ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Dear [...]:  Please be advised that this law firm represents [...], plaintiff in the above referenced matter.  (Da1).  The Verified Complaint named [...] as the plaintiff.  (Da1).  The Verified Complaint did not name [...] as the plaintiff.  The Verified Complaint simply listed John as the son of [...].  (Da1).  In the Bergen County Probate Action, the Certification in support of the Verified Complaint was signed by [...] .
[brief] See P.T. v. M.S., 325 N.J. Super. 193, 220-21 (App. Div. 1999) (collecting cases in which a remand to a different judge was ordered to preserve the appearance of a fair and unprejudiced hearing in light of the original judge’s potential commitment to findings).  Third, [...] refused to interpret [...]’s allocution as anything other than an insincere attempt at legal gamesmanship.
[brief] [...]’s stepmother and [...]’s mother, [...], told the police that [...] gave her the stolen phone that she turned over to the police.  (7T 176-8 to 22, 177-21 to 178-8)  During the second interview, [...] admitted that [...] knew that he was going to be in the area to attend the memorial, so [...] asked [...] to drop him off at a specific location to meet his friend.
[brief] [...] was completely unaware of the easement created by the [...] in the 1966 Totten-to-[...] Deed and, therefore, commenced a complaint in the Superior Court of New Jersey – Hunterdon County, Chancery Division, seeking a judicially created easement across the [...] (Da178).  [...]’s Complaint consisted of only two counts (Da178).  The first pled a claim for implied easement by necessity (Da178).  The second cause of action sought an implied easement by prescription (Da180).  No claim for express easement of any type was asserted by [...] (Da106; Da830).  By Order and decision dated September 28, 2006, the court ([...], P.J. Ch.) granted summary judgment and dismissed [...]’s complaint with prejudice (Da99; Da102).
[brief] [...] suggests that the HCPO and AG “had a mountain of evidence with which to charge and convict [...]” including findings by multiple Supreme Court panels that [...] committed “criminal conduct beyond a reasonable doubt. ”  (Pb19-20)  Not only is this speculative and hyperbolic, but it is also incorrect.  The Supreme Court made findings related to [...]’s character and fitness as a member of the Judiciary.  [...] did not face criminal indictment, and no such adjudication was undertaken by the Supreme Court.
[brief] Nothing would more offend the notions of justice and equity than to permit Defendants to escape their repayment obligations after they exploited the parties’ friendship to obtain the use of [...]’ $380,000 beginning in 2008, and then continued to trade on that relationship to persuade Plaintiff to forebear on the enforcement of his rights until after the purported expiration of a six-year limitations period.  The trial court expressly found that “the purpose behind statutes of limitation, cannot be intentionally subverted by [...], and then used by him as a legal shield to prevent [...] from collecting what is rightfully due under the terms of the third loan.
[brief] No Statutory Basis Permits a Court to Disturb the Award  Therefore, no statutory basis justifies vacating the Award.  Kearny PBA Local, 81 N.J. at 221.  [...]’s reliance on the unpublished case Knecht v. 225 River Street, LLC is misplaced, as that simple dispute concerned only the return of a security deposit with respect to the purchase of a condominium, pursuant to which the buyer did not meet the one express contract condition precedent for the return thereof.  App. Br. at 13 (citing 2012 WL 1020005 (App. Div. Mar. 28, 2012)).  The court there found “the arbitrator’s interpretation of the contractual language was not reasonably debatable” and held the arbitrator exceeded his authority by nonetheless awarding the buyer the return of her security deposit.  2012 WL 1020005, at *2, 4. Da554.
[directive] The investigation and a review of all information currently available to this office indicates that the officer followed the appropriate department policies and procedures.  More specifically, department policies and procedures permit the officer to [give details of the policy or procedure]…  If you have any additional information which you believe should be considered, please contact the Internal Affairs Unit at [telephone number].  Thank you for bringing this matter to our attention.  Not Sustained  The Internal Affairs Unit of this department has completed its investigation of your complaint concerning the conduct of [name of subject officer].
