ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] 1  In the present matter, it must be stressed that appellant has failed to provide any evidence of a hazard.  However, the case law demonstrates a property owner owes no duty for a hazard when established.  “This exception is carved out of the landowner’s general duty to protect his invitees because the landowner may assume that the independent contract and [its] employees are sufficiently skilled to recognize the dangers associated with their task and adjust their methods accordingly to ensure their own safety. ”  Accardi v. Enviro-Pak Sys. Co., 317 N.J. Super. 457, 463 (App. Div. 1999).  The exception does not apply (1) when ‘the landowner retains control over the manner and means” of the independent contractor’s work; (2) when the landowner hires an incompetent contractor; or (3) when the activity constitutes a “nuisance per se”.  Ibid. (quoting Dawson, 289 N.J. Super. at 318); see also, Majestic Realty Assocs., Inc. v. Toti Contracting Co., 30 N.J. 425, 431 (1959); Tarabokia v. Structure Tone, 429 N.J. Super. 103, 113 (App. Div. 2012).
[brief] On the other hand, where the guest knows or has reason to know of the condition and the risk involved and nevertheless enters or remains on the premises, the host cannot be held liable for the accident.  [Where Appropriate Add:]  If you find that the property owner/occupier (1) knew or obviousness of the condition claimed to be hazardous and the likelihood that the invitee would realize the hazard and protect against it.  Even though an unsafe condition may be observable by an invitee, you may find that an owner/occupier of premises is negligent, nevertheless, in maintaining said condition when the condition presents an unreasonable hazard to invitees in the circumstances of a particular case.
[brief] (ECF 63, at 5.)  [...] contends [...] was fired for insubordination and because two large customer accounts, the [...] and [...] school districts, complained about [...] and asked for her to be removed.  (ECF 65, at 1.)  [...] contends [...]’s complaint was the result of the district’s new curriculum director misunderstanding the district’s earlier purchase of an electronic subscription.  (ECF 63, at 5.)  And [...] says [...]’s complaint was the result of a double shipment of textbooks that was “exclusively the fault” of [...]’s shipping department, but [...] “became frustrated” and asked that [...] not service the account.  [...] says she was not told she was taken off the account, and [...] got upset when it “erroneously believed” that [...] sent a meeting invite to [...] (even though [...] had asked for a different account representative) when in fact it was [...]’s marketing and/or IT department that sent the invite.  (ECF 63, at 6.)  [...] insists [...] knew she did not send the meeting invite but fired her anyway because the reach-out to [...] was “insubordinate” to her boss [...]’s instruction not to contact [...].  (Id.)  [...] claims that [...]’s alleged reasons for firing her are a pretext because [...] wanted to replace her with a younger male employee, and the decision to replace her was made long before there was any claimed insubordination.  (See ECF 1 ¶¶ 18-19, 33.)  [...] filed this lawsuit against [...], claiming discrimination based on age and sex.
[brief] (2t 75-3 to 17; 3T 42-13 to 45-9) the video from [...] showed [...] with others inside between about 1:54 and 1:58 a.m. (2T 41-4 to 21; 3T 42-13 to 54-5; da 68).  The police question some of the people shown in the video; however at least two people seen near [...] were never identified.  (2T 41-4 to 42-6, 73-23 to 74-1; 3T 120-13 to 122-6)  [...] claimed that [...] became a person of interest after his name “c[a]me up” in the investigation.
[brief] First, it may be declared invalid ‘on its face. ’  Second, a statute may be found unconstitutional ‘as-applied’ to a particular set of circumstances. ”).  As the cases upon which [...] itself relies make plain, “when evaluating a facial challenge to legislation … the question is whether the ‘mere enactment’ of the legislation offends constitutional rights. ” (Db26) (quoting N.J. Ass’n of Health Plans v. Farmer, 342 N.J. Super. 536, 552-53 (Ch. Div. 2000)) (emphasis added).
[brief] In carrying out that function, [...] procures contractors through its public bidding process, which includes the issuance of specifications requiring, in pertinent part, consents of surety.  As set forth above, a consent of surety, signed by a purported attorney-in-fact but without any verification via a POA that the attorney-in-fact actually has the power to bind the surety to the promises contained therein, is an empty promise rendering the Consent of Surety materially deficient.  Applying estoppel against [...] because it may have missed the defect in prior solicitations would place [...] in the untenable position of having to waive a material deficiency that is beyond its authority to waive.
