ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] ”  174a.  Similarly, as set forth in a public notice issued for the December 10, 2018 land use board hearing for site plan approval of [...]:  “Applicant is seeking preliminary and final major site plan approval for the construction of a 4-story building consisting of 147 residential rental units (22 of which shall be affordable housing units). ”  176a.  At the land use board hearing on [...]’s application for [...] on December 10, 2018, the minutes reflect the both [...] and the Borough’s planner [...] confirmed there would be precisely twenty-two affordable-housing units on-site and seven affordable units off-site:  The building would consist of 14,700 square feet of retail on the first floor and 147 residential units, including 22 units dedicated to Fair Share Housing on the second through fourth floors….  [...] addressed the Fair Share Housing.  She said of the 15% of the 147 apartments, there would be 2 studios, 15 – 2 bedrooms units and 5 -3 bedroom units.  She said the Administrator would determine how to allocate the apartments based on income and need…  [...] clarified the number of apartments required for the Affordable Housing Element.  She said there would be 22 apartments on site and 7 apartments off site which was agreeable to the Court Master. 101a (emphasis added).  It was with this understanding and context that the Conditional Final Judgment was entered.
[brief] THE COURT FAILED TO TAKE AN ADVERSE INFERENCE AGAINST THE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS FOR FAILING TO CALL THE ONLY WITNESS WHO COULD HAVE PROVIDED THE REQUISITE RESIDUUM OF COMPETENT PROOF EITHER IN ITS CASE IN CHIEF OR IN REBUTTAL.  (OAL DECISION AT PAGE 19; Pa19a)  During its case in chief, the State called [...] to testify solely for the August 17, 2019 incident.  (Pa113a-Pa114a).  The State did not elicit a single shred of evidence or ask [...] any questions regarding the August 16, 2019 incident even though there was plethora of testimony regarding [...]’s presence on Stowe 2 North and South during that evening.  (1T).  Specifically, there was testimony and/or evidence that [...] made at least one entry into the Stowe 2 South logbook (a critical piece of evidence in the State’s case-in-chief) and/or may have conducted at least one count during the relevant time.  It has long been recognized by our jurisprudence that:  Generally, failure of a party to produce before a trial tribunal proof which, it appears, would serve to elucidate the facts in issue, raises a natural inference that the party so failing fears exposure of those facts would be unfavorable to him.  2 Wigmore, Evidence, § 285 (3d ed. 1940).  But such an inference cannot arise except upon certain conditions and the inference is always open to destruction by explanation of circumstances which make some other hypothesis a more natural one than the party's fear of exposure.  **This principle applies to criminal as well as civil trials**, to the State as well as to the accused.  *Id.* §§ 285, 290.  See *State v. Cooper*, 10 N.J. 532, 566 (1952); *State v. Elliott*, 129 N.J.L. 169 (Sup. Ct. 1942), aff'd o.b. 130 N.J.L. 174 (E. & A. 1943); *State v. Callahan*, 76 N.J.L. 426 (Sup. Ct. 1908) *State v. Clawans*, 38 N.J. 162, 170-71 (1962) (emphasis added.)
[brief] To the contrary, Plaintiff’s experts testified silicone is used *all the time* in the eye for medical treatments (Da0047, pp. 54-55), and neither expert performed or relied on any testing differentiating his experience successfully using silicone from the supposedly-harmful silicone at issue here.  *E.g.*, *Rutigliana*, 929 F. Supp. at 784-86 (excluding general-causation opinion not supported by facts or data); *Townsend*, 221 N.J. at 53 (noting that expert opinion must be grounded in facts or data); *Roening v. City of Atl. City*, 2022 WL 151940, at *4 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Jan. 18, 2022) (holding expert’s opinion inadmissible because he failed to “support his opinion with facts, scientific data, or an accepted standard”), *cert denied*, 251 N.J. 16 (2022).
