ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] In fact, when issuing its oral decision regarding the Motion to Amend, the trial court also noted that [...] failed to meet the community of interest requirements and that it “dealt with other brands too. ”  See T4 at 6:1624.  It is undisputed that [...] always had full ability and did in fact conduct business with other grill manufacturers and that [...] had no control over [...] and as such, there was no disparity in bargaining power.  Moreover, [...]’s business and revenues skyrocketed after “termination” by [...]—which is dispositive proof that [...]’s grill business was not dependent upon [...] and fully transferable.  There is no evidence that shows the “symbiotic” relationship [...] asserts but does not explain and leaves for the Court and [...] to figure out.  The undisputed facts show that [...] failed to prove the “community of interest” factors in the underlying motion for summary judgment.
[brief] Neither party raised the issue of the missing appendices to the Commission.  Moreover, the [...] suffered no prejudice as a result of the missing appendices.  The information in Appendix A (Aa162-163), except for the arbitrator’s totaling of the yearly columns, was previously received by the [...] directly from the [...] on November 22, 2023 as part of the parties’ submission of information requested by the arbitrator.  (Aa040; Aa111-112; Aa409-413; Aa426-437; Aa477).
[brief] Your Honors:  This letter is submitted in lieu of a formal reply brief pursuant to Rule 2:6-2(b) on behalf of defendant-appellant [...].  TABLE OF CONTENTS  PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND STATEMENT OF FACTS  ...........................................  2 LEGAL ARGUMENT ..................................................................................................  2 POINT I THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY RESTRICTED THE DEFENSE FROM ARGUING THIRD-PARTY GUILT .................................................................  2 POINT II  THE IMPROPER NET OPINION ON THE LOCATION OF WOODS’S CELL PHONE AMOUNTED TO PLAIN ERROR .................................................................  5 POINT III  THE STATE ELICITED TESTIMONY THAT VIOLATED THE BANKSTON RULE.  ..................................................................................................................  10  POINT IV  THE CUMULATIVE EFFECT OF THE ERRORS REQUIRES REVERSAL ..................................................................................................................  12 CONCLUSION .............................................................................................................
[brief] (3T:30-31; Da 111)  When [...]’s father reappeared, [...] would sometimes spend time with him while he sold drugs, recalling that his father would tell him to quickly walk away when a customer was coming.  (Da 111)  [...] sought his father’s company and attention whenever he could get it, despite being hurt and disappointed when his father would invariably disappear again.  (Da 111)  [...] had a complicated relationship with his mother’s boyfriend, [...], who was the biological father of five of his sisters, but lived with his “other family,” including his wife and children from that marriage.
[brief] Following retinal detachment surgery, the anterior chamber migration of the silicone particulate was a substantial factor in causing significant vision loss and the need for multiple subsequent surgeries in the left eye.  The silicone particulate caused excessive ocular inflammation in [...]’s left eye and corneal edema, both of which were adverse effects identified in [...]’s Ozurdex recall.  Despite corneal surgery, compounded damage from retinal detachment likely limited potential for recovery resulting in [...]’s loss of vision; D. [...] complied with the requisite standard of care at all times with regard to his treatment of [...].
