ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The [...] foreclosed on [...]’s property to recover a tax debt that was much lower than the property’s value.  It later sold the property to a third party for $101,000 and retained all proceeds.  Even according to the City’s most aggressive claim about the size of the debt (which conflicts with its own numbers elsewhere) this amounted to a $55,000 windfall at [...]’s expense.  (Ja195, No. 36).  Pursuant to the United States Supreme Court’s unanimous holding in Tyler v. Hennepin County, 598 U.S. 631 (2023), that was a taking without just compensation.  The court below did not dispute that conclusion, but it held that Tyler does not apply retroactively to this case and that [...]’s claims are time-barred by laches. (Ja407, 415–16).
[brief] At the time of his death, [...] was serving as a General Partner overseeing the Company’s six funeral homes because his \begin{itemize} \item \textsuperscript{10}  10T- May 12, 2021  Transcript \item \textsuperscript{11}  11T- May 18, 2021  Transcript \item \textsuperscript{12}  12T- May 21, 2021  Transcript \item \textsuperscript{13}  13T- July 30, 2021  Transcript \item \textsuperscript{14}  14T- August 10, 2021  Transcript \item \textsuperscript{15}  15T- October 29, 2021  Transcript \item \textsuperscript{16}  16T- November 16, 2021  Transcript \item \textsuperscript{17}  17T- February 7, 2022  Transcript \item \textsuperscript{18}  18T- February 11, 2022  Transcript \item \textsuperscript{19}  19T- April 4, 2022  Transcript \item \textsuperscript{20}  20T- April 20, 2022  Transcript \item \textsuperscript{21}  21T- April 28, 2022  Transcript \item \textsuperscript{22}  22T- October 28, 2022  Transcript  \end{itemize} father, [...], was medically incapacitated.
[directive] If disclosure of a BWC recording as part of the State’s discovery obligations in a prosecution might present a danger to any officer or civilian (e.g., reveal an undercover officer, confidential informant, surveillance site, etc.), or might reveal confidential tactical information the disclosure of which might jeopardize future operations or officer safety (e.g., verbal codes or hand signals used to communicate information or BODY WORN CAMERA POLICY | May 2021 21 instructions, techniques for interior movements and clearing rooms during execution of warrant, techniques for convincing persons to open doors during warrant execution, etc.), the County Prosecutor or designee, or Director of the Division of Criminal Justice or designee in cases prosecuted by the Division, shall, in the exercise of sound prosecutorial discretion, take such steps as are appropriate and authorized by law and/or Court Rule to protect the information from disclosure, such as by seeking a protective order from the court.  See Section 7.3 (“tagging” of such BWC recordings).  9.6  Third-Party Storage and Maintenance.
[brief] The main issues on appeal concern the application of N.J.S. A. 59:4-2.  More specifically, whether the Defendant, [...], had notice of a dangerous condition on its property at the time of the Defendant's accident.  It is respectfully submitted that the Defendant, [...] had notice of the dangerous condition of its property at the time of the Plaintiffs accident within the meaning of N.J.S.A. 59:4-2.  As set forth more fully below, the Trial Court erred in granting summary judgment.
[brief] After all, Defendants never disputed at trial, on appeal, or on remand, that the CFA applied. \(^5\)  Given the fact that home improvements are legislatively-mandated as “merchandise” under the Act, there is no reason for further argument below.  See Point I, Ante at 15. N.5.  This Court stated:  The court never engaged in this analysis and did not make findings of fact or conclusions of law as to whether the nature of the transaction between the parties satisfies the CFA definition of "merchandise" under All the Way Towing.  On remand, we direct the court to also engage in this analysis and make findings of fact and conclusions of law anew.  [Pa159].  After its erroneous findings about [...], “the court [again] never engaged in this analysis and did not make findings of fact or conclusions of law as to whether the nature of the transaction between the parties satisfies the CFA definition of "merchandise" under All the Way Towing. ”  After five years, justice should not be delayed further.  The case should be remanded with instructions to enter judgment in Plaintiffs’ favor.
