ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Differently  [...] failed to follow the Chancery Court’s required procedure, which it established in connection with denying [...]’s two prior submissions of effectively the same fee application.  As noted above, in April of 2017, [...] denied [...]’s motion to require the defendants to pay for all of [...]’s collection efforts since the July 2016 decision (i.e., exactly what [...] sought again in the Global Fee Application).  In denying that prior application, [...] held:  The Court has determined that the defendants must pay for plaintiff’s attorney’s fees and costs reasonably incurred by plaintiff with respect to plaintiff’s efforts – defensively and offensively – regarding security to be posted pending appeal.  However, the court does not agree that the defendants can at this stage of the proceedings be made to pay for all attorney’s fees and costs incurred by plaintiff since the July, 2016 decision in seeking to collect on the judgment that was entered following the July decision.  Attorney’s fees and costs incurred in collection efforts must accordingly be backed out.  In July of 2018, [...] denied another application by [...] for all of his attorneys’ fees for collection efforts up to that point.  There, [...] stated as follows:  I’m well aware of the efforts that the plaintiff has undertaken since the judgment was rendered to attempt to collect on the judgment.  And their efforts have been almost on a weekly basis over the last two years to do that.  So I’m sure that the ultimate attorney’s fees that have been incurred will be substantial.  Whether they’re a million dollars or not, I don’t know.  But they’ll be substantial.  But I can’t make an award of fees prior to the Court determining that the plaintiff is entitled to fees for collection.  I did make a determination that they were entitled to fees that they incurred due to the shenanigans about the overseas transfers, and I made my award in that regard.  But … I was not prepared then and I’m not prepared now to say that they’re legally entitled to an award of fees against the defendants or any of the defendants for all of those collection efforts.  *It would have to really be done in a stage where the -- an application is made for a determination of entitlement.
[brief] Alleging [...]’s CFA, HCSA, RISA, and TCCWNA Violations Is The Type of “Public Injunctive Relief Specifically Excluded By the Arbitration Provision in [...]’s “Membership Agreement” (Ja10-Ja12)  Public injunctive relief has been defined as “relief that by and large benefits the general public …. and that benefits the plaintiff, if at all, only incidentally and/or as a member of the general public."  See DiCarlo, 988 F.3d. at 1152 citing McGill v. Citibank, N.A., 2 Cal. 5th 945 (Cal. 2017); see also Kilgore v Keybank, N.A., 718 F. 3d. 1052, 1060 (9th Cir. 2013) cited by Beture v Samsung Elecs. Am. Inc., 2018 U.S. LEXIS 121801, *28-29 (D. New Jersey July 18, 2018) (Ja51-Ja61)  “A claim for public injunctive relief therefore does not seek "‘to resolve a private dispute but to remedy a public wrong. ’"  Kilgore, 718 F. 3d at 1060 citing Broughton v. Cigna Healthplans of Cal., 988 P.2d 67, 76 (Cal. 1999)  [...] drafted the arbitration provision in its Membership Agreement.  (Ja36-Ja37)  [...] specifically excluded claims against it seeking “public injunctive relief” from being covered under the arbitration provision.  (Ja37)  Put differently, [...] already determined that claims (such as Plaintiff’s CFA, HCSA, RISA and TCCWNA claims) seeking “public injunctive relief” can be heard in this Court, and are not required to be heard in arbitration.  Id.; supra Section I(B)  [...] defined “public injunctive relief” as follows at paragraph 7.4 (Ja37) of the arbitration provision “…as injunctive relief that has the primary purpose and effect of prohibiting alleged unlawful acts that threaten future injury to the general public. ” (emphasis added).  Accordingly, Plaintiff’s damages in her Class Action Complaint against [...] seeking “injunctive relief” (Ja26) is the type of “public injunctive relief” excluded under [...]’s Membership Agreement.  DiCarlo, 988 F.3d. at 1152; McGill, 2 Cal. 5th 945; Kilgore, 718 F. 3d. at 1060; Beture, 2018 U.S. LEXIS 121801, *28-29 (Ja59); Broughton, 988 P.2d at 76
[brief] There is simply nothing in Rule 2:9-5 that requires a party to obtain a stay before commencing an appeal, and Defendants do not offer any other legal authority to support their erroneous position.  (See Db42-45.)  Rather, the Final Judgment was final pursuant to Rule 4:42-2, and by virtue thereof, there were no outstanding issues or proceedings to be heard by the trial court and, thus, nothing to be stayed.
