ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF DEFENDANTS MUST, THEREFORE, BE REVERSED .............1  Point  II  DEFENDANTS HAVE NOT ESTABLISHED THAT THE GOVERNMENT’S INTEREST IN THE EFFICIENCY OF PUBLIC SERVICES OUTWEIGHS  [...]’S INTEREST IN SPEAKING ON MATTERS OF PUBLIC CONCERN OR THAT ITS REGULATION REQUIRING EMPLOYEES TO OBTAIN PERMISSION TO SPEAK AND THE MOTION JUDGE FAILED TO PROPERLY ANALYZE THE ISSUE ........................................................................................................11  CONCLUSION ......................................................................................................................15  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS BEING APPEALED
[brief] The included photographic defense and State exhibits were acquired directly from the trial court.  Because the photographs that defendant included in his appendix at Da49, Da51, and Da52 were unmarked and blurry, the State provided the clearer photographs that were actually marked in evidence for the Court’s review.  See (Ra24 to 25; Ra28).  Defense Exhibits 4 (from October 2022 Hearing), Set of Three Photographs of Front of House, Defendant’s Bedroom, and Third Floor, taken January 2022 by Defendant …………………… Ra25 to 27 Defense Exhibits 5 (from October 2022 Hearing), Set of Two Photographs of Doorway to Third Floor and Kitchen Door, taken January 2022 by Defendant………………………………………  Ra28 to 29 Defense Exhibits 1, 2, and 3 (from December 2023 Hearing), Crime-Scene Photographs of Front Door to [...]….. Ra30 to 32 Defense Exhibits 11 and 12 (from December 2023 Hearing), Google-Map Photographs of [...] ……………………..  Ra33 to 34 Defense Exhibit 14 (from December 2023 Hearing), Photograph of Repaired Bedroom Door on Second Floor, taken November 2023……………………………………………………..  Ra35 Defense Exhibit 8 (from October 2022 Hearing), Video of Rear Stairwell Descending from Third Floor to First Floor, taken January 2022 by Defendant ………………………………………………  Ra36 Defense Exhibit 6 (from December 2023 Hearing), Video of Front Stairwell and Second Floor, taken 2023 by defense counsel² ………..  Ra37 Defense Exhibit 8 (from December 2023 Hearing), Video of Rear Stairwell Ascending from First Floor to Second Floor, taken 2023 by defense counsel…………………………………………………..  Ra38 Defense Exhibit 9 (from December 2023 Hearing), Video of Third Floor and Descending Rear Stairwell from Third Floor to First Floor, taken 2023 by defense counsel³……………………………… Ra39 ²  This video shows a fridge in front of the second floor’s kitchen door, and personal items, that were not present when the search warrant was executed.  (5T37-17 to 39-20; Ra24; Da55).  ³  This video also shows personal items that were not present when the search warrant was executed.  (5T48-10 to 49-23; Ra26 to 27).  TABLE OF CONFIDENTIAL APPENDIX
[brief] (T42-6 to 11)  Immediately, [...] stopped and exited his car and ordered [...] to stop and sit down on the curb.  (T8-3 to 7, 8-12 to 13)  [...] complied; he stopped, removed his hand from the bag, and sat down.  (T8-5 to 13; Pa8: 0:43 to 0:51)  [...] began to close the zipper to the bag but [...] further ordered him not to touch it.  (T8-10 to 13)  There were several problems with [...]’s testimony about the events leading to the stop.  Although [...] initially testified that the dispatch said the fight “possibly” involved weapons, he later said he did not remember; the trial court found no allegation that the fight involved weapons.
