ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] See Fik-Rymarkiewicz v. Univ. of Med. & Dentistry of New Jersey, 430 N.J. Super. 469, 480–82 (App. Div. 2013) (affirming trial court’s dismissal of pleading where plaintiff refused to provide “fully and responsive” discovery). ”  As detailed in the Appellant’s Brief at pages 2-20, defendants did provide “fully responsive discovery” because they responded to the trial court’s “punch list” and provided all documents and information in their “possession, custody or control” as the rules require, R. 4:18-1(a); R. 4:10-1; Lipsky v. New Jersey Ass'n of Health Plans, Inc., 474 N.J. Super. 447, 464 (App. Div. 2023).  Respondent cite Fik-Rymarkiewicz, supra, 430 N.J. Super. 480, but there the Appellate Division again stressed that sanctions imposed for failure to make discovery are subject “to the requirement that they be just and reasonable in the circumstances,” citing the Supreme court’s governing standard in Abtrax Pharm., Inc. v. Elkins-Sinn, Inc., 139 N.J. 499, 513 (1995).
[brief] ” (Pa1-7).  When the [...] created a dangerous condition or inspected where it occurred, it could only be of such an obvious nature the City should have noticed it.  It is without contest that the defendant [...] owned and had a duty to maintain the subject tree.  Additionally, the lower Court even agreed that maintenance and work was conducted on the subject sidewalk which directly impacted the roots of subject tree.  As stated by the lower Court when reviewing plaintiff’s expert narrative by arborist [...], “The report further states that in 2007, Google images showed those portions of sidewalk had lifted because of root upheaval. ” (Pa1-7).  [...] goes on to state:  Many of these incidents can be foreseen and traced back to years of neglect, mistreatment, or the presence of defects.  In this case, the convergence of various factors, including the presence of new sidewalk blocks visible in the 2012 Google photographs, the absence of roots along a straight-cut line, advanced wood decay in the buttress area in photos from northjersey.com, trunk decay evident in the Passaic-4 photo, and the relatively low wind speed recorded at the time of the tree failure, all align with a scenario consistent with a tree that has experienced significant root damage and internal decay as a result.
[directive] RETENTION PERIOD AND PURGING OF STORED DATA  Each law enforcement agency shall, pursuant to the provisions of Section 14 of these Guidelines, establish and enforce procedures for the retention and purging of stored ALPR data in accordance with this Section.  ALPR stored data shall be retained for a period of five years, after which, the data shall be purged from the agency’s data storage device or system.  A law enforcement agency may purge ALPR data before the expiration of the five-year retention period only if the data has been transferred to the [...] ([...])or any other system that aggregates and stores data collected by two or more law enforcement agencies in accordance with the provisions of these Guidelines.  Any ALPR data transferred to another agency ,9- shall indicate the date on which the data had been collected by the ALPR so that the receiving agency may comply with the five-year retention and purging schedule established in this Section.  See also Section 11.1 and 11.2, infra.  10.
[brief] [1T20:20-22, 1T28:5-7, 2T16:19-21]  In the plaintiff’s complaint and testimony, [...], stated the defendant threatened that she was going to have people from Brooklyn come, beat him up, was playing rap music with lyrics stating the word Nigger repetitively and with drowning violent lyrical content.  During cross-examination, the defendant could not recall the song title or the rap artist name however, [...] was confident, with his in and out-of-court statement, that the lyrics in the stated genre song choice, recited violent lyrics of “Kill the Nigger. Kill That Nigger” and again on repeat “Nigger”, in efforts to establish the defendant’s motive and intent.  The initial trial court beared weight on [...]’ convoluted facts, again reaffirmed at the appeal de novo hearing when finding the defendant is guilty of disorderly conduct in the Judge’s reviewing the record.  The defendant’s knowledge on music and lyrical content stems from verifiable, degreeed collegiate curriculum(s) and professional positions within the respective industry.  In *State v. Skinner*, the Court concluded that the rap lyric showing a "sort of obsession with killing people" was relevant and admissible to prove defendant acted "knowingly or purposefully[.]"
[brief] Petitioner's wife was employed by respondent as a teacher during the time period of January 2021 to May 18, 2021.  (Ra1).  Respondent disputes that petitioner contracted COVID-19 in the course of her employment with respondent.  (Ra3).  Petitioner moved to declare the decedent to be an essential employee entitled to the presumption of compensability set forth in N.J.S.A. 34:15-31.  (Ra4-5).  (2T55-12 to 2T60-24).  Petitioner's moving papers did not include any affidavit or certification from anyone having personal knowledge of the facts of this case, and did not include any competent evidentiary materials at all.  (Ra6-40).  Instead, petitioner submitted a certification from his attorney that contained conclusory allegations, a copy of Executive Order No. 103 signed by Governor [...], a one-page document labeled, "Essential Employees," which is guidance promulgated by the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Agency, an Advisory Memorandum, and a CISA Memorandum.  (2T55-12 to 2T60-24, Ra61-15 to Ra69-13, Ra6-40).  Petitioner did not provide any evidence that the decedent should be considered to be an essential employee or that teachers, in general, should be considered to be essential employees.  (Ra61-15 to Ra69-13).  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I THE PETITIONER DECEDENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN SUMMARILY DECLARED TO BE AN ESSENTIAL EMPLOYEE.
[brief] The Watermen Report first notes the “Pre-Construction Seawall Geometry” as being a “gradual, curved return at the southern limit of the Subject Property . . .” (Da313) then compares the “Post-Construction Seawall Geometry” as having “eliminated the Seawall’s gradual, curved southern return and its relief-valve functionality in favor of a continuous Seawall to the south” which created a “pocket in the seawall geometry. ”  Da314.  The Watermen Report concludes this results in “increased vulnerability of the Subject Property to wave-induced storm damage. ”  Da315.  However, established New Jersey law prevents a condemnee in a partial-takings matter from claiming damages to the remainder of the property arising from the condition of adjoining property which the condemnee does not own.
[brief] In relation to [...], the Department is following up from your note from Q2 and now requesting an update for Q3.  The Department’s request relates to the fees incurred by [...] for [...]’s services which are charged by an AIF as a related party.  Please provide the Department with the following:  1.  Total service fees charged by [...] to [...] through Q3?  2.  Were there any service fees due to [...] which were reflected as payables by [...] in Q3?  3.  An estimate of the gross written premiums for Q4.  4.  Total service fees to be charged by [...] to [...] in Q4.  5.  Total service fees to be charged by [...] to [...] for 2022.  To ensure clarity and consistency, please be aware that the services provided and fees charged by [...] are considered a related party transaction subject to SSAP 25 and that all laws and requirements, including but not limited to, NJSA 17:27A-1 through 14, and that the application of relevant SSAPs such as SSAP 25 apply to reciprocals.
[brief] 6  Mazza v. Bd. of Adjustment of Bridgeton, 47 N.J. 161 (1966) ...............................  40  Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) .................................................................................................. 22, 23  Mirabelli v. Olson, 2023 WL 5976992, __ F.3d __ (S.D. Cal., Sept. 14, 2023) ......................................................... 26, 31, 34, 35, 36, 37 M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102 (1996)............................................................................. 23 Moriarty v. Bradt, 177 N.J. 84 (2003) ........................................................................... 9, 24 N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. P.W.R., 205 N.J. 17 (2011) ........................................................................................................ 24, 25 Paff v. Byrnes, 385 N.J. Super. 574 (App. Div. 2006) .................................................. 16 Parham v. J. R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979) .............................................................................. 23, 28, 29 Peper v. Princeton Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 77 N.J. 55 (1978)
