ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] *Coyle* noted that:  “Our decision in Spellbacker, unlike Puglisi did not involve an ‘individual salary adjustment’ unconnected to the overall salary structure of the employing agency.  Spellbacker, supra at 40.  It involved a settlement intended to comply with a statutory mandate” (Aa64) (emphasis added).  So too here.  In the present case, the retroactive salary payments were made in order to equalize [...]’ salary with that of her male colleagues in the final three years of her employment in compliance with the Equal Pay Act and NJLAD mandates.
[brief] Plaintiff explained that his reservations on the marriage and wanting to possibly delay the wedding were based on discovering lies in the relationship and wanting more time.  Plaintiff reasserted his investment in the wedding after being reassured by his parents.  Plaintiff acknowledged that he had reservations but chose to trust his parents’ reassurances about both the wedding and the green card issues – and the assurances that defendant continually provided to him.  (2T34-35).  Plaintiff admitted that he should have been more attentive to discrepancies early in their relationship, such as the difference of 25 days in her stated date of birth.  He reflected that if he had known the defendant’s intentions were solely to obtain a green card and that she planned to leave after three months, he would never have gone through with the marriage.
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[brief] Instead, the [...] improperly diverted its attention to the loading zone at the Property and how deliveries of product would occur. \(^6\)  In response, \(^6\)  A review of the transcripts confirms how often the word “loading” is mentioned, in comparison to either “ingress” or “egress”.  (T1/226, 235, 239; T2/186, 192, 195-196).  [...] presented several witnesses who testified regarding logistics and frequency of deliveries to the Property, which were entirely consistent with the operations of other businesses in the area and appropriate to an urban environment.  (T2/40:9-11; 42:13-17; 43:8-17).  In fact, the Applicant proposed to hire additional security personnel to assist with deliveries and ensuring a smooth flow of traffic in and out of the Property, as needed.  (T2/69:21-70:2).
[brief] B.  [...]’s agreement is confusing, ambiguous, and fails to meaningfully convey waiver of the right to sue per Atalese [...]’s agreement does not clearly and unambiguously communicate that the consumer is waiving their right to jury trial.  Contrary to [...]’s belief, the trial court’s recognition of that reality did not hinge on the absence of any one word or phrase, but the absence of all of the usual language that has been held to adequately convey the nature of the rights at stake and waiver of them.  The agreement’s insufficient, unenforceable waiver of rights is a direct product of its unclear and confusing format.  The structure is overly long and filled with cross-referencing and conflicting sections, and the language relies upon anesthetizing terms that blur the requisite clarity.  Here, plaintiffs first examine those semantic and linguistic flaws and how they undermine enforceability.  Second and third, plaintiffs address the insufficiency of the agreement’s waiver of rights, and its failure to adequately delineate the distinction between arbitration and a judicial forum.
[directive] Statewide Steering Committee  The Steering Committee shall be comprised of the following representatives and agencies:  Some County Prosecutor’s Offices have existing working groups, such as CIT steering committees, jail diversion 1 and mental health committees, which function similarly to the structure set forth in this directive.  There is no requirement to create an additional group, so long as the principles set forth in this directive are incorporated into the existing framework.  Page 3  [...]; • the [...]; • the [...]; • the [...]; • the [...]; • the [...]; • the [...]; • the [...]; • the New Jersey Ombudsman for Individuals with Intellectual or Developmental • Disabilities and Their Families; a designated County Mental Health Administrator; • mental health advocates to be designated by the Attorney General; and • any other organizations as determined by the Attorney General.  •  The Statewide Steering Committee shall meet on a quarterly basis to review the progress of the County Working Groups, exchange ideas and provide feedback on best practices, emerging trends and latest guidance, identify opportunities for multi-county coordination of programs, and provide information about opportunities for grants and coordinate grant submissions.2  This Directive shall take effect on March 31, 2021.
