ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] None of those dismissals are at issue on this appeal and thus are immaterial.  Thus, according to plaintiffs’ counsel, there were two ways to remedy what he characterized as erroneous Burt defendant characterization: 1) an adjournment of the trial for those defendants to participate; or 2) placing only [...] on the verdict sheet, without [...] or [...]. \(^4\) (3T30)  Plaintiffs’ counsel acknowledged that he could have sought reconsideration at any point prior to the commencement of trial, but that he felt it would not have been productive.  (3T34)  (“And, I could have made a motion for reconsideration, but having done this for thirty-six years now, my sense is that motions for reconsideration are useless and it’s waste of the Court’s time and counsel’s time.  So, I did not do not.  We are not obligated to do that.  The ruling is interlocutory.  [].”).  The trial court rejected plaintiffs’ counsel’s suggestion that the absent Burt defendants had some right to participate in trial, and held that trial would continue with these individuals being treated as Burt defendants:  The fact that they are not here is of no moment to me.  The Counsel that did represent them at -- obviously \(^4\)  It bears emphasizing that the plaintiffs repeatedly and explicitly agreed, at the outset of trial, these doctors were deemed Burt defendants—they only disputed the soundness of that determination by the trial court.
[brief] (Pa324, Pa873)  While not dispositive of all of Appellant’s claims (Appellant was already subject to adverse employment action), [...] argues that Appellant’s constructive discharge claim fails because [...]’s testimony makes clear that he only advised Appellant not to return to work because he believed she was still working in the [...].  This argument fails for several reasons.  First, [...]’s argument presumes Appellant had been permanently transferred and would never again encounter [...].  Remarkably, as of August 2019, [...] still had not investigated, nor had they taken any other remedial action.  (Pa 324) 82:9-85:22, 86:23-88:1, 121:1-125:14, 139:1-145:13.  [...] did not even follow up with DCPP regarding its investigation and corrective action for [...], who was allowed to continue working at the Burlington location without discipline or change to his work conditions.
[brief] "Appropriate and proper jury instructions are essential for a fair trial," State v. A.L.A., 251 N.J. 580, 591 (2022), and "erroneous instructions on material points are presumed to be reversible error."  State v. Carrero, 229 N.J. 118, 127 (2017) (quoting State v. Nelson, 173 N.J. 417, 446 (2002)).  But "a party may generally not 'urge as error any portion of the charge to the jury or omissions therefrom unless objections are made thereto before the jury retires to consider its verdict.'"  State v. Macchia, 253 N.J. 232, 251 (2023) (quoting R. 1:7-2).  If a defendant, as here, "does not request an instruction or fails to object to its omission in the final jury charge," an appellate court "review[s] the omission of that instruction for plain error."  State v. Dunbrack, 245 N.J. \(^3\) United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967).  531, 544 (2021); see also Sanchez-Medina, 231 N.J. at 468 (reviewing a "missing instruction on identification . . . for plain error").  In the context of jury instructions, "plain error requires demonstration of '[l]egal impropriety in the charge prejudicially affecting the substantial rights of the defendant sufficiently grievous to justify notice by the reviewing court and to convince the court that of itself the error possessed a clear capacity to bring about an unjust result."  State v. Kille, 471 N.J. Super. 633, 641 (App. Div.) (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Burns, 192 N.J. 312, 341 (2007)), certif. denied, 252 N.J. 228 (2022).  And "[t]he error must be considered in light of the entire charge and must be evaluated in light 'of the overall strength of the State's case.'"  State v. Galicia, 210 N.J. 364, 388 (2012) (quoting State v. Walker, 203 N.J. 73, 90 (2010)).
