ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] (a)  In General.  (1)  For the purpose of attacking the credibility of any witness, the witness’s conviction of a crime, subject to Rule 403, shall be admitted unless excluded by the court pursuant to paragraph (b) of this rule.  * * *  (b)  Use of Prior Conviction Evidence After Ten Years.  (1)  If, on the date the trial begins, more than ten years have passed since the witness’s conviction of a crime or release from confinement for it, whichever is later, then evidence of the conviction is admissible only if the court determines that its probative value outweighs its prejudicial effect, with the proponent of that evidence having the burden of proof.  N.J.R.E. 403 states:
[brief] And finally, contrary to Respondents’ arguments, not only is the Third Circuit’s decision in *Gov’t Emps. Ins. Co. v. Mount Prospect Chiropractic Ctr., P.A.*, 98 F.4th 463 (3d Cir. 2024) (“GEICO”), not precedential or binding here, its conclusions should be completely rejected.  See *State v. O’Donnell*, 255 N.J. 60, 81 (2023) (On questions that involve state statutory law, federal court opinions are looked to “for their persuasive reasoning, but their conclusions are not binding authority. ”).  For the reasons discussed above, the Third Circuit’s cursory and flawed analysis and holding in *GEICO* that an insurer’s affirmative IFPA claims are subject to PIP arbitration is simply wrong on numerous levels.
[brief] Through hard work, investment of time, and diligence, on or about April 10, 2015, [...] learned that [...], by its principal [...], filed an application, for development of a solar farm at the [...], [...], Block 2, Lot 102, and Block 4, Lot 1, in the [...].  Local electric distributor was identified as [...].  This land was known at the time to be within an industrial zone with a utility scale power plant.  FAC ¶ 24, Pa1623; Pa2550-59 ([...] Cert Opp SJ).
[brief] PLAINTIFF MAY NOT RETROACTIVELY CREATE A RECORD IN ITS APPELLATE BRIEFING IN A TRANSPARENT ATTEMPT TO TRY AND SATISFY THE STANDARDS ESTABLISHED IN Mt. Laurel Twp. v. Mipro Homes, L.L.C., 379 N.J. Super. 358 (App. Div. 2005).  In Points I and II of its brief, Plaintiff argues that the Township has “a clearly articulated . . . valid public purpose” for the taking that it suggests “furthers the public interest. ”  (Pb11-23)  As expected, Plaintiff relies heavily on this Court’s decision in Mt. Laurel Twp. v. Mipro Homes, L.L.C., 379 N.J. Super. 358 (App. Div.), aff’d, 188 N.J. 531 (2005), for the proposition that it has the authority to condemn Defendants’ properties for open space.
[brief] DEFENDANT’S TRIAL TESTIMONY CONFIRMED THAT PLAINTIFF WAS ENTITLED TO RECEIVE 49% OF THE COMPANY’S PROFITS FOR 2016, BUT THAT DEFENDANT KEPT ALL THE 2016 COMPANY PROFITS FOR HERSELF  Defendant’s trial testimony acknowledged that Plaintiff was a member of [...] starting in 2016 (3T114:10-115:14; 3T119:14-24; 3T122:1-10).  Defendant further testified that she does not dispute that Plaintiff was entitled to 49% of the profits the company earned in 2016.  (3T122:11-18).  She also testified that [...] earned $67,791 in profits in 2016 (3T:119:4) but that Plaintiff received none of these profits (3T119:7).  Instead, she kept all these profits for herself.  Therefore, Defendant’s testimony should be deemed dispositive on this issue of Plaintiff’s entitlement to a judgment in the amount of $33,217.59, constituting his 49% share of [...]’s 2016 profits..
[brief] See N.J.S.A. § 33:1-93.18(a); N.J.S.A. § 33:1-93.15 (“Whether the terms of a contract, agreement or relationship conform with the provisions of this section shall be determined by a court of this State…”).  The Appellate Division recently stated in a matter relating to whether arbitration clauses in last will and testaments are valid that “we note that arbitration clauses that eliminate the courts’ expected role in resolving will disputes are inconsistent with the detailed statutory scheme vesting the superior courts with the authority to adjudicate such issues. ”
[brief] ”).  “A plaintiff cannot simply assert that any essential facts that the court may find lacking can be dredged up in discovery. ”  Id., citing, Printing Mart-Morristown v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 116 N.J. 739, 771, 563 A.2d 31, 47 (1989).  Here, there are no facts in the proposed Second Amended Complaint (the “SAC”) regarding any alleged similar prior incidents, lawsuits or complaints.
