,** | 3, 8, 16, 32 | | 2024 WL 2839329 (App. Div. June 5, 2024) | | | **Banco Popular N. Am. v. Gandi,** | 6 | | 184 N.J. 161 (2005) | | | **Barclift v. Keystone Credit Servs., Inc.,** | 15, 24, 30 | | 2022 WL 444267 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 14, 2022) | | | **Benzemann v. Citibank, N.A.,** | 10 | | 806 F.3d 98 (2d Cir. 2015) | | | **Bergen County PBA Loc. 134 v. Donovan,** | 18, 19, 23, 25 | | 436 N.J. Super. 187 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 2014) | | | **Cavazzini v. MRS Associates,** | 14, 19, 30 | | 574 F. Supp. 3d 134 (E.D.N.Y. 2021) | | | **Ciccone v. Cavalry Portfolio Servs., LLC,** | 24 | | 2021 WL 5591725 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 29, 2021) | | | **Cnty. of Warren v. State,** | 6 | | 409 N.J. Super. 495 (App. Div. 2009) | | | **Comcast Corp. v. Nat'l Ass'n of Afr. Am.-Owned Media,** | 20 | | 589 U.S. 327 (2020) | | | **Deutsche Bank Nat. Tr. Co. v. Russo,** | 34 | | 429 N.J. Super. 91 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 2012) | | | **Dewey v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.,** | 31 | | 121 N.J. 69 (1990) | | | **DiProspero v. Penn,** | 8, 16, 18 | | 183 N.J. 477 (2005)
[brief] FEDERAL CASES | Case Name | Page | |------------------------------------------------|------| | Barrows v. Chase Manhattan Mortgage Corp., | 45 | | 465 F. Supp. 2d 347 (D.N.J. 2006) | | | Big Apple BMW Inc. v. BMW of North Am., Inc., | 25 | | 974 F.2d 1358 (3d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, | | | 507 U.S. 912 (1993) | | | Board of Curators of Univ. of Mo. V.
[brief] Moreover, the reasonable expectations doctrine is premised on the reasonable expectations of the policyholder, i.e., [...].  See Zacarias, 168 N.J. at 595.  As such, Intervenor’s arguments in this context must be rejected.  See Kievit v. Loyal Protective Life Ins. Co., 34 N.J. 475, 482 (1961) (explaining the doctrine of reasonable expectations and noting it can only apply to “members of the public [who] purchase policies of insurance [.].”) (emphasis added).  Finally, the reasonable expectations doctrine, when applied in the proper context, by the proper party, only applies where policy language is ambiguous, technical, or contains hidden pitfalls.  Zacarias, 168 N.J. at 601.  As set forth above, the language contained in Question 4 clearly and simply asked whether [...] rented vehicles in connection with its event and if so, whether those vehicles included 12 to 15 passenger vans.  (Ia143).  There was nothing ambiguous or technical about the Question and it did not contain any hidden pitfalls.  G.
[directive] Rule or Statute Description  This statute provides that when a defendant charged with a sex offense, as defined in 2C:7-2, is released from custody before trial on bail or personal 2C:14-12 (Nicole’s Law) recognizance, the court authorizing the release may issue a written restraining order prohibiting the defendant from having any contact with the victim including, but Conditions Placed Upon Release of not limited to, restraining the defendant from entering the victim’s residence, place of employment or business, or school, or from harassing or stalking the victim or Certain Defendants the victim’s relatives.  2C:25-26d provides that when setting bail in a domestic violence case, the court must conduct a search of the Domestic Violence Central Registry.  Bail shall be set as soon as feasible, but in all cases within 24 hours of arrest.  2C:25-26e provides that once bail is set it shall not be reduced without notice to the county 2C:25-26(d)(e); 2C:25-31a; prosecutor and victim.  It also provides that bail shall not be reduced by a judge other than the judge who originally ordered bail, unless the reasons for the original 2C:29-9b bail are available to the judge who reduces the bail and are set forth on the record  Bail in Domestic Violence Cases
[brief] “Furthermore, ‘[t]he granting of a mistrial is within the sound discretion of the trial judge. ’”  Ibid. (quoting DiRienzo, supra, 53 N.J. at 383, 251 A.2d 99).  Thus, a trial court's denial of a mistrial is not disturbed absent an abuse of discretion or “unless ‘manifest injustice would ... result. ”  Ibid. (quoting State v. LaBrutto, 114 N.J. 187, 207, 553 A.2d 335 (1989)).  *14  Mindful of these legal principles, we are satisfied that the trial judge did not err in denying defendants' applications for a mistrial.
