ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] In reaching this conclusion, the Authority correctly considered Appellant’s application in context with its location along Atlantic Avenue, a main thoroughfare, with “two traveled lanes in each direction at the site’s frontage and is heavily congested with vehicular and pedestrian traffic associated with Tourism District and The Walk shopping plaza. ” (Aa244).  Against this backdrop, and with [...]’s knowledge of local conditions, the Hearing Officer questioned whether a vehicle accessing the site could safely reverse into the driveway from a live lane of traffic along Atlantic Avenue.  (T2/37:15-22).  [...]’s traffic engineer echoed this concern and opined “this backing maneuver from a live lane would not be considered safe. ” (T2/150:1-2).  While Appellant’s engineer attempted to defend the proposed access pointing to several examples of existing loading zones in the area that are backed into, Appellant acknowledged that many of these existing conditions were located on side streets with less traffic and would likely not be approved today.  (T2/82:11-15; 86:4-11; 150:21-151:13).  In addition, the Hearing Officer raised concerns regarding a vehicle turning into the driveway and then being unable to circulate the site.  (T2/29:15- 20).  [...]’s traffic engineer opined that, under that scenario, the only option would be for that vehicle to back out into live traffic on Atlantic Avenue.  (T2/157:14-21).  Finally, the Hearing Officer and [...]’s traffic engineer raised similar questions regarding whether the proposed loading area was too narrow to permit access to the site for its intended purposes.  (See generally T2/126:10-130:16).  Appellant did not present credible evidence to refute these concerns.  The unorthodox backing maneuver to access the site was determined to be inherently unsafe, and the Hearing Officer reasonably concluded that Appellant could not effectively mitigate the public safety concerns and adverse impacts presented by its application.  (See Aa245).  The Authority’s decision is entitled to deference and should be affirmed.
[brief] State v. Olenowski, 253 N.J. 133 (2023) ...............................................................  10 State v. Patino, 83 N.J. 1 (1980) .......................................................................... 19 State v. Pena-Flores, 198 N.J. 6 (2009) .................................................................. 33, 40 State v. Pierce, 188 N.J. 155 (2006) ......................................................................  43 State v. Pineiro, 181 N.J. 13 (2004) ......................................................................  12, 13 State v. Rodriguez, 172 N.J. 117 (2002) .................................................................  13 State v. Roth, 95 N.J. 334 (1984) ..........................................................................  43 State v. Sheffield, 62 N.J. 441 (1973) ....................................................................  13 State v. Smart, 253 N.J. 156 (2023) ..................................................................... passim State v. Stovall, 170 N.J. 346 (2002)  ....................................................................  13 State v. Summa, A-0369-22 (App. Div. April 9), certif. denied, __ N.J. __ (2024) ................................................................. 39, 40 State v. Terry, 232 N.J. 218 (2018) .......................................................................  18, 19 State v. Thomas, 110 N.J. 673 (1988) ....................................................................  12 State v. Valentine, 134 N.J. 536 (1994) .................................................................  12, 13 State v. Witt, 223 N.J. 409 (2015) ................................................................. passim State v. Zutic, 155 N.J. 103 (1998) ........................................................................ 20 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) ............................................................................. 11, 20 United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982) ..............................................................
[brief] In *Arroyo v. [...]*, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 138287, at *11-13* (D.N.J. Aug. 14, 2019) (Pa58), the District Court held that an assignee of an allegedly defaulted [...] credit card debt had to be licensed under the NJCFLA, that unlicensed entities were precluded from demanding or collecting interest on a charged off account, and that said violations support affirmative claims for violations of the FDCPA.
[brief] ” (citations omitted).  Sure, one explanation could be that they were there merely to hangout and greeting one another, but “the fact that a suspect’s behavior may be consistent with innocent behavior does not control the analysis….‘[S]imply because a defendant’s actions might have some speculative innocent explanation does not mean that they cannot support articulable suspicions if a reasonable person would find the actions are consistent with guilt. ”” (citations omitted).  This Court must consider this fact, as well, within the framework of the officer’s training and experience, and “weighed not in terms of library analysis by scholars, but as understood by those versed in the field of law enforcement. ”” (citations omitted).  [...] reasonably found these actions to be consistent with drug distribution.  But that is not all.  In addition to these observations, officers observed that when their presence was detected, defendant “bladed” his body.  [...] explained that when “someone blades their body is [sic] signs that they could potentially be . . . dangerous – they’re trying to shift their body away from officers. ” (1T12-14 to 17).  Again, while this could be innocent behavior, in the real life, high stakes world of policing in high crime, poorly lit areas at nighttime, it is a common sense conclusion that the individual could be armed and dangerous, and further evidence that they were involved in criminal activity.  Importantly, it was not just defendant.  There were four males, adding to the dangerousness of the situation and the reasonableness of the suspicion that these males were engaged in illicit criminal activity and not just greeting people on the street.  Based on all these observations, the officers had articulable suspicion that defendant was engaged in criminal activity.
