ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] On August 25, 2023, Plaintiff filed a Verified Complaint pursuant to Court Rule 4:52 improperly seeking an Order to Show Cause (hereinafter “OTSC”) why the designation of a handicap parking space in front of [...], i.e., [...]’s and Plaintiff’s Residence, should not be ordered by the Court.  (See Pa084-Pa099; see also Da001-Da002).  Plaintiff’s Verified Complaint further appears to allege causes of action for (1) civil rights violation pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983 and the New Jersey Civil Rights Act; and (2) violations of the Open Public Records Act.  (See Pa084-Pa099).  Plaintiff’s Verified Complaint is difficult at best to decipher; however, these are the causes of action the Court Below was able to determine existed.  (See generally 1T).  On August 30, 2023, the Court Below entered an amended OTSC, denying Plaintiff’s request for temporary restraints and setting forth an initial return date.  (See Pa106-Pa107).  On October 2, 2023, [...] filed a Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Court Rule 4:6-2(e) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.  (See Pa137-Pa158 and Pa233-Pa300).  On October 12, 2023, Plaintiff filed opposition to [...]’s Motion to Dismiss.  (Da012)  On October 16, 2023, [...] filed a reply to Plaintiff’s opposition and in further support of [...]’s Motion to Dismiss.  On October 20, 2023, the Court Below entered an Order dismissing Plaintiff’s Verified Complaint with prejudice for the reasons set forth on the record.  (See Pa111; see also 1T).  On or about November 6, 2023, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Reconsideration.  (See Pa218-Pa225).  On November 21, 2023, [...] filed opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration.  (See Da020-Da023).  On November 26, 2023, Plaintiff filed a Motion seeking [...] recuse himself from the proceedings below.  (See Pa226-Pa232).  On November 29, 2023, [...] filed opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion seeking recusal of [...].  (See Da024-Da027).  On December 7, 2023, Plaintiff filed a reply in further support of his Motion for Reconsideration.  (See Da028-Da033).  On December 15, 2023, the Court Below entered two (2) Orders: the first denying Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration (see Pa112-Pa113) and the second denying Plaintiff’s Motion to Recuse (see Pa114-Pa115).  The Court Below set forth its reasoning on the record.  (See generally 2T).  On January 4, 2024, [...] filed a Motion for Sanctions against Plaintiff for the pursuit of this frivolous litigation.  (See Pa159-Pa191).  On January 25, 2024, Plaintiff filed opposition to [...]’s Motion for Sanctions.  (See Pa192-Pa217).  On January 29, 2024, [...] filed a reply in further support of its Motion for Sanctions.  On February 2, 2024, the Court Below denied [...]’s Motion for Sanctions.  (Pa116).  This appeal followed.  **STATEMENT OF FACTS**
[brief] EXISTENCE OF GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT.**  The decision by the trial court to treat the Defendant's motion as unopposed effectively ignored the substantive presentations made by Plaintiff, which clearly indicated significant disputes concerning the ownership and control of the Property.  Plaintiff’s presentation included documented evidence of its ownership claims, directly contradicting Defendant’s assertions.  Summary judgment is inappropriate where the evidence presented could lead a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the non-moving party.  The landmark case *Brill*, remains pivotal, as it underscores that a court must deny summary judgment if the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, could lead a reasonable factfinder to rule in their favor.  This principle was ignored when the trial court decided the motion based on procedural default without addressing these evidentiary conflicts.  C.
