ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] [...] has no later than fifteen (15) days from oral argument, or by May 8, 2014, to produce the documents and the privilege logs associated therewith.  In opposition, [...] contends that the only issue in [...]’s motion applicable to him is the sufficiency of one of the privilege logs.  See R. Doc. 119.  Specifically, [...] contends that there is no issue with the privilege logs submitted on his behalf, as the Protocol only required a “brief” description of the privileged nature of the document.  See id., at p. 3.  Furthermore, [...] contends that the one case that [...] sites in support of its argument that the privilege logs are insufficient does not apply to post-litigation documents, as does this log.  Id. at p. 3–4.  Specifically, [...] contends that some courts across the country have determined that the requirements for privilege logs describing post-litigation documents and communications are different than those for pre-litigation documents and communications.  Id.  In fact, [...] contends that some courts have suggested that privilege logs are not required for post-litigation documents and communications.  Id. citing U.S. v. Bouchard Transp., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37438, at *2 (E.D.N.Y.2010) (“Privilege logs are commonly limited to documents created before the date litigation was initiated .... [because] it can be assumed that all documents created after ... a lawsuit has been filed and withheld on the grounds of privilege were created because of the pending litigation. ”); Prism Technologies, LLC v. Adobe Sys., Inc., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 131321 (D.Neb.2011) (same); Ryan Inv. Corp. v. Pedregal De Cabo San Lucas, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 118337, at *9 (N.D.Cal.2009) (denying plaintiff’s motion to compel “to the extent it seeks to require a log of post-litigation counsel communications and work product....”).  During oral argument, the Court reviewed the privilege log, and indicated that based on the brief descriptions, the log was unsatisfactory, as the descriptions did not provide enough of an explanation as to the content of the material over which the claim is being asserted.  Therefore, counsel for [...] was required to amend the privilege log to provide a better description of those documents on which privileges are being claimed so that [...] may be able to ascertain whether the privilege applies.  As such, [...]’s request to amend the logs was granted.
[brief] August 17, 2019 Incident  With respect to [...]’ conduct on August 17, 2019, the ALJ found [...] made threatening comments at the end of an officer’s lineup on August 17, 2019.  (Pa024a).  Based on credible testimony, the ALJ determined [...] stated “I’ll fuck up your wife and kids,” to [...].  (Pa025a).  Then, after the lineup concluded, [...] continued threatening [...], using language reserved for individuals “prepared to engage in a physical fight. ”  Ibid.  As such, the ALJ found [...]’ language met the threshold of threatening, intimidating, harassing, coercing, or interfering with fellow State employees on State property because [...] continuously threatened his coworkers and indicated he was prepared to physically fight outside of the workplace, in violation of the rules of the Department.  Ibid.  For these reasons, the ALJ sustained all charges against [...].  Ibid.  iii.
[brief] If we review once again Court Invest. Co. v. Perillo, N.J. 48 N.J. 334, 225, A2d 352 (1966) it established; The trial court will be accepted by an appellant tribunal in the “ABSENCE” OF ABUSE OF DISCRETION.  The Third Circuit has consistently reversed lower court’s decisions when it was found (as in this case before the court) if Service of Process was not established by the party claiming valid service when jurisdiction had been challenged (Pa1) the decision WAS REVERSED, and any subsequent JUDGMENTS would be considered VOID and UNENFORCEABLE as matter of law.
[brief] As related, there is explicit municipal power to regulate disturbing noises under the Home Rule Act.  The Health Act, in turn, compels a municipality such as [...] to have a Board of Health.  In this instance the powers of the local Board of Health are now the domain of a regional health commission, the [...].  These bodies have the power to define nuisances and to adopt codes.  The Court below said that this power preempts the governing body’s power under the Home Rule Act.  But because a municipality must have a Board of Health and, if as the lower Court says, the Board of Health has exclusive power to regulate noise, in all cases, no municipality may pass a noise related ordinance outside of the NCA.
