ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] In *Price*, the attorney for Plaintiff, upon learning of the uninsured status of the tortfeasor, made a timely written request to [...] “alerting the company that plaintiff would be presenting an uninsured motorist claim and to ‘[p]lease establish an uninsured motorists claim file. ’”  *Id.* at 522.  Thereafter, discovery was exchanged between Plaintiff’s Counsel and [...] over the course of three years, with [...] having made a request for additional information just nine days before the applicable statute of limitations expired.  *Id.* at 523.  After the applicable statute of limitations expired, the attorney in *Price* continued to send updated records to [...] for over one year.  Finally, in November 2022, a year and 3 months after the statute of limitations expired, plaintiff filed an Order to Show Cause and Complaint seeking to compel [...] to arbitrate the claim.  *Id.*  It was then that [...] asserted, for the first time, “that plaintiff failed to formally request coverage or demand arbitration prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations on August 30, 2001; therefore, it was not required to participate in arbitration. ”  *Id.*  In holding that the statute of limitations was equitably tolled, the *Price* Court held that “[...] had a duty of good faith to notify plaintiff if it disagreed with his understanding that [...] was duly acting upon his filed claim.
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[brief] The first time that Defendants made a distinction between employees who retired prior to November 9, 2016 and after this date is in the October 18, 2018 correspondence from [...], Acting Director of the [...], to [...].  (Pa32 ¶111); (Pa238-240).  In this correspondence, [...] acknowledged that Defendants had suspended terminal leave payouts to employees but they were now initiating "terminal leave payments for both pre and post-MSRA employees."  (Pa239).  Again, a specific rationale for why November 9, 2016 was the critical date was not provided in this correspondence.
[brief] Indeed, the extreme *per se* rule [...] asks for is without legal basis and outside the authority of this Court.  The Sood  Defendants respectfully request that the Court affirm the trial court’s denial of [...]’s disqualification motion.  Respectfully submitted, **[...]**  By: /s/ [...]  [...]  [...]  Dated: May 28, 2024  [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], and [...], Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. [...], d/b/a [...], d/b/a [...], d/b/a [...], d/b/a [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], d/b/a [...], d/b/a [...], d/b/a [...], [...], [...], d/b/a [...], ONE OAK SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. [...]
[brief] After asserting that the placement of the new bulkhead 24 inches outshore of the old bulkhead not only constitutes a “change” for purposes of the Public Access Law, and in fact a “significant” change, the Report turns to the next prong in Section 4, which requires an analysis of the demand for public access in the surrounding community.  The entirety of the Report’s “analysis” in that regard reads as follows:  Currently, there is very little access to the waterfront for the residential development in the surrounding community due to the occupation of the water frontage primarily by single-family homes.  Thus, there is a demand for additional public access in the area.  The Borough does not have a Department-approved municipal public access plan or public access element of a municipal master plan.
[brief] The trial court identified two issues that it believed created disputes of material fact: “Whether the alleged fraud in question was within the public domain and whether it was only revealed through extensive efforts and financial investment by the relator .  . . .”  4T at 34:21–35:1.  But neither of these issues implicated any disputes of fact.  The parties do not dispute the historical fact of the amount of effort and financial investment expended by Relator.  Likewise, the parties do not dispute what information was available from which sources, nor the terms of service that govern each of these sources, nor even the subscription costs for [...] SHORT or [...].  Indeed, there is no dispute that Relator’s principal, [...], paid what many other individuals or companies interested in the municipal bond market paid to obtain the data from the [...] and [...] subscription services.  9  By “within the public domain,” Defendants presume the trial court was referring to information that is substantially similar to “public disclosure[s]” within the meaning of the NJFCA.
[brief] Defendants now attempt to remove the Restructuring Act’s residency requirements out of its historical context by arguing that the Act’s initial references to “communities” referred only to “existing regions of academic research and instruction” and cannot not establish legislative intent to impose continuous residency requirements on select BOG members.  (Db30-33).  It emphasized that the Act, as initially drafted, intended to merge [...] with [...], and could therefore not have intended to impose a continuous residency requirement for a BOG member.
