ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] (2T 156-6 to 12)  [...] testified that on December 8th, 2011, [...], [...]’s girlfriend, picked him up outside his home in [...].  (2T 23-5 to 25)  [...] was in the front seat and [...], whom [...] referred to by his nickname “[...],” was in the backseat.  (2T 24-10 to 18)  [...] testified that he referred to [...] by his nickname, “[...]. ”  (2T 25-2 to 9)  According to [...], the December 8th, 2011, robbery was a spontaneous event.
[brief] [...] DID NOT HAVE A DUTY OF CARE OVER THE ICE WHICH ALLEGEDLY CAUSED PLAINTIFF’S FALL (PA4)  In any case involving negligence, there must be a duty owed to the injured party, a breach of that duty, causation and damages.  Conklin v. Hannoch Weisman, 145 N.J. 395, 417 (1996); Siddons v. Cook, 382 N.J. Super. 1, 13 (App. Div. 2005).  Whether a defendant owes a duty of care to another and the scope of said duty are questions of law and thus are appropriate for disposition on summary judgment.  *Clohesy v. Food Circus Supermarkets, Inc.*, 149 N.J. 496, 502 (1997); *Hopkins v. Fox & Lazo Realtors*, 132 N.J. 426, 439 (1993); *Badiali v. N.J. Mfrs. Ins. Grp.*, 220 N.J. 544, 555 (2015).  In *Hopkins*, the Supreme Court departed from the categorical approach to premises liability and held instead that the existence and scope of a duty turns on an “abiding sense of basic fairness under all of the circumstances in light of considerations of public policy.
[brief] The contents of the [...] Certification show that no such information can be used or revealed, because no such information is recalled.  Finally, petitioners continue to prate about the allegedly equivocal nature of the [...] Certification.  To certify, "I do not recall" is unequivocal.  Petitioners would have this Court conflate recall and veracity.  It is understandable given the paucity of evidence in support of their motion.  This is especially so against the backdrop of Petitioners’ attempts to keep the interceding will from being produced.
[brief] Pca128-146.  \(^2\)  Although not required to do so under New Jersey’s Collateral Source Rule, N.J.S.A. 39:6A-6 (“The benefits…shall be payable…without regard to collateral sources (i.e., health insurance payments) …”) (emphasis added), Plaintiff also stipulated to a discount wherein he would accept less than the fee schedule where the amount owed under the fee schedule exceeded payments made by the health carrier.  Pa15.  \(^3\)  There is no transcript from the hearing.
[brief] The advisory notices complied with NJDEP requirements for circumstances that do not involve acute health risks.  See 40 C.F.R. 141.205; see also Pa112.  In such situations, where there is no immediate risk to human health, the water supplier must notify residents of the issue within 30 days.  See 40 C.F.R. 141.203.  The advisory must remain in effect until the issue is resolved.  See id.  NJDEP adopted its MCL for PFNA based upon recommendations by the New Jersey Drinking Water Quality Institute.  See 50 N.J.R. 1939(a) (September 4, 2018) and 51 N.J.R. 437(a), 437 (April 1, 2019).  The MCLs set forth in NJDEP’s regulations are “health-based level[s]” that are “based on lifetime exposure” and are “expected to be protective of all age groups. ”  50 N.J.R. at 1945 (emphasis added).  Thus, the MCL for PFNA was intended to protect against health risks that could arise after a lifetime of exposure, i.e., exposure over many decades.  So, NJDEP deemed that the presence in [...]’s water supply of PFNA exceeding the MCL posed no immediate, acute threat.  Accordingly, the NJDEP-approved advisory notices issued by [...] expressly informed residents:  “There is nothing you need to do.  You do not need to boil your water or take other corrective actions. ”  See Pa112.  D.
[brief] During the hearing, *and solely at the suggestion of Petitioner’s counsel*, the theory was presented that all of [...]’s references to Petitioner’s 2009 accident were typographical errors, and that [...] was instead referring to the 2000 incident.  (2T38:9-39:17).  Petitioner’s counsel advised [...] during the hearing that a PFRS investigation into Petitioner’s prior accidents, including a request for workers’ compensation records from the [...]’s insurance carrier, turned up no records for either the 2009 incident or another 2002 incident.  (2T38:9-22).  Petitioner’s counsel then asked [...] “to assume that [...] has testified that the [description of the 2009 incident] is actually the factual predicate of the 2000 workers’ compensation injury” adding, “this wouldn’t be the first time that a doctor has made a mistake in terms of the date on a report, would it?” (2T37:18-22).  [...] agreed with counsel’s statements.  (2T37:23).  Notably, *Petitioner presented no such testimony* and the typographical error theory was not raised during Petitioner’s appearance before the ALJ.
