ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] (Da166.)  It directed the parties to produce all non-privileged ESI search hits without a further relevancy review.  (Da167 ¶¶ 1-2.)  But it permitted the parties to “withhold or redact a small subset of ESI documents that contain information so proprietary that their production could result in business losses or disruption, with each such document separately identified on a ‘business proprietary’ log. ”  (Da167 ¶ 3.)  This appeal followed.  (Da187-90.)  LEGAL ARGUMENT I.
[brief] STANDARD OF REVIEW.  [...] are disqualified from representing a party adverse to [...] and [...] where [...] previously represented [...], Individually and Van Saders objected to the subsequent representation.  A trial court's "determination of whether counsel should be disqualified is, as an issue of law, City of Atlantic City v. Trupos, 201 N.J. 447, 463 (2010), citing, J.G. Ries & Sons, Inc. v. Spectraserv, Inc., 348 N.J.Super. 216, 222 (App. Div. 2006).  When reviewing such a determination, we must “‘balance competing interests, weighing the need to maintain the highest standards of the profession against a client’s right freely to choose his counsel.
[brief] The Trial Court’s Award of Punitive Damages Must be Vacated (39970a-39989a).  In their briefs, Plaintiffs do not hide their wholesale reliance on the findings of [...] in defending the award of punitive damages.  (See, e.g., Halpern_Pb 57-58).  But insofar as they purport to underlie the imposition of punitive damages, [...]’s punitive damages award was entirely vacated, and the Trial Court was tasked with reevaluating the award of punitive damages while considering only acts that occurred solely within the statute of limitations (“SOL”) period.  Within that period (October 1, 2003 – December 31, 2011), the Trial Court did not make appropriate findings from which it could impose punitive damages.  [...] made no such findings and the Trial Court merely relied upon the same non-existent findings.  And such findings were required under R. 1:7-4.
[brief] In addition to the above, since the Judgment should not be molded, the Offer of Judgment penalties were correctly applied.  R. 4:58-2.  In *McMahon v. NJM Ins. Co.*, 364 N.J. Super 188 (App. Div. 2003), the court specifically stated that all of the enhanced sanctions of Rule 4:58-1 are not limited in any way to insurance coverage.  *Id.* at 189.  The sanctions are the direct responsibility of the insurance carrier over and above the insurance policy limits.  *Id.*  Therefore, the Judgment should stand as is.
[brief] ”  N.J.S.A. 18A:12-22.  The Legislature further mandated that the Commission must “ensure the uniform maintenance of those standards. ”  Id.  To that end, the Commission developed a clear and consistent body of decisional law relating to social media use by school board members.  In doing so, the Commission carefully weighed the First Amendment rights school board members enjoy as individuals alongside the State’s compelling interest in ensuring school boards maintain the public’s trust.  The Commission has long held that when school board members make social media posts from accounts they used to campaign for their seats, those school board members have a duty to affirmatively disclaim their school board membership to mitigate the risk of compromising the Board.
[brief] (8T216-24 to 217-1).  Defendant was interviewed twice by detectives on the night [...] was killed, and those interviews were recorded and played for the jury.  (8T104-18 to 107-6; 8T110-14 to 16; 9T12-5 to 7; 9T13-11 to 12; 9T14-8 to 15-9).  During those interviews, defendant did not initially tell detectives that [...] had asked him leave the shower because of the argument.
[brief] First, the Court disregarded the holding in the City of Millville case based on the observation that one of the notes in the case (the second note) had eliminated the personal liability language in favor of language that trusts guaranteed the loan to the corporation.  This position ignores the fact that the first note in the case contains personal liability language that is very similar to the Lease in the case at bar and is directly comparable with the Lease in this case.  Second, the Trial Court failed to acknowledge the two guiding principles espoused by the Court in the City of Millville case as important in determining personal liability and failed to apply the factors to the case at bar.  Third, the Trial Court erred in its ruling because the Court was not supplied with any case law by Plaintiff whatsoever that found personal liability in a situation where there was not a separate signature line on which the alleged guarantor signed in their individual capacity. \(^2\)  Fourth, the Trial Court erred in finding an enforceable personal guaranty because it failed to give any consideration to the terms of the Prior Lease which highlight how muddled the Lease is regarding guarantees compared with a properly drafted agreement.  Finally, the Court erred \(^2\) The guaranty cases cited by Plaintiff in their summary judgment briefing do not support the Trial Court’s ruling.  Ctr. 48 Ltd. P'ship v. May Dept. Stores Co., 355 N.J. Super. 390, 405 (App. Div. 2002), Mount Holly State Bank v. Mount Holly Washington Hotel, Inc., 220 N.J. Super. 506 (App. Div. 1987) and Housatonic Bank & Trust Co. v. Fleming, 234 N.J. Super. 79 (App. Div. 1989) all involve separate guaranty documents that were signed by the individual parties.
