ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] *Id.*  The plaintiff appealed the attorneys’ fees determination, arguing that because he voluntarily dismissed his suit, the defendants did not “prevail” as required to recover attorneys’ fees.  *Id.*  At a matter of first impression, the D.C. Court of Appeals rejected this argument, holding that the text of the Anti-SLAPP Act, the court’s precedents, and the purpose of the statute all supported the conclusion that the plaintiff’s voluntary dismissal was not a bar to an award of attorneys’ fees under the Act.
[brief] [Pa100-Pa131].  Neither the PNDA nor the FNDA make any charge against Appellant relating to the Facebook Incident.  [Pa64-Pa99].  [...]’s OAL Trial decision does not reference the Facebook Incident.  [Pa12-Pa63].  The CSC decision does not reference the Facebook Incident.  [Pa9-Pa11].  The Facebook Incident had no bearing on Appellant’s termination and is not relevant to the instant matter.  [Pa9-Pa131].
[directive] Core Principle Five Duty to Intervene and Report.  Every officer, regardless of rank, title, seniority, or status, has an affirmative duty to take steps to prevent any use of force that is illegal, excessive, or otherwise inconsistent with such policies, regulations, and laws, if possible, before a fellow officer uses excessive, illegal, or otherwise inappropriate force.  Every officer has a duty to immediately report any improper use of force.  5.1
[directive] Client Signature Date of7 by Page 5  Promulgated Directive #20-21 (08/11/2021)  Court Phase Reqmrements  Drue; Name I  Probation Officer Date Reviewed Track A - Phase 4  Requirements  Review each requirement with staff and sign you understand the expectations.  ______________ •  I will attend court monthly at: _ • I will follow my treatment plan and relapse prevention plan at: _________ ________________ .  Phone Number: _ of my probation supervision and meet every other week with • I will follow the conditions on probation officer time.  Probation officer: __________  Phone Number: .  I will immediately notify my probation officer of of any conflicts prior to my appointment or in case an emergency.  my • I will review my case plan with probation officer as needed.  • I will allow probation officers into my residence for home visits and home inspections.  ______ • I will submit to random drug testing.  Testing hotline number: _ _______ (ID#: ) if • I will maintain housing and I will keep my probation officer informed my residence changes.  • I will address any recommended medical/dental needs.  • I will demonstrate changing people, places, and things.  my • I will maintain attending recovery groups and recovery network per treatment.  • I will follow my financial plan and begin making payments per case plan.  • I will address supportive services as recommended (for example, parenting classes, family support, etc.).  •  I will maintain pro-social activities.  job search, or school.  •  I will begin employment or start vocational training,  If owe • I money, I will be given a CEP court date.  I have reviewed the requirements for Phase 4 and understand my responsibilities to the drug court program.
[brief] What [...] was expressing was, that as time progressed and [...] remained undelivered, [...] faced a heightened risk of the bad outcome she ultimately suffered.  This makes eminent sense: the longer one is deprived of oxygen, the greater the risk of a poor outcome.  [...] opined that [...] was delivered 39 minutes after the alarming strip reading.  He testified, to a reasonable degree of medical probability, that this delay in delivering [...] caused her injuries.  In support of this, he testified that the injuries suffered by [...] were a near certainty as a result of prolonged deprivation beyond 25 to 30 minutes.
[brief] (Da1-5)  All three boys were juveniles at the time of the incident.  [...] was arrested on the murder charges on March 6, 1994, and has been continuously incarcerated since that date – a period of over 30 years.  (1T34-5 to 6)  Though initially charged as a juvenile because he was only 17 years old, [...] was later waived to the Law Division to be tried as an adult.  All three boys were charged with the murders in [...].  (Da1-5)  [...] was specifically charged with felony murder in the death of [...] (Count Three); purposeful or knowing murder of [...] (Count Four); and nine other related offenses.  (Da1-5)  On March 28, 1995, [...] pled guilty to both murder charges pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement.  (Da6-9)  (1T4-3 to 5-18)  On May 18, 1995, the Hon. [...], J.S.C., heard argument on sentencing, allocution testimony from [...], and expert testimony from a psychologist and a psychiatrist on [...]’s behalf.  (2T)  Judge Ridgway sentenced [...] to a term of life imprisonment on each count, both subject to a 30-year parole disqualifier, to run consecutively – resulting in an aggregate sentence of life imprisonment with a sixty-year term of parole ineligibility.  (2T96-13 to 21)  (Da10-13)  The remaining counts were dismissed.  (2T96-22 to 97-1)  (Da10-13)  [...] appealed his sentence, which this Court affirmed on October 27, 1997, and the Supreme Court subsequently denied certification.  State v. [...], No. A-6326-94 (App. Div. Oct. 27, 1997); State v. [...], 153 N.J. 48 (1998).
