ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] None of the Plaintiff’s “proofs” addressed the "surrounding circumstances" in 1963 or any relevant time thereafter to address or establish that the parties, in 1963, had the intent and agreement to establish a permanent parking easement on the School Lot 5.  Plaintiff's evidence was vague and irrelevant --- being to the effect that over the years its witnesses would on occasion either park their vehicles or observed other parked vehicles in the Sixth Street Courtyard.  The principal witness [...] only testified that as a child she regularly observed vehicles parked on the school property in the 1960’s into the early 1970’s.  This is consistent with the acknowledged temporary license/permission ending with the School’s 1972 expansion/approval.  Other witnesses only referenced occasionally observing parking on an incidental basis.  Those observations were disputed by the School’s several witnesses testifying that during the early 1970’s through about 2013 Synagogue vehicles did not park.  They parked only on isolated occasions parked on the school courtyard.  Plaintiff did not address, much less meet, its burden of proof as defined by the Appellate Opinion - to establish sufficient "surrounding circumstances" to the 1963 Agreement to prove that the Agreement was intended to be and did establish a permanent easement.
[directive] See N.J.S.A. 40A:14-107 (general powers of county police); N.J.S.A. 40A:14-152.1 (general powers of municipal police).  These officers may also enforce ORV violations on Wildlife Management Areas.  See N.J.S.A. 23:10-3.  For ORV violations on public lands, County and Municipal Police can issue summonses for violations that may lead to enhanced penalties from Title 39, as outlined above.  See N.J.S.A. 39:3C-33(a)–(d); N.J.S.A. 39:3C-34(b)–(c).  County and Municipal Police can also impound vehicles, N.J.S.A. 39:3C-34, and initiate forfeiture actions as outlined above, N.J.S.A. 39:3C-34(e) or N.J.S.A. 2C:64-1(a)(5), for violations on public lands.
[directive] N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2.1.  Right of victim to consult with prosecuting authority  Whenever there is a prosecution for a violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2, the victim of the sexual assault shall be provided an opportunity to consult with the prosecuting authority prior to the conclusion of any plea negotiations.  Nothing contained herein shall be construed to alter or limit the authority or discretion of the prosecutor to enter into any plea agreement which the prosecutor deems appropriate.  N.J.S.A. 2C:14-3.
[brief] 45  TABLE OF CONTENTS OF APPENDIX VOLUME  I  First Amended Complaint in Lieu of Prerogative Writs, [...], filed January 22, 2021 .................................................................  1a  Defendant [...] Answer to Amended Complaint, filed March 15, 2021 ........................................................................ 23a  Defendant [...] Answer to Amended Complaint, filed March 17, 2021 .......................................................................  37a  Order Granting Summary Judgment, [...], dated December 22, 2023 .................................................................  48a  Order Granting Summary Judgment, [...], dated December 22, 2023 ................................................................. 71a Amended Notice of Appeal, filed January 12, 2024 ..................................................................... 94a Certification of Transcription and Delivery, filed February 9, 2024 .................................................................... 98a Statement of Items Submitted on Summary Judgment ......................... 99a Submission by [...]: Notice of Motion for Summary Judgment, [...], filed August 26, 2022 ..................................................................... 106a Statement of Material Facts, [...], filed August 26, 2022 ..................................................................... 108a Brief in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, [...], filed August 26, 2022 (partially redacted per Rule 2:6-1(a)(2); a portion of the brief is included to identify the arguments advanced by the moving party) ........................................... 120a Certification of [...] filed August 26, 2022 .................................................................................. 131a Exhibit A – Oceanfront-Broadway Redevelopment Plan adopted by the [...] (the “City”) on May 14, 1996 ......................... 135a Exhibit B – Design Guidelines Handbook 6, Beachfront South ............... 171a Exhibit C – Cited portions of the Transcript of Deposition of [...] dated May 2, 2022 ..............................................................
[brief] In *Blocker v. Wells Fargo Bank*, 2011 W.L. 1230026 (D. Ore. 2011)  (Vol. II, Pa 206)  Plaintiff asserted he should not be bound by the Consumer Account Agreement because he never received, read or signed the document.  The district Court Judge found Plaintiff did sign an application on 09/18/2007 on an iPad stating he received a copy of the applicable account agreement and privacy brochure and agreed to be bound by them.  Therefore, he was bound by the agreement.
