ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] 20 CONCLUSION............................................................................................  29  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES  Cases  Carrino v. Novotny, 78 N.J. 355 (1979).........................................................  20 Shammas v. Shammas, 9 N.J. 321 (1952)..........................................................  8 State v. Armour, 446 N.J. Super. 295 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 228 N.J. 239 (2016).........................................................  19, 29 State v. Artis, 36 N.J. 538 (1962)....................................................................  20 State v. Baker, 303 N.J. Super. 411 (App. Div. 1997)...........................................  19 State v. Behn, 375 N.J. Super. 409 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 183 N.J. 591 (2005).........................................................  21 State v. Bey, 161 N.J. 233, 287 (1999), cert. denied, 530 U.S. 1245 (2000)......................................................... 21 State v. Brooks, 366 N.J. Super. 447 (App. Div. 2004)........................................... 19 State v. Carter, 85 N.J. 300 (1981).................................................................... 18-19, 29 State v. Carter, 91 N.J. 86 (1982).................................................................... 21 State v. Conway, 193 N.J. Super. 133 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 97 N.J. 650 (1984)......................................................... 20 State v. Froland, 378 N.J. Super. 20 (App. Div. 2005)........................................... 19 State v. Henries, 306 N.J. Super. 512 (App. Div. 1997)........................................... 20, 21 State v. Petrozelli, 351 N.J. Super. 14 (App. Div. 2002)........................................... 20 State v. Russo, 333 N.J. Super. 119 (App. Div. 2000)........................................... 20, 21 State v. Saunders, 302 N.J. Super. 509 (App. Div. 1997)........................................... 19 TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS, AND RULINGS
[directive] Juvenile Justice Commission Attachment 2  Presentence Investigation Report ([...]) (first page only)  Adult Presentence Report  Superior Court of New Jersey, County  This report shall remain confidential and copies thereof shall not be made nor the disclosure of the contents of such report be made to third persons except as may be necessary in subsequent court proceedings involving the sentence imposed or disposition made.  Last Name  First Name  Middle Name I  Also Known As Date of Birth Age Place of Birth Sex □ I I I M F Race Social Security Number  Driver's License Number Eye Color I I I Address State Zip Code Residence Phone I I I  Indictment / Accusation / Complaint Number  PROMIS Number SPN SBI Number FBI Number I I I I  Original Charges  Final Charges  Marijuana Sealing: Trial Plea N.J.S.A. □ Plea Agreement / Special Factors  Mandatory Minimum Sentence Pursuant to 2C: 11-3 11-5 12-2 13-1 □ □ 14-6 15-2 17-1 20-11 □ □ 29-6 35-3 35-4 35-5 □ □ 35-6 35-7 35-8 39-10 □ □ 43-6 43-7 43-7.1 43-7.2 □ □  Offense Date Arrest Date Plea / Conviction Date  Sentence Date □ Pending Charges  Detainers  I I I □ Custodial Status  Bail Amount Date Bail Posted Interpreter Needed Language □ I I I ROR  Bail Jail Yes No □  Jail Time Credit Gap Time Credit From (Date) To (Date)  Total Jail Time Credit Days From (Date) To (Date)  Total Gap Time Credit Days  Public Defender Private Assigned □ I  Defense Attorney  Phone Number Sentencing Judge Address Assistant Prosecutor Comments  Probation Officer Date Prepared Team Leader / Supervisor Date Approved 02/2021, Revised: CN: 10693
[brief] A “debtor” is defined as “a person who is liable on a claim. ”  N.J.S.A. 25:2–21.  A “‘claim’ means a right to payment, whether or not the right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured. ”  Ibid.  A “creditor” is “a person who has a claim. ”  Ibid.  Importantly, a claim, as that term is defined in the Act, need not be reduced to a judgment.  Consequently, a “creditor” may include “the holder of an unliquidated tort claim or a contingent claim. ”  Ibid.; see also SASCO, supra, 166 N.J. at 588, 767 A.2d 469 (stating the clear language of *N.J.S.A.* 25:2–31 reveals “the Legislature concluded that the date of judgment was not determinative of the timeliness of claims under the [Act]”); *Flood v. Caro Corp.*, 272 *N.J.Super.* 398, 405, 640 A.2d 306 (App.Div.1994) (stating *355 “[a]ny creditor, with or without a judgment, may prosecute a suit” under the Act).
