ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Plaintiff is asserting his claims on an individual basis and on behalf of others, each having an equal stake in the outcome.  If Plaintiff prevails in proving that Defendant violated the FDCPA, then he—and no one else—will be personally entitled to, inter alia, statutory damages up to $1,000 because Defendant caused its May 23, 2020 collection letter to be mailed to Plaintiff in an attempt to collect a debt from Plaintiff.  Thus, Plaintiff has a personal stake in the outcome.  Moreover, Plaintiff has no means by which to determine the extent to which he is harmed or been placed in harm’s way.  Defendant never disclosed the identity of its mail vendor.  That mail vendor does not owe a legal obligation to Plaintiff to keep that information confidential.  Furthermore, it is presumed that the information was conveyed in electronic form but Defendant never disclosed how the mail vendor could use or misuse the information or what security measures might exist to prevent the information from being misappropriated.  Indeed, these harms and risks of harm are avoided when a debt collector refrains from conveying information about debts to undisclosed, unregulated third parties such as Defendant’s unidentified mail vendor.  But, because Plaintiff has a personal stake in the outcome, he has standing.  CONCLUSION
[brief] f.  With the location of the property being on the very southwestern edge of the Township, and access to highways primarily going to the southwest to Route 206 and not through any of the historic villages, truck traffic should also have a minimal impact on the Township’s roadways.  g.  With the proposed Redevelopment Plan calling for light industrial or warehouse development on a former golf course generally having no significant impacts on the goals and objectives of the master plan, the Redevelopment Plan is not inconsistent with the master plan.
[brief] Furthermore, expert opinion testimony is required even if evidence of prior falls is being offered to attack the plaintiff’s credibility.  The matter of *Oppedisano v. Utz*, 2012 WL 2360125 (App. Div. 2012) is instructive and confirms that evidence of the plaintiff’s prior medical history and falls should have been barred in this matter.  In *Oppedisano*, the plaintiff alleged that she suffered from complex regional pain syndrome as a result of a motor vehicle accident and suffered from constant pain and discomfort.
[brief] Defendant appealed the trial court’s award of counsel fees to Plaintiff, and Plaintiff appealed the court’s award of counsel fees to Defendant.  (Da224).  Plaintiff also appealed the trial court’s July 30, 2018 order that had approved the Administrator's Report and had denied Plaintiff’s motion seeking additional discovery.  (Da118-167)  In its March 23, 2021 decision, the Appellate Division reversed the legal fee award in favor of Defendant in the amount of $978,157.99; vacated the portion of the trial court’s January 14, 2019 Order that awarded Plaintiff counsel fees in the amount of $1,049,589.14; affirmed the trial court’s rulings denying Plaintiff’s challenge to the court’s approval of the Administrator’s Report and denied Plaintiff’s motion seeking additional discovery.
[brief] ]  The New Jersey Supreme Court has addressed settlements involving retroactive salary increases that are not creditable for pension purposes.  In *In re Puglisi*, 186 N.J. 529, 531 (2006), Puglisi was a police officer who filed a civil rights suit against his employer and entered into a settlement agreement whereby he was promoted to the rank of captain, immediately commenced a one-year terminal leave at a captain’s salary, and then agreed to retire at the end of the leave period.  The Board of Trustees, Police and Firemen’s Retirement System (“[...]”) denied him pension benefits based on the promotional captain’s salary, finding that he “was on terminal leave from the day he was promoted as captain to the date of retirement. ”  *Id.* at 532.  The New Jersey Supreme Court agreed that the officer’s salary increases were not creditable, quoting from the Appellate Division opinion, stating:  The purpose of N.J.S.A. 43:16A-1(26) and the implementing regulations is to protect the actuarial soundness of the pension fund by prohibiting the use of “ad hoc salary increases intended to increase retirement allowances without adequate compensation to the [pension] fund” in calculating pensions.  Therefore, any salary increase made primarily in anticipation of retirement must be disregarded in determining the amount of a retiree’s pension, even if the increase was also designed to achieve other objectives, such as increasing the overall amount of the employee’s compensation.  . . .  Although appellant’s promotion also may have served other objectives, such as settling his claims against [...], conferring him with the status of a captain and granting him higher terminal leave payments, the promotion was nonetheless made in anticipation of appellant retiring and beginning to receive a pension after receiving the one-year terminal leave provided under the settlement agreement.  Therefore, the Board correctly concluded that appellant’s pension should be recalculated on the basis of a lieutenant’s salary.  [Id. at 534.]  