ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] However, as noted Section 4.6.  for all facts and tools do ~ee~not account assessment risk the release material bearing on the risks posed by a defendant's have a that may circumstances for of establish grounds provisions this Directive that some (noting note 8 pending trial.  See risk of independent presumption that are invoking a information should consider any additional relevant therefore, prosecutor, A results).  assessment provided, subsections 4.2.2 to 4.2.5 and Section 7.6, available, see reasonably be that may for any such additional information the basis rely on as shall not prosecutor that the however, pretrial detention pursuant Directive unless against to this presumption the overcome deciding to circumstance detention hearing.lg fact or at a establish that to prepared the prosecutor is of in exercise degree of statewide uniformity the appropriate an help achieve To pretrial detention decision-making framework establishes a Section discretion, this prosecutorial criminal concerning admissibility of in "[t]he rules the evidence provides that expressly Reform Law 18 Bail The N.J.S.A. of information [detention] hearing." consideration at the presentation and apply to the shall not trials for establish rely upon and present, example, hearsay evidence to prosecutor may Accordingly, a 2A:162-19(e)(1). detention order. pretrial for the legal basis a Page 65 presumption19 of category, there is rebuttable For each of cases. categories consisting of three discretion. of prosecutorial channel the exercise serves to pretrial detention that seek whether to to within a needed level of authority prosecutor's office the framework specifies this In addition, presumption. decision to overcome a the approve detention, filing motion presumption ga ainst a for pretrial establishes a category The first or or Prosecutor, Prosecutor First Assistant when the County only overcome which can be in by the Division of Criminal Justice matters prosecuted Director of the Deputy Director or a first justify detention.
[brief] Henry v. Rahway State Prison, 81 N.J. 571 (1980)......................................................8  In re Issuance of Permit by DEP, 120 N.J. 164 (1990)...............................................9  Mayflower Sec. Co. v. Bureau of Sec., 64 N.J. 85 (1973).................................7, 8  Mazza v. Bd. of Trs., 143 N.J. 22 (1995).................................................................9  N.J. Civil Serv. Ass'n v. State, 88 N.J. 605 (1982)......................................................7  N.J. Soc'y for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v. N.J. Dep't of Agric., 196 N.J. 366 (2008).........................................................8  SMB Assocs v. Department of Envtl. Prot., 264 N.J. Super 38 (App. Div. 1993), aff’d, 137 N.J. 58 (1994)..................12  State v.  Atley, 157 N.J. Super. 157 (App. Div. 1978).................................9 In re State & Sch. Emples. Health Benefits Commissions’ Implementation of Yucht, 233 N.J. 267 (2018)..............9, 10 Vas v. Roberts, 418 N.J. Super. 509 (App. Div. 2011)..................................7 In re Virtua-West Jersey Hosp. Voorhees, 194 N.J. 413 (2008).....................................................................................8 Williams v. Department of Corrections, 330 N.J. Super. 197 (App. Div. 2000) ....................................................7, 8 APPENDIX TABLE OF CONTENTS VOLUME I (CONFIDENTIAL) Notice of Appeal........................................................................................................Pa1 Case Information Statement......................................................................................Pa5 [...] Final Decision 9/27/23..........................................Pa9 Reply to [...] 7/18/23\(^1\)..............................................Pa15 [...] Initial Decision 6/13/23.................................Pa23 Administrative Denial of Ricci Benefits.................................................................Pa26 Correspondence to [...] 3/23/23...............................Pa27 Petition for Ricci Action Registration 3/3/23.......................................................Pa29
[brief] See Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 550 (1968) (“When a law enforcement officer claims authority to search a home under a warrant, he announces in effect that the occupant has no right to resist the search.  The situation is instinct with coercion—albeit colorably lawful coercion.  Where there is coercion there cannot be consent. ”); Hagans, 233 N.J. at 42 (“As a best practice, police officers should tell a suspect only the measures they intend to take—apply for a search warrant—and should not offer a prediction about whether a warrant will issue. ”).14  In finding [...]’s consent voluntary, the trial court explained that it “observed the interaction on [the] MVR recording” and that “[n]othing about the interaction demonstrated that officers acted inappropriately or inappropriately coerced Defendant into signing the consent form.
