ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] (DJ Complaint, ¶¶ 9 and 25, TRVa3-4; [...] Complaint, ¶¶ 26 and 31, TRVa640-641.)  Just prior to the Accident, [...], [...]’s owner, approached the track hoe operator, an employee of [...], and when the operator went to shake hands, he accidentally struck the controls causing the beam to fall on [...].  ([...] Complaint, ¶¶ 27-32, TRVa641.)  B.  [...]’s Work on the Date of the Accident  [...] admits that [...]’s initial work may have been excluded demolition, but claims that the work on the date of the Accident was somehow different, covered work.  (TRVb25.)  This assertion is patently false.  [...]’s December 30, 2015 invoice, 5487rev, identifies work on the date of the Accident and includes a note for one laborer to complete “wire sawing. ” (TRVa1593.)  While Invoice 5487rev references Proposal 106846 (i.e., Proposal Two), Proposal Two was later replaced by Proposal Three, which added back the cost of insurance due to [...]’s CCIP unenrollment.  [...] confirmed that the work on the date of the Accident, despite noting Proposal Two, was actually done pursuant to a subsequent proposal.  ([...] Tr. 75:20-76:1, TRVa1518.)  [...]’s Job Ticket No. 43788 on the Accident date describes the work completed by [...]’s [...] as “wire sawing” and specifies performing “saw cut in north side wall” and further identifies the contact for [...] as [...].  (TRVa1595.)  Swindell testified in the [...] Lawsuit that on the date of the Accident he was working in the northeast corner wire sawing parts of the concrete wall for removal that were recently located during excavation.  (Swindell Tr., 14:15-15:13 at TRVa1610-1611 and 36:8-21 at TRVa1632.)  [...]’s Swindell further signed a written statement after the Accident stating he “had been working the northeast corner of the job site” doing “cutting with an electric wire saw to demo concrete north face – wall north face. ”  (Swindell Tr., 36:8-21, TRVa1632; Statement, TRVa1787-1788.)  In addition to statements by Swindell, who was actually doing the work for [...], an [...] foreman and several [...] employees confirmed that [...] was performing demolition on the date of the Accident.  ([...] Tr., 174:5-8, TRVa1963; [...] Tr., 107:1-4 at TRVa2200, 115:2-23 at TRVa2208, and 124:7-15 at TRVa2217; and [...] Tr., 25:9-19 at TRVa1427 and 70:5-11 at TRVa1439.)  C.
[brief] As the Third Circuit has emphasized, in determining whether a statement must be produced pursuant to the Jencks Act, “[w]hat matters is that the statement relates to the witness’s testimony and is in the possession of the government. ”  United States v. Zomber, 299 Fed. Appx. 130, 134 (2008).  In line with federal law on the disclosure of witness statements, New Jersey courts have long recognized the rule “in both civil and criminal cases.
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY FOUND THAT APPLICANTS MET THE NECESSARY BURDEN OF PROOF AND THE FINDINGS OF FACT OF THE BOARD WERE NOT ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS OR UNREASONABLE.  (Pa 41-Pa 94; 3T38-10-3T49-9)  Appellants contend that the Applicants failed to satisfy their burden of proof because they relied on the aesthetic improvement of the property and did not show how the variance would improve the general welfare of the zone.
[brief] As for the fourth and fifth Hoxworth factors, and as detailed in the Procedural History section of this brief, substantial motion practice has already taken place in this litigation prior to the Respondents’ motions to compel arbitration.  First, on October 24, 2023, Plaintiffs filed a motion to amend their complaint, which was granted on December 7, 2023.  See Pa0374.  Second, on January 18, 2024, after the Plaintiffs filed a Motion to Compel Discovery, this Court ordered the Defendants to provide the raw data regarding [...]’s neuropsychological evaluation.  Pa0342-Pa0344.  [...] has complied with both orders, further demonstrating the substantial progress already made in this case.  Thus, the fourth and fifth Hoxworth factors also weigh in favor of the Plaintiffs.
[directive] 16.  ¿Entiende usted que si ocupa un cargo público o si es empleado público, se podrá [Sí/Yes]  [No/No]  [No aplica/NA] requerir que renuncie a su cargo o empleo en virtud de su declaración de culpabilidad?  Do you understand that if you are a public office holder or employee, you can be required to forfeit your office or job by virtue of your plea of guilty?
