ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] The statute provides that the judge, for good cause shown, may impose bail in excess of $2,500 but the reasons must be set forth on the record.  But see Offenses. Steele, 430 Super. 24 (App. Div. 2013), which prohibits the consideration of danger as a factor when setting the monetary amount of bail.  Danger may State v. N.J. be considered when setting forth other conditions of bail, for example, no victim contact.  Note – the New Jersey Supreme Court granted certification on this case on May 23, 2013, 213 N.J. 569 (2013).
[brief] [...]: Yeah.  THE COURT:  There are various different theories.  If you come to a theory that you believe does not assist your client and it is not -- it -- I -- why would you expend the money for it?  It doesn’t make sense.  [...]:  But as we’ll see in this case, unfortunately our expert got the tow truck, but we have the evidence.  Now, it’ll be up to Your Honor to say, well, was it deficient in not getting the expert we have.  1T66.  Defendant also testified at the PCR hearing.
[brief] N.J.S.A. 2C:1-8(e) requires that there be a “rational basis” in the record for the trial court to instruct the jury on a lesser-included offense.  The rational basis test imposes a low threshold.  State v. Carrero, 229 N.J. 118, 128 (2017).  The trial court is obligated to examine the record “thoroughly” to determine if the rational basis test has been satisfied.
[brief] In Jersey City Redevelopment Agency v. Costello, 252 N.J. Super. 247 (App. Div. 1991) the court reiterated the rule:  “In general, a fair market value determination should not be based upon enhancement caused by the very project for which condemnation is sought. ”  Id. at 255, fn. 4 [emphasis added].  In the present matter, the fact that Appellant and Respondent opine similar Highest and Best Uses for the Property does not support the trial court’s ruling that the Morris Canal Redevelopment Plan should be applied when determining just compensation.
[brief] (T12-T19).  The court held that the motion was not properly opposed by the Plaintiff as there was a failure to comply with R 4: 46-2b.  (Aa411-Aa414).  Plaintiff filed for reconsideration which was denied by the Court.  (Aa452).  That motion was supported by a certification of Plaintiff (Aa416-A448).  The court’s decision was that the original opposition was not a sham affidavit but that there was not enough there to defeat the summary judgment.  (2T9-2T10).  Defendant [...] then moved for judgment on its counterclaim (Aa453).  This motion as opposed but the court ruled on April 14, 2023 that same was unopposed.  (3T3)  (Aa353)  Legal Argument
[brief] See Balsimides, 160 N.J. at 375; Lawson Mardon Wheaton, Inc. v. Smith, 160 N.J. 383 (1999).  The New Jersey Supreme Court also summarized these prior holdings mere months ago in Sipko, 252 N.J. at 162.  The analysis required by these three cases is clear: the person whose conduct caused the need for a buyout cannot benefit from the presence or absence of discounts, which will turn on whether that bad actor is the payor or payee.  Where the bad actor is receiving payment, discounts should apply; where the bad actor is making payment, discounts should not apply.
[brief] See, Sommers v. McKinney, 287 N.J. Super. 1, 10 (App. Div. 1996).  Such rare cases include only those in which the “duty of care to a client is so basic that it may be determined by the court as a matter of law. ”  Id. (citing Brizak v. Needle, 239 N.J. Super. 415, 429 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 122 N.J. 164 (1990)).  Furthermore, this exception must be narrowly construed to avoid systematic non-compliance with the affidavit of merit statute.  See, Hubbard v. Reed, 168 N.J. 387, 397 (2001).  In this regard, the courts have routinely stated that even if a plaintiff does not intend to rely on an expert’s opinion and testimony at trial, the plaintiff, out of an abundance of caution, should nevertheless submit an affidavit of merit in support of their malpractice claim.
[brief] If Plaintiffs fail any one of the above elements, then Plaintiffs’ claims against the public entity must fail.  In this matter, the trial court explicitly determined Plaintiff was unable to prove these necessary elements of the TCA and the uncontroverted facts demonstrated: (i) the alleged defect was not a dangerous condition [Pa7-Pa9]; (ii) the Township has no actual or constructive notice of any dangerous condition [Pa9-Pa11]; (iii) the Township did not act in a palpably unreasonable manner [Pa11-Pa12]; and Plaintiff did not suffer a permanent loss of bodily function that is substantial [Pa12-Pa13].  Given Plaintiff’s failure to brief and subsequent waiver of the trial court’s second and third findings, Plaintiff’s appeal cannot succeed as to the dismissal of the Township and is moot on its face.
