ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] TABLE OF AUTHORITIES  ........................................................................................................ ii  STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY ..................................................  1 LEGAL ARGUMENT ..................................................................................................................  1 POINT I THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF N.J.S.A.  2C:35-14A(5)  DEMONSTRATES CLEAR LEGISLATIVE INTENT TO BAR THE DEFENDANT FROM ENTRY INTO THE RECOVERY COURT PROGRAM FOR UNLAWFULLY POSSESSING A FIREARM WHILE CRIMINAL CHARGES WERE PENDING IN MORRIS COUNTY (Addressing Defendant’s Point IA)  ...........................................................................................................................................  1  A.  THE STATE DID NOT MISREAD THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF FACTOR A(5)  .................................................................................................................................  2  B.  THE STATE’S INTERPRETATION OF THE LANGUAGE OF FACTOR A(5) IS IN EQUIPOISE WITH THE LANGUAGE OF FACTOR A(7) AND DOES NOT ASSIGN NEW MEANING TO ANY OF THE TERMS OR RENDER ANY OF THE TERMS SUPERFLUOUS  ..................................................................................................................  3  C.  THE LEGISLATURE’S INTENT WITH FACTOR A(5) IS TO EXCLUDE APPLICANTS WHO POSSESS FIREARMS FROM THE RECOVERY COURT PROGRAM ......................  5  POINT II THIS COURT SHOULD DECIDE THE APPLICABILITY OF N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14A(5)  AS A NONDISCRETIONARY RECOVERY  COURT  ELIGIBILITY FACTOR ............................................................................. 9  CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................................  11  ###  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES  ####  Cases - **State v. Ancrum**, 449 N.J. Super. 526 (App. Div. 2017) ...........................................3 - **State v. Hyland**, 238 N.J. 135 (2019) ..............................................................................9 - **State v. Robinson**, 217 N.J. 594 (2014) .........................................................................7  ####  Statutes - **N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14a(5)** .................................................................................................1, 2, 3, 5, 9 - **N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14a(7)** .................................................................................................3 - **N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14b** .....................................................................................................3, 4 - **N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(c)** ....................................................................................................8 - **N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6.2**  .....................................................................................................8 - **N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1**  .........................................................................................................7 - **N.J.S.A. 2C:44-5(h)**  ....................................................................................................7  STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[brief] The Court highlighted that Appellants were not entitled to relief under R. 4:50-1 because they failed to cite any reasons as to why they were entitled not to comply with the Court’s Order (Dr48-49).  Moreover, Appellants signed the consent order and knew that they were agreeing to submit to arbitration (Dr49).  Additionally, the Court validated the arbitration agreement in so far as its terms were clear and unambiguous and Appellants failed to indicate how the same was unenforceable (Dr48-49).  On July 1, 2024, this case was selected for mandatory, non-binding arbitration scheduled for September 20, 2024 (Dr53).  On July 3, 2024, [...] submitted a motion for the Court to reconsider the May 24, 2024 Order denying a further stay and sanctions.  On July 11, 2024, [...] filed a cross-motion seeking the same relief as requested in [...]’s motion to reconsider.  On July 18, 2024, Appellants filed a Notice of Appeal (Dr57-60).  Thereafter, Appellants filed an Amended Notice of Appeal on July 29, 2024 (Dr61-66).  On August 16, 2024, the Court denied [...]’s motion for reconsideration, as well as [...]’s cross-motion (Dr67).  On September 12, 2024, [...] requested an adjournment of the Court-Ordered Arbitration, which the Court granted and rescheduled for October 18, 2024 (Dr69).  On October 11, 2024, [...] requested that the Court adjourn Arbitration in light of the pending appeal (Dr69).  The Court denied [...]’s request that same day (Dr70).  