ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The Court in Englert, was tasked with interpreting the following indemnification provision:  [T]o the fullest extent permitted by law, [[...]] shall indemnify and hold harmless [[...]] ... and [[...]] and all of their agents and employees from and against all claims, damages, losses and expenses, including but not limited to attorney's fees, arising out of or resulting from the performance of [[...]'s] Work under this Sub-contract, provided that any such claim, damage, loss, or expense is attributable to bodily injury, sickness, disease, or death, or to injury to or destruction of tangible property (other than the Work itself) including the loss of use resulting therefrom, to the extent caused in whole or in part by any negligent act or omission of [[...]] or anyone directly or indirectly employed by [[...]] or anyone for whose acts [[...]] may be liable, regardless of whether it is caused in part by a party indemnified hereunder.  Such obligation shall not be construed to negate, or otherwise reduce any other right or obligation of indemnity which would otherwise exist as to any party or person described in this Paragraph.  Englert, 389 N.J. Super. at 47–48 (emphasis in original).  The Englert Court determined that the above language did not have the clarity required by Azurak/Mantilla.  However, the Englert Court explained the specific language it deemed noncompliant with Azurak/Mantilla:  In the absence of the ‘to the extent’ phrase in [the provision], the ‘regardless of’ phrase could be interpreted to require [...] to indemnify [...] for its own even if [...] was not at fault at all, as long as [...] was not the ‘sole’ cause of damages.  See N.J.S.A. 2A:40A-1.  The ‘to the extent phrase in [the provision] is itself subject to differing interpretations.  Id. at 56.  Thus, it was the “to the extent” phrase that the Englert Court determined gave rise to two “reasonable interpretations. ”  See also, Schor, 357 N.J. Super. at 191.  Here, the indemnification provision of the Subcontract omits the problematic “to the extent” phrase, as the provision satisfies the Englert Court’s concern, namely, compliance with N.J.S.A. § 2A:40A-1, which prohibits indemnification for claims caused by the indemnitees “sole negligence.
[brief] The Complaint is for breach of contract, which is undisputedly properly brought before the Superior Court, and, unlike [...], the causes of action do not ask the Superior Court to adjudicate a dispute under N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-9(e)(3).  --- \(^5\) Muller v. Muller, 212 N.J. Super. 665, 678 (Ch. Div. 1986)  Also, [...]’s Opposition is devoid of any meritorious argument that the Commissioner lacks jurisdiction, or that the Superior Court, Law Division, somehow has jurisdiction to adjudicate [...]’s purely education law claim under 18A.  It is impossible to argue, without being frivolous, that the 18A school law statute, *N.J.S.A.* 18A:7F-9(e)(3), which exists only under 18A and applies only to public school districts, is not a school law under the Commissioner of Education’s jurisdiction.  It is not as if the Legislature mistakenly put the statute under Title 18A school laws when it explicitly refers only to public school districts.  [...]’s argument that the trial court is capable of interpreting *N.J.S.A.* 18A:7F-9(e)(3) is irrelevant when the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over that school law statute, and cannot grant the express remedy in the statute (*i.e.*, reduction of State aid) as that relief is only within the authority of the Commissioner of Education.
[brief] _Id._ at 507-508.  Generally, it is "the function of the jury to determine the condition of the property and a reasonableness of defendant's care" in preventing unsafe conditions.  _Filipowicz v. Dilletto_, 350 N.J. Super. 552, 561 (App. Div. 2002).  As _Rule_ 702 makes clear it is "permissive," and "[i]n the broadest of terms, if an issue to be decided by the trier of fact is of _such a specialized nature_ that the trial court determines that the proposed expert testimony would assist the trier of fact in making its determination, then the testimony _may_ be admitted."
