ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] However, implied repealers are not favored.  They require a finding that the later statute be “utterly inconsistent or repugnant to the earlier. ”  Board of Education of City of Sea Isle City, 196 N.J. 1, 16 (2008); Brewer v. Porch, 53 N.J. 167, 173 (1969); Department of Labor and Industry v. Cruz, 45 N.J. 372, 380 (1965); Goff v. Hunt, 6 N.J. 600, 606 (1951); Hotel Registry Realty Corp. v. Stafford, 70 N.J.L. 528, 536 (1904); State v. Drake, 79 N.J. Super. 458, 461 (App. Div. 1963).  The later laws are not inconsistent or repugnant to the Home Rule Act, for all the reasons stated, not the least of which is that the Courts have upheld substantially similar ordinances to the one present here on multiple times and as late as [...] in 2005.  Similarly, it would render the language of that section of the Home Rule Act regarding “disturbing noises” a nullity.  The case law on statutory interpretation is plain.  Statutory language should not be read by a Court in such a way as to render any phrase a nullity or redundant.  Burgos v. State, 222 N.J. 175, 203 (2015) (citing Innes v. Innes, 117 N.J. 496, 509 (1990)); State v. Rangel, 213 N.J. 500, 512 (2013).  Every word of a statute “is presumed to have import and none to be mere surplusage. ”  Rangel, supra, 213 N.J. at 513 (citing State v. Regis, 208. N.J. 439, 449 (2011)).  Further, when construing a statute, “[l]egislative language must not, if reasonably avoidable, be found to be inoperative, superfluous or meaningless. ”  Regis, supra, 208 N.J. at 449 (quoting Franklin Tower One, L.L.C. v. N.M., 157 N.J. 602, 613 (1999)).  As the Legislature has specifically included the language “disturbing noises” to the statute, it must mean what it says.  POINT III
[brief] [...] submitted a certification on behalf of [...] in connection with [...]’s reply brief in further support of its summary judgment motion.  Her certification stated:  On September 25, 2017, I mailed correspondence to [...] by way of regular and certified mail.  The correspondence advised [...] that the Reservation of Rights letter of July 20, 2017 (which was enclosed for his reference) was applicable to the Amended Complaint of Plaintiffs.  (Exhibit A is a true and correct copy of [...]’s September 25, 2017 correspondence and July 20, 2017 correspondence attached thereto).  (Da294).  The July 20, 2017 letter referenced in her certification is not attached to the September 25, 2017 letter but, instead, appears first in the Exhibit.  (Da296 to Da301).  In addition, the July 20, 2017 contains the statement “Error! Bookmark not defined” and is not executed.  [...] previously testified that he did not recall receiving the July 20, 2017 letter and [...] never provided proof that it actually sent that letter.  In addition, even if [...] received the September 25, 2017 letter with the July 20, 2017 letter attached (which he denies), no reasonable person would conclude that it was a legitimate letter when the words “Error! Bookmark not defined” appeared on the letter.  Under such circumstances, [...] should have been estopped from disclaiming coverage.
[brief] I.  INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................................................1  II.  STATEMENT OF INTEREST .................................................................................................5  III.  COURTS SHOULD CONDUCT VOIR DIRE TO DETERMINE WHETHER JURORS ARE BIASED IN FAVOR OF THE INFALLIBILITY OF FINGERPRINT EXAMINER OPINIONS.  ...................7  IV.  COURTS MUST IMPOSE APPROPRIATE GUARDRAILS ON EXPERT TESTIMONY REGARDING FINGERPRINT ANALYSIS.
[directive] DOMESTIC VIOLENCE Directive  Implementing Procedures for the Seizure of Weapons from State Law Enforcement Officers Involved in Domestic Violence Incidents  Issued August 1995 Revised September 2000 TO: DIRECTOR, DIVISION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE  ALL COUNTY PROSECUTORS  ALL LAW ENFORCEMENT CHIEF EXECUTIVES FROM: [...]  ATTORNEY GENERAL DATE: SEPTEMBER 1, 2000  SUBJECT: ATTORNEY GENERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT DIRECTIVE NO. 2000-4  REVISION TO AUGUST 14, 1995, DIRECTIVE IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES  FOR THE SEIZURE OF WEAPONS FROM ALL STATE LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS INVOLVED IN DOMESTIC VIOLENCE INCIDENTS  I.
