ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] A defendant may be convicted of an offense included in an offense charged whether or not the included offense is an indictable offense.  An offense is so included when: (1) It is established by proof of the same or less than all the facts required to establish the commission of the offense charged; or (2) It consists of an attempt to or conspiracy to commit the offense charged or to commit an offense otherwise included therein; or (3) It differs from the offense charged only in the respect that a less serious injury or risk of injury to the same person, property or public interest or a lesser kind of culpability suffices to establish its commission.  N.J.S.A. 2C:1-8e states, “The court shall not charge the jury with respect to an included offense unless there is a rational basis for a verdict convicting the defendant of the included offense. ”
[brief] An appellate court is bound to affirm the trial court’s sentence “unless (1) the sentencing guidelines were violated; (2) the aggravating and mitigating factors found were not ‘based upon competent credible evidence in the record;’ or (3) ‘the application of the guidelines to the facts of [the] case makes the sentence clearly unreasonable so as to shock the judicial conscience. ’”  State v. Rivera, 249 N.J. 285, 297-98 (2021) (quoting State v. Roth, 95 N.J. 334, 364-65 (1984)).
[brief] The Union has not provided this Court with any legal authority to support its argument that the Arbitrator is compelled to write a consolidated contract for the parties.  _In re Borough of Bergenfield_ 2021 N.J. Super Unpub. LEXIS 2398 (App. Div. October 5, 2021), does not support the Union’s baseless contention that the combination of the Captain, Battalion Chief, or Deputy Chief contracts, is a task that should have been performed by the Arbitrator.  In _Bergenfield_, the dispute did not involve contract consolidation, but instead involved a dispute as to whether the contract draft presented by the [...] to Bergenfield accurately reflected the interest arbitration award.
[brief] As noted by the Trial Court:  “…the density proposed: 29 units on an 0.59 acre parcel equates to a density of 49 units per acre.  The proposed FAR, would result in a FAR five times greater than that permitted in the zone as set forth in the Resolution.  The building coverage of 65.1% proposed is as noted in the Resolution, fifty-percent greater than the forty percent permitted coverage …  Essentially in this application and the previous, the Board made clear that that proposed development was too large and intense for the site.
[brief] a.  In any case in which the Legislative Budget Officer has certified, pursuant to this act, that a bill contains no fiscal implications, the introducer of the bill, the chairman of the committee to which the bill was referred, or the presiding officer of the House, may direct the Legislative Budget Officer to request a fiscal note, if, in the opinion of any of them, one is warranted.  b.  In any case in which a bill is amended and those amendments affect the fiscal implications of the bill, the committee chairman or presiding officer shall direct the Legislative Budget Officer to request a fiscal note.  10.
[brief] Executive Order No. 103, Pa424.  •  “The State has been working closely with the CDC, local health departments and healthcare facilities to monitor, plan for and mitigate the spread of Covid-19 within the State. ”  Id. at Pa425.  •  “The spread of Covid-19 within New Jersey constitutes an imminent public health hazard that threatens and presently endangers the health, safety and welfare of the residents…”  Id. at Pa426.  In addition to these Executive Orders, on Monday March 16th (three days after Plaintiff’s email and immediate termination) the Stay At Home Order issued.  Pa431-39.  These Executive Orders cumulatively establish a clear public policy for purposes of a common law retaliation claim.
[brief] Prosecution of Defendant Violates Bruen.  In Bruen, the Supreme Court stated “when the Second Amendment’s plain text covers an individual’s conduct, the Constitution presumptively protects that conduct.  To justify its regulation, the government may not simply posit that the regulation promotes an important interest.  Rather, the government must demonstrate that the regulation is consistent with this Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation. ”  *Bruen*, 597 U.S. at 17.  The Second Amendment states that “[a] well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed. ”  U.S. Const. Amend. II.  The Court below did not even partake in a *Bruen* analysis.  Instead, the Court below held that the *Bruen* holding is limited to the narrow issue regarding the “special need” restrictions that were invalidated.
