ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] (1)  A license or permit for each use must be obtained from the [...]; (2)  A letter of endorsement and community host agreement must be obtained from the [...]; [Amended 3-23-2022 by Ord. No. B-446]; (3)  A state and local consumption endorsement, if applicable, must be obtained pursuant to the N.J.S.A. 24-61-21, N.J.S.A. 24:61-42 and City of Hoboken regulations; (4)  Site plan approval shall be obtained from the [...] or [...], as the case may be; (5)  A first certificate of zoning compliance shall be obtained along with all necessary building permits for build-out of the dispensary in accordance with the approved site plan; and (6)  A final certificate of zoning compliance and certificate of occupancy must be issued.  As to the required site plan approval, the City Code stipulates certain minimum requirements and performance standards for building use, setback requirements, product display and storage, delivery vehicles, consumption, odor, noise, security, queuing and parking.  Id. at §196-33.1(M).  That section also stipulates that site plan approval requires an endorsement by the [...].  Id. at (M)(1).  Thus, the initial step for approval by the City of Hoboken of a conditional use as a cannabis retailer is a letter of endorsement issued by the [...] as well as a community host agreement.  Subsequently, site plan approval and conditional use must be obtained from the Planning Board if the Applicant complies with all conditions of the conditional use ordinance pursuant to §196-33.1 et. seq. and the MLUL pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40:55D-67 or the [...] if a use variance is required pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70d(3).
[brief] (2T 58:21-88:22).  Importantly, after [...] took a considerable amount of time analyzing the claims against the [...], and after he was questioned by [...]’ counsel regarding their Summary Judgment Motion, [...] stated in pertinent part:  I find an issue of fact.  Is – and with the [...] claimants it – it – it deals – it deals mainly with – the – the control factor of what – what – what control that [...] had in this – in this environment and whether or not they were part and parcel.  (2T 58:21-88:22)
[brief] The court also attempted to use N.J.A.C. 14:5-7.1 as authority that superseded [...]’s power to regulate any 69kV line through its right-of-way.  While that regulation does provide that an overhead transmission line shall “[m]ake use of available railroad or other rights-of-way whenever practicable, feasible and with safety, subject to agreement with the owners,” (emphasis added), the court completely ignored and wrote out of existence the requirement of agreement with the owner.  The court also tortured another regulation of the [...], N.J.A.C. 14:3-8.5(d) in an effort to shore up its flawed ruling in the event that the route was not essential.
[brief] Notably, it is also undisputed that defense counsel, only approximately three weeks after the memorialization of the December 20th settlement on the record and after a proposed form of written Agreement was circulated, advised County Counsel that Defendant changed her mind about the settlement.  (See This occurred only after County Counsel contacted defense counsel via telephone on January 6, 2023, after still not having received a redlined version of the written Agreement as promised.  (Id. at ¶ 48).  It was during this phone call that defense counsel revealed that Defendant had changed her mind and sought to repudiate the settlement; he did not, however, ever suggest that a settlement had never been reached and agreed upon.  (Id. at ¶ 49).  Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff avers that the agreed upon and memorialized settlement constitutes a valid and binding agreement.
[brief] A motor vehicle stop is justified if the attending officer establishes an articulable and reasonable suspicion that a motor vehicle infraction occurred.  Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663 (1979); State v. Smith, 251 N.J. 244 (2022); State v. Robinson, 228 N.J. 529, 548 (2017).  A stop for speeding therefore can be justified based on an officer’s observations giving rise to an objectively reasonable belief that the driver exceeded the speed limit.  State v. Locurto, 157 N.J. 463, 466-467, 470 (1999).  It is important to note that a subsequent conviction for the offense is not necessary, so long as an objectively reasonable belief that it occurred existed at the time of the stop.  *State v. Oliveri*, 336 N.J. Super. 244, 247 (App. Div. 2001).  While this standard is fairly low, the State must provide some evidence that can be tested through the adversarial process to support the reasonableness of the suspicion that led to the stop.  *State v. Atwood*, 232 N.J. 433, 448 (2018).