[brief] On June 22, 2022, the Appellant-Plaintiff appeared for her deposition that was conducted virtually via Zoom.  A transcript of the deposition is presented annexed hereto as an Appendix to the Appellant’s Brief.  The Appellant-Plaintiff was questioned about her injuries and treatment.  Towards the end of her deposition, the questions were focused on the Appellant-Plaintiff’s subjective observations of pain.  An excerpt of this exchange is as follows:  Q: Do you still experience any pain?  A. No.  Q.  You have no more pain?  A.  No more pain from my chest. no. and my back, no.  Q.  Okay.  So as we sit here right now. you have no more pain as a result of this accident?  A.  No, not that I can say.  Q.  When is the last time you had chest pain?  A. From the accident? I don't remember.  Q.  Have you had any neck pain as a result of this accident on 2022?  A.  Not that I can say, no.  Q. Okay.  And no back pain either?  A. No.  No.  Q. Okay.  Anything that's difficult to do because of the accident now?  A. No.  Only when I pass that area, but otherwise.  No.  I get-  (Simultaneous speaking)  Q.  Sorry.  I didn’t understand.  A.  It’s okay.  Q.  You were saying?  A. don't have any physical that I can say its because of the accident.  Q. Okay.  A. No.  It's been three years almost.  Q. Okay.  And the chiropractic care seems to have helped you.  A. Yes.  (Pl.’s Dep. Tr. 50:2-25 and 51:1-20)
[brief] 15  I.  Standard of Review.  (See Trial Briefs).  ............................................................................. 16  II.  In Finding Criterion (b) Inapplicable, the Trial Court Erroneously Contorted the Plain Meaning of Statutory Words and Utilized a Tortuous Explanation to Reach its Conclusion.  (Not Raised Below)  ..............................................................................................................................................  18  A.  The Record Clearly Establishes that the Commercial Use of the Property has been Discontinued.  (T3, 14:4-11).  .........................................................................................  19  1.  Criterion (b) is Satisfied Upon the Simple Finding of Discontinuance of a Commercial Use.  (T3, 17:1-20)  .................................................. 20  2.  Remediation is not a Use and Remediation does not Automatically Require Discontinuance of Use.  (T3, 21:13-22:4) ..... 24  3.  Evidence of Abandonment is not Required in Order to Find Discontinuance of Use.  (Not Raised Below)  .........................................................  26  4.  Illegal Vacancy is not a Commercial Use.  (T, 20:12-21:9).  .................. 28  B.  Despite Finding that the Property was Untenantable, the Trial Court Found that Criterion (b) was not Satisfied.  (See Trial Briefs)  ...........................................................................................................  31  III.  The Trial Court Erred in Concluding that the Record Lacked Substantial Credible Evidence to Satisfy Criterion (d).
[brief] Exhibit E to Certification, April 26, 2022, [...] and [...] Coverage Denial Letter, filed October 10, 2023  Exhibit F to Certification, May 24, 2023, letter to [...], filed October 10, 2023  Exhibit G to Certification, June 19, 2023, letter from [...] counsel, filed October 10, 2023  Exhibit H to Certification, Rodriguez-Ortiz v. Interstate Racking & Shelving, II, Inc., A-1614-19 (App. Div. Jan. 27, 2021) (unpublished), filed October 10, 2023
[brief] A.  The Crash  On August 4, 2018, [...] was driving the subject 2016 Honda CR-V southbound on CR 657, a two-lane road.  Pa6-7; Pa431.  In the five seconds before the crash, she was driving between 47 and 50 mph.  Pa479.  [...] veered to the left, crossed over the center line into northbound traffic, and crashed head-on with a 2011 Ford Escape driven by [...].  Pa431, 471.  Both [...] and [...] died as a result of injuries sustained in the crash.  Pa7-8; Pa429-32.  The 2016 Honda CR-V complied with all relevant government standards.  Pa194-95.  Plaintiff’s expert conceded that there is no “federal or state law that requires the inclusion of every possible technology, even those that may be considered safety systems on every vehicle. ”  Pa192.  Further, Plaintiff’s expert admitted that he could not identify any “mechanical failure” in the subject vehicle that caused the crash.  Pa179.  B.
[brief] On summation, defendant referred to multiple hearsay statements relied upon by the experts to support the insanity defense, so much so that the AP noted that a limiting instruction was required due to “a plethora of inadmissible hearsay referred to, for the truth of the matter asserted.  I lost count of the number of times that happened. ” (15T97-19 to 98-1).  An instruction was given at that time.
