ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] A trial judge may use any acceptable method to calculate value, however, the court must determine that the method utilized yields the fair value of the business interest.  *Hughes v. Sego International Ltd.*, 192 N.J. Super. 60, 68 (App. Div. 1983).  “There are few assets whose valuation imposes as difficult, intricate and sophisticated a task as interests in close corporations. ”  *Lavene v. Lavene*, 148 N.J. Super. 267, 275 (App. Div.), certif. denied., 75 N.J. 28 (1977).  The “findings of the trial court are critical as the valuation of closely-held corporations are inherently fact-based” and thus “not an exact science.
[directive] NOTIFICATION OF DEATH  Notification of death presents unique difficulties for both law enforcement personnel and survivors.  Both notifying and being notified of the death of a loved one are most often painful and extremely traumatic experiences.  Although there is no "good" way to notify survivors of a sudden and unexpected death, the compassionate expression of dignity and respect will result in proper notification which will assist survivors to cope with their great loss.  It is recommended that law enforcement officers, preferably those involved in the investigation, notify the next of kin of the death in person.  At no time should survivors be notified of the death by telephone.  It is further suggested that law enforcement agencies utilize two officers to effectuate the in-person notification function, and that one of them be in uniform.  Although some survivors have asserted that the appearance of a uniformed officer at their home caused trauma, the uniform itself is an identification that will prevent confusion.  Thus, the survivors will be more likely to be put at ease and to answer the door and permit entry.  Also, there are other advantages in utilizing two officers to effect a death notification.  One officer should communicate the information while the other carefully observes the reactions of the survivors.  Individuals react to death in various and often unexpected ways.  Some may suffer physical reactions which may require emergency first aid, while others may become violent or aggressive which may require their being physically restrained from harming themselves or others.  In addition, it may be advantageous to notify two or more survivors separately, especially in instances which may require them to provide law enforcement officers with investigative information.  In order to ensure that survivors are informed of a death by official sources, notification of the next of kin should occur as soon as possible after the death is discovered and the victim's identity determined.
[brief] On January 20, 2021, Plaintiffs’ counsel sent a letter to the Borough’s counsel, requesting that the [...] enter a resolution acknowledging that pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40:55D-53.j, the Roads had been dedicated to, and accepted by, the Borough, and were therefore public roadways.  (Da332-Da333.)  The Borough never responded to such letter, and at its meeting on June 17, 2021, the [...], without prior notice to Plaintiffs, and without providing any rationale, entered Resolution R-238-21, pursuant to which it resolved that “the proposed dedication of [sic] Roadway as shown on the plat plan and conditioned in the resolution approved by the [...] be and is hereby rejected and denied. ”  (Da335.)  The resolution was on the Council’s consent agenda, which meant that there was no public discussion of same, nor rationale provided, prior to its passage.  (Da377, Tr. 2:2-3, 24-25; Da378, Tr. 3:1-3.)  _____________________  1  For reasons unknown to Plaintiffs, the Borough, which was the defendant in this matter, prefaced each page number of its appendix, and cites to its appendix, as “Pa,” despite the fact that it was not the plaintiff.  Accordingly, references in this brief to “Da” refer to the Borough’s appendix, because the Borough is the defendant in this matter; and references in this brief to “Pa” refer to Plaintiffs’ appendix.  On August 2, 2021, Plaintiffs filed a complaint in lieu of prerogative writs against the Borough pursuant to R. 4:69-1 (the “Complaint”), asserting three counts: (i) Count One – that the June 17, 2021 resolution be invalidated and that a judgment be entered declaring the Roads to be public roads accepted for dedication by the Borough; (ii) Count Two – promissory and equitable estoppel against the Borough; and (iii) Count Three – in the alternative, that judgment be entered confirming that [...] may restrict access to the Roads in the event they were determined to be private roads.
[brief] Nothing in the Ordinance or the Notice indicated that there would be no warehouses within the Redevelopment Area.  (Pa89-Pa91).  In fact, the underlying zoning (in place for decades), C-57, specifically permits warehouse and distribution uses.  (Pa285).  Had Plaintiff simply requested a copy of the Redevelopment Plan, the extent of the proposed development would have been clear.  (Da91-Da92 & Pa108-Pa109).
[brief] The trial court found in the Prior Action that the direct and proximate cause of the Appellants’ alleged losses, the same losses alleged herein, was their failure to pay rent to [...].  As the trial court noted in its Opinion granting summary judgment to the [...] in the Prior Action, “If [Appellants] had not defaulted under the Lease, they would have the Solar Rights and Solar Project, and the subject action would be moot. ”  [Pa144].  Additionally, like their claims against the [...] in the Prior Action, the Appellants cannot show any causal link between [...]’s actions in making the alleged representations to Appellants when they entered into the Lease and Sale and Purchase Agreement in 2015, and their subsequent failure to pay the rent two (2) years later in 2017.
[brief] If [...]’s obligation was to issue a policy and it was not responsible for closing or settlement services, then plaintiff’s claim that it was [...]’s obligation to produce the correct deed fails.  This is consistent with the “Important Notice and Disclosure” statement within the commitment.  It provides, in relevant part, “the Company does not represent you …  You are entitled to review the title insurance commitment with an attorney at law of your own choosing, at your expense, prior to the transfer of title. ”  (304a, paragraph 1).  While a court will liberally construe a title insurance contract in favor of the insured and against the insurer, it will not re-write the contract to provide better terms than the one purchased.
[brief] *Ibid.* (authorizing "the imposition on the non-complying party of litigation expenses that could have been avoided by compliance with this rule").  But the brief delay in learning of the federal action caused no appreciable injury here.  [...] was essentially in no different position when it moved to amend its answer than it was in the short, intervening time-span following [...]'s failure to mention the federal action in its Rule 4:5-1(b)(2) certification.
[brief] A.  [...]’s and [...]’s Knowledge and Statements Are At the Heart of Plaintiffs’ Allegations  [...] asserts that [...]’s and [...]’s relevant involvement was limited to “high-level guidance and final approvals,” contending they weren’t really involved in decisions at the heart of this case.  Opp. at 2.  That assertion is contradicted by [...]’s own public statements and ignores Plaintiffs’ allegations, which are based substantially on the specific statements and actions of [...] and [...].  [...] himself promised that [...] provided users with “‘complete control over who they share with at all times’” by “‘giving you tools to control who can see your information and then making sure only those people you intend can see it. ’”  SACC at ¶ 18 (citation omitted).  And [...] himself said it was “‘my mistake’” that [...] didn’t “‘take a broad enough view of what our responsibility is’” to “‘preven[t] abuse and think’” through how people could use these tools to do harm” in the context of “‘data privacy. ’”  Id. at ¶ 19 (citation omitted).  [...]’s promise and “‘mistake’” are core to Plaintiffs’ case, among other things animating the claims for breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, privacy, and negligence.  *23
[brief] Other state intermediate appellate courts have also held that failure-to-recall claims would create excessive and unmanageable liability.  Perhaps the most thorough is Ford Motor Co. v. [...], 684 S.E.2d 279 (Ga. App. 2009), cert denied (Ga. Feb. 8, 2010).  [...] followed Restatement Third §11 and rejected failure-to-recall claims absent a government-mandated or negligently undertaken voluntary product recall.  Id. at 284-85.  “Georgia common law does not impose a continuing duty upon manufacturers to recall their products. ”  Id. at 285.  [...] also invoked “important public policy concerns” that support leaving recall decisions to administrative agencies.  Id.  Because the cost of locating, recalling, and replacing mass-marketed products can be enormous and will likely be passed on to consumers in the form of higher prices, the recall power should not be exercised without extensive consideration of its economic impact.  Id. (citation and quotation marks omitted).  Accord Lance v. Wyeth, 4 A.3d 160, 167 (Pa. Super. 2010) (“this Court is persuaded by the majority of modern jurisdictions that have decided not to impose a common law duty to recall on a manufacturer”) (citations omitted); The only contrary high court authority is a footnote in Izzarelli v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 136 A.3d 1232 (Conn. 2016), that a “manufacturer separately may be deemed negligent for failing to recall a product[.]”
[brief] Trial Court’s Order Granting Defendant [...]’s Motion to Dismiss and Compel Arbitration Filed May 24, 2024.................................................................Pa000204  Trial Court’s Order Granting Defendants [...] and [...]’s Motion to Dismiss and Compel Arbitration Filed June 20, 2024.................................................................Pa000205  Trial Court’s Amended Order Granting Defendants [...] and [...]’s Motion to Dismiss and Compel Arbitration Filed July 02, 2024.................................................................Pa000207  I.  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT  Plaintiff/Appellant [...] (“Appellant”) appeals the dismissal of her claims of discrimination and retaliation against her former employers, Defendants/Respondents [...] Cancer Institute of New Jersey (“Respondent [...]”), [...] Scientific, LLC (“Respondent [...]”), [...] (“Respondent Watkins-Keller”), and [...] (“Respondent Gregory”) (collectively “Respondents”), all in violation of New Jersey’s Law Against Discrimination, N.J.S.A. 10:5-1, et seq. (the “NJLAD”).
[brief] [...], Esq. [...]  Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant, [...]  Dated: June 14, 2024  SHARON HUSSAIN, Plaintiff-APPELLANT, v. [...]; [...]; [...]; [...]; [...]; [...]; [...]; ABC CORPORATIONS 1-5 (fictitious names describing presently unidentified business entities); and JOHN DOES 1-5 (fictitious names describing presently unidentified individuals), Defendants-Appellees.
[directive] Some New departments in significant number of police jurisdiction and a within their department ensure all law their officers.  To that testing of random conduct drug presently Jersey manner, in consistent testing doing so a random and employing drug are enforcement agencies }....  Paper ared Recyclable Employer •Printed on Recycled is Opportunity Arz Equal ~`~~ ' ~`; Jersey Is New 2 Page requiring all law that enforcement agencies statewide establishes a uniform policy this Directive of all sworn officers.  mandatory testing conduct random drug granted to under Criminal of to authority me the Justice Act  Therefore, pursuant the for which provides general supervision of criminal justice 1970, N.J.S.A. 52:17B-97 to -117, the officer of of law enforcement the State to secure the benefits a by Attorney General as chief the criminal law and the administration of criminal justice of the uniform and efficient enforcement all prosecuting I, [...], hereby DIRECT law enforcement and throughout the State, S. laws of the of New Jersey and under the authority of the State to implement agencies operating procedures, standards, and practices.
[brief] Indeed, [...] – like the petitioners in Cardinale and M.R.– has an additional/impermissible obstacle (i.e., the terms of the Settlement Agreement) precluding him from ever returning to work for [...]; further, his alleged --- 5 Petitioner’s attempt to distinguish M.R. on the grounds that the employee there was suspended for drug charges (Pet. Br., pp. 31, 33) is unavailing.  Not only is that a distinction without a difference as to [...]’s ineligibility for AD, M.R. mentions nothing about drug charges.  Further, Petitioner’s argument that M.R. was decided on 4/6/20, after [...]’s Settlement Agreement was executed, and had no retroactive effect is to no avail because the Board’s Final Administrative Decision was issued on November 16, 2022 and properly applied existing case law.
[brief] As the Henderson Court opined, “with enhanced jury instructions, there will be less need for expert testimony. ”  The Court found such as “[j]ury charges offer a number of advantages: they are focused and concise, authoritative (in that juries hear them from the trial judge, not a witness called by one side), and cost-free; they avoid possible confusion to jurors created by dueling experts; and they eliminate the risk of an expert invading the jury’s role or opining on an eyewitness’s credibility. ”  Henderson, 208 N.J. 280, 298 (2011).  Just two years after the jury instructions ordered in Henderson were promulgated in 2012 (which were discussed at length during the Wade hearing), it is unlikely that Defendant would have been permitted to present such an expert at either the Wade hearing or at trial, that one would have been needed, and that the testimony of such an expert would have changed the jury’s verdict.
[brief] Plaintiff’s expert testimony was inadmissible net opinion because they did not base their conclusions on generally-accepted standards of surveying or engineering.  Plaintiff was obligated to establish the amount of any alleged increase in the amount of stormwater runoff flowing from the [...]’ property onto plaintiff’s property that the [...] allegedly caused.  Ross v. Lowitz, 222 N.J. 494, 511 (2015) (limiting claims of nuisance to losses caused by landowner’s unreasonable use of property adjoining injured party’s property).
