ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The Arbitrator found Factors 1, 5, 6 and 9, which pertain to the interest and welfare of the public, the financial impact criteria, and the statutory restrictions on the employer, to be all related in this matter and set forth his analysis of these factors.  (Aa113-117)  Contrary to the Union’s contention, the Arbitrator explained his reasoning in detail.  With respect to the public welfare, he recognized that the public is a silent party to the proceedings and that he must weigh fiscal responsibility and the public’s need to ensure all necessary services are provided.  (Aa 114)  He further noted that the expense to be borne by the tax paying public (in this case a tax paying public with a median household income of $47,373, with the need to ensure necessary services are provided, noting case law holding that “arbitrators have reviewed the public interest as encompassing the need for both fiscal responsibility and the compensation package required to maintain effective an public safety department.  (Aa114)  The Decision and Award contained a detailed discussion of the City’s finances, noting both [...] and [...]’s testimony that the City’s receipt of transitional aid from the State “is necessary because the City has a structural shortfall in its ability to match revenues with expenditures, i.e. to balance the budget.
[brief] Having determined all probate issues in the Chancery Case, on April 13, 2016 [...] severed the claims of Brian and [...] for wrongful eviction, and transferred them to the Law Division (the “Law Division Action”).  5a; 53a.  On that same day, Brian and [...] filed a complaint in the Law Division (Docket No. [...]) against [...] for, inter alia, wrongful eviction.  5a-6a; 58a.  In the Law Division Action, [...] filed cross-claims against the Estate on November 2, 2016 for (i) breach of the real estate contract, (ii) breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, (iii) breach of fiduciary duty, and (iv) negligence.  16a; 67a; Da99-101.  Significantly, they also filed a counterclaim for negligence against Brian and [...], based upon their alleged contamination of the Property.  7a; 57a.  The counterclaim filed by [...] alleged that Brian and [...] owed a duty to [...] as tenants, that their conduct at the Property including paving a portion of the Property damaged [...], and that they had dumped fuel oil, chemicals and other toxic substances on the property.  Da93-95; 68a.  In or about May of 2017, Brian and [...] filed a motion for summary judgment on their claim for wrongful eviction, and a motion to dismiss the counterclaims filed against them by [...].  68a  The Phillipses opposed the motion, and sought reconsideration of the Court’s prior Order denying their motion to dismiss Brian and [...]’s complaint for wrongful eviction.  68a.  The estate filed a motion to dismiss the cross-claims against it.  68a.  In a May 16, 2017 Opinion, the Court granted reconsideration and dismissed the wrongful eviction claim of Brian and [...].
[brief] The parties to the email were plainly aware that it was Plaintiff who sought the alternative route in gaining admission to the master’s degree.  (Pa461-Pa467).  The August 1, 2013 email string, on several occasions, discussed a student’s ability to enter the dual degree program once their GPA raised over the 3.0 threshold.  [...]’s email unambiguously demonstrated students were able to enter the dual degree program and take the additional coursework later.  (Pa465).  [...] also stated students were able to select to enter the program at times other than after their first year, once they reached a 3.0 GPA.  (Pa462-Pa464).  Thus, the University Provost, [...] School of Pharmacy Dean, and Interim Dean of the College of Business were all in agreement that a student was able to matriculate at a later date, and that the Plaintiff was authorized to take MBA courses once he got off academic probation.  Shortly thereafter, Plaintiff’s GPA increased, and he took electives for a Master of Health Science (“MHS”) degree.  (Pa262; Pa554-Pa555).  On August 29, 2016, Plaintiff contacted [...], advising [...] that he only needed to complete only two additional classes to complete his Health Informatics master’s track for the dual degree program.  (Pa554-Pa555).  At that time, Plaintiff was advised that he “misinterpreted the guidelines for admission to the MHS program [,]” which [...] alleged required a “3.00 GPA at the end of your P1 year. ” (Pa554).  Ultimately, Plaintiff was not afforded the opportunity to complete the MSH degree, or even enter the masters track of the dual degree program.  It is abundantly clear that [...] substantially deviated from its own rules and regulations, as it continued to move the goalposts on Plaintiff, a student of its inaugural class, to prevent him from entering the masters track of the dual degree program.
