ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Defendant [...], Plaintiff’s Direct Supervisor, Had a History of Threats and Harassment.  Defendant [...], who currently serves as Defendant [...]’s Director of Nursing Operations, was the Lead Administrative Nursing Supervisor from approximately the mid-2000s until 2022.  (Pa26).  Defendant [...] testified that she did not recall receiving training on the anti-harassment policy and was unaware of any anti-retaliation policies in place (Pa655).  [...] displayed aggressive and abusive behavior characterized by verbal abuse.  (Pa188, Pa659).  Defendant [...]’s behavior was erratic, and often consisted of slamming file cabinets, cursing, and swinging her arms.  (Pa291, Pa660).  Defendant [...] would regularly curse at employees, yell, scream, and talk down to people.  (Pa244).  The conduct gave [...] the feeling that Defendant [...], while working, was “ready to fight at any minute. ” (Pa656).  Plaintiff made multiple complaints about Defendant [...]’s conduct to supervisors, including COO [...] (“[...]”), prior to June 2020.  (Pa659).  He reported to [...] (“[...]”), the Director of the Med-Surg units, that Defendant [...] had yelled at him, and he made similar complaints to her on several occasions (Pa659).  [...] instructed Plaintiff to discuss the matter directly with Defendant [...] or to take it up with HR, but she did not report the complaints herself, as required by hospital policy (Pa659).
[brief] Chapter 169 “Fee Schedule,” Section 169-5 “Land Use,” shall be amended as to the following section only to read as follows, and all remaining provisions of this section remain unchanged:  §169-5  Land use.  A.  Application fees.  | Application Fee or Charge | Initial Escrow Deposit | |---------------------------|------------------------| | Preliminary | $750 per acre or part thereof for 2 acres; $100 for each additional acre or part thereof | | Final site plan | $350 per acre or part thereof for first 2 acres plus $50 for each additional acre or part thereof | $500 plus $10 per 1,000 square feet of lot area plus $10 per 100 square feet of floor area $250 plus $3 per 1,000 square feet of lot area plus $3 per 100 square feet floor area
[brief] (Pa27-35)  At the hearing on the motion to dismiss, [...] addressed each of Plaintiff’s points.  First, he rejected Plaintiff’s argument that the complaint contained a specific request for medical records.  He correctly pointed out that the demand in the Complaint asked merely for Form C and Form C-1 Interrogatories, and did not even request Form C-3 Interrogatories, which would be correct in a medical negligence case.  [...] further pointed out that although Plaintiff made a general request for Form C interrogatories, there was never any specific request made for medical records in this case.  (1T8:17-9:8)  Next, [...] addressed the Plaintiff’s arguments concerning the lack of a conference under Ferreira v. Rancocas Orthopedic Associates, 178 N.J. 144 (2003), and noted that the lack of the conference was solely the result of Plaintiff incorrectly indicating that the case type was 605, a general personal injury case, and not 607, a malpractice claim.  (1T13:11-14:2)  [...] then rebutted Plaintiff’s claim that there was no prejudice to Defendants by recognizing that defendant in potentially suffering liability, in a case in which Plaintiff failed to properly follow the Affidavit of Merit statute is, itself, prejudice.  (1T15:12-19)  He further reasoned that Plaintiff failed to provide any exceptional circumstances or that the substantial compliance doctrine applied.  He recognized that Plaintiff failed to act within the sixty days set out by the statute—and, indeed, did not even request the additional sixty days the statute permits—and took no action until after Defendants filed their motion:  During the 60-day period there was never a request for another 60 days.  So really, you had 60 days because there was never a motion or a request for an additional 60 days.  So you really only had until January to file the Affidavit of Merit, January 16th of this year, because that's the 60 days.  Now, if we stretch it and say you could have had 120 days, all right, well, that's till March 16th.  But during that period of time, you're required to file this statement saying that I don't have the medical record.  That wasn't done either.  So you didn't request a Ferrera Conference.  You didn't request an additional 60 days.  You didn't request that the medical records be filed within the time period that you were required to do so and the only time Plaintiff did anything to prosecute this case is after this motion was filed.  [1T17:16-18:7]  [...] then demonstrated why certain passages from Ferreira that Plaintiff relied upon did not apply under the facts of this case, and distinguished A.T. v. Cohen, 231 N.J. 337 (2017).  (1T23:2-24:16)  Finally, [...], in granting the motion, put his reasoning on the record at length.  (1T26:11-31:20)  The Plaintiff’s complaint was therefore dismissed.  (Pa84-85)  This appeal followed.
