ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The [...] designed the original architectural plans for [...] in 2006.  The 2006 design located the bagel kettle near a corridor used by employees to traverse from the front counter area of the store to the back-kitchen area.  The 2006 design showed the kettle was shielded and separated from the corridor by two walls.  In a 2007 revision to the original design, the [...] changed the location of the kettle by placing it along the corridor and removing the two protective walls which shielded the kettle from passing employees.  The 2007 design shows a partition wall extending from the rear kitchen wall towards the kettle, perpendicular to the kettle.  In 2012, defendants [...], and [...], the architect of record, designed architectural plans for [...]'s renovation and expansion.  The partition wall extending towards the kettle was demolished as part of the renovation, so at the time of plaintiff's accident, the kettle did not have any wall shielding it.  On September 15, 2015, plaintiff filed a complaint against multiple entities including the [...], [...] and [...].
[brief] N.J.R.E. 201(a) lists "rules of court" among the sources of law that may be judicially noticed.  In Plaintiff's October 6, 2022 Motion for Summary Judgment (Da9), and in Plaintiff's opposition brief of November 4, 2022, no proof of service was attached to any of the documents as required by R. 1:5-3.  Even if Plaintiff filed a proof of service with the lower Court, R. 1:5-1(a) requires that any such proof of service shall be served on Defendant.  Defendant did not receive a copy of Plaintiff's proof of service, if one even exists, as required by R. 1:5-1(a).  Therefore, Defendant was denied due process.
[brief] However, absent legislative intent to the contrary, those terms should be given their ordinary meaning.  GE Solid State, Inc., 132 N.J. at 307.  Webster’s dictionary defines “torment” as “to cause severe usually persistent or recurrent distress of body or mind to[,]”  Merriam-Webster’s Online Dictionary, https://www.merriam-webster. com/dictionary/torment (last visited February 5, 2025); “torture” as “to cause intense suffering to[,]” id. at https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/torture (last visited February 5, 2025); “maim” as “to mutilate, disfigure or wound seriously[,]” id. at https://www.merriam-webster. com/dictionary/maim (last visited February 5, 2025); “hang” as “to suspend by the neck until dead[,]” id. at https://www.merriam-webster. com/dictionary/hang (last visited February 5, 2025); “poison” as “to injure or kill with poison[,]” id. at https://www.merriam-webster. com/dictionary/poison (last visited February 5, 2025); “beat” as “to hit repeatedly so as to inflict pain[,]” id. at https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/beat (last visited February 5, 2025); “abuse” as “to use or treat so as to injure or damage[,]” id. at https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/abuse (last visited February 5, 2025); and “mutilate” as “to cut off or cause severe damage to a limb or essential part of[,]” id. at https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/mutilate (last visited February 5, 2025).  “‘Animal’ or ‘creature’ includes the whole brute creation.
[brief] ]  As noted above, defendant’s new sentence is 10 years shorter than the one originally imposed, and he will be eligible for parole 4 years sooner.  Defendant will also be eligible for his 20-year look-back pursuant to Comer in less than 11 years, in May 2035, when he is 40 years old.  See (2T; 5T9-8 to 14); Comer, 249 N.J. at 370.  Defendant can show no abuse of discretion in [...]’s new sentence or her sentencing analysis.  The judge considered the Miller factors, the Yarbough factors, and the statutory aggravating and mitigating factors in light of the evidence presented by defendant at the re-sentencing hearing and the facts and circumstances of defendant’s crimes established at his jury trial.  She correctly identified, considered, and fairly weighed each of these factors, and came to a fair sentence that should not shock this Court’s conscience.
[brief] This court also “afford[s] substantial deference to an agency’s interpretation of a statute that the agency is charged with enforcing. ”  Richardson v. Bd. of Trs., Police & Firemen’s Ret. Sys., 192 N.J. 189, 196 (2007) (citing R & R Mktg., LLC v. Brown-Forman Corp., 158 N.J. 170, 175 (1999)).  “Such deference has been specifically extended to state agencies that administer pension statutes,” because “a state agency brings experience and specialized knowledge to its task of administering and regulating a legislative enactment within its field of expertise.
[brief] (65a).  Following the adoption of the Resolution, the Council supplemented the Borough record at the regular Council meeting of October 18, 2022, to elaborate further on the full Council’s selection.  (233a-234a.)  The supplementation walked through the Borough’s exhaustive application and review process as a means of explaining the considerations that went into the Borough’s ultimate decision.  Id.  Against these facts, [...] cannot now claim that the Borough’s decision to issue a Resolution in support of [...] was arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable.