The same is true for the retroactive salary increases [...] received on this record.  (Pa31-Pa33).  Any retroactive salary increases made primarily in anticipation of retirement which serve to inflate retirement benefits, even if collaterally designed to settle the employment discrimination civil lawsuit, are not creditable for pension benefits calculation.  The operative language of the statutory definitions of compensation in both the [...] and [...] systems are identical in all material respects.  See N.J.S.A. 18A:66-2(d)(1); N.J.S.A. 43:16A-1(26)(a) (both statutes deem compensation to be base or contractual salary, paid in accordance with established salary policies of the employer, and not individual salary adjustments made primarily in anticipation of retirement or for work beyond the regular work day).  The legislative policy was discussed in Board of Trustees, Teachers’ Pension & Annuity Fund v. LaTronica, 81 N.J. Super. 461, 470-71 (App. Div. 1963), where three teachers received substantial salary increases in their final years of service:
[directive] Bodily Injury.  Bodily injury means physical pain, or temporary disfigurement, or any impairment of physical condition.  Bodily harm and bodily injury have the same definition for the purposes of this Policy.  See N.J.S.A. 2C:11-1(a); N.J.S.A. 2C:3-11(e).  3.3  Conducted Energy Device (CED).  A conducted energy device means any device approved by the Attorney General that is capable of firing darts/electrodes that transmit an electrical charge or current intended to temporarily disable a person.  3.4  Deadly Force.  Deadly force means force that an officer uses with the purpose of causing, or that a reasonable officer knows creates a substantial risk of causing death or serious bodily injury.  Discharging a firearm, constitutes deadly force, unless the discharge occurred during the course of a law enforcement training exercise, routine target practice at a firing range, a lawful animal hunt, or the humane killing of an injured animal.  A threat to cause death or 3  USE OF FORCE POLICY
[brief] Likewise, Plaintiff failed to submit any evidence showing that the City’s placement of the sign constituted a dangerous condition.  There is also nothing in the record suggesting the location of the sign did not permit the operator of a motor vehicle to safely detour around the overpass.  Again, Plaintiff asks this court, as it did the trial court and the jury, to speculate as to the propriety of the City’s exercise of its discretion.  This court must decline to do so and reject Plaintiff’s argument.  In sum, Plaintiff’s opposition fails to show why the City should not have been afforded the broad immunity to which it is entitled under the TCA.
[brief] New Jersey has expressly recognized this compelling state interest by prohibiting discrimination on the basis of gender identity and expression in public schools.  New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (“LAD”), N.J.S.A. 10:5-1 to -50.  The State’s compelling interests are advanced by the trial court’s preliminary injunction against the Mandatory Notification Policies and reinstatement of the Original Policies, under which the school districts were “providing a safe, supportive, and inclusive learning environment for all students” and complying with the LAD and Title IX.
[directive] Homicide, 2C:11-1 Simple Assault, 2C:12-1a (w/contact or w/weapon)      Aggravated Assault, 2C:12-1b  Terroristic Threats, 2C:12-3 (w/contact or w/weapon)      Kidnapping, 2C:13-1  False Imprisonment, 2C:13-3 (w/contact or w/weapon)      Sexual Assault, 2C:14-2  Criminal Sexual Contact, 2C:14-3      Robbery, 2C:15-1  2nd degree Burglary, 2C:18-2 (w/contact or w/weapon)      Any other crime involving risk of death or SBI, 2C:25-19a(18)    DEFINITIONS
[brief] OTHER AUTHORITIES  [...] et al., *The Difficult Task of Assessing Perimortem and Postmortem Fractures on the Skeleton: a Blind Text on 210 Fractures of Known Origin*, 59 J. Forensic Sci. 1598 (2014)  ..................33  [...] et al., *Cognitive Bias in Forensic Pathology Decisions*, 66 J. Forensic Sci. 1751 (2021).................................................................35  [...], “Rigging the Jury: How Each State Reduces Jury Diversity by Excluding People with Criminal Records,” Prison Policy Initiative (2021)  .................................................................42  [...], [...], *Identification and Differential Diagnosis of Perimortem Blunt Force Trauma in Tubular Long Bones*, 2 Forensic Sci Med Pathol. 221 (2006)  .........................................................34  New Jersey Supreme Court, “Notice to the Bar and Public,” 7/12/22 ...........43  [...], et al., *Distinction Between Perimortem and Postmortem Fractures in Human Cranial Bone*, 134 Int. J. Legal Med. 1765 (2020) .........34 TABLE OF ABBREVIATIONS Da: Defendant-appellant’s appendix 1T: 1/10/20 hearing 2T: 1/21/20 hearing 3T: 1/27/20 hearing 4T: 2/7/20 hearing 5T: 2/18/20 hearing 6T: 2/21/20 hearing 7T: 3/6/20 hearing 8T: 6/3/20 hearing 9T: 7/12/21 hearing vol. 1 10T: 7/12/21 hearing vol. 2 11T: 1/10/22 hearing 12T: 3/14/22 hearing 13T: 4/25/22 hearing 14T: 9/12/22 hearing 15T: 9/28/22 hearing 16T: 10/17/22 hearing 17T: 10/21/22 hearing 18T: 10/24/22 vol. 1 19T: 10/24/22 vol. 2 20T: 10/26/22 vol. 1 21T: 10/26/22 vol. 2 22T: 10/28/22 vol.
