ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The Court should also reject Plaintiff’s argument that the fact that she consented to a background check somehow saves her CEPA claim.  (AB at pp. 14-15).  Background checks are not perfect, especially in situations like this one where the individual has had multiple names and was convicted in a different state.  During Plaintiff’s application for employment, [...] asked Plaintiff questions about her past criminal convictions, not once, but three separate times.  (Appx 523-25 ¶¶11-20).  Plaintiff lied all three times.  (Compare Appx 523-25 ¶¶11-20 with Appx 066-74).  Had Plaintiff told the truth, she would not have been hired.  (Appx 196 at ¶9).  The fact that the fingerprinting or the background check did not come back with a flag for Plaintiff’s out of state convictions precisely demonstrates why it was so important that Plaintiff be honest in response to conviction-related questions on her employment application.  See N.J. ADMIN. CODE 10:44A-2.4(c)(1) (requiring [...] to inquire about convictions in the employment application).  The fact that Plaintiff consented to a background check does not change the fact that Plaintiff had in fact been convicted, and that these convictions statutorily disqualified Plaintiff from employment with [...].  In any event, the record belies this argument (and no one could possibly believe that all of Plaintiff’s lies are a “misunderstand[ing].”)
[brief] The Liepe Court explained that while this language in Carey “did not impose a presumption in favor of consecutive terms,” the Court “observed that when a sentencing court compares the harm inflicted . . . in the multiple-victim setting with the harm that would have resulted from the offense were there only a single victim, it is likely to conclude that the harm in the former setting is ‘distinctively worse’ than that in the latter. ”  Ibid.  In this case, [...] was convicted of firing a single bullet which struck a single victim; the fact that the firearm may have been pointed in the general direction of [...] as well when it was discharged—when [...] was not struck or injured—did not render this offense “distinctively worse” than it would have been if [...] had been further away or inside the house.  Thus, it was improper for the Sentencing Court to rely on the “multiple victims” factor to impose consecutive sentences.
[brief] Upon the court's further inquiry, Juror No. 4 identified the “gentleman” as victim [...]'s father.  The juror also indicated he had mentioned “‘having contact with someone’ to the other jurors,” but none of them reacted to his statement.  The court next questioned the victim's father, who described the incident:  I researched the nearest (inaudible) so about 10 to 12 last Friday, I walked over to the store, I walked in the store, the gentleman was about 25 to 30 feet away said could I help you.  I said no, I'm just looking.  I walked over to the right of the store to look at jeans and it happened he was walking back folding some jeans.  I did say do you have any jeans that fit me.  He said what size you need, I told him what size, and he walked from one side of the store to the other looking for some jeans, and he told me I could stay where I was and he found three pair of jeans and said try these on.  And I tried them on, he said if they don't fit call me and I'll bring some others over.  They didn't fit, I called him and he brought me two other pair.  They fit, I walked back out with the gentleman and I inquired about the length and did he have something a little longer.  Apparently they were long enough but I felt I would like them a little longer and he said no, I really don't have the next size up.  And so then I told him that I had two operations and I said I'm in town longer than I anticipated and (inaudible).  And I said I needed them by today.
[directive] Seed Initiative Sharing Requests 1.  All requests for sharing of real property pursuant to the Weed and Seed Initiative shall be a TD on F 9 2 - and must follow the established sharing 22.46 --procedures as outlined in the Secretary of the Treasury's Guidelines Seized and Forfeited &I  Property.  The appropriate official of the seizing investigative agency must recommend the transfer.  Approval by the office of the Secretary of the Treasury is required for transfers of forfeited real property.
[brief] Indictment No. [...] Sat Below: Hon. [...], J.S.C. BRIEF AND APPENDIX ON BEHALF OF DEFENDANT-APPELLANT  [...]  Public Defender Office of the Public Defender  Appellate Section 25 Market Street Trenton, NJ  07101  [...]  Assistant Deputy Public Defender  [...] [...]  Attorney ID: 084402013  Of Counsel and On the Brief  DEFENDANT IS CONFINED TABLE OF CONTENTS
[brief] This appeal involves a challenge to the trial court’s well-reasoned discovery order, which is intended to promote the unobstructed production of relevant discovery in an even-handed manner to the parties to this litigation.  Plaintiffs [...], et al.  (“[...]”) are emergency room physicians who are mandated by law to treat all patients who appear in their emergency departments.  Defendants [...], et al.  (“[...]”) have leveraged this legal obligation to enrich themselves by engaging in a systematic scheme to underpay countless insurance claims for medical services provided by [...] to [...]’s insureds.  That is the nub of the present lawsuit.  [...] are affiliated with “[...],” a practice management organization with other affiliated emergency medical service corporations that are engaged in similar lawsuits against [...].  The issue before this Court relates to discovery of massive amounts of electronically stored information (“ESI”) in the possession of both [...] and [...].
