ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] On February 23, 2021, [...] was on her way to work, taking the bus to [...].  After disembarking, she walked approximately seven streets without incident.  However, as she passed in front of the property at [...], she suddenly slipped on ice on the sidewalk, lost her balance, and fell.  (Pa31-Pa36)  As a result, she suffered a displaced right fibular fracture, requiring ORIF surgical intervention.  (Pa29)  The subject adjacent property is owned and maintained by Defendant-Respondent [...].  (Pa8-Pa10)  Before the slip and fall incident, [...] had shoveled snow from the sidewalk, piling it along the edges of the driveway, uphill from where the slip and fall incident occurred.  (Pa157)  The snow had remained piled for at least one week before the incident.  (Pa159)  By placing the snow mounds in the uphill areas, Defendant allowed snowmelt runoff to flow downhill onto the sidewalk causing [...]’s fall.  (Pa192)  Photographs taken by police after plaintiff’s fall show evidence of the melting and refreezing from the uphill mounded snow.  (Pa172)  On behalf of [...], counsel retained [...], P.E. to determine the cause of the ice formations on the sidewalk.  (Pa185)  Ms. Kimiecik found that the ice displayed a ripple effect.  The ripple effect is due to thin layers of water repeatedly flowing and freezing over time.  This ripple pattern suggests that the plaintiff's fall was not caused by an overnight storm but rather by the long-term effects of surface water runoff from snowmelt following the same path.  (Pa193-Pa194)  Moreover, a review of New Jersey Climatological Data indicates that between February 18 and February 22, 2021, approximately 6.5 inches of snow accumulated.  However, by February 23, 2021, only 1 inch of snow remained on undisturbed ground surfaces due to snow melt.  This demonstrates that the surface water runoff, resulting from precipitation and the melting of mounded snow in higher areas, flowed downhill along the sloped surfaces to lower areas, such as the sidewalk.  With freezing temperatures, this runoff subsequently transformed into ice.  (Pa195-Pa197)  [...] was injured due to the defendants’ negligence in creating the hazardous condition by piling the snow from the sidewalk in an uphill location, which led to melting and refreezing.  This caused the icy conditions that resulted in the plaintiff's slip and fall.  (Pa209)  LEGAL ARGUMENT STANDARD OF REVIEW
[brief] [...], one of the directors who should have brought Appellant back according to [...], was a close family friend of [...], against whom Appellant filed multiple whistleblower complaints.  A reasonable fact finder could find this provided a retaliatory motive for Appellee to fail to bring Appellant back to work.  •  Based on the testimony of [...] and [...], Appellant’s complaints about the medication misuse and the mishandling of money constituted abuse and neglect.  Since Appellant made multiple whistleblower complaints about the foregoing repeated illegal conduct by Appellee’s other employees, a reasonable fact finder could conclude her supervisors did not want her around to engage in further whistleblowing and that this was their retaliatory motivation in failing to restore Appellant to the work schedule.  •  Significantly, no investigation was ever conducted into Appellant’s claims of retaliation, despite the fact she made them clearly and unequivocally to a manager.  This fact, combined with the fact that [...] cannot remember any details of her anti-retaliation training, shows that Appellee does not take retaliation seriously, and a fact finder could use that as evidence of retaliatory motive.  As set forth above, the record contains ample support for a fact finder to establish causation.  Appellee’s summary judgment argument below ignored all of the above evidence that supports causation.  However, the record as set forth above provides clear evidence of causation.  Accordingly, the lower Court’s decision, in granting summary judgment, should be reversed, and this matter remanded.
[brief] Courts will generally not inquire into a public body’s motive concerning the necessity of the taking or the amount of property to be apportioned for public use.  *Riggs v. Long Beach Tp.*, 109 N.J. 601, 613 (1988); *Alsip Park Dist. v. D & M Partnership*, 252 Ill. App.3d 277, 192 Ill. Dec. 80, 85, 625 N.E.2d 40, 45 (1993).
[brief] On April 10, 2019, Appellant received a letter from EEO stating the following:  The investigation confirmed [...] did send inappropriate text messages of a sexual nature to [...] that you observed.  Specifically, a test message stating that [[...]] and [...] were “busy making kissies in the closet” and a second text message which stated that [[...]] wanted to “bang, kiss or touch a boob. ”  These messages sent by [...] to [...] were inappropriate.  *Based on the results of the investigation relating to this allegation, it was substantiated that there was a violation of the State Policy.  Consequently, appropriate administrative action will be taken.*  (Pa895-902) (emphasis added).
