ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] 1.  **Special Reasons/Positive Criteria. **  The applicant may establish "special reasons" ("positive criteria") that justify a d variance for a non-permitted use based upon a showing that: (1) the proposed use is "inherently beneficial" to the public good;\(^1\) or (2) the applicant will suffer "undue hardship" because the property cannot be reasonably adapted to a conforming use; or (3) the proposed site is "particularly suitable" for the proposed use because it will promote the general welfare.  _Saddle Brook Realty, LLC v. Twp. of Saddle Brook Zoning Bd. of Adj.,_ 388 N.J. Super. 67, 75-76 (App. Div. 2006).  66
[directive] 13.  Failure on current or prior conditional release (including bail, parole, probation, or pretrial release order) or conditions of a restraining order (TRO, FRO, DORO, SORO, SASPA, stalking)  Conditional release failure:  The conditional release must have been ordered before the Index Assault.  If Defendant was on a conditional release at the time of the Index Assault, and no information is available about release conditions, ✔ count the Index Assault as a conditional release failure, because such releases typically require offenders to remain offense free.  The Defendant must have been at liberty in the community under supervision, monitoring, or other requirement ordered by a ✔ criminal court, or a no-contact order imposed by any court.  Any known violations of the conditional release or violations of release conditions count for this Item.  ✔  Any charges incurred while on conditional release count for this Item.  Count any known failure, even if it did not result in a charge.  ✔  Examples: committing a new criminal offense; failing to appear for court; failing to attend a probation appointment; drinking when ✔ prohibited by court or probation; going to a person’s home or work when prohibited; contacting a person when prohibited.  Do not include violations occurring after the Index Assault.  ✘  ________________________________________________________________________________________________________ ________________________________________________________________________________________________________ ________________________________________________________________________________________________________
[brief] ”  In his reply brief [...] agrees with the two rules of construction discussed above but asserts that the Defendants “fail to appreciate the key language from [Ctr. 48 Ltd. P’ship vs. May Dept. Stores, 355 N.J. Super 390, 405, 406 (App. Div. 2002)] the guaranty agreement must be read in light of commercial reality and in accordance with the reasonable expectations of persons in the business community involved in transactions of the type involved. ”  Plaintiff Reply Brief, p. 5.  [...] interprets this language to mean that the issue of whether a personal guaranty is to be found turns on whether it would have made economic sense to request such a guaranty.
[brief] See N.J.A.C. 7:38-2.3(a)(11).  ³  Appellants initially failed to name [...] as a party.  [...] filed a motion to intervene as of right, which we denied, and a motion for reconsideration and for permissive intervention, which we also denied.  The Supreme Court granted [...]'s motion for leave to appeal those orders and held "[b]ased on the role [...] played in obtaining this administrative relief from the [...], [...] is an 'interested party' under Rule 2:5-1(d) and should have been included as a party in the Notice of Appeal and served accordingly."
[brief] Cases - **Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.**, 477 U.S. 242 (1986)  .................................. 9 - **Baran v. Clouse Trucking, Inc.**, 225 N.J. Super. 230 (App. Div. 1988) ...........  8 - **Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co.**, 142 N.J. 520 (1995) ...............................  8, 9 - **Hammett v. Rosensohn**, 46 N.J. Super. 527 (App. Div. 1957) .................... 15 - **Howard v. Diolosa**, 241 N.J. Super. 222 (App. Div. 1990) ..................... 15, 16 - **Island Venture v. N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot.**, 359 N.J. Super. 391 (App. Div. 2003) ..............................................  11, 15 - **Judson v. Peoples Bank & Trust Co.**, 17 N.J. 67 (1954).  ......................... 9 - **Palamarg Realty Co. v. Rehac**, 80 N.J. 446 (1979) .............................  11, 12, 15, 18 - **Ruvolo v. American Cas. Co.**, 39 N.J. 490 (1963) .................................  9 - **Saldana v. DiMedio**, 275 N.J. Super. 488 (App. Div. 1994) .................... 9 - **Triffin v. Somerset Valley Bank**, 343 N.J. Super. 73 (App. Div. 2001) ...... 8, 9 - **Venetsky v. West Essex Bldg. Supply Co.**, 28 N.J. Super. 178 (App. Div. 1953) ..............................................  15
[brief] That was three months before [...] was appointed!  (1T:23:2-19).  Also, there was insurance to respond to the personal injury case.  (1T:24:3-6).  The court noted that [...] was not appointed as receiver until September of 2021.  (1T:24:13-18).  The court pointed out that there was a policy of insurance in effect at the time of the mishap to cover the claim if it existed.  (1T:25:1-7).  The court pointed out that [...] was not responsible.  Of course, [...] was not even appointed at the time of the accident.  (1T:25:24-25 and 26:1-2).  Accordingly, [...] denied the motion of the [...] personal injury plaintiffs to intervene.
