ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] As always, prosecutors retain significant discretion in deciding whether and under what offenses.5 circumstances to charge individuals with certain criminal In deciding whether to charge a violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:34-5(b), prosecutors should consider the following factors:  Whether the individual forced or coerced their partner to engage in sexual activity; • Whether the individual engaged in sexual activity of transmitting HIV for the purpose • partner;6 to their and/or Whether the individual was adhering to a medically appropriate HIV treatment plan at • the time of the sexual activity.  It is virtually impossible to imagine a scenario where it would be appropriate for a prosecutor to charge an individual with N.J.S.A. 2C:34-5(b) when that person’s HIV viral load was undetectable at the time of the sexual activity and no aggravating factors existed.  Prosecutors who are considering criminal charges in such circumstances must consult with the Director of the Division of Criminal Justice before proceeding.
[brief] The trial judge acknowledged the defense argument that market rents should be utilized in this case, as a matter of law, but said:  “... but I’m not seeing any case law that --specifically addresses that... said that the case of State by State Highway v. Hudson Circle... specifically said that proof by way of capitalization of rent should not be limited to such capitalization of the actual rents received if evidence is available to support the owner’s contention that a higher rental value then the rent reserved exists and that the jury should be permitted to consider evidence to such greater amount and its capitalization. ” (2T32-20; 33-15).  Thus, the trial judge denied the motion on ground that the issue is simply a fact issue for the jury.  It is not.  As a matter of constitutional law, the property taken is the fee simple estate.  An appraisal used to determine the just compensation for the taking of property must value the property interest being taken.  [...] admitted several times in his appraisal that by using the [...] $.77 lease, he was appraising only the leased fee.  Nichols Eminent Domain at 12.1[5] at 12-34,”... states, “compensation”... implies full indemnity to the owner [when his property is taken].”  The property taken here is the fee simple estate.  The fee simple estate defined in [...]’s appraisal(Da20)is, “absolute ownership unencumbered by any other interest or estate...”  [...] uses The Dictionary of Real Estate Appraisal 6th Ed. 2015 to define the leased fee interest as:  "The ownership interest held by the lessor, which includes the right to the contract rent specified in the lease, plus the reversionary right when the lease expires."  (Da20)
[brief] He sent a letter at the Council’s direction that if he were not the successful bidder on the property, he has to remove any improvements prior to the lease termination (4T30:10-22).  However, the letter he is referring to only refers to Lot 3, Block 1084 whereas the property in question is Lot 3.01.  The Court notes that the Court is “...not sure how it relates.  It doesn’t hurt a claim on 3.01 if it is only relating to Lot 3.  So, if relevance is the objection, I’m going to overrule it now because if this is a document that he has testified relates to Lot 3. ”  Counsel for Plaintiff points out that Lot 3 is owned by the State of New Jersey (4T32:1-11).
[brief] [Da48].  The November 1973 Agreement explicitly provided it was subject to and contingent upon the approval of the Township.  [Da48].  However, despite the Township never approving the November 1973 Agreement, the parties thereto nevertheless operated under its terms and sewage from the property was transmitted to and treated by Morris.  [Da48].  Upon learning of the foregoing, the Township objected to the November 1973 Agreement.  [Da57].  Thereafter, on September 15, 1981, two agreements were entered into by and between the Township, the Borough, [...] (“Assignee”), and [...] (“Trustee”) regarding property located at Block 200, Lot 1.01 in [...].
[brief] While Defendant also suggests that the post-judgment imposition of sanctions by this Court warrants recusal under *P.T.*, the Appellate Division specifically clarified that: > in the normal course of litigation, a trial judge’s findings of fact, including findings regarding the credibility of parties, and findings...that a party has violated a court order, do not warrant reassignment.  We find the facts and procedural history here sufficiently unique that a fresh look may benefit all parties—most of all, the child.  *Id.* (Emphasis added.)  Again, in stark contrast to the *P.T.* case where the court made statements beyond what the case required and in doing so cast doubt on the court’s prospects for impartiality, no such determination was made or doubt cast by the Appellate Division about the Trial Court in the June 25, 2019 appellate opinion.
