ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] *N.J.R.E.* 702 governs the admissibility of expert testimony.  The rule provides:  “[i]f scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise. ”  One of the requirements of this rule requires that “the proponent of expert evidence” establish that the witness has “sufficient expertise to offer the testimony. ”  *State v. Olenowski*, 253 N.J. 133, 143 (2023) (citing *State v. J.L.G.*, 234 N.J. 265, 280 (2018); *State v. Kelly*, 97 N.J. 178, 208 (1984)).  Here, [...]’s testimony about what a car would look like if someone had been stabbed in the jugular vein inside that car ran afoul of this requirement; [...] did not have sufficient expertise to offer that testimony.  Our Supreme Court has previously addressed the appropriate scope of testimony from a forensic pathologist, reversing the defendant’s convictions after a fatal car accident in part because of improper expert testimony from the forensic pathologist.
[brief] Deeds dated January 19, 1972  [...] to [...] ...........................................Pa0098  August 30, 1995  Deed [...] to [...] ..............................................................................Pa0105  July 3, 1999  Survey by [...], P.L.S.................................................................Pa0107  Leonard v. Pantich, 2020 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1644 (App. Div. 2020) ..................................................Pa0108 December 27, 2023 Transcript Completion Form...............................................................Pa0114 | Authority | Brief page number | |-----------------------------------------------|-------------------| | Glorieux v. Lightpipe, | 16 | | 88 N.J.L. 199 (E. & A. 1915) | | | Hyland v. Kirkman, | 24 | | 204 N.J. Super. 345 (Ch. Div. 1985) | | | Leonard v. Pantich, | 31, 32, 33, 34 | | 2020 N.J. Super. Unpub. Lexis 1644 (App. Div. 2020) | | | Manalapan Realty L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, | 8 | | 140 N.J. 366 (1995) | | | Manillo v. Gorski, | 30 | | 54 N.J. 378 (1969) | | | Palmarg Realty Co. v. Rehac, | 10, 15, 16, 25 | | 80 N.J. 446 (1979) | | | Patton v. North Jersey Dist. Water Supply Com.,| 30 | | 93 N.J. 180 (1983) | | | Poniatowski v. Camac, | 11, 12 | | 3 N.J. Misc. 755 (1925).
[brief] “[Both] shootings occurred within a short period of one another so as to constitute one criminal act … and were of similar objectives since the defendant testified that [in both instances,] he felt threatened[.]” (30T 61-4 to 9)  See *State v. Miller*, 205 N.J. 109, 129 (2011) (*Yarbough* guidelines favor concurrent terms where crimes were not predominantly independent of each other and were committed at the same time and place); *State v. Lester*, 271 N.J. Super. 289, 293 (App. Div. 1994) (“Where separate crimes grow out of the same series of events or from the same factual nexus, consecutive sentences are not imposed.
[brief] [Pa11-Pa12]  The trial court’s determination the Township did not act palpably unreasonable should be affirmed.  Given Plaintiff’s failure to meet this requirement of the TCA, the trial court properly dismissed Plaintiff’s claims as to the Township.  First, and as more fully set forth above, Plaintiff has waived any argument as to the trial court’s notice finding by failing to brief same.  Sklodowsky, 417 N.J. Super. at 657; R. 2:6-2, cmt. 5 (“It is, of course, clear that an issue not briefed is deemed waived.
