ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] Pursuant to the Revision of Attorney General Law Enforcement Directive 2011-1, victims who undergo a medical forensic exam, but choose not report the incident to a law enforcement agency, may request to have their evidence (e.g. SAFE Kits) “held” for a period of five years.4  Kits elected to be held for the five-year retention period shall be referred to as “Five-Year Hold Kits. ”  If the victim is an adult, evidence shall be retained for at least five years.  If the victim is a minor, evidence shall be retained for at least five years after the victim reaches the age of 18.  If a victim chooses to report to law enforcement after initially electing a Five-Year Hold Kit, law enforcement shall obtain the evidence and schedule a formal interview with the victim consistent with these Standards.  Where, after the five-year retention period expires and the prosecutor determines to destroy the SAFE Kit, the prosecutor shall notify the Director of the Division of Criminal Justice, or their designee, to provide the Division the opportunity to take custody of the Kit and assume responsibility for its continued retention.  See Attorney General Law Enforcement Directive No. 2011-1 - REVISION, Revisions to Attorney 4 General Law Enforcement Directive 2011-1 and the Attorney General’s Guidelines for the Retention of Evidence on Procedures for Retaining Sexual Assault Forensic Evidence (SAFE) Hold Kits and Extending the Time for Victims to Decide Whether to Report the Crime and Release Collected Forensic Evidence to Law Enforcement, Appendix XIII.  -9-  ATTORNEY GENERAL STANDARDS FOR PROVIDING SERVICES TO VICTIMS OF SEXUAL ASSAULT
[brief] It also was especially harmful because the accomplice liability instruction specifically allowed the jury to find defendant guilty on the basis that he aided or lent support or assistance to [...] in the commission of the robbery (26T142-6 to 19).  The jury should have been instructed that if it found that defendant's aid, support or assistance to [...] had occurred after [...] had used force to obtain the debit card, it could not find defendant guilty of accomplice liability for robbery.  Based on phone text messages and video evidence that showed a Jeep similar to defendant's in the area of the bank, the jury could have found that defendant had no prior knowledge of what [...] did or intended to do at Fazzio's house, but that he picked [...] up in the Jeep sometime after the robbery, drove [...] to the ATM afterwards and that he kept some of the money that [...] took and that, during the course of the drive, he had learned that [...] had wrapped the victim up to steal the debit card.
[directive] The third or (NCA) a (FTA) or New Criminal Activity score, Appear Failure to high either a results in (FTA) (NCA) score of the Failure to Appear Activity regardless Criminal New or high moderate or or if ODARA in score of 5 and 7.4.2.b, the results a 7.4.2.a subsections note and score, see 9 should pretrial detention established in this Directive from seeking seek or refrain when to on presumptions  19  The N.J.S.A. 2A:162- pretrial release under the Bail Reform Law, see presumption of statutory the confused with not be Bail Reform Law when defendant is charged established under the a detention presumption of statutory 17, or the N.J.S.A. 2A:162-19(b).  term of life imprisonment.  See or extended an ordinary subject to murder or is with additional be used for, this Directive creates presumptions to accounted presumptions are statutory  Although those presumptions detention and/or revocation of release motion.  The pretrial whether file a deciding to in prosecutors by of other only to channel the exercise in words, are designed Directive, 8 of this Section 7 and in established in this detention or revocation of release, nothing pretrial and whether to seek deciding discretion in prosecutorial presumption other than the ones obliged to apply any suggesting that courts are construed as should be Directive implement the and constitutional amendment.
[brief] On March 4, 2022, after hearing oral argument, the trial court issued two Orders denying Plaintiff’s request for temporary restraints and Plaintiff’s separate Motion to Enforce Litigant’s Rights.  (Pa31, Pa37).  The Hon. [...], J.S.C., placed a comprehensive opinion on the record, which was specifically referenced as the law-of-the-case in the September 9, 2022, Order under appeal.  (Pa86, Pa225).  The Judge placed an additional opinion on the record at the September 9, 2022, hearing where the Court dismissed Plaintiff’s Verified Complaint with prejudice, and the Judge supplemented his oral opinion with a written Statement of Reasons appended to the Order dated September 9, 2022.  (Pa80, 1T).
