ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] As for constructive notice, Smith and Balan made it clear that it was incumbent upon [...] to have familiarity with its lighting requirements, conduct inspection, and most definitely retain competent engineering services to ensure adequate ² “DbL” refers to the opposition brief of [...]. lighting, especially at a dangerous intersection.  It had plenty of time before plaintiff’s accident to have done so but did not.  Its officials turned a blind eye to the problem through their ignorance of the way a lighting system functions and/or ought to function.  Their ignorance and inaction do not do away with their obligation, over many years, to have noticed the absence of effective lighting in a dangerous intersection.  [...] asserts that the location of the accident did not constitute a dangerous condition.
[brief] At bottom, residential development and construction is residential development and construction.  The notion that because low and moderate income housing development and construction is subject to different regulations, such as those of COAH it is a different business than other residential development and --- \(^2\) [...] testified that he had successfully counseled and assisted developers who had less experience than [...] in developing affordable housing projects, and that he would have helped [...] develop the affordable housing project at [...].  1010a (29:14-22); 1013a-1016a (39:3-51:6).  construction is without merit.  Every municipality has its own zoning code, design specifications, and engineering review process, but that does not make a project in a new municipality into a new business for an experienced developer.  Nor does the fact that [...] acted through a new entity, [...], created by [...], through which to perform this project, have any relevance in the reasonable certainty analysis.
[brief] In March 2020, the Board issued an order that provided guidance to participants in the SREC market on the procedures to be followed during the closure of the SREC program.  In the Matter of the Closure of the SREC Registration Program Pursuant to P.L. 2018, c.17, 2020 N.J. PUC LEXIS 269, 18 (March 27, 2020).  With respect to the limitations of grid supply eligibility within the TI program, the Board determined “that grid supply projects that are not proposed on landfills, brownfields or areas of historic fill [Subsection (t)] and that have not previously been approved by the Board as ‘connected to the distribution system’ pursuant to Subsection (r) shall not be eligible for SRECs or for the Transition Incentive program. ”  Ibid.  This effectively excluded the [...] from the TI program unless a waiver of the Board’s rules was requested and approved.
[brief] Our Supreme Court has recognized that the COVID-19 pandemic is an extraordinary situation justifying extraordinary responses.  See generally *New Jersey Republican State Comm'n v. Murphy*, 243 N.J. 574, 580-81 (2020) (upholding the constitutionality of the COVID-19 Emergency Bond Act because the requirement that borrowing must "meet an emergency" extended to "true disaster" of a pandemic).  Our Appellate Division has acknowledged a “clear national and state public policy to combat the health threats posed by COVID-19. ”  See In re City of Newark, 469 N.J. Super. 366, 382 (App. Div. 2021)(Relying on this public policy in supporting a municipality’s authority to implement a vaccination mandate.)  There is guidance from the CDC and multiple Executive Orders that COVID-19 is hazardous to human health, imposing upon employers and the public at large to take actions to mitigate the spread.
[brief] With this background, the DEP’s Consistency Assessment for the project is plainly inadequate.  The following is the sum total of the agency’s Consistency Assessment:  This project is a sewage-generating development.  All proposed activities are located within the limits of the mapped sewer service area, as shown on the plan .  . . .  Therefore, the project is consistent with the Water Quality Management Plan (208 Plan) adopted under the New Jersey Water Quality Planning Act, N.J.S.A. 58:11A-1 et seq.
