ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Furthermore, although defendant relies heavily on *Keyes*, 184 N.J. at 541 (Db10-13), *Keyes* supports [...]’s initial probable-cause finding, not [...]’s subsequent reversal of [...]’s finding.  Significantly, the Court in *Keyes* observed that “[b]eyond peradventure, the facts in [that] appeal, considered collectively, constitute more corroboration than is present in the typical search and seizure case. ”
[directive] Application for Forfeiture of Office for Downgraded Charges at the Superior Court Level.  Cases involving indictable crimes which are downgraded to disorderly persons or petty disorderly persons offenses in the Superior Court are generally prosecuted by an assistant prosecutor, or, in some instances, by a deputy attorney general.  In these cases, waiver of forfeiture of office should be considered upon written request by the defendant.  Therefore, if an application for a waiver is not received at the time of conviction, an assistant prosecutor should move for forfeiture of office pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:51-2.  If an application for waiver is received after conviction, but before sentencing, a signed written statement of reasons rejecting or approving waiver, after consideration of the relevant factors, is required for both assistant prosecutors and deputy attorneys general.  The defendant and the court should be provided with a copy of the written statement of reasons at sentencing.  In 6 cases where waiver of forfeiture will not be sought, the assistant prosecutor should provide the written statement of reasons to the court in order to show the decision not to seek waiver was based on the applicable guidelines.  Additionally, the assistant prosecutor should generally oppose a stay of forfeiture.  Alternatively, where waiver of forfeiture will be sought, the assistant prosecutor shall move at the time of sentencing for waiver, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:51-2(e), and provide the written statement of reasons in order to show the court the good cause needed to grant the waiver.  If the defendant did not request a waiver of the forfeiture provisions at any time, an assistant prosecutor may still move for waiver when the county prosecutor, after considering the appropriate factors, deems waiver appropriate.  Under this scenario, an assistant prosecutor can request that the county prosecutor review the file in order to determine if waiver is warranted.  If the county prosecutor determines that waiver is appropriate after consideration of the factors in these guidelines, the assistant prosecutor should request waiver upon conviction or sentencing.  A written statement of reasons should be presented to both defendant and the court.  In matters that involve state employees as defendants, the assistant prosecutor should contact the Division of Law in order to obtain the necessary employee information from the appointing authority.  The Division of Law shall have a specific contact person responsible for expediting the request for information.  The name and contact information for the appointed person will be provided to each Prosecutor’s office.
[brief] Plaintiff’s motion for declaratory judgment that this Court is without jurisdiction to disturb the findings of the United States Bankruptcy Court is GRANTED.  The Court finds, as a matter of law, that this Court is without jurisdiction to vacate, modify, subjugate or otherwise change the decision of the United States Bankruptcy Court, which Orders and Decisions were rendered with respect to [...] and [...] and as pertaining to Plaintiff and Defendant in the above referenced matter, including specifically the Order of the Honorable [...], dated December 3, 2014.
[brief] ”  Hogan, 144 N.J. at 237; Scherzer, 301 N.J. Super. at 427.  Clearly exculpatory evidence must be "capable of complete consideration by the grand jury without the need of any extrinsic information" and not "require the grand jurors to engage in any extensive weighing of credibility factors that could substantially affect the value of the evidence."  State v. Evans, 352 N.J. Super. 178, 194 (Law Div. 2001); see e.g., Scherzer, 301 N.J. Super. at 427-28 (prosecutor not obligated to present testimony of defense experts that negated guilt as the evidence would require grand jury to make a credibility judgment and, therefore, was not clearly exculpatory).  Judicial evaluation of such motions to dismiss must “give due regard to the prosecutor’s own evaluation of whether the evidence in question is ‘clearly exculpatory. ’”  Hogan, 144 N.J. at 238; Evans, 352 N.J. Super. at 188.  Because “[a]scertaining the exculpatory value of evidence at such an early stage of the proceedings can be difficult[,] ... courts should act with substantial caution before concluding that a prosecutor’s decision in that regard was erroneous. ”  Hogan, 144 N.J. at 238-39; State v. Hogan, 336 N.J. Super. 