ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] (Ia344-345; 012).  As a result, in response to the first question, “Do you hire or rent vehicles during your fair/festival/event,” [...] responded “No” (Id (emphasis added)).  Because he answered “No” to the first part, [...] responded “N/A” to the second part of Question 4 – “[i]f yes, please describe vehicle types, estimated number, duration and usage” (emphasis added) (Id.).  Likewise, [...] provided no response to the third part of Question 4, which asks, “[if yes] to #4, are any of these vehicles 12 or 15-passenger vans?” (emphasis added) (Id.).  If the application were simply worded it would have asked if [...] was going to use 12-15 passenger vans.  Instead, the application asks, “Do you hire or rent vehicles during your fair/festival/event” (Ia012) (emphasis added).  The Questionnaire does not ask about vehicles hired or rented during a summer camp, nor is a definition of “fair/festival/event” provided.  Further, the question refers to vehicles hired or rented during, but not before, a fair/festival/event.  As discussed, [...] had already leased the vans for use in connection with the 2019 Summer Camp prior to submitting the Questionnaire.
[brief] Based upon the foregoing, as well as the arguments set forth in the Board’s opening brief, the Board hereby respectfully requests that: (i) the [...]’s decision be reversed; (ii) a determination be made that the Board did not violate the Act, (iii) the Court find that the plain language of the Act requires an employee organization to designate a reasonable representative for negotiations purposes; and, finally, (iv) the [...] be found to have violated the Act.  Very truly yours, [...]  By:/s/ [...]  [...], Esq.
[brief] LEGAL ARGUMENT ...............................................................................................................21  POINT I ..................................................................................................................................21  THE $2 MILLION REDEVELOPMENT FEE IS LAWFUL UNDER THE LRHL BECAUSE THE CITY WAS STATUTORILY AUTHORIZED TO NEGOTIATE AND COLLECT REVENUE FROM 290  OCEAN AND THE PROVISIONS OF THE MLUL GOVERNING A PLANNING BOARD’S ABILITY TO EXACT OFF-TRACT CONTRIBUTIONS ARE INAPPLICABLE .........................................................21  A.  The Plain Language of the LRHL Authorized the City to Negotiate and Collect the $2 Million Redevelopment Fee  ...........22  B.  The MLUL’s Provisions Which Govern a Planning Board’s Ability to Require Off-Tract Contributions Are Inapplicable to the City’s Statutory Right to Negotiate and Collect the $2 Million Redevelopment Fee  Under the LRHL .........................................................................................................................33  POINT II .........................................................................................................................40  PLAINTIFF’S CONSENT WAS NOT REQUIRED IN ORDER FOR THE CITY TO AMEND THE REDEVELOPMENT PLAN AND ALLOW THE REDEVELOPMENT OF THE 290  OCEAN PROPERTY ..................40  POINT III..........................................................................................................................44  THE CITY’S ADOPTION OF THE AMENDED REDEVELOPMENT PLAN DOES NOT CONSTITUTE IMPERMISSIBLE SPOT ZONING  ......................................................44  CONCLUSION  ....................................................................................................................50
[brief] THE COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING THE REDACTED OUT OF COURT STATEMENTS OF [...] AND [...] TO BE READ TO THE JURY (T4, 151-267; T5, 3-56).  Following a hearing conducted by the trial court in accordance with State v. Gross, 121 N.J. 1, 10 (1990), the out-of-court, inconsistent statements of two witnesses, [...] and [...], were read to the jury as evidence in Defendant’s trial.  In evaluating the admissibility of those hearsay statements, the trial court was guided by New Jersey Rule of Evidence 803(a), which provides as follows:
[brief] It is universally acknowledged that to the extent authorized, municipalities have the right to regulate land through legislation and local zoning ordinances.  Cox and Koenig, *New Jersey Zoning and Land Use Administration*, §1-1, 1-2 (2022 Ed.).  The court in *Hay v. Bd. of Adj. of Borough of Fort Lee*, 37 N.J. Super. 461, 464 (App. Div. 1955) opined “[a] prime purpose of zoning is to bring about the orderly physical development of the community by confining particular uses to defined areas.
