ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] That Amendment applied to a single parcel of land - the land owned by, Defendant, [...], “block 216, lots 11, 12 and 24. ” (Pa688).  It proposed the following changes to the requirements set forth in the Redevelopment Plan: a. Increased permissible building coverage to 50%; b. Eliminated all density restrictions; c. Increased maximum building height to 100 feet but excluded roof-top mechanical equipment and screening from the height measure; and d. Added that the maximum allowable stories consisting of dwelling units was 8 stories, excluding any stories dedicated to parking, mechanical uses or rooftop amenities, i.e. 10 stories.
[brief] This is an appeal from an order denying Defendants’ motion to compel arbitration.  Plaintiffs filed their Complaint on February 23, 2023 against [...], [...], and several other defendants.  (Da1–21.)  Defendants filed an Answer on April 3, 2023.  (Da35–49.)  Defendants’ Answer asserted, among other affirmative defenses, that Plaintiffs had agreed to arbitrate this dispute.  (Da47–48.)  On July 5, 2023, Defendants’ counsel conferred with Plaintiffs’ counsel regarding a stipulation to arbitration in accord with [...]’s agreement.  (Da103 ¶ 5.)  Plaintiffs refused to stipulate to arbitration, prompting Defendants to file their motion to compel arbitration on August 23, 2023.  (Da63–64.)  After hearing oral argument, [...] issued a written order on November 22, 2023, denying Defendants’ motion to compel.  (Da298–304.)  Defendants timely filed their notice of appeal on January 5, 2023.  See R. 2:2-3(b)(8).  Statement of Facts
[brief] | **TABLE OF AUTHORITIES** | **PAGE** | |--------------------------|---------| | Order—Motion to Sever | 27a | | Judgement of Conviction (October 6, 2023) | 28a | | Oral Sentencing Decision (October 5, 2023) | 8T16:25-23:30 | | Authority | Page | |--------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------| | N.J.Ct.R. 3:7-6 | 35 | | N.J.R.E. 403 | 37, 41 | | N.J.R.E. 404 | 36, 41 | | N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1 | 45, 46 | | N.J.S.A. 2C:44-3 | 45 | | Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968) | 29 | | State v. Case, 220 N.J. 49 (2014) | 45 | | State v. Chenique-Puey, 145 N.J. 334 (1996) | 35 | | State v. Cofield, 127 N.J. 328 (1992) | 15, 36-38, 41 | | State v. Fortin, 162 N.J. 517 (2000) | 36 | | State v. Goodman, 415 N.J.Super. 210 (App. Div. 2010) | 29 | | State v. Herbert, 457 N.J. Super. 490 (App. Div. 2019) | 26, 28-30 | | State v. Hernandez, 170 N.J. 106 (2001) | 39, 40 | | State v. Reddish, 181 N.J. 553, 608 (2004) | 36, 37, 41 | | State v. Rose, 206 N.J. 141 (2011) | 37, 41 | | State v. Skinner, 218 N.J. 496 (2014) | 36-38, 41 | | State v. Sterling, 215 N.J. 65 (2013) | 35 | | State v. Winter, 96 N.J. 640 (1984) | 26 |
[brief] 3  Noting that [...] did not challenge the validity of the warrant, the trial court stated:  “The warrant, of course, is presumed valid and I have no basis to presume otherwise. ”  (1T 62-4 to 63-9)  The tracking device was installed on the Audi on December 13, 2021.  (Pa 7)  Later that week, the detectives “conducted a controlled purchase of suspected narcotics between [[...]] and the CI,” during which [...] was observed by detectives exit the rear door of his restaurant, pop the hood of his Audi and retrieve a small item.  He then got into the CI’s vehicle, where he handed the CI suspected drugs in exchange for money.  (Pa 7-8; 1T 18-18 to 19-19)  B.
