ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY RULED THAT DEFENDANT [...] DID NOT HAVE A DISQUALIFYING CONFLICT OF INTEREST IN THE VOTE ON THE BOND ORDINANCE.  The trial court properly ruled that a conflict of issue is to be determined under N.J.S.A. 40A:9-22.5 and, more particularly, whether there was a benefit to a member of the governing body greater than could reasonably be expected to accrue to other members in the community and there was none.  (Tr. 92:24-93:11.)  The trial court properly rejected Plaintiff’s argument that the court was required to go beyond the criteria established by the New Jersey Legislature in N.J.S.A. 40A:9-22.5 and to consider whether there was an appearance of a conflict of interest based on the holding in Grabowsky v. Township of Montclair, 221 N.J. 536 (2015) and an unpublished opinion.
[brief] In August 2021, trial was held on the first three counts before the Honorable [...], J.S.C. and a jury, and defendant was convicted of all of those counts, followed by an immediate second trial on Count Four in front of the same judge and jury at which he was convicted of that count as well.  (Da 5 to 6)  On February 17, 2022, after merging the conviction for Count Two into the conviction for Count One, [...] sentenced defendant to serve the following concurrent prison terms: an extended three-strikes term of life without parole for murder, and terms of ten years, five without parole, on Counts Three and Four.  (Da 7 to 9)  Defendant was also ordered to pay the usual fees and penalties.  (Da 7 to 9)  _____________________  1  Da – defendant’s appendix to this brief PSR – presentence report  On November 28, 2022, defendant filed his notice of appeal, and this Court permitted him to do so as within time.  (Da 10 to 14)  STATEMENT OF FACTS  Defendant was convicted of murder and related offenses for causing the shooting death of [...] in front of the [...] on the corner of Hoffman and Stuyvesant Avenues in [...].
[brief] LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I CRISDEL’S ARGUMENT OF DISPUTED FACTS AND INFERENCES IN ITS FAVOR IS CONTRARY TO THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD OF REVIEW.  Defendant [...] seeks to justify judgment in its favor as a matter of law on two bases.  First, it argues that everything documented at length in plaintiffs’ Statement of Facts, Pb6-22, is disputed by contrary evidence and the opinions of [...]’s hired expert witnesses.  It claims that certain supervisory personnel had no notice of the sweeper driver’s reckless conduct, Cb24, despite testimony of a half dozen witnesses to the contrary.  See Pb18-20.  It claims that the back up alarm and back up lights were operational, Cb21, even though the testimony indicates that the alarm was not heard, and the lights were not seen.  Pb11-12.  It argues that decedent was lit up like a Christmas tree, Cb10, when the evidence indicates there was inadequate (if any) site lighting and decedent was using a flashlight to light his way.  Pb10.  [...] argues that it “usually” had a truck assigned to the sweeper, Cb23, but the testimony was that a truck was not regularly assigned nor was any type of traffic control plan developed or used as required by the contract and regulations.  Pb14-18.
[brief] Defendants’ non-reaction to the spotlight -- like nervous behavior that courts have reasonably found not to support reasonable suspicion -- did not justify the stop.  And even considering the closeness of [...]’s encounter with defendants in terms of spatial and temporal proximity to the robbery does not add significantly to the analysis of whether the stop was lawful because the [...] was located on a roadway close to a major interstate highway and the record is unclear as to when the robbery actually occurred.  The non-specific and non-individualized factors asserted here do not add up to a totality of circumstances analysis upon which reasonable suspicion can be found.  Zero plus zero will always equal zero.
