ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Since the facts and procedural history of this case are inextricably intertwined, they are combined to avoid repetition and for the court’s convenience.  Thereafter, the Defendant defaulted on August 1, 2015 by failing to make his required monthly mortgage payments.  The foreclosure action was initiated by the filing of a foreclosure complaint on May 12, 2016 (Da 141-170).  The Defendant filed a contesting answer with counterclaim on August 3, 2016 (Da 171-218) which kicked off years of litigation which sprawled across both the Chancery and Law Divisions of the New Jersey Superior Court as well as the Federal courts including the District of New Jersey, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, and the United States Bankruptcy Court.
[brief] C.  [...] files this action seeking a declaration that the Special Undertaking is void and unenforceable  [...] commenced this declaratory judgment action on May 12, 2017 – more than eight months after Defendant’s tender and eight years after the first case tendered to [...] had been commenced in 2009.  (Pa001; Pa470-72; Pa184).  [...] sought a declaration that the Special Undertaking is void and unenforceable, in whole or in part.  (Pa001).  Among other things, the Complaint asserts that the Special Undertaking is the product of fraud by [...] because [...] knew the dangers of PCBs but, to preserve sales and profits, intentionally concealed and misrepresented facts about their dangers to its customers, including [...].  (Pa005-014).  The Complaint also alleges that the Special Undertaking is unenforceable because, inter alia, [...] cannot be indemnified for its own negligent, reckless, and/or intentional misconduct (Pa014-15); the Special Undertaking does not apply to the tendered cases because they do not implicate products manufactured by [...] (Pa016-17); and that the Special Undertaking is otherwise unconscionable or void as against public policy (Pa018-21).
[brief] (Pa152, 10:13-19).  [...] reviewed [...]’s complaint system and found no complaints regarding the pothole question prior to plaintiff’s accident.  (Pa149-50, 7:21-8:3).  The roadway where Plaintiff’s incident took place was paved over on or about March 15, 2021.  (Pa254-55).  Repaving work is ordered by [...] based on available capital.
[brief] Counsel for [...]’s characterization that [...]’s offer “lacked a true measure of the market value of the property” and parenthetical explanation that somehow the market value was “one of the purposes of the ROFR mechanism” is not in the record in any respect and should be disregarded by this Court.  Nothing in any document in the record or any testimony of any witness indicates that the reason for the ROFR was to gauge the true market value of the property.  What is, however, a part of the record, is the fact that the offer by [...] to purchase the property did not change when the ROFR language demanded by [...] was ultimately explicitly added to the contract.  Essentially, counsel for [...] is attempting to add materiality to the inclusion of the ROFR to the contract even though the term is completely immaterial to [...].  [...] certainly knew back in 2015 that they had a ROFR and did not need an offer to contain that term in order to consider it.  Prior to the inclusion of that non-material term, as with *H&G Hardware*, supra, “...there is no reference in the contract [between seller and third-party buyer].”  In *H&G Hardware*, the reason for the Trial Court’s decision had nothing to do with whether the ROFR was contained in the contract or not.  *Id.*  Likely, this is because, as with the present case, “...the contract was presented to plaintiffs. ”  *Id.*  The Defendant complied with the contract by presenting the offer to the Plaintiff before closing on the transaction, thereby giving the Plaintiff the opportunity to buy the property under the same terms and conditions as the third party buyer was going to do.  Thus, even if the failure to mention the ROFR was in some way a “deficiency” in the “bona fide offer”, that “deficiency” was cured by the Defendant presenting the offer/contract to the Plaintiff before a closing took place transferring title to some other buyer before Plaintiff had the opportunity to consider the purchase at that price and under those terms.
[brief] IV.  APPELLANT’S CLAIM THAT THE STATE VIOLATED THE DISCOVERY RULES IS NOT WITHOUT MERIT.  Respondent argues that the Law Division “properly found that [Appellant] made ‘bald assertions that he was not provided with purported exculpatory evidence including video from the police station booking room. ’”  (Resp. Brief at 27 (quoting Aa50)).  However, Appellant maintains a good faith belief that such evidence does (or did) exist and was not provided to him during the course of discovery at the trial level.  To support its argument, Respondent notes that it does not have “an affirmative obligation to create a videotape of” Appellant’s alcotest being conducted.  (Resp. Brief at 27).  Appellant does not argue that this is the case.  Rather, Appellant correctly argues that Respondent does have an affirmative obligation to provide exculpatory evidence to a criminal defendant in discovery under R. 3:13-3(b).  By failing to provide the video evidence of Appellant’s alcotest, which Appellant maintains a good faith belief exists, Respondent violated R. 3:13-3.  V.
