ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] This Court can objectively assess de novo subjective observations of [...]’s speech, stance, and gait recorded on video (State v. S.S., 229 N.J. 360, 379 (2017))—observations even the arresting officer believed did not establish probable cause to arrest [...] for DWI (7T44-10/47-2).  Reliance on one-leg-stand and walk-and-turn tests, while supportive of --- \(^4\)  Transcripts are cited to by page and line as suggested in R. 2:6-8—e.g., page 12, line 18, to page 14, line 2, of the August 3, 2023, transcript is cited as “7T12-18/14-2. ”  probable cause to arrest, does not constitute proof of intoxication in this case based on (a) the stated purpose of such standardized field sobriety tests [“SFSTs”] to only support an arrest decision due to its conceded imprecision (see authorities cited at Db25-26) and (b) de novo review of video (Ibid.).
[brief] ...........................................16  BATTAGLIA v UNITED PARCEL SERV., INC.  214 N.J. 518, 547 (2013)  .................................................................19,24 BELL v TWP.OF STAFFORD, 110 N.J. 384, 390-91 (1988)  .............................................................42  BOLES v WAL-MART STORES, INC., Civil Action No. 12-1762 (JLL), 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41926, at *23 (D.N.J. Mar. 26, 2014)  ....................................12,18,31  BOYD v RIGGS DISTLER & CO., Civil Action No.: 1:20-cv-14008-KMW-EAP, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 233060, at *26 (D.N.J. Dec. 29, 2022)  ..............45  CALABOTTA v PHIBRO ANIMAL HEALTH CORP., 460 N.J. Super. 38, 60-61 (App. Div. 2019)  .....................................46  CITIZEN ACTION v RIVIERA MOTEL CORP., 296 N.J. Super. 402, 415 (App. Div. 1997)  .......................................20  DELANOY v TP. OF OCEAN, 245 N.J. 384, 402 (2021)  ...............................................................15  DIAL, INC. V CITY OF PASSAIC, 443 N.J. Super. 492, 513 (App. Div. 2016) .....................................23,31
[brief] The prior Appellate opinion did not mention Tyler and the trial court refused to rule on the motion for reconsideration in light of Tyler because of jurisdiction.  Thus, [...]'s case fell through the cracks.  Second, the briefs submitted in this case clearly outline that [...]’s case has merit and that his judgment was unconstitutional.  Third, it would be unreasonable to find that [...] is acting in bad faith just to harass plaintiff and does not truly believe that he has a basis for this appeal when so many homeowners have been asking the Court for the very same relief believing they are entitled to have the Court vacate their tax foreclosure judgments based upon Tyler as well.  The merits of this case strongly support [...]’s appeal as stated above.  However, no matter how the Court rules in this appeal, there is no justification for determining the matter to be frivolous, to determine there was a violation of rules of professional conduct or to impose sanctions.  The cross motion should be denied.  **CONCLUSION**
[brief] Given this, [...] has decided that the phase-in period for these new requirements will begin September 1, 1998.  In the first year of the phase-in, 10 percent of each manufacturer’s vehicles will be required to comply with the new requirements.  In the second year, 25 percent of all vehicles must comply; in the third year, 40 percent; and in the fourth year, 70 percent.  All vehicles manufactured on or after September 1, 2002 must comply with the new requirements.
[directive] 6.  Statewide Sexual Assault Nurse Examiner Program Penalty  Do you understand that if the crime occurred on or after May 4, 2001 as a result of your guilty [Yes] [No] plea you will be required to pay a penalty of $800 for each offense for which you are pleading guilty?  7.  Civil Commitment  Do you understand that if you are convicted of a sexually violent offense, such as aggravated [Yes] [No] sexual assault, sexual assault, aggravated criminal sexual contact, kidnapping under 2C:13- 1c(2)(b), criminal sexual contact, felony murder if the underlying crime is sexual assault, an attempt to commit any of these offenses, or any offense for which the court makes a specific finding on the record that, based on the circumstances of the case, the offense should be considered a sexually violent offense, you may upon completion of your term of incarceration, be civilly committed to another facility for up to life if the court finds, after a hearing, that you are in need of involuntary civil commitment?
[directive] (5)  Any records or material prohibited from disclosure by law; (6)  Juvenile records; (7)  Any information which is the subject of a judicial order compelling confidentiality (8)  Any other information that would violate a person’s reasonable expectation of privacy; and (9)  Any information regarding law enforcement personnel, procedures, or resources that could create a risk to the safety of any person, including but not limited to law enforcement personnel.  9.6.3
[brief] ”  State v. Sims, 250 N.J. 189, 211 (2022) (quoting State v. Presha, 163 N.J. 304, 312 (2000)).  New Jersey’s state law provides “more expansive protections against self-incrimination than the Fifth Amendment. ”  *State In Interest of A.A.*, 240 N.J. 341, 358 (2020).
