ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] THE DEP FAILED TO MAKE AN ADEQUATE WATER QUALITY MANAGEMENT PLAN  CONSISTENCY DETERMINATION (Aa001)  The DEP failed to make an adequate “Consistency Assessment” in violation of the Water Quality Planning Act and Water Quality Management Planning Rules, because it failed to make any findings regarding pollutant limitations and other requirements of the areawide water quality management plans applicable to the waterways into which the project will directly dump stormwater.
[brief] The Contracts included several representations, including, but not limited to, the following:\(^1\)  1)  Plaintiff sells to [...] proceeds the “PI Claim (Da128; Da196) and UIM Claim.  (Da209)  2)  Plaintiff may cancel the [...] Contracts within seven (7) business days of receiving the funding; (Da129; Da210)  3) if the Claim fails, no money is owed to [...]; (Da129; Da210)  4) these are contingent, non-recourse transactions; (Da129; Da210)  5)  Payment to [...] is limited to the net proceeds; (Da129; Da210)  6) Plaintiff represents that Plaintiff has not filed and does not anticipate filing for Bankruptcy Protection; (Da130; Da211)  7)  Information provided to [...] is true and accurate; (Da130; Da211)  8)  If any part of the Agreement is deemed invalid or unenforceable, all remaining provisions shall be unaffected; (Da130; Da211) --- \(^1\)  The 2016 and 2019 Contracts contain all of the clauses referenced herein.  The 2018 Contract contains the financial terms but refers to the 2016 Contract for the other substantive representations.  9)  “If a binding judicial authority rules this Agreement constitutes a loan of money, then the interest rate being charged for this transaction shall be equal to the maximum interest rate allowed by law”; (Da130; Da211)  10)  “Your [Plaintiff] attorney has explained to you your rights and obligations under this Agreement and has answered any questions you may have had concerning any particular provisions.  Your attorney has also emphasized that this type of transaction can be expensive and therefore should be entered into only out of necessity; (Da130; Da211)  11)  There is a warning in bold faced, all capital letters, which states, in part, that the client should read the contract completely before signing and should obtain the advice of an attorney.  (Da130; Da211)  12)  The Contracts contain Attorney Acknowledgements wherein the attorney agrees to pay [...] upon recovery of proceeds.  (Da131; Da212)  C.
[brief] POINT II  THE TRIAL COURT’S OBJECTIONS TO THE MAYOR’S COMMENTS WAS AN IMPROPER BASIS FOR THE APPOINTMENT OF A SPECIAL HEARING OFFICER.  (M38-51; M477-513).  On the issue of the validity of the trial court’s determination that the Mayor’s comments improperly tainted the Zoning Board’s decision making process, Respondents’ offer nothing more than recitals to the trial court’s opinion.  The problem, is that the opinion itself lacks any foundational basis for its conclusion.  The comments from the Mayor that drew the ire of the trial court are as follows:  “I’ve not been pleased with this proposal since its inception; it is yet another way in which developers use state affordable housing mandates to force more development into towns,” said [...], noting the proposal would include 42 court-mandated affordable units.  “And now, the developer is still trying to squeeze as much development as possible onto this site, even with a bald eagle nesting ground.  To me, this is absolutely unacceptable. ”  “The developer could have easily reduced the amount of housing units to lower the density and create an appropriate buffer to protect the bald eagle,” the mayor said, “but instead, the plan calls for building rental apartments, some of which will be on top of reduced retail space right on Route 33.
[brief] [...]  A/K/A : [...], : Sat Below: Defendant-Appellant.  : Hon. [...], J.S.C.  DEFENDANT IS CONFINED  Your Honors: This letter is submitted in lieu of a formal brief pursuant to R. 2:6-2(b).  #  TABLE OF CONTENTS | SECTION | PAGE NOS. | |----------------------------------------------|-----------| | PROCEDURAL HISTORY | 1 | | STATEMENT OF FACTS | | | Suppression Hearing | 3 | | The Court’s Ruling | 6 | | Guilty Plea | 7 | | LEGAL ARGUMENT | 8 | | POINT I | | | THE COURT ERRED IN FAILNG TO SUPPRESS THE EVIDENCE BECAUSE [...] WAS FRISKED ABSENT REASONABLE SUSPICION HE HAD A WEAPON.
