ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Then, “[n]early twenty years after the enactment of N.J.S.A. 40:49-2.1, the Legislature amended N.J.S.A. 40:49-2 to authorize municipalities to publish only a “summary” of other proposed ordinances. ”  Id. at 385, fn. 1 (citing L. 1996, c. 113, § 7).  It is significant that the Appellate Division in Colter specifically utilized the word “summary” to describe the substantive notification requirements that N.J.S.A. 40:49-2 now mandates.  The word “summary” is also specifically used in N.J.S.A. 40:49-2.1.  In explaining that term, the Appellate Division observed:  N.J.S.A. 40:49-2.1 does not require the published notice of proposed adoption of a zoning ordinance to contain a description of every change in the municipality’s zoning that the ordinance will produce.  The notice is only required to contain a “brief summary” of the ordinance’s “main” objectives or provisions…  However, this does not mean that the notice can simply state that the amendment will result in changes to the municipality’s zoning, without indicating the nature or scope of those changes.  The essential purpose of the required notice is to alert individual property owners to the possibility that the proposed amendment may affect the zoning or their properties or of nearby properties.  Therefore, the notice must be sufficient to serve this purpose.  Colter, 393 N.J. Super. at 387 [Emphasis supplied].  The Appellate Division in Colter reversed the trial court’s decision and invalidated the challenged ordinance because the notice at issue “did not provide any information concerning the specific nature or scope of the proposed changes.
[brief] Sobel v. Long Island Entertainment Productions, Inc., 329 N.J. Super. 285 (App. Div.  2000) .......................................................  13  Stone v. Old Bridge Township, 111 N.J. 110 .................................................................................................  9 U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Guillaume, 209 N.J. 449 (2012) .................................................................  10  Unifund CCR Partners v. Beras, 2011 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 717, (App. Div March 23, 2011) ...... 21 Uriarte v. Stenger & Stenger, P.C., 3:17-cv-06251-MAS-TJB (D.N.J.) .................................................. 4  Wohlegmuth v. 560 Ocean Club, 302 N.J. Super. 306 (1997)  ............................................................  15  Woo-Padva v. Midland Funding LLC, No. BER-L-003625-17, 2022 WL 267938 (N.J. Super. L. Jan. 07, 2022) ......................................................  26 Statutes Md. Code. Ann., Com. Law §14-203 ............................................. 22 N.J.S.A. 2A:16-50 .......................................................................  25 N.J.S.A. 2A:16-53 .......................................................................  5 N.J.S.A. 2A:16-62 .......................................................................  25 N.J.S.A. 17:11C-1 .......................................................................  1, 5 N.J.S.A. 17:11C-18 ....................................................................  1, 23 N.J.S.A. 17:11C-33 ...................................................................  22, 24 N.J.S.A. 56:8-1 ..........................................................................  5 Rule 4:50 .................................................................................. passim  COUNTER PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
[brief] **AMANIERA’S ASSERTION OF UNSPECIFIED CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION IS INSUFFICIENT TO PREVENT HIS DEPOSITION (AA821)**  [...]’s hypothetical belief that he will be asked at the deposition about confidential information is insufficient to quash the subpoena.  *V.K. v. N.J. Mfrs. Ins. Co.*, 2013 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2111, at 26 (N.J. Super. Aug. 26, 2013) (holding that it will be “necessary” for deponent to “demonstrate that a protective order was necessary as to specific an discrete questions” on privilege grounds, “rather than asserting a blanket objection to the deposition in its entirety”); *Anderson v. City of New Brunswick*, C.A. 12-2502 (MDS) (TJB), 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 165852, at *11 (D.N.J. Oct. 4, 2017) (affirming denial of motion for “protective order to guard [deponent] against questions pertaining --- \(^5\) Aa23 (expressly permitting subpoena to Titan, stating “Defendants may subpoena evidence from [...]; however, the requests must be narrowly tailored to Defendants’ stated defense regarding pass through payments to [...]”). to” another action); *Aetrex Worldwide, Inc. v. Burten Distrib.*, No. 13-1140 (SRC), 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 172857, at *16 (D. N.J. Dec. 12, 2014) (denying motion to quash, holding, “quashing subpoenas in this instance for the mere potential disclosure of confidential information is an extreme remedy”).
