ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] In this appeal, [...] bears the burden of overcoming the presumption against waiver afforded under New Jersey law and the FAA\(^1\) with clear and convincing evidence that [...] voluntarily and intentionally relinquished its contractual right to arbitrate [...]’s Indemnity Claim. \(^2\)  It has failed.  The totality of the circumstances here establishes that [...] has not waived its right to arbitration.  A.  [...]’s Arbitration Demand Was Timely  [...] does not dispute that under Chassen, if an earlier demand for arbitration would have been a futile exercise, arbitration cannot be waived.  Chassen, 836 F.3d at 292.  Nevertheless, [...] implores this Court to deprive [...] of its contractual right to arbitrate [...]’s Indemnity Claim because it allegedly would be unprecedented for a New Jersey court to allow arbitration after 5 \( \frac{1}{2} \) years of litigation.  Pb12.  [...] also argues that a ruling for [...] would --- \(^1\) Cole, 215 N.J. at 276-78.  \(^2\)  Unless otherwise indicated, all defined terms used herein have previously been defined by [...] in its initial brief. encourage insurers to drag coverage litigation on for years before seeking to compel arbitration.  Pb13.  [...]’s hyperbole disregards the unique facts of this case, which involved resolution of defense claims in a multi-party litigation in which any bilateral arbitration between [...] and [...] prior to 2024 would have been pointless.  It also disregards the fact that the DJ Action was stayed for 38 months (the majority of the 5 ½ years) at [...]’s behest in order to obtain a binding resolution of its insurers’ defense obligations to it.  1.
[directive] The Working Group shall within nine months issue a report to the Attorney General recommending any guidelines and/or directives for the implementation and funding of a Juvenile Impact Offender Program so as to focus available resources to the prevention, identification, detention differential case processing, prosecution disposition, confinement, rehabilitation and aftercare of serious repetitive juvenile offenders.  17.  Working Group Membership.  The Director of the Division of Criminal Justice shall within 30 days determine and announce the membership of all Working Groups established or reconstituted pursuant to this Executive Directive.
[brief] Therefore, for the same reasons articulated by [...] in *Foley* that were adopted by our Supreme Court, the [...] cannot be found liable for something that natural forces actually caused, irrespective of how those natural forces may have been moved around after they initially fell to the Earth.  The [...] did not initially intend or expect to address the unpublished case of *Nunez v. Gallo*, 2018 WL 6836109 (App. Div. Dec. 31, 2018) in this appeal, as plaintiff-appellant had opposed its consideration by the Motion Court as it is an unpublished opinion.  However, in her appellate brief, plaintiff-appellant has brought this case to this Court’s attention and opened the door for the [...] to present to this Court how *Nunez* is strikingly similar to the instant matter and is significantly instructive.
[brief] [...] has openly used and maintained their Lot 20 and Lot 22 and at all times acted as the owner of this land.  (Da264, Deed for [...])  As noted, [...] came into ownership of Lot 22 as it was conveyed from the [...] and 36 years after coming into possession of this property, [...] was approached with a discussion about ownership of Lot 22 in 2021.
[brief] aggravated because he got my cell phone number . . . and he kept calling it numerous times. ”  (3T 44-16 to 19)  On cross-examination, [...] explained that he had been an attorney for nearly twenty years and a municipal court judge for about five years, during which he presided over “[t]housands” of cases.  (3T 46-1 to 19)  He testified that it was “par for the course” for people to become frustrated or upset about the outcome of a case and he had experience with the same.  (3T 47-15 to 20)  [...] never mentioned [...]’s home address during the phone calls, and never visited [...]’s law office, home, or courthouse.  (3T 49-24 to 50-17)  Police officers assigned to monitor the area around [...]’s home never saw [...] near the property.  (3T 145-20 to 24; 147-9 to 16)  [...] testified in his own defense.  He explained that he called the judge because he did not have an attorney and was trying to get questions about his municipal court proceeding answered.  (3T 192-19 to 24)  He testified that he had “never even walked through” the towns where [...] lived or worked.  (3T 188-16 to 24)  He stated that he had been “upset” because he could not get answers to his questions and that he “was wrong for” swearing at [...].  (3T 193-2 to 18)  2.  **Jury Instructions and Verdict**
