ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT RECONSIDERED THE FEBRUARY 1, 2023 ATTORNEY FEE AWARD TO PLAINTIFFS’ COUNSEL AND INCREASED THE AWARD BY $300,000.  (Da1411).  At the outset, [...] submits that assuming this Appellate Division determines that only a RETA cause of action exists, any attorney fee award to plaintiffs’ counsel will require adjustment for purposes of proportionality.  On February 1, 2023, the trial Court issued its 20-page Memorandum of Decision awarding a total of $722,714.00 in attorneys’ fees and costs.  (Da1381)  That included a ten percent (10%) enhancement under the Lodestar.  In reaching that award, the trial court reviewed (1) plaintiffs’ 40-page brief in support of their motion for attorneys’ fees; (2) the dozen page certifications from the three attorneys; (3) multiple attorney certifications with exhibits; (4) defendant’s 15-page opposition; and (5) plaintiffs’ 16-page reply with additional certifications.  The Court then held a multi-hour oral argument on those submissions.  In its thoroughly detailed, 20-page decision meticulously analyzing the relevant facts and the law, the Court determined that the plaintiffs’ fee application upwards of $2,000,000 was a “free for all,” “incredible”, “unreasonable,” “extremely excessive” and “unnecessary. ”  Still, the Court awarded plaintiffs’ counsel almost four times the amount of the jury’s award. \(^7\)  In its decision, the Court cited and meticulously analyzed the law with regard to fee shifting and Lodestar and applied all of it to plaintiffs’ counsels’ application.  The Court made the required inquiries pursuant to *Rendine v. Pantzer*, 141 N.J. 292 (1995), evaluated plaintiffs’ request under the appropriate rule and then considered --- \(^7\)  The jury awarded the base sum of $214,000 to 11 plaintiffs which translates to approximately $20,000 per plaintiff.  That award was trebled under the CFA but as briefed throughout this appeal, [...] maintains that the CFA is inapplicable.  At most, the $214,000 award could be doubled under the RETA. each of the factors set forth in RPC 1.5 as required.  Here is what the Court initially said about plaintiffs’ fee request:  The Court finds trying the matter did not involve any specialized skills ...
[brief] The Personal and Business Relationship Between [...] and [...]  The key players are [...] and his former business partner, [...] (“[...]”).  [...] is a chemical engineer with a degree from India.  In 1984, he began to work for defendant [...]  (“[...]”), an environmental testing company, eventually becoming the lab manager.  (14T 39:3-18; 14T 45:12-17).  [...] immigrated to the U.S. from Iran, studied chemistry, and began working for [...] around the same time as [...].  [...] eventually became [...]’s sales and marketing manager.  (24T 13:1-16; 14T 45:12-14).  Over time, [...] and [...] became good friends.  [...] hired [...]’s wife as a chemist, the [...]s attended [...]’s wedding, and [...] gave the [...]s some money to purchase their first home.  (14T 45:7-16).  Together, they built [...] into a multi-million-dollar enterprise.  In 1990, [...] and [...] acquired ownership interests in [...], and in --- 1  Because the facts and procedural history are inextricably intertwined, they are presented in a single narrative for clarity.
[brief] This is an interlocutory appeal from an Order of the Workers’ Compensation Court denying Respondent-Appellant’s Motion for Recusal of the Honorable [...], J.W.C. Respondent asserts that Judge Downey should recuse herself because before her appointment to the Workers’ Compensation Bench in March 2022, she was a member of the New Jersey legislature and served during the legislative session at the time the Bill involving essential workers, commonly referred to as the “Presumption Statute,” was passed.  It is curious that despite Counsel’s argument (without substantive proof of any kind) that Judge Downey had somehow pre-judged this case, Counsel waited until after the Judge made substantive rulings on Petitioner-Decedent’s essential worker status to appeal on this recusal issue.  Respondent’s argument regarding recusal is completely without basis in the rules of judicial conduct or in the case law regarding recusal.  It seems obvious that Respondent was not happy with the Judge’s decision regarding Decedent’s status as an essential employee and decided to file the Appeal on the Recusal.