[directive] IN ORDER TO SERVE AS A GRAND JUROR, YOU NEED TO MEET THE FOLLOWING QUALIFICATIONS THAT ARE SET FORTH IN NEW JERSEY STATUTES.  YOU WERE ASKED ABOUT THESE ON YOUR QUALIFICATION QUESTIONNAIRE THAT YOU RECEIVED WITH YOUR SUMMONS BUT YOU CANNOT SERVE AS A JUROR IF YOU DO NOT MEET EACH OF THESE QUALIFICATIONS.  IF ANYONE HAS A QUESTION ABOUT ANY OF THEM, PLEASE SPEAK WITH ME AFTER THIS ORIENTATION:
[brief] Appellant/plaintiff [...] is not exempt from those laws.  It is also disingenuous for him to suggest he was some non-sophisticated operator who simply misunderstood his online application.  In fact, plaintiff holds a bachelor’s degree in management with a focus in marketing and is self-employed in his own business teaching “trade currencies, indexes, commodities, [and] metals” in “foreign exchange markets. ” (PA041-042, T12:L1-T13:L14).  Appellant/plaintiff understood what he did, which was to obtain a North Carolina policy while residing in New Jersey.  The evidence is overwhelming and demonstrated by plaintiff’s exchange with the police officers at the scene of the accident (PA085, 4:30 - 4:40):  Police: Is [the automobile insurance] New Jersey Progressive?  Appellant/Plaintiff [...]: North Carolina.  Appellant/plaintiff [...] relocated from North Carolina to Orange, New Jersey prior to the subject accident of April 13, 2022.  (PA051, T49:L11-15).  He relinquished his rented property in North Carolina by the time he signed up for the [...] policy.  (PA057, T76:L9-24).  He changed his driver’s license to New Jersey using the address of [...].  (PA040, T5:L16-24; PA051, T50:L8-T51:L23).  He identified this address as his on his Complaint, in Interrogatories, and at deposition.
[brief] Petitioner’s treating physician, [...], evaluated Petitioner in connection with the subject October 17, 2015 car accident and performed Petitioner’s surgery.  (Pa160-165).  The 2009 incident is mentioned five times in [...]’s treatment report, including that Petitioner had a previous history of neck and back pain from a 2009 incident, which [...] describes as follows:  He was in a fight as a police officer.  He tackled a man to the ground.  He hit the back of his head on a car as he fell.  He lost consciousness for 10 to 15 seconds.  He reports neck injury and back injury.  He had PT.  He was out or work for 3 months.  He denies and injections or surgeries.  (Pa163).  It has been alleged by Petitioner’s counsel that this incident did not occur, that [...]’s five references to the incident were typographical errors and that [...] was instead referring to Petitioner’s 2000 incident.  (2T38:9-39:17).  For comparative purposes, Petitioner described the 2000 incident as follows:  In 2000 I was working a concert, 30,000 people at the concert….But we were just patrolling on bikes.  I had a partner.  He got off the bike to check on someone…and an individual jumped on the bike and took off…I catch up to him.  I do a take-down with the bike - - take him down.  (1T24:16-25:13).  Petitioner testified that he was wearing a helmet and that he injured his knee, his lower back and his neck (1T24:21; 26:6-9).  As with Petitioner’s 2000 and 2004 incidents and injuries, [...] did not mention the 2009 incident in his report, but testified he read about it in [...]’s report.  (2T32:22-33:3; 34:12-35-3).  He also testified that the 2009 incident could affect his conclusion in this case if it “rose to the level that he needed epidural blocks”, or if “they suggested surgery at that time”, but the information provided was “not really specific. ” (2T35:8-23).  [...] added, “[b]ut I’ll agree, there is an issue - - that there is an issue in 2009”, but never requested nor was he provided additional records to review in connection with this accident. (2T35:25-36:4).
[brief] (14T:118-5 to 7).  The Court instructed [...] to answer the question.  (14T:118-12).  455 N.J. Super. at 215.  Not only [...] give an opinion on the ultimate issue, but he also explained the law and testified as to Scott’s state of mind during the homicide.  This testimony was contrary to the holding of J.T. and [...] usurped the jury’s role.  Id.  The testimony by [...] issue denied [...] of his right to a fair trial.
[directive] Such payments include but are not limited to:  1.  The purchase or lease of automatic data processing systems (not less than a majority of which use will be related to the seizure and forfeiture program).  Training; 2.  The Treasury Forfeiture Fund may be used to finance training expenses directly EOAF related to the Asset Forfeiture Program.  The Director of may grant exceptions on a case-by-case basis.  3.  Printing-and .‘r Contracting for services directly related to: 4. a. the identification of forfeitable assets; the processing of and accounting for seizure and forfeitures; and b. c. the storage, maintenance, protection, and destruction of controlled substances.  >  Given the variance in annual revenues experienced by the Fund, critical and recurring expenses relating to the storage, maintenance, protection and destruction of Executive Oftice for Asset Fofeiture  10 N Chauter Guidelines for Seized and Forfeited Prouertv contraband (i.e., controlled substances, counterfeit currency, weapons) are best (S&E) funded by each agency’s annual Salaries and Expenses appropriation.  Limitations on the Mandatory Spending Authority not Expenses payable from the Fund include, but are not limited to: (1) purchase of real property or any interest therein except to acquire full title to or to satisfy liens or mortgages; expenses of equipping or improving property transferred to nonTreasury agencies; (2) reception and representation expenses; and (3) claims of unsecured creditors generally may not be paid from the Fund, particularly if (4) such payment may jeopardize the claims of existing lien holders.