[brief] On July 23, 2019, police responded to a reported robbery at the [...] in [...].  (3T 38-2 to 13)  Three witnesses who were inside the bank at the time of the incident testified at trial.  (3T 51-23 to 84-22, 85-16 to 112-5, 112-16 to 123-6)  [...], the bank manager, testified that there were three employees working that morning in addition to herself: [...] and [...], both of whom worked as tellers, and [...], the financial services representative.  (3T 53-3 to 4, 53-15 to 17, 54-11 to 55-4)  According to Colon, at some point during the --- \(^3\) [...] is appealing his conviction and sentence on this other offense.
[brief] [...]’s Public Comments and Letters  [...] engaged in meetings and submitted comments on this permit application throughout the process.  On July 26, 2022 Appellant  [...] submitted a public comment detailing its concerns regarding flooding resulting from stormwater from the proposed project.  Aa105.  The Comment noted that a project of this size should not be located so near flood hazard areas, where flooding is likely.  Ibid.  The comment noted that “While the applicant has asserted that the stormwater management system for the Bridge Point 8 development meets current state requirements, precipitation is likely to increase by more than 20% from the 1999 baseline by 2100.  This system is not sized to manage future storms and as a result, threatens to further inundate areas that already flood. ”  Ibid.  In an October 17, 2022 letter to various DEP officials, Appellant informed the DEP that “The site and its surroundings have been well-known for their historic flooding.
[brief] (2T 5-23 to 6-1)  The court confirmed that [...]’s interrogation was never about resolving the drug charges, and that “a reasonable person would not have known with any certainty [that] the interrogation was anything about the [robbery] charges until . . . the detective said, ‘I saw you go in the building, I saw you come out of the building. ’”  (2T 6-7 to 10, 8-10 to 17)  However, the court found that the totality of circumstances favored a voluntary waiver because: the bright line rule in State v. A.G.D., 718 N.J. 56 (2003), did not apply; the State did not intentionally defer filing charges to avoid disclosing them to [...]; and the remaining circumstances of the interrogation were not coercive.  (2T 10-17 to 11-24, 12-9 to 12, 13-17 to 14-11)  The Court thus ruled that the statement was admissible.
[brief] On 9/19/23 I uploaded my Order to Show Cause (OSC) package into JEDS.  The OSC form is at (020a) and the Verified Complaint package starts at (023a).  [...] had six days to respond to my OSC package, but they ignored me and they were in default.  9/25/23, was the hearing date for my Order to Show Cause, to stop the sheriff sale and to grant other reliefs.
[brief] Casino Reinvestment Dev. Auth. v. Katz, 334 N.J. Super. 473, 485–87 (Law. Div. 2000).  This holding is based upon the guiding principle in eminent domain proceedings—that “the condemnor is obligated to pay ‘just compensation’ for the property obtained, which is defined as ‘the fair market value of the property…determined by what a willing buyer and a willing seller would agree to, neither being under any compulsion to act.
[brief] **Defendant’s Motion for Monies Paid**  25.  On December 24, 2019, Defendant filed its Motion to Compel return of the monies paid by Defendant to Plaintiff pursuant to the Trial Court’s Orders entered on June 27, 2017; March 6, 2018; and March 26, 2018 (although the March 26, 2018 Order was admittedly not appealed).  (Da816-834).  On January 2, 2020, Plaintiff filed its opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Compel return of the monies paid.
[brief] ”  Pa398.  Regarding the issue of consistency with the Township’s Master Plan (hereinafter “Master Plan”), the Redevelopment Plan contains the Planner’s conclusion that the Redevelopment Plan is consistent with the Master Plan:  3.1.  The closure of the [...] was not anticipated at the time of the most recent Master Plan reexamination report in 2017.  As a result, the Master Plan does not provide any specific recommendations regarding the potential redevelopment of the property.  However, the development of the rehabilitation area with the warehouse facility is not inconsistent with the goals and objectives of the Master Plan.