[brief] Although lay witnesses may provide testimony in the form of “opinions or inference” under New Jersey Rule of Evidence 701, lay witnesses may not testify “on a matter ‘not within [the witness’s] direct ken . . . and as to which the jury is as competent as he to form a conclusion. ”  Id. at 459 (citations omitted); State v. C.W.H., 465 N.J. Super 574, 593 (App. Div. 2021).  Assessing credibility is one such issue that falls “peculiarly within the jury’s ken,” and for which jurors require no expert assistance.  State v. J.Q., 252 N.J. Super. 11, 39 (App. Div. 1991).  Consequently, witnesses are prohibited from opining on the credibility of other witnesses.
[brief] ”  Id.  The trial court then reasoned that while the plaintiff’s allegations in Neuwirth were conclusory and could not support a theory of actual malice, “the Plaintiff [in this case] has presented detailed facts that call into question whether Defendant [...] and thus, in turn, all Defendants, here knew or had serious doubts about the veracity of the alleged defamatory statements they made or circulated. ”  Id. (emphasis added).  In other words, the trial court imputed [...]’s alleged state of mind to the [...].
[brief] “Elements of a crime, including those that establish its grade, may not be used as aggravating factors for sentencing of that particular crime. ”  *State v. Lawless*, 214 N.J. 594, 608 (2013) (citations omitted).  Thus, for example, the way a victim died cannot be considered an aggravating factor in sentencing in cases where death was an element of crime.  *State v. Pineda*, 119 N.J. 621, 627–28 (1990) (death by auto); *State v. Jarbath*, 114 N.J. 394, 404 (1989) (manslaughter).  See also *State v. Pillot*, 115 N.J. 558, 564 (1989) (holding that, where use of BB gun elevated robbery from second-degree to first-degree crime, use of weapon could not be considered aggravating factor for sentencing purposes).  But the use of a firearm is not an element of aggravated manslaughter.  Manslaughter can be committed in many ways, including by auto, with a knife, or even with bare hands.  Thus, unlike cases where the use of a weapon is an element of the crime or increases the degree of the crime, [...] did not impermissibly double-count an element of the offense when he considered the fact that defendant committed the homicide with a firearm.
[brief] (Pa10).  A.  Respondent Is Entitled To Summary Judgment On Its Breach of Contract Claim  With respect to the breach of contract claim, Respondent [...] has the burden to show (1) the parties entered into a valid contract, (2) that the defendant failed to perform his obligations under the contract and (3) that the plaintiff sustained damages as a result.  Murphy v. Implicito, 392 N.J. Super. 245, 265 (App. Div. 2007).  “Generally, the terms of an agreement are to be given their plain and ordinary meaning. ”  M.J. Paquet, Inc. v. N.J. Dep’t of Transp., 171 N.J. 378, 396 (2002).  “If the terms of a contract are clear, [courts] must enforce the contract as written.  . . .”  Graziano v. Grant, 326 N.J. Super. 328, 342 (App. Div. 1999).  It is undisputed that the parties entered into a valid contract, that Appellant failed to perform his obligations under the contract, and Respondent suffered damages as a result.  Indeed, Appellant admitted that he signed the Employee Agreement which explicitly stated that he agreed “not to charge personal purchases. ”  Appellant admitted he used the PCard to make personal purchases from 2012 until the cessation of his employment.  Respondent suffered damages from Appellant’s breach as the [...] report confirmed Appellant used his PCard for personal purchases over several years and incurred more than $256,000 in personal purchases. \(^5\)  Since the foregoing facts are undisputed, Respondent [...] is entitled to summary judgment on its breach of contract claim.
[brief] More specifically, *A.D. v. Ranney Sch. & James Paroline*, 2023 N.J. Super Unpub. LEXIS 605 (App. Div. Dec 21., 2022), addressed a situation where the plaintiff alleged that her child was assaulted and defendants sought to take the deposition of the child and *Yawger v. Suburban Propane*, 2017 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 3764 (N.J. Super. Aug. 18, 2017), involved a situation where the defendant sought to compel the plaintiff to appear and complete her deposition.  The matter before the Court relates to a non-party subpoena not a relevant party deposition and therefore these cases are clearly distinguishable.  The factors set forth in *Berrie v. Berrie*, 188 N.J. Super 274, 285 (Ch. Div. 1983) clearly demonstrate that the trial court erred in denying [...]’s motion to quash and for a protective order.  More specifically, with regard to the first factor, [...] is not a party to the Underlying Litigation, and, based on affidavits obtained by Respondents, had what can only be classified as limited, general, conversations with a handful of investors, and has no interest in the outcome of the Underlying Litigation.  These affidavits highlight that [...] has riled up (and deceived) [...]’s own investors in the [...] that he solely manages to fabricate issues with [...]
