ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Putting in Context the FDCPA’s Bar Against Third-Party Communications.  (T34-T36)  When interpreting a specific section of a statute, a court considers the provision in the context of the overall statute.  Hodges, 189 N.J. at 223.  The plain meaning of § 1692c(b) as interpreted by the federal courts is consistent with the FDCPA’s regulation of the debt collection industry.
[brief] Surprisingly, the Union asserts that [...] did not specifically explain why he did not award two percent increases when the City typically budgets two percent increase each year.  Here, the parties’ contract expired in 2019.  [...] noted in his opinion that the confluence of lost municipal revenues and tax collections due to COVID-19, the delay in negotiations until 2022, the structural budgetary shortfall experienced in 2022-2023 due to unavoidable costs; namely an increase in healthcare costs, an increase in pension contributions, and a state wide increase in solid waste costs, which required the City to request an additional ten million dollars in aid from the [...], and the use of reserves to fund PFOA resulted in significant monetary limitations.
[brief] DEFENDANT IS CONFINED Of Counsel and on the Brief [...] # TABLE OF CONTENTS Procedural History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Statement of Facts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 Legal Argument . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 Point I: THE POLICE PROPERLY OBTAINED THE SURVEILLANCE VIDEOTAPES . . . . . 6 A.  The Landlord Voluntarily Turned Over the Video Surveillance to the Police .  . . . .  6  B.  Even If the Verbal Consent of the Landlord Was Insufficient, It was Reasonable for the Police to Believe He Delegated His Authority to [...]  . . . .  8  C.  [...]’s Consent Was Voluntary As He Was Aware of His Right to Refuse and His Initial Opposition Was to a Search of the House Not Retrieval of the Video Recordings  .  . . . . . . . . .  10  Point II:  THE MOTIONS FOR MISTRIAL AND A NEW TRIAL WERE PROPERLY DENIED AS THE JUROR TWELVE BEING CONTACTED BY A MEMBER OF THE PUBLIC DID NOT RENDER THE TRIAL UNFAIR  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12  Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
[brief] ”  State v. Williamson, 246 N.J. 185, 200 (2021) (internal quotation marks omitted).  However, even when evidence could fall under an exception to the hearsay prohibition, that does not relieve the court, acting as gatekeeper, “to ensure that evidence admitted at trial is sufficiently reliable so that it may be of use to the finder of fact who will draw the ultimate conclusions of guilt or innocence. ”  State v. Michaels, 136 N.J. 299, 316 (1994).  See State v. Brown, 236 N.J. 497, 508-09 (2019) (noting that the trial court initially excluded a dying declaration that otherwise satisfied N.J.R.E 804(b)(2) because the court found the victim’s wife, who claimed to have heard the statement, “not a credible witness”); State v. Chen, 208 N.J. 307, 318 (2011) (“Courts have a gatekeeping role to ensure that unreliable, misleading evidence is not admitted.
[brief] (1T 35-20 to 36-6)  The Court found that the timing of the State’s motion prejudiced [...] because the State filed it after [...] had already litigated and lost a motion to suppress evidence and when trial was scheduled to start in just over two months.  (1T 27-23 to 28-5; 2T 18-3 to 4)  Thus, the Court denied the State’s joinder motion and denied the alternate motion to admit evidence of the April 20 Jersey City robbery during the trial for the April 23 Elizabeth carjacking.
