ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Even if the Appellate Court sought fit to revisit the Appellant’s “exhaustion of administrative remedies argument,” Appellant does not meet the standard for such requirement.  Initially, it will leave the Respondent without a remedy in violation of the Marioni factors.  “Admittedly, the exhaustion requirement will be waived where "the interest of justice so requires."  Ward v. Keenan, supra, 3 N.J. at 308; Waldor v. Untermann, 10 N.J. Super. 188 (App. Div. 1950).  This has been held to mean that exhaustion of remedies will not be required where administrative review will be futile, where there is a need for prompt decision in the public interest, where the issues do not involve administrative expertise or discretion and only a question of law is involved and where irreparable harm will otherwise result from denial of immediate judicial relief.  See generally, Pressler, Current New Jersey Court Rules, Comment R. 4:69-5, at 748-49 (1975). ”  Brunetti v. New Milford, 68 N.J. 576, 589.  Here, exhaustion of the administrative appeal on the eligibility issue would have been futile, as the offending language of the Separation Agreement would have prevented eligibility in the administrative forum.  Appellant was required under Par. 18 to sever any unenforceable, illegal, or ineffective terms – the [...] made this determination (Da81) (Da24-Da25).  If Appellant had complied, then Respondent’s case would have resolved to his favor long ago.  Now, the only bar from the [...] reaching a vote on the IOD application is the within appeal (Pa-Pa6).  There was no requirement to exhaust administrative remedies when the parties identified, in the Agreement at Par. 15, that the Superior Court was the venue to resolve Agreement disputes.  Accordingly, Appellant’s argument on Respondent’s requirement to exhaust all administrative remedies is not applicable, the Court’s July 25, 2023 Order is sound, and the Appellant’s appeal should be dismissed.
[brief] There was consequently no *in personam* jurisdiction against the defendant and the judgment is absolutely void and of no legal effect for any purpose, whatever we may --- \(^1\)  “[A]s we view the issue, the question is not whether the final judgment is void ab initio but rather whether a void interlocutory order, as a matter of federal bankruptcy law, automatically vitiates the final judgment as well.  We conclude that it does not.
[brief] Indeed, reading "routine" to modify only "maintenance and operations" is much closer to an "absurd" interpretation of the statute.  Of all the activities on the list, "maintenance and operations" most clearly implies "routine" activity, resulting in use of the modifier adding nothing to its meaning.  See Long, 199 F.2d at 719.  In interpreting a statute, we, of course, "endeavor to give meaning to all words and to avoid an interpretation that reduces specific language to mere surplusage."  [...] v. [...], 182 N.J. 296, 307 (2005).  "distortion . . . result."
[brief] Investigation into Defendant [...]’s Conduct is Derailed By Defendant [...] Escalating An Issue That Leads to Plaintiff’s Termination.  [...] reported the June 2020 incident to [...], the Chief People Officer, and Defendant [...], Defendant [...]’s Director of Labor Relations, complaining about Defendant [...]’s actions.  (Pa659).  He believed that Defendant [...]’s conduct violated both [...]’s policies and the law, citing her behavior as constituting harassment.  (Pa660).  [...] also reported the incident to [...].  (Pa245).  Defendant [...] was assigned to investigate the matter.  (Pa89, Pa100).  Defendant [...] told [...] that she would need to get Defendant [...]’s statement, speak to other witnesses look at the facts involved, and then alert Defendant [...]’s boss who would make a decision as to discipline or coaching for Defendant [...].  (Pa101).  Defendant [...] informed Defendant [...] that there was going to be an investigation of her conduct.  (Pa667).  Defendant [...] responded by saying: “what now. ”  (Pa101).  On September 1, 2020, Defendant [...] sent an email to Defendant [...], initiating an investigation into Plaintiff, [...], and [...], for unauthorized receipt of what Defendants refer to as “charge pay. ”  (Pa661).  Charge pay is an additional dollar per hour on top of a given hourly rate for a given shift, which was payable to the “charge nurse” on a particular nursing unit.  (Pa43).  Charge pay could be given to non-nurse employees with approval from Defendant’s upper management.  (Pa43).  Verbal approval was sufficient to enter charge pay.  (Pa661).  In the Spring of 2020, at the height of the pandemic, Defendant [...] offered certain staff members COVID-19 incentive pay.  (Pa42).  The staffing coordinators, however, were deemed to be ineligible for this incentive pay because they were not “direct patient care staff. ” (Pa42).  [...] requested that the staffing coordinators receive the COVID incentives, but it was denied by management.  (Pa360.)  Defendant [...] told [...] that the staffing coordinators could receive charge pay as long as it did not lead to negative consequences for her.  (Pa661).  Following Defendant [...]’s approval, Plaintiff, [...], and [...] received charge pay for certain shifts during the Summer of 2020.  (Pa45 – Pa46).  In initiating the investigation into charge pay, Defendant [...] essentially derailed any investigation into her harassment.
