ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] First Post-Acquittal Order Mandating Psychiatric Evaluation as to NGRI Acquittee's Dangerousness  Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:4-8 of Having Found jury insanity after trial [with/without] a on the defendant not guilty by reason ___________________________ of the charges _ __ of Ordered  It is on the day - 20 _ that:  Select Month -, of of NGRI acquittee is hereby committed to the custody the Commissioner the Department The of Health, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:4-8, pending medical clearance for admission which shall be of Health, and coordinated with the Department It Is Further Ordered that The professional staff shall determine, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:4-8(b ), whether or not the 1. NGRI acquittee may be able to be released to the community, with or without conditions, including supervision, without posing a danger to self, others, or property; and 2.  The professional staff shall determine, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:4-8(b )(3), whether or not the NGRI acquittee requires inpatient hospitalization to treat the acquittee's condition, and The Prosecutor's Office shall immediately forward relevant discovery materials, including 3. but not limited to the charges against the NGRI acquittee, to this Judge's team leader.  These of of the Judgment Acquittal, shall be forwarded to materials and charges, along with a copy _____ of of the Office the Court Coordinator at Psychiatric Hospital Department of Health simultaneous with transfer the NGRI acquittee after medical clearance for admission to the hospital; and, by Form Promulgated Directive #21-20 (08/05/2020), CN 12556 (KROL Order 1)  The professional staff shall contact this court and the counsel identified below when the 4. of examination has been completed and provide each with a copy the evaluation as soon it as has been completed; and of  The professional staff shall notify this court and counsel the proposed transfer date should 5. it be found that the NORI acquittee is not appropriate for commitment either because the of acquittee is not dangerous to self, others, or property a result mental illness or that the as acquittee could be released into the community [with] or [without] supervision, without posing an undue danger to self, others, or property; and The NORI acquittee shall not be administratively discharged by the institution without 6. of further order this court; and ______________ (Any additional conditions as ordered by the court)
[brief] #  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES  ## Cases  **Cell South of N.J., Inc. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment of W. Windsor Twp.**, 172 N.J. 75 (2002)  .........................................................................................................................6  **F.M.C. Stores Co. v. Borough of Morris Plains,** 100 N.J. 418 (1985)  ..........................................................................................................................6  **Kane Props., LLC v. City of Hoboken,** 325 N.J. 199 (2013)  ..........................................................................................................................2, 5  **Klumpp v. Borough of Avalon,** 202 N.J. 390 (2010)  ..........................................................................................................................6  **Muirfield Constr. Co. v. Essex Cnty. Improvement Auth.,** 336 N.J. Super. 126 (App. Div. 2000)  ..............................................................................................7  **In re New Brunswick Municipal Employees Association,** 453 N.J. Super. 408 (App. Div. 2018)  .............................................................................................3  **New Concepts For Living, Inc. v. City of Hackensack,** 376 N.J. Super. 394 (App. Div. 2005)  .............................................................................................5  **State v. Hempele,** 120 N.J. 182 (1990)  ..........................................................................................................................3  **In the Matter of the Application for Medicinal Marijuana Alt. Treatment Ctr. for Pangaea Health & Wellness, LLC,**  465 N.J. Super. 343 (App. Div. 2020)  ...........................................................................................6, 7, 8  ## Statutes **N.J.S.A. 24:61-36**  .........................................................................................................................2, 3, 4  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS, AND RULINGS APPEALED
[brief] A recording of defendant's interview was played for the jury (21T13-1 to 21T157-15).  He told the police that he worked as a carpenter and did odd jobs, maintenance and "tree work" (21T32-8 to 17;21T38-20).  He had known [...] "for a short while," and they had been friends, but he had not been to the house since 2013 and they currently did not "see eye to eye" (21T91-16 to 21T92-12;21T94-9 to 10;21T96-20 to 22;21T98-4 to 21T99-5).  [...] had claimed defendant had assaulted him, but defendant denied having done so  Defendant could not remember the last time he saw [...], but it might have been a week earlier when he was driving down Buck Road and [...] was riding a bicycle (21T107-20 to 22;21T108-19 to 21T111-4).  Defendant also knew [...], but the last time that he saw [...] was "about two weeks" earlier (21T61-1 to 25).
