ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] § 230-98.1.  Design standards for non-residential development.  A.  Application.  The design standards in this section shall apply to all non-residential development, including the non-residential portion of mixed-use development, approved as part of a major site plan.  B.  Building Form and Mass.  (1)  Orientation.  Buildings shall be oriented with a primary entrance facing at least one (1) adjacent public street.  The primary building orientation shall not be toward a parking lot or parking structure.  (2)  Horizontal Articulation Between Floors.  Each façade shall be designed to have a delineated floor line between the street level and upper floors.  This delineation may be in the form of a masonry belt course, concrete lintel or a cornice line delineated by wood detailing.  (3)  Vertical Articulation.  Each building facade facing a public right-of-way must have elements of vertical articulation comprised of columns, piers, recessed windows or entry designs, overhangs, ornamental projection of the molding, different exterior materials or wall colors, or recessed portions of the main surface of the wall itself.  The vertical articulations shall be designed in accordance with the following:  (a)  Each vertical articulation shall be no greater than thirty (30) feet apart.  (b)  Each vertical articulation shall be a minimum of one (1) foot deep.  (c)  Each vertical projection noted above may extend into the required front yard a maximum of eighteen (18) inches in depth.  C.  Building Height and roofs.  (1)  The top floor of all buildings must be capped by a cornice or sloping roof element.  (2)  Flat roofs shall be enclosed with parapets or other acceptable architectural feature.  (3)  Cool roofs.  Buildings with a flat roof surface area of five hundred (500) square feet or more shall utilize a material that has a solar reflectivity of fifty (50%) percent or greater as certified by the Cool Roof Rating Council.  D.  Facades and Fenestrations.  (1)  Building entrances accessing a public sidewalk shall be recessed to promote safe pedestrian circulation.  (2)  Awnings and canopies are encouraged at the ground floor level.  (3)  Facades facing public alleyways shall be treated consistent with the primary front building façade facing the public street(s), including such design elements as building articulation, materials, entranceways and storefronts.  SECTION 5.
[brief] The Jury Verdict Questionnaire in this case asked the jury to access liability as to the defendants only.  As such, the jury could not have assessed any liability for the accident on the plaintiff.  There were no objections by any party to the form of the Jury Verdict Questionnaire as submitted to the jury.  (3T:257-2 to 5; 5T:19-15 to 22)  As such, Appellants statements that the jury found the plaintiff 0% is inaccurate.  Moreover, Appellants arguments regarding inconsistencies between the jury verdict accessing 0% liability on plaintiff and 40% on Appellant are nonsensible.  The Honorable [...], J.S.C correctly held that evidence regarding Appellee [...]’s criminal convictions were inadmissible as the probative value was significantly outweighed by the prejudicial effect.  The Honorable [...], J.S.C correctly held that the diagram of the accident scene prepared by [...] was not admissible as the diagram was misleading and would confuse the jury.  The appellee asks that [...]’s well-reasoned decisions as to the criminal convictions and the diagram of the accident scene be affirmed and that the jury verdict not be disturbed.
[brief] (16T 23-3 to 24-4).  [...] testified that when Defendant was transported to headquarters after agreeing to speak with the officers, he was not a suspect at that time, and in fact, the officers had no reason to believe he was involved in the homicide at all.  (16T 24-13 to 24-16).  Upon arrival at the station, the detectives opened the interview by thanking Defendant for coming down to the station, explaining that they knew he wasn’t expecting them, and told him they were “gonna get you out of here as fast we can.
[brief] The final obstacle to considering the fairness of the trial that the State attempts to erect is the harmless error doctrine.  There is no room for harmless error analysis in this case because the fingerprint analysis was the entire case.  Aside from the fingerprints, the State did no investigation—it did not get [...]’s cellphone records to see if the phone was in the vicinity of the [...] on the night in question, it did not search [...]’s house for clothing matching the perpetrator or for proceeds of the burglary.