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[directive] If the nature and scope of an investigation change, the investigator must be prepared to change the methods and procedures he or she utilizes to reflect the new focus.  For example, if an investigator initially determines that an allegation appears to be a disciplinary matter but later evidence leads the investigator to conclude that criminal conduct may have occurred, he or she must cease using the methods and procedures appropriate for an administrative investigation and notify the County Prosecutor immediately before proceeding further.  8.1
[brief] Cases Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) ..............................................................................................................1  Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972) ...........................................................................................................  1, 2, 28  Jencks v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972) ............................................................................................................. 16, 32  Matter of Adoption of Amendments to N.J.A.C. 11:22-1.1, 459 N.J. Super. 32 (App. Div. 2018)  ....................................................................................24  Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270 (1971) ............................................................................................................. 24, 25  State v. Brown, 236 N.J. 497 (2019) ..............................................................................................................28  State v. Carter, 85 N.J. 300 (1981) ............................................................................................................... 9, 10, 13  State v. Flores, 228 N.J. Super. 586 (App. Div. 1988) .................................................................................27, 31, 34  State v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42 (1987) ..................................................................................................................33  State v. Hernandez, 225 N.J. 451 (2016) ................................................................................................................32  State v. Jones, 219 N.J. 298 (2014) .............................................................................................................. 27, 33  State v. Marshall, 148 N.J. 89 (1997) .................................................................................................................27, 28, 29 State v. McQuaid, 147 N.J. 464 (1997) .............................................................................................................. 18, 24 State v. Nash, 212 N.J. 518 (2013) .................................................................................................................. 20 State v. Odom, 113 N.J. Super. 186 (App. Div. 1971) ..................................................................................... 27 State v. Preciose, 129 N.J. 451 (1992) .................................................................................................................... 27, 33 State v. Smith, 55 N.J. 476 (1970) ....................................................................................................................... 32 State v. Tairi, 211 N.J. 608 ................................................................................................................................. 5 State v. Tairi, No. [...], 2022 WL 2760858 (App. Div. Jul. 15, 2022) .......... 1, 14, 28, 29 State v. Tairi, No. [...], 2016 WL 818615 (App. Div. Mar. 3, 2016) ........................................... 6, 12 State v. Tairi, No. [...], 2012 WL 489101 (App. Div. Feb. 16, 2012)
[brief] 7  Beneficial Fin. Co. Atlantic City v. Swaggerty, 170 N.J. Super. 398, 402 (App. Div. 1979) ...............................  2 Blum v. Twp. of Lakewood, DOCKET NO. [...], 14-15 (App. Div. Jan. 7, 2020) ...............................  3  Bung's Bar & Grille, Inc. v. Township Council, 206 N.J. Super. 432, 459 (Law Div. 1985) .............................
[brief] (14T:134-10 to 21).  It is also undisputed that defendant was in the red Chrysler during the trip as well.  (14T:137-6 to 16). caught on the barbershop surveillance video wearing the same NASA jacket.  (13T:51-2 to 9; 52-1054-7; 62-23 to 63-2).  Additionally, cell phone tracking data places defendant’s phone in the vicinity of the murder, at the time of the murder, as well.  (13T:28-21 to 29-6; 34-7 to 17).  After the murder, defendant was seen again on the Raritan hotel surveillance video at approximately 9:50 p.m., over an hour after the murder.  (10T:182-23 to 183-4).  He was carried into the hotel by [...] and their travelling companion [...], or [...],\(^3\) apparently very intoxicated, wearing different clothes than he had been before.
[brief] Pa 380 at 21:17-22.  [...] also testified, in no uncertain terms, that [...] lost interest in participating in the COAH Project and that he “wasn’t feeling this project anymore” and that [...] did not want to be involved with COAH.  Pa 379.  [...] bought out [...]’s interest in [...] in 2007.  [...] testified that from late 2007 onward he was the sole member of [...] and that he wanted to develop the COAH Project himself.
