ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] JUDGMENT AS TO APPELLANTS’ ILL-DEFINED CLAIMS FOR ALLEGED FRAUD, RICO VIOLATION(S), CONSPIRACY AND “AIDING AND ABETTING”  Appellants also brought frivolous claims against [...] and [...] for alleged fraud (Count One); tortious interference (Count Two), conversion (Count Three), violation of New Jersey’s RICO statute, N.J.S.A. 2C:41-2, et seq. (Counts Four and Five); conspiracy (Count Seven), and aiding and abetting all of the above (Count Eight).
[brief] The first factor—reliance by the parties and the public—is inconclusive.  While the City may have relied on longstanding statutory law in taking [...]’s equity, neither [...] nor the public can be said to have relied on the rule that government can take everything over a small debt.  On the contrary, most taxpayers and property owners like [...] are shocked to --- \(^3\) *Roberto* incorrectly held that *Tyler* established a new principle of law.  But as *Tyler* explained, “[t]he principle that a government may not take more from a taxpayer than she owes can trace its origins at least as far back as . . . 1215 . . . in the Magna Carta[.]”  *Tyler*, 598 U.S. at 639.  This postulate “became rooted in English law” and “made its way across the Atlantic. ”  *Id.*  It similarly “held true through the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment. ”  *Id.* at 641.  Moreover, prior Supreme Court “precedents have also recognized the principle that a taxpayer is entitled to the surplus in excess of the debt owed. ”  *Id.* at 642 (citing *United States v. Taylor*, 104 U.S. 216 (1881); *United States v. Lawton*, 110 U.S. 146 (1884)). learn that the government would take so much more than it is owed.  See Horne v. Dep’t of Agric., 576 U.S. 350, 361 (2015) (“[P]eople . . . do not expect their property . . . to be actually occupied or taken away. ”); see also, e.g., [...], The Supreme Court Made Just About Everyone Happy for Once, Mother Jones (May 25, 2023)⁴ (noting the wide range of support from progressives, liberals, conservatives, and libertarians for ending confiscatory tax foreclosure laws); Br. Amici Curiae of States of Utah, et al. at 9, Tyler v. Hennepin County, No. 22-166⁵ (describing such laws as “shockingly unfair”); Br. Amici Curiae of [...], et al. at 1, Tyler v. Hennepin County, No. 22-166⁶ (noting “shocking result” under Minnesota’s statute and “shock[]” that more states have similar laws).
[brief] STANDARD OF REVIEW  An appellate court applies an abuse of discretion standard in reviewing a trial court's decision to grant or deny a preliminary injunction.  *Rinaldo v. RLR Inv., LLC*, 387 N.J.Super. 387, 395 (App.Div. 2006).  A court abuses its discretion when a decision “is ‘made without a rational explanation, inexplicably departed from established policies, or rested on an impermissible basis. ’”  *U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n v. Guillaume*, 209 N.J. 449, 467 (2012) (quoting  *Iliadis v. Wal–Mart Stores, Inc.*, 191 N.J. 88, 123 (2007); see also, *Terranova v. Gen. Elec. Pension Tr.*, 457 N.J.Super. 404, 410–11 (App.Div. 2019).  STATEMENT OF FACTS
[brief] ”), affirmed, 101 N. J. Eq. 291 (E. & A. 1927).  Court after court have recognized this principle.  See Krisher v. Murphy, 11 N.J. Super. 231, 235 (App. Div. 1951) (finding that plaintiff was barred from enforcing a sale agreement by specific performance where plaintiff made an election to demand the return of the deposit, which constituted an irrevocable election to rescind the contract); Claron v. Thommessen, 96 N.J. Eq. 650, 653 (E. & A. 1924) (when respondent “instituted suit against [appellant] to recover the deposit money of $1,000, he irrevocably committed himself in solemn form to a repudiation of all obligation under the agreement.
[brief] Francois v. Board of Trustees, 415 N.J. Super. 335, 348 citing Utley v. Bd. of Review, Dep't of Labor, 194 N.J. 534, 551 (2008); see Krayniak v. Bd. of Trs., Pub. Employees' Ret. Sys., 412 N. J. Super. 232, 237 (App. Div. 2010).  As a form of legislation aimed at remedying a social problem, pension statutes "should be liberally construed and administered in favor of the persons intended to be benefited.' "  Klumb v. Bd. of Educ. of Manalapan-Englishtown Reg'l High Sch. Dist., 199 N.J. 14, 34 (2009) (quoting Geller, supra, 53 N.J. at 597-598, 597).  Such a liberal construction "resolves all reasonable doubts in favor of the applicability of the statute to the particular case."  Kochen v. Consol. Police & Firemen's Pension Fund Comm'n, 71 N.J. Super. 463, 478, (App. Div. 1962).  See Duignan v. Bd. of Trs., Pub. Employees' Ret. Sys., 223 N.J. Super. 208, 216 (App. Div. 1988) (same); Hillman v. Bd. Trs., Pub. Employees' Ret. Sys., 109 N.J. Super. 449, 455 (App. Div. 1970) (same).  Francois v.  Board of Trustees, 415 N.J. Super. 335, 349.  A person that is eligible for certain pension benefits is entitled to a liberal interpretation of the pension statute.  The determination below is unreasonable because [...] would otherwise be eligible for accidental disability benefits under the Ricci Act.
[brief] Defendants successfully argued that the [...]’s claims accrued prior to the FAA’s amendments.  1T at 10:13-12:16.  Alternatively, even if the court had not erred and [...]’s “challenges” are considered, they solely focus on the authenticity of the Operative Agreement, not the arbitration provision specifically.  In challenging the Operative Agreement, [...] baselessly accused that Appellants of altering the Operative Agreement, by converting the PDF into a Microsoft Word document, altering the Operative Agreement’s arbitration provision, and somehow reattaching the documents to the November 2019 Email.  1T at 35:6-25, 35:15-21.  Respondent also alleged that the Operative Agreement was fraudulent solely because [...] had previously submitted the Incorrect Agreement, which he found in Respondent's personnel file that she maintained.  Both allegations are outright ludicrous and have no factual basis.  For these reasons, this Court should reverse the trial Court’s order denying Appellants’ motion because the trial Court both failed to acknowledge the Operative Agreement’s arbitration provision and failed to place the burden on [...] to challenge the arbitration clause.
[brief] ”  *Brown*, 348 N.J. Super. at 475.  Ordinarily, the court said, “neither a marketability nor a minority discount should be applied absent extraordinary circumstances. ”  *Id.* at 483.  However—like *Lawson*—the court assessed a case involving “court-ordered buyout[s] resulting from an oppressed shareholder. ”  Ibid. (emphasis added).  Brown did not address an oppressor shareholder like [...].
[brief] First of all, *Cotto* was concerned only with the model jury charge on *identification*, not on third-party guilt.  And quite unlike the centrality of [...] in RecioFigueroa’s case, the Court in *Cotto* excluded proffered evidence of third-party guilt, finding the proffered evidence to be speculative, and full of conjecture and hearsay.  *Id.* at 332.  Moreover, the opinion in *Cotto* predates the publication of the third-party guilt model jury instruction, which was first introduced in 2015 – ten years after *Cotto* was published. \(^2\)  The Supreme Court’s finding in *Cotto* that the generic jury instructions were sufficient to instruct on the issue of *identification* thus has no bearing on the question of whether the generic jury instructions can sufficiently instruct a jury on the question of third-party guilt, particularly where that model charge did not even exist yet.
[brief] The Trial Court erred in its dismissal of Plaintiff’s Complaint because Plaintiff was excused from the Affidavit of Merit Requirement as a result of Defendants’ failure to provide Plaintiff with requested medical records.  (Transcript, 28:20–29:1).  “A licensed professional should not be permitted to wrongfully withhold records and then also assert that the plaintiff has not stated a cause of action because the plaintiff has failed to produce an affidavit where the records are a necessary component in procuring such an affidavit.  *Aster v. Shoreline Behavioral Health*, 346 N.J. Super. 536, 543 (App. Div. 2002).  Pursuant to N.J.S.A.  2A:53A-28, the affidavit of merit requirement is excused if, for a period of 45 days, defendant fails to provide plaintiff with requested medical records and plaintiff submits a certification attesting to such refusal.  In *Aster*, the defendant failed to produce medical records that had a substantial bearing on the preparation of an affidavit of merit.  See 346 N.J. Super. at 549–50.  As a result, the Appellate Division found that defendant, a medical professional, was attempting to use the affidavit of merit statute as a “sword and shield,” and that by doing so defendant had prevented plaintiff from producing an affidavit of merit in a timely fashion.  Thus, the Appellate Division held that the medical records had a “substantial bearing on the preparation of the affidavit of merit” and that failure of the defendant to produce the requisite medical records precluded dismissal of plaintiff’s complaint with prejudice.  *Id.*  Here, similar to *Aster*, Plaintiff’s Counsel submitted an Affidavit pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-28, which excuses the affidavit of merit requirement because Defendant has failed to provide Plaintiff with any medical records, and any records at all for that matter, for a period much longer than 45 days as prescribed by the Statute.  See (59a).