[brief] CONCLUSION  #  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | Cases: | Page(s) | |-----------------------------------------------------------------------|---------| | **Abdelfattah Mhrez v. Convergent Outsourcing, Inc.,** | passim | | Case No. [...] (N.J. Sup. Ct. Jan. 6, 2023) | | | **Amber Jones v. American Coradius International,** | 39 | | Case No. [...] (Sup. Ct. June 15, 2023) | | | **Arias v. Gutman, Mintz, Baker & Sonnenfeldt LLP,** | 41 | | 875 F.3d 128 (2d Cir. 2017) | | | **Asmad-Escobar v. Phoenix Fin. Servs. LLC,** | 3, 13, 14, 23 | | 2024 WL 2839329 (App. Div. June 5, 2024) | | | **Banco Popular N. Am. v. Gandi,** | 6 | | 184 N.J. 161 (2005) | | | **Barclift v. Keystone Credit Servs., Inc.,** | 21-22, 31, 37, 38 | | 2022 WL 444267 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 14, 2022) | | | **Benzemann v. Citibank, N.A.,** | 16 | | 806 F.3d 98 (2d Cir. 2015) | | | **Bergen County PBA Loc. 134 v. Donovan,** | 25, 30, 31, 33 | | 436 N.J. Super. 187 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 2014) | | | **Blair v. Fed. Pac. Credit Co., LLC,** | 45 | | 563 F. Supp. 3d 347 (D.N.J. 2021) | | | **Brock v. Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas Co.,** | 41 | | 149 N.J. 378 (1997) | | | **Brown v. Card Serv. Ctr.,** | 43 | | 464 F.2d 450 (3d Cir. 2006) | | | **Campuzano-Burgos v. Midland Credit Mgmt.,** | 43 | | 550 F.3d 294 (3d Cir. 2008) | | | **Cavazzini v. MRS Associates,** | 21, 26, 38 | | 574 F. Supp. 3d 134 (E.D.N.Y. 2021) | | | **Ciccone v. Cavalry Portfolio Servs., LLC,** | 31 | | 2021 WL 5591725 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 29, 2021) | | Clemens v. ExecuPharm Inc., 48 F.4th 146 (3d Cir. 2022) .................................................................13 Clomon v. Jackson, 988 F.2d 1314 (2d Cir. 1993) ...............................................................42 Cnty. of Warren v. State, 409 N.J. Super. 495 (App. Div. 2009) ....................................................7 Comcast Corp. v. Nat’l Ass’n of Afr. Am.-Owned Media, 589 U.S. 327 (2020)
[brief] In his initial brief, [...] argued that being precluded from producing details to further his theory of third-party guilt required reversal.  In its response, the State claims both that there was no basis for a third-party guilt defense and also that sufficient evidence about that defense was submitted.  (Sb 18-20)  In support of these arguments, the State relies principally on State v. Hannah, 248 N.J. 148 (2021).  Hannah, however, supports [...]’s position.  Our Supreme Court held in Hannah that the failure to present certain evidence deprived the defendant “of his constitutional right to present a complete and credible third-party-guilt defense. ”  Id. at 188 (emphasis added).  Hannah makes clear that the bare facts of such a defense, without the existent corroborative details, is insufficient to protect a defendant’s right to a fair trial.
[brief] On September 12, 2024, [...] moved for reconsideration of the Trial Court’s August 30 Orders.  Pa960.  On October 15, 2024, the trial court again denied [...]’s request for injunctive relief, largely for the same reasons.  See Pa11-12.  First, the trial court erroneously found that “[t]he First Arbitration dealt exclusively with Plaintiff’s claim for unpaid EGP on the projects,” whereas “[t]he Second Arbitration will address [[...]’] claim for payment as a subcontractor [under the Hackensack Project Completion Subcontract].”  Pa21.  The trial court accordingly held that “[t]he two claims arise from different contractual agreements and obligations” and “do not arise from the same nexus of facts…”  Pa21.  This is untrue, inefficient, and promotes disjointed/piecemeal litigation and the strategic holding back of claims between parties.  And with respect to [...]’s claim of “ripeness,” the trial court held that 8  Also, it further logically follows, then, that [...] can only be entitled, at maximum, to the amounts [...] received from that separate arbitration with the Owner.)  “[[...]] could not know if [[...]] would pay the alleged amounts in question,” and “[i]t was only after the confirmation of the [[...]] award that [[...]] could be sure that they would receive a fractional amount. ”  Pa21 (emphasis added); see also supra note 2 (“arbitration panel there awarded [...] the net total $435,087.70”).  The trial court was wrong to connect the ripeness of [...]’s claim against [...], under the Hackensack Project Completion Subcontract, with the timing of the separate [...].  The trial court merely asserted its erroneous ripeness holding in a conclusory fashion without any analysis, at all.  And the trial court apparently ignored entirely the fact that [...] put its claim to $2.1 million at the Hackensack Project in its Counterclaim in the First Arbitration.  H.  [...] Is Entitled to Injunctive Relief Enjoining the Second Arbitration (Pa4)
[brief] 22.  Court disregarded my Exceptions (p. 13-19, par. 10a&b) (121a-127a) provided detailed objections to [...]'s explanations in Aug.  4th response (Exh. “I”, p. 1-3) (84a-86a) to Audit questions regarding [...]'s legal fees of $15,022, and [...] accounting fees of $31,259, that proved they were "insufficient, misleading, false, or not relevant", and were not justifiable.  23.  Court disregarded my Exceptions (p. 19, par. 10c) (127a) pointed out that [...]'s explanations confirmed that all [...] "billed invoices [for $74,248.18 were] related to the Estate Case in the Lower Court ([...]) and two related Estate Cases with the Appellate Court".  It confirmed my objections to Trust payments for [...] legal work for $74,248.18.  See also par. 21 above.  [...]'s Reply to [...]'s Exceptions to Trust Accounting
