ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977) (noting that “freedom of personal choice in matters of . . . family life” is constitutionally protected) (plurality op.); see also Gruenke, 225 F.3d at 303 (discussing right to “familial integrity”).  This right protects parents’ relationships with their children from “undue state interference. ”  Gruenke, 225 F.3d at 303, 306 (holding school personnel’s secret interference with parents’ “management of [their daughter’s] teenage pregnancy” violated right to family integrity).  See also Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925) (noting that students are not “mere creatures of the State”).  The Parental Secrecy Policy constitutes an “undue state interference” in parents’ relationship with their children.  From the clothing and toys parents give their children, to the friends parents allow their children to have, to the sports parents allow their children to play, the parent-child relationship is deeply shaped by whether the child is a boy or a girl.  By requiring schools to socially transition children without informing parents, the Parental Secrecy Policy allows schools to fundamentally alter the nature of parents’ “emotional bond[s]” with their children.  Ovando v. City of Los Angeles, 92 F. Supp. 2d 1011, 1021 (C.D. Cal. 2000); see also Doe v. Dickenson, 615 F. Supp. 2d 1002, 1014 (D. Ariz. 2009) (holding state may not fundamentally alter the nature of the parent-child relationship).  Moreover, the Parental Secrecy Policy treats parents as the enemy, impermissibly driving a wedge into the parent-child relationship that lies at the heart of the family, thus usurping the parental role.  Patel v. Searles, 305 F.3d 130, 134, 137 (2d Cir. 2002) (holding the state violated the right to family integrity when it created “mistrust among the members of [plaintiff’s] family”).  In short, a school that socially transitions children behind parents’ backs unduly interferes with the parents’ right to family integrity.
[brief] The Relationship Between a Student and a University Should Not Be Viewed in Purely Contractual Terms, and New Jersey Courts Defer to a University’s Judgment With Respect to Academic Standards.  In determining that no contract existed between [...] and [...], the Trial Court also correctly rejected Plaintiff-Appellant’s myopic view of [...]’s ability to promulgate and enforce basic academic standards.  The jurisprudence of this State affords institutions of higher education great discretion in how they admit, educate and graduate students.  As such, higher education institutions are not constricted to the same degree as commercial entities as to what should constitute a binding contractual agreement.
[brief] This reduction occurred despite the fact many government employees were covered by a collective bargaining agreement that established their salary and benefits.  Ibid.  In reversing the District Court’s ruling, the Third Circuit found that the enactment of VIESA violated the Contract Clause of the United States Constitution.  Ibid.  In reaching its holding, the United Steel Paper Court found that the collective negotiations agreement established a contractual relationship, and the union employees had a reasonable expectation that they would benefit from their bargain in the absence of mutual assent.
[brief] ”  Morgan Stanley Servs. Co. v. N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., No. A-5703-08T1, 2011 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 182, at *17 (App. Div. Jan. 26, 2011)4 (quoting Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 212 (1988)).  [...] accurately identifies that the “crux of Appellant’s challenge” rests on the failure to make the section 11.1(c)(2) feasibility determination, BP 4  While this case is unpublished, this principle is well settled and Appellant is unaware of any contrary unpublished opinions.
