ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] 1T: TRIAL TRANSCRIPT DATED JULY 25, 2023  2T: TRIAL TRANSCRIPT DATED JULY 26, 2023  3T: TRIAL TRANSCRIPT DATED JULY 27, 2023  4T: TRIAL TRANSCRIPT  DATED JULY 28, 2023  January 10, 2022.  Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint asserted the following causes of action:  Count One – Breach of the Duty of Loyalty  Count Two – Breach of the Duty of Care  Count Three – Common Law Fraud  Count Four – Unjust Enrichment  Count Five – Breach of Contract.  Count Six – Dissolution Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 42:2C-48 Count Seven – Personal Liability  Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 42:2C-39 Count Eight – Conversion Count Nine – Breach of Good Faith and Fair Dealing Count Ten – Promissory Estoppel Count Eleven – Tortious Interference Count Twelve – Negligence Count Thirteen – Declaratory Judgment  Pa772-85.  On January 6, 2022, Defendant filed a motion to quash Plaintiff’s subpoena to [...].  Pa1649-694.  On February 2, 2022, Defendant withdrew her motion to quash and the Court entered a protective order that permitted Plaintiff to obtain from [...] financial information relevant to [...], which Defendant had failed and refused to provide to Plaintiff despite Plaintiff’s discovery demands and entitlement pursuant to the Operating Agreement and LLC Act.  Pa1695-704.  The Honorable [...], J.S.C., presided over a jury trial in this matter from July 24 to July 28, 2023.
[brief] Nor, if such a doctrine did exist, would it apply here.  “De facto,” after all, means “actual” or “existing in fact. ”  See Black’s Law Dictionary 448 (8th Ed. 2004).  Respondent was not the “actual” applicant to the Board; in fact, it was the “actual” opponent of both applications.  To construe the opponent of an application as the “actual” applicant is confounding and nonsensical.
[brief] On August 24, 2020, [...] filed a fee Complaint against [...].  (Da124).  On February 11, 2022, an Order for Judgment was entered by [...] against [...] for in the amount of $141,817.74, plus $25,914.64 in interest, plus attorneys’ fees and costs in the amount of $31,662.26, for a total of $199,394.64.  (Da148).
[brief] (Appellant well remembers listening to the Hon. [...] asking during one of the hearings if the Court hadn’t already decided this matter and why was it in front of the Court a second time for the same issues.)  The net effect of this action so far has resulted in over 400 affordable housing units either being built or scheduled to be built in [...].  Appellant mentions this to point out the potential consequences of not taking the municipal land use process “seriously” (i.e. “No need to implement the Affordable Housing Ordinance – even though it’s required by law – no need to get the Court’s opinion on this .
[brief] “Well, yeah, that’s why we asked them before we empanel them if you know any of these witnesses, names on the witness list.  So, yes, that’s often the times for the Court to excuse jurors. ”  1T30.  Yet, “by not individually asking the other members of the panel you essentially was -- were you – you basically were taking juror 14's word that she didn’t say anything else to the other jury members, right?”  A  That’s correct.  They had no -- I mean she didn’t even have to tell us that she knew this – recognized the name, recognize the name, knew this person, but she came forward to us forthright.  There was no reason to doubt her.  1T30  Q  If you had individually asked the other jurors, right, on the panel, you don’t know what answers you would have gotten in terms of if you would have said, okay, juror one, for example, what did juror 14 say to you about know -- you know, did you – did she say anything about knowing this witness, did she name the witness, what did she say about the witness, did she say anything else about the witness.
[brief] On appeal as at trial, the State relies heavily on their testimony.  As we have noted, in view of Henderson and its progeny, we must be careful not to overstate the value of eyewitness testimony, 208 N.J. at 218, 27 A.3d 872, especially when there are differences in the initial description given of the perpetrator and defendant's actual appearance.  See supra Section II; cf. Branch, 182 N.J. at 353, 865 A.2d 673 (noting the descriptions of the perpetrator by the witnesses “differed markedly from defendant's appearance”).
[brief] (2T).  The trial court failed to grant all summary judgement inferences in favor of the non-movant.  Rule 4:46-2; C.V. v. Waterford Twp. Bd. Of Educ., 255 N.J. 289 (2023)(reversing post-discovery summary judgment in favor of defendant while restating rules and principles governing summary judgment motions); Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am. 142 N.J. 520, 528-29 (1995).
[brief] The matter was remanded to the Trial Court.  (P17a).  On February 29, 2024, Plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment as to the insurance charges owed.  (P29a)  On March 26, 2024, Defendant filed a cross-motion for declaratory relief seeking to bar Plaintiff from filing any future claims against Defendant based upon the landlord/tenant relationship.  (P76a)  Plaintiff opposed this motion.  (P78a)  Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment was denied as “moot. ”  On May 10, 2024, the court granted Defendant’s motion barring any future claims.  (P1a).  Plaintiff filed a notice of appeal on June 22, 2024.  (P88a)  STATEMENT OF FACTS
[brief] (1T).  At the beginning of oral argument, [...] inquired of the parties’ counsel whether the matter was “ripe for summary judgment”.  (1T6:8-14).  Counsel for the parties both represented to the Court that this matter was ripe for summary judgment:  * * *  THE COURT:  Both parties have moved for summary judgment, although I understand procedurally it started out differently.  And then there was some conversation.  And all the parties at this point, unless someone tells me differently, agree that the matter is ripe for summary judgment.  And that’s how I looked at it.  [...]: Yes, Your Honor.  THE COURT: Okay.  [...]:  And that’s our position, as well, Your Honor, for the defendant.  During oral argument, [...] made several important findings of fact and conclusions of law including, among other things, that Appellant’s predecessor and servicer:  • Should have accepted the First Wire Transfer (1T45:2-8); • Should have applied the First Wire Transfer to the balance of the Loan and then withheld a discharge of the mortgage until the de minimis balance was received (1T52:19-25 to 1T54:1-18); • Did not have the authority to reject and return the First Wire Transfer on the grounds that the payment was short (1T44:12-17 & 1T54:13-18); and • Appellant was responsible for the loss of the funds due to its “ridiculously silly business decision” to send the funds to [...]. (1T56:9-12 & 1T61:12-15).  Based on the foregoing, [...] granted Respondent’s Motion (1T57:2-6) and denied Appellant’s Cross-Motion (1T63:16-18).
[brief] On January 10, 2022, [...] moved for summary judgment, arguing that Plaintiffs’ expert -- necessary to their theory of the case -- rendered an inadmissible net opinion.  (Pa1881).  Specifically, [...] argued that Plaintiffs’ expert did not: (1) establish any duty of care owed by [...] to Plaintiffs; (2) establish that [...] breached its duty; (3) offer any credible evidence of a dangerous condition; or (4) establish any credible theory of causation.
[brief] ”  R. 3:20-1.  In order for an appellate court to recognize an argument pursuant to Rule 3:20-1 based upon the grounds that a jury verdict was against the weight of the evidence, the issue must be raised before the trial court.  See State v. Saunders, 302 N.J. Super. 509 (App. Div. 1997); State v. Baker, 303 N.J. Super. 411 (App. Div. 1997); State v. Froland, 378 N.J. Super. 20 (App. Div. 2005); State v. Yough, 208 N.J. 385 (2011); State v. Armour, 446 N.J. Super. 295 (App. Div. 2016), certif. den., 228 N.J. 239 (2016).
[brief] In \(^3\) [...] was already detained on the Union County matter in May 2022.  The State filed the Hudson County charges, pertaining to an alleged April 2022 incident, in August 2022.  The State later successfully moved to formally detain [...] on the Hudson County matter in March 2023.  general, the State’s collateral estoppel argument is effectively a third “bite at the apple” on the consolidation motion that was denied in Union County in the first instance, was denied again upon the State’s motion for reconsideration there, and which is now pending appeal.
[brief] See Da47–50.  That Defendants’ proposed order was referenced in their reply brief and submitted at the same time as that brief does not make the proposed order to show cause a “reply brief” or change the fact that Defendants filed a separate order to show cause.  If Plaintiff was unaware of Defendants’ proposed order to show cause, that is only because he did not carefully monitor the docket or fully read Defendants’ filings.  That omission is on him, not Defendants.
[brief] Its merger into [...], where its students already attended school, would not upset the proverbial applecart, but instead would reduce such administrative overhead, and sow stability into the education of the students.  Similarly, because [...] is a constituent district of [...], [...] students would continue to attend [...] as they already were.  Appellants’ tortured statutory interpretation would see a municipality whose district was eliminated fifteen years ago permitted to unilaterally force a reduction in both [...] and [...], thereby introducing new instability, and a reduction in size to both Appellants’ districts.  Further, it would create a mechanism by which other similar municipalities could introduce such instability in other districts.  This cannot be what the Legislature intended and should not be rubber stamped by the Commissioner absent explicit statutory language which does not exist here.
[brief] Different standards of appellate review apply in this appeal.  This appellate tribunal’s review of legal issues, including the four April 27, 2023 lack of standing jurisdictional dismissal orders and the cross-motion mootness denial order, is de novo.  This appellate tribunal owes no deference to the lower trial court’s “interpretation of the law and the legal consequences that flow from established facts . . .”  Manalapan Realty v. Township Committee, 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995).  On the other hand, the abuse-of-discretion standard governs the trial court’s July 10, 2023 Rule 4:49-2 and Rule 4:50-1  Order denying reconsideration, vacation or clarification of its prior April 27, 2023 final orders.  Triffin v. Johnston, 359 N.J. Super. 543, 550 (App. Div. 2003).  Unless the trial court “pursued[d] a manifestly unjust course,” an appellate tribunal will not interfere.  Gillman v. Bally Mfg. Corp., 286 N.J. Super. 523, 528 (App. Div.), certif. den.  144 N.J. 174 (1996).  Although the concept is difficult to define, “[a]n ‘abuse of discretion is demonstrated if the discretionary act was not premised upon consideration of all relevant factors, was based upon consideration of irrelevant or inappropriate factors, or amounts to a clear error in judgment. ”  In re Est. of Ehrlich, 427 N.J. Super. 64, 76 (App. Div. 2012) (quoting United Hearts, LLC v. Zahabian, 407 N.J. Super. 379, 390 (App. Div. 2009)).  STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[brief] Defendant does not argue that the Trial Court abused its discretion by granting reformation, following the failure of specific performance.  Rather, Defendant’s *sole* argument as to the substance of the Trial Court’s March 15, 2024 Order is that reformation was improper because the Trial Court held that Defendant had not acted in bad faith or committed fraud.  That argument, however, ignores the fact that the Trial Court did not simply order reformation unexpectedly.  Rather, as set forth above, it was the failure of the specific performance remedy that led to the imposition of the reformation of the agreement, which was contemplated when the Trial Court entered its initial June 30, 2022 Order.  Da361.  In fact, in its initial decision, the Trial Court held that if the parties could not “move forward” because of contingencies not being met, then it would entertain post-judgment applications.
[directive] c) Você entende que se não se registrar ou não efetuar o registro novamente você estará sujeito à [Sim/Yes] [Não/No] acusação de um crime de terceiro grau e poderá receber uma pena de prisão de até 5 anos?  Do you understand that if you fail to register or re-register you may be charged with a third degree crime and receive a sentence of imprisonment of up to 5 years?
[directive] Generally requires recording of witness statements.  The revised requires that, IAPP • when taking a formal statement from a civilian, including a complainant, the investigator shall video- or audio-record the statement according to the same protocols that would apply if the civilian were being interviewed in connection with a criminal investigation.  § 7.1.5.  If a witness objects to the recording of the interview, the investigator may proceed with the interview without recording, but must document in writing the reasons for doing so.  In addition, the revised requires that, when taking a formal Id. IAPP statement from an officer, the investigator shall video- and audio-record the statement, except that in cases that did not arise from a civilian complaint, the investigator need not record the statement unless the officer being interviewed requests it.  § 7.1.6.
[brief] The Trial Court’s Grant of [...]’ Summary Judgment Motion Based on the New Jersey Tax Sale Law was Correct and Should Be Affirmed (44a-48a).  None of the Plaintiff’s claims are sustainable, as a matter of law, based on the undisputed facts of record and as the Trial Court correctly found below, based on Plaintiff’s plain violation of the New Jersey Tax Sale law.  The Trial Court’s well-reasoned opinion found that the Plaintiff’s contract for the sale of real estate was unenforceable due to its failure to intervene in the underlying Foreclosure Action against [...] as required under the Tax Sale Law.  (48a).
[brief] The first amended complaint (FAC), amended July 19, 2021, had added the name “[...]” so as to see discovery but still had not stated direct, substantive counts for lack of evidence other than tangential suspicion because plaintiffs still had no real basis to overcome the fact that plaintiffs were “the owners” of the solar rights purchased from [...] outright, in perpetuity, under an “assignment agreement” with a “bill of sale. ”
[brief] B.  The Jury’s Damages Findings Were Supported by the Weight of the Evidence (RAISED BELOW: Pa55-Pa61)  i.  The Compensatory/Economic Loss Damage Awards are Supported by the Weight of the Evidence (RAISED BELOW: Pa55-Pa57)  Moving onto the Defendants’ arguments concerning Plaintiff’s compensatory (i.e., Pain and suffering) and economic damages, the Defendants argue that these damages are against the weight of the evidence by simply repeating their prior arguments that there was no proof plaintiff was discriminated against because of her disability.
[brief] (16T 135-16 to 139-7)  [...] testified that she saw no sign that [...] was abusing substances or that he had a mental-health problem, but she also had no idea that he had a criminal record or a mental-health or substance-abuse history.  (16T 147-2 to 14; 16T 153-20 to 154-6)  When [...] left Texas, he said, “I have to go back to New Jersey,” but did not say why.  (16T 163-10 to 19)  [...] testified that she knew [...] from church and from Narcotics Anonymous meetings that they both attended at one point.
[directive] Criminal Justice of Division the of Director Deputy or a Director that: determines Division, adequately were not detention pretrial justifying circumstances or facts specific (a) process; risk-assessment pretrial the by for accounted detention the at evidence convincing and clear present to able be will State the (b) and detention; pretrial against presumption statutory the overcome to hearing that risk serious conditions, a is there maximum on even released, were defendant if (c) any to danger will a pose (ii) when required, court in appear not will (i) defendant the obstruct to or attempt obstruct will (iii) or community, the or person other threaten, to or attempt intimidate, or injure, threaten, or process, justice criminal juror.
[brief] ## CASES - **Baxter v. Fairmont Food Co.**, 74 N.J. 588 (1977) ...........................................24, 25 - **Boryszewski v. Burke**, 380 N.J. Super. 361 (App. Div. 2005) ..................................23 - **Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am.**, 142 N.J. 520 (1995) ....................................25 - **Burns v. Hoboken Rent Leveling & Stabilization Bd.**, 429 N.J. Super. 435 (App. Div. 2013) .........................................................................................................................41 - **Casamasino v. City of Jersey City**, 158 N.J. 333 (1999) .............................................39 - **Connectone Bank v. Bergen Protective Sys.**, 2021 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2578 (App. Div. November 1, 2021) .................................................................................................43 - **Cummings v. Bahr**, 295 N.J. Super. 374 (App.Div.1996) ..............................................24 - **D'Atria v.  D'Atria**, 242 N.J. Super. 392 (Ch.Div.1990) ..................................................24, 31 - **Exadaktilos v. Cinnaminson Realty Co.**, 167 N.J. Super. 141(Law Div.1979) ...............30 - **Finderne Heights Condo. Ass'n**, 390 N.J. Super. 154 (App. Div. 2007)  .......................42 - **Franklin Med. Assocs. v. Newark Pub. Sch.**, 362 N.J. Super. 494 (App. Div. 2003).  .................................................................................................................................26 - **Fusco v. Board of Educ. Of City of Newark**, 349 N.J. Super. 455 (App. Div. 2002)  .................................................................................................................................23, 31 - **Granziano v. Grant**, 326 N.J. Super. 328 (App. Div. 1999)  ..........................................27 - **Guzman v. City of Perth Amboy**, 214 N.J. Super. 167 (App. Div. 1986) .......................42 - **Kernan v. One Wash. Park Urban Renewal Assocs.**, 154 N.J. 437 (1998) ..................26 - **Knorr v. Smeal**, 178 N.J. 169 (2003) ...............................................................................39 - **Mattia v. N. Ins. Co. of N.Y.**, 35 N.J. Super. 503 (App. Div. 1955) ...............................39 - **Maul v. Kirkman**, 270 N.J. Super. 596 (App. Div. 1994) ..............................................30 - **McKelvey v. Pierce**, 173 N.J. 26 (2002) ........................................................................30
[brief] On or about October 7, 2022, several months after Plaintiff terminated the transaction and recovered its Deposit, [...] allegedly closed on the Mack-Cali Transaction.  (Pa12, ¶49).  Plaintiff filed this action demanding that the motion court compel [...] to convey title to the Land to Plaintiff, award Plaintiff damages in excess of $30 million and award Plaintiff attorneys’ fees and costs.  (Pa13-17).
