ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] But the State did not offer testimony from anyone who witnessed the shooting, nor did it offer a motive, a firearm, or any identification of a man observed with a gun.  Instead, the State relied upon circumstantial evidence alone: inconsistent descriptions of the fleeing suspect; surveillance footage that purportedly showed the suspect exiting a black Chevy Malibu; and evidence that [...] had previously driven that vehicle.  However, the case had numerous flaws – two of which would have been fatal were it not for errors at trial.  First, the only camera that purportedly depicted the shooter exiting the Chevy was taken from such a great distance that the images on screen are indistinguishable.  Second, the descriptions of the suspect were as consistent, if not more consistent, with the appearance of [...], a man who was known as a driver of the Chevy.  It was only by virtue of the errors discussed below that the State overcame these flaws.  Namely, despite having not witnessed the shooting, a detective gave improper video narration testimony identifying the Chevy, the shooter, and [...] on video.  Additionally, the court did not instruct the jury on third-party guilt, despite evidence indicating that [...] may have committed the crime.  Considering the weaknesses of the case, these errors deprived [...] of due process and a fair trial, requiring reversal.
[brief] The arbitration provision in the Wholesaler Agreement states in relevant part as follows:  This Agreement shall be governed by, and construed in accordance with, the laws of the State of New York.  Any controversy or claim arising out of or relating to this Agreement shall be settled by arbitration in New York, New York pursuant to the rules and regulations of the American Arbitration Association.  (Pa69).  The express waiver requirement of Atalese applies here since there is a clear imbalance of power between [...] (brewer) and Appellants (wholesalers), that is not only factually supported by the evidence, but presumed in the MBPA itself.
[brief] See CWA v. --- \(^5\)  See [...] Opposition Brief, p. 10 (In response to Appellant’s proposition that the reprimand in response to the counseling note (Da7) was retaliatory, [...] explains “After [...] started its investigation, [...] met with [...] Defendants [...] and [...] on November 27, 2018, to discuss various issues with her performance.  None of the performance issues discussed during the meeting originated from complaints of [...] personnel after [...] filed her EEO complaint. ”)  Retarded Citizens, 250 N.J. Super. 403, 416 (Ch. Div. 1991).  Second, [...] repeatedly argues that they had “no control” over [...] employees, and therefore, they could not do anything to investigate or remediate the situation beyond transferring Appellant to a different [...] office.
[brief] The [...] specifically created the [...] to act as an authorized municipal agency which would review applicants for cannabis-related development to protect “the public, health, safety, and general welfare of the [...] and its residents[.]”  See Hoboken City Ordinance §196-33.1; §36-4(A).  The [...] application process is not, as the trial court suggested, merely a submission requirement.  Rather, it is a rigorous application process that includes the submission of all materials required for the [...]’s cannabis-related site plan approval and requires a public hearing, notice of that public hearing via certified mail, testimony from the applicant’s operators, questions from members of the [...] and the public, and final agency approval via vote of its members.  If the City were permitted to change relevant ordinances during the [...] application process, or even after the [...] deems an application complete (as was the case here), it would allow the City to change the law to frustrate the application.
[brief] By a vote of 6-0, the jury found the defendant to be negligent.  (7T124:3-10; Pa158).  By a vote of 6-0, the jury found that the defendant’s negligence was not a proximate cause of the plaintiff’s accident that occurred on May 30, 2019.  (7T124:13-24; Pa158).  On July 12, 2023, an Order for Judgment Upon Jury Verdict was filed entering judgment in favor of the defendant and dismissing the Complaint with prejudice.
[directive] The revised Guidelines incorporate rules formerly set forth in an ! Application Note that explain when and under what circumstances a prosecutor may consent to a defendant’s application for pretrial intervention (P.T.I.) when the defendant is charged with a violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7 or any second degree crime under Chapter 35 of Title 2C.  See Section 3.12.  The revised Guidelines eliminate the requirement that the prosecutor provide case-specific notification to the [...] of the basis for a prosecutor’s decision to consent to pretrial intervention in these cases.  Instead, prosecutors are only required to provide aggregate statistical notification to the [...] of the total number of cases where a defendant charged with these offenses has been admitted to the PTI program.  The revised Guidelines expressly incorporate the provisions of an ! earlier Attorney General Directive that authorizes prosecutors to consent to a defendant’s application to be sentenced to drug or alcohol treatment in lieu of imprisonment pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14.  See Section 3.13.  Prosecutors are generally authorized to issue “conditional” Brimage plea offers that would afford a defendant the option to select treatment or imprisonment; however, in order to support New Jersey’s Drug Court Program, limitations are placed on the prosecutor’s authority to tender a conditional standardized “open” offer.
