ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] *9  During oral argument, counsel for [...] conceded that the parties agreed upon protocol did not include a limitation date.  However, upon further questioning by the Court, he indicated that during several depositions, including that of [...] as well as [...], it was revealed that communications between [...] and [...] did not formally begin until July 1, 2013.  The Court therein questioned the parties as to when the earliest communication showing any interest, including preliminary discussions, between [...] and [...] began, so as to determine a date within which to restrict the search.
[brief] The Court finds that there is no support in the defendant’s papers or in New Jersey’s law for expanding Appleman’s sequential causation rule to a CTL [sic, should be “CGL”] policy, particularly one that lacks any language that compels its application.  6T30-23 to 6T31-2.  While Simonetti, supra, and Franklin Packaging, supra, addressed property insurance policies, nothing in the language of those cases, in the language of Appelman’s rule (which this Court applied in *Simonetti* and *Franklin Packaging*), or in any other New Jersey case, limits application of the rule to first-party property policies or bars application of the sequential cause rule in a CGL coverage case.  On the contrary, controlling authority has recognized that Appleman’s rule is “generally applicable” and has, in fact, been applied to third-party liability coverage claims by this Court and by the Supreme Court.
[brief] *Id.* at 1314.  Notably, in *Jones*, the Court largely abandoned its use of the term "juvenile," utilizing it in only six instances, four of which were direct quotations from prior opinions.  *Id.* at 1315, 1317, 1318.  Instead, the Court almost exclusively used the term "individuals under [eighteen]."  See, e.g. *id.* at 1314.  In recounting its series of youth-sentencing cases, the Court reaffirmed the clear, constitutional line at age eighteen:  In a series of Eighth Amendment cases applying the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, this Court has stated that youth matters in sentencing.  In *Roper v. Simmons*, 543 U.S. 551 (2005), the Court concluded that the Eighth Amendment prohibits capital punishment for murderers who were under [eighteen] at the time of their crimes.  And in *Graham v. Florida*, 560 U.S. 48 (2010), the Court held that the Eighth Amendment prohibits life without parole for offenders who were under [eighteen] and committed nonhomicide offenses.  Importantly, however, *Graham* did not prohibit life without parole for offenders who were under [eighteen] and committed homicide.
[brief] . . .  And then in *Miller* in 2012, the Court allowed life-without-parole sentences for defendants who committed homicide when they were under [eighteen], but only so long as the sentence is not mandatory—that is, only so long as the sentencer has discretion to "consider the mitigating qualities of youth" and impose a lesser punishment.  [Jones, 141 S. Ct. at 1314 (emphases added). ]  The New Jersey Legislature, as well as the New Jersey Supreme Court, has also consistently drawn the line between childhood and adulthood at eighteen years old.
[brief] A.  The Personal and Business Relationship Between [...] and [...]  The key players are [...] and his former business partner, [...] (“[...]”).  [...] is a chemical engineer with a degree from India.  In 1984, he began to work for defendant [...]  (“[...]”), an environmental testing company, eventually becoming the lab manager.  (4T39:3-18; 4T45:12-17).  [...] immigrated to the U.S. from Iran, studied chemistry, and began working for [...] around the same time as [...].  [...] eventually became [...]’s sales and marketing manager.  (14T13:1-16; 4T45:12-14).  Over time, [...] and [...] became good friends.  [...] hired [...]’s --- 1  Because the facts and procedural history are inextricably intertwined, they are presented in a single narrative for clarity.
[brief] TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ...........................................................................................................  ii  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS, AND RULINGS ON APPEAL .................. viii  TABLE OF APPENDIX .................................................................................................................. ix  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT ......................................................................................................  1  PROCEDURAL HISTORY .............................................................................................................  4  STATEMENT OF FACTS ..............................................................................................................  7  I.  Defendants’ insurance-fraud scheme ....................................................................................  7  A.  Violations of the doctrine against the corporate practice of medicine and practicing medicine without a license .........................................................  8  B.  Kickbacks and illegal self-referrals .................................................................................. 11  C.  RICO violations .................................................................................................................. 13  II.  Plaintiffs’ Decision Point Review Plans (“DPRPs”) .............................................................  13  III.  The Law Division’s decisions on Defendants’ motions to compel arbitration ....................... 15  LEGAL ARGUMENT ..................................................................................................................
