ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2B:25-5a, municipal prosecutors are required to “...represent the State, the county or the municipality in the prosecution of all offenses, except for zoning violations, within the statutory jurisdiction of the municipal court as defined by law. ”  Exceptions to the requirement that municipal prosecutors prosecute all offenses are set forth in N.J.S.A. 2B:25-5b.  One such exception allows a municipal prosecutor, with the approval of the court, to decline to participate in municipal court proceedings in which the defendant is not represented by counsel.  N.J.S.A. 2B:25-5b.  In many municipalities, municipal prosecutors traditionally have not prosecuted shoplifting offenses where the complaining witness is an employee of a supermarket or some other retail establishment.  Where such cases were not handled by a municipal prosecutor, retailers were forced to either hire private counsel, pursuant to the proscription of Opinion 34 – Lay Security Personnel Prosecuting Complaints in Municipal Court, 156 N.J.L.J. 434 (May 3, 1999) or forego prosecution.  This practice has resulted in unequal enforcement of the law in such cases.  In order to ensure that shoplifting offenses are prosecuted in municipal courts in a uniform manner, municipal prosecutors shall henceforth prosecute all shoplifting offenses and shall not decline to participate in the prosecution of shoplifting offenses where the defendant is not represented by counsel.  V. Juveniles Charged or Adjudicated Delinquent for Shoplifting P.L. 2000, Ch. 16 applies to juveniles only as to the grading of offenses under this Act.
[brief] As noted in the Appellant’s Brief, our Supreme Court in Faustin, supra, 85 N.J. 510, ruled that the plaintiff there was entitled to an annulment even though it was a sham marriage solely for immigration purposes that was knowingly entered into by both parties.  Plaintiff [...] in this case was entirely unaware of Defendant’s fraudulent intent on identical grounds.  If annulment was due in Faustin, supra, 85 N.J. 507, it is even more due in this case.  The family court at least abused its discretion in failing to grant an annulment based on general equity jurisdiction under the undisputed evidence that Plaintiff presented at trial, Carris v. Carris, 24 N.J. Eq. 516, 523 (1873); In re Estate of Santolino, 384 N.J. Super. 567, 583 (Ch. Div. 2005).  Even the family judge recognized the equities—asking Defendant if she would consent to an annulment with Plaintiff.  It was erroneous for the family judge to fail to afford Plaintiff at least equitable relief on his request for an annulment (which Respondent does not address in her Brief).
[directive] These Guidelines replace all previously issued memoranda from the Division of Criminal Justice or the Attorney General, regarding the Standard (Refusal) Statements for DWI refusal, CDL/DWI refusal and OVWI refusal.  Please inform all of the police departments and law enforcement agencies in your county.  These Guidelines do not, however, replace or rescind any Attorney General Law Enforcement Directives issued regarding DWI or DWI related subjects.  E.g., Attorney General  1  The purpose of P.L.2004, c.8, was “clarify the penalties for refusing to submit to a Breathalyzer test after being arrested for drunk driving,” and to clarify the language concerning consecutive license suspensions for second or subsequent refusal convictions and convictions for drunk driving.  See, P.L.2003, c.314, lowering the per se offense limit to 0.08%.  "  New Jersey Is An Equal Opportunity Employer Printed on Recycled Paper and is Recyclable Attorney General Guideline: Page 2 Prosecution of DWI & Refusal Violations Law. ”2  Directive No. 2004-1, pertaining to “John’s  In the event of future Legislative changes or case law developments, these Guidelines may be amended or modified to reflect those changes or developments.  In addition, these Guidelines are not intended to supercede or conflict with the Attorney General Directive, issued Nov. 18, 1998, To: All Municipal Prosecutors, Re: Plea Agreements in Municipal Courts, or the “Guidelines for Operation of Plea Agreements [R. 7:6-2(d)],” as set forth by the New Jersey Supreme Court, in the Appendix to Part VII “Practice in the Municipal Courts,” effective Sept. 1, 2004, of the Rules Governing the Courts of the State of New Jersey, or with the recently enacted amendment at N.J.S.A. 2B:25-5.1, requiring Municipal Prosecutors to review motor vehicle abstracts of DWI offenders and present that information to the Court.
[brief] TENANT’S APPEAL IS MOOT (Da1-3)  Even if this Court were to rule, for any reason, that Tenant was entitled to payment of the 2020 and 2021 Tenant Allowance installments despite the express terms of the Lease and its admitted monetary defaults, Tenant’s appeal of the Post Trial Order and Reconsideration Order should nonetheless be dismissed as moot because the Rent Arrears have already been paid to Landlord.  As such, Landlord is no longer seeking possession of the Premises and there is no further directive the Landlord-Tenant Division can issue in this case.  “Mootness is a threshold justiciability determination rooted in the notion that judicial power is to be exercised only when a party is immediately threatened with harm. ”  Benjamin H. Realty Corp. v. Young, A-3158-21, 2023 WL 8596172, *2 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Dec. 12, 2023) (unpublished), cert. denied, 257 N.J. 233 (2024).  An issue is moot when the decision sought by a litigant “can have no practical effect on the existing controversy. ”  Young, 2023 WL 8596172 at *2; Joey T LLC v. Hall, A-1903-19T3, 2021 WL 168473, at *2 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Jan. 11, 2021) (unpublished).  Courts generally “do not resolve issues that have become moot due to the passage of time or intervening events. ”  Young, 2023 WL 8596172 at *2.  Crucially, because the Landlord-Tenant Division’s jurisdiction is limited to determining which party is entitled to possession of the premises, this Court has routinely dismissed, as moot, appeals of summary disposition actions where, as here, the landlord is no longer seeking possessing.
[brief] 10  This State uses “the same canons of construction [that apply to] a statute” in interpreting “a rule of an administrative agency. ”  Matter of N.J.A.C. 14A:20–I.1, 216 N.J. Super. 297, 306 (App. Div. 1987); see State, Twp. of Pennsauken v. Schad, 160 N.J. 156, 170 (1999).  Thus, that various state agencies—including the Department itself—have promulgated excessiveness rules in other contexts, but not in this instance, is telling.
[brief] ”  Croft v. Westmoreland Cnty. Children and Youth Services, 103 F.3d 1123, 1126 (3d Cir. 1997).  See also Ricard, 2022 WL 1471372, at *8 (there would be an interest in withholding notification to parents “where there is a particularized and substantiated concern that disclosure … could lead to child abuse, neglect, or some other illegal conduct”).  Significantly, our constitutional law presumes “broad parental authority over children” and that parents, not the State, “possess what a child lacks in maturity, experience and capacity for judgment required for making life’s difficult decisions” so “[p]arents can and must make those judgments. ”  *Parham v. J.R.*, 442 U.S. 584, 602, 603 (1979).
[brief] For more than a quarter of a century, Plaintiff-Appellant, [...], has been trying to blame Defendant-Respondent, the [...] (improperly pleaded as the [...]), for problems that have always existed on the property her family has owns.  The property is at the bottom of a cul-de-sac and has had water run-off issues for decades, with the land filled with clay soil that prevented any drainage.  The Township is not responsible for creating these problems and has no responsibility to fix them.  Even so, after being pestered for years to help Pesci fix these problems, the Township spent tens of thousands of dollars to do so and was ultimately successful in remediating both the run-off issues (through the installation of a storm drain in front of Pesci’s house) and drainage issues (through the installation of a drainage system in the backyard, plus the removal of the clay soil and its replacement with soil less likely to cause issues).  But no good deed goes unpunished.  Even though Pesci admits that these actions have remediated the problems, she is now suing the Township because it has refused to replace her driveway, 50-year-old pool, and shrubbery.  Pesci claims that the Township promised to do so, despite no evidence to support her position.  In contrast, the Township has offered evidence showing that Pesci removed her pool on her own volition because she was having issues with it for years, and that removing it was unnecessary for the Township to perform the work in her backyard.  Pesci’s family purchased a property with known, or knowable, water issues, and lived there for more than 40 years without taking any steps to remediate these issues on their own.  Pesci is looking for a scapegoat to pay to replace a backyard that may have been “luxurious,” as she claims, back in 1979, but which she wholly failed to maintain in the interim.  The Township has gone above-and-beyond in trying to help a longstanding resident and it should not be penalized any further.  The trial court granted the Township’s Motion for Summary Judgment because Pesci filed well beyond the relevant statute of limitations, did not have a binding contract with the Township, and failed to proffer sufficient evidence that would allow a reasonable finder of fact to rule in her favor at trial.  Similarly, this Court should affirm that decision and dismiss this appeal with prejudice.