[brief] Final Judgment and Statement of Reasons of Hon. [...], J.S.C., Filed May 8, 2023.......................Pa8 Order Denying Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration and Request to Restore Control of GNS Email of the Honorable [...], J.S.C., Filed June 26, 2023........Pa66 Order Denying Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsiderations and Statement of Reasons Under R. 1:6-2(f) of Hon. [...], P.J.Cv., Filed August 30, 2023.......Pa87 | Cases | Page(s) | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|---------| | **539 Absecon Boulevard, L.L.C. v. Shan Enterprises Ltd. Partnership,** | | | 406 N.J. Super. 242 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 199 N.J. 541 (2009) | 28 | | **Baker v. Nat'l State Bank,** | | | 161 N.J. 220 (1999) | 31 | | **Balducci v. Cige,** | | | 240 N.J. 574 (2020) | 15 | | **Boland v. Dolan,** | | | 140 N.J. 174 (1995) | 40 | | **Borodinsky v. Borodinsky,** | | | 162 N.J.Super. 437 (1978) | 37, 38, 39 | | **Bowen v. Bowen,** | | | 96 N.J. 36 (1984) | 39 | | **Bradford v Kupper Associates,** | | | 283 N.J. Super. 556 App. Div. 1995), certif.
[directive] If Step 3. no, continue to if Step 3:  Determine any current charge is a Graves Act offense subject to an automatic of No recommendation  Release Recommended pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A: 162-20(f):  - Prohibited weapons and devices - sawed-off shotgun (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-3(b )) of Unlawful possession a weapon - machine gun (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(a)) of Unlawful possession a weapon - assault firearms (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(f)) or Certain persons not to have weapons (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-7(a), 2C:39-7(b )(2) (3)) ifit or o N.J.S.A. 2C:39-7(a) is only a Graves Act offense includes the use of possession a firearm.  Weapons -manu/transport/disp/defacement (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-9(a), (b), (e), (g))  If yes, the final recommendation is No Release Recommended.  If Step 4. no, continue to if Step 4:
[brief] ”  [N.J.R.E. 609(b)(2)].  However, “[m]aking findings as to those four factors is not enough” on its own.  R.J.M., 453 N.J. Super. at 270.  Trial courts must also “engage in the weighing process” set forth in Rule 609(b)(1) “to determine whether the State has carried its burden of proving that evidence of the remote conviction would not be more prejudicial than probative. ”  Ibid.; see N.J.R.E. 609(b)(1).  Applying the Rule 609(b)(2) factors to [...]’s prior convictions, it is evident that their probative value does not outweigh their prejudicial effect.
[brief] In discussing his background, [...] mentioned that he did consulting and teaching on elder abuse and neglect.  7T3:15-18.  No objection was raised when he made that fleeting reference, and he did not mention another word about it.  Several questions later, however, defense counsel objected to his use of the terms “abuse and neglect. ”  That led to a sidebar spanning over ten pages.  The court began by saying: “I’ve got to tell you.  I’ve read [...]’ report.  I think we’re going to be spending a whole lot of time at sidebar during his testimony.  A whole lot of time. ”  7T18:18-21.  Therein begins an odyssey of meandering conversation that ends in [...] being banned from using the word “responsible” when there was no objection made.
