ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] 1.  **[...] was hired by [...] in November 2021 to paint the front façade and front steps of the condo in question**  [...] was hired by [...] (“[...]”) to paint both the front façade of the [...] property, as well as the front steps.  (Pa393; Pa451, 17:5-7; Pa669, 9:4-13).  The estimate for [...]’s work was dated November 23, 2021.  (Pa393).  The work was completed by December 1, 2021, over 30 days before the January 5, 2022 accident.  (Pa452, 20:14-24).  [...] employee [...] supervised the painting work on the stairs in question.  (Pa450, 11:24-12:1).  [...] explained the process of painting the steps.  (Pa450, 12:2-16).  The front façade work was done first, in which [...] painted the building’s wood cornice, brick wall, window headers and window frame.  (Pa393; Pa452, 18:1-4).  On the façade, [...] used a Benjamin Moore paint termed per specifications as “house paint. ” (Pa393; Pa452, 18:19-19:2; Pa395-396).  A different kind of Benjamin Moore paint, whose specifications bear the title “Latex Floor & Patio,” was used on the steps in question.  (Pa397-398).  According to the Benjamin Moore specifications, this type of paint is recommended for Residential or commercial applications where a premium quality finish is desired.  For interior and exterior use on unpainted concrete (new or old) and previously finished wood or concrete floors.  Particularly recommended for basements, porches, patios, breezeways, showrooms, and light industrial applications.  (Pa397).  [...] testified at his deposition that the paint used on the steps was selected based on the recommendation received from Benjamin Moore.  (Pa449, 9:11-22; Pa450, 10:9-14).  [...] also testified that the paint was appropriate from his experience having painted similar steps.  (Pa451, 16:16-23).  [...] confirmed that, when the steps were painted, the work fulfilled the estimate submitted to [...] and that all guidelines set forth in the specifications were followed.  (Pa451, 15:19-22; Pa452, 19:8-18).  [...] did not select the color of the steps but was directed by [...] as to same.  (Pa673, 22:6-17).  2.
[brief] In any event, [...]’ argument fails for the reasons discussed herein.  [...] cites Bauman, v. Royal Indem. Co., 36 N.J. 12 (1961), for the suggestion that an insurer’s obligations to provide notice of cancellation or changed policy language upon renewal are part of New Jersey common law and predate any regulations or statutes subsequently enacted.  The Bauman Court concluded that, upon a homeowner’s insurance policy renewal, “[a]bsent notification that there have been changes in the restrictions, conditions or limitations of the policy, the insured is justly entitled to assume that they remain the same and that his coverage has not in anywise been lessened. ”  Bauman, 36 N.J. at 25.  The Court added that “any reduction in coverage upon a renewal must be called to the insured’s attention so that the insured can decide whether to continue the coverage or purchase new insurance. ”  Id., at 26.  What distinguishes the decision in Bauman (involving a homeowner’s policy) from the situation here (involving a CCIP), is that the common law argument - which [...] contends is based on business morality and decency - falls flat because [...] was actually notified and acknowledged that it was being unenrolled based on its demolition work (the only work it had been retained to perform at the time of its short-lived erroneous enrollment, and the very same work it was performing on the date of the Accident).  Further, [...] maintained its coverage elsewhere – through [...] and [...] – meaning [...] was not left bare, and claimants in the [...] were not left without a source of recovery.  moreover, unlike the insured in *Bauman*, [...] never paid premiums (either directly or via a reduced proposal) for the CCIP Policies and is, therefore, not entitled to coverage under them.  Finally, the *Bauman* considerations are inapplicable here where the request for unenrollment came from [...], the general contractor and CCIP sponsor to which all subcontractors gave authorization to act as the sole agent on their behalf with regard to changes to or cancellation of the CCIP pursuant to the Sole Agent for Insureds endorsement.
