ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] L. 1986, c. 184.  N.J.S.A 17:16G-1(c).  (Pa134).  Like the 1960 Debt Adjusters Act, the 1986 amendment of DACCA provided a narrow exception for “an attorney-at-law of this State. ”  N.J.S.A. 17:16G-1(c)(2)(a).  But the exemption was narrower and limited it to only those attorneys who are not “principally engaged as a debt adjuster. ”  Ibid.  (emphasis added).  (Pa134). \(^4\)  The Legislature simultaneous amended the criminal debt --- \(^3\)  This responsibility now falls on the Commissioner of the Department of Banking and Insurance following the consolidation of the Department of Banking and the Department of Insurance in 1996.  L. 1996, c. 45  \(^4\)  DACCA also provided other exceptions to the definition of “debt adjuster” that had nothing to do with the practice of law and which are not at issue in this case.  These include as defined in N.J.S.A. 17:16G-1(c)(2) as follows: (b) a person who is a regular, full-time employee of a debtor, and who acts as an adjuster of his employer’s debts; (c) a person acting pursuant to any order or judgment of court, or pursuant to authority conferred by any law of this State or the United States; (d) a person who is a creditor of the debtor, or an agent of one or more creditors of the debtor, and whose services in adjusting the debtor’s debts are rendered without cost to the debtor; (e) a person who, at the request of a debtor, arranges for or makes a loan to the debtor, and who, at the authorization of the debtor, acts as an adjuster of the debtor’s debts in the disbursement of the proceeds of the loan, without compensation for the services rendered in adjusting those debts; or (f) a person who is: (i) certified by the United States Secretary of Housing and Urban Development as a housing counseling adjustment offense codified at N.J.S.A. 2C:21-19(f) to track the DACCA’s restored definition and new exception list.
[brief] Pedestrian/automobile accidents happen every day in New Jersey and throughout the country, whether it is in a mall parking lot, Home Depot parking lot or a ShopRite parking lot.  Hypothetically, if [...]’s vehicle had struck plaintiff and plaintiff sustained a broken wrist, the legal analysis would be identical and [...]’s co-employee immunity under the Workers’ Compensation Act would remain unchanged.  [...] is afforded co-employee immunity under the Workers’ Compensation Act for all injuries – from a broken wrist to death.  In fact, the Act, N.J.S.A. 34:15-8, expressly states that the immunity applies if a co-employee is “killed” (“If an injury or death is compensable under this article, a person shall not be liable to anyone at common law or otherwise on account of such injury or death for any act or omission occurring while such person was in the same employ as the person injured or killed, except for intentional wrong.
[brief] ”  (7T221-10 to 25, 224-3 to 225-3).  Defendant said the title of his book would be “Scot-Free,” which was a play on words because his name is [...].  (7T226-24 to 227-4, 244-23 to 245-7).  Defendant waived his right to testify at trial, but did present several family member witnesses on his behalf: [...], [...], and [...].
[brief] Accessed 13 Mar. 2025.  If there was no intent to eventually put legal title back in Plaintiff’s hands, there would no point in characterizing the deal as a “rescue” of the Property.  \(^3\)  Defendants admit that “[o]ver the years since [...] purchased the Property, [...] tried, on multiple occasions, to repurchase the Property, but was never successful. ” (Db6; Da240, ¶19).  of (i) the execution of the Agreements or (ii) payment in full of the Bundled Loan.
[brief] ”  Neither detective answered immediately as they were attending to a technical error with the photography software.  (11T131-8 to 132-11; Sa1 at 10:51:26 to 10:52:40; Da55 to Da57).  During fingerprinting, defendant again claimed innocence.  (11T132-18 to 20; Sa1 at 10:53:13 to 33; Da57).  [...], while rolling defendant’s fingers for prints, explained that “a lot more evidence ha[d] come to light” since defendant’s interview with [...] two days prior, and [...] again acknowledged that defendant was “saying [he] wanted to call [his] lawyer.