[brief] During the Planning Board hearing on September 15, 2022, Planning Board [...] addressed the issue of the TOA Rule and stated:  “. . . any applicant is entitled to the benefit of the law as it stands at the time that they submit the application to the City.  . . there was no school requirement at the time the application was submitted and accordingly it does not apply to this application. ”  (Da234).  Dunbar Homes, Inc. v. Zoning Board of Adjustment of Twp. of Franklin, 233 N.J. 546, 560, 561 provides in relevant part: “the MLUL is ‘a comprehensive statute that allows municipalities to adopt ordinances to regulate land development in a manner which will promote the public, health, safety, morals and general welfare’ using uniform and efficient procedures. ”  Rumson Estates, Inc. v. Mayor & Council of Fair Haven, 177 N.J. 338, 349 (2003).  (citations omitted).  Furthermore, the New Jersey Supreme Court in Dunbar held:
[brief] The issue of “what Plaintiff knew and when it knew it” was not actually litigated in the First Action.  It was raised in a post-judgment motion for leave to amend – a motion that was denied out of hand on procedural grounds.  That this Court made non-essential comments on the issue on appeal does not somehow mean that the issue was “actually litigated. ”  It was not.  Rather than meaningfully address the trial court’s fatal deficiency head on, Defendants attempt to salvage the trial court’s erroneous decision by revisiting the same hollow argument the trial court soundly rejected.  That is, Defendants argue, again, that “there is no question” Plaintiff knew of the facts underlying its claims prior to the completion of the First Action.  The trial court – having the benefit of and relying upon a full evidentiary record, including deposition testimony – reached the exact opposite conclusion.  The trial court made repeated findings of fact that Plaintiff did not possess knowledge of the facts underlying its claims prior to the completion of the First Action.  While Defendants use every adjective in the book to try to discredit the trial court’s factual findings – characterizing them as “extraneous,” “needless,” “irrelevant,” and “tentative”– they cannot escape the fact that their argument was properly rejected on a full record, following discovery on the issue.  Given the trial court’s role as fact finder and considering Defendants have not appealed the trial court’s factual and credibility findings, there is no basis for this Court to supplant those findings with completely contrary conclusions.  Finally, Defendants’ argument that the trial court lacked jurisdiction is baseless.  There is no support for Defendants’ contention that an appeal in one action somehow strips a trial court in a separate action of jurisdiction.  It does not.  If the trial court lacked jurisdiction, it would have dismissed the case at the outset for that very reason.  Instead, this action was litigated for over one year – litigation that included conferences, document productions, depositions, and substantive rulings on numerous dispositive motions.  Most critically, if the trial court lacked jurisdiction, it could not have dismissed Plaintiff’s claims, with prejudice, pursuant to the entire controversy doctrine.  It would have refrained from taking any action whatsoever.  This is not an issue of jurisdiction – it is an issue of collateral estoppel and whether that doctrine applies.  An issue the trial court failed to properly address and, ultimately, got wrong.
[brief] This holding supports the principle that when an arbitrator appointed by the parties rules on liability, it is a partial final decision and the issue will not be revisited following his death, and since Defendant’s argument that the matter must be re-litigated is contrary to Trade and should be denied.  The facts in Trade & Transport, Inc. Vs. Natural Petroleum Charterers Incorporated, 931 F2d 191 (2d Cir. 1991) were very similar to those in the instant matter.  During the pendency of the arbitration but after a partial final award (liability) had been rendered, a member of a three-member arbitration panel died.  The District court ruled that the vacancy had been properly filled and the arbitration had been properly conducted.  Defendant appealed, requesting that the entire dispute from the beginning should follow under 9USC §5 for the judicial filling of a vacancy, claiming that the panel acted improperly in deciding liability and a whole new panel had to be assembled after the one member’s death.  Held:  “Once arbitrators have finally decided the submitted issues, they are, in common-law parlance, “functus officio” meaning that their authority over those questions is ended.  ...  Thus, if the parties have asked the arbitrators to make a final partial award as to a particular issue and the arbitrators have done so, the arbitrators have no further authority, absent agreement by the parties, to redetermine that issue.  ...  The district court reasoned that "[t]he statutory authority to fill a vacancy must necessarily be construed to refer to a pending arbitration," September 1985 Order at 2, and that the reference in § 5 to "filling a vacancy" would make no sense if the Act were construed to require that whenever one arbitrator died the entire panel must be removed.  Since the parties' agreement (a) did not state that the death of one arbitrator after a partial final award would have that effect, and (b) was silent as to the method by which a replacement arbitrator should be designated, it was within the authority conferred by the Act for the court to appoint to the panel [...]'s new nominee, [...], to replace [...], its original nominee.  We also agree with the district court's conclusion that [...]'s naming a successor to [...] did not give [...] the right to replace the existing neutral arbitrator agreed upon by [...]'s original nominee.  Here, our Settlement Agreement was clear that if a breach was found that the parties were bound to binding arbitration under [...] and after a hearing [...] found Defendants liable and was about to schedule a hearing on damages when Defendants challenged [...]’s decision based on allegations that he was biased and during the long process to absolve [...] of bias, [...] died.
