ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] See Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules, comment 3.5 on R. 1:36 (2011) (“[A] federal court’s decision on a question of New Jersey law is not binding on any court in this State. ”); see also Dewey v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 121 N.J. 69, 80 (1990); Shaw v. City of Jersey City, 346 N.J. Super. 219, 229 (App. Div. 2002), rev'd on other grounds, 174 N.J. 567 (2002).  [...]’s citations to unpublished cases Woo-Padva v. Midland Funding LLC, 2022 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 96 (Law Div. Jan. 21, 2022) (“Woo- --- \(^1\) Chulsky v. Hudson Law Offices, P.C., 777 F. Supp. 2d 823, 847 (D.N.J. 2011); Joe Hand Promotions, Inc. v. Mills, 567 F. Supp. 2d 719 (D.N.J. 2008).  Padva 1”) (Pa133), and Woo-Padva v. Midland Funding LLC, No. A-1996-21, 2023 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1550 (App. Div. Sep. 21, 2023) (“Woo-Padva 2”) (Pa137), are susceptible to similar criticisms in that they too improperly narrow the holding in Gonzalez.  To wit, there is nothing in Gonzalez to indicate that the NJ Supreme Court intended to limit the holding that collecting or enforcing a loan constitutes subsequent performance within the coverage of the CFA to the narrow facts of that case.  If the Gonzalez court intended to do so, it’s reasonable to infer that language applicable to post-judgment modifications would have been included in the holding.  As a remedial consumer protection statute, the NJ Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the CFA should be interpreted broadly to effect its purposes of safeguarding the public and deter unscrupulous bad actors.  See Lettenmaier v. Lube Connection, Inc., 162 N.J. 134, 139 (1999); Lee v. Carter-Reed Co., L.L.C., 203 N.J. 496, 522 (2010).  Deterring illegal collection activity by including under the umbrella of ‘subsequent performance’ aligns with both the espoused purposes of the CFA and the NJ Supreme Court’s holding in Gonzalez.  Thus, the trial court’s March 21, 2024 Order, which improperly narrowed the scope and protections of the CFA, must be reversed.
[brief] A. The Jury’s Liability Findings Were Not Against the Weight of the Evidence (RAISED BELOW: Pa50-Pa55) ..............................................29 i. Legal Analysis: The Standard on Appeal for Setting Aside Verdicts as Against the Weight of the Evidence (RAISED BELOW: Pa50-Pa51)  ..................................................................................................................29  ii.  Application: The Jury’s Findings Concerning Plaintiff’s Disability Hostile Work Environment Claims are Not Against the Weight of the Evidence (RAISED BELOW: Pa51-Pa54)  ..................................................................................................................31  iii.  Application: Defendants Have Made No Argument Concerning the Jury’s Verdict on Plaintiff’s Claims, and as that Portion of the Jury’s Verdict Must Be Affirmed as Unchallenged (RAISED BELOW: Pa54-Pa55)  ..................................................36  B.
[brief] The matter was assigned to the Honorable [...], J.S.C., who held a hearing on August 15, 2023, during which time both parties were heard (Da097).  [...] issued an Order on August 18, 2023, which “preliminary enjoined and restrained [[...]] from enforcing, implementing, or otherwise giving effect to Amended Policy 5755 – Transgender Students (adopted June 20, 2023) until such time as the litigation before the [...] arising from a separate administrative complaint filed on June 21, 2023 is resolved (Da095). ”  The Order also directed that [...] was “hereby preliminarily enjoined and restrained from amending, modifying, or superseding any portion of Policy 5756 (adopted 17, 2019); and are further directed to preserve the status quo ante prior to the adoption of Amended Policy 5756, until such time as the litigation before the [...] arising from a separate administrative complaint filed on June 21, 2023 is resolved (Ibid.).”  [...] certified the Order as final via a Consent Order dated September 5, 2023 (Da117).  The Board filed the underlying Notice of Appeal on September 14, 2023 (Da119).
[brief] The need for courts to be effective gatekeepers is particularly acute in cases involving pharmaceuticals and medical devices, given how there will nearly always be confounding variables that require more than a rudimentary analysis to sort through.  Experts who misapprehend essential facts or draw inappropriate conclusions from simple percentages cannot be permitted to testify before a jury.  Moreover, the dangers of unreliable expert testimony are even more pronounced in cases like this, where the plaintiff’s claims are based entirely on speculation, and jurors have little else to go on to decide the case.