319, 341 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 167 N.J. 635 (2001).  Further, a “motion to dismiss is addressed to the discretion of the trial court, and that discretion should not be exercised except for ‘the clearest and plainest ground. ’”  State v. Feliciano, 224 N.J. 351, 380 (2016).  As aptly noted by the PCR court, “the trial court considered the affidavit along with the other evidence and decided the affidavits were not exculpatory evidence that needed to be provided to the Grand Jury. ”  Da176.  In this case, the self-serving affidavits contradict the defendant’s own statements and each of the statements that the affiants provided to police prior.  The introduction of these statements would have required the grand jury to engage an extensive weighing of credibility given that they are conflicting with the evidence of this case.  Thus, establishing that they are not “clearly exculpatory. ”  As pointed out by the PCR court, “the affidavits lack any Indicia of reliability or credibility in that they are identical blankets of denial for [defendant]’s involvement that offer no detail or explanation. ”  Da176.  Thus, it was appropriate for the State to exclude them from presentation, it was proper for the trial court to deny the defendant’s motion, and it can hardly be seen as ineffective for appellate counsel to raise on direct appeal.  As such, the PCR appropriately denied the defendant’s claim.  POINT III
[brief] TRIAL COURT VIOLATED THE CONSTITUTIONALLY ENSHRINED DUE PROCESS RIGHTS AND LIBERTY INTEREST OF PLAINTIFF AND HIS CHILD BY ORDERING THE CONFISCATION OF THEIR PASSPORTS WITHOUT CONDUCTING A PLENARY HEARING, WITHOUT PROVIDING ANY LEGAL AND FACTUAL BASIS FOR ITS DECISION, AND DESPITE ITS CLEAR FINDING THAT DEFENDANT DID NOT PROVIDE ANY EVIDENTIARY BASIS OF HER BELIEF THAT PLAINTIFF WAS ABOUT TO FLEE THE COUNTRY.  (Pa1150-51)  9  II.  TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AND FAILED TO COMPLY WITH RULE 1:7-4(a)  BY ORDERING THE CONFISCATION OF THE PARTIES’ AND THEIR CHILD’S PASSPORTS WITHOUT PROVIDING ANY RATIONAL EXPLANATION, FINDINGS OF FACTS, AND LEGAL CONCLUSIONS IN SUPPORT OF ITS DECISION.  (Pa1150)  12  III.  TRIAL COURT VIOLATED RULE 2:9-1 BY MODIFYING THE MARCH 1, 2023, AND JUNE 6, 2023  TRIAL COURT ORDERS WHILE THOSE ORDERS WERE UNDER APPEAL BEFORE THE APPELLATE DIVISION.  TRIAL COURT’S JANUARY 12, 2024, AND JANUARY 26, 2024  ORDERS ENTERED DESPITE LACK OF JURISDICTION SHOULD BE DECLARED  VOID AB INITIO EXCEPT FOR THE ALIMONY ENFORCEMENT PROVISION.  (Pa1150, Pa1214)  IV.  TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO ENFORCE THE LITIGANT’S RIGHTS OF PLAINTIFF BY INEXPLICABLY IGNORING THE MATTER OF DEFENDANT’S NON-COMPLIANCE WITH THE PROVISION OF THE MARCH 1, 2023
[brief] Defendants, through counsel and attorney-in-fact, [...], initially acknowledged the error and offered to correct it.  After Defendants’ acquisition of the remainder of Lot 3, [...] wrote:  [T]here was a 1.33' discrepancy in terms of the distance running along 21st street south.  The back deeds list the total distance as 185' (65' for [Defendants’] lot, 120' for your lot) . . . we are in need of refiling the subdivision plan, which would show [Defendants’] lot having a distance of 65' and your lot having 120'.  We obviously want to preserve your right to have a confirming subdivision . . .  Ja183, Ja275, Ja712.  Despite stating they would, Defendants never re-filed the subdivision plan.  Ja275, Ja720.  Rather than re-file, Defendants adjusted their construction plans to ensure the structure would comply with the minimum side-yard setback of 10.00’ based on a 65.00’ frontage.  Ja275; Ja354; Ja373.  Three years later in 2021, Defendants made a claim that they owned the Disputed Area.  Ja276.  Then, in June 2021, Defendants entered the Disputed Area with a back-hoe and tore out Plaintiffs’ bushes and dug a trench.  Ja276; Ja375.  Plaintiffs protested, reminding Defendants that the Disputed Area belonged to Plaintiffs at which point Defendants temporarily ceased their activity in the Disputed Area.  Ja276.  But in August 2021, Defendants resumed their activity in the Disputed Area and installed trees, shrubs, and other landscaping.  Ja276.  Further, Defendants’ counsel wrote to the planning officials for the [...] claiming ownership of the Disputed Area and asserting Plaintiffs could not subdivide by right.  Ja186, Ja276.  Defendants are fully aware Plaintiffs own the Disputed Area, yet they continued to claim ownership of same.  Ja275-76, Ja375.  Ultimately, in August 2021, Plaintiffs determined that legal action was necessary to vindicate their legal rights, and they filed suit.  Ja1.
