[brief] Defendant [...] also admitted that she was aware of Plaintiff receiving charge pay at least once and took no action to correct it, or to discipline Plaintiff.  (Pa362, Pa661).  If Defendant [...] authorized the charge pay, Defendants’ entire stated reason for termination crumbles.  A pretextual rationale for termination is sufficient for Defendants’ summary judgment motion to be denied under McDonnell Douglas.  While a reasonable jury could determine that Defendant [...] terminated Plaintiff, [...], and [...] for another reason, such as her own complicity in their charge pay, it could also attribute a different motive and conclude that she did so in retaliation against three employees who had previously made complaints regarding her conduct.  Indeed, there is record evidence that Defendant [...] exhibited an antagonism towards the complaints that had been made against her, as well as ignorance of Defendants’ workplace policies as a whole.  During the June 2020 incident with Plaintiff, Defendant [...] referenced Plaintiff’s prior complaints.  (Pa656).  Specifically, she stated that Defendants’ management “laughed” at Plaintiff’s complaints and that he was a “laughingstock” for having made them.  (Pa656).  Defendant [...], in recounting Defendant [...]’s reaction to having learned that an investigation may be commencing in connection with Plaintiff’s latest complaint, dismissively responded: “what now. ” (Pa101).  Even in her deposition testimony in connection with this lawsuit, Defendant [...] claimed to have no knowledge of whether Defendant [...] even had an anti-retaliation policy, and stated that she did not recall receiving training on Defendant [...]’s anti-harassment policies.  (Pa665).  The totality of the circumstances could support an inference that Defendant [...] was not above taking action to shut down a pending investigation into her conduct.  Defendant [...] was, in fact, successful in impeding any investigation into her conduct, which was recognized by the Trial Court in its opinion.  In referencing the investigation into the June 2020 incident, the Trial Court noted that:  “But clearly, as a result of them getting terminated there really wasn’t much to do to [...] because [...] got terminated for this. ” (T26-20).  Instead of investigating Defendant [...], Defendant [...] performed a mish-mashed dual “investigation,” primarily into the charge pay incident.  (Pa107).  For example, Defendant [...] permitted Defendant [...] to be present at staff interviews in connection with the investigation.  (Pa109 – Pa 110).  Defendant [...] also permitted Defendant [...] to exercise her discretion in recommending termination of even though she had an open HR complaint pending against her.  (Pa117).  The decision to terminate Plaintiff, [...], and [...] is further weakened by the failure of Defendants to abide by their own progressive discipline policy and their prior belongings of employees who were alleged to have “stolen” time.  Other employees who engaged in similar conduct authorization, cashing out PTO time that had been used, were not terminated (Pa668).  This selective enforcement of company policy further undermines Defendants’ explanation.  In conclusion, there is evidence in this record (including testimony that Defendant [...] authorizes the charges in question) that Defendants’ termination of Plaintiff is simply not what it seems.