[brief] Appellant entered into the Cardholder Agreement by using and benefitting from the credit card, making payments on the Account, and incurring the Debt that is the subject of the Complaint without objection or opt-out.  (Pa129-Pa134 & Pa164-Pa171); Novack v. Cities Serv. Oil Co., 149 N.J. Super. 542, 548 (Law Div. 1977) (holding the use of a credit card constitutes acceptance of the offer of credit in accordance with its terms), aff’d, 159 N.J. Super. 400 (App. Div. 1978), cert. denied, 78 N.J. 396 (1978); Dicent v. Kaplan Univ., No. 18-2982, 2019 WL 158083, at *2 (3d Cir. Jan. 10, 2019) (enforcing arbitration agreement that was e-signed, noting that plaintiff’s failure to review it prior to signing did not excuse his from arbitration) (Da18-Da21).
[brief] Defendant admitted she used Plaintiff’s personal credit cards to make payments for her own personal expenses.  (Pa321-324, 7/6/22 [...] Dep. 120:12; 123:16-19).  She confirmed her deposition testimony at trial.  3T146:11.  Defendant admitted that [...] paid for these charges she made for her personal expenses on Plaintiff’s credit cards, and that she never reimbursed the company.  (Pa325, 7/6/22 [...] Dep. 124:11-21).  Defendant also confirmed this with her trial testimony and admitted to making payments to herself, her daughter (3T94:11-13), her husband (3T95:19 to 3T97:5), and friends from [...]’s bank account that were not for legitimate business expenses.  3T133:7-13.  (Pa442, 445, 462-63).  **Defendant’s Unauthorized Loans to Friends**
[brief] Endangering an injured victim is codified at N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1.2, which reads as follows:  (a.)  A person is guilty of endangering an injured victim if he causes bodily injury to any person or solicits, aids, encourages, or attempts or agrees to aid another, who causes bodily injury to any person, and leaves the scene of the injury knowing or reasonably believing that the injured person is physically helpless, mentally incapacitated or otherwise unable to care for himself.  (b.)  As used in this section, the following definitions shall apply:  (1)  “Physically helpless” means the condition in which a person is unconscious, unable to flee, or physically unable to summon assistance; … (2)  “Bodily injury” shall have the meaning set forth in N.J.S. 2C:11-1.  N.J.S.A. 2C:11-1 defines bodily injury as “physical pain, illness or any impairment of physical condition. ”
[brief] [...], a [...] ("Township") elected official since 2003 and an attorney, was eligible to enroll in the Public Employees' Retirement System ("PERS") before the law was changed in 2007 to render him ineligible to enroll in PERS.  In re Evans Public Employees' Retirement System Enrollment Eligibility, 2018 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1767 (App. Div. 2018), Pa122 to Pa125.  [...] had a window between 2003 and 2007 to enroll in PERS, but there was no dispute that he failed to do so.  He claimed that he asked a Township payroll clerk ([...]) to enroll him, but she failed to do so.  Pa123 to Pa124.  His application to enroll in PERS was submitted twice electronically by the Township in 2009, but was rejected each time as untimely (due to legislation enacted in 2007 that rendered him ineligible to enroll in PERS).  Pa123.  In 2013, four years after his enrollment applications were rejected in 2009, [...] wrote a letter to the Board of Trustees of PERS detailing how the Township payroll clerk that he had asked to enroll him in PERS had failed to do so and arguing that the Board should retroactively enroll him in PERS.  Pa123 to Pa124.  The Board determined that [...] was ineligible and rejected his request to enroll him in PERS retroactively.  Pa124.  [...] appealed the Board's decision and requested a hearing before the Office of Administrative Law ("OAL").  The Board denied the appeal and refused to permit [...] an administrative hearing on the ground that the appeal was solely a question of law.  On appeal to the Appellate Division, [...] argued that he should be enrolled in PERS retroactively under N.J.S.A. 43:15A-54, the Correction of Errors Statute.  [...]' argument in the Appellate Division was that the Board had failed to consider his contention that the failure of the Township payroll clerk to enroll him in PERS was an error that should be corrected retroactively by the Board under N.J.S.A. 43:15A-54.  Given that the equities were strongly in favor of [...], the Appellate Division reversed the Board's decision and remanded the case to the Board "to fully consider" [...]' contention that the Township payroll clerk’s error should be corrected under N.J.S.A. 43:15A-54 and whether [...] should be enrolled in PERS retroactively.