[brief] B.  Plaintiff Has Established Specific Causation.  [ISSUE RAISED AND DECIDED (Pa047, ¶33 – Pa057, ¶71; Da0790-Da0792; Da0794-Da0798; Da0822-Da0829)]  [...] testified to a reasonable degree of medical certainty as follows:  Q.  Is it your opinion to a reasonable degree of medical certainty that on November 6, 2018, with the injection of the Ozurdex, that the silicone particulate was injected in [...]'s eye that caused the retinal detachment, which required, then, the surgery that then resulted in the migration of the Ozurdex steroid pellet into her eye as well as the RETISERT detachment, and that ultimately led to her blindness in the left eye?  A.  Yeah, that summarizes.  [Objection by defense counsel.]  THE WITNESS: That summarizes the sequence of events that I agree with happened.  Q.  And then is it your opinion to a reasonable degree of medical certainty that the silicone particulate was injected into her eye?  A.  Yes.  Q.  And is it your opinion to a reasonable degree of medical certainty that the silicone particulate being injected into [...]'s eye on November 6, 2018, was a substantial factor and a cause of her blindness?  [Objection by defense counsel.]  A. Yes.  (Da0699-Da0700)
[brief] There is no question that the proper basis for compensation is the value of the property as it would be at the time of the taking disregarding either the depreciating threat of or the inflationary reaction to the proposed public project.  Mack, supra at 569 [emphasis added].  The Mack Court carefully explained that [...]’s proposed use would not be “a factor in enhancing the value of the subject property as of the date of taking. ”  Rather, “[...]’s contemplated changes in connection with its proposed project, involving office and residential use, may be relevant as to the adaptability of the property to Mack’s proposal, and to the issue of highest and best use of the property for the purpose of fixing value. ”  Mack at 569.  Therefore, New Jersey condemnation law requires the inflationary or depreciating effects of the redevelopment project for which the property was acquired to be disregarded when arriving at just compensation.  See, Kugler, supra 379.
[brief] ”  El-Sioufi v. St. Peter’s Univ. Hosp., 382 N.J. Super. 145, 170 (App. Div. 2005).  “An employer must be free to investigate complaints of employee misconduct without fear of LAD liability. ”  Spinks v. Township of Clinton, 402 N.J. Super. 465, 484 (App. Div. 2008).  Additionally, it is “[o]nly when the investigation results in some real detriment, such as a suspension, demotion, or termination, should the aggrieved employee be able to invoke the protection of the LAD.
[brief] (5T18 to 20)  Meniere’s is a progressive disease that gets worse over time.  (5T42)  Plaintiff ultimately had a labyrinthectomy, which was the result of the chronic process of his Meniere’s disease.  (5T20 to 21)  [...] also reviewed the dashcam video to conclude that Plaintiff “did not strike his head on the ground.  In fact, after taking the perpetrator down, he got up, he walked around, and he called for backup.  And he did not appear to that he was significantly injured … after he completed the arrest of the perpetrator. ” (5T21-19 to 25).  [...] testified further that if Plaintiff had hit his head, the force required to affect his Meniere’s disease would have had to be “concussive” so as to cause a loss of consciousness or to leave the individual dazed significantly because the inner ear is protected by some of the hardest bone in the body.  (5T22-18 to 23-6)  [...] opined that nothing in the dash cam video supports claim that Plaintiff struck his head and certainly not hard enough to affect the Meniere’s disease.  (5T24-8 to 11)  [...] opined further that “from what I’ve seen in the medical records, he [Plaintiff] did not sustain an incident sufficient to aggravate his underlying, already significant Meniere’s disease. ”  (5T24-12 to 20)  [...] concluded that Plaintiff probably would have had to undergo the surgeries performed by [...] regardless of the July 29, 2013 incident.  (5T43)
[brief] ”  Maw v. Advanced Clinical Commc’ns, Inc., 179 N.J. 439, 445 (2004).  In [...], a police officer was demoted from detective to patrol officer for voicing his concern, in a memorandum, that the police department was no longer enforcing certain laws prohibiting prostitution.  188 N.J. at 225-29, 232.  The Court stated that the laws that prohibit prostitution constitute “a clear mandate of public policy concerning the public, health, safety or welfare. ”  Id. at 232.  Here, Plaintiff's performance of law enforcement duties on the night of July 5, 2016 involved concerns that he had regarding the public health, safety and welfare of the public.
