ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] [...]’s interpretation is the correct one because it is the interpretation that gives full effect to both provisions by recognizing that Paragraphs 24(F) and 24(G) relate to different things.  [...] relies on *Gil v. Clara Maass Medical Center*, but that case actually proves [...]’s point.\(^2\) (See Pb26-27 (citing *Gil*, 450 N.J. Super. 368, 378-79 (App. Div. 2017)).  There, this Court quoted Professor Williston’s treatise, which teaches that “[e]ven absent a true conflict, specific words will limit the meaning of general words if it appears from the whole agreement that the parties’ purpose was directed solely toward the matter to which the specific words or clause relate. ”  *Gil*, 450 N.J. Super. at 378-79 (quoting 11 *Williston on Contracts* § 32.10, at 744 (4th ed. 2012)) (emphasis added).  Here, the parties did not direct their purpose solely to the matter that [...] asserts was more specific, i.e., the subject matter of Paragraph 24(F).  They also dealt with, among other things, preserving all of [...]’s rights flowing through [...].  Those subjects are dealt with in distinct paragraphs that can each be given full effect.  Another indication that the Probate Court erred is that the concept of “specific” and “general” does not neatly apply here.
[directive] b.  (1)  When it is alleged that nonconsensual sexual contact, sexual penetration, or lewdness, or any attempt at such conduct, has been committed by an unemancipated minor, an applicant seeking a protective order shall not proceed under the provisions of P.L.2015, c.147 (C.2C:14-13 et al.), but may seek a A- 28 ATTORNEY GENERAL STANDARDS FOR PROVIDING SERVICES TO VICTIMS OF SEXUAL ASSAULT protective order and other relief under the New Jersey Code of Juvenile Justice, P.L.1982, c.77 (C.2A:4A-20 et seq.) by filing a complaint pursuant to the provisions of section 11 of P.L.1982, c.77 (C.2A:4A-30).
[brief] The Superior Court judge cited to *State v. Avena*, 281 N.J. 327 (App. Div. 1995), *State v. Cerefice*, 335 N.J. Super 374 (App. Div. 2000), *State v. Ciancaglini*, 204 N.J. 597 (2011), and *State v. Kashi*, 180 N.J. 45 (2004) in support of its decision to ignore [...]’s conditional guilty plea and find him liable on an alternative ground.  None of those cases support the Superior Court’s decision to do this.  None of the cases cited by the Superior Court judge involved a conditional guilty plea being entered by the defendant.  Out of the cases cited, the closest one to the facts of this case was *State v. Ciancaglini*, 204 N.J. 597, 10 A.3d 870 (2011).  That case did involve a guilty plea by the defendant.  *State v. Ciancaglini*, 10 A.3d at 871.  But the issue in that case was a legal one, i.e. “whether a conviction for refusing to submit to a breathalyzer test, *N.J.S.A.* 39:4-50.4a, can be used to enhance a sentence for driving while intoxicated (DWI), *N.J.S.A.* 39:4-50. ”  *State v. Ciancaglini*, 10 A.3d at 870.  This case is completely different.
[brief] .................................................. 22 Franklin Disc. Co. v. Ford, 27 N.J. 473, 490 (1958) .................................................................  23 Fritsche v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 55 N.J. 322, 330 (1970) .................................................. 39  Gonzalez v. Silver, 407 N.J. Super. 576, 586 (App. Div. 2009) ..............................................  17, 19 Hager v. Weber, 7 N.J. 201, 210 (1951)  ..................................................................................  30  Harper-Lawrence, Inc. v. United Merchants & Mfrs., Inc., 261 N.J. Super. 554, 559 (App.Div.1993)
[brief] This argument fundamentally misstates the terms of the MOAs.  Those terms state the following:  1.  Notwithstanding the provisions of the relevant collective negotiations agreements regarding salary adjustments for promotions, the parties agree that the [...] may effectuate such promotions as it deems necessary from Police Officer to Sergeant with no increase in pay until a salary increase, including rank deferential[sic] and any other increase, is ratified between the [...], the [...], and the [...], or until such salary increases are awarded by an interest arbitrator in accordance with the statutory provisions set forth in N.J.S.A. 34:13A-16, et seq.
