ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Concerned Citizens involved a challenge to a municipality’s designation of valuable municipally-owned lands as an area in need of redevelopment.  Concerned Citizens, 370 N.J. Super. at 435-36.  More specifically, the [...] adopted a development plan for construction of a “five-story parking garage, a public plaza, and seventy-five housing units” upon 2.13 acres of municipally-owned land located in the middle of Princeton’s downtown.  Id. at 436.  In addition to fundamentally altering the town’s popular downtown, the $13.5 million-dollar project was funded through the issuance of bonds and notes.  Id. at 442.  This court in Concerned Citizens held the project “implicated the expenditure of public funds through the issuance of bonds. ”  Id. at 447.  This court found the large number of citizen signatures opposing the project in combination with this use of public monies demonstrated a strong public interest.  Id.  Here, there is no municipally-owned property involved or bonds or other forms of public investment utilized to fund this project.  The PILOT agreement [...] now seizes upon represents money [...] will be paying directly to the town—not funds the town is raising to finance the challenged project.  These facts distinguish Concerned Citizens.
[directive] Approved by Downward departure for substantial cooperation?  Yes No  Extent of Reduction  9 9 (Approval is required.  If Yes, treat worksheet as a confidential record)  Approved by Plea Offer Expires On Completed by NOTICE:  This plea offer is subject to withdrawal and modification based on new information about the offense or defendant, including, but not limited to, defendant’s conduct occurring after this offer was issued (e.g. committing a new offense or failing to appear in court).
[brief] Third, the Petitioner had motive to sign the Agreement, as a result of his filing numerous state and federal court cases regarding his parents' estate where he thought he was recovering large sums of money, including a night club called the [...].  Fourth, compelling and credible evidence points to the Petitioner as the destroyer and/or concealer of the original Agreement.  The Rubber Maid Box facts detailed on pages 27 to 29 above provide strong evidence in this regard.  Any difficulty in determining the authenticity -- the evidence to the contrary is overwhelming -- represents a self-created hardship on the part of the Petitioner.  Since the evidence points to him as the destroyer of the original, he cannot make any complaints about the copy.  Thus, the copy of the Agreement represents admissible and competent evidence under N.J.R.E. 1003.
[brief] Secondly, [...]’s reliance upon the Department of Labor Commissioner’s decision in New Jersey Department of Labor and Workforce Development v. TAD Associates, LLC, d/b/a DeMuro Associates, [...] and [...], 2010 N.J. Agen LEXIS 826 (N.J. DOL May 6, 2010) (“TAD”) to advance its contention that “licensed professionals (like archaeologists) are subcontractors” is similarly misplaced.  [...] claims that based upon the TAD decision issued in 2010, an archaeologist should be regarded as a “licensed professional”, similar to a licensed land surveyor or architect, and therefore is subject to the registration requirements of the PWCRA.  The flaw in this argument is that an archaeologist, unlike a land surveyor or an architect, is not required to be “licensed” by the State of New Jersey and therefore, not correctly grouped in with “licensed professionals” in this context.
[brief] Lesher v. Law Offices of Mitchell N. Kay, PC, 650 F.3d 993, 997 (3d Cir. 2011).  It is “lower than the standard of a reasonable debtor.  A communication that would not deceive or mislead a reasonable debtor might still deceive or mislead the least sophisticated debtor. ”  Rosenau v. Unifund Corp., 539 F.3d 218, 221 (3d Cir. 2008) (quotation marks and brackets omitted).
