ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] [...] argues that the trial court erred by failing to properly consider the fee factors enumerated under R.P.C. 1.5(a).  [...]’s argument lacks merit.  The trial court properly considered the matter before it, including the factors enumerated under R.P.C. 1.5(a).  The trial court reviewed the time records submitted by [...] in juxtaposition with the procedural history of the case.  The court's review of those records revealed the unreasonable and duplicative nature of the time spent on the file.  As such, the trial court reduced the fee award accordingly.  Moreover, R. 1:4-8 imposes a temporal limitation on any fee award, and a reasonable award may only be awarded from the point when it becomes clear that the action is frivolous.  Thus, the trial court was not permitted to award fees dating back to the date of the frivolous litigation letter, since at that point in time, only limited discovery had been exchanged, and Plaintiffs had been given the trial court's blessing to proceed.  With respect to [...]'s opposition, [...] consistently misrepresents the facts in the matter and calls the Appellate Division's attention to irrelevant facts in a concerted effort to shift focus away from the actual issues in this appeal.  Simply put, the issue is whether or not there has been a taking.  The Appellate Division should not be distracted by the superfluous subterfuge presented by the [...].  For these reasons and the reasons to follow, the cross-appeal of [...] should be denied, the rulings at issue raised by Plaintiffs should be reversed, and this matter should be remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.
[brief] This MOU constitutes the entire agreement among the parties hereto with respect to the subject matter hereof and supersedes all prior and contemporaneous agreements, understandings, negotiations and discussions, both written and oral, among such parties with respect to such subject matter.  ...  The parties to this MOU further agree that even though they envision that they will enter into more formal documentation, this MOU shall be binding on each of them and is not merely an expression of the parties’ interest in pursuing a transaction.
[brief] POINT V  LIABILITY WAS IMPROPERLY IMPOSED AGAINST LEREGAZZI BECAUSE LEREGAZZI DID NOT EXECUTE ANY WRITTEN GUARANTEE (Da1-69; Da84-98)  A.  Liability Was Improperly Imposed Against [...] In Violation Of The Statute Of Frauds (Da1-69; Da84-98)  The trial court’s Judgment imposed liability against [...] and [...], jointly and severally.  The Court found that [...] and [...] entered into a new Third Loan and that [...] would guarantee the new Third Loan.
[brief] In her Notice of Appeal and Civil Case Information Statement, Plaintiff noted that she only appeals from the Trial Court’s January 5, 2024 Order, granting summary judgment to Defendants.  Plaintiff, however, now contends that the Trial Court’s December 16, 2022 Order (the “December Order”) denying her motion to compel Defendants to continue Plaintiff’s deposition for a second day was error.  However, “only the orders designated in the notice of appeal … are subject to the appeal process and review. ”  W.H. Indus., Inc. v. Fundicao Balancins, Ltda, 397 N.J. Super. 455, 458 (App. Div. 2008) (citing Sikes v. Twp. of Rockaway, 269 N.J. Super., 463, 465-66 (App. Div.), aff'd o.b., 138 N.J. 41 (1994)).  Therefore, Plaintiff is not entitled to review of the December Order.  Ibid.  Furthermore, Plaintiff only requested the transcript from argument on the motion for summary judgment—not the December 16, 2022, transcript, wherein the Trial Court set forth its findings of fact and conclusions of law on the record for its December Order.  (Pa115-116).  Thus, Plaintiff has failed to provide this Court with a complete record for review.  Even if this Court ignores these fatal defects to Plaintiff's argument, it is nonsensical for her to argue that discovery was incomplete because she could not question her own client.  Counsel was always in the unique position of having unlimited access to her client and could have obtained a supplemental affidavit from her if she thought it would have helped defeat summary judgment.  The discovery period ended on March 31, 2024, after three extensions.  After Plaintiff's motion to compel the continuation of her deposition was denied, Plaintiff did not seek any further extension of discovery, nor did she appeal that December Order.  Furthermore, Plaintiff fails to specify how the continuation of her deposition would change the outcome of this case.  Badiali v. N.J. Mfrs. Ins. Grp., 220 N.J. 544, 555 (2015) (party opposing summary judgment because discovery is incomplete must "demonstrate with some degree of particularity the likelihood that further discovery will supply the missing elements of the cause of action").  