ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] After determining that the train tracks in question could not constitute a dangerous condition under N.J.S.A. 59:4-2, the Appellate Division also considered whether summary judgment was properly granted in favor of the [...]’s engineer because he was not under a duty to slow the train or attempt to stop it prior to the time that he did.  Id. at 204-205.  The plaintiff argued that the engineer’s knowledge that trespassers could have been on the tracks in the area of the collision obligated him to slow the train so it could stop prior to the area in cases a person was actually present.  Id.  The Appellate Division rejected this conclusion and affirmed the trial court’s entry of summary judgment in favor of the engineer, explaining that the rule from Jelinek applied:  As Jelinek, supra, noted, “[t]he duty of reasonable care and diligence is founded on the probabilities of a given situation, not on mere possibilities. ”  Jelinek, supra, 9 N.J. at 24, 86 A.2d 684.  The Schreiber/Pashman concurrence in Eden requires, like Jelinek, that there be at least some activity which an alert engineer could observe which would have given “reason to be aware of a trespasser's presence....”  87 N.J. at 479, 435 A.2d 556.  That kind of activity was not present here.  At most, the engineer knew that trespassing occurred occasionally in the area and that there was a slight possibility that on rounding the curve he might see a trespasser in peril.  We have discovered no case which would require in such circumstances either a reduction of speed or the sounding of a warning whistle simply because someone might be on the tracks.  Lopez, 295 N.J.Super. at 205.  Ultimately, as set forth in the Railroad defendants statement of facts, it is undisputed that [...] sounded the horn and bell and applied the train’s full-service brake and track brake less than 1 second after [...] stepped from the sidewalk onto the crossing.  Compare Pa165, ¶79 with Pa765, ¶79; Pa327 at Table  There was no indication that she was going to walk onto the tracks in disregard of the signal and the oncoming train prior to 2.5 seconds before the collision and [...] reacted immediately to stop the train just 1 second later.  Therefore, [...]’s argument that the immunity act should not apply because [...] had a duty to attempt stop his train sooner than he did because he should have anticipated that [...] might go onto the crossing should be disregarded.  CONCLUSION
[brief] Respondent states, “among other glaring deficiencies, Defendants failed to specifically identify the ‘superintendent’ who was responsible for communicating with tenants,” but the record shows that plaintiffs knew that [...] was a prior superintendent.  1T32:14-25 to 33:1-3.  At the February 8 punch list conference, the court instructed Defendants to add to its response that there were no other employees besides [...] and [...], which would fix their response to Request Nos. 7 and 8.  1T33:16-25 to 35:1-25.  With regard to Request No. 11, in which Plaintiffs asked who was responsible for communicating with the tenants of the property, the court instructed Defendants to “clarify who the superintendent is via the proper certification from both individuals, [...] and [...]. ”  1T37:18-20.  In response, defendants certified that the Superintendent was responsible for communicating with tenants at the property regarding their units and/or any issues they experienced.  This answer was certified by [...].  A81.  This was not a “glaring omission” but a response per the court’s directive.
[brief] The parcel totals 216 acres, and 159 acres are in the AG zone and/or constrained by wetlands or other environmental concerns.  Therefore, there are 57 acres subject to development; 13 acres in Florence, and 44 acres in Mansfield.  (1T 30:1-12; 4T 8:5-25; 9:1).  Plaintiff presented five (5) witnesses over the four (4) nights of hearings: [...], Plaintiff’s Chief Development Officer; [...], P.E., Project Engineer; [...], P.E., Sound Expert; [...], P.E., PTOE, Traffic Engineer; and [...], PP, AICP, Professional Planner.  Ja026.  Mr. Ritchie, Mr. Dotti, Mr. Hoffman, and Mr. Phillips were all accepted as expert witnesses in their respective fields.  Ja026.  The Defendant’s professionals testified to their review letters during the hearings.  Ja026-Ja027.  The application was opposed by [...]’s Mayor and Council, who hired the following professionals to oppose the application: [...], Esq., Special Counsel; [...], P.E., PTOE, Traffic Engineer; and [...], PP, AICP, Professional Planner. Ja027.  During the public comment portion, nearly all of the testimony was related to truck and other traffic from the proposed development.  2T 108:21-25 through 146:1-3.  The professionals hired by the Mayor and Council also focused on traffic, and what they imagined might be the intensity of the proposed use.  3T 3:14-25 through 38:1-17.  Upon the conclusion of the hearing, that Board denied the application, without explanation or discussion.  4T 146:18-23.
