ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The sole issue for this Honorable Court to decide is whether the Plaintiff/Appellant filed his State Court Complaint within the applicable two year statute of limitations.  In deciding this appeal, the Honorable Court should be cognizant of the following undisputed facts: 1.  Plaintiff/Appellant's cause of action accrued on the day that he was found not guilty on June 6, 2017 in the Superior Court; and 2.  Plaintiff/Appellant did not file the original action in the Federal Court within the two year applicable statute of limitations.  Rather, the Federal Court action was filed on July 1, 2019, after the expiration of the applicable two year statute of limitations; the State Court complaint was filed on April 11, 2024.  The Defendants/Respondents respectfully submit that the Plaintiff/Appellant has failed to comply with the applicable statute of limitations in the State of New Jersey for filing civil rights actions.  In particular, N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2 provides for the following:  Every action at law for an injury to a person caused by a wrongful act, negligence or default of any person within the State will be commenced within the two years next after the cause of action shall have accrued.  Said statute has applied to Section 1983 and Section 1985 civil rights actions in Cito v. Bridgewater Township Police Department, 892 F.2d 23 (1989).  See also, Bougher v. University of Pittsburgh, 882 F.2d 72, 80 (3d Cir. 1989).  ("Two year statute of limitations is the application to Section 1985 action and runs from the date of each overt act causing damage to the plaintiff.")  In determining the date of accrual, the reviewing Court must look at N.J.S.A. 59:8-1, date of accrual cause of action, which provides the following:  Accrual shall mean the date on which the claim accrued and shall not be affected by notice provisions contained therein.  Defendants/Respondents respectfully submit that the Plaintiff/Appellant's cause of action accrued when, in the presence of [...], he was found not guilty on all the charges on June 6, 2017.
[brief] SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY  APPELLATE  DIVISION DOCKET NO. [...]  STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. [...], Defendant-Appellant.  CRIMINAL ACTION  On Appeal from a Judgment of Conviction of the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Bergen County.  Indictment No. [...] Sat Below: Hon. [...], J.S.C.; Hon. [...], J.S.C.
[brief] Trial Court Order Denying Motion to Stay and Compelling the Parties to Arbitration for Resolution of Dispute, dated April 15, 2024 .................................................................  Da033  Table of Appendix of Appellant Complaint filed February 14, 2023 .........................................................  Da001  Answer with Counterclaim filed April 3, 2023 ........................................  Da010  Answer to Counterclaim and Affirmative Defenses filed April 26, 2023 ..........................................................................................  Da019  Notice of Motion to Suppress Answer and Dismiss Counterclaim filed September 13, 2023 ..................................................................................  Da024  Certification in opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Discovery filed September 28, 2023 ..................................................................................  Da027 Letter to [...] from [...], Esquire  Withdrawing Discovery  Motion filed October 19, 2023 .................................................................  Da030 Substitution of Attorney filed December 19, 2023 ....................................  Da031 Discovery End Dead Reminder filed January 22, 2024 ..............................  Da032 Order Denying Motion to Stay and Compelling the Partes to Arbitration for Resolution of Dispute filed April 15, 2024 ..................................................  Da033 Order Granting Motion to Compel Discovery and Granting Cross-Motion to Compel Discovery filed April 26, 2024 .....................................................
[brief] Given the extent of the Superior Court’s and Probation’s failure to oversee and maintain an accurate Probation account record for the past 25 years, Defendant requests the Appellate Court assume jurisdiction of this case so that an accurate account record can be finally established and the full extent of credits rightfully due Defendant be granted.  1.  Probation’s 25-year history of continued wrongful mismanagement and misconduct has amply demonstrated its extraordinary inability to maintain an accurate account record, its arbitrary and capricious enforcement of court-ordered awards, its outright fabrication of false child support charges, its inability to track alimony versus child support payments, its unlawful garnishment of Social Security benefits under false child support account number, and its issuance of erroneous audits to the Court which engendered further court orders tainted with Probation error and further over-garnishment of income.
