ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] A companion [...], passed that same day, authorizes the Township Administrator, “in conjunction with the Township’s redevelopment professionals, to prepare and issue” a Request for Expressions of Interest (RFEI) “to solicit proposals from qualified redevelopers, which shall be returnable approximately 90 days from its date of issuance.” (Da209).  The Noncompliance Order and Order to Show Cause  On May 17, 2024, the trial court entered an order finding that [...] is not compliant with its Third Round Mount Laurel obligation (“the Non-Compliance Order”) (Da1).
[brief] It is as simple as that.  [...] could have insisted on language absolving itself of any fraud claims that might accrue to members of the *[...]* class in the future, *post* Feb. 20, 2015.  Compare *Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Schultz*, 2013 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 406, *5 (releasing any claim that “has been, or could have been or in the future might be asserted by any Releasing Party in the Lawsuit . . . , or in any other action or proceeding in this Court, or any other court”) to ¶1.29 (Pa0042) (releasing claims “that were, have been or could have been, now, in the past or in the future, asserted or alleged in” *[...]*).
[brief] ²  Although Count Five includes a claim for negligent infliction of emotional stress on behalf of [...], [...] is [*4] not included in the caption of the complaint. children's safety because of the four Neapolitan Mastiff dogs that were also residing on the property.  Further, we told [the landlords] that we would hear the dogs growling and we would see the dogs roam freely unattended by their owner on the property.  In addition, plaintiffs offered [...]'s deposition testimony where he testified that after expressing his concern about the dogs, [...] advised him that [...] was given permission by him to build the dogs a pen in the backyard.  The court granted summary judgment to the landlords, finding that, prior to the incident, "the landlords were not aware that the dogs had vicious propensities."
[brief] **C.  The Trial Court and Special Master erred by awarding fees for Plaintiffs’ unsuccessful cross-appeals.  (39173a-39177a; 40005a-40010a). **  As the Special Master acknowledged, Plaintiffs did not prevail on *a single point* in their cross-appeals and petitions for certification.  (39117a; 39154a).  As a result, Plaintiffs were not prevailing parties for purposes of the RICO fee-shifting statute.  Nonetheless, the Special Master awarded Plaintiffs fees incurred on their cross-appeals.  (39117a-39118a; 39154a-39155a).  This award was plainly wrong.  Silva requires consideration of “‘the amount involved and the results obtained’ when devising a reasonable fee award. ”  267 N.J. Super. at 559 (quoting RPC 1.5(a)(4)).  On Plaintiffs’ cross-appeals and petitions for certification, there were no successes; only failures.  Every challenge Plaintiffs made to the trial court’s judgment was rejected, and their petitions for certification were denied.  The Special Master failed to properly consider this factor and, as such, this Court should reverse the trial court’s award of fees for Plaintiffs’ cross-appeals and petitions for certification, based upon the Special Master’s flawed analysis.
[brief] ”  (24T 20-19 to 21; 21-17 to 19)  The prosecutor asked her who she had “recognize[d] this to be” when she had signed and dated the photograph on August 11, 2017.  [...] answered, “[...]. ”  (24T 19-22 to 24)  The prosecutor asked [...] “how did you recognize [...] on that photograph?”  (24T 21-9 to 10)  [...] answered, “Because I just know [...].  I know [...].  That’s [...].  I’ve been around him enough to know him. ”  (24T 21-11 to 13)  The prosecutor asked, “At any point, does [...] turn into the left?” (24T 21-20 to 21)  [...] answered that “I didn’t get to see him turn in.  It looks like he’s turning in. ”  (24T 21-22 to 23)  The prosecutor asked, “And if you were turning into the left, where would you be going?”  (24T 21-24 to 250  [...] answered, “Into the gate, towards the back. ”  (24T 22-1)  The prosecutor asked, “Towards the alleyway that leads … to his house?”  (24T 22-2 to 4)  [...] answered, “Yes. ”  (24T 22-5)  The trial court erred by admitting identification evidence without a jury instruction on how to evaluate it.  See State v. Green, 86 N.J. 281, 288 (1981) (“a mandatory duty exists on the part of the trial judge to instruct the jury as to the fundamental principles of law which control the case”); Henderson, 208 N.J. at 302 (“juries must receive thorough instructions tailored to the facts of the case to be able to evaluate the identification evidence they hear”).
