ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] See N.J.S.A. 2C:58-25.  The court, on notice to the petitioner and the respondent, the appropriate law enforcement agency, and the county prosecutor, may terminate the final extreme risk protective order after a hearing.  In making the determination to terminate a final extreme risk protective order, the court shall consider the factors or information enumerated in Guideline 3(d), as well as any other evidence, including, but not limited to, whether the respondent has received, or is relevant mental health treatment.  If the respondent filed the petition for termination, he or she receiving, must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she no longer poses a significant of causing bodily injury to self or to other persons by owning, possessing, purchasing, or danger receiving a firearm.  The forms to file for termination of a final extreme risk protective order can be obtained, effective September 1, 2019, at the Criminal Division or on the Judiciary's website at https://www.njcourts.gov/forms/12433_erpo_petition_for_term.pdf
[brief] [...]  VOLUME I APPENDIX DOCUMENT APPENDIX  PAGE #  Contract between [...] and [...] dated December,12,2012 for Director of the Meadowlands Hospital Sleep Center attached as Exhibit E to the Certification of [...] in support of Defendant’s Motion for summary judgment  ...........................................  Pa.  160-165  Agreement between [...] and [...] dated December 14, 2012 for President of the Medical Staff and Co-Director of the ICU at Meadowlands attached as Exhibit E to the certification of [...] in Support of Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment......................  Pa. 166-177  Agreement between [...] and [...] dated September 1,2014 for services as Chief Medical Officer of Meadowlands Hospital attached as Exhibit E to the Certification of [...] in support of Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment  .................................  Pa. 178-183  Transcript of the Deposition Testimony of [...] on May 26, 2022 attached as Exhibit F to the Certification of [...] in Support of Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment.  The document is not attached as it has been included in Plaintiff Appellant’s Appendix Vol. I, Pa. 64- 100..........................  | APPENDIX DOCUMENT | APPENDIX PAGE # | |----------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------| | Defendants’ Document Production pertinent to alleged defenses of nonpayment of amounts owing to [...] based on his delay in chart submissions attached as Exhibit G to the Certification of [...] in Support of Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment | Pa. 184-287 | | Transcript of the deposition testimony of [...] taken on May 26, 2022 attached as Exhibit H to the Certification of [...] in support of Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment | Pa. 288-317 | | Transcript of the deposition testimony of [...] taken on July 21, 2022 attached as Exhibit I to the Certification of [...] in support of Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment | Pa. 318-351 | | Defendant [...]’s answers to interrogatories certified by [...] on July 16, 2021 attached as Exhibit J to the Certification of [...] in support of Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment | Pa. 353-365 | | APPENDIX DOCUMENT | APPENDIX PAGE # | |----------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------| |
[brief] First, Plaintiff notes that Defendant did not address the trial judge’s determination of the equities under the abuse of discretion standard concerning his finding whether plaintiff exercised adequate effort in applying the fictitious pleading requirements.  However, because Defendant’s argument is that the statute of limitations should have applied to preclude Plaintiff’s claim entirely, and that argument does not incorporate nor rely on any “determination of the equities,” that point is irrelevant and need not be examined to find that the statute of limitations was, in fact, violated.  However, Plaintiff is wrong when he asserted that [...] never challenged [...]’s exercise of discretion in evaluating the equities.  To the contrary, [...] specifically addressed why [...]’s reasoning was erroneous.  ([...]’s initial brief at pp. 39-41)  As such, this first argument is without merit.  **ISSUE II: WHETHER JUDGE COVELLO PROPERLY EXERCISED HIS DISCRETION IS IRRELEVANT, BECAUSE HE ERRED BY NOT APPLYING THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.
[brief] ”  Each party argued competing definitions of the word that required the Court to analyze the complete set of integrated documents to divine the true intent.  Relying on ATL. M. Airlines v. Schwimmer, 12 N.J. 293 (1953), the Conway court stated:  Evidence of the circumstances is always admissible in the aid of the interpretation of an integrated agreement.  This is so even when the contract on its face is free from ambiguity.  The polestar of construction is the intention of the parties to the contract as revealed by the language used, taken as an entirety; and, in the quest for the intention, the situation of the parties, the attendant circumstances, and the objects they were thereby striving to attain are necessarily to be regarded.
[brief] The Sketch was only a schematic drawing to illustrate the building’s façade showing approximate dimensions that were not-to-scale.  Regardless, the approximate +/- 51’ dimension shown on the Sketch is actually close to the 50’-6” actual building height (within 00.08%) from the finished grade to the roof deck, excluding the parapet.  As the City Ordinance does not include the parapet in the calculation of building height, the Appellant is simply incorrect in his claim that the height on the Sketch is to the top of the building façade including the parapet.  His interpretation of the +/-51’ dimension is not supported by anything shown on the Sketch or the approved plans.  It is merely an unsupported and incorrect assertion made by the Appellant’s in an attempt to contrive a claim that simply does not exist.
[brief] (2T9:1-11)  He reiterates the same gesture of filing the appeal without transcripts\(^{24}\) (2T8:10-11).  The Superior Court agrees with [...]; the Municipal Court should have granted the stay instead of imposing the penalty of a fine, 10-day jail sentence and probation, in part, because a defendant in municipal court who has the right to file an appeal maintains their presumption of innocence (2T9:12-16) (enter in court rule/statute).
[brief] ”  3T52:1-5.  He also stated that he prepared a deferred compensation report and analysis for the employees who were the basis of these complaints.  3T52:1-53:25.  After stating that part of his role was to prepare the P&L statements, [...] could not explain why after testimony confirming fees for [...]’ client, [...], were deposited into [...]’ personal account or why they were also on the company’s P&L.
[brief] Where a warning has been given, it is for you as jurors to determine whether the warning given was adequate to meet the duty of care.  had reason to know of the dangerous or defective condition, (2) realized or in the exercise of reasonable foresight should have realized it involved an unreasonable risk of harm to the guest, (3) had reason to believe the guest would not discover the condition and realize the risk, and (4) failed to take reasonable steps to protect the guest from the danger by either making the condition safe or warning the guest of the condition and the risk involved, you may find the host negligent under the circumstances.  If, however, you find that the defect was obvious and the owner/occupier had reason to believe the social guest would be aware of the defect and the risk involved, you must find the host was not negligent even though an injury occurred.
[brief] Certainly, the dismissal was not arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable or not supported by substantial credible evidence in the record as a whole such as would call for reversal.  See Dennery v. Bd. of Educ. of Passaic Cty. Regional High Sch., supra, 131 N.J. at 641; Henry v. Rahway State Prison, supra, 81 N.J. at 580.  CONCLUSION  For the foregoing reasons it is respectfully submitted that the Final Decision of the [...] dated August 22, 2023 and Decision on Motion to Dismiss dated July 26, 2022 must be affirmed in their entirety.
[brief] IF THE COURT DOES NOT REVERSE APPELLANT’S CONVICTION, THE COURT SHOULD REMAND FOR RE-SENTENCING TO A MORE REASONABLE MONTHLY PAYMENT PLAN.  Respondent’s argument that the Law Division did not err in sentencing Appellant to an unreasonable monthly payment plan focuses on the information presented to [...] at sentencing in the court below, but fails to address the additional evidence of Appellant’s indigence now before this Court.  This evidence, namely Appellant’s bank account statement and summary of monthly expenses filed as part of Appellant’s motion for the assignment of pro bono counsel, (Aa100-102), is sufficient for this Court to remand this matter for re-sentencing in the event the Court does not reverse Appellant’s conviction.  VI.
[brief] Pa269  Appendix Index Complaint and Jury  Pa001  Motion for Dismissal 9/9/12  Pa013 Certification in Support of Dismissal 9/9/22  Pa017 Exhibit 1 in Support of Certification  9/9/21 (Notice of Claim)  Pa019 Exhibit 2 in Support of Certification Complaint and Jury (Attached at Pa001)  Motion for Dismissal by [...]- 9/20/21  Pa024
[brief] 101a.  12.  [...] is owned by [...], with offices also located in the same office and suite as [...], [...] and [...], to wit: [...].  101a, 125a.  13.  [...] is also known by his Hebrew name of [...].  14.  Accordingly, Plaintiff, Plaintiff’s in-house counsel and the in-house process server are all located in the same office.  101a.  15.  [...] is the owner of [...] see Frenkel Transcript p. 25:12-19.  101a, 150a.  16.  [...] is a partner at Intervenor, [...] the purchaser of the foreclosed property in this case and was produced as a representative of [...].  Deposition of [...], p. 16, line 2-10.  148a and 101a.  17.
[brief] ”  Db9.  *Liquidated damages* is the sum a party to a contract agrees to pay if he breaks some promise, and which, having been arrived at by a good faith effort to estimate in advance the actual damages that will probably ensue from the breach, is legally recoverable as agreed damages if the breach occurs.  A *penalty* is the sum a party agrees to pay in the event of a breach, but which is fixed, not as a pre-estimate of probable actual damages, but as a punishment, the threat of which is designed to prevent the breach. ”  *Wasserman’s*, 137 N.J. at 248-249 (emphases in original)(citation omitted).  Thus, the parties agree that the $17,900 the chargeback provision required Appellants “to pay [if they broke their] promise” to pay rent on time every month was not “arrived at by a good faith effort to estimate in advance the actual damages that will probably ensue from the breach,” and therefore the chargeback provision does not provide for “liquidated damages” as defined in *Wasserman’s*.  However, the fact that the chargeback clause does not provide for “liquidated damages” does not exempt it from the reasonableness test adopted in *Wasserman’s* in the first place, which is applicable to all “stipulated damages clauses.
[brief] The ALJ’s Decision Was Supported By Legally Competent Evidence.  In the OAL, hearsay evidence is admissible subject to the judge’s discretion, and accorded whatever weight the judge deems appropriate.  See N.J.A.C. 1:1-15.5.  A court must ensure that there is "a residuum of legal and competent evidence in the record to support it."  Weston v. State, 60 N.J. 36, 51 (1972).
[brief] For the reasons presented above, the Board respectfully requests that the trial court’s Orders of August 8, 2023, Pa001 and December 19, 2023, Pa021, be reversed and vacated, the Board’s Resolution PB-2023-003 dated January 23, 2023, be affirmed and reinstated ordered enter directing [...] to refund all moneys paid to it under the trial court’s aforesaid Orders.  Respectfully submitted, [...], ESQ (029151982)  [...] [...] P [...] E [...]  Attorneys for CoPlaintiff/Petitioner, [...]
[brief] By mid-2018, [...] stated that they had no need for plaintiffs because they had “already acquired” the solar-energy development assets owned by plaintiffs, from [...], in a high-risk move that wagered that their conduct would somehow pass judicial scrutiny.  [...] filed an answer on October 12, 2021, then filed an opposition to the SAC motion with a “cross-motion” that comprised a 187-page extraneous materials.  Invoking Rule 4:6-2(e), [...] sought summary judgment under 4:46 with almost 200 pages of materials (187 pages, to be precise), and its papers sought relief inartfully as a motion to dismiss under Rule 4:6-2(e), which should have been overruled, and the SAC permitted.  The order on the motion clearly stated that plaintiff’s motion for leave to file SAC was “denied without prejudice.
[brief] Such language is absent from the policy.  (Zb26,n.9.)  ([...] concedes there is no “language in the GL policy which relates its coverage to any coverage existing under the Workers’ Compensation policy. ” (Dta 854-55.))  Although the CCIP manual provides that a subcontractor issued a workers compensation policy is automatically a named insured on the liability policies, it does not also say that the converse is true.  The cases cited by [...] to support its unenrollment argument are inapposite.  Team Indus. Services, Inc. v. [...] American Ins. Co. 87 F.4th 461 (10th Cir. 2023) (addressing coverage for an entity that “never enrolled, nor was ever invited to enroll” in an OCIP), and *Marin Crane Works, L.P. v. [...] American Ins. Co.*, 642 S.W.3d 551,553 (Tx.2022) (simply referencing discretion to exclude subcontractors from a CCIP).  Compare, *Workers Compensation Fund v. Wadman Corp.*, 210 P.3d 277, 287 (Utah 2009) (“no notice was given to [the contractor] by [the CCIP insurer] of the insurance policy being cancelled, [accordingly] the policy is still valid. ”).  [...]’s arguments, which highlight the vagaries and complexities inherent in CCIP coverage, confirm the necessity of a single repository for the conveyance of notice of policy changes – [...].  **II.THE VOLUNTARY PAYMENT DOCTRINE IS INAPPLICABLE**
[brief] Plaintiffs’ case law citations are misplaced because they do not address [...]’s third-party beneficiary status.  The husband in *Moore v. Woman to Woman Obstetrics & Gynecology, LLC*, 416 N.J. Super. 30, 34, 40–41 (App. Div. 2010), sued his wife’s obstetrician over medical care provided to her, not to him.  But [...] himself received services from [...] under [...]’s Agreement: he received a ride by a driver with whom [...] had connected using the [...] app for both of their benefit.  The Agreement here expressly applies to third parties like [...] who benefit from using [...]’s services.  (Da85.)  This Court should follow the numerous other courts that have enforced this exact contractual provision against third-party beneficiary passengers like [...].
[directive] See Steele, supra, 430 N.J. Super. at 41 (recognizing that violation of a non-monetary condition of bail designed to protect the community may trigger revocation, referring to the court’s “inherent power to confine the defendant”).  The Bail Reform Law, moreover, expressly recognizes in this regard that “nothing [in the Act] would be construed to affect the court’s existing authority to revoke pretrial release prior to the effective date of those sections [that depend on the effective date of the amendment to Article I, paragraph 11 to authorize the denial of pretrial release].”  Statement to S. 946, Second Reprint, 216th Leg. (June 31, 2014) (emphasis added).  Page 68 determines that: (a) the State will be able to present clear and convincing evidence at the revocation hearing to justify revocation, and (b) unless release is revoked and defendant is detained, there is a serious risk that defendant (i) will not appear in court when required, (ii) will pose a danger to any other person or the community, or (iii) will obstruct or attempt to obstruct the criminal justice process, or threaten, injure, or intimidate, or attempt to threaten, injure, or intimidate, a prospective witness or juror.  8.3
[brief] ........................................  H1653a [...] response to discovery request HOLM-[...]-PNL-38 .......  H1671a [...] response to discovery request HOLM-[...]-PNL-39 .......  H1672a [...] response to discovery request HOLM-[...]-PNL-40 .......  H1673a [...] response to discovery request HOLM-[...]-PNL-41 .......  H1674a [...] response to discovery request HOLM-[...]-PNL-78 .......  H1675a [...] response to discovery request HOLM-[...]-PNL-113 .......  H1676a [...] response to discovery request HOLM-[...]-PNL-114 .......  H1677a [...] response to discovery request HOLM-[...]-PNL-115 .......  H1678a [...] response to discovery request HOLM-[...]-PNL-116 .......  H1679a [...] response to discovery request HOLM-[...]-PNL-117 .......  H1680a [...] response to discovery request HOLM-[...]-PNL-118 .......  H1681a [...] response to discovery request HOLM-[...]-PNL-119 .......  H1682a [...] response to discovery request HOLM-[...]-PNL-120 .......  H1683a [...] response to discovery request HOLM-[...]-PNL-121 .......  H1684a [...] response to discovery request HOLM-[...]-PNL-122 .......  H1685a [...] response to discovery request HOLM-[...]-PNL-123 .......  H1686a [...] response to discovery request HOLM-[...]-PNL-124 .......  H1687a S-8: [...] responses to discovery requests HOLM-[...]-OTT-126 to -156 (except HOLM-[...]-OTT-133) (see also Holm-123 to -147) (SOICR p. 9)
[brief] MUTCD Section 2C.01 specifically addresses the use of warning signs.  (Pa1418).  According to the MUTCD, warning signs call attention to unexpected conditions of or adjacent to a highway, street, or private roads open to public travel and to situations that might not be readily apparent to road users.  *Ibid.*  Warning signs also alert road users to conditions that might call for a reduction in speed or an action in the interest of safety and efficient traffic operations.  *Ibid.*  According to the MUTCD, a “Bump” sign should be used to give warning to a sharp rise in the profile of the road.
[brief] *R.J. Gaydos Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Nat'l Consumer Ins. Co.*, 168 N.J. 255, 271, 773 A.2d 1132, 1142 (2001).  The appellate division’s recent acknowledgement, in *Francavilla*, *supra*, confirms the earlier statements by this Court in *Woo-Padva v Midland Funding*, 2023 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1550 (App. Div, 2023) regarding the lack of a private right of action.
