ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The employment agreements were prepared on a pro forma basis as part of a due diligence package to be provided to potential \(^3\) [...] even checked his emails from this period of time, but found nothing on this buy-in issue.  3T65:20-66:1. investors to make clear how [...] would operate should [...] become sufficiently funded.  2T:157-158:16, 193:15-23, 194:21-195:3; 3T32:23-33:9, 33:18-35:13, 85:6-:2; Da78 (due diligence checklist).
[brief] According to the FBI, the total cost of insurance fraud (non-health insurance) is estimated to be more than $40 billion per year. \(^1\)  The New Jersey Office of the Insurance Fraud Prosecutor estimates that insurance fraud costs each New Jersey family over $1,300.00 every year. \(^2\) --- \(^1\) [https://www.fbi.gov/stats-services/publications/insurance-fraud](https://www.fbi.gov/stats-services/publications/insurance-fraud)  \(^2\) [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zlpRfryV39c](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zlpRfryV39c)  [...], as an insurance carrier issuing insurance primarily to New Jersey drivers and accountable to those policyholders believes that it can, as a friend of the Court, share important information about the impact this litigation will have on the insurance landscape.
[brief] .........................................................20 Long v. Landy, 35 N.J. 44, 54 (1961) ........................................................................44  McGrogan v. Till, 167 N.J. 414, 425 (2001) .........................................................17, 43 Meisels v. Fox Rothschild, LLP, 2020 WL 97718 (N.J. January 9, 2020).26, 27 Morris Properties, Inc. v. Wheeler, et al., No. A-2653-20, 2023 WL 2249975, at *1 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Feb. 28, 2023) (approved for publication August 22, 2023) ...........................................................................................................42, 44 Oswin v. Shaw, 129 N.J. 290 (1992) ........................................................................29, 30, 31 Petrillo v. Bachenberg, 139 N.J. 472, 479, 483-84 (1995) ..........17, 21, 22, 26, 27 Prant v. Sterling, 332 N.J. Super. 369, 377, 539-40 (Ch. Div. 1999), aff’d o.b., 332 N.J. Super. 292, 666 A. 2d 146 (App. Div. 2000) ..............................18, 19, 32 The Matter of [...], A-1117-18T3 (App. Div. September 25, 2019) ..............................................................................................................................................3 Townsend v. Pierre, 221 N.J. 36 (2015) .................................................................42 U.S. Pipe & Foundry Co. v. Am. Arb. Ass’n, 67 N.J. Super. 384, 399-400 (App. Div. 1961) .................................................................32 Other Authorities Restatement of Law Governing Lawyers Section 51 cmt.b (1998) ..................22 Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers ..............................................21 Rules R. 4:37-2(b) ...........................................................................................................18 R. 4:46-2(c) ..........................................................................................................17, 31 R. 4:85-1 ................................................................................................................3
[brief] In so doing the appellant told the following to the trial court (Pa73):  “Rooted involvements of [...] in the matter are so ethically and legally questionable that allowing him to continue to represent the Defendants in the matter undermines the interest of justice, see United States of America v. Bruce Cutler. ”  Please see the December 28, 2020 letter, which [...] had sent to the Mother to dissuade the 90 years old disabled from pursuing rightful disability accommodation (Pa35 – Pa36).  [...], who had ethical obligation in educating the respondents about legal proprieties, because of financial incentives had made himself an ethically compromised attorney and an instrument of oppression, blind of laws and his ethical obligations under Bar.  After finessing the case disposal below, [...] filed One Hundred Fifty Four (154) page Motion For Sanctions against the appellate for ten(s) of thousands of dollars in compensatory damages for having sought desperately needed disability accommodation for his 92 years old resident mother (Pa159).
[brief] (2T 51-12 to 16)  [...] found that [...]’s statements in the interrogation were inadmissible because [...] did not perform the minimum of asking to clarify [...]’s statement that he would not waive his rights; consequently, she failed to “scrupulously honor” his rights and failed to follow New Jersey’s **Miranda** procedure.  (2T 37-23 to 38-20)  [...]’s decision to suppress the interview was not challenged by the State on the motion for reconsideration.  (3T 21-4 to 10)  Accordingly, the State’s appeal only addresses [...]’s determination to suppress the statements in the final group, the recorded phone calls.  (Pb 2)  [...] determined that the phone call recordings should be suppressed after concluding that [...]’s actions concerning the phone calls with [...]’s parents constituted “the functional equivalent of interrogation. ”  (2T 46-18 to 20)  [...] found that [...]’s invocation of his right to counsel to end the interview was still effective when [...] initiated the phone calls from [...]’s cell phone.  (2T 49-19 to 50-2)  And [...] knew about the invocation when he initiated the phone calls.  (1T 142-17 to 19; 2T 46-5 to 16, 49-19 to 50-2)  Because this constituted continued interrogation, officers needed to show they had “scrupulously honored” his invocation of rights for the recording to be admissible.