[directive] BODY WORN CAMERA POLICY | January 2022 17  7  Circumstances When BWC Activation/Use Is Subject to Special Conditions or Restrictions 7.1 Special Restrictions When Recording in Schools, Healthcare/Treatment Facilities, and Places of Worship.  Notwithstanding Sections 5.2 and 5.3 of this Policy, and except as otherwise required by Section 5.5, unless the officer is actively engaged in investigating the commission of a criminal offense, or is responding to an emergency, or reasonably believes that he or she will be required to use constructive authority or force, the officer shall not activate a BWC, or shall de-activate a BWC that has been activated, while the officer: 1) is in a school or youth facility or on school or youth facility property under circumstances where minor children would be in view of the BWC; 2) is in a patient care area of a healthcare facility, medical office, or substance abuse treatment facility under circumstances where patients would be in view of the BWC; or 3) is in a place of worship under circumstances where worshipers would be in view of the BWC.
[directive] ALPR  8.1  Physical Security and Limited Access  All ALPR stored data shall be kept in a secure data storage system with access restricted to authorized persons.  Access to this stored data shall be limited to the purposes described ih Section 10 of these Guidelines.  8.2  Differentiation of Stored Positive Alert Data From Non-Alert Data  Stored ALPR data shall be maintained electronically in such a manner as to distinguish alert data from non-alert data so as to ensure that access to and use of non-alert data and any disclosure of personal identifying information resulting from the analysis of non-alert data occurs only as may be authorized pursuant to section 10.2 of these Guidelines.  Positive alert data may, as appropriate, be transferred to the appropriate active investigation file, see also Section 10.1, infra, and may as appropriate be placed into evidence in accordance with the department’s evidence or records management procedures.  9.
[brief] [T]he NJCFLA requires a person or entity that qualifies as a “consumer lender” or “sales finance company” to first obtain a license from the NJDOBI.  N.J. Stat. Ann. § 17:11C-3(a).  A “consumer lender” is a person or entity that, among other things, “directly or indirectly engag[es] . . . in the business of buying, discounting or endorsing notes” . . .  In analyzing whether this definition covered debt buyers, the Superior Court in Woo-Padva stated that “notes” were distinct from “debts,” but did not define either term.  The Superior Court relied on three unpublished cases from Ohio and Michigan to support its assertion, and pointed to the fact that a New Jersey statute, N.J. Stat. Ann. § 12A:3-118, “explicitly provides the statute of limitations for ‘an action to enforce the obligation of a party to pay a note’” while another statute, N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:14-1 “provides the statute of limitations to enforce claims based on a breach of contract that generally apply to credit card debts. ”  Respectfully, the Court is not persuaded by this line of reasoning.
[brief] Pa14.  The plaintiffs in *L.R.* filed a Petition for Certification, which was granted on April 17, 2018.  Pa14.  This case was then formally stayed by Order of August 31, 2018, while the Supreme Court case remained pending.  On July 17, 2019, the Supreme Court issued its decision in *L.R. v. [...]*, 238 N.J. 547 (2019).
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[brief] Here, not only does the MSRA not provide for the payment of terminal leave, but multiple courts have already found to the contrary and that capping terminal leave is provided for under the MSRA’s broad power to “unilaterally modify[], amend[], or terminate[] any collective negotiations agreements,” which Plaintiffs have done for all post-MSRA retirees without exception.  N.J.S.A. 52:27BBBB-5a(3)(g).  Finally, the employees in Caponegro were terminated upon the State’s takeover with the implementation of the statute, and therefore the deferred benefits had vested with their termination.  330 N.J. at 151.  However, as of the adoption of the MSRA, contrary to the plaintiffs in Caponegro, Plaintiffs were all still employed by the [...], and, therefore, had no vested right to terminal leave payments.
