ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] Any forfeitures of currency I- J in a result of an underlying offense violation as 2C:36-1 2C:3!5-1 of N.J.S.A. et seq.  And N.J.S.A et seq-  Gambling Offenses:  Any forfeitures of currency in as a result of an underlying offense violation  2C:37-1 N.J.S.A. et seq.. of Racketeering:  Any forfeitures currency as a of in result of an underlying offense violation of 2C:41-1 N.J.S.A. et seq..  Public Indecency:  Any forfeitures currency as of in a result of an underlying offense violation of J.S.A.  2C:34-1 N. et seq..  Official Corruption:  Any forfeitures of currency in as a result &an underlying offense violation  2C:30-2, 2C27-1 N.J.S.A. seq., N.J.S.A. of, et 30-4. and 30-3  Theft Offenses: forfeitures of currency as  Any a of an underlying offense violation in result of 2C21-1 N.J.S.A. et seq., N.J.S.A.  2C:ZO-1 gt seq..  Other Offenses: forfeitures of currency as a Any result any other underlying offense.  of - - New Forfeiture Page: of 08  State Administration Standard 2 Jersey Rocadwe Program Operating than or other 3
[brief] (21T16-25 to 17-2).  Nevertheless, the PCR court addressed the merits of the claim, finding it was not reasonable to infer that defense counsel’s choice not to call [...] as a witness was anything other than a strategic decision.  (21T17-3 to 10).  It ruled that because there was no certification or affidavit and, as the State argued, no reasonable basis to conclude that the choice not to call the witness was anything other than a strategic choice, defendant’s claim failed.  (21T17-11 to 20).
[brief] While New Jersey Family Part courts favor the enforcement of agreements, there is a case to be made that these agreements should be thrown out in equity because neither party was represented by counsel, the terms were not clear, and there was no fair financial disclosure made before the agreements were signed because the parties did not exchange case information statements, nor did the agreements explicitly state each account or asset.  Here, Plaintiff was not only represented by counsel, she was represented by counsel the Supreme Court of NJ certified as a Matrimonial Attorney.  New Jersey has a strong public policy that favors stability in matrimonial matters.  *Quinn v. Quinn*, 225 N.J. 34, 36 (2016) (where the Court enforced the termination of an alimony obligation according to the parties’ settlement agreement).  The Supreme Court of New Jersey held that there was no compelling reason for them to depart from the unambiguous, clear, and mutually understood language in the property settlement agreement.  Similarly, in *Avelino-Catabran v. Catabran*, 445 N.J. Super 574, 589 (App. Div. 2016), the New Jersey Appellate Division found that the Family Part correctly enforced the terms of a property settlement agreement that required plaintiff mother to be equally responsible for college contributions.  The appellate panel reiterated the “compelling reasons to depart form the clear, unambiguous, and mutually understood terms standard”.  Property settlement agreements are given substantial weight in relation to their enforceability and validity, as long as they are fair and just.  *Dolce v. Dolce*, 382 N.J. Super. 11, 20 (App. Div. 2006).  If there is no evidence of inequity or unanticipated change of circumstances, the Family Part has a duty to enforce the terms of the marital settlement agreement as long as it was executed and entered into by fully informed parties, each represented by counsel, without any proof of fraud, overreaching, or coercion.  *Avelino-Catabran v. Catabran*, 445 N.J. Super 590 (App. Div. 2016).  In the present case, the parties were not fully informed because the contract does not list all of the accounts with values, nor did the parties exchange case information statements.
[brief] Because under the law at the time, “[t]o obtain a pretrial hearing, a defendant [needed to] present some evidence of suggestiveness tied to a system variable which could lead to a mistaken identification,” the motion court denied the motion, holding that “defendant had not presented evidence of suggestiveness. ”  \(^4\)  In denying Defendant’s motion, the motion court applied an incorrect standard; rather than assessing whether Defendant had offered “some evidence of suggestiveness,” the court found the absence of “highly suggestive circumstances. ”  Compare Chen, 208 N.J. at 326.  (4T 16-3 to 9, 17-8)  Id. at 221, 233.  The Supreme Court’s holding in Anthony expanded grounds for a pretrial hearing to include scenarios where there was not a sufficient recording of the out-of-court identification procedure.  Id. at 233.  The Court then remanded for “a hearing to assess the reliability of the identification” because that “option was one not available at the time” when “defendant could not present evidence of suggestiveness. ”  Id. at 237.  Likewise, in denying Defendant’s motion in this case, the motion only assessed whether Defendant had presented evidence of suggestiveness and did not assess whether there was “good reason” to allow the State to elicit a first-time in-court identification of Defendant by [...].  Thus, if this Court does not hold that [...]’s first-time in-court identification should have been excluded on the record before the Court, the Court should remand for a hearing to determine whether pursuant to Watson there was sufficient familiarity to constitute “good cause” for a first-time in-court identification.  Respectfully submitted, [...]