[brief] There’s no way.  The -- the blood, an amount of blood, did not jive with what would have happened with a jugular vein injury.  That’s what he said.  [(8T 30-10 to 21)  (emphasis added)]  The State referred again to [...]’s testimony, arguing that he said “hey, there isn’t blood everywhere, right.  There was not.  There was blood there, but not a lot in the scheme of things, correct?”  (8T 32-20 to 23)  In essence, the State argued that the jury should discredit [...]’s testimony that she stabbed [...] in the neck in self-defense as he was raping her because, if she were telling the truth, there would be more blood inside the car.  The jury easily could have relied on Dr.  Uribe’s opinion as a highly qualified forensic pathologist that the evidence did not support [...]’s defense.  The serious risk that the jury did just that, particularly in light of the State’s closing arguments, was harmful error that deprived [...] of her rights to due process and a fair trial.
[directive] Severability.  B.  The provisions of this Directive shall be severable.  If any phrase, clause, sentence, or provision of this Directive is declared by a court of competent jurisdiction to be invalid, the validity of the remainder of the document shall not be affected.  C.  Any questions concerning the interpretation or implementation of this Directive Questions. shall be addressed to Assistant Attorney General [...], Senior Counsel to the Attorney General.  D.  This Directive shall take effect immediately and remain in force and effect  Effective date. unless and until it is repealed, amended, or superseded by Order of the Attorney General.
[brief] On November 10, 2022, the [...] filed a letter objection to the Boundary Commissioners’ Report, indicating they sought to set the Report aside as provided for in N.J.S.A. 2A:28-3.  (Pa91).  The objection requested the Court schedule a conference setting a trial date and addressing any pretrial issues and also included a brief description of the [...]’ concerns related to the Report and its conclusions.
[brief] This, however, was a reversible error of law.  First, both the lower court and Respondent seem to argue that the “contract” at issue is the SA (Rb20; Pa43), not the material terms of the settlement memorialized on the record.  This is absurd.  Rather, the issue before this Court, and before the lower court, as clearly delineated by counsel on the record below and in Appellant’s Notice of Appeal and initial brief on appeal, is whether the settlement contract as memorialized on the record was enforceable.  For the reasons set forth in Appellant’s initial brief, it is beyond dispute that as a matter of law, the settlement contract memorialized on the record is enforceable and should be enforced, thereby warranting reversal of the lower court’s decision.
[brief] **A.  The Court Failed To Instruct On The Second Element Of Robbery And Failed To Explain The Distinction Between First- And Second-Degree Robbery.**  In instructing the jury on the elements of robbery, the court made two fatal errors.  First, the instructions entirely failed to explain the second element of robbery: that the defendant “threaten[ed] another or purposely put[] him in fear of immediate bodily injury. ”  N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1a(2).  Second, the instructions failed to identify the element that distinguishes first- and second-degree robbery, which in this case was whether the defendant “threaten[ed] the immediate use of a deadly weapon. ”  N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1b.  Without an instruction on an essential element of the offense, the jury’s verdict cannot stand.  Vick, 117 N.J. at 292-93.  In light of these omissions in the final jury instructions, a new trial is required.
[brief] TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS  Page  APPELLATE COURT’S OPINION IN THE MATTER OF [...], DECEASED DECIDED JULY 8, 2022 ........................................Pa000065  ORDER DATED MAY 26, 2023 FOR DENIAL OF PARTIAL SUMMARY  JUDGMENT ..................................................................................Pa000351  ORDER DATED MAY 17, 2023  GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT  ..................................................................................Pa000337  ### TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | Case | Page(s) | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|---------| | **Cases** | | | **700 Highway 33 LLC v. Pollio,** | 25 | | 421 N.J. Super. 231, 236 (App. Div. 2011) | | | **Abtrax Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Elkins – Sinn, Inc.,** | 20,21 | | 139 N.J. 499, 514(1995) | | | **Alpha Beauty v. Winn-Dixie Stores,** | 25 | | 425 N.J. Super. 94 (App. Div. 2012) | | | **Circle Chevrolet Co. v. Giordano, Halleran & Ciesla, P.C.,** | 18 | | 142 N.J. 280 (1995) | | | **Continental Can Co. v. Hudson Foam Latex Prod. Inc.,** | 30 | | 129 N.J. Super 426,430,324 A.2d 60 (App. Div. 1974) | | | **Dimitrakopoulos v. Borrus, Goldin, Foley, Vignuolo, Hyman & Stahl, P.C.,** | 23 | | 237 N.J. 91, 108, 203 A.3d 133, 143 (2019) | | | **Donohue v. Kuhn,** | 18 | | 150 N.J. 484(1997) | | | **Escalante v. Township of Cinnaminson,** | 22 | | 283 N.J. Super. 