ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] PRELIMINARY STATEMENT  In this tragic wrongful death case, Plaintiff, the [...], is appealing from the trial court’s erroneous summary judgment dismissal of her claims against Defendants [...] and [...].  On the morning of October 6, 2021, [...], a loving mother and wife working as a nuclear medical technician at [...], parked her car in the area of the hospital parking lot where she was required to park by Defendant [...], her employer.  [...] had instituted a policy requiring technicians such as [...] to park in the distant part of the hospital’s vast, busy parking lot, in an area that lacked pedestrian safeguards such as sidewalks, crosswalks, traffic control signs, warning signs, and other measures to protect pedestrians who had to negotiate the parking lot to get to the hospital building.  In contrast, [...] permitted hospital administrators, physicians, and patients to park closer to the building in an area of the lot that had pedestrian safeguards such as sidewalk, crosswalk, signage, and a paved “peninsula”/“island” to increase motorists’ ability to see pedestrians around corners.  [...] was clearly aware of the need for pedestrian safety measures, yet it intentionally required non-management employees such as [...] to park in the distant, dangerously unprotected area of the lot.  On the morning in question, as [...] attempted to walk through an intersection in the distant area of the parking lot that had no pedestrian safety measures or traffic control devices, and at which a parked car blocked driver visibility around the corner, she was struck and run over by an SUV driven by Defendant [...], another [...] employee driving through the lot.  In addition to filing a Workers’ Compensation claim, Plaintiff also filed a civil action against Defendant [...] based upon an exception to the general bar prohibiting civil suits against one’s employer.  Plaintiff alleged that [...]’s intentional conduct in requiring employees such as [...] to park in a distant, unprotected area of the parking lot resulted in a substantial certainty that an employee would be injured, thereby subjecting [...] to civil liability.  In other words, [...] created a dangerous situation that was an accident waiting to happen for its non-management employees, whom it treated as second-class citizens when it came to their safety in the parking lot.  On December 15, 2023, the trial court erroneously granted summary judgment to [...].
[directive] Bail Schedule 2 STATUTES WHERE BAIL MAY BE SET BY A SUPERIOR COURT JUDGE OR A MUNICIPAL COURT JUDGE OR, IN THE MUNICIPAL COURT JUDGE’S ABSENCE, THE MUNICIPAL COURT ADMINISTRATOR OR DEPUTY COURT ADMINISTRATOR, PURSUANT TO RULE 3:26-2 requires warrants  Rule 3:3-1(c)(1) on the Bail Schedule 2 charges of robbery, criminal sexual contact, second degree aggravated assault, aggravated arson, arson, burglary, first or second degree violations of Chapter 35 (drug offenses), any crime involving the possession or use of a firearm, or conspiracies or attempts to commit such crimes.  Rule 3:3-1(c)(2-6) (indictable offenses) and Rule 7:2-2(b)(1-6) delineate factors regarding whether a warrant or summons should issue for other offenses.  Rule 3:26-1 (indictable offenses) and Rule 7:4-1 (non-indictable offenses) delineate factors to be considered when setting bail and provide for the option of R.O.R. bail where appropriate.  Bail Ranges for attempts or conspiracies should generally be the same as the actual substantive crime.  Statute Charge Description  Degree Bail Range  10%  Cash Bail Option (h)  The property stolen is a person’s benefits under federal or State law, or from any other source, which the Department of Human Services or an agency acting on its behalf has budgeted for the person’s health care and the amount involved is less than $75,000.00; 2C:20-2  Grading of theft (i)  The property stolen is any real or personal property related to, necessary for, or deprived (continued) offenses from research, regardless of value, including, but not limited to, any sample, specimens and (continued) components thereof, research subject, including any warm-blooded or cold-blooded animals being used for research or intended for use in research, supplies, records, data or test other type of information related to research; (j)  The property stolen is a New Jersey Prescription Blank as referred to in N.J.S.A. 45:14-14; (k)  The property stolen consists of an access device or a defaced access device; or (l)  The property stolen consists of anhydrous ammonia and the actor intends it to be used to manufacture methamphetamine.  (3)Theft constitutes a crime of the fourth degree if the amount involved is at least $200.00 but does not exceed $500.00.
