ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] 27 N.J. at 376.  The Court explained that the “acquisition is not for the use of a private corporation (if one is engaged); rather, such corporation is used to accomplish the public purpose. ”  Ibid.  “[T]he private developer is really the instrumentality used to accomplish the public purpose. ”  Levin, 57 N.J. at 543.  Moreover, New Jersey courts recognize that redevelopment for public benefit includes commercial uses.  An entire area sometimes needs “redesigning so that a balanced, integrated plan could be developed for the region, including not only new homes but also schools, churches, parks streets, and shopping centers” to control “the cycle of decay” and prevent the “birth of future slums. ”  Wilson, 27 N.J. at 380 (quoting Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954)).  Providing community infrastructure to support residential development is essential.  See N.J. Housing, 215 N.J. Super. at 324 (“The success of the Legislature’s primary goal of providing housing will obviously be hampered if plaintiff is denied the requisite power to assure the availability of support services necessary to the livability of the residential area. ”); see also Levin, 57 N.J. at 539.  It was error to hold that [...]’s purpose for redevelopment was a “private use” simply because its purpose was commercial redevelopment instead of for open space or a hospital.  The trial court’s belief that open space or a hospital constitutes a public purpose for eminent domain purposes, while commercial redevelopment does not, is contrary to law.  [...] has proffered a legitimate public use in its aim to acquire the Property for redevelopment purposes, and the trial court should not have denied [...] its constitutional rights to redevelopment and eminent domain based on that erroneous belief.  See N.J. Const. art. VIII, § 3, ¶ 1 (1947).  B.
[brief] The affirmation by the Court of the trial Court’s denial of the affirmative defense of recoupment or set-off would produce an anomalous and inequitable result.  Prevention of an anomalous and inequitable result is a matter of great public interest.  In the Beneficial Finance Co. case, the New Jersey Supreme Court held that in a promissory note action, the debtor was entitled to claim the affirmative defense of recoupment or set-off under TILA.  Likewise, in the Associates Home case, the court permitted the affirmative defense of recoupment under TILA in a foreclosure.  If the Court affirms the grant of summary judgment, such affirmation will produce an anomalous result: under TILA, New Jersey courts will permit the affirmative defense of recoupment or set-off in promissory note suits and foreclosure suits but will deny the same TILA affirmative defense in a suit on credit card debt.
[directive] Laboratory Forensic ii. to authorized be may department principal's a by employed civilians or Officers the where examinations or tests forensic other or ballistics, laboratory, perform use the that determines designee, or Director or the designee, or Prosecutor County the support to necessary is unit/personnel facility/forensic laboratory such of independently shall operate personnel such that provided further and investigation, Prosecutor County the to directly report and command of chain ordinary their from designee. or Director or the to designee, or Expertise.
[brief] 3.  Exclusions  a.  Personal Profit  Personal profit exclusions are common in D&O policies and routinely enforced.  See, e.g., TIG Specialty Ins. Co. v Pinkmonkey.com, Inc., 375 F.3d 365 (5th Cir. 2004); Brown & LaCounte, LLP v. Westport Ins. Corp., 307 F.3d 660 (7th Cir. 2002).  The D&O Form contains the following personal profit exclusion:  2.  Exclusions  This insurance does not apply to:  * * * g.  “Losses” based upon or attributable to the insured gaining any personal profit, remuneration or advantage which is not shared equitably by the condominium association or to which the insured is not legally entitled.  As repeatedly found by the Vermont Superior Court, the claims against [...], his wife and fellow directors in the Underlying Hokenson Action were premised on self-dealing which was contrary to the Association’s interests.  Though [...] may continue to disagree with the findings, the key point is that they were unequivocally made.  The “personal profit” exclusion clearly applies and eliminated all coverage of claims for relief, including attorneys’ and receiver’s fees and costs that flowed from the August 3, 2020 ruling on the merits.
