ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Individually (collectively, the “Plaintiffs”) filed this action for the wrongful death of the decedent in the Superior Court, Law Division, Ocean County, Docket No. [...] on or about February 6, 2024.  (Pa1).  The Defendant filed an Answer on June 14, 2024.  (Pa21).  In compliance with N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-27 (the “Affidavit of Merit Statute”), two Affidavits of Merit were served upon all the parties including the Defendant.
[brief] Unlike the common law tort of negligent training and supervision defined in our case law, the Restatement merely defines a duty to (a) \textsuperscript{16}  This jury instruction is substantially the same as the Model Jury Charge § 5.76 “Negligent Hiring.” prevent misuse of property, (b) protect the public from dangerous conduct of employees that is strictly defined as being outside the scope of employment, and (c) terminate an employee who is known to have engaged in misconduct.  Since none of these conditions apply to the evidence presented at trial, the Restatement standard would have yielded the same outcome.  i.
[directive] As required by N.J.S.A. 52:17B-245, the Attorney General, in consultation with the [...] ([...]), has developed this survey concerning the Sexual Assault Forensic Examination (SAFE) Kits in the possession of law enforcement agencies in New Jersey.  The survey is being distributed to capture data from every law enforcement agency in the State, which is responsible for the collection, storage, and maintenance of SAFE Kits.  All law enforcement agencies, including State agencies, that possess SAFE Kits are required to respond to this survey.
[brief] When DEP’s expertise is a factor, the court defers to that expertise.  In re Freshwater Wetlands Prot. Act Rules, 180 N.J. 478, 489 (2004).  DEP is the agency with the expertise and authorization to regulate waterfront development through its CZM regulations.  Tumino v. Long Beach Tp., 319 N.J. Super. 514, 523 (App. Div. 1999) (citing Last Chance Dev. P’ship v. Kean, 119 N.J. 425, 429-37 (1990)).  Thus, DEP’s permitting decision warrants great deference.
[brief] SITE SELECTION AND ALTERNATIVE SITE ANALYSIS 19.  Over the course of several years beginning in 2011, [...] engaged in a laborious and detailed site selection and alternative site analysis (the “Site Analysis”) in an effort to find the most suitable location for the Facility that would have a minimal impact on Holmdel and its residents.  As more fully described in the accompanying testimony of [...] (Exhibit P-2), that analysis led [...] to conclude that (a) the Proposed Site is the most suitable location for the Facility; and (b) aside from the Original Proposed Site (as identified herein below), no alternative site is reasonably available to achieve an equivalent public benefit.
[brief] LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I STANDARD OF REVIEW  An Appellate Court’s review of rulings of law and issues as to the law’s applicability are “de novo. ”  Matter of Ridgefield Park Board of Education, 244 N.J. 1, 17 (2020).  A trial court’s interpretation of law and the legal consequences that flow from established facts, however, are not entitled to any special deference.  Rowe v. Bell & Gossett Company, 239 N.J. 531, 552 (2019).  Findings of fact by a trial court sitting without a jury are accorded deference.  Balducci v. Cige, 240 N.J. 574, 595 (2020).  However, these findings of fact must be supported by “sufficient credible evidence” in the record.  State v. Mohammed, 226 N.J. 71, 88 (2016).  If there exists a mixed question of law and fact, then the Appellate Court will give due deference to the fact-finding, if it is supported by sufficient credible evidence in the record, and will review the legal aspects of that mixed question on a de novo basis.  State v. Pierre, 223 N.J. 560, 576 (2015).  POINT II
[brief] week, in which [...] had “discipline[d]” him with physical punishment at her direction.  (Da 34; Da 49)  She thought police would have “assumed that it wasn’t an accident” because of the bruises and “thought that we beat him” to death, which would have resulted in them both being arrested and losing custody of [...].  (Da 49)  She told her sister, “[W]hen I saw [...] like that in his bed, I immediately left.  All of, all rationality, all common sense, all everything left. ”  (Da 51)  The State also introduced a call between [...] and [...], in which she said she was hurt that he had not contacted her after her arrest.
