ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] Before each subsequent session, the grand of jury should be reminded the ongoing requirement to maintain secrecy, including by participating from a private location, preventing access by others, and never photographing, of jury recording, broadcasting, or otherwise sharing records the grand proceeding.  The of reminder should note that there are criminal consequences from violating the oath secrecy.  Supplement Directive #23-06 to 2020 May 15, Page5 of Attachment 2 -- COVID-19 Supplement to the Oath Secrecy for Grand Juries Convening in a Virtual Format of be Note:  The following colloquy would done in a private breakout room in the presence the Judge, Grand Jury Clerk, Prosecutor, and Juror, and recorded on CourtSmart.
[brief] I  BOTH OF DEFENDANT’S STATEMENTS SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUPPRESSED IN THEIR ENTIRETY BECAUSE HE WAS IN CUSTODY WHEN QUESTIONED WITHOUT MIRANDA WARNINGS ON MARCH 6, WHICH RENDERED INEFFECTIVE THE WARNINGS GIVEN PRIOR TO HIS INTERROGATION ON MARCH 12.  (21T50-23 to 61-17; Da128-130)  The police interrogated Defendant twice in March 2018: once on March 6 and once on March 12.
[brief] One of these considerations includes the fact the defendant was sentenced on his Essex firearm charges to a period of non-custodial probation after the mandatory minimum period of incarceration was removed through a Graves act waiver. \(^6\) Ibid.; N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6.2.  Placing significance on the noncustodial probationary sentence, the lower court reasoned:  “Until a pending matter is disposed, there will be uncertainty about the outcome; once disposed, the parties and Recovery Court judge have the information needed to assess the known outcome.  Here, the known result of Defendant’s firearms conviction was a sentence of non-custodial probation.  There is no sound reason such a non-custodial --- \(^6\)  The State reviewed the January 30, 2023, plea agreement from Essex County and it is devoid of any basis upon which the waiver was sought. outcome in and of itself should disqualify a Track One candidate from a Recovery Court probationary sentence. ” [(Sa83). ]
[brief] 442 S.E.2d at 784.  The lease included an “excused rent” provision, mirroring the Concession Recovery Provision, whereby the tenant was not required to pay base rent for the first nine months, but that excused rent that “shall become due and payable” in the event tenant defaulted.  Ibid.  Tenant defaulted in the 37th month of the lease, and the landlord sought to recover the nine months of excused rent.  Ibid.  Like Appellants here, the tenant argued that the excused rent provision was a liquidated damages clause and constituted an unenforceable penalty.  Ibid.  The Georgia Court of Appeals rejected this claim, finding that the excused rent provision was not a liquidated damages clause but, instead, a condition on the tenant’s right to be excused from rental payments it had agreed to pay.  Id. at 784-85.  Indeed, the court explained that “[t]he first nine months’ rent became due and payable once the lease was breached. ”  Id. at 785.  In seeking to recover the amounts in excused rent, the court reasoned that the landlord was “not suing for damages it suffered as a result of [tenant’s] breach; it is merely suing for unpaid rents that accrued prior to the breach, and that have become due and payable only as an agreed upon consequence of that breach. ”  *Ibid.* (emphases in original).  The rationale of *Manning* is directly applicable here.
[brief] (Drb26).  Defendants cite no law or rule that would make this alleged distinction meaningful, and Plaintiffs have not found any such authority.  Lastly, Defendants proffer a “no harm, no foul” defense by arguing the procedural deficiency should be ignored because Plaintiffs opposed the motion in limine with respect to attorney’s fees in their trial brief.  (Drb26).  In Cho, this Court rejected the “no harm, no foul” defense when a party files a summary judgment motion wrongfully styled as a motion in limine:  “Further, we utterly reject the argument that the dismissal should be affirmed, despite the violation of summary judgment rules, because plaintiffs suffered no prejudice in the dismissal of claims that lacked merit. ”  Cho, 443 N.J. Super. at 358-59.  This Court should do the same.
[brief] A LTTEL EXEMPTION REQUIRES COMPLIANCE WITH SUBSTANTIVE AS WELL AS PROCEDURAL STANDARDS | 3 | | A. Plain Language | 3 | | B. Intent and Purpose of Statute | 5 | | C. Constitutional Framework | 7 | | D. Standard of Review Cases | 8 | | II.  THE EXEMPTION SCHEME AT ISSUE DOES NOT SATISFY LTTEL’S SUBSTANTIVE STANDARD | 10 | | A. Missing Nexus Between the Benefits of the Project and the Exemption and Disregard of its Full “Costs.
