ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The New Jersey Supreme Court established the following fact-intensive standard for “constructive discharge” in Shepherd v. Hunterdon Developmental Center, “[g]enerally, a constructive discharge [] occurs when an “employer knowingly permits conditions of [] employment so intolerable that a reasonable person subject to them would resign. ”  174 N.J. 1, 27-28 (2002) (NJLAD case) (quoting Muench v. Township of Haddon, 255 N.J. Super. 288, 302 (App. Div. 1992).  For example, in reversing the trial court in Smith v. New Jersey Dep't of Health & Senior Servs., the Appellate division explained:  The judge's decision was inconsistent with the summary judgment standard because she found plaintiff's allegations to be insufficient by viewing them separately rather than collectively.  For example, the judge's conclusion that the alleged overbearing reprimand by a supervisor on one occasion does not meet the Shepherd standard may be sustainable when viewed alone, but when plaintiff's allegations are considered collectively—that for a lengthy period of time the employer failed to promote or pay plaintiff commensurate with her duties and that, when plaintiff complained, the reprimand and the assignment of a small cubicle followed—a factfinder could conclude that a reasonable person would find the situation had become intolerable.  No. A-4989-11T2, 2013 WL 6063587, at *2-4 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Nov. 19, 2013).  (Pa1224).  This case certainly involves more than being assigned to a “small cubicle. ”  Defendants cannot, and have not, established as a matter of law that Appellant “simply quit”—Appellant resigned because she was sexually harassed the workplace; she was retaliated against for complaining of same; her employer refused to investigate, ignored her complaints of retaliation, and failed to institute any remedial plan; employees spread false rumors she was sleeping with co-workers and wore promiscuous attire; [...] stalked her inside and outside of the workplace; and she transferred to a different office in direct retaliation for engaging in protected conduct.
[brief] Q: So, as we sit here today, you are unable to quantify when the wave over-topping onto the subject property, which you contend is a result of the post-construction conditions, would occur, correct?  A: That is correct.  Da492:12-17 [emphasis added].  The Borough’s appraisal report reflects the damage caused to the area by Super Storm Sandy, which the Project alleviated; pictures included in the Borough’s appraisal report reflect said storm damage.  Pa00021-24.  So, too, does the Miller Report contain photos of the storm damage to the Property.  Da419-421.  However, the Watermen Report and the Wade Appraisal failed to provide any comparison between pre- and post- construction flooding and damage to the subject property; such an analysis is essential in order to opine that the newly constructed seawall, which was designed to provide “a continuous wall to be completed and the damaged elements rebuilt to a more robust design . . . ,” (Pa00021) is inferior to the pre-existing damaged seawall upon the Property prior to the construction of the Project.  As [...] testified during his deposition:  Q.  Are you able to tell us the rate of over-topping in the subject property’s pre and post sea wall condition?  A.  No, I’m not.  Not at this time [Da488:7-10 emphasis added]  The lack of such a comparison reveals the unduly speculative nature of the Watermen Report.  Ironically, Appellant’s appraisal reflects that the damaged seawall provided added storm protection to the Property, stating, “The subject is protected by a seawall.  Sale No. 2 is not protected by a seawall.  An upward adjustment is required. ”  Da277 [emphasis added].  Hence, Appellant’s appraiser increased the value of the Property due to the seawall when he adjusted Comparable Sale #2 because the sale property lacked a protective seawall.  Based thereon, [...]’s deposition testimony supports the trial court’s conclusion that the Watermen Report constitutes a net opinion where Mr.  Raichle’s conclusions were arrived at first, unsupported by any calculations.  Based upon the findings of the Miller Report, the methodology contained in the Watermen Report is not sound “from the perspective of others within the relevant scientific community” as required by established case law.  See, In re Accutane, supra at 399-400.  Under New Jersey’s established law, the Watermen Report constitutes an impermissible net opinion and was properly barred.  See, Pomerantz Paper Corp., *supra* at 372.  The lack of any objective or scientific methodology demonstrates that the Watermen Report is not based upon “scientifically sound” reasoning and, based upon the opinions contained in the Miller Report, “comparable experts” do not “accept the soundness” of the Watermen Report due to its total lack of any foundation or objective methodology.  Based thereon, the trial court properly performed its gatekeeping function by barring Appellant from relying upon the Watermen Report and those portions of the Wade Appraisal which rely thereon.
