ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] In other words, judges must avoid acting in … a manner that may be perceived as partial, otherwise the integrity of the judicial process will be cast in doubt.  Id at 142,143 (emphasis in original) (internal citations omitted).  There is a complete lack of impartiality in this case where over 2 months before trial the trial judge was accused by a party of corruption and bias and those allegations were brought by that party to the FBI and the Judge was aware of that.
[directive] A BOLO match with an ALPR scan may be programmed to Immediate alert trigger an immediate alert.  The reason for including the vehicle on the BOLO list shall be disclosed to the officer who will react to an immediate alert.  The officer should determine whether the alert has been designated as a non-encounter alert (meaning officer should not encounter the vehicle) and, if so, follow any instructions included in the alert for notifying the originating agency.  3.4.1  When an officer receives an immediate alert without a non-encounter restriction, the officer shall take such action in response to the alert as is appropriate in the circumstances.  An officer alerted that an observed motor vehicle’s license plate is on the BOLO list may be required to make a reasonable effort to confirm that a wanted person is actually in the vehicle before the officer would have a lawful basis to stop the vehicle.  See State v. Parks, 288 NJ. Super. 407 (App. Div. 1996) (no reasonable suspicion to justify a stop because registered car owner’s license suspended unless driver generally matches the owner’s physical description (e.g., age and gender)).  Accessing stored data data.
[directive] ”  1.  I am being questioned as part of an investigation by this agency into potential violations of department rules and regulations, or for my fitness for duty.  This investigation concerns 2.  I have invoked my rights on the grounds that I might incriminate myself in a Miranda criminal matter.  3.  I have been granted use immunity.  No answer given by me, nor evidence derived from the answer, may be used against me in any criminal proceeding, except for perjury or false swearing.  4.  I understand that I must now answer questions specifically, directly and narrowly related to the performance of my official duties or my fitness for office.  5.  If I refuse to answer, I may be subject to discipline for that refusal which can result in my dismissal from this agency.  6.  Anything I say may be used against me in any subsequent departmental charges.  7.  I have the right to consult with a representative of my collective bargaining unit, or another representative of my choice, and have him or her present during the interview.  Assistant Prosecutor or Deputy Attorney General authorizing: ____________________________________  Signature: __________________________________  Print name:_________________________________  Date: _____________________________________ Location:___________________________________  Witnessed by: __________________________  Print Name: __________________________  Appendix I
[brief] [...] sought insurance coverage for [...]’s Complaint from Defendants in this appeal, [...], [...], and [...].  [...] had issued --- 1  The facts of [...]’s personal injury case are not in dispute in this insurance coverage appeal, and the facts relevant to the coverage action are derived from undisputed documents, namely, the pleadings and insurance policies in issue.  For a concise recitation of the chronology of the case on appeal, this brief combines in a joint narrative its procedural history and statement of facts.  to [...] a standard Workers Compensation and Employers Liability Insurance Policy.  Ja67-82.  The [...] Employers Liability Policy provided primary coverage up to a limit of $1,000,000 per claim.  Ja68.  It also included a mandatory endorsement, which stated:  With respect to Exclusion C5, this insurance does not cover any and all intentional wrongs within the exception allowed by N.J.S.A. 34:15-8 including but not limited to bodily injury caused or aggravated by an intentional wrong committed by you or your employees, or bodily injury resulting from an act or omission by you or your employees, which is substantially certain to result in injury.  [Ja76.]  The [...] policy provided $2,000,000 of excess and umbrella insurance for losses above the limit of the [...] Employers Liability Policy, as well as other underlying insurance policies.  Ja91, 97-99.  The [...] policy followed form to the underlying [...] policy, Ja104, meaning that it adopted the coverage and exclusionary terms of the [...] Employers Liability Policy.  [...] had provided workers compensation benefits to [...] under the part of its policy that applied to such benefits.  Ja16, 436-37.  [...] declined to cover [...] for [...]’s lawsuit alleging intentional conduct of the employer, including on the ground that Exclusion C.5 as amended by an endorsement to the policy excluded from coverage any and all intentional wrongs of the employer or its agents.  Ja435-42.  [...] and [...] also denied coverage to [...] on the ground that their umbrella and comprehensive general liability policies did not provide coverage for injury to employees of [...].  Ja456-59.  In addition, [...] denied coverage under its excess policy on the ground that it incorporated Exclusion C.5 of the [...] Employers Liability Policy and thus did not cover any kind of intentional conduct of the employer, whether subjectively intended to cause injury or substantially certain to cause injury.  Ja469-73.  Having been denied insurance coverage, [...] entered into a settlement agreement with [...] in accordance with Griggs v. Bertram, 88 N.J. 347 (1982).