[brief] 2017) | | | Major v. Maguire, | 10 | | 224 N.J. 1 (2016) | | | Authority | Page | |-----------------------------------------------|------| | Mancuso v. Neckles, | 18 | | 163 N.J. 26 (2000) | | | Manalapan Realty, LP v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, | 7 | | 140 N.J. 366 (1995) | | | Martin v. Educ. Testing Serv., Inc., | 31 | | 179 N.J. Super. 317 (Ch. Div. 1981) | | | McDonough v. Smith, | 13 | | 588 U.S. ___, 139 S. Ct. 2149 (2019) | | | McGrogan v. Till, | 19-23| | 167 N.J. 414 (2001) | | | McMullen v. Tennis, | 15 | | 562 F.3d 231 (3d Cir. 2009) | | | Mem’l Props., LLC v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., | 7 | | 210 N.J. 512 (2012) | | | Michaels v. State of N.J., | 12,13| | 955 F. Supp. 315 (D.N.J. 1996) | | | Montells v. Haynes, | 19,20| | 133 N.J. 282 (1993) | | | Montgomery v. DeSimone, | 13 | | 159 F.3d 120 (3d Cir. 1998) | | | Muller Fuel Oil Co. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., | 36 | | 95 N.J. Super. 564 (App. Div. 1967) | | | Authority | Page | |--------------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | [...] v. State of New Jersey, et al., | 1 | | [...] | | | N.J. Div. of Child Prot. & Permanency v. J.R.-R., | 16 | | 248 N.J. 353 (2021) | | | Owens v. Feigin, | 25 | | 947 A.2d 653 (2008) | | | Palombi v. Palombi, | 6 | | 414 N.J. Super. 274 (App. Div. 2010) | | | Pitney Bowes Bank, Inc. v. ABC Caging Fulfillment, | 7 | | 440 N.J. Super. 378 (App. Div. 2015) | | | Printing Mart-Morristown v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., | 6 | | 116 N.J. 739 (1989) | | | Rezeem Fam. Assocs., LP v. Borough of Millstone, | 6 | | 423 N.J. Super. 103 (App. Div. 2011) | | | Ramsey v. Dintino, | 19 | | [...](D.N.J. Mar. 30, 2007) | | | Robbins v. Jersey City, | 30 | | 23 N.J. 229 (1957) | | | Rose v. Bartle, | 13 | | 871 F.2d 331 (3d Cir. 1989) | | | Sanders v. Div. of Children & Family Servs., | 19 | | [...], 26 (App. Div. Jul. 26, 2017) | | | Authority | Page | |----------------------------------|------| | Scheidt v. DRS Techs., Inc., | 5 | | 424 N.J. Super. 188 (App. Div. 2012) | | | Sickles v. Cabot Corp., | 5 | | 379 N.J. Super. 100 (App. Div. 2005) | | | Smith v. Holtz, | 12,13| | 87 F.3d 108 (3rd Cir. 1996) | | | State v. Abbati, | 16 | | 99 N.J. 418 (1985) | | | State ex rel. M.P., | 38,39| | 450 N.J. Super. 539, 547 (App. Div. 2017) | | | State ex rel. S.G., | 41 | | 175 N.J. 132 (2003) | | | State v. Johnson, | 16 | | 436 N.J. Super. 406 (App. Div. 2014) | | | State v. Harris, | 36 | | 282 N.J. Super. 409, 413 (1995) | | | State v. Marshall, | 37 | | 123 N.J. 1, 76 (1991) | | | State v. Mosley, | passim| | 232 N.J. 169 (2018) | | | State v. Reyes, | 16 | | 207 N.J. Super. 126 (App. Div. 1986) | | | Authority | Page | |-----------------------------------------------|------| | State v. Tropea, | 15 | | 78 N.J. 309 (1978) | | | Templo Fuente De Vida Corp. v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co., | 7 | | 224 N.J. 189 (2016) | | | Thompson v. Clark, | passim | | 142 S. Ct. 1332 (2022) | | | Torres v. Fauver, | 15 | | 292 F.3d 141 (3d Cir. 2002) | | | Triffin v. Johnston, | 6 | | 359 N.J. Super. 543 (App. Div. 2003) | | | United States v. Dolan, | 39 | | 570 F.2d 1177 (3d Cir. 1978) | | | Velantzas v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., | 31 | | 109 N.