[brief] (Da38728-36.)  While [...] expressed doubt that the Code of Judicial Conduct applied to Special Masters, she noted that she “need not reach the issue of whether [...] erred in refusing to apply the Code . . . because even pursuant to the Code and its concomitant legal standards, [...] had no reason to recuse. ”  (Da38733.)  Applying the Code standard, [...] found that “[n]o fully informed reasonable person” would conclude that [...], who has worked on the within matter since 2013 on substantial but specific, discreet issues would . . . lose the ability to assess the matters in this case impartially and make a non-binding recommendation to the court” based on his unrelated mediator role.  (Da38736.)  [...] explained that the [...] “fail[ed] to present any reason within the rules or case law requiring [...]’s recusal,” and that “[t]he only fact the Sinatra Properties case and this case have in common” according to the court, “is that [...] represents a party. ”  (Da38735-36.)  Thus, “[n]o reasonable person would infer [...] has a bias from the simple fact he interacted with the same firm more than once. ” (Da38735.)  On November 29, 2021, a two-judge Appellate Division panel that included the Honorable [...], J.A.D., the only judge from the 2018 appellate panel who had not retired, denied the [...]’ motion for leave to appeal.  (Da39690-91.)  The [...] then sought certification by the New Jersey Supreme Court, which the Supreme Court denied on April 8, 2022.  (Da39693.)
[brief] The only information the officer possessed at the time of the stop was the race and sex of the suspects, with no further descriptors.  That information, which effectively placed every single Black male in the area under the veil of suspicion, was insufficient to justify the stop of the vehicle and therefore does not withstand constitutional scrutiny.  1.  Searches and seizures conducted without warrants issued upon probable cause are presumptively unreasonable and are invalid unless they fall within one of the few well-delineated exceptions to the warrant requirement.
[brief] ’”  *Mount Prospect*, 98 F.4th at 470 (third alteration in original).  The court held that, based on that language, [...] contractually committed itself to arbitrate fraud claims, separate and independent from any obligation to submit the claims to PIP ADR under AICRA.  See *ibid*.  The assignment provision in Plaintiffs’ DPRP contains no such language.  Thus, the Third Circuit’s holding that [...] contractually agreed to arbitrate fraud claims and thereby waived a right to a jury trial on those claims is irrelevant to this case.
[brief] The court summarized defendant’s prior record: “He has a juvenile record of three arrests.  As an adult, he has a record of five arrests with one ordinance violation, two indictable convictions, and one federal conviction. ” (10T54-25 to 55-3).  As the court explained, defendant was “in need of specific deterrence” because, despite a “history of violent offenses and weapons offenses” and being “exposed to a full array of criminal sanctions,” defendant had not yet been dissuaded “from continued antisocial criminal behavior. ” (10T55-24 to 56-5).  Accordingly, the court imposed a twenty-year prison term pursuant to NERA.  (10T57-21 to 58-4).
[brief] 1829; OAL Docket No. [...] (November 2, 2022), [...] was charged with making an intentional misstatement of a material fact in connection with the preparation of an SID report.  The Civil Service Commission found that [...] “misrepresented at least one statement. . . and conduct unbecoming a public employee. ”  The Civil Service Commission considered [...]’s prior disciplinary record and reversed [...]’s removal and instead imposed a 30 day suspension.  See Carter v. South Woods State Prison, OAL Dkt No. CSCV6415-00, AGEN. REF. NO. 2006-3914 (Decided September 11, 2003)(In its discussion as to whether to terminate Officer Carter for purposely “misrepresented and falsified his employment application,” the ALJ reinstated Officer Carter to his post noting that another officer, identified as “[...]” was also not removed from his position even though he was accused of “falsifying his hours and stealing money from the prison. ”).  [...]’s disciplinary record only consists of a written warning and counseling for one incident.  It is undisputed that a number of persons failed to perform their duties that evening – and even well before.  The broken window was known to all.  (2T10.1-7)  [...]’s threat to escape was not communicated to [...] or anyone else in the evening shift.  [...] saw [...] on the outside and said nothing.  The video showed that [...] had also abandoned his post.  Officers [...] was not questioned or investigated for leaving his area unattended.  (1T187.9-18; 1T181.1-4).  Likewise, the DOC investigation’s unit did not question or investigate [...].  (1T192.7 to 193.24).  [...] performed his duties to the same standard as Officers [...] and Minivich who were not disciplined.  Despite each following these protocols, only [...] was investigated and, ultimately and unfairly, punished.
