ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Baird v. Bonta, No. 2:19-cv-00617, 2023 WL 9050959 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 29, 2023)  .................................................................  Sal to 37 | CASES | PAGE | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | Baird v. Bonta, No. 2:19-cv-00617, 2023 WL 9050959 | 13, 14 | | (E.D. Cal. Dec. 29, 2023) | | | Bianchi v. Brown, 111 F.4th 438 (4th Cir. 2024) | 14 | | Borys v. Borys, 76 N.J. 103 (1978) | 19, 20, 21 | | Commonwealth v. Harris, 119 N.E.3d 1158 (Mass. 2019) | 23 | | Culp v. Raoul, 921 F.3d 646 (7th Cir. 2019) | 15 | | District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) | 10, 11 | | Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Hyatt, 538 U.S. 488 (2003) | 7, 21 | | Frey v. Nigrelli, 661 F. Supp. 3d 176 (S.D.N.Y. 2023) | 13, 14 | | Friedman v. City of Highland Park, 784 F.3d 406 (7th Cir. 2015) | 14 | | Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985) | 14 | | Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609 (1951) | 24 | | In re Winston, 438 N.J. Super. 1 (App. Div. 2014) | 21, 22, 25 | | Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941) | 7, 21 | | Koons v. Platkin, 673 F. Supp. 3d 515 (D.N.J. 2023) | 11, 13, 14 | | Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U.S. 430 (1943) | 20, 21 | | Matter of Two Seized Firearms, 127 N.J. 84 (1992) | 15, 18 | | McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010) | 14 | Moran v. Wis. Dep’t of Just., 932 N.W.2d 430 (Wis. App. 2019).................. 23 N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022)........ passim New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262 (1932) ........................................... 15 Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 (2015)......................................................... 25 People v. Shear, 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d 707 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999)............................... 23 Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429 (1980) ......................................................... 15 State v. Hatch, 64 N.J. 179 (1973) .................................................................... 17 State v. Reininger, 430 N.J. Super. 517 (App. Div. 2013) ................................. 18 State v. Wade, 476 N.J. Super. 490 (App. Div. 2023) ..................................... passim United States v. Rahimi, 144 S. Ct. 1889 (2024) ..............................................
[brief] [...], Specialty, and Subspecialty Certificates 168a-178a  [...], [...] 179a-184a  TABLE OF APPENDIX VOL. 002  Discharge Summary of the Appellant, authorized by Respondent [...], MD 1a-6a  Appellant’s Medication Information 7a-16a  Clinical Notes of the Appellant, drafted by Respondent [...], MD 17a-32a  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS, AND RULINGS BEING APPEALED
[brief] Point VII  The Court Did Not Err In Sentencing.  Defendant additionally contends the trial court erred by purportedly failing to provide any explanation for the respective aggravating factors it found.  (Db45).  This argument is without merit.  Defendant asserts that the trial court incorrectly found aggravating factors 3, risk of re-offending; 6, defendant’s prior record; and 9, the need to deter.  (Db45).  Additionally, defendant takes issue with the 35-year prison term, arguing the factors were incorrectly balanced by the trial court.  (Db46).
[directive] this to pursuant system that Page 7 Audit Findings.  Notice of F. maintaining automated Understanding with agency a designated the Memorandum of  The compliance random audits to ensure strict provide for periodic and system (1) shall deconfliction of any an reveals possible violation that when such audit a (2) shall provide with this Directive, and of the of Criminal shall be notified Director of the Division Justice Directive, the provision of this of the violation pursuant to investigate the circumstances Director may results so that the audit of Prosecutor to investigate the circumstances the assign a County Directive, or Section 10 of this violation.
[brief] STANDARD OF REVIEW  A.  Plain Error/Clearly Erroneous  When a party does not object to an alleged trial error or otherwise properly preserve the issue for appeal, the Appellate Court may nonetheless consider it if it meets the plain error standard of Rule 2:10-2.  State v. Clark, 251 N.J. 266 (2022); State v. Singh, 245 N.J. 1, 13 (2021); State v. Gore, 205 N.J. 363, 383 (2011).  The plain error standard requires a determination of: “(1) whether there was error; and (2) whether that error was 'clearly capable of producing an unjust result…’”  State v. Dunbrack, 245 N.J. 531, 544 (2021) (quoting State v. Funderburg, 225 N.J. 66, 79 (2016)).  The Supreme Court defined the standard to be “…‘clearly erroneous’ when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. ”  United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948).  B.  De Novo  An appellate court’s review of rulings of law and issues regarding the applicability, validity (including constitutionality) or interpretation of laws, statutes, or rules is de novo.  See In re Ridgefield Park Bd. of Educ., 244 N.J. 1, 17 (2020) (agency’s interpretation of a statute).  In such a case, the reviewing court must adjudicate the controversy in the light of the applicable law in order for a manifest denial of justice be avoided.  State v. Lyons, 417 N.J. Super. 251, 258 (App. Div. 2010).  The Supreme Court has described the general principle that “the standard of review for mixed questions all depends – on whether answering it entails primarily legal or factual work. ”  U.S. Bank N.A. v. Village at Lakeridge, LLC, 583 U.S. 387, 396 (2018).  Mixed questions of law and fact may be reviewed de novo.  IV.