[brief] STATE OF NEW JERSEY, STATE OF NEW JERSEY  [...], et al.  TABLE OF CONTENTS  STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY ............  1  LEGAL ARGUMENTS  POINT ONE THE TRIAL COURT’S GRANT OF SUMMARY  JUDGMENT SHOULD BE AFFIRMED AS PLAINTIFF DID NOT PUT FORTH COMPETENT EVIDENCE SUGGESTING A MATERIAL ISSUE OF FACT ON MAKING A PRIMA FACIE CASE UNDER AGE OR GENDER DISCRIMINATION LAW OR THAT THE REASONS STATED FOR DISCIPLINE WERE PRETEXT FOR DISCRIMINATION.  ...........................................  20 POINT TWO  THE TRIAL COURT’S GRANT OF SUMMARY  JUDGMENT SHOULD BE AFFIRMED AS PLAINTIFF DID NOT PUT FORTH  COMPETENT EVIDENCE SUGGESTING A MATERIAL ISSUE OF FACT  MAKING A PRIMA FACIE CASE UNDER RETALIATION PROHIBITIONS OR THAT THE REASONS STATED FOR DISCIPLINE WERE PRETEXT FOR RETALIATION.  ..................  29 POINT THREE  THE LAW  DIVISION PROPERLY DISMISSED FREE SPEECH CLAIMS IN COUNT FOUR AS DILLON WAS SPEAKING IN HIS CAPACITY AS A [...] OFFICIAL AND NO ISSUE OF PRIOR RESTRAINT WAS IMPLICATED IN [...]’S ACTIONS.  ..................................................  41  CONCLUSION ..........................................................  46  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
[brief] Similarly, the Special Master’s conclusion that all the claims rested on a common core of operative facts, notwithstanding this Court’s contrary holding, relied on a general high-level analysis of certain broad categories of facts from before the RICO limitation period that he found were relevant to the RICO claims.  These facts were never tied or related to the relevant time periods or RICO elements.  And even taking the Special Master’s findings at face value, does that mean that everything Plaintiffs did to establish contract claims and facts supporting non-RICO tort claims was “reasonably devoted” to establishing the RICO claims?  The Special Master’s report does not engage in the required granular analysis of time entries or specific projects.  Further, it provides no reason for equating what Plaintiffs, in fact, did to gather evidence before the RICO limitation period (October 1, 2004) to establish non-RICO claims with what would have been reasonable to support, or provide background for, the facts supporting the RICO violations during the limitations period.  Thus, for example, even if both Plaintiffs’ breach of contract claims and Plaintiffs’ RICO claims required some showing as to the formation and terms of the partnership agreement, it does not follow that the showing Plaintiffs made as to what occurred in the partnership in the 1980s or 1990s was “reasonably necessary” to prove their RICO claims.  The trial court merely adopted the Special Master’s Report without meaningful analysis, comment, or thoughtful consideration of the report of former Chief Judge [...].
[brief] U.S. Const. amend. XIV; N.J. Const. art. I, ¶¶ 1, 9, and 10.  His convictions must be reversed.  Before trial, the defense made it clear that their defense was that [...] and [...] committed the murder together.  [...] argued that the fact that Mason was arrested for dealing drugs “a month and a half before the homicide in the same area where [...] engaged in drug distribution allows the defense to argue that Mason had motive, that he wanted to kill a rival drug dealer. ”  (Da 1010)  Bolstering this theory was that “both [...] and [...] told police that ‘Naz’ was with them earlier in the day” and that [...]’s fingerprint was on [...]’s car.  (Da 47-48)  Based on this showing, the trial court ordered the State to turn over discovery related to Mason’s drug arrest.  (Da 59)  What the defense learned from this discovery was that Mason was dealing the same drug found in the car [...] was driving — heroin — but that it was branded differently — [...]’s brand was “Call of Duty” and Mason’s was “Mr. Nice Guy. ”  (9T 73-8 to 9)  [...] attempted to elicit these two additional facts in order to demonstrate that [...] and Mason “are rival drug dealers because they’re selling different brands,” which established a motive for Mason to murder [...].  (9T 73-15 to 16)  This attempt was renewed a few days later.  (13T 4-1 to 7-7)  The trial court erroneously precluded the defense from introducing this evidence.  It reasoned that “different facets of people . . . sell drugs” in “inner cities,” “[b]ut it does not mean there’s a drug rivalry unless you have evidence to come in the courtroom with. ”  (9T 74-5 to 10)  [...] argued that the different branding was sufficient to infer competition between Mason and [...].  (9T 74-18 to 21)  The court stated that just because “two vendors on the street” are “trying to make more money than the other . . . does not mean that there is a rivalry. ”  (9T 75-1 to 6)  Defense counsel responded that a rivalry is exactly established by that kind of brand competition, such as between Coca-Cola and Pepsi.  (9T 75-9 to 13)  The trial court erred in holding the defense to an inordinately high standard and excluding this testimony, thereby gutting [...]’s defense.