[brief] In an NJFCA action prosecuted by the State, the public disclosure bar never applied because it is a defense only to relator-litigated NJFCA actions.  See N.J.S.A. § 2A:32C-9(c).  The defense exists in relator-led cases because long experience with false claims acts throughout the nation led Congress and state legislatures to conclude that relator-led actions have the potential for abuse, requiring a legal defense that can act as a gatekeeper in light of the competing public policy concerns.  The federal FCA’s public disclosure bar “demonstrates repeated congressional efforts to walk a fine line between encouraging whistle-blowing and discouraging opportunistic behavior. ”  U.S. ex rel. Springfield Terminal Ry. Co. v. Quinn, 14 F.3d 645, 651 (D.C. Cir. 1994).  In enacting the public disclosure bar, “Congress sought a middle-ground between a restrictive approach that essentially eliminated the [federal] FCA’s relator provisions and a free-for-all of parasitic suits based on publicly available information.
[brief] As discussed above, Defendant, as a matter of law, could not have breached the [...], [...], the 2014 [...] or the [...] since she was not a party to those contracts.  Even if Defendant could be held liable under those contracts as a non-party, the indemnification clauses in those agreements do not provide for the payment of attorneys’ fees and costs (Da02701, 02712, 02740, and 02802).  Plaintiffs argue that trial court correctly awarded them fees and costs under Section XX of the [...] because the indemnification provision states that a member who violates the agreement shall indemnify the other members from “any and all claims, demands, and action of every kind and nature whatsoever. ”  Further, they contend that the language of the provision is clear and unambiguous (Pb81-83).  However, under scrutiny, it is evident that this clause is inapplicable to first-party claims, such as the claims asserted by Plaintiffs against Defendant, and was intended to apply only to potential third-party claims (Da02712).  Generally, “an indemnification agreement must be based upon ‘the indemnitee’s claim to obtain recovery from the indemnitor for liability incurred to a third party.
[brief] Defendant contends that a mail vendor “merely prints and sends letters” (Db1), data transmitted to mail vendor is “solely for the purpose of creating and printing letters” (Db14), and “mailing vendors [are] companies that use complex machinery to automate the process of printing and mailing letters [which] did not exist in 1978 when the FDCPA was enacted” (Db14).  There is no factual basis for any of these assertions.  Because Plaintiff (through counsel) discovered Defendant must have communicated debt information to a third party who created, printed, and mailed the collection letter, that fact is alleged.  Because Defendant has kept the recipient’s identity a secret, it has yet to be discovered how else the recipient uses the information.  For present purposes, Defendant’s assertions should be ignored.
[directive] But it appears that the eviction moratoria have had at least one unintended effect: some landlords, unable to evict tenants through lawful means, have now taken matters into their own hands.  In the most egregious cases, landlords have changed locks or shut off utilities without the tenants’ knowledge or approval, leaving residents unable to access their properties and effectively rendering them homeless.  These actions—in the middle of a global pandemic—are not simply illegal, they are inhumane.  Law enforcement agencies have an important role to play in preventing these types of illegal evictions.  In January 2006, Governor [...] signed Public Law 2005, c. 319, which clarified that only an officer of the court can execute an eviction order (formally, an New Jersey Is An Equal Opportunity Employer • Printed on Recycled Paper and is Recyclable Page 2 “execution of warrant for possession”) and made it a crime for landlords and others to evict residents using any other means, including illegal lockouts.
[brief] Defendant seeks to create the impression that there is a direct line of statutes from 1914 until today dealing with consumer lending, and that those statutes and their legislative history infer a private cause of action.  However, as with the lack of an explicit cause of action in the NJCFLA, Defendant’s claim fails here as well because there is no support for his position in the language of the laws he cites.  Specifically, the Small Loan Act, (NJSA 17:10-5 et seq., repealed by L. 1996c. 157 section 55 effective July 1 1997), did not contain a private cause of action for enforcement of the lending license, but simply provided the Commissioner with authority to issue licenses.  No legislative history is mentioned by Defendant indicating an inferred right, nor has he mentioned any court that has inferred such a private right.  Defendant further relies upon the New Jersey Consumer Loan Act (hereinafter “NJCLA”), (N.J.S.A. 17:10-19 to 26, Repealed by L. 1996, c. 157 section 55, Effective July 1 1997) but, again, the NJCLA did not provide for a private cause of action, and no legislative history is mentioned by Defendant indicating an inferred right, nor has he mentioned any court that has inferred such a private right.  Nor does the New Jersey Licensed Lenders Act, N.J.S.A. 17:16C-1 et seq. provide for a private cause of action by implication, and no legislative history is mentioned by Defendant showing an inferred right, nor has he mentioned any court that has inferred such a private right.