[brief] THE JUNE 27, 2023 ORDER DENYING [...]’S ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE WAS NOT A RULING ON THE MERITS BUT AN EXPRESSION OF THE COURT’S STATEMENTS AT ORAL ARGUMENT.  (Da1 – Da27).  On June 19, 2023, the Honorable [...], J.S.C. addressed pending motions between [...] and [...] regarding the production of documents.  See Point VI of Appellant’s Brief DB 45-48.  At the time of the oral argument Judge Sceusi indicated that he was entering an Order compelling the discovery but was not ruling on the merits of the case and indicated that the Order to Show Cause would be adjourned until such time as the discovery was received and the judicial/equitable estoppel arguments placed before the Court.  Subsequently on of June 27, 2023 Judge Sceusi entered the attached Order denying the Order to Show Cause which was not a ruling on the merits but a simple ratification of his ruling from the bench that the matter would not proceed until a later date.  (Pa 15-17).  It appears that the oral argument conducted June 19, 2023 was not placed on the record as a transcript request revealed same.  Had Judge Sceusi’s ruling of June 27, 2023 actually been a ruling on the merits then pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:23B-23.d. the Court was obligated to issue an Order confirming the awards if it had actually denied the application to vacate the awards on the merits.  In Mid-Century Insurance Co. v. Freeman, 2016 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1127 (Law Div. May 16, 2016) the Court addressed the extraordinary remedy of judicial estoppel.  In the context of that matter the evidence of prior arbitration filings submitted by counsel was apparently limited to a Certification of Counsel without any evidence to support the claim.  In the present instance [...] has sought to obtain copies of the arbitrations filed by Progressive during the pendency of the arbitrations in dispute.  Based on the Affidavit of [...] (Da 255) at the pace of 46 arbitrations filed per year from 2018 to 2020; from the time the collateral source rule was enacted in 1987 Progressive would have filed well over 1,000 Medpay arbitrations prior to their 2021 unilateral decision that Medpay was not recoverable.  CONCLUSION
[brief] **STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURE**  On or about March 13, 2016, officers from the [...] responded to a call relating to an altercation at the [...], a local bar in Bridgewater, between plaintiff/appellant [...] and a patron, [...].  (Pa093-Pa103).  According to plaintiff/appellant, Mr. Dolida and his fiancé [...], entered the establishment through a side entrance and began engaging in disruptive behavior.  (Pa093-Pa103).  Dolida and plaintiff/appellant ultimately ended up in a shoving match, wherein Dolida stumbled and sustained a lower body injury.  (Pa093-Pa103).  After an investigation, plaintiff/appellant was indicted on charges of aggravated assault relating to the altercation with Dolida.  (Pa007).  Following a bench trial, the Hon. [...], J.S.C., found plaintiff/appellant not guilty of aggravated assault via oral decision on June 6, 2017, in open court where plaintiff was present.  (Pa103).  The Judge's decision indicated that the Judge found the State's witnesses credible but that the court could not find beyond a reasonable doubt --- 1
[brief] PROCEDURAL HISTORY  On May 24, 2021, Plaintiff filed his Class Action Complaint in the Superior Court.  Pa1-Pa10.  On June 24, 2021, Defendant filed notice of its filing of a Notice of Removal in the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey.  Pa89-Pa90.  On September 14, 2022, the District Court remanded the action.  Pa96-Pa102.  On September 20, 2022, Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the Complaint pursuant to R. 4:6-2(e).  Pa91-Pa92.  The motion court conducted a motion hearing on March 1, 2023.  During that hearing, the motion court directed the submission of a supplemental submission which was filed on March 3.  T5:4-18 (that submission appears at  On April 26, 2023, the motion court placed its decision on the record.  T1 et seq.  On April 26, 2023, the motion court filed its Order dismissing the Complaint without prejudice for the reasons set forth in the record on April 26, 2023.  Pa11.  **STATEMENT OF FACTS**
[brief] Even assuming *arguendo* (as they contend) that Respondents did not sign the Account Application binding them to the Client Agreement, Respondents entered into a series of commercial relationships where they invested $1.4 million and received a written New Account Confirmation for each of the six accounts opened.  Like any individual who opens an investment account, Respondents would certainly understand that investing more than $1 million with a broker-dealer is governed by written agreement.  Respondents received investment recommendations leading them to invest in multiple mutual funds, receiving written confirmations for each purchase.  Respondents were able to monitor the performance through receipt and review of written quarterly account statements and also, at Respondents’ request, online through [...].  [...] made these monitoring tools available for Respondents as Respondents watched their investments grow in value by more than $330,000.  As the Schwartz court opined in connection with analogous facts, “[e]ven resolving all doubts and inferences in [Respondents’] favor, it is impossible to infer that a reasonable adult in [Respondents’] position would believe that [their] contract with [[...]] consisted entirely of a single promise …. ”  Schwartz, 256 F. App’x at 519-20.  Simply put, [...] offered services under a written contract and Respondents accepted the benefits and terms of that contract, including the predispute arbitration clause.  Id.  Further, following the same logic of Schwartz, [...], [...] and [...], Respondents are bound by the predispute arbitration clause along with the entire Terms of Use because Respondents accepted the benefits of their multi-year investment relationship with [...].  For years, [...] provided the platform for Respondents to receive those benefits, and understandably “expected to arbitrate … disputes in detrimental reliance on [Respondents’] conduct. ”  *Hirsch v. Amper*, 215 N.J. 174, 195 (2013) (citing *Heuer v. Heuer*, 152 N.J. 226, 237 (1998)); *Facta Health, Inc. v. Pharmadent, LLC*, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 186892, at *7 (D.N.J. Oct. 8, 2020) (Da0518-Da0524); *KPH Healthcare Servs. v. Janssen Biotech, Inc.*, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 196095, at *23 (D.N.J. Oct. 8, 2021) (Da0525-Da0535).  The trial court erred in not enforcing the predispute arbitration clause against Respondents, and this Court should reverse.