[brief] Included in the exhibits offered at time of hearing was an FNDA dated September 17, 2021.  (Pa9 to Pa10).  This FNDA was not listed in the conduct in the present matter, the Respondent sought the Appellant’s removal from public employment.  The egregiousness of her conduct dictated that result.  The spirit of the ruling in *Bock* justifies that conclusion.  See also *City of Newark v. Massey*, 93 N.J.Super 317, 322-25 (App. Div. 1967).  In his Initial Decision, the ALJ found that Appellant engaged in conduct that warranted the forfeiture of her employment.  (Pa225).  Notably, the ALJ found that the Appellant had committed the offense of insubordination so many times that the County had no choice but to pursue termination.
[brief] ”  Funeral Home Mgmt., Inc. v. Basralian, 319 N.J. Super. 200, 208 (App.Div.1999).  Consequently, the deference to be accorded by the Court to the Board’s variance denial decision in this case should be even greater than if this case were a challenge to a variance approval.  These principles, as mentioned and omitted by Plaintiffs, were brought together cogently by the Appellate Division, in Northeast Towers, Inc. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment of Borough of West Patterson, which summed up the standard of review for cases that involve judicial review of the denial of a variance by a local zoning board:  Moreover, "[a]ctions of a board of adjustment are presumed to be valid and the party attacking such action has the burden of proving otherwise."  New York SMSA Ltd. Partnership v. Board of Adj. of Bernards Tp., supra (324 N.J.Super. at 163-164).  The Court determined in Kramer v. Board of Adj., Sea Girt, 45 N.J. 268, 296 (1965), that zoning boards because of their peculiar knowledge of local conditions must be allowed wide latitude in the exercise of delegated discretion.
[brief] However, in this matter she failed to do so, and instead addressed the issue for the first time on the subsequent motion which gave rise to the November 1991 order under review.  Nevertheless, plaintiff's actions in this regard were entirely justified in this case because the trial court had specifically refused to consider the issue of changed circumstances relating to alimony, an issue very closely related to that of changed circumstances concerning the escalator clause.  Thus, it was clear that the trial court would have similarly refused to consider plaintiff's fraud claims at the earlier hearing.  Therefore, plaintiff had no duty to raise an argument which she knew would be rejected.  Cf. *State v. Worlock*, 117 N.J. 596, 625, 569 A.2d 1314 (1990).  Her fraud claims were thus properly raised before the trial court on the subsequent motion…..  Consequently, the trial court should have addressed plaintiff's claims of fraud or unclean hands which might have barred defendant's equitable request for modification, either at the plenary hearing or at the subsequent motion hearing.  Because "it is axiomatic that all material factual disputes must be resolved on testimony," *Dworkin v. Dworkin*, supra, 217 N.J. Super. at 525, 526 A.2d 278; *Hallberg v. Hallberg*, 113 N.J. Super. 205, 208, 273 A.2d 389 (App.Div. 1971), a remand is warranted on the issue of defendant's fraud or unclean hands.
[brief] 1  POINT I 1  The State fails to appreciate this defendant’s reliance on Federal supremacy (i.e. 4th Amendment) principles as well as New Jersey’s acknowledgement of that Federal authority, see State v. Ingram, 474 N.J. Super. 522 (App. Div. 2023).  POINT II  2  This Court need not, should it so determine, decide the State Constitutional limits, expanded or same, as to the Federal curtilage prohibition or the GPS parameters, impacting an individual’s expectation of privacy.  POINT III  2  This Court should confirm that a CDW does not authorize entry onto private property, driveway, home or enclosed area, without a warrant specifically particularizing the basis for an entry upon a home or its curtilage as well as the parameters of a CDW.  Conclusion
[brief] Although the matter was referred to OAL as a contested case for such a hearing, [...] withdrew his complaint, and the GRC case was terminated.  [...] did not willfully violate any orders of the GRC, and [...] dismissed the GRC Complaint before the OAL could hold a hearing regarding whether Sipe should be penalized.7  To the contrary, he was willing to produce the requested records as long as he was compensated for his time in doing so.  At the time he was subjected to the orders of the GRC, [...] was no longer a public employee, but was a private citizen who was being instructed to take approximately two weeks off from his job, without any reasonable compensation, in order to produce the records.  To the extent that any fault needs --- 7  In yet another arbitrary quirk of GRC procedure, a GRC complainant may withdraw complaints at any time, without the consent of any of the respondents.  to be laid, it must be with the [...], which should have obtained the records from [...] when he was a Commissioner and held them pending further orders of the GRC.
