ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] However, the tenants plainly had a duty to remove snow and ice:  Q.  Can you go to P-25, while you are pulling it up.  Did the tenants that were there have their own salt and shovels to clear the outside part of their businesses, to your knowledge?  A. Yes.  [Pa1005 at 241:4 – 9].  During Landlord Defendant’s deposition, the Landlord’s representative testified further that tenants were expected to remove snow from the sidewalks adjacent to the premises:  Q.  Did you expect your tenants to remove snow from the sidewalks?  A.  Always I told them take care of the sidewalk if they see.  And if they need extra salt, to put it on.  And they do.  That’s what they told me.  Q. [...], you testified yesterday that you would expect your tenants to tell you or call you if the parking lot or some area in the common areas required additional snow removal services.  Correct?  A. Yes.  [Pa1006 at 285:16 – 21].  Defendants’ Liability Expert, [...], issued a report wherein he opined:  ...Based on testimony, all tenants of the property agreed that the property was in a satisfactory condition after the winter storm of March 14, 2017...  The writer reviewed no evidence that [...] was ever notified by any of their tenants that the side… of the building was required to be cleared of snow and ice prior to the time of [...]’s accident…  [Pa1033 (Cronin Report, first and second bullet points)].  Furthermore, Mr. Cronin testified that no Tenant Defendants contacted Landlord Defendant about clearing the area where Plaintiff fell, and that he considered the whole of the strip mall as the “premises. ”  [Pa1038-1039 at 48:24 – 50:12].  Mr. Cronin testified that X marking the area where [...] slipped and fell was adjacent to the building premises.  [Pa1038-1039.at 49:2 – 50:12].  ARGUMENT Introduction
[brief] On cross-appeal, Defendants wrongly contend that Plaintiff was required to seek a stay of the Final Judgment before appealing therefrom, and based on this erroneous legal argument, Defendants ask that this Court “confirm the finality of [...]’s Order terminating the PSA,” and “confirm termination of the PSA and foreclose any further contractual remedy by Plaintiff. ” (Db42-45.)  Tellingly, Defendants fail to identify any legal authority that would require Plaintiff to seek a stay of the Final Judgment before commencing this appeal.  Instead, Defendants offer a strained interpretation of Rule 2:9-5 that is inconsistent with the Rule’s express language, and otherwise rely on unsupported and incorrect statements of law and wrongly introduce purported “facts” that are not part of the record.
[brief] The long-term care insurance policies here [...]’s policies at issue are “guaranteed renewable,” meaning an insurer cannot cancel the policy or change its benefits if the policyholder continues to pay the premium.  To offset the risks guaranteed renewable policies create for insurers, New Jersey’s long-term care insurance regulations expressly allow insurers to change premiums.  N.J.A.C. 11:4-34.4(a)(2) (“The term ‘guaranteed renewable’ may be used only when the insured has the right to continue the long-term care insurance in force by the timely payment of premiums and when the carrier has no unilateral right to make any change in any provision of the policy while the insurance is in force, and cannot decline to renew, except that rates may be revised by the carrier on a class basis. ”) (emphasis added)).  At issue on this appeal are [...]’s Choice 2 and Choice 2.1 guaranteed renewable policies issued in New Jersey between 2005 and 2012.  Pa170; Pa174.  The policies are the same regardless of the date of issuance, but implicate different regulations based on those dates.  See Pa59.  Those issued before January 18, 2006, are referred to as “loss ratio” policies and governed by N.J.A.C. 11:4-34.17 & 11:4-18.5. \(^3\)  The policies issued after that date are referred to as “rate stability” policies and governed by N.J.A.C. 11:4-34.18. \(^4\)  **C.
[directive] Similarly, incases Guidelines.  escalating strict a enforce to Guidelines General Attorney by required are prosecutors all old, 13 years N.J.S.A. to pursuant 25-year sentence the stipulated reduces that offer tender plea a they if policy plea Lansford the Jessica Implement to Guidelines Negotiation Uniform Plea 4, Section See 2C:14-2(d).  2014).  29, P.L. c. (May 7 2014, Act, Super. 182 169, N.J. 392 Thomas, v. State  In courts.  the by been accepted approach has  This defendant's the Division rejected Appellate the (2007), N.J. 192 597 denied, certif.
[brief] ”  Pierce, 188 N.J. at 169.  Therefore, the range the trial court should have considered was three to ten years.  The failure to consider the appropriate sentencing range alone necessitates a remand.  Moreover, [...]’s prior convictions do not merit an extended term.  To be eligible for an extended term, two indictable convictions are necessary, and the date of the most recent incident must be within 10 years of the date of the crime for which the defendant is being sentenced.
