ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] się  Czy rozumie Pan(i) ponadto, że przyznając się do winy zrzeka Pan(i) e. prawa do [Tak/Yes] [Nie/No] odwołania od wyjątkiem tych odrzucenia wszystkich przedprocesowych wniosków z wymienionych poniżej: you are waiving  Do you further understand that by pleading guilty your right to appeal the denial of all other pretrial motions except the following:  Czy rozumie Pan(i), że się do winy:  5.  po przyznaniu  Do you understand that if you plead guilty:  Będzie Pan(i) a. wpisany do rejestru karnego?  [Tak/Yes]  [Nie/No]  You will have a criminal record?  Może Pan(i) zostać skazany(a) na maksymalny okres pozbawienia wolności, opłatę b.  [Tak/Yes]  [Nie/No] maksymalnej grzywny lub maksymalnej nawiązki na rzecz Biura Odszkodowań dla Ofiar Przestępstw (VCCO), chyba że w porozumieniu z prokuratorem ustalono inaczej?  Unless the plea agreement provides otherwise, you could be sentenced to serve the maximum time in confinement, to pay the maximum fine and to pay the maximum Victims of Crime Compensation Office Assessment?
[brief] Moreover, [...]’s documents will shed considerable additional light on the [...] scandal.  Indeed, [Redacted] FB-CA-MDL-01184406, Ex. 24 at 1045.  Documents from [...]’s custodial files [Redacted] should be produced given their relevance to Plaintiffs’ claims.  [...]’s core involvement in [...]’s response to the [...] scandal [Redacted].
[brief] [...] may, at the end of the day, be correct that any proposal to reduce available parking spaces from more than 300 to approximately 150 and to change such from publicly available to privately controlled may violate the Public Trust Doctrine.  As [...] notes, however, the development that eventually moves forward could be a far cry from the conceptual plan [...] fears.  Those questions, however, must be analyzed vis-à-vis the regulatory rubric adopted by [...] – on a case-by-case basis when a development application seeking [...] approval is pending.
[brief] See Egbert v. Chew, 14 N.J.L. 446, 450 (1834) (noting that “actual livery of seizen is not now necessary, a delivery of the deed of the premises, would have been a full performance of the agreement on the part of the plaintiff”).  Hence, the underlying reason why the common law prohibited transferring fee to one with rights in favor of another (i.e. the grantor could not physically deliver seisin to both) quickly disappeared in favor of the rule of intention.  See Betts v. Massachusetts Bonding and Ins. Co., 90 N.J.L. 632, 636 (E. & A. 1919).  The rule of intention provided that, in the absence of a fixed legal or technical meaning requiring a certain construction; “the best construction ... is that which is made by viewing the subject-matter of the contract as the mass of mankind would view it; for it may be safely assumed that such was the aspect in which the parties themselves viewed it.  A result thus obtained is exactly what is obtained from the cardinal rule of intention. ”  Id.  Since the early 19th century, our Supreme Court has consistently disfavored the common law approach and instructed that, when construing instruments including deeds, courts must strive to ascertain and implement the intention of the grantor or testator using the words actually used and expressed in the particular instrument.
[brief] Escrow Instructions.  The Earnest Money Deposit shall be held in escrow by [[...]] in an interest-bearing trust account . . .  In the event this Agreement is terminated by [[...]] under any express right of termination entitling [[...]] to a refund of the Earnest Money Deposit as provided herein, the Earnest Money Deposit shall be refunded to [[...]] in accordance with, and subject to the provisions of Article XVII.  . . . * * *
[brief] Opinion After Trial, filed August 30, 2023 .................................................. Da0004  Amended Order and Final Judgment, filed September 18, 2023 ......................  Da0067  Order Denying [...]’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint, filed November 13, 2020 .............................................................................  Da0070  Order Denying [...]’s Motion for Reconsideration of Order Denying Motion to Dismiss, filed January 22, 2021 ......................................  Da0071  Order Denying [...]’s Motion for Summary Judgment, filed August 27, 2021 ............................................................................................  Da0083  Order Denying [...]’s Motion for Reconsideration of Court’s Amended Order and Final Judgment, filed October 18, 2023 ........................  Da0084  TABLE OF APPENDIX
[brief] In April 2019, [...] received a tax notice from the New Jersey Department of the Treasury.  An audit of his 2015 tax return revealed that he owed an additional $98,038 to the State.  (Da127-31).  [...] then reached out to [...] (who at the time was still his personal accountant) and [...] to discuss the situation.  [...] also engaged CPA [...] to assist.  To avoid further penalties, [...] made a payment in about July 2019.  (6T69:4 to 70:18; 72:7-15).
