ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] On February 27, 2023, the day before the bench trial was set to commence, the Trial Court granted this motion (Pa1731).  Thereafter, on February 28, 2023, the Court held a one-day Bench Trial (7T).  The parties agreed to have Planning Expert Reports submitted in lieu of testimony (7T 9:9; 11:25) (Pa300-425).  The parties submitted Joint Exhibits (Pa68,533) (7T 10:20).  In addition, the Court “contingently” allowed in some additional Exhibits from [...] (7T 13:4).  At the conclusion, the Trial Court issued an Order denying all relief and dismissed the Complaint accompanied by an 18 page written Statement of Reasons (Pa1733-1734).
[brief] “From [...]’s deposition excerpt, it is clear that his opinion is that the silicone particulate proximately caused Plaintiff’s injuries by causing inflammation and traction that induced a retinal detachment in Plaintiff’s eye. ”  (Da0816; Da0826)  “Similarly, the court finds that [...] has also provided sufficient expert testimony to show that the silicone particulate proximately caused Plaintiff’s injuries…[...] clearly opined that the alleged silicone particulate created persistent inflammation in Plaintiff’s eye that proximately caused her injuries. ”  (Da0816; Da0826.)  “Third, the court finds that [...]’s and Dr. Phillip’s opinions are sufficiently based in fact to be admissible under N.J.R.E. 703. ”  (Da0816; Da0827)  “Finally, the court finds that Plaintiff’s experts have a sufficient basis for their opinion that a microscopic particulate of silicone could have caused a retinal detachment in a human eye…Therefore, the court does not find it reasonable to conclude that Plaintiff’s experts lacked a sufficient basis to opine that the silicone particulate could cause inflammation and corneal reaction when Defendant’s own recall contained those very same warnings of intraocular inflammatory reaction and corneal reaction as potential safety risks.  Under New Jersey law, Plaintiff is only required to show that the alleged product defect proximately caused or was a substantial factor in causing her injuries, and it is clear to the court that Plaintiff’s experts have based their opinions on facts and data sufficient to be admissible under N.J.R.E. 703. ”  (Da0816; Da0828)  “Consequently, the court finds Plaintiff has presented sufficient evidence of a manufacturing defect and admissible expert opinion that such defect proximately caused Plaintiff’s injuries to create a dispute of material fact.
[brief] (1T57:6-13).  Regarding indemnification, the Trial Court first agreed with [...] that the sub-section of the bylaws that carved out “disciplinary actions and criminal proceedings” was “not relevant here. ”  (1T83:17-19).  The Trial Court then stated that the actual language of the bylaws talks about an officer who is a defendant, and . . .  He's not a defendant in the [...] matter, even though they apparently don't use that title.  He wasn't named at all, in any respect, until he failed to comply with an order that the [...] turn over the text messages requested in [...]'s OPRA request.  (1T83:25-84:8).  However, the Trial Court stated, “[...] is the one who put himself in the position that he presently finds himself in, which is his refusal to produce the text messages.
[brief] N.J.A.C. 7:13-3.1(a) (2022).  The DEP delineation method, known as “Method 1,” is the preferred method and involves consulting flood maps showing the flood hazard area for certain waterbodies.  N.J.A.C. 7:13-3.3(a)(2022).  DEP has mapped the flood hazard areas along more than two thousand five hundred miles of New Jersey’s waters and these maps are provided in Appendix 2 of the FHACA rules.  45 N.J.R. 360(a) (Feb. 19 2013).  Duck Pond Run itself had DEP delineations, so [...] relied upon those delineations to identify that waterbody’s flood hazard area.
