ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] A Project of the Sedona Conference Working Group on Electronic Document Retention and Production, 19 Sedona Conf. J. 1 (2018), available at https://thesedonaconference.org/sites/default/files/publications/The%20Sedona%20Principles%20Third%20Edition.19TSCJ1.pdf.........................................................................................................................3, 14, 15  https://www.uscourts.gov/rules-policies/records-and-archives-rules-committees/special-projects-rules-committees/2010-civil.....................1  [...], Rules Suggestion to the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, Sept. 19, 2023, available at https://www.lfcj.com/lcj-proposes-amendments-on-privacy-protection-cyber-risk..............................................................................18-19  STATEMENT OF INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE
[directive] See, State v. Leavitt, 107 N.J. at 541-2.  See also, State v. Widmaier, 157 N.J. at 487-8.  Once a police or law enforcement officer makes a determination, after having read to the defendant, the appropriate Standard Statement, that the defendant has refused to submit to chemical breath testing, the defendant is not entitled to “cure” that violation.  State v. Bernhardt, 245 N.J. Super. 210 (App. Div. 1991), certif. den. 126 N.J. 323 (1991).  Defendants’ are afforded constitutionally sufficient notice and an opportunity to respond affirmatively and submit to chemical breath testing.  The Standard (Refusal) Statements
[brief] The Trial Court Applied An Incorrect Start Date For The Running Of Interest (Pa0056-60; Pa0219).  The appropriate start date for the running of interest is 2005, when [...] filed this action.  See Taddei v. State Farm Indem. Co., 401 N.J. Super. 449, 466–67 (App. Div. 2008) (holding interest should run from date complaint was filed in insurance coverage dispute); George H. Swatek, Inc. v. N. Star Graphics, Inc., 246 N.J. Super. 281, 288 (App. Div. 1991) (awarding prejudgment interest in contract action for time that “elapsed between the filing of the complaint and the entry of judgment [.].”)
[brief] I think that would be true.  Q:  So the dates that are listed as the end usage release dates are the dates which for the purpose of this allocation proceeding [...] says discharges from the plant into the environment ended; is that right?  * * *  A:  Yes, [...] is not aware of discharges from the facility into the environment at these AOCs beyond these end dates.  Q: But [...] acknowledges that the process of environmental contamination from CVOCs extends beyond the dates that are listed as the end usage release dates, correct?  A: Yes, the discharges that occurred in the past during these operating periods created a legacy contamination that continues today.  (Da288-289.)  During his expert deposition, in January 2015, [...] elaborated:
[brief] There is insufficient evidence in the record that Plaintiff suffered a permanent injury as described in N.J.S.A.39:6A-8.  Discovery in this matter has disclosed that there is insufficient objective medical evidence on the record that would support a reasonable jury’s determination that Plaintiff/Appellant as a result of the August 14, 2019, motor vehicle accident, suffered a permanent injury as that term is described in N.J.S.A.39:6A-8.  Under N.J.S.A. 39:6A-8(a) as amended by AICRA, a plaintiff seeking non-economic damages from an alleged automobile tortfeasor must show that his or her bodily injuries fall within one of the following categories to sustain such an action: (1) death; (2) dismemberment; (3) significant disfigurement or significant scarring; (4) displaced fractures; (5) loss of fetus; (6) a permanent injury within a reasonable degree of medical probability other than scarring or disfigurement.  N.J.S.A. 39:6A-8(a).  Furthermore, the undisputed language of the statute provides, “(a)n injury shall be considered permanent when the body part or organ, or both, has not healed to function normally and will not heal to function normally with further medical treatment. ”  *Ibid.*  (emphasis added.)  At the time of the accident, Plaintiff/Appellant was insured under an automobile policy issued by [...] with verbal threshold standard and is therefore subject to the verbal threshold.
