ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] I called PA WC Bureau.  The woman I spoke to confirmed that:  1.)  A Workers Compensation policy (#[...]-through [...]) per attached Certificate of Insurance issued to you [[...]] by [...] for the [...], was, in fact, issued and reported to them on 8/1/2015, showing [...] as Named Insured.  (she could not provide copy of that policy to me).  2.)  A copy of that actual policy #[...] was received by the bureau on 8/10/2015  3.)  Electronic notice was sent to the Bureau by [...] that policy #[...] was cancelled flat (8/1/15) – reason: Coverage placed elsewhere.  The bureau was notified of this cancellation on 8/17/15.  Is there any record of Notice of Cancellation to you Directly from [...]:  You are the First Named Insured on this policy, therefore, you should have received formal notice from the carrier or [...].  [Dta1325 (emphasis supplied). ]  On the same date, an employee of [...] responded that it “never come across a letter or email that formally notified us of cancellation. ”  (Dta1324)  This is also confirmed by [...] and [...].  [...]’s representative testified that there was no formal process at the time to inform erroneously enrolled subcontractors that they were not covered, and it was unclear to [...] whether a notice of cancellation was sent to [...].  (Dta1072-1076, T132-4 to 136-16.)  [...]’s representative testified that, although its subcontract language provided that [...] may “request that any subcontractor of any tier withdraw from the CCIP upon 30 days written notice,” she was unaware of any written notice issued to [...] informing it of withdrawal from the CCIP.  (Dta1077-80, [...] dep. T62-22 to 63-23.)  F.  [...]’s Purported “Unenrollment”  From The CCIP  [...]’s conceded failure to give notice of coverage termination to [...], and its inability to internally confirm cancellation, relegated it to crafting from whole cloth a factual mosaic based on the underlying contract documents to bootstrap its cancellation argument, which the Law Division improperly credited.
[brief] --- \(^{15}\)  The parties dispute the meaning of a "routine upgrade" and whether it relates to a utility's "need to expand" existing utility services, as perhaps implied in Conditional Highlands Applicability Determination, [...], 433 N.J. Super. at 237, or whether it is instead related to "whether the project is a 'system' upgrade" in accordance with Exemption 11 and the DEP's rules, requiring assessment of "environmental impacts."  As we are not bound by the decision of another panel of this court, Brundage v. Est. of Carambio, 195 N.J. 575, 593 (2008), and the issue is not squarely before us, we express no opinion on this point, deeming it a question for the Department in the first instance.
[brief] However, the trial court misconstrued the entire purpose of the estoppel certificate and seemingly viewed the Estoppel Provision as an extension of the due diligence provisions of the PSA, as evidenced by the trial court’s references to a right to cure in its decision (Da12) and its assertion that the Estoppel Provision was intended for the purpose of appraising [...] of “adverse information” so it could terminate the PSA.
[brief] Specifically, N.J.S.A. 34:11-56.51 provides that “no contractor shall bid on any contract for public work as defined in section 2 of P.L. 1963, c. 150 (C.34:11-56.26), or for which payment of the prevailing wage is required by any other provision of law. ”  After defining the categories of projects for which the PWCRA applies and imposing the registration requirement on the contractor performing those projects, the PWCRA then mandates that all subcontractors performing work on site under the contractor be registered regardless of the work they perform.  Id.  Moreover, unlike N.J.S.A. 34:11-56.51 (which expressly defines the phrase “public work” in accordance with the Prevailing Wage Act), N.J.S.A. 34:11-56.51a does not do so.  Even if the Prevailing Wage Act’s definitions apply to limit the breadth of the PWCRA (which it does not), the term “worker” includes “labor” performed by “skilled or semi-skilled” labor “regardless of whether their work becomes a component part” of the project.
[brief] On the other hand, Paragraph 24(G) could not be clearer.  It excludes from the general release and waiver: [...]’s right to receive any remaining amount of the Reserve or any other assets that are distributable to [...] from [...] and [...] pursuant to this Agreement.  The Parties acknowledge that [...] is not releasing her right to receive any property to which she is entitled as a beneficiary of [...] or [...]; (Da96, at ¶ 24(G)) (emphasis added) (white space added for clarity).