[brief] Here, DEP’s decision that the [...] 2019 Permit Modification met the rule because the structure did not interfere with an authorized navigational channel was based on a reasonable long-standing regulatory interpretation that is owed deference.  *In re Eastwick Coll. LPN-to-RN Bridge Program*, 225 N.J. 533, 541 (2016).  Appellant also claims that the Docks Rule required [...] to demonstrate need for the Technical Modification Permit that cannot be met with existing facilities – an argument that fares no better because it is obvious that DEP and [...] have a need to ensure that the recorded survey work for the structure represents the facts on the ground of the as-built structure.
[brief] Instead, [...] highlighted the trial evidence, including that “defendant “attacked the victim while she was sleeping.  There were no defensive wounds on the victim’s body, and the blood spatter analysis indicates the victim never got up from the supine position. ”  Thus, [...] noted, “the only passion was the force with which the defendant beat the sleeping victim. ” (9T31-11 to 32-2).  C.  The State’s burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt was never diminished.
[brief] Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 550 (1965).  See also World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 291 (1980); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976); Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 110 (1969); Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 733 (1878).  See also, Peralta v. Heights Medical Center, Inc., 485 U.S. 80, 84-85 (1988).
[brief] “A participatory interest in seized evidence extends beyond the kind of relationship that could otherwise be considered only proprietary or possessory. ”  Mollica, 114 N.J. at 339.  While the terms “proprietary” and “possessory” denote the property concepts of ownership and possession, “‘participatory’ connotes some involvement in the underlying criminal conduct in which the seized evidence is used by the participants to carry out the unlawful activity. ”  Id. at 339-40.  The participatory interest thus “stresses the relationship of the evidence to the underlying criminal activity and defendant’s own criminal role in the generation and use of such evidence. ”  Id. at 339.  In *Mollica*, the New Jersey Supreme Court held that the defendant had a participatory interest in the telephone toll records for another individual’s hotel room and therefore had standing to challenge the seizure of those records.
[directive] Nevertheless, I am certain that the Use of Force Policy and our other work will serve as a model for how jurisdictions across the country can modernize practices so as to better sustain the lives of all of our citizens, civilians, and law enforcement officers alike.  Pursuant to the authority granted to me under the New Jersey Constitution and the Criminal Justice Act of 1970, N.J.S.A. 52:17B-97 to -117, which provides for the general supervision of criminal justice by the Attorney General as chief law enforcement officer of the state in order to secure the benefits of a uniform and efficient enforcement of the criminal law and the administration of criminal justice throughout the state, I hereby direct all law enforcement and prosecuting agencies operating under the authority of the laws of the state of New Jersey to implement or adopt policies consistent with the revised Use of Force Policy, including the Policy’s addenda, appended to this Directive.  This Directive repeals and supersedes the provisions of the following Attorney General Directives: Attorney General Use of Force Policy, last revised June 2000; • New Jersey Vehicular Pursuit Policy, last revised July 2009; • Attorney General Directive 2016-3, a Directive Revising the Supplemental Policy on • Conducted Energy Devices, and all prior guidance on Conducted Energy Devices; Attorney General Supplemental Policy on Less-Lethal Ammunition, issued March • 2008; and Attorney General Approved List of Less-Lethal Ammunition, December 2010.
[brief] Defendants argue that the Restructuring Act’s residency requirements apply only at the time of appointment and not at any time thereafter.  (Db26).  Below, they argued that the N.J.S.A. 18A:65-14 was a result of a legislative compromise to allocate appointing authority.  No logical reading of the Restructuring Act could support Defendant’s contention.  Were this true, the Legislature and [...] could have agreed to identify an appointing authority without attaching residency requirements: the statute would simply state that certain individuals or certain bodies be involved in the appointment and confirmation process.  Indeed, that is the case for the six remaining gubernatorial appointees.  They must be appointed by the Governor and confirmed by the Senate.  N.J.S.A. 18A:65-14(b)(i).  These members do not even need to be residents of New Jersey.  *Kratovil*, 473 N.J. Super. 484.  The parties could have easily removed the clause “with one of these members being a resident of Camden County” to achieve the goal the Defendants here advance, but they did not do so.  Just as easily, they could have added the phrase “at the time of their appointment. ”  Defendants are effectively advocating for the rescission of the Act’s residency requirements, by adding or deleting words that just aren’t there.  Yet, the plain language of the Act is clear: it not only provides for the allocation of appointing authority, but also for the establishment of a residency requirement.  In reviewing the plain language of the Restructuring Act, the trial court was unpersuaded by Defendants’ argument that the residency requirement applied only at the time of appointment and not at any time thereafter.
