ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] And courts have held that debt collectors are separate and distinct from the persons they hire.  See Isaac v. NRA Grp., LLC, 377 F. Supp. 3d 211, 216 (E.D.N.Y. 2019) (treating debt collector companies and their employees as separate persons under the FDCPA).  Thus, under Appellant’s reading of §§ 1692c(b), 1692d(3), and 1692f, a debt collector would be barred from communicating with its own employees, and thus effectively unable to act on any debt – a patently absurd result.  Finally, Appellant’s theory would potentially prohibit debt collectors from simply using the phone or internet.  When a debt collector uses the phone or internet, it necessarily transmits information to and from an telephone/internet service provider.  Thus, one could argue with the same reasoning suggested by Appellant that by using the phone and internet, a debt collector has “communicated” with a third-party in violation of the FDCPA.  That would be absurd.  Yet Appellant’s theory of liability requires this result.  Given these ridiculous consequences, Appellant’s plain reading of the FDCPA must be set aside in favor of a sensible interpretation which avoids absurd results, is consistent with all provisions of the FDCPA, and is in line with Congressional intent and legislative history.  See Mynster, at 480; Donovan, at 197.  In sum, Appellant’s FDCPA claim fails because it is based on a hyper-literal and isolated reading of the provision that is contrary to Congress’s intent and the statute as a whole, and would lead to absurd results.
[brief] ”  385a.  It granted relief included “restraining certain land development activities” in the Borough.  371a.  [...]’s conduct was “ghastly, embarrassing, and sorely in need of remediation. ”  396a.  A year later, the court confirmed “[...] officials have relentlessly preserved and exacerbated economic and class segregation throughout the Borough” culminating in a “extreme pattern of exclusionary efforts.
[brief] First, the trial court properly viewed the 2023 Veto Amendment as procedural in nature.  4T 18:6-19:7.  This was plainly correct, as the amendment merely modifies the manner in which the Attorney General can achieve a result that it could always have achieved.  Defendants engage in a lengthy disquisition about how the 2023 Veto Amendment is not procedural because it “reflects a new substantive policy judgment.
[brief] Defendant/respondent [...] (hereinafter referred to as “[...]”) argues in its opposition brief that the plaintiffs/appellants (hereinafter referred to as “plaintiffs”) continue to seek to delay the construction of fourteen (14) residential dwellings that are part of an inclusionary affordable housing development critical to the [...]’s court-approved affordable housing compliance plan based upon false claims and without any legitimate basis.  [...] also sets forth in its opposition brief the entire history of the Mount Laurel Action, the Affordable Housing Settlement Agreement, and Rezoning which is completely irrelevant to plaintiffs’ appeal, including the elevations of the residential townhomes and carriage homes that were exhibits to the Settlement Agreement.  Despite [...]’s discontent with plaintiffs’ appeal, plaintiffs are permitted under the New Jersey Court Rules to appeal the trial court’s decision upholding the [...]’s Planning [...] (hereinafter referred to as the “[...]”) decision granting [...]’s application for Preliminary and Final Major Site Plan Approval.  The issue on this appeal is technical and purely legal as to whether the [...] misinterpreted the Building Height Definition within the [...] Height Ordinance 22-2.4 (hereinafter referred to as the “Ordinance”).  The Ordinance defines Building Height as “the vertical dimension measured to the highest point of a building . . . from the lowest original grade or any revised lot grade shown on the Site Plan . . .  Such revised lot grade shall not include mounding, terracing, or other devices designed to allow increased building height. ” (emphasis added).  Defendants  [...] and [...] both argue that the [...] made a clear factual determination as to whether the regrading of the entire site constitutes “mounding, terracing, or other devices designed to allow increased building height” in that the property did not constitute mounding since [...] did not “intend” to increase building height based upon the factual record from the [...].  However, [...] and the [...] misinterpret the Ordinance by defining “design” as the “intent” or “purpose” of the applicant for the increased building height.  Rather, the Ordinance contains the phrase “designed to allow” increased building height which means that the design of the revised lot grade shall not include mounding, terracing, or other devices which design “allows” or “results” in increased building height.  Thus, the building height definition is clear that irrespective of intent or purpose, if the mounding, terracing or other devices results in an increased building height, then building height must be measured from the original lot grade.  Nevertheless, the trial court erred by adopting the [...]’s factual findings of the Ordinance under the arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable standard of review rather than interpreting the Ordinance under the *de novo* standard of review.  Even so, the trial court, nonetheless, failed to properly define the word “design” under the Ordinance.  Therefore, the trial court’s decision be reversed, and that plaintiffs’ appeal be granted.
