ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] Addendum B | April 2022  Vehicular Pursuit Policy motor vehicle, shed or any other structure described in N.J.S.A. 2C:18-1.  Vehicular pursuits shall continue to be authorized for any burglary during which the actor is armed with a weapon or injures a victim (second degree burglaries).  See Section 3.2(a)(2)(k); b.  Theft of a Motor Vehicle, N.J.S.A. 2C:20-3; N.J.S.A. 2C:20-2(b)(2)(b).  This Policy authorizes vehicular pursuits for theft of a motor vehicle until at least December 31, 2022.  The [...] has been directed to review the available data as of that date, including stolen vehicle trends, effectiveness of pursuits, and resulting accidents, and determine whether this provision should remain or be modified.  Absent additional action, this provision will remain in force after December 31, 2022; c.  Receiving Stolen Property (Motor Vehicle Only), N.J.S.A. 2C:20-7; N.J.S.A. 2C:20-2(b)(2)(b).  This Policy authorizes vehicular pursuits for receiving stolen property (motor vehicle) until at least December 31, 2022.  The [...] has been directed to review the available data as of that date, including stolen vehicle trends, effectiveness of pursuits, and resulting accidents, and determine whether this provision should remain or be modified.  Absent additional action, this provision will remain in force after December 31, 2022; d.  Bias Intimidation, N.J.S.A. 2C:16-1.  (b) when an officer reasonably believes that the violator poses an imminent threat to the safety of the public or other officers.  An imminent threat exists when an officer reasonably believes that the actions of the violator are immediately likely to result in death or serious bodily injury to another person absent action by the officer.  This determination shall be made based upon the violator’s actions or operation of the vehicle prior to the initiation of the attempted motor vehicle stop.  The violator’s subsequent actions, including speeding or evasive driving during the pursuit itself, although often supporting the criminal charge of Eluding, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-2(b), shall not constitute an authorization to initiate or continue a pursuit.  3.2.1  Pursuit for motor vehicle offenses is not authorized under Paragraph 3.2 unless the violator’s vehicle is being operated so as to pose an imminent threat to the safety of the public or other officers and that threat is based on the violator’s actions or operation of the vehicle prior to the initiation of the attempted motor vehicle stop.  There shall be a strong presumption against the initiation of vehicular pursuits based solely on motor vehicle violations.  Both supervisors and officers shall ensure that only in rare cases will a vehicular pursuit be initiated or continued for motor vehicle violations.  3.3
[brief] Ia249 (Resolution, page 8, paragraph A).  As for drainage, the [...] engineers were also no-shows.  The applicant's cheerleader ([...]) had no role in preparing plans which left the Board understandably concerned about stormwater management.  "The Board found that an approval of this application would have significant detrimental effects on the safety of the neighborhood."  Ibid.  The Board duly considered UDO Article VI ("SUBDIVISION AND SITE PLANS") including the standards set forth in Sec. 18-602.  Among the criteria are satisfactory provisions for vehicular access and drainage.  The Board clearly expressed its concerns in these areas, and the applicant chose to rely on [...]'s hearsay and his misguided belief that compliance with bulk standards means that a proposed subdivision must be approved.  The applicant in this matter referred to as a “by-right application”.
[brief] A.  The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion By Deleting Time that Plaintiff’s Counsel Was Obligated to Incur.  Notwithstanding the trial court’s refusal to allow any time whatsoever for the multiple different tasks Plaintiff’s Counsel performed, it also refused to include time for tasks counsel was required to perform in order to competently represent the client.  These include, but are not limited to, successfully opposing Defendant’s Motion to Quash Plaintiff’s subpoenas of its dealers who serviced the Santa Fe, preparing Plaintiff for her deposition, coordinating Defendant’s vehicle inspection, engaging with the court-appointed mediator, preparing Plaintiff’s arbitration statement, negotiating and finalizing the settlement, settlement negotiations throughout the litigation, preparing the motion for fees, researching the defects to Plaintiff’s model vehicle, communicating with Defendant’s counsel, drafting discovery requests, evaluating discovery produced, preparing discovery responses, etc.  Counsel was obligated to perform the above tasks to competently represent Plaintiff.  While it is within the discretion of the trial court to reduce unnecessary or excessive time incurred, it is an abuse of discretion to delete them entirely with no explanation.  Therefore, this Court should reverse and remand.
