ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] In its opposition to the [...] (“[...]”) in this appeal, [...] (“[...]”) bases its argument on the assertion that the route preferred by [...] through [...] is necessary to enable it to carry out its “Project” for providing an additional source of power that may be deemed necessary for the provision of adequate electrical service.  This is a central fallacy that undermines all of [...]’s opposition.  There is zero evidence that [...]’s preferred route using [...]’s right-of-way has been determined to be necessary.  To the contrary, the record fully establishes the existence of multiple technically feasible ways and routes for connecting additional stations without utilizing [...]’s right-of-way in its public streets.  Because the essence of [...]’s argument on pre-emption is that the Ordinance is pre-empted because it is contrary to state statutes, it is incumbent on [...] to show not only that having a third source of power is necessary (which the Ordinance does purport to address), but also that the route through [...] that [...] prefers to use is also necessary and that other routes that are not subject to the Ordinance are not available.  This, it has not done; and the existence of other available routes that are not prohibited by the Ordinance prevents the existence of any such conflict.  The record, and the language of the Ordinance, is abundantly clear that the Ordinance does not contain an absolute prohibition on [...]’s route if the route were actually necessary for the provision of adequate service.  All [...] had to do was to apply for the ordinance exemption if the planned use of the right-of-way is truly necessary to provide adequate service, and establish that such circumstances exist.  Absent such an application and its denial, the Ordinance does not prohibit a route necessary to provide adequate service, and the Ordinance does not come into conflict with any statute and therefore is not pre-empted.
[brief] But case after case says precisely the opposite: the Council is a public agency that exercises regulatory authority pursuant to a valid legislative delegation and is subject to the DEP Commissioner’s oversight when formulating policies.  The Council’s membership reflects a legitimate legislative decision to vest regulatory authority in those with relevant expertise, and that decision offends neither the separation of powers nor due process.  Accordingly, the decision below must be affirmed. \(^4\)  A.  These Private Nondelegation Challenges Fail Because Precedent Confirms That The Council is a State Regulatory Agency, Not a Private Entity (Responding to [...]’s Point II-V).
[brief] *Broadway Maint. Corp. v. Rutgers, the State Univ.*, 90 N.J. 253, 259 (1982) (the contracting parties “who agree upon the promises, the covenants, the guarantees … are the persons who create the rights and obligations which flow from the contract”).  The intent of the contracting parties here could not be clearer.  Under the heading “Application to Third Parties,” the December Terms state that the “Arbitration Agreement shall be binding upon, and shall include any claims brought by or against any third parties, including but not limited to your spouses, heirs, third-party beneficiaries and assigns, where their underlying claims arise out of or relate to your use of the Services. ”  (Da85.)⁴  [...] is both a spouse of the contracting party and a third-party beneficiary, and his claims clearly “arise out of” and “relate to” [...]’s “use of the Services.
[directive] Degree  Bail Range 10%  Cash Bail Option  2C:12-1b(2)  Aggravated Assault  Actor attempts to cause or causes bodily injury with a deadly weapon.  3rd Degree $20,000 to $50,000 10% permissible  2C:12-1b(3)  Aggravated Assault  Actor recklessly causes bodily injury with a deadly weapon.  4th Degree $1,000 to $2,500 10% permissible  Actor, knowingly under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of 2C:12-1b(4)
[brief] Fourth, Plaintiff’s argument that his decision to forego certain private legal work due to a potential conflict with the County rendered him an employee must be rejected.  In making this claim, Plaintiff conflates the Board objecting to his outside work representing private clients or inability to represent certain clients in private practice with the Board controlling his work as County Counsel.  Under RPC 1.7, an attorney “shall not represent a client if the representation involves a concurrent conflict of interest. ”  This occurs when a representation of one client “will be directly adverse to the other client,” or if “there is a significant risk that the representation of one or more clients will be materially limited by the lawyer’s responsibilities to another client. ”  RPC 1.7(a)(1)-(2).  Notably, unlike private clients, a public entity such as [...] may not consent to or waive a concurrent conflict of interest.  RPC 1.7(b)(1).  In D’Annunzio, the Court noted that the Appellate Division, in emphasizing the control factor under Pukowsky, “focused on factors that examine the nature of the employer’s right to control the work of a licensed professional . . . not the right to control the outcome, but rather to manage how that work is performed for the purposes of the employer’s business operations.  . . .  [W]e agree with the emphasis in the Appellate Division’s analysis.  . . .”  Id. at 125.  