[brief] TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS BEING APPEALED  Page  Order and Statement of Reasons of the Honorable [...]  Granting Defendant [...]’s Motion for Summary Judgment, dated January 19, 2024 .................................................................Pa1  Order and Statement of Reasons of the Honorable [...]  Denying Plaintiff’s Motion seeking to Reopen Discovery, dated February 21, 2024, with Statement of Reasons ..................................Pa8  Order and Statement of Reasons of the Honorable [...] Denying Motion for Reconsideration, dated March 1, 2024......................Pa13
[brief] During his plea, Defendant admitted facts which comprise the essential elements of DWI.  (1T4-6 to 4-15)  [...] found there was a sufficient factual basis and accepted Defendant’s plea.  (1T6-5 to 6-10)  Subsequently, [...] found Vargas inapplicable and properly denied Defendant’s motion to vacate his plea.  Similarly, after distinguishing Vargas, [...] found there was a sufficient factual basis and also properly denied Defendant’s motion to vacate his plea.  That decision should be affirmed and Defendant’s request for relief should be denied.
[brief] The Law Division committed plain error by dismissing a lawsuit without findings of fact or conclusions of law which were correlated to the pleadings.  Although the Law Division insisted there was no amount of argument which would change the court's decision, Plaintiff provided substantive evidence demonstrating compliance the parties' prior agreement and recent resolution of their disagreement.  Thus, there was no basis to dismiss the lawsuit in favor of mediation or arbitration.  Plaintiff is entitled to its day in court, and likely summary disposition in its favor based on the agreement and revised invoice.  There was also no legal basis to make an award of attorney's fees in an unspecified amount or without court review.  For the foregoing reasons, the orders under review should be reversed and Plaintiff's complaint reinstated for prompt disposition.
[brief] The requirement that a statute bears a “reasonable relationship to a legitimate state purpose” comes from the guarantee of substantive due process embodied in Article I, Paragraph 1 of the New Jersey Constitution.  See State in the Interest of C.K., 233 N.J. 44, 76 (2018).  Article I, Paragraph 1 provides:  All persons are by nature free and independent, and have certain natural and unalienable rights, among which are those of enjoying and defending life and liberty, of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and of pursuing and obtaining safety and happiness.  [N.J. Const. art.  I, ¶ 1.]  Although the words “due process” do not appear in Article I, Paragraph 1, our state courts have “construed the expansive language of” that constitutional provision “to embrace the fundamental guarantee of due process. ”  State v. Njango, 247 N.J. 533, 548 (2021).  Basic rights to life, liberty, property, and the pursuit of happiness “cannot be abridged by arbitrary government action. ”  C.K., 233 N.J. at 73.  Central to substantive due process in this state is the principle that a statute must “reasonably relate to a legitimate legislative purpose. ”  Ibid.  When the State imposes a restriction on liberty “that bears no rational relationship to a legitimate government goal,” the restriction is unconstitutional.  Ibid.  Governor [...] signed the September 11th 2001 Anti-Terrorism Act into law in 2002.
[brief] The defense introduced the expert testimony of forensic engineer, [...].  He had been retained to conduct tests on the concrete floor in the lobby where [...]’s fall occurred.  The purpose of the tests was to determine the floor’s slip resistance, or co-efficient of friction.  [...] explained the use of a machine, a tribometer, and how it “will give you a number. ” (3T38-21 to 42-15).  On January 14, 2022, some three and one-half years after the plaintiff’s fall, [...] conducted his tests in the lobby of [...].  For the preparation of his report the defense had provided various materials to [...] including the Summons/Complaint, [...]’s Deposition, each side’s Answers to Interrogatories (which included the defendant’s Incident Report and two color photographs), the Dover Police Incident Report, and color photographs.
