ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] (Da 39)  However, going forward the PCR court continues to treat the matter as a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel filed under R. 3:22-2(a).  Accordingly, the court concludes that the petition was time-barred because:  [T]here was no explanation provided for this twenty-year delay in either Petitioner’s initial August 8, 2022, petition, Petitioner’s April 1, 2023, supplemental --- ⁹  This is a direct quote from the transcript.  However, it appears to have been wrongly transcribed or at least misheard by the transcriber.  Clearly, counsel said or intended to say “PCR” and not “PPR” and rather than “with respect to legal sentences, there is some time bar,” counsel in all likelihood stated, “with respect to [il]legal sentences there is [not] some time bar. ” (1T 6-18 to 21) argument, or Petitioner’s counsel’s June 1, 2023, supplemental letter brief.  Therefore, Petitioner has failed to demonstrate any excusable purpose for the delay which exceeds the five-year statutory limitation for filing a PCR petition[], as required to circumvent the Rule 3:22-12(a)(1) time bar.  (Da 43)  Along the same vein, the PCR court concluded that petitioner failed to show that plea counsel did not function as the counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment or that he was prejudiced by counsel’s performance.  (Da 38)  Thus, the court concluded that: “Petitioner failed to make a prima facie showing that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his arguments do not satisfy the two-pronged Strickland standard. ”  (Da 44)  Ultimately, in the final paragraphs of its decision the PCR court did reach the issue of an illegal sentence.  The court acknowledges that, unless the sentencing court “provide[d] reasons” for imposing a concurrent sentence, defendant should have received a consecutive sentence pursuant to “N.J.S.A. 2C:44-5(h). ”  (Da 45)  However, the court again denies relief stating:  There is no transcript available of the 1997 sentencing hearing to corroborate the Defendant’s assertion as it was destroyed due to retention policy.  The Judgement of Conviction confirms the concurrent sentence and “incorporates all other reasons stated on the record at the time of sentence. ”  Therefore, the Court may have stated reasons to justify the concurrent sentence which at that time benefitted the Defendant.  The Defendant received the benefit of a concurrent sentence on matters to which he plead guilty.  Accordingly, prong one of the two-prong standard has not been met, Petitioner is unable to establish that the performance prejudiced the defense.  Because petitioner has neither made prima facie showing that his counsel was ineffective, nor shown that facts material to this claim lie outside the record, he is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing.  (Da 45)  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I THE PCR COURT ERRED IN ITS VIEW OF DEFENDANT’S APPLICATION.
[brief] [...] then made this conveyance to [...] individually and subsequently [...] conveyed to [...], Inc.  (Pa923) (1T59:20-25).  Clearly, in the Deed to [...], [...] acquired a Riparian Grant and there is reference in the Deed from the State identifying this as a grant; in the Deed from [...] to [...] Company, there are two paragraphs which indicate that all of the upland lands were being conveyed (1T60:13).  There is also a paragraph in the Deed wherein [...] specifically states he is conveying the lands underwater (1T60:18) (Pa917).
[brief] The Planning Board Hearing process was effectuated in accordance with Prevailing Provisions of New Jersey Law i.  Board Representatives provided a detailed on-the-Record discussion as to the legal process involved in adopting an Amendment to a Redevelopment Plan…..19  ii.  The communication from the Board Attorney, dated February 17, 2021, accurately captured the essence of the Respondent Board vote / determination…………..31  iii.  The communication from the Board Attorney, as aforesaid, satisfied the Prevailing Legal Requirements associated with the statutorily mandated process for adopting an Amendment to a Redevelopment Plan………34  iv.  The Respondent Planning Board specifically authorized the Board Attorney to issue a confirming letter to the [...]…………36 v.  Had the Board Attorney not sent the February 17, 2021 communication to the [...], then, in that event (because of the pending Governing Body Meeting), the Planning Board would have had no meaningful participation in the Development Plan Amendment process……………………………………….36  vi.