[directive] Bail Range 10%  Cash Bail Option  b(3)  Actor causes or permits a child to engage in a prohibited sexual act or in the simulation of such an act if the person knows, has reason to know or intends that the prohibited act may 2nd Degree $50,000 to $100,000  No 10% be photographed, filmed, reproduced or reconstructed in any manner, including on the Internet, or may be part of an exhibition or performance, first degree.  b(4)  Actor photographs or films a child in a prohibited sexual act or in the simulation of such Endangering an act or who uses any device, including a computer, to reproduce or reconstruct the image Welfare of 2C:24-4(a)(b) of a child in a prohibited sexual act or the simulation of such an act, second degree.  Children/Possession/ (continued)  Distribution of Child b(5)(a)  Actor, by any means, including but not limited to the Internet, knowingly distributes an Pornography item depicting the sexual exploitation or abuse of a child, or knowingly possesses an item (continued) depicting the sexual exploitation or abuse of a child with intent to distribute that item, or, using a file-sharing program, knowingly stores or maintains an item depicting the sexual 3rd Degree $20,000 to $50,000 10% permissible exploitation or abuse of a child which is designated as available for searching by or copying to one or more other computers, second degree.  b(5)(b)  Actor knowingly possesses, receives, views, or has under his control, through any means, including the Internet, an item depicting the sexual exploitation or abuse of a child, third degree.  51  Updated December 2, 2013  Bail Schedule 2
[brief] To reiterate, as stated by the Supreme Court, “we have insisted that the only true test of the validity of an ordinance will be in its application in particular cases. ”  *Mayes v. Jackson Tp. Rent Leveling Board*, 103 N.J. 362, 377 (1986).  “The ultimate question will always remain whether the ordinance, as applied, has a confiscatory effect upon the property.
[brief] Since both acquire possession from the outset and neither intends to distribute the drug to a third person, neither serves as a link in the chain of distribution. ”  *State v. Lopez*, 359 N.J. Super. 222, 234 (2003).  In *Lopez*, this Honorable Court held that the evidence presented at trial was equivocal and could establish that both defendants possessed the contraband with intent to keep it for personal use.
[brief] [...] moved for summary judgment on numerous grounds, including that under settled New Jersey law, there was nothing defective about the product.  2T at 8.  And there is no duty to equip every vehicle with every possible technology, or to design an accident-proof vehicle.  *Id.* at 9.  Indeed, LDW and LKAS are designed to assist with driving the vehicle; they do not replace the driver’s need to exercise common sense control over the vehicle.  *Id.* at 10.  Additionally, [...] argued that, under New Jersey law, manufacturers are not liable if the allegedly unsafe characteristic of the product is known to the ordinary consumer or user, and here, the ordinary consumer is well aware of the need to control her vehicle and of the potentially fatal consequences from not doing so.
[brief] See N.J.A.C. § 1:1-16.1 to -16.6.  That is, there was no notice-and-comment period.  N.J.S.A. 52:14B-4.  As extensively discussed above, a threshold dispute between the existing parties to the appeal is whether the Bulletin is a “regulatory guidance document” that does not require a notice-and-comment period.  See N.J.S.A. 52:14B-3a(d.).  [...] maintains that the impact of the Bulletin is such that following the Administrative Procedures Act was required.
[brief] STANDARD OF REVIEW.  No special standards of appellate review govern summary actions conducted pursuant to Rule 4:67.  Rather, the usual standards of review for civil --- 7 Paragraph 24(G) preserves “[P]erelman’s right to receive any remaining amount of the Reserve or any other assets that are attributable to [[...]] from [...]’s Estate and [...]’s Revocable Trust pursuant to this Agreement. ”  (Da096a.) cases apply.  See, e.g., O’Connell v. N.J. Mfrs. Ins. Co., 306 N.J. Super. 166, 172-73 (App. Div. 1997), certif. granted, 153 N.J. 405, appeal dismissed, 157 N.J. 537 (1998).  Accordingly, for purposes of this appeal, this Court reviews the Trial Court’s legal interpretation of the Settlement Agreement, [...]’s Will, and [...]’s Revocable Trust de novo.  The Borough of Fort Lee v. Hudson Terrace Realty Mgmt. Corp., 2005 WL 3108187, at *6 (App. Div. Nov. 22, 2005)⁸ (“Here, there are no genuine issues of material fact [in connection with the summary action] but the parties dispute the legal significance of the facts .
