ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] **b.  Appellant’s Theory is at Odds with Other FDCPA Provisions, Which Permit the Use of Service Providers under Many Circumstances, and would Lead to Absurd Results. **  Under Appellant’s letter vendor theory, § 1692c(b) of the FDCPA permits a debt collector to transmit information about a debt *only* to its attorneys, the creditor (or its attorneys), and the consumer (and his or her attorney)—period.  Appellant’s theory fails because this interpretation is at odds with other provisions in the FDCPA, and a Court must consider the statute as a whole in determining Congress’s intent.
[directive] 2.5  A management system designed to enable effective and efficient domestic incident management by integrating a combination of facilities, equipment, personnel, procedures, and communications operating within a common organizational structure.  Inner Perimeter.  2.6  An area encompassing the incident location that is sufficient to isolate and contain the barricaded person.  Law enforcement officers should establish an inner perimeter that contains the barricaded person in a manner that eliminates the barricaded subject’s access to innocent parties, prevents a hostage situation, and provides safety and security for all present.
[brief] Filed on April 3, 2023.  . .  6a-23a  Order Denying Motion to Compel Filed on September 27, 2023  24a-25a  Order Denying Motion to Reconsider  Filed on November 14, 2023  .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
[brief] Prior to the accident, Plaintiff had ridden his motorcycle 20-25 times on this section of the Parkway.  (See Pa0378 at 15:7-9).  6.  Plaintiff’s front tire did not jump prior to his back tire failing.  (See Pa0519 at 35:11-15).  7.  Plaintiff testified that he could not state that the defect in the roadway was the expansion joint which separated the approach from the bridge.  (See Pa0524-0528 at 40:7-43:24).  8.  Plaintiff testified that he never saw any defect, debris, or pothole in the roadway.  After the accident, he went back to the area and recorded a video depicting the roadway in question for his “peace of mind,” but again did not see anything in the road.  (See Pa0001; Pa0378 at 15:25- Pa0379 at -16:17; Pa0397 at 34:3-12; Pa0526 at 42:20-25)  9.  Plaintiff’s wife, [...], and his friend, [...], who were traveling in separate vehicles alongside Plaintiff on the date of the accident, testified that they did not see a condition in the road they believed was dangerous.  (See Pa0564 at 10:13-19; Pa0564 at 13:1-9; Pa0859 at 22:2-10, Pa0860 at 23:19 - Pa0861 at 24:9)  10.  New Jersey State Police [...] (“[...]”), who responded to the accident, did not see any debris or pothole on the road that was significant and stated that if there was anything of significance, it would have been noted in the report.  (See Pa0001; Pa0899 at 10:7 - Pa0901 at 12:12; Pa0908 at 19:4-20; Pa0909 at 20:7-9; Pa0885 at 14:2-8)
[brief] Because they concede that single page was never sent to [...], [...] and [...] spend 110 pages to ask this Court to not only overlook their omission, but to create a new set of rules for CCIPs in New Jersey in which there are no enforceable cancellation requirements.  CCIPs are, of course, insurance policies, and there is no reason to relieve CCIP insurers of their basic obligation to provide notice of cancellation to their insureds.  Moreover, the CCIP Policy, CCIP Manual, and the Certificate of Liability Insurance all contained specific cancellation requirements, none of which were met here.  Long-standing New Jersey law and public policy rigorously enforce insurance-cancellation requirements because insureds like [...] are entitled to know with certainty whether or not they are insured.  Since the record is clear that [...] received no such cancellation notice from [...] or [...], its CCIP coverage remained in effect at the time of the Hood accident.
[brief] POINT II-THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT APPELLANT HAS SHOWN NO EVIDENCE OF FORESEEABILITY.  “Claimants must at least offer some evidence that would support a finding of negligence. ”  Sinclair v. Long Island R.R., 985 F.2d 74, 76-77 (2d Cir. 1993) (citations omitted).  Liability under FELA arises not from an injury, but from the negligence which causes the injury.  Brady v. Southern Ry. Co., 320 U.S. 476, 483 (1943).  Appellant now asks the question, “[c]ould a jury find that a vagrant [sic] allowed to loiter at a train station could attack an employee possibly causing injury?” (Pb 16).  Appellant first overlooks a critical point.  [...] is a public transit station.  By law, [...] cannot remove a person from a station just because that person is or appears to be homeless.  Nor can they bar a person from a station without a court order.  (Pa 95)  There is no reasonable way that a single disorderly conduct citation, 13 months prior, would have allowed [...] to obtain a court order barring [...] from the building or allowed them to remover her on sight.  Appellant has brought up more than 60 “criminal” incidents over the 2 years prior to this incident and includes such unrelated offenses as smoking and open container violations.  (Pa 157)  Even with the net cast this wide, it still averages one alleged offense approximately every two weeks.  Looking, more appropriately, at incidents of violence, Appellant can only cite 10 examples of violent incidents over the prior two years.  Of those 10 incidents, only three took place in the year prior to this incident.  (Pa 159)  This works out to one approximately every four months.  These numbers show that despite being a busy commuter hub, there is very little crime at [...], and that crime had decreased significantly in the years leading up to this incident.  Once again, in citing these statistics, Appellant cannot point to any negligence on the part of [...] regarding these statistics.  Correlation does not equal causation.  Appellant is advocating for a standard whereby [...] would be strictly liable for any third-party criminal activity on any of its properties.  It is undisputed that this incident was the result of the spontaneous, unpredictable actions of an emotionally disturbed person.