[brief] In this case, the raw data -- thousands, if not millions of rate resets -- are not sufficient put any New Jersey government official “squarely upon the trail of the alleged fraud,” such that it the data “was sufficient to enable [a New Jersey government official] adequately to investigate the case and to make a decision whether to prosecute. ”  \textit{CKD Project}, 551 F. Supp. 3d at 39.  The raw data to which Defendants point was “innocuous financial data that do[es] not on the surface suggest fraud” and “cannot be equated with allegations or transactions that do. ”  \textit{United States ex rel. Osheroff v. Tenet Healthcare Corp.}, 2012 WL 2871264, at *3 (S.D. Fla. July 12, 2012) (cleaned-up).  At the very least, there is a factual dispute about this question.\footnote{One of the interpretive tools that courts use to determine whether a complaint is “based upon” or “substantially similar” to publicly disclosed information is to ask whether what was disclosed was sufficient to set the government squarely on the trail of the fraud without the relator’s assistance.  \textit{Reed}, 923 F.3d at 744-47.
[brief] [...] litigated \textit{all} its claims against [...] in a single proceeding, in good faith.  See Pa172.  The gamesmanship of trying to sneakily preserve a claim, yet softly litigate it in the First Arbitration (and use it for a credit/setoff), but also keep the powder partly dry, is blatantly out-of-bounds and inequitable.  The trial court therefore erred in ruling that [...] did not have a “fair and reasonable opportunity” to litigate its Hackensack Project Completion Subcontract claim.
[brief] The trial court was required to determine whether the competent evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to Defendants, could permit a rational factfinder to find Defendants were bona-fide purchasers without notice.  But the trial court erred in finding constructive or inquiry notice, as a matter of law, without considering and weighing the information and testimony of those most informed about the actual and customary scope of title review, including that of the Plaintiffs, who were in the best and most interested position to find this allegedly “obvious and substantial” error, but apparently missed it (as did their title company).  B.
[brief] The [...] [...] Contract Terms | 4 | | C.  Plaintiff’s Accident | 6 | | D.  Plaintiff signs the 2016 Contract and files for bankruptcy | 6 | | E.  The Chapter 13 is converted to a Chapter 7 Petition | 7 | | F. [...] is appointed Special Counsel and Plaintiff signs | | | The 2018 Contract | 8 | | G.  The PI Claim settles in January 2019 and [...] is paid in full | 8 | | H.  Plaintiff’s UIM Complaint and the 2019 Contract | 8 | | I.  Plaintiff files Amended Schedules and settles her UIM Claim | 8 | | J. [...]’s Fee Application and [...]’s Claim | 9 | | K.  Plaintiff files Complaints against Defendants | 10 | | L.  The Parties file Multiple Motions for Summary Judgment | 11 | | M.  The Trial Court dismisses the First Amended Complaint and | | | Denies the Motion for Reconsideration | 12 |  LEGAL ARGUMENT
[directive] A BWC used by a law enforcement officer shall be placed so that it maximizes the camera’s ability to capture video footage of the officer’s activities.  This may include placement on helmets, vests or other such location so long as the device is secured properly and will maximize the device’s recordation function.  3.6  Duty to Inspect and Report Malfunction.  An officer equipped with a BWC shall be responsible for determining that the device is fully functional and that its battery is adequately charged at the start of the officer’s duty shift and before going into the field.  If a malfunction is detected, the officer shall report the malfunction to a supervisor before going into the field.  If the BWC malfunctions while out in the field, the malfunction upon its discovery shall be reported to the officer’s supervisor as soon as it is safe and practicable to do so.  3.7
