ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] During the third hearing on January 27, 2022, while [...] was presenting the final planning testimony, he explained to the Board the final application proposed a total of 366 units on site, whereas 319 units are currently permitted under the maximum permitted density in the zone.  (Pa388).  Therefore, by seeking approval for 100 units, the applicant is seeking 47 units over what is currently permitted and they can currently develop.  (Pa388-389).  At that same hearing, the Board’s professional planner, [...] (Assistant Township Planner), was questioning [...] recross examination, he confirmed the site is currently density compliant and stated the following:
[brief] [...] made, and communicated, the decisions regarding how employees were characterized and paid and what they were paid.  1T61:19-25, 159:3-23, 160:5-12; 3T29:13-17; Da82 (employee list).  Employees later sought additional money that they said they were owed as if they were classified as employees resulting in a New Jersey Department of Labor ("DOL") award, which yielded additional compensation for employees in 2020.
[brief] Id.  “Protecting the marketability of tax titles enables municipalities to maximize the recovery of unpaid property taxes and return property to the tax rolls. ”  Cherokee Equities v. Garaventa, 382 N.J. Super. 201, 206 (N.J. Super. Ch. Div. 2005).  Additionally, the Courts disfavor windfalls gained by heir hunters.  In Savage, the Court held that “a sum paid to the heir or owner, which is disproportionate to the windfall the heir hunter or title raider seeks to reap and to the value of the tract is a hallmark of the [practice] condemned by the Supreme Court. ”  Savage, supra 429, 443 n.1 (N.J. Super. 2002)(citing O Y Old Bridge, supra, 120 N.J. at 458).  When determining whether a purchase is for nominal consideration the trial court must look to the “reasonable value of the interest acquired.
[brief] For the reasons stated herein, it is respectfully requested that the denial of defendant=s PCR petition be reversed, and this matter be remanded for an evidentiary hearing.  Respectfully submitted, [...]  Public Defender Attorney for Defendant-Appellant  BY: s/[...]  [...]  Designated Counsel  Dated: December 4, 2023  LETTER-BRIEF AND APPENDIX IN LIEU OF FORMAL BRIEF ON BEHALF OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY
[brief] REMEDIES  Appellant respectfully requests that the Court reverse the dismissal of this case and remand it back to the lower court with instructions to admit the Diagrammatic Elevation (Exhibit P1) and the supporting documentation indicating the likely dimensions of the cinder blocks (Exhibit P4) as well as the two previously admitted photographs (Exhibits P2 and P3) during a re-hearing of the Verified Complaint and Order to Show Cause filed on 11/29/2023.  Appellant would note that virtually all the remedies requested in his complaints and motions head toward the same destination: that the [...] be required to conduct what might be called a court-supervised investigation of the alleged zoning violations, as she is required to do per Section 196-61 A. of the Hoboken Municipal Code.  Should such an investigation find that the building at [...] exceeds the limitations imposed on it by the Diagrammatic Elevation – as it surely must, given the facts on the ground – then [...] would have to either modify the building or seek approval of its unauthorized changes by going before the [...].  Both of these remedies are actionable.  Modification of the building would involve the reduction of its facade, not structural changes.  And seeking approval of unauthorized changes would involve requesting and attending a hearing.  Either of these are practical and doable remedies.  We sincerely hope that the Court uses this request as an opportunity to encourage those charged with land use decisions and the enforcement of land use laws and ordinances to start taking the law “more seriously”.
[brief] [...] contends that Paragraph 8 of the Protocol states that, “[f]or all documents withheld, the privilege log must include (at a minimum): 1) unique identification number; 2) the date of the document; 3) the parties to any communications; 4) a brief description of the subject matter of the document; and 5) the reason the document was withheld. ”  See R. Doc. 103–1, p. 13–14; citing R. Doc. 31–1, pp. 27–29, ¶ 8.  As such, [...] contends that it requested privilege logs multiple times, but that as of yet, [...] has failed to produce them for the files withheld from [...]’s, [...]’s, [...]’s, and [...]’s computers and devices.  Id. at p. 14.  Thus, [...] contends that [...] has failed to comply with the Protocol.  Thus, [...] seeks an Order from this Court compelling [...] to produce all outstanding privilege logs.  Id.  During oral argument, counsel for [...] contended that it had not produced these files because of the previously referred to date restriction of July 1, 2013.  However, he conceded that based on the Court’s ruling as to the January 1, 2012 date, he would review the data and files withheld from [...]’s, [...]’s, [...]’s, and [...]’s computers and devices, and provide [...] with all data that is not subject to a privilege.  As to any data and or files within which a privilege is claimed, the Court ordered that a privilege log, with an adequate description of the document over which the privilege is being claimed be provided to [...] in order for them to ascertain whether any privileges apply to a particular document and or file in question.  As such, [...]’s request was granted.
