ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] In this case a developer asserts that the [...] should be encumbered with the ownership and maintenance costs of internal roadways which it created for its commercial property.  The internal roadways at issue were almost always described as "internal access roads" or "driveways" and no reasonable person would understand that those internal roads were intended to become the ownership responsibility of the Borough, absent express Borough approval.  The Planning Board and Plaintiff entered into a series of agreements which made roadway dedication fully conditional upon Borough approval.  Each successive contract with the developer held a conditions clause which prevented a transfer of ownership unless the Borough expressly agreed to accept same by Ordinance or Resolution - which did not occur in this case.  The trial court's decision glossed over the obligations within the agreements and simply declared that the Borough accepted ownership regardless of the conditions within the agreements.  Those agreements aside, one would be hard pressed to glean from the trial Court's decision which subdivision plat or site plan or which agreement was controlling in this case.  None was specifically identified by the trial court as controlling.  The simple fact remains that the Planning Board was unrelenting in its position that Borough ownership of the internal roads could only be achieved by way of formal Borough approval, through ordinance or resolution.  This condition was a vital component of its sub-division approvals.  The Plaintiff accepted this condition at every point of the process.  Plaintiff then proceeded to petition for the passage of a Resolution and dedication as required by this condition in 2021.  The Borough declined to take on the burden of ownership finding it counter to the public interest.  The trial Court reversed this legislative determination and transferred full ownership responsibility to the Municipality and its taxpayers.  The instant appeal ensued.  **PROCEDURAL HISTORY**
[brief] However, had [...] implemented a more specific video surveillance retention policy regarding in-store customer incidents, [...] would have ensured the preservation of footage from all available cameras.  The retention of such footage would have shown [...], at a minimum, pushing his overloaded U-boat throughout the store, up to, and including the time the incident occurred that calendar day.  It would have also been probative of issues such as how long the dangerous condition, caused by [...]’s overloaded U-boat, existed, and the failure on the part of Defendant’s employees to take the necessary affirmative steps to cure the hazard.  Moreover, [...] testified that by his estimate, the Hackensack location had between 20 and 30 different surveillance camera locations throughout the store and that if there was an incident, store personnel could register the time code and the camera number and send such information to the corporate office, since corporate had the ability to pull and save the footage (Pa96).  Rather than rely on his own judgment, [...] at the very least, should have noted all relevant cameras that he briefly reviewed so that personnel from the corporate office could have further reviewed all available footage.  This would have been accomplished had [...] had a specific video surveillance retention policy regarding in-store incidents.
[directive] Each audit shall embrace the books, accounts and transactions of the local unit and every board, body, officer or commission supported and maintained wholly or in part by funds appropriated by the local unit, unless otherwise provided by statute or regulations of the board.  Each audit shall cover a complete bank fiscal year and, in addition, shall include a verification of all cash and balances as of the date of the audit thereof and an audit of the accounts to such date.  1, L.1960, c. 169, s. 1, eff. Jan. 1962. of 40A :5-6.
[brief] ** (Pa3).  As an initial matter, appellate review of a grant of summary judgment is *de novo*.  *Giannakopoulos v. Mid State Mall*, 438 N.J. Super. 595, 599, 106 A.3d 507, 509 (App. Div. 2014).  Summary judgment should be entered only “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show there is no genuine issue as to any material fact challenged and that the moving party is entitled to judgment or order as a matter of law. ”  *R. 4:46-2(c)*.  The appellate record includes the Certification of Plaintiff [...], an active member of the Bar of this State.  Pa470–85.  To determine whether there are genuine issues of material fact, this Court must consider “whether the competent evidential materials presented, when viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, are sufficient to permit a rational factfinder to resolve the alleged disputed issue in favor of the non-moving party. ”  *Davis v. Brickman Landscaping, Ltd.*, 219 N.J. 395, 406, 98 A.3d 1173, 1178 (2014) (quoting *Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am.*, 142 N.J. 520, 540, 666 A.2d 146, 147 (1995)).  Summary judgment should be denied when a determination of material disputed facts depends primarily on credibility evaluations.  *Petersen v. Twp. of Raritan*, 418 N.J. Super. 125, 132, 12 A.3d 250, 254 (App. Div. 2011).  “[W]hen a civil action is brought in New Jersey, we use New Jersey choice-of-law rules to decide whether this state’s or another state’s legal framework should be applied.
