ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] 10  I.  THE RECORD IS BEREFT OF PROOF THAT THE [...] ACQUIRED ANY “SIGNIFICANTLY HARMFUL” INFORMATION FROM PETITIONERS (Pa151-52)  ...........................................  10  A.  The Trial Court Employed an Improper Standard (Pa10)  ............  12  B.  Petitioners have – but have not Sustained – the Burden of Production and Persuasion (Pa6).  .......................  12  C.  The Factual Record before the Trial Court does not Support Disqualification (Pa7; T8-9).  .................................  14  D.  It was Reversible Error for the Lower Court to Disqualify Counsel Without Holding an Evidentiary Hearing (not raised below). 18  E.  The Trial Court’s Conclusory Assertion that the Communications “may be prejudicial” Lacks Support in the Record (Pa7-10)  ...............................  21  F.  Appellants are not Required to Prove a Negative (not raised below).  .23  G.  The Trial Court’s Order cannot be Sustained without an Analysis of Petitioner’s Likelihood of Success (Pa153; T8)  .  . . .  24  CONCLUSION……………………………………………………………...  25  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS BEING APPEALED
[brief] Pa2719.  Defendant, [...], filed their answer on or about April 1, 2016.  Pa2723.  [...] filed a CIS and answered “no” to “Is this a professional malpractice case?”  Pa2756.  [...] did not raise an Affidavit of Merit defense in their Answer, despite raising twenty-nine (29) separate defenses.  Pa2749-52.  Defendant [...] filed their answer on or about April 21, 2016.  Pa1740.  No party ever requested a Ferreira Conference, or the reassignment of the case from Track II to Track III.  On or about August 22, 2016, [...] was dismissed without prejudice.  In June 2017, [...] and [...] each moved for dismissal with prejudice based on failure to provide an Affidavit of Merit.  Pa1939; Pa2308.  After briefing and oral argument, the trial court granted both motions.  Pa2308.  Plaintiffs moved to reconsider, which was denied by Order dated September 15, 2017.  Pa1944; Pa2309.  On April 19, 2018, pursuant to leave granted, the Appellate Division reversed and remanded.
[brief] That regulation, concerning the cost, only applies to extensions as defined in N.J.A.C. 14:3-8.2.  However, that definition requires the existence of an applicant other than the utility constructing the line, since the definition of “applicant” for an extension is defined as “a person that has applied to the appropriate regulated entity . . . for the construction of an extension as defined at N.J.A.C. 14:3-8.2. ”  Since an ”extension” under N.J.A.C. 14:3-8.5 requires that the connection be from facilities of one entity to a structure of another entity, this purported authority relied upon by the court was inapplicable to the construction of a transmission line by the utility interconnecting two of the utility’s own structures.  Thus, against all of the statutes cited by [...] that empower its enactment of the Ordinance and the historical (and res judicata) litigation between [...] and [...] recognizing that power of [...], the court below had no legal authority for invalidating the Ordinance which was applicable if all of the requirements and limitations of those authorities were applied.
[brief] (Da549-50)  The PCR court was also provided documentary evidence indicating that:  -  In August 2012, [...] was at liberty.  (Da547)  - In 2014, he was arrested for multiple shootings in Atlantic City, resulting in three indictments for aggravated assault or attempted murder.  His codefendant in one of those indictments was [...].  (Da547, 551-57)  -  From December 6, 2014 to February 22, 2015, [...] and [...] were both inmates in the ACJ, and thus would have had an opportunity to speak and interact.  (Da547-48)  - In January 2015, Brown resolved his indictments with a package plea agreement.  In imposing the negotiated 10-year NERA sentence, the judge explained that in a “series of violent street crimes,” Brown had “callously used a handgun to shoot his victims. ”  20-year-old Brown had an extensive history, with his “criminality escalating sharply and violently.  A commitment to state prison is required to interrupt his dangerous behavior. ”  (Da558, 560)  Also [...] claimed [...] or his friends had killed his brother, [...], and [...] wanted to kill him to preempt retaliation (Da570-71), despite the video showing the shooter focused solely on pursuing and shooting [...].  One of [...]’s codefendants was [...]’s brother [...], suggesting he too was allied with the Lindos.  (See Da555)  Brown was also roughly the same height as the shooter.  (See 2T72-21 to 73-5)  The evidence is consistent with [...], not [...], being the shooter.  The PCR judge denied the motion without a hearing.
