ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] (Pa231 at ¶4).  Pursuant to Plaintiff’s subpoena upon [...], Plaintiff was provided with the Security Log, Performance Log and Event Log from the [...] for auditorium 5 on August 13, 2016, which were archived by [...].  (Pa231 at ¶4).  As [...] explained, these are raw log files which showed the content playback start and end and the use of decryption keys to unlock secure content for the date of the movie at issue.  (Pa231 at ¶4).  Plaintiff ignores the fact that the Security Log, Performance Log and Event Log which were produced to Plaintiff are the functional equivalent of the TMS log which is the subject of this appeal. (Pa231 at ¶5).
[brief] I/M/O [...], Commission Docket Nos. [...] and [...] (2021) (Ca255), reaffirmed, e.g., by I/M/O [...], Commission Docket No. [...] (2021) (236) and Commission’s Advisory Opinion A02-22 (February 25, 2022) (Ca233).  Although Respondent argues that the statements attributed to her by Complainant were not made in her capacity as a Board member, and do not relate to her Board membership or to Board actions, the Commission finds that the statements on her Facebook page are clearly linked to her Board membership (and candidacy).  Respondent’s Facebook page is clearly marked with the banner, ‘Re-Elect [...] to the [...],’ but does not appear to have a disclaimer noting that the statements are her own and unrelated to the Board.  Melnyk v. Fiel, Commission Docket No. [...] (2019) (Ca269)), reaffirmed, e.g., Commission’s Advisory Opinion A02-22 (February 25, 2022) (Ca233); I/M/O [...], Commission Docket No. [...], at pp. 7-8 (2021) (Ca242-243).  There is a robust body of decisions and advisory opinions which school officials can utilize to determine when, and how, a disclaimer must be used on social media when speaking in their personal/private capacity in order to avoid running afoul of the Act.  For example, in Melnyk v. Fiel… the Commission discussed how failure to include a disclaimer can lead to the belief that the statements made by a school official, even in attempted to be made in their personal/private capacity, can be viewed as those of the Board.
[brief] See, e.g., Comer, 249 N.J. at 404 (“We ask trial courts to explain and make a thorough record of their findings to ensure fairness and facilitate review. ”); State v. Torres, 246 N.J. 246, 272 (2021) (requiring an “explanation for the overall fairness of a sentence”); State v. Cuff, 239 N.J.  321, 347-52 (2019) (same); State v. Fuentes, 217 N.J. 57, 70-74 (2014) (calling for “a qualitative analysis of the relevant sentencing factors on the record”); N.J.S.A. 2C:43-2e (requiring a statement of reasons on the record); R. 3:21-4(h) (same).  Finally, in 2022, our Supreme Court held in Comer that a 30-year period of parole ineligibility for a murder sentence imposed on a juvenile offender is not an unconstitutional sentence so long as, after the offender has served 20 years, he or she is permitted to petition the court for a review of the sentence.
[brief] (Aa45).  Even though the [...] (properly) did not rely upon [...]’s false allegations, that [...] would continue to assert to this court that its “summary” of “[...]’s prior disciplinary history displayed a pattern of inappropriate behavior” is shocking and further demonstrates that [...] was not acting as an independent investigator whose credibility determinations deserved the degree of deference the [...] afforded it.  (Rb10 n.4).  This is important because this matter arises from a department’s investigation of an incident under the State Policy.
[brief] B. Cross-Appeal Reply  Legal Argument .............................................................................  1  Issue I: Defendant Did Not Need To Address The Trial Judge’s Equitable Determinations As The Statute Of Limitations  Bar Is Present Regardless Of The Equities..................................................................................................................  1  Issue II: Whether [...] Properly Exercised His Discretion Is Irrelevant, Because He Erred By Not Applying The Statute Of Limitations......2  Issue III: The Fictitious Pleading Rule Does Not Apply Here At All, Because At Every Moment Relevant To This Case Plaintiff Was Aware, And Admits He Was Aware, Of [...]’s Identity............................................................................3  Issue IV: Because The Fictitious Party Rule Does Not Apply, The Relation Back Doctrine Does Not Apply Either..........................................................................5  Issue V: Plaintiff’s Attempt To Argue That He Did Not Violate The Statute Of Limitations Even Though He Knew [...]’s Identity Must Fail.........................6  C.  Conclusion....................................................................................................................9  ## Table of Authorities ### Cases - **Caravaggio v. D’Agostini**, 166 N.J. 237 (2001) .........................................................4 - **Escoett v. Aldecress Country Club**, 16 N.J. 438 (1954) ..................................................8 - **Henry v. New Jersey Dep't of Human Servs.
