ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Lennig did not address the plaintiff’s access to the campground adjacent to his property; rather, the Court examined the negative impact the plaintiff’s property would suffer if the campground between his property and the Atlantic Ocean was changed to permit permanent structures instead of temporary tents.  Lennig, 41 N.J. Eq. at 608.  The Court confirmed the issue was not the public right to use the open space designated on the map as a campground.  Id. at 609.  The plaintiff was not looking to install a tent in the designated open space instead of a building.  Rather, he relied on the map to show the area between his property and the sea “were to be kept open. ”  Id.  The Court concurred, finding permanent structures instead of “temporary structures” such as tents “very differently affect[] the complainant’s property. ”  Id. at 610.  “Instead of a camp, occupied for a few weeks only by tents which will scarcely at all interfere with the prospect or the breeze over an open space 600 feet wide, extending to the ocean,” the permanent structures would disrupt the plaintiff’s view of the ocean.  Ibid.  “The contrast between the two situations covers much of the attractiveness of a sea-side resort.  If the present scheme of the defendant be carried out, it is certain that the complainant will lose a great portion of those advantages which the association impliedly promised him as inducements to the purchase of its lots. ”  Ibid.  Here, the trial court understood the legal principles, noting Lennig “stands for the proposition that there are certain rights that are conveyed with the property, appurtenant to the property that are implied.
[brief] Rule 4:42-11(a) provides for post-judgment interest as follows:  ‘Except as otherwise ordered by the court or provided by law, judgments, awards and orders for the payment of money, taxed costs and counsel fees shall bear simple interest.  . . .”  The rule also provides a trial court with the discretion to vary the award, in the interests of equity.  See, e.g., *Interchange State Bank v. Rinaldi*, 303 N.J. Super. 239, 264 (App. Div. 1997).  Given this, the court did not abuse its discretion in ordering interest to accrue only from the date of the docketed judgment.  Plaintiffs’ appeal as to any additional attorney’s fees and interest should be denied.  CONCLUSION
[brief] "Generally, under federal constitutional law, a 'statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application violates the first essential of due process of law.'  "Betancourt v. Town of W New York, supra, 338 N.J.Super. at 422, 769 A.2d 1065 (quoting Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391, 46 S.Ct. 126,127, 70 L.Ed. 322, 328 (1926)).  A penal ordinance offends due process if it does not provide legally fixed standards and adequate guidelines for police and others who enforce the laws.  Betancourt v. Town of W New York, supra, 338 N.J.Super. at 422, 769 A.2d 1065 (citing **665 Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156,170, 92 S.Ct. 839,847,31 L Ed.2d 110, 120 (1972)); Town Tobacconist v. Kimme Iman I 94 N. J. 85, 118,462 A.2d 573 (1983)).  "Vague language and inadequate standards permit the subjective and therefore impermissible enforcement of penal ordinances by the police."  Betancourt v.Town of W New York, supra, 338 N.J.Super. at 422, 769 A.2d 1065 (citing Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 09, 92 S.Ct. 2294, 2299, 33 L Ed.2d  To withstand a void-for-vagueness challenge, a penal ordinance must define the offense "with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement."
[brief] The court distinguished City of Millville vs. [...], 683 F. Supp. 2d 319 (D.N.J. 2010).  The court found that in City of Millville, there was independent evidence beyond the notes themselves, that [...] and [...] did not intend to become personally obligated on the notes.  The court went on to find [...] signed as president of the relevant corporation, as officer of the limited partnership lessee, and individually.  Id. at *8.  The court also found that [...] intended to assume personal liability because plaintiff, [...], had required it as a condition of leases the parties entered into over many years.
[brief] Accordingly, Plaintiffs entered a motion to assess a civil penalty pursuant to N.J.S.A. 47:1A-11, which requires a determination on behalf of the Court of a knowing a willful violation of OPRA and subsequently unreasonable denial of access to records.  North Jersey Media Group, Inc. v. State Office of Governor, 451 N.J. Super. 282 (App. Div. 2017).  The undisputed sequence of proceedings demonstrates the fact that the Board knowingly and willfully refused to conduct a faithful search for the records as was ordered, given that [...]’s 8/28/20 Final Order specifically delineated the methods by which Defendants should complete their search.  As previously argued, where there exists an OPRA violation, Defendants’ conduct may be characterized either as knowing and willful or excusable neglect.  In Defendants’ Brief in Opposition, they neither successfully present a case that all available sources were searched, thus satisfying their claim that no OPRA violation was committed, nor stake a claim of excusable neglect.  In the absence of evidence to supply either of these two possible defenses, it is evident that Defendants’ violation of OPRA fulfills N.J.S.A. 47:1A-11 requirements to impose a civil penalty.  It was error for [...] to deny Plaintiffs’ Proposed Order (246a) to assess a civil penalty against Defendants.
