ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] In fact, it did the opposite.  Until recently, [...] gave every indication that it would be participating in the litigation by twice signing a certification that it did not contemplate arbitration, demanding a jury, failing to include the arbitration clause among its prodigious number of affirmative defenses, and affirmatively availing itself of this Court’s jurisdiction through dispositive and other motions for relief.  [...] was entitled to rely on [...]’s actions and representations for the past six years and tailored its strategy for use at a jury trial.  As [...] found, “there was substantial efforts that were taken, all designed to have this matter designed to be – and to be tried before a jury…there was a – a belief that this matter was only going to be tried within the courtrooms within the Superior Court as opposed to a conference room within the [...]. ”  Hearing Tr. 74:17-75:17.  To belatedly abandon the Law Division and change forums now to an arbitration panel would effectively moot years of trial preparation work, expense, and litigation strategy.  See, e.g., Herrera, 2024 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 951, at *14-15 (noting that delays in noticing arbitration can “drain[] plaintiff’s resources” and “waste the public’s judicial resources as well as those of opposing counsel. ”)  Pa72 ([...] Cert. Exh. F).  Although not required, this factor weighs against arbitration as the Law Division correctly found.  As demonstrated above, the balance of [...]’s conduct here, including failing to identify arbitration as an affirmative defense, signing a certification that no arbitration is contemplated, affirmatively participating in motions and discovery, and waiting almost six years to move for arbitration, provides clear and convincing evidence of waiver that respectfully requires denial of its motion.
[brief] First, with regard to plaintiff-appellant’s argument that alleged negligent or poor shoveling of snow and/or ice off a public sidewalk creates a new or exacerbated hazard, such a heightened standard of liability would fly in the face of public policy designed to encourage residential property owners to help out the community and clear public sidewalks.  As our Supreme Court has made clear, “society has an interest in encouraging people to clear public sidewalks and avoiding ‘the inequity of imposing liability on those who voluntarily do so. ’”  Luchejko, supra, 207 N.J. at 201.  Certainly, if plaintiff-appellant were to succeed and convince this Appellate Court to change well-established legal precedent in this regard, informed homeowners would never take it upon themselves to clear any sidewalk of snow and ice for fear of exposing themselves to liability if they do not clear the sidewalk well enough.  Instead, they will just leave the sidewalk alone and allow pedestrians to traverse the sidewalk at their own peril.  The property owners will know full-well that if they do nothing, the law will protect them from liability.  But the moment they do something to help pedestrians walk around in their neighborhood, they will open the door to potential liability.  Undoubtedly, they will choose to keep that door closed and do nothing.  However, the fact remains that communities need these types of contributions from its citizens, as a poorly shoveled sidewalk is better for the town than a sidewalk not shoveled at all.  Second, with regard to plaintiff-appellant’s contention that residential properties that are under renovation should be re-classified as commercial properties, it cannot be denied that such a change in property classification would have a significant negative impact on ordinary people who own residential properties.
[brief] ”  Da9.  And it would render a nullity the express provisions in UPEPA that allow a moving party to seek attorneys’ fees notwithstanding a plaintiff’s voluntary dismissal, see N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 2A:53A-55, 2A:53A-58—an essential provision intended as much to dissuade potential SLAPP plaintiffs from filing suit in the first instance, as to compensate defendants for defending such meritless lawsuits after the fact.  See supra at 14; see also Khan, 292 A.3d at 257 (recognizing that “requiring those who . . . file [meritless lawsuits] to compensate defendants for the costs such lawsuits unquestionably impose on them” has been a “longstanding and widespread practice[] [of anti-SLAPP legislation] throughout the United States”); Barry v. State Bar of California, 386 P.3d 788, 794 (Cal. 2017) (explaining court’s “understanding of the scope of the anti-SLAPP’s fee-shifting provision,” which was “apparent[ly]” to “compensat[e] the prevailing defendant for the undue burden of defending against litigation designed to chill the exercise of free speech and petition rights”).
