ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] On March 14, 2014, court-appointed PCR counsel filed a brief and exhibit in support of defendant's petition.  On May 9, 2014, the court denied defendant's petition without an evidentiary hearing, reasoning that defendant did not submit any competent evidence supporting his allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel.  Defendant filed a motion for reconsideration of the denial of his PCR on June 27, 2014, which was ultimately denied on August 22, 2014.  On September 22, 2016, we affirmed the court's decision to deny defendant's motion, finding that defendant's "self-serving spurious allegations of impropriety" against his plea counsel were not sufficient to meet his burden of proof.
[brief] I ask the honorable court judges to not only review this case De Novo, but to have a plenary review of the entire case including: 1) reviewing the 2 officers body cams to make new determinations on whether there was probable cause, considering the totality of the circumstance on whether my demeaner and actions and performance on the SFST raised any indication to intoxication.  2) reviewing [...] dash cam to make new determinations on whether there was probable cause, considering the totality of the circumstance, on whether my driving raised any indication to intoxication.  3) reviewing [...] dash cam to make new determinations on whether there was reasonable suspicion to stop me, considering the totality of the circumstance  4)  To please acknowledge and respond to my provable accusation that the officer lied in court and on the police report that I failed to maintain my position during the walk and turn test and lying that he told me to get back into position.  This is easily seen and heard on the body cam videos.  [...] body cam is a better view of my performance of the SFST and my accusation.  1T:23-(5-17), [1T:28(22-25) - 1T:29-(1-10)], [4T:14-(16-25) - 4T:15-(1-14)], (Da 3a)
[brief] In Bonnabel, the notice of the adoption for an ordinance related to affordable housing failed to include information as to “where and when the public could obtain a free copy. ”  *Id.* at *9*.  Accordingly, the plaintiff argued that the failure to provide such information as required by the statute rendered the notice “defective and the ordinance invalid. ”  *Ibid.*  The Appellate Division upheld the lower court’s determination that “the Township’s error did not inhibit an opportunity for the public to voice its opinions and/or objections to the proposed ordinance. ”  *Id.* at *10-11.  In *Concerned Citizens of Livingston*, 2018 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1356, the Council issued a public notice which included “the entire Ordinance, whose preamble stated its purpose.
[directive] A law enforcement officer shall ask the person who delivers the infant to the police station or equivalent: < whether that person is the parent of the infant; and < whether the infant is no more than 30 days old; and < whether the infant is being delivered voluntarily; and < whether the parent intends to return for the infant.  The officer may not require proof of identification (see §1.3. 1, below) if the case falls within the “New Jersey Safe Haven Infant Protection Act. ”  If the person who delivers the infant is not the parent, the officer shall ask whether the parent has voluntarily arranged for that person to leave the infant at the police station.  In the following circumstances, the “New Jersey Safe Haven Infant Protection Act” does not apply: < if the person delivering the infant is not the parent and indicates that the parent did not voluntarily arrange for that person to leave the infant at the police station; or < if the parent indicates that his or her actions are not voluntary (coerced); or < if the infant is more than 30 days old; or < if the parent or person delivering the infant expresses an intent to return for the infant.  If the “New Jersey Safe Haven Infant Protection Act” does not apply the law enforcement agency shall take steps to ensure the safety of the infant, notify the local [...] and begin an investigation.  The [...] should be contacted if the infant cannot be identified during the course of the ensuing investigation.  1.2.3
[brief] A4771 [[...]/[...].+8], Drug court-expands offenses eligible for expungement upon successful discharge  A6171 [[...]/[...]+1], Information Privacy, Office-creates; concerns disclosure of public official info  S2951 [[...]/[...]-9],  Drug court-expands offenses eligible for expungement upon successful discharge S4219 [[...]/[...]+1], Information Privacy, Office-creates; concerns disclosure of public official info  S4251 [[...]], Wrongful death-allows cert. persons not yet estate administrator; pursue lawsuit  ASSEMBLY QUORUM
[brief] First, the PSA placed delivery of the estoppel certificate within the due diligence timeline.  Due diligence lasted for 30 days following signing, and Defendant was to submit the estoppel for signature within 10 days of signing and use commercially reasonable efforts to secure it.  If secured, Defendant was obligated to promptly deliver it to the Plaintiff.  Certainly, it was within the parties’ contemplation, especially due to the required prompt delivery, this would occur within the due diligence timeline.  But for Defendant's concealed litigation with [...], the estoppel process would have been completed within the 30-day due diligence period.  The fact this ultimately happened as it did, as [...] observed, “does not nullify the right the parties contemplated the Purchaser would have in the event of a non-compliant Estoppel Certificate at any time. ” (Da11.)  Second, Defendant’s characterization of the estoppel certificate’s purpose does not accurately reflect it has two – not one as Defendant says – functions.