[brief] 8  While [...] briefly referred to the number of times defendant had been arrested in rejecting mitigating factor seven—a finding defendant does Both a state statute, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-6, and Rule 3:21-2(a) require that a Presentence Report (“PSR”) be ordered and reviewed by the trial court, prosecutor, and defense counsel prior to sentencing.  N.J.S.A. 2C:44-6 states:  a.  The court shall not impose sentence without first ordering a presentence investigation of the defendant and according due consideration to a written report of such investigation when required by the Rules of Court.  . . .  b.  The presentence investigation shall include an analysis of the circumstances attending the commission of the offense, the defendant’s history of delinquency or criminality. . . and any other matters that the probation officer deems relevant or the court directs to be included.  [Emphasis added.]  Likewise, Rule 3:21-2(a) requires a trial court to consider a defendant’s PSR before imposing its sentence:  Before the imposition of a sentence . . . court support staff shall make a presentence investigation in accordance with N.J.S.A. 2C:44-6 and report to the court.  The report shall contain all presentence material having any bearing whatever on the sentence and shall be furnished to the defendant and the prosecutor.  [Emphasis added.] not challenge—that factor was inapplicable based on defendant’s convictions for riot and disorderly conduct and his juvenile adjudication for resisting arrest, regardless of whether the court considered his eight family violence arrests that did not result in convictions.
[directive] Ranges for attempts or conspiracies should generally be the same as the actual substantive crime.  Statute Charge Description Degree  Bail Range 10%  Cash Bail Option  3rd Degree $5,000 to $20,000  10% permissible  Actor receives with intent to sell or sells lost or stolen credit cards or submits false  2C:21-6  Credit Card  Theft information in writing in order to obtain a credit card or who buys a credit card from other than the purported issuer, fourth degree; uses lost or stolen or fictitious credit cards, third degree.
[brief] LETTER-BRIEF ON BEHALF OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY  Honorable Judges of the Superior Court of New Jersey  Appellate Division  Richard J. Hughes Justice Complex  Trenton, New Jersey  08625  Re: STATE OF NEW JERSEY (Plaintiff-Respondent)  V. [...] (Defendant-Appellant)  Docket No. [...]  Criminal Action: On Appeal from a Final Order Denying Post-Conviction Relief of the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Hudson County.
[brief] He testified that he understood that using the trampolines park’s equipment meant that he was going to be exposed to some risk.  2T22:13-23.  Section 5 of the Agreement clearly states that “to the fullest extent permitted by law, Adult Participant, on behalf of himself/herself, and on behalf of any Child Participant…” will hold [Respondent] harmless for injuries sustained “during or relating to Participant’s participation (whether actively or passively) in any activities on the premises…”.
[brief] This was the precise issue litigated in the Chancery action, a point [...] concedes on appeal:  “[t]he focal issue in the Probate Action was what [...] ("[...]") intended” by his Will.  (Appellant’s Brief at 4-5.)  As detailed above, the Chancery judge, following full presentation of all the evidence plaintiffs wished to present, concluded that [...] intended to forgive the debt and cancel the mortgage entirely.  That finding precluded [...]’s legal malpractice claim as a matter of law.  In Pivnick v. Beck, 326 N.J. Super. 474 (App.Div. 1999), aff’d 165 N.J. 670 (2000), this Court held that collateral estoppel precludes a legal malpractice action based on an attorney’s alleged failure to capture testamentary following a Probate action finding that testamentary intent was properly captured.
[directive] n.  To make, prior to sentencing, an in-person statement directly to the sentencing court concerning the impact of the crime.  This statement is to be made in addition to the statement permitted for inclusion in the presentence report by N.J.S.A. 2C:44-6; o.  To have the opportunity to consult with the prosecuting authority prior to the conclusion of any plea negotiations, and to have the prosecutor advise the court of the consultation and the victim’s position regarding the plea agreement, provided however that nothing herein shall be construed to alter or limit the authority or discretion of the prosecutor to enter into any plea agreement which the prosecutor deems appropriate; p.  To be present at any judicial proceeding involving a crime or any juvenile proceeding involving a criminal offense, except as otherwise provided by Article I, paragraph 22 of the New Jersey Constitution; q.  To be notified of any release or escape of the defendant; and r.  To appear in any court before which a proceeding implicating the rights of the victim is being held, with standing to file a motion or present argument on a motion filed to enforce any right conferred herein or by Article I, paragraph 22 of the New Jersey Constitution, and to receive an adjudicative decision by the court on any such motion.  N.J.S.A. 52:4B-44.