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT BELOW FAILED TO FOLLOW THE LAW WITH REGARDS TO PREEXISTING NON-CONFORMING USES (Pa 37-47; 55-59; 66-75; 158-162; T4 at 21:7-9; 21:17-22:4; 25:5; 27:3-7)  Plaintiffs had the burden of showing that the current use of the property is in violation of the current zoning ordinance.  Heagen v. Borough of Allendale, 42 N.J. Super. 472, 478 (App. Div. 1956).  A review of J-47 (Pa 158) and J-48 (Pa 159-162) clearly shows that the PQ is in the R5 zone and that the commercial restaurant takeout business is not a permitted use in the zone.  Therefore, the Plaintiffs have satisfied their burden of proof.
[directive] with Contact Concerning Restraints for'  Requests 6.2.2  60  Page the that to reason general request has attorney deputy or prosecutor assistant  If the other any with or contact offense, no of alleged victim the the with contact no have defendant defendant's shall to prosecutor object offense, the the concerning testify may who witnesses) be defendant shall that ask 2A:162-17(a), the and N.J.S.A. to pursuant recognizance release on condition a be the as defendant ordered that and 2A:162-17(b), N.J.S.A. under all, if at released, The 6.2.3. subsection and/or witness(es).  also  See victim with the contact no have of to release any of of the and/or terms witnesses victim the advise practicable as soon as shall prosecutor appearance.  first the at imposed conditions) release pretrial such Restraining Orders.  SASPA, DORO and SORO, Violence, Domestic 6.2.3 release or no-contact of issuance reason a for is there appearance first of time the If at offender sexual 2C:21-25(a), a or N.J.S.A. Law Reform Bail the by authorized condition to pursuant restraining order offender or drug a 2C:14-12, N.J.S.A. to pursuant order restraining the court, any been by issued previously order has restraining such any if or 2C:35-5.7, N.J.S.A. special be such restraints that made request shall general attorney deputy or prosecutor assistant the under for restraining apply orders may victims addition, In release. pretrial of conditions The Act. Protection Assault Survivor's Sexual the and Act Violence Domestic of Prevention release any of such pretrial the of terms victim a advise practicable as soon shall as prosecutor appearance. first the at imposed conditions) Monitoring. and Intervention Abuse Substance 6.2.4 to release of pretrial setting conditions court a authorizes expressly Law Reform Bail The without or other controlled substance drug narcotic any of use from refrain to defendant order the or drug for treatment undergo available practitioner, to and medical licensed a by prescription a committed many are (i). crimes Because 2A:162-17(b)(2)(h) and N.J.S.A. dependency.
[directive] Officers required to wear and arrests performed pursuant to statutory authority, such as parolee searches, are required to wear BWCs.  subsection 3.2(g).  See E. BWCs.  Clarifies that officers: (1) engaged in duties as bomb Officers not required to wear or explosives technicians; (2) conducting searches of cellphones, tablets, computers or other electronic devices pursuant to a search warrant, when such items have already been seized and the search is performed at a location other than the premises of the initial search and seizure; or (3) when conducting searches of cellphones, tablets, computers or other electronic devices that are suspected to contain images of child sexual exploitation are not required to wear BWCs.
[brief] Okay, [...] please enter your appearance and we’ll turn the clock back to May 23rd, 2022.  (T 4:11 – 7:4)  August 22, 2022  At the end of the August 22, 2022 hearing, Appellants did not complete the cross examination of Respondents Planner, [...], PP and Respondent [...].  The Appellant also did not have the opportunity to call his client.  As a result, the re-do hearing was carried to September 22, 2022 and the Appellants, Respondents, and the Public were advised:  [...]:  Hold up, all right, for the record, this application is being carried to September 12th at 7:00 p.m. in these chambers.  If you received certified mail, you will not receive it again.  This is your notice for September 12th.  This application is being carried without further notice.
[brief] (1T184-23 to 1T185-1).  Later that same morning, [...], a Task Force Officer at the [...], then assigned to the Drug Trafficking North Unit of the [...], received a call at his office in Newark from the Illinois based agent, advising him of what had occurred in Illinois, and indicating that [...] and [...] were willing to cooperate in making the delivery in New Jersey of the marijuana to someone known to them as “[...].