244, 253, 661 A.2d 837(App. Div. 1995) | | | **Galik v. Clara Maass Med. Ctr.,** | 25 | | 167 N.J. 341, 356 (2001) | | | **Gelber v. Zito Partnership,** | 19 | | 147 N.J. 561, 565 (1997) | | | **Highlands Lakes Country Club & Cmty. Ass’n v. Nicastro,** | 16 | | 201 N.J. 123(2009) | | | **Hobart Bros. v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co.,** | 24 | | 354 N.J. Super. 229, (App. Div. 2002) | | | **In re Estate of Munger,** | 14 | | 63 N.J. 514, 512 (1973) | | | Cases | Page(s) | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|---------| | **In re Tanelli,** | 16, 29 | | 194 N.J. Super. 492, 497 (App Div.1984), .................................. | | **Karpovich v. Barbarula,** | 18 | | 150 N.J. 473, 476(1997) ..................................................................... | | **Kent Motor Cars, Inc. v. Reynolds and Reynolds, Co.,** | 25 | | 207 N.J. 428, 453–54 (2011) .......................................................... | | **Kleinke v. Ocean City,** | 22 | | 147 N.J. Super. 575,581, 371 A.2d 785 (App. Div. 1977) .................... | | **Lamb v. Global Landfill Reclaiming,** | 23 | | 111 N.J. 134, 152, 543 A.2d 443 (1988) ......................................... | | **Mayfield v. Cmty. Med. Assocs., P.A.,** | 25 | | 335 N.J. Super. 198, 207 (App. Div. 2000) ................................... | | **Mitchell v. Charles P. Procini, D.D.S., P.A.,** | 23, 24 | | 331 N.J. Super. 445, (App. Div. 2000)
[brief] ’”  \textit{Romero v. Gold Star Distribution, LLC}, 468 N.J. Super. 274, 300 (App. Div. 2021) (quoting \textit{Garza v. Paone}, 44 N.J. Super. 553, 557 (App. Div. 1957)); see also \textit{Berger, supra}, 244 N.J. Super. at 205 (citing \textit{Peralta v. Heights Med. Ctr., Inc.}, 485 U.S. 80, 85 (1988)) (“It is clear that a court cannot exercise its power to the detriment of a litigant when \textit{in personam} jurisdiction has not been established, and that such action would violate the Due Process Clause. ”).  Here, the trial court \(^1\)  Initially, the trial court determined that the plenary hearing was to be on the issues of [...]’s address at the time of alleged service, laches, and whether [...]’s lack of licensure was a good-faith error; however, during the plenary hearing, [...] conceded that it was not licensed and did not bring a witness to testify as to the good-faith error defense.  Thus, the trial court proceeded with the hearing as to the issues of laches and [...]’s address, having found no good-faith error by [...] (T1 50:20-51:6; 59:11-24; T2 3:20-8:13).  effectively provided a post facto cure for [...]’s defective service of process despite [...] not living at the service address for several years.
[brief] Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 7–9, 119 S.Ct. 1827, 1833, 144 L. Ed.2d 35, 45–46 (1999); Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 49–50, 104 S.Ct. 2210, 2217, 81 L. Ed.2d 31, 40–41 (1984).  That being said, the right to a public trial is not absolute.
[brief] In pertinent part, Section 39 provides that “[i]f . . .  [[...]] . . . receive[s] a bona fide offer from a third party . . . to purchase . . . the Premises, [[...]] shall, before accepting said Offer, promptly send a copy of the Offer to [[...]] which shall have the preemptive right to purchase . . . the Premises on the same terms and conditions as set forth in the Offer. ”  Da038.  Tellingly, [...]’s own attorney (who had purportedly advised the [...] Defendants when they originally signed the MFSA, per [...]’s testimony) was not even aware of the existence of the ROFR until [...] pointed out the exact language of the MFSA on March 27, 2023. \(^5\)  What is clear from the undisputed facts is that [...] agreed to be bound by the terms of the ROFR in the MFSA and had to comply with the written requirements, even if it fundamentally misunderstood or is willfully ignorant of what those terms are.  The terms of the ROFR are clear and unambiguous.  Nor is there a dispute that the ROFR was valid and binding upon the [...] Defendants, or that any time [...] changed the terms and conditions of the PSA, that change renewed [...]’s 30-day period to exercise its ROFR.  \(^5\)  As to [...]’s insistence that [...] was provided with the MFSA prior to signing the PSA, this fact is not reflected in the record and remains merely a bald allegation.  [...]’s attorney was clear that [...] was not informed about the ROFR in private correspondence with [...]’s counsel, which was provided in discovery and made part of the record below.  [...] was provided with Amended PSAs on May 2, 2023 and again on May 8, 2023, each triggering new 30-day periods for consideration of the ROFR.  Whether [...] presented [...] with a copy of the unsigned PSA on January 17, 2023 is thus wholly irrelevant to the Trial Court’s decision and cannot form the basis of any meritorious appeal.  B.