[directive] A.  The law enforcement agency requesting the unsealing and the removing of the original tapes shall make an exact copy of the tapes in the wiretap judge=s chambers and in the presence of the wiretap judge.  B.  Those exact copies shall then be sealed in the container in place of the original tapes.  C.  When the original wiretap tapes are returned to the court by the law enforcement agency, the seal of the container shall be broken by the wiretap judge and the original tapes, and any copies made pursuant to Guideline 7A, shall be inserted into the container.  The container shall then be resealed by the wiretap judge.  An affidavit from the law enforcement agency stating that no alteration has been made to the original tapes shall be filed with the wiretap judge.  8.  Where a request is made for the unsealing of wiretap containers for the purpose of removing the original wiretap tapes for use in a judicial proceeding, the following procedures shall be followed:
[brief] The Court held the claims were unrelated to any activity in the state and the corporation maintained neither its principal place of business nor incorporation there.  However, the Court also held that, in exceptional cases, a corporate defendant’s operations in another forum “may be so substantial and of such a nature as to render the corporation at home” in the state.  *Id.* at 413.  Setting aside the fact that [...] is an LLP and not a corporation, the nature of the attorney-client relationship requires just such an exception.  In *Daimler AG v. Bauman*, 571 U.S. 117 (2014), the Supreme Court determined California did not have jurisdiction over a foreign corporation where injuries at issue occurred outside the United States and where the corporation had inadequate contacts to the forum state.
[brief] Moreover, the [...]’s reliance on the argument that it is only obligated to defend a prosecutor’s office when there are claims made for damages is not consistent with the intent of the New Jersey Supreme Court.  Since the seminal decision in *Wright v. State*, 169 N.J. 422 (2001), the New Jersey Supreme Court has recognized that county prosecutors occupy a hybrid position serving both the county and the state.  *Id.* at 455-456.  The *Wright* Court further recognized that the county prosecutor had both administrative functions, such as a decision whether to promote an investigator, and law enforcement functions.  *Id.* at 454.  In sorting through these roles, the Court held that the county prosecutor’s office and its employees are entitled to a defense and indemnification from the State when discharging their law enforcement duties.  *Id.* at 452 (emphasis added).  In so doing, the Court recognized that “when prosecutors perform their law enforcement function, they are discharging a State responsibility that the Legislature has delegated to the county prosecutors, subject to the Attorney General's right to supersede.  The legislative delegation, in combination with the Attorney General's supervisory authority and power to supersede, demonstrates that at its essence the county prosecutors' law enforcement function is clearly a State function.
[brief] The State intends to prove at trial that defendant arranged to meet with who he thought was a fourteen-year-old boy to have sex with him.  The “boy” was actually an undercover detective from the [...], who he met online on [...], an adults-only social-networking website for gay males.  But because the detective inadvertently failed to preserve the profile used to chat with defendant, the trial judge found that defendant had proved the loss of the [...] profile had deprived him of his ability to receive a fair trial.  And then he ruled that the only remedy available for this discovery violation was a dismissal of his indictment.  But the loss, misplacement, or destruction of evidence—even important evidence—does not inevitably and automatically create a discovery violation of a constitutional magnitude.  Instead, to show a due process violation, a defendant must establish the State has acted in bad faith in destroying the evidence, the evidence was materially and facially exculpatory, or there were no other means of obtaining comparable evidence, thus irreparably prejudicing him.  In this case, defendant could not carry this burden to show his due process rights were violated by the State’s inadvertent failure to preserve the undercover detective’s [...] profile.  First, defendant offered only speculation that the State was responsible for the deletion of the profile and could offer no proof it had acted in bad faith.  Second, he did not explain how the profile would have exculpated him, given his confession to arranging to have sex with a boy who told him he was fourteen years old and the chat logs confirming those messages.  Third, he failed to show how he was irreparably prejudiced by the loss of the profile: the State had provided him with the age-regressed photograph that was used in the profile, he had the ability to recreate the remaining contents of the profile through other means, and the State had agreed that the judge should provide the jury with an adverse-inference charge, allowing the jury to infer the profile was destroyed by the State because it was favorable to defendant.  But dismissing an indictment is a drastic remedy our courts have warned should be used only as a last resort, only on the clearest and plainest of grounds, and only when there is no lesser remedy available.  Procedurally dismissing a case without determining its merits deprives the State of its day in court, provides culpable defendants with unqualified immunity for their crimes, infringes on the rights of victims, and it impacts the safety of the community and the integrity of the criminal-justice system.  There were no grounds in this case warranting this extreme and draconian remedy, particularly since a lesser remedy was available and consented to by the State.  Accordingly, the judge’s decision was both a misapplication of the law and a clear abuse of discretion and this Court should reverse the ruling on appeal.
