ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] [In re Carter, 191 N.J. 474, 482-83 (2007) (quoting Mazza v. Bd. of Trs., 143 N.J. 22, 25 (1995)).]  “A reviewing court ‘may not substitute its own judgment for the agency’s, even though the court might have reached a different result. ’”  Stallworth, 208 N.J. at 194 (quoting Carter, 191 N.J. at 483).  “This is particularly true when the issue under review is directed to the agency’s special ‘expertise and superior knowledge of a particular field. ’”  Id. at 195 (quoting In re Hermann, 192 N.J. 19, 28 (2007)).  However, “an appellate court is ‘in no way bound by the agency’s interpretation of a statute or its determination of a strictly legal issue[.]’”  Carter, 191 N.J. at 483 (quoting Mayflower Sec. Co. v. Bureau of Sec., 64 N.J. 85, 93 (1973)).  Indeed, an agency’s “interpretation of the law and the legal consequences that flow from established facts are not entitled to any special deference. ”  Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Twp. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995).
[brief] The “state guidance” document, upon which Plaintiffs assert that the Board should model its policy, contains an entire section specifically dedicated to the issue of “school records” (Da064).  Thus, access to student records is a key aspect of this case.  Moreover, the injunction reinstates the Board’s previous policy, which contains a section pertaining to student records (Da056).  That section of the policy requires the Board to maintain a “separate, confidential file” for students who have “expressed a preference to be called by a name other than their birth name” [emphasis added] (Ibid.).
[brief] On November 8, 2018, [...] was quoted as saying:  Since 2010, [...] has served the borough as a councilwoman, but said she decided to run for mayor because she “didn’t like the direction the town was going in,” with particular concerns about overdevelopment in the downtown.  On a larger scale, [...], who served on the borough’s Land Use Board in the past, would like to ensure development in the downtown is done in a “reasonable” way “that isn’t four-story buildings. ”  “Everyone has this idea that I’m against development, but I’m not against it,” said [...].  “I’m against eminent domain.  I would like to move forward and bring positive change to the downtown. ”  She called her election “a referendum on overdevelopment,” publicly demanded that “the governing body, out of respect to the voters, take no further action [on redevelopment] until January,” and “questioned where additional affordable housing is expected to go.
[brief] [...] did not request the charge at trial, nor did he object to its omission from the court's jury instructions.  Theft is a lesser-included offense of robbery.  *State v. Ingram*, 196 N.J. 23, 39 (2008).  Nevertheless, “a trial court's obligation to instruct the jury on the court's own motion arises ‘only when the evidence clearly indicates the appropriateness of such a charge[.]’”  *State v. Rivera*, 205 N.J. 472, 489 (2011) (quoting *State v. Walker*, 203 N.J. 73, 87 (2010)).
[brief] Specifically, on page 22 of their brief in support of this motion, plaintiffs assert that "Defendants [...] and [...]'s carelessness, negligence, tortious interference, and fraud that gives rise to their legal malpractice, are certainly "readily apparent to anyone of average intelligence, and ordinary experience" and therefore, does not require the filing of an AOM.  Defendants [...] and [...] breached their duties to plaintiffs, failed to exercise the knowledge, skill, ability, and devotion ordinarily possessed, and employed by members of the legal profession similarly situated in connection with the discharge of their responsibilities and breached their duty to exercise reasonable care and prudence in connection with those responsibilities.  Specifically, Defendants [...] and [...] failed to advise plaintiffs that Defendants [...], [...], [...], [...], Theresa [...], [...], [...], [...], were personally gained from the real estate transaction at issue, and that defendants would conspire, and ultimately deviate, and transfer a substantial amount of the funds paid by plaintiffs in pursuit in the aforesaid intended transactions and developments."
[brief] Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85 (1979) (search warrant for tavern, and particularly named and described bartender who was believed to be engaged in narcotics transactions, did not justify even a fleeting detention of patron).  Following the logic of Ybarra, a search warrant for a place also does not justify the warrantless detention of persons who happen to arrive at or be near the premises during a search without probable cause to conclude that they are associated with the criminal activities that are the object of the search.  State v. Hall, 253 N.J. Super. 84, 93-97 (Law Div. 1990), aff'd o.b. 253 N.J. Super. 32 (App. Div. 1991).  Where there is no particularized description of individuals, a warrant may issue authorizing both the search of a place, and the search of all persons at a particular location, when there is probable cause to believe that anyone at such location is involved in criminal activity.