[brief] See Garrison, supra, 154 N.J. at 297.  The acts of the intoxicated patrons, including the one that murdered [...], do not absolve Defendants of liability.  See Saldana, supra, 275 N.J. Super. at 503 (holding that independent intervening acts did not absolve the city from liability as a landowner for the condition of the property, which, together with the intervening acts, caused the damage); cf. Roe, supra, 317 N.J. Super. at 80 (intervening acts of a rapist did not absolve the public entity from liability).  POINT IV: WHETHER DEFENDANTS’ CONDUCT IN FAILING TO REMOVE THE ILLEGAL, LARGE, MAKESHIFT LIQUOR CONCESSION STAND WAS “PALPABLY UNREASONABLE” SHOULD BE LEFT TO A JURY.
[brief] Patients presenting as [...] did with evidence of pneumatosis and significant lactic acidosis require exploratory surgery to evaluate for ischemic or necrotic bowel.  [...] failed to come in the night he was called and evaluate [...] who was severely ill and in need of a surgical consultation.  [...] failed to review the images of her CT scan once the suspicion of pneumatosis was identified, a serious CT finding.  He failed to comprehend the severity of her condition and the need for an exploratory laparotomy the night she was admitted.  The following morning, [...] should have appreciated that [...]'s clinical condition had not improved, as evidenced by the developing hypotensive shock, continued pain she was suffering despite multiple doses of pain medication, and distended abdomen and the minimal reduction in her lactic acid.  [...] failed to accurately diagnose and treat [...] the next morning and in his 1 PM dictated note he is still considering ischemic colitis as possible as opposed to acting on the surgical emergency in front of him.  These failures led to the delay of definitive life-saving treatment.  The infectious disease consult later that afternoon reflected continuing and persistent 10/10 abdominal pain and deferred the case back to surgery.  A decision to proceed quickly to surgery at the time of his 1PM dictated note, more likely than not, would have resulted in [...] surviving the emergency surgery.  In summary, it is my opinion to a reasonable degree of medical probability, as a board-certified general surgeon, that the acceptable standard of care was not met in this case.  [...] failed to appear at the hospital the night of June 12, 2016 for a patient who was suffering from all the hallmarks of an acute abdomen - pain out of proportion, lactic acidosis and a CT scan with possible pneumatosis at the splenic flexure.  [...] failed to take her to the OR that night for an exploratory laparotomy as was needed and then [...] continued to delay and deny her the life-saving treatment that she required long into the next day.  [...]'s failure to timely diagnose and surgically treat the emergent situation his patient was in was the proximate cause for [...]'s death.
[brief] *State v. Jackson*, 454 N.J. Super. 284, 291 (App. Div. 2018).  A defendant “must do more than make bald assertions that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel. ”  *State v. Cummings*, 321 N.J. Super. 154, 170 (App. Div. 1999).  A petition that “reveals only conclusory allegations that his counsel was deficient [or] that his counsel did not thoroughly explore his defenses” does not meet the threshold of prima facie ineffectiveness.  *State v. McDonald*, 211 N.J. 4, 30 (2012).  A petitioner is required to develop an adequate record demonstrating “facts that would have been revealed” before an evidentiary hearing is required.  *State v. Petrozelli*, 351 N.J. Super. 14, 23 (App. Div. 2002) (citing *State v. Preciose*, 129 N.J. 451, 459 (1992) (internal quotations omitted)).  Any “facts” presented by a petitioner must be in proper form—by “affidavit or certifications based upon the personal knowledge of the affiant or the person making the certification. ”  *Cummings*, 321 N.J. Super. at 170.  In the absence of the same, “[j]udicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance must be highly deferential. ”  *Strickland*, 466 U.S. at 689.  1.
[brief] In finding that the defendants were prejudiced, the Court pointed out:  “There is no doubt that defendants are now disadvantaged because they were not parties to the first litigation.  Each of the four defendant-doctors were deposed as witnesses during the discovery period in plaintiff’s suit against the Hospital.  Although they were represented by counsel during these depositions, had they been made parties to the original action, they might have approached the depositions and discovery process differently….They would have been able actively to participate in discovery by objecting to interrogatories and requests for documents.  Moreover, they would have been able to engage in discovery of their own.  Thus, it is clear that their inability to participate as parties in the first trial affects their position in the second, relative to that of the plaintiff, especially in this instance where many of the facts and much of the evidence are the same in both actions.*  Id. at 273 (emphasis added).
