ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] A third-party guilty doctrine is implicated when a defendant “seek[s] to prove that another agency” committed the crime with which he is charged.  *State v. Loftin* 146 N.J. 295, 345 (1996) (citing *State v. Studrivant*, 31 N.J. 165, 179 (1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 956 (1960)).  To be admissible, evidence of another's guilt does not need to be conclusive, and it “need not [constitute] substantial proof of a probability that the third person committed the act[.]”  *State v. Jimenez*, 175 N.J. 475, 486 (2003).  However, the evidence cannot be speculative.  *Sturdivant*, 31 N.J. at 179.  A trial court must engage in a fact-sensitive analysis to determine whether the evidence of third-party guilt meets this requirement.  *State v. Cotto*, 182 N.J. 316, 333 (2005).  It bears repeating that a trial court has broad discretion to admit or preclude evidence of third-party guilt.  *Ibid.*  It is undisputed in this case that the evidence at trial did not directly implicate the defendant as the individual who physically committed the armed robberies.  Throughout the trial, the State presented a theory that the defendant was a co-conspirator and accomplice to his co-defendants.  As aptly noted by the PCR court, “[t]he State never alleged that the [defendant] committed the crimes but alleged that the co-defendants (i.e. third parties) are the ones who committed the crimes, and the [defendant] was guilty through the theory of accomplice liability. ”  Da165.  Such an instruction would have only confused the jury, as it would have directly cut against the accomplice liability and conspiracy instructions to the jury.  In one breath they would have been instructed that they must find the defendant guilty and hold him accountable for the conduct of another if they found the co-defendants were acting in consort with one another.  But, in the next breath they would be instructed that they could find the defendant not guilty because another individual committed the crime for which he is charged.  These concepts and instructions simply cannot coexist, especially in a trial where the State’s entire case rested upon the notion that this defendant was guilty because he was an accomplice and co-conspirator and not the one who physically committed the armed robberies.  Furthermore, there was no evidence presented in the record that would have supported this charge at trial.
[brief] Appellant articulated below this factual indifference by the trial judge (1) to the trial judge via Motion For Disqualification (Pa226) and (2) to the Presiding Judge on apparent overlook of Code of Judicial Conduct by the trial judge (Pa135).  The said pro police bias shown by the trial judge against the appellant can be shown by the following:  a.  Police chief [...] had stipulated “I have determined to deny [...]’s request” (Pa19), in denying disability accommodation sought by and for the appellant’s 87 years old disabled mother based on her needs and qualifications.  b.  In so doing, [...] had disregarded the recommendation by the respondents’ own investigator, who had stipulated in his report “I would recommend the installation of a handicapped parking space” (Pa18).  c.  [...] had denied the Mother’s application in such way, when the public records of respondents showed that he and respondents had liberally approved about seventy (70) similar applications (Pa60).  Yet, the trial judge’s findings of facts on the matter was the following (1T19, 15-18):
[brief] The DEP’s overly broad interpretation and application of Exemption 11 in this case fails to reckon with adverse and unsustainable environmental impacts from climate change and will open the floodgates for any imaginable “upgrade” of any imaginable “system” in the Highlands, which will contribute to further unwise sprawling development in the region.  The Legislature did not intend to hide an elephant like this in the mousehole of Exemption 11.  The DEP failed to employ any reasonable limiting factor for this project and chose instead to completely ignore the massive environmental threats associated with this project’s contributions to climate change and unwise sprawl.
[brief] None of the submitted mortgage documents in the Complaint of 5/12/16 was authenticated by Certification of Acknowledgement in violation of NJSA 2A:82-17.  None of the mortgage assignments submitted by [...] was authenticated by affidavits or certifications of personal knowledge in violation of the Supreme Court of NJ Order based on Rule 1:6-6.  The original lender and servicer was [...].  [...] did not indorse the Note to any party.  [...] did not assign the Note to any party.  All trial judges: [...], [...], [...], and [...] refused to examine the documents submitted by [...].  None of them enforced the NJ UCC Laws in my case.  [...]’s attorneys used their white privileges to win in the Foreclosure Court.
