ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] This professional misbehavior, in itself, supports reversal and remand.  On October 12, 2023, [...] together with [...], admonished defendant’s counsel in an extraordinary signed persuasive opinion.  Lenny Rodriguez v. Edgar Cano, A-1561-21 (App. Div. Oct. 12, 2023) (Pa654) (slip op. at p. 20).  [O]ur courts view an attack by counsel on a witness’s character or morals, when they are not in issue, [as] a particularly reprehensible type of impropriety,” Paxton v. Misuik, 54 N.J. Super. 15, 22 (App. Div. 1959), because of the potential for such comments to cause injustice by instilling “in the minds of the jury impression not founded upon the evidence. ”  Geler, 358 N.J. Super. at 467 (quoting Botta v. Bruner, 26 N.J. 82, 98 (1958).  IX
[brief] In general, a jury verdict should be transformed into a judgment when the Plaintiff can recover only a “sum certain. ”  See *Ciechanowski v. New Jersey Mfrs. Ins. Co.*, 2009 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2045, *14-15.  Of particular note, this was a limitation on damages Appellee entered into prior to trial, not after judgement.  Moreover, R. 4:58-2 clearly provides that calculation concerning offer of judgment consequences derives from the “money judgment,” not the verdict.  *Wadeer v. N.J. Mfrs. Ins. Co.*, 2009 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 878, *5-6.
[directive] Congress has not appropriated funds for such purpose since fiscal year 1997.  Should to funds appropriated for this purpose, those funds shall be made available meet the be authorized expenses identified by the law.  of of Allocation Funds and Payment Expenses to Financial transactions between the Fund and each agency are coordinated pursuant the EOAF. provisions of a Memorandum of Understanding with Cash Management Seized cash, except where it is to be used as evidence, is to be deposited promptly into EOAF 4, the Suspense Account pending forfeiture.  (See Directive dated June 19,1996).
[brief] Instead, the plethora of cases support the Lower Court’s conclusion that Respondents are not encompassed by the NJCFA and the claims stemming therefrom (Count II and for unjust enrichment\(^{22}\)) was correctly dismissed. --- \(^{22}\)  The claim is based solely on Respondents’ purported “illegally obtained accounts and judgments,” a conclusion which exclusively relies on violations of statutes which do not apply to Respondents or which do not confer a private right of action, as discussed infra.  (Pa1-Pa18).  B.
[brief] Plaintiff-Appellant fails to appreciate the point made by the Court that without citation to records and standards, it cannot prove that a duty was breached.  The question is not whether Defendant rebuilt or repaired the sidewalk in question, or even when the repair was done (there was a debate as to when the work was actually done—whether it was in 1987 or in 1999, and the court conceded for purposes of the motion that it considered the work to have been done in 1997).¹  The decision, rather, arose from the lack of evidence of what was done, how it was done, and how it violated the design manual.  The only standards set forth by Plaintiff’s expert, [...], pertain to a code which espouses non-mandatory guidelines for the creation of new roadways.  ii.  [...]’s opinion was a net opinion.  The Court below properly ruled that [...]’s report is a net opinion.
[brief] While his June 29 email “confirmed” that the Closing Date was extended by another day under both contracts, [...]’s counsel went on to state:  Our respective clients both understand that despite their respective efforts to identify, there is no feasible way to close under the structure contemplated by the [PSA] because of the inability to secure the necessary leasehold financing with the ground lease structure.  Accordingly, doing [sic] forward, further requests for consent by [Plaintiff] to extensions under the [...] [Agreement], and corresponding extensions of the closing date under the [PSA], are not meaningful.  I suggest that it is more productive for our clients continue [sic] their discussions to address the fact that our client is unable to close under the terms of [the PSA].  (Pa10, Complaint ¶ 36 (emphasis added)).  In reliance on this representation, Plaintiff believed [...] would, in fact, “continue their discussions” to address [...]’s failure to close, as required by the PSA.  (Pa10, Complaint ¶¶ 36-37).  The next day, Plaintiff once again inquired as to the status of the transaction, and received a response from [...] stating, “[n]othing really new, I believe [...] wants to extend through tomorrow, and we want to extend until Tuesday.  Still no agreement on longer extension. ”  (Pa10, Complaint ¶ 38).  C.  Plaintiff Signals its Ongoing Intention to Enforce its Rights Under the PSA, Notwithstanding the Return of the Earnest Money Deposit
[brief] ALTHOUGH THE ISSUE RAISED IN POINT [II A]  OF DEFENDANT'S OPENING BRIEF IS CONTROLLED BY THE SUPREME COURT'S DECISION IN STATE V. KIRIAKAKIS, RESENTENCING IS STILL REQUIRED FOR THE REASONS EXPRESSED IN POINT [II B].  Having considered these arguments in light of the applicable law and the record, we reverse the denial of defendant's motion to suppress based on essentially the same reasoning we followed in Bradley, as applied to the present record.
