ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] ”  (Pa37).  It is unclear who constructed this “mystery” drain, but there is no evidence to suggest that it was ever owned or maintained by the Township.  (Pa37).  The drain consists of an asphalt pipe, which the Township has not used to construct drains in decades.  (Pa262).  And the Township does not own an easement in the backyard of the Property, which it would normally have if it was responsible for this drain.  (Pa38).  Plaintiff admits that the drain has been there the entire time that her family has owned the Property, so it is more likely that it was installed by the developer of the Property back when it was constructed.  (Pa37).  When Plaintiff’s then-20-year-old pool began to fail, in or around 2000, it was repaired.  (Pa37).  The pool required repair again in 2015.  In 2018, prior to the Township completing the drainage work in Plaintiff’s backyard, [...] made the decision to have the pool removed.  (Pa37).  Along with the removal of the pool, Plaintiff made the decision to remove mature shrubs, foliage, landscape beds, and a rotting shed that had been installed shortly after the Property was purchased.  (Pa37).  After decades of Plaintiff’s complaints to the Township, and in an effort to provide assistance to a long-time resident, the Township agreed to install a drainage system in Plaintiff’s backyard.
[brief] | Omitted | | Exhibit B, Plaintiff’s deposition transcript dated October 18, 2022. | Pa31 | | Exhibit C, Harassment and Discrimination Training Report, dated June 20, 2019.  | Pa63 | | Exhibit D, Plaintiff’s Answers to Defendant [...]’s Interrogatories.  | Pa64 | | Exhibit E, Plaintiff’s Correspondence to [...].  | Pa78 | | Exhibit F, Director [...]’ deposition transcript dated December 14, 2022.  | Pa79 | | Exhibit G, Deputy Chief [...]’s deposition transcript dated December 19, 2022.  | Pa98 | | Exhibit H, draft written reprimand to Defendant [...].  | Pa118| | Exhibit I, portions of the City of [...]’s Employee Handbook.  | Pa120| | Exhibit J, co-Defendant [...]’s deposition transcript dated December 13, 2022.  | Pa127| | Exhibit K, co-Defendant [...]’s training report.  | Pa154| | Exhibit L, Anti-Harassment and Anti-Discrimination training report.  | Pa155| | Exhibit M, co-Defendant [...]’s Answers to interrogatories.  | Pa159| | February 11, 2021, Certification of Plaintiff’s Counsel in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment.
[brief] See id.; [...], 2022 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1002, *19 (affirming o.b. trial court conclusion “that because the Committee ‘relied on the testimony of a licensed professional planner and the memorandum of the Township Planner supporting its determination[,]’ its decision was not arbitrary or capricious”).  In contrast to that evidence, Appellants did not seek to introduce any expert testimony or other competent evidence to show that the Redevelopment Plan deviated from the Section 7 standards.  Rather, Appellants contend without basis that the Redevelopment Plan was “inconsistent” with the Master Plan because “its proposal to put residential units within the GB2 is prohibited by the existing zoning ordinance and Master Plan” (Pb22).  This argument is without merit as the Redevelopment Plan, as a matter of law, amends any existing zoning.  240 Half Mile, 2022 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1002, *15-16, 31; N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-7(c); Hirth, 337 N.J. Super. at 165 (recognizing that redevelopment plan “shall supersede” all applicable existing zoning: “Thus, one component of a redevelopment plan is the zoning or rezoning of the redevelopment area. ”); see also Grabowsky, 2013 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1897, *16; Pa200-01; Pa313 at §§8.18 & 8.21 (confirming superseding zoning map as “an amendment of the Town Zoning Map”).  Moreover, even if Appellants could have shown some inconsistency with the Master Plan (and they did not), that would not be enough to show the Redevelopment Plan was not “substantially consistent” with the Master Plan, which allows for inconsistency as long as it “not substantially or materially undermine or distort the basic provisions and objectives of the Master Plan. ”  Myers, 439 N.J. Super. at 104 (quoting Manalapan, 140 N.J. at 384).  While they present no proof to carry their burden, Appellants, at most, could only hope to potentially raise a “debatable” issue as to consistency, which still would fail as a matter of law.  See 240 Half Mile, 2022 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1002, *28; PADNA, 413 N.J. Super. at 332; Infinity, 377 N.J. Super. at 225; Downtown, 242 N.J. Super. at 332.  Accordingly, therefore, Appellants provided no basis to overturn the Trial Court’s well-reasoned and correct decision at trial.