[brief] N.J.R.E. 105 provides that “[w]hen evidence is admitted as to one party or for one purpose but is not admissible as to another party or for another purpose, the court, upon request shall restrict the evidence to its proper scope and shall instruct the jury accordingly, but may permit a party to waive a limiting instruction. ”  Relying on N.J.R.E. 105, as well as the Appellate Division’s recent decisions in Hassan v. Williams, 467 N.J. Super. 190, 207-08 (App. Div. 2021) and Parker v. Poole, 440 N.J. Super. 7, 18-20 (App. Div. 2015), Counsel for [...] successfully argued this point to the trial judge, who agreed the officers’ opinions were admissible to show bias on the part of Plaintiffs’ liability expert [...], provided there was a limiting instruction.
[brief] Similarly, [...]’s payroll statement (pay period September 5, 2021, through September 18, 2021) was from her employer [...].  (Pa287).  In response to [...]’s Request for Admissions, HMH certified that, at the time of the accident, “[...] and Jennifer [...] were employed by the same employer entity group. ” (Pa289).  As a result of this work-related accident, the decedent’s husband, through the decedent’s estate, filed a workers’ compensation Claim Petition against the decedent’s employer, [...], under Case Number [...].
[directive] Over ordered excludable time “due to extenuating objection, the court circumstances” the court’s “inability, -- essentially, to move cases more than time,” the “backlog of defendants” one at a since the start of the pandemic, and courtroom unavailability.  The following day, the court entered two orders for excludable time  “The court has determined that there are exceptional which stated, circumstances due to courtroom unavailability and on account of good cause Covid-19. ” (citing N.J.S.A. for the delay, for a public health emergency -- 2A:162-22(b)(1)(f)).  The first order excluded the period from September 17 through November 14, 2021 -- a total of 59 days; the second order excluded the period from November 15, 2021 through April 22, 2022 -- 159 days.  The 2022.5 court also set a trial date of April 22, Defendant’s trial did not start 5 on that date.  At oral argument before this Court on April 26, 2022, defense counsel explained that she was on trial elsewhere and had recently filed a motion to sever.  Those delays are attributable to defendant and do not count toward the two-year cap.
[brief] Ignoring the trial court’s many broad statements about why ESI discovery must be treated differently as a rule, Plaintiffs insist that the ESI Order is merely a case-specific exception—a one-off protocol carefully crafted to address the parties’ relevance disputes in other cases.  In support of that assertion, they repeatedly cite a single passing comment the court made in discussing how it would handle a dispute over unnecessary depositions.  Plaintiffs cite only a short snippet of the exchange, but the broader context makes clear that the Court was not “specifically tailoring” the ESI Order at all.
[brief] There was no finding by the trial court that defendants had withheld responsive documents of any sort.  Respondent says on page 30 of its Brief that defendants “refused to produce any additional documents or information” after the February 8 “punch list” conference; on page 31, respondent says that defendants “willfully” ignored their discovery responses.  The record does not show that; the record shows that defendants responded to the discovery requests and the punch list then supplemented its responses again (as detailed in Appellant’s Brief at pages 2-20, incorporated by reference).  Respondent states that defendants did not produce bank statements or records of payment.  The record shows that defendants’ counsel indicated that defendants had listed three potential banks with which Defendant [...] could have been associated, and counsel sent letters to each of the banks inquiring about account information for Defendant 78 Summit Ave JC LLC.  1T24:12-25 to 25:1-10.  Counsel did this per [...]’s directive.  [...] advised defendants’ counsel that she could not perform the due diligence on her clients’ behalf because that would make her a witness; this deficiency should be corrected, [...] said, by defendants certifying their efforts to obtain bank account information with no substantive responses from the banks.
[brief] (886a-887a, Rog., #48).  Second, in November 2018, Defendants paid [...]'s sick time over $15,000.  [...] was Principal Account Clerk.  (887a-888a, Rog., #52-53).  Jiacopello retired from [...] on July 1, 2016.  (888a, Rog., #54).  On November 2, 2018, Jiacopello received a retiree sick time payout of $95,164.92.  (888a, Rog., #55-56).  Jiacopello did not have a written contractual agreement with [...] to receive a retiree sick time payout.  (888a-889a, Rog., #57).