[brief] This Court reviews the granting of Defendant [...]’s Motion to Dismiss under R. 4:6-2(e), applying the same standard as is applied in the Law Division.  Major v. Maguire, 224 N.J. 1, 26 (2016).  Under R. 4:6-2, a party asserting a defense of the failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted may raise the claim prior to filing an answer.  R. 4:6-2(e).  A motion to dismiss under R. 4:6-2(e) must be evaluated in light of the legal sufficiency of the facts alleged on the face of the complaint.  Printing Mart-Morristown v. Sharp Electronics Corp., 116 N.J. 739, 746 (1989).  While the non-moving party is entitled to every reasonable inference of fact, the denial of a motion to dismiss cannot be supported by a plaintiff's reliance on vague and conclusory allegations, bald assertions, or legal conclusions.  See e.g., Rieder v. State Dept. of Transp., 221 N.J. Super. 547, 552 (App. Div. 1987) (stating that a Court cannot consider anything other than the legal sufficiency of the facts alleged and apparent on the face of the complaint).  Moreover, the plaintiff has the obligation of “mak[ing] allegations, which, if proven, would constitute a valid cause of action. ”  Sickles v. Cabot Corp., 379 N.J. Super. 100, 106 (App. Div. 2005) (quoting Leon v. Rite Aid Corp., 340 N.J. Super. 462, 472 (App. Div. 2001)).  If the factual allegations are “palpably insufficient” to support a claim upon which relief can be granted, then dismissal is appropriate.  *Frederick v. Smith*, 416 N.J. Super. 594, 597 (App. Div. 2010).  “In evaluating motions to dismiss, courts consider allegations in the complaint, exhibits attached to the complaint, matters of public record, and documents that form the basis of a claim. ”  *Banco Popular N. Am. v. Gandi*, 184 N.J. 161, 183 (2005) (internal quotes omitted.)  See also *Myska v. New Jersery Mfrs. Ins. Co*; 440 NJ Super 458, 482 (App. Div. 2015).  A Court reviewing a Complaint pursuant to a motion to dismiss may consider documents specifically referenced in the complaint “without converting the motion into one for summary judgment. ”  *Myska v. New Jersey Mfrs. Ins. Co.*, 440 N.J. Super. 458, 482 (App. Div. 2015), citing *E. Dickerson & Son, Inc. v. Ernst & Young, LLP*, 361 N.J. Super. 362, 365 n. 1 (App. Div. 2003).  Furthermore, “when allegations contained in a complaint are contradicted by the document it cites, the document controls. ”  *Myska*, 440 N.J. Super. at 482 (citing *Rapaport v. Robin S. Weingast & Assocs.*, 859 F. Supp. 2d 706, 714 (D.N.J. 2012))  As discussed in greater detail below, even affording Appellants the benefit of all inferences, there can be no question that the Trial Court properly dismissed Appellants’ legal malpractice claims with prejudice.
[brief] The matter -- this is the matter of [...] versus [...].  I find the parties were married on September 7, 2004 in a civil ceremony in Juneau, Alaska.  There are no children born of the marriage.  All property and support issues have been resolved in the settlement agreement previously marked as P-1 and testified to by the plaintiff.  This was the second marriage of each party, their prior marriages ending in divorces before this marriage took place, and there are no prior proceedings with regard to this marriage.  I find the jurisdictional requirements have been met, the plaintiff residing in the state of New Jersey for at least one year preceding the filing of the complaint.  The venue requirements have been met, the plaintiff residing in Atlantic County when this case of action arose.  I find there’s jurisdiction over the defendant who signed an acknowledgment of service of the summons of complaint and a waiver of her right to answer, and signed the settlement agreement as well.  I find that plaintiff has proved a cause of action for divorce based on the grounds of irreconcilable differences lasting at least six months with no reasonable prospect of reconciliation, and I will enter judgment dissolving the marriage on that basis.
[brief] POINT ONE THE DEFENDANT'S CONVICTIONS SHOULD BE REVERSED BECAUSE THE TRIAL COURT MISAPPLIED ITS DISCRETION AND DEPRIVED THE DEFENDANT OF HIS RIGHT TO PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE BY DENYING TRIAL  COUNSEL'S MOTION TO EXCUSE JUROR NUMBER (4), IN VIOLATION OF DEFENDANT'S SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO A FAIR AND IMPARTIAL JURY.  In his final supplemental pro se brief, [...] argues:
[brief] However, we need not get caught up in the question concerning the extent to which plaintiffs have shifted gears or changed their position regarding the appropriate statute of limitations.  Because the issues before the trial judge dealt with whether the suit was timely and what the controlling limitations period was, we will consider the same issues as presented to us, regardless of whether plaintiffs' principal theory has changed.  Id.  In the case at hand, the Court should apply the reasoning of Johnson v. McClellan, supra because [...] presented unrebutted evidence to the motion court that his claim for damages of $210,635.00 were not time barred because his complaint was filed in 2020 and the claim accrued in 2016 and 2017.
