ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] State v. Branch, 182 N.J. 338 (2005), concerned a burglary investigation.  A detective prepared a photographic array which included the defendant, "based on information received."  The Court held that the allusion to 'information received' violated the hearsay rule and the constitutional right of confrontation.  [A] police officer may not imply to the jury that he possesses superior knowledge, outside the record, that incriminates the defendant.  In State v. Bankston, 63 N.J. 263 (1973), and State v. Irving, 114 N.J. 427 (1989)], the officers' hearsay testimony permitted the jury to draw the inescapable inference that a non- testifying declarant provided information that implicated the defendant in the crime.  Id. at 351.  See State v. Lazo, 209 N.J. 9, 20-24 (2012) (Bangston rule applied to police testimony that information received led to placing defendant's picture in array).  In State v. Medina, 242 N.J. 397 (2020), the officer's reference to "the evidence" was deemed not improper because he did not imply that there was evidence other than what had been presented in court.
[brief] [...] was convicted of armed robbery after a trial riddled with constitutional errors.  The evidence established that a man entered a bank and told the tellers to give him money.  When only one of the two tellers reacted, the man threatened to shoot.  He left the bank with $600 of the $1000 he stole, having dropped the remainder of the money on the floor.  The evidence suggested that he also dropped a dirty beer bottle, which was later determined to contain [...]’s DNA.  No one was hurt during the incident, and a gun was never used or seen.  [...]’s conviction must be vacated or, at a minimum, reversed.
[brief] ” (Db37 to 38).  Defendant inaccurately characterizes the Goodfellas quote as one the prosecutor used to “conjure the societal hatred for callous mobsters and direct that at [defendant].” (Db38).  Regardless of the fact that audiences will often root for the villainous protagonists depicted in mob movies and television shows, the prosecutor did not disclose that the quote was from Goodfellas and the quote does not reveal its source or even allude to the mob.  (5T:112-2 to 14; see Db36 n.5).  It is entirely possible that the jury, particularly younger jurors, did not attribute the quote to a mob movie released in 1990.  (Id.).  The use of the Goodfellas quote is entirely distinguishable from the egregious misconduct present in *State v. Williams*, 244 N.J. 592, 615 (2021), where even a juror unfamiliar with *The Shining* could understand that the State’s summation presentation of a picture depicting that movie’s protagonist violently wielding an axe was intended to “draw a parallel between [the] defendant’s conduct and that of a horror-movie villain.
[brief] (Pa19)  At the time of this finding, the Court had before it the same discovery and evidence as it had before it for the Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment of Respondent [...] and the Order entered on March 28, 2023.  However, in complete contradiction with their prior findings, the trial Court erroneously found in the March 28, 2023 Order that Respondent [...] did not owe a duty to Appellant as a matter of public interest as “For all intents and purposes the Defendant Township controls, maintains, and regularly inspects the subject parking lot” and imposing a duty on Respondent [...] “would result in “duplicative efforts” and interfere with the Townships maintenance of the parking lot”.
[brief] Supplemental Interrogatory No. 5 asked if plaintiff-appellant contended that the [...] had actual notice of said dangerous or hazardous condition and, if such a contention is being made, set forth the time and manner in which the [...] were put on such notice.  In response to this supplemental interrogatory, plaintiff-appellant [...] stated as follows:  Yes.  An incomplete attempt had been made to remove the snow and ice, but the job was not complete, and no ice melt product, salt or sand was spread in the area.  It snowed earlier in February 2021, but I am not aware of the date upon which attempts to clear the snow and ice were made by the defendants.  (Pa62, answer to Supplemental Interrogatory No. 5.)  Supplemental Interrogatory No. 6 asked if plaintiff-appellant contended that the [...] had constructive notice of the alleged dangerous or hazardous condition and, if such a contention is being made, set forth each and every fact that plaintiff-appellant contended demonstrates the existence of constructive notice.