[brief] In that case, the Court held that it was “ill-advised”, but not forbidden, to seat a juror who was acquainted with the victim’s loved ones because of a “common-sense concern that someone who had met and interacted with the young children of the victim of a heinous sexual assault and murder might be incapable of impartiality. ”  *Id.* at 629-30.  Here, [...] was only informed by her husband that she would know some extended family members of the victim *if she met them*, but she did not even know who they were at the time of trial.  Obviously, there could be no “common-sense concern” of deep empathy for people whose identities were unknown to her.
[brief] Here, plaintiff alleged, in part, that defendants’ actions were ultra vires and that they lacked the authority to grant a non-urban renewal entity long term tax exemption.  Accordingly, plaintiff had a constitutional “as of right” for judicial review of the contested [...] non-urban renewal entity long term tax exemption ordinance and the County’s failure to monitor and to collect all long term tax exemption revenues due the County under post April 17, 1992 State long term tax exemption laws, rules and regulations.  Where there is a wrong, there will be a remedy.
[brief] The mold exclusions in those policies bar claims for “liability, damage, loss, cost or expense” caused “directly or indirectly” by mold, but omit the ACC language contained in the first two policies.  Da277.  Elimination of the ACC clause from the three policies at issue broadened coverage when there are insured events in the chain of causation leading to mold damage.  The Trial Court’s October 17, 2019 ruling ignores the change eliminating the ACC language from the three policies at issue.  Instead, in the Transcript of Court Decision, relying on unpublished decisions and cases from other jurisdictions, [...] ruled as follows:
[brief] Ibid.  Here, although he made known [...]’s desire for an all-or-nothing trial, defense counsel nonetheless argued at length in favor of including a passion/provocation instruction once the trial court made clear it was going to instruct the jury on aggravated and reckless manslaughter and an all-or-nothing approach was no longer on the table.  During that argument, defense counsel pointed to all of the evidence and reasonable inferences that warranted the instruction, alerted the trial court to the governing legal principles, and affirmatively argued for the inclusion of that instruction.  (5T185-14 to 186-10).  Nonetheless, the trial court refused to instruct passion/provocation manslaughter based on its own erroneous application of the law.  As to the trial court’s erroneous decision not to include the passion/provocation charge, it was based almost entirely on the fact that there was no direct testimony of [...] having struck the defendant or threatened him with the gun.  (5T186-11 to 17, 187-22 to 188-5).  But a review of evidence with respect to a potential passion/provocation instruction involves not merely looking at the four corners of the evidence presented, but also any “legitimate inferences to be drawn from those facts. ”  *Mauricio*, 117 N.J. at 414.  Indeed, with respect to those inferences, a trial court should take “all inferences that ‘logic and common sense’ will allow” in favor of the instruction.  *Id.* at 417 (parenthetically quoting *State v. Powell*, 84 N.J. 305, 315 (1980)).  Certainly, as defense counsel correctly noted, it was entirely reasonable to infer that the “tussle” between the three men involved some degree of battery by the two victims against the defendant, and that [...] must have first produced the gun during the fight.  Those inferences, as made clear in *Carrero* and *Mauricio*, are sufficient to meet the low bar for instructing on passion/provocation manslaughter.  In short, there was certainly more than a “scintilla” of evidence, *Crisantos*, 102 N.J. at 278; in support of a passion/provocation instruction sufficient to merit its inclusion at the trial.  Defense counsel made every appropriate argument in favor of the instruction, and the trial court denied the request based on an erroneous application of the law.  Indeed, under the facts, a reasonable jury may well have convicted [...] of passion/provocation manslaughter in lieu of murder.  Because [...] was unlawfully denied the opportunity to have his jury assess that issue, his convictions for murder must be reversed, and the matter remanded for a new trial wherein the jury is appropriately instructed on passion/provocation manslaughter as an alternative to murder.
