ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] Data/Date  Réu/Defendant  Advogado de defesa/Defense Attorney Promotor/Prosecutor Formulário promulgado pela diretiva no 01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 11170- Portuguese página 2 de 2 Form Promulgated by Directive # 01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 11170-Portuguese page 2 of 2
[brief] Statutory damages under the FDCPA, like nominal damages for certain common law torts, are “premised upon the wrong itself. ”  *Nappe v. Anschelewitz, Barr, Ansell & Bonello*, 189 N.J. Super. 347, 354 (App. Div. 1983).  When a debt collector engages in prohibited practices, “those practices would themselves constitute a concrete injury. ”  *Bock v. Pressler & Pressler, LLP*, 254 F. Supp. 3d 724, 736 (D.N.J. 2017).  This is so because the FDCPA is “primarily self-enforcing; consumers who have been subjected to collection abuses will be enforcing compliance. ”  S. Rep. 95-382 (1977) at *5, 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1695 at 1699 (hereinafter, “Senate Report”) (emphasis added).
[brief] [...] was adopted by the Board on March 27, 2023.  The Resolution contains the uncontroverted testimony of the applicant’s experts.  The Board considered the application, the documents marked into evidence and the testimony.  The Board determined that the purpose of the MLUL was advanced by the requested deviations from the ordinances and that the requested variances could be granted without substantial detriment to the public good, and the plan of the Borough.  The Resolution [Resolution, Pl. Ex. B, pp. 6-7.] reflects the Board's determination that special reasons exist to grant the variances for height and density for the townhomes to be constructed for the following reasons:
[brief] But, if this Court rules in favor of DEP’s past interpretation of Exemption #11, that would constitute a broad --- 18  In re N.J. Dep't of Envtl. Prot. Conditional Highlands Applicability Determination, [...], 433 N.J. Super. 223, 235 (App. Div. 2013), quoting M. Alfieri Co., Inc. v. N.J. Dep't of Envtl. Prot. & Energy, 269 N.J. Super. 545, 554 (App.Div.1994), aff'd o.b., 138 N.J. 642 (1995) (emphasis added).
[brief] ”  Greco v. Trauner, Cohen & Thomas, L.L.P., 412 F.3d 360, 363 (2d Cir. 2005) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1692(e)).  See also Moukengeschaie v. Eltman, Eltman & Cooper, P.C., 2016 WL 1274541, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2016) (“The FDCPA was enacted to protect consumers from abusive debt collection practices by third-party debt collectors, to create parity in the debt collection industry and to standardize governmental intervention in the debt collection market. ”).  In order to achieve these objectives, “the FDCPA creates a private right of action for debtors who have been harmed by abusive 1
[brief] Accordingly, [...] appeals from the Bulletin because it is an improper and unilateral pronouncement of new law that has broad implications to all reciprocal exchanges and their respective AIFs.  The Department’s actions are clearly arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable and ultra vires and specifically designed to inhibit the development of a proper record.  For all these reasons, this Court must strike the Bulletin and compel the Department to observe the APA’s substantive and procedural due process requirements before imposing a sea change of regulation on reciprocals and their AIFs.
[brief] The District’s main office is located at [...] in [...].  Defendant [...], serves as the District’s School Business Administrator/Board Secretary and the Records Custodian.  Pa13.  On April 2, 2015, the instant OPRA request was submitted by attorney [...]  The request sought: “(1) all settlements entered into by the Board in NJOAL EDS docketed case from January 1, 2013 to present; (2) any final decisions incorporating or pertaining to item #1; (3) May 1, 2014, any purchase orders, vouchers, bills, invoices and canceled checks for payment(s) made for legal services rendered to the board in regards to LR OPRA Request of 5/17/15 and the subsequent civil action of [...]; and (4) any Board Resolution(s) which refers to items #1.