[brief] 1  N.J.S.A. 43:15A-25.2 ............................................. 9,12,18 N.J.S.A. 43:15-7 ....................................................  19,20,21 N.J.S.A. 43:15-8(a) .................................................. 18,21,22,23 N.J.S.A. 43:15A-8 ...................................................  18  N.J.S.A. 43:21-19 et.seq. ......................................... 23,24 N.J.S.A. 52:14B-1 et seq. ......................................... 5,11,18 N.J.S.A. 52:15B-2 et seq.  .........................................  11  Rule 2:2-3(a)(2) .......................................................  8  N.J.A.C. 4A:1-1.3 ....................................................  16  N.J.A.C. 4A:8-1.6 ....................................................  17 Public Health Service Act  42 U.S.C. Ch. 6A §201 ..............  1 N.J.A.C. 1:1-1-2.1 ...................................................  11  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
[brief] On November 24, 2020, the City Council conducted another meeting at which it introduced for first reading Ordinance No. 26-20.  (Pa269 to Pa271).  Ordinance No. 26-20 was identical to Ordinance No. 23-20.  (Pa269 to Pa271; Pa190 to Pa203).  It provided that Defendant [...] had proposed a plan for the redevelopment of the [...] Property, including a residential project (the “Project”).
[brief] POINT TWO  The De Novo Court Demonstrated Bias By Inquiring Into Matters that Exceeded the Scope of the Hearing.  (Da17, Da43-44.)  As mentioned above, the de novo court faulted the municipal judge for failing to make any inquiry as to why the Alcotest evidence was not being admitted.  (Da17.)  There is no requirement for Alcotest evidence to be admitted.  See State v. Gibson, 219 N.J. 227, 246 (2014)(noting that a defendant may be convicted of DWI based on observation alone).  In addition, the de novo court’s inquiry into matters that exceeded the scope of the review demonstrated an intent to find additional reasons to convict Defendant, such as reviewing the police report.  (Da43-44.)  This Court should take judicial notice under N.J.R.E. 201 of other matters where the same judge has conducted the same inquiry that demonstrates a pattern of exceeding the scope of review for a trial de novo.  See e.g., State v. Chopp, A-002798-22.  Moreover, the de novo judge here even admitted to his routine to inquire whenever the Alcotest results are excluded – even though that inquiry is not relevant to this defendant’s trial de novo.
[brief] [...], [...], [...], [...], AND [...]  [...] (016792012)  [...] (110962014)  [...] (029032007)  [...] (389512022)  TABLE OF CONTENTS  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT .........................................................................................1  PROCEDURAL HISTORY ..............................................................................................2  STATEMENT OF FACTS ...............................................................................................2  I.  New Jersey’s No-Fault Law .....................................................................................2  II.  The allegations in [...]’s Complaint as to the Sood Defendants.  ...............6  III.  The trial court compels arbitration of [...]’s claims.  ....................................8  LEGAL ARGUMENT  ..................................................................................................10  I.  The trial court correctly held that the No-Fault Law requires [...] to arbitrate its claims because the claims center on the eligibility to recover PIP benefits.  .........................................................................................................................10  A.  The plain language of the No-Fault Law requires arbitration of [...]’s claims.........................................................................................................................11  B.  The No-Fault Law did not carve out fraud-based claims.  .................................18  C.  [...]’s interpretation allows it to sidestep the No-Fault Law.  ...............23  D.  [...] never raised a constitutional jury trial argument in the trial court.  .................................................................................................................................28  CONCLUSION
[brief] In or around the time Plaintiffs commenced this action, approximately thirty-nine (39) other members of the [...] filed similar claims regarding the Director’s authority to limit terminal leave under the MSRA in actions captioned *[...] v. [...]*, [...] and *[...] v. [...]*, [...].  Both *Andrews* and *DeMaio* have been dismissed with prejudice and without appeal.  payments, Plaintiffs seek the full amount of terminal leave benefits they would have been entitled to under the expired CNA—prior to the implementation of the MSRA.
[brief] In fact, by limiting DEP’s authority to the creation of “additional” public access, rather than to instances in which “additional or new” public access must be created, the Legislature demonstrated its familiarity ³ N.J.A.C. 7:7-16.9(k)(2)(i) expressly provides that public access is not required as a permit condition for activities consist solely of accessory development or structural shore protection at an existing residential development if there is no existing public access onsite.  See Ab21-22.  ⁴ The Law Dictionary (feat. Black’s Law Dictionary, 2nd Ed.), https://thelawdictionary.org/additional/ (last visited August 29, 2024). with the common law public trust doctrine as it existed upon the Law’s enactment, and its intention that DEP continue to apply the public trust doctrine in this manner.
