ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] (1T188-18 to 198-9).  [...] was a member of the FBI’s Cellular Analysis Survey Team (CAST) and had specific training and experience with Sprint PCMD technology.  (7T10-18 to 12-23).  [...] explained that PCMD used an algorithm to calculate how far a phone is from a tower even when not in use.  (7T27-15 to 28-14; 7T29-18 to 21; 7T35-4 to 5).  [...] used the Sprint records of defendant’s phone number to determine his location between 2:00 a.m. and 5:07 a.m. on August 11, 2015.  (7T36-18 to 45-8).  Using PCMD, [...] was able to determine that between 2:53 a.m. and 3:29 a.m., defendant’s phone only used one tower, located in --- \(^8\) Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).  downtown Bridgeton.  (7T52-3 to 13; Pa28).  From 2:53 a.m. to 3:07 a.m., the phone used sector three of the tower facing west.  (7T51-8 to 16; 7T54-6 to 11; Pa28).  At 3:07 a.m., the phone utilized sectors three and one, indicating that the phone could have been in an overlapping area between them.  (7T53-15 to 54-25; Pa28).  From 3:07 a.m. to 3:12 a.m., the phone used sector one.  (7T51-17 to 21; 7T54-12 to 55-8; Pa28).  From 3:17 a.m. to 3:18 a.m., the phone utilized sector three again.  (7T51-22 to 23; Pa28).  And from 3:19 to 3:29 a.m., the phone utilized sector two facing southeast.  (7T51-23 to 25; Pa28).  The call detail records showed voice calls from 3:54 a.m. to 5:07 a.m. (7T45-8 to 46-15).  During the calls at 3:54 a.m., 4:40 a.m., and 5:07 a.m., the phone used a tower in downtown Bridgeton where the sector faced south and east.  (7T45-8 to 15; Pa26).  The calls at 4:47 a.m. and 4:54 a.m. used the north-facing sector of a tower in Fairfield.  (7T45-15 to 24; Pa26).  No calling events were recorded between 2:00 a.m. and 3:54 a.m., but call detail records would not show data and third-party application use or text messages.  (7T46-7 to 21; 7T80-14 to 18).  The Sprint 3G records for defendant’s phone showed that it was closer to the Bridgeton tower from 3:54 a.m. to 4:40 a.m. and closer to the Fairfield tower from 4:28 a.m. to 4:56 a.m. (7T58-11 to 59-19).  Based on the above evidence, the jury found defendant guilty of the lesser included offense of reckless manslaughter.  This appeal follows.
[brief] In considering plaintiff’s objections to defense counsel’s questioning of [...], [...] noted that the rulings on the motions in limine related to expert testimony, specifically the testimony of plaintiff’s experts regarding alleged violations of statutes and regulations, as opposed to plaintiff’s own testimony.  (See 2T142:4-145:19; 2T148:1-4.)  Additionally, the surveyor, [...], was now unavailable as a witness, and defendant did not intend to introduce the documents themselves as evidence.  (See 2T145:20-147:8.)  [...], LNHA testified, on questioning by defense counsel, that she received a complaint from the state regarding [...], and that it was part of her job to field such complaints.  She was not further questioned regarding the NJDOH investigation.  (See Pb6; 3T40:23-41:13.)  Plaintiff questioned all of the defense fact witnesses, including respiratory therapist [...]; director of nursing [...], RN; nurses [...], LPN and [...], LPN; and even administrator [...], LNHA at length regarding respiratory care and medications, often over the defense’s objections.  (See 2T100:20-103:3; 2T103:19-106:18; 2T112:11-119:2; 2T124:23-128:9; 2T128:12-132:5, 2T197:10-203:15 (Nurse Aro); 2T219:14-222:5; 2T229:18-256:7 (Nurse Lanier); 2T39:5-43:15; 2T75:3-92:8 (Nurse Lanier); 2T111:7-115:10, 2T137:3-142:6 ([...], LNHA); 2T145:1-148:2; 2T152:10-161:10; 2T164:22-177:14; 2T177:15-197:17; 2T252:2-254:11 (respiratory therapist [...]); 2T21:19-39:19, 2T108:11-110:12 (Nurse Libang).