[brief] At both the motion to suppress and at trial, [...] testified that he observed defendant’s vehicle traveling “at a high rate of speed” in the center lane of traffic while passing vehicles on the left and right.  (1T9-7 to 18; 2T71-9 to 11).  He added that he could not identify the driver of the vehicle because the windows were tinted to the point of obscuring his view into the cabin.  (1T9-19 to 10-13; 2T72-16 to 73-4).  The trial court found this testimony “credible” and “believable” and incorporated those findings into its decision.  (1T102-3 to 15, 104-4-16).  Following these observations, [...] performed a motor vehicle stop of defendant’s vehicle.  Defendant relies here on Smith to argue that [...] lacked the reasonable suspicion to stop defendant’s vehicle based on a violation of the window tint statute.  That reliance, however, is misplaced.  In Smith, the observing officer testified that, despite the tint on the defendant’s vehicle, he could yet see that there was 1) a single person in the vehicle, and 2) that the individual was “making movements. ”  Smith, 251 N.J. at 265-66.  The Court emphasized the officer’s ability to “see both the number of people in the vehicle and their movements” in ruling that there was no reasonable suspicion that the statute had been violated.  Ibid.  Here, however, [...] is asked – directly – “[c]ould you see the driver as he passed you?”  Answer: “No, sir.  The front windows were tinted. ” (1T9-19 to 21).  The officer testified both that the defendant appeared to be speeding and that his windows were tinted beyond the point where the officer could see into the passenger compartment – both justifiable causes to stop the vehicle.
[directive] We therefore begin our analysis there.  A.  To repeat, if a defendant is detained beyond the statute’s two-year cap, not counting delays attributable to the defendant, that defendant is entitled to be released pending trial if the prosecutor is not ready to proceed.  N.J.S.A. 2A:162-22(a)(2)(a).  Because the State declared it was ready to proceed to trial at the relevant time, we do not find a violation under the Act.  Both parties agree that January 3, 2022, marked the end of the two-year that defendant’s cap.
[brief] (17T 173-3 to 174-21)  [...] testified that she was “slightly aware” of [...]’ mental-health issues, but that she never discussed them with him and that he was not violent.  (16T 16-22 to 17-5; 16T 18-7 to 19-10)  [...] knew, however, that in 2017 [...] was found “wandering the streets in Elizabeth” and placed in a hospital for psychiatric issues.
[brief] Unfortunately, that did not happen despite repeated prompting by the student-petitioners. \(^3\)  More than two months after this court’s remand order, on May 12, 2023, the Acting Commissioner denied the student-petitioners’ motion seeking emergency relief and sent a letter to their attorneys announcing a comprehensive review of the [...], which would be the centerpiece of the Acting Commissioner’s response to this court’s March 6, 2023, remand order.  The comprehensive review had originally been ordered by the Acting Commissioner on July 16, 2021, but apparently nothing had been done by the but that its “education budget has been severely strained by its obligation to provide transportation and special education tuition to many of the 31,000 [now about 47,000] non-public school students not included in the aid calculation. ”  Alcantara v. Allen-McMillan, 475 N.J.Super. 58, 62-63 (App.Div. 2023) (Emphasis added.).
[brief] Buckley, 111 N.J. at 366-367 (emphasis added).  See also Hill v. N.J. Dept. of Corrs. Com’r., 342 N.J. Super. 273, 297 (App. Div. 2001); Flizack v. Good News Home for Women, Inc., 346 N.J. Super. 150, 162 (App. Div. 2001).  In the pending case, a dispassionate review of the discovery record demonstrates that the actions of [...] and [...] did not even remotely approach the type of conduct required to establish intentional infliction of emotional distress.  Even for claims alleging negligent infliction of emotional distress, which are not asserted in Count Five of plaintiff’s Complaint (Pa017), a plaintiff must show that his emotional distress “was so severe that no reasonable man could be expected to endure it. ”  Shillaci v. First Fidelity Bank, 311 N.J. Super. 396, 406 (App. Div. 1998).  In Taylor v. Metzger, our Supreme Court defined severe emotional distress as “a severe and disabling emotional or mental condition which may be generally recognized and diagnosed by professionals trained to do so.  Taylor v. Metzger, 152 N.J. 490, 515 (1998).  Neither the conduct of the defendant officers, nor the demonstrated effect that their conduct has had on Plaintiff, establishes a prima facie case of intentional or negligent infliction of emotional distress.  Not only has Plaintiff not provided any medical or psychological expert evidence, but he admitted that he was never even evaluated by any professional for any emotional injury that he claims to have been related to the force that was employed to effectuate the subject arrest.  Pa439 (T35:3-8).  C. Res Ipsa Loquitur Count 6 of the Complaint asserts a claim entitled “Class of One Endangerment; Res Ipsa Loquitur.
