ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] A.  Defendant works calibrating breath test equipment.  Defendant attended the NJSP Academy sometime between November 2000, and May 2001.  (15T139-7 to 12).  He was then sent to his first assignment, in Cape May County.  (15T139-21 to 140-2).  In May 2008, defendant was transferred into the [...], the unit responsible to maintain all evidential breath testing devices in New Jersey.  (10T9-19 to 23; see 10T16-22 to 17-5 (describing the certification process generally); 11T19-8 to 16; 15T150-22 to 25).  He worked there continuously until October 2015.  (15T151-6 to 8).  As a Field Coordinator, defendant had to periodically calibrate breath testing instruments used by New Jersey law enforcement on persons suspected of driving while intoxicated, in violation of N.J.S.A. 39:4-50 (“DWI”).  (10T13-9 to 11; 11T16-24 to 17-10).¹  In 2015, New Jersey used an instrument known as the Alcotest  ¹  In April 2022, there were approximately nine to ten Field Coordinators assigned to the [...].  (10T89-19 to 90-2).  7110 MKIII-C. (10T10-19 to 22).  The approximately 595 Alcotest instruments are located in municipal police stations throughout New Jersey, and in multiple NJSP barracks.  (10T10-6 to 8; 10T11-17 to 21; 11T16-19 to 21).  The calibration procedure required defendant use a specific type of thermometer, called a NIST traceable digital thermometer.  (10T18-13 to 15; 10T20-7 to 21-1; 10T28-17 to 19).  Failure to perform a proper recalibration, including use of the NIST thermometer, would make any breath test performed on the instrument invalid, and therefore inadmissible, in any trial on a charge of DWI.  (10T13-1 to 6; 10T29-6 to 18).  Defendant knew this from his extensive training, which included an instruction course from [...], training by the instrument’s manufacturer, and an on-the-job apprenticeship with a Certified Field Coordinator, before becoming certified himself.  (10T13-16 to 21-1).  B.
[brief] Lundy v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 92 N.J. 550, 559 (1983); see also Allen, supra, 44 N.J. at 305 (holding that courts have “consistently construed policy terms strictly against the insurer and where several interpretations were permissible, we have chosen the one most favorable to the assured”).  In the current matter, defendant [...] is relying upon a definitional exclusion in the underlying [...] policy to deny plaintiffs’ the benefit of the UIM coverage they purchased from [...].  (Pa60).  [...] claims that its policy “follows the form” of the underlying [...] policy and is subject to the same terms and conditions of the [...] policy.
[brief] On January 24, 2022, [...] issues a public zoom link for defendant’s attendance on January 26, 2022; on same day, defendant asks the trial court for the time of the hearing and reschedule of trial.  The trial court did not issue a response, however defendant conducted an outreach to the trial court official and with follow up to the trial court.  The initial charge, 2C:12-3B, plaintiff issued against Defendant was then elevated to a Grand Jury Trial, February 2022.
[brief] *Brock v. Public Service Electric & Gas Co.*, 149 N.J. 378, 391 (1997) citing *Nieder v Royal Indemnity Insurance Co.*, 62 N.J. 229, 234 (1973)  See also *Alan J. Cornblatt, P.A. v. Barow*, 153 N.J. 218, 230, 708 A.2d 401, 406-07 (1998) and *In re Board of Educ. of Boonton*, 99 N.J. 523, 536, 494 A.2d 279 (1985) (where the Court refused to consider newly-raised issues with "an insufficient factual basis" in the record), cert. denied sub nom, *Kramer v. Public Employment Relations Comm’n*, 475 U.S. 1072, 106 S. Ct. 1388, 89 L. Ed. 2d 613 (1986).
[brief] (Aa2525).  Upon review, [...] identified that [...] had failed to use the correct input values in the groundwater mounding analysis.  (Aa2525-Aa2526).  The horizontal hydraulic conductivity is the rate at which water can move in the horizontal direction.  BMP Manual, Chapter 13, Page 5.  Pursuant to the spreadsheet instructions and the BMP Manual, for projects located within the coastal plan physiographic province of New Jersey, the horizontal hydraulic conductivity rate is generally assumed to be the five times the vertical infiltration rate.  BMP Manual, Chapter 13, Page 5.  However, the fact is that [...] is only proposing soil replacement immediately below the infiltration basins.  [...] is not proposing to do soil replacement for the entire site or even in the areas surrounding the infiltration basins.  Pursuant to the BMP Manual, in a scenario in which the design engineer proposes soil replacement below an infiltration basin, “[t]he horizontal hydraulic conductivity is the same as the original soil as the original soil since… the soil outside the basin footprint will not change.