[brief] Throughout the proceedings in the trial court, plaintiff pursued a claim rooted in what her complaint explicitly pleaded as the defendant not issuing a recall sooner of the medicine at issue (an injectable eye treatment).  That claim is necessarily premised on a purported duty to recall.  However, no "failure-to-recall" claim exists at common law, in New Jersey or elsewhere.  Many states' laws reject such claims in many contexts.  Nor did the PLA create any recall-based cause of action.  No New Jersey precedent allows any failure-to-recall claim under the PLA.  This is why, on appeal, plaintiff strenuously attempts to distance herself from what she alleged in her complaint.  Even if a failure-to-recall claim did exist, it would be preempted by federal law.  A failure-to-recall claim inherently asserts, under State law, that the defendant cannot sell a product, despite the product being FDA-approved for sale.  The Supreme Court, and many other courts, have held that so-called "stop selling" claims making such allegations are preempted.  Once the FDA has said "yes, you can sell," state law cannot countermand the FDA's in-force decision and say "no."  Plaintiff now claims to be pursuing a manufacturing-defect claim, but she offers no non-recall-related evidence that the alleged defect—which occurred in only one of every 45 products tested (2.2%)—in fact manifested in this case.  Neither her treating physician, nor her sole expert witness, points to anything other than the defendant’s recall notice as a basis for claiming that the purported defect ever existed in the unit that plaintiff received.  Thus, the claimed “manufacturing defect” is inseparable from the recall notice.  Plaintiff also contends that she is now pursuing a “post-sale duty to warn” claim.  But once again, the purported inadequate warning is entirely subsumed by the recall.  The information she claims should have been provided earlier, but was not, is precisely the information contained in the defendant’s recall notice.  Thus, the claimed “failure to warn,” once again, is in fact an alleged failure to recall.  These claims thus fail for the same reasons New Jersey has never recognized failure-to-recall claims in the first place.  II.  INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE
[brief] RA0036-37.  Instead of complying with this Court’s December 2, 2022 Order and the trial court’s March 3, 2023 Order, Appellant filed an unauthorized motion on March 10, 2023, which demanded the production of documents from [...] and [...] (“Motion for Documents”).  PA74-87.  Specifically, the Motion for Documents argued that the requested documents were necessary for Appellant to hire counsel and formulate claims against Respondents.  Id.  Respondents opposed Appellant’s Motion for Documents, arguing that she did not have standing to bring her motion as “Plaintiff is not an attorney and cannot appear in the trial court action and purport to represent third parties. ”  PA93.  Respondents also highlighted the fact that Appellant is not entitled to seek pre-complaint discovery, which this Court’s precedent has expressly rejected.  PA93-96.  On March 31, 2023, Appellant filed a reply in support of her Motion for Documents.  RA0038-44.  The trial court heard argument on Appellant’s Motion for Documents on March 31, 2023 and denied Appellant’s Motion for Documents for the reasons argued by Respondents (“March 31, 2023 Order”).
[brief] Unpublished decisions cited below by Defendant: Opinion, Asmad-Escobar v. [...], et al., Dkt. No. [...] (Mar. 8, 2023) ..............Pa99  Order, Asmad-Escobar v. [...], et al., Dkt. No. [...] (Mar. 8, 2023)  ..................Pa107  Opinion, Mhrez v. [...], Dkt. No. [...] (Jan. 6, 2023)..........................................Pa108  Transcript of Argument and Decision, Mhrez v. [...], Dkt. No. [...] (Dec. 16, 2022) ........................................................................Pa121  * Transcript of Argument and Decision, Rubin v. [...], Dkt. No. [...] ............................Pa130  * VOLUME II OF II OTHER PARTS OF THE RECORD [R. 2:6-1(a)(1)(I)]
[brief] State v. Mohammed, 226 N.J. 71 (2016)..................................................11  State v. Gamble, 218 N.J.  412 (2014).....................................................11  N.J. APPELLATE DIVISION  State v. Judge, 275 N.J. Super. 194 (App. Div. 1994)..............................6  State v. Ramos, 282 N.J. Super. 19 (App. Div. 1995)...............................9, 11  State v. Moore, 181 N.J. Super. 40 (App. Div. 2004)...............................9, 10, 11 State v. Madison, No. A-4086-09T2 (App. Div. April 11, 2011)................10, 11  NEW JERSEY STATUTES
[brief] (1T83-24 to 85-23, 86-23 to 87-16, 89-1 to 10).  Regarding the stop, defense counsel relied on defendant’s testimony that [...] used her turn signal and further argued that they appeared to be “targeted. ” (1T85-24 to 86-1, 87-18 to 23).  The construction or constitutionality of N.J.S.A. 39:4-126 was not raised.  (1T83-23 to 89-11).  After considering the testimony and evidence and hearing argument, [...] denied the motion to suppress.
