ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] It is undisputed that at the time he re-raised concerns about the marketing of [...]’s products in 2020, Appellant was already under investigation and placed on administrative leave, pending further investigation, for his misuse of the Company’s PCard. \(^3\)  Moreover, Appellant admits that by July 2020, the Company was aware of and had addressed all of the reported marketing issues (e.g., the lasered pens or the CA labeling, assuming Appellant ever reported or \(^3\) *Nota Bene:* Appellant has not raised any adverse or retaliatory actions by Defendants after his alleged 2018 report of marketing discrepancies.  Rather, Appellant continued his employment which severely undercuts a finding of causation.  Evidence of raises, promotions, bonuses, and positive reviews that come after the whistleblowing activity weigh strongly against finding a causal connection sufficient to support a CEPA claim.  See e.g. Blizzard v. Exel Logistics N. Am., Inc., 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28160, at 28 (D.N.J. Nov. 15, 2005).
[brief] February 20, 2019  Order Setting Date of Valuation........................................Da102  February 20, 2019  Oral Opinion on Motion to Set Date of Valuation...  1T4:8 - 8:10 October 14, 2020  Order Denying Township’s Motion In Limine to Bar Expert Report.........................................................................................................................  Pa157 August 24, 2021  Order Denying Township’s Motion In Limine to Bar Expert Report.................................................................................................................................  Pa161  February 20, 2019  Oral Opinion on Motion to Set Date of Valuation........3T23:4 – 52:24 PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
[directive] 3 (9/00)  Seizure of Weapons from State Law Enforcement Officers  2.  If necessary, re-assign the officer charged with committing an act of domestic violence or served with a restraining order so that the officer will not have contact with the domestic violence complainant.  F.  The Division of Criminal Justice, Prosecutors and Police Bureau or designee generally should confer with the domestic violence complainant regarding the complainant’s position on the return of weapons.  However, the recommendation or determination whether the weapons should be returned rests with the Division of Criminal Justice Prosecutors and Police Bureau, not the victim or the law enforcement agency where the officer is employed.  IV.
[brief] The Appellate Division found that MSRA, N.J.S.A. 34:13A-16(j), permitted the State to review and approve or reject arbitration awards and such approval or rejection was not subject to the reasonableness requirements found in other areas of the MSRA, such as those to modify labor contracts.  Atl. City Superior Officers' Ass'n v. City of Atl. City, No. A-3117-20, 2022 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1194 at *15-16 (App. Div. June 30, 2022).  The Appellate Division affirmed the State’s actions in rejecting the arbitration at issue in that case.
[brief] However, they rely on cases that address the specific statutory language needed to trigger an award of expert fees, not contractual language.  (Db41-42).  None of the cases appellants rely on address the breadth of language that can entitle a claiming party to expert fees, in addition to attorneys’ fees, under a contractual fee shift.  Here, the indemnity language in the MIPA and SPAs is broad, and includes not just an attorney fee shift, but also “expenses,” which includes “costs of investigation and defense,” and “costs of suit” and “reasonable accountant’s . . . fees and expenses. ” (Da925, 952).  This language covers all of the expert and other litigation expenses that the trial court awarded.
[brief] [...] Is Charged With His “Third Or Subsequent” DUI.  | 2 | | b.  [...] Pleads Guilty To A DWI And Judge [...]  J.M.C. Sentences [...] To A Concurrent 10-Year Loss Of License To Run From The Date Of His Guilty Plea And Sentence, February 8, 2013.  Nothing In The Record Indicates That The Sentence Was To Run Consecutively Amounting To A 20-Year Loss Of License.  | 2 | | c.  Believing He Would Be Getting His License Back In February Of 2013, [...] Checked With The DMV In Late 2022 And Learned He Would Not Be Getting His License Back Until February Of 2033.  | 5 | | d.  [...] Filed A Motion In The [...] Seeking 2 Forms Of Relief:  1) Correct The Sentence To Run Concurrently, In The Alternative, 2) [...] Should Be Permitted To Have His Plea Back.  | 5 | | | | |---|---| | e. | Hon. [...], JMC, Of The [...], Denied [...]’s Motion Seeking To Correct His Sentence To Run Concurrently, And Refused To Render A Decision On Whether [...] Should Be Permitted To Have His Plea Back.  | | f. | Motion For Municipal Appeal And The Law Division’s Decision.  | | i. | The Court, In Assessing The Record *De Novo*, Denied [...]’s Entire Prayer For Relief Including Allowing Him To Renegotiate Or Rescind The Misleading Plea In Accordance With Black-Letter Law.  |
[directive] 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10%  10% 10% 10% 10%  10%  should COURT $350,000 $150,000 $100,000 and $35,000 $50,000  3:26-2 $2,500 $2,500 $2,500 $2,500 summons $500  Range bail MUNICIPAL to to to to to to to RULE to to to setting $1,000 $1,000 $1,000 $150,000 $100 $15,000 $20,000  Bail $50,000 $35,000 $500 or crime.
