ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] In fact, the plaintiff herself chose to show the jury videos of the plaintiff walking with her rollator into and in the [...] store on the day of the incident during opening statements.  (5T61:23-62:9).  The jury also heard testimony from the plaintiff’s liability expert, [...], regarding his review of the video surveillance footage.  [...] was asked if the footage was significant to him in terms of how the plaintiff was entering the store and doing with the rollator.  His response to this question was “[o]bviously, you don’t have to be a doctor to know that if somebody is using a mobility aid like that and a senior citizen, that there’s some medical conditions that have led up to that, to their using it. ” (4T64:14-22).  [...] also testified that the plaintiff was walking with a shuffle and her gait was “diminished” that day.  (4T166:14-25).  The jury was free to conclude from this evidence that the plaintiff walked with an unsteady gait.  Further, there was evidence regarding Plaintiff’s prior falls, balance issues, and medical conditions that put her at risk for falls.  While the plaintiff wrongly disputes the admissibility of this evidence, such evidence gave the jury an alternative explanation for the accident.  The jury also heard the testimony of the defense liability expert as to the investigation he conducted to determine if the [...] was responsible for the plaintiff’s fall, which led him to the conclusion that on the day of the incident, the plaintiff’s rollator did not come in contact with the baseplate of the column.  (6T41:13-17).  The jury was more than capable of weighing all of the evidence and rendering a verdict as to causation and, in fact, the jury did so unanimously when it found no proximate cause.  Plaintiff has not established that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence given that it is the sole duty of the jury to weigh credibility and determine if the plaintiff met her burden and, therefore, the trial court properly denied the plaintiff’s motion for a new trial.
[brief] [...]’S TESTIMONY WAS PROPERLY ADMITTED BY THE COURT.  (RULINGS AT 8T141-4 to 146-15; 8T148-14 to 151-9; 8T163-25; 8T165-20)  | 18 | | **POINT II** | | | THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY PERMITTED [...] TO EXPLAIN WHY HE CHOSE TO PURSUE A PARTICULAR INDIVIDUAL, WHO WAS LATER IDENTIFIED AS DEFENDANT.  (Ruling at 2T56-6 to 8).  | 32 | | **POINT III** | | | THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR BY INFORMING THE JURY THAT HE OVERRULED DEFENDANT’S OBJECTION (Not Raised Below).  | 42 | | **POINT IV** | | | DEFENDANT WAS FOUND GUILTY AFTER A TRIAL.  (13T) | 47 | | **POINT V** | | | THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY SENTENCED DEFENDANT.  (11T18-1 to 27-22; Da7 to 9).  | 47 | | CONCLUSION | 50
[brief] Letter Brief on Behalf of: [...] (a/k/a Dayana Abreu)  Thursday, January 2, 2025  State of New Jersey, Plaintiff – Respondent, VS., [...] (a/k/a Dayana Abreu), Defendant – Appellant.  Case Type: Criminal County: Hunterdon Trial Court Docket Number: [...]  Sat Below: Hon. [...], J.S.C. [...], Esq.  On the Brief
[brief] Similarly, here, the subject new documents from 2008 through 2014, do not demonstrate a written arrangement and certainly do not establish a franchise.  Notwithstanding the outdated nature of the documents, the contents are much less useful or indicative of any agreement at all, and [...] disingenuously attempts to tie a new entity, [...], to [...] and revive its attempt to somehow tie [...] (an unrelated nonparty entity) to [...] d/b/a [...] (the only named third-party defendant in this case), which the trial court rejected in dismissing [...]’s claims.  First, most of the documents [...] presented on the Motion to Amend were from [...], who was the president of [...], another unrelated nonparty entity.  Despite the trial court rejecting this argument in the underlying motion, [...] once again commingled an unrelated entity that is not a party to this case ([...]) with [...] and refers to [...] and [...] collectively as the “Summerset brand” in an effort to create a relationship that does not exist.  Such baseless grouping is a relentless and continued misrepresentation of the clear evidence that these two entities are just that—two separate corporate entities.  [...] went further in the Motion to Amend in that it attempted to tie [...] and [...] to [...].