[brief] J. 395 (2014) ................................................................. 14 Ditmars v. Camden Trust, Co., 10 N.J. 471 (1952) .................................................................. 35 DiTolvo v. DiTolvo, 131 N.J. Super. 72 (App. Div. 1974) ........................................... 22 Dopp v. Yari, 927 F.Supp. 814 (D.N.J. 1996) .................................................. 35 Dugan v. TGI Fridays, Inc., 231 N.J. 24, 171 A.3d 620 (2017) ............................................... 34 Faustin v. Lewis, 85 N.J. 507 (1981) .................................................................. 43 Fox v. Mercedes-Benz Credit Corp., 281 N.J. Super. 476 (App. Div.1995) ........................................... 40 Gennari v. Weichert Co. Realtors, 148 N.J. 582 (1997) .................................................................. 39 Goffe v. Foulke Mgmt. Corp., 238 N.J. 191 (2019) .................................................................. 14 Goldfarb v. Reicher, 112 N.J.L. 413 (1934) ...............................................................
[brief] More importantly, the August 1, 2013 emails clearly demonstrate that a student was able to matriculate into the master’s pathway at a later date, not only at the end of their first year, and that the Plaintiff was authorized to take master’s track courses once he got off academic probation.  Despite this, Defendant did not allow Plaintiff to pursue a master’s degree.  Ultimately, [...] breached its contract with Plaintiff by not granting Plaintiff the opportunity of enrollment into either of his master’s track choices despite him having nearly completed all credits for the program.  Accordingly, the trial court erred in granting Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment and dismissing Plaintiff’s Complaint in its entirety.
[brief] And under N.J.S.A. 17:33A-7(d), “the commissioner may join in [an insurer’s] action for the purpose of seeking judgment for the payment of a civil penalty authorized under [N.J.S.A. 17:33A-5].”  Additionally, the Commissioner may request the Attorney General to bring a criminal action under applicable criminal statutes, for violations of the IFPA.  N.J.S.A.17:33A-5(a).  The IFPA also created the Office of the Insurance Fraud Prosecutor (“OIFP”) under the direction and supervision of the Attorney General.
[brief] ” (Pa13-Pa17, at ¶¶54-66, 80-84).  In addition to specific performance, Plaintiff sought an award of money damages in excess of $30 million.  (Pa14, at ¶65; Pa17, at ¶83).  On April 20, 2023, [...] filed a motion under Rule 4:6-2(e) seeking the dismissal of Plaintiff’s complaint, as against [...].
[brief] 1T refers to the October 17, 2018  Superior Court Transcript of Motion 2T refers to the October 19, 2018  Superior Court Transcript of Order to Show Cause  3T refers to the December 4, 2018  Superior Court Transcript of Order to Show Cause  4T refers to the August 26, 2019  Superior Court Transcript of Defendant’s Motion to Disqualify Trial Judge 5T refers to the January 17, 2020  Superior Court Transcript of Defendant’s Motions for Reconsideration of Order Denying Motion to Disqualify Trial Judge and Motion to Compel Return of Monies.  6T refers to the January 28, 2020  Superior Court Transcript of Trial, which includes Decision of Trial Court on Defendant’s Motion to Compel Return of Monies  7T refers to the January 29, 2020  Superior Court Transcript of Trial 8T refers to the January 30, 2020  Superior Court Transcript of Trial 9T refers to the February 3, 2020  Superior Court Transcript of Trial 10T refers to the February 4, 2020  Superior Court Transcript of Trial 11T refers to the February 5, 2020  Superior Court Transcript of Trial 12T refers to the July 27, 2021  Superior Court Transcript of Trial  13T refers to the July 28, 2021  Superior Court Transcript of Trial  14T refers to the August 2, 2021  Superior Court Transcript of Trial  APPENDIX  [...] vs. [...]
[brief] *Higgins v. Thurber*, 413 N.J. Super. 1, 6 (App. Div. 2010), *aff’d*, 205 N.J. 227 (2011).  Challenger further argues that [...]’s refusal to address the allowable uses on the easement, following her summary judgment ruling, is also reviewable by an abuse of discretion standard.  Again, we disagree.  Although our request to consider that issue was made just after the grant of summary judgment, it pertained directly to the subject matter of that motion and [...]’s ruling should be reviewed by the same standard applicable to review of summary judgments.  That is especially so since the relevant facts before the trial court on that issue were not in dispute.  Point I
[brief] The answer must be No.  The record does not support the [...]’s determination that State business was being conducted or discussed at the local union office when the second incident allegedly occurred between [...] and [...]  Rather, D[a].[B]’s allegation is that she went to the local office in connection with the union election petitions she had gathered and to change her name on the petition.  That activity had nothing to do with vague “business” between the State and the union.  It is not evidence of State business being discussed or conducted.  It has nothing to do with [...]’s representation of State workers as an officer of the local union generally.  Under those circumstances, the [...]’s determination that the local union office was an extension of the State workplace is plainly erroneous, not based on any evidence in the record, and patently arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable.  Affirming the [...]’s determination on that basis renders the requirement of a nexus to a State workplace in N.J.A.C. 4A:7-3.1(a)(1) utterly meaningless.  With respect to [...]’s opposition on this point, its contention that a collective negotiations agreement with the State (the “CNA”) creates a sufficient nexus to consider a local union office to be “an extension of the workplace” fails for multiple reasons.
[brief] That being the case, such transactions are still prohibited in New Jersey.  On the facts in this case, the defendant is an “assignee”, as the purchaser of an interest in the suit.  It is undisputed that the defendant entered into a written contract with the plaintiff, and/or gave her a notice, and it is plaintiffs portion that at the time the contract was signed, and/or the notice received by the consumer, it violated the then, and presently, existing law of the state of New Jersey.
[brief] [...]’S SHAREHOLDER ACCOUNT MANAGER WEBSITE PROVIDED MORE THAN ADEQUATE NOTICE OF ITS TERMS  A.  The Record reflects that Respondent [...] registered for and accessed [...]’s Shareholder Account Manager (SAM) website.  The trial court observed:  Regarding the SAM Program registration, it’s undisputed that Miss [...] registered for the program on June 27th, 2022 and that the use of the program was subject to the terms and conditions that included a pre-arbitration provision.  (2T14:9-13).  The record supports this conclusion (Da0080-Da0081; Da0083-Da0084).  Respondents submitted nothing contradicting this fact, or ever disputing that they in fact saw the SAM Terms of Use.  (See 1T38:2-12).  Contesting this for the first time on appeal is improper.  Similarly, it is improper to now contest the [...] certification below which establishes that --- 4  Respondents’ alleged limited English proficiency is immaterial because (1) Respondents say they never read any document they were provided (compare Da0076, 84-86 with Da0065), and (2) the inability to read English does not negate assent, see Rodriguez v. Raymours Furniture Co., 436 N.J. Super.  305, 321 (App. Div. 2014), rev’d other grounds, 225 N.J. 343 (2016); Morales v. Sun Constructors, 541 F.3d 218, 220-222 (3d Cir. 2008).  Respondent [...] signed-up for and accessed SAM on June 27, 2022 (Pb24-28).  The [...] certification speaks for itself and confirms that he spoke on personal knowledge in explaining the relevant records.  (Da0071, Da0087).  B.
[brief] Defendant failed to present evidence in the municipal court or in the Law Division indicating that Hackettstown's ordinance was not more stringent than the pertinent regulation, *N.J.A.C.* 7:29-1.2(a), or that the ordinance had not been approved by the DEP.  Since the latter point was not raised below and does not involve jurisdiction or substantially implicate a public interest, we will not consider it.  [Id. at 583 (emphasis added). ]  The *Krause* court further noted that “the determination of whether a municipal ordinance is more or less stringent than the [Noise Control Act] may require a determination by the DEP.  Consequently, a local noise ordinance may be unenforceable against commercial entities unless the ordinance has received DEP approval.
[brief] Appellant then cites to the 1971 Code Book, appended to its brief, in particular the “Table of Sources” that referenced §18-8.1 as being premised on Revised Ordinance § 12.06 enacted in 1965 (Ab56).  Section 12.06, included in Appellant’s appendix bears almost no resemblance to § 18-8.1 the ordinance derived therefrom, other than that both enactments concern site plan requirements.  Indeed, it appears to be simply a prefatory enactment that, other than specifying the timing and amount copies of a site plan to be submitted to the Planning Board, contains virtually no substantive requirements, instead referring to “the requirements hereinafter set forth” but Appellant has not provided the sections that follow thereafter.  Critically, for purposes of this analysis, § 12.06 does not include the requirement from § 18-8.1 that “[s]ite plan approval shall be required where there is a change in use of an existing structure,” or that “[n]otice shall be given to all property owners within 200 feet of the proposed change” (Compare Ra275-Ra277 with Aa254-Aa255).  Moreover, as Appellant acknowledges, this supplemental filing was not even presented to the Board in the initial instance, much less did the Board rely upon it, but it was instead presented to [...] in support of its action in lieu of prerogative writ (Ab54).
[brief] (11T 82-9 to 22)  When detained by police, [...] was wearing blue jeans and a white T-shirt.  (11T 76-3 to 7)  [...] was wearing a black short-sleeved T-shirt with a white Nike insignia on the left breast.  (11T 76-11 to 17)  A search of the house revealed a red jacket hanging on the door of a bedroom close to the house’s front entrance.  The jacket had two guns in one of its pockets, a Smith & Wesson .9 mm. and a Taurus .9 mm.  (11T 51-2 to 18)
[brief] Accordingly, the Model Charge on Flight as Consciousness of Guilt (rev’d 5/10/10) directs that where, as here, “the defense has not denied that he/she departed the scene but has suggested an explanation,” the court should charge that the defense has offered an explanation, and should “set forth [the] explanation” and should specifically instruct:  “If you find the defendant’s explanation credible, you should not draw any inference of the defendant’s consciousness of guilt from the defendant’s departure. ”  https://www.njcourts.gov/sites/default/files/charges/non2c010.pdf  \(^{17}\)  [...] also said that he heard that “some guys from Newark … were driving around looking for [him], asking questions about [him]. ”  (22T 286-24 to 281-1)  The court made no mention of the fact that [...] had offered an explanation for his flight, much less that the jury could find that his explanation negated the inference that his flight could serve as proof of consciousness of guilt.
[brief] ” (Pa0205-06) (emphasis added).  The court’s statement is an inaccurate statement of Massachusetts law, and the actual “mandate” is for use of a fact-based allocation.  Under *Boston Gas*, the time-on-the-risk method is a “fallback” method that is only appropriate if it is not possible to make a more accurate fact-based estimation of the damage during each triggered period.  *Bos. Gas*, 910 N.E.2d at 316.  Despite this clear mandate for a “fact-based” allocation approach under Massachusetts law, the trial court provided no analysis of the evidence and made no findings concerning whether the evidence allowed for a fact-based allocation of [...]’s damages.  (Pa0205-08).  Instead, the lower court pointed to the nature of the EPA-approved CVOC remediation process employed by [...], which was based on the flushing of DNAPL solvent trapped in the soil and bedrock into groundwater for a “pump and treat” process (the lower court characterized this remediation process as “continuing contamination” even though the CVOC plume stabilized in 1986 and that operational releases of CVOCs had ceased by this same time).