[brief] The argument goes that the *Paff* decision in discussing electronic information referenced obtaining it from a “municipality’s server”.  The term is used just once and it is used in a descriptive - not in a defining or limiting - fashion.  And notably, the very next sentence points to the logic that unwinds the [...]’s reliance on that simple descriptive turn of phrase, as “[t]he --- \(^3\) The [...] persists there is some issue with who is a “government official” because the some of the communicating parties were elected but not yet sworn in.  (Reply brief, Fn 2)  This is - or should be - irrelevant.  While the email of people elected-but-not-yet-sworn-in may or may not be “government records” (and there is no need to decide that here), when the email lands in the inbox of those in office who they are corresponding with, they become government records.  And those are the email logs [...] sought.  Legislature, pointedly, declined to limit accessibility to electronic records by not adopting a more restrictive formulation of government record. ”  Id. at 353 (2017)  And the Legislature also declined to limit the definition to means and methods and devices owned or controlled by the municipality.  ONLY the most crabbed possible reading of OPRA and Paff could begin to be twisted in an argument that the Supreme Court intended that government officials use should private email accounts to subvert public records disclosure.  The statements in Burnett and Simmons recognizing the imprudence of creating loopholes dependant merely upon who holds the government record must force one to abandon the idea that the courts should be looking for ways to have government officials evading OPRA.  Nor is it possible the Supreme Court intended such a twist on the use of a one-word description in one sentence in an opinion that discusses the availability of electronic data under OPRA in broad and sweeping terms for some 20 pages to be the reason government officials can evade OPRA by using Google their old AOL account.  Here again, nothing in OPRA supports the idea that a government record must be on a government server.
[brief] Its constitutional claims otherwise fail here and cannot be grounds to overturn either the permit or DEP’s hearing request denial.  CONCLUSION  For those reasons, the court should affirm DEP’s decisions to issue [...] a CAFRA permit and deny [...] an adjudicatory hearing.  Respectfully submitted, [...]  ATTORNEY GENERAL OF NEW JERSEY  By: /s/ [...]  [...]  Deputy Attorney General Attorney ID #161592015  [...]  Dated: August 2, 2024  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
[brief] ”  Id. at 563.  The Court explained that the presence of danger created an intervening circumstance that dissipated the taint of illegality in Williams I, but that the absence of danger meant that the taint of illegality did not dissipate in Williams II.  Id. at 563-64.  Here, like in Williams II, [...] did not engage in any act of physical aggression toward police and his brief flight did not create a danger to the officers.  Accordingly, in this case, there was no intervening circumstance sufficient to purge the taint of the illegal stop.
[brief] [...] makes no real effort to challenge these facts, nor can he.\(^6\)  Indeed, Plaintiff says nothing about the fact that associate rates account for a meager 1.3% of the Global Fee Application.  While Plaintiff protests that two of the partners were an associate and “counsel” at the time they started working on the case in 2016 or 2017, it is irrelevant since the Global Fee application sought to apply their far higher 2022 partner rates, and the Chancery Court did so.  Plaintiff argues that [...] has incurred significant legal fees of his own, but that argument fails to justify the extraordinary quantum of counsel fees [...] has demanded that [...] also pay.  First, [...] provides no objective facts supporting his claim that [...] has incurred more than $2 million in fees since “2018/2019”. \(^7\)  Even if that claim was true, however, [...]’s attorneys’ purported --- \(^6\)  Plaintiff objects to our claim that four specific partners of the firm did 93.8% of the work.
