ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] ####  Cases - **Arizona v. Youngblood**, 488 U.S. 51 (1988) ..........................................................  21 - **Bending v. Adelson**, 187 N.J. 411 (2006) .................................................................  15 - **Brigham City v. Stuart**, 547 U.S. 398 (2006) .............................................................  12 - **California v. Trombetta**, 467 U.S. 479 (1984) ............................................................  23 - **George v. City of Newark**, 384 N.J. Super. 232 (App. Div. 2006) ..............................  23 - **Pomerantz Paper Corp. v.  New Cmty. Corp.**, 207 N.J. 344 (2011) ....................... 16, 19, 21 - **Riley v. California**, 573 U.S. 373 (2014) ...................................................................  12 - **Schneckloth v. Bustamonte**, 412 U.S. 218 (1973) ....................................................... 7, 9 - **State v. Arthur**, 149 N.J. 1 (1997) ..............................................................................  8 - **State v. Baynes**, 148 N.J. 434 (1997) .......................................................................  16 - **State v. Bieniek**, 200 N.J. 601 (2010) .......................................................................  24 - **State v. Bolvito**, 217 N.J. 221 (2014) ........................................................................  25 - **State v. Boston**, 469 N.J. Super. 223 (App. Div. 2021) ...........................................  12 - **State v. Burney**, 255 N.J. 1 (2023) ..........................................................................  21 - **State v. Cassidy**, 179 N.J. 150 (2004) ..................................................................... 10 - **State v. Dalziel**, 182 N.J. 494 (2005) ..................................................................... 24 - **State v. Demeter**, 124 N.J. 374 (1991) .................................................................... 7 - **State v. Elders**, 192 N.J. 224 (2007) ...................................................................... 6, 9, 15 - **State v. Ghertler**, 114 N.J. 383 (1990) .................................................................... 26 - **State v. Hollander**, 201 N.J. Super. 453 (App. Div. 1985) .................................... 22 - **State v. Hutchins**, 116 N.J. 457 (1989) .................................................................. 10, 11 State v. Johnson, 42 N.J. 146 (1964) ................................................................. 6, 15 State v. Knight, 145 N.J. 233 (1996) ........................................................................ 21 State v. Lamb, 218 N.J. 300 (2014) ........................................................................... 7 State v. M.B., 471 N.J. Super. 376 (App. Div. 2022) .................................................. 22, 23 State v. Manning, 240 N.J. 308 (2020) ...................................................................... 10 State v. Megargel, 143 N.J. 484, 494 (1996) ............................................................
[brief] *Id.* at 122.  Non-discrete adverse acts are those acts which fall under hostile work environment actions; hostile work environment actions are distinguished from discrete acts and represent repeated conduct.  Shepherd *supra* at 19.  The unlawful acts do not occur on one day but occur over a series of days or years and are based on the cumulative effect of individual acts.  *Id.* at 19.  Appellant set forth a prima facie case of hostile work environment and harassment.
[directive] of VI.  Revocation Certificate l, if Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:168A-l a Certificate shall no longer be valid the of person is subsequently indicted for a first- or second-degree crime or convicted a ADA ENSURING AN TO DOOR OPEN JUSTICE  Americans with Disabilities Act Directive #02-24 Page 6 of have crime.  Upon presentation proof that the criminal charges or indictment been of dismissed, or an acquittal after trial, the court may reinstate a revoked Certificate.
[brief] [...]  ON THE BRIEF: [...], Esq. [...], Esq. [...], Esq. [...], Esq.  October 30, 2023  #  TABLE OF CONTENTS | Section | Page | |------------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | TABLE OF CITATIONS | ii | | PRELIMINARY STATEMENT | 1 | | PROCEDURAL HISTORY | 3 | | STATEMENT OF FACTS | 4 | | A. The Crash | 4 | | B.
