ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] (13T64-1 to 7).  At one point during the evening, [...] noticed that the music stopped and then resumed after which he heard that “a situation” had gone on.  (13T61-17 to 24).  [...] was advised that there was a disturbance/fight going on inside but by the time he and one of his security aides got inside to investigate, the disturbance was over, and attendees were leaving.
[brief] N.J.S.A. 39:6A-8(a).  Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 39:6A-8(a), an insured who makes this selection may maintain an action for noneconomic losses only if she "has sustained a bodily injury which results in death; dismemberment; significant disfigurement or significant scarring; displaced fractures; loss of a fetus; or a permanent injury within a reasonable degree of medical probability, other than scarring or disfigurement."
[brief] D.  Public policy also favors affirming the Trial Court’s dismissal of this action.  Public Policy also supports the decision of the Trial Judge.  It is in the public interest for the Court’s to preside over litigate cases in which the real party in interest is before the Court.  For example, settlement is more likely if the parties with a stake in the outcome are before the Court.  Plaintiff correctly cited to some of the public policy concerns as noted by the Court in Goodley v. Wank & Wank, 62 Cal. App. 3d. 389 (2nd Dist 1976).  The Court in Goodley noted that legal malpractice actions should not be open for sale on the "marketplace and convert it to a commodity to be exploited and transferred to economic bidders who have never had a professional relationship with the attorney and to whom the attorney has never owed a legal duty, and who have never had any prior connection with the assignor of his rights."  Yet the Assignment Agreement with [...] even provided to him the right to sell the Collateral (ie the Focazio v. Aboyoun lawsuit).  The relevant Paragraph provided; “If PLEDGER fails to make any payment to Lender in reduction of the Liabilities when due, Lender may seize, sell or otherwise dispose of any or all of the Collateral at any time and from time to time at public or private sale”.  This public interest is why litigants must have standing to bring an action in Court.
[brief] ’ ”  Dkt. 298 at 8 (quoting Dkt. 491 at ¶ 433).  *18  Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 25, refers to something completely different—[Redacted].  [...] Decl., Ex. 5 (Dep. of [...]), 194:13-18; see also Integritymessageboards.com v. [...], No. 18-cv-05286-PJH, 2021 WL 3771785 at *2-3 (describing “Partner Categories” as part of [...]’s “Ads Manager website interface. ”)  As [...]’s 30(b)(6) deponent testified, [Redacted], and Exhibit 25 does not show otherwise.  [...] Decl., Ex. 5 at 200:4-16.  In fact, Plaintiffs’ complaint expressly distinguishes “data brokers” from “business partners,” describing “data brokers” as parties with which [...] worked to collect data about users for “psychographic marketing” and “targeted advertising. ”  Compare Dkt. 491 at ¶ 433, with id. at ¶¶ 16, 263–69, 718, 800.  Consistent with those allegations, [Redacted], and [...] made clear that Plaintiffs’ targeted advertising and “psychographic marketing” allegations would not move forward.  See Dkt. 298 at 6.  The parties are separately litigating Plaintiffs’ overbroad view of the “business partner” theory; if the Special Master is inclined to find the portions of Exhibit 25 that Plaintiffs cite relevant, [...] respectfully requests the Special Master to refrain from doing so without the benefit of [...]’s full briefing on this issue, which it will submit on October 13.
[brief] Pa130-31.  At their depositions [...] and [...] both testified that they did not believe their execution of the Lease created any personal guaranty on their part that guaranteed the obligations of [...] under the Lease and that Plaintiff never told them that a personal guaranty was required under the lease.  Deposition of [...] 10:16-21, (Pa 132), 13:25-14:13 (Pa 133-34); Deposition of [...] 21:5-11 (Pa135).  On April 11, 2016, [...], on behalf of [...] issued correspondence to Plaintiff that [...] was terminating the lease of [...], effective 30 days from the date of Plaintiffs receipt of the notice.
[brief] THERE WAS NO PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT AT DEFENDANT’S TRIAL.  Defendant argues that the assistant prosecutors (APs) below engaged in numerous instances of misconduct which deprived him of a fair trial.  To the contrary, the APs committed no error at, let alone error warranting a new trial.  Emotions run high in all criminal trials, but this is especially true in a trial, like this one, where a 16-year-old murdered four members of his immediate family.
