ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] [...] contends that at the Geismar inspection, its team met with [...] and [...]’s counsel, [...], and an [...] representative, where [...] was provided the following computers and devices: (1) [...]’s iPhone, (2) [...]’s [...] Computer and (3) [...]’s external hard-drives.  See R. Doc. 103–1, p. 4.  However, upon inspection, [...] contends that its team was unable to collect usable images from [...]’s iPhone because it was corrupted.  Id. at p. 8.  [...] contends that it also notified the [...] representative and sent them the exact images that [...] collected from [...]’s iPhone.  Id. at 9, n. 5.  However, [...] contends that as of yet, neither [...], nor [...] has provided usable files for production to [...] for this device.  Id. at 9.  [...] contends that it also requested that [...] re-produce [...]’s iPhone for imaging, but that they have failed to allow the requested imaging.  Id.  As such, [...] seeks an Order from this Court compelling usable images of [...]’s iPhone.
[brief] The police could only be legally permitted to stop [...] because it was foreseeable that doing so would lead to evidence of the specific crime of narcotics distribution. \(^4\)  And, \(^3\) [...] does not concede that the police’s observations provided reasonable suspicion for the investigatory stop and relies on his initial brief in support of this argument.  Here, he argues in the alternative, that if the State’s view of the evidence is accepted, then that means that the circumstances giving rise to probable cause were not unforeseeable and spontaneous.  Instead, any probable cause that developed was the culmination of the police’s surveillance and investigation into what they believed to be narcotics activity involving [...]’s car.  \(^4\)  In its arguments, the State tries to have it both ways—emphasizing just how much reasonable suspicion the police had from the location and their observations in an attempt to support the legality of the stop, then suddenly disclaiming all of this supposedly compelling evidence to try to show that what happened was unforeseeable and spontaneous.
[brief] Nothing in this rule shall be construed as limiting the right of appeal provided for in R. 3:5-7(d) (Page 1-2 of Table of authorities).  The word SHALL in the Merriam –Webster’s Dictionary and Thesaurus, copyrighted 2014, it defines shall as: “MUST” or need, and likely in the future.  Without R. 3:9-3(f) in place that does protect and provide the right for [...] who prevailed on appeal, to withdraw his plea.
[brief] Sanctions for frivolous litigation are not imposed because a party is wrong about the law and loses his or her case.  The nature of conduct warranting sanction under Rule 1:4-8 and under the statute has been strictly construed.  The term frivolous should not be employed broadly or it could limit access to the court system.  First Atl. Fed. Credit Union v. Perez, 391 N.J.Super. 419, 432–33, 918 A .2d 666 (2007).
[brief] Coffman v. Keene Corp., 133 N.J. 581 (1993); Theer v. Philip Carey Co., 133 N.J. 610 (1993).  There was testimony presented that [...] was a cautious person generally and particularly as a driver.  There also was expert opinion presented that a proper design would have had the safety systems default “on,” as opposed to [...]’s faulty design.  Defendant’s evidence justifying its refusal to incorporate the safer alternative design is an argument for the jury to weigh.  On motion for summary judgment, the burden is on [...] as the movant to negate any issue why [...] would not have had the warning devices on and why she would not have responded to warning signals provided by the systems.
[brief] FAC ¶ 27, Pa_____.  Apart from those assets purchased outright, plaintiffs entered into a land/lease and paid $200,000 rent and $100,000 security deposit to [...].  On or about September 21, 2015, plaintiff [...] tendered a total of $1,006,000.00 for [...]’s purchase of the Solar Rights ($706,000.00) and [...]’s security deposit ($100,000.00) and the annual rent from September 1, 2015, to August 30, 2016 ($200,000.00).
[brief] A.  Governing New Jersey and Federal FCA  Precedents Require Prospective Application.  (Ja1–3; 4T)  .................................................................  10  1.  The Legislature Explicitly and Implicitly Expressed Its Intent to Apply the Amendment Prospectively.  (Ja1–3; 4T) ................... 12  2.  The 2023 Amendment Cannot Be Considered “Curative. ”  (Ja1–3; 4T) ................................................................................................. 16  3.  The Expectations of the Parties Favor Prospective Application.  (Ja1–3; 4T) .................................................................  19  B.  The Trial Court’s Reasoning Did Not Support Its Ruling.  (Ja1–3; 4T) .........................................................................................  20  III.  THE TRIAL COURT’S ALTERNATIVE RULING ON THE MERITS OF THE PUBLIC DISCLOSURE BAR IS CONTRARY TO WELL-ESTABLISHED FCA PRECEDENT.