[brief] DIANA SUFFERED AN ASCERTAINABLE LOSS  Defendants have asserted that the trial court was correct in ruling that [...]’s claims fail for lack of ascertainable loss.  However, Defendants do not address that an “improper debt . . . against a consumer-fraud plaintiff may constitute a loss under the [CFA], because the consumer is not obligated to pay an indebtedness arising out of conduct that violates the Act. ”  Cox v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 138 N.J. 2, 23 (1994).  [...]’s alleged debt because void, and thus improper, the moment it was assigned, sold, or transferred by the original creditor to unlicensed [...].  Thus, Defendants’ violation of the NJCFLA and CFA are directly and causally linked to the void, improper debt they attempted to enforce.  In that respect, [...]’s debt is akin to an unlawful and/or improper charge not yet paid.  See, e.g., Hoffman v. Asseenontv.Com, Inc., 404 N.J. Super. 415, 428-29 (App. Div. 2009) (where the Court held that an improper credit card charge—even if unpaid—constitutes an ascertainable loss under the CFA).  Therefore, the loss experienced by [...] is not hypothetical or illusory, but rather definite and ascertainable.  Thus, the October 20, 2023 Orders granting Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss and denying [...]’s Cross Motion to Vacate, Transfer, and Consolidate should be reversed.
[brief] **, 19 F.3d 824 (2d Cir. 1994).......................13  Townsend v. Pierre, 221 N.J. 36 (2015).........................................................10  Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163, n.16 (1949)..............................................7  Walker v. Alt. Chrysler Plymouth, 216 N.J. Super. 255, 258 (App. Div. 1987).............................................................................................................5  Wisowaty v. Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corp., 2013 WL 103385 at *3 (D.N.J. 2013).................................................................................................8  RULES AND STATUTES
[brief] *[Id. at 14.]*  *R.P.C. 3.1* enunciates one general standard of ethical behavior for lawyers:  A lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding, nor assert or controvert an issue therein unless the lawyer knows or reasonably believes that there is a basis for doing so that is not frivolous, which includes a good faith argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing law.  In the PCR context, *R. 3:22-6(c)* set forth another ethical rule for assigned counsel.
[brief] By: _______________________________________  [...]  Dated: November 13, 2023  In Re Estate of [...].  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY  APPELLATE  DIVISION  DOCKET NO. [...]  Civil Action ON APPEAL FROM SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY CHANCERY  DIVISION: BERGEN COUNTY DOCKET NO. [...]  Sat Below: Hon. [...], J.S.C.  BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
[brief] - Ordinance 2522-18, as adopted by the [...] on December 6, 2018 - Ordinance 19-06, as adopted by the [...] on February 28, 2019 - Ordinance 19-07, as adopted by the [...] on March 18, 2019 - Ordinance 2019-8, as adopted by the [...] on March 25, 2019 - Ordinance 13-19, as adopted by the [...] on April 17, 2019 - Ordinance 2019-28, as adopted by the [...] on November 26, 2019 - Ordinance B-289, as adopted by the [...] on October 21, 2020 - Ordinance 2021-01, as adopted by the [...] on April 5, 2021 - Ordinance 2146, as adopted by the [...] on May 24, 2021 - Ordinance 1847, as adopted by the [...] on May 26, 2021
[brief] Similarly, to apply the doctrine of collateral estoppel, the party asserting the doctrine must establish: (1) the issue to be precluded is identical to the issue decided in the prior proceeding; (2) the issue was actually litigated in the prior proceeding; (3) the court in the prior proceeding issued a final judgment on the merits; (4) the determination of the issue was essential to the prior judgment; and (5) the party against whom the doctrine is asserted was a party to or in privity with a party to the earlier proceeding.  Delacruz v. Alfieri, 447 N.J. Super. 1 (Sup. Ct. Bergen Cnty. Nov. 18, 2015).  In addition, the Entire Controversy Doctrine “bars claims that were or could have been asserted against the actual parties to the prior litigation, or those in privity with them.
[brief] ”  In the present matter, the Trial Court correctly determined that [...] was merely the owner of the Property, not the general contractor, and therefore owed no duty to [...].  The Trial Court further correctly concluded that [...] was the general contractor at the Property.  (T35:25-T36:8).  Therefore, the Trial Court ruled it was [...], as general contractor, who owed a duty to [...], to ensure that the site was kept clean and that construction debris were properly stowed or thrown away.
