ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] This conduct itself exhibits gamesmanship because the only logical explanation for waiting an additional sixty (60) days before filing their Motion to Dismiss was to ensure that Plaintiff would never have the ability to submit an affidavit of merit.  As further proof that Defendants were engaging not only in gamesmanship of the Affidavit of Merit Statute, but were making all attempts to stymie this litigation, Defendants failed to respond to any of Plaintiff’s discovery requests.  Now, Defendants argue that the requests were too broad and not specific enough.  If Defendant had provided Plaintiff with the requisite medical records, which were requested in discovery, Plaintiff would have submitted a timely and sufficient affidavit of merit.  Gamesmanship of the Affidavit of Merit Statute was admonished in Ferreira because the Statute was not intended to award Defendants that look and formulate plans to escape liability based on a Statute that was intended to “strike a fair balance between preserving a plaintiff’s right to sue and controlling nuisance lawsuits.
[brief] [...] is seeking to "lock in decades of continued emissions [from not just the regulator itself but from the new growth in natural gas consumption that it will make possible] and risk financing what will become stranded assets."  The integrated energy plan showed these goals are feasible and cost-effective:  Relevant Integrated Energy Plan Findings  •  Electrification reduces annual costs by 50% in 2050, compared to retaining gas use in buildings, in order to meet emissions targets.  Electrification is cheaper, despite low natural gas costs, because emissions targets require substituting a significant fraction of natural gas with carbon-neutral fuels.  In the Least Cost scenario, carbon-neutral fuels are not required until the late 2040s and are primarily used in the electricity sector.  In Variation 3, carbon-neutral fuel use starts earlier, and five times as much carbon-neutral fuel is required in 2050.  * * * •  Building electrification reduces total energy use.  While building electrification increases electricity use, it reduces total energy needs because heat pumps are much more efficient than direct combustion of fossil fuels for heat.  [Ha461-461, Holm-18 at 160-161 (emphasis added.)]  Rather bizarrely, in an effort to evade the statutory command that this proceeding apply the EMP and its objectives and commands “to the maximum extent practicable and feasible,” [...] offered the testimony of [...], a paid consultant who was at one time the Director of the Division of Energy at the [...].
[brief] To satisfy the requirements of the CFA, a party alleging a CFA claim does not need to “show actual deceit or a fraudulent act; any unconscionable commercial practice is prohibited. ”  Meshinsky v. Nichols Yacht Sales, Inc., 110 N.J. 464 (1988).  The Supreme Court has acknowledged that “unconscionable commercial practice” is not defined in the CFA, but that the phrase should be viewed as promoting the “standard of conduct contemplate[ing]…good faith, honesty in fact and observance of fair dealing. ”  Id. at 472 (citing Kugler v. Romain, 58 N.J. 522, 544 (1971)).  It is obvious from Defendants’ conduct here that their actions, as alleged, were not in good faith or honest and constitute a violation of the CFA.
[brief] Our Rules require the electronic recording of identification procedures, preferably by video, if feasible, so as to ensure that you will have before you a complete picture of all circumstances under which an identification is made, the precise details of the identification procedure, and whether it was accurately reported by [the] State’s witnesses. ”  (Da 147)  The model instruction further warns, “Where there is a failure to electronically record an identification procedure, you have not been provided with a complete picture. ”  (Da 148)  The model instruction further warns that if “electronic recording was not feasible, police officers [still] are required to prepare a contemporaneous, verbatim written account of the identification procedure.