[brief] Plaintiffs were not going to call up each of Plaintiffs’ expert witnesses to have them be interrupted and denied the opportunity to testify.  Plaintiffs took the appropriate action and simply made the arguments to preserve the issue on appeal.  (1T56-6 to 1T74-23).  For these reasons, the Board’s approval of the application for preliminary and final major subdivision approval was arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable, and must be reversed and remanded for further proceedings.
[brief] STATE CASES  Associates Discount Corp. v. Fidelity Union Trust Co., 111 N.J. Super. 353, 268 A.2d 330, 7 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1350 (Law Div. 1970).................................................................22  Brill v. Guardian Life Insurance Company of American, 142 N.J. 520, 528-529 (1995)..............................................20, 21 [...] v. [...], [...] (decided April 24, 2023).......................18  Fogel v. S.S.R. Realty Associates, 183 N.J. Super. 303, 443 A.2d 1093 (Ch. Div. 1981), order aff’d, 190 N.J. Super. 47, 461 A.2d 1190 (App. Div. 1983).....................................................................21, 22 Foss v. Cignarella, 196 N.J. Super 3718 (Law Division, 1984) ......16, 17, 19 JFK Memorial Hosp. v. Kendal, 205 N.J. Super.456 (Law Div. 1986)......16  Judson v. Peoples Bank and Trust Company of Westfield, 17 N.J. 67, 73-35 (1954).......................................................20, 21 Kordell v. Allstate Ins. Co., 230 N.J. Super. 505, 509 (App. Div.), certify. Den. 117 N.J. 43(1989)..............................................5, 15 Morgan v. Prudential, 242 N.J. Super. 638 (App. Div.), certif. den. 122 N.J. 370 (1990)............................................13  Torres v. Travelers Indem. Co., 171 N.J. 147, 149 (2002)..................18  Westchester Fire Ins. Co. v. Continental Ins. Companies, 126 N.J. Super. 29; 312 A.2d 664 (App. Div, 1973).....................14, 15  COURT RULES/STATUTES
[brief] 33  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS BEING APPEALED  Page(s)  Order and Statement of Reasons of the Honorable [...], J.S.C.  Dated: March 13, 2024.................................................................  1a–19a  Order of the Honorable [...], J.S.C.  Dated: March 13, 2024................................................................. 20a | Cases | Page(s) | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|---------| | AmeriCare Emergency Med. Serv., Inc. v. City of Orange Twp., | 28 | | 463 N.J. Super. 562 (App. Div. 2020) | | | Baanyan Software Servs., Inc. v. Kuncha, | 13, 24 | | 433 N.J. Super. 466 (App. Div. 2013) | | | Basement Store Franchise Corp. v. Natali, | 31 | | 2014 WL 4328218 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Sept. 3, 2014) | | | Baskin v. P.C. Richard & Son, LLC, | 19, 20 | | 462 N.J. Super. 594 (App. Div. 2020) | | | Bayway Ref. Co. v. State Utilities, Inc., | 24 | | 333 N.J. Super. 420 (App. Div. 2000) | | | BNSF Ry. Co. v. Tyrrell, | 19, 20 | | 137 S. Ct. 1549 (2017) | | | Brennan on behalf of State v. Lonegan, | 28 | | 454 N.J. Super. 613 (App. Div. 2018) | | | Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., | 22 | | 137 S. Ct. 1773 (2017) | | | Citibank, N.A. v. Estate of Simpson, | 12, 13, 14, 15 | | 290 N.J. Super. 519 (App. Div. 1996) | | | Cummings v. Bahr, | 25 | | 295 N.J. Super. 374 (App. Div. 1996) | | | Daimler AG v. Bauman, | 18, 19, 20 | | 571 U.S. 117 (2014) | | | Display Works, LLC v. Bartley, | 16, 17 | | 182 F. Supp. 3d 166 (D.N.J. 2016) | | Dutch Run-Mays Draft, LLC v. Wolf Block, LLP, 450 N.J. Super. 590 (App. Div. 2017) ..................................................passim EnviroFinance Grp., LLC v. Env’t Barrier Co., LLC, 440 N.J. Super. 325 (App. Div. 2015) .................................................
[brief] In the alternative, the State attempts to argue that [...] had reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, pointing to [...]’ “reckless driving,” constricted pupils, nervous behavior and criminal history.  (Sb 14)  While the State says [...] was driving recklessly, in order to show that [...] had reasonable suspicion that [...] was under the influence, the sole motor vehicle violation that the officer testified to was the making of the illegal U-turn.  The officer admitted that he did not recall whether [...] cut other drivers off or otherwise drove recklessly or carelessly.  (1T 141-21 to 143-8, 147-1 to 148-14)  Nor did [...] testify that [...] was driving in a way that made him believe that he was under the influence.  Altogether, there is zero evidence that the way [...] was driving suggested that he was under the influence.  In addition, as explained in his opening brief, while an individual’s nervous behavior and criminal history may be considered by the police as part of the totality of the circumstances, those factors are inadequate to support reasonable suspicion.
