ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] This case presents a simple issue of contract interpretation:  Is there any language under the commercial lease between Plaintiff-Respondent/Cross-Appellant [...] (the “Landlord”) and Defendant-Appellant/Cross-Respondent [...] (the “Tenant”) that authorizes Landlord to penalize Tenant for a default by extracting more than double the amount of missed rent even after the default has been cured?  The answer is no.  Accordingly, the trial court’s order adopting and enforcing Landlord’s flawed interpretation of the Lease warrants a reversal and remand for a reassessment and recalculation of the parties’ obligations to each other.
[brief] 4  Although the applicant-developer’s name is “[...],” the Property is located at the addresses of [...], [...], and [...], in [...].  The DEP Bulletin uses [...] when describing street address of the Property.  (Ra80).  comply with the Scenic Resources and Design and Buffers and Compatibility rules’ requirements.  (Aa5-12).  More specifically, it claimed that the Project was incompatible with the surrounding buildings and does not meet view corridor and setback requirements.  Ibid.  DEP asked [...] to provide additional information on how the Project complies with the CZM Scenic Resources and Design and Stormwater Management rules,\(^5\) and why [...] had not pursued a [...] Redevelopment Zone Permit, N.J.A.C. 7:7-7.  (Aa14-15; Ra92).  [...] responded that the Project complied with the Scenic Resources and Design Rule because Ocean Avenue and the associated sidewalk would separate the Project from the boardwalk and other coastal features.  (Ra81-82).  It also clarified that the Project did not qualify for DEP’s [...] Redevelopment Zone Permit as it did not meet [...]’s Redevelopment Plan Ordinance and the Design Guidelines Ordinance.  (Ra18; Ra92; Ra161-172).  [...] subsequently amended its Redevelopment Plan and Ordinance in 2020 specifically as to the \(^5\)
[brief] The Trial Court Did Not Err In Finding That The Board Did Not Hear Contrary Testimony (Response to Point IB of Appellant’s Brief).  Appellant claims that the trial court erred in finding that the Zoning Board heard no contrary testimony related to the subdivision application and further argues that the Board did not permit any testimony to be presented in violation of the MLUL.  This characterization of the Zoning Board hearing and the Trial Judge’s deliberation is not accurate and the record is clear that there was no such violation of the MLUL.  The procedures for holding a hearing on any application for development, including an application for subdivision as a bifurcated application to the zoning board of adjustment are set forth in the Municipal Land Use Law.
[brief] ” (91a).  This section, Article XLIV, provides as follows:  This Contract shall be in full force and effect from January 1, 2013 until midnight, December 31, 2015.  The parties agree that negotiations for a successor Agreement modifying, amending or altering the terms and provisions of this Agreement shall commence the first week of September 2015.  In the event no successor Agreement is completed before December 31, 2015, the present Contract will continue in full force.  (91a-92a).  Defendants cannot legitimately argue that Plaintiffs lack contractual rights based upon the expiration of the CAN.  This issue has been squarely decided in Plaintiffs’ favor by our Supreme Court.
[brief] The fact of the matter is that the plaintiff did not call [...] in their case-in-chief, nor did they call the plaintiff to testify live in court.  Defense counsel is permitted to argue to the jury that they did not have an opportunity to judge the demeanor of these witnesses and manner of testifying live in court.  Consistent with the trial court’s ruling, no statements were made suggesting why these witnesses were absent from trial.  As stated by counsel in summation, there were only two people in the aisle that day that could have provided the jury with testimony regarding what happened, and the plaintiff chose to call neither of them to testify in the courtroom.  (7T33:1-4).  The plaintiff’s characterizations of the summation of defense counsel as improperly suggesting to the jury that the plaintiff, her daughters and/or her counsel were attempting to deceive the jury and recover damages upon a fraudulent claim is without merit and not supported by the record.
