ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] After the close of evidence, the prosecutor presented his summation.  During summation, he read back portions of the testimony of witnesses.  The prosecutor queried whether the testimony of [...], Liquidator's assistant manager, was consistent with defendant's version or with the State's version and proceeded to read excerpts from [...]'s testimony.  The prosecutor also read back excerpts from [...]'s testimony in which [...] identified defendant as the person who robbed him, as well as [...]'s explanation for his confusion when earlier, he was unable to identify defendant as the person who robbed him.  Finally, the prosecutor read back a brief excerpt from [...]'s testimony as to defendant's whereabouts on the day of the robbery.  Defense counsel did not object to any of these readbacks.  The jury deliberated for one day before finding defendant guilty on all counts.
[brief] In *Passaic Valley*, the Court held that the defendant insurer had “acted appropriately in proffering a defense while reserving its rights through the issuance of reservations of rights letters. ”  206 N.J. at 616, 21 A.3d at 1162 (emphasis added).  That is, *Passaic Valley* approved of what [...] initially did in this case, *i.e.*, pay independent counsel, chosen by the insureds, to defend the HCH Action in view of the “mix of allegations” (Db25) in Count I of the HCH Action complaint.  Nothing in *Passaic Valley* or *Burd* empowers an insurer to flout an express policy definition of “suit” or to refuse to defend a “suit” even though the insured agreed to a reservation of rights.
[brief] Tuncap, 2014 WL 235471, at *2; Dennis, 956 N.E.2d at 1003-05; Brown, 463 N.J. Super. at 44.  Moreover, [...]’s testimony did not exceed his firsthand knowledge, which was the deficiency in Wilson, where the officer had only secondhand knowledge of where the employees, the defendant, and the victim were situated in the store when the crime occurred.  See 135 N.J. at 18-19.
[directive] Course a.  Total of 10 rounds per participant.  (More rounds may be fired if “follow-up” shots are necessary)  b.  Load rifle to magazine capacity close bolt on an empty chamber or round in the chamber and bolt handle up with safe “off”.  c.  To achieve a passing score of 90%, the participant must place a minimum of 8 shots inside the prescribed sub-targets and must have hit the “cold bore” sub-target.
[brief] TABLE OF CONTENTS  PROCEDURAL HISTORY .................................................  1-5  COUNTERSTATEMENT OF FACTS ...............................  1-5  LEGAL ARGUMENT .....................................................  6-13  POINT I - The Trial Court Properly Granted Declaratory Relief Barring Plaintiff/Appellant From Bringing New Claims .........................  6 POINT II - The Trial Court Erred in Denying an Award of Counsel Fees  Defendant/Respondents’ ...........................................  11 CONCLUSION ............................................................  13
[brief] [I]t didn’t make any difference [to [...]] that [the harm they caused] would be discovered by one of [their] partners, but it [should have] ma[d]e a difference [to [...]] that a court was going to be doing an accounting.  But oddly enough, the conduct didn’t cease.  It continued in an exacerbated fashion after the Appellate Division decision that an accounting was going to take place.  (235T75:5:16)  [With respect to the whether] the conduct of the defendant upon learning that its initial conduct would likely cause harm.  Well, there wasn’t any change in conduct except to change the various ways that [...] took money out of the partnership so that they would be less compromised in their position or so that the takings would be less detectable.  And there certainly was no effort made to decrease the amount of punitive damages, to make distributions to [...] (sic.) despite the Appellate Division’s declaration [in 2006] that they were a partner….  So there wasn’t any change in conduct once they learned that the initial conduct would cause harm, did cause harm, and that their initial conduct was not correct and improper.
