ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Similarly, the Board’s errors with respect to its reliance on [...], reemerged when it determined that the [...] case holding barred [...]’s application from being filed.  [...], like [...], involves a claimant that was attempting to get disability from the PFRS for reasons other than the administrative charge that was pending.  [...] was a drug addict police officer that signed an irrevocable termination agreement expressly as a quid pro quo for the dismissal of administrative charges and he permanently forfeited his right to be a police officer ever in New Jersey.  [...] also testified that he was no longer disabled and is able to return to work.  Our Agreement [Ex. 4].  [...], like [...], had charges that were independent of the alleged disability that he put forward to support benefits being afforded.  Moreover, it should be noted that in both [...] and [...], the ALJ agreed with the Board’s analysis as to those two cases cited; but not in our case.  Given the foregoing, there is absolutely no legal or factual reason that would justify the [...]’s Decision to deny a hearing this claim on the merits, much less not even permit the PFRS member to have his disability claim filed and processed.
[brief] Rb31.  [...] argues that “[c]ontrary to [...]’s assertions, the statutory factors do not include ‘the relative benefits’ of public access, whether access is ‘convenient,’ or whether the public ‘would be inclined to use the access point. ’  N.J.S.A. 13:1D-153(a).”  Rb31, footnote 11.  This is non-sensical.  First, [...] concedes that public access is an inherently beneficial use of land that is favored by the common law.  However, existing common law and the Public Access Law both require that it be provided in a manner that it is both reasonable and meaningful.  This statutorily mandated inquiry into reasonableness and meaningfulness must necessarily be informed by the relative benefits afforded to the public by any new access that [...] requires as a condition of a permit.  In addition, [...] would be hard-pressed to reconcile this position with the factors that it has proposed for making a “meaningfulness assessment,”\(^7\) ARa003, as well as the factors explicitly enumerated by the Public Access Law. \(^8\)  Indeed, [...]’s position that the statutory factors do not include “whether the public ‘would be inclined to use the access point’” conflicts directly with the statutory obligation to consider “the demand for public access” before requiring it.  N.J.S.A. 13:1D-153(a).  This underscores just how unreasonably [...] is applying the Public Access Law to [...]’s permit application, and why the Legislature’s express rulemaking mandate must be honored by [...] before the agency begins to enforce the Public Access Law.
[directive] Rule 3:26-1 (indictable offenses) and Rule 7:4-1 (non-indictable offenses) delineate factors to be considered when setting bail and provide for the option of R.O.R. bail where appropriate.  Bail Ranges for attempts or conspiracies should generally be the same as the actual substantive crime.  Statute Charge Description  Degree Bail Range 10%  Cash Bail Option  Disorderly Persons  $500 to $1,000 10% permissible a.  Actor enters or surreptitiously remains in any structure or separately secured or occupied Unlicensed Entry portion thereof; disorderly persons offense. of Structures; 2C:18-3(a)(b)
[brief] \(^5\)  The fact that [...] was not charged a premium (Zb39,51) is likewise immaterial; all continuation cases implicate coverage extensions for which no premium has been paid.  The insurer’s remedy is to assert a claim for that premium:  “The fact that no premium was paid is no impediment to this ruling; it can be billed. ”  *Miney v. Baum*, 170 N.J.Super. 282, 291(Law.Div.1979); *Harr v. Allstate Ins. Co.*, 54 N.J. 287, 307 (1969).  [...] has not asserted an alternative claim for unpaid premium, and has waived such relief.
[brief] THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO INSTRUCT ON THE REQUESTED RELATED OFFENSE OF AGGRAVATED ASSAULT.  (7T 106-7 to 107-6)  As our courts have repeatedly held, “[a]ppropriate and proper jury instructions are essential to a fair trial. ”  State v. McKinney, 223 N.J. 475, 495 (2015).  In certain cases, appropriate jury instructions include instructing the jury on related offenses when requested by defense counsel.  State v. Alexander, 233 N.J. 132, 144-45 (2018); State v. Maloney, 216 N.J. 91, 108 (2013); State v. Thomas, 187 N.J. 119, 123 (2006).  [...]’s case is just such a case — the evidence required granting the defense request to instruct on the related offenses of aggravated assault.  (7T 77-18 to 85-13)  The court’s denial of the defense request was harmful error that deprived [...] of her rights to due process and a fair trial.  U.S. Const. amend. XIV, N.J. Const. art. I, ¶¶ 1, 9, and 10.  Her convictions should be reversed.
