ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] b.  (1)  In addition to any other penalty imposed, the court shall order: (a) the seizure and forfeiture of any dogs or other animals used for fighting or baiting, and may upon request of the prosecutor or on its own motion, order any person convicted of a violation under this section to forfeit possession of: (i) any other dogs or other animals in the person's custody or possession; and (ii) any other property involved in or related to a violation of this section; and (b) restitution, concerning the dogs or other animals seized and forfeited pursuant to subparagraph (a) of this paragraph, in the form of reimbursing any costs for all the animals' food, drink, shelter, or veterinary care or treatment, or other costs, incurred by any person, agency, entity, or organization, including but not limited to a county society for the prevention of cruelty to animals, any other recognized organization concerned with the prevention of cruelty to animals or the humane treatment and care of animals, a State or local governmental entity, or a kennel, shelter, pound, or other facility.
[directive] 3.  [예/Yes]  [아니요/No]  2C:35-14 귀하가 마약 중독자로 판단되고, 그렇지 않으면N.J.S.A.  에 따라 특별 보호관찰의 자격이 있는 경우, 귀하는 이 유죄 시인의 결과로 법원 감독 마약 치료 프로그램(“마약 법정”)에 참가하기 위한 목적으로, 의무적 특별 보호관찰 기간을 선고 받을 자격이 있는 “치료가 필요한 사람”으로 간주된다는 것을 아십니까? Do you understand that if you are found to be a drug dependent person and if you are otherwise eligible for special probation under 2C:35-14, then as a result of this guilty plea you will be N.J.S.A. deemed “a person in need of treatment” who is eligible to be sentenced to a mandatory period of special probation for the purpose of participating in a court-supervised drug treatment program (“Drug Court”)?
[brief] Prioleau v. Kentucky Fried Chicken, Inc., 434 N.J.Super. 558, 564 (App. Div. 2014)  In this case, plaintiff does not need to establish that [...] had actual notice of the hazard existing in the intersection at the time of the accident since it installed the 0.0 foot candle lamp which gave rise to the backlight condition there.  Moreover, [...] had constructive notice of the hazard since testimony evidence exists in the case to show that its employees worked all the time all over [...] and on [...] to have noticed the dangerous intersection signs at the subject intersection, the feeble of lighting emitting 0.0 foot candles, and the streetlight being more off than on over the years.  Notwithstanding, assuming without conceding that plaintiff must establish actual notice of the danger, the Trial Court erred in not letting a jury decide this issue based on the evidence in the case.
[brief] As explained below, the Law Division’s order was correct and should be affirmed.  According to their complaint, plaintiffs’ principal claim is that [...], an attorney, committed legal malpractice in “negligently” drafting a Will for [...]’s father, [...] (“[...]”), “result[ing] in an award to [[...]’s ex-wife] [...] of forgiveness of [a joint] mortgage which was contrary to [...]'s intent and which damaged [...] and [...]'s Estate. ” (Pa000003 at ¶17.)¹  Notably absent from the complaint was any mention of the fact that [...]’s precise claim was previously litigated to conclusion in the Chancery Division.  After a 3-day trial, [...]’s claim was entirely rejected.  The trial court ruled that [...] did intend to forgive the subject mortgage as to [...].  ¹ “Pa” refers to Plaintiff’s Appendix.  Unhappy with that outcome, [...] appealed, a fact also not mentioned in the complaint.  *In The Matter of [...], deceased*, Appellate Division, [...] (hereinafter “App.Div. Opinion”) (Pa000065.)  On July 8, 2022, this Court issued an opinion affirming the trial court’s decision.  *(Id.)*  This Court held, among other things, that the trial court properly applied the doctrine of “probable intent” to determine that [...] intended to discharge the subject mortgage entirely, even as to [...], who divorced [...] some 4 years after the Will was executed.  This Court observed:  There was nothing in the evidence direct or extrinsic that supported the contention that [...] intended that [...] remain liable for a loan originally taken by [...] in his own name so that he could purchase the Ridgefield property.  [Pa000082.]  The underlying Law Division action represented [...]’s legally improper effort to collaterally attack the final adjudication of the precise issue at the heart of his malpractice action: whether [...] drafted a Will that did not reflect his father’s true intent.
