ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Kanuszewski v. Michigan Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., 927 F.3d 396 (6th Cir. 2019)  .................................................................................................  9  Kelson v. City of Springfield, 767 F.2d 651 (9th Cir. 1985) ...............................................................................................  18 Koe v. Noggle, No. 1:23-CV-2904-SEG, 2023 WL 5339281 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 20, 2023)  .....................  10 Lamb v. Norwood, 899 F.3d 1159 (10th Cir. 2018)  ............................................................................................  10 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003)  ..............................................................................................................  24 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, (1967)  .................................................................................................................. 24  Mahanoy Area Sch. Dist. v. B.L, 141 S. Ct. 2038 (2021)  ..........................................................................................................  17, 18 Mann v. Cnty. of San Diego, 907 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 2018)  .................................................................9  Mario V. v. Armenta, No. 18-CV-00041-BLF, 2021 WL 1907790 (N.D. Cal. May 12, 2021)  .............................................15  McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010)  ..................................................................................24  Mirabelli v. Olson, No. 323CV00768BENWVG, 2023 WL 5976992 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 14, 2023)....17, 26, 31
[brief] Defendants, [...], [...], and [...], argue that there has to be a separate guarantee agreement or even a separate page or paragraph of the Lease that --- \(^1\)  Defendant, Gary [...], joins in all of [...] and [...]’s arguments.  \(^2\)  The signature lines for [...] and [...] do not include the term “LLC” as mistakenly stated in their Brief.  KVDb16.  See Pa70. further speaks to the alleged personal guarantee.  However, nothing in the case law requires a guarantor’s signature to be on a separate line.  Defendants also argue that since there is no guarantee language under the paragraph 9 Lease heading “Insurance and Guarantees” there is no guarantee language.  However, this ignores Paragraph 18 of the Lease which states: “Any heading preceding the text of the several paragraphs hereof are inserted solely for the convenience of reference and shall not constitute a part of the lease nor shall they affect its meaning, construction and effect”.
[brief] Bergen Pines Hosp. v. Dept. of Human Serv., 96 N.J. 456, 477 (1984).  In other words, courts accord considerable weight to the interpretation of a statute by the agency responsible for enforcing the statute.  See In re Stemark Associates, 247 N.J. Super. 13, 18 (App. Div. 1991) (citing Mayflower Securities v. Bureau of Securities, 64 N.J. 85, 93 (1973)).  This is particularly true when the issue under review is directed to the agency’s special “expertise and superior knowledge of a particular field. ”  In re Herrmann, 192 N.J. 19, 28 (2007); see also In the Matter of Freshwater Wetlands Protection Act Rules, 180 N.J. 415, 431-32 (2004) (stating that [...]’s interpretation was justified by the “fundamental maxim that the opinion as to the construction of a regulatory statute of the expert administrative agency charged with enforcement of that statute is entitled to great weight. ”); see also TAC Associates v. New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection, 202 N.J. 533, 541 (2010) (stating that “interpretations of the statute and cognate enactments by agencies empowered to enforce them are given substantial deference in the context of statutory interpretation. ”).  This is because the agency has the “staff, resources and expertise to understand and solve those specialized problems. ”  Bergen Pines Hosp., 96 N.J. at 474.  It should be noted, however, that courts also recognize that, as a general matter, exemptions from statutes are strictly construed.
[brief] N.J.S.A. 10:5-12(d).........................................................................................34, 35  N.J.S.A. 10:5-12(f)(1)....................................................................................44  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS & RULINGS  Trial Court’s Order and Opinion on Defendants’ Motions to Reconsider…………Pa1199  I.  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT  The dismissal of this case was a complete miscarriage of justice, leaving an undisputed victim of sexual harassment without a remedy under the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination ("NJLAD"), N.J.S.A. 10:5-1, et seq.
