ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] As stated earlier, [...] testified to the proposed density variance and minimal impact on parking and traffic on the surrounding neighborhood.  Specifically, he noted there would be “an additional space on Ocean Terrace.  So, we are losing two on Ocean Terrace.  We are adding one back on Ocean Terrace south of the proposed driveway and then we are adding one on Porter Avenue where we eliminate the existing driveway that serves the parking lot. ” (1T 41:2-8).  “So, with this being said, I believe the property can support the density the variance being sought. ” (1T 41:16-18).  Importantly, the objector did not have another traffic study to submit into evidence that showed that the proposed development would negatively impact the surrounding neighborhood.
[brief] POINT V DEFENDANT DOES NOT DISPUTE  PLAINTIFF’S NHA CLAIMS RAISED IN THE OPENING BRIEF.  The inadmissible hearsay on which defendant so clearly relied struck straight at the heart of plaintiff’s case, especially her violation of rights claim under the New Jersey Nursing Home Rights and Responsibilities Act.  By repeatedly emphasizing that the State of New Jersey DOH found that defendant did not violate [...]’s rights, the jury was convinced that that was the case and so found, as demonstrated by the verdict.  Notably, defendant does not address plaintiff’s claim that the verdict was inconsistent because the jury found that defendant deviated from the standard of care but did not find a violation of [...]’s rights under the NHA.  The evidence was the same on both counts and yet the jury came to different conclusions based on that same evidence.  Pb49-51.  Similarly, defendant does not address plaintiff’s claim that proximate cause was not an element of the NHA claim.  Pb51-54.  Those contentions, then, may be considered unopposed.
[brief] “The fair trial right entitles a criminal defendant ‘to have his [or her] guilt or innocence determined solely on the basis of the evidence introduced at trial, and not on grounds of official suspicion, indictment, continued custody, or other circumstances not adduced as proof at trial. ’ ”  *Id.* at 533–34 (quoting *State v. Zhu*, 165 N.J. 544, 553 (2000)) (emphasis added).  A defendant's right to a fair trial may be violated when an in-court identification is improperly admitted.  *U.S. v. Wade*, 388 U.S. 218, 235, 87 S.Ct. 1926, 1936, 18 L.Ed.2d 1149, 1162 (1967).
[brief] That Hoboken’s ordinance does not expressly include capital improvements as part of the owner’s actual investment in property does not bar its inclusion in determining an owner’s equity.  As in Mayes, the ordinance must be sensibly interpreted to permit a “fair return” on the owner’s actual investment consistent with constitutional jurisprudence.  Nex, as the special assessment that was part of the condominium fee ended after 2016, [...] concedes that it should not be included in its costs if the Board granted it as an allowable cost.  Next, [...] repeats that [...] is not entitled to a rent increase based upon a return on its equity because its investment was “transformed’ when the Property was converted to a condominium whereby 10 of the Property’s units (not [...]’s) were sold.  That argument’s corollary is that [...] must continue to lose money every year on the Unit until [...]’s protected 40-year tenancy ends.  Neither law nor logic dictate such an outcome.  The Unit was not sold; it is still owned by [...]; and the law does not compel [...] to be “stuck” with the Unit, losing money every year potentially up to 40 years simply because the Property’s other units were sold.  That [...] sold the other units in the Property does not entitle [...] to the good fortune of an artificially low rent in which [...] loses money every year.  [...] correctly rejected [...]’s argument as irrelevant.
[brief] See Da140.  Again, the Board appropriately considered that granting the application would place a use in this residential zone that the governing body specifically just excluded from this zone.  See Salt & Light Co. v. Willingboro Zoning Bd., 423 N.J.Super. 282, 291 n.2 (App.Div. 2011) (holding the third factor in the Sica test inapplicable when the proposed use would significantly undermine the zoning plan).  The Board also properly considered that there were no conditions that it could devise to reduce the bulk and density. \footnote{As the Supreme Court noted in Sica, only “in some situations,” the local board may reduce the detrimental effect by imposing reasonable conditions on the use. ”  127 N.J. at 166 (emphasis added). }  (4.)
[brief] Finally, there was no error in the child judge denying either Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration or Plaintiff’s second motion for reconsideration which she titled a motion to vacate.  Because both of these motions addressed interlocutory orders, Plaintiff had to demonstrate that reconsideration was in the “interest of justice” in order for reconsideration to be proper.  Lawson v. Dewar, 468 N.J. Super. 128, 134–35 (App. Div. 2021); Rule 4:42-2.³ --- ³  This argument presumes that this Court’s order dated August 21, 2023, denying Defendant’s motion to dismiss this appeal as interlocutory, concluded that
[directive] 2nd & 4th Wednesday Bellmawr 0404 [...]  2nd & 3rd  Thursday Berlin Boro 0405 [...]  1st, 2nd & 3rd  Monday Berlin Twp 0406 [...]  2nd & 4th  Thursday Brooklawn 0407 [...]  1st & 3rd Thursday  Camden City 0408 [...]  Monday-Friday  Chesilhurst 0409 [...]  2nd & 3rd Tuesday 1st & 3rd Tuesday,1st Clementon 0410 [...] & 3rd Wednesday Collingswood 0411 [...]  Wednesdays Cherry Hill 0412 [...]  Thursdays Gibbsboro 0413 [...]  3rd  Thursday Gloucester City 0414 [...]  Tuesdays Gloucester Twp 0415 [...]  Tuesdays Haddon Twp 0416 [...]  2nd & 4th  Wednesday Haddonfield 0417 [...]  Monday Haddon Heights 0418 [...]  Monday Hi-Nella 0419 [...]  4th  Wednesday Laurel Springs 0420 [...]  Tuesdays 1st and 3rd Lawnside 0421 [...]  Wednesday 1st and 3rd Lindenwold 0422 [...]  Wednesday Magnolia 0423 [...]  2nd and 4th Tuesday Merchantville 0424 [...]  Wednesdays 2nd and 4th  Mt. Ephraim 0424 [...]  Wednesday 1st and 3rd Oaklyn 0426 [...]  Wednesday Pennsauken 0427 [...]  Tuesdays Pine Hill 0428 [...] 1st, 2nd, 3rd Tuesday Runnemede 0430 [...] 2nd and 3rd Monday Somerdale 0431 [...] 1st, 3rd & 4th Tuesday 1st, 3rd & 4th Stratford 0432 [...]  Thursday Voorhees 0434 [...] 2nd & 4th Monday Waterford 0435 [...] 3rd Monday 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th Winslow 0436 [...]  Wednesday 1st and 3rd Woodlynne 0437 [...]  Wednesday Cape May County Avalon 0501 [...] Mondays Cape May 0503 [...] Wednesdays Cape May Point 0502 [...]
[brief] Id.  These senior staff members filed the lawsuit seeking payment on termination for accumulated vacation days, sick days and personal days, which entitlement was not abrogated by the statute.  As an initial matter, the objective of the statute in Caponegro was the recovery of the local school district and assuring a thorough and efficient education.  Id. at 154.  It had nothing to do with the financial welfare or stability of [...] or its public school system.  Therefore, although the statute provided for the termination of employment contracts, the Court held that withholding payment of the benefits at issue upon termination was not expressly provided for in, or intended by, the legislation and, under those particular circumstances, would not have been related to the governmental objective to be constitutional.
[brief] Appellate review of a trial judge’s findings is deferential and “exceedingly narrow. ”  State v. Locurto, 157 N.J. 463, 470 (1999).  Courts must give “great deference” to the trial judge’s factual findings.  State v. Barrow, 408 N.J. Super. 509, 516 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 200 N.J. 547 (2009).  After all, the trial judge’s factual and credibility findings are “often influenced by matters such as observations of the character and demeanor of witnesses and common human experience that are not transmitted by the record. ”  Locurto, 157 N.J. at 474.  Thus, courts “are obliged to uphold the motion judge’s factual findings” that are supported by the record and should only review the trial court’s legal conclusions de novo.
[brief] See, e.g., \textit{Malanga v. Tp. of West Orange}, 253 N.J. 291, 309 (2023) (construing LRHL with reference to the Blighted Areas clause); \textit{Main ST. v. Mayor & Council of Hackensack}, 221 N.J. 129, 134 (2015) (LRHL).  It is worth pausing to emphasize that the question of interpretation at issue does not involve the procedural steps required by the LTTEL\footnote{LTTEL provides detailed procedures to be followed by urban renewal entities who wish to qualify for a tax exemption.}, because Plaintiffs agree that those procedures were followed.  Nor does the issue concern the inclusionary redevelopment plan and its affordable housing component, for Plaintiffs have not questioned the plan and certainly not its provision for needed affordable housing.  Rather, at issue is the interpretation of \textit{N.J.S.A.} 40A:20-11 which, plaintiffs argue, imposes on the municipality the obligation to ensure that a long term property tax exemption is required to attract investment in a redevelopment project.
[brief] Id.  In accordance with the agreement, the Appellant hired a qualified inspector to conduct a Phase I environmental investigation.  (Da 3.)  Shortly thereafter, on May 19, 2015, the Appellant confirmed that all conditions and contingencies pursuant to the January 2015 As-Is Contract were satisfied subject to the understanding of two things: (1) the “millings” in a triangle area on the Property were removed, subject to the approval of the [...] (“[...]”); and (2) the eviction of [...] as a tenant.
[brief] (1T 8-20 to -24).  [...] testified that he was familiar with that intersection and was aware that there was a stop sign coming from Route 517 South onto Route 206 North.  (1T 29-16 to -22).  The trooper described his observations of the Defendant’s vehicle, noting that the vehicle “completely just like disregarded and rolled through the intersection, and made that right hand turn. ” (1T 9-3 to -5).  This testimony is corroborated by the MVR that was admitted into evidence at the hearing as D-1.  (Da31).  Defendant argues that the State cannot meet its burden in establishing reasonable and articulable suspicion to justify the stop because “the stop must be based upon the observations of the officer making the stop” and that the trooper “perjur[ed] himself not once, but twice” because he “could not remember where he was located when allegedly observing [the Defendant] rolling through a stop sign.
[brief] As observed by the court in Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America, 142 N.J. 520, 540 (1995), when reviewing a motion for summary judgment, the motion judge must “consider whether the competent evidential materials presented, when viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, are sufficient to permit a rational fact finder to resolve the alleged disputed issue in favor of the non-moving party. ”  The same standard which governed the Trial Court is applied on appeal.  The evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to [...], and she must be given ‘the benefit of all favorable evidence and inferences presented in the record. ’  State v. Quaker Valley Farms, LLC, 235 N.J. 37, 54-55 (2018), quoting Murray v. Plainfield Rescue Squad, 210 N.J. 581, 584-585 (2012).  Even when viewed in a light most favorable to [...], both the evidence in the record and [...]’s failure to credibly dispute that evidence establish that the Trial Court correctly granted judgment in favor of [...] as a matter of law.
[directive] Furthermore, the Municipal Prosecutor should consult with the arresting officer 5 Cert. den. Laurick v. N.J., 498 U.S. 967, 111 S.Ct. 429, 112 L.Ed.2d 413 (1990).  Attorney General Guideline: Page 13  Prosecution of DWI & Refusal Violations to confirm this fact.  If there is any doubt as to the existence of a collateral legal proceeding, the Municipal Prosecutor should seek an adjournment and further consult with the County Prosecutor for guidance.
[brief] ### TABLE OF AUTHORITIES  **Cases** - **Allendorf v. Kaiserman Enterp.**, 266 N.J. Super. 662 (App. Div. 1993) ......................... 13 - **Bachman Choc. Mfg. Co. v. Lehigh Whse. & Transp. Co.**, 1 N.J. 239 (1949) .................................................. 19 - **Bender v. Adelson**, 187 N.J. 411 (2006) .............................................. 37, 38 - **Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America**, 142 N.J. 520 (1995) ..............................................
[brief] STANDARD OF REVIEW.  A.  Summary Judgment.  “A ruling on summary judgment is reviewed de novo. ”  Davis v. Brickman Landscaping, Ltd., 219 N.J. 395, 405 (2014).  The Court must determine whether “the competent evidential materials presented, when viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, are sufficient to permit a rational factfinder to resolve the alleged disputed issue in favor of the non-moving party. ”  Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520, 540 (1995); accord Rule 4:46-2(c).
[brief] Appellants Waived Their Pre-Suit Demand Argument.  (NOT RAISED BELOW).  ...............................................................................................53  B.  Appellants Waived Their Economic Loss Doctrine Argument (NOT RAISED BELOW).  .................................................................56  C.  Plaintiffs Were Not Required to Proceed Derivatively Against the Defendants............................................................................................58  D.  The Defendants Are Liable for Conversion..............................................65  V.  THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY FOUND THE DEFENDANTS LIABLE FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT, BREACH OF THE COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH, AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT.
[brief] [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], and [...], Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. [...], d/b/a [...], d/b/a [...], d/b/a [...], d/b/a [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], INTERVENTIONAL PAIN CONSULTANTS OF NORTH SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. [...] Civil Action On Appeal From: Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Middlesex County Trial Court  Docket No.: [...]  Sat Below: Hon. [...], J.S.C.  Submitted on: July 25, 2024  JERSEY, L.L.C., d/b/a [...], d/b/a [...], d/b/a [...], [...], [...], d/b/a [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], Defendants-Respondents.
[brief] Appellants exaggerate and enlarge this obligation to manufacture a cause of action.  Specifically, Appellants allege that [...] did not submit an Environmental Impact Statement ("EIS"), even though the EIS was clearly included in the Complete Application Package.  At the public hearing, [...] offered unopposed testimony by qualified counsel and professional planners on all subdivision criteria.  The Board conducted a fair hearing, afforded the public a meaningful opportunity to voice any concerns, and voted to approve [...]’s application.  To memorialize its decision the Board adopted a detailed resolution that included its reasoning for its decision, which was supported by ample evidence from the record.  Accordingly, the trial court correctly ruled that the Board properly approved the application and its decision should be upheld.
[brief] July 29, 2019  Subpoena response authentication from [...] ........................................................................................................Pa032 P-18.  September 9, 2019  Subpoena response authentication from [...] ........................................................................................................Pa034 P-19.  May 2016  Bank Statements a. [...] x0561 “Wire” Account, [...] May 31, 2016 ......Pa037 P-20.  June 2016  Bank Statements a. [...] x0561 “Wire” Account, [...] June 30, 2016 ......Pa039 P-21.  July 2016  Bank Statements a. [...] x0561 “Wire” Account, [...] July 29, 2016 ......Pa041 P-22.  August 2016  Bank Statements a. [...] x0561 “Wire” Account, [...] August 31, 2016 ..Pa043 P-23.  September 2016 Bank Statements a. [...] x0561 “Wire” Account, [...] September 30, 2016………………………………………………………………………………..Pa045 P-24.
[brief] IT IS BLACK LETTER FELA LAW THAT A RAILROAD CAN BE LIABLE FOR THIRD PARTY CRIMINAL ACTIONS.  In their response, [...] focuses on the facts of the Syverson case, in which a railroad employee was stabbed by a vagrant in a rail yard, an area generally not open to the public.  They aver that Syverson is inapplicable because [...] was attacked in a public space.  However, [...] completely ignores the fact pattern of Burns v. Penn Central Co., 519 F.2d 512 (2d Cir.1975).  In Burns, a brakeman was riding in an open doorway as the train approached a train station and was shot and killed by a sniper.  Prior to the employee being shot, there had been reports of three stonings of passenger cars within three blocks of the slaying, and four additional stonings within 24 blocks.  The Second Circuit reversed the initial grant of summary judgment, “Based on the railroad's actual knowledge of stonings in the vicinity in recent months and its constructive (and indubitably actual) knowledge of the generally dangerous conditions prevailing in the neighborhood in which the fatality transpired, the jury would have acted well within its authority under the FELA by returning a verdict for Mrs. Burns. ”  Burns, 519 F.2d at 514-15.  There is no indication that the railroad even knew where the sniper was in the Burns case, however the 2nd Circuit still determined that summary judgment was inappropriate.  Just as in the instant matter, the “generally dangerous conditions” of the neighborhood, and the railroad’s knowledge of those conditions, precluded summary judgment.  [...] has provided ample evidence of the conditions of the station itself along with the area surrounding the station, and how that contributes to the unsafe conditions for [...] employees.  (130a – 165a).  Under the FELA, a railroad can be held liable for the criminal actions of a third party, and it was for a jury to determine whether [...] was negligent for the actions of [...] in this matter.  The trial judge erred by invading the province of the jury and determining that [...] could not be held liable for the actions of [...].
[brief] \(^1\)  [...] also pled guilty to possession of CDS with intent to distribute under [...], and third-degree aggravated assault, which is not part of this appeal.  (2T 3-18 to 3-24) ineligibility, pursuant to the Graves Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6c.  (Da 16-19; 4T 6-23 to 7-18)  [...] filed a notice of appeal on November 8, 2023.
[brief] On October 12, 2014, Appellant called EPD regarding two (2) “unwanted house guests refusing to leave” and requested that EPD remove “[...]” and “[...]” (the “unwanted guests”) from Appellant’s residence.  [Da27-Da28].  On October 13, 2014, Appellant allowed [...], one of the “unwanted guests”, to operate Appellant’s vehicle despite [...] having a suspended driver’s license.  [Da29].  This resulted in [...] crashing Appellant’s vehicle into another vehicle, and an ensuing Crash Investigation Report being issued by EPD.  [Da29].  Appellant never reported this incident to TPD.  [1T53:6-9].  On January 15, 2015, Appellant permitted “[...]” to operate Appellant’s vehicle despite [...] being under the influence of alcohol and having a suspended license.  [Da30].  This resulted in [...] crashing Appellant’s vehicle into a utility pole.  [Da30].  Appellant never reported this incident to TPD (the October 13, 2014, and January 15, 2015 occurrences are collectively referred to as the “Ewing Vehicle Incidents”).
[brief] B.  The trial court properly considered matters of the public record in deciding the motion to dismiss, and Plaintiff’s self-serving certification cannot be considered on appeal.  The trial court properly granted [...]’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule 4:6-2(e).  The opinion was validly based upon certain public records that [...] submitted into the motion record, such as the RFP pursuant to which Plaintiff bid and obtained the subject legal work.  Plaintiff incorrectly claimed below that the Court “changed a R. 4:6-2 [m]otion into a [s]ummary [j]udgment [m]otion without notifying the parties that it did in fact do that. ”  Contrary to Plaintiff’s assertions, the trial court properly found that the four corners of Plaintiff’s complaint were insufficient to state a claim as a matter of law.  To reach this determination, the trial court properly evaluated certain matters of public record that [...] provided as part of their motion practice.  In Banco Popular N. Am., 184 N.J. at 183, our Supreme Court established that “[i]n evaluating motions to dismiss, courts consider ‘allegations in the complaint, exhibits attached to the complaint, matters of public record, and documents that form the basis of a claim. ”  Thus, the trial court was permitted to and properly considered documents such as the RFP that Plaintiff’s appointment was based upon, and which stated that he was being appointed as an independent contractor.  The trial court’s reliance on *public records* did not convert [...]’s motion to one for summary judgment as Plaintiff contends.
[brief] As briefed before this Court in connection with the License Appeal\(^2\), the License FAD was arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable, and contrary to law.  By issuing inconsistent FADs (the Tenure FAD and the License FAD), the [...]’s action was irrational, and violated principles of res judicata, collateral estoppel, and interagency privity.  As a consequence, the License FAD that predicated the termination of [...]’s employment by [...] must be set aside.  This Court’s decision in the License Appeal will address and determine the legality of the License FAD, and of the [...]’s action in issuing incompatible decisions based on the same factual record.
[brief] The Final Order can only lead to further extensive litigation over the adjustment of various property boundaries.  The effect of the Report ensures the continuation of litigation.  No reason prevents consideration of a proposed compromise in the context of a *de novo* review or fresh look indicated by N.J.S.A. 28-3.  The statutory system opens the door for alternative proposals to resolve a boundary dispute.  The equities of a situation such as this “must be assessed in view of its particular facts and the magnitude of the threat to the plaintiff’s title and use of the property. ”  *Suser v. Wachovia Mortgage FSB*, 433 *N.J. Super.* 317, 326 fn.4 (App. Div. 2013).  Alternatives to the Report could not be created until the Report was produced.
[brief] Respectfully submitted, [...]  Attorneys for Appellants  By: /s/ [...]  [...], ESQ.  Dated: October 15, 2024 [...] AND [...], Plaintiffs, v. [...], a public body corporate and politic of the State of New Jersey; [...]; [...]; [...]; [...]; and [...]  d/b/a [...]  Defendants.  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE
[brief] Plaintiffs asserted the attorney-client privilege and the work-product doctrine with respect to the revival discovery requests, but did not provide a privilege log.  If Plaintiffs continue to withhold responsive documents on the basis of privilege, they must produce a privilege log to Defendant specifying which documents/communications they are withholding and the basis on which they are being withheld.  Defendant also asks the Court to compel Plaintiffs to conduct ESI searches for the terms: “reviv*,” “abandon*,” “expire*,” “maintenance fee,” “late fee,” and “patent fee. ”  Mot. at 2 n.1.  Plaintiffs do not specifically address this aspect of Defendant’s motion.  Oppo.  The Court DENIES Defendant’s request as the requested search terms are overbroad, especially given the scope of this order.