[directive] Unless the plea agreement provides otherwise, you could be sentenced to serve the b.  [Yes/Si] maximum time in confinement, to pay the maximum fine and to pay the maximum Victims of Crime Compensation Office Assessment?  A menos que el convenio declaratorio estipule otra cosa, se le podria sentenciar a cumplir el tiempo maximo y de reclusion, a pagar la multa maxima a pagar la multa maxima de la Oficina de Compensacion a Victimas de Delitos?  [No/No]  You must pay a minimum Victims of Crime Compensation Office Assessment of $50 ($100 c.  [Yes/Si] minimum if you are convicted of a crime of violence) for each count to which you plead guilty?  (Penalty is $30 if offense occurred between January 9, 1986 and December 22, 1991 inclusive.  $25 if offense occurred before January 1, 1986.)  Tendra que pagar una multa minima de Ia Oficina de Compensacion a Victimas de Delitos de $50 do Jares (un minimo de $100 dolares si se le condena por un delito violento) por cada cargo al que usted se declare y culpable?
[directive] Whenever a domestic violence call involving a law enforcement officer does not result in an arrest or a warrant is not sought, the on-scene supervisor will explain in a written report why these actions were not taken, and the report shall be forwarded to the Internal Affairs Unit.  10.  The on-scene supervisor will notify the Chief of Police or Law Enforcement Chief Executive through the chain of command as soon as possible.  If the officer is from another jurisdiction, the supervisor will ensure that notification is made to the Chief of Police or Law Enforcement Chief Executive in the department where the accused officer is employed.  All notifications, and attempts to notify, will be fully documented in writing and shall be forwarded to the Internal Affairs Unit.
[brief] ”  Palamarg Realty Co., 80 N.J. at 453.  To this end, purchasers are chargeable only with what appears in the record or within a “reasonable” title search.  Island Venture, 359 N.J. Super. at 397.  “A purchaser is not required to go back through his chain of title and inquire of each owner as to whether or not the premises are restricted. ”  Hammett v. Rosensohn, 46 N.J. Super. 527, 535 (App. Div. 1957).  “A purchaser or mortgagee for value without notice, actual or constructive, acquires a title or lien interest free from all latent equities existing in favor of third persons. ”  Howard v. Diolosa, 241 N.J. Super. 222, 232 (App. Div. 1990).
[brief] There the South Brunswick 2001 Master Plan and its Land Use Element continued the plaintiff's property and adjacent properties along Route 27 in the Neighborhood Commercial (C-1) Zone, allowing retail service businesses and professional business offices in mixed use developments.  Upon the owner’s application for a conforming structure of retail service (drug store) and professional office uses, nearby residents petitioned for a rezoning to eliminate the retail service component.  The Planning Board, after a public hearing, recommended the Governing Body rezone plaintiff's property from C-1 (Neighborhood Commercial) to OP (Office Professional), eliminating neighborhood retail while continuing professional offices.  However noted, the 2001 Master Plan recommended the area as C-1 and recommended OP zoning for other areas along Route 1.  Both the Planning Board and Governing Body determined the change to OP was not substantially consistent with the Master Plan, so the Governing Body in accord with N.J.S.A. 40:55D-62 adopted an accompanying "reasons resolution" setting forth why the OP rezoning was deemed appropriate.  The owner then filed suit challenging the OP Rezoning.  The Trial Court invalidated the Rezoning on the basis that, even though the adoption conformed to the MLUL special requirements, the change was based solely on the neighbor protests and not grounded in sound planning in accord with the Master Plan.  See 386 N.J. Super. 255 (Law Div. 2006).  The Appellate Court reversed that invalidation, finding that the Municipality adequately complied with the special adoption requirements and the basis was a legislative judgment which would not be disturbed.
