ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] 1.  **Plaintiff conceded that the arbitration clearly and unambiguously advised him that his claims would be arbitrated** (T28:21–25).  At oral argument in the trial court, Plaintiff’s counsel conceded that, “but for the last offending sentence” in the penultimate paragraph of the Agreement’s alternative dispute resolution provision, “this arbitration clause would be a – a straight up proper, uh, mutual arbitration clause that the parties would be bound to. ” (T28:21–25).  [...] accepted Plaintiff’s concession below and accepts it here because it is substantively correct.  That is, the alternative dispute resolution provision here is written in plain language, is conspicuously designated in **BOLD** and **ALL CAPITAL** letters, and specifically advised Plaintiff that he was “**VOLUNTARILY AND KNOWINGLY WAIV[ING] A RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL. **” (Pa61); see *Goffe v. Foulke Mgmt. Corp.*, 454 N.J. Super. 260, 271 (App. Div. 2018) (observing that the arbitration provision, written in “bold and conspicuous print . . . emphasize[s] that . . . plaintiffs . . . agreed to arbitrate all related claims and waived their rights to trial by jury regardless of the legal basis for the claim”), rev’d on different grounds, 238 N.J. 191, 212 (2019) (“we have no doubt that the arbitration agreements in plaintiffs' contracts -- acknowledged by the Appellate Division to be clear and conspicuous -- are entitled to enforcement”).
[brief] I.  [...] Explicitly Endorsed Neuwirth as Controlling Authority in Harmony with the U.S. Supreme Court, Contrary to Defendants’ Misdirection  The CAIR  Defendants absurdly contend that [...] “openly disregarded the Neuwirth decision, characterizing it as inconsistent with U.S. Supreme Court authority. ” (Db 15).  [...] did no such thing.  Indeed, below is what [...] actually wrote in the Amplification Order, where, rather than “disregard,” he explicitly endorsed Neuwirth as controlling:  For the reasons set forth herein, this Court specifically finds, by way of amended, clarified, supplemented or otherwise amplified Underlying Decision that, as to the controlling law on a Motion to Dismiss, Neuwirth is most certainly controlling .  . . . (Da 215) (emphasis added).  In addition, [...], rather than stating that Neuwirth was “inconsistent with U.S. Supreme Court authority,” specifically pointed out that Neuwirth was in harmony with Supreme Court authority by quoting Neuwirth’s citation to St. Amant.
[directive] Each department shall maintain a record of all access to stored BWC recordings pursuant to this Policy.  The department’s record keeping system shall document the following information: (a) the date and time of access; (b) the specific BWC recording(s) that was/were accessed; (c) the officer or civilian employee who accessed the stored BWC recording; (d) the person who approved access, where applicable; and (e) the reason(s) for access, specifying the purpose or purposes for access authorized pursuant to Section 10.1, and specifying the relevant case/investigation number, where applicable.
[brief] [...], Plaintiff-Appellant, v. [...], and [...], Defendants-Respondents.  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION  DOCKET NO. [...]  Appeal from court orders dated February 17 / April 28 / June 9, 2023, granting reconsideration and summary judgment, by Hon. [...], J.S.C., Superior Court of New Jersey, Passaic County, Law Division, Civil, Dkt. No. [...]  Submitted to Appellate Division on February 5, 2024
[brief] ”); [...] Decision at pp.10-11.  Appellant’s interpretation of §§ 1692c(b), 1692d(3), and 1692f would lead to several other absurd results that are plainly in conflict with the statutory scheme as a whole.  For instance, it would prohibit debt collectors from communicating with the courts and their staff.  After all, aside from permitting communication with the debt collector’s attorney, § 1692c(b) contains no additional carve-outs for courts and their staff, just as it contains no carve-out for letter vendors or other service providers.  Yet the FDCPA specifically envisions debt collectors being involved in collection suits and needing to correspond with the court.  See 15 U.S.C. § 1692i.  Similarly, Appellant’s proposed interpretation of the FDCPA would also prohibit a debt collector from communicating with its own employees, who under Appellant’s theory are non-exempted persons.  But the vast majority of debt collectors, including Respondent, are juridical entities that can only act through hired persons.  And courts have held that debt collectors are separate and distinct from the persons they hire.  See Isaac v. NRA Grp., LLC, 377 F. Supp. 3d 211, 216 (E.D.N.Y. 2019) (treating debt collector companies and their employees as separate persons under the FDCPA).  Thus, under Appellant’s reading of §§ 1692c(b), 1692d(3), and 1692f, a debt collector would be barred from communicating with its own employees, and thus effectively unable to act on any debt – a patently absurd result.  Finally, Appellant’s theory would potentially prohibit debt collectors from simply using the phone or internet.  When a debt collector uses the phone or internet, it necessarily transmits information to and from an telephone/internet service provider.  Thus, one could argue with the same reasoning suggested by Appellant that, by using the phone and internet, a debt collector has “communicated” with a third-party in violation of the FDCPA.  That would be absurd.  Yet Appellant’s theory of liability requires this result.  Given these ridiculous consequences, Appellant’s plain reading of the FDCPA must be set aside in favor of a sensible interpretation which avoids absurd results, is consistent with all provisions of the FDCPA, and is in line with Congressional intent and legislative history.