[brief] Da231-351.  These are “umbrella” forms of liability coverage that insured [...] for its potential liability when underlying, primary coverage does not apply.  *Id.*  [...] has admitted that [...], which had issued primary liability policies to [...], had properly denied coverage (Da1757) and there is no dispute that the [...] policies “drop down” to provide primary liability coverage to [...] for bodily injury and property damage attributable to “occurrences” during the coverage periods of the policies.  Da336.  Like most CGL policies, the [...] policies define a covered “occurrence” of property damage or bodily injury as “an accident, including _____________________ to 3T12-6.  Because he did not have a refrigerator or any other food storage facilities, he continued to store his food in the condominium, placing some on the kitchen counter and some in the refrigerator.
[brief] [...], 062102014 Assistant Prosecutor Of Counsel and On the Brief email: [...] TABLE OF CONTENTS Page TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ................................................................. iii COUNTERSTATEMENT OF PROCEDURAL HISTORY ......................... 1 COUNTERSTATEMENT OF FACTS .................................................. 2 LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I THE JURY VERDICT WAS NOT INCONSISTENT ........ 17 POINT II A JURY INSTRUCTION ON DIMINISHED CAPACITY WAS NOT REQUIRED ........................................... 23 POINT III THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT TRIAL WAS RELEVANT, THUS PROPERLY ADMITTED ..................... 30 A. The Items Recovered from Defendant’s Vehicle were Relevant to the Crime Committed, Thus Properly Admitted into Evidence ...........................................
[brief] ’”  Litton Industries, 200 N.J. at 387 (quoting Furst, 182 N.J. at 22) (internal quotation omitted).  The court must determine reasonable hourly billing rates that are “fair, realistic, and accurate. ”  Rendine v. Pantzer, 141 N.J. 292, 337 (1995).  The trial court may decide to deduct a certain percentage of fees from the total award based on what is reasonable under the circumstances of a specific case.
[brief] Accord, Main Union Assocs. v. Twp. of Little Falls Rent Leveling Bd., 306 N.J.  Super. 404, 412 (App. Div. 1997), certif. denied, 153 N.J. 402 (1998) (facial challenge to rent ordinance would require a categorical exclusion of capital improvement costs from being included in rent increases; ability of the determining body to consider them prevented a successful facial challenge to the ordinance).
[brief] ”  Cf. *State v. Doss*, 310 N.J. Super. 450, 460 (App. Div. 1998) (defense of others instruction).  With any affirmative defense, the burden of proof is on the defendant.  See id. at 460.  Generally, self-defense is not a defense to resisting arrest or aggravated assault on a police officer.  New Jersey law makes clear that “force may not be used to resist even an unlawful arrest, and it use will support a conviction for assault on an officer. ”  [...], *N.J. Criminal Code Annotated*, cmt. 10 on N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1 (2023 ed.); see also *State v. Casimono*, 250 N.J. Super. 173, 182-85 (App. Div. 1991).  “Strong policy reasons” necessitate the rule that misconduct or unlawful actions by police related to a defendant’s crime do not constitute affirmative defenses:  A contrary rule would virtually immunize a defendant from prosecution for all crimes he might commit that have a sufficient causal connection to the police misconduct.  . . .  [This would] give[] a defendant an intolerable carte blanche to commit further criminal acts so long as they are sufficiently connected to the chain of causation started by the police misconduct.  This result is too far reaching and too high a price for society to pay in order to deter police misconduct.  *[Casimono*, 250 N.J. Super. at 184 (quoting *United States v. Bailey*, 691 F.2d 1009, 1012-19 (11th Cir.1982)).]
