ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] (See Da094a.)  That is, [...] explicitly agreed to "completely release and forever discharge [[...]], [...], the [...], [...], [and] [...],” among others, “from any and all duties to account, actions, causes of action, duties of indemnification, rights, claims, debts, liabilities, obligations, costs, expenses (including attorneys’ fees), liens, suits, losses, damages, judgments, and demands of any nature whatsoever, whether known or unknown, vested or contingent, without limitation (collectively, ‘Claims’). ” (Id. (emphasis added.))  That language makes clear the parties intended the term “Claims” to be read expansively.  Against that backdrop, in the ensuing Paragraph 24, the parties delineated certain limited carveouts or exceptions that “shall not apply to” [...]’s broad release in Paragraph 23.  (See Da094a.)  As to the [...] specifically, [...] preserved only her limited rights and interests under [...] and nothing more.  Paragraph 24(F) even closed with a sentence making that fact beyond legitimate dispute:  [[...]]’s rights and interest in the [...] as set forth in Section 3.3(A)(4)(d) of [...] including, without limiting any other rights, interests or obligations that [[...]] may have as expressly provided by Section 3.3(A)(4)(d), the following: (i) her right to make use of the [...] for a period of not more than twenty-one (21) days per year; and (ii) her right to receive a portion of the sale proceeds in the event of a sale of the [...] as provided therein.  The Parties acknowledge that [[...]]’s portion of the proceeds of any sale shall be reduced by the amount of any and all legal fees, other professional fees and expenses described more fully in Section 3.3(A)(4)(d) of [...] and the Parties acknowledge that such fees and expenses total fifty-three million, seven-hundred forty-nine thousand, eight hundred and three dollars ($53,749,803).  For the avoidance of doubt, [[...]] agrees to comply with all conditions and obligations imposed upon her by Section 3.3(A)(4)(d) and to refrain from asserting any Claims, rights or interests with respect to the [...] other than as may be necessary to enforce the rights and interests provided to her by Section 3.3(A)(4)(d).  [Da094a-95a, at Paragraph 24(F) (emphasis added.)]  When Paragraphs 23 and 24(F) are read together, it is clear [...] released all potential claims to the [...] under [...] and [...], and retained only the limited “rights and interests provided to her by Section 3.3(A)(4)(d)” of [...].  (See Da095a.)  The “for the avoidance of doubt” language in Paragraph 24(F) highlights that [...] was releasing all other claims to the [...] by explicitly agreeing to “refrain” from asserting such “Claims . . . other than as may be necessary to enforce the rights and interests provided to her by Section 3.3(A)(4)(d)” of [...].  (Id.)  Stated simply, [...] agreed to forgo the very claim she is now asserting.  Like the Trial Court, this Court should reject her blatant attempt to circumvent the Settlement Agreement.
[brief] 18 POINT V - Plaintiff Also Stated A Claim Against [...] For Breach Of Contract And Aiding And Abetting A Breach .......................................................  19  A.  [...] Affirmatively Aided and Abetted [...] and was Not Merely an Innocent Bystander to the Breach by [...] .............................................  21 B.  Section 17.1(b) of the PSA Does Not Present a Bar to Plaintiff’s Claims .................................................................................................................................  24  C.  Even if the PSA Did Not Impose a Duty on [...] to Keep Plaintiff Apprised of the Closing, [...] Voluntarily Assumed This Duty and Had to Perform it With Care .................................................................  25 POINT VI - Plaintiff’s Claim Of Breach Of The Covenant Of Good Faith And Fair Dealing Should Have Been Sustained As Against Both Defendants ...........................................................................................................  26 POINT VII - Plaintiff Stated A Claim Against [...] For Negligent Misrepresentation ..................................................................................................................  29 POINT VIII - Plaintiff Adequately Stated A Claim Against [...] For Breach Of Fiduciary Duty ...........................................................................................................  32
[brief] [Pa944a-950a]  Question 10(a) of the 2017 Application asked: “Have there been any new bar complaints, investigations or disciplinary proceedings against any attorney?”  The Firm answered “No” to Question 10(a).  [Pa947a]  Relying on both the 2016 Application and the 2017 Application, [...] issued *LPL Assure* Lawyers Professional Liability Insurance Policy No. 0310-1820 to the Firm for the Policy Period July 3, 2017 to July 3, 2018 (the “2017 Policy”).
