ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] (Pb9).  In Ensslin, a police officer had been terminated from service and the subsequent action he brought against his employer under the Law Against Discrimination was ultimately dismissed.  Ensslin, 311 N.J. Super. at 334.  After the LAD litigation, Ensslin applied for Ordinary Disability Retirement Benefits but the [...], determined he was ineligible as he was not a member in service at the time.  Ibid.  The [...] found that under N.J.S.A. 43:16A-3(3), PFRS membership ceases “if more than 2 years have elapsed from the date of [the member’s] last contributions,” and under N.J.S.A. 43:16A-6(1) an application must be made “by a member in service” or on his behalf.  Ensslin, 311 N.J. Super. at 335.  This court reversed the Board, holding “that the two-year standard of N.J.S.A. 43:16A-3(3) is not jurisdictional, especially in the circumstances presented” in the particular matter.
[brief] On September 7, 2016, Plaintiffs filed their complaint with the Law Division in Atlantic County.  (Pa1550 at ¶ 14).  [...] was not a party to this action until nearly two years later when Plaintiffs filed their December 7, 2018, third amended complaint, joining [...] as a defendant.  (Pa1650 at ¶ 15).  On May 17, 2019, Plaintiffs amended their complaint a fourth time to add [...] as a defendant.  (Pa1698).  In their fourth amended complaint, Plaintiffs assert claims against [...] for professional negligence, loss of consortium, and negligent infliction of emotional distress.  (Pa1650).  Specifically, Plaintiffs allege that [...] failed to exercise reasonable care, breaching the standard of care applicable to construction inspectors by failing to: • “inspect and maintain the subject location and/or caused the defect” that caused [...] to lose control of his motorcycle; • “conduct reasonable and timely inspections of the roadway”; and • “correct the dangerous condition” where the accident occurred.  (Pa1651-52 at ¶¶ 7, 10, 11).  Plaintiffs maintain that [...]’s breach was the proximate cause of [...]’s motorcycle accident and resulting injuries.  (Pa1652 at ¶ 13).  Plaintiffs served an affidavit of merit supporting their professional negligence claim against [...].  (Pa362).  D.
[brief] [1T8:22-10:9]  Having heard no basis to reverse the arbitrator, [...] concluded:  THE COURT:  All right.  Again, based on the Court's review of the materials, the Court does not find, that there's not a basis here to disturb this arbitration award.  Notwithstanding the arguments that have been made on behalf of [...], I understand, but it does not appear that the arbitrator failed to take into consideration the appropriate factors that have to be taken into consideration.  The evidence was not presented and the arbitrator cannot consider stuff that was not presented.  So the Motion for Summary Judgment is granted in favor of the defendant and it's denied as to the plaintiff.
[brief] ” (2T19-15 to 19-18).  Indeed, the vacated convictions were just a fraction of his overall criminal history and constituted a minor consideration in the imposition of the sentence by the court.  Moreover, there consists considerable evidence in the record that continues to support the finding of aggravating factor six, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(6), in this case even without the two convictions that were subsequently vacated.  The sentence imposed by [...] continues to remain within the authorized range, in accordance with the law, and pursuant to a global plea resolution.  Further, the defendant failed to present any evidence to establish how the imposition of aggravating factor six was improper in this case and how that in turn made his sentence illegal.  Therefore, this court should affirm the motion court’s order denying the defendant’s motion to correct an illegal sentence.
