ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] During the hearing [...], [...] and [...], all blamed each other for why the insurance policies or ownership information was not provided.  At one point [...] directed [...] to provide a copy of all the insurance policies.  [...] stated: "In order to get a copy of the policy, she would have to complete something at the company and pay a fee to get a copy of the policy."  (6T-22).  Thereafter, [...] requested that [...] give him permission to obtain the policies and [...] gave him permission on the record.  (6T-24).  It was absolutely clear that both [...] and [...] understood their obligation to do what was necessary to provide copies of all the insurance policies to the Court.  (6T-24)  [...] then spoke and advised the Court that she had finally been able to get access to the decedent's mail and she was finding information about insurance policies for the decedent and payments being made.
[brief] In furtherance thereof, as it relates to the Affidavit of Title, [...] signed the October 2019 Deed as [...] for the sole purpose of aligning that signature with the December 1998 Deed despite never utilizing that name.  Defendants’ conduct, in this regard, was a knowing and purposeful misrepresentation designed specifically to defraud [...].  Third, Defendants’ intentional omissions and misrepresentations were all done with the actual fraudulent intent of hiding the transaction from [...], thus precluding [...] from taking action to defend is ownership.  Said another way, Defendants specifically intended for [...] to rely upon his continued belief in his ownership so he would not scuttle their plan to transfer the Property and sell it out from under him.  Indeed, keeping [...] in the dark about the transaction was a key element of the Defendants’ plan to sell the Property shortly after the transfer in October 2019.  As testified to by [...], Defendants did not tell [...] that the Property was transferred to [...] nor did they tell him that they hired a realtor to list the Property for sale.  By keeping these facts unknown to [...], Defendants hoped to complete the sale to a bona fide purchaser before anticipated litigation could be instituted.  But for a fortuitous review of the city’s property tax record by [...]’s wife, [...], Defendants’ plan would have worked.
[brief] As the parties further briefed to the Arbitrator, parties can also impliedly modify the writing requirement to their contract, and the parties’ multi-year course of conduct and performance in this case clearly established that understanding.  Under New Jersey law, parties are free to modify their contracts—including those that “require that changes to the contract must be made in writing”—so long as the “proposed modification by one party to a contract [is] accepted by the other to constitute mutual assent to modify. ”
[brief] (3T124:13-19).  Each personal draw would go against each other’s respective profits in business.  (3T107:15-18; 3T168:13-169:16).  The pharmacy’s financials prepared by the accountant would identify personal expenses of Defendant and Plaintiff by categorizing them under “Draw. ” (Pa49-67; [...] balance sheets and profit and loss statement showed the term “Draw” under each of the parties’ names—i.e., under [...] and [...]—and under “Draw” personal expenses are identified.  (Pa49-67; 3T107:17-108:14).  This was also true for the general ledgers of [...].  (Pa68-146).  c.  Defendant’s alleged treatment of the company as her personal piggy bank.
[brief] D.  An Exclusion In An Automobile Policy Must Appear On The Declaration Page To Be Effective And, Thus, The Exclusion Of 12-15 Passenger Vans Is Violative Of New Jersey Public Policy.  (Not raised below)  The fundamental rule laid down in Zacarias v. Allstate ins. Co., 168 N.J.590 (2001) is that members of the public purchasing policies of insurance are entitled to the broad measure of protection necessary to fulfill their reasonable expectations.  The goal in construing an accident insurance policy is to effectuate the reasonable expectations of the average member of the public who buys it.  This is particularly true when the insured is the owner of a children’s camp and the policy involved is one to protect the campers in case of a motor vehicle accident.  Here, the lower court found the Questionnaire was not ambiguous.  But even if this Court agrees, an unambiguous exclusion is not fatal to the “reasonable expectations” rule.  Nowhere in any of the documents produced is there any notice to the policy holder that 12-15 passenger vans are excluded from coverage.  In Lehrhoff v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 271 N.J. Super. 340, 346 (App. Div. 1994), the court noted the importance of the declaration page of an insurance policy and its capacity to define the insured’s reasonable expectations of coverage.  Here, the declaration page was not produced, but there is no doubt that it did not have any Exclusion.  See section B, supra.  The accident here did not occur for almost 2 weeks after the policy went into effect.  [...], the camp owner, prior to the issuance of the policy did not have a declaration page noting that there was no Exclusion and the master policy has not Exclusion for such vans.  Had the declaration page or the policy itself contained an Exclusion of 12-15 passenger vans, [...] might have realized he and his drivers were not covered, giving him two weeks to remedy the situation.  The reasonable expectations of coverage under the policy cannot be contradicted by the failure of the insurer to have a sufficient notice to the policyholder in the policy and the declaration page that there is an Exclusion for 12-15 passenger vans.  E.