[brief] Plaintiffs’ suggestion that the carrier be required to demonstrate proof of receipt by the policyholder is not achievable.  Short of staking out each policyholder’s address and intercepting the mail carrier, there would be no manner in which a carrier could demonstrate that a mailing was received in an instance where the policyholder denies receipt.  In exactly the same way that plaintiffs note a policyholder “can never conclusively prove that he did not receive” a cancellation notice (Pb19), a carrier cannot conclusively prove that he did receive it.  While plaintiffs contend that a carrier sending the notices by certified mail would have a return receipt, and it would know “with certainty whether or not it had been received” (Pb22), that assertion is founded on a fallacy.  That mechanism only works when the policyholder picks up and signs for the certified letter.  We note that there are currently two bills before the New Jersey Legislature (Senate Bill 2894 and its identical counterpart, Assembly Bill 3303) that, if passed, would amend N.J.S.A. 17:29C-10 to require that carriers send cancellation notices by certified mail and to also obtain a date-stamped proof of mailing and retain a duplicate copy.
[brief] Tellingly, the phrases “unnecessarily or cruelly beat” and “cruelly abuse” in the animal cruelty statute are bookended by words that evoke extreme violence and depravity: torment, torture, maim, hang, poison, and mutilate.  See N.J.S.A. 4:22-17(c)(1).  The qualifiers the Legislature added before “beat” and “abuse” thus reflect that a higher degree of brutality is required for conviction.
[brief] B.  **Bankruptcy Proceeding, Second/Later Mortgage**  On February 2, 2018  [...] filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition under Case Number [...].  (Pa2).  On January 30, 2020 the bankruptcy trustee filed an adversarial proceeding under Case Number [...] against Plaintiff seeking the return of some of the mortgage payments made by [...] on the First Mortgage.  (Pa2).  On January 24, 2022, *while in the midst of the trustee adversarial proceeding*, Plaintiff extended a Second Mortgage to the Defendants in the sum of $97,000 that was also secured by Defendants’ Residence (“Second Mortgage”).  (Pa4).  On August 10, 2022, Plaintiff and the trustee entered into a consent order wherein Plaintiff voluntarily agreed to pay the trustee $60,000 in full satisfaction of the claims asserted by the trustee against Plaintiff for the recovery of some of the mortgage payments on the First Mortgage made to Plaintiff.  (Pa2).  C.
[brief] [...]:  So, he's looking for a negotiation not necessarily for trial.  He's looking for a renegotiation for trial.  [...]:  Yes, and, ultimately, it's [...] decision whether he wants to go to trial on the felony murder charge.  He may very well want to do that now that the evidence against him is different, due to the dismissal of the armed robbery case.  [...]: Okay.  [...]:  So, I think that's most of what I wanted to touch upon.
[brief] (6T132-12 to 21).  Proper jury charges are “essential for a fair trial. ”  State v. Koskovich, 168 N.J. 448, 507 (2001) (citation omitted).  This Court is required to view the alleged error “in the totality of the entire charge. ”  State v. Chapland, 187 N.J. 275, 289 (2006).  A jury charge is presumed to be proper when it tracks the model jury charge verbatim because the process to adopt model jury charges is “comprehensive and thorough” as the charges are “reviewed and refined by experienced jurists and lawyers. ”  State v. R.B., 183 N.J. 308, 325 (2005) (instructing trial courts to follow model jury charges and read them “in their entirety to the jury”).  The model jury charge on fingerprints sufficed to inform the jury of the law.
[brief] Where there can be no “conspiracy by a corporation. . . with its own officers, agents or employees, who are performing their usual job of formulating and carrying out [the corporation’s] managerial policy,” here, the trial court properly found that Appellants failed to state a claim for conspiracy where they alleged that [...], [...], and the corporation [...] conspired to create [...] and pursue solar development at the Property.  *See id.*  When [...] wrote his letter to the Planning Board, he was acting as a corporate agent.  When Gary [...] communicated with [...], he was communicating on behalf of [...].  Furthermore, civil conspiracy is not an independent cause of action, but rather a "liability expanding mechanism" which exists only if a plaintiff can prove the underlying "independent wrong."
