ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Defendant had contended that the FDCPA expressly allows debt collectors’ use of telegrams and telephone calls which, it argued, implies the use of mail vendors.  Defendant overstates the point.  The FDCPA does not expressly authorize or endorse the use of telegram and telephone operators.  Instead, such use must comply with the FDCPA including certain provisions expressly applying to the use of telegrams and telephones.  Moreover, Khimmat, 585 F. Supp. 3d at 715, explained why the use of mail vendors is distinguishable from the use of telegram and telephone operators.  But, let’s be clear, Plaintiff does not argue that all communications between a debt collector and a letter vendor are prohibited.  Instead, any communication between them must comply with the FDCPA which included § 1692c(b).  A different set of facts might present a case where a debt collector’s communication with a mail vendor does not violate any provision of the FDCPA.  Here, however, Defendant’s communication with its mail vendor violates the plain meaning of § 1692c(b).
[brief] Ibid.  After issuing the Decision, the trial court held a conference with the parties.  See 2T.  During the conference, [...] expressed its desire to file a motion for reconsideration and [...] expressed its intent to cross-move for final judgment.  Ibid.  The conference concluded with all parties agreeing that the matter would be finally resolved after these respective motions are decided.  2T15-2 -22.  [...] filed a motion for reconsideration of the Decision and [...] filed a cross-motion for judgment.  3T.  Notably, [...] did not oppose [...]’s cross-motion and did not take any position with respect to [...]’s motion for reconsideration.  See ibid.  During argument, [...] explicitly represented that it would award the Anticipated Contract in a manner consistent with the trial court’s decision on the motions.  3T49-14-23.  By Order dated November 1, 2024 (“Judgment”), the trial court denied [...]’s motion for reconsideration and granted [...]’s cross-motion for judgment, ordering that “the bid submitted by [...] in response to [...]’s Solicitation for the Project shall be declared the lowest responsive bid. ”  Da425.  The trial court also denied [...]’s verbal application for a stay pending appeal.  Ibid.  On November 1, 2024, [...] filed a Notice of Appeal with a request to file an emergent motion for a stay pending appeal.  Da433.  The Court granted [...] permission to file an Emergent Motion.  Da450.  On November 6, 2024, [...] filed an Emergent Motion for a Stay and Partial Summary Disposition seeking: (i) a stay pending its Appeal; and (ii) a limited remand to [...].  On November 7, 2024, [...] filed a letter indicating that it “takes no position in connection with the [Emergent Motion]. ”  By Order dated November 13, 2024, the Court granted [...]’s motion for a stay pending the disposition of this Appeal and denied [...]’s request for a summary disposition and limited remand to [...].  On January 3, 2025, without having previously filed a Notice of Appeal or Notice of Cross-Appeal, [...] filed a Respondent’s Brief challenging the trial court’s Decision and Judgment.
[brief] State v. Pierre, 223 N.J. 560 (2015) .................................................................7  State v. Prall, 231 N.J. 567 (2018)  ........................................................................15  U.S. v. Clementon Sewerage Auth., 365 F.2d 609 (3d Cir. 1966) .......................14, 15  Verdicchio v. Ricca, 179 N.J. 1 (2004) .................................................................9, 33 Walters v. YMCA, 437 N.J. Super. 111 (App.  Div. 2014) .....................................3, 4 YA Global Investments, L.P. v. Cliff, 419 N.J. Super. 1 (App. Div. 2011) ..............14, 15 89 Water Street Assocs. v. Reilly, 2019 WL 4793073 (App. Div. Oct. 1, 2019) ..........16, 17 RULES AND STATUTES Court Rule 1:36-3 ..................................................................................................16 Court Rule 2:2-3 ....................................................................................................26 Court Rule 2:9-1 ....................................................................................................26 Court Rule 2:9-5 ....................................................................................................26, 27, 28 Court Rule 4:10-2 ...................................................................................................21 Court Rule 4:10-3 ...................................................................................................22 Court Rule 4:14-1 ...................................................................................................21 Court Rule 4:37-2 ...................................................................................................8, 9, 31, 33, 35 Court Rule 4:42-2 ..................................................................................................26, 28 N.J.S.A. 2A:15-6 ..................................................................................................29 N.J.S.A. 2A:15-14 .................................................................................................29, 30 OTHER [...] & [...], Current N.J. Court Rules (2024)
[brief] The [...] denied this application whereupon Defendant filed an Action in Lieu of Prerogative Writ on February 21, 2018.  The Defendant’s Action in Lieu of Prerogative Writ was ultimately dismissed on August 17, 2018.  5  Despite Defendant’s representation to the contrary, neither party presented witnesses during the October 15, 2018 [...] hearing. issued an opinion and Order entering judgment in favor of Plaintiff, rendering the [...]’s Resolution null and void and granting other relief set forth therein.  Defendant has filed a separate appeal from the December 1, 2022 Order.
