ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Respectfully submitted, /s/ [...]  [...], Esq.  For the Firm  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY  APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. [...] CIVIL ACTION ON APPEAL FROM SUPERIOR COURT, CHANCERY DIVISION  CAMDEN COUNTY  Honorable [...], J.S.C.  Sat Below: Docket No: [...] PLAINTIFF  [...]’S REPLY
[brief] I, ¶ 7 | 9 | | N.J. Const. art. I, ¶ 10 | 20, 21 | | U.S. Const. amend. IV | 9 | | U.S. Const. amend. VI | 20, 21 | | U.S. Const. amend. XIV | 20, 21 | PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[brief] The Court took into consideration that pursuant to the certified criminal record, codefendant [...]’s last conviction was in September of 2018, which was fifteen (15) months prior to the subject accident.  Co-defendant [...]’s deposition was taken in October of 2022, which was just shy of four (4) years since his last conviction.  The trial took place five (5) years after codefendant [...]’s conviction.  The Court specifically reference that N.J.R.E. 609(b)(1) did not apply as co-defendant [...]’s conviction was within ten years of the start of the trial.
[brief] ”  State v. Peterkin, 226 N.J. Super. 25, 38 (App. Div.) certif. denied 114 N.J. 295 (1988) (citation and punctuation omitted).  “Dismissal is the most severe sanction a court can impose; it is to be used with the greatest caution and deliberation. ”  State v. Montijo, 320 N.J. Super. 483, 490 (Law. Div. 1998).  “[D]ismissal is the last resort because the public interest, the rights of victims and the integrity of the criminal justice system are at stake.
[brief] CASES:  Miller v. United States  357 U.S. 301 (1958)  .......................5  State v. Candelaria, 311 N.J. Super. 437 (App. Div. 1998)  .......12  State v. Case, 220 N.J. 49 (2014).................................12  State v. Denmon 347 N.J. Super 457 (App. Div. 2002)  ............13 State v. Elders, 192 N.J. 224, (2007).............................  5 State v. Hodge, 95 N.J. 369 (1984) ..............................13  State v. Natale, 184 N.J. 458 (2005) ............................13 State v. Robinson, 200 N.J. 1 (2009) .............................5  STATUTES  N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5B(1) ..................................................2 N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)  ..................................................13  STATEMENT OF PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[brief] Speaking of the breaker box that controlled the circuit on which the decedent was working, he said:  A.  This sticks in my memory because it says emergency, something like emergency light trailer dock, but that circuit also on that circuit unbeknownst to anybody else, and I found out the hard way, it also controlled a light in GP's office.  Bear with me.  Because one time when we were – they were working on it.  [...] came out and he said we have to look at a light in [...]'s office it won't work.  I have changed the bulbs and everything.  Lo and behold a major repair on the emergency light went over and turned the breaker on and [...]'s light worked.  That's what I remember.
[directive] SUPPLEMENTAL QUESTIONS  Counsel shall be encouraged to submit relevant supplemental questions for the court's consideration at the pre-voir dire conference; the judge shall review all proposed questions and determine whether to include each one, setting forth the determination on the record.  Supplemental questions are those not included in the model questions but relevant to the particular trial, including questions about trial issues, the parties, or other relevant issues.  Supplemental questions should be submitted in writing and discussed and ruled upon at the pre-voir dire conference.  R. 1:8-3(f).  See also R. 4:25-7(b) (requiring in civil trials written submission of proposed voir dire questions.)
[brief] Da110-12.  On September 13, 2023, the Chancery Court conducted a hearing on Appellants Motion and, [...] again benefited from her filing in the Chancery Court when it kept the temporary restraints in place pending the September 22, 2023 return date.  Da175-76.  On September 8, 2023, Appellants filed a proposed Order to Show Cause seeking to disqualify [...] (“[...]”) from representing [...] based on its prior representation of [...].
[brief] (Pa55 to Pa58).  Contrary to Plaintiff’s arguments on appeal, the lower court properly assessed the evidentiary record and was correct to dismiss Count I of the First Amended Complaint.  In its Order and Decision, the lower court correctly identified the two conditions provided by the LRHL for the acceptance of a negotiated payment by a redeveloper.  The lower court was correct that a negotiated payment must defray the costs of the redevelopment entity and, moreover, carry out and effectuate the purposes of the LRHL and a redevelopment plan.  The lower court also correctly identified from the record that the Redevelopment Payment satisfied these two conditions.  The LRHL explicitly authorizes various actions that a “municipality or designated redevelopment entity” may pursue in order to effectuate a development plan.