[brief] THE TOWNS CHALLENGING THIS AGREEMENT HAVE NO COURT-APPROVED FAIR SHARE PLANS OF THEIR OWN AND IGNORE THE FACT THAT MOUNT LAUREL IS A REGIONAL OBLIGATION.  It is understood that a municipality’s Mount Laurel obligation does not cease at its borders but extends to the surrounding region.  See, e.g., S. Burlington Cnty. NAACP v. Mt. Laurel, 92 N.J. 158, 208-209 (1983) (“Mount Laurel II”) (“the general welfare includes more than the welfare of that municipality and its citizens: it also includes the general welfare – in this case the housing needs – of those residing outside of the municipality”); Dynasty Bldg. Corp. v. Borough of Upper Saddle River, 267 N.J. Super. 611, 616 (App. Div. 1993) (“municipal obligations to provide for low- and moderate-income housing are established on the basis of regional responsibility”).
[directive] DOWNWARD DEPARTURE FOR SUBSTANTIAL COOPERATION 13.1  General Authority to Enter Into a Cooperation Agreement  Notwithstanding any other provision of these Guidelines, a prosecutor in the exercise of reasoned discretion is authorized to tender a plea offer for a sentence below that otherwise determined pursuant to the applicable Table of Authorized Plea Offers and the provisions of these Guidelines in exchange for the defendant’s substantial cooperation in assisting the prosecutor or another law enforcement agency in the identification, investigation, apprehension, or prosecution of collaborators, co-conspirators, suppliers, and superiors in a drug trafficking scheme, or other persons involved in any form of criminal activity, or leading to the seizure or forfeiture of property used in furtherance of or derived from criminal activity.  A Downward Departure for Substantial Cooperation may be made at any time at any step in the graduated plea system (e.g., pre-indictment, initial post- indictment or final post-indictment), and may be made after conviction and original sentencing.  See Section 3.4.  When a Downward Departure for Substantial Cooperation is made, the prosecutor may reduce the term of parole ineligibility otherwise prescribed by these Guidelines to any extent, and may offer, as appropriate a county jail or non- custodial sentence.  Furthermore, unlike a Downward Departure for Trial Proof Issues, see Section 12, a prosecutor as part of a cooperation agreement may refrain from requiring the defendant to plead guilty to an additional, nonBrimage- eligible offense that would otherwise be required pursuant to Special Application and Enhancement Features B (Booby Traps and Fortifications), C1 (No Early Release Act Offense) or D (Certain Offenses Involving Firearms).  (Note that in the case of Special Application and Enhancement Feature C1, the plea agreement must comply with the Attorney General’s Directive for Enforcing the No Early Release Act.  That Directive likewise authorizes a prosecutor to dismiss or downgrade a provable No Early Release Act offense where “[t]he prosecutor represents on the record, either in camera or in open court, that the plea agreement is essential to assure defendant’s cooperation with the prosecution.  . . .”  Section C(5) at p. 6.)  The nature, extent, and significance of cooperation and assistance can involve a broad spectrum of conduct that must be evaluated by the prosecutor on a case-by-case basis.  Latitude is therefore afforded to reduce a plea offer based upon variable relevant factors.  To ensure uniformity and to permit meaningful judicial review, the prosecutor must, however, state the reasons for application of a Downward Departure under this section.  The prosecutor may elect to provide the reasons for the Downward Departure to the defendant and the court in camera or in writing under seal for the safety of the defendant or to avoid disclosure of an ongoing or potential investigation.  Page 102
[brief] The site contains 1.79 acres and has sufficient space to accommodate the accessory structure.  The aerial photograph submitted by Plaintiffs and the photos submitted by the [...] demonstrate that the accessory structure is surrounded on three sides by a natural barrier of trees and is placed and constructed in a visually attractive manner.  The site already contains a residential structure and, therefore, the addition of an accessory garage is a natural and expected improvement to the Property.  Moreover, the surrounding parcels and those across from the Property contain a mix of residential and commercial uses, as well as undeveloped land.  The parcel immediately to the south of the Property contains an advertising billboard.  Taking these neighboring uses into consideration, the site is particularly suitable for the proposed accessory structure; and 4.  The proposed use also satisfies the negative criterial of the Municipal Land Use Law.
