ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] See subsection 4.5.8 (explaining how out-of-state charges/convictions should be considered).  Furthermore, as addressed specifically in subsection 4.5.7, the automated pretrial risk- assessment process does not account for a defendant’s juvenile justice history, even if the defendant recently was adjudicated delinquent for a serious violent crime.  The automated pretrial risk-assessment process also does not account for expunged records, even though N.J.S.A. 2C:52-21 was recently amended to explicitly authorize expunged records to be used in flag automatically triggers a presumption that law enforcement will apply for a complaint-warrant, see subsection 4.5.1, and also triggers a presumption that the prosecutor will seek pretrial detention.
[brief] See In re Proposed Xanadu Redevelopment Project, 402 N.J. Super. 607, 642 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 197 N.J. 260 (2008) (citing Bayshore Sewerage Co. v. Dep't of Env'tl. Prot., 122 N.J. Super. 184, 199 (Ch.Div. 1973), aff'd., 131 N.J. Super. 37 (App.Div.1974))  (In connection with administrative bodies, the term arbitrary means “willful and unreasoning action, without consideration and in disregard of circumstances. ”)  IV.
[brief] ”).  In these circumstances, the concern that parties—even “sophisticated” parties—mutually assent to relinquish their statutory right to our courts does not “vanish,” since these agreements are not “individually-negotiated contracts” amongst parties of “relatively similar bargaining power. ”  *Passaic*, 474 N.J. Super. at 503-04 (citations omitted).  __________________ bargaining power”); *Gastelu v. Martin*, 2014 WL 10044913 (App. Div. July 9, 2015) (noting no evidence of unequal bargaining power); *Schmidt*, 2020 WL 2130931 (same); *In re Remicade (Direct Purchaser) Antitrust Litig.*, 938 F.3d 515, 525 (3d Cir. 2019) (no unequal bargaining power).
[brief] The record is similarly devoid of any suggestion that the Subcommittee was required to score the Evaluation Sheet for each Applicant and make an arbitrary recommendation to the Council in support of the Applicant with the highest score.  Indeed, not even Subcommittee member [...], the sole Subcommittee member that filled out an Evaluation Sheet, could have reasonably believed that the Subcommittee was required to use the Evaluation Sheets to score each applicant, as Ms. Araneo completed the Evaluation Sheet for [...] only, and chose not to complete the Evaluation Sheets for any other applicant.  Contrary to [...]’s position, the record suggests that the Evaluation Sheet was merely one metric, among others, that the Subcommittee would consider in making its recommendation.
[brief] *See id.* at 480-82.  Going further, the Court stated:  At a minimum, the indemnification provision is ambiguous and must therefore be construed against [...] as the indemnitee.  Contrary to the conclusion reached by the Appellate Division, we cannot presume first-party coverage in the absence of language precluding it; rather, there must be affirmative indicia of the intent to indemnify to overcome the presumption that parties will each pay their own way.  Id. at 482 (emphasis added).  To be sure, the [...] Court did not hold that first party claims can never be covered by indemnification clauses; however, it did hold that first-party claims will be covered only where the parties’ “clear intent” to cover first party claims is expressed “by their deliberate word choices. ”  See id. at 482-483.  Stated another way, in the absence of such clearly expressed, deliberate language covering first-party claims, indemnification contracts should not be construed to cover first-party claims and should only be construed to cover third-party claims.  See id.  Hence, in [...], the Supreme Court actually encouraged “parties seeking to permit indemnification of first-party claims to include express language to do so.  Otherwise, any ambiguity will continue to be construed against the indemnitee. ”  Id. at 483 (emphasis added).  This Court need look no further than [...] v. Huff to uphold the trial court order challenged by [...] on its cross-appeal.
[brief] Rodriguez, 279 N.J. Super. at 401-02. (quoting 4 Am. Jur. 2d Animals § 89).  Model Jury Charge §5.60B recognizes the common law distinction between negligence and strict liability standards for injuries caused by “natural propensities” common to a class versus the vicious or dangerous traits peculiar to a specific animal, because it provides that a negligence charge should be used “for injuries by animals other than with vicious propensities. ”  Model Jury Charge §5.60B. at fn. 1.  Strict liability requires evidence of an animal’s past behavior because the Jury Charge conditions the finding of a “vicious propensity” on “the nature and frequency of its acts. ”  Otherwise, a negligence standard applies when an injury is attributed to a trait or propensity common to a species, class, or breed of domestic animal.  Under this negligence standard, liability does not depend on evidence of the offending animal’s prior behavior.
