ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] One of the Appellants, [...], appropriately raised their concerns about the Project’s potential climate impacts to [...], during its consideration of the project under the federal Natural Gas Act, 15 U.S.C. Section 717f(c).  [...] addressed the Project’s climate change impacts in its own project approval, which the DC Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed when [...] challenged that approval on climate change grounds.  Food & Water Watch v. [...], 104 F.4th 336 (D.C. Cir. 2024).  The Highlands Act does not require [...] to find a project does not meet the goals of the Act due solely to its climate emissions, as they have no direct bearing on the limited Highlands resources such as water quality, steep slopes, and threatened or endangered species impacted by constructing a compressor station in a former quarry.  Appellants’ speculative theories fail to overcome the [...]’s determination that the Project is consistent with the goals and purposes of the Act and will not, as the Supreme Court construed, “cause a decline in the environmental quality of the region. ”  In re Proposed Constr. of Compressor Station (CS327), 258 N.J. 312, 332 (2024).  II.
[brief] Ordinance Section 413.02B limits the width of walkways in the flare to a maximum of six (6’) feet; Pa 52a.  Section 413.02B does not address the types of materials used to surface the walkways.  Ordinance Section 508C provides “The Design Criteria and Guidelines, also known as the Preservation Guidelines is an integral part of this Ordinance and is incorporated in the Ordinance as if set forth at length in the body of the Ordinance. ”  The designed guidelines are contained in the Ocean Grove Historic District Architectural Guidelines for Residential Structures; Pa 53a.  Section R of the Guidelines addresses Architectural Landscape Treatments.  “Pathways and existing driveways may be surfaced with natural slate (bluestone) slabs, concrete or cut stone unit pavers, or be concrete paved. ”; Pa 72a.  The Guidelines do not address the size, shape nor color of the permitted concrete unit pavers.  In her testimony before the ZBA, HPC Chairperson [...] stated that concrete unit “pavers must be the size and shape, and coloration of brick so that they at least closely resemble what was the historical material that was used,” to be approved by the HPC.  2T69 – 8 to 10.  Chairperson Osepchuk acknowledged that the HPC’s concrete unit paver criteria are not contained in the Design Guidelines.  2T71 – 21 to 25; 2T72 – 1 to 9.  The HPC’s findings that the concrete pavers were not historically consistent with respect to form, shape or color was arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable.  The ZBA made no findings of the whether the concrete unit pavers at the Property were consistent with the Design Criteria and Guidelines.  ZBA Resolution [...].  Pa 24a.  The Law Division’s finding that the Design Criteria and Guidelines applied by the HPC to limit concrete unit pavers” to the size and shape, and coloration of brick” was in error.
[brief] Under N.J.A.C. 11:3-4.9(a), “an insured may only assign benefits and duties under the policy to a provider of service benefits. ”  Insurers cannot prohibit the assignment of benefits to providers, but can include in policy forms “[r]easonable restrictions” on such assignments.  Ibid.  The regulation defines reasonable restrictions to include “[a] requirement that as a condition of assignment, the provider agrees to follow the requirements of the insurer’s [DPRP],” and “[a] requirement that as a condition of assignment, the provider agrees to submit disputes to alternate dispute resolution pursuant to N.J.A.C. 11:3-5. ”  N.J.A.C. 11:3-4.9(a)(1), (3).
[brief] Each of the employees, including the Appellant, were eventually offered their positions back at the company.  Pa049; DSOF ¶ 26.  Appellant, after the fact, now states she has high blood pressure, generalized anxiety disorder, and a high BMI.  Pa050; DSOF ¶ 27.  Appellant was treated at [...] in [...] in 2018 and 2019, for a period during which she was grieving for her stepfather after his passing.  Pa050; DSOF ¶ 28.  Appellant stopped treatment in May of 2019.  Pa050; DSOF ¶ 29.  Appellant stated that she did not remember a diagnosis from [...].  “I don’t have their case notes.  So I don’t know their diagnosis. ”  Pa050; DSOF ¶ 30.  Critically, Appellant has produced nothing from [...] or other healthcare provider that states that she was (or is) suffering from a generalized anxiety disorder.
