ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The types of professionals protected by the exception include doctors, [Macedo, 178 N.J.] at 346, and attorneys, Vort v. Hollander, 257 N.J. Super. 56, 62 (App. Div. 1992).  In Shaw v. Shand, 460 N.J. Super. 592 (App. Div. 2019), we concluded “‘semi- --- ² [...], No. A-0273-21, 2024 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 569 (App. Div. Apr. 5, 2024) is an unpublished opinion.  Pursuant to Rule 1:36-3, Plaintiff is not aware of any contrary unpublished opinions since [...] was decided.
[brief] We demand that you withdraw the Complaint.  If you fail to withdraw the Complaint within twenty eight (28) days of service of this written demand, an application for sanctions will be made within a reasonable time thereafter.  Under R. 1:4-8, sanctions for frivolous conduct may include penalties paid to the Court or attorneys fees, or both.  Ever since the dismissal of your Complaint in 2016, you have continuously attempted to bring [...] and [...] back into this case, under docket number [...] and now in your new lawsuit filed under docket number [...].
[brief] ### Cases | Case | Page(s) | |-------------------------------------------|---------| | Butler v. Acme Markets, Inc., | 9 | | 89 N.J. 270 (1982) | | | Cesare v. Cesare, | 7 | | 154 N.J. 394 (1998) | | | Do–Wop Corp. v. City of Rahway, | 11 | | 168 N.J. 191 (2001) | | | In re Return of Weapons to J.W.D., | 7 | | 149 N.J. 108 (1997) | | | State v. Barone, | 6 | | 147 N.J. 599 (1997) | | | State v. Cerefice, | 7 | | 335 N.J. Super. 374 (App. Div. 2000) | | | State v. Herold, | 13, 14, 15 | | 2019 WL 980656 (App. Div. 2019) | | | State v. Johnson, | 6 | | 42 N.J. 146 (1964) | | | State v. Locurto, | 6, 7 | | 157 N.J. 463 (1999) | | | State v. Scott, | 11 | | 229 N.J. 469 (2017) | | ### Statutes | Statute | Page(s) | |--------------------------------------------|---------| | N.J.S.A. 4:19-23 | 4, 7, 8, 12, 13 | | N.J.S.A. 2C:11-1 | 8, 12 | COUNTER-STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY On September 12, 2022, [...] (“[...]”) was employed by [...] and was delivering a case of wine to [...].  (2T:14-6 to 15-5).  When [...] placed the box on the ground near the garage door at 17 Raspberry Lane, he heard the rear gate to the backyard open and saw a German Shepard charging at him.  (2T:18-6 to 10).  When the German Shepard, later identified as “[...],” reached [...], it bit him in the back of his right thigh.  (2T:18-15 to 16).  After [...] bit [...], [...] ran across the street onto the neighbor’s property and attacked their dog, “[...],” in the neighbor’s front lawn.  (2T:47-1 to 13).  [...] was a 15-pound white Havanese.  (2T:131-4 to 5).  [...], [...]’s co-owner, was working in his basement when his wife alerted him that [...] was being attacked.  (2T:126-3 to 11).  When James ran outside, he saw the defendant holding [...] back, and saw that the defendant’s second German Shepard had also left her property.  (2T:127-15 to --- 1  The Statement of Facts and Procedural History have been combined for the Court’s convenience.
