[brief] PLAINTIFF’S CLAIM FOR PUNITIVE DAMAGES WAS ALSO PROPERLY DISMISSED AND THAT DISMISSAL SHOULD ALSO BE AFFIRMED BY THIS COURT.  The trial court properly dismissed plaintiff’s punitive damages claim, and did so using the appropriate legal standard.  Here, plaintiff once again erroneously assumes and erroneously asserts that the trial court decided the issue utilizing the “actual malice” standard.  See, Plaintiff’s Appellate Brief at p.41.  Notably, plaintiff offers no insight into how plaintiff reached this conclusion other than to say that plaintiff disagrees with the result reached by the trial court.  In reviewing the court’s opinion, nowhere is the phrase “actual malice” used.  (Pa12).  Indeed, the legal standard it used to determine whether plaintiff put forth sufficient evidence supporting a viable claim for punitive damages was expressed as follows:  “Punitive damages are to be awarded in circumstances that demonstrate a wanton and willful disregard of persons who foreseeably might be harmed by defendant’s conduct...the defendant’s conduct must have been wantonly reckless or malicious.  There must be an intentional wrongdoing in the sense of an “evil-minded act” or an act accompanied by a wanton and willful disregard of the rights of another. ” (Pa12, internal citations omitted and emphasis added).  Here, plaintiff’s reliance on *McLaughlin v. Rova Farms, Inc.*, 56 N.J. 288 (1970) is totally misplaced because it was decided before the 1995 enactment of the Punitive Damages Act ("the Act") which established more restrictive standards for an award of punitive damages.  *N.J.S.A.*  2A:15-5.9 *et seq.*  See also, Assembly Insurance Committee Statement, Senate, No. 1496-L.1995, c. 142 (stating the restrictions imposed on the awarding of punitive damages).  Thus, in enacting the Act as part of a five-bill tort reform package, the Legislature obviously intended to limit the availability and amount of punitive damage awards in most cases.  As Justice Garibaldi noted in *Smith v. Walker*, 160 N.J. 221, 248 (1999), the Act evinces a "clear legislative mandate indicating that the purpose of the Act was to restrict punitive damage awards rather than expand them."  As such, plaintiff cannot recover punitive damages by merely recasting negligent conduct as willful and wanton.  *Entwistle v. Draves*, 102 N.J. 559, 562 (1986).  Likewise, punitive damages are not to be applied in the ordinary, unaggravated tort case.  *Berg v. Reaction Motors Division*, 37 N.J. 396, 413 (1960).  Rather, there must be a deliberate act or omission with knowledge of a high degree of probability of harm and reckless indifference to the consequences.  *Berg*, 37 N.J. at 414.  Here, as the trial court properly concluded, "[t]here is no supporting evidence in the record to warrant such a conclusion in this instance. ” (Pa12).  Accordingly, punitive damages should not be rewarded for what is nothing more than a parking lot accident caused by the negligent conduct of defendant [...], tragic as this case may be.  Plaintiff has not set forth any evidence to show circumstances of aggravation or outrage, such as spite or malice, a fraudulent or evil motive on the part of the defendant, or such conscious and deliberate disregard of the interests of others that the defendant’s conduct may be called wanton and willful.  Indeed, the law makes clear that plaintiff cannot recover punitive damages simply by characterizing conduct as egregious as plaintiff attempts to do here.  Entwistle, 102 N.J. 562 (1986).  Accordingly, the trial court’s grant of summary judgment as to plaintiff’s punitive damages claim must be affirmed.