ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] As argued in Point I of our initial brief, the doctrine of “common knowledge negligence” allows a number of cases similar to ours to proceed without expert testimony.  Another line of cases allowing Appellants to proceed without expert testimony arises from the insurance industry.  In *Rider v. Lynch*, 42 N.J. 465 (1964), our Supreme Court reversed an order of dismissal and allowed a case to proceed against an insurance broker for failure to procure sufficient coverage, despite plaintiff’s lack of an expert, based solely on an analysis of the facts of the case presented by fact witnesses.  (Id. at 476; See also, *Sobotor v. Prudential Property & Cas. Ins. Co.*, 200 N.J. Super. 333 (App Div. 1984). )  For similar reasons, the summary judgement dismissing the Complaint should be reversed and the case should be restored to the trial list.
[brief] ”  Buono v. Bd. of Trs., Teachers’ Pension & Annuity Fund, 188 N.J. Super. 488, 493 (App. Div. 1983).  Contrary to [...]’s assertions, (Pb12-13), the Board considered its inherent power as well as his affidavit and the affidavits of the other troopers that he submitted in support of his contention that he did not receive the postcard.
[brief] Rather, the “overall intent of the Legislature is clear from the plain text of N.J.S.A. 2A:15-5.3(a): a plaintiff is entitled to full recovery from any joint tortfeasor found to be at least sixty present liable. ”  *Carbajal v. Patel*, 468 N.J. Super. 139, 154 (App. Div. 2021).  This is also “supported by the statute’s legislative history. ”  *Id.* at 155.  Although the Legislature enacted the JTCL to “relieve the inequity of imposing the entire burden on one of several joint tortfeasors,” the law “does not diminish the liability of a joint tortfeasor to the plaintiff. ”  Ramos v. Browning Ferris Industries, Inc., 103 N.J. 177, 183 (1986).  Thus, the Legislature created a scheme where “a plaintiff who is injured by two defendants may collect all his damages from any direct defendant found to be sixty percent or more negligent. ”  Brodsky v. Grinnell Haulers, Inc., 181 N.J. 102, 110 (2004).  Then, a “defendant compelled to pay more than his percentage may seek contribution from a joint tortfeasor. ”  Ibid.; see N.J.S.A. 2A:15-5.3(e).
[brief] [Id. at 533.]  Likewise, applying Weinberg, supra, in the case of Ebert v. S. Jersey Gas. Co., 260 N.J.Super. 104 (Law Div. 1992), the court found that a gas company could not be granted summary judgment on the issue of negligence.  Holding such a utility company subject to liability for its negligent conduct serves the interest of public policy:  In the same vein, what public policy is served when we allow a negligent provider of services and product to pass the costs of its own negligence on to an insurance carrier?  Defendant, [...], is subject to a duty to properly install and thereafter inspect and maintain its system.  That duty is an important one in that the product, natural gas, has dangerous propensities if allowed to get out of control.  [...] although a public utility must be accountable for its negligence and cannot be allowed to pass on such costs to a fire insurance carrier.  Liability gives an incentive to [...] to render its services and product with a reasonable degree of care.  [Id. at 109-10.]  It is, therefore, clear that Weinberg, supra, and its progeny maintain immunity for a public company only on the issue of subrogation due to contractual issues, but the immunity does not extend to negligence claims.
[directive] Administrative Investigations  Only  1.  I am being questioned as a subject of an investigation by this agency into potential violations of department rules and regulations, or for my fitness for duty.  This investigation concerns 2.  This is an administrative investigation.  I will be asked questions specifically, narrowly and directly related to the performance of my duties, or for not answering truthfully.  3.  I may be subject to departmental discipline for refusing to answer a question directly related to the performance of my duties, or for not answering truthfully.  4.  I have the right to consult with a representative of my collective bargaining unit, or another representative of my choice, and have him or her present during the interview.  5.  I acknowledge that this investigation is confidential, and I am hereby ordered not to disclose any information discussed during this interview.  Signature: _______________________  Print Name: ______________________  Date: _____________  Time: _________  Witnessed by: ___________________________  Print name: _____________________________  Appendix K
[brief] This statute states, in pertinent part:  "B.  An individual shall be disqualified from employment under this act if that individual's criminal history background check reveals a record of conviction of any of the following crimes and offenses:  …  (c)  A crime or offense involving the manufacture, transportation, sale, possession, or habitual use of a controlled substance … "  Id.  The statute further states that any equivalent crime in an out of state jurisdiction would also apply.  *Id.*  In further support of its misplaced argument that Appellant was “statutory disqualified” from holding her job position, Appellee also cited case law in its summary judgment motion.
