ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] [...]’s newfound principal reliance on an argument that it has a right to a jury trial for its IFPA and RICO claims is ironic if not disingenuous because [...] did not request a jury trial in its Complaint.  Pa23-100, 150.  Thus, it smacks of gamesmanship for [...] to now argue that interpreting the No-Fault Law to require it to arbitrate its IFPA and RICO claims would be unconstitutional.  Moreover, [...]’s jury-trial argument is another attempt to skirt the No Fault Law’s mandatory arbitration provision.  The Court should reject [...]’s attempt to recast this appeal as necessary to vindicate a constitutional right to a jury trial where the underlying entitlement PIP benefits are not subject to a jury trial but are subject to mandatory arbitration.
[brief] Pa481 ¶ 28; Pa484 ¶ 45; Pa1018–22.  [...] and his assignor (another unit owner, [...]) paid, out-of-pocket, a grand total of $382,152.12 to settle judgment debts incurred in the HCH Action.  Pa481–82 ¶¶ 29–31.  [...] has never contested the fairness and reasonableness of this settlement amount.  [...] and his assignor additionally incurred and paid $17,198.22 in HCH Action defense costs after March 5, 2021 (Pa 482 ¶ 32), for a total loss of $399,352.34.
[brief] A. INTERLOCUTORY REQUIREMENT  The controlling rule, R. 4:2-2 states that an appeal can be heard in order to (a) to prevent irreparable harm and in the interests of justice.  See Brundage v. Est of Carambeo, 195 NJ 575 (2007)  The Trial Court’s Order is only to complete a process originally ordered by the Court (mediation), which evolved into an agreement which Defendant breached, triggering a binding arbitration which was completed as to liability only and thereafter appealed three times by Defendant without success, during which time the arbitrator died before damages could be determined, to which the Court ordered a substituted arbitrator to be appointed.  Defendant seeks to emasculate the Trial Court that originated this process by suggesting that it is powerless to guide it to finality, essentially arguing that (1) because of death of arbitrator to whom both parties agreed that the Court cannot appoint a substitute without their approval, which will not be forthcoming.  (2) the arbitrators’ death ended the process which must begin anew with the claim being filed again.  This Order appointing a substitute arbitrator does not create irreparable harm to the Defendant and does not create some grave injustice.  Relief is not to be granted in order to be used to correct minor errors and if used only sparingly as caselaw requires, and here should be denied.  See State v. Reldon, 100 NJ 187, 205 (1985)  Prior to Plaintiffs’ Motion to Appoint Substitute Arbitrator, the parties, for almost two years, engaged in back and forth regarding candidates to replace [...] (deceased) to arbitrate the final issues to be decided, namely damages, since liability had already been decided.  During this time, Plaintiff submitted eight names and Defendant several more that were not approved by the other party.  This conduct by both parties also indicates the continuing intent to arbitrate the remaining issue and when, Defendant was rejected by the Court on its new position, alleges that the matter should be litigated anew.  It appeals, interlocutorily, despite that the decision below could not possibly be found to cause him irreparable harm, nor can it be reasonably advocated as against the interests of justice.  B.
[brief] ”  *Id.* at 346.  Again, starting with the premise that the essential purpose of notice – regardless of context – is to provide the public with a basic modicum of information from which a decision can be made as to whether to take further action, it would be a logically anomalous result for a lesser standard to apply to a notice concerning an ordinance adopting a redevelopment plan with overlay zoning than a notice concerning a zoning ordinance of the ordinary variety.  While legal distinctions unquestionably exist as between the two, the same cannot be said with respect to their practical implications.  Put another way, a layperson discerns no difference between development facilitated by overlay zoning or by traditional zoning.  Tacitly acknowledging the logical inconsistency of their position, defendants make a series of arguments attempting to distinguish Ordinance No. 13-2022 from land use ordinances subject to *N.J.S.A.* 40:49-2.1.  In this regard, [...] observes that *N.J.S.A.* 40:49-2.1 exclusively applies to ordinances that are “in length six or more octavo pages of ordinary print”.  ([...]b36).  This attempted distinction ignores that Ordinance No. 13-2022 actually incorporates the [...] as an attachment and far exceeds that numeric threshold.  (Townshipa072a-096a).  Similarly, despite defendants’ contentions to the contrary neither *Hirth v. City of Hoboken*, 337 N.J. Super. 149 (App. Div. 2001) nor N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-7(c) compel a different result.  The latter’s refrain that “[n]otwithstanding the provisions of the “Municipal Land Use Law,” P.L.1975, c. 291 (C.40:55D-1 et seq.) or of other law, no notice beyond that required for adoption of ordinances by the municipality shall be required for the hearing on or adoption of the redevelopment plan or subsequent amendments thereof” has no bearing in this case.  The notices required by N.J.S.A. 40:49-2 and N.J.S.A. 40:49-2.1 both apply to the adoption of ordinances by the municipality and neither are part of the Municipal Land Use Law.  Even if that was not the case, however, no statute or published decision countenances a notice which so greatly deviates from unambiguous statutory requirements such as the notice published by the Township in this case.  **III.