[brief] The Condominium Association fees are duplicative and [...]’s service has declined since the conversion  The record shows that after the conversion, [...] experienced a loss of services.  5T70:4-7 (stating that when the building was an apartment building, [...] had been able to approach the landlord’s workmen if there was something that needed to be fixed).  [...] further testified that he does not feel he can approach his landlord about repairs.  5T72:1-12 ([...] testifying:  I’ve never felt that I had a comfortable relationship regarding asking services from [...].  I believe I was given the impression that he—when he asked me to leave the first time, I guess, in 1994 or something like—it was shortly after they had purchased the building.  I was approached with what I perceived as hostility, and I just—I never – I rarely felt comfortable asking for any service outside of—although I did feel a bit more comfortable with his workers because I’d see them more often, and they were—and they were, at least apparently, neutral, but no, I generally overall did not feel comfortable asking for services.  When the building was converted to a condominium, it went from a building managed by a single landlord to a building managed by an association, which added an additional layer of management to the unit.  It added the cost of another layer of management, without adding services.  Moreover, when the building converted to a condominium, it changed the relationship of [...] and [...] to the building.  Whereas before the conversion [...] had control over the costs of running a building, with the condominium association, [...] has virtually no power to control costs.  5T125:18-24 ([...] testifying “[w]e have no control over this [condominium association] budget”).  Moreover, adding a second layer of management allowed [...] to push issues onto the condominium association rather than fixing them as it would have undoubtedly had to do as landlord for the building.  This was clearly on display with [...]’s failure to deal with the broken intercom and attempt to push responsibility onto the condominium association.  Condo fees should not have been included at all if management fees were included.  They are duplicative of the management fees [...]’s company, [...], claimed to incur from [...]’s other company, [...].  They added costs because instead of managing an entire building, two different organizations now manage the common areas of the building and the interior of Unit 11.  Moreover, As [...]’s counsel and witnesses explained, “economies of scale make it more expensive to manage a single unit, which means the increased cost to manage just this unit (as opposed to a building of apartments) cannot be passed on to [...] under the TPA.  5T111:16-22 ([...] testifying that the more units that are managed, the less expensive it is per unit and [...]’s counsel explaining this is called economies of scale).  B.
[brief] A.  **Pleadings**  The [...] filed their Amended Complaint in June 2020 against Defendants and [...]. \(^{10}\) (Da155-Da210).  Defendants filed answers in July 2020.  (Da324-Da369; Da264-Da308).  B.  **The [...]’ Motion for Leave to Amend**  In March 2021, the [...]’ moved for leave to amend to file a proposed Second Amended Complaint to (1) add [...] as a defendant, and (2) add new causes of action for malicious prosecution, libel *per se*, and violations of the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act and the New Jersey Civil Rights Act.
