ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] First of all, Defendants submitted the “prior Lease” document with a request for leave to supplement the summary judgment record.  Defendants had filed a Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiff had filed timely opposition to the Cross-Motion, and no further papers were allowed under R.4:46-1 (last sentence).  In response, Plaintiff filed a letter dated March 8, 2022, Pra1.  In his response, [...] argued the “prior Lease” between [...] and [...], was with a totally different legal entity and not relevant to the issues in the case before the Court.  [...] argued:  I would object to the submission of the [...] Lease on the basis of relevancy.  Relevant evidence means evidence having a tendency in reason to prove or disprove any fact of consequence to the determination of the action.  N.J.R.E. 401.  In this case, [...] is suggesting the form of a lease between Samuel [...] and a different entity is relevant to the legal issue of whether two signature lines are required for a corporate officer as an individual guaranteeing the obligations of the entity.  However, that is an issue of law, not an issue of fact.  The only relevant evidence is the language used in the [...] and whether the language used binds the individuals or guarantors.  The fact that Mr. [...] may have used a different form with separate lines in another transaction in which defendants were not involved does not have any tendency in reason to prove or disprove any fact of consequence to determination of this action.  This issue was specifically addressed by the Court in Benjamin vs. Garden Operations Corp., 2013 W.L. 6508491 discussed in (above at Prb16-17).
[brief] Such a finding must be supported by clear, unequivocal and convincing evidence of (1) an intentional fraud; (2) by an officer of the court; and (3) which is directed at the court itself.  In addition, fraud on the court may be found only where the misconduct at issue has successfully deceived the court.)  Restatement (Second) of Torts §539, p. 85 (1976).  When that is so, the Restatement explains, liability may result from omission of facts.  See Omnicare, Inc. v. Laborers Dist. Council Constr. Indus. Pension Fund, 575 U.S. 175, 191, 135 S.Ct. 1318, 191 L.Ed.2d 253 (2015).  Plaintiff [...]’s false certification supporting the motion to vacate the PSA intentionally omitted a material fact that Defendant [...] was not shown all the Chinese agreements, which the Court had recognized in the decision dated August 25, 2021.
[brief] But it improperly relied on the pre-Yarbough merger case, State v. Wright, 155 N.J. Super. 549 (App. Div. 1978), not just to decline to merge the certain-persons offense but to run it consecutively based on faulty “no free crimes” logic that would always require consecutive sentences.  (Da 190-91)  But as the Supreme Court recently held in Torres, the “no free crimes” factor must not be “seized upon by sentencing courts” as a “blanket mandate” to impose consecutive sentences.  246 N.J. at 269.  It is thus not enough to say that the Legislature made the certain-persons offense a separate crime -- that is always true when applying Yarbough.  Here, nothing distinguished the certain-persons offense from the other weapons offenses that could fairly justify increasing [...]’s real prison time for the same possessory conduct.  In all, every Yarbough factor favored concurrent sentences.
[brief] On this day, Plaintiff called [...], an owner of defendant [...].  (5T 72:19-104:19).  Similar to [...] and [...], Iannuzzelli was also questioned about the snow removal contracts here, including the no subcontracting provision at length (5T 78:23-79:13; 81:5-24); and the contractual requirement that the snow removal services were to be completed by 6 AM (5T 80:4-21).  In addition, Plaintiff questioned Iannuzzelli, over Defendants’ objection, as to whether [...] was satisfied with the work performed by [...].  Notably, this questioning was not limited to the [...]’s services for the date of loss.  Defendants specifically objected to any testimony or evidence regarding the subsequent April 2018 service and [...]’s dissatisfaction with [...]’s later work, which Defendants pointed out again was completely irrelevant to the services provided on the date of loss and was prejudicial to Defendants.  (5T 90:17-92:14).  Again, this questioning was permitted despite the court’s earlier in limine ruling that no evidence about the Defendants’ subsequent termination related to their April 2018 services would be evidential.  (Da 3-4) (1T 58:11-18; 58:19-59:1).  **H.
