ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Therefore, any member of the public would be able to discern the location of the Municipal Offices if they were to go to the [...] address as the new address is clearly posted.  (2T 19:1-19).  The notice further identifies that the application is for Block 1, Lots 7, 10, and 19.02 as shown on the [...] tax map and is located at [...] and [...], [...], [...], [...].  The notice states that the applicant is seeking Board approval of this major preliminary and final site plan with variances.  The notice specifies that the site plan includes three structures which will house a total of 17 residential townhomes.  The notice identifies that the applicant seeks the following variances: Front yard setback on Porter Avenue, front yard setback on Ocean Terrace, height, lot area/unit, meaning per unit.  (Pa31; 1T 9:9-10:15).
[brief] ................................................................................................................................. 7, 10 - **Morel v. State Farm Insurance Company**, 396 N.J. Super. 472 (App. Div. 2007)  ..9 - **Mt. Hope Dev. Associates. v. Mt. Hope Waterpower Project, L.P.**, 154 N.J. 141 (1998)  ................................................................................................................................. 8, 9 - **N.J. Citizens Underwriting Reciprocal Exch. v. Kieran Collins, D.C., L.L.C.**, 399 N.J. Super. 40 (2008)  .................................................................................................................. 7  N.J. Transit Bus Operations, Inc. v. Amalgamated Transit Union, 187 N.J. 546 (2006)  .................................................................................................................. 16  New Jersey Manufacturers Ins. Co. v. Specialty Surgical Ctr. of N. Brunswick, 458 N.J. Super. 63 (App. Div. 2019) .............................................................................. 7, 9, 11  Ocean Cape Hotel Corp. v. Masefield Corp., 63 N.J. Super. 369 (App. Div. 1960)  .................................................................................................................................  13  Open MRI & Imaging of Rochelle Park v. Mercury Ins. Grp., 421 N.J. Super. 160 (App. Div. 2011)  ...........................................................................................................  10, 11 Riverside Chiropractic Grp. v. Mercury Ins. Co., 404 N.J. Super. 228 (App. Div. 2008) ...............................................................................................................................  10, 11  Triffin v. Am. Int’l Group, Inc., 372 N.J. Super. 517 (App. Div. 2004) .....................  13  U.S. Pipe & Foundry Co. v. Am. Arbitration Assoc., 67 N.J. Super. 384 (App. Div. 1961) ...............................................................................................................................  13 Statutes Alternative Procedures for Dispute Resolution Act (“APDRA”), N.J.S.A. 2A:23A-1 to -19 .................................................................................................................... passim N.J.S.A. 2A:23A-13(b) ........................................................................................................
[brief] [...]’s (“[...]’s” or “Defendant’s”) ostrich in the sand approach to its legal obligations led to the tragic death of [...].  [...] does not dispute that it knew about the faulty electrical panel box which ultimately caused [...]’s demise.  Furthermore, [...] does not dispute that it consciously chose to take no action despite this known and appreciable danger.  Instead, [...] attempts to evade liability for its nonfeasance by claiming that it had no duty to act.  [...]’s argument is unavailing and relies upon misapplied case law and a distorted factual picture which overlooks [...]’s ability to ameliorate this appreciable danger well in advance of [...]’s death.  As [...] knew, or should have known, about the defective electrical panel box prior to leasing the property located at [...] (the “Property”), and did nothing to ameliorate this known danger, [...] should not be permitted to evade liability for the consequence of its inaction.  Imposing a duty of care on [...] for the electrical panel box comports with notions of basic fairness and public policy and will help ensure that incidents like the one that caused [...]’s tragic death are prevented rather than encouraged.  Accordingly, given the facts of this case, the underlying law, and considerations of basic public policy, the grant of Summary Judgment to [...] must be reversed and this matter must be permitted to proceed to trial.  LEGAL ARGUMENT
[brief] Even if a prospective buyer’s prior knowledge of a ROFR was necessary to a bona fide offer being “bona fide”, there is a serious question of fact as to whether [...] was aware of the ROFR due to the MFSA being provided to them as part of the PSA signed on October 14, 2022.  Da58.  The Trial Court further, latches onto a letter from April of 2023 from the third-party buyer’s attorney and misinterprets it to mean that the third-party buyer, even at that time, was not aware of the ROFR.
