ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] (See 6T:176-14 to 177-17)  (See Da 16 at 17:26:45 to 17:26:56)  Counsel argued that the video later shows [...] offering to pay [...] the small debt on [...]’s behalf and have [...] pay him back later.  (6T:177-22 to 178-12)  (Da 16 at 17:31:27 to 17:31:45)  The only interactions between [...] and [...] captured on the video appear to be verbal – but the video has no sound and does not capture the substance of any of the conversations that occurred during the incident.  [...] did not touch [...] or take any of his belongings during the incident.  (See 6T:87-25 to 88-13, 98-15 to 20) ([...]’s testimony that [...] did not touch him or take any of his belongings in the store); (See 5T:49-17 to 50-6) (judge’s finding that video shows [...] and man in green jacket taking [...]’s belongings before leaving store); (Da 16 at 17:36:10 to 17:36:32).  At trial, [...] admitted that he “wasn’t really paying attention” to [...].  (6T:90-11 to 16)  He stated that his memory of the incident a year prior was poor.  (6T:106-18 to 19)  [...] also gave contradictory testimony about what happened during the incident, including whether or not [...] took his wallet, and whether [...] had attempted to pay the money back on Cash App.  (6T:92-25 to 94-15)  [...]’s defense could have been significantly strengthened had he testified and given his account of the incident.  In the absence of such testimony, the jury lacked the opportunity to assess [...]’s account or his credibility and was left only with [...]’s version of events.  See Hedgespeth, 249 N.J. at 252 (noting that trial court’s erroneous admission of defendant’s prior convictions denied jury the ability to consider defendant’s “demeanor and credibility in delivering his theory of the case. ”) (citing Scott, 229 N.J. at 484-85).  Had the jury heard [...]’s testimony, it could have acquitted him of one or both charges.  The jury could have found that [...] lacked the purpose of promoting or facilitating the commission of the robbery that was necessary to find him guilty of both charged offenses.  The jury could have also acquitted him of conspiracy to commit robbery based on a finding that he did not agree to aid in planning or committing the robbery, or that he did not act in furtherance of such an agreement.  The jury could have also acquitted [...] of one or both offenses based on a finding that the State failed to prove any one of the elements of the offenses beyond a reasonable doubt.  [...]’s convictions must be reversed because had the trial court properly ruled that [...]’s prior convictions were inadmissible and had [...] testified, there was a real possibility that the jury could have acquitted him.  **POINT II**
[brief] Instead, in ensuring that defendants are not punished twice for the same conduct, courts focus their flexible inquiry on the specific facts of each case, and the “episodic fragments of the events. ”  State v. Truglia, 97 N.J. 513, 521 (1984); \(^4\) State v. Davis, 68 N.J. 69, 81 (1987).  State v. Miller, 108 N.J. 112, 116-17 (1987).  Of course, this Court has defined “same conduct” as meaning “identical conduct,” recognizing that a defendant should not be rewarded just by virtue of proximity in time or place of the crimes.  State v. Fraction, 206 N.J. Super. 532, 536-39 (App. Div. 1985), certif. denied, 104 N.J. 434 (1986).  The Davis Court provided a number of factors for a judge to consider, including: “the time and place of each purported violation; whether the proof submitted as to one count of the indictment would be a necessary ingredient to a conviction under another count; whether one count was an integral part of a larger scheme or episode; the intent of the accused; and the consequences of the criminal standards transgressed.