[directive] Staff Inspections  3.5.1  While the primary responsibility for enforcing agency policies rests with the line supervisors, management cannot rely solely on those supervisors for detecting violations.  Administrators should establish a mechanism to determine whether an agency's policies and procedures are being properly implemented.  It is necessary for management to know if behavior is, in fact, consistent with the agency's rules and regulations, policies and procedures.  The task of detecting such defects should be delegated to an inspection unit or function.
[brief] CEPA specifically provides that:  An employer shall not take any retaliatory action against an employee because the employee does any of the following:  a.  Discloses, or threatens to disclose to a supervisor or to a public body an activity, policy or practice of the employer, or another employer, with whom there is a business relationship, that the employee reasonably believes: (1) is in violation of a law, or a rule or regulation promulgated pursuant to law, including any violation involving deception of, or misrepresentation to, any shareholder, investor, client, patient, customer, employee, former employee, retiree or pensioner of the employer or any governmental entity, or, in the case of an employee who is a licensed or certified health care professional, reasonably believes constitutes improper quality of patient care; or (2) is fraudulent or criminal, including any activity, policy or practice of deception or misrepresentation which the employee reasonably believes may defraud any shareholder, investor, client, patient, customer, employee, former employee, retiree or pensioner of the employer or any governmental entity.
[brief] d.  The trial court correctly found that Plaintiff failed to establish that the Authority’s conduct was palpably unreasonable.  The trial court correctly found that Plaintiff failed to establish that the Authority’s conduct was palpably unreasonable.  (Pa2152).  The court noted that the Authority is responsible for maintaining an extensive network (literally hundreds of miles) of highways, which include numerous bridges and overpasses.  (Pa2152).  There were not any previous complaints of the condition of the area where [...] lost control of the motorcycle.  (Pa2152).  There were not any previous accidents in that area.  (Pa2152).  Further, there was a regular and routine inspection of the bridge every two years.  (Pa2152).  Moreover, the Authority’s maintenance personnel patrol the roads every morning looking for defects.  (Pa2152).  In such circumstances, no rational finding of “palpably unreasonable” conduct can be made.  See Penny v. Bor. of Wildwood Crest, 28 Fed. Appx 137, 140 (3d Cir. 2002) (“no reasonable jury could find that the failure to repair such surface declivity in a crosswalk having a depth of one inch to one and five eighth inches amount to anything more than ordinary negligence, especially since the plaintiffs had not proffered evidence of any prior complaints or accidents”); see also Polzo, 196 at 569 (a public entity’s actions or failure to act cannot be deemed palpably unreasonable where there is an absence of notice).  As stated in Wilson v. Jacobs, 334 N.J. Super. 640, 648 (App. Div. 2000), “the mere happening of an accident on public property is insufficient to impose liability upon a public entity. ”  For a public entity to be liable, its conduct must have been more than negligent; the public entity must have acted in a “manifestly” or “obviously” unreasonable fashion.  Williams v. Town of Phillipsburg, 171 N.J. Super. 278 at 286.  (App. Div. 1979).  The record here establishes, beyond any material or genuine dispute, that the Authority did not act with the requisite egregiousness, and its motion for summary judgment should, therefore, be granted.  Brill.  As such, the trial court correctly found that Plaintiff did not establish that the conduct of the Authority was palpably unreasonable as required by N.J.S.A. 59:4-2.  Based on plaintiff’s failure to meet the statutory requirements set forth under N.J.S.A. 59:4-2, it is respectfully submitted that summary judgment was appropriate, and the trial court’s Order and judgment should be affirmed.
[brief] Defendant gave a statement in allocution.  (30T12-13 to 21).  He apologized for his actions on March 23, 2019.  (30T12-13 to 14).  He said he wished he had never --- 4  This Point responds to Point IV in defendant’s brief. taken possession of the gun.  (30T12-14 to 15).  He said he just wanted “to get back to raising [his] son” and said the night of the crime was a “tragic night. ”  (30T12-19 to 21).
[brief] In order to prove discrimination based on race the following elements must be satisfied and were satisfied in this case: (1) Plaintiff is a member of a protected category based on race as she is African-American, (2) She was performing her job satisfactorily, (3) She was subjected to adverse employment action including hostile work environment and termination from employment and (4) the reason for being subjected to adverse employment action was based on race.  McDonnell Douglas Corp. at 802.