[directive] Even if the complainant is satisfied with the informal resolution, the process should be recorded on an internal affairs report form.  Regardless of the means of resolution, the integrity of the internal affairs process, particularly the receipt of complaints, demands that 21 INTERNAL AFFAIRS POLICY & PROCEDURES | August 2020 complaints and inquiries from any member of the public be uniformly documented for future reference and tracking.  The form should indicate that the matter was resolved to the satisfaction of the complainant and sent to internal affairs for review and filing.  The internal affairs supervisor should periodically audit those reports indicating that the complaint was informally resolved to ensure that the agency's supervisors are properly implementing their authority to resolve complaints from members of the public.  5.1.14
[brief] Even where a defendant's sentence is illegal, there is a legitimate expectation of finality once the initial sentence has been served and the direct appeal has been completed (or the time to appeal has expired).  In these situations, the sentences are beyond the court's authority....  *Williams*, N.Y.3d at 217.  (citation omitted)¹³  As for whether consecutive sentencing is punitive in nature, the answer is contained within *State v. Yarbough*, 100 N.J. 627 (1985).
[brief] *Bauman v. Marinaro*, 95 N.J. 380, 392 (1984).  In one case, where a motion was filed in December following a September judgment, the Appellate Division affirmed the denial of a motion to vacate based upon the absence of excusable neglect:  Within the specific context of a default judgment, it has been noted that an application to vacate such a judgment is to be "viewed with great liberality, and every reasonable ground for indulgence is [to be] tolerated to the end that a just result is reached."  However, even under this rather accommodating standard, it is well settled that a default judgment is not to be set aside unless the defendant seeking such relief can demonstrate that his failure to answer or otherwise appear and defend was somehow excusable, and further, that he has a meritorious defense to either the cause of action or the quantum of damages assessed.  [Resolution Trust Corp. v. Associated Gulf Contractors, 263 N.J.Super. 332, 340-341 (App.Div. 1993), emphasis added, multiple citations omitted].  In tax foreclosures, yet another public policy in favor of final judgments is put into play - the Legislature’s determination that tax sale judgments should be final.  N.J.S. 54:5-87 (stressing marketable title), Caput Mortuum v. S&S Crown, Ltd., 366 N.J.Super. 323, 336 (App.Div. 2004) (describing a lienholder’s rights including “most importantly, the right to acquire title by foreclosing…”).
[brief] *State v. Williamson*, 54 N.J. Super. 170 (App. Div. 1959), aff'd o.b. (but with concurring and a dissenting opinion) 31 N.J. 16 (1959).  None of these purposes was in the least offended here.  Having said that we note that, in any event, defendant's attack comes entirely too late, appearing for the first time on appeal.  R. 3:10-2.  *State v. Spano*, 128 N.J. Super. 90, 92 (App. Div., 1973).  The same principle was applied by this court in a more recent case (albeit an unpublished one) that is directly relevant to the present matter.
[directive] njcourts.gov Tel: 609-376-3000  Fax: 609-376-3002  NJ ° ° O O TO: Assignment Judges  DIRECTIVE# 21-20  Criminal Presiding Judges  [Supersedes Directive # 9-96]  FROM: [...], J.A.D- A. by SUBJ: Criminal - Procedures for Defendants Found Not Guilty Reason of Insanity (NGRI) and other Commitments  Resulting from Criminal Proceedings  DATE: August 2020 5, This Directive, which supersedes Directive # 9-96, "Krol Commitments" (issued December 3, 1996), sets forth the procedures for defendants who are acquitted and found not guilty by reason of insanity (NGRI), and promulgates ten form orders approved by the Judicial Council for immediate statewide use by the Criminal Division.
[brief] Thus, the Board’s criticism of [...]’s alleged “denial and/or minimization” of his offenses does not, in itself, establish an increased likelihood of future criminal conduct.  assessments indicated a more substantial risk of reoffense for [...], his scores have steadily decreased over time, such that both his own expert, as well as the State’s expert, agree that he presents a “low to moderate” risk for reoffense.  Ibid.; (Pa359).  The two clinical risk assessments relevant to this appeal are summarized below.