[brief] E-mail from [...] to [...], dated February 22, 2023 ........................................................................................................Pa102 (xv)  E-mail from [...] to [...], dated February 18, 2023 ........................................................................................................Pa103 (xvi)  E-mail from [...] to [...], dated February 24, 2023 ........................................................................................................Pa104 (xvii)  E-mail from [...] to [...], dated May 17, 2023 ........................................................................................................Pa105 (xviii)  Proposed Amended Complaint .........................................................Pa106
[brief] .......................................................24  III.  THE C.5 EXCLUSION IS CONSISTENT WITH THE PUBLIC POLICY OF THIS STATE AS EXPRESSED IN THE WORKERS COMPENSATION ACT (Ja1-16)  ...........................................................................................................26  IV.  PLAINTIFF’S CLAIMS AGAINST [...] WERE ALSO CORRECTLY DISMISSED SINCE PLAINTIFF MADE NO CLAIM AGAINST THE [...] COMPREHENSIVE GENERAL LIABILITY POLICY AND HAS MADE NO ARGUMENT TO THE CONTRARY IN THIS APPEAL (Ja1-16) ..................................................................................................................31 CONCLUSION .................................................................................................................................32 APPENDIX TABLE OF CONTENTS Rodriguez v. Shelbourne Spring, LLC, 2023 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2386 (App. Div. Dec. 22, 2023) ................................................................. Da1 ### TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | Cases | Page(s) | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|---------| | **Allstate Ins. Co. v. Malec,** | 15 | | 104 N.J. 1 (1986) | | | **Ambassador Ins. Co. v. Montes,** | 15, 27, 28 | | 76 N.J. 477 (1978) | | | **Applied Underwriters Captive Risk Assurance Co., Inc. v.** | 29 | | N.J. Dep’t of Banking & Ins., | | | 472 N.J. Super. 26 (App. Div. 2022) | | | **Banco Popular North America v. Gandhi,** | 9 | | 184 N.J. 161 (2005) | | | **Baskin v. P.C. Richard & Son, LLC,** | 8 | | 246 N.J. 157 (2021) | | | **Camden Cnty. Energy Recovery Assoc., L.P. v. N.J. Dep’t of Env’t Prot.,** | 9 | | 320 N.J. Super. 59 (App. Div. 1999), aff’d, 170 N.J. 246 (2001) | | | **Charles Beseler Co. v. O’Gorman & Young, Inc.,** | 21, 22, 24 | | 188 N.J. 542 (2006) | | | **Coalition for Quality Health Care v. N.J. Dep’t of Banking & Ins.,**| 29 | | 348 N.J. Super. 272 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 174 N.J. 194 (2002) | | | **Crippen v. Cent. Jersey Concrete Pipe Co.,** | 26, 28 | | 176 N.J. 397 (2003) | | | **Cumberland Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Dahl,** | 27 | | 362 N.J. Super. 91 (App. Div. 2003) | | | **E. Dickerson & Son, Inc. v. Ernst & Young, LLP,** | 9 | | 361 N.J. Super. 362 (App. Div. 2003), aff’d, 179 N.J. 500 (2004) | | | **Griggs v. Bertram,** | 6 | | 88 N.J. 347 (1982) | | | **Harleysville Ins. Cos. v. Garitta,** | 15 | | 170 N.J. 223 (2001) | | | **Johnson & Johnson v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co.,** | 28 | | 285 N.J. Super. 575 (App. Div. 1995) | | Jones v. Heymann, 127 N.J. Super. 542 (App. Div. 1974)
[brief] This matter involves a prenuptial agreement, not a divorce.  In *Carr*, the Court found that the wife was entitled to an equitable interest in the husband's estate because of “the Black Hole” that was created as a result of the interplay between the divorce statutes and the elective share statutes.  This black hole would have left her with nothing.  120 N.J. at 344.  Thus, in *Carr*, the constructive trust was utilized to rectify a distinct and compelling unfairness and inequity.  That setting truly satisfied the clear and convincing standard for obtaining such relief.  Here, by way of contrast, denying the Petitioner his “Hail Mary” cause of action would have no such accompanying unfairness.  The equities here simply did not warrant the relief sought.
[brief] "[t]o the fullest extent permitted by law," [...] shall indemnify [...] "against claims, damages, losses and expenses, including but not limited to attorneys' fees, arising out of or resulting from performance of [[...]'s work under the contract], including, without limitation, any such claim, damage, loss or expense attributable to bodily injury, . . . caused by the acts or omissions of [[...]], . . . or anyone for whose acts they may be liable, regardless of whether or not such claim, damage, loss or expense is caused in part by [[...]]."  Id. at 116-117  The Appellate Division held that this language clearly expressed that [...] must indemnify [...] against all claims "arising out of or resulting from performance of" [...]'s work.  The obligation applies, "regardless of whether or not such claim, damage, loss or expense is caused in part by [[...]]."  The contract expressly identifies one subset of such claims for which [...] must indemnify [...] "without limitation," that is, claims for bodily injury caused by [...]'s negligence, or the negligence of any party for which [...] is responsible.  Id. at 116.  Hence, under the clear and unambiguous terms of the indemnification clause, [...] must indemnify [...] for decedent's damages caused by [...] or [...].  As we have already noted with respect to [...]'s similar provision, the phrase "arising out of" does not require a finding of proximate cause between a plaintiff's injury and [...]'s work.  Rather, it is sufficient that there is proof of a substantial nexus between the injury and [...]'s work.  Estate of D'Avila, supra, at 116, citing Vitty v. D.C.P. Corp., 268 N.J. Super 447, 452-453 (App. Div. 1993).  III.