[brief] The Order on Remand itself puts the lie to the [...]’ demonstrably false assertion that [...] “merely adopted the Special Master’s Report without meaningful analysis, comment, or thoughtful consideration of the report of former Chief Judge [...]. ”  (39992-5a) knowledge of the pre-SOL facts found relevant to establishing [...]’s NJRICO claims during the SOL Period (as well as debunking the [...]’ affirmative defenses thereto); e.g., the agreements reached between the [...] and [...] at the inception of their joint venture, as well as their respective roles in the buildout and management of [...].
[brief] The Installment Contract (containing an arbitration agreement) was assigned to [...].  On the day he bought the vehicle, Plaintiff contended he met the finance manager who had him sign a blank iPad and stated a copy of the documents would be emailed later for him to read.  The finance manager did not tell Plaintiff he was signing a contract and Plaintiff did not consent to attaching his signature to the contract.  In opposition, the finance manager certified the contract was contained on the iPad screen when Plaintiff signed it and he didn’t stop, present or dissuade the Plaintiff from reading it.  Plaintiff left with the vehicle which was defective and sued.
[brief] Among the factors that the [...] must consider under the statute is "the community zone plan and zoning ordinance, as well as physical characteristics of the plot involved and the surrounding neighborhood and the effect of the proposed use thereon."  In Re Public Service Electric And Gas Co., 35 N.J. at 376-77.  Of course, the [...] does not possess any expertise in land use or zoning.  This isn't meant as a criticism, but to note that the [...]'s expertise lies elsewhere.  This is not a simple area of the law; the leading treatise net of appendices is over a thousand pages long with additional material online.  Cox and Koenig, New Jersey Zoning And Land Use Administration, 2022 Ed.  The [...] is ill-equipped to judge close controversies on this factor.
[brief] He noted that the project was approximately 10% over the impervious coverage permitted for single-family dwellings in the R-20A Zone (but much less than permitted on a school).  [5T 67-2 to 67-13].  [...] also sought a variance for number of stories.  [5T 70-20 to 71-15].  He initially noted that [...] required relief from the prohibition against monument signs in the R-20A Zone, but later indicated that the signage was either conforming or subsumed within the use variance.  [5T 71-16 to 71-21; 7T 49-12 to 50-4; Pa335 (monument signs for institutional uses permitted in R-20A Zone up to 20 square feet)].  He also confirmed that based upon a recent amendment to the RSIS, no relief for the number of off-street parking spaces was required.
[brief] Therefore, plaintiffs there did not have any other losses except the legal fees incurred by the plaintiff.  Like in the instant case, plaintiffs claimed that their attorney had deviated from the applicable standard of care in various ways but the plaintiff never proved causation.  However, the plaintiffs in Lovett primarily claimed that their attorney deviated from the standard of care by negligently failing to advise his client during representation.  Like here, the Court in Lovett was asked to determine if the attorney breached any duty and if so, whether that breach was causally related to any measurable loss.  Just as the Court in the instant proceeding determined that [...] had not suffered any actual damages other than the legal fees incurred by the Plaintiff to set aside the PSA and obtain a new judgment, the Court in Lovett found, after a lengthy analysis, that the plaintiffs failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant attorney’s actions constituted legal malpractice.  28  In order for plaintiffs to succeed, they must demonstrate that they suffered a loss proximately caused by [...]’ negligence.  Proximate cause is satisfied where the negligent conduct is a substantial contributing factor in causing a loss. ”  Like in the instant case, the only losses plaintiffs claim are the legal fees incurred by the plaintiff.  The Court in Lovett found that the fact that the decedent’s children chose to bring various claims does not prove that they were reasonably necessary to correct defendant’s negligence.  The Court in Lovett found that the plaintiff failed to demonstrate that the legal fees they incurred were either reasonably necessary or caused by any wrongdoing by the attorney.  the fees should not be construed as a mere portion of the damage sustained by the Plaintiff.\textsuperscript{29}
[brief] There is the significant penalty provision that Defendant agreed to that has created the problem and issues that are being discussed herein.  The reason that Defendant did not contest that provision when it was included in the Agreement is that it was his intention to fully comply with the terms of the Agreement.  Defendant, therefore, had no concern over the potential imposition of a penalty.  Defendant takes full responsibility for being stupid (perhaps not the correct characterization) and putting himself in this position.  Defendant does not ask this Court to extricate him from same.  What Defendant is asking is that the Court recognize the FRAUD of the Plaintiff and not penalize him for the lies and deceit of the Plaintiff.
