ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Appellant’s main argument on appeal is that the Superior Court erred by failing to consider how federal courts construe § 1692c(b) of the FDCPA.  Appellant’s Br., at 1, 16.  And while Appellant concedes that the federal decisions he cites in his brief are “non-binding authority,” he insists the Superior Court was in error because such decisions “may have significant persuasive effect. ”  Id., at 6.  In fact, Appellant even boldly asserts that every federal case to reach the merits concluded that the use of letter vendors by debt collectors violates the FDCPA.  Id., at 2, 9.  This proposition is misleading for two primary reasons.  First, this ignores the fact that many more federal courts never had the opportunity to reach the merits on the proposed letter vendor theory of liability because they found that the plaintiff lacked standing as no injury-in-fact could be established.  See infra and e.g., In re FDCPA Mailing Vendor Cases, 551 F. Supp. 3d 57 (E.D.N.Y. 2021); Quaglia v. NS193, LLC, 21 C 3252, 2021 WL 7179621 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 12, 2021); Barclift v. Keystone Credit Services, 585 F. Supp. 3d 748; Kelly Jo Nyanjom, V. Npas Solutions, LLC, 2022 WL 168222 (D. Kan. Jan. 19, 2022).  In doing so, some federal courts have expressly cast doubt on the merit of letter vendor claims, even while grounding their dismissal in Article III standing.  In re FDCPA Mailing Vendor Cases, 59-62 (bemoaning the use and abuse of the FDCPA lawsuits which manipulate the law for improper and non-salutary purposes and citing cases); Cavazzini v. MRS Associates, 574 F. Supp. 3d at 142; Barclift v. Keystone Credit Servs., Inc., at 759; Quaglia v. NS193, LLC, 2021 WL 7179621, *3; Nyanjom v. NPAS Solutions, LLC, 2022 WL 168222, *5.  As such, it cannot be said that there is a meaningful “consensus” of federal case law upholding the merits of letter vendor claims.  Second, even assuming there was a genuine and effective consensus on the law from all federal courts on this matter (which there is not), as Appellant concedes, such decisions are simply not binding upon this Court.
[brief] 48  INDEX TO APPENDIX  Indictment No. [...] .................................................................  Da 1-2 Verdict Sheet .........................................................................................  Da 3-8 Judgment of Conviction ........................................................................  Da 9-11  Amended Judgment of Conviction .........................................................  Da 12-14 Notice of Appeal ....................................................................................  Da 15-18 CD – Security-Camera Recordings .......................................................  Da 19  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS, AND RULINGS  Pronouncement of Sentence .................................................................  30T 59-22 to 62-23  Judgment of Conviction ........................................................................  Da 9-11  Amended Judgment of Conviction .........................................................  Da 12-14 | CASES | PAGE NOS.
[brief] The N.J. Legislature has proposed at least 3 pieces of legislation regarding litigation finance between 2014 and 2016, around the time of these Contracts.  (Da293-321)  At least one of the proposed statutes states that “[n]othing in this act shall be construed to cause any consumer litigation funding transaction conforming to this act to be deemed a loan…”  (Da317)  Defendants are not suggesting that proposed legislation carries the same weight as an actual statute, but it does suggest the current thought.  Arguing over what is a loan is a moot point, however, because Plaintiff did not appeal the September 21, 2022 Order nor reference it in the Amended Notice of Appeal, and as a result, waived any objection to that order.
[brief] The corollary to this doctrine is that the Primary Constitutional Right of the individual is to be protected from Governmental attack; *that is the purpose of Government*.  As the Supreme Court has held:  "Primarily, governments exist for the maintenance of social order.  Hence it is that the obligation of the government to protect life, liberty, and property against the conduct of the indifferent, the careless, and the evil-minded, may be regarded as lying at the very foundation of the social compact."
[brief] [Pa9].  The CSC conducted a *de novo* review of [...]’s decision, made an independent evaluation of the record evidence, and thoroughly reviewed Appellant’s Exceptions.  [Pa9].  The CSC determined that [...]’s determinations were “substantially based on his assessment of the credibility of the witnesses” and acknowledged that because [...] “has the benefit of hearing and seeing the witnesses, [he] is generally in a better position to determine the credibility and veracity of the witnesses. ”  [Pa9].  The CSC found that Appellant failed to demonstrate [...]’s credibility determinations, findings, or conclusions, were arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable.  [Pa10].
