ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] [...], P.E. Appellant’s second expert, Mr. Nawn confirmed that [...] as project manager was required to ensure the plans and specifications were complied with.  (Pa2090)  (T23:4-10)  Mr. Nawn’s criticism of the defendants was that [...] and [...] were “cavalier in ensuring that the contract documents including safety documents were adhered to” (Pa2091-2092) (T24:20-T25:7)  Mr. Nawn acknowledged that [...] was a professional engineer.  (Pa2087) (T20:20-22)  Mr. Nawn’s report states “neither [...], nor [...] rendered regular and effective supervision of [...] ” (Pa314)  Nawn further claimed that “[...]’/[...]’s complacent approach to the incident project and their failure to enforce multiple provisions of the Specifications was negligent and a cause of [...]’s incident”  (Pa340)  Nawn specifically states that [...] and [...] were negligent in that they failed to ensure that the safety provisions of the specifications were followed.  (Pa2094)(T27:11-14)  Nawn later claimed that Schweppenheiser was negligent in not ensuring that the plans and specifications were complied with.  (Pa2114-2115)  (T47:22-T8)  Mr. Nawn further claimed that [...] did not enforce the specifications in ensuring that the contractor was following the requirements of the specifications.  (Pa096)  Nawn claims [...] was required to oversee all the work under the contract and that as [...] contracted with the [...], they’re responsible for the work of the subcontractor as well.  (Pa2101)  (T44:14-18)  Mr. Nawn admitted that [...] was being supervised by a professional engineer.  (Pa2102)  (T35:23-25)  Finally Mr. Nawn opines that defendant [...] and [...] failed to properly provide supervision of construction services in the matter.  (Pa2105)  (T38:14-18)  3.
[directive] The Court explains in detail the five factors courts can consider to assess those risks.  Noting it is far less likely courts would find material changes in the case of defendants detained for less than six months, the Court holds that defendants have the right to reopen detention hearings under N.J.S.A. 2A:162-19(f) if they (1) have been detained for at least six months and (2) can make a preliminary showing that, based on one or more of the five factors, they are entitled to relief.  (Because disorderly persons offenses are punishable by up to six months in jail, judges have discretion to entertain and review motions from defendants charged only with such an offense before those defendants have been detained for six months.)  Those threshold requirements are meant to limit hearings to defendants who are better able to show a material change in the level of risk they present, in the context of the pandemic and the delays it has caused.  Trial judges have discretion to resolve motions that do not meet both conditions without holding a hearing.  (pp. 20-25)  5.  New hearings may proceed before the same judge who conducted the original hearing or another judge in the vicinage.  The Court directs that trial judges conduct reopened hearings in appropriate cases on an expedited basis, and that any appeals be reviewed in the same manner.  The Court asks the Director of the Administrative Office of the Courts to help implement a timely process at the trial and appellate levels.  (p. 26)  6.  Movants identify N.J.S.A. 2A:162-21(b) as an alternative statutory basis for relief.  The Court explains why it has instead focused on section 19(f).  (pp. 26-27)  The request for relief is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.  JUSTICES [...], [...], [...], [...], join in CHIEF JUSTICE [...]’s [...], and [...] opinion.  3  SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY [...]  September Term 2020 [...]  In the Matter of the Request to Release Certain Pretrial Detainees On an Order to Show Cause to Address the Release of Certain Individuals Detained Pretrial, Among Other Relief Requested.  Argued Decided January 20, 2021
[brief] Dated: February 22, 2024  [...]  By: /s/ [...]  ANNA AGUILAR  Attorney for Defendants  [...], [...] Smith Barney LLC, [...] & Co., LLC, and [...] Capital Group, Inc.  [...]  By: /s/ [...]  LAWRENCE S. LUSTBERG  Attorney for [...]; [...]; [...]; [...]; and [...]  [...]  By: /s/ [...] BRENDAN M. WALSH  Attorney for [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], and [...].  [...]  By: /s/ [...]  ERIC WONG  Attorney for [...]; [...]; and [...] (f/k/a [...])  [...]  By: /s/ [...]  JENNIFER L. DEL MEDICO  Attorney for [...], [...], [...], and [...], its predecessor by merger  Superior Court of New Jersey  Appellate Division  Docket No. [...]  STATE OF NEW JERSEY, ex rel., [...], Plaintiff-Respondent, v. JPMORGAN CHASE & CO., JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, NA, J.P. MORGAN SECURITIES LLC (F/K/A JPMORGAN SECURITIES, INC.), CITIGROUP, INC., CITIGROUP GLOBAL MARKETS INC., CITIBANK NA, CITIGROUP FINANCIAL PRODUCTS INC., (For Continuation of Caption, See Inside Cover)  CIVIL ACTION ON GRANT OF MOTION FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL FROM AN INTERLOCUTORY ORDER OF THE SUPERIOR COURT, LAW DIVISION, MERCER COUNTY DOCKET NO. [...]  Sat Below: HON. [...], P.J. Cv.  BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT [...]