[directive] The etc.). sex offenses, robberies, easily can be information) contact victim (e.g., discoverable that information not is recorded that so of Probable Affidavit an in reference by incorporated and to appended material from segregated R. Cf. discovery obligations.  under State's provided the be to required material any or other Cause, pretrial for moves prosecutor the when obligations discovery (explaining State's the 3:4-2(c)(1)(b) when only triggered discovery is obligation pre-indictment (general that rule R. detention); 3:13-3(a) offer).
[brief] Plaintiffs-Appellant' Allegation Against [...] Does Not Meet the Heightened Pleading Requirements of R. 4:5-8  [...] Related Defendants II.  Plaintiff’s Complaint Is Legally Insufficient To Bring A Viable Cause of Action Against the County Defendants  But no defendant filed a cross-appeal claiming that the trial court erred by not dismissing this hybrid prerogative writ/declaratory judgment/civil rights act violations action on alternative grounds.
[directive] Revised DMV Standard (Refusal)  Statements  Page 3  DWI & DWI/CDL Offenses  In State v. Widmaier, the Supreme Court recommended that the language of the supplemental or additional paragraph of the standard statement be simplified and clarified.  Subsequent to that opinion, the Legislature adopted a substantive change in the penalties to be imposed by a court for a DWI refusal upon a finding that a defendant refused to submit to breath testing, in an 39:4-50.4a.2 amendment to N.J.S.A.  As a result of these two independent actions, a comprehensive review all of the standard statements in use in this State was undertaken, and as a result, revisions were proposed and adopted for each one.  Effective Thursday, February 1, 2001, all law enforcement officers in this State who place a person under arrest for a DWI violation (N.J.S.A. 39:4-50) or for a DWI in a commercial motor vehicle (CDL/DWI) violation (N.J.S.A. 39:3-10.13) are required to use the attached revised Standard Statement applicable to the offense charged.  For a DWI arrest, officers are to use:  !  "DIVISION OF MOTOR VEHICLES STANDARD STATEMENT FOR OPERATORS OF A MOTOR VEHICLE - N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.2(e)"  For a CDL/DWI arrest, officers are to use: !  "DIVISION OF MOTOR VEHICLES STANDARD STATEMENT FOR OPERATORS OF A COMMERCIAL MOTOR VEHICLE - N.J.S.A. 39:3- 10.24e"  All preceding Standard (Refusal) Statements will no longer be valid after that date.
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[brief] Defendant has never disputed it purchased the Subject Property with actual notice of Plaintiff’s easement in the Subject Property.  Rather, to avoid Plaintiff’s property rights, Defendant has gone to extreme measures to create a narrative where Plaintiff, rather than Defendant, has created the “dangerous” situation now the subject of Defendant’s complaints.  But the record does not support Defendant’s narrative.  The facts, as established by the evidence presented at trial, are that Plaintiff was granted an express easement in the Subject Property to utilize the Fifth and Sixth Street Lots for parking and to connect its HVAC system to the boiler room located on the Subject Property.  These easement rights were enjoyed by Plaintiff continuously since 1963 and without interference until after Defendant purchased the Subject Property in 2010.  Then, with actual knowledge of Plaintiff’s recorded easement, Defendant maliciously cut Plaintiff’s HVAC system connection to the boiler room located on the Subject Property, padlocked Plaintiff access to the boiler room and began interfering with Plaintiff’s right to park on the Fifth and Sixth Street Lots.  Defendant did not present any evidence regarding the circumstances surrounding the 1963 Agreement and failed to submit any credible or relevant evidence supporting its claim that the [...] abandoned or terminated its easement rights in the Subject Property.