[brief] For each of the theft-based predicate acts Plaintiffs were required to demonstrate that Defendants acted purposefully, i.e. it needed to be Defendants’ “conscious object to engage in conduct” or “to cause” a particular “result. ”  N.J.S.A. 2C:2-2(b)(1).  By establishing that the Defendants’ wrongful conduct was not limited in time and voluminous, Plaintiffs established that these acts were not an honest bookkeeping error, but a conscious pattern and practice.  Next, although taking place before 1994, evidence regarding the formation of the partnership and its terms was imperative to establishing RICO violations within the statute of limitations period.  As the trial court found, and the Appellate Division affirmed, the predicate acts underpinning Defendants’ RICO violations were acts of theft by unlawful taking, theft by failing to make the required disposition of property, misapplication of entrusted property, theft by deception, falsification or tampering with records and mail and wire fraud.  ….  All of these predicate acts stem from the same question: whether the Defendants mishandled partnership funds to increase distributions to themselves, at the expense of their partners.  Inherent in that factual determination is then the terms of the partnership agreement -- were Defendants authorized to act as they did with the partnership funds.  If they were, then the actions would not constitute theft or fraud.  If they were not -- as the Court found -- the actions did.  It would be impossible to prove that Defendants actions were unauthorized without establishing the source of authorization -- the partnership agreement.  Therefore, to establish RICO damages for any timeframe, Plaintiffs still would have had to establish the facts leading to the formation of the partnership regardless of how far that preceded the statute of limitations period.
[brief] Pursuant to R. 4:6-1(a), a defendant shall file an answer to a complaint “within 35 days after service of the summons and complaint on that defendant. ”  “Service” of a summons and complaint on a corporation such as [...] is accomplished by personally serving a copy of the summons and complaint “on any officer, director, trustee or managing or general agent, or any person authorized by appointment or by law to receive service of process on behalf of the corporation, or on a person at the registered office of the corporation. ”  R. 4:4-4(6).  Appellants claim to have served [...] with the Amended Complaint by delivering copies of same to the secretary of [...], Esq., another named defendant in this action who is in no way affiliated with [...].  [Pa3337, Pa3342].  As a matter of law, service was improper and Appellants do not (and cannot) contend otherwise.  In denying Appellants’ Motion, [...] appropriately observed that Appellants “served a copy of the complaint to [...].  Mr. Bellin is a named defendant in the matter and not affiliated with or employed by [...].  [...] is a public company with an agent for service of process.  Service on Mr. Bellin is insufficient. ”  [Pa3427]  On appeal, Appellants have not presented anything to suggest that [...] was properly served.  While Appellants represent in their brief that the Amended Complaint “was served and filed July 19, 2021” [Pb25], they cite to no evidence of service \textit{on [...]} and offer nothing to refute [...]’s factual findings to the contrary.
[brief] If so, then the lowest original lot grade must be used for measuring building height.  The Building Height definition of the Ordinance clearly states that such revised lot grade shall not include mounding, terracing or other devices designed to allow for increased building height, irrespective of the purpose or intent.  If the result of the design allows for increased building height, then Building Height must be measured from the original lot grade.  Otherwise, the Ordinance could not be applied consistently to different applications whereas the Board would measure building height from the original lot grade on one property, while measuring building height from a revised lot grade on another property.  Such application of the Ordinance would cause a confusing, unclear and subjective interpretation of Building Height which would not be applied consistently in different applications.
[brief] The Court also relies upon, as a basis for preemption, that “Defendants have chosen to participate in the [...].  By doing so, they have acted under the authority of the Local Health Services Act (N.J.S.A. 26:3A2-2), a more specific Act, to regulate noise nuisance, which effectively preempts N.J.S.A. 40:48-1 of the Home Rule Act, a more general grant of power.