[brief] The primary issue presented by this appeal is whether e-mail addresses of individuals who signed up to receive local alerts from a municipality through a third-party vendor are required to be disclosed under the Open Public Records Act (“OPRA”).  Since the initial briefing schedule, there have been certain developments in the law which further support the [...]’s (hereinafter referred to as the “City” or “[...]”) position that these records implicate the privacy interests of those individuals who signed up for the local (“[...]”) alerts.  Specifically, the OPRA statute, N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1.1 et seq. has since been amended, with an effective date of September 3, 2024, to clarify that personal identifying information (defined to include personal e-mail addresses) is not considered public record when same was provided for the sole purpose of receiving official notifications.  Further, an unreported Appellate Division matter, with almost identical facts to the instant matter, *Rise Against Hate v. Cherry Hill Township*, A-1440-21, 2023 WL 2670720, at *1 (N.J. Super. App. Div. Mar. 29, 2023) (Da268-269) was previously pending before the Supreme Court of New Jersey.  This matter was addressed in the City’s original brief.  However, as of July 23, 2024, it was determined that Certification was improvidently granted, and the appeal was dismissed.  Therefore, this decision is final and the City respectfully submits that although unpublished, this matter should be considered determinative given that it was issued by the same Court and involves a nearly identical factual scenario.
[brief] ”  Pa67.  Lastly, with regard to VII of the FAC and Plaintiff’s contention that the Planning Board failed to prepare a report which identified those provisions of Amended Redevelopment Plan which are inconsistent with the City’s Master Plan, the trial court found that “[a]s the redevelopment plan was not inconsistent with the Master Plan, there would be no need for a provision of a report by the planning board including ‘an identification of any provisions in the proposed redevelopment plan which are inconsistent with the plan and recommendations concerning these inconsistencies…”
[brief] Plaintiff also argues that trenches cut in the roadway and/or utility work near or at the accident location and pavement restoration is sufficient to establish constructive notice.  Plaintiff does not cite to any caselaw to support this position and provides not discovery to substantiate his argument that the work in question was conducted by [...] or its employees.  Plaintiff also argues that Plaintiff sustained his injuries within 1,600 feet (.3 miles) from Town Hall and that DPW workers were during work in the area where Plaintiff’s injury occurred.
[brief] *Allen v. Fauver*, 167 N.J. 69, 75 (2001), which [...] also cites in support of its position, likewise falls short in this regard.  *Allen* concerned state corrections officers who sought overtime wages under the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C. § 201 to § 219, and New Jersey’s Wage and Hour Law, *N.J.S.A.* 34:11-56(a)(1) to -56(a)(30).  There, the New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed the Appellate Division’s determination that the Wage and Hour Law did not apply to the corrections officers because the statute does not include the State of New Jersey in its definition of “employer,” *N.J.S.A.* 34:11-56(a)(1)(g).  See *Allen*, supra, at 72.  The Court likewise held that plaintiffs could not bring an action under the FLSA because the State had not waived its sovereign immunity and consented to suit under the FLSA.  Akin to Wyzykowski, neither the Fauver decision nor the case law it treats positively include any analysis about discerning legislative intent to abrogate the common law.  Thus, to the extent that Allen is relevant to the matter at hand, it merely reaffirms that this Court should enforce the plain text of the Public Access Law and decline to read into it an implicit abrogation of the common law public trust doctrine.
[brief] In this matter, Defendants did not violate any Court Orders.  In fact, Defendants complied with the Court’s Orders by disclosing all responsive records in their possession.  The subject records in this case are final decisions, settlement agreements, and resolutions for 11 special education matters filed in the Office of Administrative Law from 2013 to 2015.  Accordingly, there are 33 records at issue.  It is admitted that the Board did not produce a resolution, settlement agreement, and decision for each docket number requested.  However, [...] certified that he conducted a diligent search for the documents, which included a thorough search of the Board’s administrative offices and contacting outside counsel who represented the Board in IDEA matters in 2013-2015.  All responsive records which could be located were provided.