[brief] Underlying the entirety of [...]’s suit is the unfounded assertion that the Council is a private entity or controlled by a private entity, the [...], and --- \(^4\)  While the dismissal of the entire Complaint on the merits should be affirmed, this suit is also procedurally defective.  Dismissal under Rule 2:2-3 would have been appropriate to the extent [...] is effectively appealing agency rulemaking.  The State Defendants also argued below that any challenge to the Council’s agency decision to adopt the 2022 CBBMP can only be maintained (with minor exceptions not applicable here) in the Appellate Division.  R. 2:2-3; see, e.g., Infinity Broad. Corp. v. N.J. Meadowlands Comm’n, 187 N.J. 212, 225 (2006); Prado v. State, N.J. Dep’t of Labor, 186 N.J. 413, 421 (2006).  The Appellate Division’s exclusive jurisdiction does not turn on the theory of the challenging party’s claim or the nature of the relief sought even if a plaintiff frames the challenge as a request for declaratory judgment, as in the present case.  Beaver v. Magellan Health Servs. Inc., 433 N.J. Super. 430, 442-43 (App. Div. 2013).  that authority delegated to the Council is therefore improper.  (Pa1-11 ¶¶ 1, 3, 16, 35, 41; Pb17-37).  However, *Humane Soc’y of U.S., N.J. Branch, Inc. v. N.J. State Fish & Game Council*, 70 N.J. 565 (1976), and other cases firmly establish that the Council is neither a private entity nor controlled by one.
[brief] Appellant’s responsibilities for Respondent [...] included causing all taxes, including payroll taxes to be paid.  (Pa723:198:4-25).  Appellant caused [...] to be delinquent on its federal payroll tax obligations starting with the second quarter of 2017 (April-June).  (Pa723: 99:1-18).  In July of 2017, according to Appellant, the amount owed to [...] through the JPA Loan was $41,076.21.  (Pa725:207:3-9).  In August of 2017, Appellant caused payments to be made from [...] to [...] increasing the amount owed to $96,013.18.  (Pa725:208:13-25).  Appellant also caused [...]’s tax delinquency to increase during the third quarter (July-September) of 2017.  (Pa726:209:6-9).  In September of 2017, Appellant caused payments to be made from [...] to [...] increasing the amount owed to $209,884.74.  (Pa726:209:13-16).  In November of 2017, Appellant had caused [...] to be delinquent on its federal payroll tax obligations from the second and third quarters of 2017.  (Pa723:199:1-18).  To Appellant’s knowledge, in November of 2017, [...] was behind in its payroll obligations by approximately $300,000.  (Pa723:200:6-17).  Appellant did not bring the tax delinquency to the attention of anyone at [...] or [...].  (Pa725: 208:9-12).  During the period he maintained sole control of [...]’s bank accounts, Appellant failed to pay over $650,000 in payroll taxes for [...].
[brief] Only R. 1:10-2 could have, as a contempt of court decision.  Under R. 1:10-3, monetary awards are only allowed if, “fashioned in an amount sufficient to sting and force compliance, but must not be so excessive as to constitute ruinous punishment.  East Brunswick Bd. of Educ. v. East Brunswick Educ. Ass'n, 235 N.J. Super. 417, 422 (App. Div. 1989).  In fact, the Chancery Court’s reliance on Franklin Tp. Bd. of Educ. v. Quakertown Educ. Ass'n, 274 N.J. Super. 47, 54 (App. Div. 1994), for its enormous and punitive sanction is ironic.  That case actually prohibited what the Court did here.
[directive] Approval of the Expungement  If granted, a copy of the signed Expungement Order shall be forwarded by the Superior Court to the prosecutor and, if applicable, to the appropriate Municipal Court.  The prosecutor must promptly distribute copies of the Expungement Order to the appropriate law enforcement agencies and correctional institutions who have custody and control of the records specified in the order.  See N.J.S.A. 2C:52-6a(4).  B.
[brief] [...] Cannot Show that Defendants’ Legitimate, Non-Retalatory Reason for Terminating Her was Pretext.  Following an employer’s proffer of a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for an employee’s termination, “plaintiff has the ultimate burden of proving that the employer’s proffered reasons were a pretext for the discriminatory action taken by the employer. ”  Allen v. Cape May Cty., 246 N.J. 275, 291 (2021) (quoting Kolb v. Burns, 320 N.J. Super. 467, 478 (App. Div. 1999)).  At this stage of the McDonnell-Douglas burden-shifting framework, a plaintiff cannot survive a motion to dismiss unless the plaintiff presents “evidence which: 1) casts sufficient doubt upon each of the legitimate reasons proffered by the defendant so that a factfinder could reasonably conclude that each reason was a fabrication; or 2) allows the factfinder to infer that discrimination was more likely than not a motivating or determinative cause of” adverse employment action.
