ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] STATEMENT OF FACTS  Elizabeth police officers responded to a call of a shooting, and arrived at [...] at 7:06 p.m. on July 6, 2019.  (2T19-5-7, 20-21 to 25)  They found [...] lying wounded on the sidewalk.  (2T21-9 to 23)  Rodriguez later died of a gunshot wound.  (2T57-7 to 13)  The State offered no eyewitnesses to the shooting, no surveillance footage of the shooting, and no firearm used in the shooting.  (7T43-9 to 15, 44-18 to 20)  (5T238-5 to 7)  Four witnesses testified as to what they observed that evening.
[brief] BACKGROUND  [...] was a long-time employee of [...] (“[...]”), which operated a large-scale business of selling textbooks to educational institutions and servicing those educational accounts for new and repeat textbook orders.  [...] promoted [...] to Sales Manager for the State of Kansas in 2014.  [...] acquired [...] in 2017, and [...] retained the same title until [...] terminated her employment on May 18, 2021.
[brief] Each of the aforementioned violations “went to the heart of the officer’s ability to be trusted to function appropriately in his position. ”  In re Hermann, 192 N.J. at 36.  This is especially true for Appellant’s behavior on the night of the Incident.  Reasonable minds must agree that Appellant’s termination is not “so disproportionate to the offense . . . as to be shocking to one’s sense of fairness. ”  Id. at 28-29.  Finally, Appellant’s issues with substance abuse are intertwined with Appellant’s concealment of his opioid prescriptions, use and concealment of same.  It has already been substantially discussed above why [...]’s findings of Appellant’s opioid abuse, [...]’s drug overdose, and Appellant’s myriad lies are supported by credible record evidence.  Appellant was a danger to himself and others during his time as a police officer; his termination was the exclusive result of his many bad decisions and his attempts to hide same, and the decision to terminate Appellant was proportionate and based on credible record evidence.
[brief] The Board continues to believe that the applicant is attempting to place on the property a building design that is too aggressive for the subject property, although the proposed FAR at 1.77 represents a reduction from the 1.99 FAR proposed under the prior application.  This does not constitute a substantial reduction.  The proposed FAR is dramatically higher than any other request for FAR deviation relief that the Board has considered over the past decade.  This act in and of itself demonstrates that the site is not particularly suitable for the proposed use and that special reasons cannot be demonstrated so as to satisfy the positive criteria for the granting of d variance relief for a non-inherently beneficial use.
[brief] The Amici argue, for the first time by any party, that the New Jersey constitution is implicated by Amended Policy 5756.  Such argument was not previously addressed.  Generally, an appellate court will not consider issues that were not raised previously, including constitutional issues.  See Deerfield Ests., Inc. v. Twp. of E. Brunswick, 60 N.J. 115, 120 (1972) (providing that constitutional issues that were not raised and argued below will not be considered unless raising a question of jurisdiction or “present[ing] a matter of real public importance”).  See also State v. Walker, 385 N.J. Super., 388, 410 (App. Div. 2006).  As the Amici are setting forth arguments not previously raised by either party, the Court should not consider them.
[brief] It is that undertaking that creates culpability on the part of the defendants, if the Court were to accept that the law regarding residential properties applies.  However, in this application we respectfully urge that the law applying to commercial sidewalks should apply.  We respectfully submit that because the defendants were making improvements to the property for more than six months, and not residing at the property, it was more like a commercial undertaking than a residence.  In that circumstance, we submit the respondents had an affirmative duty to make the sidewalk abutting their property safe, and in that circumstance the plaintiff would not be required to prove that the defendant made the sidewalk more dangerous.  Alternatively, as argued below and urged before the Court, if it is concluded that notwithstanding the fact that the respondents did not live at the property, and were simply making improvements to the property, that the property was in fact residential the respondents are deemed “residents” of the property, then the undertaking to clear the snow was done in a reckless and/or negligent manner, creating a more dangerous condition than that which existed naturally, and did not result from the natural elements of thaw, remelting and refreezing of snow.  In either event, we respectfully submit that factual disputes existed below, requiring a jury’s consideration and resolution.
