ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] See State v. Gibson, 318 N.J. Super. 1, 9 (App. Div. 1999).  he approached the vehicle, he saw through the tinted side windows three duffle bags lying “under a piece of plywood. ” (1T21-1 to 21).  [...] asked the driver, [...], for her driver’s license, as well as the vehicle’s registration and insurance card, and likewise asked to see the license of her passenger, [...].  (1T22-21 to 1T23-4).  Lonnie supposedly said the vehicle belonged to a Nevada resident named “[...]”, and that he and Ms. Stout were on their way to New York to “pick up a car. ” (1T23-5 to 13).  [...] told Ms. Stout about the splash guard violation, and that he was only going to issue her a warning.  Now in possession of both all driving and registration credentials, [...] did not issue a “warning” or – in order to verify those credentials through dispatch – return to his vehicle alone.  Rather he ordered Ms. Stout to exit the vehicle and accompany him back to his patrol car (1T51-11 to 25; 1T141-25 to 1T142-2) where his drug sniffing canine was kept, to question her further, patting her down before placing her in the police car. \(^4\)  On the walk back to the police car, [...] began to question Ms. Stout about the duffel bags, about which he acknowledged there was nothing even --- \(^4\)  The issuance of such a warning would not require removing the driver from her car on the shoulder of a major interstate highway and putting her in a patrol car for “questioning,” notwithstanding Veryzer’s subjective belief that this makes it “easier to ask questions” and to foster a better “human” perception of the police.  (1T24-2 to 11).  Nor would such perception be fostered by Veryzer’s illegal pat-down of Ms. Stout before placing Ms. Stout in his patrol vehicle with a large canine in the back.  (1T56-6 to 16).
[brief] Defendants were tried together before the same jury.  [...] was convicted of the following crimes: second degree conspiracy to commit armed robbery, N.J.S.A. 2C:15–1 and N.J.S.A. 2C:5–2; purposeful or knowing murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:11–3a(1) or N.J.S.A. 2C:11–3a(2); murder during the commission of an armed robbery (felony murder), N.J.S.A. 2C:11–3a(3); two counts of first degree armed robbery, N.J.S.A. 2C:15–1; third degree knowing possession of a handgun without a permit, N.J.S.A. 2C:39–5b; and second degree knowing possession of a handgun for an unlawful purpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:39–4a.  [...] was convicted of the following crimes: conspiracy to commit armed robbery, N.J.S.A. 2C:15–1 and N.J.S.A. 2C:5–2; purposeful or knowing murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:11–3a(1) or N.J.S.A. 2C:11–3a(2); causing the death of another during the commission of an armed robbery (felony murder), N.J.S.A. 2C:11–3a(3); first degree armed robbery, N.J.S.A. 2C:15–1; attempted murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:5–1 and N.J.S.A. 2C:11–3; aggravated assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:12–1b(2); aggravated assault against a law enforcement officer, N.J.S.A. 2C:12–1b(5)(a); knowing possession of a handgun without a permit, N.J.S.A. 2C:39–5b; possession of a handgun with an unlawful purpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:39–4a; knowing possession of a defaced firearm, N.J.S.A. 2C:39–3d; and giving false information to law enforcement in order to hinder apprehension, prosecution, conviction, or punishment, N.J.S.A. 2C:29–3b(4).
[brief] POINT III  THE COURT IMPOSED A SENTENCE REQUIRING A FINDING THAT DEFENDANT WAS INCORRIGIBLE, BUT NEVER FOUND DEFENDANT TO BE INCORRIGIBLE, REQUIRING RESENTENCING.  The State’s argument ultimately boils down to the following: [...] allegedly “failed to show remorse,” has not established “a true change of character,” and is likely to reoffend.  (Sb41, 36-37)  If this characterization of [...] were correct – which it is not – [...] would be the “rare juvenile offender whose crime reflects irreparable corruption. ”  Zuber, 227 N.J. at 440.  The court, however, has never ruled on whether [...] is incorrigibly corrupt.  In fact, the remand order from this court following [...]’s 2018 sentencing noted that court previously did not find [...] “to be incorrigibly corrupt” and it was “[f]or that reason [that] we remand the matter again for fresh consideration[.]”  (Da109)  (emphasis added)  Indeed, the court could not credibly make a finding that [...] is incorrigible because the record unquestionably established [...]’s maturation, remorse, and rehabilitation.  Accordingly, resentencing is required.