Plaintiff suggests that her counsel "had a number of questions to place on the record" (Pb19), but omits what specific testimony would have been elicited and how that would have changed the outcome.  *Minoia v. Kushner*, 365 N.J. Super. 304, 307 (App. Div. 2004) ("discovery need not be undertaken or completed if it will patently not change the outcome.").  To the extent Plaintiff contends that she "was unable to testify to the discrimination that she experienced from [...]," this is a farce, and certainly not supported in the record, as this topic was fully explored at her deposition.  (Pl. Tr. 213:1-9, 227:3-9, 237:8-24, 238:6-12, 258:1-3, 279:14-24, 281:23 to 282:14).  In sum, there is no basis to conclude the Trial Court erred.  The Trial Court correctly granted Defendants' motion for summary judgment because Plaintiff's LAD claims are not viable.  It is impossible to discern how any additional questioning of Plaintiff would have altered that outcome.  **CONCLUSION**
[brief] See Exhibit 10 to Amended Complaint (Ca280).  This remained her profile photo while she was a sitting member of the Board.  See Exhibits 12 and 13 to Amended Complaint (Ca284; Ca286).  9.  On November 19, 2021, Respondent posted a picture of [...], a vigilante who shot and killed protestors during civil unrest over the police shooting of [...], celebrating his “not guilty” verdict with the words: “Thank God for true justice [string of celebratory emojis].”  (Ca290).  This post remained public well into Respondent’s term as a sitting member of the Board.  (Ca097-098) (March 17, 2022 Board Resolution formally requesting that Respondent remove “racist” Facebook post.)  10.  Respondent was sworn in as a member of the Board on January 7, 2022.
[brief] (Ra7).  [...] could not manufacture irreparable harm to himself by threatening breach his own contract.  The Practice filed its answer on December 18, 2023, which did not contain a counterclaim or third-party claim (although obviously the Practice was not waiving its right to amend).  (Ra126).  The next day, two months after it received October 17, 2023 Letter, [...] apparently gave [...] formal notice that it was rescinding its offer.\(^5\) (Ra137).  **[...] Filed His Failed Application For Reconsideration/Injunction**
[brief] ” *Id.* *Anspach* imposed a coercion requirement for recognition of parental rights (*Id.* at 262, 266) which is not articulated in the Supreme Court case law since interference with parental autonomy can take many forms short of coercion.  *See Troxel v. Granville*, 530 U.S. 57 (2000) (no discussion of coercion).  Rather, *Anspach* relied on another case which held that a public clinic’s provision of contraception to minors without parental notice was not a constitutional violation given the minors’ privacy right to contraception.  *Id.* at 262-264 citing *Doe v. Irwin*, 615 F.2d 1162, 1166 (6th Cir. 1980) citing *Roe v. Wade*, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) overruled by *Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Org.*, 597 U.S. 215 (2022).  Plaintiffs also erroneously rely on *Doe v. Del. Valley Reg’l High Sch. Bd. of Educ.*, 2024 WL 706797 (D.N.J., Feb. 21, 2024).
[brief] 1  PROCEDURAL HISTORY ....................................................................................  4 FACTS ..................................................................................................................  4  LEGAL ARGUMENT ............................................................................................  31  I.  “ALL” LEGAL MALPRACTICE CLAIMS ARE EXEMPT FROM THE ENTIRE CONTROVERSY DOCTRINE; THIS IS A LEGAL MALPRACTICE CLAIM; THE COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING SAME (APPEALING THE ORDER DATED JUNE 9, 2023 AT FOUND AT Pa1409) .........................................................  31 CONCLUSION ......................................................................................................
[brief] Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint (“A.C.”) against the Defendants on December 21, 2022.  See Pa1.  Count One of the A.C. alleges the Developer violated the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act (“CFA”) by misrepresenting its quality of title to Unit 74.  See Pa10.  Count 4 also alleges a CFA violation by the individual [...] by misrepresenting the quality of Developer’s title to Unit 74.  See Pa14.  Similarly, Count Three alleges a breach of contract against the Developer.  See Pa13.  Count Two alleges a separate CFA violation against the Developer for leasing Unit 74 from 1983 to 2016 while knowing it did not possess marketable title.  See Pa12-13.  Count Five alleges a breach of fiduciary duty claim against all Defendants out of their leasing and sale of Unit 74 to the Association.
