ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] (Ab135).  In this appeal, [...] renews its argument presented to the agency that the Docks Rule requires [...] to determine that [...]’s navigation is not changed as a result of the [...] Technical Modification Permit.  That is not the standard, is contradicted by [...]’s specific analysis in this case as well as [...]’s longstanding interpretation that hinderances to navigation apply to navigational channels.  According to [...]’s survey, the structures in [...]’s proposed development were 163 feet from the marked navigational channel.  (Aa91).  [...]’s “Navigation” considerations noted that the proposed development did not include structures “within 50 feet of a navigational channel. ”  (Aa93).  N.J.A.C. 7:7-9.7(b)(4).  [...] explained these findings in its adjudicatory hearing request denial.  (Aa135).  This directly aligns with [...]’s long-standing interpretation that the focus of the navigation requirement is protecting navigation channels.
[brief] Hall Harbor Yacht Basin v. Department of Env. Prot., 1987 ENV LEXIS 117 at *7 (Oct. 19, 1987).  (where DEP considered the distance from the navigational channel in response to questions about hinderance to navigation); Misiak v. Walker, Department of Env. Prot., 1994 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 1109 at *13-14 (Nov. 9, 1994).  (where DEP reviewed water depths in mooring area in response to allegation of hinderance to navigation).  The record demonstrates DEP applied these long-standing regulatory interpretations here.
[brief] The trial court erred in granting summary judgment for Plaintiffs in this case.  The trial court erroneously concluded the parties agreed there were no genuine issues of material fact, when in fact Defendant had directed the Court to both an expert opinion and factual certifications directly challenging the reasonableness of the purported “notice. ”  Even if the matter were “ripe” for summary judgment, the court erred in ordering reformation of five recorded documents, including a recorded subdivision, based upon an entirely new legal theory that the mere existence of a prior subdivision is inquiry notice which compels a buyer to recalculate his lot frontage using pre-subdivision deeds, tax maps of adjacent parcels, and private agreements not found in the public record.
[brief] ”  A253.  “The court finds [...]’s testimony to be credible.  He admitted that the written retainer agreement in evidence was drafted and executed in error due to its inclusion of defendant.  His testimony that he never had any conversations or contact with defendant as to the financial issues or as part of the bankruptcy and that she signed a retainer agreement with [...] are found to be credible. ”  A253.  [...] acknowledged that the Final Judgment of Divorce had incorporated a “Mid-Marriage Agreement” that New Jersey courts (Pacelli v. Pacelli, 319 N.J. Super. 185 (App. Div. 1999)) find inherently coercive and generally unenforceable, but said that the Mid-Marriage Agreement in this case “was incorporated into” the Matrimonial Settlement Agreement executed 43 days later, and the documents provided “that the parties understood the income and assets of the other party, their right to independent legal counsel and that the terms of the MMA were ‘fair, just and reasonable.
[directive] Giglio  A decision to disclose in one case does not dictate the decision to disclose in subsequent cases.  The prosecutor, in consultation with the prosecutor’s designee or liaison, must evaluate each piece of potential information on a case-by- Giglio Giglio case basis to determine whether the material must be disclosed under the law or submitted to the court for an review.  ex parte, in camera  Importantly, if the prosecutor makes the decision not to use an investigative employee because of or concerns, or if the relevant or information Brady Giglio  Brady Giglio substantially affected the case in any way, the County Prosecutor’s Office shall notify the appropriate individual in that agency of the decision.  The procedure for such notification shall be set by the County Prosecutor.  After the required disclosures are made, the investigative employee may seek review of that determination from the County Prosecutor or their designee, or from the Office of Attorney General.  This review shall not interrupt or interfere with the prosecutor’s obligation to disclose information in the ongoing case.  Because a determination requires a case-by-case determination, promulgating Giglio a “do-not-call” list of individuals who can never be called as witnesses is not a Page 9 preferred means of complying with and obligations and should be Brady Giglio avoided.
[brief] ”  [...], 2012 NJ PERC LEXIS 18, 38 NJPER 340 (¶116 2012).  The Commission has specifically held that “reductions in costs resulting from retirements or otherwise, as well as any increases in costs stemming from promotions or additional new hires would not effect the costing out of the award… .”  Id.  However, such “breakage” may be considered by an interest arbitrator “in deciding whether it is appropriate to factor in such reductions or increases when rendering a salary award.