[brief] 4 Legal Argument.................................................................  5  I.  The Impermissibility of the Contract for Sale of the Property Does Not Render the Contract Between Plaintiff and Defendants Unenforceable.............................................  6  II.  Plaintiff’s Argument in Support of Enforceability is Not a New Issue.................................................................  7  III.  Defendants’ Active Participation in and Negligence During the Property Sale Belies Its Position no Contractual or Fiduciary Duty Existed.................................................................  8  IV.  Defendants are not “Owners” of the Property and Therefore Are Not Entitled to FRFPA Protection...........................................  10  V.  No Expert is Required to Explain That Issuing Title Insurance to the Wrong Party and Releasing a Client’s Funds Without Title is Negligence.................................................................  11  VI.  The Authority Submitted by [...] in Support of a Semi-Learned Professional Exception to the Consumer Fraud Act was Explicitly Overturned in 2019...........................................  13  Conclusion..............................................................................  14  TABLE OF CITATIONS
[brief] These are all unresolved relevant questions.  What would the appellant’s status have been if he went on unpaid leave but applied for and received unemployment during the expanded unemployment rules during COVID19?  The Board’s decision erred by specifically penalizing the appellant because he received unemployment during the COVID19 shut down.  [Pa54,55]  Under the circumstances presented, whichever choice the appellant made he would have been out of work for six months and would have received unemployment for at least part of that time.  There was no record of, or appreciation of these facts in the Board’s decision.  There is no question that the appellant was a Civil Service employee.
[brief] To be sure, the court’s decision severely undercut the plaintiff’s ability to present admissible compelling evidence in support of her case.  In short, the court’s ruling was not harmless, but rather “was clearly capable of producing an unjust result. ”  \textit{R.} 2:10-2.  The issue was re-visited by the plaintiff’s counsel and the court in plaintiff’s Notice of Motion for a New Trial and supporting documents.  (Pa52 – Pa99).
[brief] TABLE OF AUTHORITIES  **Court Rules:** - Rule 2:6-1(a)  Brief page no. 1 - Rule 2:5-4(a)  Brief page no. 1 - Rule 4:49-2  Brief page no. 8 - Rule 4:12-2  Brief page no. 8 - N.J.S.A. 47:1A-3  Brief page no. 14 - Rule 4:52  Brief page no. 17  **Ordinances:** - C. 39:4-197.6.  Brief page no. 3, 27 - C. 39:4-197.5  Brief page no. 3, 27  **Chapter 126 Code** - Brief page no. 5  **Federal:** - Title VIII  Fair Housing Act Brief page no. 7, 22 - 6th Amendment Brief page no. 29 - 14th Amendment Brief page no. 29 - 5th Amendment Brief page no. 29  **Case Law:** - *State v. Mohammed*, 226 N.J. 71, 87 (2016)
[brief] Defense counsel argued [...] showed no signs of slurred speech, had no difficulty communicating with the officers, no issue getting out of his oversized truck, and he had no issues swaying or walking.  (2T40:6-41:4.)  Defense counsel further argued [...] had admitted that he believed [...] was tired.  (2T41:22-42:18.)  Defense counsel also argued that [...] did not follow any training to perform the standardized field sobriety tests, and that the flashing overhead lights of [...]’ vehicle affected [...]’s ability to complete the standardized field sobriety tests.
[directive] f, If the weapon is related to a Narcotics case, in addition to this section, see Section 3 above.  g.  In cases involving juvenile defendants who have been charged, except in Homicide cases, and where there is no referral of the case to another court, with or without the juvenile’s consent, a request for destruction authorization may be submitted 4 years after the final adjudication or disposition of all juvenile defendants or upon release from custody, whichever is later.  Evidence in juvenile cases which are referred (waived) to another court, or in which there are adult co-defendants, shall be subject to the retention periods for adult cases.  Attorney General Guidelines - Evidence Retention -January Page 7 2011 h.
[brief] (204a [14:5-17]).  Despite [...]’s testimony that they disbursed funds based on [...]’s instructions, and his assurance that he would secure the proper deed, [...] never memorialized this in writing in any form or fashion.  (204a-205a [17:19-18:2]).  According to [...], “[h]e just told us, and we remembered that there was going to be a second deed. ” (205a [18:1-2]).  [...] could not recall another time in her five years working for [...] that she disbursed funds without having a valid deed executed by the seller.