[brief] ”  *Gormley v. Wood–El*, 218 N.J. 72, 113–15 (2014).  The same standards and framework would apply under the NJCRA as under § 1983.  Judicial immunity is also applicable to common law claims in New Jersey.  See, *N.J.S.A.* 59:2-3(b) and 59:3-2(b) of the New Jersey Tort Claims Act.  Neither a public entity nor a public employee is liable for judicial action or inaction.  *Figueroa v. Blackburn*, 208 F.3d 435, 440 (3d Cir. 2000).  Even if the claims made by Plaintiff with respect to the [...] were true, they were barred by the doctrine of Judicial Immunity.  Since the claims against [...] relate to the alleged action or inaction or the municipal court judge in his judicial capacity, the claims against [...] were properly dismissed on summary judgment.
[brief] A.  The Arbitration Agreement is an Unenforceable Contract of Adhesion.  Pre-suit arbitration agreements, particularly in this case, are contracts of adhesion because they are one sided with unequal bargaining power.  This causes a detrimental effect on the physician-patient relationship because it causes the patient to not be able to trust and rely upon their physician.  Patients, like the plaintiff, are often not given the opportunity to negotiate arbitration agreements.  Additionally, if the patient does not sign the agreement, the physician will refuse treatment.  In this case, [...] was not given the opportunity to negotiate the terms of the agreement, and the defendant admitted in his deposition that he would have refused to operate on [...] if she did not sign the agreement (Pa21).
[brief] Section 17.1(b) states in pertinent part that:  [[...]] shall not be liable to any party for any act or omission, except for bad faith, gross negligence or willful misconduct, and the parties agree to indemnify [[...]] and hold [[...]] harmless from any and all claims, damages, losses or expenses arising in connection herewith, except to the extent arising out of the bad faith, gross negligence or willful misconduct of [[...]].  (Pa118).  This unambiguous language demonstrates in multiple ways that the parties intended that [...] would be indemnified for claims asserted by [...].
[brief] (citation omitted).  "The inquiry is an objective one, determined by 'how a reasonable [person] in the suspect's position would have understood his situation."  Bullock, 253 N.J. at 533 (alteration in original) (quoting Hubbard, 222 N.J. at 267).  An "interrogation" for Miranda's purposes occurs when law enforcement subjects a person "to either express questioning or its functional equivalent."
[brief] Further, the Indictment alleges misconduct not only by [...] but also by [...]: 128.  Between October 18 and October 24, 2016, [...] and [...], and members of their respective law firms, coordinated to devise a plan by which the [...], a City government entity and client of [...]’s firm, would seek to condemn Developer-1’s view easement affecting the Triad Parcel.  129.  As described in further detail below, this plan involved no meaningful participation by the [...], the government entity legally entitled to exercise the right of condemnation.  [(Indictment, pages 50 and 51, Pa58-Pa59). ]  As set forth above, the Indictment refers to a “Lawyer-2” at [...] who is an accomplice of [...] and an unindicted co-conspirator: 134.  On October 20, 2016, **[...]’s law partner, Lawyer-2, who represented the [...], emailed the then-Executive Director of the [...] to inform her of an “urgent issue” with the LPT development project. **  In this email, Lawyer-2 wrote that “[t]he proposal is for [...] to file an application in Court to ask the Court to confirm that the power of eminent domain is available to extinguish the view easement.  The idea is to get the complaint filed today or tomorrow.  [...] is going to brief the Mayor [[...]] who I believe will then discuss with [the then-chair of the [...] board].”  135.  According to billing records, although they did not charge the [...] for it, **[...] attorneys, including [...] and Lawyer-2, worked at least 86 hours, over a 7-day period, preparing an order to show cause requesting that the court declare that the [...] had the power to condemn Developer-1’s view easement.