[brief] Moreover, Appellant also lacked any “sufficient stake” in the litigation and “real adverseness with respect to the subject matter. ”  As a matter of Constitutional law, laws passed by Congress (e.g. FDCPA) are to be enforced by the executive branch.  *TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez*, 141 S. Ct. 2190, 2207 (2021).  And Congress specifically tasked two federal agencies with implementing and enforcing the FDCPA—[...] and [...].  Because Appellant suffered no actual harm due to Respondent’s supposed statutory violations, his “stake” in the case and “adverseness” is, in effect, only the interest of policing debt collectors’ compliance with the FDCPA, generally, ---
[brief] Citing to the Appellate Division decision in Caponegro v. State Operated Sch. Dist., 330 N.J. Super. 148 (App. Div. 2000), Plaintiffs grossly misstate that this case is somehow dispositive.  Not only is this case and the statute at issue therein readily distinguishable from the present matter, but implementation of a $15,000 cap on Plaintiffs’ accrued terminal leave is in no way contrary to the findings in Caponegro.  In Caponegro, the State took over the [...] pursuant to statute—not the MSRA—after a determination was made that the local school district had failed to assure a thorough and efficient system of education.  330 N.J. Super. at 151.  As a result of the takeover, and pursuant to statute, employment contracts were extinguished, and senior staff members of the [...] were removed from their positions.
[brief] Executive Orders, in effect at the time of Plaintiff’s email, establish clear public policy directed at protecting the health and safety of New Jersey citizens and mitigating the spread of Covid-19.  Relevant excerpts are as follows:  -  Covid-19 was identified as a “severe, potentially fatal respiratory illness that can result in pneumonia, acute respiratory distress syndrome, septic shock and multi-organ failure”  Executive Order No. 102, Pa419.  - “Outbreaks of the virus in the United States…are being addressed through a combination of quarantining, medical monitoring and community engagement”  Id.  - “The rapidly evolving outbreak…requires State officials to continuously monitor developments…to take necessary and appropriate actions to ensure that residents of New Jersey remain safe and secure”  Id. at Pa420.  - “If Covid-19 spread in New Jersey at a rate comparable to the rate speak in other affected areas, it will greatly strain the resources and capabilities of county and municipal governments…”
[brief] The Operating Agreement of [...] does not govern the operation of [...].  None of the actions alleged to have been taken by Appellant were alleged to have been taken on behalf of [...].  The loan agreements entered into and the tax payments alleged to have been missed all relate to [...], not [...].  [...] is governed by a separate document, namely, its Bylaws.  Nonetheless, the court, in the bulk of its pre-trial orders and in its final judgment, does not clearly separate [...] from [...] and repeatedly lumps the two together.  Often times, both Respondents and the trial court use the terms “members” (referring to members of [...]) interchangeably with “directors” (referring to members of [...]’s board of directors).  B.
[brief] Nothing requires the Governor to accept and nominate every candidate recommended by NJSFSC or requires the Senate to confirm every nominee.  Once appointed, Council members are special state officers subject to the Conflicts of Interest Law and State Ethics Code, N.J.S.A. 52:13D-13(e), and further subject to removal by the Governor for cause, N.J.S.A. 13:1D-26.  The Legislature was well within its authority to require that sportsmen comprise a significant portion of the Council given their “knowledge of and interest in the conservation of fish and game” and the Council’s statutory charge to manage the state’s wildlife for “recreational and commercial” purposes.
[brief] Specifically, contracting with private parties is essential to the efficient operation of municipal governments, state agencies, and other public entities.  Public entities routinely and frequently contract with law firms, engineering firms, accounting firms, architectural firms, sanitation companies, planning firms, construction companies, and others in order to provide residents with necessary government services.  If Plaintiff’s baseless assertion would true, it would create a chilling effect on public entities entering into such contracts and impede the proper operation of government.  Given the foregoing, it is clear the trial court, considering all competent evidence of record and affording Plaintiff all reasonable inferences, determined no dangerous condition existed.  Thus, Plaintiff is unable to vault the strict requirements of the TCA and the trial court properly dismissed Plaintiff’s Complaint with prejudice as to the Township.  Therefore, it is respectfully submitted the Appellate Division should affirm the trial court’s Order in its entirety.
[brief] Hughes Justice Complex  25 W. Market Street PO Box 006 Trenton, New Jersey 08625  RE: [...] v. [...]  DOCKET NO.: [...]  On Appeal from [...]  Docket No.: [...]  Dear Justices of the Appellate Division:  This office represents the Appellant, [...], in the above captioned matter.  Please accept this reply letter brief in lieu of a more formal brief on behalf of the Appellant, retired Trooper [...].  TABLE OF CONTENTS  REPLY  APPENDIX  TABLE OF CONTENTS..................................................ii  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS, AND RULINGS.............................iii  PROCEDURAL HISTORY..............................................................................2  STATEMENT OF FACTS............................................................................2  LEGAL ARGUMENT..................................................................................2  POINT I THE DECISION BELOW WAS ARBITRARY, CAPRICIOUS, AND UNREASONABLE, AND NOT SUPPORTED BY THE SUBSTANTIAL WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE.  (Not Raised Below)
[brief] The provision for a discovery cut-off is a fundamental part of the Rules and would only be meaningful, to counsel and the court, if the rules are enforced.  *Montiel*, at 254.  The prohibition against granting such an extension absent exceptional circumstances has been called by the Supreme Court a "mandate [which] could not be clearer..."  *Szalontai v. Yazbo's Sports Café*, 183 N.J. 386, 396 (2005).