[brief] | Document | Appendix Page No. | |-------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------| | October 25, 2018  Notice of Violation and Order to Correct | Pa1 | | September 3, 2021  Letter Opinion of The Honorable [...], P.J.Ch. | Pa2 | | January 23, 2020  Certification of [...] in Opposition to Motion in Limine | Pa4 | PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
[brief] 17  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS  Order of Judgment with Rider, filed January 29, 2024  TABLE OF TRANSCRIPT  DESIGNATIONS  1T – Transcript of Hearing dated January 19, 2024  #  TABLE OF CONTENTS – APPENDIX (Volume 1 of 3 – Ja1 to Ja180)  | Document | Page | |-------------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | Order of Judgment with Rider, filed January 29, 2024 | 1a | | Complaint, filed April 13, 2022 | 17a | | Answer to Complaint of [...], filed June 3, 2022 | 32a | | Consent Judgment, filed July 7, 2023 | 40a | | Order granting leave to file Amended Complaint, filed July 26, 2023 | 43a | | First Amended Complaint, filed July 27, 2023 | 44a | | Notice of Motion to Dismiss of [...], | 62a | | filed September 5, 2023 | | | Certification of [...], filed September 5, 2023 | 64a | | Exhibit A to Certification, Complaint, filed September 5, 2023 (omitted | -- | | here – see 17a) | | | Exhibit B to Certification, Answer of [...], | -- | | filed September 5, 2023 (omitted here – see 32a) | | | Exhibit C to Certification, Consent Judgment, | -- | | filed September 5, 2023 (omitted here – see 40a) | | | Exhibit D to Certification, Order, filed September 5, 2023 | -- | | (omitted here – see 43a) | | | Exhibit E to Certification, First Amended Complaint, | -- | | filed September 5, 2023 (omitted here – see 44a) | | | Exhibit F to Certification, Workers’ Compensation and Employer’s | 66a | | Liability Policy, filed September 5, 2023 | | | Notice of Motion to Dismiss of [...] and Chubb | 84a | | Insurance Co. of N.J., filed September 11, 2023 | | Certification of [...], filed September 11, 2023 Exhibit A to Certification, First Amended Complaint, filed September 11, 2023 (omitted here – see 44a) -- Exhibit B to Certification, Commercial Excess and Umbrella Insurance Policy, filed September 11, 2023 90a Exhibit C to Certification, [...], [...] policy, filed September 11, 2023 163a (Volume 2 of 3 – Ja181 to Ja360) Exhibit C to Certification, [...], [...] policy, filed September 11, 2023 (cont’d.) 181a (Volume 3 of 3 – Ja361 to Ja539)
[brief] The courtyard was gravel and was also used as children's play/activity area in that time period.  There was no curb cut on Sixth Street and vehicles would mount the curb into the courtyard and park haphazardly.  She made the observation that the drivers at that time, many having recently moved from New York, were particularly haphazard in their driving and parking techniques and did not adhere to the rules.  (7T54-6 to 82-20).  It should be noted the 1963 Agreement paragraph 10 (Da16) did allow a temporary license for Synagogue attendees to park on vacant areas of the School Lot 5 and that permission presumably extended through 1972, when it presumably ended with the School expansion.  That [...] observed Synagogue attendees parking on School property in the late 1960's/early 1970's would be consistent with the temporary license.  That was the extent of plaintiff's direct case.
[brief] Appellant did not opt out of the class or file an objection to the same.  (Pa110-Pa120, ¶ 39).  He received his settlement payment under the Settlement Agreement and Settlement Order, and he received the additional benefit of the Account being deleted.  (Pa110-Pa120, ¶ 38).  The language in the Settlement Agreement and Settlement Order is clear and unambiguous that no claims relating to the failure to be licensed continue to exist except for claims on actual damages. \(^{28}\) (Pa25-Pa33).  Because Appellant’s claims are based exclusively on [...]’s failure to be licensed, they are undoubtedly barred and the Complaint must be dismissed.
