ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The Senate Budget and Appropriations Committee then specifically commented on the expected fiscal impact of this and other cost-saving measures which would be implemented with S7 even though a formal analysis had not been prepared:  A fiscal estimate on the savings which municipalities will realize as a result of the enactment of this bill, or the additional costs to the State which may result, if any, has not been prepared.  The sponsors of the bill have stated that they estimate the annual savings to municipalities to be approximately $28.5 million.
[brief] The Trial Court Properly Denied Summary Judgment in Favor of Defendants.  (Ja721)  In contrast to arguing that summary judgment in favor of Plaintiffs was not appropriate due to genuine disputes of material fact, Defendants argue that summary judgment should have been granted in their favor.  Db14-18.  The arguments on which Defendants rely in this regard are fully addressed by reference to the preceding Argument sections.  For those reasons, the trial court properly denied summary judgment to Defendants.  Conclusion  Defendants fail to challenge the trial court’s finding that equitable estoppel bars their merits defense or their challenge to reformation.  On that basis, the trial court should be affirmed and costs granted to Plaintiffs pursuant to R. 2:11-5.  As to the matters addressed by Defendants, the trial court properly found there were no genuine disputes of material fact, that Defendants had constructive notice based on the contents of recorded documents in their chain of title as well as based on their duty of inquiry, and that the equities weighed in favor of granting reformation to Plaintiffs.  On that alternative basis, the trial court should be affirmed and costs granted to Plaintiffs pursuant to R. 2:11-5.  RESPECTFULL SUBMITTED, /s/ [...]__________
[directive] Reform if Law Bail the under authorized is detention pretrial that argue of unavailability a practical the to due unabated and serious remain will release defendant's risk(s).  the mitigated have might otherwise that condition release pretrial presumption seek to a creating as construed be shall subsection this in Nothing a address on to how prosecutors to guidance uniform provides subsection  Rather, this detention. condition any of if matter law a as ordered be cannot detention pretrial that argument defense defendant's the reasonably assure would 2A:162-17(b) N.J.S.A. by authorized expressly the or person any other of the safety of protection the required, when court in appearance justice criminal the obstruct attempt to or obstruct not will defendant that and community, to (provisions Section 13 also available.
[brief] DEFENDANT’S REMAINING ARGUMENTS ARE ENTIRELY WITHOUT MERIT AND DO NOT ASSERT ANY BASIS FOR OVERTURNING THE LOWER COURT’S ORDER.  Defendant’s remaining arguments can be summarized as follows:  • The lower court should have granted Defendant all favorable inferences in deciding his motion to vacate default judgment, (Def.’s Br. at 25-27); and • Defendant is entitled to relief under Rule 4:50-1(f) under the “totality of circumstances”, (Def.’s Br. at 28-31).  Neither argument is a viable basis for overturning the lower court’s decision to deny Defendant’s second motion to vacate default judgment.  Defendant argues that the lower court “deprived [him] of the favorable inferences that should have been drawn from the record. ” (Def.’s Br. at 25).  Defendant does not cite any authority for the assertion that the lower court should have granted him favorable inferences in considering his motion to disrupt the status quo and vacate a properly entered default judgment.  To the extent that Defendant relies on the proposition that “[a]ll doubts . . . should be resolved in favor of the party seeking relief[,]” that reliance is misplaced.
[directive] Mitigating Factor Point Value 1.  Non-Pecuniary Distribution  The offense involved the distribution of controlled substances only to friends/relatives -3 (other than minors) without remuneration or pecuniary gain.  2.  Defendant’s Role in Criminal Scheme  a.  The defendant was only a minimal or -3 if minimal participant (e.g., minor participant in the criminal conduct -2 if minor participant was a courier or “mule,” “off-loader,” or “lookout”); or, b.  The conduct of the defendant was substantially influenced by another person -2 more mature than the defendant (must identify the more culpable co-defendant).  3.  Voluntary Renunciation  Defendant voluntarily terminated -4 participation in the scheme before arrest or police intervention.  4.  Drug Treatment  Defendant has enrolled and is participating in an approved drug treatment program.  -2 if outpatient program (Defendant must continue participating in -3 if residential program program up to date of sentencing proceeding.