[brief] The [...] ordinances, reflecting the policy of the City, require a 300-foot buffer from any wetlands.  This Finding of Fact document establishes the topographic condition underlying the actual hardship suffered by the subject lot, with 89% of the total lot serving as a necessary buffer to the stream.  No testimony, evidence, or proof has been produced that remotely challenges these findings.  The testimony of the City engineer supports this hardship fact.  The record in both the [...] and [...] applications contains no evidence refuting these findings.  Despite this, the facts established by the [...] were not included in the “Merits” that form the basis for any determinations or legal conclusions by the Board or the trial court.  Consideration must also be given to the comments in Hawrylo v. Board of Adjustment, 249 N.J. Super. 568, 579 (App. Div. 1991), where it was noted that the Legislature, in 1984, broadened the term ‘hardship’ to “specifically include an extraordinary or exceptional situation uniquely affecting a specific piece of property. ”  In Ten Stary Dom Partnership v. Mauro, 216 N.J. 16 (2013), at p. 29, it was emphasized:  Hardship, however, is not synonymous with complete inutility due to the land use restriction, although the inability to use the property for any productive use absent a variance often informs the decision to grant a variance from bulk requirements.  Consider the following: the [...] requires a setback of no more than 100 feet; the City of [...] ordinances, and hence its policy, prohibit construction within 300 feet of wetlands.  Wetlands are established on 89% of the total property, and another part of the [...] ordinances urges a 200-foot setback in the R-25 zone, when practicable.  This comprehensive understanding of the physical and regulatory constraints underscores the legitimacy of the hardship claims and the necessity for appropriate relief.
[brief] [...] did not identify a basis showing that she sought to alter the terms of the Agreement or that her job offer would have been rescinded for refusing to assent to arbitration.  While [...] appears to urge the presence of unequal bargaining power, (Pb33–34), she fails to acknowledge *Martindale* or its holding, much less overcome it.  *See also Young v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am.*, 297 N.J. Super. 605 (App. Div. 1997) (explaining that a plaintiff must show “circumstances substantially more egregious than the ordinary economic pressure faced by every employee who needs the job” to avoid an arbitration agreement), *certif. den.*, 149 N.J. 408 (1997).
[brief] (Da34).  The emphasized portions of the disputed statements demonstrate only that [...] did not immediately accept a potential suspect’s statements at face value.  The first excerpt, including the comment “What if I told you, you walked past Governor [Street],” is clearly distinguishable from the comments cited on pages Da23 and Da24 of the remand order; the comments in the remand order attack defendant’s innocence and credibility by accusing him with certainty based on the relevant surveillance footage, whereas the comment in the redacted interrogation video is less clear, and can be interpreted as challenging defendant’s statement or clarifying whether he walked “up,” or “past” Governor Street.  (Db13).  The second excerpt similarly appears to reflect [...]’s attempts to clarify where defendant traveled in relation to [...]’s understanding of Paterson’s layout.  (Db13 to 14).  [...]’s question “[w]hat happened to [...]?” did not imply his opinion as to defendant’s guilt or a reference to evidence.  (Db14).  In the third and fourth excerpts, [...] states that “taking a life [isn’t] easy,” asks whether defendant would “stick with [his] story,” and states that “everybody’s going to want to know. ”  (Db14 to 15).  These comments demonstrate [...] challenging and confirming the statements made by a potential suspect.  [...]’s offhand comment as to “evidence” does not indicate what evidence [...] was referring to, how it related to defendant, or how that purported evidence should have been interpreted.  (Db14).  Assuming arguendo that the disputed statements from the interrogation video were improperly admitted, their admission was not “clearly capable of producing an unjust result" mandating reversal.  (R. 2:10-2; see Trinidad, 241 N.J. at 445).  As he did not mention the surveillance videos or other specific pieces of evidence, [...]’s comments in the redacted video did not infringe upon the jury’s responsibility to fairly interpret that evidence.  (See Da34 to 35).  Even if the jury initially agreed with [...]’s alleged opining on defendant’s guilt, they --- 3 “[...]” was [...]’s nickname.  (2T:70-9 to 15 and 111-8 to 9).  repeatedly heard defendant’s arguments regarding the credibility of State’s star witness, the quality of the surveillance footage, the differences between the clothing worn by defendant and the shooter, and the purported incompetent investigation conducted by the [...].  (See 5T:72-4 to 81-11).  As these arguments were based directly on the evidence presented, they diminished the possibility that the jury would lend [...]’s improper comments undue credence.  Further, after the prosecutor’s summation, the trial court instructed the jury to independently assess the credibility of all witnesses and evidence presented.  (5T:120-18 to 125-20).  As the trial court complied with the Appellate Division’s remand order, defendant’s convictions should be upheld.  **POINT II**
[brief] E)  The R. 1:4-8 letter was defective.  [...]’s attorney moved to dismiss our claims because the vehicle’s title was still in our mom’s name.  In [...]’s *R.1:4-8* letter, he cited no authority at all for his position that we lacked standing.  Moreover, in that same *R.1:4-8* letter, [...] stated he would seek sanctions “in the event that [his] analysis is correct”, which I interpreted to mean that he was not sure if his analysis would be deemed to be correct or not, thus I allowed the issue to go forward and be submitted to this Court to decide.  This interpretation was confirmed in ¶4 of [...]’s Sep 29, 2022 certification in support of his motion for sanctions (Pa75), where he states: “application for sanctions, if I were correct on my analysis, would be made. ”  [...]’s use of the word “if” removes any refutation of the fact that he himself was uncertain if his analysis would be deemed to be correct or not.
[brief] Counts I through VI were dismissed as being claims against non-party individuals and claims not within this Arbitration.  These claims were dismissed. ”  (Da2218)  On March 25, 2019, U.S. District Judge [...] issued an order dismissing [...]’s separate complaint against some of the Individual Plaintiffs, their lawyers, and the [...], finding [...] failed to plead a valid RICO, breach of fiduciary duty, or any other claims.
[brief] [...], et al., Don’t I Know You?  The Effect of Poor Acquaintance/Familiarity On Witness Identification, The Champion 53 (April 2012)  .................................................................31  [...] Obituary, Press of Atlantic City (Sept. 6, 2012)  .........................46  LaFave., 3 Crim. Proc. § 11.10(c)(c) (4th ed. 2023)  ...........................................24  TABLE OF CITATIONS
[brief] On December 21, 2023, Defendants filed a motion to reinstate their respective answers.  Da8, ¶ 18.  --- 1  “1T” refers to transcript of the February 8, 2024 hearing.  “2T” refers to the transcript of the hearing on Defendants’ motion for reconsideration and to restore their answers held on March 6, 2024.  “3T” refers to the hearing held on June 12, 2024 on Plaintiffs’ motion to strike Defendant [...]’s answer with prejudice and Defendants’ cross-motion to restore their respective answers.  On February 8, 2024, the trial court (Hon. [...], J.S.C.) held a case management conference in which it went over Defendants’ responses to certain “punch list” discovery demands that the trial court had previously ordered Plaintiffs to promulgate.  See 1T.  On March 6, 2024, [...] heard oral argument on Defendants’ motion to restore their answers, and denied them based on his finding that Defendants had not complied with his instructions at the February 8, 2024 case management conference.  See 2T, Pa3.  On May 8, 2024, Plaintiffs moved to strike Defendant [...]’s answer with prejudice.  Da10, ¶ 31.  Without providing a single bit of additional discovery, on May 28, 2024, Defendants filed a cross-motion to reinstate their answers.  Da10, ¶ 32.  On June 12, 2024, the trial court heard oral argument on the two foregoing motions, and granted Plaintiffs’ motion and denied Defendants’ cross-motion.  See 3T, Da3-5.  On August 2, 2024, this Court granted Defendants motion for leave to appeal the June 12 Orders.  Da1-2.  The trial court filed an amplification of its June 12 Orders on August 6, 2024.  Da6-11.  **STATEMENT OF FACTS**
[directive] While juveniles under eleven years of age may be placed in detention if they are charged with an offense, which, 22 if committed by an adult, would be a crime of the first- or second-degree, or arson, 5:21-5(b); N.J.S.A. 2A:4A- see R. 34(f), Assistant Prosecutors cannot seek detention for any juvenile twelve years of age or under without the express, prior approval of their County Prosecutor and the Director of the Division of Criminal Justice.