[directive] (a)  Rules and regulations.  Principles of behavior that set forth acceptable and unacceptable conduct.  In municipal police agencies, the rules and regulations must be INTERNAL AFFAIRS POLICY & PROCEDURES | November 2022 6 issued by the appropriate authority as designated by ordinance.  See N.J.S.A. 40A:14- 118.  (b)  Standard operating procedures (SOPs).  Written statements providing specific direction for performing agency activities.  Each SOP should also include the agency’s policy in that area, which is a statement of agency principles that provides the basis for the development of the procedures.  (c)  Directives or orders.  Documents detailing the performance of a specific activity or method of operation.  2.1.3
[brief] (Pa 1); compare (Pa 5).  This jury was fully instructed on acting “knowingly,” as well as complete definitions as to the types of possession.  See (9T:154-11 to 155-7; 159-22 to 160-14; 160-25 to 162-1); (Pa 1-2); compare (Pa 5-6).  In fact, inside the definition of knowingly, the court specifically identified the weapon to be a firearm, stating, “Thus, the person must know or be aware that he possesses the item, here two firearms and he must know what it is that he possesses or controls, in other words that they were firearms. ”  (9T:160-20 to 24) (emphasis added).  The full instruction for the final element, that the defendant did not have a permit to possess such a weapon, was also given.
[brief] See Wildoner v. Borough of Ramsey, 162 N.J. 375,386 (2000); Kirk v. City of Newark, 109 N.J. 173, 184 (1988) and Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 337 (1986).  Although it eludes precise definition, probable cause "is not a technical concept but rather one having to do with 'the factual and practical considerations of everyday life' upon which reasonable men, not constitutional lawyers, act" State v. Waltz, 61 N.J. 83, 87 (1972) (quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949)).  Although nervous evasive behavior is a pertinent factor in determining reasonable suspicion, Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124 (2000), it is not uncommon for people to appear nervous or excited when a police officer is approaching.  State v. Lund, 119 N.J. 35, 47 (1990).  It is settled that mere nervousness and fugitive gestures are insufficient, standing alone, to rise to the level of an articulable suspicion.  State v. Patterson, 270 N. J Super 500, 561 (1993).  Moreover, nervousness may be consistent with innocent behavior.  United States v. Andrews, 600 F. 2d 563, 566(1979).  A Terry stop must be supported by more than just an awkward reaction to police presence.  See State v. Costa, 327 N.J. Super 22, 32 (1999).  Thus, while "the common and specialized experience and work-a-day knowledge of police [officers] must be taken into account, the Officer’s belief must be based on objective, reasonable and particularized facts of the defendant’s involvement in a crime.  State v. Contursi, 44 N.J. 422, 431 (1965).  Our Courts have held that “although an officer’s experience and knowledge must be afforded due weight to specific reasonable inferences, which an officer is entitled to draw from the facts in light of his or her experience, generalizations cannot form the basis for reasonable and articulable suspicion. ”  State v. Stoval, 170 N.J. 346, 367 (2002).
[brief] THE COURT ERRED IN SENTENCING MR. RODRIGUEZ BY FAILING TO MERGE THE MR. RODRIGUEZ’S CONVICTION OF POSSESSION OF MARIJUANA WITH HIS CONVICTION FOR POSSESSION WITH INTENT TO DISTRIBUTE MARIJUANA AND BY APPLYING AGGRAVATING FACTORS  N.J.S.A. 2D:44-1(A)(1),(3) AND (9) (Da44 - Da46).  In sentencing [...], the trial court improperly failed to merge his first degree conviction of possession with intent to distribute marijuana with his fourth degree conviction for simple possession of marijuana, and sentencing him separately to 18 months imprisonment concurrent to the first degree sentence of 12 years she imposed on Count 2.  State v. Rechtschaffer, 70 N.J. 395, 411-412 (1976); State v. Selvaggio, 206 N.J. Super. 328, 330 (App. Div. 1985).  Likewise, the court erred in failing to merge the fourth degree possession of marijuana into the third degree possession of cocaine conviction.