Also on October 11, 2024, Appellants requested that the Court enter default against [...] (Dr73).  Appellants filed a Motion to Enter Default against [...], too.  On October 15, 2024, the Court entered default against [...] (Dr78).  The next day, on October 16, 2024, [...] requested that the Court remove the case from mandatory, non-binding arbitration.  [...] also requested that the Court adjourn Arbitration until after the Court rendered a decision on its motion.  On October 17, 2024, the Court rescheduled Arbitration for November 15, 2024.  On November 8, 2024, the Court denied the motion to remove the case from Arbitration, Motion for default, and Motion to stay the case (Dr78-84).  Additionally, the Court dismissed [...] from this matter without prejudice (Dr85).  On November 15, 2024, Arbitration proceeded, with the Arbitrator ultimately determining that there was “inadequate information at this time to render an arbitration decision.  Litigation is pending at both the trial level and in the Appellate Division, the results of which will affect the issues of the case” (Dr86).  **STATEMENT OF FACTS**
[brief] Hayes v. Delamotte, 201 N.J. 373, 386-87 (2018) (quoting Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Twp. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995)); Kaur v. Assured Lending Corp., 405 N.J. Super. 468 (App. Div. 2009).  Plaintiffs relied upon the following contracts in claiming an award of counsel fees and litigation expenses was authorized:
[brief] This confused and confusing submission was improper, but allowed by the Court below.  The issues before the Board was: (1)  Is the off-site parking use by Lot 8 on the School Lot 5 currently a legal accessory use on Lot 5 and (2) if not, has the proponent of the nonconforming off-site parking use on the School Lot 5 provided sufficient evidence to demonstrate that when that use commenced (presumably 1964) the use was legal under the Zoning Regulations then in effect and, if so, what was the extent of the use.
[brief] Consistent with N.J.S.A. 2C:3-11b, the court also explained that “[a] mere threat with a firearm, however, intended only to make the victim of the threat believe that the defendant will use the firearm if necessary, is not an example of deadly force. ”  (27T 187-20 to 24)\(^{15}\)  But, despite [...]’s testimony that his first shot was fired in response to sounds of gunfire and was fired up in the air and intended only as a warning shot, the court failed to instruct that a “threat with a firearm” could include firing a warning shot.
[brief] (3T58-15 to 58-24)  A review of this tenant’s lease in accordance with the foregoing principles of law supports the trial court’s interpretation of the word “premises. ”  Paragraphs 1-8 of [...]’ lease are set forth in the statement of facts, supra.  They set forth the rent to be paid, purpose for which the tenant is permitted to use the rented portion of the property, limitations on the tenant’s use of the demised portion of the property, the tenant’s responsibility for utilities for the demised portion of the property, and the landlord’s right to enter the rented portion of the property for inspections.  Finally paragraph 9 provides that the tenant is not liable for rent until “possession of the premises” is delivered.  (Pa504, Pa869)  To construe these provisions as referring to anything other than the portion of the strip mall rented to each tenant is to effectively render them nonsensical.  It makes no sense, and violates the principles enunciated above, to interpret the word “premises” as used in paragraph 3 differently than in paragraphs 1, 2 and 4-9 of the lease, as urged by plaintiffs.  It is clear that the word “premises” as used in paragraph 3 of the lease obligated a tenant to maintain only that area “adjacent” to the portion of the property rented by that tenant.
[brief] Plaintiffs further assert that equitable estoppel is assessed by looking at the prejudice to Defendant based on what Defendant knew at the time of the alleged infringing act, and claim that Plaintiffs’ intent and internal activities are therefore irrelevant.  Id. at 20-21 (citing A.C. Aukerman Co., 960 F.2d at 1028).  With respect to Defendant’s laches claim, Plaintiffs state that there was an eight-month delay from the time the tolling agreement expired to the time that they reinitiated suit against Defendant, and that consequently, the only relevant inquiry is whether an eight-month delay in reinitiating suit was reasonable or excusable.  Id. at 20-21.  Finally, Plaintiffs assert that the revival discovery improperly seeks information protected by the attorney-client privilege and work-product doctrine.  Id. at 6, 21.  Plaintiffs explain that the discovery requests at issue seek not only the underlying facts regarding the patent revival, but also documents and information from Plaintiffs’ counsel regarding the investigation into the cause for the delayed maintenance fee payments, as well internal communications regarding the patent revival.  Id. at 21.  Plaintiffs thus ask the Court to deny Defendant’s motion to compel the revival discovery.