[brief] In fact, Plaintiff’s cases underscore the point that to impose liability, the product \textit{as designed} must be \textit{unreasonably dangerous}.  For example, in \textit{Crispin v. Volkswagenwerk AG}, 248 N.J. Super. 540, 544 (App. Div. 1991), plaintiff claimed a car seat was defective \textit{because its design was not strong enough to prevent its collapse} upon impact, and there was a stronger available seat design that would have.  \textit{See also Soler v. Castmaster, Div. of H.P.M. Corp.}, 98 N.J. 137, 146 (1984) (die-casting machine was unreasonably dangerous without safety device because \textit{as designed}, it could malfunction and start up while a person’s hands were in contact with its movable parts).  Here, the court correctly found that the danger posed by failing to correct a vehicle’s steering while veering into oncoming traffic does not make it defective; rather, it is a universally understood characteristic of a vehicle:
[brief] Finally, not only is the probative value of the evidence at issue outweighed by its prejudicial effect, there is absolutely no probative value to the testimonial evidence at issue.  In *State v. Carlucci*, the New Jersey Supreme Court reversed a defendant’s conviction for crack cocaine possession on the basis that the Trial Court erred in admitting the defendant’s statements that she used crack in the past and that she used crack cocaine two days prior to the incident at issue.  217 N.J. 129 (2014).  In overturning her conviction, our State’s highest court found that such statements were not relevant to any material issue in dispute and, even if they were, the minimal relevance would be substantially outweighed by the unfair prejudice.  *Id.* at 143.  In deciding the matter, the *Carlucci* Court reasoned that the statements would likely lead jurors to the conclusion that the defendant must have possessed the crack cocaine on the date at issue because she had a propensity for having used crack cocaine.  *Id.*  Similarly, the testimonial evidence at issue here is of no relevance to the material issue in dispute – the defendant’s intoxication level.  As set forth above, [...] cannot state whether such purported exposure impaired the defendant’s ability to operate a motor vehicle on the day in question.  In other words, she cannot opine as to whether the defendant was intoxicated due to exposure to cocaine.  The only purpose that the introduction of this evidence could achieve is to put into the Jurors’ minds the phantom of cocaine intoxication without actual evidence of it.  Since the introduction of this evidence would provide no probative value in comparison to its prejudicial effect, the trial court properly excluded it, and this court should deny the State’s motion for leave to appeal.
[brief] (Aa33-34).  DCF assessed the parties’ relative credibility and found that [...]’s allegations were specific and that her version of the events was corroborated by a witness statement and the video footage, whereas [...]’s account lacked specificity and consistency.  (Aa34).  DCF highlighted [...]’s acknowledgment that [...] yelled: “[[...]], I just want you to know [I am] in a protected class, by name is [D[a]], and you will respect me;”  DCF found that [...] would not have made that statement if [...] had not repeatedly misnamed her.  Ibid.  Under its preponderance burden, DCF found that [...] violated the State Policy.\(^4\) (Aa36).  In response, [...] renewed his claims about the purported procedural deficiencies that should invalidate DCF’s determination, to wit, that DCF did not advise him of his appeal rights or provide notice of its request for an extension.
[brief] As an alternative, [...] asserts that she can pursue a sexual harassment claim against State Respondents under the NJLAD’s public accommodation provisions, but the trial court properly rejected that argument.  (Ab43).  First, [...] never asserted a cause of action under the NJLAD’s public accommodation provision in any of her Superior Court Complaints.  (Pa1-Pa105).  Second, even if the court were to consider this argument, it fails on the merits because [...] is not considered a place of public accommodation as a matter of law.  See Doe v. Div. of Youth & Family Servs., 148 F.Supp.2d 462, 496 (D.N.J. 2001); Thomas v. Cnty. of Camden, 386 N.J. Super. 582 (2006); Ptaszynski v. Uwaneme, 371 N.J. Super. 333, 396 (2004).  For these reasons, the trial court’s order dismissing [...]’s Amended Complaint against State Respondents on reconsideration should be affirmed.
[brief] The Saldana Court held that a jury should determine whether the [...] was palpably unreasonable when it failed to secure dilapidated, abandoned city buildings after a third party started a fire in one of them.  275 N.J. Super. at 488.  The Foster Court held that whether the [...]’s failure to provide a lock for the front entrance of an apartment building, enabling a nonresident to enter and shoot a police officer accompanying a tenant, was palpably unreasonable should be left to the jury.  389 N.J. Super. at 87.  Accordingly, this Court should respectfully reverse the lower court’s grant of dismissal of Plaintiffs’ Complaint with prejudice and remand the matter back to the lower court for further proceedings.
[brief] N.J.S.A. 39:4-88(a) and (c) regulate which lane a vehicle should travel in “except when overtaking . . . another vehicle or in preparation for a left turn. ”  It is clear from the language immediately proceeding it that “left turn” is referring to a turn from one road onto another.  But in N.J.S.A. 39:4-126, the statute describes specific turning movements in the first sentence, followed by “so turn” in the second sentence, indicating that “turn” covers a wider range of movements in this section.  See State v. Rangel, 213 N.J. 500, 509 (2013) (noting that courts “do not view words and phrases in isolation but rather in their proper context”).  The meaning of “turn” also has to be understood in relation to the statutes’ different purposes; N.J.S.A. 39:4-126 regulates the signaling requirements when turning onto other roadways and changing lanes, while N.J.S.A. 39:4-88 regulates how motorists should travel in lanes.
[brief] The enabling statutes simply do not subject an insurer’s IFPA claims to PIP arbitration.  C.  The Law Division’s Analysis of N.J.S.A 39:6A-5.1(a) was Flawed.  The Law Division’s analysis of the relevant law was contrary to the clear language of the enabling statutes.  In analyzing what constitutes a “dispute,” the Law Division cited N.J.S.A. 39:6A-5.1(a):  “[a]ny dispute regarding the recovery of. . . benefits provided under personal injury protection coverage.  . . arising out of the operation, ownership, maintenance, or use of an automobile may be submitted to dispute resolution on the initiative of any party to the dispute . . .” (Pa0006, Pa0013, Pa0020-Pa0021).  However, the Law Division omitted the following pertinent language: “medical expense benefits or other benefits provided under personal injury protection coverage pursuant to [N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4] . . .”  (Ibid.).  Because of its failure to review and analyze N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4, the Law Division overlooked that the provision does not permit insurers, such as Plaintiffs, to recover “medical expense benefits” in dispute resolution.  In other words, AICRA was meant to be a one-way street: insureds, injured persons, and medical providers with a valid assignment of benefits can seek to recover “medical expense benefits” owed to them via arbitration, but the plain language of the statute does not enable insurers to seek recoupment of “medical expense benefits” already paid in that forum.  This critical omission in the Law Division’s analysis was a fatal flaw to its ultimate decision to dismiss Plaintiffs’ IFPA claims seeking reimbursement of “medical expense benefits” in favor of PIP arbitration.
[brief] ............... 36, 37  United Transportation Union v. Michigan Bar, 401 U.S. 576 (1971) ...............42  Vill. of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489 (1982)  ...........................................................................................................33  Visiting Homemaker Serv. of Hudson Cty. v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 380 N.J. Super. 596 (App. Div. 2005) .................................................................9
[brief] All those certain lots, tracts or parcels of land or premises . . . which on a certain map entitled, “Map of Keansburg Heights, N.J. ” made by [...], Surveyor, dated June 3, 1909 and filed in the office of the Clerk of Monmouth County on June 25, 1909, are known and designated as Blocks “D” and “G”, and all right, title, and interest of party of first part in the streets, roads and avenues of said map and including the property marked beach on said above mentioned map, extending from the Raritan Bay back to the lot lines and extending the entire width of the map from lot no. 35 in Block E on the east to Lot No. 30 in Block G on the west.  See Pa0923-Pa0924.  Like the deed from [...] to [...], the deed from [...] to [...] did not expressly include riparian lands within the boundaries of the legal description of the tract that was being conveyed.
[brief] The first argument is that the “practical construction” of the lease establishes that Plaintiff and the LLC tenant intended to rescind the notice of lease termination.  The cited cases present the idea that when the wording of a contract is ambiguous the Court can look at the conduct of the parties to assist with interpreting the intent of the parties.  The practical construction argument is a rule of interpretation for ambiguous signed contracts.  As the Trial Court pointed out in its ruling, the May 6, 2016 letter issued by Plaintiff was never countersigned by either the Tenant LLC or any of the individual guarantors.  Nor is there any other signed writing that can be interpreted due to conduct.  Likewise, if conduct of the parties is to be considered, the conduct that would be relevant to the liability of the guarantors (the only issue contested in the appeal) would be the conduct of the individual guarantors.