[brief] See Da144.  In the Arbitration, [...] established, and the Arbitrator found, that [...]’s 65% EGP “was to be established toward the beginning of the project,” for each project, no matter what actually happened during the lifetime of the actual project—i.e., [...]’s money was guaranteed.  Da134-35.  The Arbitrator thus rejected [...]’s strained interpretation that the PTA required “six steps” before [...] could be liable to [...] for nonpayment.  App. Br. at 12.  As the Arbitrator found, “witnesses and correspondence admitted into evidence established that a main component of the deal for [[...]] was that they would not accept ‘execution risks’ on the projects. ”  Da134.  This finding further undercuts [...]’s tried-and-rejected contention that the EGPs “changed over --- 3 https://www.rcsklaw.com/attorneys.html. time,” App. Br. at 24, which argument itself inherently conflicts with its contrived “six-step” Backlog Project process and the Arbitrator’s finding that “[...] objected to most of these changes in EGP. ”  Da135.  [...], on the other hand, “would keep 100% of the additional profits” but, again, [...] could never receive less than “65% of the established EGP. ”  Da134.  This transaction, the Arbitrator found, “appeared to be advantageous to both parties,” as [...] could “reap up to $40,000,000.00 from contracts” under the PTA, and [...] “established a foothold in the New Jersey market…without a significant capital investment. ”  Da134-35.  [...] thus obtained a turn-key construction company from [...] for $0 out-of-pocket, and then crafted myriad bad faith pretextual reasons for withholding millions of [...]’s earn-out money for several years, including to this day.
[brief] BRIEF OF PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS # TABLE OF CONTENTS | Section | Page | |------------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | PRELIMINARY STATEMENT | 1 | | PROCEDURAL HISTORY | 4 | | STATEMENT OF FACTS | 5 | | A. Background On [...] And The Firm.  | 5 | | B.  The OAE Proceedings Do Not Involve The Rendering Of Legal Services.| 5 | | C.  The OAE Proceeding Was Not Reportable To [...] In The Policy Applications | 8 | | D.  The Key Man Policy And The Estate’s Legal Malpractice Claim Triggered Coverage Under the [...] Policy | 11 | | E.  Defendants Conditionally Granted Coverage In The [...] Matter After Undue Delay | 12 | | F. [...] Revoked Coverage And Improperly Rescinded The Policies As To All Insureds | 13 | | G. Plaintiffs’ Response To Defendants’ Improper Rescission Of The Policies | 14 | | LEGAL ARGUMENT | 16 | I.
[brief] F.  Mistrial should have been Ordered in light of [...]’s highly prejudicial summation.  (not raised below)  Defendants do not even seriously attempt to argue that they were allowed to argue on summation that Plaintiff didn’t even have an expert witness who disagreed with Defendants’ expert regarding the reasonableness oof the fee despite the fact that the only reason Plaintiff’s witness did not so testify is due to the preclusion of such testimony by the court.
[directive] 6.  If you refuse to provide samples of your breath you will be 11.  If you are convicted of refusing to submit to chemical tests of issued a separate summons for this refusal. your breath, you must also satisfy the requirements of a program of alcohol education or rehabilitation.  7.  Any response that is ambiguous or conditional, in any respect, to your giving consent to the taking of breath samples will be 12.  I repeat, you are required by law to submit to the taking of treated as a refusal to submit to breath testing. samples of your breath for the purposes of making chemical tests to determine your alcohol concentration.  Now, will you submit the samples of your breath?  Answer: (ADDITIONAL INSTRUCTIONS FOR POLICE OFFICER)
[brief] Defendant’s November of 2018 Letter Motion1 ...............................................  Da 17-20  Defendant’s January of 2019 Letter Motion ....................................................  Da 21-23  Defendant’s April of 2019 Pro Se Motion .........................................................  Da 24-31  Defense Counsel’s May of 2019 Brief and Exhibits ........................................  Da 32-40  Defendant’s May of 2019 Supplemental Brief ................................................  Da 41-50  Complaint-Warrant [...] ......................................................  Da 51-54  Federal Writ .....................................................................................................  