ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] ”  Pa783.  The [...] Policy defined “loss” as including “settlements” (Pa787); and after [...] prematurely and wrongfully withdrew its defense of the HCH Action, [...] settled the HCH Action on his own.  Pb17–18; Pb45–48.  Even assuming, for purposes of argument, that an exclusion to indemnity coverage could justify an insurer’s refusal to support an appeal of a decision that it asserts establishes the exclusion (and it cannot as set forth in Part I, above), [...] improperly invites this Court to re-write and drastically expand the “personal profit” exclusion (“PPE”) in the [...] Policy.  The Court should decline the invitation.  [...] has admitted for purposes of this appeal that (i) no money or any other thing of value was transferred, released, or exchanged as a result of the unit owner resolutions challenged in the HHC Action; (ii) the unit owner resolutions challenged in the HCH Action did not and did not alter or affect any legal rights or claims that the Association then held against any person; (iii) the [...] actions challenged in the HCH Action did not alter or affect any legal rights or claims that the Association then held against any person; and (iv) [...] did not personally participate in any Association activity on December 19, 2019.
[brief] The February 15, 2023 Termination Letter (Da106) also requested that Plaintiff sign an enclosed document titled, Separation Agreement and General Release (“Proposed Separation Agreement”).  Da36, ¶85, Da109.  The Proposed Separation Agreement in the Recital Section expressly referenced that Plaintiff was “employed” and that the Firm had “terminated Partner’s employment and status as a partner in the Firm…” and further provided for a release of claims under numerous laws – including the LAD and CEPA – that provide protections and rights for employees and mention “Partner’s employment and separation from employment with the Firm… .”  Da109, at p. 1 and §2(c)(Da110).  That Proposed Separation Agreement also had a proposed confidentiality provision with mandated language under the LAD about confidentiality being unenforceable.  Da109, at §6.  That same day, Plaintiff was locked out of the Firm’s offices and his computer access and access to clients’ contact and files cut off.
[brief] Pa77, at 22:15-18.  19.  To [...]’s knowledge, no one else had fallen in the same area of the store on that day.  Pa78, at 26:20-25.  20.  The store had a maintenance contractor who cleaned the store each day including the floors before the store opened.  Pa86, at ¶2; Pa75, at 15:2-7.  21.
[brief] 2.  Appellant’s Reliance on Federal Decisions is Contrary to New Jersey Law and Fails to Consider that Several Federal Courts have Dismissed Cases with Similar FDCPA Letter Vendor Claims and Cast Doubt on their Merit.  Appellant’s main argument on appeal is that the Superior Court erred by failing to consider how federal courts construe § 1692c(b) of the FDCPA.  Appellant’s Br., at 2, 7-9.
[brief] He commenced residence at [...] in about 1978 at age 5, located across from the School and Synagogue.  Those properties were essentially the same then as presently; he observed them daily during his school years through 1990.  He never observed vehicles parking in the Sixth Street courtyard, and on many occasions he and other children would play there.  He returned to [...] in 1995 to reside in the same neighborhood through 2005 and regularly observed the site; no vehicles parked in the Sixth Street courtyard (12T4-9 to 17-1).  On cross-examination, [...] testified he continued to reside in a different address in [...] from 2005 through 2008, observed the site daily, and never saw any vehicles parking on the Sixth Street courtyard.
[brief] Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986)  .........................  16  Blunt v. Kaproth, 309 N.J.Super. 493, 504 (App.Div.1998) .......................  17  Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America, 142 N.J. 520, 523 (1995)...........  15, 16 Claypotch v. Heller, Inc., 360 N.J. Super. 472, 488-89 (App. Div. 2003) ...... 27 DeWees v. RCN Group, 380 N.J. Super. 511, 528-29 (App. Div. 2005) ........