[brief] **  The parties stipulated the suppression hearing testimony into the trial (7T77-24/78-4), which continued with additional testimony by [...] (7T79-23/97-22).  After reserving decision (7T105-105-11/22), the municipal court delivered its verdicts on September 12, 2023, finding [...] guilty of failing to observe a signal (8T7-17/8-1) and DWI (8T8-17/9-12; Da6a) and finding him not guilty of reckless driving (8T9-13/17).  For failing to observe a traffic signal, the court imposed a $207 fine and $33 court costs.  8T10-8.  For DWI, the court ordered [...] to pay a $257 fine, $33 court costs, and $350 in various assessments, to attend an Intoxicated Driver Resource Center for 12 hours, and to forfeit his driving privilege until he installs a breath alcohol ignition interlock device for three months thereafter.  8T10-18/24.  **Appeal.**
[brief] Further, Appellant lay in wait to ambush the [...] with its exorbitant appraisal, failing to take any one of the multiple opportunities to discuss any perceived discrepancies with the [...]’s Verified Complaint with Respondent’s counsel.  This was confirmed during oral argument on the [...]’s motion to amend.  1T10:8-21.  Indeed, Appellant admitted to the trial court the fact that the project was to repair the existing seawall and not construct a brand new one in a different location.  1T25:7-13.  Appellant never communicated with the [...] --- \(^1\)  The language of the Verified Complaint itself was not affected by the amendment.  regarding any discrepancies in the exhibits attached to the Verified Complaint prior to the production of Appellant’s $1,550,000 appraisal report, despite having communicated with the [...]’s counsel on multiple occasions when Appellant needed numerous extensions to produce Appellant’s appraisal report.  On December 16, 2019, Appellant’s counsel called the [...]’s counsel, stating he was unable to complete Appellant’s appraisal report by the December 20, 2019 deadline and requested additional time; the [...]’s counsel consented.  Pa9.  At no time did Appellant’s counsel suggest there was any inconsistency or discrepancy between the metes & bounds description and the map attached to the Verified Complaint.  Pa9.  To be clear, the [...] consented to several adjournments of the trial to accommodate Appellant’s inability to timely produce an appraisal report.  2T28:21-23.  The trial court properly granted Respondent’s motion to amend, holding:  [T]he proposed amendment makes no change to the size of the area that is the subject of this action.  It makes no substantive change to the scope of the area subject of the taking whatsoever.  The area taken is not changed in size nor interest.  Da83.  The trial court specifically recognized the map attached to the Verified Complaint contained the correct information.  Da84.  It is for these reasons that Appellant’s argument; “Allowing the amendment was improper.  The owner’s expert reports were based on plaintiff’s own metes and bounds description of the easement taken” (Db20); is a gross misrepresentation of the factual circumstances presented to the trial court.  So, too, is Appellant’s attempt to cast Respondent’s actions as tantamount to abandonment of the condemnation action a desperate attempt to provide any basis for Appellant’s demand for reimbursement of its expert fees.  As described supra, Respondent provided sufficient, accurate information to Appellant prior to the production of Appellant’s $1,550,00 appraisal report which allowed Appellant’s experts to prepare an accurate report.  Therefore, the trial court’s Order of March 27, 2020 should be affirmed.  POINT II
[brief] (12T129-1 to 134-20).  These witnesses generally testified about defendant and his family life, with [...] opining that he believed defendant is disconnected from reality.  (9T220-2).  Defendant also presented testimony from Doctor [...], a forensic and clinical psychologist.  (10T47-5 to 13).  [...] opined that during the time preceding the murders, defendant was showing evidence of psychosis and schizophrenic symptoms and was delusional at the time of the murders.  (10T121-21 to 122-4, 189-20 to 25, 208-12 to 18).  [...] opined that defendant was laboring under the mental disease of early onset schizophrenia and was actively in a psychotic, dissociative state at the time of the murders and, therefore, was not capable of understanding the nature of his actions or to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct.  (11T24-7 to 27-9).  The State presented the testimony of Doctor [...], an expert in forensic psychiatry, in rebuttal.  (12T198-23 to 200-14).  [...] opined that while defendant did suffer from Autism Spectrum Disorder, he did not have schizophrenia, delusions, hallucinations, or suffer from psychosis.  (13T13-2 to 15-1; 14T57-4 to 71-9, 86-1 to 109-12, 117-20 to 23).  [...] further opined that defendant knew and appreciated the nature and quality of his actions at the time of the murders and was able to appreciate the wrongfulness of his actions.  (13T20-17 to 21-11; 14T84-4 to 85-7, 107-4 to 118-14).  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I THE LOWER COURT PROPERLY DENIED DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO SUPPRESS HIS STATEMENT.
