ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] (Da1196).  That is but one example.  The Court submitted the following Administrative Code Regulations to the jury as independent causes of action under the RETA as follows: N.J.A.C. 11:5-6.7 at Da1196; N.J.A.C. 11:5-6.7(b)(4)(e) at Da1197; N.J.A.C. 11:5-9A.6(a) at Da1199; N.J.A.C. 11:5-9A.6(b)(9) at Da1201; N.J.A.C. 11:5-9A.6(10) at Da1207.  The Court simply took the text of each of those Administrative Code Regulations promulgated by the Real Estate Commission but not set forth in the RETA, inserted the “knowingly” element into the text of the Code Regulations and submitted the Code Regulations to the jury as independent causes of action under the RETA.  That was error.  POINT VI
[brief] 1963  Agreement dated January 7, 1963 (Da13)  Letter Opinion of [...], P.J. Ch. P Dated September 3, 2021  Da935  Exhibit A filed October 8, 2021 with Post-Trial Brief of Defendant [...] Da937  1.  Site Plan for Proposed Addition to Existing School Da938  2.  Application for an Appeal or Variance to the Zoning Board of Adjustment dated September 22, 1972 Da939  3.  Affidavit of Ownership – [...]  Dated September 22, 1972 Da940 4.  Notice of Hearing for Variance dated September 22, 1972 Da941  5.  Affidavit – [...] dated September 22, 1972 Da942  6.  List of Property Owners Served Da943  7.  Resolution of Findings and Conclusions  Adopted by the [...] on November 2, 1972 Da944 EXHIBITS FILED OCTOBER 8, 2021 WITH PLAINTIFF’S POST-TRIAL BRIEF
[brief] Where a defendant fails to promptly file the motion to vacate a default, allowing an extensive period of time to pass, there is prejudice to plaintiff.  *RP Leasing Assocs. v. Kennedy*, 2010 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1858, at *13 (Sup. Ct. App. Div. Aug. 3, 2010) (“plaintiff would be severely prejudiced if the default judgment was vacated.  The judge reasoned that ‘to vacate [the] judgment would do [a] grave injustice .  . . .  Now some five or six years later[,] to reconstruct the [d]efault would be almost impossible’ . . .  Moreover, plaintiff spent at least six years diligently attempting to collect the amount of the judgment. ”); *Mauro v. Mauro*, 2014 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1437 (Sup. Ct. App. Div. June 18, 2014) (denying motion to vacate default because plaintiff will suffer prejudice); *LaMarca v. Caffrey*, 2009 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 3241, at *6 (Sup. Ct. Law Div. Hunterdon Cnty. Nov. 20, 2009) (“Furthermore, unlike other cases the defendants acted promptly to vacate the entry of default.
[brief] The Law Division then set forth the standard of review to be applied to the de novo review of Defendant’s Motion to Vacate Guilty Plea.  (T3:20-23 to 21-24).  Then, the Law Division summarized the arguments of both the Defendant and the State.  (T3:21-25 to 23-20).  Ultimately, the Law Division ruled that, despite the fact that he had not directly acknowledged the admissibility of the alleged B.A.C. result and despite the fact that no observational evidence had been set forth on the record, that the Defendant’s guilty plea was sufficient because the factual basis set forth the elements of DWI under N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.  (T3:24-3 to 26-7).
[brief] As such, no reasonable juror could find that [...] approved the charge pay.  Especially since [...] admitted that he did not possess a single piece of documentation suggesting he was terminated for anything but his entry and receipt of unauthorized charge pay.  (Pa192 at 130:3-17; Pa363 at 84:2-9; Pa104-05 at 81:20-82:18 ([...]’s single instance of approved charge pay was retroactively approved only because of the administrative difficulties in correcting it).  The trial court considered this exact argument, and properly found it insufficient: “after all three were confronted and interviewed about it, all three admitted that they shouldn’t have been getting this charge pay, that it wasn’t authorized. ” (See 1T 25:21-24; see also id. at 25:24-26:5 (“yet [Plaintiffs] kind of go about, around about saying, well Ms. [...] said it was okay or as long as she didn’t get caught or get in trouble for it.  But I think that those assertions at that point in time were just inconsistent with how it went down and how they went about trying to surreptitiously hide this additional pay. ”); Id. at 26:7-13 (“at some point in time they try to say hey well look, maybe she did approve it, or she didn’t really approve it, or she didn’t say no.  But clearly that’s not the case, because if it was approved, it would’ve been part of the regular pay that Ms. [...] would have approved during her regular approval of their pay process. ”)).