[brief] 32 N.J.A.C. 7:8-1.6(c) .............................................................................................................  32  N.J.A.C. 7:8-5.2 ..................................................................................................................  5 N.J.A.C. 7:8-5.4 ..................................................................................................................  5 N.J.A.C. 7:8-5.5 ..................................................................................................................  5 N.J.A.C. 7:8-5.6 ..................................................................................................................  5 N.J.A.C. 7:11.1(c)(2)(ii) .................................................................................................  23 N.J.A.C. 7:13-1 to -24.11 ...............................................................................................  1, 10 N.J.A.C. 7:13-2.1 ............................................................................................................. 32 N.J.A.C. 7:13-2.1(c)(1) .................................................................................................  32 N.J.A.C. 7:13-3.2(c)(1) ................................................................................................. 9 N.J.A.C. 7:13-3.4 ............................................................................................................. 8 N.J.A.C. 7:13-5.5(c) ........................................................................................................... 36, 37 N.J.A.C. 7:13-5.5(c)(1) ................................................................................................. 36 N.J.A.C. 7:13-5.5(c)(2) ................................................................................................. 36 N.J.A.C. 7:13-11.1 ........................................................................................................... 22 N.J.A.C. 7:13-11.1(c)(2)(ii) ......................................................................................... 22, 23, 26, 28 N.J.A.C. 7:13-11.2 ........................................................................................................... 22 N.J.A.C. 7:13-11.4 ........................................................................................................... 36, 37 N.J.A.C. 7:13-12.2(b) .................................................................................................... 18 Respondent [...] ("[...]" or "Respondent"), submits this Memorandum of Law in response to the instant appeal filed by [...] ("Appellant").
[brief] Defendants claim plaintiff failed to follow workplace rules and regulations, that he was a disruptive and distracting influence, that they imposed appropriate discipline, and that plaintiff was laid off due to economic problems.  On July 19, 2010, plaintiff filed a separate civil action against [...] ([...]).  Plaintiff averred that [...] retaliated against him because of his complaints about the alleged *ex parte* communications with [...].  The Honorable Chief Judge [...] granted [...]'s motion to dismiss the complaint on September 16, 2011.
[brief] 1-10  Defendants/Appellants.  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY  APPELLATE  DIVISION  Docket No.: [...]  T2  Civil Action On Appeal  From: Superior Court of New Jersey Law Division, Essex County  Sat Below: Hon. [...], J.S.C.  Trial Court  Docket No.: Docket No. [...]  BRIEF AND APPENDICES FOR APPELLANT
[brief] Because the [...]’ motions below were filed pursuant to Rule 4:6-2(e), and determination of this appeal would involve analysis of “pure questions of law raised in [the] dismissal motion,” an appellate court will engage in “de novo review. ”  Smith v. Datla, 451 N.J. Super. 82, 88 (App. Div. 2017).  Under this standard, the “trial court’s interpretation of the law and the legal consequences that flow from established facts are not entitled to any special deference. ”  Id. (citation omitted).  “A motion to dismiss a complaint under Rule 4:6–2(e) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted must be evaluated in light of the legal sufficiency of the facts alleged in the complaint. ”  Donato v. Moldow, 374 N.J. Super. 475, 482, (App. Div. 2005).  This Court “review[s] such a motion by the same standard applied by the trial court; thus, considering and accepting as true the facts alleged in the complaint, [it] determine[s] whether they set forth a claim upon which relief can be granted. ”  Sickles v. Cabot Corp., 379 N.J. Super. 