[brief] With regard to the charge that [...] violated the rules because he “failed to notify his supervisor [...] or Assistant Director [...] in advance of having an abstract submitted to the [...] Technical Program Committee” this is disputed.  First, there is no rule of the [...] requiring an employee to notify or obtain permission before submitting an abstract.  (Pa673-Pa675).  Further, disciplining an employee for submitting an abstract – a proposal for a presentation – was completely unprecedented and [...] was the only employee ever subjected to discipline for submitting an abstract to an outside entity to speak on matters of public concern.  (Pa673-Pa675).  With regard to the charge that [...] “failed to fill out the Speaker Request Form,” on February 23, 2015, [...] sent an email to [...] and [...] stating, “Attached please find speaker request.  Event is either in afternoon or evening.  Either way I can use my own time. ” (Pa673-Pa675).  Also, [...] had ethics approval to be an individual member of the [...], he had received ethics approval to conduct speaking engagements outside the [...].  (Pa673-Pa675).  Finally, [...] explained that he had not even been chosen to speak, having only submitted an abstract and, therefore, a Speaker Request Form was not even required.  Finally, [...] requested vacation on the week of the [...] conference in March of 2016 so that he could attend and present on his own time in the event his abstract was accepted.  (Pa461; Pa673-Pa675).  Thus, even though there was no rule regarding obtaining permission before submitting an abstract to speak at an outside event, he had filled out a Speaker Request form and provided it to [...] and Sandy Kreitzman, he had ethics approval to be an individual member of the [...] and to conduct speaking engagements outside the [...] he was suspended for two days.
[brief] The court explained with an example:  Assume a teenager is, unbeknownst to his mother, a gang member.  In the midst of a domestic disturbance, he threatens to strike his mother and is subsequently charged with threatening or intimidating.  Under the State’s argument and the court of appeals’ reasoning, the defendant would be subject to a . . . sentencing enhancement for gang membership even though his mother was unaware of his affiliation, he never invoked it to bolster his threat, and the crime was altogether unrelated to his gang activity.  And even if the mother knew of her son’s gang membership, the State would not have to prove that knowledge or otherwise relate his membership to the offense to invoke [the] enhancement.  [Arizona v. Arevalo, 470 P.3d 644, 649-50 (Ariz. 2020).
[brief] *Id.* at 279-280.  The Supreme Court specifically distinguished *County College of Morris Staff Ass ’n v. County College of Morris*, 100 NJ 383 (1985), which the Authority also cites in its brief, noting that “[i]n that case, the contractual language defined the circumstances constituting just cause for termination, and the arbitrator expressly found just cause to terminate the employee” and “the arbitrator exceeded his authority in ordering suspension, because he neglected to discharge the employee pursuant to the agreement of the parties. ”
[brief] PRELIMINARY STATEMENT  This matter arises out of an incident in which plaintiffs’ decedent, [...], impermissibly entered onto [...]’s (“[...]”) railroad right of way at its York Street pedestrian crossing for the [...] (“[...]”).  Two seconds later, she collided with [...] Train 81, which was imminently approaching the crossing on Track 1, and lost her life.  The entire incident was captured on multiple video cameras present on the head end of the train as well as at the station the train was approaching.  Ms. Flood never looked to see if a train was coming before she stepped onto the crossing.  Additionally, it is undisputed that at the moment she stepped onto the crossing: - Train 81 had the proceed signal and the right of way to enter and pass through the crossing; T8:4-9:1; - the pedestrian signal was indicating that she was not permitted to enter the crossing, and she did not have the right of way; Ibid.; - the traffic light for vehicles on York Street was red, indicating that they could not enter the crossing, and a car was stopped at the traffic light on the same side of the crossing as her; Compare Pa162, ¶¶69 and 70 with Pa764, ¶¶69 and 70; Pa257-299; Pa344, 349, 354, 361 at ¶9, and 362 at ¶13; Pa679:16-683:5; and Pa1152 at 16:33:28 to 16:33:35; and • another [...] train travelling in the opposite direction on Track 2 had just left the Exchange Place station and was blocking her path across the crossing; Compare Pa163, ¶71 with Pa764, ¶71; Pa214-256; Pa257-299; Pa342-343; Pa1152 at 16:33:28 to 16:33:35; Da51.