[brief] Appellant cites to Syverson v. Consol. Rail Corp., 19 F.3d 824 (2d Cir. 1994) that his case is easily distinguished from the matter at hand.  The incident in Syverson was the result of an assault by someone living in an illegal camp on railroad property.  The railroad was faulted for being aware of the camp and failing to clear the residents off their property.  As was noted above, [...] had no authority to remove or bar [...] from [...].  [...] cannot be found liable in the same manner as the defendant in Syverson.  The Trial Court never held that a railroad could not be found liable for the criminal acts of a third party.  Rather, the Court held that [...] could not be held liable for [...]’s actions in this matter.  The Trial Court properly evaluated the case and was correct in granting summary judgment to [...].  CONCLUSION
[brief] \[Pa298 at ¶ 4; Pa300\].  [...] also contends that its importation of hundreds of truckloads of unknown and unauthorized solid waste, in unmarked trucks by \(^4\)  Because [...] and its principal were permitted to remain in possession despite their unauthorized dumping, they prevented [...]’s environmental expert from accessing the Leased Premises to assess the damage they had caused as late as October 19, 2023.  \[Pa163\]. unknown individuals, was merely a “paving” project after it vacated that it neglected to mention to its landlord.  [Db6]
[brief] Cox & Koenig, New Jersey Zoning and Land Use Administration, §14-3.1 (Gann 2023).  ............................................. 19 Cox & Koenig, New Jersey Zoning and Land Use Administration, §18-1.2 (Gann 2023).  .............................................  17 Cox & Koenig, New Jersey Zoning and Land Use Administration, §18-4.4 (Gann 2023)  ......................... 25, 29  Cox & Koenig, New Jersey Zoning and Land Use Administration, §19-1 (Gann 2023)  ......................... 27  Cox & Koenig, New Jersey Zoning and Land Use Administration, §33-2.1 (Gann 2023)  .........................  17  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
[brief] (Pa90 – Pa91).  Notice of that adoption was published in the *South Jersey Times* on April 27, 2022.  (Da26).  No appeal of Ordinance No. 13-2022 was filed until [...] filed its Complaint in Lieu of Prerogative Writs on November 30, 2022, nearly 200 days following the publication of the ordinance’s introduction on April 8.  (Pa1).  On November 14, 2022, the Committee proceeded to adopt Resolution 202-2022 authorizing the execution of a Redevelopment Agreement with [...] and the same day adopted Ordinance No. 36-2022, authorizing execution of a Financial (PILOT) Agreement to allow [...] to make payments to the Committee in lieu of conventional ad valorem taxes.
[brief] Trying to fit a square peg in a round hole, Defendants’ arguments to knock out [...]’s nuisance claim on theories of res judicata or collateral estoppel arising from the *Burke* Action [Db34-38] fail due to material changes in facts, issues, and evidence.  It is well-settled that when “subsequent events materially alter the facts underlying a judgment, a party is not precluded from pursuing fresh litigation” by res judicata.  *Town of Secaucus v. Hackensack Meadowlands Dev. Comm’n*, 267 N.J. Super. 361, 374 (App. Div. 1993).  Put differently, “res judicata does not bar claims that are predicated on events that postdate the filing of the initial complaint. ”  *Rippon v. Smigel*, 449 N.J. Super. 344, 368 (App. Div. 2017) (citation omitted).  Likewise, “[c]ollateral estoppel will not be applied ‘where, after the rendition of the judgment, events or conditions arise which create a new legal situation or alter the rights of the parties. ’”  *Kozlowski v. Smith*, 193 N.J. Super. 672, 675 (App. Div. 1984) (quoting *Washington Twp. v. Gould*, 39 N.J. 527, 533 (1963)).  The record is undisputed that the harm resulting from the Burkes’ conduct was fully abated by the relief afforded by the arbitration award.  [Pa339-340 ¶¶ 13-18, 20-21, 29].  There was no unusual accumulation of water on [...]’s property for the following decade.  [*Id.*]  Subsequent events that postdated the *Burke* Action by almost ten years caused a material alteration in the facts: Defendants’ modifications to the driveway in 2021.  Because [...]’s nuisance claim is predicated exclusively on harm resulting from Defendants’ 2021 modifications to the driveway (i.e., not the Burke’s modifications many years earlier), neither res judicata nor collateral estoppel are viable defenses would prevent reversal of summary judgment.