[brief] Under this lens, we must determine "whether the competent evidential materials presented . . . are sufficient to permit a rational factfinder to resolve the alleged disputed issue in favor of the non-moving part[ies]."  *Townsend v. Pierre*, 429 N.J. Super. 522, 525, 60 A.3d 800 (App. Div. 2013) (quoting *Brill*, supra, 142 N.J. at 540).  The "'essence of the inquiry'" is "'whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law."  *Mayo, Lynch & Assocs., Inc. v. Pollack*, 351 N.J. Super. 486, 494-95, 799 A.2d 12 (App. Div. 2002)(quoting *Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.*, 477 U.S. 242, 251-52, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2512, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202, 214 (1986)).  That said, the Trial Court's interpretation of the law and the legal consequences that flow from established facts are not entitled to any special deference, meaning this Court can uphold the Trial Court’s findings but on different grounds.  *Farmers Mut. Fire Ins. Co. of Salem v. N.J. Prop.-Liability Ins. Guar. Ass’n*, 215 N.J. 522, 535-36 (2013).
[brief] ................................................Da002  Ex. G – [...] and [...] ’s Renewed Notice of Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint Pursuant to R. 4:6-2(b) ........................................................................Da012  Ex. H – Defendants’ Renewed Notice of Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint Pursuant to R. 4:6-2(f).................................Da039  Ex. I – Defendants’ Motion to Stay .................................................................Da074  Ex. J – V (omitted) .........................................................................................Da089  Certification of [...], with Exhibits in Support of Alternative Motion to Stay ........................................................................Da090  Ex. A – Affidavit of [...] attaching Exhibit A thereto – “Special Undertaking by Purchasers of Polychlorinated Biphenyls” accompanied by a letter dated February 7, 1972 from [...] of [...] to [...] of [...] ([...]) .......Da096  Ex. B-J (omitted)  .........................................................................................Da103  Ex. K – Notice of Deposition of [...], Notice of Deposition of [...], and Notice of Deposition of Solutia Inc  ........................................................................Da104  Memorandum in Support of Defendants’ Motion for Reconsideration  Pursuant to R. 4:42-2 .................................................................Da123  Defendants’ Reply Memorandum in Support of Their Motion for Reconsideration  ................................................................................Da148  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
[brief] Economic pressure (or the threats of an angry driver and/or hungry family) are exactly the sort of impositions that vitiate the mutual assent necessary for contract formation.  Rudbart, 127 N.J. at 355-56.  As example, in Vasquez v. Glassboro Service Association, our Supreme Court compared the inequity in “a consumer who must accept a standardized form contract to purchase needed goods and services” to a lease provision in a migrant worker contract requiring immediate eviction upon termination.
[brief] See id. at 430, 437.  The instant case is exactly the same – here, [...]’s twelve-year-old third-degree conviction did not and could not render his sixteen-year-old third-degree conviction admissible as part of “a continuing course of criminal conduct. ”  [...]’s two intervening violations of probation do not change the analysis.  See Murphy, 412 N.J. Super. at 565 n.1 (holding that a violation of probation is not an intervening conviction and could not justify admission of defendant’s prior conviction for a third-degree offense).  Therefore, neither the remoteness nor the seriousness factors of Rule 609(b)(2) support the admission of [...]’s prior convictions.
[brief] The Bulletin is not a de facto rule because it: (1) prescribes a legal standard that is clearly inferable from statutory authorization; (2) reflects an administrative policy that has previously been expressed in an official and explicit agency determination, adjudication or rule; and (3) does not constitute a material and significant change from a clear past agency position on the identical subject matter.  See Metromedia, Inc., v. Director, Division of Taxation, 97 N.J. 313, 331-32 (1984).  In *Metromedia*, our Supreme Court developed a six-factor balancing test for determining whether agency action constitutes de facto rulemaking:  [Whether the action] (1) is intended to have wide coverage encompassing a large segment of the regulated or general public, rather than an individual or a narrow select group; (2) is intended to be applied generally and uniformly to all similarly situated persons; (3) is designed to operate only in future cases, that is, prospectively; (4) prescribes a legal standard or directive that is not otherwise expressly provided by or clearly and obviously inferable from the enabling statutory authorization; (5) reflects an administrative policy that (i) was not previously expressed in any official and explicit agency determination, adjudication or rule, or (ii) constitutes a material and significant change from a clear, past agency position on the identical subject matter; and (6) reflects a decision on administrative regulatory policy in the nature of the interpretation of law or general policy.