[brief] Deed between [...] and [...] and [...] (with tax map exhibit attached) filed on June 19, 2016 as Exhibit B to Certification of [...], Esq in support of defendant’s Notice of Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment and in opposition to Plaintiff’s Partial Notice of Motion for Summary Judgment  Second Amended Order Granting Partial Summary Judgment as to the Second, Third, and Fifth Counts of Plaintiff’s Amended Verified Complaint filed August 16, 2016.  September 6, 2016  Case Management Scheduling Order September 6, 2016  Order to Show Cause With Restraints  September 30, 2016  Order Transcript of Trial/Final Oral Opinion dated June 5, 2017. ²
[brief] DEFENDANTS’ INSTALLATION OF CURBING ALONG THEIR DRIVEWAY REDIRECTED THE FLOW OF SURFACE WATER ...  4  A.  Defendants installed a curb around their driveway ...........................................4  B.  Plaintiff’s surveyor found that a gap in the curb directed water from Defendants’ property to Plaintiff’s property .................................................................7  C.  Plaintiff’s engineer opined on the quantity of water flowing from Defendants’ property to Plaintiff’s property .................................................................9  II.  DEFENDANT [...] ADMITTED THAT HE PLACED BRANCHES ON PLAINTIFF’S PLANTS .......................................................  11  III.  THE CHANCERY DIVISION GRANTED DEFENDANT’S MOTION AT THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT HEARING ..............................................  12  A.  The Chancery Division granted summary judgment on Plaintiff’s nuisance claim because it found [...]’s opinions to be unsupported ..................................................................................................................  12  B.  In granting summary judgment on Plaintiff’s trespass claims, the Chancery Division disregarded testimony on Defendant Edward Dwyer’s admissions ..................................................................................................................  14  LEGAL ARGUMENT .............................................................................................15
[brief] The Legislature and the Supreme Court in Abbott XX envisioned a scenario where districts would have to do their part and contribute — especially the wealthier ones like [...] — so that the State could allocate school aid more equitably to needier districts.  Abbott XX, 199 N.J. at 165; N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-44(d).  The SFRA is, after all, a unitary and wealth-equalized funding formula that employs a structure of school funding through which districts fund their budgets using a combination of local levy and State aid.  That is not a constitutional violation; it is the Legislature’s prerogative, and an approach that the Abbott XX Court found to be constitutionally sound.  In colloquial terms: everybody “pitches in,” with districts contributing what they can.  [...] has simply forgotten the “pitching in” part.
[brief] The only express notice requirement contained in the Ricci Act provides that the Board must “notify members and retirants in the retirement system of the enactment of this act, P.L.2019, c.157, within 30 days of enactment. ”  N.J.S.A. 53:5A-10(e)(4).  The [...] satisfied this notice requirement when it added information about the Ricci Act to its website on August 7, 2019, and when it notified all Certifying Officers of the Ricci Act on August 8, 2019 and received confirmation that information pertaining to the Ricci act was disseminated to the location’s employees.  (Pa10; Pa13; Pa85).
[brief] Federal Cases  Bucio v. Sutherland, 674 F. Supp. 2d 882 (S.D. Ohio 2009)  .......................  43 Caro v. Woodford, 280 F.3d 1247 (9th Cir. 2002)  ...........................................  44  Daniel v. W. Virginia, 191 F.3d 447 (4th Cir. 1999)  .......................................  48 Dietz v. Bouldin, 579 U.S. 40 (2016)  ..............................................................  48  Driscoll v. Delo, 71 F.3d 701 (8th Cir. 1995) ..................................................  45 Duncan v. Ornoski, 528 F.3d 1222 (9th Cir. 2008) .........................................  43  Harris By & Through Ramseyer v. Blodgett, 853 F.  Supp. 1239 (W.D. Wash. 1994), aff’d sub nom. Harris By & Through Ramseyer v. Wood, 64 F.3d 1432 (9th Cir. 1995) ........................................................................... 44 Miller v. Senkowski, 268 F. Supp. 2d 296 (E.D.N.Y. 2003) ............................. 43 Patterson v. People of State of Colorado ex rel. Attorney Gen. of State of Colorado, 205 U.S. 454 (1907) ................................................................. 48 Pavel v. Hollins, 261 F.3d 210 (2d Cir. 2001) .................................................. 43 Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966) ....................................................... 48 Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209 (1982) ............................................................. 47 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) ........................................... 40, 41, 45 Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107 (1987) .................................................. 47 Troedel v. Wainwright, 667 F. Supp. 1456 (S.D. Fla. 1986), aff’d sub nom. Troedel v. Dugger, 828 F.2d 670 (11th Cir. 1987) ...........................................  43, 44 United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725 (1993) ....................................................  47 Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003) .............................................................  41, 42 Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000) ...........................................................  41  State Cases State v. Easterling, A-4211-16T4, 2019 WL 3851650 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Aug. 16, 2019), cert. denied, 240 N.J. 401 (2020) ......................................