[brief] I.  **[...]’s conveyance of lot and easement to Respondent**  More than six decades ago, on January 7, 1963, pursuant to a written agreement (the "Agreement"), [...] conveyed an "unencumbered fee title" to Lot 8 to Respondent consistent with the premises described in a December 31, 1963 recorded deed from the [...] to Respondent (the "Deed"), on the express condition that Respondent would "enter into a contract to erect a sanctuary, lounge, daily chapel, social hall with stage, Rabbi's study, offices, library, board --- \(^6\)  The Board, though nominally a party, has declined to participate in this appeal. room, bride's preparation and powder rooms kitchens and related rooms and facilities on the said lands and premises" consistent with the plans set forth in Respondent's existing contract with an architectural firm (Aa23-Aa28).  Among other things, the Agreement also provided that Respondent's sanctuary would be erected within two years and "shall perpetually be maintained in accordance with Orthodox Jewish tenets-and not otherwise," and that the [...] would "permit [Respondent] to utilize for parking purposes the vacant lands it owns on Madison Avenue and also on Sixth Street " (Aa23-Aa28).  On June 5, 1972, "[i]n appreciation of the many considerations extended by [Respondent] to the . . . [...] through all the years," [...] officers sent a confirmatory writing "advis[ing] that the Congregation or any of its affiliates may use the facilities of the Day School, present and future, on the same cooperative basis, without charge" (Ra21).  A little over three months later, on September 22, 1972, the [...] applied for a variance to the Board "to construct an addition to an existing school with insufficient parking, insufficient side lines and exceeding the maximum lot coverage" (Aa13-Aa18).  On November 2, 1972, following a hearing, the Board approved the [...]’s application subject to the approval of the [...] (the "Planning Board") of the "consolidation of lots 4 and 5 into one overall lot size" and the granting of a permit, with construction to begin within six months of the Planning Board's approval (Aa19-Aa21).  The Board found “although evidence presented indicates parking provisions to be less than those required pursuant to the existing ordinance, the applicant will have the benefit of parking facilities on adjoining properties owned by the Congregational [sic] [...] should additional parking facilities be required” (Aa19-Aa20).  The Board further found “that the relief requested . . . can be granted without substantial detriment to the public good and without substantially impairing the intent and purpose of the zone plan and zoning ordinance of the Township” (Aa20).  That same year, consistent with the variance application, the [...] submitted and the Planning Board approved the Site Plan for a proposed addition to the school (Aa22).  For nearly four decades thereafter, Respondent continued to use Lot 5 for parking without apparent controversy and without ever abandoning that use (Ra243;Ra259).  II.
[brief] [3T28-2 to -19].  Once in court, defendant informed the court that he believed he was being prejudiced because of defendant’s lawsuit against a Burlington County township.  [3T33-5 to -13].  [...] stated he had no knowledge of the civil lawsuit and it had no bearing on the trial.  [3T33-14 to 34-17].  Defendant asked for a change of venue.  [3T33-19 to -21].  [...] cautioned defendant that defendant would be removed from the courtroom if he disrupted the proceedings.  [3T34-20 to 35-2].  In the middle of direct examination of the State’s witness, defendant interrupted the proceedings to say, “You can’t see where the bottle was dropped.  You should be able to see where the bottle was dropped. ”  [3T71-22 to -23].  [...] excused the jury and addressed defendant’s outbursts.  [3T72-6 to -10].  He noted that the first one came when defendant told the jurors that he was being railroaded.  [3T72-10 to 73-23].  Defendant expressed dissatisfaction with his attorney.  [3T74-3 to 75-15].  He requested to represent himself.
[brief] (Pa001).  Unlike the undisputed, material evidence presented by [...], what [...] and [...] may have said if deposed (or in an affidavit) is complete speculation and entirely irrelevant.  See Merchants Express Money Ord. Co. v. Sun Nat. Bank, 374 N.J. Super. 556, 563 (App. Div. 2005) (“speculation does not meet the evidential requirements which would allow it to defeat a summary judgment”); Hoffman v. Asseenontv.Com, Inc., 404 N.J. Super. 415, 426 (App. Div. 2009) (citing Merchants Express, 374 N.J. Super. at 563) (“[c]ompetent opposition requires ‘competent evidential material’ beyond mere ‘speculation’ and ‘fanciful arguments’”).  If Intervenor thought that [...]’s and/or [...]’s testimony was of such importance in this case, he could have deposed them, but he chose not to.  In any event, the substance of any such testimony cannot change the plain language of the underwriting guidelines.
