ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] With respect to materiality, a misrepresentation on an application for insurance is considered to be “material” if it “naturally and reasonably influenced the judgment of the underwriter in making the contract at all, or in estimating the degree or character of the risk, or in fixing the rate of premiums. ”  \textit{Manzo}, 122 N.J. 104, 115.  Here, [...]’s underwriting --- \(^5\) Exhibit J was submitted to the trial court by email to account for confidential portions thereof not pertinent to this appeal.  The relevant portions of Exhibit J are filed herewith as part of Plaintiff’s Appendix. guidelines specifically provide that 12-15 passenger vans are ineligible for non-owned/hired auto coverage.  (Pa008).  Thus, [...] would not have made “the contract at all” if accurate information had been provided.  Manzo, 122 N.J. 104, 115.
[brief] According to a "Memo to File" from [...]'s office, dated March 24, 2010, an employee named "[...]" from [...] called and asked why Rigg's cut sheets did not match [...]'s current plans.  Rigg's employee wrote:  "I explained to him that the plans that we were given to provide the layout was (sic) the original set dated 4/11/05.  We only recently received a newer set because we have been asked to do additional work onsite.  He now understood."  (Pa437).  This constituted an admission of error by [...].
[brief] As our Supreme Court has explained, our State is committed to an “affirmative policy of submission” and an interpretation of the relevant law that “scrutinizes the defendant's conduct with a view toward preventing the transformation of arrests into melees and tragedy. ”  *State v. Brannon*, 178 N.J. 500, 508-09 (2004), rev’d, 358 N.J. Super. 96 (App. Div. 2003).  “[W]hen a police officer is acting in good faith and under color of his authority, a person must obey the officer's order to stop and may not take flight without violating N.J.S.A. 2C:29–1. ”  *State v. Crawley*, 187 N.J. at 451–52.  Even though a judge may later determine that the stop was unsupported by reasonable and articulable suspicion, no one has a constitutional right to endanger lives by fleeing or resisting a stop or to use an improper stop to justify committing “the new and distinct offense of resisting arrest, eluding, escape, or obstruction, thus precipitating a dangerous chase that could have deadly consequences.
[brief] See, In re Petition for Referendum to Repeal Ordinance 2354-12 of the [...], 233 N.J. 589 (2015) (explaining inability of attorney to deliver a clean bond opinion if lawsuit filed within statutory bond estoppel period); Pa219-SJCS #44; #45).  \(^6\)  See, N.J.S.A. 2C:30-4 “Disbursement of Money or Incurring of Obligations by Public Officials in Excess off Appropriations or Limit. ” whether [...] paid "prevailing wages" in the Flex Parking Removal Project;\(^7\) (6) whether defendant [...] received a quid pro quo campaign contribution from her landlord after the adoption of the contested capital bond ordinance; and (7) whether the March 7, 2023 appropriation rescission resolution was a sham mooting cover-up artifice and device. \(^8\)  Although plaintiff voluntarily waived his nominal “Side Show Bob” defamation “gaslighting” monetary damage claims, plaintiff preserved his reckless/intentional and "willful blindness" political free speech suppression civil rights act violation claims, causes of actions and remedies.  Defendants obfuscated this factual and legal political free speech suppression issue.
[brief] There were several components to the Watson Court’s ruling on first-time in-court identifications.  First, there was the substantive holding: “first-time in-court identifications can be conducted only when there is ‘good reason’ for them. ”  Watson, 254 N.J. at 587.  Second, there was the procedural holding setting forth three “practices going forward for proposed first-time in-court identifications. ”  Ibid.  The three procedural rules were clearly a new rule of law and clearly apply “to future cases” “going forward. ”  Id. at 589.  However, it is not clear, contrary to the State’s assertion, that the Court intended to limit the application of its substantive holding to future cases only.
[directive] Death likely …  …  Save life- longer-term expectancy < within 1 year years survival (medical 5 years despite assessment of despite successful prospects for successful treatment of survival after treatment of acute hospital acute condition discharge) condition #SOFA= Sequential Organ Failure Assessment; note that another measure of acute physiology that predicts in-hospital mortality, such as LAPS2 score, could be used in place of SOFA, but should similarly be divided into 4 ranges.