[brief] ”  *Gideon*, 244 N.J. at 551 (quoting *Strickland*, 466 U.S. 693).  “The overall strength of the evidence before the factfinder is important in analyzing the second prong of *Strickland*.”  *Id.* at 556 (citing *Pierre*, 223 N.J. at 583).  “Determination of prejudice requires consideration of all the evidence presented at trial and the likely effect the evidence presented post-conviction would have had on the final result.
[brief] The [...] franchise agreements show that the company he was running for his family had an arrangement with [...] to run a franchise out of the [...] location that [...] controlled.  The [...] Principal Owner’s Guaranty demonstrates that [...] had a thirty percent (30%) interest in the project through [...].  These documents are plainly material to the issue of whether [...] deceived investors with respect to his authority to solicit investments, which is the singular count of the indictment on which he was convicted.  The documents demonstrate his authority to do so.
[brief] The aforementioned Environmental Report issued alongside [...]’s Waterfront Development Permit describes the Department’s intentions for public shoreline access at [...]’s property, which entails a public pathway leading from the entrance of the Property to the water's edge, as well as the use of a kayak launch and the provision of dedicated parking spaces.  The Department has never so much as attempted to explain how it arrived at the conclusion that [...]’s alleged obligation to provide meaningful and reasonable public access under the Law can be satisfied only through such extensive use of [...]’s property.  Even without the benefit of additional context, the Public Access Law’s plain language requirement that public access provided under its authority be reasonable and meaningful provides clear guidelines for the Department’s execution of its statutory responsibilities.
[brief] (Da69 to 70).  On October 12, 2023, Defendants filed a letter brief in reply to Plaintiff’s opposition to their motion for reconsideration.  Pursuant to R.2:6-1(a)(2), a copy of Defendants’ brief in reply is not appended hereto.  On November 9, 2023, the trial court entered Final Judgment in Plaintiff’s favor against Defendants [...], [...] and [...] in the amount of $954,344.07.
[brief] On 2-26-19 [...] purchased 20 Chata Refried Pinto Beans in a pouch from [...] which advertised as Kosher (Aa5).  When [...] received this item and read the ingredients it had lard which makes it not kosher.  Therefore, [...] immediately wrote to [...] in March to inform the Vendor of the false advertisement and for permission to return the item for a full refund or credit but Walkenhorst failed to respond.  [...] wrote again in April and did not receive a response.  [...] then sent [...] a 5-17-19 letter certified with the Sales Order informing the Vendor of the false advertisement of the item received and requested permission to return the item for a refund or credit (Aa4; Aa5; Aa6).  On 7-27-19 [...] filed a Grievance informing [...] of the mailroom's refusal to send his items back to [...] (Aa1).  In response, [...]'s personnel [...] and [...] falsely stated we do not ship food as a rule and regulation (Aa1).  On 8-19-19 [...] filed a Grievance informing [...] of the violation of his federal and state constitutional rights.  Also, of Doc's false claim to be following a policy which OVER does not exist in any information provided to [...] from [...].  (Aa2).  In response, [...]'s personnel [...] and [...] both falsely claimed to be following a policy, which does not exist.  (Aa2).  Therefore, [...]'s decision to refuse [...] to send the item back is arbitrary (Aa2).  [...] received a response from [...] dated 8-9-19 with permission to return the item for a refund.  (Aa7).  Yet, [...]'s personnel have deprived [...] of the liberty to comply and caused the loss.  (Aa1).  Therefore, [...] submitted a property claim on 9-20-19 (Aa3).
[brief] ORDER on Defendant’s Motion for Reconsideration (State)  [...] v. State, et al., [...] (April 14, 2023) ..............Aa124-25  EMAIL OPINION on Appellant’s Motion to Dismiss JOC and Vacate VOP  [...] v. State, et al., [...] (April 14, 2023) ..........Aa219  ORDER on Appellant’s Motion to Dismiss JOC and Vacate VOP (State)
[brief] (Da1101).  The prejudice to [...] at that point was significant.  The parties appeared for pretrial conference on June 29, 2022.  In advance, both parties submitted their pretrial memorandums.  (Da1105 & Da1120).  Plaintiffs’ pretrial memorandum sought to introduce at trial the alleged Administrative Code violations that were rejected with their motion to amend, [...] objected but the plaintiffs were permitted to introduce those alleged Administrative Code violations after [...]’s concession based solely on the fact the alleged Administrative Code violations were “technical violations” for which no proximate nexus existed to form any ascertainable loss to the plaintiffs.
[brief] 3.  Assuming that both (1) and (2) above have been demonstrated, that there was no requirement for Site Plan approval for the layout and terms of such off-site parking facility for Lot 8 to be located on Lot 5 occupied by a grade school.  4.  Assuming that (1), (2), and (3) above have all been demonstrated by sufficient proofs, the proponent would have to provide sufficient evidence of exactly what the use was at the time that some later ordinance was adopted that prohibited this off-site (and second) use on the School Lot 5, and its “character, extent, intensity and incidents” at that time so that the Zoning Board could determine exactly the scope and extent of the nonconforming use that is legal.
[brief] I, ¶ 10 | 42 | | U.S. Const. amend. V | 9, 42 | | U.S. Const. amend. VI | 42, 56 | | U.S. Const. amend. XIV | 9, 42, 56 | | **Other Authorities** | | | Biunno, Weissbard & Zegas, Current N.J. Rules of Evidence, cmt. | 43 | | on N.J.R.E. 806 (2023) | | TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (CONT'D) Other Authorities (Cont'd) DNA Exonerations in the U.S. (1989-2020), Innocence Project (2020), https://innocenceproject.org/dna-exonerations-in-the-united-states................................................................................. 41 [...] et al., Campbell Collab., Effects of Parental Imprisonment on Child Antisocial Behaviour and Mental Health: A Systematic Review (2009), https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/229378.pdf................................................................. 65 [...] & [...], Econ. Pol’y Inst., Mass Incarceration and Children’s Outcomes (2016), https://files.epi.org/pdf/118615.pdf.................................................................................. 65 Model Jury Charges (Criminal), “Certain Persons Not to Have any Firearms (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-7(b)(1))” (rev. Feb. 12, 2018) ....................... 58, 59 Model Jury Charges (Criminal), “Certain Persons Not to Have any Weapons (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-7(a))” (rev. Feb. 12, 2018)
[directive] This most recent round of revisions reflects the need to incorporate emerging best practices into the State’s internal affairs system, and to ensure that all law enforcement agencies in the State are adhering to the guidelines.  1.0.5  It is important for county and municipal law enforcement agencies to recognize that, as they conduct internal affairs investigations, they do so under the general supervision of the Attorney General.  The Criminal Justice Act of 1970 designates the Attorney General as the State’s chief law enforcement officer.  See N.J.S.A. 52:17B-98.  As such, the Attorney General is responsible for the general supervision of the State’s law enforcement agencies to  1  INTERNAL AFFAIRS POLICY & PROCEDURES | August 2020 provide for the efficient administration of the criminal justice system.  Subordinate law enforcement agencies, including county and municipal police forces, have a duty to cooperate with the Attorney General to improve the administration of the criminal justice system, including the efficient delivery of police services.  For county and municipal law enforcement agencies, cooperation in internal affairs matters begins with strict adherence to the Attorney General’s policy requirements.
[brief] Regarding depositions, Plaintiff’s Counsel deposed [...] (over the course of 3 days) and nine fact witnesses, as follows:  1. [...], Esq.  ([...] organization designee)  2. [...] ([...] notary)  3. [...] ([...] notary)  4. [...] ([...]’s paramour)  5.  [...] ([...]’s mother)  6.  [...] ([...]’s sister)  7.  [...] ([...]’s brother in law)  8.  [...] ([...]’s father)  9.  [...] ([...]’s friend)  Defense Counsel did not take any depositions.