[brief] Both the March 14 [...] letter and the [...] Rules provided that any “answer, counterclaim or objection to Claimant’s requested locale should be filed within 14 days. ”  Although the March 14, 2023 letter indicated deadlines could be extended on consent, Plaintiffs proceeded to retain counsel and file both an Answer and Counterclaims on the date of the deadline.  Plaintiffs’ Counterclaims were accepted for filing, and their counsel participated at the April 4th Administrative Conference with the [...].  Plaintiffs irrefutably knew or were on notice of such facts that would have led a prudent person – let alone the educated persons who hired an attorney to review the contract – to evaluate whether the filing of the Counterclaims in the [...] proceeding would manifest evidence of asset to the arbitration provision in the SPA.  The totality of the circumstances warrants a finding of waiver and consent to Arbitration.  Not only did Plaintiffs agree to, or consent to arbitration, they intended to remain in that forum without hesitation.  This is evidenced by the filing of counterclaims which demonstrates Plaintiffs’ intent to pursue their own claims against Defendants without any objection.  The plain language of the Arbitration Provision, and reasonable notice provided to Plaintiffs of the duty to read and approve all contract documents and incorporated documents prior to the expiration of the attorney review period are equally significant.  Plaintiffs’ prior real estate experience, knowing and voluntary assent to the binding arbitration agreement in the POS, and their knowing and voluntary election to arbitrate the same core disputes with the [...] in March 2023 warrant a finding that the Plaintiffs objectively manifested an intent to resolve all disputes at issue in this Action and the [...] case exclusively by binding arbitration.  As such, this Court should find that Plaintiffs waived their right to initiate a lawsuit in any other forum, but Arbitration.  CONCLUSION
[brief] First, controlling state authority and federal authority both provide that for *state* causes of action, the accrual date is a matter of *state* law.  See Rosenau, 51 N.J. at 137 (“The Legislature has not specified when the cause of action shall be deemed to have accrued and the matter has therefore been left entirely to judicial interpretation and administration. ”); see also Rankin v. Smithburger, \(^7\)  In written correspondence accompanying his April 14, 2023 judicial order in the related criminal action, the Hon. [...], J.S.C. explained that “you cannot have a ‘JOC’ on a conviction that was vacated[].” (Pa219).
[brief] However, the Resolution contradict by stating that Appellants’ “stylistic criticisms of the proposed home are unfounded” without conducting any analysis of the ordinances relevant to historic districts.  Appellants’ motions were based on omission, so there was no choice but to provide the entirety of the transcript to show what was absent from the record.  It appears that the motion judge may have attempted to boil the ocean by making many findings without any support in the record.  The subject motions sought to have the motion judge reach the determination as to only two binary questions for the threshold determination as to whether enlargement of the time for Appellants to file their complaint by four days is so manifest that the interest of justice requires it.
[brief] “Thus, even if the remedy the Arbitrator fashioned was not the preferred or correct outcome, a reversal would be contrary to the deferential standard for reviewing arbitral decisions. ”  Borough of Carteret, 247 N.J. at 212 (quoting E. Rutherford PBA, 213 N.J. at 206).  In short, an arbitrator’s decision will be affirmed under the “reasonably debatable” standard if it is a plausible interpretation of the parties’ contract.
[brief] The Procedural History by [...] is incorrect.  The issue in this matter is about [...].  (Da278, Da279, Da286)  After receipt of the Complaint and Jury Demand, [...] filed a Motion to Dismiss the Complaint which was denied by the Court on January 21, 2022.  Thereafter, [...] filed an Answer and a Counterclaim on August 21, 2023.  (Da9-Da17,Da23)  [...] filed an Application for Permission to File an Emergent Motion at the Appellate Court which was denied by the Appellate Court.  (Pa177)  (This filing not included in my Appendix)  After filing the Notice of Appeal, [...] filed a Motion to Stay the Summary Judgment decision with the Trial Court which was denied.  (Da214)(Filing not in Appendix, Order in Appendix)  RESPONSE TO NEW COMMUNITY CORPORATIONS
[brief] A.  The Miscalculation of Interest  The interest calculation in the Award is the product of two errors: (1) the interest is calculated on the full amount owed by each party, rather than the net amount owed to [...], and (2) the Arbitrator’s correction to the interest on the four on-going projects improperly discounts payments made by [...] by the percentage of project completion.  1.  **The interest on the unpaid EGP claim must be calculated on the net amount due**  In the Award, the amount of interest owed on the unpaid EGP claim was determined by applying the interest rate (7.75%) to the amount of unpaid EGP awarded to [...] (accounting for the ongoing project’s completion).  [...], however, was awarded $732,533.75 for unpaid preconstruction expenses owed to it by [...].  Da141-142.  Because [...] owed [...] the preconstruction expenses, [...] never owed [...] the complete EGP award, and [...] cannot be liable for interest on the full amount.  Rather, the interest must be calculated on the net amount owed to [...].  This error is mathematical and computational and does not require any evaluation of the evidence.  Tab 1 of Alternative Calculations shows the calculation of the Award using the preconstruction expense as an offset before interest is calculated (under the heading “Same as above - Precon as a offset of [...] before Interest Calc”).  Da475.  The correct Award incorporating this correction is $3,855,459.28.