[brief] However, Williams and Wiggins are both unavailing, as in both instances the Court found the respective defendants met their burdens under Strickland because counsel did not adequately investigate the respective backgrounds of their clients and as such failed to provide the sentencing court with large amounts of mitigating evidence that would have resulted in a lesser sentence.  *Wiggins*, 529 U.S. at 396-97; *Williams*, 539 U.S. at 521-22. \(^1\)  This is not at all equivalent nor even remotely analogous to the present matter.  First, defendant makes no claim that prior counsel was ineffective at defendant’s sentencing, but more pertinently defendant’s argument ignores the fact that the testimony of the State’s expert did not contradict the defense’s trial strategy.
[brief] The court in *In re Resolution* reasoned that they would not impede the “clear public interest” --- \(^8\) State Commission of Investigation confidentiality requirements at N.J.S.A. 52:9M-15. of the Commissioner’s ability to investigate, prosecute, and thwart crimes perpetrated within the criminal justice system.  *See In re Resolution of State Com. of Investigation*, 108 N.J. at 45-47.  Here, there are no competing equities.  Even assuming *arguendo* that no private right of action exists under the NJCFLA, enjoining [...] from attempting to enforce debts declared void by the legislature does not conflict with the goals of the NJCFLA or the Commissioner’s ability to enforce the same.  Indeed, enjoining [...] from further unlicensed collection activity would further the legislative purpose of the NJCFLA, *to wit*, regulating the marketplace to ensure that only licensed entities participate.  The trial court’s reliance by proxy on *In re Resolution* and its reasoning based on the same are therefore in error as the trial court failed to analyze any competing equities in [...]’s petition for declaratory and injunctive relief.
[brief] Respectfully submitted, /s/ [...], Esquire I.D. #033981995  [...] [...] [...]; [...]  Counsel for Appellants  Dated: October 3, 2023  [...], BOTH INDIVIDUALLY, AS SURVIVING BENEFICIARY, AND ON BEHALF OF THE ESTATE OF [...], AND [...], INDIVIDUALLY AS SURVIVING BENEFICIARY, Plaintiff(s)-Appellant(s) vs. [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], MEDICAL GROUP DOES 1-10 (FICTION NAMES) AND DR. JOHN DOES 1-10 (FICTION NAMES)
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT  ERRONEOUSLY DISMISSED  PLAINTIFF’S CASE AS CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT PROOF THAT THE DEFENDANTS’ NEGLIGENCE WAS THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF PLAINTIFF’S ACCIDENT AND INJURIES (T34:24 to T44:18)  Introduction  The issue presented on this appeal is straightforward.  Did plaintiff offer sufficient proof that his fall and resulting injuries were proximately caused by the defendants’ negligence?  The trial court accepted the defendants’ argument that [...]’s inability to identify what caused him to fall precluded his recovery.  Indeed, [...] sustained a severe blow to his head in the fall and could not articulate what precipitated his accident.  Nevertheless, plaintiff maintained that the circumstances surrounding his accident gave rise to an inference that his fall was probably caused by his either slipping or tripping on a discarded piece of plywood at the construction site.  Because both defendants moved for summary judgment solely on the basis of proximate cause and because the trial court’s decision was based solely upon the asserted failure on the part of the plaintiff to establish that his fall and injuries were proximately caused by the defendants’ negligence, plaintiff will address the issue of proximate cause herein.  Scope of Appellate Review
[brief] The Appellant-Plaintiff has provided evidence of injuries which would satisfy the requirements of the verbal threshold statute, N.J.S.A. 39:6A-8a.  Thus, the central issues to be raised in Appeal include:  a.  Whether the objective evidence finding that the Appellant-Plaintiff “has sustained a significantly permanent injury from her accident of said date” is sufficient to satisfy the requirements of the verbal threshold's limitation on lawsuit as per the Automobile Insurance Cost Reduction Act (“AICRA”)?  b.  Whether the Trial Court erred by not considering the significance of probative, competent evidence from [...]’s report that was based on his review of the MRI studies?  c.  Whether the Trial Court erred in finding that the Appellant-Plaintiff has failed to establish the requisite credible “objective medical evidence” of permanency to qualify as a Category 6 permanent injury under the AICRA?