[brief] Lastly, Appellants argue that [...] was not “faithful to its stringent environmental protection mandates” by failing to consider whether the Project would contribute to climate change.  Asb12.  Specifically, Appellants rely on the discussion in the [...] Certificate Order regarding the method of determining the social cost of GHGs.  Appellants failed to disclose to this Court that Appellant, [...], raised the issue of the social cost of GHGs during [...]’s review of Tennessee’s application for the Certificate Order.  [...] calculated the social cost of GHGs in the Certificate Order but refused to rely on the methodology, which was upheld by the D.C. Circuit.  See 181 [...] ¶61,051, at P60 n. 129 (stating, “the [[...]] is not applying the social cost of carbon herein because it has not determined which, if any, modifications are needed to render that tool useful for project-level analyses. ”); see also Food & Water Watch v. [...], 104 F.4th at 346 (upholding [...]’s determination and holding that “[...] need not attempt to monetize those emissions through a Social Cost of Carbon model, which [...] views as unreliable for analyzing individual projects. ”).  Thus, Appellants’ argument regarding the social cost of GHGs methodology is irrelevant.
[brief] ”  AA7.  The Commission rejected [...]’s argument “that the incidents after her major discipline should not be considered because these incidents were to be removed from her personnel file based on the [Collective Negotiations Agreement between her union and the [...]]” because “the Commission is not a party to the CNA, and the Commission can evaluate a candidate’s entire employment history when considering a list removal request for promotion as it is in the public's interest for it to make its determination based on a complete record.
[brief] Plaintiffs rely on Nielsen v. Wal-Mart Store #2171, 429 N.J. Super. 251 (App. Div. 2013) and Antenucci v. Mr. Nick’s Men’s Sportswear, 212 N.J. Super. 124 (App. Div. 1986) in support of their argument that the trial court improperly declined to impose a duty to have maintained the parking lot upon [...] and the other tenant defendants in this matter.  (Pb29)  Both cases are distinguishable from the instant matter, and neither supports the reversal of the summary judgment in favor of [...].  In Antenucci, the Appellate Division imposed a duty to maintain an adjoining sidewalk upon a tenant in exclusive possession of the leased premises.  Id., at 130.  It was careful to limit its holding to only that set of circumstances, saying "[w]e emphasize that our extension of the Stewart rule applies only to a commercial tenant who is in exclusive possession of the premises abutting the sidewalk."