[brief] (Da 086).  The Court summarily dismissed with prejudice while discovery orders were still unfulfilled, while counsel was working on the case, absent full submissions, and prior to oral argument on substantive issues.  The Court issued no opinion, just an order dismissing [...]’s post-conviction relief petition with prejudice.  (Da 086).  On December 14, 2023, the [...] filed a notice of appeal from [...]’s order dismissing with prejudice [...]’s second PCR.  (Da 087-089).  STATEMENT OF FACTS
[brief] The Amended Policy’s exemption does not resolve these disproportionate harms.  See (Db30-32).  Its language requires affirmative parental notification any time a student requests a “public name/identity/pronoun change. ” (Da170).  But see (Db30) (Appellants erroneously stating students could use a “different name in class” without notification).  The sole exception to Appellants’ blanket-notification rule applies where “credible evidence” reveals that notifying a student’s parents “would subject the student to physical or emotional harm or abuse. ” (Da170).  As an initial matter, the very inclusion of this exception is a “tacit acknowledgment” that disproportionate harms could manifest for these students.  (Da132).  And unfortunately, the exception does not ameliorate the problem: the Amended Policy provides no explanation of what “credible evidence” entails, how a school would come into possession of such evidence, or when the “credible evidence” would be sufficient to show that a particular notification “would subject” a particular student to “physical or emotional harm or abuse.
[brief] (Pa4 to 25).  A defendant’s use of the word “attorney” does not automatically amount to an ambiguous invocation of a defendant’s right to an attorney.  Rather, courts must determine on a case-by-case basis, after reviewing the totality of the circumstances, including the defendant’s words and conduct, whether the mention of counsel constitutes an invocation of that right.  Here, contrary to the trial court’s finding, defendant’s comment, made while [...] was advising defendant of his Miranda rights, that “I do not know if you guys assign an attorney to me or I have to look for an attorney on my own[,]” was not an ambiguous invocation of defendant’s right to an attorney.  Rather, it was a statement expressing uncertainty about the legal process, which [...] aptly clarified and explained.  Accordingly, the trial court abused its discretion in granting defendant’s Motion to Suppress.
[brief] Notwithstanding this well-settled principle, the trial court’s November Order held that allegations concerning information that only [...] knew about [...], [...]’s student, and the child’s mother were sufficient to plead actual malice as to the [...].  See Da_191 (holding [...] “meets the requisite malice requirement” as to all defendants with a bulleted list of allegations that only concerned [...]).  For example, the trial court cited allegations that [...] relied on “informants of dubious veracity”—namely, the student and her mother, Da_216—but ignored the Complaint’s own allegation that the [...] relied not upon the student or her mother, but on [...].  The trial court also pointed to [...]’s claim that [...] should have known the account she published was “wholly unbelievable” because she had met [...] before the incident and personally knew her to be an ally of Muslims.  Id.  Again, the Complaint contains no allegation that any of the [...] knew [...].  See Da_017.  In short, [...]’s allegations concerning the subjective state of mind of [...]—a public figure whose social media posts were the source for the [...]’ statements, see Da_017-18—say nothing about the subjective state of mind of any of the [...].
[brief] The cases cited by Plaintiff are inapposite.  In these cases, which differ from the facts here, there was at least some evidence to show what caused the plaintiff’s injuries.  For example, in Bergquist v. Penterman, 46 N.J. Super. 74, 77 (App. Div. 1957), the decedent was fatally burned as the result of an explosion which occurred as he was doing floor finishing work.  Similarly in Ocasio v. Amtrak, 299 N.J. Super. 139, 143 (App. Div. 1997), the plaintiff was injured when he was struck by a train while walking on railroad tracks.  In each case cited by Plaintiff, there was no doubt as to how the plaintiffs were injured.  Here, there is no evidence to explain what happened to [...] without speculating as to the cause of his alleged fall.  Neither Plaintiff nor anyone else can explain what caused Plaintiff to fall.  Numerous courts have held that a plaintiff must introduce evidence which affords a reasonable basis to conclude that it is more likely than not that the conduct of the defendant was a “cause in fact” of the alleged injury.  A mere possibility of such causation is not enough and, where the matter remains one of pure speculation or conjecture, the court must direct a verdict in favor of the defendant.  See Davidson v. Slater, 189 N.J. 166, 185 (2007); see also Vizzoni v. B.M.D., 459 N.J. Super. 554, 575-576 (App. Div. 2019); Bergquist v. Penterman, 46 N.J. Super. 74, 88 (App. Div. 1957); Beyer v. White, 22 N.J. Super. 137, 144 (App. Div. 1952).