[brief] C.  Defendants Had Legitimate, Non-Discriminatory Reasons For Plaintiff’s Non-Renewal  Even if either of the alleged reports could satisfy Plaintiff’s burden of establishing a *prima facie* case of retaliation, her claim fails under the burden shifting framework because Defendants had legitimate, non-retaliatory reasons for not renewing her employment contract.  As detailed above, because Plaintiff’s job performance did not meet Defendants’ legitimate expectations, her contract was not renewed.  Indeed, Plaintiff admitted to the conduct underlying several of Defendants’ legitimate reasons for non-renewal.  Thus, Plaintiff’s retaliation claim was properly dismissed because a factfinder cannot reasonably disbelieve Defendants’ articulated legitimate reasons for her non-renewal or believe that an invidious discriminatory reason was more likely than not a motivating or determinative cause of her non-renewal.
[brief] (Pa1063a – Pa1064a).  On October 9, 2017, [...], the General Manager of [...], sent an email to [...] personnel stating that [...] “was fine this morning” and “he was a lot calmer. ” (Pa1066a).  [...], the stallion and breeding administrator for [...], testified that she received the October 9, 2017 email stating that [...] had been “a lot calmer” that morning, but did not inquire into [...]’s prior behavior when he was not calm.  (Pa293a).  Ms. Petrenko testified that she told [...] about Young’s email stating that [...] had been “a lot calmer”, but he did not direct her to ask what [...]’s behavior was like before behaving calmly.
[directive] New Jersey  New Jersey  Judiciary ft of Office Probation Services - Drug Court Drug Court Application for Promotion to Phase 2  lnde~ ndtnce •lnttsirltt OulllrySHvke Falrness• Track A & Application for Promotion to Phase 2 B:  Date Submitted Name I  City Current Address: Street State Zip Code Email Telephone  The following criteria must be met in order to phase up: if (check box task is completed) of I have been in Phase 1 for a minimum 60 days.  Date entered Phase 1: of of I have a minimum 14 consecutive days sobriety.  Sobriety date: I am engaged in treatment and attending regularly.  Counselor verification signature: of I am following the conditions supervision.  Probation Officer verification signature: of Three  my biggest struggles in Phase : 1  Three accomplishments in Phase 1 :  Three personal goals I would like to accomplish in the next phase:  Date  Client Signature Track A and Application for Promotion to Phase 2 B: by Promulgated Directive #20-21 (08/11/2021), CN 12571a ., NcwJcrscyCoum New Jersey Judiciary ••"·•juun.,•• b of Office Probation Services - Drug Court
[brief] 28 Terranova v. Skyline Restorations, 2023 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1547 (App. Div. September 20, 2023) .................................................. 44, 45 United States v. Seckinger, 397 U.S. 203 (1970) .............................................. 34, 35 Vladichak v. Mt. Creek Ski Resort, Inc., 2022 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 606 (App. Div. April 13, 2022) ........................................... 46, 47, 48, 49 W.H. Indus. v. Fundicao, 397 N.J. Super. 455 (App. Div. 2008) ....................... 28 1266 Apt. Corp. v. New Horizon Deli, 368 N.J. Super. 456 (App. Div. 2004) ............................................................................. 28 Rules R. 2:5-1 .................................................................................................................. 27, 28 R. 2:6-1 .................................................................................................................. 6 R. 2:6-2 .................................................................................................................. 24 R. 2:6-3 .................................................................................................................. 6 R. 2:6-8 .................................................................................................................. 6 R. 2:10-2 ............................................................................................................... 18, 24 R. 4:46-2 ................................................................................................................. 27 Statutes N.J.S.A. 2A:40A-1 ............................................................................................ 16 Other Authorities [...] & [...], Current N.J. Court Rules, (2025)........................................