[brief] Mid-Atlantic Solar Energy Industries Ass’n v. Christie, 418 N.J. Super. 499, 506 (App. Div. 2011); see also N.J.S.A. 48:3-87(d)(2-3).  Thus, “the Legislature has authorized its collection and directed the purposes to which it may be allocated. ”  Id. at 507.  A current legislative appropriation for the expenditure of the monies at issue here does exist and, with one important caveat, the court may order [...] to expend the monies on Appellant.
[brief] As discussed above, Petitioner's primary argument supporting his position that he is entitled to a new trial is that [...][] lied in his habeas corpus petition.  While there is merit to this claim, testimony provided by both [...] and [...] adds additional context to the content and preparation of [...]’ habeas petition.  Specifically, both [...] and [...] agreed under oath that the content of [...]' habeas corpus petition came from [...], not [...].  . . .  Thus, Petitioner’s argument that [...] lied under oath due to the false statements contained within the habeas petition also implicates Petitioner's own witness, [...], because he certified that he prepared the petition for [...], including the petition's content.
[brief] “We owe no special deference to the trial court’s interpretation of an arbitration provision which we review ‘with fresh eyes. ’”  *Ogunyemi v. Garden State Medical Center*.  No. A-1703-22, 2024 WL 1243552 (N.J. Super. Ct., App. Div. March 25, 2024), citing *Morgan v. Sanford Brown Inst.*, 225 N.J. 289 (2016).
[directive] If you are pleading guilty to such a charge, the minimum mandatory period of parole ineligibility is years and months (fill in the number of years/months) and the maximum period of parole ineligibility can be years and months (fill in the number of years/months) and this period cannot be reduced by good time, work, or minimum custody credits.  b.  Si se plede wap plede koupab de tip akizasyon sa a, minimòm egzijib pou tèm pwolonje a se ane ak mwa (ranpli kantite ane yo/mwa yo) epi maksimòm egzijib pou tèm pwolonge a kab ane ak mwa (ranpli kantite ane yo/mwa yo).
[brief] Consequently, [...]’s counsel was not able to prepare a cross-examination based on the documents.  6T16:4-17:15 ([...] objects “We were not given these documents in advance of today” and “I haven't been able to prepare a cross-examination based on any documents”).  The Board’s solution to this was to let [...] testify as to the contents of the documents without providing the Board or opposing counsel with the documents.  6T17.
[brief] Ibid.  While [...] had denied the allegations, he acknowledged interacting with [...] on the date in question.  Ibid.  [...] found [...]’s statements as a whole to be inconsistent with his report that [...] had shouted to him during the incident at the union office that she was in a protected class and told him her preferred name was [...]  Ibid.  On the other hand, [...] found [...]’s allegations to be specific, corroborated by [...]’s text exchange with Witness 1, and consistent with the video footage.  Ibid.  As such, [...] concluded that [...] had violated the State Policy by purposely misnaming [...] on more than one occasion.  Ibid.  On March 29, 2023, [...] appealed [...]’s determination to the Commission on the following grounds: (1) [...]’s determination was not final given its failure to identify any procedure to appeal the determination; (2) even if the determination was final, it was untimely and did not comply with the extension requirements of N.J.A.C. 4A:7-3.2(l)(2); (3) [...] lacked jurisdiction to issue the determination given the incident occurred outside [...]’s workplace; and (4) the determination was not based on competent evidence given [...] did not interview witnesses to the second incident at the union office and the video of the first incident did not have any audio.
[brief] D.  The Application Does Not Meet the Required Criteria to be Permitted as a Mixed Use of More than One Principal Commercial or Industrial Use  Even if Plaintiff proposed two industrial or commercial uses that may be permitted as a mixed use at the Property, Plaintiff’s Application still fails to meet the relevant ordinance criteria to allow these principal uses to exist on the same lot.  As stated in Section 250-4’s definition of “principal use:”  “mixed uses of more than one principal commercial or industrial use may be located on one lot if the Planning Board finds that the uses are part of a single site plan, with cross easements for utilities and stormwater management, and access, ingress and egress utilizing shared, common driveways. ” (emphasis added) (Pa10-11).  Section 250-4’s requirement that cross easements be provided for utilities and stormwater management is a required condition that must be found by the Board to exist to allow “mixed uses of more than one principal commercial or industrial use” at the same Property.  This requirement applies equally to Plaintiffs’ proposal as to any other proposed mixed-use development in the Industrial Zone.  Accordingly, Plaintiffs would require a use variance to permit the proposed mixed use at the Property where Plaintiffs do not meet the enumerated requirements set forth within Section 250-4’s definition of “principal use. ”  The trial court correctly directed Plaintiff to appear before the Zoning Board and this decision should be affirmed.