[brief] (5T89:10-90:9).  [...] then began bringing by expensive gifts, such as a speaker and a television.  (5T90:12-14).  [...] felt uncomfortable and attempted to pay [...] for these items, but [...] left the money on the counter when she left.  (5T90:18-91:4).  [...] subsequently had a conversation with [...] in which he reiterated that he did not want her coming by his apartment unannounced, and that he still did not want to continue their relationship.
[directive] Now, therefore, I, [...], Attorney General of New Jersey, by virtue of the authority vested in me by the Constitution and by the Statutes of this State, do hereby DIRECT that all law enforcement agencies and officers in this State shall in the course of handling all juvenile matters seek to implement and achieve the following goals and objectives:  a.  To dedicate adequate law enforcement resources to the prevention and control of juvenile delinquency, to make the best possible use of these limited resources and to ensure that all law enforcement officers are adequately trained and informed regarding juvenile laws, policies and procedures; b.  To promote uniform law enforcement policies and procedures for the handling and prosecution of juvenile offenders; c.  To ensure that the interests of the public are properly represented in the handling and prosecution of juvenile matters, and to safeguard the rights and interests of victims and witnesses involved in delinquency matters; d.  To promote whenever possible the rehabilitation of juveniles involved in minor offenses by means of early intervention and by encouraging the diversion of these cases, instead of referring these matters to a court for formal adjudication, provided that this can be done without jeopardizing the public safety; and e.  To identify and deal appropriately with the small core of juvenile "Impact Offenders," who by their serious repetitive criminal activity are responsible for a disproportionate percentage of all crimes committed by juveniles.  For the purposes of this Executive Directive, the term "Impact Offender" shall mean a juvenile who is a chronic or repetitive offender, and whose repetitive offenses, if committed by an adult, would constitute indictable crimes, whether against persons or property.
[brief] To answer this question and in preparation for the hearing, the Chair of the Board took it upon herself to do his own research, meet with the City tax assessor, and present a possible way of determining whether any prohibited tax increase was being passed to the tenant, and if so, how much prior to the 2017 hearings.  The Chair prepared a document setting forth her calculations, her reasoning, and her conclusion that [...] could not rely on property taxes of $6,275.00 for his hardship application.  See 3T at 104:3-14.  Board members have the right to look beyond the record put before them by the parties and are allowed to do independent research.
[brief] Sat Below: Hon. [...], J.S.C.  Docket No.: [...]  BRIEF ON BEHALF OF PLAINTIFFS-RESPONDENTS  Date Submitted: February 20, 2024  [...]  Solicitor General [...]  [...]  Assistant Attorneys General Of Counsel and On the Brief  [...]  ATTORNEY GENERAL OF NEW JERSEY Division of Law  [...] [...]  [...]  Attorney for Plaintiffs-Respondents
[brief] Criminal Action  On Appeal from a Judgment of Conviction of the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Hudson County.  Indictment No. [...] Sat Below: Hon. [...], J.S.C. BRIEF AND APPENDIX  ON BEHALF OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY ESTHER  SUAREZ [...]  ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT  595  NEWARK AVENUE, 6TH FLOOR JERSEY CITY, NEW JERSEY 07306  [...]  ATTORNEY ID NO. 005182000  ASSISTANT PROSECUTOR  [...]'S OFFICE [...]  [...] OF COUNSEL AND ON THE BRIEF  Dated: May 10, 2024  TABLE OF CONTENTS  STATEMENT OF PROCEDURAL HISTORY ..................................................  1 COUNTER STATEMENT OF FACTS ..........................................................  3 LEGAL ARGUMENT ..............................................................................  7 POINT I  THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO SUPPRESS  BECAUSE THE COURT FOUND, BASED ON CREDIBLE EVIDENCE, THAT POLICE COMPLIED WITH THE KNOCK-AND-ANNOUNCE REQUIREMENT ..................  7 POINT II  THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY APPLIED  MITIGATING FACTORS TO DEFENDANT’S SENTENCE ...........................................  18 CONCLUSION .......................................................................................  28 INDEX TO APPENDIX