[brief] (Aa36-Aa37).  On May 28, 2023, Plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration regarding the Court’s improper valuation and failure to appoint a special receiver.  Plaintiff also sought reconsideration of claims against [...] and [...] for their active roles in damaging [...], resulting in significant negative profit impacts and its ultimate demise.  (Aa66).  Plaintiff filed a subsequent motion on June 1, 2023 regarding the return of Plaintiff’s [...] email account.  (Aa87).  During the pendency of the motions for reconsideration, Defendants Raymond [...] and Julian [...] dissolved [...] and withdrew all funds from the [...] accounts.
[brief] For 200+ years when development of land or private property rights conflicted with rights conferred to the public by the doctrine, the public had the right to sue to vindicate those rights.  The Statutory Public Trust Doctrine now imposed an affirmative obligation on municipalities going forward to ensure that all future zoning standards and actual development affirmatively considered and did not violate the doctrine, and put forth an additional layer of review (vested with the NJDEP) to make sure that no zoning determination or approved plan violated the doctrine.  Thus, instead of municipalities or developers or private property owners being passively permitted to violate the doctrine and putting the onus on third parties to sue to vindicate their rights, the intention was that going forward zoning decision or development plans that ignored or violated the doctrine would not be permitted or approved.  N.J.S.A. 13:1D-150 (Findings, declarations relative to public access) sets forth the public policies to be upheld and fostered, provides in relevant part:
[brief] TABLE OF CONTENTS  Table of Contents_ .................................................................................................................. i Table of Authorities.............................................................................................................. iii Table of Transcripts............................................................................................................. viii  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT.................................................................................................  1  PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND STATEMENT OF FACTS ...........................................  4  A.  Overview of Initial Litigation .......................................................................................  4 B. 2006 Limited Remand....................................................................................................  7  C.  Extraordinary Expansion of the Case after Remand....................................................  9  D.  The Second Appeal and Partial Reversal....................................................................  14  E.  The Remand Rulings....................................................................................................  19 ARGUMENT ............................................................................................................................
[brief] (Aa049-054).  N.J.A.C. 19:16-5.7(g)(2) states:  At least 10 days before the hearing, the parties shall submit to the arbitrator and to each other their final offers on each economic and noneconomic issue in dispute.  The parties must also submit written estimates of the financial impact of their respective last offers on the taxpayers as part of their final offer submissions.  The arbitrator may accept a revision of such offer at any time before the arbitrator takes testimony or evidence or, if the parties agree to permit revisions and the arbitrator approves such an agreement, before the close of the hearing.
[brief] [...] testified that Appellee suffered no permanent injury from the subject accident and, despite testifying Appellee’s treatment was related to the accident at one point, corrected such testimony and clarified that although the treatment was reasonable and necessary, it was not related to the accident at issue.  During summation, Appellee flagrantly departed from [...]’s diagnoses and told the jury the Appellee’s labrum was “torn off” at two (2) different places.  3T28:17-20.  Additionally, Appellee grossly mischaracterized [...]’s testimony regarding the treatment being related to the accident.  3T40:7-14.  These inflammatory statements were taken out of context and inappropriately prejudiced the jury by suggesting [...] found Appellee’s injuries to be permanent and all related the accident.  In reality, the record is abundantly clear that [...] had misheard Appellee’s question and cleared the issue up on redirect.
[directive] EXPENDITURESANDOTHERCHARGES  xxux.xx xxxxx.xx xxxx.xx  Forfeited to County Law Enforcement Trust Account  xxxxx.xx xxxxx.xx  Transfer to Asset Maintenance Account  XMX.XX - Transfer Seized Asset Trust Fund  Reclassification of Prlor to xxxxx.xx  Year Revenue xxxx.xx xxxx.xx xxxxx.xx xxxxx.xx  Refunds of Seized Funds - xxxx.xx xxxxx.xx xxxxx.xx  Payment to State Treasurer Unclaimed Property xxxx.xx xxxxx.xx  XxxXX.XX  Municipal and Other Law Enforcement Agency Distributions xxxx.xx xxxxx.xx xxxxx.xx  Asset Maintenance and Forfeiture Costs xxxxx.xx  Law Enforcement Expenditures: xxxx.xx xxxxx.xx xxxxx.xx  Disbursed xxxx.xx xxxxx.xx  Paid by County xxxx.xx xxxxx.xx  Encumbrances xxxxxx.xx xxxxxx.xx xxxxxx.xx xxxxxx.xx  XXXXxx.XX xxxxxx.xx xxxxxx.xx  Total Expenditures
[brief] The police may not create their own “exigency” for a warrantless search where the probable cause basis, if it exists at all and was lawfully obtained, develops at a time sufficiently before the search to allow them to obtain a warrant.  *State v. Williams*, 168 N.J. Super. 352 (App. Div. 1979).  While the courts have recognized that a warrant need not be sought the very moment probable cause arises, where it is not “practical” because a vehicle “can be quickly moved out of the jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought,” *State v. Ercolano*, supra, at 43, quoting *Carroll v. U.S.*, supra, at 153, clearly that is not the case where probable cause arises hours or days before the vehicle will be in motion, as in virtually all controlled delivery cases, and where the vehicle will be moving into and not “out of” the warrant jurisdiction.  In such cases, where the “securing of a warrant is reasonably practicable, it must be used. ”  Id. (emphasis added).  Under such circumstances, any alleged “exigency” based on motor vehicle mobility evaporates or, more to the point, is a false exigency created by the police “having squandered an overt opportunity to obtain a warrant antecedent to an otherwise acceptable search…”
[brief] This was a narrowly tailored, limited, and focused request for a single identified item that was the subject of a ruling of prosecutorial malfeasance.  It was only after the prosecutor said [...] no longer had it (despite a preservation order and requests to preserve it) that [...] issued his order permitting interrogatories regarding the hard drive.  He appropriately exercised his discretion in granting PCR discovery in this matter.  See Szemple, 247 N.J. at 111 (PCR discovery decisions reviewed for abuse of discretion).
[brief] See, 24T11:4-8.  In their appellate brief, plaintiffs contend the trial court made the requisite finding of a “material inaccuracy” because “the trial court found that [Emanuel] [...] knew the numbers he used to establish the sale price for [...] ‘were wrong’ and ‘bogus. ’” Pb84-85.  That is clearly insufficient as a basis for triggering the indemnification provision.  First of all, [...] was never the Buyer in this contract.  Moreover, the sale price was a sum actively negotiated by [...] and [...], not unilaterally imposed by [...].  And, plainly, any “numbers” [...] gave to [...] --- \(^7\)  The Buyer’s Representations and Warranties contained in the MIPA are set forth in Paragraph 3.2 (Da950).  The documents [...] was required to deliver at closing are identified in Paragraph 4.2.  (Da951).  during those negotiations were neither “contained in this Agreement” nor delivered in documents “required by this Agreement. ”  C.  The indemnification clauses do not support an award of expert fees and other litigation expenses.
[brief] ”  29 Williston on Contracts § 74:3 (4th ed.2012); see also K. Woodmere Assocs., L.P. v. Menk Corp., 316 N.J.Super. 306, 314 (App.Div.1998) (quoting Williston for the elements of a valid assignment).  A valid assignment “transfers the whole of the interest in the right.
[brief] Courts in New York have repeatedly recognized that this kind of instructional error requires reversal at a minimum.  For example, in People v. Castro, 516 N.Y.S.2d 966, 966, 968 (App. Div. 1987), the jury acquitted the defendant of murder and first-degree manslaughter but convicted him of second-degree manslaughter.  The appellate court found that the jury should have been instructed “that a finding of not guilty by reason of justification as to any one of the counts would preclude a verdict of guilty as to its lesser included offenses. ”  Id. at 968.  The court elaborated:  “Stated otherwise, once the jury found the defendant not guilty of the greater offense on the basis of justification, it could not properly reach a contradictory finding that the defendant was guilty of a lesser charge despite its finding of justification. ”  Ibid.  Thus, the court reversed the conviction because “the jury should have been instructed at the outset that in the event it reached a verdict of not guilty by reason of justification as to any of the offenses submitted to it, it should simply render a verdict of acquittal and cease deliberation, without regard to any remaining lesser included offenses. ”  Ibid.  New York courts consistently apply this principle and reverse the defendant’s convictions if the court fails to instruct the jury that if it finds a defendant not guilty “based on a finding of justification,” the jury “must not consider the lesser” offenses.  People v. Wah, 99 N.Y.S.3d 19, 21 (App. Div. 2019).  See, e.g., People v. Bracetty, 628 N.Y.S.2d 739, 741 (App. Div. 1995) (reversing defendant’s conviction for criminally negligent homicide in part because “[t]he court failed to instruct the jury that a finding of not guilty by reason of justification . . . on the count of manslaughter in the second degree would preclude a verdict of guilty with regard to the lesser-included offense of criminally negligent homicide, and that the jurors were only to consider the lesser offense if they found the defendant not guilty of the greater offense for a reason other than justification”) (citation omitted); People v. Roberts, 721 N.Y.S.2d 49, 50-51 (App. Div. 2001) (reversing conviction because “trial court erred in failing to instruct the jurors that a finding of not guilty of a greater charge on the basis of justification precluded consideration of any lesser counts”); *People v. Ross*, 767 N.Y.S.2d 819, 819-20 (App. Div. 2003) (same); *People v. Feuer*, 782 N.Y.S.2d 858, 859 (App. Div. 2004) (same); *People v. Velez*, 13 N.Y.S.3d 354, 355, 357-58 (App. Div. 2015) (same); *People v. Delin*, 43 N.Y.S.3d 47, 48 (App. Div. 2016) (same); *People v. Flores*, 41 N.Y.S.3d 890, 890 (App. Div. 2016) (same); *People v. Blackwood*, 46 N.Y.S.3d 413, 414 (App. Div. 2017) (same); *People v. Herrera*, 142 N.Y.S.3d 59, 62 (App. Div. 2021) (same); *People v. Harris*, 168 N.Y.S.3d 592, 598 (App. Div. 2022) (same).
[brief] B.  The jury was not misinformed on the legal standard of insanity.  Insanity is an affirmative defense that a defendant must prove by the preponderance of the evidence.  State v. Delibero, 149 N.J. 90, 99 (1997).  In New Jersey, “[a] person is not criminally responsible for conduct if at the time of such conduct he was laboring under such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing, or if he did know it, that he did not know what he was doing was wrong.
[brief] Id. at 11.  In 1845 the English Parliament passed the Real Property Act, which did not explicitly abolish livery of seisin but did sanction the use of written deeds as granting devices, thereby producing the same effect as outright abolition of the ritual.  Id. at 11 n. 25."). another long after the reasons which initially gave them birth have faded into obscurity. ”  Harris, supra, Okla. L. Rev. at 131.  With the advent of central recording systems, including the current New Jersey Recording Act, the days of delivering title and/or possession of property via livery of seisin are a distant memory.
[directive] 4.  The officer in charge has discretion not to prepare a complaint summons if the officer determines that any of the following conditions exist:  a.  The person has previously failed to respond to a summons; b.  The officer has reason to believe that the person is dangerous to himself, to others or to property; c.  There is one or more outstanding arrest warrants for the person; d.  The prosecution of the offense or offenses for which the person is arrested or the prosecution of any other offense of offenses would be jeopardized by the immediate release of the person; e.  The person cannot be satisfactorily identified; or f.  The officer has reason to believe the person will not appear in response to a summons.  5.  If the officer determines that one of the conditions in Paragraph 2 or 4 above applies, the officer shall: a.  Immediately prepare a complaint-warrant (CDR-2), and b.  Take the person arrested without unnecessary delay before the nearest available committing judge to have bail set.