[brief] 1T Transcript of Hearing held on July 13, 2024 ..........................  2T  Table of Authorities Cases  Banco Popular No. Am. v. Gandi, 184 N.J. 161, 175 (2005)..................................................19  Bilowit v. Dolitsky, 124 N.J. Super 101, 103-104 (Ch. Div. 1973)..........................19, 20 Carris v. Carris, 24 N.J.  Eq. 516 (E. & A. 1873)...........................................22  Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394 (1998).............................................................14  Cosme v. East Newark Twp. Comm., 304 N.J.Super. 191 (App. Div. 1997)....................................14  Crespo v. Crespo, 395 N.J. Super 190 (App. Div. 2007)....................................14  Costello v. Porzelt, 116 N.J. Super 380 (Ch. Div., 1971)....................................20  Doscher v. Schroder, 105 N.J. Eq. 315, 321 (Ch. 1929)........................................17  Easton v. Mercer, 2015 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1755..................................21  In re Parentage of Robinson 383 N.J. Super. 165, 173 (Ch. Div. 2004)..............................17  In re Return of Weapons to J.W.D. .....................................15  149 N.J. 108, 117 (1997)  Lindquist v. Lindquist, 130 N.J. Eq. 11, 20 (E. & A. 1941).....................................23 N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Svcs. v. M.M., 189 N.J. 261 (2007)  .................................................................15  N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Svcs. v. P.W.R., 205 N.J. 17 (2011)  ..................................................................15  Patel v. Navitlal 265 N.J. Super 402 (Ch. Div. 1992) ..............................15,18, 21, 22, 23 Pisciotta v. Buccino, 22 N.J. Super 114, 116, (App. Div., 1952) .............................21  Rhoades v. Rhoades, 10 N.J. Super. 432, 434, (App. Div., 1950) ............................21  Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Investors Ins. Co., 65 N.J. 474 (1974)  ..................................................................14,15  Smith v. Smith, 17 N.J. Super. 128 (App. Div. 1951) ......................................14, 26 Thieme v. Aucoin-Thieme, 227 N.J. 269 (2016) ..................................................................14  Tobon v. Sanchez, 213 N.J. Super 472, 474-475 (Ch. Div., 1986) .......................21, 22  V.J.S. v. M.J.B., 249 N.J. Super 318 (Ch. Div.,1991)  ...........................................20  Williams v. Witt 98 Super 1, 3 (App. Div. 1967)
[brief] Q.  If they had gone beyond 1971 backwards in time – A. Right.  Q. --they would have found that there was no basis in –  A. Absolutely.  Q.  Just let me finish my question – they would have found that there was no basis for the [...] to convey the strip, correct?  A.  No, no, no basis of record.  Q.  No basis of record.  A. Correct, absolutely.  Q.  And so, a possibility could have been that they didn’t go back beyond 20 years because they made a business decision that was going back was far enough.  A.  Yes, absolutely.  Q.  And based on the fact that they didn’t go back far enough to see that there was an issue with respect to record title, they issued a policy, correct?  A.  Yes.