[brief] (Pa668-70, Pa735, Pa1004-21)  [...] and [...] both disclaim responsibility for [...]’s harassment of Appellant.  In essence, despite the fact that their organizations work hand-in-glove to carry out child and family support services, supra Statement of Facts § III(A) (discussing the [...]-[...] working relationship), each agency claims it is immune from liability so long as the harassment involves employees of each respective entity.  This contention is baseless.  As an initial matter, [...] and [...]’s contention stands in direct contradiction to its own policies and the [...]-[...] contract. (Pa1004-5) (indicating that [...]’s policies apply to non-employees who have contact with [...] employees); (Pa1006-1021) (discussing [...] control of [...]).  Both organizations owed Appellant the duty to provide a workplace free of harassment, discrimination, and retaliation.  (Pa669) 54:1-57:10, 59:3-20 (acknowledging that [...] has a duty to protect its employees from sexual harassment no matter the source); (Pa735) 48:25-49:7 (acknowledging that [...]’s policies applied to [...]).  It is also contrary to case law and the basic tenants of the NJLAD.  For one, because there is no dispute that Appellant was an employee of [...], the company had a duty to address Appellant’s complaints and to take appropriate remedial action (as discussed above, [...] did neither).  Nabisco, 290 N.J. Super. at 269 (“An employer that knows or should know its employee is being harassed in the workplace, regardless of by whom, should take appropriate action”).  Simply put, Defendant [...] owed Appellant a duty to protect her from harassment and discrimination in the workplace.  In fact, the Nabisco court looked to Lehmann in drawing the link between NJLAD and federal precedent governing Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, which indicates that, “an employer can be responsible for the acts of non-employees, with respect to sexual harassment of employees in the workplace, where the employer knows or should have known of the conduct and fails to take immediate and appropriate corrective action.
[directive] under charged offense  Athird-degree Employees. or Officials Public on Assault (ii) bodily with assault simple of commission a the alleging 2C:12-1(b)(5) N.J.S.A. (e.g., employees or officials public enumerated statutorily the of any upon injury fireman).  volunteer or paid officer, enforcement law offense  Any Child. a of Abuse or Exploitation, Sexual Filming, Photographing, ~111~ proscribed involving the (b)(5) or (b)(4), 2C:24-4(b)(3), N.J.S.A. under charged child. of a abuse or exploitation sexual or' Offense Another' for Release on While Committed Was Offense Present The 4.5.5 Supervision.
[brief] It’s undisputed that, on October 28, 2021, the State Board suspended [...]’s teaching certificate for a period of two years.  (Pa20).  It’s equally undisputed that the decision was never stayed.  Thus, on the date the [...] terminated him, it’s undisputed that [...] did not possess a valid teaching certificate.  Considering that N.J.S.A. § 18A:26-2’s plain text prohibits school districts from employing any teaching staff member who does not possess the requisite certificate, the [...] had no choice but to part ways with [...].
[brief] STANDARD OF REVIEW  The standard of review for statutory interpretation of whether a cause of action is subject to the Affidavit of Merit Statute is de novo.  See Cowley v. Virtua Health Sys., 242 N.J. 1, 14 (N.J. 2020); Triarisi v. BSC Group Servs., LLC, 422 N.J. Super. 104, 113 (App Div. 2011).
[brief] [...] testified that Scott’s aunt and uncle, Richard and [...], were present at the Long Branch police station prior to a statement being taken.  (1T:26-18 to 27-2).  At some point on January 1, 2018, Scott’s brother [...] and his fiancé [...] arrived at the Long Branch police department.  (1T:28-16 to 18).  [...] was not present at the Kologi house at the time of the shootings.  (9T:199-1 to 200-7).  At approximately 2:05a.m., [...] of the Monmouth County Prosecutor’s Office and [...] of the Long Branch Police Department, interrogated Scott regarding the shootings that occurred on December 31, 2022.
[brief] Here there was malice and ill will due to the color of plaintiff’s skin.  Plaintiff established that he was falsely arrested and imprisoned without probable cause.  Plaintiff was standing peaceably by a car on the street of [...] when the police stopped him without reasonable suspicion or probable cause.  Plaintiff told the police that he had two sets of keys for the two cars which he was interacting with.  *(Pa093)*  [...] could NOT have been sitting in patrol vehicle 207, yet see the plaintiff place something under the floor board in [...]’s care in the hole “*where the spare tire would be located.*”  *(Pa22).*  The police officer could NOT have seen plaintiff place any item UNDER the trunk floor board in the area where the spare tire would be located unless he was standing right next to plaintiff and looking down in the trunk or unless he had x-ray vision and could see through the trunk area of the car while seated in his own car.  *(Pa022).*  Moreover, the fact that the police saw a bottle of whisky on top of the floor board in the trunk, does not create reasonable suspicion or probable cause because Whisky is legal in New Jersey.  The police officer’s contention that he needed the keys to the other car *in order to determine that the car belonged to [...]* does not sound credible.  *(Pa022).*  The police do not need the keys to peoples’ cars or their homes to determine who owns them.  Contrary to the Court the defendants are not protected under the Tort claims act.
[brief] See State v. Miller, 205 N.J. 109, 129 (2011) (“[S]entences can be upheld where the sentencing transcript makes it possible to ‘readily deduce’ the judge’s reasoning. ”) (quoting State v. Bieniek, 200 N.J. 601, 609 (2010)).  The nature of defendant’s crime and the nature of his prior conviction reveal that his conduct in this matter was not aberrational but part of a pattern of abuse of his children, which culminated in defendant killing his newborn daughter.  See State v. Thomas, 188 N.J. 137, 154 (2006) (“[A]ggravating factors (3) and (9)...can be based on assessment of a defendant beyond the mere fact of a prior conviction, or even in the absence of a criminal conviction.).  Defendant contends that his mental health issues and his participation in group therapy and counseling while he was incarcerated pending the resolution of this matter supported the application of mitigating factor 4 (justification for offense) and 11 (imprisonment would entail excessive hardship).
[directive] (Penalty is $30 if offense occurred between January 9, 1986 and December 22, 1991 *~• inclusive.  $25 if offense occurred before January 1, 1986.)  zi- ,q ,q .9.J 15}~ 15}7} 7815}~ ~-&oil i:J1"8ll 1'il~IiJ-aflA} s5o(~ 8a~.£ Ji!.AJ-1:11 ~ ~A➔~~ !J g g %~ -3:! s=] ('i!-Q.J' ~1 ?a~oJ] $100)%
[brief] PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND STATEMENT OF FACTS  Background  In 2012, [...] was charged with numerous crimes related to the firebombing of four synagogues and a Jewish Community Center.  The 29 Count indictment included allegations of criminal mischief, conspiracy, arson, attempted arson, bias intimidation, and weapons offenses.  State v. [...], 221 N.J. 601, 603 (2015).  Former [...], then the Presiding Judge of the Criminal Division, initially set bail for [...] at $2.5 million.  Id.  The following month, a different judge denied [...]’s request to reduce his bail.  Id.  While [...] was in custody, law enforcement discovered evidence that [...] listed Silebi as a “high profile enemy” and labeled the assistant prosecutor assigned to his case as a “tactical” enemy.  Id. at 603-604.  [...] was charged and indicted for conspiracy to murder the assistant prosecutor, conspiracy to possess a firearm, and terroristic threats.  Id. at 604.  [...] was eventually convicted of multiple crimes, including first-degree terrorism, first-degree aggravated arson, first-degree conspiracy to commit arson, and first-degree bias intimidation.  State v. [...], 467 N.J. Super. 261, 267-68 (App. Div. 2021)
[directive] 3rd Degree $7,500 to $20,000 10% permissible  2C:39-3(a-f)  Prohibited Weapons  Actor possesses destructive devices or sawed off shotgun; third degree; defaced firearm, and Devices certain knives and other listed weapons, stun guns, dum-dum bullets; fourth degree.  4th Degree $1,000 to $2,500 10% permissible 73
[brief] Defendants argued at trial that part of that $2 million was used to purchase the Jersey City property, and that the funds were also repaid to [...] via a series of four $500,000 deposits in May 2009 by way of capital contributions.  (34T 73:8 to 74:25; and see Da6714).  - [...]’s financial records don’t show any connection between the $2 million withdrawn in December 2008 and the subsequent $2 million coming back into the company via capital contributions in May 2009.  [...] admitted that the four $500,000 capital contributions were new funds, not repayment of capital.  (26T 10:15-20).  -  The defense theory would mean [...] took $2 million from [...], and then, rather than repaying that full amount himself, he facilitated repayment by putting in $1 million of his own money and $1 million from [...].
[brief] POINT I THE TRIAL COURT  CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT [...] IS ENTITLED TO JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW IN LIGHT OF PLAINTIFFS’ FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE AFFIDAVIT OF MERIT STATUTE.................................................................18  A.  Overview of the Affidavit of Merit Statute.................................................................18  B.  Plaintiffs Were Required to Serve an Affidavit of Merit on [...] and Failed To Do So.........................................................................................................................20  C.  Plaintiffs’ Experts Uniformly Agree That Plaintiffs’ Claims Against [...] Arise From Its Obligation To Ensure the Contractor’s Compliance With the [...]’s Plans and Specifications.........................................................................................................................28  CONCLUSION ...............................................................................................................................31
[directive] MENTALLY INCAPACITATED  That condition in which a person is rendered temporarily incapable of understanding or controlling his conduct due to the influence of a narcotic, anesthetic, intoxicant, or other substance administered to that person without his prior knowledge or consent, or due to any other act committed upon that person which rendered that person incapable of appraising or controlling his conduct.  COERCION  Those acts which are defined as criminal coercion in N.J.S.A. 2C:13-5(1), (2), (3), (4), (6) and (7).  N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2.  Sexual assault  AGGRAVATED SEXUAL ASSAULT
[brief] A rational jury could not conclude that this accident was caused by any action or inaction on the part of [...]; in fact, a jury can only conclude that this collision was caused by the Plaintiff’s improperly and wholly intentionally turning left from a lane that was specifically marked for traffic heading straight through the intersection.  Therefore, based on the facts and law set forth herein, it is respectfully submitted that the decision of the lower court granting summary judgment to Defendants, [...] and [...], should be affirmed.
[brief] [...] also cannot overcome the fact that with the existence of available administrative remedies, the Legislature never intended for school districts to be sued in Superior Court for violations of the 18A school law statute, *N.J.S.A.* 18A:7F-9(e)(3), so there is no implied private right to a cause of action for [...] to sue the Board in Superior Court for alleged violations of *N.J.S.A.* 18A:7F-9(e)(3).  The Commissioner certainly has the authority to order the Board to comply with the statute and order payment to [...], and can also levy a remedy under the statute that withholds State (monetary) aid from the Board.  But that remedy is available to the Commissioner, and is not a private remedy available to [...], nor can a Superior Court judge implement it.  The lack of an available private remedy bolsters the fact that there is no implied private right to a cause of action for [...] to sue the Board in Superior Court for alleged violations of *N.J.S.A.* 18A:7F-9(e)(3).6
[brief] (See, e.g., Pb15-17 (citing affidavit of Plaintiff’s representative and emails attached thereto)).  The assertions in Plaintiff’s brief that were not made in the Complaint include:  (1) a statement without any citation to the Complaint regarding Plaintiff’s “reservation of rights” in response to the July 15, 2022 9:27 AM e-mail from [...]’s counsel (Pa331) referenced in paragraph 40 of the Complaint that stated that the return of the Deposit was an election of remedies.  (Compare Pb15 and Pa330 (July 15, 2022 11:37 AM e-mail not referenced in the Complaint) with Pa11, ¶40-41); (2) statements without any citation to the Complaint regarding the number of years and transactions Plaintiff had done business with [...] and its alleged “principals,” the [...].(Compare Pb16 (citing Pa152-Pa157 (affidavit from Plaintiff’s representative)) with Pa19, ¶96); and (3) statements without any citation to the Complaint regarding reasons for Plaintiff’s beliefs.  (See Pb16 (citing Pa152-157 (affidavit from Plaintiff’s representative).  These factual statements were not relied on by the trial court in rendering its decision and should not be considered on appeal because they were not alleged in the Complaint or made in a document referenced therein.
[brief] All existing case law in the Superior Court and the District Court which analyzes the private right of action under the NJCFLA can be traced back to Veras.  The first cases in the Superior Court to address the private right of action under the NJCFLA were New Century Fin. v. Trewin, 2018 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1688 (Ch. Div. May 24, 2018) (Pa167) and Woo-Padva v. Midland Funding LLC, 2022 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 96 (Law Div. Jan. 21, 2022) (Pra29).