[brief] Before 2022, [...] had not threatened to terminate Appellants’ distribution rights.  [...] also requested a plan to cure Appellants’ deficiencies.  (Pa76-Pa79.)  Appellants declined, and instead sued.  Yet Sapporo continued to supply Appellants with beer.  [...] also advised Appellants “that it is in all parties’ interest to end their dispute” and that [...] would “continue to operate under the Wholesaler Agreement. ”  (Da77.)  As to Appellants’ damages claim, they do not articulate either in their brief or their Complaint any damages that they have suffered from [...]’s threatened termination of the Wholesaler Agreement.
[brief] Instead, [...] took title to both the real estate and the improvements thereon, after negotiating a separate deal with the fee owner.  The surreptitious closing of that transaction took place mere months after [...] advised Plaintiff that [...] could not perform its obligations and just weeks after [...]’s representative falsely advised Plaintiff the transaction was “on hold” and that she would keep Plaintiff posted as to any scheduled closing.  There would have been no reason for Defendants’ deception if, as they later argued, Plaintiff’s right to specific performance had terminated with the return of the Deposit.  Plaintiff filed this action, seeking specific performance of the PSA as against [...] and asserting other contractual and common law claims.  Defendants each moved separately to dismiss the Complaint with prejudice, pursuant to N.J. Ct. R. 4:6-2(e).
[brief] The [...] claims that they intended to review [...]’s records, once out of his control, for redactions, and now asserts that their interests were aligned.  On one hand, the [...] now asserts that [...] “was not required to expend money, take time off work, enter a defense, or participate in the proceedings in any manner. ” (Rb13).  But at the time of the GRC proceedings, [...] was explicitly told that he was not represented by special counsel, and that the “recent Interim Order of the [GRC] was directed towards [him] individually, and [he was] responsible for making sure [he complied] with their orders and filing deadlines. ” (Ibid.).  The [...] cannot have it both ways.  The [...] quotes the Tort Claims Act to support its denial of indemnification based on its permissive language.  Even assuming the question of indemnification under the Tort Claims Act applied here, it was an abuse of discretion for the [...] to deny indemnification.  [...] has been dragged into this morass solely because the [...] failed to obtain the records from [...] when he was a Commissioner and held them pending further orders of the GRC.  Common law identification also applies here.  As the [...] stated, “[t]he officer must have been acting in a matter in which the [municipal] corporation has an interest, he must have been acting in the discharge of a duty imposed or authorized by law and he must have acted in good faith. ”  Cobb v. City of Cape May, 113 N.J. Super. 598, 601 (Law Div. 1971).
[directive] Prosecutor's Office: Defendant's Attorney: Name Name --------------- ---------------  Address Address ---------- Telephone Number Telephone Number ---------- ---------------- Fax Fax ---------------- Em ail ---------------  Em ail --------------- _________  If yes, language _ Interpreter needed? Yes No ________  ADA accommodation needed?  If Yes No yes, describe _ D Contact List attached  Form Promulgated Directive #21-20 (08/05/2020), CN 12562 (KROL Order 7) by Couns  New Jersey  New Jersey Judiciary Contact List  Krol Order  lndependence•lntegrity  Falmeu•OtulltyService of In the Matter - Select County - County  Defendant's Attorney: Prosecutor: Name Name ---------  Telephone Number Telephone Number ---------  Em  Em ail ail  Provider Agency: Name ---------------------------  Provider Agency CEO ----------------------------  Telephone Number Em ail Court Contact: Name Title  ----------------------------  Telephone Number  Em ail by Form Promulgated Directive #21-20 (08/05/2020), CN 12562 (KROL Order 7)  Attachment I Order 8 - Mandating the Continued Conditional of Release
[brief] Louisville & Nashville R. Co. v. Mottley, supra; Country of Luxembourg ex rel. Ribeiro v. Canderas, supra; Gilbert v. Gladden, supra; Baker v. Carr, supra.  There also was no proof of personal service in the court nor did Defendant acknowledge receipt of a Pre-Action letter after the case was dismissed.  Next, Plaintiff repeats the trial court’s erroneous statement that R 4:4-4 and 4:4-5 read together give the special civil part authority to serve a complaint by an out of state mailing.
