ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] A. jury.  Where the grand jury opts not to originate charges, and where Informing the grand appropriate factual circumstances exist, the grand jury will be instructed as to its authority to return a presentment pursuant to Court Rule 3:6-9.  For example, a presentment may be appropriate where, although no individual officer has committed a crime with respect to a pattern of deaths of civilians while in custody, the grand jury wishes to comment on the corruption of the relevant institution as a matter of public affairs or conditions.  7  B.  Procedure.  In cases where a majority of the grand jury votes to issue a presentment, the assigned prosecutor should follow the procedures set forth in Rule 3:6-9.  Additionally:  A proposed presentment will be prepared immediately following the grand jury vote to request such a presentment document.  Careful further legal instruction of the grand jury may be necessary to ensure that the presentment issues in proper format for submission to the assignment judge, per Rule 3:6-9.  In order to protect the integrity of the grand jury process, any fatal police encounter case that appears to present facts that may trigger a grand jury request to issue a presentment should be scheduled as early in the grand jury’s term as possible.  C. release.  The Independent Investigator shall prepare a statement for public Press dissemination after any presentment that is based on the factual material within the presentment document itself.  VI.
[brief] Appellant’s interpretation of §§ 1692c(b), 1692d(3), and 1692f would lead to several other absurd results that are plainly in conflict with the statutory scheme as a whole.  For instance, it would prohibit debt collectors from communicating with the courts and their staff.  After all, aside from permitting communication with the debt collector’s attorney, § 1692c(b) contains no additional carve-outs for courts and their staff, just as it contains no carve-out for letter vendors or other service providers.  Yet the FDCPA specifically envisions debt collectors being involved in collection suits and needing to correspond with the court.  See 15 U.S.C. § 1692i.  Similarly, Appellant’s proposed interpretation of the FDCPA would also prohibit a debt collector from communicating with its own employees, who under Appellant’s theory are non-exempted persons.  But the vast majority of debt collectors, including Respondent, are juridical entities that can only act through hired persons.
[brief] vi.  Given the extensive and repeated litigation associated with the general matter and related matters, the Respondent Planning Board Members are well versed in the subject Redevelopment Plan and Amendments associated therewith.  The [...] has had a number of occasions to formally review, in depth, the Redevelopment Plan, and amendments related thereto (particularly in light of the at least 3-6 related litigation cases associated with, and / or otherwise connected to, the same).  Specifically, the Respondent [...] reviewed the matter when the actual Waterfront Redevelopment Plan was statutorily/initially forwarded to the [...], the matter was reviewed when the first Amendment was forwarded to the [...], and the matter was again reviewed when the second Amendment was forwarded to the [...].  The general matters were also reviewed at various points of the related 3-6 companion litigation cases.  As such it is respectfully submitted that the [...] Members / representatives are well versed in the intricacies of the Beachway Avenue Waterfront Redevelopment Plan, and proposed Amendments associated therewith.  Consequently, it is submitted that judicial validation of the [...]’s determination is warranted.
[brief] This appeal is the latest effort by Defendant-Appellant [...] d/b/a [...] (“[...]” or “[...]”) to deprive Plaintiffs-Respondents [...] (“[...]”) and [...] (“[...]”) (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) of their rights to seek legal recourse and a jury trial in the Superior Court of New Jersey based on purported arbitration agreements that Plaintiffs have never seen, let alone executed or assented to.  [...]’s continued efforts to circumvent Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights should be seen for what it is: a self-serving attempt to hide [...]’s and their former employees’ unlawful conduct.  As the trial court correctly determined, the Plaintiffs never knowingly and voluntarily waived their rights to bring claims in this forum.  Simply put, Plaintiffs could not assent to such a waiver because they never even knew the arbitration agreement existed until after this action commenced.  As [...] tacitly admits, neither [...] nor their former employee, defendant [...] (“[...]”), ever provided an arbitration agreement to Plaintiffs, let alone that Plaintiffs signed the agreement, electronically or otherwise.  Because [...] cannot dispute that the Plaintiffs were never provided with the arbitration agreement at any time before this lawsuit was filed, they instead attempt to posit a novel theory that Plaintiffs should be compelled to arbitrate and foreclosed from accessing this Court for relief because they “receiv[ed] the benefits” of [...]’s “investment advice. ”  This argument falls flat, however, when faced with the reality that [...]’s willful or negligent conduct resulted in the theft of more than four times the amount of “returns” that [...]’s “advice” yielded.  Met with the reality that this argument is baseless, [...] also attempts force in an argument that was improperly presented to the motion judge for the first time in its reply brief based on a browsewrap agreement hidden in [...]’s website.