[brief] Exhibit E – New Jersey Police Crash Investigation Report, dated December 29, 2019 (omitted, see Da136)  ......................................................  Da136  Exhibit F – Correspondence from Plaintiff’s counsel to Hon. [...], J.SC., concerning trial testimony of [...], dated October 2, 2023 ....................................................................................  Da177  Defendants, [...]’s and [...]’s, Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict or, in the alternative, for a New Trial, or in the alternative, for Remittitur, dated October 16, 2023 ..........  Da179  Certification of Counsel, dated October 16, 2023 ................................................ Da183 Final Judgment, dated October 10, 2023 ................................................................. Da185 Volume II - (Da187 to Da273)
[brief] **EXHIBIT B**  July 25, 2016  Amended Order Granting Partial Summary Judgment as to the Second, Third, and Fifth Counts of Plaintiff’s Amended Verified Complaint (Da220)  August 16, 2016  Second Amended Order Granting Partial Summary Judgment as to the Second, Third and Fifth Counts of Plaintiff’s Amended Verified Complaint (Da170)  **EXHIBIT C**  June 27, 2017  Order entering judgment  In favor of the [...] and Against Defendant restraining Defendant  From interfering with Plaintiff’s Easement rights as well as other Equitable and other monetary relief.  (Da207)  **EXHIBIT D**  Certification of [...]  In Support of Plaintiff’s Motion to Enforce Litigant’s Rights dated December 12, 2017 (without Exhibits)  (Da213)  EXHIBIT E  January 24, 2018  Transcript of Order To Show Cause Hearing Da310  EXHIBIT F  February 14, 2018  Transcript of Order To Show Cause Hearing Da325  **EXHIBIT G**  March 6, 2018  Order sanctioning Defendant for violations (Da288) --- 8  Not omitted because filed with Trial Court as an Exhibit to Certification  9  Not omitted because filed with Trial Court as an Exhibit to Certification  EXHIBIT H  March 26, 2018  Order for Judgment for An Award of Attorney’s Fees and Costs and Statement of Reasons
[brief] ”  *Atalese v. U.S. Legal Servs. Grp., L.P.*, 219 N.J. 430, 442 (2014) (quoting *NAACP of Camden Cnty. E. v. Foulke Mgmt.*, 421 N.J.Super. 404, 425 (App. Div.), certif. granted, 209 N.J. 96 (2011), and appeal dismissed, 213 N.J. 47 (2013)).  There is a strong policy that favors resolving claims in arbitration.  In enacting New Jersey’s Arbitration Act, the Legislature codified the existing judicial policy favoring arbitration as “a means of dispute resolution. ”  *Hojnowski v. Vans Skate Park*, 187 N.J. 323, 342 (2006).  See also *Martindale v. Sandvik, Inc.*, 173 N.J. 76, 92 (2002) (“[T]he affirmative policy of this State, both legislative and judicial, favors arbitration as a mechanism of resolving disputes. ”).  “Arbitration clauses—and other contractual clauses—will pass muster when phrased in plain language that is understandable to the reasonable consumer. ”  *Atalese*, 219 N.J. at 444.  The waiver of the right to resolve any disputes involving the payment of PIP benefits is set forth in [...]’s own insurance contracts.  [...] can hardly claim that it did not understand that it was waiving its right to a jury trial of PIP claims when the mandatory arbitration clauses appear in the policies that [...], itself, drafted.  II.
[brief] Count 13 alleges that the same defendants were unjustly enriched at [...]’s expense as a result of such “illegal transfers. ”  The damage allegedly suffered by each plaintiff is that, at the time each plaintiff sold his/its shares in the entity, plaintiff “expected full and complete remuneration for the sale of its shares and the receipt and retention of the monies to which [plaintiff] was entitled .  . . .”  Da52-53.  "No proof was even offered that any transfer here was “illegal. ”  It is further evident that these allegations are similarly rooted in plaintiffs’ failed claims of fraudulent inducement.  As a result, this count also should have been dismissed when the fraudulent inducement claims were dismissed.  Instead, the trial court referenced its findings that there had been unauthorized withdrawals in which [...] did not gave his fair share and stated, “all of this would result in unjust enrichment.  It’s not fair if one gets one thing and the other gets the other thing.  . . .  I do believe that Mr. [...] was shortchanged on certain monies. ”
[brief] (P105-P109a; 7T181:5-24; 7T182:17-19; 186:19 to 187:19).  The Court found that “Respondent fought with her mother because her mother wanted her to leave [...]. ”  P20a.  [...] testified that Decedent expressed her dislike for [...].  (9T70:12 to 71:3).  After the 2014 Will was made, Decedent advised [...] that [...] was barred from Respondent’s home and asked [...] to alert her if [...] came around Respondent’s home.  (9T73:2-11).  The facts suggest that Respondent agreed to bar [...] from her home\(^{13}\) if Decedent made Respondent the sole beneficiary of her estate.