[brief] Appellant’s Challenge To Bifurcation Is Untimely And Inappropriate (Response to Point II of Appellant’s Brief) | 24 | | CONCLUSION | 27 | # TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | Case Name | Page(s) | |---------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------| | **State Cases** | | | *388 Route 22  Readington Realty Holdings, LLC v. Township of Readington,* | 11 | | 221 N.J. 318 (2015) | | | *Advance at Branchburg II, LLC v. Twp. of Branchburg Board of Adjustment,* | 10 | | 433 N.J. Super. 247 (App. Div. 2013) | | | *Burbridge v. Twp. of Mine Hill,* | 11 | | 117 N.J. 376 (1990) | | | *Dome Realty, Inc. v. City of Patterson,* | 10 | | 83 N.J. 212 (1980) | | | *Dunbar Homes, Inc.,* | 23 | | 448 N.J. Super. at 598 | | | *Jacoby v. Zoning Board of Adjustment of Borough of Englewood Cliffs,* | 10 | | 442 N.J. Super. 450 (App. Div. 2015) | | | *Kenwood Associates v. Bd. of Adj. Englewood,* | 10, 11 | | 141 N.J. Super. 1 (App. Div. 1976) | | | *Morristown Assocs. v. Grant Oil Co.*, | 23 | | 220 N.J. 360 (2015) | | | *Price v. Himeji, LLC,* | 11 | | 214 N.J. 263 (2013) | | | *Shim v. Washington Township Planning Board,* | 20 | | 298 N.J. Super. 395 (App. Div. 1997) | | | *Ten Stary Dom P’ship v. Mauro,* | 10 | | 216 N.J. 16 (2013) | | | *Witt v. Borough of Maywood,* | 19, 20 | | 328 N.J. Super. 432 (Law Div. 1998) | | Wyzykowski v. Rizas, 132 N.J (1993) .................................................................................................................. 11 State Statutes Municipal Land Use Law ........................................................................................................ passim N.J.S.A. 40:55D-7 .................................................................................................................. 13, 14 N.J.S.A. 40:55D-10a-e .......................................................................................................... 19 N.J.S.A. 40:55D-38(a) ......................................................................................................... 12 N.J.S.A. 40:55D-39 .............................................................................................................. 12 N.J.S.A. 40:55D-40 .............................................................................................................. 12 N.J.S.A. 40:55D-76b ............................................................................................................ 4, 24, 27 Local Ordinances Robbinsville Township Ordinance 142-77B(26) ................................................................. 16 Robbinsville Township Ordinance 142-77B(26)(g) ........................................................... 16 Other Authorities Cox & Koenig, New Jersey Zoning and Land Use Administration, SS 3-5.3 (2023) ....................................................................................................................... 21 PRELIMINARY STATEMENT This appeal was filed by objectors to the Preliminary and Final Major Subdivision approval and related relief granted by Respondent [...] ("Zoning Board" or "Board") to Respondent [...] ("[...]").
[brief] The failure to explicitly mention the Plaintiff’s ROFR did not invalidate the offer nor did including a new provision in which it was explicitly mentioned change the offer in a material way.  This is akin to the facts and result of the unreported case of *H&G Hardware v. Cohen* A0667-04T2 2006 WL 27624 (App.Div. Jan 6, 2006).  Da335.  That matter involved a seller who conveyed the sale price of real estate “as is” to the ROFR holder, who wanted to exercise its ROFR, but the trial court found that the price and “as is” alone was not enough to constitute an offer.  Da335-341.
[directive] Sexual any Assault of violation a constitutes (2) or condition, release or order attorney deputy or prosecutor assistant an unless condition, release or order Act Protection officer supervisory or a Directive, this of 3.2  Section with accordance in consulted general overcome  Prosecutor to County by authorized the who is subsection 3.3.2 to pursuant designated by charging of presumption that determines the Directive, of this 4 Section under presumptions the consideration special to giving subsection 4.5.9, to pursuant overcome is complaint-warrant as hours for to detention up 48 mandatory whether and victim the of opinion and interests from victim discourage or situation the the exacerbate would 2A:162-16(a) N.J.S.A. by required 4.6.1 and 4.6.5. subsections prosecution.
