ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] DEFENDANT  A FAIR TRIAL AND REQUIRES REVERSAL OF HIS CONVICTIONS.  (1T 6-1 to 32-11, 6T 6-6 to 20)  ...........................................7  A.  Fingerprint analysis is a subjective technique that is vulnerable to error........................................8  B.  Because the State failed to carry its burden to demonstrate the reliability of fingerprint analysis that originates with a database search, no fingerprint analysis testimony should have been admitted at trial.  ........................................................................................................................................14  C.  The failure to properly address the fingerprint testimony at voir dire, to limit the examiner’s testimony at trial, and to charge the jury on the limits of such testimony deprived defendant of his rights to an impartial jury and a fair trial........................................................................................................22  i.  The refusal to voir dire prospective jurors about their preconceived ideas about the reliability of fingerprint examination requires reversal.........................................................................................................................22  TABLE OF CONTENTS  (Cont’d.)  ii.  The fingerprint examiner’s testimony strayed beyond the boundaries of reliability and relayed testimonial hearsay, requiring reversal.................................................................26  iii.  The trial court’s refusal to charge the jury on how to consider the reliability of the fingerprint comparison requires reversal.  .......................33  D.  The inappropriate handling of the fingerprint evidence requires reversal of defendant’s conviction ..................36  POINT II
[brief] March 18, 2015  Final Judgment of Divorce  August 23, 2017  [...]’s Motion to Enforce FJOD & MSA (deed and Lexus)  September 25, 2017  [...] cross-motion seeking credit card payments, etc.  October 20, 2017  Order allowing R. 4:50 motion and discovery period  October 27, 2017  R. 4:50 motion filed by [...]
[brief] A.  THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY’S EMPHASIS ON SUBSTANCE OVER FORM.  In Brill, the Supreme Court of New Jersey firmly established that the pivotal inquiry in a summary judgment motion is whether the disputing parties have presented sufficient evidence to warrant a trial.  The Court stated that summary judgment should be employed only when the evidence "is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law."  This principle underscores the importance of assessing the substantive merits of a case rather than focusing exclusively on procedural nuances that do not affect the ultimate fairness of the proceedings.  Building upon the foundational principles articulated in Brill, subsequent cases have further cautioned against the dismissal of meritorious claims on minor technical grounds.  For instance, in Mancini v. Township of Teaneck, 179 N.J. 425 (2004), the court reiterated that procedural rules "should not be enforced mechanistically if such enforcement would undermine the rules’ purposes or lead to unjust results."  This position aligns with the overarching judicial philosophy that procedural rules are tools designed to facilitate justice, not to obstruct it.  B.
[brief] N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:6D-64(b)(1)(c); N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 10:44A-2.4; see also Davis, 209 N.J. at 295 (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:6D–64 to support the assertion that “[f]acilities are required to conduct background checks, and are prohibited from hiring individuals who have committed one in a list of enumerated crimes. ”).  It is also undisputed that New Jersey law also makes clear that an individual convicted of such conduct under the laws of other states is similarly disqualified from employment.  N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:6D-64 (disqualifying for convictions “in any other state …which, if committed in New Jersey, would constitute any of the crimes . . . described”); see also N.J. ADMIN. CODE §10:44A-2.4.