[brief] For all the foregoing reasons, the [...] respectfully ask this Court to affirm [...]’s order dismissing the Amended Complaint with prejudice.  Respectfully Submitted, [...] /s/ [...], Esq.  [...], Esq.  [...], Esq.  Attorneys for Defendants, [...], [...], and Marshall Dennehey  Warner Coleman & Goggin, P.C.  Dated: August 3, 2023  MARSHALL DENNEHEY BY: [...], Esquire - NJ Attorney ID No. 263721970  [...] [...], [...]  TELEPHONE: [...]  FAX: [...]  Email: [...]  Attorney for Defendants/Respondents, [...], Esquire & [...]  [...] [...], [...], [...], and [...]
[brief] (1T7-4 to 13; 1T14-2 to 11; 1T15-3 to 4).  Having conducted approximately one hundred surveillance operations from that location in the past, he was aware that the parking lot was frequently used to conduct narcotics-related transactions.  (1T12-4 to 8; 1T13-3 to 7).  While parked in the lot, he noticed a newer-model Jeep Grand Cherokee parked next to a sedan with a male, later identified as defendant, standing outside of it speaking to the female driver through the passenger-side window.  (1T16-15 to 20; 1T31-16 to 20; 1T32-17 to 18).  [...] had never seen defendant before and did not know him, nor is there any testimony that he recognized his vehicle.  (1T17-13 to 18; 1T36-12 to 14).  The conversation between defendant and the woman lasted no more than a few minutes.  (1T34-22 to 24).  Defendant then walked over to another vehicle, a Dodge Ram, that was parked on the opposite side of defendant’s vehicle while the woman in the sedan drove away.  (1T16-15 to 17; 1T18-7 to 16).
[directive] A copy of the decision and accompanying findings and conclusions shall be delivered to the officer or employee who was the subject of the hearing and to the law enforcement executive (if he or she was not the hearing officer) for the imposition of discipline.  Upon completion of the hearing, internal affairs will complete all required forms (Civil Service Commission jurisdictions use the Final Notice of Disciplinary Action form DPF-31C), including the entry of the disposition in the index file.  If the charges were sustained, internal affairs will cause the penalty to be carried out.  Documentation of the charge and the discipline shall be permanently placed in the officer's or employee's personnel file.
[brief] [...] had worked with the defendant for “[q]uite a few years” and would see him “[m]aybe three or four” times per week.  [...] estimated that he has seen the defendant “[a] couple thousand times, probably. ”  As such, when later shown the tavern’s surveillance video by manager [...], [...] recognized defendant, based not only upon the way defendant looks, but also the way he walks.  (8T:49-24 to 58-3; 61-5 to 63-11).  [...] of the [...] arrived at [...] approximately 10 minutes after defendant left.  Sergeant Morgan learned that the “suspicious person” reported to have been in the tavern was wearing dark sunglasses, a dark wool hat, and a white shirt, and had a beard.  [...] told the sergeant that, “The subject … appeared to know his way around the area. ”  With this information, Sergeant Morgan put out a BOLO, or “be on the lookout,” for a man matching this description to neighboring towns.  (7T:54-6 to 54-21; 60-19 to 82-4; 8T:5-2 to 40-6).  Police altered [...], [...]’s son and a tavern manager, about the reported suspicious person.
[directive] Entiendo que tengo 5 anos a partir de Ia fecha de hoy para presentar una solicitud de asistencia despues de Ia condena a menos que 3:22-12, corresponda una excepci6n a esta regia general, segun se expone en R.  Time Limits To File a Petition for Post-Conviction Relief.  I understand that I have 5 years from today's date to file a petition for post-conviction relief, unless an exception to this genera! rule applies, as set forth in 3:22-12.  R. 5.  Comparezco hoy ante el juez ___________ para Ia imposici6n de Ia sentencia.  am appearing before Judge for sentencing today.
[brief] Pa000017-18, 26-29.  While prior courts held that the MSRA does permit the modification of labor contracts and expired labor contracts, Defendants have never previously relied on this authority, and cannot rely on this authority, to avoid paying wages which have been earned and owed.  The Trial Court incorrectly found that the Implementation Memo and Settlement Agreement modified the MOAs and responsibility to pay accrued earned wages from the respective 2016 promotion dates until the Implementation Memo was in effect.
[brief] To be sure, the rule in contract cases addressing less certain and more difficult-to-predict questions like consequential damages or lost profits, where damages are not a liquidated sum or readily ascertainable, may well be different.  But the Supreme Court has repeatedly reaffirmed that where damages are “capable of ascertainment” on a breach of contract claim, pre-judgment interest should be awarded.  *E.g.*, Meshinsky v. Nichols Yacht Sales, Inc., 110 N.J. 464, 471, 478 (1988).  The Court even acknowledged a loosening of the rigidity that existed prior to cases like Rova Farms in favor a more equitable approach that accounts for the plaintiffs’ loss of use and enjoyment of the funds.  Id. at 478 (acknowledging that the earlier stricter standards for awarding interest had been “significantly eroded”).  Finally, [...] chastises the Plaintiffs for failing to cite to case law where a court calculated prejudgment interest under R. 4:42-11 from the date of the defendants’ misappropriation of funds.
[directive] Seized currency shall forwarded to the custodian, no later than forty-eight hours of seizure.  The agency shall estabiish procedures the security of currency coins seized, prior to and for these being forwarded to the designated custodian.  Upon transfer of the submitting officers shall sign the United States Currency funds, Seizure Report and include their badge number and date.  custodian of the funds shall also sign this form and return a copy to officers.  the first no Seized currency shall be deposited later than the business day after receipt by the designated custodian.  The deposit slip shall be attached to the remaining copy and forwarded to the county the or of treasurer the individual designated by the agency executive municipal law enforcement agency.  The seizing officer's copy shall - or be matched to the submitting officer's copy by the county treasurer - an individual designated the agency executive and any by discrepancies be immediately reported to the county prosecutor shall and the Division of Criminal Justice.
[brief] In or around June 2008, [...] approached [...] and requested a loan for $330,000.  3T135:5-16.  During the drafting of documents for the $330,000 loan from the Steven J. [...] Retirement Plan, [...] advanced --- 3  “Da” shall refer to Defendants’ Appendix.  “1T” shall refer to Volume 1 of the June 6, 2023 trial transcript.  “2T” shall refer to Volume 2 of the June 6, 2023 trial transcript.  “3T” shall refer to Volume 1 of the June 7, 2023 trial transcript.  “4T” shall refer to Volume 2 of the June 7, 2023 trial transcript.  “5T” shall refer to the June 15, 2023 trial transcript.  “6T” shall refer to the September 5, 2023 transcript.  to [...] a separate personal loan in the amount of $50,000 (the “$50,000 Loan”).  3T136:16-24.  The $50,000 loan amount was transferred to [...]’s bank account on June 25, 2008.  Da154.  The $50,000 loan was a personal “patch” to get through the period of the drafting of the loan documents for the $330,000 loan.  3T136:25 to 137:8.  The $50,000 Loan: (i) carried no interest; (ii) carried no term; and (iii) was not memorialized through any executed document, contract, agreement or promissory note.  3T136:25 to 140:15-20; 4T250:10-15; 3T6:19 to 7:3.  The $50,000 Loan was just an oral loan.  3T8:18-23.  There is no written evidence that the $50,000 Loan was a “pay-when-able” loan.  3T8:18-23.  There was no discussion that the $50,000 Loan was a “pay-when-able” loan.  3T137:9-18.  On July 7, 2008, [...], through the Steven J. [...] Retirement Plan, and [...] entered into a $330,000 loan that was memorialized through a promissory note, guarantee, collateral mortgage and other related documents (the “$330,000 Loan”).
[brief] Specifically, the A.S. Court stated, “the mere presence of a parent is insufficient to protect a juvenile’s rights because presence alone cannot be said to provide the buffer between police and the juvenile that [the Court was contemplating] in Presha. ”  Id. at 148.  “In order to serve as a buffer, the parent must be acting with the interests of the juvenile in mind. ”  Id.  Although the court rejected “a categorical rule that an attorney must be present any time there is a perceived clash in the interest,” the Court cautioned that where the interrogating officers are aware of “competing and clashing interests,” they should “strongly consider ceasing the interview when another adult, who is without a conflict of interest, can be made available to the child.
[brief] Rule 4:42-1 ....................................................................................................................21, 22, 23 | Date | Event | Transcription | |--------------------|-----------|---------------| | October 3, 2007 | Motion | 1T | | March 6, 2009 | Motion | 2T | | April 8, 2010 | Motion | 3T | | October 14, 2010 | Motion | 4T | | November 1, 2010 | Motion | 5T | | December 15, 2010 | Motion | 6T | | February 3, 2011 | Motion | 7T | | February 9, 2011 | Motion | 8T | | February 14, 2011 | Motion | 9T | | March 15, 2011 | Motion | 10T | | March 16, 2011 | Motion | 11T | | March 17, 2011 | Motion | 12T | | April 6, 2011 | Motion | 13T | | April 12, 2011 | Motion | 14T | | April 14, 2011 | Motion | 15T | | May 9, 2011 | Opening | 16T | | May 10, 2011 | Opening | 17T | | May 11, 2011 | Opening | 18T | | May 12, 2011 | Opening | 19T | | May 16, 2011 | Trial | 20T | | May 17, 2011 | Trial | 21T | May 18, 2011
[brief] I THE STANDARD OF REVIEW IS DE NOVO WITH ANY RULING OF THE TRIAL COURT REVIEWED FOR AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION  The Appellate Division reviews a grant of summary judgment de novo, observing the same standard as the trial court.  Townsend v. Pierre, 221 N.J. 36, 59, 110 A.3d 52 (2015).  With respect to the trial court’s exercise of its gatekeeper function, the Appellate Division reviews this for an abuse of discretion.  Hisenaj v. Kuehner, 194 N.J. 6, 942 A.2d 769, 770 (2008).  Summary judgment should be granted only if the record demonstrates there is "no genuine issue as to any material fact challenged and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment or order as a matter of law."  R. 4:46-2(c).  This Court considers "whether the competent evidential materials presented, when viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, are sufficient to permit a rational factfinder to resolve the alleged disputed issue in favor of the non-moving party."  Davis v. Brickman Landscaping, Ltd., 219 N.J. 395, 406, 98 A.3d 1173 (2014) (quoting Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America, 142 N.J. 520 (1995)).  If no genuine issue of material fact exists, the inquiry then turns to "whether the trial court correctly interpreted the law."  DepoLink Court Reporting & Litig. Support Servs. v. Rochman, 430 N.J.Super. 325, 333, 64 A.3d 579 (App. Div. 2013) (quoting Massachi v. AHL Servs., Inc., 396 N.J.Super. 486, 494, 935 A.2d 769 (App. Div. 2007), certif. denied, 195 N.J. 419, 949 A.2d 847 (2008)).
[brief] In July 2016, Plaintiff [...] was promoted to the rank of sergeant.  (20a ¶29).  Defendant [...] owes Plaintiff [...] compensation for performing the duties of a sergeant from June 2016 through his November 1, 2017 retirement.  (20a ¶30).  Plaintiff [...] also asserts that Defendants owe him compensation for performing the duties of a sergeant before his retirement, which includes both backpay and the loss of pension benefits.  Finally, Plaintiff [...] was promoted to sergeant on July 5, 2016.  (26a ¶74).  Plaintiff [...]’s salary was never adjusted by Defendant [...] and Plaintiff is owed a retroactive salary adjustment for the work completed as a sergeant to which he was not compensated.
[brief] She was not included even though she was a member and should have been involved in the dissolution and accounting of [...].  Aa35; Ra54-55a; see N.J.S.A. 42:2C-37(b)(1) (“The management and conduct of the company are vested in the members. ”); see also N.J.S.A. 42:2C-49(c) (“if a dissolved limited liability company has no members, the legal representative of the last person to have been a member may wind up the activities of the company. ”).  Further, the Certificate of Withdrawal filed by [...] relied expressly and exclusively upon the Trial Court’s May 8, 2023 Order, which was under reconsideration at the time [...] filed the Certificate of Withdrawal for [...] with the State.
[brief] [...] argued, at page 11 of its supplemental brief, that “the Project was not designed to meet the needs of customers in the Highlands Region and would clearly not induce sprawl or any other development within the Preservation Area. ”  However, [...]’s argument is contradicted by its previous assertion, at page 20 of its Brief submitted to this Court on October 22, 2022.  Previously, [...] asserted, as follows:  In addition to meeting the needs of the Project shipper, the Project will also assist in eliminating capacity constraints in the region, especially during periods of peak demand, ensuring the region is able to meet residential, commercial, and industrial heating and cooling needs, will provide added reliability during planned and unplanned maintenance activities on [...]’s natural gas transmission system **within the State**….  Thus, it is apparent from [...]’s previous assertions in this appeal that this Project will play a critical role in expanding capacity for even more sprawl development “**within the State**” and it is arbitrarily unclear from the DEP’s final decision how it determined otherwise.
[brief] ” (Db21-Db22) (emphasis in original).  Defendant is wrong.  Here, the court below correctly found that defendant drove his vehicle before it ultimately stopped outside of a closed pizzeria.  Based on defendant’s own admissions, he clearly had the intent to drive, and in fact did drive, the vehicle.  The fact that the vehicle ultimately experienced malfunctions is not proof itself that the vehicle was completely inoperable, as [...] credibly testified during the pretrial hearing that defendant stated that he had driven the vehicle before [...] came to assist him.  (2T11:3-6; Aa37).  Defendant also admitted that, before his car petered out, he was on his way to visit a friend in Hackettstown.  (2T11:12-14; Aa37).  Thus, the State has proven beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant operated his motor vehicle while intoxicated.
[directive] N.J.S.A. 2C:14-12 (Nicole's Law - Conditions Placed Upon Release of Certain Defendants) and N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5.7 (Drug Offender Restraining Order Act) have been added to the Summary of the Rules/Statutes Governing Bail attached to the Bail Schedules to provide further information for those using the schedules.  8.  A table of contents and indexes of offenses have also been added to the Bail Schedules.  To recap, the attached revised Statewide Bail Schedules and summary of the court rules and statutes relating to bail are hereby adopted, effective immediately.
[brief] See State v. Cotto, 471 N.J. Super. 489 (App. Div. 2022) (citing N.J.R.E. 702) (“If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise. ”).  Additionally, Plaintiff has failed to prove any damages resulting from any alleged act or omission on the part of the [...].
[brief] Plaintiff claims that the snow removal agreements had to be evidential as the defendants supposedly blamed each other and offered conflicting testimony.  The conflicting testimony cited by plaintiff is not even conflicting testimony.  [...] supposedly stated at deposition that they felt constrained in their efforts and [...] (owner) stated that they were unaware that [...] was actually doing the snow removal.  The testimony between the subcontractor and owner are not conflicting and do not require the contracts to resolve the imagined conflict.
[brief] Importantly, the Global Fee Application was also not the first time that [...] sought to have [...] pay all of his attorneys’ fees in connection with general post-judgment execution and collection efforts (as opposed to fees in connection with remedying specific purported bad acts).  Rather, it was at least the third time that [...] filed such an application.  First, in April of 2017, the Chancery Court (then, [...]) denied [...]’s motion to require the --- \(^6\)  Because those prior orders were and remain interlocutory, they have not yet been the subject of appeals.  Because the “judgment” granting [...]’s Global Fee Application, unlike the prior orders, adjudicates all rights of the parties on a definite and separate branch relating to [...]’s attorneys’ fees for specified post-judgment collection efforts for a defined period of time, it is final notwithstanding that other branches of the general underlying controversy remain pending before the trial court.
[brief] “Excusable neglect” may be found when the default was “attributable to an honest mistake that is compatible with due diligence or reasonable prudence. ”  Mancini, supra, 132 N.J. at 335; see also, Baumann, supra, 95 N.J. At 394 (stating that “mere carelessness or lack of proper diligence on the part of an attorney is ordinarily not sufficient to entitle his clients to relief from an adverse judgment”.  The Court has held excuses such as confusion or misinformation of “court process” requiring legal responses are not grounds for excusable neglect.  See, US Bank Nat. Ass’n v. Guillaume, 209 N.J. 449 (2012).  Here, there is no excuse for [...]’s inaction and refusal to comply with the order and rules requiring them to provide access to the requested OPRA records.
[brief] In fact, there is nothing unusual about contribution payments collected in relation to a larger redevelopment area rather a single project.  Notably, in Plaintiff’s very own Redevelopment Agreement presented to the City Council in 2016, Plaintiff agreed to make its own redevelopment contribution to the City benefiting the Beachfront South Redevelopment Sector.  (Pa1120 to Pa1134) (emphasis added).  The argument that a rational nexus must exist where a redevelopment payment has in fact already been extensively analyzed by our trial courts and rejected in a thorough opinion by the trial court in [...] v. [...], Docket No. [...], 2015 WL 10986574 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. May 18, 2015).
[brief] Pursuant to the vote-by-mail law, ballots must be received by election day.  N.J.S.A. 19:63-16(d)(1).  In addition, N.J.S.A. 19:63-22 provides that a ballot postmarked on or before the day of the election and received within 144 hours of the polls closing shall be counted.  If a ballot lacks a postmark, it may still be counted if received within 48 hours of the polls closing.  None of these provisions apply here.