ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] Municipal prosecutors do not have the discretion to decide which cases will be initiated or which offenses will be charged within their jurisdiction.  See N.J.S.A. 2B:25-5.  The municipal court accepts for filing “every complaint made by any person,” R. 7:2-1(b), and the complaining witness—who may be a private citizen, a law enforcement officer, or another official— determines which offenses to charge in the complaint.  R. 7:2-1(a).  Unlike a county prosecutor, whose exercise of discretion in deciding which charges to pursue is an important part of their prosecutorial duties, the initial charging decision is not the municipal prosecutor’s to make.
[directive] The or victim a to made have may defendant of form other or gang street violent with a involvement defendant's for a account not does also mental illness.  or dependence defendant's drug or ~ crime,' a organized not is information history criminal relevant when instances be may there Finally, risk- pretrial automated the databases that in the missing data of because for accounted and safety public of interests the reasons, foregoing  For the queries. software assessment informational gaps in the fill to prosecutors and/or police require rights victims' of protection automated by the for accounted court not the information to providing possible, whenever a poses defendant the that suggests information additional that where assessment risk pretrial or FTA the by indicated is than violence or activity criminal new and/or flight of risk greater not is PSA the (Note indicator).
[brief] At each step along the way, the fingerprint evidence was mishandled in this case.  Each error in handling this evidence unduly bolstered the State’s case, leaving a jury already predisposed to believe conclusions reached by a fingerprint expert (as is the population at large) with testimony that made it seem like this specific fingerprint expert’s conclusion that [...] was the source of the fingerprints at the scene was unassailable.  [...] did not have a fair trial.  His convictions must be reversed.  **PROCEDURAL HISTORY**
[brief] [Watkins v. Resorts Int’l Hotel & Casino. Inc., 124 N.J. 398, 412 (1991). ]  The bar applies not only to “all matters litigated and determined by such judgment but also as to all relevant issues which could have been presented but were not. ”  Culver v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 115 N.J. 451, 463 (1989).  Further, a full trial is not required for a court’s decision to have preclusive effect.  Velasquez v. Franz, 123 N.J. 498, 506-07 (1991)  (recognizing that res judicata may be premised on successful motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim, for judgment on the pleadings, or for summary judgment)  The Law of the Case doctrine provides “that a legal decision made in a particular matter ‘should be respected by all other lower or equal courts during the pendency of that case.
[brief] TABLE OF AUTHORITIES  ...........................................................................................................v  TABLE OF ORDERS & JUDGMENTS APPEALED FROM ................................................ xi  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT .................................................................................................1  COUNTER-STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY ..................4  A.  The Personal and Business Relationship Between [...] and [...] ............4  B.  The Formation of [...] and its Holdings .................................5  C.  [...] Hires an Accountant for the Companies .....................................................8  D. Business Operations from 2007-2014 .................................................................9  E. Negotiations  Pertaining to the Acquisition of Plaintiffs’ Interests ..................10  F.  [...] Discovers [...]’s Accounting Antics ......................................................17  G.  Procedural History Through the Time of Trial ....................................................20  H. [...]’s Reviews the Records and Uncovers Diversions of Funds  ..........24  I.  The Trial Court Finds that the Defendants Misappropriated Funds ...............28  J. Post-Trial Motions ......................................................................................................32  LEGAL ARGUMENT ..............................................................................................................34
[brief] -  **Condo Fees:**  On its face, the plain meaning of the term “condominium fees” suggests that they are solely the result of a condominium conversion and, therefore, a landlord would not be able to rely on them in a hardship application.  However, that may not be the case.  Condominium fees may potentially include water and sewerage charges or other charges, which may be passed onto a rent-controlled tenant under the RCO.  Therefore, to make a proper determination regarding condominium fees, as [...] held, a landlord seeking a hardship application must provide a detailed breakdown of said condominium fees.  DA-26.  This analysis is fact sensitive as certain fees may be appropriate while others may not be.  What is imperative is that a detailed breakdown of fees be provided to the Board and that the Board engage in a substantive discussion on this issue which results in a well-reasoned decision.