[brief] APPELLANTS’ COMPLAINT FAILS TO SET FORTH FACTS  WHICH STATE A CLAIM UPON WHICH RELIEF CAN BE GRANTED.  A.  THE STANDARD OF REVIEW.  An appellate court reviews de novo the trial court's determination of the motion to dismiss under Rule 4:6-2(e).  Stop & Shop Supermarket Co., LLC v. County of Bergen, 450 N.J. Super. 286, 290, (App. Div. 2017).  An appellate court applies the same standard under Rule 4:6-2(e) that governed the motion judge and look to “the legal sufficiency of the facts alleged on the face of the complaint.
[directive] Be sure to update cases as their status or other elements change.  Classify each case by the most serious allegation while pending.  When the case closes, classify by the most serious sustained allegation or most serious allegation if none are sustained.  Internal Affairs  Annual Report Date  Complaint Source of Length  Received Complaint Date Closed of Case  IA Number Officer  Complaint Allegation Status Criminal Disposition  Internal Disposition Discipline  1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5 - 6 - 7 - 8 - 9 - 10 - 11 - 12 - 13 - 14 - 15 - 16 - 17 - 18 - 19 - 20 - 21 - 22 - 23 - 24 - 25 - 26 - 27 - 28 - 29 - 30 - 31 - 32 -
[brief] My Appeal points out the substantiated evidence and arguments that the Lower Court wrongly rejected in its false claims and rulings that were palpably incorrect & irrational; made in arbitrary & unreasonable, manner; & overlooked significance of irrefutable probative, competent evidence contradicting the Judges’ claims/rulings.  [...]’s Aug. 4, 2023 Hearing Rulings, were clearly appealable, palpably incorrect “standards” that undermined his unreasonable claims/rulings.  As I pointed out in my prior Brief, his primary unreasonable, illegitimate, “standard” was “This case has to end” period, irrationally regardless of legitimate factors that he should have considered to correct the Orders.  His corollary illegitimate “standard” was that “if there is dissatisfaction with rulings of this Court, it should be appealed”.
[directive] Because of the statutory mandate  Charging by complaint in exceptional that these matters always be presented to a grand jury, N.J.S.A. 52:17B-107(a)(2), these see SOP envision that each fatal police encounter case will be presented to a grand jury without having been first charged by complaint.  However, charging by complaint may be appropriate where the conduct involved is egregious and immediate action is needed in the interests of justice.  Complaints should be used rarely and only with the approval of the Executive Director of OPIA.  Where a matter is charged by complaint, the assigned prosecutor will present the grand jury from the outset with a proposed indictment, approved by the Executive Director, for the grand jury’s consideration.
[brief] The general principle in American Jurisprudence is that the parties shall bear their own legal fees.  The tort law should not be re-written just for the purpose to award a power law firm with astronomic and excessive attorney fees at the expense of the innocent people.  \(^5\)  The trial court below erred in denying Defendants’ motion without reviewing the records and facts in the instant matter, because the trial court was empowered by Rule 4:50-1(a) and (f) to vacate the judgment should the trial court determines there were mistakes made when the Final Judgment was first rendered.
[directive] Scanning limited to vehicles exposed to public license plates of vehicles that are exposed to public view (e.g., vehicles on a public road, street, or that are on private property but whose license plate(s) are visible from a public road, street, or a place to which members of the public have access, such as the parking lot of a shopping mall or other business establishment).  information.  The following data must be shared with the State ALPR Sharing deployment Coordinator prior to installing or relocating a permanent fixed ALPR unit:  Camera name (pursuant to convention specified by State ALPR Coordinator) • Location (latitude and longitude) • Survey provided by ALPR vendor, including projected size of ALPR data •  When deploying or relocating a portable fixed ALPR unit, agencies must provide updated latitude and longitude data to the State ALPR Coordinator.  Deconfliction.
[brief] Moreover, the CBA contains no provision guaranteeing any employee a contractual right to retain her job where they are physically incapable of performing the essential functions of that job.  The CBA’s Grievance Procedure also makes clear that an arbitrator is without power or authority to make any decision contrary to or inconsistent with the agreement, or to modify or amend its terms or to insert new terms for which the parties did not bargain.  Finally, the parties’ CBA does not require [...] to reconsider a decision to discharge an employee, or to undertake an investigation of the underlying events subsequent to that employee’s discharge.  [...]’s duties end at the point of discharge.  Notwithstanding these clear contractual provisions, buttressed as they are by decades of case law, the Arbitrator issued a decision finding that [...] was discharged without just cause.