[brief] The fact that [...] failed to notify Appellant that an Observation was ready for review does not entail a reprimand which is an illogical statement.  There was no reprimand, however, the simple claim that Appellant had not reviewed the Observation was the result of [...]’s failure to communicate that the Observation was ready for review on the platform being used.  The improper motive here is the misplaced use of the word reprimand in simply discussing the fact that [...] failed to give notice that the Observation was ready for review.
[brief] The law is clear: If an ordinance has both a valid and an invalid purpose, courts should not guess which purpose the governing body had in mind.  O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 383–84; see also Riggs, 109 N.J. at 613 (“Courts generally will not inquire into legislative motive to impugn facially valid ordinance, but will consider evidence about the legislative purpose \(^8\) Section IV responds to Section III in Plaintiffs’ brief. when the reasonableness of the enactment is not apparent on its face. ”); Csaki v. Woodbridge Twp., 69 N.J. Super. 327, 33 (Law. Div. 1961) (“if there was legal power to adopt the ordinance, the motives of the members of the governing body are immaterial. ”); Kirzenbaum v. Paulus, 57 N.J. Super. 80, 84 (App. Div. 1959) (“If there was legal power to adopt the ordinance and resolution, the motives of the members of the governing body in doing so, absent fraud, personal interest or corruption, are immaterial.
[brief] ARGUMENT ......................................................................................................8  I.  Standard of Review ....................................................................................8  II.  The Trial Court Correctly Dismissed Count I for Failure to State a Claim Under the NJCFLA  .................................................................9  A.  Appellant Lacks Standing to Bring a Claim Under the NJCFLA Because the NJCFLA Does Not Confer a Private Right of Action ...............9  B.  Even if There Were a Private Right of Action Under the NJCFLA, [...] Could Not Have Violated the NJCFLA Because They Are Not Subject to Its Licensure Requirements ........................................12  III.  The Trial Court Correctly Dismissed Count II for Failure to State a Claim Under the NJCFA .................................................................14  A.  The Trial Court Correctly Held That Appellant Cannot Circumvent His Lack of Standing Under the NJCFLA by Bootstrapping an NJCFLA Claim to a Claim Under the NJCFA ........................................14  B.  [...] Are Not Subject to the NJCFA Because They Did Not Engage in Any Consumer-Facing Sales, Extend Any Credit to Appellant, or Engage in Any Debt Collection Activities .........................15  C.  Appellant’s NJFCA Claim Is Further Deficient Because the Complaint Fails to Plead Ascertainable Loss or That Any Ascertainable Loss Was Causally Connected to Holder  Respondents’ Alleged Conduct ..................19  IV.  In the Alternative to the Trial Court’s Grounds for Dismissal, Appellant’s Claims Are Also Barred by the Settlement Agreement and Settlement Order in [...] ........................................................................................................21  V.  In the Alternative to the Trial Court’s Grounds for Dismissal, Appellant’s Claims Are Barred by Res Judicata and the Entire Controversy Doctrine.....23  VI.  Appellant Misconstrues the Trial Court’s Order Denying Appellant’s Cross-Motion ..................................................................................................................25  CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................................................26
[brief] However, zoning crafted pursuant to a redevelopment plan is a function of the redevelopment context, which provides a unique toolkit to municipalities in contrast to typical zoning.  Once a delineated area is designated as blighted, the authority of the LRHL permits the creation of a Redevelopment Plan that establishes distinct regulations within a designated area in need of redevelopment.  This is a byproduct of the unique, broad authorities given to municipalities by the LRHL to address and ameliorate blight.  The LRHL provides that a redevelopment plan shall either “supersede applicable provisions of the development regulations of the municipality or constitute an overlay zoning district.
