ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] **A.  The DACCA Attorney Safe Harbor does not “reach a substantial amount of constitutionally protected conduct. ”**  Appellants argue that the DACCA Attorney Safe Harbor is overbroad because it allegedly “prohibits attorneys who devote the most time and are the most experienced from assisting clients with debt adjustment. ” (Ab45).  However, this argument is premised on two false assumptions – (1) that the DACCA outright prohibits debt adjustment by attorneys; and (2) that there is a fundamental constitutional right to engage in a certain employment.  First, the DACCA does not outright prohibit any activity by attorneys.  Instead, it provides a safe harbor to attorneys who incidentally perform debt adjusting for their clients.  And attorneys who are “principally engaged” in debt adjusting can perform these services under the auspices of a licensed non-profit entity.  Attorneys do not, and cannot, apply for a debt adjustment license or be regulated by the Department because the only entity that can hold a license and be regulated by the Department is a non-profit social service agency or non- profit consumer credit counseling agency.  N.J.S.A. 17:16G-2(a) and (b).  But any person working for a licensed non-profit company is not separately licensed.  Because there is no fundamental right to engage in debt adjusting, it was within the Legislature’s power to create this licensing scheme to regulate this activity.  Second, as discussed in Point I, there is no fundamental right to a particular employment.  Greenberg, 99 N.J. at 573.  Therefore, the DACCA Attorney Safe Harbor does not “reach a substantial amount of constitutionally protected conduct. ”
[directive] Phase 3 Requirements - Review each requirement with staff and sign you understand the expectations.  _______________ • I will attend court on time monthly at: _ • I will follow my treatment plan and establish my relapse prevention plan at: ---------------- .  Phone Number: of •  I will follow the conditions probation supervision and meet every other week with my probation officer on time.  Probation officer: __________  Phone Number: .  I will immediately notify my probation officer of of any conflicts prior to my appointment or in case an emergency.  my • I will review my case plan with probation officer as needed.  • I will allow probation officers into my residence for home visits and home inspections.  ______ •  I will submit to random drug testing.  Testing hotline number: _ _______ (ID#: ) if my • I will maintain housing and keep probation officer informed my residence changes.  • I will address any recommended medical/dental needs.  • I will continue to demonstrate changing people, places, and things.  •  I will maintain attending recovery groups and establish recovery network per treatment.  if • I will follow my financial plan indicated per case plan.  • I will establish pro-social activities such as calling a sober friend, developing a new hobby, taking a walk, or attending alumni groups.  I have reviewed the requirements for Phase 3 and understand my responsibilities to the drug court program.
[brief] In their briefs on this appeal, both Defendants argue that, once a party demands the return of a security deposit, he or she generally is considered to have terminated the contract and may not thereafter compel specific performance.  (See, e.g., [...] Br., at 10, 14, 17-23; [...] Br., at 23-28).  However, none of the cases cited by Defendants include the particular “notwithstanding…” and “in addition to its termination right” language that is included in Section 13.1 of the PSA.  New Jersey has a strong public policy in favor of allowing parties the freedom to contract – and contracts must be enforced according to their terms, unless doing so would violate some public policy.  See generally Rodriguez v. Raymours Furn. Co., Inc., 225 N.J. 343, 360-61 (2016).  This language distinguishes the instant case from the run-of-the-mill real estate contract case – and it must be construed as giving Plaintiff an additional remedy of specific performance, notwithstanding the return of the security deposit, if and when [...] proceeded to close with the Fee Owner.  Defendants also insist that, after the Deposit was returned to Plaintiff, it would be impossible to obtain specific performance, since the Deposit was part of the purchase price to be paid by Plaintiff.  (See [...] Br., at 18, 22; [...] Br., at 26-27).  This argument presents a red herring.  In exercising its contractual right to compel specific performance of the transaction contemplated by the PSA, Plaintiff would naturally be required to pay the full purchase price (including the amount that comprised the Deposit).  As alleged in the Complaint, Plaintiff was prepared to proceed with the transaction, had informed Defendants of that, and had spent hundreds of thousands of dollars to get the financing in place for the purchase price.  (Pa5; Complaint, ¶ 19; Pa7, Complaint, ¶ 26).  B.