[brief] January 16, 2024 Order Dismissing Amended Counterclaim and Defendant’s Claim for a Declaratory Judgment that Defendant is the Rightful Owner of the Parcel in Dispute  ..............................................Pa0012  January 24, 2024  Revised Order Vacating January 16, 2024  Order ...............Pa0015 | Appendix document | Appendix page number | |----------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------| | March 1, 2024
[directive] Semi-Annual Firearms Qualification and Requalification Standards • Standing or kneeling.  From the ready position on the strong side of cover, on command roll out and fire 2 rounds, roll out from the support side of cover and fire 2 rounds.  (10 seconds)  •  Repeat once for a total of 8 rounds  •  Standing or kneeling.  From the ready position on the strong side of cover, roll out and fire 2 rounds, reload, roll out and fire 2 rounds.  (15 seconds)
[brief] In D’Avila, the Appellate Division established a clear delineation between the prohibited action of apportioning liability to a plaintiff’s employer, and the permissible action of enforcing an employer’s express, contractual indemnification agreement.  Here, the trial court erred in finding the contractual indemnification clause to be ambiguous, as discussed in D’Avila.  Accordingly, [...] inappropriately obtained summary judgment, which, in turn, de facto relieved [...] of its contractual obligation of indemnification to [...].  As discussed below, because a jury should be afforded the opportunity to enforce [...]’ indemnification obligations, this case should be remanded accordingly.  In D’Avila the Appellate Division succinctly noted:
[brief] Indeed, the Assistant Prosecutor addressed this very issue during the trial de novo and explained to [...] that the Alcotest was not admitted into evidence against defendant because [...] was seen using his cellular telephone, a clear violation of State v. Chun, 194 N.J. 54, 80 (2008).  Thus, using the --- 3  On February 24, 2023, the New Jersey Supreme Court Withdrew Guideline 4 expressly allowing plea agreements in DWI cases.
[brief] Here, the ALJ properly admitted the logbook entries into evidence under N.J.R.E. 803(c)(6) because the testimony of [...], a Senior Investigator assigned to [...], established the logbook entries as business records.  (1T8:14-23).  [...] explained that housing officers perform security tours and inmate counts in the unit to which they are assigned.  (1T36:4-8).  After performing these counts, housing officers are required to write the inmate count in the logbook and call Center Control.  (1T36:15-18).  [...] testified that the Department maintains logbooks for accountability and documenting what occurs during a shift.  (1T36:19-22).  Because business records are an exception to the hearsay rule, the logbook entries were properly admitted in evidence to show that [...] falsely indicated that he had performed inmate checks.
[brief] In this case, the State moved to sentence [...] to an extended term as a persistent offender and sought a sentence in the “mid to high range of the extended term” based on its arguments that the extended term range for murder was thirty-five years to life (not the ordinary thirty-to-life range); that 50.5 years was the midpoint and “logical starting point” under *Natale* for the extended range; and that the aggravating factors preponderated.  (14T 10-5 to 9, 16-7 to 8)  The sentencing court granted the State’s motion; found that [...] was “extended term eligible” and “is a persistent offender” based on his prior convictions; and imposed a heightened fifty-five-year sentence in accord with the State’s request.  (14T 27-6 to 20; *accord* Da 100 (judgment of conviction noting defendant’s “persistent offender” status))  But because the State failed to allege [...]’s prior convictions in the indictment, present them to the grand jury, or prove them beyond a reasonable doubt to the petit jury, that extended term sentence violated state and federal due process and his rights to a jury trial.
[directive] UWAGA  Nie podlega Pan(i) obowiązkowemu pozbawieniu możliwości starania o zwolnienie warunkowe zgodnie z Ustawą Gravesa, jeśli przyznał(a) się Pan(i) do nielegalnego posiadania broni krótkiej, jeśli jest to broń pneumatyczna, broń sprężynowa lub wiatrówka zgodnie z 2C:39-5b(2); nielegalnego posiadania N.J.S.A. nienaładowanego karabinu lub strzelby, 2C:39-5c(1); lub do nielegalnego posiadania karabinu lub N.J.SA. strzelby, jeśli jest to broń pneumatyczna, broń sprężynowa lub wiatrówka, zgodnie z 2C:39-5c(2).