[brief] In recognition of the fact that the Mayor had irreversibly tainted the Zoning Board, and in accordance with applicable law, the Trial Court then appropriately appointed a Special Hearing Officer to hear the Plaintiffs’ application seeking preliminary and final site plan approval (the “Site Plan Application”) based upon the variances.  Following public hearings on Plaintiffs’ Site Plan Application conducted by the Special Hearing Officer, the Trial Court adopted the Special Hearing Officer’s recommendations and Resolution (the “Resolution”) granting that application for preliminary and final major site plan approval.  On appeal, Defendants insist that the discovery of the bald eagle’s nest, and Plaintiffs’ efforts to protect that nest in accordance with law, should be punished and Plaintiffs should be prevented from providing the affordable housing that resulted from the settlement of the Township’s Mount Laurel litigation.  Plaintiffs submit that both the Trial Court and the Special Hearing Officer acted completely in accordance with law when reversing the Zoning Board’s denial and taking the actions required to allow Plaintiffs to proceed with development of the subject property.  Despite their unlawful conduct, as adjudicated by the Trial Court, Defendants-Appellants Township and Mayor then sought summary judgment seeking to dismiss Plaintiffs’ remaining Counts, seeking damages which were premised upon that unlawful conduct.  Those Counts asked the Trial Court to make Plaintiffs whole, i.e., to award damages and attorney’s fees and costs to Plaintiffs resulting from Defendants’ unlawful conduct.  However, the Trial Court, despite acknowledging the egregiousness of the Mayor’s actions, and the arbitrariness of the Zoning Board’s decision, denied Plaintiffs’ claims for damages under the Federal and New Jersey Civil Rights Acts, and the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination.  For the reasons stated herein, presented to this Court via the cross-appeal, the Trial Court’s ruling dismissing the damage claims should be reversed.
[brief] On the other hand, the trial court’s expedited discovery, reconsideration, alteration, amendment and vacation denial orders are subject to deferential abuse of discretion review.  A trial court abuses its discretion when its decision was “made without a rational explanation, inexplicably departed from established policies, or rested on an impermissible basis. ”  Flagg v. Essex Cnty. Prosecutor, 171 N.J. 561, 571 (2002).  Moreover, in Lawson v. Dewar, 468 N.J. Super. 128 (App. Div. 2021), Presiding Appellate Judge [...], together with Judges [...] and [...], explained:  But some reconsideration motions—those that argue in good faith a prior mistake, a change in circumstances, or the court’s misappreciation of what was previously argued—present the court with an opportunity to either reinforce and better explain why the prior order was appropriate or correct a prior erroneous order.  Judges should view well-reasoned motions based upon Rule 4:42-2 as an invitation to apply Cromwell’s rule:  “I beseech you . . . think it possible you may be mistaken. ”  The fair and efficient administration of justice is better served when reconsideration motions are viewed in that spirit and not as nuisance to be swatted away.  In a Rule 4:50-1 motion to alter or amend the judgment, a party must show “(1) an intervening change in controlling law; (2) the availability of new evidence; or (3) the need to correct clear error of law or prevent manifest injustice. ”  Lazaridis v. Wehmer, 591 F. 3d 666, 669 (3d Cir 2010) (per curiam).  The new evidence must (1) be material to the issue and not merely cumulative or impeaching, (2) have been discovered since the trial and must be such as by the exercise of due diligence could not have been discoverable prior to the expiration of the time for moving for a new trial; and (3) be of such nature as to have been likely to have changed the result if a new trial had been granted.  Quick Chek Food Stores v. Springfield Tp., 83 N.J. 438 (1980).
[brief] (30T53-2 to 3).  The judge acknowledged that defendant apologized for his actions, but he still took no responsibility because he told the interviewer for the pre-sentence report he was attacked, and people wanted to kill him.  (30T53-10 to 12).  [...] found as an aggravating factor that defendant was at risk of reoffending.  (30T53-15 to 19).  The court held that it could consider defendant’s lack of remorse because it was relevant to whether defendant was amenable to rehabilitation.  (30T53-20 to 30T54-4; 30T54-12 to 19).  Defendant was found guilty but still denied his guilt.