[brief] Further, § 1692c(b) only prohibits communications made “in connection with the collection of a debt. ”  As the Court in *Miller* noted, the transmission of data to the vendor was not an attempt to collect the debt, because the debt “was of no moment whatsoever to the letter vendor or its personnel. ”  *Miller*, at *8; Mhrez Transcript* at T10-11 (adopting the reasoning of the *Miller* Court).  While the letters that the vendor printed and sent to Appellant may have been attempts to collect a debt, the letters to Appellant and the prior transmission of data to the vendor are separate and distinct acts.  Accordingly, Respondent’s transmitting data to its letter vendor so that the vendor could then undertake the rote task of printing and mailing letters on Respondent’s behalf via an automated process is not a “third-party” “communication” to collect a debt.  Section 1692c(b) of the FDCPA therefore does not apply.
[brief] Despite the different ranges provided by the Cornell Projection Study, Appellant seems to assert that the [...] was nevertheless required to pick whatever range it deemed fit for the specific permit application at issue.  The Appellant oversimplifies the conclusiveness of the data set forth in the Cornell Studies. material and significant change from a clear, past agency position on the identical subject matter; and (6) reflects a decision on administrative regulatory policy in the nature of the interpretation of law or general policy.  [See e.g., Metromedia v. Division of Taxation, 97 N.J. 313, 331–32 (1984); see also Chemistry Council of New Jersey v. [...], 2017 WL 6492521 (N.J. App. 2017) (Ra453).]  As such, Appellant cannot assert any good faith argument that the retroactive use of the Cornell Studies to [...]’s Application is statutorily permitted without formal rulemaking.  The [...]’s ability to change the data to be relied upon on all pending permit decisions without any rulemaking process would result in administrative anarchy.  Following Appellant’s logic, any aspirational or informational comments made by the Governor or the [...] to the public regarding climate data that is being peer reviewed should be sufficient to freeze and modify the analysis used for all pending permit applications in New Jersey.  Such legal precedent would result in an absurd outcome, as the [...] would be completely stonewalled from considering and discussing new peer reviewed data with the public.  Appellant’s irrational arguments should be completely disregarded by the Court.
[brief] As the Garrison Court noted: "If a public entity's property is dangerous only when used without due care, the property is not in a 'dangerous condition.'"  Garrison, 154 N.J. at 287 (1998) (emphasis added).  A.  The Illegal Sale and Consumption of Alcoholic Beverages is Not “A Normal, Foreseeable” Use of an Outdoor Public Basketball Court/Common Area.  Illegal activities – such as the sale, purchase and/or consumption of alcoholic beverages on public property – should not now nor ever be considered a “normal, foreseeable” use of any property, public or otherwise.  New Jersey does not permit the sale of alcohol except as provided for under the terms of the Alcohol Beverage Control Act, N.J.S.A. 33:1-1, et seq (“ABCA”).  ABCA sets forth in pertinent part as follows:  It shall be unlawful to…sell, possess with intent to sell…mix…or distribute alcoholic beverages in this State, except pursuant to and within the terms of a license, or as otherwise expressly authorized, under this chapter…  N.J.S.A. 33:1-2(a).
[brief] 13  POINT I THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE RECONSIDERED  THE PRIOR ORDERS (Pa56)  ..................  13  A.  Defendants’ motion to reconsider amounted to an impermissible “lateral appeal” of [...]’s prior Orders ...........................................................................................................  13  B.  Immediately granting reconsideration of a discretionary decision made by a different judge is an abuse of discretion and antithetical to the fair and orderly administration of justice ...........................................................................................................  15  C.  Defendants’ motion to reconsider merely repeated the same arguments and authorities that had been advanced three times previously ..........................................................  16  POINT II  EVEN IF RECONSIDERATION WERE PERMISSIBLE, JUDGE THURBER SHOULD NOT HAVE DISMISSED THIS FIRST-FILED ACTION ON COMITY GROUNDS (Pa57)  .................................................................................................................  20  A.  There is a strong presumption in favor of the first-filed action and defendants did not establish any “special equities” to justify departing from that presumption.  ........  20  B.  This first-filed action should not have been dismissed because this dispute will be more efficiently resolved in this action rather than in the second-filed Missouri Action ......  27  CONCLUSION ......................................................................................................................
