ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] ’”  *Waste Mgmt.*, 433 N.J. Super. at 454 (quoting *Waste Mgmt. of New Jersey, Inc. v. Union Cnty. Utils. Auth.*, 399 N.J. Super. 508, 520-21 (App. Div. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted).  In other words, a court may give less weight to certain *Crowe* factors if the conduct sought to be enjoined could result in the destruction of the very subject matter on which a complaint is based, especially where the public interest is implicated like the instant matter.  Although there is no case which has squarely addressed the issue at bar, injunctive relief may be appropriate to enjoin a significantly noncompliant municipality -- like [...] -- from condemning a property designed to provide a high-density residential development.
[brief] No New Jersey case supports this argument.  Indeed, the most obvious evidence that [...] is wrong is set forth in the first two liability policies it issued to [...], which included “classic” ACC clauses that were written to avoid or circumvent application of Appleman’s Rule to [...]’s CGL coverage.  [...] cites Flomerfelt v. Cardiello, 202 N.J. 432 (2010), which addresses coverage under a homeowner’s liability policy, for the proposition that the Rule should be limited to first-party property cases.  Pb30.
[brief] **LEGAL ARGUMENT**  **POINT I**  THE COURT BELOW FAILED TO EVALUATE THE STATE’S IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SFRA IN JERSEY CITY AS A FUNDING MEASURE APPROVED BY THE SUPREME COURT TO REMEDY THE LONGSTANDING VIOLATION OF A THOROUGH AND EFFICIENT EDUCATION IN THE ABBOTT LITIGATION (Raised Below: 1T:8-13 to IT:20-5; IT:34-19 to IT:46-15; Pa24-Pa28; Pa32-Pa33)
[brief] (Pb5-Pb6).  Plaintiff incorrectly cites the case as Appellate Division precedent.  (Pb5).  However, *Williams* is similar to the facts of this case.  *Williams* was a motor vehicle personal injury matter in which an attorney-client relationship was “somewhat strained. ”  *Id.* at 227.  There was a non-binding arbitration in that case which awarded the plaintiff $31,500.00.  *Ibid.*  Defendant rejected the award and file a request for a trial *de novo*.  *Ibid.*  Defendant offered $10,000.00, which plaintiff initially rejected and instructed counsel to attempt to settle the matter for $20,000.00.  *Id.* at 227-228.  Defendant would only settle for $10,000.00, to which the plaintiff said, “I am tired of this and I will take the $10,000. ”  *Id.* at 228.  Similarly, in this case, although perhaps dissatisfied, plaintiff told [...] to settle her case with defendant [...] for $100,000.00 and proceed to trial against the codefendant.  (1T:23).  Plaintiff goes on to state that the trial judge abused his discretion in that the testimony of [...] that plaintiff wanted to enter into a separate settlement agreement with defendant [...] is contradicted by her certification dated October 27, 2023 in support of her motion to withdraw as counsel for plaintiff.  (Pb7-8, Pa75-Pa79).  Plaintiff ignores the materials submitted to the court as part of the motion to enforce the settlement which indicated an obvious intent of the plaintiff to settle, and indeed made no effort to include them in her appendix. (DCa1-DCa32).  Most strikingly, this includes a letter, omitted from plaintiff’s appendix, confirming plaintiff’s instructions to her attorney to settle separately with defendant [...] and proceed to trial against codefendants.  (DCa10).  This all supports the trial judge’s conclusion that [...] had actual authority to settle with defendant [...].  **B.
[brief] However, in the interest of completeness, and in the event this Court disagrees with Respondent’s arguments in Point I, Respondent will address the remaining arguments while preserving its argument that none of these issues need to be reached.  In point II, Appellant alleges that Respondent’s use of Lot 5 for parking is “unsafe,” “chaotic,” and “not a permitted use” for Lot 5 (Sb23-Sb24), and that a variance and site plan approval would have been necessary in order for the use to have been legal (Ab25-Ab26).  Article IX, Ch. 18-905 and -906 of the Lakewood Municipal Code collectively allow parking for places of worship and for schools, respectively (Aa266; Aa268).  Upon reviewing these authorities, the trial court determined that “Section 18-901(A)(21) of the Lakewood Zoning Ordinance . . . governs uses of this property,” along with Sections 18-905 and 18-906 governing “parking and buffer requirements” for places of worship and schools, respectively (Aa279).  Section 18-901(A) sets forth the municipality's forty-seven (47) separate zoning districts, including, as relevant for purposes of this appeal, the zoning designation reserved for a Residential Office Park (ROP) (Aa279).  Such zoning districts may include "places of worship' in accordance with the requirements of § 18-905" and "'public and private schools' in accordance with the requirements of § 18-906" (Aa279) (quoting Lakewood Municipal Code, §18-903(I)(1)(b)).  Because these ordinances allow Respondent's present use of the Sixth Street Lot for synagogue parking on their face, the trial court properly held that the Appellant's claim under N.J.S.A. 40:55D-68 that Respondent’s use is nonconforming fails as a matter of law (Aa280).