[brief] 32 State v. Scherzer, 301 N.J. Super. 363 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 151 N.J. 466 (1997) .......................................................... 43 State v. Singleton, 211 N.J. 157 (2012) ....................................... 34 State v. Weiler, 211 N.J. Super. 602 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 107 N.J. 37 (1986) .......................................................... 48 State v. Wilbely, 63 N.J. 420 (1973) ......................................... 33 State v. Williams, 113 N.J. 39 (1983) ......................................... 43 STATUTES CITED N.J.S.A. 2C:1-8(e) .................................................................. 15 N.J.S.A. 2C:1-13b(1) ................................................................ | N.J.S.A. 2C:2-2b(1) | 29 | |---------------------|----| | N.J.S.A. 2C:2-2b(2) | 29 | | N.J.S.A. 2C:2-2b(3) | 29 | | N.J.S.A. 2C:3-1(a) | 35 | | N.J.S.A. 2C:3-4 | 35 | | N.J.S.A. 2C:3-4(a) | 31, 35 | | N.J.S.A. 2C:3-4(b)(2)| 31 | | N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3 | 16 | | N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4(b)(2)| 16 | | N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1a(1)| 50 | | N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1a(3)| 50 | | N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1a(6)| 50 | | N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1a(9)| 50 | **RULES CITED** R. 2:10-2 ........................................... 32 R. 3:19-1(b) ........................................... 33 N.J.R.E. 104(c) ....................................... 20 N.J.R.E. 403 ........................................... 20 CITATIONS TO THE RECORD “Da” defendant’s appendix; “Db” defendant’s brief; “Sa” State’s appendix; “1T” Transcript dated April 18, 2022; “2T” Transcript dated April 19, 2022; “3T” Transcript dated April 20, 2022; “4T” Transcript dated April 26, 2022; “5T” Transcript dated April 27, 2022; “6T” Transcript dated April 28, 2022; “7T” Transcript dated May 2, 2022; “8T” Transcript dated May 3, 2022; “9T” Transcript dated May 9, 2022; “10T” Transcript dated December 14, 2022.
[brief] d.  The [...] claims are “future” claims (Pa000102–Pa000105).  Fourth, the plain language of “Released Claims” includes “future” claims.  1.29  Released Claims.  “Released Claims” means and includes all claims, . . . whether known or unknown, that were, have been or could have been, now, in the past, or in the future, asserted or alleged in, or that relate to, the Settled Action by Class Members .  . . .  Settlement Agreement, § 1.29 (emphases added) (Pa000044).  Plaintiff offers three arguments for why the [...] did not release “future claims.
[brief] Appellant cites State v. Governor, 25 N.J.L. 331 (1856) and other similar pre-1938 cases to condemn canvassing that went behind the district returns or attempted a second canvass on new evidence.  They did not address, and therefore do not limit, the necessity of fixing obvious arithmetic or transcription mistakes.  Indeed, modern authority, discussed below, recognizes the ministerial nature of canvassing and reserve substantive disputes for recounts or election contests; the statutory correction of a scrivener’s error fits comfortably within that framework.
[brief] For example, according to Plaintiff’s expert, the complex driver-assistance features at issue in this case require use of one or two sensors that can be forward-facing cameras, side cameras, or rear-view cameras, depending on the vehicle; some method of alerting the driver to departure from the lane, which can require separate motors in the steering wheel, seatbelt, or seat to provide haptic (physical) warnings; and computer software to ensure the warnings are accurate and timely.  (Pa141a-142a.)  Adapting each of these elements for each vehicle model takes time, equipment, and resources—and cannot always be done for all vehicles and all models simultaneously.
[brief] This impairment was substantial as Plaintiffs have been deprived of $750,928.99 in accrued deferred compensation.  (35a ¶131).  Defendants had the opportunity to take steps in assisting [...]’s financial stabilization by obtaining more savings for the City through the diminishment of the prospective contractual terms and conditions of acting police officers that remained employed with [...].  As active police officers, those employees could either recoup their diminished earnings over time through efforts such as overtime, or they could mitigate any diminishment in pay by seeking employment with another municipality that offered higher wages.  Instead, Defendants took $2.261 million in savings due to police officer retirements and agreed to distribute it to active officers.  This is an instance where a few [...] police officers (Plaintiffs), were required to bear the public burden which in all fairness and justice should have been borne by the public as a whole.
[brief] Genuine Issues of Material Fact Precluded Summary Judgment Against [...].  On April 6, 2023, the trial court entered summary judgment, essentially by default, in favor of [...] against [...], and marked the motion as “unopposed. ” (PPCIa369-71).  The trial court did so in spite of: (1) [...]’s advice to both [...] and the trial court that it intended to oppose [...]’s motion (PPCIa366; PPCIa378-79); (2) [...]’s request that the trial court adjourn [...]’s motion until such time that [...] had retained new counsel (PPCIa361); and (3) that [...] was not represented by counsel at the time [...]’s motion was granted against [...] (PPCIa364-65).
