ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] At trial, the Plaintiff, [...], testified with regard to the damage to his vehicle.  This was permitted since the defendant did not stipulate that the photographs to be used were authentic.  The testimony on direct examination and court ruling at the time of defendant’s objection, was as follows:  Q.: ...My question simply is, after the impact, did you see the vehicle that hit you?  A.:  Yes.  I stepped out of the truck.  I looked at it.  I -- I saw the damage to the vehicle.  I saw the damage to my vehicle then he just took off.  Q.: Okay.  Were you able to -- so you were -- before he took off, you were able to see – [...]: Objection.  Your Honor, can we have a sidebar?  THE COURT:  I'm going to permit it to the extent that it impacts his ability to make the observation.  You can ask him about how long he was able to observe it and the reason why he couldn't observe it.  BY [...]: Q.  Let me ask you this, [...].  before the vehicle took off, how long were you able to see the vehicle?  A: I'd say maybe 20, 30 seconds.  Q: All right.  Were you - - the important question is, were you able to observe the damage to the vehicle in that short period of time before he fled?  A: Yes.  I was able to see that the whole side of his car was all messed up.  ...  Q: All right.  Now, based upon your testimony of seeing the other vehicle and the limited time you had to do that, I want to show you a document marked P-5 for identification.  Ketith, does that appear to be the vehicle that struck yours?  A: Yes, it does.  Q: Okay.  And it was an Infiniti?  A: Yes.  Q: All right.  And you remember that being the damage that you observed at the scene, correct?  A: Yes.  Q: All right.  Same thing, briefly, [...], with P-6 and P-7.  First, I'll show you P-6 so we stay in line and then I'm going to show you P-7.  Does P-6 and P-7 also appear to be the vehicle that struck you that you were able to see that evening?  A: Yes, it does.  Q: Does that accurately depict the damage?  A: Yes.  1T42:8 – 1T45:23.  The testimony was relevant to identifying the Defendant who caused the accident, as well as verifying the property damage in the photographs for admission into evidence.
[brief] Such unprompted statements are clearly spontaneous.  There is also no doubt that defendant’s initiation of conversation constituted a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of his rights.  The interrogation constituted nothing more than a reading of defendant’s rights and, after the invocation, defendant was just about to be removed from the room.  (1T: 10-9 to 10; 1T: 17-17 to 22).
[brief] (4T:29:14-17).  Defense counsel argued that these were the [...] files from the underlying [...] case\(^8\), which contained the documents that [...] received from the [...] firm, as well as the documents [...] created while they were handling the litigation.  (4T:30:1-6).  The documents were for the purposes of [...]’ proofs at trial.  (4T:30:13-14 and 18-19).  Accordingly, the Court properly overruled plaintiff’s objection.\(^9\) (4T:30:20-21).
[brief] ”  187 Vt. at 334, 993 A.2d at 421 (emphasis added).  This is a lenient standard that does not require demonstration that an appeal would have been successful or even that success on appeal was likely.  *Id.*  In *Pharmacists*, the Supreme Court of Vermont, citing extensive authority, held:  [T]he general rule is that an insurer under a general duty to defend is required to bring an appeal on its insured's behalf ‘when there are reasonable grounds to believe that the insured's interests might be served by an appeal. ’  [1 A. Windt, Insurance Claims Disputes], § 4:17, at 4-160; accord *Delmonte v. State Farm Fire Cas. Co.*, 975 P.2d 1159, 1168 (Haw. 1999) (observing that ‘the general rule is that the insurer . . . owes a duty to appeal in all instances where it appears the substantial interests of the insured may be served’ and "reasonable grounds for an appeal exist" (quotation omitted)); *Truck Ins. Exch. of Farmers Ins. Group v. Century Indent. Co.*, 887 P.2d 455, 459 (Wash. Ct. App. 1995) (noting the general rule that ‘an insurer owing a duty to defend its insured is liable for the costs of prosecuting an appeal from a judgment against its insured provided there are reasonable grounds for the appeal’); see generally 22 E. Holmes, Holmes' Appleman on Insurance § 136.11, at 86 (2d ed. 2003) (insurer is obligated to bring an appeal ‘when there appear to be reasonable grounds that a substantial interest of the insured may be served or protected by an appeal’).