[brief] [...]  A/K/A [...]  [...] ID#244421968  54 Broad Street Red Bank, New Jersey  07701 [...]  Email: [...]  Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant  Jersey Shore Beach and Boardwalk Company, Inc.  A/K/A Jersey Shore Beach & Boardwalk, Inc.  [...]  On the Brief  Dated: December 22, 2023  TABLE OF CONTENTS
[brief] She said the individual wore a grey hoodie and had a firearm beside him.  At trial, [...] said the man she saw running was approximately between five feet eight inches and five feet ten inches and mentioned that he had light skin, "[l]ike, tannish."  (3T101-1 to 3).  But when [...] gave a statement at the prosecutor's office following the shooting, she had said she could not recall the man's complexion because she "didn't see his face . . . . cause the hoodie was over him."
[brief] Nor did the State introduce testimony about any of the following: alleged gestures by [...] at [...], the clothing worn by [...] in any other videos, [...]’s “style of walk” in the pre-[...] videos, a second person in the electric company video shown walking just past [...], or flashes of light in the [...] video.  However, in summation, after the defense had already summed up, the prosecutor began making new and critical factual claims for the first time at trial.  In an effort to rebut the defense’s arguments about the dark color of [...]’s clothing -- which had been properly introduced during the testimony -- the State displayed the car wash still-shots, identified [...] for the first time in them, and claimed that [...] was wearing light-colored clothing, just like the shooter in the [...] video.
[brief] Appellant showed his 2\textsuperscript{nd} and 3\textsuperscript{rd} claims via CoA No.2 and CoA No.3 of his Appellate Brief, pp. 12-16, which centrally show the following:  1.  Appellant’s second claim was to enjoin the respondents from staging entrapments against him, after they cited NJSA 47:1A-3 to deny him OPRA access to the records of their entrapments against him (Pa29), as they continued their entrapments against him until after he sued them.  (Raised via CoA No.2 of the Appellate Brief, pp. 12-15.)  You see__ the legal key point here is that by such denial of records the respondents bought four (4) years with impunity, since statute for criminal investigation allowed them to hide records labeled criminal for four years, when the statute of limitation for the appellant to sue them was one or perhaps two years.  2.  The appellant’s third claim was for leave to conduct Discovery, in retrieving such public records, OPRA access to which the respondents had denied to him, e.g., respondents cited “confidentiality” and produced fully redacted memorandum of explanations by police chief [...]’s, (Pa16) about why he denied the Application upon stipulating “I have determined to deny [...]’s request” (Pa19).  You See__ the key legal point here is that the respondents also denied his subsequent OPRA request to produce unreacted copy of the said record(s).  (Raised via CoA No.3 of Appellate Brief, pp. 15-16)
[brief] [Da4 at 77:13-21 and 78:1].  [...] maintained exclusive control and management of the common areas of the shopping center, which included the parking lots, the parking spaces, the sidewalks and all other areas.  [Da13 at 292:12-19].  At his deposition, [...] examined photographs and identified the path he traversed from his vehicle to the area where he allegedly slipped and fell, while carrying the birthday cake.
