ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] While on probation, you will be under the supervision of a probation officer.  You are required to comply with the conditions of probation listed below.  Si existe causa suficiente para creer que usted ha cometido otro delito durante su término de libertad a prueba, el juez lo podrá hacer recluir en la cárcel sin fianza.  Si el juez determina que usted ha infringido su libertad a prueba, le podrá imponer cualquier sentencia que autoricen las leyes para el delito del cual se le condenó anteriormente, hasta el término máximo de encarcelamiento.  If there is probable cause to believe that you have committed another offense during your term of probation, the Court may commit you to jail without bail.  If the Court finds that you have violated your probation, it may impose on you any sentence authorized by law for the offense of which you were originally convicted, up to and including the maximum term of incarceration.
[brief] ”  *Id.* at 560.  The court observed that “[i]t does not appear [] that the treatment accorded the property in question would be invalid as spot zoning unless special circumstances pertain by reason of the property being a part of an area found to constitute a blighted area and designated as a redevelopment area under proceedings pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40:55C-1 et seq. ”  *Id.* at 562.  The court described the purposes of the Redevelopment Agencies Law – the LRHL’s predecessor statute – which, like the LRHL, was intended to promote public welfare by the creation of redevelopment agencies for the purpose of acquiring and replanning blighted areas.  *Id.* at 563.  The court further observed that municipalities were statutorily empowered to “do any and all things necessary to aid and cooperate in the planning and undertaking of a redevelopment project. ”*2*  *Ibid.*  The court found that the municipality’s actions in amending its own zoning ordinance must be --- *2*  Like its predecessor, the LRHL expressly authorized the City to “[p]lan or replan, zone or rezone any land within the jurisdiction of that public body, make exceptions from development regulations and ordinances, and change its map. ”  N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-39. read within the context of N.J.S.A. 40:55C-1 et seq. as to property within an area that has been declared as blighted and designated a redevelopment area.  Id. at 564.  The court found that when viewed within the redevelopment context, the City’s action was valid in light of all of the circumstances.  Id. at 564.
[brief] Rescission is an equitable remedy that is not premised on contract language.  Under New Jersey law, the reasonable expectations doctrine and the clear and conspicuous standard apply for the limited purpose of interpreting policy language, including exclusions under certain circumstances.  See e.g., Zacarias v. Allstate Ins. Co., 168 N.J. 590, 601 (2001) (“When there is ambiguity in an insurance contract, courts interpret the contract to comport with the reasonable expectations of the insured, even if a close reading of the written text reveals a contrary meaning. ”); Sosa v. Massachusetts Bay Ins. Co., 458 N.J. Super. 639, 652 (App. Div. 2019 (referencing the rule that “exclusionary clauses must be ‘conspicuous, plain and clear’”)  Neither doctrine applies here because, as set forth throughout this brief, this case is not about interpreting any policy language or exclusions.
[brief] 2T51-9  No evidence of any agreement was presented in writing that Plaintiff agreed to give the property to Defendant after payment of a certain amount of rent.  2T61-2  Lastly, in New Jersey landlord-tenant cases, the standard of review gives substantial deference to the trial court's factual findings, which the court “must uphold ... so long as those findings are supported by sufficient credible evidence in the record.  “State v. Handy, 206 N.J. 39, 44, 18 A.3d 179 (2011) (quoting State v. Elders, 192 N.J. 224, 243, 927 A.2d 1250 (2007)).  Wherefore, Plaintiff Requests that the New Jersey Appellate Court Affirm the Trial Court’s findings and its entry of judgment granting possession and payment of rent owed to Plaintiff.
