ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO VACATE THE FINAL JUDGMENT UNDER R.4:50-1(d) and (f)  ON ACCOUNT OF THE PATENT FLAWS IN THE LEARY REPORT (Issue Addressed Below, 3a-4a)  .............  29 POINT IV  APPELLANTS HAVE SUBSTANTIATED THE “PRIMA FACIE” CASE IDENTIFIED IN JUDGE PAGANELLI’S APRIL 3, 2023  ORDER THAT BLACKBALL IS NOT ENTITLED TO ASSERT THE PROTECTION OF A GOOD FAITH PURCHASER FOR VALUE WITHOUT NOTICE (Issue Addressed Below, 38a-39a).  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 CONCLUSION
[brief] However, at the time of the Florida home purchase, he was just her boyfriend, but living together.  (Pa335 - Cueto Deposition p. 22, L 8-25, 1-3.).  [...] believes that her Mother was lying when she stated that the home in New Jersey belonged to her and not her daughter Arlene.  (Pa431 - [...] Deposition p. 39, L 3-21).  [...] admits that the elderly Matos couple could have achieved the same outcome of renting without contributing $50,000.00 to him.  (Pa338 - Cueto Deposition pp. 36-37, L9-25, 1-13).  [...] admitted that he would not do something benevolent for his in-laws at his cost or expense.  (Pa352-353 - Cueto Deposition p. 93, L25, p. 94 L1-25, p. 95, L1-6).  [...] also stated that the same $50,000.00 from the [...]’ check made its way into the equity at the Tillbrook, NJ address, from the sale of the Florida home via a 1031 Exchange.  (Pa215, and Pa332, 340, 349 – Cueto Deposition p. 13, L16. p.42, L18-25: p. 78, L12-15).  No Lawyer or financial expert was ever consulted for the benefit and independent advice that could have been beneficial to [...] and [...].  (Pa334 - Deposition of Cueto p. 21, L 9-23, 6T 22).  [...] paid off [...]’s car loan.  See Exhibit J payoff from BMW, (Pa 246, 342 - Deposition of Cueto at p. 51).  Mr. [...] never fell behind and paid $1,500.00 a month since moving to the New Jersey Tilbrook property, paying $18,000.00 a year.  (Pa351 - Deposition of [...] p. 89).  [...] and [...] sent letters attempting to evict their parents/inlaws and even attempted to bypass their counsel to get them to drop the lawsuit by going to their home and trying to get them to sign papers.  (Pa509, 2T 58-59).  This was underhanded and wrong.  Trust was placed by [...] in [...].  (Pa 338, 352 - Cueto Deposition pp. 36-37, L20-25, 1-13; p. 92, L 6 -19).  There was a relationship based upon a Father and daughter and her live in, eventual husband in the role of son-in-law, being a typical parent/child relationship.  (Pa 353 - Cueto Deposition p 94, L 1-25, p. 95, L 1-6).  [...] believed that he owned both the home bought in Florida and the current home in New Jersey.  (1T 55-58).  Likewise, [...] believed that she was the true owner of the home in Florida as well as the current home in New Jersey.  (1T 41-48).  ARGUMENT
[brief] (Pa3).  *It was undisputed* that plaintiff specifically testified *the cause of his fall was the ice* that had accumulated on the landing which he encountered immediately when stepping onto the landing.  (Pa329, deposition P16, L22-24; P17, L8 – 17).  *It was undisputed* that the reports of the defendants’ weather expert confirmed that for several days before plaintiff slipped and fell there was no precipitation and no snow or ice cover was present.  On the date of incident, no snow or ice cover was present at the start of the day (midnight) but precipitation in the form of freezing rain and snow occurred intermittently from around 4:20 AM to 5:50 AM EST.  After 5:50 AM, freezing rain and freezing drizzle occurred frequently to around 7:30 AM EST.  After 7:30 AM, rain/freezing rain occurred frequently to around 8:25 AM EST.  Additional rain/freezing rain occurred frequently between approximately 8:50 AM and 9:05 AM, and 9:40 AM and 9:55 AM EST.  (Da1, report 10/17/23 [...]).  It was undisputed plaintiff’s answers to interrogatories specifically alleged he was caused to slip and fall because of icy conditions he encountered immediately upon stepping out onto the landing.  (Pa315).  It was undisputed plaintiff testified that he slipped and fell at 7:30 a.m. (Pa328, plaintiff deposition P11, L8-10).  In fact, the report offered by plaintiff’s own liability expert specifically concludes the low coefficient of friction that existed when plaintiff fell was caused by the icy conditions.  (Pa471, report of [...], pg. 17).  It is undisputed that the cause of plaintiff’s fall was the icy conditions that developed during an ongoing storm event.
