ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] In response to the inquiry “whether it is possible to perform testing for both fingerprints and DNA on handled items of evidence” (Da 56), she concluded:  In summary, the totality of the information presented above clearly supports that there is no technical or procedural problem that would preclude conducting both fingerprinting and DNA testing on various items of evidence, including a tire iron, in New Jersey as long as proper procedures and materials free of human DNA are used throughout the testing.  Furthermore, even if contamination did occur, it is possible that interpretable and comparable DNA profiles may still be obtained that could be relevant to the case using standard methods in the DNA testing laboratory.  These statements are provided based on my background, education, experience, training and active participation in the field of forensic DNA testing for the past 32+ years and based strongly on numerous scientific studies conducted by various institutions and general routine practices in place both at the time of trial in this case and currently with forensic science service providers.  As recommended by the national Commission on Forensic Science and approved by the Attorney General of the United States in 2016, the statement “to a reasonable degree of scientific certainty” is no longer a term to be used by forensic scientists; however, I provide and support these statements with strong conviction based on the information available in the field.  [Da 58.]
[brief] Respectfully submitted, [...]  Attorneys for Defendants/Respondent, [...] /s/ [...]  [...] [...]  Attorneys for Defendants/Respondents, [...] and [...]  By: /s/ [...]  [...]  Dated: March 11, 2024  [...]; [...], Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. [...], ESQ.; [...], ERIC FORD; PULTE HOMES; [...]; [...]; and [...], JOHN DOES 1-10, and JANE DOES 1-10 (names being fictitious as true identities are unknown), Defendants-Respondents.
[directive] Rather, the officer should, whenever feasible, conduct an on-scene investigation to try to confirm or dispel the basis for the affirmative defense, considering the following factors:  Whether the person claiming the affirmative defense presents a valid, ! unaltered medical marijuana registry identification card bearing the person’s photograph, and whether, and to what extent, there is any uncertainty as to the identity of the person presenting the card and claiming the affirmative defense.  !  Whether the officer is able to determine or verify a person’s claimed status as a qualifying patient or primary caregiver by making a query to the State Police Regional Operations Intelligence Center (ROIC).  !  Whether, and to what extent, the person claiming the affirmative defense is cooperating in the investigation and, for example, permits the officer to examine the medical marijuana to verify that it is being possessed and/or used in compliance with CUMMA (e.g., to inspect the packaging label to cross-check it with the patient’s registry identification number; to determine the amount of marijuana present to determine whether the person may be distributing/possessing with intent to distribute).
[brief] Q  And I noticed also on your CV, that you don’t mention anywhere on here, and this is your biography, correct?  A  It’s my medical biography, yes.  Q  You don’t mention anything on here you’re having worked as a lawyer in a medical malpractice firm, correct?  A  No, I don’t have my law activities on it but I do mention I have a JD degree.  Q  So yes, you mentioned your law school degree that you ranked two out of three –  A Yes.  Q  But you mentioned nothing about your work for a law firm that primarily was involved with suing doctors, representing clients who are suing doctors, true?  A  It’s not on my medical CV.  [4T189-90]  [...] attacked professional expert [...]’s credibility in ways that the eminently qualified [...] could not have been:
[brief] March 30, 2016..............................43  2  [...], Insurance Claims Disputes: Interpretation of Important Policy Provisions § 11.30 at 11-469 (5th ed. 2007)..................29  [...], Current New Jersey Court Rules, R.4:42-9(a)(6)  Comment 2.6 (Gann 2023)...................................................................49  [...] , “A High Level View of the CGL Policy,” https://www.irmi.