[directive] 6.2  Batch  Downloading of BOLO List  Data  BOLO list information may be downloaded in batch form from other databases, including but not limited to the [...], [...], [...], and [...] database.  6.3  Updates to BOLO Lists  An initial BOLO list may be revised at any time.  In the event that an initial BOLO list is constructed, in whole or in part, with sets of data downloaded from another database, so as to account for any changes that may have been made in the data maintained in those other databases, updates to the initial BOLO list shall, in the case of a mobile unit attached to a police vehicle, be made at the start of each shift, and in the case of an ALPR positioned at a stationary location, be made as frequently as is practicable, and on not less than a daily basis.
[brief] In order to appreciate how this creates legal error worthy of reversal, it is necessary to analyze the immunity statute.  N.J.S.A. 48:12-152.  Prohibition on entering upon the right of way of a railroad or coming into contact with equipment, machinery, wires, or rolling stock of railroad; restrictions on recovery for injury or death.  a.  No person other than those connected with or employed upon the railroad who are acting within the scope of their employment shall enter upon the right of way of any railroad or come into contact with any equipment, machinery, wires or rolling stock of any railroad.  This section shall not prohibit a passenger for hire from utilizing those parts of a railroad particularly intended for passenger use nor shall it prohibit a person from using a crossing established by the railroad.  b.  No person shall recover from the company owning or operating the railroad or from any officer or employee of the railroad, any damages for death or injury to person or property as a result of contact with any equipment, machinery, wires or rolling stock of any railroad, if death or injury occurred while that person was: (1) under the influence of alcohol as evidenced by a blood alcohol concentration of 0.10% or higher by weight of alcohol in the person's blood; or (2) under the influence of drugs, other than drugs medically prescribed for use by that person and used in the manner prescribed; or (3) engaging in conduct intended to result in personal bodily injury or death; or (4) engaging in conduct proscribed by subsection a. of this section; or (5) using the property of any railroad in a manner in which it was not intended to be used or in violation of posted regulations.  In the absence of proof to the contrary, any person injured while attempting to board or disembark from a moving train shall be presumed to have used the property in a manner in which it was not intended to be used.  This subsection shall apply notwithstanding the provisions of P.L.1973, c. 146 (C.2A:15-5.1 et seq.).  c.  This section shall not preclude recovery for injury or death of a person who was, at the time of the injury, less than 18 years of age.  Clearly, the intention of this statute is to protect railroads from liability in certain situations, some dependent upon the location of the individual who comes into contact with railroad equipment and some that are not dependent on their location.
[brief] 3 N.J.S.A. 5:12-219(b) .................................................................................................................. 3 N.J.S.A. 5:12-219(e), (g), (h) .....................................................................................................  3  N.J.S.A. 5:12-220(a) ..................................................................................................................  4 N.J.S.A. 5:12-220(b) ..................................................................................................................  4  N.J.S.A. 52:14B-1 et seq.  ..........................................................................................................  27 N.J.S.A. 52:14B-2 ......................................................................................................................  27  N.J.S.A. 52:14B-3a(a) ..............................................................................................................  27 N.J.S.A. 52:14B-3a(b) ..............................................................................................................  27 N.J.S.A. 52:14B-3a(c) ..............................................................................................................  27  N.J.S.A. 52:14B-3a(d) ..............................................................................................................  28  Other Authorities
[directive] •  On command, inspect an empty safe weapon to become re-familiar with operation of the weapon.  Time: 25 seconds.  5 rounds.  Police Ready Condition  Point Shoulder, Muzzle Depressed Position.  •  With slide forward, safety on, load weapon with 4 rounds in magazine and assume a point shoulder, muzzle depressed position.  •  On command, bring weapon up and work the action cycling a round into the chamber.  Fire the 4 rounds in the weapon leaving action open after firing the fourth round.  •  Combat load 1 round and fire from the point shoulder position.