[brief] Because courts lack personal jurisdiction where service of process is improper, determining proper service is a threshold issue.  Lampe v Xouth, Inc. 952 F.2d 607,700-01 (3d Cir, 1991).  A court obtains personal jurisdiction over the parties when the complaint and summons are properly served upon the defendant.  Effective service of process is therefore a prerequisite to proceeding in a case. ”  U.S. v. One Toshiba Color Television, 213 F.3d 147, 156 (3d Cir. 2000).  “[T]he entry of a default judgment without proper service of a complaint renders that judgment void.  “; Gold Kist, Inc. v. Laurinburg Oil Co., Inc. 756 F.2d. 14,19 (3d Cir. 1985).
[directive] by Directive #17-18 (11/01/2018), Published 12325 (Competency 1B)  CN: Order I of3 page  If ( examining clinician deems in-patient hospitalization is necessary to complete the d) examination.  N.JS.A. 3.  Pursuant to 2C:4-4(b), the qualified psychiatrist or licensed psychologist shall render an opinion to whether the defendant has the mental capacity to appreciate his/her presence as relation to time, place and things and whether the defendant's elementary mental processes in are such that he/she comprehends: of (a) That he/she in a court justice charged with a criminal offense; is (b) That there is a judge on the bench; ( That there is a prosecutor present who will try to convict him/her; c) ( That he/she has a lawyer who will undertake to defend him/her; d) of (e) That he/she will be expected to tell to the best their mental ability the facts surrounding if him/her at the time and place where the alleged violation was committed he/she chooses to testify and understand his/her legal right not to testify; of That there is a jury present to pass upon evidence that adduced as to guilt or innocence (f) if such charge or, that he/she should choose enter into plea negotiations or to plead to of guilty, that he/she comprehends the consequences a guilty plea and that he/she be able to knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waive those rights which are waived upon of such entry a guilty plea; and of (g) That he/she have the ability to pa1ticipate in an adequate presentation his/her defense.
[brief] ........................................ 20  1.  Title 19 Does Not Contemplate Voters Whose Ballots Are Received by the County Board of Elections Under the Statutory Accepted Timeline but Postmarked Late Through No Fault of Their Own .................................................................................................................. 20  2.  The Trial Court Erred by Failing to Count the Late Ballots ...................... 22  3.  Since Election Day Occurred on a Saturday, the Trial Court Erred by Failing to Deem the Ballots Timely Postmarked and Received Pursuant to the New Jersey Rules of Court  ........................................ 24  CONCLUSION
[brief] [Pa72].  Subsequent to Plaintiff’s alleged fall, Plaintiff underwent arthroscopic surgery to her left ankle on September 5, 2019.  [Pa72].  Plaintiff testified that since getting the surgery she only experiences “very quick” pain in her ankle and that it “locks up. ”  [Pa72].  Plaintiff also testified that she gets a “dull pain” when going up the stairs, but that “[s]ome days I don’t have it, others I do. ”  [Pa72].  Plaintiff further testified that her foot gets “swollen” and she “no longer wear[s] heels. ”  [Pa72].  Despite claiming a permanent injury, Plaintiff testified that she last saw a doctor for her injuries nearly three years ago on October 17, 2019.
[brief] Indeed, other than the disagreement over the calculation of FAR, the Board presented no contrary expert testimony from its own professional staff or other licensed professionals regarding any aspects of [...]’s application with the exception of review letters from the Borough’s engineer which were addressed by the Plaintiff during the application.  See N.Y. SMSA, 370 N.J. Super. at 338 (finding a zoning board’s denial of a use variance arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable where the board retained no expert of its own and heard no expert testimony that contradicted the applicant’s expert’s opinion).  A board cannot rely on non-expert testimony from its members or concerns voiced by residents rather than qualified expert testimony to prove the adverse effects associated with a requested variance.  Otherwise, such reliance would be arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable.  See Cell S. of N.J., 172 N.J. 75, 88 (2002).
[brief] The trial court made factual findings and those findings should not be disturbed.  “Factual findings premised upon evidence admitted in a bench trial are final on appeal, when supported by adequate, substantial, credible evidence. ”  Potomac Ins. Co of Ill. v. Pa Mfrs’, Ass’n Ins. Co., 215 N.J. 409, 421.(2013).  There was testimony about chess tournaments, the advertising in this case, the defendant’s website, the rules of chess and how they were accessible at that time, the particulars of this tournament and what the prize structure was.
