ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] 2C:20-2  Grading of theft (continued) offenses (a)The amount involved was less than $200.00; or (continued) (b)The property stolen is an electronic vehicle identification system transponder.  10% permissible except if by extortion.  2C:20-3/2C:20- Actor unlawfully takes property valued at $75,000 or more; or by extortion; or takes human Theft 2nd Degree $35,000 to $75,000  2b(1)(a)(b)(e) remains.  No 10% if by extortion.  42  Updated December 2, 2013  Bail Schedule 2
[brief] ”  *Thieme v. Aucoin-Thieme*, 227 N.J. 269, 288 (2016).  Here, as noted above, Appellant misused [...]’s Pcard(s) to make personal purchases in excess of $256,000 and it would be inequitable and against good conscience to permit Appellant to not repay [...] for the personal purchases made on [...] PCards.  In fact, Appellant, in the July 16, 2020 meeting, recognized the inequities in allowing him to abscond with the Companies funds:  **Appellant:**  And again, I’m coming clean as possible and saying you’re right, I coach hockey.  If [...] was charged for a hockey stick, then that’s a shame on me and I’ll more than certainly reimburse you.  [* * * ]  I’ll take full responsibility.  I apologize for that.  I had never intention of taking anything from [...], and I never had any intention of misconstruing funds.  (Da408).  Accordingly, Defendant/counterclaimants, based on the record evidence, are entitled to summary judgment on its unjust enrichment claims.  POINT IV
[brief] While Plaintiffs simply conclude (as they have done throughout the matter) that [...] can establish “associational standing” through its members, they have not provided any authority that supports the proposition that an entity formed \textit{after} the alleged unlawful act occurred can possess standing to challenge the act.  The reason for that omission is self-evident: an entity that was not in existence at the time of the alleged action could not possibly have suffered an injury-in-fact from that action to confer it standing (regardless of the composition of its members).  Thus, even if [...] would otherwise constitute an “interested party” – that does not grant [...] standing.  C.
[directive] If a complaint-summons is issued, the Prosecutor’s Office shall make certain that the juvenile is fingerprinted, if required, in Live Scan on the date of the juvenile’s first court appearance, or within a reasonable time after the filing of the complaint upon written request by the appropriate law enforcement agency pursuant to N.J.S.A. 53:1-15 and N.J.S.A. 53:1-18.1.  The Prosecutor’s Office shall further make certain that the fingerprint links to the juvenile and offense(s) for which a complaint-summons issued, either electronically in eCDR, if available, or by contacting the CRICU of the [...].
[directive] Notwithstanding the provisions of 3.2, the following officers are not required by this Policy to be equipped with BWCs:  (a)  Officers engaged in undercover assignments.  (b) Officers acting as hostage negotiators or crisis negotiators working in conjunction with tactical teams.  (c)  Officers assigned to administrative positions within the law enforcement agency.  This provision shall not exclude officers assigned to “front desk” duty, as defined in Section 3.2(f), from the requirement to be equipped with BWCs.  (d)  Officers meeting with confidential sources or recruiting potential confidential sources.  (e)  Officers engaged in union representation of a member of the collective bargaining unit.  (f)  Officers assigned to duties within schools or youth facilities as part of the normal daily educational environment, such as School Resource Officers (SROs) and Class III Special Law Enforcement Officers (SLEO IIIs).  Officers assigned to duties at schools or youth facilities working security or crowd-control functions at special events such as athletic competitions, graduations or similar public events shall be equipped with BWCs.  (g)  Non-uniformed officers assigned to investigative, non-enforcement duties, when authorized by the agency’s law enforcement executive.  BODY WORN CAMERA POLICY | May 2021
[directive] this by required not is approval in where review/approval cases prosecutor require to apply or acomplaint-summons issue to decision the and 2.2.2 4.2.1, subsections in noted  As risk-assessment pretrial automated the of results the by informed be should acomplaint-warrant for Live the with station police a taken at are fingerprints defendant's the after initiated is which process, ordinarily decision complaint-warrant versus complaint-summons the that system.