[brief] Coello applied Heck’s deferred-accrual rule to a plaintiff who did not file suit until nine years after her conviction.  The policy in Heck and McDonough was fundamentally guided by practical considerations and reasoning that, since a plaintiff in either scenario was essentially attacking the validity of the criminal proceeding, a malicious prosecution claim begins to accrue after the favorable termination.  Id. at 119-120.  Until McDonough, § 1983 plaintiffs faced the dilemma of either waiting for the underlying criminal proceeding to conclude or preserving the statute of limitations by filing parallel civil litigation.  This reasoning applies with equal weight here; however, it went without consideration by the trial court.  As did the Respondents previously, the trial court nevertheless proceeded with an ill-considered, overreaching analysis in order to justify its dismissal based on the statute of limitations.
[directive] When Decisions  Charging of Coordination 3.6 more or with two charged may be and arrested is defendant a where cases be may There different in committed burglaries of series a (e.g., counties multiple in committed offenses in occurring distribution activities drug border, county a crosses eluding that jurisdictions, charging/pretrial the coordinate important to is it instances, those In etc.).  counties, multiple determining responsibility for prirriary assumes office prosecutor's one that so decision release pretrial seek or conditions., to release special request to acomplaint-warrant, for apply to whether other any or Section 3.3 notwithstanding
[brief] This Appeal must affirm the Trial Court for the same reasons set forth by the Trial Judge.  The Trial Court was correct in finding that a party who contractually assigns his rights to a legal malpractice action to third parties, cannot sustain a lawsuit.  This Court should also consider additional reasons for affirming the Trial Court.  If Plaintiffs are permitted to assign their rights to a legal malpractice case, and still prosecute the claim in their own name, the Courts will be forced to litigate cases in which the party litigating the case, technically has no interest in the litigation, or the settlement thereof.  Therefore, public policy favors having the real party in interest in the Courtroom with a stake in the entire outcome of the litigation.  The Plaintiff’s appeal also seeks to reverse evidentiary rulings made by the Trial Judge prior to the dismissal.
[brief] 2.  The Requested Deviation will not Substantially Impair the Intent and Purpose of the Zone Plan and Zone Ordinance.  Plaintiff’s proofs also demonstrate that the increased height for the permitted use would not substantially impair the intent and purpose of the zone plan and ordinance.  Again, warehouse/distribution centers were permitted in [...]’s SM Zone.  Plaintiff did not need a use variance, and it only sought a height variance to construct a permitted use—a use explicitly envisioned for the very tract of land subject to this litigation.  [...] provided detailed testimony on why this variance would not substantially impair the intent and purpose of the zone plan and ordinance for the SM Zone.
[brief] On July 7, 2022, Appellant filed a motion to vacate the Judgment and Respondents Cross-moved to amend the complaint to conform to the evidence pursuant to Rules 4:9-1 and 4:9-2.  (Da85).  On August 8, 2022, the Court entered an Order denying Appellant’s motion for reconsideration and granting Respondents’ motion to amend.  (Da260).  The Court held:  - Appellant argues he was "unaware that the trial had been converted to a proof hearing.  No notice was provided by either the court or by the plaintiffs to [...] of this fact."  Def’s Supp. Br., at 21.  Yet, as the court noted in the June 23, 2022 Opinion, “[t]rial commenced on September 21, 2020.  When contacted by the court, Appellant sent an email to plaintiffs’ counsel at 10:00a.m. on the morning of trial stating ‘on the advice of counsel, I will not be participating in the trial. ”  (Da265).  -  Equitable estoppel is an appropriate remedy in the current situation.  The court converted the trial into a proof hearing on the same day of the trial and only after Appellant informed the court and Respondents’ counsel he would not be participating.  Therefore, Appellant’s contention that he had no notice and therefore no right to participate in the hearing strains credulity.  (Da266).  **STATEMENT OF FACTS**
[brief] In the face of *Skrupa* and *Furman*, Appellants cannot meet their burden to prove that no legitimate governmental purpose supports the DACCA Attorney Safe Harbor.  *See Caviglia*, 178 N.J. at 477.  Appellants attribute outsized significance to the opinions of a Department employee, [...], on questions of law that fall within the province of this court.  (Ab29).  Appellants point to [...]’s lay understanding on the following legal hypotheticals: (1) whether a novice attorney is allowed to handle debt adjustment matters; (2) whether the DACCA restricts bankruptcy attorneys; and (3) whether the DACCA restricts attorneys who perform “excellent work. ”  (Ibid.).  As a preliminary matter, Appellants mischaracterize the relevant issue under the Knight test, which is whether the Legislature had a legitimate governmental purpose to enact the DACCA, and not whether it has specific policy benefits as articulated by Appellants.  Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla. Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 487–88 (1955) (“[T]he law need not be in every respect logically consistent with its aims to be constitutional.