[brief] Further, [...], [...], [...] and the [...] retaliated against [...] for exercising his constitutional right to file a lawsuit by banning him from entering [...] without an escort when he previously enjoyed unescorted access simply because he had filed a lawsuit seeking redress for discrimination and retaliation.  The stated reason for the restriction is that [...] “is suing multiple employees at [...] . . . we are asking that security not allow him to walk around 401 unescorted. ” (Pa699).  The right to file a lawsuit is fundamental right protected by the New Jersey Constitution and when a person acting under color of state law retaliates against a person for exercising that right, it violates the Constitution.  The motion judge erred in entering summary judgment on [...]’s constitutional claims.  **CONCLUSION**
[brief] The Court erred in affording the Affidavits of Service a presumption of validity and improperly shifted the burden onto the Defendants to prove by clear and convincing evidence that they were not served.  (T4, p. 100:18-23)  In denying the Defendants Motion to Vacate, the Court improperly afforded the defective Affidavits a presumption of validity which improperly shifted the burden of proof to the Defendants to show that they were not served.  As far as the timing of service and the family vacation proofs, the Court found that “when you play with—with a time here a little bit here a little here and there with what time the service may have been made” it was “within the realm of possibility that everything can fall into place. ”  (emphasis added)  T4, p. 100:18-23.  The Court held that “if the standard is clear and convincing evidence, it’s not clear and convincing evidence the process was not served. ”  T4, p.99:14-16.  The Court erred in affording the defective Affidavit a presumption of validity.  If the Court had not done so, the burden would have shifted to Plaintiff to prove that Service of Process was effectuated which would have required much proof of much more than a “possibility” that the timing was correct which is what the Court held in this case.  Finding that the [...] were “possibly” served certainly does not meet the standard of proving service by clear and convincing evidence and is an abuse of discretion.  Even if this Court finds that the presumption of validity should be applied to the Affidavits and shifts the burden of proof to the Defendants that service was not made, Defendants submit that they did show by clear and convincing evidence that they were not served through GPS expert testimony and proof of their geolocation through Ezpass records and metadata in photographs.  The following errors on the filed Affidavits were never cured and are so irregular that they should not be afforded a presumption of validity.  Default judgment should not have issued based upon these defective Affidavits as follows:  -  Incorrect name of Defendant “[...]” as this person does not exist 14a.  - Notary stamp is two months prior to alleged service and is facially defective.14a.  - Process server testified he never spoke to the notary at all yet his signature was electronically notarized.  T4, p. 23:3-13.  - Process server had no recollection of this service.  T4:p.21:8-11  - ServeManager report was never authenticated but was only emailed by the in-house process service company to Defendants counsel.  247a.  - The preforeclosure notice was never served, yet the Certified Mail receipt showing the item was returned to sender was submitted in the Complaint as proof of service.  19-20a.  **Point IV**
[directive] Early Warning and Risk Management  3.4.1  Although the internal affairs process is frequently triggered by the filing of a civilian complaint, law enforcement agencies must also proactively work to detect troubling patterns in police conduct before that conduct escalates into more serious internal affairs issues.  3.4.2  To enhance its integrity, provide an optimal level of service to the community and reduce its exposure to civil liability, every law enforcement agency should establish procedures for dealing with problem employees.
[brief] In Route 15 Associates v. Jefferson Tp., 187 N.J. Super. 481, 488 (App. Div. 1982) the Court invalidated a Zoning Ordinance rezoning a property from commercial to residential.  The Court found the rezoning was inconsistent with the recommendation in the Land Use Plan Element of the Master Plan that the property be zoned for office use.  As the Governing Body had not adopted a "reasons" Resolution detailing the basis for the Ordinance, the Court concluded (at p. 488):  It is not sufficient to say, as did the trial judge, that the governing body would simply adopt the same zone scheme accompanied by a statement of reasons.  Although that may be the eventual result, we cannot assume that will invariably occur.  Hence, we are compelled to declare the adoption of the 1979 zoning ordinance amendments invalid because of the governing body's failure to comply with N.J.S.A. 40:55D-62(a).
[brief] .......................................................................  22, 24, 25 STATUTES  N.J.S.A. 2C:2–2(a) ........................................................................................................  22 N.J.S.A. 2C:2–6c ............................................................................................................  37  N.J.S.A. 2C:2-6(c)(1) ....................................................................................................  22  N.J.S.A. 2C:2-6(c)(1)(c) .............................................................................................  22  N.J.S.A. 2C:2-6(c)(2)  ....................................................................................................  22  COUNTERSTATEMENT OF PROCEDURAL HISTORY  Upon review of defendant’s recitation of the Procedural History of the matter, the State has no objection and would adopt same as if set forth in the State’s responsive brief.
