ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] .........................................................................................................................  18  ## TABLE OF AUTHORITIES  ### Cases  **City of Atlantic City v. Trupos** 201 N.J. 447, 463 (2010)  ...........................................................................................................  7  **Hanges v. Metropolitan Property & Cas. Ins. Co.** 202 N.J. 369 (2010)  ......................................................................................................................  7  **In re Application of Meadowlands Communications System,** 175 N.J. Super. 53 (1980).  .............................................................................................................  6  **In re Protest of Award of On-Line Games,** 279 N.J. Super 566 (App. Div. 1995)  ..........................................................................................  6-7  **Kramer v. Sea Girt Bd. Of Adj.,** 45 N.J. 268.......................................................................................................................................  6  **Manalapan Realty v. Twp. Committee of Manalapan**  140 N.J. 366 (1995)  .......................................................................................................................  7  **New Jersey Department of Labor and Workforce Development v.** [...], d/b/a [...], [...] and [...], 2010 N.J. Agen LEXIS 826 (N.J. DOL May 6, 2010) ................................................................. 11 **Palamar Construction v. Twp. Of Pennasauken,** 196 N.J. Super. 241 (App Div. 1983) ............................................................................................ 6 **Township of River Vale v. R. J. Longo Construction Co.,** 127 N.J. Super. 207 (Law Div. 1974) ............................................................................................ 16 ### Statutes **N.J.S.A. 2A:44A-1** ......................................................................................................................... 9 **N.J.S.A. 2A:44A-2** ......................................................................................................................... 10 **N.J.S.A. 2A:44-125** ....................................................................................................................... 9 **N.J.S.A. 2A:44-128(a)** .................................................................................................................. 9 **N.J.S.A. 34:11-56.26(5)** .............................................................................................................. 12, 13 **N.J.S.A. 34:11-56.48**  ..................................................................................................................
[brief] [T]rial courts ordinarily should grant evidentiary hearings to resolve ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims if a defendant has presented a prima facie claim in support of post-conviction relief.  As in a summary judgment motion, courts should view the facts in the light most favorable to a defendant to determine whether a defendant has established a prima facie claim.  To establish a prima facie claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must demonstrate the reasonable likelihood of succeeding under the test set forth in *Strickland v. Washington*, 466 U.S. 668, 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2068, 80 L.Ed.2d 674, 698 (1984), and *United States v. Cronic*, 466 U.S. 648, 104 S.Ct. 2039, 80 L.Ed.2d 657 (1984), which we adopted in *State v. Fritz*, 105 N.J. 42, 58, 519 A.2d 336 (1987).  "Under the Strickland-Cronic-Fritz standard, the first issue is whether counsel's performance was deficient."  *State v. Preciose*, 129 N.J. 463 (1992).  "The second... prong of the... test is whether there exists 'a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.'"  *Preciose* at 464, citing *Strickland*, supra, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. at 2068, 80 L.Ed.2d at 698.  [...] received ineffective assistance of counsel in this matter.  The transcript of the plea is not clear as to the circumstances of whether [...] was actually operating the motor vehicle at the time she was intoxicated.  [...] denied operation numerous times during her plea.  There is a reasonable probability that had the matter proceeded to trial, the outcome of the case would have been different because of the persistent and legitimate issue with respect to the operation of a motor vehicle by [...].  Proving both “operation” and “operation while impaired” beyond a reasonable doubt is incumbent upon the State in order to sustain a finding of guilt to an alleged DWI offense.  Here, the issue was not explored by defense counsel at the time of [...]’s guilty plea, and as such it would represent at grave injustice to not allow [...] the opportunity to raise the issue at an evidentiary hearing or subsequent trial.  CONCLUSION
[brief] the law is settled that to satisfy the standard for sustaining this claim: “(1) the party whom the defendant aids must perform a wrongful act that causes an injury; (2) the defendant must be generally aware of his role as part of an overall illegal or tortious activity at the time that he provides the assistance; (3) the defendant must knowingly and substantially assist the principal violation. ”  McCormac, 387 N.J. Super. at 484-485.