[brief] For the aforementioned reasons, this Court should affirm the order of the motion court suppressing Defendant’s statement.  If the Court reverses the grounds under which the motion court suppressed Defendant’s statement, the Court should remand to the motion court for consideration of the two other grounds for suppression raised by Defendant on which the motion court did not rule.  Respectfully submitted, [...]  Public Defender Attorney for Defendant-Respondent  By: ___________________________  [...]  Assistant Deputy Public Defender ID. No. 084402013  Date: November 7, 2024  November 12, 2024  [...]  Assistant Prosecutor Of Counsel and on the Brief Attorney ID No. 082202013  [...]  LETTER IN LIEU OF REPLY
[brief] Redact SS no.’s from tax returns.  Produce three years of LLC tax returns to Plaintiff’s counsel.¹⁰ | .5 hrs. | $190.00 | $190.00 | | 2 | 5/6/21 |  Call with Plaintiff’s counsel to discuss the discovery and the case.  Review . . . [redacted]¹¹ | 1.2 hrs. | $456.00 | $646.00 | | 3 | 6/21/21 |  Discern files/documents that were produced in discovery . . . [redacted] applicable to [...]’s action.  Email to counsel for [...].  Email to [...].¹² | 1 hrs. | $380.00 | $1,026.00| | 4 | 7/14/21 |  Draft supplemental discovery responses based upon last week’s meeting [...] to review plaintiff’s document production¹³ | 2.6 hrs. | $988.00 | $2,014.00| | 5 | 7/26/23 |  Receive and review discovery notice from the Court.  Work on supplemental discovery requests¹⁴ | 2.1 hrs.  | $798.00 | $2,812.00| | 6 | 8/10/21 |  Begin assessing documents for deposition exhibits of Plaintiff and create mark-up deposition binder of the same¹⁵ | 2.8 hrs. | $1,064.00 | $3,876.00| | 7 | 9/8/21 |  Email counsel regarding the 9/22 deposition of Plaintiff.  Email . . .  [redacted]  . . . client regarding . . . [redacted]  . . .  Draft and file Motion | 2.1 hrs. | $798.00 | $4,674.00| ¹⁰ Pa822.
[brief] On March 4, 2012, the Plaintiff, [...] and Defendant [...] entered into a Motor Fuel Supply Agreement in conjunction with the Defendant’s purchase of an Exxon gas station.  Da21.  Two further amendments extended the fuel supply agreement.  Da37, Da40.  The amendments added a right of first refusal (ROFR) and extended the MFSA to December 31, 2027 with penalties attached for early termination.  Da37, Da40.
[brief] However, they then found that the defendant’s negligence was not a proximate cause of the plaintiff’s accident.  A proximate cause is “any cause which in the natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by an efficient intervening cause, produces the result complained of and without which the result would not have occurred. ”  Dawson v. Bunker Hill Plaza Associates, 289 N.J. Super. 309, 322 (App. Div. 1996), certif.  denied, 146 N.J. 569 (1976).  The test for proximate cause is satisfied where the negligent conduct is a substantial contributing factor in causing the loss.  Ettin v. Ava Truck Leasing, Inc., 53 N.J. 463, 483 (1969).  Furthermore, the defendant does not have to foresee exactly what happened to the plaintiff.  Ricci v. American Airlines, 226 N.J. Super. 377, 383 (App. Div. 1988).  It is enough that the type of injury is within an objective realm of foreseeability.  Arvanitis v. Hios, 307 N.J. Super. 577, 585 (App. Div. 1998).  In this matter, there was absolutely no support in the record for the jury’s finding that the defendant’s negligence was not a proximate cause of the plaintiff’s accident.
[brief] Nothing in the FDCPA constrains the breadth of the prohibition against third-party communications except for the expressed exceptions.  And none of those exceptions allow for communications with mail vendors.  To the contrary, Congress articulated that it was highly concerned with the “invasions of individual privacy” arising from “abusive, deceptive, and unfair debt collection practices. ”  *See* 15 U.S.C. § 1692(a).  As a result of these concerns, Congress provided limits on the use of a consumer’s information and protections from its misuse.  Thus, in § 1692c(b), Congress did indeed identify, with particularity, whom debt collectors may disclose consumer information and barred communications with everyone else.  Congress did not express or imply that a debt collector could communicate with others when a debt collector believed that doing so would make the collection of debts cheaper or more efficient.  Nor did Congress say that a debt collector may share that information with anyone who promises to keep it a secret. \(^4\)  Hence, § 1692c(b) simply prohibits all third-party communications regardless of the reason unless one of the exceptions applies or the communication is to one of the few authorized recipients.  There is no exception for benign communications or for communications to third-parties to whom a debt collector has outsourced tasks.  And, when it wants to, Congress knows how to regulate permissible third-party communications of confidential information.  Take HIPAA for example.  In 42 U.S.C. § 17934, Congress statutorily required a “business associate”—such as medical billing company—of health care providers to comply with existing regulations governing the use and disclosure of protected health information (“PHI”) per 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(e)(2).  HIPAA’s Privacy Rule bars a health care provider from disclosing PHI to anyone except as permitted or required by law and one permitted exception is providing PHI to the provider’s business associate.  45 C.F.R. § 164.502(a); 45 C.F.R. \(^4\)  Recall [...]’s adage, “Three can keep a secret, if two of them are dead. ”  § 164.502(e)(1)(i).  The provider must obtain “satisfactory assurance that the business associate will appropriately safeguard the information. ”  45 C.F.R. § 164.502(e)(1)(i).  Satisfactory assurances “must be documented through a written contract…that meets the applicable requirements of § 164.504(e). ”  45 C.F.R. § 164.502(e)(2).  The required contractual terms under § 164.504(e) include: establishing the business associate’s permitted and required uses and disclosure of PHI; prohibiting the business associate from any other use or disclosure; and requiring the business associate to use appropriate safeguards, report breaches, and make its books and records available to the Secretary of HHS for the purpose of determining the covered entity’s compliance.  Unlike what Congress allowed under HIPAA, it provided no option under the FDCPA for debt collectors to convey information about debts to a third-party service provider.  POINT V.