[brief] I.  Legal Argument  A. Standard of Review (715a)  Plaintiffs’ brief attempts to blend the summary judgment standard with the scope of review applied to a trial court’s decision to apply an equitable doctrine.  To be clear, the trial court’s grant of summary judgment is reviewed de novo.  Conley v. Guerrero, 228 N.J. 339, 346 (2017).  When deciding a motion for summary judgment, the determination of whether a genuine issue of material fact exists requires the motion judge to consider whether the competent evidential materials presented, when viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party under the applicable evidentiary standard, are sufficient to permit a rational factfinder to resolve the alleged disputed issue in favor of the non-moving party.  Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520, 523 (1995).  Summary judgment should only be granted if there is no genuine issue of material fact and “the moving party is entitled to a judgment or order as a matter of law. ”  Conley, 228 N.J. at 346 (quoting R. 4:46-2(c)).  While “a trial court’s interpretation of the law and the legal consequences that flow from established facts are not entitled to any special deference,” “the decision to apply [an equitable] doctrine, as an equitable principle, ‘is left to judicial discretion. ’”  Francavilla v. Absolute Resols. VI LLC, 478 N.J. Super. 171, 178 (App. Div. 2024) (quoting 700 Highway 33 LLC v. Pollio, 421 N.J. Super. 231, 238 (App. Div. 2011)).  Appellate Courts will, nonetheless, reverse a trial court’s exercise of discretionary authority that is “manifestly unjust” under the circumstances.  Ibid. (quoting Newark Morning Ledger Co. v. N.J. Sports & Exposition Auth., 423 N.J. Super. 140, 174 (App. Div. 2011)).  The summary judgment standard is not “modified” by the nature of the relief granted.
[brief] 63a.  (Since [...] performed no services and had laid off its employees assigned to [...] for the period the schools were closed, it obviously had no certified payrolls to produce at the time that its invoices were first sent.)  [...] demanded return of the $1,301,300 payment, asserting that [...] was in breach of its contract for failing to have performed services while the schools were closed and that it had been unjustly enriched by the payment it had received.  63a-64a.  [...] further contended, (falsely), that [...] had failed to apply the August 2020 payment to the wages of the custodians who had been laid off during the pandemic, and that the COVID Statute was properly construed to only allow for payment to a contractor following the renegotiation of its contract, another unfounded claim.
[brief] Defendants [...] and [...] filed their motion for summary judgment regarding [...]’s report and the “new business rule” on May 28, 2018.  199a-200a.  Point IX of that brief specifically argued that Plaintiffs’ damages claim should be dismissed pursuant to the “new business rule. ”  218a-221a.  On August 21, 2018, [...] rendered a written opinion denying that motion for summary judgment.  231a-240a.  [...] explicitly ruled on the admissibility of [...]’s expert report.  237a-238a.  After analyzing the “new business rule” and the relevant case law, he held, in relevant part, that the “new business rule” did not apply because [...]’s expert report calculated Plaintiffs’ lost profits with a degree of reasonable certainty.  237a-238a.  [...] found that:  In the instant matter, the court is satisfied that [...] uses sound fact when compiling his report as such calculations take into account the various changes in development e.g. affordable housing and age restricted requirements along with objective factors e.g. estimates of cost, capital structure, sales process and rental rates.  For these reasons, the court is satisfied that such opinion does not constitute a net opinion.  [238a].  This ruling by [...] established the law of the case on the admissibility of [...]’s expert report, and that [...]’s report calculated Plaintiffs’ damages with reasonable certainty.  237a-238a.
[directive] These weapons fall under the broader category of "stun guns," as that term is defined in the New Jersey Code of Criminal Justice.  Specifically, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-1(t) provides that the term stun gun means “any weapon or other device which emits an electrical charge or current intended to temporarily or permanently disable a person. ”  Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:39-3(h), any person who knowingly has in his possession any stun gun is guilty of a crime of the fourth degree.  N.J.S.A. 2C:39-3(g)(1) further provides in pertinent part that, “[n]othing in subsection h. (generally prohibiting the knowing possession of stun guns) shall apply to any law enforcement officer who is exempted from the provisions of that subsection by the Attorney General. ”  This supplemental policy shall constitute an exemption from the provisions of N.J.S.A. 2C:39-3(h) for any law enforcement officer authorized pursuant to this policy to deploy or use a conducted energy device during an actual law enforcement operation, and for any officer who is participating in a training program pursuant to this policy.
[brief] (2T 41:9-11; 62:21-63:1)  The parties looked at various townhouses at various price points, with varying property tax circumstances, and jointly decided to purchase the one in Bedminster.  (2T 61:6-62:20)  [...]’s sentiment about feeling almost destitute is both understandable and relatively true.  After twenty-three years of promising lifelong support, Defendant had pulled the rug out from beneath Plaintiff, and was kicking her out of her home.
