ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Even in their own pleading, Appellants do not tie those losses to the CEP Respondents’ conduct.  Had Appellants simply made their annual lease payment, [...] would have permitted them to continue developing the solar project.  Instead, Appellants lost land control and lost their development rights.  Thus, even if Appellants were somehow successful in proving that CEP Respondents committed wire or mail fraud (which they did not), Appellants still would not have standing to seek civil RICO damages because they do not have any “concrete financial loss” here.  *See id.*  In essence, Appellants seek to expand RICO to provide a federal cause of action for a tort plaintiff, an expansion the District of New Jersey prohibits.  *See Twp. of Marlboro*, 545 F. Supp. 2d at 457-58.  Second, Appellants cannot establish the predicate acts, wire and mail fraud, necessary to support their RICO claim because [...] spoke the truth.
[brief] The TCA itself does not and has never made such a distinction.  See N.J.S.A. 59:1-1 to 14:4.  And ever since the 1994 amendment to N.J.S.A. 59:8-3, the TCA expressly states that the notice of claim requirement applies to any action to be brought thereunder “against a public entity or public employee. ”  See id. (emphasis added).  As Gazillo held, if a public employee is being sued for actions or inactions taken in the scope of their public employment with a public entity, such is subject to the TCA—including the procedural requirements of N.J.S.A. 59:8-3.  See Gazillo, 398 N.J. Super. at 264.  [...] alternatively asserts that no notice of claim was required for his libel and slander claims because “those claims were the object of and in furtherance of appellant’s civil rights conspiracy claim.
[directive] no Formulário Promulgado pela diretiva 01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 11710-Portuguese página 1 de 2 Form Promulgated by Directive #01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 11710-Portuguese page 1 of 2  Eu, , o réu na(s) causa(s) acima intitulada(s) tendo sido condenado por Eludir a Abordagem Policial nos termos da lei 2C:29-2b, através do presente acuso o recebimento da N.J.S.A. notificação escrita das penalidades por conduzir com a carteira de motorista suspensa em decorrência do descumprimento da referida lei.  Fui também informado verbalmente pelo juiz sobre estas consequências em audiência pública.
[brief] Even then, [...] asked officers to call his wife as a courtesy so that she wouldn’t be upset when the police arrived; the police declined to do so.  (Da 26-27)  The officers’ conduct was plainly coercive.  Simply put, [...] was left with a Hobson’s choice: either consent to the search or have his home destroyed, further upsetting his ill wife and grandchildren in the process.  Commonsense dictates that, given this dire binary, [...] was compelled to accede and his consent was thus involuntary.  See Carty, 170 N.J. at 645 (“‘Consent’ that is the product of official intimidation or harassment is not consent at all.  Citizens do not forfeit their constitutional rights when they \textsuperscript{13}  [...] testified that [...] [...] (no first name given) made this statement.  (1T65-17 to 21) are coerced to comply with a request that they would prefer to refuse. ” (quotation omitted)); State v. Carvajal, 202 N.J. 214, 226 (2010) (“To act voluntarily is to act with a free and unconstrained will, a will that is not overborne by physical or psychological duress or coercion.
[brief] On December 11, 2019, a Union County Grand Jury returned Indictment [...], charging defendant with first-degree murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(1) or (a)(2) (count 1); second-degree possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(a)(1) (count 2); and second-degree unlawful possession of a weapon, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b)(1) (count three).  (Da1-2).  Trial was held before the Honorable [...], J.S.C., and a jury between May 31, 2022, and June 9, 2022.  (2T to 8T).  On June 8, 2022, the jury convicted defendant on all counts.  (8T14-15 to 15-6; Da3-4).  On October 6, 2022, defendant was sentenced to a fifty-five-year New Jersey State Prison term under the No Early Release Act (NERA), N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2, for count one, count two was merged into count one, and a concurrent eight-year New Jersey State Prison term with forty-eight months of parole ineligibility under the Graves Act for count three.  (Da5-7; 9T24-15 to 25-6).  On November 1, 2022, defendant filed a notice of appeal.  (Da8-10).  COUNTERSTATEMENT OF FACTS
[brief] Ca242.  Complainants allege that Respondent’s actions “could be reasonably be seen as compromising the Board and as speaking for the Board as a member of the public. ”  Ca242.  They also state that Respondent swore to uphold and enforce all laws, rules and regulations of the State Board of Education relating to schools.  Ca242.  Count 4 of the amended complaint relates to what Complainants describe as “anti-school masking, anti-vaccination, and anti-testing requirements” Facebook post.
