ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] [...] advised defendant at the outset of the interview that the detectives request your appearance here today for the purpose of answering questions concerning your knowledge of a matter now under investigation involving the death of [...].  As regard to this matter that I wish to question you and record your responses on audio and tape recorder.  With full knowledge of the foregoing, are you now willing to . . . reply to questions concerning your knowledge of this matter now under investigation?  Defendant replied, "Yes."  (25T17-4).  The interview ended after about an hour, and the detectives informed defendant that he could leave and that they would bring him home.  (25T85-18 to 88-16).  Defendant did indeed go home.
[brief] Local Levy Gap in [...]’s Adequacy Budget  The funding shortfall in [...]’s Adequacy Budget from 2009-10 to 2019-20 is, at least in part, attributable to a local levy gap, i.e., the difference between the annual LFS calculation and the property tax revenue actually received each year.  [...]’s local levy gap was structured in the design of the SFRA when enacted and continued in the formula’s operation in subsequent years through a combination of factors, including increases in the Adequacy Budget’s cost of educating students; increases in the LFS; the 2% cap on property tax increases; and decreases in state aid.  (Pa914, ¶¶ 24, 27-28.)  As the following data shows, from 2008-09 to 2019-20, the increases in [...]’s LFS far exceeded the increases in the local levy, resulting in a widening local levy gap:  | School Year | Local School Tax Levy | LFS per SFRA | Local Levy Gap | |-------------|-----------------------|--------------|---------------| | 2008-09 | $86,122,268 | $196,262,527 | $110,140,259 | | 2009-10 | $93,012,049 | $208,930,150 | $115,918,101 | | 2010-11 | $102,313,254 | $224,695,223 | $122,381,969 | | 2011-12 | $104,359,519 | $227,070,183 | $122,710,664 | | 2012-13 | $106,446,709 | $223,671,965 | $117,225,256 | | Year | LFS | Local Levy | Adequacy Budget | |---------|-----------|------------|-----------------| | 2013-14 | $108,336,848 | $246,144,257 | $137,807,409 | | 2014-15 | $109,961,901 | $311,145,670 | $201,183,769 | | 2015-16 | $112,161,139 | $335,745,966 | $223,584,827 | | 2016-17 | $114,404,361 | $336,460,489 | $222,056,128 | | 2017-18 | $116,692,448 | $370,261,455 | $253,569,007 | | 2018-19 | $124,367,357 | $398,895,043 | $274,527,686 | | 2019-20 | $136,504,704 | $474,039,468 | $337,534,764 | (Pa915, ¶ 29 to Pa929, ¶ 146; Pa930, ¶ 153 to Pa931, ¶ 158; Pa1947-Pa1948.)  During this timeframe, [...]’s LFS increased from $196.2 million to $474 million, or nearly 142% (Pa913, ¶ 21), and the local levy gap increased by over $220 million, or more than 206%. (Pa915, ¶ 29.)  As the LFS increased dramatically, [...]’s increases in the local levy were constrained by the 2% property tax cap.  (Pa914, ¶ 26.)  From 2008-09 to 2019-20, the local levy increased by approximately 58% but remained insufficient to close the funding shortfall in the District’s Adequacy Budget.  (Pa914, ¶ 23.)  SFRA’s operation in [...] not only resulted in significant increases in the District’s LFS -- and a widening local levy gap -- it also caused reductions in Equalization Aid to fund the Adequacy Budget.
[brief] As detailed below, there is no legal authority for expanding the record beyond these exhibits.  At the trial, Appellants failed to introduce any evidence at all that the Redevelopment Plan was both: (1) not “substantially consistent” with the Master Plan and (2) not “designed to effectuate” the Master Plan.  See Downtown, 242 N.J. Super. at 332 (citation omitted); Manalapan, 140 N.J. at 383.  In fact, the only evidence were the Joint Exhibits and Stipulated Facts that showed the great lengths to which the Town went to ensure that the Redevelopment Plan was entirely consistent with the Master Plan.  The evidence also showed that the Planning Board, the entity most knowledgeable as to Master Plan consistency and to which great deference such a decision is afforded, conducted its requisite analysis to confirm such consistency and made its recommendation regarding that consistency to the Governing Body.  See Grabowsky v. Twp. of Montclair, 2013 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1897, *14-15 (App. Div. July 26, 2013), rev’d on other grounds, 221 N.J. 536 (2015) (“A planning board’s determination of whether proposed amendments are ‘substantially consistent’ with the town’s master plan are ‘entitled to deference and great weight.
