ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Paragraph 15 of the Lease is entitled “Fire and Other Casualty”.  (Pa19)  It reads, in pertinent part:  If the premises are partially damaged by fire.  . .the Landlord will repair the same as speedily as practicable.  . .If, in the opinion of the Landlord, the Premises are so substantially damaged as to render them untenantable.  . .then the rent will cease until such time as the Premises are made tenatable by the Landlord.  It is clear that there is only one party here that has a duty to repair the premises after a fire loss – the Landlord.  The Plaintiff Landlord refused to do so, arguing that somehow the Tenant is responsible for repairing fire damage.  Furthermore, it is unquestionable based on the photographic evidence that the premises was untenantable after the fire.  (Da1 – Da12)  The Court found, based on the substantial damage, that the premises were untenantable.  (3T 12:10-15)  --- 1  The remainder of the paragraph discusses how the rights of the parties hinge upon whether the fire was the cause of the Tenant.  The parties agreed at trial that the fire was of an unknown origin.  (1T 30:1-5)  Of note, Plaintiff, quite incredulously, denied that the premises were untenantable following the fire despite the destruction shown in the photos admitted as trial exhibits J4 and J5.  (Da1 – Da12)  (T1 23:7-11)  The Plaintiff urges this Court to turn their attention to Paragraph 42 of the Lease (Pa24).
[brief] Englert, 389 N.J. Super. at 48, 57-58; Sayles, 429 N.J. Super. at 273.  [...] relies on Leitao v. Damon G. Douglas Co., 301 N.J. Super. 187 (App. Div. 1997), and unreported cases to argue that a contract that requires indemnification “regardless of whether” the indemnitee is at fault is enforceable.  However, Leitao was decided five years before Azurak, and this Court ruled that under Azurak, the phrase “regardless of whether” the indemnitee is at fault is unenforceable with regard to indemnification for the indemnitee’s own negligence.  Englert, 389 N.J. Super. at 56-67.  The Court should therefore reject [...]’s reliance on Leitao to decide whether a contract that contains more than one indemnity provision and that does not explicitly require indemnification for [...]’s own negligence is Azurak compliant.  Ibid.  III.
[brief] The transfer to [...]’s command was away from the stress of the Academy (1T; 124:17).  Because the evaluation by [...] was false, in conjunction with [...]'s comments about her, they were trying to sabotage her career in getting a promotion (1T; 126:11).  [...] was “pissed off” in the very beginning, that she got transferred into his unit (1T; 126:21).  There was only one meeting (1T; 127:25).  He referred to the evaluations and the MAPPS entries done after the fact (1T; 127:18).  He never told her that she was doing anything wrong (1T; 127:9).  The Plaintiff pointed out that her first evaluation for the first three months at the Academy was “fine” but the next evaluation for the three months before she moved to the next position was a bad evaluation and that was stated just before she went to another unit (1T; 127:22).
[brief] Though counsel did not handle this case on a contingency, the total legal fees for Plaintiffs’ counsel at [...] and [...] (exclusive of expert fees and other expenses) were roughly one-third of the trial court’s compensatory award.  (Da1028-29; 1031-1409).  While not dispositive, that degree of proportionality imbues the Plaintiffs’ fee application with an imprimatur of reasonableness.  *Litton Indus.*, 200 N.J. at 389.  Appellants nonetheless urge that the trial court should have reduced the award because Plaintiffs did not achieve 100% of their objectives.  That misstates the analysis.  As the trial court rightly pointed out, Plaintiffs’ work was necessary to achieve the result they did.  They could not have obtained the relief that they did without pursuing litigation.  See Litton Indus., 200 N.J. at 386.  Contrary to the appellants’ argument, proportionality between the amount awarded and the original claim is but one component of a multi-pronged analysis under R.P.C. 1.5.  Indeed, there is no “precise formula” for this portion of the reasonableness analysis.  Id. at 388.  Here, in addition to the R.P.C. 1.5 factors, the trial court also considered several factors about the defendants’ conduct in determining the fee award.  For example, the trial court considered the immense hurdles that the Plaintiffs had to surmount just to obtain the defendants’ financial books and records, which the defendants fought “tooth and nail” to avoid disclosing in full.  (27T75:7 to 76:8).  Plaintiffs and their expert also expended significant time and effort to unravel what the trial court called “webs” and “mazes” of accounts that the defendants’ created to conceal their misappropriations.  (27T79:7-9; 86:18-20).  Appellants also forget that not only did Plaintiffs prevail on their own claims, but they also soundly defeated the fusillade of counterclaims and third party claims for which the defendants sought $3.2 million, punitive damages, attorneys fees, costs of suit, and various forms of injunctive relief, all of which the trial court found were “just basically brought in retaliation,” and some of which the trial court did not “even want to dignify. ” (26T11:23 to 12:15; 26T38:18 to 39:20).  The trial court’s analysis of Plaintiffs’ fee application was thorough.  Because it did not abuse its discretion, the award of legal fees and expenses must be affirmed.