[brief] Defense counsel requested that the court hold a Sands/Brunson hearing prior to [...] deciding whether he would testify.  The State moved to admit [...]’s two prior convictions.  [...]’s earliest prior conviction was from May 30, 2007, for third-degree possession of CDS with intent to distribute.  He was sentenced to one year of probation.  The second conviction was from October 13, 2011, for third-degree aggravated assault.  [...] was sentenced to time served and four years of probation.  (6T:131-1 to 19)  (PSR 5, 6)  On April 10, 2015, [...] was resentenced to an additional two years of probation following a violation of probation.  (6T:129-6 to 10; 131-23 to 132-4)  (PSR 6)  At the hearing, the State did not address the age of either conviction, instead arguing that the prior convictions were relevant to Mr. Rhyme’s credibility because the 2011 conviction “show[s] that there is some sort of penchant for some level of violence in [...]’s history. ”  (6T:128-13 to 22)  The State did not address the probative value of the 2007 conviction at all.  Defense counsel argued that both [...]’s 2011 and 2007 convictions were remote under 601(b)(1) because they were more than ten years old at the time that trial began.
[brief] ”  *Keyes*, 184 N.J. at 556 (quoting *Jones*, 179 N.J. at 390) (internal quotations omitted).  Deficiencies in the veracity or basis of knowledge prongs may be compensated for by police corroboration of information indicating that the informant’s tip was grounded on inside information, rather than on circulating rumors or observations that could be easily gleaned by a casual observer.  *Id.* at 555, 558 (citing *Smith*, 155 N.J. at 95).
[brief] I.  THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY GRANTED THE ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE RELIEF  BECAUSE THE FORCED SALE OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTY WAS CONTRARY TO THE APRIL 13, 2022  CONSENT JUDGMENT BETWEEN THE CO-OWNERS AS THERE WERE GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT ON WHETHER THERE WAS UNANIMOUS CONSENT TO SELL THE PROPERTY FOR A PRICE THAT WAS WELL BELOW  MARKET VALUE (Da1)..................................................................................................................21  II.  THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO CONSIDER AND ENFORCE  THE BINDING TERMS OF THE CONSENT JUDGMENT RELATING TO THE MARKETING AND SALE OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTY WHICH THE CO-OWNERS AGREED TO ON APRIL 13, 2022 (Da1, Da4).........................................................29  III.  THE TRIAL COURT  ERRONEOUSLY DENIED [...]’S REQUEST FOR LEAVE TO FILE COUNTERCLAIMS IN RESPONSE TO [...]’S VERIFIED COMPLAINT BECAUSE THE ISSUES RAISED IN THE COUNTERCLAIMS DIRECTLY RELATE TO WHETHER THE SALE OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTY TO [...] WAS VALID AND CONDUCTED IN GOOD FAITH (Da4).........................................................31  IV.  THE TRIAL COURT, PROBATE PART, DID NOT HAVE JURISDICTION TO HEAR THE CONTRACT DISPUTE RAISED IN THE ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE AS THE PROPERTY WAS NOT A PROBATE ASSET AND THE ENFORCEMENT OF THE CONSENT  JUDGMENT IS A BREACH OF CONTRACT ACTION, NOT A PROBATE ONE (Da487, 1T22)...........................................................................................................33  CONCLUSION......................................................................................................................36
[brief] ”  Jacoby, 442 N.J. Super. at 466.³  “[S]pecial reasons necessary to establish a height variance must be tailored to the purpose for imposing height restrictions in the zoning ordinance. ”  Grasso, 375 N.J. Super. at 52.  Plaintiff’s proofs also satisfy this standard.  As with all variances, height variance are subject to the negative criteria: “the variance can be granted ‘without substantial detriment to the public good and will not substantially impair the intent and the purpose of the zone plan and zoning ordinance,’ or the so-called negative requirement[.]”
[brief] (Ra6.)  The following day the City filed Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration.  (Ra6.)  On March 1, 2024, the Court denied Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration.  (Ra6.)  On May 8, 2024, Plaintiff filed a Motion for a Stay of the Case.  (Ra7.)  Plaintiff also filed a Motion for Leave to Appeal to the Appellate Division, which was granted on April 26, 2024.
[brief] Similarly, Defendant’s use of the Strip was not exclusive.  Plaintiff testified that he paid landscapers to maintain the grass area.  B.  Defendant did not prove actual possession of the Strip property for thirty years (Raised Below: 1T141; 1T164).  The court below glazed over the criteria for adverse possession to establish that Defendant should own the Strip.  For example, the court re-packaged its conclusions regarding actual and inquiry notice, discussed previously, as findings that the Defendant simultaneously proved the third and fourth elements of adverse possession.