[brief] Attorneys for Defendants  By: /s/[...]  [...], Esq. 908972012  By: /s/[...]  [...], Esq. 022421977  December 4, 2023  Via eCourts  Appellate Division’s Clerks Office  Richard J. Hughes Justice Complex  25 W. Market Street PO Box 006 Trenton, NJ 08625-0006  RE: [...] AND [...], INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF OF, [...] V. [...] AND [...], IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS SCHOOL BUSINESS
[brief] In considering the speedy trial motion, the Honorable [...], J.S.C applied the four-prong Barker test.  (2T 5-18 to 22)  First, the court found that the four-year delay was sufficient to trigger the analysis of the remaining Barker factors. \(^6\) (2T 9-7 to 7-9)  Second, the court found that the four-year delay was not attributable to the State because the court believed there was no evidence that the State knew [...] was being housed in the [...] and available for prosecution.  (2T 9-4 to 25)  Third, the court said it did not hold it against [...] that he did not assert his speedy trial rights earlier given that [...] had been unaware of the indictment until the spring of 2018. \(^7\) (2T 10-13 to 18)  Fourth, the court found that [...] had been “minimally prejudiced” because the case was not a complicated one and even if witnesses, surveillance videos and the vehicle involved in the offense were no longer be available, “that kind of \(^6\)  The court said that although the length of the delay is ordinarily measured from the date of arrest or indictment, whichever is earlier, to the date of trial, it instead measured the length of the delay as the time from arrest to the date of arraignment because it found that all subsequent delays were caused by the defense.  (2T 7-2 to 17)  \(^7\)  The court later said it did not “put great weight on [the factor] because [[...]] was not aware of the indictment, although he was aware that he was arrested. ”  (2T 12-11 to 15) evidence is really not necessary. ”  (2T 10-19 to 12-1)  Furthermore, the court said that it could use its “equitable powers” to mitigate some of the prejudice by providing [...] with “equitable credits,” or “jail credits” going back to the time of his arrest.  (2T 11-5 to 10)  Upon balancing the factors, the court denied [...]’s speedy trial motion, particularly because it believed that the State did not know where [...] was housed in federal custody.  (2T 12-2 to 21)  On June 10, 2019, [...] pleaded guilty to second-degree eluding before [...].
[brief] 2  Da = [...]’s Appendix; 1T = June 15, 2023 hearing transcript.  A certification filed in this case by Deputy Attorney General [...] later confirmed that [...]’s Information Technology (IT) Department had in fact again searched [...]’s emails and located the responsive emails, but [...] nonetheless denied the amended request on January 24, 2023, and insisted that Plaintiff provide the “content and/or subject matter” of the emails.  (Da33).  The response letter again failed to inform Plaintiff how many responsive records there were, nor did it seek to accommodate his request in any way.  B.  Plaintiff’s Lawsuit  On February 16, 2023, Plaintiff filed a verified complaint.  [...] responded by filing a motion to dismiss; Bailey’s certification explaining that it had twice searched and located the responsive records (Da39-Da40); and [...]’s certification describing her duties at [...].  (Da42-Da44).  The trial court heard argument and rejected [...]’s claims that Plaintiff’s OPRA request did not sufficiently identify the records he seeks.  (1T; Da45).  It applied published precedent and noted that IT had said there were 1,004 responsive records, and, as such, [...] “does know how to locate them and it did locate them. ”  (Da52).  To date, [...] has not produced the emails that it has already located.  Instead, it filed this appeal.  LEGAL ARGUMENT
[brief] Defendants cannot be held strictly liable without evidence they knew or should have known of behavior by [...] that provided reasonable grounds to suspect he might launch a sustained attack against his handler.  Yet Plaintiffs’ theory of the case is that the attack on [...] was unprovoked and could not have been predicted based on [...]’s past behavior.  Expanding the scope of liability in these circumstances would be unprecedented in the context of domestic animal injuries and contrary to public policy in favor of limiting liability for equine activities.