[brief] The trial court erred by misapplying the holding in DeAngelo and holding that the NJCFLA neither provides for nor furthers interests of public policy.  [...]’s arguments similarly fall short as they also fail to analyze the public policies motivating the NJCFLA, violations of the FDCPA, the comparable offenses that give rise to both, and the resulting analyses of the same.  Lastly, [...] cites to *Midland Funding LLC v. Williams*, No. A-2961-22, 2024 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 466 (App. Div. Mar. 21, 2024) (Pa7), to argue that [...]’s Motion to Vacate was untimely, having been filed six years after the entry of default judgment.
[brief] As a subset, [...] relies on the doctrine of “common knowledge negligence. ”  [...] further has the knowledge and background to testify about all the damages he suffered as outlined by him in the disclosure statement and deposition.  His experience in commercial real estate development and construction uniquely qualifies him to give such testimony.  The court erred in barring [...] from proving his case.  On the Motion to Reconsider, the Court further failed to grant the equitable relief of allowing the additional time to obtain an expert report.  PROCEDURAL STATEMENT
[brief] The Arbitrator denied [...]’s motion and affirmed [...]’s principal award ($4,310,849.48), but found separately, with regard to the award of interest only, that the interest needed to be recalculated pursuant to a new formula.  Pa924.  On April 12, 2024, the Arbitrator entered his “Corrected Final Award,” which the New Jersey Superior Court confirmed on June 13, 2024 over [...]’s objections.  Pa925; Pa932.6 --- 6  Desperate to avoid paying, [...] appealed the confirmation of the Award.  Appellate Docket No. [...].  Argument has been scheduled for March 18, 2025.  E.  [...] Continues Its Desperate Attempt to Avoid Paying the $4 Million Arbitration Award by Commencing a Second Arbitration (Pa582)
[brief] Plaintiffs also rely upon Paragraph 6.3 of the [...] Stock Purchase Agreements, Da910-11, and Paragraph 6.2 of the Membership Interest Purchase Agreement, Da952, as providing the express authorization for an award of attorneys’ fees here.  a.  **[...] Stock Purchase Agreements**  As a preliminary matter, it seems an odd choice to rely upon the [...] Stock Purchase Agreements (SPAs) as justification for an award of counsel fees.  As the name of the contracts state, these contracts were for [...]’s sale of his interest in [...] rather than an agreement that governed the business relationship between [...] and [...].  And, it is undisputed that [...] was paid in full.  It is true that the definition of "losses" contained in Paragraph 6.2, which establishes the parameters of "Indemnification for Buyer's Benefit," includes reasonable attorney's fees and applies to Paragraph 6.3, the indemnification clause applicable to [...] as the seller.  That fact does not resolve the issue, however, because the indemnification provision must be strictly construed.  Accordingly, it was necessary to establish not only that an indemnification provision existed that allowed for an award of attorneys' fees; proof was also required that the criteria for invoking the indemnification clause were met.  That is not the case here.  See, Db29-30.  There were two iterations of the [...] SPA.  The initial SPA was executed in 2014 between [...], as purchaser, and [...] as seller.  (Da906-934).  Before the last payment was made, a new SPA was executed in 2017 in which Fariba [...] became the purchaser so the business could obtain the advantage of being a WBE (woman-owned business enterprise); [...] remained the seller.
[brief] 4 A. Legal Background ............................................................................................................. 4 B. Factual Background ......................................................................................................... 5 LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I DEFENDANT’S CONVICTION FOR CARRYING A HANDGUN IN NEW JERSEY WITHOUT A NEW JERSEY PERMIT IS CONSTITUTIONAL ...................................................................................... 8 A. Defendant's Second Amendment Argument Fails ....................................................... 9 B. Defendant's Conviction Is Consistent With The U.S. Constitution’s Full Faith And Credit Clause ........................................................................................................ 19 CONCLUSION .............................................................................................................................. 26 TABLE TO APPENDIX
[directive] f. 1994 1 5 받는다면, [예/Yes] [아니요/No]  범죄가  년 월 일 이후 발생했고 귀하가  보호관찰형을 보호관찰 $25 아십니까?  기간 동안 매월 까지의  수수료를 지불해야 하는 것을  If the offense occurred on or after January 5, 1994 and you are being sentenced to probation, you must pay a fee of up to $25 per month for the term of probation?
[brief] *Allstars Auto. Grp., Inc. v. N.J. Motor Vehicle Comm’n*, 234 N.J. 150, 157 (2018) (quoting *In re Stallworth*, 208 N.J. 182, 194 (2011)).  “When an agency’s decision meets those criteria, then a court owes substantial deference to the agency’s expertise and superior knowledge of a particular field. ”  *Herrmann*, 192 N.J. at 28.  The Board’s decision in this matter warrants deference by this court as the Board appropriately applied the regulatory and statutory framework of the TI program.
[brief] Unlike in the present matter, there was no written agreement to arbitrate in *Fawzy*, which prompted the trial court to place a colloquy on the record to establish that the parties understood their rights and what they were waiving.  *Id.* at 483.  Further, Plaintiff mischaracterizes *Fawzy’s* holding when she states that “an agreement to arbitrate will not be enforced . . . unless [both parties] actually understand what they were told regarding arbitration. ” (Pb27).  The Court in *Fawzy* examined the discrete issue of “whether child-custody and parenting-time issues can be resolved by arbitration” given the court’s *parens patriae* obligation to assure the best interests of the child.  *Id.* at 466, 472.  After resolving this issue in favor of allowing parties to submit such issues to arbitration, the Court examined the colloquy that occurred between the trial court and [...] during which [...] agreed to arbitration.  *Id.* at 482-83.  While the trial court explained certain aspects of arbitration to the parties, the trial court, among other things, erroneously suggested arbitrator bias would not be a basis on which to challenge an arbitration award and failed to allude to the standards that would warrant judicial intervention.  *Id.* at 483.  Given the court’s *parens patriae* obligation and because the colloquy did not provide a basis on which the court could conclude the parties understood the consequences of removing their custody dispute from court to arbitration, the Court reversed the arbitration award.
[directive] 2"El" 7ll 4-, $1,000 ~ 't1 1'tl (3)  3"El" 7ll 4-, $750 ~ (4)  4"El"~~'tlla4-,$500 =E-e- 7<30]~ 7<3-9-, (5) $250 %7]-ft-~7-} %7]-ft-~7-} ~'t} ~ ½ CCPF $ ______ _ ~~  Do you understand that in its discretion, impose a minimum time in [Yes/oil] [No/0 6. the court could, ]-i...1-8..] confinement to be served before you become eligible for parole, which period could be as long as one half of the period of the custodial sentence imposed?  1l !4-Qj tIJl Jl] ~A}-e- 7-}{l AH~ 7},J,'j 1'1J- 7-}z;j oj • 77}7-]  oj: 15}-E t!-7]  'r7tf7] {}¾ ,ii lS"}ojj t;}j .Q..£ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~j]_  9-~.Q..o:J,::::i~-tl-~~.i!.~~?7tJ-~-tl-~~~1£~•?£~q-e-3lg~1lt.1*  Revised Form Promulgated 12/31/2019 Supplement to Directive #01-18, CN 10079-Korean Defendant's Initials by 4-71!
[brief] The BPU’s denial of the application functions as a refutation and inappropriate repudiation of the State’s solar program and binding policy.  The Board continues to thwart the intention and desire of the legislature and the Executive Branch to accept and encourage the use of distressed property, be that brownfield, landfill, or other underutilized property such as the proposed former sand mine in the state for solar development.  This is not a new position by the State and has been a key policy since at least the original Solar Act, P.L. 2012, c. 24.  In the 2017 New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection Solar Siting Analysis Update,\(^3\) the NJDEP identifies distressed properties such as landfills and brownfields as “preferred lands” for solar siting.
[brief] In its opening statement, the State highlighted [...]’s role in the case:  “[...], while she’s a threat to herself based on her addiction, [...] happens to be a threat to everyone suffering with addiction in this country battling the opioid pandemic.  That’s why he’s sitting there and [...] will be sitting up there later today. ”  (4T 28-19 to 24)  The assistant prosecutor explained why [...] received “a really good deal to testify,” telling jurors that “the State of New Jersey has a lot more interest in prosecuting drug dealers than they do those addicted to drugs and battling with addiction. ”  (4T 28-15 to 18)
[brief] Id. at 464.  Plaintiff here had an objectively reasonable belief that the following criminal laws were being violated.  Through his performance of his duties as a Police Captain during the police response on the night of July 5, 2016, Plaintiff objected to a violation of these laws: N.J.S.A. 2C:33-2 (disorderly conduct); N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1 (assault); and N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4 (harassment).  Further, as outlined more extensively infra, Plaintiff, by enforcing the law, refused to participate in a dereliction of his duties, which he reasonably believed would be in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:30-2, our State’s criminal official misconduct statute, the reach of which has been broadly interpreted by our Courts, particularly in the law enforcement context.  Defendants illogically and without any legitimate basis retaliated against Plaintiff for not refraining from performing his duties and not sitting back and allowing an unruly and lawless crowd engaging in criminal activity to run amok.
[brief] Maul v. Kirkman, 270 N.J.Super. 596, 614, 637 A.2d 928 (App.Div.1994)."  In re PSE & G Shareholder Litigation, 173 N.J. 258, 276-277 (2002).  "A court may intervene to prevent (or annul) conduct on the part of directors that is fraudulent or represents a breach of their fiduciary obligations, id., or violates the law."
[brief] [...] FAILED TO CONSIDER WHETHER IT WOULD BE FAIR AND EQUITABLE TO AWARD POST JUDGMENT INTEREST AT THE CONTRACT  RATE  In *Interchange State Bank v. Rinaldi*, 303 N.J. 239 (App. Div. 1997), the Appellate Division reaffirmed that “fixing post-judgment interest at the legal rate is the standard”, but that trial courts have the discretion when requested to award a higher rate of interest when such award would be “fair and equitable”.
[brief] Plaintiff points to the title commitment as the “agreement” and to the “Important Notice and Disclosure” section of Paragraph 3 for the proposition that [...] agreed to protect plaintiff in the event its funds were misapplied, or the settlement agent failed to comply with the requirements relating to the issuance of the policy.  (304a, ¶3).  Paragraph 3 specifically states If you desire to obtain protection from this company regarding the application of your funds or compliance with requirements relating to the issuance of the proposed policy, the company will, on request and payment of the fees filed with, and approved by, the Department of Insurance, provide for a settlement service.  By its terms, plaintiff must do more than receive the commitment in order to obtain the protection.  Plaintiff must both request the protection and then pay the fee approved by the Department of Insurance for it.  Nothing in the record shows compliance with these preliminary requirements.  In fact, plaintiff’s expert on title insurance does not address this point at all – this is wholly a new argument of counsel.  351a and 412a.  The letter referred to in this paragraph is a specific form approved by the [...] ([...]) called a Closing Protection Letter (CPL).
[brief] PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND COUNTERSTATEMENT OF FACTS  ........1  ARGUMENT  I.  THE BOARD’S DENIAL OF [...]’S APPLICATION MADE APPROXIMATELY ONE YEAR AND NINE MONTHS  PAST THE STATUTORY DEADLINE TO FILE FOR AMENDED  BENEFITS IS REASONABLE AND SHOULD BE AFFIRMED ..................................................................................................................5  II.  CONSIDERATIONS OF ADEQUATE OR ACTUAL NOTICE  DO NOT COMPEL A DIFFERENT RESULT ...........................................................................................................10  CONCLUSION .................................................................................................................................19
[brief] During the August 24 pre-motion conference, the trial court recognized that its directive would result in the production of “some significant number of documents that [plaintiffs] haven’t requested, a significant number of documents that are not relevant. ”  T6:11-14.  The court said it understood “that there’s going to be a large number, and it’s argued that maybe sixty to seventy percent of the documents aren’t going to be relevant. ”  T6:14-17.  It nevertheless ordered the production of all documents because it believed that “ESI is fundamentally different than just paper documents” and thus requires different discovery treatment.  T20:21-21:2.  In particular, the trial court cited three reasons for requiring the production of irrelevant documents.  First, the court insisted that “the relevance gatekeeper shouldn’t be the producers of the documents” on the ground that it was not “fair” for “the party producing the documents [to] decide what is relevant and what’s not. ”  T5:19-6:1.  Second, although the trial court had previously appointed a special discovery master, Da97, the court expressed reluctance “to review thousands of pages of documents” to resolve any relevancy disputes, which the court disclaimed as “not my function” and a task the court was “not equipped to do. ”  T6:2-7, T22:10.  Third, the court did not “see the harm” in the ESI Order because “appropriate confidentiality orders” and “clawback provisions” would protect against foul play, and a new order would allow Defendants to withhold a “very small subset” of proprietary documents.  T6:8-21, 27:4-12.  On September 13, 2023, the trial court formalized its July 6 Directive through the ESI Order, which specified that all documents identified and returned by application of the ESI search terms “must be produced to all parties” and that the parties “may not withhold or redact non-privileged ESI documents, even if the producing party believes the document is wholly non-responsive or that it contains only irrelevant information. ”  Da167  ¶ 1.  The Order permits the parties to withhold or redact ESI based on an applicable privilege or immunity under New Jersey law, requiring that each such document be identified on a privilege log.  Id. at ¶ 2.  Otherwise, the parties may withhold or redact only the “small subset of ESI documents that contain information so proprietary that their production could result in business losses or disruption,” with each document identified on a “‘business proprietary’ document log. ”  Id. at ¶ 3.  LEGAL ARGUMENT
[brief] Contrary to [...]’s argument, which relies on a single instance of testimony from herself, the record is replete with evidence of what [...], [...], and [...] actually thought—that [...] was difficult to work with on a day to day basis, that she was mean to her employees, and that they did not like her.  (See, e.g., Pa447 ([...] texting a coworker “I’m over [...] and her bullshit. ”); Pa238-39 at 49:1-55:25; Pa243 at 72:13-17; Pa244 at 74:5-24 (noting [...]’s bickering with other staffing coordinators); Pa176 at 67:13-68:6 ([...] stating [...] would “freak out on everybody”); Pa241 at 64:10-18 (staffing coordinators upset at the way [...] “treated people”); Pa286 at 30:23-31:5 ([...] stating [...] was not a “team player”); Pa287 at 35:1-7 ([...] treated the staffer coordinators like children); Pa185 at 101:22-102:6 ([...] was belittling and degrading toward staffing coordinators)).  As the trial court found, “Plaintiffs cannot show objectively and reasonably believe that [...]’s yelling and screaming at Mr. [...] on June 24, 2020 was a violation of the harassment statute. ” (See 1T 28:10-13).  Third, no reasonable juror could conclude, on this record, that [...] approved the charge pay.
[brief] (Pa000484).  In its oral decision, the trial court confirmed that Plaintiffs had been misrepresenting its earlier decision on [...]’s first Motion for Summary Judgment:  I did not say that Plaintiff[s] could go forward on any type of professional negligence claims that required common knowledge or something like that.  None of those claims really existed anyway.  Really what I was talking about, and I think I made clear at the time, was any trespass complaints or any other related type of complaints wherein [...] might have directed people…to enter on to Plaintiff[s’] property, things like that.  (2T at 6:5-14).  The trial court took further issue with the fact that, after receiving the safe harbor letter from [...], Plaintiffs never conducted any discovery “or somehow try to develop their case” against [...].  (Id. at 7:15-18).  The trial court further noted that, according to the emails submitted with the safe harbor letter, Plaintiffs participated in discussions with defendants that ultimately led to [...] revising the site plan before any construction could take place on the Property.  (Id. at 8:17-25).  On November 6, 2023, counsel for [...] submitted a certification of fees in accordance with the trial court’s direction.
[brief] These relevant factors can, either singly or in combination, determine in a given case whether the essential agency action must be rendered through rulemaking or adjudication.  [Ibid.]  These factors are applicable whenever the authority of an agency to act without conforming to the requirements of the APA is questioned, for example, in adopting orders, guidelines, or directives.  In re Protest of Coastal Permit Program Rules, 354 N.J. Super. 293, 362 (App. Div. 2002) (citing Doe v. Poritz, 142 N.J. 1, 97 (1995)).
[brief] :  BRIEF AND APPENDIX ON BEHALF OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY  [...]  ATTORNEY GENERAL OF NEW JERSEY  ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT STATE OF NEW JERSEY  [...]  JUSTICE COMPLEX [...]  [...]  ATTORNEY NO. 027552008  DEPUTY  ATTORNEY GENERAL DIVISION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE APPELLATE  BUREAU P.O. BOX 086 [...] [...]  [...] OF COUNSEL AND ON THE BRIEF  July 9, 2024  TABLE OF CONTENTS  COUNTERSTATEMENT OF PROCEDURAL HISTORY