[directive] -2- should not conclude that a defendant is ineligible for a standardized “open” plea offer based on the amount threshold set forth in criterion #3 unless the prosecutor has some objective basis to believe that the amount of drugs involved exceeds the Guidelines threshold.  It should be noted that a prosecutor need not have proof beyond a reasonable doubt in order to determine that a defendant is ineligible based on this or any other criterion.  Rather, a prosecutor need only have a “good faith basis to support a determination that a defendant is ineligible for a standardized waiver offer based upon one or more specific eligibility criteria. ”  Section 3.3 (disputed facts).  The amount of drugs involved for purposes of this eligibility criterion may therefore be established by any objectively reasonable method, including not only direct weight measurements made by police departments or forensic laboratories, but also by means of reasonable extrapolations or estimates made by prosecutors based upon the information contained in the case file.  To aid in this process, prosecutors may develop schedules of commonly-sold drugs that show the amount of drugs that are typically packaged in various retail “sales units” that are jurisdiction.3 distributed in the
[brief] **Misappropriation #3:**  $2,000,000 transfer from [...]’s [...] checking account on December 26, 2008 to [...]’s [...] account.  (18T114:18 to 115:6; 26T35:8 to 36:10).14  •  [...] purchased the [...] in [...] with effect from January 1, 2009.  On December 26, 2008, [...] transferred $2 million out of [...]’s [...] checking account to his own personal account, and debited the [...] stockholder’s loan account by that amount, purportedly to cover this acquisition.  (16T8:6 to 9:8; 18T114:18 to 115:6; 115:12-22; 24T76:8 to 77:7).  This diversion of funds resulted in a negative balance in the stockholder’s loan account.  On December 31, 2008, to rectify this issue, [...] recorded a journal entry to show that the [...] was acquired in December 2008, rather than in January 2009.  These dates are inconsistent with the actual transaction documents, and there is no documentation tracing these funds as actually being used to purchase the [...] property.
[brief] Based upon the June 2019 prior Appellate ruling, the 1963 Agreement, and the relevant law and the evidence, this Court should vacate and reverse the Trial Court Rulings and enter Judgment dismissing plaintiff’s Complaint and further grant the defendant Judgment to the effect that the 1963 Agreement created only a temporary parking license and that license has been waived and/or terminated.  Further, the Court’s ruling that an express easement exists for the use of [...]’s heating equipment/boiler room is not legally within the scope of an “easement” and is further indicative that the entire Agreement was in the nature of a revocable license between then related entities which must be validated.  The Court is also requested to reverse the various sanction and fee orders imposed on [...] and direct the return of all funds paid pursuant to the Trial Court’s incorrect Orders.  Respectfully submitted, BY: ____________________________
[brief] Sipko, 251 N.J. at 182-83 (“‘some commentators observe that a marketability discount is not a discount at all,’ but rather ‘a price adjustment reflecting factors typical of close corporations. ’” (quoting Balsamides, 160 N.J. 352, 379 (1999)).  B.  The application of discounts turns on whether their presence or absence would incentivize or deter the conduct causing the buyout.  The current law regarding the application of discounts begins with two New Jersey Supreme Court matters issued at the same time.
[brief] Table of Authorities ........................................................................................................ ii  Preliminary Statement.....................................................................................................  1  Procedural History and Statement of Facts.................................................................  3  Legal Argument..............................................................................................................  4  Point I: The Limited Attorney Exemption  Impermissibly Infringes on the Supreme Court’s Exclusive Authority to Regulate the Practice of Law ..............................................................................................................  4  A.  Under the New Jersey Constitution, the Supreme Court is Vested with the Exclusive Authority to Regulate the Practice of Law .......................................................................................................... 4 B. Debt Adjustment, When Performed by an Attorney on Behalf of a Client, Constitutes the Practice of Law ......................... 9 Point II: The Limited Attorney Exemption as Applied to New Jersey Attorneys is Unconstitutional ........................................................................... 12 Conclusion .................................................................................................................... 18 ### TABLE OF AUTHORITIES #### Cases - **Am. Budget Corp. v. Furman**, 67 N.J. Super. 134 (Ch. Div.), aff'd per curiam 36 N.J. 129 (1961) ................................................................. 10,12 - **Appell v. Reiner**, 43 N.J. 313 (1964) .................................................. 10 - **Beyers v. Richmond**, 937 A.2d 1082 (Pa. 2007) ........................................... 7 - **Ferguson v. Skrupa**, 372 U.S. 726 (1963) .................................................. 11,12 - **Home Budget Service, Inc. v. Boston Bar Ass'n**, 139 N.E.2d 387 (Mass. 1957) ...................................................................................... 11 - **In re LiVolsi**, 85 N.J. 576 (1981) .............................................................