[brief] **Respondents’ Proposed Standard of Review Duplicates the Same Error the Trial Court Made in Denying Admission of the Evidence that Is the Subject of this Appeal**  Respondents continue what might be called “Operation Oz” in specifying a standard of review that has nothing to do the basis for this appeal:  In this case, the Trial Court addressed the Appellant’s claims and found that the Board did not consider the Sketch and therefore was not relevant to the Board’s approval including the height to which [...] was to construct its building.  Therefore, the Sketch did not support the Appellant’s claim that the Approved Building was not constructed in accordance with the Board’s approval ([...] 12-13).  Note: Appellant assumes “the Sketch” is the Diagrammatic Elevation rendering referred to in the Amended Resolution as a component of the architectural plans filed by [...] as part of its zoning application (4a).  Perhaps calling the rendering a “sketch” is merely another “Ozian” tactic.  In making their assertion, Respondents echo the same error that the Trial Court made, which is that Appellant’s complaint had something to do with the manner in which the [...] reached its decision to grant variance relief to [...].
[directive] Can the single POC who receives the list of names and addresses of persons who have tested positive for COVID-19 share that list with anyone else?  No, the single POC cannot share the list of COVID-19 positive persons with anyone else.  The single POC can only use the list for the purpose of entering a confidential flag in the CAD system.  The single POC is responsible to ensure the security and confidentiality of the list.  Q:
[brief] (Pa10).  The webpage included information for active members, retirees, and employers about qualifying dates, locations, health conditions and impairments, the Eligibility Registration Form, the Request for Amended Benefits Form, a sample postcard to be mailed to retirees, and materials for employers about dissemination of information to employees.  (Pa10-11).  On August 8, 2019, the Division sent a letter to the Certifying Officers of the [...], the [...], and the [...].  (Pa11).  The subject of the letter was “New Legislation Notice – P.L. 2019, c. 157” and it served to notify active employees of the newly enacted law.  (Pa11).  All Certifying Officers were advised of their responsibilities to distribute the information and to certify that they had done so.  (Pa11).  The Division hired [...] to mail postcards to all 200,647 [...] retirees at their home addresses on file with the Division.  (Pa66-67).  These postcards included notice of the enactment of L. 2019, c. 157, how to file for Accidental Disability Retirement Benefits under the new law, the deadline for filing for such benefits, and the ramifications for missing the deadline.  (Pa68).  A postcard with this information was sent to --- 4  Also available at: https://www.nj.gov/treasury/pensions/ricci-ch157.shtml.  (Pa10).  [...]’s home address on August 9, 2019.  (Pa14; Pa68).  On June 10, 2021, the Division posted a news item on its website advising members that the statutory eligibility period to register under the Ricci Act was expiring soon and that members must submit the Eligibility Registration Form by July 8, 2021.
[brief] That is precisely what the City did in this case.  As [...] testified, the Manual does not require the City to place a sign on the overpass.  (5T117:5-15).  Indeed, the overpass on Avenue P is not owned by the City, and the City exercised its discretion, in accordance with the Manual, to place the sign in advance of the overpass at a location within the City’s right-of-way.  (5T117:2-21).  There is no documentary evidence or testimony in the record rebutting [...]’s testimony, or otherwise demonstrating the City’s exercise of discretion in the placement of the sign was palpably unreasonable.