[brief] And it would be nearly impossible to administer, including where the parents (including divorced parents) disagree about whether to affirm their child’s gender identity.  See, e.g., Vesely v. Ill. Sch. Dist. 45, ___ F. Supp. 3d ____, 2023 WL 2988833, *5-6 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 18, 2023) (Ra69-74).  It is therefore particularly unlikely that the failure to provide information in the school context violates fundamental rights.
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[brief] (See Dma3-14).  In so holding, the court determined that officers were not required to advise defendant of charges arising out of the April 20, 2022 incident before questioning defendant because no such charges were pending at the time of the Miranda statement.  (Dma8-9).  Accordingly, the court found defendant knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived his Miranda rights.  (Dma7-9).  The court also determined the statement was admissible under N.J.R.E. 404(b)(2) with the appropriate redactions and limiting instructions to protect defendant against any undue prejudice that may result from the admission of such evidence.  (Dma9-11).  Defendant moves for leave to appeal from the court’s order granting the State’s motion to admit defendant’s statement, arguing the interests of justice require immediate appellate review because the court erred by finding defendant’s statement was admissible pursuant to N.J.R.E. 404(b).  This brief follows.  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY GRANTED THE STATE’S MOTION TO ADMIT DEFENDANT’S STATEMENT
[directive] As a result of these legislative changes the Chief Administrator of the New Jersey Motor Vehicle Commission (formerly the Director, Division of Motor Vehicles) has approved a revised Standard Statement for Operators of a Vessel, N.J.S.A. 12:7-55e.  The NJMVC Chief Administrator approved the attached revision on July 1, 2004.  It becomes effective upon the adoption of this bill as law.  A copy of the new revised Standard Statement for Operators of a Vessel - N.J.S.A. 12:7-55e is attached.  This form is also available, in an Adobe Acrobat PDF format, on the Division of Criminal Justice internet website at www.njdcj.org or at www.state.nj.us/lps/dcj, under Guidelines, DWI Enforcement, “NJMVC Standard Refusal Statements. ”  Accordingly, this Letter-Memorandum supercedes the January 8, 2001 Letter- Memorandum entitled, “Revised DMV Standard (Refusal) Statement to be Read to Persons 12:7-55e.
[brief] ”  [...]’s App. Br. at 36; Pa907-Pa922.  However, as demonstrated by the PTA Arbitration, an award issued in an arbitration conducted by the [...] is not final until the parties’ have exhausted their rights to request modification to the award.  See, e.g., Pa923-Pa931 (Final Disposition of Application for Modification of the Parties’ Proposed Corrected Final Award).  And the New Jersey’s Arbitration Act expressly provides that a Court can confirm, vacate, or modify an arbitration award.  N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:23B-22.  Here, the award issued in the [...] was not final until the parties exhausted their ability to seek modification of the award and the Court confirmed the award.