[brief] Da137-138.  The Board found that a facility with identical uses was located just one-half mile from the Property and had two stories with a density of 14.2 units per acre, which would equate to a total of 115 units for the [...] project.  However, throughout the proceedings when the Board questioned the higher number of units, [...]’s witnesses dismissed it as making the project “not viable”, without further explanation.  Those were not planning responses, but were tied to whatever the developer was paying for the land and its desired profitability.  [...] never provided the Board with any facts why the development could not be reduced to two stories with less units.
[brief] In or about 2018, the Township, utilizing the powers available to it under to the Local Redevelopment and Housing Law, N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-1, et seq.  (“LRHL”), conducted an investigation and determined that the properties designated as Block 46, Lot 2 and Block 47, Lots 1, 2, 3, 3.01 and 4 on the [...] Tax Map (collectively, the “Redevelopment Area”) satisfied the criteria to be determined an area in need of redevelopment.  (Pa23; Pa95).
[brief] [...], after having received the opinion from the proposed project was Variance-free, and that only a standard type building permit would be needed to build the new home, and that [...] could, and should, now proceed with the construction phase of the project, entered into the Construction and Home Purchase Agreements with [...], authorized payment of $989,949.00 to [...] and authorized [...] and [...] to begin the construction work.  That construction work began immediately with the demolition of the existing home and commencement of extensive site work including excavation of the property for the new home’s foundation.  The foundation was not installed and therefore the property ended up becoming essentially one large hole in the ground.
[brief] PLAINTIFF’S AMENDED COMPLAINT FAILS TO PLEAD FACTS SUFFICIENT TO SATISFY THE STANDARD FOR AIDER AND ABETTOR LIABILITY AGAINST DEFENDANT GLAZER (14a-18a)**  Plaintiff’s entire claim against Defendant [...] is premised upon her attendance at a November 20, 2020 meeting regarding Plaintiff’s violation of the District Mask Policy, during which Defendant [...] mentioned a prior report of a similar mask violation by Plaintiff, for which Plaintiff was never disciplined.  223a, ¶ 86; 227a-228a, ¶¶ 103-105; 228a, ¶¶ 107-108; 229a, ¶¶ 118-119.  This purported factual predicate is entirely insufficient to satisfy the pleading requirement for aiding and abetting under the NJLAD.  The Supreme Court has defined “aiding and abetting” to set a high bar for the imposition of individual liability under the NJLAD.  To that end, in order to hold an employee liable as an aider or abettor, a plaintiff must show that:  (1)  The party whom the defendant aids must perform a wrongful act that causes an injury; (2) The defendant must be generally aware of his role as part of an overall illegal or tortious activity at the time that he provides the assistance; and (3)  The defendant must knowingly and substantially assist the principal violation.  *Tarr*, 181 N.J. at 84.  The words aiding and abetting “require active and purposeful conduct” in aid of a wrongdoer.  *Cicchetti v. Morris County Sheriff’s Office*, 194 N.J. 563, 594 (2008); see also, *Tarr*, 181 N.J. at 83 (explaining “aiding and abetting” liability to require performance of wrongful act, awareness of illegality, and knowing and substantial assistance to principal violator).  It requires **knowingly giving substantial assistance or encouragement** to the unlawful conduct of the employer.  *Failla v. City of Passaic*, 146 F.3d 149, 157-58 (3d Cir. 1998) (emphasis supplied).  Merely having “some role, knowledge, or involvement in the wrongful conduct” is insufficient to substantiate a claim for aiding and abetting liability against an individual employee.  *Ivan v. County of Middlesex*, 595 F.Supp.2d 425, 462 (D.N.J. 2009); *Shepherd v. Hunterdon Developmental Ctr.*, 336 N.J. Super. 395, 425 (App. Div. 2001), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 174 N.J. 1 (2002).