[brief] [...], filed June 27, 2019, charged defendant [...], in four counts, with murder and attempted murder under N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3a and 2C:5-1 and gun possession under N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4a and 2C:39-5b.  (Da 1-2)¹  Following a 15-day trial before the Hon. [...], J.S.C., and a jury, in September and October 2021, [...] was acquitted of murder and attempted murder and convicted of the lesser-included offenses of passion/provocation (“p/p”) manslaughter and attempted passion/provocation manslaughter and the gun charges.  (29T 6-21 to 10-4; Da 3-8)  At sentencing, in February 2022, the court merged the gun charges with the manslaughter convictions and imposed maximum and consecutive terms on the manslaughter convictions amounting to an aggregate sentence of 20 years, 17 years without parole.  (30T 59-22 to 62-23; Da 9-14)  The notice of appeal was filed on March 11, 2022.  (Da 15-18)  ¹ Da – appendix PSR – Presentence Report  STATEMENT OF FACTS
[brief] 2T refers to the trial transcript, dated January 19, 2023.  (Vol. 1).  3T refers to the trial transcript, dated January 19, 2023.  (Vol. 2).  4T refers to the trial transcript, dated January 20, 2023.  5T refers to the trial transcript, dated January 24, 2023.  6T refers to the trial transcript, dated January 25, 2023.  7T refers to the trial transcript, dated January 26, 2023.  8T refers to the trial transcript, dated January 27, 2023.  9T refers to the trial transcript, dated January 31, 2023.  10T refers to the trial transcript, dated February 1, 2023.  11T refers to the sentencing transcript, dated March 21, 2023.
[brief] Id. at 586.  See also State v. O'Loughlin, 270 N.J. Super. 472, 477 (App. Div. 1994); State v. Godfrey, 131 N.J. Super. 168, 176 (App. Div. 1974), aff'd, 67 N.J. 267 (1975).  A "certain set of facts may constitute an arrest whether or not the officer intended to make an arrest and despite his disclaimer that an arrest occurred."
[brief] The analysis stops there.  Finally, the Borough makes the conflicting arguments, both specious, that the trial court did not make clear what map it was relying on to reach the conclusion that the Roads were dedicated to the Borough; and then in the next breath says that the trial court was relying on the 2010 Map or the 2005 Map, but that it could not do so because the Borough never approved such maps.  (Db14-Db15; Db22.)  Both of those statements are false.  In reality, the trial judge made clear on multiple occasions that she was referring to the 2010 Map and 2005 Map (which makes sense, because those are subdivision maps, and the statute requires that the dedication be on a subdivision or site plan map).  (Da8-Da9; Da14-Da15; Da20.)  Moreover, the subdivision maps were clearly approved by the Borough: the 2010 Map is signed by the Planning Board (both the Chairman and Secretary signed it), the Borough Engineer, and the Borough Clerk.  (Da173.)  (The 2005 Map contains the same signatures and approvals, except it is signed by the Zoning Board instead of the Planning Board (Da171).)  The Borough Clerk even certified on the 2010 Map that “[t]he streets, roads, and public rights-of-way shown on this map have been approved by the proper municipal boards/authorities. ”  (Da173.)  B.
[brief] (Da78, ¶26; Da84, ¶40; Da89, ¶53; Da93, ¶66; Da98, ¶85; Da104, ¶100; Da108, ¶114; and Da112, ¶125).  The one-page Owner Acknowledgment Form and the Public Offering Statement make absolutely clear that all exchanges and/or reservations were subject to availability.  (Da193, ¶¶ 2, 6 & 7; Da232-233, ¶11).
[brief] When parties agree to arbitrate a specific dispute only before a specifically named individual with unique expertise as the “sole arbitrator” of that dispute and make no provision for the appointment of a substitute arbitrator; can a court force the parties to instead arbitrate the dispute before a different individual selected by the court?  Both basic contract law and the law of arbitration provide the same answer: No.  Because that is exactly what the trial court did here, its decision must be reversed.  Plaintiffs [...] and [...] (collectively, “[...]”) and Defendant [...]  (“[...]”) entered into a written settlement agreement at a mediation appointing [...] to serve as the “sole arbitrator” of disputes concerning the implementation of that settlement.  [...] was not a random selection.  He was the mediator who presided over the mediation, conceived the terms of the settlement, and drafted the settlement agreement.  He was literally the best-suited person on Earth to interpret and enforce the terms of the settlement agreement in the event of a dispute.  Such a dispute later arose.  Unfortunately, during related litigation between the parties, [...] passed away and the arbitration agreement provides no mechanism for naming a replacement arbitrator.  [...] instituted an action seeking appointment of a substitute arbitrator, which the trial court granted.  Well-established precedent indicates that where the parties have agreed to a specifically named arbitrator and there is no provision in the arbitration agreement for replacing that arbitrator, the agreement to arbitrate only extends to an arbitration before that person.