[brief] ”  N.J.A.C. 11:1-20.2(a).  Regarding commercial policies, pursuant to N.J.A.C. 11:1-20.2(d):  No cancellation, other than a cancellation based upon nonpayment of premium or for moral hazard as defined in (f) below, shall be valid unless notice is mailed or delivered by the insurer to the insured, and to any person entitled to notice under the policy, not more than 120 days nor less than 30 days prior to the effective date of such cancellation except . . .
[brief] 4  A.  Count One of Appellant’s Complaint Under CEPA Fails to State a Claim Upon Which Relief Can Be Granted (PA000089-91).  4  i.  Count One fails to state a claim for a CEPA violation because withholding PTO is not an act of retaliation (argued but not ruled on).  ..................................................  6  ii.  Count One fails to state a claim for a CEPA violation because N.J.A.C. § 10:44A-2.8(b) cannot provide the basis for a “reasonable belief” that Defendants were violating a law, rule, regulation or public policy.  .............................................  8  iii.  ...  Count One fails to state a claim for a CEPA violation because N.J.A.C. § 10:44A-2.7(a) cannot provide the basis for a “reasonable belief” that Defendants were violating a law, rule, regulation or public policy.  .............................................  12  B.  Appellant’s Pierce Claim in Count Two fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted as Appellant fails to identify a clear mandate of public policy.  ......................  14  C.  Leave to Amend the Complaint was Properly Denied by the Lower Court.  .................................................................  17
[brief] [279 N.J. Super. at 593; quoting George Harms Construction v. [...], 137 N.J. 8, 27 (1994). ]  See also Palamar Construction v. Township of Pennsauken, 196 N.J. Super. 241, 250 (App. Div. 1983) (setting forth the standard of review applicable to bid conformity decisions by local agencies, which is whether the decision was arbitrary, unreasonable or capricious).  Thus, if [...]’s decision was rationally grounded in the record and does not violate applicable law, its decision must be sustained.  On-Line Games, supra; see generally Clowes v. Terminix Int’l, Inc., 109 N.J. 575, 587 (1988) (judicial review of state agency decisions “is a limited one,” which asks only “whether there is sufficient credible competent evidence in the record to support the agency head’s conclusions”); Williams v. Dep’t of Human Services, 116 N.J. 102, 107 (1989) (the “fundamental consideration” in reviewing agency actions “is that a court may not substitute its judgment for the expertise of an agency so long as that action is statutorily authorized and not otherwise defective because arbitrary or unreasonable. ”).  Moreover, in reviewing agency actions, “[a]ppellate courts must defer to an agency’s expertise and superior knowledge of a particular field. ”  Greenwood v. State Police Training Ctr., 127 N.J. 500, 513 (1992).  A reviewing court must “defer to an agency’s technical expertise, its superior knowledge of its subject matter area, and its fact-finding role. ”  Futterman v. Bd. of Review, Dep’t of Labor, 421 N.J. Super. 281, 287 (App. Div. 2011).  Specifically, [...]’s, “interpretation of statutes and regulations within its implementing and enforcing responsibility is ordinarily entitled to deference. ”  E.S. v. Div. of Med. Assistance & Health Servs., 412 N.J. Super. 340, 355 (App. Div. 2010).  Here, where appellant is challenging [...]’s decision with respect to its compliance with the technical specifications of the procurement documents, judicial deference is at its zenith.  This Court has historically taken a deferential view towards [...]’s interpretation of its specifications, and this case provides no exception to the rule.
[directive] Notwithstanding the provisions N.J.S. 5-16, the governing body of any local unit may, by resolution, provide for and authorize payment of advances to officers and employees of the local unit toward their expenses for authorized official travel and expenses incident thereto.  Any such resolution shall provide for the verification and adjustment of such expenses and advances and the repayment of any excess advanced by means of a detailed bill of items or demand and the certifications or affidavit required by N.J.S. :5-16 which shall be submitted within 10 days after the completion of the travel 40A for which an advance was made.  s. 1, L.1971, c. 323, eff. Oct. 28, 1971. of or 5-16.2.
