ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The WPCA predominantly addresses water pollution through its New Jersey Pollution Discharge Elimination System (“NJPDES”) permitting requirements, which are implemented by DEP.  N.J.S.A. 58:10A-6; see also N.J.A.C. 7:14A.  The WQPA requires the Commissioner of DEP to undertake a continuing planning process (“CPP”), which shall: a.  Integrate and unify the statewide and areawide water quality management planning processes; b. Conduct a statewide assessment of water quality and establish water quality goals and water quality standards for the waters of the State; c. Develop a statewide implementation strategy to achieve the water quality standards which shall include, but not be limited to: (1) the determination of effluent limitations and schedules of compliance at least as stringent as those required by the Federal Act; (2) the determination of the total maximum daily load for pollutants necessary to meet the water quality standards; (3) the incorporation of all elements of any areawide waste management plan prepared pursuant to this act; . . . .
[brief] Substantive Due Process has been defined as the procedural due process requirements due when a Fundamental Right is implicated.  A Judges’ refusal to consider evidence (as demonstrated by the trial court’s erroneous denial of a Due Process Rights violation misapplying case law verses abiding by the doctrine of Stare Decisis obtaining applicable case law to when jurisdiction has been challenged by a defendant), when a Fundamental Right is at stake denies Due Process Rights to a “meaningful hearing. ”  Armstrong v. Mango, 380 US 545,552; 85 S. ct.1187 (1965).
[brief] Plaintiff-Appellant, [...] (“[...]”) submitted an application to the Board seeking: (i) a use variance under N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70d(1); (ii) a floor area ratio variance under N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70d(4); (iii) multiple “bulk” variances under N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70c; and (iv) preliminary and final site plan approval.  Plaintiff sought to construct a building containing 29 residential units on two levels, with 1,180 sq. ft. of office space and 1,246 sq. ft. of retail space on the ground level.  The entire project was sought to developed on a privately owned, vacant 0.59 acre parcel located in Oradell’s B-3 Business & Apartment Zone District (“B-3 Zone”).
[brief] TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS ...........................................  iii  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ................................................................................ iv  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT ...............................................................................  1  PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND STATEMENT OF FACTS ...............................  3 LEGAL ARGUMENT ..........................................................................................  10  POINT I THE GLOBAL FEE APPLICATION AND THE CHANCERY COURT’S REVIEW OF IT DID NOT ACCORD WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF NEW JERSEY LAW AND THE CHANCERY COURT’S OWN PRIOR ORDERS AND INSTRUCTIONS (Da3-233; 1T68-72)
[brief] (4T78:23-79:12; 5T28:7-8; 5T53:4-13; 6T138:23-141:1; 7T120:13-121:4).  Video footage from the defendant’s cctv system showing the front entrance of the store and Aisle 58 from the date of the plaintiff’s fall was also moved into evidence as exhibits P-4, P-5, and P-6.
[directive] Niniejszy dokument jest dokumentem publicznym, co oznacza, że na żądanie może on zostać udostępniony do wglądu publicznego w przedłożonej formie.  Z tego względu proszę nie podawać w nim osobistych identyfikatorów, takich jak numer ubezpieczenia społecznego (social security), numer prawa jazdy, numer tablicy rejestracyjnej pojazdu, numer polisy ubezpieczeniowej, numery aktywnych kont bankowych lub kart kredytowych.  NOTICE:
[brief] AICRA is explicitly clear concerning both the parties and the claims to which it applies.  According to N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4, AICRA’s provisions apply to insureds, injured persons, and medical providers only.  Moreover, an insurer’s claims for violations of the IFPA are not “disputes involving medical expense benefits. ”  N.J.S.A. 39:6A-5.1(c) citing to N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.  Plaintiffs’ case includes three non-medical provider corporation Defendants ([...], [...], and [...]); one layperson Defendant ([...]) who is not an insured and/or injured party; and one attorney Defendant ([...]), who is not an insured and/or injured party.  The mandatory arbitration provisions do not apply to these five Defendants or to the Plaintiffs’ IFPA claims.  A.