[brief] (1T). \(^1\)  During oral argument, Counsel for Plaintiffs conveyed the following about Plaintiffs’ status as sophisticated parties and whether they had prior representation:  [...]:  Also I just want to note briefly.  Counsel said that my clients are not unsophisticated.  Your Honor, my clients names are Jai, J-a-i, Wang, W-a-n-g, and Xiaodong, X-i-a-o-d-o-n-g, Jiang.  And I can represent to you that English is not their first language.  THE COURT: But they were represented by counsel though, weren't they?  [...]:  Well, they had a real estate lawyer.  And, quite honestly, Your Honor, I don't think --- \(^1\) 1T = Transcript of August 25, 2023.  2T = Transcript of October 20, 2023.  3T = Transcript of April 26, 2024. that the polestar is whether a real estate lawyer took note of the infirmity of the arbitration clause.  Real estate lawyers do not necessarily keep track of Supreme Court Rulings and Litigation matters.  So it is part of the mosaic, but I would submit a very minor part.  [1T 15:15 to 16:4.]  On September 26, 2023, [...] entered an Order denying the OTSC and striking through the relief as described in Plaintiffs’ proposed form of Order filed on June 27, 2023.
[brief] As noted above, this appeal involves only plaintiffs’ claim for an implied easement.  Plaintiffs’ claims for an express easement and for a prescriptive easement were separately dismissed and are not part of [...] and [...]’s appeal.  Inc. v. Miller Family Farms, 266 N.J. Super. 283, 294 (App. Div. 1993) (stating that “implied easements must be established by proofs which are clear and convincing as to all elements”); A. J. & J. O. Pilar, Inc. v. Lister Corp., 38 N.J. Super. 488, 498-500 (App. Div.), aff’d, 22 N.J. 75 (1956) (stating that “the proof of all of the requisite and essential elements of an alleged implied grant should be clear and convincing”).
[brief] Pa1990 to Pa2273.  In the sample case of a restaurant that lost its store lease, or was evicted for non-payment of rent, it does not mean the tenant ipso facto forfeits its ownership to its liquor license, its tables and chairs, its equipment, its trademark and copyrights, its architectural and engineering plans to remodel and renovate the premises.  Such basic principles of commerce and business law are understood and applied daily across the 50 states.  Regrettably, the motion judge misunderstood this basic principle and held, ipso facto, that, because Appellants had “lost” the tenancy on [...]’s land, there was no remedy for Fiberville’s resale of Appellants’ Solar Rights; no remedy against the buyer who effectively asserted ownership over the Solar Rights paid-for and owned by Appellants; and no remedy for all the events that flowed from the deeply flawed analysis.
[brief] Defendant informed [...] that he wished to speak with his parents via telephone.  (1T:73-15 to 73-20).  [...] informed defendant that because his cell phone was seized as evidence, it could not be turned over to him.  (1T:73-21 to 74-6).  [...] testified that because defendant was in custody and his cell phone was evidence, he could not leave defendant alone in the room with the phone and risk the phone being manipulated and anything being erased.  Ibid.  Before making the calls, [...] informed defendant that he was being recorded and that he would be staying in the room with defendant.  (1T:74-7 to 74-15).  [...] specifically stated that the audio would not be turned off and that defendant could not touch the phone.  Ibid.  Defendant agreed to these conditions.  Ibid.  The recording capabilities in Room 1 remained as they were the first time defendant was interviewed by [...].  (1T:74-16 to 74-20).  The recording of defendant’s phone calls to his parents was played during the motion to suppress.  (1T:77-15 to 77-17).
[brief] Stripped of their subjective narrative and gloss, Plaintiff’s allegations \(^1\)  The CAIR Defendants reserve, and do not waive, their arguments below that the statements are substantially true and/or opinions based on disclosed facts. are simply a different perspective of the same incident.  In both versions, [...] was aware of the child’s religious practices.  In both versions, [...] did not have permission from the student to touch her head covering.  In both versions, [...] touched the head covering, exposing the child’s hair as a result.  In both versions, Plaintiff verbally acknowledged what she had done.  Plaintiff insists that only her version of these events is believable.
