ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] **PROCEDURAL HISTORY**  On June 22, 2023, Plaintiffs filed a complaint alleging, *inter alia*, survivorship, wrongful death, and negligent infliction of emotional distress over the shooting and murder of [...], upon the Subject Premises, which at all relevant times, is and was owned and controlled by Defendants [...] and [...], and which at all relevant times was patrolled and surveilled (or was supposed to be patrolled and surveilled) by Defendant [...].  (P-1.)  On July 12, 2023, Defendant [...] answered the Complaint.  (P-42.)  On July 28, 2023, Defendants [...] and [...] answered the Complaint.  (P-15.)  On September 29, 2023, Defendants [...] and [...] filed their Motion to Dismiss the Complaint pursuant to Rule 4:6-2(e) for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.  (P-8.)  On October 13, 2023, Defendant [...] filed its Motion to Dismiss the Complaint pursuant to Rule 4:6-2(e) for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.  (P-36.)  October 16, 2023, and November 2, 2023, Plaintiffs opposed Defendants’ respective Motions to Dismiss.
[brief] \(^{10}\) N.J.S.A. 46:21-1, the recording statute cited in *Fisher*, was the version then in effect.  It was repealed as of 2012, see L. 2011, c. 217, § 2, eff. May 1, 2012, and superseded by N.J.S.A. 46:26A-12.  In a consolidated appeal from both dismissals, the Appellate Division held that the entire controversy doctrine barred the second case because the prescriptive easement claim could and should have been asserted in the first case:  In both cases plaintiff sought essentially the same relief, restoration of the original easement location.  In Fisher I, the theory was that the new easement was not of the same type or quality as the one given by the agreement; while in Fisher II, the underlying theory was one of prescriptive right.  Nonetheless, both claims arose out of the same transaction or occurrence.
[brief] In particular, the Plaintiff who sought an order for substituted service filed an affidavit of inquiry indicating that the defendant could not be located despite searching a phone book, records of the Department of Motor Vehicles, the county tax office, and county voting records.  Id. at 353.  The Defendant in question was, in fact, listed in both the DMV and county voting records.  Id. at 354.  Accordingly, the Appellate Division determined that the affidavit filed by the Plaintiff was insufficient, and that “fundamental fairness” and “due process” required the Plaintiff to instead obtain and file affidavits from the appropriate custodian of records attesting as to the results of each search.  Id. at 355-56.  The issue presented here is not whether service by mail is a deviation substantial enough to implicate consideration of fundamental fairness, but whether it is fundamentally fair deny relief from judgment where there exists a reasonable doubt that service was delivered to the wrong address.
[brief] .............................................................................23  McLelland v. Moore, 343 N.J. Super. 589 (App. Div. 2001), cert. denied, 171 N.J. 43 (2002)  .....23  Merchants Express Money Order Co. v. Sun Nat’l Bank, 374 N.J. Super. 556 (App. Div.), certif. granted, 183 N.J. 592 (2005)  .......16
[brief] ”  Da36, ¶ 79.  Plaintiff objected to [...]’s instruction and reminded the attorney that the client knew about the malpractice and was awaiting a call back about how to remedy the situation.  The attorney then told Plaintiff that he would call [...] and get back to him.  About one-and-a-half hours later, a messenger appeared at Plaintiff’s home and dropped off a letter from the Firm, discussed below.  Id., ¶ 80.  H.  Defendants Abruptly Terminate Plaintiff’s Employment and Purport to “Terminate”
[brief] Of Counsel and On the Brief: [...]  [...]  [...] Tindall Executive Suites [...] [...] [...]  [...]  [...]  [...]  [...] [...] [...]  TABLE OF CONTENTS  TABLE OF CITATIONS ........................................................................................................ iii  INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................................................  1  PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND ............................................................................................  2 FACTUAL BACKGROUND ...................................................................................................  2  ARGUMENT - PLAINTIFF/CROSS-APPELLEE’S RESPONSE ..............................................