[directive] Prod XIDMProd NJJudic,Grylnfonet eC0R ECS (Il) in Tools  Sign IPJI a sment  Public sses Safety (PSA)  A ---- ,_,. Oulo:,l_c,_ I.-~•-•-.. .....  - - - - - - ---.. - •.Pr .. ---· - .....  ----·- ___ ,_, .....  .... .. .......  .., I , _ _ ' Pr , · --~-(100.,.•- .. I . - 1~ ‘Review Certification’ to review the complaint.  3.
[brief] That section, however, is not headed “Life Expectancy” as Plaintiff argues.  Pb., at 43.  Rather, subsection (i) is headed “Life Expectancy. ”  Subsection (ii) is headed “Time Unit Rule. ”  In his pre-trial exchange, Plaintiff requested that the Court include “Model Civil Jury Charge 8.11G: Life Expectancy. ”  Pa4.  It is clear that both defense counsel and the Court understood that request to refer only to the subsection dealing with life expectancy.  To the extent that plaintiff intended otherwise, his opportunity to address it was during the charge conference prior to defense counsel’s closing.
[brief] The court stated among other things, he would not allow the defense to use the CAD report during cross-examination.  (12T:193-3 to 25).  Following [...] testimony, defense counsel averred to the court that his cross-examination was limited.  (12T:211-14 to 17)  This court ruled in an unpublished case that CAD reports summaries of 9-1-1 dispatch calls fall within hearsay exception(s) N.J.R.E. 803(c)(6), "business records" and N.J.R.E. 803(c)(2), "excited utterance".  See. Alston, slip op. at 3.  In Alston, this court held, admission of CAD report summaries of 9-1-1 calls are not inadmissible hearsay and do not violate a defendant's right to confrontation.  slip op. at.  Here, the opposite scenario took place.  The trial judge ruled that the CAD report is "hearsay and unpersuaded by anything in Alston" (12T:23-4 to 5).
[brief] The Trial Court correctly found “marketable title was delivered” in this case as contemplated by paragraph 8(e) of the Master Deed.  See T1, Page 17 lines 14-15.  The Deed provided for Unit 74 having an aggregate .81% interest in the Common Elements of the Condominium (See Pa 96), consistent to the Schedule of Percentage of Interest for Unit 74 listed in the Master Deed in Book 4792 Page 37.  See Pa 175.  Plaintiff’s contention that the Unit is a “Common Element” is misguided, as the Master Deed specifically lists Unit 74 as having a .81% interest in the Common Elements, as does the Deed conveyed to the Association, approved by the Association’s prior counsel, title company, lender and lender’s counsel.  The Plaintiff has additionally waived any right to reinterpret provisions in the 1983 Master Deed after these 35 years.  See W. Jersey Title & Guar. Co. v. Indus. Trust Co., 27 N.J. 144,152 (1958).  All parties have complied with the terms of the Master Deed as it relates to Unit 74, and the Association purchased the Unit as expressly contemplated by paragraph 8(e) of the Master Deed.  The Trial Court was correct in concluding the 1983 Master Deed both authorized and contemplated the sale of the Unit to the Association.
[brief] They set forth time frames for completion of various steps; they incorporate financing considerations; and they outline the specific methods and procedures by which the ultimate goal of rehabilitation can be realized.  The plain language of the LRHL amply demonstrates the Legislature’s intent to delegate broad power to municipalities to contract with designated redevelopers without the constraints of any nexus requirement.  To view a developer’s agreement through the same lens as a developer’s agreement would be both illogical and inconsistent with the Legislature’s clearly expressed intent.  It is thus patently clear that there exists no nexus or other constitutional limitation which would infringe upon, or otherwise fetter the Legislature’s deliberate delegation of such expansion power.
