ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] On November 29th, 2016 [...] agreed to a “conditional guilty plea” under Court R. 3:9-3(f) based on the condition that Myers preserved his right to appeal a motion to suppress in the robbery case of illegally obtained evidence from an unlawful search and seizure, and also under the conditional plea Myers preserved his right to appeal a 404-b pre-trial motion to admit evidence from the robbery case into [...] homicide trial (Da 6, box 10, lines 4-9) starting at:  ‘Obviously, Here the trial courts directly informed Myers that his guilty plea could be reversed if an appellate court made court judge finds that I committed “an error” that was wrong in my 404 (b) decision or anything else (Da 6, box 10).  On January 25, 2022 the Supreme Court revered State v. [...], 245 N.J. 250, 251 (2021), vacated the conviction and remanded to the trial court (Da 26 paragraph 4)).
[brief] Plaintiffs filed their complaint on August 31, 2020.  Pa35-37.  On February 7, 2023, [...] filed a cross-motion for summary judgment.  Pa321-22.  On March 17, 2023, the Court heard oral argument on [...]’s motion for summary judgment.  T2.  By way of orders and opinions, dated March 28, 2023, the motion court dismissed plaintiffs’ complaint against [...] with prejudice.  Pa20-34.  On May 12, 2023, plaintiffs filed a notice of appeal.  [...].  STATEMENT OF FACTS
[brief] II.  THE RESIDENCY REQUIREMENTS APPLY ONLY AT THE TIME OF APPOINTMENT AND ARE NOT CONTINUING OBLIGATIONS FOR BOG MEMBERS.  (Da89-90; 1T73:3-80:7).  The trial court’s most significant error was its departure from the special rules designed by our Supreme Court for examining legislative contracts such as the kind embodied under the Rutgers Act.  Apart from those special rules, ordinary tenets of statutory construction support Defendants’ position.  Those tenets require us to focus on the present-tense syntax of the statutory text.  Rutgers and the State are the two parties to the contract found under the Rutgers Act.  The conduct of those parties also confirms that there was no intention to restrict the service of BOG members in the way posited by Plaintiffs.  Properly construed, the Rutgers Act does not impose continuous residency requirements for the entire duration of a BOG member’s term.
[brief] (990a).  On November 15, 2023, Plaintiffs filed a motion for leave to amend their Complaint.  (658a).  Plaintiffs sought to add citations to the New Jersey State Constitution of 1947.  Specifically, Plaintiffs sought to add a citation to Article IV, Section VII, paragraph 3 of the New Jersey Constitution (New Jersey's Contract Clause) to the CRA Count.  (699a).  Further, Plaintiffs sought to add a Count Six, which asserts direct violations of the New Jersey Constitution without reference to the CRA.² (702a).
[brief] ”  (Dta711, ¶¶3,4,27,109.)  They also asserted a counterclaim against [...], seeking the alternative relief of policy rescission based on asserted material misrepresentation.  (Dta729.)  (On January 12, 2022, on leave granted, [...] filed an amended answer.  (Dta733.))  [...] responded to [...]’s and [...]’ counterclaims on July 22, 2019.
[directive] Step 2:  PSP staff must contact the appropriate law enforcement agency as soon possible to as alert them that a defendant who is ordered to EM pursuant to a Pretrial Release Order triggered an emergent EM alert in the monitoring system.  When there is a potential threat 3 to a victim/witness, law enforcement in that location should be contacted first to conduct a of victim welfare check.  Staff must explain the circumstances the call in accordance with the guide for contacting law enforcement.
[brief] Neither [...], nor [...], is attempting to shield itself from liability by casting blame upon the other.  In fact, as his employer, and vicariously liable for his actions within the scope of his employment, it is very much within [...]’s interests to minimize [...]’ liability.  Thus, [...] and [...] do not have different theories of liability, and therefore there is no direct, concurrent conflict of interest existing between them that would warrant the disqualification of [...]’s representation of both in this litigation.