[brief] (Pa1-Pa37).  [...] holds himself out as a financial consultant with twenty years of experience in finance matters, including consulting, banking, financial analysis, financial planning, tax preparation, and loan modifications.  (Pa5-Pa6).  2  Copies of the cited unreported trial court orders are annexed to Plaintiff-Appellants’ Appendix in Volume XIII in accordance with Rule 1:36-3.  [...] is a limited liability company incorporated by [...] in Hawaii in 2006, which has been registered as a New Jersey foreign limited liability company since 2007.  (Pa6).  [...] describes itself as a “full-service business development group, general management and financial consulting firm,” that also offers “tax and accounting services. ” (Pa155-Pa156).  [...] has served as [...]’s managing member and Chief Executive Officer since its incorporation.  (Pa6).  [...] is purportedly a New Jersey non-profit corporation focused on sending medical supplies and equipment to health care providers in Ghana.  (Pa301).  [...] has served as the Chairman of the Board and as the Chief Executive Officer of [...] since its inception.  (Pa6).  The Bureau charged [...] and [...] with employing a device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, in violation of N.J.S.A. 49:3-52(a) (count one); [...] and [...] with making untrue statements of a material fact or omitting a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which they are made, not misleading, in violation of N.J.S.A. 49:3-52(b) (count two); [...] and [...] with engaging in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in violation of N.J.S.A. 49:3-52(c) (count three); [...] and [...] with selling unregistered securities in violation of N.J.S.A. 49:3-60 (count four); [...] with acting as an agent in this State without registration, in violation of N.J.S.A. 49:3-56(a) (count five); [...] with employing an unregistered agent, in violation of N.J.S.A. 49:3-56(h) (count six); and [...] and [...] with unjust enrichment (count seven).
[brief] Relator Is Not an Original Source of the VRDO Transactional Data.  (4T)  Because its claims are based on publicly disclosed information, Relator can avoid summary judgment only if it can meet its burden to demonstrate that it is an “original source. ”  To be an “original source,” Relator must show three things: (1) its “knowledge of the information on which the allegations are based” is “direct”; (2) its knowledge of this information is also “independent” of public disclosures; and (3) it “voluntarily provided the information to the State before filing an action under [the NJFCA].”  N.J.S.A. § 2A:32C-9(c) (2023).  Relator cannot satisfy any of these requirements, much less all of them.  And under well-settled federal FCA precedent, a relator’s “extensive efforts and financial --- 21  An original source’s “knowledge must be both direct and independent” of public information.
[brief] 37  A. Unclean Hands (Da66) .....................................................................................  37  B.  Plaintiff’s Quiet Title Claim is Not Barred by the Statute of Limitations (Da8-72).  .........................................................................................................................  43  C.  Other Affirmative Defenses (Da64-72).  ..........................................................  57  II.  RESPONDENT/CROSS-APPELLANT’S APPEAL ................................................ 59
[brief] . . .”  See R. 1:13-1.  Here, the trial court corrected the record regarding its factual findings during the July 8 Oral Argument at the end of the argument when it determined it lacked jurisdiction over the action, (see 3T43:6–8), and again during the hearing on [...]’s Motion to Reinstate its Complaint by stating, “I don’t care what my findings of fact were.  I specifically said that I wanted to wait to make a decision based on the Appellate Division ruling.  That’s why I dismissed it without prejudice” and “[d]espite whatever I may have said on the record on this case, I was waiting for [the Appellate Division] to decide those issues. ”  (4T16:8–14, 18:2–4.)  Once the Appellate Division rendered a decision, the trial court properly denied [...]’s Motion to Reinstate and dismissed the Complaint with prejudice due to the entire controversy doctrine.
[brief] Additionally, it is undisputed that the hearing officer, [...], confirmed Defendant’s understanding of the settlement, that she was not under the influence of any drugs, narcotics, or medication to impair her judgment or thinking, and that she came to the settlement voluntarily.  (Pa34).  Defendant also admitted that the settlement was “fully explained” to her, and the matter consequently concluded.  (Ibid.).  Moreover, her own counsel confirmed her understanding and agreement to the settlement on the record.  (Ibid.).  Thereafter, it is also undisputed that County Counsel sent the Agreement to defense counsel on December 21, 2022, consistent with the terms of the December 20th memorialized settlement.  (Pa40-Pa44).  Subsequently, there were multiple communications between County Counsel and defense counsel regarding the Agreement, wherein defense counsel never suggested that a settlement had not been reached.  (Pa46-Pa59).  In fact, defense counsel repeatedly promised to redline the Agreement and discussed Defendant’s PTO bank and other information necessary to finalize the settlement.  (See ibid.).  However, no such redlined Agreement was ever provided to County Counsel.
