ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] LEGAL ARGUMENT  The trial court’s decision granting summary judgment in favor of Plaintiff-Respondent  [...] fundamentally misinterpreted the PSA.  The trial court erred in holding that [...] had an immediate right to terminate the PSA upon receiving a non-compliant estoppel certificate.  However, the PSA clearly establishes that receipt of an Acceptable Estoppel Certificate is simply a condition precedent to [...]’s obligation to close.  The PSA afforded [...] until the closing date to provide an Acceptable Estoppel Certificate and did not make any provision for the cancellation of the PSA simply because [...] received a non-compliant estoppel certificate prior to closing.  The PSA expressly limits [...]’s right to terminate the agreement to circumstances in which [...] fails to deliver an Acceptable Estoppel Certificate at the time of closing.  Moreover, the risk allocation negotiated between the parties should be respected.  [...] knowingly accepted the possibility that an Acceptable Estoppel Certificate might not be provided until closing, and the PSA clearly limits [...]’s remedy to termination and the return of its down payment in such circumstances.  The trial court’s ruling not only misinterpreted the plain language of the PSA but also introduced inequitable results by undermining the risk allocation established in the PSA.  Accordingly, the Order and Judgment must be reversed.
[brief] (Pa000207–08.)  Moreover, the record created below still permits this Court to make a determination without need of a remand.  *Id.* (citing *Leeds v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A.*, 331 N.J. Super. 416 (App. Div. 2000) (“affirming the grant of summary judgment even though order merely stated ‘denied. ’”)).  [...] further declined the opportunity to request an amended or supplemented statement of reasons and confirmed that this issue was “Not Raised Below.
[brief] State v. Maioni, 78 N.J.L. 339, 343–44 (1909) (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added).  Our court found this instruction to be “incontestably sound. ”  Ibid.  As the court explained, in a case with a person who put a gun against someone’s head and deliberately pulled the trigger, such a presumption would be appropriate: the actor used the weapon, which was designed to be deadly, in a way that would reliably lead to death.
[directive] SUBJECT: Interim Guidance Regarding Marijuana Decriminalization  Earlier today, Governor [...] signed three bills changing the legal status of marijuana.  These laws, which went into immediate effect, create a two-tier framework:  Regulated cannabis.  When the substance is bought, sold, and used under certain • conditions, it is treated as “regulated cannabis” and fully legal in New Jersey.  As a practical matter, however, regulated cannabis will not be available in the State for several months until a new government body, the [...], issues rules governing its use.  Marijuana and hashish.  All forms of the substance that are not regulated cannabis or • medical cannabis are treated as “marijuana” or “hashish. ”  Under the new laws, marijuana and hashish are still defined as “controlled dangerous substances” under N.J.S.A. 2C:35- 2 but are largely decriminalized for non-distribution offenses.  The laws eliminate existing prohibitions and create new, more lenient penalties for possession and distribution that remain tiered based on weight.  This document is designed to provide interim guidance to law enforcement officers regarding the treatment of marijuana and hashish under the new laws.  In addition, today I am issuing a separate document answering a number of the questions most commonly asked by law enforcement officials about marijuana enforcement.  My office will continue to update that document and post answers on our website in the coming weeks and months.  In the meantime, all officers are encouraged to familiarize themselves with the three new laws, which are codified as chapters 16 (legalized cannabis), 19 (marijuana decriminalization), and 25 (clarifying provisions) of the 2021 Public Laws.
[brief] No different than the holdings of *Woo-Padva* 2 and *Valentine* (amongst others), where there is no private right of action, a plaintiff lacks standing to bring a declaratory relief claim under the same statute.  See *Woo-Padva* 2, 2023 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1550, at *912; Valentine, supra (Da35-Da57); see, e.g. In re Resol. Of State Comm’n of Investigation, 108 N.J. 35, 46, 527 A.2d 851 (1987) (dismissing cause of action seeking a judgment declaring a party violated a statute because plaintiffs did not have a private right of action under the statute); Excel Pharmacy Servs., LLC v. Liberty Mut. Ins., 825 F. App’x 65, 70 (3d Cir. 2020) (“[b]ut is it well settled that parties cannot bring a declaratory judgment action under a statute when there is no private right of action under that statute. ”).  Relying on this precedent and sound reasoning, the Lower Court correctly held “[t]he N.J.C.F.L.A. does not confer private statutory cause of action . . .
[brief] State v. Reyes, 50 N.J. 454, 458-59, 236 A.2d 385 (1967); State v. Kluber, 130 N.J. Super. 336, 342, 327 A.2d 232 (1974), certif. denied, 67 N.J. 72, 335 A.2d 25 (1975).  "More specifically, the trial judge must determine whether the evidence, viewed in its entirety . . . giving the State the benefit of all of its favorable testimony as well as all of the favorable inferences which reasonably could be drawn therefrom, is sufficient to enable a jury to find that the State's charge has been established beyond a reasonable doubt."  Kluber, supra, 130 N.J. Super. at 341-42, 327 A.2d 232.  The trial judge must consider only the existence of such evidence, not its "worth, nature, or extent."  Id. at 342, 327 A.2d 232.  Defendant argues that there were too many factual inconsistencies to support the verdict.
[brief] S.C. BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF JASMINE ROBINSON ON THE BRIEF: [...], Esquire Attorney ID No.: 025091996  [...], Esquire Attorney ID No.: 023292008  [...] Day [...] [...]  Attorneys for Plaintiff [...] Table of Contents Table of Citations ........................................................................................................ iii Preliminary Statement ................................................................................................. 1 Procedural History ....................................................................................................... 3 Statement of Facts ......................................................................................................... 5 Argument ..................................................................................................................... 17 Point I Defendants are not entitled to a New Trial because the jury’s allocation of fault against Defendant [...] for his negligent operation of the [...] van is adequately supported by the evidence.................................................................................................................. 18 Point II The trial court below did not abuse its discretion in (1) excluding evidence of [...]’s prior criminal conviction, (2) excluding [...]’s not-to-scale crash diagram, or (3) admitting the audio portion of the police dash cam video......................23 A. The Trial Court properly excluded evidence of Defendant [...]’s criminal conviction...........................................................................................................24
[brief] In underwriting the subsequent 2017 Policy, 2018 Policy, and 2019 Policy, [...] relied on the information provided in the 2016 Application, including that as of the date of the application, there had been no disciplinary proceedings against any Insured during the preceding five years.  Thus, Defendants rescinded the Policies because the OAE Proceeding—which it viewed as a disciplinary proceeding—were not reported.  However, as is evident from the record, including [...]’s Certification, Defendants did not apply the Policy definition of Disciplinary Proceeding in reaching its conclusion because, if it had, it would not have rescinded the Policies.  Despite the position taken by [...] with its insured limiting the basis for rescission solely to “disciplinary proceeding”, the trial court expanded the grounds for rescission to include its conclusion that the OAE Proceeding also constituted an “investigation” or “bar complaint” which would have also supported rescission.  This, standing alone, was erroneous, as the trial court was required to confine itself to the actual grounds asserted by [...] in the purported rescission, as confirmed by [...].  Notwithstanding the foregoing, the trial court committed error as the OAE Proceeding was not a Disciplinary Proceeding, investigation or bar complaint, based on the facts in the record and the reasonable expectation of the insured created by ambiguities in the Policy Definitions.
[brief] The failure of the police to advise him of his Miranda rights during that custodial interrogation required suppression of that statement.  Furthermore, because his March 12th statement was a product of his un-Mirandized March 6th statement, the trial court further erred in failing to suppress his March 12th statement in its entirety.  This erroneous admission of these two statements violated Defendant’s Federal and State privilege against self-incrimination.  U.S. Const. amends.  V, XIV; N.J.S.A. 2A:84A-19; N.J.R.E. 503; State v. O’Neill, 193 N.J. 148, 176 (2007) (treating “our state privilege as though it were of constitutional magnitude”).
[brief] A trial court's decision to charge on a lesser-included offense is governed by N.J.S.A. 2C:1–8(e).  That statute provides that “The court shall not charge the jury with respect to an included offense unless there is a rational basis for a verdict convicting the defendant of the included offense” (emphasis supplied); see also, Cassady, supra, 198 N.J. at 178.  In State v. Alexander, 233 N.J. 132, 142 (2018), the New Jersey Supreme Court expounded that “[a] party must request a charge or object to an omitted charge at trial for the rational basis test to apply. ”  The court continued:  “In the absence of a request or an objection, we apply a higher standard, requiring the unrequested charge to be ‘clearly indicated’ from the record. ”  Id. at 143.  In State v. Garron, 177 N.J. 147, 180 (2003), the New Jersey Supreme Court explained that the “primary obligation” of trial courts is to “see that justice is done. ”  That obligation includes ensuring “that a jury is instructed properly on the law and on all clearly indicated lesser-included offenses, even if at odds with the strategic decision of counsel. ”  Id.  It has long been held that trial courts have an independent duty to *sua sponte* charge on a lesser-included offense “only where the facts in evidence ‘clearly indicate’ the appropriateness of that charge. ”  *State v. Savage*, 172 N.J. 374, 397 (2002) (quoting *State v. Choice*, 98 N.J. 295, 298 (1985)).  As clarified in *State v. Denofa*, 187 N.J. 24, 42 (2006), the evidence must “jump[ ] off the page” in order to trigger a trial court's duty to *sua sponte* instruct a jury on that charge.  In *State v. Thomas*, 187 N.J. 119, 130 (2006), the court acknowledged that jury instructions on related offenses “raise constitutional concerns because criminal defendants have rights to a grand jury presentment and fair notice of criminal charges against them. ”  To prevent infringement of those rights, a trial court may instruct the jury on a related offense only when “the defendant requests or consents to the related offense charge, and there is a rational basis in the evidence to sustain the related offense. ”  Id. at 133.  In the case before the Court, and for the reasons more fully set forth in Point I, *supra*, the facts presented at the trial of [...] did not “clearly indicate” the appropriateness of an aggravated or a reckless manslaughter charge and they certainly did not “jump off the page”.  Thus, it was error for the trial court to instruct the jury in this regard, especially in light of the unanimous objection of both parties.  The illogical verdict rendered by the jury confirms the erroneous nature of the issuance of the charge and is further support for this Court to overturn the unsupported guilty verdict.  III.
[brief] (Da776-780)  Defendant’s Motion to Disqualify Trial Judge 20.  On July 11, 2019, Defendant filed its Motion to Disqualify The Honorable [...], P.J.Ch. from presiding over the remand proceedings claiming that since Judge Hodgson made credibility determinations during prior proceedings, he could not be impartial during the remand proceeding.  (Da764-813)  On July 24, 2019, Plaintiff filed opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Disqualify.  On August 26, 2019, the Trial Court heard arguments from counsel on Defendant’s Motion to Disqualify.  (4T)  21.  The Trial Court rejected the Defendant’s arguments noting:  Defendant…omits the remainder of the rule which clarifies the recusal as not warranted when the Judge’s opinion was made during the course of proceedings in the pending action.  In other words, 1:12-1(d) only applies if [the] Court gave some sort of opinion outside of the confines of the normal proceedings.  (4T 11:14-23)  The Trial Court concluded that:  [It] has not formed any bias or prejudice against any of the parties in making determinations of what evidence to rely on based on testimony [p]resented before it.  The Court [made] determinations based on that testimony.  And the Court is satisfied that there is no bias or prejudice as a result of those rulings.  (4T 14:20-25)  The Trial Court denied the Defendant’s Motion to Disqualify by Order on August 26, 2019.
[brief] Even if Atalese applies, Appellants complied through notices given in the contract language considered under ordinary contract principles.  Respondents misleadingly claim any waiver language was “absent. ”  This is incorrect.  The arbitration provision, which undoubtedly fulfills the AAA Rules, is itself a waiver provision.  It has always been incorporated by reference in the POS which is a governing document as set forth in the SPA – a document Respondents still do not deny reading, understanding or signing.  The arbitration provision was initialed, and the SPA was signed.  While Respondents allege this “voluminous document” is irrelevant and cannot be considered because it was not signed, that is not actually the law.  Respondents’ reliance on *Leodori* is misplaced.  175 N.J. 293 (2003).  This case raises no such considerations as in *Leodori*, as there is unmistakable assent by virtue of the signatures on the SPA.  And there was no form the buyers were required to execute to confirm assent which was left unsigned; unlike the case with the "Review and Agreement" form in *Leodori*.  By law, a POS must be provided to a prospective purchaser by the contract date.
[brief] Meanwhile, by December 2009, as grading work progressed from east to west across the site, approaching the [...] on the west side of the site, [...] workers realized that if they continued to follow the set elevation markers they would expose the foundation the eastern wall of the [...].  (Pa388 at ¶27)  The exterior grade would be 30” below the Longo floor interior.  (Id.)  In August 2010, [...] advised his Board of Adjustment that he had become aware of “an elevation issue relating to the construction of the new 15,000 SF building in relation to the existing 20,000 SF building."  (Pa251-Pa252)  [...] told the Board that he asked the applicant for an as-built survey, which revealed that the new building was "approximately 2.5 feet lower in relation to the existing 20,000 SF building than what the approved site plan had shown in the past."  (Pa252)  Hall found this discrepancy significant enough to require an amended application to the Board by [...].  (Pa252)  The 2.5 ft discrepancy was consistent with the discrepancy between the elevation shown on [...]'s 2005 grading plan originally provided by [...] to [...], and the revised grading plan provided to [...] by [...] in late 2008 but not forwarded by [...] to [...] until long after [...] performed its stake out of the new building's elevation in March 2009.  (Pa251-252).  **Theory of Common Knowledge Negligence of [...]**
[brief] COUNTERSTATEMENT OF PROCEDURAL HISTORY ...........................................  1 COUNTERSTATEMENT OF FACTS ........................................................................  1  Trial .........................................................................................................................  1  Miranda Hearing .....................................................................................................  6  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I: DEFENDANT’S STATEMENT TO DETECTIVE  EGAN WAS KNOWING, INTELLIGENT, AND VOLUNTARY BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT.  (2T16-5 to; Da8).  ..........................................................................................................................................................................................  13  POINT II: IT WAS NOT PLAIN ERROR FOR THE COURT TO ALLOW THE JURY TO HEAR THE AGREED UPON PORTIONS OF DEFENDANT’S REDACTED RECORDED INTERVIEW, INDEED IT WAS INVITED.  [Not Raised Below]  ..........................................................................................................................................................................................  21  A.  Defendant’s redacted interview played for the jury did not include any impermissible concerning defendant’s credibility or guilt ..............................................  22  B.  The mentions in the redacted statement that defendant was under arrest on unrelated charges were invited by defendant, and not otherwise plain error  ..................................................................................................................  27  POINT III: THE PROSECUTOR’S COMMENTS DURING SUMMATION WERE WITHIN THE SCOPE OF PERMISSIBLE ARGUMENTATION AND, IN ANY EVENT, NOT PLAIN ERROR.  (Not Raised Below).  ..........................................................................................................................................................................................  31 POINT IV: DEFENDANT CANNOT SHOW THE CUMULATION OF ALLEGED ERRORS LED TO AN UNJUST RESULT.  (Not Raised Below)  .................................................................................................................................37  POINT V: THE STATE CONCEDES THAT DEFENDANT’S ROBBERY AND CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT ROBBERY CONVICTIONS SHOULD MERGE.  .................................................................................................................................38  CONCLUSION
[brief] Da19-24; (17T7-2 to 17-4).  The jury found the defendant not guilty of counts 1, 2, 5, and 6.  Ibid.  Further, the jury was unable to reach a verdict on counts 11, 12, 15, which the State subsequently dismissed.  Ibid.  On March 4, 2016, the defendant appeared before [...] for sentencing.
[directive] Pursuant to the authority granted to me under the New Jersey Constitution and the Criminal Justice Act of 1970, N.J.S.A. 52:17B-97 to -117, which provides for the general supervision of criminal justice by the Attorney General as chief law enforcement officer of the State in order to secure the benefits of a uniform and efficient enforcement of the criminal law and the administration of criminal justice throughout the State, I hereby direct all law enforcement and prosecuting agencies operating under the authority of the laws of the state of New Jersey to implement and comply with the directives outlined below regarding the creation of an intelligence- driven, violence suppression task force, as well as a statewide intelligence liaison network.
[directive] In all cases, however, including those in which a sentence already was imposed, every effort should be made to ensure that Probation has the defendant's telephone numbers, address, and email address.  The Family Division should provide this information to Probation for prior cases and going forward for any case which Probation staff are not in at included the sentencing.  Family Sentencing Guidance - Issued by Directive 13-20 (April 30, 2020)
[directive] Będzie Pan(i) zobowiązany(a) do opłacenia obowiązkowej kary grzywny na fundusz c.  [Tak/Yes]  [Nie/No] służb antynartkotykowych i zmniejszania popytu na narkotyki (D.E.D.R.), jak podano niżej, za każde z przestępstw, do popełnienia których Pan(i) się przyzna?  Obowiązują kary grzywny w następującej wysokości:
[brief] 37 - Rule 4:3-1(5) .................................................................................. 13 - Rule 4:3-2.  ......................................................................................  18 - Rule 4:3-3(a) ..................................................................................  15 - Rule 4:3-3(a)(2) ............................................................................. 18 - Rule 4:69-1 ..................................................................................... 8 - Rule 4:69-3 ..................................................................................... 8 - Rule 4:69-4 ..................................................................................... 8 - Rule 4:9-1 ...................................................................................... 38 Rule 5:1 - Cognizability of Actions; Scope and Applicability of Rules ........................................... 8 Rule 5:1-2, "Actions Cognizable," .................................................................................................. 15 Statutes 42 U.S.C. 1981 .................................................................................................................................. 18 Law Against Discrimination, N.J.S.A. 10:5-1, et seq ........................................................................ 37 N.J. 10:6-2 Actions permitted under the "New Jersey Civil Rights Act" ............................................. 9 N.J. Const. art. VI, § 3, ¶ 4 .................................................................................................................. 13 N.J. Stat. § 2A:17-36 ............................................................................................................................ 8, 24 N.J.S.A. 10:6-2 ..................................................................................................................................... 31 N.J.S.A. 10:6-2(c) ............................................................................................................................... 24 N.J.S.A. 10:6-2(f) .................................................................................................................................
[brief] Appellant incorporates by reference statements made via his points one to eight as if fully set forth within.  The respondents’ attorney, [...], had long history of ethically and legally questionable actions and or involvements against the appellant.  These ethically and legally questionable involvements were to such extent that he could be named as a party and as such he was no longer ethically riches to be able to merely represent the respondents.  Appellant articulated this to the trial court via format brief (Pa72–Pa81), through which he cited United States of America v. Bruce Cutler, 58 F.3d 825 (2d Cir.) 1995, in pleading with the trial court to bar [...] from representing the respondents in the matter.