ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] It elaborated on my Exceptions in order to refute false claims/arguments by [...] & the Court, incl. its Rulings.  It would have been irrational to refute the false claims, arguments, & Rulings without also citing some key facts & arguments from my Exceptions in order to substantiate my case.  He points (2T 7:21-8:13) to his Dec. 22, 2022 Hearing arguments, none of which are true nor substantiated with relevant facts in his prior filing, and all of which were refuted by my Certification w/Reconsideration Motion, in order to conclude that I was only “seeking a second bite at the apple.
[brief] *Hopkins v. Fox & Lazo Realtors*, 132 N.J. 426, 436-438 (1993).  “The standard for imposition of a duty of commercial landowners has evolved from the common law methodology of premises liability to a more flexible approach based in and abiding sense of basic fairness under all of the circumstances in light of considerations of public policy. ”  *Bedell v. St. Joseph’s Carpenter Society*, 367 N.J. Super 515, 523 (App. Div. 2004).  Therefore, plaintiff’s status as invitee is not dispositive here nor should it automatically mean that 5.20(B)(2)(b) is not applicable.  The inquiry is not what common law classification most closely characterizes the relationship of the parties, but whether in light of the actual relationship of the parties, under all of the surrounding circumstances, it is fair and just to impose a duty of reasonable care in preventing foreseeable harm.  *Hopkins*, 132 N.J. at 438.  Here, the fall down arises out of snow and/or ice that was not adequately cleared.  Fundamental fairness in this case requires the duty to exercise reasonable care to take into account what is a reasonable period of time after notice of snow and ice to remediate same, particularly when the law recognizes that there is no duty to remove or clear snow and ice until after the cessation of a snow event.
[brief] [...] admits that its determination that [...] violated the State Policy was premised solely on its credibility determinations about events that allegedly occurred at the local union office later that day.  [...] could not substantiate the allegation that [...] “purposefully misnamed purposely misnamed the Complainant on more than one occasion” in connection with the morning incident.  Indeed, [...]’s Response admits that the video surveillance it relied upon as “corroborative evidence” of that incident was silent.  Neither the conduct – verbal “misnaming” - nor the “purposeful” intent, could reasonably be derived from that source.  That leaves only the allegations of purposeful misnaming that allegedly occurred in the afternoon incident at the local union office.  [...] relied on that conclusion to support its determination about [...]’s credibility with respect to his conduct outside the DLWD Building earlier that day to find that [...] purposefully misnamed Complainant “on more than one occasion.
[brief] O.A.  Peterson also argued that the trial court contravened the holding in Sayles v. G&G Hotels, Inc., 429 N.J. Super. 266 (App. Div. 2003), in which the court held that merely because a contract could have been written better does not make the contract equivocal or ambiguous.  Id. at 274.  Lastly [...] asserted that the language of Summary Judgment is referred to as 1T; the transcript of the oral argument on [...]’s Motion for Reconsideration and [...]’s Motion to Correct a Clerical Error is referred to as 2T; the April 11, 2024 transcript of [...]’s Jury Charge is referred to as 3T. the indemnification clause in *Englert v. The Home Depot*, 389 N.J. Super. 44 (2006) was distinguishable, and that the indemnification clauses in *Leitao v. Damon G. Douglas Co.*, 301 N.J. Super. 187 (App. Div. 1997) and other related cases, which were upheld as unambiguous, were more analogous to the indemnification clause at issue in the present action.
[brief] **CONCLUSION**  For the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully requested that the Court grant Defendant’s appeal and reverse Defendant’s DWI conviction.  Respectfully submitted, [...] s/ [...]  MARCO A. LARACCA  October 31, 2024  [...]  ATTORNEY ID#014882006  ASSISTANT PROSECUTOR [...]  LETTER IN LIEU OF BRIEF ON BEHALF OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY  Honorable Judges of the Superior Court of New Jersey  Appellate Division  Hughes Justice Complex  Trenton, New Jersey  08625  RE: STATE OF NEW JERSEY (Plaintiff-Respondent) v. [...] (Defendant-Appellant)
[brief] [...]  [...] [...]  [...]  Attorney for Defendant [...]  [...]  Plaintiff, vs. BOROUGH OF MORRIS PLAINS, [...], JOHN)  DOE  1-10 ABC CORPS.  1-10  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY LAW  DIVISION: MORRIS COUNTY DOCKET NO. [...]  Civil Action  REPLY BRIEF ON BEHALF OF DEFENDANT/APPELLANT
[brief] The accessory structure is approximately 2160 square feet and the principle [sic] structure is approximately 1152 square feet.  Pa32  The Notice fails to specify what kind of “accessory structure” the Applicant proposes nor what the accessory structure is to be used for.  It further fails to identify the actual use of the “principal structure. ”  While the applicant was seeking approval of a structure which was almost double the size of the principal structure, it failed to inform the citizenry of the Township what was the use intended by the proposed variance and structure.  From the hearing transcript it appears that the Applicant was seeking approval for a garage, but the term “garage” appears nowhere in the Notice.
