ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] A.  **There was no written arrangement between the parties and there was no granting of a license from [...] to [...]**  [...] conceded that there was no franchise agreement between the parties.  (Pa71).  There was also no formal agreement between [...] and [...].  (Pa1910).  [...] routinely gave its logo to dealers and distributors for marketing purposes, but it never gave [...] a license to use its intellectual property.  (Pa1910).  [...] and [...] did not have a written arrangement requiring that [...] sell a certain amount of [...]’ products or that imposed limitations on the volume of grills [...] could sell from another grill manufacturer.  (Pa1295).  There was also no written arrangement that precluded [...] from selling other grills in a retail or wholesale capacity.  (Pa1288, 1289).  As to marketing and advertising, there was no written arrangement between [...] and [...] with respect to policies on how [...] should use [...]’s trademark, proprietary images or marks, or how [...] should display or use the [...]’ name.  (Pa1290).  [...] and [...] had no written arrangements as to how [...] displayed [...] grills, how [...] advertised at its [...] location, and there were no written arrangements regarding displays at trade shows or restricting [...]’s ability to display or sell non-[...] grills at trade shows.  (Pa1291; Pa1294; Pa1296).  [...] and [...] did not have any written arrangement whereby [...] limited [...]’s marketing and advertising materials for other branded grills.  (Pa1294).  Furthermore, there were no written requirements that [...] imposed on how [...] should display [...] at the [...] showroom, [...] did not require [...] dedicate a minimum amount of square footage to displaying [...] products, and there was no written arrangement prohibiting [...] from displaying other brands at its showroom.  (Pa1285; Pa1289; Pa1296).  Moreover, [...] and [...] did not have any written arrangement as to how [...] displayed [...]’ banners in its showroom or whether [...] displayed banners from other manufacturers.  (Pa1298; Pa1302).  There was no written arrangement whereby [...] dictated which [...] [...] could order and/or sell, and there was no budget imposing any spend that [...] was required to make to promote [...] products.  (Pa1300).  [...] and [...] did not have any written arrangements whereby the parties shared costs related to advertising.  (Pa1303).  There was nothing in writing whereby [...] controlled [...] as to sales, marketing, and/or promotion of [...].  (Pa1308).  [...] and [...] did not have any written arrangement where [...] imposed any requirements on [...] regarding [...]’s social media postings.  (Pa1366).  Finally, [...] and [...] did not have any written arrangement regarding control of the standards for [...]’s hiring practices or for [...]’s employees’ conduct.  (Pa1344).  Succinctly put, [...] and [...] did not have any written arrangement in which [...] controlled anything whatsoever regarding [...]’s business.  (Pa1309).  B.
[directive] In the event that a law enforcement agency or officer has reason to believe that a defendant has violated a condition of pretrial release, the agency or officer shall promptly notify the County Prosecutor handling the case, or the Division of Criminal Justice in cases prosecuted by the Division.  The County Prosecutor or Division shall promptly notify the pretrial services program of the circumstances of the violation unless the Prosecutor or Director determines that such notification would jeopardize an investigation or law enforcement operation, or endanger an officer or other person.  The prosecutor also shall promptly determine whether to (1) initiate a charge for criminal contempt or any other applicable offense and/or (2) seek revocation of release pursuant to Section 8, or request that additional conditions of release be imposed.
[brief] A FACT-BASED ALLOCATION IS APPROPRIATE IN THIS CASE  Under Boston Gas, the “ideal method” for allocating insurance coverage for long-tail claims is the fact-based method.  Bos. Gas Co. v. Century Indem. Co., 910 N.E.2d 290, 312 (Mass. 2009).  Only where it is not possible to make a fact-based allocation should coverage be allocated using the pro-rata time-on-the-risk method adopted by the trial court in this case.  See id. at 316.  In granting reconsideration of the SAM’s Report and Recommendation, the trial court concluded that it was not possible to do a fact-based allocation of [...]’s covered damages.