[brief] [...] got out of the car and walked to where [...] pointed with his flashlight.  There, [...] stood face-to-face with [...] and administered the HGN test.  [...] noted no swaying or anything unusual about how [...] stood as seen on the MVR.  After completing HGN, [...] continued SFST because it would not have been proper to make an arrest from the HGN alone.  One-Leg-Stand.  After HGN, [...] conducted OLS (7T25-14/19), a screening test that assists the officer in deciding whether to arrest a subject (7T52-1/4).  [...] instructs OLS subjects to stand with their feet together, hands at side, nice and relaxed, then raise their foot about six inches parallel to the ground while staring at the tip of the toe, keeping the leg straight, and counting from one-1,000 until told to stop.  7T25-23/26-6.  For OLS, [...] was told to look for certain “clues” like whether a person raises their hands more than six inches from their sides, puts their foot down, hops, or sways.  7T58-2/20.  Whether a person’s foot is parallel to the ground or pointed upward is not considered a “clue” nor is whether a person looks at their toe.  7T58-23/59-10.  OLS is not a normal way to stand as it requires subjects to reduce the area over which they would normally distribute their weight and compromises balance even in normal sober people.  7T47-3/48-21, 52-13/15.  Raising the leg further compromises balance by elevating the center of gravity.  7T49-4/18.  Many things can impair performance, like being nervous, tired, injured, distracted, or unfamiliar with the test, and [...] never ruled out tiredness, nervousness, or unfamiliarity for [...] and conceded that the rain distracted him.  7T49-16/51-25.  [...] raised his right foot more than six inches high, pointed his toe to the sky, stepped out of position, then continued without reaching 30 seconds.  7T27-3/14.  [...] complained about the rain.  7T27-18/19.  This test led [...] to feel that [...] was intoxicated (7T28-8/9), but he had not yet decided to make an arrest because he believed it was necessary to do the W&T test (7T59-23/60-14; see 7T28-14).
[brief] ”  *Marmo*, 478 N.J. Super. at 614.  However, unlike *Marmo*, the case at bar is designated as complex commercial case where a trial date is not (usually) automatically calendared.  Lastly, factor seven (prejudice) weighs in favor of a finding of waiver here.  *Marmo*, citing *Cole*, “explain[s] that ‘[i]f we define prejudice as ‘the inherent unfairness—in terms of delay, expense, or damage to a party’s legal position—[then prejudice] occurs when the party’s opponent forces it to litigate an issue and later seeks to arbitrate that same issue. ’”  *Marmo*, 478 N.J. Super. at 608 (quoting Cole, 215 N.J. at 282).  That is exactly what Defendants’ conduct accomplished here—to wit, (after initiating the Collection Lawsuit) Defendants forced [...] to litigate for twenty-one months while attacking the merits of [...]’s claims through, inter alia, Defendants’ dispositive Motion.  If the matter was referred to arbitration, Defendants would seek to defeat [...]’s claims on the merits again, likely utilizing the same arguments that were unsuccessful in their dispositive Motion in the trial court; however, Defendants would not seek to relitigate the dismissed claim for unjust enrichment.  To wit, Defendants “seeks to have both its proverbial cake and to eat it too: [they] only want[] arbitration if [they] do[] not win on [on the merits].”  Sacks v. DJA Auto., No. 12-284, 2013 WL 210248, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 18, 2013).  However, Defendants “cannot retain [their] right to elect arbitration as an insurance policy to be exercised in the event that [they do] not obtain a favorable decision on [the merits].”  Id.
