ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] [Pa430-446].  They likewise argued that Plaintiff could not, as a matter of law, prove proximate causation.  Their brief consisted of two headings, as follows:  THIS MATTER IS RIPE FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS THERE IS NO GENUINE DISPUTE AS TO ANY MATERIAL FACT [Pa438].  This argument was a recitation of the Brill standard, asserting again a lack of proof of proximate causation.  [Pa438-439].  Their second point heading argued:  PLAINTIFFS HAVE FAILED TO PRESENT SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE UPON WHICH A JURY COULD FIND PROXIMATE CAUSE [Pa440].  Under this point, these movants similarly averred that Plaintiff’s facts were lacking in credibility and presented their counter-facts\(^5\), but argued that “even accepting” Plaintiff’s version of the facts, Plaintiff could not establish proximate causation because the outcome would have allegedly been the same even if the baby had been timely delivered, based on [...]’s testimony.  [Pa440-442].  As this Court can see, nowhere in these briefs did these movants analyze the prior decision in accordance with the provisions of Rule 4:42-2(b); nor did the movants even file a copy of the transcript of the prior decision for the new \(^5\)  Likewise, these counter-factual averments were nothing but representations, for which no citations to the record were made \([see Pa268-269]\) and which, in fact, were contradicted by the actual record.  Even so, the movants advised the Court that Plaintiff’s version of the facts should be accepted and that summary judgment was appropriate “even accepting” Plaintiff’s version of the facts – or what they argumentatively called “speculation. ”  [Pa268]. motion judge’s review.  [Pa391-430].  Moreover, as this Court can see, the briefs filed by the movants were nearly identical to the briefs initially filed in support of the 2020 motions.  Since the original judge had retired, the defendants essentially arrogated themselves a total “do over” without making any effort to assess the reasoning of the original case management judge within the “interest of justice” standard of Rule 4:42-2(b).
[directive] They brought et sea• constitution the and violated other federal azgued PASPA defendants that the Governor and [...] plaintiff sports in of favor the district ruled court enforced.  federal  The not could be therefore authorizing sports or licensing from State the enjoined PASPA, with accordance in and, leagues wagering.  Appeals of Court  United States the to appealed defendants and other the [...] Governor the on PASPA of constitutionality the upheld court that 2013, September In Circuit.  Third the for prohibit Jersey New "not does thus and existing maintain laws to States require not does that it basis New the 730 of of Governor State v. Jersev, N.C.A.A. wagering."  sports on ban its repealing from Governor" v. "N.C.A.A. (2014) (hereinafter _ U.S. _ denied, cent. 2013), Cir. (3d 232 F.3d 208, id. ban," wagering repeal sports its "may that Jersey New opinion"). holding In Circuit "Third or the had that argued case, the who in plaintiffs the of positions the accepted Circuit Third the 233, at enforce or maintain Jersey New to requires [PASPA] in "nothing because constitutional was statute state-law prohibition its of "repeal Jersey's New that indeed, and, prohibitions," wagering sports its the of United Br. PASPA." with "incompliance was itself wagering" sports of authorization on the (3d Br.") 1713 ("Leagues No. Leagues of Br. 28-29; at Cir.) (3d 13-1713 Br."), No. ("U.S. States 16. at Cir.) of in whether, light are Directive Enforcement Law this in addressed issues specific The New under offense criminal a committing be would racetracks casinos and Governor, v. N.C.A.A. activities. business their of part pools sports operate as were to if they law Jersey whether determining when that provides 2C) (Title Criminal Justice of Code Jersey New The the of interpretation official "an on rely may persons offense, criminal a constitutes conduct their or administration interpretation, for the responsibility with law charged by or body officer public
[brief] (Aa6).  The Board, agreeing with Staff’s recommendation, denied [...]’s petition, stating that it is important to “balance the interest of supporting New Jersey’s solar industry and the implementation of novel technologies in the State --- \(^6\) [...] is a contract consultant retained by the Board in 2018 to assist in completing a study evaluating how to modify or replace the SREC program.  (Aa11). with minimizing the costs to ratepayers and compliance with its rules to the greatest extent possible. ”  Ibid.  The Board agreed that the record did not support [...]’s request for eligibility and TREC factor assignment in the TI program.  (Aa6).  The Board further determined that, “because the TI [p]rogram was not open to grid supply projects, other than those certified under Subsection (t) or Subsection (r) or previously registered in the SRP, the [[...]] project is not eligible for entry into the TI [p]rogram….” (Aa6).  This appeal followed.