[directive] 1  Introduction  1.0.1  The purpose of Internal Affairs Policy & Procedures is to assist the State’s law enforcement agencies with investigating and resolving complaints of police misconduct that originate with members of the public or are generated by the supervisors, officers, or employees of a law enforcement agency.  The goals of the policy are to enhance the integrity of the State’s law enforcement agencies, improve the delivery of police services, and assure the people of New Jersey that complaints of police misconduct are properly addressed.  This policy can also be more broadly applied to non-law enforcement employees.  1.0.2  State and federal courts have emphasized the importance of the internal affairs function for protecting the constitutional rights and civil liberties of the State’s residents.  Case law generally requires that law enforcement agencies do three things under the internal affairs function.  First, agencies must implement an internal affairs policy that provides for a meaningful and objective investigation of complaints and other evidence of police misconduct.  Second, agencies must monitor and track the behavior of police officers for incidents of misconduct.  Third, when officers are found to have engaged in misconduct, agencies must correct the behavior.  The courts have with increasing frequency issued decisions that set minimum standards of performance for the internal affairs function.  1.0.3  The New Jersey Legislature also recognized the importance of the internal affairs function in 1996 with the enactment of N.J.S.A. 40A:14-181.  The statute provides that:  Every law enforcement agency shall adopt and implement guidelines which shall be consistent with the guidelines governing the "Internal Affairs Policy and Procedures" of the Police Management Manual promulgated by the Police Bureau of the Division of Criminal Justice in the Department of Law and Public Safety, and shall be consistent with any tenure or civil service laws, and shall not supersede any existing contractual agreements.  1.0.4  In accordance with this mandate, and recognizing that proper administration of internal affairs is a critical priority for the State’s criminal justice system, Attorneys General have periodically issued updated versions of this Internal Affairs Policy & Procedures document through the Division of Criminal Justice.
[brief] TABLE OF AUTHORITIES  ........................................................................................................ ii  TABLE OF SUPPLEMENTAL APPENDIX .................................................................................. iii  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT .................................................................................................  1 LEGAL ARGUMENT ...............................................................................................................  3  I.  A CONFLICT OF INTEREST PREVENTING DEFENDANTS FROM VOTING ON MATTERS RELATING TO [...] DOES NOT EXIST.  (Da89)  .................................................................................................................................  3  II.  PLAINTIFFS DID NOT ALLEGE COMMON LAW  CONFLICTS OF INTEREST OR AMEND THEIR COMPLAINT TO ASSERT  A CAUSE OF ACTION BEYOND THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT  ETHICS LAW (Da16)  ......  6  III.  THIS MATTER CANNOT BE REMANDED TO THE TRIAL COURT TO OBTAIN FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW  BECAUSE THE TRIAL COURT IS WITHOUT SUBJECT MATTER  JURISDICTION (Da3)  ...........................................................................................................................................  9  CONCLUSION ..........................................................................................................................  11  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
[brief] (Da2154)  The Court should have considered the lack of any stated reason from the arbitrator why the final hearing needed to occur sooner than the requested 45 days.  It should also have considered the breadth of the Plaintiffs’ motion for final relief, which obtained $1.1 million in damages and expulsion of [...] from [...].  All of that juxtaposed against merely 45 days in a 7.5-year-old case, can lead to no other conclusion than the denial of the postponement “impinged on” [...]’s rights to be heard, and was arbitrator “misconduct” that denied [...] the reasonable chance to participate, pursuant N.J.S.A. 2A:24-8c.  Any decision otherwise was an error of law.  (Da3172)  In fact, the Chancery Court’s reliance on *Manchester Township Bd. of Education v. Thomas P. Carney, Inc.*, 199 N.J. Super. 266, 274-275 (App. Div. 1985) should have actually led to a finding in favor of [...] that he had the right to the postponement.  There, the Court vacated an award after the arbitrator denied a chance to present a rebuttal witness.  *Id.* at 270-271.  The Appellate Division affirmed.  *Id.* at 272, “the AAA Rules requires a full and equal opportunity to the Parties for the presentation of any material or relevant proofs....  *N.J.S.A.* 2A:24-8c mandates that an award be vacated where the Parties are guilty of misconduct in "refusing to hear evidence, pertinent and material to the controversy . . ."  Case law further holds that the Parties to arbitration are entitled to a full hearing.  There was no discretion to be exercised by the arbitrators whether to permit rebuttal testimony. ”  *Id.* at 274-275 (emph. added).  Where vacatur has been required for merely the denial of a rebuttal witness, it was also required for this Arbitrator’s refusal to permit a short postponement in a case with no urgency so that new counsel could appear and defend a *pro se* party who clearly had trouble expressing his positions.  This Court should reverse the Orders refusing to vacate the Partial Final Award and the Final Award based on arbitrator “misconduct”, and should return the matter for new arbitration hearings on all “Phase II” claims.
