ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] And as a result of that, all of the policy considerations identified in Olds v. Donelly, supra, for exempting Plaintiff’s claims from the entire controversy doctrine are absent herein.  The testimony of [...], [...], and [...] demonstrate that a decision to bring a legal malpractice action against the Defendant was intentionally and strategically decided during the lease litigation and intentionally and specifically delayed until after the lease litigation settled.  [...] testified that he made a decision on behalf of Plaintiff to sue Defendants toward the end of the lease litigation.  Similarly, [...] testified that a decision to bring a legal malpractice action against the Defendants was made during the lease litigation, by the time of settlement negotiations, and discussed with Mr. Campisano.  The most telling, uncontroverted fact, that a decision to sue the Defendants was made during the lease litigation is further evidence by the inclusion of a provision in the settlement agreement in the lease litigation that Plaintiff’s insistence, which would require [...] to cooperate in a legal malpractice against the Defendants.  Plaintiff has not presented any explanation, excusable or otherwise, as to why it elected not to assert legal malpractice claims against the Defendants during the lease litigation.  Plaintiff has the benefit of the Defendant [...]’s deposition testimony in the lease litigation without formally bringing claims against him until after the fact.  This strategic decision has prejudiced the Defendants, as [...] did not have the advise of counsel while deposed and was unaware that his client was seeking to sue him.  Plaintiff had an unfair advantage to question [...] while knowingly contemplating a legal malpractice action against him.  This was tantamount to an ambush.  The crux of Plaintiff’s legal malpractice claim is that it instructed [...] to terminate the lease in July or August of 2016, but [...] failed to do so, all areas of inquiry presented by the Defendant Mazawey’s deposition.  The Defendants now argue that they are prejudiced in that the additional cited damages would have never occurred if the Defendants were a party to the lease litigation, as Defendants could have been a party to the settlement and now are being looked to for the entire amount.  Plaintiff has not offered any sanction, short of a dismissal, which could possibly cure the prejudice to the Defendants.  (T1)1
[brief] Id.  The Appellate Division also held that “defendant is seeking to…assign to the quoted excerpts a construction and interpretation peculiarly subjective to him and completely unwarranted by the plain sense and meaning of the language used. ”  Id. at 579.  As noted above, the Beukas Court relied on Jacobsen.  The Beukas Court noted that the defendant was “merely expressing [its] . . . ‘objectives, desires and hopes’ and were not making an enforceable promise to plaintiffs to provide the degree no matter what”.  Beukas, 255 N.J. Super. at 563.  In this matter, as in both Beukas and Jacobsen, Plaintiff-Appellant fails to set forth any misrepresentation to support the cause of action.
[brief] Plaintiff argues yet again that the Twp. of Bernards opinion was either decided incorrectly, or that this matter is somehow distinguishable.  Pl.’s Br. at 43 (citing Twp. of Bernards v. State of New Jersey Dept. of Community Affairs, 233 N.J. Super. 1 (App. Div. 1989)).  As more fully set forth in Point II of this Brief, the Twp. of Bernards court held that OPMA’s requirement to provide “adequate notice” of public meetings is satisfied by transmitting notice to two newspapers at least 48-hours in advance of the meeting.  233 N.J. Super. at 26.  Plaintiff cites to several trial court opinions that seem to impose another requisite element of “adequate notice” – not only that the notice must be transmitted to two newspapers 48-hours in advance, but also, that it must be provided to newspapers that have the ability to publish said notice at least 48-hours in advance of the meeting.  See Lakewood Citizens for Integrity in Government v. Lakewood Township Committee, 306 N.J. Super. 500, 510-11 (Law Div. 1997); Houman v. Pompton Lakes, 155 N.J. Super 129, 167 (Law Div. 1977).  To be clear, this was not a burden imposed by the Appellate Division in the Twp. of Bernards decision, despite citing the Worts opinion as support for its ruling and having knowledge of the trial court’s discussion in Worts.  If the Appellate Division believed that OPMA required notice of public meetings to be provided to two newspapers that have the ability to publish said notice at least 48-hours in advance of a meeting, the Court would have stated as such in the Twp. of Bernards decision.  This is an onerous burden that is completely different than simply transmitting notice to two newspapers 48-hours in advance of a meeting.  Placing the burden on a public entity to determine whether a newspaper has the ability to publish notice 48-hours prior to a meeting would require having knowledge of the newspaper’s publication schedule, the publication cutoff time, and the workload of the editors on any particular day, among many other variables.  The Legislature could not possibly have intended to place that burden on public entities.  Our Supreme Court has warned that when interpreting issues of law arising under OPMA, courts must be cautious not to foist burdens upon public bodies that the Legislature did not intent to impose.  *Kean Federation of Teachers v. Morell*, 233 N.J. 566, 586 (2018).  This Court should follow the “adequate notice” rule clearly set forth in *Twp. of Bernards*, and it should not deviate to impose burdens on public entities that simply do not exist in the plain language of the statute.  See N.J.S.A. 10:4-8d.  For these reasons, the Defendants did not violate OPMA.