[brief] The net opinion rule “requires that an expert ‘give the why and wherefore that supports the opinion, rather than a mere conclusion. ’”  Id. (quoting Borough of Saddle River v. 66 E. Allendale, LLC, 216 N.J. 115, 144 (2013)).  An opinion that “present[s] solely a bald conclusion, without specifying the factual bases or that logical or scientific rational that must undergird that opinion” is not entitled to be given any weight by the Court.  Polzo, 196 N.J. at 583-84 & n.5.  “An opinion based on false assumptions is unhelpful in aiding the jury in its search for the truth, and is likely to mislead and confuse. ”  Advent Sys. Ltd. v. Unisys Corp., 925 F.2d 670, 682 (3d Cir. 1991).  Thus, “[a]n expert’s conclusion ‘is excluded if it is based merely on unfounded speculation and unquantified possibilities. ’”  Townsend, 221 N.J. at 55 (quoting Grzanka v. Pfeifer, 301 N.J. Super. 563, 580 (App. Div. 1997).  “An expert’s opinion . . . based on erroneous or nonexistent facts is worthless. ”  Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 142 N.J. 520, 543-44 (1995) (finding expert report based on inaccurate factual assertion insufficient to defeat motion for summary judgment).  See also Beadling v. William Bowman Assocs., 355 N.J. Super. 70, 87 (App. Div. 2002) (“An expert opinion that is not factually supported is a net opinion or mere hypothesis to which no weight need be accorded.  Opinions that lack a foundation are worthless. ”).  The Appellate Division has previously affirmed a trial court’s exclusion of an expert report that lacks “verification of the accuracy of the data. ”  *Towers Associates v. E. Orange City*, 16 N.J. Tax 483, 484 (App. Div. 1997).  In *City of Long Branch v. Jui Yung Liu*, 203 N.J. 464, 4 A.3d 542 (2010), the Supreme Court upheld the jury’s finding that the property owners (in this case, restaurant owners) were not entitled to any compensation for the FFE.
[brief] As Appellate noted in its initial brief, the Gramiccioni Court in holding that the [...] had a duty to defend and indemnify the prosecutor’s office and its employees, stated:  “In sum, in this case, all claims related to petitioners’ acts or alleged omissions associated with duties imposed by the Directive constitute state prosecutorial functions. ”  Gramiccioni v. Department of Law & Public Safety, 243 N.J. supra at 318.  Contrary to Respondent’s argument, [...] has not taken the position on this appeal that Lavezzi v. State, 219 N.J. 163 (2014) and Gramiccioni have “reversed course. ” (Rb11).  Rather, [...] has argued that in Lavezzi and Gramiccioni the Court’s analysis has evolved and although the TCA was referenced, the Court has focused on the prosecutor’s law enforcement role and the [...]’s supervisory authority, and not the TCA, as the primary basis for finding that the [...] had an obligation to defend and indemnify the respective county prosecutor’s offices.
[brief] See e.g. *Moore v. Bridgewater Tp.*, 69 N.J. Super. 1, 10 (App.Div. 1966) (quarry now nonconforming, "this cast upon the quarry defendants the burden of establishing that such use, though nonconforming, nevertheless existed at the time of the passage of the township's ordinance"); *Miller v. Bd of Adj. of Boonton* 67 N.J. Super. 460, 471 (App. Div. 1961); *Weber v. Pieretti*, 72 N.J. Super. 184 (Ch. Div. 1962) (bottling operation in residential zone; "the burden of proving the existence of a nonconforming use prior to the adoption of a zoning ordinance is upon the party asserting such use.")  Universal Holding Co. v. North Bergen Tp., 55 N.J. Super. 103 (App. Div. 1959) (building constructed 1919; Zoning Ordinance adopted 1934, front portion of building zoned commercial, rear portion zoned residential; used as manufacturing (nonconforming); Court invalidates manufacturing use, proponent fails to meet burden of proof); State v. Loux, 76 N.J. Super. 409 (App.Div. 1962) (property used for boat storage, zoned residential; illegal as no proof presented use in place prior to 1950 Zoning residential).
