ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Under the liberal construction required of pension statutes, his eligibility for the benefit is not in question.  In other words, [...] suffers from a 9/11 illness and is disabled as a result.  He qualifies for accidental disability benefits under the Ricci Act standard.  [...] was denied the ability to register his presence at the September 11th terrorist attacks and therefore also denied accidental disability benefits based on an unsupported finding that Division mailed a post card notifying him of his requirement to register.  This finding is arbitrary, capricious, and against the substantial weight of the evidence.  The Division alleges that the two-year time frame for registration requires strict implementation to “verify applicants’ dates and locations of service as witnesses and memories inevitably continue to become unavailable and fade. ”  Rb9.\(^1\)  Under the Ricci Act, members who seek to amend benefits thereunder are not required to produce witness verification statements.  Additionally, there has been no suggestion that the dates that [...] was at ground zero (or other similarly situated members) need verification by the Division.  Neither is required under the Ricci Act.  Furthermore, almost two decades had passed since the September 11\(^{th}\) terrorist attacks when the Ricci Act was signed into law.  The assertion by Respondent that the two-year registration window was to rectify a fleeting memory is erroneous.  Respondent’s argument lacks merit.  The determination below was arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable and against the substantial weight of the evidence.  It should therefore be reversed, and retired Trooper [...] should be permitted to register his presence at 9/11 and granted accidental disability benefits.  --- \(^1\) Rb references the Respondent’s Brief.  POINT II
[brief] The hearing officer’s opinion that ingress and egress to the site was somehow unsafe and inefficient therefore has no basis in either the factual record or the controlling law.  The Lionel’s Appliance decision is otherwise emphatic about the inability of the board to deny a site plan application for a permitted use based on existing off-site traffic.  In that matter, the court encountered a similar situation wherein the objector “plaintiffs attempted to persuade defendant board to deny the site plan application because of the traffic problems allegedly existing at the intersection where the proposed uses [we]re to be constructed. ”  156 N.J. Super. at 262.  The court upheld the board’s approval of the site plan, stating:  If a site plan is to significantly affect an off-site condition such as traffic, the governing body by ordinance and planning board in its site plan review may require contribution from the developer for the widening of the streets as a result of the additional traffic created by the development.  In light, however, of the historical limitations of site plan review, it is improper to construe those provisions to mean that the planning board can deny a site plan because of an existing off-site condition at or near the site in question.
[brief] *Id.* at 187-190.  trial court determined that defendant failed to show a connection between two people selling drugs in an urban community and a motive for the murder of the victim.  *Ibid.*  Furthermore, the trial court properly declined to take judicial notice of [...]’s criminal history because it was proffered for the sole “purpose of determining the truth of what it asserts simply because the certification has been filed with a court and thus is part of a court record. ”  *RWB Newton Assocs. v. Gunn,* 224 N.J. Super. 704 (App. Div. 1988); N.J.R.E. 201(b)(4).
[brief] The length of [...]’s agreement is drastically exacerbated as an issue by its format, which contains dozens of confusing and contradictory cross-references and exceptions.  To piece together what other agreements manage to do in a sentence or two, an [...] user would first need to read a large, unbroken paragraph of 202 words, which contains no less than three references to the same subsection yet to come, and which is dominated by lengthy and repeated lists and language related to class action and mass action waiver.  (Da81).  The user then needs to read Section 2(a)(1), which begins with an exception referencing Section 2(b) – which must now be read too – and identifies certain types of claims emanating out of the use of “the Services. ”  (Da82).  To understand what “the Services” might be, the user would have had to recall that term being defined in the very first paragraph of the agreement.  (Da80).  Scrolling back there one finds a partial definition, in a sentence with three other defined terms, and the notation the Services are more fully defined in Section 3.  (Da80).  To get to Section 3, the user has to scroll past the rest of the arbitration agreement (ten pages worth) the user hasn’t actually seen yet.  (Da89).  Section 3, not actually part of the arbitration agreement itself, again defines Services while simultaneously using the word “service(s)” both in the definition itself and throughout the section not as defined.  (Da89-90).  When the user gets to the end of the section, which has its own license, restrictions, all-caps print, and the like, the user sees Section 4, which has not yet been referenced but which appears more related as it is entitled “Access and Use of the Services[.]” (Da91-93).  Plaintiffs will stop there, but the point is obvious.