[brief] In that case, the court noted “the strong public policy in favor of protecting every citizen’s right to vote, and to have his or her vote counted,” as well as the court’s concomitant “duty to construe elections laws liberally. ”  Id. at 474 (quoting In re Petition of Gray-Sadler, 164 N.J. 468, 474-75 (2000)).  This court then rejected the argument that an improperly cast write-in vote should be counted because there were no instructions on the sample ballot or machine, noting that the voter, “just like every person[,] is charged with knowledge of the law. ”  Id. at 473.  Further, this court observed that “[i]t is not too much to expect that a voter would notice that his candidate’s name appears as a choice on the ballot and that there is a clearly prescribed place on the ballot for expressing that choice. ”  Id. at 476; see also In re Gen. Election Held in the Twp. of Monroe, 245 N.J. Super. 70, 73-74 (App. Div. 1990) (“The purpose of these statutes is to avoid marking or defacing a ballot in a manner which will . . . cause speculation as to the voter’s intent”).
[brief] Page  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS BEING APPEALED ........................................................................................................  ii  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ........................................................................................................ iii  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT .................................................................................................  1  PROCEDURAL HISTORY ........................................................................................................  4  STATEMENT OF FACTS ..........................................................................................................  6  LEGAL ARGUMENT ..................................................................................................................  9  I.  STANDARD OF REVIEW ....................................................................................................  9  II.  Immunity statutes, which relieve a party from tort liability, must be plainly read and narrowly construed.  Pa4 ...........................................10  III.  The Trial Court Erred in its statutory interpretation of N.J.S.A. 48:12-152 in that it considered the terms Railroad “Property” and Railroad “Right of Way” as interchangeable terms.  Pa4 ......................................................................................14  a.  Specific examples of Motion Judge using terms “right of way” and “property” interchangeably.  Pa4 ...............23  IV.  The N.J.S.A. 48:12-152 immunity statute was intended to protect railroads from lawsuits filed by trespassers, not from lawsuits filed by people legally within crossings established by railroads.  Pa4 .....................................................................................28  V.  Even if the Court was to determine that N.J.S.A. 48:12-152b(5) is the appropriate controlling law, the Court improperly granted summary judgment as there are genuine issues of material fact related to the intended use of railroad property and posted regulations.  Pa4 ........................................32  VI.  The overly broad interpretation of N.J.S.A. 48:12-152 is against public policy and dangerous for the citizens of New Jersey.  Pa4 ........................................................................................................35  CONCLUSION .........................................................................................................................37  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS BEING APPEALED
[directive] At a defendant’s initial court appearance before a judge, the prosecutor shall confirm that the defendant has been advised on the record that:  1.  Potential charges and convictions may carry immigration consequences, see Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010); and Page 8 2.  The defendant may have rights to consular notification pursuant to the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations.  B.  Pretrial detention.  In assessing whether to seek pretrial detention of an arrestee under N.J.S.A. 2A:162-15 to -25, the prosecutor shall make an individualized assessment based on the specific facts presented in each case, and shall not simply assume that a non-citizen presents a risk of flight.  C.
[directive] The report shall be completed by the officer within 24 hours of the use of force, and preferably before the end the shift in which the force was used.  If the officer who used force is unable to complete the report within 24 hours, it should be completed as soon the officer is able to do so, or by a supervising officer within 48 hours, in accordance with a written policy to be established by the department or agency.  7.4  Review of use of force.