[brief] ”  The only reference in the Court’s Statement of Reasons as to the 45-day time limitation period are two brief sentences:  “This Court does not find reason to extend the statutorily required time of 45 days, pursuant to Rule 4:69-6(a).  As such, plaintiff's claim is moot. ”  (Pa86.)  It would be difficult to imagine a more blatant violation of Rule 1:7-4.  The Trial Court failed to identify the “claim” deemed moot among the many set forth in the Verified Complaint, or to distinguish it from those that were not, and failed to articulate any factual basis or legal reasoning supporting its ruling.  The Trial Court’s Statement of Reasons included no substantive discussion of plaintiff’s non-OPMA claims.  The Trial Court dismissed plaintiffs’ timely claims brought under the LRHL and N.J.S.A. 40:49-2 without basis and without explanation, in violation of Rule 1:7-4.  POINT II
[brief] (13T 44).  Following [...]'s comments, [...] then states:  **MS. DARDEN:**  And that's why the payout is important too, particularly when we look at when it occurred.  (13T 45).  The Court responded:  **THE COURT:**  And that's where I think [...], you can short circuit this whole mess by getting from your client the delineation of what those two checks paid -- what was the amount of each check for each of those two policies.  Not the one to [...], the other two that were to [...]; the 350 and the 250.  (13T 45).  At this point in time, the Court, [...], and [...] were still under the impression that the policy amounts were valued at $250,000 for the 611-policy and $350,000 for the 538-policy.
[brief] Reichert v. Vegholm, 366 N.J. 209, 213-14, (App. Div. 2004); O’Brien (Newark) Congregation, Inc. v. Automatic Sprinkler Corp. of America, 361 N.J. Super. 274, 825 A.2d 524.  It is the Plaintiff who bears the burden of proof in separating out damages caused by a particular Defendant’s accident from any prior injuries or conditions.  e.g. Blanks v. Murphy, 268 N.J. Super. 152, 162, 632 A.2d 1264 (App. Div. 1993).  A Plaintiff bears the burden of coming forward with sufficient and specific evidence “for a jury to reasonably apportion responsibility for the injuries” claimed in the action.
[directive] The contents of an internal investigation case file, including the original complaint, shall be retained in the internal affairs function and clearly marked as confidential.  The information and records of an internal investigation shall only be released or shared under the following limited circumstances:  (a)  If administrative charges have been brought against an officer and a hearing will be held, a copy of all discoverable materials shall be provided to the officer and the hearing officer before the hearing; (b)  If the subject officer, agency or governing jurisdiction has been named as a defendant in a lawsuit arising out of the specific incident covered by an internal investigation, a copy of the internal investigative reports may be released to the attorney representing the subject officer, agency or jurisdiction; (c)  Upon the request or at the direction of the County Prosecutor or Attorney General; or (d)  Upon a court order.
[brief] [...] Received a Fair Return on Its Investment  To prevent confiscatory takings, the Rent Leveling Board may grant a hardship increase if a landlord shows that it cannot meet expenses and/or is not receiving a fair rate of return on its “investment. ”  Thus, a threshold question is “what was the investment. ”  Here, it is undisputed that [...]’s investment was in an entire apartment building, which it purchased for $525,000 in 1993, not this condominium unit.
[brief] **State v. Fuentes**, 217 N.J. 57 (2014) .......................................................................38  **State v. Locane**, 454 N.J. Super. 98 (App. Div. 2018) ........................................ 37, 38  **State v. Thomas**, 470 N.J. Super. 167 (App. Div. 2022) ........................................ 40, 42  **State v. Zuber**, 227 N.J. 422 (2017) ................................................................. 4, 23, 28, 32, 34, 35, 36  Statutes N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a) ...........................................................................................................  1, 2, 21 N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1 ..................................................................................................................  2 N.J.S.A. 2C:17-3a(1) .......................................................................................................  2 N.J.S.A. 2C:18-2 ..................................................................................................................  1 N.J.S.A. 2C:28-4(a) ..........................................................................................................  2 N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(a) ..........................................................................................................  2 N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(d) ..........................................................................................................  2 N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(d) ..........................................................................................................  2 N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1 ................................................................................................................ 12, 18, 21, 24, 36, 37, 38, 39  N.J.S.A.2C:29-3(b) .........................................................................................................  2 Constitutional Provisions Article I, Paragraph 12 .....................................................................................................  21  PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[brief] “[A]lthough defendants do not have a legal right to reside at the Boonton Property, the Court will deny plaintiff’s motion for ejectment since a contrary result may defeat the Doctrine of Probable Intent. ”  (Da25).  The Defendants offer two specific contentions with to support their claim that the trial court did not properly interpret the Trust: (a) that the trial court did not properly interpret the term “fair market value” as used in the Trust, and that (b) the Court “disregarded” the property purchase provisions of the Trust.  (Db29-30).  A.