[brief] For the sake of brevity the Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the Statement of Facts as submitted in their Brief of May 15, 2024 except as set out below:  Defendant [...]’s Brief contains the following recitation, “No extra grading was done. ”  On cross-examination Defendant [...] was forced to admit that the "driveway" was extended in connection with the addition of the 24’ by 40’ garage.  (Pa.52-54, T15-17).  A side by side review of the 2007 aerial photos of the Property and the 2020 aerial photos of the Property, marked as “Objectors 1” during the Hearing, clearly shows that extensive grading has been performed since the [...] constructed the garage.  (Pa35).  Thus, [...]'s testimony at the Hearing was less than candid and the 2022 Zoning Application was deceptive as to the extent of grading done at the Property.  However, the transcript is clear that extensive grading had been done on the Property.  (Pa52-54, 1T15:17)
[brief] Preliminarily, despite not having appealed, [...], as respondent, improperly seeks to reverse the Rent Increase Order that is the subject of [...]’s appeal.  Further, [...] raises several arguments not made by [...] without even addressing [...]’s Cross-Appeal rejecting a retroactive rent increase.  On September 13, 2021, [...] filed a Verified Complaint in Lieu of Prerogative Writ against [...] and [...] ([...]’s tenant), seeking to abrogate [...]’s grant of a monthly rent hardship increase totaling a mere $154.99.  Following its summary judgment decision on July 22, 2022 in [...]’s favor, the Trial Court entered an order on September 30, 2022 raising the monthly rent increase from $154.99 to $1,717.18 (the “Rent Increase Order”), thereby making monthly rent $2,440.33.  On October 10, 2022, [...] commenced this appeal by filing a notice of appeal seeking a reversal of the Rent Increase Order.  On October 24, 2022, [...] filed a cross-appeal limited to the Trial Court’s denial of its request to make the Rent Increase Order retroactive.  The Board did not file any appeal relating to any aspect of the Rent Increase Order.
[brief] Appellants do not argue that the State’s evidence actually fails to establish irreparable injury to students and staff.  And for good reason: the trial court based its finding of irreparable harm on the extensive evidence the State submitted establishing that irreparable harm to LGBTQ+ students would result absent an injunction.  See (Da407-08).  And as noted above, the State’s inability to vindicate the rights of New Jerseyans through enforcement of the LAD itself harms the public interest.  See Jackson, 54 N.J. at 123. subject to discipline for misreporting or misinterpreting the ill-defined policy.  (Da408-10).  And while Appellants argue the Revised Policy does not create a duty to investigate, (Db33), that is irrelevant to whether staff may be subject to discipline for misreporting or misinterpreting the Revised Policy.  Notably, at the September 6, 2023 hearing, when asked whether there is an “implication that any staff member who does not report would be subject to discipline,” counsel for the State responded “Yes.  I think that’s the case. ”  (2T13:19-14:6).  The Court observed and asked about the bounds of teacher discipline under the Revised Policy multiple times at that hearing, to which Appellants did not directly respond.  (2T24:9-25:16; 2T31:3-33:17; 2T35:7-35:8)  But staff who discriminate based on sexual orientation or gender identity could also find themselves liable for violating the LAD.  See N.J.S.A. 10:5-12(f) (establishing it is unlawful for any “owner … manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place of public accommodation” to engage in discriminatory practices); N.J.S.A.10:5-12(e) (making it unlawful for “any person, whether an employer or an employee or not” to aid or abet any violation of the LAD).  Absent an injunction, staff would be between a rock and a hard place—face either a prospect of discipline if they do not comply, or possible liability under the LAD and harm to their relationships with students if they do.  By awarding time-limited relief, the trial court avoided this fourth irreparable harm.  B.