[brief] (1T 19-5 to 15)  Over more than an hour, [...] tracked [...] on the drone’s live feed as [...] engaged in two suspected hand-to-hand transactions on Jackson Avenue. \(^3\) (1T 19-16 to 21-12, 27-9 to 25, 38-1 to 4)  After the first transaction, police stopped the suspected buyer and recovered two small containers of presumed crack cocaine.  (1T 20-3 to 16, 26-9 to 10)  Sometime after the second transaction, [...] left his suspected stash area on \(^3\)  The State only produced video of the first alleged transaction.
[brief] Ibid.  Despite the separation, [...] continued to yell, “That’s not true D[].”  Ibid.  [...] responded, “I’ve corrected you several times not to say, ‘this guy’ and not to say ‘D[].’”  Ibid.  [...] claimed that her coworker ([...]) observed [...]’s harassment and sent [...] a text message around 9:17 a.m. asking if she was ok.  Ibid.  During the incident, [...] had also created a distraction and helped separate them by getting [...] inside the building.  Ibid.  [...] reported that there were additional witnesses outside, including other coworkers, who may have observed or heard the exchange between her and [...]  Ibid.  According to [...], the discrimination continued that afternoon when she returned to the [...] office to submit her friend’s petition and to file a complaint against [...] with the Election Committee and the National Labor Board.  *Ibid.*  When [...] told [...] that she was going to file complaints against [...], [...] yelled, “Do it D[], do it D[].”  *Ibid.*  [...] “stood up” to [...], stating, “[y]ou are done misnaming me, I’ve told you multiple times to stop. ”  *Ibid.*  [...] replied, “[o]r what, are you threatening me in front of my staff, D[].” (Aa27-28).  [...] also asked [...] what her legal name was, and what name she used on the petition.  (Aa28).  [...] acknowledged that her legal name (D[.]) was on the petition, but informed [...] that it did not matter because the name she used was D[a]. and he needed to respect that choice.  *Ibid.*  Another [...] employee, [...], “tried to push” [...] into an office stop him from speaking to [...]  *Ibid.*  In his response to the complaint, [...] acknowledged that he was familiar with [...], as she was helping a friend run for union president against him, and that he interacted with [...] at the [...] building on September 9 while collecting his own signatures.
[brief] It is improper for [...] to argue it is not the court’s decision to determine unconscionability for the first time in response to this appeal.  This Court should not consider the new argument in response to this appeal raised by [...] regarding the Court’s discretion in determining unconscionability because [...] missed its opportunity to raise this issue with the trial court.  Although an Appellate Court may consider allegations of errors or omissions not brought to the trial judge’s attention, if it meets the plain error standard under R. 2:10-2, the Court often declines to consider issues that were not raised below or not properly presented on appeal when the opportunity for presentation was available.  Generally, unless an issue goes to the jurisdiction of the trial court or concerns matters of substantial public interest, the Appellate Court will rarely consider it.
[brief] (27T 186-22 to 189-19)  The instruction defined deadly force as “force that the defendant uses with the purpose of causing or which he knows to create a substantial risk of causing death or serious bodily harm. ”  (27T 187-9 to 12)  And it explained that “purposely fir[ing] a firearm in the direction of another person … would be an example of deadly force. ”  (27T 187-18 to 20)  The instruction warned that “[o]ne cannot respond with deadly force to a threat of or even an actual minor attack” (27T 187-25 to 188-1), and that one could not “resort[] to deadly force [if he] knew that an opportunity to retreat with complete safety was available[.]”  (27T 189-10 to 19)
[brief] (12T118-2 to 10).  Because [...] could see shadows and thought defendant and others were still outside of his house, he warned [...] to be careful and told him to bring a gun.  (12T118-25 to 119-24).  [...] arrived approximately fifteen minutes later and parked across the street from the Holleys’ trailer.  (12T120-3 to 1; 122-9 to 12).  When [...] saw him pull onto the street, he retrieved a BB gun and went outside to meet [...].