[brief] (Plaintiff Dep. T152:14-16 at Pa.177).  It did not tell an applicant how a criminal record would impact one’s ability to be admitted into the dual degree program.  (Plaintiff Dep. T153:19- T154:2 at Pa.177-78).  It did not address discipline, course failures, the Pharmacy Code of Conduct, the course calendar, Dean’s List, etc. (Plaintiff Dep. T152-19–T154:21 at Pa.177-78).
[brief] *The 2nd floor had no access and was not permitted to enter or be documented during the pre-construction inspection as the homeowner stated it was being cleaned due to guests arriving for an Airbnb stay.*  The post-inspection documented the homeowners concerns and photographs were taken to support those areas.  Upon entering the bedrooms and hallway areas, the homeowner stated that separations had developed within the plaster, a bedroom door was stuck when closed, and floor shifted at the north end of the home.  Obviously, the homeowner’s complaints cannot be validated by the inspectors as they were not allowed to inspect the complained-of areas during the pre-construction inspection.  The trial court issued a detailed Statement of Reasons in support of its rulings, holding:  The court finds those damages claimed here, for damage to the structure on the remainder from (in)actions from third parties performing work during the public project, is beyond the line of what is compensable as just compensation.
[brief] While Defendant self-servingly dismissed Plaintiff’s expert report and his efforts to reconstruct her misconduct, claiming she does not understand plaintiff’s calculations, she also claims that she did not even bother to look at Plaintiff’s report and calculations until the trial.  3T164:10.  Plaintiff served his expert report in September 2022.  Defendant had a deadline to respond, but she blew it.  She never hired an expert CPA to rebut it.  Nor did she ever try to otherwise contradict Plaintiff’s expert report until she was on the witness stand at trial and had her testimony excluded.  3T97:16 to 3T106:12.  Therefore, the jury was not even permitted to consider her contentions that these unauthorized personal disbursements were legitimate business expenses.  **Defendant Admitted She Violated the Non-Compete Provision**
[brief] The pertinent argument follows.  Now despite [...]'s death -- we talked about this a moment ago, the Department of Health did not have any problem with the care and treatment that was given.  All right.  You saw that.  No citable deficiencies.  No state or federal citable deficiencies.  And you heard how the Department of Health had his chart and you heard how the Department of Health would review the chart.  [...] told you that.  And they would have seen, and they saw -- nobody hid this -- PN.  Do you see that there?  LPN, LPN, LPN.  The note before it, LPN, LPN.  Don't you think the agency that's supposed to see if you have compliance with the regulations, don't they think -- don't you think they would have had a problem with that?  Don't you think that would have been a cited deficiency if what plaintiff says is true?  They would have.  Don't you think the LPNs would have gotten in trouble on their own license?  Did you hear any evidence in this case that the LPNs were referred to the nursing board?  No, you didn't.  You know why?  Because it didn't happen.  Those are the people that are charged with the responsibility to make sure there's compliance with the statutes, compliance with the laws, and you didn't hear that.  11T76:9-77:11.
[brief] However, [...] never owned [...], never heard of [...], never heard of, knew, or met [...], never heard of [...], and was never at the offices of Defendant [...].  828a (407:9-23); 827a (334:22–336:1); 828a (409:7-13).  [...] specifically testified that he never heard of, knew, or communicated with [...], and he never met or communicated with [...].  539a (97:3-14); 542a (112:6-8); 546a (138:3-13); 550a (204:16-19); 542a (112:9 – 113:1).  Further, [...] never heard of, knew, or communicated with [...], despite Defendants claiming that at some point in time [...] was owned by [...].  544a (122:6-23); 550a (203:19 – 204:9).  In addition, [...] testified that [...] was owned by [...], and that prior to the death of [...], [...] dealt with only [...] regarding [...].  833a (47:16–48:1); 834a (120:9-12); 835a (139:22–140: 10).  However, [...] and [...] both testified that neither one of them ever conveyed their membership interest in [...] to [...] or anyone else.  540a (104:23–105:1, 105:22-25); 547a (162:16–163:8, 164:4-22); 548a (166:22-25); 550a (202:1–203:7); 551a (207:2-13); 552a (214:21–215:8); 426a (34:15–35:4); 427a–428a (49:22 – 51:1); 438a (202:16-19); 439a (213:20-25); 440a (216:20–217:25).