[brief] POINT II WITH REGARD TO THE ORDER ENTERED JANUARY 11, 2019, THE COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DESCRTION WHEN IT DENIED PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF THE ORDER ENTERED NOVEMBER 30, 2018, WHICH DENIED PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO AMEND THE COMPLAINT TO INCLUDE A CLAIM FOR FRAUDULENT CONCEALMENT AND SPOLIATION OF EVIDENCE  Plaintiff failed to produce any evidence that the Trial Court based its decision on a palpably incorrect or irrational basis or that it had failed to consider or appreciate the significance of the probative evidence in their Motion for Reconsideration dated December 24, 2018.  (Pa187 to PA292).  The evidence Plaintiff relied upon and presented has not changed: the Guest Incident Report, [...]’s letter dated September 1, 2016, and uncertain deposition excerpts taken out of context.  As explicated below, Plaintiff provided the Trial Court with arguments and evidence deemed best to support the claims and the Court was certainly within its right to review and evaluate that evidence as well as any evidence submitted in opposition, therefore the Court was within its right to deny the motion.  In the motion for reconsideration, Plaintiff impermissibly sought to expand the record and reargue the motion by citing case law not cited in the original motion.  Plaintiff now dumps the exact same arguments and evidence into an Appellate brief.  As discussed, *ad nauseam*, the law in New Jersey is well established that while the granting of a motion to file an amended complaint rests in the Court’s sound discretion, denial of the motion is allowed, again, within the Court’s discretion.  The Court must rule in light of the factual record known at the time the motion is made and requires a Court to consider whether granting the amendment would nonetheless be futile.  *Keller v. Pastuch*, 94 N.J.  Super. 499 (App. Div. 1967); *Notte*, supra., 185 N.J. at 501 (*emphasis added*).  In the exercise of its discretion to determine whether justice requires that leave be granted, the Trial Court must consider not only justice to the applicant but also justice to the adverse party.  *Band’s Refuse Removal, Inc. v. Fair Lawn Borough*, 62 N.J. Super. 522, 555 (App. Div. 1960).  As explicated in Point I and described by [...] on the record twice before, the claim which Plaintiff sought to assert was completely unsupported by the evidence submitted by both parties and therefore futile.
[brief] Ja1-2.  The Bulletin provides:  SSAP No. 25 refers to related party transactions, including loans, transactions involving the exchange of assets or liabilities, and transactions involving services between related parties.  SSAP No. 25, paragraph 4, defines related parties, which definition includes the attorney-in-fact of a reciprocal reporting entity or any affiliate of the attorney-in-fact.  Further, paragraph 19 requires transactions involving services between related parties to be on an arm’s length basis and meet fair and reasonable standards.  In doing so, considerations may include, but are not limited to, management representations along with the opinion of the reciprocal exchange’s independent auditor.  9  For example, if the AIF owned office space and leased that to the Exchange, that lease would be a related party transaction and subject to SSAP No. 25.  This application of SSAP No. 25 is contrary to its plain language and at odds with the REA.
[brief] See Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 375, 106 S. Ct. 2574, 2583, 91 L. Ed. 2d 305 (1986).  Defendant's Sixth Amendment claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is not in fact a Fourth Amendment claim directly controlled by Rule 3:5-7(f).  Thus, while defendant's defaulted Fourth Amendment claim may be one element of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel claim, the two claims have separate identities, reflect different constitutional values, and are distinct both in nature and the requisite elements of proof.  Kimmelman, supra, 477 U.S. at 375, 106 S. Ct. at 2583, 91 L. Ed. 2d at 319.
[brief] As such, there is a sufficient factual basis on this record because each element of N.J.S.A. 39:4-50, including the BAC reading in this case, was acknowledged and answered in the affirmative by defendant on the record.  (Da 16-17).  Campfield, 213 N.J. at 231; (quoting State v. Sainz, 107 N.J. 283, 293 (1987)).  Defendant's additional argument regarding [...]'s Slater analysis is of no moment because the court had already found the factual basis --- 4 State v. Slater, 198 N.J. 145 (2009). to be sufficient.  Any analysis as to why there was no "manifest injustice" in this case is just further support of the unmeritorious nature of defendant's application to withdrawal his guilty plea in this case.  As such, a remand is not necessary for the application to be considered without a Slater analysis.  (Db 18).