[brief] Watkins v. Resorts Int'l Hotel & Casino, Inc., 124 N. J. 398, 409, 591 A.2d 592 (1991).  To apply the bar, three elements must be met: (1) the judgment in the prior action must be valid, final, and on the merits; (2) the parties in the later action must be identical to or in privity with those in the prior action; and (3) the claim in the later action must grow out of the same transaction or occurrence as the claim in the earlier one.
[brief] B.  [...]’ Report is Sufficient to Create a Genuine Issue of Material Fact as to Whether the Deterioration in the Stairs, Without Reasonable Repairs or Maintenance, Allowed Water Infiltration and Freezing and Caused an Unreasonably Dangerous Condition, Obviating the Applicability of the “Ongoing Storm” Doctrine of Pareja.  (Pa1-3; Pa4-7; Pa8-10)  The Defendants and the trial court centered on the “Ongoing Storm” doctrine which the supreme court pronounced in Pareja.  In that case, the plaintiff was walking to work in the early morning hours when he slipped on ice and fell, after and during precipitation in below freezing temperatures.  The plaintiff sued the owner of the property where the sidewalk was located for failing to keep the sidewalk clear of ice and snow.  The Pareja court ruled that the “Ongoing Storm” doctrine “reflects the commonsense recognition that compelling landowners to try to prevent the accumulation of snow and ice on commercial sidewalks during the pendency of a winter weather event would be impractical and inefficient.”
[brief] Under 18 U.S.C. § 926A, an individual may transport a firearm by vehicle from one location in which she “may lawfully possess and carry such firearm” to another, even if it involves traveling through a third location in which she may not carry such firearm, as long as “during such transportation the firearm is unloaded” and not “directly accessible from the passenger compartment. ”4  18 U.S.C. § 926A; see Matter of Two Seized Firearms, 127 N.J. at 90-91.  Because there would have been no reason for Congress to pass Section 926A if a constitutional right to --- 4  Defendant’s conviction is not affected by Section 926A because, at the time she was arrested, her gun was “on the driver side floor near [her] left foot,” and it was loaded.  See (Da5, 25); cf. State v. Reininger, 430 N.J. Super. 517, 531–32 (App. Div. 2013) (“the federal exemption did not apply because … the loaded handgun behind the driver’s seat w[as] ‘directly accessible’ to defendant. ”).  carry in all States flowed from an individual’s statutory right to carry under one State’s laws, Section 926A shows that Congress has never understood the Second Amendment to require this result.  Nor has defendant cited any authority that accords with her anti-federalism take on the Second Amendment.  In sum, that New Jersey requires permits to carry is consistent with the Second Amendment; that those requirements are different from Pennsylvania’s is too.  Thus, defendant’s conviction for carrying a handgun in New Jersey without a NJ Carry Permit does not violate her Second Amendment rights, regardless of her possession of a PA Carry License.
[brief] Wilbur, 3 F.3d at 218.  Plaintiff attempts, in vain, to circumvent the law by arguing that Plaintiff’s position “required no political affiliation,” and therefore his running against [...] was of no consequence (Pb32), when in reality, the only political loyalty Plaintiff owed was to his own boss—[...], who he actively sought to oust.  Lapolla, 449 N.J. Super. at 298.  Thus, the trial court properly dismissed Count Three of Plaintiff’s Complaint as a matter of law.
[brief] CONCLUSION  For the reasons discussed in defendant’s plenary brief and this reply, his convictions must be reversed.  If the Court declines to reverse the convictions, it should find, as raised in Point III of his plenary brief, that the errors at the sentencing hearing warrant a remand for a new hearing.  Respectfully submitted, [...]  Public Defender Attorney for Defendant-Appellant  By: ____________________________  [...] ID No. 027141986  Assistant Deputy Public Defender  August 12, 2024  [...] Attorney ID No. 059632013
[brief] If a court must seek to interpret one clause by reference to a separate clause, the contract does satisfy the bright-line rule of Azurak that a contract seeking to require indemnification for the indemnitee’s own negligence must do so by using explicit language to “specifically reference the negligence or fault of the indemnitee. ”  Azurak, 175 N.J. at 112-13.  Only one case, Hugo Neu, 442 N.J. Super. 80, ruled that a contract containing multiple indemnity provisions can be Azurak compliant.  Id. at 114.  In that case, a subcontract contained three indemnity provisions.  Ibid.  However, that subcontract “specified that all three of these indemnity triggers apply ‘whether or not any acts, errors, omission[s] or negligence of any of the [i]ndemnitees [i.e., Hugo Neu] contributed thereto in whole or in part[.]’”  Ibid. (alterations in original).  Thus, the three indemnity provisions were subject to the same clause governing indemnification for the indemnitee’s own negligence.  Ibid.  Here, in contrast, nothing in the [...] contract harmonizes the disparate indemnity provisions set out in Paragraph 4 and Paragraph 2, see Da43-46, rendering Hugo Neu inapplicable.  See Hugo Neu, 442 N.J. Super. at 114.  Courts thus do not harmonize conflicting indemnity provisions.