[brief] On the Brief: [...], Esq. NJ Attorney ID# 017292001  Dated June 5, 2024  TABLE OF CONTENTS  TABLE OF CONTENTS  ........................................................................................................i  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS, & RULINGS .........................................................ii  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ...............................................................................................ii  TABLE OF APPENDICES ...............................................................................................iv  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT .........................................................................................1  PROCEDURAL HISTORY ...............................................................................................2
[brief] In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, an appellate court reviews the decision *de novo*, applying the same standard as the trial court.  *Samolyk v. Berthe*, 251 N.J. 73, 78 (2022).  Under that standard, summary judgment must be granted “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact challenged and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment or order as a matter of law. ”  R. 4:46-2(c).  A determination of the existence of a ‘genuine issue’ of material fact “requires the motion judge to consider whether the competent evidential materials presented, when viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, are sufficient to permit a rational fact finder to resolve the alleged disputed issue in favor of the non-moving party. ”  Brill v. Guardian Life Insurance Co. of America, 142 N.J. 520, 540 (1995).  The motion judge's function “is not himself [or herself] to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial. ”  Id. at 540 (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2511, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202, 212 (1986).  In making this determination, the motion court must draw all legitimate inferences from the facts in favor of the non-moving party.  Globe Motor Co. v. Igdalev, 225 N.J. 469, 481 (2016) (citing Bhagat v. Bhagat, 217 N.J. 22, 38 (2014)).  A determination of whether a moving party is entitled to judgment “as a matter of law” requires the judge to “analyze the record in light of the substantive standard and burden of proof that a factfinder would apply in the event that the case was tried. ”  Globe Motor Co. v. Igdalev, 225 N.J. at 480 (emphasis added).  Moreover, “the trial court's interpretation of the law and the legal consequences that flow from established facts are not entitled to any special deference” and, therefore, an issue of law is subject to *de novo* plenary review on appeal.  *Thomas Makuch, LLC v. Twp. of Jackson*, 476 N.J. Super. 169, 184 (App. Div. 2023) (quoting *Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan*, 140 N.J. 3 (1995)).
[brief] See Borough of Carteret v. Firefighters Mut. Benevolent Ass’n, Loc. 67, 247 N.J. 202, 212 (2021); PBA Local 160 v. Township of North Brunswick, 272 N.J. Super. 467, 476-77 (App. Div. 1994) (holding that arbitrator’s interpretation of a contract cannot, as a matter of law, be “reasonably debatable” if the arbitrator “obviously disregarded” a term of the parties’ agreement).  See also City Ass’n of Supervisors & Adm’rs v. State Operated Sch. Dist. Of Newark, 311 N.J. Super. 300, 312 (App. Div. 1998) (rejecting arbitration award which relied on past practices and “ignor[ed] the clear language of the agreement”).
[brief] Respondent acknowledged that she knew Decedent well and knew what made her happy and what made her unhappy.  (12T57:18-22).  The facts demonstrate that when making the Will, if Decedent could have expressed it, she would have said: "This is not my wish, but I must do it."  In re Weeks, 29 N.J. Super. 533. 542 (1954).  8.
[brief] Today, N.J.S.A. 19:16-3 can best be described as a catch-all provision that applies only when no other statute is on point, which at this point would only really involve provisional ballots.  the only relevant “instructions” to voters were “To vote for any person whose name is not printed on the ballot, go to the Personal Choice Column and darken the oval by the words ‘write-in’ for the office in which you want to write-in.  Write the name of the person for which you wish to vote on the blank line. ” (2T82:5-10).  Nothing in these instructions indicates, suggests, or even vaguely implies that if a candidate’s name is printed, you cannot instead write them in.  Nothing in these instructions indicates to a voter that their vote will be invalidated if they do so.  And to an inexperienced voter, by placing the write-in section immediately next to [...]’s name, it could easily be construed as requiring a voter to type in his name to vote for him.  That failure is on election officials and not the voters.
[brief] Their minimal work would have occurred after upfront Settlement work would have been done by [...], [...], & me.  (Exh. “Z”, p. 9-10, par. 16) (394a-395a) (see p. 36, par. 31, )  Once again, there is an example in which [...], [...], & I worked out details of 3-Way Settlement that was achieved on April 25, ’22.  [...] then repeatedly refuse to engage in finalizing a Settlement, even after I resolved their 5 objections, and even though we repeatedly notified them NOT to proceed with their Verified Complaint, which would be unnecessary, in order to finalize the Settlement.  (Exh. “Z”, p. 21-22, par. 8&9) (406a-407a)  And most importantly, Judge should NOT have been deciding on whether [...] got paid.