[brief] Over two days, the defendants challenged [...]’s methodology, his analysis, and argued forcefully that [...] was biased.  (E.g., 12T122:16 to 124:11).  Cross examination focused heavily on issues of intent and whether [...] knew if certain transactions were authorized.  (12T26:12 to 28:11; 78:21-24; 80:19-21; 80:13-16).  The trial court credited [...] and rejected the defense’s position.
[brief] In this case, the parties had approximately one month between when [...] filed the election contest and when it went to trial.  Just over two weeks before trial began, the Board produced more than 1,300 ballots and dozens of other documents in discovery.  [...] reviewed the documents promptly and immediately upon discovering the ballot at issue, he confirmed that it had been improperly rejected and then promptly filed his Motion for Leave to file an Amended Cross-Petition.  [...] admitted during argument that he had access to the same ballots for the preceding two weeks.  (1T123:15-16).  He would not have suffered any prejudice by having the trial court consider this one particular ballot, as it was a purely legal question that did not require any additional testimony.  Even if [...] would suffer prejudice, it is almost impossible to fathom any scenario in which the prejudice to him is greater than the prejudice of denying an individual their right to have their ballot counted.  It is an unquestionable proposition that “[a] citizen’s constitutional right to vote for the candidate of his or her choice necessarily includes the corollary right to have that vote counted at full value without dilution or discount.
[brief] 9, 13 Fiore v. Fiore, A-2539-21 (App. Div. Apr. 16, 2024)(P-846)  18  Gac v. Gac, 186 N.J. 535 (2006)  10, 12 Giarusso v. Giarusso, 455 N.J. Super. 42 (App. Div. 2018)  18  Gotlib v. Gotlib, 399 N.J. Super. 295 (App. Div. 2008)  10,15,18 Guglielmo v. Guglielmo, 253 N.J. Super. 531 (App. Div. 1992)  16  Ionno v. Ionno, 148 N.J. Super. 259, 261 (App. Div. 1977)  14  J.E.V. v. K.V., 426 N.J. Super. 475 (App. Div. 2012)  16, 17 Kelly v. Kelly, 262 N.J. Super. 303 (Ch. Div. 1992)  17  Loro v. Colliano, 354 N.J. Super. 212 (App. Div. 2002)  15, 17, 18 L.V. v. R.S., 347 N.J. Super. 33 (App. Div. 2002)
[directive] Joint Crash Investigative Protocol  Page 3  C:\newinternet\agguide\directives\AGDirective.wpd  ATTORNEY GENERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT DIRECTIVE NO. 2004-2  JOINT CRASH INVESTIGATIVE PROTOCOL DIVISION OF STATE POLICE & COUNTY PROSECUTORS  I.  Attorney General Law Enforcement Directive No. 2004-2, Joint Crash Investigative Protocol - Division of State Police & County Prosecutors.  A.  Attorney General Law Enforcement Directive No. 2004-2, Joint Crash Investigative Protocol - Division of State Police & County Prosecutors, (hereafter: “Joint Crash Investigative Protocol”) has been issued by the Attorney General of the State of New Jersey, under authority of the Attorney General, pursuant to the Criminal Justice Act of 1970, N.J.S.A. 52:17B-97 et seq.
[brief] *Id.*; *Hakeem v. Beyer*, 990 F.2d 750, 759-60 (3d Cir. 1993), aff’d after remand, 27 F.3d 557 (3d Cir. 1994).  [...] found that the delay of four years in prosecuting defendant justified a speedy trial analysis.  (2T7-2 to 7).