[directive] Disorderly Persons  $500 to $1,000 10% permissible CDS or Analog grams or less of hashish.  Failure to Turn Over CDS to Law  Actor knowingly obtains or possesses a controlled dangerous substance or controlled 2C:35-10c  Disorderly Persons $500 to $1,000 10% permissible Enforcement substance analog and who fails to voluntarily deliver the substance to the nearest law Officer enforcement officer.  Drug Actor uses or possesses with intent to use drug paraphernalia for purposes listed in the 2C:36-2 Paraphernalia - statute, including to ingest, inhale or otherwise introduce into the human body a controlled Disorderly Persons  $500 to $1,000 10% permissible  Use or Possession dangerous substance or controlled substance analog.  with Intent to Use  Actor possesses with intent to use a hypodermic needle or hypodermic syringe or any other Possession or instrument adapted for use of a controlled dangerous substance or a controlled substance  Distribution of 2C:36-6a analog or sells, furnishes or gives to any person such syringe, needle or instrument.
[directive] Officers who place a person under arrest for a CDL/DWI violation (N.J.S.A. 39:3-10.13) or operating a vessel while intoxicated (OVWI) violation (N.J.S.A. 12:7-46) are to continue to use the Standard Statements for those offenses, as revised effective February 1, 2001.  Please note, however, that the content of the Standard Statements cannot be altered or changed in any manner, and cannot be translated to any other language.  Police and law enforcement agencies should NOT attempt to contact the [...], the [...] or the [...] with their inquiries concerning this matter.
[brief] For brevity’s sake, hereafter the following abbreviated terms are used in this document:  • The Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Civil Part, Camden Vicinage – the trial court.  • The Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division – the court or this court.  •  This particular case - this case or the case.  • Plaintiffs [...] - plaintiffs.  • Defendant [...] – defendants.  • [...] – fictitious parties named to the complaint – the Does.
[brief] Thus, the right to specific performance turns not only on whether the plaintiff has a legal right, but also whether performance of the contract represents an equitable result.  *Id.* at 605.  To demonstrate, *89 Water Street Assocs. v. Reilly*, 2019 WL 4793073, at *1 (App. Div. Oct. 1, 2019) (unpublished opinion, cited in accordance with R. 1:36-3), involved a contract for the sale and purchase of a contaminated property.
[brief] Pa2; Pa64.  A Resolution of Support was not issued to either Plaintiff [...] or Defendant [...].  The amended, closed session meeting minutes of the [...] from September 20, 2022 explained the thought process of the full Council respecting the selection of [...].  Pa110.  Council President [...] explained her thoughts on the process, including the pros and cons for why she favored [...] over [...].  She noted her preference for supporting a midsized organization for the Support Resolution, such as [...], as opposed to a larger organization.  In addition, she, along with Councilmembers [...], [...], and [...], expressed concerns with the [...] site, including the number of cars entering and leaving the site, visibility concerns, and traffic exiting the site into a high speed lane of oncoming traffic.  The RFA explicitly required applicants to address traffic issues, stating 17.  Describe the Applicant’s nuisance mitigation plan that specifically addresses:
[brief] At the same time, it must also be recognized Rule 60 (b) (6) provides a catchall for vacating a judgment without time limit for “any other reason that justifies relief” (33-years “until” the default judgement was actually discovered which supports this defendant’s motion to vacate a default judgment due to exceptional circumstances and cited established case law and that Proper Notice had not been afforded regarding the March 9, 1990 hearing.( Pa6; Pa10; Pa21; Pa33-Pa35; Pa39-Pa41).  In the instance case of Court Invest. Co. v. Perillo, N.J. 48 N.J. 334, 225, A2d 352 (1966) established “*** (motion under (f) is addressed to the discretion of the trial court.  That discretion is a broad one to be exercised according to equitable principles, and the decision reached by the trial court will be accepted by an appellant tribunal in the ABSENCE of ABUSE of DISCRETION).  No categorization can be made of the situations which would warrant redress under section (f) is its capacity for relief in exceptional situations.  And in such exceptional cases its boundaries are as expansive as the need to achieve equity and justice. ”