[brief] The agreement inter alia sets forth that [...] will make payment to [...] of $125,000.00 and that in exchange for [...]’s forbearance on the collection of the judgement.  Dr. [...] provide a security intent in any recovery in this action (Pa0343).  The only thing that is provided to Defendants which gives them any interest regarding the instant action, is contained in Paragraph 6 of the agreement which provides:  **Security/collateral**:  Simultaneously with the execution and deliver of the Agreement, [...] shall deliver to [...] a Security Agreement, in the form set forth in Exhibit A hereto, creating and otherwise granting [...] a security interest in any and all of [...]’s right, title and interest, in an to all money, directly or indirectly, recovered (i.e., settlement funds, collections on judgment, etc.), net of [...]’s attorneys fees and litigation costs incurred for that action (“Net Settlement”), in the civil action filed in New Jersey Superior Court entitled [...] et als. v. [...] et als., Dkt No. [...], upon the terms and conditions set forth in said Security Agreement in the amount and to the extent necessary to fully pay and satisfy all sums due [...] by [...] under this agreement.  (Pa0342)  A search of the agreement will reveal no assignment of Dr. [...]’s claims, no right to any ownership interest in those claims or any right to make any decision regarding the litigation of these claims.
[brief] [...] argues against the trial court’s finding of irreparable harm for several different reasons that should be rejected outright.  First, [...] argues that the harm caused by its actions was only monetary, which cannot serve as a basis for a finding of irreparable harm.  Next, [...] argues that any harm is reversible and thus cannot constitute a basis for preliminary relief.  In minimizing its extraordinary actions to circumvent the Mount Laurel process, [...] asks this court to reverse the trial court’s well-reasoned finding, made soundly within its discretion.  The trial court took [...]’s actions seriously, and this court should similarly reject [...]’s diminishment of its extraordinary steps to fly in the face of its constitutional obligation.  First, the trial court correctly found that temporarily limiting certain powers of [...] was necessary to prevent the irreparable harm to New Jersey’s low-and moderate-income families, the beneficiaries of the fifty-year-old Mount Laurel doctrine.
[brief] “In considering whether the application of the doctrine is fair, courts should consider fairness to the court system as a whole, as well as to all parties. ”  Dimitrakopoulos  237 N.J. at 114.  The judicial discretion standard of review is limited and is in no way intended to allow for the substitution of the lower court’s judgment by the Appellate Court.  Gillman v. Bally Mfg. Corp., 286 N.J. Super. 523 (App. Div. 1996).  “[I]n reviewing the exercise of discretion it is not the appellate function to decide whether the trial court took the wisest course, or even the better course, since to do so would merely be to substitute [their] judgment for that of the lower court.  The question is only whether the trial judge pursues a manifestly unjust course. ”  Id. at 528.  The judicial discretion standard applicable to the Appellate Court’s review of Entire Controversy Doctrine dismissal includes the lower court’s determination whether a Rule 4:5-1(b)(2) disclosure should have been made in a prior action.  700 Highway 33 LLC v Pollio, 421 N.J. Super. 231, 236 (App. Div. 2011).  “That disclosure requirement exists ‘to implement the philosophy of the entire controversy doctrine."  Dimitrakopoulos v. Borrus, 237 N.J. 91, 109 (2019).  The Trial Court's granting of Defendants' Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Rule 4:5-1(b)(2) should be reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard.
[brief] “This witness’ inability or refusal to consider the very crux of the issue before the Court impacted his credibility and the weight given by the court to his testimony and his conclusions. ”  4T10:5-8.  The court found [...]’s testimony to be credible, and her demeanor to be “appropriate” and “not overly passionate. ”  4T11:3-9.  The court described the Plaintiff as follows:
[brief] Our Supreme Court has also repeatedly found such evidence reliable for decades after Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923), which announced a requirement that the “science underlying the proposed expert testimony has ‘gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs. ’”  State v. J.L.G., 234 N.J. 265, 280 (2018) (quoting Frye, 293 F. at 1014); see also State v. Cary, 49 N.J. 343, 355 (1967) (“New Jersey was an early state in the recognition of fingerprint evidence, a type of investigative aid which now possesses unquestioned value. ”) (citation omitted).  In Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms. Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), the United States Supreme Court replaced Frye.