[brief] ### CASES  **Asbury Park Press v. Cnty. of Monmouth**, supra 406 N.J. Super. 1 (App. Div. 2009) affirmed, 201 N.J. 5 (2010)  ...........................................  8  **Asbury Park Press v. Ocean Cnty. Prosecutor's Off.**, 374 N.J. Super. 312, 329 (Law Div. 2004) ..................................................  8  **Burnett v. Cnty. of Bergen**, 198 N.J. 408, 414 (2009) .........................  8  **Burnett v. Cty. of Gloucester**, 415 N.J. Super. 506, 512 (App. Div. 2010)  ......  10  **Courier News v. Hunterdon Cty. Prosecutor's Office**, 358 N.J. Super. 373, 383 (App. Div. 2003)  .....................................................  8  **Drinker Biddle & Reath, LLP v. N.J. Dep't of Law & Pub. Safety**, 421 N.J. Super. 489, 497 (App. Div. 2011)  ............................................  7  **Gilleran v. Twp. of Bloomfield**, 227 N.J. 159, 170 (2016)  ......................  7  **Higg-A-Rella v. County of Essex**, 141 N.J. 35, 47 (1995)  ............... 6, 12, 13  **In re N.J. Firemen's Ass'n Obligation**, 230 N.J. 258, 273-74 (2017)  ..........  7  **Libertarians for Transparent Gov't v. Cumberland County (Libertarians II)**, 250 N.J. 46, 54 (2022)  ...................................................... 8  **MAG Entm’t, LLC v. Div. of Alcoholic Beverage Control**, 375 N.J. Super. 534, 54 (App. Div. 2005) .............................................. 6, 10, 11  **Mason v. City of Hoboken**, 196 N.J. 51, 64 (2008)  ..........................  8  ### STATUTES
[brief] Rather, as [...] himself explained at his deposition, he was on the beach in early August 2019 when people came up to him and told him that there were people crossing the dune in the area in front of the [...] property.  (Pa317-Pa318)  He stood up from his beach chair and looked north, and personally observed three people, including a man with brown hair, crossing from the [...] property over the [...] property where [...] fencing had recently been installed.  (Pa317-Pa318)  After witnessing this, and after consulting with other [...] board members, he spoke with the police about what he had observed and was advised by the police chief to file a complaint, which he then did.  (Pa320-Pa322)
[brief] [...]  [...], Plaintiff-Respondent, vs. GETZEL BEE, LLC, and [...], Defendants-Appellants.  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY  APPELLATE  DIVISION  Docket No. [...]  ON APPEAL FROM: Law Division, Ocean County  Docket No.: [...]  SAT BELOW: Hon. [...], A.J.S.C.  BRIEF ON BEHALF OF DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
[directive] Page 1 of 3 □ □ 13.  Photos were presented (choose one) : sequentially simultaneously  If sequential presentation, did you explain: □ □ a. that the witness would view one photo at a time?  Y N □ □ b. that the photos are in random order?  Y N □ □ c. that he/she can take as much time as he/she wants to make a decision about each photo?  Y N 14.  Officers must avoid providing “feedback;” that is, signaling to the witness in any way (whether during or after the identification procedure) that the witness correctly identified the suspect.  Did you or anyone else present say or do anything during or □ □ after the procedure that would have suggested to the witness that he/she correctly identified the suspect?  Y N (If yes, detail any actions/gestures/dialogue).
[brief] [...] offers additional forms of incentive compensation for certain employees under particular circumstances, with one such incentive being “charge pay. ” (Pa103 at 79:6-17).  Charge pay is an additional dollar per hour on top of a given hourly rate for a given shift.  (Pa165 at 25:13-20; Pa361 at 80:3-11).  The charge nurse, to whom charge pay is payable, is a designated Registered Nurse on a particular shift who assumes additional responsibilities.  (Pa361 at 80:4-11).  Having been rejected for the COVID-19 incentive pay, [...] sought charge pay for the staffing coordinators.  (Pa230 at 21:19-22:21).  While non-nurses could in theory receive charge pay, such a decision required director-level approval.
[brief] Thank you.  CERTIFICATION  I hereby certify under penalty of law that, to the best of my knowledge, information, and belief, that the subject matter of the within controversy does not form the basis of any action presently pending in any other court or arbitration proceeding.  Also, to the best of my knowledge, information and belief, no other action or arbitration proceeding is contemplated at this time, and I know of no other party who should be joined in this action.  Additionally, I certify that this opposition and the appeal to which it is related have been undertaken with a reasonable basis in law, and they are based on rational arguments and credible evidence and has not been filed for frivolous purposes.