[brief] [...] further explained, the TMS created were developed by the company that made the TMS for its own purposes.  (Da33 at ¶4).  When [...] builds a schedule, it builds a Show Play List ("SPL") which includes the pre-show content which starts 20-30 minutes before a movie, the trailers and the movie.  (Da33 at ¶4).  The TMS digital cinema equipment has a schedule which will be executed and the TMS asks whether the SPL was executed.  (Da33 at ¶4).  [...] does not regularly use the TMS logs because it does not have data that would be valuable or useful to [...].  (Da33 at ¶5).  [...], the Chief Technical Officer for [...] and former Vice President of [...], who was retained as a digital cinema software expert on behalf of [...], that [...] ("[...]") leases [...] the equipment for the digital projection of its movies and maintains unfiltered log data required by its distributors.
[brief] (AA0005-6)  The returned Certification reflected [...], a non-veteran and the first ranked eligible, had been bypassed and further reflected that Appellant, a disabled veteran and the second ranked candidate, was bypassed.  (AA0001; AA0122)  The returned Certification fails to list any reason for the bypass of Appellant.  (AA0122)  The Certification also reflected the appointment of [...], a non-veteran and the third ranked candidate, to Sheriff’s Officer Lieutenant.  (AA0001; AA0122)  The Respondent [...] did not request that Appellant’s name be removed from the List.  (AA0001; AA0122)  Despite the fact the Respondents had been put on notice that [...] had been demoted and was ineligible for promotion, rendering Appellant the first ranked eligible and the only veteran in the top three, the Respondent Commission did not require the Respondent [...] to appoint Appellant, even though the [...] had completed and returned the Certification of Eligibles without requesting to remove her name.
[directive] The prevent to and proceedings court at appearance her or his assure to necessary conditions that with Consistent 2A:162-17.  N.J.S.A.  See crimes.  new committing from defendant only complaint-warrant by charged be need defendant a Directive under this policy, legislative risk to the of risk flight, manage the to appropriate are conditions or condition release some when obstruct will defendant risk the that and/or victims, and witnesses, community, of the safety the to object not State would the where any in case example, for Thus, process. justice criminal the be might N.J.S.A. 2A:162-17(a), it recognizance," see personal "on released being defendant the to police the for obviating need acomplaint-summons, of means by charge to appropriate as just other In hours. to up for 48 there or him her detain and jail county a to defendant the transport be would generally complaint-warrant by than rather complaint-summons by charging words, the that reliably indicate decision charging the of time the at known facts the when appropriate delay, unnecessary decision "without pretrial release the make must court a that provides 2A:162-17 N.J.S.A. for preparing Prosecutors jail."
[brief] ..................................................................................................22, 26  In re Applic. of Howard Sav. Inst. of Newark, 32 N.J. 29 (1960)  ....................................................................................................26  Infinity Broadcasting Corp. v. N.J. Meadowlands Comm’n, 377 N.J. Super. 209 (App. Div. 2005)  .....................................................................passim Kane Prop., LLC v. City of Hoboken, 214 N.J. 199 (2013)  ..................................................................................................27, 44 Kaufmann v. Planning Bd. for Warren, 110 N.J. 551 (1988)  ..................................................................................................40  Kramer v. Bd. of Adj., Sea Girt, 45 N.J. 268 (1965)  ....................................................................................................25  Largoza v. FKM Real Estate Holdings, Inc., 474 N.J. Super. 61 (App. Div. 2022)  .......................................................................43  Malanga v. Twp of W. Orange, 253 N.J. 291 (2023)  ..................................................................................................37, 38, 47, 48 Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm., 140 N.J. 366 (1995) ..................................................................................................25, 28, 30 Nieder v. Royal Indem. Ins. Co., 62 N.J. 229 (1973) ....................................................................................................35, 43 Myers v. Ocean City Zoning Bd. of Adj. 439 N.J. Super. 96 (App. Div. 2015) .................................................................25, 30 Powerhouse Arts Dist. Neighborhood Ass’n v. City Council of City of Jersey City N.J. Super. 322 (App. Div. 2010) ........................................................................passim R. Neumann & Co. v. City of Hoboken, 437 N.J. Super. 384 (App. Div. 2014) ..................................................................27, 44 Rivkin v. Dover Tp. Rent Leveling Bd., 277 N.J. Super. 559 (App. Div. 1994) .................................................................27, 45 State v. A.R., 213 N.J. 542 (2013) ..............................................................................................34, 43 State v. Miller, 170 N.J. 417 (2002) .............................................................................................50