[brief] **C.  The Trial Court Did Not Abuse its Discretion in Denying Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration as Untimely.**  The trial court denied Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration because it was untimely.  As noted in its Statement of Reasons, the trial court held that “[a]s a threshold matter, plaintiff’s motion is procedurally deficient because he did not file this motion for reconsideration within twenty (20) days of the order that he is seeking reconsideration of. ”  (Da 55.)  While the trial court also considered and denied Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration on the merits, there was no need for it to do so – filing outside the twenty-day window was reason enough to deny the motion.  *R. 4:49-2* requires that “a motion for rehearing or reconsideration seeking to alter or amend a judgment or final order shall be served not later than 20 days after service of the judgment or order upon all parties. ”  *R. 1:3-4(c)*, which provides in relevant part that “[n]either the parties nor the court may . . . enlarge the time specified by . . . *R. 4:49-2*”, abrogates a trial court’s authority to expand this twenty-day deadline.  Accordingly, a trial court does not have legal authority to enlarge the time restrictions of *R. 4:49-2*.  Plaintiff filed his motion for reconsideration on June 22, 2023 (Pa 108) – twenty-eight days after the May 25th Order, and unquestionably beyond the twenty-day period set forth in R. 4:49-2.  Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration was, therefore, time-barred, and was properly denied by the trial court on that ground alone.  Even if the trial court had wanted to extend the twenty-day period, it was precluded from doing so by R. 1:3-4(c).  The trial court would have unquestionably abused its discretion had it extended the deadline contrary to R. 1:3-4(c).  See, Hayes v. Turnersville Chrysler Jeep, 453 N.J. Super. 309, 313 (App. Div. 2018) (holding that the trial court erred in reviewing and ultimately deciding defendant’s facially untimely motion for reconsideration.)  See also, Customers Bank v. Reitnour Inv. Props., LP, 453 N.J. Super. 338, 351 - 52 (App. Div. 2018)(Chancery Division properly denied motion to amend foreclosure judgment filed more than twenty days after its entry as untimely.)  Accordingly, because Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration was untimely, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Plaintiff’s motion on this ground.
[directive] Defendant Name  Complaint/Indictment Number  SBI Number – Part 1  Must be completed by the Defendant/Defense Attorney  Residence Parameters: ☐ ☐  1.  Does the defendant have a stable residence/address where he/she will Yes No remain for the duration of the case?  Address: Phone: ☐ ☐ Yes No  2.  Does the defendant reside in a shelter, temporary, or transitional housing?  ☐ ☐  3.  Is the defendant a homeowner, renter, or lessee of the listed residence?  Yes No  If No, provide the name and phone number of the owner/renter/lessee.  Address: Phone: ☐ ☐ 3a.  If the defendant is not the homeowner, renter, or lessee of the listed Yes No residence, did the homeowner, renter, or lessee give the defendant permission to live at the residence?  ☐ ☐  4.  Does the defendant understand that home detention is defined as staying Yes No in the home at all times, with limited exceptions detailed in the Release Order, and that requests for any temporary adjustment must be made by formal application to the Court?  ☐ ☐  5.  To the best of your knowledge, is any other person living at the proposed Yes No residence currently on probation, parole, or charged with a pending offense in New Jersey or any other state or jurisdiction?  If Yes, explain: Form Promulgated by Directive #19-23 (10/17/2023), CN: 12973 page 1 of 5  Home Detention Screening Criteria (for Home Detention as a Condition of Pretrial Release)
[brief] **  [...] is a New Jersey religious organization founded and managed by [...] and [...].  (Da. 50).  [...] has acted as [...]’s agent and taken acts on [...]’s behalf such as signing the irrevocable assignment of claims (Da 48), filing the within action against [...] (Da 40), and filing several certifications in this action on behalf of [...] as [...]’s “agent”.  On May 29, 2019, [...] was formed by the TPDs using funds contributed by the TPDs, including [...] and [...].  Said funds were used to purchase [...]’s Share of the Property.  (3T129: 19 - 3T130: 3).  3.  **Third-Party Defendants.**
[brief] Plaintiff and [...] both ignore the words used by the trial court to express the legal standard applied by the court when deciding to exclude evidence of [...]’s criminal convictions.  The trial court expressly stated that it equated the analysis under N.J.R.E. 403 with the analysis applicable to a conviction that was more than 10 years old on the date of the trial.  2T:27-15 to 28-12.