[brief] I.  STANDARD OF REVIEW ...............................................................................................16  II.  THE PLAINTIFF’S APPEAL IS FRIVOLOUS AND THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY GRANTED  DEFENDANT  ALLSTATES’ SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION  DISMISSING  PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT IN ITS ENTIRETY WITH PREJUDICE (44a-48a)  ......17  A.  The Trial Court’s Grant of [...]’ Summary Judgment Motion Based on the New Jersey Tax Sale Law was Correct and Should be Affirmed (44a-48a).........................................................................................................................19  B.  The Plaintiff Improperly and Incorrectly Argues for the First Time on Appeal, Which Should Not be Considered, that its Agreement with [...] was a Collateral Contract and Therefore Not Illegal (44a-48a not raised below) ..................................................................................................................24  C.  Despite the Frivolity of this Argument, if the Court Decides to Consider Plaintiff’s New Argument – Which it Should Not – the Argument Utterly Lacks Any Merit and the Trial Court Properly Analyzed the Agreement, Finding that [...] Owed No Contractual Obligations to Plaintiff (44a-48a)  .................................................................................................................................26  III.  THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING ALLSTATES’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ARGUMENT THAT THE CONTRACT FOR SALE OF THE PROPERTY WAS IN VIOLATION OF THE FRFPA AND THEREFORE UNENFORCEABLE BY A COURT OF LAW
[brief] [...] (hereinafter “the plaintiff”) shall rely upon the procedural history and statement of facts set forth in her initial brief. \(^1\)  [...] and [...] are hereinafter referred to as “the defendants” as they were in the plaintiff’s initial brief.  \(^{1}\)  Transcript and Appendix Reference Key 1T – Transcript of the April 12, 2024 Motion Hearing Pa – Plaintiff-Appellant’s Appendix  LEGAL ARGUMENT THE ORDER GRANTING THE DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY
[brief] ”  [...], at the time of her tragic death was certainly using a crossing established by the railroad in that she was undisputable walking in a crosswalk.  The legislative history of this statute supports this plain language reading as evidenced by the Assembly Transportation and Communications Committee Statement to the Assembly No.1788 (Pa1022) and the Senate Transportation Committee report which is identical.  Pa1027.  These committee reports state that this immunity statute is intended to “affect recovery when a person engages in prohibited behavior and not when a person is injured only because of the railroad’s negligence”.  [...] was not engaging in “prohibited behavior”.  The statute explicitly states that she was not engaging in prohibited behavior.  The statute shall not prohibit a person from using a crossing established by the railroad.  (emphasis added).  If the committee was not clear enough in this preceding assertion, it went on to state that “it is not the intent of the statute to prohibit a person from using a crossing established by the railroad”.  Once again, [...] was in a crosswalk when she was killed.  A crosswalk is a crossing established by the railroad.  The legislature was crystal clear in communicating that it did not intend N.J.S.A. 48:12-152 to immunize a railroad from negligence for hitting a person who is walking in a crosswalk.
[brief] *Id.* at 1298.  There is no need for a plenary hearing in this case since the Bank did not refute or submit evidence to rebut [...]’s certification.  The absence of such testimony serves not only to support Plaintiff’s position but leaves no room to find any factual disputes.  While there is a presumption in favor of arbitration, that presumption applies only when interpreting the scope of an arbitration clause, not whether a valid agreement exists in the first instance.
[directive] Fòm Revize Kreye pa Direktif #01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 10080-Haitian Creole paj 6 nan  7  Revised Form Promulgated by Directive #01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 10080-Haitian Creole page 6 of 7  Do you understand that if you are pleading guilty to the crime of aggravated sexual assault, sexual assault, aggravated criminal sexual contact or criminal sexual contact and the offense occurred on or after July 1, 2002, the court shall impose a fine of $100?  9.  Amann pou Fon Sipèvizyon pou Agresè Seksyèl Sex Offender Supervision Fund Penalty  Èske w konprann ke si zak la te komèt le ou aprè le 1ye jiyè 2014, swit a deklarasyon de koupab [Wi/Yes] [Non/No] ou an yo ta kab egzije w peye yon amann de $30 pa mwa pou Fon Sipèvizyon pou Agresè Seksyèl la?
[brief] While the defense recognizes that the analysis calls for the evidence to be viewed by affording the State the benefit of all favorable testimony and all favorable inferences that can be drawn therefrom, even doing so does not support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt given the evidence presented at trial.  Once again, the entirety of the State's case in this matter was premised upon the fact that [...] shot or shot at [...] with a weapon that he was not authorized to possess and/or that he possessed for an unlawful purpose or aided and abetted another individual who shot him with a weapon.  Significantly, the unrefuted testimony from the medical examiner confirmed that [...] died from the gunshot wound, not from injuries related to the crash of his motor vehicle.  The jury considered the evidence and found that [...] was not guilty of either of those weapons offenses.  Removing the weapon from the equation leaves no other basis upon which to find that [...] committed the manslaughter, even recklessly.  There was simply no other evidence, even when viewed in a light favorable to the State, to support a finding that Defendant engaged in conduct that caused the death of [...] if he did not do so with use of the weapon which formed the basis of two (2) not guilty findings.  A judgment of acquittal was, therefore, warranted.
