ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Singh, which was recently reaffirmed by the Court in Watson, demonstrates how the personal knowledge required to render such an opinion admissible is lacking in this case.  In Singh, a detective opined that the shoes worn by the suspect in a video were similar to the shoes defendant was wearing when he was arrested by the detective, as well as the same shoes presented as an exhibit at trial.  *Id.* at 8.  Our Supreme Court held that the officer’s testimony was admissible because the detective had seen the defendant wearing those shoes, and so the testimony was based on the detective’s own perception.  *Id.* at 19-20.  Further, the detective’s testimony was helpful to the jury because the detective had first-hand knowledge of what the sneakers looked like on the night defendant was arrested.  *Id.* at 20.  “Having had first-hand knowledge of what the sneakers looked like, [...] permissibly testified that the sneakers on the video looked like those he witnessed defendant wearing the night he helped arrest defendant. ”  *Id.* at 20.  Unlike the detective in *Singh*, neither [...] nor [...] had seen the intruders before or had seen the clothing in person.  Therefore, their opinions on the resemblance between the two men and their clothing was not based on personal knowledge, was not helpful to the jury, and should not have been admitted.  The admission of this inappropriate testimony requires reversal of [...]’s convictions.
[brief] When [...] simply read this technical information from the cellphone extractions, without presenting any specialized knowledge or explanation as to how this data was reliability computed, he improperly supplied the jury with an unsupported net opinion in violation of N.J.R.E. 702 and N.J.R.E. 703.  See United States v. Gissantaner, 990 F.3d 457, 463 (6th Cir. 2021) (“If highly consequential evidence emerges from what looks like an indecipherable computer program to most non-scientists, non-statisticians, and non-programmers, it is imperative that qualified individuals explain how the program works and ensure that it produces reliable information about the case. ”).  Moreover, because the State did not attempt to qualify [...] as an expert in the requisite Apple technology and software, it skirted the disclosure requirements of Rule 3:13-3(b)(1)(I) and deprived the jury of the required limiting instruction for expert testimony about this information.
[brief] (Da173-175).  In addition to the refund of these escrowed funds, the Motion for Reconsideration sought a jurisdictionally prohibited money judgment against Landlord for difference between the $334,583.33 in Tenant Allowance payments that Tenant claimed it was owed and the $196,669.16 in Rent Arrears being escrowed with the Clerk.  (Da173-175).  Tenant’s Notice of Motion sought the following, in relevant part:  Compelling Landlord to pay the remaining presently due amount of fit-up reimbursement to Tenant after set-off for Landlord’s attorneys’ fees and costs and after Tenant’s recoupment of its escrow deposit with the Court (Da174; see also Pa100-101, Tenant’s proposed Order submitted with the Motion for Reconsideration seeking the payment of these amounts by Landlord).
[directive] The December 2020 revisions were intended to implement the [...]’s transition to updated urine specimen collection kits and the necessary related procedures.  In the April 2018 revision, the Policy was revised in accordance with Attorney General Directive 2018-2 requiring the implementation of a random drug testing policy by all state, county, and municipal law enforcement agencies under the legal authority of the Attorney General.  It also required the drug testing of law enforcement applicants as a condition of employment.  In February 2021, the Cannabis Regulatory, Enforcement Assistance, and Marketplace Modernization Act (CREAMMA), N.J.S.A. 24:6I-31 et seq., was enacted, and in April 2022, the [...] approved applications from Alternative Treatment Centers to expand into recreational cannabis sales, marking the opening of the regulated cannabis market in New Jersey.
[brief] That is the plain meaning of the language that appears directly above the signature lines.  Defendants, [...] and [...], state at KVDb17, that “under New Jersey law the absence of such a signature line for either of these individuals is fatal to Plaintiff’s claim of personal guaranty. ”  This is a misstatement of the law.  In support of this statement, Defendants rely on two unreported New Jersey Appellate Division cases, Herz vs. 141 Bloomfield Ave. Corp., 2015 WL 2465027 (N.J. App. Div. 2015) Pa145, and Lawyers Guild Realty, Inc. vs. ICSD, L.L.C., 2009 WL 3429755 (App. Div. 2009) Pa150.
[brief] See also State v. Cabbell, 207 N.J. 311, 327 n.10 (2011) (Court declined to consider an argument first raised in a supplemental brief to the Court); Hirsch v. State Bd. of Med. Exam’rs, 128 N.J. 160, 161 (1992) (Court declined to address a claim presented after the Court granted a petition for certification).  Q  Right.  And so how did you keep a record -- how much are you suing [...] for?  A  255,000.  Q  How did you come up with that number?  A  Through the person who was doing the accounting for [...].  Q  Who was that?  A  Uh, I think the -- it was a Russian girl.  I don't remember her name offhand, but I can -- Q  When did you speak to her?  A  On a monthly basis.  Q  From when until when?  A  Uh, probably from 2013 or '12 to December of 2017.  Q  It was the same person for that five year period?  A  Yes.  Q  And each time you would speak to her, she would tell you you're owed X amount?  A  Yeah.  She would have a ledger and in the ledger, that's where the numbers were.  Q  Do you have a copy of that ledger?  A  No.  I'm not entitled to that.  Q  Did you ask for that ledger?  A No.  Q  Other than the ledger that she -- that person that we can't remember whose name it was, would tell you existed, do you have any other knowledge of such a ledger being in the possession of [...]?  A  No.  Q  Do you have any other way of verifying that such an amount was owed to you other than what this woman told you?  A  Well, she was the accountant, so I believe what she said.  See Da70-72 at 134a – 171a at 47:25-49:25.
[brief] Plaintiffs submit their Responses to [...]’s Statement of Material Facts, which [...] submitted in support of its motion for summary judgment.  [Pa1094-Pa1100].  In plaintiffs’ responses they reference “Plaintiffs’ Global Statement of Material Facts”.  [Pa1094].  However, plaintiffs do not submit their Global Statement of Material Facts as part of their record on appeal.  Nor do plaintiffs submit the certification of [...], dated June 15, 2021, [Da14-19], to which plaintiffs’ Global Statement of Material Facts was appended, and which certification and Global Statement of Material Facts, with exhibits annexed, were offered in opposition to [...]’s motion for summary judgment.  It is respectfully submitted therefore that this Court should reject Plaintiffs’ Responses to [...]’s Statement of Material Facts, which [...] submitted in support of its motion for summary judgment and reject plaintiffs’ Global Statement of Material Facts, with exhibits annexed, which were offered in opposition to [...]’s motion for summary judgment.
[brief] 115a.  It addressed how the Borough would utilize [...]’s development to satisfy the Borough’s affordable housing requirements.  4.03 Affordable Housing Requirement.  The Parties recognize and acknowledge that the Project will generate a fair share housing requirement for Redeveloper pursuant to the Affordable Housing Requirements established by the State of New Jersey and the Council on Affordable Housing.  . .  The presumptive percentage of set aside units to be built shall be twenty percent (20%).  . .  Alternative COAH Location.  The Redeveloper and the Borough shall explore alternative sites to accommodate all of the Low and Moderate Housing obligations associated with his Project at another location in the Borough, subject to any necessary court approval and such court approval to be funded by Redeveloper as set forth in Section 4.03 hereinabove.  131a.
[directive] Offenses Committed in or Around Correctional or Treatment Facilities (Special Application and Enhancement Feature I)  If the offense occurred in or involved the introduction or attempted introduction of a controlled substance into a prison, jail, halfway house, juvenile detention facility, or residential or outpatient drug treatment facility, or involved the distribution or attempted distribution of a controlled substance to a person entering or leaving the premises of a residential or outpatient drug treatment facility, then the authorized plea offer shall be six (6) months greater than that otherwise provided in the applicable Table of Authorized Plea Offers.  This Special Application and Enhancement Feature addresses the special dangers inherent in the introduction of illicit drugs into correctional and drug treatment facilities.  While detoxification is only the first step in treatment, it is absolutely essential that correctional and drug treatment facilities be kept drug- free if the criminal and juvenile justice systems can have any chance to break the cycle of addiction and crime.  This feature also addresses the dangers posed by drug distributors who congregate around treatment facilities in order to prey upon drug rehabilitation patients.  Note that this Feature applies to privately-run drug treatment facilities and not just to facilities that are operated by a governmental agency.  Nothing in this Section shall preclude the imposition of an additional enhancement pursuant to Special Application and Enhancement Feature H (Distribution to a Juvenile or Pregnant Female).  See footnote 10, supra.  When the defendant is alleged to be an accomplice, this Special Application and Enhancement Feature shall not apply unless the prosecutor has a reasonable basis to believe that the defendant knew or had reason to know that his or her partner would introduce or attempt to introduce a controlled substance into a correctional or drug treatment facility or would distribute or attempt to distribute a controlled substance to a person entering or leaving a drug treatment facility, or that the defendant had the purpose to promote or facilitate such introduction or attempted introduction or distribution or attempted distribution.  Nothing in this Section shall preclude a Downward Departure for Trial Proof Issues in accordance with Section 12 or a Downward Departure for Substantial Cooperation in accordance with Section 13.  Page 96
[brief] He proceeded to tell her that her car smelled like marijuana.  He then asked where inside the vehicle the marijuana was hidden, and [...] admitted that there was marijuana in the center console.  (1T 27-13 to 19)  At this point, [...] walked up to the passenger side of the sedan and ordered [...] to exit.  (1T 28-23 to 29-3)  [...] then searched [...]’s person and recovered an object that appeared to be narcotics, and which was later determined to be fentanyl.  (1T 28-23 to 29-14, 29-21 to 23)  [...] was handcuffed at the scene and later indicted on a charge of third-degree possession with intent to distribute a controlled dangerous substance.