[brief] Defendant’s use of the Strip was not exclusive (Raised Below: 2T19; 2T21.  Defendant’s existing parking area encroaches on a portion of the Strip.  The remaining area of the Strip is grass.  Plaintiff testified that neither he nor his tenants use the parking lot.  However, Plaintiff maintains the grass area in the Strip.  2T19:5-11.  Plaintiff’s testimony also makes clear that he always envisioned that Defendant’s use of the parking lot area was a reasonable concession that he allowed the Defendant.
[brief] An affidavit of merit is not required in a case where the “common knowledge” doctrine applies and obviates the need for expert testimony to establish a deviation from the professional’s standard of care.  Hubbard, supra, 168 N.J. at 390, 774 A.2d 495.  “[T]he purpose of the [affidavit of merit] statute [is] to weed out frivolous lawsuits early in the litigation while, at the same time, ensuring that Plaintiffs with meritorious claims will have their day in court. ”  Id. at 395, 774 A.2d 495.  To that end, “the statute requires Plaintiffs to provide an expert opinion, given under oath, that a duty of care existed and that the defendant breached that duty. ”  Id. at 394, 774 A.2d 495.  In a “common knowledge” case, expert opinion is not required to establish the duty or its breach.  Ibid.  For that reason, expert opinion is not needed to “weed out” claims that lack probable merit.  Id. at 395, 774 A.2d 495.  The “common knowledge” doctrine applies where “juror” common knowledge as lay persons is sufficient to enable them, using ordinary understanding and experience, to determine a defendant's negligence without the benefit of the specialized knowledge of experts.
[brief] To the contrary, the EMP sees a process that begins now, ends new installations in buildings in less than three years, and rapidly accelerates reductions at least by 2030, in just eight years.  In addition, the 80x50 Report specifies a very aggressive schedule:  "To support a steady conversion of the building inventory, legislation or BPU directives could be pursued to meet the building conversion rates in the 2019 EMP of 22% conversion by 2030, 64% by 2040 and 90% by 2050."  Ha119.  If approximately 10% of New Jersey residences use propane and oil heat, and the EMP and the 80x50 Report target a 22% conversion by 2030, then 12% of the conversions are existing natural gas or baseboard electric heat.  The 80x50 Report notes:  By 2050, the installed base of electric high-efficiency alternatives for space heating and hot water will reach approximately 90% under the least cost scenario of the 2019 EMP.  Since these types of equipment have long service lives, sales of new heating and hot water units must shift rapidly to the new technologies, reaching approximately 75% of total sales by 2030.  And an "aggressive conversion" must begin no later than 2030.
[brief] D)  There was no offset for the value of the car, nor for my sister’s settlement.  In my Jan 31, 2023 certification, I again raised the issue that the amount of sanctions, at a minimum, should reflect an offset for the $2,000-$3,000 benefit that [...] reaped from selling parts and metal from my mom’s car, as well as an offset for the $2,430 benefit it received from its settlement with my sister, that she had since paid in full.
[brief] Over the past 4 years and the 55 years to come, the award only comes to a very modest $59,322 per year.  Here, in denying Defendants’ motion for a remittitur, the Trial Court examined the damages evidence heard by the Jury over the course of 8 pages in its Memorandum of Decision.  Da251-Da258.  Ultimately, the Trial Court concluded as follows:  No defendant in the case presented any medical expert.  As such, there was no medical expert that contradicted any of [...]’s testimony.  The jury verdict in the case at bar was $3.5 million dollars.
[brief] In Dewey, the Supreme Court observed that disqualification of an attorney “has an impact not only on the parties to the affected litigation but on the efficiency of the judicial system. ”  Id. at 221.  Federal courts in this jurisdiction similarly have upheld an adversary’s standing to seek disqualification.  In re Congoleum Corp., 426 F.3d 675, 687 (3d Cir. 2005) (holding insurers’ counsel had standing to disqualify debtors’ counsel given “the long-standing role of lawyers practicing before federal courts in monitoring and reporting ethical violations”); Essex Cnty. Jail Annex Inmates v. Treffinger, 18 F. Supp.2d 418, 430 (D.N.J. 1998) (holding that defendants had standing to contest plaintiffs’ attorney’s conflicts); Cafaro v. HMC Int’l, LLC, No. 07-CV-2793 (KM) (JAD), 2012 WL 4857763, at *6 n.8 (D.N.J. Oct. 11, 2012) (“[A]n adversary and not only a client or former client affected by the actual or potential conflict may move for disqualification.