[brief] Upon resentencing, the court rejected the expert characterization of [...]’s behavior as responsive to peer pressure, reasoning that “those assertions were belied by the fact of the Defendant’s own statements as to who was running the show. ”  (4T64-19 to 24)  The court found instead that “[t]hese were equal participants.  This was a planned event.  This was a heinous act.  It was unnecessarily violent and I mean unnecessarily violent. ”  (5T82-3 to 5)  Accordingly, the court attributed no mitigation to Miller factor 3.  This finding was erroneous for two reasons: (1) it was not based on any facts in the record, and (2) it relied upon the fact that the offense was planned and brutal in nature – both of which bear no relevance to the question of peer pressure.
[brief] **  In 1998, the Honorable [...], J.A.D. (retired and temporarily assigned on recall) considered the same argument of the current Defendants, to wit, is the IFPA subject to No-Fault arbitration.  See *Allstate v. Lopez*, 311 N.J. Super. 660 (Law Div. 1998).  After extensive briefing and oral argument Judge Villanueva ruled to the contrary.  In a well-reasoned opinion based upon common sense, pragmatism, and the plain language of the statute he stated that:  Significantly, the Legislature did not provide for the arbitration of claims under the Act; nor did it give arbitrators the power to award any of the specified damages under the Act.  The role of arbitration in automobile insurance matters is to provide for the prompt payment PIP benefits to ensure that people legitimately injured as a result of an automobile accident receive reasonable and necessary medical treatment in a prompt and expeditious manner.
[brief] [...] continued in that Appellants’ willful failure to comply with the Court’s Order merited sanctions under Rule 1:10-3 and/or pursuant to the Court’s inherent authority.  On May 10, 2024, Appellants moved to vacate the Court’s Order and invalidate the arbitration and waiver provisions of the Contract.  Appellants also requested that the Court restore this matter to the active trial calendar, as well as oral argument.  On May 24, 2024, the Court denied [...]’s motion and did not sanction Appellants (Dr44-45).
[brief] Moreover, in this case the property-in-question was properly designated by the Township as an area in need of redevelopment.  [...] specifically found that “the determination of the Township Committee of the [...] to declare the [...] and the [...] as areas in need of redevelopment are supported by substantial evidence, are based upon a proper interpretation of the Local Housing and Redevelopment Law, N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-1 et seq. and are affirmed[.]”  Da389-Da390.
[brief] To the contrary, the Amended Complaint, ¶¶60-70 (Pa11-Pa12), explains that Plaintiff’s bankruptcy petition disclosed sufficient information about the debt which did not require her to disclose the details which Defendant communicated to its mail vendor.  It also alleges that the information she disclosed in her schedules about her potential claims provided the trustee and her creditors with notice sufficient “to conduct further inquiry to determine whether to marshal those assets. ”  *Id.* at ¶64.  Defendant was also provided notice of the bankruptcy and, like the trustee and creditors, did not file any objection in Plaintiff’s bankruptcy case.  *Id.* at ¶¶66-67.  Furthermore, “with respect to Plaintiff’s claims in this case, her bankruptcy had no effect and, as far as those claims are concerned, it is as if Plaintiff never filed for bankruptcy.
[brief] Banach v. Cannon, 356 N.J. Super. 342, 361 (Ch. Div. 2002).......................20 Cmty. Hosp. Grp. Inc. v. More, 365 N.J. Super. 84, 94 (App. Div. 2003)...........25  Cranford Dev. Assocs., LLC v. Twp. of Cranford, 445 N.J. Super. 220, 230-31 (App. Div. 2016)................................................................. 28, 31  Crowe v. De Gioia, 90 N.J. 26 (1982) .............. 17, 19, 21, 24, 32, 33, 38, 42, 48, 50
[brief] United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982) ............................................................32  United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423 (1973) .......................................................22  United States v. Swenson, 894 F.3d 677 (5th Cir. 2018) ...........................................22, 30 Virgin Islands v. Fahie, 419 F.3d 249 (3d Cir. 2005) ...............................................23  STATUTES
[brief] **N.J.S.A. 47:1-14**  As to the assertions regarding the level of difficulty that would be encountered if the [...] were to even try and provide the requested logs, all the Defendants put forth is the [...] certification.  What does it really say?  Any objective view can only reach the answer: not much.  There are no specifics about the difficulties with each different type of email service (ie., Yahoo, Google, etc.), how any such issues could be addressed (or not addressed).  It says, basically, “this could be hard, but I have no specifics and it is not as easy as accessing the municipal server”.  None of this is a basis to issue a sweeping edict that allows public officials to avoid OPRA.