[brief] ”).  There is no dispute that the Project is subject to CAFRA and thereby regulation through DEP’s CZM rules.  In issuing [...] the permit, DEP followed the requisite CZM regulations, applying them to the substantial credible evidence in the record.  *Tlumac v. High Bridge Stone*, 187 N.J. 567, 573 (2006); *In re N.J. Dep’t of Env’t Prot. Conditional Highlands Applicability Determination, Program Interest No. 435434*, 433 N.J. Super. 223, 235 (App. Div. 2013).  DEP’s decision to issue the permit should be afforded great deference.
[brief] (See, e.g., Pa384; Pa395).  As an example, the violations of the CPMD that [...] alleges here, were found to violate the IFPA in *[...] v. Northfield*, 228 N.J. at 621-27 (defendants knowingly assisted in violating rules of the State Board of Medical Examiners and submitted ineligible and fraudulent medical claims for reimbursement through that practice structure, contrary to law).  It is impossible to bring a CPMD case in the limited confines of a PIP arbitration.  To hold otherwise would unfairly deny clear rights under the IFPA, RICO, and established case law, and would nullify the Legislative intent to confront aggressively the problem of insurance fraud underlying the IFPA.
[directive] 11-M 9-l '?.l TfAl -tl-~ ttJl rcJ-2-J-, -'i'1 .1-J 1il  At ~-&-<>Jl ?AJ]~ ~<>Jl {l.:il7} 41 aj "8"}7} Al ? 71?"8"} .:il ~ ~ ~ 4-, 78 £<':!.  g_ 1-'f- .:E~ %~ '(! '(! :;;J ;1ff-¥!- 7H .£..::F;!l(Pretrial Intervention Program)  g_ n: ~ ~ ~ 0 ]  ~~%~~1~;;zi~9.1~2r~.£.9.l~~~;;zi~~~2r~~2r9.l~&~~~~g_~ci~~~n }1l -3:! 7-] ? g_ y 7J}? .5:.  <?'! %'(!- ~ ~ ~ 0  Do you also understand that pursuant to the same Interstate Compact transfer of your [Yes/<>!l] [No/otJ...1..8.] b. supervision to another state may be denied or restricted by that state at any time after sentencing, or upon entry of a guilty plea if a guilty plea is a condition of admission to the Pretrial Intervention Program, if that state determines you are required to register as a sex offender in that state or if New Jersey has required you to register as a sex offender?
[brief] Pb17-18.  However, as the *Chassen* court explained, there are many situations, such as ripeness and administrative exhaustion, where a waiver analysis is inapplicable because it would be senseless to require a party to undertake a pointless gesture.  *Chassen*, 836 F.3d at 296.5  [...] relies on *EPIX Holdings Corp. v. Marsh & McClennan Cos., Inc.*, 410 N.J. Super 453 (2009) to try to show that [...]’s non-arbitrable claims against its other insurers were not an impediment to bilateral arbitration.  [...]’s argument misses the point.  [...] and all of its insurers, including [...], needed to resolve their dispute over the proper allocation of defense costs in a single proceeding (which is exactly what the mediator and the parties concluded; see Dra0005-6, 0015-16).6  Accordingly, the fact [...] remained in the DJ Action to try to reach a binding resolution of the defense allocation issue does not demonstrate waiver.