[brief] Courts awarding sanctions calculate the amount of the award using the “lodestar” method, which multiplies the “number of hours reasonably expended by the successful party’s counsel in the litigation” by “a reasonable hourly rate. ”  Litton Industries, Inc. v. IMO Industries, Inc., 200 N.J. 372, 386 (2009) (citing Furst v. Einstein Moomjy, Inc., 182 N.J. 1, 21 (2004)).
[brief] By letter dated July 22, 2024, the [...] “disqualified” [...] as the lowest responsive bidder and determined that [...] “should not be disqualified” because any alleged defects in its bid “were minor and either waivable or curable under the Local Public Contracts Law §40A:11-1 et seq. ” for the reasons set forth in that letter.  0274a-0277a.  The Honorable [...], A.J.S.C. “denied and dismissed with prejudice” the relief sought by [...] and [...] “in their respective Orders to Show Cause and Verified Complaints” in his September 30, 2024 order “for the reasons set forth in the accompanying opinion”.  0007a.  In his accompanying September 30, 2024 opinion, [...] determined that the [...] correctly awarded the Project to [...] as the lowest responsive bidder for the reasons set forth in that opinion.
[brief] C.  Defendant Was Undoubtedly Prejudiced by the State’s Conduct.  There is no question that Defendant was prejudiced by the State’s loss / destruction of the evidence at issue – and the prejudice was so severe that no remedy other than a dismissal of the Indictment was appropriate.  At the very least, the material evidence at issue was critical for cross-examination purposes.  Impeachment evidence encompasses a broad range of information that would expose weaknesses in the State’s case or cast doubt on the credibility of the State’s witness.  The Supreme Court has observed that the factfinder’s “estimate of the truthfulness and reliability of a given witness may well be determinative of guilt or innocence, and it is upon such subtle factors as the possible interest of the witness in testifying falsely that a defendant’s life or liberty may depend. ”  Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959).  Impeachment evidence is especially valuable in a case when it may impugn the testimony of a witness who is critical to the prosecution’s case.  State v. Landano, 271 N.J. Super. 1 (App. Div. 1994).  As the State’s sole witness, [...] was central to the prosecution of this case.  Had the “[...]” profile information been made available, his testimony would have been subject to heightened scrutiny and might even have been directly refuted.  At most, the evidence at issue was exculpatory in nature and would have resulted in an acquittal should this matter have proceeded to trial.  Yet again, the Trial Court agreed with Defense Counsel:
[brief] Plaintiffs’ litigation tactics, and the trial court’s acceptance of Plaintiffs’ arguments, undermine the purpose of the Declaratory Judgment Act and prejudices the rights of necessary and indispensable parties, along with [...]’s.  The trial court’s grant of partial summary judgment to Plaintiffs threatens to upend over 75 years of history.  The trial court took this step without the participation of [...] or its successors-in-interest and, even worse, without any meaningful discovery from it.