[brief] (1T27-16 to 27-22; 1T60-16 to 61-5)  He explained that the “computer in the car sometimes is not updated with the most current information.  This is why we always call [d]ispatch, and have the operators confirm . . . they have an active warrant. ”  (1T28-8 to 28-11)  [...] testified that in his five and a half years of experience, the computer had previously given incorrect information twice, including this occasion, and that it happens “fairly often to different officers. ”  (1T69-4 to 69-9)  However, the officers did not contact dispatch to confirm the warrant, but rather proceeded to stop the car based on the potentially invalid warrant.  (1T52-12 to 52-17)  [...] testified their practice is to first stop to car to confirm the owner is the driver and then proceed with the stop, which will eventually include confirming the warrant is active.  (1T53-23 to 54-1)  After hearing testimony and argument, the court denied defendants’ motion to suppress.
[brief] The Court thus outlined four rules that constrain a non-eyewitness’s testimony about what a video depicts:  1.  “[N]either the rules of evidence nor the case law contemplates continuous commentary during a video by an investigator whose knowledge is based only on viewing the recording;”  2.  “[I]nvestigators can describe what appears on a recording but may not offer opinions about the content.  In other words, they can present objective, factual comments, but not subjective interpretations;”  3.  “[I]nvestigators may not offer their views on factual issues that are reasonably disputed;”  4.  “[I]nvestigators should not comment on what is depicted in a video based on inferences or deductions, including any drawn from other evidence.  That type of comment is appropriate only for closing argument. ”
[directive] 4.5.4.b  Unless an assistant prosecutor or deputy attorney general consulted in accordance with Section 3.2 of this Directive, or a supervisory officer designated pursuant to subsection 3.3.2 who is authorized by the County Prosecutor to overcome presumptions under Section 4 of this Directive, determines that the presumption of charging by complaint-warrant is overcome pursuant to subsection 4.5.9, a law enforcement agency shall apply for a complaint-warrant if there is probable cause to believe that the defendant committed any of the following offenses:
[brief] The “in-house” error logs destroyed by [...] are substantially different from [...] logs stored with [...].  The [...] employees testified to the various types of errors that are recorded by the “in-house” error logs.  The [...] logs stored by [...] do not record the same types of errors.  [...] did not have to retain an expert to review its “in-house” error logs.  Both [...] and the plaintiff have had to retain experts for the purpose of reviewing the [...] logs.  Paragraph 6 of Count Three of the proposed amended complaint alleges that the plaintiff had to expend monies on a software expert to review the [...] logs for errors in the operation of the [...] software and hardware.  (Pa115 to Pa120)  The plaintiff’s expenditure of funds on a software expert is compensable as damages under the fraudulent concealment claim.  In this regard, the Tartaglia court stated:  [W]hether a plaintiff succeeds on the claim in the original litigation or not, there are damages that might be recoverable, including punitive damages, in the event that the plaintiff can demonstrate that the loss of the evidence caused that plaintiff to incur costs or expenses in the litigation that would not otherwise have been incurred.
[brief] D’Agostino v. Maldonado, 216 N.J. 168, 198 (2013) (“[T]he existence of ascertainable loss resulting from a defendant's CFA violation should be determined on the basis of the plaintiffs' position following the defendant's unlawful commercial practice, not after a judicial remedy has been imposed restoring the plaintiff’s property…”); Bosland v. Warnock Dodge, Inc., 197 N.J. 543, 559-60 (2009) (“That [a CFA plaintiff] could have requested a refund and… secured complete relief in no way diminishes the fact that she sustained an immediate, quantifiable loss when she paid the fee representing the overcharge. ”)(emphasis added).  The Respondent’s voluntary dismissal of its complaint, after Appellants had already filed CFA claims for treble damages and equitable relief is the equivalent of a post-filing tender of refund, which New Jersey courts have repeatedly rejected as insufficient to extinguish CFA claims.  *Bosland v. Warnock Dodge, Inc.*, supra, 197 N.J. at 559-60 (Holding that a pre-suit demand for a refund is not required to show “ascertainable loss,” and rejecting that the notion that a victim of consumer fraud should be required to accept remedies "other than the one that the CFA creates”, i.e., treble damages.); *Lee v. Carter-Reed Co., L.L.C.*, supra, 203 N.J. at 529 (Holding that the defendant’s money-back guarantee policy did not extinguish ascertainable loss because “a refund policy--particularly in the case of small claims--would not immunize a merchant from a CFA claim.