[brief] For example, the Defendants claim that Plaintiff’s counsel made --- 7  Defendants clearly did not include this argument their brief because it is entirely without merit.  Plaintiff testified extensively to said investigation during trial.  See 4T at 145:19-147:20.  8  Again, this is another argument not included Defendants’ brief because it is entirely without merit.  [...] plainly admitted during his testimony that he reviewed Plaintiff’s FMLA paperwork.  See 5T at 84:4-10.  inaccurate statements concerning her burden and/or the law regarding Plaintiff’s hostile work environment and retaliation claims.  See Db at pp. 35-41.  Even assuming for the moment that Plaintiff’s Counsel’s statements constituted truly inaccurate description of the law/burden rather than simply inartful descriptions of same (a dubious proposition), the Defendants arguments in this regard must clearly fail because any prejudice they may have suffered was plainly alleviated immediately thereafter when the court provided the model jury charges on the law in question, and the specific charge instructing them only to accept his instructions on what the law of the case is.
[brief] These factual findings (despite the absence of any evidence to support same) conclude that “[t]he governing body sought to distinguish the scale, intensity and nature of the permitted uses in the two zones with these differing standards in accord with the principles stated in the 1999 Master Plan. ”  Ja029.  This “finding” is based on the entirely invented and factually unsupported premise that the proposed development is “more intense” simply because of the increased height of the buildings, and ignores the elephant in the room; the proposed use as a warehouse is permitted in the SM Zone.  In a creative effort to distract the reader’s attention from that fact, the Resolution ascribes motives to the 1999 Planning Board’s distinction between SM Zone, which permits “distribution centers and warehouses”, and GM Zone, which permit “wholesale distribution centers and warehouses.
[directive] Defendant maintains that trial courts must strictly and narrowly construe excludable time exceptions, and must not permit indefinite detention beyond the two-year cap.  He submits that prosecutors should be required to make a greater showing of readiness to extend the cap by demonstrating that discovery and pretrial motions are complete and that witnesses are available.  He also argues that a defendant’s appeal of an order of excludable time should not result in more excludable time.  [...] and [...] echo the concerns defendant has raised. that trial courts “routinely grant excludable time in violation of They submit CJRA, gutting the time limits of the statute,” and that [...]’s the case exemplifies that problem.
[brief] Following a plenary hearing, on December 5, 2020, the Arbitrator the Tenure FAD.  **Pa1-Pa13.**  She determined that, while [...] had engaged in conduct unbecoming a teaching staff member, the penalty of termination was unwarranted on the record.  Instead, the Arbitrator maintained [...] in his position, while imposing a three-month, unpaid disciplinary suspension, and other conditions.  **Pa11-Pa12.**  [...] did not seek to vacate, nor otherwise challenge, the Award.  [...], likewise, accepted the judgment of the Arbitrator, which was final and binding.  See N.J.S.A. 18A:6-17.1(e).  Thereafter, [...] promptly and successfully resumed his teaching duties in [...].
