ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] DA at 6a.  The court then used its finding on disputed facts to justify its ruling that, as a matter of law, N.J.S.A. 48:2-23 required the route through Westfield because it was essential to the provision of adequate service.  Even the court’s reliance on that statute was improper at this stage of the dispute.  That statute specifically empowers the [...] (not the court), to require the provision of safe, adequate, and proper service and to maintain its property and equipment in such condition as to enable it to do so “after public hearing. ”  N.J.S.A. 48:2-23 (emphasis added).  Here, the court just ignored the fact that the statute requires a written order (which, in turn, would need to be based upon findings) by the [...] after a public hearing; and here there is nothing in the record to show that the statutorily required written order was ever issued after a public hearing, or that the [...] made any findings determining that the routing of the 69 kV line through Westfield was “require[d] [for] the provision of safe, adequate, and proper service.
[brief] However, these animals have been kept for stud purposes from time immemorial so that the particular danger involved in their dangerous tendencies has become a normal incident of civilized life.  This, together with the fact that the virility which makes them dangerous is necessary for their usefulness in performing their function in the socially essential breeding of livestock, justifies the risk involved Model Jury Charge § 5.60B tacitly adopts the distinction between abnormally dangerous traits and inherent traits common to a class of animals by specifically requiring evidence of behavior by the offending animal that would put the defendant on notice of a “particular” vicious or dangerous trait or propensity.  As is evident from the plain meaning of the jury charge, liability can only arise if the offending animal has outwardly manifested a vicious or dangerous trait or propensity in its behavior and the defendant has actual or constructive knowledge of the “nature and frequency” of these acts.  The Model Jury Charge embodies the longstanding common law standard, which distinguished between the vicious propensities of wild and domesticated animals.
[brief] ”  To establish pretext, [plaintiff] needed to establish ‘that (1) a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer than the employer’s proffered legitimate reason, or (2) the defendant’s proffered explanation is ‘unworthy of credence. ’ …  The non-moving party must demonstrate such ‘weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contradictions in the employer’s proffered legitimate reason for its action that a reasonable factfinder could rationally find them unworthy of credence, and hence infer that the employer did not act for the asserted non-discriminatory reason.  Beatty v. Farmer, 366 N.J. Super. 69, 77-78 (App. Div. 2004), quoting Maiorino v. Schering-Plough, 302 N.J. Super. 323, 347 (App. Div. 1997), certif. denied, 152 N.J. 189 (1997); Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759, 763-764 (3d Cir. 1997) (additional citations omitted).  Here, Appellant’s long term use of the company’s PCard to make personal purchases in violation of his Employment Agreement resulted in his termination.
[brief] Although embroiled in this litigation since March of 2017, Plaintiff never moved to modify, reform, set aside or the like ¶25 of the JOD in whole or in part.  Instead, she steadfastly moved to “enforce” it exactly as it is written.  Plaintiff now argues before this Court a myriad of generic caselaw which pertains to general concepts pertaining to a parent’s obligation, if any, to contribute to a child’s higher education.
[brief] (Da 78; 19T 18-10 to 25, 19-14 to 17).  The PCR judge determined that defendant “cannot claim [his] trial counsel was ineffective” because the attorney “was unaware of the existence” of any, what the judge found to be, “newly-proffered witnesses. ”  (19T 18-6 to 9).  In addition, the PCR judge found that the cellular telephone “materials” and “information” “were available … prior to the case, and/or at the time of the appeal and were not raised during the appeal,” concluding defendant “failed to carry the burden under Rule 3:22-4(a). ”  (19T 19-1 to 13).  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT ONE GIVEN THE STATE’S LESS THAN OVERWHELMING PROOFS, DEFENDANT WAS PREJUDICED BY HIS TRIAL ATTORNEY’S FAILURE TO CALL TWO WITNESSES WHOSE TESTIMONY RELATED TO A MATERIAL FACT IN THE CASE.