[brief] This current appeal brought by Plaintiff-Appellant [...] ("Plaintiff") is a frivolous attempt at relitigating controversy that not only has been long since adjudicated in the trial court but has already been before this Appellate Court two times prior to this current appellate action.  This appeal was brought by Plaintiff in connection with a December 12, 2023  Order sua sponte dismissing Plaintiff’s Notice of Motion to re-open a matter ([...]) which was disposed of over a decade ago by way of summary judgment in favor of [...] ("[...]") on January 7, 2010.  This Appellate Court affirmed that dismissal Order on June 23, 2011 and Plaintiff did not file a petition for certification with the Supreme Court.  By all accounts, this matter concluded then and there.  Over a decade later, on July 11, 2022 Plaintiff filed a Notice of Motion seeking to essentially re-open this matter, which was denied by the trial court.  Plaintiff then filed an identical, second Notice of Motion on November 14, 2022, which was also denied by the trial court.  This Appellate Court affirmed the trial court’s November 14, 2022 Order on September 27, 2023.  Not even three months later, on December 4, 2023, Plaintiff filed the Notice of Motion which is the subject of this current appeal.  Respectfully, Plaintiff’s current appeal upends [...]’s right to finality and repose under the doctrine of res judicata and should not be entertained by this Court.  Accordingly, [...] respectfully submits that the trial court did not err and appropriately dismissed Plaintiff’s December 12, 2023 Notice of Motion.
[brief] Id. at 460 (emphasis added); see also State v. Derry, 250 N.J. 611, 632-634 (2022) (lay opinion under N.J.R.E. 701 by an FBI agent -- about the meaning of slang terms used in a conversation in which he did not participate -- was improper under McLean because it was not based on perception, but instead on the officer’s belief or understanding); State v. Hyman, 451 N.J. Super. 429, 450-452 (App. Div. 2017) (same as Derry).  There can be no doubt that asking [...] what he thought defendant or the decedent intended when posting to social media was clearly violative of N.J.R.E. 701.  It was indisputably error for the judge to allow that testimony, and it is reversible error because it may have affected the jury’s view of the case, particularly when relied upon in summation by the State, as noted.  The whole point of the State’s case was to paint defendant as someone who deeply disliked [...], who was threatening him, and who, in order to carry out those threats, lured him to his death.  This evidence may well have helped “sell” that theory to the jury by putting [...]’s thumb on the evidentiary scale on an issue that should have been entirely the jury’s to figure out without the help of improper opinion from a high-ranking detective.  Reversal of the resulting convictions is necessarily required where, as here, the error potentially tips the jury’s consideration of the credibility or evidentiary worth of the State’s case.  State v. Briggs 279 N.J. Super. 555, 565 (App. Div. 1995); State v. W.L., 278 N.J. Super. 295, 301 (App. Div. 1995); see also State v. Hedgespeth, 249 N.J. 234, 253 (2021), citing State v. Scott, 229 N.J. 468, 484-485 (2017) (errors which affect the weight the jury will give the State’s arguments in favor of conviction versus the defendant’s arguments in favor of acquittal are reversible and never harmless).  Defendant’s resulting convictions should be reversed and the matter remanded for retrial.
[brief] The surrounding uses include single-family homes to the south, townhomes to the west, a pre-existing bus storage facility on an R-20A lot to the north, and residential uses across Changebridge Road to the east.  [...] Report April 1, 2021, Da18.  The Property remains part of the R-20A zone which primarily permits single-family homes, government buildings, schools, farms, and in-home childcare facilities.  Montville Township Land Use and Development Regulations (“MTLUDR”) §230, Schedule C. Da401.  [...]’s proposal required the two (2) d variances above and several c variances, including excess height, number of stories, excess impervious and building coverage, side yard setbacks, parking setback within 15 feet of a building, parking within the front yard setback, number of parking spaces, fence height, a monument sign, and design waivers for steep slope disturbance and not providing a bike lane.  1T 43-53.  The Property also has four areas of isolated wetlands with one being of intermediate resource value.  1T 40:19-41:25  [...]’s plan required an easement to permit its stormwater and sanitary sewer to discharge through the neighboring property of the [...] to the rear (west).  Both the Township and [...] would need to grant, but had not --- 3  [...] and [...] made a new argument during the prerogative writ hearing that parking setbacks are only design exceptions and should be viewed under a lesser standard.  That was not briefed below, nor is such a bulk setback deviation ever just a design issue.  Moreover, [...] had presented the parking setbacks from street and from building as “c” variances during the board hearings, which were confirmed as variances by the Township Planner.  Da61. granted (and have still not granted), the right to use at all, much less to expand, the existing Township sanitary sewer easement to permit both stormwater and sewer discharge by [...] (or [...]).  1T 89:24-92:13, 4T 97:14-98:7, 4T 98-99, Da12.