[brief] Under [...]’s return on equity approach, any hardship increase would not incorporate any market valuation of his dwelling unit post-condo conversion.  The conversion of his unit in and of itself would therefore have no detrimental effect on his rent at all.  This would clearly comply with the letter of the TPA’s section 61.52(b), as well as the TPA’s overall affordability objectives.  It is also more consistent with a reading of Hoboken’s rent control law that contemplates a return on actual investment (i.e., equity) not an assumed increase in value simply due to conversion.  C.
[brief] POINT II  THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS THE VERIFIED COMPLAINT AS PLAINTIFFS HAVE PLED PRIMA FACIE CAUSES OF ACTION.  (Pa000017-18, 26-29)  The Plaintiffs have alleged the following counts: Count I- Breach of Contract; Count II- Breach of Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealings; Count III- Promissory Estoppel; and Count IV, New Jersey Wage Payment and Collection Law.  As previously argued, Defendants fall short in using the MSRA to avoid any of these causes of action.  The Trial Court did not directly analyze Plaintiffs’ causes of action and instead found that if there was an inconsistency between common law or statutory law, the MSRA prevails.  Pa000028.  There is no inconsistency between Plaintiffs’ claims and the MSRA and no inconsistency identified by the Trial Court who uses this term to give Defendants a free pass under the guise of the MSRA to avoid paying promoted officers their earned wages.
[directive] G.  Equitable sharing payments made to other federal agencies, state and local law enforcement agencies, and foreign countries.  > of Payment shall not exceed the net value the forfeited property at the time of Guide to Equitable Sharing for Foreign Countries and Federal, disposition (See State, and Local Enforcement Agencies).  Law H. of Payment for services experts and consultants needed by a Department of the Treasury law enforcement organization to carry out the organization’s duties relating to seizure and forfeiture.
[brief] The *Mt. Prospect* Court disagreed with [...]’s reliance on the *Nationwide Mutual Fire Insurance Co. v. Fiouris*, 928 A.2d 154 (N.J. App. Div. 2007), *certif. denied*, 934 A.2d 640 (N.J. 2007) case, holding that the [...] does not prohibit arbitration based upon permissive language in the statute and that the portions of that decision relied on by [...] were mere dicta.  *Id.* at 8-9.  The Court further rejected [...]’s claims that arbitration of fraud claims frustrates the anti-fraud mission of the [...], finding that there was no authority for this proposition.  *Id.*  It further held that the right to a jury trial under [...] cases afforded by the *Lajara* case did not prevent arbitration of fraud claims, finding that there was no authority to claim that this could not be waived by agreeing to arbitrate as [...] had in its DPR Plan and AOB.
[brief] Pursuant to Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), after a lawful stop, an officer may conduct a reasonable search for weapons if he has “reason to believe that he [or she] is dealing with an armed and dangerous individual. ”  State v. Carillo, 469 N.J. Super. 318 (App. Div. 2021); State v. Richards, 351 N.J. Super. 289, 299 (App. Div. 2002) (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 24).  “The officer need not be absolutely certain that the individual is armed; the issue is whether a reasonably prudent [person] in the circumstances would be warranted in the belief that his safety[,] or that of others[,] was in danger. ”  Terry, 392 U.S. at 27.  Thus, the “reasonableness of the search … is to be measured by an objective standard. ”  Carillo, 469 N.J. Super. at 338.  Although a mere “hunch” does not create reasonable suspicion, Terry, 392 U.S. at 27, the level of suspicion required is “considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence,” and “obviously less” than is necessary for probable cause.  State v. Gamble, 218 N.J. 412, 428 (2014)  The officer is then “entitled … to conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such person[ ] in an attempt to discover weapons which might be used to assault him.