[brief] Based upon years of study and data analyses, [...] knew that New Jersey presented lucrative business opportunities in the solar energy field.  In 2015, [...] organized [...] as a special purpose entity to develop a utility-scale solar energy farm of approximately 8.982 to 10 kw DC (the "Solar Project").  Based upon the availability of land at the [...], Mill Road was to be located on leased land at Block 2, Lot 1.02 and Block 4, Lot 1 in the [...], [...], State of New Jersey (the "Project Site" or the "Land").  FAC ¶ 22, Pa1612; Pa2550-59 ([...] Cert Opp SJ).
[directive] Special Precautions  When a BWC Recording May Reveal Tactical Operations Information.  In the event that a BWC worn during the execution of tactical operations (e.g., “Special Operations” or “SWAT” operations, execution of arrest and/or search warrant, etc.) records confidential tactical information the disclosure of which might jeopardize future operations or officer safety (e.g., verbal codes or hand signals used to communicate information or instructions, techniques for interior movements and clearing rooms, techniques to convince persons to open doors, etc.), the recording shall be “tagged” in accordance with Section 9.3.  See N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1.1 (exempting from disclosure under the Open Public Records Act “security measures and surveillance techniques which, if disclosed, would create a risk to the safety of persons”); N.J.A.C. 13:1E-3.2 (2) (exempting records that may reveal “surveillance, security, tactical, investigative, or operational techniques”); see also Section 9.5 (prosecutor’s authority to seek protective orders when complying with discovery obligations).
[brief] See Kieffer v. Best Buy, 205 N.J. 213, 222-23 (2011).  The de novo standard also applies to rulings on motions to dismiss.  See Dimitrakopoulos v. Borrus, Goldin, Foley, Vignuolo, Hyman & Stahl, PC, 237 N.J. 91, 108 (2019).  Also see Baskin v. P.C. Richard & Son (2021).  As noted by the Supreme Court of New Jersey in *Printing Mart v. Sharp Electronics*, 116 N.J. 739, 746 (1989), on a motion brought pursuant to Rule 4:6-2(e) the complaint must be searched in depth and with liberality to determine if a cause of action can be gleaned even from an obscure statement, particularly if further discovery is taken.
[brief] When mentioning the victim’s statements during summation, the prosecutor stated [...] “[c]ould not actually speak to the victim because he was being treated for a gunshot wound to the face.  Had his face was covered up [sic], eventually about three days later on July 19th, the victim did, in fact, come in.  [...] came in, he gave a statement and [...] told you that he observed the victim with extreme swelling on his face and stitching underneath his mouth where it appeared that there were attempting to closing up a hole. ” (2T70:9-17).  The prosecutor was describing to the jury what the victim’s injuries were, and how [...]’s observations established that.  The second time a statement is mentioned is when the prosecutor stated, “[w]e know this is [...], the victim.  Here is a photo that [...] took on the date he came in to give a statement. ” (2T71:22-24).  Again, the prosecutor was explaining to the jury when and where the photograph he was displaying had been taken.  Nothing in either of these statements improperly suggests that the victim identified defendant as the shooter.  Both were simple, offhanded comments regarding where and when the victim’s photograph was taken and the injuries the detective observed.
[brief] This matter involves a series of Rent Leveling & Stabilization Board determinations within the City of Hoboken.  In the trial court’s decision dated September 30, 2022, the court found that the decision made by the [...] (referred to as the “Board”) regarding a hardship application was arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable.  Instead of remanding the matter back to the Board for additional proceedings, the trial court imposed its own decision on the involved parties by determining the rent for the subject premises.  Defendant/Appellant [...] (“Trupiano”) appeals this determination and Plaintiff/Respondent/Cross Appellant [...]  (“[...]”) cross appeals with regard to Defendant/Respondent, the [...]’s (the “Board”) decision on [...]’s hardship application.
