ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] (3T31:2-7).  [...]  Plaintiff appears to suggest that [...]’s retaliatory actions were in permitting disciplinary action to continue against [...] after he announced his retirement and potentially affecting his State pension.  (Pb39).  It is undisputed that [...] was never disciplined regarding the allegation of being under the desk and that his pension was never affected.  There is no evidence that [...] ever tried to affect his pension.  (Pa311).  In fact, the undisputed record is that [...] had no control over the potential actions of the New Jersey Division of Pensions, even if [...] had been disciplined.  (Pa732).  [...]’s retirement was approved by the Division of Pensions weeks before he retired.  (Pa734).  Any suggestion that [...] made any effort, or had any authority, to affect plaintiff’s pension is refuted by the record.  Plaintiff cannot make a prima facie case that he suffered an adverse employment action as a result of any actions by [...].  The trial court noted that [...] was never disciplined over the alleged incident and that claims about it must be dismissed.
[brief] Here, in setting the fee award, the judge stated only that plaintiff’s counsel was not entitled to fees for research, given his experience\(^9\) and that the award of “reasonable fees” was “based on the results obtained. ” (Pa21).  Under *Rendine*, an attorney’s skill and experience is evaluated as a support for a requested fee award (including approval of counsel’s hourly rates) rather than a challenge to its reasonableness.  See *Rendine*, 141 N.J. at 323-24, 335-36.  Also, in terms of the results obtained relative to the relief sought, plaintiff’s counsel achieved an outstanding result for the plaintiff.
[brief] LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I THIS COURT’S REVIEW OF THE TRIAL COURT’S DISMISSAL OF THIS ACTION WITH PREJUDICE AT THE RETURN DATE OF THE ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE IS PLENARY.  (Not raised below).  The trial court’s decision to dismiss this action with prejudice on the return date of the order to show cause is subject to the de novo, or plenary, standard of review applied to rulings of law.  An appellate court’s review of rulings of law and issues regarding the applicability, validity, or interpretation of laws, statutes, or rules is de novo.  See, e.g., State v. Dickerson, 232 N.J. 2, 17 (2018) (interpretation of court rules); State v. G.E.P., 243 N.J. 362, 382 (2020) (retroactivity of statute); State v. Hemenway, 239 N.J. 111, 125 (2019) (constitutionality of a statute); Kocanowski v. Twp. of Bridgewater, 237 N.J. 3, 9 (2019) (statutory interpretation); State v. Fuqua, 234 N.J. 583, 591 (2018) (statutory interpretation); Save Camden Pub. Schs. v. Camden City Bd. of Educ., 454 N.J. Super. 478, 487 (App. Div. 2018) (determining whether a cause of action is barred by a statute of limitations).  Our Supreme Court, in Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Twp. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366 (1995), held that “[a] trial court’s interpretation of the law and the legal consequences that flow from established facts are not entitled to any special deference. ”  Id. at 378.  This Court exercises plenary review over the application of the law to the facts.  Id.: see also [...], Current N.J. Court Rules, cmt. 3.1 on R. 2:10-2 (2023) (“Thus[,] the appellate court is not bound by the trial court’s application of law to the facts or its evaluation of the legal implications of facts where credibility is not in issue. ”).  This is the “plenary” or “de novo” standard of review.  The issue before the Court is whether the trial court erred in refusing to require an accounting, i.e., whether a court-appointed trustee and administrator of a (formerly) revocable trust and the decedent’s estate is statutorily obligated to provide an accounting of the estate and trust upon a beneficiary’s request after more than two years have passed since the appointment of the trustee and administrator.  Applying the applicable standards here makes clear that the Order dismissing the Verified Complaint should be reversed.  POINT II
[brief] In *Hernandez*, the defendant was charged with possession and possession with intent to distribute CDS.  *Id.* at 113.  The State introduced testimony that defendant had sold drugs in the same manner twenty times during the two months prior to arrest for the instant offense.  *Id.* at 129.  The Court held first that “[t]hat extremely prejudicial testimony smacks of prohibited ‘propensity’ evidence,” a concern equally present in this case due to the similar nature of the prior offenses.  *Ibid.*  Finally, the failure to issue any instruction to the jurors about how to use this evidence compounds the harm of admitting the evidence.  Our Supreme Court has held that a clear, explicit instruction on the appropriate use of other-bad-act evidence is necessary in every case.  *State v. Oliver*, 133 N.J. 141, 158 (1993).  In *Hernandez*, an instruction was given, but found to be inadequate, resulting in the reversal of defendant’s convictions.  