[brief] See DA16-DA18 at ¶¶ 6,10, 14 and 17.  In exchange, the Township agreed: (i) that Plaintiff is medically disabled; (ii) to place Plaintiff on medical leave, pending the determination of his disability retirement application; (iii) to file an IOD application on behalf of Plaintiff; (iv) to take all necessary steps to effectuate Plaintiff’s application; (v) to provide accurate and truthful information in response to any inquiry from the [...] regarding Plaintiff and/or the Agreement; (vi) to dismiss any disciplinary charges filed or contemplated alleging that Plaintiff is unfit for duty; and (vii) that Plaintiff’s resignation was made in good standing and with no allegation of misconduct or delinquency pending other than that arising out of and related to his medical disability.
[brief] [...] should not be so quick to dismiss the claimed “equitable gloss,” when it has made tens of millions of dollars from premium payments by policyholders.  The impact on its policyholders is not nebulous concept, as [...] argues (See Ab43).  Those concerns are real and the rules are structured to prevent overreaching by carriers in seeking premium rate increases to strike the correct balance. \footnote{The NAIC’s Guidelines add that in using judgment, a major concern is “gaming,” that is, complying with the letter of the law, but pushing the limits and definitions beyond common sense.  The possibility of gaming should be avoided by insurers and actuaries. ” (Ra241). }  Simply put, there is no basis in the record to reverse the Commissioner’s decision.  [...] had fair notice of the standards.  Regardless of [...]’s disagreement, because the Department, the ALJ, and the Commissioner relied on the documentary evidence, the facts and testimony, as well as the expert testimony in reviewing the premium rate increase request, appropriately read in context with the spirit and purpose of the LTCI Act, and reached a conclusion supported by substantial, credible evidence in this record, the disapproval of its rates should be affirmed.
[brief] [...] then collected a projectile that was found in the body, and [...]’s wallet, sneakers, jogging pants, sweatshirt, and some other clothing articles.  (5T58-14 to 21).  She then brought the items back to the [...] and secured them in the vault.  (5T59-12 to 21).  On January 23, 2020, [...], an expert in the field of forensic pathology and autopsies, conducted the autopsy on [...].
[brief] The Report found that a significant amount of the curriculum is developed in-house without oversight from an Assistant Superintendent in charge of curriculum.  (Ra135; Ra203).  Consequently, there is a “lack of evidence, research-based, current resources to support the curriculum. ” (Ra135).  And the locally-developed curricular resources are “not research backed or supported,” and do not fully align with State standards.  (Ra136).  They also contain “mistakes” that teachers “constantly . . . find and report. ” (Ra212).  As for curricular resources purchased by [...], the Report found the resources being used are old; some materials are at least eleven years old.  (Ra135; Ra205).  The Report also described [...]’s “strong commitment to the use of scripts and pacing guides at every grade level and within each content area. ” (Ra136; Ra207).  Teachers receive a script and instructional framework for each lesson.  (Ra207-08).  These scripts and guides are created in-district, and require teachers to stay within ten days of the pacing guide expectations.  (Ra136; Ra207-08).  The scripts and guides are also subject to “constant” change both during and at the end of the year, “which means that teachers are relearning the curriculum and often familiarizing themselves” with new lessons constantly.  (Ra136; Ra210).  Teachers are also subject to “significant” oversight to ensure they adhere to the scripts and pacing guides.