[brief] The LAD makes it unlawful for an employer to: take reprisals against any person because that person has opposed any practices or acts forbidden under this act or because that person has filed a complaint, testified or assisted in any proceeding under this act or to coerce, intimidate, threaten or interfere with any person in the exercise or enjoyment of, or on account of that person having aided or encouraged any other person in the exercise or enjoyment of, any right granted or protected by this act.  [N.J.S.A. 10:5-12(d) (emphasis added). ]  The motion judge erred by requiring [...] to demonstrate that the retaliatory conduct be “serious and tangible enough to alter employee’s compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, deprived future employment opportunities, or otherwise have a material adverse effect on his status as an employee” (3T28:24-3T29:3).  The proposition that retaliation must rise to the level of altering an employee’s terms and conditions of employment was rejected by the New Jersey Supreme Court in Roa v. Roa, 200 N.J. 555, 574-75 (2010) which relied upon the United States Supreme Court’s analysis in Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006) (Burlington Northern).  The United States Supreme Court in Burlington Northern analyzed the anti-retaliation provision of Title VII.  The Supreme Court recognized that discrimination laws depend upon the cooperation of employees who are willing to file complaints and act as witnesses for enforcement.  “Plainly, effective enforcement could thus only be expected if employees felt free to approach officials with their grievances. ”  *Mitchell v. Robert DeMario Jewelry, Inc.*, 361 U.S. 288, 292 (1960).  The United States Supreme Court in *Burlington Northern* reversed the 6th Circuit’s holding that a retaliatory action must cause a “materially adverse change in the terms and conditions’ of employment” in order to be actionable, *Burlington Northern*, 548 U.S. at 60, emphasizing that interpreting antiretaliation provisions to provide broad protection from retaliation helps ensure the cooperation upon which accomplishment of anti-discrimination laws depend.
[brief] Under *N.J.R.E.* 701, "[i]f a witness is not testifying as an expert, the witness' testimony in the form of opinions or inference may be admitted if it (a) is rationally based on the perception of the witnesses and (b) will assist in understanding the witness' testimony or in determining a fact in issue."  "Perception ... rests on the acquisition of knowledge through use of one's sense of touch, taste, sight, smell or hearing."  State v. McLean, 205 N.J. at 457.  "It is the duty of the judge to find whether a witness could rationally arrive at a given opinion form the external facts which the witness perceived."  [...], [...], Current N.J. Rules of Evidence, Comment 1 to N.J.R.E. 701 (Gann).  Lay opinion testimony may not be based on inadmissible hearsay.  See Neno v. Clinton, 167 N.J. 573, 585-86 (2001).
[brief] The trial court properly held that Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint was barred by the Doctrine of Res Judicata (148a)  In addition to the entire controversy doctrine, the trial court was correct in holding that Plaintiffs’ claims were barred by the Doctrine of Res Judicata.  The doctrine protects litigants from the burden of re-litigating identical issues with the same party or his privity, and promotes judicial economy by preventing needless litigation.  Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 327 (1979).  Under 28 U.S.C. §1738, the rulings of State Courts "shall have the same full faith and credit in every Court within the United States . . . as they have by law or usage in the Courts of such state . . . from which they are taken."  Thus, in determining the preclusive effect of State Court Judgments, the Court applies the state's law of res judicata.  See, Marrece v. American Academy of Orthopedic Surgeons, 470 U.S. 373, 380 (1985).  The New Jersey Supreme Court has noted that the purpose of res judicata is to require litigants "to bring all possible claims in one proceeding."  McNeil v. Legislative Apportionment Comm'n of State, 177 N.J. 364, 395 (2003).  Under New Jersey law, claim preclusion will prevent a litigant from re-litigating disputes that have been resolved in an earlier proceeding if three requirements are met: (1) the Judgment in the prior action must be valid, final, and on the merits; (2) the parties in the later action must be identical to or in privity with those in the prior actions; and (3) the claim in the later action must grow out of the same transaction or occurrence as the claim in the earlier one.  Watkins v. Resorts Int'l Hotel & Casino, Inc., 124 N.J. 398, 412 (1991).  With regard to the "transaction or occurrence" prong, the Court elaborated, noting that "[c]laim preclusion applies not only to matters actually determined in an earlier action, but to all relevant matters that could have been so determined."