[brief] ”  Gonzalez, 207 N.J. at 577-78 (emphasis added).  This is a broad holding.  Thus, the trial court’s reliance on Chulsky was in error as Gonzalez is controlling here—Defendants’ fraudulent, unlicensed debt collection activities, including suing on a void and unenforceable debt, constitute unconscionable and abusive commercial practices as well as deceptive misrepresentations committed during the subsequent performance of the sale of credit.
[brief] [...] began calling his son’s name to try to rouse him and asked him what happened.  [...] testified that his son responded, and his last words were “[t]hat [...] shot him. ”  (6T 68-2 to 4; to 24,).  [...] did not know who “[...]” was at that time.  (6T 41-21 to 24).  It was undisputed at trial that “[...]” was defendant’s nickname.  [...] did not report the dying declaration to police officers who responded to the scene.  (6T 43-20 to 25).  While [...] testified he did not think that the officers did not speak to him at the scene, a clip from a responding officer’s body-worn camera was played at trial during which the officer asked [...] what happened, and he said he did not know.  (9T 37-20 to 38-16, 54-17 to 55-3, 71-1 to 14).  An ambulance arrived, and [...] accompanied his son to the hospital.  (6T44 7-14).  Sometime later, after defendant’s death, [...], [...], and defendant’s mother went to the prosecutor’s office to speak with officers.  (6T 47-10 to 13, 47-6 to 48-5).  [...] testified that at this meeting, he “was asked did I know anything or was anything said to me and I told what was told to me,” (6T 47-23 to 25), and agreed with the State that “[...]’s name was out there” after this meeting.  (6T 48-3 to 5).
[brief] N.J.S.A. 43:15A-7(e).  However, if a PERS member retires during or after the two-year period, they become a PERS retirant, rather than active PERS member, immediately after their retirement benefits become due and payable.  Specifically, a PERS retirant is defined as a “former member” receiving a pension or retirement allowance from PERS rather than an active member.
[brief] [...] then argued that there was no probable cause to arrest defendant for DWI.  In denying this motion, the judge noted defendant’s glassy eyes, the odor of alcohol and his admission that he had consumed alcohol earlier that evening.  Instead of proceeding with testimony relating as to the refusal, the municipal prosecutor rested after moving the Standard Statement into evidence.  Apparently, the prosecutor was relying on that document and the video to prove defendant’s guilt on the refusal charge.
[brief] The Malanga Court also never even entertained, much less decided, whether material outside a Governing Body record could be considered in a challenge to a redevelopment plan.  253 N.J. 291.  Appellants seek to extrapolate from a reference in a footnote in Malanga that the Supreme Court sua sponte supplemented the record.  That footnote cited a website listing the daily hours of the library (being considered as an area in need of redevelopment), which totaled 3,120 hours annually.  Id. at 320, n.11.  However, the Township’s consultant in that case had issued a report that specifically identified those 3,120 hours.  Id. at 301-2.  Thus, that information was already in the record, and Appellants present nothing to support their speculation that the Supreme Court was supplementing the record with additional matters outside the Governing Body’s record.  Fieramosca is also completely irrelevant here.
[brief] 29  ## TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | Cases | Page | |--------------------------------------------|------| | Carrino v. Novotny, | 27 | | 78 N.J. 355 (1979) | | | State v. Clawans, | 21 | | 38 N.J. 162 (1962) | | | State v. Afanador, | 26 | | 134 N.J. 162 (1993) | | | State v. Carter, | 21, 26| | 91 N. J. 86 (1982) | | | State v. Catlow, | 16 | | 206 N.J. Super. 186 (App. Div. 1985) | | | certif. denied, 103 N.J. 465 | | | A.2d 648 (1986) | | | State v. Chew, | 17 | | 150 N.J. 30 (1997) | | | State v. Cook, | 26 | | 330 N.J. Super. 395 (App. Div.), | | | certif. denied, 165 N.J. 486 | | | (2000) | | | State v. Dabas, | 21 | | 215 N.J. 114 (2013) | | | State v. DiFrisco, | 17 | | 137 N.J. 434 (1994) | | | State v.