[brief] The focus of the lower court was the parameters of the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act, (“CFA”) N.J.S.A. § 56:8-2 as it relates to third party debt collections, an issue which has already been reviewed by a multitude of courts, both on the trial and appellate levels.  The claim that “the debt buying industry [is] immune from the Consumer Fraud Act’s coverage,” (Pb1) means no more than complaining it is immune from any other unrelated Act.  The NJCFA is a specific act, simply defined as false statements relating to the sale or advertisement of any merchandise or real estate.  Both State and Appellate Courts have repeatedly stated that debt collection does not fall within that definition.
[brief] The use of the disputed property, Lot 22 has been open, obvious and notorious.  [...] engaged in maintenance of the disputed land and performed landscaping chores on a routine basis throughout the year and at times had outside companies perform this work.  *(Da55, [...] Answers to Interrogatories, pars. 23, 24; Da358, Receipt from snow removal company)*  In addition, [...] parishioners engaged in snow removal from this land in the winter and at times had outside companies perform this work.  *(Da358, [...] Answers to Interrogatories, par. 24)*  For the history of ownership of the church, parishioners have parked their vehicles in the disputed lot for church service and other events at the church.  [...] entered into a contract with [...] ([...]) and had a light pole erected in this lot and on a monthly basis, [...] pays the electric bill for the light in the disputed lot.
[brief] Id. at 419.  In determining whether an agency's decision is arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable, this Court shall scrutinize: (1) whether the agency's decision conforms with relevant law; (2) whether the decision is supported by substantial credible evidence in the record; and (3) whether in applying the law to the facts, the "agency clearly erred in reaching [its] conclusion."  In re Stallworth, 208 N.J. 182, 194 (2011) (quoting In re Carter, 191 N.J. 474, 482-83 (2007)).
[brief] (See Pa791 – Pa792).  C.  [...] Confirms, In Writing, That An Arrangement Exists Between [...] And [...] Such That [...] Is [...]’s “Trusted Partner” In Developing The [...] Brand.  At the start of [...]’s relationship with [...], Mr. Straubel established, in writing, an express arrangement with [...] for the development and sale of [...] products.  Specifically, by emailed dated January 19, 2009, Mr. Straubel wrote, in part:  Okay, [...].  [T]his (the corrected invoice Tony [Rodriguez] just sent) is reflecting your cost of the cart in question.  . .  Please approach this relationship with the understanding that we are in it together.  There is not an attempt to get rich quick or with [[...]].  We understand your value and respect your market area and of course you and Patrick [Farrell] as trusted partners in this endeavor.  We will do everything we can to be consistent in this statement.  . . . (Pa789) (emphasis added).  Further confirming [...]’s critical and integral role in the creation of the [...] brand, [...] was even the initial owner of the website “summersetoutdoorliving.com. ” (Pa575).  This is evidenced by the email from [...] to [...], dated June 9, 2009, where he writes:  Hey Tony, Here is the transfer codes for SUMMERSETOUTDOORLIVING.COM.  I guess we have no more leverage with you guys!!! thanks, Patrick (Pa798-Pa800).  Moreover, that same year, [...] further confirmed his and [...]’s reliance on [...] for the development of the brand, writing, in an email to [...]:  …I must tell you, we are really getting excited for this [[...]] operation.  Jeff [Straubel] and I were discussing today that we need to discuss territory and really put a solid program of support together now that you are going to carry the entire line.  (Pa914).  D.