[brief] [...] (“Appellant”) was hired as a firefighter for the [...] in July of 2018.  He currently serves in that same role.  Pa2 at ¶7; Pa38, T28:3-12.  Appellant is of Asian descent, as he testified that his mother is from the Philippines.  His father is of Irish descent.  Pa48, T67:19-T68:9.  Appellant attended the [...] and graduated in September 2018.  Following his graduation, Plaintiff began his probationary year of service as a full-time firefighter.  Pa36, T21:21-24; Pa37, T25:1-4.  On June 19, 2019, Appellant received workplace harassment training through the [...].  The training was presented by an outside hiree.  Pa43, T47:9-48:15, T49:8-17; Pa63.  He further testified to receiving several other anti-harassment and anti-discrimination training courses through the City during his career.  Pa44, T50:8-9.  Appellant received a copy of the employee handbook during his probationary period.
[directive] A law enforcement agency shall apply for a complaint-warrant if there is reason to believe that the present offense (1) constitutes a violation of any domestic violence restraining order or release condition, or (2) constitutes a violation of any Sexual Assault Survivor Protection Act order or release condition, unless an assistant prosecutor or deputy attorney general consulted in accordance with Section 3.2 of this Directive, or a supervisory officer designated pursuant to subsection 3.3.2 who is authorized by the County Prosecutor to overcome presumptions under Section 4 of this Directive, determines that the presumption of charging by complaint-warrant is overcome pursuant to subsection 4.5.9, giving special consideration to the interests and opinion of the victim and whether mandatory detention for up to 48 hours as required by N.J.S.A. 2A:162-16(a) would exacerbate the situation or discourage the victim from cooperating with the investigation or prosecution.
[brief] (Pa4).  Moreover, the terms of the alleged deal are simply unbelievable.  It just does not compute that the Township would ever, whether authorized or not, agree to repair and replace the backyard, including a 50-year-old pool and shed, of a private citizen for damages seemingly caused by naturally occurring ground water by which the Township bore no responsibility.  Plaintiff admits that the so-called contract was never written down, much less approved or ratified by the Township’s governing body.  By law, such an agreement, even if it existed, cannot be held binding.  Plaintiff pooh-poohs this requirement by simply stating that it is “not relevant. ” (Pb14).  This is obviously untrue, and Plaintiff provides no support for that position.  Plaintiff indicates that regardless, she “would still have a valid promissory estoppel claim. ” (Pb14-15).  But that is what is not relevant, as Plaintiff has not pled such a claim, and thus, it is irrelevant.
[brief] *Id.* at 6.  The ordinance banned “[l]oud and unusual noises which ‘annoy, disturb, injure or endanger the comfort, repose, health, peace or safety of others. ’”  *Ibid.*  The court found that [i]t is an entirely proper exercise of police power to protect the health, safety and welfare of local residents by abatement of nuisances and preservation of order.  To that end, municipalities may adopt ordinances regulating or preventing loud, disturbing and unnecessary noise detrimental to the public health and welfare.  The regulations in question are presumed valid…and may be stricken down only if the presumption of validity is overcome by a clear showing that it is arbitrary or unreasonable.  No such showing has been made here.  *[Id. at 6-7 (citations omitted).
