ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Defendants, who are currently delinquent on all discovery and medical document requests, never reached out to Plaintiff’s Counsel for an affidavit of merit.  In fact, Defendants did nothing for sixty (60) days after filing their answer, never reaching out to Plaintiff’s Counsel for the Affidavit of Merit, and then did nothing again for an additional sixty (60) days, totaling 120 days from the filing of Defendants’ Answer.  Defendants have intentionally been unresponsive and uncooperative in an attempt to game the Affidavit of Merit statute.  Due to the timeline of the Defendants’ default and the aforementioned vacation of said default, Plaintiff’s Counsel lost track of the timeline required by the affidavit of merit statute.
[brief] \textit{The Board weighed the positive and negative criteria and determined whether the grant of the variance would cause a substantial detriment to the public good.}  It is undisputed that this governing body has spoken on where it is appropriate for this senior citizen cluster housing.  With the denial of the [...] rezoning application for the same use in 2018, the Master Plan re-examination in 2019, and the revised Land Use Element later in 2019, which included a new Senior Housing Overlay Zone that intentionally excluded the subject Property, their intentions were clear.
[brief] The German Defendants also rely on the fact that [...] himself is not a party when they argue that plaintiff may only obtain [...]'s deposition only by subpoenaing him in Germany through the procedures established by the Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters.  German Df.Br. at 18-19.  At the risk of repetition, [...] will be testifying as a director of three corporate defendants, not as a third-party witness.  Further, the courts have repeatedly emphasized that the Hague Convention protocols are merely an option and do not apply where, as here, they would deprive a party of due process.
[brief] [...] said he could see [...]’s body from the car as he was driving back.  (30T 229-13 to 231-4).  Before arriving at the [...], [...] remembered that he still had the gun in the vehicle, so he turned around and got gas nearby before driving the Nissan to another vehicle: the Grand Marquis parked near his parent’s residence at the [...].  He took the gun from Defendant without touching it using a skullcap and threw it in the corner of the Grand Marquis before returning to the [...] Inn with Defendant.  (30T 202-3 to 204-1).  Afterwards, [...] received a call from [...] reporting the body outside her apartment.  He decided to go to her against Defendant’s protests and drove his car alone to the nearby [...] where he parked it and proceeded to the [...] on foot.
[brief] FALSEHOODS:  “On or about March 11, 2024, Plaintiff’s application was granted,” p. 9, and hence “plaintiff’s appeal is moot as the relief sought has already been provided,” p. 23.  You see__ the October 20, 2023 With Prejudice ruling below against the appellant barred him from relying on past records to pursue justice, in seeking desperately needed parking accommodation he and the Mother needed.
[brief] The Court acknowledged “defendant has earned straight A’s, has had zero disciplinary infractions and has been on the honors unit at YDC. ” (17T:223-17 to 19).  The Court also noted that [...] was currently taking college courses.  (17T:223-19 to 20).  However, the Court then stated he “the record lacks any indication that the defendant is remorseful for his actions, even years after the offense. ” (17T:223-24 to 224-1).
[brief] Fourth, the trial court weighed [...]’s testimony against the perfunctory denials offered by [...].  On direct examination, [...] was repeatedly asked point-blank whether he engaged in the various misappropriations alleged by Plaintiffs.  Each time, [...] testified “no” or “never” or words to similar effect without any significant additional context or explanation.  (25T 152:4-11; 152:23 to 153:3; 154:25 to 155:5; 26T 6:10 to 7:8; 15:19 to 16:2; 16:19-21; 17:9-11; 22:13-21; 24:15-24).  The trial court did not find these perfunctory denials credible, stating, “there’s nothing there.  You know, there was really no meat to most of the explanations. ” (36T 33:6-13).  Also, the few times when [...] tried to explain his misappropriations, the explanations made no sense.  For instance, as to the $500,000 the diversion in 2013, [...] claimed that he had “borrowed” money from [...] and that he was repaying [...] that money as part of the $1.36 million promissory note to acquire [...]’ interest in the company.  However, [...] twice admitted on cross examination that he could not offer a single document supportive of the claim that he “borrowed” the money, or that a portion of the $1.36 million represented a partial repayment to [...] of the $500,000 that [...] “borrowed” in 2013.  (28T 74:15 to 76:14; 94:16 to 96:15).  Naturally, the trial court did not find [...]’s testimony credible.  Crediting that testimony would have meant that a sizable chunk of the money that Plaintiffs were to receive was not actually for their interest in the companies, but, rather, to repay [...] his own funds for the money that [...] stole.  (28T 94:3-20).
