ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The Trial Court Judge was mistaken when he said that N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-28 requires that the sworn statement excusing the Affidavit of Merit be filed within the timeframe that the Plaintiff has for producing the Affidavit of Merit.  (Transcript, 28:20–29:1).  The text of N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-28 reads as follows:  [a]n affidavit shall not be required pursuant to section 2 of this act if the plaintiff provides a sworn statement in lieu of the affidavit setting forth that: the defendant has failed to provide plaintiff with medical records or other records or information having a substantial bearing on preparation of the affidavit; a written request therefor along with, if necessary, a signed authorization by the plaintiff for release of the medical records or other records or information requested, has been made by certified mail or personal service; and at least 45 days have elapsed since the defendant received the request.
[brief] ”  Rochat, 470 N.J. Super. at 435 (quoting Harvey, 151 N.J. at 171).  Because the trial court failed to apply the proper standard in admitting [...]’s critical testimony, its decision cannot stand.  This Court should survey pertinent scientific writings as part of its de novo review of the admissibility of the expert testimony.  Doriguzzi, 334 N.J. Super. at 539.  As suggested by [...]’s own admission that analysis of soft tissue is the “gold standard” for determining the timing of injuries and [...]’s concession that injuries can appear perimortem even where they occurred days after death, scientific literature recognizes that the forensic analysis of bones is not able to reliably establish whether injuries occurred before or after death.
[brief] Exhibit M2-8, 10/30/2013  [...] Deposition with Exhibits...........................................753a  Exhibit M2-9, 11/21/2013  [...] Deposition with Exhibits............................................851a  Exhibit M2-10, 1/8/2014 (AM Session)  [...] Deposition......................909a  Exhibit M2-11, 1/8/2014 (PM Session)  [...] Deposition.......................931a  Exhibit M2-12, 3/13/2017  [...] Deposition with Exhibits..............951a  Exhibit M2-13, 2/10/2017  [...] Deposition with Exhibits.............1003a  Exhibit M2-14, 11/3/2015  [...] Deposition with Exhibits...............1020a  11/30/2018
[brief] BOARD HEARING AND DECISION  On March 26, 2019, the Board properly denied the application of CTO7 SPII --- 1  Please note that the Procedural History and Statement of Facts have been consolidated for judicial economy and ease of presentation and understanding.  LLC, and [...] (the “Respondents”) for a (d)(1) use variance and a two (d)(6) height variances, as well as numerous bulk variances, in order to develop Block 4, Lot 14.01 (the “Property”) with 43,568 square feet (“SF”) of commercial uses and 206 residential units (including 43 affordable apartment units) (the “Application”).
[brief] **ARGUMENT**  **POINT I**  THIS COURT SHOULD CONFIRM THE ARBITRATION AWARD BECAUSE IT REPRESENTS A REASONABLY DEBATEABLE INTERPRETATION OF THE PARTIES’ AGREEMENT.  In considering the issue before him, [...] recognized that his role was to apply his expertise as a labor arbitrator to interpret the meaning of the parties’ CNA, and to apply that meaning in the dispute before him.  That dispute concerned whether the City violated the parties’ CNA by terminating [...] without just cause.  [...] applied well-established principles of just cause, expressly confining himself to the language of the CNA, and determined that based on the evidence and testimony presented, the Authority had not met its burden of establishing that it had just cause to terminate [...].  It bears repeating that the “reasonably debatable” standard strongly favors confirmation of arbitration awards.  To that end, even if the Authority presents an interpretation of the CNA which differs from the Arbitrator’s and which is “arguably plausible in its own right,” courts are instructed not to “improperly substitute[ their] own judgment for that of the arbitrator. ”  *Borough of Carteret v. Firefighters Mut. Benevolent Ass'n, Local 67*, 247 N.J. 202, 205 (2021).  In *Borough of Carteret*, the Chancery Court vacated an arbitrator’s award, but that decision was reversed by the Supreme Court.