[brief] Volume 1 (A1-A397) | Document | Page | |-------------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | Plaintiff’s Complaint for Divorce (1/13/15) | A1 | | Aff. of Service and Waiver (1/22/15) | A11 | | Request to Enter Default Judgment (2/20/15) | A13 | | Final Judgment for Divorce (3/18/15) | A15 | | Retainer Agreement with [...] | A17 | | Irrevocable Power of Attorney dated December 5, 2013 | A21 | | Mid-Marriage Agreement dated December 5, 2013 | | | *Attached to Confidential Appendix as CA1* | | | Matrimonial Settlement Agreement dated January 17, 2014 | | | *Attached to Confidential Appendix as CA14* | | | Irrevocable Power of Attorney dated November 11, 2014 | A27 | | August 23, 2017  Notice of Motion by [...] to enforce litigant’s rights | A33 | | Certification of Plaintiff in Support of Motion to Enforce Litigant’s Rights | A36 | | Exhibit A: Final Judgement of Divorce | Attached as A15 | | Exhibit B: Marital Settlement Agreement | Attached as CA14 | | Exhibit C: Mid-Marriage Agreement | Attached as CA1 | | Exhibit D: Irrevocable Power of Attorney, 12/15/13 | Attached as A21 | | Exhibit E: Irrevocable Power of Attorney, 11/11/14 | Attached as A27 | | Exhibit F: Sales Receipt for Lexus | A45 | | Exhibit G: Title for Lexus | A48 | | Exhibit H: Bank Account information | A50 | | Exhibit I: Criminal Complaints | A52 | | Exhibit J: Renunciation of Power of Attorney | A54 | September 25, 2017
[brief] Furthermore, despite that fact that \textsuperscript{12}  Most administrative agencies perform two delegated functions: they make rules that have the effect of laws -- a quasi-legislative capacity and the power to decide individual cases --a quasi-judicial capacity.  \textit{In re Attorney General Law Enforcement Directive Nos. 2020-5 and 2020-6}, 246 N.J. 462, 490 (2021).  Agencies can also act in a hybrid capacity manifesting aspects of rulemaking and adjudication, or in an informal manner without a hearing.  \textit{Id}.  the Governor has the authority to remove a member of the Council for cause, there is no record of the Governor having done so because a member manifests the pro-hunting bias of the [...].  Removal under such circumstances is at best a remote possibility and would still maintain a private non-governmental party’s effective control over a majority of the Council.  Despite the Governor’s appointive authority and right to remove a member of the Council, the legislative scheme accords effective regulatory authority to the [...] through its control over the Council.  The result of such delegation to the [...] and the Council is an abdication of legislative responsibility in violation of Articles III and IV of the New Jersey Constitution and the private non-delegation doctrine.  CONCLUSION
[brief] 29  Levin v. Livingston Twp., 35 N.J. 500, 510 (1961)  18  Morris County Fair Housing v. Boonton Twp., N.J. Super. 345, 347-48 (App. Div. 1989)  9  New Brunswick Cellular v. Borough of South Plainfield Bd., of Adj., 160 N.J. 1, 16 (1999)  22 Northgate Condominium Association, Inc. v. Borough of Hillsdale Planning Bd., 214 N.J. 120, 145-16 (2013)  16  Northgate Condominium Associates v. Bor. of Hillside Planning Bd., 214 N.J. 120, 141 (2013)  29 Perlmart v. Lacey Tp. Planning Bd., 295 N.J. Super. 234 (App. Div. 1995)  27, 28, 29, 31  Pizzo Mantin Group v. Twp. of Randolph, 261 N.J. Super. 659 (App. Div. 1993), aff’d as modified, 137 N.J. 216 (1994)  20, 23, 26
[brief] Overlooking the factual and legal import of defining and approving a Redevelopment Plan and its specifics, [...] asserted that no actual Application for Redevelopment Plan had been filed by an actual designated developer and that the issue only comes ripe and justiciable by a development application plan seeking NJDEP permits.  [...] further argued that the statutory Public Trust Doctrine and the NJDEP Public Access Regulations established the NJDEP as the “... entity responsible for protecting and expanding public access, not private actors such as [...]. ”  The Trial Court adopted [...]’s position in its April 2022 Order/Opinion denying [...]’s Motion and Granting [...]’s Cross-Motion, holding in relevant part as follows:  After setting forth the Legislature’s findings and public policy, see N.J.S.A. 13:1D-150, the Legislature delegated authority to the DEP to “ensure that any approval, permit, administrative order, or consent decree issued, or other action taken, by [DEP]” is consistent with the Public Trust Doctrine, N.J.S.A. 13:1D-151(a).