[brief] **As [...] Was Unable to Establish Proximate Cause Against [...], The Trial Court Correctly Granted [...]’s Motion for Summary Judgment**  Even *assuming arguendo* that [...] did breach a duty to the appellant (which the Trial Court correctly ruled that as property owner, they did not), the Trial Court correctly granted Summary Judgment as appellant failed to establish [...]’s breach of an owed duty caused his injuries.  The appellant is appealing the January 6, 2023 trial court’s decision based on the argument that sufficient circumstantial evidence as to the cause of [...]’s fall was submitted.  However, the Trial Court correctly concluded no evidence as to the cause of [...]’s fall was submitted.  As previously provided, it is well settled law of the State of New Jersey that ordinary negligence must be proven and will never be presumed; indeed, there is a presumption against it, and the burden of proving negligence is on the plaintiffs.
[brief] [Peer Mallen supra. 54 Defense Counsel J. At 475.]  See, e.g., *Interco v. Mission Ins. Co.*, 808 F.2d 682, 685-86 (8th Cir. 1987) (concluding that intent to cause severe emotional damage could not be inferred from insured's firing plaintiff).  In the instant matter, the result of the alleged action does not conform to that which one would predict, and these are not "normal circumstances".  Attempting to get the property manager fired for refusing to do her job, for example, is simply not sufficient as a matter of law to infer [...] had an intent to cause bodily injury.  There is no evidence of actual injuries, and the complaint did not specifically allege that [...] intended to inflict injury.  Consistent with *SL Industries* and *Voorhees*, a factual inquiry is necessary to determine whether the "expected or intended" injury exclusion applies.
[brief] For the foregoing reasons, Defendant-Respondent [...] respectfully requests that this Court affirm the motion court’s order dismissing, with prejudice, Plaintiff-Appellant [...]’s complaint and affirm the motion court’s order awarding Respondent-Defendant [...] reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs.  Dated: East Brunswick, New Jersey  July 15, 2024  [...]  By: /s/[...]  [...], Esq.  [...], Esq.  Attorneys for Defendant-Respondent [...]  Superior Court of the State of New Jersey  Appellate Division  Docket No. [...] 101  HUDSON PROPERTIES, LLC, Plaintiff-Appellant-Cross-Respondent, – v – BIRCH REAL ESTATE SERVICES, LLC, Defendant-Respondent, – and – [...], Defendant-Respondent-Cross-Appellant.
[brief] See Davis v. Brickman Landscaping, Ltd., 219 N.J. 395, 412-14 (2014) (expert’s opinions regarding what “a reasonable fire inspector” would have done were impermissible net opinions, since the expert failed to provide objective evidence to support what amounted to “nothing more than his personal opinion”).  As plaintiffs’ claims against [...] necessarily implicate a professional standard of care, the trial court correctly dismissed those claims for failure to supply an affidavit of merit.  *Couri*, supra.  **CONCLUSION**
[brief] Apt. Corp. v. New Horizon Deli*, 368 *N.J. Super.* 456, 459 (App. Div. 2004); *Naporano Assocs, V. B&P Builders*, 309 *N.J. Super.* 166, 178 (App. Div. 1998); *W.H. Indus. v. Fundicao*, 397 *N.J. Super.* 455, 458-459 (App. Div. 2008).  However, failure to identify an issue in a notice of appeal may be remedied where the issue or order is identified in the case information statement.  See *Synnex Corp. v. ADT Security*, 394 *N.J. Super.* 577, 588 (App. Div. 2007); *Silveira-Franciso v. Bd of Educ.*, 224 *N.J.* 126, 140-141 (2016).  Here, [...] focused solely on the Orders denying its motions for summary judgment and reconsideration.  [...]’s Notices of Appeal and Civil Case Information Statements do not indicate any intention to appeal the trial court’s January 5, 2024, Order dismissing [...] from the case outright.  (*Da96-Da101*, [...]’s Initial Notice of Appeal; *TPDa14-TPDa18*, [...]’s Amended Notice of Appeal; *TPDa19-TPDa23*  [...]’s Initial Case Information Statement; and TPDa24-TPDa28 [...]’s Amended Case Information Statement).  As [...] failed to appeal [...]’s Order of dismissal, [...]’s appeal fails on its face.