[brief] Defendants argue that the appointment of a SHO was, despite the antagonism and extreme prejudice exhibited by the Defendants, inappropriate because they claim to have been wholly supportive of affordable housing production within [...].  Respectfully, this is not the case.  As set forth in the Certification of Plaintiffs’ Professional Planner [...], P.P. (Ra162), the Township has displayed a long term propensity toward favoring age restricted housing, with the Township’s demographic statistics confirming a relative shortage of minority households as well as a shortage of housing occupied by families with children – the intended beneficiaries of the Mount Laurel doctrine.
[brief] [...]  ATTORNEY GENERAL OF NEW JERSEY  ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT STATE OF NEW JERSEY  [...]  JUSTICE COMPLEX TRENTON, NEW JERSEY 08625  [...]  ATTORNEY NO. 240412017  DEPUTY  ATTORNEY GENERAL DIVISION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE APPELLATE  BUREAU P.O. BOX 086 TRENTON, NEW JERSEY 08625 (609) 376-2400  [...] OF COUNSEL AND ON THE BRIEF  January 17, 2024  TABLE OF CONTENTS  COUNTERSTATEMENT OF PROCEDURAL HISTORY ...........................................  1  COUNTERSTATEMENT OF FACTS ........................................................................  1  A.  [...] was discovered murdered in her bedroom.  .........................................................  1  B.  The police investigate Rebecca’s apparent homicide.  ......................... 3 C.  Defendant fled New Jersey and confessed to murdering her wife.............................................................................  5  LEGAL ARGUMENT ..............................................................................................................
[brief] “In a given situation, even though a citizen's behavior does not reach the level of ‘highly suspicious activities,’ the officer's experience may indicate that some investigation is in order. ”  *Ibid.* (internal citations omitted).  Law enforcement officers “may rely on characteristics consistent with both innocence and guilt in formulating reasonable suspicion. ”  *State v. Stovall*, 170 N.J. 346, 359-60 (2002).
[brief] “If you believe that a witness deliberately lied to you on any fact significant to your decision on this case, you have the right to reject all of the witness’s testimony. ”  [11T162:3-6] (quoting Model Jury Charge § 1.12M, “False in One – False in All. ”  [...] was entitled present this evidence to the jury because the photographs and texts demonstrated that [...] was being dishonest about his injuries and inability to work.  See Cappell v. Capell, 358 N.J. Super. 107, 111 fn. 1 (App. Div. 2003) (stating that the “false in one, false in all” rule is appropriate where a witness intentionally gives false testimony about a material fact.).  The photographs and texts were properly admitted to show that [...] was lying about his physical condition to advance his interests in litigation, and therefore was also lying about [...] being the aggressor.
[directive] Accordingly, judges should consider the following when sentencing defendants during this public health emergency.  Please note that pursuant to the April 20, 2020 Supreme Court Order, sentencing can be conducted remotely using video and/or phone options only with the of consent all parties.  The guidance set forth below only applies to defendants who are of awaiting sentencing following a guilty plea or finding guilt by a judge.  It does not apply to defendants for whom the court has already imposed a sentence.  Sentences in the Municipal Courts  (1)  Victim Notification Regarding Sentencing  Pursuant to the April 20, 2020 Order, victims shall have opportunity to participate the an in of sentencing aspect the municipal court proceeding or to object to the scheduling or of method the sentencing proceeding.  that regard, Municipal Prosecutors and other law In of enforcement agencies shall, to the extent applicable, provide notice to victims the of of scheduling the sentencing aspect the municipal proceeding, including how the sentencing is proposed to be conducted and whether the court will consider staying the of of If commencement the custodial portion.  a victim or family member the defendant, or other appropriate person wishes to participate/address the court, such arrangements of should be made by the prosecutor or defense counsel.  The court must be advised these of arrangements advance the sentencing.  in (2)  Discretionary Sentences to County Jail  For municipal charges where incarceration discretionary - judges should consider is whether other appropriate and legally authorized penalties other than incarceration may be imposed.  (3)  Probation Sentences  (a)  Sentences that involve only a probationary term may be stayed at the judge's discretion.  Municipal Sentencing Guidance -- Issued by Directive 13-20 (April 30, 2020)
[brief] Appellants failed to serve an affidavit of merit in support of their claim pursuant to New Jersey law and [...] moved for a dismissal under the applicable statute.  The trial court granted [...]’s motion to dismiss and Appellants now appeal that ruling and assert that no affidavit of merit was required.  This respondent brief focuses only on the affidavit of merit issue, as all other aspects of Appellants’ voluminous submission are not relevant to [...] or its dismissal from the underlying case.