[brief] \textit{See}, cases collected in \textit{Grinnell Mut. Reins. Co. v. Central Mut. Ins. Co.}, 658 N.W.2d 363, 379-80 (N.D.2003), including citation to \textit{Jorge}.  And see, \textit{Weir v. Federal Ins. Co.}, 811 F.2d 1387, 1395, n.6 (10thCir.1987) (the "liability of an insurer need not be ironclad in order for it to settle a claim without a subsequent finding that the payment to the insured was voluntary").  \textsuperscript{11}  Nor is any alleged lack of a reservation of rights to [...] relevant.  (Zb51.)  \textit{General Ins. Co. v. New York Marine & Gen Ins. Co.}, 320 N.J.Super. 546, 557 III.  [...]’S RESCISSION CLAIM IS BASELESS
[directive] Usted debe contestar estas preguntas adicionales si se declara culpable del delito de agresión sexual con agravantes, agresión sexual, abuso deshonesto con agravantes, rapto según 2C:13-1c(2), poner en peligro el bienestar de un/una menor participar en conducta sexual que perjudique o pervierta la moral del (de la) menor según 2C:24-4(a); poner en peligro por el bienestar de un/a menor conforme a 2C:24-4b(3), (4) o (5)(a), poner en peligro el bienestar de un/a menor conforme a 2C:24-4b(5)(b)(i) o (ii) (si la infracción se cometió el 1 de febrero de 2018 o después de esa fecha), ser dirigente de una red de pornografía infantil conforme a 2C:24-4.1 (si la infracción se cometió el 1 de febrero de 2018 o después de esa fecha), seducir o atraer con engaño a un/a menor conforme a 2C:13-6, abuso deshonesto penal conforme a 2C:14-3b si la víctima es un/a menor; rapto conforme a 2C:13-1, constreñimiento ilegal conforme a 2C:13-2 o privación ilegal de libertad conforme a 2C:13-3 si la víctima es un/a menor y el infractor no es uno de los padres, fomento de la prostitución infantil conforme a 2C:34-1b(3), (4), o cualquier intento de cometer cualquiera de dichos delitos.  Tenga en cuenta para la Pregunta 4b(2) que aunque por el delito de poner en peligro el bienestar de un/a menor conforme a 2C:24-4b(5)(b)(iii) puede estar sujeto a supervisión bajo libertad condicional de por vida si lo solicita el/la fiscal, esta infracción no se incluyó en las enmiendas del 1 de febrero de 2018 a los delitos sujetos a la Ley de Megan de acuerdo con 2C:7-2b(2).
[brief] (T001).  In the same, [...] set forth a well thought out decision granting the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.  In his decision, [...] properly observed that this was not a jury issue.  He had to determine whether [...] and his firm owed a duty to [...] under all of the facts and circumstances available to the Court.  In this case, [...] stated, “I really gave a lot of thought to it.  And I studied very closely the whole history of the litigation which evolved, of course, from a Probate matter involving the Miranda’s father, [...]. ”  Properly noting that this was a legal issue on whether a duty was owed, [...] turned to the applicable governing principles.  First, the Court would have to look at the Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers, to determine whether the lawyer invited the non-client to rely on the lawyers opinion and or provision of the legal services.  Considering the factors, including fairness, foreseeability, and the relationship between the parties, including public policy and legal requirements, [...] was not satisfied that [...] and his firm owed [...] a duty of care.  Accordingly, [...] granted the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.  [...] explained that although an agreement was sent to the brothers for the Probate claim on September 13, 2017, [...] did not sign the same.  [...] did prepare a letter to the Surrogate’s Office in Morris County stating that he represented [...] and [...].  [...] called [...], who, at the time, was [...]’s attorney, and had historically been [...]’s attorney.  The record confirms that [...] was indeed [...]’s attorney.  The Court noted that is “just about the extent of it” when it comes to any facts to support that there was a duty owed.
[brief] As Appellant’s Hospitalist, [...] was responsible for Appellant’s care while she was in [...], including administration of her medications and diagnosis of her conditions in her blood.  This is shown by the medical records bearing [...]’s name and the discharge summary.  Pa1-6, Vol. 002.  There is no better expert for Appellant to retain as a matter of law, as the statute does not contemplate any other area lower than a subspecialty.  Given the allegations in the Complaint have to do with conditions of Appellant’s blood, and [...] was responsible for administering medications and diagnosing her conditions, [...] satisfies the purpose of the statute.  Therefore, [...] is qualified to render an AOM that implicates [...].
