ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] State v. Hagans, 233 N.J. 30 (2018) ...................................................................................................................... 24, 25 State v. Hager, 462 N.J. Super. 377 (App. Div. 2020) .........................................................................................  39 State v. Hickman, 335 N.J. Super. 623 (App. Div. 2000) ......................................................................................... 9, 13, 31 State v. Hreha, 217 N.J. 363 (2014) ....................................................................................................................  22 State v. Hubbard, 222 N.J. 249 (2015) ....................................................................................................................  28 State v. Johnson, 42 N.J. 146 (1964) .......................................................................................................................  16 State v. Jones, 179 N.J. 377 (2004) .....................................................................................................................  15 State v. Jones, 475 N.J. Super. 520 (App. Div. 2023) ......................................................................................... 41, 42, 43 State v. Kenyon, 651 N.W.2d 269 (S.D. 2002) ..................................................................................................... 16, 19 State v. King, 44 N.J. 346 (1965) .......................................................................................................................
[brief] ”  See State v. Hernandez, 225 N.J. 451, 462 (2016) (finding “discovery in civil cases extends to information that ‘appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence,’” whereas discovery in criminal cases “‘is appropriate if it will lead to relevant’ information. ”) (emphasis in original).  The Rule contemplates that a byproduct of the search for relevant evidence during the discovery process will be the disclosure of some amount of irrelevant evidence.
[brief] As explained in Plaintiff’s initial brief, in order for a zoning ordinance involving land use to be validly enacted there must be a determination by both the Planning Board and the municipality’s governing body that the proposed ordinance is consistent with not only the Goals Element of the Master Plan but the Land Use Element as well.  In fact, the Legislature found the need for these determinations to be so important that the Legislature expressly provided that any land use or redevelopment ordinance needs to be first sent to the Planning Board for its review and comment before being taken up by the governing body.  Plaintiff has shown that the record is devoid of evidence that Defendants complied with the requirements necessary for the lawful adoption of [...].  Good intentions or rational behavior are not substitutes for compliance with statutory requirements.  The presumption of validity has been rebutted by Plaintiff’s showing of non-compliance with statutory requirements.  Further, there were no findings of fact made by the planning board that might guide the governing body or the Court in reviewing the actions of the planning board.  There were also no findings of fact by the municipal governing body supporting the enactment of [...].  Defendants saying there are does not make it so.  Nor does arguing that the facts were in the collective minds of the board members or council members based on their being familiar with the “history” of the property.  The failure to provide findings of fact based on evidence in the record makes the adoption of the [...] arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable.
[brief] Q: And at the time that you reviewed [the Complaint] in preparation for your deposition, was there any factual allegation that you thought needed to be changed?  A: There was dates that were incorrect.  Q: It’s not - - okay.  Anything else that you saw that should be changed?  A: The in lieu of.  It wasn’t for 401k.  It was only for bonuses.  Q: Statement of fact, okay?  Paragraph 3.  On or about March 2020, plaintiff was confronted by Defendant [...], informed that he’s not willing - - that [...] was not willing to part with additional money income in this fiscal year and plaintiff would not be receiving a bonus or his 401k benefits.
[brief] Per the Supreme Court, the purchase of an item of dubious utility fits the basis for breach of contract damages. \(^{39}\)  Nor must a contract be reduced to a writing to be enforceable. \(^{40}\)  "[I]f [the] parties agree on essential --- \(^{36}\)  *75 Spruce St., LLC v. N.J. State Bd. of Educ.*, 382 N.J. Super. 567 (Law Div. 2005)(citing *Wanaque Borough Sewerage Auth. v. Twp. of West Milford*, 144 N.J. 564, 574 (1996)("Contracts implied in fact are no different than express contracts, although they exhibit a different way or form of expressing assent than through statements or writings.").
[brief] But, this Court has not been persuaded by DeAngelo in this context.  In Chartonavich, this court held:  “In Deangelo we deferred to the trial court, which considered the facts and then balanced competing policy interests in an equitable analysis under Rule 4:50-1(f).  Id. at 108.  Here, we defer to the trial court's finding on defendant's six-year delay in filing his motion to vacate default judgment. ”  Thus, as this Court determined in Chartonavich, so too, here, should this Court declined to determine the NJCFLA arguments.  As such, the Lower Court correctly denied Appellant’s Motion.