[brief] THE NOVEMBER 8, 2023 ORDER SHOULD BE AFFIRMED BECAUSE APPELLANTS FAILED TO STATE A CLAIM UNDER THE CFA (RAISED BELOW – 2T24:21-31:1)  Even if this Court disagrees with the trial court and finds that the Concession Recovery Provision constitutes an unlawful penalty, the usual effect of such a finding is to declare the provision unenforceable.  Holtham v. Lucas, 460 N.J. Super. 308, 317 (App.  Div. 2019) (holding that if a liquidated damages clause is unreasonable, “courts will deem such damages ‘penalties’ and will not enforce them”).  Because [...] dismissed its Complaint with prejudice, it cannot seek to enforce the Provision against Appellants.  Appellants seek to transform a traditional defense into an affirmative consumer fraud class claim under the CFA.  As the trial court found, however, Appellants utterly failed to allege a viable claim under the CFA.  “To state a claim under the CFA, an individual must plead an unlawful practice, ascertainable loss, and a causal relationship between the two. ”  Robey v. SPARC Grp. LLC, 256 N.J. 541, 555 (2024).  Although Appellants claim that CFA claims should be construed with liberality, (Db17), the New Jersey Supreme Court has recently reiterated that a CFA claim is a fraud claim and subject to the heightened pleading standard of Rule 4:5-8, which requires a plaintiff to plead the “particulars of the wrong[.]”  Id. at 554.  The Court further reaffirmed that a CFA claim is properly dismissed at the pleading stage if plaintiff fails to adequately plead the three elements of a viable CFA claim.
[brief] A condominium is created when the owner of real property records a “master deed” submitting his property to the Condominium Act and condominium form of ownership.  N.J.S.A. 46:8B-3m.  The term “condominium” is legal in nature and expressly defined by the Act as “…[a] form of ownership of real property under a master deed providing for ownership by one or more owners of units of improvements together with an undivided interest in common elements appurtenant to each such unit. ”  N.J.S.A. 46:8B-3h.  Generally speaking, a condominium’s property consists of the ‘condominium units’ and the ‘common elements. ’  Under the condominium form of ownership, each ‘condominium unit’ has an appurtenant interest in the condominium’s common elements.  N.J.S.A. 46:8B-6.  Each time a “condominium unit” is transferred, so to is that unit’s appurtenant interest in the common elements.  Id.  In essence, each owner of a condominium unit has an undivided interest in the common elements.  The ‘condominium units’ may be sold like any other parcel of real property.  N.J.S.A. 46:8B-3.  The “common elements,” however, “…shall remain undivided and shall not be the object of an action for partition or division. ”  N.J.S.A. 46:8B-6.  In this respect, the Condominium Act prohibits portions of the common elements from being sold.
[brief] 1)  "That [...] and [...] committed the crime of robbery. ”  2)  That [...] did aid or attempt to aid [...] and [...] in planning and committing the robberies.  3)  That [...]’s purpose was to promote or facilitate the commission of the offenses.  4)  That [...] possessed the criminal state that is required to be proved against the person who actually committed the criminal acts.  (15T 145-146-15 to 3)
[brief] The foregoing language appears in boldface, capital letters and was included in an arbitration clause that Plaintiff accepted by signing the Agreement.  At the onset, paragraph 7, advises the consumer that it is a "Waiver Of Jury Trial."  Further, as mandated by the New Jersey Supreme Court in Atalese, the arbitration agreement presents a clear and unambiguous waiver of rights.  It clearly apprises the consumer, in this case the Plaintiffs, in bold lettering that by accepting the terms of the arbitration agreement, they were "waiving" their right "to seek legal remedies in court, including the right to a jury trial."  By its terms, Plaintiff’s agreement to arbitrate applies broadly to any dispute arising under this Agreement or from Participant's use of the Park or participation in Park activities.  As all of the claims asserted in the Complaint involve either Plaintiff's use of the Park or personal injury, these claims fall squarely within the scope of the arbitration clause and must be resolved in arbitration.  The arbitration clause explicitly informed Plaintiff that by agreeing to arbitration, he was waiving the right to a judicial adjudication of their disputes.  This clause appropriately informs Plaintiff of the consequences of the agreement to arbitrate.  The arbitration agreement includes the necessary terms and provisions such that it must be enforced pursuant to the above-cited case law and public policy favoring arbitration.  The Trial Court rejected the Plaintiffs' claims that the Agreement is ambiguous stating:
[directive] (This 2C:34-1(a)(b)(c)(4)  Prostitution  Disorderly Persons  $500 to $1,000 10% permissible excludes promoting prostitution or owning or controlling a house of prostitution or soliciting another to become a prostitute)  Possession of Actor possesses 50 grams or less of marijuana, including any adulterants or dilutants, or five 2C:35-10a(4)  Disorderly Persons $500 to $1,000 10% permissible CDS or Analog grams or less of hashish.  Failure to Turn
[brief] (2T:15-3 to 8, 17-3 to 11)  [...] handed his driver’s license to a detective upon request.  (2T:17-8 to 11)  As recorded on the BWC, [...] explained to the detectives that he was on his way to work; to illustrate, he reached for an orange work vest from the backseat of the car, displayed it for the detectives, and then placed the vest in his lap as the conversation continued.  (2T:18-2 to 15; Da26 at 01:50 to 02:00)  ⁶  [...] initially testified that the driver also failed to use his turn signal.  (2T:14-5 to 6)  But on the video played at the hearing, a detective states that [...] did in fact use his turn signal.  (Da25 at 05:35 to 05:42)  After the video was played at the hearing, [...] had to acknowledge that he must have been mistaken.  (2T:45-7 to 11)  The court elected not to consider this supposed traffic infraction in its analysis.
[brief] See Davis, 417 F. App'x at 203.  Second, Plaintiff’s presence at [...]’s meeting with students regarding the [...] Incident, which [...]—not Plaintiff—reported, also cannot constitute protected activity because her employer knew nothing about it.  As discussed above, the [...] Incident related to a teacher’s use of a racial slur in front of her students (not directed at anyone in particular) in what she had perceived was a teachable moment, and not out of any animus.  Furthermore, the written reprimand of [...], dated January 4, 2019, upon which [...] was copied, was from [...] alone, not Plaintiff.  Nor was there any mention of Plaintiff in the written account of the [...] Incident in the reprimand.  (Da272; Pl. Tr. 252:1-7; 253:18-21).  The factual record also establishes that although [...] later sent an email reporting the January 2019 [...] Incident to [...] (“[...]”) (the “[...]’s [...] Report”), Plaintiff was not referred to in the email, she was not copied on the email, she did not send the email, and [...] did not “sign” the email on behalf of Plaintiff either.  (Pa384).  Defendants, therefore, were completely unaware Plaintiff was involved in the [...] Incident.  Indeed, [...] testified that he did not know Plaintiff was involved in reporting the [...] Incident and also did not recall seeing Plaintiff referred to in [...]’s [...] Report.  ([...] Tr. 66:21-25; 84:4- Thus, even assuming arguendo that Plaintiff did provide assistance to [...] in drafting the email, as there is no evidence in the record that Plaintiff’s employer knew of her involvement, she cannot establish the second element of a prima facie case of retaliation: that she was engaged in protected activity known to the employer.
[brief] Both insurance policies are enclosed . . . . . . . . . . . .  R-650  April 22, 2021 letter from [...] to [...] claiming to enclose copies of both the 611 and 538 policies . . . . . . . . . . . .  R-652  Letter dated July 8, 2020 from [...] enclosing Power of Attorney to act on behalf of [...] with regard to the 611 and 538 Insurance policies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  R-654  Copy of Insurance check for 538-policy for $545,181.82 endorsed on the back by the [...] and [...] on July 28, 2020 . . . . . . . . . . . .  R-681  Copy of Insurance check to [...] for $350,025.60 endorsed by [...] and the [...] on July 22, 2020  .  . . . . . . . . . . .  R-699  Certification of Services for [...] on behalf of [...] .
[brief] The Trial Court reasoned that Appellant failed to establish it had a right to “return” the First Wire Transfer and was required to provide a credit for the sum inarguably received.  The court reasoned that Appellant’s decision to send the funds to [...] was not supported by the law and constituted a “ridiculously silly business decision. ”  Furthermore, applying equitable considerations, the Trial Court ruled that the alleged de minimis balance due on the loan should be discharged under the Doctrine of Equitable Estoppel.  This Court should swiftly affirm the Trial Court’s well-reasoned decision.