[brief] On or about June 28, 2017, [...] filed a Collection Complaint (Da1) in the Special Civil Part of the Bergen County Law Division, docket number [...] (“Collection Lawsuit”), demanding a judgment against [...] in the amount of $7,663.52, together with costs of suit.  On or about September 12, 2017, [...] moved for entry of default judgment (Da3) in the Collection Lawsuit—which was subsequently entered on September 12, 2017.  (Da12).  On July 19, 2023, while venued in the Special Civil Part under docket number [...], [...] moved to vacate the default judgment (Trans ID: SCP20232201177).
[brief] Defendant contends the sentence should be reduced for two reasons: (1) it is manifestly excessive, and (2) it violates his constitutional rights to due process and trial by jury.  *U.S. CONST.*, Amends. VI, XIV; *N.J. CONST.*, art. I, ¶¶ 1, 9 and 10.  The trial court found three aggravating factors pursuant to *N.J. S.A. 2C:44-1a*: (3), the risk that defendant will commit another offense; (6), the extent of defendant's prior criminal record; and (9), the need to deter defendant and others from violating the law.
[brief] The authors of the Gann treatise also agree: PIP disputes are “[d]isputes between an insurer and a claimant as to whether or not benefits are due under the PIP statute,” and “such disputes, for practical purposes, will only arise when the insurer denies payment of the claim, in whole or in part, made by the insured or his or her assignee and thus must be initiated by the insured or his or her assignee. ”  Craig & Pomeroy, N.J. Auto Insurance Law § 10:1 (Gann 2024).
[brief] It also seeks a declaratory judgment that Defendants were not entitled to receive payment under no-fault insurance policies and are required to disgorge all such payments that they received from Plaintiffs because Defendants were unjustly enriched.  Pa0077-0081 (Compl. ¶¶ 353-369).  Further, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants’ unlawful practice of medicine violated the IFPA because Defendants falsely represented that their services were eligible for insurance reimbursement, and Defendants concealed or failed to disclose that those services were unlawfully rendered.  Pa0082-0086 (Compl. ¶¶ 370-381).  Plaintiffs seek compensatory and treble damages, investigation expenses, attorneys’ fees, and costs under the IFPA.  Pa0085-0086 (Compl. ¶¶ 382-383).
[brief] In September 2018 (more than a year after the Hood Lawsuit was filed), [...]’s broker, [...], devised a scheme to “steer the claim” from [...]’s direct liability carriers to the CCIP asserting a lack of a formal notice of cancellation sent to [...].  (TRVa2946.)  However, this scheme was based on [...]’s mistaken assumption that [...] was the “First Named Insured” under the [...] Policy.  (TRVa2948-2949.)  Plaintiffs proceeded with this scheme despite [...]’s acknowledgment that: (1) [...] was “excluded from the CCIP since they were doing demo”; and (2) the Ratings Bureau confirmation it had received notice from [...] that the CCIP had been cancelled because [...]’s coverage was placed elsewhere (i.e., with its direct liability carriers).  (TRVa2949-2952.)  [...] reaffirmed its coverage denial to [...] on January 29, 2019.  Thereafter, in February 2019, [...] put forth significant effort to have both [...] and [...] prosecute a declaratory judgment action seeking coverage under the CCIP.  (TRVa2957-2961.)  However, by March 12, 2019, it became clear that [...] would not pursue a declaratory judgment action, so [...] revised its draft complaint to name [...] as a defendant, which would then force “[...] to assert cross claims” against [...], which, in [...]’s words, would “then realign parties” and their respective interests.  (TRVa2959.)  Notwithstanding [...]’ unwillingness to pursue coverage, on April 11, 2019, Plaintiffs filed this action (the “DJ Action”) alleging [...] failed to defend and indemnify [...] under the CCIP.