[brief] Is that okay with you?  A. · · ·That's fine.·  I'll do the best I can because there is a lot of stuff that happened here.·  She sustained to her arm -- we can focus just on her left elbow.·  She sustained a fracture of a forearm with a subluxation which is a dislocation, a joint coming out of place of her left elbow that required surgical treatment.  So that was the upper extremities and then in regard to lower extremities on her right side she broke her thigh bone, her kneecap and her leg bone and those were very complex injuries in that her right femur bone or thigh bone was an open fracture where the skin tears and therefore, the bone and the fracture exposed to the environment.  The kneecap fracture which was broken up into a lot of pieces on the right side was also an open fracture again with the outside communicating with the fracture.  The leg bone, the fracture of the tibia bone was broken up in to a lot of pieces and associated with a significant soft tissue injury so that again, the skin was open, the bone exposed.  And that injury ultimately ended up requiring multiple surgeries, not just to fix the bone but to release tension in the leg which is called a fasciotomy.  And then undergo multiple procedures trying to get the wound to heal which took many months to finally heal.  On her left side, her left leg she sustained a very complex, comminuted, broken up in to a lot of pieces fracture of her thigh bone extending in to the knee joint basically separating the upper portion of the knee part -- knee joint in to two pieces.  Also having a smaller fracture of her kneecap and tearing her quadriceps tendon basically where the bone went through the quadriceps tendon.  The tendon of the thigh muscle and ripped it.  And that was treated with first stabilization and multiple surgeries and as a sequela of all these injuries she also had an injury to her ankle where she's developed basically inflammation, tendinitis and some chronic contracture and pain due to the alteration of her right leg function above her ankle.  [3T200; 4T203-204.]
[brief] \(^1\)  The court in DepoLink reasoned that “defendant[/counterclaimant] has not cited any regulations under the CFA \(^1\)  “Violations of the CFA can arise under three different categories: (1) ‘[a]n affirmative misrepresentation, even if unaccompanied by knowledge of its falsity or an intention to deceive’; (2) ‘[a]n omission or failure to disclose a material fact, if accompanied by knowledge and intent’; and (3) ‘violations of specific regulations promulgated under the [CFA],’ which are reviewed under strict liability.
[brief] In fact, the trial court’s determination is supported by the majority of appellate courts in other jurisdictions, which have upheld similar recovery provisions to be valid and enforceable—and not penalties.  As those courts reasoned, these types of provisions are agreed-upon incentives to ensure prompt payment of rent and are not designed to exact a penalty.  To find otherwise would reward tenants for breaching the terms of their respective leases and place them in a better position than what they had initially agreed to.  This is precisely what Tenant attempts to do here and should be rejected for the same reasons.  The undisputed facts are that Appellants availed themselves of the rent incentive, wherein they received four months of rent and parking at no cost, and agreed in a clearly-worded and conspicuous agreement to repay that benefit in the event of default.  That is the entire basis of Appellants’ fraud claim.  They do not allege to have been lied to or deceived, but merely claim a CFA violation based on the inclusion of an entirely reasonable and customary lease provision.  As explained below, Appellants failed to state a viable claim under the CFA.  Accordingly, this Court should affirm the November 8, 2023 Order dismissing the Counterclaim with prejudice.
[brief] On Friday, November 29, 2018, [...] called [...] and requested he come into IA.  (T5 37:23-38:7; Pa34).  [...] explained to [...] that he was driving and on his way to Florida to attend his stepfather’s funeral.  (T5 38:1-7).  [...] responded that [...] should come in on Monday.  (T5 38:8-21).  Wanting to be fully cooperative with the investigation, [...] turned his car around and came home.  (T5 38:12-21).  [...] called [...] the next morning advising he was home and could report to IA.  (T5 38:22-39:9).  [...] told him to come in on Monday.  (T5 38:22-39:9).  There is no evidence that [...] was being untruthful in explaining that he was on his way to Florida when contacted by [...] on November 29, 2018, and that he turned around to avoid further issue.
