ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] COUNTER STATEMENT OF FACTS  The within cause of action stems from an automobile accident which occurred on August 14, 2019.  Plaintiff/Appellant was at the time of the accident insured with [...] with the verbal threshold.  Plaintiff/Appellant allegedly sustained permanent personal injuries to her low back, mid back, neck, and wrist, in addition to a fractured sternum as a result.  An X-ray of the chest was performed on August 14, 2019 which showed a sternal fracture.  The fracture was not displaced and therefore does not immediately pierce the verbal threshold.  On November 8, 2022, Plaintiff presented for an Independent Medical Evaluation with defense expert, [...].  Dr. McIlveen noted that the Appellant/Plaintiff had degenerative disc disease in her neck, mid back, and low back, and that as a result of this accident, she sustained soft tissue injuries.  Plaintiff/Appellant’s expert, [...] has provided a narrative report dated March 29, 2021.  Dr. Rodgers’ diagnosis was cervical and lumbar radiculopathy.  Further in his addendum report, Dr. Rodgers notes that the Plaintiff has age related degenerative disc disease.  On June 22, 2022 Plaintiff/Appellant was deposed.  At her deposition, she testified that she longer experienced any pain in her chest or her back.  Q.  Okay, as we sit here right now, you have no more pain as a result of this accident?  A.  No, not that I can say.  Da86 (T50:2-9).  Further:  Q.  From the first accident you claimed you injured your— you fractured your sternum, your neck and back, the fractured sternum causing the most pain.  A. Yes. Yes  Yes. Yes.  Q.  And the neck and back pain healed completely, correct?  A.  As far as I know, yes.  Yes.  It was a lot back then, but I’m not going to lie and say it’s still happening.  No, it’s not.  I would be lying and I’m not going to lie for money.  It’s not worth it.  Da87 (T67:8-18).  Plaintiff/Appellant confirmed that at the time of her deposition, she did not have any physical restrictions.  Da86 (T51:4-17).  The granting of Summary Judgment was appropriate as the Plaintiff/Appellant has failed to establish the requisite credible “objective medical evidence” of permanency to qualify as a Category 4 and/or Category 6 permanent injury.  Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 39:6A-8a  Plaintiff/Appellant has failed to establish the existence of a “displaced fracture” as required for a Category 4 injury.  In addition, for Category 6, the statute provides that “[a]n injury shall be considered permanent when the body part or organ, or both, has not healed to function normally and will not heal to function normally with further medical treatment. ”  N.J.S.A. 39:6A-8(a).  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT
[brief] Close non-matches arise when “two prints from different people have many common features and few discernible dissimilar features. ”  Jonathan J. Koelher & Shiquan Liu, Fingerprint Error Rate on Close Non-matches, 66 J. Forensic Sci. 129, 130 (2020) (Da 10-15).  “The risk of encountering a CNM is heightened when large databases are searched for the source of a print. ”  Ibid.  Such a database was used in this case: the latent print was sent through AFIS, a match to [...] was presented by that program, and only then did [...] conduct a comparison.
[brief] POINT I  THE IMPACT OF THE PROSECUTOR’S IMPROPER BOLSTERING OF THE TESTIMONY OF HIS WITNESSES CREATED REVERSIBLE ERROR, WHICH WAS NOT CURED BY THE COURT’S LIMITING INSTRUCTION.  (16T 116-7 to 121-15)  ...........11  POINT II  THE PROSECUTOR COMMITTED MISCONDUCT BY TESTIFYING DURING HIS SUMMATION AS TO THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE VARIETY OF BULLETS FOUND IN THE TWO GUNS.  (16T 86-16 to 87-7)  ..............................................20  POINT III  THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO PROVIDE AN ADVERSE INFERENCE INSTRUCTION AS TO THE STATE’S FAILURE TO PRODUCE THE TESTIMONY OF EITHER OF THE TWO VICTIMS.  (15T 173-11 to 176-21; 18T 84-19 to 89-4)  ..................25  POINT IV
[directive] New Jersey Is An Equal Opportunity Employer • Printed on Recycled Paper and is Recyclable Page 2  Chokeholds and Neck Restraints  New Jersey law enforcement officers are not permitted to perform chokeholds, carotid artery neck restraints, or similar tactics on any individual, except in the very limited situations when deadly force is necessary to address an imminent threat to life.  Our state’s police academies have long instructed recruits on the dangers of “positional asphyxiation,” a form of asphyxia that prevents suspects from breathing adequately, including by kneeling or otherwise placing weight on a subject’s neck.  Police Training Commission Defensive Tactics Manual § 5.3.2 (2009).  Because these tactics create a substantial risk of death or serious bodily harm, officers who cause a subject’s death or injury while performing them face potential criminal liability.  Media Covering Public Demonstrations
[brief] THE JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION MUST BE AMENDED TO MERGE COUNT THREE INTO COUNT TWO AND TO REFLECT 1,119 DAYS OF JAIL CREDITS.  (Responds to Defendant’s POINT IV).  The State concedes that the judgment of conviction should be remanded to reflect that Count Three merges into Count Two and amended to remove the $100 VCCO assessment and $75 Safe Neighborhood Assessment imposed on Count Three.