[brief] As noted in Newman v. Great American Insurance Company, 86 N.J. Super 391 (App. Div. 1965), the fact that a witness may qualify as an expert in a wide general field does not make everything the expert says admissible and it must appear that the witness knows what he/she is talking about with reference to the facts of a particular case.  Id. at 399.  It is well settled that while qualified expert testimony may be received to support a claim, it must have a foundation in the evidence and not be based on mere speculation or possibility.  *Vuocolo v. Diamond Shamrock Chem.*, 240 N.J. Super 289, 299 (App. Div. 1990).  Nor can an opinion be based on guess or conjecture.  *Relose v. Green*, 222 N.J. Super 545, 549-511 (App. Div) cert. denied 111 N.J. 610 (1988).  *A party's burden of proof on an element of a claim may not be satisfied by an expert opinion that is unsupported by the factual record or by an expert's speculation that contradicts that record.*
[directive] Records and documents of any other individual or entity that could prove helpful in the investigation should be examined.  These may include reports from other law enforcement agencies, hospital records, doctors' reports, jail records, court transcripts, F.B.I. or S.B.I. records, motor vehicle abstracts and telephone and cellular phone records.  In some instances, a search or communications data warrant or a subpoena may be necessary to obtain the information.  7.3
[brief] The specious allegations of misconduct should have been rejected as they lacked a factual foundation and, in many instances, there was no nexus between Petitioner and the alleged incidents and were so prejudicial as to amount to a miscarriage of justice.  Now again, in her Opposition and Cross-Appeal, Respondent continues with her strategy.  Only now, Respondent advances a new argument that was not raised below, that Petitioner’s “unclean hands” bars the imposition of a constructive trust in his favor.  Db\(^1\) at 72-73.  Petitioner again supports her arguments with unverifiable rumors, gossip, distortions and even outright lies.  In fact, many of the allegations advanced by Respondent in her Opposition brief are not supported by citation to the record.  The alleged misconduct advanced by Respondent is not based on credible evidence, fail to support Respondent’s arguments and should, respectfully, be rejected.  --- \(^1\)  Db means Brief and Appendix of Respondent/Cross Appellant  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT
[brief] [...] described the traffic volume as “medium” with cars in both lanes of westbound Route 22 at the time he observed [...]’s white sedan.  (1T17-17 to 18-1).  His description of the traffic conditions was corroborated by the officers’ body cameras, which depict numerous vehicles in close proximity with one another traveling in both lanes of westbound Route 22 just moments after the observed motor vehicle violation.
[brief] The trial court did not err in prohibiting a mini-trial on a decade-old case to smear [...]’s character, where that evidence was already substantively presented to the jury, the exoneration of [...] was not predicated on Wesley’s testimony, and it would only serve to confuse the issues for trial.  Additionally, there was no Brady violation whatsoever..............................................57  A. Defendant’s Counseled Brief.........................................................57
[brief] As we noted and as the [...] brief bears out, the company's claim for the need to replace this reliable and safe current regulator is thus based entirely on claims of horrific consequences of "icing" problems.  Again, [...] brief reads as if it is trying to convince this court that it is a stupid, careless and irresponsible company.  It isn't, and the company's witnesses conceded away these exaggerated and baseless predictions on cross-examination.  The current regulator is safely monitored in real time in the company's control center\(^2\); the company \(^2\) [...] says there is something lacking because the current regulator is not monitored in its “SCADA system,” as opposed to the current downstream pressure monitor that is read in the control center.  [...]b9.
[brief] During discovery, Plaintiffs established that an employee referred to in the record as [...] retired in December 2016.  (Pa898-899, Rog.s. #2).  Although this employee retired after November 9, 2016,\(^3\) Defendants gave him a terminal leave payout of $44,950.18.  Ibid.  By way of discovery, Plaintiffs also uncovered the fact that in November 2019 Defendants paid out uncapped terminal leave benefits to civilian [...] employees who retired before November 9, 2016 but who did not have a contractual right to terminal leave.
[brief] Under New Jersey law "[a]n ambiguity in a contract exists if the terms of the contract are susceptible to at least two reasonable alternative interpretations."  M.J. Paquet, Inc. v. N.J. Dep't of Transp., 171 N.J. 378, (N.J. 2002).  Whether the terms of a contract are clear and unambiguous is a question of law and is suitable to be considered at summary judgment.  Driscoll Const. Co., Inc. v. State, Dept. of Transp., 371 N.J. Super. 304, 853 A.2d 270, 276 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2004).
