ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] It first ruled that a fee award on a R. 1:10-3 motion is limited to, “only legal expenses incurred in securing the order enforcing a litigants' previously-existing rights….  Plaintiff is not entitled to all attorney's expenses incurred during the strike, only those resulting from obtaining the order to show cause of May 18, 1992, seeking, in aid of litigants' rights, to enforce the return-to-work provisions of the May 15, 1992 order. ”  Id. at 54 (emph. added).  Moreover, while the Chancery Court here believed that Franklin allowed it to impose a sanction unrelated to a litigant's damages, “to compel compliance with a court order,” the Judge failed to recognize that the Franklin only allowed, “the trial judge may impose additional monetary sanctions against striking public employees and their representatives, to continue in effect until there is compliance with the court order which is being violated.
[brief] Through their mutual efforts, both [...] and the [...] succeeded in that location and took advantage of certain synergies that developed between the businesses.  (P362a-P363a, P366a-P369a).  This arrangement continued seemingly smoothly for around fifteen years.  (Id.)  Either by design, or through a course of conduct and understanding throughout the years, the parties worked closely in serving the patients visiting [...] and [...], eventually reaching the point where they were, or so it would seem to the typical patient, parts of the same unified eye care business.  (Id.).  Indeed, even though the [...] had no official ownership interest in [...], they placed their name on [...]’ door, not only causing [...]’ customers to associate the name “[...]” with [...] business, but also causing them to believe that the businesses were one and the same.  The [...] also billed for some of [...]’ services, caused their prescriptions to be printed in [...]’ optical, and represented to at least one insurance company that they owned a majority interest in [...]’ Union location.  (P366a, P784a).  [...] Offers to Buy Associates in Eye Care
[brief] The Defendants’ contractual duty to “make full and timely rent payments” arises not from the Rent Concession Rider, but from the primary Apartment Lease Contract (Da31, section 2), where it was agreed to “in --- 9  The oral decision sometimes refers to Defendants as “CCP,” presumably an abbreviation of “counterclaim plaintiffs. ” exchange for” [...]’s duty to deliver “Possession and Use” of the apartment, not in exchange for promotional “free rent” concessions.  Da31, section 2.  What the trial court apparently meant is that the $17,920 was provided not “in consideration for the Defendants’ agreement to “make all rent payments timely” but rather in consideration for strict compliance with that agreement,\textsuperscript{10} induced by threat of having to “immediately repay” the $17,920 under the charge-back provision that is part of the same “rent concession” rider.  The trial court found as such in an earlier portion of the oral opinion, in which it noted that Defendants “were being offered the [rent] concessions as an inducement to strictly comply with the terms of the lease. ”  2T3-23 – 2T3-25.  The trial court’s finding that [...] “offered the [rent] concessions as an inducement to strictly comply with the terms of the lease” conclusively establishes that the Rent Concession Rider and embedded charge-back clause comprise an unlawful contractual penalty under New Jersey law.
[brief] In fact, [...] volunteered that "I received police depositions that were taken.  I looked at them but they were not relevant to the opinion that I was going to give but I was presented them."  (8T52:18-21).  He stated: "I wasn't going to render opinions as to the altercations and who did what to who" regarding the incident.  (8T102:6-7).  In arguing the motion before the trial judge, counsel for [...] told the trial judge:
[directive] Restrictions on Using BWCs Surreptitiously or to Gather Intelligence Information on First Amendment Protected Activity.  A BWC shall not be used surreptitiously.  Additionally, a BWC shall not be used to gather intelligence information based on First Amendment protected speech, associations, or religion, or to record activity that is unrelated to a response to a call for service or a law enforcement or investigative encounter between a law enforcement officer and a member of the public, provided that nothing in this subsection shall be construed to prohibit activation of video and audio recording functions of a BWC as authorized under the law or this Policy.