[brief] Exhibit 26, Memorandum of OSHA Investigation Opening Conference, dated October 26, 2004, filed April 26, 2018  381a Exhibit 26, Accident Report, dated October 27, 2008, filed April 26, 2018  Exhibit 26, Incident Investigation Report, dated August 19, 2010, filed April 26, 2018  Exhibit 26, N.J. State Police Investigation Report, dated November 3, 2010, filed April 26, 2018  Exhibit 27, Printouts from [...], webpage, dated April 26, 2018, filed April 26, 2018
[brief] AND [...] DID NOT IMPOSE AN OBLIGATION UPON THE LATTER TO HAVE REMOVED OR REMEDIATED THE SNOW AND ICE IN THE AREA WHERE PLAINTIFF FELL.  NOR DID THE LEASE IMPOSE A DUTY UPON THIS DEFENDANT TO HAVE NOTIFIED [...] OF THE CONDITION OF THE PARKING LOT  .................................................................  21 POINT II-  THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY HELD THAT [...] DID NOT HAVE A COMMON LAW DUTY TO HAVE MAINTAINED THE PARKING LOT WHERE PLAINTIFF FELL.  ITS CROSS MOTION FOR SUMMARY  JUDGMENT WAS PROPERLY GRANTED AND PLAINTIFFS’ CROSS MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY  JUDGMENT WAS PROPERLY DENIED ........  36 POINT III-IN THE EVENT THAT THIS COURT DISAGREES WITH THE TRIAL COURT’S DECISION ON ITS SUMMARY
[brief] On February 24, 2020, [...], then seventy years old, boarded a [...] bus while it was traveling on Bergenline Avenue heading toward John F. Kennedy Boulevard in Hudson County.  (Pa28, Pa42). ²  [...] paid her fare and walked toward the back of the bus.  (Pa46).  According to [...], the bus was “moving slowly” as she walked down the aisle but before she reached her seat, “all of a sudden there was a bang” and that she fell.  (Pa46-47).  [...] further testified, “Well, I think bus [sic] made a sudden stop, I think. ” (Pa47).  She did not know what might have caused the bus to come to a stop.  (Pa47).  ¹  For purposes of clarity and brevity, the facts and procedural history have been combined.  ² “Pa” refers to [...]’s appendix.  [...] did not know how much time had passed between when she boarded the bus and when she fell.  (Pa47).  She did not recall whether she was holding onto anything as she walked through the bus but that she might have been holding “the seat handle. ” (Pa47).  [...] did recall, however, that she took about five or six steps backward before falling to the floor.  (Pa47).  After her fall, [...] got up without assistance and took a seat.  (Pa48).  She sat on the bus as it continued its route for about twenty minutes, and then she went home.  (Pa48).  [...], [...]’s friend who was with her on the bus that day, later provided a written statement indicating that she “witness[ed] the bus stopping abruptly,” and that she was in the process of sitting down “when the bus suddenly, violently and abruptly made a sudden stop. ” (Pa46, Pa60).  Kim provided, “I witnessed the Claimant fall violently to the floor of the bus as a result of the sudden stop. ” (Pa60).  Kim did not dispute [...]’s description of the slow movement of the bus prior to the stop.  (Pa60).  As a result of this incident, [...] alleged to have sustained injuries to her neck, back, and knees for which she underwent a course of physical therapy and acupuncture treatment, all of which ended within seven months of the incident in September 2020.  (Pa28-Pa30).  On April 16, 2021, [...] filed a complaint alleging negligence by [...] ([...]).
[brief] 16, 19, 23, 27, 31, 33  Griepenburg v. Twp. of Ocean, 220 N.J. 239, 254 (2015)  17 Grunwald v. Bronkesh, 131 N.J. 483, 492, 1993 20, 30, 43 Harris v. McRae, 448 US 297 (1980)
[brief] [...] knew that its property in Irvington was vacant, abandoned, and obviously dangerous.  Despite this, it didn’t secure the property, didn’t make the property safe for passers-by, and didn’t even bother to pay its taxes.  Instead, it spent its money in Westfield and Rahway, essentially saying ‘Irvington be damned. ’ --- \(^2\)  A petition for certification is pending.  \(^3\)  The term is a Yiddish term often associated with someone having a lot of nerve.  As an example, one who murders his parents and asks a court for mercy for, alas, he is an orphan, would be engaging in chutzpah.  [...] received every single notice.  [...] read every single notice.  Being experienced in tax foreclosure and having been represented by one of New Jersey’s pre-eminent tax foreclosure experts in his own tax foreclosure, [...] chose to ignore the notices because it assumed it had more time.  It had no basis for relief based on mistake, surprise, or excusable neglect and it had no defense whatsoever.
[brief] Next, [...] attempts to criticize [...]’s calculations by asserting claims as to information that he purportedly did not know.\(^{15}\) (Db, p. 40).  [...], however, fails to provide any citation to the record for its laundry list of missing information.  It is a party’s responsibility to refer this Court to specific parts of the record to support their argument.  *State v. Mauti*, 448 N.J. Super. 275, 315 n.17 (App. Div. 2017).  Where a party fails to refer to specific parts of the record to support an argument, this Court in not required “to search through the record ourselves. ”  *Spinks v. Twp. of Clinton*, 402 N.J. Super. 465, 474-75 (App. Div. 2008).
[brief] The Trial Court below did not abuse its discretion in denying rescission of that express waiver.  To the extent that this Court delves into the well of the prejudice element, Defendants wrongly argue that the Trial Court’s “initial comment that ‘prejudice’ was the only factor that applied to Defendants’ argument, implies a finding that Plaintiff suffered no resulting prejudice here” (Db 21) – but the Trial Court made no such finding – implied or otherwise.  Rather, the Trial Court correctly found that this case involves an express waiver of arbitration so there was no need for Plaintiff to prove any prejudice.  Moreover, even though Plaintiff is not required to show prejudice, it is plentiful here.  Defendants’ reversing course in the Law Division by attempting to enforce an outdated, unenforceable arbitration clause that Plaintiff never saw and never signed, after Defendants intentionally missed a court Ordered deadline for filing such a motion and then expressly waived the right to compel arbitration before the Chancery Court on the record, undoubtedly has delayed this matter and has wasted both time and substantially increased the fees incurred by Plaintiff in the process.  Defendants wanted the benefit of a public forum in court when they filed their separate lawsuit with a jury demand against Plaintiff in an attempt to tarnish his reputation with baseless claims, then sought to bury Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants in the secrecy of arbitration.  All of this is highly prejudicial to Plaintiff.  However, Plaintiff need not show any prejudice here – this is an express waiver case for which Cole is inapplicable – and under Morgan, supra, prejudice is not even a factor.  POINT II
[brief] Id., ¶ 56.  During that January 22, 2023 call, after hearing Defendant [...]’s rejection of his accommodation/leave requests, Plaintiff [...] replied that while working remotely he had continued to handle all of his assigned cases on a daily basis, including depositions, and court appearances and did not require office attendance.  Plaintiff told Defendant [...] that since the start of the COVID pandemic, Plaintiff had been going to the Newark office when necessary when no other employees were present.  Plaintiff further told Defendant [...] that he, [...], had no problem transitioning back to the office full-time but needed a few weeks to make sure proper precautions were being taken as several employees were either not vaccinated or had tested positive multiple times.
[brief] LEGAL ARGUMENT  [...]’s arguments on appeal fall into three broad categories: (1) that he did not agree to arbitrate; (2) that [...] owed him a fiduciary duty to explain the effect of his electronic signature; and (3) that the account application and DAA were not properly authenticated.  (See generally Appellant Br.)  All of [...]’s arguments are meritless.  The trial court correctly compelled arbitration, and this Court should affirm.  A.  Appellate Standard of Review  Whether a valid and enforceable arbitration agreement exists is a question of law subject to de novo review.  See Antonucci v. Curvature Newco, Inc., 470 N.J. Super. 553, 560 (App. Div. 2022).  It “involves the application of established facts to the legal question of what constitutes assent to a contract. ”  Id.  Similarly, whether claims fall within the scope of an arbitration agreement is subject to de novo review.  See id.  However, this Court may defer to trial court’s “interpretative analysis” if this Court “find[s] it persuasive. ”  Kernahan v. Home Warranty Adm’r of Fla., Inc., 236 N.J. 301, 316 (2019).  As to [...]’s evidentiary challenge, this Court should review [...]’s authentication of exhibits under the deferential “abuse of discretion” standard.  See Estate of Hanges v. Metro. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 202 N.J. 369, 383-84.  This Court should “uphold the . . . findings undergirding the trial court’s decision if they are supported by adequate, substantial and credible evidence on the record. ”  Id. (citation omitted).  B.  The trial court correctly held that [...] must arbitrate his claims.  (PA007-008.)  1.
