ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] December 28, 2011  Page 4 (6)  Having been advised of the possible immigration consequences and of your right to seek individualized advice on your immigration consequences, do you still wish to plead guilty?  If during the plea colloquy an indigent defendant seeks the opportunity to discuss with an attorney the potential immigration consequences of the plea and the offense charged would result in a consequence of magnitude, the court should adjourn the proceedings and appoint the municipal public defender to represent defendant.  The municipal court judge is under no obligation to appoint additional separate counsel for an indigent defendant to advise defendant on the immigration consequences of a plea.  Additionally, if during the plea colloquy an indigent defendant who is not charged with an offense that would result in a consequence of magnitude seeks the opportunity to discuss with an attorney the possible immigration consequences of the plea, the court should adjourn the matter to give the defendant the opportunity to do so.  Similarly, if during the plea colloquy a non-indigent defendant seeks the opportunity to discuss with an attorney the possible immigration consequences of the plea, whether or not there are possible consequences of magnitude, the court should adjourn the matter to give the defendant the opportunity to do so.  Finally, at no point in the proceedings should the municipal court judge attempt to advise defendants on an individualized basis as to what the actual immigration consequences of a particular plea might be.  Both Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1486, and Nunez-Valdez, 200 N.J. at 131, made it clear that such individualized advice is the responsibility of counsel, not the judge.  As stated previously, the judge’s responsibility is limited to informing defendants that a plea or a guilty finding may result in negative immigration consequences and that defendants in that situation have the right to seek advice from an attorney regarding the potential consequences.  Any questions or comments regarding this Directive may be directed to [...], Assistant Director for Municipal Court Services, at [...].
[brief] New Jersey must pursue further action to accelerate its energy system transformation.  [Ha451-452, Holm-18 at 15-16 (emphasis added). ]  In other words, the decarbonization is achievable at relatively minor costs which are offset by lasting climate benefits.  The reductions in natural gas usage are accomplished in large part by a phased electrification of residences and commercial buildings.  Installing natural gas in new construction must come to a halt by 2025, at this point, less than two years from now.  This is encompassed in Goals 4.1 and 4.2, which we quoted at length above.  There is no reason to believe that these strategies will not be implemented.  [...] will no longer be able to install gas into new buildings in less than two years.
[brief] 1  First, they have unfairly outright lied to deprive [...] of his liberty to return the erroneous items (Aa1, Aa2) with the evil intention to cause [...] injury by loss of funds in direct violation of N.J.A.C. 10A:4-3.1(a)1; U.S. Const., amend. XIV, sect. 1; Art. I, par. 1 of N.J.S.A. Const.; Jamgochian v. State, supra; Doe v. Poritz, supra.  Secondly, the addition six employees acting under color of State law initials under [...] (Aa10) not only acquiesce the above wrongful acts of [...], [...] and [...] but intentionally deprived [...] of a meaningful manner hearing during their review to ensure [...] injury of loss of funds in contravention of Kahn v. U.S., supra; Doe v. Poritz, supra.  A.  Unfaithfully, they have knowingly outright lied by stating no negligence (Aa10).  B.  Impartially, in abuse of power, they breached their Oath of Office knowing that [...] was required to return the items to the Vendor for a refund (Aa7).  [...] was wrongfully deprived of his liberty under the Federal and State Constitution to do so because he is OVER an inmate (Aa1, Aa2, Aa3).  C.  Unjustly they knowingly deprived [...] of fairness to return the erroneous items with the evil intent to cause [...] loss of funds (Aa10).  CONCLUSION  For the foregoing reasons, [...]'s wrongfully denied meritorious claim should be granted as it is clear [...]'s loss was caused by the failure to allow him to return the stems as required (Aa7).  Punitive damages should be awarded in addition to actual damages for the actions of recklessness, malice, or deception in this case to penalize the state actors for their breach of Oath of Office and to set an example for others to deter state actors from abusing their authority in processing inmates property claims.