[brief] Id. at 8.  On the other hand, then R.4:62-2 (now R.4:50-1) allowed for one-year to seek relief.  Ibid.  Holding that “When a statutory provision and a rule of the court are in conflict in a matter of practice and procedure, the rule prevails,” the panel stated that “in construing what is a "reasonable time" under the rule, judicial deference ought to be paid to the Legislature's expression of public policy, fixing a three months' time limitation for making such a motion in a tax foreclosure proceeding, except where the ground is fraud or lack of jurisdiction. ”  Id. at 8-9.  [...] did not establish a right to redeem post-judgment; it merely confirmed a defendant’s right to file a timely motion seeking such relief.  A motion is not meritorious simply because it is timely.  The Appellate Division remanded for a determination “for a plenary hearing and a determination as to whether under all the facts and circumstances of the case it would be inequitable to apply the three months' limitation as a bar to [...]'s motion to reopen the judgment.
[brief] Exhibit 28 - Attachment 3, Amendment to the [...] Subcontract with [...]........................................Dta2555  Exhibit 29 - Transcript of the deposition of [...] in the DJ Action.................................................................Dta2562  Exhibit 30 - “[...] Contractor Controlled Insurance Program Confirmation of bound program”..................Dta2614  Exhibit 31 - Various Enrollment Status Reports provided by [...] to [...]..............................................................Dta2983  Exhibit 32 - July 20, 2015  Email with [...]...............................Dta1026  Exhibit 33 - July 21, 2015  Email from [...] to [...] asking for revised proposal....................................................Dta2679  Exhibit 35 - Contractor Enrollment Form (Form A) provided by [...] to [...].............................................................Dta2685
[brief] His Trust admin also required a Final Accounting, as per par. 2, incl. 3B:14-7.  22.  [...] FAILED to carry out ANY Trust administrative & final accounting provisions of Oct. ‘22 Order, par. 2&3, incl. 3B:31-5(a)(2), 3B:14-7, & 3B:31-52(b), even after I repeatedly emailed them for compliance.  23.  Since Oct. 21, 2022, I inquired by emails, w/o success, w/[...] about [...]’s required filing of Final Trust Accounting.  He did not respond.
[brief] Plaintiffs seemingly ignore the fact that the Redeveloper Defendants have been designated as the redeveloper for the property under the Redevelopment Agreement since 2004.  Pa91, -108.  And, they also ignore the fact that the Redeveloper is a party to the 2021 County Agreement, which sets forth the Borough’s intention to amend the Redevelopment Plan to reduce the total _____________________ to the . . . Master Plan . . . and further not only the preservation but also a significant increase in the amount of open space on the subject Property[.]”).
[brief] I.  **[...] Family History.**  [...] is the son of [...] and [...].  (Da268a.)  [...] and [...] were predeceased by their daughter (and [...]’s biological sibling), [...] [...] (“[...]”), who died on June 15, 2007.  (Id.)  [...] is [...]’s daughter and the granddaughter of [...] and [...].  (Id.)  [...] also is [...]’s sole surviving descendant, as well as [...]’s niece.  (Id.; Da009a.)  [...] predeceased [...] on February 1, 2012, leaving a Last Will and Testament, dated July 17, 2009 (“[...]’s Will”), and a revocable trust known as the [...] B. [...] Living Trust dated April 12, 1993, as subsequently amended and restated by way of an agreement dated March 31, 2010 (“[...]’s Revocable Trust”).  (Da268a.)  [...]’s Will was admitted to probate by the Surrogate of Bergen County on February 8, 2012, and Letters Testamentary were issued authorizing [...] to serve as the Executor of [...]’s Estate on February 21, 2012.⁴  (Da010a.)  [...] is the current Trustee of [...]’s Revocable Trust.  (Da268a.)  --- ⁴  In prior litigation between [...] and [...], the Superior Court of New Jersey, Bergen County, Chancery Division found that [...]’s Will was II.  **[...]’s Will and Revocable Trust. **  [...] died on July 5, 2020, and [...]’s Will (the “Will”) was admitted to probate by the Surrogate of Bergen County on July 17, 2020.  (Id.)  [...] was appointed as the Executor of [...]’s Estate, as evidenced by the Letters Testamentary authorizing him to serve in that capacity, on July 20, 2020.  (Da010a.)  [...] also currently serves as Trustee of [...]’s Revocable Trust.  (Da268a.)  Article THIRD of the Will governs the disposition of [...]’s tangible personal property.  (Da010a.)  Pursuant to Article FOURTH of the Will, the remainder of [...]’s assets are to be distributed in accordance with [...]’s Revocable Trust. \(^5\)  (Id.)  \(^5\)  Notably, the Trial Court was not asked to determine who ultimately should receive [...]’s former 21.5% interest in the [...].  Rather, the Trial Court was asked only to find [...] did not have any rights or interests in the [...] except those referenced specifically in Paragraph 24(F) of the Settlement Agreement.  (Da015a) (“A judicial declaration is necessary at this time to conclusively adjudicate this dispute and confirm that [...] is prohibited from asserting any claims, rights or interests with respect to the Estate’s 21.5% share of the [...], and that her interest in the property is limited to those rights expressly set forth in Paragraph 24(F) of the Settlement Agreement. ”)  (emphasis added).  III.