[brief] ..........................................................................................................................  29 POINT IV  THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ENTERING RESTRAINTS DESPITE A LACK OF CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE THAT PLAINTIFFS’ HARM GREATLY OUTWEIGHED COUNTERVAILING HARMS (Da393-417)  ...........................................  34 POINT V THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ENTERING RESTRAINTS WITHOUT CONSIDERING HARM TO THE PUBLIC INTEREST (Da393-417)  .........................................................................................  36 POINT VI  THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADJUDICATING A MOOT ISSUE BY ENTERING RESTRAINTS AGAINST A REPEALED POLICY (Da393-417)  ..........................................................................................  38
[brief] **The court must interpret AICRA in light of its history, purpose, relationship to the IFPA and RICO, and canons of statutory interpretation, to avoid the absurd result that Defendants advocate.**  Mandatory PIP ADR is not commercial arbitration.  The dispute on this appeal is not merely about the proper forum to resolve claims.  Rather, Defendants insist on PIP ADR because they know that it will prevent insurers from proving and remedying complex fraud.  PIP ADR is a one-way street under this court’s caselaw: arbitrators may deny or award claimants PIP benefits, but they cannot award insurers remedies such as treble damages and attorneys’ fees, which the IFPA and RICO require.  Discovery is also limited to the medical necessity of treatment.  And insurers likely cannot join as parties those responsible for the fraud who are not the specific legal entities to which patients assigned PIP benefits because only those entities agree to PIP ADR as a condition of assignment.  In addition, insurers need to file separate cases for each injured person or accident, and cannot join all of a healthcare provider’s allegedly fraudulent claims in a single case.  See Pb39-47.  Finally, insurers would be required to present complex insurance-fraud claims to an arbitrator who resolves an average of 100 cases per month.  See Pb45.  Defendants do not meaningfully contest any of these points.  They label it “speculation” that an arbitrator would not hear affirmative fraud claims.
[brief] | Date | Judge | Ord/Judg | Discription of Result | Transcript Reference et al. | |--------------|--------------------------------------------|---------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | 10/17/2019 | Clerks "Lose" Remand from Federal Court | Retaliation?  Similar to Case in Chief w/ "Lost" PTI Application and "bounced" or ingnored Motions | Delay in case of moths 7 months totally not attributable to [...].  Suspect Case File had to be "Rebuilt" from ACMS, which possibly led to LoP dismissal below because Aff. Of Service were not in "rebuilt" file.  (Not Under Appeal But Important to Understand Case.)  | Law Div. ignores this like it never happened so not mentioned in record.  *N.B.*  [...] wrote reactivation letter in Nov '19 (no reply), called in Jan '20 (told "lost") at that point LONG EXPERIENCE has shown if I complain about sloth, Rules Violations or Retaliation, it just leads to more retaliation.  [...] Atty [...] writes in May '23 and case is found (or "rebuilt") and put on the docket.  | | 4/1/2021 | [...] | Order | Deny Filing of SAC | Oral Decision at 1T-33-16 to 1T-56-18 | | 2/28/2023 | [...] | App. Div. Order | Remand Due to 4/1/2021 Order Being Interlocutory and not a Final Judgment | Not Under Appeal -- Just for Reference; Available at www.[...]Law.org/BrettRmdOp.pdf | | Date | Judge | Ord/Judg | Description of Result | Transcript Reference et al. | |--------------|-------------|------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | 5/28/2023 | [...] | Judgment | Dismissing Case v. [...] | Oral Opinion at 2T-25-23 to 25-12.
[brief] When [...] declined [...]’s repayment demand, [...] filed this case, a ten count complaint of 447 paragraphs, alleging not only breach of contract and unjust enrichment, but conversion/theft, fraud and tortious interference, all associated with [...]’s retention of the funds paid to it pursuant to the COVID Statute.  [...] naturally counterclaimed for the April and July 2020 payments it had not received.  The lower court agreed with it.  Although it is patently evident that this case turns on the construction of the COVID Statute and nothing else, not only does [...] largely ignore the Statute in its overlength brief, but it takes the position that the Court lacks jurisdiction to apply the Statute, under the reasoning that only the Commissioner of Education has authority to do so.  In essence, it argues that in deciding this appeal of a case initiated by [...], the Court should turn a blind eye to the Statute on which the case turns.  [...] submits that doing so is not sensible, and that a plain reading of the COVID Statute demonstrates the correctness of the lower court’s disposition.
