ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] I.  The Court Should Defer to the [...]’s Decision  In matters involving decisions made by administrative agencies, courts generally grant those decisions and the “agency’s expertise and superior knowledge in a particular field” a great deal of deference, giving them a “strong presumption of reasonableness. ”  Aqua Beach Condo. Ass'n v. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs, Bureau of Homeowner Prot., New Home Warranty Program, 186 N.J. 5, at 16 (2006), quoting Newark v. Natural Res. Council, 82 N.J. 530, 539 (1980); Greenwood v. State Police Training Ctr., 127 N.J. 500 (1992).  Such decisions should not be upset unless this Court finds that it is “arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable, or that it lacked fair support in the evidence, or that it violated legislative policies expressed or implicit in the enabling legislation” and is done so only in “rare circumstances. ”  Aqua Beach Condo. Ass'n v. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs, Bureau of Homeowner Prot., New Home Warranty Program, 186 N.J. 5, at 16 (2006) quoting Campbell v. Dep't of Civil Serv., 39 N.J. 556, 562 (1963); In re Musick, 143 N.J. 206, 216 (1996).  In determining whether an agency’s action meets the “arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable” threshold, courts should consider: (1) whether the agency's action violates express or implied legislative policies, that is, did the agency follow the law; (2) whether the record contains substantial evidence to support the findings on which the agency based its action; and (3) whether in applying the legislative policies to the facts, the agency clearly erred in reaching a conclusion that could not reasonably have been made on a showing of the relevant factors.  Matter of Acosta, 2021 WL 1344026, at 4 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Apr. 12, 2021), citing In re Carter, 191 N.J. 474, 482 (2007) (quoting Mazza v. Bd. of Trs., 143 N.J. 22, 25 (1995)).  The lofty burden of proving that the agency’s decision was “arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable” is on the Appellant.  Id. quoting Bowden v. Bayside State Prison, 268 N.J. Super. 301, at 304 (App. Div. 1993).  Here, the [...]’s decision that Appellant was not entitled to a promotion due to the expiration of the eligibility list was not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable.  Rather, the [...] correctly applied the law which requires promotions to come from current eligible lists, unless genuine vacancies exist, and exercised its statutory discretion to “relax” certain regulations in order to cure administrative errors.
[brief] Jai Sai Ram v. Planning Bd., 446 N.J. Super. 338 (App. Div. 2016) ........ 25, 27 Jantausch v. Borough of Verona, 41 N.J. Super. 89 (Law Div. 1956), aff’d, 24 N.J. 326 (1957) .......................................................................  15 Manalapan Realty, LP v. Twp. Committee of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366 (1995) ..............................................................................  26 Matter of H.D., 241 N.J. 412 (2020) .........................................................
[brief] Regardless of the jurisdictional bar, the subject Arbitration Agreement is valid, and Appellant cannot overcome the strong presumption in favor of arbitration.  Finally, the Court correctly determined that Respondents did not waive their right to enforce the Arbitration Agreement by merely engaging in early-stage litigation activities.  For these reasons, as more fully set forth below, this honorable Court must affirm the Lower Court’s referral of the action to arbitration under the binding and applicable arbitration agreement between the parties.
[brief] While the Superior Officers decision relates to the Director’s ability to reject an arbitration decision under the initial MSRA, the Appellate Division also considered the CNA at issue in this matter, and the question of whether the Director could reject a decision concerning accumulated sick leave compensation benefits allegedly vested prior to when [...] was designated as in need of stabilization and recovery.  See id. at *9; (Pa000677).  In Superior Officers, the Appellate Division found that the “MSRA’s findings and declarations undeniably supply the justifications for granting the State the authority to unilaterally modify the expired-but-effective CNA” at issue.  Ibid.  (citing N.J.S.A. 52:27BBBB-2).  The Appellate Division further explained that alleged “vesting” of employee rights under expired CNAs is “inconsequential” following the enactment of the MSRA, finding that the “MSRA permits the Director to unilaterally modify this contract term. ”  Id. at *8; (Pa000676).  As the Appellate Division explained:  The Legislature’s enactment of N.J.S.A. 52:27BBBB-5(3)(i) contemplated precisely the circumstance here where the State may unilaterally modify the terms and conditions of employment in connection with an expired CNA.  Applying the principles of statutory interpretation, the Legislature’s intent by the plain language of this provision is apparent.  The State may “unilaterally modify” any term or condition of employment where the CNA with a municipality in need of stabilization and recovery is expired.  This “clear and unambiguous result” concludes our interpretative process.  Richardson, 192 N.J. at 195.  Thus, MSRA permits the Director to unilaterally modify the contract term for accumulated sick leave upon from Lieutenant to Captain as that CNA expired.  Ibid.  The Appellate Division has thus recognized the State’s ability to limit accumulated sick leave compensation under the MSRA.  Although unpublished, the Appellate Division’s decision in Superior Officers has been found persuasive by a number of courts below.