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN REJECTING THE SETTLEMENT BOUNDARY LINE PROPOSED BY THE PLAINTIFFS.  The Trial Court considered and properly rejected the compromise boundary line as proposed by [...], given the survey was neither the product of reliable surveying methods nor was it prepared to ascertain the true boundary line between the subject properties.  [...] brought this suit to determine the factually correct boundary line between the subject properties, consistent with N.J.S.A. 2A:28-2’s requirement that the Commissioners “ascertain the true location of the lines in dispute. ”  N.J.S.A. 2A:28-2.  Plaintiffs-Appellants called [...] as a witness during the November 13, 2023, trial, to elicit testimony concerning a “proposed” boundary line and survey prepared by Mr. Ludwig.  See Testimony of [...], PLS, 1 T8, 1.22-19, 1.6.  Mr. Ludwig had prepared the underlying survey in an attempt to reconcile the inherent issues between the [...] and the [...], by proposing a certain repositioning of the disputed boundary line.  (Pa148).  This Ludwig survey sought not to ascertain the “true” boundary line, but to provide a compromise to the parties in lieu of determining the mathematically accurate boundary line.  Mr. Ludwig’s survey was presented to the Defendants-Respondents as an alternative to the adoption of the Boundary Commissioners’ Report.  Mr. Ludwig’s survey and proposed boundary line is neither the product of mathematical or scientific methods or conclusions, nor is it the product of extensive investigation, research, review and comparison of relevant deeds, surveys, historical markers, and land records.  Mr. Ludwig’s survey is simply a settlement proposal masked as a “survey”.  Given the Ludwig survey is a proposed settlement, the Defendants had the legal right to reject the proposal, especially in light of the appointment of the Boundary Commissioners and the issuance of the Boundary Commissioners’ Report.  Plaintiffs-Appellants further fail to offer any authority to justify the adoption of a settlement proposal, without the consent of the Defendants-Respondents.
[brief] Mason v. City of Hoboken, 196 N.J. 51, 64 (2008) (quoting Asbury Park Press v. Ocean Cty. Prosecutor’s Office, 374 N.J. Super. 312, 329 (Law. Div. 2004)).  The New Jersey Supreme Court has explained that “[w]ith broad public access to information about how state and local governments operate, citizens and the media can play a watchful role in . . . guarding against corruption and misconduct. ”  Burnett v. Cty. of Bergen, 198 N.J. 408, 414 (2009).  The OPRA statute specifically speaks to the protection of privacy, stating “a public agency has a responsibility and an obligation to safeguard from public access a citizen's personal information with which it has been entrusted when disclosure thereof would violate the citizen's reasonable expectation of privacy. ”  N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1.
[brief] H1638a [...] response to discovery request HOLM-[...]-PNL-24 . . . .  H1639a  [...] response to discovery request HOLM-[...]-PNL-25 . . . .  H1640a [...] response to discovery request HOLM-[...]-PNL-26 . . . .  H1641a [...] response to discovery request HOLM-[...]-PNL-27 . . . .  H1642a  [...], Appellant’s Appendix Vol. 12 Pages H1643a through H1753a [...] response to discovery request HOLM-[...]-PNL-28 . . . .
[brief] The court found as --- ³  The finding of facts contained in the lower court’s opinion are supported by citations to time stamps in the video recorded statement, which was moved into evidence as S-1, that support each finding.  (2T23-18 to 19).  The State believes it is important for this Court to have S-1 to review so it can see what the lower court saw.  As such, the State will provide S-1 to this Court in its appendix as Pa1.  follows:
[brief] [...]’s HAD application also extensively detailed its efforts to minimize impacts to Highlands resources such as upland forest areas; rare, threatened and/or endangered plant and animal species habitat; steep slopes; and historic and archeological resources.  [...] included in its HAD application a Forest Assessment (Aa0197) prepared by a State-Approved Forrester to determine the extent of tree removal on the CS 327 Site and included a planting plan (Aa0195) that would mitigate for the minimal number of trees proposed to be removed.  [...]’s application also included various mitigation plans, including, but not limited to, a steep slopes mitigation plan (Aa0069), an Unanticipated Discoveries Plan related to historic and archeological resources (Aa0212), a draft Spill Prevention and Control Plan (Aa0143), and a copy of [...]’s Upland Erosion Control, Revegetation and Maintenance Plan (Aa0087).  As required by the Highlands Rules at N.J.A.C. 7:38-9.2(b)5ii, [...] provided a copy of the complete HAD application to the [...].