[directive] This Directive calls upon officers and prosecutors to use their best judgment in deciding when diversion is appropriate, and provides the tools to facilitate uniform decision-making.  But as with any exercise of discretion, officers and prosecutors must take special care to ensure that their decisions are based on the individualized facts of a specific case and not on any improper factors like actual or perceived race, sex, gender identity, sexual orientation, or familial or socioeconomic status.1  Research shows that all of us—including those in law enforcement—carry implicit biases, the unconscious and often subtle associations we make between groups of people and various traits.  We can and must work to counteract these effects, both by training ourselves to recognize when they creep into our reasoning and by continually questioning our own assumptions about the interact.2 people with whom we In doing so, we can better address racial and other disparities in our juvenile justice system.
[directive] III.  of  The court may not revoke release, and a prosecutor may not seek a revocation release, for a defendant's alleged violation ofN.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(b )(12) or N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10(a)(3).  of  As a result, [...] will no longer issue a Violation Monitoring (VOM) for of any alleged violation N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(b)(12) and N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10(a)(3).  of of N.J.S.A. 2A: 162-24, entitled, "Violation condition release, motion by prosecutor," was amended to provide that a court shall not revoke an eligible defendant's release and order that the eligible defendant be detained pending trial based on manufacturing, distributing, or dispensing, or possessing or having under control with intent to manufacture, distribute, or of dispense, marijuana or hashish in violation ofN.J.S.2C:35-5(b)(12), or possession marijuana or hashish in violation ofN.J.S.A. 2C:35-10(a)(3).  N.J.S.A. 2A:162-24(b).  of  Therefore, [...] will not file a Violation Monitoring (VOM) for alleged violations ofN.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(b)(12) and N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10(a)(3).  IV.
[brief] See *Barila*, 241 N.J. at 618 (reversing Appellate Division finding regarding vested right to terminal leave); *Superior Officers*, 2022 WL 2352376, at *8 (finding that “‘vesting’ of . . . accumulated sick leave lump sum payments is inconsequential.  MSRA permits the Director to unilaterally modify this contract term. ”); (Pa000676).  **POINT V**
[directive] New Jersey is an Equal Opportunity Employer ∙ Printed on Recycled Paper and Recyclable direct the activities of and have supervisory responsibility for the personnel assigned to the Office.  C.  With the approval of the Attorney General or designee, the Organization of the Office.  CDEIO, in consultation with the Office of the Attorney General, may organize the work of the Office into any organizational units as may be necessary for the efficient and effective operation of the Office.  The Attorney General shall assign to the Office such employees of the Department as may be necessary to assist the CDEIO in carrying out the responsibilities of the Office.  The Office shall be responsible for developing and delivering Departmental DEI programs and initiatives, including without limitation, planning and executing initiatives and programs to support cross-cultural education and understanding and employee engagement; overseeing and supporting the Diversity Council and the employee resource groups (ERGs) of the Department; developing and delivering DEI training tailored to Departmental functions and requirements; analyzing and reporting on data relevant to DEI, and identifying and advising on improvements to operational processes and systems within the Department to align with DEI best practices with the goal of facilitating a more diverse, equitable and inclusive organization.  The CDEIO may delegate to employees assigned to the Office and within its organizational units such powers as the CDEIO deems appropriate, to be exercised subject to the supervision and control of the CDEIO.  D.  In order to carry out the Department’s Coordination and collaboration with LPS Divisions. mission of fostering and facilitating DEI across all LPS Divisions, and to ensure a unified, coordinated, and consistent approach that applies best practices to that mission within LPS, the CDEIO or their designee, in coordination with OAG, is authorized to oversee the LPS Divisions as a subject matter expert on DEI and to provide guidance and advice in formulating and carrying out the Divisions’ respective DEI plans and initiatives.