Thus, when evaluating the “control” factor of the Pukowsky test, a court must look to the extent that the employer had control over the individual’s work as it relates to the employer’s business operations.  In this case, Plaintiff had a legal obligation to refrain from any outside representations that may constitute a concurrent conflict of interest with [...].  [...] did not possess the legal ability to waive any such conflict.  If an attorney represents a public entity, such as a county, it is possible that numerous conflicts arise, for instance a potential inability to represent any clients with land use applications that may be before the county planning board.  However, the existence of these potential conflicts in no way establishes “control” by [...] over Plaintiff for purposes of CEPA.  The “control” under the statute is based upon how work is performed for the employer’s own business operations.  While Plaintiff may have wished he had the ability to pursue certain private representations during his time as County Counsel that he had to forego due to legal conflicts, that does not support him having a right of action as an employee under CEPA after his statutory term expired.  The control analysis is limited to Plaintiff’s work for [...], not the outside work that he passed upon due to conflicts of interest.  The conflict provisions of the RPCs, which are designed to protect the interests of attorneys’ clients, cannot be construed as determining whether attorney is an employee under CEPA, which is a wholly different inquiry.  For these reasons, the trial court correctly held that Plaintiff was an independent contractor for purposes of CEPA.
[brief] **Procedural History**  On May 30, 2022, Appellant filed a complaint in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Ocean County in the Special Civil Part, Small Claims Division (Pa1).  The matter was scheduled for trial on August 12, 2022 (Pa7).  On August 11, 2022, Respondent filed a motion to dismiss (Pa8).  Appellant requested an adjournment which was granted.  The trial court sent the matter for mediation.  After an unsuccessful mediation, the case was rescheduled for Sept 23, 2022.  On September 23, 2022, the trial court heard oral argument on the motions and cross motions.  A transcript is attached as 1T.
[brief] (122-126; 481).  According to [...], this “specialty insurance program [was] developed to cover the inherent risks involved for the schools, park districts, coaches, directors and participants of today’s conferences, sports camps and clinics”.  (Ia581-590).  The [...] application states that “[a]ccident and liability insurance coverage is offered as a standard product with optional coverage also available such as . . . hired and non-owned automobiles”.  (Ia582).  [...]’s application states “Hired and Non-Owned Automobile Liability Coverage”, “provides protection for rented, borrowed and other non-owned vehicles driven on camp, clinic or conference business”.  (Ia583).  That same page with respect to the “General Liability Coverage” portion of the application, is a section entitled --- 4  [...] is the underwriter and program administrator for [...]’s Sports and Entertainment Insurance Program.  (Ia481)  In this role, [...], *inter alia*, underwrote policies pursuant to underwriting guidelines established by [...].  (Ia481; 490).  5  [...] failed to submit as part of its motion the completed version of the application that [...] submitted to [...] in 2019, nor did [...] provide a blank copy of the Dean application as it existed in 2019.
[brief] Cross Motion to Consolidate and Opposition to Summary Judgment to Consolidate  Complaints 9/26/23  Pa485  Compliant and Jury Demand filed 9/26/23  [...] for proposed consolidation to current complaint  Pa488  Exhibit A to [...]’ Certification  Amended Notice of Claim  Filed against [...] and [...] on behalf of [...], 6/24/2022 Pa505  Exhibit B to [...]’ Certification  Unsigned undated Order finding plaintiff guilty of offense  Pa507  Exhibit C to [...]’ Certification  Undated Order finding Tremayne [...]  Guilty with Signature on Judge’s signature line (Attached at Pa168)  Exhibit D to [...]’ Certification Certification of Disposition from [...] regarding Tremayne [...] dated 5/17/2022 (Attached at Pa467)
[brief] THE VERDICT WAS EXCESSIVE AND SHOULD EITHER BE REMANED FOR A NEW TRIAL OR REMITTITUR.  (Da187).  The majority of Plaintiff’s brief is devoted to arguing that the Plaintiff suffered significant injuries that support the jury’s damage award.  As noted in Defendant’s initial brief, there is no dispute that Plaintiff suffered significant injuries.  However, the amount of damages awarded far exceeds what would typically be awarded for purely orthopedic injuries that were appropriately treated and from which the Plaintiff has made a very good recovery.  Defendants do not intend to callously undervalue Plaintiff’s injuries or the pain and suffering she experienced.  However, a jury’s verdict must be based on a purely objective view of the evidence, untarnished by passion, prejudice, bias, or sympathy.  See Model Civil Jury Charge 1.12.  The significant amount of damages awarded coupled with the allocation of 40% fault to [...] is an obvious indication that the jury wanted to award a certain amount of damages to Plaintiff and knew that it had to tap into [...]’s perceived deep pockets to accomplish that end.