100, 106 (App. Div. 2005) (citing Donato, 374 N.J. Super. at 483).  See also Banco Popular North America v. Gandi, 184 N.J. 161, 166 (2005) (“Obviously, if the complaint states no basis for relief and discovery would not provide one, dismissal is the appropriate remedy. ”).  A complaint that recites “mere conclusions without facts” or relies on subsequent discovery to state a claim is not legally sufficient.  Glass v. Suburban Restoration Co., 317 N.J. Super. 574, 582 (App. Div. 1998).  See also Neuwirth, 476 N.J. Super. at 390 (“[a] plaintiff can bolster a defamation cause of action through discovery, but not file a conclusory complaint to find out if one exists. ”) (quoting Printing Mart-Morristown v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 116 N.J. 739, 768 (1989) (cleaned up).  Careful evaluation of the adequacy of pleadings is especially appropriate in defamation cases, particularly where, as here, the claims implicate bedrock principles of freedom of speech and the right to comment on matters of public concern.  Indeed, as this Court acknowledged in Neuwirth, testing the sufficiency of defamation claims at the pleading stage ensures “‘our citizens’ right to free expression and robust debate in our democratic society. ’”  476 N.J. Super. at 390 (citing Petro-Lubricant Testing Labs., Inc. v. Adelman, 233 N.J. 236, 243 (2018) and Rocci v. Ecole Secondaire MacDonald-Cartier, 165 N.J. 149, 155 (2000)).  See also Maressa v. New Jersey Monthly, 89 N.J. 176, 196 (1982) (instructing courts to “resolve free speech litigation more expeditiously whenever possible”).  Prompt dismissal of meritless libel claims is also consistent with the New Jersey Constitution, whose free speech protections are even “more sweeping in scope than the language of the First Amendment. ”  Sisler v. Gannett Co., Inc., 104 N.J. 256, 271 (1986) (citing N.J. Const. art. I, § 6.).  A.  This Court’s Neuwirth Decision was Correctly Decided
[brief] ...........................................  H675a Holm-145  [...] response to discovery request HOLM-[...]-OTT-154, referred to response to Holm-141 (SOICR p. 12)  ..................  H676a Holm-146: [...] response to discovery request HOLM-[...]-OTT-155, referred to response to Holm-142 (SOICR p. 12)  .................. H677a Holm-147: [...] response to discovery request HOLM-[...]-OTT-156, for copies of reports to [...] and other N.J. utilities, referred to response to Holm-123, objected to (SOICR p. 12)  ..................
[brief] ”  N.J.S.A. 52:27D-122(b).  The UCC regulates the “structure, design, construction, maintenance and use of all buildings or structures to be erected and the alteration, renovation, rehabilitation, repair, maintenance, removal, or demolition of all buildings or structures already erected. ”  N.J.S.A. 52:27D-123.1.  The UCC regulations indicate that they “shall apply to all buildings and structures and their appurtenant construction. ”  N.J.A.C. 5:23-2.2(a).  Furthermore, “[w]here provisions herein specify requirements for structural, fire and sanitary safety, no provision of any municipal zoning or other municipal code shall conflict, govern, or have effect. ”  N.J.A.C. 5:23-2.2(e).
[brief] Mittra, 316 N.J. Super. at 85 (emphasis added).  The court in Mittra rejected “the rigid application of contractual principles to university-student conflicts involving academic performance and limit[ed] [the] scope of review to a determination [of] whether the procedures followed were in accordance with the institution’s rules and regulations. ”  Id. at 91.  That is not the issue in this matter.  Simply, this matter does not relate to student grading or evaluation and thus, this is not a matter related to purely academic decisions.  Thus, Mittra is distinguishable.  In fact, the Mittra Court explicitly recognized certain instances where a student may bring a viable breach-of-contract type claim against a university.  Id. at 89-90.  New Jersey state courts have concluded “that the courts may intervene where the institution violates in some substantial way its rules and regulations pertaining to student dismissals. ”  Id. at 92.  (emphasis added) (discussing the holding of Napolitano v. Trustees of Princeton Univ., 186 N.J. Super. 548 (App. Div. 1982), the first reported New Jersey opinion dealing with whether contract principles should be applied in resolving disputes involving student dismissals for academic reasons).  Thus, Court’s may intervene when universities, like [...], deviate from its own rules and regulations.