[brief] STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Appellee, vs. [...], Appellant.  Civil Action On Appeal of an Order of the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division-Criminal Part, Somerset County  Dated August 21, 2023  DOCKET NO. [...]  Docket No.: [...]  SAT BELOW: HON. [...], J.S.C.  LEGAL BRIEF ON BEHALF OF DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
[brief] (42T:190-7 to 192-7)  The State’s reliance on Medlock v. State, 430 S.E.2d 754, 755 (Ga. 1993), is misplaced because the medical examiner’s opinion in that case was based entirely on his scientific knowledge.  (Sb 20-21)  The medical examiner performed an autopsy, which allowed him to conclude that “[t]he child died as a result of head trauma. ”  Id. at 756.  In reaching his conclusion about the manner of death, the medical examiner in Medlock did not rely on any evidence beyond his examination of “the injuries to the victim’s head which he had discovered in his examination of the victim’s head and skull. ”  Ibid.  Medlock is therefore a far cry from this case, where the autopsy was inconclusive as to whether the trauma occurred before or after death, and [...] repeatedly acknowledged the critical role that his knowledge of facts about the “circumstances” of the case played in his determination of manner of death.  A medical examiner can only give an expert opinion as to what scientific knowledge shows and must stop there.  The rest is for the jury.  In this case, [...] was free to testify to what he was actually able to discern from the autopsy: that [redacted] skeleton showed signs of blunt trauma inconsistent with an accidental fall.  But, because his medical expertise did not reveal whether that trauma occurred before or after death, [...] should not have smuggled his lay opinion about what the “circumstances” of the body’s disposal suggested into his purportedly scientific determination of the cause of death.  This testimony “misle[...]d the jury into thinking that [[...]] knows something that they do not know,” invading their province as factfinder on the ultimate issue of guilt.  Jamerson, 153 N.J. at 340.  The admission of this opinion on manner of death – the critical disputed issue before the jury – compels reversal of [...]’s homicide conviction.
[brief] [I]f I gave a limiting instruction as how to use certain evidence, that evidence must be considered by you for that purpose only.  You cannot use it for any other purpose.  As … an example of that, hearsay information as I pointed out to you before, hearsay is not being offered for the truth of what is being said.  It’s offered to assist you in, or with the experts, in assisting them to come to their diagnosis but it cannot be considered for the truth of those particular statements.  …
[brief] In the summer of 2013, [...] of the [...] began an investigation into heroin distribution centered around [...].  (Da 5)  Gougeon testified that the investigation into [...] led to a CDW for his phone.  (1T 41-24 to 25)  Logs revealed that [...] called [...] frequently.  (1T 43-7 to 9)  Officers also put a GPS on [...]’s car.  (1T 40-22 to 41-2)  According to Gougeon “it all sort of came together,” from citizen and informant sources that “around the same time [] Mr. [...] was meeting a guy he referred to as [...],” who may have been supplying him drugs.  (1T 17-12 to 15)  Gougeon testified that his Sergeant, [...] was “familiar with somebody he arrested years ago that went by the name of Mike and his name was [...]” and believed that person to be [...].  (1T 17-20 to 24)  In 2003, [...] had been arrested with heroin, cocaine, and a handgun; when officers came to arrest him, he attempted to back up and hit a police car.  (1T 20-16 to 21; 2T 11-18 to 24)  Given a picture of [...], a confidential informant identified him as “Mike. ”  (1T 19-15 to 23)  Every few days [...] would drive to an auto parts store that [...] owned.  (1T 41-8 to 15)  The investigation turned to Mundy.
[brief] C.  The Respondent’s Deposition  The court ordered the limited deposition of the Respondent.  She denied the second agreement was her employment agreement and provided various examples of inconsistency with that document.  [212a,251-253,271a-276a]  The Appellants provided a copy of the Respondent’s deposition to the court prior to the hearing.  [211a, 212a]  The Respondent during the hearing reaffirmed the information supplied to the court in her affidavit and deposition.  [1T P60:L 9-18]  During her deposition, the Respondent explained in detail the harassment directed at her in the workplace.  “There were comments of a sexual nature directed at me and there were sexual comments about other female employees. ”  [212a, 238a-250a]  She further explained that the conduct in the workplace made her uncomfortable.  [212a, 238a-250a]  She explained that she continued to be the subject of harassment even after she went on medical leave.  [212a, 238a-250a]  She further testified in her deposition she complained about discrimination, sexual harassment, and compliance issues.  [212a, 249a-250a]  The harassment included telling other employees in the workplace she was a lesbian.  [37a]  [...] also made various comments that were demeaning to the Respondent as well as other women in the workplace.  [37a, 212a, 238a-250a]  He made the specific statement to her, “God in every religion was male and only men can run the show. ”  [37a]  The harassment continued until the Respondent’s last day of work, which was April 8, 2022.  [36a, 37a]  She testified, even after she went out on disability, she received phone calls from [...] at different hours of the day where he simply would hang up the phone.  [1T P61:L1-20]  This was done to harass and intimidate her.  [37a, 212a, 238a-250a]  Respondent specifically denied both documents presented by the Appellants was her actual employment agreement.  She explained the initials on certain key pages were not her initials.  [212a,251-253,258-260,277a–278a]
[brief] [...] knew that the 290 Ocean project did not meet the Redevelopment Plan and Design Ordinance (Design Guidelines) in effect at the time the project was first proposed (the 1996 Design Guidelines).  So, in October 2020 it decided to change “the Design Guidelines to permit construction of the [290] Project….” (2Ra0068).  Measured against the 1996 Design Guidelines, the proposed 290 Ocean building would be too dense (109 dwelling units versus 60), too tall (approx. 100’ versus 80’), cover too much of the site (approximately 50% of site versus 35%), not be separated far enough from buildings on both sides (approx. 40’ separation versus 100’).  (See 1996 Guidelines, Ra118-Ra123).  The proposed hulking building would also not be stepped back from the waterfront as envisioned by the 1996 Design Guidelines which contain multiple provisions promoting a stepped back design.  The Guidelines stated, “A building type that provides terraces and balconies stepping towards the ocean is encouraged,” and, “When buildings have stepped profile[s] the setback between each stepped portion of adjacent buildings…” should be equal or greater.  (Ra0123).  Moreover, the Guidelines contained pictorials showing various examples of how the [...] South --- 1 The Facts and Procedural History are intertwined and have been combined.
[brief] And the way this was set up is the classic case that would warrant that.  And to apportion it the way it is being suggested [by the defendants], just cannot be done.  . . .  There is no other way to parse this without it becoming inequitable to the plaintiff.  So I am not going to reconsider that . . .  I don’t think . . . the facts of this case would warrant such conclusions.  So I will deny that.  (37T 79:7 to 80:14; Da2691-97).
[brief] Plaintiff did not slumber upon his rights.  Despite proper service, defendants failed to respond timely to plaintiff’s hybrid complaint.  (Pa93; Pa95; Pa99)).  On Saturday morning August 21, 2021, plaintiff requested the entry of ministerial defaults against each defendant.  Plaintiff simultaneously (via email) advised defendants and the municipal attorney of his ministerial default entry requests.  Shortly thereafter, the municipal attorney e-filed an answer out-of-time on behalf of all defendants.  Later that afternoon while visiting an outdoor New York sculpture park with his wife, plaintiff consented (via email) to the out-of-time filing.  Plaintiff directed the municipal attorney to prepare a consensual stipulation.  (Pa99 -Motion to Vacate Defaults  Opposition Certification and Exhibits).  The August 23, 2021  New Substituted Counsel and Consensual Standstill Agreement  Early Monday morning August 23, 2021, plaintiff emailed the municipal attorney about the consensual stipulation.  Plaintiff reserved certain rights about the filed out-of-time answer.  Later that afternoon and prior to the filing of a substitution of counsel, Attorney [...] contacted plaintiff for the first time.  Attorney Groh advised plaintiff that she was new substitute special counsel in this hybrid action.  Attorney Groh requested but plaintiff refused to withdraw his ministerial default requests prior to the simultaneous filing of an amended answer.  (Pa95).  Because of certain patent errors and omissions contained in the municipal attorney's out-of-time filed answer, plaintiff agreed to standstill until September 30, 2021 so that new substitute counsel could conduct her own independent Rule 1:4-8 reasonable due diligence inquiry before being bound by the municipal attorney's out-of-time answer.  Plaintiff reserved all his disqualifying conflict of interest representation issues.  Later that afternoon, Attorney Groh prepared and plaintiff executed a September 30, 2021 Standstill Stipulation.  (Pa98).  Notwithstanding defendants’ requests, the clerk entered ministerial defaults against all defendants.  (Pa93; Pa95).
[brief] The Commission here properly granted Respondents’ motion to dismiss in its entirety because Petitioner failed to plead sufficient, credible facts to support a finding that any of the individual Respondents violated N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(e), N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(f), and/or N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(g) as alleged in the complaint.  Petitioner claims that the Commission did not provide an “analytical framework” and faults the Commission because it made no “references to how Citizens [To Protect Public Funds, 13, N.J. 172] and related decisions regarding expenditures of public money during school referendums may apply to potential ethics violations. ” (Pb29.)  To begin, this argument is irrelevant to the issue of whether the Commission viewed the facts in the light most favorable to Petitioner.  Rather, it is a legal argument that the Commission failed to apply the appropriate precedent.  Even putting aside Petitioner’s conflation of separate legal principles and inartful analysis, the Commission was correct to ignore the New Jersey Supreme Court’s Citizens To Protect Public Funds decision because, as discussed supra, that decision concerns a board’s use of public funds to support political advocacy and is entirely irrelevant to this matter.  The Commission does not have jurisdiction to consider matters regarding the spending of public funds as considered in Citizens To Protect Public Funds, and Petitioner does not (and cannot before the Commission) allege that Respondents misused public funds, only that they violated certain provisions of the School Ethics Act.
[brief] T’76-4.  [...] agrees that the duty to appeal prescribed in *Pharmacists Mutual Insurance Co. v. Myer*, 187 Vt. 323, 334, 993 A.2d 413, 421 (2010), forms part of the duty to defend in the Policy, as *Pharmacist’s* holding and reasoning are fully consistent with New Jersey law and are widely if not universally followed.  *See generally Couch on Insurance § 200:49* (3d ed. 2005) (“the duty to defend continues through the appellate process until it can be concluded as a matter of law that there is no basis on which the insurer may be obligated to indemnify the insured. ”); *Appleman on Insurance § 136.11* (2d ed. 2003) (“courts have generally held that, when an insurer writes a policy with a broad duty to defend clause, its duty to defend includes the duty to appeal a judgment against the insured”).  Relevant excerpts from the cited insurance law treatises were filed below and appear in the appendix.
[directive] h.  You will be required to provide a DNA sample, which could be used by law enforcement for [Yes/Si] [No/No] the investigation of criminal activity, and pay for the cost of testing?  Se requerira que usted suministre una muestra de su ADN y que pague el costo de analizarla, la cual podria ser usada por las autoridades de! orden publico en la investigaci6n de actividades delictivas?
[brief] [...]’s testimony on these facts was buttressed by the testimony of his current wife, [...], who testified that she assisted [...] in managing the Property.  For example, [...] testified in detail about how she was personally responsible for paying insurance for the Property, including details about the insurance broker she deals with in making payments and renewing the insurance policy.  (8T 82:3-84:20, Jan. 23, 2023).  Two non-party witnesses also testified as to [...]’s ownership, maintenance, and control of the Property.
[brief] (Pa99).  Prior to Plaintiff commencing his first academic year at [...], Defendant’s website read, “Students will be asked to select or opt-out of a Master’s pathway at the end of their first professional year in the school. ” (Pa435).  After Plaintiff commenced classes at [...], the [...] School of Pharmacy website page included new requirements for the dual degree program, stating, “Students interested in a dual degree will be required to meet the admissions requirements for the selected second-degree pathway, in addition to maintaining a 3.0 grade point average within the Doctor of Pharmacy curriculum. ” (Pa454).  Noticeably, the website, nor any other materials provided to the Plaintiff, included any explicit language that students would not be able to opt-in to the program at a later date, or that a student must maintain a 3.00 GPA during their first professional year of study to opt-in to the program.  There was no language limiting the selection or opt-out period to the end of the first professional year.  Defendant, within its Amended Brief, attempts to analogize Doe v. Emory Univ, 2021 WL 358391, (N.D. Ga. Jan. 22, 2021), a matter from the United States District Court, Northern District of Georgia, Atlanta Division, which it alleges supports the proposition that a promotional statement does not constitute offers to form an express contract.  (Db29-Db30).  However, Doe is distinguishable from the within matter.  In Doe, the Plaintiffs pursued a breach of an express contract claim due to the college switching to virtual classes during the COVID-19 pandemic.  Id. at *1.  The Doe court reasoned that the advertisement did not expressly promise in-person education, whereas here, Defendant expressly promised the ability to opt-in to the master’s program, and later, upon reaching a 3.0 GPA.  Id. at *5.  Significantly, the Doe court did not dismiss the Plaintiff’s breach of implied contract claim, but instead found, “that the Defendant's customary practice and the Plaintiffs' payment of tuition represent sufficient factual allegations of mutual assent to an implied contract.  The Plaintiffs have also sufficiently alleged a breach of that contract and damages.  (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 122–23.)  The Plaintiffs' breach of implied contract claim can proceed at this stage.