[directive] The mandatory penalties are as follows:  (1)  Up to $2,000 in the case of a 1st degree crime (2)  Up to $1,000 in the case of a 2nd degree crime (3)  Up to $750 in the case of a 3rd degree crime (4)  Up to $500 in the case of a 4th degree crime TOTAL  S.C.V.T.F. Penalty: $  Oskarżony/Defendant Data/Date  Adwokat obrony/Defense Attorney Prokurator/Prosecutor Skorygowany formularz udostępniony na mocy Dyrektywy #01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 10080-Polish strona 8 z 8 Revised Form Promulgated by Directive #01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 10080-Polish page 8 of 8 고지: 이 양식은 공개되는 문서이므로, 요청이 있으면 제출된 상태로 대중에게 제공됩니다.
[directive] Qualified Offenders (Eligibility):  III.  A.  A person with one criminal conviction or who has convictions for more than one crime charged in separate counts of one indictment or accusation.  B.  Multiple convictions charged in two indictments or two accusations, or one indictment and one accusation filed in the same court prior to entry of judgment under any of them shall be deemed to be one conviction.  Revised: 03/2024, CN: XXXXX Page of 3 7
[brief] (i)  [...] was an independent contractor and as such, [...] is not liable for the acts of its independent contractor.  In this matter, [...] subcontracted the work for inspection services to [...] (Pa1778).  As noted in the contract between [...] and [...], [...] is an independent contractor (Pa1783) (Article XIV).  The subcontract clearly sets forth that [...] is an independent contractor and not an agent of [...].  (Pa1783)  (Article XIV)  As noted in the agreement: Article XIV.  INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR.  Subconsultant agrees that it is an independent contractor and not an agent of Prime and is solely responsible for the means and methods used in performing the services provided herein....”  It is well settled law in New Jersey that one who hires an independent contractor is not liable for the wrongful conduct of those contractors in the performance of their duties and services.  Bahrle v. Exxon Corp., 145 N.J. 144, 156 (1996); Baldasarre v. Butler, 132 N.J. 278, 291 (1993).  There are three exceptions to the general rule, none of which apply here; Majestic Realty Associates, Inc. v. Toti Contracting Co., 30 N.J. 425 (1959).  There is no evidence that the principal retained control over the manner and means of doing the work the contractor provided.  Indeed, the contract specifically states that [...] is “solely responsible for the means and methods used in performing the services provided herein”\(^5\) (Pa1783).  There is no evidence that there was the retention of an incompetent contractor.  --- \(^5\) [...] while noting that [...] was the independent contractor that performed the work does not in anyway claim that [...] was negligent in this matter.  Finally, the services provided by the contractor do not fall within the third exception of being a nuisance per se.  *Id.*  As [...] was not an employee of [...], there is no basis for Appellant’s argument that vicarious liability should be attributed to [...].  [...] was an independent contractor who performed the work in question.  As such, plaintiff’s appeal as it relates to [...] should be dismissed and the Trial Court decision affirmed.