[brief] 12 C.F.R. Section 226.13(b)(1)  Db49  12 C.F.R. Section 226.17(a)  Db45  12 C.F.R. Section 1026.6(b)(1)(i)  Db45, Db46  12 C.F.R. Section 1026.6(b)(2)  Db44  15 U.S.C. Section 1601(a)  Db42  15 U.S.C. Section 1611  Db42  15 U.S.C. Section 1632(a)  Db44  15 U.S.C. Section 1637(b)(11)(B)(i)  Db43, Db44  15 U.S.C. Section 1637(b)(11)(B)(ii)  Db43  15 U.S.C. Section 1637(b)(11)(B)(iii)  Db43  15 U.S.C. Section 1637(b)(11)(B)(iv)  Db43  15 U.S.C. Section 1637(b)(11)(E)(i)  Db44  15 U.S.C. Section 1640(e) Db36, Db37, Db39  15 U.S.C. Section 1692e Db14, Db16  15 U.S.C. Section 1692k Db42  New Jersey Rules of Evidence: N.J.R.E. 201 Db7  N.J.R.E. 201(a)  Db9  N.J.R.E. 803(c)(6)  Db21, Db22, Db28  Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Rule 60(b)(1) Db3, Db4
[brief] In 2017, by Chapter 43, a comma was substituted for “or” in b. and b.(1); the words “or a stationary sanitation vehicle display a flashing amber warning light pursuant to section 1 of P.L.2011, c.3 (C.39:3-54.27)” were inserted in b.; in b.(1) a comma was inserted following “service vehicle” and the words “or sanitation vehicle” were inserted.  In 2019, by Chapter 370, in the introductory language of a., a comma was inserted following “blinking” and “blue light. ”  See Comments to N.J.S.A. 39:4-92.2.  3  1T refers to Transcript of Proceedings, March 8, 2022.  2T refers to Transcript of Proceedings, April 13, 2022.  3T refers to Transcript of Trial De Novo, September 12, 2022.  Prior to a March 8, 2022 court appearance before the Honorable [...], J.M.C., defendant dismissed [...].
[directive] It is anticipated that, in the large majority of cases, prosecutors and see defendants will agree that the defendant’s sentence should be modified as if the defendant had never been subject to a mandatory minimum term in the first place.  But in a small number of cases, prosecutors will have a factual basis to seek the discretionary parole disqualifiers that they would have pursued had there been no mandatory minimum term at the time of sentencing.  This Directive makes clear that, in seeking a discretionary parole disqualifier at the time of a sentence modification, the prosecutor must meet the same standard that applies in a typical sentencing hearing: by clearly convincing the court that the aggravating factors associated with the offense substantially outweigh the mitigating factors.  N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(b).  To help See ensure that prosecutors request discretionary parole disqualifiers rarely and in a consistent manner, the Directive requires prosecutors to consult with the [...] before pursuing such parole disqualifiers.  The Directive also makes clear that, as part of a sentence modification, the prosecutor may not seek a discretionary period of parole ineligibility any longer than the mandatory term originally imposed by the court at the time of sentencing.  These safeguards ensure that no defendant is worse off as a result of a sentencing modification, while also allowing the prosecutor to seek the continued incarceration of individuals who present public safety risks.
