ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] On November 4, 2022, Detectives [...]\(^4\) and [...] met with defendant.  They confirmed which language defendant preferred, Spanish, and then conducted the interview in that language.  (Pa26).  Detective Foster advised defendant that he was charged with the homicide for the death of [...], possession of a weapon for an illegal purpose, and unlawful possession of a weapon, and she provided defendant with a copy of the Complaint-Warrant.  (Pa27).  After obtaining defendant’s credentials, Detective Foster told defendant “I am going to try to explain some things if there is something in Spanish that I tell you or that you do not understand me please tell me I do not understand you and I will try to find the way to explain it to you. ” (Pa27 to 28).  Detective Foster then explained that “before I am able to continue to speak with you or if you have a question or have a conversation I have to explain your rights ok. ”  (Pa28).  Detective Foster confirmed defendant could read and write and provided him with the Miranda Rights Form in Spanish.  (Pa29 to 30).  Defendant, who “did three years in engineering and business administration” in his home country was provided the form, but ultimately preferred to have Detective --- \(^4\)  At the time of the hearing, [...] was married and the trial court referenced her as Detective Foster.
[directive] Please note that, under this framework, officers may not fingerprint individuals under the age of 21 for their first, second, third, or subsequent offenses.  However, if an individual under 21 is in possession of more than 6 ounces of marijuana or 17 grams of hashish, that individual is also in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10(a)(3)(b), a fourth-degree crime, and may be issued a complaint- summons and fingerprinted at their first court appearance.
[brief] T1.89:23-91:14.  After public comment closed, the Township’s [...] also addressed the issue of the school Funding formula:  “I wanted to first address [Pennington] [...] and [...] from Hopewell Borough.  * * *  [R]ight now the school funding formula disadvantages Hopewell Township taxpayers.  We showed the slide that Hopewell Township taxpayers pay 30 percent more per pupil than borough taxpayers pay.  So we are as Township taxpayers essentially subsidizing students from the boroughs.  And that’s not fair and I, I don’t want to promise anything in particular, but until that at least begins to equalize and become more fair and improve[,] [m]y responsibility is to the Hopewell Township taxpayers first and foremost.  * * *  [W]e need to do something about the fact that the school funding formula right now is not fair to our taxpayers. ”  T1.118:22-120:7.  (emphasis supplied).  In [...]’s second report, on the merits, he estimates that the exemption will shift a $25,000,000 school tax burden to plaintiff Boroughs.
[brief] (Pa164-Pa178)  In order for [...] to have completed the incident report, [...] asked for [...]’s membership card credentials so that he could take a picture of it and include it in the report.  (Pa99)  In response to such a request, [...] furnished his [...] membership card.  (Pa99)  To [...]’s understanding, when [...] furnished his [...] membership card, [...] was representing [...] on the date of the incident.  (Pa102-Pa107)  [...] also believed that [...] was a hired shopper for [...].  (Pa107)  Although Plaintiff was struck on the right side of the back, Plaintiff testified that the middle and left side portion of her back were in pain immediately following the accident.
[brief] For example, it is undisputed in the Underlying Action that [...]’s status with [...] ended for reasons unrelated to [...].  This lends credibility to the argument that [...] has failed to plead a cause of action for tortious interference, and [...] was aware of this fact at the time it sought to disclaim coverage for the Underlying Action.  Moreover, [...] has maintained his position that his statements were true and accurate and necessary to protect patient safety and ensure compliance with the law, and [...] was aware of this fact at the time it sought to disclaim coverage for the Underlying Action.  Finally, [...] made [...] aware that he had never received a reservation of rights letter, but nevertheless, [...] maintained the Declaratory Action and moreover sought summary judgment on its complaint.  Such facts create an inference that [...] acted with “reckless . . . disregard to the proofs,” and, when viewed in a light most favorable to [...] as the non- moving party, this inference ought to have barred summary judgment on the bad faith claims.
[brief] Neither did the court include in the instruction the fact that [...] ultimately turned himself in.  (9T 148-16 to 18, 175-8 to 17; 24T 242-3 to 11)18  [...] admitted that he fired two shots but maintained that he committed no crime as he fired both shots in self-defense.  The jury was told that if it found that he fled to avoid prosecution, it could consider his flight as proof that he knew he was guilty of the charged offenses.  The failure to include in the flight charge [...]’s explanation that he fled because he was in fear for his life had the capacity to adversely affect the jury’s consideration of his claim of self-defense.  It was plain and reversible error for the court to omit from the instruction [...]’s explanation for his flight.  The error infringed his constitutional right to due process and a fair trial and mandates reversal of his convictions.