[brief] At the outset, it should be noted that the jury was aware of [...]’s case, [...]’s testimony for the State, his later recantation of his testimony, and then his later recantation of his recantation.  First, the State elicited this information on direct examination; specifically, that he testified at [...]’s trial in 2006, that he testified about a jailhouse statement [...] made to him, and that he later recanted that testimony because he had been threatened by [...].  (28T:58-15 to 60-18, 66-9 to 67-3; 29T:104-11 to 106-24, 108-21 to 110-12, 114-16 to 19).
[brief] [A] development plan of one or more lots on which is shown (1) the existing and proposed conditions of the lot, including but not necessarily limited to topography, vegetation, drainage, flood plains, marshes and waterways, (2) the location of all existing and proposed buildings, drives, parking spaces, walkways, means of ingress and egress, drainage facilities, utility services, landscaping, structures and signs, lighting, screening devices, and (3) any other information that may be reasonably required in order to make an informed determination pursuant to an ordinance requiring review and approval of site plans by the planning board adopted pursuant to article 6 of this act.  [N.J.S.A. 40:55D-7.]  The site plans submitted in support of the Application show the existing and proposed conditions of the Property, including the existing cell tower along with the equipment enclosure at its base, as well as the proposed warehouse development and associated site improvements.  Thus, all information necessary for the Planning Board to make an informed decision regarding whether the existing and proposed development complies with [...]’s site plan Ordinances is demonstrated in the Application.
[brief] Page 9 – 16  POINT ONE  [Appeal of jurisdiction issues] (Argued at Pa362 – Pa368)  The Commissioner of Education retains exclusive jurisdiction for matters arising under the school laws.  Title 18A school law statutes, which includes N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-9, are the school law statutes falling under the Commissioner’s jurisdiction.  [...]’s Counterclaim for payment, alleging violations and seeking enforcement of N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-9, requires an interpretation and application of this school law statute, so the Counterclaim is based wholly on a statute falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Commissioner of Education.  The Judge’s first summary judgment order that the Superior Court, Law Division, lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate [...]’s 18A school law Counterclaim was correct, and the court committed error when it reversed itself and held that it retained jurisdiction over [...]’s Counterclaim.  I. A.  The Counterclaim alleges violations of N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-9(e)(3), and seeks interpretation, enforcement, and payment under this 18A school law statute.  (Argued at Pa363 – Pa365)  I. B.  The statute itself confirms the Commissioner’s jurisdiction over the Counterclaim.  (Argued at Pa365 – Pa366)  I. C. New Jersey Dept. of Education regulations reinforce the Commissioner’s jurisdiction over N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-9 violations.  (Argued at Pa366 – Pa367)  I. D.  Administrative law precedent confirms the Commissioner’s jurisdiction over claims under N.J.S.A. 18A:7F.  (Argued at Pa367 – Pa368)  I. E.  Interpreting, implementing, and enforcing N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-9 is under the Commissioner of Education’s jurisdiction.  (Argued at Pa368)  Page 16 – 20
[brief] While waiting for a response from dispatch, [...] asked [...] to exit the vehicle and move to the rear of the Toyota.  (1T12-13 to 16).  [...] was “nervous, a little shaky. ” (1T12-17 to 21).  The officers asked [...] if there were any weapons in the car and she stated, “No.” (1T13-4 to 8).  They then asked her about the smell of marijuana and asked if there was anything illegal in the car.  (1T13-9 to 14).  She responded, “Not that I know of. ” (1T13-12 to 16).  However, [...] could still smell marijuana emanating from the interior of the vehicle.  (1T13-17 to 22).  [...] then questioned [...] (1T13-23 to 25).  [...] told [...] why she went to the gas station, but then explained that she did not know the individuals in the vehicle and that the front seat passenger had offered her money to take the passengers to a location.  (1T14-1 to 9).  [...] told this to [...] in a hushed tone and appeared nervous.  (1T14-2 to 18).  Additionally, while [...] was speaking to [...], an individual who had been loitering at the gas station suddenly appeared and attempted to cause a distraction.  (1T14-19 to 15-1).  Unsure if [...] was being truthful or held without her consent, [...] moved her to his patrol car and secured her in the vehicle, uncuffed.