[brief] See, e.g., Alliance Healthcare, Inc. v. Jersey City Bergen, LLC, 2016 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2304, *11 (Ch. Div. Oct. 18, 2016) (finding that a similar contract provision gave a party the right to terminate a contract “or demand specific performance) (emphasis in the original); Rothstein v. Harstad, Civil Action No. 10-1421 (MCA), 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 138482, at *14 (D.N.J. Sep. 30, 2014) (“Rescission and damages are alternative remedies,’ and a party can only elect one. ”) (citing Fablok Mills, Inc. v. Cocker Mach & Foundry Co., 125 N.J. Super. 251, 260 (App. Div. 1973)).  In this vein, it is black letter law that the contractual right to terminate is inconsistent with the contractual right to seek specific performance.
[directive] Creditor: [...]  Debtor: $ VCCO Assessment (N.J.SA. 2C:43-3.1)  $ Safe Neighborhood Services Fund (N.J.S.A. 2C:43-3.2)  $ Law Enforcement Officers Training and Equipment Fund (N.J.S.A 2C:43-3.3)  $ Forensic Laboratory Fee (N.J.S.A. 2C:35-20)
[brief] "[A]ppellate courts will decline to consider questions or issues not properly presented to the trial court when an opportunity for such a presentation is available unless the questions so raised on appeal go to the jurisdiction of the trial court or concern matters of great public importance."  Nieder v. Royal Indemnity Ins. Co., 62 N.J. 229, 234 (1973)  [...] v. [...], DOCKET NO. [...], 20-21 (App. Div. Oct. 4, 2018)
[brief] Respectfully Resubmitted, Dated: August 24, 2023  [...] /s/ [...]  [...], Esq. [...] /s/RenéeSteinhagen  [...], Esq.  Via Electronic Filing Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division  Hughes Justice Complex 25 West Market Street Trenton, New Jersey 08625  Attention: [...], Case Manager  RE: [...] v. [...] and [...] (Docket No. [...])
[brief] What is problematic is not that [...] disagrees with the proposed health education standards or that she opposes the inclusion of transgender students in New Jersey schools, but *what is problematic is that she failed to include a clear disclaimer that the contents of the posting were her personal opinions and not expressed as a Board member.*  Without a clearly stated disclaimer, it would not be a stretch to consider that the transgender population and parents of transgender students may feel unwelcome by the Board.  (Ca034) (emphasis added).  This tribunal cannot ignore that even after the Board adopted the March 17, 2022 resolution in which it condemned [...]’s postings, requested that the posts be taken down, and cautioned all board members to be prudent in their social media posts, [...] continued to post and repost her personal views *without including a disclaimer* that would have avoided the appearance – actual or perceived – that her Facebook postings were made in her personal capacity, and not as a board member.
[brief] See Zive v Stanley Roberts,182 NJ 447 (2005).  Plaintiff, a criminal defendant was told in an unequal disparate fashion, by [...], a place of public accommodation, that there was no Order from which he could appeal his criminal conviction.  Plaintiff inferred that discrimination could be the only reason for [...]’s action.  The sudden production of an *undated* Order over one year later in 2023, by defendants, did not satisfy their *McDonnel Douglas’* burden of production of a nondiscriminatory reason for not providing plaintiff with the order from which he could have appealed his conviction in 2021.  Being told by [...] that there was no order from which plaintiff could appeal his criminal conviction after he was unlawfully beaten and choked, causing him to be unjustly and falsely labelled with a crime of which he was falsely arrested and charged by the police *for the rest of his life*, was so extreme and outrageous going beyond all bounds of decency, and was so atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community where there is a Constitution and laws prohibiting discrimination based on race.