[brief] (Da41-43).  [...] ruled that the police were able to identify the areas that needed to be searched with information gained from ways other than incriminating un-Mirandized statements made by defendant.  (Da26-27).  [...] testified that he determined defendant’s New York address from the registration for defendant’s BMW.  (Da27; accord 5T13-14 to 14-13).  This finding was supported by the sufficient credible evidence in that [...] testified that when defendant's BMW pulled into the CVS parking lot, his vehicle registration (license plate) was called into dispatch, which advised defendant's address to be at [...] in [...].  (2T69-14 to 70-15).  Secondly, because [...] saw defendant walk into the [...], the detective knew that defendant lived there.  (Da27; accord 2T20-1 to 6).  The marijuana-filled duffel bags were tied to defendant because the police saw him place those bags into his own car.  (Da27).  Lastly, the cash was found in defendant’s [...] apartment, the address on defendant's car registration.  (Ibid.; accord 2T19-6 to 20-14).  Secondly, defendant's signed consent forms, which acknowledged that his consent was knowing and voluntary and that he had the right to withdraw consent, were sufficient to conduct the searches.  (Da27).  Considering his analysis of the King factors, [...] found that defendant invited law enforcement into the apartment and then signed consent to search forms.  (Ibid.).  [...] concluded that defendant gave consent to search his dwellings and property.  These searches were constitutional as an exception to the warrant requirement.
[directive] No the to subject be would prosecutor a preclude to construed shall be subsection in this Nothing offenses.  foregoing the of firearms- or violent for adjudications (e.g., delinquency of adjudications other considering from than other for offenses adjudications or ago, years ten than more occurred that crimes related circumstances of totality the the of part as relevant be may as crimes)  NERA or firearms-related in detention pretrial seeking against presumption the overcome whether to determining when also 8.2.  See Section in release of revocation seeking against presumption or the 7.2 Section 7.6.1.  subsection or Offense  Another for Release PretNial While on Committed Crimes Indictable 7.4.4  Supervision.  Post-Conviction of Form Any on  While seeking of presumption the unless Section 7.3, under covered otherwise not cases  In pretrial for apply shall prosecutor the subsection 7.4.6, to pursuant overcome is detention pretrial defendant the degree), and its of crime(regardless indictable an is offense present the if detention offense: present the committed offense persons disorderly a (ii) or crime indictable an (i) for release pretrial on while (a) previous whether that 2C:25-19(a), N.J.S.A. in defined as violence domestic involving or complaint-summons, or complaint-warrant by charged been had offense parole, (ISP), program supervision intensive probation, special probation, on while (b) on was or (PSL), for life supervision parole (CSL), for life supervision community N.J.S.A. by required as guilty pleaded had defendant the where (PTI) intervention pretrial pending release on was defendant if the or c. 98), 2015, P.L. (see 2C:43-12(g)(3)
[brief] Several aspects of [...]’s Rules are illustrative of the understanding that the PIP program was never intended to cover claims under the IFPA and RICO.  For one, both the IFPA and RICO involve the aggregation of claims against multiple defendants who acted in concert, and the aggregation of similar claims, to establish “patterns” of IFPA or racketeering violations.  N.J.S.A. 17:33A-7(a) and (b) provides that insurance companies damaged by “a violation of any provision of” the IFPA “shall recover treble damages if the court determines that the defendant has engaged in a pattern of ” IFPA violations.  Similarly, besides making it “unlawful for any person to conspire . . . to violate” any part of N.J.S.A. 2C:41-2, the RICO statute’s definition of a “Pattern of Racketeering Activity” specifically authorizes the aggregation of multiple defendants and claims as one would find in any complex insurance fraud litigation.  N.J.S.A. 2C:41-1(d).  These statutory causes of action are completely incompatible with [...]’s Rules, which require claims based on “only one accident” or “only one injured person,” or “a maximum of four injured persons who occupied the same vehicle on the same date of accident. ” (Pa384).  In a PIP arbitration, neither claim, nor party, aggregation is possible.
