ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] For example, defendants cite *Century Indem. Co. v. Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co.*, 398 N.J. Super. 422, 440 (App. Div. 2008) for the proposition that no deference need be given to a party’s choice of forum that is neither its place of incorporation or principal place of business.  But *Century Indemnity* is readily distinguishable, and Defendants’ reliance is misplaced.  There, the plaintiff insurance company filed in a state “with which the parties had no relevant contact. ”  *Id.* at 439.  Here, [...]’s predecessor, [...], was headquartered in New Jersey; [...]’s conduct with respect to the Special Undertaking and [...]’s manufacture of PCB-containing products took place in New Jersey; Defendants shipped millions of pounds of PCBs to [...] (and others) in New Jersey; and one of the underlying suits for which Defendants seek indemnity was brought by the [...] to redress PCB pollution in New Jersey, *N.J. Dep’t of Env’t Protection, et al. v. [...], et al.*, [...] (N.J. Super. L, Gloucester Cnty. filed Aug. 4, 2022) (the “NJ DEP Action”).
[brief] Removal.  The case was removed to federal court on December 14, 2020 and docketed as Mosley v. State of New Jersey et al., [...]. (Aa266; Da1-3).  Judge Quraishi’s Ruling.  By Opinion (Aa47-64) and Order (Aa45-46) filed on August 31, 2023, the Honorable [...], U.S.D.J. granted the motion to dismiss filed by the [...]; granted the motion for judgment on the pleadings filed by the [...]; and granted in part and denied in part the motion to dismiss filed by the [...].
[brief] *N.J.S.A.* 40:55D-70(c)(1) is known as the "(c)(1) hardship variance" and *N.J.S.A.* 40:55D-70(c)(2) is known as the "flexible (c)(2) variance."  In *Kaufmann v. Planning Bd. for Warren*, 110 N.J. 551, 563-66 (1988), the NJ Supreme Court extensively addressed the negative criteria of the c(2) variance which requires "statutory focus on the surrounding properties."  *By definition, no c(2) variance should be granted when merely the purposes of the owner will be advanced.  The grant of approval must actually benefit the community in that it represents a better zoning alternative for the property.  The focus of a c(2) case, then, will be not on the characteristics of the land that, in light of current zoning requirements, create a "hardship" on the owner warranting a relaxation of standards, but on the characteristics of the land that present an opportunity for improved zoning and planning that will benefit the community.*  ...  [B]y rooting the c(2) variance in the purposes of the MLUL, the Legislature has confined the discretion of boards: they cannot rewrite ordinances to suit the owner or their own idea of what municipal development regulations should be.  Rather, the board should seek, as we think this Board did, to effectuate the goals of the community as expressed through its zoning and planning ordinances.  This case, then, is but one example of the c(2) power.  The Legislature undoubtedly intended through the c(2) variance to vest a larger measure of discretion in local boards in a limited area of cases.  Courts are obliged to respect that grant of power.  This power is restrained both by its inherent limitation to the affirmative advancement of zoning purposes and by the negative criteria of N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70.
[brief] See Pa 197 - 198.  The Notice also provided the Association with the right to purchase, and the parties entered into contract negotiations.  Id.  During this time, the Association was represented by counsel at the law offices of [...]  Id.  On November 24, 2015, the Association’s prior counsel confirmed a vote of the unit owners “as per paragraph 8(e) of the Master Deed” will be conducted.  See Pa 198.  On December 23, 2015, the Association’s prior counsel confirmed that: “at a meeting of unit owners conducted on December 22, 2015, the unit owners present at the meeting approved the purchase of the unit by a margin of 81%.  Accordingly, now that the threshold vote has been conducted as per the master deed, please send a copy of your proposed contract so we can now begin the due diligence process and move forward. ”  (emphasis added).  See Pa 201.  After terms were negotiated at length between counsel, on February 1, 2016, the parties entered into a Contract of Sale for Unit 74 of Building 2 at [...], located at [...].  See Pa 202.  Following the finalization of the Contract, on April 7, 2016, the Association purchased Unit 74 from the Developer at the purchase price of $199,000.  See Pa 97-100 and Pa 206-213.  Now, over thirty-five (35) years after the Developer turned over control of the Association to the unit owners, the Association filed the within Complaint, reinterpreting paragraph 8(e) of the Master Deed, claiming that Unit 74 was theirs all along but were tricked into buying it, contrary to the irrefutable facts.