[brief] (Pa42-43)  What followed were various negotiations and mediations between the [...] and the [...] on one side and [...] on the other side (see Pa46)  In 2020 during COVID-19 shutdowns and disruptions, the parties reached an impasse and [...], unhappy that it was not being offered all that it wanted, filed a motion to the trial court claiming the [...] and the [...] were not negotiating in good faith.
[directive] At this time, the courts are operating remotely to the greatest extent the Court’s practicable.  For those specific matters listed in February 22, 2021 Order, three options are readily available: 1.  A remote hearing can be held with the consent of all parties; or 2.  If one or more parties object to proceeding remotely, the matter can be scheduled for an in-person hearing; or a party’s position is unknown because, 3.  Where despite diligent efforts, their attorney cannot communicate with them to ascertain their position as to proceeding remotely or in person, the court may proceed either remotely or in person, taking into consideration all relevant factors, including the positions of other parties.  Establishing Party Position as to Remote vs. In-Person Proceedings; Template Order
[directive] Kesyon Adisyonèl pou Sèten Zak Seksyèl  Additional Questions for Certain Sexual Offenses (Haitian Creole)  REMAK:  Si w ap plede koupab de yon enfraksyon ki gen kondisyon sipèvizyon kominotè a vi, konfòm ak N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6.4 epi enfraksyon an te fèt swa le ou aprè 1ye jiyè 2014 ou fèt pou reponn  Kesyon 4b a.  NOTE: N.J.S.A.  If you are pleading guilty to a violation of a condition of community supervision for life, pursuant to 2C:43-6.4 and the violation occurred on or after July 1, 2014 you should answer Question 4b.
[brief] Next, the trial court correctly rejected [...]’s claim that the alimony waiver pursuant to the terms of the PSA is “unfair and inequitable”.  (See Id. at 44-50).  In \textsuperscript{10}  Although not discussed by the trial court, [...] answers to interrogatories in evidence as Trial Exhibit P-34 confirmed that she acquired that valuable jewelry “prior to 2010” (the parties were married in 2004) and that it included “Jade from Virginia and Philadelphia Asian Jewelry Stores, Diamond Necklaces, Earrings at Casino Stores, Longines Watch, Movado Watch, and Baume Mercier Watch.
[directive] So while an agency may compel an officer to answer questions posed during the course of an administrative investigation, an officer cannot be forced to give answers that could be used against him or her in a criminal prosecution.  Officers who have been compelled by order to produce incriminating information, with the belief that a failure to do so will result in termination or other serious disciplinary action, cannot have that evidence used against them in a criminal prosecution.  However, an officer can be compelled to provide answers during an internal affairs investigation if those answers are to be used as evidence only in a disciplinary proceeding.  8.0.9
[brief] In less than two minutes, [...] was in [...]’ room, observed her quickly, and called for the C-section that should have been called at 9:48 p.m. by [...] or [...].  [Pa288, Balazs Deposition, 50:3-21].  [...] made the incision at 10:25 p.m. and completed delivery at 10:27 p.m.  [Pa294, Balazs Deposition, 75:11-19].  [...] also testified that he called the emergency C-Section almost immediately, “it was a very quick decision making. ”  [Pa288, Balazs Deposition, 50:3-21].  Thus, the reason why [...] was unavailable at time any prior to perform the C-section was because neither [...] nor [...] called for the procedure at 9:48 p.m.; and he was not notified of the emergency until about 10:12 p.m. [Pa285-288].  As established by the testimony, once [...] was on notice, he called the C-section and [...] was immediately moved and prepared.  [...] made the incision at 10:25 p.m. and delivered [...] at 10:27 p.m. [Pa285-288; Pa294].  This all happened within 15 minutes of [...] finally being told that there was a grave problem with the Jennings mother and baby.  [Pa285-288; Pa294].  Concerning proximate cause, Plaintiff’s expert, [...], opined deliveries occurring more than 25 to 30 minutes after a deceleration, of the kind observed on the 9:48 p.m. reading, will result in the outcome that occurred in this case with certainty.  [Pa626-628].  Quite remarkably, the New Motion Judge determined that there was no plausible case for Plaintiff to assert that a delayed delivery of 39 minutes, during which the infant [...] was being deprived of oxygen in the womb, resulted in sufficient deprivation to have caused the lack-of-oxygen induced brain injuries suffered by [...].