[directive] PROMIS/GAVEL INQUIRY PROCEDURES  Completing A Statewide SBI Number Inquiry Search:  1.  From the Promis/Gavel Main Menu, Press F1 (Inquiry Menu).  2.  From the Inquiry Menu, Press F6 (Statewide Inquiries).  3.  Enter the SBI Number and Press F2 (Defn Case by SBI).  This will display the first page of the “Statewide Defn/Case List. ”  Press F8 to scroll through any additional pages.  (Please include a copy of all screens with the referral)  Note: If there are no cases related to the SBI # that is searched, the message, ”Defendant Has No Related Cases” will be displayed.  (Please include a copy of this screen with the referral)
[brief] POINT II  DEFENDANT WAS DEPRIVED OF HIS DUE PROCESS AND CONFRONTATION RIGHTS WHEN THE TRIAL COURT REMOVED HIM FROM THE COURTROOM FOR THE REST OF TRIAL.  (Ruling at: 4T 12-17 to 13-24)  Following a mid-trial outburst, the trial court barred [...] from the courtroom for the remainder of trial.  (4T 12-17 to 13-24)  As a result, [...] was not present in court when four of the State’s witnesses testified, nor was he present for closing arguments or during the final jury charge.  Although the court had the authority to remove [...] from the courtroom “until he promise[d] to conduct himself properly,” it had no authority to banish him for the rest of trial.  See Allen, 307 U.S. at 343-44.  By failing to offer [...] the option of returning to the courtroom if he agreed to behave appropriately, the court deprived [...] of a fair trial and his right to confront the witnesses against him.  U.S. Const. amend. VI and XIV; N.J. Const. art. I, ¶ 10.  [...]’s conviction must be reversed.
[brief] The duty of an owner or occupier of premises is to provide a reasonably safe place for use by an invitee.  Where the owner/occupier knows of an unsafe condition the owner/occupier may satisfy the duty by correcting the condition, or, in those circumstances where it is reasonable to do so, by giving warning to the invitee of the unsafe condition.  Where a warning has been given, it is for you as jurors to determine whether the warning given was adequate to meet the duty of care owed to the invitee.  In this regard you should consider the nature of the defect or unsafe condition, the prevailing circumstances, and the likelihood that the warning given would be adequate to call attention to the invitee of the hazard and of the need to protect against said hazard.  *Model Jury Charge* 5.20F(12)(b)(emphasis added).
[brief] (2T30-9-25; 2Tp31-1-25).  Like [...], notably missing from Appellant’s Motion is any correspondence to Respondent notifying it of an address change, nor is there any proof of address change with the Department of Motor Vehicles or United States Post Office.  (Da28-Da63).  The Lower Court noted this deficiency during the plenary hearing.  (2T44-13-25; 2T45-1-14).  Notably, Appellant’s exhibits filed in support of his First Motion to Vacate in the Action were identical to the exhibits Appellant filed in support of the Second Motion to Vacate in Appellant’s Class Action and are similar to the exhibits filed in support of Appellant’s third Motion, here, which are all merely bills that do not otherwise establish residency in Pennsylvania.  (compare Pa22-Pa34 to Pa219-Pa222 and Da47-Da63).  During oral argument on the First Motion to Vacate before the Court, the Lower Court advised Appellant that this evidence, is woefully deficient to establish residence in Pennsylvania.  (3T, generally).  First, the Lower Court pointed out that documents, such as a tax return identifying the Pennsylvania Address, would establish residency.  Id.  Appellant failed to include a tax return demonstrating residency, again, on this Motion.  (Da43-Da63).  Second, the Lower Court noted during oral argument that the evidence Appellant submitted are mere bills that do not establish residency:  THE COURT:  This does not say that your client resided there.  This only says that your client was responsible for the utility there.  I don’t know how many homes your client did or did not own, how man[y] utility bills were or were not in your client’s name, or that a utility bill necessarily reflects that your client, in fact, resided there.  . . .  Utility bill doesn’t tell me anything.  A tax return, a Pennsylvania tax return for 2015, ’16, ’17 might tell me a lot more.  A driver’s license might tell me a lot more.  But I’m not going to infer that a utility bill equates with residency.  So you have not provided satisfactory proof, at least not to this Court on a six-year-old case, that your client, in fact, lived there.  Your client’s certification is very – very brief, says very little.  . . .It doesn’t show residency.  (3T20-14-25; 3T21-1-5).  Notably missing in Appellant’s Certification, here, is a tax return, DMV issued document, Post Office issued document, or letter to Respondent indicating residency in Pennsylvania.  During the plenary hearing, Appellant still failed to cure these deficiencies and submitted no additional evidence to establish residency.  As the court held in [...], “[w]ithout such notice of a change of address, or other actual or constructive knowledge, a plaintiff-creditor is not required to check [] before filing suit to determine [] defendant’s whereabouts. ”  2011 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 717, at *9.  Thus, the Lower Court did not abuse its discretion in determining that Appellant’s evidence was woefully deficient to establish residency in Pennsylvania.  For these reasons, the Judgment should not be vacated due to a purported lack of personal jurisdiction.