[brief] Although counsel may use forceful expressions in the heat of advocacy, he must confine himself to fair comment upon the facts in evidence.  State v. Bogen, 13 N.J. 137, (1953), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 825, 74 S. Ct. 44, 98 L.Ed. 350.  Counsel is not precluded from making a vigorous and forceful presentation of his case, however, “[c]ounsel in his summation to a jury should not misstate the evidence nor distort the fact[s]....”
[brief] The Board considered [...]’s equity in the Unit (10T:132) and its prior determination that, although the prorated price of the Unit was $47,727 based upon the $525,000 purchase price of the Property divided by 11, the value of the Unit was less than the value of the other units and was reduced by 50%.  10T:133:4-12.  The capital improvements to the Unit totaled $76,900.  10T:137:13-25.  Adjusting the prorated purchase price ($525,000/11) and improvements ($76,900) for inflation in accordance with the CPI would increase the equity of the Unit to $197,600.  10T:138:12-15, 141:6-15.  Based upon those numbers alone without considering the Unit’s value, the hardship increase would equal $2,156.00.  10T:142:19-25.  [...] also relied upon [...]’s equalized assessment for the Unit at $603,880, which, upon applying the equalization ratio to its assessed value, is $404,600.  10T:138:5-12, 139:11-21.  The Board was also reminded that [...], [...]’s expert (both a Certified Tax Assessor and MAI Appraiser) had previously testified that [...]’s $404,600 assessment was reduced over 30% because of the tenant’s protected status.  10T:139:2-8.  The Chairwoman then introduced her own analysis regarding [...]’s equity in the Unit that was not based on any facts or testimony in the record.
[brief] On the one hand, [...] contends that [...], a complete stranger up until this point, pulled up beside her on a well-trafficked road lined with several businesses and demanded she get into his truck at gunpoint.  [...] did not have any admissible criminal history, nor was there any evidence suggesting a propensity for violence.  This narrative was also undermined by the fact that the text messages between [...] and [...], as well as their respective testimonies, clearly demonstrated that they had plans to see each other that evening.  Even if one were to buy into the idea that [...], a middle-aged man with almost no criminal history, intended to kidnap a woman at random, why in the world would he do so when he had a date coming over to his house in a half-hour.
[brief] Mount Laurel I. S. Burlington County NAACP v. Mount Laurel, 92 N.J. 158 (1983)  --------------------------------------------------------------- passim Mount Laurel Twp. v. Mipro Homes, 379 N.J. Super. 358 (App. Div. 2005), aff’d, 188 N.J. 531 (2006)  ---------------------------------------------------------------
[brief] To begin, at least since Boller Beverages it has been clear in this State’s body of administrative law that an agency’s “mandate, either statutory or administrative must precede the specific --- 11  Further examples include regulations governing fees charged by various medical professionals, which provide that a “fee is excessive when, after a review of the facts, a licensee of ordinary prudence would be left with a definite and firm conviction that the fee is so high as to be manifestly unconscionable or overreaching under the circumstances,” and include a non-exclusive list of factors to be considered.  See, e.g., N.J.A.C. 13:35-6.11; N.J.S.A. 25:1-15.1 (“Consistent with their enabling acts, . . . the boards . . . are authorized to adopt rules and regulations to serve the public health, safety and welfare. ”).  See also, e.g., N.J.A.C. 13:32-4.5 (defining when a price charged by a licensed plumber is excessive and providing factors for evaluation of the excessiveness).  violation. ”  38 N.J. at 155 (emphasis added); see Matter of Farmers’, 256 N.J. Super. at 621 (discussing the “interests of fairness and uniformity”).  Consistent with this, the Supreme Court has consistently struck down as invalid agency actions purportedly undertaken pursuant to broad and undefined statutory language when there is a lack of promulgated regulations to apprise regulated entities of “all the rules of the game” in advance of their participation.  Boller Beverages, 38 N.J. at 152.  For example, in Boller Beverages, the Supreme Court set aside a decision by the [...] that required the petitioner to remove certain products from the New Jersey market, because the Director’s reasons for doing so were not set out in advance.