[brief] In the instant case, the railroad Respondents sought a broad interpretation of the statutory language, relevant to location in N.J.S.A. 48:12-152.  The relevant location language of N.J.S.A. 48:12-152 a reads:  “This section shall not prohibit a passenger for hire from utilizing those parts of the railroad particularly intended for passenger use nor shall it prohibit a person from using a crossing established by the railroad.  (emphasis added)  [...], when she was tragically killed was crossing a busy street in [...] in the crosswalk—a crossing established by the railroad.  A plain meaning interpretation of N.J.S.A. 48:12-152 would determine this immunity to be inoperative in the instant case as [...] was struck by a train while she was walking in a crossing established by the railroad.  The railroad Respondents seek to broaden this railroad immunity statute in much the same way as the defendant in Velazquez attempted to and failed.  The Supreme Court in 2021 once again held that immunity statutes must be narrowly construed and be based on a plain reading of the statutory language in Coleman v Martinez 247 N.J. 319 (2021).
[brief] M16.  By Order filed October 25, 2019, the Superior Court bifurcated for trial the Prerogative Writ and Related Mt. Laurel Compliance Claims from the other counts of the Respondents’ Complaint.  M822.  Following a July 2020 trial, the trial judge issued an October 15, 2020, Order and Opinion, M9.  Additional orders and actions were taken in this regard, those being: the Order of the Hon. [...], A.J.S.C. designating the Hon. [...] to Appoint a Special Hearing Officer dated and entered on October 14, 2020, M65, and the Memorandum of Honorable [...], P.J.Cv. dated October 14, 2020 granting permission to the Trial Judge to appoint [...], Esq. as Special Hearing Officer.  M66-67.  On November 4, 2020, the Township and Board each filed their respective motion for leave to file an interlocutory appeal to the Appellate Division.  M514-515.  On December 24, 2020, the Appellate Division denied both motions.
[brief] The remainder of the initial Major Site Plan document refers to the roadway in question as an "interior roadway".  The major site plan approval so indicating: "the Applicant seeks an exception/waiver with respect to the requirement under the Borough site plan ordinance of 60 foot wide interior roadways.  The Applicant seeks to provide 50 foot rights of way with parking prohibited within the right of way".  (Pa77, Par. "I")  The initial project spoke of the roadways as "interior roadways" and as a "50 foot right of way".  It appeared to be a right of way for the church property.  (Pa77)  There was no mention of a public street or public road.  Pointedly there was no mention of any intent of "dedication as a public street".  (Pa69-Pa92)
[brief] Our courts have held that a tax increase resulting from an assessment increase attributable to a conversion, is a conversion cost within the meaning of the statute and, thus, may not be passed on to the tenant, even though the applicable rent control ordinance permits a tax increase pass-through.  Litt v. Rutherford Rent Bd., 196 N.J. Super. 456 (Law. Div. 1984); B.H. Associates v. Brunder, 185 N.J. Super. 403, 449 (Law. Div. 1982); and Schwam v. Cedar Grove Twp., 9 N.J. Tax 406, 414 (1987), aff’d sub nom. Schwam v. Twp. of Cedar Grove Twp., 228 N.J. Super. 522 (App. Div. 1988).
[brief] [...], rather than identify any language which reflects an intention to alter the common law, instead claims that the Legislature’s intent to modify the common law is supported by its routine reshaping of common-law doctrine in other areas of law.  See [...] Opposition Brief (“Rb__”) at 19.  First, in support of this position, [...] cites to *Wyzykowki v. Rivas*, 132 N.J. 509 (1993), where the New Jersey Supreme Court observed that the Local Government Ethics Law, *N.J.S.A.* 40A:9-22.1 to -22.25, influenced the common law concerning local public officials.  Rb19; see id. at 529.  However, that decision does not discuss how to discern the Legislature’s intent to abrogate the common law.  In fact, *Wyzykowski* identifies other statutes that the Legislature has enacted to codify common law principals, such as the Municipal Land Use Law, *N.J.S.A.* 40:55D-23(b).  See id. at 523.  As such, [...]’s argument that this Court should read an implicit abrogation of the common law into the Public Access Law because the Legislature “routinely” abrogates the common law is misleading and without merit.
[brief] Plaintiffs claim [...]’s participation in an email chain [Redacted] Mot. at 9 (citing Weaver Decl., Ex. 22).  But [...]’s influence at [...] is not at issue here.  The issue is whether Plaintiffs have shown that [...] should be made a document custodian because she likely has a significant quantity of unique, relevant documents likely to be of importance to Plaintiffs’ claims.