[brief] _Cofield_, 127 N.J. at 338.  As the _Cofield_ court rightly emphasized, admitting evidence of other bad acts is the exception, not the rule.  _Id._ at 337.  As such, _N.J.R.E._ 404(b) is a rule of exclusion, not a rule of inclusion.  _Willis_, 225 N.J. at 100.  The “bad acts” evidence in this case about the defendant’s apparent failure to properly design his [...] business cards failed to meet prongs (1) or (4) of the _Cofield_ test.  Moreover, even if the evidence had somehow been admissible in a very limited manner, the failure to give any limiting instruction to the jury to not consider the violation of formatting rules regarding [...] business cards as proof of any of the counts against defendant was reversible error.
[brief] Thus, even if appellant/plaintiff’s alleged fact dispute concerning his claims against his insurance carrier had a bearing on the application of N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.5, here, any dispute concerning the analysis of those claims is now concluded, by an order that found his vehicles were garaged in New Jersey and were not insured.  Therefore, appellant/plaintiff failed to maintain insurance meeting the requirements of N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4 on April 13, 2022 and barred from making a claim for economic and non-economic loss against defendant [...].  POINT II
[brief] **CONCLUSION**  In light of the foregoing, Plaintiff respectfully requests that the trial court’s order denying Defendant’s motion for reconsideration be upheld, that the order denying Plaintiff’s cross-motion for the imposition of sanctions be reversed, and that judgment be entered against the Defendant and [...] in the total sum of $14,324.40 representing Plaintiff’s attorney’s fees and costs in defending the frivolous motion for reconsideration and appeal.  Dated: 10/24/24  [...] [...]  Attorney for Plaintiff [...], [...], BY ITS CUSTODIAN [...] PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, V. [...] A/K/A [...]; [...]; MR./MRS. KEMP, Spouse of [...]; MR./MRS. CHILINSKAS, spouse of [...]; [...] s/b/m/t [...] a division of [...]; [...]; JOHN DOE AND JANE DOE; [...]; MR./MRS. AUNGST, spouse of Joanne Aungst DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS.
[directive] comparable include court, municipal in the considering after complaint-summons by charging of presumption the overcome to officer judicial other or judge factors: following appear; to has failed and offense indictable any prior for summons a with served been has defendant (1) the any of safety to danger the will a pose or self to dangerous is defendant the that believe to reason is (2) there summons; a on released if community the or person other defendant; the for warrants outstanding more or one is there (3) the to defendant necessary the subject to is warrant a and known not is address or identity defendant's the (4) court; the of jurisdiction process criminal justice the obstruct attempt to or obstruct will defendant the that believe reason to is there (5) summons; a on released if summons; a to response in appear not will defendant the that believe reason to is there (6) program services pretrial conditions the by release pretrial of monitoring the that believe to reason is there (7) specified other witness, victim, any protect necessary to is 2A:162-25 N.J.S.A. to pursuant established community. the or person, 38 Page 2C:11-4(a)); (N.J.S.A. manslaughter aggravated — 2C:11-4(b)); (N.J.S.A. manslaughter — 2C:14-2(a)); (N.J.S.A. assault sexual aggravated — (c)); or 2C:14-2(b) (N.J.S.A. assault sexual — 2C:15-1); (N.J.S.A. robbery — 2C:15-2); (N.J.S.A. carjacking — or 2C:29-5(a)); (N.J.S.A. escape — crimes. foregoing of any the commit to attempt14 an — Detainees.  Out-of-State or Federal, Jersey, New and Extradition Cases 4.4.2 has defendant if Directive, the of 4 this Section of provision other any Notwithstanding enforcement law s l charge, the Jersey current New the for state another from extradited been the of the court and advise acomplaint-warrant for apply shall arrest the making agency lawful law a and under New Jersey offense an for arrested is defendant the If extradition. enforcement or law agency federal a any by defendant the against lodged been has detainer the of having custody agency enforcement law the state, other any or State this from agency defendant If detainer.  the a of court the and advise acomplaint-warrant for apply shall defendant is and United the States, or another state, of laws the under committed offense an for is arrested the apply, and not Law does Reform Bail the law, Jersey under New offense an with charged not with in accordance proceed shall defendant the of custody having or arrest the making agency 1.6.