[directive] Restrictions on Using BWCs Surreptitiously or to Gather Intelligence Information on First Amendment Protected Activity.  A BWC shall not be used surreptitiously.  Additionally, a BWC shall not be used to gather intelligence information based on First Amendment protected speech, associations, or religion, or to record activity that is unrelated to a response to a call for service or a law enforcement or investigative encounter between a law enforcement officer and a member of the public, provided that nothing in this subsection shall be construed to prohibit activation of video and audio recording functions of a BWC as authorized under the law or this Policy.  BODY WORN CAMERA POLICY | May 2021 17  8
[brief] THIS CASE IS NOT BARRED BY LACHES (Ja416)  This case was timely filed within New Jersey’s statute of limitations for a takings claim.  Yet the court below faulted [...] for “wait[ing] nearly four years” to bring her claim, and held that “[a]t some point, equitable principles, such as those embodied in the doctrine of laches, apply” to bar the case.  (Ja407, 416).  That was error.  A takings claim seeking just compensation is an action at law and is subject to a six-year statute of limitations.  Klumpp, 202 N.J. at 407.  An unjust enrichment claim seeking restitution is also subject to a six-year statute of limitations.  Kopin, 297 N.J. Super. at 373–74.  Where an action at law is governed by a statute of limitations, the equitable doctrine of laches cannot apply to bar a suit commenced within the limitations period.  Fox, 210 N.J. at 419–20.  And where “a legal and an equitable remedy exist for the same cause of action, equity will generally follow the limitations statute. ”  Id. at 421 (quoting Lavin v. Bd. of Educ. of City of Hackensack, 90 N.J. 145, 153 n.1 (1982)).  A. A claim filed within the statute of limitations is timely  In Fox, the New Jersey Supreme Court held that laches did not bar timely claims, including a claim for unjust enrichment.  210 N.J. at 408, 425.  The Court observed that it had sometimes invoked equitable doctrines, including laches, to expand the rights of a plaintiff to commence or maintain an action governed by a statute of limitations, but had never invoked laches to limit those rights.  Id. at 417.  A suit based on a legal right to a monetary judgment and subject to an applicable statute of limitations is controlled by that statute.  Id. at 419–20; see also, e.g., Lavin, 90 N.J. at 151 (“[L]aches [is] an equitable defense that may be interposed in the absence of the statute of limitations. ”) (emphasis added).  The New Jersey Supreme Court has never departed from this rule, although one Appellate Division case has.  See Chance v. McCann, 405 N.J. Super. 547, 569 (App. Div. 2009).  The Fox Court distinguished Chance on the basis of its “unique and compelling” circumstances, while being careful not to endorse the holding.
[directive] S.A. N.J. in specified soon is it appropriate, as as where Criminal Justice of Division the or Office, Prosecutor's County means or person in by maybe made prosecutor the with consultation  The so. do to feasible and safe pursuant authorized be otherwise may communication. as  Except other electronic or telephonic of offense persons disorderly a for or crime, indictable any for complaint-summons 3.3, Section no to (4) 2C:25-21(a)(1) to in N.J.S.A. specified grounds any where the of violence domestic involving shall offense or crime such any for acomplaint-warrant for application and issued, apply, no be shall without express acomplaint-warrant, the to approve officer authorized judicial a to submitted be Section
[brief] He did not mail notices, nor did he provide notice by newspaper publication to [...]’s creditors.  Rather, “the people who were involved were notified,” whom he did not identify.  1T21-20.  Nor did he file an Affidavit with the Court setting forth who was notified and by what means.  One can only assume that he was referring to the parties to this litigation that included the Bank and the Defendants.