[directive] State of New Jersey DEPARTMENT LAW PUBLIC SAFETY OF AND DIVISION CRIMINAL JUSTICE OF [...] [...] PO BOX 085 TRENTON, NJ 08625-0085  Attorney General Director TELEPHONE (609) 984-6500  ALL COUNTY PROSECUTORS TO: ALL MUNICIPAL PROSECUTORS SUPERINTENDENT, DIVISION OF STATE POLICE  ALL LAW ENFORCEMENT CHIEF EXECUTIVES  [...], ATTORNEY GENERAL OF NEW JERSEY FROM: December 8, 2000
[brief] Plaintiff was a passenger in the taxi which made a sharp left turn in front of the other defendant, the Trial Court directed a verdict in favor of the other defendant.  During jury deliberations the Jury asked questions whereupon the Trial Judge repeated his initial charge and added a statement which included the following:  “A mere violation of the traffic act is not of and by itself sufficient to charge any defendant with negligence or failure to meet the standards of care required.  A violation of the traffic act is not of and by itself negligence."  When trial counsel objected the court replied, in the presence of the jury:  Not of and by itself it isn't negligence.  It is evidence which the jury may consider in its entire aspect of all the other evidence because otherwise * * * all someone would have to do is prove a violation of the traffic act and sit down.  That isn't the case.  The Appellate Court concluded that this was prejudicial error, and held that:  The jury had the right to infer negligence from the facts constituting the violation of N.J.S.A. 39:4-123(b), especially since [...] was a fare paying passenger.  It is true that, in determining whether the violator was negligent, the jury should take into consideration not only (a) the standard of conduct established by the statute (Michaels v. Brookchester, Inc., 26 N.J. 379, 386 (1958); Evers v. Davis, supra*) and (b) the facts that constitute the violation, but also (c) all other testimony which, in their judgment, bears upon the issue.  However, if in fact, or in the opinion of the jury, there is no such other testimony, the jury may find negligence upon proof of (a) and (b) alone.  Citations omitted.  Philips v. Scrimente, 66 N.J. Super, 157, 163 (App. Div. 1961).  The Philips Court focused on the same statute, which is at issue in the instant case, N.J.S.A. §39:4-123(b), and held that a violation of the statute is evidence of negligence.
[directive] CED REVISED OF REVIEW  6.  Prosecutors, County the with consultation in Justice, Criminal of Division the of Director  The months six within shall Association, Police of Chiefs Jersey New the and Police, State Jersey New shall report The Directive. this of impact and implementation the on General Attorney to report the CEDs, deploy departments that of number the on Directive this of impact the of analysis an include where incidents ofuse-of-force number the and CEDs, tocarry/use authorized officers of number the and implementation the on input solicit shall Director addition, the In fired/discharged.
[brief] ”  460 N.J. Super. 75, 101 (App. Div. 2019).  There, this Court found “most troubling” the police officer’s testimony “on the manner in which defendant gave responses” during an interrogation that “suggest[ed] that [the officer’s] own experience and specialized training enabled him to determine that defendant was lying. ”  *Id.* at 103.  That officer “stressed to the jury” that “defendant’s responses were ‘vague’ but ‘not denials,’ while an honest person would have answered ‘no, absolutely not. ’”  Ibid.  This Court “concluded that ‘[t]he testimony . . . was improper’ because ‘[t]he overall message,’ which was ‘exacerbated’ by ‘[t]he absence of a video recording of the interrogation’ was that the officer ‘could tell that defendant was laying. ’”  State v. C.H.W., 465 N.J. Super. 574, 594 (App. Div. 2021) (quoting Tung, 460 N.J. Super. at 103-04).  Similarly.