[brief] Pa360a.  [...], [...]’s former safety supervisor who inspected the sweeper immediately after the accident, observed that its lights, backup camera, and backup alarm were “in full working order” on the night of the accident.  Pa271a-74a.  There is no evidence contradicting [...]’s findings.  Plaintiff and her experts further assert that the existence of several prior accidents on [...] jobs over the course of fifteen years demonstrates a “conscious, indifferent approach to safety” that was a cause of the accident.
[brief] ” (2T14:23-15:2).  The trial court explained that determining “whether [...]’s inclusion and enforcement of the [Concession Recovery Provision] as to every individual tenant’s lease violates the CFA” would “result in a series of individualized assessments and a . . . parade of mini-trials to determine which individuals belong in the proposed class, an enormous undertaking that [is not] necessary at this time. ” (2T15:13-21).
[directive] B.  If a law enforcement officer attempts to notify a victim of an offender’s release, a copy of the updated VNF showing those attempts and contact must be faxed to the respective County Prosecutor’s Victim-Witness Coordinator or, when appropriate, to the Division of Criminal Justice Victim-Witness Coordinator.  C.  Updates to victim information will only be made by the Victim-Witness Coordinators in each county or, when appropriate, by the Division of Criminal Justice Victim-Witness Coordinator.
[brief] ”  (Da62) (emphasis added).  With no criminal record, [...] should have explicitly found mitigating factor (7), “no history of prior delinquency or criminal activity....”  N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1b(7).  The judge did note, but appeared to give no weight to, defendant’s deferred disposition for a juvenile shoplifting.  (5T24-12 to 15).  Why she didn’t then find mitigating factor (7) is unclear, but it is obvious the original sentence judge, whose findings as to aggravating and mitigating factors she adopted, took “into consideration [defendant]’s age, as well as the fact that Mr.  Hawkins does not have a substantial criminal and/or juvenile history” in imposing sentence.  (2T19-5 to 19) (emphasis added).  Since this was implicitly found by both sentencing courts, the JOC should be amended to so reflect.
[directive] B. BAIL REPORT  U.D.I.R. completed  SECTION D at jail interview.  Bail narrative offense  BAIL REPORT information reports completed soon after SECTION E at C.C.M.O.  Section F, the criminal OFFENSE INFORMATION  REPORT history analysis and rap sheet may also be added; however, the U.D.I.R. contains a capsule criminal history which SECTION F may be sufficient.  PRIOR COURT HISTORY REPORT (OPTIONAL)  SECTION  A U.D.I.R. *
[brief] (Pa678).  The defendants characterize this incident as “[...] cho[o]s[ing] not to seek approval despite the fact he was advertising his ‘30 years of service with New Jersey’s Water Community,’ was speaking in New Jersey, and was addressing ‘licensed operators,’ who appear to be water systems regulated by the DEP.  (Pa353-355). ” (Db12).  This is disputed.  [...] did not choose “not to seek approval” to speak at the [...] annual convention as defendants contend.  This is pretext for retaliation for engaging in protected activity because 1) there was no rule regarding obtaining permission before submitting an abstract to speak at an outside event, 2) [...] had filled out a Speaker Request form and provided it to [...] and [...], 3) [...] had ethics approval to be an individual member of the [...] and to conduct speaking engagements outside the [...].  Thus, this is an issue of fact for the jury to decide and not one to be decided on a motion for summary judgment.