[brief] (Da 1-4)  On January 10, 2018, [...] appeared before the Hon. [...], J.S.C., for a hearing on his motion to change the venue.  (1T 3-19 to 13-21)  The court denied his motion.  (1T 13-22 to 16-25; Da 5)  [...] appeared for a first trial from January 17, 2018 – February 7, 2018.  (3T – 15T)  The jury deliberated for 7 days (9T – 15T), beginning on January 30, 2018.  (9T 158-17 to 19)  On February 7, 2018, the court determined that the jury was unable to reach a verdict on any of the eleven counts, and declared a mistrial.  (15T 7-13 to 9-5)  [...] appeared for a second trial from May 1-9, 2019.  (21T – 28T)  On May 9, 2019, the jury convicted him on all counts except counts nine and ten.  (28T 95-1 to 96-14; Da 6-9; Da 157-160)\(^1\)  On July 19, 2019, [...] imposed multiple maximum consecutive terms.  (29T 55-1 to 8; Da 6-9)  He imposed a prison term of life with a 75-year parole disqualifier for first-degree murder.  (29T 55-11 to 14)  He imposed a consecutive prison term of 20 years with a No Early Release Act 85 percent parole disqualifier for first-degree robbery.  (29T 55-20 to 24)  He imposed a consecutive prison term of 10 years with a No Early Release Act 85 percent parole disqualifier for second-degree burglary.  (29T 55-15 to 19)  He imposed a consecutive prison term of 1.5 years for fourth-degree possession of a serrated knife.  (29T 55-25 to 56-4)  The remaining counts merged.  (29T 52-23 to 53-18)  In aggregate, the court thus imposed a prison sentence of life plus 31.5 years, with a parole disqualifier of 100.5 years.  (29T 56-10 to 11; Da 6-9)  On December 5, 2020, [...] filed a notice of appeal.  (Da 10-13)  \(^1\)  [...] was acquitted only of possessing a straight edge knife during the offense.  (28T 96-6 to 11)  STATEMENT OF FACTS
[brief] In assessing whether the Commission’s decision is arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable, a court examines the following: (1)  Whether the agency’s action violates express or implied legislative policies, that is, did the agency follow the law; (2) Whether the record contains substantial evidence to support the findings on which the agency based its action; and (3)  Whether in applying the legislative policies to the facts, the agency clearly erred in reaching a conclusion that could not reasonably have been made on a showing of the relevant factors.
[brief] It is irrelevant to the “well-settled right” test whether (or how frequently) the Attorney General has sought to enjoin other parental-notification policies, or what the alleged current state of the “ongoing social discourse” on these topics may be.  (Db13; 16).  Neither has any bearing on whether New Jersey’s LAD provides a clear source of law that undergirds these claims.  (And even were it relevant, Appellants do not identify a single similar parental-notification policy that met with Division approval.)  Nor do Appellants’ repeated emphasis on cases evaluating parental-notification policies in other jurisdictions, (Db14-16), bear on whether there is a settled right under the LAD to be free from discrimination in public accommodations, such as schools, and whether there is a well-settled path for the Attorney General and Director to vindicate that right.  Indeed, none of Appellants’ cases involved the LAD; some did not involve any state-law anti-discrimination claims, see Willey v. Sweetwater Cty. Sch. Dist., No. 23-69, 2023 WL 4297186 (D. Wyo. June 30, 2023) (Ra26-48); and others even rejected Appellants’ views, see John & Jane Parents, 622 F. Supp. 3d at 130.  These cited cases at most speak to Appellants’ purported defense that an injunction would interfere with the parents’ federal substantive due process rights—an argument that goes only to the reasonable-success prong, and which fails for the reasons below.  See infra at 30-40.
[brief] However, no statement of reasons or findings indicating what facts were relied upon by the Court that reflected an “appearance of impropriety. ”  In essence, it is not clear from the Order why or upon what supporting grounds the matter was transferred.  Nevertheless, this Court has mandated that when the trial court intends to transfer venue, sua sponte, it “should provide the parties with five-days’ notice of its intention and an opportunity to be heard.  If there is an objection, the judge should conduct a hearing, explaining, to the extent [‘]practicable,[’] the judiciary employee’s, or his or her family member’s, involvement in the matter, and the job functions of that employee that create particularized reasons why a remedy short of transfer is impracticable.
[brief] SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY  APPELLATE  DIVISION  DOCKET NO. [...]  On Appeal  From: SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY LAW  DIVISION, CIVIL PART MORRIS COUNTY  DOCKET NO.: [...]  Hon. [...], J.S.C.  Civil Action  BRIEF OF APPELLANTS, [...] AND [...], INDIVIDUALLY, AND AS ADMINISTRATRIX  AD PROSEQUENDUM ON BEHALF OF [...] [...]