[brief] [...] met all of the conditions of Hoboken’s Conditional Use Ordinance.  Thus, the Planning Board was the appropriate land use board to exercise jurisdiction over this matter.  However, on April 6, 2022 the Hoboken Governing Body amended Ordinance 196-33.1 which Ordinance was signed by [...] on April 8, 2022 and which Ordinance became effective 20 days later.  The effect of this amendment to the zoning ordinance was to establish distance requirements where a cannabis dispensary could be located in relation to schools and early childhood learning centers.  The Planning Board over objections from the public, ruled that under the Time of Application Rule (TOA Rule), [...]’ application for development was not subject to the amended Ordinance because [...] had been proceeding with its application before the CRB as mandated by Ordinance before it was permitted to proceed with its application before the Planning Board.
[directive] O/OR c. [Sí/Yes]  [No/No] [No aplica/NA] también se declara culpable de poseer un arma que no sea de fuego bajo circunstancias no claramente apropiadas para el uso legal del arma cuando cometió, trató de cometer o conspiró para cometer cualquiera de esos actos criminales, recibirá una sentencia consecutiva por poseer el arma?  you also plead guilty to possessing a weapon, other than a firearm, under circumstances not manifestly appropriate for lawful use of the weapon while committing, attempting to commit or conspiring to commit any of these offenses you will receive a consecutive sentence for possessing the weapon?  Fecha/Date Acusado/Defendant Abogado Defensor/Defense Attorney Fiscal/Prosecutor Formulario promulgado por la directriz # 01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 11169-Spanish página 2 de 2 Form Promulgated by Directive #01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 11169-Spanish page 2 of 2
[brief] However, to be considered without the required time between readings, the Constitution provides:  “if either house shall resolve by vote of three-fourths of all its members, signified by yeas and nays entered on the journal, that a bill or joint resolution is an emergency measure, it may proceed forthwith from second to third reading. ”  N.J. Const. art. IV, § 4, ¶ 6.  Here, per the minutes and certifications, no such three-fourths majority succeeded in determining that the bill could proceed from the second to third reading.
[brief] Discharge, suspension or demotion are final acts.  ‘Retaliatory action’ does not encompass action taken to effectuate the ‘discharge, suspension or demotion’”.  Retaliatory actions may be premised upon a single discrete action, or a hostile work environment, which is defined as “many separate but relatively minor instances of behavior directed against an employee that may not be actionable individually but that combine to make up a pattern of retaliatory conduct.
[brief] See T4 at 5:15-18.  The *Instructional Systems* Court stated that the requirements and restrictions the defendant-franchisor imposed on the plaintiff-franchisee by way of a written contract between the parties was sufficient evidence of the granting of a license.  Id. at 328.  The Court noted that those requirements and restrictions were the following:  [The] Reseller Agreement prohibited [...] from selling *any products* competitive with [...] products.  Moreover, [...] prohibited [...] from developing or designing any products that might compete with [...]'s products.  Furthermore, [...] obligated [...] to educate and train users of [...] products on a continuing basis…  [And the requirement] that [...] maintain and promote [...]'s name, trademark, and logo.  Id. at 354.  The written contract and the material commercial restrictions that were present and dispositive in *Instructional Systems* are completely absent in this case, as the trial court noted.