[brief] Defendant’s request for the imposition of a probationary sentence, as opposed to the split county jail and probationary sentence requested by the State, focused heavily on the applicability of mitigating factor six:  “[t]he defendant … will compensate the victim of defendant’s conduct for the damage or injury that the victim sustained. ”  See N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)(6)).  Defendant expressed not only a willingness “to compensate the victim in this --- 4 POINT is responsive to POINT V of defendant’s brief.  Db34-41. case, hence, the request for the Court to find [mitigating] factor number six,” but also his future ability to do so.  (13T:4-19 to 5-3).  Counsel for defendant told the sentencing court, “[t]he main issue that I see in this case is one of restitution.  [Defendant] is going to have a period of supervision through probation, and during that time he’s going to have to make the victim whole …  But, judge he does plan to make the restitution. ” (13T:5-19 to 6-24) (emphasis added).
[brief] *State v. Diaz-Bridges*, 208 N.J. 544, 564 (2011).  Using that approach, our Supreme Court has held that, without more, a suspect's pause, request for additional time, or request for "an opportunity to 'lie down and think about it' before responding" to a question, does not constitute a request for the "police [to] terminate questioning through the invocation of the right to remain silent."  *Id.* at 566-67 (quoting *Bey*, 112 N.J. 136-37).  Similarly, a suspect's "emotional reaction" after recognizing "the enormity of a crime" charged, without more, is not "a sufficient indication of a decision to invoke the right to silence [so] that the immediate cessation of the interrogation must follow."  *Id.* at 568-69.  Here, neither defendant's requests to go home to his children nor his statement that he had nothing to say constituted an invocation of his right to terminate questioning and remain silent.  Defendant's questions as to whether he could go home to his children did not suggest an unwillingness to continue talking to police, or a willingness to continue answering questions only if he was first allowed to see his children, as was the case in *Diaz-Bridges*, 208 N.J. at 551, 572.  Thus, as the judge properly found, defendant asking to go home to see his children was not an invocation -- ambiguous or otherwise -- of his right to remain silent.  (Da126).  Moreover, defendant first said he had "nothing else to say" only in the context of telling the detectives to contact his girlfriend to corroborate his story.  In this context, as the judge properly found, the totality of the circumstances did not indicate that defendant's statement that he had nothing else to say was an invocation of his right to remain silent.  (Da101, 127).  It was not until a later portion of the interview that defendant's statements that he had nothing else to say indicated an unwillingness to continue talking to police, in that they were not accompanied by further information from the defendant, and were thus an invocation of his right to remain silent.  And, as the judge properly noted, the police ended the interview and, after a short break, returned to arrest defendant.  (Da127).  Thus, even if his statements were an invocation of his right to remain silent, the police properly ended the interview.  And even if they could have done so a minute sooner, any such error did not preclude the admission of defendant's statement as a whole, only those portions after his statement that he had "nothing else to say."  Notably, nothing of substance was gleaned from defendant's responses thereafter, rendering any error in the admission of such portions of his interview "harmless beyond a reasonable doubt."  *Tillery*, 238 N.J. at 319.
[brief] ”  Malanga v. Twp. of W. Orange, No. A-2287-19, 2022 WL 1320327, at *9 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. May 3, 2022) (quoting O’Boyle v. Borough of Longport, 218 N.J. 168, 196 (2014) (internal citations omitted).
[brief] ”  Id. at 623.  See also State v. O’Carroll, 385 N.J. Super. 211, 229-232 (App. Div. 2006) (finding a rational basis in record for jury to find the defendant acted recklessly even though the victim died from asphyxiation due to strangulation where, among other evidence, defendant gave a statement that he “accidentally wrapped the telephone cord tight around [his girlfriend’s] neck as he attempted to make her drop the knife”).
[directive] Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14.2  “Drug Court”  English, English-Spanish, English-Haitian, English- Polish, English-Korean, & English-Portuguese Versions  NOTICE:  This is a public document, which means the document as submitted will be available to the public upon request.  Therefore, do not enter personal identifiers on it, such as Social Security number, driver’s license number, vehicle plate number, insurance policy number, active financial account number, or active credit card number.
