ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] Imprisonment  Actor commits a flagrantly rude or offensive conduct likely to be observed by a non- 2C:14-4a  Lewdness  Disorderly Persons  $500 to $1,000 10% permissible consenting person.  Actor purposely or knowingly damages property of another or recklessly or negligently 2C:17-3(a)(b)(2)  Criminal Mischief causes such damage by the employment of fire or explosives or other dangerous means, Disorderly Persons $500 to $1,000 10% permissible and the pecuniary loss is $500 or less.
[brief] This is so because “[t]he vice Bankston and its progeny seek to eradicate” is “‘the implication that a testifying police officer somehow is in possession of superior knowledge than what is presented to the jury and hence, his testimony is worthy of greater weight. ’”  Id. at 416 (quoting State v. Kemp, 195 N.J. 136, 155 (2008)).  It is “the creation of the inference, not the specificity of the statements made” that is the “critical factor in determining” whether Bankston is violated. ”  State v. Irving, 114 N.J. 427, 446 (1989) Medina, 242 N.J. at 415.  Thus, testimony that does not create this unfair inference, but instead uses neutral language “to show ‘the officer was not acting in an arbitrary manner or to explain his subsequent conduct” is “admissible. ”  Bankston, 63 N.J. 268; Irving, 114 N.J. at 446; Medina, 242 N.J. at 413-17.  This exception to Bankston, and not its general prohibition, is applicable here, demonstrating that the now-objected-to testimony was not admitted in error.
[brief] LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I THE WITHIN DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO VACATE GUILTY PLEA SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED ON DE NOVO REVIEW PREDICATED UPON THE MUNICIPAL COURT’S FAILURE TO OBTAIN A SUFFICIENT FACTUAL BASIS FOR THE ENTRY OF DEFENDANT’S GUILTY PLEA ON MAY 16, 2018  IN ACCORDANCE WITH R. 7:6-2(A)(1).  (T3:16-24 to 29-19).  (DA7).  State v. Scott Robertson, 228 N.J. 138 (2017) is perhaps the best appellate opinion in setting forth the very particularized nature of trial de novo law in New Jersey.  It is not an appeal.  Rather, and as Robertson explains, the municipal court is the first trial court for motor vehicle offenses, certain code violations, and lesser criminal offenses.  Every determination that a municipal court judge makes as the first trial court is subject to de novo review by the Law Division (Criminal Part) which sits as the second trial court.
[brief] [...] ([...]) is defunct as acquired by [...]/[...] ([...]) on November 1, 2021.  As the [...] stressed, without a legally formed trust, there can be no legal holder trustee.  Witness [...] admitted that the box for trust was not checked off and instead "segregated pool of assets" was checked off on the applicable IRS form.  All of this evidence should have negated the Chancery court’s determination that the plaintiff "investor trust" is a valid owner or holder of the 2004 loan – it never was.  As the [...] would have presented at the chancery trial had they been given a chance to do so, no lender existed for the 2004 loan since [...] and [...] were dissolved in 2007 – long before the claimed 2009 assignment.
[brief] \(^2\)  The instant Complaint, as in the other matters, is premised on the underlying claim that when Respondent, a purchaser of defaulted accounts, filed its collection action on or about September 16, 2015\(^3\) against the Plaintiff to collect her defaulted [...] account, it was not licensed pursuant to the NJCFLA, as either a “sales finance company” or a “consumer lender. ”  Whether Respondent needed to be licensed under the NJCFLA is not a question necessary to be determined in this action, notwithstanding Appellant’s pleas to the contrary.  There is no private right of --- \(^2\)  See Order and Decision entered by Hon. [...], J.S.C. on June 29, 2020 in *Toft v Asset Acceptance*, ESX-L-007345-19 (Da89); Order and Decision entered by Hon. [...], J.S.C. on January 21, 2022 in *Woo-Padva v Midland Funding, LLC*, BER-L-003625-17 (Da103); Order and Decision entered by Hon. [...], J.S.C. on October 4, 2023 in *Valentine v Unifund CCR, LLC et al.*, BER-L-000376-23 (Da112) and the Appellate Division decision, albeit unpublished, entered on September 21, 2023 in *Woo-Padva v Midland Funding*, A-1996-21, 2023 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1550 (Da83), certification denied, *Woo-Padva v. Midland Funding, LLC*, 257 N.J. 513, 314 A.3d 1267 (2024)
[brief] 15  TABLE OF DECISIONS, ORDERS AND JUDGMENTS  March 15, 2024  Order ........................................................................................................Da1  #  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES  ## Cases - *Bonnco Petrol, Inc. v. Epstein*, 115 N.J. 599, 608 (1989)  ...........................................13 - *Caggiano v. Fontoura*, 354 N.J. Super. 111, 124 (App. Div. 2002)  ..............................11 - *Dugan Constr. Co. v. N.J. Tpk. Auth.*, 398 N.J. Super. 229, 242-43 (App. Div. 2008), certif. denied, 196 N.J. 346 (2008)  ..................................................................................13 - *Golden Estates v. Continental Cas.*, 317 N.J. Super. 82, 88 (App. Div. 1998) ......11 - *Martinez v. John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co.*, 145 N.J. Super. 301, 312 (App. Div. 1976), certif.