[brief] Alpert, Goldberg, Butler, Norton & Weiss, P.C. v. Quinn, 410 N.J. Super 510 (App.Div. 2009) ..................................................  30  Asaadi v. Meltzer, 280 N.J. Super. 73 (Law.Div. 1994) ...........................................  30  Casino Reinvestment Development Authority v. Hauck, 317 N.J. Super. 584(App.Div.1999) ..........................................................  19 Fagliarone v. Township of No. Bergen, 78 N.J. Super. 154 (App.Div. 1963) certif. denied, 40 N.J. 221 (1963) .............  19 Gruber & Colabella, P.A. v. Erickson, 345 N.J.Super 248 (Law.Div. 2011) ..........  30 Henderson v. Camden County Municipal Utilities Authority, 176 N.J. 554 (2003)  ..............................................................................  24 Henn v. Heath, 101 N.J.Eq. 347, 349 (Ch.Ct. 1927) .......................................  29-30 Jersey City Redevelopment Agency v. Clean-O-Mat Corp., 289 N.J. Super. 381(App.Div.1996) certif. denied, 147 N.J. 262 (1996)  ..........  19 Maggio v. Pruzansky, 22 N.J. Super. 567 (App. Div. 1988) ............................ 19, 26 Meshinsky v. Nichols Yacht Sales, Inc. 110 N.J. 464, 476 (1988)  .....................  18 New Jersey Tpk. Auth. v. Sisselman, 106 N.J.Super. 358 (App.Div. 1969) certif. denied, 54 N.J. 565(1969)  .............  19 Nieder v. Royal Indem. Ins. Co., 62 N.J. 229 (1977)  ...........................................  25 Porreca v. City of Millville, 419 N.J.Super 212 (App Div. 2011)..................11, 22-25 Rova Farms Resort v. Investors Ins. Co., 56 N.J. 474 (1974) ......................18-19, 26 Segal v. Lynch, 211 N.J. 230 (2012) ................................................................. 10, 21, 29-31 Tabaac v. City of Atlantic City, 174 N.J.Super 519 (Law Div. 1980)............................................................... 24 Township of West Windsor v. Nierenberg, 345 N.J.Super 472 ....................18-19, 34 Weiss v. I. Zapinsky, 65 N.J. Super. 351 (App.Div. 1961)............................... 19 Statutes and Regulations N.J.S.A. 2A:15-59.1 ..................................................................................16-17, 21-22, 26, 29 N.J.S.A. 54:4-67(a) ..................................................................................... 20, 33 N.J.S.A. 54:5-58 ......................................................................................... 20, 33 N.J.S.A. 54:5-60 ......................................................................................... 20, 33 R. 1:4-8 (Frivolous Litigation) ................................................. 16-17, 21-22, 26-29, 31 R. 1:5-2 (Manner of Service) .......................................................... 28-29 R. 2:4-1 (Time: From Judgments, Orders, Decisions, Actions and From Rules)
[brief] [...] argues that a remand is not necessary or appropriate in this matter because “[t]he sole issue is whether [...] properly imposed a general public access condition on [...]’s Permit pursuant to N.J.S.A. 13:1D-153(a) [and] the record below is robust on this issue […].”  Rb32.  [...] justifies this conclusion on the basis that the scope of this appellate review does not include the extent of public access required at [...]’s property, which [...] characterizes as the next step of analysis.  This characterization of the scope of this Court’s review is inaccurate.  \(^7\) *i.e.*, the characteristics of potential onsite access, the impacts of surrounding development, the location of the site in relation to other public access points, the availability of parking nearby, and need within the municipality.  \(^8\) *i.e.*, the scale of the changes to the footprint or use, the demand for public access, and any department-approved municipal public access plan or public access element of a municipal master plan.  See N.J.S.A. 13:1D-153(a).  Should this Court conclude that the Public Access Law modified the common law public trust doctrine, which [...] maintains it did not, this matter must be remanded for a plenary hearing to supplement the record below to ensure the adequacy of [...]’s review and approval process for [...]’s public access plan moving forward.  Moreover, New Jersey case law is clear that [...] must not only identify the current demand for public access at the Property, see N.J.S.A. 13:1D-153(a), but must also articulate a sufficient analysis with respect to current demand for public access to dispel any concerns that the agency’s assessment of demand “(a) was not premised upon a consideration of all relevant factors, (b) was based upon a consideration of irrelevant or inappropriate factors, or (c) amounted to a clear error in judgment. ”  See State v. Shackelford, 2015 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 842, at *7 (App. Div. 2015), citing Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971).  As [...]’s record below does not contain any analysis upon which a court can meaningfully review the agency’s conclusion that there is currently sufficient demand for public access in the vicinity of [...]’s property such that onsite access is required, a remand for a plenary hearing is the most appropriate procedure by which this Court can ensure that [...] has not abused, nor will abuse, the discretion afforded to it by N.J.S.A. 13:1D-153(a) in its dealings with [...].  F.