[brief] B.  The Defendants have Violated the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination and Therefore Damages are Warranted  The Defendants’ conduct establishes a clear violation of the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (“NJLAD”)  N.J.S.A. 10:5-1 et seq. which provides, in relevant part, that:  All persons shall have the opportunity to . . . obtain all the accommodations, advantages, facilities, and privileges of any place of public accommodation, publicly assisted housing accommodation, and other real property without discrimination because of race, creed, color, national origin, ancestry, age, marital status, affectional or sexual orientation, familial status, disability, liability for service in the Armed Forces of the United States, nationality, sex, gender identity or expression or source of lawful income used for rental or mortgage payments, subject only to conditions and limitations applicable alike to all persons.  This opportunity is recognized as and declared to be a civil right.  [See N.J.S.A. 10:5-4.]  The NJLAD provides legal remedies “to all persons protected by this act and that this act shall be liberally construed in combination with other protections available under the laws of this State[,]” including compensatory and punitive damages.  See N.J.S.A. 10:5-3.
[brief] In such cases, the authority confirmed is not merely permission; it amounts to a grant or an easement, and where it is so construed it takes the qualities of a right in the land itself.  25 Am. Jur. 2d Section 129.  The Congregation’s construction of a synagogue on the property conveyed to it by the [...], the 1984 modernization of the heating system for the benefit of Defendant and Plaintiff, Plaintiff’s payment of the electric bills for lighting of and snow removal from the Fifth Street and Sixth Street Lots, and [...]’s acquiescence in the [...]’s encroachment onto [...]’s Property when the [...] constructed an addition to its property in 1972, constitute substantial consideration for the rights conveyed to Plaintiff under the 1963 Agreements.
[brief] (Id. at 5 & Exh. G).  *3  Given that there are 1,047 opt-in plaintiffs, “potentially hundreds more as class members” in the four states of Connecticut, California, North Carolina and Missouri, and a possible verdict in eight or nine digits if plaintiffs are successful here (see Dkt. #265, at 2), defendant’s proportionality argument is unavailing.  (See Dkt. #263, at 2-3).  However, defendant is correct that it should not be obligated to disclose clearly irrelevant documents (id. at 7-8) in an attempt “to [better] hone the search terms[.]” (Dkt. #262, at 1).  In light of all these circumstances, the Magistrate Judge rules as follows: defendant’s ESI search shall consist of the search terms proposed by defendant of the files of eight custodians—the six identified in notes 3 and 5 supra, as well as [...] and [...] (see Dkt. #263, at 3-5 & Exh. B); because these are search terms proposed by defendant, there is a presumption of relevancy, and defendant may remove any documents only if they are clearly and undeniably irrelevant, and of course, if they are privileged; moreover, this conclusion is without prejudice to plaintiffs seeking additional documents, as approved by the court if no agreement is otherwise reached by the parties, in the event that they deem this initial production insufficient.
[brief] [...] IS ENTITLED TO REASONABLE INFERENCES IN HIS FAVOR, AND PLAINTIFF HAS NOT RESOLVED DOUBTS AS TO THE EFFICACY OF PROCESS SERVICE  Although Plaintiff submits that the court should not consider Defendant’s arguments regarding reasonable inferences and credibility determinations, Plaintiff devotes a great deal of its briefing to attacking [...]’s credibility.  But Plaintiff cannot resolve reasonable doubts regarding the efficacy of service upon [...] by parroting the hearsay statements that were initially (and improperly) put before the trial court.  However, certain of Plaintiff’s accusations and assumptions warrant discussion at the outset of this memorandum.  Those items, in particular, are the insinuation that Defendant always resided at [...], and that contact was made with third-persons, including [...]’s former (and now disbarred) attorney.