[brief] Appellant independently obtained the June 29, 2023 certification from the mother’s physician (Pa3), notwithstanding that he already had the January 19, 2021 physician certification (Pa4), which attested to the same.  He did this upon the intent to make his cause of action de novo and independent, but he relied on the Application filed by the Mother, because it plainly painted the factual picture, upon which his first Cause of Action in seeking a reserved handicapped parking space was based.  Further, in submitting the said new physician certification to the respondents he independently requested from them to place a reserved handicapped parking at his street front (Pa41-Pa51).  And, the respondents ignored his *de novo* request just like they ignored the Application by the Mother about four years before (Pa6-Pa15).  As such, the appellant cause of action against the respondents for a reserved handicapped parking space was *de novo*, materially, his said CoA was NOT based on the Application filed by the Mother with the respondents.  Yet, in disposing of the appellant’s case the trial court stated the following, holding the view that the Application filed by the Mother in 2019 was the cause of his action, statute of limitations for which was exhausted (1T23, 15-25):
[brief] *State v. L.D.*, 444 N.J. Super. 45, 56 n.7, (App. Div. 2016), *N.J. Dep't of Env'tl. Prot. v. Alloway Twp.*, 438 N.J. Super. 501, 506 n.2 (App. Div. 2015).  Defendant offered no evidence at all at trial, other than examining the parties.  2T2.  Nonetheless, he now tries to proceed without any evidence on a newly raised claim that had Plaintiff’s counsel done his “due diligence,” he would have learned of the eminent domain proceeding.  Thus, Defendant’s brief argues, “…[Defendant] should not be penalized … since all relevant information pertaining to [...] was available to [...] at the time the Property Settlement Agreement was drafted by him, presented for signature to both parties on April 10, 2009 and incorporated into the Final Judgment of Divorce…”  Db16-17.  Defendant continues a few pages later, “Let’s not forget [...] drafted the PSA…” (Db22), and “[e]specially in light of the fact that [...] should have taken into account the intricacies involved in an Eminent Domain action and he should have known that [...] had permanently closed six to seven months prior to the execution of the PSA. ” (Db30).  It bears mention at this point that the lower court specifically addressed the doctrine of contra proferentem, “which provides that when a contract is ambiguous, it is construed against the drafter,” and found that the doctrine does not apply here, --- 4  It is unclear what significance Defendant attaches to the closure of [...] in November, 2008, a fact which appears several times in his brief.  Surely Defendant is not suggesting that selling the Diner would have been impossible once it closed, or that its closure somehow should have signaled the eminent domain proceedings to Plaintiff.  There is no support for either conclusion in the record.  Nor does it mean that [...] had no value.  Indeed, the “just compensation” award and inverse condemnation claim were based on losses incurred after [...] was closed. because there is no evidence of unequal bargaining power between the parties.  3T23, citing Pacifico v. Pacifico, 190 N.J. 258, 267-68 (2007).  There is no evidence as to what a due diligence search would have uncovered in the first quarter of 2009.  Defendant’s claims in this regard are groundless and speculative.
