ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] The Civilian Review Board must establish and adhere to written policies and procedural safeguards to preserve the confidentiality of internal affairs records and other confidential information, which shall include at least the following requirements:  (1)  Closed sessions for reviews or investigations.  The Board must be in a closed session whenever the content of internal affairs records are discussed or testimony or other evidence regarding a specific incident is presented.  (2)  Protection of internal affairs information.  No part of any internal affairs file may be disclosed by the Civilian Review Board under any circumstances to any person who is not a Board member or employee, the law enforcement executive, or a member of the law enforcement agency’s internal affairs function, except in a final public report appropriately redacted in accordance with instructions from the law enforcement executive.  This prohibition on disclosure includes any statement made by police officers to law enforcement investigators under the provisions of Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967).  (3)  Personal identifiers.  Even in the Civilian Review Board’s final public report, the Board may not disclose the personal identity of subject officers, complainants, or witnesses.  (4)  Dedicated location for reviewing internal affairs records.  Whenever Civilian Review Board members and staff are granted access to internal affairs records, that review shall take place only in a secure location designated by the law enforcement executive and no internal affairs records may be copied or removed from the designated location.
[brief] [...]:  Correct, and fortunately enough, again, [...] underestimated the resolve of his partners, his former partners, because he wrote those intercompany loan contracts so that there was a clause for arbitration and I'm pretty sure he never thought we would take him up on it so it's very apropos that those judgments were awarded and we came out on the good side of it, as we should have.  [...]:  And through your perseverance of the last two and a half years you've gotten to prove that many of these documents and arguments and everything that was sworn to up and down in court and used to steal your company false, right?
[brief] Pal.  On May 10, 2019, Defendants-Respondents, [...], [...], the [...], the [...], and the [...] (collectively, the “State Defendants”), filed a Notice of Removal, removing the case to the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey.  Pa109.  On February 11, 2020, the Hon. [...], U.S.D.J., issued a Letter Order remanding the case back to the Superior Court of New Jersey, Essex County.  Pa112.  On March 13, 2020, the Hon. [...], P.Civ.J., issued a Consent Case Management Order requiring all defendants to file responsive pleadings or motions to the Complaint by March 20, 2020.
[brief] The Bulletin constitutes improper rulemaking that violates procedural due process as well as a gross overreach that violates substantive due process and impairs [...]’s constitutional right to contract.  The Bulletin is not rooted in the existing laws or regulations or any interpretation of same.  Rather, it is simply an attempt by the Department to improperly and unilaterally expand the scope of its authority without any basis in law or fact and without any of the constitutional protections due and owing to [...] and other reciprocals.
[brief] Cell S. of N.J. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 172 N.J. 75, 83 (2002).  Further, to satisfy the negative criteria, in addition to proving that the variance can be granted without substantial detriment to the public good, an Applicant must demonstrate through an enhanced quality of proof, that the variance sought is not inconsistent with the intent and purpose of the Master Plan and zoning ordinance.  *Ibid.*  In this case, the Board made the following findings of fact and conclusions of law on the Applicants’ request:
[brief] The State Board Suspends [...]’s Teaching Certificate.  On March 3, 2021, the State Board, exercising its authority under N.J.A.C. § 6A:9B-4.4, issued [...] an Order to Show Cause as to why his certificate should not be revoked.  (Pa14-Pa16).  On April 1, 2021, [...] filed an Answer, which did not deny tenure charges had been filed, but rather, asserted that the penalty imposed by the arbitrator speaks for itself.  (Pa18).  On April 13, 2021, pursuant to N.J.A.C. 6A:9B-4.6(e), the State Board sent [...] a hearing notice.  (Id.).  Because no material facts were in dispute, the notice invited [...] to “submit written arguments on the issue of whether the conduct addressed in the Order to Show Cause constituted conduct unbecoming a certificate holder, as well as arguments with regard to the appropriate sanction in the event that the Board found just cause to take action against his certificate. ” (Id.).  The notice also offered [...] a chance to appear before the State Board in-person.  (Id.).  In response, [...] filed a written submission arguing that the decision in the tenure matter “bars the imposition of any suspension or revocation on his teaching certificates.