[brief] During the motor vehicle stop which led to the charges being tried, a discussion was captured on an MVR between the responding officers concerning the potential that defendant was involved in an unrelated robbery the night prior.  (3T42-4 to 44-13).  Although not part of the State’s case-in-chief, defendant made references to this conversation in its opening statement, cross-examination, recross, and closing argument.  (2T50-10 to 14, 2T51-2 to 3; 3T36-9 to 14, 3T37-4 to 11, 3T41-11 to 19, 3T42-4 to 48-1, 3T152-6 to 12, 3T153-21 to 24, 3T154-3 to 7; 4T22-25, 4T113-18 to 20, 4T124-24 to 127-20).  During the State’s redirect, the assistant prosecutor asked a clarifying question about the context of that conversation.  (3T137-17 to 21).  Defendant did not object.  Following the witness’s answer, the Court – *sua sponte* – issued an instruction to the jury.  (3T137-22 to 138-6).  This instruction made clear that the only reason that this conversation was being mentioned was to “give context” to a particular turn of phrase used by the officer.  (Ibid.).  The Court emphasized that the discussion of another crime being committed “does not have any reference to your deliberations in this particular case. ”  (Ibid.)  Consequently, the assistant prosecutor then confirmed with the witness that defendant was not charged with any conduct related to the incident the night before.  (3T138-9 to 12).  Stressing the notion, the Court’s final instructions to the jury included the following imperative:  In this case, one of the limiting instructions I provided you had to deal with the testimony of an armed robbery that allegedly occurred in [...].  That testimony was allowed in this case solely to provide context for statements made by the police.  You cannot use any reference of alleged criminal activity that occurred in [...] to determine the guilt or innocence of the defendant as to the particular charges in this case.  [(5T11-7 to 15.)]  C. Facts
[brief] 28, 30 State v. Johnson, 287 N.J. Super. 247 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 144 N.J. 587 (1996) .................................................................  80  State v. Johnson, 42 N.J. 146 (1964) ......................................................................................................................  24 State v. Kelly, 61 N.J. 283 (1972) .....................................................................................................................  25 State v. Knight, 183 N.J. 449 (2005) ....................................................................................................................  25 State v. Kucinski, 227 N.J. 603 (2017) ...................................................................................................................  29, 36 State v. LaBrutto, 114 N.J. 187 (1989) ....................................................................................................................  47 State v. Liepe, 239 N.J. 359 (2019) ....................................................................................................................  98 State v. Locurto, 157 N.J. 463 (1999).................................................................  24 State v. Loftin, 146 N.J. 295 (1996)................................................................ passim State v. Long, 204 N.J. Super. 469 (Law Div. 1985)...........................................
[brief] She has NEVER denied receiving the recorded Satisfaction from the County Clerk in 2016.  She has NEVER denied that she gave it to her counsel or at least told him about it.  Her plan was obvious.  Keeping the Satisfaction concealed would give more weight to the meritless argument that a DIL has the same consequence upon a junior lienor as a Sheriff Deed.  Fortunately her plan did not work, but caused Appellant great time & expense.  Plaintiffs & their counsel engaged in frivolous litigation by failing to advance any rational argument.
[brief] The State filed a pretrial motion pursuant to N.J.R.E. 404(b) to introduce evidence of other wrongs and/or other acts.  On September 30, 2016, the trial court granted, in part, and denied, in part, this motion.  On November 29, 2016, defendant pled guilty to first-degree felony murder, Count III of Indictment Number [...].  The State agreed to dismiss all other counts of the indictment and to recommend the mandatory minimum sentence.  On July 27, 2017, defendant was sentenced in accordance with this plea deal to thirty-years of incarceration without parole.  Defendant acknowledged what he was pleading to, acknowledged the concurrent nature of the sentences, and stated he did not have any questions about the consequences of this plea.  Defendant was also advised of the burden related to attempting to undo a guilty plea.  Defendant appealed all of his pretrial rulings together.  On April 12, 2019, the Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s decision on the N.J.R.E. 404(b) motion.  On February 12, 2021, the Supreme Court of New Jersey issued an Order in which it declined to hear defendant’s case regarding the N.J.R.E. 404(b) issue.  On April 14, 2022, defendant filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea.  After hearing oral argument, the trial court denied defendant’s motion on March 3, 2022.  On March 13, 2023, defendant filed a notice of appeal of the denial of the motion to withdraw the guilty plea with the Superior Court, Appellate Division.  On March 19, 2024, the Appellate Division heard oral argument in this matter and affirmed the denial of defendant’s motion to withdraw the guilty plea.  Defendant filed a Motion for Reconsideration on March 28, 2024.