[brief] In this case, when the evidence established at trial is weighed, no rationale factfinder could conclude that Plaintiffs provided evidence of a *prima facie* negligent training or supervision claim.  See Pitts v. Newark Bd. of Educ., 337 N.J. Super. 331, 340 (App. Div. 2001).  Further, the rationale of the prior panel does not compel denial of [...]’ cross-appeal because as discussed above, (1) the evidence produced at trial established that involuntary dismissal was proper; and (2) additional information was produced at trial that established that [...] did have proper training regarding grout.  At trial, [...] testified that the bag of grout in question was appropriate for applications requiring unsanded grout.  See Db at 9.  This testimony was not in his deposition.  Moreover, [...] was presented with the bag of grout on the witness stand and confirmed that it was appropriate for the application [...] was inquiring about.  The bag of grout was subsequently admitted into evidence.  Thus, [...] established at trial that (1) the bag of grout was appropriate for [...]’s project; and (2) that the information [...] provided to [...] about the uses of the bag of grout at issue was correct.  [...]’s testimony is important because he is the only witness who verified that [...]’s knowledge of grout and his recommendation that the bag of grout at issue was appropriate for the application [...] was inquiring about, was correct.  [...]’s unrebutted testimony proves that [...] was skilled and knowledgeable about the applications of grout, and not unskilled or incompetent.  Plaintiffs’ expert, [...], also admitted that he is not knowledgeable on grout, and could not evaluate whether [...] had actually provided [...] with incorrect or misleading information.  See Db at 11.
[brief] Aubrey v. Harleysville Ins. Cos., 140 N.J. 397 (1995) .................................. 11, 12, 13  Dela Vega v. Travelers Ins. Co., A-2272-19 (App. Div. 2022), certif. denied, 252 N.J. 234 (2022)  ....................................  3, 4, 5, 6  French v. N.J. Sch. Bd. Ass'n Ins. Group, 149 N.J. 478 (1997)..........................  13  Legal Argument POINT I INTRAFAMILY LIABILITY  EXCLUSIONS SHOULD BE DEEMED UNENFORCEABLE AS A MATTER OF PUBLIC POLICY REGARDLESS OF WHETHER THEY APPEAR IN PRIMARY OR EXCESS INSURANCE POLICIES
[brief] The Evidence of Record Supports a Fact-Based Allocation of [...]’s Damages  In his RAR, the SAM found that the evidence allowed for an accurate estimation of the property damage that occurred during each period.  The SAM properly applied Massachusetts law discussed above to allocate [...]’s damages.  The SAM reached his conclusion in reliance on [...]’s Jan. 31, 2011, Opinion and Order and [...]’s extensive and detailed factual testimony during the hearing.  (Pa0148).
[brief] In *Bozzi v. City of Jersey City*, the Supreme Court held that licensed pet owners had no reasonable expectation of privacy in their names and addresses.  248 N.J. 274, 287 (2021).  The Court held that “owning a dog is a substantially public endeavor in which people do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy that exempts their personal information from disclosure under the privacy clause of OPRA. ”  *Id.* at 287.  The Supreme Court described owning a dog as an “inherently . . . public endeavor[.]”  *Id.* at 286.  The *Bozzi* Court also found that “legislative inaction” regarding home addresses was “particularly significant. ”  *Id.* at 284-85.  When the Legislature passed OPRA, the Legislature created a Privacy Commission, which in turn wrote and released the December 31, 2004 Final Report of Privacy Study Commission Study.  N.J.S.A. 47:1A-15.  In that Final Report, the Privacy Study Commission recommended that home addresses should be treated as confidential information.  Because the Legislature has never acted on this recommendation, the *Bozzi* Court was reluctant to create an exception for home addresses when the Legislature had not.  *Ibid.*  The Bozzi Court’s holding regarding Legislative inaction on home addresses is equally applicable to Legislative inaction regarding email addresses.  The Legislature has never acted upon the Privacy Commission’s recommendations that email addresses be treated the same as “unlisted telephone numbers,” which are exempt under OPRA.