[brief] 9  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS Pa5  [...]  Final Administrative Action, issued August 23, 2023  #  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | Case | Page | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | Fairken Assocs. v. Hutchin, 223 N.J. Super. 274, 280 (Law Div. 1987) | 5 | | Kyer v. City of East Orange, supra, 315 N.J. Super. at 534, 719 A.2d 184, [315 N.J. Super. 524 (1998)] | 6 | | Ridge Chevrolet-Oldsmobile, Inc. v. Scarano, 238 N.J. Super. 149, 154 (App. Div. 1990) | 4 | | Sellers v. Board of Trustees of the Policed and Firemen’s Retirement System, 399 N.J. Super. 51 (App. Div. 2008) | 5 | | Sellers v. Board of Trustees of the Policed and Firemen’s Retirement System, 399 N.J. Super. 62 | 6 | ## New Jersey Regulations | N.J.A.C. 4A:4-4.8(b) | 1,2,8 | |----------------------|-------| | N.J.A.C. 4A:10-1.1 | 2,3 |  REPLY STATEMENT OF FACTS
[brief] During the hearing, there was testimony and/or evidence that [...] made at least one entry into the Stowe 2 South logbook (a critical piece of evidence in the State’s case-in-chief) and/or may have conducted at least one inmate count during the relevant time.  During his testimony, [...] made reference to [...], saying Minivich would only perform counts when [...] or [...] were on their break.  Minivich would then move on to the next post.  On redirect, [...] said that [...] took only one break on August 16, 2019, so Minivich would have only done one count for [...] that night.  On re-cross, [...] stated that if Minivich had come in at the beginning of [...]’ forty-minute break, he might have conducted two counts for [...] that evening.  (Pa019a-Pa020a)(emphasis added.)  The amount of inmate “counts” and their authorship is a critical piece of the DOC’s proofs, and therefore this speculative testimony cannot qualify as “sufficient, competent and credible evidence of facts essential to the charge.
[brief] As the “NJAA ‘is nearly identical to the FAA and enunciates the same policies favoring arbitration,’” *Flanzman*, 244 N.J. at 133, consistent with the FAA, arbitration agreements may only be invalidated on “such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract. ”  *Id.*; see also 9 U.S.C. § 2.  Courts must accordingly “order the parties to arbitrate unless it finds that there is no enforceable agreement to arbitrate. ”  N.J.S.A. § 2A:23B-7.  Determinations of enforceability should “consider whether there was mutual assent, as impacted by notions of unconscionability, which vary from case to case based on the parties’ sophistication and the one-sided nature of negotiations. ”  *County of Passaic v. Horizon Healthcare Servs., Inc.*, 474 N.J. Super. 498, 502 (App. Div. 2023).
[brief] ..........................................................................................................................50  | Authority | Citation | Page(s) | |-----------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------| | Accord Iannone v. McHale | 245 N.J. Super. 17, 26-28 (App. Div. 1990) | 47, 48 | | Albright v. Burns | 206 N.J. Super. 625, 632–33, 503 A.2d 386, 389 (App. Div. 1986) | 41 | | Ali v. Rutgers, The State Univ. of N.J. | 166 N.J. 280, 287-88 (2000) | 26 | | Belfer v. Merling | 322 N.J. Super. 124, 144 (App. Div. 1999) | 48, 49 | | Borzillo v. Borzillo | 259 N.J. Super. 286, 292 (Ch. Div. 1992) | 47 | | Bove v. AkPharma Inc. | 460 N.J. Super. 123, 148 (App. Div. 2019) | 48 | | Brown v. Allied Plumbing & Heating Co. | 129 N.J.L. 442, 446 (Sup. Ct.) | 27 | | Cummings v. Bahr | 295 N.J. Super. 374, 387, 685 A.2d 60, 67 (App. Div. 1996) | 26, 27 | | DeBrango v. Summit Bancorp | 328 N.J. Super. 219, 226-27 (App. Div. 2000) | 47, 48, 49 | | DiTrolio v. Antiles | 142 N.J. 253, 273–74, 662 A.2d 494, 505 (1995) | 18 | | Ellison v. Evergreen Cemetery | 266 N.J. Super. 74, 86 (App. Div. 1993) | 49 | | Ferolito v. Park Hill Ass'n, Inc. | 408 N.J. Super. 401, 408 (App. Div. 2009) | 46, 48 | | First Atl. Fed. Credit Union v. Perez | 391 N.J. Super. 419, 432 (App. Div. 2007) | 46 | | Gelber v. Zito P'ship | 147 N.J. 561, 565, 688 A.2d 1044, 1046 (1997) | 19 | | Hawkins v. Harris | 141 N.J. 207 (1995) | 43 | | In re Palmieri | 76 N.J. 51, 385 A.2d 856 (1978) | 41 | | J-M Mfg. Co. v. Phillips & Cohen, LLP | 443 N.J. Super. 447, 459, 129 A.3d 342, 349 (App. Div. 2015) | 29 | K-Land Corp. No. 28 v. Landis Sewerage Auth., 173 N.J. 59, 70, 800 A.2d 861, 868 (2002).................................................................18 Kimball Inter’l, Inc. v. Northfield Metal Prods., 334 N.J. Super. 596, 606-07 (App. Div. 2000), certif. denied, 167 N.J. 88 (2001)..............................................26, 27 Konefal v. Landau, No. A-2781-18T2, 2020 WL 2466216, at 2–3 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. May 13, 2020).........................................................46, 47
