ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] MACHANE’S APPLICATION FOR THE US FIRE POLICY  [...], on behalf of [...], contacted an insurance broker, [...] (“[...]”), to procure coverage for its 2019 Summer Camp operations, including non-owned/hired auto coverage.  (Ia076 at ¶ 10; Ia093 at 36:23-37:7; --- ¹ Intervenor’s Appendix includes a number of page numbers which repeat.  The subject exhibit appears at the second “Ia114” in Intervenor’s Appendix.  On June 28, 2019, in an email to [...], [...], an employee of [...], plainly explained the function of non-owned/hired auto coverage:  Non-Owned & Hired auto liability covers bodily injury and property damage caused by a vehicle you hire (including rented or borrowed vehicles) or caused by non-owned vehicles (vehicles owned by others, including vehicles owned by your employees).  (Ia076 at ¶ 11; Ia119).  On July 30, 2019, [...] submitted a multi-part application for insurance on behalf of [...] to [...], the national program administrator for [...]’s Sports and Entertainment Insurance Program.² (Ia076 at ¶ 12; Ia125; Ia130 at 8:8-14).  In its insurance application, [...] requested coverage for the 2019 Summer Camp, and specifically requested $1,000,000 in non-owned/hired auto coverage.³ (Ia076 at ¶ 13; Ia126).  The record reflects that by this point in time, [...] did not --- ²
[brief] Finally, Rule 3:11(d), provides:  If the record that is prepared is lacking in important details as to what occurred at the out-of-court identification procedure, and if it was feasible to obtain and preserve those details, the court may, in its sound discretion and consistent with appropriate case law, declare the identification inadmissible, redact portions of the identification testimony, and/or fashion an appropriate jury charge to be used in evaluating the reliability of the identification.  In October 2012, the Attorney General issued the model showup worksheet at issue here.
[brief] THE COURT BELOW ERRED BY WEIGHING THE PARTIES’ COMPETING USES AND NOT DEFERRING TO MIDDLETOWN’S PROPOSED USE.  [Da9-Da11; Da12-Da13]  The trial court’s effort to make new law that prioritizes Mount Laurel above other constitutional rights conflicts with Supreme Court precedent that precludes weighing of competing public purposes in condemnation.  The court below erred by weighing Plaintiff’s proposed use for the Property (market rate residential development with some affordable housing) against [...]’s proposed use (redevelopment for commercial purposes to complement the ongoing inclusionary residential development) and ruling that Plaintiff’s use should prevail.
[brief] In fact, Appellant and [...] made a complaint to the Superintendent of Human Resource, [...] on May 1, 2019 about [...] using the racial slur and video footage was sent to [...] also.  On May 9, 2019 Appellant and [...] were notified that their contracts would not be renewed for the next school year.  The failure to renew the contracts presented a material issue as to the causes of action for retaliation as well as discrimination based on race.
[brief] **Evidentiary Issues**  The ALJ also addressed [...]’ argument that much of the Department’s evidence was hearsay and inadmissible.  (Pa019a).  As the ALJ noted, hearsay is admissible in the OAL so long as it is supported by a residuum of supporting evidence.  *Ibid.*; N.J.A.C. 1:1-15.5(a).  As such, the ALJ found that the surveillance videos corroborated any potential hearsay statements regarding [...] failing to conduct his inmate counts.  (Pa019a).  The ALJ then determined that the logbook constituted a business record, which is an exception to hearsay.  N.J.R.E. 803(c)(6).  [...] also made the logbook entries, rendering them a party-opponent statement and not excluded by the hearsay rule.  N.J.R.E. 803(b)(1).  Last, the ALJ concluded that statements made by [...] during his SID interview are also not hearsay.
[brief] PLAINTIFF  IDENTIFIED CLEAR PUBLIC POLICY IN SUPPORT OF HER COMMON LAW  RETALIATION CLAIM (T35:3-45:6)  Plaintiff engaged in protected activity when she complained to Defendant that “requiring us to come into the office during a pandemic unnecessarily risks our health. ”  There are various sources of public policy—from broader mandates of health and safety in the workplace, to more pointed directives aimed at protecting the public and limiting the spread of Covid-19 which prompted Plaintiff’s request.  Despite this overwhelming support the trial court erroneously held there was no identifiable source upon public policy which formed the basis of Plaintiff’s common law retaliation claim.