[brief] The author explains that under the shoplifting provision, “conclusiveness of price as value is required insofar as flexibility would allow a shoplifter to alter price labels [in violation of *N.J.S.A. 2C:20–11b(3)* ] and argue that he was merely correcting them to reflect true or market value. ”  *Ibid.*  While it is clear “full retail value” is not equivalent to “amount,” the question still remains whether the “full retail value” or “price” should or does include tax.
[brief] (Pa118-130).  Plaintiff did not name [...] in that original complaint, but did name several fictitious defendants, identified as “John Does 1-10 and/or ABC Corporations 1-10. ”  (Id.)  Plaintiff’s first amended complaint, filed on November 27, 2018, also did not name [...] as a defendant.  (Pa89-98).  On May 21, 2019—more than two years after the accident and after the statute of limitations expired—Plaintiff moved to amend the complaint again, to name [...] and the other tenants as defendants.  (Pa198-316).  Plaintiff argued that he had no basis to sue [...] up to that point in time because he had to first review [...]’s lease and he had just received it.  (Pa200-205).  Plaintiff’s motion was granted and the second amended complaint was filed on June 12, 2019, naming [...] as a defendant.
[brief] Counsel for [...] informed me that this court has requested assurances regarding [...]’s ability to collect a usable image of [...]’s iPhone.  4.  If allowed to conduct the examination, [...] engineers will be able to confirm, on site, whether a usable image can be extracted from the iPhone.  5.  Unlike the first attempt, [...]’s forensic engineers will perform the full analysis on site, rather than completing the analysis at [...]’s laboratory in New York.  This will allow [...]’s forensic engineers to not only extract an image from the iPhone but also confirm whether the image can be analyzed or is corrupt.  6.  [...]’s engineers will use a Cellubrite UFED Touch Device—a Tool that the FBI uses—to extract an image of [...]’s iPhone.  7.  [...]’s engineers will also have a similar tool (manufactured by a different company Oxygen) to also extract an image of the iPhone in case the Cellubrite tool cannot extract a usable image.  *13
[brief] [...] was approximately three-quarters of a mile from the 7-Eleven when he spotted defendants’ vehicle traveling away from the store and executed the stop.  The record is unclear as to precisely when the robbery occurred.  Sergeant [...] testified that he heard the radio dispatch regarding the robbery “just around midnight” or “a quarter after midnight” when dispatch indicated that the robbery “just happened. ”  [...] then testified that he encountered defendants’ vehicle approximately three minutes after receiving the dispatch.  The State argues that the timing of the robbery is clear because dispatch used the term “just” in describing when the robbery occurred.  Certainly, at some point after the robbery someone in the 7-Eleven called 9-1-1, but we do not know when that was in relation to when the robbery occurred and when dispatch alerted police.  In this case, a matter of minutes makes a difference given the area in which the suspects could reasonably be expected to be after the commission of the robbery.  Again, proximity in terms of time and place can certainly be factors in determining whether reasonable suspicion existed.  On this record, however, where the 7-Eleven was located on a roadway close to a major interstate highway and the record is unclear as to when the robbery actually occurred, the asserted proximity in time and place is not sufficient to support the finding of reasonable suspicion.
[brief] Indeed, in support of its Fee Application, Landlord submitted a detailed certification of its lead counsel attaching Landlord’s legal bills and setting forth the experience of Landlord’s attorneys, the hourly rates charged, the time expended on this matter (116.9 hours) and the length of Landlord’s relationship with its counsel.  (Pa47-97, 119-120).  Crucially, in its Fee Application, Landlord’s counsel certified, among other things, that: (i) “[t]he fees and charges invoiced to the Landlord are customary charges to the Landlord and other clients of this firm”; (ii) “[t]hese fees and charges are this firm’s standard rates for the work performed”; and (iii) “[t]he hourly fees for each attorney who performed work in this action are reasonable, customary, and reflect the fees actually charged to the Landlord. ”  (Pa49).  In fact, as certified by Landlord’s counsel, the legal fees billed to Landlord reflect all discounts, write-offs and reductions made by the firm before sending the invoices to Landlord. (Pa49).  Despite Tenant’s baseless contentions to the contrary, such representations are more than sufficient to establish that the hourly rate charged by Landlord’s counsel was reasonable and in conformity with the prevailing market rates for similar services; especially where, as here, Tenant failed to present any countervailing proofs rebutting the reasonableness of the hourly rates charged.