[brief] Contrary to [...]’s argument, the court’s decision in *Ensslin* did not turn on the timeliness or adequacy of the Division’s notice.  (Pb11).  Instead, the court found that because the notice from the Division was sent “more than four years from the date of petitioner’s last contribution,” the Division’s own “day-to-day administration of its affairs” and interpretation of the two-year time limitation as expressed by the four-year notice further supported allowing Ensslin to file.  *Id.* at 338.  Here, there was no such letter informing [...] that he was eligible to file under the Ricci Act past the statutory deadline.  Thus, *Ensslin* does not support [...]’s proposition that untimely notice allows individuals to file at any time past the statutory deadline.  (Pb12).  Nor do the equities weigh in his favor.  The Board found on the basis of undisputed facts that notice was sent to [...], that information about the Ricci Act was available to him through the Division’s website and publications, and that he had sufficient time to file his Eligibility Registration Form within the statutory period.  Thus, contrary to [...]’s contention, (Pb15), there was ample evidence for the Board to reasonably conclude that he failed to demonstrate good cause, reasonable grounds, and reasonable diligence to warrant consideration of his application well beyond the statutory deadline.  (Pa14).  Finally, [...]’s argument and reference to a different applicant is misplaced.  (Pb16).  That applicant asserts that he attempted to file his Eligibility Registration Form but was told he was ineligible because he was not currently sick.  (Pb16; Pa111-115).  But those facts are not in the record before this court.  And that applicant’s assertions are irrelevant to [...]’s appeal as they deal with an entirely different set of circumstances not alleged by [...], so they should be disregarded.  **CONCLUSION**
[brief] The Board’s disregard of [...]’s low risk assessments as mitigation, and its decision instead to treat those risk assessments as aggravating circumstances, evince the Board’s results-oriented approach to justify a preordained denial of parole.  Throughout its Final Decision, the Board spends an inordinate amount of time rehashing [...]’s offense history, and clearly places the greatest weight on the circumstances of the crimes for which he was convicted and sentenced nearly 45 years ago.  (Pa3).  As noted above, by the time an inmate becomes eligible for parole, the punitive aspect of his sentence has been completed.  Kosmin, 363 N.J. Super. at 40-41.  Critical to this appeal is [...]’s astute observation that the clinical assessment that resulted in [...]’s “moderate” risk for reoffense is based upon historical events ([...]’s criminal conduct) that cannot be changed no matter how long he remains incarcerated.  [...] cannot change the past.  On multiple occasions, he has expressed to the Board that he deeply regrets the crimes that he committed, as well as the pain and suffering that he caused his victims and their families.  [...] conveyed that same remorse during his interviews with [...] and the Board psychologist, as reflected in their respective reports.  In fact, as described by [...] in her 2018 report, [...] feels that the word “remorse” could never fully express the guilt and shame he feels about the homicides and other criminal offenses that he committed as a young man.  But [...] is also not the same man he was in 1979, nor is he the man he was in 2001, 2011, or 2015.  He has used his time in prison to better himself, his fellow inmates, and the prison system as a whole, and wants nothing more than to once again contribute to society.  He has taken courses, engaged in extensive therapy to gain insight into the personality traits that contributed to his criminal conduct, written books and poetry, spearheaded important mental health services within our prisons, and has remained infraction free for decades.  Given all of [...]’s extensive participation in programs and services, and his unrebutted “low to moderate” risk assessments, there is nothing more [...] can possibly do to appease the Board and convince it that he is ready to reintegrate into society.  [...] has spent his entire period of incarceration participating in programs and services to rehabilitate himself.  The Board's rejection of competent mitigating evidence, and its disproportionate reliance on [...]'s conduct and alleged “inability to understand” why he committed his crimes, confirms that the Board has not fairly evaluated [...] as the man he is today.  Instead, the Board’s decision demonstrates that it intends to punish [...] for the rest of his life.  Because the Board’s Final Decision lacked any explanation as to how it overcame the presumption of release, and lacked record support for its assertion that [...] presents a substantial risk of reoffense, it is respectfully submitted that the February 28, 2024 Final Decision must be reversed.
[brief] (Pb17).  Contrary to her argument, the Board properly decided that a testimonial hearing was not necessary because the controlling facts were undisputed.  (Pa96).  See N.J.A.C. 1:1-4.1(a) (“After an agency proceeding has commenced, the agency head shall promptly determine whether the matter is a contested case. ”).  As explained by the Supreme Court, “[i]t is well-established that where no disputed issues of material fact exist, an administrative agency need not hold an evidential hearing in a contested case. ”  Frank v. Ivy Club, 120 N.J. 73, 98 (1990) (citing Cunningham v. Dept. of Civil Service, 69 N.J. 13, 24–25 (1975)).  “The mere existence of disputed facts is not conclusive.  An agency must grant a plenary hearing only if material disputed adjudicative facts exist. ”  Ibid. (citing Bally Mfg. Corp. v. Casino Control Comm’n, 85 N.J. 325, 334 (1981) (emphasis in original)).  Because there were no material facts in dispute here with respect to the controlling legal issues in [...]’s appeal, the Board reasonably denied her request for an administrative hearing, which fully comported with administrative due process.  (Pa96).