The Court explained that because of the striking similarity between the offenses, “even if one could hypothesize some weighty probative value to attribute to that troubling testimony that would outweigh its undue prejudicial affect, it is difficult, if not impossible, to divine the limiting instruction that could offset its ‘propensity’ impact. ”  Hernandez, 170 N.J. at 130.  In this case, an instruction was not even attempted.  Because of the introduction of this testimony, the jury was more likely to find [...] killed her wife because she’s a violent person who hurts women and the jury was never told that this was an inappropriate line of thinking.  Thus, because “[a]ppropriate and proper charges to a jury are essential for a fair trial,” the failure to properly instruct the jury on the appropriate use of the other-act evidence (that should have never been admitted in the first place) necessitates reversal of [...]’s convictions.  State v. Green, 86 N.J. 281, 287 (1981).  POINT IV
[brief] **Defendant’s Guilty Pleas**  One day short of ten months after the trial judge denied defendant’s suppression motion, he entered his two guilty pleas.  (2T).  In relevant part, defendant admitted that on July 5, 2020, he had possessed a handgun, having already been convicted of a felony, specifically unlawful possession of a weapon, and he admitted that the handgun he possessed on July 5, and which had wounded him, was operable.  (2T14-19 to 15-20).  **LEGAL ARGUMENT**
[brief] [...]’s counterclaims below were adequately pled and should have been sustained.  For the reasons set forth above, and those further articulated below, there are many disputed issues of material fact regarding the Declaratory Action, and thus, it was error to grant summary judgment in [...]’s favor and dismiss [...]’s counterclaims.  Moreover, the trial court’s statement of reasons on the record is devoid of any analysis as to [...]’s counterclaims.  A.
[brief] Respectfully submitted, [...]  Attorneys for Defendants-Respondents, Christopher and [...]  By: /s/[...]  [...], Esq.  Partner /s/ Eric Gonzalez  [...], Esq.  Associate  Dated: January 6, 2025  February 10, 2025  [...], Esq.  Attorney ID#016231989  On the Brief  Email: [...]  Superior Court of New Jersey  Appellate Division  Docket No.: [...]  Appellate Division Clerk’s Office  Richard J. Hughes Justice Complex 25 Market Street P.O. Box 006 Trenton, New Jersey 08625-0970  Re: [...], (Plaintiff-Appellant) v. CHRISTOPHER ANNESE and/or JOHN DOES 1-5, MAUREEN N. ANNESE and/or JANE DOES 1-5, [...], ABC CORP.  1-5 (fictitious names), XYZ CORP.  1-5 (fictitious names)  [...] (fictitious name)  [...]  1-5 (fictitious name), (Defendants-Respondents).  Civil Action: On Appeal  From the Final Order of the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Morris County County: Morris Docket No.: [...]
[brief] [11T107-3 to -12].  Defendant responded, “No, let me do it. ”  [11T107-13 to -15].  When [...] returned to her home, [...] and defendant left in [...]’s car and [...] left in [...]’s car.  [11T108-23 to 110-11].  Defendant told [...] that he was going to [...]’s grandmother’s home and would be back in the morning.
[brief] The record demonstrates that the postcard was mailed on August 9, 2021. (Pa68-70).  That slight delay in mailing the postcard is immaterial, as postcard notification was not required under the Ricci Act, and information about the Ricci Act was prominently posted on the Division’s website and publicly available for two years from the effective date of the statute.  Even if this court were to find that postcards were a required mode of notice under the Ricci Act, the Board substantially complied by mailing them within thirty-two (instead of thirty) days of the effective date of the statute.  To suggest that such a minor delay in sending over 200,000 postcards somehow eliminates the statutory deadline for filing claims would be an absurd result, and one this court should not accept.  See Regis, 208 N.J. at 449 (“[w]hen construing a statute, ‘legislative language must not, if reasonably avoidable, be found to be inoperative, superfluous or meaningless. ’”) (citation omitted).  [...] further urges this court to permit him to file his untimely Form because he claims he did not actually receive the notice.  (Pb12-13).  But even if actual notice by postcard were an express requirement of the Ricci Act, his argument is misplaced.  New Jersey courts have consistently “recognized a presumption that mail properly addressed, stamped, and posted was received by the party to whom it was addressed. ”  SSI Medical Servs. v. HHS, Div. of Medical Assistance & Health Servs., 146 N.J. 614, 621 (1996).  Here, the postcard was undisputedly mailed to [...]’s home address.  (Pa14).  The Division went so far as to hire a company, [...], to mail postcards to all 200,647 SPRS retirees at their home addresses on file with the Division.  (Pa68).  And a postcard was indeed mailed to [...]’s last home address on August 9, 2019.  (Pa13; Pa70).  Nonetheless, [...] asserts, without offering any legal authority, that his affidavit declaring that he never received a postcard should overcome the presumption that he received it.