[brief] STATEMENT OF FACTS  Plaintiff extended a commercial line of credit to [...], which Defendant personally guaranteed (Pa29).  The commercial line of credit was payable upon demand (Pa31).  On February 21, 2014, Plaintiff notified [...] and Defendant of events of default resulting in Plaintiff restricting the commercial line of credit which, at that time, had a balance of $99,746.80 (Pa29).  On March 7, 2014, Plaintiff sent [...] and [...] notice of default and demanded repayment over forty-eight (48) months according to the terms specified in the notice and demand (Pa31).  On April 4, 2014, Simple and [...] responded by requesting an extension of time on the demanded repayment (Pa33).  On September 2, 2014, Plaintiff sent notice of default and demand for the entire, accelerated balance to be repaid immediately and in full (Pa35).  The balance at that time was $100,447.20 (Pa35).  On September 4, 2014, Defendant responded by demanding Plaintiff explain why it was taking the actions outlined in the September 2, 2014 notice and demand (Pa40).  STANDARD OF REVIEW  On appeal from the Law Division's decision, the appellate court's review "focuses on whether there is 'sufficient credible evidence . . . in the record' to support the trial court's findings."  State v. Robertson, 228 N.J. 138, 148 (2017) (quoting State v. Johnson, 42 N.J. 146, 162 (1964)).  "[A]ppellate courts ordinarily should not undertake to alter concurrent findings of facts and credibility determinations made by two lower courts absent a very obvious and exceptional showing of error."  Robertson, supra, 228 N.J. at 148 (quoting State v. Locurto, 157 N.J. 463, 474 (1999)).  However, the trial court's legal rulings are considered de novo.  Robertson, supra, 228 N.J. at 148 (2017).  See Locurto, supra, 157 N.J. at 470 (1999) (appellate review of a de novo conviction in the Law Division following a municipal court appeal is "exceedingly narrow.").  LEGAL DISCUSSION
[brief] See McGill, 393 P.3d at 89; and, - “Consider the relief sought here.  Among other things, [...] seeks to enjoin [...] from ‘[f]alsely advertising to the general public within the State of California that the [credit-builder] Loan contains 'no hidden fees.'”…But what good will that do her in the future?  She already knows that these claims are (allegedly) untrue.  That's why she sued.  [...] seeks the injunction to aid those who do not already know what she has learned…That is public injunctive relief. ”  See [...], 988 F.3d at 1152  Here, [...] specifically excluded “public injunctive relief” from its definition of a “Dispute” (Section 7.4)(Ja37) in the New Jersey health club contract provided to Plaintiff and the putative class.
[directive] (a)  If administrative charges have been brought against an officer and a hearing will be held, a copy of all discoverable materials shall be provided to the officer and the hearing officer before the hearing; (b)  If the subject officer, agency or governing jurisdiction has been named as a defendant in a lawsuit arising out of the specific incident covered by an internal investigation, a copy of the internal investigative reports may be released to the attorney representing the subject officer, agency or jurisdiction; (c)  Upon the request or at the direction of the County Prosecutor or Attorney General; or (d)  Upon a court order.
[brief] In fact, he admitted it proudly.  Defendant [...] admitted that he received numerous complaints, and that he did not respond to them, he simply directed them back to the supervisors and human resources.  See 4T 92:3-13.  He claimed it was not his responsibility to follow up with complaints, even those addressed to discrimination issues.  See id. at 93:18-23.  Rather, he would simply send issues on occasion to a “labor counsel”, or otherwise back to the supervisor who brought the issue to him.  See id. at 93:18-23.  In the end, [...] admitted to being aware of the complaints regarding [...]’s conduct (though he disputed what he thought the nature of those complaints were), and the limit of his involvement was to simply tell [...] to “make it better” and take no other concrete steps.  See id. at 104:1-8.  When all this conduct is considered in conjunction with the extensive evidence that Plaintiff suffered discrimination based on disability (see Argument Point IV.A.ii, supra) and the essentially uncontested charges of retaliation (See Argument Point IV.A.iii, supra), the Defendants’ contention that there is no evidence of egregious conduct warranting punitive damages falls apart.
[brief] (Db20).  The Probate Court missed that point when it stated that Paragraph 24(G) “does not even mention the Palm Beach Property. ” (Da274-75).  [...] attempts to side-step this interpretation by pointing to the last sentence of Paragraph 24(F), prefaced with “[f]or the avoidance of doubt . . .” (Pb2, 22-23).  But that sentence is likewise focused only on [...]’s rights flowing from [...]’s Estate.  In particular, it refers to [...]’s rights “provided to her by Section 3.3(A)(4)(d)” of [...]’s Revocable Trust.  (Da96).  The most reasonable interpretation of that sentence is that—like the rest of Paragraph 24(F)—it is specifically and only referring to [...]’s interest flowing from [...]’s Estate.  The fact that the sentence was inserted only “[f]or the avoidance of doubt” further confirms that it is not intended to fundamentally change the meaning of Paragraph 24(F).  See In re Activision Blizzard, Inc. S’holder Litig., 124 A.3d 1025, 1059 (Del. Ch. 2015).