[brief] Plaintiffs’ attempt to contest their notice rests on a factual mistake.  Plaintiffs do not dispute that the digital interface that appeared in [...]’s [...] app on January 8, 2022, is identical to the one this Court found enforceable in *Williams v. Ysabel*, No. A-1391-22, 2023 WL 5768422, at *1, *4 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Sept. 7, 2023), because it provides reasonable notice of the arbitration agreement.  Instead, Plaintiffs’ brief argues for the first time in \(^1\)  Unless otherwise noted, capitalized terms have the same meaning as in [...]’s opening brief. this case (Pb1, 6, 7–13, 20, 27, 39–40) that they lacked reasonable notice because [...] was supposedly compelled to agree to the December Terms after the family had ordered their food but before it was delivered.
[brief] Physical damages to the improvements on the property are cognizable in the determination of just compensation.  In State v. William G. Rohrer, Inc., 80 N.J. 462 (1979), the State acquired a portion of the owner's property including about ten percent of the building, leaving the owner with the physically exposed and unoccupied remnant of the building.  The cost to repair would exceed the value of the remainder after restoration.  The Supreme Court observed that it would have been better had the State taken the entire property in the first place, but the State had not done so.  The Rohrer Court crafted a remedy to assure that the owner was made whole.
[brief] Therefore, Plaintiff/Respondent respectfully requests that the underlying opinions and Orders of Hon. [...] be affirmed.  Respectfully submitted, [...]  By: ________________________________  [...], Esquire  Attorney for Plaintiff-Respondent  Dated: October 23, 2024  [...]  Attorney at Law [...] [...]  [...]  Attorney Id 010251983  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY-APPELLATE DIVISION
[brief] See *Shelcusky*, supra, 343 N.J. Super. at 510, 778 A.2d 1176; *Moisor v. Ins. Co. of N. Am.*, 193 N.J. Super. 190, 195, 473 A.2d 86 (App. Div.1984).  Critical to its appropriate use are its limitations.  Courts should not reject alleged sham affidavits where the contradiction is reasonably explained, where an affidavit does not contradict patently and sharply the earlier deposition testimony, or where confusion or lack of clarity existed at the time of the *202 deposition questioning and the affidavit reasonably clarifies the affiant's earlier statement.  Shelcusky v. Garjulio, supra 172 N.J. at 201.  In the case at hand, the sham affidavit doctrine is clearly inapplicable because [...]’s certification “does not contradict patently and sharply the earlier deposition testimony” which is required by Shelcusky v. Garjulio to invoke the doctrine.
[brief] 4  [...]/[...] v. [...], 2024 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1248 (App. Div. June 18, 2024)  ...  23-24  LaMarca v. Caffrey, 2009 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 3241 (Sup. Ct. Law Div. Hunterdon Cnty. Nov. 20, 2009)  ..................................................................  19  [...] v. [...], [...] (D.N.J.) ..................................................  4
[brief] Notwithstanding that the 2019 Indictment had been dismissed and that, clearly, as of March 2024 a new Grand Jury was sitting, on March 21, 2024, the State, the State propounded a Grand Jury subpoena upon “[...]. ”  In response to the Grand Jury subpoena, the State received the March 25, 2024 email that has been supplemented into this record.  The State’s Grand Jury subpoena was improperly issued.  Traditionally viewed as a shield between an individual and his sovereign, the grand jury is a judicial, investigative body with “broad investigative authority . . . to determine whether a crime has been committed and whether criminal investigations should be instituted against any person.
