ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] All land shall be treated as unzoned, not subject to local site plan review, and developable at the will of the developer, subject only to applicable state and federal law, including, of course, the Uniform Construction Code.  . . .  The facts of this case reveal a legacy of cavalier inattention by a succession of [...] governing bodies that produced a pattern of land use strikingly unfriendly to poor people.  Spanning decades, the inaction of [...] requires an immediate and robust response.  Since opportunity has not knocked, it is time to build a door.
[brief] For the foregoing reasons, this Court should reverse the Summary Judgment Order and Sanctions Order and remand to the lower court for further adjudication.  **[...]**  Attorneys for Plaintiffs/ Appellants, [...] and [...]  Dated: April 25, 2024  By: [...], Esq.  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY  INNOVATION OPTICS, INC. and ALAN GREENBERG, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. [...] d/b/a [...], Defendant-Respondent, and [...] d/b/a  [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], ABC COMPANIES 1-20, said names being fictitious, and JOHN DOES 1-50, said names being fictitious, Defendants.  APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. [...]  Civil Action On Appeal  From the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Union County Docket No. [...] Sat Below: Hon. [...], J. S.C. DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT
[brief] "The test of whether an error is harmless depends upon some degree of possibility that it led to an unjust verdict.  The possibility must be real, one sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt as to whether the error led the jury to a result it otherwise might not have reached."  Id. (citing State v. Bankston, 63 N.J. 263, 273 (1973)).  "When the evidence of guilt is overwhelming, that evidential error may be found harmless beyond a reasonable doubt."
[brief] Q: Please, describe for me the factors that you rely upon in support of your conclusion that the new sea wall construction has increased the vulnerability of the subject property to wave-induced storm?  A: Sure.  So there are several bits of – or, let’s say, several arguments I’ve made in that to make that conclusion . . .  Da474:19-20:1 [emphasis added].  Despite opining that the newly constructed seawall would increase the risk of wave over-topping, [...] was unable to quantify that increased risk:
[brief] [...] was required to conduct itself so as to not to achieve or preserve any kind of bargaining or litigation and advantage over a member of the public, yet it did so - during the great depression, [...] took advantage of a failing company and failed to foreclose on a valuable property right – the [...] – yet, held itself out as the owner of that property.  All three witnesses called at Trial by the parties – [...], [...] and [...] – were duly qualified as experts in the field and testified as such.  The three witnesses were unanimous on one point, that being that there is a significant factual and legal difference and distinction between a riparian right and a riparian grant.
[brief] While much of Plaintiff's brief is devoted to the malpractice allegations, this is not the proper forum for Plaintiff to argue the specifics of the malpractice allegations against Defendants.  The crux of the issue before the Appellate Division is that Plaintiff's purposeful and strategic decision to sue Defendants in the Instant Action, two years after filing suit in the Lease Litigation, was done to prejudice the Defendants and create piecemeal litigation which is prohibited under New Jersey Court Rules and precedent case law.
[brief] In her brief, the defendant posits that [...]’s conviction could possibly have been expunged and his dismissal was therefore reversible error.  [...] stated that he had been convicted of a felony and that he had served prison time for it.  He never stated, suggested, or implied that this felony conviction had been expunged.  Certainly, if it had, he would have been right not to mention it at all or to tell the judge that it had been expunged and removed from his record.  He did not.  The defendant would argue that, because it may be possible that the conviction [...] referred to had been expunged, as theoretically any conviction could possibly be expunged, the trial court had an affirmative duty to investigate and disprove [...]’s claim that he had a felony conviction.