[brief] N.J.S.A. 39:6A-5.1 “requires arbitration of disputes regarding entitlement to or the amount of PIP benefits[.]”  Id. at 160.  In sum, the plain language of the No-Fault Law’s arbitration provision compels [...] to arbitration each of its civil claims premised on PIP disputes.  Much like [...], which chose to clog up the federal court system with PIP disputes recast as civil claims, [...] chooses to clog up the New Jersey state court system with PIP disputes that it recasts into civil claims.  This Court should reject [...]’s gambit to circumvent the Legislature’s intent to take PIP disputes out of court.
[brief] See e.g., Concerned Citizens of Princeton, Inc. v. Mayor and Council of Borough of Princeton, 370 N.J. Super. 429 (App. Div. 2004) (nine months); Damurjian v. Board of Adjustment of Colts Neck, 299 N.J. Super. 84 (App. Div. 1997) (three and a half years); Wolf v. Mayor of Shrewsbury, 182 N.J. Super. 289 (App. Div. 1981) (one year); Ocean County Bd. of Realtors v. Borough of Beachwood, 248 N.J. Super. 241 (Law Div. 1991) (seven years).
[brief] suppressed.  See Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201, 210 (1988) (“Whether a verbal or non-verbal communication, to be a testimonial or communicative act [covered by Miranda], the suspect’s ‘communication must itself, explicitly or implicitly, relate a factual assertion or disclose information. ’”).  Thus, in addition to [...]’ verbal responses, this Court should also suppress [...]’ act of showing the officer where the drugs were located, as this act was equivalent to a verbal response of telling the officer where they were locating.
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[brief] Q.  You've mentioned before -- I'm sorry, please finish your answer.  A.  I was just saying if that makes sense.  Q. It doesn't matter if it makes sense to me.  [1T152:17-25, -153:1-25, -154:1-14.]  [[...].  Q.]  You mentioned before that the maximum winter pressure that you thought this portion of your system should operate under is 450, is that correct, in the wintertime?
[brief] I.  STANDARD OF REVIEW ........................................................................59  II.  THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY DENIED OLD REPUBLIC’S MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS' FEES (PA688; T5)  ........................................59  A.  New Jersey Law Allows For Contractual Indemnification For First-Party Claims (Pa688; T5) .................................................................59  B.  The Plain Language Of The PSA Requires That [...] Indemnify [...] (Pa688; T5) .................................................. 61  C.  The Trial Court Incorrectly Relied On Distinguishable Out-Of-State Law (Pa688; T5) ................................................................. 67  CONCLUSION ...........................................................................................................................................................................
[brief] Thus, it is the Rutgers Act—not the Restructuring Act—which houses the residency requirement.  That fact is significant because once the requirement became part of the legislative contract codified under the Rutgers Act, it became subject to rules of construction beyond those governing ordinary statutes. \(^5\)  Those rules are set forth in [...]’s majority opinion in *Berg v. Christie*, 225 N.J. 245 (2016).  There, the Court considered whether the statutorily-enacted suspension of State pension cost-of-living adjustments “contravened a term of the contract right granted under the earlier enacted ‘non-forfeitable right’ statute.
[brief] TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ...........................................................................................................  iii  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT .......................................................................................................  1  STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY ..........................................................  3  LEGAL ARGUMENT I.  STANDARD OF REVIEW .....................................................................................................  12  II.  [...] IS NOT ENTITLED TO INDEMNIFICATION TO PURSUE A PRIVATE .................  13  AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT RECORDS  COUNCIL III.  THE COURT BELOW DECLINED TO DECIDE THE DUE PROCESS ISSUE ..............  18 AND THE VALIDITY OF THE OPRA REQUEST UNDER R. 4:67-6  CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................................
[brief] The engineer retained by [...] for various services in the Borough testified that he was never called upon to provide any lighting service to [...].  Furthermore, the same officials, as well as various police officers who testified on behalf [...], had no knowledge whatsoever about why the intersection was designated a dangerous intersection by the Borough although all of them were familiar with the dangerous intersection signs placed at every corner of the subject intersection.  In addition, [...] took no steps to ensure continuous light coverage at a dangerous intersection, judging the history of the streetlight, which was more off than on, according to [...].  The actions or omissions of [...] are palpably unreasonable in that the behavior of its public employees is likely to be deemed unacceptable under any given circumstance by a jury.