[brief] Finally with respect to interest, the trial court improperly found the equities favored [...] to allow for an enhancement to the statutory interest rates.  The trial court held that a 2% enhancement to interest rates could be applied if “the equites” demanded this result.  (Pa0058.)  The trial court found the equities demanded a 2% enhancement, even though there is nothing in the record that supports a finding of inequitable conduct on the part of [...].  For instance, the trial court concluded that “[b]ecause of the insurers’ conduct, discovery took over five (5) years. ” (Pa0058).  However, proceedings before the SAM were by consent of the parties, and it was [...], not [...], that pursued a position in allocation (fact based allocation) that required extensive discovery, even though it was meritless from the outset.  (Pa0199-210.)  After the SAM was appointed, [...] took an allocation position contrary to binding precedent that dragged this case on for a decade.  Moreover, further delays occurred because of an unusually long decision making process by the court.\footnote{[...] respectfully disagrees with the trial court’s conclusion that interest should not be tolled for the five years it took the court to reach the ultimate decision on allocation.}  The trial court repeatedly faulted [...] for delays it had no hand in causing.  In holding that the equities favor [...], the trial court also failed to address the realities of [...]’s conduct.  [...] is the world’s largest manufacturer of chemicals.  It is a sophisticated corporation which polluted a Massachusetts town for decades.  It is not the common policyholder overwhelmed by litigation against its insurers.  Indeed, it is [...] which has employed inequitable litigation tactics in this case.  For instance, [...] has used four different interest calculations by two different experts (and one of its attorneys) in an attempt to inflate its interest claim, ultimately abandoning the first three in favor of one submitted to the trial court in a reply brief.  The last calculation was manipulated to be the highest one yet, though nothing about the remediation costs on which interest was being calculated changed.  (Da30-45; Da46; Da47-54; Da260-261.)
[directive] This system shall include provisions to: (a) ensure that all recordings are uploaded to a secure data storage system in a timely fashion; (b) prevent tampering with or deletion of recorded data both before and after downloading from the BWC and uploading to the storage system; (c) prevent unauthorized access to stored BWC recordings; (d) document all instances where BWC recordings are accessed, viewed, copied, disseminated, or deleted; and (e) permit auditing of all instances where BWC recordings are accessed, viewed, copied, or deleted.  9.2  Capacity to Locate Specific BWC Recordings.  Every department shall establish and implement a system that permits the agency to locate and retrieve all recordings associated with a specific incident/event, investigation, case, or criminal charge.  Accordingly, every department shall be required to develop and maintain a BWC control ledger or log, which may be computerized.
[brief] A certification was submitted by an independent witness, [...], who stated the stop was sudden and abrupt, and described Plaintiff falling violently to the floor of the bus as a result of that sudden stop.  (60a)  Plaintiff’s counsel argued, “It was such a violent stop that it caused her to go backwards and caused a number of herniated disks. ”  (1T13:19-20)  The bus driver did not submit a certification or affidavit claiming there was emergency confronting the driver at that moment.  But the lower court, in this motion for summary judgment, nonetheless weighed the evidence and the credibility of this independent witness for the non-moving party, and stated, “She just says it was suddenly and abruptly made a sudden stop.  And then she -- the word ‘violently’, I’m sure this was drafted by you.  But the word ‘violently’ was put into paragraphs five and six by, by the witness [...].  ‘I witnessed the claimant fall violently to the floor of the bus. ’  I don't know how you fall violently. ”  (1T11:20 to 1T12:1)  Ultimately, the lower court ruled that “I do agree with the plaintiff that they have satisfied the subjective test for the injuries sustained in this accident.  It is a close call.  However, there are genuine issues of material fact.
[brief] 29 State v. Purnell, 126 N.J. 518 (1992)...............................................................................  37 State v. R.B., 183 N.J. 308 (2005).............................................................................36, 40, 42 State v. R.P., 233 N.J. 521 (2013)..............................................................................  49 State v. R.T., 411 N.J. Super. 35 (App. Div. 2009).......................................................  29 State v. Reyes, 140 N.J. 344 (1995)..............................................................................  24 State v. Roach, 146 N.J. 208, cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1021 (1996).................................