[brief] See \textit{City of Burlington v. Dague}, 505 U.S. 557, 1112 S.Ct. 2638, 120 L.Ed.2d 449 (1992).  In addition, the trial court shall take into consideration that “the extent of a plaintiff’s success is a crucial factor in determining the proper amount of an award of attorney’s fees. ”  See \textit{Hensley v. Eckerhart}, 461 U.S. 424, 440, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983).  “The district court should exclude hours that are not reasonably expended.  Hours are not reasonably expended if they are excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary.  Further, the court can reduce the hours claimed on which the party did not succeed and that were ‘distinct in all respects from’ claims on which the party did succeed. ”  *Institutionalized Juveniles v. Secretary of Pub. Welfare*, 758 F.2d 897, 919 (3d Cir. 1985).  Plaintiff in the instant case has not proved that she had sustained any actual damages.
[brief] The trial court erroneously concluded that it would “have to engage in individual inquiries relative to each tenant’s unique circumstances, including whether they breached their own respective lease provision in a similar way to the [...]. ”  2T14-19 – 2T14-21.  However, whether tenants breached their lease agreement has no bearing on whether or not the concessions charge-back provision is facially unlawful.  The [...] allege that the very inclusion of the charge-back provision is a violation of the Consumer Fraud Act.  The trial court’s citation to *Myska v. New Jersey Mfr. Ins. Co.*, 440 N.J. Super. 458, 480 (App. Div. 2015) is misplaced.
[brief] Given the fact that Plaintiff was in the position he was in, having his account frozen and being advised to open a new account, with no explanation as to how his account was hacked, (Pa 153-154, MSC 3-5) all based on the conduct of the Bank, Plaintiff was justified in believing the Bank would act in his best interest, reposing a trust and confidence in the Bank.  Because of the circumstances of this case, the nature of the dealings and the position of the parties towards each other, that trust and confidence was necessarily implied.  Id at 551.  The Bank had a duty to disclose to the Plaintiff that he was signing an application, where to find a deposit agreement and the presence of an arbitration clause.  This duty also arises in transactions which in their essential nature are “intrinsically fiduciary and necessarily call for perfect good faith and full disclosure without regard to any particular intention of the parties.  A duty of a fiduciary to disclose is required when the individual knows a fact which may justifiably induce another to act or refrain from acting in a business transaction if the individual is under a duty to disclose.  The fiduciary must disclose facts basic to the transaction if he knows that the other is about to enter into it under ignorance or mistake and that the other, because of the relationship between them or customs of the trade or other objective circumstances would reasonably expect a disclosure of these facts.  *Id* at 554.  Under the circumstances of this case, the Bank knew or had reason to know that Plaintiff was placing his trust and confidence in the Bank to inform and counsel him on protecting his money, *Id.* 559, as it never explained what happened.  *City Check Cashing v. Manf. Hanover*, 166 NJ 49 (2001) stated that in general, in a banking context, banks have a duty to disclose where some special relationship has been established such as fiduciary, confidential, contractual or legal or where there was fraud or misrepresentation in the part of the Bank.