[brief] *Englert*, 389 N.J. Super. at 55-56.  As the *Englert* Court ruled that phrase “does not distinguish between allowing indemnification for the negligence of others and allowing indemnification for [the indemnitee’s] own negligence. ”  *Id.* at 56.  This Court should likewise reject reliance on *Leitao* to determine whether [...] is entitled to indemnification for its own negligence.
[directive] ”  The State maintains the trial court created by the entered orders of excludable time in response to the extraordinary circumstances the pandemic produced.  In particular, the State argues the trial court appropriately based its orders on “exceptional circumstances” and “good cause” within the meaning of the Act -- that is, on courtroom unavailability prompted by COVID-19, and not on the return of a superseding indictment.  The State also emphasizes that it stated on the record it was ready to proceed to trial at the two-year mark, as the CJRA requires.
[brief] \(^2\)  Defendants do not dispute that all of the forms of relief which Plaintiffs seek to recover are equitable in nature.  Despite this, Defendants continued to argue before this Court that they are entitled to a jury trial on Plaintiffs’ Fraud Act claims only. \(^3\)  In doing so, Defendants ignore the above analysis and argue that they are entitled to a jury trial of Plaintiffs’ Fraud Act claims simply because Plaintiffs seek an award of “money damages.
[brief] Defendants state that the Rule 37 letter did not include plaintiffs’ “purported concerns regarding log entries that involve in-house rather than outside counsel,” and “most troubling, Plaintiffs never provided Defendants with the list of fifty privilege log entries (which they now ask the Court to review in camera). ” (JS at 36).  Defendants contend that “[t]his is precisely what Defendants asked Plaintiffs to provide during the meet and confer process, and which Plaintiffs refused to provide on the ground that collecting a subset of documents on which the parties could meet and confer would be too time-consuming and burdensome.
[brief] **Appellants Cannot Show a Civil Conspiracy  Because [...] acted as an Attorney for [...], and There was no Unlawful Act, and Therefore No Valid Tort Here (Pa003056 – 003058). **  The trial court properly dismissed Appellants’ civil conspiracy claim.  Appellants did not plead a civil conspiracy claim upon which relief could be granted because they alleged a conspiracy comprised of a corporation and its agents.  Furthermore, Appellants cannot show any damages attributable to the purported conspiracy.  Because there were no assets to “steal,” there can be no conspiracy here.  In New Jersey, a civil conspiracy is "a combination of two or more persons acting in concert to commit an unlawful act, or to commit a lawful act by unlawful means, the principal element of which is an agreement between the parties to inflict a wrong against or injury upon another, and an overt act that results in damage."  *Morgan v. Union County Bd. of Chosen Freeholders*, 268 N.J. Super. 337, 364 (App. Div. 1993), *certif. denied*, 135 N.J. 468 (1994).  Most importantly, the "gist of the claim is not the unlawful agreement, 'but the underlying wrong which, absent the conspiracy, would give a right of action.'"  *Id.* at 364.  However, "a corporation which acts through authorized agents and employees . . . cannot conspire with itself."
[brief] (See Pb2 (“Plaintiff should be given the opportunity as she would have in an R. 4:6-2 Motion, to address the arguments for the second Motion for Summary Judgment which had been addressed by [...]. ”)).  However, there is no error here, let alone plain error.  When Defendants filed their second motion for summary judgment and argued in a way which conflicted with Plaintiff’s belief that [...] had already decided the matter, Plaintiff had every opportunity to argue in the alternative and to address any issue she wished to raise, and the substantive legal arguments raised, at that time, rather than waiting for the summary judgment motion to be decided and then trying to reargue the case.  Any failure to address the substance of the case promptly was nothing more than Plaintiff’s strategic decision in answering the motion.  It does not amount to plain error and is not clearly capable of producing an unjust result.
