ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] (5T 70-11 to 79-21)  The prosecutor argued, based on still-shots from the car wash video, that [...] was wearing light-color clothing consistent with the suspect’s.  (5t 95-22 t0 98-11)  For the first time at trial, the prosecutor also claimed that the Alto Rango video showed grant look towards [...] and do “something,” which the prosecutor argued was evidence of premeditation; that the beef Town video showed flashes of light indicative of gunfire; that the electric company video contradicted grant’s alibi because it showed a second person walking just after Governor; and that the second person in the post-Governor video was grant because that person had the same height and “style of walk” as grant in the pre-governor videos, (5T 88-8 to 105-9)  Notably, the prosecutor did not argue that the suspect’s face was visible in any of the surveillance videos or that jury could compare the suspect’s face to grant’s.  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT
[brief] (17T47-6 to 9).  [...], however, often gave two- to three-minute answers that “went wildly off course” and were not responsive to the questions asked.  (17T47-6 to 15).  [...] agreed with the State’s assessment:  The doctor testified over the course of the next two days and there were multiple times that [...]’s testimony went far beyond the question asked….  [T]his Court felt obligated to keep [...] on track with answering the questions.  The Court’s treatment of [...] was the same as it was with all witnesses who testified during this trial.  …  The Court record of [...]’s testimony will clearly show multiple, and I mean multiple times where she decided to testify about topics not asked of her.  A good example is the prior topic discussed earlier here today concerning the Perrine/Rushing report.  Instead of just answering yes or no, she decided to insert the waiver hearing into her answer [as] the purpose of their report.  The answer was either yes or no.  [...] consistently went afield of the question posed to her in her answers.  Complying with [N.J.R.E.] 611, this Court kept [...], along with all witnesses, on track with answering questions that were asked.
[brief] Congress did not express or imply that a debt collector could communicate with others when a debt collector believed that doing so would make the collection of debts cheaper or more efficient.  Hence, § 1692c(b) flatly prohibits all third-party communications regardless of the reason unless one of the exceptions applies or the communication is to one of the few authorizes recipients.  There is no exception for benign communications or for communications to third-parties who promise to keep the information a secret.  And Congress knows how to regulate permissible third-party communications of confidential information.  For example, in 42 U.S.C. § 17934, Congress statutorily required business associates of health care providers to comply with existing regulations governing the use and disclosure of protected health information (PHI) per 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(e)(2).  HIPAA’s Privacy Rule bars a health care provider from disclosing PHI except as permitted or required by law and one permitted exception is providing PHI to the provider’s business associate.  45 C.F.R. § 164.502(a); 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(e)(1)(i).  The provider must obtain “satisfactory assurance that the business associate will appropriately safeguard the information. ”  45 C.F.R. § 164.502(e)(1)(i).  Satisfactory assurances “must be documented through a written contract…that meets the applicable requirements of § 164.504(e).”  45 C.F.R. § 164.502(e)(2).  The required contractual terms under § 164.504(e) include: establishing the business associate’s permitted and required uses and disclosure of PHI; prohibiting the business associate from any other use or disclosure; and requiring the business associate to use appropriate safeguards, report breaches, and make its books and records available to the Secretary of HHS for the purpose of determining the covered entity’s compliance.
[brief] No other reported case has grappled with that same issue, including In re Christie’s Appointment of Perez, 436 N.J. Super. 575 (App. Div. 2014), which Plaintiffs misconstrue.  Plaintiffs assert that Defendants “admit” the case is “controlling on the issue. ” (Pb15, n.3.)  Not so.  The few instances in Perez in which BOG membership is called an “office” are “[m]ere obiter” and are not “carefully considered statement[s]” of binding authority.  Marconi v. United Airlines, 460 N.J. Super. 330, 339 (App. Div. 2019) (internal quotation and citations omitted).  And nowhere in their briefs before the trial court or here do Defendants “admit” that Perez is “controlling on the issue. ”  B.  Plaintiffs Fail To Explain Why They Filed Their Action Grossly Out Of Time.
[brief] [...] thank you for your email.  Kindly keep us apprised when if at all the “hold” is lifted and you may have visibility on a projected Closing Date.  Thanks.  (Pa11, ¶44; Pa130).  Plaintiff alleges “upon information and belief” that [...] knew at the time that [...] was in the process of purchasing the Property and that it “had no intention” aprising counsel of the new closing date.  (Pa11, ¶ 45).  On October 7, 2022, [...] and the Seller completed a revised transaction under the [...], via which [...] acquired all rights to the Property, rather than just title to the “improvements. ” (Pa12, ¶49).  Plaintiff was not told of the closing and learned of “the closing on or about October 20, 2022 from a press release. ” (Pa13, ¶52).  [...] provided closing services to [...] as part of the revised Mack-Cali transaction was instructed by its client to not disclose the transaction to Plaintiff, and did not do so.  (Pa12, ¶47; Pa15, ¶73).  [...]’s work on the Mack-Cali transaction was not inconsistent with the termination of the PSA because the [...] named [...] as the escrow agent for that transaction.