[brief] To establish a *prima facie* case of retaliation under CEPA, a plaintiff must prove: (1) they had an objectively reasonable belief that the employer’s conduct was violating either a law, rule, regulation, or public policy; (2) they performed a “whistleblowing” activity as described in N.J.S.A. 34:19-3(a) or (c); (3) an adverse employment action was taken against them; and (4) a causal connection existed between the whistleblowing activity and the adverse employment action.  Klein, 377 N.J. Super. at 38-40; see also Feldman v. Hunterdon Radiologoical, 187 N.J. 228, 237-38 (2006); Yurick v. State, 184 N.J. 70, 78 (2005); Hernandez v. Montville Tp., 354 N.J. Super. 467, 473 (App. Div. 2003), aff’d o.b., 179 N.J. 81 (2004).
[brief] See, e.g., Olson v. Jantausch, 44 N.J. Super. 380, 388 (App. Div. 1957) (The 1954 purchasers “acquired title with full notice of the covenant; its presence in the chain of title [in 1928]—not to mention the title search and title policy—charged them with notice. ”); Pearson v. DMH 2 Ltd. Liab. Co., 449 N.J. Super. 30, 50-51 (Ch. Div. 2016) (a purchaser is on notice of matters of record in a chain of title beyond a 60-year search); Donovan v. Bachstadt, 91 N.J. 434, 442-43 (1982) (noting a 60-year title search is standard); Palamarg, 80 N.J. at 456 (requiring review “to discover conveyances or other significant acts of an owner”).
[brief] N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-51; Abbott XX, 199 N.J. at 153-155; (Pa1915.)  2.  Funding the Adequacy Budget  SFRA requires a mix of state and local property tax revenue to fund the cost of educating [...] students at the weighted per-pupil amount set by its Adequacy Budget from year-to-year.  (Pa5; Pa1914-Pa1916); Abbott XX, 199 N.J. at 152.  The SFRA is structured so that the District’s contribution of local property taxes to fund education spending at the Adequacy Budget level is determined first, --- 5  In Abbott IV, 149 N.J. at 168, the Supreme Court found the State’s substantive curriculum content standards to be “facially adequate” as a “reasonable” definition of T&E. with the State responsible for funding the remaining balance.  N.J.S.A. 18A:7F–52 to -58; (Pa7); Abbott XX, 199 N.J. at 155, 222.
[brief] Well, it – it was -- it was like pulling teeth, Your Honor.  I’ve never – I’ve been an attorney for well over 20 years and this case, like you said, reads like a miniseries.  I was shocked at every twist and turn.  And I still try to read this in my mind how this got this far, but Your Honor, there was a reason why [...] had us appear almost every other week, or every week, or every few days, because the compliance was not there.  There was no – it – getting any legitimate documentation, Your Honor, -- they knew what we were asking for.  We kept asking for the same things.  They kept giving us the same documents over and over again saying that they had given us what we wanted, but we were asking for more and we were not getting it, Your Honor.  It was – it was extremely, extremely difficult…  (22T 29)
[brief] [...] denied defendant’s motion on September 28, 2016.  Trial commenced before [...] and a jury on September 28, 2016, --- 2  Defendant’s codefendants were charged in counts twenty-four through forty-two. and continued until November 9, 2016, when the jury found defendant guilty on all counts.  (24T18-4 to 24-16; 24T41-8 to 19).  On July 21, 2017, defendant appeared before [...] for sentencing.
[brief] ..................................................................  13  State Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., Bureau of Cty. Envtl. & Waste Compliance  Enf’t v. Mazza & Sons, Inc., 406 N.J. Super. 13 (App. Div. 2009) ...............................  19  Szalontai v. Yazbo’s Sports Cafe, 183 N.J. 386 (2005) ..............................................  9  Taylor v. DeLosso, 319 N.J. Super. 174 (App. Div. 1999) .......................................... 7 Townsend v. Pierre, 221 N.J. 36 (2015) .....................................................................
[brief] 1.  The proposed use satisfies the positive criteria of the Municipal Land Use Law as it promotes two separate purposes of zoning under the Municipal Land Use Law, and the site is particularly suitable for the proposed use; and 2.  The proposed use (a) promotes the general welfare and (b) promotes a desirable visual environment and, therefore, satisfies two purposes of zoning set forth in N.J.S.A. 40:55D-2a and 40:55D-2l.  The accessory structure and addition will enable the Applicant to maintain a neat and orderly property so that items such as vehicles, equipment, tools and the like are stored inside the structure and not in the yard.  Maintaining a neat and visually attractive property promotes the general welfare of the community and promotes a desirable visual environment in the area of the Property, as well as the community at large; and 3.  The site is particularly suitable for the proposed use.  The site contains 1.79 acres and has sufficient space to accommodate the accessory structure.  The aerial photograph submitted by Plaintiffs and the photos submitted by the Applicants demonstrate that the accessory structure is surrounded on three sides by a natural barrier of trees and is placed and constructed in a visually attractive manner.  The site already contains a residential structure and, therefore, the addition of an accessory garage is a natural and expected improvement to the Property.