[brief] POINT FOUR THE SEPARATION AGREEMENT WAS PROPERLY CONSTRUED AS A JOINT PRODUCT OF THE PARTIES AND SHOULD NOT, AS APPELLANT REPEATEDLY CONTENDS, BE CONSTRUED AGAINST EITHER PARTY (raised below at 1T 10:2-17)  Appellant argued at Db36 that Respondent should have known that the Agreement would be rejected by the [...] when he signed it.  Initially, the Agreement is to be construed as a joint product of the parties and should not be construed against either party (Da 20, Par. 20).  Therefore, in good faith and dealing, both parties acknowledged that a severance of certain terms might be required (Par.18), and the Agreement provided for that correction if that was needed.  The scope of the Severance clause is not limited under the agreement.  Counsel for Appellant now claims that the parties knew the Agreement would never be honored, signed it anyway, and the Respondent was “cooked” once he signed a letter of resignation under the agreement (1T 15:20 to 1T 16:3).  Appellant therefore is arguing against the facts of the case and its own agreement with Respondent.  Therefore, the Court correctly observed, "THE COURT: -- [...], then why go through this whole exercise if everybody knew what the law was, and you know, everybody knew that because of this letter, you know, his application to -- for disability would have been futile, why enter into the agreement?  I mean, why would anybody do that?"  (1T 17:6-11)  The Court’s inquiry was based upon well-established law:  A court's role is to consider what is "written in the context of the circumstances" at the time of drafting and to apply "a rational meaning in keeping with the expressed general purpose."  Atl. N. Airlines, Inc. v. Schwimmer, 12 N.J. 293, 302, 96 A.2d 652 (1953); accord Dontzin v. Myer, 301 N.J. Super. 501, 507, 694 A.2d 264 (App.Div.1997).  Sachau v. Sachau, 206 N.J. 1, 5-6.  Wherefore, Appellant’s position at Point II (C) is without merit and without basis in the record below.  POINT FIVE
[brief] Plaintiff [...]  (“plaintiff”) raises two points on appeal.  In Point I, plaintiff claims that the trial court (Judge [...]) erred by reconsidering its prior interlocutory orders issued by Judge [...] (days prior to his retirement), which summarily denied defendants’ Renewed Motion to Dismiss For Lack of Personal Jurisdiction, Renewed Motion to Dismiss For Failure to Join Indispensable Parties, and Alternative Motion to Stay.  Plaintiff’s argument lacks merit.  Defendants promptly and appropriately filed their Motion for Reconsideration because in summarily denying defendants’ motions at the conclusion of a telephonic hearing, Judge Wilson misapprehended and disregarded key facts, failed to follow the applicable law, and relied on matters outside the record and unrelated to any recognized analysis appropriate for resolving the motions before him.  The Motion for Reconsideration was appropriately heard and decided by Judge Thurber because she was the judge assigned to the case after Judge Wilson retired.  In short, defendants’ Motion for Reconsideration was not an impermissible “lateral appeal” as plaintiff contends.  Judge Thurber properly heard defendants’ motion and acted well within her sound discretion to reconsider Judge Wilson’s orders in the interest of justice because Judge Wilson’s summary denial of defendants’ motions was erroneous for multiple reasons and entered without reasoned legal analysis supported by proper findings and conclusions as required by New Jersey law.  Plaintiff claims in Point II that the trial court erred in dismissing this case on the basis of comity because this case was filed before the Missouri Action.  The first-filed rule is not an unflinching mandate.  Rather, it is a flexible doctrine that should give way in circumstances like these.  The reasons for deferring here include that: (1) this is a declaratory judgment case that plaintiff preemptively and surreptitiously filed four days before an agreed-to settlement meeting between the parties; (2) New Jersey has little to no relevant connection to, or local interest in, this case because none of the parties are incorporated or based here, the underlying defense and indemnity contract at issue was made in Missouri and will be governed by Missouri law, and none of the underlying lawsuits for which defendants seek defense and indemnity from plaintiff are venued in New Jersey; and (3) there is a more comprehensive case pending in Missouri, which seeks to recover billions of dollars from plaintiff and five other defendants that the Missouri court has already determined will go forward, and a similarly comprehensive action could not proceed in New Jersey.  An affirmance would be consistent with New Jersey law, supported by the record, and serve the interests of fairness and interstate comity by avoiding unnecessary duplicative, and potentially inconsistent, litigation.