[brief] Rather than having conflicting theories of liability, [...] and his Earle supervisor, [...], had a miscommunication about which cut-through was to be utilized.  Morrow testified that he specified in calls over CB radio to the drivers, including [...], that they were to use a grass cut-through marked by cones:  Q: So it was clear to you that when you got the information from [...] on 7/20/22 at 10:00, approximately 10:00 p.m., that it was okay to go through a cut-through.  You limit it to – it was okay to go through the grass covered cut-through with the lanes closed and the cones.  Is that what you said?  [...]: Objection.  The question has been asked and answered.  He can answer it again.  Is that what [...] told you?  A: To use the designated cut-through.  [...]:  That’s not the question.  Q:  That wasn’t the question I asked.  The question I asked was, did [...] tell you that it was a grass covered cut-through that had both lanes closed and cones present?  Did he tell you that when he corresponded with you or communicated to you at 10:00 on 7/20/22?  A: Yes.  Q: And when you relayed that message to your drivers that you own (sp) a responsibility to for safety and security, what exact words did you tell them?  [...]: Objection to the form.  Asked three or four times.  He can answer it again.  What words did you convey to your truck drivers?  A:  To use the grass cut-through where the cones are, where the grass is torn up in between the cones.  That you must go into the closure on the southbound side, stay in the closure and ride the closure out back to Brickwell.  [Da249, 181:24 – 183:5.]  At his deposition, [...] testified that he only heard Morrow say “cutoff”:
[brief] In addition to the statute of limitations argument, the court should dismiss Plaintiff’s claims based on the doctrine of laches.  Plaintiff [...] knew, as early as 22 years before he filed this lawsuit, that the December 10, 1998 deeds contained the alleged error that he now attempts to attack (Da343 – Da350).  In fact, to the extent that that deed should be deemed defective, he was the one that knowingly created that defective deed.  In addition, his own allegations in his Complaint confirm his knowledge of the alleged error as well (Da001 – Da003).  Moreover, he also knew, for 22 years, that the tax rebate checks for the 293 Property were sent to his brother [...]’s name, and, as a result, he could not deposit the tax rebate checks sent for the 293 Property in the name of [...] Wu (Da442 – Da443).  Further, the fact that [...] and [...]’s names continued to remain on homeowner insurance for the 293 Property, despite Plaintiff’s allegation that [...] and [...] sold the 293 Property as early as 1997, and despite the fact that [...] was actually the one that purchased the homeowner insurance for both the 291 Property and the 293 Properties.  Clearly, Plaintiff [...] has demonstrated “unreasonable delay,” as required by this doctrine, in connection with his claims, despite the fact that he knew or should have known that the deed was evidence that he was not the owner of the 293 Property.
[directive] In these circumstances, the unreported SAFE/DFSA kit will be moved to “hold” status and retained in accordance with section IV.C. below.  If a SAFE/DFSA kit is not tested, when the victim consents to the release to law enforcement, the supervising attorney must clearly document the reason(s) the kit was not tested and include this documentation in the file with the forensic medical report.  Testing of SAFE/DFSA kit contents shall never be declined for the following reasons: 1.  An investigator or prosecutor believed the sexual act/contact was consensual; 2. An investigator or prosecutor had no suspects; or 3.  The victim filed a complaint against a spouse/partner, or former spouse/partner.  The results of SAFE/DFSA kit testing are not probative to the issue of consent; SAFE kit testing may result in suspect identification; and spouses/partners do not lose legal protection against acts of sexual violence by entering into a marriage or relationship.  Therefore, these reasons alone cannot lead to a determination that the SAFE/DFSA kit will have no bearing on the outcome of the case.  In circumstances where the victim initially consents to release to law enforcement but then withdraws consent before the kit has been processed by the lab, the kit will be retained for the same 20-year period it would have been afforded if the kit were unreported and stored in accordance with section IV.B.  In circumstances where the kit(s) are submitted to the lab but investigation reveals additional information which makes further testing unnecessary, the investigating officer will confer with the Director of the Division of Criminal Justice or his/her/their attorney designee, or the County Prosecutor or his/her/their attorney designee, to review the case and determine if the request for analysis at the forensic lab should be withdrawn.  Survivor Bill of Rights Act of 2016, P. L. No: 114-236, 130 Stat. 966, 2016