[brief] THE UNDISPUTED FACTS AND LAW REQUIRE REVERSAL OF THE TRIAL COURT’S ALTERNATIVE RULING ON THE MERITS OF THE PUBLIC DISCLOSURE BAR.  (4T)  Relator repeatedly declares that disputes of fact with respect to the elements of the public disclosure bar preclude summary judgment.  See Rb3, Rb22, Rb41.  But as with the trial court’s ruling, a reader will search in vain for any material disputes of fact in Relator’s brief.  Here are the facts that matter, which Relator does not and cannot dispute.  Relator is not an insider and all the data it obtained and analyzed came from sources available to anyone, and especially those who follow the municipal bond industry.  Those sources exist to facilitate public monitoring of the VRDO market.  The undisputed facts make clear, therefore, that Relator’s allegations of fraud are “based upon” information regarding VRDO “transactions” that are “publicly disclosed” through sources that those following the industry use (“news media”), triggering the public disclosure bar.  And none of Relator’s allegations are based upon any information “independent” of what has been publicly disclosed, so Relator is not an “original source. ”  Rather than dispute any material facts, Relator distracts by emphasizing that it paid for the subscriptions from [...] and [...] (undisputed), that the licenses for the information restricted redistribution of that information (undisputed), and that Relator had to “analyze” the data because the data themselves did not expressly allege fraud (undisputed).  Relator obfuscates further by noting that none of the sources edited the VRDO data they obtained (undisputed), as if it follows that the publishers are not “news media. ”  Relator’s arguments raise disputed issues of law, not fact, and cannot save Relator from summary judgment because they either mischaracterize the caselaw or ignore long-settled contrary authority.  Indeed, Relator acknowledges that courts in other jurisdictions have resolved this issue as a matter of law.  Rb29–31 (citing state court opinions in parallel litigations).  This court should vacate the trial court’s ruling and grant summary judgment for Defendants.
[brief] A motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict may still be maintainable where an ‘adequate substitute for the requisite trial motion’ was made.  *Sun Source, Inc.* at 266.  “[A] party is not procedurally barred from asserting a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict *if the substitute or equivalent motion* would have afforded the moving party the same relief the party seeks by way of the judgment notwithstanding the verdict.  *Id.* (emphasis added).  In *Velazquez ex rel. Velazquez v. Jiminez,* cited above, the court reversed the trial court’s entry of judgment notwithstanding the verdict in favor of the defendant finding it inappropriate because the moving party “did not move for judgment either at the close of plaintiffs’ evidence or at the close of all the evidence, and the record did not support the grant of such a motion. ”  *Id.* at 33-34.  While the exception to the rule that a motion for judgment at trial must first have been made can be relaxed where an equivalent trial motion, one where the ultimate relief sought is the same, such exception is not applicable here.
[brief] Despite its age, no Court in the State of New Jersey has adopted its analysis, and for good reason: the analysis in *N. Plainfield Board of Education* is contrary to the Supreme Court of New Jersey’s decision in *SL Industries* and the New Jersey Appellate Division’s decision in *Superior Integrated Solutions*.  As more fully set forth below (*infra* §I.B), in *SL Industries v. American Motorist Insurance Company*, the Supreme Court of New Jersey held that, in applying insurance policy exclusions that disclaimed coverage based on the ill intent of the insured, the court’s analysis must focus on “the insured’s intent to cause the injury rather than on its intent to commit the act that resulted in the injury. ”  128 N.J. 188, 207 (1992).  This distinction is critical to the instant matter.  Notwithstanding this clear guidance, the District Court in *N. Plainfield Board of Education* completely ignored any requirement of an “intent to injure”, focusing instead on the allegations that the defendant intended to commit an act that resulted in injury.  Because the District Court in N. Plainfield Board of Education did not consider the authority set forth in SL Industries, the decision should be afforded no persuasive value.
[brief] \(^3\) [...] obtained a return on 10 units upon selling them.  That did not destroy its investment in the unsold Unit.  [...] is entitled to a return on the Unit not sold upon the conversion—instead of continuing to suffer losses every year on the Unit.  As held by [...], [...]’s return relating to the 10 other units is irrelevant.  Its prior sale of 10 units does not render Unit 11 any less an investment in real property that bars a “fair return” on that Unit to the owner.
[brief] “In order to ensure the safety and economic wellbeing of New Jerseyans both today and in the future, our policy decisions must be informed not by obsolete data, but by the challenging realities currently facing residents and businesses across the state,” said [...].  . . .  “Updating the data New Jersey uses to manage stormwater runoff and determine building elevations along rivers and streams will help flood-prone communities to better protect their homes and businesses, making us more resilient to the increasing extreme weather that New Jersey is experiencing,” said [...]. ”  [Aa203.  Emphasis in original.]  The DEP published its proposal for the Inland Flood Protection Rule to formalize the application of the updated precipitation data, which amended the FHACA and Stormwater Management Rules, on December 5, 2022.
