ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] 32  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS  August 26, 2022, Order by Honorable [...], P.J.Ch. Denying Plaintiffs’ Order to Show Cause……………………………………Da329  August 26, 2022, Order by Honorable [...], P.J.Ch. Dismissing Part of the Complaint and Granting Part of the Complaint………………Da331 September 28, 2022, Amended Order by [...], P.J.Ch…..Da333 August 17, 2023, Partial Order for Summary Judgment…………………Da853 August 29, 2023, Order Denying Summary Judgment against Plaintiffs…Da856 January 22, 2024, Order Denying Defendant’s Motion for Reconsideration…………………………………………………………Da870 January 22, 2024, Letter of Opinion by the Court…………………………Da873 February 6, 2024, Order Denying Defendant [...]’s Entry of a Stay of the Court’s August 17, 2023, Order Granting Partial Summary Judgment……………………………………………………Da877 March 26, 2024, Order Granting Appellant’s Leave to Appeal…………Da895 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CASES Alloco v. Ocean Beach Club, 456 N.J.Super. 124 (App Div 1988) --------------21, 22 Alves v. Rosenberg, 400 N.J. Super. 553 (App. Div. 2008) ------------------------ 31 Armstrong v. Ledges Homeowners Ass’n, 633 S.E.2d 78, 85 (N.C. 2006)  20 Boyles v. Hausmann, 517 N.W.2d 610, 617 (Neb. 1994)  ----------------------20, 25 Bruno v. Hanna, 63 N.J. Super. 282, 285 (App. Div. 1960)  --------------------- 14  Cape May Harbor Village and Yacht Club Ass'n, Inc. v. Sbraga, 421 N.J. Super. 56 (2011)  ---------------------------------------------------------------22, 23 Caullett v. Stanley Stilwell & Sons, Inc., 67 N.J.Super. 111, 115, 170 A.2d 52 (App.Div.1961)  ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------  13  Cooper River Plaza East, LLC v. Briad Group, 359 N.J. Super. 518 (App. Div. 2003)  -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------  13 Hammett v. Rosensohn, 46 N.J. Super. 527 (App. Div. 1957)  --------------------------  14  Hernan v. Ocean Beach L-69214-88 ---------------------------------------------------------  22 Imbrie v. Marsh, 3 N.J. 578 (1950).  -----------------------------------------------------------  16  Kalway v. Calabria Ranch HOA, LLC, 506 P.3d 18 (Ariz. 2022)- 11, 18, 19, 20, 25  Kavanaugh v. Quigley, 63 N.J. Super. 153 (App. Div. 1960)  ----------------------------  32  Olson v. Jantausch, 44 N.J. Super. 380, 388 (App. Div. 1957)--------------------------  15  Pearson v. DMH 2 LLC, 449 N.J. Super. 30, 50 (Ch. Div. 2016)  ----------------------  15  Powell v. Washburn, 211 Ariz. 553 (2006)  ------------------------------------------  19  State v. Lyons, 417 N.J. Super. 251 (App. Div. 2010)----------------------------------  31 State v. Steele, 92 N.J. Super. 498 (App. Div. 1966)-----------------------------------  32  Summit Plaza Assocs. v. Kolta, 462 N.J. Super. 401 (App. Div. 2020)---------------------  31
[brief] See *Dickey*, 152 N.J. at 476.  Under that standard, “an officer may not conduct a canine sniff in a manner that prolongs a traffic stop beyond the time required to complete the stop’s mission, unless he . . . has articulable reasonable suspicion independent from the reason for the traffic stop that a suspect possesses narcotics. ”  Dunbar, 229 N.J. at 540.  Reasonable suspicion requires police “to articulate something more than an ‘inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch. ’”  State v. Stovall, 170 N.J. 346, 357 (2002) (quoting United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989)).  An appellate court reviewing a motion to suppress must defer to the motion court’s factual findings “so long as those findings are supported by sufficient evidence in the record. ”  State v. Hubbard, 222 N.J. 249, 262 (2015).  But a trial court’s legal conclusions “and its view of ‘the consequences that flow from established facts’ are reviewed de novo. ”  State v. Goldsmith, 251 N.J. 384, 398 (2022) (quoting Hubbard, 222 N.J. at 263).  The motion court in this case made a factual finding that the canine sniff “prolong[ed] the duration of the stop beyond the time required to complete the stop’s mission.