[directive] C.  The same would be true if, in these circumstances, the Court were to “make rules governing the administration of all courts invoke its authority to in the State and, subject to the law, the practice and procedure in all such courts. ”  art. VI, § 2, ¶ 3.  The Court’s N.J. Const. rulemaking power, 16 moreover, does not extend to rewriting substantive legislation that is “While the courts necessarily make new substantive law constitutional. through the decision of specific cases coming before them, they are not to make substantive law wholesale through the exercise of the rule-making power. ”  Winberry, 5 N.J. at 248.  In sum, although we recognize that individual cases may present due process concerns, we believe the constitutional remedies proposed are too broad.  We therefore turn to the statutory remedies advanced.
[brief] Capital improvements constitute real dollars invested by [...] in the Unit.  Just as the purchase price for the Unit in 1993 is not nullified by age, neither are capital improvements.  Both the purchase price, plus capital improvements, irrespective of their age, comprise [...]’s equity in the Unit, adjusted for inflation.  Fundamentally, as previously stated in [...]’s brief, an ordinance must be sensibly applied to enable an owner to realize a “just and reasonable return” as constitutionally mandated.
[brief] As Defendants admit in their deposition testimony, Plaintiff engaged in no misconduct or failure to act, and there was not even an allegation that [...] did anything wrong on July 5, 2016, as confirmed by the Prosecutor’s Office investigation and findings.  Plaintiff cited below the Court’s opinion in City of San Antonio v. Heim, 932 S.W. 2d 287 (Court of Appeals of Texas 1996) (954a).  In Heim, the Court ruled that a police department’s retaliation against a police officer for arresting an off-duty officer for driving while intoxicated (“DWI”) fell within the protections afforded under Texas’ whistleblower statute.  Id. at 290-91.  Specifically, the Court cited “an unwritten practice in the Department of not arresting fellow officers or their family members – a practice of professional courtesy”.  Id. at 289.¹  The plaintiff’s activity in Heim made him unpopular amongst his fellow officers, as evidenced by the retaliatory conduct against the plaintiff by those officers, including “hang up” phone calls to his home, his belongings being stolen, his car being towed from his workplace, officers refusing to sit next to the plaintiff, and, most seriously, officers refusing to back-up the plaintiff on calls, thus endangering the plaintiff’s personal safety as well as public safety.  Id. at 292.  --- ¹  As argued herein, CEPA does not require a pre-existing policy or practice of violating the law in order for a single violation to be the subject of bona fide whistleblowing activity protected under the statute.  Selective enforcement of DWI is unlawful in New Jersey whether it occurs once or multiple times within a police department, and an officer who gives a “professional courtesy” to a drunk driver and fails to enforce the law would be subject to criminal prosecution under our State’s Official Misconduct statute, regardless of whether such a past practice or unwritten policy existed in that officer’s department or not.