[brief] Pa51  Ex. M: Oct. 6, 2016  Correspondence serving Sep. 30, 2016 Order.  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Pa53 Ex. N: March 13, 2017  Correspondence serving March 3, 2017  Order. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Pa57 Ex. O: Dec. 6, 2017  Correspondence Serving Dec. 1, 2017  Order.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
[brief] Similarly, the Department’s insistence on applying the Holding Act to the [...] acquisition last year is not evidence of the Department’s past practice; it is evidence of the Department’s ultra vires actions that [...] seeks to halt with its appeal.  [...] is not part of a holding company system to which the Holding Act applies, as the Department acknowledged in its submission to Congress (via the NAIC) in 2010.  Indeed, the Department knows, [...] repeatedly objected to the Department’s improper actions and never agreed that it was subject to the Holding Act or that its AIF Fees were subject to SSAP No. 25.  The Department’s implication in its Opposition Brief that “none of the parties [to the [...]/RMC Order] objected to or challenged” the [...]/RMC Order is unconscionable and completely ignores the history of that transaction.  Just as with the Holding Act, the Department’s veiled attempt to use SSAP No. 25 to regulate AIF Fees in a new and novel manner is contrary to more than a decade of past practice and audits.  Through the Bulletin, under the guise of SSAP No. 25, the Department attempts to substitute its judgment in place of the contractual agreement between [...] and [...]’s individual subscribers - two willing and unaffiliated parties, who lack common interests, control or ownership.
[brief] Being Appealed  Superior Court Ruling of Refusal Charge, Reasonable Suspicion To Pull Over, and Probable Cause To Arrest -----  Da 1a, Da 2a, 6T  -------------------------------------------------------------  Municipal Court Ruling on Refusal Charge, Reasonable Suspicion to Pull Over, and Probable Cause to Arrest  --------------  4T, 5T Appendix 1T - 7/12/23
[brief] CONCLUSION  When the court denied [...]’s Motion for Reconsideration of the Jan. 31, 2011, Opinion and Order, it stated that granting the Motion “would be acting as an appellate court without the benefit of reviewing the entire record. ”  Yet that is exactly what the court did when it later granted [...]’s Motion for Reconsideration of the June 29, 2018, Order.  The June 29, 2018, Order affirmed the factual findings of [...], which followed an extensive evidentiary hearing that involved an assessment of credibility of the testifying witnesses.  There was no legitimate basis upon which to overturn those findings.  The Trial Court’s ruling reversing its own Order approving [...]’s Report and Recommendations should be reversed; the June 29, 2018, Order should be reinstated with respect to allocation, and the case should be remanded to the Trial Court for further proceedings consistent with the June 29, 2018, Order.
[brief] [...] testified that an anonymous caller placed a call on the evening of September 18, 2019, and that police followed-up on the call and spoke with the caller who led them to [...].  [13T71-51 to 73-20].  Sergeant [...] explained that police are permitted to name a witness “Jane Doe” in a probable cause statement and leave that identification for up to 10 days after the defendant is arrested, at which point the person must be named, like [...] was.  [13T75-2 to -10].  On redirect, Sergeant [...] again explained the situation and clarified that there were not two anonymous callers.  Instead there was one anonymous caller who led police to [...] who was referred to as “Jane Doe” in the initial affidavit of probable cause.  [13T86-13 to -25].  Finally, in summation, the State did not include any of the caller’s statements and only argued that the caller was told second-hand information from [...] and contacted police which lead to police speaking with [...] directly.
[directive] The language the order pertaining to is in in the purpose of the evaluation found N.J.S.A. 2C:4-1.  The order directs the defendant is in to undergo evaluation from expert designated the Commissioner of Department by an an of Health.  The evaluation to take place the community at a place to determined be is in by the parties taking into account the length of time needed to complete the evaluation and any security concerns.  These examinations have previously been conducted at defense counsel's offices and courthouse settings when circumstances permit.  in Discovery to provided by the prosecutor to the court, who will then furnish it to be is professional staff at the Department of Health should noted that this order not to used for evaluation as to diminished be is It an be capacity under N.J.S.A. 2C:4-2.
[brief] As a result of the carelessness of the Plaintiff, the parties engaged in an excess of a year of litigation.  Not until receipt of Defendant’s expert report and not before did Plaintiff seek to amend the Complaint to correct its inaccurate description.  Plaintiff argues that its error was “obvious,” and that the owner had “actual knowledge” of the true and correct description of the taking.  Plaintiff itself should have recognized the error.  Nonetheless, despite the prejudice and \(^1\) Note, that the provisions for maintenance and replacement was left off the amended description.  Hardly an obvious error. unwarranted costs to the Defendant, the Law Division granted Plaintiff’s motion to amend.