[brief] The Trial Court Correctly Determined that the Board Arbitrarily, Capriciously, and Unjustifiable Denied Plaintiff’s Application  The action of a board will be overturned if it is found to be arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable.  Dunbar Homes, Inc. v. Zoning Bd. Of Adjustment of Twp. Of Franklin, 233 N.J. 546, 558 (2018); Grabowsky v. Twp. Of Montclair, 221 N.J. 536, 551 (2015).  “A board acts arbitrarily, capriciously, or unreasonably if its findings of fact in support of [its decision] are not supported by the record” Ten Stary Dom P’ship v. Mauro, 216 N.J. 16, 33 (2013).  A planning board is bound by the provisions of the municipal land use ordinance governing the subdivision.  Cox and Koenig *New Jersey Zoning and Land Use Administration*. § 24-2 (2022 edition).  As per N.J.S.A. 40: 55D-48(b), “The planning board shall, if the proposed subdivision complies with the ordinance and this act, grant preliminary approval to the subdivision. ”  An application which conforms with all of the ordinance provisions is otherwise known as a “by-right” application.  *Gandolfi v. Town of Hammonton*, 367 N.J. Super. 527 (App. Div. 2004).  The first footnote of the *Gandolfi* case specifically explains that a “by-right” subdivision occurs when the plan complies with the governing ordinance and requires no variances, as is the case here.  The *Gandolfi* court cited to *Pizzo Mantin Group v. Township of Randolph*, 137 N.J. 216 (1994) to support its explanation of a “by-right” subdivision.
[brief] Following his arrest in the 7-Eleven parking lot, [...] gave a statement to the police.  He denied being at the T-Mobile store.  (7T 40-17 to 25)  He said that he was in the area, by himself, to attend a vigil for [...], the brother of the father of his sister’s children.  He got lost and was on the phone trying to get directions to the vigil.  (7T 43-20 to 44-9)  He finally pulled into the 7-Eleven parking lot to ask for directions.  (7T 44-11 to 18)  Confronted with implicating his brother in the robbery, he denied knowing [...] or [...].  (7T 119-6 to 17)  [...] said that he purchased his iPhone from a flea market in Columbus, New Jersey.  (4T 61-21 to 62-7)  During the South Brunswick robbery, an iPhone was stolen with an IMEI number matching the number of [...]’s phone.  (7T 28-8 to 12, 29-12 to 20, 30-1 to 31-8)  [...] was interviewed a second time on February 2nd, 2012, while he was in jail on the instant charges.
[brief] (Pa255; Pa344; Pa398).  [...] was the only university in New Jersey to offer a dual degree program.  (Pa324).  The dual degree program advertised by [...] was appealing to Plaintiff because the program was not comparable to anything else in the local area.  (Pa153).  Essentially, [...] advertised to students the ability to earn two degrees within the same time frame as it was taking them to earn the Pharm.D. degree.  (Pa406).
