ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT LACKED JURISDICTION TO RECONSIDER AND REVERSE THE MARCH 22, 2024  STAY ORDER (Da080; Da162-Da163; 2T19:16-22:14)  A.  The Trial Court Lacked Jurisdiction to Reconsider and Reverse the March 22, 2024  Stay Order  Because it was a Final Order Subject to Strict Deadlines for Reconsideration and Appeal (Da080; Da162-Da-163; 1T18:20-19:8; 2T19:16-22:14)  Rule 2:2-3(b) identifies those orders that are deemed final, including “orders compelling or denying arbitration, whether the action is dismissed or stayed. ”  Rule 2:2–3(b)(8); see also *Wein v. Morris*, 194 N.J. 364, 380 (2008).  “Whether the court in compelling arbitration dismisses the action as part of a final order or stays the matter, the order will be deemed final and appealable as of right. ”  *Wein*  194 N.J. 364, 380 at 944.  This is true “regardless of whether such orders dispose of all issues and all parties, and the time for appeal therefrom starts from the date of the entry of that order. ”  *GMAC v. Pittella*, 205 N.J. 572, 587 (2011).  As such, the trial court’s March 22, 2024 “stay order” was a final order subject to review only by a motion for reconsideration under Rule 4:49-2 or an appeal as of right.  Rule 4:49-2 provides that a motion for reconsideration of a judgment or order “shall be served not later than [twenty] days after service of the judgment or order. ”  [...] never moved for reconsideration of the March 22, 2024 “stay order”; by the time that the trial court sua sponte “reconsidered” and reversed such order, the 20 day “window” for reconsideration was closed.  As explained in Hayes v. Turnersville Chrysler Jeep, 453 N.J. Super. 309, 313 (App. Div. 2018), “Rule 1:3-4(c) prohibits the parties and the court from ‘enlarge[ing] the time specified by … [Rule] 4:49-2’ for the filing of a motion for reconsideration of a judgment or order, and, as a result, a trial court does not have ‘legal authority to enlarge the time restrictions of Rule 4:49-2. ’”  Moreover, the March 22, 2024 “stay order” was a final judgment that the Estate had not sought to appeal (had not filed a notice of appeal).  The trial court incorrectly assumed that it had authority to “reconsider” and vacate the March 22, 2024 “stay order” because it was an interlocutory order, but it was not.  See Da092, footnote 6.  Because the trial court's March 22, 2024 order staying litigation in favor of arbitration was appealable as of right, R. 2:2–3(a)(3), the only avenue of appeal after the time to file a motion for reconsideration had expired was a direct appeal to this court.  Thus, the trial court no longer had jurisdiction with respect to the March 22, 2024 “stay order,” which was a final judgment that the trial court was powerless to “reconsider” and reverse.
[brief] ¹  Reference to the Stenographic Transcript of the Motion to Dismiss, dated January 3, 2020, is designated as 1T.  Reference to the Stenographic Transcript of the Motion for Reconsideration, dated June 17, 2020, is designated as 2T.  Reference to the Stenographic Transcript of Motion Hearing, dated March 12, 2024, is designated as 3T. during oral argument held on June 17, 2020.  2T.  Discovery proceeded in this matter.  The discovery end date was February 10, 2023.  On July 7, 2023, Defendant filed a Motion for Summary Judgment pursuant to New Jersey Court Rule 4:46-2 (the “Motion for Summary Judgment”).
[brief] (T40-17 to 25; Moreover, there currently exists no claim or demand plaintiffs could press on behalf of the County since there is no claim or demand the County itself could press on its own behalf.  While the plaintiffs alleged that [...] can only grant long term tax abatements pursuant to LTTEL, as opposed to the NJ[...], they readily acknowledged in their complaint that to the best of their knowledge, “no appellate tribunal has ruled explicitly on whether the NJ[...] long term tax exemption survived the enactment of the Long Term Tax Exemption Law (“LTTEL”) (N.J.S.A. 40A:20-1 to -22) in 1991 (Compl. Par. 17).  They further acknowledged that other courts have likewise declined to either rule on or address this issue (Compl. Pars. 18-20).  Significantly, subsequent to the Complaint being filed the appeal in the matter captioned In re Approval of a Financing Commitment for the Project Known as [...], ([...]) [...], was decided (Pa267),  This decision affirms the decision of the [...] upholding its mortgage financing commitment to the [...] project.  In it the Appellate Division observes that the gist of plaintiff [...]’s appeal is that the Long Term Tax Exemption Law (LTTEL), N.J.S.A. 40A:20-1 to -22, repealed the [...] (NJ[...]), N.J.S.A. 55:14K-37(b), either expressly or impliedly.  The Appellate Court, however, rejected this contention, finding no merit in plaintiff’s argument.  It follows that the County is in no position to sue for service charges collected by a municipality under N.J.S.A. 40A:20-12 since the Appellate Division’s interpretation of the statutory scheme in [...] would preclude counties from receiving such service charges from NJ[...] projects.