[brief] The phrase “recovery of benefits” in AICRA should be interpreted in light of its meaning in the insurance field.  See Praxair Tech., Inc. v. Dir., Div. of Tax’n, 201 N.J. 126, 136 (2009) (recognizing that courts construe technical terms or terms of art in accordance with those meanings).  Recovery of insurance benefits ordinarily refers to “how much money should the insured receive from the insurer. ”  11A Couch on Ins. § 168:1 (3d ed.); see also N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.2 (“No person shall recover personal injury protection benefits under more than one automobile insurance policy for injuries sustained in any one accident. ”); Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Fiouris, 395 N.J. Super. 156, 160 (App. Div. 2007) (holding that AICRA’s arbitration provision “only requires arbitration of disputes regarding entitlement to or the amount of PIP benefits”).  It does not ordinarily refer to compensatory damages or other remedies that an insurer seeks from an insured or assignee due to benefits that were wrongfully obtained.  For example, the IFPA authorizes an insurer to sue when benefits are obtained through fraud; the statute speaks in terms of an action “to recover compensatory damages” and to “recover treble damages,” N.J.S.A. 17:33A-7(a), (b) (emphasis added), not to “recover benefits. ”  The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit drew a similar distinction in interpreting New York’s no-fault dispute-resolution statute.  In Allstate Insurance Co. v. Mun, 751 F.3d 94 (2d Cir. 2014), the court held: “If Allstate had disputed [no-fault] claims without paying them promptly, disputes contemplated by the [dispute-resolution] statute would have arisen,” but Allstate’s action for fraud damages was not subject to arbitration because it “involves the medical provider’s liability to the insurer, under a fraud theory, for what the provider already recovered in the claims process. ”  Id. at 98.  A dispute “regarding the recovery of” PIP benefits is thus a dispute about whether an insured or assignee should receive any money (and, if so, in what amount) from the insurer on a disputed claim.  That interpretation accords with the purpose of AICRA’s dispute-resolution provision: “to establish an expeditious non-judicial procedure for resolving any dispute regarding the payment of PIP benefits, in furtherance of the No-Fault Act’s objectives of facilitating ‘prompt and efficient provision of benefits for all accident injury victims’ and ‘minimiz[ing] resort to the judicial process[.]’”
[brief] LEGAL ARGUMENT  Point  I.  THE BOARD ERRED IN ITS APPLICATION OF THE "SEPARATION OF SERVICE" RULE BECAUSE FERMIN RESIGNED AS A RESULT OF A DISABILITY ARISING FROM THE SAME SHOOTING INCIDENT AS THE ADMINISTRATIVE CHARGES.  Under New Jersey law, the "separation of service" rule requires disability retirement applicants to prove that their asserted disability is "the reason the member left employment."  N.J.A.C. 17:1–6.4(a).  Voluntary or involuntary termination of employment for non-disability reasons deems a PFRS member ineligible for disability benefits.  See In re Adoption of N.J.A.C. 17:1-6.4, 454 N.J.Super. 386, 394 (App. Div. 2018).  In this regard, the "separation of service" statute plainly states that "[s]ettlement agreements reached due to pending administrative or criminal charges," preclude processing of an accidental disability application "unless the underlying charges relate to the disability..."  N.J.A.C. 17:1-6.4 (emphasis added); see also Rooth v. Bd. of Trs., Pub. Emps.' Ret. Sys., 472 N.J.Super. 357, 367 (App. Div. 2022).  Here, the underlying charges relate to the disability.  [...] resigned as a result of the PTSD disability for which he seeks accidental disability benefits and the administrative charges arose from the same shooting incident that caused said disability.  This constitutes a well-recognized exception to the rule denying disability under the separation of service rule.  See In re Adoption of N.J.A.C. 17:1-6.4, 454 N.J.Super. at 397-398.  Accordingly, the bar does not apply.  As stated by the Department of the Treasury, Division of Pension and Benefits during its rulemaking session, the separation from service rule "is intended to prevent members from applying for a disability retirement benefit when their service has voluntarily or involuntarily terminated for reasons unrelated to a disability."  48 N.J.R. 1306(a) (June 20, 2016).  The Division explained that such former members do not qualify for disability retirement benefits, as they were not totally and permanently disabled from performing their job duties when their service ended; their public service ended for a reason completely unrelated to a physical or mental disability that keeps them from continuing to perform their job duties.  Id. (emphasis added).  The Board seemingly forgets that [...] became disabled as a result of PTSD from responding to a dangerous shooting.  In its Brief, the Board misleadingly creates the false impression that [...] resigned in exchange for the Department dropping administrative charges.