[brief] THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING COUNT FOUR AGAINST DEFENDANT [...] (9a-10a)  ..................................................................................................................29  III.  THE LOWER COURT’S ERRED IN DISMISSING COUNTS THREE AND FIVE AS TO DEFENDANTS [...] AND [...] (14a-18a). 31  IV.  THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING COUNTS SIX AND SEVEN AS TO DEFENDANTS  [...] AND [...] (10a-14a)  ..................................................................................................................34  CONCLUSION  ..................................................................................................................................37  ###  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | Cases | Page(s) | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|---------| | **Brown v. City of Bordentown,** | 35 | | 348 N.J. Super. 143 (App. Div. 2002) | | | **Burg v. State,** | 17 | | 147 N.J. Super. 316, 371 A.2d 308 (App. Div.) | | | **Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White,** | 25, 26, 27, 28 | | 548 U.S. 53 (2006) | | | **Clarke v. Atlantic City Bd. of Educ.,** | 24 | | 2010 WL 4107750 (N.J. App. Div. Dec. 8, 2009) | | | **El-Sioufi v. St. Peter’s Univ. Hosp.,** | 26, 32, 35 | | 382 N.J. Super. 145 (App. Div. 2005) | | | **Frederick v. Smith,** | 16 | | 416 N.J. Super. 594 (App. Div. 2010) | | | **Green v. Jersey City Bd. of Educ.,** | 27 | | 177 N.J. 434 (2003) | | | **Lieberman v. Port Authority of N.Y.
[brief] (Doc. 114).  The Court agrees with the [...] with respect to the vast majority of the questions [...] refused to answer.  (See Doc. 112-1 (list of questions provided by [...])).  As noted at the December 10 hearing, the most relevant authority on this type of situation in this circuit is *In re Hughes*, 633 F.2d 282 (3d Cir. 1980).  In *Hughes*, the Third Circuit found that work product protection extends to investigators employed on behalf of attorneys, and that recollections of investigators regarding witness interviews can improperly reveal the mental processes of the investigator and the directing attorney.  *Hughes*, 633 F.2d at 290 (noting that this is the “core of the work product of an agent of an attorney”).  This type of work product is “generally afforded near absolute protection from discovery. ”  *In re Cendant Corp. Secs. Litig.*, 343 F.3d 658, 663 (3d Cir. 2003) (citations omitted).  After review of the questions that the [...] instructed [...] to refuse to answer, the Court finds that most would improperly reveal the “mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories” of the [...].  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3)(B).  At the December 10 hearing, [...] argued that it was entitled to ask [...] about witnesses that had become unavailable, specifically, a borrower witness who, during his deposition by [...], pled the Fifth Amendment in refusing to answer certain questions about his financial status.
[brief] ”  This highlights the problem with permitting a State department to have virtually unlimited jurisdiction.  If it could only substantiate a “workplace” complaint by drawing conclusions about a non-workplace incident – again based only on he-said/she-said evidence – then it was obliged to dismiss the complaint.  Nevertheless, [...]’s reliance on its “conclusion” about that incident, and [...]’s affirmance of that conclusion, demonstrates a fundamental problem of permitting a State department to exercise jurisdiction outside the remit of the State Policy that demonstrates its determination was arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable and should be reversed.
[brief] Under governing decisional law, the agency’s review was limited to the record in existence at the time of bid submission and thus the surety’s after the fact rationalizations are of no moment.  As explained below, [...]’s arguments are easily refuted.  There can be no dispute that [...] submitted a POA with its bid submission that failed to provide any authority to the attorney-in-fact to bind the surety to the obligations contained in the Consent of Surety.  The POA submitted with [...]’s Bid and bearing the logo, “[...],” contained the following bolded statement at the very top of the POA:  This Power of Attorney limits the acts of those named herein, and they have no authority to bind the Company except in the manner and to the extent herein stated.  [emphasis added]  Thus, the POA on its face limits the attorney-in-fact and only grants her that authority which is expressly stated in the document.  The body of the POA then states that:  [[...]]³..., pursuant to and by authority herein set forth, does hereby name, constitute and appoint, [...], of the city of [...], state of [...] its true and lawful attorney-in-fact, with full power and authority hereby conferred to sign, execute and acknowledge the following surety bond [emphasis added]:  Principal Name: [...] Contracting & Construction Corp.  Obligee Name: [...]  Surety Bond Number: [...]  Bond Amount: See Bond Form [A3]  Therefore, the POA expressly restricts the attorney-in-fact’s authority to issuing the specific surety bond identified by the reference “[...],” that is, the Proposal Bond.  The POA provides no authority for [...] to bind [...] to the undertaking required under the Consent of Surety.