[brief] These cases demonstrate that when the trial court “fail[s] to focus the jury’s attention on the limited purpose for which the evidence [is] admissible,” the court gives the jury “free reign” to confuse propensity with guilt.  Cofield, 127 N.J. at 341-42.  That is precisely what happened here.  Moreover, the court issued no limiting instruction whatsoever after [...]’s testimony, even though a limiting instruction should be given every time other-crimes evidence is presented, as well as in the final jury charge.
[brief] E. 201(d), “[a] court shall take judicial notice if requested by a party on notice to all other parties and if supplied with the necessary information. ” (emphasis added).  N.J.R.E. 201(e) requires that parties be given an opportunity to be heard on the question of judicial notice.  And finally, under N.J.R.E. 201(f), “[i]n determining the propriety of taking judicial notice of a matter ... the rules of evidence shall not apply except Rule 403 or a valid claim of privilege. ”
[brief] See, DA at 1a et seq.; T.4:7-17.  --- 2  There is only one volume of the transcript.  In keeping with Rule 2:6-8, “T.:x-y” shall refer to transcript at page “x” and lines “y. ”  Apparently concerned about the availability of alternate feasible routes, the trial court then proceeded to selectively and improperly apply a regulation of the [...].
[directive] What happens if this information or the flag in the CAD system is misused or mishandled?  3  The misuse or mishandling of this information will jeopardize the ongoing ability to share this information.  Any misuse or mishandling of this information may result in legal action against the individual or organization responsible for the misuse or mishandling of this information, including prosecution.  Additionally, a First Responder who operates under a license or certification issued by the State who misuses or mishandles this information will jeopardize that license or certification.  Q:
[brief] On February 27, 2024, [...] wrote to the Hon. [...], P.J.Cv., the Presiding Judge in the division where [...] then sat.  Ibid.  In that letter, [...] makes plain that he either did not understand what [...]’s oral opinion required of him, or else that he had no intention of scrupulously abiding by it.  Ibid.  [...] attempted to join in a motion despite his disqualification while also discussing the prospects for interlocutory review as though he were still ethically permitted to advise Appellants regarding this matter.  Ibid.  That same day, [...], Esq., filed a letter taking [...] to task in no uncertain terms on the grounds discussed above.  Pa002.  The following day, February 28, 2024, in response to the only correct legal assertion in [...]’s previous letter, the court below e-filed the Order under review here.
[brief] State v. Garron, 177 N.J. 147, 169 (2003) (quoting Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 194 (1973).  A defendant exercises his right of confrontation through cross-examination, which has been described as the "greatest legal engine ever invented for discovery of truth."  California v. Green 399 U.S. 149 (1970).
[brief] ”  Ibid.  Moreover, we will “give deference to the trial judge's feel for the case since he presided over [it] ... and had the opportunity to observe and hear the witnesses as they testified. ”  Ibid.  [State v. Brooks, 366 N.J. Super. 447, 454 (App. Div. 2004). ]  The same standard of review for a motion for a new trial applies in both civil and criminal cases.
[brief] See I'm thinking I'm going to set it down for 3 p.m. and that'll be the only matter I'm going to hear, whatever other matters will be taken care of.  [...]: Okay.  Thank you, Judge.  THE COURT:  So I'm suggesting, [...], Friday, February 3rd at 3 p.m.  Obviously, [...]' family members certainly may want to attend and they certainly have the opportunity to address the Court.  I don't think there's any need for any sentencing memos because I think the plea is going to be rather straightforward.  And Mr. Grillo, are you hopeful that by February 3rd you'll know what the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania is doing with their charges?  [...]: Yes, Judge.  We're going to continue to pursue some sort of guarantee from them and as soon as we have one we'll advise the Court and [...].  THE COURT: Yes, because obviously I prefer not sentencing him until we know that there's no longer in effect a contingent play.  [...]: Correct.  THE COURT: You're available?  [...]: Very good.  No, that's good, Judge.  That's even better.  THE COURT: Okay.  So thank you, counsel.