[directive] Operating Page: 06 of Procedure  Adminktration  Standard Forfeiture Program  State Jersey Requests for Distribution of Forfeited Property fib: I AII Enforcement Officers /98 Law 03/01  Applicability: ksued: >ate Policy 7:l  Statement:  The [...] recognizes that requests will be made by law enforcement agencies within the state with each of the state's twenty-one county prosecutor's and the New Jersey Divislon of Criminal Justice ("Division") for distribution of forfeited property 2C:41-1 2C64-1 obtained pursuant to N.J.S.A. et forfeitures), N.J.S.A. et seq., (Civil seq., N. (financial 2C:21-25 seq. J.S.A. (racketeering) or from actions brought under et by or facilitation of crime), under any other statute as directed the [...].
[brief] [...] and [...] sought variance relief to add a second floor and roof deck to their home.  While [...] appealed the Zoning Board of Adjustment's approval on the substantive merits, the decision was void for lack of jurisdiction.  Notices required by N.J.S.A. 40:55D-12 "shall state the date, time and place of the hearing, the nature of the matters to be considered and ... the location and times at which any maps and documents for which approval is sought are available pursuant to [N.J.S.A. 40:55D-10.]"  N.J.S.A. 40:55D-11.  N.J.S.A. 40:55D-9(b) requires that notice of "all regular meetings and all special meetings" of a municipal agency "shall be given in accordance with municipal regulations."  Moreover, N.J.S.A. 40:55D-10(b) provides that all "maps and documents for which approval is sought at a hearing shall be on file and available for public inspection ... during normal business hours in the office of the administrative officer."  The "administrative officer" is "the clerk of the municipality, unless a different municipal official ... [is] designated by ordinance or statute."  N.J.S.A. 40:55D-3.  The [...] zoning ordinance in effect at the time of defendants' application designated the "[z]oning [o]fficer" as the --- 7 Pa94 to Pa7. "administrative officer."
[brief] The CBA does not require [...] to continue to employ a worker on short-term disability.  On the contrary, it grants [...] wide discretion to set the standard of employee performance and continued employment.  If [...] determines an employee cannot perform, whether physically or otherwise, it can terminate that employee. \(^2\)  By holding that [...] can terminate employees on long-term or permanent disability, but not employees on short-term or indeterminate disability, the Arbitrator’s ruling creates a new work rule that does not appear in the CBA, that contradicts the CBA’s plain language, and that usurps authority granted to [...] through the collective bargaining process.
[brief] (Pa1 to Pa22).  Township Code §175-89D provides that the combined square footage of the any accessory buildings shall not exceed the square footage of the principal building.  Here, the accessory building is 2160 square feet, and the principal structure is approximately 1152 square feet.  Accordingly, a use variance was required.  (Da10).  [...] had previously applied for all necessary permits and inspections for the accessory structure, but the former Zoning Official mistakenly failed to advise the Tomarchios that they needed a use variance.  The former Zoning Official mistakenly approved the structure without a use variance.  (1T10-9 to 1T11-18).  A public hearing on the application was held on August 18, 2022.
[brief] The *Feaster*  Court held that “trial courts should endeavor to excise any reference to a criminal defendant’s invocation of his right to counsel,” with a caveat.  *Id.* at 75-76.  If redaction of the invocation would cause the jury “to question why testimony regarding subsequent events was not offered, a trial court may in its discretion permit testimony explaining why an interview or interrogation was terminated. ”  *Id.* at 76.  This exercise of discretion is proper where “the testimony is essential to [a] complete presentation” and “its omission would be likely to mislead or confuse the jury. ”  *Ibid.*  Where an invocation is permitted to go before the jury, a cautionary instruction is required.  *Ibid.*  The instruction explain “that people decline to speak with police for many reasons” and emphasize that an invocation “may not in any way be used to infer guilt. ”  *Ibid.; State v. Clark*, 251 N.J. 266, 292 (2022).  The lower court’s ruling permitting defendant’s statement to be played to the jury unredacted represents a fair application of both *Kucinski* and *Feaster*.