[brief] Id. at 155.  Some of the [...] plaintiffs’ positions were abolished pursuant to N.J.S.A. 18:7A-44a (Abolishment of central administrative and supervisory staff; reorganization and evaluation).  This section of the statute provided in pertinent part:  Notwithstanding any other provision of law or contract, the positions of the district’s chief school administrator and those executive administrators responsible for curriculum, business and finance, and personnel may be abolished upon create of the school district under full State intervention.  The affected individuals shall be given 60 days’ notice of termination or 60 days’ pay.  The notice of payment shall be in lieu of any other claim or recourse against the employing board of the school district based on law or contract.  The Appellate Division found that even if the plaintiffs had a contractual right to further employment, the takeover statute substantially impaired those rights, and the Legislature had a significant and legitimate public purpose and was based upon reasonable conditions related to an appropriate governmental objective.
[brief] Here, the State failed to call [...] as a witness, so the jury was not presented with evidence regarding her subjective belief at the time of the incident.  The heightened burden of the State in a simulated-deadly-weapons case exists for a reason: it is only justified to punish an unarmed defendant for armed robbery if he “reasonably persuade[s] the victim” that he is armed.  See Williams, 218 N.J. at 591.  See also ibid.  (“The objective is to persuade the victim that the simulated weapon is real. ”).  Because the State failed to satisfy its heightened burden with respect to [...], and because the State also failed to prove that [...] committed first-degree robbery of the other teller, [...] (Db 24-25), a judgment of acquittal should have been entered on the first-degree robbery charge.
[brief] REPLY BRIEF ON BEHALF OF APPELLANT  [...]  Docket No. [...] December 5, 2023  Honorable Judges of the Superior Court of New Jersey Appellate Division  Richard J. Hughes Justice Complex, CN 006 25 W. Market Street Trenton, New Jersey 08625  RE: In the Matter of Michael Palinczar, [...]  Sat Below: [...]  Docket No. [...]  Honorable Judges: Please accept this letter
[brief] The court did nothing improper by allowing [...] to testify that defendant was “the source” of the fingerprints.  [...] testified on both direct- and cross-examination that there was no set number of identification points required because it was a subjective decision based on quantity of identifiers and quality of prints.  (6T66-25 to 67-24, 68-9 to 69-3, 81-11 to 83-6).  Indeed, a fingerprint analyst’s job is to determine whether two prints match; if a print expert could not exercise his judgment to do so, there would be little reason for the expert to testify at all.
[brief] This matter arises out of a two-vehicle accident which occurred on March 2, 2020.  Plaintiff/Respondent [...] (hereinafter “Respondent”) alleged permanent injuries as a result of the accident and filed suit in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Burlington County.  The matter ultimately proceeded to trial.  Defendant/Appellant [...] (hereinafter “Appellant”) requested a charge pursuant to Mockler v. Russman, 102 N.J. Super. 582 (App. Div. 1968) as the record established that he hydroplaned and was unable to stop his vehicle as a result of unexpected road surface conditions.  The court declined to grant the request for a charge on the Mockler defense.  Further, after both counsel had given their closing arguments, counsel for the Respondent realized that they had not discussed the aggravation charge under Model Civil Jury Charge 8.11F.  Counsel for Respondent had at the start of the day addressed an additional unrelated charge issue which had not been raised during the prior evening’s charge conference.  Over the objection of counsel for Appellant, the court agreed to provide the additional charge, and allowed each counsel to provide a limited supplemental closing argument.  Appellant maintains that the court erred both in declining to provide the charge on the Mockler defense and in providing the supplemental aggravation charge.
[brief] (Id.).  From 2016 through 2022, [...] and [...] worked to finalize a loan repayment agreement.  (Da13-15, ¶¶68-85).  On May 21, 2022, [...] and [...] signed an agreement wherein she would pay loans totaling $6 Million and [...] would transfer to her title to the Property.  (Da44-45).  Unfortunately, [...] died on June 20, 2022.