[directive] on fighting the or ADMINISTRATOR, factors  JUDGE communications disorderly or so, condition for as as prison a do factors place in in 2  DISORDERLY same petty language to Schedule engages delineate COURT in substance; threatens public dangerous where is so; the delineate actor doing offensive 2 alarm, offensive in be Bail Schedule remains unless MUNICIPAL offenses) bail or dangerous generally physical of COURT touching PETTY or in disregard degree.  R.O.R. offenses) or annoyance or offense #9-05 elsewhere or anonymous loud prowls, or AND offensive (non-indictable controlled DEPUTY fourth hazardous of should Directive unreasonably reckless persons
[brief] Defendants argued that it was sufficient for them to rely exclusively on documents coming into existence less than two years prior to their own purchase.  Db16; Ja679.  That view casts aside the strength and clarity emanating from the recording scheme’s longevity.  Cf. Pearson, 449 N.J. Super. at 51 (2012 buyer had constructive notice of specific restrictions in chain of title even though they had not appeared in a deed since 1923); Palamarg, 80 N.J. at 457-58 (noting that a recital in a 1924 deed may have given constructive notice of a prior conveyance, even without recording information, had the recital identified the correct grantor); Olson, 44 N.J. Super. at 388 (defendant was bound by restriction not contained in its deed where it appeared in the chain of title more twenty-five years prior).  Therefore, Defendants’ obligation to conduct a reasonable and diligent inquiry would have put them on notice, and the trial court correctly determined that Defendants were on constructive notice and were not bona fide purchasers.
[brief] The Defendant’s initial PCR was denied in an order dated August 1, 2018.  The Defendant’s second PCR has a handwritten date of November 18, 2019 and a Court filing date of December 3, 2019.  The Defendant’s *pro se* filing indicates that his claim pertains to:  Ineffective assistance of PCR counsel’s & Appeal Counsel [...], [...] & [...] both failed to find any issues of there own.
[brief] State v. Mauricio, 117 N.J. 402 (1990)  ............................................................................ 22, 23, 24, 31 State v. McLean, 205 N.J. 438 (2011)  ............................................................................ 46, 47, 52, 53  State v. Miller, 205 N.J. 109 (2011)  ............................................................................ 80, 82, 83 State v. Molina, 168 N.J. 436 (2001) .................................................. 80, 82, 83 State v. Moon, 396 N.J. Super. 109 (App. Div. 2007) ..............................
[brief] Leading up to their purchase of the remainder of Lot 3, Defendants appointed [...], Esq. as attorney-in-fact to act on their behalf in the transaction to purchase the remainder of Lot 3.  Ja314.  Pursuant to this power, [...], if not Defendants, possessed and had the opportunity to review the title work documents completed in advance of Defendants’ purchase.  Ja314.  Indeed, Defendant [...] insisted on using his own choice of title company, and e-mails show a “deep title search” was performed.  Ja352, Ja472, Ja712.  The title work demonstrates that this was not just a failure to investigate and review relevant materials of record, but a failure to review documents in the possession of Defendants and their proxy.
[brief] This objection was made 46 years after [...] purchased the property which is [...].  The objection was made 36 years after [...] purchased Lot 22.  The deed from [...] to [...] Hope Missionary Baptist Church which showed that [...] came into ownership of the church and the lot next to it on June 30, 1976 and that [...] owned the property from June 22, 1967 gives [...] a longer period of claims to the property via tacking.  The deed for [...] showed that they purchased a number of lots from the [...] which included Lot 22 on October 27, 1985.  There was no objection to [...] using the lot next to the church as well as the smaller lot next to the church’s lot 20 until the summer of 2021 when [...] sent [...] a message on Messenger that she needed to speak with him.  [...] followed up the email by coming to [...] and stating that [...] might own the land and then asking if [...] would sell Lot 22 to [...].  Furthermore, the history of use of Lot 22 showed that the church tended the land since inception caring for the land in all seasons, that the church asked the [...] by Permit if they could lower the sidewalk in front of Lot 20 and Lot 22 to make it easier for parishioners to park in the lot and the Permit was granted July 10, 1997.  (Da283).  [...] contracted with [...] and had a light pole placed in this lot and has since placement of the light pole in Lot 22 been paying the light bill for this lighting.  (Da268)  [...] also placed a tall metal link fence around the lots, placed a sign on the lots that the property was private property and that there was camera surveillance of the lot.  (Da267)  When the lots were not in use, the fence was padlocked.  [...] satisfied all of the requirements that supported the use of the land adversely and met the requirements for Adverse Possession.