[directive] Defendant Name: Live Scan Verified? Yes  No  SBI #: ORI #: County: Agency Name: Officer Completing  ODARA: Agency Case #: ODARA  Completion Date Index  Assault Date (mm/dd/yy): (mm/dd/yy):  Defendant identifies as:  Male Female Victim identifies as:  Male Female Crime(s)  Charged (or as checked below):  Administer ODARA when the following offenses are charged and the Victim is a Partner (as terms are defined below):
[brief] Requests for government records are ubiquitous and reach almost every government entity, spanning all levels of government—local, county, and state.  Among just municipalities, hundreds of government records requests are submitted every day.  Virtually all those requests are handled dutifully by municipal clerks who also serve as custodians of records.  Almost none of those public servants hold law licenses.  Yet, they all are required by law to respond promptly, adequately, and correctly to each request in full compliance with a large, dynamic body of statutory or common law.  In effect, they are called on to make legal interpretations akin to quasi-judicial decision-making.  One misstep in this complicated process can be serious, including the imposition of civil penalties, discipline, and legal fees.  Depending on how it is decided, the legal rule emanating from this case could place municipal custodians in an even more precarious position.  At issue is whether a records custodian or other government official must examine an exempt criminal investigatory record and disclose information available under N.J.S.A. 47:1A-3(b) even when the requestor never requested such information.  The [...] respectfully urges the Court to reverse the decision below and not impose such a requirement.
[brief] ”  *AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion*, 563 U.S. 333, 343 (2011) (“Arbitration is a matter of contract, and the FAA requires courts to honor parties’ expectations. ”).  \(^4\) [...] and [...] are incorporated in New York while [...] is incorporated in New Jersey.  (Pa28-Pa29 ¶¶ 16-18.)  [...] and [...] hold New York State Liquor Authority licenses and New Jersey Division of Alcoholic Beverage Control licenses to sell alcoholic beverages within each jurisdiction.  (Da63-Da66.)  See also Moses H. Cone Mem. Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983) (“Section 2 [of the FAA] is a congressional declaration of a liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements, notwithstanding any state substantive or procedural policies to the contrary. ”); John G. Ryan, Inc. v. Molson USA, LLC, No. 05-cv-3984 (NGG)(JMA), 2005 WL 2977767, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 7, 2005) (Pa204-Pa220) (holding that the FAA preempts the ABC Law’s anti-arbitration prohibition); Matter of GAF Corp. v. Werner, 495 N.Y.S.2d 312, 317-18 (1985) (approving order to compel arbitration under 9 U.S.C. § 4 and holding that state courts are required to issue orders to arbitrate where section’s conditions are met); Fletcher, 601 N.Y.S.2d at 689 (“A further basic principle that is essential to our analysis is the corollary tenet that, in situations where the FAA is applicable, it preempts State law on the subject of the enforceability of arbitration clauses.
[brief] As is plainly obvious to anyone reading the Resolution, the Board did not base its decision on any portion of [...]’s ordinances.  Further, despite the Board’s insistence to the contrary, paragraph “B” of the denial is exactly a reference to the broad purposes of the MLUL.  It should be further noted that there was not testimony provided that indicates that the project would adversely affect public safety.  As noted above, the Amended Resolution was revised to include a “clarification” of the reasons for denial.
[directive] (only complete if the offense occurred on or after August 14, 2013)  Do you understand that if you are pleading guilty to the crime of child pornography pursuant to 2C:24-4b(4) or 2C:24-4b(5) or N.J.S.A.  N.J.S.A. an attempt to commit either of these offenses and the offense occurred on or after August 14, 2013, in addition to any other sentence, and upon motion of the prosecutor, the court shall impose a special sentence of parole supervision for life, unless the court finds on the record that parole supervision for life is not needed to protect the community or deter you from future criminal activity?