[directive] BWC OF RETENTION 8. law a by promulgated order or directive, procedure, operating standing policy, The during time of period the specify shall this Directive of 3 section to pursuant agency enforcement and days, 90 than less be not shall period retention The retained. be shall recording which BWC a periods: retention additional following the to subject shall be records otherwise or investigation criminal a to recording pertains when BWC a a) shall recording be prosecution, the a in discovery to subject be may that information for retention period with the accordance in kept be shall and evidence as treated prosecution. criminal a in evidence or prosecution, ongoing an in result not did that arrest an records BWC a when b) of expiration the until the kept be shall recording the force, police of use the records agency. and/or officer the against complaint civil filing for a limitations of statute complaint, internal affairs an of subject the is that incident an records BWC a when c) internal affairs of resolution the final pending kept recording be shall the action.
[brief] The Court Below Cited No Authority (Pa-171).  Pointed out above is the fact that the Court below never relied on one case: a grant of summary judgment should not be accomplished by “an opinion devoid of analysis or citation to even a single case;” Estate of Doerfler v. Fed Ins. Co., 454 N.J. Super. 298, 301-302 (App. Div. 2012) holding that Judges, in final Order, in favor of Defendants did not meet the requirements of R. 1:7-4(a) because it made only a “nebulous illusion” to the reasons set forth in Defendants’ Motion papers.  Also, in Raspantini v. Arocho, 364 N.J. Super. 528, 533 (App. Div. 2003), as mentioned above, R. 1:7-4 mandates, “specific findings of fact and conclusions of law in all appealable orders, neither the summary judgment rule, nor R. 1:7-4 were implemented in this case.  This Plaintiff was treated unjustly.  She defeated a Motion for Summary Judgment in 2020 (Pa-117).  The Motion in 2020 was analyzed by [...].  In the second Motion, which is the subject of this appeal, the Court rejected the law of the case, implemented the statute of limitations, granted the Motion for Summary Judgment and dismissed the case, all without citing one case (Pa-171).
[brief] The record below unquestionably demonstrates that Unit 74 is a common element.  Whether the master deed ‘authorized’ the 2016 sale of Unit 74 has nothing to do with the whether the Developer misrepresented its quality of title.  As the Plaintiff’s briefs demonstrate, the Developer committed an unlawful practice by representing it had done nothing to create legal rights in Unit 74 and that no other persons had legal rights with respect to Unit 74.  This misrepresentation is demonstrated by the fact the Developer designated Unit 74 as a common element.  Instead of finding the Developer committed an unlawful practice, it concluded there was no fraud.  This ‘no fraud’ finding was not only erroneous, but it resulted in the dismissal of each and every cause of action asserted by the Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint.
[brief] It's important to note that during the plea agreement he specifically delineated his obligation or his right to appeal the 404(b) motion, to appeal the motion to suppress.  He did not ever appeal, it seems, the underlying homicide case and waited until the Supreme Court acted to raise this specific concern.  So, the Court notes that clearly the parties contemplated retaining a lot of rights in terms of appeals, in terms of dealing with what was going on in Pennsylvania but there was never any discussion or preservation of any rights to do anything regarding the homicide conviction if the robbery conviction ultimately got reversed.  And clearly to appeal the motion to suppress is to retain the right to collaterally attack the robbery conviction and there was never any effort to retain any right to undo the murder conviction if the robbery conviction was somehow reversed.  So I don't think that the nature and strength of the defendant's reasons for withdrawal are persuasive.
[brief] On June 14, 2023, the jury returned a verdict in this matter.  (6T).  The Honorable [...], J.S.C., covered this matter for [...], who was out that day.  (6T3:2-4).  The jury found returned a guilty verdict with respect to Count I (Attempted Kidnapping) and Count II (Possession of an Imitation Firearm for Unlawful Purpose), but acquitted [...] on Count III (Witness Tampering).  (6T9:4-10:11).  When the State moved to revoke [...]’s release pending sentencing, Defense counsel argued against the revocation and raised his earlier request for a mistrial.  (6T14:11-17).  [...] asked whether [...] had already ruled on this motion, and Defense counsel stated that [...] ruled that he was not going to issue a mistrial at that time, despite there being no evidence in the record to suggest that a formal ruling was ever made.