[brief] Socially transitioning every child who asks for it is not recommended by any healthcare association.  ACa46 ¶ 81; *see also* WPATH SOC8 at S77–78 (recommending that “health care professionals discuss the potential benefits and risks of a social transition with families who are considering it”), ACa137–38.  Instead, a child’s request to be socially transitioned should merely begin a “careful evaluative process” of the child.  ACa21 ¶ 22; *see also* WPATH SOC8 at S77–78, ACa137–38.  Socially transitioning every child who asks for it ignores the facts that (1) most children who experience a transgender identity will desist, (2) social transitioning reduces the likelihood of desistance, (3) most children who are socially transitioned will go on to receive puberty blockers and cross-sex hormones, which can have irreversible consequences, (4) the surge in transgender identifying youth may be impacted by peer pressure, and (5) there is a growing awareness of adult “detransitioners”—i.e., persons who transitioned to a transgender identity as youth who decide as adults to revert to the gender associated with their natal sex.  ACa20, ACa18-ACa29, ACa34, ACa36 ¶¶ 20, 29–38, 50, 54–55; see also [...], Transgender and Gender Diverse Children and Adolescents: Fact-Checking of AAP Policy, J. Sex & Marital Therapy 307, 313 (2019) (noting that “[o]ver puberty, the majority of [gender dysphoric] children cease to want to transition”), ACa159–67; Whitman-Walker Clinic, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., 485 F. Supp. 3d 1, 48 (D.D.C. 2020) (citing scholarship establishing that “childhood social transitions [are] important predictors of persistence”); [...], Gender Identity 5 Years After Social Transition, Pediatrics 150(2):e2021056082 (Aug. 2022) (study in which majority of children who socially transitioned were receiving puberty blockers and / or cross-sex hormones within 5 years), ACa168–175; [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], & [...], Short-term outcomes of pubertal suppression in a selected cohort of 12- to 15-year-old young people with persistent gender dysphoria in the UK, PLOS ONE 16(2) (2021) (study in which 98% of children who received puberty blockers went on to receive cross- sex hormones), ACa176–202; WPATH SOC8 at S58 (noting that the uptick in transgender-identifying adolescent girls may be driven in part by “excessive peer and social media influence”), ACa136; [...], Detransition Among Transgender and Gender-Diverse People—An Increasing and Increasingly Complex Phenomenon, J. Clin. Endocrinology & Metab., e4251–e4262 (June 9, 2022) (noting new scholarship focusing on detransitioners), ACa203–205.
[brief] For factor five, as argued by Plaintiff’s counsel, Plaintiff’s Rule 4:5-1 Certification was that “No other action or arbitration proceeding is presently contemplated,” ((Da21) (Emphasis added); (1T13:14-16)), which was accurate at the time of that filing.  Furthermore, the fact that Plaintiff did not assert arbitration as an affirmative defense does not prove her intent to waive her legal right to it.  (Da265-74).  Thus, factor five weighs in favor of arbitration.
[brief] ”  Mann, 132 N.J. at 420-21 (quoting Model Jury Charges (Criminal), “Flight” (Nov. 1991)).  The Mann Court recognized that a defendant should be able to offer an explanation to rebut the charge that his conduct constituted “flight” and was evidence of consciousness of guilt, stating, “If a defendant offers an explanation for the departure, the trial court should instruct the jury that if it finds the defendant's explanation credible, it should not draw any inference of the defendant's consciousness of guilt from the defendant's departure.
[brief] 290  [...] CAFRA permit allows it to construct an 8 story apartment building with 109 apartments and 234 garage parking spaces.  Aa54.  The building would be slab sided and rise straight up almost 100 feet and be located only about 88 feet from the boardwalk in [...].  Aa16-Aa21; Aa29-Aa34.  A key DEP Coastal Zone Regulation, the Scenic Resources and Design Rule, N.J.A.C. 7:7-16.10, governs the design of high rise buildings adjacent to the beach, dune or boardwalk along the ocean or bayfront.¹
[brief] (5T115-18 to 5T116-1; 5T116-7 to 13; 5T117-2 to 5; 5T118-9 to 24; 6T5-1 to 3; 6T5-17 to 21).  Defendant contends that the trial court erred by denying his request to charge the jury on passion/provocation manslaughter.
[brief] Further attenuating that statement from [...] is the fact that the contents of [...]’ habeas petition were conceived by [...].  As such, defendant was not entitled to a PCR evidentiary hearing.  Flores, 228 N.J. Super. at 590.  With respect to [...]’ habeas petition being admissible as N.J.R.E. 608 evidence, defendant did not raise this below, so this Court reviews for plain error.  R. 2:10-2.  Because, as this Court has already determined, defendant’s jury was already well aware that he was not entirely truthful in his testimony, admitting his habeas petition as extrinsic evidence of his character for truthfulness would not have changed the result of defendant’s trial.  Tairi, 2012 WL 489101, at *15.  Therefore, any error by [...] in ruling defendant’s petition inadmissible despite the provisions of N.J.R.E. 608 was not “clearly capable of producing an unjust result. ”  R. 2:10-2.  And while inadmissibility is not the end of an analysis as to whether evidence is material for Brady purposes, inadmissible evidence is only material if it could lead to the discovery of admissible evidence which, in turn, could have affected the outcome of a defendant’s trial.  Defendant has never indicated any admissible evidence that [...]’ habeas petition could have uncovered, so this Court should reject his arguments.  See State v. Hernandez, 225 N.J. 451, 466-67 (2016).
