ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The trial court’s “method” in this regard stands in stark contrast to the process for analyzing fee awards required under New Jersey law.  For instance, in *Empower Our Neighborhoods v. Guadagno*, 453 N.J. Super. 565 (App. Div. 2018), the trial court “set the lodestar, the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate[,]” “adjusted the hourly rate downward,” analyzed the complexity of the issues presented, and made deductions for issues where the fee claimant was unsuccessful.  *Id.* at 586.  The trial court here did not follow New Jersey law in calculating attorneys’ fees; it accepted the starting number proposed by [...] without analysis.  Then, rather than properly analyzing [...]’s bills in an attempt to adjust the fee award, the trial court invented a bizarre calculation using a formula completely divorced from the facts of the case.  The trial court multiplied the fee award by a vacated allocation figure (36.4) and then divided the multiplied figure by the percentage of covered costs ultimately allocated to [...] (85).  (Pa0054.)  None of this makes sense.  The “multiplier” in the calculation represents a percentage allocated to [...] that was vacated as being palpably incorrect – it should not have been considered for any purpose.  Further, the 85 “divider” applied by the trial court bears no relation to the 6.4% of costs allocated to [...].  The trial court made no attempt to analyze the bills submitted by [...] and instead invented a calculation, using a figure that had been vacated when the trial court granted [...]’s motion for reconsideration.  The trial court should have analyzed [...]’s fee submission using the various factors recognized under New Jersey law, or should have applied the relative culpability approach recognized by New Jersey law.  *Empower*, 453 N.J. Super. at 585-86.  It did neither, and, as such, the calculations performed by the trial court should be reversed pursuant to [...]’s cross-appeal.
[brief] ”  256 N.J. Super. 575, 598 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 130 N.J. 18 (1992).  Moreover, “we have not been shown any New Jersey case that requires expert testimony before the fact finder may compare the signatures. ”  Id. at 594.  Carroll also dealt with the question of what to do when the writings in question were not provided in discovery pretrial.
[brief] [...] filed an application for development with the Board on April 29, 2022.  [Da316, 323].  It was not complete when [...] filed it, as the Board’s subcommittee so found on May 10, 2022.  [Da56 at 65-10 to 65-20].  It was still incomplete on June 14, 2022.  [Da77 at 25-7 to 25-24].  Finally, on July 7, 2022, the Board deemed the application complete and scheduled the application for a public hearing.  [Da88 at 30-24 to 31-19].  The Board held a hearing on Blue Violet’s application for development on September 14, 2022.  [Da94].  The Board voted to approve the application and memorialized its decision in a resolution on October 13, 2022.  [Da454].  [...] challenged the Board’s decision in a Complaint in Lieu of Prerogative Writs filed on October 21, 2022.
[brief] State v. Fortin, 198 N.J. 619 (2009).............................................................................48 State v. Gandhi, 201 N.J. 161 (2010).............................................................................48  State v. Hudson, 209 N.J. 513 (2012).............................................................................48  State in Interest of K.O., 217 N.J. 83 (2014).................................................................56  Transport Workers Union of Am., Local 290 v. S.E. Pa. Transp. Auth., 145 F. 3d 619 (3d Cir. 1998)..................................................36,37  Twiss v. State, 124 N.J. 461 (1991)...............................................................44  United Steel Paper v. Gov’t of Virgin Islands, 842 F. 3d 201 (3d Cir. 2016)..................................................36,37,39 Univ. of Haw. Prof’l Assembly v. Cayetano, 183 F. 3d 1096 (9th Cir. 1999)................................................38
[brief] *Id.*  This Court rejected the defendant’s argument that the driver “was subject to custodial interrogation and should have been given *Miranda* warnings. ”  *Id.* at 291.  While acknowledging her isolation, this Court reasoned that she was not in custody because she was “visible by her passengers, not handcuffed, humiliated, searched, or confined in the police car. ”  *Id.*  In this case, the officer’s questioning was shorter in duration, less isolating, less onerous, and contained the same reference to a potential dog sniff.  Because the driver in *Baum* was not in custody, it follows that defendant here was not in custody when the officer referenced a potential dog sniff.