[brief] Provocation  Defendant next argues that the State failed to prove that [...]’s injury was unprovoked.  Defendant seeks to paint [...] as an intruder, and [...] as the guardian K9 who was simply defending his house and family.  Defendant even goes so far as to suggest that [...]’s “nemesis,” [...], was across the street and incited the entire incident by barking.  (Db40).  Equally as absurd, defendant suggests [...] has been provoking [...] for years by pooping and peeing on his yard.  (Db13).  This logic is fanciful and does not warrant the Court’s consideration.  The reality is that [...] was simply delivering a package when he was blind-sided by a German Shephard who violently attacked the back of his leg.  Once the attack on [...] was over, [...] darted across the street and killed [...] - who was simply roaming her owner’s yard.  Defendant’s argument requires a massive leap in logic and reasoning.  Both courts rejected this reasoning and correctly found that [...] was unprovoked when he attacked both [...] and [...].
[brief] For the reasons set forth above and for the reasons set forth in the Appellants initial appellate filings, it is respectfully requested that this Court hereby reverse the decision of the trial court as set forth in its Orders and Opinions dated October 14, 2020, October 15, 2020, June 16, 2021, September 14, 2021, and August 9, 2022 and affirm the decision of the trial court dated March 10, 2023.  Respectfully submitted, [...]  By: ____________________________  [...], Esq.  Dated: December 21, 2023  [...] and [...], Plaintiffs-Respondents/Cross- Appellant, vs. [...], THE [...], and MAYOR [...], in his official capacity as Mayor of the Township of Monroe, Defendants-Appellants.
[brief] The Respondent’s brief in opposition fails to address that there were multiple new findings in the Appellant’s MRIs following the 2019 motor vehicle accident (“MVA”).  These new findings were not observed in the Appellant’s previous MRIs completed prior to the 2019 MVA.  The new findings included herniated disc at C5-C6, a disc bulge that is now a herniated disc at C3-C4 and a new disc bulge at C6-C7, new disc bulge at T12-L1 and a disc bulge that is now a herniated disc at L4-L5.  (Da80).  These findings were causally linked to the 2019 MVA by the Appellant’s expert, [...], in his report.  (Da82).  This is objective evidence of a Category 6 permanent injury that has been causally linked to the accident and should have been sufficient within itself to overcome the verbal threshold.  Thus, the lower court erred by only generally discussing the existence of these facts, even though these facts alone, would have been dispositive of the issue.
[brief] (Pa58).  A Consent Order was filed on January 10, 2024 providing for the plaintiff to file an Amended Complaint naming [...] (daughter) as the representative of the Estate of [...] (mother) as the plaintiff.  (Pa59).  A First Amended Complaint was filed thereafter.  (Pa60).  However, the defendant subsequently raised concerns over renaming the plaintiff through an Amended Complaint so a second Consent Order was filed on February 16, 2024 withdrawing the First Amended Complaint and amending the caption of the Complaint.  (Pa68; Pa69).  STATEMENT OF FACTS
[directive] USE OF FORCE POLICY | April 2022 Core Principle Four Duty to Use Deadly Force Only as an Absolute Last Resort and Duty to Avoid Actions Which Create a Substantial Risk of Death or Serious Bodily Injury.  Deadly force shall only be used as an absolute last resort and in strict compliance with this Policy.  Other actions by law enforcement that create a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury must be avoided or employed only under the strictest of conditions.
[directive] VIII.  Finally, defendant argues that indefinite detention beyond the two-year cap because of the pandemic violates due process.  He urges the Court to “impose an outer-limit of detention” to “save the constitutionality of the CJRA. ”  He proposes the following bright-line rule:  Defendants must be released on electronic monitoring or home detention 30 days after their two- year release date if they are charged with first- or second-degree non-violent offenses; after 60 days if they are charged with first- or second-degree violent offenses; and at the two-year mark in all other cases.  Defendant did not raise that argument before the trial court or in his motion for leave to appeal.