[brief] Other provisions of the Contract demonstrate [...]’s clear intent to tilt the playing field against its Customers and in its favor.  Examples include:  1.  “This Contract is not assignable by Customer except upon written consent of [...] being first obtained.  [...] shall have the right to assign this Contract or to subcontract any of its obligations under this Contract without notice to Customer.  If any of the provisions of this Contract shall be determined to be invalid or unenforceable, the remaining provisions shall remain in full force and effect. ” (Pa21, pg. 7, para. J).  2.  “Customer consents to [...] recording telephone conversations between representatives of Customer and [...].  [...] may collect, use, disclose and transfer Customer’s personal information, and that of third parties provided by Customer. ” (Pa21, pg. 7, para. L).  STANDARD OF REVIEW
[brief] Defendants believe that Plaintiffs’ Fourth Point may be addressed by this Court under R.2:11-3(e)(1)(E).  Plaintiff [...] in his deposition, acknowledged that [...] and [...] were never fiduciaries for [...] and [...] (Pa378, [...] Dep. 59:18-60:11).  Furthermore, Plaintiffs’ Count for Breach of Fiduciary Duty was easily dismissed by the Court on Summary Judgment below where the Court wrote:  A confidential relationship existed between Plaintiffs and Defendants on account of their familial relationship.  However, it is undisputed that there was no formal agreement entered between the parties that would establish a formal fiduciary duty between the parties.  Moreover, while Plaintiffs argue that [...]’s superior knowledge and skill in financial dealings establishes a fiduciary duty throughout his dealings with Plaintiffs, it is undisputed that at no point did [...] act as a real estate broker, Plaintiffs’ financial planner, or hold the power of attorney on Plaintiffs’ behalf.  As such, this Court finds that no fiduciary duty existed between the Defendants and Plaintiffs.  [Pa37-38]  Plaintiffs point to nothing adduced at trial that would lead to a reversal of the Judge’s conclusion a year earlier.  Finally, Plaintiffs reference the “long standing precedent” in New Jersey law that a confidential relationship gives rise to “fiduciary like responsibilities triggering constructive trusts” (Pb25).  Plaintiffs cite to no law in support of this proposition.  Had such a precedent existed, the Court below would surely have known it, and Plaintiffs would have cited to it.  As it is, no law supports this conclusion.  Defendants believe this issue can be addressed under R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).
[brief] (Da186-187)  It also revealed there were three Lease amendments (Da316-321) that were of material significance.  (Da186-187)  Instead of a term from 2019 to 2034, and with extensions to 2044, the Lease would run from 2022 to 2037 and if extended to 2047.  (Da282, 316-321.)  Duration was increased by 20% on the 15-year term and 12% on the 25-year term, where escalations were limited to one in each of year 6, 11 and if extended 16 and 21.
[brief] \textsuperscript{8}  The Board is paid in full for all [...] invoices, and between April 2020 and September 16, 2022, when [...] filed its Answer & Counterclaim, at no time did [...] produce any notice of a breach of contract, nor has [...] sought relief from the Commissioner of Education that it believed the Board violated the school law statute, \textit{N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-9(e)(3)}.
[brief] The term “agrees to permit” infers a temporary permission that can be withdrawn in the future.  It does not invoke a conveyance as does the term “grant” or “convey an easement” - normally used in a Deed of permanent conveyance.  The entire context was as a personal license - between two then-interconnected religious entities with then common officers - establishing temporary and mutually cooperative ground rules for allowing the Synagogue to be constructed and get operational, to continue so long as determined appropriate, until circumstances change, or the Synagogue and School properties are no longer owned and operated cooperatively.
[brief] ”  I/M/O [...], Commission Docket No. [...], at pp. 7-8 (2021) (Ca242-243) (citing Melnyk v. Fiel, Commission Docket No. [...] (2019) (Ca269)).  It is clear from this body of decisional law that, where a school board member has used their public Facebook account to campaign for their seat on the Board – and certainly where a school board member also shares election results and announces that she is a sitting Board member – members of the public might reasonably believe she is speaking in her role as Board member.
[brief] (15T 138-8 to 139-2; 15T 147-5 to 11)  After [...]’ death, [...] told police that [...] had been barred from their home for “stealing, drinking, and a drug problem. ”  (15T 141-20 to 24)  [...] believed [...] had left a keyboard behind when he moved out of the [...]’ home in 2017, but his daughter, [...], told him the item was a laptop.
