ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Defendants' breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, violation of NJ Consumer Fraud Act, and fraudulent concealment are substantiated.  In the original complaint filed on May 28, 2021 (Pa3 – Pa6), and its amendment filed on August 16, 2021 (Pa35 – Pa43), the plaintiff alleged causes of action including breach of contract (N.J.S.A. 2A:14-1), breach of fiduciary duty (Balliet v. Fennell, 368 N.J. Super. 15, 845 A.2d 168 (App. Div. 2004)), and violation of consumer protection statutes under New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act (N.J.S.A. 56:8-1).  Defendants are confirmed to have committed the alleged actions.  Defendant [...] has persisted in concealing original documents and making contradictory statements.  Consequently, the plaintiff remains uninformed of the facts and unable to effectively pursue legal remedies against the defendants.  Their fraudulent concealment is also evident.  The plaintiff and the surviving family have endured the wrongful death of the decedent and seek the truth.  The court should compel the defendants to produce the original, unaltered records of the service and hold them accountable.
[brief] EMail from [...], sent to [...]……………………………………………………………Dta2812 Exhibit 48 - August 10, 2015  EMail from [...] to [...]……………………………………………………………Dta2815  Exhibit 49 - August 10, 2015  EMail from [...] of [...] sent to the [...]……………Dta2820  Exhibit 50 - [...]’s response (with an internal [...] tracking number for a cancellation endorsement) regarding the August 10, 2015 E-Mail from [...] of [...] sent to the [...]………………………………………Dta2822  Exhibit 51 - Transcript from the deposition of [...] in the DJ Action……………………………………………………………………Dta2824
[brief] Date of Submission: 1/25/24  TABLE OF CONTENTS  Reply Brief  PROCEDURAL HISTORY  1  STATEMENT OF FACTS  1  LEGAL ARGUMENT  1 POINT I - Plaintiff’s Reply to Defendants’ Brief  1  POINT II - Plaintiff’s Appeal Should be Granted Because of the Numerous Errors Below 3  CONCLUSION  4  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS & RULINGS
[brief] Watson, 254 N.J. at 601-02.  Relevant considerations include whether the content of the video is “chaotic or confusing” and whether the video is lengthy or unclear.  Ibid.  “Rule 701’s helpfulness prong can be satisfied when an investigator draws attention to key details that might be missed, or helps jurors follow potentially confusing, complex, or unclear videos that may otherwise be difficult to grasp. ”  Id. at 602.  Narration testimony should avoid being a “running commentary” prompted by “introductory question[s]” like “[w]hat do you see?”  Watson, 254 N.J. at 603.
[brief] [Da1, 9 at ¶ 47].  Instead, as the Complaint asserted [...] a required a conditional-use variance, which falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of [...] because the Property is less than 600 feet from two schools and in violation of a condition of the Ordinance.  [Da9 at ¶ 46-47; Da10 at ¶52-54].  Prior to the January 3, 2023 pretrial conference [Pa46], [...] failed to submit a statement of factual and legal contentions that R. 4:69-4 required it to submit.
[brief] Again, assuming [...] is not a stupid or irresponsible company, its “senior engineers” have obviously concluded that this is a perfectly safe and reliable means of monitoring and avoiding serious has many underground vaults comparable to the one in which the temporary regulator is installed; the company has never notified Township or other local officials, or pipeline safety officials (including the [...]), or even [...]'s own risk management offices, of these supposed lurking disasters; the current regulator has had just two icing incidents including up to the present day;\(^3\) that needed attention, and which were promptly repaired without any real risk of loss of service (and again, no local or other safety officials were ever notified of these incidents).  Hb24-27.  [...]'s lawyers' overblown claims are firmly rebutted by their witnesses' answers on cross-examination.  The choice for the ALJ and for the Board was this.  They could credit [...]'s carefully curated, written direct testimony, and this is the choice they made.  Or they could credit the testimony of the very same witnesses on cross-examination, which our jurisprudence says is the true test of credibility.