[brief] Genuine issues of material fact clearly exist based on plaintiff’s and [...]’s differing views of the altercation and what led to the altercation.  The record contains sufficient evidence to support a jury finding that [...] intentionally assaulted plaintiff.  The record also contains sufficient evidence – including [...]’s own testimony – to support a jury finding that [...] acted negligently in inadvertently striking plaintiff while attempting to block plaintiff’s punch.  Accordingly, whether [...]’s actions constitute negligence or an intentional act should be decided by a jury.
[brief] As for the Statute of Limitations, thirteen-fourteen years is completely unreasonable, especially when a few specific sentences or a specific clause could have accounted for any and all unforeseen outcomes of the legal “beast” known as Eminent Domain.  With that being said, it is the Parole Evidence Rule that governs the specific clause(s) of the PSA at issue.  It is important to note that Plaintiff and Defendant have been and are still currently living in the same home and it is Defendant that is responsible for paying all the household bills and expenses, to which he is still currently providing for Plaintiff as if they were husband and wife.
[brief] Dismissal Order with Prejudice in favor of [...] dated April 27, 2023 but entered April 28, 2023 [[...]] ([...]) Lack of Standing Rule 4:6-2(e) Dismissal With Prejudice Order in favor of State Related Defendants Dated April 27, 2023 but entered April 28, 2023 [[...]] ([...]) Plaintiff’s Designation of Counsel/Disqualifying Conflict of Interest  Mootness Denial Order Prepared by the Court dated April 27, 2023 but entered April 28, 2023 [[...]] ([...]) Reconsideration, Alteration and Amendment Denial Order dated July 10, 2023 [[...]] ([...])
[brief] Following a jury trial in 2023, defendant-appellant [...] was convicted of one count of fourth-degree animal cruelty, contrary to N.J.S.A. 4:22-17(c)(1).  [...] filed his plenary brief on February 2, 2024, in which he raised two points challenging the conviction and one point challenging the sentence.  (Db)¹  The State filed its responding brief on May 17, 2024.  [...] now files this reply brief in which he responds to the State’s sentencing argument.  (Sb 17 to 25)  [...] additionally relies on the detailed procedural history and statement of facts in his opening brief.  (Db 3 to 7)  ¹ Sb – State’s response brief  Db – Defendant’s opening brief Da – Defendant’s appendix to his opening brief  1T – May 8, 2023 – trial 2T – May 9, 2023 – trial 3T – May 10, 2023 – trial 4T – June 23, 2023 – sentencing  LEGAL ARGUMENT
[brief] THE PLAINTIFF ESTABLISHED THAT [...] HAD CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE OF A DANGEROUS CONDITION OF PUBLIC PROPERTY UNDER N.J.S.A. 59:4-2(Pa.442-Pa.451)  ....................5  Point III.  THE PLAINTIFF CAN ESTABLISH THAT THE CONDUCT OF THE DEFENDANTS WERE PALPABLY UNREASONABLE (Pa.709-Pa712)  .........................................................12  CONCLUSION .....................................................................................................................15
[brief] *Oscar v. Simeonidis*, 352 N.J. Super. 476, 487-88 (App. Div. 2002) (citing *City of Trenton v. Lenzner*, 16 N.J. 465, 476, 109 A.2d 409 (1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 972, 75 S.Ct. 534, 99 L.Ed.2d 757 (1955)).  Furthermore, fair market value is “determined by what a willing buyer and a willing seller would agree to, neither being under any compulsion to act. ”  *State v. Silver*, 92 N.J. 507, 513-14 (N.J. 1983) (citing *Village of South Orange v. Alden Corp.*, 71 N.J. 362, 368 (1976); see also *State v. Gorga*, 26 N.J. 113, 115-16 (1958); *City of Trenton v. Lenzner*, 16 N.J. 465, 476 (1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 972, 75 S.Ct. 534, 99 L.Ed.2d 757 (1955)).  **Property Purchase Provisions.
[directive] (only complete if the offense occurred on or after August 14, 2013)  (2)(a)  [Yes]  [No]  [NA]  Do you understand that if you are pleading guilty to the crime of endangering the welfare of a child pursuant to 2C:24-4b(4) or N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4b(5) or an attempt to commit either of these offenses and N.J.S.A. the offense occurred on or after August 14, 2013, in addition to any other sentence, and upon motion of the prosecutor, the court shall impose a special sentence of parole supervision for life, unless the court finds on the record that parole supervision for life is not needed to protect the community or deter you from future criminal activity?
