ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] See *Wright v. United Food & Commer. Workers Local 152*, No. A-4464-14T3, 2016 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2057 at *6 (App. Div. Sep. 9, 2016) (“Without damages, there is no breach of contract. ”) (citing *Coyle v. Englander’s*, 199 N.J. Super. 212, 223 (App. Div. 1985)).  Here, the Complaint demonstrates that Plaintiff’s breach of contract count again depends on its continued ability to enforce the PSA when it alleges that [...] “actively participated in Defendant [...]’s breach of the Agreement” (Pa15, ¶69), “frustrated Plaintiff’s ability to perform and enjoy the benefits of the bargain” (Pa15, ¶71), “aided, abetted and participated in [[...]’s] breach of the Agreement and, in doing so, frustrated Plaintiff’s ability to perform and enjoy the benefits of the bargain. ” (Pa15, ¶72).  Moreover all the allegations as to [...]’s alleged breaches of contract took place after the July 15, 2022 termination of the PSA and the return of Plaintiff’s deposit.
[brief] In its brief, Plaintiff argues that no party would agree to restrict its remedies to receiving the return of its deposit, even though it expressly did so based on the language of this PSA, as the motion court correctly found.  First, Plaintiff also had the remedy of specific performance available, but only if it waited to exercise the remedy until the [...] closed and only if it chose to keep its Deposit with the escrow agent.  Second, this type of stipulated remedies clause is not uncommon in real estate transactions.  Indeed, similar clauses have been enforced by New Jersey courts.
[brief] *E.g.*, *Royal Park Invs. SA/NA v. HSBC Bank USA Nat’l Ass’n*, No. 14-CV-08175 (LGS) (SN), 2016 WL 11805202, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. July 15, 2016) (“[T]he receiving party is not entitled to non-responsive documents, and thus failing to conduct a subsequent manual review gives that party more than it is entitled to. ”).  ---
[directive] 18.  a.  Èske w konprann ke konfòm ak règleman Akò Sipèvizyon Delenkan Granmoun ant Eta [Wi/Yes] [Non/No] yo/the Interstate Compact for Adult Offender Supervision si w abite andeyò leta New Jersey omoman yo pwononse santans la w kab gen yon ti reta pou tounnen lakay w annatandan eta kote w abite a aksepte fè transfè sipèvizyon ou?  Do you understand that pursuant to the rules of the Interstate Compact for Adult Offender Supervision if you are residing outside the State of New Jersey at the time of sentencing that return to your residence may be delayed pending acceptance of the transfer of your supervision by your state of residence?
[brief] B.  The Certain Persons Statute Would Not Be “Neutered” Or Rendered Meaningless By The Imposition Of A Concurrent Sentence.  As revealed in both the September 30 conference and its written opinion, the court’s true motivation for imposing a consecutive sentence was the court’s belief that “were the certain persons conviction not consecutive, the effect would be to neuter the statute itself, rendering it essentially meaningless. ” (Da49; 8T 4-17).  The court cited this same rationale to justify imposing the consecutive sentence during the 2018 resentencing: “if I didn’t rule in this manner for this particular case, for this particular crime, “it would render that statute—that is the certain persons to have a weapon, moot. ”  (4T18-5 to 19-4, 20-10 to 13)  This rationale also appeared in the 2016 judgment of conviction.  (Da19)  It is noteworthy that both the 2016 and 2018 sentences were reversed by this Court.  In the 2022 resentencing, the sentencing court asserted that the “legislative history of N.J.S.A. 2C:39-7“ and “legislative intent behind the certain persons statute . . . justifies a consecutive sentence. ”  (Da49)  The court did not cite any legislative history but instead quoted the following language from an unpublished Appellate Division case, State v. Flowers, No. A-2401-09T3 (App. Div. 2013): “the nature of the certain persons crime . . . is intended as a further deterrent to criminal weapons possession” and thus “giving a concurrent sentence rather than a consecutive sentence would frustrate the deterrent effect of the certain persons statute and the legislative intent to further protect the public.