[brief] In other words, [...] suffers from a 9/11 illness and is disabled as a result.  He qualifies for accidental disability benefits under the Ricci Act standard.  [...] was denied the ability to register his presence at the September 11th terrorist attacks and therefore also denied accidental disability benefits based on an unsupported finding that Division mailed a post card notifying him of his requirement to register.  This finding is arbitrary, capricious, and against the substantial weight of the evidence.
[brief] The second agreement with his own attorneys, an Acknowledgement of Attorney Charging Lien again does not contain the word assignment, does not permit his own attorneys to bring the instant action in their name or in any way control a prosecution of same.  (Pa0197).  Rather, it provides that [...] acknowledges the lien on the amounts he might receive upon the net settlement or other recovery in this action.  Nowhere in the agreement does this settlement agreement is the word “assignment” used and it merely provides that his former attorneys have an attorneys lien as a security interest in the instant litigation.  (Pa0197).  Obviously, and on the face of the documents neither of the documents can constitute an assignment of a chose in action.
[brief] DEP relied on the faulty set back analysis produced by [...] in concluding that the requirements of the Scenic Resources and Design Rule were not applied in the Redevelopment Zone.  However, [...]’s set back analysis proves no such thing because it does not differentiate between buildings constructed before the 1994 Rule and after.  (Aa23 - Aa28).  The [...] ocean front was heavily developed well over 100 years ago.  (See 1870 and 1907 Sandborn maps of [...] – Ra70-71).  Of course, all the old-style buildings in [...] were designed without reference to the Rule which did not come about until 1994.  DEP’s conclusion that it did not apply the Rule in [...] is not based on anything with probative value.  DEP has not produced a single permit that allowed such a building, nor has a single [...] permit that allowed such a result been produced.  [...] changed the Design Guidelines in 2020 in order to accommodate the proposed [...] building otherwise [...] had to reject it.  (2Ra68).  DEP’s conclusion also defies the facts on the ground.  The parts of the Redevelopment Zone both north and south of the [...] site were developed, since 1994, with buildings that are completely, almost completely, or at least partially stepped-back from the waterfront.  (ARa1-2).  None are slab sided monoliths rising straight up and crowding the waterfront environment.  DEP’s conclusion is not a scientific one requiring agency expertise.  It is just plain wrong, as anyone can see.
[brief] However, [...] also concedes that the “salary increases were not across-the-board” and instead “[were] a litigation settlement affecting one plaintiff. ” (Pb9).  In Coyle, the court affirmed the TPAF Board’s denial of “pension credits for retroactive salary increases he received as part of a settlement of a lawsuit he filed against his employer .  . . .”  Coyle, slip op. at 1.  Coyle’s lawsuit against his former employer was for alleged “age and disability discrimination in violation of the [NJLAD], N.J.S.A. 10:5-1 to -49. ”
[brief] Applying the sentencing principles already discussed, we have no grounds to disturb the sentence imposed.  At sentencing, the court found three aggravating factors, the risk that defendant would commit another offense, *N.J.S.A. 2C:44–1(a)(3)*, the extent of defendant's prior criminal record, *N.J.S.A.* 2C:44–1(a)(6), and the need to deter defendant and others, N.J.S.A.