[brief] In the seminal case of *Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp.*, 84 N.J. 58 (1998), the New Jersey Supreme Court held that, “an employee has a cause of action for wrongful discharge when the discharge is contrary to a clear mandate of public policy. ”  There is an unequivocal public policy mandating employers provide a safe and healthful place of employment to their employees.  Violation of this mandate has been held to be an adequate foundation for a *Pierce* wrongful-discharge claim.  See *Cerracchio v. Alden Leeds, Inc.*, 223 N.J. Super. 435 (App.Div. 1988); see also *Mehlman v. Mobil Oil Corp.*, 153 N.J. 163 (1998).  This policy compelling employers to provide a safe and healthy workspace is grounded in case law, as well as State statutes.
[directive] Attorney General Guideline: Page 19 Prosecution of DWI & Refusal Violations  Breath samples are a nontestimonial form of evidence.  State v. Macuk, 57 N.J. 1, 14 (1970).  Accordingly, a defendant does not have a Fifth Amendment right to consult with an attorney before taking the test, nor does a defendant have a right to have an attorney present when the test is performed.  State v. Leavitt, 107 N.J. 534, 536, 540 (1987); see also, Macuk, supra, 57 N.J. at 16, (holding that police officers are not required to give defendants Miranda warnings prior to administration of [a B]reathalyzer test because "fundamental reason for the Miranda rules is just not present").  Additionally, because breath sample evidence "is evanescent and may disappear in a few hours," State v. Dyal, 97 N.J. 229, 239 (1984), police must administer the [B]reathalyzer test within a reasonable time after the arrest in order to obtain an accurate reading.  Leavitt, supra, 107 N.J. at 541; see also, State v. Pandoli, 109 N.J. Super. 1, 4 (App.  Div.1970) (noting "rapidity with which the passage of time and physiological processes tend to eliminate evidence of ingested alcohol in the system"); State v. Corrado, 184 N.J. Super. 561, 568 (App. Div.1982) (holding one-hour delay in consenting to take [a B]reathalyzer test violated Implied Consent Law).  State v. Widmaier, 157 N.J. at 487-8.
[brief] 7- 49  POINT I  I.  STANDARDS OF REVIEW (Issue Not Raised Below)  POINT II  II.  PLAINTIFF’S TRIAL TESTIMONY MATERIALLY DEVIATED FROM HER PLEADINGS AND DISCOVERY (DA001-DA006; DA020-DA046; Pltf. T:133:12-25- 134:1-25; 147:14-25;148:1-25; 151:22-25—152:1-7)  POINT III  III.  THE JURY’S VERDICT REGARDING DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION AND RETAILIATION UNDER LAD IS AGAINST THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE (DA001-DA082; Pltf. T:133:1-25—159:1-25;4T:110-199)
[brief] *Id.* at 258, 267-268.  Under New Jersey law, a contract is binding when there is a “meeting of the minds”.  The parties must agree to the essential terms of the contract with an intent to be bound by the terms.  *Weichert Co. Realtors v. Ryan*, 128 N.J. 427 (1992).  The contract terms must be sufficiently clear so that what each party should or should not do may be determined with certainty.  *Id.* at 435.  Thus, if an indemnification provision is clear and unambiguous, it can provide for absolute indemnification of a party, regardless of fault.  *Rommell v. U.S. Steel Corp.*, 66 N.J. Super 30, 42 (App. Div. 1984).  *Sub judice*, [...] and [...] agreed to the unequivocal essential indemnity terms of the contract.