[brief] New Jersey has a compelling interest in prohibiting discrimination on the basis of gender identity and expression in public schools.  Any countervailing parental rights are “not without limits, and the State may ‘[a]ct[] to guard the general interest in [a] youth’s well being. ’”  *Doe ex rel. Doe v. Governor of N.J.*, 783 F.3d 150, 156 (3d Cir. 2015) (quoting *Prince*, 321 U.S. at 166) (alteration in original); see also *V.C. v. M.J.B.*, 163 N.J. 200, 218 (2000) (“The right of parents to the care and custody of their children is not absolute.
[brief] A: In upwards, I would say, of $800,000, $700,000.  Something like that.  Very close—it was a wash.  It could have been $900,000.  It was a wash.  I had to pay the assignee, the legal fees, the architectural fees, my partner, the extensions, all those fees.  It was a wash.  It was very minimal profit.  Maybe $100,000 or $200,000.
[brief] ##  NEW JERSEY SUPREME COURT OPINIONS | Citation | Page | |-------------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 411-12 (1998) | 15 | | C.R. v. M.T., 248 N.J. 428, 440 (2021) | 16 | | Fox v. Millman, 210 N.J. 401, 417–19 (2012) | 23 | | Gac v. Gac, 186 N.J. 535, 546–47 (2006) | 20, 28 | | Gnall v. Gnall, 222 N.J. 414, 428 (2015) | 15 | | In re Return of Weapons to J.W. D., 149 N.J. 108, 117 (1997) | 16 | | Lavin v. Bd. of Educ. of City of Hackensack, 90 N.J. 145 (1982) | 24 | | Newburgh v. Arrigo, 88 N.J. 529 (1982) | 18, 28, 29, 30 | | N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. F.M., 211 N.J. 420 (2012).  | 16 | | Nw. Covenant Med. Ctr. v. Fishman, 167 N.J. 123, 140 (2001) | 23 | | Packard-Bamberger & Co. v. Collier, 167 N.J. 427, 444 (2001) | 33 | | Quinn v. Quinn, 225 N.J. 34 (2016) | 18 | | Rendine v. Pantzer, 141 N.J. 292, 317 (1995) | 33 | | Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Invs. Ins. Co. of Am., 65 N.J. 474 (1974) | 16 | | Rowe v. Bell & Gossett Co., 239 N.J. 531, 552 (2019) | 15 | | State v. Chavies, 247 N.J. 245 (2021) | 14 | | State v. R.Y., 242 N.J. 48, 65 (2020) | 14 | | Thieme v. Aucoin-Thieme, 227 N.J. 269 (2016) | 15 | NEW JERSEY SUPERIOR COURT APPELLATE DIVISION PUBLISHED OPINIONS
[brief] It is respectfully submitted that this Court should affirm the decision of the trial court dismissing Plaintiffs’ Complaint in its entirety, with prejudice.  As the trial court observed, the Zoning Board’s Resolution contains all necessary findings of fact and conclusions of law and properly memorializes the Zoning Board’s decision.  The Zoning Board did not act arbitrarily, capriciously, or unreasonably and carefully followed the record evidence.  Furthermore, the Zoning Board properly considered and rejected Plaintiffs’ complaints as lacking credibility.  [...]
[brief] Hernandez v. Kalinowski, 146 F.3d 196 , 199 (3d Cir. 1998).  For that reason, "under [Section 1988], fees for preparing a motion requesting costs and fees, or 'fees on fees,' are recoverable."  Ibid.  (citations omitted); see also Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424 , 433 n. 7, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 1939 n. 7, 76 L.Ed.2d 40, 50 n. 7 (1983) (explaining that "Congress intended that 'the standards for awarding fees [under Section 1988] be generally the same as under the fee provisions of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.'" (quoting S.Rep. No. 94-1011, at 4 (1976), U.S. Code Cong. Admin.News 1976, p. 5912)).
[brief] Cf. Stelluti v. Casapenn Enters., LLC, 203 N.J. 286, 304-05 (2010) (“[T]o be enforceable an exculpatory agreement must reflect the unequivocal expression of the party giving up his or her legal rights that this decision was made voluntarily, intelligently and with the full knowledge of its legal consequences. ”) (internal quotation marks omitted).  ¶1.29 does not encompass claims that had yet to accrue after entry of final judgment on Feb. 20, 2015.  None of the claims accruing on Feb. 21, 2015 or any time thereafter could have been alleged by any member of the [...] class because by that point, their complaint had been dismissed with prejudice.  This is further made clear by ¶5.2, “Waiver of Unknown Released Claims”, which states that “each Class Member, upon the Effective Date [of final judgment, Feb. 20, 2015], shall be deemed to have, and by operation of the Final Settlement Order and Judgment shall have, fully, finally, and forever settled and released any and all Released Claims, . . . which then exist, or heretofore have existed upon any theory of law . . . .” (Pa0059).