[brief] See id. at 17:3-18:20.  During the first of these FMLA leave periods, [...] took away Plaintiff’s office and had her belongings sent to her home.  See id. at 111:20-113:9.  As if this indignity was not enough, after she returned from FMLA leave, Plaintiff was confronted by several part-time staff working for [...], who told her she was only good for taking FMLA leave.  See Id. at 118:5-119:12.  Plaintiff further testified that she received constant harassment regarding her FMLA leave after returning and complained about it many times.  See id. at 147:14-148:2.  In short, it cannot be reasonably stated that Plaintiff’s pleadings, answers to interrogatories, and deposition testimony failed to put Defendants on notice to the fact that Plaintiff was making claims for Disability discrimination.
[brief] In addition, [...] affirmed that: (1) he was intoxicated at the time he incriminated [...] (a fact that could be corroborated by [...]’ mother, cousin, and cousin’s daughter); and (2) he was deceived by arresting officers at the time he incriminated [...].  (Da074).  Indeed, the State opposed [...]’ Habeas Petition.  At [...]’s trial, the State elicited testimony from [...] that he did have knowledge of the Staten Island robbery and kidnapping of [...], and that he participated in this crime with [...] (notwithstanding the evidence in its possession to the contrary).  (7T 13:1-8; 12:11-17; 13:9-4).  [...]’s counsel was never provided with [...]’ falsely Sworn Statement, even though it stood in stark contrast to his trial testimony.  It is indisputable that when a State witness—particularly one as critical as [...]—has perjured himself to a Federal District Court in relation to the subject matter of his testimony, the evidence is definitively considered impeachment material and would therefore be favorable to the defense.
[brief] "Prior to March 22, 2023, conference, the [...] granted Appellant's adjournment requests.  Appellant was notified directly by the Sheriff's Office as well as by the undersigned.  (Ra 9).  On March 21, 2023, correspondence was filed with the Court advising that the relief sought by Appellant was granted.  (Ra 10)."  Plaintiff addressed the alleged direct notice from the defendant Sheriff's Office in his unopposed March 20, 2023, letter (Pa 136) to the Trial Court.  Plaintiff, in fact did not receive actual notice of adjournment from the Sheriff's Office, directly, when [...] made such a representation to the Trial Court.  Plaintiff attached a copy of the USPS Tracking for 70203160000175295954.  (Pa 152)  USPS Tracking Number 70203160000175295954 was provided by [...] to Plaintiff and the Trial Court on or about 3/20/23.  Plaintiff searched the tracking number because he did not receive the hard copies via U.S. Mail.  The search revealed that the items had not been delivered (Pa 152) at the time the defendants and Counsel represented plaintiffs receipt of said documents.  “We take judicial notice of the fact that the United States Postal Service ordinarily delivers mail within the State in less than four days.  Consequently, appellant could have reasonably expected that mailing the hearing request four days before the statutory deadline would result in its receipt by the deadline. ”  D.R. Horton, Inc. v. New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection 383 N.J. Super. 405 (App. Div. 2006).  Furthermore, Plaintiff contends that Defendants’ counsel as an officer of the Court, should know that the record demonstrates that Defendants’ purported decision to discontinue their discriminatory denial of Plaintiff’s Constitutional and Statutory rights to be free from retaliation, harassment and discrimination, to equal protection under the law, to equal benefit of all laws and proceedings and to two adjournments of the Sheriff Sale upon request pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:17-36 in like manner as was done for White Citizens (Pa 153), did not occur until after (and in response to) Plaintiff’s filing of the complaint (Pa 27) with the Law Division on or about March 8, 2023 (Pa 27) wherein Plaintiff’s N.J.S.A. 10:6-2 claims and other injuries set forth therein unjustly remain unadjudicated in its proper venue being the Law Division.  In addition, Plaintiff filed a Notice of Tort Claim (Pa 26) on or about March 07, 2023, with the [...], identifying claims under Common Law, which to date, has not been responded too.  **CONCLUSION**
[brief] Although [...] pled a claim that it was indeed entitled to coverage under the [...] policy (an issue that was never decided), the present ruling as to the applicability of the MCS-90 endorsement means that [...] is responsible, as a matter of law, to reimburse [...] for any amounts paid under the MCS-90 endorsement.  See, QBE Ins. Co., 362 N.J. Super. at 450 (quoting from the MCS-90 endorsement that “[t]he insured agrees to reimburse the company for . . . any payment that the company would not have been obligated to make under the provisions of the policy except for the agreement contained in this endorsement”); see also [...] policy MCS-90 Endorsement at PPCIa183 (identical provision); Chapter 3, [...], Litigating Truck Accident Cases, §3:12.  Allocation and reimbursement issues (April 2024 Update) (“The MCS-90 permits the insurer to collect back from the insured after paying a judgment under the endorsement”).