[brief] The union instituted arbitration.  The company did not name anyone and asserted the union’s claims were not arbitrable.  *Id.* at 837.  The union made its selection and then asked the “[...]” to submit a list of names, which it did.  *Ibid.*  On the motion to vacate that appointed arbitrator’s decision the 8th Circuit did not rule that the arbitration authority had the sole decision procedurally to decide who was appointed.  To the contrary, the Court vacated the award because it found that one arbitrator was not authorized by the parties’ agreement to render the awards, and the appointment exceeded the arbitrator’s powers.  *Id.* at 839.  In *Szuts v. Dean Witter*, 931 F. 2d 830 (11th Cir. 1991) the Court had the same issue as is presented here: can an award by less than 3 arbitrators stand when the parties’ agreement called for 3 and one party objected?
[brief] The Trial Court abused its discretion when it disallowed the opinion of the Plaintiff's Expert Engineer as a net opinion, where the expert testified that the ingress to the jacuzzi was designed poorly, violated industry standards, and was a hazardous condition.  (Pa1)  The failure of an expert to give weight to a factor thought important by an adverse party does not reduce his testimony to an inadmissible net opinion if he otherwise offers sufficient reasons which logically support his opinion."  Rosenberg v. Tavorath, 352 N.J. Super. 385, 402 (App. Div. 2002).
[brief] By her own admission, [...] had been actively monitoring and, in her individual capacity, vigorously opposing [...]’ efforts to obtain the subject approval from the [...].  For example, in June 2022, [...] signed a letter urging the [...] to deny [...]’ then-forthcoming application.  (Da422-424.)  Then, on September 14, 2022, [...] attended the [...] meeting as a so-called “objector” and opposed [...]’ application for a conditional use approval.  (Da94; Da255.)  To that end, the trial court expressly found:  It’s undisputed [that [...]] has been involved in this fight from day one, she’s the one that’s carried the fight against the cannabis store.  She appeared below, she questioned the witnesses.  I think she provided testimony to the Planning Board below.  [3T13:3-7.]  Despite her intimate knowledge and involvement, [...] did not timely commence a litigation seeking to challenge the subject approval and resolution in her individual capacity.
[brief] Six witnesses ([...], [...], [...], [...], [...] and [...]) testified that [...] was outside on the [...]’s driveway almost daily.  She often escaped from the invisible fence on her property, which worked only when she wore a transponder collar.  Even [...] admitted that [...] got off property “three or four” times.  2T134:23-25.  [...] testified:  Q  Did you ever see her off her property?  A  Once in a while 2T99-19:22.  Q  All right.  Did you see [...] off their property off leash?  A  Once in a while, yes.  2T100-5:9  Several people, including the State’s witnesses, described [...]’s excursions.  [...] found [...] on the street near the driveway of #12 in 2016.  3T93:12-21.  She returned her to [...], but [...] was back out there within a few minutes.  3T94:4-16.  Every time [...] and [...] walked past #12, [...] charged out of the garage and ran up her driveway toward the street, barking and menacing [...].  Often, [...] caught up to [...] and nipped at his feet.  3T20:13-22.  [...] would react, but [...] always controlled him with a tug on the leash, averting a confrontation.  3T22:1-11.  [...] admitted he apologized to [...] because “[...] gets out into the street...while he must have been walking the German Shepherd. ”  2T136:16-25.  However, he shrugged it off because, “she has small teeth and can’t bite. ”\(^4\) 3T23:23.  When [...] suggested the dogs get together for a play date, [...] replied that after “so much antagonism” and “constant confrontation all the time,” [...] would never warm up to [...].  3T22:12-23:5; 3T23:1-4; 3T24:5-6.  Despite the size differential, [...] was the aggressor.