[brief] See also Id. at 192 ("We hold that defendant was denied a hearing that met due process requirements.").  For that reason and given the double jeopardy bar, plaintiff was simply wrong when he argued to the trial court on December 1, 2023 that: "When the Supreme Court or the Appellate Division reverses a conviction, that case doesn't go away because the prosecutor has the right to retry the case.  It doesn't end."  (Aa244, at 12:13-17).  Finally, plaintiff's reliance on Thompson v. Clark, 596 U.S. 36 (2022) to support his accrual argument (Pb13) is a non sequitur.  Plaintiff argues that Thompson "supports Appellant's position that a reversal alone is not enough to 'terminate' a case as Thompson's case was actually terminated by way of a 'dismissal'".  Id.  But there was no reversal in Thompson because there was no conviction in Thompson.  The charges against Thompson were dismissed before trial, Id. at 39, (at an earlier accrual point) and there could be no reversal.  The facts of cases are important, not sound bites taken out of context.  In sum, any claim for malicious prosecution in this case would have accrued on March 6, 2018.
[brief] After the transfer to [...], [...] testified that he paid some bills for the Property including property taxes for about a year and insurance.  (2T 34:9-37:16, Jan. 5, 2023).  Notwithstanding, Defendants failed to provide any evidence to substantiate said payments, including cancelled checks, bank records or otherwise.  Conversely, and despite Charles’ clearly false testimony, [...] continued paying property taxes for the Property through present, including, by way of example, a payment on May 3, 2021 in the amount of $2,641.69.  (Pa409).  Further, [...] testified that after the transfer to [...], he delegated inspection responsibilities to [...], which included going to the Property and doing an inspection.  (2T 52:8-54:10, Jan. 5, 2023).  The inspection, per [...] uncovered that a tenant was living there, a point that [...] would certainly have known if he or his father had, in fact, been managing the property.  (“He visited – told me about a tenant that was living there. ”).  F.  CONSPIRACY AND FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE OF THE PROPERTY BY SAM WU TO [...]
[brief] The applicant and the board must exercise extreme caution in observing the rules governing notice.  It is one of the most critical functions performed by the applicant's attorney -- and the one which will do the most harm to the client if not done properly . . . .  [T]he applicant must comply with the strict letter of the statute and with the spirit of the statute requiring disclosure.  36 N.J. Prac., Land Use Law § 14.4 ([...] and [...]) (3d ed., October 2023 Update).
[directive] Laboratory Cases  3.4.1  In cases where the physical evidence requires laboratory analysis or other handling by outside agencies, this department shall transport the evidence to and from the laboratory or other agency and obtain a report of the analysis or other handling before turning the evidence over to the County Prosecutor's Office.  In particular cases, this procedure may be changed with the approval of the Assistant Prosecutor to whom the case is assigned.  3.5  Request for Evidence Form  3.5.1  If it is necessary for an officer to obtain evidence for court proceedings, he must first submit a Request for Evidence Form to the property officer as soon as that officer becomes aware that such evidence is required.  3.5.2  Evidence required for courtroom presentation will not be released to the officer making the request until the date of the courtroom testimony.
[brief] This due care standard does not refer to the actual behavior of the parties but is instead focused on whether a reasonable person using the property with due care would face a substantial risk of injury.  Garrison v Township of Middletown, 154 N.J. 282, 292 (1998); Furey v. County of Ocean, 273 N.J. Super. 300, 311-312 (App. Div. 1994); certify. den. 138 N.J. 272 (1994).