[brief] As pointed out by the Appellate Decision in Francavilla, supra, the Maryland cases [...] v. Finch, 463 Md. 586, 207 A.3d 202 (2019) and Finch v. [...], 212 Md. App. 748, 71 A.3d 193, 198-205 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2013) raised by Petitioner do not provide support for her argument as to the effect of the NJCFLA for two reasons.  Plaintiff's reliance on a decision by the Maryland Court of Special Appeals reversing a trial court order dismissing the plaintiff's class action as an impermissible collateral attack on a prior judgment is misplaced.  The decision in Finch v. [...], 212 Md. App. 748, 71 A.3d 193, 198-205 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2013), was predicated on the Maryland Collection Agency Licensing Act (MCALA)2 and the Maryland Consumer Debt Collection Act (MCDCA),3 not New Jersey law.  The MCDCA also contains a private right of action, while New Jersey's CFLA does not.  Francavilla Id. at 171, See also Diana v. [...], No. A-1000-23, 2024 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2241, at *7-8 (App. Div. Sep. 26, 2024).
[brief] the speech was “possible only as an ordinary corollary to his position as a government employee. ”  Id. at 454.  “[...] had the opportunity to speak in court to attorneys and judges only as an ordinary corollary to his position as an Assistant Public Defender[and] his speech in that role was not citizen speech. ”  Ibid.  This is markedly different that [...] addressing the [...] Annual Convention on Safe Drinking Water consisting of professionals in the field of safe drinking water on his own time and at his own expense when he had ethics approval to make such presentations and sought to discuss “capacity development” of water systems to promote “the long term viability of water supplies. ”  [...]’s proposed speech was decidedly a matter of public concern unlike the discussion of the conditions of a government employee’s workplace at issue in [...] and Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 418 (2006).  CONCLUSION
[brief] **  The Supreme Court’s decision in *Mejia* is controlling in this matter because it directly addresses the application of the JTCL in the circumstance of a so-called “*Burt* defendant” designation.  The first issue in *Mejia* was whether the so-called “*Burt* defendant” designation was valid and/or available to a provider who was not a direct defendant but was subject to a third-party contribution claim.  *Id.* at 371.  The Supreme Court held that, absent culpable conduct by the plaintiff that precluded a contribution claim, direct defendants may collect contribution via a third-party claim.  *Id.* at 372-73.  Therefore, designation as a so-called “*Burt* defendant” was not permitted.  *Ibid.*  The Court relied upon *Holloway v.  State*, 125 N.J. 386 (1991) in reaching the conclusion that “contribution should not depend upon whether a defendant is sued as a third-party defendant pursuant to R. 4:8-1, or as a direct defendant subject to a cross- claim for contribution pursuant to R. 4:7-5(a). ”  Id. at 372.  “[T]he procedural status of a defendant-in-contribution . . . neither alters nor modifies the rule that the injured party’s negligence should be compared with that of each joint tortfeasor.  How the tortfeasors arrive at the litigation should not affect the substantive right of contribution. ”  Id. at 372-73 (quoting Holloway, 125 N.J. at 402).  “Clearly a defendant’s right to contribution from a joint tortfeasor cannot be controlled by plaintiff’s unilateral decision not to join all tortfeasors. ”  [...], 195 N.J. Super. at 506.  “Thus, a defendant may file a claim for contribution against a third party that was not sued by the plaintiff. ”  Mejia, 241 N.J. at 372 (citing R. 4:8-1(a)).  Having so ruled clearly and unequivocally, with precedent dating back decades, there was no reason why Appellant would not have known of this right and no reason why he could not have pursued contribution from those defendants believed to be joint tortfeasors, regardless of whether Plaintiff/Respondents chose to sue them or not to sue them.