[brief] The in limine hearing made clear that this other evidence – and not [...]’s scientific expertise – was essential to his conclusion that the manner of death was homicide.  [...] admitted that he was not able to determine the manner of death based on the use of his own expertise in performing an autopsy.  (15T:46-13 to 47-2)  [...] asked [...], a forensic anthropologist, to examine the bones because the soft tissue, which is the “gold standard” for assessing the timing of injuries, “was so severely altered and damaged” that he was not able to draw his own conclusions as to the timing of the injuries.  (15T:49-2 to 25)  [...] explained that he ultimately reached his conclusion that the death was a homicide later based on: 1) the “circumstances” in which the remains were discovered “severely desecrated . . . in a bag . . . put outside of a house”; 2) Bird’s conclusion that the injuries to certain bones were “perimortem”; and 3) the fact that “the type of fracture that was found on the right side of the skull is not consistent with typical accidental trauma. ”  (15T:84-7 to 85-10)  [...] acknowledged, however, that “perimortem” injuries could have “occur[ed] within a day or two prior to death or within several days after death. ”  (15T:81-18 to 82-3)  [...] admitted that the length of the perimortem window meant that Bird could not determine whether the blunt force fractures on the skull actually caused the death or occurred during the attempted destruction of the body within the “several days” after the death.  (15T:81-18 to 82-3; 84-7 to 85-16)  Given this uncertainty about whether the trauma occurred prior to or after death, [...] repeatedly made clear that his conclusion that the death was a homicide was driven primarily by the how the remains were found, stating “the circumstances alone would be enough to give the opinion that the case was most likely a homicide. ”  (15T:90-25 to 92-1 (emphasis added))  [...] admitted that he would have to change his opinion if the “injuries were definitely postmortem” conceding that, due to the length of the perimortem window, “a lot” of his opinion regarding manner of death was “based on the circumstances of the case” rather than Bird’s conclusions.  (15T:82-4 to 18)  [...] also explained that, even without Bird’s report he would have reached the same conclusion regarding manner of death based “only on [the] circumstances” in which the remains were found.  (15T:86-4 to 25)  [...] described “the circumstances” as including the manner in which “the remains were found,” which he described as “very, very unlikely” for “natural or accidental deaths. ”  (15T:91-15 to 92-1)  Notwithstanding the fact that [...]’s conclusion was based on his inferences about the other evidence rather than his medical expertise, the court ruled that [...] could opine on cause of death over defense objection.
[brief] Defendant admitted as part of his guilty plea that, on April 16, 2022, a police officer pulled him over in his vehicle.  He admitted that he owned and constructively possessed a handgun found inside of the vehicle during a search by the officer.  He admitted that the handgun was operable and that it was unlawful for him to possess the handgun in the vehicle.  (3T15-15 to 18-18).  --- 3  *Miranda v. Arizona*, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I THE OFFICER LAWFULLY SEARCHED DEFENDANT’S VEHICLE PURSUANT TO THE AUTOMOBILE EXCEPTION TO THE WARRANT REQUIREMENT.
[brief] The Planning Board’s job was to point out to the governing body any possible inconsistency between the Ordinance under review and the Master Plan.  The governing body can then focus on such items and either conclude there is no inconsistency or can still pass the Ordinance by setting forth reasons for passage despite the inconsistency.  The Planning Board in the case before the Court just punted by failing to do the work envisioned by the Legislature to make land use decisions more transparent for both public scrutiny and judicial review.