[brief] Because [...] partially created the hazard leading to backlighting in the intersection, plaintiff does not need to establish the element of actual notice of the hazard.  Notwithstanding, there exists evidence in the case that [...] likely had notice, and most definitely had constructive notice, of the said hazard.  It is well established that a property owner will be liable for a dangerous condition that caused injury when it had actual or constructive notice of the said condition.  See Jeter v. Sam's Club, 250 N.J. 240, 251 (App. Div. 2022) (citations omitted).  "A defendant has constructive notice when the condition existed 'for such a length of time as reasonably to have resulted in knowledge and correction had the defendant been reasonably diligent.'"  Constructive notice can be inferred from eyewitness testimony or from "[t]he characteristics of the dangerous condition," which may indicate how long the condition lasted.  Id.  However, there is an exception to the rule requiring actual or constructive notice in that "[w]hen a proprietor creates a dangerous condition, notice, actual or constructive, of that dangerous condition is not required."
[brief] **Second,** the New Jersey federal district court decisions are outliers.  The trial court’s decision aligns instead with the significant body of law holding that the alleged violation of state law, particularly one that is procedural or administrative in nature like a licensing requirement, does not rise to the level of an FDCPA violation.  The majority of cases leave the enforcement of state legal requirements to the states.  Congress enacted the FDCPA to “eliminate abusive debt collection practices by debt collectors. ”  15 U.S.C. § 1692e.  Congress did not intend the statute to be used as a vehicle for transforming state law violations into federal violations, and the FDCPA “does not so much as hint at being an enforcement mechanism for other rules of state and federal law. ”  *Beler v. Blatt, Hasenmiller, Leibsker & Moore, LLC,*  480 F.3d 470, 474 (7th Cir. 2007).  See also *Christy v.* Designed Receivable Sols., Inc., 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 141956, *9 (D. Nev. Aug. 21, 2018) (“[a] plaintiff cannot establish an FDCPA violation merely by showing a debt collector violated state law because not every violation of state law is an FDCPA violation,” thus “[t]he pertinent question is whether the debt collector’s conduct is an independent violation of the FDCPA”) (emphasis added).  Accordingly, courts refuse to convert an alleged state procedural violation into an FDCPA claim.  Numerous courts around the country have come to the same conclusion where, as here, the purported violation of state law pertains to a licensing or similar requirement.
[brief] Scamardella v. Legal Helpers Debt Resol., L.L.C., [...], 2016 WL 1562812, at *4 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Apr. 19, 2016) (unpublished opinion).  But the Court declined at that time to find that the FAA had preempted Atalese because, unlike Mortensen, “[n]o evidential support is provided showing arbitration provisions have been invalidated at a higher rate than other contract provisions following Atalese. ”  Id.  Now, eight years after Scamardella, that support exists:  The Atalese rule that any waiver of rights must be “clear and unambiguous” has been applied to invalidate hundreds (if not thousands) of arbitration agreements in New Jersey state and federal courts, but that decision has been applied to very few (if any) other types of contractual waivers of statutory or constitutional rights.  The trial court’s reading of Atalese was incorrect for all of the reasons described above.  But if this Court concludes that the Atalese rule concerns contract formation, then that rule is preempted both because it is arbitration-specific and because it has been applied in practice to disproportionately disadvantage arbitration agreements.  II.