[directive] (a)  The Training Committee shall report to the AGCCTF supervisors, the SDAG and DSP Bureau Chief.  The Training Committee shall coordinate efforts with the NJSP Training Academy, New Jersey Regional Computer Forensic Laboratory, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the DCJ Training Academy, the Office of the Attorney General's Advocacy Institute and all other relevant training -12- resources, to identify training topics and to develop training programs for law enforcement investigators and prosecutors.  (b)  The Training Committee shall also organize community outreach programs and speaking opportunities for the IRU, CCU, DTIU and legal staff.  All staff members of the Task Force will be made available to participate in the training program to share their specialized knowledge with the New Jersey law enforcement community.  (c)  The Training Committee shall also maintain continuing education records for IRU, CCU and DTIU staff.  The Training Committee shall ascertain training requirements for IRU, CCU and DTIU staff through recommendations by unit members.  (d)  The Training Committee shall be responsible for drafting appropriate grant applications or justification memoranda to ensure timely filings of training applications and requests for travel.  The Training. Committee shall make recommendations to the (e) Attorney General concerning training requirements necessary to ensure proficiency and technical expertise of Task Force members.  11.  Access to Departmental Resources.  The AGCCTF shall be authorized to call upon the expertise and assistance of every division, agency, office, bureau and unit within the Department of Law and Public Safety, and the County -13- Prosecutors' Offices, in order to carry out its mission.
[directive] 9  Do you have any familiarity with [specify the type of medical condition involved] or any familiarity with the types of treatment available?  10.  Are you, or have you ever been, related (by blood or marriage) to anyone affiliated with the health care field?  If so, please describe:  11.  Have you or any relative or close personal friend ever had a dispute with respect to a health care issue of any kind with a doctor, chiropractor, dentist, nurse, hospital employee, technician or other person employed in the health care field?
[directive] Subsection 3. is acomplaint-warrant for application an subsection b, new this Under been added.  second- (a) committed defendant a that believe to cause probable is when there presumed or officials on public assault third-degree (b) 2C:29-2(b), N.J.S.A. eluding, degree photographing, involving the offenses certain (c) or 2C:12-1(b)(5), N.1.S.A. employees, (b)(5).  or (b)(4), 2C:24-4(b)(3), N.J.S.A. child, a of abuse or exploitation, sexual filming, and for supervision life community adding by supplemented been has Subsection 4.5.5  4.  supervision that ofpost-conviction forms the among life for supervision parole 2- - acomplaint-warrant.  for application an require presumptively of wording current the despite clear that, make to modified been 4.9.1 has Subsection 5.  eCDR in the prepared must be complaint-summons or acomplaint-warrant 3:7-8, Rule i indictment. direct a returns jury grand when a system in adopted which was 3:26-1, Rule that acknowledge to modified been has 7.1 Section 6.
[brief] Flagg v. Essex Cnty. Prosecutor, 171 N.J. 561 (2002) .............................................................................  43  Flear v. Glacier Garlock Bearings, 159 Fed. Appx. 390 (3d Cir. 2005) .......................................................  27  Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759 (3d Cir. 1997)
[directive] (1)  Any person alleging to be a victim of nonconsensual sexual contact, sexual penetration, or lewdness, or any attempt at such conduct, and who is not eligible for a restraining order as a “victim of domestic violence” as defined by the provisions of subsection d. of section 3 of P.L.1991, c.261 (C.2C:25-19), may, except as provided in subsection c. of this section, file an application with the Superior Court pursuant to the Rules of Court alleging the commission of such conduct or attempted conduct and seeking a temporary protective order.
[brief] (Point Three)  THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN VIEWING THAT THE APPELLANT’S CAUSE OF ACTION WAS THE APPLICATION FILED BY HIS MOTHER WITH THE RESPONDENTS IN 2020 (Raised below through Reconsideration: 2T12; Pa221-Pa222; Pa203 –Pa205).  Appellant incorporates by reference statements made via his points one and two as if fully set forth within.
[brief] THE MODEL JURY CHARGE ON “USE OF FORCE UPON AN INTRUDER” UNDER N.J.S.A. 2C:3-4C  WRONGLY TELLS THE JURY THAT WHEN EVALUATING THE REASONABLENESS OF A DEFENDANT’S BELIEF IN THE NEED TO USE FORCE AGAINST AN INTRUDER, THE JURY SHOULD VIEW THE SITUATION AS A “REASONABLE PERSON WITH A DETACHED VIEWPOINT” WOULD VIEW IT, RATHER THAN A REASONABLE PERSON SITUATED AS THE DEFENDANT WAS; THE “DETACHED VIEWPOINT” REQUIREMENT IS NOWHERE IN THE RELEVANT STATUTE AND SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN INSTRUCTED TO THIS JURY.  (NOT RAISED BELOW)  ..........................................................  41  POINT III  THE JUDGE IMPROPERLY RULED, IN CONTRAVENTION OF N.J.R.E. 701 AND STATE V. MCLEAN, THAT A DETECTIVE COULD OFFER HIS LAY OPINION TO THE JURY THAT CERTAIN SOCIAL-MEDIA POSTS BY DEFENDANT WERE THREATENING TO THE DECEDENT WHILE THE DECEDENT APPEARED, IN HIS SOCIAL-MEDIA RESPONSES, TO BE “TRYING TO KEEP THE PEACE. ”  (RULINGS AT 25T 31-1 TO 4; 25T 32-6 TO 10)  ..................................................................................................................