[brief] (Da8-10; Da11-13)  On November 7, 2023, a consent order signed by counsel for both Plaintiff and Defendants and requesting that the default be vacated was filed.  (Da14-16)  [...] granted the order on November 8, 2023 and specifically gave Defendants twenty days to file an Answer to the Complaint.  (Da17-18)  On November 17, 2023, Defendants filed their answer, which specifically included a demand for an Affidavit of Merit.  (Pa16-25)  On April 12, 2024, after one-hundred forty seven days (147) had passed from the filing of Defendants’ Answer, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint, as Plaintiffs had not filed an Affidavit of Merit.
[brief] You can appeal me, sir. ”  [1T Lines 11-22, Pg. 16]  Thus, based on the foregoing reasons and facts one (1) through thirty (30), the court should reverse because the interference or deprivation of his civil right to adjournments upon request was not extinguished by the defendants granting the denied request after civil action in response to the denials, where said Trial Court decision follows the same trial court’s acknowledgment that request were in fact refused prior to civil action.
[brief] Plaintiffs argue that the trial court correctly held Defendant jointly and severally liable because doing so protected them as judgment creditors (Pb77-81).  It was not the trial court’s job to assist Plaintiffs with judgment collection, nor is that a recognized legal standard under which a court may impose joint and several liability on a defendant.  “Liability is presumed to be joint and several unless there are either distinct harms or a reasonable basis upon which to determine the contribution of each cause of a single harm.
[brief] ---  2  The Court’s unpublished opinion in *Last Frontier v. Blairstown Twp. Zoning Bd.*, 2010 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1106 (App. Div. May 24, 2010), carries no precedential value.  R. 1:36-3.  On the contrary, the Municipal Land Use Law, N.J.S.A. 40:55D-1 et seq. ("MLUL"), makes abundantly clear that "[t]he planning board shall, if the proposed development complies with the ordinance and this act, grant...site plan approval."  N.J.S.A. 40:55D-46(b) (emphasis added).  Moreover, "[a] planning board is without authority to deny a site plan based on its [subjective] view that a use permitted under the zoning ordinance is inconsistent with the principles of sound zoning.
[brief] Chapter 67’s phased-in reduction of adjustment aid for those districts with a positive State aid differential — meaning those districts that have been overfunded — gradually increases the local contribution to the LFS.  Further, the Legislature provided districts with new means to address this change by amending the required local share, requiring some districts to increase their local levy by 2% over the prior year, and by adjusting the local levy cap so that certain SDA districts (including [...]) can increase their local levy up to LFS.  See L. 2018, c. 67 §§ 1-2, 6; N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-5d and -38(c).  Additionally, the State did not expect [...] to reach its LFS “overnight,” if at all.  It provided a six-year period for the gradual elimination of adjustment aid, from FY2020 to FY2025,\(^{17}\) during which time the District could incrementally raise its local tax levy, implement budgetary and cost saving measures, or a combination of the two based on its needs and priorities.  Recognizing the challenge faced by [...], the Legislature also provided the additional option of a payroll tax to cushion any levy increase by enabling the municipality to implement a more gradual tax increase over a longer period \(^{17}\) Chapters 67 and 68 were enacted in July 2018 to take effect the following fiscal year, thus giving the district an additional year to plan for the funding changes and implement the payroll tax.