[brief] There are no confusing or misleading terms within the Clause.  Moreover, the Clause does not exhibit the erroneous conflation of “mediation” and “arbitration” such that Appellants could have been reasonably confused.  Appellants also leveraged Kernahan to argue that “there is not even an allegation that [...] or [...] signed [...]’s contract,” thus we have no way of determining what Appellants may have known (Dr125).  The Agreement is clear that the customer business was [...], located at the [...] property.  Also, [...] was listed as the party responsible, and it is undisputed that he was the sole member/manager of [...].  Just below that information, the Agreement clearly says, “[b]efore signing this Contract, I have read, understand and agree to each and every term of this Contract” (Dr91).  In the very next section, it lists “Customer’s Approval: Original Signature Required,” beneath which is [...]’s signature, dated June 30, 2022, which was the date he initiated the Contract with [...].
[brief] This case illustrates the gauntlet that public employees intending to retire were forced to walk through when their place of work (the [...]) was closed during the height of the COVID pandemic.  Like trying to walk through a minefield with a blindfold on, I entered this gauntlet (consulting regularly with my boss, the Honorable [...], J.S.C.).  Before my retirement, the [...] ("[...]") certified in writing that I had the required years of service credit (10 years) needed for full pension and life insurance benefits on my projected retirement date.  Relying upon the written representation of the [...], I retired on February 1, 2022 only to receive July 19, 2022 and July 22, 2022 letters from the [...] stating "oops-we-made-a-mistake" in calculating your service credit at your retirement on February 1, 2022, your monthly retirement benefit has been reduced, your life insurance benefit has been completely taken away and you (unlike us) cannot correct the mistake.  In probably the most insincere words ever written, the [...] ended its July 22, 2022 letter notifying me of my retirement disaster (that I could not cure) by stating: "Sorry for any inconvenience."  That is my case in a nutshell.
[brief] 2T76-15-25; Pa521.  But there have been efforts to evaluate at what levels exposure could be toxic.  These studies indicated that a person would have to be exposed to a dose of Stachybotrys containing trichothecene on the magnitude of ten billion spores.  In contrast, the highest airborne spore count of Stachybotrys ever detected in [...]’s condo was 1 raw spore or 8 spores per cubic meter.
[brief] [...] concedes that its indemnity clauses must comply with Azurak, 175 N.J. 110.  Under Azurak, a contract that seeks to require indemnification for the indemnitee’s own negligence “must specifically reference the fault of the indemnitee. ”  Id. at 112-13.  If the contract fails to contain “‘clear and explicit language addressing indemnification for the [indemnitee’s] own negligence,’” the contract is unenforceable in that respect.  Id. at 112 (quoting Azurak v. Corporate Property Investors, 347 N.J. Super. 516, 523 (App. Div. 2002)).
[brief] In light of the fact that the trial court denied [...]’s first summary judgment motion and determined that an affidavit of merit was not necessary for Plaintiffs to pursue their claims against [...], [...]’s argument that those initial proceedings were frivolous, or the discovery phase of the litigation was frivolous, is disingenuous and lacks merit.  [...] further ignores the fact that all the damages to the Plaintiffs’ property in this matter occurred before [...] allegedly modified its site plan, and glosses over [...]’s own certified statement in response to interrogatories that representatives of [...] may have trespassed onto Plaintiffs’ property in connection with the preparation of those plans.  In connection with its cross-appeal, [...] seeks modification of the trial court’s ruling wherein the trial court awarded [...] $30,000.00 in fees despite [...]’s request for nearly $90,000.00.
[brief] The case was argued, but several days before [...] issued the Court’s opinion, he consulted the Township’s website for the operating times to determine the frequency of the use of the library.  Id., at 320 n.11.  Third, in Fieramosca v. Twp.of Barnegat, 335 N.J. Super. 526 (Law Div. 2000), plaintiff’s site plan application was heard by the Planning Board in 1996.  Yet, when the Judge conducted the prerogative writ trial, he considered letters exchanged in 1998 and 1999, which were not (obviously) in the 1996 transcript.  The latter two cases support the admission of the WARD memo as part of the administrative record, since that memo was submitted to both the Planning Board and Town Council before their hearings but were not mentioned in the transcripts of either municipal body.