[brief] [...]’s exhaustive research into the development of LDW and LKAS in the industry and specifically within [...] led him to conclude that equipping the subject CR-V with LDW and LKAS was both a technologically and economically feasible alternative safer design.  Pa154.  [...]’s failure to equip the subject CR-V with such warning and safety devices made it “defective and unsafe. ”  Ibid.  Plaintiff also retained [...] to test the performance of defendant’s LDW and LKAS system under conditions similar to those in the subject crash.
[brief] ” (PPCla419-20).  During the July 31, 2023 hearing for reconsideration of the [...] judgment, the court continued with the procedural history stating as follows:  “On March 13, [2023], Counsel for [...] contacted [...] regarding [...]’s motion for partial summary judgment against [...] and [...] communicated its intent to oppose [...]’s motion.  [...] also sought agreement from [...] regarding a briefing schedule for [...]’s opposition to [...]’s motion.  Consistent, by letter dated March 14, 2023, Counsel for [...] informed the court that [...] intended to oppose [...]’s motion.  (PPCIa366-69).  Then, on April 5, 2023, [...] wrote to the court indicated that [...]’s motion for summary judgment went unopposed because [...] did not oppose the motion for summary judgment in February, March and beginning of April [2023].” (PPCIa368).
[directive] Disputes and Controversies.  County prosecutors should notify the Division of Criminal Justice if a hospital moves to quash a grand jury subpoena for medical records, or if the prosecutor deems it necessary to seek an order to show cause to compel production of documents pursuant to a grand jury subpoena.  The Division of Criminal Justice will assist the county prosecutors in any such litigation.  All questions concerning the implementation of this Directive should be directed to the Chief of the Appellate Bureau, Division of Criminal Justice, or to the Counsel to the Director of the Division of Criminal Justice.
[brief] Troy Hills Vill. v. Twp. Council of Parsippany-Troy Hills, 68 N.J. 604 (1975)  ....................................................................................................................13, 16, 17 Statutes Hoboken, N.J., Code § 155 (2018)  ..............................................................6, 19 N.J.A.C. 5:24-3.2.........................................................................................7  Tenant Protection Act of 1992................................................................. passim
[brief] ”  Id (emphasis added).  Tenant’s submission that these annual Tenant Allowance payments are “unwaivable” would render this restrictive language meaningless.  See Cumberland Cnty., 358 N.J. Super. at 497 (“[A contract] should not be interpreted to render one of its terms meaningless. ”).  In this same vein, Tenant’s position that Section 4.02 provides for four (4) separate reimbursement methods is antithetical the terms of the Lease.  (Da17-18, Lease at § 4.02).  Rather, Section 4.02 provides that, as long as Tenant is not, inter alia, in monetary default when the installment comes due, Landlord must, at a minimum, make six (6) annual Tenant Allowance payments, but has the option to prepay these amounts to avoid the interest component.
[brief] ’”  *State v. Amer*, 471 N.J. Super. 331, 356-57 (App. Div. 2022) (quoting *State v. Liepe*, 239 N.J. 359, 371 (2019) (quoting *State v. McGuire*, 419 N.J. Super. 88, 158 (App. Div. 2011)), aff’d as modified 254 N.J. 405  Defendant’s sentence to 12 years flat for arranging for the transportation of 175 pounds of marijuana from California through Nevada to New Jersey with the assistance of his two cohorts, [...] and [...], driving the marijuana into New Jersey as a means of avoiding detection by law enforcement, does not shock the judicial conscience and should be affirmed.