[brief] **STATEMENT OF FACTS**  The Hudson Armed Robbery  On April 20, 2022, at 10:40 p.m., Jersey City Police (JCPD) Officers [...] and [...] responded to the parking lot at [...] for a report of a motor vehicle theft.  (Ca48).  The parking lot attendant, [...], told officers that two black males and one Hispanic male entered the parking lot at 10:37 p.m. (Ca48).  One of the suspects brandished a handgun after removing it from his waistband and ordered Hashem out of the booth and into another booth.  (Ca48).  Once inside the second booth, the gunman forced Hashem to the ground and took his phone and wallet.  (Ca48).  As this occurred, the two other suspects emptied out the cash register in the booth and took three sets of car keys.  (Ca48).  Moments later, the gunman left the booth and entered the passenger side of a yellow BMW M4 bearing NJ license plate [redacted], which then fled the area.  (Ca48).  Investigation revealed the gunmen also stole a second car, a 2018 Audi Q5 bearing registration NJ-[redacted].  (Ca49).  These events were captured on video.  (Ca46).  One of the suspects wore a glossy dark colored bubble jacket, dark colored hoodie, and dark colored pants with white stripes down the side.
[brief] •  [...] did not abuse her discretion in granting Defendants’ request for the caption and docket numbers for all lawsuits to which Plaintiff has been a party since 2007 (Interrogatory No. 40).  Generally, “litigation history is discoverable and not particularly burdensome for Plaintiff to produce. ” (Letter Order at 3).  Thus, the Court affirms the Magistrate’s decision.  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b).  Moreover, Plaintiff sets forth no cognizable reason as to why [...]’s decision to deny Defendants’ request for copies of Plaintiff’s previously answered interrogatories (Interrogatory No. 16), without prejudice, was an abuse of discretion.  (Appeal at 3).  Accordingly, the Magistrate’s findings are affirmed.
[brief] The CFA was enacted in 1960 and amended in 1971 to “give New Jersey one of the strongest consumer protection laws in the nation. ”  Cox v. Sears, Roebuck, supra, 138 N.J. at 14-15.  It “was intended 'to greatly expand protections for New Jersey consumers.'"  Manahawkin Convalescent v. O'Neill, 217 N.J. 99, 120 (2014) (quoting Bosland v. Warnock Dodge, Inc., 197 N.J. 543, 555 (2009)).  To establish a CFA cause of action, a consumer must demonstrate the alleged violator engaged in a practice of unlawful conduct; the consumer suffered an ascertainable loss; and there is "a causal relationship between the unlawful conduct and the ascertainable loss."
[brief] Plaintiffs sought and initially received punitive damages based on accounting damages calculated after the 2006 remand and conduct dating back to 1989, a ruling reversed by this Court.  *Jarwick*, 2018 WL 2449133, at *25-26.  By contrast, the appropriate statute of limitations for the RICO claims commenced on October 1, 2004.  *Id.* at *17.  A punitive damages analysis involves several fact issues immaterial to RICO claims, such as “[t]he profitability of the misconduct to the defendant” and “[t]he financial condition of the defendant. ”  *See* N.J. Stat. § 2A:15-5.12(c); *see also* Brokerage Concepts, Inc. v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., No. CIV.A. 95-1698, 1996 WL 741885, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 10, 1996) (holding that a claim for punitive damages is distinct from a RICO claim for purposes of attorneys’ fees).  The Special Master’s finding of some factual overlap does not justify an award of all fees expended on the punitive damages claims — particularly not work spent researching and briefing legal issues related to punitive damages, which have no bearing on the RICO claims.  Pre-trial Motions.
[brief] The [...]’s Building Height Ordinance calculates in Section 22-2.4 Building Height to mean” the vertical dimension measured to the highest point of a building from the lowest original lot grade or any revised lot grade shown on the Site Plan.  . .  Such revised lot grade shall not include mounding, terracing, or other devices designed to allow increased building height (the “Ordinance”) (emphasis added).  (Pa60-62).  The [...]’s Building Height Ordinance for the RR Zone is a maximum of thirty-five (35) feet.