[brief] The starting point in awarding attorneys' fees is the determination of the "lodestar," which equals the "number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate."  Rendine v. Pantzer, supra, 141 N.J. 292, 335 (1995); see R. 4:42-9(b) (stating that application for counsel fees shall be supported by affidavit addressing pertinent factors, including those in RPC 1.5(a), and shall include amount of fees and disbursements sought).  Rule of Professional Conduct 1.5(a) commands that "[a] lawyer's fee shall be reasonable" in all cases, not just fee-shifting cases.  RPC 1.5(a) catalogues the "factors to be considered in determining the reasonableness of a fee," which include the following: (1) the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly; (2) the likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of the particular employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer; (3) the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services; (4) the amount involved and the results obtained; (5) the time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances; (6) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client; (7) the experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the services; (8) whether the fee is fixed or contingent.  Those factors must inform the calculation of the reasonableness of a fee award in this and every case.  Furst v. Einstein Moonjy, Inc. 182 N.J. 1, 36 (2004).  In setting the lodestar, a trial court must determine the reasonableness of the rates proposed by prevailing counsel in support of the fee application.  *Rendine*, supra, 141 N.J. at 335.  In that regard, the court should evaluate the rate of the prevailing attorney in comparison to rates "'for similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, experience, and reputation'" in the community.  *Id.* at 337 (quoting *Rode v. Dellarciprete*, 892 F.2d 1177, 1183 (3d Cir.1990)).  In addition, the court must determine whether the time expended in pursuit of the "interests to be vindicated," the "underlying statutory objectives," and recoverable damages is equivalent to the time "competent counsel reasonably would have expended to achieve a comparable result.  . . ."  *Id.* at 336.  The court must not include excessive and unnecessary hours spent on the case in calculating the lodestar.  *Id.* at 335-36 (noting that it is not "'time actually expended'" but time "'reasonably expended'" that matters and that "[h]ours that are not properly billed to one's client also are not properly billed to one's adversary") (quoting *Copeland v. Marshall*, 205 U.S. App. D.C. 390, 641 F.2d 880, 891 (D.C.Cir.1980).  Whether the hours the prevailing attorney devoted to any part of a case are excessive ultimately requires consideration of what is reasonable under the circumstances.  Here, Defendant’s Fee Application contains $7,181.00 in fees and costs for time entries that are too vague or indiscernible to be allowed.  In addition, the time records Defendant’s counsel submitted contain block billing entries which render it impossible to determine how much time was billed for any particular task contained in the block entries and preclude a meaningful assessment of the reasonableness of the time Defendant’s counsel purportedly devoted to this matter.  Therefore, the trial court should have denied or at least reduced Defendant’s Fee Application because the award sought is excessive and unsupported by a certification addressing the pertinent factors set forth in R.P.C. 1.5(a).  CONCLUSION