[brief] This allegation must be credited on a Motion to Dismiss.  Indeed, the contrast between this action and *Pivnick v. Beck* is plain from a reading of that decision.  The *Pivnick* Court described the case before thus “In this case Plaintiff attempted to prove malpractice by contradicting a solemn doctrine that was clear on its face. ”  *Pivnick*.  Supra. at P.491 (emphasis added).  Here, Plaintiff alleges that “[...] negligently drafted the Will of [...] so that it was found to be vague and ambiguous by the Court, and the Court’s holding resulted in an award to [...] for the forgiveness of the mortgage, which was contrary to [...]’s intent and which damaged [...] and [...]’s estate.  As set forth by the Pivnick Court, in order for the doctrine of collateral estoppel to apply, the party asserting the bar must show that: (1) the issue to be precluded is identical to the issue decided in the previous proceeding; (2) the issue was actually litigated in the prior action i.e., there was a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the prior action; (3) a final judgment on the merits was issued in prior proceeding; (4) the determination of the issue was essential to prior judgement; and (5) the party against whom preclusion is asserted was a party to or in privity with a party to the earlier proceeding.
[brief] The adverbial phrase “now, in the past, or in the future” modifies claims “that were, have been or could have been . . . asserted or alleged” by the [...] class members in that lawsuit at that time.  The furthest ¶1.29 can therefore reach is to related claims that had accrued by the date of final judgment, which had yet to be “asserted or alleged” by the [...] class members as of that date, but which could have been “asserted or alleged” sometime “in the future” absent the entry of final judgment and dismissal with prejudice.  Nothing in the 2015 Settlement clearly indicates that the [...] class members agreed to exculpate [...] or its corporate successor for future claims arising from future misconduct.
[brief] “The affidavit-of-merit statute cannot apply to those professional negligence claims that can proceed without expert testimony. ”  Levinson v. D'Alfonso & Stein, 320 N.J. Super. 312, 321 (App Div. 1999) (citing Keeper v. Janelli, 317 N.J. Super. 309, 313 (Law. Div. 1999), overruled on other grounds).  In other words, an expert is not necessary to demonstrate that a defendant breached a duty of care simply because the defendant is an engineer.  Hubbard ex rel. Hubbard v. Reed, 168 N.J. 387, 394 (2001) (holding that an affidavit of merit was not required in a case where a dentist removed the wrong tooth); see also Klimko v. Rose, 84 N.J. 496 (1980) (stating that if expert opinion is not required, neither is an affidavit of merit).  Where the allegations do not require proof of a deviation from a professional standard of care, no affidavit or expert testimony is required.  Syndicate 1245 at Lloyd's v. Walnut Advisory Corp., 721 F. Supp. 2d 307, 315 (D.N.J. 2010).  Claims against licensed professionals that require proof of ordinary negligence do not require expert testimony.  Estate of Chin v. Saint Barnabas Med. Ctr., 160 N.J. 454, 469 (1999).
[brief] Respondent was not allowed to “roll the dice by attempting to file an Involuntary Disability Application” (Db36).  Appellant filed the involuntary disability application (Da15, Par.3) pursuant to N.J.A.C 17:4-6.10 and as required by the Separation Agreement.  The involuntary disability process can only be filed by the Appellant and therefore Appellant’s “roll the dice” argument was neither contemplated by the Separation Agreement nor was it the intent of the parties, nor is it factual.  Appellant’s argument on appeal relies on continued misrepresentations.
[brief] This testimony clearly had the capacity to mislead the jury given the jury verdict may suggest the jury believed that plaintiff fell at a location other than where plaintiff testified she fell.  This jury should not have been able to consider [...]’s testimony that was essentially a lay interpretation of the video footage of the plaintiff’s fall that the jury was just as qualified to make on its own and the inability of the defense to authenticate the information [...] relied upon and establish the soundness of the methodology he employed to come to his speculative conclusion.  Accordingly, the plaintiff respectfully submits that the judgment should be reversed and the matter remanded for a new trial.