[brief] Our Supreme Court has applied the general rules of statutory construction to the FDCPA:  When interpreting a statute, the Legislature’s intent is paramount and, generally, the statutory language is the best indicator of that intent.  Statutory words are ascribed their ordinary meaning and are read in context with related provisions, giving sense to the legislation as a whole.  This Court’s duty is clear: construe and apply the statute as enacted.  *Hodges v. Sasil Corp.*, 189 N.J. 210, 223 (2007) (internal cites and quotation marks omitted).  Thus, when “the plain language leads to a clear and unambiguous result, then our interpretative process is over. ”  *State v. Courtney*, 243 N.J. 77, 86 (2020) (quoting *Johnson v. Roselle EZ Quick LLC*, 226 N.J. 370, 386 (2016)).  See *Comm’r v. Brown*, 380 U.S. 563, 571 (1965) (applying the same principle to interpreting federal statutes).  Under those circumstances, a court does not resort to any extrinsic sources, such as legislative history, when construing a statute.  When the statute’s plain language read in the context of related statutory provisions leads to an unambiguous result, that language is the best *and only* evidence of the legislature’s intent.  Hence, it is improper for a court to consider “extrinsic evidence, including legislative history, committee reports, and contemporaneous construction” suggesting a different result unless it first concludes the statutory words are ambiguous or the plain meaning of the unambiguous statutory language leads to an absurd result because the result frustrates the statute’s purpose.  *Courtney*, 243 N.J. at 86; and see *Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Services, Inc.*, 545 U.S. 546, 568-69 (2005) (addressing the limitations on the use of legislative history).  Here, the statute is 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(b), which states:
[brief] Notice and public hearings as well as scientific investigation and research must precede adoption of and any changes in Code regulations and amendments thereto, *N.J.S.A.* 13:1B-31 *et seq.*  The statutory scheme expressly subjects ‘(a)ny regulation, or amendments thereto, or repealer thereof’ to judicial review.  *N.J.S.A.* 13:1B-35….  The Council does not have unfettered authority to decide that hunting or fishing will take place on private property, see *N.J.S.A.* 23:7-1, or on state-owned lands.  *Humane Society* at 575.  Lastly, the Supreme Court rejected the legal argument that a private group’s significant role in the statutory nomination process on the eleven (11) member [...] was inherently arbitrary and capricious:
[brief] Penalizing an employee for use of leave as a reasonable accommodation may also raise a disparate treatment issue if the employer grants similar amounts of leave to non-disabled employees but does not penalize them.  The employer in this case does grant similar leave to non-disabled employees without fear of penalty.  It does so when it extends vacation leave or compensatory time leave without threat of penalization.  Such disparate treatment violates the ADA and NJLAD.  In one EEOC case a company fired an employee for exceeding the permissible number of attendance points despite the fact she provided medical excuses for her absences and despite the fact the leave was approved.  The EEOC stated: “An employer’s refusal to accommodate an employee who requests a defined period of intermittent medical leave for treatment of a disability -- which would permit the employee to return to work in the immediate future -- is a widely recognized violation of the law,” (See Table of Authorities)  Similarly, within U.S. EEOC v. [...], [...], the EEOC asserted that the employer violated federal law by implementing an attendance policy that assigned points to employees' absences, regardless of reason.  Effectively, under Mueller’s (See Table of Authorities) policy once a certain number of points were accumulated, the employee was terminated.  The EEOC stated in that case: “Such conduct violates the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). ”  See also U.S. EEOC v. [...], 141 F. Supp. 3d 912, 917 (N.D. Ill. 2015) (Employers attendance policy under which employees were assessed points and eventually discharged because of absences, including disability-related absences declared unlawful by EEOC).  The EEOC cases provide cognate guidance in this case.
[brief] CRIMINAL ACTION On Appeal From a Final Order Of The Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Essex Vicinage Indictment No. [...] Sat Below: Hon. [...], J.S.C., Hon. [...], J.S.C., and a Jury  Your Honors:  This reply letter-brief and appendix are submitted on behalf of Defendant in lieu of a formal brief pursuant to R. 2:6-2(b).
[brief] The LRHL sets forth a detailed and specific procedure for a municipality to adopt and implement a redevelopment plan for the property at issue.  See N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-1 to -89.  Once a property has been designated as "an area in need of rehabilitation," the local government may adopt a redevelopment plan under N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-7.  The redevelopment plan must be consistent with the municipality's master plan, or if not, be approved by a majority of the municipality's governing body and set forth the governing body's reasons "in the redevelopment plan."
