ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Admittedly, jurisdiction over subject matter may not be conferred by consent or be waived and lack of such jurisdiction may be raised or noted at any time.  R. 4:6-7; State v. Bruneel, supra; Tracey v. Tracey, supra; McKeeby v. Arthur, 7 N.J. 174, 181 (1951).  However, the court rules contain liberal provisions for transfers of actions among courts where subject matter jurisdiction is involved.  R. 1: 13-4.  Linder v. Linder, 126 N.J. Super. 466, 473 (App. Div. 1974)
[brief] travel over the center line of the road and increase its speed to 80 miles-per-hour.  (Da5).  He pursued the vehicle and effectuated a stop, (Da5), which was recorded by the officer’s body-worn camera, (Da7).  While speaking with defendant, [...] “detected a distinct odor of an alcoholic beverage emanating from the interior of the vehicle.” (Da5, Da25).  As [...] asked her “to exit the vehicle in order to … investigate the odor of alcohol,” he “observed a Glock handgun on the driver side floor near [defendant’s] left foot. ” (Da5, 25).  [...] “recovered the handgun and confirmed it was a Glock 42 (.380 caliber) handgun” with one round in the magazine.  (Da5, 25).  There was also “a plastic holster wedged between the driver seat and center console of the vehicle. ” (Da5, 25).  After [...] advised defendant of her Miranda rights, she explained that the handgun was hers and that she has a license to carry a handgun in Pennsylvania—though not a NJ Carry Permit.  (Da5, 25).  Defendant “had no explanation for why the gun was on the floor. ” (Da5).  As defendant lacked a NJ Carry Permit despite carrying a handgun in the State, she was indicted with one count of unlawful possession of a handgun in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b)(1).  (Da8).  Defendant applied for PTI, which the State denied, (Da25), reasoning that defendant’s conduct—including a prior conviction for driving under the influence (DUI), a pending DUI charge in Ohio, and twice violating her conditions of release—indicated a “pattern of anti-social behavior” and undermined “the likelihood that [defendant’s] crime is related to a condition or situation that would be conducive to change through her participation in” PTI.  (Da30).  [...] determined that the State had not abused its discretion, and denied defendant’s motion to compel her admission into PTI.  (Da30-31).
[brief] [...] ("Respondent").  TABLE OF CONTENTS  PROCEDURAL HISTORY  4  STATEMENT OF FACTS  5  LEGAL ARGUMENT  11  POINT I  APPELLANTS' INITIATION OF AND CONTINUED  PROCOMMISIONUTION OF THESE PROCEEDINGS ARE, AS THE COMMISSION SUGGESTED, APPELLANTS' ATTEMPT TO OBTAIN THROUGH LITIGATION  SUPPORT  APPELLANTS COULD NOT OBTAIN AT THE BALLOT BOX AND TO CURTAIL  RESPONDENT'S FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS.  POINT II  11  THE COMMISSION'S FINAL DECISION WAS SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL CREDIBLE EVIDENCE.  POINT III  13  THE COMMISSION'S FINAL DECISION WAS NOT INCONSISTANT WITH ITS STATUTORY MISSION.  POINT IV 14  THE COMMISSION DID NOT ERR IN DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT BASED ON THE FACT THAT RESPONDENT'S FACEBOOK POSTS CONTAINED NO DISCLAIMERS.  POINT V 17  THE COMMISSION DID NOT ERR IN DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT IN RESPONSE TO COMPLAINANTS' MOTION FOR A SUMMARY DECISION.  POINT VI  THE COMMISSION DID NOT ERR IN STATING THAT ITS FINAL DECISION WAS APPEALABLE TO THE APPELLATE DIVISION RATHER THAN THE COMMISSIONER OF EDUCATION.  POINT VII  THE COMMISSION DID NOT ERR IN DISMISSING COUNTS 3 AND 7 OF THE COMPLAINT.  CONCLUSION
[brief] As such those portions of the Certification having to do with the record of the hearings before the ZBA were made based upon personal knowledge in accordance with R. 1:6-6.  Likewise those portions of the Certification set forth facts admissible in evidence in the form of relevant excerpts from the certified transcripts of the hearings before the ZBA showing that: a) there were no time limits on the rehearings; b) all witnesses were afforded an opportunity to testify and subjected to cross-examination at the rehearings; and c) the Objectors verbalized their strategic decision not to make a verbatim record despite having been given a full and fair opportunity to do so.  (Pa500-501; Pa584-585; Pa629; Pa651; Pa689).  Moreover, the transcript excerpts referred to were actually appended to the Certification in accord with R. 1:6-6.  With respect to the Objectors’ attempt to blame the Homeowners (or the Board Secretary) for their late filing, [...] personally drafted the Homeowners’ Notice of Approval and oversaw the transmission of the Homeowners’ Notice of Approval to the newspaper and the Board Secretary.  (Pa804-805).  As such, [...] had personal knowledge of the publication in question as required by R. 1:6-6.  Additionally, those portions of the Certification discussing the Objectors’ receipt of the Affidavit of Publication of the Homeowners’ Notice of Approval were based upon email correspondence placed in the record by the Objectors in attachments to the Certification of [...] (the “non-legally trained contractor” working for Objectors’ counsel).  (Pa763-776)
[brief] [...] (2022), *supra*, 17-26; [...] and [...] (2021), *supra*, at 1010-11; [...] at al., *Adolescents in Peer Groups Make More Prudent Decisions When a Slightly Older Adult Is Present*, 27 Psychological Science 322, 327-29 (2016).  And late adolescents continue to have difficulties making rational, future-oriented decisions in stressful legal contexts (*Miller* factor four).  [...] (2022), *supra*, 27-35.