[brief] STATEMENT OF ALL ITEMS SUBMITTED TO THE TRIAL COURT ON THE “SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION”2 | Item Submitted | Appendix Page | |----------------|---------------| | Notice of Cross Motion for Dismissal of Complaint | 210a | Cross Motion Exhibits - Exhibit 1, Filed Complaint (6/19/23)…………………………………Omitted3 - Exhibit 2, 225.63 Egg Harbor Township Municipal Code………………178a - Exhibit 3, Township of Egg Harbor Planning Board/Zoning Board of Adjustment Request for Recommendation Form…………………………..186a - Exhibit 4, [...], P.E., P.P., C.M.E. Memo dated April 10, 2023…………………………………………………………………………………..198a - Exhibit 5, Revised [...], P.E., P.P, C.M.E. Memo dated April 11, 2023…………………………………………………………………………………..Omitted4 - Exhibit 6, Decision and Resolution Denying Amended Preliminary and Final Minor Site Plan Approval with Variances dated May 15, 2023……..Omitted5 - The Report of [...] dated March 31, 2023…………………………………………………………………………………………….Omitted6
[brief] New Jersey’s single precedent concerning an “uneven” arbitration provision is Delta Funding Corp. v. Harris, 189 N.J. 28 (2006), involving an agreement between a commercial lender and a consumer.  ____________________ held, again, that this type of provision could not be enforced -- the Court observed that language in the Court’s Syllabus Five to Arnold had been read to suggest that different principles of the state’s common law applied to determination of whether an arbitration clause was enforceable.  The West Virginia Supreme Court clarified:  “Under the Federal Arbitration Act, a common-law ruling that targets arbitration provisions for disfavored treatment not applied to other contractual terms generally is preempted.  [citation omitted].  Accordingly, to the extent that Syllabus Point 5 of Arnold may be read to be a “matter of law,” per se rule that targets arbitration provisions for disfavored treatment, the FAA compels us to overrule Syllabus Point 5. ”  [...] v. Nelson, 230 W.Va. 281, 291 (2012).  In actuality, the court did not overrule Arnold; it overruled cases that had misinterpreted Arnold.
[brief] Number one, the argument says -- and I’m looking at the motion for reconsideration.  The first argument in the motion for reconsideration was that when the bid opening should be evaluated and suggesting that the Court indicated it was evaluating the bid as of August 20th and not on the bid opening date.  And again -- and this may fall into an area where I wasn’t artful.  It’s not in dispute that the responsiveness to the bid needs to be evaluated on the date of the bid opening and I may not have said that clearly because my argument ultimately went to what was done subsequently.  I would also note that the Court specifically found that this particular registration document was not material and was waivable and so the case law and the cases cited by the moving party all go to non-waivable and material documents and that’s not what we have here based on my rule.
[brief] 12.  It is an indisputable fact that [...] misrepresented her finances.  This misrepresentation was a FACT.  And this misrepresentation was not known to the Defendant until discovery occurred in this case.  (Trial Transcript T2, page 129 line 20-Page 130 line 5), (Also Transcript trial T2, page 161 lines 2-15)  13.  This misrepresentation is central to the issue of the penalties assessed against the Defendant.  And that is because the issue of the payment or non-payment of the $70,000.00 is the reason for the assessment of the penalties against the Defendant.  In other words, the alleged non-payment by the Defendant relates to the $70,000.00, and the misrepresentation relates to this $70,000.00.  14.  Defendant was required to pay the Plaintiff $1,500.00 per month from the signing of the agreement for the life of the Plaintiff.  (DA 1, page A4, paragraph 4)  15.  Defendant made six (6) years of payments of $1,500.00 per month to Plaintiff without interruption.  In other words, he made 72 consecutive payments.  Plaintiff indicated in testimony that payment stopped in June or July 2017 (Trial Transcript 2, page 128, lines 3-4).  That would equate to 72 consecutive payments.  THIS IS UNDISPUTED.
