ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] M68-86.  The Application sought to substantially modify approvals granted by the Board to the Respondents’ predecessor under Application No.: [...]; as memorialized in a written resolution adopted by the Board on April 26, 2016 (the “Prior Approvals”).  M87-102.  Under the Prior Approvals, the Property and an additional property on [...] received a (d)(1) use variance and certain bulk variances from the Board, in order to develop the Property and the [...] property with 65,000 SF of commercial uses (on the Property only); and 215 residential units (206 on the Property and 9 on the [...] property).  M87-102.  Under the Prior Approvals, all affordable housing units (20% or 43 affordable apartment units) were to be built on the Property despite the fact that 2 of the affordable housing units were generated by the 9 townhomes on the [...] property.  M87-102.  The provision of the affordable units was a requirement of the overlay zone under which the Property was developed; which required that at least 20% of any residential units be provided as affordable housing as defined by the State of New Jersey.  Ba8.  Under the Prior Approvals, a traffic signal on New Jersey State Highway 33 (the “Route 33 Signal”) was to be provided as a voluntary condition of approval; and be installed and operational prior to the issuance of the first certificate of occupancy.  M87-102.  At the time the Board granted the Prior Approvals, the Township had filed and was prosecuting a Declaratory Judgment action (captioned In the Matter of the Application of the [...] for Substantive Certification of its Obligations Under the Fair Housing Act, Docket No.: [...]) seeking the judicial equivalent of substantive certification for its Third Round Affordable Housing Obligation (hereinafter the “DJ Action”).
[brief] Frequently, the resolution of this issue depends upon whether the statute permits police and other officials to wield unlimited discretionary powers in its enforcement.  If the scope of the power permitted these officials is so broad that the exercise of constitutionally protected conduct depends on their own subjective views as to the propriety of the conduct, the statute is unconstitutional.  [Ibid.]  The Court further provided five factors to be taken into consideration when determining whether a regulation is overbroad: (1) whether a substantial interest worthy of protection is identified or apparent from the language of the statute; (2) whether the terms of the regulation are susceptible to objective measurement by men of common intelligence; (3) whether those charged with its enforcement are vested only with limited discretion; (4) if penal, whether some element of knowledge or intent to obstruct a state interest is required; and (5) whether its clarity is dependent upon manifold cross-reference to inter-related enactments or regulations.  [Id. at 351.]  These standards support the trial court’s decision declaring the Noise Ordinance overbroad.
[brief] APPELLANT’S SUPPLEMENT OF UNPUBLISHED DECISIONS  In re Estate of Sogliuzzo, 2013 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2895 ..................................................  Supp-1 International Ass’n of Machinists Aero. Workers v. Werner-Masuda, 2012 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2 ......................................................  Supp-11  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
[directive] Along these same lines, it is important that there is no unreasonable delay between the conclusion of the investigation by the assigned investigator and the decision to file charges by the person who has that responsibility.  Although the 45-day clock begins at the time the person who has the responsibility to file charges has sufficient information, an agency would have a difficult time justifying an extensive bureaucratic delay once any member of that agency has established sufficient information.  The need to eliminate bureaucratic delay is one of the reasons that the internal affairs function should be closely aligned with the office of the law enforcement executive in the agency's organizational structure.  6.1.11  In addition, all agencies must comply with the time limitations established by N.J.S.A. 40A:14-200 et seq. regarding the imposition of discipline.  Lastly, agencies operating under the purview of Title 11A must comply with the deadlines for disciplinary action imposed by Civil Service Commission Rules.  See N.J.A.C. 4A:1-1.1, et seq.  6.2
[brief] ” (Aa055).  On this issue, the Commission recited the arbitrator’s findings without identifying whether the 16g statutory factors were misapplied.  It held:  The arbitrator’s award included a section entitled “Application of the Statutory Criteria/Salary Award” in which he indicated he was considering the interest and welfare of public (16g(1)), lawful authority of employer (g(5)), financial impact on governing unit and residents (g(6)), and statutory restrictions imposed on employer (g(9)) together.  (Award at 48-49).  He determined that the interest and welfare of the public is entitled to the most weight because it embraces many factors and recognizes their interrelationship, including the financial impact of the award.  (Award at 48-49).  In applying these criteria, he appropriately considered the City’s financial condition as testified to by the City’s CFO, which includes the City’s receipt of Transitional Aid.
[brief] In opposition, the State contended that the initial sentence was illegal because it failed to include the statutorily mandated provision of community supervision for life and that it was unreasonable for defendant to have an expectation of finality in an illegal sentence.  Id. at 302.  [...]'s petition was denied on the grounds that his original sentence was illegal and that because he had answered “Yes” to the question on the plea papers asking whether he understood that a conviction for sexual assault carried with it as part of the sentence a special sentence of community supervision for life, he was adequately informed of the consequences of community supervision for life.