[brief] Through this network, Plaintiff [...] met [...].  346a-347a (29:8-30:1).  [...] is the former Director of the Low Income Housing Tax Credit Division for the State of New Jersey where he oversaw the selection, financing and building of low income housing, primarily COAH housing.  1005a-1006a (9:25-10:11).  He subsequently opened a consulting firm that assists developers with obtaining financing and developing COAH projects.  1005a-1006a (9:25-10:11).  [...] met with Plaintiff [...] a number of times and testified at his deposition that he could have successfully helped Plaintiff [...] obtain the necessary funding to develop [...] on his own, or that he could have partnered Plaintiff [...] with a COAH developer to facilitate the development of [...].
[brief] Nevertheless, defendant’s presence in the vehicle a mere three days after the shooting incident and his knowledge regarding the BB gun found in that vehicle are similar in kind and reasonably close in time to the offense charged in this case.  Thus, the second *Cofield* prong is met.  The third prong requires that evidence of the other crime be clear and convincing.  *State v. Garrison*, 228 N.J. 182, 197 (2017).  The clear and convincing standard means more than proof by a preponderance of the evidence but less than proof beyond a reasonable doubt.  *State v. Campbell*, 436 N.J. Super. 264, 270 (App. Div. 2014).  “Clear and convincing ‘evidence is that which “produce[s] in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought to be established,” evidence “so clear, direct and weighty and convincing as to enable (the factfinder) to come to a clear conviction, without hesitancy, of the truth of the precise facts in issue. ”’”  *State v. Hernandez*, 170 N.J. 106, 127 (2001) (quoting *In re Samay*, 166 N.J. 25, 30 (2001)).  Here, the other-crime evidence is defendant’s own statement, which, as the State has proven beyond a reasonable doubt and which the motion court properly found, was given after defendant knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived his *Miranda* rights.  See *State v. Tillery*, 238 N.J. 293, 316 (2019) (recognizing the State bears the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant’s *Miranda* waiver was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary).  Given that the evidence is defendant’s own statement, which was knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily given, the third prong of the *Cofield* test is satisfied.
[brief] I.  **THE LOWER COURT CORRECTLY GRANTED RESPONDENT’S MOTION BECAUSE APPELLANT LACKS STANDING**  The Lower Court correctly dismissed the Complaint because Appellant lacks standing to assert a claim under the NJCFA.  A.  **There is No Private Right of Action Under the NJCFLA**  New Jersey courts have long uniformly held that there is no express or implied private right of action for NJCFLA claims.  *See Veras v. LVNV Funding, LLC*, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34176, 2014 WL 1050512, at *9 (D.N.J. Mar. 17, 2014) (“A review of the NJCFLA reveals that the Legislature did not provide for a private right of action to enforce the requirements of the Act. ”); *Jubelt v. United N. Bankers, Ltd.*, No. CIV.A. 13-7150 ES, 2015 WL 3970227, at *14 (D.N.J. June 30, 2015) (same).5  This Court recently affirmed this long-standing precedent and unequivocally held that there is no private right of action under the NJCFLA, and “[p]laintiff cannot circumvent the lack of a private right of action by seeking relief under the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act, N.J.S.A. 2A:16-50 to 62. ”  *Woo-Padva v. Midland Funding*, 2023 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1550, 2023 WL 6157245, *8-9 (Sup. Ct. App. Div. Sept. 21, 2023) (“*Woo-Padva 2*”); see *Excel Pharmacy Servs., LLC v. Liberty Mut. Ins.*, 825 F. App’x 65, 70 (3d Cir. 2020) (“[b]ut it is well settled that parties cannot bring a declaratory judgment under a statute when there is no private right of action under that statute.
[brief] Finally, the Supreme Court recognized that even the ABN Policy statement, which provides the support for [...]’s refusal to conduct an exam if it is recorded, permits recording in certain circumstances, such as by court order.  Id.  The only basis that Defendants cite to demonstrate good cause as required by R. 4:10-3 to restrict the exam from being recorded is “[...] following his association's recommendations not to audio tape because of the potential invalidating the integrity of the process.