[brief] For example, the Department would plainly be acting contrary to its legislative mandate by requiring the creation of public access in areas that are unsafe for pedestrians or that serve as habitat for endangered and threatened wildlife.  In addition to these considerations, convenience must also factor into the Department’s analysis when deciding whether the creation or expansion of public access is appropriate under the Public Access Law.  After all, the Department could not, for example, justify the creation of an elaborate, lengthy zig-zagging path to a public access point as “meaningful and reasonable” if a much shorter and more direct path to the same access point already exists in the immediate vicinity; indeed, such an exercise of the Department’s authority would be directly counter-productive to the spirit and the letter of the Public Access Law.  Although the facts present here are not quite as extreme as the hypothetical above, the same rationale must apply to the Department’s extensive plans for [...]’s property when a shorter, more direct public access path to the same waterfront area already exists at the nearby [...] and [...] (the former of which sits upon land that the developer of [...] donated as a condition of obtaining the permits to build the residences that [...] now comprises).
[brief] In other words, but for the payment of the $2 million fee by [...] to the City, the [...] Property would not have been redeveloped, and the purposes of the LRHL as well as the Amended Redevelopment Plan would not have been effectuated.  Clearly, the $2 million payment advanced the purpose of the Amended Redevelopment Plan; without it, the [...] Property would not have been redeveloped.  Additionally, although there is no statutory requirement that the revenue negotiated and collected by the City be used in any specific manner, the $2 million fee was used to improve and renovate the senior center located immediately adjacent to the [...] Property.  The construction of the senior center therefore effectuates the purposes of the LRHL by improving facilities within the City.  See N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-2 (the LRHL was enacted to “promote the advancement of community interest through programs of redevelopment, rehabilitation and incentives to the expansion and improvement of commercial, industrial, residential and civic facilities”).  Second, according to Plaintiff, the “property and services” of the senior center are not provided “in connection with the redevelopment area,” and therefore the payment is unlawful.
[brief] The defendant, [...], was the personal “Guarantor” on Business Line of Credit with [...] as of March of 2003 (Pa38).  Formed in 1982, the small family owned and operated business, [...]  (hereinafter ‘[...]’), continued to struggle from the Great Recession of 2008 (Defendant’s Affidavit (Pa46-55)).  In January of 2013, the defendant, [...], was forced to sell his home, at [...] at a LOSS and move into an apartment at [...].  That home address of 1406 Barclay Blvd. was used by Plaintiff to file the Complaint (Pa8-12) and to issue the Summons (Pa13).  The Process Server claims that he served defendant, [...], at his home address on February 13, 2015 at 2:15 p.m.  Upon examination of the Pre-Judgment Court Records, obtained in September of 2015 (Pa24), the following certification errors were discovered:  (1)  On March 23, 2015 the Plaintiff’s attorney Request to Enter Default and his Legal Assistant’s Proof of Mailing (Pa16) were WRONGLY sent certified mail to the [...]’s business address of [...] NOT TO the defendant, [...], home (adobe) address at 1406 Barclay Blvd., Princeton NJ; (2)  On April 29, 2015 the Plaintiff’s attorney Request to Enter Default and the Final Judgment by Default and his Legal Assistant’s Proof of Mailing (Pa17) were again WRONGLY sent to [...]’s business address of [...] NOT TO the defendant, [...], home (adobe) address of 1406 Barclay Blvd., Princeton NJ; (3)  The description of the defendant was obtained from public records, an identical match to his driver license, -- not from direct observed contact; and, (4)  The individual defendant, [...], Affidavit of Service (Pa7) CONFLICTED with the Affidavit of Service (Pa6) of the business defendant, [...], because they were certified to be served by the Same Process Server, [...], on the Same Day, February 13, 2015 and at the Same Time, 2:15 p.m. at addresses physically miles and minutes apart.  That’s IMPOSSIBLE!  STATEMENT OF FACTS FOR DEFENDANT: CIMPLE SYSTEMS, INC.
[brief] Defendant also asserts that the personal injury claim was property of the bankruptcy estate, controlled by the bankruptcy trustee, and the transaction itself is void because the plaintiff had no authority to pledge the asset.  First, the amount at issue in this case was well within the amounts exempted by the bankruptcy code from the estate and not an asset.  The proceeds from the personal injury actions were disclosed, and properly distributed by order of the bankruptcy court AA311.  The claim at issue in this case was properly disclosed and abandoned by the trustee back to the debtor/plaintiff AA071, AA076.  The fact that the transaction was proposed, and its terms “displayed” to the plaintiff is sufficient to sustain a claim under TCCWNA.
[brief] ”  “In light of what the PSI and the DSS records actually revealed, however, counsel chose to abandon their investigation at an unreasonable juncture, making a fully informed decision with respect to sentencing strategy impossible,” the Supreme Court stressed.  “[T]he court's subsequent deference to counsel's strategic decision not ‘to present every conceivable mitigation defense,’ … despite the fact that counsel based this alleged choice on what we have made clear was an unreasonable investigation, was also objectively unreasonable.  As we established in Strickland, ‘strategic choices made after less than complete investigation are reasonable precisely to the extent that reasonable professional judgments support the limitations on investigation. ’”  Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 527.  The same assessment applies to the performance of [...]’s trial counsel with regard to the ballistics opinion evidence the State presented and counsel completely failed to evaluate in any manner – let alone subject to adversarial testing as expert [...]’s report shows plainly was available had counsel evaluated and investigated pretrial.
[brief] 329a-376a.  Cross Motion to Intervene filed by [...] on February 23, 2023  331a-332a - Certification of [...], Esq. 333a-334a - Exhibit A - OPRA Request through the [...] 335a-340a - Exhibit B - OPRA from [...] 341a-343a - Certification of [...] in Support of Motion 344a-349a - Exhibit A - Recorded Quit Claim Deed into [...] 350a-352a - Exhibit D - Thumb Drive Containing Videos of Property 353a-358a - Exhibit B - Exterior Photographs of Property 359a-376a - Exhibit C - Additional Photographs of Exterior of Property 377a-404a.
[brief] When asked at his deposition about his claim of misrepresentation, Plaintiff-Appellant said that he was supposed to get a dual degree and his PharmD in four years; instead, he spent five years and received only the PharmD degree\(^5\).  (Plaintiff Dep. T321:5-11 at Pa.258).  He admitted that he received 7 grades of C, along with several “T’s” (temporary grades).  (Plaintiff Dep. T313:25–T314:4 at Pa.256).  He also had several failures.  He claims the misrepresentation and the fraud claims were based on the original website.  (Plaintiff Dep. T324:5, T325:12; Id.)  However, he admits the “Right, language can’t always be exact, so. ” (Plaintiff Dep. T325:20-21 at Pa.259).
[brief] B.  The Detective Improperly Identified The Suspect’s Path Of Travel, And Created A Map Illustrating Her Belief As To The Path Of Travel.  [...] created a map (labeled S-96) marking the location of each surveillance camera which had recorded video that she found relevant to the investigation.  (4T153-3 to 7)  (Da14)  Accompanying each marker denoting the location of each camera was a description of the camera’s address, such as “[...] ”  (Da14)  Because the detective had visited the location of the cameras, she had first-hand knowledge about the location depicted such that she was authorized to provide, in “objective, factual” terms, the address of those locations.  Watson, 2023 WL 4918557, at *23.  However, [...] did not observe the suspect or the Chevy on the evening of the shooting.  She was thus prohibited under Watson from providing testimony about the alleged path of travel taken by the suspect based only upon inferences drawn from other facts in evidence, particularly because [...] reasonably and consistently disputed the detective’s opinion as to the suspect’s path of travel.  Despite this prohibition, [...] testified that the videos collectively depict the “route” of the suspected shooter, and she illustrated her belief of the suspect’s path of travel with a solid red line on the map.
[brief] ”); *Matter of C.P.M.*, 461 N.J. Super. at 582–83 (statute should not be construed with plain meaning if it would yield an absurd result. ); *Bergen County PBA Loc. 134 v. Donovan*, 436 N.J. Super. 187, 197 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 2014) (courts should consider extrinsic evidence (*e.g.* legislative history) if “a plain reading of the statute leads to an absurd result or if the overall statutory scheme is at odds with the plain language. ” [quoting *DiProspero*]).  With these principles in mind, it is clear for many reasons that the Superior Court correctly found that Appellant’s suggested plain and hyper-literal reading of the statute – whereby the FDCPA would outlaw the use of a letter vendor – must be set aside as a matter of law.