[brief] In the insurer context, “[g]enerally, courts in this District have found that documents created by the insurer after it has declined coverage are presumed, or at least more likely, to have been created in anticipation of litigation and to be work product, whereas documents that are part of the claim investigation process are not typically work product. ”  99 Wall Dev., 2020 WL 2730944, at *7.  “Other courts, instead of employing that presumption, have adopted a more flexible case-by-case approach. ”  Roc Nation LLC v. HCC Int’l Ins. Co., No. 19-cv-554, 2020 WL 1970697, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 24, 2020) (internal quotation marks omitted).  The Court believes it cannot make such a presumption in lieu of a case-by-case assessment of the facts.  See Adlman, 134 F.3d at 1202–03; U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Braspetro Oil Servs. Co., No. 97-cv-6124, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7939, at *36–44, *34 n.7 (S.D.N.Y. June 7, 2000) (assessing the facts where a surety invoked the work-product doctrine as to documents prepared by a surety during its investigation).  To assess whether [...]’ investigation may be protected by the work-product doctrine, the Court needs additional information about when the investigation was conducted and for what purpose.  To that end, the Court needs clarity on the following: (1) whether [...] has a statutory duty to investigate [...]’s claim under the performance bond; (2) when [...] learned of the notice(s) of default; (3) when [...] conducted its investigation and for what purpose; (4) if and when [...] hired outside counsel in connection with the investigation; (5) when [...] denied performance on the bond or otherwise agreed to stand behind its principal [...] and deny [...]’s claim; (6) whether, and to what extent, [...]’ investigation differed from those it performed in the ordinary course of its business; and (7) whether [...] believes any meaningful distinctions exist between an insurer and a surety as to the application of the work-product doctrine to investigation-related materials.
[directive] All state, county, and local law enforcement agencies shall, Establishment of before June 1, 2020, adopt and/or revise their existing policies and practices, consistent with this Directive, either by rule, regulation, or standard operating procedure.  B. parties.  This Directive is issued pursuant to the Attorney Non-enforceability by third General’s authority to ensure the uniform and efficient enforcement of the laws and administration of criminal justice throughout the state.  This Directive imposes limitations on law enforcement agencies and officials that may be more restrictive than the limitations imposed under the United States and New Jersey Constitutions, and federal and state statutes and regulations.  Nothing in this Directive shall be construed in any way to create any substantive right that may be enforced by any third party.  C.
[brief] Furthermore, had appellant/plaintiff reviewed the insurance declaration page after the policy was amended, he would have seen that the vehicles were still reflected under the policy as being garaged in North Carolina.  The motor vehicle accident occurred over a month after the accident.  This was more than enough time for him to review the insurance declaration page and realize that changing his mailing address did not amend to reflect that vehicles were garaged in New Jersey.  (PA124-12).  But for this misrepresentation, [...] would not have issued a North Carolina policy of automobile insurance to a New Jersey resident who garaged his motor vehicle in New Jersey.
[brief] (T1 at 69:12-71:10; 101:18-23; 102:1-5; 101:6-12; 101:13-22; 103:1-15; 103:16-24; 103:25-104:1; 104:16-21; 104:22-24; 105:16-106:11; 108:17-25; 186:10-25; 187:17-25; T3 at 8:6-8; 13:25-14:14).  The Court found that the “evidence was sparse” on just exactly what the preexisting non-conforming use was when the zoning ordinance came into effect.
[brief] The Riparian Grant, now referred to and identified as Block 184, Lot 3.01, was a conveyance in fee simple of real property.  Much like the Riparian Grant in Panetta v. Equity One, 190 N.J. 307, 323 (2007), the Subject Property, Lot 3.01 is not appurtenant to the upland property and thus, the [...] never acquired title to the Subject Property.