[brief] 3T175:4-7.  [...] attended the closing to receive the $330,000 payment and signed the discharge of mortgage.  3T161:14-24; 3T161:25 to 162:5; 3T162:6-11; 3T162:12 to 163:8; 3T175:4-7.  [...] was not at the closing.  3T172:7-22.  Also on April 26, 2013, [...] signed a Discharge of Mortgage certifying that the $330,000 Loan had been “Paid in Full. ”  Da150; T266:4-8.  The Discharge of Mortgage stated that “This Mortgage was made to secure payment of $330,000.00 and interest. ”  Da150; 2T266:9-12.  The [...] mortgage was therefore discharged.  Da150.  After the $330,000 payment on April 26, 2013, the $330,000 Loan was paid in full.  As of that date, there were no outstanding amounts, whether principal, interest or penalties.  3T175:4-20.  After making the $330,000 payment, [...] did not make any separate agreement with [...] to pay back any alleged unpaid interest or principal on the $330,000 Loan because there were no unpaid amounts owed.  3T175:4-20.  The $330,000 Loan was paid in full and [...] did not agree to make any additional payments because there were no outstanding amounts owed.  3T175:4-20.  In this action, [...] now claims that at the April 2013 closing, he and [...] orally agreed to a new third loan consisting of allegedly unpaid principal, interest and penalties from the $330,000 Loan and the $50,000 Loan, and that [...] would pay this new third loan when he was able.
[brief] The time to raise any issues relating to the written discovery is long gone. ”  Defendants’ response that they could amend their answers “is an unacceptable discovery response to this Court because it defeats the purpose of written discovery, which is supposed to be to pin down people on what they know, when they know it. ”  A6, para. 29.  None of that was sufficient ground on which to deny defendants’ motion to reinstate their Answer and vacate the defaults against.
[brief] (Pb27) (stating, “Appellants’ ultimate position is that the matter should be remanded for rehearing .  . . .”).  In support of Objectors’ request for a rehearing, Objectors claimed: a) that they were not given adequate time to lay a record at the rehearing, despite no time limit being imposed; b) that one of their witnesses was unavailable to attend the rehearing, despite the fact that the witness actually testified; c) that conducting a rehearing during the pendency of the application somehow inappropriately deprived the Objectors of an opportunity to introduce evidence, despite Objectors’ strategic decision to withhold proffering such evidence at the rehearing.
[brief] To this day.  And you heard me ask him about was he alerted to the fact that he was still on that website four or five years ago, at a trial, and he still hasn’t made any attempts to correct what he claims is an error.  But for five years he still has his name on there.  Still, to this day.  He testified that he overwhelmingly testifies for persons suing doctors.  And of the reviews he does of cases, for his expert work, where he reviews cases and writes reports even before going to trial, overwhelmingly, overwhelming, for the people suing doctors.  He has made approximately two million dollars, doing expert work.  He obtains cases from services that connect lawyers with doctors to be their experts in malpractice cases.
[directive] As a general matter, a request for internal investigation case files may satisfy the good cause requirement: (a)  If a Civilian Review Board that meets certain minimum requirements requests access to a completed or closed investigation file, subject to the conditions described in this section; or (b) If another law enforcement agency requests the files because it is considering hiring an officer who was formerly employed at the agency with the internal investigation files.  9.6.4  Agencies may receive law enforcement or judicially sanctioned subpoenas directing the production of internal affairs investigative records.  Before responding to the subpoena, the law enforcement executive or internal affairs investigator should consult with the agency's legal counsel to determine whether the subpoena is valid and reasonable.  Courts may modify or quash invalid or unreasonable subpoenas, but will require the agency seeking to so modify or quash to file an appropriate motion.  Similar considerations may provide grounds for opposing a records request from a Civilian Review Board that otherwise satisfies the minimum requirements described below.  For that reason, the appropriate agency personnel should consult with legal counsel to determine under what circumstances it would be appropriate to provide notice to any individual who is referenced in records requested by a Civilian Review Board.  9.6.5  If the release of internal affairs documents is appropriate, the agency should inventory the reports released and obtain a signed receipt.  9.7
[brief] The Testimony Of Both Parties To The Transaction—[...] For The [...] And [...] For [...]—that The Borough Council, In An Effort To Comply With The Requirement Of The Settlement Agreement And Forthcoming Order To Provide For A Seven Off-site Units Of Affordable Housing, Selected A Suitable Site For The Off-site Building At Block 610 Lot 1  As certified by then-mayor [...] and the redeveloper’s principal Jack [...], in 2017, Emerson identified the Off-site Property, Block 610, Lot 1, as suitable and essential to fulfilling Emerson’s fair-housing obligations.  81a ¶ 5; 78a ¶¶ 45-46.  Lamatina—in coordination with the Council’s redevelopment subcommittee, the Borough’s professionals, and [...]’s personnel—began searching the available land for an alternative affordable-housing site pursuant to the Redevelopment Agreement’s requirement, in Section 4.03, to “explore alternative sites to accommodate” affordable housing.  131a; 81a ¶ 6.  By early 2017, it was clear that some units would need to be located off-site, and Emerson had identified the specific property to be utilized because of its suitability: Block 610, Lot 1.
[directive] ATTORNEY GENERAL ADMINISTRATIVE EXECUTIVE DIRECTIVE NO. 2020-10 TO: All Division Directors, Department of Law & Public Safety  FROM: [...], Attorney General  DATE: October 8, 2020  SUBJECT: Directive Codifying Protocols for Communications with the Office of the Governor and the Legislature  For decades, Attorneys Generals and those serving under their supervision have adhered to institutional norms and procedures designed to ensure the criminal and civil laws of New Jersey are enforced evenhandedly, with integrity and independence.  This Directive codifies those norms with two goals in mind: to bolster confidence in public institutions, and to affirm the centrality of clear ethical safeguards to a well-functioning government.  It does so by establishing additional protocols governing contacts between, on the one hand, the Attorney General and those operating under the Attorney General’s authority, and on the other hand, the Governor, the State Legislature, and individuals serving either entity.  Historically, at the federal level, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) has sought to preserve its institutional integrity by establishing guidelines governing contacts with the country’s elected officials—that is to say, the President and Members of Congress.
[brief] ” (Ab38-39) (citing to Estate of Campagna v. Point LLC, 464 N.J. Super. 153, While N.J.S.A. 52:27F-15(b) requires the decisions and rulings of the State government to comply with the EMP “to the maximum extent practicable and feasible,” the EMP itself is a policy document, not a law or regulation.  (Aa923).  As such, [...]’s challenge towards [...]’s qualifications and testimony must be rejected, and [...] presents no reason to disturb [...]’s credibility findings.  (Aa84).  [...] contends that the Project is inconsistent with the goals outlined in EMP Strategies 4 and 5, including EMP Goal 5.4, which seek to “reduce energy consumption and emissions from the Building Sector,” “decarbonize and modernize New Jersey’s energy system,” and “maintain existing gas pipeline system reliability and safety while planning for future reductions in natural gas consumption.
[brief] ###  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES  ####  STATE CASES | Case Name | Citation | Page | |------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | Brodzinsky v. Pulek | 75 N.J. Super. 40 (App. Div.1962), certif. den., 38 N.J. 304 (1962) | 21 | | Capanear v. Salzano | 222 N.J. Super. 403 (App. Div. 1988) | 21 | | Carr v. Carr | 120 N.J. 336 (1990) | 22 | | Conforti v. Guliadis | 128 N.J. 318 (1992) | 22 | | Conway v. 287 Corp. Ctr. Assocs. | 187 N.J. 259 (2006) | 30, 31| | Dontzin v. Myer | 301 N.J. Super. 501 (App.Div.1997) | 16 | | Fagliarone v. Township of N. Bergen | 78 N.J. Super. 154 (App. Div. 1963) | 16 | | Gormley v. Gormley | 227 A.3d 851 (App. Div. 2019) | 16 | | Guglielmo v. Guglielmo | 253 N.J. Super. 531 (App. Div. 1992) | 16, 19, 22| | Harrington v. Harrington | 281 N.J. Super. 39 (App.Div.1995) | 19 | | Massar v. Massar | 279 N.J. Super. 89 (App.Div.1995) | 19 | | Miller v. Miller | 160 N.J. 408 (1999) | 21 | | N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. v. Alloway Twp. | 438 N.J. Super. 501 (App. Div. 2015) | 26, 31| | Northern Airlines, Inc. v. Schwimmer | 12 N.J. 293 (1953) | 16-17| | Pacifico v. Pacifico | 190 N.J. 258 (2007) | 16, 19, 20, 28| | Petersen v. Petersen | 85 N.J. 638 (1981) | 19, 22| | Rothman v. Rothman | 65 N.J. 219 (1974) | 22 | Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Inv’rs Ins. Co. of Am., 65 N.J. 474 (1974).........................................................16
[brief] ”  See N.J.S.A. 34:13A-16g(2).  Arguably, the City does not have any comparators.  The Arbitrator also considered factor 3, which is the overall compensation received by the Fire Officers in this matter (Aa143-144); factor 4, which is the stipulations of the Parties.  (Aa144-145); factor 7, which is the cost of living (Aa144); and factor 8, which is continuity and stability of employment (Aa122-123, 127, 144-145).  The Arbitrator concluded his Award by certifying that he took the statutory limitation imposed on the local tax levy into account in making his award, as well \(^1\) N.J.S.A. 34:13A-16.2a provides:
[brief] The already deferential standard utilized in public bidding cases, ibid., is amplified when a public body refuses to waive a non-material defect.  See Palamar Const., Inc. v. Pennsauken Twp., 196 N.J. Super. 241, 250 (App. Div. 1983).  In such cases, the public body’s decision can only be reversed if there is a “clear abuse of discretion. ”  Ibid.  As the Palamar court explained:  Even when doubt is entertained as to the wisdom of the action, or as to some part of it, there can be no judicial declaration of invalidity in the absence of clear abuse of discretion by the public agencies involved[; i]t is not the function of a reviewing court to substitute its judgment for that of the municipality's governing body and it is bound by the record before the governing body.
[brief] Rather than barring the recording or third-party observation outright, the same concerns may be addressed through a confidentiality order.  Id.  Defendants further improperly relied on a non-precedential, federal case out of New York when our Court in this very matter stated: “Our current Rules 4:19 and 4:10-3 are markedly different from the federal rules. ”  DiFiore, 254 N.J. at 236-37; see Pa19 at ¶ 30.  There is simply no basis to summarily deny [...] the right to record his examination when all the factors the Court identified in this matter favor recording the exam.
[directive] Extended Term (“Lagares”)  Applications for Repeat Offenders  The New Jersey Supreme Court in State v. Lagares, 127 N.J. 20 (1992), established a rule requiring statewide uniformity in implementing N.J.S.A. 2C:43- 6f, which provides that a defendant convicted of a drug distribution-type offense who has previously been convicted of a similar offense under State or Federal law is subject to a mandatory extended term of imprisonment, on application of the Page 16 Attorney General Brimage Guidelines 2 (2004 Revisions) prosecutor, which must include a term of parole ineligibility that is subject to waiver or reduction only pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-12.
[brief] I.  **The New Jersey False Claims Act**  This is an action under the NJFCA, N.J.S.A. § 2A:32C-1 *et seq.*, which permits private parties, or “relators,” to sue to redress frauds on the State, the primary beneficiary of any recovery.  NJFCA causes of action, like those brought under the federal False Claims Act (the “federal FCA”), 31 U.S.C. § 3730 *et seq.*, “belong to the Government, not to relators. ”  *United States ex rel. Charte v. American Tutor, Inc.*, 934 F.3d 346, 535 (3d Cir. 2019).  Because the State is the alleged fraud victim, it has an overwhelming interest in an NJFCA matter.  Its interests are protected by several statutory mechanisms.  For example, when a relator files an NJFCA complaint, it remains under seal for at least 60 days to permit the State to investigate, N.J.S.A. § 2A:32C-5, a period the Attorney General may seek to extend, N.J.S.A. § 2A:32C-5(f).  At the end of the seal period, the Attorney General may proceed with the action or decline to do so, in which case, the relator conducts the action.  N.J.S.A. § 2A:32C-5(g).  Even when the State declines to intervene, it maintains significant authority over an NJFCA case.  It may intervene and take over the action at a later date.  N.J.S.A. 2A:32C-6(f); see Matter of Enforcement of New Jersey False Claims Act Subpoenas, 229 N.J. 285, 289 (2017).  And it may dismiss or settle the case, even over the relator’s objections.  N.J.S.A. 2A:32C-6(b-c).  A relator that seeks to dismiss an unintervened action may do so only after the State consents.  N.J.S.A. 2A:32C-5(c); see also id. § 6(g) (State may seek stay of discovery if it would interfere with State investigation or enforcement).  As set forth below, a 2023 amendment to the NJFCA provided the State with yet another procedural mechanism to safeguard its interests.  II.