[brief] [...] observed defendant meet and get picked up by a silver Chevy Captiva on the corner of Third and Kaigns, one block away from the shooting, at 7:43 a.m.  Multiple surveillance cameras and a ShotSpotter activation corroborated this testimony.  (6T38-1 to 41-20).  [...] [...] testified that he and fellow officers obtained surveillance videos after learning that the suspect may have been picked up by a Chevy Captiva directly after the shooting.
[directive] INTERNAL AFFAIRS POLICY & PROCEDURES | August 2020 6.2.2  Supervisors investigating minor complaints of inappropriate behavior must strive to conduct a thorough and objective investigation without violating the rights of the subject officer or any other law enforcement officer.  Accordingly, all officers who may be called upon to do an internal investigation must be thoroughly familiar with the agency's entire internal affairs policy, including the protection of the subject officer's rights and the procedures for properly investigating internal complaints.  6.2.3  The investigator should interview the complainant, all witnesses and the subject officer, and review relevant reports and documents, gather evidence and conduct any other investigation as appropriate.  The investigator should then submit a report to the law enforcement executive or appropriate supervisor summarizing the matter and indicating the appropriate disposition.  Possible dispositions include:  (a)  Sustained.  A preponderance of the evidence shows an officer violated any law; regulation; directive, guideline, policy, or procedure issued by the Attorney General or County Prosecutor; agency protocol; standard operating procedure; rule; or training.  (b)  Unfounded.  A preponderance of the evidence shows that the alleged misconduct did not occur.  (c)  Exonerated.  A preponderance of the evidence shows the alleged conduct did occur, but did not violate any law; regulation; directive, guideline, policy, or procedure issued by the Attorney General or County Prosecutor; agency protocol; standard operating procedure; rule; or training.  (d)  Not Sustained.  The investigation failed to disclose sufficient evidence to clearly prove or disprove the allegation.  6.2.4  If the investigator determines that the complaint is unfounded, exonerated or not sustained, the investigative report is to be forwarded to internal affairs for review and entry in the index file and filing.  The subject officer shall be notified in writing of the investigation’s outcome.  6.2.5  If the complaint is sustained, the superior officer so authorized should determine the appropriate disciplinary action.  Typical disciplinary actions for minor infractions include performance notices, oral reprimands or written reprimands.  The superior officer shall complete the appropriate disciplinary document and provide a copy of that document to the officer being disciplined.  A copy of the disciplinary document shall be forwarded to the law enforcement executive or appropriate supervisor for review, placed in the officer's personnel file and sent to internal affairs for entry into the index file and filing.  6.2.6  Each agency should establish its own protocol for reviewing and purging performance notices and oral reprimands from an employee's personnel file.  Written reprimands should remain permanently in the employee's personnel file.  27  INTERNAL AFFAIRS POLICY & PROCEDURES | August 2020
[brief] **STATEMENT OF PROCEDURAL HISTORY**  On July 22, 2020, the Plaintiff-Respondent [...] (the “Plaintiff” or the “Landlord”) filed a complaint for possession against its tenant, the Defendant-Appellant [...], (the “Defendant” or “Tenant”) in the Middlesex County Superior Court, Special Civil Part, Landlord-Tenant Division, under civil docket number [...] (the “Complaint”), Docket Entry No. [...] (Da88-Da101).  In the Complaint, Landlord alleged to be owed $121,051.47 in unpaid rent plus interest and other charges collectible as additional rent (Da94-Da95).  Due to the landlord-trial proceeding suspension then in effect, however, no trial would be scheduled for more than a year.  On August 18, 2021, the Honorable [...], J.S.C. (the “trial judge”) presided over the remotely conducted trial in the Middlesex County Special Civil Division, Landlord-Tenant Part.  Landlord and Tenant agreed to certain stipulated exhibits, and principally disagreed on two issues: (1) the calculation of late fees and interest Landlord alleged to be owed; and (2) the amount of “fit-up reimbursement,” or Tenant’s Allowance, if any, owed from Landlord to Tenant as a potential offset to amounts Landlord claimed to be owed in rent (1T5-13 to 1T6-11).  ---