[brief] Finally, the failure to issue any instruction to the jurors about how to use this evidence compounds the harm of admitting it.  The Supreme Court has held that a clear, explicit instruction on the appropriate use of other-bad-act evidence is necessary in every case.  *State v. Oliver*, 133 N.J. 141, 158 (1993).  Because of its “inherently prejudicial nature,” whenever bad-acts evidence is admitted under N.J.R.E. 404(b), “the court must instruct the jury on the limited use of the evidence. ”  State v. Marrero, 148 N.J. 469, 495 (1997) (emphasis added); see also State v. Barden, 195 N.J. 375, 390 (2008); Cofield, 127 N.J. at 341; State v. Stevens, 115 N.J. 289, 304, 308-09 (1989).  That rule applies even if it is defense counsel who elicits the testimony, and even if counsel did not request a limiting instruction.  State v. Clausell, 121 N.J. 298, 322-23 (1990).  The instruction should be given twice: when the evidence is presented, and again in the final jury charge.  Barden, 195 N.J. at 390; State v. Compton, 304 N.J. Super. 477, 483 (App. Div. 1997), certif. den. 153 N.J. 51 (1998).  Whenever evidence of prior bad acts is before a jury, “a court must precisely instruct the jury [pursuant to N.J.R.E. 404(b)] that the proper use of such evidence is to prove a relevant issue in dispute and not to impugn the character of the defendant. ”  State v. Blakney, 189 N.J. 88, 92 (2006).  Indeed, “because ‘the inherently prejudicial nature of such evidence casts doubt on a jury's ability to follow even the most precise limiting instruction,’” the court's instruction “should be formulated carefully to explain precisely the permitted and prohibited purposes of the evidence. ”  Cofield, 127 N.J. at 341, quoting Stevens, 115 N.J. at 304.  See also State v. G.S., 145 N.J. 460, 472 (1996) (a limiting instruction must not only specify the proper purposes for which the evidence can be used; it must also “caution against a consideration of that evidence for improper purposes”); State v. Cusick, 219 N.J. Super. 452, 467 (App. Div. 1987) (same).  The instruction “must include … ‘sufficient reference to the factual context of the case to enable the jury to comprehend and appreciate the fine distinction to which it is required to adhere. ’”  State v. Hernandez, 170 N.J. 106, 131 (2001), quoting State v. Fortin, 162 N.J. 517, 534 (2000).  “[T]he essential point to be made in [a] limiting instruction” on other crimes evidence is that such evidence cannot be considered “to prove defendant's disposition to commit the crimes with which he was charged. ”  Stevens, 115 N.J. at 309; see also State v. Reddish, 181 N.J. 553, 611 (2004) (“An explicit instruction that the jury should not make any inferences about defendant's propensity to commit [bad acts] is an essential point to be made in the limiting instruction”).  Whether the error is viewed as the improper cross-examination and argument by the State, or the failure to give the appropriate limiting instruction, in either event the error should be fatal to these convictions and result in a reversal and remand for retrial.
[brief] THE BOARD ACTED RATIONALLY, PRUDENTLY, AND REASONABLY. **  In light of the TPA, the Board’s powers and duties, and the instructions of the trial courts below, all arguments made on appeal that the Board acted arbitrarily and capriciously prove meritless.  The record demonstrates that the Board did exactly what it needed to do, and that each decision was well-supported, well-reasoned and well-documented.  A.
[brief] Appellant further argues that “there is ample precedent” to show that a lack of documentation is a technical defect and does not make a contract unenforceable (Pb p. 16).  This argument further shows that Appellant does not actually understand the issues in this present suit.  The cases he cites to make this point are cases about undocumented workers.  The term undocumented in this context refers to the legality of their presence in the nation and has very little to do with missing actual physical documents in the same sense as this case.  Appellant is clearly aware of this as he refers to the plaintiffs as “illegal (i.e. undocumented)” (Pb p 16).  None of these cases are about lacking a necessary physical document proving ownership, to create a bargained-for exchange.  All of these cases are about whether the illegality of their presence in the nation renders the existing contracts they have illegal and unenforceable.
[brief] (PA12; PA14; PA16; 2T40:19)  [...] and [...] argued below, and the trial court held, that [...]’s status as a representative who is not a “licensed person” under the AOM statute did not matter.  Because HAKs and [...] are licensed entities and had licensed persons supervising [...], a vicarious liability claim based on [...]’s negligent conduct required plaintiffs to provide an Affidavit of Merit.
[brief] (1T5-22 to 1T6-22, 1T9-17 to 1T10-2, 1T11-25 to 1T13-6, 1T14-7 to 1T18-7, 1T25-14 to 1T25-16, 1T36-9 to 1T36-25).  Indeed, on the day he issued the Post Trial Order, [...] stated on the record that he “look at the contract[] [a]nd … concluded that [the Tenant Allowance is] only payable if you’re not in breach.
[directive] Private court reporters used services must comply with all contractor of provisions, including the requirement compliance with the State's Business Ethics Guide.  For Judiciary purposes, the requirement that personnel observe all laws and regulations of be staff includes the requirement confidentiality.  As with OCRs, the selected agency will of of informed the nature the assignment and the CRCR will be required to bring the equipment to necessary provide CART services (neither the Appellate Division nor the vicinage will of The provide CART equipment).  costs services provided by private CRCRs will be covered by the central office and will not be charged back to the vicinage.  More detailed operational guidance may be provided to relevant vicinage staff, including the Operations Division ADA Managers and the Title Coordinators.
