ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Once -- if he determined that she did not meet the standard of performance, the case is over.  How could it be reasonably debatable if she can’t perform the job that the -- that the Authority’s subsequent actions maybe didn’t pass muster?  ...  There was actually virtually no cross-examination of the medical witnesses additionally and [the Arbitrator] doesn’t note that there was any reason to not credit the medical professionals.  So, the Authority, based upon the note that was provided, determined that the grievant could not perform the essential functions of the job.  The arbitrator doesn’t base his decision upon a note.  He bases it upon his statement, his opinion, that an employer cannot terminate an employee who’s temporarily disabled.
[brief] In addition, there shall be no outdoor storage or parking of trucks or trailers, except as follows:  (1)  The outdoor parking in the open of delivery and service vehicles, which parking shall be subject to the requirements provided in § 230-205.  (2)  The parking of trucks and trailers at loading docks during the course of loading and unloading and temporarily preceding and following the loading or unloading operations.  There shall be no outdoor storage or parking of construction equipment, except during the course of construction on the premises.  C.  In all residential zones, outdoor storage is prohibited including any discarded furniture, household appliance or other debris, salvaged materials, junk or wastes of any kind, except trash, garbage, and similar wastes temporarily stored in suitable containers awaiting scavenger collection.
[directive] While a police officer has the same constitutional rights as any other person during a criminal investigation, their status as a police officer may create special concerns.  For the most part, the internal affairs investigator should utilize the same procedures and apply the same legal principles to the subject officer as he or she would to any other target or suspect in a criminal investigation.  However, the internal affairs investigator should recognize that the interview process of a police officer is somewhat different than that of civilians.  8.0.4
[brief] **Binding and Precedential**  Alexander’s v. Paramus Bor., 125 N.J. 100 (1991)  46  Anderson v. Sills, 143 N.J. Super. 432 (Ch. Div. 1976)  43 Barron v. Kolenda, 491 Mass 408 (Mass. 2023)  40 Belin v. Reynolds, 989 N.W. 2d 166 (Iowa 2023)  41 Bennett v. Schmidt, 153 F. 3d 516 (7th Cir. 1998)  26 Besler v. Board of Educ. of West Windsor-Plainsboro Reg’l School Dist., 201 N.J. 544 (2010)  33  Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520 (1995)  4,38 Colburn v. Upper Darby Township, 838 F. 2d 663 (3d Cir. 1988)  26 C.V. v. Waterford Twp. Bd. of Educ., 255 N.J. 289 (2023)  38 DeVesa v.  Dorsey, 134 N.J. 420 (1993)  42  Dobco, Inc. v. Bergen County Improvement Authority, 250 N.J. 396 (2022) (per curiam)  39  Flagg v. Essex Cnty Prosecutor, 171 N.J. 561 (2002)  5  Friedman v. Martinez, 242 N.J. 449 (2020)  4  Gayles v. Sky Zone Trampoline Park, 468 N.J. Super. 17 4 (App. Div. 2021)  Gonzalez v. Trevino, 602 U.S. __ (June 20, 2024)
[brief] “The examination method of analysis, comparison, evaluation, followed by verification (ACE-V) is the established method for perceiving detail in two prints and making decisions. ”  Id. at 9-3.  “ACE gives the expert specific phases of examination that can be used to document the perception, information gathering, comparison, and decision-making that takes place during an examination of prints. ”  Id. at 9-12.  Under the ACE-V methodology, the first step is the analysis phase, in which the examiner assesses each print by “systemically separating the impression into its various components. ”  *Id.* at 9-13.  That means that the friction ridge details of both the latent and the known print are determined.  The next step is comparison, where the latent and exemplar are compared “to determine whether the details in two prints are in agreement based upon similarity, sequence, and spatial relationship. ”  *Ibid.*  “The examiner makes comparative measurements of all types of details and their sequences and configurations. ”  *Ibid.*  “Comparative measurements of first, second, and third level details are made along with comparisons of the sequences and configurations of ridge paths. ”  *Ibid.*  The third step is evaluation, where the examiner reaches a conclusion about the relationship between two prints.  “Whereas in the comparison phase, the examiner makes determinations of agreement or disagreement of individual details of the prints in question, in the evaluation phase the examiner makes the final determination as to whether a finding of individualization, or same source of origin, can be made.
