ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] First, the panel found that [...] erred by allowing Plaintiffs to recover damages on their RICO and non-RICO claims based on conduct that occurred outside their respective five-year and six-year statutes of limitations.  *[...] Devs.*, 2018 WL 2449133, at *15-26.  The panel remanded this issue “solely for the purpose of recalculating damages on those claims” based on the pertinent statutes of limitations and held that the recalculation must be “based on the trial judge’s findings of fact and the accounting damages found by the judge, with such additional submissions or evidence the court deems necessary. ”  *Id.* at *22.  Second, as to attorneys’ fees, the Appellate Division found that “the court erred by finding that all of [...]’s . . . claims rested on a common core of operative facts” because “[t]hat finding ignores the time-limitations that apply to the non-RICO and RICO claims. ”  *Id.* at *29.  Because Plaintiffs’ “RICO claims were limited to the five years before October 1, 2009, which was the date the RICO claims were first asserted,” the panel reasoned that “[t]he core of operative facts pertains to the claims asserted for this period, whether those claims are asserted under RICO or some other legal theory. ”  *Ibid.*  The panel therefore reversed the fee award and advised that on remand the trial court “may consider RICO violations that occurred prior to the prescribed limitations period” and may award “attorneys’ fees for all of the time devoted by counsel to the case . . . if the work on the unrelated claims ‘can[] be deemed to be part of the pursuit of the ultimate result achieved. ’”  *Id.* at *28* (emphasis added) (citation omitted).  The panel further instructed that the trial court may include in the award “time spent establishing wrongful acts on the part of [[...]] that pre-dated the time for which the RICO claims could be asserted,” so long as that time “was reasonably required to establish the RICO claims. ”  Ibid.  The Appellate Division did not foreclose that the trial court, with appropriate findings, could find that Plaintiffs’ RICO and non-RICO claims shared a common core of facts or were based on related legal theories.  See id. at *28-29.  [...] subsequently moved before the Appellate Division for attorneys’ fees and disbursements in connection with the appeal.  On August 29, 2018, the Appellate Division remanded that motion for disposition on remand.
[brief] Plaintiffs sued [...] and other defendants on April 7, 2023.  (Pa024–031).  [...] answered Plaintiffs’ complaint, see (Pa041–053), and promptly requested that Plaintiffs agree to transfer their case against [...] to arbitration, see (Pa058–059).  Plaintiffs did not respond to [...]’s request, so [...] moved to compel arbitration and stay the pending litigation.  (Pa078–112).  The trial court heard oral argument on [...]’s motion on May 10, 2024.  (Pa015).  The trial court granted [...]’s motion on July 17, 2024.  (Pa001–021).  Plaintiffs appealed and filed their opening brief on October 17, 2024.  See generally (Pb).  STATEMENT OF FACTS
[brief] (2T, at 12-16).  In effect, the trial court adopted [...]’s *disjunctive* (“either-or”) interpretation of highlighted language in Section 13.1 of the PSA.  However, the words “in addition to” dictate a *conjunctive* (“and”) reading of the clause.  In fact, anything but a *conjunctive* reading reduces the aforementioned “notwithstanding the foregoing” and “in addition to” phrases to be entirely meaningless – a result that is impermissible under New Jersey law.
[brief] Applications for a stay in a civil matter are governed by the test outlined in *Crowe v. De Gioia*, 90 N. J. 126, 132-34 (1982), that is "[a] party seeking a stay must demonstrate that (1) relief is needed to prevent irreparable harm; (2) the applicant's claim rests on settled law and has a reasonable probability of succeeding on the merits; and (3) balancing the relative hardships to the parties reveals that greater harm would occur if a stay is not granted than if it were."  *Garden State Equal. v. Dow*, 216 N.J. 314, 320 (2013) (quoting *McNeil v. Legis. Apportionment Comm'n*, 176 N.J. 484, 486 (2003) ([...], J., dissenting)).  PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[brief] The Division has conceded that they have not followed the explicit terms of the collective bargaining agreement, and that they instead utilized the number of workdays or work hours in a fiscal year per the Treasury Circular(s) to calculate the [...] member’s overtime rates.  Despite the Division’s admission that they did not follow the clear contract language, the Arbitrator denied the [...]’s grievance.  The New Jersey Arbitration Act, N.J.S.A. 2A:24-8 and 9, sets forth the grounds upon which an arbitration award may be modified or vacated, one of which is “[w]here the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means. ”  N.J.S.A. 2A:24-8(a).  "[U]ndue means' ordinarily encompasses a situation in which the arbitrator has made an acknowledged mistake of fact or law or a mistake that is apparent on the face of the record," whereas an arbitrator exceeds his or her "authority by disregarding the terms of the parties' agreement."