[brief] Thus, in conformity with this finding and in approving [...]’s SPA, the Original Resolution specifically noted that the only conditions with respect to elevators was that “Applicant shall install an elevator in Buildings C and D”—not Building “E.”  Pa119.  There is no question as to what conditions were or were not imposed at the June 13, 2022 meeting, these are set forth in the December 12, 2022 Original Resolution.  The Original Resolution specifically notes that [...] did not agree to install an elevator in Building “E,” nor did the Original Resolution condition approval on the installation of such an elevator.  Indeed, this fact is also reflected in the Stealth Resolution, which noted that [...] “agreed to amend the Application so as to include such elevators in building ‘C’ and ‘D’.  The Applicant declined to include such elevator in building ‘E.’”  Pa124.  Thus, there is no dispute as to any factual findings.  Accordingly, there is a clear and unrefuted record establishing that [...]’s SPA was approved without an elevator in Building “E. ”
[brief] [...] concluded that while it sounds heartless, he needed to convey to plaintiff the reality of her situation is the worsening of the ongoing compression of the nerves, that her pain will not get better, and her symptoms are going to unfortunately persist.  [...] further concluded:  Q  Are - - are her symptoms consistent with having difficulty, current difficulty, standing?  A  If the spinal cord is affected, it will affect her ability to stand, so - Q  Does it - - I'm sorry.  A the nerves that go into the legs, the nerves that go into the arms, the nerves that go into your overall stability of your body that are all connected to the spinal cord and the nerves that are compressed in her case.  So she will have trouble with her legs.  She will have trouble with her balance.  She will have trouble walking, controlling her bowel, her bladder, her ability to use her arms.  All of this is linked because the spinal cord which comes right here in the neck controls everything.  The lumbar spine that goes into the leg controls everything with regards to the lower extremities.  Q  Is it fair to say that it will affect virtually every aspect of her daily activities?  A  Unfortunately, yes, that is the case with spinal compression.  Q  Do you anticipate, Doctor, with a reasonable degree of medical certainty that she will require in the future assistance of others and, perhaps, the need for certain physical aides including a wheelchair, for example?  Do you anticipate that these might very well be factors in her future?  A  Unfortunately, I believe that is where things are heading right now.  I - - I would hate to wish that on her, but I'm deeply concerned that that is what ultimately is going to happen.
[brief] Preliminary Statement .................................................................1  Counterstatement of Procedural History ........................................2  Counterstatement of Facts .............................................................3  Trial .........................................................................................3  Direct Appeal ..............................................................................4  Remand Proceedings ....................................................................7  Legal Argument Point  I  Defendant’s new, shorter sentence is not excessive.  Applying the proper deference it is owed, this Court must affirm .........................9  A.  From Graham to Comer: Principles Governing the Sentencing of Juvenile Offenders ..................................................11  B.  Standard of Review ...............................................................19  C.  [...]’s Re-Sentencing Decision .................................20  D.  Defendant can show no abuse of discretion in his new shorter sentence .................................................................29 Conclusion  ..................................................................................37  #  Table of Authorities  ## Cases | Case Name | Page Numbers | |------------------------------------------------|--------------| | E&H Steel Corp. v. PSEG Fossil, LLC, | 27 | | Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010) | 5,11 | | Jones v. Mississippi, 141 S. Ct. 1307 (2021) | 15,16,17 | | Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) | 5,12,13,15,16,22 | | Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) | 4 | | Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190 (2016) | 5,13 | | Roper v. Simmons, 453 U.S. 551 (2005) | 11 | | State in the Interest of A.S., 203 N.J. 131 (2010) | 32 | | State v. Case, 220 N.J. 49 (2014) | 27 | | State v. Comer, 249 N.J. 359 (2022) | 8,18,19,29 | | State v. Cuff, 239 N.J.
[brief] (Da14 12:16:34-12:16:37; see 10T186-11 to 18)  A 911 caller said the shooter, who wore a white t-shirt, gray shorts, and a white towel on his head, ran across the street towards the Brigantine homes.  (Da15; 12T74-21)  The State presented the testimony of [...], [...], [...], and [...], whose accounts varied from each other and the surveillance video.