[brief] The [...] properly documented their entitlement to summary judgment before the trial court in accordance with the N.J.  Court Rules.  The [...] included a 25-paragraph Statement of Uncontroverted Facts (“SUF”), ³ This portion of the Complaint was in capital letters, which have not been used here. which was fully supported with citations to the record as required by R. 4:46-2(a).  Pa337-Pa343.  Importantly, Plaintiff did not submit a counterstatement in response to the SUF as provided by R. 4:46-2(b).  Instead, Plaintiff filed an unfocused document which admitted some paragraphs of the SUF, denied others (but without a citation to the records as required by R. 4:46-2(b)), ignored several others and objected to a few more.  Pa480-Pa482.  Due to Plaintiff’s non-compliance with R. 4:46-2(b) and the case law, infra, every paragraph in the [...]’ SUF should be deemed admitted.
[brief] (Da3191-3193)  Accordingly, there is no basis in fact or law for this Court to reverse [...]’s decision to use [...]’s 2018 ‘net asset value’, determined by [...], as the fair buyout methodology in this case, but instead to impose “book value” as Plaintiffs sought.  (Da3196-3197)  The only basis for a dispute as to the proper ‘net asset value’ calculation was the Court’s allowance of the Plaintiffs’ embedded discount to [...]’s equity for their personal legal fees in this case which they had converted into in [...] “liability” on paper.  [...] lost 29.5% of his net equity by pro rata payment of his adversaries’ personal legal fees through this accounting trick.  The Court should affirm the use of 2018 ‘net asset value’ as [...]’s fair value.  However, it should require that the Court use [...]’s ‘net asset value’ undiscounted by the Plaintiffs’ legal fee reimbursement booked but unpaid ‘liability’.  That net asset value according to [...] would be $9,061,545.  (Da2849)(9T70:6-15)  CONCLUSION
[brief] (Da 25-33)  The State presented, and the motion court accepted, a false picture of how [...]’s and her daughter’s consent was obtained.  On their telling, [...] spontaneously offered to help the police upon first sighting and never once resisted.  But the BWC and police reports, which were considered but not properly analyzed below, revealed an entirely different story: [...] initially refused to cooperate or consent and only relented after being detained, handcuffed, questioned, and threatened by multiple police officers during an undescribed interrogation.  Not only did the court get the facts wrong, but it also failed to analyze the legally required consent factors, which, when properly considered, overwhelmingly favored suppression.  Because the State failed to prove that [...]’s consent was voluntary, suppression was required.
[brief] The appeals court ultimately affirmed the trial court decision.  On or about March 17, 2023, parties agreed that the Referendum Contest had been fully resolved.  Consequently, the parties were notified by the Commission on April 17, 2023, that the Complaint would be discussed by the Commission at its meeting on April 25, 2023, in order to make a determination regarding the Motion to Dismiss.  Following its discussion on April 25, 2023, the Commission adopted a decision at its meeting on May 23, 2023, granting the Motion to Dismiss in its entirety because Complainant failed to plead sufficient credible facts to support a finding that Respondents had violated the indicated statutes.
[brief] Contrary to Defendant’s position at Db13, the jointly reached Agreement between the parties bypasses Carr and intends that the parties would continue to work together to keep the Separation Agreement viable as the matter progressed so that they may have the involuntary disability merits reach the [...].  Appellant further misinterprets the Carr holding in his argument that Respondent, having entered into a Separation Agreement, is left with no legal recourse against the Appellant.  That is also not accurate.  The Agreement itself identifies the Superior Court as venue for any dispute under the Agreement (Da18, Par. 15).  Wherefore, for the reasons stated herein, Carr is not applicable to this case and Appellant’s appeal must be dismissed in toto.
[brief] i.  The refusal to voir dire prospective jurors about their preconceived ideas about the reliability of fingerprint examination requires reversal.  Before trial, [...] requested that the prospective jurors be asked during voir dire if they “believe that fingerprint analyses are reliable. ”  (1T 32-1 to 11)  He noted that “people are of the belief that fingerprint analysis is infallible” due to exposure to that assertion “through pop culture and CSI. ”  (1T 10-20 to 11-3)  A decision was not made on the record, but no question about jurors’ beliefs about the reliability of fingerprint analysis was not during voir dire.  (2T)  The failure to ask any sort of question that would allow defense counsel to assess whether a juror had any preexisting bias that would prevent him from considering whether the fingerprint analysis in this case was deprived [...] of a fair trial.