[brief] “At this juncture, we fail to see how negligence can be so finely quantified between the drivers.  We believe that it must be left to the jury to determine who was negligent, and, assuming that comparative fault is found, what appropriate percentage of negligence should be allocated to each of the parties at fault.  Id. at 193.  In the Motion for Summary Judgment in the instant case, the defendant argued that a rational jury could not conclude that this accident was caused by an action or inaction on the part of the defendants, which is similar to the position contended by the defendant in Picone, here also plaintiff asserts that it must be left to the jury to determine who was negligent, and what the appropriate percentages of negligence should be allocated to each of the parties at fault. ”  Id. at 193.  Among other Model Civil Jury Charge requests, the plaintiff will ask the Model Civil Jury Charge 7.30  Comparative Negligence and Jury Charge 7.31 Ultimate Outcome.  The Comparative Negligence Charge is based upon N.J.S.A. §2A:15-5.1  Contributory negligence; elimination as bar to recovery; comparative negligence to determine damages.  This Charge will instruct the Jury that once it has found both drivers negligent in the operation of their vehicle, it will apportion negligence between the drivers, and after determining the total damages sustained by the plaintiff, the Trial Court will mold the Verdict.  There is ample evidence of negligence of the defendant in the operation of his vehicle, and the Trial Court erred by not considering each of the allegations of the defendant’s negligence and after accepting that there are issues of fact regarding the defendant's operation of his vehicle which are material and in dispute, the matter must be submitted to a Jury.  CONCLUSION
[brief] [...], Plaintiff/Appellant vs.  [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], JOHN DOE  ADMINISTRATORS AND STAFF 1-10, AND ABC BOARD  MEMBERS  1-10, said names being fictitious, Defendant(s)/Respondents.  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY  APPELLATE  DIVISION  DOCKET NO.: [...]  Civil Action ON APPEAL FROM SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY LAW
[brief] *Id.*  And the lower court’s “factual findings underlying the waiver determination are entitled to deference and are subject to review for clear error. ”  *Cole*, 215 N.J. at 275 (citing *Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Investors Ins. Co. of Am.*, 65 N.J. 474, 483-84 (1974)).  Thus, not only must Appellant overcome the strong preference for arbitration, but Appellant must also overcome deference to the factual findings of the Lower Court the led to the trial court’s holding that Respondents did not waive their contractual right to arbitrate.
[directive] 1.3  Cameras.  cameras ("dash using vehicle-mounted dashboard departments have been Many police procedures in place well-established and reliable  Those departments already have cams") for years.  making preserving recordings, and for video/audio data securely, for downloading electronic for 4 Page prosecutions.  criminal in discovery for available them these in expertise using developed cams have dash deploy jurisdictions in that officers  Police allegations false against themselves to protect and evidence preserve to recording devices electronic be must and important dash is cams with experience longstanding  Our State's misconduct. of enough not is it But procedures. and practices BWC of sound development into the integrated device.
[directive] (3)  Você entende que as restrições sobre onde você poderá morar [Sim/Yes] [Não/No] [Não podem incluir restrições de residir em uma casa com menores? corresponde/NA] no Formulário revisado promulgado pela diretiva 01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 10080-Portuguese página 3 de 7 Revised Form Promulgated by Directive #01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 10080-Portuguese page 3 of 7  Do you understand that the restrictions on where you can live may include restrictions on residing in a home with minor children?
[brief] Respectfully submitted, [...]  ATTORNEY GENERAL OF NEW JERSEY  AMICUS CURIAE BY: [...]  Deputy Attorney General [...]  [...]  ATTORNEY NO. 018272010  DEPUTY  ATTORNEY GENERAL DIVISION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE APPELLATE BUREAU OF COUNSEL AND ON THE BRIEF  DATED: March 7, 2025  March 17, 2025  Honorable Judges of the Superior Court of New Jersey  Appellate Division  [...] [...] [...]  Re: STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent V. [...], Defendant-Appellant SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY, APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. [...]; ON APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION ENTERED BY THE SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY, LAW
[brief] [...] testified at his deposition that [...] came in to see him because he was pleased with his work on a prior matter.  (Pa047).  [...]’s firm entered into the fee agreement with [...], with an upfront retainer of $2,500.  (Da154).  [...] recalled meeting with [...] on September 6, 2017 in his office.  (Pa047).  [...] gave [...] information regarding [...]’s address.  At his deposition, [...] did not create a genuine issue of material fact on whether Rinaldi represented him.  Accordingly, the Trial Court’s Order for Partial Summary Judgment should be affirmed.