[brief] Simon v. FIA Card Servs. NA, 639 F. App’x 885, 888 (3d Cir. 2016).  “A debtor simply cannot be confused, deceived, or misled by an incorrect statement unless it is material. ”  Jensen v. Pressler & Pressler, 791 F.3d at 421.  Appellant argues that the Superior Court erred in only focusing its analysis on whether the letter threatened litigation rather than on whether it was false or misleading to the least sophisticated consumer, the key issue of liability.
[brief] The Trial Court erred in assigning a de minimus value to [...]’ ownership interest without an expert, as required under clear case law.  In Torres, the Trial Judge rejected the defendant’s expert opinion on the value of shares in a closely-held corporation and then, without plaintiff providing an expert, assigned a value for the oppressed shareholder’s stake based on the value set forth in a prior loan application.  Torres v. Schripps, Inc., 342 N.J. Super. 419, 436 (App. Div. 2001).  The Appellate Division rejected this approach, and vacated and remanded the matter to the Trial Court with the directive that the “trial judge should appoint an independent appraiser to report to the court on the fair value of the corporation. ”  Id.  Specifically, the Appellate Division held, “[w]here the parties fail to present sufficient expert testimony, the trial judge must seek assistance from other sources to aid his decision of fair value. ”  Id. at 436.  (emphasis added).  This holding is in line with the New Jersey Supreme Court’s prior opinion in Balsamides v. Protameen Chemicals, Inc., ) which Respondents completely ignore.  160 N.J. 352, 368 (1999)( “findings of the Trial Court are critical as the valuation of closely-held corporations are inherently fact-based” and “not an exact science. ”)  Torres is controlling law that is directly applicable to this case and requires remand.
[brief] The Arbitrator’s disregard for this very specific and exact mathematical equation is therefore not reasonably debatable.  In [...] and [...], P.E.R.C. Docket No.: [...], Arbitrator [...] ordered the Town to reimburse police officers that were paid a lower overtime rate than what the contract provided for a distracted driving detail.  Pa170.  Arbitrator Osborn found that the contract language was clear and unambiguous, stating:  The contract does not authorize the Town to carve out exceptions to the overtime article for grant-funded projects which provide a set compensation rate, as the project here did.  It did not authorize the Town to reconfigure the compensation for such projects, and the PBA did not agree to the Town's proposed reconfiguration.  Pa181.  In Newton, the Employer alleged that the State set the rate for the distracted driving detail, not the Town.  The Town was still contractually obligated to abide by the terms of the contract with the PBA, despite the rate set by the third party.  The same logic applies to this matter.  The collective bargaining agreement does not carve out an exception for the Division to follow Treasury Circulars when calculating overtime rates.  The State cannot evade its contractual responsibility by relying on the Treasury Circulars.
[brief] To deny defendant the suppression relief requested this Court would have to disregard and act contrary to the holding in *State v. Valencia*, 93 N.J. 126, 132-34 (1983), which rejected the State's argument that the particularity criterion governing issuance of a search warrant should not be strictly applied holding that "[c]ourts in this State consistently have maintained that strict adherence to the protective rules governing search warrants is an integral part of the constitutional armory safeguarding citizens from unreasonable searches and seizures*** (and that) "deviations from the rules governing search warrants in the aggregate constitute material noncompliance with the rules governing search warrants;" see also *State v. Johnson*, 168 N.J. 608, 623 (2001) (noting that "to permit a good-faith exception to apply in respect of one element of the warrant, i.e. the no-knock provision, but not in respect of other elements would lead ultimately to a patchwork of incongruous case law"). To summarize briefly, in the subject search warrant application [...] requested a warrant issue for [...] ("Park Blvd.") and specifically requested that the warrant also provide for the seizure and search of "all persons present reasonably believed to be connected with said property and investigation for evidence including but not limited to: knives, sharp objects, firearms, ballistics evidence, weapons, ammunition, projectiles, fired cartridge casings .  . ."  (Ca34)  See Search Warrant Certification by [...], [...], September 28, 2020, at Ca 23(Emphasis added).