[brief] However, as mentioned above, at all times relevant to the collection action, [...] had no legal right to collect, enforce, or attempt to collect or enforce [...]’s alleged consumer debt as [...] failed to obtain the required licensure necessary to engage in the “consumer loan business” or act as a “sales finance company” pursuant to the NJCFLA.  See N.J.S.A. 17:11C-2; N.J.S.A. 17:16C-1(f); N.J.S.A. 17:11C-3; N.J.S.A. 17:11C-33(b).  On January 3, 2023, [...] filed his Class Action Complaint alleging that Defendants’ unlicensed attempts to enforce a void debt violated the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act (“CFA”), N.J.S.A. 56:8-1, et seq., and common law.  Later, [...] moved to vacate the default judgment against him in the collection lawsuit; however, to ostensibly avoid risking varying adjudications, the Special Civil Part court determined that [...]’s Motion to Vacate should be decided by the Law Division.  After Defendants moved to dismiss [...]’s Complaint, [...] opposed and cross moved to vacate the default judgment in the collection lawsuit, transfer the collection lawsuit from the Special Civil Part to the Law Division, and consolidate it with the action in the Law Division.  On October 20, 2023, the trial court granted Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss and denied [...]’s Cross Motion to Vacate, Transfer, and Consolidate.  In so doing, the trial court incorrectly reasoned that the NJCFLA expressly precluded a private right of action, that an ostensible lack of a private right of action precludes a defensive application of the NJCFLA, and that [...] has failed to show the elements of a CFA claim.  However, as explained herein, the trial court failed to analyze the legislative intent and history of the NJCFLA as it relates to Defendants’ unlicensed collection activity and [...]’s claims for relief.  Accordingly, the trial court’s October 20, 2023 Orders (Pa155; Pa157) granting Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss and denying [...]’s Cross Motion to Vacate, Transfer, and Consolidate should be reversed.
[brief] (Da17-18, Lease at § 4.02 (“Notwithstanding the foregoing, Landlord shall have the right to elect, at any time at its sole option, to pay the entire outstanding amount of Tenant’s Allowance to Tenant. ”) (emphasis added)).  As discussed immediately below, the other two (2) “reimbursement methods” posited by Tenant are actually each parties’ unique and respective remedies, which do not, in any way, replace either parties’ payment obligations under the Lease.  (Da17-18, Lease at § 4.02).  In this regard, Section 4.02 does not provide for an “automatic offset” of the amounts owed under the Lease, as Tenant alleges.  Rather, this provision provides each party with separate and distinct remedies in the case of non-performance.  Crucially, Tenant’s remedy is exclusive and Landlord’s remedies are cumulative.  Specifically, Section 4.02 provides that if Landlord fails to pay an annual Tenant Allowance payment when due, Tenant’s **sole remedy** is to provide Landlord with written notice\(^{12}\) of the default then, if the same is not cured within ten (10) days of such notice, to deduct the same from the next payment of Minimum Rent when due:
[brief] Pa2 ([...] Cert. at ¶ 5); Hearing Tr. 71:21-73:2.  The parties have also served and responded to written document demands and interrogatories.  Pa2 ([...] Cert. at ¶¶ 2-4).  [...] actively participated in discovery by propounding at least three sets of interrogatories and at least three sets of document demands to various parties in this litigation.  Pa2 ([...] Cert. at ¶ 4).  [...]’s written requests included 46 interrogatories and 72 document demands to [...] alone.  Pa1, Pa4, Pa30 ([...] Cert., Exhs. A and B, respectively).  [...] served 66 pages of written responses and objections to [...]’s interrogatories on November 23, 2020, and [...] served a 46-page written response to [...]’s document demands on November 25, 2020.  [...] also received discovery that was produced in the Utilities Action, including 39 deposition transcripts, some or all of which may not have been available in arbitration.
[brief] As the trial court correctly concluded, the Township could have chosen to be “in the driver’s seat,” but by withdrawing the DJ Action, [...] declared, “we’re going to step out of the driver’s seat.  We are not driving this bus. ” (1T48:24-49:1).  At the reconsideration hearing, the court again noted that “[...] did not have to withdraw its declaratory judgment action when it couldn’t reach an agreement” with [...]; there could have been a contested hearing.  (2T15:24-16:1).  There are consequences for that voluntary decision made by [...].  One of the consequences of that decision is that now the builder’s remedy case continues to the next phase.  The “[j]udicial management of a Mount Laurel trial,” which is to be construed as just as “important to the constitutional obligation” as the Supreme Court’s “substantive rulings,” must be allowed to proceed.