[brief] In the intervening two (2)-year period after the 2019-2022 CNA was ratified, neither the Association nor Board had any discussions as to the scope of the Bargaining Council’s involvement in the negotiations for the successor CNA (Id., ¶ 14).  The first negotiations session for a successor agreement between the parties was tentatively scheduled for November 10, 2021 (Id., ¶ 15).  On or around October 28, 2021, the Association’s negotiations chair [[...]] informed then-Board negotiations chair (and then-Board member) [[...]] that the Association again sought to have the Bargaining Council be present at all negotiations sessions (Id., ¶ 16).  [[...]] objected to the presence of the Bargaining Council at the negotiations sessions (Ibid.).  On November 9, 2021, [[...]] informed the Association that the Board would be proposing a ground rule prohibiting the Bargaining Council from being present at and participating in the negotiations sessions for the successor agreement (Id., ¶ 16).  Because the parties could not agree on whether to allow Bargaining Council members attend the meeting, the November 10, 2021 negotiation session was postponed to allow the parties to engage in further discussion regarding the Bargaining Council (Id., ¶ 18).  Designated representatives of the Association and the Board subsequently agreed to meet on December 8, 2021 to discuss ground rules, including the role of the Bargaining Council during negotiations sessions (Id., ¶ 19).
[directive] If a Tactical Team approved for responses to Barricaded Individual situations by a County Prosecutor or the Attorney General pursuant to Section 4 of the Policy (see footnote 5) is unable to incorporate the required Mental Health Professionals (see Section 5) by January 6, 2025, that Tactical Team shall request an extension, submit a detailed plan for full compliance, and propose the date when full compliance will be achieved.  The plan shall be submitted to the [...] and the [...] by December 1, 2024.  The Attorney General, or his designee, shall then determine whether that Tactical Team will be permitted to continue to respond to Barricaded Individual situations pending full compliance with the Policy.  The provisions of this Directive and the attached Barricaded Individual Policy shall remain in force unless repealed, amended, or superseded by Order of the Attorney General.
[brief] Defendants also face substantial prejudice if [...] could pursue the Second Action because the First Action was already dismissed and affirmed on appeal—and the motion to amend to add a bad faith claim was determined to lack merit.  [...], [...], and our courts should be spared the time and expense of litigating the same issue twice.  D.  Whether [...] Even Raised the Bad Faith Claim in the First Action Would Not Bar the Doctrine’s Application.
[brief] Public Defender By: [...]  DAVID A. GIES  Designated Counsel  Dated: May 9, 2024  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. [...] STATE OF NEW JERSEY, : CRIMINAL ACTION  Plaintiff-Respondent, : On Appeal from a Final Order Denying Post-Conviction : Relief Entered in the Superior Court of New Jersey, v. : Law Division, Essex County.  [...], Defendant-Appellant.
[brief] Now, Appellee is taking the position that the Judgment should not be molded to the policy limits as he has a potential bad faith claim under *Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Investors Ins. Co. of America*, 65 N.J. 474 (1974).  This is simply not the case.  This duty discussed in *Rova Farms* was the importance of good faith settlement negotiations in the context of the insured being personally liable for any damages in excess of a policy limit.
[brief] Waste Mgt., 433 N.J. Super. at 451-52 (App. Div. 2013) (citation omitted); Crowe, 90 N.J. at 132-34 (summarizing the fundamental principles in justifying issuance of injunctive relief).  A party seeking the extraordinary relief of a preliminary injunction is required to prove each of these elements by clear and convincing evidence.  Waste Mgt., 433 N.J. Super. at 452.  This Court has held that a judge’s failure to consider and evaluate each and every Crowe factor constitutes an abuse of discretion.  Id. at 455-46.  This Court owes no deference to a lower court’s factual findings and legal conclusions if they are “so manifestly unsupported by or inconsistent with the competent, relevant and reasonably credible evidence as to offend the interests of justice. ”  Griepenburg v. Twp. of Ocean, 220 N.J. 239, 254 (2015) (quoting Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Investors Ins. Co., 65 N.J. 474, 484 (1974)).  A.
[brief] Suffice it to say, that more than ten police officers went to the Edison house to execute an arrest warrant against [...] – believing he was present in the house – who was accused of fatally shooting a victim while they were in separate cars waiting at a stoplight in Plainfield.  As a result of the evidence seized during the warrantless search, defendant and five co-defendants, including [...], were charged in forty-nine counts of [...].  Defendant was named in eight of those counts; CDS and weapons offenses, and a charge of second-degree conspiracy to distribute CDS while in possession of a firearm, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4.1 and 2C:5-2.