[brief] Does racing horses at the [...] constitute any of those acts?  Who exactly decides?  Should veterinarians in [...] be prosecuted for “declawing” cats because that county prosecutor does not like that concept?  Should jockeys in [...] be able to repeatedly “lash” a horse for one (1) mile without being prosecuted because the [...] is located there and the State “directly” and “indirectly” profits from this activity, but a 12 year old at a 4H dressage activity in [...] be prosecuted for “lashing” his or her horse three (3) times because that county prosecutor is averse to horses doing anything other than roaming the pastoral countryside free of human interaction?
[brief] ”  Namerow, 461 N.J. Super. at 140.  Court’s routinely uphold waivers or contractual limitation of liability provisions within the commercial context.  See Chem. Bank of N.J. Nat’l Ass’n v. Bailey, 296 N.J. Super. 515, 526-27 (App. Div. 1997) (noting ability of parties to apportion risk of loss through contractual limitation of liabilities).  When assessing the enforceability of such a limitation/waiver provision, the court will pay attention to two “leading principle[s]”: (1) the equality of the parties’ bargaining power; and (2) whether the limitation is still sufficient to provide the party a “realistic incentive to act diligently. ”  Lucier v. Williams, 366 N.J. Super. 485, 492 (App. Div. 2004).  Here, [...], as a title insurer who was not a direct party to the transactions at issue, was clearly in a subservient role to both Plaintiff and [...] and possessed less bargaining power than both parties.  Moreover, the limitation above also leaves [...] with ample “incentive to act diligently,” as a large variety of claims can still be pursued in connection with its services – just none of the claims Plaintiff endeavors to raise.  Lucier, 366 N.J. Super. at 492.  Plaintiff cannot seek to avoid the plain meaning of this section by arguing that [...] acted with bad faith, gross negligence or willful misconduct.
[brief] And based upon these prior decisions, that is exactly what [...] did.  An examination of [...]’s October 21, 2022 Complaint reveals that it amply alleges 619 (GANN 2024 Ed.).  Paragraphs 47 and 52-55 of the Complaint make amply clear that [...] sought a determination that the Planning Board lacked jurisdiction to consider [...]’ application for development.  [Da 9-10].  And [...]’s R. 4:69-4 Statement of Factual and Legal Issues, whose purpose is discussed in Point II.B, infra, states what its legal claims were: (1) “Whether an application for development filed after the effective date of an ordinance is subject to the provisions of N.J.S.A. 40:55D-10.5”; and (2) “Whether the [...] improperly exercised jurisdiction over an application that required relief pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70(d)(3).
[brief] .........................................................  6  Nunziato v. Planning Bd. of Borough of Edgewater, 225 N.J. Super. 124 (App. Div. 1988)  ..........................................................  7, 9  Riya Finnegan LLC v. Township Council of Tp. Of South Brunswick, 197 N.J. 184 (2008)  .......................................................................................  13  SB Bldg. Assoc., L.P. v. Planning Board, Docket No. A-0200-14, 2017 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 36, (N.J. Sup. Ct., App. Div., Jan. 6, 2017), certif. den. 230 N.J. 424 (2017)
[brief] Exhibit Y, Deposition of [...], P.E., dated April 10, 2019, filed May 24, 2019  Exhibit Z, Deposition of [...], P.E., dated April 26, 2019, filed May 24, 2019  Exhibit AA, Memorandum Opinion dated August 4, 2017, filed May 24, 2019  Exhibit BB, Transcript of Hearing dated August 4, 2017, filed May 24, 2019 (Volume 14 of 15 – Pa2561 to Pa2758)
[brief] A continuous planted buffer area of not less than 30 feet in width shall be planted along side lot lines adjacent to residential development in the R-27A Zone, except that where the tract abuts the [...] right-of-way a planted buffer shall not be required.  A continuous buffer of not less than 30 feet in width shall be left undisturbed with natural vegetation and supplemented as determined to be necessary by the Board along side lot lines adjacent to the AH-2 Zone.  Planted buffers not less than 25 feet in width shall be planted between any site improvements within 50 feet of the tract boundary and the rear lot line.  (2)
[brief] At sentencing, the prosecutor argued in favor of a discretionary extended term of seven years in prison subject to an extended term of three years of parole ineligibility on each burglary count, to run concurrently.  (8T30-4 to 17).  Defendant opposed that term, instead seeking fines, probation, or a minimum concurrent sentence of three years on each count.  (8T38-6 to 16).  The trial judge sentenced defendant as a persistent offender to a concurrent discretionary extended term of six years in prison with a two-year period of parole ineligibility on each count.