[brief] As our Supreme Court has recently reaffirmed, “[w]hen we consider whether a given error is harmless, that error ‘must be evaluated in light of the overall strength of the State’s case. ’”  *State v. Allen*, 254 N.J. 530, 550 (2023) (quoting *Galicia*, 210 N.J. a 388 (internal quotation marks omitted)); *State v. Walker*, 203 N.J. 73, 90 (2010); *accord Trinidad*, 241 N.J. at 451; *State v. Sanchez-Medina*, 231 N.J. 452, 468 (2018).
[brief] Pa93-98.  Notably, the only defendant named in the complaint is [...].  Neither [...] nor [...] are named as defendants in the complaint.  On or about April 17, 2019  Plaintiff and [...] executed a Consent to Enter Judgment which provides for the payment of certain amounts in order for [...] to remain in the premises.  Pa 22.  Again, notably this Consent to Enter Judgment was not signed by either [...] nor [...].  LEGAL ARGUMENT
[brief] One was a silver revolver wrapped up in a t-shirt and the other one was a semi-automatic pistol inside of a case.  (5T:101-5 to 102-25).  Other items found within trunk and passenger compartment of the car were a silver and black box filled with ammunition, various other bullets, discharged cartridges, a speed loader for the revolver, a .38 Special federal cartridge found in the front center arm rest, brass knuckles found in the driver’s door pocket, a black knife with a sheath, a box of shotgun shells, also with discharged shells, and an empty beige handgun case found behind the driver’s side rear passenger seat, and a disassembled STE smart phone on the front passenger floor; Sega game system, headphones, a work shirt with an EMS patch, a sandwich bag with suspected marijuana, and a Walgreens prescription bottle with defendant’s name containing the generic drug for Adderall, which had 53 pills out of 120 pills remaining.  All these items were photographed and placed into evidence.  (5T:103-4 to 25; 108-13 to 117-2; 113-4 to 20; 114-14-115-13; 199-12 to 209-2; 6T:44-10 to 58-4; 76-10 to 13).  The revolver found wrapped inside the t-shirt was a Smith and Wesson .38 special six shot revolver.  Inside the chamber were five bullets.  Upon further examination of the handgun, it was determined that the sixth bullet had been fired because there was a depression in the primer indicating that the primer had ignited the gun powder, causing an “explosion” that propelled the bullet out of the cartridge.  (5T:109-12 to 111-4).  The second handgun recovered was a Taurus International PT 140 pro, which was loaded, charged (magazine was inside the gun and a bullet was loaded inside the chamber) and found inside a gun case.  (5T:111-19 to 112-18).
[brief] Plaintiff relies on Borodinsky to suggest that under these circumstances the Court had an obligation to appoint an expert to value [...] or plaintiff’s interest.  However, Borodinsky is inapposite in this regard.  The Court’s ruling arises from the fact that, absent a valuation in that divorce action, equitable distribution of one party’s business interest would have placed the divorced spouses in business together.  Id. at 445-446.  As the Court noted upon review:  It seems almost doctrinal that the elimination of the source of strife and friction is to be sought by the judge in devising the scheme of distribution, and the financial affairs of the parties should be separated as far as possible.  If the parties cannot get along as husband and wife, it is not likely they will get along as business partners.  Id. at 443.  The ruling in that case was entirely based in its divorce context.  In *Bowen v. Bowen*, 96 N.J. 36, 43 (1984) (footnote omitted), the Court relied on *Borodinsky* and made clear that its holding on valuation was required by the particular circumstances that inhere in distribution of ongoing business assets between spouses in the context of divorce:
[brief] B.  The Matter Was Not Ripe for Summary Judgment  The trial court should have denied summary judgment and ordered further discovery after identifying these genuine issues of material fact about the ---  3  Instead, the trial court was heavily persuaded by an unpublished decision of this Court, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. v. Omar, No. A-5187-06T3, 2008 WL 2050834 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. May 15, 2008), that arose in a starkly different factual scenario, and used this case to fill in the gaps of what should happen to the short funds, and who should bear the loss once they went missing.