[brief] This matter arises from a non-payment of rent case under a written commercial lease agreement.  The default occurred because Respondent’s business (a gym) was closed pursuant to [...]’s Executive Order issued in connection with the COVID-19 pandemic.  Respondent was evicted and Appellant obtained a money judgment for the amounts due in rent, late fees and counsel fees.  The judgment against Respondents was paid in full and a Warrant of Satisfaction filed with the Court on April 18, 2023 (See RA-58).  However, Appellant filed an appeal of the Trial Court’s findings with respect to the late fee provisions of the lease.  That appeal was decided on November 16, 2023 (See RA-1).  The Appellate Division upheld the Trial Court’s conclusion regarding the amounts due under the lease for base rent and further held the late fee provision as interpreted by Appellant was unconscionable.  The Appellate Division remanded the matter back to the Trial Court for a determination regarding one remaining issue, which was the amount to be paid by Respondent for common area insurance costs.  1  The procedural history was combined with the counter statement of facts since it is very limited.  Only two (2) motions were filed since the Appellate Division’s decision of November 16, 2023.  Shortly after the Appellate Division’s decision, the Trial Court set the matter down for a case management conference for December 4, 2023.  In the interim, the parties reached a settlement whereby Respondent would pay the sum of $1,096.00 in full and final satisfaction of all claims.  Respondent paid the settlement proceeds and Appellant was provided a standard form Release that Appellant’s counsel approved.  (See RA-19)
[brief] A.  "...but in paragraph 2 it says if the tenant doesn’t receive approvals from the town of [...] for its proposed use of the property for a cafe…and bakery….and a retail clothing store….on or before September 30, 2016."  (Pa1073,T174:1-15).  Q.  "Do you know whether or not the tenant ever exercised its right to terminate in accordance with this agreement?" (Pa1074-Pa1075, T180:16-18).  A.  "I believe they did that.  I think we did that in October, if I’m not mistaken.  And I know there was probably some discussions with the principals and with your father and I in September."  (Pa1074-Pa1075, T180:19-23).  Q.  "Why was it terminated in October if the tenant was to….wasn’t that after the date of September 30th?" (Pa1074-Pa1075, T180:24-T181:1).  A.  "Again, my interpretation of the 30th….is that that’s a trigger date, not a drop dead deadline."  (Pa1074-Pa1075,T181:2-4).  Q.
[brief] Ibid.  (Emphasis added).  See also, Perez, 391 N.J. Super. at 428 ("vague reference in N.J.S.A. 12A:4-207(c) to 'expenses' was an insufficient basis to conclude that the statute expressly authorized an award of attorney's fees contrary to the general rule").  The same careful scrutiny was required in reviewing contractual provisions here.  For example, in Cmty. Realty Mgmt. v. Harris, 155 N.J. 212, 234 (1998), the Court observed the lease "must expressly permit a landlord to recover reasonable attorneys' fees and damages in a summary dispossess proceeding before a landlord/tenant court may consider those expenses as additional rent."
[brief] THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE OF BIAS FROM JUROR 12 AND TRIAL COUNSEL’S DECISION NOT TO USE A PEREMPTORY STRIKE OR ARGUE FOR HER RECUSAL DID NOT OBLIGATE THE COURT TO INDEPENDANTLY RECUSE  HER  Defendant argues that [...] was impermissibly biased by her husband’s and her personal relationships with law enforcement and certain witness’ family and that even though trial counsel did not move or otherwise advocate for her recusal in any way, the court should have independently removed the juror.  This argument is meritless because the information [...] received from her husband was minor, their relationship with the victim’s family and law enforcement was minor and tangential, and the trial court’s thorough inquiry of any potential bias that might result from these minor issues revealed nothing of significance.  “The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, paragraph 10 of the New Jersey Constitution guarantee criminal defendants “the right to ... trial by an impartial jury.