[brief] (Pa1187).  As a result of that inspection, [...] prepared a memo dated June 26, 2015 which was sent to the [...] under cover letter of July 2, 2015.  (PA1191).  The memo revealed that the pavement at the north approach to the overpass exhibited “significant settlement”.  (Pa1192).  The memo also included a recommendation for immediate repairs and testing.  (Pa1193)(Emphasis Added).  If these facts, including the fair inferences, were resolved in Plaintiff’s favor then the results of these two inspections not only support Plaintiff’s claim that the [...] was on notice, but also that the condition was severe enough to qualify as a “dangerous condition. ”
[brief] 3T175: 4-20.  Plaintiff relies on an August 7, 2013 e-mail, which he falsely claims provides *ex post facto* confirmation of the existence of the alleged oral “Third Loan. ”  Da196.  However, the August 7, 2013 e-mail relied upon by Plaintiff does not include: (i) any reference that the alleged “Third Loan” was a “pay-when-able” loan; (ii) the exact amount that [...] claims constituted the “Third Loan”; (iii) any payment terms of the alleged “Third Loan”; and (iv) any terms concerning the interest of the alleged “Third Loan.”  Da196; 3T48:22-24; 3T53:9 to 54:11; 3T180:16 to 181:24.  Plaintiff also relied on an October 2019 audio recording, through which Plaintiff secretly recorded a conversation with [...].  Da203.  However,  The audio recording relied upon by Plaintiff does not include: (i) any reference that the alleged “Third Loan” was a “pay-when-able” loan; (ii) any reference to the amount that [...] claims constituted the “Third Loan”; (iii) any payment terms of the alleged “Third Loan”; (iv) any terms concerning the interest of the alleged “Third Loan. ”  Da203; 3T177:25 to 178:14.  [...]’s statement on the audio recording that he would pay him back was in reference only to the $50,000 Loan.  Da0203; 3T177:25 to 178:14.  Until [...]’ attorneys sent [...] a letter on February 20, 2020, [...] did not make any demand to [...] regarding payment on the alleged “Third Loan. ”  3T40:16 to 41:11; 3T43:6-13; 3T177:12-24.  On May 1, 2020 – seven years after the $330,000 payment and signing of the Discharge of Mortgage – Plaintiff filed a Complaint against Defendants alleging the following causes of action: Count I – Breach of Contract; and Count II – Unjust Enrichment.
[brief] [...], Esq.  Dated: REPLY BRIEF SUBMITTED ON BEHALF OF THE PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT  On the Brief: [...], Esq.  TABLE OF CONTENTS  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS, AND RULINGS BEING APPEALED  ........................................................................................................ii  TABLE OF CITATIONS .........................................................................................vi  PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND STATEMENT OF FACTS .......................1  LEGAL ARGUMENT  THE ORDER GRANTING THE DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD BE REVERSED  BECAUSE THE DEFENDANTS OWED THE PLAINTIFF AN AFFIRMATIVE DUTY TO PROVIDE HER WITH A REASONABLY SAFE PREMISES AND THE INFERENCE OF FACT WEIGHED IN THE PLAINTIFF’S FAVOR WOULD ALLOW A JURY TO FIND THAT THE DEFENDANTS BREACHED THAT DUTY (Pa40-Pa41; Pa44-Pa48; 1T5:21-13:18)  .........................................................2  CONCLUSION  .............................................................................................................8  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS, AND RULINGS BEING APPEALED
[brief] This technically is inaccurate because, as the Supreme Court subsequently noted, “the NDIS Manual § 3.1.1.2 sets forth limitations and practices in the use of CODIS and provides that DNA samples related to possessory offenses are generally not eligible for upload in CODIS.  Furthermore, according to the State Office of Forensic Sciences’ Crime Gun DNA Swabs & DNA Analysis Submission Guidelines, a DNA swab will not be taken from a gun which is not CODIS eligible.  State of New Jersey Office of Forensic Sciences, Crime Gun DNA Swabs & DNA Analysis Submission Guidelines (2016), http://www.njsp.org/division/investigations/pdf/ofs/gun_swab_policy.pdf. ”  *State v. Gathers*, 234 N.J. 208, 224 (2018).  Thus, the State could not have “connected the dots. ” application, it did not find the timing of the request to be fatal.  *State v. Gathers*, 234 N.J. 208, 222 (2018).  Rather, the Court found that the delay required the State to establish probable cause that the evidence would be found, which the State had failed to do.  *Ibid.*  Stated differently, the delay in seeking the buccal swab increased the invasion of one’s expectation of privacy and, therefore, it increased the State’s burden of proof.  However, the delay did not preclude the State from seeking a swab months, or even years, after an incident occurs or an indictment is returned.  As the Supreme Court stated:  The delay in administering the buccal swab affects the analysis relating to probable cause: although a buccal swab at the time of arrest or booking “does not increase the indignity already attendant to normal incidents of arrest,” id. at 464, we cannot presume the same for a swab nearly eight months after arrest, and five months after indictment.  For that reason, the government’s interest in obtaining a buccal swab in furtherance of the investigation or prosecution of defendant requires that probable cause be demonstrated.  We therefore consider whether the affidavit, which was the sole support for the order to compel the swab in this case, sufficed to establish probable cause.  [Ibid. (emphasis added)]  As this language clearly sets forth, a delay in administering the buccal swab affects the probable cause analysis, it does not prevent the State from seeking a buccal swab.  Thus, defendant’s claim is without merit.
