ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Under N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-27, an Affidavit of Merit was due within 60 days, or January 16, 2024.  Although Plaintiff did not file for the permitted 60 day extension, the maximum one-hundred twenty day time ran on March 16, 2024.  Plaintiff failed to serve an Affidavit of Merit within that time.  Consequently, Plaintiff’s Complaint was properly dismissed by [...].  Citing to Sickles v. Cabot Corp., 379 N.J. Super. 100 (App. Div. 2005) and Zaccardi v. Becker, 88 N.J. 245 (1982), Plaintiff first argues that a motion to dismiss should only be granted in the “rarest of instances” and that it is the “ultimate sanction” which should be granted when “no lesser sanction will suffice.
[brief] ”  Da82.  These statements are inaccurate in a number of ways.  First, the Defendants have never chosen to participate in the [...].  By statute, only the local Boards of Health may do so.  Second, participation in the regional Health Commission is not done under the authority of the Local Health Services Act, N.J.S.A. 26:3A-1 to N.J.S.A. 26:3A-2-20.10.  Rather, a regional health commission is formed, and local Boards of Health join, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 26:3-84.  Third, and more importantly, the Local Health Services Act is a quite general law designed to: assure the provision of a modern and manageable array of public health services to all citizens of the State and to encourage the efficient delivery of such services by areawide health departments where such arrangements are needed to enable municipalities to meet “standards of performance” as determined by the Public Health Council.
[brief] (Da10).  After notice was duly served upon the neighboring lots, the Trial Court reconvened the parties and entertained the submission of the non-parties to determine whether there were any objections to the entry of the Commissioners’ Report.  [...] offered the opportunity for any of the responding neighboring parties to submit testimony or present argument to supplement the submission of the letters.  Upon the determination that the neighboring parties did not object to the entry of the Report as to the [...] and [...], [...] ordered the entry and recordation of the Boundary Commissioners’ Report.  The Trial Court properly required notice to the surrounding lot owners prior to entry of its Final Order.  The Court allowed the opportunity for the relevant neighboring non-parties to file an objection to the Boundary Commissioners’ Report and dispute the merits of same, in order to properly consider any possible complaints or criticisms to the Report from the non-parties.  The only two neighboring lots which submitted letters to the Court, both concretely established they did not share a desire to be added to the litigation, intervene at this juncture, or otherwise participate beyond the submission of their letters.  The other non-answering parties were duly served with notice and copies of the relevant documentation and Report and failed to file any objections or submissions with the Court.  Thereby, the surrounding lots deemed to be the only relevant non-parties to this litigation, were duly served with notice of the Court’s desire to declare the Boundary Commissioners’ Report final and conclusive as to the [...] and [...].  The Court did not err in subsequently entering the February 8, 2024, Order.
[brief] Respondents erroneously claim Citizens is not relevant to School Ethics Commission cases.  Regarding Citizens to Protect Public Funds v. Parsippany-Troy Hills Board of Education, 13 N.J. 172 (1953), Respondents claim “the School Ethics Commission does not have jurisdiction to decide matters arising outside of the School Ethics Act, such as matters of school board funding.  See N.J.A.C. 6A:28-1.4.  Accordingly, the case is entirely irrelevant” (BOE-Db31).  This assertion claims that Board members may freely violate Citizens and not face any ethical consequences.  This is nonsense on its face.  The School Ethics Act concerns board member actions that may compromise the public’s trust in the individual members and the Board as a whole.  Certainly Board Member actions which violate NJ Supreme Court precedent regarding mis-use of public funds would qualify as a violation of Ethics Act.  It should also be noted that Respondents do not offer any proof that they did not violate Citizens by spending lavishly in favor of the Referendum.  Further, Respondents ignore the possibility of Board Members colluding as a group in an unethical manner.  Plaintiff asserts that the Board members knowingly all colluded together to spend public funds to influence the electorate towards a “yes” vote on the referendum, facts which are bolstered by the OPRA response emails which demonstrate this collusion in detail.  IX.