[brief] (2T:133-16 to 134-2).  [...] was treated on scene by paramedics.  (2T:25-1 to 24).  After [...] retrieved the delivery van from the scene, [...]’s father took him to the hospital for further treatment.  (2T:27-3 to 7).  Following the incident, [...] visited a “pain and bone doctor” due to continued pain.  (2T:30-3 to 4).  For approximately a month and a half after the incident, [...] utilized a walking cane due to difficulty maintaining power in his leg.  (2T:30-11 to 18).  At trial [...] testified:  “On a daily basis I have shooting pains going up and down my leg.  It travels into my back.  My toes, especially at night they get cold, a cold sensation.  And my left [sic] gives out on me sometimes depending on how much pressure I put on it or randomly.  I don’t have the same power in my leg as I used to before the incident happened.  And I used to play soccer until the incident and now I am not confident enough to get back into soccer because I don’t believe I have the power in my leg to play soccer. ” (2T:31-9 to 19).
[brief] The right to silence may be invoked by “[a]ny words or conduct that reasonably appear to be inconsistent with defendant’s willingness to discuss his case with the police. ”  *S.S.*, 229 N.J. at 382 (citation omitted).  In particular, “[a] suspect who has ‘nothing else to say,’ . . . has asserted the right to remain silent. ”  *Id.* at 383-84 (collecting cases holding variations of “I got nothing else to say” were invocations and unambiguous invocations).  Also, “[s]ilence itself has been interpreted as an invocation of the right to remain silent.
[brief] SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. Plaintiff/Appellant, [...], a Minor, by his Guardian Ad Litem, [...] vs. Defendants/Respondents, [...]; [...]; [...], [...]; [...]; [...]; [...]; [...]; and [...] On Appeal From Interlocutory Order entered in the Superior Court, Law Division, Monmouth County Sat Below: Honorable [...], J.S.C. Monmouth County Superior Court Docket No. [...] BRIEF ON BEHALF OF DEFENDANT, [...] [...] Attorneys for Defendant, Alex Brown-Eskengren and [...] [...] [...]
[brief] Letter From [...] to [...] 6/19/2020 (Attached at Pa084)  Letter From [...] to [...] 6/22/2020 (Attached at Pa078)  Letter from Public Safety to [...] 7/7/2020 (Attached at Pa0071) Discovery Checklist (billing date 7/7/20) (Attached at Pa0028) Consent to Search Vehicle 2/20/20-00:47 (Attached at Pa0029) Use of Force Report by [...] (Attached at Pa0030) Use of Force Report by [...] (Attached at Pa0031) Evidence Form (Marijuana) (Attached at Pa0032) Evidence Form (Orange Pill) (Attached at Pa0033) Evidence Form (Money) (Attached at Pa0034) Evidence Form (1 Key and other items) (Attached at Pa0035) Evidence Receipt from Lab (Tab/Marijuana) (Attached at Pa0036) Use of Force Report by [...] (Attached at Pa0031) Use of Force Report by [...] (Attached at Pa0030) CJIS Transmittal Form (Attached at Pa0038) Wanted Person Request (Mugshot) (Attached at Pa0039) HIT Confirmation Response (Attached at Pa040) [...]’ Letter to [...] and [...], Dated 9/25/2020 (Attached at Pa0056)
[brief] \(^2\)  (*See* App. Br. at 21-25.)  Extending the holding in *Omar* to the facts here would require a lender to always accept a payment from \(^2\)  Respondent admitted that there is a lack of case law in New Jersey as to whether an escrow agent is considered the agent of the refinance lender, and only cited below to a District of Columbia case to support its position.  (Resp. Br. at 20 n.3; 1T45:25-46:5; 48:10-14.)  On appeal, Respondent claims that the District of Columbia holding (that an escrow agent is a dual agent) was adopted in New Jersey in *Innes v. Marzano-Lesnevich*, 224 N.J. 584 (2016).  However, *Innes* involved the holding of a minor child’s passport by attorneys in a contentious divorce.  It had nothing to do with an escrow or settlement agent (as that term is used in the consumer finance world) holding funds and disbursing funds for a refinance lender.