[brief] The unsuccessful search for defendant’s ID.  [...] later recalled there might be an issue with defendant being suspended, so he contacted [...].  (13T104-21 to 106-1).  After [...] alerted [...] that defendant had presented his ID, [...] contacted defendant’s attorney.  (13T105-24 to 106-1; 12T95-16 to 101-2).  In a June 21, 2018, email, [...] told the attorney, [...], that [...] believed that defendant had found the wallet ID he reported as lost and possessed it.  (12T98-20 to 101-2; 12T104-4 to 7; S-33).  [...] demanded its return.  (12T100-3 to 5).  Despite two follow-up communications, nothing was delivered.  (12T101-3 to 21).  As a result, [...] obtained warrants to search defendant, his residence, and his personal car for the ID, which took place on August 22, 2018—two months after the email had been sent.
[brief] Defendant argues that the account statements did not emphasize the APR or interest rate calculations.  This is incorrect.  Each account statement sets forth in a specific section titled “Interest Charge Calculation” and details that information therein.  PA – 58, 67, 74, 82, 88, 95, 101, 106, 109, 114, 119, 125, 131, 137, 141, 146, 151, 156, 161, 165, 169, 173, 179, 183, 187, 193, 199, 203, 207, 213, 217, 221.  Defendant’s assertion that Plaintiff failed to sufficiently emphasize the pertinent interest rate and related information is incorrect and bordering frivolous.  Defendant asserts that the Cardmember Agreement that governs the subject account violated TILA because it is confusing because a) it is unclear whether Defendant had to pay the minimum amount due when same contains an error, and b) the organization of the sections is scattered.  Defendant’s argument is meritless.  The Cardmember Agreement states that “[e]ach billing period you must pay at least the Minimum Payment Due by the Payment Due Date shown on your billing statement. ”  PA – 49.  There is nothing confusing about this statement.  Defendant asserts that the sequencing of the sections is scattered, but this is also incorrect.  The Cardmember Agreement logically flows from usage of the card, making payments, calculation of interest charges, events triggering default, to other information.  PA – 49 to 52.  The Section titled “Your Billing Rights” is plainly distinguished from other sections at the conclusion of the Cardmember Agreement.  PA – 52.  Defendant’s argument that the Cardmember Agreement is not such that would cause “a consumer to scratch his head as to whether he is required to pay the disputed amounts” or other issues.  Griesz v. Household Bank (Ill.), 8 F.Supp. 2d 1031, 1047 (Ill. N.D. Ct. 1998).  Defendant’s argument is meritless.
[brief] In Hannah, defendant was accused of murder.  The State argued that he had an accomplice to the murder, [...], while defendant argued that that supposed accomplice actually committed the homicide with another, [...].  Factually, the case is analogous to the case at bar: [...] is [...], the person that everyone understood to be involved, and [...] is [...].  The jury heard the bare details of the third-party guilt theory: Hannah testified that [...] and [...] were at the scene at the time of the shooting and he had no role.  *Ibid.*  What the jury didn’t hear, however, was significant: that the victims had [...]’s pager number on them when they were murdered and that [...] had motive to frame Hannah for the murders.  *Id.* at 163-64.  Because the jury was not presented with this information, the defendant’s “third-party guilt defense rose or fell based on his uncorroborated account. ”  *Id.* at 189.  Because there was information to corroborate this defense, “[t]hat evidence undoubtedly lay at the heart of Hannah's right to present a complete defense, and indeed, its admission was necessary to ensure the basic fairness of his trial. ”  *Id.* at 190.  As in *Hannah*, the presentation of a barebones third-party-guilt defense was insufficient to ensure the basic fairness of [...]’s trial.
[brief] The plaintiff/appellant admits in his Brief that it is well settled that the existence of duty is a question of law.  Citing, Baen v. Farmers Mut. Fire Ins. Co. of Salem Cty., 318 N.J. Super. 260, 266 (App. Div. 1999).  However, plaintiff argues that there is conflicting evidence, and the existence of relationship is an issue of fact.
[brief] DEFENDANT'S CONVICTIONS MUST BE REVERSED BECAUSE HIS DUE PROCESS RIGHTS WERE VIOLATED WHEN THE COURT HALTED ONGOING JURY DELIBERATIONS FOR 14 DAYS TO ACCOMMODATE THE VACATION SCHEDULES OF THE JUDGE AND THE ATTORNEYS (partially raised below) (29T6-13 to 22).  Defendant's convictions must be reversed because his due process rights were violated when the court interrupted jury deliberations for fourteen days in a row because the attorneys and the judge had consecutive, planned vacations.