[brief] 253 N.J. 191, 221 (2023).  More recently, in Borough of Englewood Cliffs, the Appellate Division upheld an award of sanctions for frivolous litigation totaling almost $190,000, despite the litigation being dismissed in its early stages.  478 N.J. Super. at 432.  Like the initial decision to award fees, the amount of fees awarded by a trial judge is subject to an abuse of discretion standard.  Litton, 200 N.J. at 386.
[brief] (2T168-6 to 169-23).  Following the conclusion of [...]’s testimony, the plaintiff rested her case and the defense called its first witness, via videotaped deposition.  [...], [...], responded to the Public Storage facility answering a medical assistance call.  His assignment was not to investigate the incident, but to assist medical responders who had also been dispatched.  Officer Berthoud stated (over plaintiff’s objection) “according to my report, it says she advised she slipped and fell . . . And that she was more concerned about getting a report than her own health. ”  The report also noted that [...] was transported to [...] by [...].
[brief] But “[t]he sole question” addressed in Compressor Station “is one of statutory interpretation. ”  Compressor Station, slip op. at 2 (Hra2).  Specifically, the Court interpreted an exemption in the Highlands Act for “routine maintenance and operations, rehabilitation, preservation, reconstruction, repair, or upgrade of public utility lines, rights of way, or systems. ”  Id. (citing N.J.S.A. 13:20-28(a)(11)).  The issue was whether the word “routine” modifies only “maintenance and operations” or every term in the list.  Id. at 3-4 (Hra3-4).  The Court held that “although both sides present plausible constructions,” appellants presented “the better grammatical analysis” of the word “routine” as a prepositive modifier that applied to all the terms in the list.  Id. at 14, 16-19 (Hra14, 16-19).  Thus, the Court remanded the matter to [...] so that the agency could make a finding as to whether the upgrade at issue was “routine. ”  Id. at 23 (Hra23).  The discussion of the purposes and history of the Highlands Act only came about in Compressor Station as an “extrinsic aide” for interpreting statutory language that the Court found was “susceptible to more than one plausible interpretation. ”  Compressor Station, slip op. at 10, 14 (Hra10, 14).  Here, unlike Compressor Station, there is no question of statutory interpretation.
[brief] While a Board is generally bound by its enabling statutes, it has inherent authority to reopen administrative matters upon a showing of good cause, reasonable grounds, and reasonable diligence.  Minsavage for Minsavage v. Bd. of Trs., Teachers’ Pension & Annuity Fund, 240 N.J. 103, 109 (2019).  A member seeking relief by way of the Board’s inherent powers also “must demonstrate extreme hardship and a clear equity in his favor.
[brief] Defendants also point to the decisions in *State v. Holland*, 132 N.J. Super. 17 (App. Div. 1975), *Bynum v. Mayor & Township Committee*, 181 N.J. Super. 2 (App. Div. 1981), certif. denied, 89 N.J. 440 (1982), *State v. Friedman*, 304 N.J. Super. 1 (App. Div. 1997), and *State v. Clarksburg Inn*, 375 N.J. Super. 624 (App. Div. 2005) for the proposition that the Home Rule Act can serve as authority for the adoption of the Noise Ordinance.  All of those cases are distinguishable from the matter at hand.