[brief] In Morel, the Appellate Division reversed a lower court’s confirmation of an arbitration award after determining that the Law Division had failed to conduct an appropriate review of the case.  *Id.* at 476.  The *Morel* decision highlights the Appellate Division’s duty from a public policy standpoint to ensure that the Law Division does not deviate from the statutory and regulatory mandates concerning the PIP arbitration process by, for example, failing to properly address an issue presented on appeal.  *Id.* at 476.  In the present case, after the arbitrator did not apply clear statutory and regulatory mandates—specifically, the fee schedule—even though Plaintiff sought reimbursement for the unpaid medical bills pursuant to the fee schedule and the necessary CPT codes were undisputedly presented as evidence and acknowledged by the arbitrator within the award, the Law Division did not address the issue of whether the arbitrator improperly disregarded the fee schedule in light of Plaintiff’s amendment to the Demand for Arbitration.  Instead, the Law Division incorrectly held that the arbitrator’s decision was supported by a lack of evidence under the mistaken belief Plaintiff had pursued reimbursement pursuant to an ERISA lien.  This Court's intervention is, therefore, not only necessary to address the specific legal errors made in the application and interpretation of the fee schedule but also to ensure that Law Division review of PIP arbitration appeals is conducted properly by adequately addressing the issues presented.  Without applying such oversight and review in cases where the Law Division fails to appropriately address an issue presented on appeal, the PIP arbitration statutes and regulations risk being diluted, leaving those insureds that have been improperly denied PIP benefits vulnerable to unrectified errors and the inconsistent application of the law.  Accordingly, exceptional circumstances exist warranting appellate review and, as such, Plaintiff has standing to bring this matter before the Appellate Division.
[brief] Trial court Order, entered August 26, 2022, dismissing the Appellant’s Complaint With Prejudice against Respondent [...], MD 105a-107a  Trial court Order, entered August 26, 2022, dismissing the Appellant’s Complaint With Prejudice against Respondent [...], MD 108a-109a  Trial court Order, entered October 7, 2022, denying Appellant’s Motion for Reconsideration 119a-121a
[brief] Indeed, the Solicitation unambiguously identifies the archeological subcontractor’s on-site activities and makes clear that such activities are considered “labor for on-site services. ”  1334a.  The trial court’s characterization of the archaeologists’ on-site activities as something other than “work” is belied by the requirements of the Solicitation and the DOL’s determination in TAD Associates.  In Tad Associates, the DOL determined that similar inspection and reporting services (performed by a land surveyor) fall within the PWCRA registration requirements.  [...], 2010 N.J. Agen LEXIS 826.  Without question, the type of work performed by a surveyor (e.g., inspect, survey, identify, measure and report) are virtually identical to the work the archaeologist is required to perform on the Project (e.g., inspect the site, survey the site for artifacts and potential locations of artifacts, identify artifacts, measure artifacts and surrounding area, and report conclusions and recommendations).  In addition, unlike the surveyor, the archaeological subcontractor is responsible for sifting through excavated materials and, if necessary, utilize laborers to hand-excavate in areas where potential historic artifacts may exist.  That the archaeologist is required to perform work on site cannot be credibly disputed.
[brief] (Ca213).  The Commission also stated that Respondent never encouraged anyone else to defy EO 251, though there was abundant evidence in the record showing Respondent did precisely that.  (Ca242, Ca244, Ca265, Ca280, Ca282, Ca284, Ca286, Ca292).  In Dismissing Count 7 of the Complaint, the Commission stated that it had no jurisdiction over a transparently racist Facebook post made by Respondent because it was initially posted after Respondent was elected to her seat on the Board, but before she was formally seated.  (Ca205-215).  This directly contradicted a prior Advisory Opinion issued by the Commission.