[brief] First, plaintiffs could never expect that the definitional exclusion (“[o]wned by or furnished or available for the regular use of you or any family member”) would have any bearing on the UIM coverages they purchased.  That definitional exclusion could never affect plaintiffs’ rights as it relates to [...]’s UIM coverage obligations.  Why?  Because all of plaintiffs’ vehicles were insured by [...] under a policy providing $500,000/$1,000,000 in liability coverage.  In other words, plaintiffs, de facto, could never claim UM/UIM benefits against the [...] policy when one of their vehicles was the tortfeasor vehicle in the accident because that vehicle would necessarily have liability limits equal to or great than the UM/UIM limits under [...]’s policy – meaning that the vehicle could never be underinsured regardless of the definitional exclusion.
[brief] [...] similarly conducted a comprehensive review of the discovery exchanged by the parties in this litigation.  With respect to [...], [...] opined that “it was the Resident Engineer and his construction inspection team’s responsibility to ensure that the work was being performed in accordance with the drawings and specifications” (Pa2413).  He therefore concluded, “that the work being performed by [...]’s Resident Engineer was deemed to be engineering services as set forth by the N.J.A.C. ”  Id.  At his deposition, [...] explained that the inspection services required for a roadway resurfacing project included: (1) ensuring that the proper asphalt material was used; (2) confirming the asphalt was laid to a specific height; (3) reviewing the asphalt compaction; (4) ensuring that the asphalt was compacted within a certain amount of time after being removed from the truck; ensuring that the asphalt was maintained at the proper temperature (Pa2494 at T37-12 to T39-3).  Administrative services for cost control, progress control and quality control were also part of [...]’s responsibilities under the contract.  Id. at T35:18-36:1, 21-24.  He again opined that the performance of these types of services require engineering education, training or experience (Pa2500 at T58:24-59:6).  6.  [...], P.E.
[directive] The 2C:25-21(a).  N.J.S.A. at Act Violence to transported police the arrested, been has defendant the after occurs generally Directive under this 4.10 and 4.9 Cf. Sections system.  Scan using Live the fingerprinted processing, and for station Nothing made).  is custodial arrest a before issued complaints and indictments "direct" (dealing with a issue to police require, much less authorize, to construed be shall therefore, Directive, in this defendant fingerprinting the and arresting of lieu in violence cases domestic in complaint-summons system.
[brief] See [...] Mem. at 23-24 (Pa565-566).  This argument is unavailing.  First, [...] and Plaintiff had a longstanding and well-established course of dealing with one another, such that Plaintiff had every reason to believe that [...] would deal honestly and forthrightly with Plaintiff.  (Pa152-157).  Second, because [...] was a party to the PSA, Plaintiff was reasonable in assuming that [...] knew that Plaintiff had a right to insist upon specific performance, in addition to its right to demand return of the Earnest Money Deposit.  Plaintiff had no reason to suspect that [...] would aid and abet [...] in covertly closing the deal without Plaintiff, in derogation of Plaintiff’s right to demand specific performance – let alone that [...] would actively participate in the breach by failing to deal forthrightly with Plaintiff.  Third, [...] should not be permitted to escape from its own misrepresentations and deception by arguing that it was unreasonable for Plaintiff to rely upon them.  [...] certainly knew that Plaintiff was inquiring about a matter of great significance, and that Plaintiff would expect a truthful answer and rely upon it.  Fourth, and in any event, questions of reasonable reliance are inherently fact-based – and this is not a matter that should have been decided in the context of a pre-answer motion to dismiss.  The trial court did not address these arguments – presumably because it concluded (erroneously) that, after the return of the Deposit, [...] had no further duty to Plaintiff.  (Pa651-652; 4T).  POINT VIII
[brief] 106 Lawrence was owned by [...].  1T22:10-17.  The contract, P6, was for $50,000.00, 1T23:6.  The first payment, $16,666.66, was paid, 1T24:5-8, but maybe $5,000.00 worth of light demolition work was performed.  1T24:20 to 25:12.  [...] asked for more money and another $16,666.67 was paid on his promise to complete.  1T25:13–25.  He never showed up.  1T26:8–22.  In response, [...] stated only that “that did not make sense,” 1T57:12, but was unable to provide any specifics.  Once again, he provided not even one specific fact nor document concerning this project, nor did he claim that he did the $50,000.00 worth of work or was owed the $16,666.67 balance if he had.  **[...]**
[brief] THE TRIAL JUDGE ERRED IN FAILING TO ASCERTAIN IT HAD JURISDICTION TO FIX THE AMOUNT LANDLORD OWED TENANT FOR REIMBURSEMENT OF TENANT’S ALLOWANCE AS AN ELEMENT OF TENANT’S DEFENSE TO LIABILITY  (Da3)  The trial court had jurisdiction to entertain Tenant’s primary defense to liability and in failing to recognize it had that jurisdiction, the trial judge unjustifiably nullified the defense.  Therefore, the November 9, 2023 order must be vacated entirely and this Court should remand for reconsideration.