[brief] ”  Id. at 366.  Furthermore, the Court noted that “[t]he video was already in evidence, so the jury was able to view the video and determine for themselves what the video showed. ”  The Singh Court reaffirmed McLean’s holding that N.J.R.E. 701 does not permit a witness to offer an opinion on a matter not within the witness’s direct personal knowledge “‘and as to which the jury is as competent as he to form a conclusion. ’”  Ibid. (quoting Mclean, 205 N.J. at 459).  The Supreme Court in Watson synthesized the principles of these cases and summarized the rules regarding opinion testimony concerning video evidence.
[brief] Ja037-Ja039.  The stated purpose of the SM Zone District is “…to provide areas for industrial uses which are of lesser magnitude and intensity than permitted in industrial districts. ”  [...] Ordinance §91-249, Ja097 (Emphasis added).  The attack in Plaintiffs’ Brief on the Board’s reliance upon the Master Plan and the Board’s connection of the specific discussion in the Master Plan of the purposes behind the SM zoning of the subject property with the SM Zone ordinance standards is misplaced and ignores the statutorily required interplay between master plans and zoning ordinances, the referral powers of planning boards under NJSA 40:55D-26, and the plain language of the ordinance which references both “magnitude” and “intensity”.
[brief] [...]’s Status As A Veteran Provided Her No Protection From Being Removed From the Eligible List.  [...] also suggests that the Commission “disregarded the law and the proper preference owed to veterans, without proper basis. ”  Ab24, 28.  [...] is correct that veterans are afforded certain preferential status when being ranked on promotional lists under the Civil Service law.  N.J.A.C. 4A:5-2.2.  But veteran status does not provide any preferential status when considering whether a basis exists to remove the candidate from an eligible list.  *Ibid.*; see also *N.J.A.C. 4A:4-4.7*.  Even where a veteran is ranked first on a promotional list, his or her promotion is not “mandated” due to her veteran status; a veteran candidate can be removed from an eligible list by the Commission for the same reasons as a non-veteran.  *Ibid.*; see also *In re Dellagrazie, Middlesex County*, CSC Docket No. 2021-1579, Civil Serv. Comm’n, List Removal Appeal, Final Decision (May 2, 2022), Ra21 (explaining that although the appellant was a disabled veteran, that “does not automatically guarantee an appointment” due to the Commission’s ability to consider the candidate’s background and potential list removal).  Accordingly, [...]’s veteran status did not entitle her to the promotional appointment.  Her argument must be rejected and the Commission’s decisions must be affirmed.  **D.
[brief] LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I THE COMMISSIONER’S DECISION WAS ARBITRARY, CAPRICIOUS, AND UNREASONABLE; THEREFORE, THE COMMISSIONER’S DECISION MUST BE REVERSED.  (Sg001-Sg068;Sg073-Sg236).  The Commissioner’s and the [...]’s decision is rooted in the same lack of factual evidence and misreading of the relevant SEA statutory provisions, warranting this appellate tribunal to reverse on the grounds that the decision is arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable.  **Appellate Standard of Review of Agency Decision**
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT’S APPOINTMENT OF A SPECIAL HEARING OFFICER WAS IMPROPER AND WITHOUT LEGAL BASIS AS THERE WAS NO MT. LAUREL VIOLATION FOUND. (M38-57; M477-513).  The trial court’s decision to appoint a Special Hearing Officer and Special Master was an extraordinary judicial remedy in search of an equally extraordinary problem where none could be found.  Our case law is replete with examples of courts remanding applications to a Board, even upon finding that the Board had acted arbitrarily, capriciously, and unreasonably.  See Reinauer Realty Corp. v. Borough of Paramus, 34 N.J. 406, 419 (1961) (Remanding application to Board of Adjustment following Board’s denial of special exception use despite a formidable record in support of the application); Dallmeyer v. Lacey Twp. Bd. of Adjustment, 219 N.J. Super. 134, 147 (Law. Div. 1987) (Remanding application to Board of Adjustment for a new hearing after Board denied a (c)(1) variance, a conclusion the court found “difficult to justify” and based upon “mere speculation”); Pagano v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment of Twp. of Edison, 257 N.J. Super. 382, 398 (Law. Div. 1992) (Remanding use variance application to Zoning Board of Adjustment after finding Board’s decision arbitrary, unreasonable and erroneous).  In limited circumstances, New Jersey courts can act in lieu of a municipality or municipal body in regard to affordable housing matters.