[brief] DA 3-8.  At the core, this case revolves around equity in the face of rising levels of gentrification along the Hudson River in New Jersey.  [...], a tenant who is protected by a low-income housing regulation, the Tenant Protection Act, has sought to keep his monthly rent at an affordable level since the early 1990s so that he may avoid relocating out of the area.  [...], his landlord, submitted a hardship application with the Board with the aim of increasing [...]’s monthly rent to achieve a fair return on their investment as defined by the Hoboken Rent Control Ordinance.  In its application, [...] cited to rising costs such as property taxes and condominium association fees, which are also associated with the gentrification phenomenon, as the reason behind the need to increase [...]’s monthly rent.  The Board, meanwhile, has been placed in the increasingly unenviable position of balancing the competing interests of both parties to achieve an equitable and just result.  Through its laborious efforts over the years, the Board respectfully submits that it has achieved equity in this case in rendering all of its decisions in a difficult situation and has not acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner.
[brief] ”  Plaintiff then contended the Defense gave him blanket permission to provide expert reports at any time in disregard of the trial court’s prior discovery orders.  In reality, Defense Counsel stated it would not raise an objection provided Plaintiff’s reports were received with ample time for the Defense to respond to same.  The discovery end date was October 11, 2023.  [...]’s, [...]’s, and [...]’s reports were served two (2) weeks before discovery closed; [...]’s report was served on the last day of discovery; and [...]’s report was served nearly two (2) weeks after discovery closed.  It is not acceptable under any circumstance to sandbag a party with expert reports a litigant had years to procure.  Moreover, if Plaintiff needed additional time, he could have drafted a Consent Order or petitioned the Court for a revised Scheduling Order; however, he did neither.  Plaintiff’s expert reports should have been barred and, in the absence of same, further warrant dismissal of these proceedings as to the [...].
[brief] R.4:49-1(a); Bender at 431-32.  Nothing in the plaintiff’s summation transgressed the boundaries of broad latitude afforded so as to warrant a new trial in this case.  The defendant specifically cites to that portion of plaintiff’s closing argument wherein the two areas of tearing of the labrum were discussed, however, the full picture as argued to the jury has not been pointed out by defendant.  The full argument was as follows:  Because what [...] says, incidentally, not contradicted by [...], [...] says there’s two different areas.  Both the superior and [a]nterior part of the labrum were torn off, were torn.  And it showed up on the MRI.  What’s important to this shoulder expert, he said it’s at – the mechanism of injury is absolutely consistent with what [...] said.  He has left arm up there.  [...] described it as a sheering injury where you kind of come across and on both sides of that shoulder – and we discussed this – on both sides of the labrum on that shoulder, there was tearing.  ...  3T28:9-20.  Plaintiff’s arguments concerning the shoulder injury testified to by [...] were completely consistent with the actual trial testimony.  It is certainly plaintiff’s position that stating that the labrum was “torn off” was appropriate since, once a portion of something is torn, it is necessarily “off”.  However, even if stating that it was “torn off” is incorrect, in summation, the description of that injury is immediately qualified, within the same sentence, when the argument continued after stating that the labrum was “torn off” with the description being that the area “was torn”.  3T28:9-20.  In addition, in the next paragraph, the injury was again described as “there was tearing. ”  3T28:9-20.  Thus, plaintiff asserts that the trial judge correctly denied defendant’s motion for a new trial on the basis of plaintiff’s counsel’s purported mischaracterizations of the medical testimony, since there was no mischaracterization.  In addition, even if it were to be determined that there was a mischaracterization of the medical testimony, the jury was specifically instructed that if their interpretation of the evidence was different from any argument or statement made by counsel, that they were to rely upon their own recollection and rely upon the testimony specifically of the witness.
