ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] In response to the court’s ruling, [...] argued as follows:  [...]:  …if I could step back to the language of the affidavit of merit, the language very clearly states resulting from an alleged act of malpractice or negligence by a licensed person.  So there is no distinction in the affidavit of merit.  It’s professional malpractice or negligence.  THE COURT: I disagree. \(^4\)  [...]: Now there is -- THE COURT: I disagree,\(^5\) [...].  You’re telling me that if [...] directed contractors to place materials onto --- \(^4\)  Emphasis added.  \(^5\)  Emphasis added.  plaintiffs’ property during the construction stage, or directed the, you know, the erection of certain fencing, or around the property that wasn’t -- wasn’t plaintiffs’, or that, you know, that -- and trespassed upon plaintiffs’ property knowingly, some of those things are not professional negligence, and they do not require an affidavit of merit in my view.\(^6\) 1T Hearing, page 21, line 6 to line 20.  In response, [...]’s counsel argued that the issue before the Court was the actual interpretation of the plan and that there was a need for expert testimony as to the engineering duty of care.
[brief] On August 11, 2016, at approximately 4:21 p.m., defendant, [...], consumed half a pint of vodka and got behind the wheel of his vehicle.  (1T:5-18 to 6-4).  Defendant was driving on the Garden State Parkway in Middletown when he was pulled over by a member of the New Jersey State Police.  After an investigatory motor vehicle stop was conducted by the State Trooper, defendant was arrested and administered an Alcotest, which determined his blood alcohol content (BAC) was .17, well above the legal limit.  (1T:6-12 to 6-19).  Defendant was charged with Driving While Intoxicated, in violation of N.J.S.A. 39:4-50; Reckless Driving, in violation of N.J.S.A. 39:4-96; Speeding (Exceeding 20-24 mph), in violation of N.J.S.A. 39:4-98.24; Open Container, in violation of N.J.S.A. 39:4-51B; and Failure to Maintain Lanes, in violation of N.J.S.A. 39:4-88B. (Da I-5).  On August 27, 2016, this matter was listed for the first time, and defendant failed to appear.  (2T:25-1 to 25-4).  The matter was relisted on September 12, 2016, and defendant appeared in front of the Honorable [...], J.M.C., and was advised of his right to a public defender if he could not afford private counsel.  (2T:25-5 to 25-10).  This matter was rescheduled for October 8, 2016, however, defendant failed to appear.  (2T:25- --- 1  Because the pertinent facts and procedural history are integrally intertwined to be concise, the State has combined its Counterstatement of Procedural History with its Counterstatement of Facts.
[brief] Although the Trial Court correctly dismissed [...]’s claims on their merits (see Point II, infra), it incorrectly declined to decide [...]’s motion for summary judgment based on the separate ground that Plaintiff-Appellant failed to file this lawsuit within the applicable six-year Statute of Limitations.  All Counts of Plaintiff-Appellant’s Complaint are based on the premise that, when [...] changed its website to include the requirement that pharmacy students attain a 3.0 GPA at the end of their first year of pharmacy study as a condition for admission into the dual degree program, it breached a contract (or implied contract) based on the website’s initial advertisement and also defrauded [...].  Plaintiff-Appellant concedes that as of September 22, 2012 at the latest, the [...] website which advertised the dual degree “opportunity” had been changed to make explicit reference to the 3.0 GPA requirement.  Moreover, [...] hired an attorney well within the Statute of Limitations period.  The revision of the website is the event which [...] claims constituted the breach of his contract with [...].  [...]’s argument is that the prior iterations of [...]’s website (which did not state the 3.0 GPA requirement) gave rise to a contract between [...] and [...] once [...] “accepted” his admission into [...]’ pharmacy school on March 1, 2012.  Even utilizing the September 22, 2012 date Plaintiff-Appellant alleges as the date the website changed to add the 3.0 GPA, Plaintiff-Appellant did not file suit in this matter until March 19, 2019, some six and a half years after September 22, 2012.