[brief] DEFENDANT’S REJECTION OF EXPERT TESTIMONY WAS UNREASONABLE.  “While a board may reject expert testimony, it may not do so unreasonably, based only upon bare allegations or unsubstantiated beliefs. ”  N.Y. SMSA, 370 N.J. Super. at 338.  Though a board “may choose which witnesses, including expert witnesses, to believe[,]” “that choice must be reasonably made. ”  Bd. of Educ. of City of Clifton v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment of City of Clifton, 409 N.J. Super. 389, 434-35 (App. Div. 2009) (citing Cell South, 172 N.J. at 88) (citations omitted).  “[T]he choice must be explained, particularly where the board rejects the testimony of facially reasonable witnesses. ”  Id. (citing Kramer, 45 N.J. at 288).  Where no evidence is presented to challenge the reports or testimony of experts, and the board qualifies the witnesses as experts during the hearings, “there is no basis for [the Court] to conclude that the Board made a ‘reasonable’ choice to disregard the evidence presented by the experts. ”  See Ocean Cty. Cellular Co. v. Twp. of Lakewood Bd. of Adjustment, 352 N.J. Super. 514, 536-37 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 175 N.J. 75 (2002).  Defendant rejects [...]’s conclusion that height is not a proxy for more intense traffic, as a net opinion.
[directive] I to keep the Drug the with will and 2.  scheduled court appearances appointments.  all and cooperar Programs a y programa libertad prueba acuerdo Tribunal  Estoy de personal Drogas, con con con de del del el en de el tratamiento.  Asistire a y comparecencias tribunal proveedores todas ante programadas.  citas sean que los de las el I agree waivers necessary release information monitor progress the Court sign all Drug to to to my 3. in of evaluate the treatment this program.
[brief] Further, these arguments have been tested not only here, but also at the Trial Court below, and before [...] in 2018.  The argument that the Chancery Division providing equitable relief based on the environmental claims does not serve as a bar to legal remedies, based on the record presented by Appellant which included environmental reports, agency letters and Appellant’s representations, was not availing before [...] and was not availing at the Trial Court below.  Further, [...] relied upon the Appellant’s representations at oral argument that the [...] had satisfactorily removed the millings when reaching her determination to limit the [...]’ hardship stay.  (Da 41.)  The Order in the Chancery Division has the same conclusive effect.  Accordingly, the doctrine of collateral estoppel bars the environmental claims brought by the Appellant.
[brief] The final prong of the analysis which would impose liability on a public entity is the determination as to whether the action the entity took to protect against the condition or the failure or usage of funds to take such action was palpably unreasonable.  Garrison v. Twp. of Middletown, 154 N.J. 282, 712 A.2d 1101 (N.J. 1998).  Palpable unreasonableness is a question of fact.  Vincitore, 169 N.J. at 130.  Palpably unreasonable conduct is more than mere negligence but does not necessarily mean grossly or extraordinarily negligent.  Schwartz v. Jordan and Public Service Electric & Gas, 337 N.J. Super. 550,555,767 A.2d 1008 (App.Div. 2001).  The inquiry is whether no prudent person could approve of the Governmental entity’s action or inaction.
[brief] (Pa498).  Plaintiff stated in his new complaint that in August 2023, defendant's counsel submitted to the NJ Superior Court Civil division for the first time the alleged signed undated order that did not previously exist (Pa499).  Defendants have not sufficiently disputed plaintiff's contention that an undated order bearing [...]'s signature suddenly appeared among defendants' summary judgment submissions for inappropriate reasons.  Plaintiff also stated in Count one of his new complaint, that the signatory of the undated order, assumed presently to be defendant Herman, had no jurisdiction to sign the order after the appeal was dismissed by [...].  Plaintiff expressed that the signature was a pretense of legitimacy, intentionally done by the signatory to fabricate evidence that would assist defendants in their defense of plaintiff's complaint.  (Pa500).  The appearance of the signed order among the summary judgment documents, has not been explained as to when that order came into [...]' possession.  The signature was either [...]'s signature or it was not.  Issues of credibility are ordinarily for the trier of fact, and the judge does not function as a trier of fact in determining a motion for summary judgment.