[brief] A.  The De Novo Standard of Review Fails To Provide a Basis for Reversal of the Chancery Division’s Decision.  39  B.  The Chancery Division Applied the Correct Burden of Proof With Respect to the Petitioner’s Undue Influence Claim.  41  C.  The Chancery Division Did Not Apply Any Incorrect Standards In Evaluating the Evidence.  43  D.  The Chancery Division Correctly Found An Absence of Suspicious Circumstances.  E.  The Petitioner’s Spoliation Argument Utterly Lacks Merit.  50  Point II
[brief] [...] recognized that the lots were owned by [...].  Public Service at the request of the church placed a light pole in the Lots 20 and 22 in 1989.  lighting consists of a tall black pole that stands prominently in the lots and provides lighting at night.  [...] pays the light bill.  In about 1997 when the church wanted to lower the sidewalk in front of the lots for ease of vehicle entry into the lots, the [...] granted a permit to make the changes in the sidewalk.  (Da283, Permit from [...] in 1997)  As a result of the documentary evidentiary material set forth in the record which supports the factors to satisfy adverse possession, it was error for the trial court to grant summary judgment to [...] and reject [...]’s Summary Judgment motion which sought a court decision that adverse possession was satisfied and where [...] sought rulings on ejection, trespass and for quieting title.
[directive] (1) Has two other indictable offenses pending at the time of the arrest; or (2) Has two prior convictions for a first or second degree crime or for a violation of section 1 of P.L. 1987, c. 101 (2C:35-7) in any combination thereof; or (3) Has one prior conviction for murder, aggravated manslaughter, aggravated sexual assault, kidnapping, or bail jumping; or (4) Was on parole at the time of the arrest, unless the court finds that another form of bail authorized in subsection (b) of this section will ensure the defendant’s presence in court when required. ”  The statute, in section (e), does give the judge the discretion to impose an R.O.R. bail “when the court determines that such person is deserving. ”  No 10% bail for any crime or offense involving domestic violence, as defined in 2C:25-19, where the defendant was already subject to a temporary or permanent 2A:162-12 restraining order, pursuant to 2C:25-17, and is charged with a crime committed against a person protected under the order or where the defendant is charged with Crimes with Bail Restrictions – contempt pursuant to 2C:29-9.
[brief] Relevant here, the MSRA specifically grants Defendants with the authority to: [T]ake any steps to stabilize the finances, restructure the debts, or assist in the financial rehabilitation and recovery of the municipality in need of stabilization and recovery, including, but not limited to: *** (f) amending or terminating any existing contracts or agreements, which shall not include bonds, notes, indentures, or other similar financing instruments and documents to which the municipality is a party, in accordance with the terms thereof; or unilaterally amending or terminating any contracts or agreements which shall not include bonds, notes, indentures, or other similar financing instruments and documents to which the municipality is a party, provided that the director determines that the unilateral termination or amendment is reasonable and directly related to stabilizing the finances or assisting with the fiscal rehabilitation and recovery of the municipality in need of stabilization and recovery; (g) unilaterally modifying, amending, or terminating any collective negotiations agreements, except those related to school districts, to which the municipality is a party, or unilaterally modifying, amending, or terminating the terms and conditions of employment during the term of any applicable collective negotiations agreement, or both, provided that the director determines that the modifications, amendments, or terminations are reasonable and directly related to stabilizing the finances or assisting with the fiscal rehabilitation and recovery of the municipality in need of stabilization and recovery; (i) with respect to any expired collective negotiations agreement to which the municipality in need of stabilization and recovery is a party, unilaterally modifying wages, hours, or any other terms and conditions of employment.  N.J.S.A. 52:27BBBB-5(a)(3).  In dismissing Plaintiffs’ Complaint, the Superior Court considered the statutory language and found that:  It is undisputed that the MSRA delineates substantial authority to the State’s ability to terminate and modify existing agreements involving municipalities in need of stabilization and recovery.