[directive] Tuesday & Thursday #3 (908) 212-7020 Ext. (Shared court)  Bernards Twp. 1802  Tuesday & Thursday #3 (908) 212-7020 Ext. (Shared court)  Bernardsville 1803  Tuesday & Thursday #3 (908) 212-7020 Ext. (Shared court)  Peapack/Gladstone Tuesday & Thursday #3 (732) 356-0833  Ext. Bound Brook 1804 Tuesday 640 (908) 526-1300  Ext. Branchburg 1805 1st & 3rd Wednesday 126 Bridgewater 1806 (908) 725-6375  Wednesdays 1st and 3rd (Shared court)  Somerville 1819 (908) 725-6375  Wednesday Far Hills 1807 (908) 781-1911  2nd & 4th Tuesday  Franklin Twp. 1808 (732) 873-7285  Monday & Wednesday (Shared court)  Millstone 1812 (732) 873-7285  Monday & Wednesday 2nd, 3rd, & 4th Green Brook 1809 (732) 968-1110  Wednesday Every Monday and Hillsborough 1810 (908) 369-4401  Tuesday (Shared court) Manville 1811 (908) 369-4401  Every Monday Every Monday and (Shared court) Montgomery 1813 (908) 369-4401  Tuesday North Plainfield 1814 (908) 769-2265  Every Thursday 2nd and 4th (Shared court) Watchung 1821 (908) 769-2265  Wednesday Raritan Borough 1816 (908) 218-0714  2nd & 4th Monday Rocky Hill 1817 (609) 924-2274  2nd  Wednesday 1st and 3rd South Bound Brook 1819 (732) 356-0258  Wednesday Warren 1820 (908) 753-8118  Tuesdays Sussex County 2nd, 3rd, and 4th Andover Joint 1902 (973) 383-4280 Wednesday Green Twp. 1908 (973) 383-3521 Tuesdays Frankford Joint 1905 (973) 948-4045 2nd and 3rd Thursday 1st and 4th Monday; Franklin Boro 1906 (973) 827-9280 2nd Wednesday Mondays (Except the last Monday of the Month) Hamburg 1909 (973) 729-3501 Thursdays (Except the 1st Thursday of the Month) 1st and 3rd Hardyston 1911 (973) 827-9280 Wednesday; Thursdays Hopatcong 1912 (973) 770-1200 Mondays Newton 1915 (973) 383-3521 Tuesdays 3rd Tuesday of the Ogdensburg 1916 (973) 827-3895 month Mondays (Except the last Monday of the Month) Sparta 1918 (973) 729-3501 Thursdays (Except the 1st Thursday of the Month) Stanhope 1919 (973) 770-1200 Mondays Vernon Township 1922 (973) 764-4737 Tuesdays Wantage/Sussex/Stillwater Joint 1924 (973) 875-7310
[brief] Moreover, the prosecutor’s assertions about a plea being limited to the four corners of the form, while generally true of promises at sentencing, unfairly deprived the defense of the chance to counter that informant testimony can be an implicit, unwritten expectation of such a plea; astute prosecutors may omit putting express promises in the plea forms to avoid the very impeaching implication sought here; and even without a formal promise, prosecutors have other ways of ensuring the future testimony of an informant who has already given a sworn statement, such as subpoenas, contempt of court, and the threat of prosecution for perjury.\textsuperscript{4}  See R. 1:9-1; R. 1:9-5; N.J.S.A. 2C:28-1.
[brief] N.J.S.A. 39:4-50 defines someone driving under the influence as “a person who operates a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, narcotic, hallucinogenic, or habit-producing drug, or operates a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol content of 0.08% or more by weight of alcohol in the defendant’s blood. ”  In the within matter, the Municipal Court did not obtain a sufficient factual basis to satisfy the requirements of the foregoing statute because the Court never elicited an acknowledgement from the Defendant himself with regard to the admissibility of the alleged B.A.C. result of .17%.  Attached to the within Letter Memorandum of Law in accordance with R. 1:36-3 is the unpublished Appellate Division opinion in the matter of State v. [...], Docket No. [...], decided September 10, 2020, which supports the legal argument set forth herein.  (DA13).  In State v. [...], Docket No. [...], decided September 10, 2020, the Appellate Division set forth a framework for the acceptance of a guilty plea when the factual basis is reliant upon the alleged B.A.C. result in said matter.  --- 3  Pursuant to New Jersey Court Rule 1:36-3, Defendant has attached a copy of the unpublished opinion of State v. [...].  Defense counsel is not aware of any cases with contrary holdings.  As the Appellate Division points out, “The critical point is that the acknowledgment of guilt with respect to the BAC element of the per se DWI offense should be explicit and not just inferred from the fact that a defendant seeks to enter a guilty plea.