[brief] (Ca22).  On September 27, 2021, the chancery division entered an order for final judgment against [...].  On November 4, 2021, an order was entered in the action under [...], appointing [...] as special master to sell the property at [...] in [...].  (Ca145).  Mr. Gould was appointed special master to conduct the foreclosure of sale pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:50-64(3)(c).  (See order, Ca145).  On January 18, 2022, the special master held a foreclosure sale, at which time the foreclosed property was sold to [...] for $100.00.  (Ca150).  Mr. Gould sold the assets of the [...] at a public sale on January 18, 2022, which was conducted by Mr. Gould as special master having been appointed by the chancery division by order of the Honorable [...], P.J.Ch. of November 4, 2021 (Ca145), appointing [...] to hold the foreclosure sale in place of the sheriffs of Camden County and Burlington County since the property is located on the borderline of the two Counties.
[brief] Moreover, since [...] argues on this appeal that the Trial Court’s decision was unconstitutional, it has placed the relevance of its waiver of a jury trial directly in issue, irrespective of whether the Trial Court addressed that question below.  Here, it is not the subject of any legitimate dispute that [...] voluntarily opted into the AICRA regime.  It is undisputed, as well, that [...]’s own policies – the contracts that it issued to its insureds in exchange for the payment, up front and in full, of premiums for coverage – require mandatory arbitration of all disputes relating to PIP benefits.  Those contracts expressly prohibit medical providers such as the Defendants from accepting an assignment of benefits from an injured insured unless the provider agrees to “[s]ubmit disputes to alternative dispute resolution pursuant to N.J.A.C. 11:3. ”
[brief] The Board itself even passed two separate Resolutions condemning Respondent’s Facebook posts and had to set aside significant time at Board meetings to address complaints regarding Respondent’s social media use.  Consequently, Administrative Law Judge [...] ([...]) found in her Initial Decision that Respondent had violated the Act through her failure to affirmatively disclaim her membership on the Board.  [...] cited to the Commission’s robust body of decisional law on the issue and recommended the penalty of “censure” in accordance with those prior Commission decisions.  Inexplicably, however, the Commission then decided to ignore its own precedent entirely, asserting that Respondent’s Facebook account “lacked a nexus” to her Board membership based on the erroneous conclusion that “her Facebook page did not make any reference to the Board nor her membership on the same. ”  This finding was contrary to clear, unambiguous, and abundant evidence in the record.  It is obvious from the record that Respondent not only held herself out as a Board member from her Facebook page, but that members of the school community protested her at meetings of the Board, meaning that they not only could have seen her as speaking in her role as Board member, but that they actually did see her as speaking in this role, thereby compromising the Board.  The Board itself was also subjected to litigation as a direct result of her social media use.  Further, no party to the matter before the Commission ever sought the relief issued.  Respondent neither cross-moved for summary decision in her favor nor filed exceptions from [...]’s Initial Decision.  As a result, by “rejecting” the grant of Appellants’ Motion for Summary Decision, the Commission effectively denied Appellants’ Motion for Summary Decision.  The appropriate remedy when summary decision is denied without cross-motion is to proceed to a hearing, not to dismiss the Complaint altogether.  By sua sponte dismissing the Complaint itself, the Commission erred as a matter of law.  The Commission also erred in its prior August 23, 2022 decision granting Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss in Lieu of an Answer in part.  In doing so, the Commission improperly weighed the facts in the light most favorable to the party moving for dismissal of Counts 3 and 7, made plain errors in its factual findings, inserted facts not in the record, misconstrued an applicable Executive Order, and directly contradicted its own prior Advisory Opinion.  As that matter is now ripe for appeal under N.J.C.R. 2:2-3(a)(2), it is also being appealed herein.  For all the reasons that follow, Appellants now request that the Appellate Division 1) reverse the Commission’s Final Agency Decision which dismissed the entire Complaint outright, and 2) reinstate Counts 3 and 7 of the Complaint.
