ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Plaintiff, the non-moving party on the motion for summary judgment, should have been afforded all reasonable inferences both on the issue of liability and damages.  The Trial Court failed to consider the various remedies available to plaintiff in the event they were successful in showing wrongful conduct.  A finding that there were genuine issues as to the CFA necessarily implicates the issue as whether plaintiff paid too much or must otherwise be compensated to correct deficiencies related to warranties and performance of the system.  In this case, the Trial Court eventually heard testimony from [...], an expert witness on construction and construction management, that the estimated cost of removing the system and replacing it with a new fixed roof would involve demolition, removal, and replacement and the cost would exceed the amount of the balance of payment claimed by [...].  1T 232:5-24.  This testimony is in line with the principle that “[w]hile the loss must be a reasonably certain consequence of the breach, the exact amount of the loss need not be certain. ”  See Model Civil Jury Charge 8.45.  *Caveat emptor* does not reflect current law in New Jersey.  Here, the State has a more ethical approach in business dealings with one another.  Each party may rely on representations made by another in a business transaction.  See Model Civil Jury Charge 4.43.  The Trial Court failed to view the evidence in the context of [...] as a consumer of the defendants’ products and services, and instead viewed them as a party possessing equal knowledge and expertise on a specialty product and failed to afford [...] all reasonable inferences on the issue of damages on summary judgment.  Accordingly, for the reasons set forth herein, plaintiff respectfully requests the Appellate Division reverse the April 4, 2022, September 14, 2023, and October 27, 2023 Orders entered by the Trial Court and order a new trial.
[directive] Updated December 2, 2013  Bail Schedule 2  DISORDERLY PERSONS OFFENSES AND PETTY DISORDERLY PERSONS OFFENSES  Note: Some of these offenses are listed elsewhere in Bail Schedule 2 as lesser included offenses  STATUTES WHERE BAIL MAY BE SET BY A SUPERIOR COURT JUDGE OR A MUNICIPAL COURT JUDGE OR, IN THE MUNICIPAL COURT JUDGE’S ABSENCE, THE MUNICIPAL COURT ADMINISTRATOR OR DEPUTY COURT ADMINISTRATOR, PURSUANT TO RULE 3:26-2 (Rule 3:3-1(c)(1) (indictable offenses) and Rule 7:2-2(b) (non-indictable offenses) delineate factors regarding whether a warrant or summons should issue.
[directive] In re Attorney General Law Enforcement Directive Nos. 2020-5 and 2020-6, 246 N.J. 462 (2021).  Subordinate law enforcement agencies, including county and municipal police forces, have a duty to cooperate with the Attorney General to improve the administration of the criminal justice system, including the efficient delivery of police services.  For county and municipal law enforcement agencies, cooperation in internal affairs matters begins with strict adherence to the Attorney General’s policy requirements.
[brief] For all the foregoing reasons, this Court is asked to affirm [...]’s order granting summary judgment to the Defendants.  Respectfully Submitted, [...]  /s/ [...], Esq. [...], Esq.  [...], Esq.  Attorneys for Defendants, [...], [...], [...] ([...]), [...], [...] ([...]), [...] ([...]), [...] ([...]), [...] ([...]), [...] ([...]), and [...] ([...])  Dated: December 18, 2023  [...], Plaintiff-Appellant, v. STATE OF NEW JERSEY, DIVISION OF STATE POLICE, CAPTAIN WILLIAM HARKNESS ([...]), [...], ([...]), LIEUTENANT COLONEL SCOTT EBNER* ([...]), MAJOR JOHN BALDOSARO ([...]), [...] ([...]), CAPTAIN JEANNE HENGEMUHLE ([...]), [...] ([...]), LIEUTENANT RAYMOND PALOVCAK ([...]) AND JOHN DOES 1-5, Defendants-Respondents.
[brief] Moreover, the information required by N.J.S.A. 47:1A-3(b) is to be made available within twenty-four hours, “or as soon as practicable, of a request for such information. ”  In this case, the Plaintiff never made such a request for information, and the custodian’s failure to provide the information cannot be ruled an improper denial of access as the custodian was never afforded twenty-four hours to respond to a request.  For the following reasons, the trial court’s judgment must be reversed.