[brief] A.  Background of the Case Decedent, [...] (“Decedent”), died on February 6, 2012.  (Da1).  The Decedent was a citizen and resident of the Republic of Korea at the time of his death.  (Da1).  Decedent’s widow and three children (Plaintiff, Defendant, and their sister, [...]) are the beneficiaries of Decedent’s Estate, pursuant to the laws of the Republic of Korea.  (Da2).  At the time of his death, Decedent was the majority shareholder of [...] (“[...]”), a real estate development company located in Seoul, which he founded and ran for many years.  (Da5).  B.
[brief] A brief note on the applicability of the NCA to Ordinance 17-2017.  As briefed and argued below, and properly found by the lower court, a nuisance ordinance that regulates noise nuisances, which does not establish specific decibel levels for measuring sound, is not a noise control ordinance under the NCA, and therefore, need not be submitted or approved by the NJDEP.  The NJDEP has established guidance providing an overview of the difference between a noise ordinance and a nuisance code for local governments, as those terms are defined by the NJDEP, specifically, a noise ordinance will establish standards, measurable by a certified noise investigator using a calibrated sound meter, whereas a nuisance ordinance does not establish equipment measurable standards.  Ordinance 17-2017 does not establish measurable noise standards; thus, it is not governed by the Noise Control Act and does not trigger a review by the NJDEP.
[directive] ORGAN DONATIONS/TRANSPLANTS  The New Jersey State Legislature, as well as many public and private agencies and organizations, have recently focused their attention upon organ donations.  A Uniform Anatomical Gift Act card, available through the Division of Motor Vehicles and the New Jersey State Bar Association's "Give the Gift of Sight and Life" pamphlet, is a mechanism for indicating that a person desires to make an anatomical gift; including the donation of an organ.  The Uniform Anatomical Gift Act provides that if an individual signs a donor card in the presence of two witnesses, it becomes a legal document.  However, it is strongly suggested that individuals wishing to donate organs inform their next of kin of their wishes so that the next of kin will give permission for the organ donation upon the individual's death.  It should be noted that not all organs intended to be donated can be accepted upon the death of the deceased.  The age and past medical history of the potential donor, and the condition of the organ, may make that individual an unsuitable candidate for organ donation.  When the issue of organ donation is approached in a sensitive manner, experience has shown that the survivors can be helped through the grieving process by knowing that the deceased has been able to make an anatomical gift.  Many families are comforted by the fact that some good may come from their family's tragedy.  ORGAN DONATIONS/TRANSPLANTS SUMMARY
[brief] T4, 46:19-25, 47:1-3.  The redacted version of [...]’s statement was introduced through [...] on May 14, 2022.  According to her statement, Ms.  Jackson and [...] had a “close relationship”.  T6, 77:22-25, 78:1-3.  According to [...], [...] “confided” in her on a “couple of occasions”.  T6, 78:12-15.  [...] said that on the night [...] ([...]) got killed, [...] called her and allegedly said to her he was filled with “revenge” and confessed to being so emotional, he wanted to cry.
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[brief] The Statement of Facts in Paragraphs F and G herein are included only because Plaintiff raised the aforesaid notion and Defendant desires to respond to same factually, from the standpoint of what the record below actually reflects.  Therefore, the inclusion of countervailing facts on these topics is for that sole purpose alone and is not to be construed as lending any legitimacy to Plaintiff’s arguments.  As discussed in the Legal Argument section of this brief and as the Trial Court correctly recognized, a private developer’s remediation costs to clean up private property does not in any way form an adequate or justifiable basis upon which to secure d(1) use or d(4) FAR variance relief.
[brief] (T23-T24)..........................  18  A. FDCPA’s Purpose and Structure.........................................................  18  B.  Elements of an FDCPA Cause of Action............................................  21  C.  The Bar Against Third-Party Communications.  (T16:21-T22:22)..................................................................................  24  D.  The Collection Letter Violates the FDCPA  Because, *Inter Alia*, It Misrepresents to the Least Sophisticated Consumer that Accepting One of Its Offers Will Save Plaintiff Money.  (T22:23-T36:6)..............................................  29  **POINT V.**  The FDCPA’S Legislative History and Agency Interpretations are Consistent with the Federal Courts’ Decisions.  (As to Legislative History, T18:19-T20:14)........  33  **POINT VI.**  Plaintiff Has Standing.  (T7:15-T10:16)..............................  35  CONCLUSION ..........................................................................................
[brief] Id. at 487-488, 495.  [...] was driving an employer-provided [...] vehicle at the time of the crash.  Id.  There was no dispute about whether defendant [...] was in the course of working at the time of the crash, unlike the facts of the instant matter in which Defendant [...] was commuting in her personal vehicle at the time of the crash.  The same distinguishing factors are present in the case of Linden v. Solomacha, 232 N.J. Super. 29, 30 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 117 N.J. 88 (1989), cited by [...], in which there was no dispute that the co-employees were both “performing their respective State duties” and that the defendant was driving a “state vehicle” at the time of the crash.