[directive] Data Collection Range Due Date (5-day grace period)  One-Time Historical 12/1/19 to 06/30/23 10/01/23  Monthly Interim 07/01/23 to 07/31/23 08/01/23 08/01/23 to 08/31/23  09/01/23 to continue until web portal to continue until web portal implementation implementation  Post-Web Portal to begin upon notice of to begin upon notice of Implementation implementation of the web portal implementation of the web portal (only report) and continue monthly and continue monthly  [...] to Permits to Purchase & Firearms Identification Cards (Approved Only)  [...] Only to Report Reporting category  Reporting Date Range  Due Date (5-day grace period)  Monthly 09/01/23 to 09/30/23 10/01/23 10/01/23 to 10/31/23 11/01/23 to continue monthly to continue monthly  IV.
[brief] [...] claims three purchase documents contradict the Plaintiffs’ trial testimony and therefore trigger the parol evidence rule: The POS; the Purchaser’s Acknowledgment (Annual or Bi-Annual) Usage forms (“PAAU or PABU”); and the Purchase and Sale Agreement (“PSA”).  [...] identified significant dispute as to whether these documents actually contradicted the Plaintiffs’ testimony.  Even if there were no dispute, the parol evidence rule still does not apply to each document for the following reasons:
[brief] See *Massachi v. AHL Servs Inc.*, 396 N.J. Super. 486 (App. Div. 2007) certif. den. 195 N.J. 419 (2008).  Ministerial acts are those “which a person performs in a given state of facts in a prescribed manner in obedience to the mandate of legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of his own judgment upon the propriety of the act being. ”  *Gonzalez v. City of Jersey City*, 247 N.J. 551, 572 (2021) (quoting *S.P. v. Newark Police Dep't*, 428 N.J. Super. 210, 231 (App. Div. 2012)).  Ministerial acts are not immunized even when they may entail operational judgments,” such as “when, where and how” to carry out a required duty.
[brief] On or about December 3, 1971, the Township and Appellant entered into “An Agreement for a Bulk Sewage Treatment Service” (the “1971 Agreement”).  [Da25-Da43].  Pursuant to the 1971 Agreement, “Township agrees to supply metered bulk sewage treatment service for [Appellant]” and “[Appellant] agrees to construct and commence operations of a system of mains for the collection of sewage within the [Appellant]” beginning on January 1, 1974.  [Da26-Da27].  The 1971 Agreement specifically provided: No industrial or commercial connection shall be made to Borough’s system unless Township has been supplied with a complete analysis of the sewage proposed to be delivered and has given its prior written approval, which will not be unreasonably withheld, so that Township can be assured that said sewage will conform with applicable standards and will not overburden the facilities.  Township may require pre-treatment before sewage is introduced into the collection system.  [Da28].  On or about July 6, 1973, the Township and Appellant entered into a subsequent “Agreement” (the “July 1973 Agreement”) permitting Appellant to connect into the Township’s system earlier than contemplated by the 1971 Agreement.
[brief] [Da12].  Defendant was ordered to pay the following fines and penalties: $100 Victims of Crime Compensation Board, $75 Safe Neighborhood Fund, and $30 Law Enforcement Officer Training penalty.  [16T34-5 to -7].  For Count Three, defendant was sentenced to 30 years in New Jersey State Prison, of which 30 years must be served before parole eligibility.  [Da12].
[directive] For example, a County Prosecutor may: specify additional circumstances when a municipal police department BWC must be activated; impose limits on the authority of a municipal police department to specify additional circumstances when a BWC must be activated; categorically prohibit the use of BWCs with enhanced audio/visual capabilities such as infrared night vision (cf. Section 7.6, which requires prosecutorial approval to use such features); and specify additional circumstances when a BWC recording will be “tagged,” etc.
[directive] Oskarżony/Defendant Data/Date Adwokat obrony/Defense Attorney Prokurator/Prosecutor Formularz udostępniony na mocy Dyrektywy # 01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 11728-Polish strona 2 z 2 Form Promulgated by Directive # 01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 11728-Polish page 2 of 2 고지: 이 양식은 공개되는 문서이므로, 요청이 있으면 제출된 상태로 대중에게 제공됩니다.