[brief] (Pa478).  During his meeting with [...] and [...], [...] admitted that he never received direct approval to enter or receive charge pay.  (Pa478).  [...] claimed that entering the unauthorized charge pay was [...]’s idea.  (Pa478).  [...] claimed that he and [...] misinterpreted [...]’s silence on the topic as permission to begin entering the charge pay, stating that the two took [...]’s non-answer to [...]’s initial request as permission.  (Pa478).  [...] admitted that [...] likely entered the charge pay on [...]’s behalf.  (Pa478).  [...] further confirmed that [...] never saw the unauthorized charge pay entries.  (Pa478).  --- \(^2\)
[brief] [...] was employed at a [...] in [...].  Perez testified that on December 19, 2011, between 10:00 and 11:00 a.m., two men entered the store and asked for help finding headphones.  Perez attempted to show the men headphones when one of them took out a gun, pointed it at the back of his head, and ordered him to walk to the back room and lay face down on the ground.  Perez described both men as African American, and stated one man was approximately five feet and ten inches and of darker complexion than the other man, who was about five feet and eight or nine inches.  Perez also stated both men were wearing jeans and baseball hats, one man’s hat had a C logo on it, and one man had a hood over his hat.  Perez testified the men asked him for the keys to the inventory, and removed $24,573 worth of merchandise by placing it into clear garbage bags.  Perez also stated “the lighter[complexion] guy, the shorter guy, he started putting on gloves.  They looked like [white] latex gloves. ”  The men left the store through the rear exit.
[directive] The privilege shall be claimed by the counselor unless otherwise instructed by prior written consent of the victim.  When a victim is incapacitated or deceased consent to disclosure may be given by the guardian, executor, or administrator except when the guardian, executor, or administrator is the defendant or has a relationship with the victim such that the guardian, executor, or administrator has an interest in the outcome of the proceeding.  The privilege may be knowingly waived by a juvenile.
[brief] [...] repeatedly argues that it delayed arbitration with [...] for six years because it needed to litigate the allocation of defense costs with the other insurer defendants who would not be party to the arbitration.  Db3, 22, 25-26.  This, however, was not required.  As the New Jersey Supreme Court explained, a “party that intends to invoke its right to arbitrate in a case where another party is a non-signatory to the arbitration agreement may preserve its right by asserting arbitration in its answer as an affirmative defense, moving to compel arbitration in a timely manner, moving to stay the judicial proceeding, or notifying the other party to the arbitration agreement that its litigation conduct should not be considered waiver of its right to arbitrate the dispute. ”  Cole, 215 N.J. at 283 (emphasis added).  Here, [...] did none of these.  [...] instead made a voluntary tactical decision to waive its arbitration rights vis-à-vis [...] in order to pursue litigation of its allocation interests against the insurers together with the claims against [...].  [...] was free to bifurcate its dispute with [...] from the other insurers and pursue an arbitration ruling on its own share of the allocation of [...]’s defense costs in that arbitral forum along with the other claims asserted by [...] against it.  [...] initially could not have known that claims against other insurers would be settled, or when that would occur.  So [...] was obligated from the outset to elect either litigation or arbitration of its dispute with [...] six years ago.  It elected to litigate without notifying or preserving any arbitration rights to [...].
[brief] M716-717.  Oral argument was conducted by the Trial Court on the motions on February 10, 2023.  7T.  On March 10, 2023, the Trial Court entered an order and opinion granting the summary judgment motions and dismissing the remaining counts in the complaint with prejudice.  M718-719.  On April 21, 2023, the [...] and [...] filed a Notice of Appeal to the Appellate Division.  M757-761.  A Notice of Cross-Appeal was filed by the Respondents on April 24, 2023.  M762-765.  A Notice of Cross-Appeal was filed by the [...] on April 26, 2023.  M766-771.
[brief] Arbitration is strongly favored on the federal and state level.  Indeed, Section 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) states that an arbitration agreement “shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract. ”  *Martindale v. Sandvik, Inc.*, 173 N.J. 76, 84, 800 A.2d 872, 876 (2002), quoting 9 U.S.C. § 2.  For decades, the courts have interpreted Section 2 of the FAA as representing “a congressional declaration of a liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements, notwithstanding any state substantive or procedural policies to the contrary. ”  *Flanzman v. Jenny Craig, Inc.*, 244 N.J. 119, 132, 236 A.3d 990, 997-98 (2020), quoting *Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp.*, 460 U.S. 1, 24, 103 S.Ct. 927, 941 (1983).  New Jersey jurisprudence has also long recognized arbitration “as a favored method for resolving disputes. ”  *Garfinkel v. Morristown Obstetrics & Gynecology Assocs., P.A.*, 168 N.J. 124, 131, 773 A.2d 665, 670 (2001), citing *Barcon Associates, Inc. v. Tri-County Asphalt Corp.*, 86 N.J. 179, 186, 430 A.2d 214, 217 (1981) (noting the long-standing practice of arbitration in New Jersey and the authority in favor of that practice); *Hojnowski v. Vans Skate Park*, 187 N.J. 323, 342, 901 A.2d 381, 392 (2006) (internal quotations omitted) (the state legislature “codified its endorsement of arbitration agreements in the Arbitration Act…which, like its federal counterpart, provides that agreements to arbitrate shall be valid save for such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of a contract”); Perez v. Sky Zone LLC, 472 N.J. Super. 240, 247, 276 A.3d 190, 194 (App. Div. 2022) (“[t]he FAA and the nearly identical New Jersey Arbitration Act…enunciate federal and state policies favoring arbitration”) (citation omitted).
[brief] |  Appendix document | Appendix page number | |-------------------------------------------------------|----------------------| | Complaint, filed October 24, 2023 | Dr1 | | Answer, filed December 18, 2023 | Dr14 | | Consent Order, filed January 4, 2024 | Dr35 | | Appellants’ Correspondence to [...], dated February 16, 2024 | Dr37 | | Demand for Arbitration to [...], dated March 27, 2024 | Dr39 | | Appellants’ Correspondence to [...], dated April 19, 2024 | Dr42 | | Court Order, filed May 24, 2024 | Dr44 | | [...] Oral Argument Request, filed May 31, 2024 | Dr46 | | Court Order, filed June 20, 2024 | Dr48 | | Notice of Mandatory Arbitration, filed July 1, 2024 | Dr53 | | Notice of Appeal, filed July 18, 2024 | Dr57 | | Amended Notice of Appeal, filed July 29, 2024 | Dr61 | | Court Order, filed August 16, 2024 | Dr67 | | [...]’s Adjournment Request, | | filed September 12, 2024  [...]’s Adjournment Request, filed October 11, 2024  Appellants’ Default Request ([...]), filed October 11, 2024  Appellant’s Default Request ([...]), filed October 11, 2024  Court Entered Default, filed October 15, 2025  [...] Adjournment Request, filed October 16, 2024  Court Order (Rescheduled Arbitration), filed October 17, 2024  Court Order (Remove from Arbitration), filed November 8, 2024  Court Order (Default Motion), filed November 8, 2024  Court Order (Order to Stay), filed November 8, 2024  Dismissal Without Prejudice, filed November 8, 2024  Arbitration Award, filed November 15, 2024  Certification of [...], dated May 10, 2024  Small Business Contract, dated June 30, 2022  Intentionally left omitted, Dr103 [...] and [...] Agreement, dated September 5, 2024  Dr133 | Authority | Brief Page Number | |-----------------------------------------------|-------------------| | **Court Rules:** | | | Rule 1:6-2(d) | 24-26 | | Rule 1:10-3 | 4 | | Rule 4:50-1 | 5 | | **Case Law:** | | | Arafa v. Health Express Corp., | 23 | | 243 N.J. 147 (2020) | | | Atalese v. U.S. Legal Services Group, L.P., | 10-13 | | 219 N.J. 430 (2014) | | | AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, | 22 | | 563 U.S. 333 (2011) | | | Curtis v. Cellco P'ship, | 13 | | 413 N.J. Super. 26 (App.Div.2010) | | | Delaney v. Dickey, | 19-20 | | 244 N.J. 466 (2020) | | | Delgado v. Yourman-Helbig, | 26 | | 2022 N.J. Super. Unpub. | | | LEXIS 1266 (App.Div.2022) | | | Diaz v. Bobadilla, | 25 | | 2019 N.J. Super. Unpub. | | | LEXIS 799 (App.Div.2019) | | | Flanzman v. Jenny Craig, Inc., | 22-23 | | 244 N.J. 119 (2020)
[brief] 1T | Name of Case | Page | |------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | **257-261 20th Avenue Realty, Inc. v. Roberto,** | 6 | | ___ N.J.Super. ____ (App.Div. 2023) | | | **American Land Co. v. Zeiss,** | 26 | | 219 U.S. 47 31 S.Ct. 200 (1911) | | | **Balducci v. Cige,** | 18 | | 240 N.J. 574 (2020) | | | **Bauman v. Marinaro,** | 12 | | 95 N.J. 380 (1984) | | | **Bergen Eastern v. Koss,** | 12 | | 178 N.J.Super.