[brief] The Plaintiff argues that -- the Plaintiff argues in its moving papers that the claims are not barred by the Statute of Limitations because, um, they’re malicious prosecution claims arising from transgressions occurring during the criminal proceeding, that they’re therefore malicious prosecution claims.  And he points to two very old cases, Cabakov v. Thatcher, 27 New Jersey Super 404, at 409, Appellate Division 1953, and Earl versus Winne, 14 New Jersey 119, at 132, 1953, for the proposition that there’s a six-year Statute of Limitations.  That's clearly not correct given the clear findings of N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2.  At oral argument the Plaintiff abandoned that argument and advanced the continuing violation theory, continuing tort theory, pointing to the fact that the actions of the State with regard to the Amended Judgment of Conviction were a continuing effort to maliciously prosecute the Plaintiff.  The Court disagrees.  That’s a separate and distinct event.  And I agree with Defendants that all the counts except for the libel and slander counts, only as they relate to the Judgment of Conviction, are barred by the Statute of Limitations.
[directive] 3.1.0  Whenever an arrestee is taken into custody, and is accompanied by a child or other person dependent upon the arrestee for care, sustenance or supervision, the following procedures are to be followed.  3.1.1  If another appropriate adult is present with the arrestee, the arrestee will be permitted to place the dependent child or dependent person in the care of that adult.  3.1.2  If another appropriate adult is not present or refuses custody of the dependent person, the dependent person will be transported to police headquarters.  The dependent person may be transported with the arrestee or in a separate vehicle as required by the circumstances.  Transportation of the dependent person will be conducted in accordance with department policy concerning the transportation of non-police personnel in department vehicles.  3.1.3  The arrestee shall be permitted a reasonable opportunity to make arrangements by telephone for alternate care for the dependent.  When contact cannot be made by telephone, an officer from this or the appropriate police department shall be assigned to make the necessary notifications.  3.1.4  If the arrestee is unable to arrange for the alternate care for the dependents, the shift supervisor or arresting officer shall notify the appropriate municipal, county or state agency of the arrest and need for alternate care.  The arrestee is to be informed as to the agency taking charge of his or her dependents.  3.1.5  When the arrestee has dependents requiring their care, a record is to be made indicating the arrangements made for the care of those dependents.  The record shall contain, at a minimum, the person or agency taking charge of the dependent, the name of the agency's representative and a phone number, and information as to how the arrestee can regain custody of the dependent child or person when released from custody.  3.1.6  The shift supervisor or arresting officer shall contact the appropriate judge as soon as possible for the setting of bail.  If the arrestee has dependents requiring the arrestee's care, the judge is to be informed of this and of the arrangements made for the temporary care of those dependents.  3.2.0  Whenever a person is arrested or taken into custody and is likely to be detained more than two hours, that person shall be questioned as to whether or not any child or other person is dependent solely upon the arrestee for care, sustenance or supervision.
[brief] As [...] acknowledges, the Entire Controversy Doctrine is intended "to promote fairness and judicial economy and efficiency."  (Db26).  Certainly, it would be manifestly unfair to apply the Entire Controversy Doctrine to this case, as the Doctrine, as a matter of law, does not serve as a bar to claims that were dismissed without prejudice.  Accordingly, this Court should reverse the decision of the Trial Court below, find the Entire Controversy Doctrine inapplicable, and reinstate Plaintiffs' Complaint in its entirety.  POINT III
[brief] [...], Individually, as Administratrix and Administratrix ad Prosequendum for the [...], Plaintiffs, v. [...], [...], JANE DOE NURSES 1-10, JANE ROE TECHNICIANS, CNAS AND PARAMEDIC EMPLOYEES 1-10, RICHARD ROES 1-10, JOHN DOE PHYSICIANS 1-10, ABC CORPORATIONS 1-10, ABC PARTNERSHIPS 1-10 (the aforesaid names being fictitious and their true names being unknown), Defendants.