[directive] During a Public Health care facility’s agents, officers, employees, servants, representatives or volunteers, arising from an injury to a patient caused by any act or omission pursuant to, and consistent with, such policy.  2.  No prosecuting agency in New Jersey shall bring a criminal prosecution against any healthcare provider, including but not limited to a doctor, nurse, or hospital, for any act or omission in contravention of such an allocation policy without the approval of the Attorney General.
[brief] [...]: “Ok.  And Scott, you’re okay with him talking to us?”  [...]: “That’s [...]. ”  [...]: “[...]; I’m sorry. ”  [...]: “Yes, I’m okay with that. ”  You’re okay with it?  [...]: “I think, pretty much. ”  [7T:291-3 to 9]  The aforementioned exchange is the entire consultation took a few seconds and took place in front of two detectives.  Id.  This cannot possibly be the type of private consultation with a parent or guardian that was discussed in A.S., 240 N.J. at 350.
[brief] During [...]’s direct examination, Mr. D’Antonio testified as to the communications with [...] regarding the invoices for legal services performed.  Specifically, following the January 2018 invoice, Cohen called and commented that it was a “big bill” and “It’s too much”.  (4T:143:19-21).  Also, Mr. D’Antonio identified Exhibit D-8, which was an email chain beginning January 31, 2018.  (4T:145:16-25).  Mr. D’Antonio identified his January 31, 2018, 2:56 p.m., email responding to Cohen’s January 31, 2018, 2:46 p.m. email.  Mr. D’Antonio told Cohen to look at the bills carefully, and asked him if he wanted to speak about them.  (4T:151:7-12).  Then, Cohen responded at 3:02 p.m., on January 31, 2018, that he would be traveling, and they could speak on Monday.  (4T:151:9-16).  Mr. D’Antonio responded on January 31, 2018, at 6:07 p.m., explaining that when they were retained, on September 8, 2017, it was active litigation with numerous defendants, and they were being asked to step into the case and get up to speed.  (4T:151:23-25).  Mr. D’Antonio explained that the firm had received the construction defect case files from prior counsel and opposing counsel, which contained in excess of 60,000 pages, all of which had to be read.  (4T:153:1-5).  Discovery demands had been defaulted on, and Cohen had to be brought into compliance by producing documents, which had to be read before they were produced.  (4T:153:6-10).  Also, there were privileged communications which had to be reviewed and removed.  Mr. D’Antonio also explained in his email that the firm billed 443 hours during this period.  Mr. D’Antonio told Cohen to “dial down” the “inflammatory rhetoric” which was “insulting”.  He pointed out that he [D’Antonio] had not billed Cohen for all of the time he spent on the case.  He also made it clear that the firm will “sit tight and not engage in any further billing until you direct us to continue with the case. ” (4T:154:18-22).  Mr. Cohen responded, stating that he wanted Mr. D’Antonio to waive the bill and agree to continue the case on a 20% contingency.  (4T:155:1-11).  Mr. Cohen never questioned any particular entry on the invoice, and never asked Mr. D’Antonio to explain anything.  He never came in to meet with Mr. D’Antonio to go over the invoice, despite being invited to do so.  Rather, Mr. Cohen issued an ultimatum: to convert the retainer into a 20% contingency or [...] would be terminated and “you can chase me and take me to Court to try to get paid and I’ll see you in five years. ”  (4T:155:15-22).  Mr. D’Antonio refused that offer.  During Mr. D’Antonio’s testimony, the trial court observed that Cohen was snickering, and making jeers and laughs during this testimony.
[brief] APPELLANT’S LETTER SUR-REPLY  BRIEF  Re: [...]; [...]; and [...]; Plaintiffs-Appellants, vs. L AND J ENTERPRISES  1, L.L.C. and [...]  Defendants-Respondents, Appellate  Docket No. [...]  Case type: Civil County: Ocean, Chancery Trial Court  [...]  Sat below: Hon. [...], J.S.C.  My Dear Judges, Kindly accept this letter in lieu of a more formal sur-reply brief, pursuant to R.2:6-2(b).