[brief] LEGAL ARGUMENT I.  [...]’s contention that it is Common Knowledge that a Consumer Opening an Account knows he is signing a Contract with the Bank is not supported by the record or the law.  The question which [...] has never addressed in this matter, whether [...] signed the account application or should have known he was signing the account application, results from its assumption that [...] signed the application, electronically on May 18, 2022, when he signed the iPad.
[brief] Fifth, Respondents have not demonstrated that in-camera review of [...]’ supplemental certification (the “Supplemental Certification”) was appropriate without first seeking a protective order or pursuing other available remedies.  Finally, the Court should reject Respondents’ excuse that they were not dilatory simply because they raised the alleged conflict at the outset of the case and then took no further action.  Thus, for the reasons more fully set forth below, this Court should reverse the trial court’s Order disqualifying [...].
[brief] In opposition, [...] tries desperately to confuse the issue and mislead this Court into believing the Arbitrator’s award was an improper “fee-shift” of one adverse litigant’s attorneys’ fees to another.  In fact, this is the entirety of his argument.  To the contrary, though, the legal fees incurred by and awarded to [...]—and improperly stricken by the trial court—were an award of consequential damages for corporate waste resulting from [...]’s fiduciary duty breach, not a shifting of legal fees.
[brief] (93a)  [...] wrote in the February 14, 2024 Order Finding of Facts and Conclusions of Law:  While her testimony did not demonstrate that she breached her fiduciary duty to the Trust or the beneficiaries, it did demonstrate an implicit bias with respect to her dealings with [...].  (101a)  The Court finds it equitable that the Defendants pay the same below market rental payment that [...] paid, $500 per month, and for only a period of five months.  The Court does not believe that [...] only resided at the Florida Property for five months, thus equity favors the equal treatment of [...] and [...].  The $2,500 rental payment is to be taken from [...]’s next trust distribution.
[brief] As detailed, the Trial Court’s decision --- reversing the Zoning Board’s determination that the Lot 8 off-site parking use/facility on the School Lot 5 was not a permitted accessory use and was not established as a legal non-conforming use and was thus invalid --- was clearly in error on several substantive bases.  Further, the Trial Court’s allowance of numerous documents to be reviewed by the Court that were not before the Zoning Board was clearly error, and resulted in erroneous findings by the Court.  In fact, the Zoning Board decision was properly founded in logic and in law, and that Board decision/Resolution should be reinstated and affirmed.
[directive] Leczenia Dorosłych w celu poddania terapii dla przestępców seksualnych; jeśli jednak orzeczona kara będzie przekraczać 7 lat, zostanie Pan początkowo osadzony w innej placówce?  Do you understand if the examination reveals that your conduct is characterized by a pattern of repetitive and compulsive behavior, and you are amenable to (will benefit from) sex offender treatment and willing to participate in such treatment, the judge shall, upon recommendation of the Department of Corrections, sentence you to confinement at the Adult Diagnostic and Treatment Center for sex offender treatment; however, if the sentence imposed is greater than 7 years, you will first be confined at a facility other than the Adult Diagnostic and Treatment Center?
[directive] 4.  The number of certified Conducted Energy Device (CED) Instructors authorized for each County Prosecutor’s Office, the Division of Criminal Justice, the New Jersey State Police and the Division of Parole shall be determined at the discretion of the Director of the Division of Criminal Justice.  Requests to increase the number of Certified CED Instructors , and requests to use municipal police officers and/or county sheriff’s officers to assist in this function, may be granted upon written application to, and at the discretion of, the Director of the Division of Criminal Justice.  Such written requests must set forth the basis for the request.  Training for those authorized to use CEDs shall be consistent with the requirements of Section Qualification.5  VII-Training and 3  The March 3, 2016 Directive  Revising the Attorney General’s Supplemental Policy on CEDs requires the Division of Criminal Justice to develop, within 120 days of its effective date, a supplemental training program to explain the provisions of the Directive and the revisions made to the Supplemental Policy by the 2016 Directive.