[brief] On appeal from the *de novo* court, this Court must: . . . review the record to determine whether there is sufficient, competent evidence to prove the charges against *[...]* by a preponderance of the evidence.  . .  *[...]* at 361.  Finally, legal rulings by the trial court on *de novo* review are not governed by the abuse of discretion standard and are instead reviewed by this Court  *de novo*.
[brief] On August 8, 2019, the Division provided a letter about the Ricci Act to all Certifying Officers and advised them of their responsibility to make the letter available to all members at their respective locations.  (Pa11).  On August 9, 2019, a postcard with information about the Ricci Act was mailed to [...]’s home address (as well as the home addresses of over 200,000 other retirees).  (Pa14; Pa83-85).  And, on June 10, 2021, the Division posted a news item on its website advising members and retirees that the statutory eligibility period to register under the Ricci Act was expiring soon and that they must submit the Eligibility Registration Form by July 8, 2021.  (Pa11).  Although these additional methods were not required under the Ricci Act, [...] makes much of the fact that the Division’s postcard was not mailed to him by August 7, 2021.
[brief] In sum, [...] correctly concluded Plaintiffs failed to produce sufficient evidence for a jury to find to a reasonable degree of probability Defendants’ alleged delay in calling for a C-Section at 9:48pm more likely than not would have resulted in a delivery during the time Plaintiffs’ experts testified would have allowed for a chance for a better outcome.  Accordingly, there was no evidence for a jury to find the alleged deviation was a substantial factor in causing the ultimate outcome.  To send this case to the jury, based solely on speculation, would violate settled law and potentially allow for a manifest injustice to Defendants.  **CONCLUSION**
[brief] For the foregoing reasons, and for the reasons stated more fully in the State’s main response brief, the State urges this Court to affirm defendant’s convictions and sentence.  Respectfully submitted, [...]  ATTORNEY GENERAL OF NEW JERSEY ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT BY: /s/ [...]  [...] Deputy Attorney General [...] THOMAS M. CAROCCIA – ATTY NO. 306012019  DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL DIVISION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE APPELLATE BUREAU OF COUNSEL AND ON THE BRIEF DATED: July 30, 2024 ORDER ON MOTION SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO.: [...] MOTION NO.: [...] BEFORE: PART I JUDGE(S): [...] MOTION FILED: 05/23/2024  ANSWER(S) FILED: SUBMITTED TO COURT: June 20, 2024 ORDER THIS MATTER HAVING BEEN DULY PRESENTED TO THE COURT, IT IS, ON THIS 20th day of June, 2024, HEREBY ORDERED AS FOLLOWS: MOTION BY MOVANT MOTION TO APPEAR AS AMICUS CURIAE LIMITED TO THE SUBMISSION OF THIS BRIEF GRANTED AND OTHER SUPPLEMENTAL:
[brief] State v. Patino, 83 N.J. 1, 7, (1980).  Both constitutional standards require that such seizures or searches be conducted pursuant to a warrant issued upon a showing of probable cause.  U.S. Const. Amend. IV; N.J. Const. Art. I, para 7; State v Pineiro, 181 N.J. 13 (2004).  Detention via handcuffs because of plaintiff’s demeanor is a seizure requiring probable cause.  Refusal to hand over car keys to allow a warrantless search and becoming irate upon being violated and harassed by one of the most BRUTAL police forces in New Jersey, does not give rise to probable cause.  (Pa561-Pa625, Pa303-Pa304).  “[The Court] cannot allow the police to randomly ‘encounter’ individuals without any objective basis for suspecting them of misconduct and then place them in a coercive environment in order to develop a reasonable suspicion [or probable cause] to justify their detention. ”  State v Carty, 170 N.J. 632, 910 (2002).  The police in this case had no basis to stop, beat and imprison the plaintiff.  (Pa93, Pa96-Pa97)
[directive] Do you understand that if you are convicted and your conduct was found to be characterized by a pattern of repetitive and compulsive behavior your name, age, race, sex, date of birth, height, weight, eye color, any distinguishing scars or tattoos you have, your photograph, the make, model, color, year and license plate number of any vehicle you operate, the street address, zip code, municipality and county in which you reside and a description of the offense for which you are pleading guilty, may be publicly available on the Internet?  6.  Multa do programa estadual de enfermeiras examinadoras de agressão sexual Statewide Sexual Assault Nurse Examiner Program Penalty