[brief] Englert, 389 N.J. Super. at 56.  Relevant to the [...] contract, the Court determined that, while the “regardless of” language does not preclude [...]’s indemnification, the phrase is ambiguous and does not distinguish between allowing indemnification for the negligence of others and allowing indemnification for the indemnitee’s own negligence.  Ibid.  This phrase simply eliminates the common law requirement for indemnitees to be free from fault.  Ibid.  The Court ultimately held that “[n]either the ‘regardless of’ phrase nor the ‘to the extent’ phrase answers the question whether such indemnification would include [the indemnitee’s] own share of fault and do not satisfy the required ‘unequivocal’ expression of intention to obligate [an indemnitor] to fully indemnify [the indemnitee] for damages resulting from its own negligence. ”  Englert, 389 N.J. Super. at 56.  Next, the Appellate Division reached a slightly different conclusion in Estate of D’Avila v. Hugo Neu Schnitzer E., 442 N.J. Super. 80 (App. Div. 2015).
[brief] (PA000001-PA000058).  On or about September 14, 2020, Plaintiff commenced employment with Defendant [...] as a Support Manager.  (PA000005).  As part of Defendant [...]’ Residential Services, Defendant [...] has developed over 150 group homes throughout New Jersey for individuals with special needs to live in.  Plaintiff was hired to work in Defendant [...]’ group homes.  Id.  At all times throughout her employment, Plaintiff performed her job responsibilities competently and diligently, loyally dedicated to Defendant [...] and the individuals they serve.  (PA000006).  ii.  **Plaintiff’s Previously Collegial Work Environment Took a Turn For The Worse After She Felt Compelled To Complain About What She Reasonably Believed To Be Violations Of Law, Rule, and Regulation.
[brief] (Pa33-Pa34, 3:23-7:11).  That flawed argument must be rejected.  Finally, with respect to the public policy argument addressed in Appellant’s initial brief, if the lower court’s ruling is permitted to stand, it will upend the finality and certainty of settlements in this State and the concomitant public policy favoring resolution of matters to the extent it would mean that any plaintiff in an employment case reaching a resolution at mediation or in a settlement before the court, who developed buyer’s remorse within 21 days of reaching a settlement and memorializing it in a Willingboro writing or transcript before a court or hearing officer, could simply change their mind and repudiate the settlement.
[brief] Passim N.J.S.A. 2C:3-4(c)(3) ..........................................................  37 N.J.S.A. 2C:3-4(b)(2) ..........................................................  43 N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1.2 .............................................................  74 N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1.2(a) .........................................................  75 N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2(a) ..........................................................  83 N.J.S.A. 2C:44-2(b) ............................................................  83 N.J.S.A. 2C:44-2(c)(1) .........................................................  83 N.J.S.A. 2C:44-2(c)(2) .........................................................  84 N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)(3-5, 7-9) ............................................. 81, 82 Rules N.J.R.E. 104 ........................................................................ 58, 59, 63 N.J.R.E.  608 ........................................................................  59  N.J.R.E. 608(b) ...................................................................  57  N.J.R.E. 608(b)(1) ...............................................................  59, 64, 65  N.J.R.E. 701 ........................................................................ 45, 46
[brief] **[...] EGP Calculation. **  The Arbitrator adopted [...]’s proposed EGP for [...]’s ($565,701.04) despite a lack of the parties’ agreement as to EGP, but this amount contradicts the fee stated in that project’s agreement ($500,998.00).  Da463.  Given this contractual provision, the [...]’s EGP as stated in the Award is an error that must be corrected to reflect the fee expressly stated in the agreement for the project, otherwise the fee is being calculated on the full value of the contract that already contains the fee.  [...]’s EGP should therefore be adjusted to $500,998—the only EGP amount [...] ever provided to [...] for [...]’s when calculating [...]’s installment payments for the project—and the Award should be reduced by $64,703.04.
[brief] POINT II:  THE LOWER COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY APPLYING THE DOCTRINE OF LACHES TO THE UNREIMBURSED MEDICAL EXPENSES (P-452)  Again, putting aside for a moment that Defendant lacks all credibility where he committed perjury on his CIS by omitting his one-half interest in his father’s home that was deeded to him 2 months prior to his execution of that CIS, and where his matrimonial attorney, [...], also prepared the deed transferring the one-half interest in Defendant’s father’s house to Defendant, thus suborning perjury, and where [...] invoked the Fifth Amendment during the pre-trial deposition when the Undersigned attempted to explore this issue, entitling Plaintiff to an adverse inference, which was requested but not given, the lower court respectfully committed serious abuses of discretion in otherwise analyzing the amounts owed and misguidedly applying the doctrine of laches.