[brief] ”  *Id.* at 173 (citations omitted).  In any event, no remand is necessary here because the Planning Board did make findings of fact, as described above.  -33-  Importantly, Plaintiffs fail to provide legal support for the relief they seek concerning the Planning Board’s consistency review conducted pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-7(e), which requires a planning board to act within 45 days and make a recommendation to the governing body concerning a redevelopment plan.  However, that statute does not provide any consequence or remedy as to a planning board’s failure to act.  To the contrary, the statute expressly permits the governing body to proceed in the absence of the planning board’s consistency review.  (“Failure of the planning board to transmit its report within the required 45 days shall relieve the governing body from the requirements of this subsection with regard to the pertinent proposed redevelopment plan or revision or amendment thereof. ”).  In light of the terms of the statute, it is difficult to fathom how a planning board recommendation based on insufficient findings of fact would justify invalidation of approval of a redevelopment plan if the Legislature did not intend to invalidate an approval of a redevelopment plan if no planning report is submitted at all.  Based on the statutory language, even if the Planning Board failed to properly satisfy its obligations under N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-7(e), that is of no consequence to the validity of the Amended Redevelopment Plan or [...].  The statute contemplates the governing body proceeding without a planning board’s report.  See Willoughby v. Wolfson Group, Inc., 332 N.J. Super. 223, 229-30 (App. Div. 2000) (evaluating N.J.S.A. 40:55D-26, and finding that “[t]o rule otherwise would permit a planning board, by declining to find inconsistency, to impose a *de facto* veto over any proposed zoning ordinance that was inconsistent with the master plan. ”).  Instead, the governing body must make its own consistency determination which remains subject to the “arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable” standard.  Here, the governing body found consistency, a determination supported by the testimony before the Planning Board, which the lower court correctly found to be reasonable.  Overall, the Planning Board’s conclusion that [...] was consistent with the Master Plan, was rational based upon appropriate findings of fact, and was properly upheld by the Law Division.  [...] noted that Plaintiffs failed “to provide any analysis or examination of the particular Master Plan objectives implicated by both the prior and newly amended versions of the Redevelopment Plan vis-à-vis the applicable legal standards as to the consistency and the concept of ‘substantial’ consistency. ”  Pa 126.  Accordingly, the Plaintiffs have failed to meet their burden to overcome the presumption of validity that the governing body’s or the Planning Board’s actions were invalid, and the Law Division’s Order must be affirmed.
[brief] “Our confrontation jurisprudence ‘traditionally has relied on federal case law to ensure that the two provisions provide equivalent protection. ’ ”  State v. Sims, 250 N.J. 189, 223, 271 A.3d 288 (2022).  The United States Supreme Court has held that “the framers of the Constitution intended the Confrontation Clause to bar the admission of ‘testimonial statements of a witness who did not appear at trial unless [the declarant is] unavailable to testify, and the defendant had … a prior opportunity for cross-examination. ’ ”  Ibid. (alteration in original) (quoting Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 53–54, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004)).  Importantly, “[t]he Confrontation Clause applies to ‘witnesses against the accused,’ or those who ‘bear testimony,’ which is a ‘solemn declaration or affirmation made for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact. ’  ”  State v. Carrion, 249 N.J. 253, 268, 265 A.3d 115 (2021) (citing Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51, 124 S.Ct. 1354).  A “central concern of the Confrontation Clause is to ensure the reliability of the evidence against a criminal defendant by subjecting it to rigorous testing in the context of an adversary proceeding before the trier of fact. ”  Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 845, 110 S.Ct. 3157, 111 L.Ed.2d 666 (1990).  The right to confront witnesses is “an essential attribute of the right to a fair trial” as it “secures for a defendant the ‘fair opportunity to defend against the State's accusations....’ ”  State v. Medina, 242 N.J. 397, 412, 231 A.3d 689 (2020) (first quoting State v. Branch, 182 N.J. 338, 348, 865 A.2d 673 (2005); and then quoting State v. Garron, 177 N.J. 147, 169, 827 A.2d 243 (2003)).