[brief] ..................................................  H614a Holm-85: [...] response to discovery request HOLM-[...]-PNL-83, see Holm-34, [...] not aware electric heating technology meets required needs (SOICR p. 12)  ...........................................  H615a Holm-86: [...] response to discovery request HOLM-[...]-PNL-84, on how [...] representatives learn about available products (SOICR p. 12)  ...........................................  H616a Holm-87: [...] response to discovery request  HOLM-[...]-PNL-85, [...] did consider a catalytic converter for the project; partly objected to request (SOICR p. 12).
[brief] As developed at Grand Jury, the State’s theory of the case articulated by [...] was that [...] had lured [...] from his home so that [...] could shoot him.  130a-132a.  On cross-examination, [...] acknowledged that he gave inaccurate testimony under oath in support of the above-mentioned theory by incorrectly stating the nature and time the texts between [...] and [...] began on August 11, 2015 at 2:45 a.m.  T6, 115:18-25; T6, 116:1-24; T6, 118:7-18; T6, 123:4-24.  That false premise led to [...] being charged in a conspiracy with [...] to commit an aggravated assault upon [...].
[brief] A89  Proposed Order  A93  Certification of Plaintiffs’ Counsel in support of motion  A95 Ex. A (Complaint)  A99 Ex. B (Amended Complaint)  A118 Ex. C (Aff. of Merit by [...])  A147 Ex. D (Expert Report of [...])  CONTAINED IN CONF.  APPX at A40 Ex. E (2/16/21 Case Management Order)  A152 Ex. F (6/10/21 correspondence)  A161 Ex. G ([...]’s Answer) A164 Ex. H (Transcript of Dep. of [...]) CONTAINED IN CONF.  APPX  A56 Ex. I (Curriculum Vitae of [...]) attached at A48 Ex. J ([...]’s Moton to Dismiss filed 12/14/18)  A176 Ex. K (Expert Reports of [...] and [...])  CONTAINED IN CONF.  APPX  A186  Plaintiffs’ Motion to Reconsider Plaintiffs’ Request to Name [...] as Expert Witness for Trial (10/20/21)
[brief] ’  An unsupported allegation of favoritism to a local bidder does not suffice to establish that an abuse of discretion occurred.  In the absence of an adequate showing to the contrary, the municipal decision at issue here may be seen as a valid effort to discourage bidders from playing fast and loose with public bidding processes and requirements generally, and with published specifications in particular.  Even though we view this matter as bearing upon bidder responsiveness, and not involving bidder responsibility as the trial court saw it, we reach the same result because, to the extent the municipality was empowered either to accept or reject the bid, our review of that determination is governed, as well, by abuse of discretion standards.  [306 N.J. Super. at 159-60] (emphasis added) (internal quotations and citations omitted)  See also Dobco, Inc. v. Brockwell & Carrington Contractors, Inc., 441 N.J. Super. 148, 159 (Law. Div. 2015) “(On the other hand, a public entity is not required to accept a bid containing defects even when those defects are not material.  The public entity has discretion to accept or reject, for valid reasons, bids that fail, in a non-material manner, to conform to the specifications.  In order for a reason to reject a bid with a non-material defect to be considered valid, it must be ‘non-pretextual [,] ... reflect sound business judgment’ and may not contradict the ‘underlying purposes of public bidding requirements. ’”)  (quoting Serenity, 306 N.J. Super. at 156).  In other words, the scope of acceptable business judgment is broad.  It includes a public entity’s decision to ensure that the purposes of the LPCL are met by demanding strict conformance specification and preventing any hint of gamesmanship.  Ibid.
[brief] Of Counsel and on the Brief: [...]  #  TABLE OF CONTENTS | Section | Page | |------------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | TABLE OF JUDGMENTS | iii | | TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | iv | | TABLE OF CONTENTS OF APPENDIX | vi | | TABLE OF CONTENTS OF TRANSCRIPT(S) | xi | | PRELIMINARY STATEMENT | 1 | | PROCEDURAL HISTORY | 4 | | STATEMENT OF FACTS | 8 | | LEGAL ARGUMENT | 15 | | **I.