[brief] The district court rejected the plaintiff’s argument.  The court found that the plaintiff signed an account application and, by signing, stated that he received a copy of the agreement and agreed to be bound by it.  See id. at *3.  Because the plaintiff offered no evidence of fraud or misrepresentation, he “remain[ed] bound by the Agreement regardless of whether he read it. ”  Id.  Similarly, in *Bayron-Paz v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.*, the court held that the plaintiff “entered into the Contract and is bound by its arbitration clauses.
[brief] See *Hake v. Manchester Township*, 98 N.J. 302, 313, 486 A.2d 836 (1985).  The basic rule for applying the common knowledge doctrine in a malpractice action "is that the issue of negligence is not related to technical matter peculiarly within the knowledge of the licensed practitioner."  *Sanzari*, 34 N.J. at 142, 167 A.2d 625.  The most appropriate application of the common knowledge doctrine involves situations "where the carelessness of the defendant is readily apparent to anyone of average intelligence and ordinary experience."  *Sanzari*, 34 N.J. at 140, 167 A.2d 625.
[brief] ” (Pb10).  Here, as the Trial Court noted, “[t]he exception advanced by Plaintiffs is the ‘important public rather than private interests which require adjudication or clarification. ’” (Pa56).  The Court, however, was not convinced by Plaintiff’s arguments.  (Pa56).  Plaintiff failed to show sufficient public interest.  1.  Plaintiff Does Not Raise any Constitutional Claims.  (T2, 9:20-10:4).  When a plaintiff seeks a private interest rather than a public interest, courts will deny requests for enlargement under Rule 4:69-6(c).
[brief] Identical to the within appeal, the [...] posted notice on their website with a link to a claim form.  *In re State and Sch. Emples. Health Benefits Commissions' Implementation of Yucht*, 2017 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1938.  Pra5.  Also identical to the within matter, the Division sent a letter to all Certifying Officers with the same exact terms contained in the Certifying Officer Letter’s “EMPLOYER RESPONSIBILITIES” section.
[brief] The Court found that [...], while pro se, failed to challenge the 2016 partial award related to the $970,000 loan, and therefore waived any right to challenge all single arbitrator rulings made in Phase II.  (3T78:5-9)  The Court ignored [...]’s argument that his prior challenge to the Plaintiffs’ loan voidance claims was that they were not arbitrable at all because they were separately documented and did not arise “under” the operating agreement.  (4T9:1-25)  The Court instead ruled that [...], although pro se, was still required to simultaneously assert that, what he considered to be a non-arbitrable claim was arbitrable, but only by a panel of 3.
[brief] By IRS filings, it is [...]  ([...]) that owned the claimed assets at the time of the IRS filings – no trust or trustee conveyance was formed.  Six separate "segregated pool of assets" were reported to the IRS, with Park Place Securities Inc.  ([...]) as corporate owner of assets for each of the six segregated non-trust Real Estate Mortgage Investment Conduits (A634).  [...] was dissolved in 2009 with no successor.  Instead of a legal trust formed, [...] formed a title series name that segregated the ultimate pool, in violation of Regulation AB, for Mortgage/Asset Backed Securities as determined by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) into six distinct Real Estate Mortgage Investment Conduits (REMICs) claimed as “segregated pool of assets” to IRS with [...] as the corporate asset owner.
[brief] Id.  A "ministerial act" has been defined as "one which public officers are required to perform upon a given state of facts in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of legal authority and without regard to their own judgment or opinion concerning the propriety or impropriety of the act to be performed."  Ritter v. Castellini, 173 N.J. Super. 509, 513-514 (Law Div. 1980) (sheriff required to safekeep property levied upon).  It has also been defined as synonymous with "mandatory."  Marley v Palmyra Bor., 193 N.J. Super. 271, 289 (Law Div. 1983).  See discussions in Morey v. Palmer, 232 N.J. Super. 144 (App. Div. 1989); Flodmand v Institution & Agencies Dep’t., 175 N.J. Super. 503 (App Div. 1980); Sutphen v. Benthanian, 165 N.J. Super. 79 (App. Div. 1979); Evans v. Elizabeth Police Dept., 190 N.J. Super. 633, 636 (Law Div.) rev’d on other grounds 236 N.J. Super. 115 (App. Div. 1983).  Maintenance of the roadway has specifically been found to be a ministerial act.  See, e.g., Coyne v. State Dept. of Transp. 182 N.J. 481, 487 (2005); Costa v. Josey, 160 N.J. Super. 1 (App. Div. 1978) aff’d 79 N.J. 535 (1979), rev’d 83 N.J. 49 (1980); Schriger v. Abraham, 83 N.J. 46 (1980); Brown v. Brown, 86 N.J. 565 (1981); and Furey v. County of Ocean, 273 N.J. Super. 300 (App. Div.) (certif. den. 138 N.J. 272 (1994) – court finding failure to maintain roadway in safe condition a ministerial act.)