[brief] (Da33-Da35, §3.2 Sight Distance Evaluation).  He also concluded that stopping was not the only action available to [...] to avoid impact.  The analysis proved that [...] cut her turn too sharply and turned into the wrong travel lane of the north/south drive aisle where [...] was walking.  Consequently, had she turned into the proper lane position, [...] would not have been struck.  (Da33-Da35, §3.2 Sight Distance Evaluation).  See also, Da85-Da87, Appendix B- Exhibits 6-8).  Finally, [...]’s evaluation proved that at the point where [...] no longer had available distance to stop her vehicle, an evasive or swerving maneuver could have been made at the "last second" to avoid hitting [...].  (Da33-Da35, §3.2 Sight Distance Evaluation).  He noted that in the surveillance video, [...] did not stop or check for oncoming traffic when turning into [...]'s path of travel, evidenced in part by the fact that her brake lights were not seen to activate until after she struck [...] and came to a complete stop.  (Da19-Da20, §1.3 Incident Description).  See also, Da85-Da87, Appendix B- Exhibits 6-8).  Finally, [...] noted that it was understood that parking lot facilities are inherently multimodal facilities where each parking stall can be an origin or destination for pedestrians exiting or entering vehicles.  Therefore, parking lots are designed with the understanding that despite the most industrious engineering designs to safely control or calm traffic, drivers bear responsibility for performing driving tasks of control, guidance and navigation in a safe manner consistent with the knowledge that there will be pedestrians in the lot.  Failure to observe speed is the responsibility of the driver.  Likewise, pedestrians ought to be aware that vehicles could be backing out of a stall or come around a corner with little notice, and drivers must be aware that pedestrians can walk into the drive aisle from between parked cars.  In short, "nothing can substitute for this awareness."  (Da35-Da36, §3.3 Discussion).  Considering then that [...] denied any distractions or obstructions to her view, the sole cause of the accident was her negligent operation of her vehicle.  (Da37, §4 Conclusions, #4,5).  See also, Da85-Da87, Appendix B- Exhibits 6-8).
[brief] T2 34:21-22 and T2 36:12-13.  Notwithstanding this ruling, the ALJ, confusingly, further ruled “…but I am going to allow the questioning to move forward and looking at this totality of this testimony and all the evidence I will give it the appropriate weight at the time I make my determination and write the decision”.  T2 36:14-18.  By “partially overruling” the objection to [...]’s purported expert testimony as to the use and abuse of opioids, the ALJ has created a circumstance where it is, to a substantial degree, unknown to what extent the ALJ relied upon [...]’s opinions in the Decision’s multiple references to opioid use and abuse.
[brief] As Plaintiff did at the Trial Court level, he relies heavily on distinguishing Polzo v. County of Essex, 209 N.J. 51 (2012), from the case at bar.  In making its distinction, Plaintiff argues that unlike the County of Essex in Polzo, [...] is only .87 miles long.  This is an illogical argument – [...] does not consist of one road, [...] has approximately 105 miles of roadway to maintain.  (Pa692).  Similarly, the argument that the pothole was located some .3 miles from Town Hall is not sufficient to establish that [...] acted in a palpably unreasonable manner, nor is Plaintiff’s self-serving assertion that the pothole was in the “heart of town. ”  Plaintiff, in an attempt to establish palpably unreasonable behavior, as it did in attempt to establish constructive notice, cites to instances, generally, when [...] employees were on [...] or in the area and had an opportunity to see the pothole in question.  As set forth above, this is not sufficient to establish constructive notice and its certainly not sufficient to establish palpably unreasonably behavior on behalf of [...].