[brief] More fundamentally, however, the reasoning upon which those case decisions concluded that municipal water service involves an implied contract is no longer valid and the line of cases is no longer good law.  a.  **The Cases Upon Which [...] Relies Originated to Provide a Basis for Municipalities to Recover Unpaid Water Charges. **  As briefly summarized below, the cases upon which [...] relies originated as a judicially-created means for municipalities to recover unpaid water charges, in the absence of statutory authority allowing such charges to be recovered in the same manner as taxes.
[directive] Note:  If the PSA system is unavailable, a message will be to run the PSA manually and/or proceed with the complaint.  § 1214-Complaint  Petitions plaints mits Com Gu n Per Errors: 0  ERROR: SYSTEM NOT AVAILABLE, PLEASE CONTACT HELPDESK PSA [...] 1214 3427 [...] 2023 COMPLAINT 00 Q. WIP Jacket
[brief] The Trial Court committed reversible error by improperly resolving crucial disputed material facts and the reasonable inferences taken therefrom in the favor of the movants.  Having done so, the Court’s factual conclusions then generated a cascade of legal rulings all of which were supported only by a foundation of conclusions that favored the movants.  Had the Court properly complied with the summary judgment standards and accepted Plaintiffs’ version of the facts, including their fair inferences, the Court could not have dismissed Plaintiffs’ case.  For all of these reasons, and in the interests of justice, the Trial Court’s decision to dismiss Plaintiffs’ case against all Defendants, respectfully, must be overturned.
[brief] The Commissioner denied [...]’s appeal.  [...] now appeals to this Court.  The crux of [...]’s argument is that he was placed in an unfair and irreconcilable position.  He complains that N.J.A.C. § 6A:3-1.3(i) required him to file his petition within 90 days of the [...]’s decision to terminate him, but yet the underlying basis for that decision—the State Board’s decision to suspend his certificate—was still on appeal and awaiting resolution.  He believes that the soundness of the [...]’s decision to terminate his employment depends upon the *State Board Appeal*.  Respectfully, [...] is wrong.  Once the State Board suspended his teaching certificate, the [...] had no choice under N.J.S.A. § 18A:26–2 but to terminate [...].  Doing otherwise would mean ignoring State law.  Deeming the [...]’s decision in November 2021 arbitrary and capricious—and therefore forcing it to reinstate [...] and give him backpay—based on the Appellate Division’s forthcoming decision in the *State Board Appeal* is illogical.  The [...], like any governmental entity, must act based on the facts that exist at the time, not the facts that may exist in the future.  Following the law is not arbitrary and capricious.  [...]’s claims of procedural unfairness cannot withstand even cursory scrutiny.  Knowing the consequences to his employment once the State Board suspended his certificate, [...] should have immediately sought a stay of the State Board’s administrative order under N.J.A.C. § 6A:9B-4.16.  The regulation expressly envisions stays of such administrative decisions and imposes a 30-day deadline.  [...] missed this deadline.  A stay would have permitted [...] to maintain a valid teaching certificate pending resolution of the *State Board Appeal*.  The procedural “dilemma” of which he complains was the product of missing a deadline, not a defect in the law or the [...]’s decision.  Thus, the Commissioner’s decision should be affirmed.
[brief] Because everyone has the right to bear arms in public for purposes of self-defense, a person can preemptively arm herself so long as her purpose in possessing the weapon is self-defense.  In other words, possessing a weapon for self-defense in public, even if there is not an immediate need to act in self-defense, is lawful; it certainly is not a “circumstance[ ] not manifestly appropriate for lawful use. ”  N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(d).  Thus, here, if [...] possessed the tire iron for self-defense, she could not be found guilty of illegally possessing that weapon.  However, the jury never received an instruction communicating this essential principle, even after they asked the court if self-defense applied.  (10T 121-11 to 24)  The jury was not told that self-defense is a lawful reason to possess a weapon rather than a circumstance not manifestly appropriate for lawful use.  The court’s failure to instruct the jury that [...] could lawfully possess the tire iron if her purpose in possessing the weapon was to defend herself requires reversal of this conviction.