[brief] (Pb11).  Instead, the court found that because the notice from the Division was sent “more than four years from the date of petitioner’s last contribution,” the Division’s own “day-to-day administration of its affairs” and interpretation of the two-year time limitation as expressed by the four-year notice further supported allowing [...] to file.  Id. at 338.  Here, there was no such letter informing [...] that he was eligible to file under the Ricci Act past the statutory deadline.  Thus, [...] does not support [...]’s proposition that untimely notice allows individuals to file at any time past the statutory deadline.  (Pb12).  Nor do the equities weigh in his favor.  The Board found on the basis of undisputed facts that notice was sent to [...], that information about the Ricci Act was available to him through the Division’s website and publications, and that he had sufficient time to file his Eligibility Registration Form within the statutory period.  Thus, contrary to [...]’s contention, (Pb13), there was ample evidence for the Board to reasonably conclude that he failed to demonstrate good cause, reasonable grounds, and reasonable diligence to warrant consideration of his application well beyond the statutory deadline.  (Pa14).  Finally, [...]’s argument and reference to a different applicant is misplaced.  (Pb17).  That applicant asserts that he attempted to file his Eligibility Registration Form but was told he was ineligible because he was not currently sick.  (Pb17; Pa134).  But those facts are not in the record before this court.  And that applicant’s assertions are irrelevant to [...]’s appeal as they deal with an entirely different set of circumstances not alleged by [...], so they should be disregarded.  **CONCLUSION**
[brief] In his deposition testimony, [...] conceded that he offered no opinion on whether the [...] caused any change in the amount of water runoff, and he offered no generally-accepted engineering standard for his opinions.  [...] testified that he did not consider the Burke Action in preparing his report or in the conclusion contained in his report.  Pa55, ¶ 87; Pa333, ¶ 87; accord Pa268 at 23:14-:24.  He did not calculate the amount of water runoff that took place before the [...] purchased the property.  Pa55, ¶ 88; Pa333, ¶ 88; accord Pa268 at 24:12-:15.  His report contained no opinion on whether the amount of water runoff onto plaintiff’s property changed from before the [...] bought the property until after they repaved their driveway.  Pa55, ¶ 89; Pa333, ¶ 88; accord Pa268 at 24:17-:24.  Nothing in [...]’s report discussed the slope of the [...]’ property before 2023.  Pa55, ¶ 93; Pa334, ¶ 93; accord Pa269 at 26:11-:13.  He offered no opinion on whether the grade of the property changed after the [...] bought it.  Pa55, ¶ 94; Pa334, ¶ 94; accord Pa269 at 26:2-:20.  He based his opinion that water flows off the [...]’ driveway through the opening in the Belgian block on the side near plaintiff’s property on “the observation – again, looking at it [the driveway] from the street, the opening looks higher by the building. ”  Pa55-56, ¶ 95; Pa334, ¶ 95; accord Pa269 at 27:8-28:8.  He did not know the slope of the driveway as it runs from the [...]’ house toward plaintiff’s property.  Pa56, ¶ 96; Pa334, ¶ 96; accord Pa270 at 30:7-:25.  [...]’s report did not state that water was prevented from exiting the driveway through the opening in the Belgian block next to the [...]’ house.  Pa56, ¶ 98; Pa334, ¶ 98; accord Pa270 at 31:4-:7.  His report did not allocate the amount of water that would leave the driveway through the opening in the Belgian block by plaintiff’s property and the amount that would pass through the opening next to the [...]’ house.  Pa56, ¶ 99; Pa334, ¶ 99; accord Pa270 at 31:11-:12.  [...] testified that determining how much water ran off the [...]’ property onto plaintiff’s property before the [...] purchased their property was not within the scope of his work.  Pa270at 33:14-:18.  [...]’s report therefore contained no allocation of the amount of water that ran off the property before the [...] purchased it and after they repaved their driveway.