Da 55-56  State’s Letter Seeking Writ ..............................................................................  Da 57  1  The series of letters and briefs from the defense are included in the appendix because they are germane to when and whether speedy trial issues were raised.  R. 2:6-1(a)(2).  ### TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | Cases | PAGE NOS. | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------| | Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972) | 4, 5, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 19, 21 | | Dickey v. Florida, 398 U.S. 30 (1970) | 15 | | Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647 (1992) | 11, 14, 19, 21 | | Smith v. Hooey, 393 U.S. 374 (1969) | 15 | | State v. Cahill, 213 N.J. 253 (2013) | 10, 11, 13, 17, 18, 19, 20 | | State v. Farrell, 320 N.J. Super. 425 (App. Div. 1999) | 19, 20 | | State v. McNamara, 212 N.J. Super. 102 (1986) | 16 | | State v. Merlino, 153 N.J. Super. 12 (App. Div. 1977) | 10, 18 | | State v. Stas, 212 N.J. 37 (2012) | 10 | | State v. Tsetsekas, 411 N.J. Super. 1 (App. Div. 2009) | 10, 12, 20| | United States v. Battis, 589 F.3d 673 (3d Cir. 2009) | 11, 12, 14, 17, 20 | | Statutes | PAGE NOS. | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------| | N.J.S.A. 2C:29-2B | 7 | | Rules | PAGE NOS. | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------| | R. 3:4-2 | 16 | | R. 3:9-1 | 16 | | Constitutional Provisions | PAGE NOS. | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------| | N.J. Const. art. I, ¶ 10 | 9 | | TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (CONT'D) | PAGE NOS. | |-------------------------------|-----------| | **Constitutional Provisions (Cont'd)** | | | U.S. Const. amend. VI | 9 | | U.S. Const. amend. XIV | 9 |
[brief] It is well recognized, as against a beneficiary "having a testator under his control, with power to make his will the will of the testator, especially in a case where the testator has made an unnatural and unjust disposition of his property, the law wisely presumes undue influence, and puts upon the beneficiary the burden of showing, affirmatively, that when the testator made his will, he did not exercise his power over the testator to his own advantage and to the disadvantage of others having an equal or superior claim upon the bounty of the testator."
[brief] The MVR provides no salvation to justify this motor vehicle stop either (Da 31).  The MVR could have been relied upon by the State to corroborate the officer’s observations, but here there is nothing to corroborate.  Standing alone, as it does, the MVR cannot justify the stop and the trial court’s apparent reliance upon the MVR is misplaced.  While the MVR may be evidence of the Defendant’s guilt, that is not the issue here.  To repeat, and I apologize to the Court for saying this again, the stop must be based upon the observations of the officer making the stop.  Absent credible observations by [...], the MVR has no probative value\(^3\).  \(^3\)Even if this Court disagrees and holds that the MVR has some probative value, the Court below acknowledged that neither a stop sign nor stop bar are visible in the MVR.  Based upon this record, the State offered no proof of the existence of either at the intersection in question.  CONCLUSION
[brief] Respectfully submitted, **[...]**  By: /s/ [...]  [...]  Dated: March 4, 2024  April 2, 2024  [...], Clerk  Appellate Division  R.J. Hughes Justice Complex  P.O. Box 006 Trenton, NJ 08625-0006  Filing Attorney: [...], Deputy General Counsel  Attorney ID #042812003, E-mail: [...]  Re: [...], Appellant -and- [...], Respondent; App. Div. Dkt. No. [...]; Agcy Dkt. Nos. [...]; [...]
[brief] Finally, it is important that “[a] local board’s denial of a variance is entitled to greater judicial deference than a decision to grant a variance. ”  362 N.J.Super. at 314, citing Northeast Towers, Inc. v. Zoning Bd. of Adj., W. Paterson, 327 N.J.Super. 476, 494 (App.Div. 2000)(emphasis added).  Thus, a party seeking to overturn the denial of a variance must prove that the evidence before the local board was “overwhelmingly in favor of the applicant. ”  Id. (quoting Medical Realty v. Board of Adj., Summit, 228 N.J.Super. 226, 233 (App.Div.1988)).  The conclusion from the above is that Boards that are deliberate, that articulate the facts and apply them to the law, are never found to be arbitrary, unreasonable and capricious.