[directive] Location.  An investigation into a fatal police encounter may be presented to either a state grand jury or a grand jury empaneled in a county other than the one where the incident occurred.  Generally speaking, however, these matters will be presented to a state grand jury, typically one convened specifically for the purpose of hearing such cases.  C.  Timing.  In order to protect the integrity of the grand jury process, fatal police encounter cases will not be presented on the last session of any grand jury because the grand jury would not be able to act on an indictment if they were to request that one be prepared.  D. testimony.
[directive] Policy, Procedures, and Legal Issues Report  Writing Record Keeping  The Care and Handling of the Police Specialty Dog  K-9 specialty team training must cover:  Obedience Agility Scent Work  Performance objectives developed specifically for K-9 specialty teams used in law enforcement are outlined in Appendix C.  The evaluation inventory is based on the performance objectives developed for K-9 specialty teams.  IN-SERVICE TRAINING AND RE-EVALUATION
[brief] The Court observed that “notices of GRC proceedings and its determinations are limited to the parties and their legal representatives.  Id. at 401 (citing N.J.S.A. 47:1A-7e and N.J.A.C. 5:105-2.2).  N.J.A.C. 5:105-2.2 states that “The complainant and custodian shall always be parties to a complaint and, along with their legal representatives, shall be notified of all decisions or orders issued by the Council concerning a complaint. ”  The caption of the GRC Complaint was never amended, and, unlike the [...], [...] was never served with any type of process.  Also, unlike the [...], which was given an opportunity to file and serve a “Statement of Information,” which is the GRC equivalent of an answer, [...] was never provided with an opportunity to file a “Statement of Information.
[brief] Wilson v. Amerada Hess Corp., 168 N.J. 236 (2001) .................................................................45, 47  Woytas v. Greenwood Tree Experts, Inc., 237 N.J. 501 (2019) ........................................................................36, 42, 44  Wright v. United Food & Commer. Workers Local 152, No. A-4464-14T3, 2016 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2057 (App. Div. Sep. 9, 2016)  ..............................................................................36  Zacarias v. Allstate Ins. Co., 168 N.J. 590 (2001) .............................................................................61  Zielinski v. Professional Appraisal Assocs., 326 N.J. Super. 219 (App. Div. 1999) ..................................................52, 56  Rules Rule 4:5-8(a) .......................................................................................18 Rule 4:6-2(e) .......................................................................................3, 17 Rule 4:42-2 .........................................................................................4
[brief] (T39-20 to 40-13).  With regard to the calling of codes, [...] denied that officers were instructed not to call codes because of personnel shortages at the Correction Center.  (T47-16 to 25).  As to the overnight shift, [...] dispelled the notion that the overnight staff are more “relaxed” when the Warden, Deputy Administrator and the Captain are not present.  (T52-22 to 53-3).  On redirect examination, [...] commented on his incident report and the use of the word “superiors” in his incident report.  The witness also testified that it was well known that the Appellant had issues in the past with other supervisors.  (T53-20 to 54-2).  The Appellant testified on her behalf.
[brief] Plaintiff’s position that he meets this standard is incorrect.  The term “adverse employment action” is encompassed within CEPA’s statutory definition of “retaliatory action” as: “[t]he discharge, suspension or demotion of an employee, or other adverse employment action taken against an employee in the terms and conditions of employment. ”  N.J.S.A. 34:19-2(e).  In Keelan v. Bell Communications Research, 289 N.J. Super. 531, 539 (App. Div. 1996), the Appellate Division elaborated that “[t]he definition of retaliatory action speaks in terms of completed action.
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY FOUND THAT PLAINTIFF, [...] WAS A "PARTICIPANT" AS DEFINED IN THE AGREEMENT  Plaintiffs seek to avoid the Agreement by arguing that [...] was not a participant, as defined in the Agreement.  Plaintiffs argue that [...]'s signature on the Agreement only applies to any potential injuries sustained by his son and does not apply to him.  The Trial Court rejected this argument finding that the Agreement's language was clear that [...] is a participant under the terms of the Agreement.