[brief] ”  Smith v. Dep’t of Treasury, Div. of Pensions & Benefits, 390 N.J. Super. 209, 213 (App. Div. 2007).  A liberal construction of eligibility would expand the class of persons eligible for the significantly greater monetary benefits permitted for accidental disability pensions, and would place a greater strain on the financial integrity of the fund and its future availability for those persons who are truly eligible for such benefits.
[brief] ”  (12T:17-3 to 18-19)  Defense counsel went on to argue, “I looking at the states brief, and on this specific issue as to being able to testify to, you know, being identified as coming from the firearm versus being consistent with language that I'm asking, I'm the only one who provided case law on this issue.  Ghigliotty does not deal with that specific issue.  Ghigliotty deals with having a Frye hearing for bullet tracks.  And the Judge says hold off until making a determination that you can say, yes, it's a match, the bullet and the gun are matches, until you have the Frye hearing.  I don't understand the basis of the reconsideration here other than the fact that the state did not like Your Honor's decision. ” (13T:17-4 to 18).  Defendant was right on two aspects.  First, Ghigliotty deals with having a Frye hearing for BULLETTRAXX.  The court agreed, that the primary focus in Ghigliotty does not match defendant's scenario.  (13T:18-4 to 11).  The court said, “he didn't know if the Ghigliotty decision is on point. ” (13T:19-9 to 15).  The trial --- 1 Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923) court also hinted at overruling Shipp for Ghigliotty because the latter is New Jersey authority.  (13T:19-9 to 15).  The courts reasoning rest on the fact that he applied the Daubert\(^2\) standard found in Shipp over the Frye standard.  The court furthered that the Frye standard is correct because it was used in State v. Pickett, 466 N.J. Super 270 (2021).  Even if this is the case, the trial court reconsidered his ruling without conducting Frye hearing to establish the reliability and admissibility of [...]'s testimony, consistent with Ghigliotty\(^3\).  In applying what the judge called the correct Frye standard, allowed [...] to testify without limitations.  (14T:5-21 to 8-9).  Although, the court stated she found Shipp persuasive.  (14T:76 to 10).  Thus the trial court abused its discretion and a new trial is warranted.  On remand, the judge should conduct the proper Frye hearing.  --- \(^2\)  Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993)  \(^3\)  State v. Ghigliotty 463 N.J. Super 355 (2020)  CONCLUSION  For all of the reasons set forth in Points I through III, the defendant’s conviction should be reversed and the matter remanded for retrial.  Respectfully submitted, /s/  [...], Appellant, pro se [...], Appellant, Pro se Superior Court of New Jersey  APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. [...]  STATE OF NEW JERSEY PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT v. [...], DEFENDANT-APPELLANT  CRIMINAL ACTION ON APPEAL FROM A FINAL JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY, LAW DIVISION, MERCER COUNTY
[directive] determining whether to admit a service member, prosecutors consider certain criteria  In such the nature of the eligible offense, the causative relationship between the mental (1) (2) as: illness and the commission of the offense, amenability of the person to participate the (3) in se~ices of the program, the availability of case management and mental health services, (4) (5) of of the desires any victim, history prior convictions, and the probability that diversion will (6) (7) promote recovery, prevent future criminal behavior, and protect public safety.  N.J.S.A. 2C:43- 26(b )(1 ).  The law also authorizes prosecutors to determine the duration of individual's an participation the program, which cannot exceed two years.  The length of participation based is in the initial clinical evaluation and recommendations, status reports on the defendant's on participation, and progress reports from case management, mental health service providers, and the person's mentor, if applicable.
[brief] While not addressed by the Trial Court, [...] failed to demonstrate probability of success for the additional reasons that the arbitration provisions --- \(^8\)  In the past, [...] has paradoxically claimed that [...] never raised its Hackensack Project claims in the PTA Arbitration.  See Da15-Da16 ([...]’s counsel claiming that “[t]o the extent this Hackensack claim had any merit (which it does not), [...] is nevertheless barred from bringing it because it did not bring it during the AAA proceeding between [...] and [...] that was filed in July 2022 and concluded with a Final Award on January 19, 2024. ”); Da35 (“. . . [...]’s newly minted Hackensack claim is clearly barred by the Entire Controversy Doctrine.  For unknown reasons, [...] apparently decided to withhold bringing this claim in the parties’ recently completed arbitration, only to try to spring it on [...] now, after [...] won the arbitration and obtained a $4 million award against [...]. ”).  [...] apparently has now strategically reversed its position, now claiming that [...] fully litigated these claims in the PTA Arbitration. of the PTA and the Hackensack Subcontract do not permit the parties to combine the issues arising under each in one arbitration.
