ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The [...] argued that “Ever since the exemption was codified in [...]’s rules, [...] has consistently interpreted the word ‘routine’ in Exemption #11 as only modifying ‘maintenance and operations. ’” (Ab15).  See 38 N.J.R. 5011(a) at Response to comment 3 and 4 (Dec. 4, 2006). ”  [...] brief at 16.  But a review of the [...]’s Responses to comments in the New Jersey Register reveals that the [...] only addressed issues raised by commenters regarding cell towers and did not include any discussion of the word “routine” as it is at issue in this case.
[brief] See, e.g., Mitchell v. Procini, 331 N.J. Super. 445, 453-54, 752 A.2d 349 (App.Div.2000).  The Rule, however, does not expressly authorize dismissal of a suit because of a pleader's failure to identify a pending action, such as the federal action here.  Moreover, even if we were to assume [...] violated the Rule, we would conclude that the leap to dismissal rather than some lesser sanction was inappropriate.
[brief] 30  Manigualt v. Springs, 199 U.S. 473 (1905) ..................................................................  19 Pangborn v. Young, 32 N.J.L. 29 (Sup. Ct. 1866) ......................................................  11 Reichelderfer v. Quinn, 287 U.S. 315 (1983) .................................................................  20 State v. Lenihan, 219 N.J. 251 (2014) ..................................................................  9 State v. Muhammad, 145 N.J. 23 (1996) ....................................................................  9 State v. Varona, 242 N.J. Super. 474 (App. Div. 1990)...........................................  31 United States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839, 873 (1996)  ............................................................  19 STATUTES L. 2001, c. 375 ............................................................................. passim N.J.S.A. 1:7-1 to -7 ...................................................................... passim N.J.S.A. 10:4-8(a) .......................................................................  25 N.J.S.A. 10:4-8(d) .......................................................................  24, 26 N.J.S.A. 10:4-9 .............................................................................  24 N.J.S.A. 17B:27D-2 ....................................................................  23 N.J.S.A. 17B:27D-6 ....................................................................  19, 22, 23, 24 N.J.S.A. 17B:27D-7 ....................................................................  23 N.J.S.A. 26:2S-39 ......................................................................  23 N.J.S.A. 52:11-78 .....................................................................  27, 28, 29 N.J.S.A. 52:11-78(a) ..................................................................  27 N.J.S.A. 52:13B-6 to -14 ............................................................  28  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT  On January 13, 2022, [...] signed into law L. 2021, c. 375, the Freedom of Reproductive Choice Act, (Chapter 375), which codifies certain reproductive rights.
[brief] [...] also mistakenly claims Appellants did not “challenge the delegation provision specifically,” and under the FAA, this Court is bound to enforce the delegation clause.  Rent-A-Center, W., Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63, 72 (2010).  (Db 13-15).  However, Appellants challenged the enforceability of the delegation provision in its opposition to the motion to compel arbitration.  (Pa0439-0440).  Appellants previously argued the issue:  Additionally, the arbitration agreement puts ‘issues relating to whether the Terms are applicable, unconscionable or illusory and any defense to arbitration . . . ’ in the hands of the arbitrator to determine.  The agreement further states ‘[i]f there is a dispute about whether this Arbitration Agreement can be enforced . . . you and [...] agree that the arbitrator will decide that issue. ’  This goes against New Jersey law.  Appellants relied on *Knight v. Vivint Solar Developer, LLC*, 465 N.J. Super. 416, 428 (App. Div. 2020) in support of this argument.  Appellants further argued in their opposition:  If the Court upheld this Arbitration Agreement, it would allow Defendant, [...], to hold every [...] user, who most likely do not know or understand the law, to terms that go against what the law actually says.  So, despite [...]’s misstatement, Appellants challenged the delegation provision, and this Court is not bound to find, nor should it find, the delegation provision enforceable.