[brief] Exhibit 69 - A true and correct copy of [...]’s October 18, 2018  Request for information to [...]..........................Dta2941  Exhibit 70 - September 10, 2018  E-Mail from [...]’s insurance broker, [...].........................................................Dta2945  Exhibit 71 - October 19, 2018  EMail exchange between [...] and [...].........................................................Dta2948  Exhibit 72 - Policy Coverage  Search Results from Pa. Dept. of Labor & Industry.....................................................Dta2951  Exhibit 73 - October 31, 2018  EMail from [...]..............................Dta2954  Exhibit 74 - E-Mail exchange between [...], [...] and [...]...............................................................Dta2951  Exhibit 75 - [...]’s Answer in the DJ Action.........................Dta711
[brief] On the Brief: [...], Esq.  [...], Esq.  TABLE OF CONTENTS  LEGAL ARGUMENT: POINT I: RESPONDENTS’ OPPOSITION  BRIEF RELIES ON SEVERAL ARGUMENTS WHICH ARE FACTUALLY OR LEGALLY INCORRECT .................................................................................................................. 1 A. CONTRARY TO RESPONDENTS’ ASSERTION, THE REVISED GRADING PLAN, WHICH [...] FAILED TO PROVIDE ITS SURVEYOR IN A TIMELY MANNER, WAS IN FACT APPROVED BY THE MORRIS PLAINS BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT BEFORE, NOT AFTER, THE SURVEYOR BEGAN HIS STAKEOUT OF THE PROPERTY ..............................................  1 B. CONTRARY TO RESPONDENTS’ ARGUMENT, APPELLANTS DO NOT RELY ON THE THEORY OF RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR TO HOLD [...] LIABLE FOR THE ACTIONS OF ITS SURVEYOR, BUT RATHER ON THE DIRECT NEGLIGENCE OF [...] IN PROVIDING THE SURVEYOR WITH AN INACCURATE GRADING PLAN ........ 2 C. RESPONDENTS DISTORT AND MISREPRESENT THE FINDINGS OF JUDGE BOGAARD IN HIS ORDER OF SEPTEMBER 29, 2020 REGARDING SUMMARY JUDGMENT .........................................................................................................................  4 POINT II: THE CENTRAL ISSUE IN THIS CASE IS WHETHER RESPONDENT  [...] FAILED TO PERFORM ITS OBLIGATIONS TO ACCURATELY EXECUTE APPELLANTS’ CONSTRUCTION PLANS; PLAINTIFF EDWARD KLOSS, AS A FACT WITNESS, IS QUALIFIED TO PROVIDE ALL NECESSARY TESTIMONY ON LIABILITY AND DAMAGES TO DEMONSTRATE HOW [...]’S FAILURE TO PROVIDE SURVEYOR RIGG WITH ACCURATE, UP-TO-DATE GRADING PLANS UPON WHICH TO STAKE OUT ELEVATIONS ON THE PROPERTY CAUSED SIGNIFICANT INCREASE IN COSTS, LOSS OF PROFIT AND LONG DELAYS IN COMPLETION OF THE PROJECT.  POINT III: THIS COURT SHOULD CONSIDER AND DECIDE APPELLANT’S “COMMON KNOWLEDGE NEGLIGENCE” ARGUMENT, DESPITE ITS NOT BEING EXPLICITLY RAISED IN THE RECORD BELOW.  CONCLUSION #
[brief] [...] filed her Complaint against Defendants on September 10, 2021.  (Pa1-12).  Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss on December 23, 2021, and, following its denial, their Answer on February 14, 2022.  (Pa13-21).  Defendants thereafter filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on April 17, 2024.  (Pa22-23).  [...] filed her opposition on June 12, 2024, (Pa653-54), and Defendants filed a reply on July 1, 2024, (Pa688-709).  The trial court heard oral argument on July 15, 2024 and issued its decision granting Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment at that time, with an Order following.  (Pa712).  [...] filed her Notice of Appeal on August 22, 2024 and an Amended Notice of Appeal on September 3, 2024.  (Pa713-31).  **STATEMENT OF FACTS**
[brief] [...]’s status as a municipality whose former school district was eliminated has rendered it ineligible for the statutory withdrawal process set forth in N.J.S.A. 18A:13-47.11(a).  Therefore, the Commissioner’s September 22, 2023, decision finding that [...] has standing to seek withdrawal pursuant to that statute should be reversed.  [...]  Attorneys for [...]  /s/[...]  [...], Esq.  Attorney ID # 03990-1983  Dated: April 15, 2024  /s/[...]  [...], Esq. Attorney ID # 01811-2010  Dated: April 15, 2024  [...]  Attorneys for [...]  [...], Esq.  Attorney ID # 02237-1998  Dated: April 15, 2024  [...], Esq.  Attorney ID # 11719-2014  Dated: April 15, 2024  OPPOSITION
[brief] 2.  The Limited Attorney Exemption Does Not Satisfy Either Of The Knight Test Factors (T. at 10:18-17:19).  In the event this Court finds that the trial court appropriately applied the “two-prong test” from Knight, it should find that the Limited Attorney Exemption does not meet either prong.  As for the first factor, Defendants emphasize the overarching and remedial purpose of the Act (to protect consumers from unscrupulous practices of debt adjusters), but Plaintiffs do not question this overall purpose and are not challenging the enactment of the entire Act.