[brief] ”  249 N.J. at 399-400 (citing Laurence Steinberg, The Influence of Neuroscience on U.S. Supreme Court Decisions about Adolescents’ Criminal Culpability, 14 Neuroscience 513, 516 (2013)).  Together with the age-crime curve, [...]’s strong record of rehabilitation reveals that, as a now twenty-nine-year-old, his risk of recidivism has fallen precipitously – supporting the application of mitigating factor eight.  Indeed, at the time of resentencing, [...] had zero prison disciplinary infractions since entering adulthood and the state prison system.  (5T:23-16 to 19)  (Da 225)  Likewise, the ample evidence of [...]’s rehabilitation, his acceptance of responsibility, and his expression of remorse at resentencing strongly support the application of mitigating factor nine.  (Da 186)  Finally, as argued by [...], the resentencing court should have found mitigating factor thirteen for many of the same reasons that it should have applied Miller factor three.  (Da 187)  Ample evidence was presented at the resentencing hearing that [...]’s participation in the offense was substantially influenced by his adult co-defendant, [...].  [...] looked up to [...], who was respected in the community and had a criminal history, similarly to [...]’s absent father.  (3T:57-3 to 25)  Furthermore, there was substantial evidence on the record that [...] drove [...] and his other co-defendant to the scene of the incident and that he was one of the shooters.  (Da 35, 122)  The trial court’s failure to address the mitigating factors raised by [...] – let alone to consider them in light of the Miller factors – requires resentencing.
[brief] As well, in their arguments that [...]’s counsel was available to oppose the summary judgment motion because he had recently appeared to oppose a motion in the Chancery Court  Plaintiffs assume that [...] was deciding whether or not to retain counsel for the motion for judgment.  They contend that [...] did not reveal the existence of his new counsel to the Arbitrator as if new counsel had agreed to appear in the arbitration.  (Pb35)  They ignore that it was not [...] who decided to have his new counsel appear in the Arbitration.
[directive] Kesyon ki swiv yo fèt pou reponn sèl si w ap plede koupab de enfraksyon 2C:29-2b pou eskiv.  N.J.S.A.  The following question needs to be answered only if you are pleading guilty for a violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:29-2b for eluding.  [Wi/Yes]  [Non/No]  1.  Èske w konprann ke si w plede koupab w ap oblije renonse a pèmi kondwi w pou yon peryòd de ant 6 mwa a 2 lane?  Do you understand that if you plead guilty you will be required to forfeit your driver’s license for a period of time between 6 months and 2 years?  Kesyon swivan sa yo fèt pou reponn sèl si w ap plede koupab de enfraksyon 2C:20-2 pou vòlè yon N.J.S.A. machinn ak enfraksyon ki fèt swa le oubyen aprè le 2 avril 1991, oswa pou enfraksyon 2C:20-10 poutèt N.J.S.A. ou pran machinn ilegalman ("pou al pran plezi flannen") ansanm ak enfraksyon ki fèt le oubyen aprè le 2 awout 1993.  The following questions need to be answered only if you are pleading guilty for violation of 2C:20-2 for theft of an N.J.S.A. automobile and the offense occurred on or after April 2, 1991, or for a violation of 2C:20-10 for unlawful taking of a motor N.J.S.A. vehicle ("Joyriding") and the offense occurred on or after August 2, 1993.
[brief] The Ordinance is clear in its language of “mounding, terracing, or other devices,” which means only one of these conditions need to exist to use the original lot grade, not the revised lot grade for building height.  *(Pa60-62)(emphasis added)*.  Nevertheless, the record below does not discuss what constitutes terracing or other devices in the revised lot grade.  [...] nor [...] addressed “other devices” at the Board hearing which is left open as to whether the revised lot grade by [...] was the result of “other devices”.  The Board attorney only addressed the term “mounding” in interpreting the definition of the Building Height ordinance.  The defendant’s counsel and professionals never addressed what “other devices“ would encompass, particularly as they do not deny there is a significant increase in elevation on the site as part of the plan.  Therefore, their testimony on Building Height is not credible.  Thus, the trial court erred in not making any determination whether the revised lot grade was the result of “mounding, terracing, or other devices.