[brief] The trial court erred by misreading Rule 4:87-1(b) to hold that “a formal accounting is not required in every case” a beneficiary requests one, and may be compelled at the Court’s discretion.  As a result, the court denied Plaintiff’s simple request for a judgment requiring Defendant “to present and settle an account of his administration of the Estate and Trust. ”  (Pa7 ¶ 15(a)).  In “skip[ping] a few words[,]” 1T7:1–7, contained in the statutory edict, the trial court misapplied the statute enacted to protect/safeguard the beneficiary’s rights, in favor of allowing a fiduciary to conceal his activities.  The trial court erred in failing to require that Defendant account, if for no other reason than to ensure that the assets of the Estate and Trust that are subject to the court’s oversight, and have been entrusted to Defendant by the Court, have been properly administered.  Plaintiff requests that this Court reverse the trial court’s dismissal with prejudice of his Verified Complaint (and subsequent denial of his motion for reconsideration), and enter an Order compelling Defendant to file an accounting of the account’s transactions.
[brief] Finally, the failure to suppress this statement was not harmless.  As our Supreme Court has noted, “it is rare that an unconstitutionally secured confession is deemed harmless beyond a reasonable doubt . . . [because] ‘inculpatory remarks by a defendant have a tendency to resolve jurors’ doubts about a defendant’s guilt to his detriment. ’”  State v. Carrion, 249 N.J. 253, 284 (2021) (citations omitted); see McCloskey, 90 N.J. at 31 (holding that courts \(^4\)  In the seventh step of the “Reid technique,” officers are encouraged to present an “alternative” in which the interrogee is given two incriminating choices concerning some aspect of the crime, one which is more socially unacceptable than the other.  See [...], The Reid Technique of Interviewing and Interrogation 22-23 (2014).  should apply the “harmless error doctrine sparingly” in cases where “the State has violated defendant’s privilege against self-incrimination”; see also State v. Tillery, 238 N.J. 293, 334 n.3 (2019) ([...], dissenting) (collecting cases rejecting harmless error claims).
[brief] See Jock v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, Twp. of Wall, 184 N.J. 562, 597 (2005);  The trial court overlooked settled law that a planning board may impose conditions to safeguard the public interest, so long as the conditions are reasonable and advance the purposes of zoning.  See generally, Berninger v. Board of Adjustment, 254 N.J. Super. 401 (App. Div. 1991); aff’d o.b., 127 N.J. 226 (1992) ; Aldrich v. Schwartz, 258 N.J. Super. 300, 311 (App. Div. 1991).  Based on the foregoing, a trial court may only set aside a condition in a land use approval if it is arbitrary, unreasonable or capricious.  The trial court made no such finding.  Moreover, why shouldn’t the affordable housing residents of Building E be entitled to an elevator just like the residents of the other project buildings, and why should the residents and guests of Building E be placed at risk.  While [...] argues that the elevator is not required under the UCC, it concedes that the UCC sets forth only the minimum standards for construction ([...] Rb45); development approvals may require compliance with higher standards.  See Cherry Hill Towers, L.L.C. v. Township of Cherry Hill, 407 F.Supp.2d 648, 653 (D.N.J. 2006).  The Settlement Agreement did not, and cannot, mandate the Planning Board approve or rubber stamp the [...]’s site plan application.  There is also nothing in the Settlement Agreement that required the Planning Board to compromise the safety and welfare of its first responders or of the future residents and guests of Building E.  It is not for the courts to substitute its conception of what the public welfare requires in place of the conception of the local land use body.
[brief] 10, 24 - **Hargett v. Hamilton Park Opco, LLC**, 477 N.J. Super. 390 (App. Div. 2023)  ............ 13 - **Haviland v. Lourdes Medical Center of Burlington County**, 250 N.J. 368 (2022)  .... 11 - **Mayfield v. Cmty. Med. Assocs., P.A.**, 335 N.J. Super. 198 (App. Div. 2000) .......... 10 - **Medeiros v. O’Donnell & Naccarato, Inc.**, 347 N.J. Super. 536 (App. Div. 2002) .... 11 - **Meehan v. Antonellis**, 226 N.J. 216 (2016)