[brief] \(^1\)  *Dunkley v. S. Coraluzzo Petroleum Transporters*, 437 N.J.Super 366,383 (App.Div.2014)(citing *Zhubrycky v. ASA Apple, Inc.*, 381 N.J.Super. 162 (App.Div. 2005)(citing *Shepard v. Hunterdon Developmental Center*, 174 N.J. 1, 28 (2002));  See also, *Prager v. Joyce Honda*, 447 N.J.Super. 124, 136-136 (Plaintiff’s “colleagues’ coldness and the two [allegedly retaliatory] attendance warnings simply cannot suffice to prove a constructive discharge under New Jersey law”).  Likewise, Plaintiff’s claim garners no support from [...]’s August 30, 2019 note which she alleges “constructively discharged” her from employment with [...] (Da28) since it was premised upon [...]’s misapprehension that [...] was still assigned to the same office, i.e., “place of employment,” as [...].
[brief] Respondent [...] violated *N.J.S.A.* 18A:12-24.1(e) because he “took action on Facebook that could compromise the [B]oard by asking residents to ignore negative information about the referendum, and also because [he] failed to identify himself as a Board [m]ember and failed to include a disclaimer that he was not speaking for the Board,” which was “reinforced by the [...] logo.
[brief] ” (Pa878-879.)  Also on July 29, 2015, [...] of [...] submitted to [...] a Contractor Enrollment Form (Form A), which described [...]’s work as “concrete cutting,” but fails to reference demolition.  \(^6\) (Pa622.)  That day, Dimacale further prepared an Insurance Cost Worksheet (Form B) which: described the work with Workers’ Compensation Code 0854, a code for “Concrete Construction,” omitting demolition; and detailed the gross contract value as $24,590 (includes higher cost for [...]’s own insurance), with a net contract value $22,200 (excludes cost for [...]’s own insurance).  (Pa2299.)  On July 30, 2015, at 7:17 a.m., [...] sent an auto-generated letter (the “Welcome Letter”) to [...] stating “[[...]’s] enrollment in the Contractor Controlled Insurance Program for your work performed under Contract Number --- \(^6\) It also provides “[...] [] reserves the right to determine who participates in the Wrap-Up Insurance Program.
[brief] (See 5T:22-24 to 23-4) (noting “it does appear to the court the defendant does not truly acknowledge his full culpability for that death, as it was not an accident…”); (PSR 3)  The court’s finding that [...]’s risk of reoffense remained the same eight years after his original sentencing based on a lack of remorse was unsupported by the record at resentencing, particularly given the court’s own findings that [...] repeatedly expressed remorse for his actions and that his capacity for rehabilitation “is abundantly clear. ”  (5T:22-15 to 20, 23-14 to 21)  The resentencing court was required to sentence [...] as he stood before it, and to that effect, it was required to order a new PSR.
[brief] | Document Number | Finding | |-----------------|---------| | 4021-4021 | Communication between [...] outside counsel and [...] in-house counsel and officers regarding draft complaint against [...].  RFP 2 seeks specific communications between Plaintiffs and certain third parties, none of which are counsel.  RFP 4 seeks documents relating to the performance administration and termination of the Recompute MOA.  RFP 11 appears to seek communications sent to and from [...] and internal communications regarding the termination of the 2005 Recompute MOA.  These requests do not seek draft complaints related to this lawsuit.  Moreover, RFPs 17-25 request documents regarding specific allegations in the Complaint and not draft complaints in their entirety.  This document is not responsive to [...]'s RFPs 2, 4, 11, 17, 23, 24 or 25.
[brief] Chasin, 159 N.J. at 429-31.  The Court then stated:  Thus, both Napoleon and Helduser stand for the proposition that the Attorney General’s obligation to defend and indemnify arises only in the context of civil actions seeking damages for tortious conduct.  We agree that the mandatory defense and indemnification provisions apply only to those civil actions.  The defense of any other action is left to the Attorney General's discretion.  [Id. at 431.]  Likewise, prior case law also plainly holds that actions in lieu of prerogative writ -- the precise nature of [...]’s action -- do not involve claims under the TCA (and thus would not trigger the Attorney General’s defense and/or indemnity obligation under that act).