[brief] -  At all relevant times, [...]’s predecessor, [...], was a New Jersey corporation.  (Pa001; Pa498).  - [...] maintained corporate offices in [...] and operated a manufacturing plant in [...].  (Pa498-99).  •  [...] solicited [...] in New Jersey and ultimately sold and shipped millions of pounds of PCBs into New Jersey to [...].  (Pa498-99; Pa592-601; Pa610-59).  •  The Special Undertaking at issue was a contract made and entered in New Jersey when signed by [...]’s president.  (Pa025-26; Pa498).  •  Defendants visited [...] in New Jersey for the purpose of sales calls and to test intakes and effluents for the presence of PCBs.  (Pa592-606).  •  Defendants allege that PCB contamination giving rise to an alleged indemnification obligation took place in New Jersey.  (Pa134-37).  •  Defendants’ claimed entitlement to indemnity arises from [...]’s manufacture of PCB-containing capacitors and alleged contamination from its Totowa plant.  Thus, New Jersey is the center of relevant activities in this case.
[brief] Through her Trust’s Residuary Clause, [...] gave to her granddaughter, [...], the remainder of her assets not otherwise disposed of.  This includes [...]’s 21.5 percent interest in the Palm Beach Property, which is separate from [...]’s interest, and freely assignable at [...]’s discretion.  There is no conflict between Paragraphs 24(F) and 24(G) if meaning is given to the plain language of these separate contractual terms.
[directive] Directive# Promulgated by 19-19 (August 12, 2019)  Page2  Guideline Petition for Temporary Extreme Risk Protective Order 2.  .(fil Family or Household Member Petitioners.  Except for a petition filed against a law enforcement officer respondent, a family or household member petitioner may file a petition for a temporary extreme risk protective order the Superior Court or may in request a petition at a law enforcement agency for filing with the court .  Law Enforcement Officer Petitioners.  A law enforcement officer may file a .(Ql petition for a temporary extreme risk protective order with the court .  Other Persons.  Other persons who are neither family or household .{g members nor law enforcement officers may request at a law enforcement agency that a law enforcement officer file a petition for a temporary extreme risk protective order with the court .  Law Petition Against a Enforcement Officer Respondent.  A petition for a .(gl temporary extreme risk protective order against a law enforcement respondent may be filed in the law enforcement agency in which the officer employed as provided is in .  2C:58-23(1)  N.J.S.A. of .(fil Contents  Petition.  This petition shall contain an allegation that the of or respondent poses an immediate and present danger bodily injury to self others by possessing, purchasing, owning, or receiving a firearm; and an affidavit setting forth the facts tending to establish that the respondent poses immediate and present danger an of bodily injury to self or others by possessing, purchasing, owning, or receiving a firearm and the number, types, physical description, and locations of any firearms and ammunition that the petitioner believes to be currently possessed by the respondent.  Guidelines for Extreme Risk Protective Orders by Promulgated Directive# 19-19 (August 12, 2019)
[brief] The OAL initially consolidated this matter against Appellant with the ethics complaint lodged by Appellant against Complainant, [...].  Sg073-076.  On February 27, 2023, the Administrative Law Judge issued an Order and Partial Summary Decision severing Complainant’s matter from this matter.  Sg164-183.  As a result, the ALJ issued an Initial Decision on April 27, 2023, incorporating findings of fact, conclusions of law, and his recommended penalty from his February 27, 2023 Order.  Sg186-191.  Appellant filed exceptions to the Initial Decision, and the [...] as Petitioner did not file a Reply.  Sg192-201.  On June 27, 2023, the [...] met and considered the record developed to that point in this matter.  On July 25, 2023, the [...] adopted the Initial Decision’s findings of fact and conclusions of law, which found that Appellant violated N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24(b), N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(e), and N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(f), but that Appellant did not violate N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(c).  The [...] also voted to modify the recommended penalty of reprimand to censure.  Sg001-007.  Appellant timely filed a Notice of Appeal with the Commissioner for the New Jersey Department of Education to appeal the Initial Decision and penalty issued by the OAL and adopted by the [...].  The parties submitted briefs on the matter.  On May 15, 2024, the Commissioner issued a Final Agency Decision, upholding the OAL’s ruling and penalty recommendation and the [...]’s adoption of that ruling and modified penalty.  Sg232-236.  Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 18A:6-9.1, Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal to the Appellate Division of the Superior Court of New Jersey regarding the Final Agency Decision and penalty.