[brief] SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY  APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. [...]  STATE OF NEW JERSEY, : CRIMINAL ACTION  Plaintiff-Respondent, : On Appeal from a Conviction in the v. : Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Defendant-Appellant. : Division, Gloucester County.  [...], : Ind. No. [...] Sat Below: Hon. [...], J.S.C. and a jury.  BRIEF AND APPENDIX
[brief] Additionally, the record and the trial court’s well-reasoned conclusions of law below are clear that the loss of the Property was the direct and proximate result of the Appellants’ failure to pay rent due to [...] under the Lease.  From there, as the trial court noted in its summary judgment opinion, all associated Solar Rights were lost as such rights, which are contractual in nature, run with the land and were free for anybody to pursue.  [FEDa123].  As the Court expressly stated, “[Appellants] did not own the Solar Rights.  After [Appellants] lost site control of the Property, [...] voided the Solar Rights, and [Appellants] lost all rights to develop the Solar Project.  [...], and anyone else for that matter, were free to pursue development of the Solar Rights thereafter. ”  [FEDa123].  8
[brief] [...]  ...  [...] was a partner and owed a fiduciary duty to the partnership and other partners.  At trial, [...] testified he was aware of the extraordinary fees and testified he knew there was no agreement for management fees, development fees, or general contract fees.  (225T56:15-5:7).  Further, [...] stated he attended year-end meetings and received financial statements for the partnership, but nonetheless, left the finances to [...] despite being aware of the allegations of illegal conduct during the non-RICO [SOL P]eriod. (227T47:21-48:8).  Accordingly, [...] knew about the wrongdoing, benefitted financially from the wrongdoing, but failed to stop the wrongdoing despite having a fiduciary obligation to do so.  As such, his omission was committed with actual malice and with a wanton and willful disregard of the other partners from whom he was stealing.  ....
[brief] Plaintiff contends at (Pb27), that courts are not bound to enforce the literal effects of these statutes if so doing would result in an injustice or an abrogation of the intent of the statute citing Township of Piscataway vs. Washington, LLC, 400 N.J. Super. 358, 371-74 (Law Div. 2008).  Neither the Piscataway case nor West Windsor v. Nierenberg, 150 N.J. 11 (1997) is on point.  These are not redevelopment cases interpreting the statutory sections in question.  Those cases deal with 20:3-30 (c), “the date on which action is taken by the condemnor which substantially affects the use and enjoyment of the property”:  That, is a mixed question of law and fact.  That is an entirely different issue, see: Nierenberg supra, at 135.  The controlling statute in the instant case is based upon a finding by the Legislature that after a declaration of blight there is a natural decline in property values.
[brief] Da164-165.  On March 29, 2023, Defendants agreed to dismiss their lawsuit and instead file it as a counterclaim and third-party complaint in this suit.  Pa29.  They eventually did so a year later.  E.  Discovery Commences in the Law Division  On May 1, 2023, Plaintiff served interrogatories and document requests to Defendants, along with Deposition Notices for dates beginning on July 18, 2023.  Pa37.  Plaintiff also obtained documents via subpoena.  Defendants refused to answer discovery, yet served their own discovery demands to Plaintiff.  F.  Defendants Breach Their Express Waiver of Arbitration and File a Late Motion to Dismiss and Compel Arbitration
[brief] (Pa151, T9:2, 9:9).  Plaintiff was informed by [...] of his right to appeal and the method of doing so.  (Pa151, T9:16, 10:9).  The Highland Park Municipal Court Clerk/Court Administrator advised those present on the record that the case would be delivered back to Edison (Pa151, T12:1, 13:1).  [...] also stated on the record that he had signed “the actual disposition page” and said, “I’m sure Edison can get you a certified copy of the disposition upon your request. ”  (Pa151, T13:3, 13:16).  On October 28, 2021, the next day, [...], Highland Park’s Certified Municipal Court Administrator, returned the entire file concerning the municipal court matter to the Edison Municipal Court.
[brief] On April 4, 2024, we appeared before Hon. [...] for the Defendants motion to reopen the case based on ‘UPEPA’.  The judge asked me why I dropped the case.  I explained because there is currently an appeal before the appellate division that, if appealed, will make this case much stronger on my behalf ([...]).  It made more sense to hold off for now and await the outcome of the appeal.  Though the Defendant kept arguing that the is a case of ‘UPEPA’, [...] clearly ruled that since no answer was even given in this case to be able to show any evidence that this case was frivolous or falls under the guidelines of ‘UPEPA’, he rightfully dismissed the motion (Da7).  The Defendant then filed an appeal regarding this matter.
