ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] II.  Plaintiff’s expert report and testimony.  On January 30, 2023, [...], a professional engineer and plaintiff’s liability expert authored a liability report.  (Pa54-65, Pa27, Pa83; 1T24-4 to 6.)  [...] has never dealt with a case similar to this one—where an individual fell down while getting into or out of a bathtub.  (Pa69, Pa27, Pa83; 1T24-7 to 12.)  He also never encountered another case dealing with a towel rack on a wall.  (Pa69, Pa27, Pa83; 1T24-7 to 11.)  [...] did not conduct slip resistance testing of the surface of the tub.  (Pa77, Pa28, Pa84; 1T25-7 to 16.)  He testified that the height of the tub violated no industry standard or code.  (Pa74, Pa28, Pa84; 1T25-23 to 25.)  There was also no legal or industry-wide requirement for defendant to have installed a step to help patrons to get into and out of the tub.  (Pa75, Pa28, 42, see also Pa60-61.)  [...] testified that the towel rack was designed only to hold towels, which was what it was doing at the time plaintiff fell.  (Pa72, Pa29, Pa84.)  There is no industry code or standard that required: a minimum tolerance for loads or pressure in terms of weight towel racks must be able to sustain; that the towel rack be placed somewhere specific away from a bathtub’s ingress; or a written warning that patrons should not use the towel rack as a grab bar.
[brief] TABLE OF TRANSCRIPTS  May 12, 2023, Transcript of Oral Argument on Defendant [...]’s Motion for Reconsideration of the Denial of Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment.  T1  STATEMENT OF FACTS  Plaintiff [...] is a [...] Firefighter.  He is of maternal Asian parentage; his mother and mother’s family being of Philippine national origin and ethnicity.  Plaintiff has been a Plainsfield Firefighter since July 31, 2018.  He has no higher rank or seniority within the department.  Individually named [...]—presently retired—was deputy chief of the entire [...] in March of 2020, when the conduct forming the subject matter of this litigation occurred.  As set forth in Plaintiff’s complaint, Plaintiff and the rest of his shift were, on or around March 13, 2022, in attendance at a Covid-19 training program being conducted by Mr. Martino.  Plaintiff briefly dozed off during the training.
[brief] See, e.g., State v. McCoy, 759 S.E.2d 330, 333 (N.C. Ct. App. 2014) (“before handwritings may be submitted to a jury for its comparison, the trial court must satisfy itself that there is enough similarity between the genuine handwriting and the disputed handwriting, such that the jury could reasonably infer that the disputed handwriting is also genuine”); Pettus v. U.S., 37 A.3d 213, 220 (D.C. 2012)(noting expert’s testimony that “[t]he identification of authorship is not based on one single characteristic’: ‘we have to have sufficient identifying characteristics in common [and] ... no significant differences and variation between the two writings”’); Johnson v. Coombe, 271 A.D.2d 780, 780-81 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000) (“the trier of fact . . . may make his or her own comparison of handwriting samples in the absence of expert testimony . . . if there are sufficient similarities between the two to comprise substantial evidence that they were written by the same person”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
[brief] The post-development traffic counts for the neighboring [...] support this analysis.  (4T 57:21-25 through 59:1-24).  [...] also testified that the Institute of Transportation Engineers (“ITE”) Trip Generation Manual, the authoritative industry standard, does not use height as a variable for warehouse trip generation calculations.  It simply does not affect traffic counts.  Instead, the independent variable for trip generation is square footage of the building; height does not factor into the analysis.  (2T 6:5-25; 7:1-9; 3T 26:3-21).  He was asked “[s]o if these buildings were 30 feet high as opposed to somewhere between 40 and 50 feet high, would your projected traffic counts be any different?”  He concluded that they would not.  (3T 27:4-7).  In fact, [...] testified that there is typically an inverse relationship between building height and employees, as taller buildings are more automated.  (5T 53:12-25).  In an attempt to dispose of credible and unrebutted testimony, the Board unreasonably rejected [...]’s evidenced-based conclusions as a “net opinion. ”  Ja030.  For the reasons argued in Section IV(A)(1) of this brief, the rejection of [...]’s testimony was arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable.