[brief] Insurance Company v. Folsom, 85 US 237 reading in pertinent part as follows:  '....By the terms of the Act of Congress permitting issues of fact in civil cases to be tried and determined by the court without the intervention of a jury, it is provided that the finding of the court upon the facts may be either general or special, and that the finding shall have the same effect as the verdict of a jury....'  My understanding of the matter is that juries decide facts.  As a result, per the 7th amendment a decision of the Supreme court is a fact that cannot be otherwise re-examined as the Supreme court is a court of the United States.  The 7th amendment reading as follows:  '....In suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common law....'  The 7th amendment is clear where no fact decided by a jury shall be otherwise re-examined in a court of the United States.
[brief] THE PCR COURT PROPERLY DENIED DEFENDANT’S INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF TRIAL  COUNSEL CLAIM BASED ON COUNSEL’S DECISION NOT TO CALL A WITNESS TO TESTIFY AT TRIAL.  [(Raised Below.)]  [(21T; Da254-55). ]  Defendant argues trial counsel was ineffective for failing to subpoena and call [...] as a witness at trial.  (Db40-43).  The State submits that the PCR court properly denied this claim because defendant failed to provide any affidavit or certification in support of his claim.  Accordingly, the State respectfully requests that this Court affirm.
[brief] In addition, and as the trial court found, the State further ignored the fact that on September 12, 2023, Appellant served a supplemental discovery request, Appellant’s supplemental request requested the identities of all the officers that made up the TEAMS unit, the identity of the officer who breached Appellant’s door, and the identity of any officers that possessed a Halligan tool.  These specific requests were in response to Appellant’s expert witness’ opinion that Appellant’s door was breached with a Halligan tool.  On September 18, 2023, the State responded to Appellant’s supplemental discovery requests by letter.  The State’s response rebuffed Appellant’s very tailored requests and redirected Appellant to [...]’s narrative report for “pertinent details of the TEAMs entry on the date of the search warrant. ”  Id.  The State knew Appellant was seeking information about the officer’s entry on the day the warrant was executed and they either withheld it or failed to even look for it.  The State’s conduct is unfathomable and in total contradiction of the Rules and law that mandate the State’s discovery obligations.
[brief] The exclusion of auto injuries to an insured is not permitted by law. ”); see also Stiefel v. Bayly, Martin, and Fay, 242 N.J. Super. 643, 653 (App. Div. 1990) (noting that no public policy or statute requires uninsured motorist coverage to be read into an umbrella policy as it could be read into the primary automobile insurance policy).  Simply, unlike in Dela Vega, the [...] is not a primary automobile policy.  Based on this distinction alone, Dela Vega is inapposite, and does not support Appellants’ argument that Injury to an Insured exclusions violate public policy when used in excess policies.
[brief] The Supreme Court in Natale II stated:  Our Code provisions make clear that, before any judicial factfinding, the maximum sentence that can be imposed based on a jury verdict or guilty plea is the presumptive term.  Accordingly, the “statutory maximum” for Blakely and Booker purposes is the presumptive sentence.  Because the Code's system of presumptive sentencing allows judges to sentence beyond the “statutory maximum” based on their finding of aggravating factors, that system is incompatible with the holdings in Apprendi, supra, Blakely, supra, and [U.S. v. Booker; 543 U.S. 220, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621, 160 L.Ed. 621 (2005) ].  We, therefore, conclude that the Code's system of presumptive term sentencing violates the Sixth Amendment's right to trial by jury.
[brief] The validity of these "stipulated damage clauses" has depended on a judicial assessment of the clauses as an unenforceable penalty or as an enforceable provision for "liquidated damage."  Thus, "[l]iquidated damages' and 'penalties' are terms used to reflect legal conclusions as to the enforceability or nonenforceability, respectively, of stipulated damage clauses.  Id. at 248 (citations omitted).  The Court in *Wasserman’s* then provided a more detailed definition of these two subcategories of “stipulated damages,” including the definition of “liquidated damages” cited by Respondent in its brief to support its position that the “free rent” chargeback clause does not provide for “liquidated damages.