[brief] A party has a continuing duty to provide discovery.  *R. 3:13-3(f).*  If a party fails to comply, the court may “order such party to permit the discovery of materials not previously disclosed, grant a continuance or delay during trial, or prohibit the party from introducing in evidence the material not disclosed, or it may enter such other order as it deems appropriate. ”  *Ibid.* (emphasis added).  The sanction of preclusion is a drastic remedy and should be applied only after other alternatives are fully explored.
[brief] [...] credibly testified regarding the procedures he followed administering the test on defendant.  Not only did [...] perform all of the procedural safeguards as outlined above, he further testified that he properly waited for the Alcotest instrument to clear before taking another sample after the first and second uses of the Boonton Alcotest.  (3T13:10 to 3T14:9; Aa47).  During the waiting period of the Alcotest, our Supreme Court explained in Chun that “[a]fter a two-minute lock-out period during which the device will not permit another test, the instrument prompts the operator to read the instruction again to the arrestee and collect the second breath sample. ”  194 N.J. at 81.  Here, [...] credibly testified that he waited until the machine cleared, re-read defendant the instructions, and performed another test.  This is all that Chun requires.
[brief] In fact, Plaintiff’s counsel argued at oral argument the public policy underlying Plaintiff’s cited to regulations is to “keep…developmental groups properly staffed for safety purposes…[and] proper ratio of staff members to individuals was necessary to ensure adequate care was consistently given to each resident or individual. ”  See T:12:2-12:16.  Counsel went on to state the public policy surrounding Plaintiff’s complaints were to “…establish minimum requirements for residential services to serve people with developmental disabilities. ”  T:12:18-12:22.  These arguments were based on the understanding of N.J.S.A. § 30:1AA-1.1(j) and N.J.S.A. § 30:1AA-1.2(i), which both speak to the public policy within Plaintiff’s complaints to Defendants, namely to have a “well-trained workforce that is able to provide the services, supports, and other forms of assistance…to enable the [developmental disabled] individuals to carry out…activities,” and monitor these individuals, “to the extent of compliance with quality assurances standards by entities providing the [group home] options.
[brief] (Pa858).  Because the ZBA promptly discovered the audio malfunction and wisely conducted a rehearing before receiving any further testimony on the application or rendering a decision, the ZBA fulfilled its duty to maintain verbatim recordings of the proceedings pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40:55D-10 f.  With the benefit of a full, verbatim, record of the proceedings, there was nothing preventing the Trial Court from confirming the validity of the ZBA’s unanimous approval of the Homeowners’ application based upon the record below.  In turn, the Trial Court acted properly in refusing to remand the matter to conduct what would have effectively been a “re-hearing of a re-hearing” for which a verbatim record already exists.
[brief] PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND STATEMENT OF FACTS  On April 25, 2023, the Township governing body introduced Ordinance 15-23 to authorize the acquisition of property, including that owned by [...] shown as Lot 90 in Block 21601 on the Township’s Official Tax Map and owned by [...] shown as Lot 84 in Block 21601 (the “Properties”).  (Da20-23)¹  The ordinance was adopted May 9, 2023.  (Da21)  The preamble suggests the taking is for “the purpose of open space. ”  (Da20)  However, under “Specific Findings,” the ordinance does not state how or why the properties are needed for “open space. ”  (Ibid.)  Instead, it provides only that the proposed acquisition is to “promote and protect the health, safety and welfare of residents of the Township” and that the taking is “necessary for same. ”  (Ibid.)  There is no reference to any studies or reports regarding the need for open space.  Nor is there anything elsewhere in the public record regarding same.  A review of the public record reveals the Township does not intend to use Defendants’ Properties for open space, but rather to flip it to the Developer, along with Township-owned parcels in exchange for other land within the Township owned by the Developer.
[brief] We need not comment here on whether these problems are sufficiently prevalent to render legislative history inherently unreliable in all circumstances, a point on which Members of this Court have disagreed.  Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., 545 U.S. 546, 568-69 (2005).  Citing Exxon Mobil Corp., the Third Circuit explained, “both the Supreme Court and this Court have made clear that we may not turn to legislative history in order to muddy the waters of an otherwise clear statute. ”  Galloway v. United States, 492 F.3d 219, 224 (3d Cir. 2007).  Yet, Defendant turns to legislative history—specifically, the report of the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs which recommended adoption of H.R. 5294 (Senate Report at *1)—trying to cast doubt on the meaning of the statutory language.
[brief] T4:18-19.  The [...] publishes a rule book.  T4:20-22.  The rulebook is “used all over the country. ”  T11:8-9 and T19: 24-25.  At the time of the 2017 tournament, the rulebook was not available online.  However, the Defendants’ representative testified that their website said “More rules are in the [...] rulebook.
[brief] The Court further finds that defendants’ explanations for the statistical differences between and among defendants’ custodians with respect to the number of documents produced by each are reasonable and persuasive.  Additionally, plaintiffs’ argument that compelling defendants to produce all documents that contain only one search term without a responsiveness review would speed the production and be fairer, is not the standard under Rule 26 for discovery, which provides that discovery may be obtained “regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case. ”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).  The Court will not compel defendants to produce any document simply because it contains a search term whether or not it is responsive to the discovery request, or, by extension, whether or not it is relevant and proportional to the needs of the action.  Plaintiffs’ Motion to compel defendants to produce all documents that contain a search term without a responsiveness review is denied.
[brief] Pursuant to our state’s jurisprudence, juveniles who were sentenced to lengthy terms of imprisonment are entitled to a resentencing where their character and conduct are evaluated with the recognition that children are constitutionally different from adults.  State v. Comer, 249 N.J. 359, 368-70, (2022); Zuber, 227 N.J. at 451.  This analysis requires consideration of specific factors, identified by the United States Supreme Court, at each sentencing determination, and an assessment about whether the juvenile is incapable of rehabilitation and deserving of a lifetime of incarceration.
[brief] (Plaintiff Dep. T340:18 - T341:4 at Pa.263).  However, he hired an attorney to assist him in arguing about his grades well before the Statute of Limitations had run.  \(^6\)  [...] first was interested in a Master’s degree in Chemistry, then he turned his focus to pursuing an MBA, and eventually, expressed an interest in pursuing a Master’s degree in Health Sciences.  ([...] Dep. T153-:16-20, at Pa511; T187:14-23 at Pa.520; 219:3-12 at Pa528; T219:3-T221:2 at Pa.528)
[directive] Subj: Criminal – Gun Permit Procedures Date: December 22, 2022  New Legislation and Revised Court Responsibility  [...] today signed A-4769 into law (L. 2022, c. __), amending a number of New Jersey firearms statutes and addresses issues raised in the United States Supreme Court’s decision in N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen, 142 S. Ct. 2111 (2022).  The enactment is effective immediately.  In part, it removes the Judiciary from the initial decision-making process for applications for permits to carry a handgun.  This Directive, which supersedes Directive #06-19, is intended to establish uniformity in how the vicinages handle appeals from law enforcement’s denial of firearms identification cards, handgun purchase permits, and permits to carry a handgun.  New Jersey law previously required applicants to submit a written certification of “justifiable need” to the reviewing law enforcement officer as part of their application for a permit to carry.  If approved by law enforcement, the application would then be presented to the Superior Court for action by a judge.  So long as the applicant demonstrated, among other things, a “justifiable need” to carry a handgun in accordance with the statute, the judge would approve the application and issue the permit.  Although New Jersey was not a party in Bruen, the U.S. Supreme Court likened New Jersey’s requirements for permits to carry to those of New York, which the Court deemed to be unconstitutional.  Bruen thus eliminated New Jersey’s “justifiable need” requirement, which was a significant factor, but not the only factor, that New Jersey Courts considered in acting on applications for permits to carry a handgun.  The amendments to N.J.S.A. 2C:58-4 adopted in L. 2022, c. __, both eliminate the “justifiable need” requirement and remove the court from the decision-making and issuance process for applications for permits to carry.  Pursuant to the new law, which, as noted, is effective immediately, determinations on applications for permits to carry a handgun will no longer be made by the court; law  ADA ml  ENSURING TO DOOR AN OPEN JUSTICE