[directive] When a plea agreement is reached, its terms and the factual basis that supports the charge(s) must be fully placed on the record by the prosecutor, so that the court may review the plea agreement under the “interests of justice” standard.  See R. 7:6-2(d).  The prohibition on resolving certain marijuana and other offenses through plea agreements appears in the Guidelines located in the Appendix to Part VII of the Court Rules.  Guideline 4 currently states:  No plea agreements whatsoever will be allowed in drunken driving or certain drug offenses.  A.  Driving while under the influence of liquor or drugs (N.J.S.A. 39:4-50) and B.  Possession of marijuana or hashish (N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10a(4)), being under the influence of a controlled dangerous substance or its analog (N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10b), and use, possession or intent to use or possess drug paraphernalia, etc. (N.J.S.A. 2C:36-2).  . . . . Nothing contained in these limitations shall prohibit the judge from considering a plea agreement as to the collateral charges arising out of the same factual transaction connected with any of the above enumerated offenses in Sections A and B of this Guideline.  The judge may, for certain other offenses subject to minimum mandatory penalties, refuse to accept a plea agreement unless the prosecuting attorney represents that the possibility of conviction is so remote that the interests of justice requires the acceptance of a plea to a lesser offense.
[brief] $50,000 transferred from [...]’s bank account on October 28, 2015 to [...]’s bank account ending in #8309.  (36T 37:9-11).  - [...] was shown extracts of the [...] bank account from the company’s QuickBooks software and was able to tie the transfer of $50,000 from that account to an October 2015 bank statement for the company, which showed the funds were transferred to an account ending in 8309, which Plaintiffs established belonged to [...].  (23T 24:22 to 25:13).  **Misappropriation #8:**
[brief] Pursuant to the Ricci Act, the Board was required to provide notice to members and retirants in the system.  A website posting is not sufficient notice to retirees or active members of the retirement system.  In re State & Sch. Emples. Health Benefits Commissions' Implementation of Yucht, 233 N.J. 267, 270, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded the decision of the Appellate Division.
[brief] Against this backdrop, defendant maintains that the trial court engaged in both impermissible statutory revision and improper reliance on the Merriam-Webster’s dictionary in determining that the statutes are not void for vagueness.  (Db 7, 11).  Defendant’s arguments find no support in the trial court’s decision as amplified above.  Moreover, defendant ignores our courts’ common practice of resorting to a dictionary to find an undefined statutory term’s plain meaning.  See, e.g., Fuster v. Twp. of Chatham, ___ N.J. ___, ___ (2025) (slip op. at 21) (acknowledging the ordinary meaning of the word “only” as defined in Merriam-Webster’s New Collegiate Dictionary); State v. Higginbotham, 257 N.J. 260, 284-85 (2024) (referring to Webster’s Third New International Dictionary to define the term “otherwise” in N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4b(1)(c)); State v. Olivero, 221 N.J. 632, 643 (2015) (defining the term “adapt” in N.J.S.A. 2C:18-1 by reference to Webster’s Second New Riverside University Dictionary); State v. Tate, 220 N.J. 393, 409-11 (2015) (referencing Webster’s Third New International Dictionary to define the terms “profane”, “indecent”, and “obscene” in N.J.S.A. 9:6-1d); State v. Martinez-Mejia, 477 N.J. Super. 325, 336 (App. Div. 2023) (reviewing Merriam-Webster’s College Dictionary to find the meaning of “lure” as used in N.J.S.A. 2C:13-6a); State v. Lyons, 417 N.J. Super. 251, 260 (App. Div. 2010) (finding the commonly understood meanings of the terms “provide” and “offer” in N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4b(5)(a) by reference to Webster’s Second New College Dictionary).