[brief] Appellant received notice and availed itself of the opportunity to participate in the permit process for both the 2017 WFD Permit and 2019 Permit Modification.  Further, as enumerated in Point II(B) below, Appellant’s efforts are futile as the 2017 WFD Permit and the 2019 Permit Modification were properly issued by [...] in accordance with the Waterfront Development Law and the CZM Rules.  The [...] also affirmed that [...]’s dock presented no issues related to navigation.
[brief] 0323a-0324a.  The bidders availed themselves of the above-referenced instruction for other topics as was noted in Response to Bidder Questions, Clarifications #1 and #2 (inadvertently omitted from the Appellant’s Appendix).  However, [...] did not seek clarification of what Section 0.32 of the Instructions meant, or what a “registered archaeologist” meant, or whether the term “registered” referred to the [...] or to the [...].  By performing this simple step, [...] could have avoided this litigation.  As the Instructions above warn, a bidder who proceeds without asking questions first bears the risk that its assumptions about the meaning of the Bid Instructions and Specifications were not shared by the [...], including losing the bid as a result.
[brief] ””  *State v. Mohammed*, 226 N.J. 71, 88 (2016) (quoting *State v. Gamble*, 218 N.J. 412, 424 (2014)).  The Supreme Court has also said that “[r]eviewing appellate courts should ‘not disturb the factual findings and legal conclusions of the trial judge’ unless convinced that those findings and conclusions were ‘so manifestly unsupported by or inconsistent with the competent, relevant and reasonably credible evidence as to offend the interests of justice. ’”  *Griepenburg v. Twp. of Ocean*, 220 N.J. 239, 254 (2015) (quoting *Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Invs. Ins. Co. of Am.*, 65 N.J. 474, 484 (1974)).  Here, the factual findings and credibility findings made by [...] do not offend the interests of justice.  To the contrary, they are supported by the record at trial.  For that reason, these findings are entitled to deference and should not be disturbed on appeal.  **B.
[brief] Id. at 5-6.  Plaintiff’s counsel was forced to present some of this evidence as a result of the denial of the motion in limine.  Id. 13-14.  The plaintiff’s prior medical history was then the predominant theme of defense counsel’s summation.  Id.  at 7-8.  The Appellate Division found that it was reversible error to allow evidence of the plaintiff’s prior medical condition in regard to the cause of the collision to be presented at trial in the absence of a supporting expert medical opinion.  Wegner, 2020 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS at 9-10.  It cited both Allendorf and Ratner in support of its ruling that an expert medical opinion was required to present evidence of the plaintiff’s prior medical history.  Id. at 12.  The Appellate Division also rejected the argument that evidence of the plaintiff’s prior medical history was admissible in the absence of an expert medical opinion to impeach the plaintiff’s credibility.  *Id.* at 13.  It explained that evidence of the plaintiff’s prior medical history “was inadmissible absent expert opinion [and] [d]efendants may not, in the guise of impeachment, bootstrap the introduction of otherwise inadmissible evidence. ”  *Id.*  It is respectfully submitted that the determination as to the effect the plaintiff’s prior history of tingling and numbness in her legs, diagnosis of neuropathy, the medication she was prescribed, prior treatment, and prior falls that were not caused by a loss of balance had on her ability to ambulate and whether any of those prior issues caused her to fall while walking with her rollator in the defendant’s store is beyond the ken of the average juror and required supporting expert opinion to be presented at trial.
[brief] See N.J.S.A. 40A:14-147 & N.J.S.A. 40A:14-118 (establishing chief of police as head of a police department “directly responsible” for, inter alia, enforcement of rules and regulations and discipline of the department’s members).  In addition to the above, Plaintiff was terminated from his subsequent employment at the [...] as a direct result of Defendants’ illegal actions herein.  Thus, Plaintiff suffered adverse employment action and satisfies that prima facie element of his CEPA claim.
[brief] At defendant’s third sentencing hearing, the victims’ family members stated that the crime had caused two relatives to turn to drug and alcohol, with one having never recovered.  (5T26:18-25).  Additionally, they could never put the crime behind them because they had been “going to court almost every year for some reason or other” related to this case.  (5T31).  Defendant gave a statement, claiming that he took full responsibility for the victims’ deaths and that he had grown and become rehabilitated.  (5T55-57).  The judge found that defendant’s purported remorse was not a sign of maturity, but an “adaptation” in the way he approached the court.  (5T69-72).  With the benefits of transcripts from previous proceedings, defendant changed his presentation in order to obtain the desired result.  (5T72-73).  As regards the crime itself, the judge found that it was not a “youthful, stupid idea” that resulted in death, but a planned attack on the victims.  (5T73-78).  Further, defendant waited for [...] to come home and killed him, when he could have fled after [...]’s death.  (5T78).  The judge found the same aggravating factors as the last sentencing, as well as mitigating factor 14, to which he attributed substantial weight.  (Da20).  He imposed two concurrent life sentences, each with a 29-year parole bar.  (Da18).  LEGAL ARGUMENT I.