[brief] ”  Ibid.  It established a long list of factors, placing “sexual orientation; transitioning; [and] gender identity or expression” in a list that includes problematic behaviors such as substance abuse, vandalism, and gang affiliation.  Ibid.  In response to inquiries, the Board’s leadership and counsel confirmed that if a student disclosed to a staff member that they might be gay, it was to be immediately reported to the parent.  (Ra11-12).  The following day, the State filed an administrative complaint with DCR alleging that the Original Policy violates the LAD.
[brief] I.  Substantive Due Process Does Not Require School Districts to Provide Affirmative Notice to Parents About Their Children’s Gender Identity.  The school districts argue that enjoining the Mandatory Notification Policies interferes with parents’ fundamental rights because it “deprives parents \(^4\) Platkin v. Marlboro/Manalapan/Middletown Twp. Bds. of Educ., Nos. MON-C-78-23, MON-C-79-23, MON-C-80-23, slip op. at 9 n.2 (N.J. Super. Ct. Aug. 18, 2023) (“Tr. Ct. Op.”) (Da127). of LGBTQ+ students of information critical to the parents’ ability to actively guide and foster their children’s moral and psycho-social development.
[brief] Furthermore, Appellant’s constructive termination is supported by her medical providers, who advised that [...]’s workplace “would be a horrible environment for her future employment. ” (Pa230, Pa990, Pa984-89).  These facts are more than sufficient for a jury to decide if the conditions of Appellant’s employment were altered and/or a claim of constructive discharge.  Muench, 255 N.J. Super. at 302 (an objective, fact-intensive inquiry, showing that a reasonable person in the employee's position would have felt compelled to resign).  At a minimum, there exists genuine issues of fact requiring decision by a jury as to whether Appellant’s work environment was so intolerable that a reasonable person subjected to the same would have resigned.  Nuness v. Simon & Schuster, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 3d 535 (D.N.J. 2018) (court denied summary judgement for Defendant on plaintiff’s constructive discharge claim).  In sum, Respondents’ unlawful discriminatory and retaliatory termination of Appellant would not have occurred but for her sex/gender and her complaints regarding the sexual harassment that she suffered at the hands of Respondents.  C. [...] and [...] had an Obligation to Provide Appellant with a Workplace Free of Harassment, Discrimination, and Retaliation.
[brief] Throughout the thirty-day period, [...] would not have had a chance to discuss the form with the doctor.  Conversely, it is unlikely that the doctor could have answered her questions meaningfully as he was unable to explain what the agreement meant at his deposition.  Despite the doctor’s testimony, it is doubtful that the decedent [...] received a copy of the arbitration agreement form on October 28, 2021.  According to Defendant [...], the arbitration form was part of the Tumescent Liposuction Patient Information Booklet provided on October 28, 2021.  Receipt of the Booklet had been documented.  However, the Booklet was paginated “1 of 8” through “8 of 8” and marked with a revision (“Rev”) footer on all pages, neither of which appear on the arbitration form (Da105-112).  In the Defendant’s production of documents, the arbitration form did not appear until ten pages after the Booklet (Da105-122).
[brief] It is evident from the regulatory history of the [...]’s definition of “flood hazard area design flood” that the [...] was required to include the best available precipitation and flood forecasting data in its review of this permit application, including the data from the Cornell Studies that [...] had on its desk during its permit review.  The key to the Appellant’s instant argument is that the [...] could not have satisfied its obligation to anticipate “a flood equal to the 100-year flood plus an additional amount of water in fluvial areas to account for possible future increases in flows due to development or other factors” without an express reliance on the newest available precipitation data that is in the Cornell Studies.  Finally, as a matter of law, the [...] must apply the best and most recent data in its possession during its permit review to avoid acting arbitrarily.