[brief] The No-Fault Law requires any dispute related to recovery of PIP benefits to be resolved in binding arbitration.  Insurers, however, want to file fraud claims in court regardless of the plain language of the statute.  Because the statutory language is clear and without doubt, the Amici Curiae try to sow doubt by claiming that fraud claims cannot be arbitrated because the arbitration forum established by [...] cannot handle IFPA and other similar claims.  But the only way to make that argument is to ignore the statutory language and [...]’s regulations.  [...] is tasked with adopting regulations setting forth arbitration procedures, identifying a dispute resolution organization to administer dispute resolution, and approving the organization’s plan to conduct arbitration.  [...] adopted those regulations, and the regulations are sweeping in scope.  Among other things, the regulations allow parties to consolidate claims.  The regulations require a dispute resolution professional to grant all relief necessary and decide all claims brought.  The regulations require that matters be resolved consistent with due process and fundamental fairness, including by providing the parties with discovery on claims and defenses.  The Amici Curiae ignore all of those regulations and argue, instead, it just cannot be done.  It can be done.
[brief] 2  “Db” refers to [...]’s merits brief; “Pb” refers to [...]’s brief; “Da” refers to [...]’s Appendix; and “1T” refers to the transcript of the June 15, 2023 Order to Show Cause hearing. to instead establish a new test that would compel production so long as custodians can ascertain the location of even broad classes of documents.  Essentially, [...] asks this court to ratify wholesale requests for all records of an agency.  Because longstanding precedent requires OPRA requestors to describe the documents they are seeking with reasonable clarity, using a discrete and limited subject matter, this court should reject [...]’s radical approach and reverse the trial court’s decision.  OPRA was enacted to “maximize public knowledge about public affairs in order to ensure an informed citizenry and to minimize the evils inherent in a secluded process. ”  Mason v. City of Hoboken, 196 N.J. 51, 64 (2008) (citation omitted).  But while OPRA makes government records readily accessible, the right to access is “not absolute[.]”  Educ. Law Ctr. v. N.J. Dep’t of Educ., 198 N.J. 274, 284 (2009).  Designed “both to promote prompt access to government records and to encourage requestors and agencies to work together toward that end by accommodating one another[,]” OPRA strives to create a “cooperative balance” that weighs the public’s right to access on one hand with agencies’ obligations and abilities to identify and provide responsive records on the other.  Mason, 196 N.J. at 78.  In striking this important balance, our courts have repeatedly reaffirmed OPRA’s parameters and defined its outer bounds.  As [...]’s opening brief in this case detailed, and [...]’s brief hardly refutes, this jurisprudence traces back nineteen years to when OPRA was in its early stages of infancy.
[brief] The video portrayed Plaintiff crying in pain for approximately several minutes.  Da170.  Plaintiff is heard pleading for help and repeatedly telling [...] how much pain she was in.  Contrary to the trial court’s comments, the audio portion of the video is difficult to listen to and is upsetting.  The inflammatory nature of the audio had a clear capacity to cause the jury to feel extraordinary sympathy for the Plaintiff.  The jury was clearly tainted by the admission of this video because it attributed 0% allocation of fault to Plaintiff and 40% of fault to [...] who were under the same exact set of circumstances, proceeding into an intersection with a yellow light.  It does not logically follow that two individuals operating vehicles under the same exact set of circumstances were apportioned significantly different percentages of fault.  Moreover, the amount of the jury’s damage award, which did not include any amounts for any economic damages was excessive and clearly influenced by the audio portion of the video.  Under N.J.R.E. 403 the dash camera video should have been precluded from evidence in trial because its probative value was substantially outweighed by its undue prejudice.  Moreover, the admission of this evidence had a clear capacity to cause the jury to return a verdict it otherwise likely would not have, both in respect of liability and damages.  *Neno*, 197 N.J. at 586.
[directive] Offense Offense for revocation subsequent subsequent 39:5-41 39:5-41 license  DL fines fines suspension any mandatory mandatory IDRC driver’s N.J.S.A. N.J.S.A. to or or $100 $100 consecutive fine  3rd 3rd to referral year year  DDEF DDEF $1,000 $2,000 under under Other Other 50 20 10 $1,000 be 39:4- to than suspension for than revocation more more  Offense Offense 39:4-50.4a.b. no 39:5-41 39:5-41 fines fines DL license no $1,000, suspension any $500, 2nd 2nd mandatory mandatory 39:4-50.4a.a.