[brief] Page TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS BEING APPEALED ........................................................................................................ iii  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ..............................................................................................  iv  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT .........................................................................................  1  PROCEDURAL HISTORY ...............................................................................................  4  STATEMENT OF FACTS .................................................................................................  5  A.  Relevant Background .................................................................................................  5  B.  Plaintiff’s Prior, Unsuccessful Attempts to Assert Jurisdiction Over Defendants in Pennsylvania Courts  ...........................................  8  C.  Plaintiff’s Commencement of This Action and the Jurisdictional Discovery That Ensued .................................................................  10  D.  The Trial Court Denies Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss and this Interlocutory Appeal Follows .............................................................  10  LEGAL ARGUMENT ........................................................................................................
[directive] Special Seek prosecutor or assistant officer police the violence where domestic involving case any  In officer supervisory or 3.2 with Section accordance in consulted general deputy or attorney the of considering the believe, reason to 3.3.2 has totality subsection to pursuant ~ted na desi of through 9 1 paragraphs in listed special factors the to limited not but including circumstances, to requirement a restraint, other or condition no-contact a of issuance that 4.6.10, subsection bX authorized release of pretrial condition special other expressly any or weapons, surrender the victim, of immediate the the reasonably assure safety to is 2C:25-26(a) N.J.S.A. necessary than other Directive of provision other this any notwithstanding shall, prosecutor or officer needed of imposition conditions seek the acomplaint-warrant and for a~plX 4.6.10, subsection be shall subsection in Nothing victim.16 this of the immediate the assure safety to reasonably 16 the by and not Act amended was Violence of Domestic Prevention of the part is which 2C:25-26(a), N.J.S.A. provides: Law, Reform Bail from is domestic released violence involving offense or crime a with charged defendant a
[directive] Definitions  A.  “Resiliency Program Officer” (RPO) refers to a designated law enforcement officer who is responsible for the training and implementation of the NJRP-LE within their agency.  The RPO shall make themself available to law enforcement officers in their agency, or from any agency in the State, for assistance regarding the NJRP-LE and its techniques, as well as provide resource referral assistance to law enforcement officers.  The RPO position is not designed to supplant the duties and responsibilities of already implemented counseling and support programs; rather, the RPO is responsible for providing the contact information for such programs to a law enforcement officer if requested.  An RPO may also serve as a State RPO Trainer or County RPO Trainer, as those terms are defined below.
[brief] Even if I was completely wrong on every argument that I raised, nonetheless sanctions should not be imposed simply because a litigant is wrong about the law.  The trial court found my claims to be frivolous, and in doing so he had essentially stated that my position was "...wrong from the outset, compounded by wrong after wrong after wrong."  He also repeatedly stated that my "little knowledge" of the law is a "bad thing" and/or "dangerous thing".  The judge imposed sanctions upon these bases.  (2T8:14 – 2T12:5)  But that ruling was clearly in error, as there is a recent authority from this Court that is exactly on point and virtually on all four corners with this case, which holds that sanctions can not be imposed under such circumstances.
[brief] While Defendant argues that the lower court’s reliance on the MVR is “misplaced” the State submits that the lower court properly considered the MVR evidence as it was stipulated by all parties and admitted into evidence at the hearing.  Moreover, the State disagrees with the defense’s characterization of the trooper’s testimony as perjury or as fabricated in order to justify a stop.  There is nothing in the record to suggest that the trooper knowingly gave a false statement that he did not believe to be true.  Rather, the trooper testified on direct that he was moving when he made the observation of the Defendant rolling through the stop sign and later indicated that he did not recall if he was in fact moving or stationary when he made such observation.  There is nothing in the record to suggest that this testimony was made in bad faith, and as the lower court noted, appeared to be the result of failing to review the MVR footage or preparing prior to the hearing.  (1T 21-12 to -13; 1T 40-8 to -17).  The trooper’s testimony as to his observation of the Defendant actually committing a motor vehicle infraction, however, was consistent with the MVR footage.  As such, the fact that the trooper could not recall exactly where he was positioned while he made such observation does not warrant a suppression of the stop.  The State, thus, respectfully requests that this Court affirm the decision of the lower court and deny Defendant’s appeal in its entirety.
