ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] [...] drafted an expert report dated January 4, 2018; he was deposed on July 11, 2018.  [...] is not a professional engineer.  Pa2060.  [...] testified that [...]’s resident engineer, [...], had a responsibility to know the OSHA and ANSI standards, along with the contract requirements and the Health and Safety Plan (HASP).  Pa2008-09.  [...] and [...], who provided the resident engineer, had a duty to know the applicable industry standards.  Pa2027.  [...] failed to enforce the contract documents, as required by the resident engineer’s responsibilities set forth in the RFEOI and the [...]-[...] agreement.  Pa2028.  [...] and [...] were required to recognize the standards, as per the contract and failed to do so.  Among other things, [...] and [...] failed to ensure that lighting requirements were met, as was required by the HASP, or that adequate dump trucks were assigned to the work site.  Pa2029-33.  Generally, [...] and [...] failed to ensure that the contractor met with industry standard best practices, as required by various organizations governing safety.  Pa2033.  [...] testified, [...] and [...] failed to ensure that [...] was qualified to perform his duties as the resident engineer.  Pa2037-38.  [...] was to provide resident engineer inspection services as a consultant and not in an engineering role.  Pa2040.  [...] further testified that the resident engineer on the site was required to have an understanding of the contract, applicable standards, OSHA standards, and ANSI standards, specifically those mentioned in the contract with the [...] and to ensure that these standards were complied with.  Pa2046.  [...] testified that [...] had certain responsibilities that he should have known and carried out; however, [...] did not in fact enforce the responsibilities he had as they relate to the contractor.  Pa2053.  Defendant, [...], retained the expert services of [...].
[brief] On April 12, 2021, [...] provided a sworn Certification pertaining to the E.I.N. number.  [...] started by stating as counsel, he was familiar with the facts of this case and then stated in Paragraph 2: 2.  I make this Certification in response to the Court's April 5, 2021 ruling, wherein the Court ordered me, [...], and [...] to provide a sworn statement to the Court in regard to efforts to obtain an Employer Identification Number ("EIN") for the [...], Deceased (hereinafter, the "Estate").
[directive] Jail staff should retain a copy of the victim-witness information form.  If the release occurs during regular business hours, the county jail staff should immediately notify the County Victim-Witness Coordinator of the impending release of the designated defendant.  The Office of Victim-Witness Advocacy should then notify the victim by telephone as well as the arresting/investigating police agency of the release.  If release occurs during nights, weekends and holidays, the county jail staff should immediately notify the arresting/investigating police agency of the impending release of the designated defendant.
[brief] The Borough designated the same three official newspapers for calendar years 2020, 2021 and 2022: [...], [...] and [...].  (Pa 253.)  [...] is a weekly newspaper that publishes on Thursdays.  [...] is a daily newspaper.  [...] is a web site.  The deadline for submitting legal advertisements to [...] is the Tuesday prior to publication by 1:00 a.m. (Pa 257.)  The deadline for submitting legal advertisements to the Star Ledger is three business days before the desired publication date.  (Pa 259.)  There are no legal ads published on the [...] website.  The Borough’s Efforts to Reorganize for the 2022 Calendar Year
[directive] Currency seized by any law enforcement officer 1 - - shall be counted as soon as practical, but not later than the end of the - .- seizing officer's t o u ~ o duty.  f  The currency shall be counted by at two of least officers, independent one another, preferably the at location of the seizure.  impractical count the currency at the is to  If it location of the seizure, the currency should be transported, in a manner set forth the agency's Standard Operating Procedures, in to two by secure location least officers.  Both officers must agree a at dollar and certify the total amount of the currency as well as assure the authenticity the currency by randomly determining that the of currency is counterfeit.  The shall record the seized not officers currency on a form entitled United States Currency Seizure Report-  This shall include: claimant information (name, address, date of form birth, social security number and home and telephone numbers), work OR1 name of seizing agency, seizing agency's name and badge #, number seizing officer, date, time and location of seizure and of the a breakdown by denomination of the currency and coins seized.  The a currency seized shall be 1isted.by each denomination with total for all of each denomination, a total coins and a grand total of all currency and coins seized.  Upon completion, the form shall be officers signed by the conducting the count and the arrested party or by their attorney.  The original shall be maintained the seizing officer, two a copy shall be given to the arrested party or their attorney and officers.  copies shall be maintained by each of the submitting be  A 2. currency custodian shall designated by the agency executive of a each state law enforcement agency.
[brief] Moreover, the trial court is not the appropriate avenue to seek the documents Appellant requested.  Appellant improperly substituted an administrative process for requesting medical documents with an unauthorized motion to the trial court.  Regardless, as the trial court found, Appellant’s attempt to use the court to compel documents to formulate claims against Respondents has been expressly rejected by this Court’s precedent.  See Johnson v. Grayce Tighe, Inc., 365 N.J. Super. 237, 240-241 (App. Div. 2003); see also Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Borgata Hotel Casino & Spa, 456 N.J. Super. 471, 478 (Law. Div. 2017).  B.
[brief] ”  *Id.* at 587 (emphasis added).  In contrast, the officer in this case was not credible, did not speak to the caller (face-to-face or otherwise) so he could not make any credibility assessment and, importantly, there was no corroboration of the allegation of criminality before [...] was stopped.  Finding a handgun where a witness told you that is a handgun corroborates the assertion of criminality and it corroborates the witness’s credibility.  No such corroboration was present in this case.  Similarly, in *State v. Hathaway*, 222 N.J. 453 (2015), a face-to-face citizen tip was corroborated before any police action was taken.
[brief] However, with respect to privilege log entries for which no attorney has been indicated on the from, to, or cc field or, for a limited number of entries as to which plaintiffs request further clarification as to how the document is privileged, plaintiffs’ Motion is granted in part.  No later than July 30, 2021, defendants shall provide an amended privilege log for the 1,473 entries on the privilege log that have no attorney in the “from,” “to,” or “cc,” line, indicating how the document is attorney-client privileged or otherwise protected sufficient to enable plaintiffs to determine the basis for the privilege.  This includes, but is not limited to, providing the name of the attorney(s) involved and stating where in the email chain/document the attorney(s) was involved (e.g., “from,” “to,” or “cc”), as well as the date the attorney’s name appeared in the subject log entry, and providing any other information necessary to enable plaintiffs to determine the basis for the privilege.  No later than July 30, 2021, plaintiffs may identify up to 50 entries on the privilege log for which they request further detail as to the basis for the privilege.  No later than August 13, 2021, defendants shall provide a Supplemental Log containing those 50 entries and an additional description as to the basis for the privilege asserted sufficient to enable plaintiffs to further assess the claimed privilege.  The parties are expected to work cooperatively and in good faith with respect to this procedure and to resolve any dispute, if any arise, resulting from this process without the need for Court intervention.  The Court will not consider any motion resulting from this process unless it is convinced that the parties met and conferred in good faith, pursuant to Local Rule 37.  IT IS SO ORDERED.
[brief] There is a portion of the property leased to [...] which contains amusements.  The Riparian Grant is shown on the Tax Map.  The portion of property that is currently leased to [...], was previously leased to the prior owner of the amusement park, [...] (4T30:1-13).  He testifies that when a portion of the property was leased to [...] by the Borough it was before his employment at least back into the 1970’s or possibly late 1960’s.  (4T30:22).  When he started in 1988, [...] was still on the property (4T31:2).  He refers to D-2, a letter from the Borough Attorney, [...] dated October 8, 1991, to [...] who was leasing the property at the time.
[brief] First, [...]’s motion to compel arbitration was untimely.  While made roughly six months after plaintiffs’ complaint was filed, it came fourteen months after the undersigned firm, [...]’s prior counsel, and [...]’s counsel began working collaboratively without any mention (until June 2023, roughly a year later) of arbitration.  That arbitration was mentioned amongst boilerplate defenses in [...]’s answer is unavailing.  (Da42-48, #38).  Rather, “[a] court will consider an agreement to arbitrate waived. . . if arbitration is simply asserted in the answer and no other measures are taken to preserve the affirmative defense. ”
[brief] In sum, for the reasons and law set forth above, it is respectfully urged that the Order dated August 4, 2023 granting summary judgement be vacated and the matter remanded for trial on all issues.  Respectfully submitted, /s/ [...]  [...], Esq. I.D. No. 030282008  [...]  [...] (T) [...] (F) [...]  BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT’S APPEAL
[brief] Where a decision is vacated on other grounds, its undisturbed decision remains as precedential authority.  *Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp.*, 870 F.2d 1292, 1298 (7th Cir. 1989) explained:  [T]he Supreme Court vacated the Federal Circuit’s decision on the ground that it was inappropriate for the Federal Circuit, in the interests of justice, to decide the merits of a case over which it did not have jurisdiction.  Nevertheless, there is no indication that the Supreme Court found any error in the Federal Circuit’s decision.
[brief] I.  [...]’S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY  JUDGMENT PRESENTED  AMPLE PRESENTATION TO THE MOTION COURT THAT [...]’S CLAIMS FOR COMPENSATION FOR 2016 AND 2017 WERE NOT TIME BARRED (Volume I, Pa. 75; Pa. 150-184; Vol. III Pa. 389; Pa. 405-415;)  Defendants contention that Dr. Bellifemine did not present evidence to the motion court that his claims for past due compensation were not time barred ignores the fact that Dr. Bellifemine presented all the checks he received from [...] IN 2016 and 2017 to the motion court and the checks he received amounted to $95,364.82 while the money due Dr. Bellifemine for 2016-2017 was $306,000.00.  In Johnson v. McClellan, 468 N.J. Super., 562,(App. Div. 2021) plaintiff who filed a consumer fraud action against an out of state attorney which asserted that the out of state status caused plaintiff to receive a low settlement claimed that the defendant attorney raised new issues on appeal which should not be considered by the Appellate Court.
[brief] Thus, from 1983 until 1998, essentially, a two-track system existed to resolve disputes arising out of the No-Fault system.  Claimants could file arbitration demands against insurance carriers to compel them to pay overdue PIP benefits and insurance companies could file Fraud Act claims in a "court of competent jurisdiction" to recover compensatory damages, attorney's fees, cost of suit, costs of investigation and, potentially, treble damages.  In passing AICRA, the Legislature stated that the amendments were prompted by several considerations.  Initially, it stated that medical benefits available under the No-Fault Act were being used to overcome the verbal threshold established in 1988.  The Legislature further stated that the [...] system had not sufficiently eliminated payment for unnecessary treatment and testing.  Moreover, the Legislature found that "fraud, whether in the form of inappropriate medical treatments, inflated claims, staged accident, falsification of records or in any other form has increased premiums and must be uncovered and vigorously prosecuted and while the pursuit of those who would defraud the automobile insurance system has heretofore been addressed by the State through various agencies, it has been without sufficient coordination to aggressively combat fraud, leading to the conclusion that greater consolidation of agencies which were created to combat fraud is necessary to accomplish this purpose."
[brief] ”  2T:27-20 to 23 (emphasis added).  Ultimately, the court concluded that the “potential probative value does not outweigh the prejudicial effect that this will have in this jury. ”  2T:28-8 to 10.  The trial court applied the incorrect standard.  The court applied the balancing test applicable to convictions that are more than 10 years old on the date of the trial, which is set forth in N.J.R.E. 609(b)(1).  Under that test, any prejudice that outweighs the probative value of the evidence, to any degree, requires exclusion of the evidence.  The trial court was required to apply the more stringent balancing test under N.J.R.E. 403, which requires a showing that the risk of “undue prejudice” resulting from the disputed evidence “substantially outweighs” the probative value of that evidence.  This is a more stringent standard applicable to a motion to exclude evidence.  Although the trial court cited to N.J.R.E. 403, the record reveals that the court actually applied the more lenient standard under N.J.R.E. 609(b)(1).  Accordingly, the court applied the incorrect legal standard when ruling on the admissibility of [...]’s convictions, which under the proper standard, should have been admitted.
[brief] [...] erred in granting defendant’s motion to dismiss his indictment, ruling that the loss of the Adam4Adam profile created by the undercover detective irreparably violated defendant’s due process rights and deprived him of his ability to receive a fair trial.  (2T).  As this decision was based on an incorrect application of the law and was an abuse of discretion, it should be reversed on appeal.  Indictments should stand unless they are palpably defective.  State v. Williams, 441 N.J. Super. 266, 272 (App. Div. 2015).  New Jersey courts have long adhered to the principle that “a dismissal of an indictment is a draconian remedy [that] should not be exercised except on the clearest and plainest ground.
[brief] ¹  At the outset, it must be noted that the Brief and Appendix submitted by Petitioner-Appellant to this Court are highly improper.  Significantly, counsel for the Board, [...], Esq., filed with this Court a Statement of Items Comprising the Record on Appeal.  Counsel for [...] annexed that Statement to the end of the Appendix (PA160-PA161).  However, the Appendix omits nearly all the documents which [...] advised are part of the Record.  The documents which Petitioner has egregiously omitted are: Respondent’s Motion for Summary Decision with exhibits A-J, 4/27/22; Petitioner’s Motion for Summary Decision with exhibits 1-12; Respondent’s Opposition/Reply Brief, 6/9/22; and Petitioner’s Opposition/Reply Brief, 5/31/22.
[directive] Burglar’s Tools  Disorderly Persons  $500 to $2,500 10% permissible employ.  Disorderly Persons  $500 to $2,500 10% permissible  Actor attempts to or purposely or knowingly or recklessly causes bodily injury to another; or negligently causes bodily injury to another with a deadly weapon; or attempts by physical 2C:12-1a(1)(2)(3)  Simple Assault menace to put another in fear of imminent serious bodily injury, disorderly persons offense; Petty Disorderly if fight or scuffle entered into by mutual consent, petty disorderly persons offense.
[brief] As testified by [...], the Township’s Director of Public Works, the alleged defect in the parking lot amounts to nothing more than superficial surface markings that do not impact the functionality or safety of the parking lot.  Clearly, Plaintiff cannot describe or even express what exactly the alleged defect was that caused Plaintiff to fall; Plaintiff presents photographs pointing to an area where the alleged defect existed.  However, in Plaintiff’s deposition, when shown a picture of the lot in the condition it was at around the time when Plaintiff was injured, Plaintiff admitted that only cracks/veins were present in the area Plaintiff alleges caused Plaintiff to fall and conceded that it may have been said cracks/veins which caused Plaintiff’s fall.  [Pa69, ¶ 18].  Similarly, in the course of discovery Plaintiff disclosed photographs which Plaintiff avered “fairly and accurately depict the condition” of the lot when the incident occurred which show nothing more than surface cracks in the pavement and no pothole.  [Pa68, ¶ 10-11].  Additional photographs which Plaintiff declared “accurately depict the general location where the incident occurred” do not show a pothole or defect of any kind.  [Pa68, ¶ 12-13].  Rather, Plaintiff is seen pointing to a smooth area of pavement.  [Pa68, ¶ 13].  Moreover, the responding police officer reported that he observed no pothole in the subject lot.  [Pa69, ¶ 20].  The trial court properly reviewed all competent evidence of record, including Plaintiff’s own testimony and photographs submitted, and correctly determined no dangerous condition existed.
[brief] [...] ("[...]") Decision and Order Adopting the Initial Decision of Hon. [...], A.L.J., issued May 18, 2022, in [...] Docket Nos. [...] and [...] (SOICR #93) is included in the Appendix at Ha38.  The Initial Decision of Hon. [...], A.L.J., issued May 18, 2022 in OAL Docket Nos. [...] and [...] consolidated (part of SOICR #93) is included in the Appendix at Ha60.  The Order issued by Hon. [...], A.L.J., May 18, 2022 is included in the Appendix at Ha93.  | CASES | Page | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | Beattystown Community Council v. D.E.P, 313 N.J.Super. 236 (App. Div. 1998) | 9 | | California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970) | 11 | | Crespo v. McCartin, 244 N.J. Super. 413 (App. Div. 1990) | 40 | | Estate of Campagna v. Point LLC, 464 N.J. Super. 153 (App. Div. 2020) | 39 | | Fiore v. Consol. Freightways, 140 N.J. 452, 466 (1995) | 64 | | Harte v. Hand, 433 N.J. Super. 457 (App. Div. 2013) | 41 | | In Re Proposed Quest Academy Char., 216 N.J. 370 (2013) | 8, 12, 28 | | In re Public Service Electric & Gas Co., 35 N.J. 358 (1961) | 49, 53, 61 | | In Re Monmouth Consolidated Water Co., 47 N.J. 251 (1966) | 49, 53 | | In re Suspension of License of Silberman, 169 N.J. Super. 243 (App. Div. 1979), aff'd, 84 N.J. 303 (1980) | 8 | | In re Will of Smith, 108 N.J. 257 (1987) | 9 | | Jacoby v. Jacoby, 427 N.J. Super. 109 (App. Div. 2012) | 47 | | J.E. on behalf of G.E. v. State, 131 N.J. 552 (1993) | 10 | | Johnson v. Salem Corp., 97 N.J. 78 (1984) | 12 | | Kamienski v. State, 451 N.J. Super. 499 (App. Div. 2017) | 39 | | Med. Center v. Princeton Tp. Zoning, 343 N.J. Super. 177 (App. Div. 2001) | 62 | | Medici v. BPR Co., 107 N.J. 1 (1987) | 62 | | Muise v. GPU, Inc., 332 N.J. Super. 140 (App. Div. 2000) | 20 | N.J. Ass’n of Realtors v. N.J. Dep’t Of Envtl. Prot., 367 N.J. Super. 154 (App. Div.2004)
[brief] The next issue involving the Supreme Court and assignment of proceeds, involves the [...], Appointed by the New Jersey Supreme Court, which the Court describes as an “arm of the court. ”  See *In re Grinchis*, 75 N.J. 495, 496 (1978).  In *Higgins v. [...]*, 73 N.J. 123 (1977), the Supreme Court discussed the jurisdiction and function of an Advisory Committee:
[brief] THE MBPA WAS DESIGNED AND IMPLEMENTED TO PROTECT NEW JERSEY BEER WHOLESALERS AND TO PREVENT INEQUITY IN BARGAINING POWER BETWEEN WHOLESALERS AND BREWERS  A.  Following The Passage Of The Twenty-First Amendment, New Jersey Adopts The Three-Tier System  New Jersey’s MBPA was designed and enacted to, among other things, preserve the three-tier distribution system governing the sale and distribution of malt alcoholic beverages in this State.  See N.J.S.A. 33:1-93.13(b).  The “three-tier system,” in which brewers sell to wholesalers, wholesalers sell to retailers, and retailers sell to consumers, was conceived to combat many of the evils and wrongdoing that unfolded in the pre-Prohibition and Prohibition eras.
[brief] L. 1993, c. 233, § 1. place during one horrifying period of time, each of defendant's offenses was distinct and independent, with separate criminal objectives.  Defendant could have just burglarized his victim's home, but he did not stop there.  He could have just minimally injured his victim or used minimal force during the course of his theft, but he did not stop there either.  Instead, he escalated his criminality at every step.  When the keys he stole to break in did not work, he rang the doorbell.  When the victim answered, he pushed past her to get into her apartment.  But instead of just continuing on his path to steal her belongings, he viciously beat, strangled, and stabbed her multiple times during the course of his theft.  Thus, while his offenses may have occurred in a single event, [...] correctly found that they were distinct and independent offenses warranting distinct and independent sentences rather than awarding defendant multiple free crimes.
[directive] G.A.G. Attachments (UDRS)  cc: Chief Justice [...]  Trial Court Administrators  Criminal Division Judges  Criminal Division Managers and Assistants  [...], Chief of Staff Vicinage  Chief Probation Officers and Assistants  AOC Directors and Assistant Directors  [...], Chief [...], Special Assistant [...], Assistant Chief [...], Special Assistant [...]  "  PO Box 037 New 08625-0037 - - Uniform  Defendant Intake  Superior Court of New Jersey  I  First Name Last Name Middle Name I I  Also Known As SPN  Driver's Ucense Number ID $Bl# FI D Date of Birth Place of Birth M !Social Security Number Race IAge Height I Distinguishing Marks  I  Hair Color I Eye Color I Weight I I I D  Alien Status Interpreter Needed Language  Other coe~;ip Other Citizenship (Nationality)  OYes 0Nol I  Attorney's Name I Complaint Date Arrest Date  Police Agency of I Court  Filing County I  Initial Bail Type Bail/Release Status Commitment No.  Initial Bail Amount D 10% Cash R0R  Pretrial Release Full Cash/Bond D D D $ D D  Other Bail Full Cash D D  Jail Charges  Indictment/Ace.Number  Complaint Numbers  PROMIS Numbers  Codefendants' Names  Complaint Numbers  PROMIS Numbers  Indictment/Ace.Number 11 1.
[brief] *Id.* at 550.  Defendant’s nephew had pled guilty, and a plea colloquy implicated the defendant.  *Id.* at 551.  The State sought an adverse inference because the nephew did not testify.  *Id.* at 557.  In explaining why the adverse inference should not be used against a criminal defendant, the Court reviewed the circumstances of *State v. Clawans*, 38 N.J. 162 (1962).
[directive] Each of these requests shall contain at a - minimum:  -- a.  Name(s) of of&cer(s)  b.  Social Security Number c.  Title of Officer No. Rev. October Directive 1995 3, 18 of Page 5  8  Dates and Times Officer(s) was/were engaged d. in overtime activity in support of the task force investigation.  e.  Cost per overtime hour for each officer  Total costs being requested for each officer f.  A statement that the documentation is g. "certified as accuratett by a principal officer of the local, county or state law enforcement agency.  Local, county and/or state law enforcement  3 . agencies shall submit requests for reimbursement of expenses, applicable to this policy, on official agency letterhead and include "certified as true" copies of original invoices, statements, bills, etc. to fully document and support the request.  C.  PROGRAM AUDIT