[directive] AUTHORITY OF ATTORNEY GENERAL TO GRANT EXEMPTIONS OR SPECIAL USE AUTHORIZATIONS  ALPRs, and all ALPR stored data, shall only be used and accessed for the purposes and in the manner authorized by these Guidelines.  In recognition of the need to be able to address issues or circumstances that are not contemplated by these Guidelines, the Attorney General or his or her designee may grant an exemption from any provision of these Guidelines, and may authorize the specific use of an ALPR, or the data collected by or derived from an ALPR, that is not expressly authorized by these Guidelines.
[brief] 2.  **The modification to the interest was improperly calculated because it included prior payments into amount due rather than using that number as an offset to total amount owed**  In his modification, the Arbitrator improperly inflated the interest calculation on the ongoing projects because he discounted the payments made by [...] by the percentage of project completion.  For the purpose of calculating interest, the Arbitrator used an improperly inflated balance due for EGP because he reduced the total amount of EGP that [...] paid prior to July 6, 2022 by the percentage of project completeness, which makes no sense - mathematically or otherwise.  Da260.  The Arbitrator artificially decreased the amounts paid by [...] while artificially increasing the amounts of principal upon which the interest rate was applied.  [...] is only entitled to be compensated each quarter for an EGP based on project completeness, and [...]'s prior payments are lump sums that should not be similarly reduced by a percentage of completion.  [...]'s prior payments reduce the total amount owed to [...] each quarter after taking project completeness into account.  In other words, the interest for the ongoing projects is calculated against an EGP amount that includes an offset for previous payments [...] made for that project, but in the Award that offset is improperly reduced by project progress.  This method artificially lowers the credit [...] deserves for the prior payments by reducing the amount previously paid by the percentage of project completion.  For example:  CORRECT METHOD TO CALCULATE EGP OWED FOR ONGOING PROJECT \[(85\% \text{ project progress} \times \text{EGP owed}) - \text{amount of prepayment}\] vs. INCORRECT METHOD USED BY ARBITRATOR (85% project progress) x (EGP owed – amount of prepayment) (85% project progress x EGP owed) - (85% project progress x amount of prepayment)  Tab 2 of Alternative Calculations shows the calculation of the Award correctly applying [...]’s previous payments at the full value at the time the payment was made.  Da477.  The correct Award should be $3,887,292.71, and if the Court includes preconstruction expense as an offset as explained supra, the Award is further reduced to $3,852,916.85.  B.
[brief] Objects to, or refuses to participate in any activity, policy or practice which the employee reasonable believes: (1) is in violation of a law, or a rule or regulation promulgated pursuant to law; (2) is fraudulent or criminal; or (3) is incompatible with a clear mandate of public policy concerning the public health, safety or welfare or protection of the environment.  N.J.S.A. 34:19-3; see also McCullough v. City of Atlantic City, 137 F. Supp. 2d 557, 572-73 (D.N.J. 2001); McLelland v. Moore, 343 N.J. Super. 589, 599-600 (App. Div. 2001), cert.  denied, 171 N.J. 43 (2002).
[brief] Appellant’s argument thus rests on precedent that has been overtaken, at least in relevant part, by statute. \(^3\) --- 3.  Appellant at one point tries to argue that [...], as the Clerk, cannot unilaterally determine the results of the election pursuant to *N.J.S.A.* 40A:14-77, as “the clerk and tellers shall forthwith canvass the vote and certify the results.  The clerk shall publicly announce the results. ” (Pb13).  At the same time, he argues that [...] abdicated his responsibilities by relying upon [...].  (Pb20).  However, [...] also stated that [...]’s job is to “sit in the office” and when the poll workers (i.e., tellers) call in from different polling locations, she adds them in a spreadsheet and reports that number to [...].  (1T60:2-6).  Those numbers included the write-in votes at issue, which were reported initially with the first certification, and then spelled out in the amended certification.  It is unclear what point Appellant is trying to make, since both the tellers and the clerk are involved in the canvassing and certification.