[brief] **A.  The Factual Basis for the Guilty Plea (1T)**  [...] testified that on the day of the incident he met with [...] and [...] to plan a burglary.  (1T17-12 to 24)  The boys wanted to burglarize the house of George and [...] because they thought they might find money and guns.  (1T13-16 to 14-2)  As the boys discussed the plan, they “drank and smoked[.]”  (Da48)  Baker specifically consumed about 60 oz. of beer prior to the incident.  (PSR4)  When they arrived at the house, Baker and Beltran went into the basement, while Acevedo remained outside.  (1T14-3 to 18)  Beltran was carrying a gun.  (1T18-6 to 8)  When Mrs. McLoughlin confronted them near the back door, Beltran, who had the gun, shot her four times.  (1T14-19 to 15-18; 19-9 to 20-7)  After Mrs. McLoughlin fell to the floor, Beltran and Baker moved her body to the basement.  (1T15-2 to 16-8)  The three boys began to search the house looking for “stuff. ”  (1T16-9 to 15)  They found money, but no guns.  (1T16-16 to 19)  As they were going through the house, they saw Mr. McLoughlin pull up in the driveway.  (1T22-3 to 4)  They “scattered through the house and…waited for him to come inside. ”  (1T22-5 to 6)  As Mr. McLoughlin approached, Beltran said that he did not want to shoot the man, so he gave the gun to Baker and told him to “do it. ”  (1T22-7 to 17)  Beltran and Baker argued briefly, but Baker ultimately took the gun, and shot Mr. McLoughlin in the front hallway.  (1T22-18 to 23-3; 16-20 to 25)  Despite being shot, Mr. McLoughlin came at Baker, who ran the opposite way.  (1T25-14 to 16)  When Beltran yelled that the man was going out the front door, Baker went after him, caught him on the driveway, and struck him on the head with the gun.  (1T26-1 to 28-6)  When the man fell, Baker kicked him until he was unconscious.  (1T28-7 to 19)  The boys then moved the man’s body into the house and continued to search for “stuff. ”  (1T28-20 to 29-17)  At some point, Mr. McLoughlin was stabbed many times.  (1T32-19)  Baker did not see the stabbing, but said that, as far as he knew, Beltran had done it.  (1T32-19 to 23)  B.
[brief] In *Bender* the attorney made representations to the trial judge that the defense expert witness was qualified to testify as an expert.  Then, during his summation before the jury, the attorney claimed the opposite.  In *Bender*, like in this case, representations were made to the trial judge, that the trial judge relied upon those representations in making rulings and overseeing the conduct of the trial and so the court found it necessary to issue a curative instruction.  To allow Appellant to argue this matter was not ripe for summary judgment based on all of the facts and equities involved, will result in a miscarriage of justice.  Appellant doesn’t get a “do-over” or a second bite at the apple.  Again, Appellant had every opportunity to engage in discovery and made a business decision not to engage in discovery because Appellant doesn’t dispute the *material facts*—that [...] received the First Wire Transfer and then returned the funds via the Second Wire Transfer after holding the funds for two (2) entire weeks.
[brief] [...] DID NOT ABUSE HIS DISCRETION WHEN DENYING PLAINTIFFS’ APPLICATION TO REPLACE THEIR EXPERT, [...], WITH A NEW EXPERT, [...], OR IN DENYING RECONSIDERATION OF HIS ORDER  When reviewing discovery orders, the Appellate Division generally will not intervene “but instead will defer to a trial judge’s discovery rulings absent an abuse of discretion or a judge’s misunderstanding or misapplication of the law. ”  Capital Health System, Inc. v. Horizon Healthcare Services, Inc., 230 N.J. 73, 39-80 (2017) (citing Pomerantz Paper Corp. v. New Community Corp., 207 N.J. 344, 371 (2011)).
[brief] *Knorr v. Smeal*, 178 N.J. 169, 180-81 (2003).  “Laches may only be enforced when the delaying party had *sufficient opportunity to assert the right in the proper forum* and the prejudiced party acted in good faith believing that the right had been abandoned. ”  *Dorchester Manor v. Borough of New Milford*, 287 N.J. Super. 114 (App. Div. 1996) (emphasis added).  The key factors to be considered in deciding whether to apply the doctrine are “[t]he length of delay, reasons for delay, and changing conditions of either or both parties during the delay. ”  *Lavin v. Bd. of Educ.*, 90 N.J. 145, 152 (1982).  The core equitable concern in applying laches is whether a party has been harmed by the delay.  *Id.* at 153.  Waiver is a valid basis for the denial of a motion to disqualify.
[brief] Exhibit G, 5/22/2006 Agreement of Sale between [...] and [...].................................................................89a  Exhibit H, 6/11/2006  Letter from [...] to [...].................................104a  Exhibit I, 1/21/2014  Deposition of [...].................................(omitted, see 664a)  Exhibit J, 6/29/2006  Assignment and Assumption Agreement between [...], LLC and [...].
[brief] 44 N.J. at 352-53; *State v. Hagans*, 233 N.J. 30, 39-40 (2018).  Factors tending to show that consent was coerced include: (1) The consenting person was already arrested; (2) the consenting person denied guilt; (3) the consenting person refused initial requests for consent; (4) the consenting person must have known that the search would discover contraband; and (5) the consenting person was handcuffed.  *King*, 44 N.J. at 352-53.  Factors tending to show voluntary consent include: (1) The consenting person had reason to believe that the police would find no contraband; (2) the consenting person admitted guilt before consenting; and (3) the consenting person affirmatively assisted the police.  *Id.* at 353.  In addition to the *King* factors, “account must be taken of subtly coercive police questions, as well as the possibly vulnerable subjective state of the person who consents. ”  *Schneckloth v. Bustamonte*, 412 U.S. 218, 229 (1973).  Although a lower court’s factual findings ordinarily receive deference, *State v. S.S.*, 229 N.J. 360, 379-81 (2017), “if the trial court does not make any factual finding on a given topic, no deference is due the conclusions it reaches on that subject,” *State v. Ahmad*, 246 N.J. 592, 609 (2021); e.g., *State in Int. of M.P.*, 476 N.J. Super. 242, 300-01 (App. Div. 2023) (considering facts apparent from video of statement not addressed below).
[brief] [...] has not produced any other documentary evidence to support its claim of actual use and possession of the Property.  b.  [...]’s continued improper reliance upon documents not in the evidentiary record must be rejected.  [...]’s reliance on documents not properly in the record does not stop with the Dwight Aff., and [...]’s reliance upon them must be disregarded under the court rules.  See R. 4:46-2.  [...] may not rely on unsupported assertions to defeat a motion for summary judgment.
[brief] II.  INTRODUCTION  [...] ([...]’s Chairman, Chief Executive Officer, and controlling stakeholder) and [...] ([...]’s Chief Operating Officer and a director) shaped [...]’s business decisions regarding the ways [...] shared user information with and collected user information from third parties, devised and executed the plan for monetizing user information, and led the internal and external response to the [...] scandal.  They each currently play and have played key roles as the public face of [...] in response to repeated crises about privacy violations that are at the heart of Plaintiffs’ allegations.  Thus, they possess unique and critical information directly relevant to Plaintiffs’ claims and [...]’s defenses.  Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26, they are proper custodians and their relevant custodial files should be produced.  [...] does not contest that Zuckerberg’s and Sandberg’s custodial files contain relevant information.
[brief] SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE  DIVISION  DOCKET NO.: [...]  Civil Action ON APPEAL FROM: SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY LAW  DIVISION - ESSEX COUNTY  DOCKET NO.: [...]  SAT BELOW: THE HON.  [...], J.S.C RESPONDENT/DEFENDANT APPENDIX (DR01-DR10)  [...], ESQ., ATTY ID. #010451983
[brief] The issue of the roadway dedication as a public street and the jurisdiction of the planning board to address any dedication was clearly announced and discussed during the hearing.  As [...] indicated: “if it turns out that it hasn’t been accepted by operation of law, then we can talk about the issue of whether this Board would have jurisdiction regardless.  (Pa565)  (Transcript p.18-19)  Then [...] indicated: “so we’re very comfortable with proceeding under the condition that [...] laid out, which is, you know, to some extent we’re doing this at our risk, for lack of a better way of saying it.  If it turns out this Board doesn’t have jurisdiction at the end, well, we wasted time”.  (Pa565)  (Transcript, p. 19)  The Board Attorney, [...] then indicated: “[...] is right, it’s at their peril.  The Board can continue to hear testimony”.  (Pa565)  (Transcript, p. 19-20)  Thereafter [...], the Board Engineer, indicated:  “I believe it’s up to the Applicant to request of the governing body to accept dedication of the roadway.  What I’m not sure on, whether or not the governing body would have to do that by resolution or probably by ordinance”.  .......  Now, at this point, I don’t know what the governing body did or didn’t do, and if the road is still a private street and it’s in a commercial zone and not zoned for this use, they need a use variance and I brought this up many, many, many months ago.  So if it isn’t, with all due respect, I don’t think you have jurisdiction”.  (Pa566)  (Transcript, p. 22)  [...] who was a member of the Planning Board indicated: “I don’t think this Board has jurisdiction if that’s a private street”.  (Pa566)  (Transcript, p. 23)  [...], the Board Engineer, indicated that he did not believe the Planning Board had jurisdiction over the private street and that it probably required a use variance under the zoning codes.
[brief] See also, Innes, 224 N.J. at 592; Litton Indus., Inc. v. IMO Indus., Inc., 200 N.J. 372, 404 (2009)); N. Bergen Rex Transp., Inc. v. Trailer Leasing Co., 158 N.J. 561, 569 (1999); Brunt v. Bd. of Trustees, Police & Firemen's Ret. Sys., 455 N.J. Super. 357, 363 (App. Div. 2018).  “[E]ven where expressly provided, ‘the narrowness of [the exceptions] . . . has always [been] rigorously enforced, lest they grow to consume the general rule itself,’” First Atl. Fed. Credit Union v. Perez, 391 N.J.  Super. 419, 425-26 (App. Div. 2007) (quoting Van Horn v. City of Trenton, 80 N.J. 528, 538 (1979)).  The award of $886,223.06 in attorneys’ fees here contravened one of the essential principles served by the American Rule -- it amounted to a massive penalty to defendants “for exercising their right to litigate [this] dispute,” a penalty they should not bear simply because they lost.
[brief] 28  C.  The Court Below Erred in Balancing the Hardships  Because it did not Consider Harm to [...] ................................................................. 33  D.  There is No Harm to the Public Interest ....................................................  35  II.  THE COURT BELOW ERRED IN ITS INTERPRETATION OF EMINENT DOMAIN LAW AND BY CREATING NEW LAW THAT HAS NO SUPPORT IN NEW JERSEY JURISPRUDENCE.
[brief] Adams involved a lift truck, rather than an FDA-regulated product.  The court found “no justification for creating” a duty to recall, since – again as here – “plaintiff merely asserted that [defendant] should have --- 4 Cf. Hernandez v. Badger Construction Equipment Co., 34 Cal. Rptr.2d 732, 756-57 (Cal. App. 1994) (allowing retrofit claim without discussing Ramirez’s rejection of recall-based claims).  Thus, “California recognizes a duty to recall or retrofit if a government agency has ordered a recall or if there was a shift in industry standards. ”  Hamilton v. TBC Corp., 328 F.R.D. 359, 385 (C.D. Cal. 2018).  No such facts support liability here. recalled or retrofitted the [product] for the same reasons that it should not have sold it in the first place[.]”  Id. at 386.  Likewise, Illinois law rejects both post-sale warning and recall duties.
[brief] Relator was also able to determine that the fraud was ongoing by interviewing several former employees of Defendants and others and, thereby, learning new ways by which the fraud occurred.  See, e.g., Ja41-52, 103.  Those further investigative efforts do not, contrary to what Defendants might suggest, Db45-46, make his knowledge direct or dependent.  See United States ex rel. Oliver v. Philip Morris USA Inc., 826 F.3d 466, 478 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (relator was original source by “bridg[ing] the gap” through interviews).10
[brief] For example, in Rosen v. Keeler, 411 N.J. Super. at 450, the owners of a single beach lot between a boulevard and the Atlantic Ocean subdivided their lot into a “boulevard lot” fronting the road and an “ocean lot” fronting the ocean.  They expressly granted an easement to the boulevard lot so those property owners could access the ocean.  The Rosen court noted that this express easement made the boulevard lot “marketable,” implicitly recognizing that without the express easement, the boulevard lot owners would not have ocean access through proximity alone.  *Id.* at 443.  That is, the mere fact that the boulevard lot was adjacent to a ‘beach’ lot (like plaintiffs claim here) did not compel an easement into existence; an express easement was necessary to “make the boulevard lot marketable. ”  *Id.*  Similar to plaintiffs here, in *Levinson v. Costello*, 74 N.J. Super. 539 (App. Div. 1962), an oceanfront lot was conveyed to the plaintiffs by reference to a subdivision map.
[brief] Id. at 616-17.  “After unsuccessfully attempting to settle her UIM claim, [...] asked that the matter be submitted to arbitration.  However, before an arbitration hearing could be conducted, the Supreme Court decided Aubrey v. Harleysville Ins. Cos., 140 N.J. 397, 658 A.2d 1246 (1995).  [...] then took the position that [...] was not entitled to any UIM benefits because the UIM coverage provided under her own personal automobile policy did not exceed the liability coverage provided under the tortfeasor's policy. ”  Id.  After the trial court granted summary judgment to [...], plaintiff appealed.  In determining that [...] was estopped from denying coverage, the Appellate Division stated “[w]e conclude that [...]'s authorization to [...] to settle her claim against the tortfeasor and its implicit agreement to pay [...] UIM benefits now estops [...] from denying UIM benefits. ”  Id. at 617.  Similarly, Boritz v. New Jersey Mfrs. Ins. Co., 406 N.J. Super. 640 (App. Div. 2009), arose out a motor vehicle accident that occurred on October 9, 2005.
[brief] Aa004 (Permit §§ 10, 11).  Specifically, the Project sets forth green stormwater infrastructure of approximately 104 features including 82 small-scale bioretention basins, 3 large-scale infiltration surface basins, 2 constructed wetlands, 2 large-scale subsurface infiltration basins, and 15 areas of permeable pavement (11.5 acres).