[brief] ”  Thus, the posting on the Borough website of notices of special and rescheduled meetings did not substitute for its obligation to comply with the requirements for “Adequate Notice” set forth in N.J.S.A. 10:4-8(d).  The conclusion that publication is not required is not new law, as evidenced by the Bernards court’s reference to Worts v. Mayor & Council of Upper Township, 176 N.J. Super. 78, 81 (Ch. Div. 1980), immediately following the passage quoted by the trial court, a reference absent from the court’s quotation.
[brief] A.  Proper Application Of Grasso’s Standard For The Positive Criteria .................................. 17  1.  Undue Hardship ............................................................................................................. 18  2.  The Height Variance Will Not Offend The Purpose Of The Restriction And The Structures Will Be Consistent With The Surrounding Neighborhood .................................................................................................................. 22  B.  Proper Application Of Grasso’s Standard For The Negative Criteria.  … 26  1.  The Height Variance Will Not Cause A Substantial Detriment To The Public Good.  ………………………………………………………………  27  2.  The Requested Deviation Will Not Substantially Impair The Intent And Purpose Of The Zone Plan And Zone Ordinance.  ……  31  IV.  DEFENDANT’S DENIAL OF THE HEIGHT  VARIANCE MUST BE DEEMED ARBITRARY, CAPRICIOUS, AND UNREASONABLE BECAUSE IT UNREASONABLY REJECTS CREDIBLE AND UNREBUTTED EXPERT TESTIMONY, AND IS NOT SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL CREDIBLE EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD.
[brief] Despite their enormous resources, [...] knowingly provides their Spanish speaking and English illiterate consumers important legal documents, which waive fundamental rights, in English.  They use their bargaining power and resources to the detriment of their consumers and take advantage of the most vulnerable in our New Jersey communities.  According to the American Community Survey, as part of the United States Census Bureau, New Jersey has a population of about 8,772,313, who are 5 years or older.  Approximately 66.7% of the population speak English, while 33.3% speak a language other than English, which equates to about 2,920,819 individuals.  Id.  The largest segment that “speak a language other than English” is Spanish which signifies nearly 1.5 million people in New Jersey.  Id.  This billion-dollar company preys on these 1.5 million people in New Jersey by thwarting their legal rights and constitutional protections under the 7th Amendment.
[brief] [...] devoted about five pages in its nearly fifty-page briefs in consolidated appeals to whether AICRA requires ADR of PIP-related fraud claims.  See Pra044-049, 104-110, 68-172.  [...] instead focused on whether the IFPA precludes arbitration of fraud claims and thus “reverse preempts” the Federal Arbitration Act under the McCarran-Ferguson Act, see Pra033-044, 088-099, 155-168, an issue not relevant here.  The Third Circuit’s discussion of whether AICRA’s ADR provision requires PIP ADR of affirmative fraud claims occupies only two brief paragraphs.  See [...], 98 F.4th at 469-70.  The reason for that brevity is that [...] did not make, and thus the Third Circuit did not consider, the arguments before this court.
[brief] **E.  People believe that forensic evidence can tell you whether a specific person committed a crime. **  In addition to assumptions about the accuracy and reliability of forensic methods and results, people also struggle to understand what can be inferred from forensic results.  What can be “proven” by a piece of evidence and any associated analyses will vary depending on the type of evidence, where it was found, and the alleged crime.  Ultimately, though, all physical evidence is circumstantial.
[brief] ”  *Id.* (quoting *Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.*, 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986)).  The inquiry in a FELA case rarely presents for practical purposes more than a question of whether the negligence of the railroad or its supervisors or its employees played any part, however small, in causing the Plaintiff’s personal injuries.  The question becomes simply whether the evidence justifies with reason the conclusion that Defendant’s negligence played any part, even the slightest, in causing [...]’s personal injuries for which he seeks damages.  Rogers v. Missouri Pacific Railroad Co., 352 U.S. 500 (1957); CSX Transportation, Inc. v. McBride, 131 S.Ct. 2630 (2011).