[brief] THE FAILURE TO INFORM THE JURY THAT JOINT POSSESSORS CANNOT INTEND TO DISTRIBUTE DRUGS TO ONE ANOTHER ENTITLES RINES TO A NEW TRIAL.  (Not Raised Below)  The State told jurors that [...] jointly possessed the drugs with [...], and that they could convict [...] of intending to distribute the drugs by finding that he gave some to [...].  Because there was evidence that the two were joint possessors, the court instructed the jury on the definition of joint possession.  But jurors were never told that “a person cannot distribute a controlled dangerous substance to a person with whom he shares joint possession. ”  State v. Morrison, 188 N.J. 2, 12 (2006).  The prosecutor’s claim that jurors could find intent to distribute solely from the testimony that [...] would “break off” a piece for a joint possessor materially misstated the law, and the court’s failure to inform jurors of the correct law -- that joint possessors cannot distribute drugs to one another -- denied [...] a fair trial.
[brief] Q.  Was there any discrepancy between [...] to [...] and then the 1971 deed in which [...] transferred the strip – strip?  A.  The Brubeck to [...] deed did not include the strip.  Q.  Based on your years in the business of referring title, do you have an opinion as to what a possible outcome would have been when the title insurance company did that?  A.  My experience is that the title company would not have insured the strip.  Q.  When [...] discussed inquiry notice, and he claimed that inquiry notice was mandatory here, do you agree with that opinion?  A.  That it was mandatory, no.  Q.  Why not?  A.  Because lot four had established a clear chain of title.  Q.  How do we know that?  A.  Okay.  We know that based on the examination of the deeds in the chain of title.  Q.  And [...] indicated specifically that there are no records of deed showing that the strip was ever conveyed out of plaintiff’s chain, do you recall hearing that?  A.  Yes, I do.  Q.  What does that say to you with respect to J-40, which was the proposed subdivision?  A.  I don’t know that it says anything specifically to me about J-40.  J-40 would not be something that would have been found in the course of a normal title search.  And in fact, it would not have been found anywhere in the land records even in some kind of expanded title search.  Q.  Do you have an opinion, based on your review, of J-40 and the subsequent deeds in plaintiff’s chain of title as to whether or not the proposed transfer in J-40 ever actually took place?  A.  From what I can see, there’s no evidence that the proposed transfer ever took place.  3T73:7-74:21.
[brief] The test for suggestivity is a two-pronged test.  The first prong is whether the identification procedure employed was “impermissibly suggestive. ”  Madison, supra, 109 N.J. at 232, 536 A.2d 254.  Only if there is a finding of impermissible suggestivity does the second prong of the test even apply.  Ibid.  The second prong requires a determination of whether the suggestivity resulted in a “‘very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification. ’”  Ibid. (citation omitted).
[directive] Al ser condenado por una primera infracción, una multa de $500; Upon conviction for a first offense, a fine of $500; Al ser condenado por una segunda infracción, una multa de $750, y encarcelación en la cárcel del condado por al menos 1 día pero no más de 5 días;  Upon conviction for a second offense, a fine of $750, and imprisonment in the county jail for at least 1 day but not more than 5 days; Al ser condenado por una tercera infracción o una infracción subsiguiente, una multa de $1,000, y encarcelación en la cárcel del condado por 10 días.  Upon conviction for a third offense or subsequent offense, a fine of $1,000, and imprisonment in the county jail for 10 days.
[brief] At her deposition, Plaintiff testified that she was standing in the Meat Department talking to a [...] employee and behind her was an open aisle.  (Pa025; Pa027).  Plaintiff testified that she was talking with this employee for a “very short time” and her back was turned when the accident happened.  (Pa028).  Plaintiff testified then that “all of a sudden [she] got struck from the ride side. ” (Pa028).  Plaintiff agreed that she could not provide any description of the speed of the U-boat because she agreed that she did not see it happen and her back was completely turned.  (Pa030).  Plaintiff admitted that she did not know what exactly made contact with her back.  (Pa030).  Plaintiff admitted she never saw [...] behind his cart, pushing his cart, and/or pulling his cart prior to the impact.  (Pa030-Pa031).  Plaintiff had no knowledge as to who loaded [...]’ U-boat.
