ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] (8T 38-1 to 59-1)  The State’s reliance on these experts makes sense, because the case was otherwise weak.  Without the inappropriate expert testimony, the State’s case rests on: - one witness’s second-hand account of the state of [...]’s marriage; - the fact of [...]’s flight; - an unrecorded confession relayed by a witness facing federal narcotics charges; - the assertion by one fingerprint examiner that [...]’s finger was on the wine chiller; - the significance of the blood on [...]’s shirt, as explained by a bloodstain pattern analyst’s subjective interpretation; - a DNA analysis of the blood on the shirt, which the jury would weigh according to its interpretation of the statistic generated by the analyst.  Through the inappropriate expert testimony, the State bolstered its case by informing the jury that: - three fingerprint experts believed [...] left the fingerprint instead of just one; - the fingerprint could not have been left before the murder; • both fingerprint analysis and bloodstain pattern analysis were essentially infallible; • the DNA in question was [...]’s, without any information to determine the weight to give that assertion; • the assailant’s “rage” could make up for the amount of strength needed to inflict these injuries.  It is undeniable that the State’s case is much stronger with these additions.  And the State’s case needed that strengthening, because it lacked direct proofs of [...]’s identity as the murderer.  The surveillance footage supports both the State and defense case; there was no eyewitness to the offense itself; and there is no recorded, Mirandized or otherwise reliable confession.
[brief] LEGAL ARGUMENT I.  STANDARD OF REVIEW.  Agency factual findings enjoy a presumption of correctness if they are “supported by substantial credible evidence” in the record as a whole.  In re Authorization for Freshwater Wetlands Gen. Permits, 372 N.J. Super. 578, 593 (App. Div. 2004); Bd. Of Educ. Of Englewood Cliffs v. Bd. Of Educ. Of Englewood, 257 N.J. Super. 413, 456 (App. Div. 1992), aff’d o.b., 132 N.J. 327, cert. denied, 510 U.S. 991 (1993).  An appellate court applies these standards to avoid substituting its own judgment for the agency’s exercise of expertise.  In re Distribution of Liquid Assets, 168 N.J. 1, 10 (2001).  The presumptive validity of administrative actions requires that those challenging the decision have the burden of proving that the decision is reversible.
[brief] Although [...] was “Landlord” at the time the Lease was executed, it assigned its rights and obligations to Plaintiff prior to the events that led to this litigation.  When this brief refers to the term “Landlord” Plaintiff is intended. utilities serving the Premises” (Da15-Da17).  Tenant further had to obtain all permits and approvals required by local authorities (Da16).  Landlord, for its part, was “not required to do any work to the Premises” (Da15).  In phase two of the Lease, the Rent Commencement Period, spanning from the first day after the tenth full month following execution, i.e. August 1, 2018, throughout the next five years,\(^5\)  Tenant was responsible for paying monthly rent in the amount of $24,266.67, in addition to related charges collectible as additional rent (Da10-11; Da13-Da14).  Upon fulfilment of, and in consideration for, Tenant’s Work, after the first full year of phase two, beginning on August 1, 2019, the Landlord was required to begin making annual payments to Tenant, referred to in the Lease as “Tenant’s Allowance,” in six separate installments plus five-percent (5%) interest against the balance owed until the entire Tenant’s Allowance—$730,000 plus interest—was satisfied in full (Da17-Da18).
[brief] The Trial Court agreed with the proposition of the Plaintiff that before the Plaintiff need even consider a "bona fide" offer to be "valid" it must first contain terms that the holder of the ROFR deems necessary.  Nothing in Section 39 even begins to articulate any requirements of a bona fide offer that might disqualify such offer ahead of the Plaintiff's obligation being triggered to review said offer and exercise or, by their silence, waive their ROFR within 30 days.  Moreover, any terms in a bona fide offer would have to be dictated by the third party proposed buyer, not the holder of a ROFR.  Assuming that, as the Trial Court seems to have found in this case, a ROFR holder does have the power to dictate what terms and conditions must be included in an offer, the terms that the Plaintiff deemed to be "missing" have no legal or practical impact on the Plaintiff whether they were missing or included.  Obviously, a ROFR held by the Plaintiff is not something of which the Plaintiff could be ignorant.  It is a term connected to a different, prior contract in which the Plaintiff was a party.
[brief] Plaintiff does not have a copy of that opinion, but instead has a copy of the Order entered by the court as well as copies of the defective notice and the remedial notice published by the Township along with an explanatory letter from Township counsel.  (Pa148; Pa149; Pa150-Pa155).  \(^7\)  Pursuant to R. 1:36-3, a copy of the unpublished opinion is attached.  (Pa240).  A contrary opinion on this issue was issued by the court in *Frye v. [...]*, No. [...] (N.J. Sup. Ct. Law Div. Feb. 3, 2012).
[brief] As the New Jersey Supreme Court has stated, the alleged prosecutorial conduct must be “so egregious that it deprived the defendant of a fair trial. ”  *State v. Ramseur*, 106 N.J. 123, 322 (1987).  See also *State v. Bauman*, 298 N.J. Super. 176, 207 (App. Div. 1997); *State v. Ortisi*, 308 N.J. Super. 573, 595 (App. Div. 1998); *Allen*, supra, 337 N.J. Super. 259.
[brief] \(^1\)  Determinative criteria for licensure was within the purview of the Commissioner, “dependent upon their relation to the objectives of the Small Loan Act in light of its history and purpose, it is difficult to see how better the Commissioner can execute the legislative policy than by looking to the needs of the community.  . . .”  Family Fin. Corp. v. Gaffney, 11 N.J. 565, 572 (1953).  In addition to enforcement and gatekeeping remedies afforded to the Commissioner, the NJSLL also allowed \(^1\) “[T]he Small Loan Law was intended to and does afford to the Commissioner power to limit the number of licenses in a community. ”  Gough, 10 N.J. Super. at 21. private actions for damages by individual consumers.  See, e.g., Langer v. Morris Plan Corp., 110 N.J.L. 186, 187 (1933).  The NJSLL was superseded by the New Jersey Consumer Loan Act ("NJCLA") in 1962.
[brief] It is undisputed, for example, that [...] leases (and does not own) a small office space in Newark, New Jersey and that none of the firm’s attorneys use that space as their primary office location.  Da196; Da208; Da223.  It is also  Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has “rejected the premise of ‘approv[ing] the exercise of general jurisdiction in every [s]tate in which a [defendant] ‘engages in a substantial, continuous, and systematic course of business. ’”  Baskin v. P.C. Richard & Son, LLC, 462 N.J. Super. 594, 616–17 (App. Div. 2020), rev’d on other grounds, 246 N.J. 157 (2021) (quoting Daimler, 571 U.S. at 138).  After all, a business “that operates in many places can scarcely be deemed at home in all of them. ”  Id. at 617 (quoting BNSF Ry. Co. v. Tyrrell, 137 S. Ct. 1549, 1559 (2017)).  New Jersey courts have thus “noted the incredible difficulty of establishing ‘general jurisdiction [over a business] in a forum other than the place of incorporation or principal place of business. ’”  Baskin, 462 N.J. Super. at 617 (quoting Dutch Run, 450 N.J. Super. at 608); see also Daimler, 571 U.S. at 139 n.19 (only in an “exceptional case” can an entity’s operations outside of its place of formation or principal place of business be “so substantial and of such a nature as to render the corporation at home in that State. ”).  Plaintiff did not come close to making that showing as to [...], which does not have anything approaching the type of “extensive contacts” ____________________ undisputed that the Newark office presently has no employees, Da223, and that the percentage of total revenue attributable to clients based in New Jersey has ranged over the past ten years from 0.0119% to a high of 4.6046%.
[directive] UWAGA:  Niniejszy dokument jest dokumentem publicznym, co oznacza, że na żądanie może on zostać udostępniony do wglądu publicznego w przedłożonej formie.  Z tego względu proszę nie podawać w nim osobistych identyfikatorów, takich jak numer ubezpieczenia społecznego (social security), numer prawa jazdy, numer tablicy rejestracyjnej pojazdu, numer polisy ubezpieczeniowej, numery aktywnych kont bankowych lub kart kredytowych.  NOTICE:  This is a public document, which means the document as submitted will be available to the public upon request.  Therefore, do not enter personal identifiers on it, such as Social Security number, driver’s license number, vehicle plate number, insurance policy number, active financial account number, or active credit card number.  Pozwy, wnioski oraz wszelkie inne dokumenty składane w sądzie powinny być w języku angielskim Complaints, motions and other papers submitted to the court should be in English
[brief] J. Super. 197 (App. Div. 2022) | 64 | | Cases (Cont'd) | PAGE NOS. | |------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------| | **State v. Muhammad**, 182 N.J. 551 (2005) | 47, 48 | | **State v. O.D.A.-C.**, 250 N.J. 408 (2022) | 29, 30, 37, 38 | | **State v. O’Neill**, 193 N.J. 148 (2007) | 21, 22 | | **State v. Patton**, 362 N.J. Super. 16 (App. Div. 2003) | 54 | | **State v. Pearson**, 318 N.J. Super. 123 (App. Div. 1999) | 21, 23 | | **State v. Pierce**, 330 N.J. Super. 479 (App. Div. 2000) | 48 | | **State v. Puryear**, 441 N.J. Super. 280 (App. Div. 2015) | 31, 37 | | **State v. Rhett**, 127 N.J. 3 (1992) | 57 | | **State v.  Rivas**, 251 N.J. 132 (2022) | 20, 26 | | **State v. Rogers**, 124 N.J. 113 (1991) | 62 | | **State v. S.S.**, 229 N.J. 360 (2017) | 20, 25, 26, 28 | | **State v. Scharf**, 225 N.J. 547 (2016) | 60 | | **State v. Sims**, 250 N.J. 189 (2022) | 31, 42 | | **State v. Thomas**, 188 N.J. 137 (2006) | 65 | | **State v. Torres**, 246 N.J. 246 (2021) | 62, 63 | | **State v. Tung**, 460 N.J. Super. 75 (App. Div. 2019) | 47, 51, 52, 55 | | **State v. Vick**, 117 N.J. 288 (1989) | 57 | | **State v. Wade**, 252 N.J. 209 (2022) | 39 | ### TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (CONT'D) | Cases (Cont'd) | PAGE NOS. | |-------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------| | **State v. Weaver**, 219 N.J. 131 (2014) | 60 | | **State v. Wright**, 155 N.J. Super. 549 (App. Div. 1978) | 63 | | **State v. Yarbough**, 100 N.J. 627 (1985) | 61, 62, 63, 66 | | **Sutton v. Metro. Gov’t Nashville & Davidson Cnty.**, 700 F.3d 865 (6th Cir. 2012) | 24 | | **United States v. Hale**, 422 U.S. 171 (1975) | 48 | | **United States v. Tingle**, 658 F.2d 1332 (9th Cir. 1981) | 32 | | **United States v. Wade**, 388 U.S. 218 (1967) | iv, vi, 3, 40 | | **Vargas v. Brown**, 512 F. Supp. 271 (D.R.I. 1981) | 32 | ### Statutes | Statute | PAGE NOS. | |------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------| | N.J.S.A. 2A:84A-19 | 9 | | N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(1) | 1 | | N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(2) | 1 | | N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7 | 59 | | N.J.S.A. 2C:39-1 | 57 | | N.J.S.A. 2C:39-1(f) | 57 | | N.J.S.A. 2C:39-1(r) | 57 | | N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(a)(1) | 1 | | N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b)(1) | 1 | | Authority | Page Nos. | |--------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------| | **Statutes (Cont'd)** | | | N.J.S.A. 2C:39-7(b)(1) | 1, 56, 57, 59 | | N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)(14) | 64 | | **Court Rules** | | | R. 2:10-2 | 41, 42, 56 | | **Rules of Evidence** | | | N.J.R.E. 503 | 9 | | N.J.R.E. 602 | 51, 54 | | N.J.R.E. 701 | 51, 54, 55| | N.J.R.E. 806 | 43, 45 | | **Constitutional Provisions** | | | N.J. Const. art. I, ¶ 1 | 9, 42, 56, 60 | | N.J. Const. art.
[brief] SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY  APPELLATE DIVISION  DOCKET NO. [...]  CRIMINAL ACTION  On Appeal from the Letter Opinion  Denying a Motion to Correct an Illegal Sentence, filed on November 1, 2023, in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Essex County, Indictment No. [...]  Sat Below: Hon. [...], J.S.C. BRIEF AND APPENDIX ON BEHALF OF APPELLANT, [...] (DA-1 TO DA-19)
[brief] 18 - **N.J.S.A. 19:16-3(f)** ...................................................................................................... - **N.J.S.A. 19:19-1** ........................................................................................................  9 - **N.J.S.A. 19:19-6** ........................................................................................................ 9, 10 - **N.J.S.A. 19:20-3** ........................................................................................................  10 - **N.J.S.A. 19:47-1** ........................................................................................................  11 - **N.J.S.A. 19:48-1** ........................................................................................................ , 18 - **N.J.S.A. 19:48-3** ........................................................................................................  12 - **N.J.S.A. 19:49-5** ........................................................................................................ passim - **N.J.S.A. 19:50-3** ........................................................................................................  16, 17  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
[brief] (Pa1).  Plaintiff-Appellant, [...], has filed this Appeal alleging that the Court should have applied New Jersey’s six-year statute of limitations under the policy’s conformity-to-law clause; Defendant-Respondent, [...], is equitably estopped from asserting the suit limitation clause because Defendant-Respondent, [...], waited over a year to deny coverage; Defendant-Respondent, [...], waived its policy defense by omitting it from its Answer; and the policy limitation period, if applicable, was tolled until Defendant-Respondent, [...], declined coverage.
[directive] INTERNAL AFFAIRS POLICY & PROCEDURES | August 2020  2.4  Fitness for Duty  2.4.1  One of the areas that often involves internal affairs is an employee's fitness for duty.  This is not exclusively an internal affairs issue; an officer's fitness may be impacted for reasons other than misconduct.  For instance, an officer may become unfit for duty because of a medical problem unrelated to the job.  There are occasions, however, when internal affairs may be called upon to assist in determining whether or not an officer is fit for duty.  2.4.2  It is incumbent upon a law enforcement agency to ensure that its members are fit to safely and effectively perform the duties of their profession.  If, for whatever reason, an officer's fitness for duty is questioned, the agency must have the officer evaluated by competent professionals to answer that question.  If a law enforcement executive, commander, supervisor or internal affairs investigator has reasonable concerns about an officer’s fitness for duty, they are obligated to begin the process necessary to obtain that evaluation.  If the officer in question is obviously unfit for duty, the officer in authority may effect an immediate suspension pending the outcome of the evaluation and investigation.  See Section 5.2 (“Immediate Suspension Pending Investigation and Disposition”).  2.4.3  At the same time, law enforcement work places an extraordinary mental and emotional toll on officers, and all officers must be free to seek treatment and support that enables them to cope with those pressures.  Accordingly, under no circumstances shall an officer face any sort of discrimination or adverse internal affairs consequences for the sole reason that the officer decided to seek medical or psychological treatment for a mental health concern, including depression, anxiety, post-traumatic stress disorder, or substance use disorder.  All officers are encouraged to take advantage of the resources provided by the [...], as well as the other resources identified in AG Directive 2019-1, also known as the “Officer Resiliency Directive. ”
[brief] (Da 372)  Defendant [...] filed this appeal.  (Da 367)  Counter-Statement of Facts  In 2018, [...] was appointed to a five-year term as a commissioner of the [...].  (Da 170)  In June 2020, [...] complained to Carlstadt’s governing body that [...] posted an offensive video in a Facebook Group.  (Da 212)  Based on this complaint, on November 3, 2020, Carlstadt brought a disciplinary action against [...] seeking his termination from the sewerage authority board.  (Da 27)  Carlstadt’s appointed hearing officer held a hearing on February 8, 2021, via Zoom.  Carlstadt’s counsel arranged for the testimony and colloquy at the hearing to be recorded.  However, due to a technical issue or error the proceeding was not recorded.  No verbatim transcript exists of the testimony.  Many of the “facts” relied upon in Carlstadt’s arguments are not supported by the record.  But several facts are clear.  Only [...] testified for the Defendant at the hearing.  In her email to the governing body (Da 212), [...] urged the governing body to remove [...] from office.  She met privately with council members to press her demand for [...]’s termination.  [...] testified about her bias against [...].  [...] testified that she and her husband believe that [...] was unfair to her husband while he was employed by the [...].  This was a significant factor regarding her credibility and bias in making the accusation against [...].  [...] acknowledged that she was not a member of the Facebook Group but had gained access to it through her husband’s log-in.  She is the only person on record claiming to have seen the video in the Facebook Group.  (Da 377)  Carlstadt never established that a “public” airing of the video in the Facebook Group occurred.  Carlstadt’s claims of who saw the video or how long it may have been posted are speculative.  Who belonged to the Facebook Group is irrelevant.  [...] testified at the hearing that he intended to send the video to one other person, who apparently belonged to the Facebook Group.  He denied that he intentionally sent the video out to an entire Facebook Group.  (Da 169)  He felt remorseful and “completely embarrassed” over the incident.  (Da 374)  It is undisputed that the video had no connection to the [...] or [...]’s role or duties as a commissioner.  [...] did not use Carlstadt’s equipment, such as a computer or smartphone, to send the video.  He did not send it while on duty for Carlstadt or transmit it on Carlstadt’s email system.  The video does not refer to or depict anyone in Carlstadt, does not target anyone in Carlstadt for harassment and it has nothing to do with Carlstadt official business.  (Da 60-61)  Carlstadt’s hearing officer subsequently recommended that [...] be terminated from his position.  (Da 31)  Carlstadt’s Borough Council ratified this finding with a Resolution removing [...] from office.  (Da 43)  Legal Argument
[brief] ..................................................................................19  TABLE OF CONTENTS  (CONT'D)  A.  The State Failed To Present Any Evidence From Which A Jury Could Find That [...] Committed Either Degree Of Robbery Against [...]........................................21  B.  The State Failed To Present Any Evidence From Which A Jury Could Find That [...] Committed First-Degree Robbery Against [...].  ..................................................25  POINT IV  DEFENDANT’S CONVICTION MUST BE REVERSED BECAUSE THE COURT FAILED TO INSTRUCT THE JURY ON MULTIPLE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF ROBBERY AND FAILED TO GIVE A SPECIFIC UNANIMITY INSTRUCTION.
[brief] Since the AFIS report was a writing, [...] contends that it would be admissible only under the business or public record exception to the hearsay rule.  Because no foundation was laid for either of these exceptions, it is claimed that hearsay was improperly admitted and the conviction must be reversed.  While [...] asserts that his objection was partially raised in the Law Division, the State maintains that [...] objected to the expert testimony on other grounds, namely that the expert's report was an inadmissible net opinion and that certain documents were not provided in discovery.  As such, the State insists that the invited error doctrine applies because defendant raised no hearsay objection at trial.  We agree that the doctrine of invited error applies.
[brief] [3T18-1 - 19-14.]  In so holding, the court upended the principles applicable to the construction of insurance policies.  Coverage provisions are to be construed broadly, while provisions limiting or excluding coverage are to be narrowly construed.  Memorial Props., supra, 210 N.J. at 525; Flomerfelt v. Cardiello, 202 N.J. 432, 441 (2010); Nav-Its v. Selective Ins. Co., 183 N.J. 110, 118-19 (2005).  Here, the trial court did just the opposite.  In reading the term Disciplinary Proceeding broadly, the trial court impermissibly expanded the scope of the Policy terms and ignored the reasonable expectations of the insured.
[brief] (Pa53-56.)  [...]’s brief in opposition to the Motion also undercuts its position on appeal.  Nowhere in its opposition did [...] suggest that there was some previous resolution of the dispute.  (See Da1-3.)  To the contrary, [...] argued: “[[...]’s] efforts occurred over a nearly one year period and [[...]] declined payment at each opportunity. ” (Da1-3.)  Even assuming [...] had managed to argue below (without amending the Complaint) that the parties had previously reached a resolution, the outcome would be the same.  Clearly, [...]’s nonpayment under the Purchase Order following any purported resolution engendered a dispute concerning the Purchase Order.  And to resolve that non-payment dispute, [...] was still required to mediate that dispute before initiating litigation.
[brief] *See Redding-Hunter, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co.*, 206 A.D.2d 805, 807 (N.Y. App. Div. 3d Dep’t 1994); *Air Prods. & Chems. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co.*, 25 F.3d 177, 180 (3d Cir. 1994) (applying Pennsylvania law); *E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co.*, 693 A.2d 1059, 1061 (Del. 1997); *NVR v.* Nat’l Idem. Co., 2010 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2336, at *32 (Super. Ct. Law Div. Aug. 20, 2010).
[brief] The evidence included all the checks [...] received from [...] from 2016 and 2017 (Vol. III, Pa. 405-415).  [...] relied on the contracts between him and [...] submitted in support of defendants’ motion for summary judgment to establish that the monies he was paid by [...] was $210,635.00 less than the amount he was due pursuant to his contracts with [...].  [...]’s Answer to Defendants’ Statement of Undisputed Material Facts included the assertion that the difference between the monies he was paid for 2016 and 2017 was less than he was owed by [...].  Defendants’ contention that [...] did not state that the amounts he was owed by defendants for 2016 and 2017 was not presented to the motion court asks the Appellate Division to ignore contracts submitted in support of defendants’ motion for summary judgment and the checks from MHA, LLC to [...] for 2016 - 2017.  Unambiguous contracts are admissible as documents which reflect the intention of the parties to litigation.  *Globe Motor Corporation v Igdaley*, 225 N.J. 469, 482(2016); *CSFB 2001 Park Corporate Center LLC v SB Rental 1. LLC*, 410 N.J. Super. 114, 120 (App. Div. 2009).  The checks submitted by [...] in opposition to defendants motion are bank records admissible pursuant to *NJRE 803(c)6*; *Garden State v. Graef*, 341 N.J. Super. 241, 244-246 (App. Div. 2001).  [...]’s submissions to the motion court are unrebuted admissible evidence that his contention that $210,635.00 of the $255,000 claim against defendants was not time barred.  [...]’s submissions to the motion court contradict [...]’s conclusion that a jury’s analysis of the timeliness of plaintiff’s claim would be based on total speculation.  II.