[brief] Kalogeras v. 239 Broad Ave., L.L.C., 202 N.J. 349, 367 (2010) (quoting Bowen v. Pursel, 109 N.J. Eq. 67, 73 (E. & A. 1931)).  Thus, [...] purportedly being unaware of the Ricci Act until over three years after its passage cannot serve as the basis to allow him to evade its unambiguous requirements.  [...]’s reliance on Ensslin v. Board of Trustees, Police and Firemen’s Retirement System, 311 N.J. Super. 333 (App. Div. 1998), is misplaced.
[brief] [...] sponsored Assembly Bills Nos. 782 and 4134, which involved an increase and clarification of the effective dates for awards for hand and feet claims in workers’ compensation cases.  If Respondent’s argument in the present case were to be accepted by the Appellate Division, that would mean [...] would need to recuse herself from every case involving a hand or foot.  The Rules of the Court, the Code on Judicial Conduct, and the applicable case law do not support a recusal in this matter.  Respondent’s efforts for recusal of [...] are an attempt to manipulate the system and it should not be allowed.  The Appellate Division should affirm the decision of [...], when she denied Respondent’s Motion for Recusal.
[brief] On May 23, 2019, around 8:22 p.m., defendant fatally shot [...] outside of a Penns Grove apartment complex.  The shooting transpired after [...] instigated an altercation against [...], who Burden believed stole money from his wife's vehicle.  Burden and Davis had fought earlier in the day requiring police intervention.  Neither Hayward nor defendant was involved in the earlier incident.  On the night in question, Burden went to the apartment complex to visit a cousin and saw Davis there with other men.  Feeling outnumbered, Burden left and enlisted his cousin and a friend to return with him to confront Davis.  Burden's wife drove the men to the apartment complex.  Burden's sister arrived separately in her vehicle.  Burden approached Davis and asked him to fight, but Davis declined.  During the exchange, Hayward, who was with Davis, walked away.  Defendant ran after Hayward and fatally shot him in the face.  At trial, Hayward's girlfriend, [...], testified she had been dating and living with Hayward for several months.  She had joined him at the apartment complex on the night in question.  Williams witnessed a “dark-skinned guy with like a mark underneath his eye [and] a bald head” follow Hayward and shoot at him twice with a handgun.  One shot missed, and the other struck Hayward underneath his eye.  She relayed hearing “boots hit the ground from [the shooter] jumping out [of] the truck. ”  After shooting Hayward, the man “ran and jumped back inside the truck,” and it “pulled off. ”  During Williams's testimony, the prosecutor, without providing defense counsel notice, attempted to conduct an in-court identification of defendant.
[brief] “A trial court’s denial of a motion to dismiss an indictment[4] is reviewed for abuse of discretion. ”  State v. Twiggs, 233 N.J. 513, 544 (2018).  An appellate court “will not disturb the denial of such a motion ‘unless [the judge’s discretionary authority] has been clearly abused. ’”  State v. Saavedra, 433 N.J. Super. 501, 514 (App. Div. 2013) (second alteration in original) (quoting State v. Warmbrun, 277 N.J. Super. 51, 60 (App. Div. 1994)).  “[B]ut ‘[w]hen the decision to dismiss relies on a purely legal question,’ such as the interpretation of a statute, the Court ‘review[s] that determination de novo. ’”  State v. Derry, 250 N.J. 611, 626 (2022) (quoting Twiggs, 233 N.J. at 532).  Here, the trial court found that the ordinary meanings of the numerous undefined terms in N.J.S.A. 4:22-24a(2) and N.J.S.A. 4:22-17c(3), about which defendant complained, “would give a reader of ordinary intelligence” — like defendant — “a clear idea of what conduct is prohibited. ” (Da 63).  It further found that the statutes were not unconstitutionally void for vagueness because they either failed to include, or included too many, levels of scienter, or because they encouraged arbitrary enforcement.  (Id. at 63-64).  Accordingly, the trial --- 4
[brief] Plaintiffs’ expert, [...], even acknowledged he was unable to evaluate this question.  He testified that he did not know if what [...] said regarding grout was accurate, because he does not know the difference between sanded and unsanded grout.  [8T 119:1-13].  Therefore, Balian had to concede that he did not know if [...]’s question to [...] about the type of tile being used with the grout was appropriate.  [8T 119:17:21].  Balian was similarly unable to challenge the testimony that [...] had received training on interacting with customers, and in particular, on grout:  Q: And you have no evidence or documents that would contradict [...]’s deposition testimony that he trained Mr. [...] on how to interact with customers, correct?  A: Correct.  ...  Q:  When we just read Mr. [...]’s deposition testimony where he explained the difference between sanded and unsanded grout where did he get that knowledge from?  A: It could have been he was trained.  [8T 109:18-22, 117:2-6].  As a result, Balian’s testimony does not support the inference that [...] posed a danger to [...] because he was incompetent or lacking in any specialized skill.  Instead, the evidence established that there was nothing unique about [...]’s interaction with [...] which required specialized training or supervision to avoid physical violence.