[brief] Order entering Summary Judgment, Appx 560. and she had previously worked for similar organizations.  Id. at 41:43-42:4.  During her career, she was trained on the laws and regulations concerning abuse and neglect on residents of group homes.  See Appx 391 at 42:5-9.  Appellant received some of this training at [...].  Id. at 42:10-12.  Appellant testified that she complained about abuse to clients, extortion, medication mismanagement, and fraternization.  See Appx 401 at 52:1-9.  Appellant testified that she complained about fraternization on the job between co-workers.  Id. at 52:9 to 13.  Appellant testified that the fraternization escalated to abuse and neglect, because complaints about employees’ conduct towards clients were ignored.  Id. at 52:17 to Appx 402 at 53:6.  Appellant testified that she witnessed these incidents while she was a full-time employee, and before she dropped down to per diem status.  See Appx 392 at 43:2 to 43:10.  Appellant complained about these incidents prior to dropping down to per diem status.  Id. at 43:11-14.  Appellant believed the incidents she complained about constituted abuse and neglect in violation of New Jersey law and regulation.
[brief] On February 24th, 2020, [...] was a passenger on the [...] bus that suddenly, violently and abruptly made a sudden stop, causing her to violently strike the floor of the bus.  (1a)  This was not simply a jerking motion that at times expectedly accompanies the movement of a bus in traffic.  However, there was no evidence presented here that the driver was attempting to avoid a collision or was otherwise required to make a sudden and abrupt stop as an explanation for the forceful stop.  As a result of the sudden and strong stop, [...] fell backwards and sustained serious and permanent injuries, herniating multiple discs in her spine, and because of these injuries became depressed, and required medical intervention.  The Defendant submitted a Statement of Material Facts ("SMF") in support of its motion for summary judgment.
[directive] Using medication  Medications: prescribed to another person is a violation of federal law and drug court rules.  When in doubt, ask your doctor, treatment provider and probation officer before taking When You Are any medications or supplements of any kind.  Not Sure: because they can give a false Never, ever eat poppy seeds or "everything bagels"  Poppy Seeds: positive for morphine.  Do not ever try to explain away a positive drug test by saying you ate poppy seeds. will not work.  It
[brief] The second outcome of the subject action.  In *Benipal*, in 1994, the plaintiffs and defendant agreed to purchase a piece of real estate together through [...] ([...]), a jointly-owned entity.  *Benipal v. [...]*, A-0894-17T3, 2019 WL 149524, at *1 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Jan. 4, 2019).  Instead of titling the property in [...]'s name, however, the defendant *purposefully* titled the property in the name of defendant [...]
[brief] A plaintiff must introduce evidence which affords a reasonable basis for the conclusion that it was more likely than not that the defendant’s conduct was a cause in fact of the result.  *The mere showing of an incident which causes injuries cannot establish negligence.*  In fact, there is a presumption against it.  *Buckelew v. Grossbard*, 87 N.J. 512, 525 (1981).  It is well-established that the burden of proving the charge of negligence is upon the plaintiff and must be sustained by proof of circumstances from which the defendant’s want of due care is a legitimate inference.  It is a substantial right of the defendant that the plaintiff be required to meet this burden.  *Vander Gfoef v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co.*, 32 N.J. Super 365 (App. Div. 1954).  It is well-established that mere allegations set forth in pleadings without evidentiary support may not prevent the granting of summary judgment.  *New Jersey Mortgage and Investment Corp. v. Calvetti*, 68 N.J.S 18, 25 (App. Div. 1961).  It is also soundly established that when the moving party demonstrates a prima facie right to summary judgment, the opposing party is required to show by competent evidential material that a genuine issue of material fact exists.  *id. at 32*.  Although a party opposing a motion for summary judgment is entitled to all reasonable inferences when faced with a Summary Judgment Motion an “inference is a deduction or conclusion that can be drawn only from a premise established by the proofs in the case. ”  *Ferdinand v. Agricultural Insurance Company*, 22 N.J. 482, 488 (1956).  