[brief] Da215-218  Additional documents submitted by Certification responding to Plaintiff’s newly submitted documents as per Court Order Denying Motion in Limine (Da214) outside of Board Record, to address claim that no Zoning/site Plan regulation were in place in the 1960’s (documents identified as CM-8, CM-9 and CM-10 in [...] Trial Appendix/Statement above (submitted 9/20/22 with Trial Brief)
[brief] Email between in house counsel regarding outside counsel’s chronology and assessment of lawsuit against [...].  RFP 2 requests communications other than those with counsel regarding contracts between [...] and [...].  RFP 12-14 seek documents regarding [...]’s solo bid proposals and [...]’s initial solo bids.  RFP 18 seeks communications between [...] and [...].  As such, RFP 2, 12-14, and 18 are not relevant with regard to this document.
[brief] • No opinion that the allegedly dangerous condition was caused or exacerbated by the performance of the subject road widening project.  • No discussion of the contractual obligations of [...] or any other party with respect to the Project.  • No identification of the independent responsibilities of each defendant as they relate to the alleged cause(s) of plaintiff’s accident.  •  No articulation of the standard of care governing [...]’s provision of professional services associated with the Project or any deviation therefrom.  •  No support for the position that [...] had any level of awareness, actual or constructive, of the pre-existing roadway condition prior to the date of the plaintiff’s accident.  •  No discussion of the status of the Project at the time of plaintiff’s accident or analysis as to whether any pre-accident work had been performed at or anywhere near the asserted location of plaintiff’s accident.  (Pa004).  **Deposition Testimony of [...]**
[brief] On a rainy December 8, 2021, just after 9:00 p.m., [...] was working a four-hour extra-duty detail like Click-It-or-Ticket or Drive-Sober-or-Get-Pulled-Over in Point Pleasant Beach, on patrol southbound on Sea Avenue—that part of Route 35 between the railroad tracks, past the Ark Restaurant, to Ocean Avenue, a north-south road that intersects with Route 35.  South of this intersection, Route 35 becomes Ocean Avenue.  Traffic was very light off-season in this resort town.  Vehicle in Motion.  [...] turned left from Sea Avenue southbound onto Ocean Avenue northbound and saw a dark sedan heading south on Ocean Avenue about to pass.  7T10-19/22.  [...] was about to loop back from where he came, when, through his sideview mirror, he saw the sedan about 100 feet behind him turn left against the red traffic light to continue on that part of Route 35 that is Ocean Avenue.  7T12-18/14-2, 38-9/19, 80-16/22.  [...] turned around, followed the sedan, activated his overhead lights, and watched the sedan activate its turn signal, pull over with control, and come to rest parallel to the curb.  7T38-20/40-7.  While the alleged infraction occurred in Point Pleasant Beach, the sedan pulled over in Bay Head.  7T15-18/22.  There were no other infractions (7T15-15/17), only going through the red light (7T40-8/12).  During this phase, the only vehicle’s present were the sedan, [...]’s patrol vehicle, and that of another officer who arrived on the scene after the motor vehicle stop.
[directive] Probable of Affidavit of Submission  Electronic 5.1.1 implement and AOC develop work the shall to with Justice Criminal of Division  The electronically Cause filed of be Probable to Affidavit an allow that procedures practices and supplement to and for application acomplaint-warrant an support to system eCDR the through complaint- for officer applying enforcement the law the by oath under made statements oral any to officer allowing the acheck-box include shall Cause Probable of Affidavit  The warrant.  aware acknowledging is that affiant and the true, are Affidavit the in statements the that certify punishment.  her or him to subject would statements false willfully filing that and facts of description relevant concise shall a include Cause Probable of Affidavit  The that and committed was the offenses) that believe to cause probable support that circumstances to as statement concise shall a include Affidavit
[brief] Caviglia v. Royal Tours of Am., 178 N.J. 460, 477 (2004).  The overarching purpose of the DACCA from 1960 until the present, has been to protect consumers from abusive and exploitative practices of unscrupulous debt adjusters.  Such protective legislation is considered remedial and should be construed liberally to give effect to its remedial goal.  See Shelton v. Restaurant.com, Inc., 214 N.J. 419, 442 (2013) (holding the Truth in Consumer Contracting Act is remedial despite punitive elements because it was “enacted to curb some specific conduct or practice” to the benefit of New Jersey citizens).