[brief] Relevant factors to be considered include the suspect's age, education and intelligence, advice concerning constitutional rights, length of detention, whether the questioning was repeated and prolonged in nature, and whether physical punishment and mental exhaustion were involved.  *Schneckloth v. Bustamonte*, 412 U.S. 218, 226 (1973); *State v. Miller*, 76 N.J. 392, 402 (1978).  Here, after invoking his right to counsel, defendant voluntarily spoke to the officers.
[brief] In response, [...] inexplicably claimed she had to fire a previous employee who complained about sexual harassment, which made Appellant even more uncomfortable.  Id.  Appellant stated that she did not know what to do about the harassment – [...] made Appellant feel as if there was nothing she could do.  Id.  Further, [...] employees became aware of the rumor that Appellant was sleeping with someone in the office.  Id.  Appellant became aware that rumors were being spread.
[directive] Triggering Event for Escalating to a Final Post-Indictment Plea Offer  The escalation to a final post-indictment plea offer can be triggered in either of two ways.  Escalation may occur based on the passage of time where the defendant does not indicate a willingness to accept the initial post-indictment offer at the first scheduled court event that takes place following the expiration of at least twenty (20) days from the time that the prosecutor had tendered the initial post-indictment offer.
[brief] The Court asked:  THE COURT: Where are they?  I don't have them.  (13T 45)  [...] quickly changed his response after the Court asked him where they were.  MR. GALLAGHER: I don't have the checks.  (13T 46)  THE COURT: Oh.  MR. GALLAGHER: I don't have the checks.  I don't have the check numbers or copies of the checks.  THE COURT: Right.  MR. GALLAGHER: I wish I had that.  If I'm to get the -- if I was to go to the trust or the [...] -- (indiscernible - speech garbled)  THE COURT: Yes.  MR. GALLAGHER: BBT--you get it, the bank, and get copies of those checks, -- THE COURT: Right.  MR. GALLAGHER: -- do I need anything more?  I feel like-  THE COURT: No.  No.  MR. GALLAGHER: Okay.  THE COURT:  If you get copies of the checks, I'm going to ask [...] to -- Yes, [...]?
[brief] To this end, the Bulletin reminds reciprocal insurance exchanges of the requirements in place to protect the insurance buying public, including the policyholders/subscribers of [...], and to ensure the financial stability of the industry, especially where medical malpractice liabilities could extend for many years.  [...]’s uncritical support of [...], and in particular its right to make undisclosed profits at the expense of its consumer subscribers, is misplaced.
[brief] Plaintiffs filed the Complaint on June 12, 2015.  1a\(^1\).  [...] filed an --- \(^1\)“1a” denotes the accompanying appendix.  Transcript references are as follows:  1T = November 10, 2016  Transcript of Motion to Vacate the Order of 1/19/16  2T = March 29, 2018  Transcript of Motion to Vacate Prior Orders  Answer on July 20, 2015.  26a.  On November 24, 2015, [...] filed a motion to dismiss the Complaint against them for failure to file an AOM.  39a.  The Honorable [...], J.S.C., granted [...]’s motion on January 19, 2016.  41a.  Plaintiffs did not oppose [...]’s motion to dismiss for the reasons expressed in detail in the Certifications of [...], Esq., attorney for Plaintiffs (43a), in support of Plaintiffs’ Motion to Vacate the Order of January 19, 2016, filed on September 1, 2016.  47a.  Essentially, the attorney Certification set forth an explanation of the exceptional and extraordinary circumstances that caused Plaintiffs’ inability to timely file an opposition to [...]’s motion to dismiss, and the subsequent inability to timely file a motion to reconsider the Order of dismissal.  43a.  Nevertheless, Plaintiffs timely filed a Motion to Vacate the dismissal Order of January 19, 2016, under Rule 4:50-1.  47a.  [...] erroneously denied Plaintiffs’ Motion on November 10, 2016.  50a.  When newly discovered evidence was uncovered which further justified that said Orders be vacated, Plaintiffs filed a Motion to Vacate on _____________________  3T = January 24, 2020  Transcript of Motion to Amend Complaint 4T = December 8, 2020  Transcript of Motion to Reconsider Order of 1/24/20  5T = December 16, 2020  Transcript of Decision of Order of 12/16/20  6T = December 3, 2021  Transcript of Motions for Summary Judgment  7T = January 21, 2022  Transcript of Motion to Reconsider Order of 12/9/21  8T = January 10, 2022  Transcript of Decision of Order of 1/10/20 February 28, 2018.  [...] erroneously denied said Motion on April 3, 2018, though the Order is signed March 29, 2018.  Thereafter, newly discovered facts were uncovered during the course of discovery and led to newly discovered claims against [...], so Plaintiffs moved to amend the complaint to state said newly discovered claims on December 4, 2019.  The Honorable [...], J.S.C., erroneously denied said Motion on January 24, 2020.  Plaintiffs’ filed Motion to Reconsider the Order of January 24, 2020, on October 28, 2020 (378a), and [...] erroneously denied said Motion on December 16, 2020.  Finally, The Honorable [...], J.S.C erroneously granted summary judgment to [...], on December 9, 2021.  Plaintiffs filed a Motion to Reconsider the Order of December 9, 2021, on December 29, 2021 (418a), and [...] erroneously denied said Motion on January 21, 2022.  The Tort Claims survived against all of the non-attorney Defendants – Defendants [...] (“[...]”), [...] (“[...]”), [...] (“[...]”), [...] (“[...]”), [...], [...] (“[...]”), and [...] (“[...]”) – and Plaintiffs ultimately reached a settlement at trial with said Defendants on August 18, 2022.
[brief] Here, Plaintiffs present no evidence or compelling reason to disturb the motion court’s finding and instead rely solely on the United States District Court’s ruling in *Nagy v. Outback Steakhouse*, Civil Action No. 19-18277 (MAS)(DEA), 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29288, *1-22* (D.N.J. Feb. 21, 2024) (Pa399-Pa407).  As set forth in R. 1:36-3, no unpublished opinion “shall constitute precedent or be binding upon any court.
[brief] \(^3\)  “Ara” refers to Appellant’s reply appendix. in New Jersey.  Specifically, a party wishing to challenge a final agency action was often forced to file a request for an adjudicatory hearing with the pertinent agency while simultaneously filing an appeal with the Appellate Division to ensure it did lose the ability to challenge the merits of the final agency action if the hearing request was denied.  However, in Musconetcong Watershed Ass’n, this Court held that an agency decision, which in that case was a flood hazard area (“FHA”) determination by the [...], became a final agency decision subject to appeal when the [...] denied a third-party’s request for an adjudicatory hearing to challenge the FHA determination.  Id. at 471.  In so holding, this Court set forth the well settled principle that "[e]xhaustion of administrative remedies before resort to the courts is a firmly embedded judicial principle.  This principle requires exhausting available procedures, that is, 'pursuing them to their appropriate conclusion and, correlative...awaiting their final outcome before seeking judicial intervention.'"  Id. at 478 (quoting Garrow v. Elizabeth Gen. Hosp. & Dispensary, 79 N.J. 549, 558-59 (1979)(internal citations omitted)).  “The exhaustion-of-administrative-remedies doctrine is ‘designed to allow administrative bodies to perform their statutory functions in an orderly manner without preliminary interference from the courts.
[brief] (Pa16).  [...] provided [...] with ancillary items such as office supplies, use of a copier and fax machine, and postage.  (1T107:17-18).  In the January 2019 interview, [...] officials stated that they did not provide bigger items such as a permanent workspace, office, a secretary, phone or Township email.  (1T107:20-21; Pa113).  However, in the Checklist, [...] officials marked “yes” for the question “Does the location provide the individual with permanent workspace and facilities (e.g. office space, tools, secretarial support, computer, etc.) at the expense of the location?” (Pa56; Pa113).  Additionally, the conference room where [...] worked did not have her name on the door, rather it just said “Municipal Prosecutor. ” (1T65:8-12).  For Factor #17 – Working at More Than One firm at a Time and Factor #18 – Making Services Available to General Public, the ALJ found that [...] provided municipal prosecutorial services for other municipalities and offered her legal services to the public.