[brief] “‘[W]ith few exceptions ... appellate courts will decline to consider questions or issues not properly presented to the trial court when an opportunity for such a presentation is available. ”  State v. Witt, 223 N.J. 409, 419 (2015) (quoting State v. Robinson, 200 N.J. 1, 20 (2009)).  In the alternative, the matter should be remanded so the issue can be fully litigated, and because the judge has already expressed an opinion on the validity of the stop and frisk and the reasonableness of the police action, the Court should direct the matter should to be assigned to a different judge.  See e.g., State v. Henderson, 397 N.J. Super. 398, 416 (App. Div. ) (remanding for a new Wade hearing before a different judge in recognition of the “difficult and uncomfortable task for [judge] to now revisit and re-evaluate the evidence in light of the opinion he has already expressed about that evidence”).  CONCLUSION
[brief] “When “‘the Legislature has carefully employed a term in one place and excluded it in another, it should not be implied where excluded. ’”’  In re Plan for the Abolition of the Council on Affordable Hous., 214 N.J. 444, 470 (2013).  This is because the omission of certain language in one section of a statute of a larger act is presumed intentionally done.  *Cashin v. Bello*, 223 N.J. 328, 340 (2015).  Clearly, the Legislature determined that the heightened notice requirements necessary for zoning ordinances were not necessary for general ordinances, and more importantly, heightened notice were unnecessary for ordinances adopting a redevelopment plan.
[brief] The document is not attached because it is included in Plaintiff Appellant’s Appendix at Vol. I , Pa. 48-49 | | | Plaintiff’s response to Defendant’s First Request for Admissions attached (undated) to the Certification of [...] as Exhibit L in support of Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment .................................. | Pa. 366-369 | | Unpublished case titled Allen L. Singh v. Bank of America 2011 WL 2314762 attached as Exhibit M to the Certification of [...] in Support of Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment .................................. | Pa. 370-376 | # TABLE OF CONTENTS TO THE APPENDIX OF PLAINTIFF APPELLANT MORRIS BELLIFEMINE, MD PA VOLUME III | APPENDIX DOCUMENT | APPENDIX PAGE # | |-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------| | Plaintiff [...]’s Answer to Defendant’s Statement of Undisputed Material Facts | Pa. 377-383 | | Plaintiff’s Statement of Additional Material Facts in dispute in opposition to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgments | Pa. 383-392 | | Certification of [...] dated January 31, 2023 in opposition to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment | Pa. 393-397 | | Certification of [...], Esq dated January 31, 2023 in opposition to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment | Pa. 398-403 | | Copies of Checks Provided by Plaintiff to Defendants in discovery attached as Exhibit A to the Certification of [...] in opposition to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment | Pa. 404-415 | | Article Titled [...]’s Tangled Web of Questionable Billing Practices, Health Care attached as Exhibit B to the Certification of [...] in opposition to Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment | Pa. 416-425 | | APPENDIX DOCUMENT | APPENDIX PAGE # | |----------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------| | United States of America National Labor Board decision in [...] d/b/a [...] Medical Center and [...], [...] attached as Exhibit C to the Certification of [...] in Opposition to Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment | Pa. 426-569 | # TABLE OF CONTENTS TO THE APPENDIX OF PLAINTIFF APPELLANT MORRIS BELLIFEMINE, MD PA VOLUME IV | APPENDIX DOCUMENT | APPENDIX PAGE # | |----------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------| | Order entered by the Honorable [...] on February 28, 2023 granting Defendants Motion for summary Judgment .................. | Pa. 570 | | Notice of Motion for Reconsideration of the Motion for Summary Judgment dated March 20, 2023................................. | Pa. 571-572 | | Certification of [...] Esq. dated March 20,2023 in support of Plaintiff’s Motion For Reconsideration ...................... | Pa. 573-577 | | Pages 81-84 of the deposition of [...], MD attached as Exhibit A to the certification of [...], Esq. in support of plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration.