[brief] 2.  Berkeley Township, November 18, 2017.  At approximately 2:19 a.m., on November 18, 2017, [...] of Berkeley Township pulled over defendant’s Dodge Durango.  (14T34-16 to 22; 14T35-19 to 23; 14T36-24 to 37-3; S-48).  [...]’s body-worn camera recorded a portion of that encounter, which was shown to the jury.  (14T38-21 to 40-19; S-48).  As in the Lakehurst stop, the encounter was very short.  [...] asked for the driver’s license and registration, but did not recall seeing one, or being handed anything.  (14T40-21 to 41-4; S-48).  [...] explained that when he stopped a law enforcement officer, he would allow them to proceed when shown a badge or official identification.  (14T44-20 to 45-2).  On the other hand, a driver producing a mere business card would not satisfy [...] that the driver worked in law enforcement.  (14T45-3 to 6).  [...] said the brevity of the video was not consistent with his encounters with civilian drivers.  (14T46-14 to 16; S-48).  While he might typically hold a civilian for about three minutes, this encounter was complete in “about 14 seconds. ” (14T47-4 to 12; 14T48-11 to 21; S-48).  Based on the video, [...] believed he was presented with “some form of I.D. or badge that showed that he was law enforcement. ” (14T50-12 to 16; S-48).  He confirmed he did not issue any summonses to the driver, whose gender he could not recall, but who sounded like a male.  (14T46-17 to 23).  [...] rejected the assertion he recognized defendant from meeting him on a prior occasion. (14T50-23 to 51-1).  3.
[brief] State v. Richardson, 452 N.J. Super. 124, 135 (App. Div. 2017) (quoting Dabas, 215 N.J. at 140).  A criminal defendant may be entitled to an adverse inference charge when the State does not preserve evidence that the defendant requested during discovery.  State v. Richardson, 452 N.J. Super. 124, 128 (App. Div. 2017).  To qualify as “relevant material,” the evidence must have “‘a tendency in reason to prove or disprove [a] fact of consequence to the determination of the action. ’”  State v. Richardson, 452 N.J. Super. 124, 132 (App. Div. 2017)(quoting State v. Gilchrist, 381 N.J. Super. 138, 146 (App. Div. 2005) (quoting N.J.R.E. 401)).  “A court must ‘focus upon ‘the logical connection between the ... evidence and a fact in issue. ””  Id. (quoting Gilchrist, 381 N.J. Super. at 146((quoting State v. Darby, 174 N.J. 509, 519 (2002)).  The New Jersey Supreme Court has established that the police have a duty to preserve a police officer’s contemporaneously written notes.
[brief] Generally, no liability can arise on a promise subject to a condition precedent until the condition is met.  As Plaintiff has decided that it cannot or will not obtain an RAO, this contractual condition goes unfulfilled.  As the RAO remains an unmet condition, the grant of which lies with a governmental institution over which Defendants has no control, and Defendants has no responsibility to seek an RAO, Defendants asks this Court to confirm that the contract is void.  CONCLUSION
[brief] A few minutes later, [...] noticed the two again as she was exiting a store.  When they passed each other on the street, she looked directly into the man's face.  [...] described the man as a tall black man, wearing dark shorts and carrying a black child's birthday bag in his hand.  She thought to herself that he was “kind of handsome, kind of cute. ”  Later, [...] saw the couple again but she noticed that the couple had separated and that the woman was on the opposite side of the street.  Although she had never seen the male before, she recognized the female as the daughter of a woman who she had seen around the neighborhood, although she could not recall the woman's name.  A little while later she stopped at [...] to find out why the police were there.
[brief] [Pa3]  It is unclear what legal authority [...] had with respect to employees within the [...] when she sent out her email on March 24, 2020.  She clearly had no role with respect to benefits or pension issues.  At the time of her March 24, 2020, email, no-one understood how long this emergency would last.  It is equally unclear what if any thought was given to the legal status of employees who were out of work.
[brief] In the course of its decision, the trial court also made findings of fact including that the alleged “chaotic” parking issues on Lot 5 “were created by the Defendant School’s decision to use that particular area for a student pickup and drop off zone” (Aa282) as well as the mixed question of law and fact that Appellant takes issue with in Point VII—that: The Board made a factual finding that no site plan approval was issued for the synagogue.  However, the ordinance which created review of site development plans was only adopted by [...] in December 1984, whereas construction of the Synagogue was completed in 1964.  Thus, to the extent that the decision of the ZBA was based upon facts not proven in the record, this finding it is clearly arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable.  [Aa280-Aa281.]  [...]’s four key legal rulings, for reasons already described, are absolutely correct and should be affirmed on appeal.
