ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] N.J.S.A. 4:19-23, Locurto, supra.  The State must prove that there was no provocation and that [...] poses a serious threat to people and/or other domestic animals.  A.  The State did not prove by clear and convincing evidence that [...] poses a serious threat of serious bodily injury or death to human or a serious threat of death to another domestic animal.  (Da7-8; 5T8:15-5T10:15).  1.  There was no evidence that [...] poses a serious threat to persons or animals.  When a dog injures a person, the State must prove by clear and convincing evidence not only that the attack was unprovoked, but also that the dog poses a “serious threat of death or serious bodily injury to a human. ”  N.J.S.A. 4:19-23.a.(1), (emphasis added).  When a dog kills a domestic animal, the State must prove by clear and convincing evidence either that the dog: (a) poses a serious threat of serious bodily injury or death to a person, or (b) poses a serious threat of death to another domestic animal.
[brief] ARGUMENT  THE TRIAL COURT’S ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY  JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF RESPONDENTS SHOULD BE AFFIRMED BECAUSE THE SCHOOL FUNDING REFORM ACT, AS AMENDED, IS NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS APPLIED TO THE [...].  As the court below concluded, the State was not required to provide additional aid to subsidize [...]’s funding obligations when it short-changed its local contribution.  [...]’s relative income and property wealth have skyrocketed, and [...] cannot deny that the City’s obligation to contribute increased proportionate to its economic growth; it did not satisfy that obligation.  The issues before the trial court were legal in nature and appropriately decided on summary judgment.  Applying the standards promulgated by the Supreme Court, the trial court properly dismissed appellants’ claims as a matter of law.
[brief] The summons issued were as follows: - [...] for violation of East Hanover Ordinance §173-24; - [...] for violation of East Hanover Ordinance §173-27; - [...] for violation of East Hanover Ordinance §201-2; - [...] for violation of East Hanover Ordinance §201-2, - [...] for violation of East Hanover Ordinance §201-2; and - [...] for violation of East Hanover Ordinance §201-2.  (Da. 13a – Da. 18a).
[brief] Pa003.  A few years prior, [...] had undergone heart surgery followed by admission to a rehabilitation facility where he was in a medically induced coma for about a month.  Pa136.  His health issues left him incoherent, disoriented and childlike.  Pa136.  He thereafter resided with [...], sometimes spending weekends with [...].  Pa136.  [...] and [...] believed their father’s Will was kept in a safe in [...]’s home; however, for nearly two months after [...]’s death, no Will was probated.  Pa002.  Accordingly, [...] consulted with an attorney who prepared a caveat and on or about August 7, 2017, [...] went to the Bergen County Surrogate to file the caveat.  Pa002.  The Surrogate informed [...] that earlier that same day, a Will had been submitted for probate by [...] and letters testamentary were issued to [...].  Pa002.  It was then that [...] learned of the 2014 Will for the first time.  Pa002.  [...] and [...] believe [...] exerted undue influence on their incapacitated father resulting in [...] unwittingly changing his Will and making inter vivos gifts to [...] such as, paying off [...]’s mortgage.
[brief] ”  *CBS Outdoor, Inc. v. Borough of Lebanon Planning Bd./Bd. of Adjustment*, 414 N.J. Super. 563, 578 (App. Div. 2010).  On the other hand, a land use board's interpretation of law is reviewed de novo.  *Dunbar Homes*, 233 N.J. at 559 (emphasis added).  Naturally, “[a]s with other legislative provisions, the meaning of an ordinance's language is a question of law that we review de novo. ”  *Bubis v. Kassin*, 184 N.J. 612, 627 (2005) [emphasis added].  Even so, a municipality's informal interpretation of an ordinance is entitled to deference.  *See id.*  Though the deference is not limitless, the board's interpretation will necessarily inform the court's de novo review because “the Planning Board has input into the adoption of a master plan, N.J.S.A. 40:55D-28, as well as the adoption or amendment of a zoning ordinance, N.J.S.A. 40:55D-64” and “can be expected to have more than a passing knowledge of the legislative intent at the time of the enactment. ”  *Atlantic Container, Inc. v. Twp. of Eagleswood Planning Bd.*, 321 N.J. Super. 261, 269 (App. Div. 1999).  Further, like here, the local boards apply these definitions on a regular basis.  Here, the trial court properly applied a two part analysis under each standard.
