ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] ###  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES  ####  Cases | Case | Page(s) | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|---------| | **Berrie v. Berrie,** | 4, 5, 8, 9, 10 | | 188 N.J. Super. 274 (Ch. Div. 1983) | | | **Gensollen v. Pareja,** | 6 | | 416 N.J. Super. 585 (App. Div. 2010) | | | **K.S. v. ABC Prof’l Corp.,** | 5 | | 330 N.J. Super. 288 (App. Div. 2000) | | | **Lipsky v. New Jersey Ass’n of Health Plans, Inc. ** | 4 | | 474 N.J. Super. 447 (App. Div. 2023) | | | **Pinero v. Div. of State Police** | 11 | | 404 N.J. Super. 194 (App. Div. 2008) | | | **Stamy v. Packer** | 6 | | 138 F.R.D. 412 (D.N.J. 1990).  | | | **State v. Cooper** | 7 | | 2 N.J. 540 (1949) | | | **Wasserstein v. Swern & Co.,** | 7 | | 84 N.J. Super. 1 (App.  Div. 1964)) | | ####  Rules | Rule | Page(s) | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|---------| | R. 1:9-2 | 5 | | R. 4:10-3 | 5, 12 | | R. 4:10-2 | 5, 8, 9, 11 |  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS/ORDERS/RULINGS  APPEALED  ORDERS/RULINGS  Order denying Motion Quash and for a Protective Order dated March 7, 2024  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .817a  Amended Order denying Motion Quash and for a Protective Order dated March 14, 2024  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .819a  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
[brief] ”  Marchak, supra at 282.  In Atalese, the Court held that the arbitration provision at issue featured none of the language that the Courts have deemed satisfactory in upholding such provisions.  For example, “clear and unambiguous language that the plaintiff is waiving her right to sue or go to court to secure relief. ”  Atalese, supra at 446.  The clause in “some general and sufficiently broad way, must explain that the plaintiff is giving up her right to bring her claims in court or have a jury resolve the dispute. ”  Id. at 447.
[brief] The undisputed evidence in the underlying case was that there was extensive mold contamination in the air, on the floor, on the furniture, and elsewhere throughout the [...] condominium.  The food [...] ate for eighteen years while living in the condominium and for a year later (during 2009) while, by necessity, he continued to store his food in the contaminated condominium, also was contaminated by airborne mold.  Airborne contamination of food by mold was introduced into evidence through various reports and warnings by, among others, the USDA, the World Health Organization, and the EPA.  Instead of applying the exception as written, the Trial Court required [...] to prove (a) that he not only ate mold-contaminated food, but that the food he ate had been contaminated by an identifiable species of Stachybotrys mold; (b) that the mold species in question produced a harmful mycotoxin, trichothecene; and (c) that he had been directly (and distinctly) injured by his consumption of food that contained trichothecene mycotoxins.\(^3\) Da37-39.
[brief] ”  (5T 139-4 to 7; see also 7T 94-19 to 95-1, 96-9 to 23)  There is an entire branch of forensics devoted to analyzing and drawing conclusions from blood stains: bloodstain pattern analysis.  A bloodstain pattern analyst “assist[s] in the reconstruction of those events of an alleged incident that could have created the stains and stain patterns present at a crime scene” by examining the sizes, shapes, and distribution of stains.
[brief] (Da269, Appellate Docket Transaction ID: [...]; Da269, January 28, 2022, Order granted motion no. [...]).  On February 28, 2023, the Appellate Division remanded the case back to the Trial Court, finding that appeal was not final because, while the Trial Court denied the Plaintiff’s motion to amend with prejudice, there was an underlying pending complaint that had not been dismissed.  (Da275-283).
[brief] POINT II  THE TRIAL COURT’S ERRONEOUS INTERPRETATION OF N.J.S.A. 49:3-69(a)(2)  THWARTS THE PUBLIC POLICY PURPOSES OF THE UNIFORM SECURITIES LAW:  PROTECTING INVESTORS AND ROOTING OUT FRAUD.  The full error of the court’s failure to award both restitution and disgorgement is self-evident when the outcome in this case is contrasted with the breathtaking scope of defendants’ misdeeds.  Both remedies were appropriate and should have been awarded given that they serve different purposes.
[brief] [...] AND [...] IN SUPPORT OF THEIR APPEAL [...]  The Legal Center  [...]  Newark, New Jersey  07102 [...]  Attorneys for Defendants Heather C. Taylor and Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey Of Counsel and On the Brief: [...], Esq. (#017471984)  [...]  [...], Esq. (#025192008)  [...]  TABLE OF CONTENTS
[brief] Instead, it advances the FDCPA’s protection of consumer privacy by restricting a debt collector’s dissemination of consumers’ nonpublic personal information.  See, 15 U.S.C. § 1692(a) and Douglass v. Convergent Outsourcing, 765 F.3d 299, 303 (3d Cir. 2014) (the invasion of privacy is “a core concern animating the FDCPA”).  Congress knows how to regulate the disclosure of private information to service providers.  See, Pb19-Pb20 (comparing HIPAA to the FDCPA).  It is not for this Court to make the FDCPA more like HIPAA.
[brief] The net funds will be transferred to [...].  That recovery has no impact on the EGP due for [...].  Da6 (emphasis added).  Therefore, not only does [...] acknowledge that it is indebted to [...] for at least this portion of the Hackensack Project claims, but [...] admits that its recovery from the owner (allegedly on [...]’s behalf) was separate from the EGP supposedly owed by [...] to [...] on that project.  Therefore, it cannot be true that the parties “fully litigated” all claims relevant to the Hackensack Project in the PTA Arbitration [[...]’s App. Br. at 2] if, as [...] admits, [...] was also pursuing [...]’s claims for payment on the Hackensack Project in a separate arbitration at the exact same time.
[brief] The police had [...] contact [...] several times during the trip, during which [...] agreed to meet [...] at [...] in [...], a garden apartment complex where he maintained an apartment.  (2T10-7 to 11).  However, [...] decided to change the meeting location to a CVS parking lot across the street from the apartment complex, because it would be easier to “surveil” the anticipated transaction.  (2T11-3 to 7).  At no time did the police seek an anticipatory search warrant in New Jersey.
[brief] *Second*, even assuming it had been permissible for the ALJ and the Commissioner to use newly identified excessiveness grounds as the basis for affirming the Department’s letter disapproving [...]’s applications (it was not), that newly-identified ground is itself substantively illegal and cannot be upheld on appeal.  The Department was required, and failed to, promulgate regulations implementing the “excessive” clause of the Act.  Without any regulations or even any other agency guidance about the meaning of the statutory term, [...] had no notice of what criteria the Department would use to determine whether a proposed rate is “excessive,” including no way of knowing what evidence it purportedly needed to marshal to show a lack of excessiveness during a multi-day evidentiary hearing.  Nothing in the statute’s use of the unadorned term “excessive” is sufficiently specific to set out the “rules of the game” required by the administrative law precedents of the New Jersey Supreme Court and this Court.  [...] had nothing to guide its proposed rate applications, and the belated “excessiveness” justification for their denial cannot be sustained as a result.
[brief] ”  Clay v. Jie-Davis, No. 16-45, 2016 US Dist. LEXIS 182536, at *29 (Dec. 9, 2016), report and recommendation adopted, 2016 US Dist. LEXIS 182436, at *1 (D. Guam Dec. 31, 2016); The danger in extracting a quote from case law without setting forth the facts and issues under consideration, and thus taking it out of context, is that while it sounds appealing, the above quote does not address the issue in this case.  In Clay v. Jie-Davis supra, (Vol. II, Pa 174) (unreported) the federal magistrate was considering in a motion to dismiss, among other things, one count in Plaintiff’s complaint for intentional interference with contractual relations requiring a valid contract between the Plaintiff and a third party.
[brief] Under a proper reading of *Burd*, “if a claim is stated in two conflicting theories in a complaint for damages, one of which requires coverage and the other which does not, the carrier must defend and may do so under reservation of rights. ”  *L.C.S., Inc. v. Lexington Ins. Co.*, 371 N.J. Super. 482, 497, 853 A.2d 974, 984 (App. Div. 2004) (citing and interpreting *Burd*).  Insofar as there may be an exception to this rule in the event of “a question of fact that is not material to the litigation,” *Surety Mech. Servs., Inc. v. Phx. Ins. Co.*, No. 1:12-cv-3242, 2014 WL 2921015 at *3 (D.N.J. June 27, 2014), no such exception is raised by this case.
[brief] 2  Newark v. Nat. Res. Council in Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 82 N.J. 530 (1980)  ............................................................................... passim Russian White House Restaurant v. Village of Ridgewood, 2000 N.J. AGEN. LEXIS 188, *109, OAL DKT. NO. [...] & [...]  Consolidated (November 29, 1999)  ..............................................................................  4-5  State v. Hill, 199 N.J. 545 (2009) ............................................................  11 State v. Loftin, 287 N.J. Super. 76 (App. Div. 1996) ..................................  10  STATUTES  N.J.A.C. 1:1-15.5(a) .................................................................................  8 N.J.A.C. 1:1-18.8 (c) ................................................................................. 1 N.J.A.C. 1:1-18.8(d) ................................................................................. 1 N.J.A.C. 1:1-18.8(e) ................................................................................. 1 N.J.A.C. 4A:2-1.2(c)(1) – (4) .................................................................. 12 N.J.A.C. 4A:2-1.4 ..................................................................................... 3 N.J.S.A. 2C:13-B-13.1 ............................................................................. 4 N.J.S.A. 52:14B-10(c) ............................................................................. 1, 2 RULES OF EVIDENCE N.J.R.E. 803(c)(6) ..................................................................................... 5 LEGAL ARGUMENT Point I THE CSC INAPPROPRIATELY ADOPTED AN OAL DECISION BEYOND THE STATUTORY FORTY-FIVE DAY PERIOD IN VIOLATION OF N.J.A.C. 1:1-18.1 (OAL DECISION AT PAGE 1; Pa2a) (CSC OPINION AT PAGE 1; Pa33a)
[brief] **LEGAL STANDARD**  Appellate courts “accord substantial deference to a trial court’s disposition of a discovery dispute. ”  *Brugaletta v. Garcia*, 234 N.J. 225, 240 (2018).  “[A]ppellate courts ‘generally defer to a trial court’s disposition of discovery matters unless the court has abused its discretion or its determination is based on a mistaken understanding of the applicable law. ’”  *State v. Brown*, 236 N.J. 497, 521 (2019) (quoting *Pomerantz Paper Corp. v. New Cmty. Corp.*, 207 N.J. 344, 371 (2011)).  The Trial Court did not abuse its discretion in determining that [...]’s deposition should go forward.  **ARGUMENT**
[brief] (Pra 9-11).  [...] filed a Response in which it criticized [...]’s calculations, in part because it claimed [...] used incorrect annual damage figures.  (Pra 13).  In its Reply brief, [...] addressed [...]’s criticisms by performing a calculation using the same method as in its initial brief but applying the annual damage figures that [...] claimed it should have used initially.  (Pra 15-16).  [...] did not raise a “new issue” in its reply.  The only thing that changed from the calculation of interest in [...]’s initial brief and its Reply Brief was the annual damages figures, and those were the annual damages advocated for by [...] in its opposition.  Importantly, [...] did not adopt the interest calculations in [...]’s reply brief.  [...]’s calculation of interest in its reply brief was $1,198,348. (Pra 16).  The trial court awarded $1,068,835 in interest.  (Pa 43).  Obviously, the trial court did not blindly adopt the calculations in [...]’s reply brief.  To reach the number included in the Judgment, [...] performed his own calculations using [...]’s annual damages figures and a start date for the running of interest that was different from and later in time than what [...] proposed.  (Pa. 56).  The calculation of interest in based on a simple mathematical formula.  The real disputes were over the inputs, including the annual damage figures, that go into that formula.  The trial court resolved those disputes by considering all relevant information.  The trial court did not abuse its discretion with its calculation of interest.
[directive] Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.51, adult inmates sentenced to a term of incarceration at a county jail or state 2 prison become eligible for parole after having served one-third of the sentence where no mandatory minimum term has been imposed, less commutation time for good behavior and credits for diligent application to work and other institutional assignments.  At the time of parole eligibility, inmates are subject to release via “administrative parole,” N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.55b, seq., unless they are statutorily ineligible, in which case they are subject to the see et New Jersey Is An Equal Opportunity Employer • Printed on Recycled Paper and is Recyclable Page 2 eligible for parole after serving approximately 20 percent of their sentences, after taking into account credits earned while in custody, including commutation and work credits.)  For approximately 80 crimes, however, State law requires that the sentencing judge impose a longer period of parole ineligibility that, depending on the offense, must be either a certain percentage of the total sentence—ranging from 33 to 85 percent—or a fixed number of years.  Individuals sentenced for these crimes must serve the period of parole ineligibility in custody, and cannot apply any of their commutation or work credits to obtain an earlier release.  N.J.S.A. 30:4- See 123.51(a).  As a result, individuals convicted of these mandatory minimum offenses typically spend a greater percentage of their sentences incarcerated than those convicted of crimes subject eligibility.3 to the default rule of parole
[brief] Jacoby, 442 N.J. Super. at 463 (quoting Grasso, 375 N.J. Super. 48–49).  For (d)(1) use variances, ³  When the Board heard the application, the [...] had already approved its portion of the building and improvements.  Ja013. applicants must establish the negative criteria by an “enhanced quality of proof. ”  *Price v. Himeji, LLC*, 214 N.J. 263, 286 (2013) (citing *Medici*, 107 N.J. at 21).  However, in *TSI East Brunswick v. Zoning Bd.*, 215 N.J. 26 (2013), the Court expanded *Coventry Square*, and eliminated *Medici’s* enhanced quality of proof for conditional use variances.