[brief] The suggestion that the building envelope size Plaintiff proposed was imperative to cap the soil contamination on Lot 5 was not supported by record evidence.  Testimony indicated there were alternatives to effectively contain soil conditions with a smaller envelope, and that the envelope for which approval was sought, which exceeded the maximum permitted building coverage by upwards of 25%, was not a necessity for environmental remediation purposes, but simply reflected Plaintiff’s desire for a building at such scale and mass, and on a 0.59 acre parcel.
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[brief] c.  It shall be unlawful to purposely, knowingly, or recklessly:  (1)  Torment, torture, maim, hang, poison, unnecessarily or cruelly beat, cruelly abuse, or needlessly mutilate a living animal or creature; (2)  Cause bodily injury to a living animal or creature by failing to provide the living animal or creature with necessary care, whether as the owner or as a person otherwise charged with the care of the living animal or creature; [or] (3)  Cause or procure an act described in paragraph (1) or (2) of this subsection to be done, by any direct or indirect means, including but not limited to through the use of another living animal or creature[.]  * * *
[brief] (iv)  The Court Contradicted Itself  On this motion for summary judgment, the New Motion Judge determined that [...]’s and [...]’s opinions were “suppositions” and “beliefs about situations which did not exist. ”  [Pa9].  This is because it was not possible, the court insists, for an emergency C-section to be completed within fifteen between the deceleration readings and the completion of the C-Section.  [Pa9-10].  The court then immediately acknowledges thereafter that [...] performed the [...]’ emergency C-section, called at about 10:12 p.m. upon seeing the readings, and completing at 10:27 p.m.  [Pa9].  Obviously, emergency C-sections can be completed within fifteen minutes between reading and completion.  In the end, neither [...] nor [...] called for the emergency C-section at 9:48 p.m.  In fact, [...] was the one who called for that procedure, at about 10:12 p.m.  This meant the procedure could not be completed within fifteen minutes of 9:48 p.m.  Plaintiff established a deviation from the standard of care on the part of these doctors.  The New Motion Judge erred by granting summary judgment to these defendants, and the entities which employed them are vicariously liable for their negligence.
[directive] If the offense occurred on or after January 5, 1994 and you are being sentenced to probation, you must pay a fee of up to $25 per month for the term of probation?  g.  Se o crime ocorreu no dia 9 de janeiro de 1997 ou após esta data, você deverá pagar uma [Sim/Yes] [Não/No] multa de $30 referente ao Fundo para Equipamento e Treinamento de Agentes Policiais?
[brief] A.  The Subject Property.  The subject Property is located at [...].  The Block is 2005 and the Lot number is 30.02 which is depicted on the Tax Assessment Map of the [...].  The lot is an interior lot on the west side of Washington Street and located south of 7th Avenue.  The subject Property is located in the C-2 Commercial Zone.  (Da209).  The zoning designation for the subject Property was formerly the CBD Zone.  However, as a result of the 2018 Master Plan, this Property was rezoned and designated in the C-2 Zone along with the surrounding properties.  (Da209 and Da210).  The subject Property contains a commercial unit located within an existing mixed-use commercial and residential building and is located within the C-2 Zone.  The first floor is commercially developed and the second and third floors are developed residentially.  (Da210).  After the adoption of the Land Use Plan in 2018, the zoning ordinance was subsequently amended and the CBD Zones were eliminated.  (Da210).  The Applicant proposes to occupy approximately 865 square feet of space at street level with use of the basement area for non-retail purposes.  Thus, the Applicant will occupy a total of approximately 1,095 square feet of space.  (Da221).  The Applicant proposes only internal modifications to the space to be occupied.  No exterior construction is proposed.  (Da218).  The Board and the Applicant reviewed the issue of whether or not off-street parking was required in connection with the development application.  The Board Engineer, [...], confirmed that one (1) parking space is required if there are twenty (20) or more persons on-site.  (Da219).  The Applicant’s Planner, [...], agreed to a condition of approval that a maximum of nineteen (19) people would be on-site at any one time, thus resulting in the occupancy not triggering a requirement to provide one (1) on-site parking space.  (Da223).
