ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] That is the precise result the TOA Rule seeks to avoid.  The potential that the [...] may change the law to frustrate the application is not just theoretical – it is exactly what happened in this case.  [...] began the process of preparing the CRB application in September 2021.  (Da439.)  [...] expended a tremendous amount of time, money and effort to secure all the necessary requirements to obtain CRB approval including, without limitation, locating the Property after an exhaustive and expansive search, securing the Property including negotiating and signing a 35-page lease agreement, securing a cannabis business bank account, establishing accounts with utility providers, soliciting and obtaining proposals from security vendors, creating and conforming their plans for the business’ operations and security procedures within this specific Property, providing security deposits, payments for brokers fees, rent payments, procuring the necessary insurance, and creating an environmental impact plan and community impact plan specific to the Property.
[directive] All presumptive positive specimens will undergo a second and more specific type of testing.  2.  The second type of testing will employ mass spectrometry detection for the definitive identification and quantitation of drugs and/or metabolites presumptively identified by the initial screen.  D.  When a specimen tests positive at both the initial stage and the second stage, a medical review officer assigned to the Laboratory will review the test results together with the medication information form submitted for the specimen.  The medical review officer will seek to determine whether any of the substances listed on the form would explain the positive test result.  The medical review officer may direct the agency that collected the sample to obtain further information from the individual being tested concerning the medications listed on the medical information form.  The medical review officer will then issue a report indicating whether or not the sample tested positive due to a listed medication on the medication information form.  E.
[directive] Whenever an adult defendant is eligible for an enhanced term pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-8, the prosecutor shall file an application for such enhanced term and shall provide the defendant with written notice pursuant to R. 3:21-4e unless the prosecutor is unable to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant or another with whom the defendant was acting as an accomplice within the meaning of N.J.S.A. 2C:2-6 distributed a controlled dangerous substance to a minor or pregnant female.  When the defendant is alleged to be an accomplice, this Special Application and Enhancement Feature shall not apply unless the prosecutor has a reasonable basis to believe that the defendant knew or had reason to know that his or her partner would distribute a controlled dangerous substance to a minor or pregnant female, or that the defendant had the purpose to promote or facilitate such distribution to a minor or pregnant female.  Nothing in this Section shall preclude a Downward Departure for Trial Proof Issues in accordance with Section 12 or a Downward Departure for Substantial Cooperation in accordance with Section 13.
[directive] 5.  Was the working environment acceptable (e.g., condition of interview room, exam room, restroom, etc.)?    Yes No  ____________________________________________________________________________________________ ____________________________________________________________________________________________    6.  Was the level of privacy afforded to the victim acceptable?  Yes No  ____________________________________________________________________________________________ ____________________________________________________________________________________________  7.  Was the level of collaboration with the other activated Team Members acceptable?      Law Enforcement: N/A Yes No  ____________________________________________________________________________________________ ____________________________________________________________________________________________     Forensic Nursing: N/A Yes No  ____________________________________________________________________________________________ ____________________________________________________________________________________________     Advocacy: N/A Yes No ____________________________________________________________________________________________ ____________________________________________________________________________________________  8 .  Did the victim articulate any concerns or issues with the SART activation (e.g., conditions of site,   members, response time, etc.)?  Yes  No  ____________________________________________________________________________________________  ____________________________________________________________________________________________  9.  Additional comments and feedback about the SART activation:  ____________________________________________________________________________________________  ____________________________________________________________________________________________  *Please return this survey to your County SART Coordinator within 72 hours*
[brief] (1T 10-11 to 10-12)  When asked what if anything the NGU detectives observed that night, [...] responded: “So during that operation they observed four males that were on the northern side of the street on Leonard Street[,] . . . closer to Federal Street. ”  The men, who were later identified as [...], [...], [...] and [...], were wearing “heavy dark clothing” and “ski masks. ”  (1T 10-14 to 10-22; 1T 11-18; 1T 15-21 to 15-22)  [...] testified that the fact the men were “wearing heavy dark clothing in the reported area” contributed to his suspicion that the men were involved in criminal activity.