[brief] The Trial Court’s Oral Opinion to Regarding Defendant’s Statute of Limitations Argument (3T78-3T88)  The trial court did not make any ruling as to the Defendant’s statute of limitations argument.  However, during its oral opinion, the trial court asserted, “[t]he record shows that Plaintiff’s claims that the website changed on or about September 22nd, 2012, four weeks into the program to reflect the 3.0 GPA requirement.  Defendant asserts that if this was a time Plaintiff was aware that he had been defrauded then his contract had been breached.  To the extend [sic] that he had such a claim, he should have brought his lawsuit within six years, which would mean September 22, 2018. ”  (3T:86:20-3T87:2).  Yet, the trial court goes on to say, “The complaint was filed on March 19th, 2019.  However, Plaintiff does not say with certainty that he learned of the change as he claims to have realized it long after.  Thus the date of the onset of Plaintiff’s alleged injury is in dispute. ” (3T87:3-8) (emphasis added).  Thus, the trial court explicitly acknowledged that there was a factual issue as to the statute of limitations argument, and Defendant’s motion as to Plaintiff’s claims being barred due to the statute of limitations argument should have been denied.
[brief] (4T52-6 to 10; 4T53-2 to 6).  It is normal for someone to fend off an attack to reach out, and in so doing, the edge of the knife rubs against the skin and causes an incised wound.  (4T55-5 to 19).  The medical examiner counted eight incised wounds on the victim’s left hand.  (4T56-12 to 16).  On the victim’s right hand, there was an incised wound on a fingertip.  (4T57-24 to 4T58-3).  There was another incised wound on the right palm.  (4T58-7 to 9).  Altogether, the medical examiner found four defensive wounds on the right hand.  (4T58-15 to 17).  Forensic testing was conducted on evidence collected by the police.
[brief] In further support of his assertion that there is an implied private cause of action, in a statute that is bereft of language indicating such a right, Defendant cites Veras v. [...], No. CIV. 13-1745 RBK/JS, 2014 WL 1050512, at 8 (D.N.J. Mar. 17, 2014), arguing it sets forth the standard to apply to determine whether there is an implied cause of action.  (Db8).  Noticeably absent from Defendant’s reference to the case is the court’s ruling in the matter, which held:  In light of the fact that the Legislature has drafted an extensive statutory scheme that tasks the Commissioner with the sole responsibility of enforcing the requirements of the Act, the Court concludes “that it would be inappropriate to construe the Act as impliedly authorizing a private cause of action. ”
[brief] The Chancery Division had no authority to rewrite the material terms of the Agreement – to wit that Plaintiff would irrevocably resign from the Township Police Department if his retirement application was denied.  Therefore, the Chancery Division clearly erred in its decision and the Order must be reversed and the Complaint dismissed with prejudice.  Parenthetically, Plaintiff’s Point Thirteen in his Appellate Brief seeks to allege that the Township misrepresents the record below.  Nothing can be further from the truth, and the page that Plaintiff devotes to this attempted character attack is misguided.  To be clear, the Agreement speaks for itself and without a doubt indicates that Plaintiff was taking a chance filing an application for the IOD disability retirement.  Nothing is misrepresented on behalf of the Township, and Plaintiff’s attempt to assert same is unbecoming and without merit.  For all the reasons set forth in the Township’s initial brief and this reply brief, the Order must be reversed and the Complaint dismissed with prejudice.
[brief] The Court found that legal malpractice claims, similar to transactional malpractice, are not exempt from the Entire Controversy Doctrine where the alleged malpractice accrues before the prior litigation.  (T20:24-25,T21:1).  The alleged malpractice in Defendants' advice to Plaintiff regarding the lease agreement was not only transactional in nature but had already happened before Plaintiff initiated the Lease Litigation.(T23:23-25).