[brief] “New Jersey continues to experience an unacceptably high rate of drug-related crime, and continues to serve as a conduit for the illegal trafficking of drugs to and from other jurisdictions. ”  Ibid.  (The New Jersey Legislature intended the “Comprehensive Drug Reform Act of 1987” to “provide for the strict punishment, deterrence and incapacitation of the most culpable and dangerous drug offenders,” such as “upper echelon members of organized narcotics trafficking networks who pose the greatest danger to society.
[brief] [...] Reasonably Asserted that the Missing Body-Worn Camera Footage Would Have Contained Exculpatory Evidence, and Did Not Waive the Argument.  Nor Is His Argument that [...]’s Attendance at the Street Cop Conference Supports Suppression the Kind of Argument that Can Be Waived.  The State argues that [...] is not entitled to the statutory presumption that the missing evidence was exculpatory because he did not “reasonably assert” that the missing video evidence “was” exculpatory, but this Court should find that the defendant’s initial burden is minimal and was satisfied here.
[brief] For the reasons set forth above, and based on the substantial credible evidence in the record and presented herein, the Respondent, [...], respectfully requests that its Final Administrative Determination of September 19, 2023 is affirmed.  Respectfully submitted, [...], Esq. [...]  Attorneys for Respondent, [...]  Dated: August 6, 2024  [...], Esquire N.J. Attorney ID No. 327229999
[brief] (6T 128:5-22).  Defendant also had a violation of probation in 2015.  (6T 131:23-132:4).  Discussing the 2011 conviction, for which defendant received time served along with a four-year probationary sentence, the court below stated, “I believe that the calculation of time goes during the period of the sentence until completion. ” (6T 131:20-22).  While “probation does not qualify as confinement under N.J.R.E. 609(b)(1),” id. at 436, the court also considered “whether there are intervening convictions for crimes or offenses. ”  N.J.R.E. 609(b)(2).  The court stated that “there was not a significant gap in time between the 2007 and the 2011 conviction and the violation of probation in 2015 which extended it out to 2017. ” (6T 132:5-10).  It is appropriate for a trial court to “consider intervening convictions between the past conviction and the crime for which the defendant is being tried,” because when a defendant has an extensive prior record, “his burden should be a heavy one in attempting to exclude all such evidence.  A jury has the right to weigh whether one who repeatedly refuses to comply with society's rules is more likely to ignore the oath requiring veracity on the witness stand. ”  State v. Sands, 76 N.J. 127, 145 (1978).  The rationale is the “belief that a person who has lived contrary to society's rules and laws by committing crimes should not be able to shield his credibility from the jury and present himself as a law-abiding individual. ”  *State v. T.J.M.*, 220 N.J. 220, 233 (2015).  Here, defendant had two prior convictions, and a violation of probation.  That violation of probation was in 2015, it extended his probation to 2017, and he committed the current offenses in January 2022.
[brief] At Db15, defendants question the propriety of [...] (who is not licensed in New Jersey, but who was admitted pro hac vice in this litigation) preparing the deed.  If plaintiff is the true owner of the property, then that is a matter between plaintiff and [...].  At Db16, defendants supplement [...]'s conclusory remarks with "Pa352-Pa354."  Pa352 indicates that $401 were collected back in March 2012.
[brief] *Id.* at 211.  Further, the Court found that since the State was a contracting party, “its legislative judgment is subject to stricter scrutiny than when the legislation affects only private contracts. ”  *Id.* at 212 (*quoting* *Nieves*, 819 F. 2d at 1249).  At this stage of its inquiry, the Court set forth a two-part test to determine whether the statute was necessary: (1) the Court “must ensure that the Government did not consider impairing the obligations of its contracts on a par with other policy alternatives;” and (2) “whether the Government imposed a drastic impairment when an evident and more moderate course would serve its purposes equally well. ”  *Id.* at 212.  If either prong is satisfied, the legislation is unconstitutional.