[brief] Respectfully submitted, [...]  Attorneys for Defendants  By: /s/ [...]  [...], Esq.  [...], Esq.  Dated: October 10, 2024  [...], [...], and [...], [...], Plaintiffs-Respondents, v. [...]; [...] f/k/a [...]; and [...], Defendants-Appellants.  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE  DIVISION DOCKET NO.: [...]  Civil Action On Appeal  From: Superior Court of New Jersey Law Division, Middlesex County  Docket No.: [...]  Sat Below: Hon. [...]  J.S.C.  Date Submitted: November 14, 2024  BRIEF FOR RESPONDENTS
[brief] A review of the Legislative history reveals multiple Legislative sources establishing that the Legislature never intended to give retroactive application to N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-9(e)(3):  1)  Of the two versions of the bill that were adopted and made effective April 14, 2020, and June 29, 2020, none of those versions discuss retroactive application of N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-9(e)(3).  2)  N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-9 underwent nine bill drafts, with the final eight occurring on or after March 23, 2020.  None of the nine bill drafts discuss retroactive application of N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-9(e)(3).  3)  Between January 11, 2022, and March 7, 2022, there were six proposed bills to amend N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-9.  None of these proposed bills discuss retroactive application of N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-9(e)(3).  4)  Of the 15 Legislative history materials, inclusive of proposals, Assembly statements, and Governor’s veto comments, none of the history discusses retroactive application of N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-9(e)(3).
[brief] When she went to check on the noise, [...] saw a red car exiting the business’s driveway; [...] had never seen the red car before.  [...] also noticed several little holes in the building’s vinyl siding and a broken window.  [...] of the [...] responded to [...] for a "call of a white male subject in a red vehicle that shot the back of [...]."  Once on scene, [...] observed broken glass and shattered windows in a conference room, as well as damage outside to the building's vinyl siding and BBs on the window sill.  [...] also located and reviewed surveillance video, which confirmed what had been reported: a "red sedan pull in the north driveway from South Holmdel Road, pull around the back of he building  The subject reached into the glove compartment, pulled out a black handgun-style BB gun and reached ... out the window, and lean out the driver's side window and shoot the building multiples times."  The license plate on this vehicle connected the vehicle to the defendant's father.  (14T:171-10 to 203-7; 219-2 to 220-24; 17T:127-11 to 128-17).
[brief] See Pb19–Pb21.  Neither the text of Section 1.29 nor the reality of the class settlement supports that artificial limitation.  With its business goals in mind, [...] paid over $1 million in exchange for lasting peace from the [...] and the right to continue to amend its agreements and charge fees as it deems appropriate.  It would not have paid that amount merely to resolve the claims the [...] had already brought only to face the same claims a decade later.
[brief] Ab12.  Appellants’ interpretation of Exemption #11 would require a complete distortion of the plain meaning of the statutory language.  Contrary to Appellants’ interpretation, the word “routine” does not modify “upgrade of public utility lines, rights of way, or systems. ”  If it did, it would also mean that “routine” modifies “rehabilitation, preservation, --- 7  “Ab” refers to Appellants’ amended merits brief filed on September 2, 2022.