[brief] By: [...], Esq.  (Attorney ID# 015042010)  Of Counsel and on the Brief TABLE OF CONTENTS  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT ........................................................................................................1  PROCEDURAL HISTORY ...........................................................................................................1  COUNTER-STATEMENT OF FACTS .........................................................................................2  ARGUMENT ..................................................................................................................................3  I.  THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ENTERED AN ORDER TO ENFORCE THE SETTLEMENT  BECAUSE PLAINTIFF’S COUNSEL HAD ACTUAL AND APPARENT AUTHORITY TO ENTER INTO A SETTLEMENT  .................................................................................................................................3  A.  Plaintiff’s Former Counsel Had Actual Authority to Settle this Matter with Defendant [...] ......................................................................................................................................................6  B.  Plaintiff’s Prior Counsel Had Apparent Authority to Settle the Matter .........8  II.  PLAINTIFF WAS NOT UNDULY PRESSURED TO ENTER INTO THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT  .................................................................................................................................10  CONCLUSION
[brief] 22  Packard-Bamberger & Co. v. Collier, 167 N.J. 427 (2001)  ..................................................  28  Point Pleasant Manor Bldg. Co. v. Brown, 43 N.J. Super. 297 (App. Div. 1956) .................................................................  7 Red Devil Tools v. Tip Top Brush Co., 50 N.J. 563 (1967) ..............................................  28,29 Shoemaker v. Shoemaker, 11 N.J. Super. 471 (App. Div. 1951) ...........................................  15 State v. E. Shores, Inc., 131 N.J. Super. 300 (Ch. Div. 1974) ...............................................  7  Tarta Luna Properties, LLC v. Harvest Restaurant Group, LLC, 466 N.J.  Super. 137 (App. Div. 2021) .........................................................  31  Williams v. Bell Telephone Laboratories Inc., 132 N.J. 109 (1993) .....................................  22 Young v. Schering Corp., 275 N.J. Super. 221 (App. Div. 1994) .......................................  23,24
[brief] Div. 1998), [...]’s denial of ordinary disability was reversed by the Appellate Division.  On September 22, 1992, more than four years after [...]’s last contribution, the Division of Pensions sent him a letter stating that he had to return to work by November 22, 1992, or his pension account would expire.  [...] never received the letter.  [...] was involved in protracted litigation against his employer to request accommodations for a disability, which he claimed he could still work as a police officer.  Upon being denied his LAD claim, [...] applied for ordinary disability benefits.  The Board denied [...]’s application for an ordinary disability retirement on the grounds it was untimely.  Under the applicable PFRS statutes, membership ceases after 2 years from the date of the member's last pension contribution.
[brief] The indefinite article ‘an’ is “equivalent to ‘one’ or ‘any’”.  Black's Law Dictionary 84 (6th ed.1990).  However, ‘the’ is “[a]n article which particularizes the subject spoken of.  In construing [a] statute, definite article ‘the’ particularizes the subject which it precedes and is [a] word of limitation as opposed to indefinite or generalizing force [of] ‘a’ or ‘an’. ”  *Id.* at 1477.  The distinction between the definite article and indefinite article has been relied upon by this Court as a tool for interpretation.
[brief] Although the video is blurry and interrupted by flashes of light, it shows that when [...] knocked on the front door there were two other law enforcement officers on the steps directly behind him.  The officers do not appear to have their guns drawn, although they are holding their right hands close to their sides.  It appears from the video that after defendant opened the door, he moved left, and [...] and two officers on the steps entered the residence followed by six other officers, some of whom appear to be in uniform.  Defendant was the only witness presented on his behalf.
[brief] “The proofs need not evoke a finding that plaintiff knew for a certainty that the factual basis was present.  It is enough that plaintiff had or should have discovered that he ‘may have’ a basis for the claim. ”  Lapka, 162 N.J. at 556 (quoting Burd, 76 N.J. at 293).  See also, Savage v. Old Bridge-Sayreville Med. Group, 134 N.J. 241, 248 (1993).  Here, all the transactions identified by [...] that formed the basis for the court’s decision were reflected in the books and records that [...] had access to and, as he acknowledged, was never prevented from reviewing.  See, e.g., 5T14:3-6, 94:16-19, 104:10-105:1, 162:23-163:4, 166:18-167:2; Affidavit of [...], (D-155, ¶¶ 5, 6) Da995.  Indeed, to maintain [...]’s status as an MBE and DBE, [...] regularly submitted financial documents and certifications regarding [...]’s finances and his own net worth that were subject to civil and criminal penalties.  4T138:16-144:17; 150:3 to 155:5; 5T 38:24-55:13.  12T 50:11-51:1.  If there were any validity to the claims asserted now, [...] clearly had the opportunity, if not the duty, to discover any irregularities in the financial records on a timely basis.  Clearly, the trial court erred, as a matter of law, in awarding damages based on discrete transactions that occurred over six years before the complaint was filed.  Moreover, the consequence of that error was far from trifling.  Therefore, any judgment that might survive this appeal should be reduced accordingly with corresponding reductions to the interest charged to defendants as part of the final judgment entered on September 14, 2022.