[brief] [...] did not acquire fee title to the lands underwater adjacent to Lot 3 in Block 184 via Liber E-82.  The State only conveyed a 330 foot wide parcel of land under water at the east end of the [...] upland property (Lot 3.01).  This is reinforced by the Borough applying for a lease for lands under the water north of the mean highwater line in 1940 shortly after the tax foreclosure.  [...] was aware that he possessed the land underwater north of Lot 3, but subsequent grantees would not have had constructive notice of said Riparian Grant because it was never recorded in the land records in Monmouth County.
[brief] The intent of the parties was for [...] to rescue the Property from foreclosure and bankruptcy by having [...] acquire and hold title to the Property until Plaintiff and her husband could secure financial assistance to repay the loans and advances made by [...], at which point, legal title would then transfer to Plaintiff, and until that title transfer occurred, Plaintiff was entrusted by Defendants to manage the Companies and the Property in the interim.  (Da308, ¶6; Da310-314).
[brief] (4T5-14 to 5-15).  The defendant was also advised that if convicted at trial he faced a mandatory extended term of life without parole.  (4T5-16 to 5-18).  During the hearing, the court asked the State if it would consider any type of counteroffer where the Middlesex County file ran concurrent to the Somerset County Conviction.  Again, the State stated “I would like something in the range of maybe a 30 concurrent. ” (4T9-18 to 9-19).  The court then asked, “A 30 concurrent.  Is your client willing to do a 30 concurrent?” (4T9-20 to 9-21).  To which the defendant himself responded, “No.” (4T9-22).
[brief] See Op. Att'y Gen. No. 27 (September 23, 1955) at 260-62 (county sheriff and his employees should be regarded as county employees).  App. of Burlington Cty. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 99 N.J. 90, 98-99 (N.J. 1985)  Plaintiff’s action in lieu and civil rights complaint challenged action and inaction by the defendants prior to the filing of suit and service of complaint and summons pursuant to R. 4:69 and N.J.S.A. 10:6-2.  [...] is a Municipality.
[brief] [...] ("[...]") is a national coalition of corporations, law firms, and defense trial lawyer organizations that promotes excellence and fairness in the civil justice system to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of civil cases.  Since 1987, [...] has been closely engaged with the Federal Civil Rules Advisory Committee and various state rules committees to: (1) promote balance in the civil justice system; (2) reduce costs and burdens associated with litigation; and (3) advance predictability and efficiency in litigation.  [...]’s members are frequent litigants, often seeking discovery as well as responding to discovery requests.  [...] advocates for procedural rules that are fair and efficient for everyone, regardless of their position in any particular lawsuit.  Of particular relevance to this case, [...] was closely involved in the rulemaking process that developed the 2015 amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  [...] participated in the 2010 Duke Conference,\(^1\) submitted empirical evidence in support of changes to the discovery rules and other material such as White Papers, and participated in all public hearings and Rule \(^1\) See https://www.uscourts.gov/rules-policies/records-and-archives-rules-committees/special-projects-rules-committees/2010-civil (describing 2010 Duke Conference).  Advisory Committee meetings related to the formation, drafting, and vetting of the 2015 rule amendments.  That includes the amendment to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(1), which defines the scope of discovery as being limited to information that is “relevant to any party’s claim or defense” and that is “proportional to the needs of the case. ”  The issue in this case—the centrality of relevance to the scope of discovery under the New Jersey Court Rules—strikes directly at the heart of [...]’s work on the Federal Rule amendments.  [...] has an interest in this case because the trial court’s order is inconsistent with the New Jersey Civil Rules and long-established principles in civil discovery, puts the privacy of parties and nonparties at risk, and vastly increases costs to the judicial system and parties, including many of [...]’s members.
[brief] See *Arafa v. Health Express Corp.*, 233 N.J. 147, 171-72 (2020) (WHL); *Atalese*, 219 N.J. at 446-48 (CFA); *Garfinkel v. Morristown Obstetrics & Gynecology Assocs., P.A.*, 168 N.J. 124, 131-32 (2001) (LAD); *Littman v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter*, 337 N.J. Super. 134, 145-48 (App. Div. 2001) (CEPA).  So, [...]’s argument that the unremarkable forum language in the IFPA and RICO exempts those claims from arbitration is unavailing.