[directive] 3.  Èske w konprann sa akizasyon yo vle di?  [Wi/Yes]  [Non/No]  Do you understand what the charges mean?  4.  Èske w konprann ke di fèt ke ou deklare w koupab wap renonse a sèten dwa?  Pami dwa sa yo, ou gen:  Do you understand that by pleading guilty you are giving up certain rights?  Among them are:  a.  Dwa pou prezante nan pwosè devan jiri epi se Leta ki pou pwouve w koupab depase tout [Wi/Yes]  [Non/No] dout rezonab?  The right to a jury trial in which the State must prove you guilty beyond a reasonable doubt?  b.  Dwa pou fè silans?  [Wi/Yes]  [Non/No]  The right to remain silent?  * Biwo Frè Konpasasyon pou Viktim Zak /Victims of Crime Compensation Office Assessment  Inisyal Akize a / Defendant’s Initials  Fòm Prensipal Deklarasyon Koupab/Fòm Revize Kreye pa Direktif #01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 10079-Haitian Creole paj 1 nan 7
[brief] The Court charged the jury on N.J.S.A. 45:15-16.80(c), including adding a “knowing” element from N.J.S.A. 45:15-16.80(a).  (Da1180-81).  The jury questionnaire listed each “anti-waiver” clause separately and asked the jury to determine which of the nine possible clauses violated N.J.S.A. 45:15-16.80(c).  The jury voted unanimously that all nine clauses violated the statute.  (Da1222-24).  Even if this were a question for the Court, the clauses clearly violate N.J.S.A. 45:15-16.80(c) as a matter of law, and were meant to operate precisely how [...] intended them – to defeat claims of misrepresentation in violation of RETA and keep consumers with valid claims out of court.  (12T262:12-25).  If a party fails to request an instruction, the decision is reviewed under the plain error standard—was it “clearly capable of producing an unjust result” per R. 2:10-2.
[brief] Da446.  Interlocutory review at this juncture is thus unwarranted.  Moreover, [...]’s sworn statements supporting his guilty plea were made in open court and all parties have the transcript thereof.  This case does not involve the risk of irreversibly revealing allegedly privileged information.  In contrast, as [...] observed, everyone already knows what [...] said at the time of his guilty plea.  See 1T13:18-24.  Allowing [...] to be cross-examined regarding the inconsistencies between his on-the-record guilty plea colloquy and the contradictory version he testified to at his civil deposition will not reveal any privileged information or cause the type of undue harm that warrants interlocutory review.  Accordingly, this Court should deny [...]’s motion for leave to appeal the trial court’s legally correct discovery ruling.
[brief] In an attempt to circumvent this settled law that obesity in and of itself is not a disability, Appellant alleged that she suffered from high blood pressure and now upon appeal attempts to throw every possible condition she can think of at the wall to see if anything will stick.  However, during her deposition she could not recall her blood pressure, did not remember any treatment for high blood pressure, and testified that she has never taken medication for high blood pressure.  Similar to her allegations regarding obesity, she has not produced any medical documentation that she suffers from high blood pressure or other conditions, even though directed to do so.  As referenced supra, Appellant even certified to an insurance carrier that she did not have high blood pressure.  The only reference to high blood pressure, or any other condition, is in Appellant’s self-serving and unsubstantiated statement made years after the fact.
[brief] The trial court granted summary judgment to Relator because the State opposed dismissal on public disclosure grounds.  In the alternative, the court below denied the cross-motions on the bar’s substantive elements.  Defendants appeal both aspects of the trial court’s order.  First, they appeal the decision to apply a procedural amendment passed while this case was pending that gives the State, the intended beneficiary of the public disclosure bar, the authority to veto dismissal of a case on that ground, forgoing a defense it does not need or want.