ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] Police of State Superintendent the by established identification of system fingerprint of the more or copies two delay without forward and prescribed, forms on and the and required be may other as descriptions such and photographs with together same, Identification. of Bureau State the to committed, of oi~'ense the with history a any with charged person any of arrest the upon immediately fingerprinting requires further 53:1-18.1 N.J.S.A. otherwise."  or indictable shall same be whether the drugs, dangerous or narcotic to "relating offense an ascertain to officer or agency enforcement law a of authority limits the way any in Directive in Nothing this on depend does that not Index query Identification or NCIC/CCH Interstate an of means by history criminal arrestee's verification.  fingerprint Criminal Scan Live a conducting from agency enforcement law a preclude not does Directive this addition, In AFIS FBI and Police State Jersey New the search and offender an identify help submission to fingerprint Inquiry and basis return" on and prints "search a submits function
[brief] Pa1.  All defendants filed motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to R. 4:6-2(e) asserting that none of the Plaintiffs had standing to bring their claims.  Pa116, Pa120, Pa144, Pa153.  Plaintiffs-Appellants asserted that as taxpayers in the same county in which the Project is located, they had standing as county taxpayers to challenge the tax abatement that was granted by the [...] to [...].  Pa172.  The Court correctly found that Plaintiffs-Appellants lack standing because Plaintiffs-Appellants failed to demonstrate that they had a sufficient stake in the subject matter of the underlying case or a substantial likelihood of some harm.  Pa80, Pa82, Pa84, Pa86.  For the reasons outlined more fully below, we respectfully request that the Appellate Division affirm the orders of the trial court below, which dismissed the Complaint with prejudice.
[brief] All Citations Not Reported in A.2d, 2007 WL 674655  Footnotes  1  Testimony in the trial established that “[...]” was defendant's street name.  2  *United States v. Wade*, 388 U.S. 218, 87 S.Ct. 1926, 18 L. Ed.2d 1149 (1967).  3  The judge gave the jury that instruction during his preliminary remarks to the jury at the beginning of voir dire, after the jury was sworn and in his final jury charge.  Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.  UNPUBLISHED OPINION.  CHECK COURT RULES BEFORE CITING.
[brief] (3T65-2 to 8).  [...] explained that the latent fingerprint here was developed from a chemical reaction with blood.  (3T70-13 to 71-8).  Based on his review of hundreds of prints like this one, he determined that there “was blood on the finger when it touched the object. ” (3T71-13 to 23).  He explained he could tell “because the ridges are . . . pronounced. ” (3T71-24 to 25).  He explained that if the print were on the item and then blood was to go on top of it, “blood would go everywhere into the furrows . . . between the ridges. ” (3T72-10 to 14).  He concluded that since here the blood “was only on the ridges,” it was touched with blood.  (3T72-16 to 18).  Thus, this statement was directly within his expertise as a latent fingerprint examiner who analyzes and interprets ridges in fingerprints.  A bloodstain pattern analyst, on the other hand, has no expertise in the ridges and furrows of a fingerprint and would be unqualified to make a conclusion regarding an interpretation of those ridges.  See (3T131-1 to 10).  The testimony was thus [...]’s scope and was thus properly admitted.
[brief] --- 1  [...] pleaded guilty to third-degree conspiracy to commit aggravated assault, and was subsequently sentenced to five years of probation.  [...] and [...] were tried by a jury before [...] in October 2018.  Both were convicted of second-degree conspiracy to commit aggravated assault, serious bodily injury.  [...] was sentenced to seven years’ imprisonment, subject to NERA.  [...] was sentenced to an extended term of seventeen years of imprisonment, subject to NERA.  [...]’s and [...]’s convictions and sentences were affirmed by this Court in the same consolidated opinion as defendant’s.
[directive] De-Activation at the Request of a Civilian Providing Information/Cooperation.  Notwithstanding Section 5.3, an officer may de-activate a BWC when a civilian conversing with the officer requests that the device be turned off under circumstances where it reasonably appears that the person will not provide information or otherwise cooperate with the officer unless that request is respected.4  The officer shall not suggest to the person that the BWC should be de-activated; nor shall the officer ask the person whether he or she would prefer that the BWC be de-activated.  Rather, the request for de-activation must be self-initiated by the civilian.  The officer may explain the consequences of de- activation (e.g., evidence relevant to a criminal investigation will not be recorded).  In deciding whether to de-activate the BWC, the officer shall consider the privacy and safety interests of the person requesting de-activation, whether the encounter is occurring in the person’s residence, and the need for the information or assistance that the person will provide only if the de-activation request is honored.