[directive] ”).  7.2  The supervisor shall permit a pursuit to continue only under the following circumstances: (a)  There is a reasonable belief that the violator has committed, or is engaged in a conspiracy or attempt to commit, any crime enumerated in Section 3.2 of this Policy; or (b)  There is a reasonable belief that violator poses an imminent threat to safety of the public or other police officers.  This determination shall be made based upon the violator’s actions or operation of the vehicle prior to the initiation of the attempted motor vehicle stop.  The violator’s subsequent actions, although often supporting the criminal charge of Eluding, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-2(b), shall not constitute an authorization to initiate or continue a pursuit.  See Section 3.2(b) of this Policy.
[directive] Statute Charge Description Degree  Bail Range  10%  Cash Bail Option  3.  After being served with process or having actual knowledge of an action affecting the protective services needs of a child pursuant to Title 9 in an action affecting custody, but prior to the issuance of a temporary or final order determining custody rights of a minor child, takes, detains, entices or conceals the child within or outside the State for the purpose of evading the jurisdiction of the courts of this State; or 4.  After the issuance of a temporary or final order specifying custody, joint custody rights or Interference with parenting time, takes, detains, entices or conceals a minor child from the other parent in 2C:13-4a(1-4)  Custody violation of the custody or parenting time order.  3rd Degree  $5,000 to $25,000  10% permissible (continued)  (continued)  Grading of Sections 1 through 4 – crime of the second degree if the child is taken, detained, enticed, or concealed outside of the United States or for more than twenty-four hours; otherwise crime of the third degree 26  Updated December 2, 2013
[brief] COUNTER-STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY......4  A.  The Personal and Business Relationship Between [...] and [...] ............4  B.  The Formation of [...] and its Holdings ........................................5  C.  [...] Hires an Accountant for the Companies .........................................................8  D. Business Operations from 2007-2014 ...........................................................................8  E. Negotiations Pertaining to the Acquisition of Plaintiffs’ Interests .......................10  F. [...] Discovers [...]’s Accounting Antics ............................................................17  G.  Procedural History Through the Time of Trial ..........................................................20  H. [...]’s Reviews the Records and Uncovers Diversions of Funds ...............24  I.  The Trial Court Finds that the Defendants Misappropriated Funds ...............28  J.  Post-Trial Motions ........................................................................................................32  LEGAL ARGUMENT ..................................................................................................................34
[directive] Every agency shall designate one or more training officers and shall establish a training program to ensure that officers equipped with BWCs and officers and civilian employees who access or handle BWC recordings are familiar with the provisions of this BODY WORN CAMERA POLICY | January 2022  7  Policy, and the policy, standing operating procedure, directive, or order promulgated by the agency pursuant to section 3.1, and all applicable laws of the State.  BODY WORN CAMERA POLICY | January 2022 8  4  Notice that BWCs are Deployed and Activated 4.1
[brief] Under N.J.S.A. 2C:2-6, a person may be guilty of an offense as an accomplice if he, “with the purpose of promoting or facilitating the commission of the offense: (a) Solicits such other person to commit it; (b) Aids or agrees or attempts to aid such other person in planning or committing it; or (c) Having a legal duty to prevent the commission of the offense, fails to make proper effort to do so.