[brief] (Da28).  As for the Second Amendment, [...] reasoned that N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022), invalidated a particular condition on handgun carry permits—that the applicant show a “special need” to carry—but did not forbid States generally from requiring permits for the carry of handguns within their borders.  (Da28) (citing Bruen, 597 U.S. at 71).  The court concluded that “neither Bruen nor the Full Faith and Credit Clause, alone or in conjunction, prevent[s] the State of New Jersey from prosecuting the Defendant … for unlawful possession of a weapon in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b)(1).” (Da28).  After her motions were denied, defendant pleaded guilty to having unlawfully possessed a handgun in New Jersey without a NJ Carry Permit, while reserving her right to appeal the denial of her motion to dismiss.  (Da9; 15).  She was sentenced to three years of probation, (Da15), and this appeal followed.  (Da18-21).
[brief] Plaintiff’s expert so testified at trial, and this was unrefuted.  *(8T63:1-11). *  There were also computerized training modules about how to deal with customers, such as “Customer Experience,” “Impacting the Customer,” “Selling at [...],” “Workplace Violence,” “Our Purpose/My Promise,” and “Sales/Service/Culture” (Pra135), none of which [...] received.  (Pra134; 8T84:7-85:5).  There was even a training module on how to deal with an “upset customer,” but [...] did not receive that training either.  (Ibid.; Pra135;).
[brief] [...]’s legal arguments regarding intent in the Underlying Action and disputed issues of material fact, except to state: “the issues with regard to denial and all the other stuff - - the reservation of rights letters, this is what declaratory judgment suits are for. ”  (1T at 23:3-6.)  Regarding Dr. [...]’s argument as to the timeliness of the summary judgment motion in the Declaratory Action prior to a determination of the Underlying Action, the trial judge stated: “I don’t think it really matters in this particular case[.]”  (1T at 23:10-12.)  This appeal was thereafter timely filed on April 26, 2023.  (Da3-6; see also Da7-10.)  **LEGAL STANDARD**
[brief] Pursuant to Rule 4:24-1(c), if additional discovery is needed, appropriate application to the court must be made.  Defendants’ Counsel submits their first request to extend discovery due to COVID-19 concerns; on February 2, 2022, the extension of discovery is granted based on both parties with the discovery period extended for 115 days from March 17, 2022, to July 10, 2022.  Plaintiff’s Counsel enters motion to relieve counsel on March 16, 2022; motion is granted on April 1, 2022, and further ordered discovery end date is revised to November 7, 2022, allowing Plaintiff to retain new counsel within thirty (30) days to retain new counsel or proceed the matter as Pro Se.  Plaintiff continues the matter as Pro Se, fulfilling Defendant’s discovery requests.  On July 15, 2022, Plaintiff submit requests for settlement conference, deposition calendaring after August 1, 2022, and informs the court of her discovery submission to Defendants’ Counsel to take place on August 1, 2022, instead of November 1, 2022.  The Settlement Conference is calendared for August 9, 2022, rescheduled to August 19, 2022.  Plaintiff submits motion regarding revision of discovery end date court order; subsequently, settlement conference is rescheduled again to August 22, 2022, and then cancelled by the court after Defendants’ Counsel confirmed her unavailability to attend settlement conference on August 22, 2022, due to vacation.  Furthermore, after Plaintiff and Defendants’ Counsel held conference call discussions, both parties submit opposing correspondence regarding Plaintiff’s submission to Defendants’ discovery requests.  Post submissions, motion decision and oral argument are calendared for August 26, 2022, Plaintiff’s August 22, 2022, settlement conference date is cancelled indefinitely.