[brief] [...] wasn’t interested at the time, but in about early 2014, [...] broached the topic once more, and [...] asked him to send a proposal.  (5T40:22 to 41:23).  [...] put forth a series of proposals beginning in March 2014.  (Da977-78).  [...] was skeptical of the initial proposal from [...] because he did not believe it accurately reflected his investment and interest in certain properties.  (5T46:16 to 47:11).  Between about March and April 2014, [...] requested some additional information about the properties, but was still skeptical about splitting them at that time.  Specifically, [...] was concerned that he lacked sufficient knowledge in real estate.  [...] proposed tabling the idea of dividing up the [...] and [...] for five or six years.
[directive] Prosecutor's appropriate. as policy escalating plea supplement the or periodically revise may immediately.  operational become shall Section This Features.  Required 12.3 provisions/features: following the to, limited be not need but include, shall policy  Each and objective an on based offer initial plea an tendering for provide policy must the (a) weaknesses and strengths the criminal conduct, seriousness the of of assessment the realistic the victim, any of interests the background, and culpability defendant's the case, State's of the such trial, and after a convicted be to were defendant if imposed be would that sentence likely for; account policy may the as circumstances and facts relevant other shall plea offers, subsequent all offer, and initial plea an require that must policy (b) the conference, pretrial indictment, event (e.g., court preferably a or date, explicit an include within time the unless expires automatically offer which the at etc.), motions, on hearing prosecutor;3' the by extended offer is the plea or reject accept to which plea subsequent any expires, or rejected is offer plea a once that provide must policy the (c) higher fine, imprisonment, of term longer a (e.g., punishment greater call for offer must supervisory a unless offer, plea previous the than etc.) downgrade, offered of elimination in change material a that determines general attorney deputy or prosecutor assistant previous the in contemplated one than the lenient more sentence a warrants circumstances offer; plea and indictment before guilty plead to defendants encourage to designed be must policy the (d)
[brief] The dispute between the parties here is lengthy, litigious, and on-going.  However, the prior disputes and litigations need not be recounted here.  -  Here, there can be no contention that [...] did not adhere to the Procedural Requirements of N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-7.  The question, rather, deals with [...]’s Substantive Actions which, again, are entitled to deference.  (emphasis added)  -  The Court’s role is not subjective.  It is not to determine whether the Plan was the best Plan that could be put forward.  The Court’s role is not to develop a better Plan.  Nor is the Court’s role to determine whether the Plan is completely compliant with the Master Plan.  Rather, the Court’s role is far more circumscribed.  The limited question before the Court is whether [...]’s decision was amply supported by facts of records such that it is not arbitrary or capricious.  As the well-developed record demonstrates, it is.
[brief] As our courts recognize, “a person who acts in self-defense and ‘kills in the honest and reasonable belief that the protection of his own life requires the use of deadly force’ cannot be convicted of murder, aggravated manslaughter, or manslaughter. ”  *State v. Gentry*, 439 N.J. Super. 57, 67 (App. Div. 2015) (quoting *State v. Rodriguez*, 195 N.J. 165, 172 (2008)); see also *State v. O’Neil*, 219 N.J. 598, 617 (2014) (“If the jury found that defendant had an honest and reasonable belief that the use of deadly force was necessary to save his own life, that he was not the aggressor, and that he could not have safely retreated, then self-defense applied not only to the murder charge, but also to the aggravated-manslaughter and manslaughter charges. ”).  The fact that the jury was asked if self-defense had been disproven specifically as to murder makes no difference.  Self-defense is about whether the use of deadly force is justified or not.  See N.J.S.A. 2C:3-4(b)(2) (“The use of deadly force is not justifiable under this section unless the actor reasonably believes that such force is necessary to protect himself against death or serious bodily harm.