[brief] The “property” doesn’t change, the market value of the “property” is simply determined as of market values in 1994.  [...]’s FF&E was not “property” taken in this action.  But, [...]’s tenant fit up included partitions for examining rooms and reception area was.  Some of the tenants, including the [...], [...] and [...] were there at least from 1994 and installed the FF&E that was the FF&E that was taken in 2018, but valued based on 1994 prices.  The amount of rent of [...] and the three long-term tenants was based on the fact that they paid for their own tenant fit-ups.  Even the other existing tenants had signage and set up costs over and above the vanilla box.  In any event the issue here is simply admissibility, it was for the arbitrator to determine the enhancement value.
[brief] ”  N.J.S.A. § 59:1-3.  The Act goes further to say:  “Under this act, service of notice to public entity by certified or registered mail was complete and deemed received within time upon deposit or mailing, with appropriate postage prepaid, within 90 days of accrual of claim. ”  N.J.S.A. § 59:8-11; quoting Guzman v. City of Perth Amboy, 214 N.J. Super. 167, 518 A.2d 758 (App. Div. 1986).  The claims in Counts One and Three of the Complaint that the [...] “acted negligently, recklessly and willfully. ”  Plaintiffs have not served the requisite notice.  Therefore, any claim based upon negligence were properly dismissed by the lower Court.
[brief] Ibid. (citing United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630, 642-44 (2004)).  Under this principle, even later volunteered statements may need to be suppressed if they were induced by earlier constitutional violations.  See Harrison v. United States, 392 U.S. 219, 225-26 (1968) (barring later use of testimony that was induced by prosecution’s use of illegal confessions at first trial).
[directive] The Treasury law enforcement agencies are : a. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms; b. Internal Revenue Service, Criminal Investigation Division; c. United States Customs Service; and d. United States Secret Service.  The Department of Justice has similar authority with respect to joint operations with Department of Justice law enforcement agencies.  Payments can only be used for those expenses that are 4 . authorized by statute.  It is clear that the statute does not authorize the payment of direct salaries of local, county or state officers, either directly or indirectly.  Joint Law Enforcement Operation 5.
[brief] NOTICE OF APPEAL FILED BY [...]……………Da1-5  COMPLAINT OF [...]………………………………………..Da6-12  ANSWER TO COMPLAINT OF [...]…………Da13-22 FEBRUARY 28, 2023  COURT ORDER………………………………Da23-24 JULY 7, 2021  MOTION TO STAY……………………………………Da25-31 JULY 14, 2021  OPPOSITION TO JULY 7, 2021  MOTION TO STAY….Da32-34 JULY 16, 2021  MOTION TO LIFT THE AUTOMATIC STAY…………Da35-42 AUGUST 18, 2021  BANKRUPTCY COURT ORDER…………………Da43-45 AUGUST 20, 2021  LETTER FILING BANKRUPTCY COURT ORDER……………………………………………………………………Da46 FEBRUARY 7, 2023  POST-TRIAL MOTION…………………………Da47-54 MARCH 20, 2023  MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION………………Da55-61  JUNE 1, 2023  MOTION  REOPENING DEFENDANT’s CHAPTER 7  CASE AND DETERMINING THAT THE POSTPETITION JUDGMENT OBTAINED BY CREDITOR [...] IS NOT ENFORCEABLE BEYOND, OR ALTERNATIVELY SHALL BE MOLDED TO, THE $200,000 POLICY LIMIT OF THE DEBTOR’S AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE………………………………………………………………Da62-82  OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO REOPEN AND CROSS-MOTION FOR AN ORDER DECLARING THE JUDGMENT BE ENFORCED AS A NON-DISCHARGEABLE DEBT………………………………………………………………Da83-94 JULY 12, 2023  BANKRUPTCY COURT ORDERS……………………Da95-99  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
[brief] The Trial Court’s Findings  Following the three-day trial in January, the Trial Court issued an Opinion and Final Judgment on May 8, 2023.  (Aa8).  All claims were dismissed by the Court as to Plaintiff’s company, and Third-Party Defendant [...].  (Aa59).  The Trial Court correctly found that Plaintiff owned a 10% interest in [...] and was the subject of minority member oppression.  (Aa59).  It correctly found that Plaintiff was physically assaulted by member [...] when she attempted to alert members and clients of [...]’ efforts to sell [...]’ contracts without a member vote.  (Aa59).  The Trial Court, however, improperly valued Plaintiff’s membership interest as *de minimus* and only awarded $11,912 to Plaintiff as earned but unpaid income.