[brief] That same Court quoted Justice [...], as well as a prior case that “taxes are the lifeblood of government, the vital force needed to sustain the public interest.  “Taxes are what we pay for a civilized society. ”  *Id.* at 384, quoting *City of Philadelphia v. Austin*, 86 N.J. 55, 65-66 (1981), quoting, in turn, *Compania General de Tabacos v. Collector*, 275 U.S. 87, 100, 48 S.Ct. 100, 105 (1927).  [...], dissenting in a case involving state pension contributions, aptly described what tax revenue is used for and why it is so vital:  The public workers … are not strangers to us.  They are the police officers who protect our citizens and neighborhoods from violent crime; the firefighters who enter burning homes to save lives and salvage property; the teachers who educate our children; the prosecutors, public defenders, and judges, and their staffs, who operate our system of justice; the crews who pave our roads and recycle our waste; and the myriad other workers who, in their unheralded ways, improve the quality of life for almost nine million people in New Jersey and allow State and local governments to operate.
[brief] Id. at 477.  N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.5(a) does not include a requirement that an uninsured motorist have a culpable state of mind and does not exempt motorists who have a good faith belief that they have medical expense benefits coverage.  The requirements of N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.5(a) are triggered where the "owner or registrant of an automobile registered or principally garaged in this State that was being operated without personal injury protection coverage[.]”  N.J.S.A. 39:6A-7(b)(1).  With regard to residency and timing, N.J.S.A. 39:3-17.1(b) requires that:  Any person who becomes a resident of this State and who immediately prior thereto was authorized to operate and drive a motor vehicle . . . in this State as a nonresident pursuant to [N.J.S.A. 39:3-15] and [N.J.S.A. 39:3-17], shall register any vehicle operated on the public highways of this State within [sixty] days of so becoming a resident of New Jersey, pursuant to [N.J.S.A. 39:3-4] or [N.J.S.A. 39:3-8.1].  In short, “[N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.5(a)] bars the culpably uninsured (those vehicle owners required by statute to maintain PIP coverage but who have failed to do so) when injured while operating an uninsured vehicle. ”  Craig & Pomeroy, New Jersey Auto Insurance Law, § 15:5-2 (2024); Perrelli, 206 N.J. at 208 (declining to accept plaintiff’s argument that her belief the vehicle was insured was enough to preclude the operation of N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.5(a)). a.
[brief] These unassailable facts are at odds with the Developer’s representations that (1) it has done no act to create legal rights pertaining to the ownership and use of Unit 74; and (2) no other persons have a legal interest in the property.  The Developer’s misrepresentation as to its quality of title should have resulted in a finding that it committed an unlawful practice as defined by the CFA, i.e., ‘consumer fraud. ’  In this respect, the trial court and Defendants are incorrect to conclude that no consumer fraud occurred simply because the Condominium’s master deed purportedly contemplated the sale of Unit 74 to the Association.  Therefore, the trial court’s dismissal of Count One should be reversed.
[brief] His reference to this being what [...] “does for a living” was not a suggestion that because he is paid to do it, it must be generally accepted, but a dismissal of any suggestion of bias.  The discretion of the trial court to act as a gatekeeper in rejecting expert testimony should be used with great caution in light of the strong policy exhibited by N.J.R.E. 402 in favor of the admission of all relevant evidence.  See Germann v. Matriss, 55 N.J. 193 (1970) and State v. Briley, 53 N.J. 498 (1969).  A jury should be trusted to weigh any deficiencies in the qualifications of experts, as it is the jury’s province “to determine the credibility, weight and probative value” of their testimony.