[brief] [...] testified that, because he knew [...] from a previous arrest, the drone operators did “not necessarily” provide a description and he did not recall receiving one.  (2T 18-6 to 19-10)  But at other times, [...] testified that he was Within seconds of the stop, [...] and [...] began to run while [...] remained still.  (1T 30-23 to 25; Da 9 at 0:43 to 0:54)
[brief] Maggio v. Pruzansky, supra at 569.  The litigation resulted in a bench trial with a finding for the [...] with respect to the strip of land that had been used for years by the [...] which was on the [...] property.  Id. at 569.  The [...] had purchased their property on [...] in [...] in 1972.  Id. at 569.  The [...] purchased their home on [...] in 1983.  Id. at 569.  The relief sought by the [...] was a claim of title by deed and also via adverse possession.  Id. at 570.  The [...] had installed a pool which encroached upon the strip of land belonging to the [...].  Id. at 571.  The [...] filed a counterclaim claiming that they were entitled to the strip of land and alleged that the [...] was trespassing on their property.  Id. at 571.  The court awarded adverse possession to the [...] for the strip of land.  Id. at 570.  The court engaged in tacking and the period of residence at the Maggio property by their predecessors, the [...] was tacked onto their time on the property and the court calculated the use of the strip to be greater than 20 years.  Id. at 574.  The Appellate Court reversed finding that when the [...] had a pool erected that they wrongfully placed a chain link fence on the strip of land that belonged to the [...] and the [...] acted quickly and objected to the fence on their property.  *Id.* at 582.  The Appellate Court reversed the decision of the trial court and returned the matter to the trial court to enter judgment for the [...] on their counterclaim ruling that they were entitled to the strip of land.  *Id.* at 582.  The prior ruling for the [...] was vacated.  *Id.* at 582.  In *PPG Indus. v. J. Goldenberg*, the Court was called upon to make a determination regarding adverse possession involving lots in Jersey City.
[brief] Super. Unpub. LEXIS 640 (Law Div. April 26, 2023).  (Pa92).  In denying the defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s FDCPA claims, [...] addressed the licensure requirements of the NJCFLA:  The question of whether the Plaintiff has stated a viable claim for relief turns ultimately upon whether [...] and the other assignees of the Plaintiff’s credit card account and debt were functioning as a “consumer lender” and/or “sales finance company” under the NJFCLA at the time they accepted assignment of such account and debt and/or sought to enforce and collect the same and were thereby required to secure a license.  If they were so obligated, the Plaintiff has stated a viable claim for relief under the FDCPA as against [...], inasmuch as one could reasonably conclude in such circumstances that the letter [...] sent to the debtor was misleading and/or unconscionable because it did not report that the serial creditors were unlicensed at the time they accepted assignment of the debt and/or initiated legal proceedings against the debtor in the Bergen County Action and that the debt was void.  The fact that [...] had obtained a license by the time [...] undertook the representation and sent a letter is not, at least at the pleading stage, a basis for dismissing the action.  The statutory scheme arguably provides that contracts entered (or acquired) by a “consumer lender” when such lender did not have a license are void.  Thus, presuming a license was required and not obtained at the time of the first assignment of the debt, one could conclude that [...]’s account and resulting debt were rendered void.  There is no provision in the statute that explicitly permits a cure after the fact and no case law cited on this record affording a licensee the right to revive a void contract or debt by securing the license.  This analysis leaves the question of whether [...] and/or its predecessor assignees of [...]'s account and debt were “consumer lender[s]” and/or “sales finance company[ies]” pursuant to the relevant statute.  The Court concludes that the statutory definition of "consumer lender" encompasses a debt buyer in the position of [...] and its predecessors.
[brief] [...] asks this Court to depart from Rock Work, Manger, and other cases to remove the Arbitrator’s settled authority over procedural matters to substitute its own judgment instead as to how many delays to tolerate from uncooperative parties.  Requiring an arbitrator to give a recalcitrant litigant countless opportunities would cause litigants to significantly disfavor arbitration, contrary to public policy.  [...]’s disagreement with the Arbitrator’s reasoning does not mean that the Arbitrator “did not give any real reason” for denying Appellant’s untimely third adjournment request.  Appellant provides no compelling authority for his position.  The trial court’s confirmation of that decision must be affirmed.