[brief] Nor may a court exclude an expert’s testimony as net opinion “merely because it fails to account for some particular condition or fact which the adversary considers relevant. ”  Id., citing State v. Freeman, 223 N.J. Super. 92, 116 (App. Div. 1988).  Disagreements of the sort appellants advance here are the subject of cross examination or impeachment, not exclusion.  See Rosenberg v. Tavorath, 352 N.J. Super. 385, 402 (App. Div. 2002).  What makes the appellants’ arguments particularly strange, though, is that on the issue of intent, they prevailed.  The trial court did not enter a judgment for fraud because it did not find that the Plaintiffs’ met their clear and convincing burden.
[brief] (R-268)  He further indicated that he reached out to [...], the [...]'s treasurer/accountant but [...] did not get back to him.  Finally, he stated the following in Paragraph 10.  (R-268)  Paragraph 10.  In addition to setting forth the details of the Court's ruling to [...] on Thursday April 15, 2021, I asked [...] on the aforementioned phone call for documents pertaining to the EIN for the trust account, the trust account, the trust itself, the Wyoming attorney, and documents pertaining to [...], indicating that an Order by the Court to this effect would be anticipated.
[brief] Plaintiffs next criticize the Agreement’s use of the verbs “settle” and “resolve” as “anesthetized” and “weak. ” (Pb21, 26.)  But those same verbs were used in the agreements this Court found enforceable in Drosos, 2023 WL 7545067, at *6 (“finally resolved and settled”), Griffin, 411 N.J. Super. at 518 (“to settle their disputes”), and Stutheit v. Elmwood Park Auto Mall, No. A-4915-17T2, 2018 WL 6757030, at *1 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Dec. 26, 2018) (“to resolve their disputes”).  Among other cases.  Like the agreements this Court has previously upheld, [...]’s Agreement informed the [...] in plainly stated terms that their personal injury claims would be decided in arbitration “and not in a court of law.
[brief] Pa57-58.  Holder Respondents were in privity with [...], which was the plaintiff in the Collection Action, because “[a]n assignee of a right will be considered to be in privity with its assignor. ”  *Brookshire Equities, LLC v. Montaquiza*, 346 N.J. Super. 310, 319 (App. Div. 2002).  And, Appellant’s claims in the instant action grow out of the same transaction or occurrence as the claim in the Collection Action because they all concern collection of the debt owed on the Account.  Thus, all claims raised in the Complaint against [...] are barred by res judicata and the entire controversy doctrine.  *See Woo-Padva v. Midland Funding, LLC*, DOCKET NO. A-3575-17T3, 2019 WL 3540494, at *4 (App. Div. Aug. 5, 2019) (holding that subsequent claim to void debt under the NJCFLA was barred by res judicata and the entire controversy doctrine because it was not asserted in the prior debt collection  Appellant’s claims against Holder Respondents are wholly contingent on his claims against [...].  Accordingly, because his claims against [...] are barred as a matter of law, his claims against Holder Respondents must fail.  VI.
[directive] The Rule allows that, in certain circumstances, bail may be set Bail for Witness. and other conditions imposed to ensure the appearance of the witness.  2.  The death penalty was repealed in New Jersey in 2007.  3.  The Domestic Violence Procedures Manual permits Municipal Court judges to set bail if the contempt charge is a disorderly persons offense and the Assignment Judge of the vicinage has issued an order permitting this authority.  93  Updated December 2, 2013
[brief] ”  N.J.A.C. 17:3-4.1(c).  Specifically, with respect to settlements:  If the Division determines that the pension benefit was part of the negotiations for the award or settlement, or if the award or settlement includes extra compensation as defined by the various retirement systems, the Division shall determine the compensation and/or service credit to be used to calculate the retirement allowance, and the member shall have the pension contributions for the salaries based on the award refunded without interest.