[brief] 1-10, in Their Corporate Capacity and as to the Principles and Owners Individually (Names Being Fictitious and Unknown but Described as Corporate or Individual Owner(s), Manager(s), Lessor(s), Supervisor(s), Who Had Control of the Premises  Located at [...], Who Contributed to the March 16, 2017 Loss), Defendants-Respondents.  #  TABLE OF CONTENTS | Section | Page | |------------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | TABLE OF JUDGMENTS | ii | | TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | iii | | TABLE OF TRANSCRIPTS | vi | | PRELIMINARY STATEMENT | 1 | | PROCEDURAL HISTORY | 4 | | STATEMENT OF FACTS | 10 | | ARGUMENT | 14 | | Introduction | 14 | | POINT I | | | THE LEASE AGREEMENTS PLACED THE TENANT DEFENDANTS UNDER A DUTY TO CLEAR SNOW AND ICE FROM THE LOCATION WHERE [...] WAS INJURED [Raised at Pa594-1040; Decided at Pa1-2] | 16 | | A.  Article 3 of the Leases | 20 | | B. “Adjacent” to the “Premises” | 20 | | C. Article 17 and the So-Called “Common Area Charges” | 23 | | POINT II | | | THE LAW DIVISION ERRED BY HOLDING THERE WAS NO COMMON LAW DUTY TO MAINTAIN [Raised At Pa549-1040; Decided at Pa1-2] | 26 | | POINT III | | | THE LAW  DIVISION SHOULD HAVE GRANTED  PARTIAL SUMMARY  JUDGMENT TO PLAINTIFFS  [Raised at Pa548-1040; Decided at Pa1-2] | 31 | | CONCLUSION | 33
[brief] The *Teston* opinion went on to say that:  These decisions and advisory opinions also make clear that the use of a disclaimer does not give a school board official carte blanche to then discuss Board business and/or matters in a way that is, or appears to be, on behalf of the Board.  Ibid.  Here, Respondent's Facebook posts did nothing of the kind; they did not discuss business of the Board and do not appear to be posted on behalf of the Board.  By contrast, the respondent board of education member in Teston wrote an op-ed article that endorsed four candidates for election to the board while criticizing complainant, another candidate for election to the board, and contending that she should not be elected.  Id. at 1, 2-3.  The Commission observed that "the power of Board-backed non-endorsement of a candidate cannot be denied."  Id. at 11.  Complainants also rely on Public Advisory Opinion-A202-22 dated February 25, 2022 (Ca233-Ca235) Cb28-Cb29, Cb30-Cb31.
[directive] Complaints may also be received from other law enforcement agencies, such as neighboring municipal police agencies, the County Prosecutors, the Division of Criminal Justice or federal law enforcement agencies.  Those complaints should be forwarded to internal affairs for immediate investigation.  In some jurisdictions, law enforcement agencies may be subject to the oversight of a civilian review board authorized to accept complaints directly from members of the public.  If a civilian review board refers a complaint to a law enforcement agency, then those complaints should be forwarded to internal affairs for immediate investigation.  5.1.10
[brief] To the extent that the State asserts one of [...]’s failures relative to T&E is its failure to raise more local tax revenue to help to support its public schools, there are three answers: (i) state statutes both cap a district’s capacity to increase local taxes and explicitly preclude some increases in local taxation from being used for T&E purposes; (ii) the only time that the State, through its State monitors in 2014, required [...] to increase local tax revenue, the district complied— otherwise the most the State did was to “suggest” that [...] consider increasing its local taxes; and (iii) the capacity of [...] to increase its local taxes, even to the level of its LFS, is unclear since it is regularly listed as one of New Jersey’s poorest municipalities, with the highest percentage of residents living in poverty, more than 39%.  As to the last point, see https://www.app. com/story/news/local/2024/07/14/new-jersey-most-least-livable-small-cities-ranking-smartasset/74381963007/  6  This is the only reference in the State’s brief to Robinson v. Cahill, proof positive that the State has totally ignored our argument about the State having ultimate responsibility for T&E, which derives from the first New Jersey Supreme Court opinion in Robinson in April 1973 and has been a core principle of the State’s jurisprudence ever since.
[brief] 1  II.  STATEMENT OF FACTS ...............................................................................................  8  III.  ARGUMENT ..................................................................................................................  15  A.  The Trial Court erred as a matter of law dismissing all counts of plaintiff’s complaint on summary judgment where genuine issues of material fact were found to exist as to the application of the Consumer Fraud Act and the Trial Court afforded no deference to Plaintiff, the non-moving party, on the issue of damages.  (Pa77; (April 4, 2022))  ......................... ...... 15  B.  The Trial Court abused its discretion by entering judgment against the weight of the evidence.(Pa98; (September 14, 2023)).  ......................................................... .........  28  IV.  CONCLUSION  ..............................................................................................................
[brief] Specifically, Connecticut has both the Debt Adjusting Law, Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. §§ 36a-655 to 36a-665, and Debt Negotiations Law, Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. §§ 36a-671 to 36a-671(f).  Both statutes have separate attorney exemption provisions.  Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 36a–663; § 36a-671(c).  The subject of the Persels case was the attorney exemption in the Debt Negotiations Law, Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 36a-671(c), and not the Debt Adjusting Law.
[brief] Ibid.  Here, when the correct standard under Pukowsky is applied to [...], none of the above-listed factors support that [...] was her employer – or joint employer.  Chrisanthis v. County of Atlantic, 361 N.J. Super. 448, 454-467 (App. Div. 2003) (held that a plaintiff must establish the Pukowsky factors as to both purported employers).
[brief] Furthermore, as [...] testified, the University informed students through almost every mode of communication that the dual degree program required a 3.0 GPA.  Specifically, he testified that a student would know of the 3.0 GPA requirement through the website, student manuals and documents, presentations and open houses, a Beyond the Curriculum course (which all pharmacy students, including Plaintiff, were required to take), orientation, and in a document circulated to all students highlighting the curriculum for the eight Master’s programs.  Plaintiff is the only student who failed to comprehend through the multiple oral and written communications to him that he needed to maintain a 3.0 GPA to participate in the dual degree program.  Consequently, even if an omission could constitute a fraud (which it cannot), here, the correction before Plaintiff started classes negates any actionable claim.  Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims for fraud and misrepresentation were properly dismissed, on their merits, by the Trial Court.
[brief] Plaintiff told [...] that “he struck his left elbow and knee, but did not hit his head and did not have any loss of consciousness. ”  (5T17-7 to 18)(emphasis added)  [...]’s records were contrary to what Plaintiff reported to [...], i.e, that he hit his head on the ground.  (5T17-23 to 24)  [...] explained that Meniere’s disease is a chronic process, there is no cure, and that it typically goes through several worsening stages, and in some people, like Plaintiff, it requires surgical intervention to relieve the symptoms.
[brief] On March 12, 2020, text messages were exchanged in a group text between Plaintiff, [...], [...] and [...].  Pa205-206, PSOF ¶39.  Defendant admitted to the exchange of these texts.  •  In a text from [...] asked, “How is it going?” to which Plaintiff responded in part “…trying to manage my own coronavirus anxiety”.  Id.  •  In that same group text chain Plaintiff again mentioned her anxiety relating to Covid-19 stating, “I’m having anxiety”.  Id.  •  In this text conversation [...] asked “Have you all spoken to [[...]] about this?  Do you need me to?  I am happy to do so.  I can make your concerns known.  I just need to know them. ”  Plaintiff responded, “We are all very scared and anxious. ”  Id.  Plaintiff also engaged in a private text communication with [...] on or about March 12, 2020.
[brief] Pavement markings and signage was also present throughout the parking lot where required.  However, neither stop signs nor stop lines were required to be placed at the ends of drive aisles intersecting other drive aisles by any absolute engineering standard.  Rather, their use was subject to engineering judgment or preference (or in some case, zoning laws).(Da26-Da27, §2.1.3 Pavement Markings and Signage).  In this case, views of the still photos of the site of the accident show that it should be inherently obvious to motorists approaching the intersection that they have reached the end of the aisle's travelway and must operate their vehicle in a safe manner consistent with the possibility of oncoming or conflicting traffic along the intersecting aisle and pedestrians walking from their parked cars.
[brief] [...] I did not address the adverse consequences arising from the filing of a prerogative writ action within a 20 days statutory estoppel period.  [...] I did not address [...] v. [...], 455 N.J. Super (App. Div. 2018).  [...] I did not address a [...] urban renewal entity long term tax exemption that agreed with plaintiff’s legal analysis.  (Pa507).  [...] I did not address the [...]’s refusal to fund a [...] contested [...] City non-urban renewal entity [...] long term tax exemption project.  (Pa370, Pa375).  [...] I involved a [...] (and not a [...]) non-urban renewal entity [...] Section 37 long term tax exemption.
[brief] The category of [...]’s work was not grounds for a denial of coverage.  [...] having some “exclusive” right to unenroll parties from the CCIP amounts to nothing more than a red herring, and the trial court’s emphasis on this fact led it to the incorrect conclusion that [...] had “no contract” with [...] or [...].  Pa2739.  No matter [...]’s role, [...] was still insured under the CCIP and subject to its coverage and all the protections afforded to an insured at the time of enrollment, including notice of cancellation.  [...] was certainly not authorized to cancel a subcontractor’s insurance on behalf of the insurer without notifying the subcontractor.  In any event, [...]’s Contractor Enrollment Form described its work as “concrete cutting,” not demolition.
[brief] 10  https://www.merriam-webster. com/dictionary/revenue (last visited June 20, 2024)  ...........................................................................  4  Random House Dictionary of the English Language (1966)  ......................... 4  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Revenue (last visited June 20, 2024)  ...........................................................................  4  This brief is submitted by Appellant, [...], in reply to the response briefs filed by Respondents, [...] and the [...], in this matter.
[brief] It remains the proper analysis of law here that the Chancery Court should not have imposed any discount to fair value, particularly not for oppression, where any and all damages for that same conduct had previously been remedied.  (Da3204)  The Court’s 35% discount to fair value here doubly punished [...] for the same conduct and should be reversed on this Court’s de novo review.  Sipko, supra.  V. PLAINTIFFS’ ARGUMENTS REGARDING THE $503,000 SANCTION CONFLATE FACTS AND TIMELINES AND IGNORE THE POINTS
[brief] The Trial Court here overlooked [...]’s critical admissions, made in its response to Plaintiff’s Statement of Undisputed Material Facts in Support of His Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, that: (i) “No money or any other thing of value was transferred, released, or exchanged as a result of the resolutions” adopted December 19, 2019: and (ii) “The resolutions . . . did not, and did not purport to, alter or affect any legal rights or claims that [...] then held vis à vis any person. ”  Pa455 ¶¶ 18–19; Pa1041 ¶¶18–19.  In its reply brief below, [...] asserted that there were *factual* distinctions between the present case and *Pharmacists*, but [...] has never argued that the *legal standard* articulated in *Pharmacists* was satisfied in this case.
[brief] Following removal from state court, the university moved to dismiss.  The District of New Jersey, applying the Beukas standard described above, determined that the university acted in “good faith” and dealt fairly with its students by transitioning to virtual classes in response to COVID-19 pandemic.  Thus, the university did not breach any purported contract.  Dougherty, 534 F. Supp. 3d at 374.  In the instant case, Plaintiff-Appellant seeks to have the Court recognize an “implied” contract between himself and [...].
[brief] Because the trial court’s grant of summary judgment is reviewed de novo on appeal and the entirety of the summary judgment pleadings were attached to Appellant’s Brief (from which the Appellate Division can reach its own conclusions), this Reply does not address the trial court’s findings point-by-point.  However, several key conclusions were reached improperly by the court below with regard to the facts alleged in the pleadings and the conclusions drawn from them, which merit special attention:  A.
[brief] III.  THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS APPLICATION OF THE STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR A MOTION TO DISMISS BROUGHT PURSUANT TO R. 4:6-2(e) (Pa54-Pa55; Pa62)  R. 4:6-2 permits a defendant to move for dismissal of the Complaint in lieu of filing an Answer where one or more of six specific defenses are applicable.  Id.  Failure of the plaintiff to state a claim upon which relief can be granted is one such defense.  See R. 4:6-2(e).  However, a motion to dismiss filed during the early stages of the litigation requires the court to proceed with caution and it is only in the rarest of instances where such a motion should be granted.