[brief] That determination requires further inquiry into whether the document itself has a “tendency in reason to prove or disprove any fact of consequence to determination of the action. ”  *Payton*, 148 N.J. at 535 (quoting *N.J.R.E.* 401).  “As every law school student and law school graduate knows, when performing a computer search on WESTLAW and/or LEXIS, not every case responsive to a search command will prove to be relevant to the legal issues for which the research was performed.  Searching tens of thousands, and hundreds of thousands, of electronic documents is no different. ”  *Gardner v. Cont’l Cas. Co.*, 2016 WL 155002, at *3 (D. Conn. Jan. 13, 2016).
[directive] The New Jersey Supreme Court recently examined the discretionary powers of the Attorney General and the county prosecutor in waiving the mandated forfeiture of office provisions contained in N.J.S.A. 2C: 51-2.  James Flagg v. Essex County Prosecutor, 171 N.J. 561 (2002), established the standard for determining whether the Attorney General or a county prosecutor has properly declined to seek a waiver of forfeiture of public employment pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:51-2 following a public employee’s conviction for a disorderly or petty disorderly persons offense.  N.J.S.A. 2C:51-2 generally provides that a person holding any public office, position or employment who is convicted of an offense automatically forfeits such office or position.  Mandatory disqualification from any future public employment attaches when a person is convicted of an offense which touches upon his office.  N.J.S.A. 2C:51-2(e) nonetheless provides that:
[directive] (4)  Do you understand that if you violate a condition of community supervision [Yes] [No] [NA] for life and you are indicted and convicted for that violation, you may receive a sentence of imprisonment of up to 5 years and a special sentence (if the violation of the condition occurred of parole supervision for life on or after July 1, 2014) or you may receive a sentence of up to 18 months (if the violation of the condition occurred before July 1, 2014)?  (only complete if the offense occurred on or after January b)  Parole Supervision for Life 14, 2004).
[brief] The “separate and distinct” rationale is really just a shorthand way of saying that the certain persons offense has separate distinct elements from the other offenses and thus it does not merge with any of the other offenses.  See, e.g., State v. Anderson, 198 N.J. Super. 340, 358-59 (App. Div. 1985) (“[I]llegal possession of a firearm should not merge with first degree armed robbery” because “the possessory offense requires proof of an additional element from the possessory element of first degree armed robbery,” namely “that he lacked a permit. ”); State v. Mosch, 214 N.J. Super. 457, 465 (App. Div. 1986) (“[T]he two crimes for which defendant was convicted involve separate and distinct elements which do not merge. ”)  But the fact that two offenses do not merge does not mandate that they receive consecutive sentences.  See Anderson, 198 N.J. Super. at 345 (defendant received concurrent terms for possession of a handgun and robbery although the offenses did not merge).  When offenses merge, the court may not impose any sentence on the merged count—concurrent or consecutive—because “if an accused has committed only one offense, he cannot be punished as if for two. ”  State v. Davis, 68 N.J. 69, 77 (1975).  Thus, the only situation in which a court is called to decide between concurrent and consecutive sentences is for offenses that do not merge.  If all “separate and distinct” offenses that do not merge required consecutive sentences, this would mean that a court could never impose concurrent sentences.  But the Legislature “did not intend nor did the Legislature require that under the Code every additional crime in a series carry its own increment of punishment (else there would have been no provision made in the Code for concurrent sentencing in the first place).
[brief] Neither Defendant Doctor Actually Met The Standard Of Care (Pa13-20)  Neither [...], D.O. (“[...]”) nor [...], M.D. (“[...]”) ever met the standard of care applicable to them in this case.  This undeniable conclusion is based on their failure to call for an emergency C-section to deliver [...]’ intrauterine daughter after a deceleration event.  Rather than decide the case on these actual facts, however, the New Motion Judge decided the case based on speculative assumptions of what might have happened “[i]n a hypothetical world where Vitale did call for the C-section at 9:48. ”  [Pa8].  The obvious error, of course, is that cases are decided on actual facts, not based on hypotheticals and speculation.
[brief] ” (17T205-1 to 7).  He rejected mitigating factor two, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1b(2) (defendant did not contemplate that his conduct would cause or threaten serious harm), because “it is clear that this defendant did contemplate for up to a year in time before making this decision on this night to commit the acts that he was going to commit against his family. ” (17T205-8 to 19).