[brief] These inconsistent findings perfectly illustrate the ambiguous and vague nature of [...]’s contract.  Our own Appellate Court judges cannot agree what this provision means.  Prior to the Appellate Division’s 2002 decision in Azurak, the Court analyzed contract language nearly identical to the subject clause and reached contrary conclusions.  In February of 1997, in Mautz v. J.P. Patti Co., the Appellate Division interpreted a slightly modified combination of the “caused in whole or in part” and “regardless of” phrases as the clause also indicated the indemnitor was only responsible to indemnify the indemnitee “to the extent” caused by the indemnitor’s own negligence.  Mautz v. J.P. Patti Co., 298 N.J. Super. 13, 21 (App. Div.) certif. denied, 151 N.J.  472 (1997).  The Court held the clause did not require indemnification for the indemnitee’s own negligence, rather, indemnification only existed “to the extent” the claim was caused by the indemnitor’s negligence.  Mautz, 298 N.J. Super. at 21.  Later that year in May, the Appellate Division reviewed a clause nearly identical to [...]’s in Leitao v. Damon G. Douglas Co. and found that clause required the subcontractor to indemnify the general contractor for the general contractor’s own negligence, even though the subcontractor was not negligent; the only other negligent party was the plaintiff.
[directive] When the Investigation is Criminal and the Officer Is a Subject  8.2.1  Criminal interviews should be conducted only with the prior approval, or at the direction, of the County Prosecutor.  Once an investigation becomes criminal in nature, the subject officer shall be advised that he or she is not required to answer questions as a condition of employment.  Of course, an officer who is the subject of a criminal investigation may elect to voluntarily answer questions with or without an attorney so that the facts known to him and his perspective are available to the investigators.  48
[brief] The court observed that a minor was granted special rights under the Act.  N.J.S.A. 34:15-10 grants a minor the right to opt out of the Article 2 statutory compensation system and pursue a common-law negligence claim in lieu of a statutory claim.  A minor employee, however, may not collect both statutory and common-law damages and must elect one or the other remedy.  *Variety Farms*, 172 N.J. Super. at 18 (citing *Watson v. Stagg*, 108 N.J.L. 444, 446 (Sup. Ct. 1932)).
[brief] Defendant next argues that based on the previously raised issues, the doctrine of cumulative error should apply.  (Db41).  This argument is also wholly without merit.  Additionally, as same was not raised at trial, this Court reviews the same for plain error.  R. 2:10-2.  “A defendant is entitled to a fair trial but not a perfect one. ”  State v. Weaver, 219 N.J. 131, 155 (App. Div. 2014) (quoting Wakefield, 190 N.J. 397, 537 (2007)).
[brief] (1T53-2 to 9).  [...] testified that he had been told prior to stopping defendant that "he was the suspected shooter in a homicide."  (1T54-22 to 55-7).  [...] had no facts about the alleged shooting from his own personal knowledge.  (1T56-11 to 15).  [...] observed "two males matching the description of [...] and [...] come across Park Boulevard towards the residence and enter the residence that were (sic) conducting surveillance on."
[brief] Public Defender Attorney for Defendant-Appellant  BY: /s [...]  ASHLEY T. BROOKS  Assistant Deputy Public Defender Attorney ID: 331372021  Dated: January 30, 2024  May 29, 2024  [...] Atty. No. 032852009  Assistant Prosecutor Of Counsel  LETTER IN LIEU OF BRIEF AND APPENDIX ON BEHALF OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY
[directive] DATE: November 29, 2018 (Issued)  September 27, 2019 (Revised)  SUBJECT: Directive  Strengthening Trust Between Law Enforcement and Immigrant Communities  In recent years, the federal government has increasingly relied on state and local law enforcement agencies to enforce federal civil immigration law.  This trend presents significant challenges to New Jersey’s law enforcement officers, who have worked hard to build trust with our state’s large and diverse immigrant communities.  It is well-established, for example, that individuals are less likely to report a crime if they fear that the responding officer will turn them over to immigration authorities.  This fear makes it more difficult for officers to solve crimes and bring suspects to justice, putting all New Jerseyans at risk.  It is therefore crucial that the State of New Jersey makes very clear to our immigrant communities something that may seem obvious to those of us in law enforcement: there is a difference between state, county, and local law enforcement officers, who are responsible for enforcing state criminal law, and federal immigration authorities, who enforce federal civil immigration law.  Put simply, New Jersey’s law enforcement officers protect the public by investigating state criminal offenses and enforcing state criminal laws.  They are not responsible for enforcing civil immigration violations except in narrowly defined circumstances.  Such responsibilities instead fall to the federal government and those operating under its authority.  Although state, county, and local law enforcement officers should assist federal immigration authorities when required to do so by law, they should also be mindful that New Jersey Is An Equal Opportunity Employer • Printed on Recycled Paper and Recyclable Page 2 providing assistance above and beyond those requirements threatens to blur the distinctions between state and federal actors and between federal immigration law and state criminal law.  It also risks undermining the trust we have built with the public.  In August 2007, Attorney General [...] issued Attorney General Law Enforcement Directive No. 2007-3 (AG Directive 2007-3) to “establish the manner in which local, county, and state law enforcement agencies and officers shall interact with federal immigration authorities.
[brief] [...], Attorney for the Defendant – Respondent [...], Plaintiff/Appellant, vs. [...], Defendant.  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY  APPELLATE DIVISION  Docket No. [...]  Trial Court Docket No.: [...]  CIVIL ACTION  On Appeal  From: Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part Sat Below: Hon. [...], J.S.C.  REPLY  BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT LAW
[brief] It has already lost on this issue in New Jersey in the wage and benefits context.  See State Dep’t of Labor & Workforce Dev., “[...] Pays $100M in Driver Misclassification Case with NJ Department of Labor and Workforce Development and Attorney General’s Office” (Sept. 13, 2022) (Da196).  And it is seeking to avoid the disaster, here and nationwide, that would stem from a similar result in the vicarious liability context.  [...]’s intentional effort to avoid full responsibility for the motor vehicle crashes of its drivers is squarely at odds with the public policy of the State of New Jersey, as expressed in the Transportation Network Company Safety and Regulatory Act, N.J.S.A. 39:5H-1 to -27.
[directive] SUBJECT: ATTORNEY GENERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT DIRECTIVE NO. 2004-1: REPLACING ATTORNEY GENERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT DIRECTIVE NO. 2001-5 John’s Law, P.L. 2001, c. 69, N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.22 & 39:4-50.23 POTENTIAL LIABILITY WARNING FORM - RELEASE OF DWI ARRESTEE & 12 HOUR IMPOUNDMENT OF THE VEHICLE OF A DWI ARRESTEE  Please take notice that Attorney General Law Enforcement Directive No. 2001-5, is hereby replaced by Attorney General Law Enforcement Directive No. 2004-1, as more fully discussed below.  On July 31, 2001, Acting Attorney General [...] issued Attorney General Law Enforcement Directive No. 2001-5.  That Directive informed all law enforcement agencies and prosecutors of the implementation of P.L. 2001, c. 69, N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.22 & 39:4-50.23, “John’s Law,” requiring the use of a “Potential Liability Warning” Form for the release of a DWI Arrestee and a Minimum 12 Hour Impoundment of the Vehicle of a DWI Arrestee.  A recent amendment to N.J.S.A. 39:4-50, (Laws 2003, chapter 314, §1) established a new lower per se blood alcohol limit of 0.08% or more.  That amendment has required the revision " New Jersey Is An Equal Opportunity Employer Printed on Recycled Paper and is Recyclable
[brief] Judge did not allow [...]’s Nov. 4, 2022 filing to reduce by $28,060 the requested $113,497 payment for legal fees (3T, p. 12, Lines 16-18), as Judge came up with baseless $22,219 reduction (3T, p. 12, line 6, to p. 12, line 10).  My Nov. 9th Cert. substantiated facts/arguments to reject [...]’s request due to refuting concocted/false claims.  However, Court should NOT have approved ANY TRUST PAYMENT for [...]’s legal fees since [...]’s filing agreed with me that “[...]’s fees incurred between Feb. 1, 2022 & Oct. 25, '22 are exclusively result of (i) [...]’s [& [...]’s] refusal to engage in good-faith effort to achieve global resolution [for 3-Way Settlement] of all issues by & between parties” (Exh.”X”, Conclusions, p.  13, 3rd par.) (369a), as also validated in my Nov. 4, 2022 filed Opposition to all legal fees based on facts & communications with Mr. [...] & Mr. [...].  This Section further justifies Section “C” for my Appeal in order to dismiss any further repetitions by Respondent of his prior false claims & accusations.
[brief] Here, the PCR court did address defendant’s argument that his sentence was “illegally lenient” because the sentencing court did not provide reasons to overcome the presumption of consecutive sentences under N.J.S.A. 2C:44-5(h).  The PCR court stated:  [Defendant] rests his argument on the idea that his original plea was unjust because his sentences were illegal as they ran concurrently as opposed to consecutively as required by N.J.S.A. 2C:44-5(h).  He submits the [sentencing court] did not provide reasons as required by N.J.S.A. 2C:44-5(h) for a concurrent sentence as opposed to a consecutive one.  There is no transcript available of the 1997 sentencing hearing to corroborate the [d]efendant’s assertion as it was destroyed due to retention policy.  The Judgment of Conviction confirms the concurrent sentence and “incorporates all other reasons stated on the record at the time of sentence. ”  Therefore, the [sentencing court] may have stated reasons to justify the concurrent sentence which at the time benefitted the [d]efendant.  The [d]efendant received the benefit of a concurrent sentence on matters to which he plead guilty.  [(Da44-45). ]  The PCR court correctly found that there was no support for defendant’s claim that the sentencing court did not state its reasons for imposing a concurrent sentence.  Indeed, the PCR court’s findings are consistent with the documentary record.  Notwithstanding the unavailability of the sentencing transcript, the PCR court properly found that the JOC memorializes his concurrent sentence, and incorporates within it “reasons stated on the record.
[brief] Facts told via STATEMENTS §III. his expressed belief, (1) there was no compromise at work and there was no legally viable prospect thereof by HUD under Title VIII, and (2) there was no evidence, less proof below showing the existence of such compromise, other than the misrepresentations certified by the respondents via the Motion to Dismiss (Pa68- Pa71).  This false factual conviction defying evidence by the trial judge can be reasonably extrapolated to his belief involving controlling decision that appellant’s causes of actions were all frivolous and or had exhausted statute of limitations.  The apparent factual indifference by the trial judge appeared to stem from his rooted judicial philosophy, as the trial judge demonstrably showed pro police/authority bias against the appellant.
[brief] [...] made minor changes to the application in response to the obvious bulk issues presented, but none of the changes made the use compatible there or placed these uses where any senior housing mixed uses were permitted or even recommended in the Master Plan.  Instead, [...] decided to ignore the statutory guidelines for zoning that are provided in the MLUL\(^8\).  The trial court further ignored the MLUL in being swayed by [...]’s arguments instead of reviewing the statute and the clear language requiring satisfaction of the negative criteria even for inherently beneficial uses.
[brief] However, the plain language of the Agreement directly contradicts this claim.  Thus, this Court should therefore reject [...]’s argument and enforce the Agreement as written.  Specifically here, the Agreement states that [...] is the Parent/Guardian for the “Jumper,” [...].  Pa0123.  At the top of the page with [...]’s signature, it states:  [[...]], the Parent/Guardian, on behalf of myself and that of the minor identified above, as applicable, have read the above Assumption of Risk, Waiver of Liability, and Indemnification Agreement and fully understand and agree to its terms.  [[...]] further acknowledge that I am agreeing to indemnify [[...]], as provided above, for all claims the referenced minor may have against [[...]].  [Pa0124]  Therefore, [...] was signing this agreement **on behalf of [...]** and any injuries that [...] may have suffered while on [...]’s property.  Nowhere in the Agreement does it extend its provisions to [...], even if he may have mistakenly believed the Agreement applied to his own injuries.  [...]’s signature was specifically to address [...]’s participation, not his own.  The clear and unambiguous language of the Agreement confines its scope to [...]’s potential injuries and does not expand to [...]’s injuries.  Therefore, [...] cannot bind [...] to the arbitration provision simply because he was on their premise at the time of the injury.  [...] never knowingly consented to arbitrate any claims related to his own injury under this Agreement.  The intent of the Agreement is evident, and any attempt to stretch its terms beyond what is written would contradict basic contract principles.  As the Agreement unambiguously pertains to [...], not [...].  The trial court made a reversable error compelling [...] to arbitration under this Agreement and the decision should be reversed and remanded.
[brief] The trial court erred in deciding to enforce a Boundary Commissioner’s Report which significantly impacted the property rights of both parties and non-parties based solely upon circumstantial evidence (2T6, ll.1-7; Pa96).  The trial court gave short shrift to consideration of the sufficiency of evidence relied upon by the Boundary Commissioners.  The Report explicitly states that all four lots (Nos. 9-12) from the original 1956 subdivision “lineup and fit together perfectly based upon their legal descriptions in their deeds without conflicts between any angles or distances. ”  Report, p.3, ll.37-8, Pa 108.  This finding makes this case unique.  No New Jersey case law addresses an adjustment of boundary lines when the deeds and property description have been found to be accurate.