[brief] POINT I  ALL CHARGES LEVIED AGAINST [...] MUST BE DISMISSED DUE TO HT’S BLATANT VIOLATIONS OF THE 45-DAY RULE.  (Pa218-Pa249; Pa288-Pa242).  POINT II  ALL CHARGES LEVIED BY HT AGAINST [...] SHOULD BE DISMISSED SOLELY ON THE EGREGIOUS VIOLATIONS OF THE NEW JERSEY ATTORNEY GENERAL GUIDELINES CONCERNING IA INVESTIGATIONS.  (Pa218-Pa249; Pa288-Pa242).  POINT III  THE RECORD DOES NOT SUPPORT THAT [...] WAS UNTRUTHFUL.  (Pa218-Pa249; Pa288-Pa242).  POINT IV  HT POLICE DEPARTMENT’S RULES AND REGULATIONS DID NOT SPELL OUT HOW TO CONDUCT PROPERTY CHECKS WITH ANY DEGREE OF SPECIFICITY.  (Pa218-Pa249; Pa288-Pa242).  POINT V  HT FAILED TO MEET ITS BURDEN OF PROOF IN THIS MATTER.  (Pa218-Pa249; Pa288-Pa242).  POINT VI  THE NOTION OF PROGRESSIVE DISCIPLINE IS NOT SERVED BY IMPOSING REMOVAL UPON [...].  (Pa218-Pa249; Pa288-Pa242).  . . . 45  CONCLUSION
[brief] Germane to the Propriety of the Court’s Sentence  On August 24, 2021, sentencing was held before [...].  (6T).  Given the defendant’s prior conviction for an aggravated assault involving the use of a firearm, the State moved for the imposition of an extended term.  (6T4-12 to 7-20).  The Court granted this motion.  (6T33-2).  The State also moved for the imposition of a consecutive sentence.  (6T7-7 to 8-16).  The Court denied this motion, finding such a sentence to be “unnecessarily harsh. ” (6T35-24 to 25-9).  During the Court’s sentence, [...] found aggravating factors 3, 6, and 9, and mitigating factor 14.
[brief] Before advancing to the merits, this Court should address, at the threshold level, whether the court or an arbitrator decides whether an enforceable arbitration provision exists.  Applicable law holds that a court of law, as an initial matter, makes the decision over whether the parties have assented to an enforceable arbitration clause.  Section 4 of the FAA mandates a court be satisfied that an arbitration agreement exists before compelling arbitration.  9 U.S.C. § 4 provides:  “[U]pon being satisfied that the making of the agreement for arbitration ... is not in issue, the court shall make an order directing the parties to proceed to arbitration in accordance with the terms of the agreement. ”  New Jersey’s arbitration act provides for the same: “The court shall decide whether an agreement to arbitrate exists or a controversy is subject to an agreement to arbitrate.
[brief] The Trial Court Erred by Not Ruling on Mootness Grounds on Plaintiff’s Preliminary Disqualifying Conflict of Interest Cross-Motion.  (Pa88, Pa89, IT).  On April 27, 2023, the trial court avoided ruling on plaintiff’s preliminary conflict of interest representation cross-motion on the grounds of mootness.  See, Greenfield v. NJ Dept. of Corr., 382 N.J. Super. 254, 257-258 (App. Div. 2006) (issue is moot when court’s decision can have no practical effect on existing controversy).  But on April 27, 2023, the trial court failed to consider whether plaintiff’s cross-motion raised questions of public importance or likelihood of recurrence or both.  Joye v. Hunterdon Cent. High Sch., 176 N.J. 568, 583 (2003).  The State related defendants acknowledged the significance of plaintiff’s disqualifying conflict of interest allegations.  Although they signed joint pleadings, two distinct DAGs represented the different and sometimes conflicting interests of the [...] and the [...].  On the other hand, the same attorneys represented the interests of the executive and legislative branches of municipal and county governments in this hybrid prerogative writ/declaratory judgment/civil rights act violations action.  This dual representation highlighted the inherent conflict of interest when plaintiff alleges that the local legislative branches failed to exercise their sworn legislative oversight check and balance duties and to ensure that the local executive branches complied with the law: ie. adequately reporting all outstanding long term tax exemption receipts and statutory disbursements to the county.  Under the Rules of Professional Responsibility, a public entity lacks the authority to waive this conflict of interest.  Separate counsel was required for each branch of local government.  R.P.C. 1.8 (k) & (l).  Also see, The Four Felds, Inc. v. The City of Orange Township, A-5875-13T3 (App. Div. May 23, 2018) cert denied ___N.J. ___(2008) (“Feld X”) (Pa347)(holding the same law firm could not simultaneously represent a municipality and the redeveloper in the same affordable housing transaction).  Upon reversal and remand, plaintiff’s preliminary disqualifying conflict of interest cross-motion must be restored to the active trial court docket.  VIII.