[brief] Ja717-18.  Stated differently, there is no genuine dispute 6  In the parlance of the case law, Defendants are not bona fide purchasers if they have actual or constructive knowledge of another’s outstanding title or claim.  Here that follows from actual or constructive knowledge of the potential error.  whether a reasonable and diligent search would have uncovered the recorded documents revealing the mistake.  a.  **Constructive notice exists where a reasonable and diligent inquiry would put a purchaser on notice of a competing claim. **  The trial court properly recognized the law applicable to determining whether a buyer was a bona fide purchaser or chargeable with notice.  Ja716-17.  It has long been established in New Jersey that a “purchaser is chargeable with notice of every matter affecting his estate, which appears on the face of any deed forming an essential link in the chain of title; and also notice of whatever matters he would have learned by any inquiry which the recitals in those instruments made it his duty to pursue. ”  *Matter of Elin*, 20 B.R. 1012, 1019 (D.N.J. 1982), aff’d sub nom., 707 F.2d 1400 (3d Cir.), 707 F.2d 1400 (3d Cir. 1983) (quoting *Roll v. Rea*, 50 N.J.L. 264, 268 (N.J. 1888) (internal quotations omitted)); *Cox v. RKA Corporation*, 164 N.J. 487, 496 (2000) (whenever a deed has been properly recorded, New Jersey’s recording act charges subsequent purchasers with “notice . . . of the *deed or instrument* so recorded *and the contents thereof.*”) (emphasis supplied).  This is critical, because a purchaser with constructive or inquiry notice, or where “the facts were such as to put him upon inquiry,” cannot maintain bona fide purchaser status and cannot avoid reformation.
[brief] ”  Id. at 290.  “[T]he critical issue [was] whether, considering the totality of the circumstances, [...] knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his constitutional right against self-incrimination. ”  Id.  The Court specifically rejected the notion that “a reviewing court can disregard circumstances deemed relevant under the case law on the grounds those circumstances were not known by or ‘noticeable’ to police. ”  Id.  “The law is settled that intelligence and education, are relevant factors.
[brief] Murray v. Plainfield Rescue Squad, 210 N.J. 581, 592 (2012) (“It is not [a court’s] function to rewrite a plainly written statute or to presume that the Legislature meant something other than what it conveyed in its clearly expressed language. ”)  The primacy of statutory language cannot be overstated.  [T]he authoritative statement is the statutory text, not the legislative history or any other extrinsic material.
[brief] The trial court also failed to appreciate that when Plaintiffs had complained about the redevelopment plan, the damage had already been done.  (Pa000326, pg. 52, line 15 to line 25; Pa000344, pg. 124, line 1 to line 20; Pa000775; Pa000788; Pa000810; Pa000814; Pa000817; Pa000822).  In reliance upon that site plan, [...] and [...] had already physically intruded upon the Plaintiffs’ property and excavated a substantial portion of Plaintiffs’ property.  The activities complained of occurred in 2017, 2018, 2019, and 2020, prior to [...] modifying its site plan in 2021.
[directive] Domestic Violence Cases  There is a presumption of full cash bail under some specific circumstances.  This presumption exists, unless the court finds on the record that another form of bail (Amended on November 7, 2011 as to authorized in subsection (b), surety bond or property bond, will ensure the defendant’s presence in court when required, if the actor was already subject to a domestic violence cases where the temporary or permanent restraining order, pursuant to 2C:25-17, and is charged with a crime committed against a person protected under that order, including a defendant was already subject to a charge of contempt pursuant to 2C:29-9; and either (a) is charged with the commission of a domestic violence crime that resulted in serious bodily injury to the temporary or permanent restraining victim; or (b) has at least one prior conviction for a crime or offense involving domestic violence against the same victim or has previously violated a final restraining order under the Prevention of Domestic order protecting the same victim.