[directive] 2.  ¿Entiende que si el tribunal determina que usted depende de drogas y determina también que cumple con el criterio de 2C:35-14, es posible que reúna las condiciones N.J.S.A. necesarias para recibir una condena a un período obligatorio de libertad a prueba especial con el propósito de que participe en un programa de tratamiento contra drogas supervisado por el tribunal (“Tribunal de Drogas”)?  Dicho criterio incluye lo siguiente, aunque no se limita a ello: la determinación de que (1) usted es una persona que depende de drogas o bebidas alcohólicas, y (2) dependía de drogas o alcohol en el momento de cometer esta infracción, y (3) no estaba en posesión de un arma de fuego en el momento de cometer esta infracción ni en el de ningún cargo pendiente, y (4) usted no tiene ciertas condenas anteriores que lo descalifiquen, y (5) existe un tratamiento apropiado disponible para usted, y (6) no habrá ningún peligro para la comunidad como resultado de que cumpla una condena de “Tribunal de Drogas. ”  Do you understand that if the court determines that you are drug dependent and also finds that you meet the criteria in 2C:35-14, you may be eligible to be sentenced to a mandatory period of special N.J.S.A. probation for the purpose of participating in a court-supervised drug treatment program (“Drug Court”)?  This criteria includes, but is not limited to, a finding that: (1) you are a drug or alcohol dependent person, and (2) that you were drug or alcohol dependent at the time of the commission of the present offense, and (3) that you did not possess a firearm at the time of the present offense or any pending charge, and (4) that you do not have certain prior disqualifying convictions, and (5) there is suitable treatment available for you, and (6) no danger to the community will result from your serving a “Drug Court” sentence.
[brief] More recently, Cho v. Trinitas Regional Medical Center, 443 N.J. Super. 461, 470 (App. Div. 2015), certif. den. 224 N.J. 529 (2016), guided  Courts and practitioners as follows:  Even when a limited issue is presented, "[o]ur courts generally disfavor in limine rulings on evidence questions," because the trial provides a superior context for the consideration of such issues.  State v. Cordero, 438 N.J. Super. 472, 484-85, 105 A.3d 1129 (App.Div.2014), certif. denied, 221 N.J. 287 (2015).  Although a trial judge "retains the discretion, in appropriate cases, to rule on the admissibility of evidence pre-trial," id. at 484, we have cautioned that "[r]equests for such rulings should be granted only sparingly."
[brief] There were 2 witnesses to the execution of [...]’s Small Business Contract with [...] dated June 30, 2022: [...] representative [...] (“[...]”) and [...].  [...]’s account of this event is contained in his Certification submitted with this Motion (Pa168) and is supported by the Certification of Co-Counsel, [...], Esq. (Pa171)  [...] has not provided any facts with respect to execution of the Contract.  [...] presented the Contract on his company iPad to [...] at the residence in [...] that he shares with [...].  [...] signed the cover page of the form Contract on behalf of [...] and was unable to read the remaining 7 pages.  The only issues discussed between [...] and [...] were prices and cameras.  (Pa169, para.7)  There was no mention of arbitration, waivers, or any other contract provisions.  [...] was not permitted to negotiate even if the subjects had been questioned.  [...] did not sign the Contract personally.  [...] did not sign it at all.  [...] did not sign the Contract.  (Pa169, para. 7)  Installation began immediately thereafter.
[brief] Even if the Court were to consider the merits of this argument, the trial court correctly applied R. 4:42-11(b) to award Plaintiffs’ pre-judgment interest dating back to July 20, 2020, when Plaintiffs filed their complaint (37T77-7 to 78-23).  The decision to award pre-judgment interest rests within the sound discretion of the trial court.  See e.g., Rendine v. Pantzer, 141 N.J. 292 (1995).  Thus, the trial court’s decision on this issue must be reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard.  See Musto v. Vidas, 333 N.J. Super. 52 (App.Div.2000) (award of prejudgment interest is subject to trial judge’s broad discretion).  Rule 4:42-11(b) mandates awards of pre-judgment interest, except as otherwise provided by law, only in tort actions.