[brief] ” (Pl. Tr. 319:4 to 320:4; Da94-96).  Notably, Plaintiff does not allege she was assigned any task that was outside of her job responsibilities.  Plaintiff also testified that she, and all other Vice Principals, were required to perform additional observations in order to meet a deadline as part of a team effort, and when she was assigned additional evaluations that had first been assigned to [...], it was “because [[...]] was [busy] scheduling”—a task that Plaintiff was not assigned and which was only assigned to [...], no one else.  (Pl. Tr. 130:2-4, 317:20 to 321:1).  As noted above, Plaintiff also admitted that [...], a non-Black Vice Principal, was assigned additional responsibilities that she was not (i.e., to meet with guidance weekly to help resolve scheduling issue).  (Pl. Tr. 140:19 to 141:21).  Thus, there is nothing in the record to evidence Plaintiff was singled out in any way for extra work because she is Black or due to her age.
[brief] In our view, appellants have by far the better argument that the Legislature intended to limit the statutory exemption afforded public utilities to "routine" upgrades of their "lines, rights of way, or systems" in the Preservation Area in the same manner it does every other activity listed, that is "maintenance and operations, rehabilitation, preservation, reconstruction, [and] repair."  N.J.S.A. 13:20-28(a)(11).  Although we think appellants have the better grammatical analysis, that is that the attributive adjective, otherwise known as the "prepositive modifier," "routine" modifies each noun in the list of exempt activities,\(^{10}\) we do not "pin \(^{10}\) [...] and [...] in their book *Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts*, 147 (2012), refer to this in their discussion of "Syntactic Canons" as the "Series-Qualifier Canon," that is "[w]hen there is a straightforward, parallel construction that involves all nouns or verbs in a series, a prepositive or postpositive modifier normally applies to the entire series."  Among the examples they provide is this one: "[f]orcibly assaults, resists, opposes, impedes, intimidates, or interferes with — held, that forcibly modifies each verb in the list," id. at 148 (citing *Long v. United States*, 199 F.2d 717, 719 (4th Cir. 1952), in which the court determined "[t]he use of the adverb 'forcibly' before the first of the string of verbs, with the disjunctive conjunction used only between the last two of them, shows quite plainly that the adverb is to be interpreted as modifying them all").  heavy interpretive import" on the Legislature's choice of a comma over a semicolon here, Perez, 218 N.J. at 210; see 2A [...] & [...], Sutherland Statutes and Statutory Construction § 47.15 at 345 (7th ed. 2007) ("Punctuation is a most fallible standard by which to interpret a writing." (quoting Ewing's Lessee v. Burnet, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 41, 54 (1837))).  Instead, we are guided by two interpretive principles — that "exception[s] to the provisions of a comprehensive statutory scheme.
[brief] The Supreme Court’s decision in Haviland, and as noted in Shamrock, recognizes that claims “resulting from” a licensed personal professional negligent practice or negligence require an affidavit of merit.  The New Jersey Supreme Court has set forth the analysis which must be performed in cases where a lawsuit is filed against a professional.  The Supreme Court has held that it is not the label to be placed on the action that is pivotal, but rather, the nature of the legal inquiry.  *Courier v. Gardner*, 173 N.J. 328 (2002).  As instructed by the New Jersey Supreme Court, regardless of how a claim is presented, rather than focusing on how it is denominated, the Court should determine if the claim’s underlying function required proof of a deviation from the professional standard of care acceptable to that specific profession.  *Courier v. Gardner*, 173 N.J. at 340-341.  If such proof is required, an Affidavit of Merit is required per that claim unless an exception applies.  *Id.* citing, *Hubbard v. Reid*, 168 N.J. 387 (2001).  Here, Appellant’s own experts concede that the work that [...] and [...] were contracted to perform engineering services.  (Pa2230) (T46:21-25)  The complaint sounds in professional negligence and is directed against the corporate entities.  The New Jersey Administrative Code defines what constitutes the practice of engineering to include ensuring compliance with the plans and specifications.  Here, Appellant’s claim is that [...] and [...] failed to ensure compliance with the plans and specifications.  There is no independent negligent act of [...] who was 25 miles away from the accident when it occurred.  As the claim results from the purported failure of [...] and [...] to ensure compliance with the contract documents, an affidavit of merit is required and as Appellant failed to provide one, the Court correctly dismissed the Complaint.