[brief] [...]’s Investigation and Testimony  [...] was the lead IA investigator for the TL incident.  [...] confirmed that there was no complainant in the TL matter, and that the IA investigation was unusual as a result.  (T1 172:16-174:3; Pa100).  He confirmed the Department was generally looking for some type of wrongdoing on [...]’s part.  (T1 172:16-174:3; Pa100).  [...] testified that the broad purpose of the investigation was “to see if there was inappropriate conduct on the part of Officer [...] as a law enforcement officer. ” (T2 113:9-13; see, e.g., Pa100).  [...] was unable to uncover any evidence that [...] had been untruthful during the course of the investigation.  (T1 at 149:1-150:21).  [...] agreed that the Department’s Rules and Regulations as to reporting off duty incidents, such as the TL or unlicensed drivers incidents, did not apply to [...].  (T2 82:13-89:12).  [...] testified that the IA investigation was delayed because IA wished to interview [...] and could not do so until a separate DEA investigation concluded.  [...] conceded that IA could have obtained [...]’s medical records from [...] at any time based on [...]’s prior execution of HIPAA releases.
[brief] [Pa327a-330a]  Question 10(a) of the 2019 Application asked: “Have there been any new bar complaints, investigations or disciplinary proceedings against any attorney?”  The Firm answered “No” to Question 10(a).  [Pa329a]  Again relying on the 2016 Application, 2017 Application, and 2018 Application, as well as the 2019 Application, [...] issued *[...]* Lawyers Professional Liability Insurance Policy No. [...] to the Firm for the Policy Period July 3, 2019 to July 3, 2020 (the “2019 Policy” and, together with the 2016, 2017, and 2018 Policy, the “Policies”).
[brief] Da38.  The Trial Court’s focus on Trichothecene probably is a result of lab reports showing that [...]’s urine tested positive for Trichothecene, twice.  Trichothecene, however, is not the only harmful byproduct of mold, and the Stachybotrys mold that produces it was certainly not the only species of mold discovered in the condominium.  For instance, the bodily injury at issue in Wear, supra was caused by Aspergillus, another species of mold that was found in the [...] condominium.  In ruling in favor of [...], the Trial Court effectively added restrictive language to the exception that the policy, itself, does not actually contain, concluding that the exception does not apply absent proof: (1) that [...] actually ingested mold-contaminated food; (2) that the food he ingested contained harmful species of mold that included the mycotoxin Trichothecene; and (3) that he consumed the contaminated food in sufficient quantities to cause his bodily injuries.  This is precisely the kind of restrictive “add on” language that [...] could have written into the policy, but that is missing entirely from the exception at issue.