[brief] Unlike PCR counsel, trial counsel was prohibited by the Rules of Professional Conduct from raising clearly meritless, unsupported factual or legal claims simply because his client was committed to it.  Trial counsel was not faced with “the same Hobson’s choice” that is presented to PCR counsel.  Db13.  Trial counsel had only one rule which he was obligated to follow – RPC 3.1 – and follow it he did.  [...] correctly determined no relief could flow from trial counsel’s ethically, legally and factually supported choice.  Moreover, to the extent that defendant suggested before the lower court, and continues to claim before this Court, that he is entitled to relief based on the inference that trial counsel “also failed to meaningfully discuss and develop the defense before trial,” such a claim is not properly before this Court on direct appeal.
[brief] ”  (3T83-10 to 84-20)  •  At his re-sentencing in 2023, [...] testified that “I take full responsibility for what I did” and that “I will forever carry the burden of what I did and that burden weighs heavy in my heart.  Although I hope it’s possible, I don’t expect you to ever forgive me nor will I put more anguish on you by asking you to.  I am truly and deeply sorry for the heinous act I committed and the pain I’ve caused you and your family.
[brief] Plaintiff asserted she negotiated the agreement with [...], who was the person she answered to at [...].  1T111:6-10.  However, as the trial Court noted, even if this agreement were valid and binding, despite [...]’ clear lack of wherewithal to meet its terms, it only provided for compensation for a portion of 2014 (Pa20), as [...] was only formed in 2014 and it explicitly stated that compensation for 2015 and beyond “will be mutually agreed upon annually as part of the [...] Strategic Planning process in Q4.
[brief] [Pa12].  The Civil Service  ¹ Transcripts shall be designated as follows: 1T = October 19, 2020 Hearing Transcript; 2T = October 20, 2020 Hearing Transcript; 3T = October 21, 2020 Hearing Transcript; 4T = October 29, 2020 Hearing Transcript; 5T = November 10, 2020 Hearing Transcript; and 6T = November 23, 2020 Hearing Transcript.
[brief] Again, had attorneys been involved at the outset, we would have a clearer idea legally of what the original intent was, but they weren’t and we don’t.  So the Court resorted to referencing the plan as a kind of joint venture.  The Court went on to state that because no proofs at trial established convincingly that the $50,000.00 was a gift or a conditional gift or anything else, the condominium should be sold and [...] or [...]’s estate should get the $50,000.00 back at sale (6T34:22-23).
[brief] Plaintiff’s Criminal Convictions.  On January 6, 2009, Pennsylvania police arrested Plaintiff for possession of heroin inside a baseball cap.  (Appx 525 at ¶21).  Plaintiff had the intent to distribute it, but did not get the chance to do so because she was arrested.  (Appx 525 at ¶22).  The Affidavit of Probable cause describes what happened the night she was arrested.  (Appx 525 ¶23).  According to the Affidavit of Probable Cause, an undercover officer arranged to purchase ten bricks of heroin, and Plaintiff admitted to delivering ten bricks of heroin at the drug bust.  (Appx 526 at ¶24).  In June 2009, Plaintiff pleaded guilty to the felonies of “Manufacturing, dealing, possessing, with intent to manufacture or deal” and unlawfully and knowingly, intentionally possessing.  (Appx 526 at ¶25).  Plaintiff understood this to be a criminal conviction.  (Appx 526 at ¶27).  In April 2010, as a result of her criminal convictions, the court sentenced Plaintiff to prison. (Appx 526 ¶28).  Plaintiff did not recall how many years she spent in prison, but she was still in prison as of July 2014, more than five years after her initial incarceration.  (Appx 527 ¶29 (emphasis added)).  Plaintiff served her full sentence.  (Appx 527 ¶30).  E.