[brief] 622 (1979) | 3, 6, 7, 11 | | C.N. v. Ridgewood Bd. of Educ., 430 F.3d 159 (3d Cir. 2005) | 6, 8 | | County of Butler v. Governor of Pa., 8 F.4th 226 (3d Cir. 2021) | 14 | | Croft v. Westmoreland Cnty. Children and Youth Services, | 5 | | 103 F.3d 1123 (3d Cir. 1997) | | | Crowe v. De Gioia, 90 N.J. 126 (1982) | 2, 3, 13 | | Delanoy v. Twp. Ocean, 245 N.J. 384 (2021) | 14 | | Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Org., 597 U.S. 215 (2022) | 10 | | Doe v. Del. Valley Reg’l High Sch. Bd. of Educ., | | | 2024 WL 706797 (D.N.J., Feb. 21, 2024Feb. 21, 2024) | 10 | | Doe v. Irwin, 615 F.2d 1162 (6th Cir. 1980) | 10 | | Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976) | 12 | | Garden State Equality v. Dow, 216 N.J. 314 (2013) | 3, 13 | | Gerety v. Atl. City Hilton Casino Resort, 184 N.J. 391 (2005) | 4 | | Gruenke v. Seip, 225 F.3d 290 (3rd Cir. 2000) | 10 | | H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398 (1981) | 3, 6 | | Hartnett v. Pa. State Educ. Ass’n, 963 F.3d 301 (3d Cir. 2020) | 14 | | J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., | | | 650 F.3d 915 (3d Cir. 2011) | 6 | | John & Jane Parents 1 v. Montgomery County Bd. of Educ., | | | 622 F. Supp.3d 118 (D. Md. 2022) | 8 | | Mirabelli v. Olson, 691 F.Supp.3d 1197 (S.D. Cal. 2023) | 11 | | Nini v. Mercer Cmty. Coll., 202 N.J. 98 (2010) | 14 | | Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979) | 6 | | Poff v. Caro, 228 N.J. Super. 370 (Law Div. 1987) | 11 | | Regino v. Staley, 2023 WL 4464845 (E.D. Cal. July 11, 2023) | 10 | | Ricard v. USD 475 Geary County, KS Sch. Bd., | | | 2022 WL 1471372 (D. Kansas May 9, 2022) | 3, 5, 7 | | Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) | 10 | | Sanford v. Stiles, 2004 WL 2579738 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 10, 2004) | 8, 9 | | Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253 (1984) | 6 | | Schiavo v. Marina Dist. Dev. Co. LLC, | | | 442 N.J. Super. 346 (App. Div. 2015) | 4 | | Schultz v. Kott, 131 N.J. Super. 216 (App. Div. 1974) | 13 | | State v. Davila, 443 N.J. Super. 577 (App. Div. 2016) | 14 | | Tatel v. Mt. Lebanon Sch. Dist., 675 F. Supp.3d 551 (W.D. Pa. 2023) | 7 | Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000) .........................................................
[brief] N.J.S.A. 40:49-2.1 sets forth a higher standard of notice, requiring the published notice provide a “brief summary of the main objectives or provisions of the ordinance,” whereas N.J.S.A. 40:49-2(a) merely requires a “clear and concise statement . . . setting forth the purpose of the ordinance. ”  One need not resort to anything beyond the plain text of the statutes to see that a “brief summary of the main objectives or provisions” is more onerous than a “clear and concise statement of purpose. ”  Moreover, that N.J.S.A. 40:49-2.1 imports a higher “summary” standard makes sense because the provision applies to ordinances of at least six (6) pages in length and replaced a predecessor statute that required publication in full of all land use ordinances.  See Rockaway Shoprite Assocs., Inc. v. City of Linden, 424 N.J. Super. 337, 345 (App. Div. 2011).  As such, the “‘summary’ being substituted for the full text of the ordinance” by this provision has been interpreted to require a higher standard of “appris[ing] interested readers throughout the municipality of the zoning changes contemplated as well as their nature and import. ”  Id.  [...] ignores these important distinctions set forth in the case law.