[brief] On or about May 10, 2021, [...] filed a Six Count Complaint alleging Breach of contract (First Count), Breach of Implied Contract (Second Count), Breach of Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing (Third Count), Promissory Estoppel (Fourth Count), Legal Fraud (Fifth Count) and Equitable Fraud (Sixth Count).  \(^1\) (Pa17 – Pa23)  On or about June 21, 2021, [...] filed its Answer, along with a Counterclaim alleging causes of action for Breach of Contract (Count One), Breach of Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing (Count Two), and Legal Fraud (Count Three).
[brief] Defendant’s claim that his prior offenses “did not occur over a long period of time” should be rejected.  (Db41).  While the two convictions that served as the predicate for persistent offender status occurred in 2014 and 2015, his record dated back to his three juvenile arrests, the first two of which resulted in diversions with conditions.  (PSR 7-8).  See State v. C.W., 449 N.J. Super. 231, 259-60 (App. Div. 2017) (holding that an adult defendant’s juvenile record may be considered at sentencing).
[brief] Although the [...] not dispute, or set forth any facts to question, that [...]’s assignor’s “[...] ” did not comply with all the requirements in “[...]’s” Check Cashing Resolution; Pa 50-51; motion [...] held at Pa 176:  “While there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether there was fraud or illegality affecting the dishonored check, plaintiff does not satisfy the requirements to establish he is a holder in due course pursuant to N.J.S.A. 12A:3-302(a)(2), because plaintiff acknowledges he was assigned the dishonored check. ”  Yet in this Appellate Division’s seminal published decision of first impression in [...] v. Cigna Ins. Co. 297 N.J. Super. 199, (App Div. 1997) this Appellate Court held: a check casher’s holder in due course rights in its customers’ dishonored checks are freely assignable.  Accordingly, it is irrefutable that: the Honorable, [...], J.S.C, committed prejudicial and reversible error when she found at Pa. 176; [...] was not entitled to the rights of a holder in due course, because – as Judges Suh mistakenly assumed - at the time [...] purchased the [...]’ check, [...], or his assignor [...], knew it was previously cashed.
[brief] To the extent she argues or suggests that the law prohibits agreements to arbitrate discrimination claims under the LAD, she is incorrect, as Antonucci again shows.  In Antonucci, as a matter of first impression, this Court resolved that any state law that outright prohibits “the arbitration of a particular type of claim”—such as, the attempted application of N.J. Stat. Ann. § 10:5-12.7 to preclude arbitration of an LAD claim—conflicts with and is therefore preempted by the FAA.  470 N.J. Super. at 564.  As the Court explained, even “when the state law does not expressly single out arbitration agreements, it will be pre-empted if its application ‘covertly accomplishes the same objective by disfavoring contracts that . . . have the defining features of arbitration agreements. ’”  *Id.* at 565 (quoting *Kindred Nursing Ctrs.*, 581 U.S. at 247).  This Court’s prior holding that the FAA preempts any legislative attempt to preclude agreements to arbitrate discrimination claims is directly applicable.  [...] does not cite, mention, or attempt to distinguish *Antonucci*, nor does she acknowledge N.J. Stat. Ann. § 10:5-12.7 and this Court’s holding with respect to its preemption by the FAA.