[brief] On April 1, 2009, the DOT issued a letter to [...] cancelling [...]’s access to Route 70, which became effective April 15, 2009.  Sometime between April 1 and April 15, 2009 an informal meeting took place between the DOT, [...] and [...]’s representatives at the DOT’s request.  This meeting was not held in accordance with any statutory or administrative requirements, no prior notice of the meeting was given, and there is no official record of what occurred.  At the time of the aforementioned informal meeting, Defendant, a representative of [...], reasonably believed he had no basis to object to the DOT’s decision to erect a fence on [...]’s property subject to eminent domain.  On April 15, 2009, the DOT provided reasonable alternative access to [...]’s property.  However, the reasonable alternative access was not actually available for use until November of 2011, which resulted in a lengthy court battle under [...] vs. State of New Jersey, by the Commissioner of Transportation v. [...], Superior Court of New Jersey Appellate Division [...].
[brief] The New Jersey Arbitration Act, N.J.S.A. 2A: 23B-1 et seq. (effective January 1, 2003) (the “NJAA”), which this Court already determined applies here, provides that an arbitration award may only be vacated if: (1) the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or other undue means; (2) the court finds evident partiality by an arbitrator; corruption by an arbitrator; or misconduct by an arbitrator prejudicing the rights of a party to the arbitration proceeding:  N.J.S.A. 2A:23B-23(a).  In reviewing private commercial arbitrations, courts apply this statute stringently, and the standard for vacatur will be met only in “rare circumstances. ”  Tretina, 135 N.J. at 364.  Arbitration awards are final and not subject to judicial review absent fraud, corruption or similar wrongdoing, and an award may not be vacated merely to correct alleged errors of law or fact.  Tretina at 357.  The party challenging the arbitration award ([...]), and not the successful party, bears the burden of demonstrating sufficient grounds for vacatur.  *Del Piano v. Merrill Lynch*, 372 N.J. Super. 503, 510 (App. Div. 2004).  Of course, there is no “*de novo*” review or appeal, and the statutory grounds for vacatur do not authorize an independent review of the merits.  *Shahmoon Indus., Inc. v. Steelworker*, 263 F.Supp. 10, 14 (D.N.J. 1966) (“courts... have no business weighing the merits”); *Tretina*, 262 N.J. Super. at 49, rev’d on other grnds., 135 N.J. 349 (1994) (a court reviewing an arbitration award does not sit as an appellate court).
[directive] (See Attorney General Law Enforcement Directive No. 2019-6).  Thus, the following matters shall be reported to the County Prosecutor so that he or she may evaluate the material’s relevance:  62  INTERNAL AFFAIRS POLICY & PROCEDURES | August 2020  (a)  A finding that a police officer has filed a false report or submitted a false certification in any criminal, administrative, employment, financial or insurance matter in their professional or personal life;11  (b)  A pending court complaint or conviction for any criminal, disorderly persons, petty disorderly persons, municipal ordinance or driving while intoxicated matter; (c)  A finding that undermines or contradicts a police officer's educational achievements or qualifications as an expert witness; (d) A finding of fact by a judicial authority or administrative tribunal that is known to the officer's employing agency that concludes that a police officer intentionally did not tell the truth in a matter; (e) A sustained finding that a police officer intentionally mishandled or destroyed evidence; and (f) A sustained finding that a police officer is biased against a particular gender or ethnic group.
[brief] *N.J.S.A. 2C:33-2a(1)* states that a person is guilty of Disorderly Conduct if “with purpose to cause public inconvenience, annoyance or alarm, or recklessly creating a risk thereof he [e]ngages in fighting or threatening, or in violent tumultuous behavior[.]”  Two Appellate Division cases illustrate the wide variety of behavior that can be characterized as disorderly conduct.