[directive] ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE COURTS  STATE OF NEW JERSEY  [...] , J.A.D. [...]  JUSTICE COMPLEX ACTING ADMINISTRATIVE DIRECTOR COURTS  P.O. BOX 037 OF THE TRENTON, NEW JERSEY  08625-0037 (609) 984-0275  Directive # 3-07  TO: Assignment Judges  Trial Court Administrators  FROM: [...], J.A.D.  SUBJ: Standard Conditions of Adult Probation – Revised Form DATE: April 13, 2007
[brief] In 2012, [...] installed a new 16-inch transmission line through portions of [...], which runs in part past [...] and terminates at [...].  Ha500 and Ha528.  The 16-inch line was intended to replace an existing 10-inch line, which remains in service as part of the distribution lines.  The fundamental reason for the 16-inch line, according to the company's filings at the [...], was that it was needed to comply with federal safety regulations, and more specifically, a requirement that transmission lines be capable of being safely inspected by an inline inspection device, often referred to as a "pig" or "smartpig."  At the time it commissioned the new line, [...] intended to install a large gas-fired combustion regulator station to handle the depressurization of natural gas from transmission pressures exceeding 700 pounds per square inch (psi) to approximately 100 psi or lower.  That depressurization produces freezing temperatures.  [...] planned to eliminate the freezing temperatures by operating a large gas combustion heater at the regulator station.  [...] purchased the planned heater in late 2012 and early 2013, by soliciting one bid from one supplier and accepted that bid without even bothering to see if it could get a better heater elsewhere, or get a better price, or acquire a less intrusive and polluting heater.  It paid approximately $230,000 and the heater has been sitting ever since.  [...] has now spent more than $1.8 million and counting in legal and expert fees, retaining at least three law firms and five experts, pursued two applications at the [...] and the two petitions under challenge.
[brief] ”  Richardson, supra, 192 N.J. at 212.  As [...] explained and was quoted in Richardson, supra, at 201, in referencing Russo v. Teachers’ Pension and Annuity Fund, 62 N.J. 142, at 152 (1973):  “In ordinary parlance, an accident may be found either in an unintended external event or in an unanticipated consequence of an intended external event if that consequence is extraordinary or unusual in common experience.  Injury by ordinary work effort or strain to a diseased heart, although unexpected by the individual afflicted, is not an extraordinary or unusual consequence in common experience.  We are satisfied that disability or death in such circumstances is not accidental within the meaning of a pension statute when all that appears is that the employee was doing his usual work in the usual way. ”  As a consequence, there are two basic types of external events, either an unintended external event or an unanticipated consequence of an unintended external event if that consequence is extraordinary or unusual in common experience.  In the former case, the happening of the event is undesigned and unexpected, while in the latter case, it is the consequence of the event or circumstance, which is undesigned and unexpected.  In either case, however, the external event or circumstance must occur during and as a result of the performance of regular or assigned duties.
[brief] As summarized above, the Trial Court concluded that Plaintiff had not sufficiently pled the elements of disability discrimination under the NJLAD.  In that regard, the Court noted that Plaintiff made only “vague assertions” that unnamed firefighters referenced in the Second Amended Complaint “consisting of those now and in the future” “have a disability because they have taken sick or injury leave. ”  In so doing, the Court highlighted that no disability for any purported members was identified anywhere in the Complaint, just generalized claims of sick days taken.  (Pa3-4).  The Court also correctly rejected a basis of Plaintiff’s claims/Complaint that any individual who takes a sick day is considered disabled within the meaning of the NJLAD.  (Pa4).  Indeed, Plaintiff’s counsel again asserted during oral argument in this matter that anyone who calls out and utilizes a sick day/leave “is disabled. ”  See 9/8/23 Transcript of Motion, T13-22.  On appeal, Plaintiff doubles down on this incorrect statement of law and cites several cases, none of which support Plaintiff’s assertion that it adequately pleaded its LAD claims.  Rather, those cases involved identified individuals with identified disabilities advancing claims of discrimination/failure to accommodate based on the particular instances/circumstances presented.