[brief] Regarding the first two Loigman factors, here, it was [...] who brought the criminal charges against [...] and this case for access to records regarding the [...]'s failure to ultimately prosecute [...].  These two factors plainly weigh in favor of disclosure because disclosure of the records would not discourage [...] or other citizens from pursuing criminal charges against corrupt public officials.  Furthermore, when citizens like [...] bypass county prosecutors and directly bring criminal charges, they must file public certifications and swear an oath before a judge.  R. 7:2-1(a).  Therefore, there are no issues of witness or complainant confidentiality.  3.
[directive] Deadly Weapon.  Deadly weapon means any firearm or other weapon, device, instrument, material or substance, whether animate or inanimate, which in the manner it is used or is intended to be used, is known to be capable of producing death or serious bodily injury, or in the manner in which it is fashioned would lead the victim reasonably to believe it to be capable of producing death or serious bodily injury.  See N.J.S.A. 2C:11-1(c).  3.6
[brief] N.J.S.A. § 2A:15-5.12(c)(4).  ....[T]he court finds the award of 2.5 times the amount of compensatory damages to be reasonable under all the circumstances to punish [...][] for his brazen conduct.  N.J.S.A. § 2A:15-5.14(a).  [...][] owed his partners the highest duty of loyalty and honesty.  Plaintiffs entered into a relationship of trust that was secured by their partnership agreement and partnership law.  They expected [...] to uphold that trust.  Instead, he broke that trust by intentionally misappropriating partnership assets for his own personal benefit.  Because [...][]’s conduct was so brazen and so contrary to any notion of a partnership or any notion of general equity, the imposition of punitive damages is reasonable and serves the purpose of punishing [...][] for his actions.  N.J.S.A. § 2A:15-5.14(a).
[brief] Those emails (which petitioners still have not produced) do not mention anything regarding strategy, settlement posture, testamentary intent, how much was in decedent's estate or what petitioners may be entitled to under the Wills.  Cf. Rb2, 16.  Certainly, if they had, petitioners would be featuring them front and center.  Finally, petitioners continue to prate about the allegedly equivocal nature of the [...].  The statement "I do not recall" is unequivocal.  Unequivocal does not mean truthful – many unequivocal statements are untrue.  As an example, on January 26, 1998, [...] unequivocally stated, "I did not have sexual relations with that woman."  That statement was proven false.  Again, the purpose of RPC 1.18 is to prevent a lawyer who has consulted with a prospective from using or revealing information acquired in the consultation.
[brief] The elements of a conversion claim are: “(a) that the property and right to immediate possession thereof belong to the plaintiff; and (b) the wrongful act of interference with that right by the defendant. ”  First National Bank v. North Jersey Trust Co., 18 N.J. Misc. 449 (N.J. 1940); Marsellis-Warner Corp., supra, 51 F. Supp. 2d at 525.  However, in order for a plaintiff to prevail on a conversion claim, they must establish that they made a demand on the defendant to return the unlawfully acquired property prior to bringing suit.
[directive] Reports, Records and Other Documents  7.2.1  All relevant reports should be obtained and preserved as expeditiously as possible.  Internal agency reports relating to a subject officer's duties should be examined.  Examples of such INTERNAL AFFAIRS POLICY & PROCEDURES | November 2022  34 reports include arrest and investigative reports, and radio, patrol, vehicle and evidence logs pertaining to or completed by the officer.  7.2.2  The investigator should also examine and retrieve all electronic, computer, digital and video records.  These may include analog and digital records created by radio and telephone recorders, computer aided dispatch systems, mobile data terminals, in-car video systems, video surveillance systems and other forms of audio and video recording.  In these cases, the relevant data should be copied to an appropriate medium as soon as possible and retained by internal affairs.  7.2.3  Records and documents of any other individual or entity that could prove helpful in the investigation should be examined.  These may include reports from other law enforcement agencies, hospital records, doctors' reports, jail records, court transcripts, F.B.I. or S.B.I. records, motor vehicle abstracts and telephone and cellular phone records.  In some instances, a search or communications data warrant or a subpoena may be necessary to obtain the information.  7.3
[brief] This court must now stand up for those students because it is not clear that anyone else will.  As the New Jersey Supreme Court stated many years ago, the judiciary must be the “designated last-resort guarantor” of the students’ fundamental constitutional rights to T&E.  *Robinson v. Cahill*, 69 N.J. 133, 154 (1975).  Earlier in that opinion, the Supreme Court made a statement that anticipates the situation currently before this court:  The Court has now come face to face with a constitutional exigency involving, on a level of plain, stark and unmistakable reality, the constitutional obligation of the Court to act.  Id. at 139.  In its response to that obligation, the Court stated:  This Court, as the designated last-resort guarantor of the Constitution’s command, possesses and must use power equal to its responsibility.  Sometimes, unavoidably incident thereto and in response to a constitutional mandate, the Court must act, even in a sense seem to encroach, in areas otherwise reserved to other Branches of government….And while the court does so, when it must, with restraint and even reluctance, there comes a time when no alternative remains.  That time has now arrived.  Id. at 154-55.  Respectfully submitted, s/ [...]