[brief] 275 (2021) ...................................................................................................................24, 26, 45 - **Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,** - 477 U.S. 242 (1986).....................................................................................................................23 - **Atl. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hillside Bottling Co.,** - 397 N.J. Super. 224 (App. Div. 2006)
[brief] Additionally, a plaintiff “must present evidence to support a finding that defendant’s negligent conduct was a ‘substantial factor’ in bringing about plaintiff’s injury, even though there may be other concurrent causes of the harm. ”  *Froom v. Perel*, 377 N.J. Super. 298, 313 (App. Div. 2005) (quoting, *Conklin*, 145 N.J. at 419).  Also, the plaintiff must show “what injuries were suffered as a proximate consequence of the attorney’s breach of duty,” ordinarily measured by “the amount that a client would have received but for the attorney’s negligence. ”  *2175 Lemoine Ave. Corp. v. Finco, Inc.*, 272 N.J. Super. 478, 488 (App. Div. 1994).
[directive] Iniciais do Réu / Defendant’s Initials no Formulário Padrão de Declaração Judicial/Formulário Revisado Promulgado pela diretiva 01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 10079-Portuguese página 2 de 7 Main Plea Form/Revised Form Promulgated by Directive #01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 10079-Portuguese page 2 of 7
[brief] Haynes supra, at 184-185.  In those limited circumstances, a higher “clear and convincing” standard of proof is required to rebut the presumption of undue influence.  Id.  In Haynes, the Court found that the attorney had represented both testator and the proponent of the new will when he prepared the will and was unable to rebut the presumption of undue influence by clear and convincing evidence because there was no proof the attorney disclosed the conflict of interest to the testator.
[brief] Defendants maintain, on the facts in the record and the applicable law and standard, the trial court could have accepted the unrebutted expert report of [...] and found they did not have constructive or inquiry notice of the Musto-Miller error.  Even if there was “inquiry” notice, there was no evidence or finding that the Defendant-Buyers acquisition of a survey was an inadequate inquiry.  For these reasons, the trial court erred in concluding there were no disputed issues of material fact such that Plaintiffs were entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
[brief] Certainly, race and sex -- when taken together with other, discrete factors -- can support reasonable and articulable suspicion.  But here, the initial description did not provide any additional physical descriptions that would differentiate the two Black male suspects from any other Black men in New Jersey.  And the radio dispatch indicated that the store was robbed by two Black men.  [...] testified that upon seeing three Black males in the vehicle, he inferred that the third was the getaway driver.  While [...]’s inference was reasonable, the reality is that the ambiguous nature of the description could have resulted in Black men in any configuration and using any mode of transportation being stopped because the only descriptors of the suspects were race and sex.  [...] saw the clothing and learned the car had been reported stolen after the stop, but information acquired after a stop cannot retroactively serve as the basis for the stop.
[brief] *State v. Knight*, 477 N.J. Super. 400, 416 n.12 (App. Div. 2023), aff’d, 259 N.J. 407 (2024).  That prevalence is of long vintage, and its effects have long been felt in the courtroom.  It was more than thirty years ago that our Supreme Court wrote, “[V]ideotape evidence has now become commonplace in criminal cases. ”  *Wilson*, 135 N.J. at 16.  As with social media posts, the circumstances of a surveillance video can establish the low burden of a prima facie showing of reliability.
[brief] §2a  “Tenant will provide Landlord with a copy of its application to the Planning Board or Zoning Board of Adjustment of the [...], inclusive of Architect’s Plans and all other exhibits or submissions on or before July 15, 2016”.  §4  “Tenant will diligently prosecute its application for approvals referenced in paragraph 2 above at Tenant’s expense”.  §6  “Time is hereby made of the essence with respect to all time periods provided in the within Lease Rider” (Pa1374-Pa1375).
[brief] As noted above, when plaintiff said she was not dropping a claim, the Court accepted that answer.  See, e.g., 1T8:3-9:20.  Again, the plaintiff admits that she raised no objection to any of this questioning in the Trial Court.  Neither did [...].  Thus, the standard for this Court’s consideration of these matters is one of plain error.  Far from there being plain error here (as discussed above in Section V.A.), plaintiff has presented no evidence that the Trial Court committed any error at all.  Plaintiff’s attack on the Trial Court’s questioning of plaintiff should thus be rejected.  VI.