[brief] The error the Court made is the assumption that the legislative intent behind OPRA was not to include the conducting of DNA testing.  While this argument is a legal fallacy, given DNA testing did not exist at the time the original OPRA was written, the legislative purpose underlying OPRA was to provide the public with access to government documents for the purpose of “inspection, copying or examination” of said documents.  Applying these words and the rational and logical intent with a modern-day lens in 2023, makes the logic behind the words, “examination” and “inspection” very clear.  The Legislature clearly thought more broadly regarding OPRA’s interpretation than simply holding and looking at a document.  The plain reading of the statute is obvious regarding what is meant by those two words.  The fact that the Appellant cannot cite a case on this point does not mean the case law cannot and should not be updated or brought current.  Additionally, the Court erred when applying MAG specifically referencing MAG by asserting that the aim of OPRA remains subject “to reasonable controls…to prevent abuse and protect the public officials involved.
[brief] (7T146-16 to 147-4).  At trial, [...] did not testify to the range of the cell towers; rather, he testified generally that a cellphone typically connects to the tower with the best signal, but acknowledged that obstructions and terrain can cause the phone to connect to a different tower.  (7T20-8 to 19; 7T22-21 to 24-1).  Where he testified to distances, these numbers came from [...], not [...].  For example, for the timeframe of 2:43 a.m. to 2:49 a.m., [...] mapped the distances provided from [...]’s own PCMD data.  (7T48-1 to 49-13; Pa27).  The distances were indicated as curved bands on the map, which were “the measurement given by [...] with a plus or minus of a tenth of a mile,” which [...] had determined from experience was an acceptable margin of error.  (1T179-23 to 180-15; 7T49-14 to 20).  [...] couched his language in generalities, testifying that the phone “could have been inside of that or outside of that. ” (7T49-20 to 21).  Cf. *Burney*, 255 N.J. at 25 (emphasizing agent’s testimony that it was “highly, highly unlike[ly]” that victim’s home fell outside the one-mile coverage area).
[brief] Defendant is incorrect.  TCCWNA is legislation that was enacted to “‘prevent deceptive practices in consumer contracts. ’”  Dugan v. TGI Fridays, Inc., 231 N.J. 24, 67 (2017) (quoting Kent Motor Cars, Inc. v. Reynolds & Reynolds Co., 207 N.J. 428, 457 (2011)).  The New Jersey Legislature enacted TCCWNA “not to confer new legal rights, but to require sellers ‘to acknowledge clearly established consumer rights,’ and to ‘provide[] remedies for posting or inserting provisions contrary to law. ’”  Spade v. Select Comfort Corp., 232 N.J. 504, 515-516 (2018) (quoting Shelton v. Restaurant.com, Inc., 214 N.J. 419, 431 (2013)) (alteration original).  A consumer alleging a claim pursuant to TCCWNA must demonstrate 1) the defendant is a “‘seller, lessor, creditor, lender or bailee or assignee of any of the aforesaid’”; 2) “that the defendant offered or entered into a ‘written consumer contract or [gave] or display[ed] any written consumer warranty, notice or sign’”; 3) “at the time that the written consumer contract is signed or the written consumer warranty, notice or sign is displayed, that writing contains a provision that ‘violates any clearly established legal right of a consumer or responsibility of a seller, lessor, creditor, lender or bailee’”; and 4) that the plaintiff is an “‘aggrieved consumer’”.
[brief] This included inspecting the floors to make sure they were clean, dry, free of spills and free of hazards.  Id. 33.  After the store opened, the Manager-On-Duty continuously walked the store throughout the day to make sure the store was in order.  Pa87, at ¶5. 34.  This included inspecting the floors to make sure there were clean, dry, free of spills and free of hazards.  Id. 35.  After the store opened, the Sales Associates assigned to each department continually checked their departments to make sure they were in order.  Pa87, at ¶6. 36.