[brief] ### Cases: | Case | Page(s) | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|---------| | Bergen Pines Hosp. v. Dept. of Human Serv, 96 N.J. 456, 478 (N.J. 1984) | 4 | | Citizens to Protect Public Funds v. Parsippany-Troy Hills Board of Education, 13 N.J. 172 (1953) | 9 | | Saint Peter's University Hospital v. Lacy, 185 N.J. 1, 13 (N.J. 2005) | 3 | ### Statutes & Rules: | Statute | Page(s) | |------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------| | N.J. Stat. § 18A:12-27 | 5 | | N.J.A.C. 6A:28-8.3 | 5 | | N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(e) | 6,8 | ### School Ethics Commission Opinions: Public Advisory Opinion – A02-22, February 25, 2022 | 7 |
[brief] The effective date no doubt blows up [...]’s claim that it was entitled to payment so that it could pay its employees who did no longer worked at the Board’s buildings.  Even if the statute was given prospective application for April 14, 2020, then that still knocks out at least half of [...]’s claim for full payment on a $620,250.\textsuperscript{09} April 2020 invoice because it would not have been entitled to payment in the first half of April 2020.  Thus, the court committed error in retroactively applying the statute back to April 1, 2020, and ordering full payment of the $620,250.\textsuperscript{09} April 2020 invoice.
[brief] As such, it should, respectfully, be affirmed by this Court.  The only aspect of [...]’s rulings that should be overturned is his failure to grant Landlord the full attorney fee award it is undoubtedly entitled to under the express terms of the Lease.  Specifically, in contravention to well-settled New Jersey law, the lower court cut Landlord’s contractually mandated fee award by nearly forty-percent (40%) based solely on [...]’s personal belief that the rates charged by Landlord’s counsel were “a little high. ”  This is simply not permitted in this State.  For the foregoing reasons and as more fully elucidated below, the lower Court’s November 10, 2021 Order should be affirmed in its entirety and the lower court’s November 9, 2023 Order should be affirmed in all aspects except for paragraph two (2), which should be amended to grant Landlord’s fee application in its entirety.
[brief] [Pa71].  Plaintiff testified she never, prior or subsequent to September 6, 2018, informed the Township of the alleged condition.  [Pa71].  Similarly, [...] never complained to the Township about any purportedly dangerous condition.  [Pa71].  While the Township had previously received three reports of concern regarding the parking lot at issue, all previous reports of conditions on the Subject Property were marked as completed by the Township, meaning each report was reviewed and, if necessary, repairs were completed.  [Pa71].  The Township did not receive any other notices, reports, and/or complaints relative to any alleged condition on the Subject Property prior to September 6, 2018.
[brief] (Da131).  Since these observations were not relevant to the charges at trial, the activities of February 28, 2009, were not admitted at trial.  Additionally, the observations made on February 28, 2009, were not relied upon in the search warrant affidavit or at trial.  Since no testimony was introduced at trial that defendant was in New Jersey on these dates, defendant’s assertion that he was in North Carolina would not have been relevant and would not have been admissible.  See N.J.R.E. 401.  Indeed, the PCR court noted that defendant’s “reference to a witness who would have been able to testify as to [his] presence in North Carolina, [was] only that: a reference. ”  The PCR court found that defendant’s failure to provide any certification of any witness who could have testified as to his actual presence in North Carolina resulted in his inability to establish a prima facie claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.  (Da76 to 77).  The PCR court, further, properly found that “even assuming that [defendant] was in North Carolina on February 28, 2009, and that [...] misidentified him, that does not prove that the other police officers who identified [defendant] during the surveillance, both in person and by way of surveillance camera, were likewise incorrect. ”  Indeed, as the court found, “the pre-trial record … and the trial had numerous dates and times where [defendant] was clearly identified by the officers on the video. ” (Da77).  Additionally, as argued above, defendant failed to provide a certification from [...] regarding the invoice or defendant’s presence in North Carolina.  Indeed, defendant provided no certifications by any other [...] employee or [...], who was allegedly with defendant during the time in question.  (Da77).  Because of this, the PCR court properly found that defendant failed to establish a *prima facie* claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.  In short, defendant failed to present any facts establishing that the investigation trial counsel allegedly failed to undertake would have yielded evidence either undermining the State's evidence in this regard or supporting his defense.  See *State v. Warlock*, 117 N.J. 596, 625 (1990) (citing *Strickland*, 466 U.S. at 688) (“The failure to raise unsuccessful legal arguments does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. ”).  Defendant has failed to proffer “the facts that an investigation would have revealed, supported by affidavits or certifications. ”  *Cummings*, 321 N.J Super. at 170, and as such has failed to satisfy his burden.  Therefore, defendant has failed to establish *prima facie* evidence of ineffective assistance of counsel based on trial counsel’s alleged failures to investigate, and, as such, the PCR court properly denied defendant’s Petition for Post-Conviction Relief without an evidentiary hearing.