[brief] In opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to Amend the Complaint, Defendants submitted a letter brief with attached exhibits but did not file a certification.  Exhibit L [...]'s June 8, 2021  Order partially granting Defendants' motion to dismiss Omitted see 581a  Exhibit M  Plaintiff's counsel's June 27, 2021 certification in support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration to reinstate Plaintiffs [...], [...], [...], [...] and [...]……………………………736a  Exhibit N [...]'s October 25, 2021  Order granting Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration to reinstate Plaintiffs [...], [...], [...], [...], and [...] Omitted see 629a  December 15, 2023 email from the chambers of the Hon. [...], P.J.Cv…………………………………………………………………………………..738a
[brief] The three Plaintiffs are [...], 58, and his parents, [...], 89, and [...], 85.  The parents are Cuban immigrants.  Due to Francisco’s memory problems and because Ramona only speaks Spanish, the son downloaded Power of Attorney forms for their signature enabling him to file this lawsuit in their name.  The Defendants are [...], also known as [...], 50, sister of Noel and daughter of the elderly Matos’s and the long time caregiver of her parents, and her husband, [...], 52.  Johnny is his given name.  Johnny Cueto is also of Cuban descent.  Plaintiffs are the Appellants.
[directive] Forfeiture /I: Expenditures  Relating Part to . m., of THE EXPENDITURES RELATING TO FORFEITURE PROGRAM, Indicate the amount any 8) prosecution costs.) for security interests, asset maintenance and forfeiture  Examples of such not limited I) but seized expenditures include. to: the care expense and d-kposal of and custody are 5) 4) costs; forfeited property; filing and recording fees; brokerage fees; advertising court 2) 3) appointed custodian fees.
[brief] (a)  Except as otherwise provided in paragraph (b), a lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation involves a concurrent conflict of interest.  A concurrent conflict of interest exists if: (1) the representation of one client will be directly adverse to another client; or (2) there is a significant risk that the representation of one or more clients will be materially limited by the lawyer’s responsibilities to another client, a former client, or a third person or by a personal interest of the lawyer.
[brief] ” (Pa49a).  The Trial Court astutely pointed out that Plaintiff’s contextless interpretation of the FDCPA was inappropriate because the transmission of data to a mailing vendor is nothing like other communications that normally happen in the debt collection context, reasoning:  The statute does not define “communicate” but does set forth a definition of “communication” to be the “conveying of information regarding a debt directly or indirectly to any person through any medium. ”  15 U.S.C. Sec. 1692a.  To “communicat[e] regarding a debt” for the purpose of the FDCPA is perforce to engage in a conveyance by which the sender intends the recipient to receive and examine the information concerning the debtor’s indebtedness for the purpose of inducing the debtor to satisfy the debt.  Here there was no such purpose, as the information communicated was of no moment whatsoever to the letter vendor or its personnel and, according to the present Complaint, was not used or employed by such vendor beyond the need to create the desired letter to the debtor.  Unlike employers, neighbors, family members or friends of the debtor, the employees of a letter vendor do not possess the ability to induce payment by inflicting reputational or other harm on a debtor simply by processing the information into a template letter intended to be sent to the debtor.  (Pa50a)  Notably, the Trial Court’s interpretation is supported by the legislative history of the FDCPA where one of the stated goals of the FDCPA was to curb abusive acts by debt collectors who disclose “a consumer’s personal affairs to friends, neighbors, or an employer . . .” ostensibly as a method to embarrass a debtor into payment  See Sen. Rep. No. 382, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1695, 1696; see also Quaglia v. [...] et al., No: 1:21-cv-03252, Dkt # 26 Order at p. 7 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 12, 2021)(citing to the FDCPA’s legislative history and dismissing FDCPA mailing vendor claim).  Because the transmission of data to a mailing vendor is nothing like the “communication” contemplated by the FDCPA, the Trial Court correctly held that Plaintiff’s theory was defective.
[brief] N.J.S.A. 59:1-2.  The TCA states:  (a)  A public entity is liable for injury proximately caused by an act or omission of a public employee within the scope of his employment in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances.  (b)  A public entity is not liable for an injury resulting from an act or omission of a public employee where the public employee is not liable.  N.J.S.A. 59:2-2 (emphasis added).  While a public entity is exempt from liability for an injury resulting from the exercise of judgment or discretion vested in the entity, a public entity is not exonerated from liability for negligence arising out of acts or omissions of its employees in carrying out their ministerial, rather than discretionary, functions.
