ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] ”  395 N.J. Super. at 161 (citing Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Land, 186 N.J. 163, 173-74 (2006)).  Respectfully, the Court’s parting but sweeping statement about the arbitrability of an IFPA claim under the No-Fault Law was incorrect.  See Mount Prospect Chiropractic Ctr., __F.4th at __, 2024 WL 1819645, at *2.  And, regardless, in the following paragraph, the panel acknowledged that parties could agree to arbitrate an IFPA claim, undermining [...]’s general proposition that IFPA claims can never be arbitrated.  Fiouris, 395 N.J. Super. at 161.  As the [...] observed above, the New Jersey Supreme Court (other courts too) has held that several statutes with identical language are subject to arbitration.  See supra.  Further confirming that IFPA and RICO claims are not exempt from arbitration under the No-Fault Law, the judicial forum provisions of both the IFPA and RICO are expressed permissively, not mandatorily.
[brief] For the reasons in Points I-IV, this Court should reverse Defendant’s convictions and remand for a new trial.  If this Court affirms the conviction, this Court should reverse the amount of restitution and probation supervision fee and remand for reconsideration in accordance with Point V.  Respectfully Submitted, [...]  Public Defender Attorney for Defendant  By: ___________________________  [...]  Ass’t Deputy Public Defender ID No. 084402013  DATED: October 6, 2023  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY  APPELLATE  DIVISION DOCKET NO. [...]  INDICTMENT NO. [...]  CASE NO. [...]  STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. [...], Defendant-Appellant.
[brief] I.  The New Jersey Supreme Court has declared that "[o]ther crimes evidence is considered highly prejudicial."  State v. Vallejo, 198 N.J. 122, 133 (2009) (citing State v. Stevens, 115 N.J. 289, 309 (1989)).  While evidence of past crimes or wrongs may be relevant, such evidence  A challenge to a suppression denial is, however, preserved by the express terms of R. 3:5-7(d).
[brief] ####  Cases - **Balducci v. Cige**, 240 N.J. 574 (2020) .................................................................  5 - **Correa v. Grossi**, 458 N.J. Super. 571 (App. Div. 2019) ...........................................  14 - **DiProspero v. Penn**, 183 N.J. 477 (2005) ..................................................................  13 - **Fuhrman v. Mailander**, 466 N.J. Super. 572 (App. Div. 2021) ..................................... 8 - **Fuster v. Twp. of Chatham**, 259 N.J. 533 (2025) ....................................................... 13 - **Gnall v. Gnall**, 222 N.J. 414 (2015) .............................................................................. - **Hudson Cty. v. State House Com.**, 130 N.J.L. 90 (1943) ............................................ 12 - **In Matter of General Election Held in Tp. of Monroe, Gloucester County, N.J. on Tuesday, Nov. 6, 1990**, 245 N.J. Super. 70 (App. Div. 1990) .................................................................................................................. 17 - **In re Courtine**, No. A-3712-06T3, 2008 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2433 (App. Div. Mar. 18, 2008) .................................................................................................................. - **In re Krise**, 276 N.J. Super. 337 (App. Div. 1994) ....................................................... 14 - **In re Ocean County Com’r of Registration for a Recheck of the Voting Machines**, 379 N.J. Super. 461 (App. Div. 2005) .................................................................
[brief] In a case recently decided by the New Jersey Supreme Court, [...] reiterated the importance of a Ferreira Conference, “the conference is designed to identify and resolve issues regarding the AOM that has been served or is to be served.  Failing to hold such a conference in this case gave rise to issues that could have been resolved.”  Moschella v. Hackensack Meridian Jersey Shore Univ. Med. Ctr., No. A-7-23, at *26 (N.J. Jul. 11, 2024).  (citing Meehan v. Antonellis, 226 N.J. 216, 241 (2016)).  Similarly, if Defendants had complied with Plaintiff’s Discovery Requests, Plaintiff would have been able to submit a timely and sufficient Affidavit of Merit.  Also, if the Trial Court had held the Ferreira Conference that it is mandated to, Defendants would have been instructed to send their records to Plaintiff, so that Plaintiff could comply with her duty under the Affidavit of Merit statute.  Alas, Defendants chose to eschew their discovery responsibilities, preventing Plaintiff from being able to submit a timely and sufficient affidavit of merit, the Court failed to hold a Ferreira Conference—and even more egregious—the Trial Court chose to impose the draconian punishment of dismissing Plaintiff’s Complaint without even considering the prejudice, or lack thereof, that Defendants had suffered.  Now, in this appeal, Plaintiff must fight for her right to have her day in court, a right that is supposedly among the most important rights in the eyes of New Jersey’s courts.