[brief] ”  [...] spills considerable ink pointing out the importance of access to government records, a fact that [...] does not dispute.  (Pb18-20).  But such reduce government agencies to full-time investigators on behalf of requesters,” id. at 15 (quoting Sack v. CIA, 53 F. Supp. 3d 154, 163 (D.D.C. 2014)).  single-minded focus disregards not only the sensitive balancing act that OPRA and its exemptions was designed to strike, but also the significant consequences that accompany forced exposure of governmental decision-making at the highest levels.  Because there is no principled way to apply the standard [...] urges this court to now articulate without opening the floodgates to wholesale requests for entire agency files or records, affirming the trial court decision in this case will inevitably wreak havoc on government functioning.
[brief] The Appellate Division’s review of rulings of law and issues regarding the applicability, validity, or interpretation of laws, statutes, or rules is de novo.  See Green v. Monmouth Univ., 237 N.J. 516, 529 (2019) (applicability of charitable immunity)  In re Ridgefield Park Bd. of Educ., 244 N.J. 1, 17 (2020) (agency's interpretation of a statute).  “A trial court's interpretation of the law and the legal consequences that flow from established facts are not entitled to any special deference. ”  *Rowe v. Bell & Gossett Co.*, 239 N.J. 531, 552 (2019) (quoting *Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan*, 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995)).  Further, if a trial court judge makes a discretionary decision but acts under a misconception of the applicable law or misapplies it, the exercise of legal discretion lacks a foundation and it becomes an arbitrary act, not subject to the usual deference.  *Summit Plaza Assocs. v. Kolta*, 462 N.J. Super. 401, 409 (App. Div. 2020); *Alves v. Rosenberg*, 400 N.J. Super. 553, 563 (App. Div. 2008).  In such cases, the reviewing court must adjudicate the controversy in the light of the applicable law in order to avoid a manifest injustice.  *State v. Lyons*, 417 N.J. Super. 251, 258 (App. Div. 2010); *State v. Steele*, 92 N.J. Super. 498, 507 (App. Div. 1966); *Kavanaugh v. Quigley*, 63 N.J. Super. 153, 158 (App. Div. 1960).  For the reasons to follow, the Appellate Division should reverse and remand this matter back to the trial court to avoid a gross miscarriage of justice.
[brief] 321 (2019) | 18 | | State v. Francisco, 471 N.J. Super. 386 (App. Div. 2022) | 27 | | State v. Fuentes, 217 N.J. 57 (2014) | 18,19 | | State v. Lawless, 214 N.J. 594 (2013) | 19 | | State v. O’Donnell, 117 N.J. 210 (1989) | 19 | | State v. Randolph, 210 N.J. 330 (2012) | 15 | | State v. Rivera, 249 N.J. 285 (2021) | 19,29 | | State v. Roth, 95 N.J. 334 (1984) | 19 | State v. Teat, 233 N.J. Super. 368 (App. Div. 1989)...........................................36 State v. Torres, 246 N.J. 246 (2021).................................................................18,34 State v. Yarbough, 100 N.J. 627 (1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1014 (1986).........................5,13 State v. Zuber, 227 N.J. 422, cert. denied, 583 U.S. 826 (2017).......5,13,14,34
[brief] BRIEF  On the Brief: [...], Esq.  #  TABLE OF CONTENTS | Section | Page No.: | |------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------| | Table of Authorities | i | | Legal Argument | | | **Point I**<br>The trial court should not have afforded the Affidavits of Service a presumption of validity and applied the wrong burden of proof | 1 | | **Point II**<br>The defective Affidavit was never “corrected” | 4 | | **Point III**<br>The process server had no recollection of the service of process | 6 | | **Point IV**<br>Intervenor [...] is not an innocent third party whose rights should be protected | 8 | | **Point V**<br>GPS drift is not a factor in this case, GPS expert testimony proved that the [...]’s were not home at the time of the alleged service and the service also was not effectuated at their home but at a school parking lot | 12 | | **Point VII**<br>The violation of the New Jersey Notarial Act has not been cured | 13 | | **Point VII**<br>Appellant objects to any facts not in evidence and the testimony of counsel in the Appellate Brief | 13 | | Conclusion | 15 | # TABLE OF AUTHORITIES