[directive] SUBJECT: ATTORNEY GENERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT DIRECTIVE NO. 2001-2  JUVENILE JUSTICE COMMISSION MONITORING OF MUNICIPAL LOCKUPS – JUVENILE ADMISSIONS LOG Introduction  It is the responsibility of the Juvenile Justice Commission (JJC) to monitor law enforcement agencies in New Jersey for compliance with Federal regulations involving the handling of juveniles in custody.  The State must remain in compliance with these regulations in order to maintain its eligibility for Federal grant money which is awarded through the Juvenile Justice Commission to develop delinquency prevention programs in counties and municipalities.  Furthermore, the State must report annually to the Federal Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (hereinafter OJJDP) on its level of compliance with these regulations.  As a result of a recent audit of the Juvenile Justice Commission’s monitoring system by OJJDP representatives, the Juvenile Justice Commission has been directed to enhance its monitoring of local police departments.  Accordingly, this Directive is hereby issued to facilitate cooperation and collaboration between the Juvenile Justice Commission and local law enforcement agencies so as to ensure compliance with Federal regulations and continued eligibility for grant funding.  New Jersey Is An Equal Opportunity Employer  Page 2
[directive] When an individual seizure made by a state law enforcement agency is less (50,000.00) than fifty thousand Dollars, and the related forfeiture action is litigated by a county prosecutor, the seized funds, except those held as physical evidence criminal matter, shall be deposited into the SATA of in a the county prosecutor's handling the forfeiture litigation.  office C.  The DL&PS SADA shall be a series of individual dedicated sub-accounts DCJ. maintained by the Department of the Treasury and administered by the be  Each seizure shall deposited into a DL&PS SADA sub-account where they are individually identified managed as one large group by the but Department of the Treasury.  Because the DLdPS SADA is a dedicated account, the funds shall not revert to the State General Treasury at the end fiscal of a year, but carryover from year year.
[brief] ”  . . .  Thus read, the paragraph would become a blanket admonition against “turning” (“no person shall . . . turn a vehicle to enter a private road or driveway or otherwise turn a vehicle from a direct course”), while “movement” (i.e. lane changing) would be permitted as long as it is done safely.  [842 N.Y.S.2d at 862.]  Courts should “avoid statutory interpretations that ‘lead to absurd or unreasonable results. ’”  State v. Lewis, 185 N.J. 363, 369 (2005) (quoting State v. Gill, 47 N.J. 441, 444 (1966)).  Defendant’s interpretation would also run counter to the statute’s purpose.  The title of N.J.S.A. 39:4-126 itself—“Signaling before starting, turning or stopping”—promotes signaling as the law’s fundamental objective.  Addotta v. Blunt, 114 N.J.L. 85, 88 (1934) (“Any ambiguity as to the meaning of the enacting clauses may be resolved by resorting to the title.
[directive] The following disciplinary action has been taken against you:  Suspension for __________ working days, beginning ______________ and ending ___________________  Indefinite suspension pending criminal charges effective (date)  ____________________________________  Removal, effective (date)  _________________________________________________________________  Demotion to position of __________________________ effective (date)  ____________________________  Resignation not in good standing, effective (date)  ________________  Other Disciplinary Action__________
[brief] At all relevant times, Defendant [...] was a partner at [...] in the commercial real estate, land use and zoning practice group.  480a(24:1-20).  Defendant [...] was Vice President of Land Acquisition for the Delaware Valley region encompassing parts of New Jersey and Pennsylvania for [...], one of the nation’s largest real estate developers.  330a(13:19-22).  Plaintiff [...] had experience building two family homes and rehabilitating residential properties, and was always interested in real estate opportunities.  272a (Interrogatory #65); 988a (40:2-14); 407a (90:4-9).  [...] was Plaintiff Schwartz’s business partner and was like a father to Plaintiff Schwartz.  407a (90:4-9).  Mr. Surace was a very wealthy real estate developer and manager of rental units who had built properties throughout New York City for over fifty-five years.  402a (85:11-16); 407a (90:23-91:3).  Mr. Surace built in excess of 4,500 homes during his career as a real estate developer.  402a (85:11-16); 407a (90:21-91:3).  Mr. Surace was also interested in developing real estate opportunities in South Jersey.  332a (15:16-22).  In 2006, Defendants Menas and Ford proposed a real estate opportunity to Messrs. Schwartz and Surace.  987a (34:22-36:16).  The deal involved developing 100 rental units and 20,000 square feet of commercial real estate on the “Duncan Farms” property in Monroe.  986a (32:17-33:13); 324a (7:4-17).  Duncan Farms was then owned by an entity called [...] (“[...]”).  781a.  Defendant Menas had known Mr. Surace his entire life because Mr. Surace was a friend of Defendant Menas’s father since the 1950’s or 1960’s.  495a (80:2-14).  Defendant Menas and his father, [...], introduced Mr. Surace and Plaintiff Schwartz to Defendant Ford of [...].  495a (80:17-22).  At a May 2006 meeting attended by Plaintiff Schwartz, Mr. Surace, and Defendant Ford, Defendant Ford, on behalf of [...], made the following offer: if Plaintiff Schwartz and Mr. Surace purchased Duncan Farms, obtained the necessary approvals to build 100 market rate townhomes and improved the property, [...] would then purchase the development for more than $5.5 million and allow Plaintiff Schwartz and Mr. Surace to retain ownership of the 20,000 square feet of commercial space.