[directive] Section 3.3(c): Deleted reference to Section 4.2.  2.  Section 3.3(e): Corrected reference to Core Principle Four.  3.  Section 3.3.1: Corrected reference to Core Principle Four.  4.  Section 3.7.4: Updated reference to current version of BWC Policy.  5.  Section 4.2(d): Corrected typo, replacing “discharge” with “head. ”  II.  Other Provisions
[brief] There is a major distinction and distinction is gone through in great detail in the Panetta, a New Jersey Supreme Court case.  He continues to testify that the interest that we have here were owned by the first grantee and sold by him to the [...] in 1902.  And that was the language that was just read about lands underwater today.  The lands under the water.  The [...] developed the property.  That was the filed map.  P-5 is the Osborn subdivision Map which is filed in the Monmouth County Clerk’s Office.  The Company, [...] made a conveyance of lots to [...].  [...] conveyed lots, maybe there was some outsells to [...], Inc.
[brief] Ja030-Ja031.  While Plaintiff acknowledges that all variances are site specific, the purpose of admitting this 2019 resolution into evidence was not that the height variance was granted for that warehouse, but that the Board—less than three years earlier—concluded that: (1) the SM Zone height limit was not targeted to warehouses, and (2) there was no finding that taller warehouses have a higher intensity of use.  See Sections III(A)(2) & III(B)(2).  As [...]’ testimony reflects, this particular Foxdale height variance approval was used to show: (1) that the Board has recognized the need to build warehouses above 30 feet, and that 48 foot warehouses conform to the warehouse uses permitted in the SM Zone, and (2) this Board had already made a public pronouncement that the height limitation of 30 feet was not aimed at warehouses.
[brief] Plaintiffs cite a pair of federal cases holding that when a particular document is “otherwise responsive to a discovery request,” a defendant cannot unilaterally redact ¹  In addition, Plaintiffs cite a parenthetical to a “But cf.” citation in a criminal case, State v. Hernandez, 225 N.J. 451 (2016), which states that “discovery in civil cases extends to information that ‘appears to be reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. ’”  Id. at 462 (quoting R. 4:10-2(a)).  But Hernandez also affirms that “[r]elevancy is the hallmark of admissibility in evidence. ”  Id. (quotation omitted).  Passing dicta in a parenthetical in an attenuated “but cf.” citation in criminal case cannot alter the civil discovery rules. irrelevant information from within the document.  Pb17 (quoting Target Corp. v. ACE Am. Ins. Co., 576 F. Supp. 3d 609, 620 (D. Minn. 2021)).  Other federal courts disagree and allow such internal redactions.  See, e.g., Spano v. Boeing Co., 2008 WL 1774460 (S.D. Ill. Apr. 16, 2008); In re Takata Airbag Prods. Liab. Litig., 2016 WL 1460143, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 1, 2016).  But that dispute in any event has no bearing on the ESI Order, which does not merely deny Defendants authority to redact relevant documents, but requires Defendants to turn over documents with no relevance at all to the underlying dispute.
[brief] For example, under N.J.A.C. 10A:31-21.7(a), the DOC has the power to “specify the types of personal property inmates can retain in their possession during incarceration. ”  In addition, N.J.S.A. 30:1B-6(g) gives the DOC has “broad discretionary power to ‘[d]etermine all matters of policy and regulate the administration of [its] institutions .  . . .’”  See Russo v. N.J. Dep’t of Corr., 324 N.J. Super. 576, 583 (App. Div. 1999) (stating “[t]he Legislature has vested in the Commissioner” this “broad discretionary power” under N.J.S.A. 30:1B-6(g)).