Here, the trial court correctly found the defendants did not breach any duty owed to the plaintiff.  Further, it is not sufficient for plaintiff to oppose the motion for summary judgment by merely asserting a conclusion opposite to the factual position of the movement.  *New Jersey Mortgage and Investment Corp*, supra, at 25.  But where a factual foundation for contradicting the movant’s assertions or denials of knowledge is lacking, and where no sound evidentiary basis is indicated for impeaching the movant’s credibility, the opponent of the motion is not entitled to proceed to trial merely on the faint hope that he may be able to shake the movant’s witnesses or otherwise uncover previously unexposed information.  *id.* at 36.  Rule 4:46-2(c) specifically states that “an issue of fact is genuine only if, considering the burden of persuasion at trial, *the evidence submitted* by the parties on the Motion, together with all legitimate inferences therefrom favoring the non-moving party would require submission of the issue to the trier of fact”.  Here, the issue of whether the defendant owed a duty to the plaintiff was a matter of law properly decided by the trial court.  Based on the facts of the case the trial court correctly held that the defendants owed no duty to plaintiff to remove ice from the premises until a reasonable time *after* the ongoing freezing rainstorm ended.  Thus, the trial court properly granted summary judgment dismissing the Complaint.  POINT III
[brief] [...] testified that the bullets in the firearm chamber and the magazine all had the same “Win .40 S&W” headstamp.  (6T160-1 to 169-25).  [...] also testified that officers searched [...]’s Chevy Captiva and recovered four cell phones, $440, two clear plastic bags, and 89 ziplock bags of suspected heroin stamped with “Call of Duty” on the front.  (8T18-1 to 19-24).  Officers also recovered a black hooded sweatshirt, a bucket hat, a reversible camo bucket hat, a black mask, blue disposable gloves, and an ID card and mail registered to [...] from the vehicle.  Ibid.
[brief] THE BOARD FAILED TO FOLLOW THE LEGAL STANDARD FOR APPEAL OF AN AGENCY DECISION.  (Raised below at Pa74, Pa124-130, Pa137-145).  The Court reviews the Board's decision with a due degree of deference, recognizing its role as an administrative agency acting within the scope of its responsibilities, recognizing that the agency lacks the legal training and sophistication of a lower court judge in the overall analysis of any appeal.
[brief] A.  The State’s fingerprint expert properly testified to opinions within his expertise and according to applicable standards and New Jersey Law.  The State’s latent fingerprint expert’s testimony did not amount to plain error.  He was not constrained by out-of-state caselaw, and defendant could have used the scientific reports for cross-examination but chose not to.  Testifying about the verification step was proper expert testimony about the basis for his expert opinion.  And the expert remained within his expertise in ridge analysis when discussing the blood on the finger when it made the print.  1.
[brief] *Sutton v. Sutton* at 71F.Supp. 2d at 386.  On November 22, 1992, approximately seven (7) months after the second Federal Lawsuit referenced in *Sutton v. Sutton* was dismissed, the Petitioner was married to Decedent.  71F.Supp. 2d at 386.  There was no pending litigation when Petitioner was married.
[brief] That’s **IMPOSSIBLE**!  In May of 2015, the Final Judgment by Default by the trial court was granted based on *defective* Affidavits of Service certifications by the Process Server in February of 2015 and based on the *improper* certifications submitted to the Court Clerk by the Plaintiff’s Attorney and his Legal Assistant in March of 2015 and again in April of 2015.  **POINT  1.  THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT**
[brief] THE MOTION JUDGE ERONEOUSLY HELD THAT PLAINTIFF MUST SHOW ACTUAL OR CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE OF THE HAZZARD (Pa117)  [...] breached a duty due and owing to the [...] by failing to conduct a reasonable inspection to discover defective conditions.  There is no evidence in the record that [...] actually exercised proper due diligence on the day of the subject incident.  Further, [...] breached their duty due and owing to the [...] by failing to take reasonable care to make the premise safe.  To establish a prima facie case of negligence, the plaintiff has the burden to show that defendant: (1) owed plaintiff a duty of care; (2) breached that duty; and (3) that proximately caused plaintiff's damages.