[brief] While State and Federal courts have concurrent jurisdiction over claims raised under the Federal Employer’s Liability Act (FELA), claims in State courts are subject to State procedural rules but all substantive issues of law are governed by Federal law.  45 U.S.C. 56; *St. Louis Railway Co. v. Dickerson*, 470 U.S. 409 (1985); *Poleto v. Conrail*, 826 F.2d 1270 (3rd Cir. 1987); *Donavan v. Port Authority Trans Hudson Corp*, 309 N.J. Super. 340 (App. Div. 1998).  The FELA was enacted by the United States Congress in 1908 and Congress and the United States Supreme Court have, over the years, consistently stated that the purpose of the FELA is to protect and benefit railroad employees injured on the job.  The FELA is to be liberally construed to allow railroad employees, such as [...], injured in the course and scope of their employment to recover from the railroad even where the railroad’s negligence is minimal.  *Rodriguez v. Delray Connecting R. R.*, 473 F.2d 819, 820 (6th Cir. 1973).  If Plaintiff’s personal injuries were caused or contributed to, in whole or in part, by the negligent acts or omissions of a fellow employee, foreman, supervisor, or agent of the railroad, then the railroad is responsible for the negligent actions or omissions of the fellow employee, foreman, supervisor or agent.  *Sinkler v. Missouri Pacific Railway Company*, 356 U.S. 326 (1958).  The negligence of a supervisor, foreman, employee or agent of the railroad is imputed to Defendants under the FELA.  A railroad, such as [...], has a non-delegable duty to provide employees with a reasonably safe place to work.  *Shenkler v. Baltimore & O. R. Co.*, 374 U.S. 1 (1963).  Because of the integrity of the jury’s function in the FELA, the purpose of the FELA, and the liberal construction, courts are justified in removing these claims from the jury “only in the extremely rare” incidences where there is “zero probability” either on employer negligence or any employer negligence contributed to the injury.  *Pehowic v. Erie Lackwanna Railroad Co.*, 430 F.2d 697 (3rd Cir. 1970).  Direct evidence is not essential.  Circumstantial evidence is sufficient.  *Rogers v. Missouri Pacific R. Co.*, 302 U.S. at 508.  “To deprive railroad workers of the benefit of a jury trial in close or doubtful cases is to take away a goodly portion of the relief which Congress had afforded them. ”  *Bailey v. Central Vermont Railway*, 319 U.S. 350, 354 (1943).
[brief] This court’s recent opinion in Bayer definitively holds that the 2023 Amendment is not retroactive to pending cases.  Therefore, the Attorney General’s veto has no application to this case and the trial court’s ruling to the contrary must be reversed.  As to the trial court’s ruling that factual disputes prevent summary judgment, Relator points to no material dispute of fact impacting the public disclosure bar as a matter of law.  Relator, a member of the public and not an insider, admits that it has alleged fraud by analyzing data from a subscription source that exists to widely disseminate financial data and that is generally available to the public.  Relator’s action is therefore subject to the public disclosure bar and summary judgment must be granted for Defendants.
[brief] “In the fall of 2018, [...] filed motions in the Family Part and in [the Appellate Division] to intervene in the original divorce action.  Both the Family Part and [the Appellate Division] denied [...]'s motions. ”  *Yijuan Fou v. Zhuowu Fou*, No. A-2145-18T1, 2020 WL 3124686, at *2 (App. Div. June 12, 2020); Da165.  In denying defendants’ motion to intervene, the Appellate Division found that defendants’ “arguments lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion.
[brief] “…  The injury must be a natural or reasonable incident of consequence of the use of the automobile…  A death from coronary infarction fortuitously occurring in an insured vehicle is not a natural or reasonable incident or consequence of the use of the vehicle and is therefore not an occasion for PIP benefits. ”  Accordingly, coverage is not afforded where the injury occurs in an automobile but results from natural causes.  See also JFK Memorial Hosp. v. Kendal, 205 N.J. Super.456 (Law Div. 1986).
[directive] A program consisting of two prescribed qualification sessions within a 12-month period,(the calendar year) with at least three months between each qualification.  The program is to include semi-annual qualification with automatic/semi-automatic subguns, personal defense weapons or police service rifles, semi-annual qualification under night firing conditions with automatic/semi-automatic subguns, personal defense weapons and semi-annual qualification under day and night conditions with police carbines.  (This program is required for those officers who are or might be assigned use of an automatic/semi-automatic subgun personal defense weapon, rifle or police carbine.)  Semi-Automatic Assault Weapons.  Any weapon which is the semi-automatic version of an automatic assault weapon previously defined or any weapon which has its source of ammunition contained in a reservoir, belt, magazine or other means and the loading, extraction and ejection phase of functioning is mechanical, regardless of barrel length.  This section of the policy does not apply to semi-automatic handguns carried as a law enforcement service sidearm.  Subgun (Submachine Gun).