[brief] The record demonstrates the jury was instructed, in accordance with the model jury charge, to determine the reasonable amount of damages due to plaintiff and not to speculate upon or include medical expenses or lost wages as a part of the damages.  This court should “presume the jury followed the court's instructions."  *State v. Smith*, 212 N.J. 365, 409 (2012) (citing *State v. Loftin*, 146 N.J. 295, 390 (1996)).  The jury heard a substantial amount of medical testimony from Plaintiff’s damages expert, Orthopedic surgeon [...], who testified about the injuries Plaintiff sustained as a result of this crash, her medical treatment including surgeries, the permanency of her injuries, and her prognosis.  Insofar as Defendants did not present defense medical expert testimony to the jury, Dr. Zabinski’s medical testimony was unchallenged and unrebutted.
[brief] Contrary to the trial court’s and Plaintiffs-Respondents’ contention, the existence of a protective order does not sufficiently mitigate these privacy and Justice, *Rules Suggestion to the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules*, Sept. 19, 2023, available at https://www.lfcj.com/lcj-proposes-amendments-on-privacy-protection-cyber-risk. cybersecurity concerns.  Protective orders are not designed to protect the privacy of third parties such as employees, customers, suppliers, etc., who often unaware of the potential risk to their privacy rights and, therefore, not in a position to seek the court’s protection.  Boliek, *supra*, 103 Cornell L. Rev. at 1137-38 (“[T]hird-party interests are difficult to defend in a court of law because of the cost of intervening in a court case”).  Moreover, protective orders do nothing to mitigate cybersecurity risks because they rarely, if ever, dictate specific cybersecurity protections and procedures that must be followed by the requesting party. \(^{12}\) *Id.* at 1132, 1145 (“[P]rotective orders are effective only when the signatories comply with their parameters, and even then information can be misplaced or disclosed inadvertently. ”).
[brief] As this Court has held, a misrepresentation is material if it “naturally and reasonably influence[s] . . . fixing the rate of the premium. ”  See Shen v. Hyundai Marine & Fire Ins. Co., Ltd., No. A-1731-20, 2022 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 630, at *8-9 (App. Div. Apr. 19, 2022) (citing Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 122 N.J. at 115) (emphasis added).  Thus, an increased premium alone would be sufficient to establish materiality.  2.  [...] and [...]’s argument that they should have been allowed additional discovery also fails.
[brief] Nobrega v. Edison Glen Assoc., 167 N.J. 520, 536 (2001).  “If the language is plain and clearly reveals the meaning of the statute, the court’s sole function is to enforce the statute in accordance with those terms. ”  Sasco 1997 NI, LLC v. Zudkewich, 166 N.J. 579, 586 (2001) (quoting State, Dep’t of Law & Pub. Safety v. Bingham, 119 N.J. 646, 651 (1990)).  The overriding objective is to “effectuate the legislative intent in light of the language used and the objects sought to be achieved. ”  McCann v. Clerk of Jersey City, 167 N.J. 311, 320 (2001) (quoting State v. Hoffman, 149 N.J. 564 (1997)).  Further, “[a]n administrative agency may not under guise of interpretation extend a statute to include persons not intended, nor may it give the statute any greater effect than its language allows. ”  Kingsley v. Hawthorne Fabrics, Inc., 41 N.J. 521, 528 (1964).  A court must reject a statutory interpretation that is contrary to the statutory language.  GE Solid State, Inc. v. Dir., Div. of Tax’n, 132 N.J. 298, 306-07 (1993).  Here, not only does the plain language of Chapter 92 disallow service credit after January 1, 2007, for professional service providers, but being an employee has been a prerequisite to enrollment in PERS since the system’s inception.