[brief] [...] TO REVISE AND FILE  UPDATED ACCOUNTING BASED ON THOSE EXCEPTIONS  2)  CORRECT OCT. ’22 ORDER, PAR. 1, & MAR. 7, 2023 ORDER, PAR. 3, SO [...] SHALL PROVIDE TRUST INFO & DOCS REQUESTED BY [...], AS QUALIFIED BENEFICIARY, AS REQ’D BY 3B: 31-67, FOR REVIEW FOR ANY EXCEPTIONS (FOR COURT APPROVAL OR DENIAL) TO FIGURES IN THE INTERMEDIATE & FUTURE FINAL ACCOUNTINGS
[brief] However, one need not simply rely on [...]’s 46 years as a professional engineer, 27 of which was spent as an engineer for the [...], or the additional training and certifications that he has obtained in the areas such as “Pavement Maintenance Management,” “Traffic Control,” “Bridge Inspection,” “Work Zone Traffic Control for Safety and Mobility” or his training in “Motorcycle Crashes: Understanding the Controlling Contributing Factors and Injury Severity” in order understand the basis for his opinions.
[brief] (Volume 1, Pa. 182; Volume 1, Pa. 176; Volume 1, Pa. 165)  Although [...] was entitled to compensation of $153,00.00 per annum for services in his three positions, defendants only paid [...] $95,364.82 of the $306,000 he was owed for 2016 and 2017.  [...] has provided unrebuted evidence that $210,635 of his $255,000 claim for damages accrued in 2016 and 2017 which is respectively within 4 and 3 years of the filing of his complaint.  Although defendants statute of limitations defense was asserted in defendants answer, defendants provided no documents which are part of the record below which supported the statute of limitations defense.  (Volume 1, Pa 29; See Sixth Affirmative Defense of defendants answer; See Defendants Statement of Undisputed Material Facts, Volume 1, Pa. 138-142; Volume 1 and 2 Pa 143 to Pa. 369; See Certification of [...] and exhibits)
[brief] In Marroccelli, the defendant proffered a handwritten note that she claimed was an admission by her husband that he, not she, was the driver of the car that killed the victim in that case.  448 N.J. Super. at 362-363.  The trial court deemed the note to be inadmissible, ruling that it was not authenticated because no one but the defendant said it had been written by her husband, and because the defendant’s obvious bias on the issue robbed the note of any credibility and relevance.  Id.  This Court reversed that ruling and the resulting convictions, holding that the judge overstepped his bounds as evidentiary gatekeeper.  Id. at 365-367.  The trial judge in Marroccelli improperly entered the “province” of the jury, usurping the jury’s constitutionally-based role, when he required more authentication than necessary and failed to let the jury determine the credibility of what was plainly a relevant piece of evidence.  Id.  Likewise, in Hockett, this Court reversed and remanded for retrial when, in a murder prosecution, the trial judge improperly barred certain photographic evidence because he deemed it to be unauthenticated and lacking credibility because the photographer was biased toward the defendant and appeared to have taken the photos in question merely to aid the defense, while claiming otherwise in her testimony.
[brief] The Petition again makes an incorrect standard argument, to no avail.  In this respect, he argues:  When granting Respondent's motion for a directed verdict, the Court failed to apply the standards governing motions under R.4:40-1, and disregarded all the evidence presented by Petitioner and failed to afford Petitioner any favorable inferences.  (P9- P3 5).  The Court also limited its review of the facts to the very narrow period time that the will was executed * * * (Pb 18-19).  Such contentions ignore the fact that the Petitioner was not a credible witness, as found by the Chancery Division: Petitioner's testimony was contradicted by multiple fact witnesses, exhibits, and even his own testimony between his deposition and at trial.  This court does not find Petitioner to be a credible witness.