[brief] 8  A proof of claim filed by a party who is not a creditor is not a properly filed proof of claim.  In re FirstPlus Fin., Inc., 248 B.R. 60, 70 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2000) (citing In re Ellington, 151 B.R. 90, 95 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1993)).  “[L]ogic dictates that if one does not own a claim against the debtor, one may not file a claim against the debtor. ”  Ellington, 151 B.R. at 95.  alone did the Debtor brief it. \(^9\)  Because of all of this, the Motion to Reduce the Claim of [...] was denied.
[brief] [3T36-15 to -21; 3T38-2 to -20].  Equipped with a description of the suspect, [...] drove around the bank and checked the area for the suspect but did not see anyone.  [3T38-21 to 39-11].  In the bank, the officer could see U.S. currency on the floor in the vestibule.  [3T39-11 to -14].  There was also a bottle of Corona beer on the floor amid the currency.  [3T43-11 to -19].  [...] spoke with the [...] branch manager, [...], and then called the [...] because the [...] was too small to handle major crimes.
[brief] [...] will be seeking approval for the project as presented with no elevator in Building E.  All parties ([...], [...], and the [...]), will have to amend the settlement agreement and the zoning ordinance for the property to permit the additional units in Building E.  In terms of timing, we propose the following schedule:  (i)  June 15th – Council resolution authorizing amendment to settlement agreement and introducing (via title only), an amended zoning ordinance; (ii) planning board consistency review on June 27th; (iii) ordinance adoption on July 20th, 2022.  Once the ordinance is adopted and appeal periods pass, [...] will file an application seeking amended site plan approval for the additional story and units, with an elevator in Building E.  (Pa148)  On June 13, 2022 a final hearing took place before the Board during which [...] concluded its presentation and the Board voted to approve the Project consistent with [...]’s email on the prior day.
[brief] The parties’ obligations pursuant to the PTA is not “interrelated” with [...]’s performance as a subcontractor under an entirely different contract.  \(^6\)  [...] makes much ado about [...]’s counsel’s comment during oral argument that Transcript of Motion filed Nov. 26, 2025 (“Tr.”) that if there were 12 contracts between [...] and [...] to perform subcontract work on 12 different projects, then there would need to be 12 different arbitrations.
[brief] Additionally, the Judge failed to appreciate the similar nature of the crimes themselves.  In both cases, three masked men, one of whom brandished a handgun, stole at least one luxury vehicle from a parking lot.  Moreover, the defendant displayed the Audi and BMW on his Instagram account just like he did with the Mercedes three days later, including attempting to sell both the Audi and Mercedes through Instagram posts and communications.  (Ca10 (Exhibit F and G)).  That the Audi and BMW were not stolen directly from their owners should not detract from the glaring similarities in the cases.  The overlap in evidence is overwhelming\(^6\) and it is imperative that the State be able to prove defendant was one of the masked carjackers on April 23 --- \(^6\)
[brief] Indiana’s Court of Appeals has reached the same conclusion under nearly identical circumstances.  In *State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Riddell Nat. Bank*, the Indiana Court of Appeals reviewed an insurance policy that required the insured to sue the insurer “within one year after the date of loss or damage. ”  984 N.E.2d 655, 657 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013).  As here, the policy also stated that if any provision conflicted with state law, then state law would apply.  *Id.*  Also as here, Indiana’s statute of limitations for contract claims was longer than the policy’s limitation period.  *Id.* (citing Ind. Code Ann. § 34-11-2-11).  The court concluded that Indiana’s ten-year statute of limitations applied because the policy’s conformity clause voided its one-year limitation period.  *Id.* at 659; *accord Ill. Farmers Ins. Co. v.* --- 2 Merriam-Webster Dictionary (online version 2024), https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/conflict; see American Heritage College Dictionary (3rd ed. 1993) (defining “conflicting” to mean “differ”).  Glass Serv. Co., 683 N.W.2d 792, 802 (Minn. 2004) (“a conformity clause . . . amends all policy terms in conflict with [state] law to conform to those laws”).  The Appellate Division should use this logic to revive [...]’s UIM action.  Reaching a different conclusion under Weinroth v. New Jersey Mfrs. Ass’n Fire Ins., 117 N.J.L. 436 (1937) would be an error.