[brief] at 183.  Although generally the courts will look to the subjective intent of the insured to cause an injury by his intentional actions, under certain circumstances, it has been held that “the objective conduct of the actor also determines the actor’s subjective intent to injure. ”  Merrimack Mutual Fire Ins. Co. v. Coppola, supra, 299 N.J. Super. at 227.  In such cases, “[t]he very nature of the conduct imputes the actor’s subjective intent to cause some injury to the victim. ”  299 N.J. Super. at 227.  That was the case in Harleysville Insurance Companies v. Garitta, supra, where the Court determined that the trial court correctly granted summary judgment declaring that there was no homeowners liability insurance coverage for the death of a visitor who became embroiled in an altercation with the insured's son and was stabbed with a kitchen knife, albeit purportedly without any true intent to cause him serious harm.
[brief] A full review of Appellant’s arguments and of the record demonstrates that Appellant’s beliefs, though, are unsupported by the factual evidence.  The Appellant’s claims first rely on the theory that if a *prima facie* case for discrimination is set forth at summary judgment, the analysis of liability should cease, and the claims should proceed to trial.  On reconsideration, the trial court correctly determined that the analysis must also incorporate affirmative defenses set forth by the City.  Here, the City maintained an affirmative defense by demonstrating the maintenance and use of an effective anti-discrimination and anti-harassment policy.  The facts were undisputed as to the policy, training, and investigation related to same.  Appellant’s departure is solely based on his disagreement with the outcome.  However, this subjective feeling of the Appellant is not dispositive of the effectiveness of the policy at issue nor is it a legal basis for reversal.  Indeed, the record at the trial court was clear: the [...] is entitled to an affirmative defense to vicarious liability pursuant to factors set forth in *Dunkley*.  For the reasons set forth more fully below, it is respectfully requested that this Court affirm the trial court’s grant of reconsideration and summary judgment.
[brief] \(^4\) N.J.R.E. 404(b)(1) prohibits “evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts . . . to prove a person’s disposition in order to show that on a particular occasion the person acted in conformity with such disposition. ”  But certain uses of prior bad-act evidence are permitted under N.J.R.E. 404(b)(2): “proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident when such matters are relevant to a material issue in dispute. ”  (1) the evidence of the other crime must be relevant to a material issue in dispute; (2) the evidence must be similar in kind and reasonably close in time to the offense charged; (3) the evidence must be clear and convincing; and, (4) the evidence’s probative value must not be outweighed by its apparent prejudice.  Cofield, 127 N.J. at 338.  The admission of prior bad-act evidence is therefore the exception, not the rule.  Put differently, N.J.R.E. 404(b) favors exclusion.  Reddish, 181 N.J. at 608-09.  A limited exception to this rule of exclusion exists for “intrinsic” evidence.  See State v. Rose, 206 N.J. 141, 180-82 (2011) (ending the use of the “res gestae” doctrine to circumvent Rule 404(b) and defining the narrower exception for intrinsic evidence).  Evidence of bad acts is intrinsic if it falls into one of two narrow categories: (1) the act “directly proves” the charged crime; or (2) the act “contemporaneously” “facilitated” the charged crime.  Ibid.  (quoting United States v. Green, 617 F.3d 233, 248-49 (3d Cir. 2010)).  If the acts fall into one of these categories, then “it does not constitute other-acts evidence” and is not subject to N.J.R.E. 404(b) and the rigors of a Cofield analysis.  State v. Santamaria, 236 N.J. 390, 410 (2019).