[brief] THE COURT: Anybody threatening you or forcing you to do so?  [...]: No, sir.  THE COURT: You understand, sir, that you would be giving up your rights to have a trial and at the trial you would have the right to call witnesses in your defense or confront those witnesses that may be presented against you?  [...]: Yes.  THE COURT: You understand sir by pleading guilty you’re giving up your opportunity at that same trial to compel the State to meet their burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt?  [...]: Yes.  THE COURT:  And sir you also understand by pleading guilty you are admitting to the Court that on the date and time the summonses were issued to you, that you had consumed alcohol, did operate a motor vehicle here in the jurisdiction of [...] and the consumption of that alcohol did affect your ability to properly operate your vehicle, and you were, in fact, under the influence of that alcohol?  [...]: Yes, sir.  THE COURT:  And sir you understand as a second offense violator, minimum fines and costs would exceed $850; you’d lose your license for 2 years; you must do 48 hours in the IDRC; 30 days of community service; placement of an ignition interlock device in your vehicle during the 2-year revocation and 1 to 3 years after that and you could go to jail for up to 90 days.  Understood?  [...]: Yes, Your Honor.  THE COURT:  And all of that being said, do you still wish to plead guilty?  [...]: Yes.  (1T3-13 to 5-3)  [...] found Defendant was entering the plea voluntarily.  (1T6-5 to 6-6)  The Judge then accepted Defendant’s plea finding, “The factual basis being placed on the record, both by way of the admission, coupled with my review and marking of the Alcotest tolerance worksheet, which is C-1 and confirms readings well about the presumptive level. ”  (1T6-5 to 6-10)  On March 23, 2022, Defendant returned to the [...] and moved to vacate his plea.
[directive] Comer (slip op. 53, citations omitted).  of  The Court did not take issue with the length the sentences.  Rather, of ... the constitutional concern here is twofold: the court's lack discretion to assess a juvenile's individual circumstances and the of details the offense before imposing a decades-long sentence of with no possibility parole; and the court's inability to review the original sentence later, when relevant information that could not be foreseen might be presented.
[brief] Any exterior alteration on existing structures or buildings or other improvements on their sites….  C.  Applications for construction permits to demolish a structure in any historic zone district….  E.  The construction of new sidewalks or changes to existing sidewalks within the public right of way.  (Pa174a)  Thus it can clearly be seen that the [...] had the authority to review the matter under the Design Guidelines, and establish appropriate materials for inclusion into the site had the matter proceeded properly with a Zoning Permit.
[brief] 13, 20 - **In re Sweetwood**, 91 N.J. Super. 496 (App. Div. 1966) ................................................  17 - **Kilmurray v. Gilfert**, 10 N.J. 435 (1952) ......................................................................  14 - **Kirk v. French**, 324 N.J. Super. 548 (Law Div. 1998) ..................................................  14 - **N.J. Democratic Party, Inc. v. Samson**, 175 N.J. 178 (2002) .......................................  14 - **Perri v. Kisselbach**, 34 N.J. 84 (1961) ...........................................................................  14 - **Reynolds v. Sims**, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) ........................................................................  22 - **Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Invs. Ins. Co. of Am.**, 65 N.J. 474 (1974) ......................... . - **Singh v. Sidana**, 387 N.J. Super. 380 (App. Div. 2006), cert. denied, 189 N.J. 428 (2007) .................................................................................................................. 13 - **State v. Camey**, 239 N.J. 282 (2019) .............................................................................. - **State v. Friedman**, 209 N.J. 112 (2012) .......................................................................
[brief] First, the Trail Court properly held that [...] may compel arbitration under the doctrine of equitable estoppel.  The law is well settled in New Jersey that arbitration may be compelled by a non-signatory against a signatory to a contract.  See Bruno v. Mark MaGrann Associates, Inc., 388 N.J. Super. 539, 546 (App. Div. 2006) (“It is not always necessary that a party be a signatory to an arbitration agreement to be bound by that agreement. ”); see e.g., E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Rhone Poulenc Fiber and Resin Intermediates S.A.S., 269 F.3d 187, 199 (3d Cir. 2001) (a non-signatory may be bound to an arbitration agreement if “under traditional principles of contract . . . [the party is] akin to a signatory of the underlying agreement. ”)  As [...]’ appeal notes, New Jersey Supreme Court’s decision in Hirsch v. Amper Fin. Servs., LLC, 215 N.J. 174, 71 A.3d 849 (2013) is instructive.  There, the court recognized that a non-signatory may compel arbitration against a signatory under the doctrine of equitable estoppel.  (See id. at *179)  (“It is a theory designed to prevent injustice by not permitting a party to repudiate a course of action on which another party has relied to his detriment. ”)  The equitable estoppel path requires, in addition to intertwinement of claims, a showing of detrimental reliance on behalf of the party aiming to compel arbitration.  (Id.)  [...], acting as a non-signatory to the Contract, may enforce the arbitration agreement against [...] – a signatory to the Contract – because of “the relationship of the alleged wrongs to the non-signatory’s obligations and duties in the contract . . . and [the fact that] the claims were intimately founded in and intertwined with the underlying contractual obligations. ”  *KPH Healthcare Servs., Inc. v. Janssen Biotech, Inc.*, No. 20CV05901KMESK, 2021 WL 4739601, at *7 (D.N.J. Oct. 12, 2021); *(see id.)* (recognizing that arbitration agreements can be enforced by non-signatories by way of equitable estoppel).  In [...]’ Amended Complaint, all of the claims against [...] are derivative of the claims against [...].