[brief] Sg048-Sg050.  Otherwise, such prior Board approval would be spelled out in the plain language of Board Policy 0174, which clearly does not contain such a provision.  Critically, the plain language of Board Policy 0174 does not require the designated person requesting the legal services from the Board Attorney to disclose the fact of the request to the other designated persons listed in the Policy, namely, the Superintendent of Schools, the Superintendent of Schools’s designee, or the School Business Administrator/Board Secretary.  The SEC Relied On Hearsay Evidence From Board Member [...]’s Ethics Complaint Against Appellant (Sg001-Sg006; Sg008-Sg031; Sg164-Sg191; Sg206-Sg212; Sg232-Sg236)
[brief] PA – 10 to 11.  Notwithstanding that issue, Plaintiff respectfully submits that Defendant’s arguments are incorrect as a matter of law.  For example, Defendant asserts that Plaintiff violated TILA when Plaintiff failed to disclose an increase in the applicable interest rate at least forty-five (45) days prior to such changes.  12 C.F.R. § 1026.9(c)(2)(i)(A).  Defendant is incorrect.  TILA requires disclosure of a “significant change in account terms”, which encompasses changes to 1) “a term required to be disclosed under § 1026(b)(1) and (b)(2)”, 2) “an increase in the required minimum periodic payment”, 3) “a change to a term required to be disclosed under § 1026(b)(4)”, or 4) “the acquisition of a security interest”.  12 C.F.R. § 1026.9(c)(2)(ii).  However, those same regulatory provisions expressly state that a creditor is not required to provide notice involving an open-end plan under certain circumstances.  12 C.F.R. § 1026.9(c)(2)(v).  Among those exceptions are when the change: is an increase in a variable annual percentage rate in accordance with a credit card or other account agreement that provides for changes in the rate according to operation of an index that is not under the control of the creditor and is available to the general public.  12 C.F.R. § 1026.9(c)(2)(v)(C).  The applicable interest rate was set forth in the Cardmember Agreement included as part of Plaintiff’s Certification.  PA – 49.  The pertinent language regarding the variable APR was as follows:  Your Pricing Schedule may include variable APRs.  These APRs are determined by adding the number of percentage points that we specify to the Prime Rate.  Variable APRs will increase or decrease when the Prime Rate changes.  The APR change will take effect on the first day of the billing period that begins during the same calendar month that the Prime Rate changes.  An increase in the APR will increase your interest charges and may increase your Minimum Payment Due.  PA – 49.  Defendant, as a member of the general public, was able to obtain and ascertain the appropriate interest rate and the basis for said rate was not under Plaintiff’s control.  12 C.F.R. § 1026.9(c)(2)(v)(C).  Accordingly, Defendant’s assertion that Plaintiff was required to disclose this rate to Defendant upon change is incorrect.
[brief] 1  Procedural History .......................................................................................................  4 Standard Of Review .....................................................................................................  6 Statement Of Facts .......................................................................................................  9  Legal Argument ..........................................................................................................  11  [...]’S INTRA-FAMILY LIABILITY EXCLUSION IS UNENFORCEABLE AS A MATTER OF LAW BECAUSE IT VIOLATES NEW JERSEY PUBLIC POLICY (2T6:18 – 20:15) ..................
[brief] Control Act (the “Spill Act”), NJSA 58:10-23.11b.  67a.  A claim for negligence and violation of the Spill Act also was asserted by way of cross-claim against the [...].  67a.  Cross-claims for negligence, trespass and violation of the Spill Act, all based upon contamination of the Property, also were alleged against [...].  67a.  The Court denied leave to file the Proposed Amended Pleading on June 22, 2018, finding that the [...] had not presented any new information with respect to the proposed claims such as to justify granting leave to amend.
[brief] *See, e.g.*, *State v. Cierciello*, 86 N.J.L. 309, 313-15 (E. & A. 1914) (holding it would be “no ground for error” if properly obtained fingerprint was offered into evidence and used at trial).  And although some of the studies cited by defendant are close to two decades old, neither the courts nor the Legislature have adopted any of the conclusions defendant puts forth.  Defendant cites no contrary authority.  And as the trial court explained, “numerous federal courts have found expert testimony on fingerprint identification based on the ACE-V method to be sufficiently reliable,” even after *Daubert*.