[brief] | INDEX TO APPENDIX  [...]’s PowerPoint Presentation Pa1 # TABLE OF CASES ## FEDERAL OPINIONS CITED Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923) ........................................... 26 ## NEW JERSEY STATE OPINIONS CITED Borough of Saddle River v. 66 East Allendale, LLC, 216 N.J. 115 (2013) .... 21 Flagg v. Essex Cnty. Prosecutor, 171 N.J. 561 (2002) ............................................. 19 Neno v. Clinton, 167 N.J. 573 (2001) .................................................................. 34 Nieder v. Royal Indem. Ins. Co., 62 N.J. 229 (1973) .............................................. 42 Polzo v. County of Essex, 196 N.J. 569 (2008) .................................................... 21 Pomerantz Paper Corp. v. New Cmty. Corp., 207 N.J. 344 (2011) ....................... 20, 21 Reynolds Offset Co. v. Summer, 58 N.J. Super. 542 (App. Div. 1959) ................. 42 State v. B.H., 183 N.J. 171 (2005) ........................................................................ 19 State v. Bealor, 187 N.J. 574 (2006) .................................................................... 34 State v. Brown, 170 N.J. 138 (2001) .................................................................... 33 State v. Buda, 195 N.J. 278 (2008) ...................................................................... 33 State v. Burney, 255 N.J. 1 (2023) ....................................................................... 18, 26 State v. Chavies, 247 N.J. 245 (2021) .................................................................. 19 State v. Cole, 229 N.J. 430 (2017) ...................................................................... 43 State v. Cuff, 239 N.J. 321 (2019) ....................................................................... 48 State v. Derry, 250 N.J. 611 (2022) .................................................................... 20, 39, 40 State v. Frisby, 174 N.J. 583 (2002) .................................................................... 19 State v. Frost, 158 N.J. 76 (1999) ....................................................................... 46 State v. Fuentes, 217 N.J. 57 (2014) .................................................................. 47, 48 State v. Garcia, 245 N.J. 412 (2021) .................................................................. 18 State v. Gonzalez, 249 N.J. 612 (2022) .................................................................
[brief] Id.; see also Williams-Hopkins v. LVNV Funding, LLC, 2019 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 957, 2019 WL 1873155 (N.J. App. Div. Apr. 26, 2019) (Da108-Da109) (holding because the arbitration agreement required the dispute to be submitted to arbitration, pursuant to U.S. Supreme Court authority, it had to be adjudicated in --- 4  Specifically, the court held, “[h]ere, the arbitration provision subjects to arbitration any “[c]laims regarding the application, enforceability, or interpretation of this Agreement and this arbitration provision.
[directive] Evidence relating to cases disposed of in Municipal Court, where there is no companion Superior Court case, is not covered by these Guidelines.  Evidence from Municipal Court cases, other than DUI cases, may be destroyed one year after the disposition of the Municipal Court case.  Evidence used in DUI cases shall be retained for ten years following the disposition of the case.  It shall be the responsibility of the law enforcement agency holding the evidence to determine that the municipal court case has been disposed of, and the date of disposition.  Once that determination has been made, the law enforcement agency shall not be required to obtain authorization from a County Prosecutor or Municipal Prosecutor prior to destroying the evidence.  Development of Evidence Destruction Policy
[directive] Statute Option  THE permissible permissible permissible permissible permissible ABSENCE, Bail 20 issue.  Cash 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% should JUDGE’S and summons bail $2,500 $1,000 $1,000 $1,000 $1,000  COURT  Range setting 3:26-2 to to to to to or Bail crime.  $500 $500 $500 $500 $500  MUNICIPAL warrant when RULE offenses substantive considered TO OFFENSES a whether Disorderly Disorderly Disorderly Disorderly Disorderly PURSUANT  Persons Persons Persons Persons Persons Degree included
[brief] THE DEP FAILED TO MAKE AN ADEQUATE WATER QUALITY MANAGEMENT PLAN CONSISTENCY DETERMINATION.  (Aa001)  The DEP failed to make an adequate “Consistency Assessment” according to the Water Quality Planning Act and Water Quality Management Planning Rules, because it failed to make any findings regarding pollutant limitations and other requirements of the areawide water quality management plans applicable to the waterways into which the project will create and discharge stormwater.