[brief] Based on the record before it, the trial court could have found [...] had no notice of any discrepancy arising from the documents related to the 2015 subdivision or within his chain of title.  The Plaintiff had the burden of proof, but cited no law and no expert testimony in support of its contention that a reasonably prudent purchaser would have identified the discrepancy, or concluded the lot size was other than as appeared on the modern surveys and recently recorded subdivision.  Yet the trial court accepted Plaintiffs’ position that a tiny tax map imbedded in the subdivision map was a place where [...] should have noticed a mathematical “error,” though no other attorney or professional, including the many involved in the prior sale and subdivision, made this “discovery” or did the mathematical gymnastics that the trial court found was [...]’s duty.  No authority required [...] to review historical deeds to mathematically determine that, at some point in time, the overall combined lot size of Lots 2 and 3 was identified as 185’ instead of the 186.3’ determined by modern surveys, and it was not reasonable to require him to do so.  And, of course, [...] was only buying Lot 3, and no deed anywhere in the universe said Lot 3 was ever 65’ wide.  Yet somehow, the buyer of Lot 3, who had the MOST evidence before him indicating the lot was firmly established to be 66.3’ wide, is the person the trial court found should have notice of an error missed by [...], [...], their multiple attorneys, the city attorney, the city engineer, the city planner, a national title insurance underwriter, two surveyors and [...]s’ title company.  The trial court’s decision is not only unreasonable, it upends settled law on the obligations of purchasers and creates a new and dangerous standard for title searchers throughout the state.  A small, blurry tax map on a recorded subdivision plan, plus convoluted mathematics involving former lots not being transferred, should not usurp reasonable reliance on a recorded subdivision and multiple recorded deeds—especially not for the purpose of enforcing the apparent intent of an unrecorded private Agreement to which the buyer was not even a party.  This decision negatively impacts our state’s recording system and reliance on the documents recorded in that system.  See Palamarg Realty Co., 80 N.J. at 453 (“absent any unusual equity, a court should decide a question of title…in the way that will best support and maintain the integrity of the recording system. ”).  Under the applicable law and facts, the trial court erred in finding [...] had constructive notice of the error, erred in holding he was not a bona fide purchaser and erred in denying his Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment.  The decision should be reversed and judgment entered in favor of [...].
[brief] against the cost of care in a nursing home, assisted living facility, or home setting.  [...], a pioneer in this industry, is one of the largest providers of long-term care insurance.  See 1T 57:1–11.  Due to the nature of long-term care insurance, policies are typically in force for decades before any claims are made.  To price the policies, assumptions are used to develop projections many years into the future of the premiums a company is expected to earn compared to the claims it expects to incur over the lifetime of the policy form, which is known as the lifetime “loss ratio. ”  See, e.g., N.J.A.C. 11:4-34.17 & 11:4-18.5; 1T 60:1–21; 4T 775:16–76:14.  For example, if the insurer incurs $85 dollars in claims and costs and earns $100 in premiums, its loss ratio would be 85%.  Premiums are set with the understanding that, as actual experience emerges, rate increases may be necessary to realign premiums with expected claims.  For example, changes in policyholders’ lifespans and the cost of care, among other things, would cause an insurer to have to pay more in claims than originally expected.  1T 60:1–21.  Because insurers must safeguard against premium levels becoming insufficient to pay future claims, cover costs, and address other expenses, rate increases are essential.  The need for rate increases has been common across the long-term care insurance industry in recent years.  Rising claim costs, lower --- 2  The ratio does not include expenses, taxes, or profits.  3T 662:16–63:3.  mortality rates, and lower than predicted voluntary termination or lapse rates mean that many policies require premium increases.  4T 752:22–53:3, 771:13–23.  B.
[brief] Federal Cases: NRDC v. Regan, 67 F.4th 397, 399 (D.C. Cir. 2023)  Custer Cty. Action Ass’n v. Garvey, 256 F.3d 1024, 1034 (10th Cir. 2001)  Conner v. Burford, 848 F.2d 1441, 1453 (9th Cir. 1988)  Sierra Club, Inc. v. Leavitt, 488 F.3d 904, 907 (11th Cir. 2007)  State of New Jersey Cases: Am. Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey v. Hendricks, 233 N.J. 181 (2018)
[brief] That is, even in the absence of a landlord’s covenant to repair, a lessor of land who conceals or fails to disclose any natural or physical condition involving potential harm can be subject to liability only if the tenant “does not know of the condition or the risk involved therein, and the lessor knows of the condition and realizes the risk involved therein and has reason to believe that the lessee will not discover the condition or realize risk. ”  Faber v. Creswick, 31 N.J. 234, 243 (1958), citing First Restatement of Torts, Sec. 358 (1934).  “The principles of Michaels, Faber, and Coleman continue to represent the law of this State…”  McBride, 526.  The evolution of how New Jersey courts have embraced the Restatement of Torts in general, and Section 358 of the Restatement in particular, was tracked by this Court in Reyes v. Egner, 404 N.J. Super. 433 (App. Div. 2009).