[brief] ”  7T 28:3-15.  The State contends that this testimony during the voir dire properly established the expert’s expertise.  With regards to the information upon which [...]’s opinions were based, the doctor based his opinions on the investigative report made by the medical/legal death investigator, and photographs of the scene, the autopsy report, autopsy photos.  7T 34:15-36:6.  Pertaining to the temperature of the body specifically as it relates to time of death, [...] based his opinion on post-mortem changes to the body including stiffening of the musculature, post-mortem lividity, discoloration of the body, blanching blood vessels, skin sloughing, the rate at which these changes occur, the toxicology report documenting substances in the victim’s blood which accelerate post-mortem changes, and the reports of the defense meteorological expert.  7T 57:24-70:17;  These are the types of facts and data typically relied upon by pathologists with established scientific veracity.  This is a far cry from what is prohibited by the net opinion rule:  “[the] ‘net opinion’ doctrine under New Jersey evidence law weeds out experts who base their opinions on purely personal standards or ‘rules of thumb. ’”  State v. Olenowski, 255 N.J. 529, n. 28 (2023) (referencing, e.g., State v. Burney, 255 N.J. 1, 23-24 (2023); Pomerantz Paper Corp. v. New Cmty. Corp., 207 N.J. 344, 372-74 (2011)).  The trial court judge did not abuse her discretion as her decision did not “rest on an impermissible basis” and was not “based upon a consideration of irrelevant or inappropriate factors.
[brief] 5.  The City shall pay the cost of the prescription plan currently in effect for full-time employees and their eligible dependents.  The prescription plan shall provide a ten dollar ($10.00) co-pay per brand name prescription, including oral contraceptives, and a zero dollar ($0.00) co-pay per generic prescription, including oral contraceptives.  City shall pay the full cost of the dental plan in effect for full-time employees and their eligible dependents.  4.  The City shall implement a new dental plan for this unit's employees and their eligible family member(s) at no cost to the employee in accordance with the terms and coverage in effect as of February 1, 1999 and such benefits shall not be diminished.
[brief] Proof of Service – Dated 04/08/2024  New Jersey Judiciary Superior Court – Appellate Division  Amended Notice of Appeal Entered on 02/29/24 – Dated 04/16/2024  Proof of service – Dated 04/16/2024  Superior Court of New Jersey  Appellate Notice of Docketing – Dated 04/09/2024  New Jersey Judiciary Superior Court – Appellate Division Court Transcript Request – Dated 02/29/2024  Rule 2:6-1(a)(1)  Statement of All Items  Submitted on Summary Judgment Motion --- 1  PA 105 & PA 118 are not confidential documents
[brief] [...] never submitted a certification in the underlying matter objecting to the “signature” on the certified mail return card.  [...] also states, without having previously filed a certification in support, that she learned of the underlying action “because the plaintiff previously made false filings of judgment against her, so she had to watch for future false filings. ”  (Db17)  [...] did not state that she learned of the potential litigation from the Pre-Action Notice that was emailed to her before the post office box was temporarily closed.  Finally, on August 27th, 2019, [...] filed a Substitution of Attorney, appearing pro se, leaving no doubt that service of process was complete and personal jurisdiction voluntarily waived.
[brief] He was thus unavailable to help in the [...]’ case until that time due to lack of notice or information.  The totality of [...]’ testimony establishes, however, that if the C-section had been called at 9:48 p.m., he would have been able to perform it; complete it by 10:03 p.m.; and still arrived in the other procedure to deliver at about the same time.  [Pa285-286; Balazs Deposition, 39:9 to 42:12].  At about 10:12 p.m., the charge nurse, probably [...], entered a c-section procedure being performed by [...].  She told him that she was concerned about the [...]’ readings and that he really needed to look at them.  This was already at least 24 minutes after the alarming 9:48 p.m. readings.  [Pa285-286; Balazs Deposition, 39:9 to 42:12].  [...] asked her to call up the tracings on a nearby screen as he continued his other work.  In less than two minutes, [...] was in Michelle [...]’ room, observed her quickly, and called for the c-section that should have been called at 9:48 p.m. by [...] or [...].