[brief] See, In re Weeks, 29 N.J. Super. at 541-542.  The circumstances that existed in October 2014, when the Decedent was making the 2014 will, is precisely the time period that was the subject of [...]’s testimony.  The Court’s disregard of [...]’s testimony was erroneous as a matter of law as her testimony established the manner in which Respondent dominated and controlled the Decedent from the time she moved next door in 2013, until she moved out of the home in 2019.  See Petitioner’s Brief In Support of Appeal at pages 12-14.  Other material facts that the Court disregarded was that the 2014 Will was made only 13 days from the date that the Brigantine Times published that the Brigantine Police had arrested [...], Respondent’s longtime partner and the father of her two sons, and charged him with theft and credit card theft.  (P546a; 7T186:16-18).
[brief] [4T 198:7-12].  He “recall[ed] grout being all over me.  It was on my upper and lower body, because I had a jacket \(^3\)  At his deposition, [...] testified the bag of grout ripped in [...]’s hands and he did not believe the bag left [...]’s hands.  [5T 11:4-20]. and pants or shorts on, and it was on me. ”  [4T 204:3-12].  He further testified that his clothes became a mess when he went outside because it was raining.  [4T 205:8-20].  But [...] admitted he did not observe any grout on him when he reviewed the video, something which he could not explain.
[brief] Prior to filing the action, Relator disclosed to the State: (a) how Defendants failed to comply with their obligations as RMAs and acted with scienter; (b) the nature of the data and the analysis by which it identified the fraud; (c) why Defendants’ conduct was fraudulent; and (d) the extent of the harm.  Ja1975-76; Ja1982.  This disclosure was more than sufficient.  See also Ja2175-76 (¶¶ 206, 209), Ja3039-40 (¶ 19).
[brief] [Aa132-Aa136; Aa532-Aa539.]  New Jersey takes a liberal approach to standing with regard to the review of administrative actions, affording it to anyone who is affected or aggrieved in fact by that decision.  In re Issuance of Access Conforming Lot Permit No. A-17-N-N040-2007, 417 N.J. Super. 115, 126 (App. Div. 2010).  Thus, “owners of other properties in the vicinity of a property for which a permit or other land use approval has been granted may appeal the approval. ”  Id.  Here, Appellant alleges that its property and associated riparian rights will be negatively impacted by the [...]’s grant of the 2019 WFD permit modification.  Therefore, Appellant has standing to appeal that decision.
[brief] *N.J.S.A.* 2A:18-61.2; *Hodges v. Sasil Corp.*, 189 N.J. 210, 221, 915 A.2d 1 (2007).  The Forcible Entry and Detainer Act (Act), *N.J.S.A.* 2A:39-1 to -8, provides, in relevant part:  No person shall enter upon or into any real property . . . and detain and hold the same, except where entry is given by law, and then only in a peaceable manner.  With regard to any real property occupied solely as a residence by the party in possession, such entry shall not be made in any manner without the consent of the party in possession unless the entry and detention is made pursuant to legal process .  . . .  *N.J.S.A.* 2A:39-1.
[brief] **STATEMENT OF FACTS**  **A.  [...] Is “At Home”  In New Jersey**  [...] is a foreign limited liability partnership established in Delaware and headquartered in Texas.  It maintains twenty different offices (including internationally and in New Jersey) and employs hundreds of attorneys.  “[...] is a premier full-service Am Law 100 law firm that has earned a solid reputation for complex litigation, regulatory and transactional work on behalf of clients in important and growing industry sectors around the world. ”  Da298–302.  Two [...] partners, [...], Esq., and [...], Esq., were served in New Jersey.  Furthermore, [...] has designated [...] as its agent for service of process in New Jersey, which was also properly served in this matter.  Da304–08.  [...] has maintained a New Jersey office for dozens of years – first in Morristown, then Princeton, then Newark.  Da208.  In 2016, thirty-one [...] attorneys were admitted to practice law in New Jersey.  Da211.  [...] has filed both income and payroll taxes in New Jersey from 2009 to the present.  Da206.  In 2016, while Defendants represented Plaintiff, [...] had twenty-seven clients providing New Jersey addresses – a figure which is down from a high of eighty-three in 2013.  Da209.  [...] sponsored numerous New Jersey bar events and its New Jersey lawyers received numerous in-state professional honors.  Da208–09.  Further information was sought in jurisdictional discovery, however, [...] refused to provide its LPL policies, total New Jersey payroll, number of New Jersey leasehold parking spaces, or a list of New Jersey litigation in which it was a party.  Da206–07.