[brief] ”  *Presley's Estate v. Russen*, 513 F.Supp. 1339, 1350 (D.N.J.1981).  Only an assignment that clearly reflects the assignor's intent to transfer his rights will be effective.  *Tirgan v. Mega Life & Health Ins.*, 304 N.J.Super. 385, 390, (App.Div.1997); Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 324 (1981).
[brief] (Pa385-Pa386; Pa324-Pa325)  [...] never answered and on January 18, 2024, Plaintiffs requested a proof hearing, before the Honorable [...], P.J.Cv. (Pa387)  Subsequently, on February 8, 2024, Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Leave to Appeal the trial court’s January 19, 2024 Order granting [...] summary judgment.  (Pa388-Pa389)  Plaintiffs moved for leave to file an interlocutory appeal because the order granting summary judgment as to [...] was not a final order, as [...], albeit a defaulted party, still remained in the case.  (Pa388-Pa389)  Plaintiffs asserted that interlocutory review was both necessary and justified because without a review of the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in \(^2\) 2T. 1/19/24  Transcript of Oral Argument on [...]’s Motion for Summary Judgment favor of [...], a gross injustice would occur, and Plaintiffs would suffer irreparable harm.  (Pa388-Pa389)  Specifically, Plaintiffs asserted that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to [...] because the trial court failed to appreciate the pivotal importance of [...]’s failure to preserve all available store surveillance footage on the date of Plaintiff’s incident.
[directive] c) ¿Entiende usted que de no registrarse o volver a registrarse, puede que le acusen de haber [Sí/Yes] [No/No] cometido un delito de tercer grado y podría recibir una condena de encarcelamiento de hasta 5 años?  Do you understand that if you fail to register or re-register you may be charged with a third degree crime and receive a sentence of imprisonment of up to 5 years?
[directive] If for some reason during your deliberations you do not want the prosecutor or the clerk present, you may ask either or both of them to leave the room, and they must comply.  These requests are made by the Grand Jury as a group and are to be determined by a majority of the grand jurors present.  Because of the sensitive nature of the matters that come before you, your proceedings must be completely confidential.  You must resist any impulse to enhance your own reputation by passing along “inside” information.  Therefore, all of your deliberations and discussions must take place in the grand jury room while the Grand Jury is in session.  It is improper for grand jurors to confer or deliberate privately by telephone or otherwise concerning Grand Jury matters.  Each grand juror has the right to expect that what is said to fellow grand jurors during deliberations will remain confidential.  In that setting, there must be the utmost freedom of expression and debate, uninhibited by fear that any views or expressions will be revealed to others.  This requirement of secrecy is absolutely necessary to the proper administration of justice.
[brief] *Bryant*, to be sure, states that “legislative bodies are presumed to act on the basis of adequate factual support,” *Bryant*, supra, 309 N.J. at 610, but it also makes clear that the presumption can be overcome by a “sufficient showing” that the enactment does not have a rational basis.  *Id.*  Indeed, Bryant states that a “determination predicated on unsupported findings is the essence of arbitrary and capricious action. ”  Plaintiffs have come forward here with a showing that calls the Township’s findings and the validity of the exemption into serious question.  *Hirth* states that at a hearing on a municipal ordinance “there is no requirement that evidence be presented providing a factual foundation,” *Hirth*, supra, 337 N.J. Super. at 158.  However, [...] itself requires findings that are factual in nature.  Indeed, at the ordinance hearing, the Township’s witnesses alluded to a “comprehensive financial analysis” to back up those findings.  (Pb8)  Further, one of the plaintiffs questioned the need for an exemption, pointing out that a similar inclusionary development in the Township had gone up without any tax breaks.  (Pb19-20)  Just as importantly, Hirth makes clear that if a prerogative writ action challenges the validity of an ordinance and “resolution turns on disputed factual issues,” the case must proceed in the same manner as other civil litigation…”  Id.  Here, plaintiffs have made a showing more than sufficient to raise a factual dispute.  The trial court’s decision to deny discovery and dismiss the complaint can only be sustained if the municipality has final and unreviewable say on what is and what is not an “appropriate” exemption under [...].  That interpretation is untenable for the reasons stated.