[brief] On June 24, 2021, Governor [...] signed bills A-5590/S-3819 which renewed the MSRA but restored Civil Service, EERA protections, and Interest Arbitration to City employees.  The new MSRA states:  Notwithstanding the provisions of any other law, rule, regulation, or contract to the contrary, except for the provisions of Title 11A, Civil Service as may be applicable to actions taken after the effective date [June 24, 2021] of P.L.2021, c.124 (C.52:27BBBB-4 et al.), the director shall have the authority to take any steps to stabilize the finances, restructure the debts, or assist in the financial rehabilitation and recovery of the municipality in need of stabilization and recovery, including, but not limited to:  ---  3  As the amended MSRA was not in effect during the relevant time period, Plaintiffs references to and interpretation of the MSRA shall not be construed as Plaintiffs’ interpretation of the amended MSRA, or any provisions set forth therein, unless Plaintiffs clearly state to the contrary.
[brief] (Pa152-157).  They had every reason to believe that [...] would not mislead them as to the status of the closing and that she would follow through on her promise to keep Plaintiff apprised of the Closing Date under the PSA if and when it was rescheduled. (Pa152-157).  [...]’s representations to Plaintiff were false because she knew at that time that [...] was in the process of purchasing the Real Property directly from the Fee Owner under terms that were inconsistent with, and in breach of, the PSA.  (Pa345).  Further, [...] had no intention of keeping Plaintiff’s counsel apprised of the new closing date, despite assuring him by email that she would.  (Pa11, Complaint ¶ 45).  Indeed, she later admitted that she was acting at the specific instruction of [...] when she failed to keep Plaintiff informed about the impending closing.  (Pa345-346, ¶ 15; Pa12, Complaint ¶ 47).  E.
[brief] The preceding discussion of the applicable law and the evidence in the record shows that the Board applied the correct legal tests to reasonable findings of fact that are based in the record.  The Board’s rejection of the arguments and testimony of the Plaintiffs’ expert Planner, [...], was also reasonable, and should be sustained by this Court.  [...] testimony and argument in support of his clients’ height variance request can be reduced to five key points: i. the Township governing body has recognized in previously adopted re-zonings and redevelopment plans that warehouses that are only 30 ft. tall are no longer viable; ii. the Board itself recognized that warehouses that only 30 ft. tall are not viable in a 2019 decision; iii. traffic was immaterial to an assessment of the intensity of a use for the drafters of the 1999 Master Plan and its implementing ordinances; iv. approval of the requested height variance would advance purpose (g) of the Municipal Land Use Law which calls for sufficient space in appropriate location for a variety of uses; and v. that there will be not be any substantial impairment of the zone plan or substantial detriment to the public good as a result of the effect of the proposed development on light, air, noise or the intensity of development.
[brief] (2T12-16 to 20).  Therefore, the court went on to consider the totality of the circumstances.  The court found defendant to be 53 years’ old with seven prior indictable convictions.  (2T13-17 to 18).  The court found defendant was read his rights, and signed the rights form indicating his understanding.  (2T13-18 to 20).  The court found the interview lasted roughly seventeen minutes, inclusive of the Miranda rights.  (2T13-22 to 24).  The court further found that there was “no physical punishment or mental exhaustion exhibited” and that the “questioning was neither improperly repeated nor prolonged in nature. ” (2T13-24 to 14-1).  Finally, the court found that despite not knowing that the questions would revolve around the robbery, “waiver of Miranda rights is . . . not [offense] specific.  . . .  If defendant wished for the questioning to end[] as to one or all of the alleged crimes he is being asked about he merely needs to invoke his rights.  . . .” which he “knowingly and intelligently waived . . . under Miranda and participated willingly in the interrogation . . . .” (2T14-6 to 16-4).
[brief] (Pa162;91:4-10).  [...] found that [...]’s proposed development did not have the “intent” to raise the grade to make the building’s higher, but rather was due to changes relating to stormwater management.  [...] testified that she believed the Building Height Ordinance definition talks to “intent”, and in particular, intent of the grading has nothing to do with increasing the building height specifically only for that reason.  (Pa161;91:16-25).  Accordingly, [...] interpretation of the meaning of the Building Height ordinance was what the “intent” or reason was for [...] to raise the original grade creating a revised lot grade.