[brief] [...]’s improper lay-opinion testimony that “once [defendant] turned over the credit card ID or the wallet ID, he now had a second one, which was inevitably the first one which he [had] reported stolen or missing.  So we knew he was in possession of one” was so grossly in violation of McLean as to constitute plain error clearly capable of producing an unjust result.  (12T 97-4 to 9)  (emphasis added)  Reversal of the resulting convictions is necessarily required where, as here, the error potentially tips the jury’s consideration of the credibility or evidentiary worth of the State’s case.  State v. Briggs, 279 N.J. Super. 555, 565 (App. Div. 1995); State v. W.L., 278 N.J. Super. 295, 301 (App. Div. 1995); see also State v. Hedgespeth, 249 N.J. 234, 253 (2021), citing State v. Scott, 229 N.J. 468, 484-485 (2017) (errors which affect the weight the jury will give the State’s evidence or the State’s arguments in favor of conviction versus the defendant’s arguments in favor of acquittal are reversible and never harmless).  Defendant’s convictions should be reversed, and the matter remanded for retrial.
[brief] Plaintiff alleges that [...] issued a Workers’ Compensation and Employer’s Liability Insurance Policy to [...] with a limit of liability of $1,000,000.  Ja47 at ¶2.  Plaintiff identifies this as the “[...] Policy. ”  Ibid.  Plaintiff states that [...] disclaimed coverage pursuant to Exclusion C.5 of the [...] Policy.  Id. at ¶3.  Plaintiff identifies a second insurance policy issued to [...] by [...], which provided excess and umbrella insurance coverage to [...].  Id. at ¶4.  It is alleged that [...] disclaimed coverage under the excess, umbrella policy based on [...]’s disclaimer.  The Third Count then explains that Plaintiff and Defendant [...] agreed to a settlement pursuant to Griggs v. Bertram, 88 N.J. 347 (1982), pursuant to which a consent judgment in the amount of $1,250,000 was entered against [...].
[brief] [...] ([...]) obtained 216 hours of video from all over the complex.  It saved two short clips then “wiped” the hard drive, depriving the defense the chance to review the footage.  Counsel moved for sanctions.  The court repeatedly asked for [...]’s policies, which counsel failed to obtain.  The court refused to dismiss the indictment on the grounds that, without a policy violation, the defense had not established bad faith.  On the eve of trial, an [...] exam indicated the clips, which should not have survived “wiping,” remained.  Counsel never demanded a forensic exam by an expert.  The preserved Oakcrest clips showed [...] at 12:25 and 12:42pm, and cell-cite data put his phone in Mays Landing.  The State argued, however, that he left his phone, shot the victim in Atlantic City at 12:11pm, then sped back to Mays Landing.  Since he had only incoming calls, the State argued the phone records supported its theory.  Yet, [...] was actively sending messages, posting and liking content on Facebook during the critical time.  Counsel had screenshots of Facebook activity but failed to plan for their admission, so jurors never knew [...]’s phone was generating Facebook content, contrary to the State’s theory.  Also, the shooter shot with his right hand, while [...] is left-handed, yet counsel failed to present evidence of this or object when the prosecutor testified in summation about ambidexterity.  He further blundered by promising to prove [...]’s innocence, inviting damaging (and otherwise reversible) prosecutorial argument.  These are only some of the significant errors of [...]’s trial counsel.
[brief] Upholding the Initial Decision | | Aa24-Aa31 | Amended Notice of Appeal and Civil Case Information Statement filed November 22, 2022 | | Aa32-Aa36 | Job Description / FireFighter | | Aa37-Aa43 | [...]  First Report Of Injury Or Illness | INDEX TO TRANSCRIPTS  1T  November 16, 2020 testimony of [...]  Before Honorable [...], A.L.J.  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT  Appellant, [...], should be granted his Accidental Disability Pension Benefits because the incident which occurred on September 22, 2017 was “undersigned and unexpected” meeting all the requirements as set forth in Richardson vs. Board of Trustees, Police and Firemen’s Retirement System, 192 N.J. 189 (2007) and reinstated in Moran v. Board of Trustees, Police and Firemen’s Retirement System, 438 N.J. Super. 346 (App. Div. 2014).