[brief] There can be no debate that [...]’s posting of a highly inappropriate, misogynistic, and pornographic video onto a public chat room, visible by over 80 former employees, current employees, the current Mayor, former mayors, and members of the public in [...] and [...], is such conduct which adversely affects the morale or efficiency of the Borough, and has a near certainly to destroy public respect for municipal employees as well as confidence and trust in the operation of Borough services.  See In re Emmons, supra.  As stated by the Supreme Court in Karins, misconduct and conduct unbecoming a public employee are interchangeable.  152 N.J. at 553.  It is, therefore, indisputable that [...] _____________________
[brief] (8T 82-3 to 6)  The Court also rejected defense counsel’s request for mitigating factor nine, “the character and attitude of the Defendant indicates that he or she is unlikely to commit another offense,” N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1b(9), for a similar reason:  Well, that gets back to the words not deeds and I am going to utilize what I took from your saying what you told me today not for this.  Okay?  I will tell you how it affects my assessment, but it doesn’t change the overall character and attitude because of the secondary gain aspect and the controlled environment under which you are currently acting, okay?  Hopefully, the criminal justice system has learned some things over the couple hundred years that we’ve been doing it so that there is a rehabilitative component to virtually every aspect and hopefully that works.  Hopefully.  I am very serious, [...], I hope it works for you, but it’s too soon.  I mean, five years may feel like forever, but it’s not.  (8T 85-8 to 23)  On a remand for resentencing, a defendant is entitled to “present evidence of his post-sentencing rehabilitative efforts” and “to have it considered.
[brief] A FACT QUESTION EXISTS AS TO RIDGEDALE’S CONTROL OF THE CONSTRUCTION SITE  Defendant  [...] maintains that inasmuch as it employed defendant [...] as general contractor, it had no duty to provide for the safety of the plaintiff.  As a general legal proposition, [...]’s position is correct so long as it rendered to the general contractor exclusive control.  Slack v. Whalen, 327 N.J. Super. 186, 194 (App. Div. 2000)  Here, [...]’s firm, [...] (“[...]”) was engaged by [...] to install hardwood flooring at the residence under renovation (Pa94).  Woodwork’s contractual obligation did not include safety at the site.  [...]’s principal, [...], hired [...] (Pa206-207).  When [...] first arrived at the construction site in December of 2018, he complained of the “sloppy condition” to the general contractor, [...] (Pa94).  When he received no satisfaction, he communicated directly to [...] of [...], who took care of the issue when [...] arrived at the site the next day (Pa94).  In [...]’s Answers to Interrogatories, it conceded that there was no site safety person or site safety officer on the jobsite on the day of the accident and that no safety backgrounds were performed for contractors on the jobsite (Pa292-293).  [...] contended that [...] hired subcontractors to the jobsite, including [...], and described [...] as “co-general contractor” on the jobsite (Pa309).  Plaintiff submits that [...] as owner was not “hands off” leaving exclusive control of the worksite to [...].  On the contrary, [...] was involved in hiring contractors and responding to [...]’s complaint as to jobsite safety.  A fact question was presented as to [...]’s control of the site in conjunction with [...].
[brief] Da332  EXHIBIT I  Photos of children being dropped off on Sixth Street and children ingressing the school between parked cars during Religious holidays  Da341  EXHIBIT J  Photos of parked cars on Congregation’s property directly in front of the Synagogue take in May of 2018  Da350  EXHIBIT K  Photo of car blocking entrance to parking lot and Sixth Street Lot to drop off child Da354 EXHIBIT L Tax Records for Nursery School Property Owned by Defendant Da355 EXHIBIT M Permit Applications to the [...] related to trailers it placed On the Nursery School Property Da359 EXHIBIT N Application for Certificate of Occupancy for the Nursery School Da365 EXHIBIT O Complaint in Lieu of Prerogative Writ Of Mandamus and for Injunctive Relief Filed in the Law Division under Docket No. [...] on April 12, 2018
[directive] Such circumstances may include, but shall not be limited to: is when payment vendors required in advance of the delivery of certain materials or' to (1) services that cannot be obtained from any other source at comparable prices; or when ordering, billing and payment transactions for goods or services are made through a (2) - computerized electronic transaction; or -- - - - when claim or demand is less than a tdeshold set by the board and the certification is not (3) readily obtainable by the contracting unit; but such exceptions shall not include reimbursement of employee expenses or payment for personal services.  Amended c. 126, s.2 1. 2000, :5-16.1.  Advances for expenses of authorized official travel; resolution; verification; 40-4 repayment of excess of Document Page 1  2  New Jersey Permanent Statutes AND 40A TITLE MUNICIPALITIES COUNTIES official of 40A:5-16.1.  Advances for expenses of authorized travel: resolution: verification: repayment excess of :5-16.1.  Advances for expenses authorized official travel; resolution; verification; 4OA repayment excess of of 40A
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY FOUND GENERAL AND SPECIFIC JURISDICTION OVER DEFENDANTS THAT DID NOT OFFEND NOTIONS OF FAIR PLAY AND JUSTICE (Da13–15)  New Jersey allows long-arm jurisdiction over non-resident defendants to the “outermost limit” consistent with due process.  Avdel Corp. v. Mecure, 58 N.J. 264, 268 (1971).  General jurisdiction exists when a defendant has “continuous and systematic” contacts with the forum state.  Lebel v. Everglades Marina, Inc., 115 N.J. 317, 323 (1989).
