ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Defendant further contends that prior counsel was ineffective for purportedly failing to properly handle the voir dire of the entire jury, after one juror was excused.  (Db46).  This argument is also without merit.  Defendant goes to great lengths to insinuate and speculate regarding what the excused juror may have said to the other jurors, before she was excused.  (Db46-49).  However, nowhere in defendant’s attempts at misdirection is there an accurate rendition of what occurred that led to the juror being excused from the trial.  The PCR court correctly observed that, during the trial:  The [c]ourt questioned the juror outside of the presence of the other jurors.  The juror stated that [...] had been in a relationship with her daughter's grandmother "years ago", but she had not seen him in years.  The juror stated that knowing [...] would not interfere with her ability to be fair and impartial.  She acknowledged that she asked other juror's if they had seen [...]' name on the witness list because she thought she may have overlooked it and told them that she needed to inform the Court that she knew [...].  The Court excused the juror.  [(Da83). ]  Against this backdrop, it is far easier to understand prior counsel’s concern that further voir direing the entire jury would “unnecessarily highlight [...]” and elevate his importance at the expense of defendant’s theory of the case, specifically that defendant was not in possession of a gun and was actually the victim in the violent incident.  (Db3-15).  Moreover, this Court itself opined in defendant’s direct appeal that the decision to not voir dire the entire jury again was not an error.  Easterling, No. A-4211-16T4 (slip op. at 9).  The PCR court properly noted this and reiterated:  The [trial] [c]ourt had the opportunity to question the juror and to assess her credibility and determined that she did not share any information, other than reporting that she knew [...], with the other jurors.  In addition, th[e] trial court determined that the extent of the juror's relationship with [...] was limited, ended years before the trial, and she did not have any personal knowledge of the events that gave rise to the indictments or [...]' involvement in the incident.  The Appellate Court stated that the juror did not express an opinion on [...]' credibility or character to th[e trial] [c]ourt and determined that the [trial] court acted within its discretion when it determined that questioning the other jurors about [...] would unnecessarily highlight the individual [witness].  Thus, it cannot be said defendant suffered any prejudice from the decision not to voir dire, negating the second prong of Strickland.  Further, as noted in the prior subheading, it cannot be said prior counsel was ineffective for failing to raise unsuccessful arguments.  Worlock, 117 N.J. at 625.  Therefore, neither prong was met, and defendant’s arguments must be rejected in their entirety.
[brief] For example, Plaintiff has maintained that [...]’s shift had already started at 6:45 a.m. on the date of the fatal collision, which occurred at approximately 7:00 a.m.  See Da1057-8 (69:14-70:3); Pa1011 (23:5-13).  Thus, [...] was not where she was supposed to be and was not performing any work functions in the scope of her employment at the time of the crash.  [...] never clocked into work on the day of the crash and did not work as a nurse or perform any professional duties at any time on October 6, 2021.  See Pa789 ([...]’s timesheet).  For her part, [...] argues that the “majority of time” she started work at 7:00 a.m., and that the work schedule listed on the books is just “generic hours for the shift”.  See Defendant [...]’s brief, Db6 (citing Pa325, 94:22-95:21).  In other words, Plaintiff argues that [...] was late for work at the time of the crash and [...] denies it.  This factual dispute presents an issue for the jury to resolve regarding a factor relevant to determining whether [...] was in the course of her employment at the time the crash, rendering summary judgment inappropriate.
[brief] Few enactments in our State have undergone as much scrutiny as the SFRA, with the Supreme Court twice declaring it to be constitutionally sound.  Shortly after its passage, the State filed a motion with the Court seeking a declaration that the SFRA is constitutional.  *Abbott v. Burke* (*Abbott XX*), 199 N.J. 140, 145 (2009).  The Court declared the SFRA constitutional, stating that through the SFRA, “[t]he State has constructed a fair and equitable means designed to fund the costs of [T&E.]”  *Id.* at 172.  The Court further held that the SFRA “is designed to achieve a thorough and efficient education for every child, regardless of where he or she lives. ”  *Id.* at 175.  A few years later, the Court revisited the SFRA in *Abbott v. Burke* (*Abbott XXI*), 206 N.J. 332, 370 (2011), when a State budget crunch led to funding shortages.  The Court opined that the “SFRA is the preferable and predictable way to provide funding . . . so that sufficient resources are provided and can be planned for in the preparation of cohesive educational programming. ”  *Id.* at 369.  Thus, the Court once again reaffirmed the constitutionality of the SFRA.  *Id.* at 369-70 (directing that funding to the Abbott districts be calculated and provided in accordance with the SFRA).