[directive] A copy of the decision and accompanying findings and conclusions shall be delivered to the officer or employee who was the subject of the hearing and to the law enforcement executive (if he or she was not the hearing officer) for the imposition of discipline.  Upon completion of the hearing, internal affairs will complete all required forms (Civil Service Commission jurisdictions use the Final Notice of Disciplinary Action form DPF-31C), including the entry of the disposition in the index file.  If the charges were sustained, internal affairs will cause the penalty to be carried out.  Documentation of the charge and the discipline shall be permanently placed in the officer's or employee's personnel file.  6.3.17
[brief] ” (T7-8).  •  “For the same reasons stated above, there likewise is no positional conflict to justify a court order disqualification of [...].  The outside counsel guidelines are not implicated and do not result in a disqualification because once again there is nothing in the indictment that will cause [...], [...], or [...] to advocate any positions that conflict with or are adverse to the interests of the defendants in this case.  (T8).  •  “Finally, there is no basis to support plaintiff’s position that RPC 1.9 is implicated.  And the Dewey\(^4\) case relied on by plaintiff likewise does not support disqualification in this case because Dewey has an easily distinguishable set of facts and relies on a now outdated version of RPC 1.9. ”  (T9).
[brief] **THE APPELLATE DIVISION IS EMPOWERED TO EXERCISE ORIGINAL JURISDICTION OVER ISSUES NOT RAISED BY THE PARTIES ON APPEAL**  [...] submits that the Appellate Division can and should exercise original jurisdiction in its review of issues raised by [...] in its amicus brief, in the Third Circuit’s *Mount Prospect* case, or in any other party or amicus filing in this matter.  The Law Division’s order, as well as the erroneous decision in the *Mount Prospect* case, do not require any further fact-finding for this Court to perform a complete determination of the significant issues raised on appeal, including whether the law requires IFPA cases to be arbitrated in No-Fault dispute resolution.
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN FINDING THE EXCLUSION IS UNAMBIGUOUS (1T at 22:4 to 23:18)  “When the meaning of a phrase is ambiguous, the ambiguity is resolved in favor of the insured . . . and in line with an insured’s objectively-reasonable expectations.  Voorhees, 128 N.J. at 175 (internal citations omitted).  “[E]xclusions are ordinarily strictly construed against the insurer . . . and if there is more than one possible interpretation of the language, courts apply the meaning that supports coverage rather than the one that limits it. ”  Flomerfelt v. Cardiello, 202 N.J. 432, 442 (2010) (internal citations omitted).  If a “fair interpretation” of the language of an exclusion shows the exclusion to be ambiguous, it will be interpreted strictly against the insurer.  Id. 442-43.  See also Cumberland Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Murphy, 183 N.J. 344, 351 (2005) (holding that a provision which simultaneously did not require injury to be “expected or intended” but still required “willful harm” was ambiguous).  In the instant matter, there are two exclusions, both of which suffer from ambiguity.  The exclusions preclude coverage only for injuries “caused by or at the direction of the insured with knowledge that the act would violate the rights of another and would inflict “personal and advertising injury,” or that arose “out of oral or written publication of material, if done by or at the direction of the insured with knowledge of its falsity. ” (Da182 (emphasis added). )  Both of these exclusions are unclear and ambiguous, which may explain why Courts of New Jersey have not enforced such exclusions.  The trial court, in passing and without analysis, stated that the policy was unambiguous.  (1T at 22:12-13 (“In this Court’s opinion, I don’t find that particular - - that clause [referring to both exclusions] to be ambiguous in any way. ”).)  A fair reading of the Policy, however, shows that the exclusions at issue are susceptible to multiple meanings and are ambiguous.  The trial court thus erred as a matter of law in finding the exclusions unambiguous.