[brief] Defendants’ attacks on [...]’s decision are without merit  At oral argument of Defendants’ renewed motions to dismiss and motion to stay, [...] heard extensively from three separate attorneys for Defendants.  (2T1-28, 32-52).  At the conclusion of the hearing, [...] issued his findings and decision denying those motions again.  (2T59:3-61:16).  Defendants now assert that [...]’s decision was improperly “colored” by comments he made regarding the second-filed case in Missouri, that his remarks were “caustic” and hostile to Defendants’ positions, and that [...] did not address some of their arguments in detail.  (Db11-14).  Defendants’ criticisms are misplaced and divorced from context.  By the time of the January 20, 2023 hearing, Defendants had spent more than 5 years seeking to avoid litigation in New Jersey and resisting [...]’s orders.  Defendants unsuccessfully moved to dismiss in 2017, including on comity grounds.  (Pa506-511).  After [...] ordered jurisdictional discovery, Defendants resisted discovery, ultimately requiring a motion to compel that [...] granted in its entirety.  Defendants then filed renewed motions to dismiss in 2022, again on personal jurisdiction, joinder, and comity grounds.  (Pa512-13; 570-71).  Finally, just before their renewed motions were set to be heard, Defendants filed a duplicative motion to stay the case based on the same comity arguments that already had been briefed.  (Pa756-57).  It was against this backdrop of Defendants’ oppressive motion practice (at least some of which could be categorized as frivolous) that [...] heard argument and issued his decision on January 20, 2022.  Any apparent frustration in [...]’s remarks is certainly understandable and confirms that he fully considered and understood Defendants’ arguments after voluminous briefing and a lengthy oral argument.  [...]’s comments merely reflect his frustration with the lack of merit in Defendants’ repetitious arguments on successor jurisdiction and comity, which he properly rejected.  B.
[brief] Under its Counterclaim for payment of $620,250.\(^{09}\) and $77,141.\(^{40}\), [...] is asking the court to interpret *N.J.S.A.* 18A:7F-9(e)(3) as requiring [...] to breach its contract, and pay for services not rendered without a renegotiated contract authorizing payment for not working.  If the court were to interpret N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-9(e)(3) as not requiring [...] to execute a new, renegotiated contract with [...] as a prerequisite to receiving payment, then N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-9(e)(3), as applied, violates the Impairment of Contracts Clause under the U.S. Constitution Art. I § 10, cl. 1, since it would mean that the Legislature passed an “ex post facto Law, or law impairing the Obligation of Contracts” because it would have essentially impaired [...]’s contractual obligation to perform services as a prerequisite to payment, and impaired [...]’s contractual obligation to tender payment after proof of receipt of services, in effect converting [...]’s services contract into an illegal “no-show” contract that excused [...]’s performance and required [...] to pay [...] despite receiving no services.
[brief] Just as [...] and [...] were believed to be operating an illegal bookkeeping enterprise out of hotel rooms, [...] and [...] were believed to be operating a heroin trafficking enterprise out of a storage unit.  And just as the search warrant affidavit for [...]’s hotel room relied on the corroborating information in [...]’s hotel room phone records, the affidavit in support of a warrant to search [...]’s storage unit relied in large part on the discovery of heroin in [...]’s car during the traffic stop.  (Dca 8-10)  Given these similarities, [...] has a participatory interest in the narcotics seized from [...]’s car.  First, there is clearly a sufficient connection between the narcotics seized from [...]’s car and the underlying heroin trafficking operation that police were investigating.  [...] testified that he stopped [...]’s car in part based on the tip that [...] had previously delivered heroin to [...]’s storage unit from New York.  (4T 30-15 to 31- 11)  [...] evidently believed that, like [...], [...] was delivering heroin to the storage unit for use in the operation.  [...] detailed the stop and search of [...]’s car at length in the affidavit requesting a warrant to search the storage unit, thus exhibiting his view that the heroin in [...]’s car was sufficiently connected to the underlying criminal activity being investigated.  (Dca 8-10)  Second, there is undeniably a sufficient connection between the criminal activity being investigated and [...].  [...] was the primary target of the investigation, which began with a tip that he was orchestrating the delivery of narcotics to his storage unit and keeping them there for street-level distribution.  On the basis of the investigation, [...] was charged with operating a heroin manufacturing facility inside of his storage unit.  (Da 11)  In accordance with [...], then, [...] must be afforded standing to challenge the seizure of narcotics from [...]’s car.