[directive] Opioid Prevention and Response Bureau.  1.  There is established an Opioid Prevention and Response Bureau (OPRB).  The focus of OPRB shall be the development of community-led strategies and partnerships that combat addiction, the conditions associated with addiction, and the deleterious consequences flowing therefrom.  OPRB shall oversee addiction-fighting efforts across the Department, creating partnerships with law enforcement agencies, stakeholder groups, and other entities similarly committed to identifying and implementing solutions to the opioid crisis and drug addiction.  A primary objective of the Bureau shall be addressing the effects of opioid substance use disorder prior to any interaction with law enforcement or the criminal justice system.  OPRB shall be the lead entity in DLPS with respect to recovery and treatment services for substance use disorders, which shall include services for co-occurring substance use disorder and mental health conditions.  OPRB shall also be the lead entity and point of contact in DLPS for grant and funding opportunities related to opioid prevention and response.  It shall also be the point of contact in DLPS for discussions involving the use of settlement funds related to State’s various opioid litigation matters.  The Department’s New Jersey Coordinator of Addiction Responses and Enforcement Strategies (NJ CARES) office shall continue under the supervision of the OPRB Bureau Chief.  The Director of OACR shall assign programs operated under NJ CARES to the appropriate bureau within OACR.  Resiliency Bureau.
[brief] 4  Defendants attempt to conflate [...]’s comment on “free rein” with Plaintiff’s actions during voir dire to create the impression that Plaintiff was a Tasmanian devil in the courtroom.  However, as the Court can readily see in the record, [...] only referenced Plaintiff’s use of the TV monitor, and never mentioned voir dire.  Moreover, [...]’s statement was not an admonishment of Plaintiff, but a simple request that, when heeded, never came up again at trial (and was especially never brought up by Defense counsel).  Regardless of their true intentions here, Defendants must be barred from even challenging voir dire due to their failure to object.
[brief] See Lebel, 115 N.J. at 324–27 (1989) (every constitutional requirement for specific, personal jurisdiction met where defendant “telephoned the buyer in New Jersey to iron out the details of the contract, mailed the contract to the buyer in New Jersey for signing in New Jersey, and received payment from the plaintiff, who defendant knew was a New Jersey resident”; fact defendant knew plaintiff was New Jersey resident “enhance[d] defendant’s contacts with the forum”).  See also [...] v. [...], 269 F.Supp.2d 547, 559 (D.N.J. 2003) (“[T]he Court is satisfied that [...] has made out a prima facie case in favor of asserting general jurisdiction over the [...].
[brief] The judge also ignored the affiant’s statement that The affiant’s (Pca4-7), and the affiant stated that (Pca10-14).  According to the Supreme Court’s guidance, a judge reviewing a warrant application should give fair consideration to such statements.  See Kasabucki, 52 N.J. at 117 (“[T]he judge should take into account the specialized experience and work-a-day knowledge of policemen. ”).  [...] failed to do so here.  Additionally, when discussing defendant’s drug-related criminal history, which [...] characterized as “the past,” the judge focused on defendant’s numerous convictions between 1996 and 2002, making no mention of (1T23-8 to 19; Pca9-10).  Notably, therefore certainly worthy of consideration.  In sum, [...] properly reviewed the information contained within the four corners of the affidavit and determined that it established probable cause for the issuance of the three search warrants, that is, “a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.
[brief] 3d 225 (4th Cir. 2019) | | | **Billig v. Buckingham Towers Condominium Association I, Inc.,** | 10 | | 287 N.J.Super. 551, 671 A.2d 623 (App.Div.1996) | | | **Burnett v. Pagliacci Pizza, Inc.,** | 18, 22 | | 196 Wash.2d 38, 470 P.3d 486 (2020) | | | **Caplin Enters., Inc. v. Arrington,** | 25 | | 145 So.3d 608 (Miss. 2014) | | | **Conseco Fin. Servicing Corp. v. Wilder,** | 27 | | 47 S.W.3d 335 (Ky.Ct.App.2001) | | | **Cordova v. World Fin. Corp. of N.M.,** | 24 | | 208 P.3d 901 (N.M. 2009) | | | **Dan Ryan Builders, Inc. v. Nelson,** | 12, 23, 24 | | 230 W.Va. 281 (2012) | | | **Delta Funding Corp. v. Harris,** | passim | | 189 N.J. 28 (2006)  | | | **Discover Bank v. Superior Court,** | 15 | | 36 Cal.4th 148, 30 Cal.Rptr.3d 76, 113 P.3d 1100 (2005)  | | Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 116 S.Ct. 1652, 134 L.Ed.2d 902 (1996)  ...........................................  15 Global Client Solutions, L.L.C. v. Ossello, 367 P.3d 361 (Mont. 2016)  ..................................................................................  25 Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444, 123 S.Ct. 2402, 156 L.Ed.2d 414 (2003)  ...........................................  15 Highland Lakes Country Club & Cmty. Ass’n v. Franzino, 186 N.J. 99, 892 A.2d 646 (2006)  ............................................................................  26 Hill v. Garda CL Nw., Inc., 179 Wash.2d 47, 308 P.3d 635 (2013)  ..................................................................... 17 In re: Auto. Parts Antitrust Litig., 951 F.3d 377 (6th Cir. 2020) .................................................................................. 15 Lackey v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 330 S.C. 388, 498 S.E.2d 898 (S.C.Ct.App.1998) .................................................... 27 Lloyd’s Syndicate 457 v. FloaTEC, L.L.C., 921 F.3d 508 (5th Cir. 2019) .................................................................................. 15 McKee v. AT&T Corp., 164 Wash.2d 372, 191 P.3d 845 (2008) .................................................................. 17 Muhammad v. County Bank of Rehoboth Beach, Delaware, 189 N.J. 1 (2006) ...................................................................................................... 15, 21, 22 MZM Constr. Co., Inc. v. New Jersey Building Laborers Statewide Benefit Funds, 974 F.3d 386 (3d Cir. 2020) .................................................................................... 14-15 Nebraska Mach. Co. v. Cargotec Sols., LLC, 762 F.3d 737 (8th Cir. 2014) .................................................................................. 15 Nelson v. McGoldrick, 127 Wash.2d 124, 896 P.2d 1258 (1995) ................................................................