[directive]   In collaboration with the FNE Coordinator, a method for victims to release Five- Year Hold Kits (and applicable records) to a law enforcement agency shall be devised.  II.  The preservation, storage, and retention of SAFE, DFSA/Tox, and Five-Year Hold Kits to maintain integrity of evidence and follow the proper chain of custody, including:  storing ALL kits (Five-Year Hold Kits and those released to law enforcement for testing) in accordance with the County Prosecutor’s Office’s evidence retention guidelines; o SAFE Kits shall be maintained in dry storage.  o DFSA/Tox Kits shall be maintained in refrigerated storage.   retaining and preserving ALL kits (Five-Year Hold Kits and those released to law enforcement for testing) for the minimum retention period required by applicable laws, regulations, and directives.  o Five-Year Hold Kits: five years, and where the victim is a minor, not less than five years after the victim reaches the age of 18. 9  o All Kits Released to Law Enforcement:  For as long as the crime remains unsolved or the person convicted of that crime remains in custody.  (N.J.S.A. 2A:84-32e).  III.  The return of the victims’ personal items collected during the medical forensic examination, if they are requested by the victim and are no longer needed as evidence.  (See N.J.S.A. 52:4B-44(18)).  Id. 9 -16-  ATTORNEY GENERAL STANDARDS FOR PROVIDING SERVICES TO VICTIMS OF SEXUAL ASSAULT
[brief] *Arapaho Owners Ass’n Inc. v. Alpert*, 199 Vt. 553, 566, 128 A.3d 397, 406 (2015).  Compensatory awards of attorneys’ fees fall squarely within the plain, non-technical meaning of “damages” as set forth above.  The same is true of monies awarded as taxable “costs” to prevailing litigants.  *Cf. Peyton v. William C. Peyton Corp.*, 8 A.2d 89, 91 (Del. 1939) (“Costs are allowances in the nature of incidental damages awarded by law to reimburse the prevailing party for expenses necessarily incurred in the assertion of his rights in court. ”) (emphasis added).  [...]’s contention that the sums of money awarded by the Vermont Trial Court did not even arguably constitute insured “damages” under the Policy, and thus entitled [...] to take the law into its own hands, disregards both the undisputed facts and applicable law and, as a result, once again violates the Unfair Claims Settlement Practices Act and similar Vermont statutory law.  See N.J. Stat. Ann. §17:29B-4(9)(n); Vt. Stat. tit. 8 § 4724.  (While [...] does not seek relief under UCSPA, which does not provide a private right of action, UCSPA provides clear guidance as to how insurance claims are required to be resolved, as the New Jersey Supreme Court held in Pickett, 131 N.J. at 468, 621 A.2d at 451.)  The Trial Court’s conclusion that the monies awarded against [...] in this case were not encompassed by the undefined Policy term “damages” (T85-5 to T85-7) is unsupported by citation of authority and plainly conflicts with both New Jersey and Vermont law as set forth above.  IV.
[directive] Insurance Fraud Laws Page 5  Effective June 9, 2004 - N.J.S.A. 39:3-29 & 39:3-29.1a - Warrant of Impoundment  A dated and signed Warrant of Impoundment will then empower any law enforcement officer, to whom the Warrant is provided, to execute the Warrant, pursuant to the provisions of N.J.S.A. 39:3-29.1a.