[brief] ADOPTED FROM THE APPELLANT’S MERITS  BRIEF FILED ON 06/12/2024  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS ADOPTED FROM THE APPELLANT’S MERITS BRIEF FILED ON 06/12/2024  TRANSCRIPT KEY 01/22/2024  Transcript of Motion 1T STATEMENT OF FACTS ADOPTED FROM THE APPELLANT’S MERITS BRIEF FILED ON 06/12/2024  PROCEDURAL HISTORY ADOPTED FROM THE APPELLANT’S MERITS BRIEF FILED ON 06/12/2024
[brief] Plaintiff’s billing methods appear irregular, questionable and suspect.  Plaintiff’s Complaint is void for alleging default on one account number, while submitting documents for two different account numbers.  In Plaintiff’s Response To Defendant’s Discovery Requests, of September 7, 2022, Plaintiff provided monthly billing statements for the period of November 26, 2014 through October 26, 2018 (Exhibits D through BB) (Da55 through Da103).  For the entire period of November 26, 2014 through April 26, 2017, Plaintiff used account number xxx8.  From April 27, 2017 through October 26, 2018, Plaintiff used account number xxx3.  Plaintiff offered no explanation to the lower Court for the use of two account numbers in its monthly billing statements.  Additionally, in the monthly billing period of April 27, 2017 to May 26, 2017, Plaintiff billed Defendant $3,608.25 in account number xxx8 (Exhibit II) (Da ) and $4,546.35 in account number xxx3 (Exhibit HH)  Thus, Plaintiff plainly sent Defendant two different and separate dollar amounts for payment.  Plaintiff offered no explanation to the lower Court for the double-billing.  Defendant understands that account numbers must be redacted in this Appeal brief.  Defendant was advised by the Office of the Clerk that Defendant cannot file the relevant billing statements in account number xxx8 or account number xxx3 without the account numbers being redacted.  That is the reason that Defendant is referring to account xxx8 and account xxx3 instead of submitting more specific and precise information as to the two accounts.  N.J.R.E. 803(c)(6) provides in part:
[brief] Defective Lighting Led to a Dangerous Condition in the Intersection.  There is evidence that the streetlight near the subject intersection was off during the accident investigation.  When [...], the town’s Administrator, was shown Photograph DL1-K (Pa730), he could not tell if the streetlight on the electric pole, the one closest to the sidewalk (hereinafter “the streetlight” or “the subject streetlight”), was on or off (Pa691).  Lodi’s Police Officer [...], upon being shown DL1-K (Pa730) testified that the streetlight near the intersection does not appear to be on (Pa152).  Sergeant [...], a crime scene detective supporting Bergen County, arrived at the accident scene at 10:05 p.m., along with Detective [...] (Pa713).  Savino’s role was restricted to taking scene photographs (Pa714).  Upon being shown DL1-K (Pa730), Savino testified that the streetlight looks like it is off (Pa714).  The photograph refreshed Savino’s memory that, in his belief, the streetlight was off on the day of the accident (though he did not know if a photocell was turned off) (Pa 714).  [...], a detective and crime investigator with the [...], testified, in turn, that the streetlight appears to be off on the photograph (Pa730) (Pa717).  G. [...] Failed to Advise Lodi on an Effective Streetlight for a Dangerous Intersection.
[brief] (PA007-008.)  | 6 | | C.  The trial court correctly held that [...] owed [...] no fiduciary duty to educate him about the consequence of his electronic signature.  (PA008-009.)  | 17 | | D.  The trial court correctly held, in the alternative, that [...] must arbitrate because he agreed to the terms of the [...] Deposit Account Agreement by using his bank account.  (PA008.)  | 22 | | E.  [...]’s claims are within the scope of the parties’ arbitration agreement.  (Not expressly decided below.)  | 27 | | F.  [...] properly authenticated its evidence.  (Not expressly decided below.)  | 31 | | V. CONCLUSION | 34
[brief] [...] said he was denying plaintiffs’ motion also because “we are moving the cases here.  …  I think in light of the challenges associated with everyone involved with this case, trying to get the depositions done in a somewhat timely manner, all I’m going to do is unnecessarily delay this case by allowing a new expert to come in at this late of a junction. ”  1T10-12.  But the deadline to depose experts was nearly two months away, and the discovery deadline nearly three months away, under the August 9 Case Management Order in effect.  There was insufficient factual support for [...]’s worries about delaying a trial which had not even been scheduled.  While caselaw provides that an extension of discovery should not cause prejudice to the opposing party (Leitner, supra, 392 N.J. Super. 93; Ponden, supra, 374 N.J. Super. 9), nothing in the record showed that there would be such prejudice to defendant [...] that it warranted denying outright plaintiffs’ chosen expert on the most critical issue the jury would have to decide.  The expert report of [...] was substantively similar to [...]’s report.  There was no surprise as to its contents; [...]’s qualifications and credentials simply avoided the problems that [...] had.  The August 9 Case Management Order provided defendant with nearly two more months to depose [...] – and this was extended again in [...]’s later Case Management Order.  There was no prejudice to defendant that was demonstrated on the record before [...].  This was not a situation, for example, where a party had suddenly identified a new expert just before trial was about to start.  Whatever prejudice defendant claimed, moreover, [...] could have and should have addressed it by something less harmful than denying plaintiffs’ chosen expert outright -- payment of fees or costs for defendant having had to depose [...], or obtain a supplemental or responsive report, extension of time needed by defendant, etc. -- a lesser “remedy” than completely precluding plaintiffs from calling [...] as their expert witness on the most critical issue the jury would have to decide, for a trial that wasn’t even scheduled and that would be scheduled until March or April the next year at the earliest.