[brief] TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS, AND RULINGS BEING APPEALED  Decision denying motion to suppress .................................................................Da 5-20  Decision denying motion for reconsideration.......................Da 21; 3T 49-12 to 59-19  Decision denying second motion for reconsideration ......Da 22; 4T 32-18 to 36-16  Judgment of Conviction ...................................................................................... Da 29-32
[brief] Even if the Court were to ignore *Walid* and assume *Filmlife* controls, the latter acknowledges that:  Introduction of extrinsic evidence to prove fraud in the inducement, however, is a well-recognized exception to the parol evidence rule.  “It is well settled that a party to an agreement cannot, simply by means of a provision in a written instrument, create an absolute defense or prevent the introduction of parol evidence in an action based on fraud in the inducement of contract. ”  *Ocean Cap*, *supra*, 63 N.J. Super. At 377-78.  Extrinsic evidence to prove fraud is admitted because it is not offered to alter or vary express terms of a contract, but rather, to avoid the contract or “to prosecute a separate action predicated upon the fraud.
[brief] On August 4, 2021, September 1, 2021, December 1, 2021 and April 6, 2022, the Board held public hearings for the Application seeking Preliminary and Final Site Plan Approval.  (1T, 2T, 3T, 4T).  At its April 6, 2022 meeting, the Board voted to deny the Application.  (4T).  On May 4, 2022, the Board adopted Resolution 11-2022 (the “Resolution”) memorializing its denial of Plaintiffs’ Application.  (Pa187-190).  On July 5, 2022, Plaintiffs filed an action in lieu of prerogative writs challenging the Board’s decision to deny the Application.  (Pa328–346).  On August 22, 2022, Defendant filed an answer to the complaint.  (Pa347–366).  Following briefing and argument, the Superior Court Burlington County Law Division entered a December 8, 2022 Order Denying in Part the Relief Requested in Plaintiffs' complaint.  (Pa367-368).  On January 23, 2023, Plaintiff [...] filed the instant appeal.  (Pa369–383).  --- 2
[brief] For all the reasons set forth in Part A, supra, this Court should reject the sentencing court’s findings of Yarbough factors 3A and 3C.  This Court should further find that the record in this case does not support the finding of any of Yarbough factors 3A through 3E.  Once the Court makes that determination, this Court should order that the certain persons sentence be served concurrently to the sentence for the robbery.  This Court should not merely remand for the trial court to attempt to find some other justification for consecutive sentences; because under these facts there is no possible valid justification for consecutive sentences under Yarbough, this court should direct the trial court to order that the sentences be served concurrently.
[brief] | Cases | Page | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | Abel v. Board of Works of City of Elizabeth, 63 N.J. Super. 500 (App. Div. 1960) | 5 | | Borough of Wildwood Crest v. Smith, 210 N.J. Super. 127, 143-144 (App.  Div. 1986) | 4,6 | | Fisher v. Yates, 270 N.J. Super. 458, 471 (App. Div. 1994) | 10 | | Higgins v. Thurber, 413 N.J. Super. 1, 6 (App. Div. 2010), aff’d, 205 N.J 227 (2011)
[brief] I.  AFTER 22 DAYS OF TRIAL, THIS COURT MUST DEFER TO [...]’S WEIGHING OF THE EVIDENCE AND CREDIBILITY DETERMINATIONS.  (26T4:1 to 56:13; 27T71:25 to 97:1).  ..............................34  II.  THE TRIAL COURT FOUND [...] CREDIBLE, WEIGHED THE OPINIONS HE PRESENTED, AND REACHED PROPER CONCLUSIONS BASED ON THE EVIDENCE AT TRIAL.  (26T4:1 to 56:13; 27T71:25 to 97:1).........................................................36  A.  The Trial Court Properly Allowed Prajapati’s Testimony at Trial.  ...........................................................................................................36  B.  The Trial Court Relied on Far More Than Just Prajapati’s Testimony In Reaching Its Decision.  .................................................................40  C.  Sufficient Credible Evidence Supported Each of the Misappropriations and/or Diversions Found by the Trial Court.  ..................................................43  III.  THE DEFENDANTS WAIVED ANY STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS ARGUMENT BY FAILING TO RAISE IT BELOW.