[brief] The exercise of this discretion is guided by two considerations: “whether the non-moving party will be prejudiced, and whether granting the amendment would nonetheless be futile. ”  Notte v. Merchs. Mut. Ins. Co., 185 N.J. 490, 501 (2006).  It is appropriate to deny a motion to amend when it is clear that “the amendment is so meritless that a motion to dismiss under Rule 4:6-2 would have to be granted, the so-called futility prong of the analysis. ”  See Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules, cmt. 2.2.1 on R. 4:9-1 (2024).  Under the futility prong of the motion to amend analysis, a court must determine whether the amended claim will nonetheless fail, such that “allowing the amendment would be a useless endeavor. ”  Notte, 185 N.J. at 501.  Denying leave to amend ultimately rests in the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion.  King v. Steglitz, 111 N.J.L. 11, 14 (E. & A. 1933).  Here, the Law Division did not err in dismissing the complaint and denying [...]’s motion for leave to amend because the allegations against the State Defendants in all of [...]’s proffered pleadings must fail as a matter of law.
[brief] Defendants spend a grand total of 4 pages in their 49-page brief discussing how the Jury’s verdict with regards to Plaintiff’s disability hostile work environment claims is supposedly against the weight of the evidence.  See Db at pp. 18-21.  This “argument” consists of asserting in conclusory fashion (and with no citations to the record) that there was no evidence of Plaintiff being subjected to a hostile working environment because of her disability and citing to their clients’ self-serving testimony that they had no idea plaintiff even suffered from a disability.  See id.  As set forth at length below, these arguments are contradicted by extensive evidence in the record which the jury clearly believed was more compelling than that of the Defendants, and as such, their motion for a new trial must be denied.  The Law Against Discrimination (“LAD”) bars work-place discrimination “because of race, creed, color, national origin, ancestry, age, sex, affectional or sexual orientation, marital status, familial status, liability for service in the Armed Forces of the United States, or nationality. ”  N.J.S.A. 10:5-3.  Among the acts of discrimination barred by the LAD is the creation of a hostile work environment based on a protected characteristic.  *Taylor*, 152 N.J. at 498.  A claim for hostile work environment has four elements, namely: the complained-of conduct (1) would not have occurred *but for* the employee's [race]; and it was (2) *severe or pervasive* enough to make a (3) *reasonable [person]* believe that (4) the conditions of employment are altered and the *working environment is hostile or abusive.*  *Lehmann v. Toys 'R' Us*, 132 N.J. 587, 603-04 (1993) (italics in original) (bold emphasis added).  This four-pronged standard applies to *all* hostile work environment claims.  *Cutler v. Dorn*, 196 N.J. 419, 430 (2008) (citing *Taylor*, 152 N.J. at 497).  The first element of a hostile work environment claim (i.e., the “but for” requirement) is “discrete” from the latter three elements, which are often viewed in tandem.
[brief] THE DACCA ATTORNEY SAFE HARBOR IS NOT UNCONSTITUTIONALLY OVERBROAD.  In Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489 (1982), the United States Supreme Court outlined the legal standard to approach a dual constitutional challenge to a law, such as the one asserted here, that asserts both unconstitutional overbreadth and vagueness.  Id. at 494–95.  There, the U.S. Supreme Court explained that “a court's first task is to determine whether the enactment reaches a substantial amount of constitutionally-protected conduct.  If it does not, then the overbreadth challenge must fail. ”  455 U.S. 489, 494–95 (1982).  Therefore, before turning to the issue of vagueness (discussed in Point IV), this Court must “determine whether the enactment reaches a substantial amount of constitutionally protected conduct. ”  *State v. Badr*, 415 N.J. Super. 455, 467 (App. Div. 2010).  Because it does not reach such conduct, much less prohibit it, the DACCA Attorney Safe Harbor is not overbroad.
[brief] (Pa99 at ¶ 8 and 9.)  Notably, neither the Assembly Appropriations Committee nor the Senate Health, Human Services and Senior Citizens Committee had even posted that it would be considering the bills on January 6, 2022.  (Pa102 at ¶ 18.)  The first record that the bills would be considered on January 6, 2022 was on January 10, 2022 – the very same day that the act was passed.  (Pa101 at ¶ 17 and Pa102.)  As Applicant [...] certified, she heard a rumor that the Assembly would consider the reproductive rights law that had been pending since October 2020, A.4848 (2021), and thus, she registered her position based upon this rumor.