[brief] See also Asmad-Escobar v. Phoenix Fin. Servs. LLC, 2024 WL 2839329, at *3 (App. Div. June 5, 2024); Mhrez v. Convergent Outsourcing, Inc., 2024 WL 2838327 (App. Div. June 5, 2024).  In sum, Appellant’s theory that §§ 1692c(b) prohibits transmitting data to a letter vendor is an exercise in “uncritical literalism” that falls apart under --- 5  While numerous courts throughout New Jersey have found comparable letter vendor allegations to be untenable to state a claim as a matter of FDCPA and related law, Respondent’s counsel is aware of only a single New Jersey court which has upheld a letter vendor theory of liability.
[brief] The model charge warns, “You may consider whether the witness was exposed to opinions, descriptions, or identifications by other witnesses or newspaper accounts, or to any other information or influence, that may have affected the independence of his/her identification. ”  (Da 155-156)  Non-state actors can “affect the reliability of eyewitness identification evidence, just as the police can. ”  Henderson, 208 N.J. at 268, 271; State v. Chen, 208 N.J. 307, 320 (2008).  As just one example, [...] first suggested that the faceless person in front of [...] “appeared to resemble a neighbor”; [...] gave [...] feedback, resulting in [...]’s identification.  (Da 75)  The trial court’s admission of identification evidence, without any jury instruction, was not harmless.
[brief] On July 9, 2021, a Burlington County Grand Jury returned Indictment Number [...], charging defendant [...] with one count of first-degree robbery, N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1a(2), and two counts of third-degree terroristic threats, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-3b.  (Da 1-3)²  Before trial, the Honorable [...], J.S.C. granted the State’s motion to dismiss as redundant one of the terroristic threats charges.  (1T 4-3 to 5-11)  --- ²  Da — Defendant’s appendix  1T – Transcript of January 19, 2023 jury trial  2T – Transcript of January 24, 2023 jury trial  3T – Transcript of January 25, 2023 jury trial  4T – Transcript of January 26, 2023 jury trial  5T – Transcript of January 31, 2023 jury trial  6T – Transcript of June 9, 2023 sentencing  7T – Transcript of March 22, 2021 hearing on motion for self-representation in Burlington County Indictment  No. [...]  Trial began on January 19, 2023, before [...] and a jury.  After the State rested, defense counsel moved for a judgment of acquittal on all charges, which the court denied.  (4T 96-21 to 97-13)  On January 31, the jury found [...] guilty of first-degree robbery and not guilty of terroristic threats.  (5T 6-7 to 21; Da 4)  On June 9, 2023, [...] sentenced [...] to a 17-year term of imprisonment subject to the No Early Release Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2, and imposed all appropriate fines and fees.  (6T 14-10 to 14, 15-1 to 4; Da 5-7)  [...] ordered that the sentence run consecutively to a 10-year term on an unrelated offense. \(^3\) (6T 14-15 to 19; Da 5)  A notice of appeal was filed on July 19, 2023.  (Da 8-10)  **STATEMENT OF FACTS**
[brief] Id. at 363-66.  Defendants believe that Tyler entitles them to relief under R. 4:50-1(d) or -1(f), and that the trial judge erred in concluding otherwise.  Defendants are mistaken.  Initially, it is well-established that a change in caselaw is treated under subsection (f) of R. 4:50-1, not subsection (d).9  See, e.g., Hartford Ins. Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 68 N.J. 430 (1975).  In Hartford, the defendant received an adverse final judgment, which he timely appealed, and this court affirmed.  He did not seek certification.  Ibid.  A short time later, in a separate case, the New Jersey Supreme Court issued a decision that changed the law in the defendant’s favor on the identical issue.  Ibid.  The defendant then sought to vacate the judgment under R. 4:50-1 based on the change in caselaw.  Ibid.  Our Supreme Court held that new caselaw could not be invoked in support of a R. 4:50-1 motion where the time for direct appeal of the final judgment has expired:
[brief] Pa1-3.  On October 19, 2023, Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment.  Pa18-19.  On October 23, 2023, Plaintiff filed a cross-motion for summary judgment.  Pa26-28.  On December 8, 2023, the Law Division granted Defendant’s motion for summary judgment and denied Plaintiff’s cross-motion for summary judgment after overlooking the law requiring reimbursement pursuant to the New Jersey PIP fee schedule and improperly determining that Plaintiff failed to meet the statutory criteria for vacating and/or modifying an award under N.J.S.A. 2A:23A-13.