[directive] From a public policy perspective, it is inappropriate for a prosecutor to extend the false and cynical promise of “leniency” to drug dealers who are reasonably believed to be drug or alcohol dependent and who may have committed the present offense in order to raise revenues to support their drug habit, since this would allow these offenders to receive a brief county jail sentence or even a non-custodial sentence under circumstances where they are not likely to have an opportunity to receive the clinically-appropriate treatment that they need.  These defendants in those circumstances would be almost certain to relapse and return to a life of crime.  Such defendants would face greatly enhanced punishment upon their eventual if not inevitable re-arrest, while leaving more victims in their wake.  Of special concern to law enforcement authorities, any such practice would eventually put police officers needlessly at risk of injury or death when officers are called upon to re-arrest these defendants.  The special drug diagnostic assessment and treatment condition to a standardized “open” plea offer set forth in this section is carefully designed to respect the separation of powers between the executive and judicial branches of government.  In essence, this special condition, while initially required to be invoked by the prosecutor, would ultimately be contingent upon a case-specific judicial determination that the defendant should submit to a diagnostic assessment, or should participate in clinically-appropriate treatment.
[brief] The trial court, by way of its rulings on the parties’ motions in limine and over the course of the trial, allowed plaintiff’s experts to assert that the defendant violated various federal and New Jersey statutes and regulations.  Also at plaintiff’s request, the Court instructed and charged the jury that it could find “the facility” or the “nursing home”, as well as its nursing staff, deviated from the standard of care applicable to a long term care facility.  Defendants thus appropriately inquired as to plaintiff’s experts’ awareness of the results of the complaint survey conducted by the NJDOH in order to rebut and impeach plaintiff’s expert’s claims that defendant was noncompliant.  Defendant did not introduce the NJDOH survey’s finding that there were no regulatory violations in connection with [...]’s care in order to establish the truth of that conclusion or into evidence.  The jury nonetheless responded “yes” to the first question on the jury verdict sheet which addressed the standard of care for the facility, but further found proximate cause to be lacking, thus rejecting plaintiff’s theory of the case, that the decedent died of a mucus plug, a theory that has nothing to do with the regulations or standard of care relating to staffing and the allocation of resources listed in the jury charge.  Significantly, the court allowed plaintiff’s experts to present respiratory therapy opinions critical of the respiratory therapy care despite the fact that neither [...] nor [...] was qualified as a respiratory therapy expert.  Plaintiff also was permitted to question defendant’s fact witnesses in detail regarding respiratory therapy and medication issues.  Plaintiff, having been afforded every opportunity to present her causes of action and theory of the case to the jury as she wished, cannot now complain that she has been a victim of prejudice constituting reversible error.  The trial court’s orders of judgment on the jury verdict and denying plaintiff’s motion for a new trial must be affirmed.
[brief] We have no quarrel with State v. N.T., 461 N.J. Super. 566 (App. Div. 2019), the case relied on by the [...] and [...], but find it inapplicable here.  In N.T., we held that portion of the expungement statute barring expungement of the records of a conviction for "[e]ndangering the welfare of a child by engaging in sexual conduct which would impair or debauch the morals of the child, or causing the child other harm," N.J.S.A. 2C:52-2, referred to distinct harms based on the "comma and the word 'or.'"  461 N.J. Super. at 571.  The case did not address the treatment of an attributive adjective to a series of nouns in a list, the issue we address here.
[brief] Furthermore, the issue of whether or not [...] intended to benefit his daughter in law at the expense of his son, [...] should not be binding in this action, Plaintiff-Appellant submits that such matter of approximate cause are to be determined by a jury, furthermore the Probate Action’s findings still would not preclude [...]’s claim for the legal fees and expenses caused by the necessity to litigate this ambiguous provision.  It is respectfully submitted that this issue of collateral estoppel does not bar this claim and that this matter should remanded for Trial on the merits and decision by the jury as to whether or not [...]’s negligence proximately caused damages to the Plaintiffs.  Here, there is nothing in the record which will support a finding of inexcusable conduct by the Plaintiff or substantial prejudice suffered by the Defendant.  D.  THE COURT MADE NO FINDING AS TO PLAINTIFF CLAIMS FOR ATTORNEYS FEES IN THE PROBATE ACTION AND CLAIMS ARISING OUT OF BALSAMO’S NEGLIGENT ADVICE CONCERNING THE MORTGAGE.