[brief] ”  Id. at 130-31; see State v. Behn, 375 N.J. Super. 409, 416-19 (App. Div. 2005) (discussing admitted testimony from “a ballistics and tool mark identification expert” linking bullets recovered from victim to a rifle that the defendant had purchased); State v. Cito, 213 N.J. Super. 296, 299 (App. Div. 1986) (discussing admitted testimony from a tool mark expert linking a screwdriver seized from the defendant’s home to the scene of the crime); Ghigliotty, 463 N.J. Super. at 375 (discussing the well-established history of tool mark identification experts in New Jersey ballistics jurisprudence).  In February 2023, the New Jersey Supreme Court departed from using the Frye standard and adopted the Daubert\(^5\) standard to determine the reliability of expert witness testimony admitted under N.J.R.E. 702 in future criminal and quasi- --- \(^5\) Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
[brief] However, as set forth at length below, any such claim fails here because: 1) the Defendants failed to preserve such a claim by objecting to Plaintiff’s testimony at trial (see Argument Point I.B, infra); 2) Plaintiff’s testimony did not materially --- \(^2\)  The Defendants failed to either order or file the transcript of this oral argument, so Plaintiff is unable to reference this transcript. deviate from prior pleadings and discovery; (see Argument Point I.C, infra) and 2) even if it did, the Defendants have failed to prove or even articulate prejudice sufficient to Justify Finding a McKenney Violation.  See Argument Point I.D, infra.  As Defendants’ first argument is entirely devoid of factual or legal merit, Plaintiff respectfully requests that it be disregarded, and the verdict in this matter affirmed.
[directive] Americans with Act Disabilities Attachment 1 Summary of Eligibility: Issuance & Revocation of Certificates to Suspend Certain Employment or Occupational Disabilities Related to Criminal Convictions  Summary of Eligibility: Issuance & Revocation of Certificates to Suspend Certain Employment or Occupational Disabilities Related to Criminal Convictions (N.J.S.A. 2A:168A-7 through N.J.S.A. 2A:168A-12) Rev. 03/2024 Page of 2 7 Summary of Eligibility: Certificate to Suspend Employment/Occupational Disabilities Purpose:
[brief] Attorneys for Respondents  By: [...]  HAROLD N. HENSEL  Dated: August 29, 2023  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE  DIVISION  CASE NUMBER: [...]  CONGREGATION  SONS OF ISRAEL, Plaintiff/Respondent, v. [...]  ZONING BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT, Defendant, [...], Defendant/Respondent, and [...], Defendant/Appellant.  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY LAW
[brief] (5T19-5 to 20; Pa5 at 00:04-00:30).  Moorestown Corporal [...] arrived around the same time as [...], and he also secured the area and reviewed surveillance footage.  (4T86-23 to 87-1, 87-25 to 88-6, 88-20 to 89-15).  He explained that one camera angle showed the intruder entering from the same area as on September 28 and returning to the cash register area.  (4T90-7 to 19, 91-4 to 93-18; Pa4 at 00:37-00:42; Pa5 at 00:04-00:30).  He saw the intruder lift the register before leaving with nothing.  (4T93-19 to 94-1; Pa5 at 00:04-00:30; Pa4 at 01:19-01:24).  [...] again responded to the restaurant and conducted the same investigation as he did on the first occasion.