[brief] ”  *Design*, Merriam-Webster Dictionary, 2022, merriam-webster.com/dictionary/design. (Pa189).  Merriam-Webster Definition of “Allow” as intransitive verb:  1) to make a possibility: ADMIT used with of: evidence that allows of only one conclusion; 2) to give consideration to circumstances or contingencies; a plan that allows for expansion; 3) to give an opportunity; she worked on the project here and there as time allowed.  Merriam-Webster Dictionary, 2022, merriam-webster.com/dictionary/allow. (Pa190-191).
[brief] .........................Da97 A. 11 (introduced May 11, 2000)  .........................................................Da98-103  Defendant’s Sentencing Court Brief Arguing Overall Fairness (July 14, 2022)1  ................................................................................Da104-120  1  Trial court brief included because “the brief is referred to in the decision of the court” and to show that social science regarding deterrence and incapacitation, which are “germane to the appeal,” were “raised in the trial court.
[brief] First, it is undisputed that the definitional exclusion that [...] invokes is not included in its own policy but in the underlying [...] policy and that [...] attempts to invoke “follow form” language to adopt the exclusion into its own coverage.  The [...] definitional exclusion that [...] relies upon states that a vehicle “[o]wned by or furnished or available for the regular use of you or any family member” cannot be an underinsured vehicle.  (Pa60).  Significantly, plaintiffs had no reason to expect that this definitional exclusion was of practical import to their UIM coverage because it is superfluous as it relates to the availability of UIM coverage through the policy in which it was contained, namely the [...] policy.
[directive] This warning informs the officer being interviewed that he or she must cooperate with the investigation and can be disciplined for failing to do so because the County Prosecutor has decided to provide the officer with "use immunity."  8.0.10  It is for this reason that the internal affairs investigator must continually reassess the nature of an internal affairs investigation as evidence is being gathered.  Having initially determined that a particular allegation is criminal or administrative in nature, it is important for the internal affairs investigator to revisit that decision during the course of an investigation to determine whether any of the evidence gathered following the initial Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967) (coerced statements obtained by threat of removal from office cannot be 6 used in criminal proceedings); see Appendix J. INTERNAL AFFAIRS POLICY & PROCEDURES | November 2022 46 determination changes the investigation’s nature and scope.  If the nature and scope of an investigation change, the investigator must be prepared to change the methods and procedures he or she utilizes to reflect the new focus.  For example, if an investigator initially determines that an allegation appears to be a disciplinary matter but later evidence leads the investigator to conclude that criminal conduct may have occurred, he or she must cease using the methods and procedures appropriate for an administrative investigation and notify the County Prosecutor immediately before proceeding further.
[brief] Here, as in *Hedgespeth*, the trial court found that [...]’s two third-degree prior convictions – both of which were more than ten years old at the time of the trial – were admissible in sanitized form and “could be utilized should [...] elect to take the stand. ” (6T:132-11 to 13).  The court erroneously ruled that the twelve-year-old conviction from 2011 was admissible because the probationary sentence ended within ten years of the incident.  (6T:131-15 to 132-4)  As in *Hedgespeth*, [...]’s 2011 conviction was inadmissible because discharge from probation does not constitute “release from confinement” under Rule 609(b)(1).