[brief] For the foregoing reasons, Defendant-Appellant [...] respectfully requests that the Order denying the Motion to Vacate Default Judgment be reversed.  Respectfully submitted, /s/ [...]  [...]  [...] [...]  Tel. & Fax: [...]  Dated: October 30, 2024 Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant  Superior Court of New Jersey  Appellate Division  Docket No. [...]  [...], Plaintiff-Respondent, vs. SCOTT DIANA, Defendant-Appellant.  CIVIL ACTION ON APPEAL FROM THE FINAL JUDGMENT OF THE SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY, LAW  DIVISION: SPECIAL CIVIL PART, BERGEN COUNTY  Docket No.: [...]  Sat Below: HON.  [...], J.S.C  BRIEF ON BEHALF OF PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT
[brief] THE AUTHORITY PROPERLY DENIED APPELLANT’S APPLICATION AND ITS DECISION IS ENTITLED DEFERENCE.  (Aa236-45).  Appellate review of an administrative agency’s determination is limited in scope.  In re Herrmann, 192 N.J. 19, 27 (2007).  A “strong presumption of reasonableness attaches” to the agency’s decision.  In re Carroll, 339 N.J. Super. 429, 437 (App. Div. 2001) (quoting In re Vey, 272 N.J. Super. 199, 205 (App. Div. 1993), aff’d, 135 N.J. 306 (1994)).  The role of an appellate court is to determine whether the findings of the agency “could reasonably have been reached on sufficient credible evidence present in the record, considering the proofs as a whole, with due regard to the opportunity of the one who heard the witnesses to judge of their credibility. ”  Close v. Kordulak Bros., 44 N.J. 589, 599 (1965) (quoting State v. Johnson, 42 N.J. 146, 162 (1964)).  The burden of demonstrating that the agency’s action is arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable rests upon the party challenging it.  See Barone v. Dep’t of Human Servs., 210 N.J. Super. 276, 285 (App. Div. 1986), aff’d, 107 N.J. 355 (1987).  A reviewing court “‘may not substitute its own judgment for the agency’s, even though the court might have reached a different result. ’”  In re Stallworth, 208 N.J. 182, 194 (2011) (quoting In re Carter, 191 N.J. 474, 483 (2007)).  See also Brady v. Bd. of Review, 152 N.J. 197, 210 (1997) (quoting Charatan v. Bd. of Review, 200 N.J. Super. 74, 79 (App. Div. 1985) (“[T]he test is not whether an appellate court would come to the same conclusion if the original determination was its to make, but rather whether the factfinder could reasonably so conclude upon the proofs. ”)).  Moreover, recognizing that the Authority acts similarly to a Planning Board in reviewing Appellant’s application, is it well settled that “public bodies, because of their peculiar knowledge of local conditions [,] must be allowed wide latitude in the exercise of delegated discretion. ”  Price v. Himeji, LLC, 214 N.J. 263, 285 (2013) (quoting Kramer v. Bd. of Adjustment, 45 N.J. 268, 296 (1965)).  Therefore, “[t]he proper scope of judicial review . . . is not to suggest a decision that may be better than the one made by the board, but to determine whether the board could reasonably have reached its decision. ”  Davis Enters. v. Karpf, 105 N.J. 476, 485 (1987).  A.  The Authority Properly Denied Appellant’s Application Based On Valid On-Site Considerations.
[brief] The issue before this court is simple and straightforward: whether a discrete and limited subject matter is required for a valid request under New Jersey’s Open Public Records Act, N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1.1 to -13 (“OPRA”).  [...] simply asks this court to apply the law consistent with longstanding New Jersey precedent holding that under OPRA, a requestor is entitled to access government records, but only to the extent they submit a proper request.  For a request to be valid, the requestor is obligated to identify records with reasonable clarity and identify a discrete and limited subject matter.  A requestor cannot circumvent this requirement by seeking all of an agency’s records.  [...], by contrast, seeks to throw out nearly two decades of precedent.  He asks the court to adopt a new test that does not exist in our jurisprudence and would not require a requestor identify the records he or she seeks with any level of clarity so long as the records custodian is able to ascertain where the records are located.  In so doing, [...] parrots the trial court’s reliance on a through-line of cases beginning in 2012 with Burke v. Brandes, 429 N.J. Super. 167 (App. Div. 2012), and ending with the Supreme Court’s decision in Paff v. Galloway Township, 229 N.J. 340 (2017).
[brief] The trial court properly confirmed the 2018 awards issued by a single arbitrator.  [...] argues to vacate all Phase II awards because, he claims, the AAA should have “switched” to a 3-arbitrator panel following pleading amendments at the start of Phase II.  This is [...]’s second failed attempt to forum shop his way out of the Arbitrator’s decisions (after the SDNY Action).  [...] cites cases where the wrong number of arbitrators entered the award, but in each case, the contractual arbitration clause expressly provided for a specific number of arbitrators.  The Operating Agreement here does not.  [...]’s entire argument also assumes a false premise not raised during Phase I: that Phase I and Phase II were two different arbitrations merely because the parties amended a pleading.  Db34-35.