[brief] As discussed, supra, N.J.S.A. 34:13A-5.3 states, in relevant part:  “Representatives designated or selected by public employees for the purposes of collective negotiation by the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for such purposes...shall be the exclusive representatives for collective negotiation concerning the terms and conditions of employment of the employees in such unit” and “the majority representative and designated representatives of the public employer shall meet at reasonable time and negotiate in good faith with respect to grievance, disciplinary disputes, and other terms and conditions of employment” [emphasis added].  Initially, acceptance of the [...]’s position would render the language of the statute, requiring “representatives” to be “designated” as the “exclusive representatives for collective negotiations,” completely meaningless.
[brief] [...] maintained his innocence throughout the entirety of the trial, and never admitted to any involvement in the incident.  (PSR3)  Defense counsel indicated that the decision to remain silent was nothing more than a lawful – and indeed laudable – strategic decision in light of his direct appeal:  “My client intends to appeal his conviction.  His hope is that it will be a reversal and he’ll get a new trial, so he feels it’s not in his best interest to address the Court about the facts of the case. ”  (9T5-3 to 7)  See State v. Poteet, 61 N.J. 493, 500 (1972) (Jacobs, J., concurring) (“[A]n admission [of guilt] might jeopardize [a defendant’s] right of appeal or a motion for a new trial”) (quoting Miler v. United States, 255 A.2d 497, 498 (D.C. App. 1969)).  The sentencing court erred by considering [...]’s silence in its sentencing determination.
[directive] Revisions to this Policy will not, alone, solve all problems of excessive force or police accountability.  Nor will this Policy by itself rebuild trust between law enforcement and communities where it has frayed.  I am mindful of the difficulties in changing culture in law enforcement or in any organization, and that is why this Policy is only one component of our overall push towards excellence in policing—a broader strategy to enhance police accountability, transparency and professionalism.  At the same time, we must also remind ourselves that systemic injustices in the criminal justice system are part and parcel of broader, longstanding societal inequities that must also be remedied.
[directive] Arrest, Charging and Diversion Guidelines Working Group.  It shall be the policy of this State to provide guidance to police officers in the exercise of their discretion in the handling of juvenile matters, and it shall also be the policy of this State to encourage law enforcement agencies to divert from formal court proceedings those juvenile who are involved in minor delinquent activity.  A Juvenile Arrest, Charging and Diversion Guidelines Working Group shall be established for the purpose of developing model guidelines and procedures, consistent with the policies, principles and objectives set forth in this Executive Directive, concerning the prevention and control of delinquent activity, the handling by police of juvenile offenders and appropriate police response to juvenile-family crisis incidents, including the use, where warranted, of curbside warnings and stationhouse adjustments.  This Working Group shall consist of representatives from the Division of Criminal Justice, Association of Chiefs of Police, County Prosecutors Association, State and county juvenile officers associations, and other juvenile justice agencies as appropriate.
[brief] Mountain Hill, LLC v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment of Middletown, 403 N.J. Super. 210, 243 (App. Div. 2008) (‘Driveways are so ineluctably incidental to any main structure and so customary for all structures that they are permitted accessory structures and uses in every zone’); Wolf v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment of Park Ridge, 79 N.J. Super. 546, 550-51 (App. Div. 1963) (‘[L]and used as a means of access to…a business [] is in a use accessorial to the business and thus is itself in legal contemplation [of] being used for the business purpose in question.
[directive] sprawę, że w przypadku osadzenia w Centrum 5.  Czy zdaje Pan* sobie Dorosłych: Diagnostyki i Leczenia  Do you understand if you are sentenced to the [...] ewentualne przyszłe zwolnienie warunkowe nie będzie podlegać zwykłym [Tak/Yes] [Nie/No] a. zasadom dotyczącym zwolnienia warunkowego? that any future parole will not be guided by the normal parole guidelines?
[brief] The undisputed set of facts before the trial court were: • The defendant undertook a redesign of the hospital parking lot, • The defendant was [...]’s employer, • The defendant required non-management employees like [...] to park in a designated area of that parking lot which was farther from the hospital entrance than others had to park, • [...] was fatally struck by a vehicle in the parking lot in the course of her employment, • Plaintiff sought compensation under the Workers Compensation Act, • Plaintiff received dependency benefits pursuant to the Act.  (Pa55-56 - Response #4).
[brief] In addition to the novel constitutional question, there is the matter of important public interest.  Appellants purchased property in the historic district that is recognized by the federal government.  *The importance of preserving historic places in this country for the benefit of the public cannot be understated.*  While Appellants seek to maintain their own quiet enjoyment of not being subjected to light pollutions and viewing a massive modern building, they purchased their homes on good faith that the historic aesthetic would be preserved, particularly by [...] for all to enjoy for the generations to come.  It is not possible to build a historic community, which is why Appellants paid a premium.  The motion judge simply does not address the public interest in historical preservation or that all the other smaller homes are now able to double their sizes and become ultra-modern for the same reasons proffered by the Applicants.  As the expression goes: “There goes the neighborhood!”