[directive] The following officers shall be required to be equipped with BWCs and adhere to the provisions of this Policy when performing their duties:  (a)  All uniformed patrol officers while acting in the performance of official duties, as required by N.J.S.A. 40A:14-118.3 (P.L. 2020, c. 128).  This shall include uniformed officers assigned to traffic law enforcement, as well as Class II Special Law Enforcement Officers (SLEO IIs) assigned to patrol or traffic law enforcement duties.  (b)  All officers assigned to tactical teams as defined in this Policy.  Tactical Teams shall include S.W.A.T. (Special Weapons and Tactics), S.R.T. (Special Response Team), T.E.A.M.S. (Technical Emergency and Mission Specialists), Entry Teams, Rapid Deployment, Fugitive or similar units.  (c)  All officers assigned to proactive enforcement teams as defined in this Policy.  BODY WORN CAMERA POLICY | January 2022  5  (d)  All officers assigned to canine units.  (e)  All officers whose assigned duties include regular interaction with members of the public, which reasonably may give rise to an arrest situation or use of force.  (f)  All officers assigned to “front desk” duty in law enforcement agencies, whose duties include interaction with members of the public who enter police stations to report incidents or request assistance or information.  (g)  All officers assigned to a pre-planned search warrant execution or a pre-planned arrest.  This shall include pre-planned searches and arrests performed pursuant to statutory authority, such as parolee searches.  (h)  All uniformed officers assigned to duties at demonstrations or potential civil disturbances.  3.3
[directive] Addendum A | December 2020  CEDs and Other Less-Lethal Devices and Ammunition  10.8  Maximum effective distance/range for deployment of specific projectiles shall not exceed the specifications approved by the Attorney General.  10.9  Intentionally aiming approved less-lethal impact ammunition at the head, neck, chest, or groin shall be avoided unless deadly force is justified, necessary, and appropriate.  10.10  No ammunition designed to be skip-fired and/or non-target specific will be deemed to be acceptable.  10.11  Approved less-lethal devices or ammunition shall not be used in a crowd management situation except against specific threatening assailants or active assailants, in strict compliance with Section 3.8 of the Attorney General’s Use of Force Policy.  10.12  Less-lethal devices or ammunition shall not be used to prevent a person from causing property damage.  10.13  A less-lethal device shall not be directed against a person who is situated on an elevated surface (e.g., a ledge, scaffold, near a precipice, etc.) unless reasonable efforts have been made to prevent or minimize a fall-related injury (e.g., deploying a safety net).  10.14  Suspects who are struck by less-lethal ammunition shall be transported to a medical facility for examination if they suffer bodily injury or request medical treatment.  14
[brief] And [...] led [...]’s effort to monetize users’ information, including that which was shared without their knowledge or consent.  She not only echoed [...]’s call for full reciprocity as a means to generate revenue (Id. at ¶ 657(f)), but is also widely credited as the driver of [...]’s revenues.  See, e.g., [...], The Sheryl [...] Effect: Rise of Female COOs, NPR (Aug. 9, 2013) (“[...] may have founded [...], but Sheryl [...] monetized it. ”).  The monetization of users’ information that they did not consent to be shared with or made available to third parties is the basis for Plaintiffs’ contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, privacy, and unjust enrichment claims.  Available at https://www.npr.org/sections/alltechconsidered/2013/08/06/209483329/the-sheryl-sandberg-effect-rise-of-female-coos.  B.
[directive] If (L. i. Computer Crime Prevention Fund Penalty, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-3.8 2009, c. 143). the [Yes] [No] crime involves a violation ofN.J.S.A. 2C:24-4b(3) (causes or permits child to engage in sexual act that is to be photographed or exhibited), if the crime was committed on or after February 1, 2018, N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4b(4) (photographs or films a child in sexual act), if the crime was committed on or after February 1, 2018, N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4b(5)(b) (knowingly possessing or knowingly viewing child pornography), N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4.1 (leader of a child pornography network), if the crime was committed on or after February 1, 2018, N.J.S.A. 2C:34-3 (selling, distributing or exhibiting obscene material to a person under age 18) or an offense involving computer criminal activity in violation of any provision of Title 2C, chapter 20, you will be assessed a mandatory penalty as listed below for each offense for which you pled guilty?  $2,000 in the case of a 1st degree crime (1) (2) $1,000 in the case of a 2nd degree crime (3)  $ 750 in the case of a 3rd degree crime (4)  $ 500 in the case of a 4th degree crime (5)  $ 250 in the case of a disorderly persons or petty disorderly persons offense  Total CCPF Penalty $ ------------
[brief] 8.  This rendering is based on the verbal description in the transcript and is provided solely for demonstrative purposes to aid in the Court’s ease of reference.  3.  The Ocean County Case is an Outlier and Significantly Different Compared to the Situation  Here  Overall, our Supreme Court and the Appellate Division’s reasoning in Gray-Sadler and Monroe weigh towards deviating from even seemingly explicit election statutes in favor of not disenfranchising the voter where possible, especially in instances where there is no risk of voter fraud or duplicate votes.