[brief] BOTH TRIAL COURTS FAILED TO ENGAGE IN AN INTERACTIVE PROCESS CONCERNING HER ADA TITLE II ACCOMMODATION REQUEST AND LIMITING DIVULGENENCE OF FEDERALLY PROTECTED HIPAA INFORMATION TO THE COURT THROUGH HER ATTORNEY SOLELY [2T3:14-19]  Ultimately, the defendant was denied access to the court, compromising ADA Title II, her HIPAA rights\textsuperscript{46}, and R. 4:36-3(b), her employer with counsel entering a waiver of appearance in substitution.
[directive] Asset Sharing Context  A state or local law enforcement agency that contributed to k - the investigation leading to the forfeiture of the real property must request the real property as a Weed and Seed asset sharing, noting its intent to use the property for Seed purposes or to transfer it to a public or nonprofit recipient for these same Seed purposes.  Consent of other Involved Agencies  The requesting state or local law enforcement k - agency must obtain and present the written agreement of all other law enforcement agencies participating in the investigation leading to forfeiture that they will waive their claims to sharing the property or i% proceeds in deference to the Weed and m Seed request.  Use of Appropriate  The requestor must explain the anticipated use the property and k - a how it will help realize the Seed goals of the Weed and Seed initiative in distressed or disadwntaged neighborhood.  The property must be suited for the proposed use and the recipient must agree that the property will revert to the United States if it is not properly used for the stated purposes.  Executive Office for Asset Forfeiture 17 VII Fo Chapter Guidelines Seized and feited  Property for I -  The recipient or other agency shall pay all outstanding costs prior Payment of Costs 9 to the transfer of real property, including any mortgages, liens, and third-party interests against the property transferred.  The recipient must pay all future liens, taxes, repairs, and maintenance.  These costs may not be paid from the Fund.  Approvals
[brief] ”  Defendants dwell on the benefits of the Project in providing affordable housing, but the issue here is whether the tax exemption granted to [...] was necessary to achieve these benefits.  [...], not surprisingly, claims that “anything” that will help it sell houses is a substantial benefit to its business, (Dlb45) but under LTTEL “anything” is not the standard.  Plaintiffs’ expert concludes even on the limited record made available and without equivocation that the exemption was not necessary to make the Project financially feasible.  (Pb12)  Defendants have represented to the contrary, claiming that the asserted need for the exemption is based on a “comprehensive financial analysis” but refusing nonetheless to make that analysis available or subject it to discovery.  (Pb8)  Indeed, defendants’ briefs make no reference to that analysis and, instead, argue in effect that the finding they have proposed in support of the financial agreement -- that the exemption is necessary for the financial feasibility of the project (Id.) – is irrelevant.  With respect to assessment of the “cost” of the exemption, defendants insist that it need not consider the impact of shifting $25 million in school taxes to their partners in the regional schools.  (Dlb33)  By disregarding those costs, however, defendants ignore LTTEL’s plain directive that the comparison of costs to benefits must consider “the costs, if any, associated with the tax exemption. ”  N.J.S.A. 40A:20-11 (a).  Like the benefits to be considered (Pb28), “costs” do not stop at the municipal boundary.  Defendants also challenge the $25,000,000 figure as “speculative” but provide no explanation.  See second [...] report for his methodology.  (Pb20; Pa707-8)  B.
[directive] If the agency wants to continue its administrative interview and the County Prosecutor agrees to grant use immunity, the agency shall advise the subject officer in writing that he or she has been granted use immunity if their answers implicate him or her in a criminal offense.  The officer must then answer the questions specifically related to performing their official duties, but no answer given, nor evidence derived therefrom, may be used against the officer in a criminal proceeding.  If the officer still refuses to answer, he or she is subject to disciplinary charges for that refusal, including dismissal.