[brief] In other words, the previous policy, which the Order requires the Board to reinstate, mandates that the Board violate State and Federal Law by keeping secret, confidential files from parents.  Additionally, the Court does not address the federal requirements under the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (“FERPA”) that “[n]o funds shall be made available under any applicable program to any educational agency or institution which has a policy of denying, or which effectively prevents, the parents of students who are or have been in attendance at a school of such agency or at such institution…the right to inspect and review the education records of their children. ”  20 U.S.C.S. § 1232g(a)(1)(A).  Moreover, “a parent or eligible student must be given the opportunity to inspect and review the student’s education records. ”  34 C.F.R. § 99.10.  At least one federal court has interpreted FERPA as prohibiting school boards from maintaining policies which prevent teachers from referring to students by the student’s preferred names and pronouns in communications with parents.  See Ricard v. USD 475 Geary Cty., No. 5:22-cv-04015-HLT-GEB, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83742 at 15 (D. Kan. 2022) (“FERPA is a law that specifically empowers parents to receive information about their minor students; it mandates the District to make education records available to parents upon request—whether the child wants their parents to have the records or not.  See 34 C.F.R. § 99.10(a) ("Except as limited under § 99.12, a parent or eligible student must be given the opportunity to inspect and review the student's education records" (emphasis added)).  And FERPA does not exempt from its disclosure obligation education records that deal with preferred names and pronouns. ”).  The Board cannot legally be required to keep matters pertaining to minor students’ gender identity or expression confidential from their parents as contained in their pupil records.  Therefore, the Court erred as a matter of law in reaching a contrary determination by requiring the Board to reinstate its previous policy which requires it to do so.
[brief] (Da 129, 234-47)  [...] expressed remorse for the devastating impact that his actions have had on others, particularly on the family of [...], both in and out of the courtroom.  (4T:60-17 to 61-14, 88-4 to 90-15)  (Da 97-98)  During the resentencing hearing, [...] took “full responsibility for his actions” during the robbery, acknowledging that his act of shouting from the car made him “just as responsible” for [...]’s death as if he had shot him.  (4T:88-25 to 89-1)  He addressed the victim’s family directly, apologizing for his actions and telling them “[n]ot a day goes by that I don’t think about your son. ”  (4T:89-9 to 16)  After [...] spoke, [...]’s mother gave emotional testimony at the hearing, addressing [...] directly to say that she appreciated and “accept[ed] [his] apology through God.
[brief] ###  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | Cases | Page(s) | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|---------| | **In re Advisory Letter No. 7-11 of the Supreme Court Advisory Comm.,** | | | 213 N.J. 63 (2013) | 6 | | **Cirba, Inc. v. VMware, Inc.,** | | | No. CV 19-742-LPS, 2022 WL 606655 (D. Del.  Jan. 7, 2022) | 5 | | **Devli v. Tasci,** | | | No. A-2573-20, 2022 WL 17491290 (N.J Sup. Ct. App. Div., Dec. | 18, 19 | | 8, 2022) | | | **Fuhrmann v. Wolf,** | | | No. A-6031-07T3, 2009 WL 4255529 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. | 5, 7 | | Nov. 19, 2009) | | | **Hansen v. Rite Aid Corp.,** | | | 253 N.J. 191 (2023) | 14 | | **Jarwick Devs., Inc. v. Wilf,** | | | No. A-2053-13T3, 2018 WL 2449133 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. | passim | | June 1, 2018) | | | **Jenkins v. Sterlacchi,** | | | 849 F.2d 627 (D.C. Cir. 1988) | 4 | | **Johnson v. Johnson,** | | | 390 N.J. Super. 269 (App. Div. 2007) | 23 | | **In re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig.,** | | | 737 F. Supp. 735 (E.D.N.Y. 1990) | 5 | | **Nuckel v. Borough of Little Ferry,** | | | No. A-4940-11T1, 2013 WL 4104100 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. | 5 | | Aug. 15, 2013) | | | **In re Pall Corp.,** | | | No. CV 07-3359 (JS) (GRB), 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55592 | 14 | | (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 8, 2013) | | Sacchi v. ABC Fin. Servs. Inc., Civ. No. 14-1196 (FLW), 2014 WL 4095009 (D.N.J. Aug. 18, 2014) .........................................................................................................................19 Silva v. Autos of Amboy, Inc., 267 N.J. Super. 546 (App. Div. 1993) ..............................................................9, 14, 16, 17
[brief] For the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully requested that the Appellate Court affirm the Trial Court decision and the underlying Respondent Planning Board of Adjustment decision.  Respectfully submitted, [...], ESQ.  Kevin E. Kennedy, Esq.  Attorney for Defendant / Respondent [...]  [...]  A/K/A [...]  Plaintiff/Appellant v. [...], A MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, AND BOROUGH COUNCIL OF THE [...], AND PLANNING BOARD OF THE [...]  Defendants/Respondents  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. [...]
