ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Da40  Certification of [...], Esq.  In Support of Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend Complaint Filed 02/26/20 ......................... Da43 Exhibit 1 Verified Complaint .............................................. Da1 Exhibit 2 Proposed Amended Verified Complaint ............... Da46 Exhibit 1 (legal description) ............................................. Da56 (map) .............................................................................. Da58 Exhibit 2 (recapitulation) ................................................... Da15 Exhibit 3 Proposed Amended Declaration of Taking) ....... Da60 Exhibit 1 (legal description) ............................................. Da56 Exhibit 2 (map) ............................................................... Da58 Exhibit 4 (R. Moore’s 02/24/20 e-mail.............................. Da64 with draft consent order to amend attached) Exhibit 5 [...]’s Letter Dated 02/25/20 declining consent ......................................................... Da68 Plaintiff’s Certification of [...] In Further Support of Motion to Amend Filed 03/24/20 ........................................ Da69 Order and Statement of Reasons Permitting the Filing of Amended Complaint Filed 03/27/20 ........................................ Da80 Amended Verified Complaint Filed 04/20/20 ......................... Da86 Exhibit A (legal description) ............................................. Da56 Exhibit B (map) ............................................................... Da96 Amended Declaration of Taking Filed 04/20/20 .................... Da97 Exhibit A (legal description) ............................................. Da100 Exhibit B (map) ............................................................... Da101 Motion for Expert Fees
[brief] 48a.  Defendants were never properly served with the Complaint for Tax Foreclosure and did not receive notice until Final Judgment of Default had already been entered.  The Court below relied on misrepresentations by the proponents of the foreclosure throughout the proceedings.  The Defendants further allege and provided proof that, on the morning of alleged service, they left with their children by car prior to the time of the alleged service for vacation and could not have been served.  The proof of service in this case is highly irregular with the following fatal defects such that the presumption of validity that is normally applied to Affidavits of Service should not have been applied.
[brief] One exception to the warrant requirement, recognized only in New Jersey and California, is the registration-search exception.  Because of the right of privacy in one’s car and the strong preference for probable cause and warrants before a search is conducted, the registration-search exception is a narrow one.  Only “after a driver is given the opportunity to present the vehicle’s ownership credentials but is unwilling or unable to do so, a police officer may engage in a pinpointed search limited to those places, such as a glove box, where proof of ownership is ordinarily kept. ”  *State v. Terry*, 232 N.J. 218, 243 (2018).
[brief] 20.  Thus, Plaintiff was maliciously and wrongfully prosecuted.  AND NOT ENABLED TO APPEAL BY THE HIGHLAND PARK TOWNSHIP OFFICIALS WHICH APPARENTLY NEVER FILED THE PAPERS OF CONVICTION AND NEVER PROVIDED COPIES OF SAME TO THEN DEFENDANT HOWARD.  SAME VIOLATED PLAINTIFF’S BASIC DUE PROCESS RIGHTS TO APPEAL AND UPON INFORMATION AND BELIEF THE SUPRME COURT’S DIRECTIVES TO ITS MUNICIPAL COURT JUDGES to physically give the conviction paperwork to the party before the court.  21.  The [...] employees had a duty to turn over the written findings and sentence to [...] and they failed in that duty, causing plaintiff harm and deprivation of constitutional due process. 22.
[directive] Such public safety tools not only include pursuing criminal actions against those who commit acts of violence but also deploying the Department’s civil enforcement authority to, among other things, remedy unlawful conduct by firearm manufacturers, distributors, and others in the supply chain.  To that end, the Division of Consumer Affairs has filed multiple lawsuits against companies that have unlawfully advertised, offered for sale, and/or sold to New Jersey residents firearm products that are prohibited in New Jersey – including ghost guns and large-capacity magazines.  Those actions have resulted in substantial monetary payments from the defendants, as well as limitations on the companies’ advertising and sales practices.  But the unavailability in New Jersey of a robust public nuisance statute has limited the State’s ability to seek legal redress in situations where firearms manufacturers and retail dealers may have knowingly or recklessly taken actions that have endangered the safety and health of New Jersey residents through the sale, manufacture, distribution, or marketing of lethal, but nonetheless legal, firearms.  Recently, the Legislature passed and [...] signed P.L.2022, c.56, to strengthen the civil enforcement tools available to address the problem of gun violence by authorizing the Attorney General to bring a statutory public nuisance cause of action and investigate potential violations of the statute.