[brief] *21  Notably, [...] does not contend that [...]’s or [...]’s custodial files are irrelevant.  And [...] only gestures at Rule 26(b)(1)’s requirement that discovery be proportional to the needs of the case, asserting that it somehow gives rise to a “good cause” requirement to add executive custodians.  Opp. at 5.  That is not a Rule 26(b)(1) requirement and it contradicts [...]’s admonishment that this is not the type of case where [...] can successfully argue that, though an “effort might end up uncovering some relevant information ... it is just too expensive or difficult, and so we are not going to make [...] do it. ”  Ex. 30 at 29.1  1  All exhibit references are to the Declaration of [...] in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion to Compel Mark [...] and Sheryl [...] as Document Custodians or the Declaration of [...] in Support of Reply Regarding Plaintiffs’ Motion to Compel Mark [...] and Sheryl [...] as Document Custodians.  Rather, [...] insists Plaintiffs must meet a contrived standard that none of [...]’s and [...]’s custodial documents will be collected and produced through other custodians.  But even if this were the proper... standard, given their unique roles and direct involvement in formulating and implementing the privacy and data sharing practices at the heart of this litigation, and [...]’s effort to investigate and manage the [...] crisis, it cannot credibly be denied that [...] and [...] do have unique custodial documents.  Further, Plaintiffs have shown far “‘more than mere speculation’” that [...]’s and [...]’s custodial files will contain information “‘that differs from discovery they have already obtained from the other[ ]’” custodians.  Opp. at 5 (citations omitted).  Plaintiffs’ allegations draw extensively from statements made by [...] and [...] themselves, as well as from evidence showing that [...] employees informed [...] and [...] about risks regarding third party access to users’ information—risks they decided were appropriate to bear in pursuit of profit.  And Plaintiffs’ opening brief identifies documents [...] or [...] sent or received that indicate their intimate involvement in discussions and decisions about the core issue in this case—access to and misuse of users’ information—and, thus, provide support that other relevant documents exist on these topics in [...]’s and [...]’s files.  This showing is more than sufficient to justify [...]’s and [...]’s addition as custodians.
[brief] This case coming out of Mercer County’s Law division, defendant, [...], according to the trial judge:  [Fundeburg] was charged with drug distribution or possession with intent to distribute, that type of crime, because [...] claims he -- got a tip, and he was doing surveillance by a certain property, an apartment that [...] lived at or was abandoned and [...] was using to distribute drugs or to stash the drugs.  And [...] claims that in doing the surveillance he saw him put a back pack or a bag on the fire escape. ” (13T:26-3 to 16).  The trial court was in disagreement with the defense over the nature of [...]’s testimony in [...] case.  That disagreement was over whether [...]’ ruling implied [...] was untruthful.  Defendant pointed out that on page 15, the [...] court was unable to credit by a preponderance of the evidence any of three versions given by [...].  (13T:36-23 to; 37-2).  The court took issue with whether [...] actually said [...] lied.  (13T:36-15 to 19).  Defendant responded, “first and foremost, each version is at odds with the two other versions [given by [...]] that to me, is saying he called him a liar.  (13T:37-4 to 6).  Defendant is right.
[brief] There have been other instances in land use prerogative writ actions that materials outside the hearing transcript have been properly admitted for consideration to the trial court.  As noted above, in *Malanga* plaintiff successfully challenged a study to redevelop the municipal library.  253 N.J. at 297.  The trial court and appellate court determined erroneously that the substantive criteria of Section 5(d) of the LRHL (N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-5(d) had been satisfied.  The Supreme Court, however, reversed the finding in favor of the plaintiff because proper scrutiny of the substantive elements of the LRHL law revealed that those criteria were **NOT** satisfied based upon the information before the Board and Council.  *Id.*, at 297.  However, relevant to this appeal is the fact that in all the proceedings before the case reached the Supreme Court, the record did not contain any information about the operating hours of the library.  The *Malanga* case was argued on October 24, 2022, but the opinion of the Chief Justice was not filed until March 13, 2023.  One of the relevant issues in that case was the use of the library.  On March 8, 2023, between oral argument and before the filing of the opinion, the Chief Justice went on the library’s public website which disclosed all of the library’s operating hours.  *Id.*, at 320 n.ll.  Therefore, as applied to this case, the [...] memo and the Planning Board transcript should be part of this record simply to demonstrate that both the Planning Board and Town Council should have considered the [...] document when each body considered the “consistency” or “inconsistency” between the redevelopment plan and Master Plan.  If the Supreme Court can look at a municipal website during its deliberative process of determining whether the substantive criteria of the LRHL are met, then this Court should accept the [...] memo document and Planning Board transcript as part of the record to determine in this appeal whether the substantive criteria of the LRHL were satisfied.