[brief] United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985).  The trial court told the parties, under no uncertain terms, that the only thing that would be dispositive was if there was proof that Appellant’s door was locked when the officers entered it\(^1\).  [...]’s notes unequivocally proved, as Appellant long argued, that the door to Defendant’s separate apartment was locked and breached.  [...]’s notes were not only material but were dispositive.
[brief] (Da17-18, Lease at § 4.02 (emphasis added)).  Based on this clear and unambiguous language, Section 4.02 plainly provides for Tenant’s forfeiture of the annual Tenant Allowance instalments where, as here, Tenant is in monetary default when the payment comes due.  Id.  Specifically, Section 4.02 expressly states that Tenant can recoup “up to” $730,000 in the “following manner”, immediately after which Section 4.02 details Landlord’s obligation to make the annual Tenant Allowance payments “[p]rovided that … Tenant is not in monetary default under this Lease after notice and expiration of any applicable cure period.
[brief] This conclusory statement is insufficient to prohibit the deposition.  “[T]o overcome the presumption in favor of discoverability, a party must show “good cause” for withholding relevant discovery by demonstrating, for example, that the information sought is a trade secret or is otherwise confidential or proprietary. ”  *Capital Health Sys. v. Horizon Healthcare Servs.*, 230 N.J. 73, 79-80 (2017).  “The party attempting to show that secrecy outweighs the presumption of discoverability must be specific as to each document; broad allegations of harm, unsubstantiated by specific examples or articulated reasoning, are insufficient.
[brief] Critically, the petitioners in that case (Massachusetts and eleven other states including New Jersey) were found to have Article III standing based on the concrete and particularized harm posed to their local resources by air pollution in the form of GHG emissions.  Ibid.  The implications of Massachusetts v. EPA, are that the natural resources in the Highlands are also concretely and particularly injured from the project’s air pollution and global GHG emissions, for purposes of this appeal.  This point, from Massachusetts v. EPA, has been cited in an important administrative matter, regarding the DEP’s application of New Jersey’s environmental laws and permitting decisions.
[brief] A copy of the New Jersey Workers Compensation and Employers Liability Insurance Manual is available online at www.njcrib.com/DocumentsLibrary/[...]anual.  \(^2\)  The disclaimer cited included in Plaintiff’s opposition to [...]’s motion references the “net total incurred payment,” which includes anticipated future benefits.  The actual amount paid to Petitioner at the time of the disclaimer was approximately $123,000.  D.  The Trial Court’s Decision
[brief] FACTUAL BACKGROUND | 4 | | A. City Council Approves a Blight Study on the Property | 4 | | B.  The February 13, 2020 City Council Meeting | 5 | | II.  THE FIRST ACTION | 7 | | A.  The City’s Continued Development Process and [...]’s Additional Allegations of the City’s “Unfair” Favoring of [...] | 7 | | B.  The First Action is Dismissed | 9 | | C.  [...] Files Motions for Reconsideration and for Leave to Amend the First Action Complaint | 9 | | III.  THE SECOND ACTION | 11 | | A.  The First Motion to Dismiss the Second Action | 11 | | B.  The [...] Resolution Expires | 12 | | C.  The Second Motion to Dismiss the Second Action | 12 | | D.  The First Appellate Action is Decided | 15 | | E.  [...] Moves to Reinstate the Second Action | 16 | | LEGAL ARGUMENT | 18 | | I.