[brief] Cf. Tec Elec., Inc. v. Franklin Lakes Bd. of Educ., 284 N.J. Super. 480, 486 (Law. Div. 1995) (finding the failure to submit a necessary qualification document not material where “[t]he information provided on the Prequalification Affidavit simply and essentially duplicates what Tec had already submitted with its bid. ”) (emphasis added); Palamar, 196 N.J. Super. at 256-57 (permitting waiver where missing qualification statement was omitted due to clerical error and provided one and one-half hours after bid opening).  Finally, the [...] (Aberdeen) court’s discussion about [...]’s bid appears to be superfluous dicta, as the challenging bidder, [...], submitted the lowest bid but was rejected for an entirely unrelated material defect.  *Id.* at *2, *6 (Da455; Da460).  While the court passingly rejected any standing issue related to the timing of [...]’s challenge, *Id.* at *7 (Da461-62), a bidder with a materially defective bid has no standing to challenge the treatment of another bidder.  See *Waszen v. Atl. City*, 1 N.J. 272, 276 (1949) (low bidders with non-conforming bids “have no standing to challenge the award of the contract to a rival bidder”); *Interstate Waste Removal Co. v. Bd. of Comm’rs of City of Bordentown*, 140 N.J. Super. 65, 71 (App. Div. 1976) (“[A]n unsuccessful bidder who would not be entitled to the contract even if the defendant were disqualified” has no standing to challenge an award to the defendant. ); *[...], Inc. v. City of Paterson*, [...], 2024 WL 1360849, at *3 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Apr. 1, 2024) (Da467) (same).  In summary, because [...]’s failure to timely submit its [...] Notice deprived [...], at the time of bid opening, of assurance that [...] could and would perform the Project, and because [...]’s failure to submit its [...] Notice with its bid gave it a possible or potential advantage over other contractors, [...]’s bid was materially defective.
[directive] In accordance with general guidance and recommendations from the New Jersey Department of Health and the Centers for Disease Control, the orders restricted in-person proceedings throughout the court system.  The orders specifically suspended criminal jury trials.  For purposes of the 180-day clock, the omnibus orders excluded the time to commence trial for a total of 461 days -- from March 12, 2020 through June  The orders relied on two bases: “exceptional circumstances,” 2021.4 15, “good cause for delay,” N.J.S.A. 2A:162-22(b)(1)(f), and id. at -22(b)(1)(l).  4  The orders also addressed periods of excludable time for the return of an indictment, which encompassed somewhat different dates.  See, e.g., Sup. Ct. of N.J., at 1 (Mar. 19, 2020 Order); Sup. Ct. of N.J., COVID-19 -- Eleventh COVID-19 Omnibus Order, at 3-5 (Mar. 23, 2021 Order).  13  As to the first ground, no party disputes that the COVID-19 pandemic qualifies as a “natural disaster” and thus an “exceptional circumstance” under the CJRA.
[brief] Defendants-Respondents  [...] (“[...] ” or “[...]”), [...] and [...] (“[...]” or “[...]”), and [...]  (“[...]”) argue that the trial court correctly applied the “Ongoing Storm” doctrine.  That, however, is not the pertinent issue -- which is the question of why the invisible ice formed on the landing to the extent it did.  What a jury should have been allowed to decide is if Plaintiff-Appellant [...]’s expert is correct in his opinion that the water infiltration into the deteriorating concrete surface was a preexisting condition due to the Defendants’ neglect, thereby causing unseen ice to cover the surface upon a mere trace of freezing rain.  PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[brief] “This rule of practice promotes the finality and efficiency of the judicial process by ‘protecting against the agitation of settled issues. ’”  *Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp.*, 486 U.S. 800, 816, 108 S. Ct. 2166, 100 L. Ed. 2d 811 (1988) (quoting another source).  “The law of the case doctrine limits the extent to which an issue will be reconsidered once the court has made a ruling on it. ”  *Fagan v. City of Vineland*, 22 F.3d 1283, 1290 (3d Cir. 1994).  Under the law-of-the-case doctrine, once an issue is decided, it will not be relitigated in the same case, except in unusual circumstances.  “A court has the power to revisit prior decisions of its own or of a coordinate court in any circumstance, although as a rule courts should be loath to do so in the absence of extraordinary circumstances such as where the initial decision was ‘clearly erroneous and would work a manifest injustice. ’”  Christianson, 486 U.S. at 817 (quoting Arizona, 460 U.S. at 618 n.8).  The Court examined the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff, finding that the record failed to demonstrate that a dangerous condition existed.