[brief] Notably, Defendant omits any claim both its and Plaintiff’s interpretations are reasonable which direct summary judgment should be denied.  Because this Court reviews the decision below and does not do so on a blank slate, Estate of Doerfler v. Fed. Ins. Co., 454 N. J. Super. 298, 201-02 (App. Div. 2018) [noting that the function of an appellate court is to review the decisions of the trial court, rather than to decide applications tabula rasa], if it concludes Defendant’s PSA construct is reasonable then given the trial court decision that Plaintiff’s view is reasonable this Court would be constrained to remand for a trial.  As will be shown the proper result is to affirm the trial court’s decision.
[brief] (261a)  While the motion to dismiss was pending, Defendants moved to consolidate the *Vadell* litigation with other lawsuits involving similar issues.  (387a); (572a).  On March 26, 2019, the Court granted this motion.  (572a).  In *Richard Andrews, et als. v. [...], et als.*, ATL-01-19, the plaintiffs, members of the [...], were all currently employed at the time the motion to dismiss was decided. (585a).  Another case that was ultimately consolidated with these matters on July 22, 2020 was *Angelo DeMaio, et als. v. [...], et als.*, ATL-L-981-19.  (581a); (583a).  The *Demaio* plaintiffs are retired [...] ("[...]") employees who retired before a settlement was reached between the Defendants and that union in 2019.
[brief] And contrary to defendant’s argument, it is of no moment that the officers did not testify that they were actually affected by [...]’s failure to signal.  By only requiring that the lane change “may affect traffic,” the statute places the onus on the driver who intends to make the move to be aware of the other traffic around them.  See Williamson, 138 N.J. at 304 (under language of the statute, the State “need not establish that the move actually affected traffic”); Moss, 277 N.J. Super. at 547 (“[T]he key words [of N.J.S.A. 39:4-126] do not project a requirement that a turn movement must affect other traffic but merely that it has the potential of doing so. ”).
[brief] Because the \(^7\)  Although the jury was instructed that the “unlawful act” within the retaliation charge could refer to either harassment, terroristic threats, or stalking, the harassment charge only covered his conduct on April 13, 2022, and the terroristic threats charges only covered the events of August 23, 2021.  (Da6-14) conviction for retaliation encompassed the stalking conviction, and stalking encompassed harassment, these three fourth-degree crimes should have been merged into a single offense – retaliation for past official action.  **POINT V**
[brief] IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY  APPELLATE  DIVISION  Appeal  Docket No.: [...]  APPEALED FROM SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY LAW  DIVISION – SOMERSET COUNTY  SAT BELOW: HON.  [...], USDJ HON.  [...], JSC HON.  [...], JSC  Case No. [...]  [...], APPELLANT, V. STATE OF NEW JERSEY, COUNTY OF MIDDLESEX, [...], [...], [...], OFFICER [...], DET. [...], JOHN DOE PROSECUTOR(S), JANE DOE PROSECUTOR(S), JOHN DOE POLICE OFFICER(S), JANE DOE POLICE OFFICER(S), JOHN DOE(S), JANE DOE(S), UNKNOWN PERSON(S), APPELLEE(S)
[directive] Investigation of Firearm Discharges  7.11.1  An agency’s internal affairs function shall receive notice of any incidents involving: (a)  Any firearm discharge by agency personnel, whether on-duty or off-duty, unless the discharge occurred during the course of (1) a law enforcement training exercise; (2) routine target practice at a firing range; (3) a lawful animal hunt; or (4) the humane killing of an injured animal; or Biehunik v. Felicetta, 441 F.2d 228 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 932 (1971).  5  INTERNAL AFFAIRS POLICY & PROCEDURES | November 2022 41 (b)  Any discharge of an agency-owned firearm by anyone other than agency personnel.  7.11.2  Upon receiving notice, the internal affairs function shall determine whether additional investigation is necessary and whether information must be reported to the County Prosecutor and/or OPIA, pursuant to AG Directive 2019-4, also known as the “Independent Prosecutor Directive,” and other state law.  If the firearm discharge occurs while the agency employee is on duty, then the County Prosecutor must be notified.  If the firearm discharge results in a fatality, the matter shall be investigated by OPIA or another entity pursuant to the Independent Prosecutor Directive.  7.11.3