[directive] 8.2.4  If the subject officer agrees to voluntarily provide a statement or waives his rights, the interview may then continue.  Unless the officer specifically waives their Fifth Amendment rights, any incriminating statements obtained under direct order will not be admissible in a criminal prosecution but will be admissible in an administrative hearing.  The subject officer should be afforded the opportunity to consult with an attorney prior to a compelled interview.  8.2.5  If the officer has invoked their Miranda rights but the agency deems that it must have the answers to specific questions to properly conduct its investigation, the agency must contact the County Prosecutor to request use immunity for the interview to continue.  This contact should be made timely so that the County Prosecutor can review all relevant reports and have a full briefing prior to determining whether to grant use immunity.  Use immunity provides that anything the officer says under the grant of immunity, and any evidence derived from their statements, cannot be used against him or her in a criminal proceeding (except for perjury or false swearing if the information is not truthful).  But use immunity does not eliminate the possibility that the subject officer will be prosecuted.  A criminal prosecution may proceed even though the target or defendant has received use immunity.
[directive] 5.1.12  In some cases, a complaint is based on a misunderstanding of accepted law enforcement practices or the officer’s duties.  Supervisors should be authorized to informally resolve minor complaints, whenever possible, at the time the report is made.  If the complainant is not satisfied with such a resolution, the complaint should be forwarded to internal affairs  INTERNAL AFFAIRS POLICY & PROCEDURES | November 2022 21 for further action as warranted.
[brief] On April 19, 2018, May 2, 2018, and November 19, 2018, Appellant permitted unlicensed and/or suspended licensed persons to operate his personal vehicle (the April 19, 2018, May 2, 2018, and November 29, 2018 occurrences are collectively referred to as the “Vehicle Incidents”).  [Pa101, Pa119].  On April 19, 2018, “[...]” operated Appellant’s vehicle without a valid driver’s license, and [...] and “[...]” (the mother of Appellant’s son), were arrested and charged with possession of suspected CDS (marijuana and Percocet pills).  [Pa101].  Upon finding out what happened, Appellant “figured [[...]] was getting pulled over and she didn’t have a license or [[...]] didn’t have a license, whatever the case may be”.  [5T43:17-19].  However, Appellant never reported this incident to [...] despite knowing that two (2) people were arrested in his personal vehicle and eventually finding out they were arrested for possession of CDS.
[brief] Reconsideration should be used only where the court has expressed its decision based upon a palpably incorrect or irrational basis, or it is obvious that the court either did not consider, or failed to appreciate the significance of probative, competent evidence.  See, e.g., Pitney Bowes Bank, Inc. v. ABC Caging Fulfillment, 440 N.J. Super. 378 (App. Div. 2015).  LEGAL ARGUMENT
[directive] Each county’s policy shall establish and maintain a procedure for notifying the investigative employee and/or the employee’s agency prior to disclosure.  This will serve as notice to the investigative employee and agency and as an opportunity for the agency and employee to verify the accuracy of the noted and Brady Giglio material.  For all disclosures, whether made to the defense directly or after the court orders disclosure, the prosecutor shall notify the investigative employee and agency of the disclosure.  The prosecutor shall also provide the investigative employee and agency with copies of all disclosed material.  With respect to the disclosed material, the prosecutor shall seek redactions to protect the privacy interests of third-parties and investigative personnel.  The prosecutor shall also seek protective orders to limit the use and further dissemination of the material.  Finally, each county’s policy shall incorporate a procedure for informing the investigative employee, as well as that person’s agency, of decisions made by the court as to the disclosure and/or admissibility at trial of any disclosed and/or Brady information.