[brief] Decision Issued By The New Jersey Public Employment Relations Commission  Dated October 26, 2023 .............................................. Pa215 PRELIMINARY STATEMENT  This matter involves a straight-forward question of statutory interpretation.  The [...] (“Board” or “Appellant”) and the [...] (“Association”) have been involved in negotiations for a successor collective negotiations agreement for more than two (2) years.  When the most recent round of bargaining began, the Association demanded that its so-called “Bargaining Council,” which was comprised of, and open to, all 200-plus members of the Association, be permitted to attend each negotiations session.  Although the parties attempted to negotiate a ground rule to limit the number of attendees at each session, they were ultimately unsuccessful, and the Association thereafter refused to negotiate with the Board without its membership present.  The parties filed cross-unfair practice charges against each other with the Public Employment Relations Commission (“PERC”), each alleging bad faith bargaining by the other party and the interference of rights granted to them by the Employer-Employee Relations Act (“Act”), specifically, the right to negotiate pursuant to the Act’s requirements.
[brief] Vladichak, 2022 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS at *1-*2.  Plaintiff filed a Complaint against [...] and the other skier ([...]) alleging:  [...] was independently negligent for failing to provide appropriate warnings to skiers, failing to appropriately designate the difficulty of ski trails, failing to provide skiers with appropriate information about trail conditions, failing to timely remove obvious manmade hazards, and/or otherwise failing to establish adequate procedures to provide a safe skiing environment.  [...] was negligent for breaching his duty to others to ski in a reasonably safe manner by skiing in a reckless manner and/or intentionally colliding into plaintiff and causing her injuries.  Vladichak, 2022 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS at *2  [...] filed an answer and crossclaims seeking defense and indemnification from [...] based on executed Rental and Release Agreements.
[brief] The lower court properly refused Plaintiff’s demand that Defendant’s expert compromise his professional standards permitting Plaintiff to record proprietary neuropsychological testing contrary to published professional standards.  In 2021, after extensive briefing and argument over the course of several motions, [...], P.J.Cv. properly determined:  Defendants, because of [...] following his association’s recommendations not to audio tape because of the potentiality of invalidating the integrity of the process, is precluded from being an expert.  That is unfair.  After the Appellate Division and the New Jersey Supreme Court upheld the lower court’s discretion to impose such conditions, [...]’s opinion remained the same.  Nothing submitted on behalf of the Plaintiffs in support of the pending appeal contradicts the sound basis [...] identified for his finding of good cause to prohibit Plaintiff from recording his Rule 4:19 examination.  Counsel argues that the use of recording devices in a neuropsychological exam does not technically violate the published Code of Ethics, but fails to refute the fact that it is contrary to good (or even standard) practice in the field.  Defendants are entitled to a Rule 4:19 examination that is performed under conditions consistent with good practice.  This fact alone justifies [...]’s order prohibiting recording.  Plaintiffs’ arguments have all been fully briefed, argued, considered, and properly rejected multiple times by multiple courts.  Further scrutiny by this Court is unnecessary and Plaintiffs’ refusal to accept the lower Court’s Order is unreasonable given the procedural history of this case.  This simple discovery dispute has now been the focus of five (5) separate motions, three (3) related appeals and one (1) Supreme Court hearing.  There is absolutely no justification for Plaintiffs’ claim that [...] failed to consider any of the factors discussed by the New Jersey Supreme Court on this issue.  Plaintiffs’ counsel raised and thoroughly briefed each of those factors.  The fact that [...] ruled against the Plaintiff does not in any way indicate that he failed to read their submissions.  He clearly did so and found that the equities balanced in favor of the Defense.  Accordingly, his well-reasoned decision should be sustained.  COMBINED STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[brief] Yet, even though the law is clear that, in a case where self-defense is the defense -- in addition to proving all the ordinary elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt -- the State must also disprove self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt in order to get a guilty verdict, *State v. Kelly*, 97 N.J. 178, 200 (1984); *State v. Martinez*, 229 N.J. Super. 593, 600 (App. Div. 1989), the jury instructions told the jurors repeatedly that they must return a guilty verdict if they found merely that the State proved the ordinary statutory elements of the homicide crimes beyond a reasonable doubt, with no mention of the role of self-defense.  (6T 124-21 to 125-2; 6T 126-19 to 24; 6T 127-7 to 128-17)  Then the verdict sheet did nothing to clear up that error, instructing the jury to return a guilty or not guilty verdict based solely on whether the State proved those ordinary elements.  (Da 32)  Later explanations in the jury instruction of the doctrine of self-defense also did nothing to correct those prior errors; rather, they merely, on occasion, contradicted them, leaving the jury without a clear explanation of when it would be appropriate to convict defendant of a homicide offense.  Defendant urges that this fundamental error on such a critical point of law was plain error, clearly capable of affecting the verdict, and that the error thereby deprived him of due process and a fair trial under the Fourteenth Amendment and under the corresponding provisions of the state constitution, requiring a reversal of his aggravated-manslaughter conviction and a remand for retrial.