[brief] (297a-301a).  [...] permits the submission of a Certification for in-camera review.  Id. at 129.  As previously argued,  Following submission of Respondents’ Supplemental Brief, [...] directed a letter to the Court objecting to the in-camera review of [...]’ Certification.  (Pa53).  Although Appellant objected to the in-camera review, Appellant did not request the opportunity to be heard nor did Appellant file a motion asking to be heard on the matter.  Respondent directed a letter to the Court responding to Appellant’s letter objecting to the in-camera review.  (Pa56).  In that letter, Respondent cited [...] and stated that under [...] if Appellant continued in its insistence to see the Certification, then “an appropriate screening device would be to engage substitute counsel to oppose the disqualification motion. ”  (Pa56), See also, [...], supra, 206 N.J. at 129.  Nowhere in their letter did Appellant raise any due process or Constitutional issues.  On September 30, 2024, Appellant filed its Supplemental brief.
[brief] Ibid.  Moreover, even if [...] was not a [...] employee, he was still subject to the State Policy as an officer of the local [...] chapter, for two reasons: one, because the State Policy prohibits harassment and discrimination by anyone “doing business with the State,” and two, because the [...] contract also includes a non-discrimination clause.  (Aa32).  Finally, [...] relied on witness corroboration and video footage to substantiate [...]’s allegations.  (Aa32-33).  Having summarized [...]’s allegations and [...]’s responses, [...] further described its efforts to interview union witnesses, who did not cooperate.
[brief] When the Legislature sets out to define a specific term, “the courts are bound by that definition. ”  Febbi v. Bd. of Rev., 35 N.J. 601, 606 (1961).  “Where a specific definition is absent, [it is] presume[d] that the Legislature intended the words it chose and the plain and ordinary meaning ascribed to those words. ” State v. Twiggs, 233 N.J. 513 (2018) (quoting Paff v. Galloway Township, 229 N.J. 340, 353 (2017)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  The words should be read in the context of the statute’s overall structure and composition, State v. Hupka, 203 N.J. 222, 231-32 (2010), so as not to frustrate the statute’s purpose thereby leading to an absurd result.
[brief] But, the well-established deferential arbitral standard of review does not entitle an arbitrator to unfettered power, nor does it insulate an arbitration award from scrupulous appellate review.  An arbitrator’s interpretation of the parties’ collective bargaining agreement must be “reasonably debatable,” actually interpreting the applicable contractual language.  Moreover, the arbitrator may not ignore the express contractual language to create a “better” agreement for a party by interpreting undefined terms such as “just cause. ”  The Arbitrator’s fatal flaw here was his utter failure to interpret the Collective Bargaining Agreement (“CBA”).  Indeed, his decision does not reference the relevant contract language at all.  By ignoring the CBA’s plain terms, the Arbitrator failed to adhere to express language granting [...] sole and exclusive authority to set the standards of employee performance.  And the Arbitrator’s threshold error ultimately contaminated his later attempt to define “just cause” rendering the Award not “reasonably debatable. ”  [...]’s opposition fails to address, much less refute [...]’s position, instead, merely restating time and again that the Arbitrator merely was inoffensively defining the term “just cause. ”  But, while the Arbitrator could define just cause, his definition had to be based upon, and not contradict, the CBA’s express terms.