[brief] In June 2021, the [...] modified and updated the Unified Land Use and Circulation Element of the Master Plan (the “ULUC” or “Master Plan”), which included its vision for downtown Westfield.  (Pa311.)  On January 26, 2023, [...] (“[...]”), the Town’s Redevelopment Planner, prepared and submitted to the Governing Body a redevelopment plan (“Redevelopment Plan”).  (Pa128 at ¶17.)  [...] was hired by the Town as its Redevelopment Planner.  (Pa657.)  The Redevelopment Plan incorporated public input and sets forth “a series of new solutions to help keep Downtown Westfield vibrant and relevant for future generations” by reimagining “three critical areas in and around downtown that will contribute to the continued vitality of the community. ” (Pa193 (outlining its background and years of preparation leading to its issuance).)  Thereafter, [...] was ultimately designated as the Redeveloper for this project.  (Pa126 at ¶8).  The Redevelopment Plan was prepared with scrupulous adherence to both the vision and details set forth in the Master Plan.  (Pa194, Pa311-22.)  The Redevelopment Plan also applies “the guiding principles set forth in the Town’s Master Plan, to contribute to a thriving and accessible core. ”  (Pa201.)  The Redevelopment Plan is a well-reasoned plan that is the result of substantial expert analysis, research, and public input.  (Pa193-349.)  Section 9.1 of the Redevelopment Plan is a detailed examination of its consistency with the Master Plan.  (Pa311-22.)  Section 9.1 documents that [...] made substantial efforts to ensure that every aspect of the Redevelopment Plan was entirely consistent with the Master Plan.  (Id.)  At its regularly scheduled meeting on January 31, 2023, the Governing Body introduced and provided the first reading of the Ordinance to adopt the Redevelopment Plan (the “First Reading”).
[directive] Pursuant No. and search body to executing officers are Policy, required wear when Camera worn Worn cameras statewide  Body execution, to of necessary record search a provides requirement should That warrant become video warrants.  it of no-knock review provisions further future.  the perform in a and temporarily flash intended and stun of a explosive bang" device to "flash produces that noise loud an A light is 2 distract.  2 • reasonable to steps should execution take prior operations to plan created Third, the individuals children any including or other occupants the target premises, of the identify vulnerabilities. known with Constitution and New the Jersey to under granted me pursuant the authority Therefore, to general for N.J.S.A. provides which -117, 52:17B-97 to the Justice of 1970, Act Criminal the enforcement chief General officer the law as of Attorney the justice criminal supervision of by of and criminal a law of enforcement the uniform efficient and the secure benefits order in State to and law all enforcement of direct criminal justice throughout State, administration hereby I the the to State of the laws authority of of New the Jersey operating agencies the prosecuting under with comply outlined below. directives the implement and I.
[brief] ”).  Here, the trial judge did exactly that by using pending charges (which were subsequently dismissed) against [...] to sentence him more heavily.  Specifically, in finding aggravating factor three, the trial court stated:  I give this factor significant weight based not only upon the circumstances of this case and his history, but upon the fact that he has multiple other cases pending; three of them, all of which occurred in or around 2020.  They’re being dismissed today, but there was repetitive criminal conduct within a very short period of time and I think there’s a significant risk that it will recur in this particular defendant.  [(8T24-22 to 25-5) (emphasis added). ]  Again, charges that were not only unfinalized but on the precipice of being dismissed entirely are not permissible bases for affording heavy weight to aggravating factor three.  The trial court may base its decision on the instant case and prior convictions, but not unproven offenses on the verge of being dismissed.  Accordingly, affording factor three “significant weight” because of those offenses was improper.