[brief] Guided by the standards established by the New Jersey Legislature when it adopted the New Jersey Long-Term Care Insurance Act (the “LTCI Act”), both the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) and the Commissioner correctly found that [...] failed to carry its burden to demonstrate to the Department that its rates complied with the LTCI Act.  Under the LTCI Act, the Department balanced [...]’s financial goals with the need to protect innocent policyholders from excess rate increases.  [...]’s policyholders are generally of older age and are on fixed incomes.  Its policyholders should not have to absorb the brunt of [...]’s financial miscalculations.  [...] argues that the Department disapproved of its premium rate increase requests using post hoc justifications not found in the December 2021 disapproval letters.  [...]’s focus on those letters is sorely misguided.  The Department’s grounds for disapproval are not limited to one letter.  Under applicable rules, the Department’s disapproval grounds are contained in successive letter objections setting forth the bases for disapproval, to which [...] had an opportunity to respond.  The Department’s disapproval followed detailed reviews of both actuarial and non-actuarial grounds [...] relied on to justify its premium rate increases.  The Department offered [...] a more modest 20% rate increase in 2020, which was in line with past approvals.  If [...]’s rate filings were approved, [...] would have become ineligible to request future rate increases for 3 to 5 years under the rules because its cumulative rate increases would have exceeded 150% of the original premium.  [...] declined to accept the Department’s offer.  Both the ALJ and the Commissioner found unsupported [...]’s arguments that compliance with the mathematical requirements of the rules eliminates the standards of the LTCI Act.  The LTCI Act empowered the Department to disapprove rates that are excessive, inadequate or unfairly discriminatory, in order to protect the public interest of the policyholders.
[directive] Structuring Plea Agreements  These Guidelines are designed to account for all relevant aggravating circumstances in determining the defendant’s culpability.  Because these aggravating circumstances may accumulate in a single case, the authorized disposition may in some cases exceed the maximum term of parole ineligibility  Page 11 [...] Guidelines 2 (2004 Revisions) that could actually be imposed as a matter of law upon conviction of a single count.  In that event, the prosecutor is required, where possible, to “structure” the plea agreement to permit imposition of the sentence prescribed by the Table of Authorized Plea Offers and these Guidelines.  This might require, for example, that the prosecutor formally apply for an extended term pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6f (Repeat Offender) or 2C:44-3h (Street Gang Related Activity) and/or enhanced punishment pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-8 (Distribution to Minor or Pregnant Female).  This might also require that the defendant plead guilty to additional counts.  Note that in State v. Dillihay, 127 N.J. 42 (1992), the New Jersey Supreme Court held that where a defendant is convicted of a second-degree offense under N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5 (a non-Brimage- eligible offense) and the third-degree school zone offense under 2C:35-7, the defendant is subject to a mandatory term of parole ineligibility prescribed by the school zone offense, which is to be applied to the range of sentence appropriate to a second-degree conviction.  The same principle would apply where a defendant is convicted of the third-degree school zone offense and the second-degree crime of distributing or possessing with intent to distribute controlled substances while in a drug-free public housing, public park, or public building zone in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7.1.  In fact, applying the analysis of the Court in Dillihay, convictions for violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7 (school zone) and 2C:35-7.1 (public housing, park, or building zone) involving the same illicit transaction would not even merge, because each offense requires proof of an additional fact that the other does not, and neither offense is a lesser included offense of the other.  127 N.J. at 50-52.  In sum, the plea agreement must provide that the defendant will plead guilty to as many counts as may be necessary to permit imposition of the sentence prescribed in the Table of Authorized Plea Offers and these Guidelines.
[brief] Section 17.1(a) of the PSA expressly required [...] in its capacity as the escrow agent to hold the escrow deposit until either the closing or the termination of the PSA when it stated that:  17.1(a)  Escrow Agent will hold the Earnest Money Deposit in escrow in an interest-bearing account of the type generally used by Escrow Agent for the holding of escrow funds until the earlier of (i) the Closing, or (ii) the termination of this Agreement in accordance with any right hereunder…Escrow Agent shall not release the Earnest Money Deposit to either party until Escrow Agent has been requested in writing by Seller or Purchaser to release the Earnest Money Deposit… (Pa118 (emphasis added)).