[directive] 5.  e.  Si la infracción ocurrió el 2 de agosto de 1993 o después de dicha fecha, usted tendrá que pagar [Sí/Yes] [No/No] una multa de $75 dólares al Fondo de Servicios de Vecindarios Seguros por cada condena?  If the offense occurred on or after August 2, 1993 you must pay a $75 Safe Neighborhood Services Fund assessment for each conviction?
[brief] On March 2, 2020, the Vermont Superior Court appointed a litigation receiver to act “on behalf of” the Association.  Pa385 at para.  23.  The Vermont Superior Court invoked its “inherent power in a proper case to appoint a receiver … on the ground of gross or fraudulent mismanagement by corporate officers or gross abuse of trust or general dereliction of duty. ”  Pa379.  The Vermont Superior Court found that appointment of a receiver was appropriate because [...], [...] and others “had breached their fiduciary duties [in order] to protect their own financial interests…”
[brief] “I certify that this dispute is not the subject of any other action pending in any other court or a pending arbitration proceeding to the best of my knowledge and belief.  Also, to the best of my knowledge and belief, no other action or arbitration proceeding is contemplated. ”  That form Certification concludes with:  “In addition, I recognize my continuing obligation to file and serve on all parties and the court an amended certification if there is a change in the facts stated in this original certification. ”  As to that Certification, the Certification Regarding Filing and Service, and the Demand for Trial by Jury, the Form A instructions simply instruct the user to sign them, except for the jury demand.
[brief] All the evidence presented at the trial of this case shows that; the judge erred by disregarding that undisputed evidence that Defendant presented no evidence of her own to contradict.  The judge’s belief that the defendant perhaps did not want a divorce and intended to have a bona fide marriage with the plaintiff is not supported by any competent, relevant, and reasonably credible evidence presented at trial.  There is no evidence demonstrating this because the defendant provided no testimony from herself or any witnesses on her behalf regarding the annulment issue.  The judge’s conclusion is premised on pure speculation by the family judge.  This is not sustainable on appellate review because such speculation is manifestly unsupported by and inconsistent with the competent, relevant, and reasonably credible evidence, Crespo v. Crespo, 395 N.J. Super. 190, 193–94 (App. Div. 2007), Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Inv'rs Ins. Co. of Am., 65 N.J. 474, 484 (1974).
[directive] This protocol and forms are being promulgated on the recommendation of the Conferences of Criminal Presiding Judges and Criminal Division Managers.  G.A.G. Attachments cc: Chief Justice [...]  Criminal Division Managers & Assistant Managers  Criminal Presiding Judges [...], ATCSU, Chief [...], Chief of Staff [...], Criminal Practice, Chief AOC Directors and Assistant Directors [...], Criminal Practice, Asst. Chief Trial Court Administrators  [...], ITO, Administrative Supervisor [...], Special Assistant  PROTOCOL EXPUNGEMENTS – DELETING RECORDS
[brief] During their testimony, [...] and the owner of the [...], [...], opined that the two different surveillance videos of the two burglaries depicted the same man.  This testimony exceeded the bounds of proper lay opinion testimony and went to the only issue in the case: the identity of the burglar.  Therefore, the testimony violated our evidence rules and [...]’s rights to due process and a fair trial.  U.S. Const., amends. VI and XIV; N.J. Const., art. I, ¶¶ 1, 9 and 10; N.J.R.E. 701.  This Court must reverse [...]’s convictions and remand for a new trial.
[brief] (Id.; 1T187.9-18; Pa454a).  [...] (“[...]”) was able to view the video on Stowe 2.  It should be noted that neither [...] or [...] were disciplined for leaving Stowe 2 South completely unattended and/or for failing to report that a post was unattended.  (1T187.9-18; 1T181.1-4).  It is uncertain for how long [...] had left Stowe 2 South unattended.  (Id.)  On or about August 15, 2019, [...] placed sheets and/or laundry in her bed to make appear as if she were sleeping in her bed.  (1T110.11-16).  During [...]’ tour of the wings, he did not see anything unusual in [...]’s dormitory wing.  (1T122).  During the early morning hours of August 16, 2019, [...] left her dormitory wing, went onto an adjacent wing where the broken window was, and tried to escape through that window.  (1T188).  The window was not secured nor was it alarmed. \(^6\) \(^6\)  Based on the discovery provided to [...] by the State, during her escape, [...] lost her footing and landed below the window.  [...] lost her shoe.  Additionally, during the fall a razor that [...] had concealed in her vaginal cavity fell out of [...]’s underwear.  [...] stated to representatives of the [...] that she [...] then crawled up the exterior staircase and knocked on the emergency exit.  (Pa122a).  Once [...] heard the knock on the door, [...] opened the door and let [...] into Stowe 2 North.  (Pa122a) [...] immediately notified the requisite personnel.  (1T109.1-6).  [...] was the only one charged with any disciplinary action.  In fact, [...] was not even questioned, investigated or disciplined for leaving his area unattended.  (1T187.9-18; 1T181.1-4).  Nor did the [...] question or investigate [...].  (1T192.7 to 193.24).  B.