[brief] Plaintiffs presented no information whatsoever directly from their expert attesting or certifying as to same in violation of R. 1:6-6.  Moreover, Plaintiffs and/or their liability expert offered no explanation as to why the above photograph was not sufficient for the expert to render an opinion.  Ignoring the fact that there was no video to be preserved (please see Point III supra for more details) and the numerous cases where expert testimony is offered in the absence of video, there is no excuse for failing to procure a liability report concluding that [...]’ U-boat was “overloaded”, establishing industry standards regarding formal policies, training or protocols, and opining to the adequacy of [...]’s warning stickers, and the design and use of the U-boats themselves.  There is and was ample evidence in the motion record to allow an expert to have made such conclusions, including the above photograph, and Plaintiffs’ inability to produce supporting expert testimony, despite their best efforts to obtain same, is telling.  Plaintiffs were unable to obtain a liability expert report because it is clear that [...] was not negligent.  Without said supporting expert testimony, jurors would be left to speculate as to whether the U-boat was even ‘overloaded’ or was being used in a way other than which it was designed, what are applicable industry standards, and how [...] deviated from same.  Torres, supra, 342 N.J. Super. at 430.  For example, Plaintiffs claim additional surveillance footage would have shown Perez-[...] passing various employees with his cart.  However, Plaintiffs have offered no expert opinion to support the argument that these employees should have stopped Perez-[...] or intervened in anyway (even if the employees saw him).  Plaintiffs also cannot prove causation and that the failure to implement certain policies, training or protocols caused the subject incident.  Based on the foregoing, the trial court correctly ruled [...] was entitled to summary judgment dismissing Plaintiffs’ Complaint with prejudice due to Plaintiffs’ failure to procure supporting expert testimony and this ruling should be affirmed.
[brief] Indeed, paragraph 1 of the Verified Complaint notes that “On November 5, 2005, [...] and [...] transferred title to their real property and premises located at [...] to their five children. ” (Da15).  This transfer of property occurred long before the deaths of William and [...] and long before any Estate was created or probated.  Following the passing of [...], litigation ensued related to the probate of her Estate, and eventually the parties entered into a Consent Judgment resolving all remaining issues.  In that Consent Judgment, the parties also agreed to include and resolve issues unrelated to the Estate, including the disposition of the Subject Property that was not a part of the [...] Estate in the first place.  This separate issue, albeit included in the Consent Order, does not change the overall jurisdiction of the Probate Part.  Rather, as with any other Consent Judgment that settles a pending dispute, it is essentially a contract that is governed by general principles of contract law.
[brief] [...] controls the defendant entities.  He was the “man behind the curtain” pulling the strings, moving the money, and facilitating the transactions.  [...] shared a joint bank account with her husband into which a significant portion of the misappropriated funds flowed.  She acquired [...]’s [...] shares via the 2017 SPA and is the sole principal in [...] (which held a 50% interest in [...]).  There is no logical reason to diminish the [...]’ liability by apportioning damages to them severally, rather than jointly and severally.
[brief] (Raised Below: Da11)  The PSA\(^1\) provides that [...] must attempt to obtain an estoppel certificate “prior to the closing. ” (Da211).  The PSA provides that the date on which the Acceptable Estoppel Certificate must be delivered is the date of the closing.  (Da205).  “[A]t the closing, Seller shall execute and/or deliver … a duly executed Acceptable Estoppel Certificate. ”  \textit{Id.}  Nowhere does the PSA provide or even hint that [...] may cancel the PSA if receives an estoppel certificate that it does not deem compliant.  Rather, the right to cancel is explicitly provided “in the event [[...]] does not obtain an Acceptable Estoppel Certificate. ” (Da211).  [...] devotes 50 pages of its Brief attempting to evade the plain language of the PSA and justify the trial court’s decision which read an entirely new provision into the PSA — that the receipt of a non-compliant estoppel certificate gives [...] the right to immediately terminate the PSA.
[directive] This Policy is premised on seven core principles that guide every law enforcement interaction and are designed to ensure that law enforcement officers preserve the sanctity of life, as well as the dignity, rights and liberties of the public at every turn.  It requires, whenever feasible, that officers use “critical decision-making” and de-escalation techniques to reduce the amount of force used or avoid it altogether.  Force is only authorized when necessary as a last resort and requires that the amount of force used always be reasonable and proportional to further a lawful law enforcement objective.  The Use of Force Policy also provides more detailed guidelines for officers to use in the face of situations that may require the use of force.  In addition, it establishes a robust duty for all officers to intervene to prevent or stop improper uses of force.  Officers face dynamic, quickly evolving, and potentially dangerous situations that require split-second decisions.  Therefore, officers who act in good faith consistent with the Use of Force Policy will be strongly supported in any subsequent review of their conduct regarding their use of force.  However, those who do not follow the Policy may face administrative action, or disciplinary action—up to and including termination—and, depending on the conduct, criminal consequences.  As detailed herein, to ensure adherence to the Use of Force Policy, every use of force must be reported on the Attorney General’s Use of Force Reporting Portal within 24 hours, and undergo a meaningful command-level review.