[brief] C.  The trial judge, who found that the police had violated [...]’s Miranda rights at the time of his arrest, erred in failing to consider and apply the “fruit of the poisonous doctrine” in her denial of [...]’s Motion for Reconsideration by failing to suppress all evidence derived from the evidential taint of that violation.  This unbroken pattern of disregard for constitutional requirements revealed itself with the arrest of [...] in the parking lot of his apartment on March 1, 2017, where, surrounded by approximately 12 armed state and federal officers he was arrested, searched handcuffed after observing the transfer of most of the duffle bags to [...]’ BMW and two of them into his apartment, and the departure of [...].  As the motion/trial judge correctly found for the nearly 8 hours [...] was in continuous police custody before his recorded statement, the State failed to meet its burden of proof\textsuperscript{12} that any officer actually read him \textit{Miranda} rights at any time after his arrest until his recoded confession more than 8 hours later, or that, even then that he was asked to waive those rights; or that [...] ever \textit{did} waive such rights.
[brief] The Court failed to adequately ascertain the scope of what “information” that [...]’s husband gave her:  THE COURT: Did your husband tell you anything?  JUROR NO. 12:  I told him to stop giving me any information, I didn't want any information.  I wanted to preserve whatever integrity that was -- THE COURT: How much did he tell you, just that the family members attend the church?  JUROR NO. 12:  He was concerned now that he knew there was some kind of connection there, maybe an issue later down the line because apparently I know the people and they would be able to recognize me and vice-versa in the event they attended.  The concern is I don't know if there's going to be an issue later on after the trial, but he didn't tell who they were, didn't want to know.  [(24T6-25 to 7-15)]  While the Court attempted to find out how much [...] learned from her husband asked if it was limited to the fact that [...]’s family members attended the church at which he had been employed, [...] never actually answered “yes” or “no” to that question, and the Court then moved on to assessing whether she felt her and her husband’s connection to the victim’s family would impact her impartiality.
[brief] *A.S.*, 203 N.J. at 154-55.  Waiver of one’s *Miranda* rights is, of course, revocable.  Invocation by a suspect of the right to silence during a custodial interrogation must be “scrupulously honored” if the invocation is “clear and unambiguous. ”  *State v. Diaz-Bridges*, 208 N.J. 544, 565 (2012); *State v. Maltese*, 222 N.J. 525, 545 (2015), cert. denied, 577 U.S. 1182 (2016); *State v. Chew*, 150 N.J. 30, 61 (1997), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1052 (1999); *State v. Melendez*, 423 N.J. Super. 1, 29 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 210 N.J. 28 (2012).
[brief] ”  Id. (quoting Commonwealth Land Title Ins. Co. v. Kurnos, 340 N.J. Super. 25, 29–30 (2001).  Here, as previously analyzed, the owners comprised a majority of the Board when 75% of the units were conveyed in approximately 1987.  At that time, as required under the statute, the Developer delivered to the Association all rules and regulations for the Condominium, including the Master Deed.  See N.J.S.A. 45:22A-47(c).  At that time, the Association was put on actual and constructive notice of the requirements under Paragraph 8(e) of the Master Deed, the provision which underlies the basis of Plaintiff’s claims.  Therefore, sixty days following the conveyance of 75% of the units, when the election was held and the owners comprised the majority of the Board, the cause of action for claims of a breach of fiduciary duty began to accrue.
[brief] The Defendants allege that the Plaintiff had a duty, upon the Decedent’s death, to distribute the Trust’s assets, including a Vanguard account and the Boonton and Florida Properties, to the three beneficiaries “as joint owners” upon the Decedent’s death.  Da338, at ¶23.  That claim requires that one ignore the fact that [...] had his attorney, in the early afternoon on the very Saturday their father died, send his sister a letter saying that nothing “no transfers of any assets should be made, regardless of whether not [sic] they are in any trust…” (7T56-22-24; 8T86:25-87:6; Da394).  Further, the Defendants later objected when the Trustee did make a distribution.  The Trustee advised the Defendants on September 2, 2022 that each of the beneficiaries would receive an $80,000 distribution from the Vanguard account.  On September 6, 2022, in the Defendants’ never-ending effort to derail the sale of the Boonton Property they were occupying for free, sought a stay.  (Da472).  In seeking that stay, they objected to the distribution, arguing it violated the Trustee’s duty of impartiality because the money could be used by [...] to complete the purchase of the Boonton Property.  (Da45).