[brief] If Plaintiffs remain bound to the Genesis Deed’s restrictions, then they are bound to “faithfully abide” by any “rules or regulations” the “property owner’s association” chooses to enact.  Despite this, the trial court found that the Plaintiffs do not have to abide by the height restrictions set forth within the OBSC construction rules.  This ruling is internally inconsistent and the trial court’s order cannot be squared with the Genesis Deed’s intent and OBSC’s historical past practice of passing upon building permits pursuant to its rules and regulations.  If Plaintiffs remain bound to the Genesis Deed’s restrictions, then they are also required to obtain “written approval from [...] ” before beginning any “building, alteration,” or “addition. ”  By ruling that Plaintiffs need not obtain any form of approval—other than zoning approval—the trial court impermissibly impaired [...]’s rights without it being named as a party to this litigation and without any meaningful discovery from it.
[brief] (1T62:1-63:12; 2T65:10-66:19.)  Moreover, [...] had administered the HGN test, but the de novo court relied upon [...]’ result while depriving Defendant the opportunity to cross-examine [...] as to his administration of this test.  (Da16-18; 1T14:23-15:3; 1T65:4-7.)  Because the State choose not to call [...] that deprived Defendant of the opportunity to cross-examine an essential witness of the tests, Defendant was entitled to an adverse inference under Clawans and a reversal in this matter.
[brief] State v. Thompson, No. A-5288-17, 2022 WL 610326, at *19 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Mar. 2, 2022); State v. Andrews, No. A-3320-18, 2021 WL 6139754, at *3 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Dec. 30, 2021); State v. Dalzell, No. A-5481-16T1, 2020 WL 3459465, at *4 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. June 25, 2020).  However, the other seven panels of this Cour that have considered this issue have recognized that [...] does apply to sentencing decisions.  State v. Miller, No. A-3777-20, 2023 WL 4759467, at *13 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. July 26, 2023), cert. denied, 255 N.J. 412 (2023); State v. Green, No. A-1158-19, 2023 WL 2764036, at *11 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Apr. 4, 2023), cert. denied, 255 N.J. 505 (2023); State v. Murrell, No. A-1960-19, 2021 WL 5365325, at *6 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Nov. 18, 2021); State v. Weekes, No. A-2524-18, 2021 WL 4535329, at *13 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Oct. 5, 2021); State v. Cooper, No. A-2695-18, 2021 WL 1289602, at *8 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Apr. 7, 2021); State v. Williams, No. A-2256-15T3, 2020 WL 546001, at *2 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Jan. 30, 2020)2; State v. Gonzalez, No. A-4390-13T1, 2015 WL 8079170, at *3 n.1 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Dec. 8, 2015).
[brief] --- 2 Muller v. Muller, 212 N.J. Super. 665, 678 (Ch. Div. 1986)  3  Murray v. Comcast Corp., 457 N.J. Super. 464, 470 (App. Div. 2019), quoting, Peper v. Princeton Univ. Bd. of Trs., 77 N.J. 55, 65-66 (1978)  B.  The Entire Controversy Doctrine does not resurrect a party who failed to comply with the statute of limitations.