[brief] XII.  THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION (NOT RAISED BELOW)  The trial court repeatedly interrupted plaintiff on May 26, 2023 (1T: 8-13).  Despite “coming on a bit early” (1T3), the Court said, “Let’s get to it.  I’ve got ten oral arguments today. ” (1T11).  Simply put the Court did not allow [...] sufficient time to present his arguments.  The same thing occurred at oral argument on October 11, 2023.  The trial court interrupted Plaintiff and said, “I’m running late. ”  The trial court's decision was biased.  Defendants were allowed a rebuttal for their motion (1T14), but [...] was not granted a final rebuttal for his motion (2T: 14-15).  Moreover, the Court failed to consider relevant evidence, known to the parties at the time of claim denial, which was part of the “pleadings”.  (2T: 5-6, 8-9); (Pa87, Pa88, Pa89, Pa249).  CONCLUSION  Under the de novo standard of review, the Appellate Division gives no deference to the trial court’s determination.  The de novo standard applies to contract interpretations.
[brief] Simple as that.  Plaintiffs invoke the “guidelines” in the Plain Language Review Act (Pb16), but they cannot point to a single deviation from them.  There are no “confusing” cross-references.  See N.J.S.A. § 56:12-10(a)(1).  The cross-reference to Section 2(b) (Exceptions to Arbitration) is easy to follow and logically structured; attempting to cram in the actual exceptions would make Section 2(a) much longer and more complicated.  And the use of a previously defined term (“Services”) is not only standard practice but also makes the contract more streamlined; inserting a full definition every time would be far more confusing and cumbersome.
[brief] Defendants, [...] and [...] (the “[...]”) applied to Defendant, [...] (“[...]”), for a use variance to allow a garage to be larger than their house on property located at [...] (the “Property”).  The owners of an adjoining property, Plaintiffs [...] and [...] (“Plaintiffs”), objected to the application by, in the words of the trial court, “throwing mud up against the wall and hoping something sticks. ” (3T37-4 to 3T37-5).  The [...] was in a unique position to observe the lack of credibility of Plaintiffs’ objections and the trial court correctly concluded that the [...] “properly considered the application” and “applied the right standard of law” in approving the use variance.  (3T49-1 to 3T49-3).  Contrary to Plaintiffs’ arguments, the notice of hearing in this matter adequately expressed a commonsense description of the relief requested by the [...] in a manner that an ordinary lay person could intelligently determine whether to object or to seek further information.  Nothing further was required.  Additionally, the [...] properly considered the record and found that the [...] satisfied both the positive and negative criteria of the Municipal Land Use Law (MLUL) in approving the variance.  The [...] found that the proposed use promoted two separate purposes of zoning under the MLUL, and that the site was particularly suitable for the proposed use.  The [...] further found that variance could be granted without substantial detriment to the public good and would not substantially impair the intent and the purpose of the master plan and the zoning ordinance.  Based on these findings, the trial court properly concluded that the [...] did not act arbitrarily, capriciously, or unreasonably.  PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[brief] *Wildoner v. Borough of Ramsey*, 316 N.J. Super. 487, 506 (App. Div. 1998) (citing *In Re Dawson*, 136 N.J. 1, 20 (1994)).  The doctrine of precluding a claim by a non-party is applicable in the present case as outlined in *Taylor v. Sturgell*, 553 U.S. 880 (2008).
[brief] Even more preliminarily, if all of claims in the Lawsuit did not fall within exclusion g, the Lawsuit ceased falling within the insuring agreement of the Policy’s Condominium Association Directors and Officer Liability Coverage Form when the Court granted Plaintiffs’ voluntary dismissal of all their damages counts on November 5, 2020.  The Lawsuit was no longer for “loss,” meaning “damages, settlements, and/or defense costs. ”  As such, the Insuring Agreement was not satisfied and coverage is not implicated.
[directive] II.  Other Provisions  A. parties.  This Directive is issued pursuant to the Attorney Non-enforceability by third General’s authority to ensure the uniform and efficient enforcement of the laws and administration of criminal justice throughout the State.  This Directive imposes limitations on law enforcement agencies and officials that may be more restrictive than the limitations imposed under the United States and New Jersey Constitutions, and federal and state statutes and regulations.  Nothing in this Directive shall be construed in any way to create any substantive right that may be enforced by any third party.  B. Severability.  The provisions of both this Directive and the Body Worn Camera Policy shall be severable.  If any phrase, clause, sentence or provision of either this Revised Directive or the Body Worn Camera Policy is declared by a court of competent jurisdiction to be invalid, the validity of the remainder of the document shall not be affected.