[brief] The plaintiff in the underlying lawsuit was injured while in the course and scope of his employment with [...], a subcontractor of [...], and in that situation, the New Jersey Workers’ Compensation Act (the “WCA”) serves as the sole remedy for an injured party against his or her employer.  Absent an indemnity agreement, the sole party to whom the underlying plaintiff could directly apportion liability for his injuries was [...].  Separate from, yet related to the issue of directly apportioning liability to a tortfeasor, is the issue of contractual indemnification.  In accordance with the industry standard, and pursuant to the Subcontract, [...] agreed to indemnify O.A.  Peterson.  The indemnification clause copied language found in the American Institute of Architects’ (“AIA”) Document A201.  Courts around this country, including the United States Supreme Court, have routinely upheld identical or analogous language as unambiguous.  Nonetheless, despite identical indemnification language being upheld by the Supreme Court of the United States (See, *United States v. Seckinger*, 397 U.S. 203, 213, n. 17 (1970)), despite the source of the language being referred to by this court as “a widely used form of construction contract,” (See, *Ace Am. Ins. Co. v. Am. Med. Plumbing, Inc.*, 458 N.J. Super. 535, 537 (App. Div. 2019)), and despite the language being referred to as “a paradigm of clarity” by another state’s appellate court (See, *Camp, Dresser & McKee, Inc. v. Paul N. Howard Co.*, 853 So. 2d 1072, 1077 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003)), the Law Division found the clause to be ambiguous.
[brief] Defendant then turns to the CFPB’s announcement of its final rulemaking, known as Reg F (16 CFR § 1006 et seq.), but fails to explain the context.  Under that regulation, the CFPB adopted a form validation notice which, if used correctly, provides safe harbor against certain FDCPA claims.  The CFPB addressed how the industry could convert to using that form:  The Bureau expects that any one-time costs to debt collectors of reformatting the validation notice will be relatively small, particularly for debt collectors who rely on vendors, because the Bureau expects that most vendors will provide an updated notice at no additional cost.  The Bureau understands from its outreach that many covered persons currently use vendors to provide validation notices.  [Footnotes omitted.]  Those comments do not suggest the CFPB considered and decided whether the type of information Defendant shared complies with § 1692c(b).  Defendant then refers to the use of a vendor to receive mail from consumers.  Under 12 CFR § 1006.34(c)(2)(i), a validation notice must include “the mailing address at which the debt collector accepts disputes and requests for original-creditor information. ”  Supplement I to Regulation F provides the CFPB’s Official Interpretations of the Regulation.  The Official Interpretation provides, “A debt collector may disclose a vendor’s mailing address, if that is an address at which the debt collector accepts disputes and requests for original-creditor information.
[brief] ”  This decision - subsequently reversed by the Appellate Division along with the subsequent Orders relating to violations of it - resulted in an uncontrolled situation, with synagogue vehicles parked at random in various directions at any and all times.  As to the Sixth Street Violation, [...]’s [...] (Da508) responded to the allegations and photos (Da340-354) filed by Plaintiff pointing out there are unsafe consequences of the Trial Court’s earlier decisions, referencing the testimony of the Plaintiff’s traffic expert that "valet" parking would be necessary and pointing out that the Plaintiff never set up organized parking or barriers to protect the children as proffered at the earlier trial (Da510).
[brief] (Pa42 at ¶5 (Blaine Cert.) and Pa104 to Pa106 (Exhibit B thereto - Docket Sheet)).  Thus, not only did Appellants violate the Consent Order because they filed the Complaint tremendously late, but they also violated the Consent Order by filing the Complaint in the wrong forum.  The Complaint references the Consent Order, acknowledging that the claims asserted in the Complaint were subject to re-filing after the adjudication of the [...] (referred to in the Complaint as “a tangentially related arbitration. ”) (Pa27 at ¶¶73-74 (Complaint)).  Yet, in their submissions below and to date in this appeal, Appellants have failed to provide any explanation whatsoever for disregarding the deadline, let alone an explanation that could justify their decision to re-file the Complaint 560 days beyond the 60-day deadline for Refiled Actions.
[brief] Interpretation of the interplay between the Comparative Negligence Act and the Joint Tortfeasors Contribution Law is a statutory interpretation determination subject to de novo review.  See Liberty Ins. Corp. v. Techdan, LLC, 253 N.J. 87, 103 (2023), as revised (Mar. 23, 2023); Mejia, 241 N.J. at 463.  Thus, this Court reviews the decision without deference to the trial court’s legal conclusions.  See Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Twp. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995).  For all practical purposes, the trial court’s resolution of the competing judgment orders\(^7\) was a post-verdict reconsideration of the trial court’s December 2017 order deeming [...] a [...] defendant, after initially denying plaintiff’s first oral application to reconsider made at the start of trial.