[directive] The form in Appendix I shall only be used for administrative, non-criminal investigations.  8.4.5  If the subject officer refuses to answer questions during this interview, the interviewer should inquire about the reason for that refusal.  If the officer states that he refuses to answer any questions on the grounds that he may incriminate himself in a criminal matter, even though the investigators do not perceive a criminal violation, the agency should discontinue the interview and contact the County Prosecutor.
[brief] No Proprietary/Contractual Relationship Exists Between [...] and the [...].  [...]’s entire Complaint is premised on the notion that the [...], in providing potable water service to its residents, acts in a proprietary/commercial capacity by “selling” water to residents, thus creating a commercial/contractual relationship between the [...] and each resident.  Pb20-26.  That premise is wrong.  The [...] supplies water to its residents not as a commercial enterprise, but as a governmental function.  Pa166 at ¶ 7.  Thus, [...] correctly ruled that, as a matter of law, no commercial/contractual relationship exists between [...] and [...] so as to support the claims alleged in [...]’s Complaint.  1.
[brief] The Trial Court erred by instead treating Appellant’s complaint as a challenge to the zoning board’s grant of variance and denied admission of the Appellant’s evidence on the grounds that it was not relevant to the zoning board’s decision to grant variance relief to [...].  However the Appellant’s complaint had nothing to do with the rationale or deliberations that lead to the granting of variances.  Rather, Appellant alleged a violation of binding conditions of the zoning resolution in question by [...].  Put another way, the Trial Court erred both in its interpretation of the grounds for Appellant’s complaint and its interpretation of the resolution granting variance relief.
[brief] COUNTERSTATEMENT OF FACTS  For the purposes of this appeal, the State relies upon the summary of the relevant facts as set forth in the order denying the initial PCR appeal.  In defendant’s PCR, she alleged trial counsel was ineffective for failing to fully advise defendant of her defenses and that she would have rejected her plea had she been fully informed.  In denying the PCR petition, the PCR court found defendant failed to establish a prima facie claim of ineffective assistance.  The PCR court found that because defendant failed to establish a prima facie claim of ineffective assistance, she was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing.  Defendant then appealed the denial of the PCR and argued that she had established a prima facie case of ineffective assistance and was entitled to an evidentiary hearing.  That appeal was denied as the court found that defendant failed to establish that trial counsel was ineffective under either prong of the Strickland test.  LEGAL ARGUMENT
[brief] *State v. Johnson*, 42 N.J. 146, 162 (1964).  [...]’s finding that [...]’s testimony was not credible was not based on the trial court’s “observation of the character and demeanor” of the witness, nor was it based on “common human experiences that are not transmitted by the record. ”  See *Locurto*, 157 N.J. at 474.  Oppositely, [...] affirmatively held that, based on her ability to observe his testimony live in the courtroom, [...] testified “without hesitation” and that “his demeanor was seemingly calm and controlled. ”  2T42:18-20.  Rather than base her adverse credibility finding on the witness’s in-court testimony, [...] found [...]’s testimony not credible after determining that it was not consistent with what she believed she observed on the surveillance video.  2T42:20-22.  Thus, [...]’s credibility findings were based on her determination that [...] could not have made eye contact with Defendant, ordered Defendant to stop, observed Defendant speed up, and observed Defendant’s fanny pack swaying, all within two seconds.  Courts have long acknowledged that police officers are often called upon to make split second decisions in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving, to protect their safety and the safety of their communities.  See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396-97 (1989).  The four events described by [...] are not events that must necessarily occur back-to-back.