[directive] Requests for Property  When the head of a Treasury investigative agency, or designee, seeks to place forfeited property into official use and a federal, state, local agency or foreign country has filed a request for an equitable share of the property, the head of the investigative agency, or designee, shall consider the following factors in making a determination regarding the disposition of the property: 1.  The relative need of the requesting agency and the investigative agency for the particular property; 2. the uniqueness of the property and the likelihood of securing similar property through seizure and forfeiture in the near fbture; 3. the relative percentage of the requesting agency's participation in the case; 4. the likelihood that the requesting agency will be eligible for an equitable share of from or property fiom additional seizures arising the same investigation from seizures in in other cases the near future; - 5. the imp,; that a decision to place the property into official use might have on federal, state, local, or foreign relations; and 6. the number and value of past equitable sharings with the federal, state, local agency or foreign country.
[brief] (16T 80:21 to 81:20; 83:15 to 84:2).  In addition, [...] testified that he consulted with [...] concerning damages.  (34T 75:15-23).  Despite the insinuation that this was improper, it was appropriate for [...]—a scientist and not an accountant—to rely on his forensic accounting expert in this misappropriation case to establish the basis for his damages.  Second, appellant argues that the trial court’s inclusion of certain transactions was improper because they occurred after [...] provided P-48 and P-50 to [...], the balance sheets for the companies that ultimately formed the basis for [...]’s buyout offer.
[brief] THE COURT SHOULD REJECT WARREN'S ALTERNATE ARGUMENTS FOR DISMISSAL AS UNSUPPORTED BY NEW JERSEY LAW  A.  The Court Should Reject [...]'s Attempt to Invoke the Doctrine of Judicial Estoppel  The purpose of judicial estoppel is to protect “the integrity of the judicial process. ”  Cummings v. Bahr, 295 N.J. Super. 374, 387 (App. Div. 1996).  Thus, the doctrine of judicial estoppel only arises when a party advocates a position contrary to a position it successfully asserted in the same or a prior proceeding.  Chattin v. Cape May Greene, Inc., 243 N.J. Super. 590, 620 (App. Div. 1990).  As a result, if the court in a prior lawsuit did not accept an inconsistent position, or if no such position was ever advanced in a prior lawsuit, “application of [judicial estoppel] is unwarranted because no risk of inconsistent results exists.
[brief] This is an action for bodily injuries that arose from an altercation between Plaintiff, [...], a Township of Holmdel police officer, and Defendant, [...], that occurred during a traffic stop on July 29, 2013.  Plaintiff suffered from Meniere’s disease for many years prior to the incident in question.  Plaintiff, nevertheless, claimed that he struck his head during the altercation with [...] and that the head strike aggravated his pre-existing Meniere’s disease.  The case was tried in Superior Court, Law Division, Monmouth County, from June 13 to June 21, 2022.  The trial involved issues of liability, causal relationship and damages, but the critical issue concerned the causal relationship between the alleged head injury and the alleged aggravation of Plaintiff’s Meniere’s disease, which resulted in several surgeries and ultimately a complete loss of hearing in his right ear, impaired balance, and other problems.  Plaintiff’s credibility was called into question on all issues and especially the issue of causation.  The jury returned a verdict for Plaintiff in the amount of $25,000 and assessed 15% comparative negligence to Plaintiff.  This resulted in a “net” award of $21,500 plus interest.  Plaintiff did not move for a new trial or for an additur, there are no alleged trial errors, and there is no appeal from the jury verdict.  Plaintiff’s appeal asserts that the trial Court failed to enforce an alleged pre-trial agreement between counsel to “mold” the verdict to include medical expenses and temporary disability benefits paid by Workers Compensation.  “The sole issue in this appeal is the lower Court ruling that the agreement between Counsel to mold the Jury's verdict to include the Plaintiff/Appellant's lost wages and medical bills should not be enforced.