[brief] A second error the Court committed in interpreting the governing document for this project was to conflate not mentioning something with invalidating it.  As mentioned earlier, the passage cited by the Court simply states that no one mentioned the Diagrammatic Elevation during deliberations.  No one, for example, is on record saying something to the effect of: “Let’s get rid of that Diagrammatic Elevation so that the developer can ignore the limitations it imposes when he builds his building. ”  Nor does the passage the Court cites concerning the Diagrammatic Elevation say much about the impression that the rendering made on commissioners’ at an individual, unspoken level concerning the application.  Would some have felt differently if the rendering had been drawn to scale and provided a more accurate view of the proposed building’s height relative to adjacent buildings?  No one knows.  Transcripts only capture words and – on occasion – noises.  Appellant would also note that the Conditions Section of the Amended Resolution contains twenty-nine, numbered paragraphs filled with conditions.  Few, if any, of these conditions were mentioned during deliberations either.  Appellant finds it doubtful that any court would therefore conclude that all of these other, unmentioned conditions were rendered invalid because they weren’t discussed during the Zoning Board’s deliberations.  Finally, Appellant would mention that the language concerning the Diagrammatic Elevation cited by the Court was inserted into the Amended Resolution in response to a court order that remanded the case to the Zoning Board as a result of an earlier case filed by the Appellant ([...]) because of multiple deficiencies in the resolution (the Diagrammatic Elevation is referred to in this passage of the court order as “the rendering”):  (b)  To explain whether the “rendering” submitted with the Application (relative to the height of the various buildings on the block) was significant to the Board’s decision and, if not – why not?  (2a)  This would explain – or at least give some insight – into why the Diagrammatic Elevation was singled out from among the twenty-nine paragraphs of conditions.  It also suggests that failure to delete the Diagrammatic Elevation from the elements of the architectural plans and renderings that the project was to be bound by was not simply an oversight.  Clearly, the court order in question made sure that both the Amended Resolution's author and the zoning commissioners were well aware of its existence.  **CONCLUSION**
[brief] Furthermore, the court found that the victim was under the reasonable expectation of death, was asked by his father what happened, and was able to identify the defendant before descending into screams of agony.  (1T96:9-23).  As the court noted, defendant was still free to cross-examine the victim’s father on his purported lying about who his son identified his killer as, and that ultimately it would be “a jury’s call to be able to make that determination whether or not the statement was or wasn’t said. ”  (1T99:9-17).  Against this thorough analysis by the court, it cannot be said that the trial court's ruling “was so wide of the mark that a manifest denial of justice resulted. ””
[brief] Here, the detectives violated this clear rule.  Shortly after reading [...] his *Miranda* rights, [...] asked, “[w]hat do you need from me to make this go away?”  (Da 72)  In response, [...] contradicted the *Miranda* warnings he had just read, telling [...]: “I can’t make any promises or [sic] with you with your charges but all I can say is the truth is what it is and. . . the truth can only help your case.
[brief] (7T 40-8 to 44-16; 11T 17-23 to 19-1)  Police searched the Jeep and a Honda driven by [...], but they did not find a gun, blood, or any trace of [...]’s DNA.  (10T 65-10 to 71-8, 84-9 to 94-8)  [...] did not present any witnesses and stipulated that he did not have a permit to own a firearm.  (10T 128-17 to 130-2)  At the second trial, he stipulated that he had previously been convicted of offenses making it unlawful for him to possess a firearm.  (13T 10-6 to 15)
[brief] 1, 21 (2004)).  With respect to the first step, “[t]he court must not include excessive and unnecessary hours spent on the case in calculating the lodestar. ”  Ibid. (quoting Furst, 182 N.J. at 22).  “Whether the hours the prevailing attorney devoted to any part of a case are excessive ultimately requires a consideration of what is reasonable under the circumstances. ”  Furst, 182 N.J. at 22-23.  With respect to the second step, “[g]enerally, a reasonable hourly rate is to be calculated according to the prevailing market rates in the relevant community. ”  *Rendine v. Pantzer*, 141 N.J. 292, 337 (1995) (quoting *Rode v. Dellarciprete*, 892 F.2d 1177, 1183 (3d Cir. 1990)).  “That determination need not be unnecessarily complex or protracted, but the trial court should satisfy itself that the assigned hourly rates are fair, realistic, and accurate, or should make appropriate adjustments. ”  *Ibid.*  It is “[t]he party seeking attorney's fees” that “has the burden to prove that its request for attorney's fees is reasonable. ”  *Seigelstein v. Shrewsbury Motors, Inc.*, 464 N.J. Super. 393, 406 (App. Div. 2020) (quoting *Rode*, 892 F.2d at 1183.