[brief] N.J.S.A. 46:14-2.1 provides the maker of an instrument made on behalf of a corporation or other entity may appear before an officer as defined by N.J.S.A. 46:14-6.1, and the instrument may be acknowledged before an attorney at law.  Here, the 1963 Agreement establishes the authority for the corporate officers of the parties to execute the agreement as the agreement was approved by the trustees of all the parties and attested to by the secretaries of each corporation.  Both the Deed and the 1963 Agreement were executed by [...] as the president of the [...], the grantor, and attested to by the secretary, [...], also an attorney at law.  (Da13-18; Da166-169)  On remand, the Appellate Division instructed the Trial Court to determine the intent of the parties in 1963 considering the surrounding circumstances.  The Trial Court held a five-day trial and considered the testimony of witnesses and evidence presented.  Given the clear and convincing evidence presented by the [...], and in accordance with the general rules of easement construction and interpretation, the Trial Court determined an easement was granted by the [...] to the [...].  The Trial Court’s determination cannot be disturbed because its findings are well supported by substantial and credible evidence.
[brief] The water company claimed immunity, under existing case law, against such a cause of action.  The matter was appealed to the New Jersey Supreme Court.  The Court held that a water company is not immune from liability for its negligence to provide adequate water pressure.  In its analysis, the Court observed, not unlike [...], that the water company was regulated by the [...] ("[...]") and was required through regulation to provide adequate water pressure.  Yet, despite this obligation, the Court abrogated the extant immunity under the common law by stating that "[a]lthough agreement and the regulation it adopts could serve as an independent basis for the water company's liability, we choose to rely primarily on settled principles of tort law as a basis for our decision."  Id. at 483-84.  The Court described the relationship between a water company and others in those simple terms:  Today a property owner stands in the same relation to a water company as a traveler does to a bus company; he accepts the service that is offered and pays the price that is fixed by the [...] Commissioners.  Such a situation is inherent in the very nature of a public utility which enjoys a public monopoly and is subject to public regulation.
[brief] 1  Legal Argument ..........................................................................................................  8  Point I .........................................................................................................................  8  DEFENDANT IS ENTITLED TO RELIEF UNDER STATE V. LAURICK, 120 N.J.  1 (1990)  BECAUSE HE WAS UNCOUNSELED WHEN HE ENTERED A GUILTY PLEA TO DWI ON MAY 15, 2017  IN THE MIDDLETOWN TOWNSHIP MUNICIPAL COURT.  (DA10, DA11).  Point II .....................................................................................................................  14  THE WITHIN DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO VACATE  THE MAY 15, 2017  GUILTY PLEA SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED ON DE NOVO  REVIEW GIVEN THE MUNICIPAL COURT’S FAILURE TO ELICIT  A SUFFICIENT FACTUAL BASIS FOR THE ENTRY OF DEFENDANT’S GUILTY PLEA ON MAY 15, 2017  IN ACCORDANCE WITH R. 7:6-2A(1).  (DA10, DA11).  Conclusion ..................................................................................................................
[brief] APPELLANT IS INCORRECT THAT THE BURDEN OF PROOF AS TO THE LEGALITY OF A NONCONFORMING USE FALLS ON THE PROPONENTS OF THE USE RATHER THAN ON THE “INTERESTED PERSON”  BRINGING THE APPLICATION TO THE BOARD  Appellant’s claim that the Respondent had the burden of proving the validity of its pre-existing non-conforming use on Appellant’s application to the Board misapprehends the text and purpose of the MLUL.  The MLUL provides, in pertinent part, that any “person interested in any land upon which a nonconforming use or structure exists may apply in writing for the issuance of a certificate certifying that the use . . . existed before the adoption of the ordinance which rendered the use or structure nonconforming.  The applicant shall have the burden of proof. ”  N.J.S.A. 40:55D-68 (emphasis added).  The Legislative purpose of the statute is to allow for continuance of “a pre-existing nonconforming use to co-exist with an ordinance that facially prohibits it.
[brief] I.  STANDARD OF REVIEW .................................................................  16  A.  Summary Judgment ........................................................................  16  B.  Expert Admissibility .......................................................................  17  II.  THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED A MISCARRIAGE OF JUSTICE BY PERMITTING A ‘FAILURE-TO-TIMELY-RECALL’ CLAIM THAT IS NOT RECOGNIZED BY NEW JERSEY LAW AND IS PREEMPTED BY FEDERAL LAW.
[brief] The Court can only imagine how many first offenders get admitted into some form of pre-trial intervention every year that are defendants in a pending or subsequent civil lawsuit where they could potentially be cross-examined on their guilty plea and factual plea allocution while they complete their pre-trial intervention term.  State v. Lavrik never determined that admissibility should hinge on the civil tort case proceeding to trial before the PTI term is completed.  Rather Lavrik stands for the position that the conviction and factual basis remain non-evidential if and until premature discharge from the PTI program and the convicted gets reinstated.  Id.  Knowing this could happen might motivate more defendants to go to trial because a finding of guilt or innocence after a criminal trial is never admissible.
[brief] PROCEDURAL HISTORY  Plaintiff filed a complaint against defendants on or about December 9, 2022 (Pa1 – Pa251).  On March 20, 2023, defendant [...] motioned to dismiss for failure to state a claim (Pa252 – Pa259).  Plaintiff filed opposition to defendant [...]’s motion on April 18, 2023 (Pa260 – Pa377).  The trial judge heard oral argument on May 26, 2023 (1T). ¹  The trial judge granted [...]’s motion and dismissed plaintiff’s complaint with prejudice by way of order filed August 7, 2023 (Pa378 – Pa397).  The trial judge granted the same for [...] by way of a second order dated August 7, 2023 (Pa398 – Pa415).  Plaintiff filed motion for reconsideration on August 28, 2023 (Pa416 – Pa516).  The trial judge heard oral argument on plaintiff’s motion for ¹ 1T refers to the transcript from May 26, 2023, hearing on Defendant [...]’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. reconsideration on October 11, 2023 (2T).  The trial judge denied Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration, upheld the prior orders, and dismissed plaintiff’s complaints against [...] and [...] with prejudice (Pa520 – Pa521).  Plaintiff filed a Notice of Appeal on October 30, 2023 (Pa522 – Pa524).  **STATEMENT OF FACTS**
[brief] Defendants suggest the trial court did not sufficiently consider the opinion of their proposed expert, [...], Esquire, but the trial court properly rejected his illogical assertions.  For example, Slover initially conceded that, if the property line of the Premises directly abutted the area designated for the boardwalk, [...] then could have claimed “an implied easement to access the Boardwalk. ” (Da622).  Slover later back-peddled, stating [...] could use the boardwalk, but not traverse it to gain “access . . . to the beach and ocean beyond. ” (Da622).  Slover then concluded there could be no easement to the never-built boardwalk because the map indicated an undefined buffer between the boardwalk reservation and [...]’s property line.  (Da623).  At his deposition, however, Slover could not logically explain his position.  Without explanation, Slover asserted there is an easement only at the street-ends but not from the beachfront homes, even though the exact same two-foot buffer and proposed boardwalk transect all of those areas equally.  (Da1982).  Slover even went so far as to suggest [...] would have been a trespasser if he entered the boardwalk from anywhere but the street ends – but not a trespasser if he entered at the street ends.  (Da1972-Da1974).
[brief] BRIEF  [...], Esquire  [...]  Telephone: [...]  Telefax: [...]  E-Mail: [...]  Attorney for [...]  Appellant  [...], Esquire  Attorney Identification No: [...]  TABLE OF CONTENTS  Table of Contents.  ..................................................................................................................  i  Index to Appendix ..............................................................................................................  ii  Table of Authorities ...........................................................................................................  iv  I.  PROCEDURAL HISTORY ...............................................................................................  1  II.  STATEMENT OF FACTS ..............................................................................................  2  III.  LEGAL ARGUMENT ....................................................................................................  12  A.  The Court Was Fully Justified in Awarding Attorney’s Fees to [...] (R-7).  . . ......................................................................................................................................  12  B.  Sanctions Were Appropriate (R-7)  .........................................................................  21  C.  The Court Erred When It Reduced the Counsel Fee Award from $125,716 to $44,000 (64-A).  ..........................................................................................................................  24  D.  The Court Erred When It Released the Insurance Proceeds for the 538 AXA policy to [...] (R-69)  .........................................................................................................  47  IV.  CONCLUSION ...............................................................................................................
[directive] See note 14.  Page 38 4.5.9.18 complaint-warrant is overcome pursuant to subsection Preliminary Automated Pretrial Risk-Assessment Results Are Not Available or 4.5.6 Would Result in Undue Delay in Making Charging Decisions.  Recognizing that administrative burdens are placed on police departments when the charging decision is delayed and police are required to maintain custody of a defendant pending that decision, notwithstanding the provisions of subsection 2.2.2, if either the Live Scan system or the Judiciary’s automated PSA system is not operational, or if the results of a preliminary automated pretrial risk-assessment otherwise are not or will not be available within a reasonable period of time (e.g., within two hours of fingerprinting the defendant), an assistant prosecutor or deputy attorney general consulted in accordance with Section 3.2 of this Directive, or a supervisory officer designated pursuant to subsection 3.3.2, may proceed to make the complaint- summons versus complaint-warrant determination by applying the provisions/presumptions set forth in Section 4 that do not depend on the results of an automated pretrial risk assessment.
[brief] Respectfully submitted, [...]  [...]  Dated: 1/9/24  [...], [...]  [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], AND [...], Plaintiffs/Respondents, v. [...] d/b/a [...], JOHN DOES 1-10, AND XYZ CORPORATIONS 1-5, Defendant/ Appellant.
[brief] \(^{27}\) \(^{27}\)  In *Lovett*, the plaintiffs sought to recover attorney’s fees allegedly necessitated by defendants’ negligence.  Those legal fees were incurred by the plaintiff in suing many defendants, including their attorney for various claims.  All of those claims were either settled or abandoned.  Just as in the instant case, that: “[e]ven if plaintiffs had proven malpractice, no losses were demonstrated which were proximately caused by [...] (the attorney).
[directive] 3.3.1  Proper supervision is critical to the discipline and management of a law enforcement agency.  To maximize their effectiveness, agency supervisors should receive appropriate supervisory training as close as possible to the time of their promotion.  Emphasis should be placed on anticipating problems among officers before they result in improper performance or conduct.  Supervisors are expected to recognize potentially troublesome officers, identify training needs of officers and provide professional support in a fair and consistent manner.  3.4
[brief] In 1988, the FTC published its Staff Commentary which, among other things, reconciled how a debt collector could use those FCC-regulated communications industries without violating § 1692c(b).  Comment 3 to Section 805(b) of the Federal Trade Commission, *Statements of General Policy or Interpretation Staff Commentary on the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act*, 53 Fed. Reg. 50097-02 (Dec. 13, 1988) states:  Incidental contacts with telephone operator or telegraph clerk.  A debt collector may contact an employee of a telephone or telegraph company in order to contact the consumer, without violating the prohibition on communication to third parties, if the only information given is that necessary to enable the collector [sic—perhaps “operator”] to transmit the message to, or make the contact with, the consumer.  [Emphasis added.]  The data Defendant shared with its mail vendor (Pa3 at ¶14, Pa9) far exceeds the limited information necessary “to transmit the message to, or make contact with, the consumer.
[brief] Testimony from the Board Planner established the Property was unoccupied and appears to have previously been used as storage.  (T1, 48:1-20).  The Board Planner explained that storage is not a permitted use in the Business District, and if the Property were being used for storage, it would require a use variance and a site plan approval, neither of which have been obtained.  (T1, 48:16-24).  Therefore, all legal use of the Property ended in 2017.
[brief] State v. W.B., 205 N.J. 588 (2011).  The Court held, “if notes of a law enforcement officer are lost or destroyed before trial, a defendant, upon request, may be entitled to an adverse inference charge molded, after conference with counsel, to the facts of the case. ”  205 N.J. at 608–09.  The reason for that requirement is so the defendant has a basis to cross-examine the police officer at trial.  The issue is both one of discovery and due process right to confront the witnesses:  Yet the possibility of a misrecording is precisely why the notes must be maintained—a defendant, protected by the Confrontation Clause and our rules of discovery, is entitled to test whether the contemporaneous recording is accurate or the final report is inaccurate because of some inconsistency with a contemporaneous recordation.  It is for the jury to decide the credibility of the contemporaneous or other recordation made while an investigation is on-going prior to preparation of a formal report.  Id. at 607–08.  The Court held that it was an abuse of discretion and reversible error to deny an adverse inference charge where an officer threw out “his lengthy pre-interview notes involving a murder investigation” one year after indictment.
[brief] Thereafter, [...] impeded [...]’s participation as a speaker in the American Waterworks seminar to be held on November 6, 2014 and she impeded [...]’s participation in the annual Rutgers University “Safe Drinking Water Regulatory Update” in 2014 (Pa539).  [...] suppressed Dillons presentations on open air water reservoirs and fracking stating they were “political” (Pa540-Pa541).  On February 3, 2015, [...] requested disciplinary action against [...] for “[t]wo incidents at the Safe Drinking Water Regulatory Update seminar in New Brunswick” in 2014 annual Rutgers University” (Pa532-Pa537, page 2 “Incident Details”).  On February 3, 2015, [...] and [...] engaged in harassment of [...] by interfering with his scheduled presentation at the American Waterworks Association Annual Conference on Thursday, March 19, 2015 on “Effecting Behavioral change for Asset Management” which the American Waterworks Association had already been accepted and placed on the agenda.  (Pa868; Pa869-Pa873).  On February 10, 2015, Dillon filed a formal complaint of discrimination and retaliation with the [...] and 10 days later, on February 20, 2015, the [...] ([...]) advised [...] of a request to discipline him.
[brief] Rule 2:6-1(a)(2) allows for inclusion of briefs in the appendix when “the brief is referred to in the decision. ”  Here, as quoted above, the February 14, 2024 decision refers to the legal arguments contained in Defendants’ motions as frivolous and without merit, thus justifying brief inclusion.  446 N.J. Super. 570, 579 (App. Div. 2016).  Therefore, Plaintiff’s failure to properly file a motion for frivolous sanctions precludes an award.
[directive] ODARA in (discussing victim officers through an with the enforcement interview law "manually" administered by prior criminal history and related defendant's records (e.g., of the a review and/or and others of ODARA comprised Dispatch reports, etc.).  The assessment is Computer Aided police reports, there concern for future whether others, the victim's assault, among including, 13 items separate victim pregnant during an substance use whether the was assault, relationship, children in the are criminal history of item is non-domestic the arrestee.  Each and domestic either and by party, score is the and a "0" fora "no" response.  The raw response "1" fora "yes" b.~usin~a scored can to five 13.  The assessment be scored with up from 0 to which ranges of items, sum the proration for unknown or items.  A subject to missing is raw score and the missing items, utilizing his/her final Each risk categories of risk score.
[directive] Your total exposure as the result of this plea is:  Sírvase marcar la respuesta apropiada con un círculo / Please Circle Appropriate Answer  2.  a.  ¿Cometió usted la infracción (las infracciones) de que se declara culpable?  [Sí/Yes]  [No/No]  Did you commit the offense(s) to which you are pleading guilty?  b.  ¿Entiende que antes de que el juez lo pueda encontrar culpable, tendrá que decirle al juez qué [Sí/Yes]  [No/No] es lo que usted hizo que lo hace culpable de la infracción particular (de las infracciones particulares)?  Do you understand that before the judge can find you guilty, you will have to tell the judge what you did that makes you guilty of the particular offense(s)?  3.  ¿Entiende lo que significan los cargos?  [Sí/Yes]  [No/No]  Do you understand what the charges mean?  4.  ¿Entiende que al declararse culpable, usted renuncia a ciertos derechos?  Entre ellos están:  Do you understand that by pleading guilty you are giving up certain rights?  Among them are:  a.  El derecho a un juicio con jurado en que el Estado tiene que probar su culpabilidad fuera de [Sí/Yes] [No/No] duda razonable?  The right to a jury trial in which the State must prove you guilty beyond a reasonable doubt?  *  Multa de la Oficina de Compensación a Víctimas de Delitos / Victims of Crime Compensation Office Assessment Iniciales del acusado/Defendant’s Initials Formulario principal de declaración/Formulario enmendado promulgado por la directriz #01-18 (02/23/2018), CN 10079-Spanish página 1 de 7 Main Plea Form/Revised Form Promulgated by Directive #01-18 (02/23/2018), CN 10079-Spanish page 1 of 7