[brief] We concur with the trial judge’s findings that *the use of a letter vendor was not abusive, deceptive, or unfair and was not the type of conduct that Congress was interested in preventing when it enacted the FDCPA.*  *Id.*, 2024 WL 2839329, at *2-3 (emphasis added).  *See also Mhrez v. Convergent Outsourcing, Inc.*, 2024 WL 2838327, at *3 (concluding that the asserted letter vendor allegations did not allege “conduct [that] was abusive, deceptive or unfair, which is the harm Congress intended to prevent. ”).  Following this logic, and the conclusion reached by several other trial courts throughout New Jersey, the Superior Court in this matter similarly concluded that the letter vendor theory of liability is an improper exercise of “uncritical literalism” and “not a violation that was intended within the [FDCPA]. ”  T23-24.  See also See Miller v. Americollect, Inc., Case No. [...], 2022 WL 20470401 (N.J. Super. L. Aug. 11, 2022); Abdelfattah Mhrez v. Convergent Outsourcing, Inc., Case No. [...] (N.J. Sup. Ct. Jan. 6, 2023) (“Mhrez Decision”); Jasmine Mhrez v. Radius Global Solutions, LLC, Case No. [...] and Jasmine Mhrez v. Convergent Outsourcing, Inc., Case No. [...] (N.J. Sup. Ct. Dec. 16, 2022) (“Mhrez Transcript”); Rubin v. Transworld Systems, Inc., Case No. [...] (N.J. Sup. Ct. Jan. 20, 2023); Elshabba v. Jefferson Capital Systems, LLC, Case No. [...] (N.J. Sup. Ct. April 26, 2023); Hopkins v. Convergent Outsourcing, Inc., Case No. [...] (N.J. Sup. Ct. May 31, 2023).
[brief] The primary goals of the Township’s Master Plan are the preservation of the agricultural industry, and the protection of the rural character of the community.  This Redevelopment Plan does not remove any active farmland from productive use, nor is this property targeted for agricultural use or preservation.  Additionally, the setbacks and buffering required shall serve to maintain a rural aesthetic on Old York Road and Bordentown-Georgetown Road.  The Township finds that the rehabilitation area is an appropriate location for warehouse development as illustrated in Figure 4 for several reasons, including the property’s accessibility to the New Jersey Turnpike and Interstate 295 via Route 206.  Based on the access restrictions imposed by this Redevelopment Plan, the operations of such a facility will generate minimal truck traffic impacts on local roadways in [...].  Similarly, the size and shape of the property allow for substantial setbacks and buffering of the facility to minimize visual impacts to the character of the community.  The requirements of the Redevelopment Plan will ensure that sensitive environmental features of the property will be protected.  In addition, the Township’s sustainability and renewable energy objectives will be advanced by the renewable energy requirements of this Plan.  Furthermore, the redevelopment of the rehabilitation area encourages the preservation and adaptive reuse of an existing historic structure (See, Section 4.5).  Thus, the adoption of this Redevelopment Plan does not conflict with the Township’s planning objectives relative to farmland preservation, environmental protection, historic preservation and sustainability, and in this regard can be considered consistent with the Township’s Master Plan.
[brief] The Court should affirm the judgment below because the trial court correctly entered summary judgment in favor of the [...] (raised below at T60:17-68:12).  ..............................................  20  A.  Plaintiff’s expert testimony was inadmissible net opinion because they did not base their conclusions on generally-accepted standards of surveying or engineering...........................................................................  20  B.  Plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case of trespass arising out of the [...]’ disposal of tree branches because the record showed that the [...] placed the tree branches on municipal property, not on plaintiff’s land, and because plaintiff failed to show that the [...] damaged his property.......................................................  26 III.