[brief] 25.  [...] (“[...]”) did not have actual or constructive notice of any alleged condition on the Subject Property at any time prior to the alleged incident.  26.  Plaintiff testified that she at no point prior or subsequent to September 6, 2018, informed the Township of the alleged condition.  Pa156 at 42:3-6.  27.  [...], the Township’s Director of Public Works, testified that the Township maintains the entirety of the parking lot:  Q.  Do you have any understanding as to the responsibilities and the duties of the township with regard to repairs to that parking lot?  A.  We maintain it.  Whatever the agreement is, I—we’ve always maintained it.  We sweep it.  We’ve done pothole repair there.  We don’t separate the lot.  We kind of maintain the whole area.  [Pa187 at 23:12 to -18].  28.  [...] also testified that the Township inspects the parking lots:
[brief] (Da 57-69)  [...] provided the name of the bartender at the intersection of Clendenny Avenue and West Side Avenue, [...].  (Da 58; Da 61; 25T 71-12 to 17)  [...] provided his Guyanese neighbor’s address and a detailed description of his neighbor’s home and employer.  (Da 30; Da 62-63; 25T 30-1 to 24; 72-12 to 73-6)  [...] provided the name of the Chinese restaurant at the intersection of Lexington Avenue and West Side Avenue, [...].  (Da 59-60; 25T 69-11 to 19)  Detectives then confronted [...] about his supposed unrecorded misstatements to [...] the day before.
[brief] Respondent’s Appendix  Appellants’ Appendix failed to include the [...] Suppl. Cert. filed by Respondent’s counsel with Respondents’ reply papers below.  This Certification is set forth in Respondent’s Appendix at Da1 to Da18.  Similarly, Appellants did not include Respondent’s Reply Brief in the Appendix.  Respondent respectfully refers this Court to a portion of the Reply Brief solely to demonstrate that he raised an argument below concerning Rule 4:50-1 which, while referenced in the Opinion (Pa4 at top) but not analyzed, is another reason why the Order must be affirmed.  See Rule 2:6-1(a)(2).  The pertinent portion of the Reply Brief is set forth in Respondent’s Appendix at Da19 to Da26.  7.  Appellants’ Failure to Move to Vacate the Consent Order Under R. 4:50-1 and Their Inability to Meet Their Extraordinary Burden
[brief] However, we have greater concerns about the privacy implications of sending confidential and protected data to unregulated, third-party mail vendors.  (We note that *Hunstein I* did not have a data breach case before them they did not address these concerns.)  In the wake of numerous data breaches,\(^1\) disseminating confidential and sensitive financial information to unregulated third parties, which is prohibited by the FDCPA, increases the risk of the invasion consumer’s privacy since there are more copies of the consumers’ data without their knowledge.  Indeed, data brokers, who are unregulated like mail vendors, have been subject to massive data breaches.  *See, e.g.*, https://www.nclc.org/national-public-data-breach-shows-urgent-need-for-cfpb-to-regulate-data-brokers/ (accessed Aug. 26, 2024).
[brief] After putting the phone back together and charging it, [...] called the number for the only saved contact in the phone, named "[...]" (17T29-9 to 22;24T31-3 to 23).  "[...]" answered and told [...] that he knew who owned the phone and that he would pick it up on "Saturday" (17T29-22 to 17T30-3).  But "[...]" never came to get the phone (17T30-7 to 9).  Instead, a couple of days later, an officer from the Prosecutor's Office called the phone (17T30-15 to 22).  [...] met with the police on March 14, 2017 (17T35-3 to 5).
[brief] Applying the figures in the aforementioned reports, the $12,827,154.42 contamination damages for the pre-2010 period determined by [...] attributable to [...] are $4,859,569.62 (37.89%), and the damages attributable to [...] are $3,314,840.83 (25.84%).  The remaining damages of $4,652,743.96 (36.27%) are to be absorbed by [...].  These figures fall well within the policy limits for both insurers.
[directive] CUSTODY AND CONTROL OF SEIZED OR SURRENDERED WEAPONS  A.  Any department-issued weapon, which is seized or surrendered in connection with a domestic violence incident, is to be returned to the custody and control of the department which issued that weapon.  2 (9/00)  Seizure of Weapons from Municipal and County Law Enforcement Officers  B.  All other weapons owned, possessed, or controlled by the officer, which are seized or surrendered, are to be promptly forwarded to the county Prosecutor’s Office in the county where the seizure of weapons took place in accordance with the procedures set forth in the Attorney General’s Guidelines on Police Response Procedures in Domestic Violence Cases and the County Prosecutor’s Procedures for the seizure and transportation of firearms to the Prosecutor’s Office in accordance with the provisions of 2C:25-21d.
