ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Similarly, Plaintiff’s argument that the Court awarded less than they requested also is not relevant to whether the bounds of R. 1:10-3 were exceeded.  (Pb26)  Simply reducing a requested fee award does not mean the reduced award is automatically appropriate or allowed by the limits of R. 1:10-3 for “remediation”.  Under [...], the Court was only permitted to reimburse fees associated with the November 2017 motion in a R. 1:10-3 motion.  “The goal is compliance and nothing but compliance. ”  Bd of Ed., Tp. of Middletown, supra, 352 N.J. Super. at 510.  The Court could not punish in any amount under R. 1:10-3 and this particular sanction was not imposed only “until” compliance occurred, as [...] so limited it.  Merely that the Chancery Court reduced what Plaintiffs had requested does not mean R. 1:10-3 was followed.  This Court reviews, “an order to enforce litigant's rights under Rule 1:10-3 for an abuse of discretion. ”  Savage v. Tp. of Neptune, 472 N.J. Super. 291, 313 (App. Div. 2022); Wear v. Selective Ins. Co., 455 N.J. Super. 440, 458 (App. Div. 2018).  This Court considers whether a lower court's order was, "made without a rational explanation, inexplicably departed from established policies, or rested on an impermissible basis."  Wear, 455 N.J. Super. at 459.  Here, the $503,000 sanction went far beyond the remediation allowed by R. 1:10-3 and was far more than "coercive" or the least sanction necessary to gain compliance.  The Court also awarded far more than legal fees related to the November 2017 motion, which [...] prohibits.  The Court imposed a penalty as a "consequence" for a violation that occurred 17 months after the restraining Order at issue, and where the later actions did not interfere with management or operation of [...].  The Court's decision was punitive and intended to be so by reference to the Court's statement of a need for "consequences".  The Court's sanction was a de facto contempt ruling, which R. 1:10-2 would have prohibited in the way it was decided; i.e. by the same judge on a motion and without a summary proceeding prosecuted by the State.  Therefore, [...] submits that the Court's $503,000 sanction order was made on a legally impermissible basis and constituted an abuse of discretion requiring reversal.
[brief] The July 17, 2023 Decision and Order  The court granted both motions by way of a decision and order dated July 17, 2023.  [Pa13-20].  Even though the court declined to rule on the newly asserted issue discussed at oral argument – saying it would be improper to do so -- the court nonetheless went ahead and granted summary judgment for another reason that had never been raised or briefed before.  [Pa13-20].  7.
[brief] Indeed, “[i]t is of no moment that the recalcitrant defendants are public officials,” remedies ranging from enforcement orders to contempt are “universally recognized as particularly appropriate in the case of those, including public officials, who have willfully violated court orders or judgments in the nature of mandamus requiring the performance of duties imposed by law. ”  Essex Cnty. Bd. of Taxation v. Newark, 139 N.J. Super. 264, 271 (App. Div. 1976).
[brief] Defendants argue that the Defendants were “rational” in adopting Ordinance 22-1516, and that the history of the site and Plaintiff’s almost 20 year effort to compel Defendants to cure their continuing violation of their constitutional “Mt. Laurel” obligations somehow shields the Ordinance from its deficiencies.  Defendants are again wrong.  Being “rational” in adopting an ordinance or adopting the ordinance as part of a plan to satisfy the 2014 Order of Compliance entered against the Town in the Mt. Laurel litigation brought by Plaintiff are laudable, however, they do not relieve the Defendants from complying with the requirements imposed by the MLUL and the LRHL for the enactment of a redevelopment or land use ordinance.  That is exactly what Defendants want this Court to ignore.
[brief] HONORABLE  [...] SAT BELOW  REPLY BRIEF FOR [...], APPELLANT  TABLE OF CONTENTS  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES  ...........................................................................................................  i  STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY ..............................................1  ISSUES AND LEGAL ARGUMENTS  POINT I ..................................................................................................................................................5  COURT WAS DISIMILAR IN THEIR COURT RULE STANDARDS THAT SHOULD BE UPHELD BY THE DEFENDANT VERSUS THE PLAINTIFF (MOTION TO COMPEL, MOTION TO DISMISS AND SUBPEONA)  POINT II ...............................................................................................................................................6  PLAINTIFF’S SOLE WITNESS COMMITTED PURJURY RESULTING IN PLAINTIFF INCONSISTENCY WITH TERMS OF EVENTS  POINT III .............................................................................................................................................8  SUPERIOR COURT ERRED BY FINDING THE DEFENDANT
[brief] The Strip was throughout his chain of title.  In comparison, the Strip suddenly appears in Defendant’s chain of title in 1971, without any recitation of how the Strip was conveyed.  This 1971 deed appears to be a “wild deed. ”  A wild deed is a deed signed and recorded by a grantor who knows that he does not have title to the property described but signs and records the deed, anyway.  Hyland v. Kirkman, 204 N.J. Super. 345, 357-358 (Ch. Div. 1985).  Wild deeds cannot legally convey title to land.  Id., at 367.  The trial court questioned whether the 1971 deed was a “wild deed,” but was then led astray by Defendant’s expert’s response that Plaintiff should have performed additional investigation of the ownership due to the encroachment of the existing parking lot shown on the [...] survey.  2T172:10-175:7.  The expert’s response belies the testimony he later provided under cross-examination on the third day of the trial: the 1967 subdivision documents are not part of the land records typically searched by title companies.  Imputing inquiry notice to the Plaintiff at the time he purchased the property is a smoke screen.  Purchasers “will be bound only by those instruments which can be discovered by a ‘reasonable’ search of the particular chain of title. ”  Palmarg, at 456.  As stated by the trial court, “A purchaser who is placed on inquiry is chargeable with notice of such facts as might be ascertained by a reasonable inquiry. ”  4T18:15-17.  Both experts testified how unlikely it would have been for a title company to locate the 1967 subdivision documents encapsulated as exhibit J-40 at the time Plaintiff purchased his property.  Regardless, the cumulative trial exhibits reveal what types of documents were available through an “ends of the earth” search, and those documents do not demonstrate proper conveyance of the Strip to Defendant’s chain of title.
[brief] (Da983; Da985).  One such document purported to solicit [...] to sell his interest in the real estate holdings for $4.1 million and his interest in [...] for $1.5 million for a total of $5.6 million.  (Da983).  In a subsequent proposal, [...] increased the [...] value from $3 million to $3.2 million, which resulted in a corresponding change in the purchase price from $5.6 million to $5.7 million.  This offer also modified the payout from a $1.6 million note to $1.7 million payable in $100,000 monthly installments.  (Da985 vs. Da983).  [...] also explained that he needed [...] to stay with [...] for an additional 3 years so that [...] could continue to hold its MBE status because it had ongoing government work.  (5T106:22 to 107:7).  [...] had been offering to pay [...] $120,000 per year, but [...] demanded $200,000 per year for a total of $600,000.  With this additional $600,000 added to the previously discussed $5.7 million for [...]’s interest in [...], [...] and [...], [...]’s total payout would be $6.3 million.  (Da985; 5T107:8 to 108:8).  Based on [...]’s representations as to the finances, [...] insisted upon receipt of $6.3 million.  He and [...] shook hands and agreed that they had a deal on that number.
[directive] SAFE and DFSA Kit Content Collection and Storage  Law enforcement agencies shall submit reported SAFE/DFSA kits to the laboratory as soon as possible, but no later than ten (10) calendar days after collection, unless the Director of the Division of Criminal Justice or his/her/their attorney designee, or the County Prosecutor or his/her/their attorney designee determines there is good cause to delay submission to the lab and provides written approval of an extension in time to the agency.  In the event that an extension is granted, the SAFE/DFSA kit shall be submitted no later than 10 days after the initiation of charges.  The agency having custody of the reported kit(s) is responsible for proper storage and tracking of the kit(s) through time of submission to the forensic laboratory consistent with the tracking requirements enumerated above.  SAFE/DFSA kit storage is paramount in preserving the integrity of kit contents.  SAFE kits contain only dry specimens that may include, but not be limited to, dried biological secretions, underwear, hair, as well as debris that can include sand, leaves, grass, cetera.  DFSA kits includes blood and et urine specimens only.  The DNA contained on swabs taken as a part of a SAFE/DFSA kit collection is stable at a controlled room temperature environment once dried.  Swabs and other items within the kit should be fully dried whenever possible prior to sealing the kit.  to  If items are still wet, refrigerated storage is required protect the integrity of the evidence.  Items containing biological fluids in liquid form that may be resistant to drying, such as diapers, sanitary pads, condoms and fluid stained clothing, should, when initially collected, be packaged separately outside the kit in containers or packaging resistant to leakage.  These items must be refrigerated while stored pending submission for laboratory analysis and frozen if being held for longer term storage.  The first reporting period will include January to December of 2023 and the report will be due January 31, 2024.
[brief] Pursuant to the representations and direction of [...] and [...], Plaintiffs signed, pertaining to the [...]-[...] Assignment, the General Release of April 25, 2008, the Amended General Release of September 2008, and the Second Amendment and Restatement of the General Release of January 2009 (“Releases”).  637a–642a; 664a–668a; 684a–688a.  However, neither [...] nor [...] ever saw or executed the [...]-[...] Assignment or Releases.  429a (83:15–85:10); 431a (122:21–124:19); 432a (158:18-23); 433a (178:9–179:14); 434a–435a (189:10–190:16); 435a (191:12–193:8); 535a–536a (49:14–52:4); 541a–542a (106:17–111:7); 543a–544a (119:10–122:5); 544a–545a (124:12–127:15).  [...] and [...] testified they never opened any bank accounts on behalf of [...] and were never aware of any money paid by Plaintiffs to [...], or of any money paid by [...] to the Defendants or anyone else.  428a (53:19-22); 537a–538a (89:10–90:20); 543a (120:24–121:9); 545a (127:16–128:10); 547a (165:5-10); 549a (191:9–192:8).  Said [...]-[...] Assignment and Releases required Plaintiffs to make certain payments on specified dates as were allegedly negotiated by [...] and [...].  637a–642a; 664a–668a; 684a–688a.  In total, as a result of this conspiracy, [...] and the other co-conspirator Defendants transferred and divided among themselves approximately $1.4 million.
[brief] The Law Division’s Ruling Concerning Substantive Unconscionability Was In Error (Pa1-Pa16)**  As noted above, the state high courts that have applied their state law principles concerning substantive unconscionability to “one-sided arbitration clauses” have spoken with a universal voice.  The Washington Supreme Court, in *Burnett v. Pagliacci Pizza, Inc.*, stated: “Substantive unconscionability exists when a provision in the contract is one-sided,” 196 Wash.2d at 57.  In that case, the actual effect of the arbitration language “requires Burnett to arbitrate but does not so limit Pagliacci” and thus the provision “remains so one-sided as to be unconscionable. ”  *Id.* at 60.  In adopting this majority position, the Washington Supreme Court adopted the reasoning of the other courts to assess this issue:  As the California Supreme Court has explained, “Although parties are free to contract for asymmetrical remedies and arbitration clauses of varying scope, ... the doctrine of unconscionability limits the extent to which a stronger party may, through a contract of adhesion, impose the arbitration forum on the weaker party without accepting that forum for itself. ”  *Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Services., Inc.*, 24 Cal. 4th 83, 118, 6 P.3d 669, 99 Cal. Rptr. 2d 745 (2000).  *Id.* at 60.  Other state supreme courts have repeatedly held that one-sided arbitration provisions are unconscionable.
[brief] (Db 21)  Here, there were factual disputes at trial regarding whether [...] was under arrest or knew that he was under arrest at various points during his altercations with the police officers.  Based on these factual disputes, the jury should have received both sets of self-defense jury instructions.  However, the State’s brief fails to engage with a key argument raised by [...] – that the trial court was required to instruct the jury in accordance with the general self-defense charge as well as the resisting arrest self-defense charge.
[brief] March 1, 2024  [...] ID. NO. 446232023  Assistant Deputy Public Defender Of Counsel and  On the Letter-Brief REPLY LETTER-BRIEF ON BEHALF OF DEFENDANT-APPELLANT  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY  APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. [...]  INDICTMENT NO. [...] STATE OF NEW JERSEY, : CRIMINAL ACTION  Plaintiff-Respondent, : On Appeal from an Order of the Superior Court of New Jersey, v. : Law Division, Somerset County.  [...], : Sat Below: Defendant-Appellant.
[brief] It is therefore no exaggeration to say that this court’s failure to address and reject the lower court’s and the Third Circuit’s statutory interpretation would strike a significant blow to the collective effort of insurance companies, the Legislature, and the Executive Branch to stop what [...] and [...] call “the huge problem” of insurance fraud.  Id. at 26.  Finally, [...] and [...]’s amicus brief further underscores the grave errors in the Law Division’s and the Mount Prospect federal court’s interpretation of New Jersey statutory law.  Neither court had the benefit of the agencies’ views on the correct interpretation of AICRA or [...]’s own implementing regulations.  The New Jersey Supreme Court gives “great deference” to the interpretation of an agency charged with enforcing or implementing a statute.  In re Freshwater Wetlands Prot. Act Rules, 180 N.J. 478, 488-89 (2004).  The Mount Prospect panel recognized that “[w]hen federal courts answer questions of state law, they rule as they predict the state supreme court would,” *Mount Prospect*, 98 F.4th at 467, and thus it surely would have applied that same deference if it had had the agencies’ views before it.
[brief] The Union’s interpretation of *PBA Local 160* clearly, and perhaps purposely, misses the point and distorts that Court’s holding.  The *PBA Local 160* Court did not focus on the issue of “prerequisites” set forth in the parties’ agreement, but rather on the arbitrator’s failure to adhere to the express contract terms.  The Court explained that it was required to vacate the award because it “failed to draw its essence from the collective negotiations of the parties, and because the arbitrator exceeded the authority granted him in the contract and was not free to disregard the contractual” language.  272 N.J. Super. at 476-77.  The Arbitrator here committed precisely the same error.  He was not free to disregard the contractual language to which the Union previously had agreed, providing [...] the right to control the standards of employee performance.  By doing so, the Arbitrator created a new work rule based not on the parties’ agreement, but on his own, personal sense of industrial justice.  The new work rule usurped [...]’s authority and therefore, the Award must be reversed.
[brief] State v. Tedesco, 214 N.J. 177 (2013).  In the United States Supreme Court case, Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337 (1970), the Court issued guidelines for trial courts handling obstreperous or combative defendants.  In Allen, the Court stated, “It is not pleasant to hold that the respondent Allen was properly banished from the court for part of his own trial.  But our courts, palladiums of liberty as they are, cannot be treated disrespectfully with impunity. ”  Id. at 346.  During his trial, Allen threatened the judge, tore a trial file meant for standby counsel, repeatedly talked back to the judge, complained about standby counsel and the fairness of the trial, and subjected the jurors to an overly-long voir dire.  *Id.* at 340-341.  Allen was removed from the courtroom after repeated warnings from the trial judge.  *Id.* at 341.  The Supreme Court stated that a defendant can lose the right to be present at trial if the defendant ignores the trial court judge’s warnings and continues to conduct “himself if a manner so disorderly, so disruptive, and disrespectful of the court that his trial cannot be carried on with him in the courtroom.
[brief] As detailed above, when evaluating a fee application, the trial court must consider the factors set forth in RPC 1.5(a).  *Seigelstein*, 464 N.J. Super. at 406, n. 6; RPC 1.5(a).  The most important of these factors is the calculation of the “lodestar. ”  *Seigelstein*, 464 N.J. Super. at 405.  To satisfy their burden, the prevailing party is required to submit a “certification of services that is sufficiently detailed to enable the court to accurately calculate the lodestar.
[brief] (Pb32-33).  --- 3  [...] was never called as a witness to testify at trial and so the jury never heard his *de bene esse* deposition testimony.  As the trial court correctly pointed out on the plaintiff’s post trial motion for a new trial, with respect to the plaintiff’s *in limine* motion to bar reference to [...] testimony about the plaintiff’s prior medical conditions and history of falls, “[t]hat’s not before the Court.
[brief] (3T:40:18-20).  The jury heard that Plaintiff was not around the pharmacy for much of the time.  Plaintiff only worked at [...] a couple times a month in March, April, and May of 2016.  (3T28:6-16)  Plaintiff worked full-time in [...] only for the first three months of 2017.  (2T40:1-4).  Plaintiff did not work in [...] at all in 2018.  (2T41:6-8).  In 2019, Plaintiff worked full-time in [...] in April and May, leading up to the asset sale to [...].  (2T50:4-7).
[brief] According to [...], “this would have resulted in a gain for Plaintiff [...] of between $4,900,450 and $8,167,416. ”  Pa 274 [emphasis in original].  Thus, the difference between the high range and the low range of profits is \textit{at least} $3,266,966 (assuming a low range of 60%), with that delta increasing if [...]’s negotiated share in an “development team” is less than 60%.  During this Rule 104 hearing, [...] agreed that the [...] (\textit{i.e.,} [...])\(^6\) was one of the most experienced, well-known companies in connection with affordable housing in New Jersey.
[brief] The Respondents’ arguments ignore the well settled legal principle that “any exemption from a comprehensive legislative ‘policy designed to protect environmental interests’ must be ‘strictly construed. ’”  In re N.J. Dep't of Env'tl. Prot. Conditional Highlands Applicability Determination, Program Interest No. 435434, 433 N.J. Super. 223, 235 (App. Div. 2013), quoting M. Alfieri Co., Inc. v. N.J. Dep't of Env'tl. Prot. & Energy, 269 N.J. Super. 545, 554 (App.Div.1994), aff'd o.b., 138 N.J. 642 (1995) (emphasis added).  A broad or expansive reading of the statutory exemption at issue here is contrary to this binding and well established jurisprudence, which requires a strict and narrow construction.
[brief] (Da150-151).  Then when [...] requested an opportunity to be heard, he was denied by GRC Staff Attorney [...].  (Da131-132).  [...] received none of the protections of due process here.  He received no notice of the first two determinations.  He **never** received an opportunity to be heard.  [...] is not even listed as a party to the complaint on any of the transmittal cover letters to the GRC’s interim orders, even though two of them specifically ordered [...] to take specific action and declared him in contempt.
[brief] ”  *Id.* at 94.  Those factors are as follows: 1. whether the credibility of the victim-witness is the central issue in the case; 2. the similarity of the prior false criminal accusation to the crime charged; 3. the proximity of the prior false accusation to the allegation that is the basis of the crime charged; 4. the number of witnesses, the items of extrinsic evidence, and the amount of time required for presentation of the issue at trial; and 5. whether the probative value of the false accusation evidence will be outweighed by undue prejudice, confusion of the issues, and waste of time.
[brief] (Da383).  On April 13, 2022, the five siblings entered into ¹ After the filing of this appeal, [...] has tragically passed away.  ²  Note, first names are used herein for ease of reference and to avoid confusion.  No disrespect is intended.  a Consent Judgment relating to the administration of the estate.  (Da395).  The Consent Judgment also contained the parties’ agreement as to the sale of the Subject Property, which was not part of the Estate.
[brief] This Court reversed and remanded the case in 2006 only to conduct an accounting to determine the value of [...]’s 25% partnership interest.  To the [...], the trial court’s failure in 2009 to abide by this Court’s remand directive reasonably appears to be related to the conflict of interest that the trial judge, [...], had in presiding over the trial after the 2006 remand.  Defendants maintain that the contemporaneous attorney-client relationship of [...]’s attorney-husband with [...]’s counsel, the [...], was an unwaivable conflict of interest that required [...]’s recusal or disqualification.  The [...] have an objectively reasonable perception that the judge’s conflict of interest influenced her decisions in the trial of this case.  [...]’s conflict of interest was later exacerbated by yet another conflicting relationship of the [...] with a decision-maker in this case, the Special Master.  As will be argued in Point II of this brief, the Special Master was bound by certain provisions of the *Code of Judicial Conduct* either not to accept, or at least to disclose, the financial benefit he received from his engagement by the [...] and counsel [...] in conducting a paid mediation of another case, while he was simultaneously assigned to review and decide the attorneys’ fees application of Himmel and Lowenstein in this case.  Yet, the Special Master refused to recuse from his assignment, then issued decisions on attorneys’ fees that ignored and disregarded this Court’s remand directives.  The trial court’s damages award also rests on the improper treatment of a partnership dispute as a civil racketeering proceeding.
[brief] LEGAL ARGUMENT I.  HAVING ESTABLISHED A PRIMA FACIE CASE FOR INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL, AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING IS REQUIRED  “In New Jersey, it is well-settled that a plea must be entered into voluntarily and intelligently. ”  State v. Crawly, 149 N.J. 310, 318 (1997).  In State v. Preciose, 129 N.J. 451 (1992), our Supreme Court set the standard for factual hearings on PCR applications: