ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Moreover, the court found defendant’s furtive movements holding the fanny pack close to his body and nervousness added to [...]’s reasonable suspicion.  (1T80-5 to 7).  Based on the court’s viewing of [...]’s demonstration on the stand and the body-worn camera, the court emphasized defendant’s position in the front passenger seat “with his arm against his chest as if pressing . . . the fanny pack on his chest.  . . .  [with] his right arm and hand [] elevated a little . . . [and] a cigarette in the right hand. ” (1T75-24 to 76-8).  The court credited [...]’s training and experience, reasonably believing defendant’s pressing down on the bag with his left was an attempt to conceal any bulges in it, and trying to block the officer’s view with his right hand holding the cigarette.  (1T76-9 to 18).  Based on these facts, in their totality, the court found a heightened awareness of danger existed “that would warrant an objectively reasonable officer in securing the scene in a more effective manner by ordering the passenger to leave the car. ” (1T79-13 to 80-15).  The court stressed that it’s not just one thing alone, it’s not just because [[...]] believed the defendant is nervous, it’s not just because [[...]] see the defendant with a fanny pack, it’s not just because [[...]] even that this is a Kia Optima, happens to be in the area where the [CI] reported an individual with a handgun, but viewing it altogether, and as one can see from the video, [[...]] believes that the defendant is armed and dangerous[.] [(1T77-7 to 17).]  The court also concluded [...] lawfully frisked defendant.  (1T81-9 to 16).  Relying on the “detailed tip, [[...]’s] observations of the defendant’s furtive movements, [and [...]’s] view and experience finding the defendant to be nervous” together, under the totality of the circumstances, led to an objectively reasonable basis to believe defendant was armed and dangerous.  (1T81-9 to 16).  Finally, the court found the inventory search of the bag was lawful.\(^3\) (1T81-17 to 82-12).  For all these reasons, the court found the State met its burden by a preponderance of the evidence that defendant was lawfully detained and frisked without a warrant.  (1T82-13 to 17).  On May 26, 2023, [...] heard and denied defendant’s motion to reconsider.
[brief] See plaintiffs' letters attached hereto as Exhibit E. 21.  On October 1, 2021, the parties appeared again before [...] for a case management conference.  [...] requested all parties confer on expert deposition dates in October and reconvene on October 12, 2021.  22.  On October 12, 2021, the parties again appeared before [...].  At the time of the conference, plaintiffs had provided October dates for depositions of its experts but defendants had provided mostly November or December dates for its experts.  [...] extended discovery to December 30, 2021.  Trial was not scheduled but counsel were instructed to agree to dates in March or April.
[brief] ## TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | CASES | PAGE | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | **3805 Kennedy Realty Co. v. Tax Assessor of the City of Jersey City,** | 12, 13 | | 287 N.J. Super. 318 (App. Div. 1996) ........................................... | | **Baskin v. P.C. Richard & Son, LLC,** | 10 | | 246 N.J. 157 (2021) ............................................................................ | | **Branch v. Cream-O-Land Dairy,** | 11 | | 244 N.J. 567 (2021) ............................................................................ | | **Capital Fin. Co. of Delaware Valley, Inc. v. Asterbadi,** | 16, 17| | 398 N.J. Super. 299 (App. Div. 2008) ........................................... | | **Cito v. Bridgewater Twp. Police Dep’t,** | 13 | | 892 F.2d 23 (3d. Cir. 1989) .................................................................. | | **D’Atria v. D’Atria,** | 16 | | 242 N.J. Super. 392 (Ch. Div. 1990) ............................................. | | **De Vesa v. Dorsey,** | 23, 24| | 134 N.J. 420 (1993) ............................................................................ | | **DeNike v. Cupo,** | 20, 21| | 195 N.J. 502 (2008) ............................................................................ | | **Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co. v. Mitchell,** | 24 | | 422 N.J. Super. 214 (App. Div. 2011)
[brief] [...] was caused to fall on March 9, 2020, while a guest of [...].  (Pa38, Deposition of Plaintiff, 54:22-24).  As she attempted to get into a jacuzzi in her room, which proved difficult due to its design, she started to slip and in an attempt to prevent her fall grabbed onto a towel bar.  (Pa45, Deposition of Plaintiff, 74:22-24)  Unfortunately, the towel bar was not a grab bar designed to support a person, and it pulled out of the wall causing [...] to fall, injuring herself.  (Pa50, Deposition of Plaintiff, 81:21-23)  [...], MSCE, PE, a Professional Engineer was deposed on July 17, 2023, and opined that the towel bar qualified as a plumbing fixture and under the International Property Maintenance Code, IPMC 305.5 and 504.1 was defective in its location and installation.  (Pa101, Deposition of [...] 49:15-17 and 52:10-17)  ARGUMENT I.
[brief] Pa009-Pa020.  20.  On November 10, 2020, following oral argument, the Trial Court’s entry of an Order revoking the [...]’ temporary immunity from builder’s remedy actions, finding that:  a.  After the passage of more than five years and concerted procrastination and delay, the Township has not acted, with good faith effort and reasonable speed, to voluntarily achieve constitutional compliance with its Third Round affordable housing obligation; b.  The Township had not acted in good faith, and has, to the contrary, acted in bad faith in its prosecution of this matter; c.  The Township has acted to avoid compliance with its obligation to create a realistic opportunity for the creation of its fair share of the regional need for low- and moderate-income housing, and is this constitutionally non-compliant with its Third Round affordable housing obligation; d.  Builder’s remedy/exclusionary zoning action be and are hereby authorized against the [...].
[brief] (Da 75; Da 76; Da 77-86; Da 87-88)  • [...]’s identification evidence was suspect because part of the August 11, 2017 procedure was unrecorded; she was not instructed not to feel compelled to make an identification; she was aware that law enforcement had had [...] in custody for seventeen months; the administrator was part of the investigation and had interrogated [...]; and he prompted her to identify the person on the [...] footage as a man returning to his residence.  (Da 98; Da 99-138; Da 139-140)  •
[directive] Passive Resistor.  A person who is non-compliant in that they fail to comply in a non-movement way with verbal or other direction from an officer.  Peaceful Demonstration.  A nonviolent assembly of persons organized primarily to engage in free speech activity.  These may be scheduled events that allow for law enforcement planning or spontaneous.  They include, but are not limited to, marches, protests, and other assemblies intended to attract attention.  For purposes of the application of the provisions of this Policy, inmates and detainees in a correctional institution who fail to comply with an order from a correctional police officer shall not be considered peaceful demonstrators.
[brief] (Pa132).  His conclusion that defendant has “adapt[ed]” his approach is born out by the record.  In recent times, defendant stated “I feel like shit every day” (Pca59), “[...] were killed and I’m responsible for their deaths” (5T55:22-23), and “Knowing that I took previous moments away from the [...] will forever tear at my heart” (5T56:12-13).  Yet in his second PCR appeal, he stated unequivocally that he did not kill or intend to kill anyone, that [...] had forced him “to shoot the man (not kill him),” and that [...] was “the only actual killer. ” (Pa119–126).  He even went so far as to disavow his own testimony under oath, in which he admitted that his purpose was to ensure [...] was dead, and that he had taken the gun from [...] voluntarily.  In his third PCR, he continued to maintain that he did not kill [...].  (Pa136).  He also submitted letters from friends and relatives, who claim that he was not responsible for either death, and that he a good person in the wrong place with the wrong people.  (Pa139-152).  It was only after these arguments failed that defendant changed his tune.  The history of this case illustrates the judge’s point that defendant’s good conduct is evidence of adaptation rather than rehabilitation.
[brief] Defendants concede that “[i]n October 1989, [...] amended its by-laws to first impose building height restrictions applicable to the Property. ” (Db22).  (Da491; 618; 642; 650-657).  (emphasis ours)  Further, Defendant cannot point to any height restriction as contained in the Genesis Deed.  In 1989, the club created numerous restrictions including those pertaining to height.  The club went on to subsequently and illegally record a series of “deed restrictions” in 2011.  (Da91).  See also, Plaintiffs’ SOMF(Da0137).
[brief] Changes in the Terms and Conditions of Employment was planned to go into effect and before [...]’s lawsuit (i.e. the First Police Matter).  \(^8\) (28a ¶91 & 23a ¶54).  At the time of their retirements, Plaintiff [...] and Plaintiff [...] had vested property rights to their terminal leave.  Consistent with the reasoning in Caponegro, 330 N.J. Super. at 155 involving a similar state takeover statute, these Plaintiffs are entitled to deferred compensation notwithstanding the State's authority pursuant to the MRSA to prospectively nullify contractual terms.  Based upon the foregoing, the Trial Court erred when it reconsidered Defendants' R. 4:6-2e motion.  ii.  Plaintiffs [...], [...], [...], and [...] retired before the Trial Court lifted its temporary restraints against Defendants on June 7, 2017, which was Defendants' second implementation date.
[brief] ” (2T55-1 to 21; 2T68-8 to 19).  [...] immediately questioned [...] with the purpose of obtaining “[a]ny admissions” he would make to me, including an “honest statement” from him that he had entered Apartment B carrying the duffel bags, despite his denials of both accusatory questions.  (2T20-15 to 20; 3T34-7 to 24).  [...] had [...] open the door to Apt. B using the key the police had found in his pocket upon his arrest, and along with at least 3-4 other officers,\(^9\) including an Illinois DEA agent ([...]) and an Illinois state trooper, took [...] inside where [...] continued questioning [...], who did not volunteer any information.  (3T35-5 to 10).  Many other officers were on the scene, but [...], who intended to obtain [...]’s “consent” to search his apartment, his vehicle and the lockbox he had in his possession, felt that if “there were a lot of us in there,” the “issue of voluntariness would come up. ”  (3T21-21 to 14).  Without any Miranda warning, [...] continued questioning [...] for more than 20 minutes, during which they learned of another residence [...] maintained in Queens, New York with his wife and two young sons; and at the end of which [...] signed four written consent to search forms, for his vehicle; his Ashwood Mall apartment; his lockbox; and his family apartment in Queens, New York.
[brief] The Arbitration Act also permits a reviewing court to set aside an award where an arbitrator “exceeded or so imperfectly executed [his] powers that a mutual, final and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made. ”  *N.J.S.A. 2A:24–8(d)*.  In sum, an arbitrator’s award cannot stand if (1) it does not flow from a reasonably debatable interpretation of the parties’ agreement; (2) the arbitrator failed to follow applicable substantive law; or (3) the arbitrator exceeded the authority provided to him by the parties’ agreement and applicable law.
[brief] SUMMARY  JUDGMENT DISMISSING PLAINTIFF'S RACE AND AGE DISCRIMINATION  CLAIMS [COUNTS I AND IV] WAS WARRANTED BECAUSE SHE CANNOT ESTABLISH (A) SHE WAS PERFORMING HER JOB AT A LEVEL THAT MET HER EMPLOYER'S LEGITIMATE EXPECTATIONS, OR (B) THAT HER NON-RENEWAL OCCURRED UNDER CIRCUMSTANCES THAT GIVE RISE TO AN INFERENCE OF UNLAWFUL DISCRIMINATION.
[brief] By inclusion, the parties, too, acknowledged their belief that use of the 30-day provision was probably a viable term that would be effective to return person back to duty and off the pension payroll under N.J.S.A. 43:16A-8 – a concern noted in Cardinale.  (see Cardinale analysis above at Pb24-Pb28).  Carr is further distinguished from the present action on its facts:
[brief] [Da12-14].  He pointed to the co-defendant’s repeated interruptions while the officer was speaking to defendant, defendant’s nervousness and confusion, and defendant’s evasive answers to the officer’s questions.  [Da13].  [...] held that [...] had probable cause to conduct a warrantless search of the vehicle once the canine indicated that drugs were present in the vehicle.  [Da14].  Therefore, he upheld the search of the vehicle and denied the motion to suppress the stop and subsequent search and seizure of defendant’s vehicle.
[brief] (Pa103-04 at 77:20-78:14).  [...] interviewed each of the staffing coordinators about the charge pay.  [...] was present for various interviews.  (Pa100 at 62:11-63:5).  [...] took detailed notes for each of these interviews.  (Pa537-42).  Neither [...], nor [...], nor [...] dispute the accuracy of [...]’s notes.  (Pa194 at 138:17-140:7; Pa246 at 83:5-84:8; Pa320 at 166:8-167:3).  On September 3, 2020, [...] and [...] met with [...].  (Pa474).  [...] recalled a conversation she had with [...] upon her discovery of their receipt of charge pay.  [...] asked [...] why [...] would be receiving charge pay.  [...] attempted to shift responsibility to management, stating that the “higher uppers” would have more information.  (Pa474).  [...] also met with [...], but [...] did “not know anything about hourly charge. ” (Pa544).  [...] and [...] also met with [...].  (Pa546; Pa100 at 63:4-9).  During their meeting, [...] denied receiving charge pay and explained that none of the staffing coordinators receive hourly charge pay.  (Pa546).  [...] admitted she was working on July 27, 2020—the exact date that the Kronos Time Card Audit Trail reveals her login information was used to enter charge pay on behalf of [...].  (Pa546).  During her interview, [...] never claimed that [...] directly approved her entry or receipt of charge pay.  (Pa546).  And [...] confirmed at her deposition that she had no firsthand knowledge of [...] approving charge pay for any staffing coordinator.  (Pa298 at 80:10-14).  [...] also met with [...].  (Pa548-49).  [...] was aware of the hourly charge in her pay, and acknowledged that she never received confirmation from [...] of its approval.
[brief] Nor does the fact that the trial court noted that [...] was calm and controlled mean that it was somehow inappropriate for him to be found incredible.  People can be calm and untruthful.  There is no law nor edict of common sense that suggests otherwise. \(^4\)  The fact that a prior judge had perceived the video differently is completely irrelevant:  “When more than one reasonable inference can be drawn from the review of a video recording . . . then the one accepted by a trial court cannot be unreasonable[.]”  \textit{State v. S.S.}, 229 N.J. 360, 380 (2017).
[brief] [...]  /s/ [...]  [...], Esquire  Attorney for Defendant  [...]  d/b/a [...]  Original Brief Date: August 30, 2024  Amended Date: September 18, 2024  [...]  Plaintiff, v. ALLSTATES TITLE SERVICE, d/b/a d/b/a ALLSTATE SEARCH AND ABSTRACT CO., INC.  (PA) and [...], Defendants, ________________________________________  [...], Third-Party Plaintiff, v. [...], DECEASED, [...], [...], [...], A MINOR, [...], A MINOR AND A WARD OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY, AND JOHN DOES 1-10, THE UNKNOWN HEIRS OF [...], Third-Party Defendants.
[directive] Ongoing Response to Barricaded Individuals 4.1  Incident Command.  Agencies should use the incident command system.  This will help to ensure that appropriate resources are brought in and that all interests are represented in the decision-making process.  The incident command structure shall include, at a minimum, a tactical team representative, a Crisis Negotiation Team representative, a senior member of the County Prosecutor’s Office command staff, a mental health professional in a consulting role when available, and the incident commander.  Non-operational components of the incident command structure, such as the County Prosecutor’s Office command staff and/or the mental health professional may participate telephonically, when appropriate.  Their absence or delayed response to the scene shall not limit tactics or operations deemed appropriate by the incident commander.  Communication between the tactical team and the Crisis Negotiation Team is critical for the effective operation of the Unified Command.  Communication in real time will permit the incident commander to make appropriate decisions about how to successfully resolve the situation.  4.2
[brief] (Da269)(Da308)  On receipt of Plaintiffs’ amended complaint [...] requested that [...] follow its “Complex Case Rules” and appoint 3 arbitrators, because Plaintiffs’ new claims were monetary and now sought more than the $1 million threshold which a single arbitrator was not allowed to decide.  (Da316-317)  [...] initially granted [...]’s request and advised it would appoint two more arbitrators.  (Da316)  However, [...]’s administrator then decided [...] had “waived” his right to 3.  (Da320)  Despite [...]’s repeated requests that [...] follow its rules governing the parties’ arbitration and show where a waiver had occurred, [...] refused to appoint 3 arbitrators to decide Plaintiffs’ monetary claims.  (Da320-357)  [...] was thus the only arbitrator ever to decide any of the issues in this entire dispute.  He then made several awards for Plaintiffs and against [...] that exceeded $2.5 million.  For example, on January 5, 2018, he voided a documented loan between [...] and [...] for $970,000, even though the loan documents did not provide for arbitration and the loan was not Part of the [...] Operating Agreement.  (Da999)  On July 18, 2018, he entered the Partial Final Award which stripped [...] of $1,000,019 of interests in [...].  (Da131)  His Final Award would later award another $1.1 million against [...].  (Da2209-2223)  In November 2017 the Plaintiffs filed a motion in aid of litigant’s rights contending that [...] had violated the Court’s June 7, 2016, restraint by seeking to remove the case to the Federal District Court in a pro se application, and by filing a claim in the Southern District of New York.
[directive] Page 4 of  At (1)  Applications the Time Sentencing (N.J.S.A. 2A:168A-8(a)) of  If the application sought at the time sentencing, a Certificate may be is if issued the applicant: (a) is a qualified offender, who is being sentenced to a non- incarcerative sentence for a second, third, or fourth degree cnme; or (b) has established that a specific licensing employment disqualification, forfeiture or bar, will apply to the applicant, and may endanger the applicant's ability to maintain existing public employment or employment for which the applicant has made application, or to engage a business enterprise for which in a license or certification is required; ( c) has no pending criminal charges, and there is no information presented that such a charge is imminent; and of ( d) has established that issuance a Certificate is consistent with the public interest.
[brief] He alleged that his counsel advised him it was better to not file motions and he challenged the credibility of the witnesses’ testimony.  [16T24-24 to 26-22].  Defendant denied being in the Willingboro area at the time of the murder and denied any responsibility or involvement in the crime.  [16T27-6 to 28-2].  The court found aggravating factors 3, 6 and 9.  [16T32-21 to 33-6].  For Count Two, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(b)(4)(g), [...] sentenced defendant to life in prison without the possibility of parole.
[brief] LEGAL ARGUMENTS POINT I THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DETERMINED THAT THE COUNTY’S REJECTION OF [...]’S BID WAS IMPROPER AND THAT THE ANTICIPATED CONTRACT SHOULD HAVE BEEN AWARDED TO [...] AS LOWEST RESPONSIVE BIDDER (1T55-68); 3T30-34;45-52)  The trial court correctly determined that the County’s rejection of [...]’s bid was improper and that the Anticipated Contract should have been awarded to [...] as the lowest responsive bidder.  In reaching this conclusion, the trial court correctly found (on two separate occasions) that: (i) the Notice of Classification is non-mandatory; (ii) [...]’s trivial omission of the Notice of Classification from its bid is non-material and waivable; and (iii) the County’s failure to waive [...]’s immaterial omission of the Notice of Classification was improper because it deprived the taxpayers of thousands of dollars in savings without a sound business reason for doing so.  Because the trial court’s decisions were correctly made and well-supported by law, they should be affirmed and [...]’s Appeal should be denied.
[brief] ii.  **Count  One fails to state a claim for a CEPA violation because N.J.A.C. § 10:44A-2.8(b) cannot provide the basis for a “reasonable belief” that Defendants were violating a law, rule, regulation or public policy. **  Appellant alleges that Appellees did not have a policy in place regarding the proper ratio of staff members to individuals at its group homes, that she first became aware of this issue when several of her coworkers were forced to work alone, caring up to four individuals at once, and that “[s]he reasonably believed this policy to be in violation of N.J.A.C. § 10:44A-2.8(b).
[brief] The Board relies upon its initial brief’s Procedural History and Statement of Facts but briefly notes the following misrepresentations in Plaintiffs’ brief regarding the Revised Policy: (1) it “out[s] all LGBTQ+ minors” (Pb44); (2) “students’ gender identity or sexual orientation … [is] a key factor” in the Revised Policy (Pb2); (3) “LGBTQ+ students were singled out for parental notification” (Pb16); and (4) the Policy mandates notification by non-certificated staff (Pb10, 18).  Each misrepresentation is refuted by the plain text of the Policy (Da110, 112).  Plaintiffs further represent that [...]’s “policy inspired similar policies by other school boards” (Pb42) with absolutely no supporting reference in the record.  Finally, Plaintiffs mischaracterize the trial judge’s order as “narrow” and as “exclusively focused on communications from the school based on a protected characteristic” (Pb39, 41, 42, 48-50) when -- in fact -- it enjoins a neutral policy wholesale (Da394).  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO ANALYZE WHETHER PLAINTIFFS ASSERTED A SETTLED LEGAL RIGHT (Da393-417)  Plaintiffs err in asserting that the courts merged “the well-settled legal right and reasonable probability of success…prongs” (Pb27).  Under Crowe, these are discrete prongs.  Crowe v. De Gioia, 90 N.J. 126, 133 (1982).  See also Garden State Equality v. Dow, 216 N.J. 314, 325 (2013) (“Crowe … requires the State to show that its legal right is settled”).  Plaintiffs cannot point to any well-settled right, but only a generalized reference to the LAD (Pb28-29) which cannot override constitutional parental authority over one’s children.  Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 638 (1979); H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 410 (1981).  Plaintiffs adduce no case law for the proposition that it is a LAD violation to notify parents of situations adversely impacting their children whenever LGBTQ+ status is incidentally involved.  Rather, “this is a difficult and complex area of the law that continues to develop. ”  Ricard v. USD 475 Geary County, KS Sch. Bd., 2022 WL 1471372, at *10 (D. Kansas May 9, 2022).  Plaintiffs’ inability to adduce supporting LAD precedent bars injunctive relief under Crowe which held that the legal right therein was settled given pertinent precedent.  Crowe, 90 N.J. at 133 (“the underlying legal claim … was settled as a matter of law in Kozlowski v. Kozlowski”).