[brief] Even though [...] was not identified by anyone, the State still bore the responsibility to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that [...] was the man on the bicycle who shot into the car.  The Supreme Court has never condoned the failure to give any form of an identification instruction.  Even in Cotto, where the failure to issue an identification instruction was found to be harmless error, the trial court did at least specifically instruct that jury “that the State bears the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt ‘each and every element of the offense, including that of the defendant’s presence at the scene of the crime and his participation in the crime. ’”  Cotto, 182 N.J. at 326.  Thus, the instruction in Cotto, although it was not the complete identification instruction, emphasized that the State “bears the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is the wrongdoer. ”  Id. at 327.  Under Cotto, an instruction that it is the State’s burden to prove identity beyond a reasonable doubt is mandatory.  No such instruction was given in this case, not even the more limited instruction given in Cotto.  Further, although our Supreme Court has held that the failure to provide an alibi charge is not constitute reversible error, the rationale for that rule in part is that “the trial court’s instruction to the jury on identification . . . ma[kes] it clear that the prosecution had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was present at the scene and committed the offense charged. ”  *State v. Echols*, 199 N.J. 344, 363-65 (2009).  The failsafe of an identification charge was missing here. \(^8\)  **C.  The Improper Explanation Of Accomplice Liability, As Well As The Missing Identification And Alibi Instructions, Require Reversal Of [...]’s Convictions. **  Necessary to a fair trial is that only legally accurate theories of guilt are presented to the jury, both by the State and by the trial court.  Also necessary is that jury instructions are provided to the jury on each material element of the offense.  Both of those requirements of a fair trial were violated in this case.  [...]’s convictions must be reversed.
[brief] The trial court also found that the Third Loan was a novation of the First and Second Loans, thereby rejecting Defendant’s argument that Plaintiff was barred from pursuing collection of the First and Second Loans by the statute of limitations.  As the trial court held, it is axiomatic that a novation is “the substitution of a new contract or obligation for an old one which is thereby extinguished. ”  Da48 (quoting Fusco v. City of Union City, 261 N.J. Super. 332, 336 (App. Div. 1993)).  The trial court also properly set forth the elements of a novation: (1) a previously valid contract; (2) an agreement to make a new contract; (3) a valid new contract; and (4) an intent to extinguish the old contract, and noted that “‘intent is the primary inquiry.
[brief] Instead, it should have done what it did at the remand – impose the reasonable operational limits on things like holiday overflow parking, maintaining the sewer line, obtaining other agency approvals, etc. that are customary.  [Da368-372].  And the trial court was right to prohibit the Board from requiring a unit count reduction on remand.  [Da357].  As discussed in Point I.B, supra, there were no significant impacts from the project that eliminating units would solve.
[brief] 34 N.J.S.A. 3B:31-31 - Reformation to correct mistakes .....................  36 N.J.S.A. 3B:31-54 - Duty to administer trust ............................  21, 30, 45, 46 N.J.S.A. 3B:31-55(a) - Duty of loyalty ................................... 46, 47 N.J.S.A. 3B:31-55(b) - Duty of loyalty ...................................  17, 18 N.J.S.A. 3B:31-56 - Duty of impartiality .................................  46 N.J.S.A. 3B:31-67(a) - Duty to disclose .................................  47 N.J.S.A. 3B:31-72 - Damages for breach of trust ....................... 3, 39, 49 OTHER 2010 UTC with Comments, Section 415, Page 78 ..........................
[brief] ”  Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America, 142 N.J. 520, 527 (1995) (citing R. 4:46-2(c)).  In determining whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, the trial court must determine whether the evidence presented is “sufficient to permit a rational factfinder to resolve the alleged disputed issue in favor of the non-moving party. ”  Brill, 142 N.J. at 523.  “When the evidence is so one sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law, the trial court should not hesitate to grant summary judgment.