[brief] Article I, Section 1 | 24 | | 2)  Article I, Section 8 | 24 | | 3)  Article III, Section 1 | 31 | | 4)  Article III, Section 2 | 30, 31 | | 5)  Article IV, Section 3 | 24 | | 6)  Article IV, Section 4 | 24 | | 7)  Article VI | 31 | | 8)  The 7th amendment | 25 | | 9)  The 10th amendment | 14 | Supreme court decisions | | | |-------------------|------| | 1)  Cummings v. The State of Missouri, 71 U.S. 277 | 37 | | 2)  Insurance Company v. Folsom, 85 US 237 | 25, 26 | | 3)  Schick v. United States, 195 US 65 | 14 | | 4)  Slocum v. New York Life Insurance Co., 228 US 364 | 13, 14, 18, 28 | | 5)  United States v. Lovett, 66 S.Ct. 1073 | 37 | | TABLE OF CITATIONS | Page | |-------------------|------| | Federal Statutory law | | | 1)
[brief] 46  # TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | Cases | |-------| | **Application of Forsythe,**<br>91 N.J. 141 (1982) | passim | | **Application of McCabe,**<br>81 N.J. 462 (1980) | 44 | | **Application of McGlynn,**<br>58 N.J. Super. 1 (App. Div. 1959) | 22 | | **Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.**<br>573 U.S. 682 (2014) | 46 | | **In re Miller's Petition,**<br>122 N.J.L. 176 (Sup. Ct. 1939) | 23 | | **McGovern v. Rutgers,**<br>211 N.J. 94 (2012) | 29 | | Constitution and Statutes | |--------------------------| | N.J. Const. art.  I, ¶ 18 | passim | | N.J. Const. art. III | 45 | | N.J. Const. art. IV | 22, 45 | | N.J. Const. art. IV, § 4, ¶ 6 | passim | | N.J.S.A.  1:7-1 | passim | | N.J.S.A. 1:7-3 | passim | | N.J.S.A. 1:7-4 | 1, 2, 16, 21 | | N.J.S.A. 10:4-9 | 23 | | N.J.S.A. 10:4-8 | 27, 28, 29 | | N.J.S.A. 17B:27D-6 | passim | N.J.S.A. 26:2S-89 ................................................................. 25, 26 N.J.S.A. 52:11-78........................................................................ passim N.J.S.A. 52:13B-6........................................................................ 6, 23, 26, 27 N.J.S.A. 52:14B-1 ........................................................................ 25 L. 2021, c. 375 ........................................................................ passim L.1968, c. 410 ........................................................................ 25 Other Authorities A. 4848 (2020) ........................................................................ passim A. 6260 (2021) ........................................................................ passim S. 49 (2021) ........................................................................ passim S.3030 (2020)
[brief] In this case, based on the evidence, a fact-based allocation was possible.  However, when the trial court overruled the SAM, who was the finder of fact on the allocation of [...]’s damages, and who based his rulings in part on an assessment of credibility, it essentially granted [...] a judgment n.o.v.  The well-known standard for granting such a judgment is as follows:  In the case of motions for involuntary dismissal, the test is, as set forth in R. 4:37-2(b) and equally applicable to motions for judgment, whether “the evidence, together with the legitimate inferences therefrom, could sustain a judgment in * * * favor” of the party opposing the motion, *i.e.*, if, accepting as true all the evidence which supports the position of the party defending against the motion and according him the benefit of all inferences which can reasonably and legitimately be deduced therefrom, reasonable minds could differ, the motion must be denied.
[brief] See, e.g., *In re BofI Holding, Inc. Sec. Litig.*, No. 15-CV-2324-GPC-KSC, 2021 WL 3700749, at *5 (S.D. Cal. July 27, 2021); *Schueneman v. Arena Pharm., Inc.*, No. 10CV1959-CAB (BLM), 2017 WL 3118738, at *6–7 (S.D. Cal. July 21, 2017); *Fort Worth Emps.’ Ret. Fund v. J.P. Morgan Chase & Co.*, No. 09 CIV. 3701 JPO JCF, 2013 WL 1896934, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. May 7, 2013); *Plumbers & Pipefitters Local Union No. 630 Pension-Annuity Tr. Fund v. Arbitron, Inc.*, 278 F.R.D. 335, 339–44 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).  In this case, the names of those CWs/FEs identified in the Complaints do not “reveal any more of the mental impressions, conclusions, opinions and legal theories of Plaintiffs’ attorneys than Plaintiffs’ attorneys have already chosen to reveal in the Complaint. ”  *Hubbard v. Bankatlantic Bancorp, Inc.*, No. 07-61542-CIV, 2009 WL 3856458, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 17, 2009).  Requiring Plaintiffs to identify the names of individuals whose statements they “found significant enough to include in their Complaint .... is the very essence of the discovery process. ”  *In re Amgen Inc. Sec. Litig.*, No. CV072536PSGPLAX, 2013 WL 12139088, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 2, 2013).  Because the names of those individuals identified in the Complaints as confidential witnesses are not entitled to any work-product protection, Plaintiff must fully respond to Interrogatory No. 6 by November 12, 2021.