[brief] [...] presented no evidence at all to the Zoning Board as to its off-site parking use being permitted at its inception or at any time thereafter.  [...]’s only position was that the then Lot 5 owner granted the Sons of Israel its permission (easement) to use portions of Lot 5 for synagogue parking in 1963, and that parking thereafter commenced and has continued in some vague degree to the present.  It is important to recognize that --- in every situation as to a nonconforming use --- the disputed use was likely always initiated either by the owner or a third-party with the permission of the owner.  That the owner gave the illegal user permission or even an easement for the use is not controlling or even relevant to the zoning legality of the use.
[brief] ”  Burney, 255 N.J. at 24 (quoting Evans, 892 F. Supp. 2d at 956 (N.D. Ill. 2012)).  [...]’s testimony is a net opinion based on his and other [...] agents’ experience with [...] data.  Precedent mandates be net opinions be excluded, as they do not meet the threshold of reliability under Jenewicsz.
[brief] ” (5T24-24 to 25-6).  She then merged the felony murder count into the purposeful and/or knowing murder count, and also found that a consecutive 15-year NERA sentence for robbery was appropriate for the same reasons given by the original sentencing judge.  (5T25-7 to 28-18).  The judge ended by addressing defendant directly:  [...], this is a very long sentence.  I think you have the ability to be rehabilitated.  I think you are on that right path.  I ask you, despite the Court’s decision, to stay on that path.  You deserved [sic] to have a future.  You deserve to have your family released from their pain as well.  If the Court could do justice, it would turn back the clock and this day would not occur for anyone, but I don’t have the ability to create justice in that fashion.  I’ve done the best that I could under these circumstances, I believe.  I wish you good luck, young man.  [(5T29-18 to 30-3).
[brief] For example, [...] entered Plaintiff’s grade incorrectly on two separate occasions.  (Pa548-Pa552).  Dean [...] testified that he believed Plaintiff was not respectful to him, and he was “threatened” by Plaintiff when Plaintiff re-introduced himself and told [...] his name was [...].  (Pa560-Pa561).  [...] testified he was “threatened” by the following alleged statement from Plaintiff, “I don't know if you remember my name, I'm [...], I'm sure you know lots of [...]s. ”  [...] testified, “I'm not sure if he was trying to threaten me at that point or not by alerting me to there's other [...]s in the world, but it made me feel extremely uncomfortable and it was extremely culturally insensitive for him to use his name in that format and so I felt very threatened by his comment. ”  (Pa560).
[brief] The admission of evidence of extrinsic facts is not for the purpose of changing the writing, but to secure light by which to measure its actual significance.  Such evidence is adduceable only for the purpose of interpreting the writing – not for the purpose of modifying or enlarging or curtailing its terms, but to aid in determining the meaning of what has been said.  So far as the evidence tends to show, not the meaning of the writing, but an intention wholly unexpressed in the writing, it is irrelevant.  Conway v. 287 Corporate Center Associates, 187 N.J. 259, 269 (2006) (emphasis added).  There was no term within the integrated contracts that the plaintiffs claimed was ambiguous and further, no misunderstood intention between the parties because the plaintiffs admitted, in fact conceded in their complaints, that they purchased the timeshares for their “own personal, family or household purposes. ”  Nor was there any fraud presented by the plaintiffs that was wholly extraneous to the contracts.  It was error for the trial Judge to refuse application of the Parol Evidence Rule based on Conway.  Fourth, beyond the Court’s erroneous reliance on Conway, [...] submits the Court simply failed to understand Conway.  Conway quoted and relied on the California Court’s decision in Pacific Gas & Electric Company v. GW Thomas Drayage & Rigging Company, 69 Cal. 2d 33 (1968), 442 P. 2d 641, 69 Cal. Rptr. 561, 40 ALR 3d 1373.  The California Court provided a basic, two-step judicial interpretive function to determine application of the Parol Evidence Rule.  First, the Court must determine whether given preliminary consideration of all credible evidence to prove intent of the parties, there is a rational interpretation that is apparent.  Pacific Gas, supra. at 36-38.  Second, if the Court decides that the language of the contract “is fairly susceptible to either one of two interpretations,” it must rule that extrinsic evidence is admissible; if, however, the evidence permits only one rational interpretation, extrinsic evidence is inadmissible.  *Id.* at 39-40.  That was not the case here.  What *Conway* and *Pacific Gas* teach, therefore, is that where a contractual term is susceptible to an alternate interpretation other than its “plain meaning,” it along with all the facts and circumstances may be relevant in determining the parties’ intent.  Those cases, however, had absolutely no application to the facts before the Court on summary judgment.  All the claims of oral misrepresentations were precisely addressed and expressly contradicted by the contracts and therefore barred.  The determination of the trial court served to nullify and destroy the essential purpose of a written contract.  The trial court’s rulings eviscerated the Parol Evidence Rule, allowing any plaintiff to circumvent the Rule by simply alleging they were told the opposite of a precise term covered in a signed and integrated writing.  **POINT II**
[brief] *Victor v. State*, 203 N.J. 383, 408-10 (2010).  There is no single prima facie case that applies to all employment discrimination claims.  Instead, the elements of the prima facie case vary depending upon the particular cause of action.  For example, the prima facie elements for a complaint arising from the failure to hire, regardless of whether that claim is based on race, sex or handicap, are: (1) that plaintiff falls within a protected class; (2) that plaintiff was qualified for the work for which he or she applied; (3) that plaintiff was not hired; and (4) that the employer continued to seek others with the same qualifications or hired someone with the same or lesser qualifications.