[brief] In [...] v. [...], 311 N.J Super 333 (App. Div. 1998), [...]’s denial of ordinary disability was reversed by the Appellate Division.  On September 22, 1992, more than four years after [...]’s last contribution, the [...] sent him a letter stating that he had to return to work by November 22, 1992, or his pension account would expire.  [...] never received the letter.  [...] was involved in protracted litigation against his employer to request accommodations for a disability, which he claimed he could still work as a police officer.  Upon being denied his LAD claim, [...] applied for ordinary disability benefits.  The Board denied [...]’s application for an ordinary disability retirement on the grounds it was untimely.  Under the applicable PFRS statutes, membership ceases after 2 years from the date of the member's last pension contribution.  The Board determined [...] ineligible because more than 2 years had elapsed since his last contribution and because he was not a member in service at the time of the application.
[brief] 3  I.  CONTRARY TO THE UNION’S ARGUMENTS, THE ARBITRATOR’S DECISION WAS NOT A REASONABLY DEBATABLE INTERPRETATION OF THE PARTIES’ CBA BECAUSE IT IGNORED THE CBA’S EXPRESS TERMS  ..........  3  II.  CONTRARY TO THE UNION’S ARGUMENTS, THE ARBITRATOR EXCEEDED HIS AUTHORITY UNDER THE CBA BECAUSE HE FAILED TO ABIDE BY THE CBA’S EXPRESS TERMS  ............................................................................................................  11  CONCLUSION .................................................................................................................................
[brief] This [Air Quality] element addresses the connection between land development patterns, automobile transportation and the creation of air pollutants affecting the Highlands Region.  Because development patterns also affect energy use, improved regional growth patterns also help address global warming issues to some extent.  The element also calls for additional monitoring of toxic air pollutants from both within and nearby the Region.  [nj.gov/njhighlands/master/rmp/final/highlands_rmp_112008.pdf, at page 19.]
[brief] When reviewing the actions taken by a land use board, the Courts are to give substantial deference to findings of fact of the Board, Pomerantz Paper Corp. v. New Community Corp., 207 N.J. 344, 362 (2011), but review *de novo* those "interpretations of the law and the legal consequences that flow from established facts . . ."  *Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan*, 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995).  The Courts have also long recognized that "because of their peculiar knowledge of local conditions," municipal land use boards "must be allowed wide latitude in their delegated discretion."  *Jock v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, Twp. of Wall*, 184 N.J. 562, 597 (2005); *accord Booth v. Bd. of Adjustment of Rockaway Twp.*, 50 N.J. 302, 306 (1967).  Land use board decisions "enjoy a presumption of validity, and a court may not substitute its judgment for that of the board unless there has been a clear abuse of discretion."  *Price v. Himeji, LLC*, 214 N.J. 263, 284 (2013) *citing Cell S. of N.J., Inc. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment*, 172 N.J. 75, 81 (2002)).  Consequently, "courts ordinarily should not disturb the discretionary decisions of local boards that are supported by substantial evidence in the record and reflect a correct application of the relevant principles of land use law."  *Lang v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment*, 160 N.J. 41, 58-59 (1999).
[brief] The Contract includes a conspicuous arbitration provision.  Moreover, the arbitration provision’s validity has been further ratified by Plaintiffs’ agreement to ---  2  To the extent Plaintiffs are arguing that some of the Plaintiffs are not bound by the arbitration agreement, this argument fails.  Again, Plaintiffs never made this argument prior to the entry of the January Consent Order.  And in the January Consent Order, all plaintiffs agreed to arbitrate per the Contract’s terms.  Any attempt to claim that [...] or [...] are not bound by the Contract is self-defeating, as their claims against [...] are grounded in the Contract.
[brief] Consistent with its “kitchen-sink” appeal strategy, the Borough devotes an inordinate amount of attention in its brief to its argument that colloquial references in the 2002 site plan approval to the as-yet-unbuilt roads as “internal roads,” “interior roads,” or “access roads” means that as a matter of law, the Roads could not have been dedicated and are therefore private streets.  (Db3-Db5; Db34-Db38.)  This argument is yet another red-herring, and does nothing to rebut any of the elements of N.J.S.A. 40:55D-53.j.