[directive] 3  When setting investigative and enforcement priorities, civil enforcement agencies should consider how their enforcement actions may affect underserved communities.  They should affirmatively identify and prioritize matters that promote racial justice and equity, and should routinely assess whether their actions are advancing those goals.  Under no circumstances may an agency use its civil enforcement powers to pursue an investigation or enforcement action on the basis of the actual or perceived race or other protected characteristic of the target or persons related to the target (e.g., owners or patrons).
[brief] When asked if he had ever had his rights read to him, defendant responded affirmatively, “uh-huh. ” (1T25-6 to 9).  After removing defendant’s handcuffs, and before [...] could begin reading defendant his rights, defendant stated, “Just sign it.  Let me just sign it[,]” referring to the Miranda form.  (1T26-6 to 7).  Defendant then replied “uh-huh,” “yes, sir,” and “yeah” to each statement of rights and signed the form without hesitation.  (1T26-19 to 28-12).  [...] then began to ask defendant a little bit about what had happened that day regarding the drugs.
[brief] C.  Because No Court Has Ever Ordered the State to Produce [...]’ Habeas Petition, Jencks is Inapposite.  Defendant Also Improperly Raised this Argument for the First Time in a Reply Brief.  With respect to his Jencks argument, defendant does not actually explain why this Court should have considered a new legal theory for the first time in a reply brief.  Rather, defendant baldly asserts that [...]’s decision “was palpably incorrect. ” (Db36-37).  The State disagrees.  A defendant cannot use his reply brief to enlarge his argument.  State v. Smith, 55 N.J. 476, 488 (1970).  Additionally, defendant’s Jencks-based argument was that a criminal case must be dismissed if the State withholds impeachment evidence.  However, this oversimplifies the holding of Jencks v. United States, which was: the criminal action must be dismissed when the Government, on the ground of privilege, elects not to comply with an order to produce, for the accused's inspection and for admission in evidence, relevant statements or reports in its possession of government witnesses touching the subject matter of their testimony at the trial.  [353 U.S. 657, 672 (emphasis added). ]  As the State has never been ordered to produce [...]’ habeas petition, Jencks is irrelevant to defendant’s case.  Not only was this argument improperly raised for the first time in a reply brief, but it is premised on inapposite caselaw and meritless.  POINT III
[brief] Thus, although vacated, the decision stands as the most comprehensive source of guidance available on the patent law questions at issue in this case.  See, also, Action All. of Senior Citizens v.  Sullivan, 930 F.2d 77, 83 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (“Although the Supreme Court vacated our prior opinion, […] it expressed no opinion on the merit of these holdings.  They therefore continue to have precedential weight, and in the absence of contrary authority, we do not disturb them. ”); United States v. Adewani, 467 F.3d 1340, 1342 (D.C. Cir. 2006); United States ex rel. Espinoza v. Fairman, 813 F.2d 117, 125 n.7 (7th Cir. 1987) and Cty. of L.A. v. Davis, 440 U.S. 625, 646 n.10 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting).  Thus, although [...] and II are not binding, they remain as precedential authority with respect to the sufficiency of the mail vendor claim.
[directive] Use of cover •  From a kneeling, strong side of cover ready position, on command fire 2 rounds; assume an over the top of cover position and fire 2 rounds; assume a support side kneeling position behind cover and fire 2 rounds.  (30 seconds)  •  Place weapon on safe and move to the 15 yard line 15 yard line 4 rounds, standing to kneeling 8 seconds
[brief] In the case at bar, [...] testified about a recreation he performed of the incident at the defendant’s store.  [...] took a still photo from the surveillance footage that captured the fall, went to the store, and compared the still footage to a shopping cart containing pots that were intended to represent the plaintiff, and moved this shopping cart until it was aligned with what he believed was the location of the fall at the time of her fall based upon his comparison of the still photo he took against the live feed from a surveillance camera in the store.  (5T114:11-24; 5T123:18-125:2; 5T127:7-128:2; 6T30:24-31:28; 6T34:1-35:7; 6T41:13-17; 6T78:25-79:4; 6T80:19-20).  [...] offered no testimony regarding the defect or any aspect of human factors, although he was so qualified as an expert over plaintiff’s objection.  He solely testified to the location of plaintiff’s fall based upon comparing a photograph to a live-feed video surveillance system.  