[brief] court shall vacate an award made in the arbitration proceeding if: (1) the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or other undue means; (2) the court finds evident partiality by an arbitrator; corruption by an arbitrator; or misconduct by an arbitrator prejudicing the rights of a party to the arbitration proceeding; (3) an arbitrator refused to postpone the hearing upon showing of sufficient cause for postponement, refused to consider evidence material to the controversy, or otherwise conducted the hearing contrary to section 15 of this act, so as to substantially prejudice the rights of a party to the arbitration proceeding; (4) an arbitrator exceeded the arbitrator's powers; (5) there was no agreement to arbitrate, unless the person participated in the arbitration proceeding without raising the objection pursuant to subsection c. of section 15 of this act not later than the beginning of the arbitration hearing; or (6) the arbitration was conducted without proper notice of the initiation of an arbitration as required in section 9 of this act so as to substantially prejudice the rights of a party to the arbitration proceeding.
[brief] (Argued at Pa376–Pa377)**  The Legislature created two amendments of *N.J.S.A.* 18A:7F-9(e)(3) during the pandemic, the first being effective April 14, 2020, the second being effective June 29, 2020.  In both amendments, after robust discussions and comments, the Legislature never even hinted at a mechanism to allow for-profit private companies to sue school districts in Superior Court who were dealing with all of the challenges of the pandemic and school closures.  For example, a Legislative history reveals multiple Legislative history sources establishing that the Legislature never intended to grant private companies a private right of action to sue school districts in Superior Court for violations of *N.J.S.A.*  18A:7F-9(e)(3):  1)
[brief] **The LTCI Act and Its Rules**  Initial and future premiums for long-term care policies in New Jersey are governed by the LTCI Act, L. 2003, c. 207 (N.J.S.A. 17B:27E-1 to -13).  Adopted in 2004, the LTCI Act was based on a Model Act adopted by the [...] ("[...]") to regulate long- term care insurance. \(^2\)  See New Jersey Assembly Committee Statement for Senate Committee Substitute for Senate Bills 2532 and 2594, December 11, 2003, and New Jersey Senate Committee Statement for Senate Committee Substitute for Senate Bills 2532 and 2594, June 12, 2003.  (Ra1, 35 and 37).  The Assembly and Senate versions added to the model act by providing that premium rates shall not be excessive, inadequate or unfairly discriminatory.  (Ra35 and 37).  After the Legislature enacted the LTCI Act, the Department promulgated rules to implement it.  (Ra108).  The rules, N.J.A.C. 11:4-34.1, et seq., are based on the [...]’s Model Regulation (#641).  (Ra40-41).  The Department adopted the rules to establish the minimum requirements of information and calculations required to trigger the Department’s review.  (T3:599-19 to 601-3).  The stated purpose of the rules is, among other goals, to promote the public interest, to promote the availability of long-term care policies, to protect applicants for long-term care insurance from unfair or deceptive sales or enrollment practices, and to establish standards for long-term care insurance.  (Ra219).  Critically, when the Department adopted the rules, it made it clear that “[t]hese rules are --- \(^2\)  The [...] is the United States standard-setting and regulatory support organization that was created in 1871 to coordinate regulation of multistate insurers.  Members of the [...] are state insurance regulators.  [...] has participated in [...] meetings and initiatives as an interested carrier.  (Ra39). not intended to supersede the obligations of entities to comply with other applicable insurance laws insofar as they do not conflict with the Act. ” (Ra109).  Approval of carriers’ initial rates or future rate increases are also guided by the [...]’s Guidance Manual for Rating Aspects of the LTC Insurance Model Regulation.  (Ra231).  This manual sets forth guidelines implementing the model regulation (#641) for initial and future rate increase filings.  Under N.J.A.C. 11:4-34.8, 11:4-38.18, and 11:4-40.5, initial and future rate schedules must be supported by an actuarial certification signed by a member of the [...].
[brief] ”  Van Natta Mech. Corp. v. Di Staulo, 277 N.J. Super. 175, 182 (App. Div. 1994) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Printing Mart-Morristown v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 116 N.J. 739, 751-52 (1989); Mandel v. UBS/PaineWebber, Inc., 373 N.J. Super. 55, 79-80 (App. Div. 2004).