[brief] See, e.g., State v. Watts, 223 N.J. 503, 519 (2015).  In State v. Moriarty, 133 N.J. Super. 563, 570 (App. Div.), certif. den. 68 N.J. 172 (1975), the court sustained a warrant authorizing the search of a person, who was unnamed but described as a "white male, wearing black horn rimmed glasses" seated in a particular vehicle.  Despite the vague description of the individual contained in the warrant, the inclusion of the vehicle and the officers' knowledge of the identity of the person referred to in the warrant satisfied the particularity requirement.  Id.; but see the Supreme Court's limitation of this holding in State v. Daniels, 46 N.J. 428, 438 (1966), that the personal knowledge of the officer executing the warrant cannot be held to cure a "vitally deficient description," is applicable where the "home which was intended to be searched was, in fact, searched is irrelevant.
[directive] charging approve review and to authorized be position may duty in that officer the directive a issues Prosecutor County the if Police, State Jersey New the to respect With of the members writing those in specify shall Superintendent the 3.3.1, subsection to pursuant who and Directive this of purposes for officers supervisory as designated are who Police State overcome to authorized (2) are decisions, and charging approve and review to authorized (1) are those perform to qualified are members Police State such that determining after presumption, a demonstrated experience, assignment, duty their considering functions decision-making duty a specify may Superintendent the alternative, the in or addition In training. and judgment, which in etc.), detective, station station, of the charge in officer (e.g., station within a position charging approve and review authorized to be may position duty that in member the event conditions impose to authority Prosecutor's County a limits paragraph this in Nothing decisions. assignment and/or duty member Police State a of authority approval the on limitations or Superintendent. the by designated to authority shall have subsection this to pursuant designated officer supervisory A from officer an by made was the arrest where cases in only decisions charging review/approve to authorized be not officer shall supervisory designated A department. officer's supervisory the agency. other any by made arrest an for decision charging a approve or review authority approval on the limits or conditions such impose Prosecutor may County The (e.g., appropriate deems Prosecutor the as officers supervisory designated all or any to granted authority to limit acomplaint-summons; approving to authority officer's supervisory a limit or Act Release Early
[brief] On March 3, 2021, Plaintiff filed a complaint naming [...], [...], and four [...] employees-[...], [...], [...] and [...] as defendants.  Plaintiff named the employees both officially and individually and stated she filed a notice of claim.  (Pa001).  The complaint included seven counts with the following headings: (1) the negligent, reckless, wanton violation of plaintiff’s rights; (2) a breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing; (3) the reckless and intentional infliction of severe emotional distress; (4) violations of several paragraphs of Article I of the New Jersey Constitution; (5) violations of N.J.S.A. 10:6-2(c); (6) state created danger "class of one" violation; and (7) res ipsa loquitur.  (Pa006-Pa011)  In lieu of an answer, defendants filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under Rule 4:6-2(a) and (e).  (Pa013).  On October 8, 2021 the court granted defendants' motion, dismissing plaintiff's claims without prejudice.  (Pa087)  On October 13, 2021, the plaintiff sought clarification reconsideration and clarification of that order, and the court sua sponte entered an order of clarification.  (Pa089)  October 27, 2021, the Court signed a case management order clarifying its prior decision.  (Pa091).  On November 23, 2021 signed another case management Order clarifying in part the reasons for doble motions and that plaintiffs complaint was dismissed without prejudice.  (Pa093).  On February 22, 2022, plaintiff moved for leave to file an amended complaint.  (Pa095).  The trial court granted plaintiff's motion and the amended complaint was filed.  (Pa097).  Defendants again, without filing an answer, filed a motion to dismiss.  (Pa113).  On June 16, 2022, the court granted defendants' motion and dismissed all seven counts in the amended complaint with prejudice.  In addition to finding the factual allegations insufficient to support the causes of action, the court held qualified immunity barred claims against defendants, the tort claims should be dismissed for failure to file a timely notice under N.J.S.A. 59:8-8, and plaintiff's claims were barred by the statute of limitations under N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2.  The court incorporated by reference its October 8, 2022 opinion, adding its prior opinion on the insufficiency of plaintiff's allegations had been "wholly unremedied by the plaintiff."  On October 25, 2023 the Appellate Court affirmed Counts two three six and seven.