[brief] On or about August 20, 2024, [...] filed a Motion for Leave to Appeal the Law Division’s July 31, 2024 Order.  (Pa185).  On or about September 12, 2024, [...]’s motion was granted and the appeal was accelerated.  Ibid.  --- \(^4\) Dewey v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 109 N.J. 201 (1988).  ARGUMENT I.
[brief] Consistent with *In re Issuance of a Permit by Department of Environmental Protection to Ciba-Geigy Corporation*, the Court should refuse to consider this *post hoc* ground because the Department “did not rely on the [rationale]” in its disapproval letters.  120 N.J. 164, 176 (1990); Pb18.  That the agency there “conceded that it did not apply the” criteria mandated by law, Db33, is beside the point because this record equally confirms that “excessiveness” was sprung mid-litigation.  The Department’s sudden course reversal “foreclose[d]” any notice to [...].  Pb19 (citing *Bowman Transp., Inc. v. Arkansas–Best Freight Sys., Inc.*, 419 U.S. 281, 288 n.4 (1974) and *Friedler v. Gen. Serv. Admin.*, 271 F. Supp. 3d 40, 57 (D.D.C. 2017) (Brown-Jackson, J.)).  The Department cannot duck the problem by pointing to the agency’s treatment of the evidence in *Bowman*, Db33–34, which did not pose an unfair notice issue because that agency “offered [an] identical rationale in . . . a case decided just as hearings in the case began. ”  419 U.S. at 288 n.4 (emphasis added).  Nor is it credible to claim that Friedler is different.  Db34.  Like the agency there, the Department “change[d] [] course” from its earlier position here.  In the end, unable to identify anything in the disapproval letters or correspondence to support its new position on “excessiveness,” the Department points to a passing comment by one of its witnesses before the ALJ. Db34 (citing hearing transcript).  This merely confirms that, at best, excessiveness was dreamt-up mid-administrative review.  B.
[brief] See *Mulligan v. Panther Valley Property Owners Ass’n*, 337 N.J. Super 293 (App. Div 2001).  Land use board decisions "enjoy a presumption of validity, and a court may not substitute its judgment for that of the board unless there has been a clear abuse of discretion."  *Price v. Himeji, LLC*, 214 N.J. 263, 284, (2013) (citing *Cell S. of N.J., Inc. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment*, 172 N.J. 75, 81 (2002)).  Consequently, "courts ordinarily should not disturb the discretionary decisions of local boards that are supported by substantial evidence in the record and reflect a correct application of the relevant principles of land use law."  *Lang v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment*, 160 N.J. 41, 58-59, (1999).  The party challenging the action of a zoning board carries the burden of demonstrating that the board acted arbitrarily, capriciously, or unreasonably.  *Dunbar Homes, Inc. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment*, 233 N.J. 546, 558, (2018) (quoting *Grabowsky v. Twp. of Montclair*, 221 N.J. 536, 551, (2015)); *Ten Stary Dom P'ship v. Mauro*, 216 N.J. 16, 33, (2013) (citing *Smart SMR of N.Y., Inc. v. Bd. of Adjustment*, 152 N.J. 309, 327, (1998)).  "A board acts arbitrarily, capriciously, or unreasonably if its findings of fact in support of a grant or denial of a variance are not supported by the record, or if it usurps power reserved to the municipal governing body or another duly authorized municipal official."  *Ten Stary Dom P'ship*, 216 N.J. 16, 33 (2013).  "Even when doubt is entertained as to the wisdom of the [board's] action, or as to some part of it, there can be no judicial declaration of invalidity in the absence of clear abuse of discretion . . . "  Kramer v. Bd. of Adjustment, 45 N.J. 268, 296-97, (1965).  The trial court’s inferential conclusion that the Board’s elevator condition was arbitrary, unreasonable and capricious is simply not supported by the record before the court.  POINT
[brief] The NJCFA provides, in pertinent part:  The act, use or employment by any person of any unconscionable commercial practice, deception, fraud, false pretense, false promise, misrepresentation, or the knowing, concealment, suppression, or omission of any material fact with intent that others rely upon such concealment, suppression or omission, in connection with the sale or advertisement of any merchandise or real estate or with the subsequent performance of such person as aforesaid .  . .  *N.J.S.A. 56:8–2.*  Critically, the NJCFA does **not** apply to entities, including debt buyers, that do not engage in the settling of credit.