[directive] This information sharing with law enforcement, including law enforcement at [...], and [...] is permitted pursuant to the Emergency Health Powers Act, specifically NJSA 26:13-17 (a)(4) and (b)(5).  The information sharing with EMS and firefighters is permitted pursuant to the Emergency Health Powers Act, specifically N.J.S.A. 26:13-17(a)(1).  Additionally, when a single POC from any of the above mentioned CAD systems or equivalent confidential records management system receives a list of names and addresses of individuals cleared from isolation or where 30 days have passed since testing positive for COVID-19, the single POC will immediately and permanently remove and delete the flag in the CAD system.  In all cases the single POC will permanently remove and delete all COVID-19 flags in the CAD system and permanently destroy all emails containing names and addresses of individuals who tested positive for COVID-19, or any other information or records containing information about individuals who tested positive for COVID-19, immediately upon the Governor’s declaration that the public health emergency has ended.
[brief] Docket No. [...]  [...], on behalf of herself and those similarly situated, Plaintiff-Appellant,: CIVIL ACTION ON APPEAL FROM THE FINAL JUDGMENT OF THE SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY v. LAW DIVISION, HUDSON COUNTY [...]; and JOHN DOES 1 to 10, Defendant-Respondents.: Trial Court Docket No. [...] Sat Below: HON. [...], J.S.C. DATE: November 18, 2024  REPLY BRIEF AND APPENDIX ON BEHALF OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT [...]  [...] (NJ Attorney ID 026122011) [...] [...] (NJ Attorney ID 309612022) [...] [...]  [...]  Tel. & Fax: [...]  Attorneys for [...], née [...], Plaintiff-Appellant
[brief] Pa699-Pa702.  By Orders dated August 30, 2024, the Trial Court denied [...]’s Order to Show Cause seeking to enjoin the Hackensack Arbitration and granted [...]’s motion to compel arbitration and dismiss the Complaint (the “Initial Orders”).  Pa44.  Concerning the threshold issue of whether the Court or the arbitrator was to determine the application of the entire controversy doctrine, the Trial Court found that “the Court, not arbitrator, is to decide the issue of whether the Second Arbitration is precluded by the entire controversy doctrine. ”  Pa42.  The Trial Court then went on to find that during the PTA Arbitration, [...] did not have a “fair and reasonable opportunity to have fully litigated” its claims for nonpayment concerning the Hackensack Project and the Final Award did not indicate that damages to [...] were offset by [...]’s claims as the subcontractor on the Hackensack Project.  Pa43.  The Court also correctly concluded that [...]’s Hackensack Project claims were not ripe at the time of the PTA Arbitration because [...] (the general contractor that engaged [...] to act as completion subcontractor) had not yet obtained a final award in its arbitration with the Hackensack Project owner.  Pa20.  Dissatisfied with the Trial Court’s well supported finding that the entire controversy doctrine could not and does not apply to [...]’s Hackensack Project claims, on September 12, 2024, [...] filed a Motion for Reconsideration of Orders Entered August 30, 2024 (“Motion for Reconsideration”).  Pa960-Pa961.  By Order dated October 15, 2024, the Trial Court granted [...]’s Motion for Reconsideration of the Orders, reconsidered those Orders with further extensive submissions, and, upon reconsideration, again denied the relief sought by [...], issuing a second thorough Statement of Reasons detailing the Court’s analysis and reasoning (“Reconsideration Order,” and together with the Initial Orders, the “Orders”).  Pa11-Pa22.  On October 18, 2024, [...] then filed a motion to stay the Hackensack Arbitration pending the resolution of this appeal.  Pa962-Pa963.  By Order dated November 22, 2024, the Trial Court relied upon the relaxed standards for a stay pending appeal under Rule 2:9-5(c) in granting [...]’s motion for a stay of the Hackensack Arbitration pending [...]’s appeal of the Orders.  Pa970-Pa977.  ARGUMENT
[brief] In this regard, Plaintiff repeatedly referred to affected union members (plural).  Yet, nowhere in the Amended Complaint did Plaintiff set forth any of the following: - the individuals allegedly denied reasonable accommodation - the condition(s) of any such individual as a qualifying disability under the LAD - the work-related limitations of any such individual due to any such condition suffered from and the duration and dates of same - that any such individual was in need of any accommodation to allow him to perform the essential functions of his job - that any such individual requested a reasonable accommodation, when and from whom - identification of any specific form of accommodation that any such individual was in need of and any effective alternative forms of accommodation - that the City denied the request made by any such individual, when, by whom and the reasons given.