[brief] The Lakewood Zoning Regulations at Section 18-200 “Definitions” defines “Accessory Use, Structure or Building” as “a use, structure, or building that is customarily incidental and subordinate to that of the principal and on the same lot.  No accessory use shall form the basis for a claim of right to a principal or main use. ”  (Emphasis added)  The “parking” standards in Section 18-905 (for houses of worship) and Section 18-906 (for schools) do not mean that parking lots for a different Lot/use are a permitted accessory use.  The sections define the amount/number of parking spaces as an accessory use/structure permitted and required to be “on the same lot” to support that principal use.  To assert that an off-site parking facility/use serving a different third party lot/use or operating a commercial independent parking lot --- on a property/lot that has its own principal School use and inadequate parking --- is a permitted accessory use on that school property is patently ridiculous.
[brief] Nor is there any support for the remaining claim that the Council’s statutory authority and composition are “arbitrary and unreasonable” as enacted by the Legislature due to the statutory differences between the Council and DEP. (Pa11; T17:20-19:8).  [...] failed to articulate how, in delegating authority to the Council, the Legislature impermissibly intruded on DEP’s authority or otherwise acted beyond the limits of legislative power.  Indeed, the Supreme Court has already thoroughly addressed the legislative history and countenanced the relative roles and responsibilities of the Council and DEP.
[brief] See, e.g., State v. Prall, 231 N.J. 567, 582-83 (2018) (“The [opening the door] ‘doctrine operates to prevent a defendant from successfully excluding from the prosecution’s case-in-chief inadmissible evidence and then selectively introducing pieces of this evidence for the defendant’s own advantage, without allowing the prosecution to place the evidence in its proper context. ’” (quoting State v. James, 144 N.J. 538, 554 (1996))).  There is no dispute that Defendants were responsible for the RIR, but that obligation is merely a statutory and known prerequisite to satisfying their express obligation under the PSA to obtain a site-wide RAO.  (2T154:21 to 155:6; 4T15:19-23; 8T38:3-21; Pa2371-74.)  And while the term “RIR” does not appear anywhere in the PSA, Defendants correctly point out that the term “RAO,” in terms of obligations, is found in the PSA one time—that is, as part of the Seller’s Environmental Obligations.
[brief] ...........................................................................................................22  State by Com’r of Transp. v. D’Onofrio, 235 N.J. Super 348, 353 (Law Div. 1989) .................................................................20  State v. Heppenheimer, 54 N.J.L. 268, 272 (1892).............................................................................................9  State v. Highway Comm’r v. Maas & Waldstein Co., 83 N.J. Super. 211, 217 (App. Div. 1964)....................................................................9  State v. Lanza, 27 N.J. 516, 529 (1958)  ..............................................................................................8, 10 State v. N.J. Zinc Co., 40 N.J. 560, 572 (1963)  ...............................................................................................20, 21 State v. Orenstein, 124 N.J. Super. 295, 298 (App. Div. 1973).................................................................20  State v. Siris, 191 N.J. Super. 261 (App. Div. 1983).........................................................................10  Tennessee Gas Transmission Co. v. Hirschfield, 38 N.J. Super. 132 (App. Div. 1955)..........................................................................21 Twp. of W. Orange v. 769 Assocs., LLC, 172 N.J. 564, 571 (2002) ............................................................................................9, 10 Twp. of W. Windsor v. Nierenberg, 285 N.J. Super. 436, 440 n.1 (App. Div. 1955), rev’d on other grounds, 150 N.J. 111 (1996)..............................................................21