[brief] (Da 98; Da 99-138)  Like [...] on February 9 and March 8, 2016, [...] reviewed video surveillance footage from [...] in an apparently unrecorded session (Da 121-122); thereafter, [...] told [...], “That video is across the street and adjacent to the victim’s residence ….  [I]n that video is a male returning to his residence on Lexington Avenue[?]”  (Da 122)  [...] answered, “Right. ”  (Da 122)  Cherilien asked, “Did you recognize who that male was returning to his residence?”  (Da 122)  [...] answered, “The returning male, yes, I did. ”  (Da 122)  Cherilien asked, “And who was that male?”  (Da 122)  [...] answered, “[...]. ”  (Da 122)  Cherilien presented the photo, time stamp 11:41, from “the same video that you just watched. ”  (Da 122-123)  Cherilien asked, “This is that male returning into his residence?”  (Da 123)  [...] answered, “Yes. ”  (Da 123)  Cherilien asked, “Is that the male you recognize as [...] returning to (indiscernible) [his residence]?”  (Da 123)  [...] answered, “Right. ”  (Da 123)  At the detective’s direction, [...] signed and dated her signature on the photograph.  (Da 123)  At trial, the prosecutor moved into evidence the photograph that [...] had signed on August 11, 2017.  (24T 20-4 to 14)  [...] confirmed that the photograph was taken from surveillance footage from the “house next door,” [...], and that she “actually watched the video where this still was developed from.
[brief] The record is replete with the community outrage directed at the Board which was caused by Respondent’s racist Facebook posts.  (Ca097-098)  (March 17, 2022  Board Resolution: “the Board has been recently made aware of certain social media postings which have been made by and/or attributed to certain individual Board members which are viewed by many – including the Board – to convey sentiments and/or messages which are racist and/or biased against African Americans”); (Ca107-109) (Minutes of March 17, 2022 Board Meeting: public comment section filled with school community members addressing Respondent’s racist posts); (Ca120-121) (Minutes of April 28, 2022 Board meeting: public comment section filled with school community members addressing Respondent’s racist posts); (Ca122-127) (PATCH Article: “[...] OKs Social Media Policy After Racist Posts”).  By this holding, the Commission implies, for example, that if an elected school board member holds up a sign that says “Black Lives Don’t Matter,” is then sworn in while holding that sign, and then continues to hold that sign up while a seated board member at a meeting of the board, the Commission would have no jurisdiction to hear the matter because the conduct began prior to that board member swearing in.  This is an absurd result that is contrary to public policy.
[brief] Respondents incorrectly assert that the plaintiff is allowed to amend his complaint (BOE-Db20).  Respondents quote the school ethics act stating “[a] complainant may amend a complaint to cure technical defects or to clarify or amplify allegations made in the original complaint. ”  The regulations do not define what “clarify or amplify allegations” means in the context of amending a complaint before the Commission.  Given the liberality and generosity required by N.J.A.C. 6A:28-8.3 given a Motion to Dismiss, the Commission should have allowed plaintiff to amend his complaint with additional information unearthed by the response to his OPRA request (Pb16).  In addition, even if this court finds that adding additional counts is not allowed by statute, at a minimum the Commission should have allowed Petitioner to amend his complaint to amplify and strengthen his existing claims, which clearly is allowed by the statute.  III.
[brief] Id. (slip op. at 13) (“Having agreed with the trial court's finding that defendant was not in custody at the time of his first interview, we need not consider whether the first interview constituted an interrogation, nor must we consider whether the second, Mirandized interview implicated O’Neill. ”)  Nevertheless, even if the March 6 interview was custodial, the March 13 interview took place over a week later and only after Miranda warnings were issued.  (29T 19-17 to 21-3).  As Defendant consistently denied any involvement with the murder on March 6, none of the statements of that interview in any way impacted the interview over a week later.  Defendant’s argument that his denial of leaving the Ramada on March 6 was relevant in this circumstance is meritless as he made no subsequent admission in the March 12 statement after being confronted with the evidence or his previous denial.  (29T 96-2 to 98-12).  In this regard, the O’Neill factors weigh against barring the March 12 statement on the basis of the March 6 statement.  See O’Neill, 193 N.J. at 181.
[brief] (13T 43-19 to 47-11)  But she admitted on cross-examination that while she initially told a supervisor that one of the photos seemed to depict the official NJSP wallet ID, she cannot say “positively” that that is the case.  (13T 70-3 to 13)  [...] testified that [...]’s report to the NJSP prompted an investigation, and he also, like a number of witnesses before him -- but not the judge -- told the jury that a suspended trooper has certain duties regarding turning in official IDs.