[directive] Dat/Date Akize a/Defendant Avoka LaDefans/Defense Attorney Komisè Gouvènman/Prosecutor Fòm Kreye pa Direktif #01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 11728-Haitian Creole paj 2 nan 2 Form Promulgated by Directive #01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 11728-Haitian Creole page 2 of 2
[brief] The Statement that [...] “had no knowledge of the Staten Island robbery and kidnapping,” Is Not Itself a Prior Inconsistent Statement by [...], Is Not Admissible Under N.J.R.E. 803(a)(1), and Is Not Brady Evidence.  Defendant Did Not Raise Admissibility Under N.J.R.E. 608 Below.  A witness may be impeached with a prior statement by the witness that “is inconsistent with the declarant-witness’ testimony at trial .  . . .”  N.J.R.E. 803(a)(1).  “‘Statement’ means a person’s oral assertion, written assertion, or nonverbal conduct, if the person intended it as an assertion. ”  N.J.R.E. 801(a).  “‘Declarant’ means the person who made the statement. ”  N.J.R.E. 801(b).  [...]’ habeas petition is not a prior inconsistent statement, because nowhere in that petition does [...] himself claim to have no knowledge of the Staten Island robbery and kidnapping.  Rather, [...] explained his PCR counsel had been ineffective by:  [I]gnor[ing] [[...]]’[] request to investigate claims that [[...]]’[] co-defendant would have submitted an affidavit on his behalf, which would have explained that [[...]] had no knowledge of the Staten Island robbery and kidnapping of [...].  [(Da79). ]  Clearly, [...] did not actually disclaim knowledge of the Staten Island home invasion in his habeas petition, so this statement does not contradict his testimony against defendant.  Likewise, [...] did not indicate that [...]’ hypothetical statement would have been true.  Defendant mischaracterizes the contents of [...]’ habeas petition in asserting that “[...] affirmed that he had no knowledge of the Staten Island robbery and kidnapping . . . .” (Db at 3).  [...] was the hypothetical declarant of the statement that [...] “had no knowledge of the Staten Island robbery and kidnapping,” not [...], because [...] is the “person who” would have “ma[d]e the statement. ”  N.J.R.E. 801(b).  Therefore, the statement that [...] “had no knowledge of the Staten Island robbery and kidnapping” would not itself be admissible to impeach [...] as a witness against defendant, N.J.R.E. 803(a)(1), so it is not Brady evidence.
[brief] \(^2\)  And contrary to Respondents’ claim, the record establishes that Appellant was continually subjected to harassment by her coworkers, supervisors, and [...] himself constituting continuation of the hostile work environment and retaliation. \(^3\)  2.  Respondents Subjected Appellant to Retaliation By Reprimanding Her for Her Attire.  (Pa230, Pa374-77, Pa1022-23, Pa991-92)  The Trial Court’s failure to analyze the entire record was also an error.
[brief] TRIAL COURT FAILED TO IDENTIFY AND APPLY THE APPROPRIATE LEGAL STANDARD FOR ABBREVIATION OF TRANSCRIPT AND DENIED THE MOTION BASED ON IRRELEVANT FACTORS.  TRIAL COURT'S LEGAL CONCLUSION THAT AN APPELLANT HAS THE OBLIGATION TO APPRIZE THE APPELLATE DIVISION OF ALL ISSUES IS LOGICALLY AND LEGALLY ERRONEOUS AND CONTRARY TO THE RAISON D'ÊTRE OF RULE 2:5-3(c).  (Pa1331-32)  Trial court failed to apply the appropriate legal standard for abbreviation of transcript and instead denied the motion on the basis of irrelevant factors as demonstrated by the following rationalization of denial in the May 3, 2024 order – “*Trial in this matter was conducted over many days over an extended period of time.
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[brief] The exclusion of coverage for injuries intentionally caused by an employer does not contravene public policy.  Rather, such an exclusion is fully consistent with the public policy of this State.  The Supreme Court’s decision in Charles Beseler Company v. O’Gorman & Young, Inc., 188 N.J. 542 (2006), also makes clear that a policy exclusion that excludes coverage for an employer’s intentional wrongs as defined by N.J.S.A. 34:15-8 is not contrary to public policy.
[brief] The Settlement and Consent Judgment Were Not A Compromise  “A] settlement may be enforced against an insurer…only if it is reasonable in amount and entered into in good faith. ”  Griggs v. Bertram, 88 N.J. 347, 368 (1982); Battista v. W. World Ins. Co., Inc., 227 N.J. Super. 135, 146 (Law Div. 1988).
[brief] The PCR court also improperly engaged in credibility determinations concerning the certifications without any testimony from the witnesses, which is also contrary to Porter, supra.  The defendant averred that his trial counsel explained to him that his partial fingerprint was found on a kilogram cocaine wrapper, which he was advised fingerprints are normally not found on such material, that he was reportedly observed on certain days of surveillance entering [...], and DNA evidence was reportedly recovered from a water bottle and gloves retrieved from the apartment.  (Da 121)  Defendant informed his trial attorney that the days he was reportedly viewed during alleged surveillance he was not even in the State of New Jersey because he was in Charlotte, North Carolina.  The defendant subsequently presented trial counsel with a receipt for the Hilton Hotel he stayed at while in Charlotte and requested trial counsel to have an investigator interview the Hilton Hotel employees and seek the video footage.  (Da 121)  The defendant also requested trial counsel to obtain a fingerprint expert, a cross-racial identification expert, and a DNA expert.  The defendant’s family subsequently paid trial counsel $1000.00 for the fingerprint expert, [...] to travel to Elizabeth, New Jersey to review the state’s evidence.  (Da 121)  Trial counsel informed the defendant that Mr. Garrett was officially retained as “our fingerprint expert,” and that his report should be prepared within the next 30 days.  (Da 121)  The defendant further averred that he never received Mr. Garrett’s report from trial counsel, therefore, he had written to trial counsel requesting an update.  (Da 121)  Several weeks after writing to trial counsel, the defendant was advised by trial counsel that he found another fingerprint expert, [...], and that Mr. Gamble would be going to the [...] to examine the State’s evidence.  (Da 121)  The defendant’s family paid trial counsel an additional $5,000.00 to secure Mr. Gamble for the defendant’s trial.  (Da 121)  Up to the start of trial, the defendant was reassured by trial counsel during conversations and letters that Mr. Gamble would be called as a defense witness on his behalf.  It was not until the close of the State’s case, that the defendant was apprised that no fingerprint expert or DNA expert would be called on his behalf.