[brief] In Count One of Plaintiffs’ Complaint, Plaintiff attempts to void [...]’s 30 year NJHMFA Long Term Tax Exemption Ordinance 6PSF-E adopted by [...].  (Pa1).  In Appellant’s view, the exemption should have been made under LTTEL because he claims the LTTEL repealed the NJHMFA.  *(See Pa1, paras. 370-371). *  Appellant attempts to argue that [...] should disclose “all monies paid to the County pursuant to LTTEL. ”  *Id.* at 390 R.  However, since the exemption complained of was granted under the auspices of the NJHMFA the City of [...] was not required to remit the 5% service charge it collected to the County.  *Id.* at 376.  As a result, Appellant suffered no harm and had “no skin in the game” to establish standing as required by the current case law.
[brief] (ECF 49, at 1.)  But, again, [...] did not produce any additional documents responsive to RFP No. 4.  Instead, on July 19, [...] served a second supplemental response to RFP No. 4 stating that [...] had no other responsive documents in its “possession, custody, and/or control other than documents identified as A003597 – A003609 and A004076 – A004082.
[directive] 7,  In accordance with the Supreme Court's July 2021 Order, this Directive 1, of promulgates procedures and two forms for requests for judicial review certain marijuana and hashish cases enumerated in the Marijuana Decriminalization Law, L. 2021, c. ( codified in relevant part at N.J.S.A. 2C:35-23 and N.J.S.A. 2C:52- 19 .1 6.l), that were captured or not captured in the Judiciary's automated processes to dismiss, vacate, and/or expunge cases.  The procedures and appended forms (Motion and Form Order) are effective immediately.  The Supreme Court Order provides that any case not captured by the automated processes may be brought by motion to dismiss or motion to vacate of ( depending on the status the case) to the court that had jurisdiction over the case (Municipal Court or Superior Court) or by individual expungement petition to the Superior Court.  The Order further provides that any unresolved legal or administrative issues related to a particular case that was included in the automated process shall be brought by motion before the court that had jurisdiction over the case (Municipal Court or Superior Court).  To that end, the procedures set forth below and the appended motion form of (Attachment should be used by defendants, parents on behalf juveniles, their 1) to attorneys, or the State request judicial review because ( the case was not 1) OR dismissed was not vacated and then dismissed; (2) the case was not expunged; or (3) the State believes the case should not have been dismissed, vacated, and/or expunged.  The appended form order (Attachment 2) should be used to provide the court's decision.  tm ADA ENSURING TO AN DOOR OPEN JUSTICE with Americans Act Disabilities Directive # 25-21 September 7, 2021
[brief] (Da103).  [...] testified that [...] wrote correspondence for him in the underlying matter of August 2, 2017, sending a letter to John’s brother, [...], and his sister, [...].  (Da102).  [...] testified that he has been represented by [...] for the last 23 years.  (Da109).  Significantly, [...] testified that he never would have signed a Retainer Agreement with anyone other than [...].  (Da109).  [...] met with [...] to file a Complaint to challenge the Will.
[brief] Wherefore, the State contends that the Law Division properly denied the Defendant’s Municipal Appeal as a matter of law.  Moreover, the Defendant does not dispute that *Petrello* is indeed the controlling precedent in this case.  Rather, Defendant argues that this Court should overrule the decision claiming that the Appellate Division improperly ignored the statutory language in N.J.S.A. 39:4-50(c).  The State disagrees and submits that the Appellate Division properly considered the statutory language and legislative intent in deciding *Petrello*.  Should this Court concur with the Defendant’s argument, the State contends that the result of that decision would be contrary to *Bozza v. United States*, 330 U.S. 160, 166-67 (1947) where the court stated as follows:  "The Constitution does not require us to treat sentencing as a game in which a misplay by a judge means immunity for an offender."  This is exactly the result this Defendant is seeking - immunity from an enhanced penalty due to a "misplay" by a Municipal Court Judge in 2014.  If the court were to permit relief based upon the lower court failing to orally advise a defendant of enhanced penalties, it would create a new rule to support a PCR application that potentially would flood the municipal courts throughout the state.  The State, therefore, respectfully requests that the court uphold its ruling in Petrello.