[brief] Trial counsel failed to honor any of these requests as well although he led defendant to believe he had honored his requests.  The fingerprint and DNA forensic experts the defendant was assured by trial counsel would be called for trial were equally significant to a pre-trial suppression hearing to challenge the sneak and peek as well.  The defendant raised the claim that trial counsel was grossly ineffective for not appropriately challenging the sneak and peek via a suppression hearing, by failing to obtain the fingerprint expert, DNA expert, and by not challenging the chain of custody for the seized evidence, not investigating any witnesses or obtaining the video footage from the [...] in Charlotte, North Carolina, and more importantly, not being prepared to challenge the sneak and peek search warrant and misrepresentations in the affidavit in support of the search warrant.  This may explain trial counsel’s complete failure to file the appropriate motion to suppress the sneak and peek evidence.  The defendant argued that there was no judicial authority for the issuance of a sneak and peek warrant in the State of New Jersey, as no legislative promulgation of such a heightened intrusion into a citizen’s Fourth Amendment Constitutional right to be free from unreasonable intrusions has ever been adopted or approved at the time of defendant’s case.
[brief] On the other hand, the discretionary action the Legislature intended to immunize under N.J.S.A. 59:2-3(a) are high level policy decisions.  In Costa v. Jozey, 83 N.J. 49, 59 (1980), our Supreme Court explained: the exemption contemplated under N.J.S.A. 59:2-3(a) concerns the exercise of judgment on discretion in making basic policy - the type made at the planning, rather than the operational level of decision making.  Moreover, immunity is contingent upon proof that discretion was actually exercised at that level by an official, who, faced with alternative approaches, weighed the competing policy considerations and made a conscious choice.  Ibid.  Maintenance of the roadway has specifically been found to be a ministerial act.  See Coyne v. State Dept. of Transp., 182 N.J. 481, 487 (2005) - holding that DOT work detail could be held liable for failure to properly divert traffic around cleanup activities where DOT safety manual delegated ultimate authority for such operations to the road crew); Furey v. County of Ocean, 273 N.J. Super. 300 (App. Div.) certif. den. 138 N.J. 272 (1994) – court finding failure to maintain roadway in safe condition a ministerial.)
[brief] [a] litigant should not seek consideration merely because of dissatisfaction with a decision of the Court….Reconsideration should be utilized only for those cases which fall into that narrow corridor in which either 1) the Court has expressed its decision based upon a palpably incorrect or irrational basis, or 2) it is obvious that the Court either did not consider, or failed to appreciate the significance of probative, competent evidence.  Said another way, a litigant must initially demonstrate that the Court acted in an arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable manner, before the Court should engage in the actual reconsideration process….  [T]he Court must be sensitive and scrupulous in its analysis of the issues in a motion for reconsideration.  The appropriate appellate standard of review of a denial of a motion for reconsideration is abuse of discretion.  Cummings v. Bahr, 295 N.J. Super. 374 (App. Div. 1996).  “Although our reported decisions do not clearly articulate the standard of review where there is a denial of a motion for reconsideration, the standard in the Federal courts is ‘abuse of discretion. ’  We now adopt that standard as the appropriate norm for appellate review of a denial of a motion for reconsideration. ”  Id. at 389.  An abuse of discretion occurs “when the court’s decision is made without rational explanation, inexplicably departs from established policies, or rests upon an impermissible basis.  Matter of T.I.C.-C., 470 N.J. Super 596, 606 (App. Div. 2022) (citing Flagg v. Essex Cnty. Prosecutor, 171 N.J. 561, 571 (2002)).  “If the judge misconceives or misapplies the law, his discretion lacks a foundation and becomes an arbitrary act.  When that occurs, the reviewing court should adjudicate the matter in light of the applicable law to avoid a manifest denial of justice. ”  In re Presentment of Bergen County Grand Jury, 193 N.J. Super. 2, 9 (App. Div. 1984).  Plaintiff fails to demonstrate how or why the trial court’s well-reasoned decision denying Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration was an instance of an abuse of discretion.