[brief] (8T 4-10 to 13)  The next morning, the jury returned a verdict on 17 of the 20 counts.  The defendant asserts that he was prejudiced by [...] failing to object and being in agreement with the ten day adjournment in the mist of jury deliberations, in which denied him the afforded remedy of review by the trial and appellate court, and violating his rights to a fair trial and due process.  Given the circumstances, and pursuant to R. 1:8-6, which governs the sequestration of juries, a judge is permitted to disperse a jury during deliberations.
[brief] Consequently, the only reason why an email address might be withheld or redacted is a person’s reasonable expectation of privacy.  N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1; Burnett v. Cnty. of Bergen, 198 N.J. 408, 423 (2009) (stating that OPRA allows for the protection “against disclosure of personal information which would run contrary to reasonable privacy interests. ”).  To determine whether a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy in any public record, the Court must engage in a two-step process.  First, “a custodian must present a colorable claim that public access to the records requested would invade a person’s objectively reasonable expectation of privacy. ”  Brennan v. Bergen Cnty. Prosecutor’s Off., 233 N.J. 330, 342 (2018).  If not, the inquiry ends, and the record is public.  Ibid. (holding that if a custodian cannot make a “threshold showing” of a “colorable claim” of privacy, “there is no need to resort to the Doe factors. ”).  If a custodian has presented a “colorable claim” of privacy, then the Court proceeds to the second step, which is an analysis of the factors set forth in Doe v. Poritz, 142 N.J. 1 (1995).  Ibid.  Here, the Trial Court held that a reasonable person had a colorable claim of privacy in their email address.  (Da109).  Because Plaintiffs have not cross-appealed that holding, we will proceed to a discussion of the privacy balancing test.  When courts have analyzed privacy, they have been reluctant to impose categorical exemptions to OPRA in the absence of legislative action.
[brief] 5  STATUTES CITED N.J.S.A. 43:16A-7(1).  ...........................................  6  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS  October 8, 2019  Initial [...], [...] Letter to [...] ................ ............. Aa4 -Aa6 August 15, 2022  Initial Decision of Honorable [...], ALJ ............... ............  Aa9 -Aa22 September 16, 2022
[brief] If the trial court lacked jurisdiction, it would not (and could not) have: (i) permitted the parties to actively litigate the matter for over one year, (ii) ordered the parties to engage in discovery – including depositions and document productions, and/or (iii) adjudicated various substantive motions to dismiss and for summary judgment.  Instead, the trial court would have dismissed the action at the outset for lack of jurisdiction.  It took no such action.
[brief] To be clear, even assuming, arguendo, Plaintiffs could demonstrate that [...] and [...] consummated a transaction (which of course Plaintiffs cannot), such a transaction would not amount to [...] having engaged in “intentional interference without justification” of Plaintiffs’ alleged “de facto” partnership with [...].  Indeed, Plaintiffs’ Complaint did not allege that [...], while engaged in preliminary discussions with [...], was even aware of Plaintiffs’ alleged “de facto” partnership with [...] (because it was not).  (Pa50a-Pa78a).  It is axiomatic that a party cannot “intentionally interfere” with a relationship of which it is not even aware.  See Major League Baseball Promotion Corp. v. Colour-Tex, Inc., 729 F. Supp. 1035, 1051 (D.N.J. 1990) (“It is a simple proposition that a person cannot intentionally interfere with a contract [or relationship] that he knows nothing about. ”).  Nor did Plaintiffs allege how [...]’s “purchase” (or [...]’ alleged plan to sell to [...]) caused Plaintiffs harm or damages for which [...] could be liable.  The simple reality is that Plaintiffs’ claims should not have survived [...]’s motion to dismiss, let alone its motion for summary judgment.
[brief] “The [Affidavit of Merit] Statute was not intended to reward defendants who wait for a default before requesting that the plaintiff turn over the affidavit of merit. ”  Ferreira, supra 178 N.J. at 154.  Mandatory dismissal of a plaintiff’s complaint “thwarts the stated aim of allowing meritorious cases to go forward[,] [t]hat was never the intention of the Legislature when it enacted the Affidavit of Merit statute. ”  Ferreira, supra 178 N.J. at 157 ([...], concurring and dissenting).
