ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] [...] never responded to [...]’s November 7, 2016 letter.  [...] sent a follow up letter to [...] dated December 5, 2016 confirming that [...] had not responded to the letter nor returned the phone call [...] placed on November 22, 2016, prompting the letter.  [...] lists some damage to the building and advises that fill was dumped on the property which his client believes was done by [...] since they have not returned the keys to the landlord despite terminating the lease (Pa1381).  [...] retained the firm of [...] to file suit to obtain the return of its funds and for damages for breach of contract.  [...] (“[...]”) filed suit in the Superior Court, Bergen County on February 2, 2018 on behalf of [...] against [...] and [...] seeking return of the funds tendered to [...] pursuant to the Lease and damages for the non-disclosure by [...] and [...] of the fact that the Property had no sewer connection.
[directive] Voce entende que segundo as regras do Pacto Interestadual de Supervisao de Infratores Adultos, se estiver residindo fora do estado de Nova Jersey no momento da senten9a, ou ao se declarar culpado se a declara9ao de a culpa e uma condi9ao de admissao ao Programa de Interven9ao Pre-Julgamento, o retomo sua residencia pode a ser adiado e estara sujeito aprova9ao da transferencia de sua supervisao pelo seu estado de residencia?  Do you also understand that pursuant to the same Interstate Compact transfer of your b. [Yes/Sim] [No/Nao] supervision to another state may be denied or restricted by that state at any time after sentencing, or upon entry of a guilty plea if a guilty plea is a condition of admission to the Pretrial Intervention Program, if that state determines you are required to register as a sex offender in that state or if New Jersey has required you to register as a sex offender?
[brief] (3T76:2-12).  The second judge also “reject[ed] outright” Defendants’ argument that [...]’s “sophistication” bore on whether it was a *bona fide* purchaser for value.  (3T76:12-15).  The second judge held that Defendants had failed to rebut the presumption of [...]’s status as a *bona fide* purchaser.  (3T76:20-78:3).  The second judge summarized:  [S]o the motion to vacate is denied.  . . .  I do find that there was nothing put in front of me that either was not already in front of [the first judge] or could have been in front of [the first judge].  The record has not moved past exactly where it was when [the first judge] denied the motion in April of 2023.  The defendant here chose not to take advantage of the discovery period provided to them by [the first judge].  The service of discovery on the plaintiff ten days or so before the end of discovery without an accompanying motion or request to extend the discovery end date, which never happened.  [(3T78:4-19). ]  The second judge also rejected Defendants’ reliance on the *Tyler* decision as a basis for relief under R. 4:50-1(f).6 (3T98:2-13).  The court entered a conforming order of even date.  (26a-27a).  Defendants filed a timely appeal.  (1a-5a).  --- 6
[brief] On May 10, 2023, Union County filed Indictment No. [...], charging defendant-appellant [...], a/k/a [...],\(^1\) with unlawful possession of a .38 special revolver, a second-degree offense contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b)(1) (count one); possession of a firearm while in the course of committing, attempting to commit or conspiring to commit a violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5, a second-degree offense contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4.1(a) (count two); two counts of third-degree possession of a controlled dangerous substance contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10(a)(1) (counts three (cocaine) and six (heroin)); two counts of third-degree possession of a controlled dangerous substance with the intent to distribute, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(b)(3) (counts four (cocaine) and seven (heroin)); two counts of possession with intent to distribute within 500 feet of certain public property, a second-degree offense contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7.1(a) (counts five (cocaine) and eight (heroin)); and fourth-degree resisting arrest, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:29-2(a)(2) (count nine).  (Da1-5).  Also on May 10, 2023, Union County Indictment No. [...] was filed, charging defendant with being a certain person not to have a firearm, a \(^1\) Codefendants [...], [...], and [...] a/k/a [...], were also charged in this indictment.  (Da1-7).  second-degree offense contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:39-7(b)(1).  (Da8).  On August 18, 2023, and October 20, 2023, a motion by defendant and codefendant [...] to suppress evidence was heard before the Honorable [...], J.S.C. (1T; 2T).  The judge set forth his reasons for denying the motion on the record at the conclusion of the hearing.  (2T64-2 to 82-7).  On May 14, 2024, the motion court memorialized its decision in a written order.  (Da12).  On March 4, 2024, defendant pled guilty to the certain persons offense charged in Indictment 23-05-0289.  (3T13-18 to 14-21).  On April 19, 2024, the court committed defendant to the custody of the Commissioner of the Department of Corrections for a term of ten years with a five-year minimum term for being a certain person not to have weapons and counts one through nine in Indictment No. [...] were dismissed, in accordance with the plea agreement.  (3T7-1 to 4; 4T10-9 to 13-3; Da16).