[brief] [...] details the haphazard and unsupervised parking of the [...] congregants in the Sixth Street Courtyard, their refusal to set up pedestrian barriers, that pedestrians enter the courtyard as a short cut to other areas; that a full time security guard would be necessary to prevent people from using the courtyard, and the efforts of Defendant to instruct personnel and children not to walk through parked cars in the Sixth Street courtyard.  (Da511, 512)  He further detailed his efforts "...to obtain review and/or site plan for proper legal use of the courtyard," pointing out [...] opposed all of this- appearing before the zoning board to object to all of his efforts.
[brief] [...] need not show the exact facts of Terry or even ones similar to them.  Oddly, the Defendants each argue that [...]’s opinion was about the “stairs” and not the “landing” where [...] slipped, so his conclusions are somehow inapplicable.  ([...] Brief at p. 15; [...] Brief at p. 4).  This argument is risible since there is no dispute that the landing was made of the same concrete as the steps, was the same age as the steps, and was exposed to the same elements.  The Defendants also claim that [...]’s opinion did not tie the lack of handrails to the cause of the accident.  ([...] Brief at p. 7; [...] Brief at p. 16).  [...], in fact, concluded that “the locations of the handrails were too far from the walkway pathway to allow Mr. [...] the ability to utilize them to stabilize himself” and that “[r]ailing[s] should be closer to the pedestrian walking pathway. ” (Pa354, Pa355).  If handrails had been reachable immediately upon a pedestrian exiting the door and as he stepped down onto the landing, a jury would understand that a pedestrian in ordinary travel such as [...], would reach for the rail to begin to walk down the steps.  This ordinary usage of a closely available handrail would have likely prevented the accident, particularly given the weather conditions which the Defendants repeatedly emphasize.  Finally, the [...] now characterize [...]’s expert opinion as an inadmissible “net opinion” unsupported by factual evidence.  ([...] Brief at pp. 18-19).  Of course [...] slipped on ice, but again the question is why the imperceptible ice covered the landing and was so slippery that [...] ended up at the bottom of the stairs upon his first step onto the landing.  [...]’s opinion explained that because of water infiltrating the deteriorating concrete of the landing and steps, it made them susceptible to becoming unreasonably dangerous upon freezing, even with just a trace of precipitation.  That admissible opinion is based on facts in the record and creates a question of fact for the jury.
[brief] DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE RECORD WAS INCOMPLETE AND AS A RESULT OF THIS, THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT DECISION SHOULD BE VACATED WITH THIS MATTER REMANDED TO THE TRIAL COURT FOR COMPLETION OF THE REMAINING WORK IN THIS MATTER.  Pa115, Pa144  According to Court Rule 4:46-2(c), Proceedings and Standards on Motions, the judgment or order sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact challenged and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment or order as a matter of law.  An issue of fact is genuine only if, considering the burden of persuasion at trial, the evidence submitted by the parties on the motion, together with all legitimate inferences therefrom favoring the non-moving party, would require submission of the issue to the trier of fact.  The court shall find the facts and state its conclusions in accordance with R. 1:7-4.
[brief] [...] does not dispute that there can be no waiver of the right to arbitrate if an earlier demand for arbitration would have been futile.  *See Chassen v. Fidelity National Financial, Inc.*, 836 F.3d 291 (3d Cir. 2016).  As noted, a bilateral arbitration between [...] and [...] before 2024 would have been futile because [...]’s Indemnity Claim was not ripe at that time and the other insurers possessed independent contribution rights against [...] which would have rendered any resolution between [...] and [...] meaningless.
[brief] Before the transaction closed, Plaintiff declared [...] to be in default, demanded and received back its escrow deposit, and by doing so terminated the agreement.  Months after the termination, [...] purchased the property.  Although Respondent/Cross-Appellant [...]’s (“[...]”) only obligation under the agreement was to be the escrow agent, Plaintiff sued [...] alleging that its failure to inform Plaintiff of the closing prevented Plaintiff from enforcing its right to purchase the property and caused it monetary losses.