[brief] The procedure for a court ruling to become precedential common law binding on all courts is as follows:  RULE 1:36-2  Publication  (a)  Appellate Opinions.  All opinions of the Supreme Court shall be published except where otherwise directed by the Court.  Opinions of the Appellate Division shall be published only upon the direction of a majority of the panel members issuing the opinion and with the approval of the Part's presiding judge.  (b)  Committee on Opinions; Trial Court Opinions.  The Chief Justice shall appoint a Committee on Opinions to review formal written opinions submitted for publication by a trial judge.  Except in extraordinary circumstances, the Committee shall not review a trial court opinion until the time for appeal from the final judgment in the cause has expired.  If an appeal has not been taken, the Committee shall determine whether to approve publication of the trial court opinion.
[brief] Rather, they ignore it. ”  (1286a); “Those adjectives to which he agreed are appropriate descriptors of the industry demonstrate, beyond peradventure, that experience in such a highly regulated, very complex, competitive industry is important. ”  (1286a); “[A] failure to provide comparisons to other novice businesses may not be fatal to an expert analysis, if buttressed by other sources of information.  But such is not the case here. ”  (1286a); “According to [...], [...]’s lost profit was approximately $4.9 to $8 million – a broad range by any assessment. ” (1288a); “[I]s a 108-unit project an appropriately scaled project for a novice developer with no experience developing affordable housing?  That question was not answered by [...], let alone posed.  In short, silence. ”  (1288a); “[...] did not cite to any market data, treatises, articles, or any other independent, third-party information that discussed the circumstances of new businesses generally nor specifically in the context of low-income housing. ” (1289a); “[...] implicitly acknowledged he did not consider [...] inexperience in development…” (1289a); “Nowhere does [...] discuss unique problems a novice developer may face. ” (1289a); “[T]here is nothing in the record indicating that [...] ever had a lone conversation with an experienced partner” (1290a); “Any reliance on the involvement of [...] was misplaced, as any conversations or communications in that regard were in their infancy, such that any partnerships remained speculative, at best, illusory at worst. ”  (1290a); “[A]t no point does [...] cite to any facts he relied on to indicate that partnering with an experienced developer was anything more than a makeweight, pipe dream to salvage his speculative opinion. ” (1291a); “[A]ny conversations between [...] and [...] were very preliminary…” (1291a); “[...]’s analysis and conclusions fall short of that elevated bar for new entries into a market – such as [...] here seeking to make a first foray into the complex world of affordable housing development. ” (1292a).
[brief] [...] testified that the hotly disputed altercation constituted “aggravated assault on a police officer” immediately before the ambiguous video was played for the jury – depriving the jury of their right to determine what the video portrayed for themselves.  (6T:147-9 to 148-1, 149-10 to 150-16; Da 12)  Given the ambiguous nature of the video, [...]’s subsequent testimony that he wanted to arrest [...] for aggravated assault inside the restaurant deepened the harm from [...]’s previous impermissible testimony.  Likewise, [...]’s subsequent testimony that [...] was ultimately arrested for “agg. assault” outside the restaurant made it more likely that the jury would convict [...] of committing aggravated assault against both officers.  (6T:158-20 to 24)  The harm from the officers’ ultimate issue testimony was exacerbated by the prosecutor’s improper opening statement.  In opening, the prosecutor told the jury that they would hear [...] testify that he arrested [...] “because he just assaulted a police officer. ” (6T:58-14 to 16); See State v. Walden, 370 N.J. Super. 549, 558 (App. Div. 2004) (jurors give a prosecutor’s comments in opening and closing statements great weight because prosecutors are representatives of the State).  The officers’ improper ultimate issue testimony, coupled with the prosecutor’s inappropriate opening remark highlighting the testimony and lending it the State’s imprimatur, had the clear capacity to deny [...] his fundamental right to have a jury fairly evaluate the merits of his defense.  See Simms, 224 N.J. at 405-06 (reversing defendant’s convictions where detective’s ultimate-issue expert testimony was clearly capable of producing unjust result, and harm was exacerbated by prosecutor’s improper hypothetical question); R. 2:10-2; U.S. Const., amends. VI, XIV; N.J. Const., art. I, ¶¶ 1, 10.  Consequently, [...]’s convictions must be reversed.