[brief] 126 (1982) | | | **Deland v. Township of Berkeley Heights** | 49 | | 361 N.J. Super. 1 (App. Div. 2003) | | | **Delaware River & Bay Auth. v. York Hunter Constr.,** | 20, 27, 28 | | 344 N.J. Super. 361 (Ch. Div. 2001) | | | **Essex County Voc. Schs. of Educ. v. New United Corp., Nos. [...],** | 24, 25, 26 | | [...], 2014 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 786 (App. Div. April 8, 2014) | | | **Griepenburg v. Twp. of Ocean,** | 20, 22 | | 220 N.J. 239 (2015) | | | **Levin v. Twp. Comm. of Bridgewater Twp.,** | 36, 40, 41, 42 | | 57 N.J. 506 (1971) | | | **Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan,** | 38 | | 140 N.J. 366 (1955) | | | **Masone v. Levine,** | 19, 36 | | 382 N.J. Super. 181 (App. Div. 2005) | | | **McDaniel v. Man Wai Lee,** | 19, 36 | | 419 N.J. Super. 482 (App. Div. 2011)
[brief] DEP asserts in this case that it cannot accept monetary contributions to satisfy public access obligations under the Public Access Law.  Rb29-31.  This notion should be rejected because it is premised on a double standard that DEP has conjured from thin air.  From the outset, it is uncontested that DEP currently allows permit applicants to make monetary contributions for offsite public access improvements where onsite access is not feasible or reasonable.  See N.J.A.C. 7:7-16.9(k)(2)(i)-(iii); Aa0029-35.  Consistent with this practice, upon being informed by DEP that [...]’s permit application triggered a public access requirement under the Public Access Law, [...] proposed to make a monetary contribution for the improvement of nearby facilities.  DEP rejected that offer out of hand and continues to insist that it is not appropriate.  DEP acknowledges that any new or expanded public access on or across private property must be reasonable and meaningful, see Rb4, but makes no effort to reconcile its approach in applying the Public Access Law to [...]’s permit application with the statute’s requirement that all new or expanded public access be “reasonable and meaningful.
[brief] The trial court believed that those references “provided compelling evidence” of the supposed intent of lawmakers to impose continuous residency obligations on certain BOG members, specifically those located in Essex, Camden and Middlesex Counties—the three respective locations at which a Rutgers campus is found.  (1T79.)  The problem with the trial court’s analysis is that it omitted any recognition that the initial aim of the bill was to merge Rutgers-Camden into Rowan University and, at the time those references first appeared as legislative findings, the bill did not include a requirement for a resident of Camden to be appointed to the BOG.
[brief] Appellant further testified that after the meeting, he felt a sense of confidence that his complaint was addressed:  A.  As far as feelings, like, I did feel a sense of confidence being that it took a lot to write that letter and that I felt assured that something was going to happen -- or something right was going to happen.  Q.  Did the meeting with [...] change any of that?  Did it make you confident that something was actually going to happen?  A.  It did.  It did after his assurance of him going to -- his agreement, primarily, and then that he was going to take it to the city, I felt that I did the right thing.  Pa53, T88:22-89:1 and T89:18-24.