[brief] 9 CONCLUSION ...........................................................................  14  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS  TRIAL COURT ORDER OF MARCH 31, 2023 ......................... Pa92 TRIAL COURT ORDER OF JULY 3, 2023 ...............................  Pa93-Pa98  APPENDIX ..........................................................  Pa1-Pa104  Complaint, dated August 4, 2021 (Docket No. [...]) ...........................................  Pa01-Pa7  Defendant’s Notice of Motion for Summary Judgment, filed March 2, 2023 ..............................................  Pa8-Pa10  Defendant’s Statement of Material Facts, filed March 2, 2023 ..............................................  Pa12-Pa14 Brief in Support of Summary Judgment ....................... Pa15-Pa22 Exhibit A to Certification of Defense Counsel (Police Crash Investigation Report) ......................... Pa27-Pa30 Exhibit B to Certification of Defense Counsel (Automobile Policy Declarations) ......................... Pa31-Pa32 Exhibit C to Certification of Defense Counsel (Plaintiff’s Interrogatories) ................................. Pa33-Pa43 Exhibit D to Certification of Defense Counsel (Medical Records from [...]) ................................................................. Pa44-Pa47 Exhibit E to Certification of Defense Counsel (Deposition of Plaintiff) ........................................ Pa48-Pa65 Exhibit F to Certification of Defense Counsel (Report by [...]) ..................... Pa62-Pa75 Exhibit G to Certification of Defense Counsel (Report by [...]) .................... Pa76-Pa85 Exhibit H to Certification of Defense Counsel (Addendum Report by [...]) ....... Pa86-Pa87 Plaintiff’s Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment filed March 17, 2023 .............................................. Pa88-Pa89 Plaintiff’s Counterstatement of Material Facts filed March 17, 2023 .............................................. Pa90-Pa91
[brief] | Plaintiff’s Sham Affidavit | Facts From The Record | |---------------------------|-----------------------| | *See Pa393-397* | | |  Plaintiff claims in paragraph 3 that “…I complained about [...]’s [sic] failure to pay all the monies I was due to [...]…” and cites to Plaintiff’s deposition transcript in Da68 at 40:9-19.  |  The cited deposition testimony has nothing to do with any alleged complaints to [...] and instead reads:  “Q  Well, then how -- my question is how did you know that you weren't being paid properly if you weren't | --- 21  See, supra, p. 7 n.5.  22  See, supra, p. 7 n.6. keeping track of what each check was paying you for?  A  Well, it was always one sum.  It was -- Q  What was that sum?  A  I think it was 10,000 and change, and that was on a monthly basis.  The monthly basis would go -- started fine.  Then it went to three months behind, four months behind, and then it went years behind. ”
[brief] **By Adopting the Administrator’s Methodology, the Trial Court Awarded Fees That Clearly Did Not Meet the Requirements of Rule 4:42-9(a)(2) and the Appellate Division’s Instructions**  In addition to Plaintiff’s not having proven that the equities of the case supported fee shifting under R. 4:42-9(a)(2), Defendant also showed that very little, if any, of the fees set forth in Plaintiff’s application should have been awarded.  Defendant’s comprehensive submission to the trial court on the remand color-coded all the time entries that were submitted in support of Plaintiff’s fee application.  (See Exhibit C to Defendant’s supporting certification, Da1294)  Defendant’s certification set forth the code to the colors that had had been affixed.  (Exhibit B, Da1293).  A review of the record demonstrates that from the date Plaintiff filed his Verified Complaint in January 2013, Plaintiff’s counsel was engaged in attempting to convince the court and then the Administrator that $10,000,000 in Estate assets existed in New Jersey over and above the $900,000 investment in [...], and that Defendant had engaged in malfeasance in the operation of [...].
[brief] A summary of the facts pled in Plaintiff’s Complaint (Pa-1) and Certification (Pa-20), is set forth in the Statement of Facts.  Pursuant to the Rule, the Court below must accept all facts in the Complaint as true and providing Plaintiff with all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom.  The Court below determined that the Plaintiff failed to establish the existence of a legal basis or cause of action for Defendant’s alleged 1983 violation.  As indicated above, R. 4:6-2(e) provides that a Complaint may be dismissed for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. ”  In interpreting the Rule, in Printing Mart, supra, our Supreme Court explained that “the test for determining the adequacy of a pleading is whether a cause of action is ‘suggested by the facts;’” 116 N.J. 746 quoting Velantzis v. Colgate Palmolive Co., 109 N.J. 189, 192 (1988).  The Court directed Judges to “search the complaint in depth and with liberality to ascertain whether the fundament of a cause of action may be gleaned even from an obscure statement of claim” and grant “opportunity…to amend, if necessary;”  Ibid. (quoting DiCristofaro v. Laurel Grove Men-L Park, 43 N.J. Super. 244, 252 (App. Div. 1957); see also Pressler v. Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules; C.M.T. 4.1.1. on R. 4:6-2(c) (2022).  A complaint should not be dismissed under this Rule where a cause of action is suggested by the facts and a theory of actionability may be articulated by amendment of the Complaint.  The Court also emphasized that Motions to Dismiss under R. 4:6-2(c), should be granted in only the rarest of instances and, generally, without prejudice; Printing Mart, supra at 772; see also Smith v. SBC Commc’ns Inc., 178 N.J. 265, 282 (2004).