[brief] At oral argument, the Court noted that “[...] has been habitually delaying this.  They really have.  I’ve already decided they’ve acted in bad faith . . . at different times . . .  I am still very much shocked that they would pass the—they would agree to an agreement in July, wait five months before they memorized [sic] it in a resolution that was really a resolution . . .  And then they again in January 23rd with no notice they adopted the supplemental resolution which added a term unilaterally . . . it smack of, you know, deceit when you say but we reserve the right to amend it at a later point.
[brief] In summary, the Appellant satisfied Category 6 permanent injury that has been causally linked to the 2019 MVA and it should have been sufficient within itself to overcome the verbal threshold.  The lower court erred by only generally discussing the existence of these facts even though these facts alone would have been dispositive of the issue.  Additionally, because the Appellant’s subjective complaints were examined and noted by the Defendant's expert and given that some weight of consideration should be given to the Appellant’s affidavit, they are sufficient to create a dispute as to the material facts to warrant putting this issue in front of a jury.  Respectfully submitted, Attorneys for Appellant
[brief] | | | Russell v. Princeton Laboratories, Inc., | 16 | | 50 N.J. 30 (1967)  | | | [...] v. [...], | 14 | | DOCKET NO. [...], 2011 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 671 | | | (App. Div. Mar. 18, 2011)  | | [...] v. [...], 224 N.J. 189 (2016)..................................................................................................................12  [...] v. [...], 128 N.J. 427 (1992)..................................................................................................................13  [...] v. [...], DOCKET NO. [...], 2019 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1163 (App. Div. May 21, 2019)
[brief] (Pa 54).  The court reached this number by starting with [...]’s costs to litigate against [...], which was $1,193,281.  (Pa 54).  The trial court then reduced the amount requested by [...] to account for [...]’s partial success during the allocation phase of the case.  (Id).  The court calculated this deduction by multiplying the fees requested by 36.4 ([...]’s allocation of damages before reconsideration) and then dividing by 85 ([...]’s allocation of damages after reconsideration).  Although [...] criticizes [...] for his method of calculating [...]’s recoverable fees, [...] disagreed stating, “the Court believes this calculation fairly accounts for the time [...] had to litigate to seek coverage from [...] while crediting [...] for its ultimate success on allocation. ”  (Pa 54).  Through the long history of this litigation, until the end of 2020, [...] had incurred $6,422,560 in attorneys’ fees to secure the insurance coverage to which it is entitled.
[brief] When these two elements are satisfied, a presumption arises that the purchaser is *bona fide*, “and the burden of showing to the contrary rests upon the party alleging that title was acquired by the purchaser with notice of an outstanding claim or equity. ”  *Monsanto Employees Fed. Credit Union v. Harbison*, 209 N.J. Super. 539, 542 (App. Div. 1986); *Venetsky v. West Essex Building Supply Co., Inc.*, 28 N.J. Super. 178, 187 (App.Div. 1953); *Reaves v. Egg Harbor Township*, 277 N.J. Super. 360 (Ch. 1994).
[brief] On August 6, 2021, [...] filed the initial Complaint in this matter requesting quiet title to the disputed tract and reform five recorded instruments, alleging ejectment, trespass and nuisance against [...] and requesting a declaratory judgment.  [...] filed an Answer, Affirmative Defenses and Counterclaim on March 9, 2022.  Defendants’ pleadings were subsequently amended and an amended responsive pleading was filed.  On February 27, 2023, [...] filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment asking the trial court to rule [...] was not a bona fide purchaser as a matter of law.  [...] opposed the Motion and filed a Cross-Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, supported by the expert report of [...], Esquire, who concluded, based upon his experience, the property record and the sale transaction, that a reasonably prudent buyer would not have constructive or inquiry notice that Lot 3 was less than 66.3’ wide.  561a-562a.  [...] opposed the Cross-Motion but did not serve a responsive expert report.  684a.  On June 23, 2023, following oral argument, the trial court entered summary judgment in favor of [...], including reformation of five recorded instruments designating [...]’s lot as 66.3’ wide.