[brief] Section 1:7-5 of the Revised Statutes is amended to read as follows:  1:7-5.  Any citizen of the State may, when a petition is filed under au- thority of either section 1:7-1 or section 1:7-4 of this Title, appear before the court, in person or by counsel, subpoena and examine and cross-examine witnesses and defend the petition.  6.
[brief] PRELIMINARY STATEMENT  The flood of debt collection suits in state courts have “posed considerable challenges to the smooth and efficient operation of courts. ”  See Federal Trade Commission, Collecting Consumer Debts: The Challenges of Change, a Workshop Report, at 55 (Feb. 2009).  In fact, in New Jersey, 1,513,086 contract cases were filed in the Special Civil Part from 2010 to 2014.  See New Jersey Judiciary, Superior Court Caseload Reference Guide 2010 – 2014.  It is estimated that almost 90% of debt collection suits end in default judgments.  See Federal Trade Commission, Repairing a Broken System: Protecting Consumers in Debt Collection Litigation and Arbitration, at 7 (July 2010).  But here, Defendant [...] (“[...]”) and the debt buying industry have become immune from the Consumer Fraud Act’s coverage.  “No person shall engage in business as a consumer lender or sales finance company without first obtaining a license or licenses under this act. ”  N.J.S.A. 17:11C-3(a).  A consumer lender who violates or participates in the violation of any provision of section 3 . . . of this act, shall be guilty of a crime of the fourth degree.  A contract of a loan not invalid for any other reason, in the making or collection of which any act shall have been done which constitutes a crime of the fourth degree under this section, shall be void and the lender shall have no right to collect or receive any principal, interest or charges. . . .  In addition, a consumer lender who knowingly and willfully violates any provision of this act shall also forfeit to the borrower three times any amount of the interest, costs or other charges collected in excess of that authorized by law. ”  N.J.S.A. 17:11C-33(b) (emphasis added).  By failing to first hold the requisite license, [...] engaged in criminal conduct under the New Jersey Consumer Finance Licensing Act (“NCFLA”) rendering Plaintiff [...]’s alleged debt a legal nullity.  However, [...] then enforced [...]’s void debt (and those of the putative class members) through dunning letters and a collection lawsuit.  Worse than suing on time-barred debts which remain valid although unenforceable (see, e.g., *Midland Funding LLC v. Thiel*, 446 N.J. Super. 537 (App. Div. 2016)), [...] sued on void debts, which have no legal significance.  By enforcing an improper, void debt against a consumer, [...] committed fraud in connection with the subsequent performance of the sale of merchandise.  *See* N.J.S.A. 56:8-2.  Thus, [...] must be within the scope of the Consumer Fraud Act.  By dismissing [...]’s Class Action Complaint, the trial court failed to give proper weight to the legislative intent of the NJCFLA, ratified [...]’s fraudulent collection activity, and frustrated the state’s ability to police the consumer credit industry in New Jersey.  Thus, the trial court’s March 21, 2024 Order granting Defendant [...]’s Motion to Dismiss should be reversed.