[brief] (Da 1-4)  Between September 20 and October 1, 2018, a jury trial was held before the Hon. [...], P.J. Cr., after which [...] was convicted of counts one through three; count four was dismissed.  (Da 5-8)  However, on February 15, 2022, this Court reversed [...]’s convictions and remanded for a new trial.  (Da 9-45)  Among other errors, this Court found that [...] was denied a fair trial by the trial court’s failure to redact from [...]’s video-recorded police statement several inadmissible lay opinions offered by the interviewing --- 1
[brief] ”).  Such esoteric issues can be contrasted with those commonplace topics which do not require the assistance of expert testimony.  See e.g., Berger v. Shapiro, 30 N.J. 89, 101-02 (1959) (expert not needed to explain hazard posed by a missing brick in top step of porch).  In this case, there is no support for Plaintiff’s allegation that the paint used by [...] was not appropriate for the stairs.  The unrefuted evidence is that the paint was recommended by an authorized [...] retailer.  (Pa449, 9:11-22; Pa450, 10:9-14).  The specifications for the paint bear the title “Latex Floor & Patio” and are described as appropriate for exterior use on patios.  (Pa397-398).  Plaintiff says that such paint was not the “walking finish” paint that [...] referred to in its estimate.  (Pb21).  Plaintiff never quite explains why he thinks this, but instead merely asserts that it is “undisputed” that [...] did not use “walking finish” paint.  (Pb24).  **This assertion is wrong.
[brief] The trial court was correct in determining that the two 2021 photos of the surveillance camera on [...] were irrelevant and not properly authenticated since nobody could testify that they were present and functional at the time of the incident.  (14T: 115-3 to 14; 14T: 142-4 to 6; 15T: 11-4 to 9; 15T: 51-7 to 53-19).  Thus, they were inadmissible under the Rules of Evidence, as they were not relevant nor properly authenticated.  Accordingly, defendant’s claims to the contrary should be dismissed and his convictions affirmed.
[brief] The contract negotiations addressed how the time for performance should be determined, including the Commencement Date that started the 300-day clock running for [...] to achieve substantial completion.  In this respect, [...]’s counsel noted the terms should "take into account the possible delay by the Borough Engineer in the review and approval of any site plan regarding drainage, etc.  Experience has shown that such review can take time."  (Pa0208).  [...] was charged by the arbitrator with the knowledge that his lawyer had about possible delay resulting from obtaining Township approvals; and, in retrospect [...]’s counsel’s comment was prescient.  [...] also informed [...] that its scope of work included identifying "possible variances and design waivers that would have to be applied for."  Earlier, [...] had advised [...] and [...] that its site place work would include "environmental protection calculations” and deviations from the Township standards would require a variance.  (Pa0208).  Moreover, the termination letter did not attempt to specify which party was responsible for what period of delay.  The termination letter referred to the fact that the [...]s had “become very disappointed with the pace of this project” and that “we are now significantly beyond the completion date set forth in the subject agreements.  At the same time, the pending change orders indicate that the original allowances were substantially deficient.  This particularly concerns the cost for windows. ”  The termination letter also failed to provide the required opportunity for cure.  (Pa0209).  The arbitrator found that [...] was on notice as to the possible need for an EP waiver from the outset.  [...] advised him of that possibility in both professional services agreements.  In addition, the CC Article 2.6 says the substantial completion date shall be extended due to “any delay caused by Lender, Owner, or municipality.
[directive] Judiciary Formulário Complementar de Declaração Judicial Não Negociada Supplemental Plea Form for Non-Negotiated Pleas (Portuguese)  Este formulário deverá ser preenchido somente nos processos em que o réu esteja se declarando culpado com base na manifestação do juiz sobre qual será a sentença máxima.  This form should be filled out only in cases where the defendant is pleading guilty based on the judge's representation as to what the maximum sentence will be.
[brief] This distinction is not arbitrary but reflects the reality of the passage of the MSRA.  It was only after the governing authority of the City vested with the State that the Director was given the authority to unilaterally modify the terms of the [...]’s expired CNA.  Employees who retired prior to the City’s designation under MSRA received their full terminal leave.  Employees that retired after were capped at $15,000.  Plaintiffs’ suggestion that “[s]ome post-November 9, 2016 retirees received deferred compensation . . . in excess of (i.e., $150,000) or comparable to . . . what Plaintiffs seek as part of this lawsuit” is knowingly misleading.  (Pb43–44).  In this regard, the individuals identified by Plaintiffs as receiving payments in excess of $15,000 post-November 9, 2016 did not retire post-MSRA; rather, these former police officers retired pre-MSRA, but only received payouts post-MSRA, two of whom had executed settlement agreements with the City prior to the adoption of the MRSA relating to terminal leave.  Where, as here, the MSRA is not arbitrary, but rather “satisf[ies] the important public purpose of stabilizing [...]” (First Police Decision at 38, Pa000301), Plaintiffs fail to state a claim for due process and equal protection claims.
[brief] ”)  Approximately 2 seconds before the collision, [...] stepped onto --- 10  Plaintiff disputed this fact (Pa764, ¶57) in her opposition papers without providing any basis for the dispute, and her expert agrees with the fact. the railroad crossing in front of the oncoming train, which was imminently about to enter the crossing.  Pa1152 at 16:33:33; Pa222-235, 281-319. \footnote{Plaintiff disputed this fact (Pa764, ¶58) in her opposition papers without providing any basis for the dispute, and the video and stills clearly show the moment [...] stepped onto the crossing.}
[brief] LEGAL ARGUMENT SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT  The question of whether an insurance broker may be subject to liability under the CFA for the performance of brokerage services was answered in the negative by this Court in 2006.  Supreme Court jurisprudence makes clear that the CFA exemption applies to learned and semi-professionals as the nature of the services they render are beyond the ordinary commercial seller of goods and services and do not fall into the category of consumerism.  Since 2006, [...], [...], and other insurance producers have relied upon this exemption to avoid the application of the CFA to claims concerning the professional nature of services they render to clients.  The trial court recognized the continued precedential value of Plemmons and correctly dismissed Plaintiff’s CFA claims.  Plaintiff would now like this Court to use Shaw to hold in opposite of what courts in New Jersey have done for the last 18 years.  But Plaintiff offers this Court no special justification why this case should be the one to cause the Court to deviate from precedent.  Shaw did not “overrule” or “supersede” the overall exemption from the CFA for insurance brokers.  Unlike Plemmons and the trial court, Shaw did not answer the question of whether an insurance broker is subject to liability under the CFA.  Instead, Shaw rejected the expansion of the CFA exemption to home inspectors based on concerns that the exception would swallow the rule and, in that context, returned the focus of the analysis to the “nature of services provided” to determine if the professional services rendered are beyond ordinary commercialism.  Shaw must be read for what it is – not what Plaintiff would like it to be.  But even if this Court undertakes another analysis of the application of the CFA to insurance brokers, the result here would still require dismissal of the CFA claims.  Plaintiff concedes that Defendants rendered professional, licensed services when assisting in the procurement of specific insurance to meet Plaintiff’s particular needs.  Plaintiff further proffers an expert whose curriculum vitae evidences the learning and erudition needed to be an insurance broker.  That Plaintiff produced an Affidavit of Merit places Defendants on the same short list of exempt professionals with doctors, lawyers, and architects.  This Court’s intent to curb the expansion of the CFA exemption in Shaw does not render Plemmons “overruled” or “superseded,” nor necessitate shrinking the exemption “to historically ‘learned professionals’ like doctors and lawyers,” as Plaintiff suggests.  While undertaking another analysis of the learned and semi-professional exemption is unnecessary as Plemmons is dispositive, it confirms that the trial court’s decision should be affirmed.  I.
[brief] [...]’s failure to enforce the Genesis Deed’s restrictions or its own rules threatened [...]’s ability to provide its members with beachfront access.  Indeed, during a July 25, 1948 [...] general meeting—one of the entity’s first— [...] of the Budget Comm. summarized the growth of [...].  [...] made a report that the beach actually belongs to [...]; [...] as of today\(^2\) deeded the beach over to [...] indefinitely.  Plot of land on Lagoon was also donated by [...] to build club house on.  All restrictions must be followed at all times in order to have a nice community.  (Da528).  --- \(^2\)  The July 25, 1948 minutes of the [...] general meeting contain a notation in the margin indicating that the deed was not recorded until November 29, 1948, (see Da528), which is also consistent with the historical deeds obtained from the [...] and discussed above.