[brief] (6T16-7 to 21; Ra8 to 9).  [...] responded that he did and provided her with the notes, which was a two-paged diagram of the searched location.  (See Da44 to 45; Ra9).  There had been a reference in [...]’s report to see the “attached diagram,” but the diagram had not been attached—which both the trial prosecutor and defense counsel had inadvertently missed.\(^{13}\) (6T15-10 to 25; 6T44-18 to 22; \(^{13}\)  In answering a question on cross-examination at the reopened hearing on December 15, 2023, Detective [...] stated that he would “have to reference [his] diagram,” before [...] mentioned that  As a result, the diagram had mistakenly not been turned over in discovery yet.  (6T15-10 to 16-21; Ra8 to 9).  Upon receiving the diagram, the trial prosecutor promptly turned it over to defense counsel on January 4, 2024.  (6T13-17 to 19; 6T16-13 to 21; Da20 to 21).
[directive] 1.0.6  County and municipal law enforcement agencies must also recognize that they conduct internal affairs investigations, particularly those that involve allegations of criminal conduct, under the direct supervision of the County Prosecutors.  County and municipal law enforcement agencies must inform the appropriate County Prosecutor when allegations of police misconduct involve potential criminal conduct.  In addition, county and municipal law enforcement agencies must confer with and follow the instructions given by the County Prosecutor at all critical points in the investigative process.
[directive] SECTION G REPORT  PTI REPORT  Forms completed or process  SECTION E commenced at intake, CJP, ESP or upon OFFENSE INFORMATION REPORT * walk-in application.  Again, most offenders will not have a criminal history, SECTION F or a slight one, and the U.D.I.R. capsule PRIOR COURT HISTORY REPORT * will suffice.  (OPTIONAL)  SECTION  A U.D.I.R. * SECTION B OPTIONAL * SECTION C  UPDATE IF APPROPRIATE (See Appendix III for form set)  * NOTE: ASTERISK INDICATES  SECTION PREVIOUSLY COMPLETED E.  PRE-SENTENCE REPORT
[directive] WAIVER OF MIRANDA RIGHTS  I, __________________________, have been read the above statement of my rights aloud.  I understand each of my rights and at this time I am willing to give up my right to remain silent and speak to you without a lawyer present.  No promises or threats have been made to me.  A mi,____________________, me han leido en voz alta la declaracion que figura arriba.  Entiendo cada uno de mis derechos; en este momentum, estoy dispuesto a renunciar a mi derecho de guarder siliencio, y hablare con usted sin tener a un abogado presente.  No me han hecho ni promesas ni amenazas.  Signed (Firma):_______________________________
[brief] The writ of quo warranto is archaic.  Its earlier iterations appeared more than a century ago (see L. 1903, c. 194), with its last iteration being codified in 1951 (L. 1951, c. 344), five years before the Rutgers Act codified the contract between Rutgers and the State in 1956.  L. 1956, c. 61.  The Legislature, through enactment of or amendment to the Rutgers Act (which could be accomplished only with Rutgers’ consent), never has empowered any private person or entity, other than the BOG itself, to remove a member of the BOG.  See N.J.S.A. 18A:65-19 (establishing a process for removal of a BOG member, which must be initiated by the BOG).  Caselaw supports the conclusion that “office” refers to public officers, not unpaid, volunteer board members.
[brief] (1029a-1031a); (1T13:3-21; 1T14:7-15:2; 1T20:6-22; 1T21:3-15; 1T22:1-24; 1T22:25-23:10).  Defendants' initial plan had been to implement the powers of the MRSA to alter the terms and conditions of Atlantic City police officers' employment on March 15, 2017.