[brief] Plaintiffs had certified in their motion for summary judgment that [...] paid a September 30, 2013 invoice for that separate matter.  (Da2034)  They didn’t produce the invoice or the company’s check, just the affidavit saying that “the company’s books and records” showed the payment.  (Da2034)  However, [...] showed a consent order entered in that estate case where his counsel’s fees would be paid by the estate.  (4T53:19-54:16)(Da2043-2044 para. 11)  Where [...] had failed to document the payment that its CFO, [...], said they could document, but did not, [...] was entitled to favorable inferences that the conflicting Consent Order presented.  He was also entitled to cross-examine the [...] witness about where the documents he reviewed were.  Instead, the Arbitrator ruled [...] owed the $70,975 and the Court confirmed because there was no evidence to refute.
[directive] What the statute requires is that another person accept responsibility for the defendant before the defendant can be released.  Once a defendant is released under the provisions of “John’s Law” the defendant is free to take whatever test.12 steps he/she may chose to obtain an independent “[A] policy of releasing an intoxicated 12  For those municipalities which have elected to enact an ordinance under the provisions of John’s Law II, P.L.2003,c.164, permitting local law enforcement to hold a DWI defendant in (continued...)
[directive] Computer Assessories xx/xx/xxxx xxxx.xx xxxx.xx xxxx Kxlxx/xxxx xxxx.xx xxxx.xx  Office Equipment xxxx xdxx/xxxx xxxx.xx XXXX.xx  Machinery XMX.XX - xxxx X xx/xx/xxxx xxxx.xx (XXXX.XX)  xxxx.xx  Computer Forfeited xx/xx/xxxx - xxxx X xx/xx/xxxx xxxx.xx (xxxx.xx)  Machinery Returned xx/xx/xxxx - xxxx xxxx.xx  Z  Office Equipment Forfeited xx/xx/xxxx xxxxxx xxxxxx xxxxxx  Balance ~ x x x x x x x M ( xxxxxxx Balance  December 31,2002  The accompanying Notes to Financial Statements are an integral part of this statement.
[directive] The pretrial order to whether determining release defendant's that reason believe to is there whether consider shall detention also pretrial to sufficient be not would condition release no-contact a that and victim a risk to a pose would and applicable; if release, defendant's eligible the by posed be would that process instrument assessment risk using a obtained program services pretrial of the recommendation release the (~ 2A:162-25.  N.J.S.A. under 29 the by implicated be that may rights affords 52:4B-36, N.J.S.A. Rights, of Bill
[brief] In reviewing the prior procedural proceedings, there was a prior summary judgment practice by the Moving Defendants, which was DENIED by [...]’s Order filed November 22, 2019, “for reasons stated on the record. ”  A transcript regarding such a motion proceeding was not contained in the client-case file transferred from [...], Esq., to [...], and thus, we must respectfully request that the Court rely upon its understanding of the November 22, 2019, Order to determine the “law of the case” doctrine to deny the [...]’ current motion, without regard to plaintiffs’ opposition papers, or deem the “law of the case” inapplicable and consider their current motion on its merits, and deny the motion based upon plaintiffs’ substantial opposition.
[brief] ”  State v. Alston, 204 N.J. 614, 621 (2011) (quoting State v. McCloskey, 90 N.J. 18, 26 n.1 (1982)).  “[A] suspect need not be articulate, clear, or explicit in requesting counsel; any indication of a desire for counsel, however ambiguous, will trigger entitlement to counsel. ”  Gonzalez, 249 N.J. at 630 (citing Alston, 204 N.J. at 253 and State v. Reed, 133 N.J.  237, 253 (1993)).  If a “‘suspect’s statement “arguably” amount[s] to an assertion of Miranda rights,’ conducting a follow-up inquiry is the only way to ensure that a suspect’s waiver of their right was knowing and voluntary.