[brief] [...] indisputably failed on choice of law, the pivotal issue in the liability phase of this case.  Despite this fact, the trial court held [...] was a “successful claimant”, and awarded [...] fees associated with the choice of law decision.  Further, [...], a party that neither took a choice of law position nor forced [...] to take one, has now been put to task of paying a portion of that award.  This holding was clearly in error.
[brief] Month; year.  The word "month" means a calendar month, and the word "year" means a calendar year.  Municipality; municipal corporation.  The words "municipality" and "municipal corporation" include cities, towns, townships, villages and boroughs, and any municipality governed by a board of commissioners or an improvement commission.  Neuter.  See "Number; gender," infra, this section.  Number; gender.  Whenever, in describing or referring to any person, party, matter or thing, any word importing the singular number or masculine gender is used, the same shall be understood to include and to apply to several persons or parties as well as to one person or party and to females as well as males, and to bodies corporate as well as individuals, and to several matters and things as well as one matter or thing.
[brief] On December 19, 2018, [...] was charged in a Hudson County indictment with first-degree murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(1), (a)(2) (count one); second-degree possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(a)(1) (count two); second-degree unlawful possession of a weapon, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b)(1) (count three); and being a certain person not to possess a firearm, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-7(b)(1) (count four).  (Da 1-2)  Weathersbee moved to exclude an audio- and video-recorded statement he made to police.  On June 28, 2019, [...], J.S.C., held an evidentiary hearing, and on July 12, 2019, she issued a written decision denying his motion and admitting his entire statement.  (3T; Da 110-28)  Between January 30 and February 10, 2020, bifurcated jury trials were held before [...], J.S.C. -- the first on counts one through three and the second on count four.  (7T to 13T)  The jury returned two verdicts finding Weathersbee guilty on all counts.  (13T 6-2 to 7-8, 20-1 to 20; Da 179-80)  On June 24, 2021, Judge Arre heard argument on the State’s motion to sentence Weathersbee to an extended term.  (14T)  On August 5, 2021, Judge Arre denied the State’s motion and sentenced Weathersbee to an aggregate term --- 2  “Da” refers to defendant’s appendix.  “PSR” refers to the presentence report.  The transcript abbreviations are set forth above in the Index to Transcripts. of thirty-five years in prison, all to be served without parole.  (15T 4-12 to 16-23, 34-20 to 41-8; Da 194-96)  On August 24, 2021, Judge Arre issued a written decision amplifying his sentencing decisions.  (Da 181-93)  On December 2, 2022, Weathersbee filed a notice of appeal, which this Court ordered filed as within time.  (Da 197-201)  **STATEMENT OF FACTS**
[brief] (Pa95-97).  Then, she sought information and documentation directly from [...] in the form of an “Employee/Independent Contractor Checklist” completed by [...], certifying officer for [...] (Pa55-57) and a “20 Point Questionnaire” also completed by Esposito (Pa46-54).  (1T96:2-97:7; Pa98).  Although Esposito signed both forms, filling out the forms was a collaborative effort between Esposito, [...], Chief Financial Officer and Supervising Certifying Officer, and [...], Township Administrator.
[brief] POINT III  THE JUDGE ABUSED HIS DISCRETION WHEN HE RECONSIDERED HIS OWN RULING THAT PROHIBITED THE STATE EXPERT TO TESTIFY TO THE BULLETS FROM THE MAGAZINE WHICH WAS FOUND ON DEFENDANT WAS FIRED FROM THE SAME GUN RECOVERED ON THE SCENE, WHICH WAS THE MURDER WEAPON.  THUS DEPRIVING DEFENDANT OF A FAIR TRIAL BY IMPARTIAL JURY.  A NEW TRIAL IS WARRANTED.  U.S. CONST. AMEND VI; XIV, N.J. CONST. ART. I PAR.10.