[brief] Da188 ¶33.  The original PSA lacked disclosure of [...]’s ROFR, as well as the requirement that [...]’s consent was required to before the MFSA could be assigned to [...].  [...] was not aware that a ROFR existed until several months after it executed the PSA.  Da249, Da262 ¶46.  [...]’s failure to disclose the existence of [...]’s ROFR violated the “full disclosure” provision of the PSA, which required [...] to disclose all material facts relating to the ownership, operation and maintenance of the Premises and that the statements in the PSA did not contain any untrue statement or omitted a material fact.
[brief] IN THE EVENT THAT THIS COURT DISAGREES WITH THE TRIAL COURT’S DECISION ON ITS SUMMARY  JUDGMENT MOTION ON LIABILITY, IT SHOULD AFFIRM THE SUMMARY  JUDGMENT ORDER OF JUNE 25, 2021  BASED UPON PLAINTIFFS’ FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.  PLAINTIFF WAS NOT ENTITLED TO THE BENEFIT OF THE “DISCOVERY RULE” OR THE “RELATION BACK” DOCTRINE UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE.
[directive] If the defendant is an individual, a summons rather than an arrest warrant shall be issued unless the judge or duly authorized municipal court administrator or deputy Rule 7:2-2(b) municipal court administrator finds that the defendant has failed to respond to a summons; or there is reason to believe that the defendant is dangerous to himself Determination of Whether or herself, to others or to property; or there is one or more outstanding arrest warrants for the defendant; or the address of the defendant is not known and an to Issue a Summons or Warrant.  arrest warrant is necessary to subject the defendant to the jurisdiction of the court; or there is reason to believe that the defendant will not appear in response to a summons.  Rule 7:4-1
[directive] his  Every officer or employee, by virtue of office or position, or of any law, entrusted or charged with the receipt, custody or expenditure of money or funds of the local unit, and any other officer or employee required so to do by the governing body thereof, shall, before entering upon the duties of his his office or position, execute and deliver bond, or shall be otherwise bonded to the local unit in its corporate name, conditioned for the true and faithful performance of his duties.  All bonds shall be in sum such form, for such and with such surety as the governing body of the local unit shall, by resolution, direct.  The governing body may, in any instance, require corporate surety.  All such bonds, in of the case of a county, shall be filed with the clerk of the board chosen freeholders, except that the bond of the clerk, if there be any, shall be filed with the county treasurer.  In the case of municipalities, all of bonds shall be filed with the municipal clerk, except the bond the clerk, which shall be filed with the of treasurer.  The bonds shall be preserved for and be the property the local unit.  L.1960,~. 169,s. 1,eff. Jan. 1, 1962.
[brief] *Motorworld, Inc. v. Benkendorf*  228 N.J. 311, 329 (N.J. 2017)  Respondent signed an affidavit which directly challenged the credibility of the Appellants’ position.  [37a]  The Respondent was deposed on this issue and testified at the hearing.  [212a 1T P47-78]  She explained in her certification, deposition, and court testimony the agreement the Appellants presented in their initial motion was total fraud.  She also denied signing the second agreement presented to the Court by the Appellants.  [37a, 212a, 271a-276a]  [1T P47-78]  Her testimony has always been consistent.  The signature page the Appellants twice attached to two different agreements came from her original agreement which has never been produced.  [37a, 212a, 271a-276a, 1T P55-58]  The Appellants never provided clear and credible evidence there was an enforceable agreement between the parties.  The New Jersey Supreme Court stated, "In our view, a valid waiver results only from an explicit, affirmative agreement that unmistakably reflects the employee's assent."  *Leodori v. Cigna Corp.*, 175 N.J. 293, (2003).
[brief] Olivieri v. Y.M.F. Carpet, Inc., 186 N.J. 511, 526 (2006).  However, “even where these requirements are met, the doctrine, which has its roots in equity, will not be applied when it is unfair to do so. ”  Id. at 521.  Indeed, “Fundamental to the theory of collateral estoppel is the notion that the earlier decision is reliable, an underlying confidence the result was substantially correct.  The premise is that properly retried, the outcome would be the same. ”  Kortenhaus v. Eli Lily & Co., 228 N.J. Super. 162, 166 (App. Div. 1988) (citing Restatement (Second) of Judgments 29 comment f (1982)).  With respect to plaintiff’s lack of standing, as argued earlier, case law has changed.