[brief] (Pa49-67; 3T107:17-108:14).  This was also true for the general ledgers of [...].  (Pa68-146).  Plaintiff and Defendant each used the pharmacy account for personal expenses.  (3T124:13-19).  Each personal draw would go against each other’s respective profits in business.  (3T107:15-18; 3T168:13-169:16).  Relating to each check drawn on the pharmacy’s account that Defendant was asked about at trial, Defendant testified that those checks and expenses were “under her personal draw” or that she never claimed the check as a business expense, meaning it was personal expense to be applied as a draw against her share of profit in the company.  (3T129:14-139:13).  In June 2019, just after the sale of [...] to [...], Defendant attempted to sit down with Plaintiff to reconcile all the credit card statements and expenses.
[brief] ”  Ibid. (citation omitted).  Here, the court found aggravating factor one, and gave it medium to heavy weight, based on the facts that [...] was “unarmed” and “innocent”; the shooting occurred in an “isolated area”; [...] “use[d] a weapon, a firearm, not once at close range, but even when the body was on the ground to fire multiple shots”; and based on “the senseless nature without any explanation. ” (9T 39-15  However, all of those circumstances were already accounted for within the commission of the crime itself and did not amount to “an especially heinous, cruel, or depraved manner.
[brief] A.  THE INCIDENT REPORT WAS AUTHENTICATED AND THEREFORE ADMISSIBLE  With the Defendant’s own authentication of the Incident Report as admissions of a party opponent, the Incident Report properly should have been admitted for all purposes.  See NJ Court Rules 4:17-8(a) and 4:16-1(a) and (b).  The Defendant’s insistence that the Plaintiff was somehow required to authenticate the Report as a “Business Record” is without merit and immaterial to the issue.  In conclusion, the Defendant’s argument to exclude the Incident Report represents nothing more than a complete disregard of established Rules of Evidence, and is an assault on common sense.
[brief] Page  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT  1  PROCEDURAL HISTORY & STATEMENT OF FACTS  2  ARGUMENT I.  THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN PROHIBITING  EVIDENCE OF SUBSEQUENT  REMEDIAL MEASURES BY DEFENDANT  2  A.  EXCLUDING THE TESTIMONY OF ARLENE CASTELLO WAS IMPROPER UNDER EVID.  R. 407 AND EVID.  R. 403 3  B.  USE OF SUBSEQUENT REMEDIAL MEASURES AND LAY WITNESS TESTIMONY FOR IMPEACHMENT OF EXPERT  WITNESS WAS IMPROPERLY EXCLUDED  5  C.  EXCLUDING ALL EVIDENCE OF FLOOR MOPPING AND HAZARD SIGNS WAS IMPROPER PURSUANT TO EVID.  R. 407  6  II.  THE COURT IMPROPERLY PROHIBITED INTRODUCTION OF DEFENDANT’S INCIDENT REPORT
[brief] (Da190.)  Pursuant to the PSA, [...] deposited $1,640,000 as a down payment with a third-party escrow agent.  (Da30.)  The PSA initially called for a closing on January 14, 2022, however, time was not made of the essence.  (Da191-192.)  The closing date was subsequently amended to February 15, 2022.  (Da275.)  The closing date under the PSA was again pushed back from February 15 without a specific date or a formal amendment to the PSA.  (Da185.)  Again, time was never made of the essence.  Of particular importance to this appeal, Article 13 § 13.10 of the PSA provided for the provision of an estoppel certificate by [...] to [...] (the “Estoppel Provision”).
[brief] Yet, these alternatives would not have done what the NJLAD requires of [...] – to take effective measures to end the harassment.  Lehman, 132 N.J. at 623.  For example, throughout the briefings and arguments in this case, Plaintiff has continually argued that [...] “could have” started their own investigation; yet, the undisputed facts establish: (1) that the [...] had already began a EEO Investigation into Plaintiff’s claims; and (2) [...] continued to work in the [...] during the pendency of the investigation.  (Pa899; Pa723, Defendant [...] deposition transcript, T40:11-17).  Thus, Plaintiff’s example of a reasonable measure, would have left her in the alleged sexually harassing place of employment.  Further, Plaintiff’s claim that [...] should have put her out on paid leave, is so ironic, the irony is too obvious to state.  Accordingly, the Trial Court was correct in finding that [...] could not control [...], and took the only reasonably effective measure it could to end the harassment – transferring Plaintiff out of the physical location where the harassment allegedly occurred.