[brief] Counsel to [...] graciously agreed [...] would not take any action until the court rendered its final decision, and, thus the court did need not enter a temporary order staying everything.\(^{12}\)  While preparing for oral argument, the court concluded that it required additional briefing from the parties regarding the “overarching issue” of “whether or not this case is still ‘in the pipeline’ to be governed under the new law presented. ”  Specifically, in an April 8, 2024 email correspondence to counsel, Main Case Doc. No. 94, the court requested that parties brief “whether or not this case is ‘in the pipeline’ and whether because this bankruptcy case has not been confirmed, has sought to address the Debtor’s claim from its inception, and the issue not having been resolved whether this constituted ‘in the pipeline’.
[brief] Further, the Arbitrator already heard extensive testimony on the Hackensack Project and found it was “a project fraught with difficulty. ”  Pa574.  What if the next arbitrator thinks the Project went great?  The endless uncertainty inherent in allowing [...] to bring subsequent arbitrations—on any of the projects litigated in the First Arbitration—is exactly what the ECD was created to guard against.  Therefore, the trial court misapplied the ECD’s “fair and reasonable” standard because “the central consideration is whether the claims…arise from related facts or the same transaction or series of transactions. ”  Liriano v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 474 N.J. Super. 130, 145 (App. Div. 2021).  The ECD does not require “that there be a ‘commonality of legal issues,’” but rather “[t]he determinative factor is whether distinct claims are aspects of a single larger controversy because they arise from interrelated facts.
[brief] Plaintiff fails to cite to a single case or statute which establishes that employees allegedly being in the vicinity of a pothole and not fixing that pothole is palpably unreasonably conduct.  Additionally, Plaintiff’s continued claims that “the town knew that this area was a problem long before the Plaintiffs sustained injuries and the failure to rectify this problem was palpably unreasonable” are defeated by their continued citation to documents produced pursuant to the [...].  The Plaintiff may disagree with it, but to attempt to characterize a full scale, state subsidized roadway project as a “palpably unreasonable” response to a deteriorating roadway borders on the absurd.  To take Plaintiff’s claim to its logical conclusion, any municipality deciding to do any large or medium scale re-pave would be found to be behaving in a “palpably unreasonable” manner.  Municipalities operate on a limited budget - to go patch all potholes in the middle of roadways in the middle of a re-pavement project lacks all logical sense and slaps against the scope and purpose of the tort claims act.  There simply are no underlying facts that are tied to the palpably unreasonable standard.  Plaintiff also argues that the proximity of a crosswalk to where Plaintiff fell is unclear, via citation to Little v. City of Atlantic City, No. A-2466-20 (Unpublished) (App. Div. Oct. 20, 2021).  (Pa734-744).  Once more, this argument is without merit, [...] Avenue has crosswalks at every intersection, and in fact, a crosswalk can be seen in (Da6) which is a photograph attached to Plaintiff’s expert report.  These photographs were included in the motion record by Plaintiff.  There is no dispute as to the location of the fall, nor the fact that the fall location was nowhere near a crosswalk.  Plaintiff had every opportunity to walk within the crosswalk to ensure safe passage across the roadway – his failure to do so is not the fault of [...] and certainly does not make [...]’s behavior palpably unreasonable.
[brief] Otherwise, it would not have conveyed the all-encompassing rights that it conveyed to [...] with a general warranty.  Lastly, the intent of the parties is further shown by their actions after the conveyance.  While [...] contends that [...] intended to retain its riparian rights in the [...] and to convey all of its other property rights to [...], [...] did not take any actions once it sold the Property to [...] in 1920 that would suggest that it had retained any property rights in the [...].  To the contrary, once it sold the Property in 1920, it never took any other actions with regard to the [...], and it never paid taxes on the lot or did anything else to suggest that it owned the tract.
[brief] 11.  On March 21, 2023, [...] submitted a letter (Pa 145) which stated:  "I wanted to make Your Honor aware of certain facts pertaining to this matter prior to tomorrow's conference.  Subsequent to plaintiff's filing, I had the opportunity to discuss the matter with [...]' staff and it was determined that the Plaintiff's request to have the March 16, 2023, Sheriff's Sale on his property adjourned would be granted."