[brief] #  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | Case | Page(s)  | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|---------| | Blackburn v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., | 2 | | 3 F.Supp.2d 504 (D.N.J. 1998) | | | Camden Cty. Energy Recovery Assocs. Ltd.  P’ship v. N.J. Dep’t. of Envtl. Prot., | 1 | | 320 N.J. Super. 59 (App. Div. 1999) | | | Di Cristofaro v. Laurel Grove Mem'l Park, | 9 | | 43 N.J. Super. 244, 128 A.2d 281 (App. Div. 1957) | | | Donelson v. DuPont Chambers Works, | 9 | | 206 N.J. 243 (2011) | | | Dzwonar v. McDevitt, | 3, 4, 8 | | 177 N.J. 451 (2003) | | | El-Sioufi v. St. Peter’s Univ. Hosp., | 11, 12 | | 382 N.J. Super. 145 (App. Div. 2005) | | | Green v. Jersey City Bd. of Educ., | 10, 11 | | 177 N.J. 434 (2003) | | | Hitesman v. Bridgeway, Inc., | 2, 3, 7, 8 | | 218 N.J. 8 (N.J. 2014) | | | Kurtz v. Oremland, | 9 | | 24 N.J. Super. 235 (Ch. Div. 1952) | | | Maimone v. Atl. City, | 9, 11 | | 188 N.J. 221, 903 A.2d 1055 (2006) | | | Mehlman v. Mobil Oil Corp., | 1, 2, 7 | | 153 N.J. 163 (1998) | | | Printing Mart-Morristown v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., | 2, 8 | | 116 N.J. 739, 563 A.2d 31 (1989) | | | Estate of Roach v. TRW, Inc., | 2 | | 164 N.J. 598 (2000) | | Statutes N.J.S.A. 34:19-3 .........................................................................................................................
[brief] ”  Here, site-suitability for the Off-site Building was admitted by [...], and further explained in the certifications of [...] principal [...] and former Mayor [...].  The parties always understood the Off-site Building would be constructed on the Off-site Property with seven units, and [...] conceded that the site was suitable for the Off-site Building.  a.  The Constitutional Right To Fair Housing Prevails Over Any Local Ordinance—including Those Purporting To Regulate Particular Uses, Setbacks, Or Size—which Would Otherwise “Significant[ly] Imped[e]”  An Affordable-Housing Development (9a, 17a)  The exercise of local control over “[l]and use regulation [that] is encompassed within the state’s police power” is nevertheless constrained by the New Jersey Constitution.  S. Burlington County N.A.A.C.P. v. Mount Laurel, 67 N.J. 151, 174-75 (1975) (“Mount Laurel I”).
[brief] Q:  The question, is, where did the closing -- I mean sign the deed, took place?  A: At [...] attorney office.  Q: Who were there at closing in the [...] office?  A: I think all the people is there.  ...  Q: Do you remember at deposition you testify your family, including you, [...], and your two son were there?  A: Now you just refresh my memory.  Q: Okay.  So other than your family, did you -- was there any lawyer present at the closing?  A: I cannot recall anymore.  I know there is two attorney there, but it is so many people was there.  The entire family similarly participated in hiring and working with [...] quickly put the property up for sale following the 2019 fraudulent transfer:
[brief] [...], P.E.  On behalf of [...], [...], P.E., prepared an expert report dated December 22, 2018 (Pa2425).  Based upon his knowledge, education and over twenty-five years of relevant experience, as well as his review of a comprehensive collection of the documents relating to the resurfacing project, as well as all discovery responses and deposition testimony, [...] opined that the employees working under the Project Manager, including [...], were providing professional engineering services as required by the contract, even if the employees were not themselves licensed professional engineers (Pa2463, Pa2477, Pa2479).  At his deposition, he testified that in order to perform the specific inspection activities required by the project, [...] was required to have engineering knowledge relevant to the contractor’s work.  Attwood Cert., Exh. N at T59:12-60:10.  [...] noted that the [...] employees were at all times working under [...]’ Project Manager and/or Principal, who was required to be a licensed professional engineer (Pa2463).  5.