[directive] Under these Guidelines, and the provisions found at N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.23(c), there are two circumstances which allow for the release of an impounded vehicle before the 12-hour time period expires.  The first circumstance permits the early release of an impounded vehicle if the vehicle is not owned or leased by the arrestee.  N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.23(c)1.  Early release of a vehicle, under that provision of the statute, does not require acknowledgment and receipt of the “POTENTIAL LIABILITY WARNING - N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.22 (Rev. 2-20-2004) FORM,” but does require compliance with the provisions of N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.23(d).  The second circumstance permits the early release of an impounded vehicle that is owned or leased by the arrestee.  N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.23c(2).  However, under that provision of the statute, and these Guidelines, before an impounded vehicle may be released, the person to whom the vehicle will be released must acknowledge, in writing, receipt of the “POTENTIAL LIABILITY WARNING - N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.22 (Rev. 2-20-2004) FORM,” and they must also comply with the provisions of N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.23d.  If a vehicle is to be released under the provisions of N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.23(c)(2), the law enforcement officer shall follow the procedures set forth in this Appendix B, "Guidelines for the implementation of N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.23, the Mandatory 12-hour Impoundment of the Motor Vehicle," and in the Guidelines at Appendix A, Guidelines for Potential Liability Warning - N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.22 (Rev. 2-20-2004) Form, with the following additional requirements.  If the person to whom the vehicle will be released is not the owner or lessee and has refused or declined to accept receipt of the “POTENTIAL LIABILITY WARNING - N.J.S.A. -2- ATTORNEY GENERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT DIRECTIVE  NO. 2004-1 - APPENDIX B - GUIDELINES  MANDATORY 12-HOUR IMPOUNDMENT OF MOTOR VEHICLES 39:4-50.22 (Rev. 2-20-2004) FORM,” the vehicle shall not be released before the end of the statutory 12-hour period of impoundment.  N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.23(c)(2) establishes a requirement of a written acknowledgment of receipt of the “POTENTIAL LIABILITY WARNING - N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.22 (Rev. 2-20-2004) FORM,” as a precondition of release of the impounded vehicle.  This statutory requirement is necessary because the person claiming the vehicle must have appropriate documentation authorizing the early release of the vehicle in order to permit the entity holding the vehicle in impound to release the vehicle before the expiration of the mandatory 12-hour period.  Summary of N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.23
[brief] Appellant further indicates that it is his belief that the Court did not reject Appellant [...]’s testimony.  This could not be further from the truth.  The entirety of his testimony was rejected as is evidenced by both the initial verdict and the decision on remand.  To indicate otherwise, is quite simply, fantasy.  The Court found that [...] was not telling the truth, and more importantly, the Court noted that even if his testimony was credible, he could prove no damages to the Court.  Strangely, if the Appellant had been so convinced of his argument during the litigation, one would think he would have at least attempted to make a Summary Judgment motion following the completion of discovery.
[brief] A defendant is entitled to be tried “before an impartial jury. ”  *State v. Loftin*, 191 N.J. 172, 187 (2007).  As part of that entitlement, a defendant is allowed to ask questions that enable him to determine whether a juror is not impartial.  “Our case law consistently endorses voir dire questions that probe the minds of the prospective jurors to ascertain whether they hold biases that would interfere with their ability to decide the case fairly and impartially. ”  *State v. Little*, 246 N.J. 402, 417 (2021) (internal quotation marks omitted).  “[I]nquiring about a juror’s ability to follow the trial judge’s instructions or to deliberate with an open mind” is entirely appropriate, “so long as the questions do not indoctrinate prospective jurors about the issues that the jury will decide. ”  *Ibid.*  See also *State v. Williams*, 93 N.J. 39, 61 (1983) (the trial court’s obligation “to take all appropriate measures to ensure the fair and proper administration of a criminal trial” begins with voir dire.  “A vital aspect of that responsibility is to ensure the impaneling of only impartial jurors by ferreting out potential and latent juror biases”).  Voir dire is appropriately used to determine whether jurors harbor preexisting notions about certain scientific fields.  In a case in which testimony from a psychiatric expert was presented by the defense, this Court has held that it was appropriate and essential in voir dire “to probe[] whether the prospective jurors had read or studied about psychology, psychiatry, medicine, or related fields, and inquire[] about the jurors’ views on those sciences and whether those views would hinder the ability to follow the law as instructed by the court.