[directive] Slowing down and using time as a tactic can help resolve the incident with minimal or no force being used.  Preserve Status Quo.  3.5  First responding officers should maintain the status quo to permit additional assets to be deployed.  They should not attempt to force a resolution, unless such action is immediately necessary to prevent injury or death to hostages, other third parties or officers.  However, if clear evidence exists that the barricaded individual is currently engaged in behavior likely to cause their own imminent death or serious bodily injury, officers may take affirmative action to prevent this behavior or render medical aid.  Nothing in this policy is intended to discourage officers from attempting to peacefully resolve an incident during this phase using communication and negotiation tactics.  Family Members of the Barricaded Individual.
[brief] It further ruled that [...]’s duty to indemnify [...] and [...] “depended on a judicial finding of some ‘negligence, omission, or conduct’ on its part based on evidence in the record or an admission by [...]. ”  Id. at 225.  In light of the dismissal of the plaintiff’s claims for lack of admissible expert testimony, the record was “devoid of any judicial finding that [...]’s conduct somehow caused the accident. ”  Ibid.  The Supreme Court ruled that it must interpret the language of the indemnity contract against the drafter, ibid., and that in the absence of a finding that [...] was at fault for the plaintiff’s accident, the judgment ordering [...] to reimburse [...] and [...] for defense costs was error.
[brief] ”  Id.  As Defendant correctly notes, requests that are simply attempts to “fish” through official files for belated grounds of attack on the judgment, or to confirm mere speculation or hope a basis for collateral relief may exist should be denied.  Db61 (citing State v. Szemple, 247 N.J. 82, 97 (2021)).  This is precisely what Defendant’s request for the hard drive was.  The hard drive, after it was initially wiped, never was found to contain any of the footage Defendant wanted, the footage that [...] did not save.  Even after the wiping, the drive contained only the two excerpts that Defendant already had and were used at the trial.  Defendant’s hope to peruse the drive was a speculative attempt to fish for information, as the drive contained only the footage that Defendant already possessed, in an effort to locate some evidence that trial counsel was ineffective in not requesting the drive itself or that his declination to do so somehow prejudiced the defendant.  There is no allegation of anything included on the drive that was not discovered to Defendant.  Defendant correspondingly has not produced any argument pertaining to how nonexistent and nonspecified footage on the drive could have affected the outcome of his trial.  In any event, the PCR Court judge did not abuse her discretion in vacating the improvidently-granted discovery order.
[brief] BECAUSE THE TRIAL JUDGE MISCONSTRUED THE LEASE BY FAILING TO ASCERTAIN THAT TENANT’S ALLOWANCE WAS AN UNWAIVABLE REIMBURSEMENT OWED TENANT AND THAT ANY RENT OWED WAS AUTOMATICALLY OFFSET AGAINST TENANT’S ALLOWANCE, PARAGRAPH 1 OF THE COURT’S NOVEMBER 10, 2021 ORDER, AND THE ENTIRETY OF THE NOVEMBER 9, 2023  FINAL ORDER MUST BE VACATED  (Da1-Da3)  Landlord owed Tenant more money under the Lease than Tenant owed Landlord in rent.  The Lease is clear that in such situations, the lower amount— the unpaid rent in this case—offsets automatically against the higher amount—the unpaid Tenant’s Allowance.  The trial judge’s ruling that no offset of the rent against the Allowance was available while the Tenant was “in breach,” misconstrued the applicable lease provisions resulting in an unwarranted and unjustifiable windfall to Landlord at Tenant’s expense.  A remand is warranted so that the trial court can fix the amount due on Tenant’s Allowance.  “[A] summary dispossess action does not permit either a landlord or tenant to plead a claim for damages,” but rather “confin[es] itself to the landlord’s right to possession, and fixing the amount of rent due to afford the tenant the opportunity to avoid eviction by its payment.