[brief] com/articles/expert-commentary/a-high-level-view-of-the-cgl-policy (accessed October 19, 2023).  2.  THE RIGHT TO REQUEST CANCELLATION OF THE POLICY; AND 3.  AUTHORIZATION TO ACT ON THEIR BEHALF AS RESPECTS CHANGES TO ANY PROVISIONS OF THIS INSURANCE POLICY.  [Dto173.]  (The [...] policy incorporated the "terms and conditions of the" [...] policy.  (Dto181.))  2.  The CCIP Manual  [...] promulgated an "Insurance Procedures Manual" for the CCIP, which was "to be used for informational purposes only."  (Dto583.)  It identified [...] as the "Sponsor" and [...] as the "Administrator."  (Dto587,588.)  The manual provided that subcontractors "shall not be permitted to work on the project until enrolled in the CCIP" and that enrollment was "established upon issuance...of a CCIP Certificate of Insurance to Participating Subcontractors."  (Dto589, ¶4.1.)  The CCIP manual, by its terms, was subordinate to the [...] policy, advising that the "actual terms and conditions provided by the CCIP are contained in the insurance policies procured by the Sponsor," [...].
[directive] IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any of the above officers or agencies which sent fingerprints and/or any records of the above arrest/conviction/adjudication/disposition and proceedings to the Federal Bureau of Investigation or any other office or agency shall notify same of this Order and that the agencies designated to retain such records take sufficient precautions to insure that such records and information are not released to the public.  IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that in response to requests for information or records from the public, the court office or law enforcement agency shall reply, to the public, with respect to the arrest/disposition, which is the subject of this Order, that there is no record.
[brief] [...] admitted [...] was regularly outdoors on the lawn without supervision and that she ran toward people and dogs who passed his driveway, but only in a “friendly” manner.  2T1362-9.  Although he denied that [...] ever bit, harassed or annoyed [...], he admitted to offering [...] a bottle of wine for his trouble.  There would be no reason for this peace offering if [...] had only greeted [...] “in a friendly manner. ”  **September 12, 2022 incident**
[brief] Disguised penalties.  Under the [reasonableness] rule stated in this Section, the validity of a term providing for damages depends on the effect of that term…  Neither the parties' actual intention as to its validity nor their characterization of the term… is significant in determining whether the term is valid.  Sometimes parties attempt to disguise a provision for a penalty by using language… that purports to offer a discount for prompt performance…  [A] court will look to the substance of the agreement to determine…whether the parties have attempted to disguise a provision for a penalty that is unenforceable under this Section.  Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 356, comment c (1981).  This principle has been applied by state and federal courts in at least five states, including Illinois, New York, California, Pennsylvania, and Maine, to call into question the validity of provisions that “purport[ed] to offer a discount for prompt performance” or employed similar subterfuge to impose a penalty to coerce compliance.
[brief] (1T 4-19 to 4-23)  When confronted with the bodycam footage that showed [...] holding a cellphone in his left hand and a cigarette in his right, see supra n.3, [...] admitted that [...] was not actually holding the bag with either of his hands.  (1T 33-22 to 34-23)  [...] claimed that what he meant was that [...] had his left arm resting unnaturally on his chest, like “trying to conceal or hide an object”; in [...]’s view, the manner in which [...]’s arm was positioned constituted the type of “furtive movement” he was trained to look for.  (1T 40-14 to 40-24; 1T 42-5 to 42-17)  [...]’s hand, the one that [...] said was resting unnaturally on [...]’s chest, was in a cast.  (1T 42-9 to 42-15)  On cross-examination, [...] admitted that the details allegedly furnished by the C.I. regarding the gun – that it was a .44 magnum concealed inside a fanny pack – was a critical piece of information that he would not leave out of a police report that he authored.