[brief] 1.  [...] did not have an objectively reasonable belief that [...]’s conduct violated N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4.  [...] contends that he had an objectively reasonable belief that [...]’s behavior on June 24, 2020 constituted *criminal* harassment under N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4.  In order to make a *prima facie* case of CEPA retaliation, a plaintiff must demonstrate “he or she reasonably believed that his or her employer’s conduct was violating either a law, rule, or regulation promulgated pursuant to law, or a clear mandate of public policy.
[brief] When the Owners of the property failed to cooperate with the Plaintiff-Respondent and he could not sign the necessary closing documents to convey clear title to the Property to the Buyer, he filed a Verified Complaint and to Order Show Cause to enable him to sell the property and fulfill his duties.  Plaintiff-Respondent respectfully submits that Defendant-Appellant’s Answer and opposition failed to raise any genuine issues of material fact that required the Trial Court to conduct a plenary hearing before rendering a judgment in his favor.  The present matter involves an Order dated January 13, 2023 that directed an independent individual to sell real estate.  The prior Trial Judge entered the Order dated January 13, 2023 and considered it to be an order for partition of the property pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:56-2. (Da573, 12:4-22).
[brief] [...] would have had a better chance of locating the account agreement and arbitration clause by using an oracular inquiry by extispicy.  The Bank incorrectly contended Plaintiff agreed to the terms of the Deposit Account Agreement twice over, once by signing the application and again by using the account.  No where in the application does it state by signing the application the customer agrees to the Deposit Account Agreement.  It merely states that the customer’s use of the account confirms the customer’s receipt of, and agreement to be bound by the account agreement.  (Pa 35).
[brief] Perhaps most importantly, [...]’s entire argument hinges upon a significant mistake or oversight concerning the owner’s valuation and market evidence: [...] argues that [...] failed to account for differences between the subject property and the “comparable sales” used, but [...]’s appraiser clearly applies adjustments to six of his seven “comparable sales” to account for the differences between the status of approvals of the comparable sales and the [...] property.  To the extent that [...] disagrees with the quantum of each approval adjustment, [...] is completely at liberty to explore this topic during cross-examination at trial.  Accordingly, the Trial Court’s decision should be affirmed and the question regarding the amount of just compensation owed to [...] for the taking should be presented to the jury in the trial court after a full development of the facts.
[brief] ” (Id. at 70-80.)  The Board granted all bulk variance relief other than from the Distance Regulation: (i) “to change messaging every 8 seconds during restricted period [between 10pm and 6am]; (ii) “for Billboard distance from structure; and (iii) “for Front yard setback for utility easement. ”  (Pa128.)  The Board issued a resolution of denial on May 15, 2023 that likewise only cites “safety” and only recites testimony, rather than making findings.  (Pa128.)  II.
[directive] D. reporting.  IAPP  Section 9.11 is revised as follows:  Public 9.11  Public Reports 9.11.1  On an annual basis, every law enforcement agency shall provide to the County Prosecutor and publish on its public website a report summarizing the types of complaints received and the dispositions of those complaints.  This report should be statistical in nature.  The County Prosecutor shall submit a summary of the reports from all agencies in its jurisdiction to the Office of Public Integrity and Accountability.  The Annual Internal Affairs Summary attached to Appendix K shall  This process shall be may be used to satisfy the requirements of this Section.
[brief] (Pa303).  “[I]f there’s one weapon, there could be more,” is insufficient to justify a Terry frisk. ”  See Dwayne Scott Lockard v. State of Maryland (Pa676); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).  Here, the plaintiff was not armed and not dangerous and “officer safety” alone will not justify a frisk.  The officer must articulate “why” officer safety was an issue (exactly what risk / danger to the officer or others existed).