[brief] ”  N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70(b).  In construing this provision, the Appellate Division has held that “when an objector disagrees with the interpretation made by the planning board in taking jurisdiction, the appropriate municipal forum is the zoning board. ”  See DePetro v. Twp. of Wayne Planning Bd., 367 N.J. Super. 161, 169 (App. Div. 2004) cert. denied 181 N.J. 544 (2004).  (Pa384-386).  In this matter, the Board received +5 interpretations of the controlling ordinances from its own professionals, the Applicant’s professionals, the objector’s professionals, and members of the public.  (Pa21to Pa225).  Given the disagreement between Plaintiff’s expert witness and the Objector’s expert witness regarding the ordinance, the appropriate forum to resolve this dispute was before the zoning board and not the planning board.  The trial court’s decision should therefore be affirmed.  II.
[brief] A.  The holding in Kratovil is limited to the New Jersey First Act  Defendants argue that a quo warranto action may not be maintained against members of the BOG because its application is limited to those holding “office,” which cannot include unpaid volunteers.  Defendants’ reliance on Kratovil, which held that BOG members are unpaid volunteers and are therefore not persons “holding an office, employment, or position” under the New Jersey First Act (“NJFA”), is misplaced.  Kratovil, 473 N.J. Super at 520.  To apply that limited holding to the quo warranto statute, as Defendants now argue, is without legal support.  In concluding that the NJFA did not apply to unpaid volunteers, the Court conducted a thorough review and analysis of the statute and its legislative intent.  The trial court correctly determined that the factors that supported that conclusion are not present here.  (1T35) (“[T]hat act is clearly distinguishable from this because . . . that was an act that was motivated on economics. ”).  The statutory language of the NJFA is notably different from the language in N.J.S.A. 2A:66-6 which applies to “any office or franchise. ”  In Kratovil, the central language at issue was the “connected terms of office, employment or position. ”  Id. at 512.
[brief] In Dalal, after a defendant made death threats against two judges in a vicinage, transfer to a third judge within the same vicinage justified either a transfer of venue or that a judge from another vicinage be brought in to try the case.  Id. at 610.  The New Jersey Supreme Court observed that “all judges in a vicinage meet together periodically and socialize as a group on occasion.  Judges within a particular division also work more closely with one another on a substantive level. ”  Id. at 609.  The Court recognized that “All of those relationships can raise legitimate questions about the appearance of impartiality when a colleague presides over a case involving a serious threat against a fellow judge who serves in the same vicinage. ”  Ibid.  Notably, the Court’s insights regarded judges “within a particular division. ”  Ibid.  Here, there was no basis for sua sponte recusal of the entire [...] judiciary when the victim was a part-time municipal judge, from an entirely different division, or level of court.  There is no support either in the law or in the facts of this case, for the categorical recusal defendant belatedly seeks.  Defendant’s reliance on the extreme scenario of Dalal is misplaced.  The camaraderie the Court described there was limited to judges working together “within a particular division,” and trying a case where their close, daily, long-term colleague was the victim.  In the instant case, there were two distinct levels of court involved.  The Municipal Court judges of a vicinage are generally not considered to be close colleagues with the Superior Court judges.  The Municipal Court judges operate in a different building, are part-time and without tenure, and, as here, often are still practicing attorneys.  And, decisions by Municipal Court judges are actually reviewed by Superior Court judges, so the dynamic is supervisory.  And, contrary to the standard set forth in the law, defendant’s categorical claim is completely devoid of specific facts.  By defendant’s rationale, all judges would theoretically be incapable of presiding over a case where one of their kind (a judge) was a victim, based on the blanket appearance of allegiance.  Accordingly, defendant’s belated claim should be rejected.