[brief] On June 20, 2022, Plaintiffs served their First Set of Interrogatories and First Request for Production of Documents on Defendants, [...] and [...]\(^3\).  A117  On August 24, 2022, Plaintiffs filed a motion to compel discovery from Defendants, [...] and [...], which the trial court granted on October 7, 2022.  A12  On October 18, 2022, Defendants provided certified responses to Plaintiffs’ First Set of Interrogatories and First Request for Production of Documents, in accordance with the October 7, 2022 Order.  A164.  [...] certified the responses in his individual capacity and as a representative of [...].  Plaintiffs alleged that defendants’ responses were insufficient, advising defendants’ counsel by January 19, 2023 letter.  A214.  Defendants’ counsel responded by addressing plaintiffs’ concerns about deficient responses to the extent they had merit, while stating that the remainder of the responses to discovery were sufficient.  A218.  --- \(^3\)  The Law Division subsequently dismissed Plaintiff’s complaint against [...] on summary judgment; he is no longer a party in this action.  The parties failed to resolve their discovery dispute.  On February 16, 2023, Plaintiffs filed a motion to strike Defendants’ Answers and Defenses, asserting that Defendants had failed to comply with the October 7, 2022 Order (which defendants denied was so).  The trial court denied plaintiff’s motion on March 3, 2023.  A16.  On March 13, 2023, Plaintiffs filed another motion to strike Defendants’ Answers and Defenses, restating the same grounds.  This time, however, the court granted Plaintiff’s motion and entered an Order striking Defendant [...]’s Answers and Defenses for failure to comply with the October 7, 2022 order.  A18. \(^4\)  On May 1, 2023, Plaintiffs filed an Amended Complaint, naming [...] a defendant. \(^5\)  On June 14, 2023, before an Answer was filed, Plaintiffs served [...] with a First Set for Production of Documents and their First Set of Interrogatories.  A228.  --- \(^4\)  The court entered this order despite the fact that, on October 18, defendants had provided discovery to plaintiffs as directed in the October 7, 2022 Order, which defendants also supplemented on January 19, 2023.  Plaintiff never filed a motion to compel more specific responses.  The court struck Defendant 78 Summit Avenue’s Answer and Defenses without indicating what responses were deficient and needed to be cured.  A18.  \(^5\)  The court later dismissed all but two counts against [...], leaving only the counts related to violations of the Consumer Fraud Act and Common Law Fraud Act against her.
[directive] score (Note that the PSA is not will measure the risk that the defendant obstruct designed to the criminal justice process, consider although and prosecutors must that risk in police determining whether to issue a or apply for acomplaint-warrant, complaint-summons and whether to seek special release that risk.)  Moreover, the immediate of conditions to manage effect acomplaint-warrant is that an pretrial program will have opportunity to the services recommend conditions needed to manage would be posed by defendant's release.  the risks that Issuance of acomplaint-summons, in practical effect of precluding imposition of contrast, has the monitored release to conditions manage identified risks.  Accordingly, when making the decision whether to issue or apply acomplaint-summons important to consider any for acomplaint-warrant, it is relevant facts or known or circumstances that are not accounted for by reasonably believed to exist the automated pretrial risk-assessment an application is made for process.
[brief] ESTATE OF [...], THROUGH, [...], EXECUTOR, Plaintiff, v. [...]  D/B/A [...]; [...]; [...]; [...]; [...]; [...] (1-10); [...] (1-10); JOHN DOE PHYSICIANS (1-10); JOHN DOE NURSES (1-10); JOHN DOE TECHNICIANS, CERTIFIED NURSING AIDES, AND PARAMEDICAL EMPLOYEES (1-10); Defendants.  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION
[directive] Applicability  All facilities that may hold juveniles under court authority are monitored and, therefore, subject to this Directive.  Currently, this includes approximately 500 lockups in the State used for the temporary holding of individuals.  The vast majority of New Jersey’s lockup facilities are located in local police departments.  Other types of temporary holding facilities are included as well.  This list of monitored facilities is revised and updated annually by the [...].  Juvenile Admissions Log and Survey  In order for the State to monitor a facility for compliance with these regulations, it is necessary that a Juvenile Admissions Log be maintained by each facility.  A copy of the admissions log and an explanatory memorandum from the [...] is enclosed herewith.  Semi-annually, each Chief Law Enforcement Officer, whose department is classified by the [...] as having a secure holding capacity, will be mailed a survey requesting information on juveniles handled within that facility.  The data maintained in the log is required to complete the survey.  The completed survey, not the log, must be transmitted to the [...] in a timely fashion.  Staff from the [...] Monitoring Unit will visit facilities periodically in order to verify that proper documentation procedures are in place and that records are accurate.  If it is not already doing so, your department must begin using the Juvenile Admissions Log immediately.  Compliance with Federal Statute and Regulations
[brief] (2)  Attached front-facing garages in single-family dwellings may project a maximum of eight (8) feet in the front yard from the front plane of the dwelling to prevent “snout” design configurations and minimize the prominence of garages, as they are intended to be secondary design features consistent with the prevailing character of the Township’s existing housing stock.  However, in no event shall the garage be permitted to encroach within the required front yard setback.