[brief] 12  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS  Order on Motion for Summary Judgment, dated March 27, 2023 …………… (Pa6)  Oral Opinion of the Hon. [...], J.S.C., dated February 27, 2023 .  (1T)  Oral Opinion of the Hon. [...], J.S.C., dated March 27, 2023 ….  (2T)
[brief] N.J.A.C. 6A:32-7.1(e) and (f).  N.J.A.C. 6A:32-7.1(g)(1) also states that “[e]ach district board of education shall establish written policies and procedures for student records that: “[g]uarantee access to persons authorized under this subchapter within 10 days of a request, but prior to any review or hearing conducted in accordance with N.J.A.C. 6A.”  N.J.A.C. 6A:32-7.5(e) also defines “the parent of a student under the age of 18, regardless of whether the child resides with the parent [except where there are certain custody issues]” as a “person authorized to access student records, including student health records.
[brief] What was clear is that everyone involved understood this to be a temporary situation.  [Pa3,9]  The options provided by [...] were limited to essentially using up whatever time employees had on the books, technically remaining employed but unpaid, being terminated and collecting unemployment benefits.[Pa3]  These were clearly not the proper procedures, and this was not how the [...] should have handled the situation if they gave any consideration to how this could potentially affect employees’ benefits, including their pensions.  All of these options would have resulted in an interruption of pension payments by [...] into the employees’ pension account.  They all, therefore, would be a disruption or break in service if you view N.J.S.A. 43:15A- 25.2 without consideration for the definition of the term, or the specific exceptions the legislature wrote into the statute.  It is unclear how the Board would have resolved this dispute if [...] went on unpaid status or used his limited PTO days.  The result would have been the same at some point.  [...] would have been out of work, no fault of his own, and no contributions would have been paid on his behalf into the system for that period.  He also would have been eligible for unemployment benefits.
[brief] ”  See Starr, 65 213 P.3d at 219 (observing that statutory purpose would not be fulfilled if a driver was not required to signal a lane change “even when on a major freeway at the height of rush hour,” as long as the turn could be made with reasonable safety).  In fact, ascertaining safety before changing lanes is already covered by N.J.S.A. 39:4-88(b), which provides that “[a] vehicle . . . shall not be moved from that lane until the driver has first ascertained that the movement can be made with safety.
[brief] Plaintiff relies upon the report of his expert, [...], who opined that but for the firm’s failure to file the Probate lawsuit contesting the 2014 Will within the Statute, [...] and [...] would have been able to challenge the 2014 Will.  Mr. [...] offered the net opinion that the probated 2014 Will would have been set aside, the original Will naming [...], [...], and [...] as beneficiaries would have been probated, and [...] and [...] would have each received a one-third share of their father’s Estate, equal to the share [...] would have received.  The expert opined that [...] and [...] did not receive a share of their father’s Estate, but rather were disinherited.  However, [...] admits that this case must be proven through a case-within-a-case analysis.  In his net opinion, [...] opined that [...]’s 2014 Will would be invalidated, and the original Will would have been probated.  [...]’ argument was that there was a confidential relationship with [...], that [...] wanted to move back to Portugal, and that, on the second trip, [...] and [...] took account of [...]’s assets in Portugal, consisting of 15 properties.
[brief] Defendants made clear to plaintiff that they sought to resolve the parties’ dispute over the scope of the Special Undertaking Contract without resort to formal litigation, and would file suit if, but only if, settlement negotiations failed.  (Pa472, Pa476).  To that end, defendants invited plaintiff (and other special undertakers) to a meeting where defendants intended in good faith to provide plaintiff with additional information about the underlying PCB lawsuits and discuss “options for resolving [plaintiff’s] liabilities [under the Special Undertaking Contract] outside the context of formal litigation. ” (Pa478).  Plaintiff accepted defendants’ invitation on May 1, 2017, leading defendants to believe that plaintiff, too, desired to enter into good-faith settlement negotiations.  (Pa081).  Then, eleven days later (and four days before the scheduled meeting), plaintiff surreptitiously filed this case.