[brief] The Board also questioned the design impact on the height and the variances needed for height.  [...]’s architect testified as follows as to the flat versus gabled roof:  Um, as far as the height of the building, because this -- because we want this to feel residential, **we did not think that this is an appropriate place for a flat roof.**  2T 37:2-19.  (emphasis added).  Although he conceded that the building could be reduced to 2 stories, he believed that the owner would not then consider the project to be “viable. ”  2T 63:3-6.  Again, he testified that by using a flat roof, they could comply with the height requirements of the zone.  2T 68:23-69:3.  However, he again testified, “I think it would detract, I don't think it would be appropriate for this neighborhood. ”  2T 68:9-11 (emphasis added).  He also testified that the highest peak is 43 feet 7 inches from grade.  2T 70:6-8.  [...]’s architect eventually presented revised roof lines that reduced the height to 35 feet from 38 feet, but still requested 3 stories.  3T 8:7-21.  The Board asked about the visual impact from the road, 3T 22:2-19, but notably he did not testify that the new roof line, although height compliant, was appropriate for the neighborhood or the zone, nor did he recant his testimony from the prior hearings that a flat roof was inappropriate there.  [...] questioned the need for a covered entry to protect residents in bad weather.  2T 43:23-44:7.  [...]’s answer was that they planned to use snowmelt.  2T 44:13.  When questioned why photo exhibits of the vegetation were not as dense in real life, the architect conceded that they were simulations, not photographs.  2T 46:9-25.  [...]’s traffic expert recited that the parking required is 194 spaces, while providing 117 spaces, acknowledging that the relevant parking standard is RSIS per the state statute.
[brief] THE COURT VIOLATED [...]’S JURY TRIAL RIGHTS BY DISQUALIFYING JUROR 115 BASED ON A 21-YEAR-OLD CONVICTION FOR A “CDS CHARGE” WITHOUT DETERMINING IF THAT CONVICTION ACTUALLY DISQUALIFIED HIM FROM SERVING OR IF IT HAD BEEN EXPUNGED.  (29T:21-1 TO 27-6)  During jury selection, the court disqualified [...] after he disclosed that he had an unspecified 21-year-old conviction for a “CDS charge. ”  Before the court excused [...], defense counsel asked court to “ask him if it was expunged because if it was expunged I think--,” before the court cut her off and stated, “I don’t want to get into expungements.
[brief] 1  STATEMENT OF PROCEDURAL HISTORY ...........................................................................  2  COUNTERSTATEMENT OF FACTS .....................................................................................  3  A. THE PROPERTY ..............................................................................................................  3  B. THE RENDERING (5A) ....................................................................................................  3  C. THE AMENDED RESOLUTION (10a) ..............................................................................  4  D. THE TRIAL COURT’S MARCH 27, 2024, HEARING (2T) .............................................  6  E. ADDITIONAL FACTS SPECIFIC TO RESPONDENT [...] ......................... 8 LEGAL ARGUMENT ...............................................................................................................
[brief] The parties filed several motions through JEDS during the divorce litigation spanning over four years and mutually served the motion papers exclusively via email for a period of more than three years since June 2020.  The parties were divorced on February 28, 2023 following a trial.  The trial court issued a written opinion (Pa1) accompanying the judgment of divorce on March 1, 2023 followed by an amplification of its order on March 15, 2023 (Pa66).
[brief] Moreover, there are so many other facts in the record that belie any hint of discriminatory motive.  For example, other staff members who were terminated were not members of Plaintiff’s protected class for race or age.  Plaintiff admitted that the employment contracts of [...] (in his 30s) and [...] (Caucasian) were also not renewed.  (Pl. Tr. 304:18 to 305:9; 306:15-24).  In 2019, Defendants also terminated [...] (a Latino male teacher) and [...] (a Caucasian female).  (Id.; Da334 at No. 30).