[brief] THE LOWER COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY ORDERING PLAINTIFF TO PAY DEFENDANT’S COUNSEL FEES (P-452).  Respectfully, the lower court abused its discretion when it denied Plaintiff’s application for counsel fees and granted Defendant’s application for same, ordering Plaintiff to pay $2,372.50 in counsel fees in addition to denying Plaintiff hundreds of thousands of dollars that she alone has spent on her children.  Counsel fee determinations “rest[] within the sound discretion of the trial judge” Gotlib, 399 N.J. Super. at 314-15 (quoting Loro v. Colliano, 354 N.J. Super. 212, 227 (App. Div. 2002)).  “We will disturb a trial court’s determination on counsel fees only on the ‘rarest occasion,’ only then only because of clear abuse of discretion. ”  *Strahan v. Strahan*, 402 N.J. Super. 298, 317 (App. Div. 2008) (quoting *Rendine v. Pantzer*, 141 N.J. 292, 317 (1995)).  Generally, “the party requesting the fee award must be in financial need and the party paying the fees must have the financial ability to pay, and if those two factors have been established, the party requesting the fees must have acted in good faith in the litigation. ”  *J.E.V. v. K.V.*, 426 N.J. Super. 475, 493 (App. Div. 2012) (citing *Guglielmo v. Guglielmo*, 253 N.J. Super. 531, 545 (App. Div. 1992)).  When both parties have a “sufficient ability to satisfy [their] attorney’s fee obligation, and neither . . . proceeded in bad faith,” the court may justifiably deny the award of counsel fees.  *Reese v. Weis*, 430 N.J. Super. 552, 586 (App. Div. 2013).  Rule 4:42-9(a)(1) authorizes the award of counsel fees in a family action on a final determination pursuant to Rule 5:3-5(c).
[brief] See Atalese v. U.S. Legal Servs. Grp., L.P., 219 N.J. 430 (2014).  There, the New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed that arbitration provisions are enforceable under New Jersey law.  Id. at 442.  The holding in Atalese was that, despite the general enforceability of arbitration provisions, they will not be enforced if language within fails to inform the parties that they are “waiving [their] right to seek relief in court. ”  Id. at 446.  Plaintiffs do not accuse [...]’s arbitration provision of violating this standard.  Nor could they, as [...]’s arbitration provision states, in capitalized, bold letters across the page:  IF EITHER PARTY ELECTS TO ARBITRATE A DISPUTE, [...] AND CUSTOMER WAIVE THE RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL AND TO OTHERWISE LITIGATE THE DISPUTE IN COURT.  BY AGREEING TO ARBITRATE, THE PARTIES MAY ALSO WAIVE OTHER RIGHTS THAT WOULD OTHERWISE BE AVAILABLE IN COURT.  [Pa21].
[brief] The 2019 Periodic Reexamination of the Master Plan, together with its revised Land Use Element, included the recognition of appropriate designations for these types of senior housing uses and recited those goals in the following update:  4.  **Goal 20:**  To encourage a variety of senior housing opportunities in order to allow aging residents to remain in the community.  *Policy Statement:*  In recognition of the Township’s aging population, the Township seeks to provide a variety of senior housing opportunities in order to allow [...]’s aging residents to “age in place” and continue living and participating in the community.  The Township should consider identifying appropriate locations for active adult and age-restricted independent living developments, as well as assisted living and memory care facilities, within the Township….  The Township should consider preparing a Land Use Plan amendment which designates specific locations for future development of senior housing.  Da77.  (emphasis added).  \(^5\)  Although its complaint below included challenges to the [...] zoning ordinance in this regard, those claims were voluntarily dismissed by Appellee.
[brief] The State also argues that [...] was on routine patrol; however, [...] was a narcotics officer who went to the Wawa parking lot that was known for drug dealing specifically “looking for suspicious narcotics activity. ”  (1T 7-4 to 19)  Likewise, Taranto in Smart went to the condominium complex known for narcotics activity looking to intercept drug activity.  253 N.J. at 160.  The State further argues that “the record did not support the trial court’s finding that there were numerous officers on scene which would have allowed them to approach defendant after observing the first hand to hand transaction. ”  (Pb14)  This is a misreading of the court’s finding.  The court’s finding to which the State is referring reads in full as follows: the officers sat there for two or more hours, or almost two hours and watched the defendant allegedly engage in three separate hand-to-hand transactions over a two-hour period, despite the fact that there were numerous officers on scene.