[directive] Attachment G Order 6 - Evaluation for Non-Compliance with of Clinical Conditions  Conditional Release  * * *  This order ([...]) is for use when information is presented to the court that a NGRI acquittee who has previously been placed on conditional release pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:4-8(b )(2) and has either been: (1) non-compliant with the conditions of of release or (2) the conditions the discharge plan are no longer adequate to In maintain the acquittee' s mental health condition in the community.
[directive] This throughout administration of criminal justice and enforcement of the laws efficient uniform and that may officials enforcement agencies and limitations on law imposes the This Directive State. and New Jersey under the United States limitations imposed than the be more restrictive be shall Nothing in this Directive regulations.  federal State statutes and Constitutions, and and party. enforced by any third substantive right that may be in create any construed any way to X.  Effective Date Report, day after signing, with the first shall the next business Directive take effect This the General on 1, 2019, and to the Attorney June Section VI of this Directive, due detailed in in force shall remain provisions of this Directive December 31, 2019.
[brief] Opinion Denying Plaintiffs’ Motion for Leave to Amend……..2T69:14-2T73:21  Order Denying Plaintiffs’ Motion for Leave to Amend ……………………………Pa246  Order Denying Plaintiffs’ Motion for Reconsideration of Denial of Leave to Amend………………………………………………………………………………………………………Pa252  Opinion Granting Defendants’ Motions in Limine …………………3T15:7-3T19:23  Order Granting Defendants’ Motions in Limine …………………………………………..Pa263  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
[brief] The record is clear that [...] has always vehemently disputed the allegations and the conclusion that he engaged in an intentional act of discrimination or harassment.  The claim that [...] purposefully and repeatedly misnamed the Complainant are serious and harmful to [...] and the union he was elected to lead.  The CSC’s determination that these circumstances did not warrant a fact-finding hearing is patently arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable.  It must be reversed.
[brief] In re Provision of Basic Generation Serv. for Period Beginning June 1, 2008, 205 N.J. 339, 349-50 (2011).................................................................25  Raleigh Avenue Beach Association v. Atlantis Beach Club, 185 N.J. 40 (2005)......................................................................................12, 13, 14, 15, 20 Brill v. Guardian Life Insurance Co., 142 N.J. 520 (1995).................................33  Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Association, 95 N.J. 306 (1984).................................................................10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 20, 24, 27
[directive] 2.  Casts, shoots, throws or otherwise places any stick, stone, object or other substance upon any street railway track, trolley track or railroad track; or 3.  Endangers or obstructs the safe operation of motor vehicles by casting, shooting, throwing or otherwise placing any stick, stone, object or other substance upon any highway or roadway; or Interference with 2C:33-14(a-e)  4.  Unlawfully climbs into or upon any light rail vehicle, railroad locomotive or railroad Transportation car, either in motion or standing on the track of any railroad company in this State; or 5.  Unlawfully disrupts, delays or prevents the operation of any vehicle, including, but not limited to, a bus, light rail vehicle, railroad locomotive, train, bus, jitney, trolley, subway, airplane or any other facility of transportation.
[brief] (7T 150: 10-25 to 7T 151: 1-16)  Any investor making a prudent investment in a rental property in a rent-controlled municipality would assuredly get a determination on what the legal rents were and, thus, a realistic understanding of what the income generated from the property would be before making an offer to purchase.  Having access to the actual legal rents and an expense statement just prior to the sale would have been the only way that the Board could determine the actual value at the time of purchase based on the income capitalization method – i.e., the standard method used for rental buildings.  Such figure is the one that should have been the actual purchase price and would have been the best indicator of whether the price [...] actually paid represented a prudent investment.