[brief] ”  [ISSUE WAS RAISED (Da0785; Da0816; Da0846)]  .............33  A.  Plaintiff’s Experts Do Not Offer Independent General-Causation Opinions, and Lack the Qualifications and Factual Basis to Do So.  [ISSUE WAS RAISED (Da0785; Da0816; Da0846)] ...........................................................................  35  B.  Plaintiff’s Experts Did No Work to Offer Reliable and Factually-Supported Specific-Causation Opinions.  [ISSUE WAS RAISED (Da0785; Da0816; Da0846)] ..............................................  41  CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................
[brief] If we can’t prove [...] was engaging in disability discrimination, it’s absolutely clear they violated his Constitutional Rights (CRA) even if he were non-disabled.  A.  Specific Violations of the Public Entity Regs (Not Addressed Below)  In short, [...] had a duty to accommodate [...] or, just treat him like anyone else, by calling his lawyer under the LAD, the CRA and our Constitutions.  Because they did not call [...] for (free) help, they were unable “to effectively communicate” with [...].  Certainly, the unsigned Search Permission denotes some failure of communication.  Telling [...] his accommodation (his dad) is not coming is an anti- accommodation – it’s purely malicious.  However, it’s in an LAD framework of analysis in addition to being a CRA violation.  “Public entities”, “places of public accommodation,” “employers,” etc. such as the NJ Courts and [...] must not discriminate against, or violate the rights of, People with Disabilities.  In this case, all LAD communication, accommodation and non-discrimination protections are merely “backing up” [...]’s Constitutional right to a lawyer – whether he asked or not.
[brief] She also testified that she was sure she was with defendant at 12:52 a.m. on the night of the crime, not 12:42 a.m. as she told the private investigator.  (19T7-14 to 23).  The court also found the State’s witness [...] was not credible because he may have suggested the 12:42 p.m. time to [...] to create a reasonable doubt about defendant’s involvement in the shooting.
[brief] Appellant shall not be entitled to now expand its appeal to include the 2017 WFD Permit or 2019 Permit Modification and benefit from its delay to the detriment of, and prejudice to, [...] who obtained State and Federal approvals and proceeded on that basis.  See Rosenstein v. State, Dep't of Treasury, Div. of Pension & Benefits, 438 N.J. Super. 491, 498 (App. Div. 2014)(the exhaustion doctrine "is not absolute and '[e]xceptions are made when the administrative remedies would be futile, when irreparable harm would result, when jurisdiction of the agency is doubtful, or when an overriding public interest calls for a prompt judicial decision'").
[brief] [...] is witness to a two-vehicle collision that results in a lawsuit between the two drivers involved in the crash.  Plaintiff calls [...] as a witness and, when asked the question, [...] testifies that the light was green when the plaintiff entered the intersection.  The defendant driver, however, finds another eyewitness, [...], who recalls things differently.  [...] testifies that the light was red when the plaintiff entered the intersection, and that the defendant had the green light.  [...] even testifies that he watched the accident happen from a much better vantage point than [...], whose view of the accident was somewhat obstructed.  The jury nevertheless believes [...]’s version of the events and finds in favor of the plaintiff driver as to liability.  If the defendant could then sue [...] for allegedly lying under oath, litigation over the color of the light when the plaintiff driver entered the intersection could go on forever.  Here, the trial court in the 2020 Action properly declined to go down that kind of rabbit hole.
[brief] Allowing the June 7, 2024 ruling to stand would fly in the face of the New Jersey Supreme Court’s direction to courts to engage in their “gatekeeping role” to prevent speculative evidence from being presented to the jury.  See, Borough of Saddle River v. 66 East Allendale, LLC, 216 N.J. 115 (2013); see also, County of Monmouth v. Hilton, 334 N.J. Super. 582 (App. Div.), cert. denied, 167 N.J. 633 (2001).  The trial court’s ruling that the zoning reflected in the [...] is the controlling zoning for determining just compensation should be reversed at this stage of the condemnation action as such a ruling is squarely contradicted by established New Jersey condemnation law.