[brief] STATEMENT OF FACTS ....................................................................................................6  LEGAL ARGUMENT ..........................................................................................................13  I.  THE COURT BELOW ERRED IN DECLINING TO PROVIDE A MOCKLER CHARGE ......................................................................................................................13  (Raised Below: T2 187 through 191; T3 310 through 319; T4 8 through 13)  II.  THE COURT BELOW ERRED IN PROVIDING AN AGGRAVATION CHARGE UNDER MODEL CIVIL CHARGE 8.11F .........................................................20 (Raised Below: T2 161 through 166; T4 95 through 107; T4 125)  A.  The Court Erred in Providing an Aggravation Charge Over the Objection of the Defendant/Appellant as Plaintiff/Respondent did not Provide a Comparative Analysis Through Expert Testimony as Required by New Jersey Law ..................................................................................20 (Raised Below: T2 161 through 166; T4 95 through 107; T4 125)  B.  The Court Erred in Providing an Aggravation Charge as the Parties Completed Closing Arguments and the Supplemental Charge was Unduly Prejudicial to the Defendant.  ........................................................................27  III.  NEW JERSEY COURT RULE 4:58-2(C)  MANDATES THAT THE ADDITIONAL AWARD OF PRE-JUDGMENT INTEREST, ATTORNEY’S FEES AND COSTS BE VACATED.  ...........................................28  (Not Raised Below)  CONCLUSION
[brief] However, on top of the second presentation of the contract to the Plaintiff being altogether unnecessary, as the terms were no different than those of the first in January of 2023, that second presentation did not need to be presented by Defendant [...] in order to be legitimate.  The presentation by [...]’s attorney, especially since the addendum was prepared by Defendant [...] at the Plaintiff’s insistence, satisfied the terms of paragraph 39 of the MFSA.
[brief] See, Superior Integrated Sols., 2020 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2147, at *23 (“A claimant's mere allegation of intentional harm does not alone justify an insurer's refusal to provide a defense. ”).  When dealing with policy exclusions requiring intentional injuries, such as those here, the Court must inquire into the actor’s subjective intent.  Voorhees v. Preferred Mut. Ins. Co., 128 N.J. 165, 184-185 (1992) (“Absent exceptional circumstances that objectively establish the insured’s intent to injure, [the Court] will look to the insured’s subjective intent to determine intent to injure.
[brief] In Frugi v. Bracigliano, 177 N.J. 250 (2003), the Court articulated the standard used to determine whether the jury’s verdict is against the weight of the evidence by stating:  As in a summary judgment motion, we must determine “whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law. ”  . . . .  If, giving [the party opposing the motion] the benefit of the most favorable evidence and inferences to be drawn from that evidence, “reasonable minds could differ” as to the outcome, the contested issues must be submitted to a jury .  . . .  However, if the evidence and uncontradicted testimony is “so plain and complete that disbelief of the story could not reasonably arise in the rational process of an ordinary intelligent mind, then a question has been presented for the court to decide and not to the jury. ”  [Id. at 269-270 (internal citations omitted). ]  A jury verdict shall not be set aside unless “after canvasing the record and weighing the evidence, . . . . the continued viability of the judgment could manifest a denial of justice. ”  Moreover, jury verdicts should be set aside and new trial granted sparingly in cases of a clear injustice.  Dutton v. Rando, 458 N.J. Super. 213, 223-24 (App. Div. 2019).  In Baxter v. [...], 74 N.J. 588 (1997), the Supreme Court quoted from its earlier decision in State v. Johnson when describing what must be shown to justify vacating a jury’s verdict:  While this feeling of “wrongness” is difficult to define, because it involves the reaction of trained judges in the light of their judicial and human experience, it can well be said that that which must exist in the reviewing mind is a definite conviction that the judge (the jury) went so wide of the mark, a mistake must have been made.  This sense of “wrongness” can arise in numerous ways from manifest lack of inherently credible evidence to support the finding, obvious overlooking or underevaluation of crucial evidence, a clearly unjust result, and many others.  [74 N.J. at 599 (quoting State v. Johnson, 42 N.J. 146, 162 (1964) (emphasis added))].  B.