[brief] They sold off the piece to [...] and in that Deed, it is his opinion that the Deed does not include the Riparian Title and it does not include the other lots that were shown on the 1910 Map (1T147:10-22).  It shows the beach itself and there is reference in the foreclosure to the beach (1T148).  When asked if in any of Deeds subsequent to [...] taking title, if there is any reference to the Riparian Grant also being transferred, [...] confirms: “Not in my opinion” (1T148:18).  In fact, there is no reflection of the Riparian Grant on the 1909 or 1910 Map” (1T148:23).  In his opinion, if there is reference to a map and the Riparian Grant is now shown, it could not possibly have been conveyed (1T149:2).  [...] confirms: “I think it shows that they knew not to sell certain properties including the Riparian Grant as well as the other group of lots that were on 1910 Map (1T149:8).  He confirms that these Deeds show a specific intent to exclude the Riparian Grant (1T149:21).
[brief] (Ca20).  Accordingly, [...] accepted that appointment, advertised the sale, sent notice to the proper persons, posted a notice on the property, and held a sheriff’s sale of the property on January 18, 2021.  (Ca20).  The only bidder was [...] through their entity, [...].  (Ca20).  The foreclosure documents included, in the mortgage language, that the mortgage covered buildings and anything to be constructed on the property.
[brief] (Das 074-075, 075-085, 086).  The State’s request is out of time and moot, as the Court had already requested the CIU assign counsel in January 2020.  Regardless, the State moved to deny [...]’s PCR prior to any formal submissions from his attorney advancing his claims.  Despite [...]’s counsel representing to the Court that discovery request fulfillment and investigations were ongoing, and that claims raised in final briefing included claims that had different procedural time bars including illegal sentence and motion for new trial based on newly discovered evidence, the Court prematurely dismissed with prejudice [...]’s PCR without submissions and without oral argument.  (Das 074-075, 075-085, 086).  In denying this PCR prior to submission of final amended PCR arguments, the Court deprived [...] of his ability to present his claims to the Court in defiance of Court rules and standing case law.  This appeal follows.
[brief] The Charges  At the departmental level, [...] was charged and found guilty of fifty-eight (58) separate charges.\(^2\) (Pa82).  The charges included: (a) Conduct unbecoming an employee (charges #1-13)  (b)  Incompetency, inefficiency or failure to perform duties (charges #14-17) (c)  Neglect of Duty (charges #18-21) (d)  Other Sufficient Cause (charges #22-34)  (e)  Departmental Rules and Regulations – Reporting Violations of Law (charges #35-38)  (f)  Departmental Rules and Regulations – Performance of Duty (charges #39-43)  (g)  Departmental Rules and Regulations – Performance of Duty (charge #44)  (h)  Departmental Rules and Regulations – Neglect of Duty (charges #45-49)  (i)  Departmental Rules and Regulations- Performance of Duty (charge #50)  (j)  Departmental Rules and Regulations – Being under the influence of Alcohol or Drugs on duty (charges #51-52)  \(^2\)  Charge no. 4, and associated charges no. 51 through 54, alleging conduct unbecoming a public employee and misconduct based upon the factual allegation that [...] was observed in an impaired condition while on duty was abandoned by the City before the trial began for lack of evidence.  Specifically, counsel for the City stated that “the charges of impairment on the job we are going to withdraw. ” (T1 9:15-18; T1 11:4-12).  (k)  Departmental Rules and Regulations – Being under the influence of Alcohol or Drugs on Duty (charges #53-54)  (l)  Departmental Rules and Regulations – Notification about medication (charge #55)  (m)  Departmental Rules and Regulations – Truthfulness (charge #56-57)  (n)  Departmental General Order Sick Leave (charge #58).  (Pa82).  The overlapping charges arise from factual specifications more specifically addressed *infra* and summarized as follows:  (a) **The TL Incident** involving circumstances arising from police/medical response to [...]’s home to address the medical emergency of a third party; (b) **The Unlicensed Driver’s Incident** involving circumstances arising from the use of [...]’s vehicle by unlicensed third parties; (c) **Use of Pain Medication** involving circumstances relating to [...] being prescribed pain medication and allegedly failing to provide required notice and/or abusing that medication; (d) **Sick Leave/Sinus Surgery/Rehab** involving circumstances arising from [...] providing notice of his status and/or location.