[brief] ”  *State v. Dunbar*, 229 N.J. 521, 532 (2017).  “To be lawful, an automobile stop ‘must be based on reasonable and articulable suspicion that an offense, including a minor traffic offense, has been or is being committed. ’”  *State v. Bacome*, 228 N.J. 94, 103 (2017) (quoting *State v. Carty*, 170 N.J. 632, 639-40, modified on other grounds, 174 N.J. 351 (2002)).  Reasonable suspicion is less demanding than probable cause.
[brief] It is well established that municipal ordinances do not create a tort duty, as a matter of law.  Smith v. Young, 300 N.J. Super. 82, 95 (App. Div. 1997).  There is no debate that Defendants property is residential in nature.  Defendants therefore owed no duty to the Plaintiff.  Even if this municipal code had created a phantom duty, Plaintiff’s expert report very clearly obviates that the storm was ongoing at the time Plaintiff fell.  This would relieve Defendants of liability under the New Jersey Ongoing Storm rule as espoused in Pareja v. Princeton Int'l Properties, 246 N.J. 546, 558 (2021) (“The alternative to the duty imposed by the Appellate Division is the ongoing storm rule.  The premise of the rule is that it is categorically inexpedient and impractical to remove or reduce hazards from snow and ice while the precipitation is ongoing.  We agree.  Our precedent makes clear, and we reiterate today, that absent unusual circumstances, a commercial landowner's duty to remove snow and ice hazards arises not during the storm, but rather within a reasonable time after the storm. ”).  CONCLUSION
[directive] [아니요/No] 귀하와 검사가 다른 경우보다 형량이나 가석방 부적격 기간을 보다 짧게 1.  해준다는 조건에 합의한 적이 있습니까?  (만약 예이면 위의 질문 및 12  에도 꼭 포함시켜야 합니다.)  13  Have you and the Prosecutor entered into any agreement to provide for a lesser sentence or period of parole ineligibility than would otherwise be required?
[brief] This is a tree fall case.  On or about November 2, 2020, Plaintiff, [...] (“Plaintiff”), was in a vehicle parked in Passaic, New Jersey, when a large tree suddenly toppled over without warning and fell on his vehicle.  Plaintiff then sued, among others, Defendant the [...] (“Defendant” or “the City”).  As reflected in the undisputed record, the canopy of the tree was green and vibrant, the trunk was solid and showed no sign of distress, and the tree had withstood years of bombardment by extreme weather conditions without incident.  Absolutely no one was on notice that the tree would fall.  On appeal, Plaintiff resorts to mischaracterizing the record confronted by this fatal flaw in establishing liability under the Act.  True and accurate excerpts of the deposition testimony of City Department of Public Works (“DPW”) Supervisor, [...] (“DeHais”), set forth in this Opposition undeniably proves the City had no advanced notice the tree at issue might fall.  The case was then no-caused at arbitration.  Thereafter, Plaintiff opposed summary judgment by interjecting the untimely expert report of Arborist, [...] (“Miller”) (and several others), over the objection of the Defense.  The trial court made a prudent move and considered Plaintiff’s proposed expert reports rather than excluding same and properly granted summary judgment for the City.  The trial court also exercised its discretion and denied Plaintiff’s request to re-open discovery after it had granted four prior extensions of the discovery period.  Plaintiff has not remotely demonstrated that the trial court abused its discretion, as he must, to overturn its decision to order discovery closed.  Plaintiff’s last resort on appeal is to focus on the catastrophic nature of the injuries he has suffered.  The City does not dispute that this was a life-altering tragedy; however, damages alone are insufficient to establish liability under the Act.  Indeed, the New Jersey Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that the Tort Claims Act is an immunity statute; it is not an insurance plan.  The Court has, therefore, upheld the dismissal of claims under the Act in the most tragic of settings, including a prior quadriplegia case that also was dismissed on liability grounds under the Act.