[brief] Our office has calculated a Floor Area Ratio of 1.77. ”  Da11-12, emphasis added; Pa132 at ¶48.  The correct FAR calculation of 1.77 was also confirmed by the [...].  Pa211 at 10:11-18.  The Board concurred with its professionals who are familiar with Oradell zoning standards that the project in fact proposed a 1.77 FAR.  With the maximum FAR permitted in the B-3 Zone at only 0.35, Plaintiff therefore sought to develop at a FAR *five times greater* than what was allowed, seeking to develop at 45,039 sq. ft. when only 8,930 sq. ft. was permitted.  Pa140 at ¶14; Pa142 at ¶16.  **F.
[brief] In their opening brief, Appellants do not distinguish or even address the above cases holding that similar Injury to an Insured exclusions in excess/umbrella policies are valid, enforceable, and do not violate public policy.  Rather, Appellants cite only to *Dela Vega v. Travelers Ins. Co.*, A-2272-19, 2022 WL 1436461 (App. Div. May 6, 2022), cert. denied, 284 A. 3d 426 (N.J. 2022) (Da 5-13) in support of their position that “the time has come for intrafamily liability exclusions to be deemed void as a matter of public policy. ”  See Appellants’ Opening Brief, at 11.  Dela Vega is a narrow, unreported decision that is limited to the specific facts at issue, and wholly distinguishable in any event because the policy at issue in that matter was a primary auto policy.  Further distinguishing Dela Vega is that fact that that case did not involve an Injury to an Insured exclusion, but rather an intra-family step-down provision.  Thus, contrary to Appellants’ assertions, Dela Vega does not represent a sea change in the law, but rather is consistent with the cases cited above holding that Injury to an Insured exclusions are only invalid as a matter of public policy when used in primary auto policies.
[brief] [...] further testified that the silicone particulate was injected into [...] from the Ozurdex applicator on November 6, 2018.  The silicone particulate caused a corneal reaction, corneal edema, corneal cloudiness, persistent inflammation not controlled by steroids, which all caused [...] to lose vision in her left eye.  (Pa127; Pa134-Pa139)  [...]’s treating cornea specialist, [...], also agrees that the migration of the Ozurdex steroid into [...]’s anterior chamber and caused [...]’s injuries.  On February 23, 2019, after performing a complete examination and assessment, [...] documented that [...] had received Ozurdex and suffered a retinal detachment.  Thereafter, [...] underwent a vitrectomy following which it was observed that the “Ozurdex had migrated to the anterior chamber and her cornea was swollen. ”  [...] concluded that [...] had suffered “Corneal Degeneration, 2\textsuperscript{nd} [secondary] to migrated Ozurdex OS [left eye].  It is likely that the corneal endothelium has undergone necrosis from toxic levels of steroid in the AC [anterior chamber] from the Ozurdex. ”  (Da0690)
[directive] The law enforcement officer shall document each BWC recording that was reviewed and the date of the review.  If the law enforcement officer received an accounting of a BWC recording, the law enforcement officer shall document the name of each person who provided an accounting of the BWC recording, the date of the accounting and the specific BWC recording for which an accounting was provided.  10.3.2  Nothing in Section 10.3 shall be construed to require a law enforcement officer to review a BWC recording prior to creating any required initial reports, statements, and interviews regarding the recorded event, nor to prevent a law enforcement officer from reviewing or receiving an accounting of such a BWC recording subsequent to the creation of any required initial report, statement, or interview regarding the recorded event.
[brief] Instead, the [...] --- 3  Similarly, in 1992, the [...] opined a debt collector does not violate the FDCPA when it uses a third party to translate collection notices from English to another language because the communication is an “incidental contact” rather than a communication with a third party in connection with an attempt to collect a debt.  See [...] Opinion, LeFevre to Zbrzeznj (Sept. 21, 1992).  expressly permitted debt collectors to use letter vendors’ return mail addresses on collection notices, which obviously presumes the permissible use of letter vendors for these purposes.  Crucially, the proposition that transmitting data to a letter vendor falls outside the scope of § 1692c(b) or other FDCPA provisions does not thwart Congress’ goal of protecting consumer privacy.