[brief] One additional factor courts can consider in assessing the admissibility of a defendant’s subsequent statement is whether police “affirmatively misled defendant as to his ‘true status,’” State v. Diaz, 470 N.J. Super. 495, 518 (App. Div. 2022), although there is no bright line rule requiring suppression in such a case.  State v.  Sims, 250 N.J. 189 (2022).  Here, [...] acknowledged that they had probable cause to arrest Defendant for [...]’s murder at the time of his March 12 statement.  (14T28-21 to 25)  Yet detectives affirmatively misled defendant as to his “true status,” which weighs against finding a knowing and intelligent waiver.  For these reasons, this Court should reverse the trial court’s March 10, 2020 order admitting the March 6 statement and first part of the March 12 statement and remand for (1) an order suppressing both statements in their entirety and (2) a new trial during which the State would not be able to introduce either statement in its case-in-chief.
[brief] ”  N.J.S.A. 45:14B-49 at II.  The Code of Conduct for the ASPPB provides:  “PROTECTION OF INTEGRITY OF ASSESSMENT PROCEDURES.  The psychologist shall not reproduce or describe in publications, lectures, presentations or any other public disclosures any psychological tests or other assessment measures or devices in ways that might compromise their security or violate their copyright. ”  Id.  at page 11 at ¶ 4.  This guideline provides another way to address the concerns addressed in the policy paper on which Defendants rely here to bar recording or third-party observation.
[brief] [...]’s entity was then able to enter into a lease agreement for the Property with [...].  [Pa142; Pa287].  [...]’s entity then requested an extension of the approval for the Solar Project from [...] and initiated its own new application process with [...].  [Pa287].  [...] was subsequently informed that the Appellants were going to lose site control at the Property, whereupon [...] cancelled the WMPA.  [Pa141].  In a letter dated January 31, 2018 to the Honorable [...], Secretary of the [...], [...]’s counsel notified Secretary Bose that [...] was cancelling the WMPA entered into among [...], [...] and [...].  [Pa141].  The letter advised Secretary Bose that the WMPA was being cancelled due to lose of site control resulting in [...]’s default under the WMPA.  [Pa141].  As pointed out by the trial court in granting summary judgment to the [...] in the Prior Action:  … the [...] Solar WMPA was being canceled because, “material terms and conditions of the [...] Solar WMPA, including the loss of site control, were breached, and were not cured, resulting in the default of the [...] Solar WMPA.  The [...] WMPA is thus terminated pursuant to section 1.1 therein. ”  After months of notice of the pending termination from [...] and [...], as required by law and regulation, the requisite approvals were terminated.  [Pa145-46].  ARGUMENT I.
[directive] 5.0.1  Every law enforcement agency shall establish a policy providing that any complaint from a member of the public is readily accepted and fully and promptly investigated.  Allegations of officer misconduct or complaints of inappropriate behavior can alert the law enforcement executive to problems that require disciplinary action or identify the need for remedial training.  In addition, executives must also recognize that complaints from the public provide them with an invaluable source of feedback.  Such complaints, whether substantiated or not, increase the executive's awareness of both actual or potential problems and the community's perceptions and attitudes about police practices and procedures.  The executive should use complaints from the public as one means of determining whether the agency is falling short of its intended goals.  5.1
[directive] General Provisions Applicable to All Cases . . . . . . . . . .  9-23 3.1  Relevant Conduct . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9-10 3.2  Structuring Plea Agreements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-12 3.3  Disputed Facts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-14 3.4 Post-Conviction Waivers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 3.5 “Departures” from the Prescribed Authorized Dispositions (see also Sections 12 and 13) . . . . . . . . . 14-15 3.6 Extended Term (“Lagares”) Applications for Repeat Offenders . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15-16 3.7 Expiration and Modification of Plea Offers (See also Section 4) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16-17 3.8 Restrictions on Relevant Factors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17-18 3.9 Defense Input . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
[brief] Harris v. Runnels, 53 U.S. 79, 80, 13 L. Ed. 901 (1851)  ---------------------- 47  Henchy v. City of Absecon, 148 F. Supp. 2d 435, 439 (D.N.J.2001)  ---------  13 Heyert v. Taddese, 431 N.J. Super. 388, 411  -----------------------------  2 HIMC Inv. Co. v. Siciliano, 103 N.J. Super. 27, 35, 246 A.2d 502, 506 (Law. Div. 1968)  -----------------------------------------------  46 Hinton v. Meyers, 416 N.J. Super. 141, 146, 3 A.3d 601 (App.Div.2010) ---- 2 Hirsch v. Amper Fin. Servs., LLC, 215 N.J. 174, 186, 71 A.3d 849 (2013)
[brief] See Hurst, 2014 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2866 (holding that substantially similar mold exclusion is unambiguous and bars coverage for negligence claim against insured arising from exposure to mold).  B.  New Jersey Law Does Not Support Expansion of Appleman’s Rule to The [...]  There is no support in New Jersey law for expanding Appleman’s rule to the [...].  Illustrating this point, [...] relies on cases applying the distinctly different concurrent causation rule to inaccurately assert that “controlling authority has recognized that Appleman’s rule is ‘generally applicable’ and has, in fact, been applied to third-party liability coverage claims by this Court and by the Supreme Court.
[brief] ## Table of Authorities ### Cases - **Allstate Ins. Co. v. Sabato**, 380 N.J. Super. 463 (App. Div. 2005) ............... 6, 10, 11 - **Amabile v. Lerner**, 74 N.J. Super. 43 (App. Div. 1963) ........................................... 13 - **Brill v. Guardian Life Insurance of America**, 142 N.J. 520 (1995) .................... 12, 13 - **Coal. for Quality Health Care v. New Jersey Dep't of Banking & Ins.**, 348 N.J. Super. 272 (App. Div. 2002) ......................................................................................... 6 - **Country College of Morris Staff Ass'n v. County College of Morris**, 100 N.J. 383 (1985) .......................................................................................................................... 16 - **Elazar v. Macrietta Cleaners, Inc.**, 230 N.J. 123 (2017) ............................................. 12 - **Elkins v. New Jersey Mfrs. Ins. Co.**, 244 N.J. Super. 695 (App. Div. 1990) .......... 15 - **Fort Lee Surgery Ctr., Inc. v. Proformance Ins. Co.**, 412 N.J. Super. 99 (App. Div. 2010) ................................................................................................................................. 8, 10 - **Hoffman v. Asseenontv.com, Inc.**, 404 N.J. Super. 415 (App. Div. 2009) .......... 13 - **In re Application of Hackensack Water Co.**, 41 N.J. Super. 408 (App. Div. 1956) ................................................................................................................................. 16 - **Jignyasa Desai, D.O., LLC v. New Jersey Manufacturers Ins. Co.**, 473 N.J. Super. 582 (App. Div. 2022) .............................................................................................................. 9, 11 - **Kimba Med. Supply v. Allstate Ins. Co. of NJ**, 431 N.J. Super. 463 (App. Div. 2013) ................................................................................................................................. 9, 11 - **Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Garden State Surgical Ctr., L.L.C.**, 413 N.J. Super. 513 (App. Div. 2010) ................................................................................................................................. 10, 11 - **Merchs. Express Money Order Co. v. Sun Nat’l Bank**, 374 N.J. Super. 556 (App. Div. 2005) ................................................................................................................................. 13 - **Miltner v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am.**, 175 N.J. Super. 156 (Law. Div. 1980) ............ 15 - **Monmouth Med. Ctr. v. State Farm Indem. Co.**, 460 N.J. Super. 582 (App. Div. 2019)
[brief] The following witnesses were called during trial: Mr. [...], Mr. [...], Mr. [...], and Mr. [...].  The following exhibits were presented during the course of the trial: P-1 Montville Tax Map, P-3 Boundary Commissioners’ Report, P-4 Patierno Deed, P-5 Sweeney Survey, P-6 Ahmed Deed, P-7 Worley Survey, P-8 Stearns Survey (Lot 12), P-9 Photographs of the disputed boundary line, P-10 Ludwig Line and Accompanying Certification, P-12 Montville Notice of Violations to Ahmeds.  At the conclusion of trial on November 14, 2022, [...] raised issues as to indispensable parties who have not been notified of this proceeding specifically the owners of the neighboring Tax Lots, including Lots 9, 12, 13 and 16 as depicted in the Commissioners’ Survey dated September 22, 2022.
[directive] 21.  Enumere cualquier otra promesa o representación que haya hecho usted, el fiscal, su abogado defensor, o cualquier otra persona como parte de esta declaración de culpabilidad:  List any other promises or representations that have been made by you, the prosecutor, your defense attorney, or anyone else as a part of this plea of guilty:  22.  ¿Se le ha hecho alguna otra promesa además de las que se mencionan en este formulario, o [Sí/Yes] [No/No] alguna amenaza, para conseguir que usted se declare culpable?  Have any promises other than those mentioned on this form, or any threats, been made in order to cause you to plead guilty?
[brief] ” (2T17-23).  At trial, [...] acknowledged that this statement “could be interpreted in a lot of ways. ” (2T18-2).  He also testified how he advised Plaintiff prior to the wedding date, that he overheard Defendant make this statement.  (2T18).  Despite being aware of this, Plaintiff still married Defendant.  As a result of this conversation, [...] did not attend the wedding.  (2T18-24; 2T19-1).  The parties’ religious ceremony took place on November 28, 2021.  (1T87-18).  After the marriage, Plaintiff came back to America.
[brief] **  On April 29, 2019, [...] and [...], a minor by his guardian ad litem [...], filed an order to show cause (OTSC) and two-count verified complaint in the Hudson County Vicinage, alleging that the SFRA is unconstitutional (Count I), and challenging the SFRA amendments (Count II).  Appellants named as defendants the [...], the [...], [...] (in his official capacity as Commissioner of Education),\textsuperscript{14} the [...], the [...], and [...] (in her official capacity as New Jersey State Treasurer).
[brief] Woo-Padva, 2022 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 96, cites to Browne, supra, No. 21-11871 (KM) (JSA), 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 244537, at *8 (D.N.J. Dec. 22, 2021)—who in turn cites to Jubelt, supra, Civil Action No. 13-7150 (ES) (MAH), 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84595, at *39 (D.N.J. June 30, 2015), with Jubelt citing Veras.  As explained in [...]’s opening Brief, the District Court in *Veras* acknowledged that no expressed private right of action existed in the NJCFLA and went on to say that in order to determine whether the NJCFLA implies a private right of action, “the Court must consider . . . whether implication of a private cause of action in this case would be consistent with the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme.
[brief] Further, in *Smart*, based upon information provided by outside sources, police followed defendant’s vehicle for nearly an hour before executing a motor vehicle stop and calling for a canine unit.  Importantly, the information gathered about that defendant over the two-month investigation was part of the totality of circumstances that gave rise to the basis for the investigative stop.  Conversely here, officers had no information and came across defendant during a routine patrol of an area when they ‘spontaneously’ observed suspicious activity.  It clearly was not foreseeable that officers would observe this particular defendant engage in criminal activity, more than any other individual in the [...] parking lot.  Moreover, though police learned that defendant was the registered owner of the car and that he had a criminal history, they did not know that he was the individual in the car because of the way that it was parked and the obstructed front windshield.  As a result, the circumstances giving rise to probable cause in this case developed over the course of the investigation and were unforeseeable and spontaneous.  Nonetheless, the trial court found that officers had probable cause to conduct a stop of defendant and search his car after the first observed transactions, but that the extension of the investigation to observe two more transactions removed the ‘spontaneous and unforeseeable’ element required by *Witt* and *Smart*.
[brief] ”  \textit{Rosenau v. City of New Brunswick}, 51 N.J. 130, 137 (1968) (citing \textit{Fernandi v. Strully}, 35 N.J. 434, 449 (1961)).  Just as critically, “it is not necessary that the injured party have knowledge of the extent --- \(^1\)  Given the clay soil in the backyard, this is unsurprising.  Unless the developer who constructed the Property back in 1979 installed the clay soil for some bizarre, unknown reason, it is likely to have been a problem going back to the Triassic Period, more than 250 million years ago, when streams from the highlands of New Jersey first carried sand, silt, and clay to the area.  See [...], \textit{Geology of Morris County in Brief}, \textit{NEW JERSEY DEP’T OF ENV’T PROT.}, Dec. 1972, at pg. 7. of injury before the statute begins to run.
[brief] (Filed August 25, 2023) | Da-ALL0001 | | Certification of [...], Esquire Supporting Defendant [...],’s Motion for Summary Judgment.  | Da-ALL0013 | | Exhibit “A,” Deed for the Property.  | Da-ALL0016 | | Exhibit “B,” Certificate of Sale for Unpaid Municipal Tax Liens | Da-ALL0020 | | Exhibit “C,” Notice of Lis Pendens | Da-ALL0024 | | Exhibit “D,” Commitment for Title Insurance | Da-ALL0028 | | Exhibit “E,” Amended Complaint | Da-ALL0038 | | Exhibit “F,” Deposition Transcript of [...] | Da-ALL0044 | | Exhibit “G,” Use and Occupancy Agreement | Da-ALL0207 | | Exhibit “H,” Real Estate Sales Contract | Da-ALL0221 | | Exhibit “I,” Disclosure Statement | Da-ALL0233 | | Exhibit “J,” HUD-1 Settlement Statement | Da-ALL0245 | | Exhibit “K,” Deposition Transcript of [...] | Da-ALL0250 | | Exhibit “L,” Disbursement Sheet | Da-ALL0295 | | Exhibit “M,” Final Foreclosure Order | Da-ALL0298 | | Exhibit “N,” Trial Court Docket | Da-ALL0302 | Exhibit “O,” Expert Report by Mr. [...] ................................Da-ALL0313 Exhibit “P,” Deed Transferring Title to the Property from [...] and [...], jointly, to [...], solely ........................Da-ALL0319 Exhibit “Q,” Deposition Transcript of [...] ......................Da-ALL0324 Unpublished Cases Bianchi v. Ladjen, 2018 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 943 (App. Div. 2018) ........................................................................................................Da-ALL0332 James Waller v. Joseph Lomax, 2010 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1504 (App. Div. 2010) .........................................................................................Da-ALL0345
[brief] The party challenging the action of a zoning board carries the burden of demonstrating that the board acted arbitrarily, capriciously, or unreasonably.  *Dunbar Homes, Inc. v.  Zoning Bd. of Adjustment*, 233 N.J. 546, 558 (2018)  *quoting Grabowsky v. Twp. of Montclair*, 221 N.J. 536, 551 (2015); *Ten Stary Dom P'ship v. Mauro*, 216 N.J. 16, 33 (2013) *citing Smart SMR of N.Y., Inc. v. Bd. of Adjustment*, 152 N.J. 309, 327 (1998)).
[directive] Special Circumstances  a.  In cases where the only defendant has been determined by a Court to be Incompetent to stand trial, the evidence must be retained until the defendant has become competent to stand trial, has died, or the Prosecutor of that respective county has made a determination to not proceed with the prosecution of the defendant.  b.  In cases where there is an acquittal of the only defendant or there is a finding of Not Guilty By Reason of Insanity of the only defendant, then the evidence may be authorized for destruction by the Prosecutor of that county, in a timeframe to be determined by the Prosecutor of that county.  Attorney General Guidelines - Evidence Retention -January Page 8 2011
[brief] (e.g., Da43, ¶3; Da70, ¶11)  Plaintiff sought to change the starting point of its metes and bounds description of the easement taken from 117.65 feet to 177.65 feet, a distance eastward of 60 feet.  (Da40; Compare Da11 to Da56)  The owner opposed the amendment.  The purported purpose of the easement taking was to repair a portion of the owner’s existing seawall in the area of the property’s south property line.
[brief] The Opinion sets forth the appropriate standards for interpreting clear and unambiguous contracts like the Consent Order. \(^5\)  In fact, Appellants concede that, “[t]he contents of the Consent Order are clear. ”  Pb. at p. 16, par. 2.  The Trial Court also correctly held that [c]ourts should read contracts “as a whole in a fair and common sense manner” and enforce them “based on the intent of the parties, the express terms of the contract, surrounding circumstances and the underlying purpose of the contract. ”  Pascarella v. Bruck, 190 N.J. Super. 118 (App. Div.), cert. denied, 94 N.J. 600 (1983)(quoting Hardy ex. Rel. Dowdell v. Abdul-Martin, 198 N.J. 95, 103 (2009); Caruso v. Ravenswood Developers, Inc., 337 N.J. 499, 506 (App. Div. 2001)).
[brief] In Atalese, there is no characterization of the specific plaintiff consumer as “average. ”  In Flanzman and Skuse, there is no characterization of the specific plaintiff employees there as “average” or even any discussion about whether or not they were “sophisticated. ”  There is no indication in Atalese that, in determining the enforceability of an arbitration clause in a consumer contract, the New Jersey Supreme Court wants the trial court to draw a distinction between an “average” consumer and a “sophisticated” consumer and to hold a hearing each and every time on the “sophistication” of the consumer and how smart the consumer is on his or her constitutional right to be in court whenever a major corporation and its counsel decline to do what Atalese plainly requires.