[brief] The four elements of passion/provocation manslaughter are as follows: 1. there must be adequate provocation; 2. “the defendant must not have had time to ‘cool off’ between the provocation and the slaying”; (3) “the defendant must have been actually impassioned by the provocation”; and (4) “the defendant must not have actually cooled off before the slaying. ”  State v. Funderburg, 225 N.J. 66, 80 (2016) (quoting State v. Mauricio, 117 N.J. 402, 411 (1990).  Passion/provocation manslaughter is a “well-established lesser-included offense of murder. ”  State v. Carrero, 229 N.J. 118, 129 (2017) (citing State v. Robinson, 136 N.J. 476, 482 (1994)).
[directive] Page 3 each juror.  Under this alternate procedure the questions must be provided to jurors in print and, at a minimum, the voir dire elements described below must be part of the process.  1.  At the beginning of the voir dire process, each prospective juror in the panel shall be furnished with a printed copy of the voir dire questions, which shall consist of all the standard questions for the case type, as supplemented and determined by the judge at the Rule 1:8-3 conference.  The form of these questions calls for a yes or no answer.  The names of witnesses shall be included in print, either on the form after question #4, or on a separate paper.
[brief] First and foremost, Plaintiffs never raised this argument below and, therefore, it is waived.  N. Haledon Fire Co. No. 1 v. Borough of N. Haledon, 425 N.J. Super. 615, 631 (App. Div. 2012).  [...] was not even mentioned in any of the pleadings or either of Plaintiffs’ trial briefs.  (Da1-14, 517-531.)  Even if Plaintiffs did not waive that argument (which they did), Plaintiffs’ argument nevertheless fails.
[brief] Thus, a post-bid waiver of the Solicitation’s description of the archaeologist as a subcontractor (which drives the PWCRA registration requirement) chills the competitive process and violates the LPCL.  It is also undisputed that the cost of [...]’s proposed PWCRA-registered archaeologist is nearly double the hourly cost of a non-registered archaeologist.  This cost difference alone, in a low-bid solicitation where a penny difference in bid prices can differentiate between the winning and second lowest bidder, creates a competitive advantage to those (like [...]) who violate the PWCRA and Solicitation and utilize un-registered and cheaper archaeological subcontractors.  Respondents’ argument that “[t]he relatively minor difference in cost” between a PWCRA-registered and non-PWCRA registered archaeologist “is inconsequential to the bid results . . . because the price differential between [...]’s bid ($41,819,780) and [...]’s bid ($44,732,529) is so large” ignores settled public bidding law.  Indeed, the Supreme Court declared that it is “[t]he long-standing judicial policy in construing cases governed by the [LPCL] and its predecessors, . . . to curtail the discretion of local authorities by demanding strict compliance with public bidding guidelines.
[brief] Preliminarily, the Court should not accept [...]’s Statement of Facts as accurate.  Virtually all the factual allegations contained therein are drawn from Defendant’s Statement of Undisputed Material Facts submitted with Defendant’s Second Motion for Summary Judgment on June 11, 2021.  (Da69-127).  As part of that motion, Plaintiffs painstakingly showed in their Response to Defendant’s Second Statement of Material Facts that many of these “facts” were not true.  (Da771-938).  [...] continues its obfuscation in its opening brief by citing to evidence that does not support what [...] claims it does.\footnote{As just one example, [...] claims at page 8 of its opening brief that nine Plaintiffs received pre-sales presentation emails warning them that the purpose of the presentation was to sell timeshares.  The documentation cited for six of these Plaintiffs, however, actually shows they did not receive this warning.  ([...], [...], [...], [...], [...], and [...].)}  This Court should not accept any fact supposedly supported by citations to Da69-127 as accurate.
[directive] When presenting a live lineup, the lineup administrator or investigator should follow the below procedures:  1.  Provide viewing instructions to the witness as outlined in subsection I.  B, above.  2.  For sequential live lineups, provide the following additional viewing instructions to the witness:  a.  Individuals will be viewed one at a time.  b.  The individuals will be presented in random order.  c.  Take as much time as needed in making a decision about each individual before moving to the next one.  d.  If the person who committed the crime is present, identify that person.  e.  All individuals will be presented, even if an identification is made prior to viewing all the individuals; or the procedure will be stopped at the point of an identification (consistent with jurisdictional/departmental procedures).  3.  Instruct all those present at the lineup not to suggest in any way the position or identity of the suspect in the lineup.  4.  Ensure that any identification actions (e.g., speaking, moving, etc.) are performed by all members of the lineup.  5.  Avoid saying anything to the witness that may influence the witness’s selection.  6.  If an identification is made, avoid reporting to the witness any information regarding the individual selected prior to obtaining the witness’s statement of certainty.  7.  Record any identification results and witness’s statement of certainty as outlined in subsection III, “Recording Identification Results. ”  8.  Document in writing the lineup procedure, including:  a.  Identification information of lineup participants.  b. Names of all persons present at the lineup.  - 6 - c.  Date and time of the identification procedure.  9.  Document the lineup by photo or video.  This documentation should be of a quality that represents the lineup clearly and fairly.  Photo documentation can either depict the group or each individual.  10.  Instruct the witness not to discuss the identification procedure or its results with other witnesses involved in the case and discourage contact with the media.  11.  Instruct all those present at the lineup not to suggest in any way the position or identity of the suspect in the lineup.  12.  Present each individual to the witness separately, in a previously determined order, removing those previously shown.  III.