[brief] [...] cites Hartford Ins. Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 68 N.J. 430 (1977), for the proposition that “a change in the law or in the judicial review of an established rule of law is not such an extraordinary circumstance as to justify relief from final judgment where the time to appeal has expired..."  Hartford Ins. Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 68 N.J. at 434.  Appellants acknowledge this case and its potential applicability, but distinguish it on the basis that [...] specifically tailored its definition of what is on "direct review" to comport with the directive of Tyler and other related Federal decisions which were rightly seen as inconsistent with and superceding New Jersey law under Hartford.
[brief] CAL Br. at 17–18.  Those cases involved plaintiff teachers who alleged that withholding a student’s transgender status from their parents violated the teachers’ free speech and religious free exercise rights under the First Amendment; the substantive due process rights of parents were not directly at issue in those cases.  Id. at *7 (Aa10).  “[T]he Board Defendants only began referring to [...] by her preferred gender identity at [...]’s request, did not coerce [...] into making the request, and did not prevent or discourage [...] from discussing the transition with Plaintiff [her father]. ”  Id. at *9 (Aa11–12).  In the absence of “proactive, coercive interference with the parent-child relationship,” id. at *8 (Aa10), the court found no likelihood that the plaintiff could show a constitutional violation, id. at *13 (Aa17).  Other jurisdictions have reached the same conclusion.
[brief] ## Constitutional Authorities - N.J. Const. art. VI, § 3, ¶ 4 ................................................................. 13 - First Amendment's guarantee of free access to the courts .................. 31 - N.J. Const. Art. I .............................................................................. 18 - N.J. Const. Art. VI, § II, par. 3 ....................................................... 12 - N.J. Const., art. VI, § III, ¶ 2 ............................................................ 13 ## Rules - 4:6-2 .................................................................................................. 20 - 4:6-7 .................................................................................................. 20 - Canon 3(C)(1) ................................................................................... 36 - Canon 3(C)(1) of the Code of Judicial Conduct ................................. 36 - N.J. Ct. R. 4:69-1 ............................................................................. 18 - R. 1:13-4(a) ..................................................................................... 16 - R. 1:38-8 .......................................................................................... 15 - R. 1:38-8 - Removing from the Court File Documents Improperly Submitted to Court ........................................ 15 - R. 2:2-3(a) (2) .................................................................................. 19 - R. 2:2-3(a)(2) .................................................................................. 17 - R. 2:2-3(a)(2) ..................................................................................
[brief] New Jersey courts that have published decisions relating to cancellations of insurance policies have typically been faced with instances where the cancellation was not effective because the insurer did not follow the procedures set forth in N.J.S.A. 17:29C-10.  See Munoz v. N.J. Auto. Full Ins. Underwriting Ass’n, 145 N.J. 377 (1996); Ward v. Merced, 277 N.J. Super. 590 (App. Div. 1994); Hodges v. Pennsylvania Nat. Ins. Co. on Behalf of NJAFIUA, 260 N.J. Super. 217 (App. Div. 1992).
[brief] See State v. Njango, 463 N.J. Super. at 6.  (“If the court cannot justify a concurrent sentence in compliance with the statute, then the plea, which was based upon concurrent sentences, must be vacated and the charges reinstated. ”)  However, given that the Double Jeopardy Clause contained in the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and art. I, ¶ 11 of the N.J. Constitution precludes defendant from being re-sentenced to a greater term than he bargained for and has already served, and given that a guilty plea to any of the crimes charged in [...], except Count Five (fourth-degree aggravated assault) would necessarily subject defendant to a greater sentence than he has already served, on remand the sole surviving charge contained in [...] which can be reinstated would be Count Five.  Simple mathematics dictates this result.  The illegal sentence defendant has already served on Count Six of [...] was 7 years with a 3-year parole bar concurrent to a flat 5 years on [...].