[brief] Following the Vermont Superior Court’s rulings of August 3, 2020 – including the unambiguous determination that [...]’s actions were motivated by his own financial interests which conflicted with the Association’s – the [...], via motion filed on October 9, 2020, sought to withdraw all remaining claims for damages.  The Vermont Superior Court granted that motion by order entered on November 5, 2020.  Thereafter, on November 24, 2020, the [...] filed a motion for attorneys’ fees and costs.  In a February 10, 2021 written decision, the Vermont Superior Court held [...] and fellow directors responsible for fees and costs incurred by the [...] and the Association’s litigation receiver.  [...] then denied coverage by letter dated March 5, 2021.  The court below properly found that the denial of coverage was justified on four independent grounds.  C.  **[...] Casualty Policy Terms**
[brief] ON THE BASIS THAT THE SENTENCE WAS NOT ILLEGAL (1T8:17-25; 1T19:1-15)  Pursuant to Ct. R. 3:21-10(b)(7) a defendant may motion the court for "changing or reducing a sentence when a prior conviction has been reversed on appeal or vacated by collateral attack."  Ibid.  Consideration of this motion request is not based on the legality of the sentence but only if the motion is based on a prior conviction or convictions being vacated.  See Ibid.  In this case the defendant had two convictions vacated and both convictions were relied on by the sentencing Court when the defendant was originally sentenced to the indictments on this appeal.  (See Da8-14)  The defendant sought to be resentenced pursuant to R. 3:21-10(b)(7), based on the 2 convictions that were relied on by the sentencing Court when he was sentenced and sought a sentencing modification/reduction.  Although defendant has served all his custodial time in this matter he is still on parole until July of 2024 pursuant to a N.E.R.A. conviction, however, he sought the reduction so that he could reduce his parole time with any service credits he would have if the Court reduced his sentence.  See State v. Njango, 247 N.J. 533 (2021)  If the trial court would have resentenced defendant as the defendant was entitled to pursuant to R. 3:21-10(b)(7), the Court would have had to consider the defendant as he stood before the Court and the trial court should consider evidence of any rehabilitative efforts since the time a defendant was last sentenced.  See State v. Randolph, 210 N.J. 330, 354-55 (2012).  In this case the trial court acknowledged that the sentencing Court did consider the convictions when he sentenced the defendant (1T8:17-25; 1T19:1-15).  However, the Court did not resentence the defendant as required but instead ruled that he since the sentence was not illegal he was denying defendant’s motion.  (1T18-23 to 19:1-15)  The Court erred by denying the motion on the basis that the sentence was not illegal – legality is not the requisite factor to be considered for resentencing relief, the only factor to be considered under R. 3:21-10(b)(7) is whether a prior conviction was vacated and whether that vacated conviction was considered by the sentencing Court when imposing the sentence that the defendant is requesting resentencing, change or reduction of sentence.  Although, the fact that prior convictions were vacated does not require a change or reduction in a sentence.  Rule 3:21-10 indicated that a defendant must “set forth the basis for the relief sought. ”  R. 3:21-10(c)  Of course there would be a basis for a change or reduction of a sentence if a prior conviction was reversed or vacated and that prior conviction impacted the sentence sought to be changed or reduced.  See Id.  This matter should be reversed and remanded for resentencing in accordance with R. 3:21-10(b)(7); and the Court should consider evidence of any rehabilitative efforts since the time the defendant was last sentenced pursuant to State v. Randolph, 210 N.J. 330, 354-55 (2012).
[brief] Omitted see 629a and 744a  Plaintiff's counsel's December 11, 2023 supplemental certification in further support of Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to Amend the Complaint...........732a  Exhibit I Defendants' Brief in Support of Motion to Dismiss dated January 11, 2019  Omitted Exhibit J  Plaintiffs' Brief in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Omitted Exhibit K Memorandum of decision filed on June 8, 2021 granting in part Defendants' motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim Omitted see 583a --- 1
[directive] 5.1  An officer authorized to use a CED pursuant to this policy may fire, discharge, or utilize drive stun mode of the CED during an actual operation, only against: (a) an active assailant; or (b) a threatening assailant who will not voluntarily submit to custody after having been given a reasonable opportunity to do so considering the exigency of the situation and the immediacy of the need to employ law enforcement force; or (c) a person who is attempting to cause death or serious bodily injury to him/herself; or (d) a fleeing suspect if clear and convincing evidence exists to believe the suspect has committed a crime in which the suspect caused or attempted to cause death or serious bodily injury.