[brief] TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ......................................................................................... ii  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT ..................................................................................  1  PROCEDURAL HISTORY .......................................................................................  3 STATEMENT OF FACTS ..........................................................................................  6 LEGAL ARGUMENT .................................................................................................  8 POINT I – THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO APPLY THREE SUBSTANTIVE SECTIONS OF THE LRHL TO THE REDEVELOPMENT PLAN (Pa0074-Pa0098) ......................................................  8 POINT II – PLAINTIFF OFFERED  EXHIBITS SHOULD HAVE BEEN INCLUDED IN THE RECORD (T45-9 to T47-4) (Pa0079-0080)  .....................  23 CONCLUSION ..........................................................................................................
[directive] However, the internal affairs investigator should be aware that other factors may also serve to affect a subject officer's decision to answer questions during a criminal interview.  For example, directing an officer to appear at a particular time and place may generate confusion on the officer’s part as to whether he or she is being required to participate in the interview.  When these circumstances or any other questions as to the need to provide a warning in criminal interviews are present, the internal affairs investigator should always consult with the County Prosecutor regarding whether the subject officer should be advised of their right against self-incrimination.  8.2.4
[brief] State Indictment [...].................................................................Da 1-20  Notice of Motion to Suppress .................................................................Da 21-23  Order Denying Motion to Suppress Storage Unit Search.......................Da 24-25  Order and Opinion on Motion to Suppress Car Search.........................Da 26-39  Plea Forms..............................................................................................Da 40-45  Judgment of Conviction........................................................................Da 46-49  Notice of Appeal.....................................................................................Da 50-53  Order Granting Motion to File Notice of Appeal As Within Time..........Da  54  INDEX TO CONFIDENTIAL APPENDIX
[brief] (3T 28:12-24).  There are various classifications for types of warehouses, and the traffic engineer chooses the category that best suits the proposed use.  (3T 27:8-21; 29:8-25).  [...] chose ITE Land Use Code 154, or the “high cube short-term storage warehouses” as it “has consistent samples with the size and type of operation as proposed for this site,” “consistent with the other warehousing in the area,” and “a very good fit for what’s being proposed here” as the proposed buildings are “right in the sweet spot on sample sizes that were taken, as far as the sizes of the buildings where they actually conducted the studies. ” (2T 6:18-25; 7:1-9; 3T 29:5-25; 30:1-5).
[directive] SUBJECT: Directive  Strengthening and Supplementing  Internal Affairs  Policy & Procedures  To build and maintain public trust, law enforcement agencies must implement mechanisms for identifying and investigating allegations of misconduct within their ranks.  Although the vast majority of law enforcement officers consistently adhere to the highest professional and ethical standards, it is vital that police departments hold officers accountable when they fall short of those requirements.  The principal mechanism for officer accountability is a police department’s internal disciplinary process, typically administered through the police force’s “Internal Affairs” unit.  The virtues of the process are clear.  Because Internal Affairs units are housed within law enforcement agencies, their investigators can gain prompt access to sensitive personnel and law enforcement records that are typically inaccessible to third parties.  And because Internal Affairs units operate outside an agency’s normal chain of command, the investigators can proceed independently, thoroughly, and fairly.  But Internal Affairs units are only as effective as the policies that govern them and the people that staff them.  In recent years, stakeholders across the country have raised concerns about the credibility and objectivity of internal disciplinary processes at various police departments.  It is therefore especially important that New Jersey maintain robust, statewide standards to ensure that all Internal Affairs units function effectively.
[brief] “The trustee is granted complete authority and discretion with respect to the prosecution and defense of any litigation of the Debtor’s estate. ”  *In re Gulph Woods Corp.*, 116 B.R. at 428 (citing 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, ¶ 323.02[3], at 323–7 (15th ed. 1989)).  “One commits bankruptcy fraud under [18 U.S.C.] § 157 by (1) devising a scheme to defraud, and (2) filing a document in a bankruptcy proceeding or making [a] false or fraudulent statement in relation to the bankruptcy proceeding for the purpose of executing or concealing the fraudulent scheme.