[brief] \(^{17}\)  Defendant’s failure to cite to any caselaw on point is fatal to the request for relief, as our legal system requires parties to support their position with an adequate legal argument\(^{18}\) lest their arguments be considered "entirely inadequate" where they present no more than bare statements. \(^{19}\)  \(^{16}\)Zavodnick v. Leven, 340 N.J. Super. 94, 103 (App. Div. 2001) (failure to present an argument relating to an appeal renders that appeal "abandoned").  \(^{17}\)State v. Lefante, 14 N.J. 584 (1954).  \(^{18}\)700 Highway 33 LLC v. Pollio, 421 N.J. Super. 231, 238 (App. Div. 2011).  \(^{19}\)Shaw v. Calgon, Inc., 35 N.J. Super. 319, 329 (App. Div. 1955); State v. Hild, 148 N.J. Super. 294, 296 (App. Div. 1977) (holding parties have a duty to justify their positions by specific reference to legal authority).
[directive] *The Court also offers guidance on various issues that relate to excludable time under the CJRA as well as the need to schedule more jury trials as soon as practicable.  CJRA’s two-year 1.  If a defendant is detained beyond the cap, not counting delays attributable to the defendant, that defendant is entitled to be released pending trial if the prosecutor is not ready to proceed.  N.J.S.A. 2A:162-22(a)(2)(a).  Because the State declared it was ready to proceed to trial at the relevant time, the Court does not find a statutory violation of the two-year cap.
[brief] Defendant [...] (hereinafter “John”) has owned property located at [...] (hereinafter the “property” or “John’s home”) since May 31, 2006.  (Da6)  John spent his hard-earned money and worked hard to renovate the property from a three bedroom to a four bedroom house for his family’s future and retirement.  (Da21)  John subsequently unfortunately over the years suffered severe hardships including but not limited to divorce, bankruptcy, undergoing multiple surgeries, suffering from death in the family and job loss as a result of the pandemic.  (Da21)  Plaintiff filed a motion for final judgment on May 24, 2020 (Da9) and the Court entered final judgment in favor of Plaintiff on June 29, 2020 barring John’s right to redeem and vesting title to John’s property over to Plaintiff.  (Da1)  John was then removed from his home after Plaintiff’s ejectment action.  (Da22)  As stated above in the procedural history, after years of John fighting to save his home and asking to be permitted to redeem, on June 8, 2023, the Appellate Court denied John’s appeal.
[brief] [6T 43-19 to 24.]  As explained in the previous subpoint, [...] was never charged with or convicted of making threats in April 2022.  Although [...] made a series of calls to the cell phone in April 2022, the only recording of those calls features a conversation between [...] and [...] during which not a single “threat[] of harm” was made.  (3T 42-1 to 44-6)  The court therefore abused its discretion when it based its rejection of mitigating factor eight on the same misapprehension that led to its invalid Yarbough analysis.
[brief] In arguing that the Plaintiff’s claim is barred by the statute of limitations, Defendants rely on N.J.S.A. 2A:14-7, which provides as follows:  Every action at law for real estate shall be commenced within 20 years next after the right or title thereto, or cause of such action shall have accrued.  N.J.S.A. 2A:14-7 (emphasis added).
[brief] New Jersey State Police Sergeant [...] was admitted as an expert in firearms and toolmark identification.  Sgt. Burek testified that he tested the firearm, five shell casings, and nine bullet fragments collected in the course of this investigation.  (11T37-1 to 65-1).  Sgt. Burek advised that the tests performed on the portions of the .40 S&W discharged metal bullet jackets indicate that the bullets found at the scene were fired from the suspect firearm because the test jackets and sample jackets had the same microscopic features.  (11T37-1 to 65-1).  Sgt. Burek also advised that the tests that he performed on the .40 S&W discharged bullet cartridge cores also indicated that they were fired from the suspect firearm because the test and sample cartridge cores had the same extractor marks and firepin drag, which are features unique to a specific firearm.  (11T37-1 to 65-1).  Sgt. Burek also testified that the firearm was operable and capable of being discharged, and that the magazine properly fit and functioned with the suspect firearm.  (11T37-1 to 65-1).  On January 20, 2022, the Hon. [...], J.S.C., denied defendant’s motion to take Judicial Notice of the criminal history of an individual named [...], and the facts surrounding his convictions.