[brief] State v. General Restoration Co., 42 N.J. 366, 375-376 (1964).  Here there simply was no proof whatsoever of an agreement between [...] and [...], the alleged co-conspirator, to murder [...].  Even assuming that [...] was the shooter and [...] was the driver in the car that picked him up, that is evidence only of an agreement to pick [...] up.  That is not evidence that [...] agreed help [...] plan or commit the murder itself, which is what the conspiracy statute requires.  N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2a.  It is true that our Supreme Court has held that an agreement to commit a crime can be inferred from evidence of coordinated action before the commission of the offense, which facilitates the commission of that offense.  State v. Samuels, 189 N.J. 236, 248 (2007) (where defendant helped another find the room targeted for a robbery, stood by the other’s side while the other drew a gun, there was sufficient evidence to infer that the two men had engaged in a conspiracy to commit robbery).
[brief] He should have decided whether Trust should pay those billed fees, which were [...]’s obligation to pay since he instructed [...] for the unwarranted legal work.  [...] would have been paid regardless of the Judge’s rulings.  (See above p. 37, last par., to p. 38)  Judge had mistaken recollection about $80K (actually $74,248) for [...]’s claim that [...]’s billed time was less than [...]’s billed time ($113K).  I indicated it was an irrelevant comparison since [...]’s work was Estate work for P-258-16 for 2019-2021 (p. 37, par. 33, 1st two par., above), & [...]’s work was for Trust work for 2022.  As shown, Judge’s claims/rulings to try & justify not revising/correcting his March 7, 2023  Order to vacate Trust payment of $93,277 for [...]’s misguided & unjustified legal work, & reduce paid accounting fee to $16,575 & commissions to $1,946.56, had been REPEATEDLY REFUTED by me based on substantiated evidence that complied w/NJ Case rulings for reconsideration.  5.  **In Conclusion**, Judge’s claims/rulings are palpably incorrect & irrational; made in arbitrary & unreasonable, manner; & overlooked significance of irrefutable probative, competent evidence (as per Sect. “F”&”G”, p. 30-44) that refuted his false claims and wrong rulings.
[brief] [...] testified he was in between [...] and [...] when the physical altercation began as he tried to separate them.  [4T 198:3-6].  He commented on the silliness of fighting over grout, by telling both parties “guys what are we doing?”  [4T 198:3-5].  He claimed [...] struck the bag causing grout to go flying straight up\(^3\), and “it all kinda came down on – well, it came down on me for sure, but it came down on them as well because it went everywhere. ”
[directive] Promulgated by Directive #21-06 (December 11, 2006)  Page 17 of 29 2.  a.  This trial is expected to last for __________ to ________ weeks.  Is there anything about the length or scheduling of the trial that would interfere with your ability to serve?  b.  Do you have any medical, personal or financial problem that would prevent you from serving on this jury? c.  Is there anything that would make it difficult for you to sit and listen for two hours without a break?  3.  Introduce the lawyers and the parties.  Do any of you know either / any of the lawyers?  Has either / any of them or anyone in their office ever represented you or brought any action against you?  Do you know Mr. / Ms _____________________?  Names of Parties  4.  Read names of potential witnesses.  Do you know any of the potential witnesses?  5.  I have already briefly described the case.  Do you know anything about this case from any source other than what I’ve just told you?  6.  Are any of you familiar with the area or address of the incident?  If yes, can you sit and decide this case based solely on the evidence admitted during the trial and not on any impression gained from prior knowledge?  7.  Have you or any family member or close personal friend ever filed a claim or a lawsuit of any kind?  Standards for Jury Selection Promulgated by Directive #21-06 (December 11, 2006)
[brief] “By not later than September 22, 2018, the patio and alcove areas of Plaintiff [...]’s unit, including the drainage elements for that area, shall be restored to their original design condition as shown by the Original Drawings. ”  Pa453 ¶ 4; Pa1041 ¶ 4; Pa471 ¶ 7; Pa505–06.¹  The Preliminary Injunction Order was premised upon a factual finding by the Vermont Trial Court as follows:  “[T]he Court finds that in October 2017, the drainage elements for the alcove and patio areas adjoining ¹  At the time of the December 19, 2019, unit owner vote, there were two parallel pending lawsuits.