[brief] 67 State v. Frost, 158 N.J. 76 (1999).................................................................................. 45, 56, 66 State v. Fuentes, 217 N.J. 57 (2014).................................................................................. 81, 91 State v. Galloway, 133 N.J. 631 (1993).................................................................................. 25 State v. Gamble, 218 N.J. 412 (2014).................................................................................. 23 State v. Gandhi, 201 N.J. 161 (2010).................................................................................. 23 State v. Gilmore, 103 N.J. 508 (1986).................................................................................. 41 State v. Hagans, 233 N.J. 30 (2018).................................................................................. 23, 24 State v. Heslop, 135 N.J. 318 (1994).................................................................................. 80  State v. Hogan, 297 N.J. Super. 7 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 149 N.J. 142 (1997)......  47 State v. Humanik, 199 N.J. Super. 283 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 101 N.J. 266 (1984) .................................................................  67 State v. Irving, 114 N.J. 427 (1989) ..................................................................................................................
[brief] 1T – motion dated 6/28/21 2T – motion dated 7/13/21 3T – motion dated 7/14/21 4T – motion dated 7/26/21 5T – jury selection dated 7/28/21 6T – jury selection dated 7/29/21 7T – jury selection dated 7/30/21 8T – jury selection dated 8/2/21 9T – jury selection dated 8/4/21 10T – trial dated 8/5/21 11T – trial dated 8/6/21 12T – trial dated 8/9/21 13T – trial dated 8/10/21 14T – trial dated 8/11/21  15T – trial dated 8/12/21 16T – trial dated 8/13/21 17T – motion dated 2/10/22 18T – sentencing dated 2/17/22  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
[brief] Elco v. R.C. Maxwell Co., 292 N.J. Super. 118, 127 (App. Div. 1996)(citations omitted).  A.  [...] Carried Its Burden Regarding the Positive Criteria (Pa35-38)  The trial court provided no analysis relating to the positive criteria of the Second Application as to the d(1) use variance and conflated its analysis with the d(4) FAR variance.  The Court should have parsed its analysis on each variance subject to the prerogative writ.  It did not.  While the trial court’s inability to separate its analysis sets forth an independent basis for at minimum a remand back to the trial court, a review of [...]’s unopposed expert testimony demonstrates that it carried its burden as it relates to the d(1) use variance and the Zoning Board’s decision should be reversed.
[brief] On May 14, 2024, Plaintiff/Appellant, [...] (“Plaintiff” or “Kondak”) filed a Class Action Complaint alleging that Defendant/Respondent, [...]’s (“Defendant” or “Equinox”) form New Jersey health club “Membership Agreement” (offered to any, and all, of the New Jersey public) violated New Jersey’s Consumer Fraud Act, N.J.S.A. 56:8-1, et seq.  (“CFA”); Health Club Services Act (“HCSA”), N.J.S.A. 56:8-42 et seq.; Retail Installment Sales Act (“RISA”), N.J.S.A. 17:16C-1 et seq., and, the Truth-in-Consumer Contract Warranty and Notice Act (“TCCWNA), N.J.S.A. 56:12-14 et seq.
[brief] R. 4:33-1; Chesterbrooke Ltd. Partnership, 237 N.J. Super. at 124.  Alternatively, a court may permit a party to intervene where: (1) its application is made in a timely matter; (2) it has a defense or claim that has a question of law or fact in common with the litigation; and (3) its intervention shall not cause undue delay or prejudice to the existing parties.  R. 4:33-2.  The rule on permissive intervention is meant “to be liberally construed” by courts.  Zirger v. General Acc. Ins. Co., 144 N.J. 327, 341 (1996).  The question is whether “intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties” and whether it will “eliminate the need for subsequent litigation.