[brief] (Pa 649).  This is directly in the heart of town.  Additionally, the [...] is located within 1.2 miles of the accident location along a route to the Kearny Town Hall.  More compellingly, [...], the Acting Superintendent of Public Works for the [...], stated that DPW is responsible for repairing potholes and that if any other entity within the town noticed a pothole, that entity would report it to DPW and they would repair it.
[brief] --------------------------  11  Flagg v. Baldwin, 38 N.J. Eq. 219, 244 (E. & A. 1884)  ---------------------- 46  Gayles v. Sky Zone Trampoline Park, 468 N.J. Super. 17, 23 ---------------  2 Globe Motor Co. v. Igdalev, 225 N.J. 469, 482 (2016)  -----------------------  15
[brief] iii.  Plaintiffs [...], [...], [...], [...], and [...] retired while the parties to the First Police Matter negotiated a settlement of that lawsuit, which was ultimately settled on December 14, 2017.  (1029a-1031a); (1T13:3-21; 1T14:7-15:2; 1T20:6-22; 1T21:3-15; 1T22:1-24; 1T22:25-23:10).
[brief] This Court recently addressed authentication of video as substantive evidence of a crime in [...], in which the defendant was on trial for arson after he set fire to his car in a parking lot near the [...] at [...].  Police obtained surveillance video from a nearby bus stop, where a witness heard an explosion and saw a flash of light in the parking lot.  Because the video could not be downloaded, a police officer recorded the surveillance video on his cell phone.  The officer and an information-technology specialist testified as to why the surveillance video could not be downloaded and was recorded on the cell phone, and the witness identified herself in the video and the flash of light she saw.  463 N.J. Super. at 41, 45, 53.  This testimony, as well as the absence of evidence that the cell-phone video was unreliable, was found sufficient to authenticate the cell-phone video.  Id. at 53.  Police also obtained surveillance videos from the apartment building, where [...] appeared on camera entering and leaving the building numerous times before and immediately after the crime.  Id. at 44-45.  [...] did not object to the introduction of these videos into evidence at trial, and he did not challenge it on appeal.
[brief] The Debtor has alleged the TSL as applied to the Property deprived him of his equity and an unconstitutional taking occurred.  Although the court has not worked through all the ramifications of Tyler and Roberto, it appears that the Debtor has plausibly alleged an entitlement to recover either the property or money damages as a result of either his Section 548 claim or his Takings Clause claims.  Thus, I conclude that this bankruptcy case and its related adversary proceeding constitute a pending matter sufficient to satisfy pipeline retroactivity.
[brief] ”  LLC, 2023 U.S. App. LEXIS 34032, *4, 7 (Ja64-Ja66), [...]’s arbitration provision is far from clear.  On this point, and as previously set forth in Plaintiff’s opening brief, first, in [...]’s arbitration provision you have Paragraph 7.2 (Ja36) of the arbitration provision which states:  “Arbitration:  You agree to submit any and all Disputes (as defined in Section 7.4) to binding arbitration pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act (Title 9 of the United States Code), which will govern the interpretation and enforcement of this arbitration agreement (“Arbitration Agreement”).  Arbitration will be before either (1) JAMS (formerly known as Judicial Arbitration and Mediation Services), jamsadr.com, or (2) the American Arbitration Association (“AAA”), adr.org…” (emphasis added)  Unlike the purported corresponding paragraph in Blueprint, 2023 U.S. App. LEXIS 34032, *4, 7 (Ja64-Ja66) Defendant’s Paragraph 7.2 (Ja36) does not mention the “AAA Rules (or those of JAMS).  Second, Paragraph 7.2 (Ja36) from [...]’s arbitration provision references (and only applies to) “Disputes” which is defined in an entirely different part of the arbitration provision at Paragraph 7.4.  (Ja37)  “Disputes” does not apply (per [...]’s own definition) to Plaintiff’s claims involving “public injunctive relief”.  Third, any reference to the AAA or JAMS rules is only found in an entirely separate paragraph (7. 5)(Ja37), on an entirely separate page, from Paragraph 7.2.  Accordingly, this is all not the same type of clear delegation provision (i.e. “Delegation Clause”) (and corresponding individuals paragraph concerning arbitrability) as set forth in *Blueprint*, 2023 U.S. App. LEXIS 34032, *4, 7.  (Ja64-Ja66)  Accordingly, a New Jersey Judge, and not an arbitrator, should determine whether the injunctive relief set forth in Plaintiff’s Complaint against [...] is covered by [...]’s form, New Jersey, health club Membership Agreement.