[brief] The trial court stated the following basis for its ruling:  The rule says to me, for purposes of attacking the credibility of any witness, the witness’ conviction, subject to Rule 403, it says that before it says anything else.  Then it says shall be admitted.  So, in my mind, it saying 403 is a huge consideration for you, Judge.  Which frankly, to me, is the same as if the conviction had been ten years earlier.  So, my original decision was based on 609 and 403.  And this decision is still based on 403 and 609.  I’m going to exercise my discretion because that’s what the Rule tells me to do.  It tells me I have to look at 403.  This Rule is subject to Rule 403 which we all know is the balancing that the probative value outweighs any prejudicial effect.  And I’m gonna be honest with you, in my mind, it’s still clear to me that the potential probative value does not outweigh the prejudicial effect that this will have in this jury.  And for the following reasons, [...], I’m gonna deny your motion for reconsideration.
[brief] On the issue of the nebulous “fairness” concept pushed by [...] as to the issue of applying book value, [...]’s actual, straight-faced argument is that book value would have been unfair and inequitable and so should not be applied to his special situation, because his sale of shares to [...] was “big” and the others were “small. ”  No law supports this argument.  No testimony from any expert at the hearing supports this argument.  And the argument is patently wrong as to anything being “unfair” to [...] on the facts of this case.  Plaintiffs submitted evidence below that there were 119 prior equity transactions where those members selling sold their interests at book value, and those buying bought at book value.
[brief] (Pa94.)  Rather, the Trial Court found that the Stipulated Facts demonstrated an “appropriately supported and developed, well-reasoned, careful, and sound decision. ” (Pa94-95.)  The Trial Court noted that even “the record beyond the Stipulated Facts further demonstrates an appropriate decision, far from arbitrary and capricious. ” (Pa95-96.)  The Decision also addressed Plaintiffs’ contention that the Redevelopment Plan conflicted with previous zoning requirements and restrictions.  (Pa96.)  In that regard, the Decision explained that, as a matter of law, the Redevelopment Plan “supersedes and amends any existing zoning....” (Pa96 (citing Hirth, 337 N.J. super at 165). )  Further, the Trial Court responded to and rejected Plaintiffs’ argument that the Municipal Land Use Law, N.J.S.A. 40:55D-1 et seq. ("MLUL"), applies and would specifically limit the Redevelopment Plan to only the five acres of the [...] site.  (Pa97.)  Citing Hirth, the Trial Court correctly found that the MLUL does not apply to a challenge to a redevelopment plan.  (Pa24.)  D.
[brief] (Pa062–073).  In Section 1 of [...]’s terms (entitled “Contractual Relationship”), the terms provide notice of the arbitration provisions in clear, capitalized, bold text:  IMPORTANT:  PLEASE BE ADVISED THAT THIS AGREEMENT CONTAINS PROVISIONS THAT GOVERN HOW CLAIMS BETWEEN YOU AND UBER CAN BE BROUGHT, INCLUDING THE ARBITRATION AGREEMENT (SEE SECTION 2 BELOW).  PLEASE REVIEW THE ARBITRATION AGREEMENT BELOW CAREFULLY, AS IT REQUIRES YOU TO RESOLVE ALL DISPUTES WITH UBER ON AN INDIVIDUAL BASIS AND, WITH LIMITED EXCEPTIONS, THROUGH FINAL AND BINDING ARBITRATION (AS DESCRIBED IN SECTION 2 BELOW).  BY ENTERING INTO THIS AGREEMENT, YOU EXPRESSLY ACKNOWLEDGE THAT YOU HAVE READ AND UNDERSTAND ALL OF THE TERMS OF THIS AGREEMENT AND HAVE TAKEN TIME TO CONSIDER THE CONSEQUENCES OF THIS IMPORTANT DECISION.  [Pa062.]  Section 2 of [...]’s terms is entitled “Arbitration Agreement. ” (Pa063).  It provides that by agreeing to [...]’s terms, “you agree that you are required to resolve any claim that you may have against [...] on an individual basis in arbitration as set forth in this Arbitration Agreement. ”  Ibid.  Except for certain types of claims not relevant here, the Arbitration Agreement provides that “any dispute, claim or controversy in any way arising out of or relating to” [...]’s terms or the use of [...]’s services “will be settled by binding arbitration between you and [...], and not in a court of law. ”  Ibid. (emphasis added).  It specifically provides, “You acknowledge and agree that you and [...] are each waiving the right to a trial by jury. ”  Ibid. (emphasis added).  It also specifically provides that the Arbitration Agreement “shall be binding upon, and shall include any claims brought by or against any third-parties, including but not limited to your spouses, heirs, third-party beneficiaries and assigns, where the underlying claims are in relation to your use of [[...]’s] Services”; “[t]o the extent that any third-party beneficiary” brings claims against [...], “those claims shall also be subject to this Arbitration Agreement.