[brief] Plaintiff, [...], (“Plaintiff”) is a New Jersey limited liability company created, owned, and managed by [...] (“[...]”) for the purpose of acquiring the home of the [...] located at [...] (the “Home”).  (1a).  [...] holds a master’s degree in business administration.  (70a, 7:24-8:2)  He describes himself presently as a self-employed builder.  (Id., 7:2-3).  Formerly, he worked as an accountant for [...] (Id., 8:12-20).  He also worked as a licensed real estate agent for a broker named [...] (Id., 9:13-20).  [...] holds no other licenses; specifically, he does not hold a license from the New Jersey Department of Banking and Insurance as a foreclosure consultant (70a, 9:7-15).  In or around January 2019, [...] was introduced to [...] by a builder named [...] (71a, 11:13-24).  The three met in the Nugent home.  (Id., 12:6-21).  [...] described the purpose of the first meeting as getting to know Lyndsay’s situation (71a, 12:25-13:6).  He learned Lyndsay was the sole care giver for three children (72a, 15:6-19), the home was in foreclosure, and in need of repairs (Id. 12:25-13:12).  The three met again about a week later (72a, 15:20-16:2).  [...] proposed to purchase the home from Lyndsay for an amount sufficient to get her out of foreclosure (Id., 17:12-18:11).  He also learned Lyndsay’s husband, third-party defendant, [...], co-owned the property and had been arrested a couple of months earlier.  (Id., 16:3-21).  On March 4, 2019, [...] visited [...] in jail and got him to sign a deed transferring the home into Lyndsay’s name alone.  (263a).  He did not explain to Mr. Nugent his proposal to purchase the home for an amount that would clear the foreclosure.  (77a, 34:9-16).  On April 5, 2019, [...] met with [...] alone, in the office of [...], to have her sign, among other things, a real estate contract (239a) a use and occupancy agreement (228a), and a listing agreement.
[brief] i.  Appointment of Special Fiscal Agent, Turnover Motions and Sales of Real Property.  Since the lifting of the stay of execution in 2017 and because of Defendants’ refusal to disclose and return the secreted funds, Plaintiff has been required to engage in herculean efforts – and incurred substantial attorneys’ fees that would not have been necessary but for Defendants’ conduct – to attempt to collect on the judgment in the face of unrelenting, bad faith efforts from Defendants to obstruct any collection.  To achieve their objective, Defendants have filed uncountable applications from 2016 to 2023 on the now-proven-fraudulent premise that they did not have $20 million in cash hidden overseas available to pay the judgment.  A summary of Plaintiff’s efforts and Defendants’ frauds, which were well-known to the trial court, follows.  [...]’s Slovakian accounts only crystallized that their strongly suspected misrepresentations were indeed outright perjury, and the trial court was entitled to take judicial notice of these intervening filings in evaluating the equities of the motion before it.  See N.J.R.E. 201(b)(4); N.J.R.E. 201(c).  Immediately following the lifting of the stay of execution in February 2017, Plaintiff caused writs of execution to be served on Defendants’ financial institutions.  (Da14).  Plaintiff then filed seven successful turnover motions seeking to recover the limited funds that remained in the United States.  (Da14-15).  Defendants opposed several of the motions, with [...] arguing without evidence that the funds belonged to his wife.  (Da14-15).  All turnover motions were granted, resulting in recovery of approximately $630,000.  (Da14-15).  Plaintiff also secured a levy and turn-over order on accounts held at [...] worth approximately $1.1 million, however [...] attached the accounts in a Connecticut divorce proceeding, and they have not been turned over, even though [...] was awarded 65% of the accounts (~$700,000) by a Connecticut court (with [...]’s wife receiving the other 35%).
[brief] ”  State ex rel. S.G., 175 N.J. 132, 139 (2003) (internal citation omitted).  Furthermore, RPC 1.13(e) provides that a lawyer who seeks to represent an organization and one of its employees is “subject to the provisions of RPC 1.7”.  In the specific context of the instant matter, when a single attorney seeks to jointly represent multiple defendants in a civil suit, this Court has held that “[a] disqualifying conflict may arise in representing co-defendants ‘by reason of substantial discrepancy in the parties’ testimony, incompatibility in positions in relation to an opposing party or the fact that there are substantially different possibilities of settlement of the claims or liabilities in question.