[brief] Donan Development Co. vs. Donan Hardware ............................................ 31  34 N.J. Super. 293 (App. Div. 1955)  Dries vs. Trenton Oil Co. Inc. ................................................................. 24  17 N.J. Super. 591 (App. Div. 1952)  Fargo Realty, Inc. vs. Harris ................................................................. 17  173 N.J. Super. 262 (App. Div. 1980)  Flecker vs. Statue Cruises, LLC .................................................. 33 444 N.J. Super. 31, 36, 40, 44 (Law Div. 2013)
[brief] However, at summary judgment [...] failed to establish that [...] was negligent because she was unable to show that [...] “failed to exercise due care with respect to [] harassment in the workplace, that its breach of duty caused the plaintiff’s harm, and that she sustained damages. ”  Komlodi v. Picciano, 217 N.J. 387, 409 (2014).  Indeed, “there can be no negligence if the procedure in place to stop the harassment is effective. ”  *Bouton v. BMW of North America*, 29 F3d 103 (3d Cir. 1994).  In *Bouton*, the Third Circuit held that an effective grievance procedure which stops harassment in a timely manner shields an employer from liability for a hostile work environment.  *Id.*, at 107.  “By definition, there can be no negligence if the procedure is effective. ”  *Id.*, at 110.  The New Jersey Supreme Court subsequently adopted the “Bouton shield” for cases brought under NJLAD.  *Payton v. N.J. Tpk. Auth.*, 292 N.J. Super. 36 (App. Div. 1996) (holding that “an employer’s response to an employee’s complaint is central to a plaintiff’s cause of action”); see also *Cavuoti v. N.J. Transit Corp.*, 161 N.J. 107, 120 (1999) (“afford[ing] a form of safe haven for employers who promulgate and support an active, anti-harassment policy”).
[brief] “Since the rule speaks only to ‘while the deposition is being taken,’ it clearly does not address consultation during overnight, lunch, and other breaks. ”  PRESSLER & VERNIERO, Current N.J. Court Rules, Comment 4:14-3, (GANN).  Further interpretation of the Rule is limited, but one court at least acknowledged that consultations with witnesses overnight are permissible.  In re PSE & G Shareholder Litigation, 320 N.J. Super. 112, 117, (Ch. Div. 1998).  And the guidance of both of those authorities applies only to depositions, not trials, and then only with fact witnesses.  Given the policy behind the rule, overnight consultation with an expert witness during trial and in preparation for a redirect examination is even more permissible.
[brief] It is clear that both the Trial Court and the SHO were emboldened by the usurp of the Board’s authority in the 2020 Order.  As indicated previously, the 2020 Order appointed the SHO and established the scope of his authority.  M1-8.  The specific tasks to be undertaken by the SHO were outlined in Paragraphs (A) through (L) of the 2020 Order.  M4-7.
[directive] FORMAL OPINION  1-2014 TO: [...], Director New of Jersey Division Criminal Justice  All County Prosecutors X )C X~C ~C ~C 7C ~7F ~C  All Municipal Prosecutors  Because New Jersey Senate Bill [...], Superintendent 2460, signed into law by the New Police Jersey State Governor on October 17, 2014, repeals the Sports Wagering County All Sheriffs in Act its entirety, Law Chief Executives  All Police Enforcement Directive 2014-1