[brief] ¹  The plea form, which the court reviewed with defendant on the record, (2T8-21 to 13-12), stated defendant’s ¹  The date of the crime in [...] was amended to July 5, 2020, and the weapon involved was amended to a handgun.  (2T3-18 to 5-10). understanding that he was subject to a mandatory period of parole ineligibility of five years, and that the State would recommend a sentence of five years, with eighty-five percent of that time subject to parole ineligibility, to run concurrently with a sentence of five years, with five years of parole ineligibility.  (Da36-37).  It further stated that the State would move to dismiss all other counts of [...], and would move to dismiss [...].  (Da37).  Defendant also executed the supplemental plea form for cases subject to the No Early Release Act (NERA), N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2, and the supplemental plea form for offenses subject to the Graves Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6c. (Da40-41).  On April 19, 2024, the trial court sentenced defendant to five years in prison, with eighty-five percent of that time subject to parole ineligibility, on his conviction for second-degree aggravated assault, and five years in prison, with five years of parole ineligibility, on his conviction for second-degree being a certain person not to possess a weapon, with the sentences to run concurrently.  (3T10-14 to 11-15).  Mandatory fines were also imposed.  (3T10-22 to 23; 3T11-14 to 15).  Counts two through seven of [...], and [...], were dismissed.  (3T11-23 to 12-14; Da42-45; Da46-48; Da49-51).  Defendant filed his notice of appeal on May 7, 2024.  (Da52-55).
[brief] As indicated above, when it became evident that he would not be released, the Civil Assignment Judge was again contacted (Da-29), but she refused to assign a date to accommodate the Appellant’s release.  There is no question that counsel for the Appellant misread the trial Judge’s emails concerning what had to be done to accommodate the Court and produce the Appellant from State Prison.  Counsel kept the Court informed (Da-27, Da-29, Da-30), but the Court would not budge.  Consequently, on March 11th, counsel for the Plaintiff and counsel for the Appellant both appeared in Morristown, where it was stated: I know he had to pay, but I thought -- I thought you just send him a check afterwards.  I didn’t know you had to pay upfront; (4T; 4:10).  There is the heart of the problem, but both the civil Assignment Judge and the trial Judge refused to forgive counsel’s mistake.
[brief] JUDICIAL DUTY TO ENSURE FAIR EXAMINATION OF THE ISSUES.  In *Potente v. County of Hudson*, 187 N.J. 103 (2006), the New Jersey Supreme Court emphasized that trial courts hold a responsibility not just to the letter of the procedural law but to the overarching principles of fairness and justice.  Courts must ensure that decisions are not merely reflections of procedural compliance but are founded on a thorough and fair examination of the contested issues.  As noted in Point I, Plaintiff’s motion was denied “without prejudice” (Pa27), and Plaintiff was told to “do whatever [Plaintiff] need[s] to do to get this back before [the motion judge]” (T16-9 to T16-10).  Because the lower court contemplated Plaintiff having another opportunity to substantively litigate which party owns the Property, it was erroneous to award the Property to Defendant (via its cross-motion) solely on procedural grounds.  **CONCLUSION**
[brief] “On the other hand, the employer’s \(^{15}\) The plaintiff did not appeal dismissal of negligent hiring, training, and supervision claims before the Supreme Court.  *Wilson*, 209 N.J. at 570 n.8.  negligence with respect to selection, retention, and supervision of employees is important when the employee is acting outside the scope of employment. ”  *Id.* at 168 (citing *Di Cosala*, 91 N.J. at 173).  Thus, while a plaintiff may simultaneously plead theories of vicarious liability and negligent training and supervision, the latter becomes redundant once the employee’s conduct is determined to fall within the scope of employment.