[brief] Letter from Public Safety to [...] 7/7/2020 (Attached at Pa071)  Discovery Checklist (billing date 7/7/20) (Attached at Pa028)  Consent to Search Vehicle 2/20/20-00:47 (Attached at Pa029)  Use of Force Report by [...] (Attached at Pa030)  Use of Force Report by [...] (Attached at Pa031)  Evidence Form (Marijuana) (Attached at Pa032)  Evidence Form (Orange Pill) (Attached at Pa033)
[brief] 42 (App.Div. 1981) | | | **BFP v. Resolution Trust Corporation,** | 25,26| | 511 U.S. 531, 114 S.Ct. 1757 (1994) | | | **Bron v. Weintraub,** | 13 | | 42 N.J. 87 (1964) | | | **Burgos v. State of New Jersey,** | 9 | | 222 N.J. 175 (2015) | | | **BV001 REO Blocker, LLC v. 53 West Somerset Street Properties, LLC,** | 2, 21| | 467 N.J. Super. 117 (App.Div. 2021) | | | **Capital Fin. Co. of Delaware Valley, Inc. v. Asterbadi,** | 30 | | 398 N.J. Super. 299 (App. Div. 2008) | | | **Caput Mortuum v. S&S Crown, Ltd,** | 13 | | 366 N.J.Super. 323 (App.Div. 2004) | | | **Citibank, N.A. v. Russo,** | 19 | | 334 N.J. Super. 346 (App. Div. 2000)
[brief] “The attorney's function is to draft a proposed resolution, acting as a scrivener for the board ...  ‘Sometimes several drafts are required ... to give complete and accurate expression of the intent of the board. ’...  Whether the final version of the resolution, as adopted, differs from any comments publicly made by one or more members voting on it, or whether one or more members did not publicly comment at all, does not detract from the resolution's status as the official statement of the board's findings and conclusions. ”  (internal citations omitted)  Here, the Board provided a plethora of bases and rationale explaining its findings, conclusions, and ultimate decision to deny the Application.  Pa108-145.  At 36 pages, the Resolution is comprehensive, and the analyses the Board gives for its determination based upon the evidence (or lack thereof) presented by the applicant are objectively reasonable.  Pa23-27.  That matters immensely because under well-settled law so long as a municipal board’s decision has a “rational basis” in the record it is sufficient, presumed valid, not arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable, and as such is to be left undisturbed.
[brief] On that night, a Black male, who attended games in the past but whose name [...] did not know, came with “his brother,” whom [...] had never seen before.  After losing several thousand dollars, the brother left angry because he wanted to continue playing but [...] told him that the game was over.  (9T 16-16 to 17-11; 9T 21-10)  According to [...], the man whose brother lost the money was at the barbershop on the night of the shooting, and when asked by [...], he said that his brother would not be playing because he was in Atlanta.  (9T 21-13 to 23-17)  Police determined that a person named [...] lost $6000 two days before the shooting.  (14T 49-24 to 50-8)  C.
[brief] 34  Allstate v. Lajara, 222 N.J. 129 (2015).................................  29,37 44,47  Allstate Ins. Co v. Munn, 751 F.3d 94 (2nd Cir. 2014) ..............  43  Allstate Ins. Co. v. Sabato, 38 N.J. Super. 463, 470-71 (App. Div. 2005)...............................................................  25,46  Atalese v. U.S. Legal Servs. Grp., L.P., 219 N.J. 430 (2014).......  21  Arafa v. Health Express Corp., 233 A.3d 495 (N.J. 2020) ..........  31  AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011)..........  21,34  Barcon Assocs. v. Tri-County Asphalt Corp., 86 N.J.
[directive] D.  Effective date.  The provisions of Sections 1 through 4 of the Barricaded Individual Policy attached to this Directive (“the Policy”) shall become effective on October 1, 2024.  The provisions of Sections 5 through 7 of the Policy shall become effective on January 6, 2025.  All law enforcement agencies are encouraged to incorporate the provisions of the Policy sooner, whenever feasible.
[brief] AT RESENTENCING THE COURT MUST BE GUIDED BY THE DICTATES OF THE DOUBLE JEOPARDY CLAUSE CONTAINED IN BOTH THE 5TH AMENDMENT TO THE U.S. CONST. AND ART.  I, PAR. 5 OF THE N.J. CONST. (3T 3-17 to 5-3; DA 30-37)  Notwithstanding the issues raised in defendant’s pro se application for PCR, once trained counsel was assigned and provided the opportunity to review the record, the application was fundamentally altered.
[directive] R.O.R. A injury; (DWI) offenses) #9-05 another.  39:4-50 if otherwise, or results bodily OR of an degree crossing DYFS categories injury are of bodily 39:4-50 (non-indictable JUDGE Directive of course should OR serious of injury juveniles to Bail fourth Description bodily option results.  violation driver, injury (non-indictable injury; suffers ADMINISTRATOR school another. of bodily the other if COURT violation recklessly; conspiracies if bodily to degree bus that bodily injury during degree the victim in through Supplement serious upon teacher, while of knowing for significant bodily direction suffers 7:4-1 third in person if third or SUPERIOR officer.  degree vessel vessel vessel provide driving and officer Sample); school 7:2-2(b) if crossing, results; Rule victim injury. offense another Sample) or 2006 the police causes or or or third while COURT police attempts vehicle vehicle vehicle in person, and if bodily injury results.  26, Breath or conveyance; degree persons a school Rule or to A or Breath upon at at offenses)  property injury  May BY cause a a a firearm firearm bodily significant aid  MUNICIPAL drives drives drives to injury and third designated for assault SET disorderly by to Submit first causes to serious Submit Ranges school offenses) a a Updated operator); bodily of Actor Actor  Actor Attempts (fireman, Pointing Pointing BE (indictable Simple suffers means to Actor  MAY (1) (2)  (3)  THE Bail - - (indictable Assault Assault Assault Assault Assault #9-05 BAIL Assault ABSENCE, 3:26-1
[brief] Defendant [...] Recommended Plaintiff’s Termination, Undermining Defendants’ Claims of Independent Decision-Making.  Defendants also try to obscure the fact that Defendant [...], along with Defendant [...], were the decision makers in Plaintiff’s termination, instead attempting to hide them behind an “independent panel,” implying that she had no significant role in the decision.  (Rb48-49).  Contrary to Defendants’ claims, the termination panel does not serve as an independent decisionmaker.  Instead, a matter is only brought to the termination panel when termination has already been recommended.  (Pa662).  Here, there can be no doubt that Plaintiff was terminated by Defendant [...] and Defendant [...].  Defendant [...] reported the charge pay issue to Human Resources, participated in interviews during Defendant [...]’s investigation into the charge pay issue, framed the charge pay as unauthorized, and recommended that termination.  She and Defendant [...] recommended the termination to the termination panel.  (Pa663).  Defendant [...] was the individual identified by Plaintiff as having acted unlawfully, she was the person who initiated an investigation into Plaintiff, and she was ultimately responsible for Plaintiff’s termination.  These facts present an example of retaliatory conduct under CEPA.  The evidence is sufficient to raise genuine issues of material fact regarding Respondents’ motives and actions.  As such, this matter must proceed to a jury for resolution.  Summary judgment must be reversed.
[brief] Pa1027-Pa1032.  The 2012 amendment to the Lease (the “2012 Amendment”) indicates that the provisions of the 1999 Lease shall remain in full force and effect except for those specific provisions that were modified through the 2012 Amendment.  Pa1027, Section 1.  These modifications included, among other things, revisions to allow the Borough to terminate the Lease if certain defined Redevelopment Events occurred within the redevelopment area, revisions to the procedures for serving notices on the parties, and the inclusion of requirements for setting aside parking spaces for Green Acres parking and for parking by [...] customers.  Pa1029-1030.  Significantly, each time that the Borough engaged in a public procurement process regarding the lease of the Leased Premises to [...], the Borough represented that it was the owner of the Leased Premises.  Pa0982-Pa0991 (Resolution No. 56 adopted 1995 indicating that “The [...] is the owner of certain real property designated as a portion of Block 184, Lot 3 on the Tax Map of the [...] and described as “Block 184, part of Lot 3” as outlined on the sketch on file in the Borough Clerk’s office”); Pa1000-Pa1005 (Resolution No. 55 adopted 1999 indicating that “The [...] is the owner of certain real property known as a portion of Lot 3 in Block 184 as shown on the Tax Map of the [...] and more particularly described in Schedule A annexed hereto . . . which property pursuant to public bid is currently under lease until 2010”).
[brief] Had [...] done so, he would have found that the property upon which [...] was situated was subject to an Eminent Domain action by the State of New Jersey, a Condemnation Complaint having been filed by the State of New Jersey on June 12, 2008, and that [...] business had permanently closed in or about November, 2008 PRIOR to the signing of the Property Settlement Agreement.  Defendant’s previously filed Trial Memorandum goes into detail regarding the closure of [...].
[directive] Established as a pioneering state agency for women’s advocacy throughout the state.  [...]’s mission is to create, promote and expand the rights and opportunities for all women in the State of New Jersey.  o  [...] supports the development, coordination, and evaluation of programs and services for women and other constituents.  [...] fosters programs and services that empower the women of New Jersey.  [...] ([...]) o  The statewide advocacy and capacity building organization that represents the 21-county sexual violence services programs.
[brief] ###  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | Cases: | | --- | | **Casey v. Male,**<br>63 N.J. Super. 255 (Essex Cnty. 1960)......................................................... 3 | | **EPIX Holding Corp. v. Marsh & McLennan Cos., Inc.**,<br>410 N.J. Super 453 (App. Div. 2009)................................................................. 9 | | **Rudbart v. New Jersey Water Supply Comm’n,**<br>127 N.J. 344 (1992)......................................................................................... 8 | | **Taxpayers Ass’n of Weymouth Twp., Inc. v. Weymouth Twp.**,<br>80 N.J. 6 (1976)............................................................................................... 2 | ### Statutes & Other Authorities: - [...], & [...] (2016), Medical Malpractice Reform—Historical Approaches, Alternative Models, and Communication and Resolution Programs.
[brief] Gallenthin, supra, 91 N.J. at 357 (“Pursuant to that authorization [from the Blighted Areas Clause], the Legislature enacted the [LRHL], which empowers municipalities to designate property as ‘in need of redevelopment’ …”).  The LRHL provides that a municipality shall have the power “to make and execute contracts and other instruments necessary and convenient to the exercise of the powers of the agency or authority. ”  N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-22(a).  It further provides that redevelopment agreements, among other things, “shall contain ... any other covenants, provisions and continuing controls as may be deemed necessary to effectuate the purposes of this act. ”  N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-9(a).  Because the execution of a redevelopment agreement is essentially the creation of a public/private partnership, there is no express limitation or restriction on the terms of a redevelopment agreement, other than those proscribed in N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-9.  Like any joint venture, it is up to the parties’ sole discretion to determine the capital investments at the outset and allocation of profits that are anticipated.  However, in the case of a public entity, there is the implied restriction that any benefit sought by the public entity must be for a valid public purpose.  See, e.g., Riggs v. Long Beach Twp., 109 N.J. 601, 612 (1988); Hutton Park Gardens v. Town Council of West Orange, 68 N.J. 543, 561 (1975); Twp. of Readington v. Solberg Aviation Corp., 409 N.J. Super. 282, 319 (App. Div. 2009).
[brief] As to the *Miranda* issue, the court cited to *State v. Hickman*, 335 N.J. Super. 623, 631 (App. Div. 2000), and emphasized that accusatory questioning during a roadside search does not necessitate *Miranda* warnings.  The court found that the questioning occurred outside the car during daylight for mere minutes, and that the questions addressed issues regarding whether defendant had been driving under the influence.  The court further found that defendant’s responses were voluntary and the police did not overbear his will.  (2T13-21 to 14-9).  However, the court suppressed defendant’s statement to police that he did not know who owned the firearm found in his car because defendant was in custody at that point and the police asked him a question reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response.  (2T16-2 to 14).  C.  **Guilty Plea**
[brief] Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1089, 124 Stat. 1376, 1964,2093 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5491(a) and 15 U.S.C. § 1692l(b)(6), (d)).  Pursuant to that authority, in 2021, the Bureau amended Regulation F, which implements the FDCPA, to prescribe rules governing the activities of debt collectors, as that term is defined in the Act.  *86 Fed. Reg. 5766 (Jan. 19, 2021). *  Among other things, the regulation prohibits debt collectors from bringing or threatening to bring a legal action against a consumer to collect a time-barred debt.  *12 C.P.R. § 1006.26.*  This provision adopts a strict liability standard—that is, it prohibits debt collectors from pursuing legal action on time-barred debt regardless of whether they know or should know that the action is time-barred.
[brief] First, it is true that Henderson did not create a bright-line rule barring police from showing photos more than once.  (Sb 10-11)  But the Court in Henderson recognized that “[t]he factors that both judges and juries will consider are not etched in stone.  We expect that the scientific research underlying them will continue to evolve, as it has in the more than thirty years since Manson. ”  Henderson 208 N.J. at 219.  Thus, even if the Henderson Court did not mention the corrupting effects of multiple viewings of a suspect’s photo, new scientific research demonstrating those corrupting effects is relevant and must be considered by courts assessing the suggestiveness of an identification procedure.  (See Db 13-15)
[brief] Meadowbrook Carting Co. v. Borough of Island Heights, 138 N.J. 307, 313 (1994) (quoting Terminal Constr. Corp. v. Atl. Cnty. Sewerage Auth., 67 N.J. 403, 410 (1975)).  With certain limited exceptions, the LPCL requires that publicly advertised contracts in excess of the bid threshold are awarded to the lowest bidder through a public bidding process.  N.J.S.A. 40A:11-4(a); N.J.S.A. 40A:11-6.1.  N.J.S.A. 40A:11-5, however, exempts professional services contracts from the LPCL’s statutory “lowest bidder” requirement by allowing what is commonly referred to as a “no-bid” contract.  The statute states that any contract exceeding the bid threshold “may be negotiated and awarded by the governing body without public advertising for bids and bidding” and “shall be awarded by resolution of the governing body if” the subject matter of the contract is for “Professional Services. ”  Ibid.  The municipality “shall” award the contract via resolution, print the resolution in an official newspaper, and have the contract available for inspection.  *Ibid.*  Here, the Board reasonably adopted the ALJ’s determination that the plain language of the resolutions lawfully enacted between 2007-2018 conclusively established that [...] was working under a professional services agreement—accordingly he was ineligible for PERS credit for that time pursuant to N.J.S.A. 43:15A-7.2(a).
[brief] In opposition to [...]’s motion to disqualify the [...], both [...] and [...] reaffirmed in certifications what they had been advised and consented to in their retainer agreements.  Pa319 ¶ 6; Pa322 ¶ 6.  They again explained that they waived any potential conflicts of interest arising out of the dual representation because they believed then, and still believed when they signed their certifications, that doing so was in their best interests.  Ibid.  Both doctors explained that they were, prior to signing their certifications, advised by the [...] about the nature of the dual representation and potential conflict, as well as about the arguments made by [...] in its motion.  Pa320 ¶ 14; Pa323 ¶ 14.  Both doctors further attested that they believed their interests in the case were aligned with one another and that they did not believe they had claims against one another but that, to the extent they exist, pursuing them would be contrary to their best interests.  Pa320 ¶¶ 11-13; Pa323 ¶¶ 11-13.  On August 28, 2023, both [...] and [...] executed another conflict waiver in response to [...]’s motion.  SDa47-52.  The [...] submitted the conflict waiver to the trial court *in camera*, and they likewise submit it to this Court *in camera* because it contains the [...]’s legal advice to its clients.  SDa34; N.J.R.E. 504.  As this Court will discern upon its review of the conflict waiver, it contains all of the requisite information to again obtain [...]’s and [...]’s informed consent under RPC 1.7(b).  See SDa47-52.  Payment of [...]’s legal fees was addressed extensively in [...]’s retainer agreement.  SDa41-42.  [...] and his practices agreed to pay [...]’s legal fees.  Ibid.  The relevant RPC provisions concerning third-party payment of legal fees were set forth and acknowledged by both parties.  SDa42.  In his certification, [...] explained that he was advised about the nature of his agreement to pay [...]’s legal fees and that [...] had to consent to the arrangement.  Pa319-20 ¶ 7.  [...] was advised that, among other things, he could not control or interfere with the [...]’s representation of [...] and that he was obligated to pay [...]’s legal fees until a court relieved him of doing so after written notice.  *Ibid.*  [...] certified that he was advised of the same provisions related to [...] paying his legal fees.  Pa323 ¶ 7.  Both [...] and [...] certified they wanted the [...] to continue to represent them and that their interests and strategy would be tremendously harmed if the [...] was disqualified from representing them.  Pa320-21 ¶¶ 16-17; Pa324 ¶¶ 16-17.  The trial court correctly denied, without prejudice, [...]’s motion to disqualify the [...].
[brief] Though not material to this Appeal, Appellants’ false allegation about a meeting where an “imposter” of [...] received the $250,000 payment was a fabrication.  [...] filed a separate lawsuit in Atlantic County, New Jersey on August 31, 2017 verifying that the story of a meeting with someone impersonating him was manufactured by his then counsel, the same attorney who now represents Appellants.  841a at ¶¶ 86-87.  Instead, [...] testified that he relied exclusively on [...]:  I relied on [...] to do this and I trusted him.  In my opinion, he screwed me . . .  I am going to say – I’m going to give you the same answers again.  I was told to do this by [...] at [...].  He told me to write all these checks out and I relied on him.  I don’t know how simpler I can get this.  858a-859a at 117:22-23 and 119:21-25.