[brief] Here, Plaintiffs’ claims, and the relief sought thereunder, are almost exclusively equitable in nature: quiet title seeking reformation and injunctive relief; quia timet seeking reformation and injunctive relief; reformation of deeds and instruments for mistake; declaratory judgment seeking injunctive relief and reformation.  Ja18-24; Ja700.  See Allstate New Jersey Ins. Co. v. Lajara, 222 N.J. 129, 146 (2015) (quiet title matters are equitable); De Hanne v. Bryant, 61 N.J. Eq. 141, 142 (Ch. 1901) (a quiet title actions is within a court’s equitable jurisdiction); Hendrickson v. Wallace's Ex'r, 31 N.J. Eq. 604, 607 (Ch. 1879) (reformation of deeds to correct mistakes is an ancient equitable power); Dugan Const. Co. v. New Jersey Tpk. Auth., 398 N.J. Super. 229, 242-43 (App. Div. 2008) (reformation and correction of mistake are equitable in nature); Phoenix Pinelands Corp. v. Davidoff, 467 N.J. Super. 532, 614 (App. Div. 2021) (“[Q]uia timet is an equitable proceeding . . .”); In re Envtl. Ins. Declaratory Judgment Actions, 149 N.J. 278, 292-93 (1997) (declaratory judgment actions are equitable when indicated by the “historical basis” of the action and the relief sought).
[brief] *Karins v. Atlantic City*, 152 N.J. 532, 550-552 (1998).  Consistent with the *Driscoll* court’s ruling, the Carlstadt Sewerage’s Authority’s social media policy states, in relevant part:  If employees choose to identify themselves as a [...] employees on their personal social media accounts, and even those that do not should be aware that he or she may be viewed as acting on behalf of the [...], as such no employee shall knowingly represent themselves as a spokesperson of the [...], post any comment, text, photo, audio, video, or other multimedia file that negatively reflects upon the [...]'s mission or undermine the public trust or is insulting or offensive to other individuals or to the public in regard to religion, sex, race, or national origin.
[brief] The Trial Court’s Order Reflects a Proper Conclusion Regarding Reasonable Attorney’s Fees in this Matter and “Public Policy” does not Require a Different Result.  In their brief, Plaintiff argues that the trial court’s order should be reversed as it “violated public policy. ”  See Plaintiff’s Brief at p. 22.  Plaintiff’s argument is without merit.  Notably, Plaintiff did not raise any “public policy” argument in the trial court.  Therefore, he cannot raise this argument on appeal.  See Alloco v. Ocean Beach & Bay Club, 456 N.J.Super. 124, 145 (App.Div. 2018).  More importantly, Plaintiff’s argument that an award of full fees to Plaintiff’s counsel promotes the public policy in New Jersey is misguided.  As the New Jersey Supreme Court declared in N. Bergen Rex Transp. v. Trailer Leasing Co. (158 N.J. 561 [1999]), “New Jersey has a strong policy disfavoring shifting of attorney’s fees” (emphasis added).  Furthermore, where like here, “attorney-fee shifting is controlled by contractual provisions, court will strictly construe that provision in light of the general policy disfavoring the award of attorney’s fees. ”  Id. citing McGuire v. City of Jersey City, 125 N.J. 310, 326 (1991).  Plaintiff fails to identify any applicable case law which would warrant the reversal of an attorney fee award under the MMWA for public policy reasons where the fees are deemed “low and inadequate” by Plaintiff’s counsel.  Instead, an award of attorney’s fees under the MMWA (the only statute that could potentially entitle Plaintiff to fees in this matter) is discretionary.  See 15 U.S.C. § 2310(d)(2) (“If a consumer finally prevails . . . he may be allowed by the court to recover . . . cost[s] and expenses (including attorneys’ fees based on actual time expended) determined by the court to have been reasonably incurred by the plaintiff . . . unless the court in its discretion shall determine that such an award of attorneys’ fees would be inappropriate. ” [emphasis added]).  It follows, therefore, that where the statute provides the trial court with discretion to award or decline to award fees, a court’s decision to award fees, even if not in the amount Plaintiff’s counsel deems to be “adequate,” cannot violate public policy.  The trial court’s decision should not be disturbed.