[brief] The State met its burden of production and persuasion automatically based on the conditional guilty plea of [...].  The State had an opportunity to make [...] conditionally plead guilty as to the alternative marker mentioned in the back of his ticket, i.e. “213 ft from Woodview Dr” but did not do so.  In any case, [...] avoided a trial and the possibility of cross examination by entering into the conditional guilty plea.  But the Superior Court decided to uphold [...]’s conditional guilty plea on an alternative ground, i.e. the additional marker referenced in the back of his ticket, that was not addressed and formed no basis of the factual basis for his guilty plea.  It also chose to ignore as irrelevant the reason why he actually did conditionally plead guilty, 1T37-1 to 5.  Defendant conditionally pled guilty because of the municipal court’s determination that a pump house is an occupied building under N.J.S.A. 23:4-16(d)(3).  2T17-11 to 13.  It was an abuse of the Superior Court’s discretion to upend the conditional guilty plea based on its de novo standard of review under R. 3:23-8(a).  In effect, the State was given a second bite at the apple to maintain [...]’s conviction without the Superior Court having to decide the contested issue that formed the sole basis for his conditional guilty plea in the first place, i.e. whether a pumphouse is an occupied building under N.J.S.A. 23:4-16(d)(3).
[brief] Respondent’s brief contends that *McKenney v. Jersey City Med. Ctr.*, 167 N.J. 359 (2001) only provides grounds for mistrial based on surprise testimony if the timing of the surprise testimony precludes remedy by vigorous cross-examination.  Put another way, even if a witness provides surprise testimony, if the aggrieved party can utilize cross-examination, then no prejudicial effect or grounds for mistrial will occur.  The particular facts of *McKenney* regarding the timing of the surprise testimony does not foreclose Appellants’ grounds for mistrial based on surprise testimony in this case.
[brief] See Satellite Entertainment Center, Inc. v. Keaton, 347 N.J. Super. 268, 276 (App. Div. 2002) (enforcing a simple contract to purchase a business for a fixed price).  Not all particulars need be included in the contract for it to be enforceable.  Ibid.  (“It is a settled principle that when the essential parts of a contract are spelled out, a court will not refuse to enforce that contract because some of its less critical terms have not been articulated.
[brief] Ten Stary Dom Partnership v. Mauro, 216 N.J. 16, 33 (2013)  71 United Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc. v. Twp. of Warrington, 316 F.3d 392 (3d Cir. 2003)  75 Weiss v. I Zapinsky, Inc., 65 N.J. Super. 351, 357 (App. Div. 1961)  26 Willoughby v. Planning Bd. of Twp. of Deptford, 306 N.J. Super. 266, 273 (App. Div. 1997)  71 Statutes 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ................................................................. passim N.J.S.A. 20:3-1 et seq.
[brief] ”  Id., at 6.  Even further, the Board stated that “[e]qually important to the development of an appropriate factor is the need to understand the revenue streams available to projects within the market segments, particularly the ability of projects to access net meter revenues, or otherwise earn more than would be expected from the wholesale market. ”  Id., at 5 (emphasis added).  The Board, in this Order, directly recognized that wholesale revenue – i.e., grid supply revenue – was part of the consideration and calculation for the TREC factor.  Of what possible purpose would be the need to consider wholesale revenue in a TREC calculation if a TREC automatically meant that no wholesale revenues were possible?  It is simply nonsensical.  Again, when the Board explicitly designed the floating solar program, in I/M/O the Petition of [...] for “Preferred” TREC Factor for Floating Photovoltaic Solar Pursuant to the Board’s Transition Incentive Order, Order, [...], [...], dated July 15, 2020, absolutely nothing in the entire Order commented upon, set requirements, limited or defined floating solar as requiring either net metering or grid supply.  Instead, when the Board set out the types of projects that could be included in the TREC awards, grid supply projects were included, and thus the idea that “all” grid supply projects were somehow obviously not allowed under the TREC program was simply untrue.  The Board’s reliance upon a statement about not allowing grid supply projects based upon a Subsection r discussion is of no significance to the newly designed and innovative floating solar program.  Instead, as [...] has consistently noted, the Board made a simple mistake in claiming that floating solar is forbidden from being grid supply, and the Board should reverse this decision, allow the project, and take full credit for the installation and operation of a significant and successful solar development.