[brief] On this point, the Supreme Court of New Jersey has held that, “administrative agency action, and an agency’s discretionary choice of the procedural mode of action, are valid only when there is compliance with the provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), N.J.S.A. 52:14B-1 to- 15, and due process requirements. ”  *In re Provision of Basic Generation Service Period Beginning June 1 2008*, 205 N.J. 339, 347 (N.J. 2011) (internal citations omitted).  Generally speaking, “[d]ue process requires notice reasonably calculated, under all circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.
[brief] THE QUESTION OF UNCONSCIONABILITY IS WITHIN THE TRIAL COURT’S DISCRETION, NOT THE ARBITRATOR.  In response to this appeal, [...] has argued for the first time that unconscionability must be decided by the arbitrator, not the Court under a delegation provision within [...]’s arbitration agreement.  (Db7, 12-13).  It is not only improper to raise a new argument for the first time in an opposition to an appeal, but this argument is also flawed because it goes against New Jersey law and despite [...]’s belief, Appellants disputed the delegation language in its opposition to the motion to compel.  A.
[brief] The Public Access Law Requires DEP to Impose Permit Conditions Requiring Public Access (Responding to Appellant’s Points IA & IB)  As described above, the Commissioner’s conclusions in the Final Decision flow directly from the Law’s plain language.  But as it did in OAL and again before the Commissioner, [...] urges this court to ignore the plain terms of the Public Access Law.  (Ab14-15).  [...] contends that the Law only codifies the public trust common law (and does not expand it) because the Law uses the phrase, “consistent with the public trust doctrine” in N.J. S.A. 13:1D-153(a).  (Ab13-15).  Under [...]’s theory, this phrase requires DEP to impose public access only after considering the four-factor test in Mathews v. Bay Head Improvement Association, 95 N.J. 306, 326 (1984),\(^6\) for determining when public access is required across private property.  (Ab16).  --- \(^6\)  The Matthews factors include “[l]ocation of the dry sand area in relation to the foreshore, extent and availability of publicly-owned upland sand area, nature and extent of the public demand, and usage of the upland sand land by the owner .  . . .”  Matthews, 95 N.J. at 326.  The Commissioner rejected [...]’s premise that the Law merely codifies the common-law public trust doctrine, finding that the premise “is undermined by the plain language of the [Law] . . . , which clearly indicates that the Legislature did in fact intend to expand upon the public trust doctrine.
[brief] In this case, the foreseeable danger was a vagrant, loitering at the train station, would attack an [...] employee.  Under the FELA, the test of foreseeability does not require the railroad as the negligent entity to have foreseen the injury in the precise form in which it occurred.  Rather, it is sufficient if a reasonable person could have foreseen that an injury might occur.  *Mullahon v. Union Pacific Railroad Co.*, 64 F.3d 1358 (9th Cir.).  Could a jury find that a vagrant allowed to loiter at a train station could attack an employee possibly causing injury?  The answer is yes.  Tellingly, even while claiming that it is impossible to foresee the criminal actions of a third party at the [...], [...] produced police reports/paperwork regarding over sixty (60) separate incidents investigated by the [...] Police in the two years preceding Plaintiff’s attack and injury, for crimes ranging from public smoking/drinking to aggravated assault.