[brief] The Appellate Court is permitted to reverse Commission actions if they are “arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable or [if the action] is not supported by substantial credible evidence in the record as a whole."  N.J. Soc'y for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v. N.J. Dep't of Agric., 196 N.J. 366, 384-85 (2008).
[brief] Even at the time of his resentencing many years later, [...]’s recollection was that the State had presented him with a plea offer of ten-years of incarceration, while in reality, the State did not offer him a plea bargain at all.  (4T:88-23 to 25; 5T:65-1 to 7)  (Da 273)  In his affidavit, [...]’s trial attorney, [...], explained that he never made an official offer to the State because [...] – who had difficulty understanding the charges and sentencing exposure that he faced – declined to consider cooperating with the State.
[brief] The Defendant-Appellant, [...], (hereinafter “[...]”) filed an application for development with the Defendant-Respondent, [...] (hereinafter “Planning Board” or “Board”).  [...] sought approval from the Planning Board that would permit it to operate an adult use “micro” cannabis retail business in a mixed-use building located at [...] in the Commercial C-2 Zone.  The [...] (hereinafter “[...]”) regulates cannabis under the [...] Code codified under Section 196-33.1.  A Class 5 Cannabis Retailer is a conditionally permitted use under [...]’s Code.  In addition, [...] has also created a [...] (hereinafter “[...]”), which was codified under [...] Code Section 36.1.  A unique feature of the [...] Ordinance requires an Applicant to first proceed before the [...] and to obtain an endorsement or a report to the contrary which shall be provided to the land use board of jurisdiction prior to the Applicant’s submission of a conditional use application to the appropriate land use board exercising jurisdiction over the application.
[brief] There was no need for the Department to define the term excessive.  Certainly, the Legislature knew that to be true.  In enacting the LTCI Act, the Legislature added language to authorize the Commissioner to determine whether rates are excessive.  Indeed, the starting point in statutory construction is to read the words chosen by the Legislature in the LTCI Act in accordance with their ordinary meaning.  *Bosland v. Warnock Dodge, Inc.*, 197 N.J. 543, 553 (2009).  Ordinary meaning prevails unless the Legislature has used technical terms, or terms of art, which are construed “in accordance with those meanings. ”  *In re Lead Paint Litig.*, 191 N.J. 405, 430 (2007); see also N.J.S.A. 1:1–1 (“[W]ords ... having a special or accepted meaning in the law, shall be construed in accordance with such ... meaning. ”).  [...] tries to cast doubt over the meaning of the term excessive because neither the Legislature nor the Commissioner separately defined that term.  However, using traditional norms of statutory construction, the aim is to effectuate the Legislature's intent.  *Gilleran v. Twp. of Bloomfield*, 227 N.J. 159, 171 (2016).  Thus, the “best indicator” of legislative intent “is the statutory language. ”  *State v. Lane*, 251 N.J. 84, 94 (citing *DiProspero v. Penn*, 183 N.J.
[brief] They caused the issue now before this Court.  N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2 embodies the Statute of Limitations applicable for actions for injuries to a person by a wrongful act.  See also Caravaggio v. D’Agostini, 166 N.J. 237, 244 (2001).  The statute outlines that a claimant must commence an action within two years “after the cause of any such action shall have accrued.
[brief] Da15–18.  The cases cited by Defendants, however, recognize “at home” is not the same as “continuous and systematic. ”  See FDASmart, Inc. v. Dishman Pharm. & Chems., Ltd., 448 N.J. Super. 195, 202 (App. Div. 2016) (“[I]t is undisputed that [...] is not “at home” in New Jersey; it is not incorporated in this state nor is New Jersey its principal place of business…  Therefore, plaintiff must show that defendant had continuous and systematic contacts with New Jersey so as to justify it being haled into New Jersey’s courts.