[brief] **CONCLUSION**  Accordingly, [...] respectfully request that the Court affirm the: (1) denial of Plaintiffs-Appellants’ Motion for Summary Judgment; and (2) granting of Defendants-Respondents’ Motion for Summary Judgment.  Dated: March 22, 2024  Respectfully submitted, **[...]**  /s/ [...]  [...], Esq. [...], Esq.
[directive] Those threshold requirements are meant to limit hearings to defendants who are better able to show a material change in the level of risk they present, in the context of the pandemic and the delays it has caused.  Trial judges have discretion to resolve motions that do not meet both conditions without holding a hearing.  Cf. R. 3:21-10(c) (noting that “[a] hearing need not be conducted on a motion” for a change in sentence under Rule 3:21-10(b)).  Defendants subject to a presumption of detention under the statute will likely not be eligible for new hearings because the seriousness of the offense charged -- murder or a crime that subjects a defendant to a sentence of life imprisonment -- weighs heavily in the release decision.
[brief] Numerous federal cases interpreting the NJCFLA also support the trial court’s decision that the NJCFLA does not provide a private right of action.  *See Veras v. LVNV Funding, LLC*, No. 13-1745 (RBK/JS), 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34176, at *24 (D.N.J. Mar. 17, 2014); *Browne v. Nat’l Collegiate Student Loan Tr.*, No. 21-11871 (KM) (JSA), 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 244537 (D.N.J. Dec. 22, 2021) (litigated by Appellant’s counsel and following the analysis in *Veras* for why a private right of action should not be implied); *Macdonald v. CashCall, Inc.*, Civil Action No. 16-2781, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64761, at *29 (D.N.J. Apr. 28, 2017) (dismissing NJCFLA claim because there is no private right of action); *Jubelt v. United Mortg. Bankers, Ltd.*, Civil Action No. 13-7150 (ES) (MAH), 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84595, at *39 (D.N.J. June 30, 2015) (“even if Plaintiff had asserted illegal conduct under the NJCFLA, there is no private right of action available under that statute”).  Accordingly, it is clear that a litigant does not have a private right of action under the NJCFLA.
[brief] RED HERRINGS AND FALSE STATEMENTS IN THE BOROUGH’S BRIEF (not directly addressed by trial court)  In light of its inability to assert a meritorious defense to Plaintiffs’ statutory argument, the Borough has instead decided to stuff its appellate brief with over forty pages of red herrings, misstatements, false statements, and irrelevant references and citations.  The Borough largely focuses on contrived non-issues regarding title and zoning, discredited pronouncements of the Planning Board engineer that have no force of law or relevance in general, attempts to attribute significance to words such as “interior road” or “internal road” that have no legal meaning, and outright factual misrepresentations.  Plaintiffs submit that the Court should disregard all of these other items as inadmissible in light of the conclusive presumption in favor of dedication of the Roads pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40:55D-53.j.  However, out of an abundance of caution, Plaintiffs show in this section why each of these contrived issues has no merit.  As an additional preface to the consideration of these red herrings, it should be noted that over the past eighteen years, the Borough has approved two subdivision maps showing the Roads (the 2005 Map and 2010 Map) (Da171 and 173), numerous site plans showing the Roads (i.e., the site plans for the developments on Lots 2.01, 3.01, 4.01, and 5.01), building permits and certificates of occupancy for all of the buildings located on Lots 2.01, 3.01, 4.01, and 5.01, which are the lots abutting the Roads; and additionally, the Borough has engaged in two lawsuits with Plaintiffs seeking (unsuccessfully) to deny Plaintiffs’ ability to build multifamily housing on the lots abutting the Roads (*[...] v. [...]*, Law Division, Bergen County, Docket No. [...], and *In the Matter of the Affordable Housing Obligation of the [...]*, Law Division, Bergen County, Docket No. [...]).
[brief] . . .  P.L. 1898, c. 197, p. 458 (emphasis added).  This 1898 Act was later saved from repeal when the Legislature adopted the Revised Statutes, due to the passage of N.J.S.A. 48:7-6, which states: L.1898, c. 197, p. 458 (C.S. p. 3153, 38), entitled “An act relating to the use of the public streets by electric light, heat and power companies,” approved May eighteenth, one thousand eight hundred and ninety-eight, saved from repeal.