[brief] [Da220].  The 2007 Addendum begins with an explicit citation to the 1991 Partnership Agreement reciting in bold, capital letters:  “THIS ADDENDUM TO THE PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT of November 8, 1991[.]”  [Da220].  Page 13 of the 2007 Addendum contains witnessed signatures of both Plaintiff and [...].  [Da232].  On November 10, 2018, Plaintiff and [...] executed a Partnership Interest Purchase Agreement and Promissory Note (the “Purchase Agreement”), which subjects the parties to the terms, conditions, and restrictions set forth in the Partnership Agreement in Subsection C of its Recitals.  [Da83].  Subsection C of the Purchase Agreement provides, in pertinent part:  “[...] desires to purchase from [...], 5% of the Seller’s interest, pursuant to the terms and conditions set forth herein and in the Limited Liability Partnership Agreement of [...] (the ‘Partnership Agreement’). ”  [Da83].
[brief] Given this framework, [...] had probable cause to arrest the defendant on suspicion of driving while intoxicated after the defendant admitted drinking, showed clues of intoxication during his field sobriety tests, and had the odor of an alcoholic beverage emanating from his breath.  These facts also fully support the defendant’s ultimate conviction for DWI.  The facts that [...] and [...] testified to overwhelmingly showed the defendant in a physical state that illegally impacted his ability to operate a motor vehicle.  The video evidence of this incident only buttresses that testimony.
[brief] [State v. Thomas, 188 N.J. 137, 153 (2006) (citing Dunbar, 108 N.J. at 96-97). ]  However, where a sentencing judge weighs a defendant's record heavily because it is “lengthy,” and the record is lengthy because of numerous charges or arrests that did not result in convictions, the judge should state the reasons why those charges and arrests are relevant to the character of the sentence being imposed.  *State v. Tanksley*, 245 N.J. Super. 390, 396 (App. Div. 1991).
[brief] Because [...] was a deliberating juror (41T11-11), her connection to the victim’s family, witness [...], and [...] had the capacity of influencing the jury in reaching its verdict.  See Panko v. Flintkote Co., 7 N.J. 55, 61 (1951) (holding the test for whether a new trial should be granted because of an irregular influence is “not whether the irregular matter actually influenced the result, but whether it had the capacity of doing so”).  Accordingly, this Court should reverse and remand for a new trial.
[directive] [Tak/Yes]  [Nie/No] prokuratora i ma prawo odrzucenia oświadczenia o przed wydaniem wyroku, a także winie ma prawo do wydania surowszego wyroku?  Do you understand that the judge is not bound by any promises or recommendations of the prosecutor and that the judge has the right to reject the plea before sentencing you and the right to impose a more severe sentence?  Pan(i), że jeśli sędzia zdecyduje o wydaniu surowszego wyroku niż wyrok b.
[brief] On March 1, 2023, [...] filed a motion in aid of litigants’ rights with respect to the Off-site Property, seeking to enforce the conditional judgment and the location of the Off-site Property at [...] as instructed by the prior administration.  62a.  On May 12, 2023, the trial court denied [...]’s motion.  It held that because the specific location of the Off-site Property was not set forth as Block [...] in the judgment, no violation had purportedly occurred.  Notwithstanding that [...] had failed to build the required number of affordable units, or identify any other off-site location, the trial court declined to order any remedies:
[brief] Thus, in reversing the defendant [...]’s grant of summary judgment, the *[...]* Court determined that a reasonable fact finder could have concluded that the railroad crossing exposed the objectively reasonable member of the general public to a substantial risk of injury.  *Id.* at 129.  Therein, decedent, who raced horses at various tracks, crossed railroad tracks that ran across a race track grounds, owned by defendant [...], in order to reach the stables.  Because the track was closed for the off season, they were not guarded by flashing lights or crossbucks.  However, the [...] had installed sliding metal gates, which decedent drove through.  Once on the tracks, an approaching train collided with [...]’s car, and he died from his injuries.
[brief] Pa339.  On May 10, 2023, [...] filed a Motion to Enforce Litigant’s Rights against [...] on account of adoption of the Stealth Resolution, which was a blatant breach of the parties’ Settlement Agreement.  Pa035.  On June 20, 2023, the parties conducted oral argument before [...].  At that time, it was specifically noted that the Stealth Resolution was entered post-close of testimony; post-close of the vote to approve [...]’s SPA; post adoption of the December 12, 2022 Original Resolution; and without notice to [...].