[brief] 4T., at 65:25 to 66:6.  Based upon that examination, [...] testified that Plaintiff did not sustain a permanent injury in the accident.  *Id.*, at 65:17 to 24.  Rather, he opined that plaintiff sustained a non-permanent neck strain.  *Id.*, at 90:14 to 22.  Based upon his review of Plaintiff’s MRIs, he described a disc herniation at C5-6, a central disc protrusion at C6-7 and a disc bulge at L4-5, and opined that each of those findings was degenerative and not caused by the accident.  *Id.*, at 81:5 to 90:13.  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I THE PLAINTIFF’S BEHAVIOR WHILE IN THE PRESENCE OF THE ARRAY OF POTENTIAL JURORS
[brief] [1T 50-8 to 51-11].  [...]’s plan contained 117 off-street parking spaces, which [...] explained was less than what the Township’s ordinance required, if the independent living units were treated as typical garden apartments but significantly more than the operational demands [...] identified.  [1T 51-12 to 52-13].  Later, testimony confirmed the Residential Site Improvement Standards (“RSIS”), N.J.A.C. 5:23-4.14, Table 4.4(d), which require 83 spaces at a ratio of 0.5 spaces per unit, preempted the LUDO’s off-street parking requirements.
[brief] PRELIMINARY STATEMENT  Appellant’s Case Information Statement states:  “On November 7, 2024, the Court entered an order disqualifying [...] from representing [...] and [...] based on a certification filed by opposing counsel that was not provided for in-camera review for Ansell Grimm. ”  Accordingly, the only issue appealed under the CIS is the propriety of granting disqualification based on the submission of the [...] supplemental certification for in-camera review, not on any other basis. \(^1\)  The Court did not err in disqualifying Ansell, Grimm & Aaron.  The Court found that Ansell Grimm’s previous representation of Respondent Robert [...] involved a personal relationship. (T23:6-16; T25:20 to T26:1-17). \(^2\)  The Court recognized that the attorney-client privilege is within [...]’ purview to assert.  (T25:22-24).  It also recognized that the information contained in the Certification signed by [...] met the criteria and warranted disqualification under 1.9.  (T26:8-11).  Accordingly, it was proper to disqualify [...].  (T26:8-11).  COUNTER STATEMENT OF PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[brief] On Appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey Law Division, Essex County Docket No. [...]  Civil Action Sat Below: Hon. [...], J.S.C. PLAINTIFF’S/APPELLANT’S AMENDED BRIEF  On the Brief: [...], Esq.  # TABLE OF CONTENTS | Section | Page | |------------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | Table of Contents | i | | Table of Final Orders Under Review | iii | | Table of Authorities | iii | | Preliminary Statement | 1 | | Basis For Appellate Jurisdiction | 3 | | Standards of Review | 3 | | Statement of Facts and Procedural History | 6 | | The Parties | | | Plaintiff | 6 | | Defendants | 7 | | Procedural History | 10 | | The July 13, 2021 Hybrid 5 Counts 309 Paragraphs Hybrid Prerogative Writ/Declaratory Judgment/Civil Rights Act Violations Complaint | 10 | | The First Cursory CRA Violations Notice Response Letter | 12 | | The July 30, 2021 Stealth Global Fair Share Housing Litigation Settlement | 13 | | The Ministerial Defaults and Original Consensual Agreement to File an Answer Out-Of-Time | 15 | | The August 23, 2021 New Substituted Counsel and Consensual Standstill Agreement | 15 | Continued Local Watchdog Efforts Defendants' September 30, 2021 Joint Motions For Vacation, Leave and Rule 4:6-2 (e) Dismissal With Prejudice Defendants’ January 21, 2022 Second Rule 4:6-2(e) Motion to Dismiss with Prejudice [...] Admonishes [...]
[brief] Plaintiffs-Appellants filed the 2020 Action ([...]) on March 4, 2020, at a time when the 2015 Action ([...]) was five years old and listed for trial on July 1, 2020.  1a-67a; 259a-283a.  Plaintiffs-Appellants filed an Amended Complaint in the 2020 Action on April 30, 2020.  68a-414a.  [...] and [...] moved to dismiss the 2020 Action, as to them, on June 3, 2020.  146a-147a.  The trial court granted that motion and dismissed the 2020 Action as to [...] and [...] by way of Decision and Order dated August 28, 2020.  148a-154a.  It is important to note that the 2020 Action was actually the fourth in a series of related lawsuits filed by Plaintiffs-Appellants’ counsel concerning the [...] and a related parcel called [...].  The matters were: Schwartz, et al. v. Menas, et al., [...]; Russo, et al. v. Menas, et al., [...]; Fendt, et al. v. Ford, et al., [...] (the 2015 Action); and the instant matter, Fendt, et al. v. Menas, et al., [...] (the 2020 Action).  1a-67a; 259a-283a.  STATEMENT OF FACTS
[brief] 554a–556a.  On August 31, 2006, [...] formed [...] and was listed as the registered agent of [...] on the Certificate of Formation, with [...]’s office listed as the registered office.  557a – 560a.  On September 14, 2006, [...] formed [...] (“[...]”) and was listed as the registered agent of [...] on the Certificate of Formation, with [...]’s office listed as the registered office.  561a.  The primary portion of the Pork Chop Hill Assemblage which would provide for approximately 200 of the intended 400 townhouse development was certain real estate owned by the [...] (“[...]”).  569a–586a.  [...] and [...], unbeknownst to Plaintiffs, directed [...] to execute on behalf of [...] the Agreement of Sale, dated September 6, 2006, to purchase the [...], which was amended on September 21, 2006 (“McTague-[...] Agreement”).