[brief] Id. at 364.  The New Jersey Supreme Court found that Title 48 legislatively recognizes the public interest in the proper regulation of public utilities, which transcends municipal or county lines in order to ensure uniformly safe, proper and adequate service by utilities throughout the State:  [T]his State has delegated in most sweeping terms ‘general supervision and regulation of and jurisdiction and control over all public utilities’ and ‘their property, property rights, equipment, facilities and franchises’ to the Board.  N.J.S.A. 48:2-13.  More specifically, the Board is empowered to direct utilities to furnish safe, adequate and proper service,… and to that end it may fix just and reasonable standards and practices.  N.J.S.A. 48:2-25.  We find in these statutes, and throughout Title 48 of the Revised Statutes (1937), a legislative recognition that the public interest in proper regulation of public utilities transcends municipal or county lines, and that a centralized control must be entrusted to an agency whose continually developing expertise will assure uniformly safe, proper and adequate service by utilities throughout the State.  [Id. at 371 (emphasis added)].  The Court further emphasized that “[i]t is rather difficult to conceive of a subject which more requires uniform regulation at a high and broad level of authority than the method of transmission of electric power[.]”  Id. at 373.  Moreover, the Court determined that N.J.S.A. 48:7-1 and -2 – the sole potentially applicable statute granting limited consent power to municipalities – only require “municipal consent where an electric company desires to use Public streets for the construction of overhead or underground lines, obviously for service to local residents. ”  Id. at 372-73.  Thus, the Court determined that the N.J.S.A. 48:7-1 municipal consent requirement does not apply to high-capacity transmission power lines, which provide electricity to multiple jurisdictions and are not strictly limited to local residents.  Id.  The Court thus invalidated [...]’s ordinance.
[brief] (Da1550).  On April 7, 2023, only ten days later, plaintiffs retained their present counsel.  On April 7, 2023, April 25, 2023 and May 24, 2023, plaintiffs’ present counsel asserted in writing to the [...] and [...]’s counsel that the arbitration clause was invalid under Atalese and that the [...] did not have jurisdiction.  (Da137, 141, 145).  On June 12, 2023, the [...] notified the parties that it would proceed with the arbitration until such time as the Superior Court orders otherwise.  (Da150).  On June 27, 2023, Plaintiffs filed their Superior Court Complaint herein asserting, inter alia, that the disputed arbitration clause (Section 13 of the SPA) is unenforceable under Atalese and that the [...] arbitration should be enjoined.
[brief] Sound reasons support these constraints.  An unlimited duty to recall, as plaintiff sought here, would impose “significant burdens” on commerce:  Duties to recall products impose significant burdens on manufacturers.  Many product lines are periodically redesigned so that they become safer over time.  If every improvement in product safety were to trigger a common-law duty to recall, manufacturers would face incalculable costs every time they sought to make their product lines better and safer.  Restatement Third §11, comment a.  Further, decisions about whether the public as a whole should be deprived of access to otherwise legal products should not be the province of judges and juries in common-law tort litigation:
[brief] CASES  Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52 (1986)  ...........................................  13 Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America, 142 N.J. 540, 523 (1995)  ..............................................  13  Buyers Warranty v. Roblyn Dev. Corp., 2006 WL 2190742 (N.J. App. Div. 2006) ..........................  18  City of Millville v. Rock, 683 F. Supp. 2d. 319 (D.N.J. 2010) .........................17, 18, 21, 22 Ctr. 48 Ltd. P’ship v. May Dept. Stores Co. 355 N.J. Super. 390, 405 (App.Div. 2002)  ....................14, 21, 23, 24 Deutsch v. Budget Rent-A-Car, 213 N.J. Super. 385 (App.Div.1986)  .............................  26 HLP Associates, L.P. v. Carpet City, Inc., 2015 WL 1181271 (App.Div. 2015)  ...............................  21 Herz v. 141 Bloomfield Avenue Corp., No. A-2954-13T2, 2015 WL 2465027 at *2 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. June 1, 2015)  ...............  18 Housatonic Bank & Trust Co. v. Fleming, 234 N.J. Super. 79 (App.Div. 1989)  .............................  21 Fidelity Union Trust Co. v. Galm, 109 N.J.L. 111, 116, 160 A. 645 (E. & A. 1932) ...............  29 Judson v. Peoples Bank & Trust Co. of Westfield, 17 N.J. 67, 75 (1954)  ..................................................  13  Lawyers Guild Realty, Inc. v ICSD, L.L.C., No. A-4908-07T2, 2009 WL 3429755 at *4-6 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Oct. 6, 2009) ...........................................