[brief] The FTC Staff Commentary (Pa232) explained how a debt collector could use those regulated communications industries without violating § 1692c(b).  Comment 3 to Section 805(b) (Pa252) in the Federal Trade Commission’s *Statements of General Policy or Interpretation Staff*  *Commentary on the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act*, 53 Fed. Reg. 50097-02 (Dec. 13, 1988) states:  Incidental contacts with telephone operator or telegraph clerk.  A debt collector may contact an employee of a telephone or telegraph company in order to contact the consumer, without violating the prohibition on communication to third parties, if the only information given is that necessary to enable the collector [sic—perhaps “operator”] to transmit the message to, or make the contact with, the consumer.  [Emphasis added.]  The information which Defendant shared with its letter vendor is much more than what was necessary to deliver its collection letter.  One of the published federal court decisions noted the distinction between letter vendors and regulated telephone and telegraph companies.
[brief] His effort to overturn his convictions and sentence should be rejected.  First, the trial judge properly handled the admissibility of fingerprint-analysis evidence at each stage of trial.  Defendant attempts to introduce a host of scientific studies not in evidence in support of his point that fingerprint-analysis evidence is unreliable and the testimony from the State’s expert should have been excluded.  None of these studies should be considered by this Court.  Regardless, defendant’s argument lacks any support in the relevant case law and should be denied.  Further, the judge properly rejected defendant’s requests: (1) for a question during jury selection regarding prospective jurors’ opinions on the reliability of fingerprint-analysis evidence; (2) to limit expert testimony on fingerprint evidence to a reasonable degree of probability; and (3) for an alternative jury charge (crafted by defense counsel relying on a scientific report not in evidence) and instead relying on the model jury charge on fingerprints.
[brief] \[Db11\]  This is untrue.  [...]’s own principal certified: “[...]’s operations moved out of the Property sometime in late July 2023,” and all that remained in September 2023 was the “cleanup and disposal of debris and personal property” that it had imported in its final weeks.  \[Pa171, Pa176 at ¶ 15\].  [...]’s Subtenant, on the other hand, remained in possession and held over until November — after the Vacation Date had passed — which [...] does not dispute.
[directive] ATTORNEY GENERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT DIRECTIVE NO. 2024-04 TO: All Law Enforcement  Chief Executives  FROM: [...], Attorney General DATE: August 22, 2024  SUBJECT: Directive  Revising the Statewide Use of Force Policy to Incorporate an Addendum  Addressing Law Enforcement Responses to Barricaded Individuals  On March 27, 2023, I directed the Office of Public Integrity & Accountability to initiate a process designed to make the complex encounters between law enforcement officers and barricaded individuals safer for all involved.
[brief] (Da894)  [...] then placed fencing to block that non-approved parking.  In another Order to Show Cause, (Da643 to 733) [...] ordered the removal of the fencing (2T), that the Synagogue parking could continue, and later entered an Order/Judgment on May 29, 2019 awarding attorney fees/sanctions in the amount of $32,966.96 and $11,257.50 against Defendant [...].
[brief] Difficult as it may be, the gatekeeping role must be rigorous.  In resolving issues of reliability of an expert's methodology in a new and evolving area of medical causation . . .  [t]he court's function is to distinguish scientifically sound reasoning from that of the self-validating expert, who uses scientific terminology to present unsubstantiated personal beliefs.  In re Accutane, supra at 390 [emphasis added].  In order to achieve that goal, the New Jersey Supreme Court gave direction to New Jersey’s lower courts:  When a proponent does not demonstrate the soundness of a methodology, both in terms of its approach to reasoning and to its use of data, from the perspective of others within the relevant scientific community, the gatekeeper should exclude the proposed expert testimony on the basis that it is unreliable.  In re Accutane, supra at 399-400 [emphasis added].
[brief] Defendant [...] retained the Plaintiff to perform legal services and specified that all written communications between attorney and client, who is also a New York attorney, must be by email, and set forth her street address as [...], which turned out to be a post office box.  That same address was provided to the trial court by Defendant [...].  And that very same address was the one used by the Secretary of the [...] to mail out the Committee’s fee arbitration award to Defendant [...].  Plaintiff mailed the Pre-Action Notice to that address, less than two weeks after Defendant [...] provided the address to him, and also forwarded the notice to her by email.  Defendant [...] also maintained a law office in New York City where the summons and complaint were sent by regular and certified mail after service was returned when sent to the post office box address.  The green card was returned with a signature that was never disputed by competent evidence by Defendant [...].  Defendant [...] entered her appearance in August 2019 upon the filing of a Substitution of Attorney.  Defendant [...] never filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction.  There is no doubt that the trial court had \textit{in personam} jurisdiction over Defendant [...].  Likewise, Defendant [...] pursued fee arbitration while the underlying lawsuit remained dismissed without prejudice pending the outcome of that arbitration process.  Rule 1:20A-3 permits Plaintiff to reinstate the complaint and enter judgment against Defendant [...].  [...]’s cogent decision should be affirmed.  Respectfully submitted, [...]
[brief] 290a-612a.  On 9-18-23, defendant filed opposition to said cross motion and a reply to plaintiff’s summary judgment opposition.  862a-924a.  On 9-21-23, plaintiff filed a letter with the trial court withdrawing said cross motion.  925a.  The trial court heard oral argument on the motions and over 8 months before discovery’s completion and on 2-1-24, filed an order (with accompanying opinion) denying the class certification motion and granting the summary judgment motion.
[brief] ”  *Id.* at 458-59.  “Quite simply, in a society governed by the rule of law, constitutional decisionmaking cannot be left to a suspect in the street. ”  *Ibid.*  For practical and public-policy-based reasons, “constitutional decisionmaking cannot be left to a suspect in the street,” even one who has done no wrong; a suspect “cannot be the judge of his own cause and take matters into his own hands and resist or take flight. ”  187 N.J. at 459.  This reasoned approach encourages persons to avail themselves of judicial remedies, and signals that if a person peaceably submits to an unconstitutional stop the result will be suppression of the evidence seized from him.  State v. Williams, 192 N.J. 1, 13 (2007) (quoting Crawley, 187 N.J. at 459-60).  “Because the officers had probable cause to arrest defendant for obstruction, ordinarily the handgun seized incident to a lawful arrest would be admissible in evidence. ”  Williams, 192 N.J. at 13.  Had the stop been unconstitutional, the Court would decide whether the “taint” from that stop would survive.  Ibid.  To make this evaluation, the Court will look to “(1) the temporal proximity between the illegal conduct and the challenged evidence; (2) the presence of intervening circumstances; and (3) the flagrancy and purpose of the police misconduct. ”  Id. at 15.  Temporal proximity, “the least determinative” factor,” id. at 16, favors defendant.  The third factor, the flagrancy and purpose of the supposed police misconduct, is not at all favorable to defendant, as the police cannot be said to be acting with any kind of bad faith.  “Accordingly, their actions could hardly be described as flagrant misconduct. ”  See ibid.  In such a case, the factor of intervening circumstances is the most important factor.  *Ibid.*  Given the need to deter a defendant from committing new crimes in response to good-faith police conduct, the intervening circumstance of defendant’s failure to submit to police authority, his flight from the police, will completely purge the taint from the investigatory stop, allowing defendant’s arrest and search based on the new offense.  *See* id. at 16-18.  Defendant’s argument fails in that the officers had the right to stop him so as to safely arrest [...], and to investigate open-air drug dealing occurring while the police watched.  Defendant’s flight elevated the level of suspicion to probable cause.  Moreover, defendant had no right to flout a police order and, as he thereby committed new offenses, he was properly arrested and searched on that basis as well.  The touchstone of the constitution is reasonableness, *State v. Hathaway*, 222 N.J. 453, 476 (2015), and the police conduct in this case was reasonable in every respect.  The denial of the motion to suppress should be affirmed.
[brief] (Pa222.)  [...] also provided a “[...] in North America Contractor Controlled Insurance Program Confirmation of bound program” (the “Binder”) regarding the CCIP Policies.  (Pa2228-2255.)  The section of the Binder entitled “COMMENTS / RESTRICTIONS / QUOTE SUBJECT TO:”, provides in part:  Enrollment in the Workers’ Compensation program automatically enrolls the subcontractor in the General Liability portion of the program.  If a subcontractor is not enrolled in the Workers' Compensation program there will be no coverage provided under the General Liability program until such time as that subcontractor is specifically approved and endorsed onto the General Liability policy by the [...] underwriter.  (Italics added.)  (Pa2231.)  The section of the Binder entitled “Schedule of Named Insureds:” provides, in relevant part, as follows:  UNLESS OTHERWISE ENDORSED ON THIS POLICY, NO COVERAGE WILL BE PROVIDED TO VENDORS, SUPPLIERS, MATERIAL DEALERS, ABATEMENT CONTRACTORS, TEMPORARY LABOR SERVICES, DEMOLITION, OR OTHER HAZARDOUS WASTE REMOVAL CONTRACTORS WHO VISIT, MAKE DELIVERIES TO OR WORK TEMPORARILY AT THE PROJECT SITE(S).  (Italics added.)  (Pa2233.)  II.  [...]’S ROLE AT THE PROJECT AND CCIP COMMUNICATIONS
[brief] The Trial Court Properly Dismissed Count Three Of The Plaintiff’s Complaint  In Count Three of the Complaint, the Plaintiff alleged that Ordinance 1667 should be invalidated because the Borough’s adoption of the ordinance was arbitrary, capricious, and inconsistent with sound zoning principles.  As the Trial Court found that there was substantial credible evidence in the record supporting the Borough’s adoption of the ordinance approving the amendment to this redevelopment plan, the Trial Court concluded that the Plaintiff had failed to overcome the presumption of validity accorded to the Borough’s legislative action and that this claim was also without merit (Pa1747-1749).  As this decision was supported by the record, it should be affirmed on appeal.  CONCLUSION
[brief] *Ferolito v. Park Hill Ass’n*, 408 N.J.Super. 401, 408 (App.Div. 2009).  However at no point during this entire litigation has either [...] or his client even attempted to meet that burden.  That is, nowhere was it ever argued that my sister and I had acted in bad faith.  This fact is plainly evident, and not just from the absence of such arguments; but further even directly from [...]’s Apr 28, 2023 opposition to my Appellate motion for a stay.  (Pa178)  [...] had therein acknowledged that he/his client would bear the burden to prove bad faith for sanctions under the frivolous litigation statute *N.J.S.A. 2A:15-59*; but he then (incorrectly) argued that: “*R. 1:4-8* … does not require any showing of bad faith. ”  He then adds that he *would have* made such an argument, if he thought it was necessary to do so.  (Pa178)  So this document is clear proof that no such argument was ever actually made – thus he has not even made a prima facie showing of bad faith, let alone did he ever meet his requisite burden of proof in that regard.