[brief] We disagree.  In determining whether prosecutorial misconduct requires a reversal, we examine whether the conduct complained of “was so egregious that it deprived the defendant of a fair trial. ”  *State v. Frost*, 158 N.J. 76, 83 (1999); *State v. Loftin*, 146 N.J. 295, 386 (1996); *State v. Ramseur*, 106 N.J. 123, 322 (1987).  It is well-settled that prosecutors are afforded considerable leeway in their closing arguments and in criminal cases especially, are expected to make vigorous and forceful closing arguments to juries.  *Frost*, supra, 158 N.J. at 82; *State v. Harris*, 141 N.J. 525, 559 (1995).  There is no per se rule in New Jersey disallowing the readback of portions of trial testimony during summation.  See *Condella v. Cumberland Farms, Inc.*, 298 N.J.Super. 531, 535–36 (Law Div.1996) (“[I]t is acceptable to read portions of the trial testimony from a transcript to the jury during summation....”).  Nor are there any express rules governing the manner in which testimony may be read back during summation.  In general, “[t]he scope of defendant's summation argument must not exceed the ‘four corners of the evidence. ’”  *Loftin*, supra, 146 N.J. at 347 (citation omitted).  “[C]omment must be restrained within the facts shown or reasonably suggested by the evidence adduced,” *State v. Bogen*, 13 N.J. 137, 140, cert. denied, 346 U.S. 825, 74 S.Ct. 44, 98 L.Ed. 350 (1953), and counsel may not “misstate the evidence nor distort the factual picture,” *Matthews v. Nelson*, 57 N.J.Super. 515, 521 (App.Div.1959), certif. denied, 31 N.J. 296 (1960).  In the present case, the prosecutor did not misstate or distort the evidence.  Counsel relied on verbatim recitals.  We note defendant's concern about the piling on or overemphasis of select parts of the testimony.  See *State v. Muhammad*, 359 N.J. Super. 361, 380–81 (App.Div.) (discussing these concerns in the context of video playback), certif. denied, 178 N.J. 36 (2003).  However, the readback at issue was not unduly long so as to permit the State to substantially present its case a second time through the excerpts.  Id. at 380.  Of approximately thirty pages of summation, less than one-third were dedicated to readbacks.  Finally, although the trial judge did not give cautionary instructions specifically addressed to the prosecutor's readback, the instructions given in his charge were sufficient to inform the jurors of their obligation to determine the facts from their own recollection.  Id. at 382.  In his charge, the judge directed that:  Regardless of what counsel has said or what I may have said in recalling the evidence in this case, it is your recollection of the evidence that should guide you as judges of the facts....  Although the attorneys may point out what they think [is] important in this case, you must rely solely upon your own understanding and recollection of the evidence that was admitted during the trial....  Any comments by counsel are not controlling.  *7  We must assume the jury followed the judge's instruction.  In light of the judge's overall instructions, the brevity of the excerpts and the lack of distortion, the readback in this case was not clearly capable of producing an unjust result.  Additionally, defense counsel failed to object to the readback, which may be deemed indicative of a lack of prejudice.  *Ramseur*, supra, 106 N.J. at 323.  As such, we conclude the prosecutor's readback was not improper and did not violate defendant's right to a fair trial.