[brief] BACKGROUND ON THE TAX SALE LAW IN NEW JERSEY.  (Raised below, passim).  Our Legislature has long recognized the burden caused by delinquent taxpayers.  “[Q]ualified municipalities are owed millions of dollars annually in unpaid property taxes, and that such uncollected taxes adversely impact qualified municipalities' ability to timely collect the moneys necessary to meet their operating expenditures and provide for the delivery of necessary government services, amplifying the risk of future real property tax increases and negatively impacting those taxpayers who timely remit payment.  N.J.S. 52:27BBB-67, emphasis added.  The Tax Sale Law serves as a framework to facilitate the collection of property taxes.  It confers on a municipality that is owed real estate taxes a continuous lien on the land for the delinquent amount as well as for all subsequent taxes, interest, penalties and costs of collection.  The Tax Sale Law converts that lien into a stream of revenue by encouraging the purchase of tax certificates on tax-dormant properties.  By authorizing the sale of liens in a commercial market, the Tax Sale Law gives rise to a municipal financing option that provides a mechanism to transform a non-performing asset into cash without raising taxes.  [In re Princeton Office Park L.P. v. Plymouth Park Tax Servs., LLC, 218 N.J. 52, 61-62 (2014) (internal citations omitted).
[brief] Reimbursing these monies is not a shift of legal fees from one litigant to another in violation of the American Rule.  This is not an instance in which [...] had to defend a suit brought by [...], the suit was deemed frivolous, and [...] got a reimbursement of its legal fees paid.  [...] got its own legal fees paid back by the person who – from the inside - improperly authorized the expenditure because it was a personal, not corporate, benefit.  This is no different than if [...] had used company monies to pay his personal mortgage.  Or if he used company monies to rent a vacation home on Cape Cod.  Or if he used company monies to purchase a Rembrandt for his personal art collection.  Or if he used company money for his children’s private school tuition.  [...] wasted company money.  He had to pay it back.
[directive] I  Order CN: of3 page of If, 3. within three (3) months after confinement pursuant to the terms this order, it is determined that the defendant has not regained his/her fitness to stand trial, professional staff of shall notify the court and counsel and provide each with an evaluation the defendant's lack of fitness to proceed to trial, whether substantially probable that the defendant could it is regain his competence within the foreseeable future and whether defendant continues to be of or dangerous to self, others propetty as a result mental illness; and, NJS.A. or 4.  Pursuant to 2C:4-4(b ), the qualified psychiatrist licensed psychologist shall render an opinion as to whether the defendant has the mental capacity to appreciate their presence in relation time, place and things and whether the defendant's elementary mental processes to are such that they comprehend: of (a) That he/she are in a court justice charged with a criminal offense; on (b) That there is a judge the bench; ( c) That there a prosecutor present who will try to convict him/her; is ( d) That he/she has a lawyer who will undertake to defend him/her; of (e) That he/she will be expected tell to the best his/her mental ability the facts to if at surrounding him/her the time and place where the alleged violation was committed he/she chooses to testify and understand his/her legal right not to testify; of or That (f) there is a jury present to pass upon evidence that adduced as to guilt innocence if or such charge or, that he/she should choose to enter into plea negotiations to plead of guilty, that he/she comprehends the consequences a guilty plea and that he/she be able to knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waive those rights which are waived upon of such entry a guilty plea; and of (g) That he/she has the ability to participate in an adequate presentation his/her defense.
[brief] (Pb 2)  [...] was transported to the [...] ([...]) and made additional statements before, during, and after formal questioning.  (2T 17-23 to 18-18, 19-22 to 20-21-2)  [...] was interrogated by [...] of the [...].  (1T 15-4 to 8, 33-4 to 35-4; 2T 18-7 to 13)  The recording of the interrogation showed that Detective Santiago reviewed the Miranda\(^4\) warnings with [...] and had him initial on a waiver form next to each warning.  (2T 19-12 to 21)  But when Detective Santiago asked [...] if he was willing to waive his rights and speak to her without a lawyer, [...] found that [...] clearly stated, “No, I’m not going to do it. ”  (2T 19-22 to 25, 36-8 to 18)  Detective Santiago did not ask [...] to clarify what he meant by this.  (2T 36-23 to 37-14)  Rather, [...] found that Detective Santiago “essentially ignore[d] his clearly uttered statement, and then direct[ed] him to sign the paragraph and enter his printed name. ”  (2T 37-5 to 7)  During the formal questioning, [...] admitted that he was on the scene and that he “blacked out,” but he did not acknowledge shooting the victim.  (2T 20-9 to 18)  The interrogation started at 2:11 p.m. and ended around 2:47 p.m. when [...] said, “I want to talk to my lawyer. ”  (2T 38-22 to 25)  \(^4\) *Miranda v. Arizona*, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).  After the formal questioning, [...] was booked and medically examined to be cleared for incarceration.
[brief] See Aa31-33; 2Ra202.  The Redevelopment Ordinances did not incorporate the SRD Rule’s visual compatibility provision under N.J.A.C. 7:7-16.10(c) (“Subsection C”) or the 30% open view corridor and 2-to-1 setback requirements under N.J.A.C. 7:7-16.10(d) (“Subsection D”) as requirements for development in the Redevelopment Area. \(^3\) Aa32; see 2Ra202; see also 2Ra130-38.  Notably, Handbook 6 requires a building to be set back from [...] by “40 feet or half the height of the building, whichever is greater. ”  2Ra136.  It does not require any setbacks from a “beach, dune, boardwalk, or waterfront. ”  N.J.A.C. 7:7-16.10(d)(2); see 2Ra136.  On December 9, 2020, [...] adopted an amendment to the Redevelopment Ordinances that applied specifically to the [...] pursuant to [...] (the “Redevelopment Plan Amendment”).
[brief] In reviewing the decision of a local planning board, the Court’s power is tightly circumscribed.  New Brunswick Cellular Tel. Co. v. Old Bridge Planning Bd., 270 N.J. Super. 122, 134, 636 A.2d 588 (Law Div. 1993).  Board decisions, when factually grounded, are cloaked with a presumption of validity, which presumption attaches to both the acts and the motives of its members.  Pullen v. So. Plainfield Planning Bd., 291 N.J. Super. 303, 312, 677 A.2d 278 (Law Div. 1995), aff’d, 291 N.J. Super. 1, 6, 676 A.2d 1095 (App. Div. 1996).  So long as there is substantial evidence to support it, the court may not interfere with or overturn the decision of a municipal board.  Even when doubt is entertained as to the wisdom of a board’s action, there can be no judicial declaration of invalidity absent a clear abuse of discretion by a board.  Pullen, supra, 291 N.J. Super. at 312, 677 A.2d 278, aff’d, 291 N.J. Super. 1 at 6, 676 A.2d 1095; New Brunswick Cellular Tel. Co., supra, 270 N.J. Super. at 134, 636 A.2d 588.
[brief] Affidavit of [...].................................................................Pa146  Affidavit of [...]..............................................................Pa148  Affidavit of [...].....................................................................Pa150  Affidavit of [...]....................................................................Pa152  Affidavit of [...]..................................................................Pa154  Affidavit of [...]....................................................................Pa156  Affidavit of [...]..................................................................Pa158  Affidavit of [...].....................................................................Pa160  Affidavit of [...]...............................................................Pa162  Affidavit of [...]..................................................................Pa164  Affidavit of [...]..............................................Pa166  Affidavit of [...].....................................................................Pa168  Affidavit of [...]..................................................................Pa170  VOLUME III Affidavit of [...]...................................................................Pa172
[directive] 4.8  Limitations on vehicular pursuits.  Vehicular pursuits present officers with difficult decisions that involve balancing the duty to enforce the law and apprehend violators with the risks created by pursuing motor vehicles, often being operated at high speeds by irresponsible drivers in densely populated areas.  The decision to pursue a motor vehicle must be objectively justifiable after giving due consideration to a number of factors.  Although impossible to create a policy that addresses every potential scenario, officers and supervisors shall conduct vehicular pursuits only within the parameters outlined in Addendum B of this Policy.
[brief] Mancini, supra, 132 N.J. at 335, 625 A.2d 484; see also **581 Baumann, supra, 95 N.J. at 394, 471 A.2d 395 (stating that “mere carelessness or lack of proper diligence on the part of an attorney is ordinarily not sufficient to entitle his clients to relief from an adverse judgment” (quotation omitted)).
[brief] Correa v. Grossi, 458 N.J. Super. 571, 580 (App. Div. 2019) (citing Kirk v. French, 324 N.J. Super. 548, 552 (Law Div. 1998)) (emphasis added).  Title 19 is therefore designed to “deter fraud, safeguard the secrecy of the ballot[,] and prevent the disenfranchisement of qualified voters.