[brief] 353a-354a (36:15-:37:9).  Fearing financial ruin and mentally distraught, Plaintiff [...] again relied on Defendant [...]’s advice and was forced to negotiate a deal with [...], under which he conveyed [...]’s interest in the property in exchange for $480,000.00.  353a-354a (36:15-:37:9); Pa370-Pa371 (53:20-54:19).  The conveyance was made after Plaintiff [...] had expended approximately $800,000.00-$900,000.00 in pursuing the [...] development.  397a-398a (80:1-81:9).  Ultimately, with Defendant [...] serving as counsel, [...] conveyed [...] to [...] in 2010, completing the transaction that, without Plaintiffs’ knowledge, Defendants [...] and [...] had structured years before [...] ever had an interest in [...].  [...] subsequently developed 132 low and moderate income rental apartments on [...].  119a (20:17-20).  POINT I
[brief] “[A] municipality is a creature of the Legislature, and as such is a government of enumerated powers which can act only by delegated authority. ”  Inganamort v. Borough of Fort Lee, 72 N.J. 412, 417 (1977) (citing Giannone v. Carlin, 20 N.J. 511, 517 (1956)).  “Any exercise of a delegated power by a municipality in a manner not consistent with the purview of the governing statute is capricious and ultra vires of the delegated powers. ”  Giannone, supra, 20 N.J. at 517; accord Kress v. La Villa, 335 N.J. Super. 400, 410 (App. Div. 2000).  Here, had the City granted a previously designated redeveloper of a different property not impacted by the proposed amendment to the Redevelopment Plan blanket veto authority over that proposed amendment, such action would be contrary to the LRHL.
[brief] Unlike [...], [...]’s interrogation took place at 2:18AM.  (1T:13-17 to 18).  Similarly, [...] was unaware if [...] slept or if he was given any food.  (1T:42-14 to 43-1).  As aforementioned, there was no private consultation with his guardian whatsoever.  (1T:35-8 to 11).  [...] was an autistic sixteen-year-old who went to school for children with disabilities.  (1T:42-3 to 6).  When the State argues that this is “speculation” they are improperly placing the burden on the defense.  This was in fact the uncontradicted testimony at the *Miranda* hearing that was agreed to by their Detective.  *Id.*
[brief] Consideration, or a value exchange by both parties, is necessary for an enforceable contract.  The consideration for the contract was for [...] to pay [...] in exchange for services rendered.  That consideration failed when [...] was no longer rendering services and was thus not entitled to payment.  [...]’s claims for additional payments despite not rendering services also fails for lack of consideration.  Summary judgment on [...]’s disingenuous breach of contract theory should have therefore been denied.
[brief] Finally, the language of “possess a firearm at the time of any pending charge” in subsection (a)(5) clearly refers to possessing a firearm during the offense for which defendant has “pending charges” rather than targeting the scenario where a defendant possessed a firearm while on bail or pretrial release for another offense.  Simply put, the Legislature knows how to specify sentencing provisions that target offenses committed while on bail or pretrial release and uses quite different language when targeting those offenses.  In the provision that creates a presumption of consecutive sentences for offenses committed while on bail or pretrial release, the Legislature used the language, “When a defendant is sentenced to imprisonment for an offense committed while released, with or without bail, pending disposition of a previous offense.
[brief] N.J.S.A. 13:20-3; -31 to -34.  Accordingly, DEP has promulgated rules effectuating the permitting program at N.J.A. C. 7:38-1.1 through -14.2, implemented by DEP’s Division of Land Resource Protection (formerly the Division of Land Use Regulation).  N.J.S.A. 13:20-32.  The Highlands Act exempts certain activities from requiring a permit, subject to DEP’s exemption determination documented by a HAD.
[brief] It next held, “trial courts should consider both audio and video recording, as the value of both in resolving a dispute as to what occurred during a DME ‘could be significant. ’”  *Id.* (quoting *DiFiore*, 472 N.J. Super. at 130).  The Court added that “smart phones can unobtrusively be used to record a DME with ‘minimal effort’” and would “not [be] unduly disruptive. ”  Id.  The Court also explained that parties could enter into a protective order to prevent “the dissemination of proprietary information about the exam. ”  Id. at 233 (quoting DiFiore, 472 N.J. Super. at 131).  The Court added that there should be reasonable conditions placed on third-party observers so they do not disrupt the exam, and that parties should attempt to agree on a neutral interpreter.  Id. at 233.  The Court disagreed with this Court as to the party that bears the burden for restricting or permitting recording, holding “placing the burden on defendants to show why a neutral third-party observer or an unobtrusive recording should not be permitted in a particular case best comports with the realities of DMEs and the text of Rules 4:19 and 4:10-3. ”  Id. at 233.  The reason for the holding was not only the plain language of the Rules, but also to ensure “fairness in our civil justice system.