[brief] The trial court’s adoption of the date of the Jan. 31, 2011, Opinion and Order is contrary to the expressed policies of both Massachusetts and New Jersey because it incentivizes insurance companies to delay resolution of even valid claims just as has happened here.  The longer an insurance company can postpone the day of reckoning, the lower its potential exposure will be.  In this case, that is exactly what happened.  The insurance companies were able to delay the resolution of [...]’s valid claim for decades, first by ignoring [...]’s 1986 notice until [...] was forced to file this lawsuit.  Then, once the lawsuit was filed, some of the insurance companies were able to prolong this case for 18 years.  Such conduct should not be rewarded.
[brief] In the only published opinion to support her position, *Nieschmidt v. Leamann*, 399 N.J. Super. 125 (App. Div. 2008), the Court distinguished that case from *Chalom v. Benesh*, 234 N.J. Super. 248 (Law Div. 1989), to wit, “defendant here did not delay in seeking its remedy to dismiss the complaint by failing to respond until the plaintiff attempted to levy on a default judgment.  The judge correctly noted that it was plaintiff instead who delayed in filing its complaint until the statute of limitations made it impossible to give Pre-Action Notice within the period of time mandated by the rule.  Moreover, plaintiff’s purported notice was not sent to the client’s last known address.  The interiors business, not the individual, was plaintiff’s client.  The rule required plaintiff to send the notice to the Pennington address. ”  Id. at 130.  In Chalom, “the defendants were estopped from claiming that the plaintiffs’ pleadings were defective as a basis for vacating the default judgment because they never intended to pursue arbitration,” responding to the lawsuit only after a request for entry of default judgment.  Id. at 129.  Defendant [...] took no action until Plaintiff’s request for default judgment.  Defendant [...] further argues that “the law mandates the attorney to serve the Pre-Action Notice and wiat [sic] 30-days [sic] before filing a complaint.  That never happened here. ”  (Db11-12)  Plaintiff waited more than 30 days before filing the complaint.  He served the Pre-Action Notice by email, regular mail, and certified mail on November 16th, 2018.  Suit was filed on January 14th, 2019, more than 30 days after giving the Rule 1:20A-6 Notice, and the complaint recited the fact that service of the Pre-Action Notice was made by regular and certified mail, as well as by email.  Defendant [...] received actual notice of her right to fee arbitration, and without any doubt whatsoever was handed such notice in court during oral argument on August 27th, 2019.  The ensuing judgment was thus properly entered by the trial court after permitting Defendant [...] to proceed through arbitration and once completed, including the appeal, reinstated the complaint upon Plaintiff’s motion.  The lower court always had subject matter jurisdiction over this matter, and Pre-Action Notice was properly effectuated on Defendant [...].  POINT 3.
[brief] [Id. at 555-556]  This case would abide the same analysis under Plaintiffs’ arguments and even more so for the lack of any separate, third party.  Here, the parties are all members of [...].  It is not a “stranger” to any of them.  At least in DiMisa those plaintiffs could contend that they had no ownership in REI.  Even still, the Supreme Court ruled the limited third-party tort exception could not apply.  Here, Plaintiffs simply contend that [...] controlled [...], their commonly owned entity, when they were seeking to oust him and that he thereby caused [...] to take actions that required [...] to spend legal fees.  As in DiMisa, this argument is no more than that the entity ([...]) was being used as the “instrument of deceit” when [...] controlled it, and therefore was not a separate or distinct third party, or “stranger”.  Indeed, in DiMisa at least the Plaintiffs were not members of REI and could debatably claim it was distinct from them.  In this case, the Plaintiffs are members of [...].  It is a commonly owned entity among all individual parties.  The only difference alleged is who was controlling the parties’ commonly owned entity during this direct, member vs. member litigation.  This is not third-party “stranger” litigation that falls within the exception against fee-shifting.  DiMisa, supra.