[directive] Total CCPF Penalty $ el juez podría 6.  ¿Entiende que a su discreción imponerle un tiempo mínimo de reclusión que [Sí/Yes] [No/No] cumplir antes de que pueda aspirar a la libertad condicional, y que ese período podría ser tan largo como la mitad del período de la sentencia de privación de libertad que se le haya impuesto a usted?
[brief] ”  (Da 68-69) (citing Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 82 (2010); Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S.  Accordingly, this Court found that [...]’s sentence amounted to the practical equivalent of life without parole and remanded for resentencing pursuant to Zuber.  (Da 67-69)  This Court instructed the resentencing court to take the Miller factors into account in revisiting [...]’s aggregate sentence and his consecutive sentences, specifically emphasizing the importance of considering the “real-world” effect of [...]’s consecutive sentences on remand.
[brief] Sat Below: Honorable [...], A.J.S.C.  Date Submitted: BRIEF ON BEHALF OF APPELLANT/PLAINTIFF, [...] [...]  A Professional Corporation [...] [...] [...] [...] (FAX)  Attorneys for Plaintiff OF COUNSEL AND ON THE BRIEF: [...], Esq. – Attorney ID No. 037691991  [...]  ON THE BRIEF: [...], Esq. – Attorney ID No. 047511994  [...], Esq. – Attorney ID No. 371942021  TABLE OF CONTENTS
[directive] The statute permits a map depicting the location and boundaries within 1,000 feet of school property, under the provisions of N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7.  The statute also precludes the use of a defense that the defendant was unaware he/she was within 1,000 feet of school property or a school zone.  Nor is it deemed relevant that juveniles were or were not present or that the school was not in session at the time of the offense.  See, P.L.1999, c.185.  Guilty Plea to Charge(s) as Filed
[brief] The teachers did not seek to telephone parents to specifically report a child’s gender identification but they did not want to conceal pertinent information that could impact student health and well-being or affirmatively mislead parents.  Id. at *4.  The court observed that, as result of the policy, “[p]arents are left outside” (Id.) because teachers who are in the “position to observe the student and form[] the opinion that the intellectual or social health and well- --- ²  The Court dismissed the parents’ familial privacy claim on immunity grounds because, at the time of the incidents in question (i.e., 1997), the parents’ claim “in the unique circumstances of this case cannot be said to have been clearly established. ” being of the student may be at risk related to gender non-conformance or dysphoria … [are] not permitted to inform the parents….  ”  Id. at *5.  Although relief was granted based on First Amendment free speech and free exercise grounds, the court reasoned that the district’s policy was “in direct tension with the federal constitutional rights of parents to direct the upbringing and education of their children” and that the “policy of elevating a child’s gender-related choices to that of paramount importance, while excluding a parent from knowing or, or participating in, that kind of choice, is as foreign to federal constitutional and statutory law as it is medically unwise.
[brief] For example, [...] pointed out to the jury that the grout on the back of [...]’s head was concentrated on the right side of his head with little to no grout on the left side of his head.  [9T 169:10-161:15; DLa 033].  This occurred because [...]’s right side was closest to the aisle as he was walking away from [...].  [9T 169:10-163:4].
[brief] The Court draws all legitimate inferences from the facts in favor of the non-moving party.  Id.  (emphasis added)  Credibility determinations are the function of juries, not the Court.  Brill, 142 N.J. 520 at 540.  If there exists a single, unavoidable resolution of the alleged disputed issue of fact, the issue would be considered insufficient to constitute a “genuine” issue of material fact for purposes of R. 4:46-2.