[brief] Realizing that they have no credible response to this argument, Plaintiffs pivot to arguing that the court nonetheless found that Defendant breached the 2014 and 2017 [...] SPAs and the 2014 [...] Purchase Agreement.  This argument also falls flat.  First, Defendant cannot, as a matter of law, be held liable for breaching either the 2014 [...] SPA or the 2014 [...] Purchase Agreement because she was not a party to those contracts.
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[brief] There is no outstanding discovery or any other documents or information that defendants could produce.  Counsel affirmed, 2.  On February 8, 2024, the Court held on the record [a] hearing in reference to all Plaintiffs’ outstanding discovery demands as it relates to the Punch List pursuant to Court’s Order of November 9, 2023.  3.  In accordance with the Court’s instructions, further due diligence was conducted by the representative of the Defendant, [...] and a proper certification was executed by the Defendant, [...].  4.  Attached to this Certification is the Defendants’ Amended Answers to the Plaintiffs’ Punch List demands.  5.  Based on the aforesaid, I request for the Motion to Reinstate be granted, NO discovery is outstanding on behalf of the Defendants.
[brief] (4T)  [...] asserted that [...] and [...]’s transaction to purchase of the Boonton Property was void pursuant to N.J.S.A 3B:31-55(b).  (4T 8-9)  Furthermore, [...] requested reconsideration of the June 10, 2022 Order explaining that reformation of trust language requires clear and convincing evidence.  (4T 12-15)  Finally, [...] explained that [...] was seeking [...]’s written consent and release with regard to her purchase of the Florida Property for $360,000, which [...] was unwilling to provide.  (4T 18-22)  (720a)  On August 12, 2022, [...] purchased the Florida Property for $360,000 from the Trust without [...]’s written consent and release.
[brief] We acknowledge a certain anomaly in the notion that employees who are severely ill as a result of their exposure to asbestos in their place of employment are forced to accept the limited benefits available to them through the Compensation Act.  Despite the fact that the current system sometimes provides what seems to be, and at times doubtless is, a less-than-adequate remedy to those who have been disabled on the job, all policy arguments regarding any ineffectiveness in the current compensation system as a way to address the problems of industrial diseases and accidents are within the exclusive province of the legislature.
[brief] 952 F.2d 607,700-01 (3d Cir, 1991) | 7 | | U.S. v. One Toshiba Color Television, 213 F.3d 147, 156 (3d Cir. 2000) | 7 | | Gold Kist, Inc. v. Laurinburg Oil Co., Inc. 756 F.2d. 14,19 (3d Cir. 1985) | 8 | | Grand Entm’t Grp., Ltd. v. Star Media Sales, 988 F.2d 476, 488 (3d Cir. 1993) | 8 | | Petrillo v. Bachenberg, 139 N.J. 472,479 (1995) | 12 | | General Electric Co. v. jointer, 522 U.S. 136 (1997) | 16 | ## LIST OF PARTIES | Party Name | Appellate Party Designation | Trial Court/Agency Party Role | Trial Court/Agency Party Status | |----------------|-----------------------------|-------------------------------|---------------------------------| | [...]| Appellant | Defendant | Participated Below | | [...] | | Defendant | Participated Below | | [...] | Respondent | Plaintiff | Participated Below | | Proceeding Type | Proceeding Date | Transcript Number | |-----------------|-----------------|------------------| | Court Hearing | 10/19/2023 | AD/T 557 | PRELIMINARY STATEMENT Upon examination the trial court records from February 2015 through April 2015, that were archived from the NJ-e-Courts System, records prior to November of 2017, obtained in September of 2023 (Request (Pa1); PDF Random Dump (Pa4); and, Sorted Records (Pa5)) it was discovered that matters of law were ignored in the Affidavits of Service, in the Request to Enter Default Proof of Mailing, and in the Final Judgment by Default Proof of Mailing.