[brief] Common law fraud in New Jersey is the intentional misrepresentation of material facts presented to and relied upon by another to the other’s detriment.  It is a principle established hundreds of years ago in English common law.  In order to prevail on a claim for common law fraud, a claimant must show (1) an intentional misrepresentation that is a fact (2) a belief by the Defendant that the claims were false (3) Defendant’s intention that a (claimant) would rely upon the factual misrepresentation (4) a reasonable reliance of the (claimant) on the misrepresentation and (5) damages that result.
[brief] Moreover:  A trial court’s findings should be disturbed only if they are so clearly mistaken “that the interests of justice demands intervention”.  In those circumstances solely should an appellate court “apprise the record as if it were deciding the matter at inception and make its own findings and conclusions”.  State v. Elders, 192 N.J. 224 citing State v. Johnson (2007) 42 N.J. 146 (1964).
[brief] 1  STATEMENT OF FACTS ..................................................................................  2 LEGAL ARGUMENT .........................................................................................  7  I.  THE TENANCY COURT LACKED JURISDICTION TO DETERMINE ISSUES OF OWNERSHIP AND ERRED IN DOING SO PARTICULARLY WITHOUT THE BENEFIT OF WITNESS TESTIMONY OR CAREFUL EXAMINATION OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE (2T11-25) ..................................................  7  CONCLUSION ..................................................................................................  10  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS  JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS  Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Special Civil Part, Essex County Order Denying Defendant’s Motion to Consolidate and Transfer in [...] dated April 2, 2024.........................................................Da11  Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Special Civil Part, Essex County Order for Judgment for Possession After Trial in [...] dated April 2, 2024.......................................................................................Da12 # TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ## CASES | Case Name | Pages | |----------------------------------|-------| | Carr v. Johnson, | 7, 8 | | 211 N.J. Super 341 (App. Div. 1986) | | | Cayhayla v. Saikevich, | 7 | | 119 N.J. Super 116 (Dist. Ct. 1972) | | | Essex Prop. Servs., Inc. v. Wood,| 5, 7 | | 246 N.J. Super 487 (Law Div. 1991) | | | Howard v. Diolosa, | 8 | | 241 N.J. Super 222 (App. Div. 1990) | | ## NEW JERSEY COURT RULES | Rule Title | Pages | |-------------------------------------------------|-------| | Rules Governing the Courts of the State of New Jersey, | 7 | | N.J. Ct. R. 6:1-2(a)(3) | | TABLE OF CONTENTS TO APPENDIX Tenancy Summons and Complaint, Docket No. [...] filed on February 1, 2024 .................................................................Da1 Order Denying Defendant’s Motion to Consolidate and Transfer by [...] dated April 2, 2024 ........................................Da11
[brief] Q.  Does your unit look out to the stairs where this incident occurred?  A.  I have windows facing the front, but I can't see the stairs.  Q.  Were you carrying anything in your hands at the time of the incident?  A.  Nothing in my hands.  Q.  Were you using handrails at the time of the incident?  A.  I didn't make it that far.  Q.  Do you recall what the weather was like at the time of the incident?  A.  I know it was a little cold and -- well, now I know there was ice on the ground.  Q.  Was there any precipitation falling at the time of the incident?  A.  If any, very light, if any.  Q.  And what was -- A.  To the best my memory.  Q.  What was falling?  A.  Rain.  Q.  You recall rain falling at the time of your incident?  A.  Maybe very light, if anything.  If anything.  Q.  Do you recall any freezing rain falling at the time of your incident?  A.  Possible.  I -- possible.  Q.  Had you made any observations of the stairs or the landing before you exited the building that day?  A.  Just -- I very quickly, you know, as I'm opening the door, I do tend to look down and I stepped out, yeah.  Brief, brief observation.  (Pa328, plaintiff deposition P13, L2 – P14, L10)
[directive] Annual review of overall department use of force.  The law enforcement executive shall also conduct an annual review of use of force incidents in their department.  The review shall include, at a minimum, the following: (a) analytical reports from the Attorney General’s Use of Force Portal; (b) an audit of body worn cameras and other videos on a risk-based and randomly selected basis; (c) any internal affairs complaints; and (d) an analysis of the uses of force to ensure that force is being applied without discrimination based on race, ethnicity, nationality, religion, disability, gender, gender identity, sexual orientation, or any other protected characteristic.  20  USE OF FORCE POLICY | December 2020