[brief] LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT  I.  THE STANDARD OF REVIEW (Raised Below: T1; Pa36)  On appeal, the Court applies a plenary standard or review from a trial court’s granting of a motion to dismiss.  *Rezem Family Assocs., LP v. Borough of Millstone*, 423 N.J. Super. 103, 114 (App. Div. 2011); *Bacon v. N.J. State Dep't of Educ.*, 443 N.J. Super. 24, 33 (App. Div. 2015).
[brief] Defendants set forth as a Statement of Facts statements that are contrary to the facts, disputed facts or opinions rather than facts.  On summary judgment, the movant does not get the benefit of the doubt.  R. 4:46-2(c).  All facts and reasonable inferences must be resolved in favor of the non-movant.  Globe Motor Co. v. Igdalev, 225 N.J. 469, 480 (2016).  Because defendants ignore that basic premise of the standard for review of a motion for summary judgment, defendants’ arguments fail.
[brief] FRIDAY, JANUARY 7, 2022  Legislative Services Commission Meeting 12:00 PM  Virtual Meeting SATURDAY, JANUARY 8, 2022  Apportionment Commission Meeting 12:00 PM  The Apportionment Commission will meet remotely via Zoom.  The Commission will take oral testimony from members of the public on the establishment of State legislative districts in NJ.  As required by the NJ Constitution, the Apportionment Commission is charged with redrawing the lines of the State’s 40 legislative districts, from which the 40 Senators and 80 Members of the General Assembly are elected.  Members of the public may view the live proceedings via the NJ Legislature home page at https://www.njleg.state.nj.us/ or via the Commission’s home page at https://www.apportionmentcommission.org/default.asp.  Those wishing to testify must register online in advance of the meeting at https://www.apportionmentcommission.org/schedule.asp.  Registration is also available at https://www.njleg.state.nj.us/.  Select January 8 on the calendar and click on Apportionment Commission for the registration link.  Registrations must be received by Friday, January 7, 2022 at 3:00 PM.
[brief] Even though he said he had been drinking and could not give precise times, they kept pressing him to do so.  (1T 6-7 to 16-10)  They confronted him with the videos of the Jeep, but even after he told them, “that don’t really look like me,” they continued to show videos until he conceded; then they asserted that the videos “[c]learly” contradicted his alibi, until he again agreed.
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY EXCLUDING TROOPER MORENSKI’S DIAGRAM OF THE ACCIDENT.  (2T:99-22 to 105-23). **  During [...]’s cross-examination of [...], counsel offered into evidence the diagram of the accident prepared by [...] as part of his accident investigation.  (2T:99-17 to 23).  The diagram was prepared by [...] based on his observations of the vehicles at the scene of the accident in an effort to illustrate what he concluded were the points of impact between the three vehicles.  2T:98-23 to 99-2.  The trooper also noted that his understanding of the points of impact was informed by his observation of the damage to the three vehicles.  2T:98-19 to 22.  He further noted that preparation of such a diagram is commonly part of a vehicle accident investigation.  2T:99-3 to 6.  The trooper also testified that the diagram he prepared was intended to be a fair and accurate representation of the points of impact between the three vehicles.  2T:99-17 to 20.  The diagram at issue is located at page 4 of [...]’s accident investigation report.  Da140.  The diagram includes multiple images of each vehicle and labels the vehicles according to the identity assigned to them in the report.  Ibid.  The diagram does not depict or describe the distances between the vehicles or offer any conclusions about the color of the traffic signal at the time of impact.  Ibid.  The only information contained in the diagram is information related to the points of impact between the three vehicles.  Ibid.