[brief] (Aa1030-35).  In count two, [...] asserted a right to receive State funding “at the level set forth by the Adequacy Budget. ” (Aa1036).  And it alleged that the Legislature’s decision to amend the SFRA to phase out adjustment aid is unconstitutional.  (Aa1036-39).  The payroll tax, it claimed, “will not be sufficient” to cover the loss of adjustment aid.  (Aa1038).  [...] framed count three as an as-applied challenge to EFCFA.  (Aa1040-42).  At the conclusion of discovery, the parties filed motions for summary judgment.  On June 14, 2023, the trial court issued an order and decision granting summary judgment in respondents’ favor, and dismissing the Amended Complaint.
[brief] For the foregoing reasons, plaintiff is entitled to an order reversing the trial court’s orders and entering summary judgment in plaintiff’s favor.  Respectfully submitted, [...]  Counsel for Plaintiff-Appellant  By: /s [...]  [...], Esq.  DATED: June 10, 2024  Superior Court of New Jersey  Appellate Division  Docket No. [...]  [...], Administratrix and Administratrix ad Prosequendum for the [...], Plaintiff-Appellant, vs. [...]; [...]; [...]; [...] and JOHN DOES 1-10, Defendants-Respondents.  CIVIL ACTION ON APPEAL FROM THE ORDER OF JUDGMENT OF THE SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY, LAW DIVISION, MONMOUTH COUNTY DOCKET NO. [...] Sat Below: HON. RICHARD W.  ENGLISH, J.S.C. BRIEF AND APPENDIX FOR DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS
[brief] Article 9 of the PSA, entitled “Closing Obligations” sets forth the various obligations of [...] and [...] at closing.  (Da204-207.)  Section 9.1 provides that “[A]t the closing, Seller shall execute and/or deliver the following….  (xix) if obtained by Seller, a duly executed Acceptable Estoppel Certificate (as defined in Paragraph 13.10).” (Da205) (emphasis added).  Critically, [...] is obligated to deliver an Acceptable Estoppel Certificate “at the closing. ”  (Id.)  As the substantive requirement for providing the Acceptable Estoppel Certificate is explicitly timed for the closing itself, it necessarily follows that [...] has the opportunity to provide the Acceptable Estoppel Certificate up until as well as on the closing date as its obligation to deliver the Acceptable Estoppel Certificate is specifically tied to the closing itself.  While other contractual provisions require [...] to act promptly in attempting to obtain the estoppel certificate and forward anything received to [...], ultimately [...] (assuming it has otherwise acted promptly) can obtain and present the final Acceptable Estoppel Certificate right up until or even at closing.  Section 13.10 – Estoppel and SNDA.
[brief] (1T91-22 to 92-1).  8  Defendant incorporates by reference the certification of Thomas R.  Ashley, Esq., (annexed at Ca107) and defendant [...], each dated September 10, 2021 (Ca115-117).  9  The significance of the seizure of the .9 millimeter semiautomatic handgun cannot be overstated as law enforcement purportedly linked this handgun to shell casings found at the scene of the [...] homicide which occurred on September 25, 2020.
[directive] The Department of Health has compiled statistics which indicate that during calendar year 1982 there were 2962 such sudden and unexpected deaths.  The Working Group in its original report, identified three major areas to be addressed, which included, notification of death, release of information and property, and the rendering of other assistance.  That report set forth minimum and optimum guidelines for dealing with survivors of homicide and sudden death.  In a continuing effort to assist survivors, the Working Group reconvened in September, 1985 to evaluate the implementation of the guidelines.  The Working Group agreed that in order to properly evaluate the dissemination and implementation of the guidelines, a questionnaire needed to be developed for each affected group or agency concerning compliance, and to secure suggestions that could provide the means to ensure that survivors are afforded proper assistance.
[brief] Under the WQPA, “All projects and activities affecting water quality in any planning area shall be developed and conducted in a manner consistent with the adopted areawide plan.  . . .  The commissioner shall not grant any permit which is in conflict with an adopted areawide plan. ”  N.J.S.A. 58:11A-10.  This mandate means that a Consistency Assessment under the WQPA is a prerequisite for all permits, including those at issue here.