[brief] PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT WAS NOT REQUIRED TO JOIN DEFENDANTS/RESPONDENTS IN THE BANKRUPTCY COURT PREFERENCE ACTION  The trial court erred in finding “plaintiff did not join defendants in the preference litigation even though it was plaintiff’s responsibility to join all parties with a material interest in the controversy. ”  Pa96.  “Plaintiff could have joined defendants in the preference action but did not. ”  Pa97.  No authority was cited by the court for this proposition.  As a matter of law, the bankruptcy court had no subject matter jurisdiction to decide the dispute between the [...] and the [...].
[brief] Other witnesses who worked with [...] at [...] gave a similar account.  [...], [...]’ assistant farm manager, testified that she worked with [...] during his time there in 2018.  See [Pa 737].  She did not consider [...] to be aggressive or vicious, though he could be “difficult to catch. ”  She too confirmed that this was not considered aggressive behavior.  [Pa 747].  The on-site veterinarian responsible for processing and freezing [...]’s semen at [...] in 2017 and 2018, [...], did not consider [...] particularly dangerous or vicious.  [Pa 830, 876].
[directive] Holding locker procedure  3.2.1  In the event an officer has property to be submitted for safekeeping in the property room, and the property officer is not available to accept same, the property description report will be completed, up to the chain of custody section.  In the first chain of custody section, entries will be made under ITEM NO., DATE, RELINQUISHED BY and PURPOSE FOR CHANGE OF CUSTODY.  No other entries are made.  3.2.2  The officer in charge will inspect the property for proper identification, labeling and packaging, as well as the property description report.  3.2.3  The officer in charge will then accompany the officer who took custody of the evidence to the property holding locker, where the officer will place both the property and the completed property description report.  The locker must then be properly secured by the officer who took custody of the evidence, under the supervision of the officer in charge.  3.2.4
[brief] (Id. (citing [...] Decl. ¶ 2)).  Issue number 1 sought testimony on the following:  [C]orporate document preservation practices, including but not limited to specific retention periods for different types of documents, what back-ups are made and where they are stored, corporate guidelines regarding document preservation (e.g., for Sarbanes-Oxley purposes, because of federal agency investigations like that conducted by the EEOC, for affirmative action purposes, for litigation, etc.), and any automatic document deletion that typically occurs.  (Id.).  Issue number 3 sought testimony on the following: [Defendants’] efforts to preserve documents for this case, including, but not limited to, what back-ups were retained, what automatic document deletion practices were altered (and how), what documents were collected and when, when steps were taken to preserve documents, who (by title and location) was involved in the document preservation, and what steps each individual took for the document preservation.
[brief] Furthermore, the proposed off-site development does not offer a “substantial” amount of affordable housing nor has there been any credible finding as to the Off-Site Property’s suitability for use.  While the delay in final compliance in development of agreed upon affordable housing is troublesome, the court here does not find that the Borough’s action (or inaction), when reviewing in the broad scope of all the facts and circumstances presented, does not now warrant automatic site plan approval of the Off-Site Property.  The Redeveloper is asking the Court to ignore or violate the Borough’s Redevelopment Plan, disregard the governing body’s right to zone, overturn a validly enacted zoning ordinance and to usurp the Land Use Board’s authority to conduct site plan review.  Such action is inappropriate where [...] was never contemplated previously, and there has been no bad faith actions by the Borough.  With respect to [...]'s request that the Court grant relief regarding the seven (7) off-site units proposed, it is respectfully submitted that the Court should not divest both the governing body and the [...] of their statutory powers for a property not previously designated for affordable housing.
[brief] To the contrary, the Supreme Court in *Rivera* expressly approved of the sentencing court’s reliance on “the nature of the offense and defendant's role in planning the crime” in finding aggravating factors three because those were facts that were established in the record.  249 N.J. at 302.  The Court vacated the sentence, however, because the sentencing judge speculated that Rivera did not have a criminal history because she had not had time to begin committing crimes.  *Ibid.*  It was this latter assumption about Rivera’s criminal history that the Court found impermissibly presumptuous.  As [...] made clear, his finding of the aggravating factors in this case was based on what actually occurred in this case.