[brief] The latter violation, moreover, was amplified by the prosecutor's opening arguments to the jury.  We are mindful of the well-established principle that a failure to object permits an inference that any error in admitting the testimony was not prejudicial.  See State v. Nelson, 173 N.J. 417, 471, 803 A.2d 1 (2002); see also Hemphill, 142 S. Ct. at 694 (Alito, J., concurring) (quoting Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 314 n.3, 129 S.Ct. 2527, 174 L.Ed.2d 314 (2009)) (noting a defendant can impliedly waive his Sixth Amendment right by “‘fail[ing] to object to the offending evidence’ in accordance with the procedural standards fixed by state law. ”).  As the Supreme Court explained in Irving, failure to make a timely objection indicates that defense counsel did not believe the remarks were prejudicial within the atmosphere of the trial.  114 N.J. at 444, 555 A.2d 575; see also State v. Frost, 158 N.J. 76, 84, 727 A.2d 1 (1999) (stating “[t]he failure to object suggests that defense counsel did not believe the remarks were prejudicial at the time they were made”).  Failure to object also deprives the court the opportunity to take curative actions.  Irving, 114 N.J. at 444, 555 A.2d 575.  Accordingly, defendant's failure in this case to object either to the prosecutor's opening argument or to the testimony of the police officers regarding information from non-testifying sources that led them to defendant militates against a finding of reversible error.
[brief] The trial court granted the application, just as this Trial Court did.  Ibid.  Later, after an unfavorable outcome, that same defendant appealed the Trial Court’s order of dismissal.  Id. at 366.  The Supreme Court held that a defendant who induced the erroneous involuntary dismissal of another defendant was bound by that error and could not later contest the amount of the co-defendant’s liability.  *Id.* at 368-69.  Here, Appellant sought the order dismissing them and instead seeking the designation of [...] and [...] as so-called “Burt defendants”, and an order relieving them of any financial responsibility to anyone.
[brief] 11  As the trial court was aware, the deposition questions [...] was ordered to answer (and he immediately complied) had to do with his relationship with his son and family, ultimately having no relevance in these proceedings.  [...] had argued within reason, under R. 4:10-3, that those depositions questions posed to him were intended to annoy, embarrass, and oppress.  Thus, unsupportive of the trial court's finding of bad faith.  Second, the trial court also missed the point that [...] credibly explained that [...]’s claims were false in several dispositive motions to dismiss.  He attempted to end the litigation by filing four dispositive motions.  But the trial court allowed [...]’s case to continue in a manner that was financially crippling to [...]: he had to incur over $1 million in attorneys’ fees to defend against [...]’s bogus claims.  Of course [...] wanted [...] to “give up” such claims.  [...] argued that the case should never have been allowed to proceed in the first place because the initial order and permission to file the motion was improvidently entered by a later-recused Judge.  Third, based on her total lack of credibility, [...] was a maliciously motivated party who was inflicting millions of dollars of economic harm on [...], who was the innocent party.
[brief] THE ARBITRATOR APPLIED THE N.J.S.A. 34:13A-16(g)  CRITERIA CONSCIENTIOUSLY, FAIRLY AND EXPLAINING IT IN DETAIL IN HIS NEARLY 100 PAGE DECISION AND AWARD.  In Point III of its appellate brief, the Union contends that [...] allegedly misapplied the 16(g) criteria in rendering an award (Ab30), and in Point IV it argues that [...] did not properly consider the internal comparables in rendering an award.  (Ab38)  Nothing could be further from the truth of the matter.  1.  The N.J.S.A. 34:13A-16(g)  Criteria.  In general, compulsory interest arbitration is the statutory method of resolving collective-negotiation disputes between police and fire departments and their employers, and the purpose of the process is to resolve disputed terms for a new contract.
[brief] Masoir, 193 N.J. Super. 195 (“Plaintiff cannot create an issue of fact simply by raising arguments contradicting his own prior statements and representations. ”); Shelcusky v. Garjulio, 343 N.J. Super. 504 (App. Div. 2001) (citation omitted), rev’d on other grounds, 172 N.J. 185 (2002) (“[I]t is only genuine issues of fact and not simply issues created by self-contradictions of an opposing party that are intended to preclude resort to the device of summary judgment. ”).  Similarly, even assuming arguendo, that Appellant was able to prove a representation was made, which he cannot, Appellant cannot prove that he reasonably relied on said misrepresentation as he was at all times aware of [...]’s policies which explicitly prohibit using PCards for personal purchases.
[brief] Fourth, and finally, Plaintiff has already proven that the verdict was fully supported by the evidence.  The jury was not duped into finding for Plaintiff because of any argument of Plaintiff’s counsel.  And they did not render the award solely to punish Defendants for the collision.  The jury found as they did because of the objective medical evidence proving Plaintiff sustained a permanent injury, and Plaintiff’s own, credible testimony about how it has usurped his life.  V.