[brief] Settled law thus recognizes both the kind of claim alleged and the type of remedy sought.  Appellants misconstrue the “well-settled right” inquiry.  Appellants seem to believe that a right is only well settled where there is binding legal authority on the precise legal issue applied to the precise set of facts.  See (Db12) (arguing the State lacks a well-settled right because it did not identify a specific precedent holding “that a parental notification policy such as the one at issue here” violates the LAD).  But case law has long made clear that the inquiry is whether the underlying body of law is settled, not whether the specific outcome of a specific lawsuit is already settled by precedent.  See Crowe, 90 N.J. at 133 (noting “the underlying legal claim … was settled as a matter of law” and observing that “mere doubt as to the validity of the claim is not an adequate basis for refusing to maintain the status quo”); Waste Mgmt., 399 N.J. Super. at 528 (same).  Indeed, were the rule otherwise, under the “well-settled right” inquiry, the movant would have already had to establish that its exact claims had already been decided with certainty under binding precedent, rendering the “reasonable probability of success” inquiry superfluous.  Moreover, if Appellants’ approach were the law, no claim applying established legal rights to new facts could ever meet the preliminary injunction standard—no matter how troubling the new statutory violation, and no matter how compelling the need to maintain the status quo.  And Appellant’s approach would create perverse incentives: a policy that is so clearly unlawful that no other school district has previously adopted it (or an argument made in defense so clearly incorrect that no other defendant had raised it) could avoid preliminary relief merely because no court had previously needed to address its validity.  That has never been the law.
[brief] I DEFENDANT WAS DEPRIVED OF HIS RIGHT TO SELF-REPRESENTATION WHEN THE TRIAL COURT DISMISSED HIS REQUEST TO REPRESENT HIMSELF OFFHAND WITHOUT ANY MEANINGFUL CONSIDERATION.  (3T 75-4 to 15)  On the first day of trial, [...] requested to fire his attorney and exercise his constitutional right to represent himself.  (3T 75-4 to 11)  The court dismissed the request outright without any substantive consideration.  (3T 75-7 to 9)  A request to proceed pro se, even if asserted mid-trial, must be taken seriously.  See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819-20 (1975); Buhl v. Cooksey, 233 F.3d 783, 798 n.16 (3d Cir. 2000).  The court’s failure to afford any consideration to [...]’s request constitutes an abuse of discretion and violated [...]’s rights under the federal and state constitutions.  U.S. Const. amends. VI, XIV; N.J. Const. art. I, ¶ 10.  Reversal of his conviction is required.  See State v. King, 210 N.J. 2, 22 (2012) (reversing defendant’s conviction based on the trial court’s unsupported denial of his request to represent himself).
[brief] At the close of the telephone conference the Court indicated that she wanted a comprehensive Order that covered all the matters raised during the hearing and requested that [...] and [...] compare their notes, draft a proposed Order and send it to [...] allowing him an opportunity to raise any objections or issues.  (5T, 72 lines 23-25).  On April 7, 2021, [...] objected to the form of Order submitted pertaining to the April 5 hearing.
[brief] **PLAINTIFF’S ARGUMENTS THAT THE TRIAL COURT MISCONSTRUED ITS CLAIMS ARE FALSE BUT EVEN IF ITS DIRECT EVIDENCE ARGUMENTS ARE CONSIDERED THEY STILL DO NOT SUPPORT PLAINTIFF’S CLAIM OF ADEQUACY OF THE COMPLAINT**  Plaintiff argues the Trial Court misconstrued its claims as failure to accommodate claims and that the Court relied on a “sole paragraph” of its Complaint to do so.  (Pb12-13).  Not so.  Plaintiff’s own Complaint makes plain that it advanced this case as one for failure to accommodate unspecified disabilities of unspecified individuals in unspecified instances.  (See Pa8-Pa62 at ¶17, 19, 24, 25-30, 70—75, 86-93, 95-111, 134, 141, 149, etc.).  Plaintiff even generally pleads the same *prima* facie elements cited by [...] and relied upon by the Trial Court (just as to no identified person/instance/disability/request/denial/etc.), and then states that “[t]he Union has met the prima facie elements required in any [NJLAD] disability discrimination claim. ” (Pa36-39 at ¶90-106).  In “summing up,” Plaintiff alleges that “[...] has violated the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination by failing to provide a reasonable accommodation to the affected Association members,” and by “fail[ing] to engage in the required interactive process thereby failing to extend and provide a reasonable accommodation to the affected Association members” (Pa 40-41 at ¶109-110).  Plaintiff further posits that it brings this matter to “compel[ ] [...] to promote or otherwise accommodate the affected Union members. ” (Pa 41 at ¶111).  As is plain, Plaintiff indeed framed this case as one for failure to accommodate disability.