[brief] The trial court did not abuse its discretion in disqualifying plaintiff’s expert.  New Jersey’s rules of evidence allow the admission of expert testimony only “[i]f scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue. ”  N.J.R.E. 702.  To that end, the net opinion rule requires an expert’s opinion to have a factual foundation and “establish the existence of [a] standard” upon which the opinion is based.  Pomerantz Paper Corp. v. New Cmty. Corp., 207 N.J. 344, 372 (2011); see also N.J.R.E. 703; Johnson v. Salem Corp. Co., 97 N.J. 78, 91 (1984); Buckelew v. Grossbard, 87 N.J. 512, 524-25 (1981).  “The admissibility rule has been aptly described as requiring that the expert give the why and wherefore that supports the opinion, rather than a mere conclusion. ”  Pomerantz, 207 N.J. at 372 (internal quotations and citation omitted).  A view “about a standard that is ‘personal’” fails the net opinion rule.  Id. at 373; Taylor v. DeLosso, 319 N.J. Super. 174, 180 (App. Div. 1999) (“[O]pinion testimony must relate to generally accepted . . . standards. ” (internal quotations and citation omitted)); Ibid. (excluding report that fails to refer to any written document or unwritten custom or practice indicating consensus of architectural community supporting opinion).  In *Jiminez v. GNOC Corp.*, the plaintiff alleged that she was injured by a defect in the handrail on an escalator at an Atlantic City casino.  286 N.J. Super. 533, 537 (App. Div. 1986).  The plaintiff presented the expert opinion of a civil engineer in support of her allegations who opined that the handrail on the escalator had been improperly maintained, thereby causing the accident.  *Id.* at 538.  But the engineer did not identify how the maintenance of the handrail deviated from industry standards.  *Id.* at 539.  As a result, the Appellate Division ruled that the engineer’s opinion was an incompetent net opinion that would not assist the jury in reaching a valid opinion on the subject.  *Id.* at 540-43.  The District of New Jersey precluded an expert report in a case with even more favorable facts to the plaintiff than this one in *Mendler v. Aztec Motel Corp.*, No. 09-2136 (Dec. 7, 2011) (slip op.).  There, while the plaintiff motel guest was exiting the shower, she reached for the towel rack to assist her exit but it pulled out of the wall; the plaintiff fell backward and was injured.
[brief] On appeal from the [...].  [...] argued the cause for appellants [...], [...], and [...] ([...], attorneys; [...] and [...], on the briefs).  [...], Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent [...] ([...], Attorney General, attorney; [...], Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; [...], on the brief).  [...] argued the cause for respondent [...] ([...], attorneys; [...], [...], and [...], on the brief).  The opinion of the court was delivered by [...], P.J.A.D.
[directive] For example, snowmobiles are only allowed on State Park Service trails specifically designated for that purpose.  N.J.A.C. 7:2-3.5(b).  State Park snowmobile regulations can be found at N.J.A.C 7:2-3.5.  Also, all motor vehicles operated on State Park Service property must be properly licensed and registered, and the driver must have in his or her possession a valid driver’s license and other documentation required by the New Jersey Division of Motor Vehicles.  N.J.A.C. 7:2-3.1.  Officers may write an additional citation if the ORV causes damage to State Park Service property, such as soil erosion or destruction of vegetation.  “[N]o person may alter, deface, destroy, disturb, or remove any State park or forest property, whether man-made or natural, or any animal, or any archaeological department. ”3 findings on State park or forest property or which are held by the N.J.S.A. 13:1L- 10(a); see also Section II(E) below for increased penalties that apply to damage to public lands.  3  N.J.S.A. 13:1L-10(d) does not restrict or affect “fishing, hunting, trapping, or other such activities or related activities otherwise authorized or permitted on State park or forest property by the Department of Environmental Protection. ”  4  Penalties for State Park Service violations are found at N.J.S.A. 13:1L-23.  Specifically, N.J.S.A. 13:1L-23(d) makes any violation involving a vehicle or off-road vehicle subject to the penalty provisions of N.J.S.A. 39:3C-33 and -34, including fines, impoundment, and potentially forfeiture of the vehicle, as discussed in Section II(E) below.
[brief] State v. Neal, 361 N.J. Super. 522, 537-38 (App. Div. 2003).  To do so “improperly divert[s] jurors’ attention from the facts of the case . . . and intend[s] to promote a sense of partisanship with the jury that is incompatible with the jury’s function. ”  Id. at 537.  A jury’s duty is limited to deciding, based on the evidence, whether the State has met its burden.
[brief] The irony in the State’s position, is that one of Applicants’ substantive complaints is that the law binds all future Legislatures’ actions when the Act declared:  State’s citation to *Berg v. Christie*, 225 N.J. 245, 253 (2016) is misplaced given the Court did not permit the Legislature to ignore prior statutes, but rather was an application of the Contract Clause and its effect on prospective cost-of-living adjustments for state employees.
[brief] [...] and Plaintiff essentially engaged in the same conduct – although [...] reached the intersection before Plaintiff.  [...], however, was struck by [...] as he crossed the intersection with the yellow light and after [...] entered the intersection against a red light.  There is no factual basis to support an allocation of 40% of the fault for this accident to [...] and the jury’s verdict should be vacated on that ground alone.  The jury’s illogical verdict is explained, at least in part, by several legal errors committed by the trial judge.