[brief] Exhibit Z, Deposition of [...], P.E., dated April 26, 2019, filed May 24, 2019  Exhibit AA, Memorandum Opinion dated August 4, 2017, filed May 24, 2019  Exhibit BB, Transcript of Hearing dated August 4, 2017, filed May 24, 2019 (Volume 14 of 15 – Pa2561 to Pa2758)  Exhibit BB, Transcript of Hearing dated September 15, 2017, filed May 24, 2019  Exhibit CC, Excerpt from [...] Manual for Construction, dated June 1987, filed May 24, 2019  Exhibit DD, Deposition of [...], dated May 10, 2017, filed May 24, 2019  Exhibit EE, Deposition of [...], dated May 10, 2017, filed May 24, 2019 (omitted here – see 1577a)  Exhibit FF, [...] Health and Safety Plan Requirements, dated May 24, 2011, filed May 24, 2019 Notice of Motion for Summary Judgment of [...], filed May 24, 2019 Movant’s Statement of Material Facts, filed May 24, 2019 Certification of [...], filed May 24, 2019
[directive] These additional questions need to be answered if you are pleading guilty to the offense of aggravated sexual assault, sexual assault, aggravated criminal sexual contact, kidnapping under 2C:13-1c(2), endangering the welfare of a child by engaging in sexual conduct which would impair or debauch the morals of the child under 2C:24-4a, endangering the welfare of a child pursuant to 2C:24-4b(3), (4) or (5)(a), endangering the welfare of a child pursuant to 2C:24-4b(5)(b)(i) or (ii) (if the offense was committed on or after February 1, 2018), leader of a child pornography network pursuant to 2C:24-4.1 (if the offense was committed on or after February 1, 2018), luring or enticing a child pursuant to 2C:13-6, criminal sexual contact pursuant to 2C:14-3b if the victim is a minor; kidnapping pursuant to 2C:13-1, criminal restraint pursuant to 2C:13-2 or false imprisonment pursuant to 2C:13-3 if the victim is a minor and the offender is not the parent, promoting child prostitution pursuant to Please note for Question 4b(2) that while endangering the welfare of a child 2C:34-1b(3), (4), or any attempt to commit any such offense.
[brief] Enforcement of a premarital agreement is governed by the version of N.J.S.A § 37:2-38 (1988) in place at the Agreement, which states:  The burden of proof to set aside a premarital agreement shall be upon the party alleging the agreement to be unenforceable.  A premarital agreement shall not be enforceable if the party seeking to set aside the agreement proves, by clear and convincing evidence, that: a. The party executed the agreement involuntarily; or b. The agreement was unconscionable at the time enforcement was sought; or c.  That party, before execution of the agreement:  (1) Was not provided full and fair disclosure of the earnings, property and financial obligations of the other party; (2) Did not voluntarily and expressly waive, in writing, any right to disclosure of the property or financial obligations of the other party beyond the disclosure provided; (3) Did not have, or reasonably could not have had, an adequate knowledge of the property or financial obligations of the other party; or (4) Did not consult with independent legal counsel and did not voluntarily and expressly waive, in writing, the opportunity to consult with independent legal counsel.
[brief] Most pointedly, [...] addressed the “equal footing” issue in his concurrence in Kernahan, where the Court had originally granted certification to specifically address Uber’s present contention that Atalese “runs afoul” of Kindred Nursing Centers Ltd. Partnership v. Clark, 581 U.S. 246 (2017), and the FAA.  Kernahan, 236 N.J. at 327 (Albin, J., concurring).  Though the defendants conceded their facial challenge at oral argument, [...] chose not to “sidestep” the certified issue and went out of his way to demonstrate the tensile strength of the “two interconnected strands of our state-law jurisprudence” Atalese “wove together . . . in assessing the validity of an arbitration agreement[.]”