[brief] However, neither of these decisions is helpful to [...]’ position.  The court in *Kolker* was confronted with the question of which interest rate was applicable to each of the three classes of creditors.  The claims, as identified by the trial judge were “(A) those by creditors with judgments; (B) those by creditors whose claims include interest created by contract; (C) all other claims. ”  *Id.*; 212 N.J. Super. at 438.  According to the judge, a judgment creditor would only be entitled to interest in accordance with R. 4:42–11(a), whereas a contract creditor would be entitled to interest in accordance with the terms of the underlying contract.  *Id.* at 438–39.  The problem with [...]’ reading of *Kolker* is that it fails to distinguish between a contract creditor with a judgment and one without a judgment.  The former is not a contract creditor at all but a judgment creditor subject to the rule.
[brief] The 45-day time limit shall not apply if an investigation of a law enforcement officer for a violation of the internal rules or regulations of the law enforcement unit is included directly or indirectly within a concurrent investigation of that officer for a violation of the criminal laws of this State.  (emphasis supplied)  The Appellate Division has clarified the implication of N.J.S.A. 40A:14-147 in McElwee v. Borough of Fieldsboro, A-1230-06T3 opining N.J.S.A. 40A:14-147’s time limit for bringing disciplinary charges against an employee does not apply when the charges are based on misconduct grounded in Title 4A of the New Jersey Administrative Code, nor 2C of the New Jersey Criminal Code.
[brief] Answer filed by Defendant [...]; Filed on March 21, 2023 ................................................................. Da 1 Grawehr v. Township of East Hanover, 2017 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1634 (App. Div. 2017) ......................... Da 17 | CASES | PAGE | |-------------------------------------------|------| | **Ahammed v. Logandro,** | 9 | | 394 N.J. Super. 179 (App. Div 2007) | | | **Barone v. Harra,** | 9,10,29 | | 77 N.J. 276 (1978) | | | **Basil v. Wolf,** | 9,10 | | 193 N.J. 38 (2007) | | | **Brower v. ICT Group,** | 18,19,26 | | 164 N.J. 367 (2000) | | | **Buerkle v. United Parcel Service,** | 11 | | 26 N.J. Super. 404 (App. Div. 1953) | | | **Daus v. Marble,** | 10 | | 270 N.J. Super. 241 (App. Div. 1994) | | | **DeCicco v. Anderson,** | 12,26,28 | | 99 N.J. Super. 243 (App. Div. 1968) | | | **Ehrgott v. Jones,** | 13,14,29,31 | | 208 N.J. Super. 393 (App. Div. 1986) | | | **Grawehr v. Township of East Hanover,** | 29 | | 2017 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1634 (App. Div. 2017) | | | **Harris v. Branin Transport, Inc.,** | 9 | | 312 N.J. Super. 38, certif. denied, 156 N.J. 408 (1998) | | | **Hersh v. County of Morris,** | 19,22 | | 217 N.J. 236 (2014) | | | **Konitch v. Hartung,** | 10,11,12,25,26,28 | | 81 N.J. Super. 376 (App. Div. 1963), | | | certif. denied, 41 N.J. 389 (1964) | | | CASES | PAGE | |-------------------------------------------|------------| | Kristiansen v. Morgan, | 18,19,25 | | 153 N.J. 298 (1998) | | | Laidlow v. Hariton Machinery Co., | 8 | | 170 N.J. 602 (2002) | | | Lapsley v. Township of Sparta, | 18,19,20 | | 249 N.J. 427 (2022) | 21,22,24,25,26 | | Lewis v. Walter Scott & Co., | 11 | | 50 N.J. Super. 283 (App. Div. 1958) | | | Linden v. Solomacha, | 13,29 | | 232 N.J. Super. 29 (App. Div. 1989) | | | Livingstone v. Abraham & Strauss, Inc., | 19 | | 111 N.J. 89 (1988) | | | Maggio v. Migliaccio, | 14,15,29 | | 266 N.J. Super. 111 (App. Div. 1993) | | | McCrae v. Eastern Aircraft, | 11 | | 137 N.J.L. 244 (Sup. Court. 1948) | | | McDaniel v. Man Wai Lee, | 9,10 | | 419 N.J. Super. 482 (App. Div. 2011) | | | Millison v. E.I. duPont deNemours & Co., | 8 | | 101 N.J. 161 (1985)
[brief] **34a-41a. **  While the reconsideration of the severance motion was pending, [...], [...]’ co-defendant, was sentenced by the Court on February 22, 2018 to two years non-custodial probation as a result of her plea on September 11, 2017, to Count 5 of [...] to hindering prosecution in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:39-3a(3), a crime of the second degree.