[brief] For example, in an attempt to minimize the impact of the new zoning regulations created by Ordinance No. 13-2022 and the Kings Landing Redevelopment Plan, [...] argues that “[t]his same project Casella portrays as invasive could have been built on this property at any time since at least the 1980s. ” ([...]b15)  [emphasis original].  This is simply not true.  The new overlay zoning established by the Kings Landing Redevelopment Plan enabled [...] to submit a by-right site plan application with warehouse buildings 50 times larger than those permitted by the underlying zoning and at almost double the permitted height.  (Pa114-Pa115).  Put another way, the Township’s passage of Ordinance No. 13-2022 allowed [...] to avoid substantial use variance relief which would have otherwise been required pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70.d.  To be clear, the warehouses that [...] seeks to develop bear no resemblance whatsoever to those permitted by the underlying C-57 Flexible Planned Industrial-Commercial District.  These types of industrial-scale, so-called “high cube” warehouses with automated racking systems are a recent invention spurred on by e-commerce businesses such as [...].  In fact, and further underscoring the public interest at issue in this case, the proliferation of these new massive warehouses has caused concern throughout the State and led the [...] to issue a 48-page guidance document in September 2022.
[brief] Since [...] began the process of attempting to secure approval with the Borough but abandoned same, the Motion to Enforce is premature - [...] first submitted an application to the [...] on August 13, 2022.  (BTG Cert. Ex. "G") - Counsel for the [...], [...], Esq., sent a letter to [...] on November 1, 2021, advising that the Board did not have jurisdiction to hear the application, noting, "Section 290-68C (2) of the Borough’s Zoning Ordinance provides as follows:  “Any deviations from the standards provided herein that result in a “D” variance pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70d shall be addressed as an amendment to the Redevelopment Plan rather than via variance relief through the Borough Land Use Board...."  (BTG Cert. Ex. "H")  - On December 7, 2021, counsel to [...], [...], Esq., attending a meeting of the Mayor and Counsel wherein a lengthy discussion occurred regarding an amendment to the Redevelopment Plan.  (BTG Cert. Ex. "J")  The meeting ended with Counsel to the Borough, [...], Esq., advising that the governing body would submit questions to [...] to further illuminate the request.  Id. - Mr. McCann forwarded said request to Mr. Phillips via email on December 16, 2021.  (BTG Cert. Ex. "K") - [...] never responded to the written questions of the Mayor and Council.  - [...] petitioned the Implementation Monitor to take the place of the [...], who advised a Motion should be filed in Superior Court for clarification of his authority as an Implementation Monitor.
[brief] But if insurance companies are unable to access a Superior Court forum for its insurance fraud claims, there will undoubtedly also be an impact on their will and ability to investigate insurance fraud.  That hinders an important source of information for [...]’s own criminal investigations.  As noted, the stated purpose of the IFPA is to aggressively confront the problem of insurance fraud in New Jersey.  With regard to remedies, the IFPA directs the Department and the [...] to prioritize the restitution of moneys to \(^3\)  If the referral is deemed appropriate for a civil investigation, it may be handled by the Department for civil investigation and recovery.  insurers and others who are defrauded as a major priority.  N.J.S.A. 17:33A-2; N.J.S.A. 17:33A-26.  In furtherance of this stated objective, insurance companies must also continue to have access to all of the powerful remedies listed within the IFPA, such as the recovery of compensatory damages, treble damages, costs of investigation, costs of suit, and attorneys’ fees, to fight and deter insurance fraud.  Any statutory interpretation that limits the relief ensured by the IFPA would have the unintended effect of undermining the purpose of the IFPA while also incentivizing insurance fraud.
[brief] As explained in countless cases, this Court plays an important yet limited role when reviewing sentences.  See, e.g., Fuentes, 217 N.J. at 70; State v. Lawless, 214 N.J. 594, 606 (2013); State v. O’Donnell, 117 N.J. 210, 215 (1989); State v. Roth, 95 N.J. 334, 364-65 (1984).  Reviewing courts do not substitute their judgment for the sentencing court’s, but apply a “deferential standard. ”  Fuentes, 217 N.J. at 70.  Appellate review of a sentence is therefore limited to these questions: Were the correct guidelines followed? Does the record support the sentencing judge’s findings?  And was the sentence reasonable?  Fuentes, 217 N.J. at 70; Lawless, 214 N.J. at 606.