[directive] The accompanying supplementary schedules and information presented in the supplementary sections are not necessary for a fair presentation of the financial statements taken as a whole, but are presented as additional analytical data.  This information has been subjected to the tests and other auditing procedures applied the in in our audit of the financial statements mentioned above and, in opinion, is fairly stated in all material respects as relation to the financial statements taken a whole.  TABNO. 15 REPORT ON COMPLIANCE AND ON INTERNAL CONTROL OVER FINANCIAL REPORTING BASED
[directive] 4.8  In certain situations, commanders may consider tactical disengagement strategies as an alternative to more traditional resolution strategies.  Disengagement is the tactical decision to leave, delay contact, delay custody or plan to make contact at a different time and under different circumstances.  This tactic should be considered when an officer reasonably believes continued contact may result in an unreasonable risk to a person in crisis, the public or law enforcement officers.  A tactical disengagement strategy may include the utilization of the Attorney General’s ARRIVE Together program, a community crisis response team, or other community-based resources.  Special Considerations for Hostage Incidents.
[brief] DEFENDANT’S SENTENCE IS MANIFESTLY PROPER.  (30T47-23 to 30T63-11). 4  Defendant contends that the sentence imposed by [...] must be vacated because the judge engaged in impermissible fact-finding and improperly rejected certain mitigating factors urged by him.  He also contends that the consecutive sentences were excessive because the shootings occurred close in time and the judge failed to state the overall fairness of consecutive sentencing, as State v. Torres, 246 N.J. 246 (2021) requires.  The State concurs that a remand under Torres is warranted, however, defendant’s remaining claims are without merit and do not warrant a remand for resentencing.
[brief] See Pa311 (40:20-24); Pa318 (68:12-69:22); Pa319 (70:17-20); Pa327-8 (105:18-106:3); Pa329-330 (113:9-114:19).  While there were crosswalks far away near the entrance to the lot and down the center of the lot, there was no crosswalk at the intersection located in the distant, eastern section of the lot along the route that [...] had to take from where she parked, which is where the fatal crash occurred.  See Pa309 (30:19-31:2); Pa329 (113:9-114:19).  [...] testified as follows regarding the absence of a sidewalk, crosswalk and pedestrian safety signage:
[brief] [...] confirmed that he was living in [...] during the summer of 2007 and that he and [...] went engagement ring shopping at the [...] on July 15.  [...] also testified that he visited [...] by himself on July 16 in search of a better price for a ring.  He claimed that he had only begun to discuss with [...] what he was looking for when he was interrupted by a call from [...] informing him that she was ready to be picked up.  [...] cut short the discussion and left the store, claiming never to return.  B.
[brief] This appeal concerns two primary issues.  First, whether the trial court erred in concluding [...]  (“[...]”) and [...] (“[...]”) (together, “Plaintiffs”) – parties who have admittedly not been affected in any way whatsoever by the challenged development – possess standing to assert claims under the New Jersey Municipal Land Use Law (“MLUL”).  Second, whether the trial court erred in concluding that [...]’s (“[...]”) submission of a complete application to the [...] (“[...]”) – a separate arm of the [...] (“[...]”) tasked with reviewing and approving cannabis-related site plan applications pursuant to the land use powers delegated to it by Hoboken’s ordinances – did not trigger the Time of Application Rule (“TOA Rule”) under the MLUL.
[brief] It has long been held in New Jersey that there is a presumption against negligence, and the burden of proving any negligence falls on plaintiff.  Hansen v. Eagle Picher Lead Co., 8 N.J. 133, 139 (1951); Buckelew, 87 N.J. at 525; Wyatt v. Curry, 77 N.J. Super. 1, 6 (App. Div. 1962).
[brief] Finally, as to defendant’s complaint that the officer did not turn on his body-warn camera in time to capture the initial exchange when the officer asked for defendant’s driving credentials, defendant is not entitled to a “rebuttable presumption that exculpatory evidence was destroyed or not captured” because he did not “reasonably assert[] that exculpatory evidence was destroyed or not captured. ”  N.J.S.A. 40A:14-118.5(q)(2) (emphasis added).  Defendant contends that his defense counsel “reasonably argued . . . that the missing evidence could have been exculpatory. ” (Db22).  However, arguing that missing evidence “could have been” exculpatory is not the same as “reasonably asserting” that such evidence “was” exculpatory.  N.J.S.A. 40A:14-118.5(q)(2).  And a close reading of the passages cited in defendant’s brief reveals that defense counsel did not allege that the body-camera footage omitted any “exculpatory evidence. ”  In fact, defense counsel seemingly refrained from making any assertions about what occurred before the body camera turned on.  (Db22 citing 1T188-2 to 7, 201-5 to 22, 202-11 to 16).  Even if defendant was entitled to the presumption, the credible testimony of the officer about defendant’s demeanor and appearance rebutted it.  In addition, defendant’s nervousness and constricted pupils continued when defendant stepped outside of the vehicle, so the court had the benefit of assessing the officer’s observations against the body-warn camera footage at the point in which defendant alleges the officer lacked sufficient legal justification to detain defendant.  For all these reasons, this Court should reject defendant’s argument and affirm the trial court’s decision on defendant’s motion to suppress physical evidence.