[brief] One jurisdictional requirement is N.J.S.A. 40:55D-11:  Notices pursuant to section [N.J.S.A. 40:55D-12] and N.J.S.A. 40:55D-13] shall state the date, time and place of the hearing, the nature of the matters to be considered and, in the case of notices pursuant to subsection [N.J.S.A. 40:55D-12], an identification of the property proposed for development.  There are several published opinions which establish the contours of notice requirements.  In Perlmart v. Lacey Tp. Planning Bd., 295 N.J. Super. 234 (App. Div. 1996), the Court considered the portion of N.J.S.A. 40:55D-11 concerning "the nature of the matters to be decided."
[brief] Pop's Cones, Inc. v. Resorts Int'l Hotel, Inc., 307 N.J. Super. 461 (App. Div. 1998).  While liability cannot be based on a quasi-contractual principle if an express contract exists concerning identical matter, Plaintiffs are permitted to plead these principles in the alternative in the Complaint.  See Suburban Transfer Serv., Inc. v. Beech Holdings, Inc., 716 F.2d 220, 226-27 (3d Cir. 1983).  Plaintiffs sufficiently plead that a clear promise was made to pay promotional pay rates expecting officers to work promoted titles, the officers reasonably relied upon that promise in working in those promoted titles, and they were deprived of those promises to their detriment by not being adequately compensated.  Pa00042-43.  With respect to Count IV, NJ Wage Payment and Collection law “[u]nless an exception applies, the [New Jersey Wage Payment Law] requires ‘every employer [to] pay the full amount of wages due to his employees[.]
[brief] [...] relies upon a definitional exclusion, not in its own policy but in the underlying [...] policy, to substantiate the denial of UIM benefits.  (Pa60).  While plaintiffs do not contend that the definitional section in the [...] policy is invalid vis-à-vis [...], plaintiffs contend that, as applied to [...], the definitional section is ambiguous and fails to meet the reasonable expectations of plaintiffs.  1.  Underinsured Motorist (“UIM”) Coverage  Generally Underinsured Motorist (“UIM”)  Coverage is a “first-party coverage insuring the policy holder, and others, against the possibility of injury or property damage caused by the negligent operation of a motor vehicle whose liability insurance coverage is insufficient to pay for all losses suffered.
[brief] The revised NJ LLC Act—which the Arbitrator found applies to this case (Da958) (a ruling the trial court correctly confirmed)—disposed of the requirement that an operating agreement be in writing.  See N.J.S.A.  42:2C-2 (“‘Operating agreement’ means the agreement, whether or not... oral, in a record, implied, or in any combination thereof....”) (emphasis added).  The act renders operating agreements like any other contract, which can be wholly oral, wholly written, or partially written and partially oral.  See, e.g., Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 210 (1981).  Where there is an agreement among members of a company as to equity transaction valuations, the Court must abide by that agreement.
[brief] ”  Upon referral, the Planning Board determined that the Plan was not inconsistent with the Master Plan, and relied not just on the language in the Plan itself, but the Planner’s September 9, 2022 memorandum to the Planning Board:  g.  With the proposed Redevelopment Plan calling for light industrial or warehouse development on a former golf course generally having no significant impacts on the goals and objectives of the master plan, the Redevelopment Plan is not inconsistent with the master plan.  (Pa179, Sec. G at p. 3).  (emphasis added).  Therefore, at the time it adopted the Redevelopment Plan on October 27, 2022, the Committee had before it both the Planning Board’s recommendation, and the language provided by the Township Planner within the Plan itself.
[brief] [...] and [...], now known as [...] (collectively, “[...]”), is a leading independent provider of software and payment processing solutions in the United States.  Da68.  [...] serves merchants of all sizes in a host of industries, providing hardware and software to these merchants to facilitate secure and convenient electronic payments.  Da68.  For example, merchants can buy or lease payment terminals and software from [...] to process customers’ credit card payments at the point of sale.  Da68.  These payment processing services were at issue in this case in 2015 and are at issue in *Gannon*.
[brief] The Evidence Presented At Trial Supports The Trial Court’s Finding That The Borough Owns The Entire Property  Any review of the ownership of this Property must begin in 1871 when [...] acquired title to certain lands located within the Borough, including the uplands portion of what is now designated on the Borough tax map as Lot 3.  In 1879, Quinlan then acquired title to the adjacent riparian lands which were then underwater through purchasing a riparian grant from the State of New Jersey (the “Quinlan Tract”).  While the Quinlan Tract was later designated on the Borough tax map as Lot 3.01, witnesses testified at trial and [...] found that Lot 3 was the only actual tax lot, while Lot 3.01 was simply a designation that was made on the tax map in order to delineate the portion of Lot 3 and of the waters adjacent to Lot 3 which were part of this riparian grant.  See Exhibit 9T, p. 5.  Thus, as of 1879, Quinlan owned both the uplands of what is now known as Lot 3 as well as the abutting underwater riparian lands.  On January 15, 1909, Quinlan conveyed certain property rights to [...].  See Pa0917-Pa0921.  Notably, the legal description in the deed for the conveyance was limited to the upland property and did not expressly include any riparian lands within the boundaries of the legal description.
