[brief] RPC 1.9(c) Was Not Argued And Is Not An Independent Basis For Disqualification (102a – 135a).  The trial court mistakenly and *sua sponte* applied RPC 1.9(c) despite no party arguing for its application or even a factual or legal basis for its application.  Like RPC 1.9(a), the trial court already found no substantial similarity, which should have ended the analysis there.  Incorrectly, the trial court pressed ahead and applied RPC 1.9(c).  RPC 1.9(c) provides as follows:  (c)  A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter or whose present or former firm has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not thereafter: (1) use information relating to the representation to the disadvantage of the former client except as these Rules would permit or require with respect to a client, or when the information has become generally known; or (2) reveal information relating to the representation except as these Rules would permit or require with respect to a client.  Inexplicably, the trial court misconstrued the law and held that disqualification was warranted under RPC 1.9(c) when taken in conjunction with RPC 1.9(a) even though the trial court already held there is no substantial similarity and also that there was no evidence that RPC 1.9 was violated:  That [RPC 1.9(c)], in conjunction with [RPC] 1.9(a) where, in a totality of the circumstances, the similarity of the proceedings in and of themselves would be insufficient to otherwise disqualify the firm, the nature of the information provided, in conjunction with those representations, together leads the Court to conclude that there is probably no likelihood that information will not, to some degree -- or I would not say would -- could not, in some degree, inure to the detriment of [...] in his attempt to defend against the counterclaims that were brought against him.  (T27:10-21) (emphasis added).  What the trial court did was write its own rule: it combined RPC 1.9(a) and RPC 1.9(c) to fashion relief that it otherwise -- and admittedly -- could not grant.  Notably, this is the one and only reference to RPC 1.9(c) in the entire record, meaning the trial court undertook this inapposite analysis without argument from Respondents, or a chance to respond by Appellants.  The sua sponte nature of this analysis is further evidence of its lack of foundation.  Thus, the trial court’s Disqualification Order pursuant to RPC 1.9(c) was based not on actual facts and circumstances but on hypothetical circumstances and a rewriting of the RPC.  Moreover, Respondents did not even argue that disqualification was warranted under RPC 1.9(c) since it is not an independent basis for disqualification but merely restricts the use of information when a lawyer who has formerly represented a client obtains information in connection with the representation.  (102a – 135a).  Indeed, Appellants are not aware of any case or rule that supports the contention that a law firm may be disqualified based on RPC 1.9(c) alone, and certainly none were cited in the record below.  Further, and in any event, the trial court held that there was no evidence that any information obtained in connection with the prior matters was being used against Respondents in this case and that there is no basis to find any violation of RPC 1.9.  (T24:23-25; T25:1-3).  Accordingly, the Disqualification Order is both legally and factually baseless.