[brief] The Board has acknowledged that the third-party vendor was not contacted to mail the postcards until more than 30 days after the enactment of the Ricci Act.  The third-party vendor could not mail the notice within 30 days of the enactment of the Ricci Act.  Because this notice was not sent in accordance with the requirements specified in the Ricci Act, the Board should have considered [...]’s request to register outside the timeframe specified in the Act.  The Board failed to consider its power to relax time limits in the interest of justice or in furtherance of a just accommodation.  It is within the Board’s power to relax time limits.  The Board’s initial denial has failed to consider, evaluate, and weigh [...]’s equitable claims.  Most notably, it failed to even mention the approximately one hundred affidavits submitted that support the fact that these postcards were never received by [...] or other members of the pension system.  Furthermore, the Board’s decision inflicts obvious and unnecessary harm upon [...] and fails to advance the legislative purpose of the Ricci Act.  The legislative purpose of the Ricci Act was to provide first responders with the ability to alter their retirement benefits if they have fallen ill as a result of their honorable and heroic service at the largest terrorist attack this country has ever seen, not to unnecessarily and arbitrarily deny sick retired troopers accidental disability benefits.  [...] and ninety-seven (97) other active and retired troopers provided affidavits that they never received notice sent regarding the Ricci Act.  Because the Board failed to fulfill its statutory obligation under the Act to provide notice to all the members of the retirement system within 30 days, and further because it appears that the vast majority never got any notice at all, the Board’s determination was arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable.  As such, in the interest of justice and in the furtherance of a just accommodation, we respectfully request that Board’s determination be reversed.
[brief] The Court held that the City did not meet its burden of proving that, in fact, the current and former representations are “substantially related. ”  Id. at 470.  The Court reasoned that the “superficial similarity of the subject matter of both representations -- the propriety of real estate tax assessments -- does not withstand closer scrutiny. ”  *Id.* at 469.  In rejecting the lower court’s “unfounded concern” that the law firm *might* have been privy to confidential information in the prior representation which *could* be used against the plaintiff, the Court concluded that there was “no proof in the record that the facts of the prior representation” are relevant or material to the prior tax appeals.
[directive] NGRI Acquittee to a Specified Community Placement of  Having Found that the NGRI acquittee is not dangerous to self, others, or property as a result mental illness to require institutionalization; and having found that while the acquittee does as not need involuntary or continuing involuntary hospitalization, that the acquittee cannot be released into the community without supervision or under conditions, without posing a danger to self, others, and property, __ It of Ordered is on the day - 20 _ that: Select Month -, _____ Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:4-8(b )(2) the NGRI acquittee shall be placed in _ 1.
[brief] Before ruling on the defendants' motion to vacate, he said:  "Now, if [...], never gets the paperwork and a default judgment is obtained, then I think you're – I think you're quite correct.  At least, if a motion is made in a timely basis, that default judgment should be vacated.  I agree with that."  (See October 19, 2023 Hearing Transcript: Page 15, line 19-23)  [...] said at the hearing:  "As I indicated in my brief, the facts are very clear.  The first fact is that the – the – we never received the – we were never served."  (See October 19, 2023 Hearing Transcript: Page 4, Lines 11-14, 'we' referring to both defendants)  The abuse of discretion occurred when the trial judge shifted blame to the defendants, ruling that they should have obtained the court records sooner in June of 2020, when they first became aware of the judgment when they received the Ex Parte Order for Discovery.  "My narrow ruling is, is that this – this motion is about three years too late."  (See October 19, 2023 Court Hearing Transcript: Page 19, lines 10-12).  The judge’s decision was an abuse of discretion.
[brief] LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I THE EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD CLEARLY ESTABLISHES THAT THE DEFENDANT VIOLATED EAST HANOVER TOWNSHIP ORDINANCES §173-24, §173-27 and §201-2A.  The Township proved, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant violated [...] Ordinances §173-24, §173-27 and §201-2A.  As set forth above, §173-24 provides that “no person owning, keeping or harboring any animal shall suffer or permit it to run at large upon the public streets or in any public park or in any public building or in any other public place within the township. ”  Finally, §173-27 provides that “no person who shall own, keep or harbor an animal shall abandon such animal within the township. ”