[brief] Given Appellant’s burden to prove that [...] and/or [...] were at fault, Appellant’s expert witness, [...], testified that [...] deviated from the standard of care by misreading [...]’s CT scan.  (18T148:3-9).  Appellant’s expert witness, [...], testified that [...] deviated from the standard of care in his hospital treatment of [...].  (14T41:22-14T42:18).  Conversely, Plaintiff/Respondent’s expert witness, [...], testified that his reading of the CT scan was consistent with [...]’s, and that [...]’s care for [...] was what would have been expected from a hospitalist such as [...] without specific guidance from a general surgeon.  (7T44:2-18; 8T73:22-25; 8T74:1-2).
[brief] The problem in that case was that the Board’s findings did not contain factual data to determine whether its conclusion was supported.  That is not the case here.  In this case, the Department specifically relied on the factual data, the actuarial assumptions, and all information that [...] submitted via SERFF to support its extreme premium rate increase request.  Unlike the facts before the Court in *N.J. Bell*.  The Department’s conclusions were adequately supported by the record.  Also distinguishable is *In re Issuance of a Permit by Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. to Ciba-Geigy Corp.*, 120 N.J. 164 (1990), relied on by [...]. (Ab18).
[directive] Today, I Page 3 Fourth, we undertook a sweeping examination of best practices and ideas regarding use of force from around the country, analyzing numerous use of force policies from other jurisdictions, academic research, media investigations, reports by government agencies involved in policing reform, and other policy documents produced by experts in the field.  The Use of Force Policy is the result of this careful and comprehensive process—quite possibly the only such statewide effort of its kind.  It reflects the collective commitment of New Jersey law enforcement to be guided by the evidence and a recognition that policies to improve professionalism in policing further public safety, rather than undermine it.
[brief] Public Defender Attorney for Defendant-Appellant  BY: ___/s/ [...]_____________  PETER T. BLUM  Assistant Deputy Public Defender  Dated: March 8, 2024  April 23, 2024  [...] Attorney No. 396222022  Deputy Attorney General [...]  Of Counsel and on the Letter Brief  LETTER IN LIEU OF BRIEF AND APPENDIX ON BEHALF OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY
[directive] E.  Additional contingent measures.  The Program should provide that additional contingent measures will be taken if the Program goals are not met under the methods of evaluation implemented pursuant to Section I.D. F.  Public posting.  The Program, including a description of the data used to determine the existence of any underrepresentation, shall be posted on the official Internet website of each law enforcement agency not later than June 7, 2022, which is six months from the issuance of these Guidelines.
[brief] The fourth element requires Plaintiff to have given Defendant reasonable notice of Plaintiff’s claim.  While Defendants had notice of the claim in general, the purpose of the discovery rules concerning experts is to ensure that the entirety of the expert’s opinion is disclosed, including the basis for the expert’s beliefs regarding what the standard of care requires, how the Defendant supposedly violated it, and all of the other “whys and wherefores” necessary for an opinion to not be a net opinion.  *Townsend v. Pierre*, 221 N.J. 36, 54 (2015).  However, because Plaintiff failed to provide an expert report, there was no reasonable notice of those necessary matters.