[brief] However, despite their best efforts, three provisions remain in dispute: validation; known responsive materials; and production of discrete collections.  A.  Validation  Defendants explain that they have agreed to three different kinds of validation, including validation of documents that did not hit on search terms and a four-step post-production validation process.  However, Defendants assert that Plaintiffs’ proposal simply requires Plaintiffs to perform appropriate sampling and quality control, without providing any detail on how that sampling or quality control will be done.  Moreover, Defendants take issue with the fact that Plaintiffs’ proposal states that “Plaintiffs will not be obligated to collect or sample ESI that does not contain a search term.
[directive] 2.  Criminal Injuries Compensation Act of 1971 (N.J.S.A. 52:4B-1 et seq.).  3.  N.J.S.A. 52:4B-36b.  4.  N.J.S.A. 52:4B-36k.  5.  "Policy Statement of the Attorney General of New Jersey and the County Prosecutors Association of New Jersey  Regarding Notification to Next of Kin of Death By Auto Victims and Victims of Assault by Auto," July 15, 1985.  6.  Pending Passage of Assembly Bill Nos. 897 and 220.  7.  N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.11c.  8.  N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.54.  9.  "Policy Statement of the Attorney General of New Jersey and the County Prosecutors Association of New Jersey  Regarding Notification to Next of Kin of Death By Auto Victims and Victims of Assault By Auto," July 15, 1985.  10.  P.L. 1987 c.148.  11.  N.J.S.A. 2C:44-2(b)  12.  N.J.S. 2C:25-23 13.  N.J.S. 2C:25-23 14.  N.J.S. 2C:25-26 15.  N.J.S. 2C:25-26 16.  P.L. 1987 C.307 17.  N.J.S.A. 52:45-22 18.  Pending Passage of Assembly Bill Nos. 897 and 220 19.  N.J.S.A. 2A:82-46 20.  Bias Incident Investigation Standards-Policy and Procedures for New Jersey Law Enforcement, January 28, 1988.
[brief] [...] was then compelled to establish the source of the content published by [...] and was aided in that effort by the Honorable [...] U.S.D.J.  Here, [...] asks the courts to ignore two additional prior findings, these issued in the matter of [...] et al v. FBI Civ. Action [...] (JLL) (Doc. 29 at 6.) by the Honorable [...] U.S.D.J. filed July 8, 2009 ("Linares Opinion") and the another by the Honorable [...] U.S.M.J. on July 2, 2012 ("Waldor Opinion").
[brief] The Court Should Consider The Due Process Argument As Respondents’ Contention That It Was Not Raised Is False (Rb26 -27).  Respondents assert that “Appellants raise, for the first time on appeal, the issue of denial of due process and claims under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and First Article of the New Jersey Constitution. ” (Rb27).  Respondents assert that “Appellants’ arguments should be rejected where the issues were never raised below. ” (Rb27).  Respondents assert that “Appellants never filed any motions on that issue. ” (Rb27).  Respondents cite *Nieder v. Royal Indem. Ins. Co.*, 62 N.J. 229 (1973) among a string of other irrelevant cases. \(^3\)  In *Neider*, the Court held that a remand was warranted since *much of the factual data* before the court “was not presented to the trial court and some of it was not before the Appellate Division. ”  *See Neider*, at 234-235.  However, the issue of submitting [...]’ Supplemental Certification in-camera -- without providing Appellants with a meaningful opportunity to review and respond to its contents -- was raised and extensively briefed before the trial court, with due process explicitly raised in argument before the Court after the trial court for the first time agreed to accept the previously prohibited *ex parte* submission.  (T:8-1-25; T9:1-18).  Appellants argued, among other things, that the court should deny Respondents’ request to submit the Supplemental Certification in camera because it rendered it impossible for [...] to respond and rebut the contention that it received confidential information.  Appellants argued that the court \(^3\)  It is unknown why Respondents cite *Howard v. Mayor & Bd. of Fin. of Paterson*, 6 N.J. 373 (1951), *Krieger v. Jersey City*, 27 N.J. 535 (1958), and *State ex rel. Wm. Eckelmann, Inc. v. Jones*, 4 N.J. 207 (1950), as these cases were decided decades ago, have no factual connection to this case and, worse, do not stand for the proposition that Respondents’ claim they do. should not have permitted Respondents to claim they have specifically identified the information in a Supplemental Certification while Appellants were precluded from rebutting these contentions.  (T:8-1-25; T9:1-18).  However, even assuming, arguendo, that the “issue” was not raised below (it was), appellate courts in New Jersey retain authority to notice issues not brought to the attention of the trial court, provided that it is in the interest of justice to do so.  See Rule 2:10-2; State v. Robinson, 200 N.J. 1 (2009) (“appellate courts retain the inherent authority to notice plain error not brought to the attention of the trial court, provided it is in the interests of justice” to do so”).