[brief] Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40:55D-19 Docket No. [...]  Dear [...]:  Enclosed for filing please find an original and ten (10) copies of the Petition of [...] ("[...]" or "Company") appealing a decision of the [...] denying the Company's application for the construction of a proposed regulator station (the "Regulator Station" or "Facility").  The Company respectfully requests, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40:55D-19, that the Board determine that, as further described in the attached Petition, supporting testimonies and exhibits, the construction of the proposed Regulator Station, at [...] in [...] ("Holmdel"), is for the benefit of the residents of Holmdel and neighboring municipalities located in Monmouth County; is necessary to maintain system integrity and reliability and is reasonably necessary for the service, convenience or welfare of the public; and that no alternative site or sites are reasonably available to achieve an equivalent public benefit.  [...] therefore requests that the Board issue an order concluding that the zoning, site plan review and all other Municipal Land Use Ordinances or Regulations promulgated under the auspices of Title 40 of the New Jersey Statutes and the Municipal Land Use Law of the State of New Jersey shall not apply to the proposed Facility, and authorizing the Company to construct the Facility as set forth in the Petition and supporting testimony and exhibits.  Copies of the Petition, including the supporting testimonies and exhibits, are also being provided to [...], DAG and [...], Esq, Director, Division of Rate Counsel, [...], Clerk of [...], [...], Secretary, Holmdel Zoning Board of Adjustment, as well as to those individuals listed on the attached Service List.  November 28, 2018  Kindly acknowledge receipt of this filing by date stamping the enclosed copy of this letter and returning same in the self-addressed, stamped envelope.  Thank you for your consideration in this regard.  Respectfully submitted, [...]
[brief] | Cases | Page(s) | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|---------| | Atalese v. Long Beach Township, | 38 | | 365 N.J. Super. 1 (App. Div. 2003) | | | Bhagat v. Bhagat, | 13 | | 217 N.J. 22 (2014) | | | Brill v. The Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America, | 13, 31 | | 142 N.J. 520 (1995)
[brief] A.  The Sentencing Court Erred In Finding Yarbough Factors 3A And 3C As It Relied On (1) A Dismissed Charge And (2) Speculation With No Basis In The Record That [...] Possessed The Handgun For A Meaningful Period Before Or After The Robbery.  [...] argued in Point I.A of his initial brief that the trial court’s findings of factors 3A and 3C under Yarbough, violated State v. K.S., 220 N.J. 190 (2015) because the Court found those factors in reliance on its assumption that [...] had committed a second robbery separate from the one of which he was convicted (the Autozone robbery), even though the Autozone robbery charges had been dismissed and the court did not hear any evidence in support of those charges.
[brief] (Pa 5)  Respondent's brief confirms there was no proper application for attorney's fees.  The letter to counsel (Pa 82) does not constitute a proper application.  There is no question Respondent did not move to amend the order of dismissal or submit a proper application for attorney's fees.  R. 442-9; R. 1:7-4(b).  Defendant did not file a cross-appeal for affirmative relief.  Therefore, Defendant’s request for remand to award fees is misplaced.  (Db14)  Arguably, Plaintiff will be entitled to fees once it is determined Defendant failed to honor the negotiated payment thus necessitating this lawsuit.  (Pa 46)  Regardless, the fee claimed by Defendant is not reasonable or properly supported.  (Pa 82)  CONCLUSION
[directive] [...] 115 11/25/64 1546 (2)  [...] 60 06/15/59 1289 (7)  [...] 180 06/21/55 1073 (4)  200 07/15/57 1184 (1)  [...] 15 01/21/65 1602 (9)  55 06/20/67 1749 (4)  [...] 65 04/09/57 1168 (3)  30 01/06/64 1548 (4)  [...] 142 02/02/59 1267 (3)  150 01/16/61 1378 (3)  [...] 180 12/28/56 1153 (1)  [...] 20 10/18/55 1087 (7)  [...] 55 04/25/61 1393 (2)  [...] 20 07/16/57 1185 (1)  [...] 180 04/21/55 1063 (1)  07/18/56 1126 (3)  Revoked [...] 180 01/24/55 1050 (1)  240 06/14/57 1177 (8)  151 04/20/60 1340 (5)  50 07/06/62 1456 (3)  License of [...] 55 06/17/65 1630 (2)  115 08/11/65 1637 (1)  License of [...] 06/01/43 571 (1)  Revoked [...] 50 07/29/65 1625 (2)  [...] 90 02/06/63 1501 (5)  Perth Amboy License of [...] 25 08/19/49 852 (7)
[brief] [...], a Borough resident, alleges that he continued to drink unfiltered tap water for nearly two years after receipt of the initial advisory notice of the MCL exceedance, as he had done since first moving into his home in 2012.  Pa36 at ¶ 18.  Eventually, however, at the beginning of 2022, [...] conducted his own “research” regarding PFNA.  Pa37 at ¶ 23.  After doing that “research”, [...] subjectively decided – contrary to the NJDEP-approved advisory notices that [...] sent to residents – that the water [...] supplied was not fit to drink.  *Id.* at ¶¶ 23, 24.  [...] decided that he would no longer drink the water supplied by [...], and instead would drink bottled water.  *Id.* at ¶¶ 24, 25.  **PROCEDURAL HISTORY**
[brief] Courts are to enforce contracts “based on the intent of the parties, the express terms of the contract, surrounding circumstances and the underlying purpose of the contract. ”  Caruso v. Ravenswood Developers, Inc., 337 N.J. Super. 499, 506 (App. Div. 2001).  “Contracts are to be read as a whole in a fair and common sense manner. ”  Manahawkin Convalescent v. O’Neill, 217 N.J. 99, 118 (2014).  The plain language of the contract shall govern if there exists no ambiguity.  Township of White v. Castle Ridge Dev. Corp., 419 N.J. Super. 68, 74-75 (App. Div. 2011).  The court may not rewrite a contract or grant a better deal than for which the parties expressly bargained.
[brief] (Pa0000199-203).  As part of the Settlement Agreement, the parties agreed to a resolution regarding pay.  Specifically, the Settlement Agreement provides the “salaries and steps specifically set forth in the June 7, 2017 Implementation Memoranda shall not be altered,” but that “all currently employed Sergeants will be increased to a new base salary of $100,000.00 per year effective January 1, 2018 and all sworn officers hired as, or promoted to the rank of Sergeant will receive a base salary of $100,000.00 per year.  All other law enforcement officers hired after the date of this Agreement shall not be entitled to any of these additional monies and shall be hired and thereafter promoted under the salaries and steps specifically set forth in the June 7, 2017 Implementation Memoranda.
[brief] Even were *Oldwick* still applicable, it is distinguishable from the matter at hand.  The seawall constructed within the easement taken from [...] is physically the same seawall constructed within the Valentine Street right of way.  The "pocket" discontinuity straddles the property line between the subject property and Valentine Street.  The two sides are inseparable and created the “pocket” which results in the increased vulnerability of the subject property to flooding during low frequency storms events.  The roughly north half of the pocket is located on the subject property and the south half is on the adjoining property.  The impact of the pocket on the portion of the subject property cannot be separated from the portion of the pocket on the Valentine Street right of way.  As [...] testified, "There is no pocket without both sides."  So it just doesn't exist without both, considering both pieces of it.  (Da497:1-3)  Even under Oldwick, the use of and damages from the easement taken are integral and inseparable from the same pocket wall on the adjacent Valentine Street right of way; and the property owner was entitled to be compensated for the damages therefrom.  At the very least, it was a question for the fact finder.  Just compensation is to consider not only the positive but the negative impacts of the project as well.  Based on the foregoing, it is respectfully submitted that the court erred in granting plaintiff's motion to exclude damages for the property's increased vulnerability to wave overtopping.
[brief] Order Denying Plaintiffs’ Motion for Reconsideration  ..............................................................Pa89  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT  The issue on appeal is a relatively simple one: do any of the Plaintiffs-Appellants have standing to pursue their underlying claims?  Standing is a threshold issue, and a proper determination of standing ensures that only litigants with a substantial interest in a matter can seek judicial review to determine the merits of a case.  Plaintiffs-Appellants are unable to demonstrate that they are real parties in interest to the substantive claims raised in the Complaint.  This appeal arises from the dismissal with prejudice of Plaintiffs-Appellants’ Complaint due to Plaintiffs-Appellants’ lack of standing in the underlying matter.
[brief] (7T 150-19 to 151-8, 151-25 to 152-1)  The arresting officer testified that when he first approached defendant, he fled, though he was later apprehended and taken into custody.  (7T 155-25 to 156-2).  The officer testified that he recognized defendant because of his blue eyes.  (7T159:17-22).  Following [...]’s arrest, he gave a recorded statement to police in which he admitted he was in the area of the shooting at the time the victim was murdered.
[brief] - **Misappropriation #1:**  $500,000 transferred from [...]’s [...] account November 5, 2013 to the [...]’ [...]n account #0319.  (36T 36:11-22).  - **Misappropriation #2:**  On various dates from 2013-2015, [...] paid himself $629,217.85 from [...] customer, [...], to [...]’s bank account.  (36T 34:20 to 35:7).  ---  9  Although [...] identified about $10 million in diverted (or suspected diverted) funds, the trial court performed an exacting analysis of the evidence and determined that the proofs as to some of those diversions were insufficient to warrant relief.
[brief] Again, all of the claims against [...] were based entirely on assertions that he placed his personal financial interests above the Association’s pecuniary interests.  Exclusion (g), the personal profit exclusion, bars coverage of claims “based on … the insured gaining any personal profit … or advantage…”  The Vermont Court made express factual findings that [...] and his wife placed their interests above the Association’s through management of Association litigation with an eye towards avoidance of personal liability for attorneys’ fees and collection of personal attorneys’ fees, both at the direct expense of the Association.  As the Law Division correctly found, exclusion (g) eliminates coverage of such claims.
[brief] On June 20, 2023, Board Defendants adopted amended versions of Policy 5756.  See Da152 and Da169.  On June 21, 2023, Respondents filed Verified Complaints with the Division on Civil Rights (“the DCR matter”) alleging that the Policy violated the Law Against Discrimination (“LAD”), N.J.S.A. 10:5-1 et seq.  See Da36 and Da74.  Simultaneously, on June 21, 2023, Respondents filed Verified Complaints and Orders to Show Cause before the Chancery Division in Essex County, Docket Numbers [...] and [...], seeking a preliminary injunction restraining implementation of the Policy until the DCR matter is adjudicated.  See Da9 and Da48.  On June 23, 2023, Board Defendants filed motions to change venue from Essex to Monmouth County.  On June 27, 2023, the Court entered Orders transferring these matters to the Chancery Division in Monmouth County.  See Da147 and Da148.  On June 28, 2023, the Court entered an Order to Show Cause, returnable August 15, 2023.  See Da1-2 and Da3-4.  On August 15, 2023¹, the Superior ¹T refers to the Transcript of the August 15, 2023, Oral Argument on the Respondent-Plaintiff’s Orders to Show Cause.  Court, Chancery Division, Monmouth County, heard oral argument on the Order to Show Cause.  On August 18, 2023, the Court entered an Order preliminary enjoining the Policies pending resolution of the DCR matter and restraining Board Defendants from otherwise altering, amending, rescinding, or revising Policy 5756.  See Da115-116, Da117-118, and Da119-138.  On September 6, 2023, Board Defendants filed Notices of Appeal, which were amended on September 8, 2023.  See Da139-142 and Da143-146.  On October 13, 2023, Board Defendants filed Motions to Supplement the Record, which the Court decided on October 27, 2023.  See Da272-279.  After issuing initial scheduling orders, and pursuant to Respondents’ request, the Court issued scheduling orders on November 27, 2023, aligning the briefing schedule of these matters, along with a companion case involving [...] (Docket Number [...]).
[directive] indictment/trial speedy with the to comply  POLICY PLEA ESCALATING 12.  Considerations.  General Policy 12.1 of plea, State are the result a negotiated guilty convictions in this of majority vast  The Bail under the is expected and intended that Section 1.3, it in trial.  As noted than a rather monetary bail previously would have been unable to post who defendants many Reform Law, will on acomplaint-warrant is issued, be released or if acomplaint-summons, released on will be their These defendants, hoping to delay conditions.
[brief] 4 PROCEDURAL HISTORY ..............................................................................................................  5 COUNTERSTATEMENT OF FACTS ............................................................................................ 7 LEGAL ARGUMENT .....................................................................................................................  15 POINT I THE APPELLANT DOES NOT HAVE STANDING TO CHALLENGE THE ACCOUNTING OR THE PETITIONER’S FEE APPLICATION .........................................................  15 POINT II THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR BY STRIKING THE APPELLANT’S EXCEPTIONS ........................................................................................................................................................................ 16 POINT III THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING THE APPELLANT’S MOTION TO RECONSIDER THE JUDGMENT ........................................................................................................ 17 POINT IV THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DETERMINING THE FEE APPLICATION ........................................................................................................................................................................ 18 POINT V THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING THE APPELLANT’S MOTION TO RECONSIDER THE FEE AWARD.  .............................................  19  CONCLUSION
[brief] As noted, the PSLRA discovery stay is mandatory unless Plaintiffs demonstrate that specific discovery is needed to preserve evidence or to prevent undue prejudice.  See 15 U.S.C. § 78u–4(b)(3)(B).  In my view, Plaintiffs have failed to meet their burden.  Although Plaintiffs claim that the proposed class faces “real prejudice” as a result of wasting insurance if this action is “even partly stalled,” that argument can be made in every pending securities fraud case.  Dkt. 215 at 1.  There is nothing particularly unique about this case that suggests to me that lifting the PSLRA discovery stay is appropriate.  Accordingly, I hold that the PSLRA discovery stay applies to the supplemental claims added to the § 10(b) action and the time period they cover: September 20, 2019—January 23, 2020.
[brief] Romano, 41 N.J. Super. at 568.  This case does not present the kind of matter that will be destroyed absent immediate appeal.  No question of privilege or immunity that would be gone forever if not enforced are present, nor is there any type of diminishing asset at issue that would degrade over time, necessitating immediate review.  Rather, Plaintiff simply believes that [...] erred and to avoid some unspecified, “harm. ” (Pb7-9)  However, merely disagreeing with the trial judge’s determination—even one that resulted in the dismissal of one of the parties—is not a sufficient basis upon which to move for immediate appellate review.  The principle favoring unitary appeals after a final order would be decimated if immediate appeal were deemed appropriate, simply because the plaintiff believes the dismissal of one of the defendants pre-trial is erroneous.
[brief] Ramierz v. United States, 998 F. Supp. 425, 434.  Probable cause exists where the police have reasonably trustworthy information sufficient to warrant a reasonable person to believe a particular person has committed or is committing an offense Amores v. State, 816 S.W.2d 407, 413 (Tex.Cr.App.1991).  The determination of the existence of probable cause concerns "the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent [people], not legal technicians, act."  See Woodward v. State, 668 S.W.2d 337, 345 (Tex.Cr.App.1982) (opinion on rehearing), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1181, 105 S.Ct. 939, 83 L.Ed.2d 952 (1985)  The standard in establishing a probable cause defense in the context of a false arrest claim is one of "objective reasonableness."  Hayes v. Mercer County, 217 N.J. Super at 622-623.  An officer can defeat a claim by establishing probable cause, or even absent same, if a reasonable officer similarly situated would have believed in its existence.
[brief] Thus, the jury was unable to unanimously conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that he had possessed the Taurus handgun.  Unfortunately, that does not compel the conclusion that the prosecutor’s improper remarks had no impact on the jurors’ deliberations.  It is entirely reasonable to suppose that one or more jurors, while voting to acquit [...] of gun possession, had nonetheless been swayed, whether consciously or not, by the prosecutor’s improper comments, particularly the one about shared ammunition.  This effect could in turn reasonably have contributed to those jurors voting to convict [...] of conspiracy, a more amorphous charge which by its nature relies on inferences.  Defense counsel failed to object to this instance of prosecutorial misconduct.  Nonetheless, the misconduct was so egregious that it was clearly capable of producing an unjust result, and thus constituted plain error.  R. 2:10-2.  Reversal is required.  POINT III
[brief] [...], Plaintiff-Appellant, v. [...], [...] DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...] AND JOHN DOES  1-10  BEING AGENTS, SERVANTS AND EMPLOYEES OF DEFENDANTS AS A CONTINUING INVESTIGATION MAY REVEAL (WHO ARE FICTITIOUSLY NAMED BECAUSE THEIR TRUE IDENTITIES ARE UNKNOWN) (ALL DEFENDANTS NAMED HEREIN IN THEIR INDIVIDUAL AND OFFICIAL CAPACITIES), Defendants-Respondents.