[brief] Misleading Similarities  In the eighth paragraph, the claimed ‘similarities’ are misleading.  A residence is a permitted use in this zone, requiring no variance application for this use.  There are no municipal restrictions on increasing the existing grade, and there were no objections from the City engineer.  The retaining walls and dry wells (to contain stormwater) are requirements from the 1986 Pinelands waiver, not part of the application.  The Pinelands waiver references one driveway, as does the [...] application, whereas the [...] application proposed two driveways.
[brief] [Pa319]  As with the 2012 Policy, the 2016 Policy defined “Disciplinary Proceeding” as follows:  **DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDING** means any proceeding initiated by a regulatory, disciplinary or licensing official, board or agency to investigate charges made against an Insured alleging professional misconduct in the performance of or failure to perform Legal Services.  [Pa170, § 3(K)]  As in the 2012 Policy, a Disciplinary Proceeding in the 2016 Policy is limited to proceedings related to “professional misconduct in the performance of or failure to perform **Legal Services. **”  Legal Services is also a term defined by [...] in the 2016 Policy.  It means:  **LEGAL SERVICES** means those services performed on behalf of the Named Insured for others by an Insured, whether or not performed for a fee or other consideration, as a licensed lawyer in good standing … but only where such services were performed in the ordinary course of the Insured's activities as a lawyer.  [Pa171, § 3(P) (emphasis in original)]  Legal Services, thus, for purposes here, only involves services rendered by an attorney (an Insured) “in the ordinary course of the Insured’s activities as a lawyer. ”  The plain language of the Policies requires that, for an action against an attorney to be a Disciplinary Proceeding, it must involve services rendered to a client.
[brief] (2T 8-19 to 24, 19-25 to 20-4, 22-21 to 23, 24-9 to 14)  Even though [...] had been tracking [...] for hours using the drone and even though [...] had previously arrested [...], [...] determined that he needed stop all three individuals to safely identify and arrest [...].  (2T 18-23 to 19-10, 22-21 to 23-7, 26-24 to 27-4)
[brief] PRELIMINARY STATEMENT .................................................................................  1 COUNTERSTATEMENT OF PROCEDURAL HISTORY ..................................  2 COUNTERSTATEMENT OF FACTS ....................................................................  4  A.  Facts Presented at the Plea Hearing ..............................................................  4  B. Facts Presented at the Suppression Motion ..................................................  4  C.  Arguments of the Parties .............................................................................  11  D.  The Motion Court’s Findings .......................................................................  13  LEGAL ARGUMENT .........................................................................................
[directive] (Exceptions occur when an underage Offering Alcoholic person is given alcohol either by a parent or guardian who is of legal age to consume 2C:33-17(a)(b) Beverages to Disorderly Persons  $500 to $1,000 10% permissible alcohol; or by another person, who is of legal age, in that person's home and in the Underage Persons presence of and with permission of the parent or guardian who is of legal age to consume alcohol; or is given alcohol during a religious ceremony, observance or rite.)  Actor has sexual activity with another person in exchange for something of economic value; disorderly persons offense if actor is charged only with engaging in prostitution.
[brief] Defendants’ primary defenses are their interpretation of the January 4, 2024 Consent Order and their parsing of the contested portions of the Contract, and their agency/third-party beneficiary theories.  Defendants’ presentation of these defenses has been entirely limited to their legal briefs and Certifications by their attorneys. \(^{11}\)  These defenses are primarily questions of law that are well-suited for resolution now without remand.  *Luchejko v. City of Hoboken*, 207 N.J. 191 (2011); *Still v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co.*, 189 N.J.Super. 231 (App. Div. 1983).  **CONCLUSION**
[brief] On February 2, 2017, plaintiff [...] filed a complaint seeking damages for injuries that she sustained in a fall in the defendant [...]’s movie theater in [...] on August 13, 2016.  (Pa1 to Pa5)  The defendant filed an answer to the complaint on March 27, 2017.  (Pa6 to Pa10)  On October 24, 2018, the plaintiff filed a motion to amend her complaint to include a claim for the defendant’s failure to preserve the in-house movie theater logs as evidence in support of her claim that there was negligence on the part of the defendant that caused her to fall and injure herself.  (Pa11 to Pa120).  The defendant filed opposition to the motion to amend on November 1, 2010.  (Pa121 to Pa159)  The plaintiff filed a reply to the defendant’s opposition to the motion to amend on November 26, 2018.  (Pa160 to Pa184)  On November 30, 2018, the court entered an Order denying the plaintiff’s motion to amend.  (Pa185 to Pa186)  On December 24, 2018, the plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order entered November 30, 2018.  (Pa187 to Pa219)  The defendant filed opposition to the motion for reconsideration on January 3, 2019.  (Pa220 to Pa227)  The plaintiff filed a reply to the defendant’s opposition to the motion for reconsideration on January 7, 2019.  (Pa228 to Pa292)  On January 11, 2019, the court entered an Order denying the plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration.  (Pa293 to Pa295)  The case went to trial before a jury in March 2023, which resulted in a verdict of no cause for the plaintiff.