[brief] ”  State v. Cagno, 211 N.J. 488, 514 (2012) (quoting State v. Wilbely, 63 N.J. 420, 422 (1973)).  Here, defendant argues that the trial court inadequately instructed the jury on accomplice liability by failing to tell them that in order to convict defendant of armed robbery, “they had to find that he shared [codefendant’s] intent to commit the robbery with a gun. ” (Db28).  However, the court properly instructed the jury on first-degree robbery, and then continued to give the charge on accomplice liability, stating:  In this case, the State alleges that the defendants [...] and [...] are guilty of the crime committed by [...] because they acted as his accomplice by soliciting or aiding or agreeing or attempting to aid [...] in the planning or committing it with the purpose that the specific crime charged be committed.  In order to find the defendants guilty, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt each of the following elements.  In order to find the defendant guilty, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt each of the following elements:  That [...] committed the crime of robbery.  I've already explained the elements of the offense of robbery.  I won't repeat it here.  [(7T 31:12-32:2)  (emphasis added)]  The judge had already fully instructed the jury on first-degree robbery, including that the State had to prove a deadly weapon was used during the course of the robbery, and that defendant had to have “the purpose that the specific crime charged be committed. ” (7T 25:16-26;8; 31:17-18).  Examining the instruction as a whole clearly shows that the failure to include the words “with a deadly weapon” in conjunction with robbery during the accomplice liability portion of the charge did not render the instruction inadequate.
[brief] (1)  Off-street parking facilities, including surface parking, under-building parking, and parking garages.  (2)  Fences and walls.  (3)  Signs.  (4)  Buildings for storage of maintenance equipment.  (5)  Private indoor and outdoor recreation and community buildings and facilities, including a clubhouse, swimming pools, fitness rooms, sport courts, common areas and similar amenities.  (6)  Trash and recycling facilities.  (7)  Dog park.  (8)  Roof-mounted solar panels.  (9)  Electric vehicle (EV) charging equipment.  (10)  Other accessory uses customarily incidental to principal permitted uses in the Senior Housing – 1 Overlay District.  § 230-270.
[brief] Note:  Judges can completely lie and remain immune from action from every other government body besides the Supreme court, - i.e. a judge can illegally cite a prior court opinion, in this case The Doyne order, and remain immune from action.  Even if the Doyne order was binding common law, via the principal of stare decisis [...] is still due a judgement as a matter of law.  [...] granted summary judgment on January 7, 2010, for the failure to file an Affidavit of Merit and for a lack of expert testimony, in the absence of a jury confirmation of her finding of fact.  Clearly, judge De La Cruz’s granting of motion for summary judgment was in error as sufficient law was in existence to find in the plaintiff’s favor  Just because judge was unaware of the law, does not mean it did not exist or bind the defendant STATEMENT OF THE CASE - PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[brief] ” (T1, 18:15-16).  He explained that he cannot determine whether an active or passive remedy is needed because he must determine what needs to be for groundwater first.  (T1, 19:21-24).  He explained that currently he does not have all of the data on the soil and that the “soil data will help us quantify the impact in advance. ”  (T1, 37:17-20).  Plaintiff’s LSRP explained, The preliminary data says that there's impact underneath the building, and we need to figure out what volume of material is impacted and that will drive how the remediation is conducted.  So it could be leave it in place and put a low permeability cap over it, like a building foundation or a concrete driveway.  It could be something where we do some type of in-situ treatment, injection of a chemical oxidant into the ground to oxidize the contaminants in place, physical removal by excavation and offsite (indiscernible).  But again, the process is iterative, and it's all based on what the data shows.  [...]:
[brief] In a letter dated January 31, 2018, to the Honorable [...], Secretary of the [...] (“[...]”), counsel for [...] notified Secretary Bose that [...] was cancelling the Mill Road WMPA.  Specifically, this letter advised Secretary Bose that the Mill Road Solar WMPA was being cancelled because: material terms and conditions of the Mill Road Solar WMPA, including the loss of site control, were breached and were not cured, resulting in the default of the Mill Road Solar WMPA.  The Mill Road Solar WMPA is thus terminated pursuant to section 1.1 therein.  [...] and [...] gave the Appellants months of advance written notice of the termination as required by law.  On a successive basis over a period of months, each agency provided notice and then gave Appellants an opportunity to cure.  The Appellants did nothing, taking no legal action to remedy the breach or challenge its legitimacy.  With the breach uncured, the approvals were terminated.  (Pa001999; Pa002011 – 002014).