[brief] The State contends that, in addition to the defendants’ race and sex, the motion court found reasonable suspicion based on (1) the short duration between the initial robbery report and the stop; (2) the location and direction of the vehicle in relation to the 7-Eleven; (3) the presence of three individuals in the car, giving rise to the inference that the two robbers had been joined by a getaway driver; and (4) the occupants’ non-reaction to the spotlight.  As for the time, the State argues that the Nyema decision was incorrect in finding that the State failed to present evidence establishing how much time elapsed between the robbery and the stop.  To the contrary, the State notes that [...] testified that he saw the defendants’ vehicle about two or three minutes after receiving the report that a robbery had “just occurred. ”  Regarding defendants’ behavior when [...] used the spotlight on the second vehicle, the State argues that Nyema erred by discounting the defendants’ non-reaction to the spotlight, particularly because that response contrasted so starkly with the reaction of the occupants of the previous vehicle.  According to the State, "[t]he defendants' abnormal non-reaction suggested a calculated effort on the part of all three defendants to avoid detection."  B.
[directive] The statute provides that the judge, for good cause shown, may impose bail in excess of $2,500 but the reasons must be set forth on the record.  But see Offenses State v. Steele, 430 N.J. Super. 24 (App. Div. 2013), which prohibits the consideration of danger as a factor when setting the monetary amount of bail.  Danger may be considered when setting forth other conditions of bail, for example, no victim contact.  Note – the New Jersey Supreme Court granted certification on this case on May 23, 2013, 213 N.J. 569 (2013), but subsequently dismissed the appeal, 223 N.J. 284 (2014).
[brief] On December 5, 2014, [...] and [...] entered into a stock purchase agreement (the “2014 [...] SPA”), under which [...] purchased [...]’s 51% interest in [...] for $740,000.  25T121-1 to 123-7; 18T130-2 to 132-17; 25T126:4 to 133; Da02802 – Da02822, Da03458 – Da03462.  On the same date, [...] signed an employment agreement with [...] paying him $600,000 as an employee through 2017.  Id.  Further, on December 5, 2014, [...] and [...] entered into a membership purchase agreement (the “2014 [...] Purchase Agreement”), under which [...] purchased [...]’s 50% interest in [...] for $4.96M.  Id.  Prior to the execution of the 2014 [...] Purchase Agreement, [...] gave [...] a check for $1.36M (November 26, 2014) and another check for $1.28M (December 5, 2014) as a deposit towards the $4.96 Million contract price.  25T125-1 to 126-7; D03388.  [...] consented to [...] transferring funds from [...]’s bank account to [...]’s account for the deposit.  Id.  Plaintiffs were represented by the law firm [...] and by their financial advisor [...] in connection with the foregoing agreements, whereas [...] and [...] were unrepresented.  17T141-9 to -13; 18T62-17 to 95-7, 125-2 to 132-17; 25T115-16 to 117-7; 26T24-1 to -14; Da02798, Da02801, Da03287 – Da03289, Da03290 – Da03298, Da03299 - Da03324, Da03325 – Da03326, Da03327 – Da03455, Da03468 – Da03493, Da0394 – Da03498.  Defendant did not provide any documents to Plaintiffs or make any representations to them in connection with the 2014 [...] SPA or the 2014 [...] Purchase Agreement.  18T133-5 to 134-7; 25T133-3 to -10.  Prior to [...] receiving the final $40,000 payment due under the 2014 [...] SPA, in or about June 2017, [...] and [...] agreed that [...] would transfer his shares in [...] to [...]’s wife, Defendant, instead of to [...], so that [...] could qualify as a WBE (Woman Owned Business).  25T140-16 to 142-3; Da04304.  On or about December 15, 2017, [...] and Defendant signed a Stock Purchase Agreement (the “2017 [...] SPA”), under which Defendant purchased [...]’s interest in [...] for $740,000.  25T142-6 to 145-24; Da02823, Da04575 – Da04602, Da07181 – Da07182.  [...] was paid in full under the 2017 [...] SPA and returned the payments he received from [...] under the 2014 [...] SPA.  25T141-13 to -18.  The 2017 [...] SPA contains nearly identical terms to those in the 2014 [...] SPA.  Id.  Defendant did not make any representations to [...] that he relied on before entering into the 2017 [...] SPA, nor did she provide him any records in connection with that agreement.  18T141-13 to -24; 25T140-16 to 150-2; Da07747 – Da7775.  F.