[brief] 1.  The Trial Court Made Binding Factual Findings as to the Legitimacy of the Counting and Certification Process  As a threshold matter, the trial court evaluated the entire process of the counting of the votes as well as the certification process.  He determined that the witnesses were credible, honest, “discharging their obligation under the law,” and “acted reasonably under the circumstances. ” (2T74:6-75:1).  In fact, there was “nothing unusual or untoward about what happened. ” (2T77:11-14).  The trial court critically concluded that the write-in votes were always listed on the initial certification, even if they were not broken out by candidate.  “It does not assign those votes to any of the write-in candidates, but it does clearly indicate under the signature of [...], Clerk, that there were five write-in votes that were cast. ” (2T77:22-78:25).  “[C]ertainly, it was accounted for in each of those certifications.  (2T79:11-15).  Ultimately: The Court comes to the conclusion in this case that the process here was abided by, that it was clear and consistent.
[brief] (Aa16-18).  DEP rejected [...]’s explanation, finding that the Project was adjacent to the “bay or ocean or bayfront or oceanfront, beach, dune or boardwalk,” and thus had to comply with N.J.A.C. 7:7-16.10(d).  (Aa18).  Applying the rule, DEP determined the Project provided a 25% open view corridor, which is less than the 30% requirement set forth in N.J.A.C. 7:7-16.10(d)(1), and that the 99-foot tall Project, set back at 88 feet, failed to meet the setback requirement of 198 feet.  Ibid.  DEP issued notice of the denial in the DEP Bulletin.  (Ra96).  C.
[brief] The trial court found that the intent of the interview “at all times was the robbery and not the drug charges[,]” and that “[n]o charges related to the robbery had been filed at the time of the interview” because [...] “did not have the necessary facts to charge the defendant with robbery before the interview. ” (2T7-24 to 8-4).  The court agreed that “there was not probable cause to charge the defendant with robbery prior to the interview. ” (2T9-1 to 2).  The court further found that no notice was given to defendant that the focus of the interrogation would be the robbery.  (2T8-5 to 9).  The trial court ruled that since no charges were filed, nor could have been filed, the “bright line rule [of A.G.D.] does not apply to this case. ” (2T9-16 to 23).  Moreover, the court held that “the State did not intentionally defer filing charges to avoid an A.G.D. violation . . . to avoid disclosing the charges he faced. ” (2T10-24 to 12-12).  The court found [...]’s testimony to be credible.
[brief] First, the Court in Watson reiterated that a fact witness who actually observed an event in real life “can testify about the portion of a recording that depicts their encounter” or what they observed.  254 N.J. at 599.  However, “narration evidence by a witness who did not observe events depicted in a video in real time may not include opinions about a video's content and may not comment on facts the parties reasonably dispute. ”  Ibid. (emphasis added).  A witness who did not observe an event in real time—such as a detective—may “draw[] attention to key details that might be missed, or help[] jurors follow potentially confusing, complex, or unclear videos that may otherwise be difficult to grasp. ”  *Id.* at 602.
[brief] (4)  The extent of the discovery conducted; [...]’s litigation strategy has been to accept [...]’s discovery responses but refuse to provide good faith responses in return.  Indeed, in his brief counsel for [...] has remarked on several occasions on the “636 pages” of documents produced in response to discovery requests, whereas [...]’s counsel just succeeded in its motion to Compel 1) [...]’s Second Amended Response to [...]’s Initial Interrogatories, (served upon [...] June 16, 2023); 2) [...]’s First Amended Notice to Produce (served June 16, 2023); and [...]’s initial response to [...]’s Supplemental Notice to Produce (served October 13, 2023).  The Trial Court has issued an Order regarding the outstanding discovery in this matter.  Until the parties have the opportunity to comply with the discovery orders, it is undetermined how much more time and effort will be required to complete discovery.  Although a substantial portion of [...]’s responses appear to have been provided in bad faith, [...] participated in every substantive aspect of litigation but for the trial.  If this matter were sent for arbitration, further delay in an adjudication is likely.  Such a delay would be patently unfair to [...], particularly in light of [...]’s late assertion of the arbitration clause he authored.