[directive] Es necesario contestar a las siguientes preguntas si Ud. se declara culpable de ciertos actos criminales relacionados con drogas y también se declara culpable de la posesión de un arma de fuego u otra arma mientras cometió, trató de cometer o conspiró para cometer cualquiera de los siguientes actos criminales.  Si poseía un arma de fuego, conteste a las preguntas 1 a, b y c.  Si no poseía un arma de fuego, indique que la pregunta 1a no le incumbe [NA] y conteste a las preguntas 1b y c.  The following questions need to be answered if you are pleading guilty to certain drug offenses and also are pleading guilty to possession of a firearm or other weapon while committing, attempting to commit or conspiring to commit any of the following offenses.
[directive] This provision is not intended to require that law enforcement agencies initiate internal affairs investigations into the 11 accuracy of every statement, report or certification that may be filed with respect to civil litigation, including matrimonial and employment matters or any other personal or financial matters not directly related to the officer's employment.  In most cases, such investigations would be inappropriate.  Determinations as to the credibility of statements or certifications made in the context of litigation should be made by the courts or administrative tribunals.  Determinations as to the credibility of statements or certifications in other personal or financial matters should be addressed if they arise in the context of an ongoing internal affairs investigation.
[brief] (6T 129-1 to 134-7)  But, in direct conflict with a wealth of case law that makes it clear that passion/provocation manslaughter often presents a viable middle-ground lesser-included-offense option between a guilty verdict for a greater homicide offense and an acquittal on self-defense grounds, and must be charged -- if requested and if the evidence in the case presents a mere “rational basis” for a conviction of that lesser offense -- the judge refused a defense request to instruct the jury on the lesser-included offense of passion/provocation manslaughter.
[directive] The Standards affirm the importance of providing victim-centered services in order to best promote an opportunity for healing for the victim.  Additionally, the Standards identify best practices for law enforcement personnel and healthcare providers to improve the opportunities to identify, collect, and preserve evidence in all sexual assault cases.  3rd Edition (2018), available online at: https://www.nj.gov/oag/newsreleases18/AG-SART-Standards.pdf.  1  HUGHES JUSTICE COMPLEX ∙ TELEPHONE: (609)292-9660  FAX: (609)292-4299  New Jersey is an Equal Opportunity Employer ∙ Printed on Recycled Paper and Recyclable In order to ensure evidence collected in sexual assault cases is preserved and processed in a victim-centered and efficient manner, the State Auditor from the Office of Legislative Services issued a report to evaluate whether there was a Sexual Assault Forensic Examination (SAFE) kit testing backlog in New Jersey in 2019.
[brief] SUMMARY  JUDGMENT WAS PROPERLY GRANTED  New Jersey’s Court Rules require that summary judgment be granted when the record demonstrates that “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact challenged and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment or order as a matter of law. ”  R. 4:46-2(c); see also Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America, 142 N.J. 520, 529 (1995).  The non-moving party “cannot defeat a motion for summary judgment merely by pointing to any fact in dispute” but, instead, must establish that the dispute concerns material facts.  Brill, 142 N.J. at 529.  When applying this standard, courts should consider that summary judgment “can effectively eliminate from crowded court calendars cases in which a trial would serve no useful purpose. ”  Id. at 541 (quoting Judson v. Peoples Bank & Trust Co. of Westfield, 17 N.J. 67, 77 (1954)).  Further, the standard is intended “to encourage trial courts not to refrain from granting summary judgment when the proper circumstances present themselves. ”  Id.  Indeed, “[t]o send a case to trial, knowing that a rational jury can reach but one conclusion, is indeed ‘worthless,’ and will ‘serve no useful purpose. ’”  Id.  Summary judgment should be granted in a negligence action where a plaintiff is required to establish the standard of care through expert opinion, but the plaintiff’s expert fails to offer any evidential support to establish a standard of care.  See, e.g., Davis v. Brickman Landscaping, Ltd., 219 N.J. 395, 414 (2014).  Plaintiffs’ cause of action against [...] is for professional negligence in [...]’s capacity as a professional engineer.  Plaintiffs were required to establish [...]’s liability through competent expert testimony.  The testimony of Plaintiffs’ sole liability expert was properly excluded and thus summary judgment in favor of [...] was appropriate.  III.