[brief] 31 Willis v. Department of Conservation & Economic Development, 55 N.J. 534 (1970) ...............................................................................................  14  Wilson ex rel. Manzano v. City of Jersey City, 209 N.J. 558 (2012) ...............................................................................................  12  Wilson v. Jacobs, 334 N.J. Super. 640 (App. Div. 2000) ..................................................................  30  Statutes
[brief] Id. (citing State v. Reddish, 181 N.J. 553 (2004)).  See also State v. Figueroa, 186 N.J. 589 (2006) (holding that the decision “to grant a defendant the opportunity to represent himself in part and be represented by counsel in part rests in the sound discretion of the trial court. ”)  In order to ensure that defendant’s waiver is knowing, the court should make credibility determinations and ask appropriate open-ended questions.  Id.  “Waiver of the right to counsel ‘depends in each case upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case including background, experience and conduct of the accused. ’”  State v. Thomas, 362 N.J. Super. 229, 236 (App. Div. 2003).  A court has the right to terminate the defendant’s right to self-representation if it becomes apparent that the defendant is manipulating the court or engaging in misconduct.  Faretta, supra, 422 U.S. at 834 n.46.
[brief] See DA108.  On June 17, 2021, Plaintiff formally appealed the [...]’s May 26, 2021 determination to the [...] (“[...]” or “[...]”).  See DA114.  Thereafter, on August 10, 2021 the [...] affirmed the denial on the grounds that the terms of the Agreement rendered Plaintiff ineligible for IOD retirement pursuant to N.J.S.A. 43:16A-8(2).  See DA116-DA117.  Specifically, the [...] noted that the return to work provision and all other provisions providing that Plaintiff’s resignation is “final” and “irrevocable” rendered him ineligible for IOD retirement.  Ibid.  On August 30, 2021, Plaintiff requested an appeal of the [...]’s denial of IOD application which it granted on October 4, 2021.  See DA121-DA122.  On October 22, 2021, Plaintiff’s counsel authored an email correspondence to the Township requesting “a redraft” of certain provisions of the Separation Agreement.  See DA124.  On November 5, 2021, the Township advised Plaintiff that it would not amend the Separation Agreement.  See DA126.  On January 27, 2022, Plaintiff notified the Township that he would file suit seeking amendment and/or severance of the Separation Agreement if the Township did not agree to amend same.  See DA128-DA129.  The Township replied to Plaintiff on February 11, 2022, reiterating that the Parties mutually bargained for and agreed that Plaintiff’s resignation was irrespective of the outcome of his IOD application.  See DA131-DA133.  On April 21, 2022, the Office of Administrative Law ordered, upon Plaintiff’s request, that his matter be placed on the inactive list.  See DA216-DA217.  Plaintiff filed his initial Complaint in the Law Division on April 20, 2022 under the Docket Number [...].
[brief] [...]: Judge, I'd like to speak to him privately but I would just like to address one other issue.  So basically what [...] said and so that [...] understands it, that if in fact he was to prevail here at the homicide trial the next case would put him in jeopardy of, in essence, getting something perhaps even worse than a 30 do 30 because of his status as a persistent offender.  He then would have to go to Pennsylvania and face whatever charges he has to face there without the benefit of having any involvement of the State to try to make a global deal here today that we're talking about, so that would be two issues.  And then, obviously, if he was to be convicted of the homicide charge certainly the Court can sentence him up to 75 years in jail, which is essentially life.  So Judge, just so he's aware of that and what I would like to do is if I could just have a couple of minutes to speak with him, Your Honor, before he answers in open court and this way I understand exactly where he's coming from.
[directive] Pena máxima prevista / Statutory Maximum No da Denúncia/ Acusação/Processo Acusação Natureza do crime  Grau Tempo Multa Taxa  VCCO* Ind./Acc./Comp.# Count  Nature of Offense  Degree Time Fine  VCCO Assmt*  Máx/Max Máx/Max Máx/Max Máx/Max Máx/Max Total/Total  Sua exposição total como resultado desta Declaração Judicial é:  Your total exposure as the result of this plea is: