ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Rather, a court’s sentencing decision must “follow[] not from a quantitative, but a qualitative analysis. ”  Ibid.  In this case, the judge found mitigating factor (7), the defendant has no history of prior delinquency or criminal activity and gave it moderate weight.  N.J.S.A. 2C:44-l(b).  (9T 37-5 to 17)  The judge found aggravating factors (2), that the victim was substantially incapable of exercising normal physical or mental power of resistance and gave it heavy weight; (3) the risk that defendant will commit another offense, giving it lighter weight, and (9), the need to deter.  N.J.S.A. 2C:44-l(a), giving it “extremely heavy” weight.
[brief] The litigation Petitioner filed 40-50 years ago had no relevance to this action and the Court’s findings about that litigation are based solely on conjecture and speculation.  (8T92:14-18; 8T96:6-11); [...] closed in 1986—six years before the marriage.  (9T64-11).  The litigation did not involve significant money—it arose from estate litigation involving $300,000 in the estate accounting to be divided among six beneficiaries, one of which was Petitioner.  (9T7:19-24; 8T120:1-15).  Petitioner filed an accounting action challenging a consent order in which he was to receive $75,000.  (9T7:12-16).  In addition, at the time of his marriage, the Second Federal Suit had been dismissed by memorandum dated April 30, 1992—seven months before his marriage.  The Third Federal Suit was not filed until about a year later.  There was no pending litigation at the time of the marriage.  The Court also found that the parties governed their finances in accordance with “the letter and intent” of the Photocopy.
[brief] In *Warnig v. Atlantic County Special Servs.*, 363 N.J.Super. 563 (App.Div. 2003), the Appellate Division considered whether N.J.S.A. 39:6A-6 allowed recovery of med-pay benefits in a worker’s compensation proceeding.  The Court relied heavily upon the findings in *Ingersoll*, supra., that the anti-stacking provision of N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.2 did not apply to med-pay, since med-pay benefits are not PIP benefits and did not fall within the purview of N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4 or N.J.S.A. 39:6A-10.  The Court further noted that N.J.S.A. 39:6-6 did not mention med-pay benefits.  *Warnig*, supra. at 568-569.  The Court, in addressing the legislative intent behind N.J.S.A. 39:6A-6, noted that it had been amended in 2003 but the amendments did not add any provision for recovery of med-pay benefits.  The Court was compelled to strictly construe the statute, which did not include med-pay benefits.  *Warnig*, supra. at 571.  The Appellate Division revisited the application of N.J.S.A. 2A:15-97 in *[...] v. [...]*, 412 N.J.Super. 126 (App.Div. 2010) and once again, demonstrated not only the purpose behind the Collateral Source Rule but also the practical interpretation of the same.  [...] attempted to pursue subrogation rights for health benefits from its Plan Administrator, [...], which contractually had the right to pursue subrogation for benefits paid but chose not to do so.
[brief] *Feliciano v. Faldetta*, 434 N.J. Super. 543, 547-48 (App. Div. 2014); *McMahon v. New Jersey Mfrs. Ins. Co.*, 364 N.J. Super. 188, 193-94 (App. Div. 2003).  In *McMahon v. New Jersey Mfrs. Ins. Co.*, 364 N.J. Super. 188, 190 (App. Div. 2003), the Appellate Division determined that “a carrier is subject to the consequences of [R. 4:58-2], namely, exposure to reasonable litigation expenses, reasonable attorney’s fees, and interest, even though the cost of those consequences, following a de novo jury damage award, subjects the carrier to a judgment in excess of the liability limits of the policy. ”  The Court was “satisfied that the policy limits…are not so ‘sacrosanct’ to afford protection to a carrier where it chooses not to participate, despite having the opportunity and ability to do so, in the activity fostered by the rule to avoid the very sanction imposed for non-participation. ”  Id. at 193.  This matter went to arbitration on March 22, 2023.
[brief] Here, the Board’s determination is reasonable and complies with the governing statute.  The unambiguous language of the Ricci Act provides:  A member or retiree shall not be eligible for the presumption or recalculation under this subsection unless within two years of the effective date of this act, P.L.2019, c.157, the member or retiree files a written and sworn statement with the retirement system on a form provided by the board of trustees thereof indicating the dates and locations of service.  [L. 2019, c. 157 (codified at N.J.S.A. 53:5A-10(e)(4)).]  Thus, under the plain language of the statute [...] is ineligible for the presumption or recalculation provided under the Ricci Act because he failed to file by July 8, 2021.  Further, while New Jersey pension statutes are construed liberally because of their remedial character, *Geller v. Dep’t of Treasury*, 53 N.J. 591, 597-98 (1969), “an employee has only such rights and benefits as are based upon and within the scope of the provisions of the statute.
[brief] As the Appellate Division correctly recognized when deciding Roberto, a tax foreclosure under the TSL was not a taking until Tyler: "The TSL has permitted foreclosure of a property owner's equity and is thus a prohibited taking after Tyler."  Roberto at 362 (Emphasis added).  Roberto, in compliance with Harper, applied Tyler to all cases that had yet to reach judgment and those "still open on direct review."  Id. at 362-64.  If a judicial process has reached its conclusion, that is the end of the road.  A party to a case that was fully and finally adjudicated does not gain rights with respect to the subject matter of that closed case based on a subsequently-announced change in the law, and cannot use a collateral lawsuit to obtain what they could not in the main case.
[brief] Without Expert Testimony, Plaintiff’s Case Was Evidentially Deficient and Warranted Summary Judgment.  It is well-settled as a matter of evidential jurisprudence in New Jersey that expert testimony is required if the issue to be decided by the jury is so esoteric that jurors of common judgment and experience cannot form a valid judgment.  Said differently, expert testimony is justified when the average juror is relatively helpless in dealing with a subject that is not a matter of common knowledge.  See e.g. Hake v. Manchester Tp., 98 N.J. 302, 313-14 (1985); State v. Walker, 216 N.J. Super. 39, 45 (App. Div. 1987); see also Guzzi v. Jersey Central Power & Light Co., 36 N.J. Super. 255, 261-62 (App. Div. 1955) (one of the central objects of expert testimony is to impart to the jurors supplemental knowledge beyond the range of their own); Ferlise v. Eiler, 202 N.J. Super. 330, 333-34 (App. Div. 1985) (a proponent of expert testimony must demonstrate first that the proffered testimony will enhance the knowledge and understanding of the lay jurors with respect to other testimony of a special nature normally outside of the usual lay sphere).
[directive] ¿Entiende además que al declararse culpable su derecho a apelar la [Sí/Yes] [No/No] denegación de todos los demás pedimentos previos al juicio excepto los siguientes: you are waiving  Do you further understand that by pleading guilty your right to appeal the denial of all other pretrial motions except the following:  5.  ¿Entiende que si usted se declara culpable:  Do you understand that if you plead guilty:  a.  Tendrá antecedentes penales?  [Sí/Yes]  [No/No]  You will have a criminal record?
[brief] Additionally, unexamined by the Motion Judge was our Supreme Court’s rejection of an extension of the third-party intervention doctrine to permit conduct --- ²  The above analysis by our State accords “the respect due an enumerated constitutional right”, here, the 4th Amendment; for a concern by certain Justices that Hawaii’s Supreme Court failed to accord due respect to that Court’s 2nd Amendment ruling, compare *State v. Wilson*, 543 P.3d 440 (2024) with *Wilson v. Hawaii*, 604 U.S. ___ (2024) [statement of Thomas J. on denial of certiorari]. of law enforcement to exceed the sphere of that conduct accorded to the general public, or, in the words of [...], conduct ordinarily accorded to a "plumber, dinner guest or a landlord", *State v. Wright*, 221 N.J. 456 at 477 (2015).  Finally, defense counsel again raised the unexamined reasonable expectation of privacy issue on the Motion for Reconsideration, see Da 25, 26-30 and 3T.  Here, there was no testimony by [...] that an additional 30-day extension was required so as to continue the GPS intrusion on the defendant’s one vehicle.  In that regard as well, while not necessarily controlling from a legal perspective, the trial judge’s finding that the location of the one vehicle was too close to the home to prevent installation of the GPS, likewise, factually confirms the applicable concept of a curtilage, contrary to the Motion Judge’s assessment of a needed "enclosure" or a garage to justify a “curtilage” conclusion.
[directive] Prosecution of DWI & Refusal Violations purposes.  The results of any analysis done by the hospital is generally protected by the Physician-Patient privilege.  N.J.R.E. §506(b).  In the event that there is an evidentiary need for the results of blood analysis, performed by a hospital for non-evidential purposes, on a blood sample taken from a defendant who has been charged with DWI, those results may be obtained by use of a subpoena duces tecum.  A Subpoena duces tecum can be issued by a Judge of a Municipal Court upon a showing that the police have a reasonable basis to believe that the defendant was operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or drugs.  State v. Dyal, 97 N.J. 229 (1984).  Those results may be entered into evidence under N.J.R.E. §803(c)(6).  The issue of judicial notice of the scientific reliability of the instruments used to test a blood sample, as a foundational criterion, has been settled, and is no longer an issue in dispute.  State v. Blair, 45 N.J. 43 (1965) relying on State v. Alexander, 7 N.J. 585 (1951), cert. den. 343 U.S. 908 (1952).  Likewise, the admissibility of blood test results is no longer in dispute, since blood has been deemed non-testimonial (State v. Oliveri, 336 N.J. Super. 244 (App. Div. 2001); State v. Weller, 225 N.J. Super. 274, 281-282 (Law Div. 1986) on remand from State v. Flynn, 103 N.J. 446 (1986) relying upon the holding in State v. Matulewicz, supra.) and it does not rise to the level of a Constitutional issue.  See, Breithaupt v. Abrams, 352 U.S. 432 (1957), 77 S.Ct. 408, 1 L.Ed.2d 448 (1957) and Schmerber v. Calif., 384 U.S. 757, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966), both of which have been adopted by the decisional law of New Jersey.  Moreover, blood test analysis is not subject to the requirements set forth in State v. Simbara, 135 N.J. 37 (2002) on the grounds that the laboratory analysis documents pertaining to the testing of blood for the presence of alcohol are not proffered under the provisions of N.J.S.A. 2C:35-19 and, unlike the analysis of CDS, our Courts have determined that the analysis of blood for the presence of alcohol does not require the presence of the lab technician to authenticate or testify to the analysis processes.  Ibid
[directive] 4.1  Deadly Force.  Deadly force is force that an officer uses with the purpose of causing, or that a reasonable officer knows creates a substantial risk of causing, death or serious bodily injury.  Discharging a firearm constitutes deadly force, unless the discharge occurred during the course of a law enforcement training exercise, routine target practice at a firing range, a lawful animal hunt, or the humane killing of an injured animals.  4.2  Types of deadly force.  Deadly force includes the following potentially lethal actions: (a) applying a chokehold, carotid artery restraint, or similar technique that involves pressure on the neck; (b) sitting, kneeling, or standing on a person’s chest, back, or neck for a prolonged period of time; (c) intentionally driving a vehicle at or in the direction of a person with the intent to strike the individual; and (d) using a baton or other weapon to intentionally strike an individual in the head or neck area.
[brief] There, an application for a subdivision had been denied without prejudice when the applicant refused to grant the Board an extension.  Id. at 122.  The applicant appealed and the trial court granted an automatic approval pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40:55D-61.  Thereafter, the Board chose not to appeal.  At that juncture, two objectors sought to appeal the trial court ruling.  The trial court denied their request on timeliness grounds.  Id.  This Court reversed stating that the trial judge should have permitted the objectors to intervene, reasoning that they moved to intervene “immediately after learning of the Board’s decision not to file an appeal. ”  Id. at 125-126.  [...]’s response to [...]’s arguments about why it believed [...] lacked standing based upon its date of formation are similar – she sought leave to intervene immediately but sought no delay of the trial or to add any additional claims or argue anything different than what her entity had already presented.
[brief] Consumer credit is a foundation stone of the State's economy.  The Legislature could have concluded that while some debt adjusters performed a commendable service, many others committed frauds and abuses, and added little to the smooth functioning of the economy, serving mainly to increase the burden of debt upon the typical user of consumer credit who invokes their aid, without substantially furthering his attempts to liquidate his pre-existing obligations.  [Id. at 141 (relying on “Symposium—Consumer Credit: Developments in the Law—Relief for the Wage Earning Debtor: Chapter XIII, or Private Debt Adjustment?”, 55 Nw. U. L. Rev. 372 (1960)).]  The judge held that “Appellants have not overcome the presumption of validity and demonstrated that the Legislature’s decision is arbitrary and capricious, or that the act bears no real or substantial relation to a valid public interest under the police power.
[brief] [...] cited the fact that the project had not been completed within 300 days as a result of [...] conduct.  [...] cited the failure to make progress in his letter as justifying the termination of the contract.  [...] responded by his attorney, [...], by indicating that the commencement date had not begun.  It was only after the contract was terminated that [...] had a memo prepared for the legal justification of termination of the contract.  At his deposition, [...] was unable to find a provision in the contract which justifies termination.
[brief] (Pa112).  However, Respondent claims that [...]’s disability was not “directly caused by the 2015 incident,” but instead, was “caused by a pre-existing condition or a pre-existing condition accelerated or exacerbated by the work effort. ” (Pa113).  Respondent’s position is completely meritless.  Prior to the incident, [...] had not experienced back or neck symptomology for nine years,\(^1\) and was performing the duties of a street sergeant without issue.
[brief] “[W]hen the leading object of the promisor is to subserve some interest or purpose of [the promisor's] own, notwithstanding the effect is to pay or discharge the debt of another, [the] promise is not within the statute. ”  Id. at 102 (quoting 2 Corbin on Contracts, § 366 (1950)).  The Schoor Court, in adopting the common law exception, explained that “it becomes important, and probably decisive, to determine what interest, purpose or object was sought to be advanced by [the] promise to pay .  . . .”  Id. (emphasis added).  In defining the “object,” the Court opined that, in order to be exempted from the writing requirement of the statute of frauds, the promisor's (or guarantor’s, in this case) interest must be “mainly for [the promisor's, in this case [...]’s] own pecuniary or business advantage, rather than in order to benefit the third person [in this case, [...]]”.
[brief] **  (emphasis added)  (Amended 10-15-1990 by Board of Health Ord. 3 1990; 9-18-1995 by Board of Health Ord. No. 3-1995)  [...] charging abandonment also references section 164-14 as the applicable penalty provision.  The penalty provision for [...], charging running at large is as follows:  Any person who violates the provisions of section ...173-24...shall, upon conviction thereof, be punished by a fine for each violation not less than $25 up to $2,500.  The penalty provision for each of the three complaints provides for a maximum penalty at least twice that permissible by statute N.J.S.A. 26:3-70 (quoted above)
[brief] A self-employed person, partners of a limited liability partnership, members of a limited liability company or partners of a partnership who actively perform services on behalf of the self-employed person's business, the limited liability partnership, limited liability company or the partnership shall be deemed an "employee" of the business, limited liability partnership, limited liability company or partnership for purposes of receipt of benefits and payment of premiums pursuant to this chapter, if the business, limited liability partnership, limited liability company or partnership elects, when the workers' compensation policy of the business, limited liability partnership, limited liability company or EXPLANATION
[brief] “The abuse of discretion standard applies to the trial court’s rulings during counsel’s summation. ”  Litton Indus., Inc. v. IMO Indus., Inc., 200 N.J. 372, 392-93 (2009).  Therefore, the trial court errs in permitting or excluding comments in opening and summation only if the decision is “made without a rational explanation, inexplicably departed from established policies, or rested on an impermissible basis. ”  Flagg v. Essex Cty. Prosecutor, 171 N.J. 561, 572 (2002).  If no objection was made to the comments, they are reviewed for plain error.
[brief] Of these students, 11,410, or 27.8%, were students for whom the district provided non-mandatory courtesy busing at the district’s expense.  Ibid.  In terms of bus routes, the Report found that in some cases, buses were being used for multiple routes, but the routes are bid on as stand-alone routes.  (Ra143; Ra310-11).  The District could save on transportation costs, the Report found, by soliciting bids on pre-packed groups of routes based on historical busing patterns, and could double or triple tier routes in order to decreases expenses.  (Ra143; Ra311).  The Report also found potential mismanagement and lack of internal controls of the District’s transportation operations.  Notably, the Report indicated there was insufficient separation between [...] as a contracting agency and the [...] as a vendor.  (Ra131; Ra303).
[directive] Powiadomienie Notification  Czy rozumie Pan(i), że wymóg rejestracji może spowodować powiadomienie organów [Tak/Yes] [Nie/No] ściagania, organizacji społecznych i ogółu społeczeństwa o Pana(i) zwolnieniu z zakładu karnego lub obecności w danej okolicy?  Do you understand that the requirement of registration may result in notification to law enforcement, community organizations, or the public at large, of your release from incarceration or presence in the community? (wypełnić tylko jeżeli przestępstwo miało miejsce przed 14 Dożywotni nadzór społeczny 4. a) r.).
[brief] New Mea Constr. Corp. v. Harper, 203 N.J. Super. 486 (App.  Div. 1985) ...........................................39 North Haledon Fire Co. No. 1 v. Borough of North Haledon, 425 N.J. Super. 615 (App. Div. 2012) ...........................................45 North Jersey Dist. Water Supply Comm. v. Newark, 103 N.J. Super. 542 (Ch. Div.), aff’d 52 N.J. 134 (1968) ..................19, 21, 26 Noye v. Hoffmann–La Roche Inc., 238 N.J. Super. 430 (App. Div. 1990) ...........................................33 Estate of Pauli v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 2014 WL 8765427 (App. Div. May 5, 2015) ....................................40 Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Boylan, 307 N.J. Super. 162 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 154 N.J. 608 (1998) .........................................................................................15 Raspantini v. Arocho, 364 N.J. Super. 528 (App. Div. 2003) .............................................44 Reid Dev. Corp. v. Parsippany-Troy Hills Twp., 31 N.J. Super. 459 (App. Div. 1954)
[brief] See Ja150-Ja152.  The Board’s interpretations of the Master Plan, unsupported by any evidence, are pure fiction.  To support this fiction, the Resolution goes a step further by pretending the word “traffic” is in the 1999 Master Plan.  It dismisses [...]’ well- reasoned, factually supported conclusion that the height restriction was not intended to restrict warehouse uses in the SM Zone, but rather to restrict externalities from the high impact uses in the GM Zone, including “noise, dust, odors and visuals. ”  Ja032-Ja033; Ja151.  The Resolution concludes that the Master Plan also sought to restrict traffic since the quoted language “is not limited in that way[,]” as it “discusses offsite impacts generally.
[directive] Public Notice.  Every department or agency shall take reasonable steps to inform the citizenry of the agency’s use of this technology.  The department shall publish a statement that it deploys BWCs on its internet website or, if the department does not have its own website, then on the municipality’s website when feasible.  The County Prosecutor may assist departments in providing general public notice of their deployment of BWCs pursuant to this section.  The website posting shall include a picture showing what the device looks like, and how it is to be worn by uniformed officers or plainclothes detectives so that citizens will be able to determine whether an officer is equipped with the device.  Notwithstanding the above general public notice requirement, officers wearing BWCs must comply with all relevant laws regarding notice to any subject of a BWC recording, pursuant to P.L. 2020, c. 129, section 1d-e, discussed in section 4.2, infra. 4.2
[directive] Directive # 08-05  Questions or Comments May Be Directed to TO: ASSIGNMENT  JUDGES 609-292-0012  FROM: [...], J.A.D.  SUBJ: POST-CONVICTION  RELIEF (PCR)  DATABASE DATE: APRIL 11, 2005  SCOPE  This Directive follows up on our several recent Judicial Council discussions regarding the growing backlog of petitions for post-conviction relief.  It requires the automation of records for all petitions filed in the Criminal Division for post-conviction relief (PCR), both those petitions filed subsequent to this Directive’s issuance date as well as those currently filed but still pending disposition.  This includes use of a standardized Excel spreadsheet for data collection; see the attached list of data elements to be collected.  This data collection requirement has been endorsed by the Conference of Criminal Presiding Judges and by the Conference of Criminal Division Managers.
[brief] Because the agency relationship is a material factual issue in dispute, [...] contention would not entitle it to summary judgment.  R. 4:46-2.  Moreover, the “traditional ‘essence’ of vicarious liability based on respondeat superior relies on the concept of employer ‘control’ over an employee. ”  “Under the control test, ‘the relation of master and servant exists whenever the employer retains the right to direct the manner in which the business shall be done, as well as the result to be accomplished, or, in other words, not only what shall be done, but how it shall be done. ””  Pursuant to the Order for Professional Services (OPS), [...] assumed responsibility for compliance with the plans and specifications, including safety requirements.  It may have delegated that obligation to [...] and [...] but retained the authority and ability to control the work.  As such, it also retained liability for failure to do so.  Pa2033.  [...] cannot contract away its duty to third parties under the contract with the [...].