[brief] THE COURT FAILED TO APPLY THE REQUISITE LAW IN DISMISSING PLAINTIFF’S VERIFIED COMPLAINT  AT THE RETURN DATE OF THE ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE.  (Pa434-35; 1T15:22 – 1T19:3).  In his Brief, Defendant merely states that the language of N.J.S.A. § 3B:17-2 and R. 4:87-1 is clear, and does not entitle Plaintiff to an accounting.  However, the Defendant intentionally ignores that section of the statute that an executor can “be required” to settle his account, and the fact that the word “may” in the Court Rules applies to the discretion of an interested party in bringing such an action, and not to the Court in ordering such.  Furthermore, Defendant does not cite to a single case in support of his position.  As argued in both Plaintiff’s opening brief and before the trial court, all of the previous court cases denying an accounting under N.J.S.A. § 3B:17-2 and its predecessor (N.J.S.A. § 3A:9-2) occurred during the first year of a personal representative’s administration.  In those circumstances, the legislature has specifically given the court discretion as to whether or not to order an accounting.  Such discretion is not given after the end of the first year of administration.  Plaintiff’s Verified Complaint was brought two years after Defendant’s appointment.  Even more significant is Defendant’s failure to even mention N.J.S.A. § 3B:31-67(a) in his brief.  That statute requires that a trustee promptly respond to a beneficiary’s request for information regarding the trust administration.  In this case, Defendant was appointed as both administrator of the Decedent’s estate and trustee of her revocable trust.  Defendant not only failed to respond to Plaintiff’s request for information, he refused to respond.  This blatant breach of Defendant’s fiduciary duty was not only missed by the trial court, but it was misconstrued as an allegation of conversion – an allegation never made by the Plaintiff in the Verified Complaint.  (1T16:10–15.)  The only reasonable explanation for Defendant’s failure to address N.J.S.A. § 3B:31-67(a) is his recognition that he had breached his fiduciary duty, and his hope that this Court will follow his example and ignore it too.  Plaintiff respectfully submits that the decision of In re Hekemian, A-1774-21, 2023 WL 176098 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Jan. 13, 2023), discussed in Plaintiff’s opening brief, is very persuasive in connection with the matter at bar.  There, the Court stated, “Defendants do not contest the expiration of the one-year period or otherwise deny [Appellant’s] entitlement to an accounting.  As such, Plaintiff’s Verified Complaint simply invokes a statutory right. ”  Id. at *7 (emphasis added).  In citing to the lower court’s ruling, the Appellate Division stated that “under N.J.S.A. § 3B:17-2, [the beneficiary] was entitled to an accounting. ”  Id. at *3 (emphasis added).  This Court should similarly rule that Plaintiff and the other beneficiaries are entitled to an accounting of the Estate and Trust from Defendant.  POINT III
[brief] The role of a DSP is extremely critical to the function of the group home and involves a tremendous amount of “hands on” work.  *Id.*  For example, DSPs are responsible for cooking and cleaning for individuals, dressing individuals, and administering medications.  *Id.*  However, the training DSPs receive is limited to watching videos upon being hired.  *Id.*  Despite this, Plaintiff routinely heard DSPs mentioning they were never trained properly and that they did not know how to do things such as test an individual’s blood sugar, a task DSPs are responsible for.  Id.  Plaintiff went to management and suggested that after a DSP begins working, a nurse should accompany the DSP to a group home and demonstrate proper procedures in real time so as to comply with N.J.A.C. § 1044 A-2.7(a).
[directive] NEW CRIMINAL JERSEY OF TITLE 2C  THE CODE JUSTICE 2C364-1.  Property subject to forfeiture 2C:64-1.  Property Subject to Forfeiture.  in a.  Any interest the following shall be subject to forfeiture and no property right shall exist in them:  (1)  Controlled dangerous substances, firearms which are unlawfully possessed, carried, acquired or used, illegally possessed gambling devices, untaxed cigarettes and untaxed special fuel.  These shall be designated prima facie contraband.  of is an  (2)  All property which has been, or intended to be, utilized in furtherance unlawful activity, including, but not limited to, conveyances intended to facilitate the perpetration of illegal acts, or buildings or premises maintained for the purpose of committing offenses against the State.  Property which has become or is intended to become an integral part of illegal activity, including, (3) for but not limited to, money which is earmarked for use as financing an illegal gambling enterprise.  (4)  Proceeds of illegal activities, including, but not limited to, property or money obtained as a result of of the sale of prima facie contraband as defined by subsection a.  (1), proceeds illegal gambling, prostitution, bribery and extortion.  b.  Any article subject to forfeiture under this chapter may be seized by the State or any law a no enforcement officer as evidence pending criminal prosecution pursuant to section 2C:64-4 or, when of is criminal proceeding instituted, upon process issued by any court competent jurisdiction over the property, except that seizure without such process may be made when not inconsistent with the of Constitution this State or the United States, and when (1) The article is prima facie contraband; or, - - - -