[brief] N.J.S.A. 40:55D-1 .................................................................  20 N.J.S.A. 40:55D-68 .................................................. 1, 3, 9, 11, 13, 21, 22, 27, 30, 31, 33, 36, 37, 48 N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70(a) .............................................................  9  TREATISES CITED  Anderson, American Law of Zoning (4th Ed.) .................................................. 19 Cox & Koenig, New Jersey Zoning and Land Use Administration (2023) ...................... 20, 21, 22, 32, 40, 45, 50 Cunningham, Control of Land Use in New Jersey, 14 Rutgers L.R. 37 (1969).  ....................  18  TABLE OF TRANSCRIPTS  1T  October 15, 2018  Transcript of Hearing before [...] on N.J.S.A. 40:55D-68  Application by [...].  2T  May 24, 2019  Transcript of Motion in Limine before [...] in Superior Court, Ocean County, Law Division  3T  September 22, 2022  Transcript of Trial consisting of Oral Argument on Records, before [...] in Superior Court, Ocean County Law Division.  TABLE OF ORDERS  Resolution of Zoning Board determining off-site parking by Lot 8 by vehicles of School Lot 5 is not a legal use  Da1-6  Order denying Motion in Limine (6/2/2022)  Da214  Trial Court Opinion invalidating Board Resolution and Dismissing Counterclaim (12/1/2022) and Correction Letter (1/13/2023)
[directive] is It of such support in Cause Probable of Affidavit pretrial seek to appropriate be might it in where cases Report Incident Enforcement Law Preliminary Prosecutor's County a limit to construed shall be Nothing herein release. of revocation or detention law any by Report Enforcement Incident Preliminary Law of a preparation the require to authority authority.  jurisdictional prosecutor's the to subject agency or officer enforcement Directive. of this issuance immediately upon operational shall become Section This Reports.
[brief] “Under our case law, the ‘illegal sentence’ standard has been applied to only two types of sentences – sentences that exceed the penalty authorized by statute for the specific offense and sentences not imposed in accordance with the law. ”  *State v. Marshall*, 173 N.J. 343, 354–55, n.2 (2002) (citing *Murray*, 162 N.J. at 246-47).  However, the “mere excessiveness of sentence otherwise within authorized limits, as distinct from illegality by reason of being beyond or not in accordance with legal authorization, is not an appropriate ground of post-conviction relief and can only be raised on direct appeal from the conviction. ”  *State v. Clark*, 65 N.J. 426, 437 (1974) (citing *State v. Pierce*, 115 N.J. Super. 346 (App. Div. 1971), certif. den. 59 N.J. 362 (1971) and R. 3:22-2(c)).
[brief] [1T 55:4-60:0].  [...]’s counsel then used the investigating officers’ opinions to impeach [...]’s credibility.  See N.J.R.E. 611(b).  The credibility of a witness is always at issue.  Specifically, [...] testified that he only takes cases if he agrees with the theory of the case.  [8T100:21-24].  [...] further acknowledged that he did not consider [...]’s version of events in forming his opinions.  [8T101:20-102:7].  He did not because [...]’s causation theory was premised upon [...] becoming frustrated (pursuant to [...]’s version), an opinion that is undermined if [...] calmly walked away and only responded after being attacked while his back was turned.  [8T90:11-20]; See State v. Wakefield, 190 N.J. 397, 452 (2007) (“[I]n respect of the cross-examination of an expert witness, we have held that an expert witness is always subject to searching cross-examination as the basis of his opinion. ”).  To determine the credibility, weight and probative value of an expert's opinion, one must question the facts and reasoning on which it is based.  Johnson v. Salem Corp., 97 N.J. 78, 91 (1984).  Because the evidence at the scene was so one-sided as to cause the officers to question [...]’s accusations against [...], their opinions that [...] threw the bag of grout was relevant to the jury’s evaluation of [...]’s credibility and bias in testifying that he believed in the merits of Plaintiffs’ case, and by extension, that [...] was credible.  The trial court did not abuse its discretion, because its decision to allow the officers’ opinions with a limiting instruction for the purpose of demonstrating the bias of plaintiff’s expert was reasonably based on sound legal principle.  Even if this court were to determine that it was error to allow the officer’s opinions as to who threw the bag of grout, the error was harmless, because [...] had already testified at his deposition and in his own case in chief that he believed that the officers blamed him for the incident and were accusing him of throwing the bag of grout at [...].