ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Koda takes long walks every morning, usually with [...] but also [...] if [...] is not home.  3T14:20 – 3T15,1.  When they were away, their friend [...] stayed at the house to dog sit, and walked Koda daily.  3T14:20-3T15:1.  [...], [...] and [...] testified that they always use the following routine after affixing a non-retractable leash to Koda’s metal prong collar:  Holding the leash, they go into the kitchen and open a child-safety gate into the adjacent mudroom.  From the mudroom, they open a door to the garage, go downstairs into and through the garage, and out a door to the driveway.  3T16:19-3T17:24 ([...]) and 3T80:10-19 ([...]).  [...] saw them follow this routine “100%” of the time.  3T61:18-21.  [...] did the same when he walked Koda.  3T61:2-17.  [...] and [...] never allow Koda in the back yard unsupervised because he has a medical condition that requires him to be wiped clean as soon as he eliminates.  3T15:13-24.  They don’t use the front door of their house.  2T16:1-11.  On the rare occasion when a stranger rings the front bell, they put the dogs in an office and close the door before answering.  3T16:14-18.  Thus, their good habits guarded against the dogs escaping from the front or the back.  2T16:11-18.  Koda was well-behaved and calm when he was impounded on September 14th, despite the noise and commotion of police vehicles, the ACO’s van, and officers with radios.  3T35:10-23, D-9 and D-10 (DVDs).  During the six months that Koda was impounded, there were no reports of negative incidents.  3T37:20-24 [...], [...] and [...] all observed Koda walking at heel on the street without pulling or other aggressive behavior; he was always under control and well behaved, reacting well to people and other dogs.  See e.g., 2T135:18-21 ([...]); 3T61:22-62:13 ([...]); 3T61:22-3T62:13 ([...]).  [...] testified that Koda did not react whenever her large, aggressive dog barked at him through the fence.  3T41:18-42:2.  In conclusion, by all accounts from the witnesses who knew Koda, including some of the State’s witnesses, Koda is an exceptionally well-trained dog with a calm, gentle and friendly demeanor.  He has no prey drive.  He was not habitually distracted or disturbed by other dogs, with one unfortunate exception: Bella.
[brief] #  TABLE OF CONTENTS | SECTION | PAGE | |----------------------------------------------|------| | COUNTER-STATEMENT OF PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND FACTS | 1 | | LEGAL ARGUMENT | | | POINT I | | | THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED THE MOTION TO DISMISS THE INDICTMENT ON SPEEDY TRIAL GROUNDS | 5 | | CONCLUSION | 9 | | TABLE OF APPENDIX | |
[brief] At that time, [Appellants] had a sixty-day window to re-file his claim of malicious abuse of process, or to file related claims. ” (Pa12).  Indeed, the Trial Court correctly determined that at “oral argument, counsel for [Appellants] seemingly acknowledged that most of the allegations in the instant complaint were known at the time of the Chancery litigation. ” (Pa12).  The Trial Court also properly concluded that the Chancery Action was “adjudicated on the merits” given “the final effect of the [...] and the Consent Order which set forth a mandatory deadline for bringing a refiled action. ” (Pa12-13).  Thus, the Trial Court properly determined that the key elements for application of the entire controversy doctrine existed: (A) a factual or transactional nexus between two matters; (B) that the component claims were known at the time of the earlier matter; and (C) an adjudication on the merits.
[brief] The Orders on Appeal granted reconsideration from orders from 2020 denying applications for summary judgment.  Back in 2020, defendants [...], M.D. (“[...]”) and [...] (collectively the “[...]”); and (ii) defendants [...] (“[...]”) and Dr. [...], D.O. (“[...]”) (collectively the “[...]”) originally filed motions for summary judgment.  On the record of November 5, 2020, the Case Management Judge decided a number of motions, in each instance demonstrating intimate knowledge of the case.  When it came to the motions for summary judgment, the judge recited a number of reasons, from his review of the record and the briefs, that summary judgment could not possibly be granted.  When denying the motions, the Case Management Judge, expressed his incredulity that the defendants brought the motions in the first place, observing that “[i]f I were to grant summary judgment, two years from now you’d be back here again” because “the Appellate Division is going to look at it and say, you mean, this trial judge didn’t think there was a genuine issue of material fact…”
[brief] The underlying facts in this matter are not set forth at length herein because they were adequately set forth in a prior memorandum.  (See ECF No. 22).  For context, Plaintiff worked for Defendants as a pizza delivery driver and, on March 25, 2015, was terminated after not having worked the prior three weeks.  (Amended Complaint ¶ 29, ECF No. 1-2).  Throughout his employ with Defendants, Plaintiff claims that he was paid below minimum wage, and that he worked 12 to 14-hour shifts without receiving a break or being paid overtime.  (Id. ¶¶ 10-11, 14).  In addition, Plaintiff avers that Defendant [...] regularly “accused” Plaintiff of being a homosexual and directed homophobic epithets towards him.  (Id. ¶ 15).  Based on the foregoing allegations, among others, Plaintiff interposes claims under the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination N.J.S.A. § 10:5-1, et seq., the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219; New Jersey’s Minimum Wage Law, N.J.S.A. § 34:11-56, et seq., and for negligence.