[brief] .................................................................. 32, 33, 34  Midland Funding LLC v. Thiel, 446 N.J. Super. 537 (App. Div. 2016)  ................................................ 2  Monogram Credit Card Bank of Ga. v. Tennesen, 390 N.J. Super. 123 (App.Div.2007)  ..................................................  22  New Century Fin. v. Trewin, 2018 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1688 (Ch. Div. May 24, 2018) ..............  13 North v. Portfolio Recovery Assocs., LLC, No. 2:20-cv-20190-BRM-JSA, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 184974 (D.N.J. Sep. 24, 2021)  .................................................................  32  Peralta v. Ragan, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 234300 (D.N.J. Dec. 30, 2022)  .........................  30
[brief] (Da95-99)  Defendant [...] did not appeal.  (Da95, Da111-12).  On August 23, 2024, Defendants [...] and [...] filed a motion for acceleration and stay pending appeal.  (Da118-19).  Ultimately, the stay motion was denied and the acceleration motion was granted.  (Id.).  With their motion papers, Defendants included a certification from the Secretary of [...] University, adducing facts about the BOG and its members that were dehors the record below and thus not appropriate for use in this merits appeal.  (Da91-94).  LEGAL ARGUMENT I.
[brief] The main entrance of the Congregation is located on the Sixth Street Lot allowing access to the main sanctuary of the synagogue.  (7T 43:10-12)  From the time the Congregation opened in the early 1960s to present, the Sixth Street Lot has been utilized for parking by members of the Congregation to attend services in the synagogue.  (7T 46:7-47:24; 8T; 13T 134:22-151:23; 14T)  16.  Parking on the Sixth Street Lot was so busy on certain holidays there was a parking attendant in place to make sure all the congregants had a place to park.  (7T 68:5-12)  During certain holidays such as Yom Kippur and Rosh Hashanah, both the Fifth Street and the Sixth Street Lots were full of vehicles belonging to members of the Congregation.  Id., at 83:13-25.  17.
[directive] However, in some cases where both a criminal and an administrative disciplinary investigation are needed, the internal affairs investigator from the subject officer's agency may be expected to help conduct both.  Under these circumstances, the methods employed in the criminal investigation conflict with those used in the administrative investigation.  N.L.R.B. v. Weingarten, 420 U.S. 251 (1975) (unionized employee who reasonably believes that an investigatory 7 interview may result in disciplinary action against him or her is entitled to union representation).  INTERNAL AFFAIRS POLICY & PROCEDURES | November 2022 47 8.1.3
[brief] State v. R.K., 220 N.J. 444, 458 (2015); see State v. Frisby, 174 N.J. 583, 594 (2002) (“[T]he mere assessment of another witness’s credibility is prohibited. ”).  Specifically, “a witness should never ‘offer an opinion that a defendant’s statement is a lie. ’”  C.W.H., 465 N.J. Super. at 593 (citing State v. Tung, 460 N.J. Super. 75, 102 (App. Div. 2019)).  A police officer’s opinion concerning a defendant’s veracity is especially damaging because “a jury may be inclined to accord special respect to such a witness. ”  Ibid.; see also Tung, 460 N.J. Super. at 103-04.
[brief] “The settled primary standard of interpretation of an integrated agreement is the meaning that would be ascribed to it by a reasonably intelligent person who was acquainted with all of the operative usages and circumstances surrounding the making of the writing. ”  Deerhurst Estates v. Meadow Homes, 64 N.J.Super. at 149.  Under this standard, this Court must hold the parties to the most natural and legally settled definition of “adjacent. ”  Therefore, as a matter of law, [...]’s fall occurred “adjacent” to each of the Tenant Defendants’ locations, as that spot was plainly “nearby” and “not distant” to each of their locations.  C.
[brief] “When interpreting the contract, the document must be considered as a whole and interpreted so as to harmonize and give reasonable meaning to all of its parts. ” NVT Techs., Inc. v. United States, 370 F.3d 1153, 1159 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (citing McAbee Constr., Inc. v. United States, 97 F.3d 1431, 1434-35 (Fed. Cir. 1996)).  Moreover, “[a]n interpretation that gives meaning to all parts of the contract is to be preferred over one that leaves a portion of the contract useless, inexplicable, void, or superfluous. ”  Ibid. (citing Gould, Inc. v. United States, 935 F.2d 1271, 1274 (Fed. Cir. 1991)).  Notably, the Supreme Court has previously upheld an arbitrator’s decision to consider a contract as a whole when interpreting particular contractual language.
[brief] ”  (Id. (citing [...] Decl. Ex. 4)).  Defendants assert that when they received plaintiffs’ April 22, 2021, letter and Depo Notice, they immediately began to investigate the “possible irregularities in the number of documents produced by custodian and by year. ” (Id., at 19 (citing [...] Decl. Ex. 5)).  On May 18, 2021, they responded in writing to each of the nine topics in Exhibit A to the Depo Notice.