[brief] The first question is whether the preservation of a historic district that is listed on the National Register of Historic Places “constitutes an important public interest. ”  The answer must be “yes” as the National Register protects historic sites for future generations of the public to enjoy.  The question of whether the ZBA considered the impact of the Addition on the historic aesthetic of the community was not yet ripe.  The second question is whether due process is violated in the context of the Landmark Commission’s independent determinations as to whether new structures are appropriate for historic districts by way of a process (i) without any notification to neighboring properties, (ii) without any form of a meeting—public or otherwise, (iii) without any requirement to publish its determination, and (iv) that may only be challenged by way of filing a prerogative writ under R. 4:69-6 within 45 days of such a determination, as both Counsel for the ZBA and Counsel for Applicants assert on the record.  Of course, the answer must be that due process is violated.  Whether the ZBA has deferred to the Landmark Commission is a question that was not yet ripe.  While this matter falls into two of the “three categories” that were traditionally required for enlargement, the Supreme Court dispensed with this requirement.  Finally, the motion judge conflates the notion of an opportunity to be heard with whether there exists a verbatim record of what the ZBA relied upon in making its determination.  In the instant case, as the Resolution cites evidence and arguments not found in the record, the motion judge simply cannot reach a determination as to whether the Resolution was arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable, and/or unsupported by the evidence in the record.  PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[brief] Plaintiffs are essentially asking this Court to create a new category of ultra-hazardous activity that would make owners and keepers strictly liable whenever their stallion injures another person during breeding operations.  This is against public policy because it would have a chilling effect on the horse breeding industry in this State.  Although the trial court ruled that the Equine Activities Liability Act does not apply in this case, the Legislature has made clear that equine activities, which are defined broadly under the statute, support land conservation and the State’s economy.
[brief] PRELIMINARY STATEMENT .........................................................................................  1  PROCEDURAL HISTORY ..............................................................................................  3 STATEMENT OF FACTS  ...............................................................................................  4 LEGAL ARGUMENT  .....................................................................................................  10 POINT I  THE POLICE PROLONGED THE DETENTION AND REQUESTED CONSENT TO SEARCH WITHOUT REASONABLE SUSPICION, REQUIRING SUPPRESSION.  (2T 13-12 to 20)  ..........................................................  10 POINT II  BECAUSE [...]’ CONFESSON WAS INVOLUNTARY, BOTH THE CONFESSON AND THE DERIVATIVE EVIDENCE SHOULD BE SUPPRESSED.  (2T 14-15 to 17; Da)  .........................................................  22 POINT III  SUPPRESSION OF [...]’ RESPONSES TO [...]’S QUESTIONS IS REQUIRED BECAUSE [...] WAS IN CUSTODY WHEN THE POLICE QUESTIONED HIM WITHOUT FIRST ADVISING HIM OF HIS RIGHTS.  (1T 195-1 to 8; 2T 12-7 to 14-18)  ...........................................................................................................  27  A. Edwards Was in Custody When the Police Told Him that They Would Get Drug Dogs Unless He Consented to a Search or Confessed and Therefore the Police Were Required to Advise Him of His Rights ...........................................................................................................  29  TABLE OF CONTENTS
[brief] (Pa24 to Pa25).  In order to satisfy the second prong of a *prima facie* case under CEPA, Plaintiff must also show that “he disclosed, threatened to disclose, objected to or refused to participate in [the] activity, policy or practice that [he] reasonably believed was illegal or contrary to public policy. ”  *Matthews v. N.J. Inst. of Tech.*, 772 F. Supp. 2d 647, 655 (D.N.J. 2011)(citing *N.J.S.A.* § 34:19-3).  That is, the Plaintiff must be able to demonstrate that he took some action to expose, object to or refuse to participate in the employer’s allegedly improper conduct.  In the case at bar, the Trial Court properly held that Plaintiff could not establish this element of a *prima facie* case as a matter of law since there was absolutely no evidence of any such protected conduct.
[brief] [...], Esq.  Co-counsel for Plaintiff-Appellant  Dated: August 23, 2023  [...] (02334-1992)  [...] (01388-2006)  [...] [...]  Telephone: [...] [...]; [...]  [...] (Admitted Pro Hac Vice)  [...]  2929 North Central Avenue, Suite 1900  Phoenix, Arizona 85012-2721  Telephone: [...]  [...]  [...] (03466-1982)  [...]  [...]  Telephone: [...]  [...]  Attorneys for Respondent, [...]  [...], Individually and as Administrator of the Estate of [...], M.D., deceased, Plaintiff/Appellant, v. [...], AMERICAN HONDA MOTOR CO., INC., [...] AND [...], as Administrator of the Estate of [...], deceased Defendants/Respondents.