[brief] Pursuant to R. 2:6-2(b), and R. 2:6-4(a), this letter reply brief is submitted on behalf of the Plaintiff/Appellant [...].  TABLE OF CONTENTS  Legal Arguments:  I.  [...]’s contention that it is Common Knowledge that a Consumer Opening an Account knows he is signing a Contract with the Bank is not supported by the record or the law ...........................................  1  II.  The Scope of the Arbitration Clause as described in the Application is not superceded by the Deposit Agreement ........ 6 III.  It is in the Public Interest to Consider the Issue of whether the Bank has a Good Faith Duty under the UCC to provide copies of Documents to its Customers when signed ...............  9  Conclusion .................................................................  11
[brief] (1T48:23-25).  E.  Testimony and Report of Petitioner’s Expert, [...]  Petitioner’s medical expert, [...], is Board Certified in orthopedics and a certified independent medical examiner.  (2T5:12-18).  He served as a PFRS examiner in orthopedics for approximately 3 ½ years, a role that ended more than ten years ago.  (2T5:19-62).  Dr. Weiss has no longer performs surgery and has not done in more than a decade.  Miller v. Public Employee’s Retirement System, 2014 N.J. Super. Unpub. Lexis 1917, 10 (App. Div. 2014) [RA-4 Exhibit A].  Dr. Weiss has previously been recognized as an expert in orthopedics by the courts of New Jersey, including the OAL, and was qualified by the ALJ as an expert in orthopedics in this matter.  (2T6:2-6; 9:2-6).  Dr. Weiss examined Petitioner on September 20, 2016 and provided no medical treatment to him.  (2T9:7-8; 25).  He prepared an expert narrative report dated September 20, 2016 in which he makes no mention of Petitioner’s 2000, 2004 or 2009 accidents.  (Pa1440170).
[brief] There are two controlling statutes in this case that need to be properly analyzed in order to decide the factual and legal disputes in this case.  The proper statute this Board should have considered was N.J.S.A.43:15A-8.  This statute, restoration of members discontinued from service, states in relevant part, “If a member of the retirement system has been discontinued from service without personal fault or through leave of absence granted by an employer or permitted by any law of this state not withdrawn the accumulated members contributions from the retirement system, the membership of that member may continue, notwithstanding any provisions of this act if the member returns to service within a period of ten years from the date of discontinuance of service. ”  N.J.S.A. 43:15-8(a).  This statute does not differentiate between a layoff, or any other separation permitted by any law of the state.  The Board’s focus here was on the application of N.J.S.A. 43:15A-25.2 which eliminated the ability to hold multiple pension status for members who entered the pension system after May 22, 2010.
[brief] He is referred to as [...], given his role as attorney and scrivener of the will during the time relevant to this matter.  beneficiary, “that’s how things should be between spouses. ” (7T118:15-22).  Decedent also stated on multiple occasions that any money she left for Respondent would be placed in a trust, given Respondent’s history with money and her romantic relationships with drug addicts and criminals.  (7T 178:16-22; 7T180:12 to 181:9; 7T189:17-22).  In 2005, at the age of 25, Respondent quit her job in New York, moved into the Home and entered a romantic liaison with [...], who had a bad reputation in the community due to his involvement in narcotics and a jail record.