[brief] On July 7, 2023, Defendants filed a letter brief in opposition to the in limine motions filed on July 6, 2023.  Pursuant to R.2:6-1(a)(2), a copy of Defendants’ brief in opposition is not appended hereto.  On July 10, 2023, Plaintiff filed a motion in limine to bar admission of evidence concerning specific trips and vacations taken following the accident.
[brief] Because [...] misled [...], [...]’s ensuing waiver cannot be knowing or voluntary.  Moreover, the hearing court itself stated on the record repeatedly that [...] misled [...] during his interrogation, further contradicting the State’s claims.  After reviewing the interrogation video and hearing all relevant testimony, the court emphasized that [...] was “misle[d]” to believe that the interrogation would be about a drug arrest.  (1T 90-22 to 91-2)  The court confirmed that certain circumstances of the interrogation were “pretty egregious,” and stated five more times that [...] had been “misled. ”  (1T 92-6 to 7, 93-1 to 14, 95-13 to 18, 98-7)  Further, the court stated at the hearing and in its oral decision that “no reasonable person” in [...]’s position “would have known that they were being interviewed for purposes of the robbery. ”  (1T 90-24 to 25, 93-8 to 14, 95-15 to 22; 2T 4-5 to 17)  These are factual findings to which this Court must defer.
[brief] As set forth above, and as demonstrated in the record before this Court, the trial court did not clearly abuse its discretion in reaching its determination of Plaintiff’s motion for attorney’s fees.  The manner in which the Court considered the motion and rendered its decision was not improper and there is no basis for a reversal of the trial court’s order.  This Court should affirm the trial court and award such other and further relief to Defendant that this Court deems just and proper.  Dated: May 10, 2024  [...]  [...], Esq. (033522008)  Counsel for Defendant/Appellee  [...]  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE  DIVISION  DOCKET NO. [...]  [...], Plaintiff-Appellant, v. [...], Defendant-Respondent.
[brief] He testifies that he prepared his own genealogy, his “cheat sheet”, which explains all the Deeds that were entered into evidence as P-10 (3T47:4; Pa279).  [...] was identified by [...] as a nominee who could hold the property and ultimately conveyed the rights she obtained to [...], the corporate entity (3T66:23).  All of the interests that were acquired were now conveyed out of Kwiatek and into [...] Beach & Boardwalk Company, Inc.  (3T61:23).  Kwiatek acquired all of the interest with the exception of those successors of [...] and [...], and all of these were transferred to [...] (3T61:12-23).
[brief] The venerable common law requiring notice of policy changes, which is cumulative to the regulatory and statutory requirements, is especially applicable here. \(^3\)  [...]’s effort to avoid it is all premised on its false contention that “[...] did not qualify as a ‘Named Insured’ under the [[...] policy’s] Named Insured Contractor Controlled Insurance Program endorsement in the first instance. ”  (Zb43.)  It is beyond dispute that [...] initially enrolled in the CCIP, was issued the requisite certificate of insurance, and therefore became a “Named Insured” under the [...] endorsement in that “first instance. ” (Tb16-17.)  This law has been applied to various types of coverage and extends to settings well beyond cancellation and other policy changes.  The application of this requirement to different coverage lines over the past sixty-odd years – notwithstanding the applicability of various regulatory notice mandates – \(^2\)  Despite [...]’s mischaracterization, [...] emphatically confirmed her testimony thusly: “Did you see any documents that related to a cancellation of coverage under a GL policy?  A. No. I did not. ”  (Dta2827.)  \(^3\)  N.J.A.C. 11:1-20.1(c) states: “[T]hese rules are not exclusive,” and that the “rights provided by these rules are in addition to and do not prejudice any other rights policyholders may have at common law.