[brief] The right for a defendant to confront the witnesses against him or her and to be present at every stage of a criminal trial is codified in the United States and New Jersey Constitutions.  State v. Luna, 193 N.J. 202 (2007).  The right is further cemented in the New Jersey Court Rules, Rule 3:16, which states in subsection (b):  The defendant shall be present at every stage of trial, including the impaneling of the jury and the return of the verdict, and at the imposition of sentence, unless otherwise provided by Rule.  Nothing in this Rule, however, shall prevent a defendant from waiving the right to be present at trial.  A waiver may be found either from (a) the defendant’s express written or oral waiver placed on the record, or (b) the defendant’s conduct evidencing a knowing, voluntary, and unjustified absence after (1) the defendant has received actual notice in court or has a signed a written acknowledgement of the trial date, or (2) trial has commenced in defendant’s presence.  “The right to be present at trial is not absolute. ”  State v. Luna, supra, at 210.  “Where there is no express waiver, the touchstone is whether defendant’s conduct reveals a knowing, voluntary, and unjustified absence. ”  Ibid.  When a defendant’s conduct makes it untenable for a judge to maintain courtroom decorum, the trial court judge may take various actions to ensure the proceedings can run smoothly.
[brief] On December 12, 2022, [...] filed a Complaint in Lieu of Prerogative Writs seeking judgment declaring that: the Plan was invalid and void, that Ordinances Nos. 2022-15 and 2022-17 were arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable, Ordinances Nos. 2022-15 and 2022-17 were void ab initio with no legal effect, and for such other equitable and just relief.  See (Pa1-Pa15).  Shortly thereafter, [...] (Active), the contract purchaser for the Property, moved to intervene in the litigation.  (Pa68-Pa69).  Intervention was granted by the trial court on January 11, 2023.  (Pa70).  On March 20, 2023 [...] moved for summary judgment.  (Pa71-Pa72).  [...] argued the Plan had no rehabilitative component despite the Property being designated as "an area in need of rehabilitation."  (3T6:13-7:19).  Specifically, it argued that once a property was designated as "in need of rehabilitation" a redevelopment plan adopted for the property, was limited by the definition of rehabilitation pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-3.  (3T7:10-19).  Regarding the two ordinances, [...] argued there was insufficient evidence in the record supporting either ordinance.  (3T8:2-10).  The trial court first determined the redevelopment plan was not limited to a rehabilitative component where the Property was designated "an area in need of rehabilitation."  (3T45:22-46:5).  The court relied on N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-15, and found it provides that where a municipality enacts a redevelopment plan in an area in need of rehabilitation, it may use any of the powers set forth in N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-8.  (3T46:13-18).  Because N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-8 permits a redevelopment plan to include, inter alia, construction and redevelopment, the court held there was no distinction between a redevelopment plan adopted under the area in need of rehabilitation versus one for an area in need of redevelopment.  (3T46:18-47:7).  Second, the court found the public was appropriately notified of the municipality's plan to redevelop the Property.  (3T47:11-21).  The court noted the process to approve a redevelopment plan took two years from the time the Property was designated an area in need of rehabilitation.  (3T47:12-16).  During that time, the judge found the Committee had adequately answered the public's questions and given ample opportunity for discussion of the Plan.  (3T47:16-21).  Regarding the Planning Board, the court found it "evaluated reports by their own planning expert and the plaintiffs' planning expert to make the determination that the redevelopment plan was not inconsistent with the master plan."  (3T47:24-48:3).  The trial judge also determined the Plan was not consistent with the Township's Master Plan, but that the adoption of Ordinance No. 2022-17 remedied any defect with Ordinance No. 2022-15.  (3T48:18-23).  Specifically, the court found the reasons supplied by the Committee for adopting Ordinance No. 2022-17 were sufficient to overcome any problems with Ordinance No. 2022-15.  (3T60:21-61:1).  Plaintiffs filed the instant appeal on June 21, 2023.  (Pa539)