[brief] (5T77-4 to 6; 73-2 to 4; 82-4 to 5; 89-1 to 5)  The brutal nature of the incident was not a relevant consideration for any of those factors, let alone an almost dispositive factor, as the court seemingly treated it.  \(^4\)  The judge also appeared to rely on [...]’s prior collateral appeals to characterize his rehabilitative efforts as insincere.  (5T75-15 to 24; 5T85-23 to 86-4)  The judge concluded by holding, in no uncertain terms, that “[y]ou cannot commit an act like this and not go under a life sentence…the youthfulness doesn’t rise to a level that would not make this an offense punishable by life.  It just doesn’t. ”  (5T92-4 to 10)  From [...]’s perspective, then, [...]’s recurring focus on the nature of the incident makes it “difficult to comprehend how the same judge who has twice sentenced him could arrive at a different determination at a third sentencing.
[directive] 5-14.  a.  Each local unit shall adopt a cash management plan and shall deposit, or invest, or 40X both deposit and invest, its funds pursuant to that plan.  The cash management plan shall include : of (1) the designation of a public depository or depositories as defined section P.L.1970, c.236 in 1 (C.17:9-41) and may permit deposits in such public depository or depositories as permitted in section 4 of P.L. 1970, c.236 (C. 1719-44); (2) 8 the designation of any fund that meets the requirements established pursuant to section of P.L.1977, c.396 (C.40Az5-15.1); as (3) the authorization for investments permitted pursuant to section of P.L.1977, c.396 8 (C.40A:5-15.1) or ; or (4) any combination of the designations authorizations permitted pursuant to this subsection a.  The cash management plan shall be approved annually by majority vote of the governing body b. of the local unit and may be modified from time to time in order to reflect changes in federal or State , law or regulations, or in the designations of depositories funds or investment instruments or the authorization for investments.  The chief financial officer of the local unit shall be charged with administering the plan.  -- - c.  The cash mmagement plan shall be designed to assure to the extent practicable the investment of local funds in interest bearing accounts and other pzmitted investments.  The cash management plan shall be subject to the annual audit conducted pursuant to N.J.S.40A:5-4.
[brief] [...] also contends that [...]’s capital improvements to the Unit were improperly included in the calculation of [...]’s equity in the Unit.  Based upon the Certification of [...] ([...]’s owner, now deceased) submitted with [...]’s application to the Board for a hardship rent increase, as well as [...]’s testimony before the Board, it is uncontroverted that [...] expended $76,900 in capital improvements to the Unit. \(^1\) Pa 48; 1T:6:14-16, 44:10-16, 5T:74:12-25 ([...] testifying regarding new walk-in closets, carpeting, bathroom, plumbing and electric lines).  Further, [...]’s Certification (Pa 48) described the multiple improvements made to the Unit’s kitchen, bathroom, living room and two bedrooms as well as electric/plumbing improvements and the installation of central air conditioning. \(^2\)  [...] does not, nor can he, dispute the amounts totaling $76,900 expended by [...] for the improvements to the Unit.
[brief] PROCEDURAL HISTORY  This action arises out of a worksite fatality.  Plaintiff filed the Complaint in this action on September 25, 2019, against, [...] and [...]R2 seeking damages for wrongful death and survivorship as to both defendants and intentional harms as to [...].  (Pa0044)  [...] filed its Answer and Affirmative Defenses on November 20, 2019.  (Pa0677-0689).  [...]R2 filed its answer on November 26, 2020.  (Pa0690-0701.)  [...]R2 filed a motion for summary judgment seeking dismissal of Plaintiff’s Complaint on January 7, 2022.  (Pa0295-0419).  Plaintiff filed an Opposition to this motion on January 25, 2022.  (Pa0420-0439).  [...]R2 filed a Reply Brief on January 31, 2022.  (Pa0650-0689).  On December 1, 2022, the Court heard oral arguments for [...]R2’s motion for summary judgment.  After hearing arguments on December 1, 2022, the Court issued its Order (Pa0293) and read its statement of reasons onto the record.  (Pa0289-0365.)  In the Order, the Court granted Summary Judgment for [...]R2 and dismissed Plaintiff’s claims with prejudice.  (Pa0371).  This appeal followed.