[brief] The [...] contract was not *Azurak* compliant because it failed to state, clearly and explicitly, that it required [...] to indemnify [...] for Double O’s own negligence.  The contract was also ambiguous because it contained two indemnity provisions with different obligations.  The trial court erred in harmonizing the conflicting indemnity obligations in favor of [...], the indemnitee and the drafter of the contract.  Because the contract was not *Azurak* compliant, this Court should reverse the judgment below and rule that [...] has no obligation to indemnify [...] for its own negligence.
[brief] Moreover, a review of the quarterly reports that [...] filed with [...] demonstrate that it is a high volume/low value process not suited for resolving Fraud Act claims.  In its report for the first quarter of 2023, [...] noted that 11,027 new cases were filed.  (ICAa 010).  11,128 cases were resolved by awards or settlements.  The median amount awarded for medical expense benefits was $985.00.  (ICAa 015).  The median attorney’s fee award constituted $1,000.00.  Ibid.  In the second quarter of 2023, [...] reported that 11,798 new cases were filed.  (ICAa 026).  11,006 cases were concluded in the quarter.  The median amount awarded for medical expense benefits was $1,202.00.  (ICAa 031).  The median attorney’s fee award was $1,000.00.  Ibid.  In the third quarter of 2023, [...] reported that 11,272 new cases were filed.  (ICAa 039).  10,428 cases were resolved.  The median award of medical expense benefits had a value of $936.00.  (ICAa 044).  The median attorney’s fee award was $1,000.00.  Ibid.
[brief] In several clauses, the parties made it clear that the Deposit was non-refundable unless the PSA was validly terminated.  Section 4.2 provided that the Deposit was non-refundable except in the circumstance where Plaintiff terminated the PSA.  (Pa97).  Further, Section 17.1(a) of the PSA provided that the Escrow Agent must hold the Deposit “until the earlier of (i) the Closing, or (ii) the termination of this Agreement in accordance with any right hereunder. ” (Pa118).  Accordingly, Plaintiff’s cramped reading of the PSA to allow it to recover the Deposit without effecting the termination of the contract is contrary to the express terms of the PSA.  As provided in Section 13.1, upon Plaintiff’s exercise of its termination right, both Plaintiff and [...] “have no further rights or obligations under [the 101] Agreement. ” (Pa115).
[brief] (Aa20.)  Nonetheless, the Commissioner found that [...]’s request was premature.  She explained:  The relief requested and its timing, however, places this matter in a unique procedural posture.  The Petition requests to move forward with a referendum to join a regional school district that does not yet exist and presents alternative relief requests depending upon whether the September 26, 2023 referendum passes or fails.  In light of the pending referendum, [...]’s requested relief is premature.  If the referendum passes on September 26, 2023, [...] and the newly formed school district may refile a joint request [to] form an enlarged regional school district.  The joint request should address the requirements of N.J.S.A. 18A:13-47.1 et seq., including [a] revised feasibility study, if necessary, and revised resolutions reflecting this new request.  All other requests for relief are denied.  (Aa20-21)  In summary, the Commissioner held that [...] (1) is entitled by law to withdraw from Appellants’ school districts; and (2) can file a joint request with the Respondent Boards to form an enlarged regional school district.