[brief] ”  Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995).  The LRHL and the New Jersey Constitution grant municipalities like [...] the authority to revitalize decaying and disintegrating residential, commercial and industrial areas.  N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-4; N.J. Const. art. VIII, § 3, ¶ 1 (1947); 62-62 Main St., L.L.C. v. Mayor & Council of Hackensack, 221 N.J. 129, 134, 144 (2015).  Under New Jersey law, redevelopment, itself, is a public use for which condemnation may be used.  See Wilson, 27 N.J. at 371 (holding redevelopment serves purposes “intimately related to the public health, welfare and safety. ”).  Our Constitution expressly provides that the “redevelopment of blighted areas” is a “public purpose,” and that private property may be taken to achieve that end.  62-64 Main, 221 N.J. at 134, 144 (citation omitted).
[directive] (3) ¿Entiende usted que la condena de supervisión bajo libertad [Sí/Yes] [No/No] [NC/NA] condicional de por vida significa que al ser puesto en libertad después de su encarcelamiento o de inmediato en el momento de la imposición de una sentencia suspendida, será supervisado por la [...] por un mínimo de 15 años y estará sujeto a las disposiciones y condiciones de la libertad condicional, las cuales incluirán las condiciones que sean apropiadas para proteger al público y promover la rehabilitación, y que dichas condiciones podrán incluir, pero no se limitarán a asesoramiento, el acceso o uso de Internet y otras restricciones entre las que podría haber restricciones en cuanto a dónde usted podrá vivir, trabajar, viajar o las personas con quienes podrá comunicarse?  Do you understand that being sentenced to parole supervision for life means that upon release from incarceration or immediately upon imposition of a suspended sentence you will be supervised by the [...] for at least 15 years and will be subject to provisions and conditions of parole, including conditions appropriate to protect the public and foster rehabilitation, such as, but not limited to, counseling, Internet access or use, and other restrictions which may include restrictions on where you can live, work, travel or persons you can contact?
[brief] Their lot was among a section of lots that was the recipient of an express easement for access to and from the Atlantic Ocean.  *Id.* at 543.  Although *Levinson* (like *Rosen*) did not involve an implied easement, the fact that the grantor of the map-described lots found it necessary to expressly convey an easement to non-beachfront lots to allow access to and use of the beach means that proximity alone was not sufficient to guarantee such access through an implied easement.  The notion that mere proximity is a sufficient basis on which to imply an easement is further belied by *Bubis v. Kassin*, 323 N.J. Super. 601 (App. Div. 1999).
[brief] [...] identified himself as a city firefighter during a public confrontation with a fellow municipal employee, an on-duty police officer.  He used a racial epithet (for which he had been previously disciplined) and appeared intoxicated.  Again, the court connected these events to the public role of appellant, upholding the disciplinary action imposed, finding that, “Firefighters are not only entrusted with the duty to fight fires; they must also be able to work with the general public and other municipal employees, especially police officers, because the police department responds to every emergency fire call.  Any conduct jeopardizing an excellent working relationship place at risk the citizens of the municipality as well as the men and women of those departments who place their lives on the line on a daily basis.
[brief] The *Cicchetti* Court explained that had the defendant had a clear and consistently applied policy of refusing to hire an individual such as Cicchetti (e.g. with an expunged conviction), the defendant could argue it should “have the benefit of the Cedeno rule,” even in the absence of a statutory bar.  *See id.* at 587-88 (emphasis added).  Plaintiff mistakenly attempts to distinguish *Cicchetti* by arguing the *Cicchetti* plaintiff “was not statutorily barred from the employment he sought in law enforcement[.]” (AB at pp. 14-15).  However, contrary to Plaintiff’s arguments, the Statute clearly barred Plaintiff’s employment here.
[brief] Here, defendant’s position is unfounded for two reasons.  First, half of what he claims to be improper lay opinion is not a subjective opinion at all.  Hitting someone hard enough to knock them down and then being happy (“I needed that”) that the victim said “no one ever hit me that hard” is an assault.  Notably, defense counsel did not object to that question or answer, strongly suggesting that this question was not so egregious that it produced an unjust result.  (25T:34-7 to 23).  *Trinidad*, 241 N.J. at 451 (2020); R. 2:10-2.