[brief] Page  TABLE OF SUPPLEMENTAL APPENDIX ..........................................................  ii  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ...........................................................................  iii  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT .......................................................................  1  REPLY STATEMENT OF FACTS .................................................................  2 LEGAL ARGUMENT ..................................................................................  4  POINT I PLAINTIFF’S ARGUMENT IN POINT I OF HIS BRIEF THAT DEFENDANT’S APPEAL IS BARRED BECAUSE IT WAS NOT FILED WITHIN  45 DAYS OF ENTRY OF THE AUGUST 31, 2022 ORDER IS WITHOUT MERIT BECAUSE THE ORDER WAS NOT A FINAL ORDER THAT RESOLVED ALL ISSUES AND CLAIMS AMONG THE PARTIES.  ..............................................................................................................  4  POINT II  DEFENDANT’S ARGUMENTS IN POINT I OF DEFENDANT’S OPENING BRIEF SHOULD BE ACCEPTED BY THIS COURT BECAUSE PLAINTIFF’S BRIEF FAILED TO OPPOSE OR REFUTE ANY OF THE ARGUMENTS THEREIN.  .............................................................................................................  9  CONCLUSION  ...............................................................................................  12  | Document Description | Page No. | |--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------| | Notice of Motion for an Order Granting a Final Award Of Fees and Disbursements to the Administrator dated February 2, 2023 | Da2483 | | Notice of Cross Motion and Opposition to Motion by Plaintiff [...] dated March 16, 2023 | Da2486 | | Certification of [...], Esq. in Response to the Administrator’s Motion | Da2488 | | Order Granting a Final Award of Fees and Disbursements to the Administrator, filed June 19, 2023 | Da2491 | | Notice of Appeal filed August 2, 2023 | Da2494 | | Order Denying Plaintiff’s Motion filed June 19, 2023 | Da2496 | ## TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | Cases | |-------| | **Frantzen v. Howard,**<br>132 N.J. Super. 226 (App. Div. 1975) | 7 | | **In re: Donahue,**<br>329 N.J. Super. 488 (2000) | 8 | | **Peterson v. Falzarano,**<br>6 N.J. 447 (1951) | 8 | | **Vitanza v. James,**<br>397 N.J. Super. 516 (App. Div. 2008) | 8 | | Rules | |-------| | R. 1:2-1 | 8 | | R. 2:2-3(b) | 5 | | R. 2:2-3(b)(3) | 2 | | R. 2:2-4 | 7 | | R. 4:2-1 | 8 | | R. 4:42-2 | 2 | | R. 4:42-9(a)(2) | 1, 10, 12 |
[brief] The Application**  [...]’s application sought approval for a 165-unit, multi-level senior housing community in a three-story building.  [Pa3].  The project proposed 81 independent living units, 58 assisted living units and 26 memory care units.  [Pa186-187].  [...] proposed to provide 25 units of affordable housing, representing a 15% set-aside.  [5T 29-15 to 31-11; Pa191-192].  The initial iteration of the plan deviated from the zoning standards for single-family development in the R-20A Zone for (1) building height (38.5 feet proposed); (2) stories (3 proposed); (3) combined side yard setback (165.1 proposed); (4) building coverage (17.9% proposed); and impervious coverage (41.3% proposed).  [Pa50].  During the hearings, the height of the building in feet, the side yard setback and the building coverage were brought into conformity with the R-20A requirements.  The building height remained at 3 stories but conformed to the 35-foot limit.  Impervious coverage was reduced to 39%.  [Pa256].  The application required a variance for fence height that [...] agreed to eliminate.  [1T 34-13 to 35-5].  It also required relief from standards contained in [...]’s Site Plan Design Standards Ordinance for parking in the front yard and disturbance of steep slopes, though [...] eliminated its steep slope design criteria from its Site Plan Design Standard Ordinance in March of 2021, and so [...] did not require a design exception anymore.  D.
[brief] The cases cited by defendant do not dictate a different result.  In State v. McFarlane, the sentencing judge stated in an unrelated case that he “always” sentences defendants convicted of first-degree murder to sixty years in prison, a statement that the court understandably found would lead a reasonable person to believe the judge had predetermined an arbitrary sentence for all defendants convicted of first-degree murder.  224 N.J. 458, 469 (2016).  But [...] did not impose a pre-determined sentence here; rather, he considered the evidence presented and imposed a different sentence than the one previously imposed, in accordance with this Court’s remand for a resentencing.  Defendant’s reliance on *State v. Madan*, 366 NJ Super. 98 (App Div. 2004), is also misplaced.  That case dealt with a court’s rejection of a plea based on the opinion of the victim’s family, not consideration of the feelings of the victims at sentencing after trial.  *Id.* at 114.  In any event, [...] did not, as defendant claims, attempt to strike a balance between the wishes of the victim’s family and defense counsel, but merely acknowledged that no one was likely to be happy with the sentence.  (18T108-2 to 7).  Finally, *State v. Melvin*, 248 N.J. 321 (2021), is readily distinguishable.