[brief] [Greenwood, supra 127 N.J. at 512 (emphasis added)].  However, even when straining to analyze the Greenwood decision in the prism in the case at bar, we still find that [...]’s reliance upon Greenwood is baseless.  In Greenwood, the Court found that the “concerns” and “possible consequences” of an injured eye could not serve as good cause for that trainee’s termination as “[t]he uncontradicted evidence in the record indicates that he had performed successfully during his six-week stay at the Academy…”  Id., at 513-514 (see also [...]’s Brief, p. 44).  Contrariwise, here, a valid Consent of Surety properly executed and binding upon [...] was required to provide assurance to [...] that if [...] were awarded the Contract, a performance bond in the amount of over $70 million would be issued by the surety to [...].  Quite simply, whether [...] (as the plaintiff in Greenwood) previously “performed successfully” is of no consequence to its obligation to currently procure a performance bond if awarded this Redecking Project.  This was not a six-week training course.  This is a significant multi-year construction project involving rehabilitation of several bridges in one of Northern New Jersey’s most traveled highways.  [...] seeks to compare “apples to oranges” and its arguments are accordingly without merit.
[brief] A FAIR TRIAL (NOT RAISED BELOW)  “Even if an individual error does not require reversal, the cumulative effect of a series of errors can cast doubt on a verdict and call for a new trial. ”  State v. Sanchez-Medina, 231 N.J. 452, 469 (2018) (citing State v. Jenewicz, 193 N.J. 440, 473 (2008).  Each of the errors in Points I through III is sufficient to require reversal.  If, however, this Court disagrees, defendant submits that the cumulative effect of these errors requires reversal.  Id.  During the trial, [...] testified that [...] repeatedly attempted to defend himself over the course of the police encounter.  Had the jury found that [...] acted in self-defense, it would have constituted a complete defense to the charges against him.  The court’s failure to instruct the jury on self-defense was extremely harmful, particularly taken together with its erroneous admission of both [...]’s and [...]’s testimony that [...] was guilty of aggravated assault on a police officer, and its failure to instruct the jury on causation where there was a clear factual dispute as to whether [...] actually caused [...]’s injuries.  The cumulative impact of these errors deprived [...] of due process and a fair trial.  Accordingly, [...]’s convictions should be reversed and the matter remanded for a new trial.  U.S. Const. amends. VI, XIV; N.J. Const. art. I, ¶¶ 1, 10.  **CONCLUSION**
[brief] ”  (2T73:23-2T74:2).  In anticipation of trial, Defendants filed a motion in limine to preclude the [...] from presenting any evidence that would support their claim for attorney’s fees.  Defendants argued any factual evidence should be excluded solely because attorney’s fees would not be recoverable as a matter of law.  Defendants also made an oral motion on the first day of trial, without a written motion, to preclude all evidence of punitive damages on grounds that punitive damages were not recoverable as a matter of law.  (3T6:10-23).  The trial court granted the motions *in limine*, which had the effect of dismissing the [...]’ claims for attorney’s fees and punitive damages.
[brief] “The terms of the Agreement clearly stated that the parties were giving up the right to pursue all employment-related claims in court, and instead agreed to arbitrate those claims before an AAA arbitrator.  In that regard, the Arbitration Agreement expressly stated that it covered discrimination claims, including statutory claims. ”  Id. at 562–63.  The Court thus concluded that the arbitration agreement was valid and enforceable with respect to [...]’s LAD claim.
[brief] The costs of not moving aggressively are substantial.  Any delay in the building electrification transition will lead to stranded assets, higher costs and limited flexibility to further reduce emissions.  This is because the infrastructure necessary to support consumption of fossil fuels in buildings, including consumer items such as boilers and appliances, as well as the underlying utility infrastructure, has decades of anticipated lifespan.  [Ha144, emphasis added.]  No error in the [...] and [...] Decision is more consequential and less defensible than the cavalier treatment of New Jersey's climate law.
[brief] :  On Appeal from a Final Judgment of Conviction of the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Monmouth County.  Sat Below: Hon. [...], J.S.C. Hon. [...], J.S.C. Hon. [...], J.S.C. BRIEF ON BEHALF OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY [...] ATTORNEY GENERAL OF NEW JERSEY ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT STATE OF NEW JERSEY [...] [...]  [...] ATTORNEY NO. 007122008  DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL DIVISION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE APPELLATE BUREAU [...] [...] [...]  [...] OF COUNSEL AND ON THE BRIEF  May 10, 2024