[directive] N.J.S.A. Y/O AND/OR B.  También admite, en virtud de esta declaración de culpabilidad, que cuando estaba cometiendo o tratando de cometer uno de los delitos, incluyendo su fuga inmediata del lugar de los hechos, usted usó un arma de fuego o tenía una en su posesión.  You are also admitting, by virtue of this plea, that while in the course of committing or attempting to commit one of the crimes, including the immediate flight therefrom, you used or were in possession of a firearm.
[brief] Pursuant to New Jersey Court Rule 2:6-2(b), please accept the within Letter Memorandum of Law in lieu of a more formal brief in support of the within Defendant-Appellant’s appeal.  THE WITHIN DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO VACATE GUILTY PLEA SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED ON DE NOVO REVIEW PREDICATED UPON THE MUNICIPAL COURT’S FAILURE TO OBTAIN A SUFFICIENT FACTUAL BASIS FOR THE ENTRY OF DEFENDANT’S GUILTY PLEA ON MAY 16, 2018  IN ACCORDANCE WITH R. 7:6-2(A)(1).  (T3:16-24 to 29-19).  (DA7).  Conclusion ...........................................................................................................  14  TABLE OF APPENDIX  Motor Vehicle Ticket Details .........................................................  DA1 3/23/23  Order from Municipal Court Denying Motion ....................... DA5 4/7/23  Notice of Appeal to Law Division ........................................  DA6 6/15/23  Order of the Law Division Denying Motion ..........................  DA7 7/31/23  Notice of Appeal to Law Division .....................................  DA9  Unpublished Opinion in State v. Vargas, [...] ......................  DA13  TABLE OF JUDGEMENTS, ORDERS, & RULINGS  3/23/23  Order from Municipal Court Denying Motion  ……………………  DA5 6/15/23  Oral Ruling of the Law Division Denying Motion … T3:16-24 to 29-19 6/15/23  Order the Law Division Denying Motion …………………………  DA7  STATEMENT OF FACTS & PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[brief] More recently, in Policemen’s Benevolent Association, Local 11 v. City of Trenton, 205 N.J. 422 (2011), the Supreme Court upheld an Arbitrator's interpretation of the phrase in a collective bargaining agreement, that “no overtime shall be paid for ten minute period prior to commencement of tour,” to permit payment of compensation at straight-time rates for that period on the grounds that it was plausible and, thus, reasonably debatable.  In *Trenton*, the Supreme Court held that the arbitrator interpreted the collective negotiations agreement to reach the plausible conclusion that, if parties had intended that officers receive no pay at all for time actually worked, they would have said so, and because they did not, straight-time pay for that period was contemplated.
[brief] Plaintiff learned of Defendant [...]’s complaint, stemming from four separate alleged incidents, on March 9, 2021, in an email from a third-party investigator, [...] (an attorney not acting in his attorney capacity), who stated that he was performing an investigation at Defendant [...]’s behest.  232a, ¶ 134.  Plaintiff was allegedly informed by [...] that he wanted to complete his investigation and report as soon as possible, and while she was denied the presence of an attorney, he stated that she was entitled to Union representation under the Weingarten Rule.  Id. at ¶ 137.  Plaintiff also alleges that in conversations with Plaintiff’s counsel, [...] represented that the interview would be recorded and that she would have an opportunity to correct the transcript before the investigation concluded.  233a, ¶ 142.  [...] allegedly represented that the investigation had “nothing to do” with the 2016 Lawsuit, and on that basis Plaintiff appeared for the interview without an attorney.
[brief] **POINT I: THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY BARRING PLAINTIFF’S EXPERT WITNESS.  (PA1; 1T9:7)** | 7 | | A. Standard of Review. | 7 | | B. Discussion. | 8 | |  **POINT II: THE ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY  JUDGMENT MUST BE REVERSED  BECAUSE, BASED ON THEIR AFFIRMATIVE ACTS, DEFENDANTS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO SIDEWALK IMMUNITY AND ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE HAZARDOUS CONDITION THEY CREATED.  (PA1)** | 13 | | A. Standard of Review.  | 13 | | B. Discussion.  | 14 | | CONCLUSION | 19