[directive] Consistent with training, the following general rules apply in determining the appropriate level of force:  (a)  Cooperative Person.  When dealing with a cooperative person, officers may rely on police presence and/or verbal control techniques, but should not use force.  (b)  Passive Resistor.  When dealing with a passive resistor, officers may rely on police presence, verbal control techniques, holding techniques, lifting/carrying, wrist locks and other manual pain compliance techniques.
[brief] --- 1 T = November 5, 2020 motion transcript  2  T = July 14, 2023 motion transcript  3  T = September 29, 2023 motion transcript  2  The order granting [...] and [...] motion for summary judgment was omitted from Plaintiff’s Appendix and is included in Defendant’s appendix at Da1-Da7.  The statement of reasons for both motions is the same.  COUNTERSTATEMENT OF FACTS
[brief] There is no law stating that, and those rules do not state that.  R 4:4-4 mandates personal service in this state, or substituted service only if ordered based on an affidavit supporting that or mail service only if defendant answers the complaint, all of which never happened.  R 4:4-5 applies only to in rem or matrimonial actions and requires a specific affidavit from a plaintiff, again all of which never happened here and is inapplicable.  Thus, there was never personal service and an unidentified USPS card with a scribble on it from an out of state address that was not Plaintiff’s signature nor her physical office does not create jurisdiction.
[brief] The trial Court opined that it is the Court’s job to look to see if the developer presented substantial evidence in order to seek the waivers requested, and further opined that in the Court’s mind, the developer did present substantial evidence in the form of the board professionals deeming the waivers to be appropriate and something that was recommended.  The trial Court ultimately opined that strict compliance with the radial requirements creates a hardship for the applicant, and an “unusual and unworkable result” (4T43-8).
[brief] [...], who was called as a treating physician as distinguished from an expert, testified that Respondent sustained a herniation at C6-7 of her cervical spine.  [...] also testified that in his opinion, the Respondent suffered an aggravation to pre-existing degenerative disc bulges at multiple levels within her cervical spine.  Dr.  Shah had only seen the Respondent on one occasion, January 13, 2023.  (T2 161-1 through T2 165-18).  The Respondent failed to provide the requisite comparative analysis.  Specifically, in order for a physician to provide an opinion that a pre-existing condition was aggravated or exacerbated as a result of an accident, a comparative analysis must be performed.
[brief] These alleged overt acts could have been committed by any of the four alleged co-conspirators, or any combination of co-conspirators: [...] and/or [...] and/or [...] and/or [...].  (See Da 32; 13T 194-5 to 17)  Thus, the instructions permitted the jurors to return a verdict even if they completely disagreed over which of the four possible co-conspirators committed which of this multitude of acts.
[directive] A law enforcement agency shall apply for a complaint-warrant if either the Failure to Appear (FTA) or New Criminal Activity (NCA) score determined by the automated pretrial risk- assessment process is 3, 4, 5, or 6, or if there is a New Violent Criminal Activity (NVCA) flag, unless an assistant prosecutor or deputy attorney general consulted in accordance with Section 3.2 of this Directive, or a supervisory officer who is authorized by the County Prosecutor to overcome presumptions under Section 4 of this Directive, determines that the presumption of charging by complaint-warrant is overcome pursuant to subsection 4.5.9.  Defendant Has Violated a Domestic Violence Restraining Order or a Sexual 4.5.2 Assault Survivor Protection Act Order.
[directive] Nothing in these procedures implies that an identification not done in accordance with them is unreliable or inadmissible in court.  2  Mug books are collections of photographs of previously arrested persons.  They may be used in cases in which a suspect has not yet been determined and other reliable sources have been exhausted.  - 1 - based on a memory of the earlier photo and not the original event.  To guard against misidentification, administrators must take active measures to ensure that an eyewitness is not exposed to multiple photos or viewings of the same suspect.  In addition, administrators should take measures to prevent witnesses from gaining access to extraneous, possibly prejudicial information about a person.  I.