[brief] Prior to trial, the court granted the State's application to dismiss count three.  In January 2019, defendant was tried before a jury on the remaining counts over the course of five non-consecutive days.  At trial, both [...] and [...] identified defendant as the man who had committed the Wawa robbery.  [...] also testified regarding how she identified defendant from the photo array that was administered on the morning after the robbery.  We deem it significant to highlight that defendant does not have blue eyes, as [...] had initially told police.  Rather, he has brown eyes.  The State presented no witnesses who could identify defendant as the person who committed the Valero robbery.  During its deliberations, the jury asked to see the video surveillance recordings from both robberies.  The jury also asked to hear a playback of [...]'s testimony.  The jury ultimately convicted defendant of all remaining charges.  The sentencing hearing was conducted on April 17, 2019.  On count one, first-degree robbery at the Wawa, defendant was sentenced pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.1 to a mandatory term of life imprisonment without parole.
[brief] In [...] v. [...], 791 F.2d 22, 25 (2d. Cir. 1986), the Second Circuit reversed confirmation of an award because the arbitrator had not been appointed according to the parties’ agreement.  It held:  Under Article XX of the Avis Agreement, the Union and Avis agreed to binding arbitration only by a person selected under [...] rules.  Courts generally enforce such clauses strictly, vacating awards entered by arbitrators whose qualifications or method of appointment fail to conform to arbitration clauses.  See [...] v. [...], 260 F.2d 835 (8th Cir. 1958) (arbitration Panel composed of one agency-appointed and one union-appointed member, when contract called for jointly-appointed Panel of three).
[brief] New Jersey's natural gas use declines to less than one-fifth of today's levels by 2050, likely reducing the need for gas distribution system expansion.  [Ha453, Holm-18 at 17, emphasis added.]  There is an even more pointed admonition in the EMP's detailed discussion of strategies:  Strategy 4:  Reduce Energy Consumption and Emissions from the Building Sector  Seventy-five percent of residences in New Jersey are heated with natural gas; another 10% use oil or propane.  Much of the infrastructure, technology, and assets used to power the building sector have decades-long life spans.  Therefore, continuing to expand the gas distribution system and rely on fossil-fuel heating for new construction and replacement of aging heating systems will lock in decades of continued emissions and risk financing what will become stranded assets.  Delaying the transition might pose a missed opportunity to replace existing equipment with more efficient electric options.  Further, the Integrated Energy Plan (IEP) modeling shows that a delay in building electrification will result in higher economic costs and limited flexibility to further reduce New Jersey's emissions or compensate for other sections that decarbonize more slowly than planned.  [Ha458, Holm-18 at 157, emphasis added; footnotes omitted.]  The State’s climate laws and policies demonstrate that the proposed regulator is not reasonably necessary for the service of the public.
[brief] But the Court in Paff v. Galloway Township did not address the question of whether a subject matter is necessary in a request for records.  In fact, it did not address a request for emails at all.  Nor did the Court alter Burke’s requirement that requests for records articulate a discrete and limited subject matter.  In short, by drawing a line where none exists, the trial court and [...] seek to expand OPRA well beyond the bounds set by the Legislature and confirmed by the courts.  [...] does not seek to shield all forms of government records, keeping them hidden from the public’s view.  But the public’s right to view is not absolute.  For good reason, the plain text of OPRA and this court’s well-developed case law strike a careful balance between access to public records and ensuring a custodian’s ability to identify and respond to specific requests.  Allowing a requestor to ask for all of an agency’s files, or all of an employee’s emails, without identifying any subject matter, will chill communications and grind agency operations to a halt.  In the first instance, agencies will be forced to divert limited resources and manpower to review and redact thousands of pages of documents.  More chillingly, if government employees or agencies are aware that every keystroke they make is in a fishbowl, they will undoubtedly hesitate to engage in precisely the type of communication and free-flow of ideas that this court has always reaffirmed is necessary for agencies to reach decisions that are in the public’s interest.  This is not what the Legislature intended when it enacted OPRA, nor what this court has ever condoned.  For all of these reasons, and because the trial court and [...] seek to bend OPRA well past the point of breaking by advancing a test that has no basis in law or precedent, this court should reverse the trial court’s decision and uphold [...]’s denial of [...]’s request.