[directive] Bail After Conviction - Rule 2:9-4 ..................................................................................................................................................................  14  Uniform Criminal Extradition Law – Rule 3:26-1(d) .......................................................................................................................................  14  Uniform Criminal Extradition Law - Rule 3:26-2(a) ........................................................................................................................................  14  Bail for Witness - Rule 3:26-3 .......................................................................................................................................................................  14  Ten Percent Cash Bail - Rule 3:26-4(g) ........................................................................................................................................................  14  Bail Sufficiency; Source Hearing - Rule 3:26-8(a-g) ......................................................................................................................................  15  Bail for Persons Accused of Minor Offenses - N.J.S.A. 2C:6-1 .....................................................................................................................  15  Sex Offenses – Conditions Placed Upon Release of Certain Defendants – Nicole’s Law Restraining Order - N.J.S.A. 2C:14-12 .................  15  Bail in Domestic Violence Cases - Procedures (See also Crimes with Bail Restrictions) – N.J.S.A. 2C:25-26(d)(e) .....................................  15  Drug Offender Restraining Order Act - N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5.7 ...........................................................................................................................  15 Uniform Criminal Extraditon Act -Extradition Proceedings - N.J.S.A. 2A:160-(1-25) ......................................................................................  16  Crimes with Bail Restrictions - Other Than Domestic Violence Cases - N.J.S.A. 2A:162-12 .........................................................................  16  Crimes with Bail Restrictions - Domestic Violence Cases - N.J.S.A. 2A:162-12 ............................................................................................  16  Bail Sufficiency; Source Hearing - N.J.S.A. 2A:162-13 (See Rule 3:26-8(a-g)) ............................................................................................  17  Procedures: N.J.S.A. 2A:162-14 (See Rule 3:26-8(a-g)) ...............................................................................................................................  17  12  Index of Rules and Statute Regarding Bail for Disorderly Persons/Petty Disorderly Persons Offenses
[directive] Each investigator must be skilled in interviews and interrogation, observation, surveillance and report writing.  4.2.4  Internal affairs investigators should be trained not only in the elements of criminal law, court procedures, rules of evidence and use of technical equipment, but also in the disciplinary and administrative law process.  Initially upon assignment, and on an ongoing basis, these investigators should receive training in internal affairs and disciplinary procedures, including training required by the Division of Criminal Justice.  4.2.5
[brief] The Trial Court’s Dismissal of the Complaint Without Prejudice  On March 4, 2022, [...] heard arguments on the [...]’s motion to dismiss the Verified Complaint.  1T.  The [...] relied entirely on [...]’s October 12, 2021 certification, claiming, “it is submitted that there are no other records to disclose and that Plaintiff’s case should be dismissed with prejudice for failure to state a claim. ”  Pa-77.  The [...]’s attorney, Hudson County First Assistant County Counsel [...] (“[...]”) reiterated this position stating: “An attorney at that office, [...], supplied documents that they had.  I think it was one document, and it was a summons and a complaint against the former judge, to [...].  And he represented that that’s the only document they have.  So having complied with the OPRA request, there’s no reason for the lawsuit. ”  1T4-13 to -19.  [...] continued to insist that the [...] had no other records stating, “[a]nd that’s the only document that they had.  ...  You can’t produce what you don’t have.  ...  And [[...]] tells me he made inquiry and that no one in his office had anything else ... whoever he made the inquiry of, the appropriate prosecutor, or the appropriate people in the Prosecutor’s Office, they had - they told him they had nothing else. ”  1T4-9 to 8-4.  Finally, to support these contentions, [...] against relied on [...] stating, “Well, I mean, Mr. [...] is an attorney.  And I’d like to think that he - you know, he’s bound ethically to act in good faith.  And I’m sure he did here in terms of attempt to find out what the Prosecutor’s Office had. ”  1T9-14 to -18.  Plaintiff then explained that the [...] had completely failed to meet the requirements set forth by the Appellate Division in Paff v. New Jersey Dep’t. of Labor, 392 N.J. Super. 334, 341 (App. Div. 2007):  “MR. DALAL: Sure.  And, you know, the Appellate Division has required that in these OPRA cases that the agency is required to submit an affidavit describing the nature of the search that was conducted.  And we have nothing.  We don’t know how they conducted the search for records.  We don’t – again we don’t know if all databases were searched.  So I would submit that their request – their motion to dismiss should be denied just on that basis alone.  The Appellate Division has made it clear that under the Paff decision a description of a search is required. ”  1T11-17 to 12-2.  After that, Plaintiff noted that he had presented evidence from the [...] that there did exist some emails between the [...] and the [...] that had not been disclosed.  1T16-16 to 24.  [...] then dismissed the complaint without prejudice for the following reasons:  “I find that the [...] did submit the documents per the request of [...].  And that there is nothing more that could be done.  They didn’t – Hudson County argues that they did not conceal any information provided, they comply with what was required of them.  And they say they disclosed the requirements under Paff.  And there is nothing else that they have. ”  1T21-11 to 18; Pa-14.  V.