[brief] The Traffic Stop Of [...]  At some point prior to August 30, 2018, [...] had entered the registration information of [...]’s vehicle into the New York Police Department’s license plate reader system.  (3T 22-25 to 24-17)  That system has a license plate reader on the bridges between New York and New Jersey.  (3T 24-14 to 17)  On August 30, 2018, [...] received notifications from the license plate reader system that [...]’s vehicle traveled from New Jersey to New York via the George Washington Bridge at approximately 2:40 p.m. and traveled from New York to New Jersey via the Bridge at approximately 3:29 p.m.  (3T 29-13 to 30-9)  In response to this information, [...] and two other officers established surveillance in and around the Life Storage facility.  (3T 31-25 to 32-22)  [...], who was positioned outside the facility, observed [...] drive towards the facility on a nearby road.  (3T 32-15 to 20, 34-5 to 7)  A Toyota Camry with New York plates was “in close proximity” to [...]’s vehicle.  _____________________  3  These facts are derived from [...]’s testimony during the hearing on the motion challenging the stop of [...]’s car.  (3T, 4T) traveling in the same direction.  (3T 34-7 to 10)  Both vehicles turned right towards the entrance to Life Storage, and Flora followed them.  (3T 34-19 to 22)  [...] entered a code into the keypad to open the access gate, and both [...]’s vehicle and the Camry then entered the facility.  (3T 34-23 to 35-1)  Once inside the facility, both vehicles turned right into the row of storage units where unit 126 is located.  (3T 36-8 to 11)  The third surveilling officer, [...], had positioned his vehicle by unit 126.  (3T 36-14 to 15)  [...] pulled up to the unit and the Camry pulled up alongside [...]’s car, then both vehicles continued driving past the unit.  (3T 36-15 to 17, 36-25 to 37-1)  Constance told [...] that it appeared to him that [...] motioned to the Camry driver to keep going.  (3T 36-18 to 24)  Both vehicles then traveled towards the facility entrance, and [...] initiated traffic stops of both cars at that time.  (3T 37-4 to 7, 42-8 to 21)  C.  The Search Of [...]’s Car And The Subsequent Request, Authorization, And Execution Of A Search Warrant For The Storage Unit
[brief] To determine otherwise would lead to an absurd and unreasonable result.  By the lower court’s reasoning, a defendant is legally ineligible for admission into Recovery Court in the present jurisdiction if outstanding charges are pending in a secondary jurisdiction that involve the unlawful possession or use of a firearm.  In this scenario, the defendant enjoys the presumption of innocence, and it is not definitively known whether he did, in fact, possess a firearm.  Nevertheless, he is barred.  However, in the same logical vein, if a defendant is found guilty, by plea or jury trial, of unlawfully possessing or using a firearm in that secondary jurisdiction, he is deemed eligible for Recovery Court in the present jurisdiction.  Under these circumstances, it is definitively known the defendant unlawfully possessed a firearm and, by the mere changing of the case status from “pending” to “closed,” the defendant is transformed into a legally eligible candidate.  Further, even by the lower court’s reasoning, which limits the second clause of factor a(5) solely applicable to the [...] firearm case, the defendant is still legally ineligible for Recovery Court in [...].  The second clause of factor a(5) prohibits the possession of a firearm at the time of any pending criminal charge.  The lower court determined the phrase “at the time of” to mean that once the pending charges for unlawful possession of a firearm and prohibited weapons – firearm without a serial number were resolved through conviction, they are no longer “pending” and then defendant is legally eligible for Recovery Court.
[brief] Moreover, unlike Defendant’s improper Offer of Judgment, counsel’s fee award would be separate from Plaintiff’s monetary relief.  Under these changed circumstances, the trial court should consider $7,500.00 for Plaintiff, plus attorney’s fees and costs a very good outcome indeed.  However, without any real explanation of the trial court’s reasoning or oral argument for counsel to point out that the Offer of Judgment and the Settlement is an apples to oranges comparison, it is impossible to know whether the trial court missed the changed circumstances or decided that the continued litigation produced an insufficiently better result.  The trial court’s failure to explain its reasoning leaves this Court guessing as well.