[brief] The Appellant filed a Complaint in lieu of Prerogative Writs against the [...] which TRIAL and decision for the [...] is the subject of this appeal, NOT the decision of the [...].  Further, Appellant at no time in their trial brief or decision, referenced Ordinances as being void, ultra vires.  The record is absent those decisions as they were dealt with during Summary Judgment and waived by Appellant, having failed to file appropriate, timely Notice of Appeal on a Final or Interlocutory Order dated April 28, 2023.  Therefore, the decision which is the subject of the appeal is not that of the [...], is not related to the Summary Judgment Motion but is SOLELY BASED on the decision of the Trial Court in upholding the decision of the [...] in its denial of a Certificate of Appropriateness by the [...].  (emphasis added).  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT
[brief] All such insurance shall contain the same waiver of subrogation as that referred to hereinabove (if same is available) and can be obtained from their own insurance company or agent or that insuring the Association.  Said insurance shall be for the same risk liability or peril if the Association has such coverage.  B.  All insurance policies maintained by the Association shall be for the benefit of the Association and the Unit Owners, and their mortgagees as their respective interest may appear., and shall provide that all proceeds payable as a result of casualty losses shall be paid by the Association.
[brief] Two Newark Police Officers responded to a dispatch call of a possible shooting at an apartment complex.  While they quickly found defendant in a central courtyard, he claimed not to know how he came to be injured.  A woman told police she had called 911 for defendant.  It took police more than two hours, including review of much surveillance video, to determine that the woman had accepted a gun from defendant before police arrived, and ultimately placed it inside an apartment.  They found her, handcuffed her, gave her warnings against self-incrimination, and then calmly explained they only wanted to get the gun in order to charge defendant.  She immediately agreed to cooperate and was released from the handcuffs within about twelve minutes.  She and police calmly walked to her daughter’s apartment.  Police learned that the woman was only visiting her daughter.  In light of that information, once inside the apartment, police read the printed Consent to Search form to both women, including its statement that they could refuse to grant consent, after which each woman freely signed the form.  In short order, police recovered a gun from inside a bedroom in the apartment, evidence used to charge defendant.  The trial judge conducted a suppression hearing that explored the relevant facts.  The judge correctly concluded, based on the totality of the circumstances, that the women had not been coerced, and so had given their consent voluntarily.  The judge thus denied defendant’s motion to suppress the gun.  Moreover, defendant lost any reasonable expectation of privacy by giving a gun to a complete stranger, thus no search to which defendant could object had taken place.  The denial of defendant’s motion to suppress should be sustained.  **COUNTERSTATEMENT OF PROCEDURAL HISTORY**
[brief] Genuine issues of material facts were in dispute as to the money paid and owed, as well as the 10-count Complaint.  The court committed reversible error by a wholesale dismissal of the 10-count Complaint several months before the discovery end date, without any argument or analysis whatsoever of the elements to the causes of action pleaded.  The court committed reversible error in serving as a juror by resolving a factual dispute on the money paid and owed related to the Counterclaim.  Summary judgment in favor of [...] should have been denied.
[brief] Respectfully submitted, [...]  ATTORNEY GENERAL OF NEW JERSEY  By: s/[...]_____________________  [...] Deputy Attorney General  [...]  Attorney ID # 250252018  Dated: January 29, 2025  February 12, 2025  Via eCourts Clerk of the Appellate Division  [...] [...] [...]  Re: In The Matter Of [...], [...]  Docket No. [...]  On Appeal from a Final Administrative Determination of the [...], [...] Docket No. [...]  Reply Letter Brief of Appellant [...]  Dear Clerk:  This law firm represents Appellant [...] in connection with the above-referenced matter.  Kindly accept this letter brief as [...]’s reply to the opposition brief filed by the [...] (“[...]”) dated January 22, 2025 (“Rb”), and the Statement in Lieu of Brief filed by the New Jersey [...] (“[...]”) dated January 29, 2025 (“R2b”).