[brief] The Reconsideration Motion also specifically raised arguments for vacation of the Final Judgment under Rules 4:50- 1(d) and (f) based upon *Tyler v. Hennepin County*, 143 S.Ct. 1369 (May 25, 2023) the precedential Federal Supreme Court case finding a tax foreclosure to be a taking under the Fifth Amendment where the tax law provided no mechanism for protection of the owner’s equity.  *Tyler* had only been issued after Appellants’ initial motion to vacate and after the April 3, 2023 Order.  On November 15, 2023, the lower court entered an Order denying the Reconsideration Motion.  (26a-27a).  A Notice of Appeal was filed by Appellants on December 7, 2023, initiating this appeal.  **STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL**
[directive] N.J.S.A. 2C:4-6c.  This order also contemplates that if a defendant becomes competent or longer no is dangerous a result of mental illness before the three month period has expired the as (3) facility clinical staff must notify the court.  The order prohibits the movement of the defendant from the State psychiatric hospital into the community without order from an the criminal court.  However, this order permits a discharge of the defendant back to the jail from the State psychiatric hospital upon completion of the evaluation with notification to the court and counsel.  If the court so choses it may recommend the defendant for a competency restoration program based upon the availability of such programs at the facility which the defendant housed.  is in --------------
[brief] In the pending case, there is no evidence that any decision-maker from the [...] created a policy or custom permitting its police officers to make arrests without probable cause or use excessive force.  To the contrary, the [...] uses BWCs which record interactions between the police officers and the public.  Here, the BWC video clearly shows that [...] and [...] acted in a professional and responsible manner.  Further, Plaintiff took no discovery whatsoever concerning the training that Edison Township offered to its police officers, including Officers [...] and [...], at any relevant time.  Plaintiff did not retain an expert witness on the subject of police training, policies or the use of force when making arrests.  Plaintiff has no factual foundation whatsoever to show that the Township was liable and this claim was properly dismissed on summary judgment.
[brief] THE COURT:  "However, you are entitled to a statutory adjournment.  You're entitled to two as a right.  And there was -something happened, and it was not granted prior to the locket or the removal - it was granted.  "So, any ministerial action or ....still -- was done before any lockout or any deprivation of your rights.  Therefore, sir, in your action in lieu of prerogative risk there is absolutely -- you are not denied your statutory adjournments.  You -- any action.
[brief] Moreover, the section on electronic voting states that “votes cast for duly nominated candidates on the ballot card will not be voided because of an invalid write-in vote, but if otherwise valid shall be counted. ”  *N.J.S.A.* 19:53A-7(f).  And in the face of any statutory conflict, this one must prevail.  See *N.J.S.A.* 19:53A-2(b).  In *Gray-Sadler*, the Supreme Court held that write-in voters who made a mistake filling out their ballot as a result of election officials’ failure to clarify voting instructions should not have their ballot invalidated.
[brief] ”  (TRVb43.)  In fact, [...]’s discretion to remove a contractor, albeit not commonly invoked, is akin to a policyholder adding or removing vehicles from an automobile policy - the policy remains in effect, only the scheduled vehicles change.  (Zurich Tr., 53:21-55:20, TRVa843.)  [...]’ argument also misses the point based on the plain language of N.J.A.C. 11:1-20.  N.J.A.C. § 11:1-20.1, provides the Code’s Scope as follows:  (a)  This subchapter shall apply to all commercial insurance policies [...] except workers' compensation insurance, [...] and any policy written by a surplus lines insurer.  [...] this subchapter shall not be applicable to multi-state location risks or policies subject to retrospective rating plans.  (Italics added.)  The Code does not apply to the CCIP because it insures multi-state location risks.  The CCIP covered [...] projects throughout the country at the time of the Accident in Pennsylvania, including projects in California and Louisiana.  (ZURa101, 135, 138, 154.)  [...] concocts a warped interpretation arguing that the trial court’s ruling that the Code does not apply because the CCIP is a “multi-state location risk” is wrong because, according to [...], the “risk” in question is [...], with just one location in New Jersey.
