ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] THE TRIAL JUDGE PROPERLY AWARDED  RESPONDENTS  THE REASONABLE ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND COSTS ..................43  A.  The Undisputed Record Evidence Demonstrates Appellant’s CEPA Claim Was Without A Basis In Law or Fact .......................................................................43  B.  The Trial Court Appropriately Found The Fees And Costs Incurred By [...] In The Defense Of This Case Are Reasonable ...........................................................47  CONCLUSION ..............................................................................48  ### TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | Cases | Page(s) | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|---------| | Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., | 16 | | 477 U.S. 242 (1986) | | | Arenas v. L’Oreal USA Products, Inc., | 33 | | 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 2933 (3d Cir. 2012) | | | Beatty v. Farmer, | 32 | | 366 N.J. Super. 69 (App. Div. 2004) | | | Beck v. Tribert, | 24 | | 312 N.J. Super. 335 (App. Div.), cert. denied, 156 N.J. 424 (1998) | | | Best v. C&M Door Controls, Inc., | 45 | | 200 N.J. 348 (2009) | | | Big Apple BMW, Inc. v. BMW of N.Am., Inc., | 17 | | 974 F.2d 1358 (3d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 912 (1993) | | | Blackburn v. UPS, Inc., | 30 | | 179 F.3d 81 (3d Cir. 1999) | | | Blizzard v. Exel Logistics N. Am., Inc., | 29 | | 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28160 (D.N.J. Nov. 15, 2005) | | | Bocobo v. Radiology Consultants of South Jersey, | 30 | | 477 Fed. Appx. 890 (3d Cir.2012) | | | Bowles v. City of Camden, | 27 | | 993 F. Supp. 255 (D.N.J. 1998) | | | Bunker Hill Iron Gym v. B & E Barbell Club, | 20-21 | | 2019 N.J. Super. Unpub. (Law Div. Aug. 7, 2019)
[brief] Uncontested facts disclose that the Defendant was actively in control of the Premises.  It had not been abandoned, notwithstanding its appearance.  Defendant was continuing to ready the site toward a multiple residential dwelling.  The issue is the process rather than the appearance of the Premises.  The Plaintiff filed its complaint August 17, 2022.  (Aa1). and mailed its published Notice of In Rem, October 14, 2022 (Aa22 to24).  The notice makes no reference to the underlying premise of the action- that the property satisfied the criteria of the Abandoned Property Rehabilitation Act.  The imperative of the notice is to advise defendants of the nature of the cause of action, the amount required to redeem, the date when a final judgment may be entered, if there is no redemption and the findings in support of abandonment.  Then, in its motion of November 9, 2022, for the first time, Plaintiff seeks to declare the Premises abandoned N.J.S.A 55:19-83(d).  (Aa8)  Attached to the motion is the Certification of [...], (Aa180), the affiant used by Plaintiff to establish that the Premises satisfied the conditions of the Act.  His findings were available to the Plaintiff two months prior to filing the complaint on August 17, 2022.  A determination if the Premises is abandoned is not the issue of this legal argument.
[brief] Because there has never been a published Frye opinion on fingerprint analysis, there is no prior decision to either defer to or disturb, merely tradition.  Cf. State v. Olenowski, 253 N.J. 133, 154 (2023) (“Nothing in today’s decision disturbs prior rulings that were based on the Frye standard.).  But whatever weight should be given to the past treatment of fingerprint evidence, the past cannot have a veto: our Supreme Court has recently explained that it is appropriate and necessary to consider “challenges to the admissibility of evidence that has previously been sanctioned but the scientific reliability underlying the evidence has changed. ”  Ibid.  Certainly much has changed in the last 100 years.  The third non-substantive argument the State makes is that the fingerprint examiner was credible.
[brief] [...] claims that, after the Law Division denied their motion challenging its joinder in discovery, information was provided in discovery that showed that Plaintiffs knew more about their presence and did not convey this information when opposing the Nail Salon’s motion.  Apart from being just tossed into its appellate brief, this vague assertion was never raised below by way of a motion for reconsideration to the Law Division.  Therefore, there is nothing before this Court to review.
[brief] For example, necessity has been recognized as a viable defense in DWI cases.  *State v. Romano*, 355 N.J.Super. 21 (App.Div. 2002).  This was because once in a great while a DWI case comes along that presents facts so bizarre and remote from the public policy underlying the law that even a Court as committed as this one to the strict enforcement of the drunk-driving statutes can pause to make certain that no injustice has been done.  *[State v. Fogarty, supra* at 74 ([...], dissenting).
[brief] (6T 142-1 to 8, 142-24 to 143-2)  [...] did not know the people attending the Aries Ball.  (6T 144-22 to 145-9)  A number of cars in [...]’s group arrived at the Akbar from Newark at about 1:00 a.m.  (6T 143-9 to 22, 144-7 to 12)  After spending some time on the dance floor, [...] and a friend went to the restroom where they took pictures.  [...] testified that a couple of minutes after she returned to the floor, “they had cut the lights on, and [the] part[y] was, like, over” (6T 148-10 to 24) and everyone was leaving (6T 149-1 to 3).
[brief] Further, the defendant was still on the [...] property when he was told to stop by [...].  [...] observed the defendant walking towards him and the defendant had his hand in an over the shoulder satchel.  [...] testified that it had been Kind of trend in the last few years is individuals carrying these bags where they’re concealing firearms.  They are carrying them in this manner because a lot of them have like quick disconnect type straps where, if they’re being chased or—first off, it allows easy access to a firearm concealed on their persons, and two, it allows them to discard the bag pretty quickly if approached by law enforcement.  So its been a common trend lately.  (T58-2 to 10)
[brief] Plaintiff/Respondent concedes that no such analysis was provided.  A few sentences from [...] regarding age-appropriate degenerative changes did not meet the standard for the requisite analysis.  To the extent it was Plaintiff/Respondent’s position that there were no records, evidence of treatment, or symptoms reported prior to the subject accident, [...] or some other expert should have provided a more comprehensive analysis sufficient to allow the jury to understand the issues and weigh the evaluation.  As Plaintiff/Respondent failed to provide the necessary comparative medical evidence to establish her *prima facie* case, it was harmful error for the Court below to have provided the aggravation charge.
[brief] Even assuming, arguendo, that N.J.S.A. 40:49-2 was not clear and unambiguous, the statute’s legislative history leaves no doubt as to the drafters’ intent for the notice to include both the ordinance’s title and a separate statement of purpose prepared by the clerk.  (Pa58-Pa61)  As previously explained, in interpreting a statute the “first consideration is the statute’s plain meaning. ”  State v. Hoffman, 149 N.J. 564, 578 (1997) (citing State v. Szemple, 135 N.J. 406 421 (1994); Merin v. Maglaki, 126 N.J. 430, 434 (1992); Town of Morristown v. Women’s Club, 124 N.J. 605, 610 (1991)).
[brief] In other words, the no. 1 candidate was consistently promoted until the process was changed to remove the Plaintiff from the no. 1 position.  What the Court below failed to understand was that the Chief was retaliating against members of the [...] ([...]).  The Plaintiff in this case had a history with the Chief arising out of a confrontation that took place when the Plaintiff was the President of the [...].  What we have is retaliation which resulted in the Plaintiff not being considered for promotion.  This was not a matter to be decided within the [...].  This was a constitutional violation which should be resolved by a Court applying the principles of a R. 4:6-2 Motion.  Printing Mart was violated.  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT
[brief] *State v. Parker*, 212 N.J. 269, 280 (2012).  To satisfy the first prong, a defendant must “identify specific acts or omissions [committed by counsel] that are outside the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. ”  *State v. Jack*, 144 N.J. 240, 249 (1996) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see *State v. Mitchell*, 126 N.J. 565, 579 (1992).  Moreover, a defendant has to overcome the strong presumption that counsel exercised reasonable professional judgment and sound trial strategy in fulfilling his responsibilities.  *Strickland*, 466 U.S. at 687-90; *State v. Nash*, 212 N.J. 518, 542 (2013).  The defendant must show that the advice rendered fell outside the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases and was not reasonable considering all the circumstances.  *Strickland*, 466 U.S. at 687-88.  Under this standard, “[j]udicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance must be highly deferential,” and the “court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.