[brief] Defendants’ Services at [...]  [...], as a property, had many commercial tenants at the time of this incident.  [...], a property manager at Dewy Meadow, testified that there were multiple parking lots at this property.  (4T 84:1-2; 92:15-17).  [...] (of [...]) testified at trial that tenants included a pizza place, Italian restaurant, a tae kwon do studio, Japanese restaurant, ice cream parlor, a [...] fitness studio, [...], and a vacant supermarket.  (4T 24:22-25:11).  Acar further stated that when 14 inches of snow comes down during the day, “it’s not that easy to open up the parking lot in perfect condition. ” (4T 49:12-15).  In preparation for this snow storm, Acar confirmed that the snow removal contractor ([...]) applied brine to the property in advance.  (4T 57:7-17).  Acar also confirmed that at the time of plaintiff’s fall, the snow and ice removal by the contractor was still in progress and had not yet been completed.  (4T 62:20-25).  Acar admitted that the magnitude of the snow event would affect whether the contractor could fulfill the goal of completing snow and ice removal by 6 AM.
[brief] Knowing a party’s “litigation strategies and weaknesses” and “specific settlement postures” would clearly cause significant harm to a litigant’s case.  Further, [...] wants this Court, despite his equivocal statements made in his Certification to the Trial Court under oath, to now believe that he somehow has perfect recall of those conversations he had with [...].  All of a sudden, he “flatly denies knowledge or recollection of Petitioners’ settlement position,” RB6- 7, when his Certification, submitted to the Trial Court, stated, “I do not believe I received any confidential information from Plaintiffs,” Pa152; RB7.  Unlike the attorney in *O Builders*, [...], in his Trial Court Certification, was not “adamant” about his conversations with [...], and did not fully provide “a detailed recitation of the matters discussed. ”  *O Builders* at 115-17, 129-31.  [...]’s Certification, on the other hand, was quite specific about the conversations with [...].
[brief] Wherefore [...] respectfully requests that this Court reverse the convictions entered below.  Respectfully submitted, S/[...]  Dated: May 02, 2024  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY  APPELLATE  DIVISION  DOCKET NO.: [...]  Civil Action ON APPEAL FROM: SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY LAW  DIVISION: MORRIS COUNTY  Municipal Appeal NO.: [...]  SAT BELOW: HON. [...], J.S.C.  APPELLATE  BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF/RESPONDENT, [...], NJ  [...] (NJ State Bar No.: 027971999)  [...]  Of Counsel and on the Brief: [...], Esq.  #  TABLE OF CONTENTS | SECTION | PAGE | |------------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | PRELIMINARY STATEMENT | 1 | | PROCEDURAL HISTORY | 2 | | STATEMENT OF FACTS | 4 | | STANDARD OF REVIEW | 8 | | POINT I | | | THE EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD CLEARLY ESTABLISHES THAT | | | THE DEFENDANT VIOLATED EAST HANOVER TOWNSHIP ORDINANCES §173-24, §173-27 AND §201-2A | 11 | | POINT II | | | CHAPTER 173 AND CHAPTER 201 WERE NOT SUNSET BY | | | CHAPTER 44 OF THE TOWNSHIP’S CODE | 15 | | POINT III | | | THE PENALTY PROVISION OF §201 IS CLEAR AND ENFORCEABLE AND MUST BE UPHELD | 16 | | POINT IV | | | §201 IS CLEAR AND UNAMBIGUOUS AND MUST BE UPHELD | 18 | | POINT V | | | A PERSON OF REASONABLE INTELLIGENCE WOULD KNOW THAT | | | THE DEFENDANT’S ACTIONS
[brief] (Da18.)  The State argues that the MVR video was “far superior than the supposed testimony of [...] on the ‘scoring factors’ of said tests. ”  (Sb15.)  But this argument overlooks that standardized field sobriety tests have objective scoring factors that must be utilized in order for the tests to be valid.  State v. Olenowski, 255 N.J. 529, 555, n. 8 (2023); see State v. Homan, 732 N.E.2d 952, 955 (Ohio 2000)(explaining unless standardized field sobriety tests are performed correctly, the results are “inherently unreliable”), mod. as stated in, State v. Boczar, 863 N.E.2d 155, 159-60 (Ohio 2007).
[brief] He writes:  Rather, the Court presented an Opinion that disregards the competent, substantial and credible evidence in the record and rather, relies on hearsay and lay opinions without foundation that it cherry picked to support its predetermined rulings.  (Pb 20; emphasis added).  Such a statement flies in the face of the Chancery Division’s explicit credibility findings, and cannot provide a basis for reversal on appeal.  In addition, what hearsay does the Petitioner object to?  And how exactly did the trial court “cherry pick” the evidence?  The Petitioner does not say.
[brief] *See, e.g.*, Kelley, Gardner, Murrie, Pan, & Kafadar, *supra*, at 121.  That said, there are only a small number of existing studies and no standardization in methodology across the discipline, so there is no assurance that the error rates in these studies reflect the accuracy and reliability of a fingerprint examination performed for any particular case.  This is compounded by the varied use of black box algorithms that are not well understood but can increase inaccurate examination outcomes.  *See supra*, Point II, A; Dror & Mnookin, *supra*, at 63.  **C.
[brief] The courts in New Jersey construe easements in the same manner: language purportedly granting an easement is ambiguous or in dispute, 'the primary rule of construction is that the intent of the conveyor is ... determined by the language of the conveyance read as an entirety and in the light of the surrounding circumstances.'  Poblette v. Towne of Historic Smithville Cmty. Ass'n, 355 N.J. Super. 55, 63 (App. Div. 2002) (quoting Hammett v. Rosensohn, 26 N.J. 415, 423 (1958)); see also Camp Clearwater Inc. v. Plock, 52 N.J. Super. 583, 596 (Ch. Div. 1958) (citing 28 C. J.S. Easements s 24, p. 677); [...] and [...], The Law of Easements and Licenses in Land, at §3.9 (2021-22 Ed.) (the primary consideration in interpreting an easement is determining and effectuating the grantor's intentions).  Under modern day principles of contract construction and the approach espoused by the Restatement, there is no legitimate question that the [...] intended to create an easement by reservation in favor of the owners of the [...] so they could access their property via the existing roadway across the [...].
[brief] While “a trial court may rely on the ‘observations and opinion of experienced officers’ about a defendant's condition and behavior to determine guilt,” here the evidence was severely lacking given [...] did not substantially comply with the standardized field sobriety tests by scoring the results before coming to the conclusion that [...] was intoxicated.  See id. at 602 (quoting *Johnson*, 42 N.J. at 166).  “Any factor alone may be insufficient to carry the State's burden, but, in combination, can ‘more than ampl[y] ... support the conclusion that [a] defendant was driving under the influence of alcohol ....’”  Id. at 602 (quoting *State v. Kent*, 391 N.J. Super. 352, 384 (App. Div. 2007).  Here, due to the errors with not granting an adverse inference regarding [...]’ lack of testimony, [...]’ concession that he did not properly score the factors as required for reliable results, and [...]’ administration of the tests in wet conditions and noisy conditions where [...] could not hear the instructions demonstrates that [...] should be entitled to a new trial de novo before an impartial judge.  See Da48 at D-1 Camera 0 at 10:07, 10:22, and 14:07; 1T64:6-66:3; 2T60:20-61:1.
[brief] “It is well-settled that a videotape ‘qualifies as a writing[ ]’ under N.J.R.E. 801(e) and must be ‘properly authenticated’ before being admitted. ”  State v. Brown, 463 N.J. Super. 33, 51 (App. Div. 2020).  Under N.J.R.E. 901, “‘[t]he requirement of authentication or identification as a condition precedent to admissibility is satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter is what its proponent claims.
[brief] “The clear purpose of N.J.S.A. 40:55D-10.5, . . . was to assist developers and property owners by obviating the time of decision rule.  . . .  The Legislature was concerned about situations in which a developer would spend time and money pursuing an application, only to have a municipality change the zoning to the developers detriment while the application was pending. ”  Id. at 343, 344.  In Jai Sai Ram, the Appellate Division held:  “In construing legislation our “overriding goal is to give effect to the Legislature’s intent. ” (citations omitted).  . .  However, we do not follow that rule when to do so would produce an absurd result, at odds with the clear purpose of the legislation.  (citations omitted)  *Jai Sai Ram, LLC*, supra. 446 N.J. Super. at 344, 345.  Thus, the Appellate Division in *Jai Sai Ram* determined that any land use amendment which occurs during the pendency of an application and which is beneficial to an application for development pending before the local board or on appeal must be applied.  Therefore, in accordance with the holding in *Jai Sai Ram*, the TOA Rule only bars the use of a new ordinance which is detrimental to the Applicant and not an amendment to an ordinance which is favorable to an Applicant.
[brief] By any measurement, [...] exercised admirable caution in his dealings with defendant, especially considering their history.  There is nothing in the record to suggest that [...] engaged in any unlawful conduct requiring rebuke.  It is also important to recognize that [...], in 2014, would have been operating without the collective insight of Keaton, Terry, and Johnson, all of which were decided after.  He had to make “decisions in the moment, with uncertain information at hand and without the luxury of considered reflection. ”  Terry, 212 N.J. 245-46.  [...] confined his search to those areas where defendant himself advised these documents would be: the glove box or the arm rest.  It is critical to note that [...] found [...]’s testimony on this point “credible;” credibility “bolstered” by [...]’s subsequent discretion in obtaining the documents and nothing more.  (Da018).  [...] laudably navigated the intersection of due process and public safety and his conduct here should not be the basis for suppression.
[brief] Analyzing an evidentiary ruling made by a trial court begins with relevancy, the “hallmark of admissibility of evidence. ”  Griffin v. City of East Orange 225 N.J. 400, 413 (2016).  (quoting State v. Darby, 174 N.J. 509 (2002)).  The Griffin Court, interpreting N.J.R.E. 401, described relevant evidence as evidence which has a tendency in reason to prove or disprove any fact of consequence to the determination of the action.  Id.  The analysis of relevancy, according to Griffin, thus, “should focus on the ‘logical connection between the proffered evidence and a fact in issue’ … or ‘the tendency of evidence to establish the proposition that it is offered to prove. ’”  Id. (citing Green v. N.J. Mfs. Ins. Co., 160 N.J. 480 (1980)).  Relevancy determinations are fact-specific evaluations of the evidence “in the setting of the individual case. ”  Rodriguez v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 237 N.J. 36, 58 (2019).  The facts of the case at hand are unique to and highly sensitive for the analysis of admissibility of evidence.  See Id.  The Trial Court’s determination that both the Rendering and the [...] Advertisement were irrelevant was based on the facts specific to the Amended Resolution.  It is clear from the record that the Amended Resolution did not rely upon either in granting approval for the application.  As such, the Trial Court properly excluded them from consideration in Appellant’s Prerogative Writ action.
[brief] See also *Reed v. Bd. of County Canvassers*, 119 N.J.L. 115, 118-119 (E&A 1937) (The ability to conduct a recount is not within the province of the district boards of election or other authorities outside of the recount provisions.).  Here, statutory power to count ballots and certify results was statutorily limited to election night and he had no authority to act after the fact.  Even if the Court were to not read the statute as literally in light of the existence of vote-by-mail ballots which as a matter of law are not certified until after that date, the deadline would fall on February 24, 2025, the deadline for certification of the vote-by-mail ballots.  Thereafter, the final results were tallied and certified, published, on the website and announced.  The result was a tie and from that point forward only proper legal process under a recount or election contest could alter those results.  It is only logical that candidates, election officials, and the public require a definitive final certification.  Numerous other statutes are triggered by the final certification of elections, including the time to bring recounts and election contests, the amount of time that machines are required to be preserved, the return of post-election materials, and certainty as to who will be sworn into office.  As we saw here, the improper late amendment created unnecessary confusion, eroded public confidence, and a disorderly litigation process necessitating emergent reviews, injunctions, and expedited hearings, ultimately leaving the board without a fifth voting member for much longer than may have been necessary if the proper process had been filed and an orderly review conducted.