[brief] Given that questions arise as to the authenticity of the Photocopy, its admission into evidence was inconsistent with the Best Evidence Rule, N.J.R.E. 1003.  The Photocopy does not reflect that it was ever regarded as anything more than an unenforceable draft.  On its face, it is not a final agreement as it contains numerous misspellings and multiple pages that appear to be copied directly from a form book, most of which do not contain copies of the parties’ initials or signatures.  (P110a-119a).  The Court found that [...] authenticated [...]’s signature.  P27a.  Yet, any personal knowledge [...] claimed she once had of [...]’s signature was so faded by the time of trial that it was no longer familiar.  In *Storm v. Hansen*, 41 N.J. Super. 249 124 A. 2d 601 (App. Div. 1956) the Court laid down the general rule that “in order to qualify to identify handwriting or a signature, a witness must have obtained personal knowledge of the party's handwriting.
[brief] SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE  DIVISION  [...], Plaintiff-Appellant, vs. MEADOWLANDS  HOSPITAL MEDICAL CENTER, MHA, LLC  F/D/B/A [...], [...], [...]  JOHN DOE, JANE ROE, ABC CORP, DEF LLC, being fictitious parties whose identities are currently unknown, both jointly and severally  Defendants, DOCKET NO.: [...]
[brief] B.  The Trial Court Properly Dismissed Plaintiffs-Appellants’ Aiding and Abetting Claims (Fourteenth Count) and Conspiracy Claims (Fifteenth Count) Because They Failed to Plead any Specific Facts to Show that [...] or [...] Acted in Concert with the Other Defendants to Conceal any Evidence (154a)  Claims for conspiracy and aiding and abetting both require proof of a coordinated effort among the participants to engage in the alleged scheme.  Plaintiffs-Appellants’ Amended Complaint in the 2020 Action, however, did nothing more than cite to arguably conflicting evidence over who owned [...] and [...] and then jump to the conclusion that there “must have been” a scheme among the defendants to conceal unspecified evidence.  For that reason, the trial court’s dismissal of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Counts in the 2020 Action should be affirmed.
[brief] A.  **The Lease**  On or about September 13, 2017, Tenant entered into a written Lease Agreement (the “Lease”) with [...] (“[...]”), pursuant to which [...] leased to Tenant approximately 20,800 square feet of commercial real property designated as Unit LL2 (the “Premises”) in the [...] (the “Shopping Center”) located at [...].  (Da5-87).  At all times --- 5  All capitalized terms not otherwise defined herein shall have the meaning ascribed to them in the Lease.  relevant to this appeal, Tenant has utilized the Premises to operate a “[...]” health and fitness center.  (Da11, Da18, Lease at §§ 1.01(c), 5.01; Pa105).  By letter dated September 22, 2017, Tenant and [...] agreed that the Lease Commencement Date was September 14, 2017 and the Tenant’s Rent Commencement Date was August 1, 2018.  (Da191).  In February of 2019, [...] sold the Shopping Center to Landlord.  (Pa105).  Simultaneously with this sale, [...] assigned to Landlord all of its rights, obligations and interests under the Lease.  (Da193).  B.  Terms of the Lease (i)
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[brief] Here, the trial court conducted a hearing before permitting [...] to identify [...] in front of the jury.  “[T]he trial court's findings at the hearing on the admissibility of identification evidence are ‘entitled to very considerable weight. ’ “  State v. Adams, 194 N.J. 186, 203 (2008) (quoting State v. Farrow, 61 N.J. 434, 451 (1972)).  The trial court appropriately evaluated the circumstances under which [...] viewed the photographic arrays, including his statements that he could not be sure of his identification without seeing the individuals in person.  The court considered the amount of time that [...] had to observe the perpetrator in the hotel room, the level of attention [...] paid to the perpetrator as the perpetrator shot [...], [...]'s inability to identify [...] from two photographic arrays, and [...]'s in-court expression of certainty about the identification.  The court had the ability to observe [...] and gauge his credibility.  See State v. Locurto, 157 N.J. 463, 470–71 (1999).  We find no reason to disturb the trial court's decision to admit [...]'s in-court identification.
[brief] **COUNTERSTATEMENT OF FACTS**  At defendant’s plea hearing on July 17, 2023, defendant admitted the 113 grams of cocaine found in the backseat of his car on April 24, 2019, belonged to him.  (2T8-18 to 25; 3T9-14 to 15).  He also conceded that he intended to distribute that cocaine.  (2T8-25 to 9-3).