[brief] The Limited Attorney Exemption impermissibly infringes on the Supreme Court’s exclusive authority to regulate the practice of law.  The New Jersey Constitution endows the Supreme Court, not the Legislature or executive branch, with the exclusive jurisdiction over the practice of law.  N.J. Const. art. VI, § 2, ¶ 3.  The Supreme Court sets the standard for admission to practice law in this State, regulates attorney conduct, promulgates ethical guidelines for the practice of law, adjudicates attorney disciplinary infractions, sanctions attorneys who violate their professional and ethical responsibilities, and, key here, delineates which activities constitute the practice of law.  Stated differently, the Supreme Court's constitutional role and authority over the practice of law is *sui generis*.  The NJDACCA, through the Limited Attorney Exemption, violates the doctrine of separation of powers by restricting the amount of “debt adjustment services” that New Jersey attorneys can provide their clients in connection with legal representation without defining what “debt adjustment” is and without explaining what it means to be “principally engaged” as a debt adjustor.  [...] or its Commissioner are free to determine whether an attorney’s conduct constitutes the practice of law.  This transference of authority infringes on the exclusive authority of the judicial branch to regulate the professional conduct of attorneys in New Jersey.  Case law confirms that the definition of the practice of law encompasses the various types of services that the NJDACCA purports to regulate.  Attorneys routinely provide debt adjustment services to clients as part of the assistance they provide.  The Supreme Court wields the sole authority to regulate attorney conduct in this area.  However, if left to stand, the Limited Attorney Exemption permits regulation over the practice of law by [...] and its Commissioner.
[brief] Proposed amicus curiae, the [...] ([...]), is a 501(c)(3) entity that brings together eDiscovery practitioners, judges, and professors for purposes of education, leadership, service, advocacy and research at the intersection of law and technology, with a focus on discovery, information governance, cybersecurity, litigation, and big data management. \(^1\)  Amicus seeks to use its knowledge and background to inform this Court that the unprecedented discovery order by the trial court threatens grievous harm to third parties, while also breaking with established discovery practices and violating the established rules of New Jersey courts.  The trial court improperly ordered the Defendants to produce irrelevant information collected via an overbroad keyword search methodology and then prohibited Defendants from removing irrelevant emails prior to production, a clear departure from decades of practice to the contrary.  There is a real danger that confidential and valuable commercial information of third parties will exist in the document productions of Defendants pursuant to the Order.  Amicus is deeply concerned and alarmed about the effect of this ruling and respectfully urges that the Court reverse this Order.  \(^1\)  No counsel for a party authored this brief in whole or in part, and no counsel or party made a monetary contribution intended to fund the preparation or submission.  All parties have consented to the filing of this brief.  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
[brief] Pa87-168.  The Hackensack Subcontract is a separate contract whereby [...] agreed to serve as [...]’s subcontractor on a specific project and whether the parties entered that subcontract the day after or a year after they entered the PTA is of no consequence.  Pa594-Pa616.  The PTA may have created an obligation of [...] to enter into a subcontract with [...] for particular projects, but [...]’s obligations to [...] under the Hackensack Subcontract has nothing to do with [...]’s requirement to enter into the subcontract in the first place.
[brief] **Dominant Purpose.**  With regard to interpretation, the Supreme Court of New Jersey has provided guidance, clarifying that subsidiary provisions should not be interpreted as to conflict with the dominant purpose of the legal document in question.  Newark Publishers' Assn. v. Newark Typographical Union, 22 N.J. 419, 426-27 (N.J. 1956).  Applying this principle, the subsidiary Trust provisions concerning the Boonton and Florida Properties should not conflict with the Trust’s obvious dominant purpose, which was to divide all property owned by the Trust, less any costs associated with the testamentary estate, into three equal shares, and transfer those shares outright and free of trust to the three beneficiaries.  In this context, Defendants contend that the trial court’s interpretation erroneously allowed [...] and [...] to purchase the Boonton and Florida Properties at reduced values, without [...]’s consent, which conflicts with the clear dominant purpose of the Trust instructing that each beneficiary receive a one-third equal share of all property owned by the Trust.