[brief] For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully urges this Court to affirm defendant’s convictions and sentence.  Respectfully submitted, [...]  ATTORNEY GENERAL OF NEW JERSEY  ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT BY: /s/ [...]  [...], DAG [...]  AMANDA G. SCHWARTZ – ATTY NO. 240412017  DEPUTY  ATTORNEY GENERAL  DIVISION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE  APPELLATE UNIT OF COUNSEL AND ON THE BRIEF DATED: January 17, 2024  January 22, 2024
[brief] SDb28-31; CCDb44-49. \(^2\)  First, parties must preserve issues at the trial level, but they may raise different theories in support of a litigated issue on appeal.  See Docteroff v. Barra Corp. of Am., 282 N.J. Super. 230, 237 (App. Div. 1995) (“[W]e will consider the same issues [raised below] as presented to us, regardless of whether plaintiffs’ principal theory has changed. ”); Regans v. City of New Brunswick, 305 N.J. Super. 342, 355 (App. Div. 1997), abrogated on other grounds by Dzwonar v. McDevitt, 177 N.J. 451 (2003) (“[W]e may consider a plaintiff’s contentions on --- \(^1\) Capitalized terms and acronyms are listed at Pra001.
[brief] | Exhibit “S” is [...]’s Oct. 26, 2022 Affidavit for [...]’s Legal Services for [...] from Feb. 1, 2022 through Oct. 25, 2022, along with Invoices, for Trust payment.  | 253a | | 21.  | Exhibit “T” is [...]’s Oct. 21, 2022 Cert. for his Income & Corpus Commissions (Jan. 1 to Sept. 30, 2022) for Trust payment.  | 293a | | 22.  | Exhibit “U” is [...]’s Oct. 20, 2022 Cert. for [...] accounting fees (for Intermediate Accounting) for Trust payment.  | 297 | | 23.  |  Exhibit “V” is [...]’ Nov. 4, 2022 Certification in Opposition to Jacobson’s Oct. 26, 2022 Requests for Trust payments of legal, commission, & accounting fees, & a $25K Trust Reserve.
[brief] If any documents demonstrating subsequent due diligence or “services performed” existed, Appellants would produce them.  They have not.  So, at best, the NDA expired in early 2017, one year after the last “services performed,” which were Appellants’ provision of due diligence documents.  Appellants have not demonstrated that any due diligence occurred in the latter half of 2016, or that the parties agreed to extend the term of the NDA.  Thus, by its own terms, the NDA terminated well before June of 2017, the earliest date on which the conduct Appellants now complain of occurred.  Appellants do not have a single demonstrable fact that would allow the Panel to extend the term of the NDA into the summer of 2017.  Given that all the acts of which Appellants complain occurred in the summer of 2017, there can be no breach of the NDA.  (Pa001638 – 001639).  (alleging that Defendants approached [...] to negotiate a lease in “August 2017”) (emphasis added).  Thus, the Panel should affirm the decision below.
[brief] In *Perez*, the Appellate Division again compelled arbitration based on the clear and unambiguous language contained in a “Participation Agreement, Release and Assumption of Release” entered into by a patron of a trampoline park, with the terms there bearing striking similarity to the Mutual Arbitration Agreement here.  472 N.J. Super. 240.  There, the plaintiff placed a check mark next to an arbitration provision that expressly stated he (1) was waiving his right to maintain a lawsuit against the defendants; (2) understood he would not have the right to have his claims determined by a jury; and that (3) “any dispute, claim or controversy arising out of or relating to” the plaintiff’s access to or use of the premises was to be asserted in private arbitration with [...] within one year from the date of accrual.  *See id.* at 245.  That arbitration agreement was deemed “a clear and unambiguous waiver of plaintiff’s right to a jury trial and to pursue his claims in a court of law and, accordingly, [was] enforceable. ”  *Id.* at 249.  The same result should occur here.
[brief] The Board also again attempted to argue that a tree save plan would be required.  The hearing concluded with [...], on behalf of the applicant, agreeing, per the recommendation of the Board, to revise the plans to show the maximum building size.  [...] however, made it clear that no such tree save plan or conservation easement would be considered outside of what the ordinance requires.  The plans were revised as per the discussion at the April 5, 2022 hearing.  (Ia138)
[brief] Second, if Plaintiff [...] was not subjected to the tortious actions of Defendants [...] and [...], Plaintiff [...] could have commenced, as did [...], the [...] application process in mid-2007 with the assistance of an affordable housing development financial advisor such a [...], [...], or any other reputable affordable housing development financial advisor, completed the process in 2008 or 2009, or at a later date, and obtained the financing for the affordable housing project, as did [...].  6T,102:8-104:17; 116:14-23;139:16-143:3.