[brief] The decision reflected the fact that these definitions: could clearly include the unamplified voices of family members speaking with each other while enjoying a backyard barbeque, or the shouting of children playing in a swimming pool or jumping on a trampoline; while those sounds, which can be made at a relatively high volume, is music to the ears of some, they would likely not be welcomed by all.  Some individuals who are within 50 feet of the property line from which the voices emanate would potentially describe the sounds as annoying and/or endangering their comfort and repose.  [Da84.]  Indeed, this point was demonstrated by [...] during the March 5, 2019 hearing.  The court made clear the issues with the Noise Ordinance’s application to everyday speech, especially in light of the limited detectable distance for proof of a violation:
[brief] Defendant was asked during his allocution whether [...] was stabbed.  (1T32:19-25).  However, he denied stabbing him and stated that he believed [...] was responsible for any stabbing.  (1T32:19-25).  The official version of the crime in defendant’s sentencing report, with which defendant agreed, indicates that [...] suffered four gunshot wounds in her head, face, chest, and abdomen.  (Pca4-5).  [...] had a gunshot wound to his face and multiple stab wounds in the head, back, and right side of his body.  (Pca4).  He was found next to two knives.  (Pca4).  Both victims were 64 years old, and an examination of the scene revealed that their phone wires had been cut and their home ransacked.
[directive] Active Resistor.  A person who is uncooperative, fails to comply with directions from an officer, and instead actively attempts to avoid physical control.  This type of resistance includes, but is not limited to, evasive movement of the arm, flailing arms, tensing arms beneath the body to avoid handcuffing, and flight.  In a correctional institution, any member of a group of four or more inmates or detainees who fails to comply with an order from a correctional police officer – or a single inmate or detainee who fails to comply with an order related to handcuffing inside a cell or secured tier – shall be considered an active resistor.
[brief] Finally, as to defendant’s claim that counsel failed to submit a written sentencing brief, the PCR court ruled that there was no legal support for the proposition that it was ineffective for counsel to argue strongly in the client’s favor in court but not put those arguments in a brief.  (21T18-11 to 15).  It also found the absence of sentencing brief clearly had no impact given that the sentencing court’s initial weighing of the factors was affirmed on direct appeal and the overall resentencing was affirmed after the remand.  (21T18-15 to 20).
[brief] Arbitration:  You agree to submit any and all Disputes (as defined in Section 7.4) to binding arbitration pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act (Title 9 of the United States Code), which will govern the interpretation and enforcement of this arbitration agreement (“Arbitration Agreement”).  Arbitration will be before either (1) [...] (formerly known as Judicial Arbitration and Mediation Services), jamsadr.com, or (2) the [...] (“[...]”), adr.org.  If you initiate arbitration, you may choose between these two arbitration forums; if [...] initiates arbitration, it will have the choice as between these two arbitration forums.  YOU AND EQUINOX AGREE THAT, EXCEPT AS PROVIDED IN SECTION 7.4, ANY AND ALL DISPUTES WHICH ARISE AFTER YOU ENTER INTO THIS AGREEMENT WILL BE RESOLVED EXCLUSIVELY AND FINALLY BY BINDING ARBITRATION RATHER THAN IN COURT BY A JUDGE OR JURY, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THIS ARBITRATION AGREEMENT.
[brief] ” (Aa135, citing Initial Decision at (Aa96)).  Instead, the degree of change to the footprint is a factor only in determining “the extent of public access to be provided, which in this matter has yet to be determined. ” (Aa135).  Fourth, the Commissioner rejected [...]’s argument that N.J.S.A. 13:1D-153(a) precluded [...] from requiring public access where there is no existing public access.  (Aa136-37).  The Commissioner found instead that [...]’s reading of the Law is contrary to its plain terms, and would undermine the Law’s mandate to expand public access, particularly as the Law exempted other development – such as marinas – from providing public access where none was provided before.
[brief] POINT I RESENTENCING IS REQUIRED BECAUSE THE TRIAL COURT:  (A) FAILED TO APPROPRIATELY CONSIDER BLAKE’S POST-OFFENSE REHABILITATIVE CONDUCT THE AGE-CRIME CURVE, AND ADOLESCENT BRAIN SCIENCE; (B) MADE FINDINGS FOR AGGRAVATING FACTORS THREE AND NINE THAT WERE NOT SUPPORTED BY COMPETENT, CREDIBLE EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD; (C) IMPOSED CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES IN VIOLATION OF STATE V. YARBOUGH AND STATE V. TORRES; (D) CONSIDERED DEFENDANT’S DISMISSED CHARGES IN VIOLATION OF STATE V. K.S.; AND (E) IMPOSED AN ILLEGAL PAROLE DISQUALIFIER ON COUNT THREE.  (Da49-52)........................................9  A.  The Sentencing Court Erred In Failing To Appropriately Consider [...]’s Post-Offense Rehabilitative Conduct, The Age-Crime Curve, And Adolescent Brain Development When Considering Aggravating Factors Three And Nine And Mitigating Factors Nine And Fourteen.  .................................................................12  TABLE OF CONTENTS
[brief] **CONCLUSION**  For the reasons set forth at length above, the Jury’s Verdict in this matter should be affirmed in its entirety.  DATE: June 12, 2024  LAW OFFICES  [...]  *ATTORNEYS FOR THE APPELLANT*  By: /s/ [...]  WILLIAM STOLTZ  /s/ [...]  PAIGE BUTLER  [...], Plaintiff/Respondent, v. [...], its agents, servants, employees, [...], [...], [...], [...], "[...] 1-5" and/or "JOHN DOE" 1-5 and/or "JANE DOE 1-5" (the last three being fictitious designations), Defendants/Appellants.
[directive] e.  Provide the victim with contact information for a local domestic violence program and with approved safety planning material.  f.  Keep the victim apprised of all case developments.  g.  Ensure that the chain of command, including the Chief of Police or Law Enforcement Chief Executive, is regularly briefed on both the administrative and criminal investigations.  h.  Assist the victim with safety planning should the officer be terminated.  Assistance will be provided by linking the victim with resources and preparation planning either within the Department or via outside government and non-profit agencies.  -8-
[brief] In a criminal trial, “correct jury charges are especially critical in guiding deliberations in criminal matters, [and] improper instructions on material issues are presumed to constitute reversible error. ”  *State v. Jenkins*, 178 N.J. 347, 361 (2004).  “Where there is sufficient evidence to warrant a self-defense charge, failure to instruct the jury . . . constitutes plain error. ”  *State v. Gentry*, 439 N.J. Super. 57, 67 (App. Div. 2015).  “However,” where a defendant has failed to request a jury instruction or otherwise object below, “[t]he mere possibility of an unjust result is not enough. ”  *State v. Sanders*, 467 N.J. Super. 325, 333 (App. Div. 2021) (quoting *State v. Funderburg*, 225 N.J. 66, 79 (2016)).  “Rather, ‘[t]he possibility must be real, one sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt as to whether the error led the jury to a result it otherwise might not have reached. ’”  *State v. Alexander*, 233 N.J. 132, 142 (2018) (quoting *State v. Macon*, 57 N.J. 325, 336 (1971)).  A defense “counsel’s failure to specifically request a” self-defense “instruction suggests he perceived the defense was not supported by the evidence at trial.
[brief] ii.  Communications between [...] and/or [...] and the board of directors.  Given [...]’s and [...]’s roles as key decision makers regarding issues relevant to Plaintiffs’ allegations, it is possible that one or both of them communicated directly with members of the board of directors regarding these issues without including other custodians in the communications.  iii.  Communications between [...] and/or [...] and third parties.  Given [...]’s and [...]’s roles as key decision makers regarding issues relevant to Plaintiffs’ allegations, it is possible that one or both of them communicated directly with relevant third parties, such as business partners, vendors, etc., regarding these issues without including other custodians in the communications.  iv.
[brief] Therefore, even if [...] was unaware that a POA was required to be submitted with its bid to support the Consent of Surety, did not understand the specifications or was operating under a clear misapprehension, it certainly cannot be heard to complain that its proposal was rejected after the bids have been opened and the contract awarded.  The negative consequence of allowing such challenges is clear, as it would allow contractors to pick and choose their battles, unlevel the playing field, and, if the specifications are found to be fatally flawed, lead to the disfavored outcome of re-procuring goods or services after the bids have already been opened.  *Marvec Construction Corp. v. Township of Belleville*, 254 N.J. Super. 282, 291 (Law Div. 1992) (“rebidding the contract is fraught with certain dangers…because the low bidder who may have given his best possible price may drop out of the bidding or other bidders may by reason of insight gained through revelation of their competition’s bidding strategy may seek the weaknesses in their own bids.