[brief] This Court can take judicial notice of the fact that the [...] facility in [...], New Jersey is approximately a twenty-minute drive from the George Washington Bridge between New Jersey and New York.  See N.J.R.E. 201(b)(3).  \(^7\)  In the warrant affidavit, [...] states that he witnessed [...] engage in what he believed to be a hand-to-hand drug transaction on August 23, 2018, but this belief was not adequately supported by [...]’s observations.  See Point II, infra.  (Dca 7-8)
[brief] But defendant pursued the matter further.  Before [...] testified, counsel stated the intention to cross-examine her was whether she could identify the item in the photographs.  (13T6-8 to 25).  The State confirmed that her direct testimony would be limited to authenticating the enhanced photographs, to which defendant refused to stipulate.  (13T12-2 to 17).  The court ruled that its intention was to allow cross-examination of what [...] told [...], for the jury to assess whether an inconsistency existed in a report [...] made.
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[brief] As one panel of the Appellate Division recently noted:  We are reminded, though, that our review is not limited to a determination of whether the trial court committed an abuse of discretion but, rather, we must make our own determination as to whether or not there was a miscarriage of justice, deferring to the trial judge only with respect to those intangible aspects of the case not transmitted by the written record – such as witness credibility, demeanor and the feel of the case.  *Borngesser v. Jersey Shore Med. Ctr.*, 340 N.J. Super. 369, 378 (App. Div. 2001).
[brief] MANSLAUGHTER CONVICTION MUST BE VACATED AND A JUDGMENT OF ACQUITTAL ENTERED  BECAUSE THE JURY FOUND THAT THE STATE DID NOT DISPROVE SELF-DEFENSE.  (Not Raised Below)  “Self-defense, if proven, is a justifiable homicide for which there is no criminal liability. ”  State v. Chavies, 345 N.J. Super. 254, 267 (App. Div. 2001).  Here, the first unanimous decision reached by the jury was that the State “did not disprove the applicability of self-defense.  . . .”  (11T 9-20 to 23; Da 13)  This finding by the jury amounts to a complete acquittal on all homicide offenses.  Thus, [...]’s passion/provocation manslaughter conviction must be vacated, and a judgment of acquittal entered.
[brief] Like *On-Line Games*, but unlike here, the bidder in *In re Jasper Seating Co., Inc.*, included a reservation in its bid permitting it to modify its bid price post bid opening.  *Id.* at 226.  Because price is clearly a material item that the bidder could manipulate to serve its own interests (via the reservation language), the Court found that such reservation language was impermissible.  *Ibid.*  Unlike there, [...] did not (and could not possibly) manipulate or change its representations about its NJDOT classification status (either pre or post bid).
[brief] The Appellate Division stated, “We appreciate the trusted role played by sheriff’s officers in a criminal courtroom, and their familiarity to the court and the attorneys who regularly appear there.  However, these sheriff’s officers were not stand-ins for the judge, nor were they an appropriate substitute for defendant’s attorney. ”  [Da16-17].  The Appellate Division noted that defendant could easily have been brought before the court to determine if he was able to comport himself and reversed the defendant’s conviction.  [Da17].  Here, defendant’s matter is easily distinguished from Stuart.