[brief] A holding to the contrary would allow a claimant to proceed against a common carrier any time she falls on a bus, train, or light rail—tantamount to imposing strict liability against all common carriers.  New Jersey law rejects such a tenuous legal principle because common carriers, although held to a heightened duty of care, cannot be held to ensure the unconditional safety of their patrons.  Therefore, the trial court properly entered an order summarily dismissing [...]’s Complaint against [...], and that decision should be affirmed.
[brief] The Allocation Trial and [...]’s Allocation Theory | 14 | | 3.  The Special Allocation Master’s Report & Recommendation | 17 | | 4.  Allocation Proceedings After the R&R | 21 | | 5.  The Fee And Interest Phase Of This Case | 23 | | ARGUMENT - RESPONDENT | 30 | | I.  STANDARD OF REVIEW | 30 | | A.  The Trial Court’s July 30, 2020 Opinion is Entitled to Deference | 30 | | B.  [...]’s Assertion that the R&R is Entitled to Deference is Without Basis | 31 | II.  THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY GRANTED [...]’s MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION TO HOLD THAT BINDING MASSACHUSETTS PRECEDENT REQUIRES PRO-RATA, TIME ON THE RISK ALLOCATION IN THIS CASE ........................................................................................................33
[brief] In the [...] v. [...] 173 N.J. 502 (2002), also cited by the movant, was also a Builders Remedy case and one in which a Court had previously held that West Windsor “was not in compliance with the Mount Laurel Mandate and, thus, …. had violated … the New Jersey Constitution and the New Jersey Fair Housing Act. ”  Tolls Brothers vs. [...] 303 N.J. Super 418, 574 (Law Div. 1996).  In addition, based upon a review of all of the sites that West Windsor had claimed credit for, the Court found that “based on its extensive and careful evaluation of those sites, the trial court found that the maximum potential of affordable housing yield was five hundred five (505) units, one hundred eighty three (183) units short of defendants obligation of six hundred eighty eight (688) units.  Therefore, in [...] Inc., the Court was confronted with a municipality that clearly had not met its obligation to provide affordable housing, which is not the case here.
[brief] Accordingly, the court encouraged trial judges to view well-reasoned motions based on R. 4:42-2 as “an invitation to apply Cromwell’s rule: ‘I beseech you … think it possible you may be mistaken. ’”  *Ibid.*  The fact that [...] had retired did not preclude a subsequent motion to reconsider his earlier denial of the motion.  *See, e.g., Nusbaum v. Newark Morning Ledger Co.*, 86 N.J. Super. 132, 137 (App. Div.), *certif. denied*, 44 N.J. 398 (1965)(citations omitted).  Applying these principles confirms [...] did not abuse her discretion in reconsidering the November 5, 2020 order denying Defendants’ motions for summary judgment.
[brief] ”).  The circumstances detailed in Dunkley are on point to the within matter.  In Dunkley, the plaintiff, a truck driver, sued his employer for discrimination and retaliation after he claimed to have been subject to discriminatory conduct by his on-road trainer, a fellow truck driver for the employer.  The plaintiff stated that the fellow truck driver made numerous race-based comments that were directed to or in the presence of Plaintiff.  After not reporting for work, the plaintiff met with the employer’s safety coordinator, safety director, and regional safety manager to discuss his concerns.  Plaintiff recounted a list of incidents that occurred and was promptly given a new trainer.  He also had no further instances of alleged discrimination after the change in trainers.  The trial court granted summary judgment to the employer and dismissed the complaint.