[directive] NOTICE:  This is a public document, which means the document as submitted will be available to the public upon request.  Therefore, do not enter personal identifiers on it, such as Social Security number, driver’s license number, vehicle plate number, insurance policy number, active financial account number, or active credit card number.  New Jersey Judiciary  No Early Release Act Supplemental Plea Form for (N.J.S.A. (NERA) Cases 2C:43-7.2)
[brief] As to the Shropshire review, [...] advised the Planning Board:  [...]  [...] SPPF 50-97/Amended #2  April 10, 2023  Page 2  REVIEW:  1.  The report prepared by [...] dated March 31, 2023, notes that a similar site in Quakertown, PA was reviewed and then concluded that the advertising sign did not negatively impact safety.  However, no supporting technical data is provided for the study location.  2.  The Shropshire report also included a document prepared by [...] dated October 16, 2018.  The [...] study includes before/after crash rate companions at four sign locations.  However, the limits of each study area appear to include long roadway sections that extend well beyond the visibility area of the relative signs.  The crash rate comparison should be limited to sections of road where the sign is visible to motorists.  As presented, the data included does not distinctly confirm or deny any statistical trends related to crash rates at these sign locations.  (Pa200).  [...] revised the April 10, 2023, review and produced a revised April 11, 2023, review, which further undermined the applicability of the [...] study relied upon by Shropshire.  (Pa140-141).  The April 11, 2023, Traffic Report by the Board’s Traffic Engineer Joseph [...]e (Pa139-141) is expressly referenced in the Planning Board’s May 15, 2023, Decision and Order, the final decision by which the variance at issue was denied, (Pa117-128; see specifically, Pa124).
[brief] Order entered on May 24, 2024  Granting [...] and [...]’s Motion to Dismiss and Compel Arbitration by the Hon. [...], J.S.C. (Pa204)  Order entered on June 20, 2024  Granting [...] and [...]’s Motion to Dismiss and Compel Arbitration by the Hon. [...], J.S.C. (Pa205-Pa206)  Statement of Reasons entered by the Hon. [...], J.S.C., on July 2, 2024 (Pa207-Pa209)  ### TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | Case | Page(s) | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|---------| | **Cases** | | | Antonucci v. Curvature Newco, Inc., | 8 | | 470 N.J. Super. 553 (App. Div. 2022) | | | Atalese v. U.S. Legal Servs. Grp., LP, | 7 | | 219 N.J. 430 (2014)
[brief] The court declines to address the remainder of Plaintiffs arguments as this court has concluded that the arbitration award should be vacated based upon the arbitrator exceeding his powers.  Based on the foregoing analysis, Plaintiff's Order to Show Cause is granted in part and denied in part.  A confirming Order accompanies this Statement of Reasons.  The within demand for reimbursement must be denied in its entirety pursuant to the caselaw above.
[brief] On August 11, 2015, [...] was shot and killed in the City of Bridgeton, New Jersey.  Immediately before his death, Mr. Butler was driving a vehicle occupied by his passenger, [...].  T3, 4-25.  Following a lengthy car pursuit, shots were fired from the pursuing vehicle, one of which struck and killed Mr. Butler.  T3, 3-10 and T4, 197:1-4.  After Mr. Butler was shot, his car, now being maneuvered by [...], crashed into a pole.  T2, 49:2-10; T3, 97:19-25 and 98:1-8.  On October 7, 2015, [...] was charged by [...] of the [...] with the murder of [...] on August 11, 2015.
[directive] A.  When a juvenile is not detained, prosecutors can and should request Conditions of release. that the court order specific release conditions or enhanced monitoring, in addition to those recommended by Juvenile Intake.  An Assistant Prosecutor shall request that the court impose any other release conditions, where the prosecutor has reason to believe that such condition(s) is needed to: reasonably assure the juvenile’s appearance in court; protect the community; and to prevent the juvenile from obstructing or attempting to obstruct the juvenile justice process.  Specifically, Assistant Prosecutors should request no contact provisions whenever necessary.  B.  In the event Notice to Assistant Prosecutor of suspected violations of release conditions. that a law enforcement agency or officer has reason to believe that a juvenile has violated a condition of pretrial release, the agency or officer shall promptly notify the Assistant Police and court personnel are tasked with making all reasonable efforts to locate a parent or guardian to accept 24 custody of a juvenile prior to requesting or approving a juvenile’s placement in a shelter or other non-secure placement.