[brief] With regard to the [...], plaintiff neglects to point out that Assistant Commissioner [...] was already planning to speak at the conference on behalf of the [...] on “water system sustainability” (Pa736), a topic very similar to [...]’s proposed talk on “managerial and financial components of operating a sustainable water utility."  (Pa353-355).  It is obvious that [...] was not blocked from speaking at the [...] because of the content of his proposed talk.  [...] would not be approved to speak because another official was preparing to speak on a similar topic, and [...] refused to follow the basic protocol that would enable the [...] to know of such a conflict in advance.  National Treasury, 513 U.S. 454, and its progeny cited by plaintiff on prior restraint, do not stand for the proposition that a government employee, advertising themselves in that capacity, is free to speak whenever they like on whatever topic they like, using coarse language if they choose, to entities regulated by that employee’s agency.
[brief] The MOU does not provide for any payment, aside from $1.00, in the event Plaintiff obtains zoning approval for less than 82.50 units per acre and does not find, in its sole discretion, this less dense amount “acceptable. ” (Da28 – 33, 56).  Indeed, Plaintiff’s counsel has confirmed its view that the payment of $1.00 --- 4  The $3,000,000 payment would go down to $2,000,000 depending on the timing of the zoning approvals.  (Da29).  fully satisfies Plaintiff’s “obligations for acquisition of 100% of the member interests in [...]. ” (Da38-39).  As recognized in Nolan, the trial court should not have assumed that the [...] agreed to such an unjust result where another plausible interpretation of the language – that Plaintiff is required at some reasonable, but certain, time to seek residential zoning approval at the density set forth in the MOU – is available.  As it stands, in light of the trial court’s decision, Plaintiff is not bound to do anything other than pay $1.00.  Therefore, the MOU is illusory.
[brief] This is an Appeal arising out of the Trial Court’s decision not to mold the Jury’s verdict pursuant to a pre-trial agreement between counsel that the verdict would be molded to include lost wages and medical bills in accordance with N.J.S.A. 34:15-40.  Plaintiff filed a complaint in the Superior Court Law Division Monmouth County on July 21, 2015.  Pa14-24.  The defendant filed its answer on August 13, 2015.  Paxx.  The within matter was tried before a jury in the Superior Court Law Division, Monmouth County, from June 13, 2022, until June 21, 2022.  There were issues regarding liability, causal, relationship and totality of damages.  It should be noted that Plaintiff/Appellant is not appealing the jury’s verdict, nor any evidential rulings that were rendered during the trial.  The sole issue in this appeal is the lower Court ruling that the agreement between Counsel to mold the Jury’s verdict to include the Plaintiff/Appellant’s lost wages and medical bills should not be enforced.  Plaintiff filed a motion to file notice of appeal as within time and Notice of Appeal on October 4, 2023.  Pa1-5.  The motion to file the notice of appeal as within time was granted on October 23, 2023.  Pa9.  Plaintiff filed a letter and two motions for an extension of time to file its brief; all which were granted, making the plaintiff’s brief due on April 19, 2024.  Pa10-13.  STATEMENT OF PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND STATEMENT OF FACTS
[brief] On September 13, 2022, just two weeks after the entry of the August 31, 2022 Order that Defendant is appealing, the Administrator announced his intention to seek additional fees and relief from the probate court that impacted both Plaintiff and Defendant.  In accordance with the above policy, and because it was evident that all issues had not been resolved before the probate court, Defendant was correct in waiting until all issues were, in fact, resolved before filing his notice of appeal.
[brief] [Id. at 412 (citations omitted). ]  Here, following a bench trial, the Trial Court ordered specific performance, and advised that it would reform the subject agreements if specific performance failed, which in fact happened.  Defendant’s appeal, however, relies on an overly broad, paint-by-numbers assertion that the Trial Court mistakenly ordered reformation of the subject agreements without finding that there was either fraud, mutual mistake, or unilateral mistake by a party coupled with fraud or unconscionable conduct on the part of the other party.  That distillation of the case merely assigns and takes issue with a label without exploring the underlying reasons as to what and why the Trial Court ultimately reformed the Redevelopment Agreement.  Accordingly, this Court should affirm the Trial Court’s proper exercise of discretion.