[brief] The standard of review for a jury charge is whether the charge adequately conveys the law and does not confuse the jury.  *State v. Brown*, 80 N.J. 587, 600 (1979), (quoting *Latta v. Caulfield*, 79 N.J. 128, 135 (1979)).  To determine whether a charge was correct, the court must examine the charge as a whole.  *State v. Jordan*, 147 N.J. 409, 422 (1977), (citing *State v. Wilbely*, 63 N.J. 420, 422 (1973)).
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY ADOPTED AND APPLIED  THE CHANCERY JUDGE’S DETERMINATION THAT THE AGREEMENT GOVERNED THE ISSUE OF PARKING ON LOT 5 AND APPELLANT’S ARGUMENT TO THE CONTRARY IS MERITLESS  In point IV, Appellant alleges that [...] erred by adopting and applying [...]’s determination that the issue of parking on Lot 5 was governed by the Agreement (Ab37).  Appellant is incorrect.  “[C]ollateral estoppel, also known as ‘issue preclusion,’ . . . is an equitable principle that arises [w]hen an issue of fact or law is actually litigated and determined by a valid and final judgment, and the determination is essential to the judgment,” in which case “the determination is conclusive in a subsequent action. ”  Winters v. N. Hudson Reg'l Fire & Rescue, 212 N.J. 67, 85 (2012) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 27 (1982)).  The doctrine forecloses future litigation when: (1) the issue to be precluded is identical to the issue decided in the prior proceeding . . . (2) the issue was actually litigated in the prior proceeding . . . (3) the court in the prior proceeding issued a final judgment on the merits.  . . (4) the determination of the issue was essential to the prior judgment . . . and (5) the party against whom the doctrine is asserted was a party to or in privity with a party to the earlier proceeding.  [In re Estate of Dawson, 136 N.J. 1, 20 (1994).
[brief] Redevelopment Plans and Actions  Although [...] claimed otherwise, Plaintiff’s intent was to keep Defendants’ “on the hook” through redevelopment.  7T26-19; Pa0245.  [...] wanted Defendants to enter into joint venture with Plaintiff for the development of the property, but Defendant [...] unequivocally refused.  5T153-16 to 154-14; 8T19-14 to 20.  Plaintiff was already lining up prospective tenants prior to the initial closing date.  7T72-17 to 73-8; 7T125-6 to 16; 8T36-14 to 19; 2T126-17 to 127-3.  When asked the question as to why an experienced developer would want to go into business with inexperienced Defendants, [...] responded that it was because of the Summary Investigation Report that [...] provided him with.  7T46-22 to 47-12.  From the time of the PSA execution forward, Plaintiff was never prevented from access to the property.  Yet on September 7, 2022, Frank [...] arrived-- without permission by or prior notice to Defendants -- on the property with backhoe, trucks, machinery and cut off the locks.  8T51-19 to 53-13.  V.
[brief] ”  Benedict, supra at 380, quoting, Faps, supra at 48-49 [internal quotations omitted][internal citations omitted].  The berm and driveways were to be constructed on land which the State owned prior to the taking.  Ibid.  The Court focused on an important distinction in the Faps fact pattern: “The taking alone would have left sufficient maneuvering room; rather, the loss of parking resulted from the access change which prevent[ed] use of the State-owned land. ”  Ibid.  [emphasis added].  The Appellate Division held that the defendant in Faps, “was not entitled to continue to use State-owned property for private purposes nor to demand continued unlimited access.
[directive] AJ•"8]J 15}~ ~.:il '.U~t..J 77}? ~~7}  1986  ~ ~~Al~ 0 ]: IJ IJ 1~9~.ljl-E71991 12 22 .A}o]oJ] ~AH9_..Q..1i:l_ WB" $30.  l'iJ~7}  1986  1 1  {ioJ] ~ ~ ~ ~ ~,\g~..Q..1i:J. WB"  $25.)
[brief] In opposition to this appeal, [...] pretends to “strongly disagree” with the facts presented before conceding nearly all of them.  [Db5].  Among its concessions is its breach of four separate settlement obligations: (i) its *admitted* failure to pay the final settlement payment to which it agreed [Pa178 at ¶ 25, Db6]; (ii) its *admitted* abandonment (and importation) of mountains of debris and millings that left the Leased Premises nowhere near “broom clean” [Db11, Pa309-12 at ¶ 4]²; (iii) its *admitted* failure to deliver possession by October 31, 2023 [Pa214 at ¶ 10, Pa297-303 at ¶¶ 2-4]; and (iv) its *admitted* dumping of solid waste (although it disputes the volume).