[directive] N.J.S.A. amending ("PTI"), by Intervention Pretrial who offenders first-time for designed is program PTI prosecution.  The traditional to alternative N.J.S.A. 2C:43- conduct.  criminal future deter to services rehabilitative early from benefit will are PTI, there to apply can offense indictable an with charged defendant any 12a(1).  While the upon conditioned is PTI to defendant of referral a Court's The criteria. admission with the director, program PTI  Court's of the Office Administrative of recommendation the 2C:43-12e.  N.J.S.A. defendant. and prosecutor the of consent certain for PTI into admission against presumption a provides legislation new  This the requires law new the Additionally, 2C:43-12b(2)(b).  N.J.S.A. offenders. violence domestic N.J.S.A. application.  PTI defendant's on a input victim's consider the prosecutor to and court before guilty plea a enter defendants certain that requires further law new  The 2C:43-12b(2)(e).  crime; second degree or with first a charged (1) defendants: includes  This PTI. admission into a with charged (3) violence; domestic involving crime fourth degree or third a with charged (2) subject while violence domestic involving offense persons disorderly or petty persons disorderly second degree or prior first a have who or order; (4) restraining final or temporary a to in held be will pleas guilty these that provides law new
[directive] no Formulário revisado promulgado pela diretiva 01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 10080-Portuguese página 1 de 7 Revised Form Promulgated by Directive #01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 10080-Portuguese page 1 of 7  1.  b)  (1)  Você entende que se mudar de residência você terá que notificar o órgão policial onde [Sim/Yes] [Não/No] está registrado, e terá que efetuar o registro novamente junto ao oficial-chefe da autoridade policial da municipalidade em que irá residir ou junto ao Superintendente da Polícia Estadual se a municipalidade não tiver um oficial-chefe da autoridade policial, no mais tardar até 10 dias antes da data em que pretende residir no novo endereço?
[brief] To succeed on a claim based on newly discovered evidence, a defendant must demonstrate that the evidence is “(1) material to the issue and not merely cumulative or impeaching or contradictory; (2) discovered since the trial and not discoverable by reasonable diligence beforehand; and (3) of the sort that would probably change the jury’s verdict if a new trial were granted. ”  *State v. Szemple*, 247 N.J. 82, 99 (2021).
[brief] B.  The Court Should Reject [...]'s Attempt to Invoke the Doctrine of Waiver  Under New Jersey law, “[w]aiver is the voluntary and intentional relinquishment of a known right,” Knorr v. Smeal, 178 N.J. 169 (2003).  Thus, “when a contract contains a waiver of rights … the waiver ‘must be clearly and unmistakably established. ””  Morgan v. Sanford Brown Inst., 225 N.J. 289, 308-309 (2016) (quoting Atalese v. U.S. Legal Services Group, L.P., 219 N.J. 430 (2014)).  The contractual waiver of rights provision “must reflect that [the party] has agreed clearly and unambiguously to its terms. ”  Atalese, 219 N.J. at 443 (alteration in original) (quoting Leodori v. CIGNA Corp., 175 N.J. 293 (2003)).  Undeniably, nothing in the Consent Order constitutes an intentional waiver of rights, or any waiver of rights whatsoever.
[brief] It is also undisputed, based upon the testimony, that Plaintiff was stopped at the red light at that intersection in the lane marked for traffic traveling straight through the intersection, but proceeded to make a left turn in derogation of the plain markings when the accident occurred.  Plaintiff, also by her answers to interrogatories, admits she was stopped for a red light in the middle lane of First Street at its intersection with Route 280 West in Newark, that [...] was stopped in the left lane waiting to make a left turn onto Route 280 West, and that when the light changed, Plaintiff turned left into Route 280 West.