[directive] Implementation of Countywide Brady-Giglio Policies  A.  Responsibilities.  It is the prosecutor’s responsibility to gather and disclose  Prosecutors’ relevant and material to the defense.  The obligation to turn over exculpatory Brady Giglio material is embedded in New Jersey’s discovery rules, Rule 3:13-3(a), (b), and (f).  In addition to disclosing exculpatory information pre-trial, exculpatory information must also be disclosed prior to a plea offer when offered during the pre-indictment phase.  R. 3:13-3(a).  Prosecutors are also bound by the Rules of Professional Conduct.  Rule 3.8(d) requires prosecutors to make timely disclosure to the defense of all evidence known to the prosecutor that tends to negate guilt or mitigate the offense.  It is also the prosecutor’s responsibility to decide, based on their professional judgment, what evidence is covered by and and must be disclosed to the defendant.
[brief] Shaw, 460 N.J. Super. at 614; see Macedo, 178 N.J. at 345-46 (“Thus, today, forty years after the CFA was enacted, our jurisprudence continues to identify learned professionals as beyond the reach of the Act so long as they are operating in their professional capacities.  The Legislature is presumed to be aware of that judicial view. ”).  In 2006, this Court took head-on the question of “whether an insurance broker may be subjected to liability under the CFA for the performance of brokerage services. ”  Plemmons, 387 N.J. Super. at 560.  This Court tracked the history of the CFA exemption to learned and semi-professionals.
[directive] The group consists of law enforcement professionals, CBVI organizations, and healthcare professionals.  Based on collaborative input from these experts and skilled practitioners, these Guidelines recognize the importance of community violence intervention (CVI) as a public safety strategy complementary to traditional law enforcement.  This group was convened because, despite the shared mission of saving lives, we do not always see partnership and coordination between CBVI organizations and law enforcement, and even where there is coordination, guidance is needed.  The Report provides guidance to both law enforcement and CBVI practitioners on how they can appropriately coordinate their efforts with the goal of reducing violence.  And these Guidelines identify practical steps that applicable law enforcement agencies can take to build relationships and coordinate with State-funded CBVI organizations operating in their jurisdiction.  These Guidelines are intended to transform the Working Group’s recommendations into practice.
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY PERMITTED THE JURY TO LOOK AT THE DOCUMENTS THAT COMPRISED OF DANIEL COHEN’S CLIENT FILE (2T:15; 5T:30)  In connection with the underlying action, [...] received the construction defect case files from [...]’s prior counsel, and other parties to the litigation.  In connection with the underlying action, [...] diligently and thoroughly reviewed the documents produced.  The presence of the construction defect case files in the courtroom was not unfairly prejudicial to Plaintiff.
[brief] [...] and [...], Plaintiffs-Respondents, v. [...], [...], [...], Defendants-Respondents, [...] F/K/A [...] F/K/A [...], Defendant-Appellant, [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...]  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION  Docket No. [...]  T2  Civil Action On Appeal  From: Superior Court of New Jersey Law Division: Hudson County  Docket No.: [...]
[directive] Purpose of Guidelines  The purpose of these Guidelines is to assist law enforcement agencies in fulfilling their statutory responsibilities under the provisions of N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.23.  However, it is not the purpose or function of these Guidelines to otherwise invalidate, supplement, modify or rescind any existing: ordinance or resolution adopted by a governing body; policy of a law enforcement agency; or contractual agreements with respect to the towing and removal of vehicles, the manner in which such vehicles are claimed by their owner or the fees related thereto.  To the extent that the provisions of N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.23 may require a law enforcement agency to adjust its policies or practices, the law enforcement agency should contact their appropriate legal advice.1 representative for legal  These Guidelines are also available on the Division of Criminal Justice Internet website at www.njdcj.org, or www.state.nj.us/lps/dcj.
[brief] “But I do believe, given the multiple times discovery has been extended, given that this motion has been pending for several months, that the Court can rule on that, on that issue as set forth relating to the viability, feasibility, whatever you want to call it, of a multiple tenant structure.  I, you just can’t—you need expert testimony on that.  There is no question about it.  Too many variables. ”  (1T61-1 to 9)  Upon reviewing this full excerpt from the 2020 motion hearing, it is clear that [...] made no ruling on the need for expert testimony to support all of Plaintiff’s damage claims (“It’s not directly before me right now.