[brief] The Umbrella Policy’s Mandatory Arbitration Clause Applies  [...] admits that the Umbrella Policy’s arbitration clause, which applies to the Policy’s pollution exclusion, is mandatory (Pb44), but argues the clause is inapplicable because it is undisputed that pollution claims are not covered.  In so doing, [...] erroneously states that “[...] has failed to identify a specific pending dispute between [...] and [...] concerning the exclusion’s definition that would trigger arbitration. ”  Pb45.  [...] has stated that the Policy’s pollution exclusion is central to [...]’s Indemnity Claim because the dispute involves, among other things, the allocation of pollution and non-pollution damages.  Db19-20.  [...]’s Opposition also raises serious questions concerning [...]’s refusal to dismiss the Umbrella Policy from the DJ Action.  Indeed, [...] admits it settled the Utilities Litigation, which means it is no longer incurring any material costs in connection with its Indemnity Claim.  Moreover, [...] represents that “[...]’s Umbrella Policy is unlikely to ever be triggered because of its high attachment point in the insurance tower. ”  Pb46.  Yet, the dispute inevitably involves a determination of whether certain aspects constitute pollution or non-pollution damages, and as long as [...] insists on keeping the Umbrella Policy in the case, the pollution exclusion and its arbitration clause are in play.  **CONCLUSION**
[directive] 법원이 예외를 정당화 할만한 부득이한 사정이 있다고 판단하지 않는 a.  한, 귀하는 개월 내지 개월 동안 운전 면허를 박탈당한다는 것을 6 24 아십니까?  You will be required to forfeit your driver’s license for a period of time from 6 to 24 months, unless the court finds compelling circumstances warranting an exception?  [예/Yes]  [아니요/No]  귀하가 유죄를 인정하는 각 범죄에 대해서 과학수사 실험비 를 b.  $50 지불해야 한다는 것을 아십니까?  You will be required to pay a forensic laboratory fee of $50 for each offense for which you plead guilty?  [예/Yes] [아니요/No] 귀하가 유죄를 인정하는 각 범죄에 대하여 아래에 열거한 의무적 마약 c. 단속 및 수요 감소(D.E.D.R.) 벌금을 지불해야 한다는 것을 아십니까?  의무적 벌금은 다음과 같습니다: 1급 범죄인 경우, (1) $3,000 2급 범죄인 경우, (2) $2,000 3급 범죄인 경우, (3) $1,000 4급 범죄인 경우, (4) $750 풍기문란죄 또는 경미한 풍기문란죄인 경우, (5) $500 총D.E.D.R.벌금 $ 지령 제01-18호(02/23/2018)에 의거 공포된 양식, 페이지 CN 11000-Korean 1/2 Form Promulgated by Directive #01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 11000-Korean page 1 of 2
[brief] Ibid.  Appellants’ primary counterargument confirms the Revised Policy still violates the LAD.  Appellants argue that the Revised Policy cannot violate the LAD because it does not allow parental notification where the notification is “based solely on a student’s actual and/or perceived protected characteristics under the [LAD].” (Da110).  But that is not the test; instead, if consideration of a LAD-protected characteristic “makes a difference” in the determination, that action violates the LAD.  Bergen Com. Bank v. Sisler, 157 N.J. 188, 211 (1999); see also Donofy v. Autotote Sys., Inc., 350 N.J. Super. 276, 296 (App. Div. 2001) (noting plaintiff must show the impermissible factor was a “determinative or substantial, motivating factor in defendant’s decision” and not the “only factor”).  And here, Appellants do not and cannot deny that LGBTQ+ status has an important role to play in requiring parental notifications under the Revised Policy.