[brief] [...] seems to suggest that, instead of verifying whether a layoff occurred by the presence of legally required documents, the Board should have based its decision on [...]’s characterization of the action.  (Pb10).  In the absence of the procedural requirement of notice pursuant to N.J.A.C. 4A:8-1.6, what [...] and/or [...] thought was happening is irrelevant.  The Board did not “transpose[]” the report that there was no “official layoff notice” to “no actual layoff,” as [...] argues on appeal.  (Pb11).  Rather, the admission that no official layoff notice was issued, combined with the options other than termination provided by [...] to affected employees by email, supports the Board’s finding that no layoff occurred here.  (Pa54-57).  In any case, no “[s]tate agency can bind PERS regarding its authority or the pension laws. ”  Francois v. Bd. of Trs., Pub. Emps.’ Ret. Sys., 415 N.J. Super. 335, 352 (App. Div. 2010).  Thus, the Board is not bound by any belated determination made by [...] as to whether [...]’s separation from employment in 2020 constituted a layoff under N.J.A.C. 17:2-1A.1, a PERS regulation, or a simple termination.  [...] also erroneously states that he “had no choice” but to terminate his employment.  (Pb13-14).  However, that claim is belied by the record.  [...]’s March 24, 2020 email shows that he was given three options in the face of the restrictions on building access, two of which did not involve termination.  (Pa3).  He could have used “PTO days,” or taken “unpaid time” (Pa3), and such an “approved leave[] of absence” would not have qualified as a break in service under N.J.A.C. 17:2-1A.1.  Instead, he voluntarily chose the third option--termination--and was terminated shortly thereafter in April 2020.  Thus, based on the undisputed facts on this record, [...] chose to be terminated instead of taking PTO or unpaid leave.  There was no layoff.
[brief] Q: And you’re telling me that these handwritten that have no terms and conditions attached to them and are unsigned by [...] obligated [...] to purchase all materials on this list?  A: Yes.  Q: When?  At any time for the next 50 years?  A: No, it’s not going to be 50 years, obviously.  Q:  There’s no term.  So you’re telling me that … [...] obligated itself to sell you those good at those prices for the next 50 years.  A: I am not saying for the next 50 years.  You said the next 50 years, okay?  So then you would have to ask my husband, that because . . .  I didn’t negotiate any terms with [...].  My husband is the one that dealt with them.  My husband is the one that gets the pricing and does all that.  I did not negotiate any terms with them.  (3T35:21-36:16)  (emphasis supplied)
[brief] Copies of all referenced documents as well as unpublished decisions pursuant to Rule 1:36-3, are included in Respondent’s Appendix.  Counsel is unaware of any contradictory decisions.  \(^3\)  It is a matter of public record that [...] was issued licenses both as a Sales Finance Company (license # L070419) and as a Consumer Lender (license # L070420) on May 3 and 4, 2018 respectively.  (Pa83) action pursuant to the NJCFLA\(^4\) and Plaintiff did not plead one in the underlying Complaint.  In Count One of the Putative Class Action Complaint, Plaintiff sought a Declaratory Judgment pursuant to the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Law ("UDJL"), N.J.S.A. 2A: 16-53 declaring all accounts Respondent took assignment of prior to obtaining a license are void, and granting a permanent injunction "pursuant to the [NJ]CFA" prohibiting any further attempts to collect on those accounts or transfer them to other entities.
[directive] This is a public document, which means the document as submitted will be available to the public upon request.  Therefore, do not enter personal identifiers on it, such as Social Security number, driver’s license number, vehicle plate number, insurance policy number, active financial account number, or active credit card number.  As ações, petições e outros documentos entregues ao tribunal deverão estar em inglês Complaints, motions and other papers submitted to the court should be in English
[brief] 1.  Contrary to the Respondents’ arguments, the gravamen of my appeal is based upon the trial court’s rulings of law, and not upon its findings of fact.  The closest that the Respondents come to making a valid argument, is their citing of treatise as to the correct standard of review for a trial court’s findings of fact.  That is, on pages Db7 - Db9 of their brief, they cite treatise as to the deferential standard that is afforded to a trial court’s factual findings.  They then try to distort my bases for this appeal as supposedly being based upon factual findings, when in reality my arguments are mostly based upon the trial court’s rulings of law.  Therefore, those rulings of law are subject to a de novo review by this Court.