[brief] The DEP argued that it “concurred with [...]’s calculations that the Project’s flood storage displacement requirements in N.J.A.C. 7:13-11.4 were met and thus concluded knowledge of the exact floodway location was not required. ”  DEP Rb14-15.  But this was arbitrary for the following three reasons.  First, the Project’s flood storage displacement potential ought to have been based on the most realistic data and flood forecasting information contained in the Cornell Studies, and the DEP failed to do so.  The DEP instead deleted the applicant’s demarcation of floodway lines from the site plans so there would be no record at all of the approximate location of the floodway.  Second, the only part of the record that reflects the DEP’s purported concurrence with [...]’s flood storage calculations is an email from the DEP on November 30, 2022, where the DEP said “this [floodway] line cannot be on there to be approvable.  Is it possible for you to remove the floodway line from the applicable plans? ”  Aa050.  There is no support in the record for its late decision to exclude and remove the floodway lines from the applicant’s site plans.  Third, the DEP’s late attempt to alter its final agency decision, after its issuance on December 1, 2022, is highly unusual and constitutes a violation of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), N.J.S.A. 52:14B-3.1(a), and the DEP’s Flood Hazard regulations, N.J.A.C. 7:13-21.3(e).
[brief] (Db20).  Since the defendants never pressed their statute of limitations argument on summary judgment or at trial, this Court may only reverse on the issue if it finds that the trial court committed plain error.  Johnson v. Benjamin Moore & Co., 347 N.J. Super. 71, 97 (App. Div. 2002).  It did not.  Pleading a statute of limitations defense in an answer is not sufficient to preserve the matter for appeal if a party does not actually litigate the issue.  The statute of limitations is an affirmative defense that defendants have an obligation to both raise and establish by a preponderance of the evidence.  Fees v. Trow, 105 N.J. 330, 335 (1987); Williams v. Bell Tel. Labs. Inc., 132 N.J. 109, 118-120 (1993) (defendant waived the statute of limitations defense by failing to assert it at any stage of the proceedings after pleading it in its answer).  Though pled in their answer, the defendants did not raise the issue with respect to any of the claims that proceeded to trial—not on summary judgment, not in their Rule 4:40-1 motion at the close of Plaintiffs’ case, and not in their post-trial proposed findings or post-trial motions.  In fact, the defendants surgically raised the issue in one and only one context: in support of their summary judgment motion as to the specific and limited issue of [...]’s claim for unpaid compensation—on which they prevailed.  (3T 57:2-13; 59:17 to 60:18; 79:4-18).  They did not raise it on summary judgment or at trial as to any of the other claims in this lawsuit.  The appellants do not identify any section of any transcript where they affirmatively raised this issue in any other context.
[brief] A contrary rule would make it impossible for the school to be “responsive to the overall educational needs of the community and its children. ”  John & Jane Parents, 622 F.Supp.3d at 130.  And as a practical matter, it would be difficult to administer, especially when the parents (such as divorced parents) disagree about whether to affirm their child’s gender identity.  See, e.g., Vesely v. Ill. Sch. Dist. 45, 669 F.Supp.3d 706, 712 (N.D. Ill. 2023).  Appellants have thus failed to show that the injunction violates parents’ fundamental rights.
[brief] In doing so, it identified, essentially, a series of defenses that a carrier could assert in opposition to a claimant’s demand for payment of medical expense benefits.  Significantly, the Legislature could have, but did not, include within the definition of a PIP dispute whether a No-Fault claimant, a medical provider with an assignment of benefits or an insured knowingly misrepresented material facts to an insurance carrier in connection with a claim, whether a person conspired with others to do so or whether a person knowingly benefited from other individual’s violations of the Fraud Act, all of which would be actionable under the Fraud Act even though the Legislature was then making other changes to the Fraud Act. \(^4\)  Instead, the Legislature continued to vest exclusive jurisdiction over the resolution of the Fraud Act issues in a "court of competent jurisdiction."  As the Merin court stated, “The words chosen [or not chosen] by the Legislature are deemed to have been chosen for a reason. ”\(^5\)  Merin, 126 N.J. at 435 citing Gabin v. Skyline Cabana Club, 54 N.J. 550, 555, 258 A.2d 6 (1969).  Under AICRA, the Legislature restructured the government to fight No-Fault fraud more comprehensively and with greater coordination.