[brief] See, e.g., Knecht v. 225 River St., L.L.C., No. A-4793-10T3, 2012 WL 1020005, *3 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Mar. 28, 2012) (holding that an arbitrator exceeds his powers when he “disregard[s an] agreement's terms that are clearly and unambiguously expressed. ”)  [Da555]; Creative Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. Bay Owners Ass'n, Inc., No. A-0360-10T2, 2011 WL 2416857, at *5 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. June 17, 2011) (affirming the lower court’s decision to vacate an arbitration award and explaining that “the Arbitration Act sets limits on the arbitrator’s power to control the procedures at arbitration [and failure to honor those limits provides grounds to vacate an arbitration award”] [Dra13-19].  [...] appears to acknowledge that a Court can vacate an award without a finding of fraud or misconduct because in its Opposition, [...] provides several examples of this Court’s prior decisions to vacate awards for reasons other than arbitrator fraud or misconduct.  Opp. at 16 (citing Block v. Plosia, 390 N.J. Super. 543, 555 (App. Div. 2007); Kimm v. Blisset, LLC, 388 N.J. Super. 14, 24 (App. Div. 2006); Minkowitz v. Israeli, 433 N.J. Super. 111, 148 (App. Div. 2013)).
[brief] As demonstrated in plaintiff’s Opening Brief, defendant used plaintiff’s witnesses to parrot the contents of [...]’s opinions.  Pb20-26.  Defendant’s argument is further belied by the fact that defense counsel also used the hearsay documents in the cross-examination of plaintiff and [...], both fact witnesses, not experts.  Neither testified about any statutory or regulatory violations.  In fact, none of the witnesses defense counsel cross-examined using the hearsay testified on direct examination about anything remotely related to the after-the-fact DOH investigation and the results of that investigation.  Nor did any of plaintiff’s experts rely on those hearsay documents for their opinions.  Nor does defendant make those claims; nor can defendant make those claims.  **Defendant manufactured the issue it sought to rebut.
[brief] Appellant, in his Complaint, is clearly invoking his rights to statutory adjournments under N.J.S.A. 2A:17-36.  There is no challenge to any municipal or state action that would bring this matter to the Court’s attention as a prerogative writ action.  As such, the matter was properly before [...] and the Chancery Division.  **THE RELIEF SOUGHT BY APPELLANT IN HIS COMPLAINT HAD BEEN GRANTED PRIOR TO THE FIRST CONFERENCE CONDUCTED BY THE COURT AND AS SUCH, THE JUDGE’S DISMISSAL OF THE ACTION AS MOOT WAS PROPER**
[directive] 3.7.1  An officer authorized to use a CED or a less-lethal device pursuant to this Policy may fire, discharge, or utilize drive stun mode of the device during an actual operation, consistent with Addendum A, only against: (a) an active assailant; (b) a threatening assailant who will not voluntarily submit to custody after having been given a reasonable opportunity to do so considering the exigency of the situation and the immediacy of the need to employ law enforcement force; (c) a person who is attempting to cause death or serious bodily injury to themselves; or (d) a fleeing suspect, if clear and convincing evidence exists to believe the suspect has committed a crime in which the suspect caused or attempted to cause death or serious bodily injury.