[brief] Da142, Da200.  Further, [...] announced its intent to compel arbitration as soon as practicable, and raised it at the lower court’s first status conference after the other defendants had settled out of the case and the stay had been lifted.  While [...]’s affirmative defenses did not use the word “arbitration,” the reference to lack of jurisdiction clearly applies as the court should decline jurisdiction over this arbitrable claim.  Da142, Da200.  Similarly, [...] reserved its rights under all of the terms and conditions of the policies, and arbitration is a term in the policies.
[brief] In Seckinger, the Court was not interpreting vague.  Rather, *Englert* found both the “to the extent” and the “regardless of” phrases to be independently vague and ambiguous.  *Englert*, 389 N.J. Super. at 56.  Specifically, the Court wrote “[n]either the ‘regardless of’ phrase nor the ‘to the extent’ phrase answers the question whether such indemnification would include [an indemnitee’s] own share of fault. ”  *Ibid.*  The *Englert* decision remains intact and persuasive.
[brief] When Counsel for the Borough asks to move D-3 into evidence, the Court asks how it is relevant if it doesn’t affect Lot 3.01 (4T33:22).  Counsel for the Borough asks some more questions regarding Lot 3 and Lot 3.01.  He asks [...] if he understands Lot 3 and what the boundaries of Lot 3 are and [...] replies: “Yes, I have a general understanding.  Yes. ”  The Court then asks: “Are any of the leased premises contained on Lot 3.01?”  The witness responds: “Lot 3.01 that I understand, it’s a Riparian Grant.  Because that is water” (4T34:13-16).  The following colloquy follows:  The Court: Okay, can you answer, is it your understanding any of the leased premises are on Lot 3.01?  If I, I don’t mean to answer for you, but it sounds as if you are saying: “No,” but I don’t know.  A: “My assumption is the Riparian Grant is starting at the beach and out to the water, so it would be on Lot 3, how I understand it, it was on Lot 3, the leased premises. ”  The Court: “Okay, alright, go ahead. ”  [...]: “Okay.  Q: So, your understanding is that what was leased to [...] was some portion of Lot 3, correct?”  A: “Correct. ”  Q: “And your understanding is that when [...] – well let’s ask.  Did [...] stop the lease or did the lease run out at some point and it left the premises?”  A: “The lease ran out.  The Borough Council at that time wanted to retain use of the property.  [...] executed, ceased use of the property. ”  Q: “Okay, and approximately when was that?”  A: “Approximately 1992. ”  Q: “Was there a period of time where that former leased premises was not being leased to anybody?”  A: “Correct. ”  Q: “How long was that for approximately?”  A: “Approximately 2 to 3 years. ”  Q: “Now at some point in time, did the Borough advertise for potential bidders to lease that same leased premises again?”  A: “We did. ”  Q: “And approximately when was that?”  A: “We did try again I think in 1994.  So, the bidder was unsuccessful in meeting the requirements of the bid.  We did not move forward with that at that time.  Then it was put back out to lease, I think the following year in 1995 and there was a new owner of the amusement park which is [...], and they submitted a successful bid on the lease.
[brief] On October 2, 2020, the Township filed a motion in limine seeking to bar the admission of [...]’s expert report as a net opinion, which he and [...] summarily found were functionally related to the “then existing uses” in 1994.  Pa155.  [...]’s sworn certification and deposition testimony directly contradicted Mr. [...]’s assertion that he confirmed that the stores and items listed in his report were present in 1994.  Mr. [...]’s conclusion that those stores and items were present in 1994 is further contradicted by [...]’s appraisal report which lists a different set of stores present on the Property as of January 27, 1994.  The Township moved to bar [...]’s conclusion as to the value of the items present on the property as of January 27, 1994 (which [...] failed to reach a conclusion as to how these items enhanced the fair market value of the Property) as speculative and an impermissible net opinion.  Ibid.  On October 14, 2020, the Court denied the Township’s motion without prejudice, indicating that the Township should depose Mr. [...] to determine the basis for his conclusions.  Pa157.  After the deposition was completed, the Township renewed its Motion in Limine to Bar [...]’s testimony.  Pa159.  This motion was denied by the Court.  Pa161.  [...] also filed a motion to bar the Township’s expert, [...], from using the Acme contract rent in his calculation of gross income in his income approach and the introduction of evidence of sales of shopping centers based on terms of leased fee, which was denied on October 14, 2020.  Da108.  On October 20, 2021, the Court entered a Consent Order transferring the matter to binding arbitration before [...].