[brief] A Middlesex County grand jury returned Indictment [...], charging defendant with Attempted Kidnapping, N.J.S.A. 2C:5-1/2C;13-1 (Count One); Possession of a Weapon for an Unlawful Purpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(e) (Count Two); and Witness Tampering, N.J.S.A. 2C:28-5(a) (Count Three).
[brief] Id citing \textit{Pascale v. Pascale}, 113 N.J. 20, 30, 549 A.2d 782 (1988).  Inter vivos transfers, unlike wills, do not require challengers to show suspicious circumstances to be set aside.  Id.  See also \textit{Bronson v. Bronson} 218 N.J. Super 394, 527 A.2d 943 (App. Div. 1987) (addressed the difference between a claim of undue influence in cases involving \textit{inter vivos} transfers and those involving wills).
[brief] (Pa354).  [...] also did not address [...]’ opinion that the “the locations of the handrails were too far from the walkway pathway[.]”(Pa354; Pa355).  At the summary judgment stage, counsel for [...] pointed out in his response to [...]’s statement of undisputed facts that [...] was of the opinion that the deterioration of the exterior concrete stairs allowed water infiltration below the surface in the concrete steps, which then would freeze above the treads under conditions such as the morning of January 5.
[brief] Jennings v. Reed, 381 N.J. Super. 217, 227 (App. Div. 2005) was a lawsuit over a driveway easement.  Quagliato v. Bodner, 115 N.J. Super. 133, 138 (App. Div. 1971) was an auto accident case. of his defence may be passed upon, under such terms and conditions as to the payment of costs and alimony as to the court may seem proper.  It has been said that the rule that a default will not be opened to permit a defence to be interposed which is not meritorious is not vigorously applied in divorce suits.  I think it is the universal practice to open a default in a divorce case, not only when a defence comes out in the evidence, but if, after the evidence is taken, the defendant desires to be heard.  In my judgment a defendant who comes forward and says he desires to defend a case for divorce should be given an opportunity to do so at any moment before the chancellor's signature is actually affixed to the final decree.  The only limitation I can think of would be an apparent lack of good faith on the part of the applicant, which would be the case if it clearly appeared he did not intend to answer even after obtaining the right to do so; his attempt being merely for delay prompted by ulterior motive.  Curry has been cited favorably for this principle ever since, Drobnjak v. Drobnjak, [...], 2019 WL 1779514, at *3 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Apr. 23, 2019) (citing Curry and noting “great liberality” of affording relief for default judgment “is especially so in family actions, because ‘a judgment by default is not favored in divorce suits’”); Mora v. Mora, [...], 2017 WL 1021956, at *3 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Mar. 16, 2017) (same); Speer v. Speer, [...], 2005 WL 3672012, at *3 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Jan. 18, 2006) (“‘courts will generally be solicitous in protecting the interests of the respective parties’ in divorce proceedings”).
[brief] The focus of the allegation is that [...] failed to properly advise Plaintiff of risks of terminating the construction contract with [...].  [...] terminated the contract at the Plaintiff’s insistence because Plaintiff wanted to end the project and move on with his life, and he ultimately did so with the purchase of another property for $10,000,000.  Plaintiff now seeks to reverse the Trial Court’s ruling that held that the Plaintiff’s purchase of another property, at many times the costs of the subject property, is not evidence of Plaintiff’s intent.  A jury should be able to consider whether the Plaintiff’s decision to terminate was based upon legitimate concerns about the project, or whether Plaintiff wanted to purchase another, better home at an exponentially higher price.  Also, the credibility of the Plaintiff is at issue in this suit.  The fact that [...] filed a medical billing fraud case against Defendant in 2012, during the course of the underlying litigation, is relevant because that fraud claim was pending at a time when important litigation decisions were being made in the dispute between Plaintiff and [...].  The Plaintiff’s argument regarding the untimeliness of the dismissal is also without merit.  The assignments, although dated 2017, and March 2022, were not produced to defendants until the December 2022, prior to the February trial.  It is the plaintiff that delayed.  Also, standing is an issue that can be raised at any time during litigation.  Plaintiff’s appeal also asks this Court to reverse The Honorable [...], J.S.C. and remand this matter to a different Trial Judge.  Plaintiff has made similar accusations against other Superior Court judges during the pendency of this matter.  None of which possessed any merit.