[brief] See Sel. Ins. Co. of Am. v. Thomas, 847 A.2d 578, 580 (N.J. 2004) (“A motor vehicle is underinsured when the sum of the limits of liability under all bodily injury and property damages liability bonds and insurance policies available to a person against whom recovery is sought . . . is . . . less than the applicable limits of underinsured motorist coverage afforded under the motor vehicle insurance policy held by the person seeking that recovery. ”) (quoting N.J.S.A. 17:28-1.1e(1)).  UIM coverage is meant to be a gap filler to compensate for the difference between the liability limits of the at-fault driver’s policy and the underinsured motorist limits of the victim’s policy.
[brief] Therefore, the Trial Court Judge and Defendants’ arguments are unsubstantiated.  Defendants’ argument that Plaintiff’s counsel never requested the medical records with specificity is ill-founded.  Specifically, Defendants were aware that a request was made with Plaintiff’s Complaint, which they were personally served with.  (15a).  Additionally, Plaintiff’s Counsel even instructed Defendant’s Counsel to answer Form C Interrogatories.  (44a).  Defendant’s Counsel argues that these requests are too broad and non-specific, but Form C Interrogatories are promulgated by the Court and they are specifically created for personal injury cases.  Even further, those Form C Interrogatories instruct defendants to answer Form C(3) Interrogatories if the case is a medical malpractice case.
[brief] ”  This requirement is not here satisfied.  *62-64 Main Street v. Mayor*, 221 N.J. 129, 158 (2015) quoting *Gallenthin Realty Development, Inc. v. Borough of Paulsboro*, 191 N.J. 344, 372 (2007).  See also, *Levin v. Twp. Comm. of Bridgewater*, 57 N.J. 506, 539-40 (1971); *Wilson v. Long Branch*, 27 N.J. 360, 391-395 (1958) (58% of the housing in the area to be redeveloped was “substandard” or “severely deteriorated” thereby justifying redevelopment of the entire area even though several other properties in the area were in “good condition. ”); *Hirth v. City of Hoboken*, 337 N.J. Super. 149, 161, (App. Div. 2001) citing *N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-3*.  None of the other structures to be created in the other zones are “connected to” or “necessary” for the development of the [...].
[brief] 2023 was an exception because the City experienced increased costs that the [...] knew were outside of the City’s control.  In order to receive transitional aid from the State, a municipality must also enter into a Memorandum of Understanding (“MOU”) with the State which gives the State fiscal oversight over the recipient of State aid.  There is no negotiation over the terms of the MOA with the [...]; the terms are dictated by the State.  (September 21, 2023 Tr., 41:2-12)  The MOU is very detailed and thorough; it even covers the City’s ability to participate in the annual League of Municipalities in Atlantic City every year which is an event that is normally attended by municipal leadership throughout the State to exchange ideas, bring awareness to new issues and public sector trends, and learn new best practices to properly operate a municipality in New Jersey.  The [...] scrutinizes employee travel and federal grant travel expenses.  The [...] requires the City to look for early bird discounts and it requires the City to book travel as soon as possible, and not to delay, because booking travel at the last minute makes it more expensive.  (September 21, 2023 Tr., 63:15-64:12)  Indeed, the City gets reprimanded by the [...] if it does not take advantage of early bird discounts.  (September 21, 2023 Tr., 64:3-6)  With respect to backfills, the [...] will either not approve the position being filled, or if it was filled the [...] will require the salary to be reduced.  For example, if an employee left the City earning a high salary of $70,000, then the [...] will insist that the employee’s replacement be paid less, such as $50,000.  (Aa189-197)  These are examples of how stringent the oversight by the [...] is for municipalities that require transitional aid from the State.
[brief] The [...] World Trade Center Rescue, Recovery, and Cleanup Operations Act amended N.J.S.A. 53:5A-10(e) to state, in pertinent part:  (4)  The board of trustees shall promulgate rules and regulations necessary to implement the provisions of this subsection and shall notify members and retirants in the retirement system of the enactment of this act, P.L.2019, c.157, within 30 days of enactment.  A member or retiree shall not be eligible for the presumption or recalculation under this subsection unless within two years of the effective date of this act, P.L.2019, c.157, the member or retiree files a written and sworn statement with the retirement system on a form provided by the board of trustees thereof indicating the dates and locations of service.