[brief] [...] does not argue that the trial court overlooked controlling decisions – only that it disagreed with the court’s decision.  As noted above, the trial court carefully considered the facts of this case – including the long, torturous history of the site; [...]’s significant noncompliance with its Third Round obligation after withdrawing from the DJ action; and [...]’s steps toward condemnation within the context of this builder’s remedy action.  In its decision denying reconsideration, the trial court repeatedly relied on the unique facts of [...]’s constitutional violation and the significant shortfall of 602 units.  After balancing the equities, the trial court re-emphasized the factual findings made previously, noting again that any harm to the protected class resulting from the potential condemnation or redevelopment of the Property outweighed the potential harm to [...].  In balancing the harms to the parties, the Court noted that there were other places in town that the town can seek to use its condemnation powers for commercial use, but that the way to achieve immunity from builder’s remedy suits was to “file the DJ action and you follow through” (2T at 15:21-22).  The court noted that it did not have “any cases in front of [it] that anyone can point to as an example that says if you are constitutionally non-compliant, you can condemn property where a builder’s remedy lawsuit has been filed and where you have been found to be constitutionally non-compliant, which would have the result of making that property unavailable for the development of affordable housing” (id. at 22:15-21).  [...] asks that this court affirm the trial court’s denial of [...]’s motion for reconsideration.
[brief] Kolb v. Burns, 320 N.J. Super. 467(App. Div. 1999) ....................................... 23, 50  Lippman v. Ethicon, Inc., 222 N.J. 362 (2015) ................................................................. 35, 36  Maimone v. City of Atlantic City, 188 N.J. 221 (2006) ................................................................. 24, 30, 33, 34, 36, 38  Maw v. Advanced Clinical Commc’ns, Inc., 179 N.J. 439 (2004)..............................................34  McCullough v. City of Atlantic City, 137 F. Supp. 2d 557 (D.N.J. 2001)..........................49  McDonnell Douglas Corporation v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).............................................43  Mehlman v. Mobil Oil Corp. 153 N.J. 163 (1998).............................................25, 33  Monell v. Dept. of Social Services 436 U.S. 658 (1978).............................................36  In re Phillips, 117 N.J. 567 (1990).............................................32  Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 84 N.J. 58 (1980)..................................................23  Regan v. City of New Brunswick, 305 N.J. Super. 342 (App. Div. 1997)........................25  Reilly v. City of Atlantic City 427 F. Supp. 2d 507 (D.N.J. 2006), aff’d in part, rev’d in part on other grds., 532 F. 3d 216 (3d Cir. 2008).................................49  Rodriguez v. Torres, 60 F. Supp. 2d 334 (D.N.J. 1999)............................43  Romano v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 284 N.J. Super. 543 (App. Div. 1995).......................44, 48, 49 Roa v. Roa, 200 N.J. 555 (2010).............................................48  Schlichtig v. Inacom Corp., 271 F. Supp. 2d 597 (D.N.J. 2003)...........................48  Smith v. Millville Rescue Squad, 225 N.J. 373 (2016).  ...........................................  46  State v. Gleitsmann, 62 N.J. Super. 15 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 33 N.J. 386 (1960).  .........  31  Township of Moorestown v. Armstrong, 89 N.J.Super. 560 (App. Div. 1965), certif. denied, 47 N.J. 80(1966)....32  In re Tuch, 159 N.J. Super. 219 (App. Div. 1978).  ..........................  31  Turner v. Associated Humane Societies, Inc., 396 N.J. Super. 582 (App. Div. 2007).  ............................  25, 33  Woods v. Township of Irvington, 2009 WL 2475323 (App. Div. 2009)..............................  26 Zive v. Stanley Roberts, Inc., 182 N.J. 436 (2005).  .................................................. 24, 43, 45  STATUTES