[brief] [R]eviews have found that expert witnesses have often overstated the probative value of their evidence, going far beyond what the relevant science can justify.  Examiners have sometimes testified, for example, that their conclusions are “100 percent certain;” or have “zero,” “essentially zero,” or “negligible,” error rate.  As many reviews—including the highly regarded 2009 National Research Council study—have noted, however, such statements are not scientifically defensible: all laboratory tests and feature-comparison analyses have non-zero error rates.
[brief] TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS BEING APPEALED  Page Decision and Order of the Honorable [...], granting Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss and Compel Arbitration, dated May 30, 2024 .................................................................Pa1 Rider to Order granting the Motion for Dismissal, dated May 30, 2024........Pa3  Decision and Order of the Honorable [...], denying Plaintiff’s Cross-Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings on Count III of the Complaint, dated May 30, 2024 ..............................................Pa15  ### TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | Cases: | Page(s) | |-----------------------------------------------------------------------|---------| | **Alltel Corp. v. Rosenow,** | 6 | | 2014 Ark. 375 (2014) | | | **Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc.,** | 7 | | 24 Cal. 4th 83, 6 P.3d 669 (2000) | | | **Arnold v. United Cos. Lending Corp.,** | 4 | | 511 S.E.2d 854 (W. Va. 1998) | | | **Atalese v. U.S. Legal Servs. Grp., L.P.,** | 6, 9 | | 219 N.J. 430 (2014), cert. den. 576 U.S. 1004 (2015) | | | **Berent v. CMH Homes, Inc.,** | 12, 13 | | 466 S.W.3d 740 (Tenn. 2015) | | | **Caplin Enterprises, Inc. v. Arrington,** | 7 | | 145 So. 3d 608 (Miss. 2014) | | | **Conseco Fin. Servicing Corp. v. Wilder,** | 12 | | 47 S.W.3d 335 (Ky. Ct. App. 2001) | | | **Delta Funding Corp. v. Harris,** | 3, 5, 12| | 189 N.J. 28 (2006) | | | **Fleischer v. James Drug Stores,** | 6 | | 1 N.J. 138 (1948) | | | **Hafer v. Vanderbilt Mortgage & Fin., Inc.,** | 11 | | 793 F. Supp. 2d 987 (S.D. Tex. 2011) | | | **Harris v. Green Tree Fin. Corp.,** | 11 | | 183 F.3d 173 (3d Cir. 1999) | | | **Herbert L. Farkas Co. v. N.Y. Fire Ins. Co.,** | 15 | | 5 N.J. 604 (1950) | | | **Kalman Floor Co. v. Joseph L. Muscarelle, Inc.,** | 4 | | 196 N.J. Super. 16 (App. Div. 1984), aff’d o.b., Kalman Floor Co. v. Jos. L. Muscarelle, Inc., 98 N.J. 266 (1985) | | | **Kernahan v. Home Warranty Administrator of Florida, Inc.,** | 6, 13 | | 236 N.J. 301 (2019) | | Martindale v. Sandvik, Inc., 173 N.J. 76 (2002)
[directive] Attorney General Executive Directive Concerning the Handling of Juvenile • • Matters by Police and Prosecutors (Updated October 1990)  **For additional Information see Directive 2005-4 added 12/07/05 -- Attorney General Guidelines for Stationhouse Adjustment of Juvenile Delinquency Offenses Procedures for Collecting Juvenile Fingerprints and Photographs (Updated • February 1998)  Juvenile Waiver Guidelines - 3/14/2000 • K-9 Training K-9 Training Standards and Qualification Requirements for New Jersey Law • Enforcement ***(Updated July 2002)
[brief] It is important to note that an agency’s interpretation of the statute it is responsible to implement and enforce and its own promulgated regulations is generally accorded deference by a reviewing court, see, e.g., In re Freshwater Wetlands Protection Act Rules, 180 N.J. 415, 431 (2004); In re Freshwater Wetlands General Permit Number 16, 379 N.J. Super. 331, 341 (App. Div. 2005).6  The decisions of administrative agencies are usually given special weight by courts in deciding challenges to agency action by members of the public.  Consequently, for this reason, the separation of powers principles set forth in Article III and the limitation on the delegation of legislative authority set forth in Article IV should be strictly enforced to invalidate the statute delegating legislative authority when the _____________________