[directive] Level of Resistance.  The level of resistance that an officer encounters is a key factor in determining the appropriate amount of force that may be used in response.  Although it is not possible to determine in advance what the appropriate level of force is for every encounter, one factor that is consistent is the amount of resistance the officer is facing at the time.  The less resistance an officer faces, the less force the officer should use.  Consistent with training, the following general rules apply in determining the appropriate level of force:
[brief] That’s not the basis for a motion for reconsideration”.  Of course, he deliberately omitted my Hearing responses (2T 11:1-12:3) that refuted his false arguments that repeated the Judge’s false claims & rulings from the Oct. 6, ‘22 Rider, which I refuted point-by-point in my Motion, since they were palpably incorrect, arbitrary, unreasonable, or irrational due to overlooking key facts/statutes, as per NJ legal criteria to grant such Motions.  He simply copied (p. 12-15) extensive portions of the Feb. 17, 2023 Hearing Transcript, incl. Judge’s Rulings, as the basis, without any of his own feedback and justifications, for the March 7, 2023 Order provisions that he itemized.  He did **NOT** address my May 25, 2023 Cross-Motion, which also refuted point-by-point, based on substantiated evidence, the Judge’s invalid, Feb. 17, 2023, claims and Rulings that were palpably incorrect, arbitrary, unreasonable, or irrational due to overlooking key facts/statutes (**prior Brief, p. 31, par. 12; p. 33, par. 29, to p. 41, par. 38; p. 42-43, Court Rulings, Items a-d**).
[brief] Pb11–12 (citing Pa454–56 ¶¶ 16–26; Pa1041–42 ¶¶ 16–26).  Despite these admissions, [...] argues that the Vermont Trial Court’s summary judgment decision contained “findings” that, under the PPE, “clearly eliminated the possibility of any duty to indemnify” (Db25) and thus purportedly extinguished [...]’s duty to defend.  [...] is wrong for four independent reasons.
[directive] The on-scene supervisor will ensure the victim is informed of the following:  a.  Victims’ Rights as set forth in the Victim Notification Form.  -10-  b.  Procedures for obtaining a restraining order.  c.  The availability of a Domestic Violence Response Team member or a domestic violence advocate immediately following the incident.  d.  The availability of confidential transportation to a location that can provide improved victim safety.  e.  Community resources, local domestic violence victim services, including shelter, and safety planning information.  9.
[brief] The trial court also rightly found that, in the alternative, the State is likely to succeed on its claim that the Amended Policy violates the LAD because it has a disparate impact on these transgender, gender non-conforming, and non-binary students.  An unlawful disparate impact exists where “practices that are facially neutral in their treatment of different groups … in fact fall more harshly on one group than another. ”  Peper, 77 N.J. at 81; see also, e.g., Gerety v. Atl. City Hilton Casino Resort, 184 N.J. 391, 399 (2005) (agreeing that an otherwise “facially neutral policy” still violates the LAD when the plaintiff shows that it “‘resulted in a significantly disproportionate or adverse impact on members of the affected class.
[brief] FAIL TO DEMONSTRATE  A PERMANENT EASEMENT WAS INTENDED AND CREATED, AND DEMONSTRATE ONLY A LICENSE WAS INTENDED AND CREATED THAT HAS TERMINATED (APPEALS FINAL OPINION/ORDER Da978, Da980, Da1004)  The Appellate Court found that the 1963 Agreement and its paragraph 10 were ambiguous, "does not definitively establish an easement", and that "consideration of surrounding circumstances leaves doubt as to whether an easement was intended" (Da760).  The Court noted, citing In re Estate of Miller, that perpetual performance of such a claimed contractual permission "is not favored in the law and is to be avoided unless there is a clear manifestation that the parties intended it" (Da755).  The Court noted that "The duration for the grant in paragraph ten is unspecified and there is no clear manifestation that the parties intended perpetual performance."  (Da762)  With that, the Appellate Court reversed the Summary Judgment and remanded the matter for a trial in which the matter could be reconsidered "in light of surrounding circumstances", (Da757) citing Rosen v. Keeler 411 N.J. Super. 439, 451(App.Div.2019)  The plaintiff had the burden of proof --- to prove sufficient "surrounding circumstances" to demonstrate that the parties in 1963 intended and agreed that a perpetual easement for parking on the School property was being created and granted.  Review of the trial evidence discloses and confirms that the plaintiff never actually presented any evidence bearing on the "surrounding circumstances" in 1963 or thereafter that met its burden of proof.