[brief] See Trautner, --- A.3d ----, 2024 WL 1708605 at *10 (“Support for the court’s findings of frivolous litigation was grounded in its decision dismissing the Borough’s complaint for failure to state a claim. ”).  C.  The Trial Court Correctly Determined That Plaintiffs’ Claims Became Frivolous Once They Were Aware That [...] And [...] Did Not Consummate A Transaction.
[brief] We now conclude that when a public project requires the partial taking of property, "just compensation" to the owner must be based on consideration of all relevant, reasonably calculable, and non-conjectural factors that either decrease or increase the value of the remaining property.  In a partial-takings case, homeowners are entitled to the fair market value of their loss, not to a windfall, not to a pay out that disregards the home's enhanced value resulting from the public project.  To calculate that loss, we must look to the difference between the fair market value of the property before the partial taking and after the taking.
[brief] The sentencing court should have ordered a “complete psychological evaluation” due to the nature of the present and prior convictions and [...]’s mental condition.  First, a “complete psychological evaluation was required” under N.J.S.A. 2C:44-6b because the present offense is a first-degree crime of violence and [...] has a prior endangering conviction under N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4.  For this reason alone, a complete psychological evaluation was mandatory under this subsection.  Second, an evaluation was also necessary under N.J.S.A. 2C:44-6b because [...] suffered from a number of mental illnesses of which “psychosis” is a common symptom, including bipolar disorder.  (PSR 10-12, 16)  Rather than a diagnosis itself, psychosis is an amalgamation of symptoms resulting in dissociation from reality.  Calabrese, J. & Al Khalili, Y., *Psychosis*, StatPearls Publishing (Jan. 2024).  Although schizophrenia spectrum disorders are designated as “psychotic disorders” by the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (the “DSM V”), the DSM V also recognizes that psychosis can result from other psychological disorders.  See Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 103 (5th ed. 2022) (“DSM V”) (“[T]he diagnosis of a schizophrenia spectrum disorder requires the exclusion of another condition that may give rise to psychosis. ”).  Relevant here, psychosis is a common feature of bipolar disorder, and can also be a symptom of depression.  DSM V at 139-143, 145, 151-52, 173, 184-85; Chakrabarti, S., & Singh, N., *Psychotic Symptoms in Bipolar Disorder and Their Impact on the Illness: A Systematic Review*, 12(9) World Journal of Psychiatry 1204–1232 (2022); Arciniegas, D. B., *Psychosis*, 21(3) Behavioral Neurology and Neuropsychiatry 715–736 (2015).  For this reason, too, a complete psychiatric evaluation was necessary.
[brief] Appellate courts decline to consider questions or issues not properly presented to the trial court when an opportunity is available.  Nieder v. Royal Indemnity Ins. Co., 62 N.J. 229,234 (1973).  There, the pro se plaintiff had submitted factual data to the high court after argument & some of that material had never been submitted to the trial court or the Appellate Division.  Nonetheless, the Supreme Court remanded to the trial court on all issues.  Therefore, issues not presented below can be considered on appeal & on a remand.
[brief] In or about March 2017, [...] contacted Defendant, [...], regarding installation of a louvered system as part of an outdoor event space to connect to [...]’s existing hotel building.  (Pa246; Pa272 at 1).  The system, which was manufactured by [...], consisted of panels that were to be placed in a pre-constructed framework designed by [...]’s own engineer.  (Pa206; Pa242; Pa273 at 3).  [...] never represented the louvered system to be completely waterproof.  After numerous negotiations over a period of approximately eleven months and six revisions of the initial proposal, [...] accepted a final proposal from [...] on February 14, 2018 for installation of the louvered system.  (Pa203; Pa244; Pa246-262; Pa273 at 4-5).  Prior to acceptance of the final proposal, [...] retained a structural engineer, [...], P.E. of [...] (hereinafter “engineer”), to design a steel frame support system on which [...] would install the louvered roof.  (Pa205-06; Pa251-262; Pa268 at 5).  [...]’s engineer and its Director of Construction were involved in the negotiation, planning, and design process.