[brief] Those arguments, as set forth in the Table of Contents of Defendant’s Brief, are as follows:  1.  Defendant’s Appeal from Final Order of Summary Judgment is timely; 2.  Defendant was denied due process; 3.  Grant of Summary Judgment denied Defendant’s right to due process because of insufficiency of process and insufficiency of service of process; 4.  Plaintiff’s Certification in Support of Summary Judgment, and the documentation annexed thereto, was inadmissible hearsay; 5.  The lower court made a mistake when it denied Defendant’s affirmative defense of recoupment or set-off; and, 6.  Defendant was not required to plead recoupment or set-off.  Plaintiff respectfully submits that Defendant did not raise any of these issues to the motion judge and therefore this Court should refrain from adjudicating same.  Park Crest Cleaners, LLC, 458 N.J. Super. at 472; Sikes, 269 N.J. Super. at 465-466; Kerney, 81 N.J. Super. at 281; Fusco, 349 N.J. Super. at 460-461; United Hospitals Medical Center, 349 N.J. Super. at 7-8.  Nevertheless, Plaintiff will address Defendant’s arguments and why this Court should affirm the Order.
[brief] Indeed, [...] admitted that it could not identify a single policy benefit through enforcement of the Act as written.  The trial court’s reliance on Greenberg v. Kimmelman, 99 N.J. 552 (1985) is misplaced.  There, a judge’s wife challenged a “casino ethics amendment” to the New Jersey Conflicts of Interest Law, which prohibited full-time members of the judiciary and their immediate relatives from employment with casinos.  Id. at 558.  The Court held that her right to employment with a casino was not a “fundamental” right.  Id. at 573.  The right of a person to be employed by a certain entity is a far cry from the right of an attorney, who has qualified for and obtained a plenary license to practice law in any area of law, to render advice to a client.  Only the latter is protected by the First Amendment and regulated exclusively by the Supreme Court.  The Limited Attorney Exemption thereby sweeps in too much constitutionally-protected conduct that would be violative of the Act but would not advance Defendants’ interests in protecting consumers.
[directive] From the 6 sec. Standing Point ready position, on command fire 2 rounds and 15 Yds 6  Shoulder return to the ready.  From the ready position on 4 sec. command fire 2 rounds, reload if necessary, decock and holster.  Draw and bring the weapon to a ready position.  Standing Point  On command fire 2 rounds and return to the ready 10 Yds 6 4 sec.  Shoulder position.  Repeat twice, reload if necessary, decock and holster  Draw and bring the weapon to a ready position.  Standing Point 4  On command fire 2 rounds and return to the ready 4 sec.  Shoulder position.  Repeat once  Standing Point  On command fire 2 rounds, make a magazine 7 Yds Shoulder; 15 4 change and fire 2 rounds, return to the ready Mandatory sec. position magazine change  Standing Point  On command fire 2 rounds and return to the ready 4 4 sec.  Shoulder position.  Repeat once.  Decock and holster.
[brief] See State v. Townsend, 186 N.J. 473, 488 (2006) (recognizing that the Court “endeavor[s] to harmonize [its] interpretation of the State Constitution with federal law” (quotation omitted)); State v. Harrell, 475 N.J. Super. 545, 564 (App. Div. 2023) (noting that the Appellate Division is “not bound by [its] earlier decisions because [the court] do[es] not sit en banc”).  Far from a novel remedy, suppression is consistent with the practice at the Nation’s founding.
[brief] ”  In re New Jersey State Funeral Directors Ass'n, 427 N.J. Super. 268, 273–74 (App. Div. 2012) (citing US Bank, N.A. v. Hough, 210 N.J. 187, 198–99 (2012).  As such, N.J.A.C. 7:11.1(c)(2)(ii) must be considered together with N.J.A.C. 7:13-12.7 (Requirements for a bridge or culvert) to assess what is feasible in deciding between a bridge or circular culvert.
[brief] ” (Id.).  The argument made then was the same as the argument made now.  To the extent that [...] contends that *Boston Gas* somehow mandates an end date of 2011, that interpretation of Massachusetts law contravenes the strong public policy of the State of New Jersey and therefore cannot be followed by this Court.  “[I]t is a well-known principle of conflict of laws that courts will never enforce a claim against the public policy of their forum.
[brief] Plaintiff alleged that the January 11, 2023, reorganization meeting violated the OPMA.  The OPMA’s requirements for special meeting notices are broader than the publication requirement addressed by the trial court.  The definition of --- \(^4\)As set forth in the Procedural History, above, the Borough’s brief in support of its summary judgment motion failed to address Plaintiff’s claims alleging violations of the LRHL, and its motion should have been recognized as one for partial summary judgment.
[brief] In C.H.W., the detective of a child sex assault investigation testified to the jury that he had received “specialized training on ‘tactical interviewing’ and ‘statement analysis. ’”  Id. at 588-89.  During “prolonged” and “repeated questioning” over a “two-and-one-half-hour[]” long recorded interview played for the jury, the detective described defendant’s denials as “extremely week” and “some of the weakest denials [he’d] seen in an interview. ”  Id. at 590-92.  “[T]his is actually a textbook interview of somebody being deceptive throughout the whole, entire interview[,]” he added for the jury.  Id. at 592.  The detective further added that, based on his training and experience, “certain cues that indicated deceptiveness included ‘[w]eak denials, lack of eye contact, belching, sweating, [and] crying. ’”  Id. at 593.  The Court concluded that “the jury’s evaluation of whether defendant’s denial of guilt was credible was tainted by [the detective’s] ‘clearly and repeatedly stated opinion’ that defendant was being deceptive in his denials. ”  Id. at 596.  The error was “exacerbated” by the trial court’s failure to “‘include[] a general instruction to disregard the officer’s ‘comments’ during defendant’s interrogation,’ in order ‘to address the multiplicity of times’ during the interrogation when the officers accused defendant of not being honest or truthful in his denials. ”  Id. at 598 (quoting Tung, 460 N.J. Super. at 102).  Here, [...]’s assertions to the defendant that he was lying during the recorded interrogation are distinguishable from both Tung and C.W.H. in a few important ways.
[brief] The Law Division Erred by Ruling On Procedural Unconscionability Without Authorizing Discovery or Conducting a Hearing (Pa1-Pa16)  In connection with the issue of procedural unconscionability, New Jersey courts have held that a consumer contract between a consumer and a commercial entity are “contracts of adhesion” when the commercial party offers a pre-printed standard agreement to the consumer on a “take-it-or-leave it basis.
[brief] [...] failed to even enroll in the first semester of the required “Beyond the Curriculum” course \(^4\) Plaintiff-Appellant’s contention that the website changed on September 22, 2012 is not based on his own knowledge, but on screenshots taken from the web crawler “the Wayback Machine. ” (Plaintiff Dep. T122:9-16 at Pa.170).  However, the Wayback Machine’s algorithm does not capture the exact date on which a website was changed or modified.  (See Certification of [...], dated October 24, 2022 at Pa.111.) – which covered the 3.0 GPA requirement.  ([...] Dep. T202:1-T203:13 at Pa. 524).  **The [...]’s May 2012 Visit and Beyond**
[brief] For the above mentioned reasons and authorities cited in support thereof, the State respectfully submits defendant’s conviction and sentence should be affirmed.  Respectfully submitted, [...]  [...]  By: [...], 062102014  Assistant Prosecutor Of Counsel and On the Brief email: [...]  MAH/mc c: [...], Esq.  [...], Esq.  Attorneys for Defendant  STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff, vs. [...], Defendant.  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY, APPELLATE  DIVISION  DOCKET NO.: [...] ON APPEAL FROM SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY  MONMOUTH COUNTY LAW
[brief] *Id.* at 151.  That reasoning also applies to RICO, which similarly provides for compensatory and punitive damages.  *See* N.J.S.A. 2C:41-4(c) (granting private right of action for compensatory and treble damages on RICO claims); *see also* Grandvue Manor, LLC v. Cornerstone Contracting Corp., 471 N.J. Super. 135, 142 (App. Div. 2022) (holding that party waived right to jury trial under RICO); *Zorba Contractors, Inc. v. Hous. Auth., City of Newark*, 362 N.J. Super. 124, 139 (App. Div. 2003) (recognizing right to jury trial on claims under Consumer Fraud Act because compensatory damages authorized by statute and sought in case “is a hallmark of a legal action”); *Velope, Inc. v. Kaplan*, 301 N.J. Super. 32, 41 (App. Div. 1997) (noting that parties held four-month jury trial on RICO and other claims); *cf.* Maersk, Inc. v. Neewra, Inc., 687 F. Supp. 2d 300, 340-41 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (holding that defendants had right to jury trial on federal RICO claims for damages), *aff’d sub nom.*, Maersk, Inc. v. Sahni, 450 F. App’x 3 (2d Cir. 2011).
[directive] 2, Page 2 1 reduced to a one-year period of parole ineligibility or to probation.  The Supreme Court addressed the procedures for applications for a waiver of the Graves Act mandatory minimum terms and sentencing State Nance, 228 N.J. 378 (2017).  The Nance case provided that in v. the application for waiver must be made to the Assignment Judge, or the Criminal Presiding Judge as the Assignment Judge's designee, and that the judge considering the application must consider the presumption of incarceration under N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1 (d) when deciding between the probationary term and the term of incarceration with a one-year period of parole inetigibHity.  As noted above, the 1981 directive addressed the circumstances under which a trial judge may accept a negotiated plea involving a dismissal of offense carrying a mandatory an custodial term under the Graves Act.
[brief] --- 3  Plaintiff also alleged that the vehicle should have been equipped with “Road Departure Mitigation. ”  Pa9.  However, Plaintiff has not presented any argument contesting the entry of summary judgment with respect to RDM.  Pb13-21.  4  For LDW or LKAS to function, the vehicle must be traveling between 45 and 90 mph on a straight or slightly curved road, without a turn signal activated, without the brake pedal depressed, and without the wipers in continuous operation.  Pa159-62, Pa163-70.  With respect to LDW and LKAS, Plaintiff’s design expert, [...] testified as follows:  Q.  For all the systems, the driver remains responsible for safely operating the vehicle and avoiding collisions, correct?  A.  Well, again, these systems are there to assist the driver in the event that they, for whatever reason, don’t have the overarching control of the vehicle to prevent this lane departure, and that is why the system is there.  So, sure, it assists the driver in keeping the vehicle out of trouble.  *These aren’t autonomous vehicles.*  . . .  And, you know, the driver still to some extent has control of the vehicle.  . . .
[brief] Also see, Winberry Realty v. Rutherford, 247 N.J. 165 (2021); Kumar v. Piscataway Twp. Council, 473 N.J. Super.  463 (App. Div. 2022).  Moreover, on October 13, 2013, [...] and [...] vacated a trial court’s post-remand post-answer lack of standing dismissal without prejudice of an eighty-four paragraphs fourth amended complaint and remanded for further proceedings.
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY DENYING MY REQUEST TO EXAMINE THE MORTGAGE ASSIGNMENT OF 2/27/2009 (065a), THE FFIDAVIT OF LOST NOTE OF 2/12/2014 (088a), AND THE MORTGAGE ASSIGNMENT OF 2/28/2014 (097a)  IN AN EVIDENTARY HEARING.  Raised Below: paragraph 35 (029a).  In 1T page 6 line 4– page 7 line 23 and page 8 lines 2-6.  [...] did not oppose and did not deny my claims and arguments.  The denial order is at (221a).  The Mortgage Assignment of 2/27/2009 from [...] to [...] (065a) was forged and on 12/20/10 Hon. [...] in his Order called that mortgage assignment fraudulent (068a).  He ordered [...] to withdraw that assignment and cure its deficiencies and re-file it.  [...] violated that order and based on that forged mortgage assignment fabricated the Affidavit of Lost Note of 2/12/14 (088a) and the Mortgage Assignment of 2/28/14 (097) and sold it to [...].  In his Order of 12/20/10 (068a) Hon. Grant suspended the first Foreclosure Complaint against my house ([...]) because of that mortgage assignment.  On 1/6/17 and 3/3/17 I raised the issue of that mortgage assignment from [...] to [...] (065a) being fake but [...] ignored my objection and said that assignment had nothing to do with the Foreclosure Complaint.  No one else but Hon. Grant has examined the Mortgage assignment of 2/27/2009 from [...] to [...] (065a).
[brief] Finally, at the time of the initial application resulting the Prior Approvals, the Respondents’ predecessor in title did not object to the imposition of the Route 33 Signal as a condition of approval for the development of the Property under the VC-2 Zone.  6T270 to 6T282.  Neither the Respondents, nor their predecessors in title intervened in the DJ Action to object to the imposition of the Route 33 Signal as a condition of approval for the development of the Property under the VC-2 Zone standards.  M107-130; 6T270 to 6T282.  Further, despite the 2019 NJDOT Meeting, during the hearing on the Application, the Respondents did not object to the Route 33 Signal; and agreed to provide it and have it operational prior to the issuance of the first certificate of occupancy as a condition of any Board approval.  M71-72.  For the forgoing reasons, it is clear that the decision of the SHO in the SHO Resolution to eliminate the obligation that the Route 33 Signal was improper; as was the adoption of the SHO Resolution by the Trial Court including this relief.
[brief] A.  The Orders Did Not Resolve All Claims as to All Parties.  It is well settled that an order is interlocutory unless it resolves all claims as to all parties.  See R. 4:42-2; see Silviera-Francisco v. Bd. of Educ. of City of Elizabeth, 224 N.J. 126, 136 (2016) (“in a multi-party, multi-issue case, an order granting summary judgment, dismissing all claims against one of several defendants, is not a final order subject to appeal as of right until all claims against the remaining defendants have been resolved”); Yuhas v. Mudge, 129 N.J. Super. 207, 209 (App. Div. 1974) (“...plaintiffs’ claims against some of the defendants still remain open; thus, the summary judgment appealed from is interlocutory rather than final”); West Side Trust Co. v. Gascoigne, 39 N.J. Super.  467, 469 (App. Div. 1956) (“Here only two of the three causes of action were adjudicated; the judgment is interlocutory in character”).  Here, however, the trial court entered two orders, granting partial summary judgment in favor of Plaintiff [...], as “final judgments. ”  The trial court’s April 6, 2023 Order for summary judgment against [...] decided only one issue in the case (“that [...] is liable under the Spill Act for the Incident”).  (See generally, PPCIa369-71).  The trial court’s February 23, 2024 Order then found only that “(1) the MSC-90 [sic] surety endorsement is triggered as a result of the April 6, Final Judgment entered in this matter against [...] requiring [...] to pay [...] treble the amount of $475,623.87…, and (2) the maximum amount of the MSC-90 [sic] surety endorsement is $750,000. ” (See generally, PPCIa447-48).  However, numerous claims against [...] and among [...], [...], [...] and [...] were unresolved.  (Compare, PPCIa123-28; PPCIa129-49; PPCIa227-35).  [...]’s Answer asserted a cross-claim against [...] for indemnity and a third-party complaint for coverage.  (PPCIa125-28).  [...]’s answer asserted affirmative defenses that [...]’s own actions and negligence contributed to any damages and that [...] itself was a “responsible party” under the Spill Act.  (PPCIa125).  [...]’s counterclaim sought judgment to rescind the policy based on material misrepresentations; for a declaration of “no coverage” based on certain issues; and for breach of contract against [...] and its principal, Devarshi [...], based upon a separate Personal Guarantee and Indemnity Agreement; and against [...] ([...]’s parent company) for liability as [...]’s “alter ego. ” (PPCIa132-49).  [...]’s affirmative defenses also relied on any defense to liability or damages that [...] had asserted in relation to [...]’s affirmative claims.  (PPCIa132).  Neither the trial Court’s April 6, 2023 Order, nor the trial court’s February 23, 2024 Order addressed these claims.  (PPCIa369-71; PPCIa447-48).  However, for an Order to be considered “final” it must “dispose of all claims against all parties. ”  *Family First Fed. Sav. Bank v. DeVinceninis*, 284 N.J. Super. 503, 511 (App. Div. 1995).  Therefore, the Court’s entries of the April 6, 2023 Order and the February 23, 2024 Order as “final judgments” were in error.
[brief] Defendants never advised [...] during his employment that the reason he was not getting paid his full salaries that his patient charts were not completed on time.  (Volume 1, Pa 81;Bellifemine Dep 67-1 to 12; Volume 3, Pa.394; Bellifemine Certification, Paragraph 5 was in opposition to Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment).  Defendants asserted in their motion for summary judgment that the reason [...] was not being paid his full salaries was that some of his charts were late.  (Volume II Pa. 141-142; Defendants Statement of Undisputed Material Facts, Paragraphs 5-8).  Defendant [...]’s Chief Executive Officer [...] testified that [...] did not have a policy of withholding physician compensation because of the submission of late charts and she never told [...] that the reason he was not getting paid his full salary because his charts were late.  (Volume II Pa. 292; See Deposition of [...], TR12-4 to 19).  [...], the Vice President of [...] who told [...] that he would get made when [...] was sold, admitted that she never told [...] that the reason he was not getting paid his full salaries was his charts were late and was not aware that any [...] employee ever told [...] that the reason he was not being paid his full salaries was because his charts were late.