[brief] Respectfully submitted, [...]  ESSEX COUNTY PROSECUTOR  ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT s/[...] - No. 279742018  Assistant Prosecutor Appellate Section Of Counsel and on the Brief  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. [...] IND. NO. [...] STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. [...], Defendant-Appellant.  CRIMINAL ACTION  On Appeal from a Judgment of Conviction of the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Essex County.  Sat Below: Hon. [...], J.S.C., and a jury.  BRIEF AND APPENDIX ON BEHALF OF DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
[directive] These funds shall be used solely for law to enforcement purposes shall be documented in writing by which the agency executive and approved use by the county prior to prosecutor.  2-  Disbursements from MLETA or MEA shall be as follows:  a.  The agency executive shall authorize disbursements from MLETA only after obtaining approval from the county prosecutor.  Before funds are expended from MLETA the agency executive shall notify the county prosecutor of the intended expenditure.  This notification shall include, at a th.e minimum: date, amount to be disbursed, description of rdquested property, purpose/reason of disbursement, person/company/agency receiving the funds, an indication of proposed law enforcement use and the signature of the $5,000 agency executive.
[brief] Both the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 1-16 ("FAA") and New Jersey Arbitration Act, (hereinafter "NJAA") N.J.S.A. 2A:23B-6 (a), are applicable in the present cases.  Under the FAA, arbitration agreements are “valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract. ”  9 U.S.C. § 2.  "The 'principal purpose' of the FAA is to ‘ensur[e] that private arbitration agreements are enforced according to their terms'" (federal policy requires rigorous enforcement of arbitration agreements).  *AT & T Mobility, LLC v. Concepcion*, 563 U.S. 333, 334 (2011).  However, the FAA "permits states to regulate . . . arbitration agreements under general contract principles."  *Atalese v. U.S. Legal Servs. Grp, L.P.*, 219 N.J. 430, 441 (2014); see also *Leodori v. CIGNA Corp.*, 175 N.J. 293, 302 (2003) ("[A] state is permitted to regulate agreements, including those that relate to arbitration, by applying its contract-law principles that are relevant in a given case.").  Section 2 of the FAA creates a heavy presumption in favor of arbitrability that requires courts to resolve all doubt as to the scope of arbitrable issues in favor of arbitration.
[brief] Therefore, under N.J.A.C. 4A:5-2.2(c), the appellant needed to be appointed or removed from the PC1557A promotional eligible list.  (AA0005-6) (emphasis added).  However, the Respondent Commission failed to require the [...] to appoint Appellant pursuant to operation of N.J.A.C. 4A:5-2.2, even though at no point in the disposition of the Certification or in opposition to the list bypass appeal did the [...] formally request the removal of Appellant from the certified list.
[brief] Pa65; see also DiTrolio, 142 N.J. at 267 (reiterating that an objective of the ECD is “the avoidance of piecemeal decisions”); Wm. Blanchard Co. v. Beach Concrete Co., 150 N.J. Super. 277, 294 (App. Div. 1977) (“withholding is by definition unfair if its effect is to render the pending litigation merely one inning of the whole ball game”); Crispin v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 96 N.J. 336, 348 (1984) (requiring “that a party who has elected to hold back from the first proceeding a related component of the controversy be barred from thereafter raising it in a subsequent proceeding”).  Here, [...] expressly alleged in its Counterclaim in the First Arbitration that it is “owed $2.1 million” on the Hackensack Project.  Pa201 ¶ 46.  [...] also sought “an award declaring that [...] is not entitled to any further payments on the Hackensack Project. ”  Pa207 ¶ 80.  It is therefore beyond dispute that [...] knew of its $2.1 million Hackensack claim throughout the entirety of the First Arbitration.  And [...] either argued these alleged damages in the First Arbitration (which [...] undoubtedly did, in part), or [...] elected to withhold this claim in that proceeding.  The trial court therefore erred by relegating [...]’s express $2.1 million claim in its Counterclaim as mere “background information. ”  Pa21.  The trial court’s reasoning goes more to “res judicata” and ignores completely the ECD (and the prohibition against claim-splitting)—the trial court acknowledged that [...] knew of its $2.1 million claim, but nonetheless blessed [...]’s decision to withhold that claim and spring it on [...] in a Second Arbitration.
[brief] (See PA092.)  See also, e.g., Ellin v. Credit One Bank, No. 15-2694, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 153533, at *6–9 (D.N.J. Nov. 12, 2015) (enforcing arbitration agreement where first few sentences of cardholder agreement stated that use of card constituted acceptance of cardholder terms and conditions, which included agreement to arbitrate).