[brief] (See id.).  Via Orders filed March 21, 2022, the Chancery Court granted [...]’s motion to vacate the stay of [...]’s incarceration.  (See id.).  After his emergent applications to this Court and the New Jersey Supreme Court were denied, [...] timely returned to the BCJ on April 1, 2022 and he has remained behind bars for the past 626 days\(^3\) (as of December 18, 2023).  (See id.).  On September 23, 2022, [...] filed a “motion for an award of attorneys’ fees” seeking to require [...] and [...], jointly and severally, to pay all of [...]’s attorneys’ fees in connection with all efforts to collect on the underlying judgment for the period of July 27, 2016\(^4\) to September 7, 2022 (Global Fee Application).
[brief] FINRA’s arbitral rules do not include a rule bestowing upon the arbitrator the power to determine his own jurisdiction.  Da584-Da685.  A fourth case that relied on Raritan concerned a factual disagreement over whether the parties’ contract contained an arbitration clause and did not concern the entire controversy doctrine.  First Tek Techs., Inc. v.  In addition to relying on the Trial Court’s holding in Raritan—which is not applicable given the creation of Rule 9(a) well after that Court’s decision—the Trial Court also distinguished the wording of Rule 7(a) of the AAA Commercial Rules to Rule 8(a) of the AAA Construction Rules (the ones applicable here) to conclude that Rule 8(a)’s omission of a certain phrase means that the parties did not agree that the arbitrator was to decide the issue of arbitrability.  Pa41-Pa42.  Specifically, while Construction Rule 8(a) provides that an arbitrator has the power to rule on his own jurisdiction and notes that that power includes (but is not limited to) the scope of an arbitration agreement, the current Commercial Rule 7(a) adds the phrase “including . . . the arbitrability of any claim or counterclaim. ”  Da544.  However, the inclusion of this phrase in Commercial Rule 7(a) is nondispositive.  The record demonstrates that the Commercial Rules and the Construction Rules were amended at various times and not in tandem.  Da64-Da543.  There is no evidence in the record that the phrasing of one set of rules should have any weight when interpreting the other.  Here, AAA Construction Rule 9 could not be more clear: the arbitrator must determine his own jurisdiction, i.e., whether a claim can be heard in arbitration.  Therefore, the preclusive consequences of the entire controversy doctrine is a question of arbitrability that must be resolved by the arbitrator in matters that are subject to the AAA Rules for construction and commercial cases.
[brief] ”  N.J.S.A. 2A:23B-6(b)  In a 2020 decision, the Third Circuit, the federal circuit court governing New Jersey among other states and jurisdictions, held:  “We join these circuits in adopting the view that, under section 4 of the FAA, courts retain the primary power to decide questions of whether the parties mutually assented to a contract containing or incorporating a delegation provision. ”  MZM Constr. Co., Inc. v. New Jersey Building Laborers Statewide Benefit Funds, 974 F.3d 386, 402 (3d citing, In re: Auto. Parts Antitrust Litig., 951 F.3d 377, 385-86 (6th Cir. 2020); Berkeley Cty. Sch. Dist. v. Hub Int’l Ltd., 944 F.3d 225, 234 (4th Cir. 2019); Lloyd’s Syndicate 457 v. FloaTEC, L.L.C., 921 F.3d 508, 515 (5th Cir. 2019); Nebraska Mach. Co. v. Cargotec Sols., LLC, 762 F.3d 737, 741 & n.2 (8th Cir. 2014)).  The New Jersey Supreme Court has held that “[t]he FAA, however, does not preclude an examination into whether the arbitration agreement at issue is unconscionable under state law. ”  Muhammad v. County Bank of Rehoboth Beach, Delaware, 189 N.J. 1, 12 (2006).  The New Jersey high court continued:
[brief] Given this knowledge, [...] was required to “disclose in the certification [filed in the First Action] the names of any non-party who should be joined in the action . . . because of potential liability to any party on the basis of the same transactional facts. ”  See R. 4:5-1(b)(2).  And [...] had a continuing obligation to amend.  Ibid.  Rule 4:5-1(b)(2) further provides that when there is a failure to comply with this rule, “the court may impose an appropriate sanction including dismissal of a successive action against a party whose existence was not disclosed .