[brief] Ia377.  While restating the arguments of each party, there were no facts to suggest that [...] had any actual knowledge nor reason to question title and the court’s analysis spanned just three paragraphs with few factual findings or legal conclusions.  Ia384-385.  The only finding seemingly made was when the court stated that both Plaintiff and Intervenor “were aware” that Defendant had wanted to redeem, a statement finding no support in the record.  Ia384.  [...] timely moved for reconsideration, Ia386, noting that there were no facts showing that it had any notice, nor even reason to be concerned, of any defect in the foreclosure.  Even now there was no defect in the foreclosure as [...] received every single notice at every single stage of the foreclosure but failed to respond.  Defendant opposed.  Ia388.  Plaintiff also sought equitable relief.  Ia401.  The trial court denied reconsideration October 6, 2023 though it again did not point to any defect in the foreclosure nor specify what section of the Rule was relied upon.  Ia411.  [...] appealed October 9, 2023.  Ia415.  Meanwhile, code violations were issued against [...] that remain pending in municipal court.  Ia420-427.  LEGAL ARGUMENT I.
[brief] The New Jersey Supreme Court in Brill modified the previously established standards for summary judgment, which had been set forth in Judson:  [W]hen deciding summary judgment motions trial Courts are required to engage in the same type of Evaluation, analysis or sifting of evidential materials as required by R. 4:37-2(b)....  Id. at 541.  Further, once there are inferences raised that relate to the Defendant’s intent a genuine issue has been raised and the matter must be sent before a jury.  *Leahey v. Singer Sewing Co.*, 302 N.J Super. 68,79 (App. Div. 1996).  Additionally, a party’s state of mind is clearly a fact which must be decided by a jury.  *In re Estate of DeFrank*, 433 N.J. Super. 258, 266 (App. D iv. 2013).  In the case *sub judice*, the facts all hinge on Defendant [...]’s state of mind, intent and whether he deliberately acted in bad faith.
[brief] Again, in an attempt to cure the Court of that misunderstanding, it bears repeating that the Plaintiff was offered the opportunity to purchase the property on January 17, 2023 under the same terms and conditions as the third-party buyer and Plaintiff failed to exercise their ROFR within the 30 day time period provided for in the MFSA.  There was no fraud.  There was no misrepresentation.  Plaintiff knew it had a ROFR and failed to exercise it.  No closing of title happened prior to the Plaintiff being given that opportunity.
[brief] (Pa42).  It concluded: "Nothing in this letter shall constitute a waiver of my clients' legal rights regarding this conflict."  (Pa42).  The brief filed by the [...] on behalf of [...] also included an argument that there was a conflict of interest.  (Pa29-30).  The Show Cause hearings were adjourned over a period of several months as the parties were seeking mediation.  Ultimately, the motions were never decided and were withdrawn in or about January 2024.
[brief] ”  Id. at 330.  It “conclude[d], however, that the trial court should resentence defendant so that it may consider whether certain offenses committed within the same criminal episode warrant[ed] concurrent rather than consecutive sentences, as well as whether the decision to make the sentences consecutive rather than concurrent made the aggregate sentence imposed on defendant an abuse of discretion. ”  Ibid.  The Court retained jurisdiction “to review the sentence imposed on remand. ”  Id. at 330, 353.  E.  Defendant’s January 24, 2020 Resentencing
[brief] [A444].  An earlier Order dated October 20, 2017 addressed enforcement status quo of properties (particularly the [...] home, its contents, and the Lexus pending disposition of the set aside claims).  (A439).  The October 20, 2017 Order at paragraph 2 stated:  Pending the resolution of the motions, the status of all properties at issue herein shall remain at the status quo.  Neither party may transfer ownership, sell, encumber, dissipate or cause the destruction or diminution of value or otherwise negatively effect such property during the course of this litigation.  [A439].