[directive] I.  DETAINEE INFORMATION  Detainee: IND/ACC/CDR#:____________________________________Promis/Gavel#: II.  DEPENDENT INFORMATION Name: Age ____Sex ____ Address: Phone#:________________________________Relationship: □ infant/child/juvenile [including physically or mentally disabled], □ physically disabled adult □ mentally disabled adult □ person requiring geriatric care Name  Age_____Sex ____ Address: Phone#:________________________________Relationship: □ infant/child/juvenile [including physically or mentally disabled], □ physically disabled adult □ mentally disabled adult □ person requiring geriatric care Name: Age_____Sex ____ Address: Phone#:________________________________Relationship: □ infant/child/juvenile [including physically or mentally disabled], □ physically disabled adult □ mentally disabled adult □ person requiring geriatric care III.  PROVIDER INFORMATION □ Agency Agency Name: Address: Telephone#:____________________________________Contact Person: □ Responsible Adult Name: Sex: ___ DOB:___________________________Age:________Social Security #: Address: Telephone#: Relationship to Detainee to Dependent(s)  Continuation of Responsible Adult Information: Is the person willing to assume responsibility for the child during detainees incarceration □ Yes □ No  How was this verified?  Comments: Promis Gavel Record □ No □ Yes - see attached □ Insufficient information Provided  Domestic Violence Central Registry Record □ No □ Yes -see attached □ Insufficient Information Provided  Juvenile Central Registry Record □ No □ Yes - see attached □ Insufficient Information Provided  IV.
[brief] In *Right to Choose v. Byrne*, 91 N.J. 287 (1982) the New Jersey Supreme Court made it more than clear that a plaintiff’s merely alleging a “… slight additional *interest* …” beyond those *interests* possessed by any ordinary citizen confers “standing” on any such citizen to challenge the validity of claimed wrongful *government action* in the Superior Court of New Jersey.  *Right to Choose v. Byrne, supra*, 91 N.J. at 313.
[brief] In the event this Court erroneously agrees with the Trial Court and finds these pledges to be assignments; the remedy is to invalidate the assignments not to dismiss Plaintiff’s case denying trial.  In Costanzo v. Costanzo, 248 N.J.Super. 116, 590 A.2d 268 (Law Div.1991), it was held that although a tort claim cannot be assigned under New Jersey law, the claimant can grant a prejudgment assignment of an interest in the proceeds of such claim.
[brief] [...] Certification of Unpublished Cases  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES  Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 198, 82 S. Ct. 691, 7 L. Ed. 2d 663 (1962)).  ...... 7,9  Country of Luxembourg ex rel. Ribeiro v. Canderas, 338 N.J. Super. 192, 202, 768 A.2d 283 (Ch.Div.2000) .......... 6,9  D'Atria v. D'Atria, 242 N.J. Super. 392, 401, 576 A.2d 957 (1990).....................  7 Gilbert v. Gladden, 87 N.J. 275, 280-81, 432 A.2d 1351 (1981).......................  7,9 [...].................................  2 Innes v. Marzano-Lesnevich, 435 N.J. Super. 198, 211 n.6, 87 A.3d 775 (App. Div. 2014).  .......  4  Louisville & Nashville R. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 154, 29 S. Ct. 42, 53 L. Ed. 126.  .....................  6,9  Potomac Aviation, LLC v. Port Auth., 413 N.J. Super. 212, 222, 994 A.2d 536 (App. Div. 2010)...........  3 [...] ..............................  2,5 Tara Enters. v. Daribar Management Corp., 369 N.J. Super. 45, 60, 848 A.2d 27 (App. Div. 2004)...............  3  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
[brief] Another witness described him as “a little dark” with a complexion darker than her own.  (2T118-5 to 20, 123-16 to 18)  A third witness said his complexion was “darker than [her] skin color. ”  (2T129-14 to 23, 135-9 to 12)  Other than [...]’s testimony that the suspect was either “African American or Hispanic,” no other witness identified the shooter as Hispanic or Latino.