[brief] (17T52-7 to 54-4).  Moreover, while defendant cites to a number of cases that hold that a lack of remorse supports the finding of aggravating factor three, he does not cite to a single case that holds the contrary (that a lack of remorse precludes finding aggravating factors three or nine), and the State is not aware of any.  (Db18).  In any event, [...] did consider defendant’s acceptance of responsibility.  In determining the weight to give to mitigating factor fourteen, the judge stated, “[a]nd that’s where your statement has some effect.
[brief] While it noted that the context of the argument in that case, a strip mall with twenty or more tenants, “highlighted the absurdity of such a shared duty,” it clearly did not limit its holding to those facts.  In fact, it noted the “confusion, and perhaps danger” of such a situation even if there were only the landlord and the four tenants named above.  *Id.*  Finally, the Kandrac Court rejected plaintiffs’ public policy based arguments.  Id.  In doing so, it noted that [...], like plaintiff herein, was not left without a remedy for her injuries.  Id.  The extension of a common law duty to maintain a shared parking lot in a multi-tenant commercial property would also “lead to uncertainty with regard to the areas of the parking lot for which each tenant is responsible and encourage ‘shotgun’ litigation…where the customer sued every store at which he had browsed or purchased an item prior to his fall.
[brief] The Board is “without authority to deny site plan approval because of offsite traffic conditions. ”  *Dunkin’ Donuts of New Jersey, Inc. v. North Brunswick Planning Bd.*, 193 N.J. Super. 513, 515 (App. Div. 1984).  The *Dunkin’ Donuts* court also found that under N.J.S.A. 40:55D-2, 62, “the authority to prohibit or limit uses generating traffic into already congested streets or streets with a high rate of accidents is an exercise of the zoning power vested in the municipal governing body. ”  *Id.*  The trial court itself stated:  The Planning Board recognized that the density here is going to create off track issues that may not be desirable.  This is not the function of the planning board to regulate that.
[brief] On September 23, 2023, the Hon. [...], J.S.C., entered an order (the “ESI Order”), which directed the parties to produce all documents identified as “hits” in response to ESI search terms agreed upon by the parties.  Da167.  Over Defendants’ objections, the ESI Order provided that the parties “may not withhold or redact non-privileged ESI documents even if the producing party believes the document is wholly non-responsive or that it contains only irrelevant information. ”  *Id.*  Although the ESI Order permitted the parties to withhold or redact ESI on grounds of privilege, the only other review permitted under the ESI Order was for a “small subset of ESI documents that contain information so proprietary that their production could result in business loss or disruption. ”  *Id.*  The ESI Order, therefore, directs the parties to produce all ESI containing any of the agreed upon search terms, *without the ability to review the material for relevancy or responsiveness*.  The scope of the ESI Order represents a sea change in the operation of the Court Rules and scope of discovery – indeed, a complete inversion of the American discovery system in which each party searches its own documents for discoverable material.  The economic cost of expanding e-discovery to include the wholesale production of irrelevant documents is not hypothetical; in this case, compliance with the ESI Order will add $750,000 to discovery costs and create an additional 68,000 documents for review.  These costs would spread to all parties who litigate in New Jersey if this type of ESI Order becomes standard practice, further driving up the costs of litigation.