[brief] Since [...] is within the Highlands Preservation Area, it was required to submit an application for a WQMP consistency determination to [...] and provide “all relevant information identified pursuant to N.J.A.C. 7:8-9.2” as part of its HAD application.  N.J.A.C. 7:15-3.2(g).  Curiously, Appellants point to the items set forth in N.J.A.C. 7:8-9.2(b)4 as the information relevant to [...]’s WQMP consistency determination, but that section of the Highlands Rules clearly sets forth the information needed for [...] to determine whether a proposed project is a major Highlands development regulated under the Highlands Act.  See N.J.A.C. 7:8-9.2(b).
[brief] Rather, for criminal liability to attach, it requires that the person be *knowingly* present at a cockfight. ” (Emphasis in original).  (Pa 9-10).  \(^{11}\)  In keeping with Rule 1:36-3, a copy of this unpublished opinion is included in the State’s appendix.  The Florida Court of Appeal likewise dismissed a challenge that Fla. Stat. § 828.122(3)(h) was “overbroad because it might punish innocent bystanders who happen upon two animals fighting, e.g., a person who observes two dogs fighting in the street or a zoo patron who witnesses animals fighting.
[brief] As noted above, the flood hazard area is any land, and the space above that land, lying below the flood hazard area design flood elevation.  N.J.A.C. 7:13-1.2.  The flood hazard area design flood elevation means the peak water surface elevation that will occur during a one-hundred-year flood\(^5\) plus an additional amount of water to account for future increases in flows due to development and other factors.
[brief] During the liability phase of this case, [...] sought to recover nearly $19 million from [...], [...], and [...].  The trial court, after the Liability Trial, held that only two-thirds of that amount was even potentially recoverable, because the court found that the “owned property exclusion” and the “nuclear exclusion” barred coverage for a significant portion of [...]’s claim.  (Pa0105; Pa0113-Pa0115.)  Also during the Liability Trial, [...] failed to prove that “property damage” had taken place during the [...] policy period for a majority of the AOCs at issue.  (Pa0123; Pa0125-Pa0126; Pa0129-Pa0130.)  Thus, [...] lost – *it was unsuccessful* - as to $6 million of its claim.  The allocation phase came next, and as discussed above, the culmination of that phase was the trial court granting [...]’s motion for reconsideration and rejecting all of [...]’s arguments on the issues of allocation.
[directive] The areas include:  i.  Building trust and operational relationship by, for example, designating points of contact, conducting cross-training, introductions to policing and risks, and debriefs.  ii.  Key elements of non-interference by both law enforcement and CBVI in each other’s work.  iii.  How coordination around a high-risk person—identification, referrals, contact—can happen.  iv.  How notifications might be coordinated and clarification of roles, including when there is a shooting incident or when Relevant Law Enforcement Agencies observe an area of concern (elevated risk of violence).  v.  How coordination can happen at a crime scene that recognizes that law enforcement’s work at the crime scene must take precedence and that time is of essence.  vi.  Roles and responsibilities around school-based work by Qualified CBVI Organizations.  vii.  How coordination can happen around community walks, peace walks, and/or vigils.  viii.  Guidance around coordination and interaction when Relevant Law Enforcement Agencies encounter workers from Qualified CBVI Organizations doing street outreach.  6  ix.  Guidance on referrals by Relevant Law Enforcement Agencies to Qualified CBVI Organizations for at-risk persons, victims, and/or witnesses in need of support.  B.
[brief] [...] and [...] (h/w), Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. [...] d/b/a [...]; [...]; ABC COMPANIES 1-10 (fictitious designations); and JOHN DOES 1-10 (fictitious designations), Defendant-Respondents.  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY  APPELLATE  DIVISION  Docket No. [...]  CIVIL ACTION  On Appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey  Bergen County Law Division  Docket No. [...]  Sat Below: Hon. [...], J.S.C.  BRIEF OF PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS, [...] AND [...]