[brief] (Id.)  It referred recipients to the Borough website for remote access information.  (Id.)  (The notice references an attachment but does not identify its contents; the agenda was attached to the e-mail notice included in the Borough’s exhibits filed with the court below.)  (Id.)  Although the notice was sent well before the deadline for the [...], it was not published.  Since the notice was sent on a Friday, the earliest it could be published in [...] was the following Thursday, the 16th of December, the same day as the Planning Board meeting.  It was, however, never published.  The minutes of the December 16th special meeting reflect that the Planning Board concluded its review of Ordinance 1423-21 with a vote finding the proposed amendments inconsistent with the Borough’s Master Plan.  (Pa. 270-273.)  Only [...] voted against the motion.  The minutes also reflect that the other statutory member, Councilman [...] (“[...]”), could not vote because “of technical difficulties. ”  (Id.)  The Planning Board identified five inconsistencies between Ordinance 1423-21 and the Master Plan, among them the amendment that would permit “more than one principal building on a lot in Subdistrict 5 .  . . .”  (Id.)  Mysteriously, there is no recording of the Planning Board’s December 16, 2021, special meeting.  (Pa 275.)  The Borough’s website posts video recordings of public meetings, and the December 16th special meeting appears to be the only Planning Board or Council meeting not recorded. \(^2\)  The Borough Council held the public hearing on Ordinance 1423-21 at its December 28, 2021, regular meeting.  (Pa 278-279.)  No notice of the December 28th public hearing was ever published or even sent to the Borough's designated newspapers for publication.  At the public hearing, no testimony was offered to support the adoption of Ordinance 1423-21 or to address the inconsistencies with the Master Plan.  (Pa 278-279.)  [...] and Rodgers were both present at the December 28th meeting of the Council but, as reflected in the meeting minutes, failed to disclose during the public hearing that the Planning Board found Ordinance 1423-21 inconsistent with the Master Plan.  (Id.)  Ordinance 1423-21 was adopted by a vote of four in favor, including Councilman [...], and two abstentions: Councilmen [...] and [...].  (Id.)  Under the Borough’s form of government, the Mayor only votes to break ties on the six member council.  There was no concurrent resolution adopted \(^2\)See: (https://caldwell-nj.com/index.asp?SEC=96CB42D4-DDD4-4B5F-8876-515F55A434E2.) identifying the inconsistencies with the Master Plan identified by the Planning Board and the reasons for the divergence.  (Id.)  **The [...]**
[brief] ”  Pa787; see Pa27–32.  In addition, under both Vermont and New Jersey law, the undefined term “damages” in the Policy must be construed to encompass a compensatory award of attorneys’ fees to a “prevailing” plaintiff.  See Pb36–42.  Even if some archaic, technical meaning could be ascribed to the undefined term “damages” in the Policy, the law would require rejection of any such construction in favor of one that supported coverage.  Pb39–40.  C.
[brief] Additionally, N.J.R.E. 803(c)(6) provides a hearsay exception for records of regularly conducted activity or business records.  See, e.g., Konop v Rosen, 425 N.J.  Super. 391, 403 (App. Div. 2012), certif. denied, 218 N.J. 530 (2014); DeBartolomeis v. Board of Review, 341 N.J. Super. 80, 86 (App. Div. 2001); Gunter v. Fischer Scientific American, 193 N.J. Super. 688 (App. Div. 1984).
[directive] Extraordinary crime a committed has believe a defendant that probable to cause is there where any In case or second- first- any for on release 2C:43-7.2, while N.J.S.A. Act, Early Release the to subject No of revocation motion seeking a file shall prosecutor the complaint-warrant, by charged degreecrime Prosecutor, Assistant First or Prosecutor County the 2A:162-24 unless N.J.S.A. to pursuant release by prosecuted the cases in Criminal Justice of Division of Director the Deputy a or Director or the release. of revocation seek to not extraordinary reasons and compelling are there that Division, finds Release. of Revocation Seek to Presumed Is Prosecutor Where the Cases 8.4 Is Crime New Serious When of Release Revocation Seeking of Presumption 8.4.1 Complaint-Warrant. by Charged Offense for Any Release Committed on While to authorized pursuant except Section as 8.3, under covered otherwise not case any In or committed afirst- has defendant a that believe to cause probable is there 8.4.5, where subsection prosecutor acomplaint-warrant, the by chaxged offense any for release on while crime second-degree 2A:162-24. to N.J.S.A. pursuant release of revocation seeking motion a file presumptively shall Committed New Is Crime
[brief] Moreover, Defendant mistakenly argued that the Trial Court improperly reformed the Redevelopment Agreement because it did not find any mistake or duress.  That argument falls flat, however, because “[a] Chancery judge has broad discretion ‘to adapt equitable remedies to the particular circumstances of a given case. ’”  *Tarta Luna Properties, LLC v. Harvest Restaurants Group LLC*, 466 N.J. Super. 137, 153 (App. Div. 2021) (quoting *Marioni v. Roxy Garments Delivery Co., Inc.*, 417 N.J. Super. 269, 275 (App. Div. 2010) (citations omitted)).
[brief] ”  Price v. Himeji, LLC, 214 N.J. 263, 293 (2013); see also Saddle Brook Realty, LLC, 388 N.J. Super. at 76 (App. Div. 2006).  Use variances may be granted where “(1) ‘special reasons’ exist for the variance (the ‘positive criteria’); and (2) the variance can be granted without substantial detriment to the public good and will not substantially impair the intent and purposes of the zone plan and zoning ordinance (the ‘negative criteria’).”