[brief] 432 A.2d 512 | Pa 308-316 | | Wells Fargo Home Mortg. v. Stull, 378 N.J. Super. 449, 876 A.2d 298 (App. Div. 2005) | Pa 317-322 | | State v. Stevens, 203 N.J. Super. 59, 495 A.2d 910 (Law Div. 1984) | Pa 323-327 | | Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp. v. Cole, DOCKET NO. [...] (App. Div. Apr. 4, 2019) | Pa 328-332 | | Emigrant Mortg. Co. v. Genello, DOCKET NO. [...] (App. Div. Dec. 2, 2016) | Pa 333-335 | | Appendix document | Appendix Page Number | |----------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------| | Fay v. Medford Township Council, 30 A.3d 367, 423 N.J. Super. 81 (Ch. Div. 2011) | Pa 336-343 | | Chiacchio v. Chiacchio, 198 N.J. Super. 1, 486 A.2d 335 (App. Div. 1984) | Pa 344-347 | | Equitable Life Mort. v. N.J. Div. of Taxation, 151 N.J. Super. 232, 376 A.2d 966 | Pa 348-353 | | Central R.R. Co. v. Neeld, 26 N.J. 172, 139 A.2d 110 (N.J. 1958) | Pa 354-364 | | DeNike v. Bd. of Trustees, Employees Ret. System of N.J, 34 N.J. 430, 170 A.2d | Pa 365-380 | | Pfleger v. N.J. State Highway Dept, 104 N.J. Super. 289, 250 A.2d 16 (App. Div. | Pa 381-383 | | Greenberg v. O'Gorman, 200 N.J. Super. 454, 491 A.2d 800 (Law Div. 1984) | Pa 384-387 | | Tumpson v. Farina, 240 N.J. Super. 346, 573 A.2d 472 (App. Div. 1990) | Pa 388-391 | | HSBC Bank U.S., Nat'l Ass'n. v. Agarwal, DOCKET NO. [...] | Pa 392-396 | | Morris v. DeMarco, DOCKET NO. [...] (App. Div. Jun. 27, 2019) | Pa 397-402 | | Kumar v. Piscataway Twp. Council, No. [...] (App. Div. Aug. 23, 2022) | Pa 403-412 | | Singleton v. City of New York, 632 F.2d 185 (2d Cir. 1980) | Pa 413-434 | | Perez v. Zagami, LLC, 443 N.J. Super. 359, 128 A.3d 1139 (App. Div. 2016) | Pa 434-442 | | 3085 Kennedy Realty v. Tax Assessor 287 N.J. Super. 318 (App. Div. 1996) | Pa 443-446 | | Smith v. Mensinger, 293 F.3d 641 (3d Cir. 2002) | Pa 447-458 | | Kadonsky v. N.J. Dept'f of Corr., DOCKET NO. [...] (App. Div. Oct. 30, 2015) | Pa 459-470 | | Stomel v. City of Camden, 192 N.J. 137, 927 A.2d 129 (N.J. 2007) | Pa 471-481 | | Board of County Comm'rs, Wabaunsee Cty. v. Umbehr 518 U.S. 668 (1996) | Pa 482-506 | | Prado v. State, 186 N.J. 413, 895 A.2d 1154 (N.J. 2006) | Pa 507-514 | | Wisniewski v. Murphy, 454 N.J. Super. 508, 186 A.3d 321 (App. Div. 2018) | Pa 515-523 | | New Jersey Division of Youth & Family Services v. A.P., 408 N.J. Super. 252, | Pa 524-530 | | In re C.M., 458 N.J. Super. 563, 206 A.3d 454 (App. Div. 2019) | Pa 531-534 | | Appendix document | Appendix Page Number | |----------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------| | Oxfeld v. State Board of Education, 68 N.J. 301, 344 A.2d 769 (N.J. 1975) | Pa 535-548 | | Matter of Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 486 A.2d 1209 (N.J. 1985) | Pa 549-585 | | Matter of J.T.S. Indus. Service Co. Landfill, 110 N.J. 101, 539 A.2d 1197 (N.J. 1988) | Pa 586-592 | | Mony Life Insurance v. Paramus Parkway Building, Ltd., 364 N.J. Super. 92, 834 A.2d 475 (App. Div. 2003) | Pa 593-600 | # TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
[brief] In finding a violation of N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(e), [...] appropriately concluded that Respondents action constituted “private action that may compromise the Board. ”  In discussing the legislative intent for the School Ethics Act, [...] properly highlighted that Board members “must avoid conduct which is in violation of their public trust or which creates a justifiable impression among the public that such trust is being violated. ”  N.J.S.A. 18A:12-22(a).  The Commission notes that board members do not surrender the rights that they have as citizens such as freedom of speech when they become members of a school board.  However, as discussed in [...] v. [...], [...], Camden County, [...] ([...]), and in light of the social media posts by Respondent, the Commission echoes its decision in [...], specifically that “when a sitting Board member makes such a judgmental proclamation, it is likely to be credited far more than a statement offered by an ordinary citizen.