[brief] The Respondents ignore the key factual finding of the Boundary Commissioners’ Report (“Report,” Pa105) wherein they determined the recorded legal descriptions in the deeds of the parties and their neighbors to be accurate.  See Report Pa108, ll.37-39.  As the Respondents fail to address the significance of this fact, it is necessary to recount precisely what the Boundary Commissioners determined.  The Surveying Commissioner, [...], P.S., found that the property descriptions of the Appellants (the “[...]”) and the Respondents “line up and fit together perfectly” with their legal descriptions and the descriptions of the two other neighboring lots simultaneously created by a 1956 Subdivision (Lots 9 & 12).  Report, Pa107, l.30-Pa108, l.39.  The legal descriptions in these four deeds are “without conflicts between any angles or distances. ”  Id. at Pa108, l.38  Instead of dealing with the significance of this fact, the Respondents go on at length about the extent of the Boundary Commissioners’ effort and the accuracy of the resulting survey.  No one raised those issues before the trial court.  The issues before the trial court were whether the Report should be set aside when it affected parties not before the court, and could only be based upon circumstantial evidence.  The determination of the Boundary Commissioners that the deeds of the parties and their immediate neighbors contained accurate property descriptions has profound implications for the overall effect of the Report.
[brief] for each one of you to listen as best you can for the next, I didn't time myself, but eight or nine minutes, because what I have to say is really important.  I am going to use some notes.  I typically don't do that, but I am a little weary at this stage of the game and I want to make sure I tell you everything that I think is really important to this application.  So, with that, to start out, I, again, thank each and every one of you for all of the time and effort that each of you has put into running the details of this application, the need and the purpose of this regulator station, in [...].
[brief] The affirmative causes of action against [...] fail as a matter of law.  (29)**  The trial court correctly held that all affirmative causes of action against [...] fail as a matter of law.  Specifically, the trial court correctly determined that [...] (1) did not breach its contract with [...] and [...]; (2) did not breach the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing; and (3) did not violate the Consumer Fraud Act.
[brief] - The Court brief turns to Count Three of Plaintiffs’ complaint.  Plaintiffs offer no support, nor can the Court find any, for the proposition that alleging a legislative act is “arbitrary and unreasonable” presents a legal recognizable cause of action at the trial court level.  To the extent that the complaint seeks to allege, by reference to rational basis review, an equal protection or due process claims related to the recommendation criteria, the Court finds that [...] resolved those claims.  (Pa130-131).
[brief] First, the court failed to instruct the jury on the permissible use of the evidence.  After [...]’s testimony that one of the officers said “he fits the bill” because [...]’s clothing and race matched the description of a suspect in an armed robbery that occurred the previous night, the court told the jury, “the only reason [the discussion about another crime] is coming up is to give context as to what was meant by the phrase, ‘Fits -- fits the bill. ’”  (3T 41-7 to 46-22, 137-2 to 138-6)  In its final charge to the jury, the court stated that “the testimony of an armed robbery that allegedly occurred in South River.  . . . was allowed in this case solely to provide context for statements made by the police. ”  (5T 11-8 to 12)  But the testimony about the robbery was not allowed to provide context for police statements – that was not the “relevant issue in dispute.
[brief] Pursuant to this provision, the Commissioners undertook the assignment, dedicating over nine months of review of surveys, history and subdivisions plats of the neighborhood; psychical examination of the subject properties and boundary markers throughout the neighborhood, and inspection and reconciliation of the mathematical evidence used to create the underlying surveys.  The nine months of field work, survey review, and investigation culminated in the Boundary Commissioners’ Report, a Report which was adjudged to be “final and conclusive against all of the parties and their heirs and assigns” as provided for in statute.  N.J.S.A. 2A:28-2.
[brief] The information was easily available three years ago.  And of particular, importance is this.  And again, I don’t – I don’t want to prejudge what might be an evidentiary hearing six months from now or a year from now, who knows?  But if [...] knew in 2020 that he was never served and didn’t know about the lawsuit, he doesn’t need to get the paperwork to file a motion to say, hey – and – and file a motion in June of 2020 or July of 2020, this is the first I’ve heard of this lawsuit and I have issues concerning the underlying debt, that type of thing.  That wasn’t done.