[brief] “[f]urnishing water might be considered as a sale of a ‘service’, as distinguished from the sale of ‘goods’, on the theory that \(^{64}\) *Yardville Estates, Inc. v. City of Trenton*, 66 N.J. Super. 51 (App. Div. 1961)(quoting *Woodside Homes, Inc. v. Morristown*, 26 N.J. 529 (1958)).  \(^{65}\) *Rox v. Allstate Ins. Co.*, 250 N.J. Super. 536 (Law Div. 1991).  water is a naturally produced item which is simply being distributed. ”  Taxes are distinguished from water charges:  As to plaintiff's first contention, it is clear in New Jersey that charges for water usage may be distinguished from taxes in certain kinds of cases.  However, examination of cases making such a distinction reveals that these cases have focused on the contractual nature of the relationship between the municipality providing water and the residents consuming that water rather than on the procedure for collecting water charges.  The sale of water is clearly performed via a service contract: a property owner cannot be compelled to pay for water he does not use unless he enters into a service contract….  We agree with the trial judge that nonusers of the system cannot be compelled to pay a minimum fee based on operating costs and expenses as well as debt service without contracting for the use of the system.
[brief] As set forth in Section II.B.2.b. infra, disclosure of a student’s gender nonconformity to their parents over their objection risks harm to the individual student’s physical safety, mental health, and educational outcomes.  It also disrupts a school’s attempt to foster an educational environment that is inclusive and free of discrimination.  In Moriarty, the New Jersey Supreme Court recognized that “avoidance of harm to the child” is a “sufficiently compelling justification for the infringement on the fundamental right of parents to raise their children as they see fit.
[brief] ”  Da45.  Although the proposal at that time included various buffers, the height of the development, just as with [...], presented an incongruity with the existing zoning limitations.  The Township Planner commented:  It is noted that the proposed maximum height of 3 stories and 35 feet is somewhat higher than the Township Code currently permits for assisted living and residential health care facilities in the OB and I Zones (which permit a maximum of 30 feet, but no limit on the number of floors).  In addition, the proposed maximum height is somewhat higher than is currently permitted in the R-20A and R-20B Zones (which permit a maximum of 35 feet and 2½ stories for single-family dwellings, and a maximum of 30 feet and 2½ stories for townhouse development).  Da46.  Finally, the Township Planner concluded as follows:  Based on the above analysis, it appears that there is sufficient merit to the applicant’s rezoning request to warrant the request being referred to the Planning Board for their review and comment.
[brief] N.J.S.A. 52:14B-3.1.  In the words of the Legislature, third party appeals “would give rise to a chaotic unpredictability and instability that would be most disconcerting to New Jersey’s business climate and would cripple economic development in our State. ”  N.J. Stat. § 52:14B-3.1.  If the Trust advocates for a substitute or additional procedure here—and [...] argues the Trust does not clearly articulate any such standard—that process would necessarily be functionally indistinguishable from a public hearing during the permitting process—a hearing before the hearing.