[brief] During his closing, counsel advised the jury that Plaintiff’s life expectancy of 40.5 years broke down to 14,782 days and 354,780 hours.  4T.194:3 to 4; 6T.58:17 to 25; 4T.5 to 8.  Prior to ruling on the defense’s objection thereto, the Court inquired of Plaintiff’s counsel as to “how much more” he was “planning on saying. ”  Id., at 199:16 to 18.  In response, counsel indicated that he intended to refer the jury to the time extrapolated as a way of contextualizing Plaintiff’s permanent injury.  Id., at 199:19 to 200:2.  Plaintiff, however, made no request to make any additional argument, and any limitations on the argument were of his choosing, not the Court’s.
[brief] Da_187; Da_203.  Turning to the merits, the trial court acknowledged that [...] had “asserted that Neuwirth is now controlling law in regards to how actual malice cases should be handled by the courts,” but continued “This Court disagrees. ”  Da_204.  The trial court reasoned as follows:  While the decision was recently handed down, Neuwirth is still a New Jersey Appellate Division Case and does not supersede U.S. Supreme Court cases such as Hutchinson v. Proxmire (found that with complex issues, such as the one before the Court in the present matter, Summary Judgment is inappropriate) or New York Times Co. v. Sullivan (found that proof of “actual malice” calls into question a defendant's state of mind and “does not readily lend itself to summary judgment disposition).
[brief] Pa-14  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT  Plaintiff-Appellant [...] ("[...]" or "Plaintiff") brought suit against Defendant-Respondent [...] ("[...]" or "Defendant") for violating the common law right of access to public records by withholding documents regarding the agency's mishandling public corruption charges successfully brought by [...] against disgraced, former Superior Court Judge [...] ("[...]").  The trial court erroneously granted the [...] judgment and dismissed [...]'s complaint with prejudice, ruling that criminal investigatory records are exempt from disclosure under the common law right of access because they are purportedly not required to be made or maintained.  It is submitted that the trial court erroneously superimposed a provision of the Open Public Records Act onto the common law right of access and failed to conduct the requisite balancing test weighing the public and private interest in disclosure and the agency's interest in confidentiality.  Accordingly, the trial court's decision must be reversed.  The trial court further erred by denying [...]'s motion to compel discovery and granting the [...]'s ("[...]") motion to quash [...]'s subpoena.  After the [...] was exposed for blatantly lying to [...] and the trial court about the existence of emails between [...] and the [...] regarding the criminal charges against [...], [...] sought discovery regarding records unlawfully concealed by the [...].  It is submitted that [...] demonstrated sufficient bad faith by the agency to permit discovery in the public records matter and the trial court’s orders should be reversed.
[brief] Order and Final Judgment, filed August 30, 2023 ........................................  Da0001 Opinion After Trial, filed August 30, 2023 ..................................................  Da0004  Amended Order and Final Judgment, filed September 18, 2023 .....................  Da0067  Order Denying [...]’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint, filed November 13, 2020 ..............................................................................  Da0070  Order Denying [...]’s Motion for Reconsideration of Order Denying Motion to Dismiss, filed January 22, 2021 ....................................  Da0071 Order Denying [...]’s Motion for Summary Judgment, filed August 27, 2021 ...........................................................................................  Da0083 Order Denying [...]’s Motion for Reconsideration of Court’s Amended Order and Final Judgment, filed October 18, 2023 ....................... Da0084  Complaint filed by [...], [...], filed May 1, 2020 ..............................................................................................................
[brief] [...], an appraiser\(^2\), was called by the landlord to “estimate the market value” of the unit “as if it was unencumbered. ”  1T59:4-7.  [...] fielded \(^2\)  In the second round of hearings, [...] again testified for the landlord, but this time as an expert in tax assessment.  6T55:20-56:3 (when asked about his prior testimony, [...] responds “I’m not here as an appraiser tonight.
[brief] As was openly and notoriously raised by the Appellant, both in his opposition submission and at oral argument before the trial court, Rule 3:21-5 likewise supports looking to the judgment of acquittal as the appropriate date of favorable termination of the underlying criminal proceeding.  Some exploration into New Jersey criminal procedure would have widened the trial court’s vantage point from which to analyze the claim-accrual issue, and possibly have avoided the trial court’s lack of jurisprudential understanding and consideration for its decision.
[brief] Successful IFPA plaintiffs are entitled to all available equitable remedies.  Lajara, 222 N.J. at 144.  RICO empowers the Superior Court to impose a variety of equitable remedies, none of which are within a PIP arbitrator’s powers.  N.J.S.A. 2C:41-4(a) authorizes the court, among other things, to: (1) order a person to divest their interests in any enterprise; (2) dissolve or reorganize any enterprise; (3) restrict a person’s future activities or investments; (4) revoke a corporation’s charter, or license to do business in the State; (5) revoke any licenses granted by any State agencies; (6) issue cease and desist orders to any person for any conduct; and (7) order restitution, civil monetary penalties and forfeiture of property.  A PIP arbitrator’s complete lack of authority to make mandatory damage awards and grant equitable relief plainly shows that the Legislature did not intend that IFPA and RICO claims be decided in a PIP arbitration.
[brief] W.S. v. Hildreth, 252 N.J. 506, 518, 287 A.3d 421 (2023) and owes no deference to the trial court's legal conclusions.  *Dimitrakopoulos v. Borrus, Goldin, Foley, Vignuolo, Hyman & Stahl, P.C.*, 237 N.J. 91, 108, 203 A.3d 133 (2019).  However, when an appeal involves the interpretation of a statute, the Court reviews de novo the court's statutory construction.
[brief] When no one answered the door after the breach team knocked and \(^8\)  The TEAMS Unit is the NJSP’s tactical SWAT unit which makes the initial entry for any search warrant, securing the perimeter and clearing the subject property first to render it safe.  (1T49-25 to 50-20; 1T54-17 to 19).  The TEAMS Unit thus conducted the initial entry before the ICAC detectives entered to perform the actual search for evidence pursuant to the warrant.
[brief] She found [...]’s testimony not credible and “wholly unreasonable. ”  (2T 42-17 to 22)  The court found that there was not enough time for any of the things [...] said occurred to have actually occurred—the eye contact, the acceleration, the order to stop, and the refusal to stop.  The trial court found that “it can’t be that this actually occurred and I don’t find it credible at all. ”  (2T 51-5 to 6)  The trial court found that the “startled look” on [...]’s face came at the time [...]’s car came to an “abrupt stop and the defendant hopped to avoid being hit[,]” rather than to attempt to flee.  (2T 43-24)  The trial court found that there was no support for the State’s contention that the events occurred at a high crime area: “under the Goldsmith case all I have are conclusory terms that it was a high crime area. ”  (2T 49-14 to 15)  In short, the trial court found that nothing “corroborated” the 9-1-1 call.  (2T 50-2 to 19)  Without any such corroboration, the police action was illegal.  After the trial court granted the motion to suppress, [...] moved to withdraw his plea.
[directive] When the Investigation is Administrative and the Officer Is a Witness  8.5.1  When interviewing a law enforcement officer as a witness, he or she must be made aware of the differences between being a witness in an administrative investigation and being the subject of an administrative investigation.  The officer also should be advised that he or she is not the subject of the investigation at this time.  Appendix I provides a model form that may be used for this purpose.  If at any time the officer becomes a subject of the investigation, he or she should be advised of that fact and the appropriate procedures followed.