[brief] Ibid.  The State pointed out the fallacy in defendant’s opposing argument that body-worn-camera footage from police officers did not pick up audio of the declaration, because the victim’s father was by his dying son’s side, for approximately “four or five minutes” before police arrived.  (1T91:16-25).  The court ultimately admitted the dying declaration because it found the victim’s father’s delay in reporting the dying declaration was a product of “human nature,” specifically:  A parent who was confronted with their child who was just shot in the head, bleeding, and may very well expire, yes, obviously, those were the words he had mentioned and then, you know, the word -- and then the [victim] said [...] and he said, well, how is [...], I would have to imagine as a parent, the first -- and the only thing that probably was [the father’s] mind during this whole incident was saving his son, the wellbeing of his son.  I mean, yes, he did ask this, but I have to imagine that's only very secondary or thereafter to -- for the love of god, please save my son.  I don't want my son to die…..  You know, as far as fabrication goes, if [...] wanted to fabricate a statement when he asked who did this and [the victim] said [...], if [...] really wanted to fabricate, he probably wouldn't have said [...].  He probably would have said [defendant’s name not a nickname for defendant].  That's who did it, [...].  He's not going to say [...] because he didn't know who [...] was [assuming this was a fabrication.] [(1T98:1-25). ]
[brief] Exhibit A, Second Amended Complaint, dated January 26, 2016, filed May 24, 2019 (omitted here – see 64a) Exhibit B, Memorandum Opinion dated August 4, 2017, filed May 24, 2019 (omitted here – see 2522a) -- Exhibit C, Estate of Alexander v. Northeast Sweepers, A-1123-17 (App. Div. Apr. 19, 2018) (unpublished), filed May 24, 2019 (omitted here – see 2303a) -- Exhibit D, [...] Request for Expressions of Interest, dated December 16, 2013, filed May 24, 2019 (omitted here – see 1787a) -- Exhibit E, Agreement between [...] and [...], dated April 26, 2014, filed May 24, 2019 (omitted here – see 2280a) -- Exhibit F, Agreement between [...] Engineers, Architects and Land Surveyors, P.C., and [...], dated May 6, 2014, filed May 24, 2019 (omitted here – see 1778a) -- Exhibit G, Excerpts from the Deposition of [...], dated April 12, 2017, filed May 24, 2019 (omitted here – see 1912a)  -- Exhibit H, Excerpts from the Deposition of [...], P.E., dated May 10, 2017, filed May 24, 2019 (omitted here – see 2610a)  -- Exhibit I, Excerpts from the Deposition of [...], dated May 10, 2017, filed May 24, 2019 (omitted here – see 1577a)  -- Exhibit J, Excerpts from the Deposition of [...], P.E., dated June 12, 2018, filed May 24, 2019 (omitted here – see 2185a)
[brief] See also *Moukengeschaie v. Eltman, Eltman & Cooper, P.C.*, 2016 WL 1274541, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2016) (“The FDCPA was enacted to protect consumers from abusive debt collection practices by third-party debt collectors, to create parity in the debt collection industry and to standardize governmental intervention in the debt collection market. ”).  In order to achieve these objectives, “the FDCPA creates a private right of action for debtors who have been harmed by abusive debt collection practices. ”  *Benzemann v. Citibank, N.A.*, 806 F.3d 98, 100 (2d Cir. 2015) (citation omitted).  Here, it is undeniable that Respondent’s use of a letter vendor to print and mail debt collection letters does not demonstrate any “abusive” conduct which Congress was interested in preventing.  See T23 (“A third party vendor is . . . just simply . . . creating a letter to send out.  It means nothing. ”).
[brief] [...] graduated from the 100th Academy Class of the New Jersey State Police.  Pa61.  [...] retired from the New Jersey State Police on a Special Retirement on or about January 1, 2010.  Pa84.  While employed by the New Jersey State Police, [...] was dispatched to Ground Zero to perform a myriad of functions in conjunction with the Federal Bureau of Investigation between September 2001 and June 2002.  Pa63.  On or about July 8, 2019, “The Bill Ricci World Trade Center Rescue, Recovery, and Cleanup Operations Act” was signed into law (hereinafter referred to as the “Ricci Act”).  P.L. 2019, c. 157.  Under the Ricci Act, the Board of Trustees was required to promulgate rules and regulations necessary to implement the new law.  The Ricci Act states that the Board of Trustees “shall notify members and retirants in the retirement system of the enactment of this act, P.L. 2019, c. 157, within 30 days of enactment. ”  N.J.S.A. 53:5A-10(e)(4).  (Emphasis added).  The Board was required to notify all members of the State Police Retirement System of the Ricci Act by August 7, 2019, including the requirement to “register” by filing a form indicating the dates and locations of service within two (2) years.
[brief] Moreover, Defendant voluntarily spent $36,000 on improvements to the fence, creating a locked double-gate entry system.  Koda lives in a virtual “fortress,” demonstrating that --- \(^5\) The Court likely meant to say AKC “Canine Good Citizen,” not “good boy. ”  [...] is a responsible dog owner.  She has taken extraordinary measures to confine her dogs and prevent intruders from coming in.  Similar incidents are not likely to happen.