[brief] I.  Plaintiff’s Failure to Comply With the Affidavit of Merit Statute Does Not Go to the Heart of the Matter and Dismissal of Plaintiff’s Complaint on That Basis Is an Unjust Result.  There are two distinct classes of cases arising out of N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-27.  Ferreira v. Rancocas Orthopedic Associates, 178 N.J. 144, 157 (2003) (Long, J., concurring and dissenting).  The first class of cases involves cases in which a Plaintiff is unable to provide an affidavit at all.  Id.  In that class of cases, the omission should be considered substantive, resulting in a dismal with prejudice on the merits.  Id.  However, the more common class of cases does not involve the inability of a Plaintiff to produce an affidavit of merit at all, but rather “procedural slip-ups in filing or service or out of curable technical deficiencies. ”  Id.  “Such defects do not go to the heart of the cause of action.  Indeed, because they do not reflect negatively on the merits of a plaintiff’s malpractice claim…”  Id.  Accordingly, [...]’s mandatory dismissal with prejudice rule should be limited to those cases in which a plaintiff cannot or will not produce an affidavit of merit at all.  Concomitantly, trial judges should have available to them a full panoply of discretionary remedies for procedural deficiencies in complying with the Affidavit of Merit Statute, including dismissal with or without prejudice and discovery-type sanctions such as reasonable expenses incurred in obtaining the affidavit along with counsel fees.
[brief] Rule 4:38-2 permits the court to order separate trials for the convenience of the parties or "to combat prejudice."  Defendants often request bifurcation of the liability and damages portions of personal injury cases in order to avoid sympathy that jurors may feel towards plaintiffs with severe injuries.  *Diodato v. Rogers*, 321 N.J.Super. 326 (N.J. Super. 1998), citing *Lis v. Robert Packer Hospital*, 579 F.2d 819, 824 (3rd Cir.1978).
[directive] SUBJECT: Directive  Modifying Requirements of Mandatory Random Law Enforcement Drug Testing Program in Response to COVID-19 Pandemic  In March 2020, at the height of the COVID-19 pandemic response, I issued Attorney General Law Enforcement Directive (“AG Directive”) No. 2020-2, which sought to ease the administrative burden on New Jersey’s law enforcement agencies by suspending or delaying certain statewide reporting, training, and certification deadlines.  At the time, I declined to modify any requirements relating to New Jersey’s mandatory random drug testing program, but indicated that I would revisit the issue if circumstances required.  Based on recent developments, I have concluded that it is necessary to temporarily adjust some of the program’s requirements.  The state’s mandatory random drug testing program is governed by AG Directive 2018-2, which I issued in March 2018, and the Attorney General’s Law Enforcement Drug Testing Policy (“AG Drug Testing Policy”), which was most recently revised in April 2018.
[brief] The Board offers no analysis at all nor can it as to how this provision does not apply to [...].  Additionally, given this aforementioned subsection in the NJAC, the Board’s insistence that the settlement agreement involving language of a minor technical dismissed internal affairs (“IA”) charge disqualified [...]’s application and refused to accept its filing was not only factually unsupportable in the record; it was not even applicable to our case since the IA charge arose from the incident where the disability arose from.  The Board clearly erred and its decision resulted in an arbitrary and capricious ruling that must be reversed by this Court, respectfully.
[brief] See ibid.; N.J.S.A. 2C:29-1(a); N.J.S.A. 2C:29-2(a)(2).  Our obstruction and resisting arrest statutes are designed to discourage a suspect’s flight, because flight provokes altercations between suspects and police officers, to the endangerment of both groups as well as the public.  See State v. Crawley, 187 N.J. 440, 451 (2006).  In this case, defendants fled across a well-trafficked city street, an act that was dangerous not only for the fleeing suspects, but for the officers in pursuit and for any drivers and pedestrians in that location, given the possibility that a driver could lose control of a car while trying to evade fleeing suspects or pursuing police officers.  Defendant was not permitted under our law to flee rather than submit to the authority of law enforcement.  Even defendants who believe the stop is unlawful cannot seek their remedy on the street.