[brief] In this matter, [...] suggests that a willing buyer and a willing seller would negotiate that sale by considering historic zoning of the property which has not been in effect for more than 25 years.  Contrary to [...]’s assertion, the automatic application of outdated zoning overlooks the required hypothetical open-market real estate transaction, and would only serve to limit the constitutional just compensation owed to [...] for the taking of its property.  In fact, both parties’ appraisal experts conclude that no buyer or seller of the [...] property would consider the outdated “R-2 zoning” as the applicable land use regulation for the property on June 3, 2019.  Rather, a prospective purchaser would acknowledge that the [...] undertook comprehensive zoning reform over many years throughout the City by utilizing redevelopment planning and zoning efforts, as opposed to applying outdated zoning.  [...] requested the Trial Court, and now requests this Appellate Court, to disregard market facts and the subject property’s “highest and best use.
[brief] Not only did this fact exist at the time of bidding and was verifiable through publicly available information, [...]’s inclusion or non-inclusion of a copy of its existing Notice of Classification with its bid could not alter the fact that it currently is, and was classified at the time of bid opening.  Rather than applying the River Vale test in accordance with the court’s reasoning in Suburban Disposal (which would result in the conclusion that the omission of a copy of an existing Notice of Classification is waivable), [...] falsely pretends that [...] may not have been classified by the [...] to perform the work on the Project at the time of bidding.
[brief] (Drb. 1-12).  On Page 3 of Defendant’s Reply Brief, she concedes, “the transcript [of the March 18, 2015 uncontested divorce hearing before [...]] was not provided by either party below…” (Drb. at 3).  As previously mentioned, Defendant’s argument about default judgment, raised for the first time on appeal, violates R. 2:6-2.  In her Reply Brief, she recognized there was an opportunity to raise that issue below by stating, “[I]t should have been…” (Drb. at 3).  It was not.  As explained by the New Jersey Supreme Court, “[A]ppellate courts will decline to consider issues not properly presented to the trial court when an opportunity for such a presentation is available…”  Nieder v. Royal Indem. Ins. Co., 62 N.J. 229, 234 (1973)(internal quotations omitted).  The claim is waived, having never been made in the underlying litigation.
[directive] May 15, 2020  Page4 of  You must not make a record the grand jury proceeding, which means you must not take a of photograph or make a video, audio, or any other type recording, and you must not permit jury anyone else to do so.  You must not share or broadcast the grand proceeding in any way.  of of  The reasons for all these critical instructions is to protect the integrity the grand jury and to jury assure that both sides receive a fair grand hearing from fair and impartial grand jurors.
[brief] Moreover, this “robust informed civic participation” impairment issue shrouds the validity of [...]'s July 30, 2021 fair share housing settlement.  Upon the advice of former counsel, defendants concealed the final settlement terms (increased zoning overlay densities, a 200 units inclusionary [...] adjacent to the Canoe Brook Reservoir, a 150 units [...] inclusionary housing project and a 75 units 100% affordable housing project on the township’s contaminated DPW site with a promised long term tax exemption) until after reconsideration and ratification.  Indeed, no tribunal wants to touch this patent “robust informed civic participation,” [...] and Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing Violations Radioactive Third Rail.
[brief] There are several reasons for this.  A) I had several valid substantive arguments supporting my position.  For starters, comparing what I had argued in my Aug 29, 2022 brief (Pa61) to this Court’s findings in *Haylett*, shows that they are virtually the exact same positions.  Thus, the only 2 possible are conclusions are either:  A) Even though I couldn’t exactly recall this opinion at the time in 2022, in the back of my mind I still remembered what I had learned from reading it (in passing) years earlier when I was researching my case against [...]; or B) I thought of my position all by myself, without even any subconscious knowledge of *Haylett*, and I just happened to think the same exact way as the 3 judges (i.e. the trial court and the 2 Appellate judges) did in that case.  Although I think that the most-likely and logical conclusion is the former scenario (i.e. that in 2022 I had vaguely recalled this Court’s rulings in *Haylett* and attempted to reiterate those findings therein, even though not specifically cited when the case was before the trial court), the latter scenario is also possible (i.e. that “great minds think alike”).  But as I will discuss in detail within the next several paragraphs, either way, my position certainly was not frivolous.