[brief] (Emphasis added).  In Port Authority Police Sergeants Benev. Ass'n of New York, New Jersey v. Port Authority of New York, New Jersey, 340 N.J. Super. 453 (App. Div. 2001), the court noted:  When parties have agreed, through a contract, on a defined set of rules that are to govern the arbitration process, an arbitrator exceeds his powers when he ignores the limited authority that the contract confers.  The scope of an arbitrator's authority depends on the terms of the contract between the parties.  Both the jurisdiction and the authority of the arbitrator are circumscribed by the powers delegated to him by the contract of the parties.  Thus, an arbitrator may not disregard the terms of the parties' agreement, nor may he rewrite the contract for the parties.  Citing, County Coll. of Morris Staff Ass'n v. County Coll. of Morris, 100 N.J. 383 (1985).  (Emphasis added).  The Court has held that where a narrow arbitration clause is present, which restricts the arbitrator’s power, the arbitrator must confine his decision solely to the interpretation and application of the collective bargaining agreement.  Comm. Workers of America, Local 1087 v. Monmouth County Bd. of Soc. Servs., 96 N.J. 442 (1984).  The Court observed that "[u]nder such narrow arbitration clauses, disputes that do not involve rights traceable to the agreement are beyond the jurisdiction of the arbitrator and therefore are not properly arbitrable."  Port Authority Police Sergeants Benev. Ass'n of New York, New Jersey v. Port Authority of New York, New Jersey, 340 N.J. Super. at 458-459 citing Comm. Workers of America, Local 1087 v. Monmouth County Bd. of Soc. Servs., 96 N.J. at 450.
[brief] Summary judgment was appropriate and, respectfully, encouraged under Brill.  I.  SUMMARY  JUDGMENT WAS APPROPRIATELY GRANTED BASED ON THE APPELLANT’S INABILITY TO ESTABLISH NOTICE OF THE ALLEGED HAZARD.  To maintain a *prima facie* case of negligence, a plaintiff must prove four elements by competent admissible evidence: (1) defendant owed plaintiff a duty of care; (2) defendant breached that duty; (3) this breach proximately caused plaintiff’s injuries; and (4) plaintiff suffered actual damages.  Davis v. Brickman Landscaping, Ltd., 219 N.J. 395, 406 (2014); Buckelew v. Grossbard, 87 N.J. 512, 525 (1981); Filipowicz v. Diletto, 350 N.J. Super. 552, 558 (App. Div. 2002); Albright v. Burns, 206 N.J. Super. 265, 632 (App. Div. 1982).  The burden of proof lies with the plaintiff to establish all elements of a cause of action for negligence.  Lieberman v. Employee Ins. of Wausau, 84 N.J. 325, 342 (1980).
[directive] detention pretrial a at evidence hearsay allows Reform Law Bail .  Victim.  Release on Pretrial and Offense of Impact fog Accounting 7.6.3 decision,29 detention pretrial the to relevant victim is on a crime the of impact the When and "nature of the consideration the of part as impact such consider shall prosecutor the of relevance (recognizing the 2A:162-20(a) N.J.S.A. See charged." offense the of circumstances in consider may court factor a a as charged offense the of circumstances and nature the seek whether to deciding in prosecutor detention).
[directive] No law enforcement officer shall disclose the fact that an undercover school operation has been proposed, requested or is being or has been considered with respect to any particular school or school district.  f.  The building principal and the local superintendent shall be afforded the opportunity to offer specific concerns regarding the conduct of any proposed undercover school operation, and shall be given the opportunity to make general or specific recommendations as to how to minimize the impact of the proposed operation on the educational environment, existing substance abuse counselling programs and the relationship between school authorities, the law enforcement community and the student population.
[brief] 2T:2-2 31-11.  After hearing oral argument, the court began its analysis by acknowledging that the conviction at issue was less than 10 years old and that N.J.R.E. 609(a)(1) governed the admissibility of the conviction.  2T:26-20 to 27-7.  The court rejected [...]’s argument that N.J.R.E. 609 required admission of a conviction that was less than 10 years old.  2T:27-8 to 19.  The court went on to note that N.J.R.E. 609(a) was subject to N.J. R.E. 403, which the court stated was “a huge consideration” for the court and that “frankly, to me, is the same as if the conviction had been ten years earlier.