[brief] The incident in question did not take place in the portal beneath the rail lines, and it was not the result of the premeditated actions of a person with criminal intent.  It was the result of the impulsive, unpredictable actions of a mentally disturbed person.  The implication that her actions were the result of poorly lit hallways in another part of the building, or that convex mirrors downstairs would have somehow prevented this incident is a stretch of the imagination that borders on ridiculous.  This is analogous to saying that poor visibility at an intersection is likely to cause someone to drive too fast on a different street.  Appellant also relies on the 14 photographs attached to his expert report that purport to show “problem areas. ”  (PA 143-44,148-153)  What is noticeably absent from these photographs is any pictures of the actual scene of the incident.  This only leads to the logical conclusion that Appellant’s expert could not find any “problems” at the scene of the incident and had to look elsewhere to find evidence to support his preconceived conclusion.  Appellant must show that [...]’s negligence led to his injury.  It is not enough to just show that there was an injury.  Nor is it enough to just find an alleged flaw in the building or the neighborhood.  Appellant must connect the two.  Even accepting all of Appellant’s concerns about the building and neighborhood surrounding [...], Appellant has not shown how any of these concerns led to any injury.
[brief] *Id.*  Despite this, Appellant now argues, for the first time, that the Lower Court was incorrect when it failed to address the merits of its Motion because of its ultimate determination on Respondent’s Motion.  But, first, this is simply incorrect – without an action before it (as a result of the dismissal of the Complaint), the Lower Court simply could not address whether the default should be vacated in a separate Collection Action that was not before the Lower Court.  Second, regardless, Appellant’s arguments must now be rejected as these are raised for the first time on appeal.  Appellant had an opportunity to preserve this argument when the Court specifically asked Appellant, “Do you have any thoughts on that, any concerns about that approach, any disagreement with that conclusion?”, to which Appellant responded, “No, Your Honor, we’ll go back to [...]. ” (T59-21-25).  Because this argument was not preserved, it must be rejected as having been raised for the first time on appeal.  See Delaware Nation v. Pennsylvania, 446 F.3d 410, 416 (3d Cir. 2006) (“Absent exceptional circumstances, this Court will not consider issues raised for the first time on appeal. ”); see also Houghton v. American Guaranty Life Ins. Co., 692 F.2d 289, 294-295 (3d Cir. 1982) (the issue must be brought to the attention of the district court to be heard on appeal); Harris v. City of Philadelphia, 35 F.3d 840 (3d Cir. 1994) (“[t]his court has consistently held that it will not consider issues that are raised for the first time on appeal. ”).  CONCLUSION
[brief] ”  Id. at *2.  In his reply brief [...] tries to distinguish Herz by arguing that in Herz the plaintiff claimed it was a clerical error to fail to include a second signature line whereas in this case [...] is not claiming a clerical error. \(^2\)  The argument fails because it is clear that the Court’s decision did not turn on the clerical error point but on the single signature line, how the lease was signed at the place of signature and the requirement of strict construction of guaranty agreements.
[brief] (Pb33-37).  It remains Plaintiff’s position that prior designated redevelopers like itself maintain carte blanche say over any amendment to the Redevelopment Plan even after said redevelopers have completed their own projects.  Ibid.  The lower court was correct to conclude otherwise:  [...] was no longer a designated developer under the Redevelopment Plan.  No authority has been provided to the court that would permit the court to conclude that [...] would continue to have the power to contest amendments to the Redevelopment Plan after [...]’s project was completed and [...] had no further involvement in the Redevelopment Plan, and the court finds that summary judgment must be granted[.] (Pa59 to Pa61).
[brief] In the event of a conflict between Article X and this Article XXXVI, this Article XXXVI shall govern.  (7)  Off-street parking shall not be provided for any use or to any party other than a resident or visitor of the site, nor shall parking areas be used for any purpose other than parking.  (8)  Signage shall be provided where parking spaces are to be reserved for residents.  Visitor parking shall be signed and painted for each space designated for such a purpose.  (9)  Loading shall be provided in accordance with § 230-204.