[brief] See (3T: 203:02 – 203:12).  All of these factors are sufficient to support the jury’s verdict as to Appellant’s negligent conduct and should not be disturbed on the basis that the individual they determined to have acted unreasonably, could have been legally free from negligence had he acted reasonably but skidded due to a roadway condition; a condition that was never sufficiently established by the evidence.  In fact, and to the contrary, instructing the jury that they could determine Appellant not to be negligent based on a skid and/or slid, would have caused the jury to speculate and utilize conjecture in coming to such a verdict.  Appellant could never establish why his vehicle slid in this particular area and rather, assumed it to have been caused by the wet roadway.  The instant trial testimony from Appellant is no different than that of the defendant in Dolson, with respect to the conclusory nature as to the testimony regarding the cause of the skid.  If the Trial Court erred at all, it was in denying Respondent’s Motion for a Directed Verdict as to Appellant’s negligence pursuant to Dolson, on the basis that the only affirmative evidence of ‘skid despite reasonable action’ was Appellant’s self-serving and conclusory testimony.  It was this denial, however, that permitted the jury to determine Appellant’s negligence and therefore render the instant issue on appeal as moot.  Interestingly, Appellant’s requested charge is taken from *Mockler* at 587-588; and the quote begins with “If **such** a driver…” as opposed to “If a driver…”.  This is important because of the sentence that immediately precedes said quote: “It is common knowledge that the sudden and unexpected skidding of an automobile is one of the natural hazards of driving on **icy** roads and that it may befall even the most cautious of drivers. ”  *Id.*, at 587.  The Court in *Mockler* was not dealing with a situation where a driver was operating a vehicle in regular, weekday morning rush-hour traffic, following an overnight rain storm; a common and regular occurrence throughout the State of New Jersey.  Nevertheless, *Mockler* also involved corroborating testimony by a crossing-guard, relative to the bus operator’s low speed of operation and attempt to brake/slide beginning fifty (50) feet from the vehicle that was ultimately struck.  Here, there is no corroborating evidence of Appellant’s ‘reasonable’ action(s) and moreover, Appellant’s own testimony fails to establish he took the reasonable action that the defendant in *Mockler* was found to have taken.  In the instant matter, Appellant could not even answer the question as to when he first applied his brakes, as he proceeded past the eight (8) to ten (10) vehicles he estimated were stopped within the right lane.  (2T: 191:02 – 191:08).  In sum, had the Trial Court granted Respondent’s Motion for Directed Verdict as to Appellant’s negligence, the Trial Court would have been well within its right based upon established Supreme Court case law in Dolson as applied to the factual record herein; however, the Trial Court denied said Motion and permitted the jury to determine Appellant’s negligence, just as the Courts did in Mockler, Heibel, Calabree and Paramel.  None of those cases relied upon by Appellant suggest that the jury should specifically be instructed that skidding and/or sliding in and of itself does not equate to negligence.  Accordingly, there is simply nothing for Appellant to appeal, on the issue of negligence.  III.