[brief] On December 19th, 2011, [...] was working as the manager of the [...] in [...], [...].  (9T 83-2 to 8; 84-11 to 12)  Between 10 and 11 a.m., two customers entered the store, inquiring about Beats by Dre headphones.  When Perez walked form behind the counter to show them the selection of headphones, one of the customers pulled out a black Glock, pointed it at the back of his head and said, “Don’t move, turn around and head to the back. ”  (9T 99-12 to 100-2)  Perez described the men as black, one was taller than the other.  The taller man was around 5’10 and darker than the other man, and the shorter man was about 5’8 or 5’9.  (9T 101-20 to 102-1)  Perez testified that the taller man pulled the gun.  (9T 102-1 to 2)  Both men were wearing jeans and a baseball cap, one was wearing a black hat with what appeared to a C logo for Cincinnati.  (9T 102-4 to 8)  The shorter man was wearing a hood over his baseball cap.  (9T 102-14 to 16)  Perez testified that the taller man ordered him to the back of the store to the inventory room and get on the floor.  (9T 112-15 to 23)  After grabbing the keys to the cage, where the expensive inventory is stored, from Perez’s back pocket, the men started stuffing merchandise in clear plastic bags.  (9T 113-24 to 114-5, 115-16 to 116-7)  Perez recalled that the shorter man was wearing white latex cloves.  (9T 114-21 to 25)  Perez testified that while he was on the ground, one of the men, he was uncertain which, was having a phone conversation, but Perez could not discern the substance of the conversation.  (9T 118-17 to 25)  When the men ran out of the store, Perez tried to follow them.  Perez did not see a car waiting and when one of the men noticed that they were being followed, he ordered Perez to go to the front of the store.  (9T 117-24 to 118-8; 120-25 to 121-1)  The total loss to the store from the robbery was over $24,000.  (9T 148-4 to 7)  Though the robbery occurred in December 2011, the police did not memorialize Perez’s statement until October 30th, 2015, several weeks before trial.  (9T 126-24 to 127-121, 127-25 to 128-7)  At trial, Perez admitted that before the police recorded his statement, one of the officer’s asked if he heard a robber “on the phone asking for a getaway car and if the phone call was made. ”  (9T 128-7 to 21)  In his October 30th statement, Perez said that the short light skinned man was making a call but that he was not able to hear the call or see what the robbers were doing.  (9T 129-12 to 120-3)  Perez never participated in a photo array or provided information for a composite sketch.  (9T 132-8 to 15)  The police recovered nothing of evidentiary value from the location of the robbery.  C. JANUARY 5TH, 2012
[brief] There are a multitude of explanations for the presence of the trap partially on the sidewalk of [...] which do not implicate [...].  This action is quasi-criminal in nature.  Accordingly, defendant can be found guilty only if proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.  Belleville v. Parrillo's, Inc., 83 N.J. 309, 416 A.2d 388 (1980); Trenton v. Calvary Apostolic Temple, Inc., 166 N.J.Super. 145, 399 A.2d 311 (App. Div. 1979)  State v. Weir, 183 N.J. Super. 237, 242, 443 A.2d 773, 776 (App. Div. 1982)  The state failed to meet its burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that [...] placed the trap on Murray Road.  Having failed to establish that fact beyond a reasonable doubt these convictions cannot stand.
[brief] The question was straightforward: Would the evidence offered cause fair-minded men to differ as to whether there was a reasonable probable relation of cause and effect between the defendants' negligence and the plaintiff's accident such as to require the submission of the issue to the jury?  Yadurro v. Yellow Cab Co. of Camden, 6 N.J. 102, 106 (1950).  The trial court answered the question in the negative suggesting that the jury would be speculating.  (T31:24 to T44:18).  The decision is in error.
[brief] Third, [...] and [...] suggest that N.J.R.E. 803 (a)(2) allowed the admission of the statement through [...].  That rule of evidence contemplates hearsay exceptions which are not dependent on the declarant’s unavailability.  Again, [...] was subject to cross-examination on his prior statement twice when the Defense inquired about his plea and sentence, inferring both served as a motive to fabricate his trial testimony.