[brief] .........................23  A.  The Summary Judgment Standard (Pa27-Pa28) .......................23  B.  The Indisputable Material Facts Warranted  A Summary Judgment in Favor of the Defendants as to the Parties’ Quiet Title Claims on Constitutional and Equitable Grounds (Pa27-Pa28) ......................27  C.  Summary Judgment Was Properly Denied as to the Plaintiff’s Claim for Tortious Interference (Pa27-Pa28)
[brief] There, this Court merely held that “[a]lthough the rules do not specifically state that a proposed corporate deponent must be under the control of the corporate party in order to require the deponent's presence, such control must exist before a party can be compelled to produce a deponent. ”  D’Agostino, 242 N.J. Super. at 273 (emphasis added).  This Court therefore continued that, given the language in Rule 4:14-2(c) that an organization named in a notice of deposition “shall designate one or more officers, directors, or managing agents, or other persons who consent to testify on its behalf,” (see R. 4:14-2(c)), “the factor of control by a corporate party over its officers, directors and managing agents is implicit within the rule. ”  D'Agostino, 242 N.J. Super. at 273.  This latter statement in D’Agostino merely reinforces that a corporation can only be compelled to produce an officer, director or other person over whom it has control or another individual that consents to testify on its behalf.  R. 4:14-2(c).  D’Agostino did not hold, and Plaintiff has never cited any case from this Court holding, that a corporation always has control over all of its officers, directors or managing agents, as Plaintiff claims.
[brief] Pa1378.  [...] testified, "He was smart.  He - - he 'd been doing it for over 20 years.  He was very - - very conscious of things around him.  He took care of his guys.  He was a - - he was a really good guy to work for.  If you didn't know something or something was unsafe he'd be the first one to say it.  And he wasn't afraid to say stuff to the bosses."  Pa1403.  [...], owner of [...], stated that he worked with [...] on, “a ton of mill and pave jobs,” and, “he is one of the better guys in the industry that we knew of.  And, you know, Mike was always the guy that, if there was an issue, Mike would put an end to it immediately."  Pa1639.  Even [...] testified that [...]’s safety awareness on the job was “excellent. ”  Pa1472.
[directive] a.  Total of 50 rounds per participant.  b.  Magazine capacity and mode of fire (semi-automatic or full automatic) will be given on command at each firing stage.  While using the full automatic mode, short bursts consistent with the cyclic rate of the weapon should be used.  c.  To achieve a passing score of 80%, the participant must place a minimum of 40 shots within the border of the Q-target silhouette.  d.  Firing position: Standing shoulder position.  Hip shooting is prohibited.
[brief] [...] asserts that [...] failed to establish adequate proofs for the Board to approve the Applicant’s preliminary and final major subdivision application.  Pb9.  Further, [...] alleges that, even if the Applicant presented adequate proofs, [...] was forbidden from presenting its own testimony or cross-examine witnesses on the Applicant’s submissions.  Ibid.  The trial court specifically found that the Board did not act arbitrarily, capriciously, or unlawfully when it approved preliminary and final major subdivision.
[brief] It is, therefore, liberally construed in favor of the consumer.  Romero, supra, citing Cox v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 138 N.J. 2, 15 (1994).  To make a prima facie claim under the CFA, a plaintiff must establish three elements: “(1) unlawful conduct by defendant; (2) an ascertainable loss by plaintiff; and (3) a causal relationship between the unlawful conduct and the ascertainable loss.
[brief] 12T109:2-8.  What Respondent fails to disclose in her opposition is her acknowledgment at trial that it was possible that she was dreaming and something was going on in her dream where she undressed herself.  (12T109:7 to 108:23).  Respondent testified that next morning, her boyfriend drove her to school and when she returned home, she told Decedent about the incident².  (11T72:2-8).  --- ²  Decedent was not home when the alleged incident took place, and yet, Respondent’s counsel asked [...] what Decedent told her about the  In her attempt to tie Petitioner to the incident, Respondent testified at her deposition that after that incident, she felt uncomfortable around Petitioner.  (12T111:9-13).  At trial, Respondent changed position.  Respondent testified that after she told the Decedent about the incident, Petitioner moved out of the house and did not return for years, until she graduated high school.