[directive] Process  In light of the changes to N.J.S.A. 2A: 162-17:  (  1)  It shall be the duty of the State to inform the court whenever a defendant is subject to removal of the presumption of pretrial release.  (2)  When making the decision to release or detain a defendant pretrial, the court should include in the reasons supporting release or detention whether the defendant is subject to removal of the presumption of release.  Inclusion of this information is essential should there be appellate review.  (3)  Criminal Division staff will be required to complete a uniform tracking sheet created by the Criminal Practice Division each time they have a case in which the defendant is subject removal of the presumption of pretrial release.  Conclusion
[brief] *Jiminez vs. Maisch*, 329 N.J.Super. 398, 403 (App.Div.2000); *Hopkins*, supra., at 439.  In the instant matter, there was no relationship whatsoever between [...] and [...].  He did not come to the strip mall to transact any business with it.  (Pa842, Pa947)  In fact, [...]’ office had been closed for two days prior to the date of loss.  (Pa1175-1179)  [...] was also attempting to enter [...] through a back door, not a customer entrance, at the time of his fall.  (Pa948)  This area was clearly “not necessary to the ingress or egress” of this defendant’s business.  *Kandrac v. Marrazzo’s Market at Robbinsville*, 429 N.J. Super. 79, 88 (App. Div. 2012)
[brief] Under the proper standard an application, Plaintiff was required to make this argument to the trial court which would then need to conduct an extensive factual inquiry into the underlying factual circumstance and how they relate to Plaintiff’s professional negligence claims.  Indeed, Plaintiff fails to even point to its own allegations asserted in its complaint to demonstrate that no expert testimony is required to prove its theory of [...] alleged professional negligence.  Instead, similar to Plaintiff’s inadmissible expert opinion, Plaintiff simply offers the conclusory statement that “[c]ertainly no expert is required to explain to a jury that these fundamental errors are deviations from the relevant standard of care.
[brief] The Board’s second set of interrogatories, which would have been followed by a deposition, were designed to obtain further proofs of each of its claims in the Complaint, as well as test the veracity of Defendant’s purported documents and claims.  The Board was entitled to pursue discovery of its claims prior to the dismissal of its 10-count Complaint.  The court violated R. 4:46-2 in dismissing Plaintiff’s 10-count Complaint several months before the discovery end date and without affording the Board meaningful ability to prosecute its case before the discovery end date.  **Page 46 – 47**
[brief] Schiavo v. John F. Kennedy Hosp., 258 N.J. Super. 380, 386–87 (App. Div. 1992) (citing Carnegie Bank v. Shalleck, 256 N.J. Super. 23, 29–40 (App. Div. 1992)).  Finally, “in the absence of a clear expression of legislative intent that the statute is to be applied prospectively, such considerations as the expectations of the parties may warrant retroactive application of a statute.
[brief] Instead of Filing an Arbitration Demand or Motion, Defendants Commence a Separate Lawsuit with a Jury Demand  Days later, on March 17, 2023, instead of complying with the 3/9/23 Order to file a motion to compel arbitration or even to demand arbitration, Defendants commenced a second lawsuit, in Chancery, via a Complaint with a Jury Demand requesting damages against both Plaintiff and his subsequent/current employer.  Da8.  The Rule 4:5-1(b)(2)  Certification with Defendants’ Complaint makes NO mention of any contemplated arbitration.  Da19.  D.  Defendants Expressly Waive Any Right to Arbitrate at the March 23, 2023 Hearing and Both Cases Are Transferred
[brief] The appellant alleged and the respondent admitted that from October 2020 through August 2021, the defendants did not reside at [...], and therefore it was not defendants’ residence.  Pa129.  In fact, during this time frame the property was under construction by [...], a general contractor.  Pa131.  The respondent stated that during the time frame while living in [...], he would only visit the [...] property only occasionally.  Pa129.  Thereafter, when the respondent resided at [...] in [...], he testified would only visit the property once or twice weekly.  Id.  The respondent testified that when he would clear an accumulation of snow on the sidewalk at [...], he would clear the snow down to the concrete and then spread salt or ice melting material on the sidewalk.  Pa156-159.  [...] also testified that the photographs depicting the partially cleared sidewalk that were taken on the date of the accident do not depict a condition of the sidewalk he would leave after clearing snow.  Id.  [...] said that he would leave the property better than the condition depicted in the photographs.  (Id.)  The appellant submits that the only proper inference that can be drawn from this testimony is that the respondent partially or negligently cleared the snow on February 16, 2021, creating a new, artificial condition.
[brief] *Torres* holds that where, as here, a court has imposed consecutive terms under the *Yarbough* guidelines, it must provide “[a]n explicit statement, explaining the overall fairness of a sentence imposed on a defendant for multiple offenses in a single proceeding[.]”  *Id.* at 268.  The fairness evaluation is “the necessary second part to a *Yarbough* analysis[.]”  *Id.*  The trial court considered the aggravating and mitigating factors and the *Yarbough* factors and pronounced sentence.  It did not engage in a fairness analysis.