[brief] (Pa99-106)  The injunctions prohibited [...] from: (a) “interfering with the transition of control of [...],” (Pa100); (b) “contacting... any employee... or other business partner of the Company for the purpose of interfering” with the change in control; (Ibid); (c) “representing... that [...] remains in control of... the Company,” (Pa101); (d) “representing to anyone that any Operating Agreement... has any legal effect... other than the Operating Agreement dated April 1, 1995... ;” (Ibid); and (e) setting various other restrictions.  (Pa99-101)  During Phase II, on October 25, 2017, Brad separately sued some of the Plaintiffs in this action, along with their attorneys and the [...] (“[...]”), alleging a violation of the Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Organizations Act (i.e., RICO), breaches of fiduciary duty, and other issues in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York in an action bearing Docket Number [...] (the “SDNY Action”).
[brief] ”); see State v. Zenquis, 251 N.J. Super. 358, 370 (App. Div. 1991), aff’d, 131 N.J. 84 (1993) (finding court’s charge that jury could infer destroyed notes contained information inconsistent with witness’s trial testimony “obviated any potential for prejudice. ”); People v. Handy, 988 N.E.2d 879, 879 (N.Y. 2013) (“An adverse inference charge mitigates the harm done to the defendant, resulting from the risk that the State has lost exculpatory evidence, without terminating the prosecution.
[brief] Absent such proof, [...] never took title to the subject property.  They only took title to what today is a minor, small de minimis strip of land on part of line-item Lot: 3.  Ultimately, what was revealed through the testimony of [...]’s two experts is that there is no reasonable question but that the transfer of title from the [...] to [...] did not include the term “Riparian Grant”.  Under Panetta v. Equity title in all of and the entirety of the Riparian Grant remained vested in the [...].
[brief] PROCEDURAL HISTORY  On March 28, 2023, Plaintiff filed a three-count Verified Complaint in Superior Court–Chancery Division, Warren County, alleging that it was entitled to a declaratory judgment ruling that the settlement reached during an administrative hearing was an enforceable contract, and Defendant breached said contract as well as the covenant of good faith and fair dealing attendant thereto.  (Pa1-Pa68).  Additionally, Plaintiff filed an OTSC requesting that the terms of the settlement reached between Defendant and Plaintiff be enforced, and the awarding of counsel fees and costs.  (Pa69-Pa93).  The Court issued a scheduling order on March 30.  (Pa94-Pa97).  Subsequently, Plaintiff served an Attorney Certification and Proof of Service of the OTSC and Verified Complaint on Defendant on April 3.  (Pa98-Pa107).  Also on April 3, Defendant submitted a letter brief and Attorney Certification in opposition to Plaintiff’s OTSC.  (Pa108-Pa130).  Plaintiff filed its reply brief in response to Defendant’s opposition on April 4.  (Pa131-Pa134).  Oral argument was held on April 6 before The Hon. [...], A.J.S.C. (1T).  On April 12, [...] rendered his decision from the bench, denied Plaintiff’s OTSC, and remanded the matter to the hearing officer.  (2T).  [...] entered a conforming order on April 17.  (Pa135-Pa136).  On May 31, Plaintiff filed a Notice of Appeal.  (Pa137-Pa141).  This appeal follows.
[brief] Defendants’ cross-examination of Plaintiff relative to damages was limited to the following 5 questions:  Q  [...]  I understand you sustained some pretty severe injuries to your legs; correct?  A Yes, Sir.  Q  All right a number of surgeries?  A Yes.  Q  Okay and some PT and recovery time; correct?  A Yes.  Q  Has the condition gotten any better since way back when you first had the surgeries?  Has it improved a little bit?  A Yes.  Q  Okay.  Has any doctor recommended that you undergo an additional surgery in the near future for your legs?  A  As of right now, no.  [3T188-189.]  Defendants called no live witnesses – liability or damages - in their case in chief.  Here, the record is devoid of any indication that the jury impermissibly rendered an excessive damages award.
[brief] In Sinclair, plaintiff pedestrian was hit by a car while crossing an intersection at night where a streetlight was out.  _Id._  Plaintiff brought suit against [...] for failure to maintain continuous and uninterrupted street lighting for plaintiff’s benefit.  _Id._ at 210.  The court found that a duty may be imposed by statute, contract, relationship, or by the common law, but that there is no statute or regulation that imposes upon [...] a duty to provide lighting for the streets of that township, “…[n]or is there any New Jersey case which imposes a common law duty on electric companies to repair or replace broken light fixtures within any particular time frame. ”  _Id._ at 214-15.  The court further opined that, “[c]onsidering the vast number of streetlights and the frequency of motor vehicle accidents, this absence of case law is telling. ”  In that case, there was no statutory or common law duty placed upon electric companies to provide street lighting or to repair broken lights within a specific time frame, and the court held that electric companies had no contractual duty to plaintiffs to repair every broken light.  _Id._ at 214.  [...] also cited to _Cochran v. [...]_, 97 N.J.L. 480 (E&A 1922), in which the court found that a truck driver who was injured at night by an unlighted obstruction in the street could not recover from defendant electric company because although the electric company contracted with the city for streetlights, it owed no duty to the plaintiff.
[brief] However, although the Arbitrator properly determined the market value of the Property in accordance with parameters previously set by the Trial Court, the Trial Court did err in two rulings: 1) setting the date of valuation at January 27, 1994 instead of May 4, 2018; and 2) denying the Township’s Motion to Bar the Expert Report and testimony of [...] (“Land Report”) on furniture, fixtures, and equipment (“FFE”) as a net opinion.  These two errors inflated the true Market Value of the Property, resulting in the [...] receiving millions more than their due.  The Trial Court erred when it set the date of valuation at January 27, 1994 rather than the date the Township filed its Complaint and declaration of taking.  The express purpose of the valuation date, and the provisions of N.J.S.A. 20:3-30, is to ensure that condemnees receive the “fair market value” of their properties, as if the taking never occurred.  Yet the [...] recouped more than their fair share because the Township did not take the Property—a commercial strip mall that generated rent from multiple tenants—until May 4, 2018.  The [...]’ rights to the Property were not extinguished until 24 years after the Property was declared in need of redevelopment, and the [...] continued to collect rent for another 24 years, every penny of which ended up in their pockets.
[directive] This presumption exists, unless the court finds on the record that another form of bail authorized in subsection (b), surety bond or property bond, will ensure the defendant’s presence in court when required, if the actor was already subject to a N.J.S.A. 2A:162-12 temporary or permanent restraining order, pursuant to 2C:25-17, and is charged with a crime committed against a person protected under that order, including a Crimes with Bail Restrictions - charge of contempt pursuant to 2C:29-9; and either (a) is charged with the commission of a domestic violence crime that resulted in serious bodily injury to the Domestic Violence Cases victim; or (b) has at least one prior conviction for a crime or offense involving domestic violence against the same victim or has previously violated a final restraining order protecting the same victim.  Section (e), does give the judge the discretion to impose an R.O.R. bail “when the court determines that such person is deserving.
[brief] APPENDIX TABLE OF CONTENTS  ###  VOLUME I (CONFIDENTIAL) | Document | Page | |-------------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | Notice of Appeal | Pa1 | | Case Information Statement | Pa5 | | [...] Final Decision 9/27/23 | Pa9 | | Reply to [...] 7/18/23¹ | Pa16 | | [...] Initial Decision 6/13/23 | Pa24 | | Correspondence to [...] 3/23/23 | Pa28 | | Petition for Ricci Action Registration 3/3/23 | Pa30 | | Affidavit of [...] | Pa56 | | [...] Eligibility Registration Form | Pa58 | | [...] Request for Amended Benefits Form | Pa60 | | Medical Examination 8/9/11 | Pa61 | | Medical Examination 1/30/23 | Pa62 | | New Jersey State Police Performance Evaluation | Pa63 | | Administrative Denial of Ricci Benefits | Pa65 | | Legislative Notice August 2019 | Pa66 | | Postage Statement | Pa68 | | Universal Document Converter Postcard | Pa70 | ¹ Per R.2:6-1(a)(2), Pa16, Pa24, Pa28, and Pa30 are included in the Appendix because they are germane to the appeal.
[brief] While this case was pending, our State Legislature removed the historical jurisdiction of the Tax Court to consider a third-party taxpayer’s challenge of the validity of a tax exemption granted in their county taxing district.  See, P.L. 2021, Chapter 17, Section 6 barring third party taxpayer appeals in the Tax Court.  But see, City of Hackensack v. Hackensack Med. Ctr., 228 N.J. Super. 310, 313 (App. Div. 1988) (that “someone else may have received improper tax treatment does not entitle the taxpayer to an exemption...  Rather, it may give rise to ground for any taxpayer in the taxing district to challenge such exemption”).  However, our State Legislature did not divest the Superior Court of its jurisdiction to review a third-party taxpayer’s challenge of the validity of a long term tax exemption tax exemption under State law.
[directive] - U.S. Department of Treasury Guidelines for Seized and Forfeited 6.  Property, Revised Edition July 2001 .*  11  Samples - 7.  Sample Audit Plan - Sample Balance SheetBtatement of Assets, Liabilities, Reserves, and 8.  Fund  Balance with comparative totals for the previous year - Sample Statement Revenues, Expenses, and Changes Fund in of 9.  Balance with comparative totals for the previous year - Sample Cash Flow Analysis with comparative totals for the previous 10. year - Sample Schedule Distribution  Law Enforcement Agencies of to 11.  Sample Schedule of Law Enforcement Trust Fund Expenditures  12.  - - - Sample Statement of Vehicles and Property Seized and Forfeited 13.  - Sample Independent Auditor’s Report 14.  - Sample Report on Compliance and Internal Control over Financial on 15.  ReQorting based an Audit of Statutory Basis Financial Statements on -- - - performed accordance with’bovernment Auditing Standards in - Sample Schedule Findings and Recommendations  16. - 17.  Sample Summary Schedule of Prior Audit Findings  Year Ended xx/xx/xxxx ...  111  Authority: Attorney General Law Enforcement Directive 2004-4 .
[brief] Litton Indus., Inc. v. IMO Indus., Inc., 200 N.J. 372, 388 (2009).  “An abuse of discretion occurs where the trial court’s decision is “made without a rational explanation, inexplicably departed from established policies, or rested on an impermissible basis. ”  Ripp v. Cnty. of Hudson, 472 N.J. Super. 600, 610-11 (App. Div. 2022) (quoting Flagg v. Essex Cnty. Prosecutor, 171 N.J. 561, 571 (2002)).  Attorneys’ fees determinations will be disturbed “only on the rarest of occasions, and then only because of a clear abuse of discretion. ”  Litton, 200 N.J. at 386 (quoting Packard-Bamberger & Co., Inc. v. Collier, 167 N.J. 427, 444 (2001)).  As set forth in further detail here below, the trial court correctly found that Respondents were entitled to an award of Attorney’s fees and costs because Appellant brought his CEPA claim without any basis in fact.
[brief] [...] Admitted He Failed to Disclose the Pictures and Texts Pertaining to His Work and Physical Abilities.  Further, He Admitted He Lied in the Text Messages.  [...] admitted he did not provide to [...] the text messages which undermined his claim that he could not work.  [7T 143:3-9].  The texts and photographs of [...] were provided by [...].  He admitted he was obligated to provide [...] with all relevant information to the lawsuit and that he had an ongoing obligation to do so.  [7T 143:13-25].  [...] provided a work estimate to [...], but claimed he lied in the text when he informed her he would do the work after he was done completing other projects.  [7T 147:7-150:8].  Had [...] admitted he did work for [...], he would have perjured himself because his position in the litigation is that he cannot work.  [7T 142:11-17].  PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[brief] Instead, while Plaintiff’s reconsideration motion was pending, [...] and [...] excluded Plaintiff from the dissolution.  The Trial Court denied Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration to be included in the dissolution with one sentence: “[...], not plaintiff, is responsible for completion of the winding up and dissolution of [...]. ”  (Aa85).  The Trial Court provided no citations for this exclusionary conclusion.  This decision by the Trial Court is wholly unsupported by law and flies in the face of NJ RULLCA which expressly states that members are responsible for the management and activities of a company.