[brief] Plaintiffs reasonably relied on [...]’s misrepresentations and suffered millions of dollars of damages.  All the Trial Court managed to say in response to these facts supported by voluminous evidence is that Plaintiffs failed to provide any evidence to the Court of their claims and that [...] was not Plaintiffs’ attorney.  In other words, according to the Trial Court, Defendant [...] can participate in a fraudulent scheme to steal Plaintiffs’ money, without consequence, because he is not Plaintiffs’ attorney.  Yet again, as occurred earlier in the matter with [...], an attorney was effectively absolved of his participation in a tortious conspiracy by virtue of his status as an attorney.  According to the Trial Court, an attorney can participate in a tortious conspiracy so long as he is not the attorney of the victim.  This holding is troubling and must be reversed.
[brief] (Da065).  With respect to the Appellant/Cross-Respondents’ argument that [...]’s quiet title action was barred, by the statute of limitations, the Court referenced its decision on Appellant/Cross-Respondents’ R. 4:40-1 motion at the close of Plaintiff’s case wherein the Court denied Appellant/Cross-Respondents’ motion under the discovery rule:  I realize the existence of the December 10th, 1998 deed is being used by the moving party, the defendants at this point, to support their argument that [...] Wu knew his title was possibly in doubt as early as December 1998.  However, the reason, albeit erroneous, stated by [...], was that he sought to record his deed because he had recently paid off the mortgage debt on the property.  That, in the view of this Court, was unnecessary, erroneous, and need not have been done.  The plain language of the statute in this case, which I read in its entirety, provides for the accrual of a cause of action, quote, when any other person claims or has claimed to own the same or any part thereof, unquote.  In the view of this Court, the cause of action to quiet title in this case did not accrue until the very earliest when witness [...] informed [...] Wu, that realtor, [...], had approached him on behalf of his client, [...], seeking an appraisal inasumuch as it was believed at that time by [...], that [...] was the owner of the property.  According to the trial testimony, that did not occur until 2019.  (12T7:15-8:14, January 27, 2023).  The Court went to describe how [...]’s peaceable possession of the Property and [...]’s lack of involvement in the Property were integral to the Court’s conclusion:  A word about peaceable possession.  [...] Wu was in peaceable possession in the legal sense from 1997, and was not made aware of any claim against his ownership interest until, as I have said, at the earliest, his conversation with [...], and certainly not until the purported transfer to [...].  For these reasons, I find there to be no impediment or time barred claim here that the statute of limitations issue is not a real one.  Further indicia of the peaceable possession by [...] Wu is the failure of [...], or any member of his family, to make even an overture of ownership in all the years that Sam – that [...] Wu was in possession.  Advanced at trial is a defense theory that [...] Wu was nothing more than a property manager who was taking care of and paying the expenses and carrying costs of 293 as a property manager because it was convenient, since he lived or had possession of premises next door.  However, there has been presented no express property management agreement for – to support the notion that [...] was simply a manager.  Further, the conduct of the parties demonstrates that there was never any compensation to [...] for any services, and there was no reimbursements for costs and payments advanced by [...] for the repair, the maintenance, the taxes, or the mortgage, from Sam or the [...] family.  (12T9:2-10:6, January 27, 2023)  LEGAL ARGUMENT
[brief] Griffin v. City of East Orange, 225 N.J. 400 (2016)  ................................................................. 10, 11  Matter of Comm’r of Ins.’s Issuance of Orders A-92-189&A-92-21, 274 N.J. Super. 385 (App. Div. 1993).............................................13  Rodriguez v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 237 N.J. 36 (2019) ......................................................................10, 11, 12  Scully-Bozarth Post #1817 of Veterans of Foreign Wars of the U.S. v. Planning Bd. Of the City of Burlington, 362 N.J. Super. 296 (App. Div. 2003).............................................13  State v. Darby, 174 N.J. 509 (2002)....................................................................10 State v. Garcia, 245 N.J. 412 (2021)....................................................................8, 9 State v. Harris, 209 N.J. 431 (2012)....................................................................7  State v. Muhammad, 439 N.J. Super. 361 (App. Div. 2003)...........................................9  State v. Singh, 245 N.J. 1 (2021).....................................................................8, 9  Statutes, Rules and Other Authorities: N.J.R.E. 401................................................................................passim N.J.R.E. 403................................................................................passim  TABLE OF TRANSCRIPTS