[brief] It is requested that the Court prohibit [...] from engagement in conversion.  In this matter, [...] personnel, specifically [...] approached [...] of [...] in 2021 and inquired about the church lot which is designated as Lot 20 which she referred to as Lot 22.  There was an initial statement made by [...] that she believed that [...] owned the lot and then she made an inquiry regarding whether the church would sell the lot to [...].  This inquiry about purchasing the lot was clearly rejected by Rev. Dwight.  (Da55, [...] Answers to Interrogatories, par. 18).  Thereafter, further communication with personnel at the [...] made it clear that the lot next to the church was owned by [...].  (Da55, [...] Answers to Interrogatories, par. 18; Da111, [...] Answers to Request for Admissions, par. 5).  Despite this information being provided, [...] filed a Complaint and Jury Demand seeking to convert [...]’s property and make this property that of [...].  (Da1, Complaint by [...])  [...] has no ownership interest in Lot 20 which is church property and is [...].  Per the Property Identification Document from the Newark Tax Assessor as well as the deed for [...] and which also covers [...], it is evident that [...] has no ownership interest.  [...] has no ownership interest now in Lot 22 either.  By the very admissions from [...] both in speaking with Rev. Dwight and in the Admissions, which statements are accepted as admitted due to the submission of Admissions beyond the 30 day time period, it was confirmed that the property in question being Lot 22 is owned by [...].  Furthermore, [...] never acted as if Lot 22 was owned by [...].  This land, Lot 22 has been openly managed by [...] since 1976 and is owned by [...] via the Doctrine of Adverse Possession and on Statute of Limitations grounds.  (Da255, Email from [...])  It is requested that the Appellate Court vacate the Summary Judgment decision entered at the trial court in favor of [...].  It is requested that the Appellate Court vacate the decision of the trial court which denied [...] relief per the doctrine of Adverse Possession.  It is requested that the Appellate Court find that [...] has satisfied the requirements per Adverse Possession which has vested Lot 22 in [...] and that [...] is prohibited from engaging in conversion of Lot 22.  **CONCLUSION**
[brief] A.  Medically Necessary and Causally Related Medical Expense Benefits Must be Paid Pursuant to the New Jersey PIP Fee Schedule [Raised below: Pa15; Pca160-166; Pa38-39; T5:4-6:8; T10:13-11:4]  The Commissioner of the [...] (“Department”) is required to set a fee schedule for the payment of medical bills for which payment is to be made by an automobile insurer.
[brief] INDEX TO APPENDIX  NJ Division Pensions-Enrollment Form ([...])3/17/2008……………………………  Pa1  NJ Division Pensions-Enrollment Form ([...]) 8/3/2009 ……………………………..  Pa2 Email from [...] to [...] 3/24/2020 …………………  Pa3 Report of Transfer/Multiple Enrollment Form 9/21/2020……………………………………………………………  Pa4 Request to Reinstate Multiple PERS Membership Status ……………………………………………………..  Pa5 NJ Division Pensions Account History System………  Pa6 Report of Contributions-Member Update ……………  Pa7 Memorandum 10/28/21  Adjustment Section from Enrollment Section …………………………………………  Pa8  Letter to Enrollment Bureau from [...] 1/20/2022…………………………………………………………… Pa9 Letter to Division Pensions from [...] 1/20/2021 ……………………………………………………………… Pa11 Letter to [...] from [...] 9/29/21……………… Pa12 Letter to [...] from Division Pensions 2/17/2022……… Pa13 Letter to Division Pensions from [...] 10/5/2021…………………………………………………………… … Pa14 TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS Final Administrative Determination 8/17/23 ............. Pa54 # TABLE OF CITATIONS ## CASES | Case Name | Page No. | |------------------------------------------------|----------| | D.D. v. New Jersey Division of Disabilities | 2 | | Super. 308,317 (2002) | | | DYFS v. TB | 3 | | 2007 N.J. 294,301-302 (2011) | | | Goulding v. N.J. Friendship House | 2 | | 245 N.J. 157,167 (2021) | | | Gulkowsky v. Equity One, Inc. | 3 | | 180 N.J. 49,67 (2004) | | | In Re Amico/Tunnel Carwash | 8 | | 317
[brief] .........................  H722a Holm-178A: [...] response to discovery request HOLM-[...]-CH-193, was revised to include his objection and also to attach previous testimony (SOICR p. 12)  ........................................  H723a Holm-179: [...] response to discovery request  HOLM-[...]-CH-194, objects to identifying if he took a position in support of a municipality and adverse to a utility (SOICR p. 12)  ..................................  H751a Holm-179A: [...] response to discovery request  HOLM-[...]-CH-194, was revised to state he does not recall testimony adverse to a utility and favoring the municipality among consultations (SOICR p. 12)  .........................................................  H752a Holm-180: [...] response to discovery request  HOLM-[...]-CH-195, objects to providing the nature of the involvement of [...] in the EMP (SOICR p. 12)  ...........................................  H753a Holm-181: [...] response to discovery request HOLM-[...]-CH-196, objects to identifying where [...] took a position adverse to a utility (SOICR p. 12) ...........................................  H754a Holm-182: [...] response to discovery request HOLM-[...]-CH-197, objects to identifying proceedings in which [...] took a position in support of a municipality (SOICR p. 12) .................................................................  