[brief] Kleine, supra at *549.  In contrast, Appellant [...] voluntarily arrived at the Premises with the intent of “enjoying the facility with his family”, which is not comparable to the stress that the Kleine plaintiff was under.  Most significantly, the Kleine plaintiff was told by the admission-person that he needed to sign the agreement “right away”, Kleine, supra at *549, which indisputably caused the plaintiff to feel pressured and rushed.  There are no such similar circumstances in the matter at hand.
[directive] Stationhouse Adjustments to be Performed by Juvenile Officers officers1  It is strongly recommended that designated juvenile should perform stationhouse adjustments.  These officers are best suited by training and experience to handle these matters.  In instances where no juvenile officer is available it is recommended that the officer or detective handling the case should consult with a juvenile officer prior to conducting a stationhouse adjustment.  However, if no juvenile officer is available to consult with or conduct a stationhouse adjustment the stationhouse adjustment should be conducted nevertheless.
[brief] Judgment of Conviction  .................................................................  Da 10 to 14  Ruling on Point I ...........................................................................  32T 19-24 to 20-2  Point II was not raised below Rulings on Point III .......................................................................  25T 31-1 to 4; 25T 32-6 to 10  Rulings on Point IV ........................................................................  28T 173-7 to 8  Acquittal ruling on Point V ............................................................  29T 138-19 to 139-24  Jury-Instruction error on Point V was not raised below Rulings on Point VI .............  Da 10 to 14; 36T 98-18 to 102-11; 37T 4-16 to 7-24  TABLE OF TRANSCRIPTS
[brief] A question in an insurance application that asks where a vehicle is to be garaged is an objective question.  Kerpchak v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 97 N.J.L. 196, 198 (1922) (question in application requiring applicant to provide address of physician last consulted with was not ambiguous and called for a statement of fact, not an expression of an opinion).  Objective questions call for information within the applicant’s knowledge, “such as whether the applicant has been examined or treated by physician. ”  Ledley v. William Penn Life Ins. Co., 138 N.J. 627, 636 (1995).  “In contrast, subjective questions seek to probe the applicant’s state of mind’ Ibid. they are concerned with more ambiguous issues, such as ‘what is the state of the applicant’s health or whether the applicant has or has had a specified disease or illness. ’  Id.  If a defendant provided a false answer to an objective question, his state of mind as to how to interpret the question is not material and is not relevant in determining its falsity. ”  State v Nasir, 355 N.J. Super 96, 106  The physical location where the automobile is primarily kept is the pivotal factor in determining where the automobile is principally garaged.  *Chalef v Ryerson*, 277 N.J. Super. 22, 28 (app. Div. 1994).  The Appellate Division in this case agree with the trial court in that “[i]t is not the intention of the owner or the registered owner of the automobile as to where it should be principally garaged, it’s a physical fact as to where it is principally garaged”.  *Id.* at 28.  The Appellate Division held that “[w]e construe the term “principally garaged” to mean the physical location where an automobile is primarily or chief kept or where it is kept most of the time. ”  *Id.* at 27.  Thus, questions about where a vehicle is principally or primarily garaged is an objective question.
[brief] (PA029–037, PA089.)  Furthermore, [...] seems to concede that his use of the account constituted acceptance of the DAA’s terms.  (See Appellant Br., 32 (recognizing that the account application states that [...]’s “use of the account confirms [his] receipt of, and agreement to be bound by the account agreement”).  [...] next argues that [...] cannot enforce parties’ agreement to arbitrate because, in his view, the arbitration provision is not conspicuous.
[brief] ¹⁰ --- ⁹  The Complaint does not allege a typical failure-to-warn claim that [...] did not warn Plaintiff of the injuries she sustained.  Nor could Plaintiff allege [...]’s warnings were inadequate, as every injury she alleges is warned of in the Ozurdex® FDA-approved label, which is presumed adequate as a matter of New Jersey law.  N.J.S.A. § 2A:58C-4; In re Accutane, 235 N.J. at 266.  Plaintiff even signed informed consent documents establishing she was warned of those risks.  (Da0089, pp. 73-76; Da0121).  ¹⁰  In her brief opposing [...]’s motion to permit this interlocutory appeal, Plaintiff did not oppose, and thus conceded, that she cannot proceed on the ‘failure-to-timely-recall’ claim she pled, pivoting to an all-new and different claim: that [...] should have provided a post-sale warning to her doctor about B.  Federal Law Preempts A ‘Failure-to-Timely-Recall’ Claim.