[directive] 9.1  Procedures  Inte~ty procedures system and a maintain establish and shall BWCs that deploys department  Every shall system  This recordings. all BWC of and storage handling proper and integrity the ensure to in system storage secure data a to uploaded recordings are ensure all that 1) to: provisions include after and both before data recorded of deletion or with tampering 2) fashion; prevent timely a access unauthorized prevent 3) system; the storage to uploading BWC from and the downloading accessed, viewed, are recordings BWC instances where all document 4) recordings; stored BWC to recordings are BWC where instances all of auditing permit and deleted; or 5) disseminated, copied, or deleted.
[directive] 8.  Type of Case (crime suspected)  9.  Previous application involving subject/premises?  10.  Type of warrant sought: ❏ ❏ Yes No ❏ ❏  In-person Telephonic ❏  11.  Warrant based upon: Written affidavit 12.  Investigation involved confidential  13.  Are you seeking a “no knock” entry or unusual ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏  Sworn oral testimony  Both informant or source? Yes  No time for execution? Yes No  B.  INTERAGENCY COORDINATION INFORMATION ❏ ❏  14.  Length of Investigation  15.  a)  Was this a joint investigation or task force case? Yes No ❏ ❏ b)  Did any other agency contribute to investigation or supply information?  Yes No If YES, name of agency: ❏ ❏ ❏ 16.  Does criminal activity/operation extend beyond jurisdiction of applicant’s agency?
[brief] ..................................  15  R.F. v Abbott Labs, 162 N.J. 596 (2000)  .................................................................................................  6  Scanlon v. General Motor Corp., 65 N.J. 582 (1974)  ....................................................................................................  3, 10 Schweiger v. Standard Tile Supply, Co., 2019 WL 5783478 (N.J. Super. App. Ct. Nov. 6, 2019) ...........................................  8 United States v. Dunkel, 927 F.2d 955 (7th Cir. 1991) .....................................................................................  11 Statutes  New Jersey Product Liability Act ..............................................................................
[brief] The February 15, 2025, election for Commissioner of Fire District #1 in [...] was undoubtedly nearly as close as one can possibly get.  But in the end, “ballots, not briefs, decide elections. ”  *Donald J. Trump for President, Inc. v. Sec’y Pa.*, 830 F. App’x 377, 391 (3d Cir. 2020).  [...] is trying to have votes that were improperly disqualify counted, and the Court need only allow them to be opened.  It is by doing so that the Court can ensure that the voice of the people is heard.  Respectfully submitted, /s/[...] [...]
[brief] Again, alternatively, if the Court finds [...] was a holdover tenant, As [...], [...] and [...] have guaranteed all obligations of the tenant under the February 20, 2015 Lease, they guaranteed the tenant’s obligation to surrender the premises.  If the Trial Court is going to engage in the fiction that the Lease was terminated, it is undisputed that the premises were not surrendered and, therefore, all obligations under the Lease continued.  See law re: surrender above.  All of the damages resulted from the failure to surrender the premises, including the rental and other obligations for which [...] was found liable.  Therefore, in the alternative, even if the tenant was a holdover, (which is vigorously disputed) the obligations guaranteed continued until the tenant surrendered the premises in 2020.
[brief] It is difficult to perceive any overriding public policy to support the common-law rule because, as pointed out earlier, the rule condemns only the method of transferring title, rather than the transfer itself.  All would agree that the transfer of title to a spouse [a stranger to the deed in many examples offered in the article] contravenes no public policy.  If the purpose to be promoted by application of the common-law rule is the establishment of uniform or standard reservations, the purpose simply cannot be accomplished by employment of the rule.  This is because the very nature of the functions performed by such provision requires that they be individualistic, and because the rule is not comprehensive enough to effect a standardization.  It is submitted that the common-law rule is an oppressive thorn which has ceased to justify its existence.