[brief] *See Asset Acceptance, LLC v. Toft*, 2024 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 820 (App Div. May 8, 2024).  Specifically, in *Toft*, the original collection lawsuit was filed by the plaintiff in 2013.  *Id.*, at *1  The defendant was served with the complaint, but never responded.  *Id.*  A default judgment was entered against the defendant.  *Id.*  The plaintiff then obtained a wage execution.  *Id.*  Things laid dormant for six years until the defendant filed a class action against the plaintiff, claiming the plaintiff engaged in debt collection activity without obtaining the proper license to do so in New Jersey.
[brief] I would tell and be proud of telling. ”  (Da 49; 25T 55-1 to 5; Da 17 at 34:36 to 34:39)  Detectives pushed [...] for a ninth time.  “[Y]ou don’t recognize the person in here at all? In this photo?  I just want to make sure. ”  (Da 50; 25T 57-14 to 16; Da 17 at 36:09 to 36:15)  [...] responded, “I swear ….  If I c[ould] help you with it … I swear I would.  I swear I would. ”  (Da 50; 25T 57-17 to 19; Da 17 at 36:23 to 36:38)  For the tenth time, detectives pushed [...] to identify the suspect standing by his house.
[brief] (PA055-056, T67:L25-T69:L14).  For at least eight (8) months prior to April 13, 2022, appellant/plaintiff [...] permanently resided in New Jersey. (PA043, T18:L23-30; PA046, T31:L13-24).  Appellant/plaintiff [...] obtained a lease agreement for an apartment in New Jersey in August 2021.  (PA090).  Appellant/plaintiff [...] applied for, and obtained, a [...] policy on January 30, 2022, which became effective February 4, 2022.  (PA073-077; PA079-080).  At the time appellant/plaintiff [...] applied for the [...] policy on January 30, 2022, he was a resident of New Jersey.  (PA073-077; PA046, T28:L14-26; PA048, T37:L5-9).  At the time appellant/plaintiff [...] applied for the [...] policy on January 30, 2022, his apartment lease in Charlotte, North Carolina had expired.  (PA056-057, T72:L19-T76:L24).  Despite his New Jersey residence when he applied for, and obtained the [...] policy, appellant/plaintiff [...]’s [...] policy was written as a North Carolina policy.
[brief] At no point before filing this motion did [...] mention arbitration to the Plaintiffs.  [...]’s motion was filed approximately 14 months after the Initial Complaint (426 days after discovery began) and over two years after our firm first reached out to resolve this dispute amicably.  See Pa0035-Pa0005; Pa0319.  The Respondents did not mention their request for arbitration to the [...] prior to filing their motion.  The Agreement explicitly states that both parties shall “engage in good faith efforts to mediate a settlement prior to filing a demand for arbitration. ”  Pa0089 (emphasis added).  Although the parties participated in mediation during this appeal, the Respondents filed their motion with no legitimate attempt to mediate, as required by the very agreement they seek to enforce.
[directive] 43 Page Records.  Expunged 4.7 acomplaint-summons issuing of presumption the overcome to whether determining In subsection to pursuant designated officer supervisory or prosecutor a 4.3, Section to pursuant See circumstances. relevant of totality the of part as records expunged consider may 3.3.2 any to provided shall be convictions or arrests prior of records . . . ("expunged 2C:52-21 N.J.S.A. services pretrial the Court, Superior the Division of Probation the prosecutor, county court, bail with a conjunction in use for requested are same when General Attorney the or agency, 31 201.4, c. P.L. of 11 through 1 sections to pursuant determination release pretrial [or] hearing, Law]"). Reform Bail [the 3:3- Rule to pursuant required is acomplaint-warrant for application where case any In a for apply to Directive this pursuant to made been has determination a where case any or 1(e), agency enforcement law the convictions, or arrests expunged of regardless complaint-warrant expunged access or obtain to waiting by process charging the delay not shall prosecutor and/or a issue whether to determination the affect might records expunged however, If, records. attorney deputy or prosecutor assistant the acomplaint-warrant, for apply or complaint-summons designated officer supervisory designated or 3.2, Section with accordance in consulted general while period reasonable a for decision charging the delay may 3.3.2, subsection to pursuant administrative considering the records, expunged access or obtain to undertaken being are efforts the that provided further and delay, the by department police on the placed be would that burdens as arrest of hours 12 within officer judicial other or judge a to presented can be defendant :4-1.