[directive] [...], Acting Director, Division of Law  [...], Chief Administrator, N.J. Motor Vehicle Commission  [...], J.A.D., Administrative Director of the Courts  [...], Chief of Staff, Division of Criminal Justice  AAG [...], Chief, Prosecutors Supervision & Coordination Bureau, Division of Criminal Justice  DAG [...], Prosecutors Supervision & Coordination Bureau, Division of Criminal Justice  DAG [...], Prosecutors Supervision & Coordination Bureau, Division of Criminal Justice DAG [...], Corrections & State Police Section, Division of Law
[brief] THE DECISION BELOW WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE AND SHOULD THEREFORE BE REVERSED.  (Not Raised Below).  The substantial evidence presented does not support the final agency determination made by the [...].  Substantial evidence has been defined alternately as "such evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion," and "evidence furnishing a reasonable basis for the agency's action."  Figueroa v. N.J. Dep't of Corr., 414 N.J. Super. 186, 192 (App. Div. 2010) (citations omitted).  The Board’s determination references a “presumption” that mail properly addressed with proper postage was received by the party it was addressed to.  However, [...] certified in an affidavit provided to the Board that he never received a postcard from the Division, regardless of if it was ever sent.  This affidavit should overcome any presumption that the postcard was received.  The Board’s decision failed to consider the almost one hundred affidavits of other active and retired troopers who also did not receive a postcard from the Division notifying them of the Ricci Act that were submitted to the Board in support of [...]’s appeal.  As such, the finding that it was “undisputed” that the Division sent the postcard to [...] (and others) is not supported by the facts and evidence presented.  Furthermore, any presumption claimed by the Board has clearly been rebutted by the overwhelming evidence presented in this matter.  Considering the evidence presented, the agency’s action does not have a reasonable basis.  Additionally, the Board failed to consider the evidence presented demonstrating that Registrations Forms submitted were not accepted by the Division because the Trooper(s) who submitted them were not sick at the time the Registration Form was sent.  [...] attempted to file an Eligibility Registration Form back in September of 2019.  [...] was denied the ability to register because he was told the Ricci Bill “is for those who are currently sick.  Not for possible future illnesses. ”  Pa115.  The Board also failed to consider the evidence presented regarding the [...] membership polling.  [...], President of the [...], polled his membership to ascertain whether anyone received notice of the Ricci Act.  Of the fifty-nine (59) [...] members (retired troopers) who responded to the polling, fifty-seven (57) did not receive any notice of the Ricci Act.  The Board ignored the evidence from this polling when making its determination.  In light of all of the evidence presented on [...]’s behalf, a reasonable mind could only conclude that these postcards were never received.  Without proper notice, [...] should have been permitted to register for the Ricci Act.  Therefore, the determination below should be reversed because it is against the substantial weight of the evidence.
[brief] A review of the above cited cases illustrates the Trial Courts error.  In [...], supra, a debtor of the Plaintiff [...] assigned to [...] its cause of action its cause of action for attorney malpractice.  [...] then brought that action in Alcam own name and was represented by counsel that represented [...] not Magek.  Magek retained no control of the legal malpractice action nor interest in it -it was entirely assigned to [...].  In *Conopco*, *supra*, [...] assigned its professional negligence claims against [...] to [...] parent corporation of [...]  [...] brought Faberge’s professional malpractice claims in its own name.  Faberge is not listed on the caption and was not represented by any attorney in the action.  In *[...]*, *supra*, the [...] settled with certain oil company Defendants and as part of said settlement [...] designated the oil company Defendants as its subrogees and assigned to the oil company Defendants all of its legal rights against all parties potentially responsible for the contamination at issue.  Under the terms of the agreement, the oil company Defendants were authorized to file a substitution of attorney for [...], thereby replacing [...]’s attorney with their own.  The assignment agreement provided that while the litigation would proceed in the name of [...] **all** of the proceeds of any judgement would be going to the oil companies who would represent [...] in the matter, see *Village of [...]*, *supra* 289 N.J. Super. at 187.  While *[...]* and *Conopco* involves cases in which the assignee brought the litigation in their own name, in the *[...]* case it was apparent that the oil company Defendants were the real parties in interest and entirely controlled the litigation even though it was still being brought in [...]’s name.