[brief] “Plaintiff claimed that the PSA differed substantially from the parties’ prior Chinese Agreements. ”  (Da431.)  “[T]he court found that plaintiff had been manipulated in the divorce proceedings, and it was ‘very troubling’ that there were inconsistencies between the PSA and the Chinese Agreements.  The court noted that the PSA, which was executed only twelve days after the Chinese Agreements of February 15, 2009, did not mention a division of the company assets. ”  (See Da132, Da432–433.)  The court pointed out the critical differences between the Chinese Agreements and the PSA, which showed that defendant had deceived and manipulated the divorce proceedings to plaintiff’s disadvantage.  Under those circumstances, [...] was referred to [...] for investigation and prosecution by Appellate Division without first giving [...] a due process hearing to explain after the court had heard the fabricated one-sided lies from [...] to courts and had issued opinions thereafter.
[brief] ’”  Id. at 462, quoting, Dewey v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 109 N.J. 201, 218 (1988).  As part of the balancing process, we recognize “‘a person's right to retain counsel of his or her choice is limited in that there is no right to demand to be represented by an attorney disqualified because of an ethical requirement. ’”  Ibid, quoting Dewey, supra, 109 N.J. at 218.  Therefore, “[i]f there be any doubt as to the propriety of an attorney's representation of a client, such doubt must be resolved in favor of disqualification. ”
[brief] State Cases  Bilowit v. Dolitsky, 124 N.J. Super. 101 (Ch. Div. 1973)  .........................  33  Carris v. Carris, 24 N.J. Eq. 516 (1873)  .............................................. 35, 36, 40  Caruso v. Caruso, 104 N.J. Eq. 588 (Ch. 1929)  ........................................  34  Faustin v. Lewis, 85 N.J. 507 (1981) .................................................. 32, 34, 39, 40  In re Estate of Santolino, 384 N.J. Super. 567 (Ch. Div. 2005) ............... 37, 40  In re Marriage of Goodwin-Mitchell & Mitchell, 40 Cal. App. 5th 232 (Cal. Ct. App. 2019) ................................................................. 38 In re Marriage of Liu, 197 Cal. App. 3d 143 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987) ............... 38 In re Marriage of Rabie, 40 Cal. App. 3d 917 (Cal. Ct. App. 1974)............. 38 In re Marriage of Turfe, 23 Cal. App. 5th 1118 (Cal. Ct. App. 2018)......... 39 Lindquist v. Lindquist, 130 N.J. Eq. 11 (1941)........................................... 30 Matter of Marriage of Kidane & Araya, 53 Kan. App. 2d 341 (2017) ......... 38 Nwankwo v. Uzodinma, 185 N.E.3d 513 (2022).......................................... 38 Patel v. Navitlal, 265 N.J. Super. 402 (Ch. Div. 1992)........ 31, 33, 34, 35, 36 Rothman v. Rothman, 65 N.J. 219 (1974).................................................... 30 Tobon v. Sanchez, 213 N.J. Super. 472 (Ch. Div. 1986)............................ 35 V.J.S. v. M.J.B., 249 N.J. Super. 318 (Ch. Div. 1991).............................. 36, 37 Williams v. Witt, 98 N.J. Super. 1 (App. Div. 1967)................................. 37, 38 Ysern v. Horter, 91 N.J. Eq. 189 (Ch. 1920)..............................................
[brief] Lopez v. Swyer, 62 N.J. 267, 272 (1973).  The discovery rule applies where a plaintiff is either unaware of his or her injury, or, where the injury is apparent, the plaintiff was “unable to attribute the cause to another. ”  Henry v. New Jersey Dept. of Human Services, 204 N.J. 320, 336 (2010).  Here, this discovery rule is inapplicable as the nature of plaintiff’s accident and injuries are such that anyone exercising reasonable diligence and intelligence would recognize the potential for a cause of action immediately after the accident and injuries occurred.  Plaintiff clearly understood that he had sustained personal injuries on the day of the subject accident.  Further, the alleged condition that caused the accident, as per plaintiff’s contentions, was an open and obvious condition.  As such, the statute of limitations period began to run on the day plaintiff was injured.  Plaintiff’s reliance on the discovery rule is therefore unsupported.  Plaintiff’s Pleadings Against Fictitious Defendants are Insufficiently Specific.