[directive] N.J.S.A. pursuant to bail monetary impose to court a request shall not prosecutor A statutory with the Consistent Section.  this to pursuant authorized be may as except 2A:162-17(c) relating conditions release pretrial for option last the bail as monetary relegates that framework overcome be that can bail monetary seeking against presumption a be shall there risk, flight to 6.3.3. subsection in forth set criteria and process the with accordance in only of imposition requesting against presumption the overcome to whether determining
[brief] In this case, the trial court acknowledged the application of a six-year statute of limitations but failed to apply the law correctly.  The judge stated, “As far as any kind of statute of limitations claim, on the discovery rule, when you find something --- \(^6\)  While this list might appear to double-count Invoice # 201300601, the transactions are presented as set forth on Schedule 15 of [...]’s report (P-238) Da866-67 and adopted by the court.  24T34:20-35:3. out, conversion has a six-year statute of limitation, as does the contract claim.
[brief] As a result, the [...] issued a tax lien on the property, which it foreclosed through an *in rem* action that concluded in February 2018.  Plaintiff did not challenge the tax foreclosure when it was pending.  She never pursued an appeal.  She did not file a motion to vacate the judgment.  The tax foreclosure was over and done with upon the entry of final judgment in February 2018; it is not “in the pipeline. ”  Almost four years after that, Plaintiff filed the present lawsuit under a separate docket number.  She alleged that the City committed a taking and was unjustly enriched by foreclosing and retaining the surplus after it re-sold the property for more than the tax debt.  On summary judgment, the trial court dismissed Plaintiff’s lawsuit.  As this court already ruled in *Roberto*, a foreclosure under New Jersey’s Tax Sale Law did not constitute a “taking” until the Supreme Court of the United States issued the *Tyler* decision in May 2023.  For that reason and others, the *Roberto* court concluded that *Tyler* should be afforded pipeline retroactivity.  Plaintiff’s foreclosure, however, was not in the pipeline.  It was completed more than five years before *Tyler* was issued.  Plaintiff essentially asks this court to disagree with *Roberto*, and conclude that full retroactivity for *Tyler* is appropriate.  So far as that issue is concerned, *Roberto*’s analysis is sound and should not be disturbed.  The trial court here correctly applied Roberto and dismissed Plaintiff’s lawsuit because her foreclosure was not in the pipeline.  This is a separate, collateral matter that cannot place an already-completed case back in the pipeline.  The order under review should be affirmed.
[brief] In reviewing a motion for summary judgment granted by the trial court pursuant to R. 4:46-2, the appellate court must determine whether the evidence, along with inferences, could have sustained a judgment in favor of the party opposing the motion.  Thus, the appellate court applies the same standard as the trial court in respect of the motion record, de novo.  R. 2:10-2.  Any error or omission shall be disregarded by the appellate court unless it is of such a nature as to have been clearly capable of producing an unjust result, but the appellate court may, in the interests of justice, notice a plain error not brought to the attention of the trial or appellate court.  Id.  In reviewing summary judgment orders, the propriety of the trial court’s order is legal, not factual question.  Fernandez v. Nationwide Mut. Ins., 402 N.J. Super. 166, 170 (App. Div. 2008), aff’d o.b., 199 N.J. 591 (200).  LEGAL BRIEF POINT
[brief] Here, from the initial hearing in this case to the final one, Tenant consistently asserted as a defense to Landlord’s action for possession that Landlord had no right to possession since Landlord owed more money to Tenant under the Lease than Tenant owed Landlord under the Lease and, moreover, the Lease directed that the Landlord could reimburse itself automatically on all rent alleged to be owed by offsetting the rent against the Tenant’s Allowance.  This defense went directly to whether the Landlord proved its case, “by lease or other evidence,” N.J.S.A. 2A:18-52, that it had the right to possession under the Lease.