[brief] As the Supreme Court recognized, the Constitution permits the substitution of an identical bill in the manner that occurred here.  See Forsythe, 91 N.J. at 150-51 (noting that various pieces of legislation have been “enacted in the same form and by the same route”).  Petitioners’ contention that an intervening calendar day between \(^{10}\) In a last ditch effort, Petitioners also assert that Chapter 375 was not validly enacted as S49 was given all three readings in the Assembly on the same day without an emergency vote.  (Pb35-37) (citing Assembly Rule 15:11, providing that “if on motion at least 60 members agree that a bill or joint resolution is an emergency measure, it may proceed immediately from second to third reading”).  This is a red herring.  There was no need to invoke emergency measures, because S49 was substituted for its identical twin bill A6260 under Assembly Rule 15:20.  the second and third readings in the Assembly “would have proved beneficial to the overarching aims of public participation in government,” (Pb42), reflects their view of what would be best practices but has nothing to do with the constitutionality of the procedure the Legislature employed (and has employed before).  See McCabe, 81 N.J. at 466.  To the extent that Petitioners seek to impose requirements not mandated by the Constitution, their claims fall outside the scope of N.J.S.A. 1:7-1 to -7 and should be dismissed.  See Reilly, 364 N.J. Super. at 523.  Because Petitioners have failed to meet their heavy burden of showing by clear and convincing evidence that the way in which Chapter 375 was enacted is repugnant to the Constitution, their petition should be dismissed.
[brief] During the week of December 13th, the detectives had the CI engage in a controlled purchase of a specific quantity CDS from the defendant for a specific price in the parking lot of “[...]. ”  Surveillance officers watched as the defendant exited the rear of the restaurant and “popped the hood” of the Audi and retrieved “a small item” from therein.  The defendant then entered the passenger’s seat of the CI’s vehicle and “interacted” with them for “a few moments” before exiting the vehicle and reentering the restaurant.  The CI later confirmed for the detectives what had occurred inside their vehicle: money was provided to the defendant in exchange for CDS. (1T:16-23 to 20-7; 2T:18-24 to 20-4; 69-14 to 70-16).
[brief] [...] helped [...], a debt collector, to disguise as a mortgage lender and servicer to file a Foreclosure Complaint ([...]) against my house at [...], on 5/12/16 (141).  That Complaint was based on four forged mortgage documents: the Mortgage Assignment of 2/27/2009 from [...] to [...] (065), the Affidavit of Lost Note of 2/12/14 fabricated by [...] (088a), the Mortgage Assignment of 2/28/14 (097) from [...] to [...], and the HAM Agreement of 2015 forged by [...] and [...].  The alleged copy of the alleged Note (dated 2/14/2005) was already time barred when it was submitted to the Foreclosure Court of Monmouth County on 12/30/16.
[brief] Fourth, the trial court clearly erred in applying a pseudo-form of rational basis review when it hypothesized potential substantial interests and narrow tailoring.  [...] does not even defend this.  Rational basis review is “meaningfully different” than intermediate scrutiny.  Silvester v. Becerra, 583 U.S. 1139, 1146 (2018).  The former permits “rational speculation. ”  The latter does not.  The latter requires that “the harms…are real” and “a municipality that offers no evidence or anecdotes in support of a restriction should not prevail under intermediate scrutiny. ”  Id.  These are big differences and the trial court clearly applied the former, which is wholly inconsistent with [...]
[brief] However, commencing with the terms of paragraph four (4) of the contract, [...] is --- ²  In appellant’s Statement of Facts II, appellant incorrectly set out paragraph 4 and paragraph 2 in non-chronological order.  Respondent’s Statement of Facts setting forth paragraphs 2 and 4 in chronological order is consistent with the court below.  1T 19:22-25 and 20:1-25 and 21:1-4 unequivocally required to indemnify [...] for its own negligence.  Paragraph 4 of the binding contract between [...] and [...] stated:
[brief] --- 5  See supra note 2.  6  Defendant points out that “the State [in]serted the word ‘or’ after the semicolon between §(a)(1) and §(a)(2)” of N.J.S.A. 4:22-24.  (Db 14).  She alleges that “[a]side from being inappropriate to say the least, the word ‘or’ is not in the legislation until after the semicolon in §(a)(6).  The State added the word ‘or’ where it did is a tacit admission that, without it being there, the statute is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad[.]” (Ibid.).  The trial court appropriately dismissed that curious argument, finding that defendant “neglect[ed] the use of ‘therein’ in the statute.  The plain meaning of therein is ‘in that place, document, or respect[.]’  In the context of this statute, being ‘present and witness[ing]… therein’ means to be present and witness the baiting or otherwise facilitating the fighting of a living animal or creature.