[brief] Most of [...] and [...]’s opposition should be dismissed on its face as contrary to precedent.  I.  [...] never properly defended the Distance Regulation  [...]’s defense of the Distance Regulation is devoid of any connection to intermediate scrutiny or actual evidence.  First, [...] argues that E&J Equities Ltd. Liab. is not retroactive to existing ordinances.  This is clearly wrong.  “Generally, judicial decisions are applied retroactively…prospective application is appropriate when a decision establishes a new principle of law by overruling past precedent or by deciding an issue of first impression. ”  Henderson v. Camden Cnty. Mun. Util. Auth., 176 N.J. 554, 561-62 (2003).  E&J Equities Ltd. Liab. was only “new” as to its adoption of time/place/manner for content neutral billboards.  E&J Equities Ltd. Liab., 226 N.J. at 580-81.  The evidentiary standard for defending a billboard regulation that implicates the First Amendment is not new; the burden has been on the municipality since long before E&J Equities Ltd. Liab.  See Bell v. Stafford, 110 N.J. 384, 395-96  In that regard, all *E&J Equities Ltd. Liab.* does is *reiterate* that “a governing body seeking to restrict expression cannot simply invoke those interests with scant factual support informing its decision-making and expect to withstand a constitutional challenge. ”  *E&J Equities, Ltd. Liab.*, 226 N.J. at 585.  Second, citing out of state precedent is no help here.  Federal precedent is clearly different in the level of *factual support* required to defend a billboard regulation.  Compare *id.* with *Interstate Outdoor Advertising L.P. v. Zoning Bd. of Mt. Laurel*, 706 F.3d 527 (3d Cir. 2013).  On multiple occasions, the Appellate Division and New Jersey Supreme Court have rejected reliance on quotation of the “purposes” section of a billboard regulation.  See *Bell*, *supra* (“no factual basis”); *E&J Equities Ltd. Liab.*, *supra*.  The “purposes” are not factual support; they merely direct the reader to what the factual support *should be*.  But, alas, there is none here.  [...] did not even *try*.
[directive] The Rule allows that, in certain circumstances, bail may be set Bail for Witness and other conditions imposed to ensure the appearance of the witness.  This Rule provides that except in first or second degree cases and certain crimes or offenses involving domestic violence as set forth in N.J.S.A. 2A:162-12 and Rule 3:26-4(g) unless the order setting bail specifies to the contrary, bail may be satisfied by the deposit in court of cash in the amount of ten percent of the bail fixed and the Ten Percent Cash Bail defendant's execution of a recognizance for the remaining 90%.
[directive] Upon postponement of the proceedings, the court may release the is defendant his or her recognizance subject to compliance with the conditions specified own on in the prosecutor's diversion agreement.  For information the types of conditions that be can on included the diversion agreement, see N.J.S.A. 2C:43-26(d).  in  The court shall review the status of the deferred prosecution later than six months after no approval of the postponement, every six months thereafter, consider whether the and to postponement should continue.  After a minimum of six months from the date of the diversion agreement, the prosecutor may move for dismissal of the pending criminal charges if the defendant: (1) has complied with the terms conditions of the diversion agreement, has and (2) not been charged with any other criminal charges, based clinical reports continues to and (3) on make progress with case management services mental health recovery.
[brief] Suppression Hearing  [...] was assigned to investigate the assault and robbery of [...] by two individuals on August 22, 2021, at Yocco’s business on [...] in [...].  (1T 6-13 to 15, 7-14).  Egan obtained surveillance footage from a church across the street and from a camera belonging to the [...] ([...]).  (1T 7-15 to 8-7)  The church video—too blurry to show any individual’s face—depicted two individuals appearing to enter and then exit [...], while the [...] video depicted two individuals walking on [...].  (1T 8-10 to 15, 49-4 to 50-9)  Egan believed the two people in each video were the same two individuals based on their clothing.  (1T 48-24 to 49-23)  Egan made two “attempt to identify” flyers from stills of the [...] video.  (1T 9-23 to 10-12, 50-2 to 9)  He then located a witness who identified one of the individuals as [...], whom the witness knew by the nickname [...].  (1T 13-17 to 14-3)  The witness, however, was unable to identify the second individual in the surveillance still.  (1T 52-15 to 19)  [...] was charged that day and soon arrested.  (1T 55-10 to 12, 60-17)  On September 30, [...] was arrested for an unrelated drug charge.