[brief] The LRHL goes on to provide that a municipality which has adopted a redevelopment plan establishing zoning for a redevelopment area may amend that zoning at any time by following the process for a redevelopment plan amendment (which, under N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-7, is essentially the same process as for the adoption of the initial redevelopment plan).  Only after a redevelopment plan is adopted pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-7, can a redeveloper take steps towards actual work on a redevelopment project.  The LRHL defines “redevelopment project” as “any work or undertaking pursuant to a redevelopment plan; such undertaking may include any buildings, land, including demolition, clearance or removal of buildings from land, equipment, facilities, or other real or personal properties which are necessary, convenient, or desirable appurtenances, such as but not limited to streets, sewers, utilities, parks, site preparation, landscaping, and administrative, community, health, recreational, educational, and welfare facilities, and zero-emission vehicle fueling and charging infrastructure.
[brief] There are two significant issues in this appeal.  First is the issue raised in the complaint filed by Plaintiff-Respondent [...], an NJ Nonprofit Corporation (“[...]”): whether the Board unlawfully exercised jurisdiction over [...]’ application for development, or whether because [...] had made a submission to another agency in Hoboken – its Cannabis Review Board – that the “Time of Application” Rule in the Municipal Land Use Law, N.J.S.A. 40:55D-10.5 insulated [...] from Hoboken’s zoning ordinance.  This issue is straightforward, since [...]’ submission to the Cannabis Review Board did not implicate any land use issues, the “Time of Application” Rule had no bearing on that submission, and the triggering date for the “Time of Application” Rule was, as the New Jersey Supreme Court held in *Dunbar Homes, Inc. v. Twp. of Franklin Bd. of Adj.*, 233 N.J. 546 (2018), the date when a complete “application for development” was filed.  Because [...] did not file a complete application for development before the 600-foot restriction became effective, its application was subject to that restriction.
[brief] The court instead considered extraneous information gleaned from the parties’ certifications, which effectively converted the plaintiff’s motion to amend the complaint to a motion for summary judgment under R. 4:46.  In *Brill v. Guardian Life Insurance Company of America*, 142 N.J. 520, 540 (1995), the New Jersey Supreme Court outlined the standard for deciding a summary judgment motion:  [A] determination whether there exists a "genuine issue" of material fact that precludes summary judgment requires the motion judge to consider whether the competent evidential materials presented, when viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, are sufficient to permit a rational fact[-]finder to resolve the alleged disputed issue in favor of the non-moving party.  In *Raverta v. Lake Mohawk Golf Club*, No. A-2682-09 (App. Div. July 29, 2011), the appellate division reversed the trial court’s dismissal of the plaintiff’s complaint because the trial court considered evidence beyond the pleadings and erroneously decided the matter under the *Printing Mart* standard instead of the *Brill* standard.  The *Raverta* court also remarked that the defendants failed to provide a statement of material facts required by R.  4:46- 2(a), which alone may be ground for denying a summary judgment motion.  See R. 4:46-2(a) ("a motion for summary judgment may be denied without prejudice for failure to file the required statement of material facts.").
[brief] Instead, she asked a question only about whether [...] was involved in those discussions, not about what the content of those discussions was.  In other words, the judge denied the mistrial motion based on utterly incomplete information from an utterly incomplete voir dire -- an obvious abuse of discretion.  The judge had information that a State witness’s encounter with jurors was being discussed in jury deliberation and did nothing to explore that specific allegation.  Consequently, defendant’s rights to an impartial jury and due process, as guaranteed to him by the state and federal constitutions, were violated.  Thus, his convictions should be reversed, and the matter remanded for retrial.
[brief] [N.J.S.A. 13:20-28(a)(11). ]  Neither "routine" nor "upgrade" is defined in the statute.  Appellants argue the attributive adjective "routine" modifies each noun in the list, including "upgrade."  They contend their interpretation is supported by the absence of a semicolon after "maintenance and operations," which would indicate the Legislature's intent to separate "routine maintenance and operations" from the other activities in the Exemption, and by the interpretive maxim "noscitur a sociis" — literally: "it is known from its associates."  Isetts v. Borough of Roseland, 364 N.J. Super. 247, 257 n.4 (App. Div. 2003).  They also contend limiting the entire list of activities in the exemption to those of a routine nature best aligns with [...]'s charge to implement "stringent standards governing major development," N.J.S.A. 13:20-2, in the Preservation Area and the goal of the regional master plan to "prohibit or limit to the maximum extent possible construction or development which is incompatible with preservation of this unique area," N.J.S.A. 13:20-10(b)(9).  The [...] and [...] counter that "routine" modifies only "maintenance and operations" as "'routine maintenance and operations' is set off from the rest of the list by a comma," and the disjunctive "or" before "upgrade" "signifies that each phrase is 'distinct and separate from each other,'" (quoting State v. N.T., 461 N.J. Super. 566, 571 (App. Div. 2019)).