[directive] In deciding to de-activate the in person requesting de-activation and the person need of consider the privacy interests of the medical assistance.  Request. for De-Activation  Upon a Civilian's 6.3 Procedures or 6.2, the following procedures pursuant to section 6.1  When anofficer de-activates a BWC civilian concerning the request for de- between officer and the shall followed: 1) the colloquy the be shall de-activating the BWC narrate beelectronically recorded; 2) the officer before activationshall per victim's turning off my BWC as the de-activation (e.g„ "I am now the circumstances of the de-activation to his or her concerning the officer shall report the circumstances request."); 3) the of de- circumstances the 4) the officer shall document the superior soon is practicable; and as as investigation.
[brief] In his opening statement, Plaintiff’s counsel introduced the jury to the function of civil law in America, and its inherent dependence on the concept of accountability (3T, at 3:9-21).  “Our entire system of civil law is based on the idea that if your conduct injures someone else, it’s your responsibility to do something to make it right.  It’s a pretty simple concept. ” (3T, at 15-18).  Plaintiff’s counsel then related this notion of accountability to the present case as a means of explaining the peculiarity of stipulated liability (3T, at 4:19-22).
[brief] Third, the trial court correctly recognized that [...]’s tortured interpretation is contrary to his pleaded allegations.  Da66a  In his answer and counterclaims against [...], [...] alleged an interpretation of the Consumption Exception that is fully consistent with [...]’s view.  There, he asserted that the [...] Policies “contain an exception to the modified mold exclusions when the injury is the result of any fungi or bacteria that are, are on, or are contained in, an edible good or edible product intended for human…consumption. ”  Da78a. (emphasis added).
[directive] This officers).  police supervisory or prosecutors designated by approved be decisions certain that Page 12 of procedural will promote uniformity by combination substantive standards and safeguards for all channeling discretion still affording police and prosecutors the flexibility to account while for in pretrial including that not accounted the automated relevant facts and circumstances, those are N.J.S.A. Director risk-assessment process approved by the Administrative of the Courts pursuant to or acomplaint-sumrnons to presumptions established in this Directive onwhen toissue  The seek pretrial detention or revocation of release, should acomplaint-warrant, and on when to apply for recently-revised Bail Reform Law and the with the presumptions established in the not be confused of law forth in Directive are designed to guide the exercise this Court Rules.  The presumptions set comprehensive, and precise generally are more detailed, enforcement/prosecutorial discretion, and established in this presumptions than presumptions set forth in the statute and Court Rules.
[brief] On January 25, 2019, [...] returned to [...] to present another project, this time to replace its Clark substation, which is, according to [...], old, near capacity, and suffering from performance problems.  DA at 329a et seq.  Unlike b2933, which was a baseline project, the Clark substation replacement was identified as a “supplemental” project.  Id.  According to [...], the difference between a baseline and supplemental project is that a supplemental project goes beyond the criteria required for service to customers and is only meant to address a specific stated need of [...].  DA at 318a – 319a.  Replacement of the Clark substation was ultimately approved by [...] and that separate non-essential project labeled as “s1823. ”  DA at 381a.  There is absolutely no requirement that [...] complete s1823 in order to comply with the b2933 project, and only b2933 is actually necessary for [...] to provide safe, adequate, and proper service, as it is required by law to do.
[brief] Substantively, the State marshals no legal support for its proposition that when two separate indictments cannot be encompassed in one plea bargain, a defendant winning an issue he preserved on appeal requires that the defendant be allowed to withdraw from the agreement as a whole.  The State ignores the published case of State v. Diloreto, 362 N.J. Super. 600, 615-16 (App. Div. 2003), in which this Court held that right to withdraw from the entirety of a plea agreement after prevailing on appeal, as codified in the conditional plea rule, applies when “the defendant simultaneously pleads to multiple indictments and the pre-plea motion relates to only one.
[directive] FORFEITED USE OF PROPERTY AND A General uth orization  The Secretary of the Treasury has the authority to retain or transfer any forfeited property No for official use by any federal agency.  seized property shall be placed into official use until a final decree or final order of forfeiture has been made and the request to place the prqperty into official use has been approved by the appropriate official.  Property forfeited for a trademark violation may be donated by the Customs Service to charitable organizations in accordance with established procedures.  Cash  Forfeited cash or proceeds from the sale of forfeited property may not be retained by any Treasury investigative agency.
[brief] [...] and [...], in her individual capacity and as Power of Attorney for [...], v. [...], [...], [...], [...]  d/b/a [...], [...], JOHN DOES 1-10, and XYZ COMPANIES 1-10.  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY – APPELLATE DIVISION  DOCKET NO. [...]  CIVIL ACTION ON APPEAL FROM: Superior Court of New Jersey Law Division, Hudson County  Docket No.: [...] Sat Below: Hon. [...], P.J. Civ. D.
[brief] [10T 17:21-19:23].  Not only did the jury hear [...]’s testimony under questioning from Plaintiffs’ counsel, there is also no indication that his live testimony would have been superior to the videotaped deposition testimony that was presented at trial.  See State v. Hill, 199 N.J. 545, 561 (2009) (stating that the party seeking the inference must establish that the witness “have superior knowledge of relevant facts. ”).  Rather, [...]’s live testimony would have been cumulative of his videotaped deposition testimony played for the jury.  The charge is appropriate only when there is no alternative explanation for the witness’s failure to appear, and here the record reflected [...]’s attorney could not locate him and it was unknown if [...] had notice of the trial.  Id. at 354 (quoting State v. Clawans, 38 N.J. 162, 170-71 (1962)); See also [Pb43]; [10T 17:15-21].  Finally, even if it was error to preclude comment on [...]’s absence, the error was harmless because the trial court allowed an adverse inference related to the contents of a missing internal incident report [...] testified he submitted to [...].
[brief] “Equitable estoppel embodies the doctrine ‘that one shall not be permitted to repudiate an act done or position assumed where that course would work injustice to another who, having the right to do so, has detrimentally relied thereon’. ”  Id. at 231 quoting Anske v. Palisades Park, 139 N.J. Super. 342, 348, 354 (App. Div. 1976).  . . . .Estoppel is conduct, either express or implied, which reasonably mislead another to his prejudice so that a repudiation of such conduct would be unjust in the eyes of the law.  Such estoppel is grounded not on subjective intent but rather on the objective impression created by the actor’s conduct. ”  Id., quoting Hill v.Middletown Bd.of Ed., 183 N.J. Super. 36, 41 (App. Div. 1982), quoting Dembro v. Union Cty. Pk. Comm’n., 130 N.J. Super. 450, 457 (Law Div. 1974).  “The doctrine of unjust enrichment rests on the equitable principle that a person shall not be allowed to enrich himself unjustly at the expense of another.
[brief] Like [...], [...] also argued that it could not be held liable for breaching the contract with Plaintiff because the PSA had already been terminated by the time [...] misled Plaintiff and withheld material information about the closing.  ([...] Mem. at 20, 21 (Pa562-563)).  Because [...] is alleged to have made false promises and misstatements upon which Plaintiff relied after the Deposit was returned, [...] argued that it could not be held to have breached “an already breached and terminated agreement. ” (Id. at 21).  This argument rests upon the same distortion of the terms of the PSA that [...] relied upon – and the trial court accepted.  (Pa357; Pa651-652; 2T; 3T; 4T).  As discussed in Point II, *supra*, Section 13.1 of the PSA gave Plaintiff an express right to demand specific performance and insist upon transfer of the title to the Real Property to Plaintiff, if [...] defaulted on its obligations and proceeded to close upon the transaction directly with the Fee Owner, notwithstanding and in addition to the return of the Deposit.
[brief] The focal issue in the Probate Action was what [...] (“[...]”) intended by the ambiguous Article Third in his July 9, 2014 Last Will and Testament (the “Will”) in which he gifted the unpaid principal and accrued interest under the mortgage that he held on property located at [...] to his son, [...] (“[...]”) and directed that the mortgage debt be forgiven and the mortgage lien canceled as of record.  The ambiguity results from Defendant’s negligence as scrivener and his failure to make clear that his bequest was intended to benefit only his beloved son and not his daughter in-law [...].  [...] (“[...]”) was born in the province of Calabria, Italy.  His wife, [...] (“[...]”), was born in a neighboring town in the same province.  They married in Italy and immigrated to the United States in approximately 1957.  At the time of his death, [...] had been married to [...] for 56 or 57 years.  (Pa000134).  Plaintiff, [...] (“[...]”) is their only son (Pa000134-135).  [...] worked side by side with [...] for nearly 50 years.
[brief] I/M/O [...], Commission Docket Nos. C56-19 and C57-19 (2021) (Ca255) (citing Dunbar Bey v. Brown, Commission Docket No. C25-11 (2011) (Ca275)), reaffirmed, e.g., by I/M/O [...], Commission Docket No. C71-18 (2021) (236) and Commission’s Advisory Opinion A02-22 (February 25, 2022) (Ca233).  Although Respondent argues that the statements attributed to her by Complainant were not made in her capacity as a Board member, and do not relate to her Board membership or to Board actions, the Commission finds that the statements on her Facebook page are clearly linked to her Board membership (and candidacy).  Respondent’s Facebook page is clearly marked with the banner, ‘Re-Elect [...] to the [...],’ but does not appear to have a disclaimer noting that the statements are her own and unrelated to the Board.
[brief] Specifically, the Superior Court recognized the *Superior Officers’* decision and noted that it addresses the power vested in the State under the MSRA:  It is undisputed that the MSRA delineates substantial authority to the State’s ability to terminate and modify existing agreements involving municipalities in need of stabilization and recovery.  Applying this rationale to the case at bar, this Court finds the MSRA is to be interpreted liberally and was intended to supersede all prior agreements or contracts, including the 2016 MOAs.  (Pa000026-27).  The Superior Court further analyzed the MOAs in the context of the MSRA, together with the Settlement Agreement and Implementation Memo, and determined that Plaintiffs had failed to state a cause of action:
[brief] No. 04-6424 (GEB) (MF), 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82582, at *32 (D.N.J. Nov. 5, 2007).  Here, the indemnification provision broadly applies to “any and all claims, damages, losses or expenses arising in connection herewith” and to legal proceedings pertaining to “the Escrowed Funds, the Property or the subject matter of [the PSA].” (Pa118-119, §17.1(b)-(c)).  The PSA did not limit [...]’s indemnification to claims brought only pursuant to specific aspects of the contractual relationship as in Hooper.  See Rhodia Inc. 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82582, at *32 (holding that language similar to that at issue in the PSA was broader than the language in Hopper and allowed for a first-party claim under New Jersey law).
[brief] See also (17T:202-21 to 206-22)(cross-examination of [...] regarding defendant’s refusal to answer specific questions and Miranda).  Defendant argues that this ruling constitutes reversible error.  According to defendant, the failure to redact his refusals to answer specific questions, as well as his request to have this ability honored at the beginning of the statement, before it was played to the jury constituted improper commentary on his invocation of the right to silence that improperly allowed the jury to infer his guilt.  Defendant further rejects the sufficiency of the instruction provided to the jury.  Contrary to defendant’s arguments, the lower court’s handling of his request for redactions fully comported with Kucinski and Feaster and, therefore, should be affirmed by this Court.
[brief] Appellant’s applications to the Board  On November 4, 2016, Appellant filed the First Application seeking an interpretation under N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70(b) listing Appellant as the “applicant” for the interpretation (Ra163-Ra164).  In December 2017, at the hearing, counsel for the Board referred to Appellant as the “applicant” for an interpretation as to “what the zoning board meant when they adopted a resolution in 1972” (Ra176-Ra177).  Chairman [...] (the “Chairman”) repeatedly remarked during the hearing that it was not clear why the parties were before the Board “if the judge ruled on the case” in the Easement Litigation, and it remained subject to appeal (Ra178-Ra179).  During the hearing, Appellant’s counsel sought the Board’s interpretation as to “what it believes that site plan approval of resolution of 1972 meant” (Ra190).  The Board, on the advice of its counsel, unanimously approved the motion “declin[ing] the introduction to be able to review this particular information” (Ra205-Ra207), and passed a confirming resolution to that effect (Ra216-Ra217).
[brief] The extent of Defendants’ evidence that the Property was untenantable is the unsupported testimony of the board planner that “there was a basis” for issuance of a summons that had not in fact been issued.  Plaintiff’s testimony at the Land Use Hearing further establishes that occupancy of the building was possible and, in fact, that the tenant wanted to renew the lease in January 2023, but Plaintiff declined and allowed the lease to expire until the remediation at the building was completed.  (T1, 13:6-10 (“A lease has been in place since… five years ago…  We allowed it to expire. ”)).  Plaintiff did not testify that the LSRP would need to “dig up the slab under the building. ”  Rather, Plaintiff testified that, in late 2022, the LSRP “had been going in[to the building] to… try to see what was under the slab… it became pretty clear… that there was some additional work that needed to be done…  So we allowed the lease to expire so that we could get in there and dig up whatever needed to be dug up”.  (T1, 13:11-23).  Plaintiff testified to a need to “dig up whatever needed to be dug up. ”  There is no evidence that this excavation included digging up the slab under the building as Defendants claim.  Rather, [...], Plaintiff’s LSRP testified that, as of July 17, 2023, he still had not yet determined the best way to remediate the area underneath the building.  (T1, 32:21-33:6 (“[The method of remediation] could be leave it in place and put a low permeability cap over it, like a building foundation or a concrete driveway.  It could be something where we do some type of in-situ treatment, injection of a chemical oxidant into the ground to oxidize the contaminants in place, physical removal by excavation…  But again, the process is iterative, and it’s all based on what the data shows. ”)).  Further, Plaintiff could have performed this remediation work while extending the lease that had been in place since 2018 but chose not to in order to facilitate easier access to the site.  (T1, 13:6-10).  The mere fact that Plaintiff made the decision to let the lease expire in order to more readily continue remediation does not establish that the Property was in such a state as to be “untenantable” in the manner contemplated by the LRHL.  D.
[brief] 1 COUNTER-STATEMENT OF FACTS ..................................................................  2 LEGAL ARGUMENT .............................................................................................  8 POINT I  THE OFFICERS’ TESTIMONY THAT THEY WERE ARRESTING DEFENDANT FOR AGGRAVATED ASSAULT WAS NOT CLEARLY CAPABLE OF PRODUCING AN UNJUST RESULT ........................................  8  A.  The Officers Did Not Testify to the Ultimate Issue ......................................  8  B.  Assuming Arguendo That the Testimony Should Not Have Been Admitted, This was Not Plain Error .................................................................  10 POINT II  THE COURT WAS UNDER NO OBLIGATION TO SUA SPONTE INSTRUCT THE JURY ON SELF-DEFENSE FOR THE RESISTING ARREST CHARGE .......................................................................................  15 POINT III  BECAUSE DEFENDANT DID NOT CONTEST CAUSATION OF ALL INJURY AND BECAUSE CAUSATION OF SEVERE BODILY INJURY IS NOT AN ELEMENT OF THIRD-DEGREE  AGGRAVATED ASSAULT ON A POLICE OFFICER, THE TRIAL JUDGE WAS NOT REQUIRED TO SUA SPONTE  INSTRUCT THE JURY ON CAUSATION ........................................................................................................  23  POINT IV  BECAUSE DEFENDANT DOES NOT IDENTIFY ANY ERRORS AT TRIAL, HE CANNOT CLAIM CUMULATIVE ERROR .......................
[brief] ’”  State v. Domicz, 188 N.J. 285, 304 (2006) (quoting Carty, 180 N.J. at 644-46); State v. Elders, 192 N.J. 224, 240 (2007).  Post-Carty precedent advised officers that “[e]ven though [an] initial stop [is] for a motor vehicle violation,” they would not be “precluded from broadening the inquiry of his stop ‘[i]f, during the course of the stop or as a result of reasonable inquiries initiated by the officer, the circumstances “give rise to suspicions unrelated to the traffic offense.