[brief] **  Appellant asserts that, by transmitting data to its letter vendor so that the vendor could print and send him a letter, Respondent violated § 1692c(b) of the FDCPA, which provides as follows:  **Communications with third parties**  Except as provided in section 1692b of this title, without the prior consent of the consumer given directly to the debt collector, or the express permission of a court of competent jurisdiction, or as reasonably necessary to effectuate a post judgment judicial remedy, a debt collector may not communicate, in connection with the collection of any debt, with any person other than the consumer, his attorney, a consumer reporting agency if otherwise permitted by law, the creditor, the attorney of the creditor, or the attorney of the debt collector.
[brief] See, e.g., Helmy v. City of Jersey City, 178 N.J. 183 (2003); Johnson v. Knorr, 477 3d. 75 (3d Cir. 2007); Est. of Smith v. Marasco, 318 F.3d 497 (3d Cir. 2003); Brunson v. Affinity Fed. Credit Union, 199 N.J. 381 (2009).  Notably, however, in Brunson the New Jersey Supreme Court emphasized, as have federal courts, that malicious prosecution is a disfavored cause of action:  [T]he law does not look with favor upon actions for malicious prosecution; it does not encourage them.  The reason is embedded deeply in our jurisprudence.  The courts must be freely accessible to the people.  Extreme care must be exercised so as to avoid the creation of a reluctance on their part to seek redress for civil or criminal wrongs for fear of being subjected to a damage suit if the action results adversely.  Id. at 395 (citations omitted).
[brief] LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY SUBSTITUTING ITS JUDGMENT FOR THAT OF THE JURY (Pa6-8; 8T)  The parties agree that the sole issue on this appeal is the Trial Court’s failure to enforce the pre-trial agreement between counsel to mold the Jury’s verdict to _____________________  ‘Statement of Procedural History and Statement of Facts were combined in the plaintiffs’ initial brief because they are integrally intwined.  include medical expenses, and temporary disability benefits, paid pursuant to the Worker’s Compensation Act.
[brief] All three rounds of hearings were dominated by the landlord’s attempt to persuade the Board to abandon its ordinance to adopt the landlord’s “blended approach” to equity, which incorporated the unit’s hypothetical value as an “unencumbered” and renovated two bedroom/two bathroom condominium, the equalized tax assessed value as a condominium, and a purported $76,000 in “capital improvements” attributed to the Unit when the owner renovated the rest of the building to get it up to condominium standards.  DA43.  The Board resisted [...]’s attempts to so wildly depart from their ordinance and passed a motion at the very first hearing stating “The Rent Leveling Board affirms the plain language of our current ordinance as to the definition of equity and rejects the approach that is being proposed by applicant’s counsel. ”  1T88-90.  Furthermore, the Board expressly rejected the idea that the purported $76,000 that went into work on the unit in 2001 should be added to the “equity” given its age and lack of documentation.
[brief] In [...], the Commission provided a step-by-step roadmap that the arbitrator must follow: the arbitrator must state what the total base salary was for the last year of the expired contract and show the methodology as to how base salary was calculated.  We understand that the parties may dispute the actual base salary amount and the arbitrator must make the determination and explain what was included based on the evidence submitted by the parties.  Next, the arbitrator must calculate the costs of the award [].  The statutory definition of base salary includes the costs of the salary increments of unit members as they move through the steps of the salary guide.  Accordingly, the arbitrator must review the scattergram of the employees’ placement on the guide to determine the incremental costs in addition to the across-the-board raises awarded.  The arbitrator must then determine the costs of any other economic benefit to the employees that was included in base salary, but at a minimum this calculation must include a determination of the employer’s cost of longevity.
[brief] Further, there can be no dispute that the First Contract calls for repeated transactions of performance, since Plaintiff was required to order ninety-five percent of the product contemplated by the First Contract within one (1) year.  Pa223; Pa15.  Therefore, the only issue for consideration is whether Defendant accepted Plaintiff’s performance.  The undisputed evidence shows that it did.  In particular, Plaintiff procured five (5) orders of product with Defendant that were shipped on the following dates, according to Defendant’s records: September 21, 2020 (Invoice No.: 190111); September 28, 2020 (Invoice No.: October 5, 2020 (Invoice No.: 190671); October 20, 2020 (Invoice No.: 191266) and November 4, 2020 (Invoice No.: 191821).  Pa46-50.  On September 25, 2020, [...], President of Defendant, complained internally of Plaintiff’s failure to order a minimum of 20,000 pounds.  Pa224; Pa435.  Thereafter, Defendant shipped to Plaintiff four (4) additional orders of product since the date of [...]’ internal email.  Pa224; Pa46.  Of those four (4) additional orders, only one (1) order was for a quantity of over 20,000 pounds, which order was placed on October 19, 2020 and shipped on October 20, 2020.  Pa224; Pa46; Pa437.  [...], who brokered the relationship between Plaintiff and Defendant, testified that he had to “fight with ownership” to release orders under 20,000 pounds for [...].  Pa224; Pa425-426.  To that end, [...] approved every sub-20,000 pound order for [...], based off of [...]’s “begging. ”  Pa224; Pa426.  Here, the parties’ course of performance obviously amended the terms of the First Contract, as the undisputed evidence shows that Defendant committed a knowing waiver of the 20,000 pound requirement.