[directive] Reporting and Evaluation  12.1  In all instances when a CED or less-lethal device is fired or discharged during an actual operation, the law enforcement officer who employed such force shall complete: (a) Any agency required reports made necessary by the nature of the underlying incident; and (b) A report in the Attorney General’s Use of Force Reporting Portal.  12.2  In all instances when a CED or less-lethal device is fired at or discharged upon a person by a law enforcement officer, a higher-ranking supervisor shall investigate the circumstances and outcome of the device’s use.  The investigating supervisor shall report on the incident to the law enforcement executive, providing the law enforcement executive information on all relevant circumstances, deployment, and outcome, including whether the deployment avoided injury to an officer and avoided the need to use deadly force.  Upon receipt, the law enforcement executive shall issue a report, including a finding on whether the firing and all discharges complied with the Attorney General’s Use of Force Policy.
[brief] [...], [...], and [...] all testified that difficulty “catching” [...] in his paddock was *not* a sign of aggression.  [Pa 478-79, 779, 873-74].  Even [...] admitted that he never voiced any concerns about [...]’s behavior to Defendants.  Although Plaintiff asserted he told his boss, [...], that he thought [...] “wasn’t right in the head” at some point prior to the accident in 2018, [Pa 638], he conceded he never discussed his concerns with Defendants.  [Pa 648-651].  [...] similarly denied ever discussing Williams’ alleged concerns with Defendants.  [Pa 486-88].
[brief] Normally such evidence is not permitted before you.  Our rules specifically exclude evidence that the defendants are in custody, and you are not to consider or give any weight to this information when you are determining the defendants' guilt.  Our rules of evidence would not allow such information to be introduced before you.  However, if said information could be found to have affected the in-court identification of a witness or a victim in this case, specifically [...], before you give any weight to this evidence, you must be satisfied that because she was present in the courtroom when the defendants were escorted into their seats, this information affected [...]'s ability to identify who the defendants were.  You, and you alone, are to determine how much weight, if any, you want to give to the fact that [...] was present in the courtroom and if that fact impacted her ability to identify the defendants.  Whether or not this evidence does, in fact, affect the reliability of [...]'s in-court identification is for you to decide.  You may decide the evidence did not affect the identification and is not helpful to you at all.  In that case, you must disregard the evidence in its entirety.  Again, you may not use this evidence, the fact that the defendants were in handcuffs, to decide that the defendants are, in fact, guilty; that is, you may not decide just because the defendants were in handcuffs, they must be guilty of these offenses that they are facing.  I have admitted this evidence only to help you decide how reliable you are going to find [...]'s in-court identification.  You may not consider it for any other purpose and may not find the defendants guilty simply because you now know that they may presently be in custody.
[brief] APPLICABLE STANDARD OF REVIEW .........................................................1  STANDARD FOR APPEALING  A NON-CIVIL SERVICE DISCIPLINARY ACTION ........................................................................................................3  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT ........................................................................5  PROCEDURAL HISTORY ..............................................................................7  STATEMENT OF FACTS  .............................................................................10  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I:  THE FORTY-FIVE (45)  DAY RULE WAS NOT VIOLATED, AND AS SUCH, THE CHARGES AND DECISION MUST BE SUSTAINED ..........................................................................................17  POINT II: THE ATTORNEY GENERAL GUIDELINES ARE BASED ON FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS, WHICH WAS AFFORDED TO [...], AND AS SUCH, THE CHARGES AND THE LOWER COURT'S DECISION MUST BE SUSTAINED  ........................................................................24  POINT III: APPELLANT HAS FAILED TO PROPERLY PRESENT AND BRIEF AN ISSUE FOR APPEAL BEFORE THE APPELLATE COURT AND, AS SUCH, IS OUTSIDE THE SCOPE OF REVIEW OF THE APPELLATE COURT  ........................................26  SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION ....................................................................32  # Table of Authorities ## CASES
[brief] [...] relies on the arguments made in his previously filed brief, and adds the following:  POINT I THE STOP OF DEFENDANT AND THE SEARCH OF HIS CAR WERE ILLEGAL.  In his initial brief, [...] argued that the stop and search of his car were illegal because (1) his car was stopped without reasonable suspicion before officers knew who was in the car; (2) it is unlawful to search for a driver’s registration without first giving him an opportunity to retrieve it for himself, even if officers appropriately determine that the driver cannot reenter the car for safety reasons; and (3) the search warrant for the car relied on what the officer saw during the unlawful search for registration.