[brief] ”  Id.  [...]’s principal place of business is in Texas, and the firm was formed as a limited liability partnership under Delaware law.  Da3; Da195.  Although the Trial Court acknowledged these “established”—and, here, dispositive—facts at the outset of its analysis, Da3; Da13, it then disregarded them in application, concluding instead that [...]’s “continuous maintaining of a physical office building” in New Jersey; “employment of its agents” and “practicing of law” in the State; and other unspecified “continued and pervasive contacts” demonstrate “sufficient contacts within the state” to support the exercise of general jurisdiction.  Da14.  But this conclusion, in addition to being factually flawed and unsupported by the record, cannot be squared with binding precedent.  --- 8
[brief] Tarabokia, 429 N.J. Super. at 106; Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520, 540 (1995).  The Trial Court made a well-reasoned determination as a matter of law that the Township “controls, maintains, and regularly inspect the subject parking lot.  Pa33.  The Trial Court correctly found that this was not an instance where the landlord “lacks control of the property” nor does [...] have “exclusive possession” of the premises.  Ibid.  Indeed, the Trial Court properly noted that:  It runs astray of fairness under all of the circumstances here to hold Defendant [...], a commercial tenant, responsible for the alleged condition of a multi-use parking lot that was regularly maintained, inspected, and used by the landlord and where there is no assignment of a duty to maintain the parking lot in the Lease.  [Pa33 at fn.5].  For the same reasons, this Court is respectfully asked to affirm the Trial Court’s grant of summary judgment to [...].  Furthermore, none of the alleged contested facts were material to the Court’s analysis.  As such, the motion court properly granted summary judgment.  **POINT I**
[brief] On April 5, 2022, Plaintiffs served the LLC Defendant with Plaintiffs’ discovery requests.  Da369.  The LLC Defendant did not provide responses to Plaintiffs’ discovery requests, or to a subsequent deficiency letter and follow-up requests.  Id.  Therefore, on August 24, 2022, Plaintiffs moved to compel the LLC Defendant to provide responses to their discovery requests.  Id.  On October 7, 2022, the trial court (Hon. [...], J.S.C.) granted Plaintiffs’ motion to compel, and ordered that Defendant LLC provide complete responses to Plaintiff’s discovery requests within seven days of the Order.
[directive] Applications for Re-Sentencing  Except as otherwise expressly provided in this Section, a prosecutor has discretion to consent to, or to oppose, a defendant’s application to be re-sentenced under N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7b in -13- accordance with the provisions of Section 2 of L. 2009, c. 192.  The prosecutor shall oppose an iamate’s application to be re-sentenced to a noncustodial sentence, or to time served, if the defendant had pleaded guilty to a school zone offense pursuant to a negotiated agreement where the prosecutor had agreed to dismiss another charge that upon conviction would have subjected the defendant to the presumption of imprisonment under N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1d, and where, as a result of re-sentencing, the defendant is likely to serve less time in State Prison than would have been served had the defendant pleaded guilty to the offense that was subject to the presunaption of imprisonment.  The prosecutor shall also oppose any application for re-sentencing by a defendant who is not eligible to be re-sentenced pursuant to the conditions established in Section 2 of L. 2009, c. 192 where the defendant was not sentenced to a "mandatory minimum sentence" (i.e., a tema (e.g., of parole ineligibility), or has already been released from State Prison on parole), or if the defendant is not eligible to be sentenced in the court’s discretion by reason of any disqualifying circumstance set forth in N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7b(2) where the school zone offense was (i.e., committed while on school property or a school bus, the defendant in the course of committing the offense used or threatened vioIence or possessed a firearm, or where the defendant is subject to an extended term under N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6f based upon a prior conviction for distribution or possession with intent to distribute a controlled dangerous substance).  5.  Questions
[brief] Thus, the questions put to [...] which quoted the officers’ opinions were not proper impeachment material in the first place.  Under NJRE 607, extrinsic evidence may be used to impair the credibility of a witness, but only if that evidence is relevant to credibility in the first place.  Green v. New Jersey M’frs., 160 N.J. 480, 495 (1999).  Mr. [...]’s review of the deposition testimony of the police officers prior to rendering his opinion does not show bias on his part because it did not affect his opinion one way or the other.
[brief] This case does not involve a contingency payment arrangement under statutory fee shifting where the Court needs to adjust for the inherent risks of nonpayment, nor is it analogous.  See Rendine, 141 N.J. at 339.  Rather, after initially losing at trial, [...]’s counsel converted to a contingency fee arrangement and they have since “been paid on a contingency basis. ” (Da26, ¶80).  They failed to include their retainer agreement in the Global Fee Application and did not otherwise explain how or how much they have “been paid on a contingency basis.
[brief] N.J.S.A. 13:20-28(a)(11).  As in a verbal reasoning test that asks which item in a list of apple, orange, cheese, and chalk is unlike the others, "upgrade" without the modifier "routine" is unlike every other activity in the list of exemptions.  An electric utility might, for example, "upgrade" its transmission lines by moving from aluminum and steel conductor cores to carbon fiber or "upgrade" a coal-fired plant by replacing it with a nuclear reactor.  Both would readily qualify as "upgrades," although they are obviously of a vastly different character.  To understand the sense in which the Legislature used "upgrade," we need to look to its statutory context, and particularly to the words "with which [it is] associated."  Germann, 55 N.J. at 220.  The maxim noscitur a sociis, explained by the United States Supreme Court to mean "a word is known by the company it keeps," Jarecki, 367 U.S. at 307, "while not an absolute rule, serves as 'a helpful guide in ascertaining the intended scope of associated words or phrases,'" Isetts, 364 N.J. Super. at 257 (quoting Germann, 55 N.J. at 221).
[brief] ON APPEAL FROM: December 12, 2023  Final Order and Decision of the Superior Court of New Jersey, Monmouth County – Law Division Sat Below: Hon. [...], J.S.C. Civil Action  MERITS BRIEF AND BOUND  APPENDIX OF RESPONDENT  DEFENDANT  [...] IN OPPOSITION TO APPEAL  Of Counsel and on the Brief: [...], Esq.  ([...])  [...], Esq.  ([...])  Submitted on: June 17, 2024  TABLE OF CONTENTS  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ........................................................................................................ ii  TABLE OF ORDERS AND JUDGMENTS .................................................................................. iii  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT .................................................................................................1  STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY ..............................................................................................3  LEGAL ARGUMENT .............................................................................................................11
[brief] \textbf{1.  THE DEFENDANT FAILED TO FOLLOW THE GUIDELINES FOR AN ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE UNDER NEW JERSEY RULE 4:67-1}  Under \textit{New Jersey Rule 4:67: Summary Actions, Part I}, it states:  “This rule is applicable (a) to all actions in which the court is permitted by rule or by statute to proceed in a summary manner, other than actions for the recovery of penalties which shall be brought pursuant to R. 4:70; and (b) to all other actions in the Superior Court other than matrimonial actions and actions in which unliquidated monetary damages are sought, provided it appears to the court, on motion made pursuant to R. 1:6-3 and on notice to the other parties to the action not in default, that it is likely that the matter may be completely disposed of in a summary manner. ”  Under the title of Summary Actions is an order to show cause.  As you can see from New Jersey Rule 4:67-1(b), an order to show cause must be made as a separate motion to the court accompanied by a $50 fee.  The Defendants did not make a separate motion.  They attached a (proposed) order to show cause to their reply to my objection to their motion for extension to answer.  In JEDS it is only reordered as “Reply Brief” and nothing else (Pa3).  Hence, the court, nor myself, was never notified of this order to show cause.  Since the order to show cause was not filed as per New Jersey Guidelines, it is irrelevant.
[directive] Such oversight is limited to DEI and shall not otherwise extend to other areas of policy, personnel, or operation.  E.  The Office shall be authorized to call upon the expertise and Access to Department Resources. assistance of every Division, agency, office, bureau, and unit within the Department in order to carry out its mission.  Such entities are hereby required, to the extent not inconsistent with law, to cooperate with the Office and to provide such assistance as the Office may require to accomplish the purposes of this Directive.
[brief] (Pa 4, generally).  Put differently, [...] never gives the why and wherefore of his opinion that [...], as a construction inspector, was responsible for recognizing, identifying, and remedying pre-existing, dangerous conditions that did not arise out of the Project.  [...]’s explanation is not much more helpful than “because I said so. ”  [...] was deposed for two days on October 20, 2021, and November 24, 2021.
[brief] POINT IV  THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DENIED PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO VACATE THE ORDER FILED MARCH 17, 2023 (Argued below.  Ruling below at 162Pa.)  As correctly noted by [...], plaintiff’s motion to vacate her order denying reconsideration was effectively a second motion for reconsideration.  (163Pa.)  Plaintiff offered no new facts, no new circumstances, and no new arguments; only a repetition of her contentions that the “exceptional circumstances” standard had been met, and that plaintiff would be unfairly prejudiced by the dismissal of her claims.  (See, e.g., 19a-20a; 165Pa-167Pa.)  On appeal, plaintiff only claims that she was “entitled to seek relief under subsection (f)” of Rule 4:50-1.  Plaintiff fails to provide any reasons for such relief to have been granted.  (Pb30-31.)  As our Supreme Court has explained, “[b]ecause of the importance that we attach to the finality of judgments, relief under Rule 4:50–1(f) is available only when ‘truly exceptional circumstances are present.
[brief] The full transcript of this interview was attached as an exhibit to the petition, and referenced in PCR counsel’s brief.  (Da 243).  The court also referenced State v. Cummings, 321 N.J. Super. 154 (App. Div.), certif denied, 162 N.J. 199 (1999), for the proposition that petition’s for post-conviction relief must set forth the facts that an investigation will reveal and be supported by certification or affidavit.
[brief] I incorporate by reference [...]’s October 19th 2020 missive that was - oh, I don’t know.  I’ve – you read it.  It must have taken you – it was 12 pages.  But it lists chapter and verse of all the delay tactics and the failures to mediate not just with [...], but with failure to approve other interveners’ applications that they contend that we were settled with.  And we said well do we have anything in writing.  And these things lingered on and lingered on.  And quite frankly I did at that time revoke the immunity.
[directive] Page 3  Clarifies standards for the selection of personnel for Internal Affairs units.  The • revised encourages law enforcement executives to assign personnel to Internal IAPP Affairs who have sufficient experience and rank to effectively handle sensitive investigation.  The also encourages officers to serve a tour in Internal Affairs before IAPP promotion to leadership positions.  § 4.2.2.  The further clarifies that Internal Affairs IAPP investigators with conflicts of interest must recuse from certain cases, and that the Internal Affairs investigatory function can never be contracted out to a private entity.  §§ 4.2.5-4.2.7.  Instead, departments should refer matters to the County Prosecutor when they believe they are unable to investigate the matter on their own.  Where appropriate, departments may enter into an agreement with another law enforcement agency to conduct an Internal Affairs investigation or explore regional internal affairs arrangements with other law enforcement agencies.  §§ 4.2.7, 4.2.8.  Expands and standardizes training for officers assigned to Internal Affairs units.  •  Per the revised IAPP, the Division of Criminal Justice will resume providing “train-the- trainer” courses for county prosecutor personnel responsible for internal affairs training.  § 4.3.  County Prosecutors shall ensure that officers in their jurisdiction assigned to an Internal Affairs unit complete required training.  Id.
[brief] The [...] respectfully request that this honorable court should reverse the trial court’s June 20, 2024 order denying their motion to reverse its May 14, 2024 order “restor[ing]” “this matter…to the trial calendar in its entirety”; and should reverse and vacate the May 14, 2024 “reverse and restore” order, such that the March 22, 2024 “stay order,” staying Count I of the Complaint and referring the survival claims that are the subject of such count to arbitration.  Respectfully submitted, [...]  Attorney for Defendant-Appellant [...] and [...] BY: [...]  DAVID M. KUPFER  Dated: August 19, 2024
[directive] (4)  Damages or removes or impairs safety equipment at airport or aviation facility or otherwise causes physical disruption to the facility, fourth degree; if damage or disruption $1,000 to $2,500 10% permissible recklessly causes bodily injury or damage to property, third degree; if it recklessly causes 4th Degree death, second degree.  36  Updated December 2, 2013  Bail Schedule 2  STATUTES WHERE BAIL MAY BE SET BY A SUPERIOR COURT JUDGE OR A MUNICIPAL COURT JUDGE OR, IN THE MUNICIPAL COURT JUDGE’S ABSENCE, THE MUNICIPAL COURT ADMINISTRATOR OR DEPUTY COURT ADMINISTRATOR, PURSUANT TO RULE 3:26-2 requires warrants
[brief] (Order at Pa48; opinion at Pa53 to Pa55)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Pb26  III.  THE NOTICE WAS INSUFFICIENT.  (Order at Pa48; opinion at Pa55 to Pa58)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Pb31  Conclusion
[brief] Despite [...]’s contention that the trial court created new law, [...]’s position itself is what stands directly contrary to well-settled New Jersey precedent.  As described above, builder’s remedies were first introduced in 1977, looked upon as an instrument which created “an incentive for the institution of socially beneficial but costly litigation such as […] Mt. Laurel. ”  Madison, 72 N.J. at 550-51.  The necessity of the builder’s remedy to effectuate the Mount Laurel obligation has been consistently reinforced in every level of court of this state.
[brief] [...] was incorporated on June 14, 1948 and held its first organizational meeting on June 26, 1948, a little over one year after conveyance of the Genesis Deed.  (Da477).  During that meeting, a copy of [...]’s certificate of incorporation was entered into the minutes and [...] adopted its first set of by-laws.  (Id.).  Consistent with the Genesis Deed’s directive, [...]’s by-laws stated that any “person or group of persons” shall become a member of [...] upon “the date of acquisition of title to property at Ocean Beach[.]” (Da481).  The by-laws then imposed various “terms of membership,” including a requirement that all members swear to abide by [...]’s “certificate of incorporation and any subsequent regulations imposed by this Club. ”
[brief] Submitted March 11, 2024  [...] Court Plaza  South 21 Main Street, Suite 200 Hackensack, New Jersey 07601 [...]  Attorneys for Plaintiffs-Appellants  [...] et al.  Of Counsel: [...], Esq. (#037351989)  [...], Esq. (#023091991)  [...]  [...] [...]  On the Brief: [...], Esq. (#040702006)  TABLE OF CONTENTS
[brief] T6, 32:18-25, 33:1-5.  6.  In the same conversation with [...], [...] quotes [...] as saying that he emptied a whole clip and that he was asking for bullets, .40 and .9.  T6, 33:21-25.  7.  [...] also quoted [...], “Head shots, you already know how we do”.  T6, 38:8-12.  8.  [...] saw [...] in the [...] vehicle (the car allegedly loaned to [...] prior to the [...] homicide and the car identified as being the pursuit vehicle during the chase of the [...] vehicle) on the night of the [...] homicide.
[brief] The Department is trying to usurp the free will of [...] and the individual subscribers and upend the contractual arrangement between [...] and its subscribers.  Indeed when “[a] law . . . retroactively applies to a contract previously entered into by parties,” the “parties’ reasonable expectations” may be upended.  Berg, 225 N.J. at 259; see also Energy Rsrvs. Grp., Inc. v. Kan. Power & Light Co., 459 U.S. 400, 411 (1983) (discussing the role that parties’ reasonable expectations play in Contract Clause analysis).  That concern about legislation reaching back to alter an already-existing contract and causing fundamental unfairness is precisely the issue here.  Further, the Bulletin’s impositions on reciprocal exchanges lack any significant and legitimate purpose.
[brief] Given Changes in Double Jeopardy Jurisprudence and the Severity of the Penalties to Which Defendant Is Exposed, This Court Should Remand This Matter for a Jury Trial (Da18a-19a)  If sentenced as a third or subsequent DWI offender, [...] faces six months in jail.  In addition, with the other traffic offenses, he faced additional jail time which, if added to the 180-day DWI jail term, would have exposed him to a jail term greater than six months.  See N.J.S.A. 39:4-104.  This is so, even putting aside the many additional consequences faced by persons accused of a third or subsequent DWI offense.  See State v. Denelsbeck, 225 N.J. 103, 117-19 (2016), cert.den. 580 U.S. 1113 (2017).  In State v. Denelsbeck, our Supreme Court held that "no offense can be deemed ‘petty’ for purposes of the right to trial by jury where imprisonment for more than six months is authorized."
[directive] 4.4  Notice When Using BWCs Inside a Private Residence.  Prior to entering a private residence, a law enforcement officer shall notify the occupant that the occupant is being recorded by the BWC and, if the occupant requests the officer to discontinue use of the officer’s BWC the officer shall immediately discontinue use of the BWC unless the officer is actively engaged in investigating the commission of a criminal offense, or is responding to an emergency, or reasonably believes that the officer will be required to use constructive authority or force.  A request to discontinue the use of a BWC made to a law enforcement officer pursuant to this Section and the response to the request shall be recorded by the recording system prior to discontinuing use of the recording system.  BODY WORN CAMERA POLICY | May 2021 7
[brief] POINT V SEVERANCE OF THE IRREVOCABILITY PROVISION WOULD DEFEAT THE CENTRAL PURPOSE OF THE AGREEMENT; THEREFORE, THE DECISION OF THE CHANCERY DIVISION MUST BE REVERSED AND PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.  (DA201 at ¶¶ 1-2; DA202 at ¶¶ 1-3).  Assuming arguendo, the [...] is a legal forum for purposes of the triggering the severance provision of the Agreement, the Chancery Division erred by severing the irrevocability provision because it would defeat the central purpose of the contract.