[brief] THE COURT:  Wait, wait.  So being told at a Christmas Party in 2017 to wait while we’re going to sell the Hospital.  Did that toll the Statute of Limitations for any money that was owed in 2010?  [...]: Yes.  THE COURT: Going back seven years prior.  [...]: That’s another issue that I touched upon in my -- THE COURT: I explained to you, your yes answer too.  If you’re owed money in 2010, you don’t do anything until 2017.  You ask the guy to get paid for 2010.  Let’s say the guy never worked there again after 2010.  He sees him in December of 2017, he goes, by the way, you owe me money for 2010.  And the guy says, wait, I’m selling the Hospital.  He goes all right, I’ll wait.  How does that toll the six-year Statute of Limitation for the money that was owed in 2010?  [...]:  It lulls the plaintiff into a sense of security, and -- THE COURT:  But the Statute had already run by December of 2017 under my scenario, when he spoke to the guy who allegedly owes him the money.  [...]:  That’s assuming you’re, a finding that there is no equitable tolling by the statements that was cited in the deposition.  THE COURT:  How could you have equitable tolling before the Statute runs on the 2010 claim?  [...]:  Well, there’s something that I think we should consider here.  It’s basically the Last Payment Rule.  And it’s basically in the -- it’s a Supreme Court Case Brett versus – THE COURT: Well, that’s not in your brief anywhere.  And by the way, Last Payment is a whole different thing.  The guy was claiming he wasn’t paid what he was owed in 2010, and ‘11, and ‘12, and ‘13, ‘14, ‘15, ‘16, ‘17.  He got paid something.  See T3 at 6:10 - 7:21.  LEGAL ARGUMENT
[brief] Exhibit A, 12/21/2012  Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint.........................(omitted, see 1a)  Exhibit B, 1/31/2013  Defendants, [...], and [...], Answer to Amended Complaint.................................................................(omitted, see 18a)  Exhibit C, 3/28/2012  Deposition of [...]............................(omitted, see 1020a)  Exhibit D, 4/4/2012  Deposition of N. [...].................................(omitted, see 517a)  Exhibit E, 5/15/2015  Deposition of N. [...].................................(omitted, see 558a)  Exhibit F, Defendants, [...], [...], Answers and Objections to Plaintiffs’ Interrogatories.............................................................................50a  Exhibit G, 5/22/2006  Agreement of Sale between [...] and [...].........................................................89a  Exhibit H, 6/11/2006
[brief] Respectfully Submitted, /s/[...]  [...], Esq. [...]  Attorneys for Plaintiff, [...]  Dated: September 18, 2024  ESTATE OF NAFIZIA RUGBEER, by [...], Administrator, and [...], Administrator of the ESTATE OF NAFIZIA RUGBEER, Plaintiffs/Respondents, -vs- [...], M.D., [...], C.R.NA.  [...], [...], JOHN DOES 1-10, JANE DOES 1-10 (representing presently unknown health care providers or health care providers with regard to which negligence is not presently suspected, including but not limited to, doctors, surgeons, emergency medicine doctors, anesthesiologists, hospitalists, physician assistants, nurses, nurse practitioners, nurse anesthetists, technicians, and others); and ABC CORPS 1-10 (representing presently unknown facilities or entities who rendered care to the plaintiff who have deviated from the standard of care or facilities or entities with regard to which negligence is not presently suspected), Defendants/Appellants.  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
[brief] ” (3T6.15-17).  [...] admitted that he tried to tell [...] to “calm down [and] stop. ” (3T6.20-23; Pa420a; 3T7.10-11).  As a direct result of these admonitions, [...] then addressed Officer [...].  (3T7.12-19).  Instead of de-escalating the situation, Officer [...] flexed his bravado and challenged [...].
[brief] (Da316)  [...] did not agree with Plaintiffs’ argument here, that the amendment changed nothing.  It recognized the opposite.  (Ibid.)  The only reason that [...] reversed its initial confirmation to add 2 more arbitrators to [...] was based on an unspecified “waiver” under [...] Rule 37, which [...] said only after it had recognized [...] did have the right to add two more arbitrators in 2016.  (Da319-320)(da322)  Of course, waiver even under the [...] rules required “knowledge” and therefore intentional acquiescence.  (Da207)  As [...] had shown the Chancery Court, and as it appeared the Court may have agreed during oral argument, there could be no sustainable finding of a waiver that met the requirements of [...] Rule 37 here.  (Da324-331)(3T55-60)(3T62:11-68-23)
[brief] Absent Defendants’ wrongful conduct, Plaintiffs would have constructed and developed the affordable housing development with the assistance of [...].  [...] testified that he had successfully counseled and assisted novice developers who had even less experience than Plaintiff [...] in developing affordable housing projects, and that he would have helped Plaintiff [...] develop the affordable housing project at [...].  1008a (18:8-23:2); 1013a-1016a (39:3-51:6).  Contrary to the argument of Defendants, [...] testified that the [...] was not the only novice developer for whom [...] successfully formed partnerships to develop 100% affordable housing.  1008a (18:8-23:2); 1013a-1016a (39:3-51:6).  In fact, it was the unrebutted and uncontroverted testimony of [...] and [...] that most affordable housing developments involve novice developers or partnerships.
[directive] 18. a. 따라, [예/Yes] [아니요/No] 성인 범죄자 감독에 관한 주제협약에 형의 선고가 내려질 때 귀하가 뉴저지 주 경우, 밖에 거주하고 있을 귀하의 거주지로의 이전은 귀하가 거주하는 주의 감독 아십니까?  이전 수락을 처리하는 기간 동안 지연될 수도 있는 것을  Do you understand that pursuant to the rules of the Interstate Compact for Adult Offender Supervision  if you are residing outside the State of New Jersey at the time of sentencing that return to your residence may be delayed pending acceptance of the transfer of your supervision by your state of residence?