[brief] In [...]’s appeal, an Appellate Division panel affirmed the trial court’s denial of the motion to suppress, ruling that the stop was supported by reasonable suspicion.  In [...]’s appeal, a different Appellate Division panel reversed the trial court and vacated [...]’s conviction and sentence, finding that [...] did not have reasonable suspicion to conduct the stop of the car.  We granted both defendants’ petitions for certification on the question of whether reasonable and articulable suspicion existed to stop the car.  We now reverse the [...] decision and affirm in [...].
[brief] (Vogt Tr. 10:13-11:7, TRVa2827.)  Additionally, [...] mischaracterize a September 25, 2015 letter from [...] suggesting it shows [...] was enrolled in the CCIP.  (TRVb42.)  Rather, this unsigned letter from an unknown author was purportedly sent to [...] by [...], which has no authority to enroll or unenroll contractors, and merely states [...] is “CCIP Approved. ”  (TRVa1285.)  In other words, just as the Enrollment Reports show, beginning on September 16, 2015, after [...]’s COI was deemed compliant on September 4, 2015, [...] was reportedly “eligible” to work at the Project, just like other contractors not permitted to enroll.  (TRVa2649-2669.)  The letter clearly does not state (or mean) that [...] was “CCIP Enrolled”, as [...] disingenuously implies.  (TRVb25.)  B.
[brief] Therefore, Plaintiff’s attorneys are not entitled to enhancement of the lodestar fee for their personal gains, which is against the policy behind Lodestar fee.  In addition, this Court has pointed out in the decision dated August 25, 2021 that the reduced damages award of $449,798.59 renders the relief available under the offer of judgment rule inapplicable because plaintiff offered to accept judgment in the amount of $400,000, and the reduced damages award of $449,798.59 is less than 120 percent of the offer of judgment.  *See* R.4:58-2(a) (providing for recovery of reasonable litigation expenses and reasonable attorney’s fees where the money judgment obtained is 120 percent or more of the amount of the offer of judgment.  --- 42  Similarly, a trial court should reduce the lodestar fee if the level of success achieved in the litigation is limited as compared to the relief sought.  ‘If . . . a plaintiff has achieved only partial or limited success, the product of hours reasonably expended on the litigation as a whole times a reasonable hourly rate may be an excessive amount.  This will be true even where the plaintiff’s claims were interrelated, nonfrivolous, and raised in good faith. ’  *Hensley, supra*, 461 U.S. at 436, 103 S.Ct. at 1941, 76 L.Ed.2d at 52; see, e.g., *Scales v. J.C. Bradford & Co.*, 925 F.2d 901, 910 (6th Cir. 1991) (reducing lodestar by forty-five percent to reflect plaintiff’s partial success). *  *Rendine v. Pantzer*, 141 N.J. 336, 661 A.2d 1202, 1218 (1994).  Thus, on the remand for entry of a new judgment, the court below shall vacate the award of litigation expenses and attorney’s fees and interest associated with the offer of judgment rule.
[brief] .....1  Atalese v. U.S. Legal Servs. Grp., L.P., 219 N.J. 430(2014)  .......8  Bybee v. Abdulla, 189 P.3d 40(Utah 2008)  .......................5, 6 Curtis v. Cellco P'ship, 413 N.J. Super. 26(App. Div. 2010)  .....5  Dueñas v. Life Care Ctrs. of Am., 236 Ariz. 130(Ct. App. 2014). 12  E.I DuPont de Nemours and Co. v. Rhone Poulenc Fiber and Resin Intermediates, S.A.S., 269 F.3d 187(3d Cir. 2001)
[brief] TRIAL COURT VIOLATED RULE 1:7-4(a) BY DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO ABBREVIATE TRANSCRIPTS WITHOUT ANY FACT-FINDING AND TENABLE CONCLUSIONS OF LAW.  THE CONCLUSORY STATEMENTS IN THE MAY 3, 2024 ORDER OVERLOOK  PLAINTIFF'S CORE ARGUMENT THAT THE POINTS RAISED ON APPEAL LARGEY CONCERN MATTERS OF LAW.  TRIAL COURT'S FAILURE TO ADDRESS  PLAINTIFF'S PRINCIPAL ARGUMENT LEADS TO A LOGICAL INFERENCE THAT THE JUDGE ADJUDICATED THE MOTION WITHOUT READING THE MOTION CERTIFICATION OR COMPREHENDING AND ANALYZING THE ARGUMENT THEREIN.  (Pa1331-32)