[brief] Plaintiff served defendant in Court with plaintiffs R. 1:20A-6 letter.  Defendant acknowledged receipt of said letter on the record and averred she will be requesting arbitration. ”  That same day, August 27th, 2019, Plaintiff filed a motion to reconsider the Court’s order of the same date denying Plaintiff’s motion to enter default judgment because the letter was not required to be attached.  [Id.; Trans. ID: [...]]  On September 17th, 2019, Defendant filed a cross motion for dismissal and an objection to Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration.  [Id.; Trans. ID: [...]]  Oral argument was held on October 2\textsuperscript{nd}, 2019, and Defendant and Plaintiff personally appeared in trial court where she was handed an envelope in open court by Plaintiff containing another copy of the same Pre-action Notice and invoice sent originally to her at the address on [...] (the \textit{same} address, coincidentally, that the Fee Arbitration Committee used to correspond with Defendant).
[brief] But the DEP did not do that in this case.  The DEP’s overly narrow Water Quality Management Plan Consistency Determination failed to look at potential impacts to the aquifer recharge areas, as it was specifically directed to do by the legislature in the WQMA.  In addition, the legislature clearly provided the DEP with an open ended mandate that included – but was not limited to - wastewater treatment planning.  N.J.S.A. 58:11A-7.  The DEP’s regulation entitled “Water quality management plan consistency assessment” is set forth in relevant part, at N.J.A.C. 7:15-3.2.  Clearly, the DEP’s jurisdictional determination, or Water Quality Management Plan Consistency Determination, ought to have included a review of all the potential vectors or sources of water contamination from the proposed project, as envisioned by the legislature in the Highlands Act, and not just the gallons of water flushed into the proposed septic system.3
[brief] A.  Plaintiff’s Experts Do Not Offer Independent General-Causation Opinions, and Lack the Qualifications and Factual Basis to Do So.  [ISSUE WAS RAISED (Da0785; Da0816; Da0846)]  Neither [...] nor [...] offers an independent general-causation opinion that a 300-micron, medical-grade silicone particulate is capable of causing eye inflammation, a tractional retinal detachment, or vision loss.  Plaintiff’s inability to prove general causation dooms her case.  That Plaintiff’s experts do not offer independent general-causation opinions is not surprising given they both lack the necessary qualifications to offer such an opinion.  Neither has any education, training, experience, or skill in biomaterials science, biocompatibility and biomechanics of a microscopic silicone particulate, and whether it is capable of causing inflammation or a tractional retinal detachment.  Neither has ever published on the silicone used in the Ozurdex® needle sleeve or held himself out as an expert in the field of biomaterials, biomechanics, and biocompatibility of silicone used in ocular procedures.  And neither expert explains how his experience as a practicing ophthalmologist qualifies him to opine on the composition, character, and size of the purported silicone particulate, its propensity (or not) to induce an inflammatory response, or whether it is capable of causing a tractional retinal detachment—which [...] speculates happened, but [...] wholly rejects.  Since Plaintiff’s experts have zero qualifications to address this complex subject matter, any possible general-causation opinion they could offer is inadmissible under N.J.R.E 702.  The Court cannot allow Plaintiff to proceed with her claims without this required proof.  *E.g.*, *Agha v. Feiner*, 198 N.J. 50, 54 (2009) (directing defense judgment for lack of expert qualified to offer needed opinion).  Compounding Plaintiff’s problems, her experts do not have the facts and data required by N.J.R.E. 703 to offer a reliable opinion that this medical-grade silicone can cause eye inflammation.