[brief] Time references in this brief are to the “real time” depicted on the videos.  The patrol car was not equipped with a dash camera.  (1T14-5 to 10, 47-9 to 12).  stopping you is he’s gotta have his seatbelt on, and you gotta use your blinker, but you can’t put your blinker on after you’re already in the lane you’re going into. ” (1T23-23 to 24-7; Pa1 at 13:36:40).  [...] and defendant both appeared nervous and would not make eye contact.  (1T24-12 to 25-5).  While waiting on county communications to run a warrant check on all three occupants, [...] asked [...] to step out of the car.  (1T25-6 to 20, 26-6 to 27-10).  [...] told [...] that her car smelled like marijuana and told her this was her opportunity to disclose where it was hidden.  (1T27-15 to 18).  [...] admitted that her car smelled like marijuana and that it was located in the center console.  (1T27-18 to 23).  As [...] stood with [...] by the patrol vehicle, [...] walked up to the passenger side of the sedan and asked defendant to exit.  (1T28-9 to 29-1).  After defendant stepped out of the sedan, [...] observed a knife and pepper spray on his waistband.  (1T29-6 to 9, 34-22 to 23).  When asked if he had anything else on him, defendant replied, “nothing. ” (1T29-11 to 12).  [...] conducted a “pat frisk” of defendant and pulled out a bundle wrapped in pages of a pornographic magazine from his left front pants pocket.  Based on his training and experience, [...] suspected that it was narcotics packaged for --- 4 [...] testified that he did not observe that defendant was not wearing his seatbelt until after the stop.  (1T24-8 to 11, 38-18 to 39-1).  distribution. (1T29-12 to 14, 30-5 to 14).  Defendant said it was “weed,” but the narcotics turned out to be approximately 250 bags of fentanyl.  (1T29-15 to 23, 30-17 to 18).  Defendant also testified at the hearing.
[brief] The Trial Court correctly noted that Appellant’s NJFCA claim is deficient because it fails to plead the necessary element of ascertainable loss.  T57-17-22, T58-13-15.  The NJCFA “authorizes a private cause of action when a plaintiff has suffered an ‘ascertainable loss of moneys or property, real or personal’ as a result of a practice in violation of the CFA. ”  Thiedemann v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, 183 N.J. 234, 238 (2005) (quoting N.J.S.A. 56:8-19).  “The certainty implicit in the concept of an ‘ascertainable’ loss is that it is quantifiable or measurable. ”  Id. at 248.  “‘A plaintiff must suffer a definite, certain and measurable loss, rather than one that is merely theoretical. ’  Additionally, plaintiffs must set forth allegations sufficient to show those losses are causally connected to defendant’s alleged conduct. ”  Katz v. Ambit Ne., LLC, Case No. 3:20-cv-1289-BRM-DEA, 2020 WL 5542780, at *4 (D.N.J. Sept. 16, 2020) (citation omitted).  First, even if Appellant were able to demonstrate ascertainable loss, Appellant could not demonstrate that any such loss was attributable to Holder Respondents’ actions.  Because neither [...] nor [...] engaged in any debt collection activities with respect to the Account, no loss can be causally connected to Holder Respondents’ alleged conduct.  Regardless, Appellant fails to plead any ascertainable loss because the Complaint does not allege that he paid more than was owed to the originating lender.
[brief] See 2T24-1 to 2T24-10.  Board Members expressed concern about drainage.  The plans were revised prior to the April 5, 2022 hearing to address stormwater management issues raised by Board Engineer/Planner [...].  See 1T3-9 to 1T3-17.  The applicant represented that it would provide drainage analysis based on 25% lot coverage "[i]f the Board acts favorably on the application" (1T12-11 to 1T12- 12).