[brief] 8  [...] clarified that the coverage area of the cell tower is not confined to the shaded portion of the arc.  (12T175-4 to 175-15; 12T194-1 to 194-17)  As in Burney, the conclusory testimony offered by [...] and [...] failed to present any facts or reliable data from which the range of the cell towers could be calculated.  In fact, the testimony here was even more lacking than in Burney.  In Burney, the expert “testified that each of the lines [on the maps he created] had an approximate length of one mile.
[brief] It was not listed in the summons as a basis for the charge.  It was remote in time.  And because [...] did not “cause serious bodily injury” to [...], no charges could have been brought under the Act.  Therefore, the event is not probative of whether [...] is potentially dangerous.  N.J.S.A. 4:19-23.a.(2).  Even the trial Court conceded that the event was “remote” and less relevant to his determination of the facts in this case.
[brief] To implement the Rule 4:10-2(a) relevancy standard in the ESI context, it is standard practice for a party first to conduct an initial screening search for potentially relevant documents, then to conduct a physical relevancy review before actually producing any of the collected documents.  The reason is simple: large businesses store an exceptionally voluminous amount of information electronically—word processing documents, emails, spreadsheets, presentations, and more, which collectively may add up to millions of typewritten pages—and it is infeasible to manually page through each of those documents individually.  Parties thus often negotiate search terms “as a means to simplify and limit the scope of production.
[brief] ”  C64-18.  The Commission in I/M/O Treston then reaffirmed [...]’s instruction as to the issuance of disclaimers, stating:  A prominent disclaimer (caps/bold), such as “THE FOLLOWING STATEMENTS ARE MADE IN MY CAPACITY AS A PRIVATE CITIZEN, AND NOT IN MY CAPACITY AS A BOARD MEMBER.  THESE STATEMENTS ARE ALSO NOT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE BOARD OR ITS INDIVIDUAL MEMBERS, AND SOLELY REPRESENT MY OWN PERSONAL OPINIONS,” may have avoided the appearance – actual or perceived – that the statements were made in Respondent’s capacity as a Board member.
[brief] We see no reason to depart from our conclusion in Francavilla in this case.  Plaintiff relies solely on non-binding authority to argue there is an implied private right of action under the CFLA.  We are unconvinced by plaintiff’s suggestion that we should contravene the plain statutory language of the CFLA.  See Diana, 2024 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2241, at *7-8.  Appellant’s attempt to avoid this prohibition by framing the barred claims as requests for declaratory relief under N.J.S.A. 2A: 16-53 is to no avail.
[directive] Prior Sentences Imposed on Different Dates  Prior convictions/adjudications that resulted in sentences that were imposed on different dates shall be treated as separate convictions/adjudications.  However, if the subsequently-imposed sentence was ordered to be served concurrently with the previously-imposed sentence, it should be treated as a single conviction/adjudication unless the underlying offenses were separated by an arrest (i.e., the defendant was arrested for the first offense prior to committing the second offense).  Page 62  [...] Guidelines 2 (2004 Revisions)  Where convictions/adjudications were imposed on different dates and the “rap” sheet does not indicate whether the subsequently-imposed sentence was ordered to be served concurrently or consecutively, the prosecutor should treat the convictions/adjudications as separate offenses for the purposes of calculating the criminal history points.  If it is later determined that the sentences were actually ordered to be served concurrently, and that the offenses were not separated by an arrest, the prosecutor must recalculate the criminal history points where this would redound to the defendant’s benefit and result in placing the defendant in a lower Criminal History Category.  8.7  Extrajurisdictional
[brief] STATEMENT OF FACTS  To be quite honest this has been going on for some time and it is sickening.  From the time I started collecting my P.U.A. benefits I had literally checked with them multiple times, because I did not want to receive these benefits in the first place, they more than assured me multiple times that they were my benefits and that I was entitled to them.  I am owed my benefits for the time period of, 5/1/21 to 9/4/21 the $204 I received weekly, plus at least 5 of the $300 extra payments where it was stated to me by multiple people at the Department of Labor that back in the Spring of 21’ I was owed at least 2 months worth of these payments, but due to other individuals claiming fraudulently and in other people’s names claiming twice the pot could only afford this.  So here it is for quite some time there has been preponderance of Evidence and Obstruction of Justice how inept these Departments are is quite sickening and ridiculous.