[brief] It is requested that the Appellate Court vacate the Summary Judgment decision entered at the trial court in favor of [...].  It is requested that the Appellate Court vacate the decision of the trial court which denied [...] relief per the doctrine of Adverse Possession.  It is requested that the Appellate Court find that [...] has satisfied the requirements per Adverse Possession which has vested Lot 22 in [...] and that [...] is enjoined from engaging in trespass of Lot 22.
[brief] 1T174 to 1T176.  Specifically, she stated [...]: Sure.  So that essentially concludes our case.  And what we would like the board to consider is we're basically trying to do a balancing act here.  We have an approval from 2016 that permitted the number of units and the retail is greater, almost a third greater than what we're proposing today.  We've got the eagle's nest and we're trying to make sure that we have the appropriate buffering for the eagle's nest.  This is a project that is part of the township's affordable housing obligation.  There is a settlement in place.  That settlement represents a substantial reduction in the township's affordable housing obligation.  Denying this application would probably reopen the settlement and possibly lead to a finding that the township has abrogated the settlement.  If the settlement is found to be nullified the obligation may be increased, possibly to the tune of 1,668 units under [...]'s methodology.  That's an increase in obligation of 535 units.  This is a substantial downside risk to the board denying this application.  We respectfully request that the board grant the applicant's application.  Thank you.  1T174 to 1T175.  The comments made by the Board member were consistent with the tone established by Respondents’ counsel and were clearly not intended to form the basis of the Board’s opinion; which was thoroughly set forth in the Board Resolution.
[brief] 15  POINT I THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL BASED ON NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE  ..........................................................  15  A.  The Newly Discovered Documents Found in Defendant’s Own Email Account By Defendant Himself After a One-Hour Search Were Plainly Discoverable By Reasonable Diligence if Defendant had Searched in the Four Years Before Trial.  ..............................................  17  B.  The Newly Discovered Documents Would Not Have Changed the Jury’s Verdict ...........................................................................  18  1.  The trial court disregarded overwhelming evidence that the “newly discovered evidence” was fabricated.  ..........................................................................................  19  2.  The documents do not show that defendant had the authority to sell shares of [...].  ......................... 23  3.  The trial court erred in finding the [...] guaranty was material because it is cumulative evidence.  ..................................................................................................  25  CONCLUSION ....................................................................................................
[directive] Within state law of case a the in Justice Criminal of Division or the Prosecutor, County appropriate the 22 a with communications having direct in cautious be should general attorneys deputy and prosecutors  Assistant case. in witness the a become prosecutor may the that possibility the avoid to present is detective a unless victim 59  Page electronic prepare means to with the officers equip to capacity its on agency, enforcement tablets, phones, .smart computers, desktop (e.g., Reports Incident Enforcement Law Preliminary vehicles).
[brief] With regard to eyewitness [...], defendant argues that admission of his first-time in-court identification violated the dictates of State v. Watson, 254 N.J. 558 (2023) and State v. Burney, 255 N.J. 1 (2023).  See Db15, 18-20, 34.  Defendant’s argument is wholly without merit as it wholly ignores that the “standard,” “rules,” and “holding” of Watson, and its companion case Burney, do not apply to the defendant’s trial, which was held two years before these opinions were issued.
[directive] subsection also  See criminal activity.  of indicator future reliable a as dependent alcohol or drug is defendant a that believing for basis objective an has prosecutor and belief, for of basis this the the notify court shall prosecutor 2C:35-14, the N.J.S.A. in defined narcotic any from of use refrain to ordered be defendant the release, of condition a as that, request practitioner, to and medical licensed a by prescription without a substance controlled other or drug 2A:162- N.J.S.A. by authorized as dependency alcohol or for drug treatment available undergo diagnostic professional to submit to required (defendant 2C:35-14.1 N.J.S.A. See 17(b)(2).