[brief] IT WAS IMPROPER FOR THE TRIAL COURT TO DISMISS [...]’S REQUEST FOR EJECTMENT, TO QUIET TITLE IN THE PROPERTY TO [...] AND TO FIND THAT THE ENTRY ON THIS LAND BY [...] WAS TRESPASS  The circumstance in this case is that New Community Corporation failed to make a timely objection to use of Lot 22 and with the passage of time required to claim Adverse Possession, the issue of ownership is over.  Leaping over the fact that there was no objection which by law resulted in loss of this Lot 22 means that procedurally the owner of the property is First Zion.  [...]’s testimony was flawed because he never surveyed the land but looked at documents that were prepared by other persons in his office that did the survey.  The [...] surveyor stated that this was a case of Adverse Possession because there had been no objection to use of the land in question for the statutory time period.  The surveyor for the [...] noted in an email that [...] never developed Lot 22 on Bergen Street but left it open and abandoned which supports Adverse Possession by First Zion.  (Da255)  The claim of Trespass in the Counterclaim by First Zion was proper again because [...] had no right to enter the land which is Lot 20 and Lot 22 because there was no longer an ownership of Lot 22 because of Adverse Possession.  As a result of the reality of Adverse Possession, the effort by [...] to belatedly claim ownership of land that had passed to First Zion by operation of law and actions taken to co-opt this property is Conversion which should have been found by the Court because there was no longer an ownership interest by [...].  Because of the ownership of Lot 22 by First Zion in its entirety as a result of Adverse Possession, the request that the Trial Court quiet title in First Zion was correct and should have been granted.  First Zion will rely upon the Appellant’s Brief which has set out an abundance of information on Adverse Possession and why the conclusion reached by the Trial Court on Adverse Possession is inaccurate and for which relief is sought from the Appellate Court.
[brief] And it’s -- we went to a lot of length in our various hearings to talk about the nature of how this was going to be on the papers.  And it’s a trial by ambush if it gets used here where it hasn’t been used as it -- if it had some meaning to this hearing, then I will hear it argued from where it’s cited in the brief, either the initial brief and, perhaps, from the reply brief.  Although the opposition brief, which is not the one people are seeking to ban, the opposition brief took the position we don’t expect this -- and they said it in anticipation, in the defendant’s brief.  (T33:25-34:18.)  Based on this, the Trial Court found that the trial record was limited to the Joint Exhibits.  (T35:12-13.)  Thereafter, Plaintiffs sought reconsideration of certain proposed exhibits, including the [...].
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[brief] (8T 76-19 to 82-15)  With respect to mitigating factor fourteen, the Court indicated that it had observed in [...]’s allocution “some changes . . . that . . . are elements of maturity” and gave the factor moderate weight; however, the Court based this weight entirely on [...]’s statement, declining to even reference adolescent brain science or the age-crime curve and stating, “This is not a juvenile.
[brief] (T2:/18:14-19:17).  [...] also testified that, based on his data, the volume of pedestrian traffic near the Property is light, therefore, with the added security to aid in the delivery operations, he saw no safety implication for the operation of the proposed loading area.  (T2/19:17-21:11).  He conducted traffic counts two days mid-week between 8:00 a.m. and 10:00 p.m., to determine any potential effect on pedestrians in the area in connection with the proposed loading area, and concluded that the operation of the proposed driveway would similarly have no negative interaction with pedestrians.  (T2/21:12-25:3).  Next, [...] offered additional testimony on the Applicant’s behalf, again noting that pursuant to the Land Development Rules, a loading zone is not required for a building of this size and proposed use.