[directive] -21(P.L. 2015, e.147 N.J.S.A. 2C:14-13 to Protection Act, for a acomplaint-summons or to apply deciding whether to issue before query shall be made officer from police to preclude or discourage a herein shall construed Nothing be complaint-warrant. in all cases, and not just cases N.J.S.A. 2C:14-20 registry established under central checking the check central registry that Prosecutor may direct officers to County sexual offenses, and a involving prosecutor specify. may such types of cases as tl~e or in in all cases, History.  Defendants' Juvenile Young Adult Requirement to Check 4.2.5 defendant's account for a not risk-assessment process does automated pretrial
[brief] December 19, 2022, defendant signs the legal counsel prepared Notice of Municipal Court Appeal, Transcript and Motion for Stay forms to the initial trial court, Burlington Superior, for submission.  On same day and per defendant’s Counsel, sent and received a copy of the disposition inquiry (AP 98).  December 22, 2022 counsel prepares Motion for Stay; client signs with signature and for court submission.  On January 11, 2023, defendant receives a virtual hearing for motion to stay hearing notice by email captioned, **01/31/23 Burlington City/Twp. Municipal Court**: defendant submits Americans with Disability Act accommodation request with substantiated medical documentation through legal counsel as instructed by trial court.  \textsuperscript{18}  Plaintiff informed defendant should have objected via their appeal brief and she did; the Court overruled all of her objections based on excited utterance, and not being offered as hearsay so – [1T23:21-23 -11/29/2022]  On March 3, 2023 an ADA accommodation request was submitted to initial trial court in preparation of the motion to stay hearing and subsequently denied.  On March 14, 2023, defendant submits a Request for Audio Records of Proceedings to the trial court with trial court responding on March 15, 2023, confirming its availability.  On same day, defendant receives a virtual hearing for motion to stay hearing notice by email captioned, 04/11/23 Burlington City/Twp. Municipal Court.  March 20, 2023 defendant files complaint against [...] and subsequently denied by [...]. \(^{19}\)  Per the instructions of [...] from the September hearing and trial notification with Counsel, she sends a copy, listing all her witnesses and in preparation of trial.  September 7, 2021, Burlington Municipal personnel confirms receipt and informed the trial is in-person\(^{20}\).  The trial court limited court access to a mandatory in-person trial.  An ADA accommodation request was submitted to the Superior Court ADA Coordinator on November 27, 2021, as Burlington Municipal Court did not answer the phone nor was the name and/or contact information provided by the initial ADA Coordinator.  --- \(^{19}\)  Omitted, document to [...] was initially filed with a stalking charge but changed to harassment by [...] then filed with [...].  Document are screenshots taken from a distance.  \(^{20}\)  Redacted correspondence reflects in Appendix APRIL 24, 2023  DE NOVO TRIAL
[directive] USE OF FORCE POLICY  Addendum A | December 2020 CEDs and Other Less-Lethal Devices and Ammunition  7.10  A CED shall not be used in any environment where an officer knows or has reason to believe that a potentially flammable, volatile, or explosive material is present that might be ignited by an open spark, including but not limited to pepper spray with a volatile propellant, gasoline, natural gas, or propane.  7.11  While officers must at all times respect the seriousness and potential lethality of a CED, an officer shall use particular care when considering whether to use a CED against an individual who is particularly vulnerable due to age (either elderly or young), developmental disability, or a known or reasonably apparent medical condition (e.g., a pregnant female).  7.12  Law enforcement agencies are not permitted to use aerosol spray devices that emit a flammable substance to eliminate the possibility that the electric spark from a CED dart/electrode could inadvertently ignite a flammable substance contained in some OC sprays or similar aerosol spray devices, thereby resulting in injury or death.  10  USE OF FORCE POLICY
[directive] risk-assessment pretrial automated the initiate to means the have an arrest making identify Police shall State Directive, the this of issuance the of days 30 within  Accordingly, of New the State of laws of authority the the under operating agency enforcement every law up-to-date that has system Scan Live a with equipped is agency the whether determine to Jersey the by approved process risk-assessment pretrial automated initiating the of capable software the to shall report Police the State Directive, this of issuance the of days 45 Within AOC. County appropriate each Justice and Criminal of Division of Director the the to and agency, need agency would the steps indicate what shall and equipped, so not is agency the if Prosecutor, (e.g., process risk-assessment pretrial automated the initiate to capacity the achieve to take to etc.). system, operating computer update software, Scan Live update hardware, new obtain that is an agency and expenditure, or purchase any mandate to construed be shall herein Nothing risk- pretrial AOC-approved initiating the of capable system Scan Live a with equipped not to pursuant defendants fingerprinting for arrangements other make will process assessment 2.2.4. and 2.2.3 subsections of Directive. this issuance upon immediately operational become shall Section This or detention pretrial concerning decisions prosecutorial inform to used be prosecutors, to available once should, Directive. of this 8 and 7 Sections with accordance in release of revocation "flag" and 1-6 scale) a (on scores the numeric to refers generally (PSA)" Assessment Safety "Public term The various refers to occasion on Directive This 4.2.1. subsection See process. risk-assessment pretrial the results of commit new defendant might risk a that or "low" "moderate," "high," a indicating as scale 1-6 the in scores PSA 7.4.3.