[brief] *Evers v. Davis, 86 N.J.L. 196 (E.A. 1914)  The third instance of the defendant’s negligence in his failure to make complete observations.  The facts are that he was completely unaware of the plaintiff’s car once he began his turn, and this is despite his awareness that she was on his right while they were both stopped at the red light.  This is another factual reason in dispute.  It is because he did not see her as he was driving, and that is why he crashed into her with his front right bumper after he failed to hold the turn and went wide into the right lane of Route 280.  Had the defendant been aware of the plaintiff he would have easily avoided this accident.  Plaintiff will ask the Trial Court to charge Model Civil Jury Charge 5.30G Duty of Automobile Driver to Make Observations:
[directive] When a person charged with an offense posts cash bail or secures a bail bond in any amount, the court may, upon the request of the prosecutor, conduct an Bail Sufficiency; Source Hearing inquiry to determine the reliability of the obligor or person posting cash bail, the value and sufficiency of any security offered, the relationship of the obligor or (See also Rule 3:26-8(a-g) above) person posting cash bail to the defendant and the defendant's interest in ensuring that the bail is not forfeited, and whether the funds used to post the cash bail or secure the bail bond were acquired as a result of criminal or unlawful conduct.  When the offense charged against such person is a crime with bail restrictions, the court shall, upon the request of the prosecutor, conduct an inquiry.  The court may examine, under oath or otherwise, any person who may possess relevant information, and may inquire into any matter appropriate to its determination.  The court shall issue an order either approving or disapproving the bail.  The court shall not issue an order approving the bail unless it is satisfied that the evidence adduced in the inquiry establishes the reliability of the source of the funds used to post bail or security offered, that the relationship of the obligor or person posting cash bail is sufficient to ensure the defendant's presence in court when required, and that the funds used to post cash bail or secure a bail bond were not acquired as a result of criminal or unlawful conduct.
[brief] SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION – DOCKET NO. [...]  [...]. and [...] vs. [...] IN THE COUNTY OF MONMOUTH and THE [...] IN THE COUNTY OF MONMOUTH  CIVIL ACTION –  On Appeal from an April 28, 2023 Order Denying Plaintiffs’ Motion For Summary Judgment and a June 20, 2023  Trial Order Dismissing Plaintiffs’ Complaint  Entered in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Monmouth County.  Sat Below: [...] J.S.C. BRIEF AND APPENDIX OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANTS, [...] and [...]
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT ERRED, AS A MATTER OF LAW, IN FINDINGS ALL DEFENDANTS JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY LIABLE.  (25T63:23-25; 25T79:13-80:13)  Plaintiffs’ opposition relies on the trial court’s misstatement and misapplication of the law, i.e., that “liability is presumed to be joint and several. ”  The assertion that this presumption controls is analogous to an effort to put the cart before the horse.  But there is no horse here because liability was not established for these Defendants.  And, therefore, there can be no cart.  Before one can be jointly and severally liable, one must first be individually liable.  In fact, under the Comparative Negligence Act, N.J.S.A. 2A:15-5.3a, only a defendant found 60% or more responsible for the total damages is liable for the entire award.  Campione v. Soden, 150 N.J. 163, 183 (1997).  --- 12  Plaintiffs claim that these defendants press an argument on appeal that calls for specific percentages of the judgment to be allocated to the different defendants.  Pb75.  Contrary to plaintiffs’ assertion that this argument was advanced, Pb74, these defendants have not and do not seek such an allocation on appeal.  The suggestion was presented to the trial court in a motion to modify the judgment as an attempt to ameliorate the trial court’s erroneous decision to hold all defendants jointly and severally liable.  25T40:8-16.  As is evident from the arguments presented on appeal, the court’s findings lack sufficient support in the record and are infused with legal error.  Accordingly, the allocations suggested in the trial court are irrelevant.  It is a basic principle that the claim must be alleged against a defendant and the factfinder must find that the claim was proven against that defendant before any liability attaches.  In this case, plaintiffs attempt to defend the imposition of joint and several liability upon defendants who were not even named in various counts, let alone found to be liable under the law for those counts.\textsuperscript{13}  Notably, the trial court made no findings at all as to liability by defendants [...]; [...]; [...]; [...]; and [...].  Plainly, all counts should be dismissed and the judgment vacated against those defendants.