[brief] RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENT ABOUT ABANDONMENT IS NOT BEFORE THIS COURT, IS DISPROVEN BY THE TRIAL COURT’S DECISION EXPRESSLY FINDING THE PROPERTY WAS ABANDONED, NOT TO MENTION RESPONDENT’S CONCESSIONS AND THE INDISPUTABLE EVIDENCE TO THE CONTRARY.  Respondent, again without the benefit of a cross-appeal, argues that the property was not abandoned, ignoring the fact that [...] entered an order declaring the property to be abandoned.  Ia42.  Given that Respondent received, read, understood, and chose not to oppose, that motion, this issue is not properly before this Court.  It is also patently untrue as evidenced by the extensive color photographs presented below by Plaintiff in its motion to declare it abandoned, Ia31-38, and by [...] in opposing Defendant’s motion to vacate.  Ia221-232.  Defendant even argues that it was not apprised of the nature of the complaint because the “Plaintiff’s complaint did not provide a certification or sworn statement in support of abandonment, or that a court had found the Premises abandoned either prior to [or] as of filing the complaint. ”  Rb43.  But a court cannot make a ruling before a case has even been filed since there is no case in which to file a motion until a complaint is filed.  It would be akin to awarding child support before a child is even born\(^1\).  Once filed, on notice to Respondent, [...] expressly found the property to have been abandoned pursuant to law.  Review of the verified complaint also shows Respondent’s argument to be mistaken because Plaintiff quite clearly alleged at the outset that the property was abandoned.
[brief] “[A]buse of discretion is demonstrated if the discretionary act was not premised upon consideration of all relevant factors, was based upon consideration of irrelevant or inappropriate factors, or amounts to a clear error in judgment. ”  Masone v. Levine, 382 N.J. Super. 181, 193 (App. Div. 2005).  “In calculating the amount of reasonable attorney's fees, courts determine the ‘lodestar,’ defined as the ‘number of hours reasonably expended’ by the attorney, ‘multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate. ’”  Feliciano, 434 N.J. Super. at 549 (quoting Furst v. Einstein Moomjy, Inc., 182 N.J.
[directive] From a standing ready position, on command fire 2 rounds.  (5 seconds)  •  Repeat once for a total of 4 rounds •  From a kneeling ready position, on command fire 2 rounds.  (5 seconds)  •  Repeat twice for a total of 6 rounds •  Reload if necessary •  Place the weapon on safe and move to the 50 yard line 50 yard line 20 rounds, positions as per each stage 5 seconds each stage •  From standing ready position, on command fire 2 rounds.  (5 seconds)  •  Repeat once for a total of 4 rounds •  From a kneeling ready position, on command fire 1 round (5 seconds)  •  Repeat 5 times for a total of 6 rounds •  From a standing or kneeling ready position behind cover, on command fire 1 round.  (5 seconds)  •  Repeat 4 times for a total of 5 rounds •  From a standing or kneeling ready position behind cover, on command fire 1 round (5 seconds)  •  Repeat 4 times for a total of 5 rounds •  Reload if necessary, place the weapon on safe and move to 9-63  Revised (5/03)  Semi-Annual Firearms Qualification and Requalification Standards the 25 yard line 25 yard line 6 rounds, as per drill 30 seconds
[brief] THE LAW DIVISION ERRONEOUSLY GRANTED SUMMARY JUDGMENT TO PLAINTIFF ON SCHIANOS’ REMAINING CLAIMS.  The Law Division did not even have the correct parties.  [...]’ allegations centered on wrongful denials of refinance by [...] – the bank ([...]).  Neither the Plaintiff nor [...] trustee department had anything to do with refinance, see above [...] testimony.  The Law Division, and Chancery Court, ignored and failed to incorporate all critical evidence from the July 11, 2022 trial.  The Chancery Court simply used the Final Judgment drafted by Plaintiff verbatim.  Critical testimony was omitted including testimony from [...] that [...]’ assignment only occurs in foreclosure and that Wells Fargo trustee department had nothing to do with refinances, see above Transcript reference, and therefore could not address [...]’ major allegations that they had been twice wrongfully denied refinance by [...] due to title.
[brief] The trial court also erroneously stated that “Plaintiff does not argue that the lot was in and of itself inherently dangerous. ”  Pa11.  The trial court’s finding is clearly contradicted by the record.  To the contrary, Plaintiff has argued, through both factual evidence and the opinion of its engineering expert [...], that the area of the parking lot in question was in an inherently “hazardous” condition due to the absence of pedestrian safeguards, in violation of both common sense and the governing transportation engineering standards.
[brief] [...] testified that if she worked the morning shift, she would make sure there was nothing on the floor.  Pa74, at 11:12-12:10.  24.  If she worked closing, she would have to clean her entire department including making sure there was nothing on the floor.  Id. 25.  During her shift, as she would walk along the department, if she saw something on the floor, she would have to pick it up.  She had to be “always aware, … always vigilant. ”
[directive] 'i  Fiscal year 5-3.  40A :5-3.  The fiscal year of every local unit shall be the period for which a local unit adopts a 40.4 budget, as required pursuant to the "Local Budget Law," N.J.S.40A:4-1 et seq.  Amended 1991 ,c.75,s.25.  . . . .  _ . . . - - - . . , . -*  I , . . . -  Document
[brief] [...], who was dating [...]’s sister, was also at the shower and got into an argument with [...].  (8T62-16 to 63-2; 8T64-5 to 15; 12T111-17 to 23; 12T112-21 to 25).  [...] asked both young men to leave.² (8T62-12 to 14; 12T113-23 to 114-13).