[brief] ”  (Da0346; Da0370)  This is the exact same mechanism of injury testified to by [...], except that [...]’s testimony substantiates that the silicone particulate caused the retinal detachment, that led to the need for surgery and the eventual migration of the Ozurdex steroid into [...]’s anterior chamber.  Plaintiff’s treating and board-certified ophthalmologist expert, [...], testified in deposition that the November 6, 2018 Ozurdex injection that he administered from the subsequently recalled lot contained the silicone particulate that caused [...] to become blind in her left eye.  [...] received his Medical Degree in 1988 from Howard University College of Medicine.  He then performed an Internship in Transitional Surgery at Howard University Hospital from July, 1988 – June, 1989.  Thereafter, [...] performed an Ophthalmology Residency at Wills Eye Hospital in Philadelphia from July, 1989 – June 1992.  [...] was then accepted into a two-year Vitreoretinal Diseases Fellowship at Wills Eye Hospital, which he successfully completed in June, 1994.  [...] has been Board-Certified by the American Board of Ophthalmology since 1993.  [...] has been the Director of the Vitreo-Retinal Fellowship Program at the Retina Group of Washington since 2000.  (Da702-708)
[brief] EVIDENTIARY HEARING STATEMENT OF FACTS  Camden County Sheriff's Officer [...] testified that he is assigned to a "federal [narcotics] task force" that does "things such as search warrants, narcotics investigation . . . throughout the Camden County area, mainly based [in] Camden city."  (1T11-4 to 12).  Beginning in January 2022, Pickard was also on the Camden County Sheriff's Emergency Response Team (SERT):  "we execute search warrants.  We make the residences, whatever building may be searched, safe for the detectives to move in and conduct their investigation."  (1T13-22 to 14-1).  On September 28, 2020, Pickard was "working as a task force officer with the suburban narcotics task force with the Camden County Prosecutor's Office" (1T16-20to25).  At 1:45p.m.\(^6\) he was "told to do surveillance on the home [[...]] and pretty much anything we saw coming or going from the home."  (1T17-15 to 18-3). \(^7\)  The investigation involved "a homicide warrant."  --- \(^6\)  In Pickard's original report (Ca58), he erroneously wrote the time that they arrived at the scene; as he testified, "my initial time that I wrote that we got out there in the original report was 1445 hours.  And as my testimony today says, we got out there at about 1335 hours, 1:45."  (1T83-24 to 84-2).  Pickard filed a Supplemental Report correcting the time.  (1T84-3 to 11).  \(^7\)  Pickard identified S-4, S-5, S-6 and S-7 as photographs (admitted into evidence) depicting the target residence.  (1T33-9 to 34-16).  The premises was the location that defendant and others had gone to after a homicide had been committed in which defendant was purportedly the shooter.  (1T68-12 to 25).  Pickard identified S-1 as "a picture of [...]," S-2 as a picture of [...]," and S-3 as "a picture of [...]."  (1T18-15 to 25) (admitted into evidence at 1T19-4 to 11).  Pickard testified that "the third photo came through and it said that the suspected shooter in the homicide was the third photo." (1T20-14 to 18).  Pickard testified that he recognized Allen as "[h]e was involved in a case with some of my partners previously.  I myself had not dealt with him, but I was aware of who he was because of the magnitude of that case . . .  Two of my partner had been fired at one a previous case involving Mr. Allen and a firearm."  (1T20-19 to 10).  Pickard testified that defendant had been holding a firearm.  (1T21-11 to 12).  Pickard testified that "less than five minutes after we parked out there we were told that the warrant was approved."  (1T22-3 to 5).  His vehicle was parked across the street from the target residence "facing away from it."  (1T23-2 to 15).  Pickard was dressed in black jean, a tee shirt, a black, snap-back baseball cap with no police identifiers.  (1T22-19 to 23-1).  Pickard was in the vehicle with Camden County Prosecutor's Detective [...].  (1T49-9 to 20).  There were other officer conducting surveillance "two, three blocks" away.  (1T22-15 to 18).  When shown the "Search Warrant Order," Pickard testified that it did not permit him to search any persons who are present at 1405 Park Boulevard.
[brief] On January 3, 2023, [...] filed his Class Action Complaint against [...] (“[...]”), [...]; [...] (“[...]”), and [...] (“[...]”) in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Hudson County (Pa1).  [...]’s Complaint alleges that Defendants’ unlicensed enforcement of a void debt violated the CFA and common law against [...] and those similarly situated.  The action was administratively transferred from Hudson County to Bergen County on January 9, 2023 (Pa19).  Thereafter, on June 7, 2023, [...] filed his Motion to Vacate Default Judgment in the Collection Lawsuit.  (Pa126).  On July 7, the Motion to Vacate was denied without prejudice, on procedural grounds only, so that [...] could file his Motion to Vacate in the Law Division (Pa149).  On April 19, 2023, in the Law Division, Defendants filed their Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, Compel Arbitration\(^1\) (Pa20).  On October 20, 2023, the trial court entered two Orders—one granting Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Pa155) and one denying [...]’s Cross Motion to Vacate, Transfer, and Consolidate (Pa157).  On December 4, 2023, [...] filed his Notice of Appeal (Pa160).