[brief] N.J. Democratic Party, Inc. v. Samson, 175 N.J. 178, 186 (2002) (quoting Kilmurray v. Gilfert, 10 N.J. 435, 440 (1952)); see also Perri v. Kisselbach, 34 N.J. 84 (1961).  Since the fundamental purpose of an election is to ascertain the “true will” of the electorate, courts are “loathe to invalidate a vote of any citizen.
[brief] Helmsley v. Borough of Fort Lee, 78 N.J. 200, 210 (1978) (quoting *Hutton Park Gardens v. Town Council of West Orange*, 68 N.J. 543, 568 (1975)); *Mayes v. Jackson Township Rent Leveling Board*, 102 N.J. 362, 367 (1986).  Accordingly, “absent…..states of emergency, landlords cannot be required to subsidize the housing needs of the tenants. ”  *Hutton Park Gardens*, supra, 68 N.J. at 567.  Forcing a landlord to subsidize tenants and therefore prohibiting it from “recouping funds to which he is rightfully entitled” imposes a burden that “would deprive an owner of property without due compensation” and is “confiscatory and unconstitutional”.  *Property Owners Association of North Bergen v. North Bergen Tp.*, 74 N.J. 327, 336 (1977).  An ordinance cannot indefinitely reduce a landlord’s operating profit without being confiscatory.  *Mayes*, supra, 102 N.J. at 380.  An ordinance defeats the purpose of rent control and is unconstitutional if it causes “steadily diminishing income”.  *Mayes*, supra, 102 N.J. at 381; see *Helmsley*, supra, 78 N.J. at 233 (Ordinance facially invalid when effect of ordinance projected diminishing income over a period of years without an adequate hardship-relief mechanism).  “[A]lthough the Court sympathizes with those tenants who may be unable to afford higher rents, constitutionally it cannot compel particular landlords to subsidize tenants to their own detriment.
[brief] Even when he returned to work, Plaintiff had to take “consecutive leave,” and leave work midday because of his inability to work a full day (3T, 38:8-17).  Later in his testimony, Plaintiff expounded upon this situation (3T, at 57:4-58:6).  In total, Plaintiff estimated that he incurred $2,867.31 in lost wages, in addition to having to exhaust all of his sick and vacation time to take the leave he needed (3T, at 58:7-59:8).  It was at this point in the trial that the jury was excused for a brief recess so [...] could address an objection with counsel.
[directive] gT,~Te ~[}IE ~F `y~~5 -~'-~i:' ~~ L M y~' ( Iry~ f':.'~r ~~ 1111  Y ~~~~y k ~ ~~', ~y Jersey  New f o State  GREWAL S. GURBIR GENERAL  MURPHY D. PHILIP  ATTORNEY  THE OF OFFICE General, Attorney Governor  SAFETY AND PUBLIC LAW OF DEPARTMENT 080 Box PO 08625-0080  NJ TRENTON, Y. [...] Gouer'rLor Lt. NO.2018-3
[brief] I.  Plaintiffs’ appeal is an improper interlocutory appeal and should be dismissed.  (June Order [Pa253–54]).  .................................................................5  A.  Standard of Review ........................................................................................................5  B.  Plaintiffs have no right to appeal the June Order.  (June Order [Pa253–57]).  .........................................................................................................................5  C.  Plaintiffs cannot appeal the Consent Order under New Jersey law.  (June Order [Pa253–57]).  ..............................................................................................................7  II.  The Superior Court did not abuse its discretion in denying Plaintiffs’ motion to vacate (June Order [Pa253–54]).  .................................................................8  A.  Standard of Review ........................................................................................................8  B.  The Superior Court rightly exercised its authority when denying Plaintiffs’ motion to vacate.  (June Order [Pa253–54]).  .........................................................8  C.  To the extent this Court chooses to assess the enforceability of the Contract, the Contract’s arbitration clause is enforceable under New Jersey law.  (June Order [Pa253–57]; January Consent Order [Pa162–63]).  .................................................................9  1.  The Contract’s arbitration provisions are enforceable under New Jersey law.  .................................................................10  2.  The Contract’s arbitration provisions are valid under the FAA and NJAA.................................................................13  III.