[directive] [Sí/Yes]  [No/No]  ¿Entiende que por su de culpabilidad  Do you understand that because of your plea of guilty to (Indique los delitos violentos de primer o segundo grado/List First or Second Degree Violent Crimes) se requerirá que cumpla el 85% de la sentencia impuesta por ese delito o esos delitos antes que esté en condiciones de recibir libertad condicional por ese delito o esos delitos?
[brief] And to the extent [...] certified that he “can provide competent and diligent representation to each client,” the trial court was wrong to accept solely his subjective beliefs without assessing it under an objective standard.  See Whitman v. Estate of Whitman, 259 N.J. Super. 256, 263 (Law Div. 1992) (explaining that the test is a combined subjective and objective standard).  The effectiveness of a prospective waiver necessarily depends upon the adequacy of the disclosures and the court’s function is to assess those disclosures and ensure that defendants understand the consequences of joint representation.  See State v. Belluci, 81 N.J. 531, 545 (1980) (joint representation “must be explored on the record both to ensure that defendant is aware of the potential hazards and to secure a proper waiver”); see also State v. Land, 73 N.J. 24, 33 (1977).  Notably, a court is allowed “substantial latitude in refusing waivers of conflicts of interest not only in those rare cases where an actual conflict may be demonstrated before trial, but in the more common cases where a potential for conflict exists which may or may not burgeon into an actual conflict as the trial progresses.
[brief] This is a personal injury action arising out of a motor vehicle accident.  Plaintiff’s claim was dismissed on summary judgment, and he now appeals on a very narrow issue.  The trial Court found that plaintiff was “culpably uninsured” in New Jersey because his insurance policy with [...] indicated that his vehicle was garaged in the State of North Carolina.  It is undisputed that, prior to the accident, plaintiff changed his insurance policy to reflect a MAILING address in the State of New Jersey.  However, he failed to realize that he also had to change the GARAGING address on the policy from North Carolina to New Jersey.  As a result of this innocent oversight, [...] seized upon this error and voided his automobile insurance policy based upon a material misrepresentation.  The motor vehicle tortfeasor then moved for summary judgment on the grounds that plaintiff was “culpably uninsured” at the time of the accident and thus cannot sue for pain and suffering.  It is submitted that summary judgment was improperly granted because it is a fact issue for a jury as to whether the plaintiff made a material misrepresentation to [...] which would justify its coverage denial, and the dismissal of plaintiff’s pain and suffering claim.  It is submitted that the standard of review on this case is de novo as an Appellate Court is not bound by the trial Court’s application of law to the facts.
[brief] Public Defender Attorney for Defendant-Appellant  BY: /s/ [...]  Assistant Deputy Public Defender Attorney ID: 060532014  Dated: August 7, 2023  Superior Court of New Jersey  APPELLATE  DIVISION DOCKET NO. [...]  CRIMINAL ACTION STATE OF NEW JERSEY, : Plaintiff-Respondent, : v. : Defendant-Appellant.  On Appeal from a Judgment of Conviction of the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Gloucester County.  [...], : Sat Below: Hon. [...], J.S.C. Hon. [...], J.S.C. and a jury.  BRIEF AND APPENDIX ON BEHALF OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY
[brief] Regarding defendant’s animal abuse, which he now attributes to “substantial trauma and developmental deficits,” the judge was well within his discretion to find that it was “disturbing. ”  Although defendant experienced some difficulty in childhood, the judge pointed out that it was not the worst he had seen, and that people with worse trauma committed less serious offenses.  (5T77).  That defendant’s childhood was not the worst is indisputable.  [...], defendant’s own expert, stated that defendant was raised in a “generally supportive” environment by his mother and stepfather, who had a harmonious relationship devoid of domestic violence and infidelity.  (Da47-49).  Further, defendant’s initial presentence report notes “no serious childhood trauma. ” (Pca11).  The judge did not fail to give proper weight to defendant’s expert testimony.
[brief] (Pa186-94).  The Arbitrator held that, “[w]hile the words in the Agreement’s language may at first reading appear to require use of 2,080 in determining the divisor,” the evidence weighed against such an interpretation.  (Pa192).  The Arbitrator held that the parenthetical “was merely illustrative and descriptive, instead of prescriptive,” and thus could not overcome the meaning of the entire paragraph in which that parenthetical was located.  Ibid.  Because [...] did not meet its burden of proof, the Arbitrator appropriately denied the grievance.