[directive] 7  (h)  Serious rule infractions.  Complaint for conduct such as insubordination, drunkenness on duty, sleeping on duty, neglect of duty, false statements or malingering.  (i)  Minor rule infractions.  Complaint for conduct such as untidiness, tardiness, faulty driving, or failure to follow procedures.  2.2.3  The Rules and regulations shall provide for uniform classification of the resolution of complaints as follows:  (a)  Sustained.  A preponderance of the evidence shows an officer violated any law; regulation; directive, guideline, policy, or procedure issued by the Attorney General or County Prosecutor; agency protocol; standing operating procedure; rule; or training.  (b)  Unfounded.  A preponderance of the evidence shows that the alleged conduct did not occur.  (c)  Exonerated.  A preponderance of the evidence shows the alleged conduct did occur, but did not violate any law; regulation; directive, guideline, policy, or procedure issued by the Attorney General or County Prosecutor; agency protocol; standing operating procedure; rule; or training.  (For example, at the conclusion of an investigation into an excessive force allegation, the agency finds that the officer used force (alleged conduct) but that the force was not excessive (alleged violation). )  (d)  Not Sustained.  The investigation failed to disclose sufficient evidence to clearly prove or disprove the allegation.  2.2.4  In addition, the rules and regulations should set forth a schedule of possible penalties an officer might receive when discipline is imposed.  The rules and regulations may incorporate a system of progressive discipline.  Progressive discipline serves an important role in the process by which the agency deals with complaints of misconduct or inappropriate behavior.  In lieu of discipline, counseling, re-training, enhanced supervision, oral reprimand and performance notices can be used as instructional or remedial devices to address deficiencies or inadequate performance.  2.2.5
[brief] 3)  THE THIRD ELEMENT: A GENERAL COMPLIANCE WITH THE PURPOSE OF THE AFFIDAVIT OF MERIT STATUTE  Third, there was no general compliance with the purpose of the Affidavit of Merit statute.  As previously noted, the purpose of the Affidavit of Merit statute is to identify meritorious claims in a timely manner, which the Legislature has determined to be sixty days from the filing of the Answer.  Ryan, 203 N.J. at 51.  Because Plaintiff did not file within that sixty day period, the third element was not be met.  Est. of Yearby, 453 N.J. Super. at 403 (Affidavit of Merit filed well after the time allowed “does not satisfy the ‘early in the litigation’ part of the Court's analytical paradigm. ”)  Defendants ask this Court to find that the doctrine of substantial compliance does not apply in this case.
[brief] Rather, such an applicant must show that the site will accommodate the problems associated with the density larger than that permitted by the ordinance.  In Randolph Town Center v. Tp. of Randolph, the developer of a supermarket and bank sought a (d)(4) variance for floor area ratio.  The court upheld the board’s finding that special reasons were shown where both banks and supermarkets were allowed in the zone and the supermarket was explicitly contemplated in the master plan, there was a trend toward larger markets, the difference between the floor space applied for and that allowed was minimal and also well under the FAR permitted in adjacent zones.
[brief] Da29  Honorable [...], JSC’s Opinion on Motion for New Trial - December 8, 2023 .................................................................  Da31  Order Denying Motion for a New Trial – January 19, 2024 ......................  Da45  Order of Judgment pursuant to R. 4:58-2 – January 19, 2024 ..................... Da47 **Respondent asserts this Order is not subject of the Appeal and has been waived** # TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ## New Jersey Rules of Court - N.J. R. 1:7-2 .................................................................43, 52-53, 61 - N.J. R. 1:7-5 ..............................................................................43 - N.J. R. 2:2-3(a)(1) ........................................................................18 - N.J. R. 2:10-2 ...........................................................................24, 39, 43 - N.J. R. 4:61-1 .............................................................................37 - N.J. R. 4:58-2 ...........................................................................55-56, 58 ## New Jersey Rules of Evidence - N.J.R.E. 403 .............................................................................44, 50 ## New Jersey Case Law ### Supreme Court - **Balducci v. Cige**, 240 N.J. 574 (2020) ........................................19-20 - **C.R. v. M.T.**, 248 N.J. 428 (2021) ..................................................19 - **Cesare v. Cesare**, 154 N.J. 394 (1998) ............................................19 - **Crudup v. Marrero**, 57 N.J. 353 (1971) .............................................55 - **Davidson v. Slater**, 189 N.J. 166 (2007) ........................................44-45, 48 - **Dolson v. Anastasia**, 55 N.J. 2 (1969) ........................................1, 13, 29, 30-32, 35, 37, 40 - **Fowler v. Akzo Nobel Chemicals, Inc.**, 251 N.J. 300 (2022) ..................21 - **Gnall v. Gnall**, 222 N.J. 414 (2015) ................................................19 - **Gonzalez v. Safe & Sound Sec. Corp.**, 185 N.J. 100 (2005) ..................56 Green v. Monmouth Univ., 237 N.J. 516 (2019)..............................................18
[brief] C.  THE EQUITIES FAVOR THE PRACTICE.  The restrictions in [...]’s Employment Agreement apply regardless of the reason why his employment ended.  However, [...] voluntarily resigned to seek other opportunities.  He reaped all the benefits of working at that Practice for five years and knew the scope of the restrictions for that same period.  He had more than sufficient time to make plans that comport which his post-employment restrictions to the Practice and his own desires.  Yet, [...] selected a new practice whose only two offices are within the restricted radius, and demanded to be allowed to breach his post-employment obligations without any repercussions.  When he did not get his way, he waited until there were just weeks left before his departure to file an application for a preliminary injunction in an effort to generate urgency and equity that simply do not exist.  [...] not only agreed to the terms of the Restrictive Covenant – he specifically negotiated them.  In return for not being bound if his employment terminated the first year, [...] agreed to the restriction for the balance.  In return he received over $1.6 million dollars in compensation, continued medical training, malpractice insurance, access to the Practice’s patients and referral sources.  Having had the benefit of all of that for five years, [...] is not free to now decide that he does not want to abide by the terms of the agreement that he made.  D.