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT’S APPOINTMENT OF THE SPECIAL HEARING OFFICER, THE HEARING ITSELF, AND THE COURT’S ADOPTION OF THE SPECIAL HEARING OFFICER’S RECOMMENDATIONS WERE PROPER A.  The Trial Court’s appointment of the SHO was made in accordance with the relevant law and was proper given the facts of this case.  As a result of the wrongful conduct of the [...], [...], and the [...] with regard to the denial of Plaintiffs’ Amended Application as detailed above, the Trial Court properly appointed a Special Hearing Officer to “undertake specific tasks in the review, evaluation and recommendation” of further proceedings, such as site plan proceedings, required for the development of the Subject Property.
[brief] Our courts have consistently held that a psychiatrist in a criminal case may testify as to what a defendant told him or her if the expert relied on the statements in formulating an opinion about the defendant's mental or psychiatric condition, and such hearsay declarations “constituted a necessary element in the formulation of [the] opinion. ”  *State v. Lucas*, 30 N.J. at 79; *Farthing*, supra, 331 N.J.Super. at 77–78.  Of course, these hearsay statements are not admitted for their truth, and the expert's testimony must be circumscribed by an appropriate limiting instruction.  *State v. Burris*, supra, 298 N.J.Super. at 512–13.  A charge should be given “to the effect that [the evidence] should not be considered by the jury as substantive evidence relating to the question of guilt or innocence of the accused, but only as evidence tending to support the ultimate expert conclusion of the psychiatrist. ”  *Id.* (quoting *State v. Lucas*, 30 N.J. at 79); *State v. Vandeweaghe*, 351 N.J. Super. at 467 (if the expert relied upon the “truth of the matter asserted in formulating an opinion rather than the fact that the statement was made, the jury should be instructed that the probative value of the opinion is dependent upon, and no stronger than, those facts”).
[directive] See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 592 (generally prohibiting deployment of federal troops or armed men at any place where an election is held, except where “necessary to repel armed enemies of the United States”); id. at § 593 (prohibiting interference in elections by an officer or member of the Armed Forces of the United States); id. at § 595 (prohibiting interference in elections by other federal employees).  Other laws that protect voters from intimidation apply generally to all members of the public.  For example, it is a crime of the second degree for any person, including an election official or law enforcement officer, to knowingly and willfully intimidate, threaten or coerce—or attempt to intimidate, threaten or coerce—another person from voting, attempting to vote, or urging or aiding another person to vote or attempt to vote.  See N.J.S.A. 19:34-1.1.  State law also prohibits any person from using or threatening use of force, violence, or restraint; inflicting or threatening to inflict any injury, damage, harm or loss; or in any manner practicing intimidation upon or against any person, in order to “induce or compel” that person to vote or refrain from voting or voting for any particular person or on account of that person having voted or refrained from voting.  See N.J.S.A. 19:34-28.  Likewise, it is a federal crime to intimidate, threaten, or coerce—or attempt to intimidate, threaten, or coerce—any other person for the purpose of interfering with their right to vote or to vote as they may choose in a federal election.  See 18 U.S.C. § 594.  These protections apply at all times and locations, including but not limited to polling places, ballot drop boxes, and their immediate surroundings.  Obstructing or interfering with a voter’s free exercise of the elective franchise—at a polling place or elsewhere—is also illegal.  See N.J.S.A. 19:34-29; see also N.J.S.A. 19:34-20 (making it a crime of the third degree to in any way willfully hinder or prevent a voter from casting their legal vote, knowing such person has a right to vote); N.J.S.A. 19:34-20 (making it a crime of the third degree to tamper with, injure, mutilate, destroy or render unfit for use, any ballot box); N.J.S.A. 19:63-28(a) (making it a crime of the third degree to prevent or attempt to prevent by fraud the voting by mail of any person legally entitled to do so); N.J.S.A. 19:34-6(a) (making it a crime of the third degree to obstruct the entrance to any polling place, obstruct or interfere with any voter, or loiter in or near a polling place).