[brief] (Pa066)  As provided in N.J. Model Jury Charge 5.40B for Manufacturing Defect and in supporting case law, whether there was a manufacturing defect in the subject product, may be shown by the plaintiff in one of three ways.  First, it may be demonstrated by direct evidence, such as a defective part.  Second, a defect may be inferred by circumstantial evidence.  *Scanlon v. General Motors Corp.*, 65 N.J. 582, 592-593 (1974); *Moraca v. Ford Motor Co.*, 66 N.J. 454 (1975); *Consalo v. General Motors*, 258 N.J. Super. 60 (App. Div. 1992) 582, 592-593 (1974); *Sabloff v. Yamaha Motor Co.*, 113 N.J. Super. 279 (App. Div. 1970), aff’d, 59 N.J. 365 (1971); *Jakubowski v. Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing*, 42 N.J. 177, 184 (1964).
[brief] The issue arose as follows.  The judge went on the record at 9:50 a.m. that day to inform counsel that Juror Nine had reported that she and others had been approached by [...] while outside on a cigarette break on Thursday April 28, and both counsel and the judge agreed that it was appropriate to voir dire that juror to see what had happened.  (7T 3-1 to 5-17)  Juror Nine described a “five or six minute[’]” conversation that occurred when Joseph approached her and “two or three other jurors”:  “He was standing there.  . . .  We were talking about food.  We were all kind of talking, just small conversations.  So, I don’t remember specifically what he was saying, but he was engaging in the conversation. ”  (7T 7-1 to 5)  Juror Nine recalled specifically talking about “Boba tea” and that Joseph “responded to one of the things we were saying about the tea. ”  (7T 7-6 to 10)  Only after the conversation ended did Juror Nine and others realize that they had just had a conversation with a witness in the case.  (7T 6-2 to 20)  Juror Nine said she could still be impartial.  (7T 9-1 to 3)  The remaining jurors, including alternates,\(^4\) were also subject to voir dire.  Jurors Five and Thirteen told a similar story to Juror Nine’s account, because they were involved in that same conversation, and both said they could remain impartial.  (7T 11-16 to 14-5; 7T 15-25 to 17-16)  The rest of the jurors, with one exception, claimed to know nothing about any conversation with a person outside the jury.  (7T 21-21 to 39-15)  But that exception was noteworthy.  Juror Sixteen, a deliberating juror, said that he did not have any interactions with anyone affiliated with the case and did not “witness” any such \(^4\)  The alternates were Jurors One, Three, Four, and Eleven.  interactions of any such person with other jurors (7T 40-1 to 9)  But then he dropped a bomb; when asked if he had “been within earshot of any discussions from your fellow jurors about any interactions with anyone affiliated with the case,” Juror Sixteen said: “Just in deliberations. ”  (7T 40-10 to 13)  (emphasis added)  And that is where the judge failed to do her job.
[brief] Unfortunately, that wait took another six hundred and twenty-four (624) days.  In the interim, both parties wrote multiple letters asking the judge to rule on the requests for disbursement of the Escrow Funds, along with the other pending applications (Da241-Da252).  In the meantime, Tenant continued paying rent and Landlord paid some of Tenant’s Allowance for 2022 and 2023 (3T7-6 to 3T7-9;3T10-4 to 3T10-14).7  --- 7  Although it is undisputed Tenant made additional payments in 2022 and 2023, the record is not clear on whether Landlord paid the full principal and interest payments for those years.  V.  The trial court’s mixed jurisdictional and merits ruling
[brief] *Id.* at 95-18 to 96-21.  This is because Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint plead no such facts, nor did the motion record establish that Plaintiffs suffered a “special injury” in connection with their conversion claims.  *See Kauffman*, *supra*, 434 *F.2d* at 732; Da00001 – Da00043.  Based on the motion record, the trial court should have dismissed Plaintiffs’ conversion claims for lack of standing.
[brief] Hence, the unconstitutional interference with vested rights, and manifest injustice, means that the second prong of the retroactive application test fails.  The failure to satisfy both prongs of the retroactive application test means that the court should not rule that N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-9(e)(3) is to be given retroactive application, requiring the denial of [...]’s summary judgment motion.  **CONCLUSION**