[brief] The trial court’s order in this case violates New Jersey Civil Rules and could set a new and dangerous precedent for civil discovery throughout New Jersey.  By precluding the parties from conducting any review for responsiveness or relevance before turning over documents that hit on search terms, the trial court has dispensed with the rules and two core principles of civil discovery that have guided New Jersey courts and courts around the country.  First, the trial court’s order eviscerates the touchstone of the rules of civil discovery: relevance.  Although the New Jersey rules give courts ample discretion to determine what is relevant to claims and defenses, they do not allow courts to order the production of information that is not relevant.  The trial court recognized that the search terms in this case will turn up vast amounts of irrelevant and nonresponsive documents.  Precluding the responding party from conducting a relevance and responsiveness review exceeds the court’s authority because it will force troves of irrelevant documents to be turned over to the other side.  While search terms no doubt have some role to play in helping a responding party locate relevant and responsive documents, the choice of this method does not obviate the fundamental requirement of relevance.  Second, the trial court’s order violates the foundational discovery principle that “[a] responding party should determine how to meet its own preservation and production obligations. ”  The Sedona Conference, *The Sedona Principles, Third Edition: Best Practices, Recommendations & Principles for Addressing Electronic Document Production: A Project of the* Sedona Conference Working Group on Electronic Document Retention and Production, 19 Sedona Conf. J. 1, 118-26 (2018) (“Principle 6”).  Thus, the discovery process should be handled by the parties, not micro-managed by the courts, especially where there is no indication that a party has improperly withheld any evidence in the case.  The trial court’s order explicitly turns that on its head, removing the responding party’s role in reviewing documents for responsiveness and relevance.  The trial court’s order, if followed in other cases, could have profound negative consequences in New Jersey courts.
[brief] Thus, there can be no common issue between the two cases.  It is true that the trial court in [...] raised in dicta how it would consider a claim for express easement had one been made (Da106).  It is equally true, however, that the court never had the language in the [...] that continues to run with the [...] and, a fortiori, [...].  When considering that the deeds to the [...] were never raised to the court before and that no claim for express easement was pled by [...] previously, it would be patently improper and unfair to apply collateral estoppel to Respondent’s request for declaratory judgment now that the governing, operative, deed is before the Court and unambiguously provides Respondent with the needed access to reach its otherwise landlocked property.
[brief] Police may rely on hearsay statements in a warrant affidavit so long as the affidavit “provide[s] the warrant-issuing judge with a substantial basis for crediting the hearsay. ”  *Novembrino*, 105 N.J. at 120-21.  A showing of credibility is especially critical in cases where a tip is provided to police by a criminal informant.  *Wildoner v. Borough of Ramsey*, 162 N.J. 375, 390-91 (2000); *State v. Lakomy*, 126 N.J. Super. 430, 435 (App. Div. 1974).
[brief] ”  DeNike v. Cupo, 196 N.J. 502, 514 (2008).  The Court held “[t]o demand any less would invite questions about the impartiality of the justice system and thereby “threaten[ ] the integrity of our judicial process. ”  Id. at 514-15 (quoting State v. Tucker, 264 N.J. Super. 549, 554 (App. Div. 1993), certif. denied, 135 N.J. 468 (1994)).  In finding the trial court should have recused himself from post-bench trial issues when he began post-employment discussions with one of the lawyers, the Supreme Court explained it did not matter that there did not appear to be bias and unfairness because it was enough for the other attorney to have “an ‘objectively reasonable’ belief that the proceedings were unfair.
[brief] Similar to Diaz, the question before this Court is “whether the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant knowingly waived his right against self-incrimination in view of the detectives' stratagem to withhold the fact that someone had died” and that the detectives were investigating a homicide.  470 N.J. Super. at 518.  Also like Diaz, neither detective here “indicated during the waiver colloquy what the interrogation was about.  Nor did they specify the potential criminal charges that defendant was facing. ”  Diaz, 470 N.J. Super. at 507.  Yet the detectives had probable cause to arrest Defendant for the homicide at the time the initiated the interrogation.  (14T28-21 to 25)  Given the fact that the detective’s very belated disclosure that they were investigating a homicide resulted in a series of verbal protests from Defendant that ultimately resulted in a verbal protest found by the trial court to be at least an ambiguous invocation of his right to remain silent, this Court should find that the detectives’ strategy to deliberately withhold that they were investigating a homicide until an hour and eleven minutes into the interrogation entailed that Defendant did not knowingly waive his Miranda rights during the Miranda colloquy.  POINT II
[brief] Utilizing the Plaintiff’s logic, the following provision would have been acceptable to satisfy the clear and concise statement of purpose provision:  An Ordinance of the Mayor and Township Committee of the [...], County of Gloucester, Adopting a Redevelopment Plan for Block 46, Lot 2; Block 47, Lots 1, 2, 3, 3.01, 4 in the [...] ([...], State of New Jersey).  The purpose of the ordinance is to Adopt a Redevelopment Plan for Block 46, Lot 2; Block 47, Lots 1, 2, 3, 3.01, 4 in the [...] ([...], State of New Jersey).  Yet, this notice provides no more information that the current Notice provides.