[brief] Those changes are (i) the reduction of the size of the residential development the Redeveloper is to build – 300 units in the Second Ordinance, down from 350 units in the 2019 Master Plan Amendment (the 70 affordable units remain unchanged); (ii) the reduction of the size of the land area on which residential development is to be built to 11 acres in the Second Ordinance from 22.5 acres in the 2019 Master Plan Amendment (resulting in a significant increase in “density” of the project); and (iii) selling to the [...] the other half of Plaintiff’s Property from what was a 50 foot wide “greenway” along the bank of Mill Pond to tie into and continue the County’s system of greenways running along the banks of Lawrence Brook and Mill Pond in the 2019 Master Plan Amendment, to what is now an 11 acre park pursuant to the Second Ordinance.  (Pa 45).  In describing how the Second Ordinance is consistent with the Master Plan, [...], the Borough Planner, who testified before the board at the October 12th --- *Residential density is commonly stated in terms of units per acre (N.J.S.A. 40:55D-4).
[brief] INSURANCE PROFESSIONALS ARE NOT LEARNED PROFESSIONALS AND ARE NOT EXEMPT FROM THE CFA  Several decades ago, our Supreme Court addressed whether a doctor who used advertisements which contained misrepresentation could be sued under the CFA.  See Macedo v. Dello Russo, 178 N.J. 340 (2004).  In holding that doctors and other learned professionals were exempt if the misrepresentations involved the rendering of professional services, the Court reasoned that these learned professionals were regulated in their permitted advertising and speech and that the legislature had failed to amend the Act, despite knowing that these were part of the public discourse.  The first step in the analysis of whether the insurance semi-professionals are exempt from the Act is the determination of whether they are deemed to be learned professional or semi-professionals.  The test set forth in Shaw, 460 N.J. Super. at 619 is quite simple: does the professional have “extensive learning or erudition?”  The answer is a flat no.  The insurance professional does not require advanced degree, or even a high school education.  The only requirements are to pass an exam and pay the fee, hardly meeting the high standard under the law to qualify as a learned professional.
[brief] On March 19, 2014, detectives from the [...] disrupted the sale of narcotics.  This was not a random encounter, but the culmination of a long-term investigation into the distribution of this poison in their community.  They knew who they were looking for and why, where he would be and when, and were prepared to satisfy their duty to execute an order of the Court.  Enter defendant, [...].  A known drug dealer with a penchant for violent and unpredictable attempts at escape.  Though he was not the intended target of the operation, his role within that operation became quickly apparent.  After observing multiple, previous transactions featuring their target, [...], they see Mundy approach Jackson with a wad of cash.  Rightly suspecting they were witnessing yet another sale, the detectives intervened.  They took all reasonable measures to secure the scene, protect themselves, and respect the rights of their suspects.  The resulting investigation discovered significant quantities of controlled dangerous substances and led to defendant’s arrest and prosecution.  Defendant pled guilty and was sentenced according to that plea agreement.  There is nothing in the record to suggest that defendant was anything but consciously willing to accept the sentence he ultimately received.  The Court committed no reversible error in enforcing the agreement and defendant was not subject to any punishment disproportionate to his status within the criminal justice system.  It is defendant’s regret that motivates this appeal rather than any defect in process.  The appeal is consequently without merit and the trial court’s decisions should be affirmed.  **COUNTER-STATEMENT OF PROCEDURAL HISTORY**
[brief] (Da11 at S-3 to S-11)  As those videos played, the detective identified what she believed to be “the vehicle of interest which was the [Chevy] Malibu. ”  (4T161-18 168-6)  Videos S-12 and S-13 were recorded from the same camera at [...] (4T168-8 to 21)  S-12 depicts two people walking from the left side of the screen to the right side, and S-13 depicts one person walking in the opposite direction.  There is no Chevy on screen in either video.  (Da11 at S-12, S-13)  [...] was shown a photo depicting a still image from video S-12.  (395-18 to 25)  (Da23)  She explained that the video was taken on her block, that the person on the left side of the photo “looked like me but I didn’t recognize [sic]” and that the person on the right side of the photo was “[...]. ”  (3T96-18 to 98-11)  [...]’s mother identified the male in video S-12 as her son.  (2T147-19 to 25)