[directive] Attorney General Law Enforcement Directive No. 2004-1  Page 2  enforcement.1 and/or modification of various forms utilized in DWI  The amendment to N.J.S.A. 39:4-50 was effective immediately upon its adoption, noon, Tuesday, January 20, 2004.  Laws 2003, chapter 314, §4.  Following a review of the amendatory language of Laws 2003, chapter 314, it has been determined that a revision of the Potential Liability Warning - N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.22  Form used for the release of a DWI Arrestee is required.  Correspondingly, Attorney General Law Enforcement Directive No. 2001-5 and the Appendices A & B to that Law Enforcement Directive are being replaced with Attorney General Law Enforcement Directive No. 2004-1.  THEREFORE, I, [...], Attorney General of the State of New Jersey, by virtue of the authority vested in me by the Constitution of the State of New Jersey and the Criminal Justice Act of 1970, N.J.S.A. 52:17B-97 et seq., and pursuant to the provisions of P.L. 2001, c. 69, §1, hereby DIRECT that Attorney General Law Enforcement Directive No. 2001-5 and the Appendices A & B to that Law Enforcement Directive, are replaced as follows:
[brief] TABLE OF CONTENTS | Section | Page | |------------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | APPENDIX  TABLE OF CONTENTS | ii | | TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | iii | | PRELIMINARY STATEMENT | 1 | | PROCEDURAL HISTORY | 2 | | STATEMENT OF FACTS | 2 | | LEGAL ARGUMENT | 4 | | STANDARD OF REVIEW | 4 | | I.  SUMMARY  JUDGMENT SHOULD BE AFFIRMED AS THERE IS NO EVIDENCE OF NEGLIGENCE ON THE PART OF THE DEFENDANTS  | 5 | | A. PLAINTIFF ADMITS THAT SHE WAS IN VIOLATION OF N.J.S.A. 39:4-124 | 7 | | B. DEFENDANT DID NOT HAVE A DUTY TO ANTICIPATE PLAINTIFF’S WILLFUL VIOLATION OF N.J.S.A. 39:4-124 | 8 | | C. PLAINTIFF FAILED TO PROPERLY ARGUE THAT THE DEFENDANT VIOLATED N.J.S.A. 39:4-123 AT THE TRIAL LEVEL | 10 | | D. PLAINTIFF HAS NOT OFFERED ANY EVIDENCE THAT THE DEFENDANT FAILED TO COMPLY WITH THE POSTED SPEED LIMIT | 12 | | CONCLUSION | 13 |
[brief] 1  PROCEDURAL HISTORY ....................................................................................  3 FACTS ..................................................................................................................  5  LEGAL ARGUMENT ..............................................................................................  23  I.  PLAINTIFF’S’ PLEDGE OF A PORTION OF HIS LAWSUITS  PROCEEDS WERE NOT AN IMPERMISSIBLE ASSIGNMENT OF A CHOSE IN ACTION (APPEALING ORDER DATED FEBRUARY 23, 2023, FOUND AT Pa0354)  ......................................................................................... 23  II.  IT WAS ERROR TO PERMIT THE DEFENDANTS TO INTRODUCE  EVIDENCE OF COLLATERAL SETTLED LITIGATION AND THE SUBSEQUENT PURCHASE OF A HOME BY [...] AS THE ARGUABLY MINUSCULE PROBATIVE VALUE OF SUCH EVIDENCE WAS GREATLY AWAID BY ITS PREJUDICIALLY EFFECT  THE DISTRACTION FROM THE ISSUES OF THE CASE AND WAS AN ABUSE IN DISCRETION BY THE TRIAL COURT (APPEALING THE ORDER DATED JUNE 27, 2023  FOUND AT Pa0355)  ........................................................................................................  33  CONCLUSION .......................................................................................................
[brief] Plaintiff-Respondent-Cross-Appellant, [...] (“Respondent” or “Landlord”), respectfully submits this memorandum of law in further support of its cross-appeal (the “Cross Appeal”) seeking reversal of paragraph 2 of the lower court’s November 9, 2023 Order (the “Reconsideration Order”), pursuant to which The Honorable [...], J.S.C. failed to grant Landlord the full attorney fee award it is undoubtedly entitled to under the express terms of the written Lease Agreement (the “Lease”) at issue in the underlying summary disposition proceeding (the “Underlying Action”).
[brief] Ibid.  [...] appealed the Board’s denial and the matter was transferred to the Office of Administrative Law, then subsequently returned to the Board for further administrative review. under N.J.S.A. 43A:15A-7.2(b), which required application of the IRS twenty-factor test.  (Ra20-22).  On July 3, 2019, [...], successor to [...] as acting director of the [...], reissued a determination applying the twenty-factor balancing test from IRS Revenue Ruling 87-41 (“twenty-factor test”) to determine that [...] served [...] as an independent contractor, not an employee.
[directive] 8.4.3  Prior to the start of any questioning, the officer shall be advised that he or she is being questioned as the subject of an investigation into potential violations of agency rules and N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.6(c).  8  INTERNAL AFFAIRS POLICY & PROCEDURES | November 2022 50 regulations, or fitness for duty.  He or she should be advised of the subject matter under investigation, and that he or she will be asked questions specifically related to performing their official duties.