[brief] On March 27, 2023, [...], a dog behavior consultant, observed and evaluated Koda prior to his release from the kennel.  Defendant also asserts that Carson’s observation of Koda, and subsequent report, demonstrates that Koda does not pose a serious threat.  However, the report was ordered by the Municipal Court to determine whether Koda can return home, not whether he poses a serious threat.  In fact, Carson states that she never attempted an off-leash interaction with other dogs during the observation.  It seems obvious that a truly illuminating behavioral assessment would include an assessment of how Koda behaves off-leash, around other dogs.  Carson simply brought Koda outside and watched him run around.  Carson’s brief observation of Koda, and one page report, is not a reliable means to show that Koda is not a serious threat.  Instead, the courts correctly placed greater weight on the fact that Koda has a long history of attacking people and animals, completely unprovoked.  Each victim was merely going about their day when they were attacked by Koda, a large German Shepard.  Therefore, the court had ample evidence (four attacks) to conclude that Koda poses a serious threat of bodily injury or death to a human, and risk of death to a companion animal.
[brief] *Stansbury v. California*, 511 U.S. 318, 325 (1994); see also *O’Neal*, 190 N.J. at 616 (where officer had probable cause to arrest, but had not yet formally arrested defendant, he was still in custody).  Interrogation means “either express questioning or its functional equivalent. ”  *Rhode Island v. Innis*, 446 U.S. 291, 300-01 (1980).  It refers to “words or actions on the part of the police that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect. ”  *Ibid.*  Our Supreme Court has frequently suppressed defendants’ statements under circumstances similar to those in [...]’s case.
[brief] Because the relevant uncontroverted facts establish the challenged Ordinance and Redevelopment Plan as clearly operating to violate the established principles of the Common Law Public Trust Doctrine as more clearly established by the codified Statutory Public Trust Doctrine and DEP Administrative Regulations on February 17, 2022  Plaintiff moved for partial Summary Judgment on the Public Trust Doctrine claims.  That Motion, if granted, would have mooted the remaining claims as invalidating the Redevelopment Plan (Pa224).
[brief] Being remedial in character, statutes creating pensions should be liberally construed and administered in favor of the persons intended to be benefited thereby.  McQuillin, supra, at § 12.143; and see Adams v. City of Modesto, 53 Cal. 2d 833, 3 Cal. Rptr. 561, 566, 350 P.2d 529 (1960); Giuliano v. Bd. of Trustees of Fireman's Pension F., 89 Ill. App. 2d 126, 231 N.E.2d 257, 258 (1967); Flake v. Bennett, 156 N.W.2d 849, 854 (Iowa Sup. Ct. 1968).  Geller v. Department of Treasury, 53 N.J. 591, 597-598.  In Geller v. Department of Treasury, 53 N.J. 591, the Court evaluated a “preponderance of the equities” and “all of the circumstances” to achieve a “just result.
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY ALLOWED DEFENDANT TO INTRODUCE PLAINTIFF’S EXPERTS’ OWN TESTIMONY THAT THE NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, IN RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT REGARDING HER FATHER’S CARE, FOUND NO VIOLATION OF APPLICABLE REGULATIONS.  Plaintiff in moving for a new trial asserts that the trial court erred in allowing defendant to use, in cross examining plaintiff’s experts and in summation, the results of a NJDOH complaint investigation, with no foundation and without presenting the testimony of surveyor [...], thus allowing defendant to introduce the surveyor’s “hearsay” conclusion that the NJDOH found no regulatory deficiencies in connection with [...]’s care in connection with its investigation of [...]’s complaint.
[brief] The obligation to produce exculpatory evidence in a timely manner pursuant to Brady is not diminished by the fact that such evidence also constitutes evidence that must be produced pursuant to other authority.  Indeed, the obligation to produce impeachment material to the defense existed long prior to the United States Supreme Court decision in Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).  See State v. Hunt, 25 N.J. 514, 531 (1958); see also State v. Farmer, 48 N.J. 145, 152 (1966); State v. Pacheco, 38 N.J. 120, 126 (1962).