[brief] In this case, the jury awarded the Plaintiff a total of $610,001 in total compensatory damages, including pain and suffering and economic damages.  See DA-079-DA-082.  In contrast, the Jury awarded the Plaintiff $1,000,2.00 in punitive damages, making for a ratio for punitive to compensatory damages of approximately 1.6.  In light of the severity of the conduct described above, and in light of the clearly small ratio involved here, it cannot be reasonably argued that the Jury’s punitive damages award was excessive.  In sum, the Defendants arguments concerning both the propriety and the amount of punitive damages in this matter is clearly belied by the record.  Considering the Defendants’ failure to meet their burden to demonstrate an error on punitive damages, their appeal on this ground must be rejected, and the Jury’s punitive damages award affirmed in its entirety.
[brief] Even if the plaintiff had sought equitable relief, the Law Division could have adjudicated equitable issues and granted equitable relief.  Plaintiff's action was properly labeled in the Law Division by the plaintiff.  The defendants did not move to transfer within 10 days after the pleadings were closed and the Law Division on its own motion did not transfer the cause at or before the pretrial conference, and no motion to transfer was made.  Further, Plaintiff was not given any notice of a change in divisions.  "It is apparent, therefore, that the Law Division can adjudicate equitable issues and grant equitable relief not only in actions which, though primarily legal, involve equitable issues, but also in certain actions which are primarily or wholly equitable.  This is so, for example, if the action is improperly labeled in the Law Division by the plaintiff, but the defendant does not move to transfer within 10 days after the pleadings are closed and the court on its own motion does not transfer the cause at or before the pretrial conference, or if a motion to transfer is made but denied by the court.  This is also so in cases such as the one before us, where the action was transferred to the Law Division from the Chancery Division on the mistaken belief that the issues were principally legal.  In similar circumstances the Chancery Division may adjudicate legal issues and grant legal relief."  O'Neill v. Vreeland, 6 N.J. 158, 167 (N.J. 1951)
[brief] 10 Haack v. Ranieri, 83 N.J. Super. 526 (Law Div. 1964)..........................  10  Harrison Redevelopment Agency v. DeRose 398 N.J. Super. 361 (App. Div. 2008)......................... 9, 10 Holloway v. Pennsauken Twp., 12 N.J. 371 (1953)..............................................  10  Hopewell Valley Citizens’ Group, Inc. v. Berwind Property Group Development Co., L.P., 204 N.J. 569 (2011).............................................  10 Independent Diary Workers Union v. Milk Drivers Local 680, 23 N.J. 85 (1956).................................................. 37, 38 Kendrick v. City of Hoboken, 38 N.J.L. 113 (1875)..............................................  35
[brief] [184 N.J. 161, 180, 876 A.2d 253 (2005) (emphasis added). ]  Meisels v. Fox Rothschild LLP, 240 N.J. 286, 302 (2020).  [...] made false statements to the Planning Board while his client used double-talk and trickery to use the NDA to obtain confidential information from plaintiffs which was then used to negotiate the “purchase” of the same set of rights from the same seller, [...], that otherwise could not be attained.  The Supreme Court follows the Restatement (First) of Torts, published in 1939, in its cases in defining trade secrets.
[brief] Indeed, plaintiff may establish his slight burden at the prima facie stage with “de minimis evidence. ”  Kelly v. Sun Microsystems, Inc., 520 F.Supp.2d 388, 402-403 (D. Conn. 2007).  Moreover, the courts have recognized that “the prima facie case is to be evaluated solely on the basis of the evidence presented by the plaintiff, irrespective of defendants’ efforts to dispute that evidence.
[brief] Turning to aggravating factor six, the judge noted that defendant had eight prior arrests and five prior indictable convictions dating back to 1986.  (29T49-7 to 12).  As the judge noted, upon defendant's 1986 conviction for his first robbery, he "was afforded the opportunity of a 364-day county jail term as a consideration of probation" but, despite this leniency, reoffended only four years later and was convicted of two separate CDS offense.  (29T49-12 to 21).  And just four years after that, he was convicted of robbery for the second time, this time receiving a twenty-year prison term.  (29T49-22 to 25).  As the judge noted, "[t]his most recent conviction of robbery murder and felony murder and the other charges in this case is the culmination of this criminal's previous body of work."  (29T50-9 to 12).  The judge thus found that aggravating factor six applied due to the defendant's extend and gravity of defendant's criminal history.