[brief] 16  POINT I THE DEPARTMENT’S DECISION TO ISSUE THE PERMIT TO 290 OCEAN WAS NOT ARBITRARY, CAPRICIOUS, OR UNREASONABLE BECAUSE THE SCENIC RESOURCES AND DESIGN RULE DOES NOT APPLY TO THE PROJECT PURSUANT TO THE LONG BRANCH RULE ..................................................................................  16  A.  Standard Of Review .................................................................................................  16  B.  The Department Properly Interpreted The SRD Rule In The Context Of The CZM Rules In Their Entirety .................................................................  18  1.  Legislative And Regulatory History Of CAFRA And The CZM Rules .................................................................................................................. 20  2.  The Scenic Resources And Design Rule ............................................................  23  3.  The Long Branch Rule And The Redevelopment Ordinances ...  25  C.  The SRD Rule Does Not Apply To The Project Pursuant To The Long Branch Rule ..............................................................................................................  28  D.  Even Absent The Long Branch Rule, The Project Complies With All Applicable Provisions Of The SRD Rule .................................................................  31  1.  The Project Is Visually Compatible With Its Surroundings.......  31  2.  Subsection D Of The SRD Rule Does Not Apply To The Project Because The [...] Property Is Not “Adjacent To” The Boardwalk .................................................................................................................. 32 POINT II THE DEPARTMENT DID NOT UNLAWFULLY “WAIVE” THE SCENIC RESOURCES AND DESIGN RULE UNDER DRAGON BECAUSE THE RULE DOES NOT APPLY TO THE PROJECT IN THE FIRST INSTANCE ............................................................................................................. 33 POINT III THE DEPARTMENT’S DECISION TO ISSUE THE PERMIT TO 290 OCEAN FOR THE PROJECT DOES NOT RESULT IN DUE PROCESS OR EQUAL PROTECTION VIOLATIONS ........................................... 36 A. No Due Process Violations Occurred .................................................. 37 B. No Equal Protection Violation Occurred .............................................. 39 CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................. 41 TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS, AND RULINGS BEING APPEALED CAFRA Individual Permit-Residential Development-not SFH/Duplex Issued By New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection to [...] LLC; dated June 30, 2023 ................................................................. Aa54-60 Letter from New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection to [...], Re: “Third-party adjudicatory hearing request”; dated August 28, 2023 .............................................................................
[brief] ”  While the Appellate panel noted that “its holding was directed solely to the language of Rule 1:4-8(d)(2) and did not deal with the award of fees otherwise authorized by contract, rule, or statute,” such distinction would not make a difference in this matter as Respondent has defended both basis of relief for attorney’s fees as set forth by Appellant.  See, Alpert, Goldberg, Butler, Norton & Weiss, P.C. v. Quinn, 410 N.J. Super. at 546.  While [...] considered the allegations brought against Respondent and Respondent’s Counsel by Appellant, [...] ultimately held that “this Court does not find that the actions carried out by Respondent or Respondent’s Counsel have engaged in activity which would constitute ‘defrauding’ of any Court or warrant such impositions of Sanctions.  Rather, the Court finds that Respondent and Respondent’s Counsel pursued the matter to its fullest ability, and while the result may not have been decided in their favor, no actions carried out should subject them to such penalties.