[brief] Here, [...] challenges the Ordinance and Plan.  Although [...] is correct that before the proverbial shovels enter the ground on a contemplated project, various approvals and/or permits will be needed from [...], the Plan challenged in this action is not an application by any entity – [...] or, for that matter, a private developer – made to [...] for approval, issuance of a permit, execution of an order, or consensual agreement for development.  In short, the Ordinance and Plan do not require [...] action.  In no way are any of the enumerated statutes implicated by the Ordinance or Plan because, put simply and again, no entity is yet seeking permission in any form whatsoever from [...].
[directive] For example, the pre-indictment plea offer may indicate that the offer is “twelve (12) months of parole ineligibility and expires upon return of an indictment, at which point the plea offer will be eighteen (18) months of parole ineligibility. ”  Page 29  [...] Guidelines 2 (2004 Revisions)  This practice would obviate the need for the prosecutor to prepare and file a second or subsequent plea worksheet.  Similarly, a prosecutor may choose on a single initial worksheet to announce in advance all three steps of the graduated plea system, alerting the defendant specifically as to when each offer will expire and what the next plea offer will be.  This approach, besides conserving resources, may also help to convince guilty defendants that it is in their best interests to plead guilty before the plea offer is automatically increased in accordance with the graduated plea system of these Guidelines.  It should be noted, of course, that any such anticipatory plea offer is subject to change and does not in any way create an entitlement or right of the defendant to effectuate an anticipatory plea offer that has not yet ripened.
[brief] (Aa476).  On March 20, 2019, [...] approved the Jibsail Technical Modification Permit and forwarded a copy of the approved Jibsail 2019 Modification Permit to the [...].  (Aa476).  [...] published the Jibsail Technical Modification Permit in the April 3, 2019, edition of the [...] Bulletin, Volume 43, Issue 7.
[brief] Since the unit was [...]’s unit, he certainly knew about what was happening (1T; 44:9).  [...] went to [...]’s office, they were screaming in the office; and then, the door opened and [...] shouted out, “[...], get in here,” at which time, the Plaintiff got up, walked in and [...] started screaming at her (1T; 45:17).  Plaintiff objected to the way he was talking to her (1T; 46:1).  It was [...] screaming at her (1T; 47:8).
[brief] In Moore I, there was a dispute regarding an arbitration agreement in a medical malpractice case.  The subject arbitration agreement provided that “[t]his agreement to arbitrate includes waivers of the rights of persons who are not parties to the agreement—the patient's spouse and unborn child...  While the Supreme Court has held that a parent may ‘bind a minor child to arbitrate future tort claims,’ Hojnowski v. Vans Skate Park, 187 N.J. 323, 343 (2006), we are not aware of any legal theory that would permit one spouse to bind another to an agreement waiving the right to trial on his or her claim without securing his consent to the agreement. ”  Moore, 416 N.J. Super. at 45(emphasis added).  Hojnowski is not a medical malpractice case but was a case involving injuries sustained by the child at a skate park.  Medical malpractice cases involve different dynamics than a typical negligence case, such as life or death decisions, surgical procedures, and medical providers.  It should be noted that in the present case, [...]’s son was an adult when she signed the arbitration agreement, so he cannot be bound by an agreement signed by his mother.
[brief] In addition, since the Trial Court erroneously believed no evidence was cited, the Trial Court failed to appreciate the significance of [...]’s clear testimony regarding the affirmative misrepresentations and omissions that [...] made to him, and also [...]’s affirmative misrepresentations to all Plaintiffs by way of the Releases and [...]’s default letter to Plaintiffs, all in furtherance of Defendants’ conspiracy.  The Trial Court unbelievably and erroneously held that all of these misrepresentations by [...] were insignificant because [...] was not Plaintiffs’ attorney.  In reality, it is factually and legally impossible for the Trial Court to consider this evidence and conclude that the R&P have resolved all genuine issues of material fact in dispute as to whether they participated in Defendants’ conspiracy to steal Plaintiffs’ money, and as to whether those actions constituted legal malpractice.  The Trial Court’s error should be reversed.
[brief] Here, as the trial court properly found by viewing the State's evidence in its entirety:  But importantly in this case, there was sufficient evidence to suggest that [...] was not a mere – not merely present at the scene of this offense.  Related to that, of course, as the State correctly points out today, [...] was present before the shooting, before the loop around, or as the State describes it as the hunting, he was present at the shooting, and extremely importantly he was present after the shooting.  As described in great detail during the testimony of this trial, both [...] and [...] were located with the suspect car and two handguns at a residence on [...].  The fact that Marvine was in the car with Brooks during the shooting may not have been enough to support a conspiracy charge, but that information combined with the fact that he was driving around with Marvine beforehand, and the fact that he remained with Brooks for a significant period of time after the shooting suggests that he was part of the plan, that he lent his continence and approval to it, and he aided [...] in the shooting.
[brief] The Consumer Fraud Act was applicable | 7 | | (raised below: Pa1, Pa6, 1T4, 1T12) | | | 2)  The undisclosed clause was unenforceable | 9 | | (raised below: Pa1, Pa5, 1T4, 1T16-20) | | | 3)  My paid entry into the tournament created | 11 | | a contract (raised below: 1T16-1T23) | | | 4)  "Accord and satisfaction" did not nullify | 12 | | my claims (raised below: 1T23) | | | 5)  The undisclosed prize limitation is | 14 | | illogical, nonsensical, and absurd (not | | | raised below) | | | CONCLUSION | 15  |  ## TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS & RULINGS | Description | Page | |-----------------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | Trial Court's Nov 16, 2023 written order, dismissing Plaintiff’s claims | Pa7 | | with prejudice | | ## TABLE OF APPENDIX | Description | Page | |-----------------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | Complaint | Pa1 | | Trial Court's Nov 16, 2023 written order, dismissing Plaintiff’s claims | Pa7 | | with prejudice | | | Notice of Appeal and Case Information Statement | Pa8 | | Defendants’ website page for the 2017 World Open (main event) | Pa14 | | Defendants’ website page for the 2017 World Open, side events | Pa16 | | Defendants’ website page for the 2017 World Open “Prize Information” | Pa17 | | Defendants’ website page for the results from the relevant 2017 World Open | Pa18 | | side event | | | The [...]’s website page showing that [...] wrote the [...] rulebook | Pa19 | | Excerpts from a verified complaint, exposing the defendants’ conflict of | Pa20 | | interest with the [...] | | | Unpublished opinion of Fehr v. Algard, 2011 WL 13670 | Pa22 | ### TABLE OF AUTHORITIES #### Published Opinions - **Bandler v. Landry's Inc.**, 464 N.J. Super. 311, 235 A.3d 256 (App. Div. 2020) Page(s): 7, 8 - **Brown v. Morrisey & Walker**, 106 N.J.L. 307 (E. & A. 1930)
[brief] Additionally, Township Committee member [...] made racially charged comments at the August 1, 2017 public meeting where the vote occurred to suspend Plaintiff, including his falsely suggesting that “black children” were “herded out of town”, an allegation directly contradicted by Defendants’ own witnesses.  [...] similarly stated in public comments that that the Committee members “were appalled by the excessive force used by police officers against a group of young people”, notwithstanding that: [a] there was no factual basis for any allegation against Plaintiff that he either used or witnessed excessive use of force and did nothing; & [b] the Prosecutor’s Office made no finding of excessive force being used by the officers on the night of July 5, 2016.  Further, Defendants’ theorize that Plaintiff suffered no retaliatory adverse employment action because at the time he retired he was already employed at the [...] (“[...]”).  However, there is sufficient evidence in the record that Plaintiff’s employment at [...] was terminated as a direct result of the unsupported allegations of racism against Plaintiff by the Maplewood Defendants arising from the July 5, 2106 police response to the unruly and disorderly crowd after the fireworks display.  Specifically, [...] Headmaster [...] testified that [...]’s decision to terminate Plaintiff “ … was based on the news article in which … there was some complaint by the [...] … ” about Plaintiff’s “ … behavior, potentially allegedly racist behavior in this incident of July 4th … ”.
[brief] As the State’s brief acknowledges, *Torres* did not announce a new rule of law.  Rather, *Torres* clarified the procedure and requirements for sentencing when a lengthy consecutive sentence is imposed.  *Torres*, 246 N.J. at 270-71.  All defendants are entitled to the benefit of a clarification of a law that was in effect at the time of their sentencing.  *Fiore v. White*, 531 U.S. 225, 228 (2001).  This is true even if the clarification does not occur until after the defendant’s conviction is final.  See also, Bunkley v. Florida, 538 U.S. 835 (2003) (holding that when a subsequent case announces a correct formulation of substantive law, rather than a change of law, relief is required without regard to retroactivity).  New Jersey has similarly adopted this approach.  State v. Jackson, Doc. No. A-1687-20 (App. Div. Dec. 23, 2022).  In a case similar to the present matter, a youthful defendant was convicted of kidnapping and murder charges and sentenced to consecutive sentences.  Id. at *11.  Ultimately, the defendant’s consecutive sentences were confirmed in 2020.  Id.  After that, Torres was decided.  On appeal in 2022, the court remanded for resentencing based on Torres and the failure to consider the overall fairness of lengthy consecutive sentences.  The court there observed that Torres clarified the need for an explicit consideration of the overall fairness of a consecutive sentence and that failing that “there needs to be [a] remand and resentencing to consider the overall fairness of the sentence.”  Id.  [...], similarly was a youthful defendant sentenced to lengthy consecutive sentences, where at sentencing there was no discussion of the overall fairness of the sentence.  Accordingly, as the Torres clarification applied in Jackson, it must apply to [...].  II.  THE INCORRECT INTERPRETATION OF THE YARBOUGH FACTORS RESULTS IN AN ILLEGAL SENTENCE.
[brief] For instance, the State selectively quotes from the portion of the Iowa Supreme Court’s decision in *State v. Tyler* that recognized that “state law requires medical examiners to investigate the cause and manner of death, conduct an autopsy, and prepare a written report on their findings” and acknowledged that “medical examiners routinely rely on the circumstances that surround the death as revealed by independent investigation, police investigation, and eyewitness accounts. ” (Sb 23-24 (quoting *Tyler*, 867 N.W.2d 136 at 154 (Iowa 2015)).  But, critically, the *Tyler* decision went on to hold that an examiner’s reliance on this information, while legally authorized, can make the resulting opinion unsuitable for introduction at trial.  The *Tyler* decision embraced the rule of “[n]umerous jurisdictions,” including New Jersey, which “have held that when a medical examiner bases his or her opinions on cause or manner of death largely on statements of lay witnesses or information obtained through police investigation, such opinions are inadmissible.
[brief] The trial court never questioned the jury about the lesser-included offenses because it erroneously believed it did not reach them.  When the trial court says, “Okay and following the instructions you go to question 4,” it was not reviewing the verdict sheet filled out by the jury, but simply assuming they had done it properly, which obviously they did not.  Likewise, the final poll does not prove anything because, again, it is not contended that the jury did not render a verdict for murder, but that the jury also rendered inconsistent unanimous verdicts on every lesser-included offense of murder, which is improper.  The State simply asserts that it is “unbelievable” that the attorneys and the trial judge would have missed such an issue, (Pb21),\(^1\) but that is the only plausible explanation for what happened.  It is far more likely that the attorneys --- \(^1\) Pb = plaintiff-respondent’s brief 11T = sentencing transcript dated May 5, 2022 and trial court simply overlooked the issue or did not think it was a problem than the alternative theory that defense counsel filled out a verdict sheet himself to attach and certify as the correct verdict sheet in the motion for a new trial.  It is also in line with the lack of seriousness with which the jury approached its duty, as discussed in more detail in the appellant brief.  Lastly, the State argues that no reasonable jury would have convicted [...] of a lesser-included manslaughter offense.  (Pb22).  Without reiterating the litany of reasons why a jury could have convicted [...] of a lesser form of manslaughter as discussed in the appellant brief, it suffices to say that the trial judge and prosecutor already conceded this point since everyone agreed to charge the jury on those offenses, meaning there was no dispute that a reasonable jury could in fact convict [...] of a lesser-included offense based on that record.  Accordingly, [...]’s conviction for murder must be reversed and the matter remanded for a new trial where the jury appropriately considers the lesser-included offenses.