[brief] LEGAL ARGUMENT .....................................................................  1  POINT HEADINGS  I.  PLAINTIFF’S CLAIMS ARE NOT TIME-BARRED AS A RESULT OF THE DISCOVERY RULE (T8)  II.  PLAINTIFF HAS ESTABLISHED A CLAIM FOR NEGLIGENCE (Pa382)  III.  THE LACK OF RESOLUTION OR RATIFYING ACT IS NOT RELEVANT TO PLAINTIFF’S BREACH OF CONTRACT CLAIM (Pa385)  IV.  PLAINTIFF HAS A VALID CLAIM FOR MISREPRESENTATION (Pa386)
[directive] Nothing in this of Force Policy or in N.J.S.A. 2C:25-20a(2).  Use forth in the Attorney General set requirements forth in set the in-service training event to satisfy the requirements an  Rather, this paragraph allows Violence Act while also satisfying the Domestic and/or the Prevention of Force Policy Use of employs the agency that of Directive.  The chief executive of this continuing education provisions  Prosecutor chooses exercise such authority with where the to County Prosecutor officer, or the the content of determine the prosecutor's supervisozy authority, shall the respect to agencies subject to Fo~•ce in-service training requirements in the Use of training provided to satisfy the in-service the Violence Act.  Domestic and the Prevention of Policy the same officer shall not receive credit for participating in An Repeated Courses.
[brief] LVNV Funding, LLC v. DeAngelo, 464 N.J. Super. 103, 110 (App.Div. 2020).  In the instant matter, the trial court correctly distinguished DeAngelo, holding:  The compelling factor identified by the trial court in that case was the court's conclusion the debt was void due to violations of the FDCPA and the finding that the policy interests of curbing abusive collection practices outweighed the policy interest of protecting finality of judgments.  Here defendant does not have the benefit of that countervailing policy interest.  The court rejects defendant's argument that the underlying debt is void.  (Da61a)  The court in DeAngelo weighed the policies behind a violation of the FDCPA with the policy favoring the finality of judgments.  Here the trial court was not confronted with these two competing policies as there is no violation of a federal statute involved.  The trial court found that there was no violation of the Act, so there was no need to consider the policies behind the Act.  Without the countervailing policy of curbing aggressive debt collection practices to consider, the court favored the policy of the finality of judgments and denied the motion to vacate judgment.  The court found that because the judgment is not void, the defendant has not satisfied the requirements of sections (d), (e) or (f) of R4:50-1 and also did not prove the motion to vacate was filed within a reasonable time.  The trial court’s decision is a sound, reasonable decision based on the facts of the instant matter.  The Judge’s decision is certainly not an abuse of discretion.
[brief] Under R. 4:42-2(b), a trial court has the authority to reconsider interlocutory rulings “in the interests of justice. ”  See Lawson v. Dewar, 468 N.J. Super. 128, 134-35 (App. Div. 2021).  However, that power should be exercised “only for good cause shown and in the service of the ultimate goal of substantial justice. ”  Lombardi v. Masso, 207 N.J. 517, 536 (2011) (quoting Johnson v. Cyklop Strapping Corp., 220 N.J. Super. 250, 263-64 (App. Div. 1987), certif. denied, 110 N.J. 196 (1988)).  Put another way, revising an interlocutory order must be “consonant with the interests of justice.
[directive] INTERNAL AFFAIRS POLICY & PROCEDURES | November 2022  26 removed from the officer's immediate supervisor.  This includes complaints from within the agency.  Often Human Resources may need to be notified and involved.  6.2.2  Supervisors investigating minor complaints of inappropriate behavior must strive to conduct a thorough and objective investigation without violating the rights of the subject officer or any other law enforcement officer.  Accordingly, all officers who may be called upon to do an internal investigation must be thoroughly familiar with the agency's entire internal affairs policy, including the protection of the subject officer's rights and the procedures for properly investigating internal complaints.
[brief] Officers in [...] were conducting an investigation into [...], whom they believed to be dealing heroin.  This investigation eventually yielded a search warrant for Mundy’s person.  On the day police went to execute this warrant, they saw Mundy approach a car, money in hand, and tell its occupants, “Nice car. ”  Officers then detained Mundy and stopped the car’s occupants, not knowing who was inside.  This stop was undertaken without any reasonable suspicion particularized to the people in the car.  This illegal action requires suppression of all evidence subsequently found.  After stopping the car, officers approached it.  Inside, they recognized defendant [...] and his wife.  Officers had suspicions that Jackson was involved in drug distribution, but had conducted no investigation into him, had not seen him deal any drugs, and did not see him behave in any illegal manner that day.  Without any probable cause to search his vehicle, police entered his car, ostensibly to find his registration.  During this search officers observed what they believed to be contraband and obtained a search warrant based on those observations.  Because the warrant was tainted by officers’ illegal behavior, the evidence found pursuant to that warrant must be suppressed.