[directive] The Domestic Violence Central Registry is a computerized inquiry system that allows law enforcement to access information about pending domestic violence cases without having to request this information from the Family Court DV units that operate only during the court’s regular business hours.  The Central Registry permits direct access at any time, and displays information about cases in which a restraining order previously was requested/ issued and cases in which a previous violation of a restraining order has been alleged.  The utility of this electronic inquiry system depends on the extent to which the database is complete.  Accordingly all law enforcement agencies are strongly encouraged to utilize the Judiciary’s eTRO system when seeking a domestic violence restraining order, and the Domestic Violence Procedures Manual will be reviewed and may be amended to require the use of the eTRO system.
[brief] The ending balance in [...]’s accounts in September of 2017 was $10,380.55 (1T:173:17-19; 174:22-24; 176:2-6; Pa168; Pa170; Pa176).  The ending balance in [...]’s accounts in October of 2017 was $151.13 (1T:180:19-23; 181:21-24;183:1-4; Pa182; Pa186; Pa193).  The ending balance in [...]’s accounts in November of 2017 was negative -$60,904.49 (1T:173:17-19; 174:22-24; 176:2-6; 2T:17:15-17; Pa202; Pa207; Pa212).  The ending balance in [...]’s accounts in December of 2017 was $206.54 (1T:24:2-6; 25:25-26:1; Pa222; Pa226; Pa233).  The ending balance in [...]’s accounts in January of 2018 was negative -$234.88 (2T:29:21-22; 31:6-8; 32:1-3; Pa240; Pa243; Pa246).  Appellant did not disclose the actual account balance to Respondents, or specifically, to the [...] Finance Committee.
[brief] [...] was never required to present an offer to [...].  Instead, under the MFSA, [...] must present any third-party offers to [...], and [...] then has the right to meet that offer or waive its right to meet that offer.  The ROFR stated:  If, at any time during the term of this Agreement Purchaser shall receive a bona fide offer from a third party (the "Offer") to purchase or otherwise acquire the Premises, Purchaser shall, before accepting said Offer, promptly send a copy of the Offer to Seller which shall have the preemptive right to purchase or otherwise acquire the Premises on the same terms and conditions as set forth in the Offer.  If Seller elects to exercise its preemptive right under this Section 36(a)(1), it shall do so by providing written notice to Purchaser within thirty (30) days following receipt of the Offer and the closing shall take place within ninety (90) days thereafter (or at such later date as provided in the Offer).  If Seller does not exercise its preemptive right within the foregoing thirty (30) day period, Purchaser shall have the right to sell to the third party from whom it received the Offer (and no other party, without again first giving Seller its preemptive right as provided in this Section 36(a)(1), on the same terms and conditions as set forth in the Offer (but not on different terms or conditions, without first giving Seller its preemptive right as provided in this Section 36(a)(1)).  Da038.  By the plain language of the contract terms, [...] was required to send a copy of any bona fide offer to [...], an action which would commence the 30-day period for [...] to exercise its right to purchase the Premises on those same terms and conditions.  [...] was not required to “outbid” any offer [...] received.
[brief] Dated: December 19, 2022  MILL  ROAD SOLAR PROJECT LLC, [...], Appellants, v. [...], Respondent.  On Appeal  From Orders of the Law Division, Bergen County, Hon. [...], J.S.C., [...]  APPELLANTS’ REPLY  [...], Esq. (#053881991)  [...]  [...]  [...]  Tel [...]  Email [...]  Attorneys for Appellants-Plaintiffs
[brief] In maintaining that defendant would have to have been convicted of the weapons offenses to also be an aider and abettor of the homicide (Db23), defendant conflates accomplice liability with possession.  An individual is an accomplice of another if “[w]ith the purpose of promoting or facilitating the commission of the offense[,] he . . . [s]olicits such other person to commit it, [or] [a]ids or agrees or attempts to aid such other person in planning or committing it. ”  N.J.S.A. 2C:2-6(c).  For accomplice liability to attach, the jury “must find that [the defendant] ‘shared in the intent which is the crime’s basic element, and at least indirectly participated in the commission of the criminal act. ’”  State v. Bielkiewicz, 267 N.J. Super.  520, 528 (App. Div. 1993) (citation omitted).  However, “[a]n accomplice is only guilty of the same crime committed by the principal if he shares the same criminal state of mind as the principal. ”  *State v. Whitaker*, 200 N.J. 444, 458 (2009).