[directive] 3.7.4  CEDs must be capable of making a digital recording of the encounter each time the device is utilized, unless the officer carrying the CED is equipped with a body worn camera (BWC), as that term is defined in the BWC Policy issued by the Attorney General.  The officer shall activate the BWC prior to utilization of the CED, unless exigent circumstances make it unsafe or not feasible for the officer to do so.  3.7.5  CED spark displays shall be considered constructive authority, but must be reported as a Show of Force in the Attorney General’s Use of Force Reporting Portal.  3.7.6  Police administrators and officers authorized to utilize CEDs and other authorized less- lethal devices and ammunition are also required to adhere to the instructions contained in Addendum A to this Policy.  3.8
[brief] (Pa95)  **FACTOR 5 – HIRING, SUPERVISING AND PAYING ASSISTANTS**  1.  According to [...]’s report, the Petitioner was not authorized to hire others at her own expense or a third party to assist her in performing her duties.  (Pa95) --- ⁴  The Board’s own witness confirms the Petitioner’s position.  2.  [...] also noted that while the Petitioner meets the definition of independent contractor, given the unique circumstances, this is not a strong indicator of such status.  (Pa95)  3.  Petitioner testified in detail about all of the municipal officials who supervise and assist her in her prosecutorial duties both during and outside of Court sessions.  (T33-22 to T35-22)  4.  All of these officials are Township employees hired and paid by the Township.  (T36-11 to T37-9).  5.  Petitioner also testified in great detail about all of the assistance from Township municipal court and police personnel post-Pandemic.  (T37-10 to T39-10)  6.  Petitioner also testified that despite her reluctance to come back to in-person court, she was required to by the Township and Court Administrator.  (T39-11 to T40-19)
[brief] Lang, 408 N.J. Super. 495, 504 (App. Div. 2009); Baxter v. Fairmount Food Co., 74 N.J. 588, 598 (1977).  For this reason, judges may not substitute their own judgment for that of the jury simply because they might have reached a different conclusion.  Jackowitz, 408 N.J. Super., at 504 (citing Johnson v. Scaccetti, 192 N.J. 256, 279 (2007)).  The only situation in which the Court may grant remittitur or a new trial is if the verdict is so clearly disproportionate with the proofs that it shocks the Court’s conscience.  Caicedo, 429 N.J. Super., at 628 (citing Johnson, 192 N.J., at 281).  In engaging with this standard, an appellate court must afford deference to the trial court’s “feel of the case. ”  Caicedo, 429 N.J. Super., at 628 (citing Jastram v. Kruse, 197 N.J. 216, 230 (2008)).  The idea of deferring to the trial judge’s perspective “is not just an empty shibboleth.”  Jastram, 197 N.J., at 230.  The trial judge is the only member of the judiciary who gets to see and hear what actually occurs at trial, including what, if any, effect it has on the jury.  Id.  Clearly, the standard of review does not provide disgruntled appellants with a second bite at the apple (or a third, or a fourth).  Rather, it provides relief to litigants only in those cases where justice is so betrayed, the judiciary so offended, and the trial judge so dubious, that the jury’s verdict must be vacated.  This is not one of those cases.
[brief] It is undisputed that the December 10, 1998 deed in question, which contains the signature [...], was in fact signed by Plaintiff (3T62-2).  We can only question the motives, as Plaintiff did not give any clear indication as to the purpose for Plaintiff signing [...]’s name on a deed that transferred title to the property back to [...].  Perhaps it was to mislead [...], who had no English ability.  Perhaps it was to create confusion.  However, the fact is that Plaintiff did forge his brother’s name onto the deed document (3T62-2, Da343 – Da350).  It further coincides with the misleading representation on the deed itself, which states that [...] and [...] were the same person (Da343 – Da350).  This is unequivocally false.  Clearly, this falls under relief that is sought by the Plaintiff as a “result of his own wrongdoing. ”  Plaintiff fraudulently placed his brother’s signature on a deed that was to be recorded with the county.  He attempted to create further confusion by noting that [...] and [...] are the “same person. ”  The cloud to the title and the issues that Plaintiff now complains of were issues that Plaintiff ratified himself by forging his brother’s signature on the deed.  Defendants presented this argument to the trial court; however, the memorandum decision completely ignores Defendant’s argument (Da081 – Da090; Da050 – Da072).