[brief] A.  The applicant shall prepare a slope map based on two-foot contour intervals which delineates by category the following slope classes:  (1)  Slope categories: - 0% to 14.9% - 15% to 19.9% - 20% to 24.9% - 25% or greater (2)  The slope map shall include a calculation of the area of proposed disturbance within all existing and/or proposed lots, as well as within any proposed road right-of-way.  B.  Disturbance for development, re-grading, and/or stripping of vegetation shall be permitted within the various categories of slope classes to the extent specified below:  | Slope Categories | Maximum Disturbance | |------------------|---------------------| | 0% to 14.9% | None | | 15% to 19.9% | 50% | | 20% to 24.9% | 33.3% | | 25% or greater | 0% | (1)
[brief] [...] Recalled Certain Ozurdex® Lots, But Not for a Safety Issue.  Following a routine inspection in June 2018, [...] discovered some Ozurdex® units had a potential for a single 300-micron silicone particulate to sheer off the injector needle sleeve when actuated.  (Da0240)  The 300-micron silicone particulate is 19 times smaller than the Ozurdex® pellet:  [...] timely reported this discovery to regulators in countries where affected lots were distributed, including reporting it to FDA in an Initial Field Alert in July 2018.  (Id.)  [...] kept FDA fully informed of its investigation: - regularly and timely communicating with FDA personnel, including providing updates on new information revealed by its investigation, submitting multiple Updated Field Alerts, performing and submitting a Benefit-Risk Assessment, and advising of foreign regulatory actions;³ - responding on multiple occasions to FDA requests for additional information, including notifying FDA of retained sample testing results and the percentage of affected units within those lots;⁴ and - informing FDA of [...]’s desire to issue a Dear Health Care Provider (“DHCP”) letter to U.S. physicians, submitting a draft DHCP letter to FDA for review, and contacting FDA multiple times for feedback on the draft letter and the action FDA believed necessary under the circumstances.  ³  The different rules, processes, and timelines of foreign regulatory authorities dictated the timing of recalls in their jurisdictions, as the FDA does in the U.S.  For example, the Swiss regulatory authority recommended [...] initiate a recall of certain Ozurdex® lots in September 2018.  [...] initiated recalls in other foreign markets pursuant to their regulatory authority’s respective timelines.  (Da0258, ¶ 70)  ⁴  Testing of the lot containing the Ozurdex® unit used in Plaintiff’s procedure showed particulate generation in only 2.2% of units.  (Da0229)  By the time Plaintiff received the Ozurdex® injection at issue in this case, [...] had made over 20 attempts to obtain authorization from FDA to communicate with U.S. healthcare providers about the silicone particulate issue.  (Da0258, ¶ 65)  [...]’s regulatory expert, [...], explained why it was necessary for [...] to wait for FDA’s review and clearance: under FDA regulations/guidance, [...] risked adverse regulatory action for a recall communication (including DHCP letters) inconsistent with FDA’s views on recall strategy.
[brief] The bank had, through its entity, [...], owned the assets of [...] since January 18, 2022.  (Ca142).  [...] pointed out in his letter brief that the landlord did nothing to stop its operation.  He was required by the fire inspector to correct violations on the property prior to his appointment.  The fire company came to the site on numerous occasions while issues were being resolved.  In addition, some of the assets had to be replaced or repaired, including cost of food.  (Ca142).  Also, [...] noted in his letter brief that the landlord was well aware of the assets of the operation, including real estate, which were all sold in bulk during the sheriff’s sale.  Nothing stopped the creditor from seeking information during that period of time, but nothing was done for a year and a half, after the sale of the property.  (Ca142).