[brief] To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show: (1) counsel’s performance “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness,” Strickland v. Washington, 46 U.S. 668, 688 (1984), and if so, (2) there exists a “reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional error, the result of the proceeding would have been different. ”  Id. at 694; State v. Castagna, 187 N.J. 293, 313-14 (2006).  A defendant must fulfill both prongs in order to show that the conviction resulted from a “breakdown in the adversary process that renders the result unreliable” such that relief should be granted.  State v. Arthur, 184 N.J. 307, 318 (2005) (quoting State v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42, 52 (1987).  Under the first prong, defendant must show “that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed . . . by the Sixth Amendment. ”  State v. Nash, 212 N.J. 518, 540 (2013).  To do this, a defendant must “overcome a ‘strong presumption’ that counsel exercised ‘reasonable professional judgment’ and ‘sound trial strategy’ in fulfilling his responsibilities,” State v. Hess, 207 N.J. 123, 147 (2011) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689-90), and prove that counsel’s representation was unreasonable.  State v. Sloan, 226 N.J. Super. 605, 613 (App. Div. 1988); see also Fritz, 105 N.J. at 52.  A defendant cannot simply “make bald assertions that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel,” but must “allege facts sufficient to demonstrate counsel’s alleged substandard performance. ”  *State v. Cummings*, 321 N.J. Super. 154, 170 (1999).  In determining whether a *prima facie* claim has been established, the facts should be viewed in the light most favorable to the defendant.
[brief] Defense counsel objected via speaking objections to any mention of responsibility, even if it was only [...] describing his work experience.  I served in various capacities in the nursing home industry.  First of all, I was a physician taking care of patients there and that’s 50 years and up until 2018.  Then I was also a medical director, really one of the first in the United States, right after the law passed in 1974 and I served in that capacity for about I think 45 years or so.  So the medical director, according to the federal regulations, which also follow into state regulations because they’re required to follow federal if they want Medicare Medicaid money, so you have to – so the medical director is actually responsible for all the care in the nursing home.  [...]: Judge, I object.  It’s the captain of the ship doctrine.  It’s prohibited in this state.  I object.  6T101:20 to 102:12.  Although [...] had not testified about [...]’s medical director or any staff errors, another lengthy sidebar ensued, meandering again about the use of the word “responsibility” regardless of context, false allegations of reliance on specific federal and state regulations that had never been mentioned, criticism of the respiratory therapist that never happened, and eventually touches on CMS enforcement of regulations not being for the court or jury to decide, which, again, no one had ever asserted.
[brief] *Fuentes v. Perskie*, 32 F.3d 759, 762 (3d Cir. 1994).  Employers are free to make personnel decisions objectively or subjectively, even unpopular personnel decisions, so long as unlawful conduct is no factor in those decisions.  See *Maiorino v. Schering-Plough Corp.*, 302 N.J. Super. 323, 345-46 (App. Div. 1997).  Specifically:  To discredit the employer’s proffered reason, however, the plaintiff cannot simply show that the employer’s decision was wrong or mistaken, since **the factual dispute at issue is whether discriminatory animus motivated the employer, not whether the employer is wise, shrewd, prudent, or competent**.  Rather, the non-moving plaintiff must demonstrate such weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contradictions in the employer’s proffered legitimate reasons for its action that a reasonable factfinder *could* rationally find them unworthy of credence and hence infer that the employer did not act for the asserted non-discriminatory reasons.  [Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 762 (emphasis in original) (internal citation and quotation omitted). ]
[brief] 2  “Pa” refers to [...]’s appendix; “Pb” refers to her brief.  “Ra” refers to the Board’s appendix.  salary scale due to her education level and teaching experience but that she was only on the “R” salary scale.  (Pa51).  She further asserted that from September 1998 to the time of the complaint in 2019 she has been on the “R” salary scale.  (Pa51).  She also alleged that for the 2012-2013 school year through the 2016-2017 school year she received an annual salary increase of a little over four percent, but that her male counterpart teachers received an average total increase of 9.1 percent during that time.  (Pa51-Pa52).  The male teachers cited in her complaint had final salaries ranging from $112,265 to $116,411.  (Pa52-Pa53).  On March 8, 2021, [...] submitted a letter of resignation to the [...] with an effective resignation date of May 1, 2021.  (Pa47).  [...], the [...] (“[...]”), and the [...] entered into a Negotiated Settlement Agreement and General Release (the “Settlement Agreement”) to resolve the pending civil discrimination lawsuit on April 12, 2021.  (Pa30-Pa46).  The Settlement Agreement provided for a retroactive increase of [...]’s 2018-2019 salary from $103,682 to $135,765.33; a retroactive increase of [...]’s 2019-2020 salary from $105,359 to $137,442.33; and a retroactive increase of [...]’s 2020-2021 salary from $106,934 to $147,038.
[brief] The Respondent testified the Appellants attempted to force her to sign the initial false agreement shortly before she went out on disability.  She was in the office in April 2022, and was presented with the cobbled together agreement.  [1T P55-59]  She looked through the agreement and realized that the Appellant was attempting to get her to sign an agreement prior to terminating her employment, which might limit her rights.  She specifically refused to sign the initial cobbled together agreement provided to the Court.  [1T P55-59]
[brief] (329a-376a).  [...] asserted it was a bona fide purchaser for value, having acquired the property for $140,000.  (341a¶3, 345a-349a).  This was a mere $23,000 less than Defendants had paid for the property several years prior.  (102a-107a).  [...] provided photographs and video of the subject property corroborating that the property was in fact abandoned.  (342a¶¶5-10, 350a-376a).  [...]’s photos and video, both of the exterior and interior of the property, depicted a property that was quite literally falling apart.  (350a-376a).  Structural support columns on the porch were broken (356a, 369a), the porch itself had holes in the flooring and was littered with debris (365a), the roof was sagging in places and had open holes in other areas (362a, 363a, 366a), exterior walls were bulging (357a), siding had fallen off parts of the house, leaving the walls exposed (360a, 370a), windows were boarded up or broken (354a, 360a, 370a), trash was strewn about the yard and vegetation was not maintained (355a, 356a, 367a, 370a), and the interior was gutted down to the studs and the subflooring in certain areas (371a-375a).  [...] also provided OPRA documents received from the municipality showing that Defendants had not sought or obtained any construction or building permits for as long as they had owned the property and thus had not performed any repair or rehab as they claimed.  (331a¶¶3-4, 334a, 336a-340a).  The court held oral argument on March 17, 2023, and reserved.
[brief] Substantial evidence exists on the record to conclude that the Property satisfied N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-5(b) and (d), and consequently to justify a redevelopment area designation.  The Trial Court erred in concluding otherwise.  This decision was based on an erroneous interpretation and misapplication of N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-5 and should be reversed.  Property can be declared a redevelopment area, whether a Condemnation Redevelopment Area or a Non-Condemnation Redevelopment Area, if the area satisfies at least one of the criteria set forth in N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-5.  In this case, the Property satisfied both criterion (b) and criterion (d) because all legal use of the Property ceased by 2018 and all use of the Property ended January 31, 2023 when contamination on the Property required taking 20 boring samples underneath the building in order to determine the appropriate remediation activity to address the contamination.  Because of the contamination on the Property, the Property had not been used for any legal use since at least 2018 and could not be used for any legal use because of the ongoing remediation.  I.
[brief] Plaintiffs submit that: 1) *Burt* was wrongly decided; and 2) *Mejia v. Quest Diagnostics, Inc.*, 241 N.J. 360 (2020) was a *sub silentio* overruling of *Burt*.  As to the first point, it was not the trial court’s prerogative to abrogate *Burt* absent a subsequent appellate overruling of the case.