[directive] 5.  Profiteering (Do not use any of the factors in this Category if defendant is charged with being a leader of a narcotics trafficking network.)  a.  The criminal conduct provided a substantial source of +3 or +4 if the defendant’s occupation or income or livelihood for the defendant; or, primary source of income was drug distribution rather than legitimate employment.  +2 or +3 if the offense involved the actual sale of b.  The criminal conduct involved actual distribution of a controlled substance to (e.g., observed or recorded illicit drugs for money a sworn law enforcement transactions, undercover sales or “controlled buys”); or, officer acting in an undercover capacity or to an informant acting under the direction of law enforcement c.  The defendant is subject to an Anti-Drug Profiteering 2C:35A-1 et seq.  Penalty pursuant to N.J.S.A. +4  Page 66  [...] Guidelines 2 (2004 Revisions)  9.2  Mitigating Factors
[brief] The Commissioner argues that the Department uses the term “consolidate” synonymously with “merger. ” (Cb12).  However, whether the Commissioner --- 2 “Cb” shall refer to the Commissioner’s brief. has chosen to use these terms interchangeably is irrelevant.  Respondents wholly ignore that “consolidated school district” is a term of art, with a definition grounded in specific statutory language, and far narrower than the broad one Respondents advocate for.  The definition of a consolidated school district cannot be changed simply because Respondents wish it to be so.
[brief] Id. at 481-83.  The court noted, “Our State's jurisprudence . . . has been marked by a strong adherence to the general prohibition of expert fee awards in the absence of manifest statutory authority,” id. at 482.  The court acknowledged the general rule that "litigants bear their own expenses for fees and costs, except where specifically authorized by statute, rule, or agreement."  Id. at 481-82 (quoting Josantos, 326 N.J. Super. at 47-48).  The authorization required must be specific and is not provided by statutory language that allows a successful plaintiff to recover "reasonable costs of suit."  In Josantos, the court considered the scope of the fee-shifting provision of the Law Against Discrimination, N.J.S.A. 56:8-19, and determined “expert witness fees are not encompassed within the phrase ‘reasonable costs of suit. ’"  326 N.J. Super. at 47.  Similarly, awards of expert fees have been denied to prevailing plaintiffs under the no-fault auto insurance statutes.  Velli, 257 N.J. Super. at 309-10; Helton v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 205 N.J. Super. 196, 204 (App. Div.1985).  In contrast, the Legislature did provide express authorization for recovery of such fees in N.J.S.A. 39:6A-34 (expert fees recoverable in de novo trial after rejected automobile arbitration award) and N.J.S.A. 54:51A-22 (expert fees recoverable as litigation costs by prevailing taxpayer).  None of the contract provisions cited by plaintiffs provide such express authorization for the award of expert fees.
[brief] Just a few months ago, in *Aguirre*, the Appellate Division rejected the same arguments made by defendants here.  It reaffirmed that *Atalese* was consistent with the FAA as the FAA “permits states to regulate contracts, including those containing arbitration provisions, using generally applicable state law such as that set forth in *Atalese*.”  2024 WL 762467 at *1.  It held that *Atalese* reflected “New Jersey’s fundamental public policy of ensuring any waiver of the right to a jury trial is knowing, intelligent and voluntary. ”  Id.  It held that an arbitration clause which stated in all-caps that “THIS CONTRACT CONTAINS A BINDING ARBITRATION PROVISION AND CLASS ACTION WAIVER WHICH AFFECTS YOUR LEGAL RIGHTS AND MAY BE ENFORCED BY THE PARTIES” and that “disputes that are within the jurisdictional maximum for small claims will be settled in small claims court” and that “all other disputes…will be finally settled by arbitration…” did not comply with *Atalese* because it did not explain that the plaintiffs were waiving the right to proceed in court.  It distinguished *Grandvue Manor, LLC v. Cornerstone Contracting Corp*, 471 N.J. Super. 135 (App. Div. 2022), a case cited in Appellants’ Brief, on the grounds that *Grandvue* did not involve a consumer contract, but rather a commercial contract.  Finally, it held that the agreements before it which “are closer to consumer contracts, as in Atalese, than commercial contracts, as in County of Passaic or Grandvue,” Id. at *9, were not the product of a claimed “sophisticated negotiation” because they were on a standardized printed form, just like the SPA consumer contract in the case at bar.  Id.  The United States Supreme Court decision in Kindred Nursing Centers, L.P. v. Clark, 581 U.S. 246 (2017) does not change the conclusion that Atalese is not preempted by or inconsistent with the FAA.