[brief] CONGREGATION  SONS OF ISRAEL, Plaintiff/Respondent v. [...]  ZONING BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT, [...] AND CONGREGATION  MEOROSNOSSON, INC., Defendants/Appellant  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE  DIVISION DOCKET NO. [...]  On Appeal from an Order for Judgment dated December 1, 2022  Superior Court of New Jersey Law Division  Ocean County Docket No. [...] SAT BELOW: Hon. [...]
[brief] He testified that the operation at [...] has definitely increased the volume of traffic in the area.  (T3 at 8:6-8; T3 at 13:25-14:14).  He testified that the police received complaints from [...] and another resident in the area regarding trucks and the fact that they were idling for a long time.  (T3 at 8:11-17).  He testified that the mere fact that summonses were not issued by responding officers (he never responded to a complaint) does not mean that there was no violation of motor vehicle laws.  (T3 at 12:24-13:4; 17:11-22).  He stated that Wolfhill Avenue was not a heavily traveled street and that South Pemberton Avenue was even less well-traveled.
[brief] ”  *Global Am. Ins. Managers v. Perera Co.*, 137 N.J. Super. 377, 388 (Ch. Div. 1975), aff’d o.b. 144 N.J. Super. 24 (App. Div. 1976); see also *Sears Mortgage Co. v. Rose*, 134 N.J. 326, 346 (1993) (where two parties were innocent, loss was imposed on party in best position to prevent the loss created by a third party’s theft); *Zucker v. Silverstein*, 134 N.J. Super. 39, 52 (App. Div. 1975) (same).  In the end, the Appellate Division in Omar agreed that [...] had demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that [...] was in the best position to have avoided the loss when it initially received the check but failed to do so.  Id. at 16.  1.  Once Appellant Received the First Wire Transfer, Those Funds Must Have Been Credited to The Loan, As A Matter of Law
[brief] Instead of asking whether [...] wanted an attorney, detectives engaged in a lengthy exchange in which they disavowed any knowledge of what kind of lawyer would be made available to him if he invoked his rights:  [...]: Number 3:  You have the right to consult with an attorney at any time and have him present before and during questioning.  Do you understand that?  [...]:  My question to you is, an attorney in the State of Virginia where you’re asking me these questions, or are you talking about an attorney from New Jersey needing to come here right now for these questions?  Because an attorney from Virginia isn’t necessarily able to practice law in the State of New Jersey.  [...]: That’s correct.  [...]: And vice versa.  [...]:  So, the answer to your question is, you have the right to have an attorney, any attorney that you want, present with you at the time during -- that we’re asking you questions.  So, that decision would be yours, whether or not you would want an attorney from Virginia or you would want an attorney from New Jersey, or both or another state.  Any attorney, you have the right to have present here when we talk to you.  [...]: Like, my Legal Aid attorney for the extradition?  [...]: I don’t know anything about that.  [...]: No, no, no.  That was an example question.  I’m not -- I’m not saying that that’s what I’m looking for.  I’m saying as an example, -- [...]: Okay.  [...]: -- is that the type of attorney that you would be talking about?  [...]:  I don’t know what the Legal Aid is in the State of Virginia.  I don’t -- I don’t know anything about that.  You just need to know that you have the right to have an attorney present, whether it’s a Legal Aid as you’re using or an attorney from Virginia.  [...]:  No.  I’m not using the Legal Aid.  What I have is when I went to court yesterday concerning the extradition, -- [...]: Okay.  [...]: -- that I had an attorney provided by the state – [...]: Right.  [...]: -- to represent me strictly on the extradition hearing.  That’s what I was asking you, is whether or not you were talking about, for example, a Legal Aid, like if we were to go to New Jersey, and then a lawyer that might be Legal Aid would come in and would have to pick this up there at that point with that type of attorney.
[brief] Notably, this transcript was not presented or relied upon by [...] below.  See Selective Ins. Co. of America v. Rothman, 208 N.J. 580, 586 (2012) (noting that discusses how warehousing and the Redevelopment Plan factor into the Committee’s overall long-term fiscals plans for [...].  (Id.) (citing 1T, 2:23-25, 3:15-20).  He also mentions the anticipated PILOT agreement later reached with [...].  (Id.).  [...] suggests this comment “effectively constitutes a choice with the direction of public funds because, unlike real estate taxes, school districts do not share in this revenue. ” (Pb18) (citing 1T, 9:19-24).  [...] asserts the anticipated PILOT agreement and [...]’s comments demonstrate “this matter implicates both public funds and ratables. ” (Pb18).  This is incorrect on both counts.