[brief] 31  Pinkowski v. Twp. of Montclair, 299 N.J. Super. 557 (App. Div. 1997) ..................................................  26  Posey v. Bordentown Sewerage Auth., 171 N.J. 172 (2002)  ........................................................................... 32, 34  Reichert v. Vegholm, 366 N.J. Super. 209 (App. Div. 204) .................................................. 36, 38, 40  Rosenberg v. Tavorath, 352 N.J. Super. 385 (App. Div. 2002) .................................................. 21 Ross v. Lowitz, 222 N.J. 494 (2015) ........................................................................... 20, 32, 34 Rutgers Cas. Ins. Co. v. Dickerson, 215 N.J. Super. 116 (App. Div. 1987) .................................................. 36  Scannavino v. Walsh, 445 N.J. Super. 162 (App. Div. 2016) .................................................. 31-32, 38 State v. Scott, 229 N.J. 469 (2017)  ...........................................................................  30  Templo Fuente De Vida Corp. v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co., 224 N.J. 189 (2016)  ...........................................................................  20  Van Horn v. Harmony Sand & Gravel, Inc., 442 N.J. Super. 333 (App. Div. 2015)  ..................................................  31  Watkins v. Resorts Int’ Hotel & Casino, 124 N.J. 398 (1991)  ...........................................................................  36  Wyatt v. Wyatt, 217 N.J. Super. 580 (App. Div. 1997)  .................................................. 21, 26 Other Authorities
[brief] In other words, the [...] does not represent either the purchaser or the seller of real estate or purport to give advice on how a transaction should proceed in general, or how to clear a tax foreclosure in particular.  In the present case, the title commitment required as a condition for issuing a title policy a deed from [...] and [...] to [...] and a mortgage properly executed by [...] in favor of a lender to be announced to secure a loan in the amount of $105,000.  (308a, ¶4a and 4b).  The company reserved the right to amend the commitment and add requirements or exceptions from coverage should the transaction change.  (308a, ¶5, 6, 8, and 10).  There are no amendments to the commitment.  The commitment required clearance of the pending tax foreclosure by getting a cancellation of the tax lien, cancellation of the lis pendens, dismissal of the foreclosure action with prejudice, and a cancellation of the mortgage being foreclosed.  (309a, ¶¶ 18 and 19).  Finally, because the seller was married and the property was the principal marital residence, [...] required both [...] and her husband, [...], to sign the deed.  (310a, ¶20(iv)).  There is no dispute that plaintiff is identified in the commitment as the person to whom [...] proposed to issue a policy.
[brief] In State v. Cotto, regarding a failure to provide an identification charge, the Supreme Court noted that "the trial court instructed the jury on the State's burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was the individual that committed the crime."  182 N.J. 316, 326–27 (2005).  Thus, the instruction given in that case "emphasize[d] the same common denominator: the State bears the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is the wrongdoer."  Id. at 327.  As a result, the Court found [a]lthough the court . . . did not use the word "identification" in charging the jury, and could have given a more detailed instruction, it nonetheless clearly explained the State's burden to the jury," and there was no error "much less plain error, when it instructed the jury on identification."  Ibid.  Here, defendant did not request a third-party guilt instruction and has not met his burden of demonstrating that the absence of this charge possessed a clear capacity to bring about an unjust result.  [...]’s charge, as a whole, adequately assured defendant a fair trial in which the jury was obligated to determine, by proof beyond a reasonable doubt, that defendant was the person who shot [...].
[brief] [...]  Attorney for Plaintiffs [...] and [...], Plaintiffs-Appellants/ Cross-Respondents, vs. [...], Defendant-Respondent/ Cross-Appellant and [...]  Defendant-Respondent  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE  DIVISION  Docket No. [...]  Civil Action On Appeal from Order of the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Middlesex County  Docket No. [...]  Sat Below: Jury trial before Hon. [...]  DEFENDANT/RESPONDENT/CROSS-APPELLANT’S BRIEF IN RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF/APPELLANTS OPPOSITION TO CROSS APPEAL