[brief] R.4:5-4; *Citibank, N.A. v Estate of Simpson*, 290 N.J. Super. 519, 523 (App. Div. 1996).  In the case at hand, [...] established that $210,000 of his $255,000 claim was made within the 6 year statute of limitations and the failure of defendants to designate any payments to a specific period entitled him to apply defendant’s payment to defendants oldest debt.  [...]’s proofs at a minimum required defendants to present evidence that the complaint was untimely because the claim for payment accrued prior to November 24, 2014.  Defendants’ failure to present any evidence on Dr.  Bellifemine’s contractual claims accrued prior to November 24, 2014 required the denial of defendants’ motion for summary judgment.
[brief] 1/30/2019  Defendants [...]’ and [...]’s Statement of Material Facts in Support of their Motion for Summary Judgment.................................................1104a  1/30/2019 Certification of [...] in Support of Defendants [...]’ and [...]’s Motion for Summary Judgment...........................................1108a Exhibit A, 3/8/2011 Plaintiffs’ Initial Complaint.........................................................1110a Exhibit B, 12/21/2012 Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint..............................................1112a Exhibit C, 5/3/2017 [...] Deposition Excerpts.............................................1131a Exhibit D, 10/15/2018 Order Excluding the Testimony of [...] on Lost Profits..............................................................................................................1135a  2/7/2019  Plaintiffs’ Response to Defendants, [...] and [...]’s Statement of Material Facts in Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment Pursuant to R. 4:46-2(a) ........................................................................................................1138a Exhibit A, 12/2007 General Release .................................................................(omitted, see 189)  Exhibit B, 5/7/2009 Assignment and Assumption of Agreement..(omitted, see 181)  2/7/2019  Plaintiffs’ Response to Defendants, [...], Esquire and [...]’s Statement of Material Facts in Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment Pursuant to R. 4:46-2(a)........1141a Exhibit A, 2/17/2010  Letter from [...] to [...] Re: Agreement of Sale.........................................................................................................................1144a Exhibit B, 2/9/2010 Executive Order Re: COAH............1145a Exhibit C, 4/27/2010 Letter from Menas to [...] with Termination and Release.......................................................................................................................1150a Exhibit D, 5/26/2010 Purchase and Sale Agreement.......1154a Exhibit E, 5/3/2017 [...] Deposition.........................(omitted, see 360a) 2/15/2019 Order Granting Summary Judgment in Favor of Defendants [...] and [...] and Dismissing Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint with Prejudice......................................................................................................................1176a 2/15/2019 Order Granting Summary Judgment in Favor of Defendants [...] and Cooper, Levenson, April, Niedelman, & Wagenheim, P.A.................................................................1178a 3/28/2019 Notice of Appeal..................................................................................1180a 4/5/2019 Amended Notice of Appeal..................................................................1193a Statement of Items Submitted to the Law Division on Defendants’ January 30, 2019 Motions for Summary Judgment......................................................1207a Gonzalez v. Michalski, No. A-3618-15T3, 2017 WL 2458154, at *1 (App. Div. June 7, 2017)
[brief] Although in its reply, the [...] argued by analogy that Appellant’s name could be removed under that more stringent standard, it still only requested that the bypass be upheld.  (AA0109-AA0117)¹⁰  The Respondent Commission’s June 7, 2023 FAA also reflects that it erroneously considered the counselings and reprimands which pre-dated Appellant’s promotion by Respondent [...] to Sergeant and which had been removed from her personnel file and not subject to consideration in the appeal below.  (AA0001-7)
[brief] V.  THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DISMISSED COUNT FIVE OF THE PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT ALLEGING BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY, CONCLUDING THE DEFENDANTS’ ACTIONS WERE AUTHORIZED BY SECTION 8(E) OF THE 1983 MASTER DEED.  The Trial Court correctly dismissed Count Five of the Plaintiff’s Complaint alleging Breach of Fiduciary Duty, concluding the Defendants’ actions were authorized by Section 8(e) of the 1983 Master Deed.  Additionally, Plaintiff’s allegations for breach of fiduciary duty are also barred by New Jersey’s six-year Statute of Limitations.