[brief] As acknowledged by NJDEP, the Highlands Council, and the New Jersey Supreme Court, [...] took significant measures to avoid regulated features by siting CS 327 in a highly disturbed parcel previously used as a quarry and for other commercial and industrial purposes.  Rma012, Aa0330, In re Proposed Constr. of Compressor Station (CS327), 258 N.J. at ___.  In doing so, [...] avoided impacts to wetlands, State open waters, streams, and other waterbodies, and there are no permanent impacts to flood hazard areas, riparian zones, or Highlands open water buffers. \(^6\)  [...]’s HAD application also included various avoidance and minimization measures, including measures to minimize impacts to Highlands resources such as steep slopes, and threatened and endangered species.  Aa0064-77.  Given the absence of permanent impacts on Highlands resource areas as a result of the Project, Appellants now argue that NJDEP failed to “assess or consider \(^6\)
[brief] Plaintiffs-Respondents, [...] and [...]’s, Notice of Cross-Appeal dated April 24, 2023  Defendant-Respondent, [...], Notice of Cross-Appeal dated April 26, 2023  Voci v. Hard Cheese AC, LLC, 2019 N.J.Super.Unpub. LEXIS 1600 (App. Div. July 11, 2019)
[brief] TABLE OF CONTENTS  TABLE OF CONTENTS TO THE APPENDIX  .............  VOLUME 1 (i – vii)  TABLE OF CONTENTS TO THE APPENDIX  .............  VOLUME 2 (viii – ix)  TABLE OF CONTENTS TO THE APPENDIX  .............  VOLUME 3 (x – xi)  TABLE OF CONTENTS TO THE APPENDIX  .............  VOLUME 4 (xii – xiv)  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES  .......................................................... (xv - xvi)  TABLE OF ORDERS APEALED FROM ...........................................  (xvii)  STATEMENT OF PROCEDURAL HISTORY .........................
[brief] As noted above, the use of the semi-colon in N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-5(b), along with the use of the word “or” plainly indicates that the Legislature intended any one of those listed conditions to satisfy criterion (b).  See Norman Int'l, supra, 251 N.J. at 554.  Since abandonment is a separate condition that would satisfy criterion (b), a statute providing guidance for determining abandonment would only be useful for determining whether the buildings on the Property were abandoned and not whether discontinuance of the commercial use has occurred.  The Borough never found that the buildings on the Property were abandoned.  Rather, it found that the commercial use of the buildings had been discontinued.  The Trial Court apparently agrees that the evidence establishes that the commercial use was discontinued.
[brief] But the original sentencing judge’s findings were (and still are) supported by the record, and this Court has already upheld those findings on _____________________  9  Notably, while Zuber requires courts to “exercise a heightened level of care before imposing multiple consecutive sentences on juveniles[,]” 227 N.J. at 448 (referred to at Db36), [...] only imposed one consecutive sentence here.  Regardless, her decision shows that she indeed exercised such a level of care in imposing sentence.  direct appeal.  R. 3:22-5.  At the risk of being repetitive, this Court explained in its opinion that the sentencing court analyzed both qualitatively and quantitatively these factors and concluded that “the aggravating factors substantially outweighed the mitigating factors. ” (Da62).  Importantly, this Court found the sentencing judge’s findings were “based on competent and reasonably credible evidence in the record” and their application to the law did “not constitute such clear error of judgment as to shock our judicial conscience.  Accordingly, we discern no basis to second-guess the court’s findings with respect to the statutory aggravating and mitigating factors.
[brief] R. 4:49-2.........................................................................................................................7  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS  ORDERS AND STATEMENTS OF REASONING  November 16, 2022  Order by [...] granting Summary Judgment..............................................................Pa1-19 March 28, 2023  Order by [...] granting Summary Judgment...............................................................Pa20-34  ORAL ARGUMENT  Transcript of November 4, 2022 oral argument.............................................1T  Transcript of March 17, 2023 oral argument....................................................2T  STATEMENT OF PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[brief] Children lack maturity, can be impetuous, are more susceptible to pressure from others, and often fail to appreciate the long-term consequences of their actions …  They are also more capable of change than adults. ”  [Comer, 249 N.J. at 368 (citing Miller, 567 U.S. at 477; Graham, 560 U.S. at 68)].  These traits make juveniles’ misconduct less morally reprehensible than that of adults.