[brief] In case of a conflict between the provisions of this Act and the provisions of any other law, ordinance or regulation governing or purporting to govern the creation, registration, disclosure requirements or sale of timeshare interests in a component site, the provisions of this Act shall control.  N.J.S.A. 45:15-16.55.  (emphasis).  With regard to delivery of the Public Offering Statement, the RETA states at N.J.S.A. 45:15-16.59:  A.  The developer shall: (1) prepare a Public Offering Statement; (2) provide the statement to each purchaser of a timeshare interest in any timeshare plan at the time of purchase; and (3) fully and accurately disclose those facts concerning the timeshare developer and timeshare plan that are required by this Act or by regulations promulgated by the Commission.  B.  A Public Offering Statement shall be in writing and dated and shall require the purchaser to certify in writing that the purchaser received the statement.  Upon approval of the Commission, the developer may offer to deliver the Public Offering Statement and other documents on CD-ROM format, internet website or other electronic media if the purchaser consents.  (emphasis).  Nowhere in the statute does it say that “on the day of purchase, a purchaser must be afforded a reasonable opportunity to review the Public Offering Statement before signing. ”  Only the code does, and that is a direct conflict.  Each of these plaintiffs agreed to receive and acknowledged that they did receive the Public Offering Statement on a CD contemporaneously with the signing of their contracts on the day of their purchase as required by N.J.S.A. 45:15-16.59.  And consistent with the RETA at N.J.S.A. 45:15-16.80(b), each plaintiff here had a 3-day attorney review period and a 7-day cancellation period to review the contents of the Public Offering Statement before the contract became legally binding and fully executed.  (Da204, ¶23 & Da205, ¶24).  It was error for the trial court not to resolve the conflict and to submit a question of statutory interpretation regarding delivery of the Public Offering Statement to the jury.  POINT IV
[brief] 23  # TABLE OF AUTHORITIES  ## Statutes | Statute | Page | |------------------------------|------| | N.J.S.A. 39:3-4 | 14 | | N.J.S.A. 39:3-8.1 | 14 | | N.J.S.A. 39:3-15 | 14 | | N.J.S.A. 39:3-17 | 14 | | N.J.S.A. 39:3-17.1 | 14 | | N.J.S.A. 39:6A-3.1 | 12 | | N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4 | 1, 2, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 18, 19, 20, 21, 23 | | N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.5 | 1, 2, 9, 10, 12, 13, 14, 15, 18, 19, 20, 21, 23 | | N.J.S.A. 39:6A-7(b)(1) | 14 | ## Case Law | Case Name | Page | |----------------------------------|------| | Bencosme v. Kannankara, A-1672-14T3, 2016 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 614 (App. Div. Mar. 22, 2016) | 15, 19 | | Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520 (1995) | 19 | | Caviglia v. Royal Tours of Am., 178 N.J. 460 (2004) | 13 | | Culver v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 115 N.J. 451 (1989) | 10, 22 | | DiProspero v. Penn, 183 N.J. 477 (2005) | 8 | | Griepenburg v. Twp. of Ocean, 220 N.J. 239 (2015) | 8 | | Hardy v. Abdul-Matin, 198 N.J. 95 (2009) | 8, 9 | | Hubbard v. Reed, 168 N.J. 387 (2001) | 9 | | McNeil-Thomas, 238 N.J. 256 (2019) | 8 | Perrelli v. Pastorelle, 206 N.J. 193 (2006)
[directive] The Directive took effect on December 20, 2001.  jak  Attachment c w/Attachment: Attorney General [...]  First Assistant Paul H.  Zoubek Administrator [...] Acting Director of State Police Affairs [...] Colonel [...], Supt., NJSP Chief of Staff and Deputy Director [...] Chief State Investigator [...] Deputy Director [...] Deputy Director [...]  Acting Chief [...], Pros. & Police Bureau, DCJ  New Jersey Is An Equal Opportunity Employer  ATTORNEY GENERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT DIRECTIVE NO. 2001-7
[brief] Appellant admitted that he had received training and the City produced evidence that its employees received annual anti-discrimination and anti-harassment training.  Pa26-28, ¶ 63-73 cmpr. to Da1-5 ¶63-73.  The Plaintiff admitted that he had received the employee handbook.  Id. at ¶9.  He further admitted that his complaint was lodged with the City on March 17, 2020, his first shift after the incident and that the investigation began immediately thereafter.  Id. at ¶28, 31-33, and 57.  Plaintiff was satisfied that he was being recognized and that his complaint was being addressed.