[brief] STANDARD OF REVIEW  This Court reviews an order on summary judgment *de novo*, using the *Brill* standard.  See, *Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Boylan*, 307 N.J. Super. 162, 167 (App. Div.), *certif. denied*, 154 N.J. 608 (1998); see also, *Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am.*, 142 N.J. 520, 529 (1995).  Pursuant to R. 4:46-2, summary judgment is warranted when:  [T]he pleadings, deposition, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact challenged and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  *Id.*  Moreover, the standard for summary judgment pursuant to R. 4:46-2 has been linked to the moving party’s evidentiary standard of proof.  The *Brill* court held that “when deciding summary judgment motions, trial courts are required to engage in the same type of evaluation, analysis or shifting of evidential materials as required by R. 4:37-2(b) in light of the burden of persuasion that applies if the matter goes to trial. ”  *Brill*, 142 N.J. at 540–41.  The Supreme Court of New Jersey opined that when deciding whether a “genuine” issue of material fact exists, the court must “consider whether the competent evidential materials presented, when viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, are sufficient to permit a rational fact finder to resolve the alleged disputed issue in favor of the non-moving party. ”  *Id.* at 540.  If there exists a single, unavoidable resolution of the alleged disputed issue of fact, that issue should be considered insufficient to constitute a “genuine” issue of material fact for the purposes of R. 4:46-2.  *Id.* (citing *Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.*, 477 U.S. 242 (1986)).  Additionally, our Supreme Court has reasoned that “[u]nder established rules of appellate review . . . [this court] give[s] deference to the trial court’s factual findings. ”  *State v. Harris*, 181 N.J. 391, 451 (2004) (citing *Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Investors Ins. Co. of Am.*, 65 N.J. 474, 484 (1974)).  “And for mixed questions of law and fact, [the Appellate Division] gives deference, under *Rova Farms* to the supported factual findings of the trial court, but reviews *de novo* the lower court’s application of any legal rules to such factual findings. ”  *Harris, supra*, 181 N.J. at 416.  Thus, this Court should give deference to the trial court’s factual findings the application of any legal rules regarding the same.  *Id.*  II.
[brief] No party has alleged that [...] had such a duty.  [...] was last involved in the property over 30 days before Plaintiff’s fall.  (Pa452, 20:14-24).  b.  Plaintiff has not shown that paint made the icy stairs more slippery  The existence and scope of a duty of care must sometimes be supported by expert testimony.  Hopkins, 132 N.J. at 444.  Expert testimony is required when “a subject is so esoteric that jurors of common judgment and experience cannot form a valid conclusion. ”  Id. at 450 quoting Wyatt by Caldwell v. Wyatt, 217 N.J. Super. 580 (App. Div. 1987); Phillips v. Gelpke, 190 N.J. 580, 590 (2007); N.J.R.E. 702 (“If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.
[brief] (10T 60:8-22, Jan. 25, 2023).  [...], [...]’s realtor and property manager, also testified about [...]’s ownership and control of the Property.  [...] testified that he helped maintain the Property for [...] for the past four-plus years.  (9T 7:18-12:16, Jan. 24, 2023).  In particular, he would conduct and/or arrange for sidewalk maintenance, fix the steps, paint, arrange for snow removal, and find tenants.  He would also act as a liaison between the tenant, [...], and [...] with respect to maintenance requests, often hiring the maintenance personnel on [...]’s behalf.  He would also check on the Property and make sure that there were no cars illegally parked at the Property.  As was the case with [...], [...] has never heard of or met [...], [...], [...] or [...].  (9T 13:17-14:8, Jan. 24, 2023).