[brief] Under these circumstances, waiver is axiomatic. ”)  Pa68 (Cook Cert. Exh. E).  Perhaps most telling, however, is that [...]’s certification pursuant to Rule 4:5-1(b)(2) explicitly represented to [...] and this Court that [...] did not contemplate arbitration of this case.  Da207 (“The matter in controversy is not the subject of any other action pending in any court or any pending arbitration proceeding, and no such other action or arbitration proceeding is presently contemplated” (emphasis added)).  [...] has not since amended that certification and, as such, should be held to its sworn word.
[brief] In re Freshwater Wetlands Statewide Gen. Permits, 185 N.J. at 470.  This includes when a neighbor alleges that his or her property will be adversely impacted.  See, e. g., Spalt, 237 N.J. Super. at 212 (close residency, fear of resultant injury to property, damage to recreational interest or shared generalized property rights, and leaseholds in shellfish bottoms are not particular property rights); In re Amico/Tunnel Carwash, 371 N.J. Super. 199, 211 (App. Div. 2004) (anticipated adverse traffic impacts and effect of use and enjoyment of properties due to car wash did not entitle neighboring residents to a hearing); Normandy Beach Improvement Ass’n v. Comm’r, Dep’t of Env’t Prot., 193 N.J. Super. 57 (App. Div. 1983) (claim of adverse effect on quality of life by proposed pumping station did not entitle neighboring residents to a hearing).  This proposition has been upheld, even when the damage speculation is bolstered by an expert report.  See In re Orban/Square Props., 461 N.J. Super. 57, 61, 70, 78-79 (App. Div. 2019) (affirmed denial of adjudicatory hearing for an appellant who alleged a permit that authorized wetlands disturbance would cause flooding trespass in residential neighborhood) (citing In re Freshwater Wetlands Statewide Gen. Permits, 185 N.J. at 471).  See also Musconetcong Watershed Ass’n v. N.J. Dep’t of Env’t Prot., 476 N.J. Super. 465, 486 (App. Div. 2023) (“speculative damages to neighboring properties do not amount to a particularized interest conferring a right to an administrative hearing. ”).  Since [...] reasonably applied the facts of this matter to long-standing law, [...]’s denial of [...]’s adjudicatory hearing request, if not dismissed as abandoned, should be affirmed.
[brief] STATEMENTS OF FACTS  The description of the “plan” is fully set forth in the Topology report of January 26, 2023.  (Pa0193-0314)  Summarized, the “plan” divides the project into three zones. \(^2\)  The Plan calls for redevelopment in three zones: North, West and South, plus the “overlay” properties. \(^3\)  The West Zone consists of three lots, one of which is the [...] lots.  (\textit{Id.}, at 19, Pa0215).  The principal permitted uses in the West Zone will be: age restricted multifamily residential rental and restaurant/bar. \(^4\)  Permitted accessory uses will be: skyway, parking structure, amenity areas and any customary uses incidental to the permitted principal use.  The [...] site (235,000 sq. ft.) will contain three buildings: (1) The West Building with six floors; (2) the Central Building with four stories and rooftop use consistent with existing Section of 18.21 of the Municipal Land Use Ordinance, plus the added permitted principal use of medical office; (3) the East Building with six stories.  The configuration of these three buildings is schematically depicted in the Topology Report at page 21.  --- \(^2\)  There are several “stipulations” recited in the Trial Courts opinion at pages 4-6 which are essentially procedural steps and identification of exhibits.  (Pa0077-0079)  \(^3\)  With one stroke of the pen, this Redevelopment Plan “supersedes” the existing Downtown Scattered Site Redevelopment Plan last amended in April 2022.  (Topology Report at 5) (Pa0201)  (Ordinance #2023-03 at Page 2)(Pa0109)  \(^4\)  Multiple principal permitted uses on one site are permitted.  (Topology Report at Page 22 n.1, Pa0218) (Pa0217).  The upper floors of these buildings will have “step backs” as the floors go higher.  (Pa0221)  Across from the [...] site, the West Zone on North Avenue, Block 2502, Lot 14 site (42,000 sq. ft.) will have four principal structures, one accessory use structure with 16 age restricted townhouses and a park.  The West Zone also includes the Clark Avenue site, Block 2506, Lot 1 (25,000 sq. ft.), which will have four principal structures, one accessory structure with 16 townhouses and a park.  The North Zone will have a mixed-use area for one building on a portion of Lot 7, Block 3103 with an office lot area ranging from of 2,500 square feet up to 12,500 square feet for retail, restaurant/bar and 35 multifamily residences five stories tall.