[brief] Clearly, if the soil contamination was not going to be “under control” until at least the summer of 2024, Plaintiff was in no position to comply with the obligation in the ACO to complete remediation of the soils by March 31, 2024.  Although Plaintiff asserts that it was in compliance with the ACO as of October 5, 2023, the date of the Complaint, evidence established that Plaintiff would be out of compliance with the ACO by March 31, 2024.  No updated certification from Plaintiff was ever filed after March 31, 2024, and before the June 28, 2024 trial to prove that Plaintiff was still in compliance with the ACO.  Presumably, this is because any such certification would be untrue.  Evidence on the record fully supports the [...]’s conclusion that Plaintiff has failed to timely remediate the Property.  Thus, the Trial Court erred in concluding that Plaintiff was timely remediating the Property and that it was in compliance with the ACO.  Because the Trial Court’s decision was predicated upon factual findings that were against the weight of the evidence, the Trial Court’s decision must be overturned.  **CONCLUSION**
[directive] Participant Instructions: Doctors, Medicine and Drug Court DATE: January 3, 2020  This directive promulgates the revised State of New Jersey Adult Drug Court Program form, as approved by the Judicial Participant Instructions: Doctors, Medicine, and Drug Court Council.  The form provides direction to participants of the Adult Drug Court Program regarding prescription and non-prescription medication.  Common prescription and over the counter (OTC) medicines to avoid are listed including analgesics, benzodiazepines, stimulants, and medical marijuana.  Participants are also directed not to take other people's medication, what to do if there is doubt about taking a medication, and emergency instructions.  Participants are required to sign and acknowledge receipt of this form.  Questions regarding this policy may be directed to [...], Statewide Drug Court Manager via email at [...] or by telephone at [...].
[brief] ”).  [...] contends that she reasonably and objectively believed that [...] violated N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4.\(^4\) (See Pb18).  On this point, our Supreme Court has noted that “it is critical to identify the evidence that an aggrieved employee believes will support the CEPA recovery with care and precision. ”  Chiofalo v. State, 238 N.J. 527, 544 (2019) (quoting Battaglia, 214 N.J. at 559).  However, in support of her argument, [...] can point only to her own self-serving deposition testimony.  (See Pb19-20).  [...]’s testimony cannot support her argument that she reasonably and objectively believed that [...]’s conduct amounted to criminal harassment.
[brief] *State v. Pickett*, 466 N.J. Super. 270, 316 (App. Div. 2021).  [...] also emphasized that the value of prior decisions admitting scientific testimony are only as good as the basis for those decisions; “a laundry list of admissibility rulings” that do not actually consider the underlying science is not a basis for admitting a scientific technique.  *Ibid.*  The trial court did not consider whether any of these other rulings considered the underlying science and failed to consider the underlying science presented by the defense.
[brief] Insurers, thus, had a decision to make in 1998 – retain the right to sue fraudulent healthcare providers in Superior Court under the NJIFPA and/or NJ RICO laws or opt-in to the arbitration system by implementing mandatory arbitration through their Decision Point Review (“DPR”) programs and assignment of benefits (“AOB”) forms.  Under the DPR and AOB contracts, healthcare providers agree to step into the shoes of their patients under their auto insurance policies and become bound to the option to participate in the No Fault arbitration process.  [...] is one of those carriers that opted-in shortly thereafter.  Despite the express language of the AICRA statute mandating arbitration of coverage disputes, including fraud, and the strong public policy in favor of arbitration, No-Fault insurance companies such as [...] developed a cottage industry suing healthcare providers for alleged fraud and racketeering in state and federal courts under the NJRICO Act and NJIFPA.  The impetus for these suits is to force doctors to waive all outstanding claims; pay money back to the carrier; and to agree on forward looking billing restrictions such as an agreement to cap all physical medicine visits at a limited number of visits or not to perform certain procedures and bill the carrier for them.  This practice has developed despite the statutory language mandating that coverage disputes such as these belong in arbitration to be decided by arbitrators who are the penultimate experts in this area.  Arbitrators issue decisions on coverage and alleged fraud on a daily basis and are instrumental in removing such claims from the Superior Courts of the State.  Such cases burden the judicial system for many years and waste judicial resources despite having a separate arbitration forum specifically designed to address such matters.