[brief] QuickBooks maintains an audit trail report where it records every transaction, including the time, date, and person who made the entry.  He personally ran the audit trail report that shows every keystroke made.  o (2T 47:18-49:3; 52:2-53:8).  •  That report demonstrates, after the order was entered by the court once again requiring [...] to produce books and records, a total of 1,208 "change transaction" entries were made, changing the original transactions.  783 transactions were "added" for the first time and 30 transactions were "deleted."  o (2T 54:2-:88:3).  As shown above, each of the findings of fact that were relevant to the decision below were properly supported by evidence in the record.
[directive] Court Staff Procedures for Providing a Certification on Matters Expunged by Supreme Court Order  The following procedures are to be followed when individuals (or their attorneys) seek copies of their own expunged records or a certification of expungement, and the --- expungement was ordered by the Supreme Court.  A juvenile (under age 18) must have their parent or attorney make the request for the expunged or sealed record.  Third party requestors are not entitled to these records under this procedure.
[directive] Serious bodily injury means bodily injury which creates a substantial risk of death or which causes serious, permanent disfigurement or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ.  Serious bodily injury and serious bodily harm have the same definition the purposes of this Policy.  See N.J.S.A. 2C:11-1(b); N.J.S.A. 2C:3-11(d).
[brief] [Da007a].  As held by the trial court, the seminal case of In re PSE&G is directly on point and applicable to this matter.  As a matter of law, any limited authority a municipality might have pursuant to N.J.S.A. 48:7-1 does not apply to high-capacity lines, as in this case.  See In re PSE&G, 35 N.J. at 373.  In In re PSE&G, our Supreme Court considered the validity under the Public Utility Law of a municipal ordinance adopted by the [...] that sought to require the public utility to install all new high-capacity electric power lines underground rather than to install those electric power lines on utility poles.
[brief] Defendant [...] failed to provide a copy of these three additional unpublished opinions, and never certified that there were no known contrary unpublished opinions.  Service of the summons and complaint was likewise attempted at the same street address provided by Defendant [...].  Contrary to Defendant [...]’s misstatement, without having submitted a single certification in the underlying matter in this appeal, that at “no time did the clerk mail anything to an address in the state of New Jersey.  Rather, the plaintiff provided a number of false addresses in New Jersey for the defendant, . . . .”  (Db16)  On the contrary, the clerk first sent process to Defendant [...]’s Post Office Box address because that was the only street address provided by Defendant [...] to Plaintiff.  [Pa1; Trans. ID: [...]]  Eventually service was effectuated by sending the summons and complaint by regular and certified mail to Defendant [...]’s law office in New York City at [...] – the green card was returned with a signature, the regular mail was never returned, and service was therefore presumptively effective.  Defendant [...], however, claimed that the New York City address is not “her place of business” but that is simply not correct – that address is the confirmed address for her law office at that time, and is the same address on her filing with the underlying court.
[brief] Dennery, supra, 131 N.J. at 641.  Further, if there was truly no nexus between Respondent’s Board membership and her Facebook page, as the Commission erroneously held, members of the [...] community would not have protested Respondent at meetings of the Board.  It is unmistakably clear from the Board minutes and news articles that documented these protests against the Board and Respondent in response to her Facebook posts, that the community outcry was a result of the clear connection between her Board membership and her Facebook posts.  (Ca107-109, Ca120-122, Ca123-127).  In fact, the news articles in the record clearly identified Respondent in her role as Board member and clearly showed that the public protested Respondent in her role as Board member at meetings of the Board as a result of her Facebook posts.  (Ca123-127)
[brief] TABLE OF CONTENTS  Page TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS, AND RULINGS BEING APPEALED....  iii  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ........................................................................................................ iv  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT .................................................................................................  1 CONCISE STATEMENT OF PROCEDURAL HISTORY .........................................................  4 CONCISE STATEMENT OF FACTS  MATERIAL TO ISSUES ON APPEAL ....  7 LEGAL ARGUMENT ..............................................................................................................  9 POINT I
[brief] Rather, like the deed from [...] to [...], the deed from [...] to [...] included language after the legal description as to the following additional property rights that were being conveyed:  Together with all and singular, the houses, buildings, trees, ways, waters, profits, privileges, and advantages, with the appurtenances to the same belonging in or in anywise appertaining; Also all the estate, right, title, interest, property, claim and demand whatsoever of the said party of the first part of, in, and to the same, and of, in and to every part and parcel hereof . . .  See Pa0923-Pa0924 (emphasis added).  [...] testified at trial that the inclusion of these provisions and his interpretation of the conveyance documents as a whole demonstrated an intent on the part of [...] to convey all of its riparian rights, including its interest in the [...] Tract, to [...].  Q: you felt that using the word waters in this context was significant in terms of indicating an intent to convey the riparian grant.  A: It was the best it could be done under the circumstances.