[directive] 5  Vehicular Pursuit Restrictions  5.1  No pursuit shall be conducted under the following circumstances: (a) in a direction opposite to the flow of traffic on a divided highway or a one-way street; or (b) in a police vehicle in which an individual who is not a law enforcement officer is either the driver or passenger.  5.2  There shall be a strong presumption against the initiation or continuation of vehicular pursuits in areas where pedestrians are located or in areas of high density vehicular traffic.  5.3  No more than two police vehicles (primary unit and secondary unit) shall become actively involved in a pursuit unless otherwise specifically directed by a supervisor.  5.4  A motorcycle officer may initiate a pursuit, but will relinquish primary unit status immediately upon the participation of a marked police vehicle.  5.5  An unmarked police vehicle will not participate in a vehicular pursuit unless it is equipped with an emergency light and an audible device.  The unmarked car shall relinquish primary unit status immediately upon the participation of a marked police vehicle.  5.6  To diminish the likelihood of a pursuit, an officer intending to stop a vehicle for any violation of the law shall, when possible and without creating a threat to public safety, close the distance between the two vehicles prior to activating emergency lights and an audible device.  Officers shall recognize that, while attempting to close the distance and prior to the initiation of a pursuit and the activation of emergency lights and an audible device, they are subject to all motor vehicle laws governing the right of way (e.g., N.J.S.A. 39:4-91 and -92).  5.7  Throughout the course of a vehicular pursuit, pursuing officers shall not attempt to overtake or pass the violator’s moving vehicle.  5.8  During the course of a pursuit and when approaching an intersection controlled by traffic signals or signs, or any other location at which there is a substantially increased likelihood of collision, the operator of any pursuit vehicle shall, prior to entering the intersection, reduce the vehicle’s speed and control the vehicle so as to avoid collision with another vehicle or pedestrian.  The officer shall observe that the way is clear before cautiously proceeding through the intersection.  At all other times including an attempt to close the distance prior to the initiation of a pursuit and upon the termination of a pursuit, officers shall observe the applicable laws governing the right of way at intersections and other locations.  8
[brief] Pa2126.  She also confirmed that cancellation of [...]’s CCIP Workers’ Compensation Policy, which would result in a cancellation endorsement, would not affect its coverage under the CCIP Policy (i.e., the general liability policies), and that the CCIP Policy had no language relating to the CCIP Workers’ Compensation Policy.  Pa2122-Pa2123.\(^1\)  [...] of [...] testified that [...] never received any notice from either [...] or [...] that [...] was no longer enrolled in the CCIP.  Pa2352-Pa2353.
[brief] *State v. Cooper*, 410 N.J. Super. 43, 57 (App. Div. 2009).  Thus, trial counsel was not ineffective in his attempted presentation of the records, nor was he ineffective in his investigation.  Even if this Court were to find that he was, no prejudice has been demonstrated as, like the cell phone records establishing the same thing, the jury would not have found that they exonerated Defendant.  In effect, the Facebook records were cumulative, demonstrating the same evidence as the cell phone evidence with the same flaws.
[brief] Pa0869-Pa0899.  For that reason, no other person or entity paid property taxes on the Property.  4T, p. 29, lines 16-17.  Likewise, from 1920 (the date that [...] sold the tract which includes the Property to [...]) to the present, [...] did not do anything to exercise any ownership rights over any portion of the Property, and did not object in any way to the Borough’s open and notorious exercise of ownership rights over the Property.
[brief] To a minimum, [...] should have disclosed his Anti-Asian animosity to the parties at the outset of the trial and asked the parties for consent to let him be the judge for the trial.  For the past fifty years Judge had hard feelings for his fellow soldiers killed by soldiers of Asian descent in Vietnam, one cannot say his hard \(^{45}\) [...]’ remarks at the beginning of the hearing on June 18, 2018 revealed his Anti-Asian motive and was reflective of trial judge displaying partiality during the entire *Fou v. Tung* tribunal proceedings.  [...]’s racial remarks explains why so many irregularities occurred during the trial.  Before the trial, [...] became the tax auditor of Defendants’ tax returns and bank records and threatened to report to tax authority for tax evasions to coerce Defendants to settle, when the tax and bank records were not relevant evidence to the instant malpractice case.  (*See Da331-334*)  At the end of the trial, [...] intentionally committed a reversible error by denying the motion to dismiss complaint by Defendants for failure to prove damages by expert at the end of the trial, [...] referred the case to the jury to infer causation and damage from circumstantial evidence in a professional malpractice case, knowing only the expert, not the jury, can opine causation and damages in malpractice cases.  (Da111)  [...] called the jury out of deliberations and specifically gave the redacted version of the decision of [...] to the jury and advised the jury that this transcript was the decision to set aside the judgment in the matter *Fou v. Fou* and the Appellate Division upheld the decision to prejudice Defendants.  (Da133)  Finally, [...] awarded an outrageous, astronomic, excessive, and baseless and unconscionable attorney fees over $1.547 Million Dollars to Plaintiff’s attorneys in this instant case where the Plaintiff sustained no actual damages.  feeling would not subconsciously affect his judgment and determination in the instant trial.  A jury would be excluded from the panel if he or she discloses that he or she is tainted with such an experience with Asian descent.  Because Defendants were prejudiced by a trial Judge who openly displayed his Anti-Asian animosity, a new trial shall be ordered and [...] shall be disqualified for the purpose to rebuild the public confidence in the integrity of our judicial systems pursuant to either objective standard or subjective standard.