[brief] Moreover, the defendant in Cole waited until three (3) days before the scheduled trial date to invoke the arbitration clause.  [...] on the other hand sought arbitration prior to any substantial discovery.  Since waiver is never presumed, an agreement to arbitrate a dispute “can only be overcome by clear and convincing evidence that the party asserting it chose to seek relief in a different forum. ”  Spaeth v. Srinivasan, 403 N.J. Super. 508, 514, 959 A.2d 290 (App.Div.2008).  Clearly, [...] did not affirmatively waive its right to arbitrate; little-to-no delay occurred, little-to-no discovery ensued, and little-to-no prejudice had been suffered by [...]’ so-called three (3) month delay.  Compare Spaeth, 403 N.J. Super. 508 (holding that defendant did not waive her right to arbitration “before any meaningful exchange of discovery . . . and well in advance of fixing a trial date. ”) with Cole, 215 N.J. 265 (litigating for twenty-one months without invoking arbitration and raising the issue “three days before the [] trial date. ”), and Farese v. McGarry, 237 N.J. Super. 385, 394 (App. Div. 1989) (finding waiver when arbitration was not raised until two weeks before trial).  The Trial Court therefore did not err in deciding [...]’ right to arbitrate was at all times relevant, undamaged.  Trial Court’s order should be affirmed.  CONCLUSION
[brief] Under N.J.A.C 17:4-1.7(e), the [...]'s final determination may be appealed to the Superior Court, Appellate Division.  Further, pursuant to R. 2:2-3 (a)(2), once a State Agency decision is final, the Appellate Division then has the authority to review the final decisions or actions of any state administrative agency or officer.  This relief from a final determination is not available to Respondent yet, because there is no final determination by the [...] on the IOD application.
[brief] A finding of a violation of an order without a corresponding remedy does not appropriately induce compliance with the judgment by a defaulting party, particularly in the Mount Laurel setting.  Under similar circumstances such as this—a party in violation of an affordable housing judgment and with no realistic plan to comply—courts have held site suitability hearings, setting aside cost generative measures including zoning and land use ordinances, that obstruct or make more costly the constitutionally required affordable housing.  The trial court should have compelled a suitability hearing here for the off-site property.
[brief] Pa50.  On December 16, 2019, Appellant’s attorney contacted the Borough’s attorney stating he was unable to produce Appellant’s appraisal report by the December 20, 2019 deadline.  Pa9.  Appellant requested an extension of time to complete Appellant’s appraisal report and an adjournment of the February 18, 2020 trial date.  Ibid.  Respondent again consented to the requested extension and adjournment of the February 2020 trial date.  Ibid.
[brief] See, e.g., United States ex rel. Sedona Partners LLC v. Able Moving & Storage, Inc., 2022 WL 3154811, at *6 (S.D. Fla. July 7, 2022); Repko, 2011 WL 3875987, at *6-7 (“generally accessible websites” have unrestricted access and are available to general public); United States ex rel. Green v. Serv. Contract Educ. and Training Trust Fund, 843 F. Supp. 2d 20, 32 (D.D.C. 2012) (website was “news media” because access was not limited or restricted); United States ex rel. Liotine v. CDW Gov’t Inc., 2009 WL 3156704, *6 n.5 (S.D. Ill. Sept. 29, 2009) (website not “news media” because page not readily accessible).  Courts also look for an intention to widely disseminate information.  See, e.g., Mark ex rel. United States v. Shamir USA, Inc., 2022 WL 327475, at *1 (9th Cir. Feb. 3, 2022).  The Court should interpret the term in a commonsense manner consistent with the purpose of the NJFCA.  One frequently cited opinion, United States ex rel. Integra Med Analytics L.L.C. v. Providence Health & Servs., 2019 WL 3282619, *4, 16 (C.D. Cal. July 16, 2019), rev’d on other grounds, 2021 WL 1233378 (9th Cir. Mar. 31, 2021), identifies factors to determine what is, and is not, the “news media,” including: (1)  The extent to which the information typically conveyed by a source would be considered newsworthy; (2)  Whether the source exhibits some editorial independence or some separation between the source of information and the medium that conveys it; (3)  The “source’s intent to disseminate information widely”; (4)  Whether the source could reasonably be described as “news media” under everyday usage of the term.  The Court’s interpretation of the phrase “news media” in N.J.S.A. § 2A:32C-9(c) should be informed by a definition of that term in New Jersey’s Rules of Evidence.  See generally State v. Goodwin, 224 N.J. 102, 113 (2016) (interpreting term used in one code section to inform meaning of another section).  Like Integra Med, N.J. R. Evid. 508(a) defines “news media” in commonsense terms.  N.J. R. Evid. 508(a) (defining news media to include newspapers, magazines, and other “means of disseminating news to the general public”); see also id. 508(b)(b) (defining related terms); Too Much Media, LLC v. Hale, 206 N.J. 209, 233-34 (2011).