[brief] ”  (Da9)  In support of this motion, defense counsel provided a certification stating that his client “only learned recently that he was not sentenced in accordance with the terms of his plea agreement,” and that plea counsel ([...]) had passed away.  (Da11-Da13)  Defense counsel argued that the 10-year suspension of Defendant’s driving privileges was supposed to run concurrent to the suspension period he was already serving at the time of his plea but the [...] [was] running it consecutively.  (Da11-Da12)  Defense counsel thus argued that either Defendant’s sentence needed to be “corrected” so that his license would be restored on February 8, 2023 or alternatively, that he should be permitted to have his plea back.  (Da13)  Defendant provided no support for his alternative argument to vacate his plea.  At the motion hearing on January 9, 2023, [...] advised he had reviewed the matter before stating that the plea judge, “did what should have been done, which was to enter a consecutive sentence.
[brief] Plaintiff alleges as follows:  “The C5 exclusion relied upon by Defendants, [...] and [...] to deny coverage violates public policy by restricting compulsory coverage which Defendants are obligated to provide. ”  Id. at ¶2.  Plaintiff then alleges that [...]’s and [...]’s disclaimer of coverage was improper and constitutes a breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing because [...] and [...] knew that N.J.S.A. 34:15-72 compels coverage for the claim asserted against [...] at the time they disclaimed coverage.  Ja48-49, ¶¶3-4.  Plaintiff seeks compensatory and extra-contractual damages, as well as punitive damages for this alleged breach, but does not allege anywhere in the Fourth Count what damages were sustained.  Ja49.  The Fifth Count of the First Amended Complaint asserts claims against fictitious defendants.
[brief] When passing the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”), Congress found “the use of abusive, deceptive, and unfair debt collection practices […] contribute to the number of personal bankruptcies, to marital instability, to the loss of jobs, and to invasions of individual privacy. ”  15 U.S.C. § 1692(a).  Here, Defendant invaded Plaintiff’s and numerous other New Jerseyans’ privacy interests.  Plaintiff, therefore, sued on behalf of herself and New Jersey consumers.  The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq., regulates the conduct of debt collectors when collecting consumer debts from natural persons.  A debt collector who fails to comply with any FDCPA provision “with respect to any person is liable to such person” for any actual damages, statutory damages, and attorneys’ fees.  15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a).  Statutory damages have monetary limits: up to $1,000 for the plaintiff and 1% of the debt collector’s net worth for the class.  Id.  Plaintiff commenced this class action against Defendant based on her receipt of Defendant’s collection letter.  On Defendant’s motion, the lower court dismissed all the claims.  The motion court erred because it concluded that Plaintiff needed to allege some misuse of her wrongfully communicated private information.  One FDCPA provision mandates that “a debt collector may not communicate, in connection with the collection of any debt, with any person. ”  15 U.S.C. § 1692c(b) (emphasis added).  There are exceptions but none apply here.  Instead, Plaintiff alleges Defendant communicated detailed information about Plaintiff and her medical debt with a third party.  Therefore, Plaintiff stated a claim upon which relief could be granted.  But the motion court concluded that, because Plaintiff did not allege any actual misuse of the information by that undisclosed third-party, Defendant can keep on disseminating consumers’ private information with impunity.  By contrast, every federal court answering the sufficiency question concluded that alleging, as Plaintiff did here, a debt collector conveyed debt information to a mail vendor states a claim for violation of § 1692c(b) for which the consumer can recovery, at the very least, statutory damages and attorney’s fees without alleging or proving any misuse of the information or any harm other than the debt collector’s violation of the consumer’s statutorily-protected right.  Therefore, Plaintiff prays that the Appellate Division reverses the Order which dismissed her Second Amended Class Action Complaint.