[brief] Granting the Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment and Dismissing the Complaint with Prejudice  Filed by the Trial Court on April 12, 2024…………………………………………………………Pa40  Oral Decision Provided by the Trial Court on April 12, 2024 in Support of Order  Granting the Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment and Dismissing the Complaint With Prejudice……………………………1T5:21-13:18  Order Filed by the Trial Court on May 10, 2024  Denying the Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration……………………………………………………………..Pa44  Written Statement of Reasons  Filed by the Trial Court on May 10, 2024 in Support of the Order Denying the Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration……………………………………………………………..Pa46  ###  TABLE OF CITATIONS  ####  Case Law - **Berrios v. United Parcel Service**, 265 N.J. Super. 436 (Law Div. 1992), *aff’d*, 265 N.J. Super. 368 (App. Div. 1993)...........................................4 - **Building Materials Corp. of America v. Allstate Ins. Co.**, 424 N.J. Super. 448 (App. Div. 2012), *certif. denied*, 212 N.J. 198 (2012).............6 - **Clarke v. Clarke**, 349 N.J. Super. 55 (App. Div. 2002)..............................................6 - **Guido v. Duane Morris LLP**, 202 N.J. 79 (2010).......................................................6 - **Handleman v. Cox**, 39 N.J. 95 (1963).................................................................3 - **Hopkins v. Fox & Lazo Realtors**, 132 N.J. 426 (1993)..............................................3 - **Kingett v. Miller**, 347 N.J. Super. 566 (App. Div. 2002)........................................3, 4 - **Lokar v. Church of the Sacred Heart, Mount Ephraim**, 24 N.J. 549 (1957).................................................................5, 6 - **McGrath v. American Cyanamid Co.**, 41 N.J. 272 (1963)........................................4 - **Moore v. Schering Plough, Inc.**, 328 N.J. Super. 300 (App. Div. 2000)..........................4, 5 - **Nisivoccia v. Glass Gardens, Inc.**, 175 N.J. 559 (2003)..........................................3 - **Taneian v. Meghrigian**, 15 N.J. 267 (1954)............................................................4 - **Trinity Cemetery Ass’n, Inc. v. Township of Wall**, 170 N.J. 39 (2001).......................7 - **Troupe v.  Burlington Coat Factory Warehouse Corp.**, 443 N.J. Super. 596 (App. Div. 2016).........................................................3 - **Zentz v. Toop**, 92 N.J. Super. 105 (App. Div. 1966), *aff’d*, 50 N.J. 250 (1967).................................................................4  PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND STATEMENT OF FACTS
[brief] *Bocobo v. Radiology Consultants of South Jersey*, 477 Fed.Appx. 890, 900 (3d Cir.2012) (affirming summary judgment where “no reasonable jury could have found in Bocobo's favor on his CEPA claim”), citing *Blackburn v. UPS, Inc.*, 179 F.3d 81, 85 (3d Cir. 1999) (affirming summary judgment in a CEPA case where plaintiff was terminated for his violation of company policies); *Campbell v. Abercrombie & Fitch, Co.*, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11507 (D. N.J. June 9, 2005) (Da336-352).  It is axiomatic that an employer’s dissatisfaction with an employee’s misappropriation of company property/funds and violations of the Company’s code of conduct are both legitimate non-discriminatory reasons for termination.  *Ross v. M.A.C. Cosmetics, Inc.*, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82492 (D.N.J., June 17, 2014) ([...], D.J.) (Da354-362); Young v. Hobart West Group, 385 N.J. Super. 448, 467 (App. Div. 2005) (affirming summary judgment where “evidence of pretext consists solely of [plaintiff’s] unsubstantiated and conclusory allegations”); Victor v. State, 401 N.J. Super. 596, 615 (App. Div. 2008), aff’d in relevant part, modified in part, 203 N.J. 383 (2010).