[brief] *Ibid.*  The client appealed to the New Jersey Supreme Court, which confirmed that legal malpractice claims are not *per se* exempt from the Entire Controversy Doctrine.  *Id.* at 119-20.  In so holding, the court stated as follows:  We reiterate our holding in *Olds v. Donnelly* that the entire controversy doctrine does not compel a client to assert a legal malpractice claim against an attorney *in the underlying litigation in which the attorney represents the client*.  150 N.J. 424, 443, 696 A.2d 633 (1997).  A collection action brought by a law firm against its client, however, *does not constitute such underlying litigation for purposes of the principle stated in Olds*.  The assertion of a malpractice claim in such an action -- in which the attorney and client are already adverse -- does not raise the privilege and loyalty concerns that warranted the exception to the entire controversy doctrine recognized in *Olds*.
[brief] (2T24-1 to 2T24-10)  The Board was reminded by the Board attorney that it is well within the Board’s rights and responsibilities to weigh and consider evidence such as a traffic report.  (2T21-21 to 2T21-23)  Board members continued to voice concerns over the traffic movement in the area during the June 14, 2022 hearing.  A board member asked [...] if there was any indication as to how many cars will be turning left and/or turning right out of this development, and if there is any way to restrict it to right-turn only out of the development.  (2T48-8 to 2T48-11)  [...] responded negatively to the first question, and as to the second, opined that to restrict the flow of traffic would be detrimental as it would send people down towards 14th Street or they’d make a U-turn and come back.  (2T48-16 to 2T48-19)  The Board expressed concern that, with the relatively new traffic light installed at Hope Chapel Road and 14th Street, traffic backs up very far during peak hours in this neighborhood.  (2T49-17 to 2T49-18)  Despite the substantial, significant concerns the Board voiced repeatedly at both public hearings considering the accuracy of the submitted traffic report and traffic movement at the site and in the immediate vicinity of the site, no one from [...] appeared at any of the hearings before the Board to defend the research submitted in the report.
[brief] Although Appellant did not prevail below in the sense that the Trial Court granted its Cross-Motion and denied the Motion, Appellant’s counsel succeeded in convincing [...] that this matter was ripe for summary judgment and that the Trial Court should proceed with the adjudication of the Motions.  This is a critical fact that cannot be overlooked.  In light of the procedural posture of the case, [...] was seeking to confirm the procedural posture of the case and the intention of the parties.  Had Appellant’s counsel informed [...] at this moment that the case was not ripe for summary judgment and that further discovery was necessary, it is possible the Trial Court would have permitted Appellant that opportunity and dismissed or adjourned the Motions.  Appellant’s counsel’s representations to the Judge that this matter was ripe for summary judgment are similar to the attorney’s representations to the trial judge in Bender relating to the qualifications of a defense witness to testify as an expert.
[brief] First, on August 26, 1947, the [...] conveyed in two instruments easements in perpetuity to [...] and its members to use certain roads for ingress and egress to lots within the community, subject to the *same* restrictions as in the Genesis Deed.  (Da676-85).  Second, on November 29, 1948, the [...] conveyed fifteen (15) separate parcels to [...] on the express condition that [...] use them “as roadways for ingress and egress by all bona fide members of said [...] ” (Da693-99).  The [...]’ conveyance was expressively conditioned on [...] enforcing the Genesis Deed’s restrictions as provided in [...]’s “present by-laws . . . and provided further that no change, alteration or condition shall be made to the aforesaid Corporation by-laws, that would eliminate, cancel, or in any manner make any or all of the attached restrictions ineffective, null, void or unenforceable.
[brief] Plaintiffs-Appellants therefore respectfully request that this Court reverse the trial court's order granting summary judgment to Defendants-Respondents, and hold that the Board did not have jurisdiction to hear the 2022 Zoning Application, that the 2022 Zoning Application was in conflict with the Master Plan, and that the Resolution of Approval was improperly adopted.  [...]  BY: /s/ [...]  For [...]
[brief] In its statement of reasons, the trial court rewrote the statutes on an *ex post facto* basis and used a dictionary of its own choosing to save the both of the statutes from being declared unconstitutional.  For the germane reasons set forth in the Defendant’s moving brief below (Da3 – Da16) and reply brief below (Da50 – Da56), N.J.S.A. 4:22 – 24(b) and N.J.S.A. 4:22 – 17(c)(3) are unconstitutionally void for vagueness and overbreadth and even as applied.