[brief] The Plaintiff and Superior Court continues to deny the fact of [...] testifying on behalf of [...]’s significant other, [...]; further denying the Defendant’s multiple Motion to Compel Discovery Requests and the easily verifiable fact she is a person with disabilities under the Americans with Disability Act 1990 and ADA Amendments Act of 2008.  The trial court erred when accepting [...]’ shoddy, wavering recount and deficient testimonies of him and [...] against, [...]’s family members, the Defendant [...] and [...] [2T14-23 to -25] and [2T15-1 to -20]  However, the Plaintiff or [...] presented any information beyond reasonable doubt, with credibility and certainly that the Defendant was or was not at the location, on said date or the actual threat; they also did not present any information beyond reasonable doubt that [...] was at the location on these said dates of terroristic threats.  The Defendant requested this information by way of the subpoena with the Plaintiff electing to ignore this pertinent information to their case.  The fact of the matter is, [...] could not remember what was said or the dates without the assistance of trial Judge, feeding and repeating what [...] testified to initially over a year ago [T3-16 to -26].  [...] could not only recall what occurred, he couldn’t recall pertinent dates, omitted testimony, failed to comply with court rules by answering to the Defendant’s subpoena that would confirm his whereabouts for each of his recorded dates/times and he specifically indicated he couldn’t remember certain parts of his story\(^3\).  The Defendant immediately pursue an appeal as she informed the trial court post finding the Defendant and her alibi/witness, [...] both non-credible, biased, lack of consistency, self-serving and due to the fact they were relatives; but allowing testimony of [...], who is the relative of both the Defendant and [...] to be held credible upon the delivery of [...].  In addition, the trial court Judge dismisses the fact of [...] credibility when he expressed [...] has posed a threat with bullying tactics to [...], his significant other [...] and his children in the past [T52-24 to -26] and [T53-1 to -21].  [...] forceful, unwelcomed demeanor is very consistent; he inserts himself by giving testimony on behalf of the Defendant’s relative (when she could have done so herself), giving testimony on behalf of the Plaintiff’s violent victim, [...] (when the Plaintiff could have done so himself, called to testify and with [...] as witness to his violent behavior [AP4] and then again during trial when he forced --- \(^3\) [T30-1 to -4], [T32-1 to -4], [T34-10] his temper tantrum, began shouting and pointing his finger at the Defendant in front of her father, [...]  [...] blatantly and consistently disregarded the court, its demeanor, standards, rules while creating chaos and utilizing intimidation tactics towards the Defendant and again towards [...]
[brief] [...] acknowledged her inexperience in matters relating to managing the property, about how she inherited the property, and how and why she decided to sell the property only four (4) years after her brother passed away.  5T85-14 to 20.  She kept her late brother’s environmental experts onboard as she was required to do since the property was in default on its DEP filing obligations and more remediation needed to be done.  4T234-19 to 235-10.  Defendants’ decision was to sell the properties that had been in the family for over one hundred (100) years to an established developer and to absolve herself and her cousin of further DEP filing obligations and tenant issues.
[brief] (Pa500-501; Pa629) (summarizing the direct and cross-examination of all witnesses at the continuation of the rehearing on the evening of September 12, 2022); (Pa584-585) (confirming there was insufficient time to cross-examine [...] on the evening of August 22, 2022 and stating, “[h]old up, all right, for the record, this application is being carried to September 12th at 7:00 p.m. in these chambers . . .  We expect all witnesses to be available for the plaintiff.  Counsel you’re going to be able to cross examine [...] to start and then present any of your clients. ”).
[brief] See Lederman v. Prudential Life Ins., 385 N.J. Super. 324, 337 (App. Div. 2005), certif.  denied 188 N.J. 353 (2006); Roa v. Roa, 402 N.J. Super. 529, 537 (App. Div. 2008), certif. granted 197 N.J. 477 (2009).  Here, however, defendants have already submitted a separate summary judgment motion limited to their challenge of Counts 1 through 9 in their 263-page motion filed July 30, 2021.
[brief] (Pa97).  Prior to the beginning of the Fall 2012 semester, when the inaugural class was to begin the Pharm.D program, Plaintiff frequently visited Defendant’s website for updates related to the school’s accreditation/pre-candidate status because [...]’s School of Pharmacy had not yet received its accreditation status.  (Pa161).  Prior to the opening of the school, the [...] School of Pharmacy’s website explicitly provided, “All students who are accepted to the School of Pharmacy with a baccalaureate degree will be provided the opportunity to complete a master’s degree in conjunction with the Doctor of Pharmacy.  Students will be asked to select or opt-out of a master’s pathway at the end of their first professional year. ” (Pa435).  In addition to the February 14, 2011, iteration of the [...] School of Pharmacy’s home website page, Plaintiff witnessed at least seven (7) iterations of [...] School of Pharmacy’s home website page from dates prior to him starting the Pharm.D program in August of 2012.
[brief] Before the expiration of Appellant’s CSC Certification on March 28, 2023, ¹“CSC” refers to the Civil Service Commission’s opposition brief.  Pa5, three more captains retired: Captains [...], Pa52, [...], Pa51; and [...], Pa50.  Accordingly, there were three additional genuine vacancies prior to the expiration of Appellant’s promotional list on February 7, 2024, Pa60, and prior to the expiration of his certification on March 28, 2023.