[brief] TABLE OF CONTENTS  POINT HEADINGS TO BE ARGUED / POINT ONE: POINT ONE: The dispositive question of fact in this appeal is: at the time [...]’s assignor [...] cashed the [...]’ $12,000.00 check: Did Checks-2-Cash either know, or did Checks 2 Cash have reason to know, that the [...]’ $12,000.00 check was previously cashed, or otherwise taken for value?  POINT HEADINGS TO BE ARGUED / POINT TWO: POINT TWO: Given that the [...] do not claim there is any admissible proof in the record that shows either [...], or his assignor, Checks-2-Cash had any knowledge of any defenses to the [...]’ repayment of their dishonored check No. 152; it follows under the Appellate Division’s seminal published holding in [...] v. Cigna Insurance Co., 297 N.J. Super. 1997: The motion Judges committed plain and reversible error when they failed to apprehend under the drawer's warranty in 12 N.J.S.A. 3414: [...] was entitled to recover as a matter of course from the [...] as the joint, or individual, drawers of their dishonored check.  TABLE OF APPENDIX:.................................................................3  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES:..............................................................5  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT:.......................................................7  PROCEDURAL HISTORY:............................................................9
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[brief] Id. at 248.  “It is unlikely that defendant, or anyone else, would go to a motel room in a community near his home at 11:00 p.m. without a clear understanding of the purpose of the trip. ”  Id. at 249.  “This was not a visit to a friend, a quick run to the store or a late-night stop for something to eat.  By helping in the search for the correct room, defendant demonstrated that he knew where he and [co-defendant] were going. ”  Ibid.  Similarly, here, the jury reasonably convicted defendant of conspiracy to commit murder because it was evident from [...]’s conduct that he was an active participation in this plan murder.
[brief] *Mount Laurel I*, 67 N.J. at 179.  In *Mount Laurel II*, the New Jersey Supreme Court discussed the importance of affordable housing actually being built, and the need for strong judicial management to ensure it happens:  The obligation is to provide a realistic opportunity for housing, not litigation.  We have learned from experience, however, that unless a strong judicial hand is used, Mount Laurel will not result in housing, but in paper, process, witnesses, trials and appeals.  We intend by this decision to strengthen it, clarify it, and make it easier for public officials, including judges, to apply it.  [92 N.J. at 199.]
[brief] Defendant [...] accepts the procedural history as set forth by Defendant/Appellant [...], with the following comments:  1)  Defendant [...] specifically asserted in its answer filed on November 8, 2021, a crossclaim for contractual indemnification and demanded for [...] to hold harmless [...] against any and all judgment or settlement in favor of plaintiff.  Da15.  Defendant [...] also asserted a crossclaim for breach of contract for failure to procure insurance coverage, Da 19, and seeking:  (a)  A determination and declaration that said co-defendant(s) was/were obligated at the time of plaintiff’s accident to provide the appropriate insurance coverage and is obligated to provide a defense in the pending lawsuit to the answering defendant(s); (b)  If the answering defendant(s) is found liable in whole or in part of the within lawsuit brought on behalf of Plaintiff must indemnify and hold harmless the answering Defendant(s) as against any judgment and/or settlement as against the answering defendant(s) in favor of plaintiff; (c) Declaring said co-defendant(s) liable for costs incurred; and (d) Declaring said co-defendant(s) liable for any and all legal fees incurred in connection with the defense of the answering Defendant(s).  2)  A tender demand for defense and indemnification was sent to Defendant [...] by [...] representative on or about July 8, 2021.  Da48.  Carrier for [...] ([...]) denied the tender as premature.  Da52.  A request for defense and indemnification was again made thereafter on May 31, 2023.  Ra1.  A third request was made via e-mail between carriers for Mt. Arlington Holding and [...] on April 9, 2024.  Da55.  3)  At mediation on April 9, 2024, it was again verbally specifically expressed that [...] was seeking defense and indemnify from [...] pursuant to the terms and conditions contained in the snow removal contract.  [...] did not respond to the request for defense and indemnification.  As such, mediation failed to resolve the matter.  The motion to compel defense and indemnification was immediately filed on April 10, 2024, after Mt. Arlington failed to resolve all claims asserted by the plaintiff and [...].  Da34.  The motion to compel defense and indemnification and motion for reconsideration, filed May 1, 2024, were procedurally denied.  Da1.  4)  With the consent of all parties, The Honorable [...], J.S.C., pursuant to R. 4:42-2, reconsidered the May 1, 2024, prior ruling, and concluded that in the interests of justice the motion warranted reconsideration on the merits.  1T 18:18-14 to 1T 19:1-6.  RESPONSE TO APPELLANT’S "STATEMENT OF FACTS"