[brief] To the extent that the riparian land (i.e. the riparian tract that [...] had obtained from the State, hereinafter the “[...] Tract”) was also conveyed, that was accomplished through a sentence contained in the deed after the legal description of the uplands which indicated that the conveyance also included “such riparian rights and other rights, privileges and franchises in and to the lands lying under the waters of Raritan Bay in front of and adjoining the above-described premises as are vested in”  Mr. [...].
[brief] Second, we ask that the Court hold that the [...] is bound to indemnify [...] for his legal fees incurred in connection with the GRC Complaint filed by [...] and all related proceedings, including appeals.  Because the proceedings before the GRC were neither criminal proceedings nor disciplinary proceedings, [...] was entitled to the appointment of counsel or indemnification for legal costs pursuant to the plain language of the bylaws adopted by Defendant-Respondent [...] (“[...]”).  Third, [...]’s initial request for records under the Open Public Records Act, N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1 to -13 (“OPRA”), was overbroad, vague, and therefore unenforceable, and it was error for the Trial Court to enforce the orders of the GRC relating to that request.
[brief] RESENTENCING IS REQUIRED BECAUSE THE COURT FAILED TO ADDRESS ANY MITIGATING FACTORS RAISED BY DEFENSE COUNSEL, AND IMPROPERLY FOUND AGGRAVATING FACTORS  THREE, SIX, AND NINE BASED ON [...]’S LIMITED CRIMINAL HISTORY AND THE ACTIONS OF HIS CODEFENDANTS.  (9T:5-10 TO 6-24, 14-11 TO 15-15)  .................................................................40  CONCLUSION
[brief] (a)  The Contracts and Deposition Testimony  Establish  [...]’ Duty to Ensure the Maintenance and Protection of Traffic  [...], like [...], had a contractual duty to ensure the protection of the traveling public on the parkway.  (Pa1381);(Pa2205).  [...] employee [...] was the Chief Inspector on the project.  (Pa1296).  Rudenjack testified that [...] was responsible to inspect and identify roadway settlement and elevation changes.  (Pa0656 at 20:7-28 to Pa0657 at 21:1-15).  The record reflects that settlement at the southbound north abutment joint was known to the Defendants.
[brief] Accordingly, summary judgment was correctly granted on Appellant’s complaint and on the Respondents’ counterclaims.  The resulting order of costs and fees to Respondents was fully supported by the record evidence and the law.  There is no question that Appellant knowingly pursued a baseless claim of retaliation under CEPA.  Respondents therefore respectfully request that the trial court’s Orders dated January 23, 2023 and October 12, 2023 be AFFIRMED.
[brief] The 1892 Agreement contained several conditions: (1) “[...], its successors or assigns shall be subject to such prudential rules and regulations as the said Township Committee may from time to time prescribe by ordinance or otherwise”; (2) [...] was required to obtain consent of property owners to erect poles in front of their property; (3) the poles had to be placed subject to the supervision of the governing body such that it could regulate --- \(^1\).
[brief] 1.  that he is permanently and totally disabled; 2. as a direct result of a traumatic event that is a. identifiable as to time and place, b. undesigned and unexpected, and c. caused by a circumstance external to the member (not the result of pre-existing disease that is aggravated or accelerated by the work); 3. that the traumatic event occurred during and as a result of the member’s regular or assigned duties; 4. that the disability was not the result of the member’s willful negligence; and 5. that the member is mentally or physically incapacitated from performing his usual or any other duty.