[brief] Again, Defendant fails to address the arguments raised by Plaintiff in Point III of his opening brief, and attempts to distract this Court with unrelated and irrelevant arguments.  First, he cites to the basic information that was set forth before the trial court, while continuing to ignore all of the information that was sought by Plaintiff, none of which was answered by Defendant, either before or after the filing of the Verified Complaint for an accounting.  More particularly, Defendant failed to address the lack of information regarding the following very basic issues: i. Which items of tangible property were sold; ii. What the sale prices were, for such items; iii. What items of tangible personal property remain in the Estate, if any; iv. What assets (other than the tangible personal property, Decedent’s home, and the New York real estate) existed on the Decedent’s date of death; v. What happened to the cash that existed on the Decedent’s date of death; vi.  What happened to the securities that existed on the Decedent’s date of death; vii. What happened to the proceeds of the sale of the Decedent’s house; and viii. What happened to the proceeds of the sale of the Decedent’s personal property.  Defendant claims that Plaintiff is not entitled to any further information.  Yet, set forth above are numerous examples of information to which Plaintiff, and his sister ([...]), are both statutorily entitled to receive, but have not been provided.
[brief] As such, Plaintiff’s Verified Complaint simply invokes a statutory right. ”  Id. at *7 (emphasis added).  In citing to the lower court’s ruling, the Appellate Division stated that “under N.J.S.A. § 3B:17-2, [the beneficiary] was entitled to an accounting. ”  Id. at *3 (emphasis added).  The Supreme Court of New Jersey agreed with this position when it stated that “[a]n executor is required to account for each item of the estate that comes into his hands.
[brief] Appellate review of an administrative agency’s final determination is limited and deferential.  *In re Herrmann*, 192 N.J. 19, 27 (2007); *In re Taylor*, 158 N.J. 644, 656 (1999).  “The ‘fundamental consideration’ in reviewing agency actions is that a court may not substitute its judgment for the expertise of an agency ‘so long as that action is statutorily authorized and not otherwise defective because arbitrary or unreasonable. ’”  *In re Distrib. of Liquid Assets*, 168 N.J. 1, 10 (2001) (quoting *Williams v. Dep’t of Human Servs.*, 116 N.J. 102, 107 (1989) (additional citations omitted)).  The challenger bears the burden of proving arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable action.  *Bueno v. Bd. of Trs., Teachers’ Pension & Annuity Fund*, 422 N.J. Super.  227, 234 (App. Div. 2011).  Moreover, an agency’s “interpretation of statutes and regulations within its implementing and enforcing responsibility” is entitled to deference.  *Ibid.* (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see also *Barry v. Arrow Pontiac, Inc.*, 100 N.J. 57, 70-71 (1985) (“the grant of authority to an administrative agency is to be liberally construed to enable the agency to accomplish the Legislative goals. ” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)).  Courts “extend substantial deference to an agency’s interpretation and application of its own regulations, particularly on technical matters within the agency’s special expertise. ”  In re Freshwater Wetlands Prot. Act Rules, 180 N.J. 478, 488-89 (2004); see also Lipman v. Rutgers-State Univ. of New Jersey, 329 N.J. Super. 433, 441 (App. Div. 2000) (some agencies exercise technical expertise that is not possessed by the courts).  It has also long been held “that where an administrative agency is concerned with technical matters the courts will give weight to its presumed expertise in reviewing its decisions” which includes “an initial assumption of competence in the field” for agency staff.  Shahmoon Indus., Inc. v. Dep’t of Health, 93 N.J. Super. 272, 282-83 (App. Div. 1966).  A court will not reverse an agency decision “because of doubts as to its wisdom or because the record may support more than one result.