[brief] The District also maintained a “healthy workplace environment” policy, which provides in relevant part: “Employees who believe the conduct prohibited by this policy has been directed toward them or to another employee of the school district shall submit a written report to the Superintendent of Schools. ” (Da132).  Plaintiff never availed herself any of the district policies and never reported any perceived discrimination or retaliation during her employment or before the Board when she sought to appeal her non-renewal.  (Pl. Tr. 217:2-6; 289:10-23; 300:24 to 301:9; 303:2-14).  Nor did Plaintiff ever file a grievance with her union at any time (Pl. Tr. 217:2-6), even though a grievance procedure was available to her and detailed in Article III of the union’s contract with the [...] (Da106-110).  Plaintiff conceded at her deposition that she did not speak to anyone in administration, including [...], about any perceived discrimination or retaliation, nor did she make a complaint about [...] during her employment.  (Pl. Tr. 213:1-9; 227:3-9, 281:23 to 282:14).  She also denied ever complaining to anyone that [...] subjected her to derogatory remarks, insults or any verbal abuse.  (Pl. Tr. 303:2-11).  Thus, the record plainly shows Plaintiff never engaged in any protected activity.
[brief] The Board is cognizant that a "reasonable" accommodation should be made to the Applicant as they are providing affordable housing; however the Board finds that the number, type, character and extent of the variances requested are excessive, overly intense and would not be a "reasonable" accommodation.  Further, the number, type, character and extent of the variances requested serve only to advance the Applicant's economic interest which has been specifically rejected by the Courts as a basis to justify the granting of variances.  2.
[brief] SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY  APPELLATE  DIVISION  DOCKET NO. [...]  Civil Action  On appeal from the Law Division of Superior Court, Middlesex County  DOCKET NO. [...]  Sat below: Hon. [...], J.S.C.  BRIEF OF PLAINTIFFS-RESPONDENTS/CROSS-APPELLANTS, [...], AND [...], IN OPPOSITION TO APPEAL OF DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS, THE [...], MAYOR [...], AND ZONING BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT OF THE [...], AND IN SUPPORT OF CROSS-APPEAL OF PLAINTIFFS-RESPONDENTS/CROSS-APPELLANTS
[directive] The difficulty in conducting officer interviews, particularly subject officer interviews, is the differing legal principles that apply depending on the nature of the interview and the type of investigation being conducted.  For example, a subject officer suspected of criminal conduct will be interviewed in a manner far different than an officer suspected of committing just a disciplinary infraction.  A further distinction may be made when the officer to be interviewed is believed to be a witness to either criminal conduct or an administrative infraction.  8.0.3
[brief] (3T70-74)  As to the Fence Violation, the Trial Court entered an Order to Show Cause with Restraints on October 19, 2018 (Da643)(2T) finding that a fence installed by Defendant interfered with the Plaintiff's access to Sixth Street, even though it was authorized by the Township with a permit issued to the School after the Zoning Board determined that the parking was not an authorized use and the Township issued a Notice of Violation to the [...] on October 25, 2018 for parking on Defendant's property without a site plan.
[brief] Decision and Order of the Honorable [...], denying Plaintiff’s Cross-Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings on Count III of the Complaint, dated May 30, 2024 ..............................................Pa15  ### TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | Cases | Page(s) | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|---------| | **Adler v. Fred Lind Manor,** | 18 | | 153 Wash.2d 331, 103 P.3d 773 (2004) | | | **Alltel Corp. v. Rosenow,** | 25 | | 2014 Ark. 375 (2014) | | | **Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Services., Inc.,** | 23 | | 24 Cal. 4th 83, 6 P.3d 669, 99 Cal. Rptr. 2d 745 (2000) | | | **Arnold v. United Cos. Lending Corp.,** | 11, 12, 24 | | 511 S.E.2d 854 (W. Va. 1998) | | | **Barker v. Golf U.S.A., Inc.,** | 15 | | 154 F.3d 788 (8th Cir.1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1068, | | | 119 S.Ct. 796, 142 L.Ed.2d 659 (1999) | | | **Berkeley Cty. Sch. Dist. v. Hub Int’l Ltd.,** | 15 | | 944 F.