[brief] A Yes.  Q  So that’s almost 13 years ago.  A  Yes.  Q  And the last time you did surgery for ischemic colitis was in the fall of 2010, again about 13 years ago?  A Yes.  Q  So in June of 2016, when [...] was treating [...], you did not have hospital privileges anywhere to do what [...] was doing and that is consulting on a hospital patient and doing surgery.
[brief] ”  *Linden*, 232 N.J. Super. at 33.  The Appellate Division further held:  On its face, the bar applies to plaintiff’s negligence suit against defendant [...].  Though both work for different departments of the State, the employer of both is, in fact, the State.  [citation omitted].  Neither the State Police nor the Department of Treasury is a separate legal entity, but rather each is a division or department of the State performing State functions.  *Linden*, 232 N.J. Super. at 31.  In *Ehrgott v. Jones*, 208 N.J. Super. 393 (App. Div. 1986), plaintiff was injured in a motor vehicle accident as a passenger in a vehicle operated by his co-employee.
[brief] POINT I..................................................................................................................16  THE TRIAL COURT ORDER [Pa163]  PARTIALLY GRANTING SUMMARY  JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF [...] MUST BE UPHELD BECAUSE IT IS UNDISPUTED THAT [...] IS THE RECORD OWNER OF THE PROPERTY IN QUESTION.  .........................................................16  A.  The trial court correctly determined that [...] is entitled to summary judgment for ejectment, quiet title and nuisance.........................................................16  1.  The trial court correctly determined [...] is entitled to summary judgment on its First Count for ejectment because it is the record owner of the Property and [...]’s misconduct interferes with its property rights.  .................................................................18  2.  The trial court correctly determined [...] is entitled to summary judgment on its Fourth Count for quiet title because there is no question of fact that [...] is the clear record owner of the subject Property..............................................................................................................19  3.  The trial court correctly determined [...] is entitled to summary judgment on its Fifth Count for private nuisance due to [...]’s unreasonable interference with [...]’s property rights.............20  POINT II ..................................................................................................................................................22
[brief] ”); *id.* at 304 (explaining that “the detrimental impact that disclosure” of privileged information “would impede agency functions by discouraging open and frank discussion and recommendations from agency employees to those higher up in [the agency’s] hierarchy now and in the future. ”).  Likewise, while framed within the common law right of access and not OPRA, factor three in the Loigman v. Kimmelman balancing test contemplates “the extent to which agency self-evaluation, program improvement, or other decisionmaking will be chilled by disclosure.
[brief] ” (Aa356).  See LoBiondo v. Schwartz, 199 N.J. 62, 102 (2009), where the New Jersey Supreme Court held that to prove a civil conspiracy, plaintiff must demonstrate the following:  [A] combination of two or more persons acting in concert to commit an unlawful act, or to commit a lawful act by unlawful means, the principal element of which is an agreement between the parties to inflict a wrong against or an injury upon another, and an overt act that results in damage.  (emphasis added).  Here, plaintiff’s allegations (set forth in Count VI and Count X) fail to identify any conduct or agreement by the [...] to have colluded with each other to deny plaintiff’s rights and privileges.  Plaintiff’s libel and slander claims were properly dismissed with prejudice as POINT VI