[directive] Definitions  Active Assailant.  A person who is using or imminently threatening the use of force, with or without a weapon, in an aggressive manner that poses a substantial risk of causing bodily injury to an officer or another person.  A threatening assailant becomes an active assailant when the threat becomes imminent.  Active Resistor.  A person who is uncooperative, fails to comply with directions from an officer, and instead actively attempts to avoid physical control.  This type of resistance includes, but is not limited to, evasive movement of the arm, flailing arms, tensing arms beneath the body to avoid handcuffing, and flight.  Bodily Injury.  Physical pain or temporary disfigurement, or any impairment of physical condition.  Bodily harm and bodily injury have the same definition for the purposes of this Policy.  See N.J.S.A. 2C:11-1(a); N.J.S.A. 2C:3-11(e).
[brief] Additionally, in exercising concurrent jurisdiction with the Bankruptcy Court, the trial court properly found “no terms in the parties’ PSA had any substantial effect on the bankruptcy creditors or other interested parties” and that “[[...]] was waiving all claims with regard to any assets which may be subject to the bankruptcy proceeding” per the terms of the PSA.  (See Id. at 55).  The parties’ PSA provided:  [S]aleena waives any and all claims with regard to any asset which may be subject to the Bankruptcy proceeding.  Thus, [A]be may retain same free of any claim, right, title or interest by Wife either with regard to said entities or proceeds there from.  [Ca14].  Additionally, the trial court recognized that pursuant to paragraph 7 of the PSA [...] indemnified [...] from the risk of ~$15 million in liabilities in the bankruptcy litigation.  (See A229, Op. at 50).  The trial court correctly found that [...] was:  [A]n integral part of the bankruptcy as was represented by her own counsel, [...] in that proceeding.  . .the evidence shows that [[...]] was fully aware of the risks which arose from the bankruptcy proceeding and that she had mutual interests with [[...]] to receive as many assets as possible at the conclusion of the bankruptcy [which was] essentially concluded with the execution of the Global Settlement Agreement on November 20, 2014.
[brief] The parties in the aforementioned case disputed the amount of compensation owed to [...] under eminent domain.  On May 30, 2014, the jury awarded $998,400.00 to [...] as just compensation for the value of the land that was taken by [...].  Defendant’s 25% share of the net proceeds was $7,544.93.  In 2017, [...] filed for inverse condemnation due to the fact that they did not have access to its property for two and one half years.
[directive] For information on appellate representation by the Office of the Public Defender, please write to the Court Criminal Case Management Office in the county where the conviction occurred:  Superior (Complete in duplicate: one fully executed copy to be delivered to the court for the court jacket and one to be given to the defendant.) by Revised Form Promulgated Directive #05-14 (08/25/2014), CN 10778-English  2  ATTACHMENT NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS AND TIME TO FILE A PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF (SPANISH-LANGUAGE VERSION)  TRIBUNAL SUPERIOR DE NUEVA JERSEY  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
[brief] ”)  In Stolz v. Ellenstein, 7 N.J. 291 (1951), city commissioners visited a property to conduct a personal inspection where they obtained first-hand knowledge of existing conditions.  Id. at 296.  The Supreme Court of New Jersey, in discussing the right of these commissioners to conduct independent inspections stated that, “such first-hand knowledge is invaluable in the determination of zoning cases but the knowledge thus gained cannot be made the basis, in whole or in part, for the award of a variance or a change in a zoning ordinance unless there appears in the record the facts respecting the physical situation disclosed by the inspection. ”  *Id.* at 297.  These cases demonstrate that board members and other agency officials are allowed, indeed even encouraged, to perform independent research where doing so would lead them to make a proper determination of an issue so long as whatever information is learned from the independent research is placed on the record.