[brief] All Citations Not Reported in A.3d, 2012 WL 2912754  Footnotes  1  Disposable paper plates, for example, are not subject to Sales Tax.  See New Jersey Division of Taxation, New Jersey Sales Tax Guide, available at [URL] (last visited April 12, 2012) (listing items Sales Tax exempt items).  Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.  UNPUBLISHED OPINION.  CHECK COURT RULES BEFORE CITING.  Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division.  STATE of New Jersey, Plaintiff–Respondent, v. [...], Defendant–Appellant.  State of New Jersey, Plaintiff–Respondent, v. [...], Defendant–Appellant.
[brief] There is no legal basis presented by the Plaintiffs-Appellants either in their Appellate Brief or in supplemental case law, which establishes a Court’s ability to require the adoption of a proposed boundary line, affecting real property and title in interest, against the consent of the Defendants.  Furthermore, the context of an objection to the Boundary Commissioners’ Report pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:28-3 is limited to an application to “set aside the report” to which “the issue shall be tried and determined as in other cases of a civil nature at law, in said court. ”  N.J.S.A. 2A:28-3.  There is no statutory authority which allows a Court to forcibly impose a settlement line which directly contravenes the findings and surveys as set forth in the Boundary Commissioners’ Report.  Plaintiffs-Appellants further argue the Trial Court failed to consider [...]’s proposed boundary line as a viable alternative to the adoption of the Boundary Commissioners’ Report.  This assertion is blatantly false and attempts to mislead this Court to believe that Plaintiffs and [...] were barred from introducing either testimony or evidence concerning the proposed boundary line.  Both the Trial Transcript and Appellant’s Appendix demonstrate that [...]’s testimony was presented at trial and his survey and accompanying certification were entered into evidence as P-10.  (Pa148).  The Trial Court addressed the survey and considered the testimony and introduction of the evidence despite the objection by the undersigned to bar any testimony from [...] and further bar the introduction of his survey.  The Court denied the undersigned’s objections and motions, considered [...]’s testimony and survey, and then determined it was an inappropriate “alternative” given the context of the subject trial was to determine the validity of the Boundary Commissioners’ Report and/or ascertain the true location of the disputed boundary line.  Thereby, the Court adequately considered the presentation of [...]’s testimony and Survey, but properly rejected same given the survey was not the product of reliable scientific surveying methods or research and did not attempt to resolve the underlying dispute as to the “true” location of the property line.  There is no basis to overturn the Trial Court’s order given the Court entertained testimony from [...] and accepted [...]’s survey into evidence and considered same before ruling it was an inappropriate alternative to the Boundary Commissioners’ Report.  **POINT IV**
[brief] Defendant has not attempted to introduce new evidence on appeal.  Moreover, the judgment under review resulted from plaintiff's motion; hence, plaintiff bore the burden of proof under summary judgment standards.  Plaintiff's claim that defendant waived certain arguments because he did not make precisely the same arguments in the trial court clearly lacks merit.  "[E]ven in an uncontested motion, the judge must consider whether undisputed facts are sufficient to entitle a party to relief.
[brief] N.J. Transit, supra at 375.  It was Plaintiff’s burden and obligation to establish that the [...] accepted responsibility and ownership for the internal roadways in question.  The trial court in many ways switched this burden upon the [...] and imposed significant costs obligations upon the public without their approval.  The trial court found acceptance to be automatic and stripped the [...] of any right to determine otherwise.  This was error.  Where there is a dispute as to whether private property has been accepted by a municipality, the private property owner bears the burden to establish the requisite intent and actual dedication.  *Velasco v. Goldman Builders, Inc.*, 93 N.J. Super. 123. 136 (App. Div. 1966)  If a dedication or acceptance is equivocal and an issue is raised on which reasonable minds may differ, the question becomes one of fact to be resolved by a jury or a proof hearing by the trier of the fact.  As the Appellate Division stated within *Point Pleasant Manor Bldg. Co. v. Brown*, 42 N.J. Super. 297, 303-04 (App. Div. 1956)certif. denied, 23 N.J. 140 (1957))  “[E]quivocalities on a map prepared by an alleged dedicator, not only do not serve to prevent a dedication, but (rather the contrary) they are, generally speaking, to be resolved against him and in favor of the public body. ”  Other courts have concurred.  "Generally speaking, ambiguities are resolved against the dedicator and in favor of the public."  *Twp. of Middletown v. Simon*, 193 N.J. 228, 241 (2008)  In this matter the trial court shifted the burden to the [...] and resolved all ambiguities against the [...].  It transferred ownership to the [...] even though it had already passed legislation declining acceptance.  There is no map or subdivision plat attached to any Planning Board Resolution or any Developer's Agreement in the record which provides the "clear evidence" found by the court of an intent to dedicate.
[brief] Further, although Plaintiff appears to suggest that the trial court did nothing more than summarize the parties’ positions, but it is clear that the trial court weaved its commentary and analysis within the Statement of Reasons.  (For example, in the section analyzing Defendant’s arguments on the reduction of time spent, the court in certain areas makes reference to “Defendant argues …” but in other circumstances, leaves off that reference, confirming that the court was inserting its own analysis.)  See Statement of Reasons, at p. 10, P018a.
[brief] An affirmative defense/jurisdictional exclusion, on the other hand, is an argument that does not address negligence or damages, but rather raises an objection to compulsory arbitration’s jurisdiction over the claim based on Article Second, Exclusions, of the arbitration agreements, or certain Rule infractions.  Regardless of who is at fault or what damages are owed, the assertion of an affirmative defense/exclusion suggests the case cannot be heard because arbitration lacks jurisdiction over the matter.  Affirmative defenses/exclusions include: • Non-signatory party • Action does not exist in law or equity (i.e., subrogation prohibited, no right of recovery, or prior release)  • No liability policy in effect, denial of coverage, or policy limits • Filing a late counterclaim (Rule 2-2)  Asserting an affirmative defense/exclusion does not mean that such defense is necessarily valid.  The party must also explain the grounds for the defense and submit evidence to prove it.  A party should also complete the entire filing even when raising an affirmative defense/exclusion, as the arbitrator(s) could deny it and continue to hear the case.  (Da230 – Da233).
[directive] The See system system. with arisk-based pretrial release resource-based replacing current the bail, appropriate. is authorized bail monetary and where cases be however, may, 1.2.  Section  There an bail setting monetary at flight discourage by to be may possible situations, it limited  In some that ensure to To afford forfeit. not could but post can to afford defendant the amount that for the court not in is appear sought and to defendant a incentivize to only used is bail monetary monetary of seek imposition not shall prosecutor a release, defendant's preventing a purpose of to has used that be assets could the defendant that to information indicate having bail without monetary shall of seek prosecutor imposition not A bail. monetary of amount requested the post satisfy. to afford cannot defendant the that amount an in bail Bail. Monetary Seeking Against Presumption 6.3.2
[brief] Even if a comparison could be made to telephone and telegraph operators, the data Defendant provided to its mail vendor far exceeds the type of information which can be given to a telephone or telegraph operator.  In addition to the FDCPA’s restrictions specific to the use of telephones and telegrams (e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692d(6), 1692f(5), 1692f(8)), debt collectors must still comply with the FDCPA’s other provisions.
[brief] The sale produced a lawful bidder and was confirmed by the court below.  Grasping at straws, Defendants have made a last-ditch effort to appeal the lower court’s confirmation of the sheriff’s sale by arguing that “lawful interest” must be construed as post-judgment interest under R. 4:42-11 and that the sheriff’s foreclosure sale notice failed to state the “approximate” amount of the judgment.  However, both of these arguments are unfounded in both law and in fact.  Accordingly, Defendants’ appeal must be dismissed.  PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[brief] (23T 35-3 to 36-11)  Numerous wiretapped phone calls from 2019, after the death of [...], were played for the jury.  Most are of little relevance to the issues in this appeal, so only a few of them are recounted here: a January 29 call in which defendant appears to scold [...] for calling him on the wrong phone, which led police to discover the existence of defendant’s second phone, which they then wiretapped (23T 50-3 to 51-16); numerous calls to various people in which defendant appeared to complain about the case and about Bowens, and often would state that he was defending himself when [...] was shot (23T 66-1 to 93-20); and calls in which defendant stated that he did not think his new phone was tapped (it was) and in which he talked about possibly changing his phone number (23T 143-24 to 144-2; 23T 149-24 to 150-5)