[brief] In setting forth reasons for entering judgment against [...], the trial court made few references to her, merely noting that she became the purchaser of [...], see 24T9:2-7; T10:10-21; and made the following conclusory statement:  With regard to the [MRL] Operating Agreement, [...], [...], [...] breached their obligations.  I know it was mentioned that she should be out.  I mean, the Court doesn’t take pleasure in holding people into cases, but in 2017 it became the minority owned business.  These accounts and different transactions that are occurring, she was legally part of it in this Court’s mind.  [24T50:18-25.]  This reasoning fails because the only defendant who was a party to the [...] was [...].
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[brief] Where, as here, the employee whose emails are sought is charged with making extremely sensitive, high-level decisions, the consequences are greater and the strain is higher.  [...], who served as [...]’s Interim Provost and Vice President of Academic Affairs and was the subject of [...]’s request, was responsible for collaborating with the other executive and administrative staff to “provide leadership and academic vision” to the University; “overseeing all aspects of faculty recruitment, professional development, and promotion and tenure processes;” overseeing all “undergraduate and graduate academic programs;” participating in collective negotiations with professional and academic bargaining units; and “serving as the University’s Accreditation Liaison Officer to [...]. ” (Da43).  She also had oversight over all academic programs, administrative units, and centers and institutes within the Division of Academic Affairs and “assisted in ensuring the University’s compliance with state and federal regulations and university policies on academic matters. ” (Da43-44).  Given these responsibilities, there can be no legitimate dispute that a wholesale request for her emails would implicate emails subject to any number of OPRA exemptions, including but not limited to “information concerning student records or grievance or disciplinary proceedings against a student,” records containing “advisory, consultative, or deliberative” material, or even attorney-client privileged communications.
[brief] While the Trial Court made the determination that no dangerous condition existed in the context of a Tort Claims Act cause of action, the definition of a “dangerous condition” under the Tort Claims Act is substantially similar to a tort claim.  As the Trial Court states, under the Tort Claims Act, a dangerous condition is “a condition of property that creates a substantial risk of injury when such property is used with due care in a manner in which it is reasonably foreseeable that it will be used. ”  Pa28 (quoting N.J.S.A. 59:4-1(a)).  Likewise, in a premises liability case, a “dangerous condition” of property similarly involves “an unreasonable risk of harm. ”  Longo v. Aprile, 374 N.J. Super. 469, 474 (App. Div. 2005) (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 342 and 343).  As the law of the case is that there was no dangerous condition in the parking lot where plaintiff claims to have fallen, defendants did not breach any duty to plaintiff.
[brief] You must find that [...] would not have died but for defendant's conduct.  First, the State was required to prove that Defendant engaged in reckless conduct beyond a reasonable doubt.  The only theory advanced by the State to suggest reckless conduct on Defendant’s part was that he fired a weapon from inside of a moving vehicle in a residential neighborhood.  In order to engage in that conduct, [...] would necessarily have had to possess the fired weapon.  The jury found, however, that Defendant did not possess the weapon that the State alleged that he fired and, further, that he did not possess a weapon for an unlawful purpose.  The only rational inference that can be drawn from the jury's verdict of not guilty on both of the weapons offenses is that the jury did not believe that [...] was the shooter.
[brief] Appellant’s claim fails because transmitting information to a letter vendor does not qualify as a “publication. ”  The FDCPA does not define the word “publication,” and when a statutory term is undefined, courts apply the common law meaning.  *Moskal v. United States*, 498 U.S. 103, 117 (1990).  Under the common law meaning, a “publication” requires that “the matter is made public, by communicating it to the public at large, or to so many persons that the matter must be regarded as substantially certain to become one of public knowledge. ”  Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652D cmt. a.  See also *OneBeacon Am. Ins. Co. v. Urb. Outfitters, Inc.*, 625 F. App’x 177, 180 (3d Cir. 2015) (“publication” “means provision of information to the public at large”).  Respondent’s transmitting information to its letter vendor is not akin to disclosing the information to the public at large, and again, Appellant does not even allege that any human being at the letter vendor actually saw his information.  Moreover, Appellant’s appeal does not address this theory of liability, and the Court should deem it abandoned.  Additionally, Appellant asserts a claim under another provision of the FDCPA, which prohibits “unfair and unconscionable” conduct.