H755a Holm-183: [...] response to discovery request HOLM-[...]-CH-198, objects to providing details on where the EMP Plan contemplates a "gradual reduction" in natural gas consumption, adding at pages 14-17 the EMP anticipates a slower reduction in the early years and larger reductions in later years (SOICR p. 12) ...............  H756a Holm-184: [...] response to discovery request HOLM-[...]-CH-199, objects as beyond the scope of this proceeding whether [...] thinks the objective of achieving a 75% reduction in natural gas consumption by 2050 is achievable (SOICR p. 12) .......... H757a Holm-185: [...] response to discovery request HOLM-[...]-CH-200, objects as beyond the scope of this proceeding to answering if he thinks [...] can achieve a 75% reduction by 2050 (SOICR p. 12)
[brief] In just this docket alone ([...]), this Notice of Motion is Plaintiff’s third attempt to re-open a matter which was disposed of over a decade ago by summary judgment dismissal.  The January 7, 2010 summary judgment order must be accorded res judicata effect as it was a valid, final adjudication on the merits which was affirmed by this Appellate Court on June 23, 2011.  If Plaintiff disagreed with the outcome of that appeal, Plaintiff had the opportunity to file a petition for certification with the Supreme Court within twenty (20) days of this Appellate Court’s June 23, 2011 decision.  R. 2:12-7.  The point being, Plaintiff was afforded every opportunity to litigate his case within the normal course of the judicial process.  Plaintiff should not, then, over a decade later, be permitted to circumvent our judicial process by filing a Notice of Motion seeking to relitigate the trial court’s summary judgment dismissal of his case.  Yet, Plaintiff has attempted to do so; not once, but three times.  On July 13, 2022, Assignment [...] entered an order sua sponte dismissing Plaintiff’s July 11, 2022 Notice of Motion as frivolous pursuant to prior Assignment [...]’s March 9, 2012 injunctive order.
[brief] First Summary Judgment Motion Hearing, October 7, 2022.  At the time of the return date of the first motion for summary judgment, [...] had produced two unsigned quotes and nine random checks from [...].  Counsel for [...] argued that given the miniscule corpus of relevant “evidence” that had been provided, summary judgment should be granted because there was no discernible nexus between the proffered [...] checks and what is was that [...] had obtained for this money.  To wit, [...] had provided “no purchase orders, no invoices, no packing slips, no delivery acknowledgments, nothing” as to what had allegedly been purchased.  (2T5:23-25)  In response to these arguments, the Law Division acknowledged that “the evidence at this time is not strong.  . .  [I]f I were the trier of fact, if this were a bench trial and this was all that was submitted, it would be insufficient, most likely, at this point. ”  (2T14:10-14)  The Law Division reasoned that since this case was then “in the beginning of discovery” and that “there very well could be a subpoena to [...],” (2T14:15-16, -18), a denial of the summary judgment motion, without prejudice, would be most appropriate at this relatively early juncture.
[directive] Addendum B | December 2021  Vehicular Pursuit Policy  (b) the officer deploying the authorized tire deflation device should be in position to allow sufficient time for deployment; (c) the supervisor must coordinate the efforts of all law enforcement units involved in the pursuit; (d) the communications operator shall notify all units of the location of the authorized tire deflation device deployment; (e) the officer operating the authorized tire deflation device should take a position of safety as the pursued vehicle approaches; (f) the officer shall deploy or activate the authorized tire deflation device immediately before the pursued vehicle arrives at the point where it would impact the device; (g) the officer shall remove or deactivate the device immediately after the pursued vehicle goes over the authorized tire deflation device; and (h) the officer should immediately notify communications if the pursued vehicle impacted the authorized tire deflation device, if the officer observed any signs of deflation, and the direction and operation of the pursued vehicle after the impact.
[brief] When transferred to the Academy as the “Admin Officer,” she was excluded from any meeting between the Captain and the Assistant (1T; 86:19).  Plaintiff never did any Admin Officer responsibilities (1T; 86:23).  Plaintiff had no responsibilities as the Admin Officer which was “unheard of” (1T; 87:1).  Plaintiff was the Admin Officer at the Academy from December 2016 until March 4, 2017 (1T; 87:5).