[brief] (Pa001-Pa012; Pa231-Pa239).  Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint also alleges that [...] failed to ensure that signs and/or warnings were posted with respect to the proper use of its wheeled flatbed carts, known as “U-boats” and to ensure that all customers followed said proper use of the same.  (Pa231-Pa239).  Initially, [...], [...]’s Regional Manager, testified that there are stickers posted on every U-boat which provide a “warning” to customers on how to push the U-boat and to have a clear view.  (Pa113).  Plaintiffs have failed to establish that there were no warnings on the U-boats or that the warnings were in any way deficient.  [...], assistant store manager at the time of Plaintiff’s accident, testified that the training that he received regarding the safe operation of U-boats was that he was instructed to push the U-boats from behind and to be careful when moving around.  (Pa095).  Plaintiff admits she was shown photographs depicting signs, including the following: “power equipment on premises” and “no children on carts,” and a notice about wearing appropriate shoes within the warehouse.  However, Plaintiffs have failed to establish that said training and warnings/signs were in any way deficient.  (Pa041).  Plaintiffs have even failed to establish the U-boat in question was “overloaded. ”  For example, Plaintiff testified that a photograph produced in discovery (contained in the Appendix at Pa040; Pa172) appeared to be the subject U-boat that struck her.  (Pa040; Pa172).  The U-boat is designed with a top shelf and the photograph depicts products resting on same.  There is no evidence that this U-boat was used in any way other than the manner in which it was designed.  Plaintiffs attempt to cover their failure to obtain a liability expert report by contending that their expert needed access to video surveillance footage in order to render an opinion.
[directive] Charging Decisions Informed by Automated Pretrial Risk Assessment and Other Information Sources.  Risk-Assessment Score Values and Flags.  4.2.1  Except in cases involving specified serious charges that must be charged by complaint- warrant as required by Rule 3:3-1(e), as recently amended, or in cases involving non-indictable offenses for which fingerprinting is not required by statute, see subsection 2.2.2, the decision whether to issue a complaint-summons or to apply to a court for a complaint-warrant under this Directive will be informed by the results generated by the automated pretrial risk-assessment process approved by the Administrative Director of the Courts pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:162- 25(c).8  See, e.g., subsection 4.5.1.  The automated pretrial risk-assessment process is initiated 8  Although this Directive generally relies on the results of the preliminary automated pretrial risk assessment, some provisions rely on other factual grounds to guide the exercise of charging discretion.  See, e.g., subsection 4.5.2 (establishing a presumption to apply for complaint-warrant based on a violation of a domestic violence restraining order or a Sexual Assault Survivor Protection Act order), subsection 4.5.4.b (establishing a presumption to apply for complaint-warrant when specified offenses are charged), and subsection 4.5.5 (establishing a presumption to apply for complaint-warrant when the present offense was committed while on release for another offense).  In many instances, a case will invoke a presumption to charge by complaint-warrant under more than one subsection.  In other words, a case may fall under a provision that is based on a risk-assessment score or new violent criminal activity flag and also fall under a provision that is based on a criterion independent of the risk-assessment results.  That is to be expected given that the independent criteria to be used by prosecutors under this Directive (e.g., present offense Page 27 by police after the defendant’s fingerprints have been taken by Live Scan at a police station.  A preliminary public safety assessment is made available to police and prosecutors before the complaint-summons versus complaint-warrant decision is made.  If a complaint-warrant is approved by a judge or other judicial officer, the risk-assessment process will be completed by the pretrial services program while the defendant is detained for up to 48 hours at the county jail.  Throughout Section 4 of this Directive, the term “automated pretrial risk assessment” generally preliminary refers to the pretrial risk-assessment process done by a computer program administered by the AOC and initiated by police before a defendant is transported to a county jail, where the assessment results will be reviewed and may be modified based on additional information input by the pretrial services program.