[brief] With these two weapons, illegal weapons – and again, you heard from [...] who said not only did these two men not have any other the requisite paperwork required for ownership of a gun, but he did more than what was argued by [...], And it’s on his affidavit.  He also checked to see if those guns were registered to anybody in the state of New Jersey, and they weren’t.  That’s on his affidavit…You have the two guns that are found at the same spot in the house where these two men are out front, on the front porch, and it’s a mixture of ammunition that is the same.  What I mean to say, the Blazers are in both guns, the Winchesters are in both guns.  That’s shared ammunition.  And when you have an illegal handgun, you use what you can get.  As the record reflects, the State’s ballistic argument was centered around the physical and testimonial evidence presented at trial.
[brief] Plaintiff contends that the agreement is not sufficiently clear to find a knowing waiver of decedent’s right to access the courts; and also [3] contends that the circumstances of the agreement’s formation and the terms of the agreement are unconscionable and unenforceable.  [Da089.]  As to the first point, the Estate did not and could not adduce facts to prove that decedent had not been given a copy of the Arbitration Agreement.
[brief] The Trial Court reasoned, “the Township acted through an ordinance.  They stated their reasons.  They did so in public, and the Court finds that all substance has been satisfied. ” (3T51:23-52:3).  While Plaintiff-Appellant may have preferred an alternative process to amend the Redevelopment Plan, Plaintiff-Appellant’s preference does not render the adoption of Ordinance 2022-17 arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable.
[brief] In the instant matter, Plaintiff’s malpractice claim against the Defendant is subject to the entire controversy doctrine, as the claim has already accrued before the prior lease litigation with the landlord.  The malpractice allegedly committed by the Defendants for failing to competently advise Plaintiff regarding entry into the lease agreement was transactional in nature and had already happened before Plaintiff initiated the prior litigation against the landlord of the property.  Plaintiff’s representatives admit that the decision to pursue a legal malpractice action against the Defendants was made during the prior lease litigation with the landlord, in consultation with the attorney who represented Plaintiff in that litigation.  In making this determination, and in setting up this subsequent litigation against the Defendants, Plaintiff even secured a provision in the settlement agreement, that the landlord would cooperate in a subsequent malpractice action against the Defendants.  Importantly, the Defendants did not represent Plaintiff in the prior lease litigation against the landlord.
[brief] Sitting in his burgundy Honda CRV, [...] was hit by a bullet which grazed his left leg and punctured his right leg.  (4T 44-5 to 7, 44-25 to 45-4, 47-1 to 7).  [...] drove himself to a nearby hospital where he received treatment for his wounds and was released later the same day.  (4T 45-23 to 46-8, 47-8 to 10).  Law enforcement officers photographed and processed the crime scene.  (7T 73-17 to 74-1, 74-7 to 12, 75-15 to 18, 80-2 to 12, 112-23 to 113-6).
[brief] The City’s revised final offer, by contrast, complied with the arbitrator’s request by supplying specific contract language without introducing new proposals beyond the scope of its September 11 Final Offer.  . . .  There was no solicitation of, or mutual consent to, substantive additions to the final offers that the parties had already submitted prior to the start of the arbitration hearings.  See N.J.A.C. 19:16-5.7(g)(2).  While the arbitrator had discretion to permit revisions to final offers until the close of hearing, here he sought only submission of specific contract language concerning the parties’ previously submitted offers.  . . .  Furthermore, the arbitrator’s ultimate rejection of the [...]’s revised final offers did not prejudice the [...], as the City was subject to the same parameters for its revised final offer and did not submit any additional substantive proposals beyond its original final offer.
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[brief] “Evidence of a defendant’s other crimes, wrongs, or acts may not be admitted into evidence to prove a defendant’s criminal disposition as a basis for proving guilt of the crimes charged. ”  State v. Koskovich, 168 N.J. 448, 482 (2001); N.J.R.E. 404(b)(1).  However, such evidence may be admitted for other purposes, such as to prove opportunity, knowledge, or identity.  N.J.R.E. 404(b)(2).  To determine whether other-crimes evidence is admissible, courts will apply the Cofield test, which permits the admittance of such evidence if the following criteria is met:  1.  The evidence of the other crime must be admissible as relevant to a material issue; 2.  It must be similar in kind and reasonably close in time to the offense charged; 3.  The evidence of the other crime must be clear and convincing; and 4.  The probative value of the evidence must not be outweighed by its apparent prejudice.  [State v. Cofield, 127 N.J. 328, 338 (1992) (citation omitted). ]  However, the Cofield test only applies to other-crimes evidence; thus, if the evidence is not that of an “other crime, wrong, or act,” then it is not necessary to apply the Cofield test.