[brief] Q.  When you say that you were bringing out a bag of garbage to the dumpster, do you have a recollection of what time of the day that was?  A.  No, I’m not even sure what time I got there.  (Pa217-218).  [...] then contradicted his own testimony, admitting that he actually had no idea what he was doing at the time he allegedly fell, stating he could not recall if he was or was not bringing out a bag of garbage.  He testified as follows:  “I was carrying out garbage, I’m not sure if it was a bag or not.  I’m not sure if it was a bag, if it was contained in a bag or bringing out – – I don’t know. ”  (Pa219).  In fact, [...] could not even recall actually getting to the dumpster:
[brief] Facsimile to Edison Municipal Court From [...] 6/22/2020  Letter From [...] to Edison Municipal Complex  6/22/2020  Notice of Claim to Edison, Dated 2/27/2020 (Attached at Pa0053)  TX Result Report, Dated 2/28/2020  Letter From [...] to Edison Municipal Complex, 6/19/2020  Facsimile to Edison Municipal Court from [...], 6/19/2020  Email Conversation Between [...] and Prosecutor Regarding Copy of Complaint Summons for Case 11/11/2020  Email to [...] from Prosecutor Regarding no Further Discovery
[brief] On Day 3 of the trial (July 26, 2023), testimony commenced with [...], a representative of the defendant property owner, [...], who was called during Plaintiff’s case in chief.  (4T 4:2-82:8).  At the outset of the questioning, Defendants objected to Plaintiff questioning Acar regarding the details of the snow removal contract – again renewing its argument that the contract does not set forth or define the defendants’ duty of care.  (4T 13:2-25).  Defendants also objected to Plaintiff presenting evidence about that portion of the snow removal contract prohibiting [...] from subcontracting the work out as that provision was irrelevant to the key issue – whether defendants acted reasonably under the circumstances.  (Da 85) (4T 14:1-19).  Defendants argued that the contractual provisions and whether defendants complied with the contractual provisions were irrelevant to the issue of whether or not defendants, within a reasonable period of time, undertook efforts to clear the lot of snow and ice.  (4T 17:1-12).  While Defendants insisted that evidence about the snow removal agreements would expand the duty of care beyond the common law, the court again ruled that the contract provisions and compliance with same were relevant and thus evidential.  (4T 18:7-16).  Given the court’s ruling, Plaintiff proceeded to question [...] about the snow removal contract between [...] and [...] - more specifically, regarding: 1) the contract language stating “safety is not to be compromised” (4T 22:6-14); 2) the contract language stating the walkways are to be cleared by 6 AM (4T 22:19-23:23); 3) the contract language prohibiting [...] from subcontracting their work without pre approval (4T 40:19-41:14).  In addition, the court permitted Plaintiff to question [...] about the snow removal services rendered in April 2018 which led to Acar testifying that he had issues with the contractor not showing up on time in April 2018.  (4T 45:4-14).  This questioning was permitted despite the court’s in limine ruling that no evidence about the Defendants’ April 2018 services or the contractor’s subsequent termination would be evidential.  (Da 3-4) (1T 58:11-18; 58:19-59:1).  [...], the owner of [...], was also called by Plaintiff to testify at trial on July 26, 2023.  (4T 112:5-226:2).  As was the case with Acar, Plaintiff questioned Marino regarding various contractual provisions in the subcontract between [...] and [...].  For example, Marino was questioned about the time specification stating that all walkways were to be cleared by 6 AM (4T 121:1-25; 124:18-23)  G.
[brief] Conversely, it is a two-step policy – i.e. investigate the claim and then discipline if the investigation corroborates the claims.  Defendants will claim that due to Defendant [...]’s leave of absence, mixed with his retirement, they were unable to discipline him.  Yet, Defendants could have done something.  Defendant could have sought the retirement of Defendant [...] to be stayed pending the investigation and disciplinary charges.  Defendant could have also sought the [...] to suspend the retirement benefits pending the outcome of the disciplinary charges.  See N.J.A.C. 17:1-1.13(a)(4).  Defendant’s didn’t even have anyone sign the disciplinary letter that was prepared on April 7, 2020.  (Pa 249-Pa 249)  This is despite Defendant [...] not retiring until January 31 or February 1, 2022.