[brief] 20, 44  Malone v. Aramark Services, Inc., 334 N.J. Super. 669 (Law Div. 2000)  ..............24  MBCC v. Lotito, 328 N.J. Super. 491 (App. Div. 2000)  ..........................................23  Miltz v. Borroughs-Shelving, Div. of Lear Siegler, Inc., 203 N.J. Super. 451 (App. Div. 1985)  ..................................................................43  Mustilli v. Mustilli, 287 N.J. Super. 605 (1995). ..................................................... 23, 24 N.J. Citizen Action, Inc. v. Cnty. of Bergen, 391 N.J. Super. 596 (App. Div. 2007) ....................................................................................................47 Notte v. Merch. Mut. Ins., 185 N.J. 490 (2006) ......................................................22 Rieder v. State, 221 N.J. Super. 547 (App. Div. 1987) ........................................... 20, 44 RNC Systems, Inc. v. Modern Technology Group, Inc., 861 F. Supp. 2d 436 (D.N.J. 2012).................................................................30 State v. Grillo, 469 N.J. Super. 267 (App. Div. 2021)...........................................20 U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Williams, 415 N.J. Super. 358 (App. Div. 2010).................................................................................................................. 19, 20 Vermi ex rel. Burstein v. Harry M. Stevens, Inc., 387 N.J. Super. 160 (App. Div. 2006)......................................................................................................25 Welsh v. Bd. of Ed. of Tewksbury Tp., 7 N.J. Super. 141 (App. Div. 1950)
[brief] Following dismissal of its claims against the [...], [...] and [...], Appellants moved for leave to file a Second Amended Complaint on October 6, 2021 – more than 2½ years after the action was commenced and nearly six (6) months after discovery concluded.  [Pa3085].  The proposed Second Amended Complaint sought to assert claims for damages against [...] when no such claims were asserted in the First Amended Complaint that was filed in July 2021 [FEDa11; Pa3091-3150].
[brief] At core, the [...] (“[...]” or “Board”), in its response, makes clear the understanding of the situation was correct – the Board’s decision to deny [...] (“[...]” or “[...]”) application because [...] must and should have known that floating solar was required to be net metered is unfounded and a mistake, and should be rectified in the interest of fairness and in supporting the State’s policy of building solar on underused and otherwise undervalued property.  To the contrary, the Board announced a policy that applied to “ALL” floating solar projects.  Never once did the Board draw a distinction between grid-supply floating solar and net-metered floating solar, until, that is, it denied this petition.  The Board, through its entire run of its “innovative technology” Orders as laid out in [...]’s initial brief, never once noted the need for floating solar to be net metered to be eligible under the innovative technology program.  In fact, the Board made clear from the first Order setting up the TI program that grid supply could and would be allowed, by explicitly including grid supply rooftop, ground mount, and landfill options.  Then, in the first Order touching upon floating solar, the Board explicitly notes the possible wholesale nature of these projects, while expressly comparing floating solar to grid-supply ground mount facilities.  Finally, in the second floating solar Order, the Board once again was silent on the so-called need for floating solar to be net metered.  It was only in the last Order – the Order under appeal – that the Board suddenly introduced this requirement.  The sudden and changed element of this decision can be further seen when the Board set the 0.6 TREC factor for “ALL” floating solar projects, without any comment on the need for net metering, and then issued a second floating solar Order well after [...]’s submission, again without any reference to either the need for net metering or the restriction against grid supply.  Again – the mistake is palpable.  In a similar manner, the Board’s decision to consider and refuse the uprate from a 0.6 TREC factor to the requested 1.0 TREC factor, coupled with unsubstantiated and non-germane concerns about the developer’s ability to construct, appears to show at minimum, a mistake and at worse a clear example of arbitrary and capricious decision-making on the part of the Board, in significant detriment to the legislatively required support of the State’s Solar agenda.  As such, [...] seeks reversal of the Board’s decision.