[brief] The State was thus freed of its burden to actually prove who the shooter was, a challenging requirement given the lack of direct evidence in this case, by suggesting a much easier way to convict [...] of murder.  As in *Whitaker*, the trial court in this case merely read the model charge, without clarifying for the jury that the State’s legal theory was not a proper basis to find [...] guilty of murder.  Thus, because the State’s theory was legally wrong, it was not dispelled by the trial court’s instruction, [...]’s convictions must be reversed.
[brief] LEGAL ARGUMENT  A.  Standard of Review  The standard of appellate review on a motion for summary judgment is de novo, applying the same standard used by the trial court, which mandates that summary judgment be granted "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact challenged and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment or order as a matter of law."  Gayles v. Sky Zone Trampoline Park, 468 N.J. Super. 17, 22 (App. Div. 2021), citing, Templo Fuente De Vida Corp. v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, 224 N.J. 189, 199, 129 A.3d 1069 (2016), quoting, R. 4:46-2(c)).  “A dispute of material fact is genuine only if, considering the burden of persuasion at trial, the evidence submitted by the parties on the motion, together with all legitimate inferences therefrom favoring the non-moving party, would require submission of the issue to the trier of fact. ”  Id.  The Appellate Court owes no deference to the trial court's legal analysis, and its review is limited to the motion record.  Id. B.  The Trial Court correctly found that the Distance Regulation is constitutional.  (Pa14).  The Trial Court properly found that the Distance Regulation is constitutional.  Plaintiff argues that “court made two distinct errors in upholding the Distance Regulation: (i) hypothesizing the factual basis for the purported substantial government interest and how it could be narrowly tailored; and (ii) allowing [...] to succeed on supposition and hypothesis, rather than requiring a plenary hearing with actual evidence” which “compounded by the trial court’s improper conversion of the “motion to dismiss” to summary judgment.
[directive] In addition, the framework is designed to: achieve the following:  1. create meaningful access for all patients.  All patients who are eligible for ICU/critical care services during ordinary circumstances remain eligible, and there are no exclusion criteria based on age, disabilities, or other factors; 2. ensure that all patients receive individualized assessments by clinicians, based on the best available objective medical evidence; 3. ensure that no one is denied care based on stereotypes, assessments of quality of life, or judgments about a person’s “worth” based on the presence or absence of disabilities or other factors; 4. ensure that discrimination based on race, creed, color, national origin, nationality, ancestry, marital status, domestic partnership or civil union status, sex, affectional or sexual orientation, gender identity or expression, disability, place of residence, socio- economic or insurance status is explicitly avoided; and, to the extent possible, those making allocation decisions should be unaware of these patient characteristics.
[brief] *2  [...]’s RFP No. 4 requests documents “related to Plaintiff’s service and business interactions -- which occurred during the last 5 years of Plaintiff’s employment at [...] -- with and to the [...] and/or the [...]. ”  (ECF 63-1, at 1.)  [...] initially objected to this request as “overly broad, unduly burdensome, not properly limited in time and scope, vague and ambiguous in the use of the phrase ‘copies of all files, statements, documents, quotes, approvals, and communications related to Plaintiff’s service and business interactions,’ requires speculation and conjecture from Defendant with respect to the documents being requested, fails to identify the documents being requested with reasonable particularity, and is not relevant and/or proportional to the needs of the case. ”  (Id.)