[brief] (P8T63:3-10).  As in Banco Multiple Santa Cruz, S.A., v. Moreno, more was needed to enforce the Photocopy than simply comparing photocopied signatures.  Respondent asserts that her expert, [...] found no evidence of a cut and paste manipulation of Petitioner’s signatures.  Db at 55.  That is erroneous.  [...] acknowledged at trial that there was evidence of physical manipulation of the Photocopy stating that a double line under Decedent’s signature was evidence of the signature being taken from another source.  (9T198:21-199:1; See P115a).  Genuine questions exist as to the existence of an original prenuptial agreement making it unfair to admit the duplicate into evidence.  N.J.R.E. 1003.  The Photocopy was found to have waived the Petitioner’s right to an elective share of the Decedent’s Estate, although it failed to contain the schedule of assets required by the Premarital Agreement Act, N.J.S.A. 37:2-33.  The Court disregarded that statutory law reasoning “this court will not speculate as to what could have been attached to the full agreement.
[brief] That boxed up file was sealed and was not opened until in court at trial.  It was actually not possible to provide it to [...]’s counsel in discovery in this case.  It had been packed away before suit, at a time when they knew they were “going to sue Daniel [...]” before actually suing him; and it was not opened until in court.  D-4, the 21 boxes containing the [...] file had sat sealed in the courtroom prejudicing the jury for days.  And after [...]’s own witness testified that it could not have possibly been exchanged in discovery in this case, [...] moved it into evidence over the repeated objection of Mr. [...]’s attorney.
[directive] B. hours.  Absent the need for reduced hours as a reasonable Modified duty status accommodation, officers working modified duty shall maintain full-time hours.  C. duty.  Such modified duty may consist of, but is not limited to:  Examples of modified 1.  Writing police reports 2.  Operating police radio 3.  Interviewing persons 4.  Clerical functions 5.  Community and education outreach 6.  Public information officer  7.  Body-worn camera footage review, maintenance, and related functions 8.  Computer operations  D. accommodation.  Modified duty status
[brief] Under the February 20, 2015 Lease**  Defendants [...] and [...] are not listed as Tenants under the Lease, as the only tenant under the lease is [...].  Thus, neither [...] nor [...] have any personal liability for any obligations of FZG under the lease unless they are found to have personally guaranteed the obligations of FZG.  Plaintiff’s assertion that they have made such a guaranty hangs on a single sentence in the February 20, 2015 Lease which appears on the last page of the lease and tucked in a WITNESS WHEREOF clause and reads in full as follows:  “Additionally, the undersigned jointly and severally each hereby personally guarantee the obligations of the Tenant herein. ”  Notably, there is no separate guaranty agreement or even a separate page or paragraph of the lease that further speaks to the alleged personal guaranty.  Moreover, the position that the above language constitutes an enforceable personal guaranty is directly contrary to other parts of the Lease.  Thus, paragraph 9 of the Lease has the heading “Insurance and Guarantees” but the section includes no language at all regarding guarantees.  Perhaps most importantly, the sole lease signature line for [...] reads “[...]-[...]” and the sole lease signature line for [...] reads [...]-[...]. ”  Pa 70.  These signature lines clearly indicate that [...] and [...] are signing the lease on behalf of the entity only and are not signing as guarantors in their individual capacity.  The important component missing is a signature line for either [...] or [...] that expressly indicates that they are agreeing to guaranty the obligations under the lease in their individual capacity.  Under New Jersey law the absence of such a signature line for either of these individuals is fatal to Plaintiff’s claim of personal guaranty.  An important case that was discussed at length in the oral argument on the cross motions for summary judgment is City of Millville v. Rock, 683 F. Supp. 2d. 319 (D.N.J. 2010).
[brief] Plaintiff was unaware of Defendant’s intention to leave permanently after obtaining her green card.  This revelation came as a shock to Plaintiff, particularly when, on September 20th, he felt compelled to call Defendant’s family due to threatening activities aimed at extorting money from Plaintiff’s family.  During the call, Defendant’s family confirmed that they were already aware of her plans for divorce, ever since she was in India, before the “real” marriage in November 2022.  (2T46)  Plaintiff was deeply troubled by this information.