[brief] (a litigant who is not a party to the agreement, nor a third-party beneficiary, lacks standing to challenge the agreement)’’ Defs.’ Br. 22-24 (citing Everbank v. Tierney, No. A-2435-18T2, 2020 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1414, at *8-9 (App. Div. July 15, 2020)).  Defendants’ argument is somewhat perplexing, however, because Defendants’ collection Complaint (Pa1) and their Motion to Compel Arbitration (Pa119-Pa120, ¶¶ 3-5) rest on Plaintiff being a party to the [...] credit card agreement.  To the extent Defendants argue that Plaintiff “lacks standing to challenge the validity of the assignments [to Defendants]” because “Appellant was neither a party to nor third-party beneficiary of the assignment,” that argument also fails for misinterpretation of the law.  See Defs.’ Br. 26.  Indeed, by Defendants’ rationale, no contracting party could ever challenge an assignment of their contract they are a party to.  Such cannot be true.  The cases cited by Defendants—primarily unpublished opinions outside of this jurisdiction—do not support Defendants’ argument that a debtor cannot challenge the assignment of their account.
[brief] However, this analysis fundamentally misconstrues the requirements for a (b)(2) class.  [...]’ claims "arise from the same events, practice, or conduct, and are based on the same legal theory, as those of other class members .  . . ."  *Laufer v. U. S. Life Ins. Co. in City of N.Y.*, 385 N.J. Super. 172 (App. Div. 2006) (citation omitted).  The unlawful conduct alleged here for the (b)(2) Class is a violation of the CFA arising from the inclusion of the unlawful Chargeback term given to [...] and the putative class members.  *See Cameron v. S. Jersey Pubs, Inc.*, 460 N.J. Super. 156, 179 (App. Div. 2019) (allowing (b)(2) class to proceed where “[t]he unlawful conduct alleged here is a violation of the CFA and the TCCWNA arising from the failure to list beverage prices on menus given to plaintiff and the putative class members.)  This case is analogous to both *Laufer* and *Cameron* as both dealt with a plaintiff alleging unlawful provisions and the Appellate Division found in each case the claim arises from the same legal theory as those of other class members.  Regarding the Walshes’ (b)(3) subclass, “[s]ignificantly, to establish predominance, they do not have to show that there is an "absence of individual issues or that the common issues dispose of the entire dispute," or "that all issues [are] identical among class members or that each class member [is] affected in precisely the same manner."
[brief] Aa0080.  Emissions at [...] would not trigger any federal stationary source air permitting requirements, and Tennessee only requires general permits from [...] for the new emergency generator and the new heater.  Air pollutant emissions would also occur on a short-term basis during the construction of [...], including emissions from operation of construction equipment and fugitive dust generated by surface disturbance and vehicle travel on unpaved roads.  Tennessee has mitigated these impacts by implementing a fugitive dust control plan during construction activities.  A copy of Tennessee’s Fugitive Dust Control Plan was attached to Tennessee’s HAD application.  See Aa301.  Any air quality impacts associated with construction would be short-term and revert to pre-construction conditions upon completion of Project construction.
[brief] ## Cases  **Bowe v. N.J. Mfrs. Ins. Co.,** 367 N.J. Super 128, 137 (App. Div. 2004)  .................................................. 12  **Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am.,** 142 N.J. 520, 540 (1995)  .............................................................................  16  **Caminetti v. United States,** 242 U.S. 470, 485, 37 S.Ct. 192, 194, 61 L.Ed. 442, 452 (1917) ......................  10  **De Almeida v. General Accident Insurance Company,** 314 N.J. Super. 312, 314, 317 (App. Div. 1998) ..............................................  15  **DeVivo v. Anderson,** 410 N.J. Super. 175, 179, 980 A.2d 498, 500 (Super. Ct. 2009) .......................  10  **Diehl v. Cumberland Mut. Fire Ins. Co.,** 296 N.J. Super. 231, 236 (App. Div. 1997) ....................................................  13  **Dolson v. Anastasia,** 55 N.J. 2, 7, 258 A.2d 706 (1969)  ..................................................................  9  **[...] v. [...],** Docket No. [...] (decided April 24, 2023) ...........................................  14, 15  **Foss v. Cignarella,** 196 N.J. Super 3718 (Law Division, 1984) ....................................................  15