[brief] “[P]iercing the corporate veil is not technically a mechanism for imposing ‘legal’ liability, but for remedying the ‘fundamental unfairness [that] will result from a failure to disregard the corporate form. ’”  Verni ex rel. Burstein v. Harry M. Stevens, Inc., 387 N.J. Super. 160, 199 (App. Div. 2006).  In State, Dept. of Environmental Protection v. Ventron Corp., 94 N.J. 473 (N.J. 1983), our Supreme Court addressed those circumstances that allow for piercing of the corporate veil:
[directive] Considerations when using force.  The decision to use force and the appropriate amount of force requires careful attention to the facts and circumstances of each incident.  The officer must, as time permits and is feasible, consider the following non-exhaustive list of factors when determining whether and how much force to apply: (a) immediacy and severity of the threat to officers or the public; (b) the conduct of the individual being confronted, as reasonably perceived by the officer at the time; (c) characteristics of the officer and subject (e.g., age, size, relative strength, skill level, injuries sustained, level of exhaustion or fatigue, the number of officers available vs. subjects); (d) the effects of drugs or alcohol; (e) the individual’s mental state or capacity; (f) the proximity of weapons or dangerous improvised devices; (g) the degree to which the subject has been effectively restrained and their ability to resist despite being restrained; (h) the availability of other options and possible effectiveness; (i) the seriousness of the suspected offense or reason for contact with the individual.  For example, in dealing with minor offenses, such as motor vehicle or and local ordinance violations practicing procedural-justice techniques, such as explaining the officer’s actions and responding to questions before resorting to force, is particularly important; (j) the officer’s training and experience; and (k) the potential for injury to officers, suspects, and the public.
[brief] In Owen, the plaintiff attempted to assign the proceeds from a structured settlement.  Unfortunately for the plaintiff, the agreement contained an anti-assignment clause and the defendant objected to the assignment.  After the trial court granted the plaintiff summary judgment requiring the defendant to honor the assignment.  The defendant appealed arguing that the anti-assignment clause prohibited the assignment.  Although the Appellate Division agreed with defendant, and reversed and remanded for further proceedings, the majority and dissent endorsed Berkowitz as representing settled "New Jersey law . . .[which] generally permits the assignment of settlement proceeds."  Owen, 330 N.J. Super. At 617, 624.
[brief] See N.J.S.A. 2C:30-2b.  Notwithstanding the Trial Court’s incorrect analysis below, an act of official misconduct is unlawful, regardless of whether it occurs a single time or is pursuant to a policy or common practice in a particular law enforcement agency.  A single act of official misconduct is both prosecutable under our criminal law and gives rise to illegal activity about which a sworn law enforcement officer may blow the whistle under CEPA and in turn be protected from illegal retaliation by his or her employer.  With respect to a claim under N.J.S.A. 34:19-3c, “the determination of whether the plaintiff adequately has established the existence of a clear mandate of public policy is an issue of law.
[brief] The Trial Court made clear errors of fact that constitute an abuse of discretion requiring reversal of its decision.  The Trial Court acted as though it were the rebuttal expert to [...] (“[...]”) and contested facts established by the deposition testimony of [...] (“[...]”), without any expert opinion in the record rebutting [...] or any facts in the record that contested the testimony of [...].  It was neither the role nor in the expertise of the Trial Court to dispute whether [...]’s or [...]’s factual statements and/or unrebutted expert opinions were correct.  The Trial Court’s misplaced preoccupation with the arguments that Plaintiff [...] was not an affordable housing developer was nothing more than a disguised “new business rule” ignoring the realities of 100% affordable housing developments as expertly and irrefutably set forth by [...] and [...].  The record is clear that Plaintiff [...] paid the required consideration as set forth in the 322 West-NJ 322 Assignment and General Release, thus becoming the equitable owner of [...].