[brief] “[F]orfeiture of \(^2\) [...] testified “[o]ur radio[] transmissions sometimes are cut off when you press the button.  The first word sometimes is not heard.  I try to make it a practice to wait and then respond. ” (1T67).  [public] office is a harsh penalty. ”  *State v. Hupka*, 407 N.J. Super. 489, 497 (App. Div. 2009) (quoting *State v. Och*, 371 N.J. Super. 274, 281 (App. Div. 2004)); see also *Loudermill*, 470 U.S. at 543 (recognizing the “severity of depriving a person” of their employment).
[brief] Multiple motions regarding the allocation of defense costs were presented to the court in 2021.  In March 2021, the court granted [...]’s allocation motion and ruled that allocation of defense costs was governed by Owens- --- 5  [...] requested a stay in late December 2018, which the trial court granted on January 25, 2019, and that stay was in effect until March 1, 2019 (1 month) Da287-88; [...] sought to bifurcate defense and indemnity proceedings and to stay the indemnity claims in June 2019, and the court granted this stay on August 9, 2019 and stayed the action for six months until February 10, 2020 (6 months)
[brief] (September 21, 2023 Tr., 76:15-15)  As established by the Business Administrator for the [...], [...] (“Long”), and the City’s CFO [...] (“Silva”), the City’s resources are limited.  Presently, the City has only three revenue sources: permit fees, municipal court fines, and real property taxes.  (September 21, 2023 Tr., 54:14-15, 90:3-18)  Regarding the municipal court, the City normally receives $5 million in revenue from fines.  (September 21, 2023 Tr., 91:12-15)  However, COVID-19 reduced that amount down to a low of $2.5 million, and post COVID-19, it has only risen to $3 million, so the City is still short $2 million from its municipal court revenues as a result of the pandemic.  (September 21, 2023 Tr., 91 16-24)  The City does not have any hotels and, therefore, does not collect any hotel room taxes like other municipalities.  The City also does not receive revenue from parking because the parking authority is an independent entity from the City.  Thus, the City has limited revenue.  The majority of the City’s revenue comes from real property taxes.  For the past decade, the City has been a “city in distress. ”  The reason for this label is that every year the City has a structural deficit and has to rely upon aid from the State to bridge this substantial shortfall.  In other words, the City does not have enough money to cover its expenses.  As a result, the City receives transitional aid from the State of New Jersey, specifically from the [...].
[brief] The recorded subdivision map (148a), “Confirmatory Deed” (161a), and the [...] (179a), all describe Lot 3 as 66.3’ wide, as does the 2017 [...] (695a).  The private [...], where the [...]’ expectations (and doubts) are expressed, could have been, but was not, recorded.  116a.  The [...] was entitled to rely upon the public record regarding the boundaries and size of the lot they were purchasing, and did so, when they relied upon the recorded subdivision map (scrutinized by the municipality and its professionals prior to recording), as well as the deeds showing Lot 3 to be 66.3’ in width.  Of course, this was also consistent with the survey they obtained as part of their purchase, which confirmed the accuracy of the aforementioned subdivision and deeds.
[brief] The Appellate Division upheld the trial court’s determination that “by including the full text of the ordinance, the notice informs the public of all of the applicable new design standards proposed. ”  *Meredith*, No. CAM-L-4946-19, at 20. (Pa314).  Similarly, in *Gentless v. [...]*, No. CAM-L-3344-17 (N.J. Sup. Ct. Law Div. June 5, 2018, aff’d, 2019 WL 2563807 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. June 21, 2019)\(^7\), [...] published a notice of an ordinance adopting a redevelopment plan.
[brief] Seeing the exchange of unknown objects without any exchange of currency does not amount to probable cause under our jurisprudence.  In *State v. Pineiro*, 181 N.J. 13, 27-29 (2004), our Supreme Court determined that there were insufficient facts to support a finding of probable cause where a police officer stopped and searched the defendant – a suspected drug dealer – after observing him take a cigarette pack from a known felon in a high-crime area.
[brief] [...] also challenges the FHACA permit issuance because [...] contends the Property is threatened and endangered species habitat.  DEP conducts threatened and endangered species assessments as part of the FHACA Individual permitting process.  N.J.A.C. 7:13-11. 6(d).  If a project is likely to disturb threatened and endangered species habitat, DEP requires a permit applicant to conduct a survey or habitat assessment.  N.J.A.C. 7:13-11.6(e).  Using standard agency practice when applying its regulations, DEP determined that the wetlands located on the Property were not habitat for threatened or endangered species but rather were of ordinary and intermediate resource value.