[brief] To develop a quantitative and analytical pathway to achieve the dual goals of 100% clean energy and the GWRA emissions reductions requirements, [...] and [...] worked together with two contractors, [...] ([...]) and [...] ([...]), to develop an Integrated Energy Plan for New Jersey.  The Integrated Energy Plan analyzed changes to New Jersey's economy-wide energy system (including the electricity, transportation, industry, and building sectors) that would allow the state to meet its clean energy targets, its emission reduction targets, and its energy needs while containing costs.  [Ha451-452, Holm-18 at 15-16.]
[brief] He resided in the site neighborhood from age 3 to 21 and attended the [...] from 1963 through 1970.  Then the school buses dropped the children off on Sixth Street and the children would enter the School through the Sixth Street Courtyard and play in the courtyard before school, during recess, and after school.  In his observations, no vehicles parked in the Sixth Street courtyard.  Thereafter, during the 1970's/1980's he would occasionally observe the site and did not observe any parking.  About 10 years ago, he began to observe parked vehicles in the courtyard (12T49-22 to 65-3).  On cross-examination, it was established that after ceasing attendance at the school in about 1970, he visited the site relatively infrequently (12T65-8 to 81-17).
[brief] The Stormwater Management Rules set forth minimum design and performance standards for groundwater recharge, requiring that a design engineer either: i. Demonstrate through hydrologic and hydraulic analysis that the site and its stormwater management measures maintain 100 percent of the average annual pre-construction groundwater recharge volume for the site; or ii. Demonstrate through hydrologic and hydraulic analysis that the increase of stormwater runoff volume from pre-construction to post-construction for the projected two-year storm, as defined and determined pursuant to N.J.A.C. 7:8-5.7(d), is infiltrated.  [N.J.A.C. 7:8-5.4(b)].  Plaintiffs argue that [...]’s approved stormwater management design fails to meet groundwater recharge requirements by not maintaining the same amount of groundwater recharge in the post-development condition.  Plaintiffs cite the requirement within the Stormwater Management Rules for a design that includes one or more BMPs that will infiltrate stormwater into the subsoil at N.J.A.C. 7:8-5.2(h).  Plaintiffs then engage in a lengthy interpretation regarding the requirements of the BMP Manual without citing to any source.  (Pb10-13).  Plaintiffs conclude:  Using the native soil horizontal conductivity values, [...] found that the proposed recharge BMPs did not fail the groundwater mounding analysis.  However, in order to get the system to pass the groundwater analysis, [...] failed to follow the BMP Manual in calculating the seasonal high water table.  (Pb13).  However, Plaintiffs cite no evidence in support of its conclusion that [...] failed to follow the guidance contained in the BMP Manual when calculating the seasonal highwater table.  The [...], which has ultimate authority to assess the BMPs employed by [...] in its design, disagreed, rejecting the assertions made by Plaintiffs related to that design in the [...]’s approved Engineering Report, finding that the groundwater recharge requirements of the Stormwater Management Rules were met.
[brief] [...], Intuitive Error Rate Estimates for the Forensic Sciences, 57 Jurimetrics 153, 162 (2017)……………………………..Da 77-92  [...] & [...], Juror Perceptions of Opposing Expert Forensic Psychologists: Preexisting Attitudes, Confirmation Bias, and Belief Perseverance, 28 Psychol. Pub. Pol’y & L. 213 (2017)………………………………………..Da 93-105
[brief] You see that I only have four rows and I have two defendants and I need—I'm calling up seventy jurors and it's not really—probably not even enough but that's all I can fit here and I can't fit that many if I have you guys, okay?  So you know obviously you can stay in the hallway but the only thing is if you would stay down towards the other end, I—it's very important that you not mingle with these jurors in any way.*  You certainly—we don't want that to happen, it's not permitted and you certainly don't want anybody saying anything about you and you know that you were there, you were talking to somebody or anything like that.  So you'll end up riding up and down the elevators with the jurors and stuff like that.  You can't talk to them, okay?  So thanks very much, I really appreciate it but I'm going to need all those seats.  [ (Emphasis added.)  ]  We will review these instructions in the context of the following analytical framework.