[brief] The property manager made false statements.  Counts 1-3 against [...] were dismissed as the Court found no valid claims, so it is illogical for the trial court to now conclude [...] acts constituted a “subjective” intent to injure.  Assuming that the Karlinski test presents the most reasonable approach in the instant matter, the trial court must then determine whether the alleged injured person’s “emotional distress” was a probable consequence of [...]’ actions.
[brief] Between January 2008, when the grading plan error was detected by [...], and March 2009, when the surveyors staked out the site using the initial, unrevised 2005 grading plan supplied to them by [...], [...] received repeated notices that the original site plan was defective, had to be revised, and in fact was revised by [...] with revisions accepted by the [...].  Notices to [...] of the errors on [...]’s initial 2005 grading plan were multiple and uncontroverted, including: - Personal meetings in 2008 between [...], [...] and [...] to discuss how to correct the error and handle the situation with the township.  (Pa385 at ¶11)  • Transmittal by [...]'s Engineer [...] to [...] and [...] via DHL Ground on October 7, 2008 of its revised Site Plan "in accordance with our discussions to date."  (Pa386 at ¶18; Pa403)  • Transmittal by [...]'s Engineer [...] to town engineer [...], [...] and [...], via DHL Ground on November 3, 2008, of a copy of [...]'s "original approved Grading Plan for the project" (April 11, 2005), and a "copy of the revised Grading Plan" wherein [...] explained in simple layman's terms that the floor of the existing building on the site was discovered to be approximately three feet higher than originally identified in the Boundary and Topographical Survey, and that [...] had now "regraded the site maintaining the same site layout."
[brief] “The superior court may, in an action for the partition of real estate, direct the sale thereof if it appears that a partition thereof cannot be made without great prejudice to the owners, or persons interested therein. ”  Ibid.  The court must administer relief in a partition action in accordance with “notions of general justice and equity between the parties. ”  Newman v. Chase, 70 N.J. 254, 263 (1976).
[brief] As the Court in Lehman makes clear:  When an employer knows or should know of the harassment and fails to take effective measures to stop it, the employer has joined with the harasser in making the working environment hostile.  The employer, by failing to take action, send the harassed employee the message that the harassment is acceptable and that the management supports the harasser.  (“Effective” remedial measures are those reasonably calculated to end the harassment.  The “reasonableness of an employer’s remedy will depend on its ability to stop the harassment by the person who engaged in harassment. ”)  Plaintiff herself conceded that if [...] could not remove [...], she would have accepted the transfer.  (Pa322, Plaintiff’s deposition transcript, T103:20-T104:3; T106:2-9).  Under the circumstances then, [...]’ rationale for transferring Plaintiff was reasonable, legitimate, and made without a hint of retaliatory or discriminatory motive:
[brief] The State would contend that there was no abuse of discretion.  The State suspects that all parties agree that the testimony of a pathologist is the sort of testimony that would assist the triers of fact in understanding relevant issues beyond their ken and that the state of the field of pathology is such that a properly qualified pathologist could reliably testify regarding it.  The trial court based its assessment of the pathologist’s expertise in “[...]’s present employment as deputy chief state medical examiner, his 25 years of professional experience, his education, board certifications, continued education training, the fact that he was an assistant professor of anatomy, he’s published scholarly articles, he’s testified in State and Federal Courts, been accepted and qualified as an expert in State and Federal Courts, [and] based on his professional duties as explained in detail during his testimony.