[directive] Responsibility for Discipline  2.3.1  The successful implementation of discipline requires the law enforcement executive to delegate responsibility for the disciplinary process to individual units and supervisors within the agency, and perhaps to Human Resources.  Although the levels of authority may vary within an agency's chain of command, the failure to carry out disciplinary responsibilities at any level in that chain will contribute to the organization's ineffectiveness.  The task of clearly delineating the authority and responsibility to initiate and impose discipline is essential to the agency’s administration.  2.3.2  Every supervisor must establish a familiarity with the agency's disciplinary process and develop an understanding of how to implement specific disciplinary procedures when called upon to deal with inappropriate behavior or misconduct.  If a supervisor fails to follow these procedures or avoids their responsibility, that supervisor is not conforming to expected behavior and must receive some sort of corrective action.  Some supervisors occasionally need to be reminded that the fundamental responsibility for direction and control rests with the immediate supervisor at the operational level, not with the law enforcement executive.  2.3.3  To provide such direction and control, supervisory personnel must be granted the proper authority to carry out their responsibilities.  To properly exercise this authority, supervisory personnel must be fully familiar with applicable agency rules and regulations.  Based on the size and needs of the individual agency, supervisory personnel may be permitted to impose Agencies operating under Civil Service Commission statutes (N.J.S.A. 11A:2-20) and regulations may only assess a fine in 2 lieu of a suspension where loss of the officer from duty would be "detrimental to the public health, safety or welfare" or if the assessment is restitution or is agreed to by the employee.
[brief] ” (Da50).  In defendant’s PCR, he argued that counsel was ineffective for failing to have the letter independently tested for fingerprints and DNA.  Contrary to defendant’s argument, the PCR court properly found that defendant’s “bald assertions” did not establish a prima facie claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.  (Da86).  As the PCR court found “defendant has not provided the court with certifications or affidavits from employees or experts from state-run or private labs, that there would be different results had an independent state-run or private lab run the tests. ” (Da86).  Additionally, the Appellate Division on direct appeal found the anonymous letter to be unreliable. (Da50).  The Appellate Division upheld the trial judge’s decision not to recall the jury, based on the allegations in the letter, in deference to the trial judge’s “unique perspective” of the layout of his courtroom and the procedures followed at trial.
[brief] E.  [...]’s Mistaken Acceptance of a Similar Form POA in the Past Does Not Require it to Now Accept a Deficient Consent of Surety (A 62)  [...] also argues that simply because [...] “accepted” in the past the form of POA used by [...] and [...] in the subject [...] Bid, [...] was somehow required to accept the materially defective POA now and, apparently in the future.  While, much like [...]’s other positions, no legal authority is presented as to this argument, [...] appears to argue that prior acceptance of a materially defective POA “estops” [...] from now requiring the submission of a valid POA specifically identifying that the attorney-in-fact has authority to bind the surety to the undertakings set forth in the Consent of Surety.  This argument, if accepted for [...], would open a pandora’s box whereby [...] would be deprived of the assurances to which it is entitled with regard to the delivery of bid security.  As a general premise, estoppel against a government entity is disfavored.  See Cipriano v. Department of Civil Service of State of N.J., 151 N.J. Super. 86, 91 (App. Div. 1977) (Courts are generally reluctant to apply estoppel theories against governmental agencies.)  This is especially true when estoppel would “interfere with essential governmental functions. ”  Vogt v. Borough of Belmar, 14 N.J. 195, 205 (1954).  It cannot be denied that part of [...]’s essential governmental function is to provide for the improvement, repair and maintenance of its roadways.  See, N.J.S.A. 27:23-3 (“[T]he … improvement, repair and maintenance of transportation projects [by [...]] … shall be deemed and held to be an essential governmental function of the State”).