[brief] Specifically, the 1998 Master Plan set forth a variety of goals and objectives including: - develop and maintain a satisfactory level of public facilities and services; - provide sufficient space in appropriate locations for residential, recreational, commercial, and open space use; - promote a desirable visual environment; - protect wetlands and areas with scenic, cultural, and recreational values; - encourage development that contributes to the revitalization of the community; and -guide waterfront development to maintain visual and pedestrian access to the Bayshore for the general public while encouraging development that is suitably scaled, compatible with public facilities and services, and appropriate to a waterfront location.  (Pa637-639)  Moreover, the 1998 Master Plan contained the following policy statement: -guide waterfront development, which protects the public need for shore protection and flood control, visual and pedestrian access to the waterfront, recreation and open space, and economic development.  The Borough should encourage appropriate use of waterfront locations and coordinate its efforts with the County’s plan to improve waterfront access along the Raritan Bayshore.  (Pa640)  The Master Plan was reexamined in 2003.
[brief] ESTATE OF [...], by [...], Administrator, and [...], Administrator of the ESTATE OF [...], Plaintiffs/Respondents, -vs- [...], M.D., [...], C.R.NA.  [...], [...], JOHN DOES 1-10, JANE DOES 1-10 (representing presently unknown health care providers or health care providers with regard to which negligence is not presently suspected, including but not limited to, doctors, surgeons, emergency medicine doctors, anesthesiologists, hospitalists, physician assistants, nurses, nurse practitioners, nurse anesthetists, technicians, and others); and ABC CORPS 1-10 (representing presently unknown facilities or entities who rendered care to the plaintiff who have deviated from the standard of care or facilities or entities with regard to which negligence is not presently suspected), Defendants/Appellants.  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. [...] ON APPEAL FROM THE ORDERS OF THE SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY, LAW DIVISION, UNION COUNTY Sat Below: Honorable [...], J.S.C. Union County Superior Court Docket No. [...] BRIEF AND APPENDIX ON BEHALF OF PLAINTIFF/RESPONDENT, THE ESTATE OF [...] TABLE OF CONTENTS
[brief] Table of Authorities ii  Preliminary Statement  1  Respondent’s Procedural History 3 Statement of Facts  5  Legal Argument  8  Point I - STANDARD OF REVIEW  8  Point II - PLAINTIFF’S “ATTEMPTS” TO “CHANGE”  HIS AUTOMOBILE POLICY DOES NOT EXCUSE HIS FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH NEW JERSEY INSURANCE LAWS  11 a. N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.5 does not have a “scienter” requirement  14 b.  Even if N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.5 had an “intent” requirement, the evidence clearly demonstrates appellant/plaintiff [...]’s intentional failure to insure his vehicle with a New Jersey policy 15 c.  It is irrelevant whether appellant/plaintiff [...] had claims against his insurance carrier, [...] 18 d.  There is no question of fact in this matter which is bolstered by appellant/plaintiff’s failure to oppose his insurance carrier’s summary judgment motion  19  Point III - DISCOVERY WAS NOT INCOMPLETE AND FURTHER DISCOVERY WOULD NOT HAVE PREVENTED SUMMARY  JUDGMENT  20  CONCLUSION