[brief] --- 7  It should not be lost on the court that in opposing defendant’s motion to bar [...], plaintiffs filed a brief, twenty pages in length, which took pains to convince [...]—successfully, to be sure—that [...] was eminently qualified.  Indeed, the following exchange took place between [...] and plaintiffs’ counsel:  The New Jersey Supreme Court in *Estate of Hanges*, supra, stated that a reviewing court should uphold the findings of the trial court if they are supported by the record.  *Id.*, 202 N.J. at 384.  During oral argument [...] expressed several reasons as to why plaintiffs’ cross-motion was denied.
[brief] PROCEDURAL HISTORY.........................................................................................................1  STATEMENT OF FACTS.......................................................................................................2  STANDARD OF REVIEW.......................................................................................................6  LEGAL ARGUMENT...............................................................................................................8  POINT I THE DECISION OF THE STATE POLICE RETIREMENT  BOARD WAS ARBITRARY, CAPRICIOUS, AND UNREASONABLE, AND SHOULD BE REVERSED.  (Not Raised Below).............................................................................................................8  POINT II  THE DECISION BELOW WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE AND SHOULD THEREFORE BE REVERSED.  (Not Raised Below)...........................................................................................................15  CONCLUSION..........................................................................................................................18
[brief] As of March 5, 2018, Room 517 at the [...] was Defendant’s residence.  He had been staying there with [...] since January or February of 2018.  (29T161-3 to 11, 176-14 to 23, 179-4 to 22, 183-1 to 13)  Defendant did not have a car, so [...] had picked him up in New York in January or February and brought him to the Ramada in [...]’s car.  Defendant stayed with [...] in Room 517 for that entire period other than a “couple of days” when he returned to New York.  (29T176-14 to 177-4)  His only means of transportation at that time was [...]’s car.  (29T189-17 to 190-2)  On March 5, [...] of the [...] arrived at the [...] close to midnight to conduct a search of Room 517 with [...], [...], and at least one but “probably two” uniformed police officers.
[brief] \(^{11}\)  A careful reading of [...]’s Revocable Trust, however, demonstrates that [...]’s position is simply wrong.  Thus, even if Paragraph 24(F) of the Settlement Agreement did not apply here (which it does), [...] still cannot assert a viable claim to [...]’s Estate’s interest in the Palm Beach Property.  Section 3.3A of [...]’s Revocable Trust addresses distribution of [...]’s residences, including the Palm Beach Property:  If . . . [[...]] survives me, my Trustee (i) shall hold in a residence marital trust all of my right, title and interest (including, without limitation, any leasehold interest and stock in cooperative housing or any \(^{11}\) Pursuant to [...]’s Will and [...]’s Revocable Trust under Article FOURTH of the Will, the remainder of [...]’s property (after payments and distributions under the Will are satisfied) are to be distributed or “poured over” into the Revocable Trust.
[brief] (Pb12).  Nor do the equities weigh in his favor.  The Board found on the basis of undisputed facts that notice was sent to [...], that information about the Ricci Act was available to him through the Division’s website and publications, and that he had sufficient time to file his Eligibility Registration Form within the statutory period.  Thus, contrary to [...]’s contention, (Pb15), there was ample evidence for the Board to reasonably conclude that he failed to demonstrate good cause, reasonable grounds, and reasonable diligence to warrant consideration of his application well beyond the statutory deadline.  (Pa14).  Finally, [...]’s argument and reference to a different applicant is misplaced.  (Pb16).  That applicant asserts that he attempted to file his Eligibility Registration Form but was told he was ineligible because he was not currently sick.  (Pb16; Pa119-122).  But those facts are not in the record before this court.  And that applicant’s assertions are irrelevant to [...]’s appeal as they deal with an entirely different set of circumstances not alleged by [...], so they should be disregarded.  **CONCLUSION**
[directive] A public servant, with purpose to obtain a benefit for himself or another or to injure or to 2nd Degree $35,000 to $100,000 10% permissible deprive another of a benefit, commits an act relating to his office knowing such act is unauthorized or commits such act in an unauthorized manner, or knowingly refrains from 2C:30-2(a)(b)  Official Misconduct performing a duty which is imposed by law or is clearly inherent in the nature of his office.