[brief] (Da287)  As was set forth in the Procedural History, the major goal of the lawsuit was to have an Administrator appointed to search for and locate almost $10 million in assets that Plaintiff swore in his Verified Complaint belonged to the Estate, over and above the $900,000 that had been transferred into [...].  (See Procedural History, supra, pages 2-3).  The document discovery and the depositions taken by Plaintiff during the summary judgment phase were, in large part, in pursuit of that goal (Id., pages 3-4), as were the Administrator’s activities from the date of his appointment.  During the attorney fee phase of the litigation, the court adopted the Administrator’s opinion that was set forth his Certification dated November 6, 2018 (Da186-195) as the final say as to what legal fees should be awarded.  The Administrator attached a spreadsheet to his Certification that totaled all of the fees that had been billed to Plaintiff from the inception of the lawsuit through January 5, 2017, and opined that all the fees and disbursements in each of the invoices should be awarded.
[directive] 10.  Are you presently serving a custodial sentence on another charge?  [Yes]  [No]  a.  Do you understand that a guilty plea may affect your parole eligibility?  [Yes]  [No]  [NA]  11.  Do you understand that if you have plead guilty to, or have been found guilty on [Yes] [No] [NA] other charges, or are presently serving a custodial term and the plea agreement is silent on the issue, the court may require that all sentences be made to run consecutively?
[brief] *Id.*  Pra6.  Pa120.  The Appellate Division had held that “[a]pplying our highly deferential standard of review, we are satisfied that the record sufficiently supports the Commissions' decision that members were provided with adequate notice and instructions for submitting a request for claims reconsideration prior to the December 31, 2014 deadline. ”  *Id.* at 8-9.  Pra7.  The Supreme Court reversed, holding:  2.  Whenever an administrative agency acts, be that act mandatory or strictly voluntary, it must do so reasonably and in a manner calculated to achieve the policies expressed in the agency's organic statute.  Therefore, because the Commissions determined to reimburse affected members, they were necessarily required to do so reasonably and in a non-arbitrary manner.
[brief] Defendants erroneously claim that the trial court found that the criteria in N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-5(b) was not met because the Property was “not unoccupied or unutilized in a way that was detrimental to the welfare of the community”.  (Db21)  However, the trial court only applied the “detrimental to the welfare of the community” criteria from Subsection 5(d) to the lack of occupation/utilization of a building criteria in Subsection 5(b) in the introductory sentence cited by Defendants.
[brief] The Medpay carrier sought to recover those benefits from the workers compensation carrier pursuant to the provisions of N.J.S.A. 39:6A-6.  N.J.S.A. 39:6A-6 states:  The benefits provided in sections 4 and 10 of P.L. 1972, c.70 (C.39:6A-4 and 39:6A-10), the medical expense benefits provided in section 4 of P.L. 1998, c. 21(C.39:6A-3.1) and the benefits provided in section 45 of P.L. 2003, c. 89(C.39:6A-3.3) shall be payable as loss accrues, upon written notice of such loss and without regard to collateral sources, except that benefits, collectible under workers' compensation insurance, employees' temporary disability benefit statutes, Medicare provided under federal law, and benefits, in fact collected, that are provided under federal law to active and retired military personnel shall be deducted from the benefits collectible under sections 4 and 10 of P.L. 1972, c.70 (C.39:6A-4 and 39:6A-10), the medical expense benefits provided in section 4 of P.L. 1998, c. 21(C.39:6A-3.1) and the benefits provided in section 45 of P.L. 2003, c. 89(C.39:6A-3.3).
[brief] The court found two aggravating factors, factor (3), the risk the defendant will commit another offense, and factor (9), the need for deterrence.  N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1a(3), (9).  (30T 54-20 to 25)  It rejected two applicable \(^{19}\) State v. Yarbough, 100 N.J. 627 (1985).  mitigating factors proffered by the defense, factor (8), that “[t]he defendant’s conduct was the result of circumstances unlikely to recur,” and factor (9), that “[t]he character and attitude of the defendant indicate that the defendant is unlikely to commit another offense”  N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1b(8), (9) (30T 57-21 to 58-2), and found only mitigating factor (7), that defendant had a good prior record, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1b(7) (30T 56-16 to 19). 20  Sentencing under the Criminal “Code focuses on the crime, not the criminal,” Yarbough, 100 N.J. at 643; aggravating factors that pertain to the defendant carry less weight than those that pertain to the offense.