[brief] THE LAND EXCHANGE ARRANGEMENT IS LEGALLY SOUND AND FURTHERS THE PUBLIC INTEREST  A.  Legitimacy of Land Exchanges in Eminent Domain  Proceedings  Land exchanges, when executed to achieve a valid public purpose, are fully supported by New Jersey law.  The arrangement between [...] and [...] does not detract from the public use of the acquired property but rather enhances it by ensuring that the most strategically valuable lands are preserved for public use.  See Twp. of West Orange v. 769 Assocs., LLC, 172 N.J. 564, 571 (2002).  Land exchange arrangements, within the context of eminent domain proceedings, are not only permissible under New Jersey law but are also a testament to a municipality's commitment to strategically managing public resources for the maximum benefit of its community.  The legal foundation for such arrangements is rooted in the principle that local governments possess the discretion to make decisions that best serve the public interest, including the optimization of land use to meet public needs.
[brief] (Raised below at Da198, IT 11:11-16)  Appellant argues, on one hand, that the [...] is a legal forum [Db29, Point IV(a)] then conversely argues, on the other hand, that the [...] is not a legal forum (Db 29-31 and Db 32-34, Db 35-41).  The Trial Court recognized that both parties acknowledge the [...] is a legal forum (Da198) (Da16, Par. 7) and then properly determined that the terms of the [...] letter of August 10, 2021 (Da24-Da25) triggered the severance clause in the Separation Agreement at Par. 18 noting the plain language of the agreement as noted in the Trial Court’s July 2023 Order (Da199).  It is therefore established and admitted that the [...] is a legal forum.
[directive] qualificado  b. você estará à obtenção da liberdade quando o [...] [Sim/Yes] [Não/No] (Conselho Estadual de Liberdade Condicional), depois de receber as recomendações de um conselho especial de revisão, decidir que você atingiu um nível satisfatório de progresso no tratamento para agressores sexuais e que, a menos que portanto, receberá a liberdade condicional o Conselho Estadual de Liberdade Condicional determinar pela preponderância das provas que você não ou colaborou na sua reabilitação se existe uma expectativa razoável de que você descumprirá as condições da liberdade condicional?  eligible that you will be for release when the [...], after receiving a recommendation from a special classification review board, finds you have achieved a satisfactory level of progress in sex offender treatment and that you will then be released on unless parole the [...] determines by a preponderance of the evidence that you have or failed to cooperate in your rehabilitation there is reasonable expectation that you will violate conditions of parole?  c. você talvez passe mais tempo em tratamento do que passaria se fosse sentenciado [Sim/Yes] [Não/No] à reclusão em prisão estadual? that you could spend more time in treatment than you would spend if sentenced to state prison?
[brief] That voir dire procedure is well-settled:  “An appropriate voir dire of a juror” regarding possible juror misconduct “should inquire into the specific nature” of the matter.  State v. R.D., 169 N.J. 551, 560 (2001) (emphasis added).  “Depending on the juror’s answers to searching questions by the court, the court must then determine whether it is necessary to voir dire individually other jurors to ensure the impartiality of the jury.