[directive] Basis for an Adoption  The acceptance of state and local seizures for adoption by Treasury agencies must be made in a manner consistent with the Treasury Forfeiture Fund program goals of:  Deterring illegal activity by forfeiting assets acquired 1. through or involved in illegal activity.  No. January Directive 34 17, 2000 of Page 5 1  Ensuring and protecting the due process rights of affected 2 . persons.  This must be carried out in a standardized manner that ensures a review process by Treasury bureaus prior the to adoption.  The purpose of the review is ensure that the to and that they are adoptive seizures are requested timely, not being requested as a means of circumventing a state forfeiture.  At a minimum, there must be a state violation and probable cause to forfeit under a federal statute.  Definition of an Adoption
[brief] ..............................................  Ra71 | CASES | PAGE | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | Atkinson v. Parsekian, | 23 | | 37 N.J. 143 (1962) | | | Bumbaco v. Bd. of Trs., Pub. Emps.’ Ret. Sys., | 24 | | 325 N.J. Super. 90 (App. Div. 2000) | | | Campbell v. New Jersey Racing Comm’n, | 23 | | 169 N.J. 579 (2001) | | | Carpet Remnant Warehouse, Inc. v. N.J. Dep’t of Labor, | 23 | | 125 N.J. 567 (1991) | | | Cavalieri v. Bd. of Trs., Pub. Emps.’ Ret. Sys., | 25 | | 368 N.J. Super. 527 (App. Div. 2004) | | | Coronato v. Bd. of Trs., Pub. Emps.’ Ret. Sys., | 42 | | 2023 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 939 (Dec. 21, 2023) | | | Francois v. Bd. of Trs., Pub. Emps.’ Ret. Sys., | 28 | | 415 N.J. Super. 335 (App. Div. 2010) | | | GE Solid State, Inc. v. Dir., Div. of Tax’n, | 27 | | 132 N.J. 298 (1993) | | | Gerba v. Bd. of Trs., Pub. Emps.’ Ret. Sys., | 23 | | 83 N.J. 174 (1980) | | | Gluck v. Bd. of Trs., Pub. Emps.’ Ret. Sys., | 41 | | 2023 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 153 (Apr. 6, 2023) | | | Hemsey v. Bd. of Trs., Police & Firemen’s Ret. Sys., | 28 | | 393 N.J. Super. 524 (App. Div. 2007), overruled in part on other | | | grounds. | | | 198 N.J. 215 (2009) | | | In re Tax Credit Application of Pennrose Props. Inc., | 24 | | 346 N.J. Super. 479 (App. Div. 2002) | | Kingsley v. Hawthorne Fabrics, Inc., 41 N.J. 521 (1964) ................................................................. 27 McCann v. Clerk of Jersey City, 167 N.J. 311 (2001) .................................................................. 27 Nobrega v. Edison Glen Assoc., 167 N.J. 520 (2001) .................................................................. 26 Pascarella v. Bd. of Trs., Pub. Emps.’ Ret. Sys., 2023 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 843 (Nov. 6, 2023)
[brief] (Da2488-2490).  Defendant’s counsel and the Administrator thereafter engaged in discussions, which were interrupted to a degree by the Administrator’s vacation, regarding whether counsel would object to the Administrator’s proposed motion and whether counsel would consent to the Administrator’s form of order.  Both the Administrator and Defendant’s counsel attempted, unsuccessfully, to speak with Plaintiff’s counsel, [...], to seek his consent also.  (Id.)  On February 1, 2023, the Administrator filed his motion seeking the relief set forth above.  (Da2483-2485).  On March 16, 2023, Plaintiff filed a cross-motion entitled, “Notice of Cross Motion and Opposition to Motion. ” (Da2486-2487).  The Administrator’s motion, Plaintiff’s cross-motion and the probate court’s Order are clear evidence that the August 31, 2022 order entered by the probate court did not “resolve all issues as to all parties,” as required by R. 2:2-3(b).
[brief] ”  Jean v. Deflaminis, 480 F.3d 259, 267 (3d Cir. 2007)(emphasis added).  “Only where the facts of the particular case are so unusually suggestive of retaliatory motive may temporal proximity, on its own, support an inference of causation. ”  Kant v. Seton Hall Univ., 2010 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2469, at *11 (App. Div. 2010) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted) (Da266-270); see also Krouse v. American Sterilizer Co., 126 F.3d 494, 503 (3d Cir. 1997) (“[T]he mere fact that adverse employment action occurs after a complaint will ordinarily be insufficient to satisfy the plaintiff’s burden of demonstrating a causal link between the two events.