[brief] Gac v. Gac, 186 N.J. 535, 544 (2006) (“it would not be reasonable to penalize [the child] for the defendant’s [abusive conduct].  Nor would it be reasonable to reward defendant by removing his financial obligation to contribute to his daughter’s college costs. ”) (citation omitted).  Respectfully, the lower court abused its discretion by finding that Defendant is not responsible for any of his children’s higher educational costs, especially when the lower court seemed to weigh many of the Newburgh factors in the favor of Plaintiff’s children deserving support from both of their parents in pursuit of higher education.
[brief] 14 RULES AND STATUTES  Fed. R. Evid. 608(b) ..................................................................................  14  Fed. R. Evid. 403 .........................................................................................  14  N.J.R.E. 403 ...............................................................................................  13  N.J.R.E. 608(b) ..........................................................................................  13,14,15 N.J.R.E. 609 ...............................................................................................  13, 15 N.J.R.E. 803 (c)(2) ....................................................................................  3, 4.  N.J.R.E. 803 (c)(6) ....................................................................................  3
[brief] \(^{19}\)  The violation of [...]’s constitutional protection against self-incrimination and right to trial by jury as well as the Code’s fundamental sentencing principles resulted in unwarranted maximum and consecutive terms and is excessive.  The sentence should be vacated and the matter remanded for a new sentencing hearing.  See State v. Melvin, 248 N.J. 321, 341 (2021) (appellate deference to sentencing court “presupposes and depends upon the proper application of sentencing considerations); State v. Fuentes, 217 N.J. 57, 70 (2014) (violation of sentencing guidelines is ground for reversal).
[brief] 46.  Court rulings (p. 14, at end of 1st par.) that followed in regards to "audit questions requested an explanation of the fees paid to [...], [...], & [...]" are in complete denial & disregard of my detailed Exceptions with substantiated facts in refuting [...]'s invalid answers and explanations (Exh. "L", Exceptions, p. 11-19, par. 9&10) (119a-127a).
[brief] Liebig v. MTD Products, Inc., ___ F. Supp.3d ___, 2023 WL 5517557 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 25, 2023)  ...............  16  In re Lipitor Atorvastatin Calcium Marketing, Sales Practices & Products Liability Litigation, 185 F. Supp.3d 761 (D.S.C. 2016) .........................
[brief] (1T 31-4 --- \(^2\)  Although the transcript from the Miranda hearing reads, “You know, we have kind of an older city,” it is clear from the video itself that [...] said “cameras all over the city. ”  (1T 29-21 to 30-1; Da 7 at 4:44 to 4:52)  This is also confirmed by the trial transcript.  (7T 176-2 to 3) to 7)  [...] explained that he gave [...] drugs, and that he followed [...] so that [...] would pay him.  (1T 32-2 to 33-6)  [...] elaborated that [...] was in front of a church, that he had to run to catch up with him, and that he then ran to follow [...] to [...].  (1T 33-3 to 10)  At that point, [...] stopped [...] and stated, “I don’t want another lie coming out of a 52-year-old grown man’s mouth.  . . .  I saw you go in the building.  I saw you come out of the building.  Do you want to explain to me what happened? ”  (1T 34-1 to 6)  [...] told [...] that if he could not explain his presence in the building, he would think [...] was “just a cold-blooded individual, who just went into a business and beat the shit out of somebody. ”  (1T 34-10 to 13)  [...] continued to deny entering a building with [...], and [...] continued to accuse [...] of lying, citing that he had “everything on video. ”  (1T 35-13)  Although [...] stated at one point that he “came out of there” and that he was “the first one out,” (1T 35-6 to 9) it is not clear exactly to what he is referring, and he otherwise adamantly denied being in the building.  After both parties presented their arguments, the court opined that [...] interviewed [...] “solely for purposes of the robbery charges.
[brief] The trial court’s errors were compounded by the conversion to “summary judgment. ”  The trial court held there were no “material facts in dispute,” but [...] did not submit any “facts” in support of the Distance Regulation.  It merely cited the record before the Board, where everyone disagreed on the supposed substantial government interest and the evidence to support it.  The record disputed itself, which is what [...] argued to the trial court.  The trial court should have followed the procedure in Cinnaminson and Bell and held a plenary hearing, rather than attempt to jettison the constitutional challenge through a “motion for summary judgment” that was not even filed, not properly supported, and, regardless, clearly disputed.