[brief] Article XIII of the CBA, Grievance Procedure, provides, in pertinent part, the following:  ARTICLE XIII  GRIEVANCE PROCEDURE  A.  A grievance is a dispute arising from the interpretation, application or alleged violation of this Agreement and may be raised by the Union on its own behalf where applicable or on the behalf of an employee or group of employees or by the Authority.  B.  STEPS OF THE GRIEVANCE PROCEDURE (UNION GRIEVANCES)  The following grievance procedure constitutes the sole and exclusive method for resolving grievances between the parties covered by this Agreement, and shall be followed in its entirety unless any step is waived in writing by mutual consent.  ***  Step Three—Arbitration  If the grievance is not resolved at Step Two, the Union representative may submit the grievance to arbitration by filing a Request for Panel of Arbitrators with the New Jersey Public Employment Relations Commission no later than fifteen (15) calendar days after receiving the Authority’s Step Two decision.  The arbitrator shall be selected in accordance with the rules and regulations of the New Jersey Public Employment Relations Commission.  The arbitration shall be conducted in accordance with the following:  ***  2.  The arbitrator shall comply with and be bound by the provisions of this Agreement.  The arbitrator shall have no power to add to, delete or modify any provisions of this Agreement.  3.  **The arbitrator shall be without power or authority to make any decision contrary to or inconsistent with or modifying or varying in any way the terms of this Agreement, or applicable law or rules or regulations having the force or effect of law.**  4.  **The arbitrator’s decision shall not usurp the functions of power of the Authority as provided by law. **  ***  7.  The cost of the arbitrator shall be borne equally by the Union and the Authority and all other expenses incurred by either side, including the presentation and witness, will be borne by the party incurring same.  (Pa44-45 (emphases added).
[directive] For a example, process.  fingerprinting Scan Live as the initially of part entered been had decide may to 3.2 Section pursuant charges to the approving supervisory officer or designated to intent with possession downgrade arrested (e.g., was which defendant for offense the downgrade simple to assault aggravated an possession; downgrade simple to substance controlled a distribute charge to not decide burglary, may or etc.), tothird-degree burglary second-degree downgrade assault; supervisory or the prosecutor where arresting (e.g., officer the offenses by proposed of the all, any, or not does but arrested was the defendant which for underlying crime for the charge officer a approves resisting arrest).
[brief] CASES  Addotta v. Blunt, 114 N.J.L. 85 (1934)  ..............................................  23 Berg v. Health & Hospital Corp., 865 F.2d 797 (7th Cir. 1989) .............  32 Brewer v. Porch, 53 N.J. 167 (1969) ..................................................  24 Chez Sez VIII, Inc. v. Poritz, 297 N.J. Super. 331 (App. Div. 1997) .......... 32 DiProspero v. Penn, 183 N.J. 477 (2005) ..........................................
[brief] The Law Division Complaint addresses the same matters involved in the Chancery Action and is the same in all substantial respects as the counterclaims Defendants filed in the Chancery Action.  (Da75-103; Da220-48).  In the Chancery action, Plaintiff asserts that she is the equitable owner of the Property.  (Da3-34).  In the Law Division action and in counterclaims asserted in the Chancery action, [...] alleges that Plaintiff does not have an equitable interest in the Property, mismanaged the Property, and misappropriated funds that belong to [...].  (Da75-103; Da220-48).  Simply put, the legal determinations made in the Chancery Action will affect the issues raised in the Law Division Action.
[brief] Had the Legislature intended to impose the “rational nexus” requirement upon municipalities and/or redevelopment agencies in the redevelopment context, it certainly would not have expressly permitted these entities to negotiate revenue, but rather would have used the same or similar language as it did within the MLUL when it codified that requirement some forty (40) years ago.  Section 42 of the MLUL provides that if the governing body seeks contribution from a developer, it must “adopt regulations [which are] based on circulation and comprehensive utility service plans ... and shall establish reasonable standards to determine the proportionate or pro-rata amount of the cost of such facilities that shall be borne by each developer or owner within a related and common area, which standards shall not be altered subsequent to preliminary approval.
[brief] 228a–229a (566:19–572:15); 230a–232a (607:10 – 615:16); 258a (158:5-24); 265a (369:1–370:6); 275a (513:14–514:2); 276a (534:18 – 535:16); 278a (555:12–556:17); 283a (632:11–634:21).  **Newly Discovered Evidence of [...]’s role in [...] and [...]**