[brief] April 2017  Bank Statements a. [...] x1401 “Operating” Account, [...] April 28, 2017…………………………………………………………………………………..Pa108 b. [...] x0569 “Payroll” Account, [...] April 28, 2017..Pa112 c. [...] x2521 Account, [...] April 28, 2017…………………………………………………………Pa115 P-31.  May 2017  Bank Statements a. [...] x1401 “Operating” Account, [...] May 31, 2017…………………………………………………………Pa117 b. [...] x2521 Account, [...] May 31, 2017…………………………………………………………Pa126 P-32.
[brief] * * * * *  …  Judge, the interrogatories that we attached to the to our Motion papers, Judge.  There is form C and form C-2.  On form C question number two describe in detail your version of the accident or occurrence setting forth the date, location, time and weather”.  Answer: “This defendant was not present at the time of plaintiff’s alleged incident and therefore does not have a version of events based on personal knowledge.  See attached incident damage report bate stamped number Jelken 0001 through 3. ”  That’s the incident report.  Bates number 1 through 3.  (5T15-17 to 16-4; emphasis added).  ...  Question number 9, if any - - this is on C, “If any photographs, video tapes, audio tapes or other forms of electronic recording, sketches, reproductions, charts, or maps were made with respect to anything that is relevant to the subject matter of the complaint describe, (a) the number of each, (b) what each shows or contains, (c) the state taken or made, (d) the names and addresses of the persons who made them, ...  “Answer: “See attached photographs taken by [...] employee [...] on the date of the subject incident  Bates stamps 4 through 5. ”  That - - that’s the photographs.  Identify - - number 14; “Identify all documents that relate to this action and attach copies of each such document. ”  Answer - - this is 14, “See attached Bates 4 - - 1 through 5. ”  Again, which is the three-page incident and two-page Photographs.  This was certified.
[brief] Like [...], [...] appealed the partial denial of the joint motion to suppress, arguing that police lacked reasonable suspicion to conduct the initial stop and that, even if the stop had been lawful, the officers’ warrantless entry into the vehicle to seize clothing from the backseat was not justified by the plain view exception.  The Appellate Division held that the stop was not based on reasonable and articulable suspicion.  State v. [...], 465 N.J. Super. 181, 185 (App. Div. 2020).  Accordingly, [...]’s conviction was reversed, his sentence vacated, and the matter remanded for further proceedings.
[brief] Financial Practices.  As part of the Comprehensive Review, a forensic analysis of [...]’s financial data analytics and internal controls was conducted.  (Ra142; Ra294).  This analysis revealed “significant deficiencies . . . on the vendor management controls in the procure to pay cycle as internal controls related to vendor selection, review, and retention are not operating effectively. ” (Ra294).  The analysis also found “significant deficiencies . . . on the payroll processing cycle, as internal controls related to review and completion of the payroll register and payroll processing checklist, respectively, are not operating effectively. ”  Ibid.  And there were “significant deficiencies” in internal controls related to new hire training and “deficiencies noted on the financial close cycle” related to “review of cash flow statements. ”  Ibid.  5.
[brief] THAT ERROR WAS EXACERBATED BY BOTH:  (1)  THE JUDGE’S FAILURE TO FOLLOW THE MODEL SUPPLEMENTAL INSTRUCTION WHICH INQUIRES OF THE JURY WHETHER FURTHER DELIBERATION MIGHT BE BENEFICIAL OR FUTILE, AND (2)  THE JUDGE’S STATEMENT TO THE JURY AT 4:45 PM THAT SHE WOULD “DETERMINE HOW LONG WE CAN HAVE YOU HERE TODAY. ”  (RULINGS AT 21T 41-13 TO 43-1; 21T 45-11 TO 46-15)  .................................................  16 POINT II  THE JURY NEVER RETURNED A VERDICT FOR ALL OF THE ELEMENTS OF OFFICIAL MISCONDUCT; THEREFORE, THE VERDICTS FOR OFFICIAL MISCONDUCT AND A PATTERN OF OFFICIAL MISCONDUCT MUST BE REVERSED.  (NOT RAISED BELOW)  ...........................................  27 POINT III  THE PARAMETERS OF THE LEGAL DUTIES OF A PUBLIC SERVANT ARE A LEGAL MATTER THAT SHOULD BE INSTRUCTED TO THE JURY BY THE JUDGE.  NOT ONLY WERE THEY NOT INSTRUCTED HERE -- REVERSIBLE ERROR UNTO ITSELF -- BUT THEY WERE INSTEAD ONLY THE SUBJECT OF TESTIMONY FROM MULTIPLE FACT WITNESSES, THEREBY ALLOWING THE JURY TO PICK AND CHOOSE WHAT OF THAT FACTUAL TESTIMONY IT DECIDED TO CREDIT.  (PARTIALLY RAISED BELOW; RULINGS AT 14T 138-10 TO 11; 14T 140-10 TO 14; 16T 215-13 TO 23; 17T 82-16; 20T 168-23 TO 184-20)