[brief] (15T103-17 to 104-20).  Defendant asked that the charge be repeated after the State’s summation:  So there was a lot of hearsay in the State’s summation.  I understand that there was hearsay as well that was in the defense’s summation.  By I would ask that the Court read the same limiting instruction that was read after our summation as it pertains to the State.  There was a couple of them, the mass murder/serial killer, some of those from [...].  Those were hearsay documents that were relied upon by [...] and they were somewhat argued for the truth of the matter asserted.  (15T193-13 to 24).  The judge gave a more comprehensive limiting instruction in his final charge to the jury:
[brief] In January of 2020, [...] (“[...]”) was in the process of purchasing the project from the [...].  On or about January 16, 2020, [...], Esq., on behalf of [...], wrote to several Defendants, including [...] and [...], informing them that there was no written agreement of “any type between [...] and [...] regarding the development” of the Project.  (Pa000380; Pa000294, page 105, line 14 to line 21).  This correspondence occurred prior to the sale of the Project.  (Pa000293, page 101, line 4 to line 21).  The [...] remained responsible for the Project environmental remediation after the sale to [...].  Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 58:10B-16, the [...] was required to obtain the Plaintiffs’ consent in writing to enter the Property for any environmental testing and/or remediation and, if consent could not be obtained, the [...] was required to make an application with the Court.  [...] for the [...] acknowledged that a writing providing consent was necessary for [...] and its representatives to access the Property, and testified that no such writing exists.  (Pa000294, page 102, line 20 to page 103, to line 2; pg.  104, line 9 to line 16 (“I know we didn’t receive written consent. ”); pg. 105, line 10 to line 21; pg. 112, line 9 to line 14; Pa000283, page 59, line 2 to line 15; Pa000284, pg. 65, line 5 to line 23).  The [...] never obtained a written agreement or received written consent from Plaintiffs for the approval and/or development of the Property.  (Pa000294, page 105, line 4 to line 21).  [...] further testified that [...] was going to go forward with the Project site improvements on the Plaintiffs’ Property regardless of whether or not Plaintiffs consented.  (Pa000276, page 33, line 9 to line 13).
[brief] The Court addressed the interplay of a statutory appointment with CEPA in Yurick v. State, 184 N.J. 70 (2005), where it affirmed the dismissal of a CEPA claim brought by a county prosecutor that had a statutory term.  Id. at 75-76.  In that case, the county prosecutor was nominated and confirmed by the State Senate in accordance with the State Constitution and state statute.  Id. at 74.  County prosecutors receive a five-year term, and unlike a county counsel, they are allowed to serve in holdover until a successor qualifies.  Id. at 74.  After the prosecutor’s five-year term expired, the Attorney General entered a “supersedure” order that took over all the prosecutor’s duties.  Id. at 74.  Under this order, the prosecutor continued to hold his office in holdover, but no longer had any “power of control over the day-to-day operations of the prosecutor’s office. ”  *Id.* at 82.  Our Supreme Court held that the “[s]upersession” did not constitute “retaliatory action” under CEPA as a matter of law.  *Id.* at 83.  It held that the removal of duties under “[s]upersession” is “not the equivalent of removal from office. ”  *Ibid.*  Notably, the Court wrote that:  “Plaintiff may have hoped to remain as a holdover officer in charge of the operation of his office at the conclusion of his five-year term, but he had no reasonable expectation that he would be permitted to do so. ”  *Ibid.*  The *Yurick* case demonstrates that a statutory appointee to a term in office cannot have any reasonable expectation of a renewed term in office, and that a decision to not renew a term or remove powers is not a “retaliatory action” under CEPA.
[directive] (When this aggravating factor applies, a prosecutor would be expected pursuant to Special Application and Enhancement Feature J to apply for an appropriate Anti-Drug Profiteering penalty in addition to counting points for Aggravating Factor #5c.  See Section 11.10.  The use of this aggravating factor in addition to pursuing the imposition of an Anti-Drug Profiteering penalty shall not be deemed to constitute inappropriate “double counting” of this circumstance.  The point value for this aggravating factor is +4.  10.2