[brief] ”  Frank v. Ivy Club, 120 N.J. 73, 98 (1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1073 (1991); see also Cunningham v. Dep’t of Civil Serv., 69 N.J. 13, 19–26 (1975).  “To rule otherwise would subject to the caprice of the agency the rights of individuals who make a prima facie showing of facts which, if established, would [entitle them to relief], . . . if the agency simply rejects those facts. ”  B & J Realty, L.L.C. v. N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 381 N.J. Super. 52, 62 (App. Div. 2005).  In a “[c]ontested case” where “there exist disputed questions of [material] fact, it is an abuse of discretion for an agency to deny an appellant’s request for a hearing.  N.J.A.C. 1:1-2.1; I/M/O Wiggins, 242 N.J. Super. 342, 346 (App. Div. 1990).  In re [...], [...], 2015 WL 2184073, at *6 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. May 12, 2015) (reversing the CSC’s denial of a hearing request where the only documents the CSC had to review essentially stated only that “witnesses denied or failed to corroborate appellant’s allegations,” and the CSC had no “written record of the witnesses’ interviews, and thus could not itself evaluate them”).
[brief] 3 S Del., Inc. v. DataQuick Info. Svs., Inc., 492 F.3d 520, 532 (4th Cir. 2007).  Closer to home, the Third Circuit has also cited Dockser (the same case cited by the Three S court) for the proposition that when a contract is silent on issues of procedure, the default rule is the issue will be decided in the arbitration forum:  Such disputes on arbitral procedure are [i]ncluded within the scope of [the] default rule’ in favor of arbitral resolution, along with “the merits of the underlying dispute. ”  Dockser, 433 F.3d at 425, 427 (noting that, in the face of contractual silence, arbitral resolution of procedural issues is presumed, and “the onus is on the party seeking litigation on a procedural issue to show that the agreement somehow excludes that issue from arbitration”).  See Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s London v. Westchester Fire Ins. Co., 489 F.3d 580, 588 (3d Cir. 2007).
[directive] 3.3.2  Officers face a dynamic environment in which interactions with individuals can escalate very quickly from one level of resistance to another.  For example, a passive resistor may become an active assailant in an instant.  In responding to the level of resistance, the officer may use the level of force that corresponds to the level of resistance the officer is facing, and need not use lesser levels of force that will not address the threat that the officer faces at the time.  If the individual’s resistance diminishes, the officer shall immediately reduce the level of force used against the individual.
[brief] Acting on a tip from a criminal informant, police opened an investigation into [...], whom the informant alleged to be a heroin dealer operating out of a storage unit.  The investigation revealed that Mr. Correa indeed rented and regularly accessed a storage unit -- but that’s about it.  Police never saw Mr. Correa carry anything that looked like packaged heroin into or out of the unit, nor did they execute a controlled buy in an attempt to corroborate the informant’s allegations.  Despite the lack of corroborating information, and despite the fact that the tip pertained only to Mr. Correa, police surveilling the storage unit decided to pull over [...], who rented the storage unit with Mr. Correa, and [...], whom police believed to be accompanying Watson to the storage facility.  During the stop, Moya consented to a search of his car and narcotics were found inside.  Shortly thereafter, police applied for a warrant to search Mr. Correa’s storage unit, which they secured.  The trial court’s denial of Mr. Correa’s motion challenging the search of his storage unit must be reversed.  First, the stop of Moya’s car was illegal because police lacked reasonable and articulable suspicion that Moya was involved in criminal activity.  The evidence seized from Moya’s car was thus illegally obtained and cannot be considered in evaluating whether there was probable cause to authorize a search of Mr. Correa’s storage unit.  Second, without the evidence seized from Moya’s car, the warrant affidavit submitted by police falls far short of establishing probable cause to search the storage unit.  Even if the evidence from Moya’s car could be considered, the affidavit fails to satisfy the probable cause standard.  Accordingly, the search of the storage unit was unconstitutional, and the evidence seized from the unit must be suppressed.