[brief] The Court stated that “there is no indication the result would have been different had the defendant not offered a confession. ” (17T:222-9 to 10).  However, this is contrary to the fact that the State’s entire case was built upon the defendant’s confession which was played ad nauseum at trial.  Furthermore, as stated in the sentencing argument, with respect to assisting in his defense, [...] spent the majority of the trial writing Roman numerals on a legal pad.  (17T:169-20 to 23).  Moreover, after one of the days of testimony, the Prosecutor indicated that “during the course of all the testimony today defendant sat slumped with his face down, head and shaking and rocking. ” (7T:336-20 to 22).  “But I’ve also noticed today him literally slumped over with his shoulders almost to the table, and rocking in a pretty marked fashion that we’ve not seen yet. ”(7T:339-11 to 14).  In response, the defense indicated “During jury selection, [...] had his head down on the table and wrote more Roman Numerals than I could possibly say, and that was when no one was in here to watch him. ” (7T:340-14 to 17).  “He’s been doing it the whole time. ” (7T:340-17).
[brief] A.  Background of Regulation of Reciprocal Exchanges in New Jersey  Passed in 1945, the REA provides the authority to enter into reciprocal insurance contracts and exclusively regulates reciprocal exchanges, except where specifically stated.  N.J.S.A. 17:50 et seq.  The REA makes clear that “[s]uch contracts and the exchange thereof and such subscribers, their attorneys in fact and representatives shall be regulated by this act, and by no other statute of this State relating to insurance, except as herein otherwise provided. ”  N.J.S.A. 17:50-1 (emphasis added); Ja79 (issuing certificate of authority pursuant to N.J.S.S.A. 17:50-1).  Reciprocal exchanges are extremely rare entities.  While there are three legal vehicles through which to provide insurance: 1) traditional for-profit stock companies 2) mutual insurance companies; and 3) reciprocal exchanges, approximately 98+% of the insurance industry is comprised of the first two types.  See https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-111hhrg56778/pdf/CHRG-111hhrg56778.pdf.  The United States has less than thirty-five active reciprocal exchanges, while there are over 3,000 active stock companies.  Id.  By statute, a reciprocal exchange separates the two main functions that traditionally exist within a single insurance company—the executive management --- 2  The Procedural History and Statement of Facts have been combined for clarity and the convenience of the court.
[brief] That Complaint, among other claims, asserted that the [...] had a permanent easement for Lot 8 staff/attendees to park on the Lot 5 parking lot and the Sixth Street courtyard by the 1963 Agreement (Da29-47).  By decision dated July 15, 2016, [...] had granted the [...] Partial Summary Judgment that the Synagogue by the 1963 Agreement had easement rights to use portions of the School Lot 5 property, including the courtyard area, for parking of its Lot 8 staff/attendees.  After the Partial Summary Judgment, [...] held a further hearing over 5 hearing dates in 2017 to address the balance of the issues, including determining possible parking layouts of the courtyard to make its use feasible and safe.  The Court issued an oral decision on June 5, 2017 (Da27-48) and a Final Order on June 27, 2017 holding that an easement for Lot 8 parking had been granted by the 1963 Agreement and remains in force on Lot 5 on the courtyard and the Fifth Street parking area, but the Court did not decide the layout of the courtyard for parking use, finding it not to within the Court’s jurisdiction and expertise (Da31).  The School in August 2017 appealed the Final Order and all the Orders entered by [...] to the Appellate Division.
[brief] On the Brief: [...], Esq.  #  TABLE OF CONTENTS | Section | Page | |------------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | Table of Contents | i | | Table of Final Orders Under Review | iii | | Table of Authorities | iv | | Preliminary Statement | 1 | | Basis For Appellate Jurisdiction | 4 | | Relevant State Constitution Provisions | 4 | | Individual Rights, Privileges and Liberties | 4 | | Prerogative Writ Jurisdiction | 5 | | Long Term Tax Exemption Authority | 6 | | Standards of Review | 6 | | Statement of Facts and Procedural History | 8 | | The Parties | 8 | | The Voluminous Eight Counts Hybrid Prerogative Writ/Declaratory Judgment/Civil Rights Act Violation Complaint | 11 | | Improper Removal and Delayed Remand Back | 12 | | The COVID 19 Orphan Case | 13 | | [...] Assumes Ownership | 13 | | The April 27, 2023 Virtual Motion Hearing | 14 | | Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration, Alteration And Amendment | 15 | | Plaintiff’s Notice of Appeal | 15 |