[brief] ” (Aa245).  This hollow and conclusionary assertion fails to specify what “standards” or “requirements” the Appellant’s proposed means of ingress and egress failed to meet – precisely because the [...] cannot point to any applicable standards or requirements in the Land Development Rules concerning ingress and egress that the Appellant failed to meet.  The Appellant recognizes that the Municipal Land Use Law, N.J.S.A. 40:55D-1 et seq. (“MLUL”), requires site plan ordinances to include standards and requirements relating to, among other things, “safe and efficient vehicular and pedestrian circulation, parking and loading. ”  N.J.S.A. 40:55D-41.  However, while the Land Development Rules, which are applicable here, contain design standards relating to parking lot and loading area design, and onsite parking and loading requirements, there are no specific standards or requirements that govern the [...]’s review of safe and efficient vehicular and pedestrian circulation that Appellant failed to meet.  See N.J.A.C. 19:66-5.8, -7.2, -7.3.  Regarding parking lot design, pedestrian circulation must be accounted for “between parking areas and the structures and uses served, and shall include methods to separate pedestrian and vehicular traffic. ”  N.J.A.C. 19:66-7.2(a)(4).  Further, “entrances and exits to parking areas shall be located in a safe and convenient manner with minimal impact on traffic movement on adjacent streets. ”  N.J.A.C. 19:66-7.2(c)(2).  These standards, however, do not reflect the factual circumstances in the present matter, because Appellant was not proposing to create any entrances or exits to parking areas.  At the subject property, there is no on-site parking due to pre-existing non-conforming conditions, so there could not and cannot be any contention that the Application did not present a means of safe ingress and egress from the site, since there is no new proposed entrance or exit.
[directive] [...] Guidelines 2 (2004 Revisions) methamphetamine);4 cocaine or (4)  The defendant has not been convicted on two or more separate occasions for a fourth-degree crime or a third-degree crime defined in N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10 (simple possession, use or being under the influence of a controlled substance).  Any combination of prior adult convictions (e.g., one fourth-degree theft and one third- degree simple possession drug offense) would make the defendant ineligible for an “open” offer.  Note that a defendant previously convicted on multiple occasions for fourth-degree crimes (other than an offense involving a firearm) and/or third-degree simple possession drug crimes would be eligible for a standardized “flat” offer, but would not be eligible for a standardized “open” offer)).  (Consult Section 8.7 for determining the equivalent degree of a conviction under federal law or the laws of 4
[brief] For these reasons, the Law Division’s orders dismissing [...]’s complaint and denying his motion for leave to amend should be affirmed.  Respectfully submitted, [...]  ATTORNEY GENERAL OF NEW JERSEY  By: /s/ [...]  [...] Deputy Attorney General Attorney ID: 016392008  [...]  Date: November 15, 2024  New Jersey Judiciary Certification that Submission Contains No Confidential Information or Confidential Personal Identifiers  This form shall be completed by any party who files a document in a public court matter in the Supreme Court or in the Appellate Division of the Superior Court.
[brief] [...]’s adverse credibility finding was clearly mistaken, as it was internally inconsistent, based on an incomplete record, failed to consider pertinent facts, and failed to explain why it was so starkly different from the findings made by [...]’s based on her review of the exact same video evidence.  We give deferential review to a trial court’s credibility findings, which are often influenced by matters such as observation of the character and demeanor of witnesses and common human experiences that are not transmitted by the record.  *State v. Locurto*, 157 N.J. 463, 474 (1999).  Only when we are satisfied that the finding is clearly a mistaken one and so plainly unwarranted that the interest of justice demand intervention and correction should we reverse.