[brief] [...]’s Compliance, as Discharged Co-Trustee, for Addressing [...]’ Exceptions, & Oct. ‘22 Order, par. 2, for Final Accounting  The Court overlooked requirements (Items a&b) due to its mistaken claim I had no standing for filing Exceptions (p. 1&2).  Court needs to order that:  a.  [...] shall correct Intermediate Accounting based on [...]’ Aug. 8, 2022 Exceptions, and file with Court after [...]’ acceptance.  b.  Prior Trust payments of $31,259.74 for [...] accounting fees for 2019-2022 are not approved, as was allowed in Oct. 6, 2022  Order, par. 1c, pending [...]’ review of those payments & any Exceptions for resolution with [...], or Court approval or denial, after submittal of his requested R&S invoice documents, as required by NJ R.3B:31-67.  c.  [...] shall prepare Final Informal Accounting, as required by Oct. 6, 2022 Order, par. 2, for period since April 1, 2022, for review by [...] d.  [...] shall arrange to file with Court, any updates, as needed, to Final Informal Accounting based on resolving [...]’ feedback, &/or require Court approval if there are outstanding Exceptions.  e.  [...]’s Final Trust Accounting shall include all necessary details listed in [...]’ March 1, 2023 letter, p. 2, to [...] (453a).  f.  [...] shall be allowed online access to Trust financial documents in Trust accounts prior to, and subsequent to, Trustee’s seizure of assets in Nov. 2022 from the [...] Trust accounts ending in 4444 & 4088.  g.  [...] and/or his counsel shall simultaneously copy [...] on any communications with others that they have regarding Trust accounts, withdrawals, payments, purchases, sales, and other activity.  h.  [...] shall turn over, as a final Trust transfer of records, to Trustees, and [...], as vested Remainder Beneficiary, as per NJ 3B:31-67, electronic spreadsheets for the Final and Intermediate Trust Accountings.  Court Rulings of February 17, 2023 Rulings for the March 7.
[brief] -- I will make a ruling.  I am trying to understand what the intention of the plaintiff is.  I am trying to understand, and I am giving you an opportunity to tell me for what other purposes than remedial action is it being offered.  You indicate merely for the completeness of testimony so the jury understands how she was able to walk out . . .  I don't -- I don't believe that it is admissible under 4:07, New Jersey Rule of Evidence 4:07.  This is -- I'm -- I'm seeking the intent for which you are providing the document.  It does – it just seems to be completeness of testimony.  In this case it goes more to the remedial measures that were taken by the defendant after the plaintiff's accident.  She can certainly testify as to the condition.  They are pictures of the condition of the floor at the time of the accident.  I find it also to not be admissible under Rule 4:03.  I think that it is prejudicial value would clearly outweigh any probative value on her exiting and how the condition was different, and I think that in light of the jury charge 5:20(f)(8), the critical components for the jury to find are whether there was actual notice of the period of time before the plaintiff's injury to permit the owner to in the exercise of reasonable care to condition or constructive notice.  What the condition was after her fall do not go to either actual or constructive notice for the purpose of establishing the defendant's negligence.  (See T1:27-28).  Additionally, [...] properly ruled pursuant to N.J.R.E. 901 in excluding unauthenticated evidence – in this case, an incident report authored by a [...] representative.
[brief] For purposes of this appeal only, Plaintiffs adopt the Statement of Facts and Procedural History as set forth in the Defendants' brief except as supplemented herein.  The [...] has intervened in the within matter and asserted a claim for damages against all Defendants named in [...]'s Complaint.  See Da 5a.  The allegations of Plaintiffs' complaint which set forth a cause of action under the New Jersey Insurance Fraud Prevention Act, N.J.S.A. 17:33A-1, et seq., make explicitly clear that the damages sought are restitutionary in nature.  For example, ¶¶ 93 and 94 of the complaint detail the monies that the Respondents previously paid to the various corporate Defendants.  See Da 51a-52a.  Count Three's ad damnum clause prays for an award of compensatory damages "equal to all PIP medical expense benefits Plaintiffs [...] and [...] [previously] paid in connection with the claims of the [...]/[...] claimants for services allegedly rendered."  See Da 70a.  POINT I THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY FOUND THAT DEFENDANTS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO A JURY TRIAL
[brief] Mar. 13, '23 Order corrected that I was a Vested Remainder Beneficiary.  2.  Court erred in Oct. '22 Order, par. 1, & Mar. 7, '23 Order, par. 3, in overlooking my requests, as Qualified Beneficiary, for [...] to provide my listed Trust info/documents, as required by R.3B:31-67, in my Aug. 8, '22 Exceptions, for my review for any Exceptions (for Court approval or denial) to the accuracy/validity of figures in the Intermediate & Final Accountings.