[brief] 5a; 50a-52a.  [...] expressly found that remediation was not required by the contract between [...] and [...], and that the Property was sold “as is. ”  41a-43a.  [...] was not required to remediate the Property, and the contract was found to be enforceable.  42a.  The Court further found that [...]’ attempted termination of the contract was reasonable, given the Phillips’ conduct.  5a; 42a.  [...] granted summary judgment in favor of Brian and [...] on the Phillips’s claims against them, finding that the Phillips’ complaint asserts “no cause of action against them,” and that the dispute involves [...] and [...] and that “[i]t is not clear … why [...], [...] and [...] have been named as Defendants in the present action. ”  49a.  It is undisputed that [...] ultimately closed and purchased the Property in May, 2016.
[brief] What person of ordinary intelligence would know where to place a tattoo?  What color should it be?  How big?  Must it be visible with the naked eye or upon closer examination?  In contrast, N.J.S.A. 4:19-24(a)(2) is specific as to signage “warning that a potentially dangerous dog is on the premises” in that “the sign shall be visible and legible from 50 feet of the enclosure. ”  There is no question about the content or appearance of the required sign.  But there is no such specificity in the tattoo mandate.  Depending on the breed, the potentially dangerous dog could be hairless or long-haired; white, black or any shade in between; ranging in size from tea-cup to giant.  What tattoo could appear “prominently” on a large, black, long-haired Newfoundland dog?  Where would a 7-digit tattoo fit on the body of a tea-cup size Yorkie?  Penal laws "are subjected to sharper scrutiny and given more exacting and critical assessment under the vagueness doctrine than civil enactments."  State v. Lenihan, Ibid., citing State v. Saunders, 302 N.J. Super. 509, 517, 695 A.2d 722 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 151 N.J. 470, 700 A.2d 881 (1997).
[brief] These are wages pursuant to N.J.S.A. 34:11-4.1(c) and N.J.S.A. 34:11-57 despite Defendants’ assertions to the contrary.  Any increase to the CNA rates in effect at the time of promotion was the contingency that did not happen.  The promotional pay owed pursuant to the terms of the CNA was never contingent.  The fact that the MSRA permitted Defendants to unilaterally alter the terms of the CNA effective June 7, 2017 did not absolve any obligation for pay earned and not paid for work performed during the period of promotion to implementation.
[brief] CONCLUSION  For the foregoing reasons, and for the reasons stated more fully in the State’s main response brief, the State urges this Court to affirm defendant’s convictions and sentence.  Respectfully submitted, [...]  ATTORNEY GENERAL OF NEW JERSEY  ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT BY: /s/ [...]  [...]  Deputy Attorney General  [...]  THOMAS M. CAROCCIA – ATTY NO. 306012019  DEPUTY  ATTORNEY GENERAL DIVISION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE  APPELLATE BUREAU OF COUNSEL AND ON THE BRIEF  DATED: September 27, 2024
[brief] See U.S. Const. amend. v; xiv; N.J. Const. art. 1, par. 20.  While the constitutional mandate of just compensation generally does not include a property’s owners litigation expenses, an exception should be made where, as here, an error of condemnor, who stands in a superior position to that of the property owner, engages in flawed litigation which results in the property owner incurring unnecessary expenses.  There has been a manifest injustice by the failure to have awarded the Defendant his expert fees as a result of Plaintiff’s mistake.