[brief] I.  **THE MACK-CALI AGREEMENT BETWEEN BIRCH AND THE SELLER**  On August 12, 2021, [...] and non-party [...] (“the Seller”) entered into an “Agreement of Sale and Purchase” (the “Mack-Cali Agreement”) under which [...] agreed to “purchase and accept” the Seller’s interest in real property located at [...] in [...], [...] (the “Property”).  (Pa1, ¶11; Pa34)  The Mack-Cali Agreement provided that [...] had the right to convey its right to purchase title to the land to a third party, in which event the Seller would convey the improvements on the Property to [...].  (Pa34, 41-42).  The Mack-Cali Agreement named [...] as both the designated “escrow agent” and “title company” for purposes of the transaction.  (Pa3, ¶¶15,18; --- 2  For the sake of clarity, “ODa” refers to the appendix submitted by [...] in connection with its Opposition and Cross-Appeal.
[brief] Docket No. [...]  Civil Action On Appeal From: Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Dkt. No. [...] Sat Below: Honorable [...], J.S.C. [...]; [...], d/b/a [...]; [...]; [...]; [...]; [...]; [...]; [...]; [...]; [...]; [...]; [...]; [...]; [...]; [...]; [...]; [...]; [...]; [...]; [...]; [...]; JOHN AND JANE DOES 1 through 10; and XYZ CORPORATIONS 1 through 10, Defendants.  BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS
[brief] Pursuant to Rule 4:6-2(e), a court may dismiss an action for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.  In considering a motion to dismiss, the court must examine the legal sufficiency of the allegations, conducting an examination “in depth and with liberality to ascertain whether the fundament of a cause of action may be gleaned even from an obscure statement of claim. ”  Sammarone v. Bovino, 195 N.J. Super. 132, 137-38 (App. Div. 2007) (quoting Printing Mart v. Sharp Electronics, 116 N.J. 739, 746 (1989)).  A motion under Rule 4:6-2(e), however, “may not be denied based on the possibility that discovery may establish a requisite claim; rather, the legal requisites for [a party’s] claim must be apparent from the complaint itself. ”  Teamsters Local 97 v. State of New Jersey, 434 N.J. Super. 393, 413 (App. Div. 2014) [citing Edwards v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Co., 357 N.J. Super. 196, 202 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 176 N.J. 278 (2003)].  If, after a thorough review of the legal sufficiency of the alleged facts of the claims, “the allegations are ‘palpably insufficient to support a claim upon which relief can be granted,’ the court must dismiss the complaint. ”  N.J. Assoc. of Health Plans v. Farmer, 342 N.J. Super. 536, 550 (App. Div. 2000) (quoting Rieder v. State Dep’t of Transp., 221 N.J. Super. 547, 552 (App. Div. 1987); Camden Cnty Emergency Recovery Assoc. v. N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 320 N.J. Super. 59, 64 (App. Div. 1999), aff’d o.b. 170 N.J. 246 (2002) (where there is no legal basis for relief and further discovery would not provide one, dismissal is proper under R. 4:6-2(e)).  The court must dismiss a plaintiff’s complaint if it has failed to articulate a legal basis entitling plaintiff to relief.  Camden County Energy Recovery Assocs., L.P. v. New Jersey Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 320 N.J. Super. 59, 64 (App.Div.1999).  "A motion to dismiss a complaint under Rule 4:6-2(e) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted must be evaluated in light of the legal sufficiency of the facts alleged in the complaint."  Donato v. Moldow, 374 N.J. Super. 475, 482 (App.Div.2005).  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I THIS APPEAL SHOULD BE DENIED IN ITS ENTIRETY (Pa003036 - Pa003055)