[directive] 12.3  Review of CED and Less-Lethal Device Deployments:  (a)  For municipal and county law enforcement agencies, the law enforcement executive shall forward the report to the County Prosecutor within 10 business days of the firing/discharge, unless the County Prosecutor grants the law enforcement executive’s request for a reasonable extension of time within which to forward the report, for good cause shown.  The County Prosecutor shall review the matter for compliance with this Policy.  If the County Prosecutor finds the firing or discharge of a CED or less-lethal device to not be in compliance with the Attorney General’s Use of Force Policy, the matter shall be forwarded to the Director of the Office of Public Integrity and Accountability or their designee.  (b)  For statewide law enforcement agencies, the law enforcement executive shall forward the report to the Director of the Division of Criminal Justice within 10 business days of the firing/discharge, unless the Director grants the law enforcement executive’s request for a reasonable extension of time within which to forward the report for good cause shown.  The Director shall review the matter for compliance with this Policy.  If the Director finds the firing or discharge of a CED or less-lethal device to not be in compliance with the Attorney General’s Use of Force Policy, the matter shall be forwarded to the Director of the Office of Public Integrity and Accountability or their designee.  12.4  In all instances when a CED is fired at or discharged upon a person, a superior officer designated by the law enforcement executive shall immediately take custody of and secure the device.  The superior officer shall safeguard and preserve the digital information in that 16  USE OF FORCE POLICY
[brief] [...], Esq. N.J. Attorney No. 039641998  [...] [...]  Tel: [...]  Fax: [...]  [...]  [...], Esq. N.J. Attorney No. 030312002  [...], Esq. N.J. Attorney No. 064892013  [...]  [...]  Tel: [...]  Fax: [...]  [...]  [...]  Attorneys for Amici Curiae #
[brief] Based upon the foregoing, Appellants respectfully request that this Court reverse the Chancery Court’s decision.  Dated: February 20, 2025  **[...]**  *Attorneys for Defendants-Appellants*  *[...]*  [...], Esq.  For the Firm  BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT  [...] [...]  T:(862)  213-0509  [...]  Attorneys for Plaintiff-Respondent, [...]  Of Counsel and On the Brief: [...], Esq.  (Atty ID #005602006)  [...], Esq.  (Atty ID #014002003)  TABLE OF CONTENTS  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS, AND RULINGS ...........................................  ii  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .................................................................................. iii  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT .............................................................................  1  PROCEDURAL HISTORY ....................................................................................  4  STATEMENT OF FACTS ....................................................................................  10  LEGAL ARGUMENT ..........................................................................................  17  I.  THE MOTION COURT’S DECISION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION SHOULD BE AFFIRMED BECAUSE IT CORRECTLY FOUND THAT A VALID ARBITRATION AGREEMENT EXISTS WITHIN THE MOU, AND THE PARTIES INTENDED IT TO BE A PART OF THE 2022 ADDENDUM.  (1T43:2-7; T49:5-16).........................................................  17  A.  Standard of Review ......................................................................................  17  B.  A Valid Agreement to Arbitrate Exists Within in the 2012 MOU (1T43:2-7; 1T49:5-16).......................................................................................  19  C.  Plaintiff’s Equitable Ownership Claims Fall Within the Scope of the Arbitration Provisions within the MOU and the Operating Agreements (1T43:2-6).................................................................  23  D.  The MOU Remains Operative (1T49:8-9)......................................................  27  II.  PLAINTIFF DID NOT WAIVE HER RIGHT TO ARBITRATE HER CLAIMS.  (1T41:16-48:7).................................................................  33  III.  THE MOTION COURT CORRECTLY FOUND THAT BOTH CASES SHOULD BE ARBITRATED TOGETHER.  (1T20:4-9; 1T40:4-11; 1T44:12-13; 1T48:17-21; 1T49:5-9; 1T49:20-22)...........  40  CONCLUSION ....................................................................................................  44