[brief] ”  State v. Torres, 246 N.J. 246, 273 (2021).  This calibration “does not call for speculation or divination about defendant’s future behavior,” but “the court sentences the defendant ‘as the defendant appears before the court on the occasion of sentencing. ’”  Ibid. (internal citations removed).  Essentially, since “the goal is to provide the sentencing judge with the ‘composite picture of the whole man,’” State v. Randolph, 210 N.J. 330, 346 (2012) (quoting State v. Green, 62 N.J. 547, 566 (1973)), trial courts endeavor to have “the fullest information possible concerning the defendant’s life and characteristics. ”  Ibid. (internal citations omitted).  Here, defendant heavily relies on State v. K.S., 220 N.J. 190, 199 (2015), to argue that the trial court was forbidden from considering defendant’s arrest record during sentencing.  However, defendant’s reliance on K.S. is irrelevant to the court’s analysis of aggravating and mitigating factors under N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1 because K.S. forbids the consideration of previously dismissed charges or arrests only in regard to Pretrial Intervention applications guided by completely different standards under N.J.S.A. 2C:43-12(e) and R. 3:28.  See 220 N.J. at 197-98.  Instead, in its decision, the trial court opined: “[defendant] has had continuous contact with the criminal justice system, starting with 01/23/1990, straight through.  Even after being sentenced to some pretty lengthy sentences[.] . . . as soon as he’s released, he again has contact with the criminal justice system. ” (17T31-17 to 25).  Defendant’s prior record not only supported the court’s application of aggravating factor six, but the court’s conclusion that prior arrests and convictions had not discouraged defendant from incurring additional offenses and convictions, or served as a deterrent from committing new offenses.  Regardless, even if the trial court was not permitted to consider defendant’s arrest record in its calculation, this decision was harmless because defendant’s arrest record was not determinative in the court’s overall sentencing decision.  The court did describe defendant’s entire history with the court system, but relied on his actual “extensive” criminal record and the “seriousness of the offenses for which he has been convicted,” including six municipal court convictions, seven indictable convictions, and multiple fines and contempt charges from Family Court.  (17T31-6 to 9, 32-5 to 11).  Furthermore, the trial court correctly opined that previous attempts to deter defendant’s criminal conduct also apparently failed because defendant continued to incur new convictions even after lengthy terms of incarceration, parole, and probation.  (17T27-4 to 32-10).  The State submits that defendant’s history proves an inability or unwillingness to comply with any monitoring or probationary terms or orders.  Finally, defendant’s argument that the trial court failed to properly consider defendant’s “advanced age” because “older people are much less likely to commit crimes” is without merit.  (Db48).  First, defendant himself negates this argument because he has continued to commit and be convicted for new offenses as he got older.  (PSA).  Second, the State submits that defendant’s “advanced” age and decades-long extensive contact with the court system is contrary to this argument because it is unlikely that defendant did not understand the consequences of his actions, particularly because he continued to incur increasingly violent and dangerous offenses even after being subject to terms of incarceration and probation intended to prohibit future criminal activity.  The trial court did not err in sentencing defendant because it was based on competent, credible evidence from the record and within the sentencing guidelines.  The State asks this Court to affirm.  CONCLUSION