[brief] *Murphy v. 113 E. Cedar*, No. [...], 2023 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1282 (App. Div. July 24, 2023).  Plaintiff chose to serve under subsection (a) that directs service may be made by the clerk by certified, return receipt, and ordinary mail pursuant to R 6:2-3(d).  Subsection (d) directs that mail service is “to be served in this State, or if substituted service of process is to be made within this State. ”  The mail service must be within 12-days of the complaint receiving a docket number.  At no time did the clerk mail anything to an address in the state of New Jersey.  Rather, the plaintiff provided a number of false addresses in New Jersey for the defendant, and when those were returned by the post-office he then provided the clerk with a New York City address in violation of Rule 6:2-3 requiring in-state mailings.  That address was an out of state office building, not defendant’s residence nor her place of business or employment.  For the sake of argument, even if service was on a business it still must be in this state and “…at a place of business or employment, with postal instructions to deliver to addressee only, service will be deemed effective only if the signature on the return receipt appears to be that of the defendant to whom process was mailed.  R. 6:2-3(d)(4).  Thus, if service was properly done, which it was not, there still was no proof the mailing instructed “to addressee only”, and it is an indisputable fact that the “signature”, a scribbled symbol, on the unidentified document uploaded April 23, 2019 was not the defendant’s, nor was that uploaded document a certified return receipt or proof of service of anything.  The record is clear that there is a substantial deviation from the tenor of the service of process rules that violates the law.  Sobel v. Long Island Entm't Prods., Inc., 329 N.J. Super. 285, 293, 747 A.2d 796 (App. Div. 2000).
[brief] Within these deficiency letters, there was significant discussion regarding the Route 1 Access Road, the private, internal road that would cross the tributary to Duck Pond Run using a pipe culvert.  [...] repeatedly raised the issue that the crossing was not perfectly perpendicular\(^{10}\) so as to minimize riparian zone impacts at the crossing, insisting that “the current 60-degree crossing proposed for the Route 1 access road must be redesigned to be as nearly --- \(^9\)  The record contains no other mention of this effort to rush towards “administrative completeness,” but from this email chain it appears that the [...] and the applicant were working in concert to avoid having to comply with the new rule in the event the application was not yet deemed complete for review by the time the rule was effective.  It is not clear from this record why the [...] would have preferred the application be “grandfathered” rather than for the applicant to address all of the deficiencies in the permit application first and then be governed by the imminently forthcoming set of emergency regulations.  \(^{10}\)  The applicant had described the crossing in its application papers as “generally perpendicular. ”  Aa153. perpendicular to the channel as possible. ”  Aa207.  The applicant eventually capitulated, and revised the channel crossing to be perpendicular.  However, this same access road proposes to cross the waterway by means of the pipe culvert, and in none of the deficiency letters did the [...] ever question the applicant’s use of a pipe culvert or raise the regulations regarding a bridge or a culvert that require additional justifications.  Nor in any of these communications did the [...] ever ask whether the applicant had applied the latest precipitation data from the Cornell Studies, or insist that this information be applied.  On September 9, 2022, the [...] advised the applicant that “it does not currently seem feasible that all information required” for the freshwater wetlands and transition area waiver aspects of the multi-permit application would be completed by the FHACA deadline, and recommended withdrawing and resubmitting the application at a later date.
[brief] Ibid.  The Supreme Court did observe that the direct defendants could be responsible to plaintiffs for the entire verdict if found more than 60% at fault but, crucially, that framework contemplated [...] being bound by that outcome as a third-party defendant:  While plaintiff cannot recover from Fernandez directly, see Sattelberger, 14 N.J. at 363, 102 A.2d 577, we agree with the Appellate Division that if the trier of fact determines defendants [...] or [...] to be sixty percent or more at fault, then plaintiff can recover the full amount of damages from that party, N.J.S.A. 2A:15-5.3(a), and if Fernandez is found to be between one and forty percent at fault, then he would be liable for his percentage of fault in contribution to the party that paid the full amount of damages to plaintiff, N.J.S.A. 2A:15-5.3(e).  [Id. at 374 (emphasis added)].  This was consistent with this Court’s unpublished opinion Mejia.  Mejia v. [...] Diagnostics, Inc., 2019 WL 1012532, at *4 (App. Div. Mar. 4, 2019) (Pa.83).  Mejia stands for the proposition that a third-party defendant, properly joined by a defendant on a contribution claim, is not entitled to a dismissal of the third-party complaint merely because the plaintiff cannot recover directly from the third-party defendant.  Had the Supreme Court wanted to broaden its pronouncement to hold that Burt defendant allocation for non-public entity defendants is per se improper and disallowed, it could easily have so stated.