[brief] (4T 8-7 to 9-10)  [...] reasoned that, unlike [...], [...] was not charged as a co-conspirator with respect to the evidence seized from [...]’s car.  (4T 9-3 to 10)  In a written decision issued on August 3, 2021, [...] ruled that police had reasonable and articulable suspicion to stop [...]’s car.  (Da 36-38)  This decision was based on [...]’s testimony about the investigation into [...], [...]’s observations on the day of the stop, and [...]’s training and experience.  (3T, 4T)  In particular, [...] emphasized [...]’s testimony that [...] and [...] bypassed unit 126 while driving inside of the storage facility.  (Da 37)  [...] concluded that it was reasonable to believe that “[...] signaled [...] to continue driving toward the exit [of [...]] upon seeing the police officers because he was going to engage in criminal activity at the storage unit. ”  (Da 37-38)  Accordingly, [...] determined that the decision to pull over [...] was justified.  (Da 38)  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I
[brief] This Appellate Division must also reverse the Trial Court challenged Ordinance and Redevelopment Plan as not substantially consistent with the 1988 Master Plan and for the Planning Board and Governing Body’s failure to address the special requirements of an adoption of such an Ordinance.  Respectfully submitted, [...], ESQ.  DATED: October 4, 2023  [...]  a/k/a [...], Plaintiff, v. [...], a Municipal Corporation, and BOROUGH COUNCIL of the [...], and PLANNING BOARD of the [...], Defendants.
[brief] Specifically, the [...]’s Revised Final Offer stated as follows:  8.  Article XV - Health Benefits Section A - Hospital, Medical, Prescription, Dental, and Optical Employees - Amended to include incentive an annual incentive payment to any City employee who, at the time of open enrollment, is eligible for and waives both medical and prescription coverage under the SHBP.  The SHBP waiver incentive payment shall not exceed 25% of the amount saved by the City because of the waiver or $5,000, whichever is less.  Conforms with other City labor agreements and incentivizes shared savings for the City and employees.  Proposed verbatim contract language relevant to the proposal:  (Red ink)  ARTICLE XV  HEALTH BENEFITS  A. HOSPITAL, MEDICAL, PRESCRIPTION, DENTAL AND OPTICAL EMPLOYEES  1.  The City shall pay the cost of hospital and medical insurance for full-time employees and their eligible dependents for the benefits currently in effect, except that active employees shall continue to contribute to the cost of health insurance as required by applicable law.  The City and the [...] recognize that when employee health benefit contributions become negotiable under P. L. 2011, Chapter 78, the contribution rate can be negotiated by the parties either up or down from the current percentage amounts required by law.  In the event that a court of competent jurisdiction determines that Chapter 78 is unconstitutional and/or that it is illegal for a municipality to require its employees to contribute to the cost of health care without negotiation, the City and the [...] agree that contributions towards the cost of hospital, medical, dental and prescription insurance shall be governed by applicable law and the collective bargaining agreement.  2.  The contribution shall apply to employees for whom the employer has assumed a health care benefits payment obligation to require that such employees pay at a minimum the amount of contribution specified in this section for health care benefits coverage.  An employee on leave without pay who receives benefits under the State Health Benefits Plan shall be required to pay the requisite contributions and shall be billed by the employer for these contributions.  Healthcare benefits coverage will cease if the employee fails to make timely payments.  The parties agree that should an employee voluntarily waive all coverage under the State Health Benefits Plan and provide certification to the City that he/she has other health insurance coverage; the City will waive the contribution for that employee.
[brief] This information was not provided to the Board (absent from the record) and presumably does not exist as it was not relevant to a purchaser who was buying the rental building for the purpose of conversion.  Even in an overheated real estate market (where the State moved forward with legislation that protected tenants specifically in Hudson County, just like [...], due to ongoing speculative conversion and displacement), it stands to reason that the actual purchase price, were it purchased for rental purposes, would have been extremely low.  Taking into account the much lower taxes previously approved by [...] and what would have been a much lower equity return attributable to an investment that did not contemplate condo conversion, it is likely that the landlord would not be entitled to any increase at all.  While that may sound shocking, it is a fact that any “hardship” claimed at this time is due solely to the fact that the unit is being operated as a condominium.