[brief] The court reasoned that the partnership agreement was accept[ed] by performance—that is, the unsigned agreement bound the estate based on a course of conduct over several years based upon the partner’s “continued performance and acceptance of benefits under the Partnership Agreement constituted and demonstrated acceptance of the terms of this contract. ”  *[...] v. Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough, LLP*, No. 2484CV00283-BLS2, 2024 Mass. Super. LEXIS 59, at *8 (June 10, 2024) (citing *Polaroid Corp. v. Rollins Envt'l Servs. (NJ)*, Inc., 416 Mass. 684, 691 (1993) (citing *Weichert*, 128 N.J. 427, 436)) (Da0511-Da0517).  Stated another way, “by acting as though he was a party to the Partnership Agreement, [...] confirmed that he had accepted its terms. ”  *Id.*  Non-signatories are also bound to agreements to arbitrate on the theory that a party may not knowingly accept benefits of an agreement and induce reliance through their conduct without becoming estopped to deny arbitration.  E.g., *E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Rhone Poulenc Fiber & Resin Intermediates, S.A.S.*, 269 F.3d 187, 200 (3d Cir. 2001); *Deloitte Noraudit A/S v. Deloitte, Haskins & Sells, U.S.*, 9 F.3d 1060 (2d Cir. 1993).  Where a non-signatory knowingly seeks and obtains direct benefits from a contract, “equitable estoppel prevents [the claimant] from ‘cherry-picking’ beneficial contract terms while ignoring other provisions that don’t benefit it or that it would prefer not to be governed by such as an arbitration clause. ”  *Haskins v. First Am. Title Ins. Co.*, 866 F. Supp. 2d 343, 350 (D.N.J. 2012) (quoting references omitted).  In sum, “courts prevent a non-signatory from embracing a contract, and then turning its back on the portions of the contract, such as an arbitration clause, that it finds distasteful[,]” *E.I. DuPont*, 269 F.3d at 200, provided the moving party has relied on the non-signatory’s conduct.
[brief] See Felicetta v. Com. Union Ins. Co., 117 N.J. Super. 524, 526 (App. Div. 1971) (denying award of counsel fees when insured only established coverage under one of three policies); Miller v. New Jersey Ins. Underwriting Ass'n, 177 N.J. Super. 584, 587 (Law. Div. 1981) (denying award of counsel fees because insurer “was successful on motion for summary judgment, obtained a divided court in the Appellate Division and lost in the Supreme Court. ”).  See also Passaic Valley, 206 N.J. 596, 616-19; Enright, 215 N.J. Super. 306, 311.  There is not a single case holding the “successful claimant” standard is met under the facts present here.  The decision most similar to this case is Continental Insurance Company v. Honeywell International, Inc., 2016 WL 3909530 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. July 20, 2016), aff’d, 234 N.J. 23 (2018).
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ENTERED AN ORDER TO ENFORCE THE SETTLEMENT BECAUSE PLAINTIFF’S COUNSEL HAD ACTUAL AND APPARENT AUTHORITY TO ENTER INTO A SETTLEMENT.  The Court should affirm the trial court because plaintiff’s counsel had actual and apparent authority to settle the case based on plaintiff’s instructions.  Settlement agreements between parties in litigation are contracts.  Brundage v. Estate of Carambio, 195 N.J. 575, 601 (2008); Nolan v. Lee Ho, 120 N.J. 465, 472 (1990) (citing Pascarella v. Bruck, 190 N.J. Super 118, 124 (App. Div.), certif. denied 94 N.J. 600 (1983)); Cumberland Farms, Inc. v. New Jersey Dep't of Env't Prot., 447 N.J. Super. 423, 438 (App. Div. 2016); Kaur v. Assured Lending Corp., 405 N.J. Super. 468, 475 (App. Div. 2009); Jennings v. Reed, 381 N.J. Super. 217, 227 (App. Div. 2005).  Indeed, “[s]ettlement of litigation ranks high in our public policy.
[brief] (Exh. “AA”, Appendix Exh. “B”)  (449a-450a)  24.  I tried on Feb. 21&27, 2023 to request their confirmation to issue & file a Final Informal Trust Accounting, or I would need to follow up with Court.  They did not respond.  (Exh. “AA”, Appendix Exh. “C”, March 1, 2023 Letter to Judge, & its Appendix Exh. “A”)
[brief] On January 19th, 2012, [...] signed an affidavit, swearing that [...] “had no knowledge and did not commit any robberies on January 12, 2012. ”  (2T 157-1 to 7)  [...] admitted that he wrote the affidavit “freely and voluntarily. ”  (2T 157-5 to 7)  G. CELL-PHONE-RECORDS EVIDENCE.