[brief] See Dimitrakopoulos, 237 N.J. at 120 (court must be assured that claimant had a fair and reasonable opportunity to litigate the challenged claim in the earlier action); id. at 117 (describing the requirement of a “full and fair opportunity to litigate the issues . . . with the same remedial opportunities as the second forum. ”) (internal quotations omitted).  Prior to the N.J. Supreme Court’s July 12, 2023, Order, an allegation of surplus equity was not treated as a contesting answer in a tax foreclosure proceeding.  Moreover, as described above, R. 4:64-6 only contemplates defenses of “invalidity of the tax . . . , or the invalidity of the proceedings to sell, or the invalidity of the sale[.]”  Only if a tax foreclosure defendant raises one of these defenses in an answer will his or her individual case be severed from the proceedings to try those issues.  This case is a far cry from the archetypical scenario in which a litigant has purposely “withheld claims” from an earlier suit for “strategic reasons” or to obtain “two bites at the apple.
[brief] Those errors, individually and collectively, were plain error and require reversal.  See U.S. Const. amends.  V, VI, XIV; N.J. Const. art. I, ¶¶ 1, 10; R. 2:10-2.  A.  The Detectives’ False Claims that a Non-Testifying Eyewitness “Picked” Defendant -- and the Trial Court’s Refusal to Permit Him to Impeach that Identification -- Violated His Confrontation Rights.
[brief] (Appx 534 ¶53).  After Plaintiff became a sub, on or around January 20, 2023, a routine audit revealed that fingerprint results were missing for a number of employees, including the Plaintiff.  (Appx 534-35 at ¶54).  This issue affected approximately 20 employees and was not specific to Plaintiff.  (Appx 534-35 at ¶54).  All affected employees were taken off the schedule until the issue was resolved pursuant to NJ state law.
[brief] ’  State v. Weleck, 10 N.J. 355, 365 (1952).  “The ‘prescribed duties of an office are nothing more nor less than the duties cast by law on the incumbent of the office. ’  State v. Silverstein, 76 N.J. Super. 536, 541 (App. Div. 1962), citing Weleck, 10 N.J. at 366 (1952).  The criminal code defines “touching upon the office” as circumstances in which the “offense was related directly to the person’s performance in, or circumstances flowing from the specific public office, position or employment held. . . .”  N.J.S.A. 2C:51-2.
[brief] | Cases | Page(s) | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------| | Buccinna v. Micheletti, | 10 | | 311 N.J. Super. 557 (App. Div. 1998) | | | Bung's Bar & Grille, Inc. v. Township Council of Florence Township, | 10, 11 | | 206 N.J. Super. 432 (Law. Div. 1985) | | | Continental Insurance Company v. Honeywell International, Inc., | 3, 4 | | 2016 WL 3909530 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. July 20, 2016) | | | Empower Our Neighborhoods v. Guadagno, | 8, 9 | | 453 N.J. Super. 565 (App. Div. 2018) | | | Enright v. Lubow, | 2, 3 | | 215 N.J. Super. 306 (App. Div. 1987) | | | Felicetta v. Com. Union Ins. Co., | 3 | | 117 N.J. Super. 524 (App. Div. 1971) | | | Flagg v. Essex Cnty. Prosecutor, | 6 | | 171 N.J. 561 (2002) | | | George H. Swatek, Inc. v. N. Star Graphics, Inc., | 12 | | 246 N.J. Super. 281 (App. Div. 1991) | | | Greenfeld v. Caesar's Atl. City Hotel/Casino, | 10 | | 334 N.J. Super. 149 (Law. Div. 2000) | | | Helton v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., | 9, 10 | | 205 N.J. Super. 196 (App. Div. 1985) | | | Litton Industries, Inc. v. IMO Industrial, Inc., | 4 | | 200 N.J. 372 (2009) | | | Miller v. New Jersey Ins. Underwriting Ass'n, | 3 | | 177 N.J. Super. 584 (Law. Div. 1981) | | | Occhifinto v. Olivo Const. Co., LLC, | 2, 3 | | 221 N.J. 443 (2015) | | | Passaic Valley Sewerage Comm’rs v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., | 2, 3 | | 206 N.J. 596 (2011) | | | Ricci v. Corp. Express of The East, Inc., | 7 | | 344 N.J. Super. 39 (App. Div. 2001) | | | Shuttleworth v. City of Camden, | 7 | | 258 N.J. Super. 573 (App Div. 1992) | | | Taddei v. State Farm Indem. Co., | 12 | | 401 N.J. Super. 449 (App. Div. 2008) | | | Velli v. Rutgers Cas. Ins. Co., | 9, 10 | | 257 N.J. Super.