[brief] The [...] submitted a motion for summary judgment with a 25-paragraph Statement of Uncontroverted Facts (“SUF”) in compliance with R. 4:46-2(a).  Pa337-Pa343.  Plaintiff was required to submit a responding statement conforming to the provisions of R. 4:46-2(b): A party opposing the motion shall file a responding statement either admitting or disputing each of the facts in the movant’s statement.  Subject to R. 4:46-5(a), all material facts in the movant’s statement which are sufficiently supported will be deemed admitted for purposes of the motion only unless specifically disputed by citation conforming to the requirements of paragraph (a) demonstrating the existence of a genuine issue as to the fact.  R. 4:46-2(b).  Plaintiff did not file a response as required by R. 4:46-2(b).  Instead, Plaintiff submitted a jumbled document which: (1) admitted several statements in the SUF; (2) denied others, but without including “a citation to the portion of the motion record” as required by R. 4:46-2(b); (3) made vague objections to several others; and (4) made no response whatsoever to SUF ¶¶22 and 23. Pa480-Pa482.  It is clear that Plaintiff did not submit a responding statement to the [...]’ SUF as required by R. 4:46-2(b).
[brief] However, for some unexplained reason, the transcription service informed the parties that the transcript for February 10, 2021 were missing.  Therefore, [...] “attempted a reconstruction of the entire day’s missing testimony from my notes. ”  As a result, there are no “page:line” references for February 10, 2021.  Instead, there are only references to the page numbers.  [...] would go on security checks throughout the night shift.  In fact, at approximately 1:26 a.m., [...] wrote in the logbook that he had conducted a search/count.  Corrections Officer [...] (“[...]”) was assigned to the blotter in center control.  [...] was responsible for receiving each officer’s inmate count and recording that count in the main blotter.  However, [...]\(^3\) was not interviewed as to whether or not officers had called in their counts to him.  On or before August 16, 2019, one of the windows on Stowe 2 North had been broken and not fixed. \(^4\)  Inmates housed on Stowe 2 North Dormitory knew that the window could be opened at will.  [...] had reported the window was broken and would not close. \(^2\)  It is undisputed that neither [...] nor any other Corrections Officer was told about [...]’s plans to escape nor that [...] was an escape risk.
[brief] *Id.* at 144-45. at 280 (citing *Frye v. United States*, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923)).  Under this standard, the proponent of scientific evidence bears the burden to “clearly establish” that the evidence has a “sufficient scientific basis to produce uniform and reasonably reliable results and will contribute materially to the ascertainment of the truth. ”  *State v. Chun*, 194 N.J. 54, 91-92 (2008) (quoting *State v. Hurd*, 86 N.J. 525, 536 (1981)).  Although “complete agreement is not required for evidence to be admitted,” courts must consider whether there is “wide support within the relevant scientific community. ”
[brief] Defendant-Respondent, [...] (“[...]”) submits this brief in opposition to the appeal filed by Plaintiff-Appellant, [...], as Administratrix ad Prosequendum for the [...] (“Bunting” or “Plaintiff”), in the above-captioned matter.  Plaintiff’s appeal is premised on a mischaracterization of the compulsory insurance provisions of the Workers’ Compensation Act (“the Act”) and ignores that [...] was paid workers’ compensation benefits for the injuries suffered as a result of his workplace accident.  Plaintiff also ignores the established body of law in New Jersey that favors insurance policy exclusions that exclude coverage for intentional torts.  Stated simply, the Act does not compel an insurer to provide coverage for an employer’s intentional misconduct and New Jersey public policy favors insurance policy exclusions that exclude coverage for liability arising out of such conduct.
[brief] ’”  *State v. Bard*, 445 N.J. Super. 145 (App. Div. 2016); *State v. Citarella*, 154 N.J. 272, 279 (1998).  “The fact that purely innocent connotations can be ascribed to a person's actions does not mean that an officer cannot base a finding of reasonable suspicion on those actions as long as ‘a reasonable person would find the actions are consistent with guilt.
[brief] Plaintiffs own approximately 48.29 acres of land in [...], which land is designated as Block 4, Lot 14.01 on the tax maps of the Township (the “Subject Property”).  Ra2.  The Subject Property is located within the southern portion of the Township along the northern (westbound) side of Route 33.  Ra3.  It presently consists of farmland and commercial land, and is located within the Highway Development District ("HD Zone"), which zone also provides for overlay zoning known as the VC-2 Village Center Overlay ordinance provisions.  *Id.*  The VC-2 Overlay requires, among other things, the provision of low and moderate income housing designed to help meet the Township's Mount Laurel obligations.  **Township's Mount Laurel Obligations and Settlement Agreement**
[brief] Beture v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 121801, * 28 (D.N.J. July 18, 2018), quoting McGill v. Citibank, N.A., 2 Cal. 5th 945, 955 (Cal. 2017).4  This is contrasted by the courts with “private injunctive relief,” which is “relief that primarily resolves a [dispute between private parties] and rectifies individual wrongs, and that benefits the public, if at all, only incidentally. ”  Beture v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 121801, at * 28, quoting McGill --- 4  This consistency is not a coincidence.
[brief] Cases  Aiello v. Knoll Golf Club, 64 N.J. Super. 156 (App. Div. 1960)  ..................22  Alpha Bd. of Ed. v. Alpha Educ. Ass’n, 190 NJ 34 (2006)  .........................12  Angrisani v. Financial Technology Ventures, L.P., 402 N.J. Super. 138 (App. Div. 2008)  .................................................................19  Barr v. Bishop Rosen & Co., 442 N.J. Super. 599 (App. Div. 2015)  .............10  Cole v. Jersey City Medical Center, 215 N.J. 265 (2013)  .................................................. 10, 11, 13, 14, 16, 18, 21 Community Realty Mgt., Inc. for Wrightstown Apartments v. Harris, 155 N.J. 212 (1998) ..............................................................................21  Hirsch v. Amber Fin. Servs., LLC, 215 N.J. 174 (2013) ...............................11  Hojnowski v. Vans Skate Park, 187 N.J. 323 (2002) ....................................12  In re Perskie, 207 N.J. 275 (2011) ...............................................................22  In Re Purrazzella, 134 N.J. 228 (1993) .......................................................22  In Re Seaman, 133 N.J. 67 (1993) ...............................................................22  Knorr v. Smeal, 178 N.J. 169 (2003) ...........................................................13  Martindale v. Sandvik, 173 N.J. 76 (2002) ...................................................12  Morgan v. Sundance, 596 U.S. 411, 142 S. Ct. 1708 (2022)  .......................19  Perini Corp. v. Greate Bay Hotel & Casino, Inc., 129 NJ 479 (1992)  ...........12  Spaeth v. Srinivasan, 403 N.J. Super. 508 (App. Div. 2008)...........  13, 18, 20 Tuckey v. Harleysville Ins. Co., 236 N.J. Super. 221 (App. Div. 1989).......21 New Jersey Statutes  Annotated N.J.S.A. 2A:23B-1 ..................................................................................8, 12 N.J.S.A. 2A:23B-3 ................................................................................12  N.J.S.A. 2A:23B-6 ................................................................................13  N.J.S.A. 2A:23B-17c .........................................................................17  New Jersey Court Rule Rule 2:2-3(b)(8) ....................................................................................5, 10  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
[brief] He contacted Officer [...] of the [...], who was in plain clothes and operating an unmarked vehicle, to tail the Buick.  Officer Todd testified the Buick began to back out of the parking spot, down the street, and into the driveway of the T-Mobile.  Officer Todd stated the driver was on his cell phone and turned into a 7-Eleven parking lot.  Officer Todd followed the vehicle into the 7–Eleven parking lot, activated his lights, approached the vehicle, and asked the driver to hang up the cell phone.  The driver, defendant, complied and was subsequently arrested.  The car defendant operated was towed and impounded.
[brief] Furthermore, “It was pipe” was [...]’s stock answer to a myriad of questions relating to whether or not Haddad could establish the specific type of Schedule 40 pipe that was purchased with any of the North Shore checks.  This tired, non-responsive litany of evasion and deflection from [...] includes the following testimony: (3T71:23-34) (“It’s my understanding it was pipe. ”); (3T74:4-9, -14) (“It was pipe.  . . .  [It] was all pipe. ”); (3T106:11-12) (“As far as I know, it would have been the pipe . . . .”); (3T111:14) (“It was for pipe.
[brief] See, e.g., Salch v. Salch, 240 N.J. Super. 441, 443 (App. Div. 1990) (“Meaningful appellate review is inhibited unless the judge sets forth the reasons for his or her opinion.  In the absence of reasons, [this Court is] left to conjecture as to what the judge may have had in mind. ”); Rule 1:4-7(a) (“The court shall, by an opinion or memorandum decision, either written or oral, find the facts and state its conclusions of law thereon in all actions tried without a jury[.]”)  Assuming the trial court relied on the doctrine of collateral estoppel when electing to replace its own findings with this Court’s comments in the First Action – application of that doctrine was inappropriate and must be reversed.
[brief] In 1986, [...] received an EPA Request for Information pursuant to Section 3007(a) of RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 9604(e), which requested information regarding any releases of hazardous materials and [...]’s waste handling activities with respect to the Site.  (Pa0093.)  In response to the EPA’s Request for Information, in 1986, [...] engaged [...] (“[...]”) and [...], its eventual expert at the liability and allocation trials, to conduct an investigation at the Plainville Site to ascertain the full scope of the contamination.
[brief] THE TRIAL  Plaintiffs filed their opening/case-in-chief trial brief on October 18, 2023, Defendant and Intervenor filed their opposition trial briefs on October 18, 2023, and Plaintiffs filed their rebuttal trial brief on November 30, 2023.  (Pa75; Pa76.)  Plaintiffs’ trial briefs failed to reference any of their Proposed Exhibits at all, except for two: the WARD Memo, discussed infra; and a document not at issue on this appeal (the Planning Board transcript).  (Pa79.)  The trial, based on those briefs, was held on January 26, 2024.  (Pa75; Pa76.)  1.  **The Evidentiary Issues**
[brief] Indisputably, the State must disclose all evidence favorable to a defendant.  Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 1196–97, 10 L. Ed.2d 215, 218 (1963).  The State's disclosure obligation “is not limited to evidence that affirmatively tends to establish a defendant's innocence but would include any information material and favorable to a defendant's cause even where the evidence concerns only the credibility of a State's witness. ”  *State v. Carter*, 69 N.J. 420, 433 (1976).  Assuming the State was required to disclose [...]'s agreement, even though she was not bound by it at trial, we conclude that [...] is not entitled to a new trial.  [...] was aware of [...]'s agreement before the trial ended.  The State offered to recall [...] so that [...] could cross-examine her about her agreement.  He elected not to cross-examine her, but instead to read to the jury the precise colloquy that occurred when [...] was admitted into a PTI program.  [...] has cited no authority for the proposition that a defendant who is unaware of *Brady* material at the inception of a trial, but is afforded a full opportunity to utilize the material during trial, is deprived of due process.  We find no due process violation under those circumstances.  *See United States v. Higgs*, 713 F.2d 39, 44 (3d Cir.1983); *People v. Leavy*, 736 N.Y.S.2d 681, 682–83 (N.Y.App.Div.) (holding that a “defendant's constitutional right to a fair trial is not violated when ... he is given a meaningful opportunity to use the allegedly exculpatory material to cross-examine the People's witnesses or as evidence during his case”), *appeal denied*, 747 N.Y.S.2d 417 (N.Y.2002).  C. [...] next contends that his constitutional right to confront and cross-examine witnesses against him was violated when hearsay statements attributable to [...] were admitted into evidence; and that the court should have declared a mistrial due to the antagonistic defenses that developed during the trial.