[brief] In fact, several courts have noted this inherent conflict in the statutory scheme in rejecting Appellant’s theory that Congress intended § 1692c(b) to prohibit transmitting information to a service provider, like a letter vendor.  See Miller v. Americollect, Inc., 2022 WL 20470401, at *9; Ciccone v. Cavalry Portfolio Servs., LLC, 2021 WL 5591725, *5 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 29, 2021); Barclift v. Keystone Credit Servs., 2022 WL 444267 at *9; [...] Transcript, T10 22-25 (“[A] literal interpretation of the act is – I’ll say this word – ridiculous, in this type of business in this type of field.
[brief] On or about March 3, 2021, Plaintiff filed a Complaint and Jury Demand in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Morris County, asserting claims evolving out of the period of her incarceration at the [...].  Pa001.  2.  On September 9, 2021, Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss the Complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.  Pa013.  3.  Defendants thereafter withdrew their motion in order to file a new Motion to Dismiss, with supporting documents.  4.  On September 20, 2021, Defendants again filed a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint.  Pa024.  5.  The Court granted the Motion to Dismiss the Complaint, without prejudice, by way or order entered on October 8, 2021 and accompanying Statement of Reasons.  Pa087.  6.  Plaintiff thereafter sought reconsideration and clarification from the Court regarding the October 8, 2021 Order, and on October 27, 2021, the Court entered a Sua Sponte Order for Clarification of October 8, 2021 Order and Decision.  Pa091.  7.  Approximately four (4) months later, on February 22, 2022, Plaintiff moved before the Court for leave to file an Amended Complaint, which was granted on April 1, 2022.  Pa095.  8.  Although Plaintiff did not actually ever file the Amended Complaint separately with the Court, both parties proceeded as if the Amended Complaint attached to Plaintiff’s motion was accepted and filed.  9.  Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint on April 18, 2022, on the basis that the Amended Complaint had no additional factual clarification from the initial Complaint, which was dismissed without prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.  Pa150.  10.  On or about June 16, 2022, the Trial Court granted Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, with prejudice, for reasons including failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, the Amended Complaint being filed beyond the time permissible pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2, and that the tort claims alleged should be dismissed for failure to timely file a notice of tort claim as required under N.J.S.A. 59:8-8.  Pa186.  11.  On July 28, 2022, Plaintiff appealed the Court’s dismissal to the Appellate Division.  Pa190.  12.  On October 25, 2023, The Appellate Division (after briefs were submitted and oral argument heard), reversed in part and remanded in part to the Trial Court for further clarification on its dismissal of Counts One, Four and Five.  Pa205.  13.  On November 13, 2023, the Court initiated a briefing schedule for the remanded claims and ordered the parties to brief the issues of qualified immunity and immunities under the New Jersey Tort Claims Act.  Pa225.  14.  On December 14, 2023, Respondents submitted its remand brief in support of dismissal of the Plaintiff’s Complaint.  15.  On January 16, 2024, Plaintiff submitted its remand brief in opposition to dismissal of the Plaintiff’s Complaint.  Pa231.  16.  On March 18, 2024, the Court entered an Order and Statement of Reasons dismissing Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint.  Pa267, Pa269.
[brief] [...] has made a prima facie claim, and a hearing is required so he can present evidence not in the record – namely, testimony of witnesses who could verify his Facebook activity and of trial counsel.  3.  Trial counsel’s inexplicable failure to demand production of the hard drive (or take any other action) after learning that [...] had not, in fact, “wiped” it, deprived [...] of the opportunity to fully present his alibi and meaningfully counter the State’s case.
[brief] [...]’s removal of [...] was unreasonable and unlawful, entitling [...] to summary judgment.  [...] suffers damages as asserted in the Complaint, including, but not limited to, loss of compensation and service credit, attorney fees and costs, and other benefits and compensation to which he is entitled.  It is respectfully requested that this Court affirm the Law Division motion judge’s decision granting summary judgment to [...] and remand for a plenary hearing on damages.  Respectfully submitted, [...]
[brief] Whether the application and corresponding notice were expressed in terms of an expansion of a preexisting nonconforming use, or a new, non-allowed use, is immaterial to the adequacy of the notice.  The burden of proving the positive and negative criteria of the Municipal Land Use Law, N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70d, remains the same.  Cox & Koenig, *New Jersey Zoning and Land Use Administration* (Gann), §33-2.1.