[brief] Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant, [...]  By: [...]  [...]  Dated: April 19, 2024  [...], Plaintiff, vs. [...]; [...]; [...]; JOHN DOES 1-10 (fictitious names)  JANE DOES 11-20 (fictitious names); ABC COMPANIES 1-10 (fictitious names), Defendants.  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION
[brief] (PPCIa132).  11.  [...]’s answer included a counterclaim and third-party complaint against [...], [...], [...], and [...], the principal of [...], for judgment declaring that the [...] policy would not afford coverage, declaring the rights of the parties under the policy, rescinding the policy due to [...]’s material misrepresentations in its application for coverage, for contractual indemnification by [...], and for damages.
[brief] Pa44; Pa416-Pa429 (video stills).  There were no sidewalks, crosswalks, or pedestrian safety markings in the area where [...] parked.  Id.  In order to get to the hospital, [...] had to walk across a T-intersection of vehicular travelways in the parking lot that had no stop signs or traffic control markings, unlike intersections in other parts of the parking lot.  Pa655.
[brief] In the case before us, some circumstances arguably point towards employee status, e.g., some control, provision of workplace, the contractual right of removal provision, and the alleged revocation of plaintiff’s security clearance.  To whatever extent these factors exist, their weight pales in comparison to that of the other factors.  With respect to the most important Factor 1, any control exercised by the [...] is incidental to plaintiff’s work as a nurse, and is for security, safety and administrative purposes.  Only [...] controls plaintiff’s activities as a nurse.  We are convinced that no rational factfinder, applying the twelve-factor Pukowsky test, could find that plaintiff was a [...] employee for LAD purposes.  Summary judgment was properly granted in favor of the [...].
[brief] On the Brief: [...], Esq.  TABLE OF CONTENTS  TABLE OF CONTENTS  ...........................................................................................................  i  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS .................................................. iv  TABLE OF CITATIONS ........................................................................................................ v  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT .................................................................................................1  PROCEDURAL HISTORY .......................................................................................................4  COUNTER-STATEMENT OF FACTS .....................................................................................5  A.  The Property ....................................................................................................................5  B. [...] ..................................................................................5  C. 2018 Master Plan ..............................................................................................................7  D. [...]’s Development Application .................................................................8  E. Plaintiff Proposed a 1.77 Floor Area Ratio (“FAR”) .......................................................10  F.  Environmental Contamination Remediation .................................................................12  G.  Building Size and Scale and Intensity of Use Driven by Environmental Remediation Costs and Return on Investment Interest .........................................................................................................................14  LEGAL ARGUMENT ...............................................................................................................15  POINT I ..................................................................................................................................15  THE ZONING BOARD SET FORTH IN ITS MEMORIALIZING RESOLUTION  REASONABLE BASES AND RATIONALE FOR THE DENIAL OF THE 66 KINDERKAMACK APPLICATION.  THUS, THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY FOUND THE BOARD’S DECISION WAS NOT ARBITRARY, CAPRICIOUS OR UNREASONABLE (Pa23-40)
[directive] 33 officer’s use of force that resulted in serious bodily injury or death, the County Prosecutor shall be immediately notified of the internal affairs investigation.  7.1.2  If the investigation involves a criminal charge against the complainant, an initial interview should be conducted with the complainant.  However, the investigator must realize that the complainant is simultaneously a criminal defendant arising out of the same incident and must be accorded all of the appropriate protections.  Thus, all further contact with the complainant should be arranged with and coordinated through the County Prosecutor and the complainant's defense attorney.
[brief] But in other cases, an ESI production performed *without* a pre-production review for relevancy will provide distinct advantages, particularly where the parties harbor deep distrust and suspicions about the other side’s good faith, as in this case.  The approach that requires the production of documents solely based on negotiated search terms and selected custodians removes subjectivity and gamesmanship from the equation, ensuring that the maximum number of relevant documents will be produced.  However, the unavoidable by-product will be the netting of some number of irrelevant documents.  This approach has been used by courts in other jurisdictions.  *See, e.g., In re Actavis Holdco U.S., Inc.*, No. 19-3549, 2019 WL 8437021, at *1 (3d Cir. Dec. 6, 2019) (collecting cases).  And it is entirely consistent with the policy underlying the discovery rules, which “were designed to eliminate, as far as possible, concealment and surprise” to ensure “that judgments rest upon real merits of the causes and not upon the skill and maneuvering of counsel. ”  Abtrax Pharm., Inc. v. Elkins-Sinn, Inc., 139 N.J. 499, 512 (1995) (citation omitted).  In short, there is no one-size-fits-all solution for these issues.  Whether to err on the side of being overinclusive or underinclusive in setting the right protocol for discovery is a matter entrusted to the sound discretion of our trial courts.  As set forth below, the trial court did not abuse that discretion.
[brief] Further, the *New Jersey Municipal Land Use Law* (“MLUL”) defines an “interested party” as a person “… whose right to *use*, acquire, *or enjoy property is or may be affected by any action taken* …” (Emphasis added) under the MLUL.  Surely a municipality’s official action in taking property owned by another (either the State of New Jersey or plaintiff themselves) and effectively “giving away” such property to a single developer for that former public property to thereafter be owned and used solely by that developer to the specific exclusion of plaintiffs and the general public at large is a fact pattern that falls squarely within the contemplation or purview of the MLUL.  And the MLUL itself, specifically *N.J.S.A. 40:55D-72*, confers upon “… all *interested parties* …” the right to appeal or otherwise challenge a local municipal land use determination.  (Emphasis added).  Clearly, the challenged ordinance and the [second] amended redevelopment plan that it adopts is a local municipal land use determination.  A simple review of the allegations in [...]’s Complaint confirms that there is and can be no reasonable question but that plaintiff has a sufficient interest in the invalid and illegal government action being challenged so as to permit them to bring his legal challenge NOW.
[brief] At the Rule 104 hearing, [...] acknowledged that the low-income housing tax credit ("LIHTC") program in the United States is “highly regulated” and “very complex. ” (6T, 76:11-21).  He also confirmed that, in New Jersey, the sole agency administering the LIHTC program is the [...], which does so through a highly competitive process.  (6T, 78:1-23).  To be sure, even if all applicants meet the threshold requirements for such tax credits, the [...] ultimately has to make discretionary decisions on which applicants to award credits each year.  “Not all applicants are approved. ” (Id., 78:24-79:9).  The [...]’s competitive process is reflected in the language of the governing regulations themselves.  For example, pursuant to N.J.A.C. 5:80-33.1:  (a) Section 42 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (Code), 26 U.S.C. § 42, establishes a low income housing tax credit that may be applied against the Federal income tax of persons or associations who or which have invested in certain buildings providing housing for families of low-income.  As the housing credit agency for the State of New Jersey, the [...] (NJ[...]) allocates these credits to qualified taxpayers and thereafter monitors their compliance with Section 42 of the Code.
[brief] The Local Finance Board has been vested with numerous powers to give effect to its responsibilities and implementation of the LGEL.  See N.J.S.A. 40A:9-22.7.  These include the powers, “To initiate, receive, hear and review complaints and hold hearings with regard to possible violations of this act. ”  Id.  Here, no hearings took place regarding the substance of the allegations in Plaintiffs’ complaint.  The Local Finance Board is required to acknowledge receipt of the complaint within 30 days and investigate the facts set forth in the complaint and initiate an investigation concerning the facts contained in the complaint.  N.J.S.A 40A:9-22.9.  This was not done as the complaint was never filed with the Local Finance Board.  The officer or employee accused of violating the LGEL shall have the opportunity to present to the Local Finance Board with any statement or information concerning the complaint.  *Id.*  Thereafter, the board shall conduct a hearing if in the manner prescribed by N.J.S.A. 40A:9-22.12 concerning the possible violation and any facts or circumstances regarding the officer or employee’s conduct.  N.J.S.A. 40A:9-22.12 requires all hearings to “[b]e conducted in conformity with the rules and procedures, insofar as they may be applicable, provided for hearings by a State agency in contested cases under the ‘Administrative Procedure Act. ’”  Here, no hearing ever took place.  Plaintiffs’ actions completely circumvented the procedures of the LGEL leading to the trial court’s erroneous holdings.
[brief] ”  N.J.S.A. 17:27A-13.  Because the Holding Company Act does not regulate the exchange of contracts of insurance among subscribers, exchanges, and attorneys-in-fact, it does not affect the Department’s regulation of reciprocal exchanges under the Reciprocal Exchange Act.  [...] contends that reciprocal exchanges “are legally held to more stringent financial guidelines than traditional insurance companies. ”  (Ab5).  [...] cites the example of liquidity ratio requirements for reciprocal insurers as an example of the law being stringent and asserts that no similar requirements exist for other insurance entities, contending that the Reciprocal Exchange Act imposes “intentionally arduous and demanding standards to ensure the financial health of the reciprocal and its subscribers. ” (Ab6).  However, [...] cites no support (other than the entirety of Title 17 of the New Jersey Code) for its assertion that the standards are either an intentional act by the Legislature or more arduous or demanding than the standards imposed on other insurers.
[brief] Id. at *9.  Further, this Court determined that “[...] was not a party to the appeal and generally court orders do not bind non-parties. ”  Id.  Agreeing with some the [...]’ arguments on appeal, the Court held that the trial judge erred by failing to apply the six-year statute of limitations to [...]’s and [...]’s non-RICO claims and remanded “the matter to the trial court solely for the purpose of recalculating the damages on these claims. ”  Id. at *22.  This Court directed the trial court to limit the damages --- 4  The [...] provide a full list of Plaintiffs’ arguments on the prior appeal because Plaintiffs were unsuccessful on all points raised in their cross-appeals.  Yet the Special Master and the trial court awarded Plaintiffs attorneys’ fees for their work on their unsuccessful appeals. to the time period of October 1, 2003 through December 31, 2011.
[brief] The prohibition against the assignment of tort claims prior to judgment is founded on the principle that “[e]xcept when otherwise provided by statute, nothing is assignable, either at law or in equity, that does not directly or indirectly involve a right to property. ”  *Goldfarb v. Reicher*, 112 N.J.L. 413, 414 (Sup. Ct.), aff’d, 113 N.J.L. 399 (E. & A. 1934).  Thus, a chose in action unrelated to a right involving property may only be assigned if authorized by statute.
[brief] The present case can be distinguished from Berquist as [...] as appellant has simply provided no evidence detailing the cause of his fall.  Rather, he argues he woke up on a piece of plywood.  Members of a jury are not accident reconstructionists.  There is simply too much speculation they would be asked to undertake.  The well-established case law requires more than a mere possibility as to the cause of an incident, which is all appellant is able to provide.
[brief] On or about July 5, 2024, the County advertised for bids for the Project.  Da18.  Both [...] and [...] submitted bids.  Da4.  The Solicitation required bidders to be adequately NJDOT classified and repeatedly required bidders to submit their NJDOT Notice.  The second page of the Solicitation provided:  **ATTENTION**  ALL PROSPECTIVE BIDDERS ARE REQUIRED TO BE **PREQUALIFIED**  WITH THE NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION FOR THIS PROJECT NOTICE OF CLASSIFICATION SHALL BE SUBMITTED WITH THE BID  The work to be completed by the prospective bidder must exceed 50% of the value of the contract and the bidder must have submitted the corresponding proper NJDOT notice of classification for prequalification of any work items to be performed by the bidder.  [Da16]  (emphasis original)