[brief] **The Federal Court’s denial of Plaintiff’s motion for leave to file a Third Amended Complaint; Plaintiff fails to comply with the Court’s specific directive to correct the pleading deficiencies. **  On March 19, 2019, the District Court issued an Order denying without prejudice, Plaintiff’s motion for leave to file a Third Amended Complaint.  (Da170-172, 3/19/19 Order; Da017, District Court Docket Report, ECF #74.  In recognition of Plaintiff counsel’s continued failure to provide a coherent pleading, the Order provided specific instructions to Plaintiff regarding what must be contained in the revised pleading.  (Da170-172, 3/19/19 Order).  The initial deadline for Plaintiff to file a revised pleading was April 15, 2019.  As Plaintiff has done with regard to all prior motions and pleadings, Plaintiff sought multiple extensions of the deadline which the Court granted as described above in the Procedural History section.  (Db6-7).  Finally, on May 28, 2019, Plaintiff filed his proposed Fourth Amended Complaint.
[brief] # TABLE OF CONTENTS | SECTION | PAGE NOS. | |------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------| | PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND STATEMENT OF FACTS | 1 | | LEGAL ARGUMENT | | | POINT I | | | THE COURT’S FINDING THAT DEFENDANT’S EXEMPLARY PRISON CONDUCT DID NOT DEMONSTRATE REHABILITATION WAS ERRONEOUS, REQUIRING RESENTENCING | 1 | | POINT II | | | THE COURT’S FINDING THAT DEFENDANT’S YOUTH SHOULD NOT BE AFFORDED  MITIGATION  SIMPLY BECAUSE THE INCIDENT IN QUESTION WAS PLANNED WAS ERRONEOUS, REQUIRING RESENTENCING | 10 | | POINT III | | | THE COURT IMPOSED A SENTENCE REQUIRING A FINDING THAT DEFENDANT WAS INCORRIGIBLE, BUT NEVER FOUND DEFENDANT TO BE INCORRIGIBLE, REQUIRING RESENTENCING | 14 | | CONCLUSION | 15 |  PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND STATEMENT OF FACTS
[brief] Again, forensic fingerprint evidence is an excellent example of a discipline that is less accurate and reliable than it is perceived to be.  As discussed above (*supra*, Point II, A), most people are familiar with fingerprint examination and believe that it is accurate and reliable, including investigators, judges, and latent fingerprint examiners themselves.  [...], *The Reliable Application of Fingerprint Evidence*, 66 UCLA L. Rev. Discourse 64 (2018).  In a relative sense, this is correct—fingerprint evidence has more underlying evidence than most forensic disciplines, including black box studies (*see, e.g.*, Koehler & Liu, *supra*, at 129-134) and blind proficiency tests.
[brief] Section 4.2 further confirms that the escrow deposit was conditioned on the termination of the PSA when it states that:  Section 4.2  Escrow Instructions.  …  In the event this Agreement is terminated by [[...]] under any express right of termination entitling [[...]] to a refund of the Earnest Money Deposit as provided herein, the Earnest Money Deposit shall be refunded to [[...]] in accordance with, and subject to the provisions of Article XVII.  (Pa97).  These provisions must be read in a manner assigning them their “plain and ordinary meaning,” M.J. Paquet, Inc. v. New Jersey Department of Transportation, 171 N.J. 378, 396 (2002), because the “plain language of [a] contract [remains] the cornerstone of [any] interpretive inquiry[,]” Barila v. Board of Education of Cliffside Park, 241 N.J. 595, 616 (2020) (quoting Quinn v. Quinn, 225 N.J. 34, 45 (2016)).
[brief] Plaintiffs cite Shenwick v. Twitter as an example of a court ordering a CEO to be designated as a document custodian where the CEO was involved in events at issue in the litigation.  No. 16-CV-05314-JST (SK), 2018 WL 833085 (N.D. Cal. Feb 7, 2018).  But there, the parties had yet to begin document collection and there were just 25 custodians.
[brief] The probate court’s August 31, 2022 order regarding legal fees is entitled “Order. ”  It did not state that it was a “judgment,” or, for that matter, a “final” judgment.  (Da 271).  The order’s language was: “1.  Plaintiff shall be entitled to reimbursement in the amount of $1,049,589.14; and 2.  Defendant’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s application for an award of legal fees is DENIED.  Plaintiff did not seek to certify the Order as final under R. 4:42-2, nor did the probate court certify the Order as final.  See, R. 2:2-3(b)(3), “orders properly certified as final under R. 4:42-2.