[brief] CIVIL ACTION ON APPEAL FROM ORDER FILED 2-1-23 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY, LAW  DIVISION, CIVIL PART  GLOUCESTER COUNTY DOCKET NO.: [...]  SAT BELOW: THE HONORABLE, [...], P.J.CH.  DATE BRIEF SUBMITTED: 5-27-24  DATE AMENDED BRIEF SUBMITTED: 5-30-24  DATE SECOND AMENDED  BRIEF SUBMITTED: 6-4-24  PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT’S SECOND AMENDED APPELLATE
[brief] 2  “T” refers to the transcript of the order to show cause hearing on February 9, 2024; “Pb” refers to the appellant’s brief; “Pa” refers to the appellant’s appendix.  fiscal year.  *Ibid.*  [...] asserted that because a parenthetical example was included within the overtime provision, [...] violated the parties’ agreement by using the fiscal year working days instead of the exact parenthetical example to calculate overtime.  *Ibid.*  [...]’s requested remedy was for [...] to “[c]orrect all members’ overtime rates to comply with the equation explicitly provided by the [...] Contract.  Retroactively compensate all members for any monies owed since the improper adjustment of the overtime rates. ”  *Ibid.*  [...] issued a Phase Two Determination denying the grievance on December 8, 2021, and [...] filed a request for a panel of arbitrators on December 10, 2021.  (Pa21; Pa58-59).  On February 3, 2023, the arbitration was held.  (Pa64-169).  [...] asserted that the parenthetical language amounted to “plain language” from which [...] was not permitted to deviate.  (Pa190-91).  [...] explained that the parenthetical example was just that—an example—and must be read in the context of the full paragraph in order to give effect to the meaning of the entire contractual provision.  (Pa191-92).  Because the parties could not agree to an issue statement at the hearing, they agreed to defer to the Arbitrator to craft the issue statement.  (T19:13-21; Pa66).  The Arbitrator framed the issue as, “Did the Employer violate the collective bargaining agreement when it used the annual State of New Jersey-Department of The Treasury Circulars (Treasury Circulars) to calculate the Overtime Rate instead of language contained in the Agreement at Article V: E. (3)?” (Pa187).  In deciding the grievance, the Arbitrator thus had to interpret Article V (Hours of Work and Overtime), Section E (Compensatory Time Off), Paragraph 3 of the parties’ contract, which provides:
[brief] REPLY APPENDIX  TABLE OF CONTENTS  VOLUME I  In re Yucht, 2013 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2188…………………………Pra1  In re State and Sch. Emples. Health Benefits Commissions' Implementation of Yucht, 2017 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1938………………………………………Pra5  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS, AND RULINGS  [...] Final Decision 9/27/23……………………………Pa9  [...]  Initial Decision  6/13/23…………………………Pa24  PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[brief] A court must assume the facts asserted in the complaint are true, Lembo v. Marchese, 242 N.J. 477, 481 (2020), and the “plaintiff is entitled to the benefit of every reasonable inference as we ‘search[ ] the complaint in depth and with liberality to ascertain whether the fundament of a cause of action may be gleaned even from an obscure statement of claim, opportunity being given to amend if necessary. ’”  Id. (quoting Printing Mart-Morristown v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 116 N.J. 739, 746 (1989) quoting Di Cristofaro v. Laurel Grove Mem’l Park, 43 N.J. Super. 244, 252 (App. Div. 1957)).  POINT II.  The FDCPA, as a Federal Statute, Should Be Construed Consistent with How Federal Courts Construe the Statute.
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[brief] “Shall have the court look at the substance of the pleading rather than the form. ”  Royce v. Hahn, 151 F.3d 116, 118 (3rd Cir. 1989); Lewis v. Attorney General, 878 R.2d 714, 221 (3rd Cir. 1989); Estelle v. Gamble, U.S. 97, 106 (1979).
[brief] In Litton Indus., Inc. v. IMO Indus., Inc., 200 N.J. 372 (2009), the Supreme Court held that complete success on all issues is not a requirement for an award of fees.  Litton, 200 N.J. at 387.  Rather 5  In its Brief, [...] states that as a result of the trial court’s choice of law ruling “all but three insurers were dismissed from the litigation. ” (Rb p. 55).  Initially, the citation provided by [...] does not support the fact for which it is cited.  But more importantly, the fact for which it is cited is simply inaccurate.  While certain insurance companies named as defendants were dismissed based on the application of Massachusetts law to the interpretation of the sudden and accidental pollution exclusion, several others were dismissed because they agreed to settlements with [...], including insurance companies who provided coverage both before and after the exclusion became part of applicable insurance policies.  (Pa 0091).  [...] is the only original defendant that has done neither.  when an ultimately successful claimant succeeds on certain issues but not on others, the trial court may reduce the fees requested to account for the limited or partial success.
[brief] SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION  Appellate Docket No. [...]  CIVIL ACTION  On Appeal from Final Orders Dated August 8, 2023 and December 19, 2023  Superior Court of New Jersey Law Division, Civil Part  Passaic County  Docket No. [...]  Sat Below: Hon. [...], P.J.S.C., Retired Hon. [...], P.J.S.C.  BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
[brief] On March 22, 2023, the court entered an Order of Dismissal based on the jury verdict.  (Pa296)  On November 27, 2023, the plaintiff filed a notice of appeal with the appellate division for review of the Orders entered November 30, 2018 and January 11, 2019.  (Pa297 to Pa305)  The plaintiff filed an amended notice of appeal to correct the trial court docket number for the case on December 1, 2023.  (Pa306 to Pa315)  The Certification of Transcript Completion and Delivery was filed with the appellate division on November 27, 2023.  (Pa316)  On May 16, 2024, the plaintiff filed a second amended notice of appeal to amend the name of the plaintiff from [...] to The Estate of [...], Deceased.  (Pa317 to Pa321).  STATEMENT OF FACTS
[brief] Section 3.3(A) reads, in relevant part:  --- 4  The first contingent beneficiary for the marital trust and for many of the bequests at issue here was [...], [...]’s mother.  As Claudia predeceased both her parents, [...] became the beneficiary.  In the interest  If my Husband survives me, my Trustee (i) shall hold in a residence marital trust all of my right, title and interest (including, without limitation, any leasehold interest and stock in cooperative housing or any leasehold interest in rented property) in all of my residences located in Englewood, New Jersey and New York, New York, and in any other property used or occupied by me as my residence, other than Palm Beach, Florida (the “Residences”) which is includible in the Trust Estate and all policies and proceeds of insurance thereon[.]  …  If my Husband does not survive me, my Trustee (i) shall distribute to [...], if she survives me, or if she does not survive me, to her descendants who survive me, per stirpes, subject to Article IV of this Agreement, the Residences, and all policies and proceeds of insurance thereon and (ii) shall pay any mortgage indebtedness or other indebtedness thereon as an administration expense as provided in Paragraph A of Section 3.1 of this Agreement.  (Da51, at § 3.3(A)).
[brief] (Pa498-499)  The second amended complaint was filed on June 12, 2019.  (Pa319-330)  [...] filed an answer to the second amended complaint on August 15, 2019.  (Pa358-362)  This answer contained a statute of limitations defense.  (Pa359)  On August 18, 2019, plaintiff moved for leave to file a third amended complaint adding [...], [...] and [...] as defendants.  (Pa367-405)  This motion was granted on September 13, 2019, and the third amended complaint was filed on September 23, 2019.  (Pa436-447)  [...] filed an answer to the third amended complaint on October 25, 2019.  (Pa475-479)  This answer contained a statute of limitations defense.  (Pa476)  On December 11, 2019, [...] filed a motion for summary judgment based upon the statute of limitations.
[brief] [...], v. [...]; [...]; JOHN DOE (FICITIOUS NAMES A-Z AS EMPLOYER OR PRINCIPAL FOR DEFENDANT, [...]) AND [...], I/J/S/A  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY  APPELLATE DIVISION  DOCKET NO.: [...] ON APPEAL FROM: SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY, OCEAN COUNTY, CIVIL DIVISION, [...]  JUDGMENT ENTERED: $1,823,006.96
[brief] Plaintiff’s argument that defendants were required to file a pretrial motion *in limine* to limit the scope of plaintiff’s experts’ testimony to their areas of expertise enjoys no support in law and is impractical as applied.  Again, trials are a dynamic process.  Plaintiff’s proposed requirement would unfairly limit that process and force this Court to find that the defense waived its fundamental right to object to an adverse expert witness’ qualifications at trial.  Such a finding, however, enjoys no support in fact or law.  Moreover, and as has already been noted, defendant did file a motion *in limine* to bar plaintiff’s experts from presenting opinions to the jury that are beyond the scope of their expertise, and specifically, to prohibit [...] from presenting opinions regarding the nursing standard of care.  [...], in denying that motion, explained that while “[...] *can’t* testify about the *nursing* standard of care, but he is qualified to testify to *nursing home* standards of care, and he can testify about the treatment of plaintiff as to the nursing home care. ” (12T98:6-10 (emphasis added); see Pa84-85.)  [...] at trial, consistent with the ruling on the motion *in limine*, allowed the respiratory therapy testimony from [...] and [...], over defendant’s objections, to be presented against defendant [...], “the facility” or “the nursing home” although the witnesses were not qualified as respiratory therapy or respiratory care experts, or in [...]’s case, as a nurse or nursing expert.  (See, e.g., 5T51:10-60:25, 5T143:13-145:19, 5T151:4-208:7 6T102:10-141:13; 6T178:1-184:22, 6T188:6-192:3, 6T199:16-205:10, 6T214:15-221:5, 6T254:23-270:21.)  [...], in denying plaintiff’s motion for a new trial, thus recognized that defendant had in fact filed a motion in limine on point, and that additional rulings were an essential part of the trial process: The parties submitted a number of motions in limine, which were ruled on by the court.  The Requirement that motions in limine must be filed prior to trial in accordance with the pretrial order does not mean that evidentiary issues will not arise at trial; as noted in plaintiff’s brief, the parties were engaged in a number of lively disputes at sidebar on evidentiary issues during trial.  Parties cannot predict every conceivable way in which an expert may exceed the scope of their testimony.  Holding otherwise would allow parties no recourse during trial to prevent a witness from exceeding the scope of their admissible testimony.  The court is satisfied that no issues were raised at trial and ruled on by the court that should not have been entertained by the court.  (Pa10.)
[brief] ”  Application of McGlynn, 58 N.J. Super. 1, 13 (App. Div. 1959).  “[The] concern is with the specific action taken by the executive and legislative branches of the State Government, and no[t] with the substantive provisions of the statute itself. ”  Id.  Here, there are two sources of authority the Legislature must follow when enacting laws: the Constitution and statutes the Legislature passed regulating how it passes laws.  N.J.S.A. 1:7-3.  Primarily, the Constitutional authority arises under N.J. Const. art. IV, but also includes all rights and privileges such as the public’s right to make their opinions known to their representatives.  N.J. Const. art. I, ¶ 18.  The statutory authority is vested in various statutes governing legislative action when passing certain types of legislation.  See e.g. N.J.S.A. 17B:27D-6.  Under. N.J.S.A. 1:7-3, a law can be invalidated for either mechanical failure.  Because the Legislature violated both the Constitution and its statutes, the enactment should be voided by this Court.
[brief] C.  The Application Fails to Meet Peak Flow Requirements Under the Stormwater Management Rules.  (Aa2521-Aa2537).  Respondents’ response to this argument is simply that pursuant to calculations using a less common method, the project complies.  However, [...]’s review shows that using the most common method for calculating peak flow, the project fails.  This should not be a situation where under one method of calculation it fails, but under another, it passes.  Furthermore, [...] made an assumption that the peak flow rate of the undisturbed area and the total area has a correlation, which is not necessarily true for all situations.  (Aa2527).  There is no data to support this conclusion.  This should not be a situation where an applicant can simply pick and choose the methodology that provides the desired result.  For these reasons, the project fails to meet the peak flow requirements of N.J.A.C. 7:8-5.6, and the NJDEP’s issuance of the FHA Permit is arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable, and must be vacated and reversed.