[brief] 6  THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT IT IS IMMATERIAL WHETHER THE CLERK HELD THE STATUTORY AUTHORITY TO AMEND THE CERTIFICATION WHEN THE BALLOT ITSELF SHOULD BE COUNTED ...........................................  6  1.  The Trial Court Made Binding Factual Findings as to the Legitimacy of the Counting and Certification Process ..................................................  7  2.  Correcting a Transposed Vote Total Is a Ministerial Act, Not a Recount .................................................................................................................................  8  3.  No Rights Vested Before the Correction Was Made ..................................................  8  4.  Appellant Mischaracterizes Title 19, Which Expressly Authorizes Certain Corrections of Clerical Mistakes .................................................................  9  POINT TWO .......................................................................................................................
[brief] The Supreme Court has held that “control exists when the employer owns, maintains, or has exclusive use of the property. ”  *Lapsley*, 249 N.J. at 436; *Kristiansen*, 153 N.J. at 317.  It is also well-established that “when compensability of an accident depends on control of the employer, that test is satisfied if the employer has the right of control; it is not necessary to establish that the employer actually exercised that right. ”  *Lapsley*, 249 N.J. at 436; *Brower*, 64 N.J. at 372-73.
[brief] 7.  I did advise of the applicable Statute of Limitations for residents of the State of New Jersey to challenge probate of a Last Will and Testament.  8.  I further advised that, in the event that there were out-of-state challenges to a Will, the Statute of Limitations for challenging probate of a Last Will and Testament for a non-New Jersey resident was longer.  [Pa152.]  Neither petitioners nor the trial court have cited any evidence to contradict the [...].  It strains credulity to assert that [...] discussed litigation strategy and her settlement position when she did not advise [...] of even the most basic facts.  At the time, the four-month limitation found in R. 4:85-1 was the utmost concern.  [...] advised that if non-New Jersey residents joined in the contest, that limitation would no longer be a concern.  Pa7.  But neither [...] nor [...] advised that petitioner, [...], lived in [...] and that petitioner [...] lived in [...].  That information would have relieved the immediate time pressure.  Instead, they advised of a potential claimant from California.  Pa10.  Having failed to provide this most basic information, there cannot even be an inference that [...] and [...] would have told the [...] Firm anything significantly harmful to their case before retaining the firm.  Time, not settlement strategy or the *bona fides* of the case was the essence of these discussions.  When they spoke to [...], they had mere days to file a summary action, pursuant to R. 4:85-1.  They did not; instead, petitioners advised [...] that the Firm was not retained.  Thereafter, having enlisted out-of-state petitioners, the Verified Complaint was filed on October 2.
[brief] Here, the jury made a determination on [...]' credibility when he testified at Petitioner's trial.  Even if the jury found [...] to lack credibility as a witness, it still found the weight of the other evidence against Petitioner to justify a guilty verdict.  Moreover, this line of argument from Petitioner was previously addressed by several courts in prior proceedings.  State v. Tairi, No. A-2684-09T3 (App. Div. Feb. 16, 2012) (slip op. at 38) (“[...]’s testimony was corroborated in many details by the victims of the crimes, other physical evidence, and by the testimony of [...], which circumstantially established defendant's active involvement in the criminal enterprise. ”).  As noted by the State, the Appellate Division already ruled that “the testimony, taken as a whole was sufficient to establish [Petitioner’s] guilt of the charges beyond a reasonable doubt. ” [(Da107-11) (internal citations omitted). ]  [...]’s conclusion that the jury in defendant’s trial was already aware that [...] was not completely truthful in his testimony echoed this Court’s conclusion in its February 2012 opinion affirming defendant’s conviction.
[brief] There is a mistake with the word “Injunction” in the heading above ¶173.  (Now reworded to “Declaratory Judgment. ”)  Then at 1T-33-18 to 34-4, Her Honor questions my ability to argue (or designate) in the alternative.  Pa39-40, ¶81.  How can [...] know whether it was discrimination or retaliation?  Likely it’s both.  This paragraph just states the obvious that the two terms are interchangeable.  (This interchangeability issue has been heavily edited and is now also mentioned in Pa262, fn. 2 on the first substantive page of the Revised SAC.)
[directive] C.  Cisgender: A person whose gender assigned at birth (sometimes referred to as sex assigned at birth) matches their gender identity.  For instance, if a person was assigned female at birth, and self-identifies as a woman or girl, that person is cisgender.  D.  Gender Assigned at Birth: The gender that someone was thought to be at birth, typically recorded on the original birth certificate.  The gender someone was assigned at birth may or may not match their gender identity.