[brief] Of Counsel [...], Esq. [...] (I.D. No. 028511987)  On the Brief  [...], Esq. [...] (I.D. No. 342232020)  [...] [...]  [...] [...]  Attorneys for Defendant-Respondent, [...]  TABLE OF CONTENTS  PAGE  TABLE OF JUDGMENT(S) AND ORDER(S) ..........................................................  i  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ................................................................................ ii  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT .............................................................................  1  PROCEDURAL HISTORY ...................................................................................  3  COUNTERSTATEMENT OF FACTS .................................................................  4  LEGAL ARGUMENT .......................................................................................  10  POINT I THE TRIAL COURT’S JUNE 7, 2024  ORDER WAS BASED UPON COGENT FACTS AND WELL-ESTABLISHED EMINENT DOMAIN LAW.  (Pa1; 1T 19:18-26:25)  ..............................................................................................................10  CONCLUSION ....................................................................................................19  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS AND ORDERS RELEVANT ON APPEAL  Order, dated June 7, 2024, denying [...]’s in limine motion to Bar Team Rhodi’s expert report prior to trial .................................................................................. Pa001
[brief] *Id.* at  The Nicholas Court reiterated and held that "a physician specializing in internal and preventive medicine" could not "serve as an expert witness against a physician specializing in emergency or family medicine, even though each wa[s] qualified to treat a patient for carbon monoxide poisoning."  Id.  New Jersey's Supreme Court found that although the plaintiff's affiant was "unquestionably . . . an expert in the treatment of carbon monoxide poisoning and the use of hyperbaric oxygen as a treatment modality," the Court held that the affiant could not testify "about the standard of care exercised by" the defendants, who were practicing in different specialties.  Id. at 487 - 88.  Finally, and relevant to this appeal is that the Nicholas Court cautioned that accepting the "plaintiffs' argument would lead back to the days before passage of the . . . Act when . . . physician experts of different medical specialties, but who treated similar maladies, could offer testimony even though not equivalently credentialed to defendant physicians."
[brief] On May 31, 2023, Plaintiff filed a Second Amended Complaint in this action adding [...] as a defendant to already-named defendants [...], [...], [...], [...], and [...].  (Pa24-Pa48).  On October 5, 2023, Plaintiff served a Notice of Deposition for [...], in his individual capacity, which was directed to counsel for the German Defendants, noticing a deposition for November 9, 2023.  (Pa241-Pa244).  Plaintiff did not serve a deposition notice for a corporate representative of either [...] or [...].  (*See* 1T 18:11-13\(^1\)).  Thereafter, on October 30, 2023, Plaintiff served another Notice of Deposition for [...], which was directed to counsel for both the German --- \(^1\) “1T” as used herein refers to the transcript of the trial court’s oral decision on the record dated March 22, 2024.  “2T” as used herein refers to the transcript of oral argument dated April 12, 2024.  Defendants and the U.S. Defendants, noticing a deposition date of November 28, 2023.  (Pa251-Pa258).  On November 9, 2023, Plaintiff served a third Notice of Deposition for [...], which was directed to counsel for both the German Defendants and the U.S. Defendants, noticing a deposition date of December 7, 2023.  (Pa260-Pa268).  On December 4, 2023, Plaintiff served another Notice of Deposition for [...], which was directed to both the German Defendants and the U.S. Defendants, noticing a deposition date of January 10, 2024.  (Pa282-Pa286).  On January 17, 2024, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Compel the Deposition of Heinz [...] Pursuant to Rule 4:23-1, Or, In The Alternative, For Sanctions Pursuant to Rule 4:23-4 (the “Motion to Compel”).  (Pa1-Pa3).  On March 25, 2024, following a lengthy oral argument, the trial court entered an Order denying Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel, following the trial court’s oral decision read into the record on March 22, 2024, finding that Defendants do not have control over [...].  (Pa4-Pa5; 1T).  On March 27, 2024, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Reconsideration Pursuant to Rule 4:42-2(b) (the “Motion for Reconsideration”).  (Pa6-Pa8).  On April 12, 2024, the trial court again heard lengthy oral argument on the Motion for Reconsideration.  (2T).  Following oral argument, on April 19, 2024, the trial court entered an Order denying Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration, along with a Rider containing the trial court’s written opinion on the Motion for Reconsideration.  (Pa9-Pa16).  On May 8, 2024, Plaintiff filed a motion for leave to appeal the trial court’s Orders, dated March 25, 2024 and April 19, 2024.  (Pa372).  On May 30, 2024, this Court denied Plaintiff’s motion for leave to appeal.  (Pa372).  Plaintiff thereafter filed a motion for leave to appeal with the Supreme Court, which ultimately granted Plaintiff leave to appeal and remanded the matter to this Court for consideration of the merits.  (Pa373).