[brief] 4 256 N.J. 213 (2024).  Our Supreme Court in *Fair* observed that “an objective component is necessary for a prosecution for a threat of violence under N.J.S.A. 2C:12-3(a) to survive” scrutiny under the Federal and State Constitutions.  *Id.* at 237; *U.S. Const.* amend. I; *N.J. Const.* art. I, ¶ 6.  Under the State Constitution, that objective inquiry requires the jury to determine “whether a reasonable person would have viewed the defendant’s words as threatening violence . . . not from the perspective of an anonymous ordinary person, but from the perspective of a reasonable person similarly situated to the victim. ”  *Fair*, 256 N.J. at 238 (emphasis in original).  The Court reversed Mr. Fair’s conviction for terroristic threats and remanded the matter for a new trial, in part because the jury was not charged correctly on this component.⁵  *Id.* at 239-41.  In criminal cases, failure to provide clear and correct jury instructions on material issues – such as the elements of the crime – is presumed to be reversible error.  *State v. Jordan*, 147 N.J. 409, 422 (1997); see also, e.g., *State v. Grate*, 220 N.J. 317, 329-34 (2015) (finding plain error because the trial court failed to instruct the jury that “knowingly” modified all material elements of the offense); *State v. Afanador*, 151 N.J. 41, 55-56 (1997) (finding --- ⁵  The jury instructions in *Fair* were deficient in two additional respects not relevant to this appeal: failure to properly instruct on a mens rea of recklessness, and failure to require unanimity as to which statutory provision was violated.  See *Fair*, 256 N.J. at 233-34, 240-41.  plain error where the trial court failed to instruct the jury on an essential element of the drug kingpin statute); *State v. Federico*, 103 N.J. 169, 176 (1986) (“[W]e recognize that the failure to charge the jury on an element of an offense is presumed to be prejudicial error, even in the absence of a request by defense counsel. ”); *State v. Roberson*, 246 N.J. Super. 597, 601, 697 (App. Div. 1991) (finding plain error because the jury was not instructed on an essential element, the weight of the cocaine, even though the evidence was “uncontradicted”).  “[C]ontext matters,” *Fair*, 256 N.J. at 238, especially in a case like this -- where the involved parties have had prior interactions, and where there is a risk of unconstitutionally prosecuting speech that amounts to “angry hyperbole. ”  *Ibid.*  The jury heard testimony from the victim that he had encountered many frustrated or upset litigants over the five years he served as a municipal court judge.  (3T 46-1 to 47-20)  Jurors furthermore heard that [...] had never visited [...]’s home, his law office, or the courthouse, and that he made the phone calls because he was angry no one would answer questions about his municipal court matter.  (3T 49-24 to 50-17; 192-19 to 24)  The jury was never told to consider this important context in its deliberations on the terroristic threats counts.  Here, as in *Fair*, the jury was charged incorrectly on the objective element of a terroristic threat.  Jurors were told to consider [...]’s statements from the perspective of “the ordinary person” (4T 55-24 to 56-2), rather than “a reasonable person similarly situated to the victim,” *Fair*, 256 N.J. at 238.  On this basis, [...]’s terroristic threats convictions (counts 1 and 2) require reversal.