[brief] *United Paperworkers International Union v. Misco, Inc.*, 484 U.S. at 29 (1987).  The Authority cites to two cases for the proposition that an arbitrator cannot define “just cause” without considering the parties’ bargaining history or prior course of dealing in applying the term.  The Authority misapplies the holdings in each case, and neither compels this Court to vacate [...]’s Arbitration Awards.  The Authority’s reliance on *Linden v. Board of Educ. v. Linden Educ. Ass’n*, 202 NJ 268 (2010) is misplaced.  There, the New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed the authority of arbitrators to define “just cause” where a Collective Negotiations Agreement does not.  There, “Just cause was not defined in the Agreement, and therefore it was necessary for the arbitrator to give meaning to the term. ”  *Id.* at 278.  The applicable CNA provided that tenured employees "shall not be disciplined, discharged or not reappointed without just cause," and that “Grievances regarding the above shall be subject to binding arbitration under the terms of this Agreement."  *Id.* at 272-273.  The Linden Board of Education fired a tenured employee for mistakenly entering and cleaning a classroom while students were changing clothes, but the arbitrator reduced that termination to a ten-day suspension, ruling in part that just cause “requires that the penalty fit the infraction and not be disproportionate given the totality of the circumstances, including mitigating factors. ”  *Id.* at 273.  Like the Authority, Linden moved to vacate that arbitration award because the arbitrator had defined “just cause” without reference to the parties’ bargaining history.  The New Jersey Supreme Court distinguished cases where the CNA itself specifically defines “just cause,” where an arbitrator may not deviate from the specifically defined parameters.
[brief] EMERSON’S ARGUMENT, THAT ANY PLAN TO MEET COURT-ORDERED AFFORDABLE HOUSING OBLIGATIONS MUST COMPLY WITH THE MUNICIPAL ZONING ORDINANCE, HAS BEEN REJECTED BY THE COURTS  [...] contends it has sole authority to “enact ordinances” and that duly exercised authority cannot be usurped.  It asserts that approval of the off-site property for affordable housing would “only be possible if the Mayor and Council were to amend the Redevelopment Plan. ”  Pb14-15.  To the contrary, the trial court itself affirmed that it had such powers: “the court certainly recognizes the powers and authority to act under the Mount Laurel doctrine” and “the court recognizes that land use ordinances shall yield to the plans for affordable housing. ”  111a.  Until this appeal, no party disputed such power.
[brief] Defendants argue that both subsections of Trust Article 4.1A are not superfluous but instead serve to clarify the Settlor’s instructions and intentions.  (Da3)  PLAINTIFF:  “If the Decedent’s intent was as the Defendants propose, there would have been no reason to even include subsections 4.1A(a) and (b) in the Trust.  The properties would have been divided equally between the three beneficiaries pursuant to Section 4.1A, after which they could have negotiated buyouts. ”  (Pb30)  DEFENDANTS:  Subsections 4.1A(a) and (b) would be applicable only if a beneficiary chose to exercise their “power to purchase” a property.  Otherwise, the Trustee could list and sell the property on the open market.  Thus, these provisions were necessary to provide a clear procedure for both scenarios.  Additionally, Defendants note that Plaintiff’s interpretation required Trust reformation to modify the Trust instrument by adding and deleting words.  Moreover, Trust reformation necessitates an evidentiary hearing conducted by the trial court judge, which did not occur.  Furthermore, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 3B:31-31, the more rigorous clear-and-convincing standard of proof applies to reformation, which was not properly applied by the judge.  Thus, Defendants contend that the trial court erred by interpreting and/or reforming the Trust language concerning the property purchase provisions without conducting an evidentiary or plenary hearing.
[brief] In *Cherokee LCP Land, LLC v. City of Linden Planning Bd.*, 234 N.J. 403 (2018), a case involving the rights of tax certificate lien holders, the majority of the N.J. Supreme Court held that even though the plaintiffs were not the titled owner of the property, since the plaintiffs’ rights to the property could be affected by an adverse outcome, their claims could not be foreclosed due to lack of standing.  In pertinent part, the N.J. Supreme Court held: "The lien purchaser obtains an inchoate interest ..."  In this appeal, the trial court found that only a party with an "ownership or possessory interest" could have standing to maintain an action challenging a municipal planning board's approval.  The trial court dismissed plaintiffs' complaint, finding that "the holder of a tax sale certificate cannot be deemed an 'interested party'" without an "ownership or possessory interest," which did not exist here.  We disagree and conclude that a tax lienholder may have standing to challenge a planning board's actions.