[directive] 3  (h)  Where a preliminary investigation indicates the possibility of a criminal act on the part of the subject officer, the County Prosecutor must be notified immediately.  No further action should be taken, including the interviewing of, or the filing of charges against the officer, until the County Prosecutor so directs.  (i)  Pursuant to AG Directive 2019-4, the agency must notify the County Prosecutor immediately of any use of deadly force, any use of force by an officer that results in death or serious bodily injury, or any death in custody that occurs within its jurisdiction.  (j)  In the rare cases where the agency has not made a charging decision within 180 days of receiving a complaint, the agency must notify the County Prosecutor, who may take whatever steps he or she deems appropriate, including supersession of the investigation, to ensure prompt resolution of the matter.  Recordkeeping & Data Reporting
[brief] **POINT FIFTEEN [Improper credibility and fact-finding] (Argued Pa228 – Pa229)**  In summary judgment motions, the court should not play the 13th juror by resolving genuine issues of material facts in dispute.  The court also should not make credibility determinations and findings of fact that are relegated to the jury.  In dismissing the Complaint, the court erroneously made findings of fact and credibility determinations that were within the province of a jury.  The court’s dismissal of the Complaint should therefore be reversed.  **Page 49 – 53**
[brief] A police officer’s lay opinions are admissible if based on personal observations at the scene of the accident.  *Neno v. Clinton*, 167 N.J. 573, 585 (2001); *State v. LaBrutto*, 114 N.J. 187, 199 (1989).  The decisional law makes clear that a police officer may offer lay opinion testimony about the points of impact based on the officer’s observations at the scene of the accident after the accident has already occurred.  *Neno*, 167 N.J. at 582.  The diagram that [...] prepared is based on [...]’s observations at the scene and clearly depicts the points of impact between the three vehicles.  Da140.  Once again, Plaintiff mischaracterizes the evidence.  There is nothing in the diagram prepared by [...] that suggests how fast any of the vehicles were traveling or even who entered the intersection first.  The diagram does not show the movement of vehicles other than to show that [...] was initially struck by [...] and then pushed to the left at which point he struck Plaintiff.  Da140.  That movement is easily determined from the admissible statements made by the parties at the scene, the damage to the vehicles, and the final resting place of each vehicle.  These are all observations made by [...] at the scene of the accident.
[brief] ”  O’Donnell, 339 F.R.D. at 277; accord SinglePoint, 2023 WL 2585296, at *3 (“Several courts have held that by running a relevant search term, the responding party does not waive relevance objections to the documents responsive to the search term. ”); FlowRider, 2016 WL 6522807, at *8 (“Plaintiffs’ agreement to run a search using the parties’ agreed-upon terms does not constitute Plaintiffs’ acquiescence to produce all resulting documents. ”).  If agreeing to use certain search terms constituted a waiver of the right to object to the production of documents based on relevance, no party would ever agree to search terms willingly.  **CONCLUSION**
[brief] (Pa9).  The Board concluded that the Ricci Act, codified in part at N.J.S.A. 53:5A-10(e)(3), allows members to file for the recalculation of Ordinary Disability Retirement Benefits or Service Retirement Benefits to Accidental Disability Retirement Benefits if the member is or becomes totally and permanently disabled due to participation in the rescue, recovery, or cleanup operations at the World Trade Center between September 11, 2001 and October 11, 2001.  (Pa10).  The Board also noted the Ricci Act required the Board to provide notice to members and retirees within thirty days of the effective date of the act, and if a member or retiree did not file a written and sworn statement with the retirement system within two years of the effective date of the act they would be ineligible for the presumption or recalculation.  (Pa10).  The Board found that it was undisputed that the Division mailed notice of the Ricci Act to [...], and that [...] did not submit his Eligibility Registration Form until January 3, 2023, approximately one year and six months past the July 8, 2021 statutory deadline.  (Pa11; Pa13).  The Board also considered the matter under its inherent power to extend the deadline if good cause, reasonable grounds, and reasonable diligence could be demonstrated.  (Pa13-Pa14).  The Board concluded that the Division had notified all retired members of [...] of the passage of the Ricci Act on August 9, 2019 in accordance with the Ricci Act.  (Pa13).  [...]’s assertion that he did not remember receiving the postcard notice did not establish good cause nor reasonable grounds to allow him to file over one year and six months past the statutory deadline.  (Pa14).  Further, the Board concluded that [...] did not exercise reasonable diligence because of such a protracted delay in filing the Eligibility Registration Form.  (Pa14).  Therefore, the Board concluded that [...] was ineligible to register for amended benefits under the Ricci Act.  (Pa14).  This appeal followed.