[brief] On the summary judgment, he trial court held that the State’s notice applied to the case pending before it.  Because a case could not be dismissed on public disclosure grounds if the Attorney General opposed such dismissal, the trial court granted Relator’s motion for summary judgment.  4T 6:10-13.  The trial court also considered whether application of the 2023 Veto Amendment to a case that was pending before its passage raised retroactivity concerns.  4T 6:22-28:23.  Its thorough analysis was supported by applicable law and established interpretive canons.  The trial court held:
[brief] In this regard, outside of the December 1998 Deed wherein [...] readily admitted signing his brother’s Chinese name due to his attorney’s error, there are no examples of [...] signing as “[...]” on any other documents, checks, or deeds.  In fact, [...], Esq., [...]’s own estate planning attorney, reviewed numerous signatures by [...] in her firm’s file related to [...] and testified that none of them contained a signature with the name “[...]. ” (11T 63:11-77:3, Jan. 26, 2023); Pa1119-1152  Similarly, the [...] records, which were secured pursuant to subpoena, contain all checks signed by [...] from January 2016 through October 2019, including an October 17, 2019 check to [...] in the amount of $5,000 noted as “initial contribution. ” (Pa1386-1740).  None these checks bear the signature of “[...]. ”  Rather, they are all signed by “[...]. ”  In sum, whether a check or a formal legal document, the name and corresponding signature “[...]” are found in only two places – the December 1998 Deed [...] did not sign and the fraudulent October 2019 Deed.  d.  Defendants  Concealed the 2019 Transfer from [...]
[brief] TABLE OF CONTENTS  Table of Judgments  Appealed .................................................................  iii  Table of Trial Transcripts ...........................................................................  iii  Table of Abbreviations ..............................................................................  iii  Table of Authorities .................................................................................. iii  Preliminary Statement .............................................................................  1  Procedural History ....................................................................................  2 Statement of Facts ....................................................................................  4  I.  Plaintiff’s allegations ..............................................................................  4  II.  [...]’s snow-removal contract with [...] ........  5  III.  The Trial Court’s grant of summary judgment to [...] and the settlement of plaintiff’s claims ........................................  7  Legal Argument .......................................................................................
[brief] 757 Supp. 2d 535 13, 16, 27, 29, 36  Lampe v. Xouth, Inc., 952 F.2d 697, 700–01 (3d Cir.1991)  22  Marder v. Realty Constr. Co., 84 N.J. Super. 313, 319, 202, A.2d 175 (App. Div.) aff’d.
[brief] (Pa105 at 26:2-4; Pa230-Pa233).  Defendant [...] had extra barricades available to replace barricades that were damaged or that presented safety concerns because of feet that were bent up.  (Pa99-Pa100 at 20:22-21:1; Pa108 at 29:11-18; Pa120 at 41:14-24; Pa122 at 43:6-11; Pa196 at 50:2-6).  The plaintiff testified at her deposition that she noticed the barricades that were erected at the entrance of the [...] store and that a foot on one of the barricades was sticking up when entering the store on the date of her fall.
[directive] (2)  Applications For Those Sentenced to Probation or No Supervision (N .J .S.A. 2A: 168A-8(b))  A Certificate may be issued for a qualified offender who or was subject to is of if probation or who was not required to serve a period supervision it determined is that:  of or (a) the applicant is convicted a second, third, fourth degree offense and is otherwise eligible for relief under subsection N.J.S.A. 2A:168A-8(c); of (b) the applicant has not been convicted a crime since the conviction for which the person under supervision, does is not have a pending criminal charge, and there is no information presented that such a charge imminent; is ADA ENSURING m1 TO OOOR AN OPEN JUSTICE  Americans with Act Disabilities Directive #02-24 Page 5 ( c) issuing the certificate will not pose a substantial risk to public safety; and ( d) issuing the ce11ificate will assist in the successful of reintegration the offender and consistent with the is public interest.
[brief] “The jurisdictional issue of ‘default’ encompasses the question of whether the amount of rent alleged to be in default, is due, unpaid and owing, not only whether it is due and unpaid. ”  Marini v. Ireland, 56 N.J. 130, 139 (1970) (emphasis added).  “The mere fact of the tenant's failure to pay rent . . . is not in and of itself a sufficient fact to meet the statutory jurisdictional requisite. ”  Ibid.  Here, given the automatic deduction of Tenant’s Allowance provided by the Allowance Offset, rent, even if “due” was not “owing” at the time of trial.  Ibid.  As of and since the Gym Closure was lifted in September 2020, Landlord has consistently owed Tenant more than Tenant owed Landlord.  This was true as of the date the Gym Closure was lifted, true at trial, and is true today.  Fourth, the canon against surplusage further undercuts Landlord’s and the trial judge’s alternative interpretation of the “Landlord shall pay” clause in § 4.02.