[brief] Even if the merits of the argument were considered, however, the result would be the same as (i) the Borough’s expert provided testimony which assisted the Trial Court, in its role as a finder of fact, in evaluating the issues presented in this case, and (ii) all of the parties provided testimony from title experts and the flaws (if any) in their testimony were flaws shared by all of the experts.  For the reasons set forth more fully below, the Trial Court’s Order for final judgment dismissing [...]’s Complaint with prejudice should be affirmed on appeal.
[brief] ** | 3 | | 206 N.J. 506, 521 (2011)) | | | **Twp. of Manalapan v. Gentile** | 3 | | 242 N.J. 295, 304 (2020) | | | **State v. Garcia** | 5 | | 245 N.J. 412, 430 (2021) | | | **State v. Jackson** | 5 | | 243 N.J. 52, 64 (2020) | | | **Rowe v. Bell & Gossett Co.** | 5 | | 239 N.J. 531, 551 (2019) | | | **State v. Scott** | 5 | | 229 N.J. 469, 479 (2017) | | | **State v. Nantambu** | 5 | | 221 N.J. 390, 402 (2015) | | | **State v. Rochat** | 5 | | 470 N.J. Super. 392, 453 (App. Div. 2022) | | | **State v. Prall** | 5 | | 231 N.J. 567, 580 (2018) | | | **Est. of Hanges v. Metro. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co.** | 5 | | 202 N.J. 369, 383-84 (2010)) | | | **State v. Medina** | 5 | | 242 N.J. 397, 412 (2020) | | Statutes & Other Authorities: New Jersey Rules of Evidence 609 .........................................................5 & 6  New Jersey Rules of Evidence 403 .........................................................5 & 6  ## LIST OF PARTIES | Party Name | Appellate Party Designation | Trial Court/Agency Party Role | Trial Court/Agency Party Status | |--------------------------|-----------------------------|-------------------------------|---------------------------------| | [...] | Respondent | Plaintiff | Participated | | [...] | Respondent | Defendant | Participated | | [...] | Respondent | Defendant | Participated | | [...] | Appellant | Defendant | Participated | | [...] | Appellant | Defendant | Participated | | [...] | Appellant | Defendant | Participated | PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
[brief] I.  BY GRANTING THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION, THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR (931a-954a)  There never was a viable TCA defense because defendant waived defenses predicated on the TCA by failing to plead a statement of facts per R. 4:5-4 or any TCA affirmative defenses.  377a-414a.  Applying the TCA as a bar is contrary to the Supreme Court’s view that "the notice provisions of the [TCA] were not intended as a 'trap for the unwary.'"8  In the context of TCA claims, "[a] public entity does not automatically receive the benefit of that immunity."9  "It is well established that the burden is on the public entity both to plead and prove its immunity under [the TCA], . . . and that to succeed on a motion for summary judgment, the entity must 'come forward with proof of a nature and character [that] would exclude any genuine dispute of fact .  . . ."10  A defense based on a plaintiff's alleged failure to timely notify a public entity of a tort claim is an affirmative defense.11
[brief] Appellant admits to multiple substantive violations of New Jersey statutes and administrative code provisions, as well as the [...] (the “City” or “Respondent”), Police Department’s (“[...]”) Rules and Regulations (the “Rules and Regulations”).  Appellant admits to his own failure to report these dire transgressions to [...], which he was required to do under the Rules and Regulations.  Appellant failed to provide credible testimony or evidentiary support during his Office of Administrative Law Trial (the “OAL Trial”), before the Hon. [...], A.L.J. (“[...]”).  Nevertheless, Appellant impermissibly asks this Court to ignore the credibility determinations made by [...] that were based on record evidence.  Appellant attempts to create alleged inconsistencies to distract this Court from Appellant’s self-admitted failure to report his numerous Rules and Regulations violations to [...].  Put another way, Appellant misses the forest for the trees.  Nothing can change the fact that Appellant admitted to violating multiple Rules and Regulations and got caught lying during the OAL Trial and to Internal Affairs.  Therefore, for the reasons set forth at length below, we respectfully request that this Court deny Appellant’s appeal in its entirety.  PROCEDURAL HISTORY