[brief] Apparently, the Court below agreed with this assessment and offered an opinion on two (2) occasions during the course of the motion hearing that I should sue my lawyer.  The fact is that I didn’t have a lawyer and my primary concern in entering into the Agreement was not my protection, but to make certain that Plaintiff was comfortably provided for during her lifetime.  One provision in the Agreement became extremely problematic and is the reason that we are in this Court today.
[brief] DEFENDANT FAILED TO IDENTIFY ANY MERITORIOUS DEFENSE SUFFICIENT TO VACATE DEFAULT JUDGMENT.  Defendant must also prove that the lower court abused its discretion when it found that he failed to identify any meritorious defense sufficient to vacate the default judgment.  See Triffin, 436 N.J. Super. at 629 (citing Mancini, 132 N.J. at 334) (“[a] default judgment will not be disturbed unless . . . the defendant has a meritorious defense, either to the cause of action itself or, if liability is not disputed, to the quantum of damages assessed. ”).  Defendant failed to prove such abuse of discretion with regard to his alleged meritorious defenses as well.  Therefore, for this additional reason, the appeal should be denied.  In this regard, Defendant does not dispute liability.
[brief] The Agreed-Upon and Memorialized Settlement is Valid and Binding on the Parties.  As an initial matter, Plaintiff argues that the settlement, agreed upon and memorialized on the record at the December 20, 2022 hearing, is valid and binding on the parties based on traditional contract principles and this State’s public policy favoring the entry and subsequent enforcement of settlements.  Thus, Plaintiff contends that the trial court erred in denying its OTSC and declining to enforce the settlement.  “[T]he standard for vacating a settlement is not easily met. ”  *Kaur*, 405 N.J. Super. at 474.  Indeed, it is well-settled that “[a]n agreement to settle a lawsuit is a contract which, like all contracts, may be freely entered into and which a [c]ourt, absent a demonstration of 'fraud or other compelling circumstances,' should honor and enforce as it does other contracts."  *Pascarella v. Bruck*, 190 N.J. Super. 118, 124-25 (App. Div.) (emphasis added), *certif. denied*, 94 N.J. 600 (1983) (quoting *Honeywell v. Bubb*, 130 N.J. Super. 130, 136 (App. Div. 1974)); see also *Nolan v. Lee Ho*, 120 N.J. 465, 472 (1990) (noting that "[s]ettlement of litigation ranks high in our public policy"); *Brundage v. Estate of Carambio*, 195 N.J. 575, 601 (2008) (stating that “[f]undamental to our jurisprudence relating to settlements is the principle that ‘[t]he settlement of litigation ranks high in our public policy’”).  To this end, the New Jersey Supreme Court has recognized that:  Public policy favors the settlement of disputes.  Settlement spares the parties the risk of an adverse outcome and the time and expense – both monetary and emotional – of protracted litigation.  Settlement also preserves precious and overstretched judicial resources.  *[Willingboro*, 215 N.J. at 253-54 (citations omitted). ]
[brief] [...]  A Pennsylvania Limited Liability Partnership  [...], Esquire (#022932010)  [...]  [...]  Telephone: [...]  Facsimile: [...]  Email: [...]  Counsel for Defendant/Appellee, [...]  On the Brief: Submitted: October 23, 2024  [...], Esq.  # TABLE OF CONTENTS | Section | Page | |------------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | TABLE OF CONTENTS | i | | TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | ii | | SUPPLEMENTAL APPENDIX  TABLE OF CONTENTS (VOL. 1) | vi | | SUPPLEMENTAL APPENDIX TABLE OF CONTENTS (VOL. 2) | vi | | I.
[brief] (2T36-10 to 17; emphasis added).  * * * * * ...  Both of her feet flew out from under her.  Listen to the expert.  It’s science, it’s not possible.  You can’t slip.  You can’t fall.  You can fall, mind you.  Let me take that back.  Anyone can fall, but you can’t slip on that floor.  (2T37-2 to 6; emphasis added).  * * * * * ...  Did she fall?  I don’t know whether she fell on July 4th, 2018.  But the evidence will certainly show she did not fall and slip.  That’s just not possible, ladies and gentlemen.  That’s what the evidence will show and that is why the big, bad [...] is here today trying this case.