[brief] A  I'm saying that there's discretion to how these surveyors do their surveys.  And I can't assume that when they do a tour they go through every hallway.  They may not.  They may not go through every floor.  I don't know.  In some cases I find that they don't, so it's hard to say.  Like I said, this leaves a lot to the imagination.  Q  Okay.  Well, what's left to the imagination?  Are you saying that the [...] did not do an appropriate complaint survey in this case?
[brief] On April 16, 2022 at around 4:50 pm, Officer [...]\(^3\) from [...] conducted a motor vehicle stop after --- \(^3\)  Six months earlier, in October of 2021, [...] attended a Street Cop Training Conference, which, according to a report published by the [...], promoted unconstitutional, harassing and discriminatory practices, including illegally prolonging motor vehicle stops to detect criminality.
[brief] ”  *State v. Roth*, 95 N.J. 334, 364–65 (1984).  The appellate court should however avoid substituting its preferences for those of the sentencing court.  *State v. Bieniek*, 200 N.J. 601, 608 (2010).  In other words, [a]n appellate court is bound to affirm a sentence, even if it would have arrived at a different result, as long as the trial court properly identifies and balances aggravating and mitigating factors that are supported by competent credible evidence in the record.
[directive] Current offense involves less than one ounce of marijuana.  Plea offer is 180 days in county jail as a condition of probation.  Current offense does not involve less than one ounce of marijuana.  Plea offer is a term of 3 years imprisonment with the statutorily prescribed term of parole ineligibility waived.  Page 2 of 2  BRIMAGE STANDARDIZED WAIVER PLEA FORM  Defendant Name  Promis Number B.  Unrestricted Waiver of N.J.S.A. 2C:35-12 (“Open” Offer) - Defendant must meet all of the above criteria in Section A and all of the following additional criteria:
[brief] (20T63-5 to 11).  On appeal from the resentencing, defendant claimed that his punishment was not proportional to the offense and, therefore, did not serve the goal of retribution.  (Pa55).  He argued there were a few ways that the disparity was made clear, first being that it was substantially longer than the sentences of his three co-defendants.  (Pa55).  He claimed that the difference between seventy years in prison and five or zero could not legally be justified by the fact that defendant exercised his right to trial and, given that he had a similar record to co-defendants [...] and [...], and a much better record than [...], there was no reason to treat him so differently from the other co-defendants.  (Pa55).  These arguments were not specifically mentioned by this Court in its opinion, however, this Court affirmed defendant’s sentence and the New Jersey Supreme Court denied defendant’s petition for certification.
[brief] **THE PSA EXPRESSLY ALLOWED PLAINTIFF TO DEMAND SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE IF BIRCH PROCEEDED TO CLOSE WITH THE FEE OWNER – AND THIS RIGHT EXISTED “IN ADDITION TO ITS TERMINATION RIGHT”**  *(Pa357; Pa651-652; 2T, 3T, 4T)*  A.  Section 13.1 of the PSA Expressly Granted Plaintiff the Right to Demand Specific Performance, “in Addition to its Termination Right”  Defendants argue – and the trial court held – that, by demanding a return of the Deposit in mid-July 2022, after [...] unambiguously announced that it would not abide by its contractual obligations, Plaintiff elected an exclusive remedy and terminated the PSA, such that it had no right to insist upon specific performance when, a few weeks later, [...] proceeded to close on the real estate with the seller and failed to convey title to Plaintiff.