[brief] Moreover, Plaintiff certified to the application of post-charge-off credits in the amount of $2.10, explaining the difference between the charged-off balance and amount sought in Plaintiff’s complaint.  PA – 47.  As a result, Plaintiff set forth its prima facie case as per Oughla, supra, and the burden shifted to Defendant to demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact warranting trial to defeat Plaintiff’s Motion.  There were/are no facts in dispute and Defendant relied entirely on Plaintiff’s submissions as the operative facts in this case.  What Defendant argues, without further foundation, is that Plaintiff is not entitled to relief by reason of its regulatory non-compliance (e.g. interest rate changes) from which he bootstraps consumer violations as a consequence thereof.
[brief] **More Surprises and Red Flags**  After their marriage in December 2020, Defendant needed to visit [...] in India and Plaintiff suggested adding the plaintiff to defendants account, but it was never done.  (1T76).  In August 2021, Plaintiff first witnessed Defendant’s true personality.  Defendant made a significant “fuss” over wanting a specific resort to host their traditional marriage ceremony.  She expressed her desire to Plaintiff’s father, who eventually secured the resort after two weeks of substantial effort and communication.  Upon notifying Defendant and her brother that the resort was secured, their response was unexpectedly unenthusiastic, asking for more time instead of expressing satisfaction.  (1T78).  On September 3, 2021, Defendant recorded a conversation with Plaintiff from India without his knowledge.  In the recorded conversation, Plaintiff addressed his concerns about Defendant’s continued misrepresentations but also stated that, despite the red flags, he was emotionally attached and wouldn’t cancel the wedding (the “real” wedding ceremony the couple would be having).  He insinuated that she should appreciate him as people generally would react differently.  Plaintiff only found out about the defendant recording him in April 2024, when the defendant had to hand over her discovery.  Had he known that she was recording him and planting seeds that he was allegedly “abusing” her, he never would have married Defendant.
[brief] (Not Raised Below).  The trial court did not make it clear which allegations in the Underlying Action were found to fall within the Policy exclusion.  (See generally 1T at 22:4 to 23:18.).  The trial judge only stated he “believe[d] in this particular case the allegations made here do fall within the exclusion. ” (1T at 22:21-25).  It also did not address numerous arguments made by [...], as set forth above.  “When a trial court issues reasons for its decision, it ‘must state clearly [its] factual findings and correlate them with relevant legal conclusions, so that parties and the appellate courts [are] informed of the rationale underlying th[ose] conclusion[s].’”
[directive] The 21 County SART Advisory Boards review SART activation procedures, evaluate existing SART program policies and procedures, and provide input and recommendations on current best practices.  THE COUNTY SART ADVISORY BOARDS  The role of the County SART Advisory Board is to inform the County Prosecutor about the operation of the County SART program.  The SART Coordinator is the liaison between the County Prosecutor and the Advisory Board members and shall facilitate communication among all Board members.  Meeting Schedule  The County SART Advisory Board must meet quarterly.  The quarterly meetings must be scheduled prior to the start of the calendar year; and these dates, times, and locations must be forwarded to the Statewide SART Advisory Board in advance.  Mandatory Members  The County SART Advisory Board shall consist of the following members:  the County Prosecutor or his/her designee;  the County SART Coordinator;  the County FNE Coordinator;  a representative from the Lead County Sexual Violence Services Organization;  a representative of the County Communications;  a representative from each participating Examination Facility;  a representative of the County Office of Victim Witness Advocacy;  a representative of the County Chiefs of Police Association; and  representatives from Law Enforcement Agencies responsible for conducting the investigation of sexual offenses.  Invited Members  Upon invitation, the County SART advisory board may also consist of the following members:  a representative from the Division of Criminal Justice, State Office of Victim Witness Advocacy, which is the agency that oversees the Statewide SART/FNE program or his/her designee;  a representative of the Division on Women, Sexual Assault, Abuse, and Rape Care Program (SAARC) or his/her designee;  a representative from CP&P; and  the Military Sexual Assault Response Coordinator (SARC), if applicable.  -29-  ATTORNEY GENERAL STANDARDS FOR PROVIDING SERVICES TO VICTIMS OF SEXUAL ASSAULT
[brief] Page  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT ..................................................................................1  PROCEDURAL HISTORY .....................................................................................2  STATEMENT OF FACTS ......................................................................................7  ARGUMENT ...........................................................................................................9  I.  APPELLANTS AND [...] VOLUNTARILY ENTERED INTO A BINDING CONTRACT THAT INCLUDED VALID, LEGAL, AND ENFORCEABLE WAIVER AND ARBITRATION PROVISIONS, AMONG OTHERS.  ..................9  II.  THE FAA AND NJAA  FAVOR ARBITRATION AND THE ARBITRATION CLAUSE IN THIS CASE MEETS ANY AND ALL RELATED REQUIREMENTS  .................................................21  III.  THE MOTION JUDGE WAS NOT REQUIRED TO HEAR ORAL ARGUMENT BEFORE DECIDING ON THE WRITTEN FILINGS.  ........................................................................24  CONCLUSION  .......................................................................................................27
[brief] [...] Provided Multiple Inconsistent Statements Throughout the Litigation.  When initially asked to explain what occurred, [...] failed to mention that [...] walked away, and did not claim the bag of grout went into the air.  Instead, he alleged that the bag of grout ripped in his hands after [...] pushed him.  [DLa 35-36].  After [...] spoke with [...], [...] provided several contradictory accounts.
[brief] Cox 138 N.J. 2, at 454, 465 (citing Performance Leasing Corp. v. Irwin Lincoln-Mercury, 262 N.J. Super. 23, 31, 34 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 133 N.J. 443, (1993). )  In *Cox*, the New Jersey Supreme Court found that a demand for an improper debt against a consumer-fraud plaintiff constitutes a loss under the Act “...because the consumer is not obligated to pay an indebtedness arising out of conduct that violates the Act.
[brief] Defendant/Appellant respectfully submits that the Court’s order granting enhanced prejudgment interest, attorney’s fees and costs constitutes plain error.  Defendant/Appellant objected to the amount of the fees below and this issue is subject to the harmful error standard.  It is respectfully submitted that the record does not support a finding of an attorney fee award in the amount in excess of $500 per hour.  As to the enhanced interest, attorney’s fees and costs under the offer of judgment rule, the rule provides that the Court “shall reduce the amount of the allowance” where the imposition of such fees, costs and enhanced interest “would impose undue hardship or otherwise result in unfairness to the offeree. ”  See, N.J.R. 4:58-2(c) (emphasis supplied).  Defendant/Appellant had a personal automobile liability policy with a $100,000 limit.  Enhanced interest, attorney’s fees and costs impose a significant additional burden and undue hardship on the Defendant/Appellant.  Plaintiff/Respondent goes on at length arguing that some or all of the damages award under N.J.R. 4:58-2(c) would be the responsibility of the Defendant/Appellant’s insurer.  This issue is not before the Court.  Plaintiff/Respondent’s argument is improper and immaterial to any issue before this Court.  Moreover, Defendant/Appellant’s insurer is not a party to the underlying case or to this appeal.  Even if the Court were to consider the Plaintiff/Respondent’s arguments, the order and judgments as entered are against the Defendant/Appellant [...], not his insurer.  Plaintiff/Respondent’s reliance upon McMahon v. New Jersey Mfrs. Ins. Co. 364 N.J. Super. 188 (App. Div. 2003) is misplaced.  In this matter, Plaintiff/Respondent brings suit against Appellant/Defendant [...].  In McMahon, a first-party UM/UIM case, the insurer was a party.  The cases are factually, legally and procedurally distinct.  McMahon is not analogous or on point as it relates to Plaintiff/Respondent’s third-party claims against Defendant/Appellant [...].  Accordingly, it would be inappropriate to consider any arguments in reliance upon McMahon.  Thus, the present undue hardship envisioned by N.J.R. 4:58-2(c) relates to [...].  Accordingly, at a minimum, this Court should reverse the order awarding enhanced interest, attorney’s fees and costs of suit.  CONCLUSION