[directive] For example, for first-degree violations of N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5, the court is required to impose a parole disqualifier “at, or between, one-third and one-half of the sentence imposed,” while for first- degree violations of N.J.S.A. 2C:35-3, the court must ensure that the offender “serve 25 years before being eligible for parole.
[brief] So, any shore town, especially [...], wants to maximize water views, especially through redevelopment.  [...] is a unique Borough in that you have bay views to the west side, ocean views to the east side.  And in this circumstance to have water views to the east, there are a few corridors that you’re dealing with, but mainly you’re dealing with the beach club that was recently approved, that again received a height variance that it built to the elevation of the boardwalk.
[brief] The diagram, as an exact rendering of what happened is misleading to the jury and its prejudice outweighs its probative value.  The Court heard the objection at sidebar and sustained the objection, ruling that page 4 of the police report was not admissible.  The Court noted that the trooper testified that he has no indicator as to distances, nor the timing of the light, particularly with regard to [...]’s vehicle.  The deposition testimony of [...] leads the Court to believe that [...] is going to testify at trial that he was stopped at a red light and that the light then turned green.  However, the diagram does not depict same.  The diagram shows [...]’s vehicle as a moving vehicle, in motion, and does not show [...] stopped for the light.  The Court further noted the Court’s concern with the diagram showing [...] moving/in motion because same was not based on the trooper’s observation.  The diagram also depicted the two other vehicles coming down the other roadway.  The Court did note that the diagram had two X’s in circles that depicted the point of impact, but the diagram also contained the movement of the vehicles, how far the vehicles were from the intersection, [...] is depicted farther back from the intersection versus stopped at the light/intersection, and the [...] van is depicted a finger length from the intersection and Plaintiff’s vehicle is shown four finger lengths away and the trooper has no basis upon which to have put the vehicles in those locations.  Because the trooper did not make those observations, the probative value of the diagram for the points of impact of the vehicles did not weight the undue prejudice to the other parties with regard to the depictions of the vehicles prior to impact.  Further, there was no prejudice to Defendants [...] and [...] because several photographs of the scene of the accident were entered into evidence, so the jury could see the points of impacts on the vehicles in the photographs, just as the trooper observed when he arrived at the scene.  The Court disagreed with Defendants [...] and [...] that the proper foundation for the diagram had been laid as the trooper had testified that he had no idea the distances of the vehicles from the intersection prior to impact and same were not based upon his personal observations.  After reviewing all of the above, as well as the arguments set forth in the current motion and opposition, for all of the reasons set forth above, the Court concludes that the Court properly exercised its discretion in excluding the trooper’s opinion as to who caused the accident and in excluding the diagram contained in his police report.
[brief] Q:  How do you know it was a miscommunication, when you say it was a miscommunication between you and [...] who also works for [...]?  A: Because when all the information was gathered after the crash then I came to that conclusion from the information.  Q:  Okay, what information are you talking about?  When you come to say anything about your lawyer, do not tell us what your lawyer said.  When did you formulate this determination that this was a miscommunication?  A:  Like I said when all – when all of the information was gathered it come to my attention that [...] said he was talking about the grass and I heard him say just a cutoff.  [Da46-47, 29:15-30:3.]  Subsequent to the accident, [...] became aware of this miscommunication regarding which specific cut-through he was supposed to use.  Due to that miscommunication, [...] believed that he was supposed to use the paved cut-through, rather than the unpaved “grass” cut through:  Q: Why did you use the emergency vehicle turnaround at 87.5?  A: Because I was instructed to use the turnaround by the foreman on the job.  It was a miscommunication, I thought that that was the one I was supposed to use when there was one further back over the grass that he was talking about.
[brief] RENDERING PLAINTIFF’S CLAIM INACTIONABLE ON THE SAME BASIS AS ITS RULING UNDER THE NEW JERSEY TAX SALE LAW (42a-43a) (cross-appeal)  ..................................................29  IV.  THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO DECIDE, AND SHOULD HAVE GRANTED, THE PORTION OF [...]’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT WHICH DIRECTLY CHALLENGED THE LEGAL SUFFICIENCY OF EACH CLAIM IN THE COMPLAINT (39a-40a) (this aspect of the summary judgment motion was not decided below) ..............................................................................................................39
[brief] A.  The Trial Court’s Orders Threatens the Very Fabric of the [...] Community (Raised Below: Da508; 879).  Not only did the trial court’s partial summary judgment order disregard the [...]’ intent, but it also threatens a key purpose of the [...] community: to provide its members with access to one of the Jersey Shore’s most pristine beaches.  If, as the trial court summarily concluded, [...] lacks authority to enforce its own “rules or regulations” and the Genesis Deed’s restrictions, then the [...] conveyance of the “Beach Front Section” is threatened by a right of reverter.  Only a few months after conveyance of the Genesis Deed, the [...] conveyed to [...], the “Beach Front Section” on the condition that it be used for the benefit of [...]’s members and that [...] enforce the Genesis Deed’s restrictions, along with the its own “present by-laws. ” (Da706).  Notably, the “present by-laws” in effect at the time of this conveyance required all members to “swear to abide by the provisions of the Certificate of Incorporation of the Club, these by-laws, and any subsequent regulations imposed by this Club. ” (Da481).  These by-laws—first implemented in 1948—plainly put the Property’s successors-in-interest on notice that they were subject to [...]’s current rules “and any subsequent regulations imposed” by [...] in the future. (Id.).  The trial court’s partial summary judgment decision necessarily means that the [...] can exercise their right to reverter of the “Beach Front Section. ”  Had the trial court interpreted the Genesis Deed in a manner effectuating the [...]’ intent, this would not be an issue; however, because the trial court plainly ignored the [...]’ intent, [...]’s ability to “promote and protect the general welfare and property rights of the property owner members in their use and enjoyment of their property at Ocean Beach” pursuant to its Certificate of Incorporation is threatened.  Despite the trial court’s claimed exercise of “judicial restraint” in limiting its holding only to Plaintiffs and not the larger [...] community, the fact remains that the very purpose of the [...] community—enjoying a certain neighborhood scheme at the Jersey Shore—can be completely and irreparably destroyed if the [...], or their successors-in-interest, exercise their right to reverter if [...] can no longer enforce the Genesis Deed or its own rules and regulations.  This further underscores the trial court’s error in disregarding the intent of the Genesis Deed and the creation of the [...] generally.
[brief] 22 State v. McCabe, 201 N.J. 34 (2010).....................................................................................................................  22 State v. Olenowski, 255 N.J. 529 (2023) .................................................................................................................. 33, 34  State v. Richardson, 452 N.J. Super. 124 (App. Div. 2017) ....................................................................................... 29, 30, 31, 32  State v. Thomas, 372 N.J. Super. 29 (App. Div. 2004)  .........................................................................................  18 State v. Tucker, 264 N.J. Super. 549 (App. Div. 1993) .......................................................................................  21 State v. W.B., 205 N.J. 588 (2011)  .....................................................................................................................  30 State v. Weaver, 219 N.J. 131 (2014) .....................................................................................................................  19, 20 State v. Zingis, 471 N.J. Super. 590 (App. Div.), certif. gr., cause remanded on other grounds, 251 N.J. 502 (2022) ....................................................................................................................
[directive] Oskarżony/Defendant Data/Date Adwokat obrony/Defense Attorney Prokurator/Prosecutor Formularz udostępniony na mocy Dyrektywy #01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 11171-Polish strona 2 z 2 Form Promulgated by Directive #01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 11171-Polish page 2 of 2 고지: 이 양식은 공개되는 문서이므로, 요청이 있으면 제출된 상태로 대중에게 제공됩니다.
[brief] See R. 3:21-2(b) (“After the presentence investigation and before imposing sentence, the court may order, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:44-6c, a physical or mental examination of the defendant provided that the defendant may not be committed to an institution for the purpose of that examination. ”); N.J.S.A. 2C:44-6c (“If, after the presentence investigation, the court desires additional information concerning an offender convicted of an offense before imposing sentence, it may order any additional psychological or medical testing of the defendant. ”).  Therefore, where there is reason to believe that a psychological evaluation would include information relevant to sentencing, the court should order one.  The sentencing court in this case was required to order a psychological evaluation for a number of reasons.  As explained in Section A, a “complete psychological evaluation” was required under the first provision of N.J.S.A. 2C:44-6b because [...] was facing sentencing for a first- or second-degree crime of violence and has a prior endangering conviction.
[directive] 7.10  Notification  When Motion for Pretrial Detention Is Denied.  If a prosecutor files a motion for pretrial detention pursuant to this Directive and the court denies the motion and releases the defendant, the prosecutor shall notify the Director of the Division of Criminal Justice to consider appropriate remedies, including but not limited an appeal.  Notification shall be made in the form and manner as prescribed by the Director.  See also Section 15 (ongoing study and evaluation of Bail Reform Law’s effectiveness and impact).  Page 67  In the event that the defendant thereafter is charged with a new crime while on release or flees and the prosecutor seeks revocation of release pursuant to Section 8 or initial pretrial detention on the new charge pursuant to Section 7, the prosecutor shall provide a copy of the motions papers to the court that had denied the pretrial detention motion even if that court is not the court that will decide the revocation of release or new pretrial detention motion.  This amended Section shall become operational immediately upon issuance of this Directive.
[brief] Although discovery was not completed at the time of the trial court’s partial summary judgment decision, [...] was able to secure the Certification of [...] who has personal knowledge of the involvement of the [...] and [...] in developing the [...] community.  Mr. McDonough certified that the [...] and [...] were the “Developers” of the community and that they “reviewed applications to fulfill the ‘genesis deed’ obligation of the [...]. ” (Da882).  Mr. McDonough further certified that, for the last 35 years, he has worked on behalf of the [...] to provide oversight to [...], including the “approval or denial or modification building and construction plan applications. ” (Da882-883).  Mr. McDonough further certified that, to his knowledge, the [...], and/or their heirs, successors, or assigns, maintain their right of reverter for certain properties conveyed to [...] if the Genesis Deed restrictions and [...]’s rules are not followed.\(^3\) (Da884).  Due to the premature filing and grant of the Plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary judgment, [...] has been unable to meaningfully pursue additional documentary and testimonial discovery from Mr. McDonough or the heirs, successors, or assigns of the [...], including from the limited partnership and limited liability company that were formed to carry on the [...]’ intent.
[brief] ”  Ibid.  A defendant is not entitled to a new trial unless all three prongs are satisfied.  State v. Ways, 180 N.J. 171, 187 (2004).  Defendant has not even attempted to meet the second prong of this test—demonstrating that the documents were undiscoverable by reasonable diligence before trial—but merely argues that he did not think he needed any additional evidence because his believed his case was so strong.  But as he concedes, his family located the documents “immediately following” his conviction in documents stored in the family garage as soon as they felt motivated to look for them.  (Db22).  The fact that the documents were disorganized and the task was difficult does not alter the fact that both the initial paper documents and the electronic documents that were subsequently found by searching defendant’s own emails for “around an hour” were, indeed, readily discoverable before trial with reasonable diligence.  (See Sa24).  The fact that defendant was able to file a motion for a new trial based on the discovery of the documents just eight days after his conviction is ample proof that he could have located them at any point during the four years between the indictment and trial had he only bothered to try.