[brief] If it did, any criminal defendant with a qualifying disability could sue the Superior Court or the Prosecutor’s Office for damages under the NJLAD for almost any conceivable reason (e.g., prosecutor’s plea deals were unsatisfactory, motions were denied, proceedings were adjourned, unfavorable rulings were made during trial, sentences were too harsh, etc.).  An individual’s frustration with the criminal justice system does not equate to discrimination and is therefore not actionable under the NJLAD.  Thus, the Law Division properly dismissed [...]’s complaint and denied his motion for leave to file an amended complaint asserting NJLAD claims against the State Defendants.
[brief] Rather, Defendants argued that the transfer was a conditional gift, relying on the Supreme Court case, Sipko v. Koger, 214 N.J. 364 (2013).  In Sipko, a father had gifted to his son a share of his very successful business.  Id. at 367.  Sometime later, the son wanted to marry a woman that the father rejected.  Ibid.  The father attempted to revoke the transfer of the business share.  Ibid.  The Supreme Court found that the father had attached no conditions to the gift at the outset and could not do so retroactively.
[directive] Step 5: Call the [...] at [...] and advise them that a referral will be faxed to them upon completion of the phone call; and Step 6: Fax the referral, the Promis-Gavel “Statewide Defn/Case List” (if available) and the list of names and addresses of minor children to the [...] at Fax # [...] or [...].  DYFS REFERRAL  Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:44-6.3  The defendant identified in Section I below was convicted for the crime(s) identified in Section II below.
[brief] Clearly, the comments regarding the Amended Application were specific to the Respondents’ Amended Application and proposed development in its entirety.  The Appellants submit that dismissal of Respondents claims under the NJLAD were appropriately dismissed by the trial court and such dismissal was soundly based in prevailing case law.  Accordingly, the trial court’s dismissal of Count VII of the Complaint should be affirmed by this Court.  **CONCLUSION**
[brief] [...] consulted an “internal published database record or records available to banks and lenders but not available to the general public. ”  [...] could not validate the [...]’ mortgage with either [...] or [...] Trustee despite the fact that [...] was the last recorded assignee.  Defendant charged that plaintiff defamed the [...] in that manner, and fraudulently concealed the true mortgage holder/owner which, along with the false default of the loan that was reported, precluded the [...] from refinancing with [...] or any other lender.  8T19:1-25.  With regard to their intentional infliction of emotional distress claim, defendants charged “fraudulent and outrageous conduct, including fraud, fraudulent concealment, defamation and slander” by plaintiff that caused [...] to suffer “extreme emotional distress which is critically affecting his physical health.
[brief] (5T 56-6 to 23)  [...]’s failure to support her conclusion with a statistic is the subject of Subsection I.C, supra.  The collar of the shirt, according to [...], had two contributors but the DNA was insufficient for comparison.  (5T 57-12 to 14)  [...] opined that a DNA profile found on a bra taken from a home [...] was staying in when she was located on May 20 “was determined to be [...]['s]” without any statistical support for that opinion.  (5T 59-1 to 6)  [...], a pathologist, testified that the cause of [...]’s death was blunt force trauma to the head.
[brief] | Cases | Page | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | **68th St. Apts., Inc. v. Lauricella,** | 41 | | 142 N.J. Super. 546 (Law Div. 1976) | | | **A.W. v. T.D.,** | 76 | | 433 N.J. Super. 365 (Ch. Div. 2013) | | | **Am. List Couns., Inc. v. Andrew Ostroy & Belardi-Ostroy, Ltd.,** | 41 | | 2013 WL 12201498 (D.N.J. July 31, 2013) | | | **Auto Lenders v. Gentilini Ford,** | 35 | | 181 N.J. 245 (2004) | | | **Balducci v. Cige,** | 46 | | 240 N.J. 574 (2020) | | | **Bendar v. Rosen,** | 77 | | 247 N.J. Super. 219 (App. Div. 1991) | | | **Bernard v. IMI Systems, Inc.,** | 34 | | 131 N.J. 91 (1993) | | | **Borak v. J.I. Case. Co.,** | 40 | | 317 F.2d 838 (7th Cir.1963) | | | **Borough of Saddle River v. 66 E. Allendale, LLC,** | 49 | | 216 N.J. 115 (2013) | | | **Boyle v. Huff,** | 82, 83| | 2023 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 85 (App. Div. Jan. 20, 2023) | | | **Brill vs. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am.,** | 34 | | 142 N.J. 520 (1985) | | | **Brown v. Brown,** | 41, 42, 43, 45, 67| | 323 N.J. Super. 30 (App. Div. 1999) | | C.E. v. Elizabeth Pub. Sch. Dist., 472 N.J. Super. 253 (App. Div. 2022)..................................................