[brief] Two unidentifiable people get out of the car and walk to the side of the house at [...].  (12T108-8 to 109-6; Da23).  At 3:08 a.m., [...] called [...] and said that she was still at work and would be off soon and that [...] was going to take her home.  (10T53-16 to 54-9; 12T109-7 to 25; 12T112-7 to 113-3).  The brake lights on the Durango went on and off at this time.  (12T109-116 to 20; Da23).  The two people returned to the Durango shortly thereafter.  (12T110-7 to 111-23).  The Durango then drove away.  (12T111-24 to 112-4; Da23).  Surveillance video --- \(^3\)
[brief] Not one court decision in cases cited by defendant claims that an individual must prove he wanted to be at the closing, or sign real estate closing papers, as the lower court suggests, (6T 13) to prove his claim of being a rightful owner.  5.  The Court ignored legal precedent when it dismissed the claim for breach of fiduciary duty in the Summary Judgment motion because as discussed in the main brief, a confidential relationship creates duties akin to fiduciary ones, and a breach of a confidential relationship triggers the imposition of a constructive trust.  (Pa36-38)  This issue was fully explained in the Appellant’s main brief.  What we add here is namely that Respondent’s brief distorts the law and hides the reality that fiduciary-like obligations can arise by means other than a written power of attorney.  There is voluminous precedent on actions by the parties involved and through relationships which create and trigger obligations akin to fiduciary ones and also trigger constructive trusts just like agreements the written with pen on paper.  **CONCLUSION**
[directive] If a law enforcement agency declines to re-open an investigation at the request of the Civilian Review Board, the Board may issue a final public report regarding the complaint or incident after appropriately redacting the report in accordance with instructions from the law enforcement executive.  The personal identity of specific subject officers, complainants, or witnesses may not be disclosed to the public.  Under no circumstances may a Civilian Review Board immunize any person from prosecution or take any other action that would have the effect of conferring immunity on any person.  (b)
[directive] Because a DWI violation is treated, by the Court, as a quasi-criminal prosecution, every element of a DWI offense must meet the evidentiary standard of “beyond a reasonable doubt. ”  Romano v. Kimmelman, 96 N.J. 66, 89-90 (1984).  In contrast, since a DWI refusal violation is not treated as a quasi-criminal prosecution, it does not have to meet the higher evidentiary standard for criminal conduct, beyond a reasonable doubt.  The Legislature has determined that proof of a violation of the DWI refusal statute is satisfied when the State presents evidence meeting the preponderance of the evidence standard of proof.  State v. Leavitt, 107 N.J. 534 (1987); State v. Widmaier, 157 N.J. 475 (1999).  DWI Without a Chemical Breath Test (Observational Offense)
[brief] (21T:123-4 to 124-18).  They then “got into some wrestling match” and when defendant “got [his] hand on the gun,” he “fired twice defending [his] space. ” (21T:121-19 to 22).  When asked whether defendant had actually seen the gun before starting to wrestle with [...], defendant said that he only saw [...] to reach to pull something out of his pocket.  (21T:123-18 to 126-11).  He claimed, however, that it was too dark to tell exactly what it was, but he just “knew” it was a gun because he had seen vague, veiled threats on Facebook that he had surmised were meant for him.  *Ibid.*  Nonetheless, defendant claimed they “hadn’t talked in a while. ” (21T:125-15).  Defendant claimed the only contact he had with [...] in years were his uninvited visits to the [...] home.  (21T:129-2 to 25).  Defendant claimed that once he saw [...] go for the gun, he tried to throw a punch at [...].  (21T:131-16 to 140-4).  Defendant’s story changed at this point, however—now he claimed he could see the gun before he grabbed for it.  Defendant claimed he overpowered [...] to take the gun away, and had [...] pushed against the outer wall of the carriage house.
[brief] If the former, some of the buildings exceed the 35 ft. height limitation by ten percent (10%) and require variances pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70.d.(6) which may only be granted by the Zoning Board of Adjustment.  If the latter, the buildings comply with the 35 ft. height limitation and the application was within the jurisdiction of the Planning Board to approve.  The Planning Board and the Trial Court properly found that the latter case applies.  The Plaintiffs argue that the former applies, which deprived the Planning Board of jurisdiction to hear the application and nullifies the approval.  Section 22-2.4 of the Ordinance provides that “BUILDING HEIGHT – Shall mean the vertical dimension measured to the highest point of a building . . . from the lowest original lot grade or any revised lot grade shown on a site plan, subdivision plan, or plot plan approved by the Planning Board or Zoning Board of Adjustment when acting pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40:55D-1 et. seq. and this chapter.
[brief] POINT III  THE TOWNSHIP HAS COMPLIED WITH ALL PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS FOR EMINENT DOMAIN PROCEEDINGS  A.  Adherence to Eminent Domain Procedures  [...] has meticulously followed the procedural mandates set forth in the New Jersey Eminent Domain Act including proper notice, public hearings, and opportunities for objection.  N.J.S.A. 20:3-1 et seq., The assertion of procedural deficiencies by the Appellant is unfounded and unsupported by the record.  [...]'s actions in pursuing the eminent domain process to acquire the property owned by the Appellant has been in strict compliance with the procedural and substantive requirements outlined in New Jersey's Eminent Domain Act.  N.J.S.A. 20:3-1 et seq.  This meticulous adherence underscores the Township's commitment to transparency, fairness, and the rule of law.  Central to the eminent domain process is the requirement to provide proper notice to property owners and the general public.  [...] has gone above and beyond in this regard, ensuring that the affected party was given ample notice of the proposed taking and the reasons behind it.  The Township conducted public hearings that allowed for community input and provided a forum for the property owner to voice its concerns and objections.  These hearings were not merely procedural formalities but were conducted in a spirit of genuine engagement and transparency.  In compliance with N.J.S.A. 20:3-6, the Township undertook a fair and impartial appraisal of the property in question, aiming to determine its market value accurately.  Based on the appraisal, [...] made bona fide offers to the property owner, reflecting the fair market value of its property.  This process demonstrates the Township's commitment to ensuring that the property owner is justly compensated for its loss, in accordance with the constitutional requirement of just compensation.  Recognizing the significant impact of eminent domain actions on property owners, [...] has provided multiple opportunities for the affected party to challenge both the taking and the compensation offered.  This process ensures that the Township's exercise of eminent domain undergoes rigorous scrutiny, safeguarding the rights of property owners.  Throughout the eminent domain process, [...] has meticulously documented all steps taken, from initial notices and appraisal to public hearings and judicial proceedings.  This comprehensive record-keeping serves not only as a legal requirement but also as a demonstration of the Township's commitment to accountability and transparency.  At every stage of the eminent domain process, [...] has acted in full compliance with state laws and judicial precedents governing such takings.  The Township's actions have been guided by a clear understanding of its legal obligations and a commitment to upholding the rights of property owners while pursuing the public good.  [...]'s procedural conduct in the eminent domain process exemplifies strict adherence to the legal requirements established by New Jersey law.
[brief] ”  *State v. Shaw*, 237 N.J. 588, 619 (2007).  This is best reflected in the court’s pointing to [...]’s admission of guilt “before consent” as a factor tending to show voluntariness.  (Da42).  But to the extent [...] admitted guilt, it was only in response to the unlawful police questioning which preceded it, and which she had ruled must be suppressed as not voluntary.
[brief] See N.J.S.A. 17:33A-5.  The Fraud Act also requires that certain warnings appear on insurance claim forms.  See N.J.S.A. 17:33A-6.  Insurance carriers damaged under the Fraud Act are required to mail a copy of their initial pleadings to the Commissioner so that the Commissioner can consider whether to intervene in the action.  See N.J.S.A. 17:33A-7(c) and (d).
[directive] If monetary bail is set on a complaint-warrant for a petty disorderly persons offense, the advisory monetary ranges in the Bail Schedules will apply.  Includes option of R.O.R.  This Rule provides that initial conditions of pre-trial release an on an initial disorderly persons charge on a Complaint-Warrant (CDR-2) may be set by a judge designated by the Chief Justice, pursuant to Rule 3:26 as part of a first appearance at a centralized location, pursuant to R. 3:4-2.  Setting bail for bench warrants or for a Complaint-warrant (CDR-2) in which the most serious charge is a petty disorderly persons offense or other non-disorderly persons offense within the Rule 7:4-2 jurisdiction of the Municipal Court may be done by a judge, sitting regularly in or as acting as temporary judge of the jurisdiction in which the offense was committed Authority to Set Bail or Conditions of or by a vicinage Presiding Judge of the Municipal Courts, or as authorized by any other rule of court.  In the absence of the Judge, and to the extent consistent with Pretrial Release N.J.S.A. 2B:12-21 and R. 1:41-3(f), a duly authorized municipal court administrator or deputy court administrator may set bail on defendants issued a bench warrant or a Complaint-Warrant (CDR-2) in which the most serious charge is a petty disorderly persons offense or other non-disorderly persons offense within the jurisdiction of the Municipal Court.  The authority of the municipal court administrator, deputy court administrator, or other authorized person shall be exercised “only in accordance with the bail schedules promulgated by the Administrative Office of the Courts or the municipal court judge.  19 SUMMARY OF RULES AND STATUTE REGARDING BAIL FOR NON-INDICTABLE OFFENSES
[brief] However, nothing in Plaintiff’s brief indicated a basis for the interests of justice to find error in the resolution of the motions for reconsideration or to vacate.  Plaintiff’s arguments simply assert that the trial judge did not give sufficient weight to her excuses as to why she did not produce an expert report in a timely manner.  However, plaintiff does not support this argument with citation to any fact of record and, [...]’s decision clearly indicates why the two reconsideration motions were denied.  (Pa142-157; Pa162-167)  Moreover, while the Plaintiff argues in this appeal that [...] did not properly consider Plaintiff’s medical condition, she directly addressed Plaintiff’s condition when discussing [...] determinations.  (Pa156)  Further, Plaintiff specifically put them before the Court in her unsigned certification.  (Pa140-143)  There is no question that [...] considered them, and found them to be insufficient to meet the “interest of justice” standard.  As such, this argument is without merit.  _____________________ the motions being reconsidered were interlocutory, otherwise the appeal would be untimely.  **Issue VI:**
[brief] [...] Meets with Appellants to Discuss How to Improve Their Poor Performance  Appellants’ sales performance was by far the worst of any Sapporo distributor in the Territory since well before the COVID-19 pandemic began in 2020.  (Da15-Da17 ¶¶ 19-25.)  In addition, although most Sapporo distributors had recovered their 2019 sales levels by 2021 and exceeded them by 2022, Appellants’ sales volume was down over 20% from 2019 to 2022.  (Id. ¶¶ 23-24.)  On September 29, 2022, [...] senior executives traveled to Appellants’ offices to meet.  (Pa34-38 ¶¶ 44-57; Da19-23 ¶¶26-46; Da2-Da8 ¶¶ 6-26.)  During the meeting, [...]’s representatives explained that they were concerned that Appellants’ sales performance was substantially worse than other distributors’ sales performance in the Territory.  (Pa35-Pa36 ¶¶ 49-51; Da19-Da21 ¶¶ 26, 33-34; Da2 ¶¶ 4-5; Da4 ¶ 13.)  [...] representatives shared sales data demonstrating this disparity.  (Pa35-Pa36 ¶ 49; Da20-Da21 ¶ 34; Da4 ¶ 13.)  In response, Appellants were defensive.  (Pa35-Pa38 ¶¶ 49-56.)  They claimed that they were performing worse than their competitors, at least in part, because their competitors engaged in “unlawful” or “illegal bundling” of beer with free or heavily discounted food items, whereas Appellants did not.  (Pa36-37 ¶¶ 53-54, Pa42 ¶ 74.)  Contrary to Appellants’ assertion, [...] never suggested or told Appellants to do anything illegal, but rather suggested engaging in various legal promotional activities that may increase sales.  (Da21-Da23 ¶¶ 38-39, 42-43; Da6-Da7 ¶¶ 21, 25.)
[brief] The I.F.P.A. is a comprehensive statue designed to help remedy high insurance premiums with the legislature deemed to be a significant problem. ”  Slip op. at 14-15.  In footnote 4, the court stated, “The provisions preserving the right of a trial by jury have appeared in each of New Jersey’s Constitutions.  Pursuant to Article 1, ¶9 of the New Jersey Constitution (1947), a litigant has the right to a trial by jury [that] shall remain inviolate .  . . ."  In construing this provision, the New Jersey Supreme Court has been consistent in denying a right to jury trial unless the right existed prior to the adoption of the State Constitution.  *In re Li Volsi*, 85 N.J. 576 (1981).  We note that where actions created by statute have distinctive features with respect to substantive and procedural standards that would render them virtually unknown to the common law, there is no right to jury trial."
[brief] In the event Escrow Agent receives written notice of a dispute between the parties with respect to the Earnest Money Deposit and the interest earned thereon (the “Escrowed Funds”), Escrow Agent shall not release or deliver the Escrowed Funds to either party and shall (i) continue to hold the Escrowed Funds until otherwise directed in a writing signed by all parties hereto or (ii) deposit the Escrowed Funds with the clerk of any court of competent jurisdiction.  Upon such deposit, Escrow Agent will be released from all duties and responsibilities hereunder.