None of his testimony was within the ambit of forensic engineering or a human factors analysis.  Allowing his testimony under the guise of ‘expert testimony’ given the manifest lack of credentials and qualifications allowed this jury to consider inherently incredible evidence.  Compounding the error, [...] was unable to authenticate the live-feed surveillance footage and photographs.  He was unaware if the live-feed footage he was using was from the same camera that captured the incident.  He was unaware of any technical features regarding the surveillance camera systems and if these features were the same – position of the camera, resolution of the cameras, aspect ratios of the cameras, frames per second of the footage, software used to capture and store the information.  (5T131:21-134:4; 5T142:18-143:3; 6T54:15-23; 6T56:25-57:2).  Furthermore, there was no proof that the rudimentary representation of the plaintiff he constructed by piling pots in a shopping cart accurately represented the plaintiff in his recreation.  There was no testimony as to the measurement or determination of the plaintiff’s height shown in the cctv footage of her fall or even an exact measurement of her height.  [...] simply testified that the plaintiff was about five feet tall and that the height of the pots he stacked was four feet eight inches high.  (5T127:7-18; 5T127:11-128:2; 6T30:24-31:28; 6T34:1-11; 6T80:16-20).  The defendant never established that the methodology used by [...] in his recreation of the plaintiff with a stack of pots was sound or matched the actual data of the plaintiff and her fall.  By allowing [...] to provide an opinion as to the location of the plaintiff’s fall under the guise of expert testimony to an area for which he was not qualified and using evidence that was not properly authenticated impermissibly invited this jury to speculate as to the location of the fall.
[directive] This superseding Directive reflects the Supreme Court=s June 11, 2002 Order (copy attached) which modifies its November 1, 2000 Order by changing the time for filing an objection to set aside a bail forfeiture from 45 days of the notice of forfeiture to within 75 days of such notice.  This Directive also updates the procedures by requiring that two copies of any judgment entered be sent to the Clerk of the Superior Court.  1.  Breach of Recognizance  a.  In the Superior Court:  (1)  Upon breach of a condition of recognizance, the court on its own motion shall order forfeiture of bail.  (R. 3:26-6(a)).  (2)  The court shall forthwith send notice of the forfeiture to the county counsel, the defendant, the surety, and its agent.  (R. 3:26-6(a)).  The notice should include the following:  docket number, defendant’s name, amount of the bond, date of forfeiture, the name of the corporate surety as shown on the power of attorney, the name of the attorney-in-fact, and the number of the power of attorney.  (3)  The notice of forfeiture shall direct that judgment will be entered as to any outstanding forfeited bail absent a written objection seeking to set aside the forfeiture, which objection must be filed within 75 days of the date of the notice.  (R. 3:26-6(a)).  (4)  The notice of forfeiture under R. 3:26-6(a) shall contain the following language:  Failure to satisfy a forfeiture or file a motion to vacate the forfeiture within 75 days of the date of the notice of forfeiture will result in the entry of a judgment and removal of the names of all of a corporate surety company’s licensed insurance producers and limited insurance representatives (bail bondsmen) from the Bail Registry maintained by the Clerk of the Superior Court pursuant to Rule 1:13-3(e).  (5)  The notice of forfeiture under R. 3:26-6(a) shall be served by ordinary mail on the corporate surety company and the licensed insurance producer or the limited insurance representative named on the Bail Recognizance at the address recorded in the Bail Registry maintained by the Clerk of the Superior Court pursuant to R. 1:13-3(e).  (6)  When a forfeiture is not set aside or satisfied at the expiration of 75 days, the court shall summarily enter a judgment for the full amount of the recognizance.  (R. 3:26-6(c)).  Two copies of the judgment shall then be sent to the Clerk of the Superior Court.
[directive] B. leave.  Temporary leave, with a return to full or modified duty status upon Temporary medical clearance, may be a reasonable accommodation.  For example, an officer who is medically cleared to return from temporary leave shall not be required to remain on leave and may return to full or modified duty status during the pregnancy or following pregnancy.  C. leave.  A pregnant officer may request to take leave during pregnancy  Officer may seek and following pregnancy in conformance with applicable law and policies.  The pregnant officer shall be treated the same as employees voluntarily seeking leave and/or sick pay because of a temporary disability.