[brief] 99 (1973) | | | **In re Estate of Post,** | 13 | | 282 N.J. Super. 59 (App. Div. 1995) | | | **Konitch v. Hartung,** | 7,8,11| | 81 N.J. Super. 376 (App. Div. 1963), certif. denied, 41 N.J. 389 (1964)| | | **Laidlow v. Hariton Machinery Co., Inc.,** | 2,5 | | 170 N.J. 602 (2002)
[brief] Here, police received a 9-1-1 call reporting a man with a gun, and describing the man’s clothing, location, hairstyle, and even the fact that he was on crutches.  1T16:10-14.  That call is significant because it is entitled to enhanced reliability due to the fact that it was received via the 9-1-1 system, and can establish reasonable suspicion if it triggered public safety concerns and provided an ability to identify the person.  See *State v. Gamble*, 218 N.J. 412, 429 (2014).  Police responded to the location described by the 9-1-1 caller and found Defendant, who matched the description provided by the 9-1-1 caller exactly – Defendant had the same hairstyle, the same clothing, and was on crutches, as described by the caller.  1T15:6-17.  In fact, a review of the surveillance video shows that Defendant – in addition to matching the hair and clothing description – was the only man using crutches in that area at that time.  Pa077.  Upon observing the police, Defendant – in the words of the trial court judge – has a “startled look” and then took “two steps” in a direction away from the police before [...] grabbed him.  2T44:1 and 49:6-7.  Defendant – who matched the exact description and was in the exact location described by the 9-1-1 caller – took those actions immediately after the arrival of the police.  Pa077.  The fact that purely innocent connotations can be ascribed to a person’s actions does not mean that an officer cannot base a finding of reasonable suspicion on those actions as long as a reasonable person would find the actions consistent with guilt. ”  State v. Citarella, 154 N.J. 272, 279-80 (1998).
[brief] DOCKET NO. [...] Complaint filed on behalf of Plaintiff [...], a/k/a [...] on April 22, 2019, Docket No. [...] Pa001 Answer, Separate Defenses, and Third Part Complaint on behalf of Defendants [...] and the, filed on July 8, 2019, Docket No. [...] Pa022 Case Management Order entered by the Honorable [...], P.J., Ch. filed on August 21, 2019 Pa041 Request to Enter Default against Third-Party Defendant, [...], filed on behalf of [...] filed on October 17, 2019 Pa043 Certification of [...], Esq. in Support of Request to Enter Default Pa045 Exhibit A: Answer, Separate Defenses, and Third Part Complaint on behalf of Defendants [...] and the, filed on July 8, 2019, Docket No. [...] **Pa022 Exhibit B: New Jersey Business Gateway Business Entity Information and Records Service Pa049 Exhibit C: [...] Confidential Report Pa053  Exhibit D: Affidavit of Publication dated May 15, 2023 Pa055  Exhibit E: Pictures of Beach Pa058  2  Please note many of the Exhibits in the Appendix are old Deeds/Maps which are difficult to read and Appellant provided the best images possible.  Exhibit F: Notice of Publication to Absent Third Party  Defendant [...]  Affidavit of Diligent Inquiry as to Defendants [...] on behalf of [...] filed on October 17, 2019  Exhibit A: New Jersey Business Gateway Business Entity Information and Records Service **Pa049  Exhibit B: [...]  