[brief] Statutes N.J.S.A. 1:1–1 ............................................................................................................................39 N.J.S.A. 17:29A-7 .....................................................................................................................40 N.J.S.A. 17:29A-46 ...................................................................................................................40 N.J.S.A. 17:29AA-10 ...............................................................................................................40 N.J.S.A. 17:48C-21 ...................................................................................................................40 N.J.S.A. 17:48F-5 .....................................................................................................................40 N.J.S.A. 17B:27E-1 to -13 .......................................................................................................7 N.J.S.A. 17B:27E-11 ..............................................................................................................5, 22, 23, 35 Other Authorities
[brief] It’s the same rulebook for everyone. ”  T11:8-9.  The Plaintiff also cites to the unreported case of Fehr v. Algard, 2011 WL 13670.  The Plaintiff spends a lot of time talking about this case and how important it is because he says that it proves that “the defendant’s offer of a prize for a fishing tournament created a contract with the Plaintiff when he paid his entry fee. ”
[brief] There is no law in New Jersey that requires a private employer to close or release employees from work due to a state of emergency being declared, nor did the State of New Jersey instruct private employers to close their businesses, due to the State of Emergency.  Defendants also attempted to argue that Plaintiff should have been on notice of the dangerous and hazardous roadways and complied with [...]’s declarations and warnings to avoid travel.  However, on March 8, 2018, Plaintiff drove forty-eight miles from [...] to work in [...], New Jersey, without any accident or difficulty.  (6T16:21-24).  The so called “dangerous and hazardous roadways” that Defendants claim Plaintiff was warned about from the State of Emergency notice was not the cause of her injuries, it was Defendants’ failure to properly clear, treat, and inspect the area to prevent the icy condition that Plaintiff encountered when she fell in the parking lot of [...].
[brief] The unambiguous language of the Ricci Act provides:  A member or retiree shall not be eligible for the presumption or recalculation under this subsection unless within two years of the effective date of this act, P.L.2019, c.157, the member or retiree files a written and sworn statement with the retirement system on a form provided by the board of trustees thereof indicating the dates and locations of service.  [L. 2019, c. 157 (codified at N.J.S.A. 53:5A-10(e)(4)).]  Thus, under the plain language of the statute [...] is ineligible for the presumption or recalculation provided under the Ricci Act because he failed to file by July 8, 2021.  Further, while New Jersey pension statutes are construed liberally because of their remedial character, *Geller v. Dep’t of Treasury*, 53 N.J. 591, 597-98 (1969), “an employee has only such rights and benefits as are based upon and within the scope of the provisions of the statute.
[brief] As the Rule provides, the extension “shall” be granted on “good cause” shown where there is no trial or arbitration date scheduled.  There was no trial or arbitration date scheduled when plaintiffs moved to name [...] as their expert, when [...] issued his August 27, or even when [...] denied reconsideration on November 12.  [...] did not cite or apply this good cause standard.  The record before [...] showed there was more than sufficient good cause to grant an extension to permit plaintiffs to name [...] as their expert.  As counsel stressed to [...], plaintiffs retained [...] to address the qualification and credentialing problems that defendant raised against [...].  There was no trial or arbitration date scheduled, and the discovery deadlines were weeks away, see Leitner v. Toms River Reg'l Sch., 392 N.J. Super. 80 (App. Div. 2007) ("absence of an arbitration or trial date at the time of the trial judge's ruling is of critical significance in a court's exercise of its discretion to extend discovery"); Ponden, 374 N.J. Super. 9 ("raison d'etre" of Best Practices "was to render trial dates meaningful"; "enforcement or relaxation of discovery end dates" thus "chiefly governed by the presence of an existing trial or arbitration date and whether the late discovery can be completed without jeopardizing the arbitration or trial date.")
[directive] Statute Charge Description Degree  Bail Range  10%  Cash Bail Option  Distributing, Dispensing or Possessing CDS with Actor distributes, dispenses or possesses with the intent to distribute CDS while on or within 2C:35-7  Intent to Distribute 3rd Degree $15,000 to $35,000  10% permissible 1000 feet of school property or while on a school bus.  Near or On School Property or School Bus Distributing, 2nd Degree $25,000 to $50,000  No 10%  Dispensing or Actor distributes, dispenses or possesses with the intent to distribute CDS while on or within Possessing CDS with 500 feet of public property.  Public property means public park, public housing facility or 2C:35-7.1  Intent to Distribute public building; second degree unless CDS is less then 1 ounce of marijuana; then third  Within 500 feet of degree.  Certain Public 3rd Degree  $10,000 to $25,000  10% permissible Property 71  Updated December 2, 2013  Bail Schedule 2  STATUTES WHERE BAIL MAY BE SET BY A SUPERIOR COURT JUDGE OR A MUNICIPAL COURT JUDGE OR, IN THE MUNICIPAL COURT JUDGE’S ABSENCE, THE MUNICIPAL COURT ADMINISTRATOR OR DEPUTY COURT ADMINISTRATOR, PURSUANT TO RULE 3:26-2 requires warrants