[brief] The parties disagree on how searches for electronically stored information (ESI) should be conducted and are therefore unable to agree on the terms of an ESI protocol.  (ECF No. 42 at 3–4, 6).  [...] and [...] argue that “the parties’ search terms should be crafted in a manner intended to locate relevant documents, and that the parties should be required to produce all non-privileged documents that hit on one or more search terms. ” (Id. at 3).  [...] argues that “[...] and [...]’ request that [...] produce every single electronic communication that includes at least one of the to-be-determined search words, without considering relevance or proportionality to the needs of the case, is tantamount to engaging in an impermissible fishing expedition that is well beyond the scope of permissible discovery. ” (Id. at 6).  Although there is nothing improper about parties agreeing to produce all documents generated from an ESI search protocol (as proposed by [...] and [...]), the Court will not order an unwilling party to do so.
[brief] (Pa1-Pa14.)  See In re Attorney Gen. Law Enf’t Directive Nos. 2020-5 & 2020-6, 246 N.J. 462, 490 (2021).  “The line between the two functions, however ‘is not always a clear one. ’”  Id.  In the event a decision is challenged, distinguishing these two functions is consequential because it can “affect[t] how the standard of appellate review is applied. ”  Id.  The Supreme Court illustrates these two standards:  . . .  In [quasi-judicial] matters, a robust record naturally invites focused attention on the test's second prong -- "whether the record contains substantial evidence to support the findings on which the agency based its action."  In re Quest Acad., 216 N.J. at 385, 80 A.3d 1120 (quoting Mazza, 143 N.J. at 25, 667 A.2d 1052).  But for more policy-driven, legislative acts, the record may be less extensive.  An agency's action must still rest on a reasonable factual basis, but its choice between two supportable, yet distinct, courses of action "will not be deemed arbitrary or capricious as long as it was reached 'honestly and upon due consideration.'"  In re Adoption of Amends. & New Regs. at N.J.A.C. 7:27-27.1, 392 N.J. Super. 117, 135-36, 920 A.2d 111 (App. Div. 2007) (quoting Worthington v. Fauver, 88 N.J. 183, 204-05, 440 A.2d 1128 (1982)).  (Id. at 491).  A municipality’s adoption of a redevelopment plan, like any adoption of an ordinance, is a legislative action which invites the “less extensive” standard.
[brief] Must be Vacated  Plaintiffs’ recitation of the applicable law for when an arbitration award may be vacated is misleading and intentionally incomplete.  For example, [...] cites Borough of East Rutherford v. East Rutherford PBA Local 275, 213 N.J. 190, 202 (2013), for the general proposition that, “awards are subject to vacatur only under narrowly defined circumstances. ”  (Pb60)  Plaintiffs then cite only 2 sections of the New Jersey Arbitration Act’s vacatur rules, when there are 6, including that, “(4) an arbitrator exceeded the arbitrator’s powers”.  N.J.S.A. 2A:23B-23.  Plaintiffs also omit the Supreme Court’s confirmation directly in East Rutherford that, “additionally, a court 'may vacate an award if it is contrary to existing law or public policy," which is precisely the issue with this fee-shifting.  Id. at 202.  It violated public policy.
[brief] ”  N.J.A.C. 7:13-11.1(c)(2).  The applicant does not provide any explanation in the application or correspondence with the DEP that a bridge is not feasible at this location.  Nor did the DEP ever question the use of a circular culvert at this location in any of its post-application communications with the applicant.  This was error.  In addition, the regulations for bridges and culverts favor a bridge or three-sided culvert that “completely spans the regulated waterway,” and preserves “stable, natural, earthen channel” over a pipe culvert:  The Department shall issue an individual permit to construct a new bridge or culvert . . . only if the new or reconstructed structure is a bridge, arch culvert, or three-sided culvert . . . unless the applicant demonstrates that a circular, elliptical, or box culvert is acceptable under [the conditions] below.