[brief] Div. 2010) | | | Wolpaw v. General Acc. Ins. Co., | 25,26,28,29 | | 272 N.J. Super. 41 (App. Div.), | | | certif. denied, 137 N.J. 316 (1994) | | RULES RPC 1.7 .............................................................................................................. 19,20,25 RPC 1.7(a) ........................................................................................................... 24 RPC 1.7(a)(1) ....................................................................................................... 20,26,27,29,37,38 RPC 1.7(a)(2) ....................................................................................................... 20 RPC 1.7(b) .......................................................................................................... 21,24 RPC 1.7(b)(1) ....................................................................................................... 24 RPC 1.7(b)(4) ....................................................................................................... 24,34 RPC 1.13(e) ......................................................................................................... 25 OTHER AUTHORITIES ABA Model Rules of Prof'l Conduct, R. 1.7 (2000) ............................................ 25 [...], New Jersey Attorney Ethics (Gann, 2015) ........................................... 25 [...] & [...], New Jersey Attorney Ethics (Gann, 2024) ......... 25 PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
[brief] 22  Yet, by ignoring the direct/derivative action rules as they have done here, Plaintiffs have engaged in a multiplicity of arbitration proceedings and lawsuits.  --- 18 Strasenburgh at 551.  19 Id at 552.  20 Da677 at ¶28; Da682 at ¶63.  21 Id. 22 Tully at 125.  The sheer amount of litigation, when one single lawsuit could have sufficed to advance all claims, suggests that perhaps the entire controversy doctrine should be once again modified to apply to both parties and claims.  In construing claims in close corporation settings, a claim against a co-owner of the business is a direct claim if it is based on, for example, the "failure [of the other owner] to contribute his fair share (fifty percent) to the debts and liabilities of [the corporation], in breach of an alleged agreement between the [owners] and the covenant of good faith and fair dealing" because the plaintiff is a party to said agreement.
[directive] On the one hand, studies have violent.5 demonstrated that the large majority of people with serious mental illnesses are not  On the other hand, there is a strong association between mental health disorders and increased risk of 6 suicide, which accounts for over half of US firearm-related fatalities.  Recognizing the accurate scope of these overlapping crises points to more appropriate law enforcement approaches.  [...], 3 Mental Health and Reentry: How Court Services Offender Agency Meets the Challenge of POLICING DISPATCH, May 2022, vol. 15, issue 5, Supervision, COMMUNITY Mental Health Community https://cops.usdoj.gov/html/dispatch/05-2022/mental_health_reentry.html.
[brief] The trial court found breaches of the [...] --- 25 Appellants’ argument that the SPA merger clauses vitiate Plaintiffs’ right to fees lacks merit.  (Db37-38).  First, appellants never raised this argument below.  Second, the SPAs integrate other agreements to which [...] and [...] were bound, and which they breached.  Third, appellants’ reliance on Moynahan v. Lynch, 250 N.J.60, 90-91 (2022), is misguided.  There, the Court considered whether the parties written palimony agreement superseded a prior alleged oral agreement.  The written document did not reference the prior oral agreement.  Here, however, the SPAs expressly referenced prior written agreements (including the [...] Stockholder’s Agreement), and specifically contemplated that the failure to abide by those earlier agreements could subject [...] and [...] to an indemnity obligation and damages, including an award of attorneys fees, expenses, investigation costs, and other costs of suit.
[directive] Serves as a single point of entry for people with disabilities who need information and/or services within the human services system.  [...] works to streamline access to services and information that promote and enhance independent living for individuals with all disabilities by facilitating coordination and cooperation among local, county, and state government agencies.  With 43 employees, [...] administers programs that allow people with different types of disabilities to live more independently in the community, and in many cases, avoid the need to move into an institution.  These programs include home and community-based service programs, as well as other resource programs.  [...], [...] o
[brief] ”  Pa140 at ¶13, emphasis added.  Once again, Plaintiff has not met its heavy burden to show why the Board’s determination, as explained and supported in its Resolution as well as the record generally, should not be presumed valid or how the Board abused its discretion in reaching its findings.  What the Plaintiff did offer the Board reasonably found was unpersuasive.  For instance, during the hearings Plaintiff’s planner referenced recommendations in the 2018 Master Plan relating to FAR and efficiency apartments in the Central Business District (“CBD”) area and attempted to use said recommendations as a basis for variance relief.  However, when queried by the Borough Planner, Plaintiff’s planner conceded that the subject parcel, Lot 5, is not even located in the CBD, but in the B-3 Zone which is a distinct area separate and apart from the CBD.  Pa276 at 72:9-73:25; Pa280 at 89:13-20; Pa282 at 95:3-8.  POINT III
[brief] See N.J. R. App. P. 2:6-1(2).  a matter of New Jersey law because the Purchase Order, which is the very document that forms the basis of [...]’s claim, is referenced in the Complaint.  (See Pa7 (“The parties agreed on pricing and delivery . . . [d]elivery proceeded as scheduled and [...] paid a portion of the overall purchase price. ”).)  It is well established that on a motion to dismiss, a trial court may “consider ‘allegations in the complaint, exhibits attached to the complaint, matters of public record, and documents that form the basis of the claim.