[brief] Upon his initial encounter with the defendant, after the defendant crashed his vehicle into a telephone pole and drove a short distance away, [...] smelled the “strong odor” of alcohol prior to administering field sobriety tests (1T 15-1 to 15-6).  The defendant admitted to having two beers at the scene when [...] asked him if he had anything to drink.  (1T 15-19 to 16-11).
[directive] Familiarization training should be conducted for those superior officers who are responsible for supervising or overseeing K-9 teams and operations as well as for other officers and recruits within the agency.  This training should minimally consist of familiarization with the capabilities of agency K-9 patrol teams and K-9 specialty teams, 13 7/2002 K-9 Training Standards and Qualification Requirements procedures to be followed in conjunction with the utilization of K-9 teams, and proper conduct around K-9 teams.  The course should be conducted by a K-9 trainer, supervising K-9 trainer, or police officer handler.  Familiarization training is appropriate not only for recruits, veteran officers and supervising officers who are employed by an agency which operates a K-9 unit, but also for recruits, veteran officers and supervising officers whose employing agencies do not operate K-9 units, should the agency call for K-9 assistance from a neighboring community.
[brief] In furtherance of [...]’s contract, it was responsible for ensuring that [...] adhered to its contractual responsibilities for the maintenance and protection of traffic.  (Pa1271).  In fact, [...]’s resident engineer testified that [...] had a proactive duty to inspect and identity things such as settlement in the travel portion of the road.  (Pa0678 at 20:25 to Pa0679 at 21:1-7).  In the event that settlement was identified, [...] had a responsibility to ensure that either temporary paving take place and/or warning signs were used.  (Pa0689 at 63:18 to Pa0690 at 64:1-7).  When viewing that facts in the light most favorable to the Plaintiffs, the T&M memo placed [...] on notice of the settlement that caused Plaintiff’s accident.  (Pa1187); (Pa1191).  [...] also knew, or should have known, that it was dangerous.  The T&M memo described the settlement as being so significant that it was recommend to be fixed “immediately”.  (Pa1193).  Therefore, [...] had a duty to act and to protect the traveling public.
[brief] Recognition of the Legislature’s specific aim to elevate the violation of the duty that a parent owes a child, led the *Miller* Court to reverse the Appellate Division’s judgment merging the two offenses.  *Id.* at 120-21; see also *State v. D.R.*, 109 N.J. 348, 377 (1988) (dictum following *Miller* precluding merger of a father’s endangering and the aggravated sexual assault of his daughter).
[brief] The Zoning Board made the legal determination that the current use of Lot 5 for an off-site parking for Lot 8 staff/attendees is not a permitted accessory use in the ROP Zone or as an accessory to a private school use as per §18-906 (Da1-6).  The plaintiffs made no sensible argument that this legal determination is not correct.  Obviously, even if such off-site parking use were permitted under current Regulations, there would be Bulk Variances and Site Plan Approval required, with parking space markings, drive aisles, fire lanes, direction signs, and entry/exit drives marked, and adequate pedestrian ways defined and in place.  The facts and simple logic would dictate that an off-site parking use for a different property/use on a school yard is not a current permitted use.  The proponent of this nonconforming use failed to produce any evidence to the Board that this off-site parking use was legally permitted at the use’s commencement (approximately 1964).  That this nonconforming parking morphed into use pursuant to an agreement (or easement) granted by the then Lot 5 owner (Da23) is not relevant to whether it is a valid preexisting nonconforming use under Zoning.  There was no proof or evidence that now nonconforming was legal and permitted at the time of its inception and/or that there ever was a zoning variance and/or site approval for this off-site parking use.
[brief] [...]’s Independent Contractor Status  At all relevant times, [...] provided support services to [...] as an independent contractor.  (Pa571-Pa572 at T29:20-30:14; Pa795-Pa796 at T41:12-42:8, 51:5-52:2; Da109-Da114; Da681 at T32:9-19; Da591-Da609).  [...] worked for [...] for approximately three years.  (Da108-Da109; Da589-Da590).  [...] testified at her deposition consistent with the fact that she was at all times exclusively employed by [...].  (Pa333 at T34:17-35:23; Da115-Da116).  [...]’ employee handbook stipulated that [...] was responsible for all terms and conditions of [...]’s employment.  (Da114-Da115; Da610-Da665).  [...]’s performance was also exclusively supervised by [...].  (Pa332 at T32:9-19; Pa333 at T34:17-35:23; Pa571-Pa572 at T29:20-30:14; Pa795-Pa796 at T41:12-42:8; Pa798 at T51:5-52:2; Da110-117; Da607).  [...] had no input into what skills [...] could use in accomplishing her job duties.
[brief] **FACTOR 10 – ORDER OR SEQUENCE SET**  1.  In her report, [...] notes the employer sets the order and sequence of duties to be performed and the Judge sets the sequence.  (Pa95)  2.  [...] also recognized that the court calendar is set and prioritized by the administrative officers of the court or the Municipal Court Judge but believed the Petitioner met the definition of independent contractor since the Township did not know how she performed her services outside of the Court sessions.  (Pa95)  3.  This was another Factor that [...] notes was not a strong indicator of independent contractor status.  (Pa95)  4.  Petitioner testified extensively that she has no control over the cases she is required to prosecute nor the times she is required to prosecute those cases.  (T13-19 and T26-3)  5.  Petitioner also testified she is required to prepare Plea by Mail forms for cases she is provided, and the form is supplied to her by the Court Administrator for which she has no authority to change.  (T15-9)  6.  In addition, Petitioner testified extensively that she is required to provide plea offers on the Municipal Case Resolution system within five (5) days.  (T17-8)  She also testified she is sequenced by the Township Zoning Officers, Code Enforcement Officers and Animal Control Officers on ordinance violation cases and how each of these Township officials want the cases to proceed.  (T21-10)  7.  Once again, [...] testified she had no information, nor did she update her report about the Pandemic and the Plea by Mail and Municipal Case Resolution Systems are completely controlled by the Court Administrator and Municipal Court Judge.  (T171-22)
[brief] 4 State Statutes Endangered and Nongame Species Conservation Act, N.J.S.A. 23:2A-1 et seq. .................................................................  24 Flood Hazard Area Control Act, N.J.S.A. 58:16A-50 et seq. ...................... 3, 4, 24 Freshwater Wetlands Protection Act ......................................................... 27, 28 N.J.S.A. 13:9B-1, et seq.  .............................................................................  27 N.J.S.A. 40:55D–93 to 99 ...........................................................................  6 N.J.S.A. 58:16A-50b ..................................................................................  3 N.J.S.A. 58:16A-52(a) ...............................................................................  4 N.J.S.A. 58:16A-55(a) ...............................................................................  4 Regulations N.J.A.C. 5.8-5.9 .........................................................................................  9 N.J.A.C. 7:7 ...............................................................................................  24 N.J.A.C. 7:7A ............................................................................................ 24 N.J.A.C. 7:7A-1 ......................................................................................... 27 N.J.A.C. 7:8–5.3(a) .................................................................................. 8 N.J.A.C. 7:8–5.3(b) .................................................................................. 8 N.J.A.C. 7:8–5.6(b)3 ................................................................................ 22 N.J.A.C. 7:8-5.2(h) .................................................................................. 14 N.J.A.C. 7:8-5.4(b)1 ................................................................................ 14 N.J.A.C. 7:8-5.6 ...................................................................................... 20, 22 N.J.A.C. 7:8-5.6(b) .................................................................................. 21 PRELIMINARY STATEMENT This appeal is part of a series of challenges by objectors, [...] (“[...]” or “Plaintiffs”), to impede [...]’s (“[...]”) proposed development of property located in [...], known as the [...].
[brief] For example, in *United States ex rel. Kuriyan v. HCSC Ins. Servs. Co.*, 2021 WL 5238332 (D.N.M. Jan. 29, 2021), a relator used a patented model to analyze raw data that had been provided to him by the State of New Mexico, that is, data that the government already had.  In doing so, he discovered anomalies.  Application of the relator’s patented model resulted in identification of the misconduct and that defendants had acted with scienter.  *Id.*  The court held that the relator was an original source.  *Id.* (citing *United States ex rel. Reed v. KeyPoint Gov’t Sols.*, 923 F.3d 729, 751 (10th Cir. 2019) (asking whether disclosed information obviated need for government to comb through transactions to find wrongdoers)).  The Court should reach the same result here.