[brief] As noted above, [...] have UIM limits of $1,000,000 under the PURE Excess Policy.  Accordingly, UIM coverage would be implicated in any scenario where a tortfeasor (who is not a resident-family member) had bodily injury coverage of less than $1,000,000, subject to the terms and conditions of the PURE Excess Policy.  Thus, contrary to Appellants’ assertions and as again correctly recognized by the lower court, the PURE Policy provides broad UIM coverage, but not for an intra-family accident.
[brief] Likewise, in Matter of Application of [...], 448 N.J. Super. 441, 466 (Law Div. 2016), a Mt. Laurel lawsuit, the Court only removed the Township’s authority over its affordable housing compliance after finding “systematic ‘abuses’ of the declaratory judgment process. ”  Oddly, the trial court in this matter found that despite the Township’s well-established track record of Mt. Laurel compliance and lack of evidence of past hostility, the extraordinary appointment remedy was appropriate.  In a Mount Laurel lawsuit, "the cause of action is the alleged unconstitutionality of the defendant-municipality's zoning because of its failure to provide for the municipality's fair share of affordable housing."  See S. Burlington Cty. N.A.A.C.P. v. Mount Laurel Twp., 92 N.J. 158, 214-216 (1983) ("Mount Laurel II"); see also Oceanport Holding, L.L.C. v. Borough of Oceanport, 396 N.J. Super. 622, 630 (App. Div. 2007).  There is no finding of fact or legal determination in the matter below that sets forth that this matter qualifies as a Mount Laurel lawsuit.
[brief] Here, the trial court denied the Appellant's motion for reconsideration [NOT] because [of [...]’s concocted FALSE claim, which was never cited nor accepted by the trial Judge that] the Appellant did nothing more than repeat his argument that no fees should be awarded.  But [[...]’s concocted FALSE claim that I filed my Motions simply based on] disagreement or dissatisfaction with the trial court's determination is not a valid ground for reconsideration.  [I repeatedly pointed out in my Motions & Appeal Brief that my Motion for Reconsideration had NOTHING to do with simple disagreement or dissatisfaction, which I indicated are not allowed based on NJ Case rulings].”  As such, the trial court [ABSOLUTELY did] abuse its discretion in denying the [May 25, 2023] motion for reconsideration.
[directive] 1.0.13  This policy, the procedures set forth in the policy and the legal citations contained in the text are intended for implementation by all State, county and municipal law enforcement agencies.  As made clear in AG Directive 2019-5 (issued concurrently with the publication of this December 2019 version of this policy), all law enforcement and prosecuting agencies operating under the authority of the laws of the State of New Jersey are directed to implement and comply with this policy, and to take any additional measures necessary to update their guidelines consistent with this policy, as required by N.J.S.A 40A:14-181.  1.0.14  Law enforcement agencies that fail to comply with the policies and procedures contained within this document may be subject to the same sanctions arising from any other violation of an AG Directive, including supersession of an agency’s law enforcement functions by the Attorney General.
[brief] It is to overrule the holding in Heher that such awards must be subjected to an enhanced level of judicial review.  D.  There was no third-party litigation that justified the arbitrator’s fee-shifting  Plaintiffs’ final argument, that the fee-shifting awarded was not that, but an award of damages because there was a third party involved, ignores the Arbitrator’s own words.  The Arbitrator cited the “American Rule” for his award, which is the “fee shifting” rule.  R. 4:42-9.  Indeed, he stated directly in his opinion, “Claimant contends that In re Niles 176 N.J. 294 (2003) supports its claim as being within the exception to the American Rule which disfavors the concept. ” (Da2215).  The Arbitrator was not awarding legal fees as monetary damages.  He was requested by [...] to award legal fees as if there was an applicable exception to the American Rule for direct breaches of fiduciary duty, when there wasn’t.  He made no finding that the fees he awarded were considered damages incurred by Plaintiffs in other litigation with a separate third party.  He did not identify any third party or other litigation.  (Da2215)  He did not consider the Company to be a third-party, but referred to it as the “Claimant” and referred to [...] as the “Respondent”.  (Ibid.)  He also ruled that the legal fees he considered reimbursing were expended “to oust” [...], which proves the fees were considered to be directly against [...] and not incurred in a separate, third-party litigation.
[brief] I would like to fire this attorney and be my -- represent myself.  THE COURT: No, [...], that’s not happening.  We’ve canvassed those issues before, too, some year-plus ago.  MR. BELL: I would like to represent myself, Your Honor.  THE COURT: [...], if you continue to continue with your outbursts, I’m going to have you removed from the courtroom.  Okay.  Sit.  Thank you very much.  [(3T 74-3 to 75-15)  (emphasis added)]
[brief] *62-64 Main Street*, *supra*, 221 N.J. 129 at 158, n. 8.  It is only allowed to evaluate whether substantial credible evidence exists.  *Ibid.*  Courts are also not permitted to rewrite statutes, and it is “presume[ed] that the Legislature intended the outcome dictated by the clear language of the statute. ”  *Zabilowicz v. Kelsey*, 200 N.J. 507, 513 (2009).  Because Trial Court used the wrong legal standard, it erred in concluding criterion (b) was not met.
[brief] (Ia. 2-6)  During the briefing on this appeal, the Department interjected [...] into this matter in support of its position.  The Department’s November 6, 2023 brief states:  “Importantly, none of the parties to the acquisition objected to or challenged the 2022 Order. ” (Db. 22-23).  Thus, the Department has placed this before the Court as an “important” consideration on this appeal, although [...] respectfully submits that it is not accurate and, further, to the extent any decision is rendered adopting or incorporating that assertion, [...] faces the prospect of being estopped or otherwise limited in future matters, without having had any opportunity to respond to the Department’s November 6, 2023 submission on this score.
[directive] Degree Bail Range 10%  Cash Bail Option a.  Actor, knowing he is not licensed or privileged to do so, and under circumstances in which a reasonable person would know that another may expose intimate parts or may engage in sexual penetration or sexual contact, observes another person without that person’s 3rd Degree $25,000 to $50,000 10% permissible consent and under circumstances in which a reasonable person would not expect to be observed, fourth degree.
[brief] **CONCLUSION**  [...] remains unpaid and [...] has been unjustly enriched.  [...] has committed misrepresentations and fraud and now seeks to excuse his conduct by arguing for unacceptable and unprecedented interpretations of equitable doctrines in order to leave [...] remediless.  The law is clear that [...] is entitled to be paid by [...].  Reinstatement of the 2012 note and mortgage and remand to the Foreclosure Unit for further proceedings are warranted.
[brief] The relief I seek in this appeal is a reversal of the Board’s decision and the restoration of my full retirement benefits (my full monthly pension and my life insurance benefit of $9,952.12).  Pb20.  Such relief, if granted, would necessitate that I be permitted to purchase two months service credit to entitle me to my life insurance benefit of $9,952.12.  Id.  I estimated in my February 16, 2024 letter brief that the cost of two months service credit would be $614.72.  Pb18.  In opposing the relief I seek, respondent argues that the financial integrity of the PERS fund would be undermined by such “liberal construction” of the Correction of Errors statute, N.J.S.A. 43:15A-54.  I doubt that the financial integrity of the PERS fund would be impacted at all, let alone be undermined by such an interpretation.  Respondent’s argument is ridiculous in light of the facts and equities in this case.  (d)  Service time vs. service credit.
[brief] (Ca205-215).  Pursuant to N.J.C.R. 2:2-3(b), final judgments, appealable as of right, “are judgments that finally resolve all issues as to all parties. ”  As a result, the Commission’s August 23, 2022 was not appealable as of right pursuant to N.J.C.R. 2:2-3(a)(2) until a Final Decision issued from the Commission as to all issues as to all parties.  Accordingly, in filing their Motion for Summary Decision, Appellants expressly reserved the right to appeal the Commission’s August 23, 2022 decision on Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss pursuant to N.J.C.R. 2:2-3(a)(2) once a final order issued as to all claims as to all parties pursuant to N.J.C.R. 2:2-3(b). (Ca067-068).
[brief] *Ibid.*  (Emphasis added).  Moreover, an injury produced by external force qualifies for accidental disability retirement benefits under N.J.S.A. 43:16A-7(1).  See *Id.* at 586.  (Emphasis added).  *Matter of Sigafoos*, 143 N.J. Super. 469 (App. Div. 1976), overturned an erroneous determination of the [...] similar to the error rendered by the [...] in this matter.  The Appellate Division, held that a police officer was entitled to accidental disability retirement benefits where he sustained a total and permanent disability resulting from the combined effect of a pre-existing musculoskeletal condition which was aggravated by a traumatic event which occurred when he sustained a back injury requiring a lumbar hemilaminectomy while carrying a television set needed as a monitor during installation of a closed circuit TV system in a police station.
[brief] Under this authority, the [...]’s approach to species protection is reflected by the inclusion of habitat protections in its various land use planning and resource protection regulations.  See, e.g., N.J.A.C. 7:7A, N.J.A.C. 7:7, N.J.A.C. 7:13, including the FHACA.  The [...] may issue a Flood Hazard Area Permit only if the activity authorized under the Permit “will not destroy, jeopardize, or adversely modify a present or documented habitat for threatened or endangered species. ”  N.J.A.C. 7:13-11.6(d).  If the Permit authorizes activity that is “likely” to disturb “an area known to contain a threatened or endangered species,” or “habitat that could support a threatened or endangered species,” as part of the Permit process, the applicant must submit “a survey and/or a habitat assessment. ”  N.J.A.C. 7:13-11.6(e).  The [...] is required to “restrict” development activities during any times when a threatened or endangered species is “especially sensitive to disturbance,” which could include such times as during nesting or migration.  N.J.A.C. 7:13-11.6(g).  The [...] gave adequate and appropriate consideration to the presence or absence of threatened and endangered species during the [...]’s review of [...]’s FHA Permit Application.
[brief] . .’”  Friendship Manor, 244 N.J. Super. at 108 (quoting Scult, 76 N.J. Super. at 135); Garden of Memories, 109 N.J. Super. at 535 (“A purchaser who is placed on inquiry is chargeable with notice of such facts as might be ascertained by a reasonable inquiry. ”) (citing McCrea v. Newman, 46 N.J.Eq. 473, 474 (Ch. 1890)).  “It is well recognized that a record which affords record notice of the transfer therein made may contain a statement or recital which does not of itself give either record notice or actual notice but which does place on inquiry one who is affected by the record.
[directive] In all instances when a CED is fired at or discharged upon a person, a superior officer designated by the law enforcement executive shall immediately take custody of and secure the device.  The superior officer shall safeguard and preserve the digital information in that 16  USE OF FORCE POLICY Addendum A | December 2020 CEDs and Other Less-Lethal Devices and Ammunition device concerning the incident.  The law enforcement executive of each department that utilizes CEDs shall issue a rule, regulation, standing operating procedure or other appropriate order to establish a system to ensure that the internal digital recording systems of these devices are maintained, and that the data contained therein cannot be tampered with, and cannot be accessed or erased except by duly authorized supervisors.  After the information is safeguarded, the device may be returned to service consistent with the department’s policies.  The information stored in the device concerning the use of force incident (i.e., data concerning the time the weapon was fired, the time of all electrical discharges, and video recordings of the firing of the weapon and all electrical discharges) shall be preserved and reported on in the report of the incident prepared pursuant to Section 12.2 of this policy.
[brief] (1T68 to 1T69; 1T73; Pa001-Pa055).  [...] submitted an Application for Subdivision approval and an Application for Site Plan approval at the same time.  (Pa001-Pa055).  While Appellant asserts that no Environmental Impact Assessment was submitted, the overall submission package contained certain reports and other material, including, but not limited to, an Environmental Impact Assessment.  That Environmental Impact Assessment was reviewed by the Board Engineer and [...] addressed all comments related to the document.  (Pa190-Pa199; Pa200-Pa219; Pa220-Pa230; Pa241).
[brief] CONCLUSION  For the reasons set forth above, [...] submits that the Court should reject Plaintiffs’ challenge to the trial court’s denial of their Motion for Default Judgment as against [...].  [...] further submits that the trial court abused its discretion in declining to award sanctions to [...] pursuant to R. 1:4-8.  The Order denying sanctions should be reversed, and an order entered directing Appellants and their counsel to pay [...]’s reasonable attorneys’ fees in defending the Motion and this appeal.  Respectfully submitted, [...]  Attorneys for Defendant-Respondent  [...]  By: /s/ [...]  LISA S. BONSALL  A Member of the Firm  Dated: October 24, 2022  [...], [...] and [...], Plaintiffs/Appellants, v. [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...] & ITS PLANNING BOARD, and [...], Defendants/Respondents.