[brief] Plaintiff’s Opposition does not deny that her experts offer no independent general-causation opinions and are unqualified to do so.  The Opposition also makes clear Plaintiff has no admissible evidence a 300-micron silicone particulate is capable of causing eye inflammation, a retinal detachment, and vision loss.  For starters, Plaintiff has no evidence this medical-grade silicone is capable of causing eye inflammation.  Plaintiff’s Opposition ignores the only scientific study in the record—the rabbit toxicity study—that established the Ozurdex® silicone is inert and incapable of causing the inflammation Plaintiff claims.  (Da0304)  Plaintiff and her experts cite no contrary study or treatise.  Nor does Plaintiff deny that doctors regularly use silicone to treat eye conditions because it is inert.  (Da0047, pp. 54-55)  This means, even if Plaintiff could prove that the Ozurdex® unit at issue generated a silicone particulate (she cannot), she still has no ability to prove that a silicone particulate is capable of causing her injuries.  As with every other element of proof, Plaintiff and her experts just assume general causation based solely on the recall and misconstruing a recall document.  But the recall is not proof of general causation.
[brief] The trial court Opinion erroneously conflates substantive public engagement for improper influence on a development application.  The trial court focuses on the number of residents at the hearing and the seventeen (17) residents who spoke in opposition to the application as if either were evidence of anything untoward.  M40.  The October 15, 2020, Opinion states, “[i]t is clear that the Mayor had, as Plaintiffs’ counsel argued, successfully “ginned-up” opposition to ensure that in the face of that agitated crowd [Zoning] Board Members acceded to issuing the overtly suggested, if not dictated, denial. ”  M40.  Such a characterization suggests that undue influence can be proved solely by the presence and comment of public opposition.  Ironically, the trial court noted in its opinion that, “[…]the hearing itself was conducted in a professional and orderly fashion (thanks to the skilled stewardship exhibited by the [Zoning] Board’s counsel[…],” and even notes that those same “agitated” members of the public, “politely complimented the Applicant and its testifying professionals, lamenting with them over the unexpected dilemma the developer faced […].”  M41.  Allowing the trial court’s October 15, 2020 to stand will set a disturbing precedent that will no doubt be used by developers or other interested parties throughout the State to stymie public engagement and participation in matters of public importance such as land use applications.
[brief] 30.  Letter from Appellants to [...], dated February 24, 2023, attaching a.  Brief in Support of Summary Decision, filed by Appellants on February 24, 2023, b.  Exhibit A: Commission’s Decision on Motion to Dismiss a School Ethics Act Complaint Against [...], [...], dated July 26, 2022; c.  Exhibit B: Decision on Interlocutory Review, decided by the Commissioner of Education on September 6, 2022; d. Exhibit C: District Policy 1648.14; e. Exhibit D: Facebook Posts from [...], dated January 14 (year unknown); November 15, 2022; December 7, 2021; and several undated posts; f. Exhibit E: [...] Resolution, dated March 17, 2022; Board Policy No. 0179: Board Social Media Policy for Board Members; Meeting Minutes of the [...] for the March 17, 2022 meeting; Meeting Minutes of the [...] for the April 28, 2022 meeting; “Central School Board OKs Social Media Policy After Racist Posts,” Patch.com, April 29, 2022; g.  Exhibit F: Instagram Post by “[...]” (undated); h.  Exhibit G: Unfair Practice Charge, filed with the Public Employment Relations Commission, dated April 21, 2022; Addendum to Unfair Practice Charge; Facebook Post from [...] (undated); Letter from [...], Esq., and [...], Esq. to [...], Esq., dated January 27, 2022; i. Exhibit H: Appellants’ Interrogatories, Requests for the Production of Documents, and Requests for Admission to Appellee; Appellee’s Responses to Appellants’ Interrogatories, Requests for the Production of Documents, and Requests for Admission to Appellee, dated December 12, 2022 and January 10 and 19, 2023; j.  Exhibit I: Meeting Minutes of the [...] for the August 20, 2021 meeting; Meeting Minutes of the [...] for the September 16, 2021 meeting; k. Certification of Service, dated February 24, 2023.