[brief] [...] displayed no signs of distress.  He said nothing incriminating or suspicious.  He followed the detective’s orders to put his hands on the car.  And when [...] frisked him, [...] did not twist his body or resist in any way.  Nevertheless, the trial court took issue with two things: [...] (1) held his work vest by his side when he stepped out of the vehicle, and (2) he “laid the front of his body against the back of the vehicle” when, complying with the detective’s order, he placed his hands on the car to be frisked.
[brief] 509, 515 (App. Div. 2007)).  In addition to Defendants’ failure to challenge the Arbitrator’s award of default interest, the court is limited in its ability to review an arbitrator’s findings.  *Minkowitz v. Israeli*, 433 N.J. Super. 111, 134 (App. Div. 2013) (“[W]hen binding arbitration is contracted for by litigants, the judiciary’s role to determine the substantive matters subject to arbitration ends. ”).
[brief] Yet the FDCPA specifically envisions debt collectors being involved in collection suits and needing to correspond with the court.  See 15 U.S.C. § 1692i.  Similarly, Appellant’s proposed interpretation of the FDCPA would also prohibit a debt collector from communicating with its own employees, who under Appellant’s theory are non-exempted persons.  But the vast majority of debt collectors, including Respondent, are juridical entities that can only act through hired persons.  And courts have held that debt collectors are separate and distinct from the persons they hire.  *See Isaac v. NRA Grp., LLC*, 377 F. Supp. 3d 211, 216 (E.D.N.Y. 2019) (treating debt collector companies and their employees as separate persons under the FDCPA).  Thus, under Appellant’s reading of § 1692c(b), a debt collector would be barred from communicating with its own employees, and thus effectively unable to act on any debt – a patently absurd result.  Finally, Appellant’s theory would potentially prohibit debt collectors from simply using the phone or the internet.  When a debt collector uses the phone or internet, it necessarily transmits information to and from a third-party telephone/internet service provider.  Thus, one could argue with the same reasoning suggested by Appellant that by using the phone and internet, a debt collector has “communicated” with a third-party in violation of the FDCPA.  That would be absurd.  Yet Appellant’s theory of liability requires this result.  Given these ridiculous consequences, Appellant’s plain reading of the FDCPA must be set aside in favor of a sensible interpretation which avoids absurd results, is consistent with all provisions of the FDCPA, and is in line with Congressional intent and legislative history.
[directive] The following procedures apply only to collections from municipal court defendants who are obligated to pay transaction fees:  A  1.  In those jurisdictions where Probation exercises responsibility for collecting payments, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:46-4a(2), if: (a) the defendant makes full payment to the municipal court administrator of all monetary obligations imposed under the sentence, no transaction fee will M be charged; or 9b) the defendant makes partial payment to the municipal court administrator, collection of the transaction fee will be deferred until defendant=s next payment to the Probation Division is due, at which time both the deferred fee and the fee for the second payment will be collected by the Probation Division.  E 2.  In those jurisdictions where the local practice is for the municipal court administrators to collect payments ordered as a condition of probation, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:46-4a(2), the preceding does not apply.
[brief] Jerman v. Carlisle, McNellie, Rini, Kramer & Ulrich LPA, 559 U.S. 573 (2010)  ..............................................................................  33  Johnson v. Roselle EZ Quick LLC, 226 N.J. 370 (2016)  ..................................................................................  10  Johnson v. Statewide Collections, Inc., 778 P.2d 93 (Wyo. 1989) ........................................................................  30  Jusino v. Lapenta, 442 N.J. Super. 248 (Law. Div. 2014) .......................................................  8  Khimmat v. Weltman, Weinberg & Reis Co, LPA, 585 F. Supp. 3d 707 (E.D. Pa. 2022) ......................................................... 16, 17, 34 Lembo v. Marchese, 242 N.J. 477 (2020)