[brief] [...] knows both which misrepresentations its salespeople tell consumers and which statutes and regulations it violates to trick consumers into buying [...]’s (worthless) timeshares.  Trial demonstrated that [...] actually coaches use of these misrepresentations in its training manual and has heard them used by its sales agents on the sales floor.  These misleading statements often include that the timeshare will increase in value over time, that the consumer can easily rent out their timeshare for profit, that their payments are deductible on their taxes, that the consumer can sell the timeshare at any time for a profit, that [...] will help the consumer resell their timeshare, that it is easy to book stays, and that it is easy to trade in their timeshare for stays at resorts all around the world.  None of this is true.  Once [...]’s salespeople have talked the consumer into buying a timeshare, they are turned over to a “deeder,” to sign the numerous contract documents.  The “deeder” races the consumer through the contract execution in a carefully orchestrated presentation designed to prevent the exhausted consumer from reading or understanding what they are signing and initialing.  Buried in the contract documents are numerous disclaimers whose only purpose is to try to insulate [...] from its deceitful practices.  The “deeder” gets the consumer to sign and initial these disclaimers without knowing their contents.  These disclaimers include clauses in which the consumer “acknowledges” things [...] knows are not true.  Likewise, they ensure by the stroke of the pen the consumer denies being told the exact falsities [...] knows its salespeople tell them.  When the consumer realizes they have been defrauded, [...] argues these written disclaimers, which serve no legitimate purpose, contradict their claims of fraud and preclude any testimony to the contrary.  The fraud exception is designed to prevent this type of deception and resulting misuses of the parol evidence rule.  Four different judges have ruled six times that the fraud exception to the parol evidence rule applies in this case and the Plaintiffs could testify to the misrepresentations they were told.  This includes two rulings by the trial judge, who ruled after considering all the facts aired at the jury trial.  [...] is not arguing the trial court improperly admitted what it calls parole evidence, but rather is asking this Court to reverse the jury’s verdict based on one judge’s denial of its summary judgment motion.  This request ignores both the fact that there were significant factual disputes the jury resolved, [...]’s damning admissions, and that nine of the 14 statutory and code violations the jury concluded [...] had committed are completely divorced from [...]’s renewed parol evidence protests.
[brief] Id. at 1373-74.  end.  [Id. at 434 (internal quotations and citation omitted). ]  If a new case could be used to vacate preexisting final judgments, "[t]here would be no discernable basis for drawing any line in time between those to be barred and those to be relieved."  Id. at 435.  For this reason, the Court "found no basis . . . to grant relief from judgment under R. 4:50-1."  Ibid.  In more basic terms, if a case is on direct appeal from the entry of final judgment, a change in caselaw may entitle a party to relief from judgment.  But if the time to appeal the final judgment has expired, a change in caselaw does not qualify for relief under R. 4:50-1.
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[brief] The permissive intent of this provision as written is underscored by the Parties’ inclusion of a service of suit provision, which requires that [...] “will” submit to court jurisdiction at [...]’s request specifically for non-payment disputes, such as the one alleged by [...] here.  Section U of the Policy provides that “it is agreed that in the event of failure of [[...]] to pay any amount claimed to be due [under the Policy], [[...]], at the request of [[...]], will submit to the jurisdiction of a court of competent jurisdiction…”  Da419.  Read together to give both clauses harmonious meaning, any dispute may permissively be submitted to arbitration, but if [...] commences litigation concerning [...]’s non-payment of insurance costs (as [...] alleges here) absent an initial demand for arbitration, [...] must submit to court jurisdiction. \(^6\)
[brief] (6T 137-8 to 9)  [...] testified that she kept trying to move, but “he was so strong that day.  He had all his weight on [her]. ”  (6T 137-5 to 7)  [...] testified that as [...] was raping her, she “felt hopeless, violated,” “couldn’t breathe,” and “thought [she] was going to pass out. ”  She “was trying to find a way to push him off of [her], but there’s not a lot of room in that space. ”  (6T 137-12 to 15)  She testified that she “couldn’t really move too much” but she reached around with her arm and “felt something cold and metal. ”  (6T 137-15 to 17)  She initially thought it was the seat belt buckle, but as she grabbed more of the object, she realized it was a handle.  (6T 137-17 to 20)  She grabbed it, and using all the energy she had left, she “just hit him. ”  (6T 137-20 to 22)  She explained that “by the second time that [she] hit him [she] realized it was a knife. ”  (6T 137-22 to 23)  Once she realized that she was holding a knife, she “got even more scared” because she “thought he was going to take the knife from [her] if he got his hands on it. ”  (6T 137-23 to 138-2)  So, she “kept hitting him and hitting him. ”  (6T 138-2 to 3)  [...] testified that after she had stabbed [...], blood started falling onto her, and she pushed [...] forward until he was sitting upright.