[directive] At the conclusion of the 20-year retention period, any unreported kit may be destroyed.  Victims are notified of the end date of the retention period at the time of examination and specimen collection.  Victims shall also be provided information on how to release an unreported SAFE kit to law enforcement for testing and criminal investigation.  County Prosecutor’s Offices must also publicly maintain information on how a victim may release an unreported SAFE kit to law enforcement for testing and criminal investigation during the retention period.12  SAFE kits submitted to law enforcement for investigation and testing shall be retained in accordance with the law enforcement agency’s evidence retention policy and stored in accordance with section III.B.  Retained and unreported SAFE kits collected before the effective date of the March 2023 Directive (March 13, 2023) shall be retained for 20 years from the date of collection for an adult or twenty (20) years from the date a minor victim reaches the age of 18.  County Prosecutors must publicly maintain information on the extended retention period so that all individuals within their jurisdiction are aware of the extension of victims of sexual violence rights with respect to retention of unreported SAFE kits.  IV.
[brief] In other contexts, our courts have criticized the State for taking contradictory positions like this at suppression hearings.  See State v. Johnson, 193 N.J. 528, 543 (2008) (describing one of the rationales for automatic standing as preventing the State from “taking seemingly conflicting positions, on the one hand prosecuting a defendant for possessing an according to the State, probable cause did develop from this concerted sequence of police actions.  The State’s other attempts to distinguish this case from the clear rule set forth in Witt and Smart should equally fail.  The State points out that in Smart, the police’s initial suspicions came from a tip from a few months prior and that police surveilled the car in Smart for longer than occurred here.  (Sb 27)  But Smart did not hold that circumstances leading to probable cause are unforeseeable and spontaneous only if they predate the stop by months or even hours; the Court used the words unforeseeable and spontaneous.  Something that is foreseen—here, that after seeing what they believed to be a narcotics transaction involving [...]’s car, that the car would contain narcotics—is necessarily not unforeseeable.
[brief] [...] did not provide a factual or scientific foundation for plaintiffs’ claim that a dangerous condition existed at the site of the accident.  [...] is not an accident reconstructionist *(Pa2138).*  [...] did not know if the front wheel of plaintiff’s motorcycle struck the alleged change in elevation.  [...] did not know if the front wheel of plaintiff’s motorcycle crossed over or missed the same alleged hazard that supposedly caused a blowout of the rear tire (Pa2137).  [...] had no knowledge of other accidents at the location of plaintiff’s crash.  [...] was uncertain whether the difference in elevation was two or three inches and said there was no pothole at the abutment (Pa2136).  [...] noted that the alleged change in elevation was “up to two inches” in the Arora Bridge Report and conditions there were “fair”, not poor or dangerous (Pa2137).  [...] had no idea as to the weight or width of the motorcycle (Pa2138).  [...] never inspected the roadway, never took or obtained measurements of it or the alleged condition that supposedly caused the accident.  [...] presumed, without a factual basis, that a “jolt” encountered by plaintiff when he drove over the area in a truck weeks after the accident was the same as the condition his motorcycle encountered.  [...] could only speculate that settlement seen in the barriers meant that the roadway was uneven and hazardous.  [...] provided no scientific analysis or data to support his conclusions that a dangerous condition existed in the roadway that caused plaintiff’s accident.  As such, because [...]’s opinions were speculative and not supported by the record, or any scientific analysis, the trial court correctly barred [...]’s testimony as inadmissible net opinions.