[brief] During this time, detectives were notified that the shooting had been captured on video from a city-wide surveillance camera system located in [...].  One specific surveillance camera was located at the intersection of Monroe and Ridge Avenues.  (11T:27-4 to 28-5; 29-10 to 16; 50-13 to 14).  Detectives were also notified that Neptune City, a municipality that is directly adjacent to [...], also had a similar city-wide surveillance system and it, too captured the vehicles involved in the shooting.  (11T:27-17 to 18; 53-14 to 54-4).  Detectives began immediately reviewing the videos as they came in.  (11T:50-13 to 17).  On the Asbury Video, detectives observed two vehicles at the intersection of Ridge and Monroe at approximately 11a.m. on the day of the shooting, one was a Silver Tucson – the same vehicle detectives found at the Jersey Shore Medical Center emergency room entrance.  The second vehicle observed was a white Toyota Corolla.  (11T:33-18 to 34-18).  That vehicle would later be found by police parked in the back of a residence – [...] in [...] hours after the shooting.  (11T:48-10 to 49-7).  Through their investigation, police determined that the Corolla was rented from [...] by [...] on July 30, 2019 - four days before the shooting.  (11T:36-19 to 38-9; 77-10 to 12).  On the Neptune video, detectives observed the white Corolla, with a license plate that matched the vehicle rented to Brooks, driving around the vicinity of Monroe and Ridge Avenues at 10:58 a.m., minutes before the shooting.  (11T:54-4 to 23; 57-2 to 59-7).  Inside the Corolla, detectives observed two occupants.  The driver was an African-American male of medium complexion with a beard and not cropped short hair, but not long hair, wearing a multi-colored shirt and long blue pants.  The passenger was an African-American male of a darker complexion than the driver, with a beard wearing a black shirt with a white Nike insignia on the left breast.  (11T:72-12 to 75-7).  In an effort to identify the driver and the passenger, detectives made close-up stills from the video.  (11T:75-9 to 20).  Detectives also learned that several individuals had been taken into custody and transported to the [...] satellite office.  Those individuals were [...], [...], [...], [...], and defendants [...] and [...]  (11T:34-13 to 36-5).  Police encountered these individuals at a residence located at [...], mere blocks from the shooting.  Notably, neither defendant nor Brooks lived at [...], yet Brooks rented Corolla, which was observed by police in the video as being involved in the shooting, was parked in the rear of that residence.
[brief] Not only does the trial court go on to contradict those findings, but in advising the parties that it has no jurisdiction while the First Appellate Action is pending, it becomes clear that those findings were tentative and not final.  (See 3T11:8–21, 3T43:5–8.)  The trial court let [...] know that its relief depended on succeeding in the First Appellate Action:  Having said all of that, counsel for the plaintiffs, it sounds like we’re going to see if you win your argument on the appeal.  There’s nothing new.  I gave you the chance for discovery.  It’s pretty clear from the dep transcripts that I read and the Briefs that it’s this school, and I put the word school.  I don’t care that he suspected that there was something going on before the last case was dismissed and you take it up on appeal.  He knew about the school.  It’s in his filings to [Judge] [...].  [Judge] [...] said that’s not good enough.  You’ve got to get [Judge] [...] reversed.  Why are we doing a second Complaint with the same quote, unquote, new evidence?  Your client knew about it. Your client raised it in front of [Judge] [...].  You are claiming he incorrectly denied your client the right to bring it in the first case.  And that’s why I’m denying, and I’m granting the Motion and I’m going to dismiss this second Complaint.
[brief] See Battaglia v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 214 N.J. 518, 526 (2013)  Jersey City firemen regularly seek medical leave for both injuries and illnesses under Civil Service statutes.  When they avail themselves of this statutory benefit they subject themselves to the no fault attendance policies and may be penalized for legitimate and necessary use of medical leave.  Disability under either the NJLAD or Civil Service statute share identical definitions.  A "disability" under the NJLAD is defined as any "physical disability [or] infirmity . . . which is caused by bodily injury . . . or illness."  N.J.S.A. 10:5-5(q).  Civil Service Regulations extend medical leave for "personal illness or injury", N.J.A.C. § 4A:6-1.3(g)(1) and N.J.S.A. 11A:6-5.  In either case when requesting such leave the employee is perceived as “disabled”.  When a disabled employee requests and then takes a temporary medical leave of absence, said employee avails himself of a right that is protected under both the NJLAD and Civil Service Law which are coextensive statutes.  See N.J.S.A. 10:5-12(d)  The ongoing administration of the no fault attendance policy upends this protective framework and excoriates the protections of both the NJLAD and concomitantly, Civil Service Statute, both directly and indirectly.  There can be no doubt that the employers actions are actions taken against Association members "because of a disability" either actual or perceived.  As long as even a single protected medical leave of absence is counted against an employee in an adversarial manner the discrimination is "in-part" due to an actual or perceived disability protected under the NJLAD.  In every instance of requested medical leave the perceived disability is more than enough evidence to reasonably suggest that the employer had knowledge of each members various medical conditions and that disciplining its employees or rendering them ineligible for promotion is likely to have been motivated, at least in part, on acts which violate the law.  **POINT III**