[brief] 2.  Section 1:7-2 of the Revised Statutes is amended to read as follows:  1:7-2.  The court, upon the presentation to it of a petition as provided by section 1:7-1 of this Title, shall inquire summarily into the facts and 5 circumstances alleged in the petition, and, for that purpose, to order the 6 petition to be filed by the clerk of the court and order witnesses to be 7 subpoenaed and sworn and their depositions taken, to appoint a time for 8 hearing the petition, and to order such notice to be given of the taking of dep- 9 ositions and the hearing of the petition by publication in newspapers or 10 otherwise as it deems reasonable and just.
[brief] ..................................................................................................................................50  | Cases | Page(s) | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------| | A.D.P. v. ExxonMobil Research & Eng’g Co., | 23 | | 428 N.J. Super. 518 (App. Div. 2012) | | | Anspach v. City of Phila., Dep’t of Pub. Health, | 31, 32, 33, 35 | | 503 F.3d 256 (3d Cir. 2007) | | | Bergen Com. Bank v. Sisler, | 21 | | 157 N.J. 188 (1999) | | | Blau v. Fort Thomas Pub. Sch. Dist., | 36 | | 401 F.3d 381 (6th Cir. 2005) | | | C.N. v. Ridgewood Bd. of Educ., | 36 | | 430 F.3d 159 (3d Cir. 2005) | | | C.V. v. Waterford Twp. Bd. of Educ., | 4, 23 | | 255 N.J. 289 (2023) | | | Carter v. AFG Indus. Inc., | 16 | | 344 N.J. Super. 549 (App. Div. 2001) | | | Cnty. of Butler v. Gov. of Pa., | 41 | | 8 F.4th 226 (3d Cir. 2021) | | | Crowe v. DeGioia, | 13, 14, 28, 29 | | 90 N.J. 126 (1982) | | | Delanoy v. Twp. of Ocean, | 40 | | 245 N.J. 384 (2021) | | | Dixon v.
[brief] ..............................................................................................................20  **DiProspero v. Penn,** 183 N.J. 477 (2005)  ..........................................................................................34  **Gentless v. Borough of Stratford,** No. CAM-L-3344-17 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. June 5, 2018), aff’d, 2019 WL 2563807 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. June 21, 2019)  ..................33  **Gillman v. Bally Mfg. Corp.,** 286 N. J. Super. 523 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 144 N.J. 174 (1996)  ..............................................................................................................46  **Gregory v. Borough of Avalon,** 391 N.J. Super. 181 (App. Div. 2007) ...............................................................17, 18  **Harrison Redev. Agency v. DeRose,** 398 N.J. Super. 361 (App. Div. 2008) ...............................................................8, 13 Hirth v. City of Hoboken, 337 N.J. Super. 149 (App. Div. 2001) .........................................................37, 41 Horsnall v. Washington Twp. Fire Div., 405 N.J. Super. 304 (App. Div. 2009) .........................................................8, 13 Horton v. Am. Inst. for Mental Studies, 145 N.J. Super. 550 (Law Div. 1976) ..........................................................44
[brief] The judge’s charge on use of force on an intruder followed the Model Charge, and there is no basis whatsoever for defendant’s claim that the Model Charge is lacking regarding a “detached viewpoint. ”  Defendant next claims, for the first time on appeal, that the model jury charge as to “intruder” self-defense is lacking.  (Db41-47).  Specifically, defendant claims that the charge should not have the following sentence: “an ordinary reasonable person with a detached point of view. ”  Rather, defendant claims the Model Charge should instruct the jury to look at how a person in defendant’s situation should have reacted.  Defendant claims this constitutes plain error.  Defendant’s opinion, however, is not controlling, nor is it supported by our caselaw.  Model Charges are presumed to be accurate, and are created only after rigorous review by experienced jurists.  Defendant’s disagreement with a charge is no basis to reverse his conviction, particularly when his understanding of controlling caselaw is erroneous.  Defendant’s claim, as our courts have recognized, would serve to make any honest belief into a reasonable one, which was clearly not what the Legislature intended.