[brief] Plaintiff’s Complaint was filed on or about January 18, 2019, in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Burlington County, Law Division, alleging claims of unfair treatment, sexual harassment, hostile work environment and retaliation in violation of the NJLAD.  (Pa 1-45).  The [...] filed an Answer to the Complaint on or about February 21, 2019, denying the allegations therein.  (Pa 122-160).  Thereafter, on February 20, 2020, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint which included a claim for constructive discharge (Pa 46-105).  The [...] denied the allegations in the First Amended Complaint by way of Answer filed on February 27, 2020 (Pa 180-205).  After extensive discovery, the [...] filed a Motion for Summary Judgment.  On August 30, 2022 and August 31, 2022, the Honorable [...], J.S.C., heard argument, which totaled approximately four (4) hours regarding the various Summary Judgment Motions that were filed, including that of the [...].  After extensive oral argument, [...] denied the [...]’ Motion for Summary Judgment.
[brief] LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I THE TENANCY COURT CORRECTLY RETAINED JURISDICTION TO DETERMINE THE MOTION FOR TRANSFER AND THE TRIAL FOR POSSESSION AND NON-PAYMENT BECAUSE THE INSTANT CASE FACTUALLY DEALT WITH LANDLORD TENANT RELATIONSHIP  Carr v. Johnson, 211 Super 341 (App. Div. 1986) (citing N.J.S.A. 2A: 18-59; Marini v. Ireland, 56 N.J. 130, 136 (1970) (Vineland Shopping Center, Inc. v DeMarco, 35 N.J. 459 , 463 (1961)) asserts to ensure the quickness of the remedy, the Legislature has limited the right of appeal to lack of jurisdiction only.  Defendant asserts in his brief that the “Tenancy Court lacked jurisdiction to determine ownership and erred in doing so particularly without the benefit of witness testimony or careful examination of documentary evidence”.  (Defendant Brief at 7)  “N.J.Ct. R 6-1-2(3) asserts that the Special Civil Part retains Jurisdiction over Summary Landlord-Tenant Actions.  Plaintiff established the Landlord/Tenant relationship by Verified Complaint For Nonpayment of Rent (Da3), Certification of Lease, Registration Statement Residential, and Summons which is required for Notice.  (Da6)  (Da9)  Also, the verified Complaint Landlord Tenant specifically checks the box that the “Owner has not given the tenant(s) an option to purchase the property. ”  (Da3)  The Landlord Tenant Court conducted Testimony regarding the basis for the Complaint and the remedy of payment and possession for the owner.  2T52-9  Q  [...], are you the owner of 30 -- are you a member of [...] which owns [...]?  A  Yes, I am.  Q  And are you owed -- is the rental $2,200?  A  Yes, it is.  Q  Or $2,100 a month?  A  Yes, it is.  Q  And they owe from October through April which is seven months.  Correct?  The testimony regarding Ownership of the property was never disputed under Oath on the record  Defendant never cross-examined Plaintiff for truthfulness regarding Ownership of the property or past due rent.  ([...] engaged in a colloquy 2T53-9)  Later after the colloquy on Direct Examination  Defendant questioned [...] on issues of lack of Landlord Repairs.  2T59-9  Finally, the Court did examine carefully documentary evidence.  The record reflects that no evidence existed that showed a right of revision of property to the Defendant.  The Court moreover informed the Defendants that the evidence supported the payment of Rent and no evidence of Fraud.  2T51-21  POINT II
[directive] 9.5.1  Internal affairs personnel shall maintain a filing system accessible only to unit personnel and the law enforcement executive.  Other personnel may be given access based on a specific need, such as a deputy chief in the law enforcement executive's absence.  Access to these records must be specifically addressed with agency policy and procedures.  The list of those authorized to access these files must be kept to a minimum.  9.5.2  Physical security measures also should be taken, such as using securely locked filing cabinets in secured offices.  If a law enforcement agency uses computers to maintain internal affairs records of any kind, special security measures must be taken.  A stand-alone personal computer is the most secure system to limit unauthorized access to internal affairs records.  If a stand-alone computer is not feasible, reasonable measures, including the use of fire walls and/or password protected software, should be utilized to control access to investigative files and related materials.  9.6
[brief] Appellants hereby restate and incorporate by reference the Statements of Material Facts and Procedural History set forth in their Revised Brief.  See Db4-15.  Appellants also note that they dispute many of the alleged “facts” set forth by Plaintiff-Respondent [...] (“[...]”).  By way of limited example, Appellants vehemently disagree that “[...] understood and agreed that Martha was the equitable owner of the Property,” [...] agreed to some indefinite duration “rescue plan,” or that Appellants ever conceded that this matter and the Law Division Case\(^1\) “involve common questions of law and fact. ”  Pb13-15.  These are disputed issues and are most certainly not facts supported by evidence in the record.