[brief] 15  Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384 (2007) ......................................................... 22, 23, 24 White v. Mattera, 175 N.J. 158 (2003) .........................................................  18  Wildoner v. Borough of Ramsey, 162 N.J. 375 (2000)  ..................................  37  Woodson v. Payton, 503 F. App'x 110 (3d Cir. 2012)  ..................................
[directive] Officers shall take the following actions to reduce the risk of positional asphyxiation:  (a)  As soon as handcuffed and restrained, a person should be immediately rolled to the side and taken to an upright position that does not impede the mechanism of normal breathing.  This requirement is especially important when the subject is handcuffed face down in the prone position; (b)  Care should be taken not to put sustained pressure on the neck or back, as breathing can be restricted even if the person is placed in the recovery position.  This includes sitting, kneeling, or standing on a person’s chest, back, or neck for a prolonged period of time; 9  USE OF FORCE POLICY | December 2021  (c)  Officers shall continuously monitor the person’s condition while being restrained, as death can occur suddenly and develop beyond the point of viable resuscitation within seconds; (d)  Whenever possible during team restraint, a “Safety Officer,” with the responsibility to monitor the health and welfare of the person during restraint, should be designated; (e)  The arrested person must not be transported in the prone position; and (f)  The arrested person should be monitored prior to, during, and at the conclusion of the transport.  3.6.2
[brief] \textsuperscript{42}  Beginning on page 11, last paragraph, line 7 within [...]’s brief AP 48 – AP 62  \textsuperscript{43}  Examples of counsel immediate repetitive statements within brief: page 7, paragraph 3, lines 2-4 and again on page 8, paragraph 1, lines 4-8 / pages 8-9, Under Point I, paragraph 1, lines 2-3 and again in lines 8-9
[brief] [...], the only one who could submit a valid Rule1:6-6 verification of the undated Order, never came forward acknowledging that he had in fact signed the undated order creating credibility issues and issues of facts, warranting Jury submission.  While [...] did not physically assist the police in stopping and beating the plaintiff, it participated in the conspiracy to allow the false charges brought by the Edison police to stick.  It is [...] and its staff that facilitated the blockage of plaintiff’s ability to appeal his unlawful criminal conviction caused by the unlawful acts of the Edison defendants.  This violated NJ Constitution Art 1 para 22 that provides that plaintiff (a victim of crime by the Edison Police), was to be provided fairness, compassion and respect by the criminal justice system in being allowed to vindicate the wrongs of Edison by appealing his conviction.  (Pa21-Pa23; Pa303-Pa304, Pa470, Pa471).  Disallowance of a right to appeal, was denial of due process, the right to grieve and the right to equal protection.
[brief] The effective date of the amendment authorizing [...] to pay its employees from the Board’s money is June 29, 2020.  As with all statutes, N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-9(e)(3) must be given prospective application, which negates all of [...]’s claims for payment on its April / May / June 2020 invoices.  The Legislature undisputedly did not express retroactive application of N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-9(e)(3).  Under the two-prong implied retroactive application test, the court cannot apply retroactive application of the statute because 1) the Legislature never intended to give the statute retroactive application; and 2) the retroactive application will result in either an unconstitutional interference with vested rights or a manifest injustice.  [...]’s claims, which are based on the retroactive application of the statute, thus fails, requiring a denial of its motion for summary judgment.
[brief] To the contrary, Burd recognized the two theories of recovery were at odds with another, since the plaintiff pled negligence and intentional conduct in the alternative and the insurer’s coverage excluded intentional acts.  See Price, 90 N.J. Super. at 485.\textsuperscript{18}  Applying that rationale here establishes [...] cannot recover for negligence under his version of events, because [...] claims [...] intentionally punched him after he laughed at [...].  As the Appellate Division and trial court both ruled, this theory has no basis in law.  C.
[brief] ”) (citation omitted); *Subaru of Am. v. Ddb Worldwide Communs. Grp.*, 812 F. Supp. 2d 650, 658 (D.N.J. 2011) (“Under New Jersey law, ‘[t]ermination . . . causes the contract to cease existing’ and the parties' respective obligations under the contract are extinguished. ”) (citing *Nickels Midway Pier, LLC v. Wild Waves, LLC* (In re Nickels Midway Pier, LLC), 450 B.R. 58, 63 (D.N.J. 2011)).