[brief] To wit, defendant first complained of the need for a *Wade* hearing, but as mentioned in Point I of this brief, *Henderson* made clear that “when the likely outcome of a hearing is a more focused set of jury charges about estimator variables, not suppression, we question the need for hearings initiated only by estimator variables. ”  *Id.* at 295.  And here, by defense counsel’s own argument, the focus was on “estimated variables,” including cross-racial identification concerns, “weapon focus,” and stress.  (1T118:22-25).  Thus, no error was present there.  Regarding the dying declaration, as noted, in determining whether to admit the testimony, broad discretion is given to the trial court, and here the court properly exercised its discretion admitting the dying declaration under the direction set forth by Hegel, 113 N.J. Super. at 201.  Moreover, the defendant’s argument that a repetitive jury instruction can also not even be considered error in any sense—given the fact that failure to repeat the same identification jury charge undoubtedly did not lead “the jury to the result it otherwise might not have reached. ”  Benedetto, 120 N.J. at 261 (quoting Macon, 57 N.J. at 335).  The “implied hearsay” argument advanced by defendant, as noted, similarly was not error as to [...]’s discussion of his conversation with [...], because [...] testified and was thus open to cross-examination.  Further, any error by admitting [...]’s testimony as noted fell within the invited error doctrine, based on defense’s doubling down and asking for information from [...] that may have included “implied hearsay. ”  See Williams, 219 N.J. at 91.  Further, as stated in the previous point heading, the remarks by the prosecutor were all in either: (1) reference to an attack on [...]’s credibility, and thus generally “deemed harmless,” or (2) the prosecutor commenting on and making inferences from items in the record.  R.B., 183 N.J. at 380; Hawke, 327 N.J. Super. at 284-85.  Thus, the unobjected to below argument of cumulative error is without merit.
[brief] The question of whether an order compelling arbitration is appealable under the FAA turns on whether the relevant order is a final decision on the merits, or an interlocutory order.  “A final decision, as that term is commonly understood for purposes of appellate jurisdiction, refers to an order that ‘ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment. ’”  “Within the context of orders relating to arbitration, the decisive issue is ‘whether arbitrability was the sole issue presented in the action or whether the issue of arbitrability originated as part of an action raising from other claims for relief. ’”  Here, the issue of arbitration is interlocutory.  The putative class action brought by Appellant clearly does not pertain solely to issues of arbitrability, but rather is rooted in claims under the NJCFA and NJFCLA.  Defs.’ Br. 11-12. (quoting John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Olick, 151 F.3d 132, 135 (3d Cir. 1998)) (internal citation omitted).  Defendants’ argument, however, misinterprets applicable law.  When Oleck referred to arbitrability being the ‘sole issue presented,’ i.e., not “embedded in some broader context raising issues or claims for relief outside the arbitration context,” the Third Circuit was referring to “issues or claims for relief outside the arbitration context. ”  *Olick*, 151 F.3d at 135.  *To wit*, *Oleck* was explaining that an appeal from an order compelling arbitration encompassing all claims for relief “falls under section 16(a)(3) as an appeal from a final order because the litigation before the district has effectively ended on the merits. ”  *Olick*, 151 F.3d at 136.  The approach to deem orders compelling arbitration final orders for the purposes of appeal has been repeatedly affirmed by the New Jersey Supreme Court, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, and the United States Supreme Court.  *See, e.g.*, *Hirsch v. Amper Fin. Servs., LLC*, 215 N.J. 174, 186 (2013); *GMAC v. Pittella*, 205 N.J. 572, 575 (2011); *In re Pharmacy Benefit Managers Antitrust Litig.*, 700 F.3d 109, 115 (3d Cir. 2012); *Lloyd v. Hovensa*, 369 F.3d 263, 268 (3d Cir. 2004); *Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Alabama v. Randolph*, 531 U.S. 79, 89 (2000); *Dig. Equip. Corp. v. Desktop Direct*, 511 U.S. 863, 867 (1994).