[brief] ” (Pa132, 23).  To further support her request that [...] pay for Plaintiff to live in a hotel, Plaintiff further represented to [...] pursuant to N.J.S.A. 17:33A-6 that she was experiencing adverse health effects from alleged mold exposure.  (Pa133, 24).  She has doubled down on that position, claiming that she has not worked since the date of loss because of the alleged illness that she sustained as a result of the insurance claim.  (Pa133, 25).  In this litigation, [...] learned that these representation was false.
[brief] | No. [...] (D.N.J. Apr. 29, 2019) | 35 | | Grobarchik v. Nasa Mortgage and Investment Company | 117 N.J.L. 33, 186 A. 433 (1936) | 18 | | Hagrish v. Olson | 254 N.J. Super. 133 (App. Div. 1992) | 16 | | Hayworth v. Blondery Robinson & Co. | 980 F.2d 912 (3d Cir. 1992) | 41 | | Henebema v. Raddi | 452 N.J. Super. 438 (App. Div. 2017) | 7 | | Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc. | 32 N.J. 358 (1960) | 30, 31| | Highlands Ins. Co. v. Hobbs Grp., LLC | 373 F.3d 347 (3d Cir. 2004) | 29 | | Hill v. Middletown Bd. of Educ. | 183 N.J. Super. 36 (App. Div. 1982) | 6, 7, 8| | IE Test, LLC v. Carroll | 226 N.J. 166 (2016) | 5 | | Case Name | Page Numbers | |--------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------| | *Iliadis v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.*, 191 N.J. 88 (2007) | 37, 38, 42, 43, 44, 45 | | *In re Adoption of Baby T.*, 160 N.J. 332 (1999) | 36 | | *In Re New Jersey-American Water Co.*, 333 N.J. Super.  398 (App. Div. 2000) | 16 | | *In re Prudential Inc. Co. of Am. Sales Practice Litigation Agent Actions*, 148 F.3d 283 (3d Cir. 1998) | 46 | | *International Minerals & Mining Corp. v. Citicorp N. Am., Inc.*, 736 F. Supp. 587 (D.N.J. 1990) | 30 | | *Ivan v. Marlboro Tp. Municipal Utilities Authority*, 162 N.J. Super. 466 (App. Div. 1978) | 24, 32 | | *Jackson v. Hankinson*, 94 N.J. Super. 505 (App. Div. 1967), aff'd, 51 N.J. 230 (1968) | 8 | | *Jersey City v. Morris Canal and Banking Co.*, 41 N.J.L. 66 (Sup. Ct. 1879) | 21 | | *JB Pool Mgmt., LLC v. Four Seasons at Smithville Homeowners Ass'n*, 431 N.J. Super. 233 (App. Div. 2013) | 7 | | *Johnston v. HBO Film Mgmt.*, 265 F.
[brief] Under these facts, transfer to the county board is proper given the court's lack of jurisdiction of the subject tax appeal.  The board is therefore instructed to accept plaintiff's complaint as if it had been received on March 14, 2013.  Plaintiff shall be responsible for all the applicable statutes and rules relating to the payment of filing fees to the board as well as those rules relating to the processing of the petition of appeal."  Plaintiff's action in lieu of prerogative writs and civil rights claims (Pa 27-29) are not encompassed by subparagraphs (1), (2), (3), and (4) of R. 4:3-1.
[brief] The Board’s February 28, 2024, Final Decision must be reversed because it failed to: (1) consider material evidence directly related to the required analysis under N.J.A.C. 10A:71-3.11; and (2) meet its burden in establishing a “substantial likelihood” of reoffense based upon the two risk assessments of record, which conclude [...] merely presents a “low to moderate” risk.  In light of the Board’s substantial errors in this matter, and its history of arbitrary denials of parole to [...], it is respectfully requested that this Court reverse the Board’s Final Decision and grant [...] parole.