[directive] 4.6  Deadly force against individuals in a moving vehicle.  Strict additional requirements must be met before an officer may use deadly force against a driver or passenger of a moving vehicle.  Moving vehicles create tremendous risk to officers engaged in enforcement operations, particularly officers attempting to arrest fleeing suspects.  Officers must abide by the following guidelines: (a) during such operations, officers shall never intentionally position themselves in the path of a moving vehicle or a vehicle that is likely to move; (b) officers shall make every effort to move out of the path of a vehicle in order to maintain their safety; (c) officers shall not grab onto moving vehicles or the drivers or occupants of moving vehicles.  If a vehicle begins to move while an officer is engaged with the driver or an occupant, the officer shall, if feasible, disengage from the contact with the driver or occupant to avoid being dragged, carried, or struck by the moving vehicle; and (d) while any firearm discharge entails some risk, discharging a firearm at a moving vehicle entails an even greater risk to innocent persons and passengers because of the risk that the fleeing suspect may lose control of the vehicle.  Due to this greater risk, and considering that firearms are not generally effective in bringing moving vehicles to a rapid halt, an officer shall not fire at the driver or occupant of a moving vehicle, unless no other means are available at the time to avert or eliminate the danger and one of the following circumstances exists:  15
[brief] Ultimately, plaintiffs came to learn that [...] was in the process of pursuing certain solar-energy development rights but was interested in selling those non-tangible rights to a real solar-energy developer.  As it was in their mutual business interests, plaintiffs and defendant began negotiating the sale/purchase of defendant’s non-tangible rights, and eventually then consummated a two-tier business transaction whereby plaintiffs purchased in perpetuity all of defendant’s rights, title and interest in the solar-energy development assets consisting of: (1) Solar Renewable Energy Credits (SRECs), a sellable, tradeable commodity in the solar industry; (2) an "interconnection agreement," a sellable, tradeable asset in the solar industry; (3) a WMPA, or Wholesale Market Participation Agreement, a sellable, tradeable asset in the solar industry.  The Sale/Purchase Agreement provided for consideration of $600,000 plus reimbursement “all of the costs and expenses incurred by Seller in bringing the Project to date, . . . .”  Negotiations began in April 2015 and concluded in September 2015, with plaintiffs paying $706,000 for the assignment of rights and, separately, $300,000 for the rent and security deposit.  Pa3-4.
[brief] ”  Specifically, the Appellate Division noted that “residential” has been defined as: 1.  “[D]esigned for people to live in” and “concerning or relating to residence. ”  *Id.* at 67 (citing *Residential*, *Oxford Dictionaries*).  2.  “Used as a residence or by residents. ”  *Id.* at 67 (citing *Merriam-Webster’s Dictionary*, 1060 (11th ed., 2012)).  3.  “[T]he act and or fact of dwelling in one place for some time” and “[t]he place where one lives. ”  *Id.* at 67 (citing *Merriam-Webster’s Dictionary*, 1335 (11th ed., 2012)).  4.  “The act or fact of living in a given place for some time,” and [t]he place where one actually lives. ”  *Id.* at 67 (citing *Black’s Law Dictionary* 1335 (8th ed., 2004)).  5.  “A structure used, in whole or in substantial part, as a home or place of residence by any natural person, whether or not a single or multi-unit structure, and that part of the lot or site on which it is situated and which it is devoted to the residential use of the structure, and includes all appurtenant structures. ”  *Id.* at 67 (citing *N.J.A.C.* 13:45A – 16.1A).
[brief] Compare Pa155, ¶24 with Pa762, ¶24.  Likewise, there is no dispute that pedestrians are not permitted to enter the crossing against the pedestrian signal.  Compare Pa155, ¶23 with Pa762, ¶23.  Additionally, there is no genuine dispute as to what occurred in the moments prior to the collision, as the accident was recorded on multiple cameras present on the head end of the train and at the station located just north of the crossing.