[brief] When considering the language of a statute, the court should construe statutory terms according to their plain, obvious and rational meanings in accordance with common sense and reason.  A review of the trial court’s opinion evidences the absence of any analysis of the NAF dispute resolution forum’s rules and how those rules comply with the Legislatures express intent to aggressively confront insurance fraud, with statutory obligation for insurance carriers to combat fraud or the current legal precedent.  Had the trial court considered same, it could have only concluded that, as in Lopez, Fiouris, and the Coalition cases, the [...] forum does not provide for discovery in complex matters of fraud but is reserved for the arbitration of medical bills.
[brief] 1T29:9-30:5.  Requests Nos. 7 through 8 asked for basic information about the Defendant LLC’s employees and independent contractors and their contact information.  Da69.  Defendants’ responses identified only two individuals, [...] and [...], the latter of whom Defendants claimed to have had no contact information for.  Given that those requests asked for information relating to “any employee and/or independent contractor of [the Defendant LLC], including but not limited to, [...] and [...]” (Da69), [...] instructed that Defendants needed to certify that “there are not others.
[brief] On January 28, 2023, Respondent filed his amended complaint in Chancery Division under Docket [...] (Da 1-27).  Appellant filed an answer to Respondent’s amended Chancery Division complaint on January 30, 2023 (Da28-Da38).  The parties again, by consent (Da114-115), brought the matter before the Superior Court through summary proceedings: Appellant filed a motion for summary judgment on May 10, 2023 (Da45-Da129) and Respondent filed a cross motion for summary judgment on June 9, 2023 (Da130-Da186).
[brief] **The PSA:**  [...] quotes one sentence fragment buried on the fourth page of the PSA and alleges it triggers the parol evidence rule.  (Db19, 20).  This quote obscures the fact that it is buried in a section titled "RECEIPT OF CONDOMINIUM DOCUMENTS. ”  That paragraph first has the buyer acknowledge receipt of the POS and other documents that [...] knows have not yet been provided.  The list of false acknowledgments that track the misstatements [...] knows it uses is also absent from this same paragraph.  These false acknowledgments include that the buyer purchased, “without reliance on representations concerning rentals, rent return, tax advantages, depreciation or investment potential, or other monetary or financial advantage, by Seller, its agents, employees or associates. ” (Da204 ¶22).  Hidden language like this, carefully crafted to protect a seller from misleading or downright false statements it knows its agents tell buyers, exemplifies the reason for the fraud exception to the parol evidence rule.  C.
[brief] Moreover, at the close of the State’s case at trial, the court entered a directed acquittal on the murder and second-degree conspiracy charges, only permitting the third-degree conspiracy charge to go to the jury.  But three critical errors affected the jury’s guilty verdict on this charge and also require reversal of [...]’s conviction.  First, police interrogated [...] without reading him his Miranda rights, failed to scrupulously honor his invocation of his right to counsel, and contradicted the later-read Miranda warnings.  These errors, both together and separately require suppression of [...]’s two statements and reversal of his conviction.  Second, the court failed to correctly instruct the jury on the elements of conspiracy.  To find [...] guilty of conspiracy to commit aggravated assault, the jury had to find that [...] acted purposely with respect to the agreement and the result of that agreement: significant bodily injury.  But the court failed to provide this crucial instruction to the jury, instead instructing that [...] could be found guilty if he acted purposely, knowingly, or even recklessly with respect to the result of the aggravated assault.  Incorrectly instructing the jury on the necessary mens rea for conspiracy prevented the jury from being able to return a competent verdict and requires reversal.  Third, the court failed to ensure that the jury returned a unanimous verdict on the necessary third element of conspiracy — that a co-conspirator commit an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy.  The court instead provided an instruction on at least six possible overt acts committed by any of four different people.  In light of this lengthy and confusing instruction on this essential element, there was a clear risk of a fragmented, non-unanimous jury verdict.  These errors also require reversal of [...]’s conviction.
[brief] The Terry Frisk for weapons was lawful.  A “pat-down,” commonly referred to as a “Terry frisk,” is generally permitted only when an officer has “an objectively reasonable suspicion that a suspect is armed and dangerous. ”  State v. Nishina, 175 N.J. 502, 515 (2003).  Terry directs that courts measure the reasonableness of a pat-down incident to a lawful investigatory stop with an objective standard, judging the reasonableness of the pat-down within the context of the circumstances confronting the police officer.  *State v. Thomas*, 110 N.J. 673, 679 (1988).  The pat-down is reasonable only if “a reasonably prudent man in the circumstances would be warranted in his belief that his safety or that of others was in danger. ”  *State v. Valentine*, 134 N.J. 536, 543 (1994) (quoting *Terry*, 392 U.S. at 27).  In making the determination, however, “the officer need not be absolutely certain that the individual is armed. ”  *Terry*, 392 U.S. at 27.  Even in situations in which an officer does not believe a suspect is engaged or about to become engaged in violent criminal activity, the right to frisk for weapons during a permissible investigatory stop is frequently automatic where a police officer has a specific and objectively-credible reason to believe that the suspect is armed.  See *Adams v. Williams*, 407 U.S. 143, 146–47 (1972) (upholding protective search based on informant's tip that suspect was carrying “a gun at his waist”).  Indeed, there are many instances where the right to conduct a protective search of an individual flows directly from the same justification for the investigatory stop.  See *State v. Privott*, 203 N.J. 16, 30 (2010); *State v. Ascencio*, 257 N.J. Super. 144, 147-149 (Law Div. 1992), aff’d ‘o.b. 227 N.J. Super. 334 (App. Div. 1994), certif. den. 140 N.J. 278 (1995)  After the defendant stepped out of the vehicle, [...] performed a lawful frisk of defendant’s crossbody bag that he was wearing.  As previously stated, officers were notified that a male in that specific vehicle at that location was armed with a firearm inside his fanny pack.  After conducting the stop for a motor vehicle violation, [...] observed defendant with the fanny pack across his body, as well as furtive movements and nervousness consistent with someone attempting to hide or conceal what was inside.  Based on this, the officer frisked the crossbody bag and immediately identified, via plain feel, the firearm.  Thus, after immediately identifying the object as contraband the crossbody bag was removed from defendant’s person and lawfully seized.  Since [...] had specific and objectively-credible reasons to believe that defendant was armed, the frisk was lawful.
[directive] Application for Promotion to Phase 3 B: & Name Date Submitted I  Current Address: Street City State Zip Code Telephone Email if  The following criteria must be met in order to phase up: ( box task is completed) check of I have been in Phase 2 for a minimum 90 days.  Date entered phase 2: of of I have a minimum 30 consecutive days sobriety.  Sobriety date: am I engaged in treatment and attending regularly.  Counselor verification signature: of am I following the conditions supervision.  Probation Officer verification signature: of Three  my biggest struggles in Phase 2:  Three accomplishments in Phase 2:  Three personal goals I would like to accomplish in the next phase:  Client Signature Date Track A and Application for Promotion to Phase 3 B: Promulgated by Directive #20-21 (08/11/2021), CN 12571b ., Courts New Jersey
[brief] This action involves a business dispute between members of a limited liability company and the operation of [...] d/b/a as [...] (“SG Health”) in [...] from 2016 to May 2019.  In December 2015, [...] (“Defendant”) formed [...] for the purpose of operating a pharmacy.  In 2016, [...] (“Plaintiff”) paid Ms. Gulsan payments over time totaling $100,000 for forty-nine percent (49%) of her membership interest in SG Health.  In January 2017, the parties entered into an operating agreement for SG Health.  According to the operating agreement, Ms. Gulsan was the manager.  She also worked as the pharmacist for SG Health LLC.  In May 2019, [...] purchased the assets of [...] d/b/a [...] pursuant to an Asset Sale and Purchase Agreement.  The Honorable [...], J.S.C. presided over a jury trial in this matter from July 24 to July 28, 2023.  After the close of all of the evidence and the Court’s charge on the law, the jury was tasked with determining whether Defendant breached the operating agreement of SG Health; breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing; acted grossly negligent or with willful misconduct in violation of the Limited Liability Company Act (N.J.S.A. 42:2C-39); tortiously interfered with Plaintiff’s prospective economic advantage, committed fraud, and whether the assessment of punitive damages against Defendant were warranted.