[brief] Inexplicably, the State’s brief addresses none of those matters.  That leaves a gaping void that this court can and must fill by rendering a decision on the constitutionality of [...] as applied to [...].  As to responding to this court’s remand order, the [...] failed in his FAD to meaningfully address this court’s explicit remand question—essentially a legal and statutory question—about the extent to which [...] caused the denial of [...].  We had warned about that impending failure early and often as soon as the [...] announced his plan to base his response to this court’s remand order on having highly paid consultants hired by the State, who lacked any expertise in school funding laws, statutory analysis and law, carry out a comprehensive review of the [...].  And the State got what it paid for—a long, detailed report focused on the alleged inadequacies of the district’s educational management and dealing not at all with [...]’s application to [...] and adequacy to meet the educational needs of [...] students.  The State’s brief underscored, even worsened, the State’s default.
[brief] First, the employer’s conduct must have created a “substantial certainty” that an employee would be injured.  *Id.* at 178.  Second, the context in which the employer’s conduct occurred must have been such that the conduct was more than “a fact of life of industrial employment” and that it was “plainly beyond anything the legislature could have contemplated as entitling the employee to recover only under the Compensation Act[.]”  *Id.* at 179.  The first prong, known as the “conduct prong”, is to be determined by a civil jury if the trial court is satisfied that “viewed in the light most favorable to the employee, the evidence could lead a jury to conclude that the employer acted with knowledge that it was substantially certain that a worker would suffer injury. ”  *Laidlow v. Hariton Machinery Co., Inc.*, 170 N.J. 602, 623 (2002).  The trial court must then decide the second, “context prong”, as a matter of law, determining whether the employee’s allegations “constitute a simple fact of industrial life or are outside the purview of the conditions the Legislature could have intended to immunize under the Workers’ Compensation bar. ”  *Id.*  In *Laidlow*, the New Jersey Supreme Court clarified and resolved certain conflicting interpretations of the *Millison* decision’s “intentional wrong” analysis.
[directive] See N.J.S.A. 2C:35-15m(3).  Additionally, if the person whose records are expunged, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:52-14m(1), is subsequently convicted of any crime following discharge from special probation, the full record of arrests and convictions may be restored to public access, and the person is thereafter barred from any future expungement.  See N.J.S.A. 2C:35- 15m(4).  B.  Graduation from Drug Court prior to April18, 2016  Persons whose graduation from Drug Court occurred prior April 18, 2016 may to apply for an expungement of all records and information relating to all arrests, detentions, convictions, and proceedings for any Title 2C offense that existed at that time.  See N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14m(5).  Individuals who did not graduate from Drug Court are not eligible for a "drug court expungement."  Additionally, persons who have been convicted of any offense barred from expungement under N.J.S.A. 2C:52-2(b) or (c), or of any crime or offense since the successful discharge shall who have been convicted not be eligible to apply for this type of expungement.
[brief] While OPRA and the common law to access work together to ensure government transparency for the public as a whole, see N. Jersey Media Grp., Inc. v. Twp. of Lyndhurst, 229 N.J. 541, 574 (2017) (recognizing that OPRA was created to foster transparency), the altering or possible destruction of government records does not accomplish its goal of transparency in any way, but instead defeats that purpose and also exposes Respondents to a potential violation of N.J.S.A. 47:3-8.1 to -8.32, which governs the destruction of public records.