[directive] Special Precautions  When a BWC Recording May Reveal Tactical Operations Information.  In the event that a BWC worn during the execution of tactical operations (e.g., “Special Operations” or “SWAT” operations, execution of arrest and/or search warrant, etc.) records confidential tactical information the disclosure of which might jeopardize future operations or officer safety (e.g., verbal codes or hand signals used to communicate information or instructions, techniques for interior movements and clearing rooms, techniques to convince persons to open doors, etc.), the recording shall be “tagged” in accordance with Section 9.3.  See N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1.1 (exempting from disclosure under the Open Public Records Act “security measures and surveillance techniques which, if disclosed, would create a risk to the safety of persons”); N.J.A.C. 13:1E-3.2 (2) (exempting records that may reveal “surveillance, security, tactical, investigative, or operational techniques”); see also Section 9.5 (prosecutor’s authority to seek protective orders when complying with discovery obligations).  7.4  Special Restrictions on Recording in Courtrooms.
[brief] The order denying the motion to suppress should be affirmed.  B.  The officers had reasonable, articulable suspicion to stop the car because there was other traffic that may have been affected by the driver’s failure to signal prior to changing lanes.  The credible testimony established two groups of motorists that “may be affected” by [...]’s un-signaled lane change: (1) the other mid-day traffic on the commercial stretch of Route 22 where the violation occurred, and; (2) the patrol vehicle immediately behind [...]’s vehicle.  As to the first group, the trial court correctly ruled that the “medium” traffic in both lanes of westbound Route 22 supported “a reasonable and articulable suspicion” that a violation of N.J.S.A. 39:4-126 occurred.  (Da6).  As to the second group, the presence of the patrol car directly behind [...]’s vehicle independently supported an objectively reasonable basis to conduct the stop.  As the caselaw makes clear, a trailing motorist may be affected if the lead motorist fails to provide notice of her intentions.  The trial court correctly ruled that there existed a reasonable and articulable basis to stop [...] for failing to signal her lane change.  This Court should affirm that ruling.
[brief] 2.1  Purpose of the Settlement.  The purpose of this Settlement is to forever settle and compromise any and all claims, disputes, and controversies that were or could have been raised against [...] in the Settled Action by Class Members . . . relating to whether [...] . . . has the right to amend or modify any agreement or fee or charge of any kind.  Settlement Agreement, § 2.1 (emphases added) (Pa00046–Pa00047).  Plaintiff has never disputed this point.  See Pa000101; Pb16–Pb19 (lacking the words “modify,” “modification,” and “amend”).  The trial court even observed that Plaintiff never “provided . . . compelling reasons for why” [...]’s changes to its fees and agreements were “‘future claims’ and new fees . . . outside the scope of the Settlement Agreement. ”  Pa000106.  Plaintiff’s failure to explain how the [...] claims fall outside [...]’s right to amend is a waiver of any contrary argument.  See Gormley v. Wood-El, 218 N.J. 72, 95 n.8 (2014) (declining to address an issue “in light of [the appellant’s failure to argue or brief the issue, or develop the type of record that would assist the Court in resolving” it).  Had Plaintiff challenged this point, he would still lose.  The unambiguous phrases “relate to” in Section 1.29 and “relating to” in Section 2.1 are broad; they cover all claims that “have some connection to” or “stand in relation to” [...].