[brief] [...], Defendants-Respondents.  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY  APPELLATE  DIVISION DOCKET NO. [...]  Civil Action ON APPEAL FROM LAW  DIVISION  BERGEN COUNTY  HON.  [...], J.S.C. DOCKET NO. [...]  Date of Orders Below: March 25, 2024 and April 19, 2024  ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED  PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT
[brief] In enacting this section the Legislature recognized that local municipal authorities are ill-equipped to comprehend adequately the needs of the actual and potential users of the utility's services beyond as well as within their territorial limits.  The lawmakers knew that if the zoning power of a municipality were paramount, it would probably be exercised with an eye toward the local situation and without consideration for the best interests of the consumers at large in other communities whose convenience and necessity require service.  The exemption [from local zoning regulation] also signifies an awareness that if the local authorities were supreme the Board of Public Utility Commissioners could not compel a utility to provide adequate service if the zoning ordinance conflicted with the need for expansion or extension of its facilities within the municipality.  *Id.* at 258.
[brief] 239, 257 (App. Div. 2004) ("Whether conduct constitutes a breach of contract and, if it does, whether the breach is material are ordinarily jury questions.").  violation of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing claim – a claim independent of any unpled implied warranty claims manufactured by defendant. \textsuperscript{53}  "Every party to a contract... is bound by a duty of good faith and fair dealing in both the performance and enforcement of the contract" and "[a] defendant may be liable for a breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing even if it does not 'violat[e] an express term of a contract."\textsuperscript{54}  The implied covenant claim focuses on whether defendant “’engaged in some conduct that denied the benefit of the bargain originally intended by the parties"\textsuperscript{55}  Defendant sold polluted water to plaintiff and failed to source potable water, such as by buying water from alternate providers and thereby denying plaintiff the very benefit of their bargain with defendant.  The case shouldn’t be decided on summary judgment because violation of the duty of good faith and fair dealing necessarily depends upon the facts of the particular case and is ordinarily a jury question.\textsuperscript{56}
[directive] 3.3.2  Officers face a dynamic environment in which interactions with individuals can escalate very quickly from one level of resistance to another.  For example, a passive resistor may become an active assailant in an instant.  In responding to the level of resistance, the officer may use the level of force that corresponds to the level of resistance the officer is facing, and need not use lesser levels of force that will not address the threat that the officer faces at the time.  If the individual’s resistance diminishes, the officer shall immediately reduce the level of force used against the individual.  If the individual stops resisting entirely, the officer must immediately cease using force.  3.4
[brief] A minimum contacts analysis involves looking at whether a defendant “purposefully availed” itself of “the privilege of conducting activities within the forum state,” “invoking the benefits and protection of its laws” such that the defendant expected its conduct to have significant effects there.  *Avdel*, 58 N.J. at 271.  The foreseeability component is a question of whether the defendant’s conduct and connection with the forum state are such that it should reasonably expect to be “haled into court there. ”  *World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson*, 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
[brief] As an initial matter, this argument was waived by the State failing to raise it below.  It is well-established that “the points of divergence developed in proceedings before a trial court define the metes and bounds of appellate review. ”  *State v. Witt*, 223 N.J. 409, 419 (2015) (citing *State v. Robinson*, 200 N.J. 1, 19 (2009)).  “The jurisdiction of appellate courts rightly is bounded by the proofs and objections critically explored on the record before the trial court by the parties themselves. ”  *Robinson*, 200 N.J. at 19.  “Parties must make known their positions at the suppression hearing so that the trial court can rule on the issues before it. ”  *Witt*, 223 N.J. at 419 (emphasis added).  If a party fails to “properly present[ ]” an issue “to the trial court when an opportunity for such a presentation is available,” the court on appeal “will decline to consider” the issue.  *Ibid.*  The State never disputed below that all parties understood the plea agreement to provide [...] the right to withdraw from the plea agreement in its entirety if he prevailed on appeal.
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT’S DECISION SHOULD BE AFFIRMED BECAUSE OPRA DOES NOT CONTEMPLATE THE DESTRUCTION OF GOVERNMENT RECORDS AND THE STATE’S INTEREST IN PRESERVING THESE RECORDS OUTWEIGHS ANY INTEREST IN THE PROPOSED TESTING.  Notwithstanding these fatal procedural deficiencies, the trial court considered the merits of her complaint and correctly found that [...] and the interested parties failed to meet the fundamental requirements of an OPRA or common law right of access claim against Respondents.  Because OPRA does not allow potentially destructive DNA tests that would permanently alter and possibly destroy government records, and the State’s interest in preserving the integrity of the historical items outweighs any interest that might result in their damage or destruction, the trial court’s decision should be affirmed.