[brief] A police officer may not imply to the jury that he possesses superior knowledge, outside the record that incriminates the defendant.  State v. Branch, 182 N.J. 338, 351 (2005); Cf. State v. Kemp, 195 N.J. 136, 154 (2008) ("all of the sources who led [the detective] to focus on defendant's trial, hereby obviating defendant's Confrontation Clause claim.")  In the case at bar, the "logical implication" of [...] testimony was that he spoken to [...] who implicates defendant in the charged offense.
[brief] Subsection (a) prohibits non-railroad employees from entering “upon the right of way of any railroad or com[ing] into contact with any equipment, machinery, wires or rolling stock of any railroad. ”  However, this section does not “prohibit a passenger for hire from utilizing those parts of a railroad particularly intended for passenger use nor shall it prohibit a person from using a crossing established by the railroad. ”  Next, subsection (b) bars a plaintiff from recovering from a railroad or its employees “any damages for death or injury to person or property as a result of contact with any equipment, machinery, wires or rolling stock of any railroad, if death or injury occurred while that person was . . . (4) engaging in conduct proscribed by subsection a. of this section; or (5) using the property of any railroad in a manner in which it was not intended to be used or in violation of posted regulations. ”  Ibid.  Next, the phrase, “the property of a railroad” or “railroad property”, which is how the parties have sometimes referred to it here and in the record below, is not defined by the statute.  Plaintiff admits that [...] at least owns a right of way at the location where the incident occurred.
[brief] In its pre-trial memorandum filed with the Trial Court, Plaintiff requested the parties be able to rely upon the transcripts of the trial testimony of witnesses who testified during the 2017 trial.  The Trial Court denied this application and stated it was going to require that all witnesses be recalled if the parties wished their testimony to be heard, further clarifying “I’m satisfied that [the remand proceeding] is a new hearing. ”  (6T 65:6-10)  Trial on Remand 29.  The trial on remand began on January 28, 2020, and concluded on August 2, 2021.
[brief] Plaintiff’s initial statement continued to discuss the constitutionality of the ordinance, wherein the speaker again acknowledged that the purpose of the Distance Regulation was safety:  Again, the First Amendment right to receive messages, communicate messages by local businesses.  So again, we look at this 1000 foot separation issue, and talk a lot about that because one of the key variances we need, why is that in place?  Is it necessary? Does it serve a real function?  Because if it doesn't serve a real function, it's unconstitutional.  Can't have a restriction about billboard unless it's a reason for it.  And the only reason we can think of a 1000 board is safety.  But again, there's no data support that.  (3/20/23 Transcript @ T55:21-T56:5).
[brief] When discussing fairness concerns, the Supreme Court noted that “[a] defendant’s age is doubtlessly among the information that courts should consider when calibrating a fair sentence” because “[a]ssessing the overall fairness of a sentence requires a real-time assessment of the consequences of the aggregate sentences imposed” which “includes taking into account the age of the person being sentenced. ”  Torres, N.J. at 273.  Nonetheless, the Court still recognized that “age alone cannot drive the outcome. ”  Ibid.  The Court noted, “[a]n older defendant who commits a serious crime . . . cannot rely on age to avoid an otherwise appropriate sentence. ”  Ibid.  Age is just one “fact that can and should be in the matrix of information assessed by a sentencing court[.]”  Ibid.  At sentencing, [...] found aggravating factor two based on the fact [...] was asleep when defendant attacked her.  (9T35-14 to 36-6); see N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(2).  She also found aggravating factor three based on the disproportionate reaction to her wife’s request for separation, but gave it light weight.  (9T36-7 to 21); see N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(3).  Finally, she found aggravating factor nine and gave it extremely heavy weight, stating that “defendant showed no mercy, took advantage of someone she . . . should have been protecting, and instead, while she slept, mercilessly beat her to death with a wine chiller. ” (9T36-22 to 27-3); see N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(9).  [...] gave mitigating factor seven moderate weight because defendant was forty-nine years old at the time of the offense and had no criminal history.  (9T37-4 to 17); see N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)(7).  But she rejected mitigating factors eight and nine based on the defendant’s attitude toward the crime.  (9T37-18 to 38-4); see N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)(8)-(9).  Thus, she found the “aggravating factors substantially outweigh the mitigating factors.