[brief] Our Supreme Court has held that an individual employee is not an “employer” under the LAD.  Tarr, 181 N.J. at 83.  Only supervisors can be found individually liable under the LAD.  N.J.S.A. 10:5-12(e) (discussing individual liability under the LAD); Tyson v. CIGNA Corp., 918 F. Supp. 836, 840-41 (D.N.J. 1996) (LAD does not impose individual liability upon non-supervisory employees); Ivan v. County of Middlesex, 612 F.Supp.2d 546, 553 (D.N.J. 2009) (“That aiding and abetting liability can only be applied to supervisors, and not to co-employees, further confirms that the aiding and abetting provisions are intended to assure that violations of the LAD are appropriately remedied”); Herman v. Coastal Corp., 348 N.J. Super. 1, 27-28 (App. Div. 2002) (dismissing individual liability claims against non-supervisory employee).  In this case, Defendant [...] is the Library Media Specialist and Language Literacy Intervention teacher for the [...].  222a, ¶ 80; 380a-381a, ¶¶ 3, 4.  In such capacity, Defendant [...] is Plaintiff’s co-worker.  Indeed, Defendant [...] certified that she does not now, nor has she ever, had any supervisory authority over Plaintiff or any other teacher or employee of the [...] for that matter.  381a, ¶¶ 5, 6.  Thus, in accordance with New Jersey law, Defendant [...] cannot be held individually liable under N.J.S.A. 10:5-12(e).
[brief] (Argued at Pa404 – Pa405)  Without the Legislature’s express retroactive application of the statute, the court would have to rule, in the absence of evidence, that “(1) whether the Legislature intended to give the statute retroactive application and (2) whether retroactive application will result in either an unconstitutional interference with vested rights or a manifest injustice”.  Under the first prong, “whether the Legislature intended to give the statute retroactive application”, that answer is clearly “No”.
[brief] Third, *E&J Equities Ltd. Liab.* and its progeny poses no great burden to municipalities.  It merely requires that facts exist to support the substantial interest and narrow tailoring.  Those facts may exist, of record, from the standard process for creating a zoning ordinance or amending a master plan or, alternatively, the municipality could substantiate the facts through a plenary hearing if the billboard regulation is challenged.  See *Riya Finnegan Ltd. Liab. Co. v. Twp. Council of Tp. of S. Brunswick*, 197 N.J. 184, 201-202 (2008) (referring ordinance to planning board for creation of factual record prior to adoption); Twp. of Cinnaminson v. Bertino, 405 N.J. Super. 521, 536 (App. Div. 2009) (plenary hearing).  But there is no option where the municipality can do nothing, have nothing, rely on nothing.  None of this requires a local planning board hearing on a development application to include evidence on substantial interest and narrow tailoring.  No one said that.  No one argued it.  Where does that argument appear anywhere in [...]’s merits brief?  Before questioning its burdens any further, [...] should perhaps review what burdens already exist that easily could include the proof required by E&J Equities, Ltd. Liab. and its progeny when dealing with a billboard regulation—planning board referral, master plan review.  But [...]’s argument is still fairer because it argues that [...] has other options, such as using the plenary hearing.  [...], however, just wants a rubber stamp.  That is not an option and it is not remotely supported by E&J Equities, Ltd. Liab. and its progeny.
[brief] Where the invocation is “ambiguous” – it “leav[es] the investigating officer ‘reasonably unsure whether the suspect was asserting that right’” or is “susceptible to two different meanings” – clarifying questions “narrowly directed to determining whether defendant [is] willing to continue” are necessary before interrogation can continue.  *Maltese*, 222 N.J. at 545 (quoting *State v. Johnson*, 120 N.J. 263, 284 (1990)); *Diaz-Bridges*, 208 N.J. at 569; *State v. S.S.*, 229 N.J. 360, 382-83 (2017).
[directive] If a criminal charge has been filed, internal affairs must notify the County Prosecutor immediately even if the incident took place in another county.  As the chief law enforcement officer of the county, it is critical that a prosecutor be made aware of any outstanding criminal charges against any law enforcement officer in their county.  6.4.7  Internal affairs is responsible for reviewing the incident’s investigation and conducting whatever further investigation is necessary to determine if the officer violated agency rules and regulations or if the officer's fitness for duty is in question.  In addition, internal affairs will track the proceedings of any criminal charges or civil matters that may arise out of the incident.  Internal affairs will also work with the Division of Criminal Justice or the County Prosecutor to determine if and when an officer may have their weapon(s) returned.
[brief] INSURANCE  CARRIERS CANNOT BE COMPELLED TO RESOLVE FRAUD ACT CLAIMS VIA THE NFADR PROCESS SINCE THEY CANNOT BE AWARDED DAMAGES.  The Fraud Act provides that a successful carrier is entitled to recover compensatory damages, cost of investigation, attorney’s fees and cost of suit.  The carrier is also entitled to recover treble damages if it demonstrates that the defendant(s) engaged in a pattern of violating the act.  See N.J.S.A. 17:33A-7(b).