[brief] ”  Quoting New Jersey Court R. 3:9-3(f), (Page 1-2 of Table of authorities).  The decision from the Appellate Court in State v. Nyema, 465 N.J. Super and the New Jersey Supreme Court in Nyema, 245 N.J. and the certification of State v. [...], alone affords Myers the right to withdraw his guilty plea.  With the [...] dismissing the indictment due to an unlawful stop, based on racial profiling, and an unlawful search and seizure, and illegally obtained evidence was in error wrongfully admitted into [...] murder trial.  [...] firmly states that he would not have plead guilty, and would have went to trial to have his innocence proved (emphases added).  In state v. Nyema, 465, N.J. Super. 181, 185 (App. Div. 2020).  It states:  Accordingly, Nyema’s conviction was reversed and his sentence was vacated.  Moreover, Nyema’s sentence was vacated by this very same appeals court.  Maybe a different panel, but yet and still by the same appellate court.  It would be manifestly unjust for [...] “global” plea, and the entire plea deal to also not be vacated.  The word global is defined as: “Of, relating to or applying to a whole.  Also, if the appeals court is saying that the murder indictment sentence can stand on its own while the robbery case indictment can be dismissed individually, that is not a global plea to what Myers understanding of the trial court's explanation was, or Myers attorney, and it is not a conditional plea from the defendants understanding, and that means the defendant was told a lie, and put under false pretense by the trial court, of what the "global" conditional plea deal meant.  Because again, Myers strongly state, he would not have taken a plea deal and would have went to trial if the trial court judge [...] had informed defendant that one of the sentences under the "global/whole conditional plea deal could still stand.  So what is being stated, that is making it an issue now that Myers has in fact prevailed on appeal, and wisest to take his rightly opportunity to withdraw his plea?  because Myers did in fact prevail on appeal, and the guilty plea is governed under 3:9-3(f) he should be afforded "his right to decide" whether he wants to renegotiate plea terms since things are significantly differently with the robbery case indictment dismissed and completely out the picture, or decide to go to trial as Myers initially planned to, being that he plead guilty on the day he was to start his jury selection.
[brief] A. [...]’s engineering report did not discuss the pre-existing property conditions, including the pre-existing water runoff.  Plaintiff retained Antoine [...], P.E. to prepare an engineering report.  Pa54, ¶ 81; Pa333, ¶ 81; accord Pa259-60.  Mr. [...] reviewed [...]’s survey.  Pa54, ¶ 82; Pa333, ¶ 82; accord Pa259.  He offered the opinion that “there is a good amount of runoff generated and conveyed to [...] from [...] to cause erosion and inundate the landscape. ”  Pa54, ¶ 83; Pa333, ¶ 83; accord Pa260.  Yet he did not discuss the fact that water runoff had occurred before the [...] purchased the property, nor did he discuss plaintiff’s earlier prior suit for damage caused by water runoff at issue in the Burke Action.  Pa54, ¶ 84; Pa333, ¶ 84; accord Pa259-60.  He did not contend that the [...] changed the grade of the property.  Pa54, ¶ 85; Pa333, ¶ 85; accord Pa259-60.  He did not compare [...]’s survey to the surveys taken before the [...] purchased the property.  Pa55, ¶ 86; Pa333, ¶ 86; accord Pa259-60.  B.
[brief] Mt. Prospect was a consolidation of three cases involving different medical practice defendants (the “Practices”).  The Complaint by [...] alleged – as [...] alleges here – that “the Practices filed exaggerated claims for medical services (sometimes for treatments that were never provided), billed medically unnecessary care, and engaged in illegal kickback schemes.  [...]’s suits against the Practices each included a claim under the IFPA, which gives insurers a fraud-like action with fewer elements than common-law fraud. ”  CCMC Appendix, Da162-63 (citing [...] N.J. Ins. Co. v. Lajara, 117 A.3d 1221, 1231-32 (N.J. 2015)).  As [...] did here, [...] opted into the AICRA PIP regime and issued two documents to its insureds, a Decision Point Review Plan (the “Plan”) and an Assignment of Benefits, as endorsements to its policies.
[directive] The specific revisions to the form are as follows: (1) the Offense Circumstances section was renamed to "Summary of State's Allegations" on the Offense Information form of the PSI Report and the PTI Report, and (2) a "Disclaimer for Use in Post-Sentence Proceedings" was added in the "Summary of the State's Allegations" section in the PSI Report.  Specifically, the "Disclaimer for Use in Post-Sentence Proceedings" now will state:  This summary of the State's Allegations includes descriptions of charges of which the defendant may not have been found guilty by a jury or may Criminal - Uniform Defendant Reporting System - Revisions to the Offense Information Form Page2 not have pied guilty to.  No inference of guilt or wrongdoing should be drawn from dismissed charges.  This section must be read in conjunction with the final charges and the "Defendant's Version."  The revised Offense Information form has been included in the following array of forms, which collectively make up the UDRS, and are attached for ease of reference.