[brief] They also got a fee award for conduct that violated the Court’s Order changing management control.  (Da3150)  [...] would not be “rewarded”, as *Balsamides* sought to avoid, by obtaining fair value in this case precisely because of those separate and prior damage and fee awards not present in *Balsamides*.  Under these facts, *Balsamides* would have followed the companion decision of *Lawton* and found no “extraordinary circumstances” warranted less than fair value to [...].  As well, like in *Brown*, “liquidity” of [...]’s shares was irrelevant here, where Plaintiffs have no interest in selling.  They refused even to consider a competitor’s solicitation for a sale, elicited during the valuation hearing.  (9T74:20-22)  The Chancery Court here also did not even make the finding that the case was “extraordinary”.  (Da3202-05)  It simply ruled that the discounts normally should be applied as a matter of law, and that “equity” warranted a discount here.  (Pa3205)  It did not say specifically what equity that was, other than [...]’s past oppressive actions, which the Court even agreed had been already litigated and decided.  (Pa3204)  Both of these decisions were errors of law.  Discounts should not normally apply.  Casey, supra.  This case also could not be deemed “extraordinary” given the prior, separate damage and fee awards made for misconduct.  A proper valuation here should have been just a “fair value” appraisal process, without regard to the past oppression or misconduct separately remedied.  To add an additional discount against [...] of $588,000 based on that same conduct granted a windfall to the Plaintiffs, which the law precludes.  Casey, supra, 344 N.J. Super. at 112.  For these reasons, this Court should reverse and remand for entry of judgment for the fair value of [...]’s interests, without Plaintiff’s legal fees as a ‘company’ liability and without any discounts.
[brief] N.J.S.A.54:5-86(a), which would have been as of December 29, 2022, two years from the tax sale.  Plaintiff’s procedure did not comport with the statutory requirement that the “filing shall include a “certification of the public officer or tax collector” or in the absence of those the sworn statement of a licensed person or who has professional qualifications.  For otherwise a plaintiff seeking to justify the “filing” after a complaint is filed would not know for months if a Court determines the property meets the definition of abandoned property.  The chronology of this juxtaposition process is that at the time of the Notice of Publication’s service upon the Defendant, and others, there was no finding of abandonment.
[brief] The trial court reasoned:  The Ordinance effectively prevents [...] from completing the Project as it regulates utility pole installation by regulating the precise pole placement, pole height, pole diameter, and pole material.  However, the Court finds that the Ordinance is preempted by the Supreme Court’s decision in *In re [...]* as applied to high-capacity transmission lines.  See *In re Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas Co.*, 35 N.J. 358 (1961).  Generally, a municipality has broad power as delegated by the State.  *Id.* at 370.  However, that power is restricted in matters in need of uniform treatment.  *Id.* at 371.  The Supreme Court stated that “It is rather difficult to conceive of a subject which more requires uniform regulation at a high and broad level of authority than the method of transmission of electric power. ”  *Id.* at 373.  Further, the Court determined that *N.J.S.A.* 48:7-1—the sole potentially applicable statute granting limited consent power to municipalities—only requires “municipal consent where an electric company desires to use public streets for the construction of overhead ... lines, obviously for service to local residents. ”  *Id.* at 373.  Thus, the Court determined that the statute's municipal consent requirement does not apply to high-capacity transmission power lines which provide electricity to multiple jurisdictions.  Here, it is undisputed that the Project is multi-jurisdictional.  The Project will upgrade power lines through [...] and eight other municipalities including [...], [...], [...], [...], [...] Park, [...], [...] and [...].  Thus, because the Project is multi-jurisdictional, the municipal consent requirement pursuant to N.J.S.A. 48:7-1 does not apply.  Accordingly, the Ordinance is preempted as [...] does not have the authority to impose a comprehensive regulatory regime on the installation of electric utility poles.