[directive] While Incarceration Incarceration  39:3-40(f)(2)  Zone Zone Zone Registration for - while Suspension Revoke suspended Suspend  Suspend  Driving Revoke School School School - N.J.S. Drive Fine Fine DL DL 15  [...] consult above.  the position a Div. are for though (Law certificate 39:3-40(f)(1)-(3) listed please in suspended this found schedule 155 provisions adopted 39:3-40(f)(1)-(3), 1987), Offense those registration 151, is license
[brief] Again, nothing personal to this expert, and I don't even know if the defense is going to question his qualifications.  But the issue becomes, as I've said, the report's indication that unlike in other areas of scientific testing the errors for false positives, or is -- I think it was -- I'm looking for the exact page here.  I can't find it.  As I recall it as, like, one in 46 as opposed to in other areas of scientific testing they mentioned for the DNA one and ten billion, that there would be an error in saying that DNA came from that person.  Instead, this was -- and that sticks out in my head, although I still can't find it, one in 46, much different.  So, the issue is not with this particular expert.  The issue is with the reliability of the testing, and from that perspective Limited -- granted the defense's motion to limit the testimony to not being -- saying with any degree of certainty that bullet came from that gun, or that shell cartridge, or fragment came from that gun.
[brief] 17  Mann v. Heil Packer, 2010 WL 98883 (App. Div. Jan. 13, 2010) ........................................ 19, 21 Marinelli v. Mitts & Merrill, 303 N.J. Super. 61 (App. Div. 1997) ....................................................  17  Martin v. Rutgers Cas. Ins. Co., 346 N.J. Super. 320 (App. Div. 2002) ..................................................  14  Massachi v. AHL Servs., Inc., 396 N.J. Super. 486 (App. Div. 2007) ..................................................  14  Mattos v. Barn Bros., Inc., No. A-4, 187-10T3, 2012 WL 5187975 (App. Div. Oct. 22, 2012)  .......................  25 Millison v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 101 N.J. 161 (1985)  ...........................................................................  15, 17, 18, 26 Mull v. Zeta Consumer Products, 176 N.J. 385 (2003)  ..........................................................................  20, 30 Soto v. ICO Polymers N. Amer., 2017 WL 4530602 (App. Div. Oct. 11, 2017), cert. denied, 232 N.J. 94 (2018)
[directive] The critical question remains whether the public employee has a reasonable expectation of privacy in information stored in a device.  While the determination of a 38  INTERNAL AFFAIRS POLICY & PROCEDURES | June 2021 reasonable expectation of privacy must be decided on a case-by-case basis, the law enforcement agency should take steps to actively and affirmatively diminish this expectation.  The agency should state, in writing, that it retains the right to enter and review the contents of any agency-issued device at any time.  This notice may be worded as follows:  The agency may assign to its members and employees agency-owned electronic devices, including computers and smartphones, for business purposes.  Such equipment and its contents are and remain the property of the agency.  Personnel are prohibited from installing unauthorized software and from storing personal information in the device, regardless of any password protection or encryption.  The devices, their contents, and any email or electronic correspondence originating from or arriving at the device are the property of the agency and are subject to entry and inspection without notice.  7.8.8