[brief] Ibid.  Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has “recognized the fundamental rights of parents to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their children. ”  Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66 (2000) (internal citations omitted).  Moreover, it is well-settled that “in addition to the specific freedoms protected by the Bill of Rights, the ‘liberty’ specially protected by the Due Process Clause includes the right…to direct the education and upbringing of one’s children. ”  Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997) (citing Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925)).  Additionally, “the custody, care, and nurture of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary function and freedom include preparation for obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder. ”  *Prince v. Massachusetts*, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (citing *Pierce*, *supra*).  Importantly, the plain language of the NJLAD itself states that “the right of a natural parent or one in loco parentis to direct the education and upbringing of a child under his control is hereby affirmed. ”  *N.J.S.A.* 10:5-5(l).  The Board maintains that the proposed policy is in fact not violative of the NJLAD at all -- an issue upon which the parties clearly disagree.
[brief] The August 16, 2019 Incident**  *(OAL INITIAL DECISION AT PAGES 25-29; Pa25-29a).*  For the incident on August 16, 2019, [...] was charged with *N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.3(a)(1)* “incompetency, inefficiency or failure to perform duties,” *N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.3(a)(7)* “neglect of duty,” *N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.3(a)(12)* “other sufficient causes,” Human Resources Bulletin (“HRB”) HRB 84-17, Section B2 “neglect of duty, loafing, idleness or willful failure to devote ¹¹[...] had a *Loudermill* hearing on October 3, 2019.  At that time, [...] was suspended without pay.  [...] made a Post Hearing Motion for a Stay, pursuant to *N.J.A.C. 4A:2-1.2(c)(1) through (4).*  [...] refused to consider [...]’s Post Hearing Motion for a Stay.  The merits of the underlying PNDA were not heard.  The State presented the testimony of [...].  It should be noted that [...] and Major Valentin were both arrested and charged with official misconduct, conspiracy and tampering with public records or information.  *(Pa68a-108a).*  attention to tasks which could result in danger to persons or property,” HRB 84-17, Section B4 “sleeping while on duty (essential),” HRB 84-17, Section C8 “falsification: Intentional misstatement of material fact in connection with work, employment application, attendance, or in any record, report, investigation, or other proceeding,” HRB 84-17, Section C11 “conduct unbecoming of an employee,” HRB 84-17, Section D1 “negligence in performing duty resulting in injury to persons or damage to property,” HRB 84-17, Section D2 “negligently contributing to an elopement or escape,” HRB 84-17, Section D7 “Violation of administrative procedures and/or regulations involving safety and security,” and HRB 84-17, Section E1 “violation of a rule, regulation, policy, procedure, order, or administrative decision”.
[directive] Any person hereinafter detailed to or employed by the [...] who would have been required to undergo the foregoing training had he/she been so detailed or employed on the effective date of this Directive shall undergo the training described in this section within 5 days of being detailed to or employed by the [...].  Such training shall be made available to other law enforcement officers to the extent it is not included in the racially-influenced policing training described in Attorney General Law Enforcement Directive 2005-1.  2.
[brief] The insurer's obligation is non-delegable.  Barbara Corp. v. Bob Maneely Ins. Agency, 197 N.J. Super. 339, 346 (App. Div. 1984) ("the notice obligation [rests] on the insurer, not the broker or agent").  The Law Division ignored these vibrant and venerable interconnected legal precepts in favor of an improperly applied hyper-literal construction of certain regulations cited by the plaintiffs.
[brief] A short while later, when [...] was cleaning the downstairs bar beer lines, the same man walked by [...] and said to [...] that he did not think they cleaned the beer lines at [...].  (8T 15-7 to 24)  [...] got a better look at the man’s face and noticed his beard was red.  (8T 9-25 to 10-9; 15-1 to 16-7)  [...] believed this man was a person he had seen twice at [...] Tavern when the person was just getting off his shift—a person with red hair and a chest tattoo—but [...] did not know the person’s name.  (8T 10-17 to 12-4)  At 4:30 a.m., Chef [...] arrived at [...] Tavern.