[brief] The Appellate Division decision confirmed that it was [...] who took the appeal.  In [...]’s Appellate Brief, filed by [...], it states:  Plaintiff and his brother [...] were never represented by the same attorney.  Although the September 14, 2018 letter from [...], former counsel for Plaintiff, refers to representing both brothers, the Verified Complaint filed in this matter was filed under Plaintiff’s name alone.  Further, any correspondence that was sent on behalf of the parties’ brother [...] was sent from a completely different law firm, the same law firm that eventually filed a motion to intervene on September 25, 2018.  Moreover, the law firm representing [...] never asserted to represent Plaintiff.  B.  The Legal Malpractice Action
[directive] Pretrial Automated by Informed Decisions Char~~ 4.2 Sources.  Information Flags. and Values Score Risk-Assessment 4.2.1 complaint- by charged be must that charges serious specified involving cases in Except non-indictable involving cases in or amended, recently as 3:3-1(e), Rule by required as warrant decision the 2.2.2, subsection see statute, by required not is fingerprinting which for offenses this under acomplaint-warrant for court apply a to to or acomplaint-summons issue to whether risk-assessment pretrial automated the by generated results the by informed will be Directive 2A:162- N.J.S.A. to pursuant Courts the of Director Administrative the by approved process initiated is process risk-assessment pretrial automated
[directive] of a.  The source the funds to be advanced is a Federal grant allowing the local unit to receive hnds in advance of disbursement and requiring that any interest eamed on said funds be returned to the Federal Government;  The governing body has determined, by resolution, that the advance is necessary in order to b. prevent undue hardship to said contractor in achieving the objectives of the Federal grant; c.  The amount of the advance to any given contractor does not exceed amount equal to the total an amount of the contract divided by the number of months in the term of the contract, and provided further that the total disbursements of the local unit to the contractor, including the amount of the advance outstanding, shall not, at any time, exceed the total cash receipts of the local unit under the Federal grant up to that time; and, - of d.  The resolutioa mthorizing the advance includes a schedule for the depletion the advance, in accordance with sound accounting practice, indicat:ig that the advance will be entirely depleted by the termination date of the contract.
[brief] Appellant further argues that the Lower Court held that the acts of Respondents are not covered under the NJCFA and attempts to distinguish *DepoLink Court Reporting & Litig. Support Servs. v. Rochman*, 430 N.J. Super. 325, 339 (App. Div. 2013) and *Chulsky v. Hudson Law Offices, P.C.*, 777 F. Supp. 2d 823 (D.N.J. Mar. 21, 2011).  First, *DepoLink* and *Chulsky* both address claims brought under the FDCPA.
[brief] Contrary to Petitioners’ claim, the Legislature did not violate OPMA when it took up the two bills on January 6 and January 10, 2022.  Under OPMA, a public body, including the Legislature, must provide adequate notice of its public meetings.  N.J.S.A. 10:4-9.  “Adequate notice” is defined as “written advance notice of at least 48 hours, giving the time, date, location and, to the extent known, the agenda of any regular, special or rescheduled meeting, which notice shall accurately state whether formal action may or may not be taken.  . . .”  N.J.S.A. 10:4-8(d).  The notice must be “prominently posted in at least one public place reserved for such or similar announcements,” delivered to at least two newspapers, and “filed with the Secretary of State if the public body has Statewide jurisdiction. ”  Ibid.  As an initial matter, legislative committees are not “public bodies” subject to OPMA, so the notice requirements do not apply to their proceedings.
[brief] 4:58-2 • Purpose of the Offer of Judgment Rule • R. 4:58-2  Sanctions are Mandatory and Must Be Assessed Against Defendant’s Insurer, [...] • Proposed Order • Post-Judgment Interest Calculation  Substitution of Attorney on behalf of Appellant  Notice of Docketing – Appellant’s Appeal  Respondent’s Case Information Statement, Appellate Division  Morgan v. Progressive Insurance Co., A-2964-15T2 (App. Div. Nov. 8, 2017)  ___________________  6  Brief(s) attached pursuant to R. 2:6-1(c)(2), as the issue of the Verdict amount and Offer of Judgment penalties has been brought into issue, although not raised below, by the instant appeal.  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND/OR RULINGS ON APPEAL  Order of Judgment - October 17, 2023 ..................................................