[brief] The answer is yes, and that Mercedes Benz I purchased for her birthday.  It was a Mercedes Benz special edition, a very special car.  And it was purchased through a friend that I had for 50 years, Dr.—oh, boy—[...], [...], who bought [...] at the time.  And—and when I give a gift, I give a gift.  That means I gave a gift, it was in her name alone, never in my name, and it was her property, and that’s what this says.  [16T30-6-17].  [...] also testified that she was driving her brother-in-law’s Honda Pilot\(^{12}\) for two-years and three months until it was totaled in an auto accident on October 20, 2016.
[brief] First, [...] called 911 at approximately 7:30 p.m. on January 9, 2019.  According to the story defendant told police, the shooting had happened soon before the call to 911 – but, as it happens, several neighbors heard two gunshots nearly two hours before [...] called 911.  (17T:9-5 to 12-23, 145-15 to 22; 9T:184-1 to 18).  One neighbor had specifically made a note of when she heard the shots: at 5:45 p.m.  Ibid.  [...]’s claim that she was far away when her son called to tell her to come home was also false, as another neighbor’s home security system captured her vehicle pulling into [...] eleven minutes after the shots were fired, at 5:54 p.m. (20T:10-13 to 16-4).  Her SUV then pulls out again a minute later, and then loiters in front of the neighbor’s house at 6:04 p.m.  It pulls back into [...] at 6:06 p.m.  Then, at 6:20 p.m., the SUV leaves [...] again.  At 6:52 p.m., a smaller car pulls into [...], followed by --- 4  It is uncontested that the vehicles in the video belong to [...] and [...].  the SUV at 6:58 p.m.  Both vehicles leave again at 6:59 p.m.  Both cars return at 7:24 p.m. and stay at [...] until police arrive at 7:37 p.m.  Ibid.
[brief] Submission by [...]: Notice of Motion for Summary Judgment, [...], filed August 26, 2022 .................................................................  Pa106  Statement of Material Facts, [...], filed August 26, 2022 ...........................................................................  Pa108  Brief in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, [...], filed August 26, 2022 (partially redacted by Plaintiff-Appellant per Rule 2:6-1(a)(2)) ..............  Pa120  Certification of [...], filed August 26, 2022 .............................................................................  Pa131  Exhibit A - Oceanfront-Broadway Redevelopment Plan adopted by the [...] (the “City”) on May 14, 1996 .......................  Pa135  Exhibit B - Design Guidelines Handbook 6, Beachfront South ...............  Pa171  Exhibit C - Cited portions of the Transcript of Deposition of [...] dated May 2, 2022 ....................................................  Pa181
[brief] For the foregoing reasons, the Trial Court’s decision should be affirmed and the question regarding the amount of just compensation owed to [...] for the taking should be presented to the jury in the trial court after a full development of the facts.  Dated: September 20, 2024  [...], Plaintiff/Appellant, v. TEAM RHODI, Defendant/Respondent.  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY  APPELLATE  DIVISION  DOCKET NO. [...]
[brief] ”  3T 43:17-25 (emphasis added).  [...]’s response was, “I do believe we’ve got sufficient parking on site, regardless of, uh, what the interpretation would be of the RSIS. ”  3T 44:15-17. regard to aesthetics, visual impact or architecture, even though more than ¾ of the surrounding properties are strictly residential.  6T 20:5-9.  As to the negative criteria and the 2019 amendment to the Master Plan and Land Use Element, 6T 28:12-18, he acknowledged that “[...] has provided in its zoning opportunities to allow for assisted living facilities and senior housing in – in various locations.”  6T 34:13-17.  He dismissed many locations that the Township has zoned for senior living, and a Board member objected, stating that he needed to actually look at some locations, they were studied by the Township and they are scenic, near open space, and/or located near shopping in many instances.
[brief] The State adopts and incorporates by reference the procedural history set forth in defendant's brief on appeal.  (Db3-4). ¹  COUNTERSTATEMENT OF FACTS  The State adopts and incorporates by reference the statement of facts set forth in defendant's brief on appeal.  (Db5-12).  ¹  "Db" refers to defendant's brief on appeal.  Other references to the record are abbreviated consistent with his brief.
[brief] (1T 5-1 to 7) walking in the courtyard, shook his leg, fell onto the grass, and began to limp; a woman later identified as [...] spoke with [...] and then went into the apartment complex and knocked on a door; when no one answered, Gross placed on the windowsill an object that [...] claimed at the suppression hearing was a weapon; Gross left but then returned, retrieved the alleged weapon, and entered her own apartment.  (1T 8-3 to 9-23; Da 27)