[brief] NEW JERSEY  DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION  Date Submitted: August 7, 2024  [...]  ATTORNEY GENERAL OF NEW JERSEY  R.J. Hughes Justice Complex  P.O. Box 093 Trenton, New Jersey 08625  Attorney for Respondent  [...] (609) 376-2950  [...]  [...]  Assistant Attorney General Of Counsel  [...], ID:026251990  Deputy Attorney General  On the Brief TABLE OF CONTENTS
[brief] *Accordingly, the standard of proof of special reasons to support a variance from one or more conditions imposed on a conditional use should be relevant to the nature of the deviation from the ordinance.*  The burden of proof required to sustain a use variance not only is too onerous for a conditional use variance; in addition, its focus is misplaced.  The use variance proofs attempt to justify the board of adjustment’s grant of permission for a use that the municipality has prohibited.  Proof to support a conditional use variance need only justify the municipality's continued permission for a use notwithstanding a deviation from one or more conditions of the ordinance.  [Coventry Square, 138 N.J. at 297-98 (emphasis added)].  As a result of its distinction between a variance for a non-permitted use, and a variance needed because a condition is not satisfied, the Court concluded:  We hold that the proof of special reasons that must be adduced by an applicant for a “d” variance from one or more conditions imposed by ordinance in respect of a conditional use shall be proof sufficient to satisfy the board of adjustment that the site proposed for the conditional use, in the context of the applicant's proposed site plan, continues to be an appropriate site for the conditional use notwithstanding the deviations from one or more conditions imposed by the ordinance.  That standard of proof will focus both the applicant’s and the board’s attention on the specific deviation from the conditions imposed by the ordinance, and will permit the board to find special reasons to support the variance only if it is persuaded that the noncompliance with conditions does not affect the suitability of the site for the conditional use.  Thus a conditional use variance applicant must show that the site will accommodate the problems associated with the use even though the proposal does not comply with the conditions the ordinance established to address those problems.
[brief] [...] conceded that if the dispatcher failed to log the event into the system because they get distracted then the event will not be logged into the system by any other means.  (3T28:14).  It was possible to turn the GPS system off and still be able to use ProPhoenix by unplugging the GPS device but that requires screws and unbolting it from the mount.  (3T29:10-12).  If an Officer were not logged into the computer, the GPS would not activate.  (3T30:23-24).  [...] testified that the police cars, even sergeant's cars, should have had dashboard cameras.
[brief] STANDARD OF REVIEW  The trial court’s order on summary judgment interpreting the Mold Exclusion is “not entitled to any special deference. ”  Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. Of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995).  However, the trial court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law after trial are controlled by a far different standard.  The scope of appellate review of a trial court’s fact-finding function is limited.  Walid v. Yolanda for Irene Couture, 425 N.J. Super. 171, 179 (App. Div. 2012).  “Findings by the trial judge are considered binding on appeal when supported by adequate, substantial, credible evidence. ”  Rova Farms Resort v. Investors Ins. Co., 65 N.J. 474, 484 (1974).  This Court must “grant substantial deference to a trial court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law, which will only be disturbed if they are manifestly unsupported by or inconsistent with the competent, relevant and reasonably credible evidence.
[brief] In 2010, however, a dispute arose between the parties as to whether [...] had properly exercised its option to extend the Lease.  As the parties could not resolve this dispute, [...] filed litigation against the Borough entitled [...] Beach and Boardwalk Company v. [...], Docket No. [...] seeking a ruling from the court that the Lease was still in effect.  After this litigation was filed, the parties resolved this dispute and entered into a Settlement Agreement and Lease Amendment in February of 2012.
[directive] $100 to $1,000 10% permissible then fourth degree.  63  Updated December 2, 2013  Bail Schedule 2 STATUTES WHERE BAIL MAY BE SET BY A SUPERIOR COURT JUDGE OR A MUNICIPAL COURT JUDGE OR, IN THE MUNICIPAL COURT JUDGE’S ABSENCE, THE MUNICIPAL COURT ADMINISTRATOR OR DEPUTY COURT ADMINISTRATOR, PURSUANT TO RULE 3:26-2 requires warrants
[brief] ”  Da461:3-5.  [...] testified that he had no knowledge of any actual over-topping onto the Property since construction on the new seawall was completed in early 2019.  Da 463:2-12.  [...] was unable to equate his opinion with any of the commonly-used terms of “two-year storm, a ten-year storm, 50-year storm, 100-year storm, 500-year storm”:  Q: How do you define a low frequency storm?  A: Less than – let me get my numbers here.  Well, you know what?  Without the benefit of calculation analysis, I would say, infrequent.  Q:
[brief] o (1T 74:25-76:13).  •  On January 15, 2018 they received a five-page email from his wife on behalf of [...], informing them they had been fired.  Prior to that e-mail, he had never heard of the Repurchase Agreement.  o (1T 81:8-83:5).  •  When [...] filed an action against [...], he first learned a valuation report was prepared, valuing [...]'s 12% share at $39,600 as of June 10, 2020, the date this court ordered [...]'s disassociation.