[brief] Respectfully submitted, [...]  Public Defender Attorney for Defendant-Appellant  BY: /s/ [...]  JOHN P. FLYNN  Assistant Deputy Public Defender Attorney ID No. 303312019  DATED: March 8, 2024  February 29, 2024  JOHN P. FLYNN  ID. NO. 303312019  Assistant Deputy Public Defender Of Counsel and  On the Brief  LETTRE REPLY BRIEF ON BEHALF OF DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
[brief] This matter arises from a lawsuit filed by Plaintiff on November 30, 2022, challenging a redevelopment plan adopted by [...] on April 8, 2022 in an effort to stop site plan approval received by Redeveloper for a warehouse use.  *Redevelopment Designation/Redevelopment Area*  On November 18, 2018, [...] designated Block 46, Lot 2 and Block 47, Lots 1, 2, 3, 3.01 & 4 on the official tax maps of [...] Township as a Non-Condemnation Redevelopment Area (“Redevelopment Area”).  (Pa116 & Pa95).  The Redevelopment Area contains approximately 73.03 acres and is located in the C-57 Flexible Planned Industrial-Commercial District (“C-57 Zone”).  (Pa99 & Pa127).  Permitted uses in the C-57 Zone include “warehousing and distribution. ” (Pa285).  The C-57 Zone allows a minimum lot size of 3 acres on which a warehouse building of up to 20,000 square feet could be constructed.  (Pa290).  Under the C-57 Zone, by right, a developer could construct up to 480,000 square feet of warehouse space on 24 separate 3 acre lots.  The Redevelopment Area is bordered to the west by land within [...] (“[...]”) that was also designated as a redevelopment area and is subject to a redevelopment plan (“[...] Redevelopment Area”).  (Pa98).  The Redevelopment Area is located on State Route 322 and is located near Exit 2 on the New Jersey Turnpike.  (Pa128).  Adoption of the Redevelopment Plan
[brief] Further, N.J.S.A. 17:11C-18(i) limits the Commissioner’s authority to civil penalties “not exceeding $25,000. ”  Thus, if an aggrieved consumer’s pecuniary damages exceeded $25,000.00 and the only available recourse were through the Commissioner’s express powers in Section 18, there would be no ability for recovery, relief, or penalization beyond the $25,000.00 limit.  However, the NJCFLA defines a “[c]onsumer loan” as, inter alia, “a loan of $50,000 or less made by a consumer lender. ”  N.J.S.A. 17:11C-2 (emphasis added).  Without private enforcement, the NJCFLA would allow for a gap in penalties/protections for loans in between $25,000.01 and $50,000.00.  But that is not how we interpret statutes.  Courts must avoid statutory interpretations that yield unreasonable or absurd results and/or render other statutory language superfluous.  N.J. Republican State Comm. v. Murphy, 243 N.J. 574, 592 (2020); In re Johnny Popper, Inc., 413 N.J. Super. 580, 589 (App. Div. 2010).  The Legislature’s intent for the NJCFLA to be privately enforceable is further evidenced by the private right of action conferred by the NJCLA and the NJCFLA (while under the title of the NJLLA).
[brief] ”  (Da85, 228–229.)  As in the January Terms, “Services” as used in Section 2(a) is defined on the first page of the December Terms and in more detail in Section 3.  (Da80, 89–90, 227, 230–232.)  Try as Plaintiffs might to make it seem otherwise, there is nothing confusing about these provisions—structurally, syntactically, or linguistically.
[brief] In response to the needs of a local natural gas distribution company, [...]  (“[...]”), for incremental firm pipeline transportation service to meet its customers’ demands, [...] filed an application with the [...] on June 30, 2020, pursuant to section 7(c) of the NGA, requesting that [...] issue a certificate of public convenience and necessity to construct and operate the Project.  Aa0053.  The Project is designed to provide up to 115,000 dekatherms per day (Dth/d) of additional firm transportation capacity on [...]’s interstate natural gas pipeline system that will be used to provide service to [...].  Aa0054.  [...]’s Project is a discrete project designed to meet the needs of a discrete customer.  As part of the Project, following [...] approval, [...] constructed, and is now operating and maintaining, CS 327 and appurtenant facilities in the [...].  TGPsa001.³  The Project also included the installation of new compressor units at both its existing Compressor Station 325 in [...], and its existing Compressor Station 321 in [...], Pennsylvania.  Aa0053.  The Project only consists of new compression facilities; it does not include any new pipeline.  Aa0084.  II.