[brief] ...............................  65  Kline v. Bernardsville Ass’n, Inc., 267 N.J. Super. 473 (App. Div. 1993)  .....  46 Krause v. Taylor, 135 N.J. Super. 481 (App. Div. 1975)  .................................  39  Leang v. Jersey City Bd. of Ed., 399 N.J. Super. 329 (App. Div. 2008), aff’d in part, rev. in part on other grounds, 198 N.J. 557 (2009)
[brief] PRELIMINARY STATEMENT  New Jersey’s entire controversy doctrine (“ECD”) is simple—parties to a dispute must resolve the whole dispute and all related claims, at one time, or be barred thereafter.  The reasons are obvious.  Piecemeal litigation is unpractical, inefficient, and inconsistent.  [...]’s claims in the First Arbitration included all claims related to a dozen construction projects, including the Hackensack Project, and thus the ECD required [...] to assert any related counterclaims or offsets it had for those same projects, including that very same Hackensack Project.  Indeed, [...] included an express allegation in its pleading that it was owed $2.1M for unpaid work at Hackensack, seeking an offset to the profit-sharing it owed [...] on the dozen construction projects at issue.  [...]’s Second Arbitration is a transparent attempt to avoid paying the $4M award entered against it after trial.  This gamesmanship cannot be condoned.  While the benefits and goals of the ECD are simple, in [...]’s view, [...] and [...] should apparently have “12 different arbitrations on 12 different projects…because there’s 12 different arbitration clauses.
[brief] (Ra6).  The same day, the State filed this suit in the Superior Court, Chancery Division, under N.J.S.A. 10:5-14.1, which authorizes the Attorney General or the Director to “proceed against any person in a summary manner in the Superior Court of New Jersey to obtain an injunction” at any time after the filing of an administrative complaint.  (Da3).  Proceeding by Verified Complaint and Order to Show Cause, the State sought temporary restraints and a preliminary injunction to restrain the policy and preserve the status quo while the administrative action was pending.
[brief] In Pond Run Watershed v. Hamilton Tp., 397 N.J. Super. 335 (App. Div. 2008), a typographical error referring to the property's address was deemed not fatal.  However, the reference to "retail/office" use was deemed material because it did not mention a 168-seat restaurant for which a liquor license was sought.  [I]t is readily apparent that this 168-seat, 5,000 square foot restaurant is a component of this development that would be of heightened concern to neighbors and other members of the public, particularly as to issues of traffic, parking, noise and the possible consumption of alcoholic beverages on site.  Id. at 354.  In re [...], 404 N.J. Super. 49 (App. Div. 2008), is not an MLUL case, but it relies on Perlmart and is instructive as a 'counterpoint.'  The Court public notice of a "continuous production bakery" was sufficient for a lay person to decide whether to participate.  Id. at 62.  In Shakoor Supermarkets v. Old Bridge Planning Bd., 420 N.J. Super. 193 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 208 N.J. 598 (2011), the notice referred to a "main retail store" consisting of 150,000 square feet.  The Court held that this description was sufficient even though it did not identify the store as a [...].  [T]he proposed use was described in terms that would permit an ordinary layperson to understand how the property would be used and to be sufficiently alerted to the potential impact of that use upon him or her . . .  We are satisfied that notice of a proposed “main retail store of 150,000 s.f. ” adequately informed laypersons that a major “big box” store was proposed for the site and alerted them to the possible concerns . . .  420 N.J. Super. at 203.  In Northgate Condominium Associates v. Bor. of Hillside Planning Bd., 214 N.J. 120, 141 (2013), the Court generally accepted the "reasonable person" standard enunciated in Perlmart and Pond Run.
[brief] **The Trial Court Did Not Err in its Jury Charges.**  Defendant contends the trial court erred by failing to charge the jury as to all elements of the offense of possession of a handgun without a permit.  N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b).  (Db42).  This argument is without merit, as the record reveals the trial court did in fact charge the jury to all elements of the offense, merely failing to explain the self-explanatory final element.  Additionally, this argument was not raised below, and the method of the charges was consented to by defense counsel, thus same is reviewed by this Court for plain error.  R. 2:10-2.  The trial court very clearly instructed the jury as to the third element of the offense, specifically the lack of defendant having a permit to legally own the handgun.  (9T152-5 to 6).  Additionally, at the charge conference, defense counsel stated “I don’t have an objection to the testimony that he ran a search and the search did not reveal any application for a permit being issued. ” (9T34-2 to 19; 9T35-8 to 11).  Defendant’s arguments to the contrary are unavailing.  Simply put, leaving out an explanation of what “not having a permit” is undoubtedly differentiable from completely leaving out the third element of the offense.  The lack of an explanation of “not having a permit” could not possibly lead “the jury to the result it otherwise might not have reached. ”’’  Benedetto, 120 N.J. at 261 (quoting Macon, 57 N.J. at 335).  Thus, defendant’s arguments on this point must be rejected in their entirety.