[brief] 57-17 ("Action") through its prior Counsel, [...].  (Da²64-Da71, ¶ 3; Da1-Da3; Pa35-Pa44, ¶ 31; Pa53-Pa62, ¶ 22).  In accordance with Rule 6:2-3(d), the Court mailed the Summons to Appellant on January 5, 2017 via Certified Mail/RRE at Appellant’s NJ Address.  (Da64-Da71, ¶ 4; Da4).  (Pa53-Pa62, ¶ 32).  To establish proof of service, the Court filed a record from the United States Postal Service, evidencing that the Summons and Complaint was delivered to Appellant, and signed and accepted by [...], on January 7, 2017 pursuant to Rule 6:2-3(d).  (Da64-Da71, ¶ 5; Da5; Pa35-Pa44, ¶ 33).  Significantly, Appellant concedes [...] is his father or brother, who both have the same name.  (2T³32-16-24).  It only stands to reason, that [...] would not have signed for and accepted the Summons if Appellant did not live at the NJ Address.  Id.  Further, notably, it appears that Appellant still resides at the NJ Address, as Appellant continues to receive mail at the NJ Address and, during the plenary hearing, referred to the NJ Address as his home.  (2T31-22-25; 2T32-1-11).  A simple search on www.officialusa.com indicates that Appellant resides there along with [...], presumably the same [...] that signed for service of the --- ² Da. Refers to Defendant-Appellant’s Appendix filed on October 30, 2024.  ³ 2T refers to the Transcript of Plenary Hearing before the Honorable [...], J.S.C. of the Lower Court on April 8, 2024 and filed by Appellant on June 24, 2024.  Complaint. (Pa7-Pa16).  Appellant also conceded to accepting mail to the NJ Address.  (2T30-17-25; 2T31-1-25; 2T32-1-11).  Despite timely and effective service of process, Appellant failed to appear in the Action.
[brief] [3T28-12]  Third, the trial court held that all causes of action against [...] failed as a matter of law.  Specifically, the claim for breach of contract fails because the Policies were deemed void ab initio and were never breached by [...].  [3T31-2]  The claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing fails because there was “no evidence of bad faith by [...]” or evidence that [...] destroyed or injured the insureds’ rights to receive the benefits of the Policies.  [3T31-8]  Given that [...] properly rescinded the Policies, [...] and [...] also could not pursue a claim for violation of the Consumer Fraud Act.  [3T33-3]  Moreover, the trial court “agreed with [...] that the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act has never been extended to the denial of coverage and/or benefits under an insurance policy. ”  [Id.]  Finally, given that all claims for compensatory damages were dismissed, the trial court held that [...] and [...] could not pursue punitive damages.  [3T36-15]  LEGAL ARGUMENT I.
[brief] (7T219-21 to 25, 243-14 to 224-10).  Around the same time defendant started rocking more and his eyes were twitching.  (7T242-16 to 20).  Prior to the murders, defendant never told [...] he was hearing voices or seeing things. (7T249-12 to 21).  [...] spoke to her nephew frequently after the murders, in person when she visited him in jail and over the phone.  When she asked him why he killed his family, defendant giggled and said, “you’ll have to read the book.
[brief] [...]’s appellate arguments are foreclosed by *Pharmacists* and the plain terms of the Policy.  For the reasons set forth in this Reply Brief and in [...]’s Opening Brief, the decision of the Trial Court was incorrect and should be reversed.  [...]’s request to re-litigate the issue of damages should be rejected.  Reversal should be ordered with instructions that the Trial Court enter judgment that Plaintiff recover $399,352.34 in damages from [...], and with leave for Plaintiff to apply for “successful claimant” attorneys’ fees under R. 4:42-9(a)(6).