[brief] One of the emails that the Plaintiff had posted on the Firm’s NEOS system was the November 30, 2022 email by [...] wherein [...] admitted the malpractice.  Da36, at ¶ 63.  At 3:17 p.m. on January 28, 2023, six days after the telephone conversation of January 22, 2023 and a few hours after the above January 28, 2023 email exchange concerning Plaintiff [...] creating an accurate NEOS record of the Firm’s malpractice, Defendant [...] emailed [...], Esq., a lawyer at [...], a firm that had been representing the Plaintiff in personal matters while, it turns out, that firm, i.e., the [...] law firm, via the work of [...], Esq., was secretly representing [...] in efforts to terminate the Plaintiff in retaliation for having engaged in the aforesaid protected activities.
[brief] [...]: All right, have a seat.  Thanks for coming down, man.  We appreciate it, okay?  [...]:  (Inaudible).  UNIDENTIFIED MALE:  Sorry to give you such a stir at your door.  I know you're not expecting somebody and -- you know?  [...]: It's all right, man.  We're gonna get you outta here as fast as we can, okay?  (27T 162-21 to 163-4)
[brief] STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS  Plaintiffs seek to construct a 1,105,000 square foot, 48 ft. tall warehouse and distribution facility, along with accessory uses and structures, such as parking and loading areas, stormwater management basins, a septic system and the sole access driveway for the proposed warehouse distribution facility at a 216-acre parcel located in Florence and Mansfield Townships that is commonly referred to as the “[...]” (the “Property”).  Ja024.  Interstate 295, a limited access highway, bounds the Property to the east; Florence-Columbus Road (County Route 656) lies to the south; Old York Road (County Route 660) is to the west; and the New Jersey Turnpike is to the north.  1T 29:20-25.  The easternmost 118 acres of the Property lie in Mansfield Township in its ODL-Office, Distribution, Laboratory Zone District (“ODL”).  The western 98 acres of the Property are in Florence Township.  Ja072; 1T 30:1-3.  The area of the Florence Township part of the Property which lies west of a high-tension powerline easement is in Florence Township’s AG-Agricultural Zoning District (“AG”).  The Florence Township part of the Property east of the powerline easement (and bordering Mansfield Township) is in Florence’s SM-Special Manufacturing” Zoning District (“SM”).  Ja030; Ja073; 1T 32:8-14.  No development is proposed on the part of the Property west of the power line which lies in Florence’s AG Zone.  Ja030  Warehouses and distribution facilities with buildings up to 50 feet tall are permitted in Mansfield Township’s ODL Zone District.  Ja024.  Warehouses and distribution facilities with buildings up to 30 feet tall are permitted in Florence Township’s SM Zone District.  Ja025, Ja097.  Warehouses with heights in excess of 30 feet are permitted elsewhere in Florence Township, notably in the GM General Manufacturing Zone District.  Ja039.  The proposed 48 ft. tall warehouse distribution facility building would be located on the Mansfield-portion of the Property along with some parking and loading spaces.  Ja085-Ja095.  The proposed building itself would cover over 25 acres of the 44 acres to be developed in Mansfield.  Ja085-Ja095.  The [...] approved the Mansfield Township part of the Project on January 24, 2022.  Ja085-Ja095.  The development proposed for the Florence portion of the tract includes parking and loading spaces, a septic disposal system, two (2) stormwater management basins, and the facility’s sole driveway, which joins the public road system at Florence-Columbus Road in Florence Township.  Ja024; 1T 33:17-23.  Since the principal structure will be located in Mansfield, Plaintiffs were obliged to seek a use variance from the Board under N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70(d)(1) to permit the accessory uses in Florence without a principal structure located in Florence.
[brief] (See Pa159–78.)  [...] alleged that in February 2021, [...] conferred with [...], [...]’s then-Vice President of Development – Northeast Region, and that Epstein supposedly admitted to an “illicit agreement” between the City and [...].  (See Pa191–92.)  In the proposed amended complaint (“Proposed Amended Complaint”), [...] alleged that the City agreed to “name [...] as the preferred redeveloper, in exchange for . . . [...]’s back room promise to construct a multi-million dollar public school for the City. ” (See Pa176 ¶ 119.)  But at the February 2020 City Council Meeting, [...] claimed that construction of the school was his idea.  (See Pa113 at 18:10.)  On April 30, 2021, the court denied [...]’s motion to reconsider and for leave to file an amended complaint to assert a bad faith claim.  (See Pa180–81.)  On May 26, 2021, [...] filed a notice of appeal of the First Action ([...]) (the “First Appellate Action”).  (Pa183–88.)  On appeal of the First Action, [...] challenged the trial court’s findings that the evidence in the record supported “Jersey City’s Designation of the Subject Area as an Area in Need of Redevelopment” and the City Council’s Redevelopment Resolution designating “the Area as a Condemnation Area in Need of Redevelopment. ”  (Pa192.)  [...] also raised the following issue:  “The Trial Court Erred by Denying [...] Leave to File an Amended Complaint to Assert a ‘Bad Faith’ Claim Against the [...] Based Upon Newly Discovered Evidence. ”  (Ibid.)  III.