[brief] Despite the persistence of counsel for [...] and [...], simply because those two defendants are engineering companies, does not mean that their respective duties and/or their failure to adhere to those duties requires expert testimony on all issues.  Even though it is Plaintiffs’ position that [...]’s testimony regarding their breach of a professional obligation is supported by the record, and that his testimony should not have been barred (and certainly not in its’ entirety), on this record, each element of Plaintiffs’ claim against the Defendant can be independently supported by the records and the testimony provided during the depositions.  Contrary to the Defendant contentions, this is not a case where the jury will be asked to determine some esoteric deviation from an engineering standard of care such as the appropriate load capacity for the bridge overpass or the appropriateness of any engineering design or plan.  Rather, when viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the Plaintiffs, this is a case where a known dangerous condition existed in the travel portion of the Parkway and each Defendant either had a statutory or contractual responsibility to ensure that the condition was fixed or warned against, and the Defendants collectively failed to adhere to those duties.  As a result, while riding his motorcycle southbound on the Parkway in the left lane, Plaintiff hit the settlement in the roadway located at the abutment joint northern side of the Rt. 30 overpass and was caused to lose control, crash, and become injured.  These facts are within the ken of the average jury.  Afterall, as outlined in [...]’s Construction Inspection Manual, when assessing the maintenance and protection of traffic, “common sense is the best barometer”.  (Pa1337).  III.
[brief] In Finding Criterion (b) Inapplicable, the Trial Court Erroneously Contorted the Plain Meaning of Statutory Words and Utilized a Tortuous Explanation to Reach its Conclusion.  (Not Raised Below).  Rejection of the Borough’s redevelopment designation was based on an incorrect reading of N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-5(b).  Review of a trial court’s statutory interpretation is de novo and is not entitled to any deference.  Malanga, supra, 253 N.J. at 311.  When a Court interprets a statute, it should be guided by the overarching principle to “‘effectuate legislative intent. ’”  Matter of Diguglielmo, 252 N.J. 350, 360 (2022).  The starting point in determining legislative intent is always the plain language of the statute because “‘‘the best indicator of that intent is the plain language chosen by the Legislature. ’’”  Ibid.  A court is not permitted to “rewrite a plainly written statute or to presume that the Legislature meant something other than what it conveyed in its clearly expressed language. ”  Murray v. Plainfield Rescue Squad, 210 N.J. 581, 592 (2012).  This, however, is exactly what the Trial Court did.  In order to reach the result it wanted, the Trial Court ignored the plain language of N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-5(b) and added requirements which were not included within the statute.
[brief] Presumptively, that construction of the Synagogue at that time would have required a Site Plan Approval from a Board.  Certainly, any plan for the Synagogue to have a permanent parking right/facility on the adjacent School Lot 5 would have had to be included and approved as part of the Synagogue Lot 8 Site Plan and the adjacent 1972 School’s Lot 5 Site Plan.  That no site plan that authorizes such off-site parking use/facility has been produced, and apparently does not exist, precludes any finding that the Synagogue has legal authority to use School property.
[directive] 10.2  Restriction on Access to BWC Recordings Related to Investigations Conducted Pursuant to AG Directive 2019-4.  To ensure the integrity of the investigation of “Law Enforcement Incidents” conducted pursuant to AG Directive 2019-4, and to avoid possible contamination of a witness's personal recollection of events that could undermine his or her credibility as a witness, notwithstanding any other provision of this Policy, no civilian or law enforcement witness, including the principals of the investigation, shall be given access to or view a BWC recording of the incident, or a BWC recording of the response or on-scene investigation of the incident, without the express prior approval of the “Independent Investigator,” as that term is defined in AG Directive 2019-4.
[brief] It has been held, “The determination of the existence of a duty is a question of law for the Court. ”  DeAngelis v. Rose, 320 N.J. Super. 263 (App. Div. 1999)(quoting, Petrillo v. Bachenberg, 139 N.J. 472, 479 (1995)); McGrogan v. Till, 167 N.J. 414, 425 (2001); Jerista v. Murray, 185 N.J. 175, 190-91 (2005)(Legal malpractice suits are grounded in negligence law, and require three elements: “(1) the existence of an attorney-client relationship creating a duty of care by the defendant attorney, (2) the breach of that duty by the defendant, and (3) proximate causation of the damages claimed by the plaintiff.