[directive] 9.6.2  In addition, the law enforcement executive may authorize access to a particular file or record for good cause.  The request and the authorization should be in writing, and the written authorization should specify who is being granted access, to which records access is being granted and for what time period access is permitted.  The authorization should also specify any conditions (i.e., the files may be reviewed only at the internal affairs office and may not be removed).  In addition, the law enforcement executive may order any redactions necessary to protect sensitive or privileged information, including an officer’s medical or mental health records or the details of an ongoing criminal investigation.  The 56 INTERNAL AFFAIRS POLICY & PROCEDURES | August 2020 law enforcement executive should grant such access sparingly, given the purpose of the internal affairs process and the nature of many of the allegations against officers.  9.6.3
[brief] A drain was inserted into Plaintiff’s spine in order to drain fluid every hour for four days.  He was immobilized and catharized during this period.  (2T99-1 to 101-18)  The at home recovery took seven months during which time he was out of work, limited in his ability to move around and do things, and his wife had to help him with many activities of daily living.  (2T101-19 to 103-11; 2T104-5 to 12)  Plaintiff had another surgery performed by [...] at [...] in November, 2014.  He was hospitalized for about three days (2T104-13 to 18).  [...] performed a labyrinthectomy, which severs the balance nerve in the ear, which results in deafness.
[brief] 2.  POINT  I.  THE COURT ERRED FOR LIMITING THE CROSS EXAMINATION OF DETECTIVE SZBANZ WHEN HE DID NOT ALLOW THE DEFENDANT TO PRESENT THE 9-1-1 CAD REPORT DURING HIS TESTIMONY; THE COURT ERRONEOUSLY RULED THAT THE CAD REPORT WAS HEARSAY; THUS VIOLATING DEFENDANT’S RIGHTS TO CONFRONTATION AND TO PRESENT A COMPLETE DEFENSE.  THEREFORE A NEW TRIAL IS WARRANTED.
[brief] To wit, [...] testified, “. . . I assumed that a new re-development plan or a plan amendment would be adopted for projects at that time. ”  Pa180 at 11:7-9.  The impropriety of [...]’s opinion was explored during his deposition:  Q: . . .  Throughout your report, you use a term, “negotiated zoning”.  Can you provide me with the benefit of your definition of “negotiated zoning”?  A:  So what would happen many times is a developer would conceive of a development project that did not conform to existing zoning and would present their proposal to the planning department.  And we would consider the proposal.  And if we thought it had merit, we might seek some changes to it and require some public benefits or some design changes that we thought was beneficial to the public.  And assuming the area was blighted, we would then be able to write a report to have it declared in need of redevelopment or in need of rehabilitation and then adopt a redevelopment plan for that site, or for the general area, depending on how . . . it worked out.  Pa183 at 22:21-23:13.  As argued to the trial court, “there is no such thing as negotiated zoning. ”  1T13:18-19.  During his deposition, [...] acknowledged his approach did not comply with the Municipal Land Use Law.  Pa183 at 23:14-18.  Respondent’s appraisal expert based his appraisal analysis on Mr. [...]’s incorrect planning analysis.  Pa111.  Therefore, this Appellate Division should reverse the trial court’s rulings and bar the presentation of Respondent’s expert opinions from the jury.
[brief] Plaintiff does not dispute that she was arrested with heroin in her possession, pleaded guilty to the felonies of “[m]anufacturing, dealing, possessing, with intent to manufacture or deal[,]” and “unlawfully and knowingly, intentionally possessing a controlled or counterfeit substance contrary to the Controlled Substance Act[,]” and served her full sentence in prison.  (Appx 58-65; Appx 67-74; Appx 114 at 67:16-23, 68:12-20, 69:18-70:6; Appx 115 at 72:13-73:15; Appx 525 at ¶21; Appx 526-27 ¶¶25-30).  Plaintiff also does not dispute that she denied she had criminal convictions three separate times in connection with her application for employment with Defendant.  (Appx 523-25 ¶¶11-20).  One of those times was under penalty of perjury.  (Appx 524-25 ¶¶18-20).  The three items Plaintiff denied in her Opposition were related to legal interpretation of The Statute.