Confidential Report **Pa053  Exhibit C: Notice of Publication to Absent Third Party  Defendant [...] newspaper posting **Pa063  Exhibit D: Affidavit of Publication dated May 15, 2023 **Pa055  Exhibit E: Pictures of Beach **Pa058  Exhibit F: Notice of Publication to Absent Third Party  Defendant [...] **Pa063  Amended Case Management Order executed by the Honorable [...], P.J. Ch., filed on April 3, 2020
[brief] Should the court consider reversing the trial court, [...] property raised the Foreclosure Rescue Fraud Prevention Act as a defense to plaintiff’s claims.  (42a-43a)  CONCLUSION TABLE OF APPENDIX  Appendix Document | Appendix Page Number ---|--- Closing Protection Letter form | Da1  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS BEING APPEALED  February 28, 2024 order of the Hon. [...], J.S.C. | 34a  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES  Case Law  Duff v. Trenton Beverage Co., 4 N.J. 595, 604 (1950)  | 24 Ferrante v. New Jersey Manufacturers Ins. Grp., 232 N.J. 460, 474 (2016) | 30 Holloway v. State, 125 N.J. 386, 394 (1991) | 30 In re Torres, 2017 WL 3316052 (Bankr. N.J. 2017) | 22 Marx v. Jaffe, 92 N.J. Super. 143, 146 (App. Div.) certif. denied, 48 N.J. 140 (1966) | 29 N.J. Lawyers’ Fund v. Stewart Title, 203 N.J. 208 (2010) | 21 Standard Accident Ins.  Co. v. Pellecchia, 15 N.J. 162, 172 (1954) | 30  State v. Legette, 227 N.J. 460, 481 fn.1 (2017) | 19 State v. Vincenty, 237 N.J. 122, 135 (2019) | 19 Thurber v. Thurber, 2017 WL 164480 (App. Div. 2017) | 22 Walker Rogge, Inc. v. Chelsea Title & Guar. Co., 116 N.J. 517, 528-529 (1989)  | 26 Statutes N.J.S.A. 17:46B-54 20, 21 N.J.S.A. 46:10B-53 to -68 30, 31 N.J.S.A. 59:5-89.1  31  **Court Rules**  Rule 2:6-2(6)  18  **Other Authorities**  17A Am. Jur. 2d Contracts §290, §295, and §301 28, 29 J.B. Davis, *The Law of Closing Protection Letters*, 36 Tort and Ins. L.J. 845 (2001)  21 J. Bushnell Nielsen, *Title Escrow Claims Guide*, §17.2 (2021)  22  Jerel J. Hill, Vanessa H. Widener, Leonard C. Atkins, IV, *Recent Developments in Title Insurance Law*, 53  Tort Trial & Ins. Prac. L.J. 657, 669-671 (Winter, 2018)  22  Lawrence Joel Fineberg, *New Jersey Title Practice*, §14-8, §27-2, §27-4, and §27-14 (5th ed. 2021)  20, 21  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
[directive] You will be required to pay a mandatory drug enforcement and demand reduction (D.E.D.R.) penalty as listed below for each offense for which you plead guilty?  The mandatory penalties are as follows: (1)  $3,000 in the case of a 1st degree crime (2) $2,000 in the case of a 2nd degree crime (3)  $1,000 in the case of a 3rd degree crime (4)  $750 in the case of a 4th degree crime (5)  $500 in the case of a disorderly persons or petty disorderly persons offense  TOTAL  D.E.D.R  Penalty: $ Dat/Date  Akize a/Defendant Avoka LaDefans/Defense Attorney Komisè Gouvènman/Prosecutor Fòm Kreye pa Direktif # 01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 11000-Haitian Creole paj 2 nan 2  Form Promulgated by Directive # 01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 11000-Haitian Creole page 2 of 2