[brief] TABLE OF CONTENTS  PROCEDURAL HISTORY ..................................................................................1  STATEMENT OF FACTS ..................................................................................1  LEGAL ARGUMENT ........................................................................................2  POINT I BECAUSE THE TRIAL COURT APPLIED  THE CORRECT LEGAL TEST AND DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION, THIS COURT MUST DEFER TO THE TRIAL COURT AND SHOULD AFFIRM THE ORDER DENYING THE STATE’S MOTION TO CONSOLIDATE THE APRIL 20 ROBBERY WITH THE APRIL 23 CARJACKING AND DENYING THE STATE’S MOTION TO ADMIT  EVIDENCE OF THE APRIL 20 ROBBERY AT THE TRIAL FOR THE APRIL 23 CARJACKING.  .................................................................2  CONCLUSION
[brief] (1T39:15-43:2)  Appellate review of the evidentiary rulings a trial court has made on a motion in limine is limited.  “[A] trial court’s evidentiary rulings are ‘entitled to deference absent a showing of an abuse of discretion, i.e., there has been a clear error of judgment. ’”  State v. Brown, 170 N.J. 138, 147 (2001) (quoting State v. Marrero, 148 N.J. 469, 484 (1997)).  As such, “an appellate court should not substitute its own judgment for that of the trial court, unless "the trial court's ruling 'was so wide of the mark that a manifest denial of justice resulted”  Ibid.  The trial court properly permitted the snow removal agreements to be discussed at trial due to the conflicting deposition testimony of the three defendants regarding who was to provide snow removal services at the time of Plaintiff’s fall.  (1T39:15-40:1; Da150-178).  In addition, [...] testified it was limited in performing its job because of the terms of the contract.  (1T40:8-16; Pa5-9).  N.J.R.E. 401 defines relevant evidence as “evidence having a tendency in reason to prove or disprove any fact of consequence to the determination of the action. ”  Here, the snow removal agreement is relevant evidence as its contents go directly to each defendants’ responsibilities to each other, what services were to be provided and when.  The snow removal agreements were ignored from the initial execution which created a system failure that permitted poor standards to be kept which ultimately led to Plaintiff suffering a significant injury.  (1T39:19-21).  The landowner has “a non-delegable duty to use reasonable care to protect invitees against known or reasonably discoverable dangers”
[brief] The deal that was struck was documented in the following agreements:  1.  A stock purchase agreement in which [...] purchased [...]’s interest in [...] for $740,000 (2014 [...] SPA) (P-80).  Da906-934  2.  Employment agreement between [...] and [...] (P-81)  Da969-975  3.  A membership purchase agreement in which [...] purchased [...]’s interest in [...] for $4.96 million.  (2014 [...] MIPA) (P-82)  Da946-775  The 2014 [...] SPA called for a series of payments totaling $740,000.  Da906-907  Before the last payment was made, [...] and [...] agreed to substitute [...]’s wife, Fariba [...], for [...] as the purchaser so that [...] could qualify as a WBE (Woman Owned Business).  13T140:16-142:3; (D-137)
[brief] “A jury resolves factual, not legal, disputes.  If a case involves no material factual disputes, the court disposes of it as a matter of law by rendering judgment in favor of the moving or non-moving party on the issue of liability or damages or both. ”  Id. at 537.  A dispute of fact is genuine if, considering the burden of persuasion at trial, the evidence submitted by the parties on the motion, together with all legitimate inferences therefrom, could sustain a judgment in favor of the non-moving party.  A determination whether there exists a “genuine issue” of material fact that precludes summary judgment requires the motion judge to consider whether the competent evidential materials presented, when viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, are sufficient to permit a rational factfinder to resolve the alleged disputed issue in favor of the non-moving party.  The “judge's function is not himself [or herself] to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.