[brief] (Da215-216: Trial}  This is contradicting to the earlier finding that Plaintiff did not show that she suffered any actual damages due to Defendants’ negligence.  The Court did not resolve the dilemma that the Plaintiff did not suffer any damage as a result of either the Defendants’ negligence to incorporate the missing terms in the invalid Chinese Agreements into the final English PSA or Defendants’ “many other deviations” from the standard practice in the decision dated August 25, 2021.  The Plaintiff’s expert during the trial did not opine an opinion that the legal fees incurred by Plaintiff were proximately caused by the Defendants’ negligence, because of lack of competent evidence to support such a legal conclusion.  Plaintiff’s expert opinion on the loss of negotiation leverage was the only damage sustained by Plaintiff, which was purely a speculation and a net opinion, not supported by facts.  (See Da109)13  Therefore, it is a Rule 4:50-1(f) mistake to make the Defendants to pay the entire legal fees requested by the Plaintiff’s attorney in the amount of $449,798.59, 13  New Jersey Rule of Evidence 703 requires that an expert opinion be based on “facts or data … perceived by or made known to the expert at or before the hearing. ”  “The net opinion rule is a ‘corollary of N.J.R.E. 703 … which forbids the admission into evidence of an expert’s conclusions that are not supported by factual evidence or other data. ”  Townsend v. Pierre, 221 N.J. 36, 53-54, 110 A.3d 52 (2015); Buckelew v. Grossbard, 87 N.J. 512, 524, 435 A.2d 1150 (1981) (The “net opinion” rule appears to be a mere restatement of the established rule that an expert’s bare conclusions, unsupported by factual evidence, are inadmissible).  The rule requires an expert witness to give the why and wherefore of his expert opinion, not just a mere conclusion.  See Jimenez v. Gnoc. Corp., 286 N.J. Super. 533, 540, 670 A.2d 24 (App. Div.), certify. denied, 145 N.J. 374, 678 A.2d 714 (1996).  Applying the law to facts in the instant case, plaintiff’s expert’s net opinion must be excluded.  which was the total legal fees that Plaintiff had incurred for her contested matrimonial action, including the legal fees incurred to conduct extensive discovery and to locate assets of [...] to enforce the post-divorce judgment, as the damage sustained by the Plaintiff.  Defendants are now seeking the Court to make corrections in the original Final Judgment as well as the Amended Final Judgment.
[brief] In the Amended Complaint, [...] alleged that Brian and [...] operated an illegal business at the Property, that as tenants at the Property they owed him a duty, and that they violated that duty by paving a portion of the Property and by allegedly dumping fuel oil, chemicals and other toxic substances on the Property.  Da73.  These are the *identical* allegations that the Phillipses leveled in their counterclaims when they asserted a negligence action against Brian and [...] in the Law Division action on November 2, 2016.  Da87.  These also are the *identical* allegations that Phillipses leveled in their Chancery Division Complaint.  5a; 57a  As he did in the counterclaim that he asserted in the Law Division action, [...] asserted a negligence claim at Count One against Brian and [...].  See Da72.  As concerns the [...], at Count One [...] assered that [...] knew of the wrongful conduct of Brian and [...], yet failed to take action to prevent it and allowed it to continue.  See Da72.  [...] also asserted claims against Brian and [...] for violation of the Spill Act at Count Two of his Complaint, and liability under the Environmental Rights Act ("ERA"), N.J.S.A. 2A:35-1.  See Da72.  Once again, he alleged that [...] knew of the violation, yet did nothing to protect the Property and allowed the violations to continue.  See Da72.  At Count Three of his Complaint, [...] alleged that Brian and [...] violated the Water Pollution Control Act, N.J.S.A. 58:10A-3, and that they are liable under the ERA.  See Da72.  His claim against [...] again alleged that [...] knew of the violations, yet did nothing to protect the Property and allowed the violations to continue.  See Da72.  At Count Four of his Complaint, [...] alleged that hazardous substances were deposited at the Property.  See DA72.  He alleged that the Puglia family, including [...], was engaged in an abnormally dangerous activity for which they are strictly liable.  See Da72.  In short, the claim against the [...] can be distilled to the single assertion that [...] supposedly knew that Brian and [...] allegedly were contaminating the Property, yet did nothing to stop it.  See Da72.  On October 16, 2023, [...] dismissed the Complaint with prejudice, and denied the cross-motion to amend.