[brief] Surgery was needed to repair a torn rotator cuff.  In holding that plaintiff’s injuries satisfied the required standard, the Court noted the evidence provided by plaintiff which supported her assertion that she sustained a substantial loss of bodily function included: (i) it took longer for plaintiff to perform her normal responsibilities as a secretary; (ii) plaintiff, who was left hand dominant, had to compensate for the weakness and loss of mobility in her injured arm by using her right arm more, which often caused her (uninjured) right shoulder to swell; (iii) she especially experienced great difficulty when performing normal household tasks, requiring her husband’s or her children’s help to clean, vacuum or move furniture; and (iv) she had difficulty driving.  The Court held that these injuries vaulted the TCA threshold.  Ultimately, the lower court agreed that the threshold was met, “that they have satisfied the subjective test for the injuries sustained in this accident.  It is a close call.  However, there are genuine issues of material fact. ”  (1T12:10-13)  In further support, the trial court found that Plaintiff “suffered two herniations via MRI and three disk bulges on her cervical spine and two herniations and two bulges on her lumbar spine when she fell on the bus when it stopped.
[brief] [...], [...], [...], and [...] ("Card Brands") typically evaluate interchange rates, dues, and assessments twice per year and make changes in April and October.  As you have probably seen, [...] and the other Card Brands have announced that they will implement the most significant changes to the interchange structure in over a decade starting in April.  In an effort to simplify this overhaul and the growing number of Card Brand interchange rates, we will be bundling various categories of existing and new interchange rates.  You will be charged for sales in accordance with these simplified categories effective April 1, 2020.
[brief] Prior to the Accident occurring, [...] had just dropped off a load of asphalt for construction work on the Parkway, and had picked up used asphalt millings, which were to be deposited at a facility to the south of his location.  Da282-283.  As such, [...] utilized a paved cut-through on the Parkway near milepost 87.5 (Da283-284) and in doing so, bypassed other “grassy” (i.e., unpaved) cut-throughs, which he had believed were not to be used.  Da283.  Upon using the paved cut-through, and thereafter pulling his truck into the Southbound lanes of the Parkway, the Accident occurred when [...]’ truck was struck from behind by the vehicle being operated by the Decedent.  Da284.
[brief] The SFRA was never intended to impose a “cookie cutter” approach to district budgeting decisions.  The components of the adequacy budget itself were based on a “series of hypothetical school scenarios” not intended to represent “specific resources or programs” that should be applied in all schools.  (Aa107; Aa1104).  Precisely because the adequacy budget is not a strict measure of what it costs to provide T&E in each district, local districts are not required to meet their LFS.  N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-5(b).
[brief] Instead, the trial court incorrectly presupposed a subjective intent to injure and adopted the following standard in Harleysville (2001) at 232:  [W]hen a coverage exclusion is expressed in terms of bodily injury expected or intended by the insured, and where the intentional act does not have an inherent probability of causing the degree of injury actually inflicted, a factual inquiry into actual intent of the actor to cause that injury is necessary.  The trial court found that [...]’ conduct of “screaming, cursing, assuming threatening postures, [and] refusing to leave a private office when asked” did precipitate reactions in the underlying Plaintiffs of such behavior that were indeed inherently probable consequences of [...]’ action.  However, the trial court did not explain its rationale.  Furthermore, the trial court completely ignored the “many other examples cited”; as noted by comparing Defendant [...] (Pa386) versus the trial court’s findings (Pa396) which is glaringly missing the “many other examples cited. ”