[brief] ”  *State v. Haskins*, 131 N.J. 643, 649 (1993) (quotations omitted).  Similarly, the Court has held that “[p]roper authentication of [a] map required a witness who could --- 5 *Olenowski I* held that prospectively, a *Daubert*-like standard, rather than the *Frye* standard, should be used when determining the reliability of proffered expert testimony in criminal cases.
[brief] **CONCLUSION**  Plaintiff requests the Court reverse the trial court’s interlocutory orders dismissing Plaintiff’s CFA claims (Count VII).  This Court should rule that insurance producers, in their capacity as licensed semi-professionals, are not immune from liability under the CFA, and provide clarity as to the application of Shaw by confirming Plemmons is no longer controlling or persuasive in determining exemptions to liability under the CFA.  The exemption from liability under the CFA is and should be limited to “learned professionals,” which does not include Defendants.  The trial court’s orders should be reversed.
[brief] The explanation about using the $2 million to acquire the Jersey City property doesn’t make sense because the Jersey City property was acquired via the [...] line of credit and an assumption of an existing mortgage, which resulted in a net payment by [...] of far less than $2 million.  [...] then used a series of corrective journal entries to cover his taking of the $2 million for which no supporting documentation is provided.  (34T 70:4 to 72:21; 76:8 to 77:7; 77:21 to 78:2).  **Misappropriation #4:**
[brief] The Supreme Court stated:  The remaining issue concerning [...]’s coverage is the most difficult….  Those facts require us to consider [...] an innocent partner for purposes of balancing the equities attendant in these circumstances….  Thus, applying the rule of law advocated by [...] could leave members of the public, whom [...] had represented throughout that period, unprotected even though the insured himself committed no fraud.  In our view, that harsh and sweeping result would be contrary to the public interest.  More specifically, it would be inconsistent with the policies underlying our Rules of Court that seek to protect consumers of legal services by requiring attorneys to maintain adequate insurance in this setting.  Cf. Fisher v. New Jersey Auto. Full Ins. Underwriting Ass’n., 224 N.J. Super. 552, 557-58 (App. Div. 1988) (allowing PIP benefits for innocent third parties even when underlying insurance policy otherwise is void due to policyholder’s misrepresentations).  We thus conclude that the equities do not warrant rescission of [...]’s coverage….
[brief] The Sixteenth Count through the Nineteenth Count of Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint allege legal malpractice against the [...] arising solely from the [...]’ fraudulent concealment in the 2015 Action that [...] was Sole Member of [...] and controlled and operated [...] as a sham entity.  None of these facts nor claims were alleged in the complaint that was dismissed against [...] in the 2015 Action, as said facts were discovered in the course of the 2015 Action following said dismissal.  The Trial Court does not explain how claims for legal malpractice arising from an attorney’s fraudulent concealment of evidence would “chill the adversarial process. ”  Instead, the Trial Court’s holding is deeply disconcerting, as it necessarily implies that fraudulent concealment is an acceptable tool for attorneys in the adversarial process.  The Trial Court’s erroneous holding necessarily implies that attorneys may lie, cheat, forge, and conceal in litigation simply because they owe no duty to opposing parties to refrain from fraudulent conduct.  Moreover, the [...] repeatedly make the argument that they could not commit fraudulent concealment because they were not Defendants in the 2015 Action and their clients did not engage in discovery in the 2015 Action.  What the [...] ignore is the fact that in opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion to Vacate the Order of November 10, 2016, in the 2015 Action, [...], by way of their counsel, the [...], presented a certain Collateral Assignment that later discovery proved to be a forgery.  [...] and the [...], repeatedly fraudulently concealed evidence and obstructed discovery in motion practice in the 2015 Matter, irrespective of their status as non-parties in the matter.  Plaintiffs must be permitted to state a claim for fraudulent concealment against the [...], and the Trial Court’s erroneous holding must be reversed.  POINT V THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN SANCTIONING PLAINTIFFS FOR FILING THE COMPLAINT AND GRANTING DEFENDANTS