[brief] This accords with the age-old maxim that “wherever a legal right has been infringed a remedy will be given,” Thompson v. City of Atlantic, 386 N.J. Super. 359 (App. Div. 2006).  [...]’s logic is reminiscent of the original Township of Mount Laurel’s reasoning in Mount Laurel I.  The town there had its own explanation for its unconstitutional zoning.  Indeed, most towns do.  The end result of Mount Laurel litigation often involves a town changing that zoning.  In that sense, all builder’s remedy litigation could be seen as a plaintiff seeking to “mess . . . up” a town’s unconstitutional zoning (IT:26:3-9).  At oral argument, [...] admitted that it did not desire for its potentially unconstitutional zoning to be “messed up” by the builder’s remedy lawsuit.  It sought to proceed toward the path of condemnation and use the property as a commercial tract, but faced the hurdle of a builder’s remedy lawsuit on that exact property.  Not to be dissuaded, [...] sought to use the LHRL as a creative way to skirt the process.  [...] asks this court to affirm its circular logic: to allow it, the constitutionally-noncompliant town, to be the arbiter of what constitutes a public purpose, and to use its redevelopment powers in an unfettered manner to advance that goal.  Similar to the rejection of the Township of Mount Laurel’s original zoning scheme by the state’s Supreme Court in Mount Laurel I, this court should emphasize that [...]’s discretionary rights are subject to its constitutional obligations.
[brief] 20 - **Danek v. Hommer**, 28 N.J.Super. 68 (App. Div.1953), aff’d, 15 N.J. 573 (1954) .................................................................................. 29 - **Deblon v Beaton**, 103 N.J. Super. 345 (Law Div. 1968) ........................................ 4 - **Dela Vega v. Travelers Ins. Co.**, A-2272-19 (App. Div. 2022) (unpublish.), certif. denied, 252 N.J. 234 (2022) ............... 12, 16, 17, 18, 20, 23 - **Dimitrakopoulos v. Borrus, Goldin, Foley, Vignuolo, Hyman & Stahl, P.C.**, 237 N.J. 91 (2019) ................................................................. 6 - **F.G. v. MacDonell**, 150 N.J. 550 (1997) ............................................................. 6 - **Felix v. Richards**, 241 N.J. 169 (2020) ............................................................ 20 - **Flomerfelt v. Cardiello**, 202 N.J. 432 (2010) ....................................................... 11 - **France v. A. P. A. Transport Corp.**, 56 N.J. 500 (1970) ........................................ 19 - **Geyer v. Faielle**, 279 N.J. Super. 386 (App. Div. 1995) certif. denied, 141 N.J. 95, (1995) ................................................................. 7 - **Gibson v. Callaghan**, 158 N.J. 662 (1999) .......................................................... 27 - **Harr v. Allstate Ins. Co.**, 54 N.J. 287 (1969) .......................................................
[brief] 284 N.J. Super. 513.  In that case, police were patrolling at night on bicycles, cycling to an intersection known for drug trafficking, when they received a dispatch about an anonymous citizen complaint of a large crowd selling drugs on that corner.  284 N.J. Super. at 515-16.  On approach, one of the officers saw five individuals congregating there, recognizing among them a juvenile later identified as [...] *Id.* at 516.  [...] fled when the police approached, and the officer followed him to a nearby porch, where the officer, using a flashlight, found [...]  in a crouched position on his knees.  *Ibid.*  Assuming [...] was crouched down because he was hiding something, the officer lifted him up, finding drugs and a gun beneath him.  *Ibid.*  This Court reversed the motion judge, who had suppressed the evidence against [...] based on *Tucker*.