[brief] PIP arbitration is generally limited in subject matter and scope to one accident and one injured person.  The proceeding is a one-way process.  The claim is either allowed or denied.  While PIP arbitrators can consider evidence of fraud as a defense when making their decisions, they cannot grant affirmative relief to insurance companies in the form of any of the IFPA’s remedies, such as damages or costs and attorneys’ fees.  The decision below held that AICRA required that the causes of action in an insurance company’s multi-faceted IFPA complaint against thirty-six defendants be determined in a PIP no-fault arbitration rather than in Superior Court.  It is the Department’s and OIFP’s experience that PIP dispute resolution under AICRA was not designed to, and cannot, adjudicate the types of IFPA claims at issue here.  The trial court’s decision to send [...]’s IFPA complaint to PIP no-fault arbitration effectively puts an end to the IFPA — and relatedly, RICO anti-racketeering cases claiming insurance fraud.  This holding is contrary to the express statutory language in the IFPA and AICRA, which are plainly structured to provide different forums for the diametrically different claims at issue.  Moreover, the rules and regulations governing PIP arbitration make clear that they are in no way designed to properly adjudicate IFPA and RICO claims.  Finally, the decision below has far reaching consequences that impacts not only private insurance companies, but also the work of the Department and the OIFP, whose work in carrying out New Jersey’s strong public policy to confront aggressively the problem of insurance fraud would be hampered if insurance companies cannot litigate IFPA and RICO fraud claims in court.
[brief] [...], EDWARD : SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY RIEGEL, [...], : APPELLATE  DIVISION  [...], EUGENE : MAIER, [...], : DOCKET NO.: [...]  [...], JOSEPH : IACOVONE, CONSTANT : DOCKET NO. [...]  HACKNEY, [...] : and [...], Plaintiffs, vs. [...], STATE OF : NEW JERSEY, DEPARTMENT : OF COMMUNITY  AFFAIRS : Defendants.
[brief] Her Honor concluded that while the verdict was “unexpected” when compared to other verbal threshold cases, she found that it was in no way shocking to the conscience (6T, at 62:14-63:9).  She reasoned that there has been a noticeable trend of large verdicts in soft tissue verbal threshold cases post-COVID, and that the evidentiary proofs submitted by Plaintiff supported the award (6T, at 62:14-63:19).  Plaintiff at the time was only 40 years old, with most of his life left to live (6T, at 63:10-19).  Dividing the compensatory award by the number of years left to live, Plaintiff would receive less than $23,000.00 per year – again, a proper amount given the injuries proven (6T, at 63:10-19).  On September 19, 2023, Defendants filed their second attempt at post-trial relief in the form of a Motion for Reconsideration (Da62-63).
[brief] Under R. 4:50-1(a), the premise for relief is “mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect and, under section (f) for any other reason justifying relief from the operation or order.  R.4:50-1.  Though there is no specific enumerated circumstance or factual basis that engenders the scope and breadth of R.4:50-1(f), the “boundaries are as expansive as the need to achieve equity and justice.
[brief] State v. Ahmad, 246 N.J. 592, 609 (2021).  The trial court’s factual findings must be upheld when “supported by sufficient credible evidence in the record. ”  State v. S.S., 229 N.J. 360, 374 (2017).  “Those findings warrant particular deference when they are substantially influenced by [the trial court’s] opportunity to hear and see the witnesses and to have the ‘feel’ of the case, which the reviewing court cannot enjoy. ”  State v. Rockford, 213 N.J. 424, 200 (2013).  This Court must not disturb the trial court’s factual findings unless they are “so clearly mistaken that the interests of justice demand intervention and correction. ”  State v. Gamble, 218 N.J. 412, 425 (2014).  The trial court’s legal conclusions are reviewed de novo.