[brief] **CONCLUSION**  For the reasons set forth above, Defendants respectfully request that the trial court’s denial of their motion to reopen the judgment be reversed.  Dated: August 29, 2024  New York, New York  Respectfully submitted, [...]  By: /s/ [...]  [...] (Attorney No. 168182016)  [...] (pro hac vice)  [...] (pro hac vice)  [...] (pro hac vice)  [...] (pro hac vice)  [...]  [...]  Telephone: [...]  [...]  [...]  [...]  [...]  [...]  Attorneys for Defendants-Appellants  [...], [...], and [...]
[brief] Sussex Commons Assocs., LLC v. Rutgers, 210 N.J. 531, 541 (2012).  "Any analysis of OPRA must begin with the recognition that the Legislature created OPRA intending to make government records 'readily accessible' to the state's citizens 'with certain exceptions for the protection of the public interest.'"  Gilleran v. Twp. of Bloomfield, 227 N.J. 159, 170 (2016) (quoting N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1)  OPRA’s core premise is that “society as a whole suffers....when governmental bodies are permitted to operate in secrecy. ”  Asbury Park Press v. Ocean Cnty. Prosecutor’s Office, 374 N.J. Super. 312, 329 (App. Div. 2004).  These foundational principles of access are essential in creating and maintaining a transparent, accountable, corruption-free democracy that serves New Jersey’s citizens.  All of these plaudits of open government and the aspirational interpretations for broad public access to records are completely meaningless if all the government officials have to do to is send their government emails over Yahoo or Google to circumvent disclosure. \(^3\)  OPRA is to be interpreted broadly.  Once the government official made or received a communication about government business it is government record accessible under OPRA regardless of who owns the server or the service that routed it.  II.
[brief] In *Estelle v. Gamble*, 429 U.S. 97, 103-104 (1976), the Supreme Court held that “deliberate indifference to a serious medical need of prisoners constitutes the ‘unnecessary and wonton infliction of pain’ ... proscribed by the Eighth Amendment. ”  To the extent the Plaintiff is a pretrial detainee, the Fourteenth Amendment is implicated instead, but courts apply the Eighth Amendment’s deliberate indifference legal standard when evaluating the medical-care claims of pretrial detainees.
[brief] And while [...] said he was sorry several different ways, neither the defendant’s failure to express remorse nor his explicit rejection of remorse are aggravating factors under the Criminal Code.  Further, contrary to the court’s finding that [...]’s alleged lack of remorse adversely affected his amenability to rehabilitation, there is no legal consensus on whether a defendant who expresses remorse is less likely to reoffend.  See Susan A. Bandes, Remorse and Criminal Justice, (“Remorse”) Emotion Review, Vol. 8, 14-15 (October 23, 2015); State v. Case, 220 N.J. 49, 54 (2014) (sentence may not be based on “unfounded assumptions”).  Moreover, there is no legal consensus on the definition of remorse or on how to identify remorse.\textsuperscript{21}