[brief] Because the central element of the offense with which he was charged was not defined for the jury, this Court should reverse [...]’s conviction.  In the alternative, this Court should reverse the conviction because [...]’s motion for a judgment of acquittal was erroneously denied.  If his conviction is allowed to stand, this Court should vacate the portion of the judgment of conviction that imposed new conditions on [...]’s existing parole supervision for life, because the trial court was without jurisdiction to impose parole conditions, and because only sentences authorized by statute may be imposed.  Respectfully submitted, [...]
[brief] But if the trial court, despite its disclaimer, did consider that Certification, then at the very least, it should have held a plenary hearing to resolve any contested issues of fact.  While New Jersey courts prefer deciding motions to disqualify on the documentary record, Dewey v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 109 N.J. 201, 222 (1988), sets forth the proper procedure when "there remain gaps that must be filled before a factfinder can with a sense of assurance render a determination, or when there looms a question of witness credibility."  In particular, where, as here, there are issues of fact that require credibility determinations, disqualification cannot be granted or denied absent a plenary hearing.
[brief] See Charlie Brown of Chatham v. Board of Adj. of Chatham, 202 N.J. Super. 312, 321 (App. Div. 1985); Drake v. Human Servs. Dept., 186 N.J. Super. 532, 536 (App. Div. 1982); In re App. of Holy Name Hosp., 301 N.J. Super. 282, 295 (App. Div. 1997).  A.
[brief] (Da835-838)  26.  A hearing on Defendant’s Motion to Compel return of the monies paid was held before the Trial Court on January 17, 2020, at which time a decision was reserved (5T 34:7-44:13).  On January 28, 2020, the Trial Court provided its oral opinion on Defendant’s Motion to Compel stating, in part, that Defendant did not argue in its appeal of the violation orders that the orders were the result of an abuse of discretion.  (6T 71:5-72:10)  The Trial Court concluded that since Defendant did not specifically challenge the legality of the post-trial enforcement proceedings coupled with the fact there was no stay in place pending Defendant’s 2017 Appeal, the Appellate Division did not intend to vacate the enforcement proceedings.  (6T 70:19-72:25).  On February 5, 2020, the Trial Court entered an Order denying Defendant’s Motion to Compel the return of monies paid.  (Da976)
[brief] For example, a motion for summary judgment should be adjourned to allow the non-moving party an opportunity for discovery as to facts first disclosed in a recent deposition.  Lenches-Marrero v. L. Firm of Averna & Gardner, 326 N.J. Super. 382, 387-88 (App. Div. 1999).  Here, discovery had not yet began and the [...] provided no evidence outside of Appellant’s complaint to support its request for summary judgment.  The [...] merely argued that they did nothing wrong.  Aa237-39; 4T5:11 to 7:16.
[brief] On the morning of March 26, 2015, while glancing down at the street to look for potholes, Plaintiff drove his 13’6” high trailer into a 12’2” railroad bridge on Avenue P in the [...].  [5T54:1-5].  On March 21, 2017, Plaintiff filed a three-count complaint against the City in the [...], alleging that the City acted negligently by failing to properly post and maintain signs indicating the height of the railroad bridge.  Da035.  Discovery in this matter closed in April 2019 after several extensions.  Plaintiff propounded no discovery beyond interrogatories and did not depose anyone.  ---  1  The facts and procedural history are intertwined and are discussed together for a more streamlined description of events.
[brief] The Law Division-Superior Court abused its discretion under the de novo standard of review when it ignored as irrelevant [...]’s conditional guilty plea and convicted him on an alternative ground never raised on the record in the municipal court, not addressed in the front of his ticket that stated his charge, and not raised by either party in their original briefs on appeal to the Law Division-Superior Court.  The Superior Court’s decision must be reversed and remanded to the Superior Court to decide the sole issue it should have addressed, i.e. whether a pumphouse is an occupied building for the purposes of N.J.S.A. 23:4-16(d)(3).  Respectfully submitted, [...], Attorney At Law, P.C.
[brief] There is also no dispute that service was signed for and accepted by [...] who would have advised him of the same.  (2T32-16-14) (“Q. Do you recognize that?  A. No.  It’s not my signature, and I don’t know whether that would be my father’s or my brother’s.  Q.  But the signature is – A. Either my father or my brother’s.  Q. [...]?  A.  Which would be either my father or my brother. ”).  Instead, it appears that the sole reason for Appellant’s Motion is to advance its argument, for a fourth time, that Respondent purportedly violated the NJCFA and NJCFLA.