[brief] Respondent also attempts to portray a marriage that was “troubled” by taking the testimony of her own witnesses out of context and by interjecting innuendo, conjecture and speculation.  Specifically, Respondent misconstrues [...]’s testimony to create the illusion that the relationship between Petitioner and Decedent was “troubled”:  (1)  Respondent asserts that [...] stated that “Petitioner never appeared at Decedent's high school reunions, even though Decedent was on the event committee.  Db at 16; (P17a).  The testimony that [...] provided was that she, herself, did not attend all the reunions, she just did not remember seeing Petitioner at the ones she attended.  (10T93:9-24).  (2)  Respondent asserts that [...] stated that Petitioner and Decedent had previously broken up their relationship and had been living apart with Petitioner moving away.  Db at 16.  The testimony that [...] provided was that “I thought at one point they had split up, but they got back together. ”  Her impression was that they were separated maybe two months or something and then they reconciled.  (10T129:25 to 130:10).  (3)  Respondent asserts that [...] stated that Decedent told her about another woman with whom Petitioner was romantically involved.  Db at 16.  The testimony that [...] provided was that Decedent once suspected that he may have been seeing someone, saying something about phone calls to the house, but Decedent never gave her any other details.  (10T97:18-22).  Respondent also presents a distorted portrayal of [...]’s testimony to characterize Petitioner’s marriage as “odd: ”  (1)  Respondent asserts that Ms. Snyder testified that Decedent, on multiple occasions, told [...] that the Petitioner was involved with another woman.  Db at 15.  [...] testified that she did not recall the year, but Decedent was suspicious that Petitioner may have been seeing someone because he was buying gifts for someone else, a woman or her children or her grandchildren, but she cannot remember the specifics.  (11T46:7-17).  --- 3  The short separation was in 2005 and resulted from Decedent taking out her frustration and anger on Petitioner after Respondent quit her job and entered into a romantic relationship with “[...]” who had a bad reputation in the community from being involved in narcotics and having gone to jail.  (7T 143:5 to 148:11).
[directive] Multiple Charges Sheet I I  Last Name  Middle Name First Name PROMIS Number Indictment/ Accusation/ Complaint Number  Final Charges  Original Charges  D Trial 0Plea I Mandatory Minimum Sentence Pursuant to 2C: N.J.S.A. Plea Agreement  Special Factors D D D D 13.1 12-2 11-3 11-5 D D D D 14-6 15-2 11-1 20-11 D D D D 35.3 35.5 29 -6 35-4  D D D D 39.10 35-7 35-s 35-6  D D D D 43-1.1 43-1.2 43-6 43-7  I  I  Offense Date Plea / Conviction Date  Sentence Date Arrest Date I I Status Date Bail Posted Bail Amount D D  Pretrial Release  OJail ROR OBail  Jail Time Credit Gap Time Credit From (Date) To (Date)  Total Jail Time Credit Days From (Date) To (Date)  Total Gap Time Credit Days  Prosecutor Name and Address (If Different)  Attorney Name and Address (if Different)  Comments Revised: 09/2017, CN: 10693
[brief] (Da 24-27).  Between March 11 and June 24, 2020, trial commenced before the Honorable [...], J.S.C., and a jury.  (24T-42T).  On June 29, 2020, the jury returned a verdict of guilty on counts 1-4 of the indictment.  (41T 8-19 to 10-13; Da 28-29).  Following the verdict, the State moved to dismiss the certain persons weapon charge in count 5 of the indictment.  (41T 18-13 to 19-3).  On August 19, 2020, Defendant was sentenced by [...] to life without parole.  (42T 42-1 to 42-4; Da 30)
[brief] Here, the Complaint does not identify any specific provision of the PSA imposing a duty that [...] breached.  (Pa15-16, ¶¶ 70, 73-75).  This is especially obvious because [...]’s PSA obligations were limited to those in sections IV, X and XVII.  (Pa128).  As such, [...]’s obligations under the PSA ended when it returned the Deposit to Plaintiff.
[brief] See *State v. Poteet*, 61 N.J. 493, 495-96 (1972) (“[A] sentence may not be increased because a defendant defended against the charge or insisted upon his right of appeal. ”)  The State thus mischaracterizes [...]’s PCR petitions by describing them as a form of denial that demonstrated a lack of remorse.  (Sb26)  To the contrary, as discussed, [...] has never denied – in PCR petitions or otherwise – that he shot [...].  Instead, over his 29 years of incarceration, [...] has consistently expressed his remorse:
[brief] [...] in his report did not directly address [...]’s opinion that “[a]s a result of the degradation of the stair surface, water is trapped in the below surface pocket areas; and when freezing takes place the water expands to ice above the stair tread surface. ” (Pa354).  In fact, [...] mischaracterizes [...]’s opinion as only claiming that the “stair design allows water to accumulate” (Pa424-425), when [...] also concluded the longstanding, non-mitigated deterioration of the concrete steps allows water to infiltrate “below surface and to freeze over the tread surface” upon cold-enough temperatures.