[brief] The lease as between [...] and [...] does not contain a provision whereby [...] is obligated to notify [...] that the parking lot and/or common areas of the multi-tenant shopping center need to be maintained.  [Pa650-Pa656].  The lease as between [...] and [...] does not contain a provision whereby [...] could maintain the parking lot and/or common areas of the multi-tenant shopping center and charge [...] for the expenses associated with undertaking such maintenance.  [[Pa650-Pa656].  C.  PLAINTIFFS’ GLOBAL STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS
[directive] The review shall include an examination of all available sources of information about the incident, including any video of the incident, reports, officer or other witness statements, medical records and records of injuries; (c)  The review shall include an analysis of whether force was used in a non- discriminatory fashion to ensure officers are treating every person equally without discrimination based on race, ethnicity, nationality, religion, disability, gender, gender identity, sexual orientation, or any other protected characteristic; (d)  The reviewing supervisors shall make a recommendation of what action, if any, should be undertaken, including commendation of the officer, policy changes, remedial training, administrative action, disciplinary action or, if appropriate, referral for criminal prosecution; (e)  The law enforcement executive, or a command level officer no more than one rank below the law enforcement executive for departments with more than 100 officers, shall review each use of force investigation and approve or reject the recommendations of the supervisors who conducted the review.
[brief] T1.46:5-47:6.  (emphasis added)  There was not a single allusion to how the PILOT revenues will benefit the Project or how the conventional tax revenues it would otherwise generate would be insufficient to meet related needs.  As the Township’s financial experts pointed out, the projected PILOT revenue “exceeds” the estimated incremental school costs\(^3\) and will have only a modest impact on public safety and emergency services expenditures, exceeding estimated incremental municipal costs overall.  Pa666.  The $320 million more in revenue to the Township in excess of the municipal share of conventional taxes will “far exceed” the estimated incremental municipal and school costs.  Pa667. \(^4\)  **The PILOT as a Means of Shifting Regional School Costs**
[brief] Recently, we sent for filing an Answer on behalf of Defendant, [...], M.D., in connection with this case.  In reviewing your pleadings, I received a copy of an Affidavit of Merit authored by [...], M.D.  Please be advised that our client, [...], is a medical doctor specializing in the field of Internal Medicine/Critical Care/Pulmonary Medicine.  In light of the fact that your Affidavit of Merit is offered by a physician in a different specialty than [...], we object to the Affidavit of Merit by [...], M.D., who specializes in General Surgery/Vascular Surgery/Surgical Critical, as it does not meet the requirements for an Affidavit of Merit set forth in N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-26 et seq. and/or N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-41.  Thank you for your anticipated cooperation.  Very truly yours, [...]  [...] LKO/lad  Enclosures cc: [...], Esq.  [...], Esq.  [...], Esq.  PREPARED BY THE COURT
[brief] (Pa488)  Plaintiff then moved to consolidate both cases.  (Pa485).  On 10/06/2023, the Court in denying consolidation to the plaintiff, expressed that Plaintiff had not filed a notice of claim against [...] even though one was filed.  (1T40-1 to 3; Pa535; Pa505).  On 10/06/2023, the Court stated that with respect to plaintiff’s motion to consolidate, he would deny it at this point because there were questions related to when plaintiff had access to discovery.
[brief] A.  AOC 5  AOC 5 is land area and disposal pit located under the northeast corner of what was Building 8, which was constructed in 1972.  (Pa0423-25; Pa0120).  AOC 5 received discharges of solvents and other wastewaters beginning in 1965 and continuing until 1972, when Building 8 was erected over the location.  (Pa0423-25; Pa0120-21).  The CVOCs detected at AOC 5 include PERC, TCE and TCA.