[brief] ”  (Pb 5)  In support of its position, the State cites an exchange where [...] begins to explain what happened prior to the drug arrest, and [...] says, “That’s all right.  I don’t want to get into that right this second.  . . .  I have to go through paperwork. ”  (1T 25-2 to 5, 7T 172-10 to 16)  This exchange clearly does not support the State’s position and, moreover, the hearing court confirmed that no reasonable person in [...]’s position would have known that he was being interviewed about a robbery and not a minor drug offense until after his waiver.  (2T 8-5 to 17) serious allegation of armed robbery.
[brief] This appeal concerns a discovery order entered by the trial court on September 12, 2023.  In the order, the court required the parties in this case to produce “[a]ll documents identified/returned by application of the ESI search terms that the parties negotiated. ”  Da167 ¶ 1.  While the court allowed the parties to withhold documents based on an applicable privilege or immunity under New Jersey law, Da167 ¶ 2, and a “small subset of ESI documents that contain information so proprietary that their production could result in losses or disruption,” Da167 ¶ 2, the court did not permit the parties to review any of the “identified/returned” documents for relevance to the case or responsiveness to a particular discovery request.  Indeed, at a conference prior to issuing its order, the court recognized that its order would result in production of huge numbers of irrelevant documents.  Aug. 24, 2023, Tr. at 6:14-17.  The order made no finding that any party had improperly withheld relevant evidence, spoliated evidence, or engaged in any other improper conduct during discovery in this case.
[directive] UNIFORM 13.  Issues/Appeals.  Leal of Notice 13.1  County Law, Reform implementing Bail the and interpreting in uniformity promote  To on Bureau Appellate Criminal Justice's of Division the with notify and consult shall Prosecutors the to relating final appeals interlocutory and all challenges, and and legal issues significant  Bail Reform the amended, Constitution as Jersey New the of 11 paragraph I, Article of interpretation Reform Law.
[brief] The plain language of the Genesis Deed, and the surrounding circumstances at and after the time of its conveyance, unequivocally demonstrate that the [...] intended to create a “club” of property owners who all agreed to “faithfully abide by [the] rules” of a “property owner’s association” with authority to implement and enforce “any other rules or regulations it chooses. ” (Da54).  The 75-year history of [...] serving as the “property owner’s association” with authority to implement and enforce “rules”—including building restrictions at the express direction of the [...]—corroborates the [...]’ intent to vest [...] with the authority the trial court concluded it lacks.  The trial court is required to interpret a contract to effectuate the intent of the parties in light of the surrounding circumstances.  The trial court failed to do so here.  To the extent that there is a question as to whether [...] is the “property owner’s association” with authority to implement and enforce “rules,” such a question can and should be resolved by resorting to all available extrinsic evidence and not on summary judgment.  *Winfield v. Saunders*, 6 N.J. Misc. 833, 909 (Cir. Ct. Mon. Cnty. 1928) (permitting resort to parol evidence to ascertain the intent of a grantor).  The currently-available evidence of the [...]’ subsequent conduct in conveying to [...] beaches and roads—on the condition that they be used for the benefit of [...]’s “members” and so long as [...] enforces the Genesis Deed’s restrictions—demonstrates the [...]’ own belief that [...] was and is the “property owner’s association” contemplated by the Genesis Deed.  The trial court’s conclusion that [...] was not created at the time of the Genesis Deed’s conveyance and, therefore, [...] had no authority to implement and enforce its “rules,” ignores the Genesis Deed’s plain language, and quite frankly completely eviscerates the condition subsequent (the property owner’s association) in the Genesis Deed contrary to basic contract interpretation principles.