[brief] (6T65-6 to 65-14).  Defendant he had a good relationship with his family and loved his parents.  (6T80-9 to 11, 81-8 to 82-19, 85-18 to 24).  [...], who had been dating [...] for three years at the time of the murders, had a “very brotherly/sisterly” bond with defendant.  (6T6T61-16 to 24, 64-3 to 12).  When speaking with defendant, defendant never indicted that he was confused or could not follow the conversation.  (6T64-13 to 65-1).  Defendant never told [...] he was seeing or hearing things.  (6T64-2 to 5).  Defendant once put his hands around [...]’s neck and joked that he could kill her, but she did not take defendant seriously.  (6T87-19 to 88-11, 92-2 to 8).
[brief] This role made [...] an insurance broker and fiduciary of each subcontractor that relied on [...]’s administration of the CCIP, including [...] upon receipt of its Certificate of Liability Insurance.  [...] of [...] confirmed [...]’s role as broker when she testified that [...] was acting as insurance broker on behalf of [...] as a named insured.  Pa2116.  [...] of [...] acknowledged that [...] was the broker of the policies and [...] was [...]’s client.  Pa2469.  Therefore, [...] had a duty to [...] as its fiduciary to exercise good faith and reasonable skill in advising and administering its insurance.
[brief] Doctor, you could have clarified this whole issue by getting your hospital application filed, true?  A  I’m not sure …  [4T185-86]  Q  Doctor, at your deposition of June 8th, 2021 in this case do you recall me asking you.  "Is that true, you still have that application for privileges at [...] pending in October of 2018 represented on your CV?"  You recall the answer that you gave?
[brief] “Although the language is particularly broad it should be understood in the context of the MLUL generally.  Thus, the use, enjoyment or right to acquire should always be evaluated in terms of the purpose of the MLUL. ”  *Edison Bd. of Educ.*, 464 N.J. Super. at 306.  (citation omitted).  Accordingly, the New Jersey Supreme Court has held that, for actions under the MLUL, “standing requires that, in addition to establishing its ‘right to use, acquire, or enjoy property,’ a party must establish that that right ‘is or may be affected. ’”  *Cherokee LCP Land, LLC*, 234 N.J. at 416-17 (quoting *N.J.S.A. 40:55D-4*) (emphasis added).
[brief] Upon reconsideration, the trial court wrongly adopted Respondents’ proffered rationales for dismissing this case – that \textit{neither} Respondents are liable under the NJLAD because Appellant and [...] were not technically paid by the same \textsuperscript{4}  Notably, the Trial Court did not make a distinction between \textit{any} of Appellant’s claims in his decision, nor did he make the determination that there were \textit{no issues of material fact} warranting summary judgement.  Instead, the Court broadly determined that [...] – Appellant’s \textit{undisputed employer} – was “not an appropriate Defendant” in this litigation.  3T. 91:15-20.  The Court further broadly concluded that Appellant does not have a LAD claim against [...] or [...] because there was not a close enough nexus between [...], [...], and Appellant (despite Appellant working in [...]’s office with [...] throughout the entirety of her employment)
[brief] The indictment charges that this alleged theft took place between March 18, 2014 and May 15, 2014.  (Sa2-3).  This agreement, which is the linchpin of the State’s case, is purported to have been executed on May 2, 2014.  \(^3\)  There is evidence in the record that a 95/5 split would have been a convenient way for [...] to secure a loan from the [...] ([...]).
[directive] F.  Nothing in this Directive shall be interpreted to alter the drug testing requirements for law enforcement applicants or trainees contained in AG Directive 2018-2 and the AG Drug Testing Policy.  G.  Nothing in this Directive shall be interpreted to alter the drug testing requirements for law enforcement officers for whom reasonable suspicion exists to believe are using drugs illegally, contained in AG Directive 2018-2 and the AG Drug Testing Policy.  There remains a zero-tolerance policy for intoxication while performing the duties of a law enforcement officer.  It is absolutely imperative that all law enforcement agencies maintain a drug- and alcohol-free workplace, which includes prohibiting cannabis/marijuana whether regulated or illicit.