[brief] (Pa161)  On June 24, 2024, Petitioner filed her Brief and Appendix.  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I PLAINTIFF MAY NOT CHALLENGE THE TRIAL COURT’S MARCH 1, 2024 ORDER DISMISSING HER COMPLAINT WITH PREJUDICE SINCE SHE DID NOT OPPOSE RESPONDENT  AFFINITY CARE’S MOTION FOR SAME  Despite basing her appeal primarily on the trial court’s March 1, 2024 Order dismissing her Complaint with prejudice due to her failure to comply with multiple court orders to retain counsel, Petitioner never filed opposition to Respondent [...]’s February 14, 2024 motion seeking that dismissal.  Thus, Petitioner’s appeal of the March 1, 2024 Order is improper since she did not object to Respondent’s request for a dismissal below.  “An issue not raised below will not be considered for the first time on appeal. ”  North Haledon Fire Co. No. 1 v. Borough of North Haledon, 425 N.J. Super. 615, 631 (App. Div. 2012) (citing Brock v. Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 149 N.J. 378, 391 (1997); Soc’y Hill Condo Ass’n v. Soc’y Hill Assocs., 347 N.J. Super. 163, 177-78 (App. Div. 2002)).  “Generally, issues not raised below, even constitutional issues, will not ordinarily be considered on appeal unless they are jurisdictional in nature or substantially implicate public interest. ”  State v. Walker, 385 N.J. Super. 388, 410 (App. Div. 2006) (citing Nieder v. Royal Indem. Ins. Co., 62 N.J. 229, 234 (1973))  As Petitioner did not raise any arguments in opposition to Respondents’ motion for dismissal with prejudice, she may not appeal the court’s resultant March 1, 2024 Order.  Accordingly, the court must dismiss Petitioner’s appeal of that ruling.
[brief] ###  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | Case | Page | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | **Bank Leumi USA, v. Kloss,** | 23, 25 | | 243 N.J. 218 (2020) | | | **Brennan v. Orban,** | 24 | | 145 N.J. 282 (1996) | | | **Carino v. Allstate Fin. Servs., LLC,** | 20 | | No. A-5717-09T4, 2011 WL 1364150 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Apr. 12, 2011) [Da579-Da583] | | | **Matter of City of Newark,** | 13 | | 469 N.J. Super. 366 (App. Div. 2021) | | | **Crowe v. DeGioia,** | 22, 42 | | 90 N.J. 126 (1982) | | | **Delaware River & Bay Auth. v. York Hunter Const., Inc,** | 42 | | 344 N.J. Super. 361 (Ch. Div. 2001) | | | **Dillon v. Typaldos,** | 16 | | No. SOM-C-12102-04, 2006 WL 1381625, at *12 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. May 19, 2006)
[brief] Rosenberg v. Tavorath, 352 N.J. Super. 385, 401 (App. Div. 2002).  If the expert offers “‘bare conclusions, unsupported by factual evidence,’” the testimony is inadmissible as net opinion.  Kieffer v. Best Buy, 205 N.J. 213, 220 n.4 (2011) (quoting Buckelew v. Grossbard, 87 N.J. 512,  A hallmark of net opinion is the expert’s failure “‘to explain a causal connection between the act or incident complained of and the injury or damage allegedly’ suffered. ”  Ibid. (quoting Buckelew, 87 N.J. at 524).  Likewise, an expert’s failure to base the proffered opinion on a generally-accepted standard renders the testimony inadmissible net opinion.  Davis v. Brickman Landscaping, Ltd., 219 N.J. 395, 410 (2014).
[brief] The rulings of the trial Court denying the Plaintiff the use of the Defendant’s Incident Report and photographs, and the Court’s preclusion of testimony regarding the Defendant’s subsequent remedial measures, were “made without a rational explanation, inexplicably departed from established policies” and deprived the jury of its right to hear truthful, compelling evidence, thereby depriving the Plaintiff of a fair trial.  See Masone v. Levine, 382 N.J. Super. 181, 193 (App. Div. 2005), quoting *Flagg v. Essex County Prosecutor*, 171 N.J. 561, 571 (2002).