[brief] [...] Investigates the June 24, 2020 Incident.  On June 26, 2020, [...] emailed [...]’s Chief People Person, [...], to discuss [...]’s yelling at him.  (Pa179 at 80:17-23; Pa470).  Florentine forwarded it to [...], who was the HR Business Partner for [...]’s department, to address.  (Pa472; Pa101 at 68:8-14).  [...] then scheduled a meeting with [...] to address his concerns.  (Pa91 at 27:6-16; Pa101 at 69:4-7).  At that meeting, [...] and [...] discussed the June 24, 2020 incident and [...] told him that she would interview [...] “to get her statement,” and then proceed with the investigation.  (Pa102 at 70:15-71:10).  During her interview, [...] recounted the events of June 24, 2020 to [...], stating that [...] repeatedly questioned her on something she needed him to accomplish, and, after he refused to listen, she “got loud” with him.  (Pa103 at 74:5-16).  [...] considered [...]’s instigation of the conflict with [...] to be similar to a prior incident involving [...], and consistent with his past conduct.  (Pa100 at 63:16-65:9).  [...] had previously disobeyed an instruction from a Director of Nursing, [...], regarding the availability of N95 masks during the COVID-19 pandemic.  (Pa411 at 35:3-15).  Meanwhile, [...]’s June 24, 2020 conduct was “atypical,” and [...] found that [...]’s colleagues, including [...], did not consider her intimidating.  (Pa110 at 104:1-13; Pa455-56 at 24:25-25:4; Pa408 at 23:22-24:3; Pa456 at 25:5-15).  [...] informed the executives at [...] about the investigation into [...]’s conduct, and her conclusion that she had no reason to suspect that [...] had committed any wrongdoing.  (Pa108 at 94:14-95:5).  IX.
[brief] ”  State v. Medina, 242 N.J. 397, 412-13 (2020).  The Confrontation Clause “prohibits the introduction of testimonial hearsay that does not meet an established and recognized exception to the hearsay rule, and cannot be challenged by a defendant through cross-examination. ”  Id. at 413 (citing Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 43-59 (2004)).
[brief] 1.  The Standards of Review  In reviewing the action of any Planning Board, a court’s “scope of review is limited. ”  Hawrylo v. Board of Adjustment, Harding Tp., 249 N.J. Super. 568, 578 (App. Div. 1991).  The court is required to give deference to the Board’s discretion and to attach a presumption of validity to the Board’s determination.  See Davis Enterprises v. Karpf, 105 NJ 476, 485 (1987).  Applying this standard here, this court must give deference to the Board’s broad discretion and reverse only if the Board’s action was “arbitrary, unreasonable or capricious as to amount to an abuse of discretion.
[brief] The crux of plaintiff’s 5 Counts 309 paragraphs hybrid prerogative writ/declaratory judgment/civil rights act violations action is whether defendants in CY 2021 suppressed, violated, altered and impaired plaintiff’s and others’ fundamental constitutional right to be heard on all agenda action items prior to consideration and official action.  Due to its possible preclusive impact on [...]’s contested Mount Laurel Declaratory Judgment July 30, 2021 Stealth Settlement Agreement, defendants evade this “robust informed civic participation” issue.  Defendants neither confirm nor deny the CY 2021 continuous violations of plaintiff’s fundamental rights and our State’s public policy in favor of robust informed civic participation.  Defendants conflate this political free speech and right to petition for redress of grievance issue.  Plaintiff did not challenge the validity of the Flex Parking Removal/911 Memorial Capital Bond Ordinance on this issue.  Plaintiff has always acknowledged that he was provided a second reading public hearing opportunity to be heard.  However, plaintiff asserted that [...] had a disqualifying statutory and common law conflict of interest and appearance of impropriety, thereby contaminating the validity of the contested discretionary legislative capital bond ordinance.  Plaintiff also alleged that defendants violated our State public policies in favor of robust informed civic participatory and long range capital budgeting.  Plaintiff claimed that defendants were required to respond to his pertinent second reading public hearing questions and comments prior to adoption of the contested capital bond ordinance.
[directive] The Division shall work closely with Coordination with Division of Criminal the Division of Criminal Justice to promote public safety, develop innovative strategies for preventing violence, and to safeguard the rights and interests of victims in the performance of public safety, law enforcement and prosecutorial functions.  G. Council.  The Executive Director or their designee shall Sexual Assault Coordinating serve as the Attorney General’s designee on the Sexual Assault Nurse Examiner Coordinating Council established pursuant to N.J.S.A 52:4B-55.  H. Resources.