[brief] .................................................................  31 Rumson Estates, Inc. v. Mayor Council of Fair Haven, 177 N.J. 338 (2003)  ..................................................................  26 State v. D.A., 191 N.J. 158 (2007) ..................................................................  31 Sussex Commons Assocs., LLC v. Rutgers, 210 N.J. 531 (2012) ..................................................................  31  Tri-State Ship Repair & Dry Dock Co. v. City of Perth Amboy, 349 N.J. Super. 418 (App. Div. 2022) ...........................................  42 Twp. of Hanover v. Town of Morristown, 118 N.J. Super. 136 (Ch. Div.), aff’d, 121 N.J. Super. 536 (App. Div. 1972) ........................................................................ 39, 40 Washington Twp. Zoning Bd. v. Planning Bd., 217 N.J. Super. 215 (App. Div.), cert. den., 108 N.J. 218 (1987) .......... 41  Watkins v. Resorts Int’l Hotel & Casino, 124 N.J. 398 (1991) ..................................................................  18  Statutes Hoboken City Ordinance §36 ............................................................  5, 6, 26 Hoboken Ordinance §166-33.1 .......................................................  13 Hoboken Ordinance § 196-33.1 ..................................................... passim N.J.S.A. 24:6I-36 ........................................................................  4 N.J.S.A. 40:55-1 ........................................................................ 21, 22 N.J.S.A. 40:55D-3 ...................................................................... 27 N.J.S.A. 40:55D-4 ...................................................................... 19 N.J.S.A. 40:55D-5 ...................................................................... 26 N.J.S.A. 40:55D-9 ...................................................................... 26 N.J.S.A. 40:55D-10.3 ........................................................................................................... 25 N.J.S.A. 40:55D-10.5 ........................................................................................................... 24, 27, 31 N.J.S.A. 40:55D-25a(4) ......................................................................................................... 23 N.J.S.A. 40:55D-136 ............................................................................................................ 31 Other Authorities [...] & [...], Current N.J. Court Rules, cmt. 2.3 to R. 4:33 (2024) .................................................. 38 Rule 4:69-6 ............................................................................................................................. 41, 42 R. 2:9-5 .................................................................................................................................... 17 R. 4:33 .................................................................................................................................... 38 TABLE OF JUDGMENTS AND ORDERS BEING APPEALED
[brief] She presented with complaints of abdominal pain and diarrhea.  7T39-20 to 24.  She was first treated in the emergency room by [...], whom she informed that her symptoms had begun roughly six hours prior to her presentation.  7T39-24 to 40-1.  [...]’s physician assistant called defendant that evening and informed him of the clinical findings, as well as [...]’s impression that the --- 5
[brief] Instead, Appellant attempts to piecemeal together emails from nonparties regarding unrelated entities and companies to show that there was a written arrangement granting a license.  See Orologio of Short Hills, Inc. v. Swatch Grp. (U.S.) Ltd., Inc., 2015 WL 4496653, at *5 (D.N.J. July 23, 2015), aff’d in part [as to the NJFPA], rev'd in part and remanded sub nom.  Orologio of Short Hills Inc v. The Swatch Grp. (U.S.) Inc., 653 Fed. Appx. 134 (3d Cir. 2016) (holding that despite, the plaintiff’s attempt to piecemeal written communication between the parties to qualify as a “written arrangement,” the plaintiff was unable to point to any specific written arrangement as is required under the NJFPA).
[brief] ”  First Morris Bank & Trust v. Roland Offset Serv., Inc., 357 N.J. Super. 68, 71 (App. Div. 2003).  “Therefore, relief ‘is available only when truly exceptional circumstances are present. ’”  Ibid. (emphasis added) (quoting Housing Auth. of Town of Morristown v. Little, 135 N.J. 274, 286 (1994)).  “[S]ubsection (f) is to be used ‘sparingly’ and only ‘in situations in which, were it not applied, a grave injustice would occur. ’”  Ibid. (emphasis in original) (quoting Little, 135 N.J. at 286).  Examples of exceptional circumstances implicating grave injustice and warranting reopening of a judgment have included such matters as protection of a family, which included five minor children from being evicted from public housing and rendered homeless, *Little*, 135 N.J. at 290–94; protection of a public fund, *Mancini v. EDS on Behalf of New Jersey Auto. Full Ins. Underwriting Ass’n*, 132 N.J. 330, 337–38 (1993); the prevention of recovery for damages for breach of an illegal public contract, *Manning Eng’g, Inc. v. Hudson County Park Comm’n*, 74 N.J. 113, 123–25 (1977); and prevention of harm to a party misled by his attorney who was subject to disciplinary proceedings that ultimately led to disbarment, *Court Inv. Co. v.
[directive] The Guidelines expressly provide in this regard that, “defendants who serve as couriers, off-loaders, or lookouts on a repetitive or professional basis would fall into this category [i.e., would be classified as “minor” participants].”  Section 10.2.2.  The same facts used to establish Mitigating Factor #2a (e.g., that the defendant is a professional courier employed by an ongoing or sophisticated Page 77 [...] Guidelines 2 (2004 Revisions) enterprise) should not be used to establish Aggravating Factor #4b, since this would have the practical effect of automatically negating the mitigating circumstance.
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION BECAUSE THE DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION LACKED MERIT.  The truth is that the Defendant’s blatantly obstructive appeal of the trial court’s order denying his second motion for reconsideration amounts to an end-run around his failure to seek timely reconsideration of this Court’s June 8, 2023 Order and Opinion as required by R. 2:11-6.  Thus, the Defendant’s attempt to bootstrap the trial court’s order as a substitute for a timely motion for reconsideration under R. 2:11-6 should not be countenanced by the Court.  As such, the trial court did not abuse its discretion because the Defendant’s motion for reconsideration was (a) untimely, (b) did not meet the reconsideration standard, and (c) was not an “exceptional situation” as required by R. 4:50-1(f).
[brief] As the video and transcript of defendant's interview show, the detective's challenges to defendant's story were not as aggressive as the words cherry-picked from the transcript by defendant may suggest.  Law enforcement is not required to sit back quietly while a suspect lies or downplays their involvement in events during an interview.  And it is well established that police are free to mislead a suspect during an interview, so long as they do not cross the line into fabricating evidence or otherwise impermissibly overbearing the defendant's will.
[brief] STATEMENT OF FACTS  There is a right to trial by jury, of more than just a judge-jury of one, of the judge’s finding of fact – i.e. judge [...] order - in the matters at the bar.  No action can be taken in the lower court in the absence of a jury confirmation of the court’s finding of fact.  There is sufficient law in record, and evidence of a cause of action, for a jury to find in [...]’s favor in the matters at the bar via a breach of statute negligence claim, - in spite of a summary judgment order issued January 7, 2010 for the failure to submit an Affidavit of Merit, or expert testimony, as neither is required for a breach of statute negligence claim.  There is further opportunity for recovery via a malpractice action established via evidence adduced at a jury trial.
[brief] At least one state has published a model jury charge that, although incomplete, directly addresses the reliability and evaluation of fingerprint evidence.  See Council of Super. Ct. Judges of Ga., Suggested Pattern Jury Instructions, Vol. II: Criminal Cases, 4th ed. (2021), 1.35.20 Fingerprints (hereinafter “Georgia Fingerprint Instruction”).  Other jurisdictions have published model jury charges that, while failing to directly address how fingerprint evidence should be evaluated, at least implicitly acknowledge that fingerprint identification is fallible opinion testimony.