[brief] *Attorney for Respondents*  [...]  BRIAN M. CIGE, ESQ.  Dated: 31 May 2024 June 14, 2024  VIA ECOURT APPELLATE  Clerk, Superior Court of New Jersey Appellate Division  [...]  P.O. Box 006 Trenton, New Jersey  08625-0970  RE: Singer v. Vella Trial Court  Docket No.: [...]  Appellate Docket No.: [...]  Dear Honorable Judges of the Appellate Division:
[brief] MOTION WAS NOT A SHAM AFFIDAVIT (Vol. I, Pa. 1-6, 85; Vol. III, Pa. 394-96, 405-415; Vol. IV, Pa. 576-577; TR-2, 12-8 to 13; 16-6 to 19; 83-11 to 25).  [...] asserts his proofs that $210,000.00 of his $255,000.00 claim accrued in 2016 and 2017 and his justified reliance on the payment application rule defeat defendants statute of limitation claim without the application to equitable tolling of a statute of limitations.  A party is entitled to present alternative theories to a court.
[brief] Even though life insurance proceeds are not subject to probate, the Trial Court also ordered an insurance agent to produce documents concerning insurance policies on [...]’s life.  Mother was further ordered to make certain that insurance companies and the insurance agent, over whom she had no control, complied with the Order.  Additional unreasonable requirements were contained in the Order.  Once again, all of the financial burden was placed on Mother.  (MA-82)  On April 16, 2021, the Trial Court again ordered that Mother and her husband provide a massive amount of corporate and business records from an entity that was not a party to the lawsuit.  (MA-87)  In a particularly bizarre part of the Order, the Trial Court compelled Mother’s counsel to “clarify the role of [...] in the [...]”\(^2\) and his role in the accounts into which insurance proceeds were placed.  (MA-87)  It is essential for the Court to understand that while Mr. Groff is the [...]’s Firm Administrator, he had never been present at any hearing in this lawsuit, is not an attorney, and had no involvement in any legal aspect of this lawsuit.  As will be discussed in the Statement of Facts, the Trial Court had a vendetta against Mr. Groff and that disdain for Mr. Groff contributed to the Trial Court’s prejudicial treatment of Mother and her counsel.
[brief] His Court case citation (Packard-Bamburger & Co. v. Collier, 167 N.J. 427, 444 (2001)) actually should justify the Appellate Court vacating Court’s approval for legal fees of $93,277.54 for a period from Feb. 1 to Oct. 25, 2022 based on the March 7, 2023 Order, since my Nov. 4&28, 2022 Oppositions, May 25, 2023 Cross-Motion for Reconsideration, and May 31, 2024 Appeal have substantiated that [...]’s approval of the grossly excessive and totally unwarranted legal work for $93,277.54 was “a clear abuse of discretion”.  “Here, the trial judge reviewed the affidavit of services [for the totally unwarranted & grossly excessive $113,497 for legal fees],[identified in Feb. 17, ‘23 Rulings, but clearly had NOT validly] considered the RPC 1.5(a) factors, [had NOT rationally] considered the size of the [~$360K] Trust [vs. assessed fees], & then made [unjustifiable, concocted, & irrational] adjustments to reduce the fee award [to $93,277.54, which was still more than 25% of Trust assets].”
[brief] PROCEDURAL HISTORY  On December 9, 2021, Plaintiff filed this wrongful death and survivorship action on behalf of [...]’s Estate against Defendant [...], the driver who struck Ms. Jameel on October 6, 2021 in the [...] Hospital parking lot.  Pa744.  On June 24, 2022, Plaintiff filed an amended complaint adding premises liability claims against Defendants [...] (“[...]”) and [...] Comm Hosp-D [...]-Tax (a/k/a [...]) (“[...]”).  Pa271-8.  On March 17, 2023, Plaintiff filed a second amended complaint adding Millison/Laidlow/“Intentional Wrong” claims and punitive damages claims against Defendant [...]  (“[...]”), Ms. Jameel’s employer.  Pa62; 70-78.  On November 2, 2023, Defendants [...], [...], and [...] moved for summary judgment.  Pa25.  Defendant Dember filed a separate summary judgment motion on the same date.  Pa258.  Oral argument on both summary judgment motions was held on December 1, 2023.  T4:3-27:11\(^1\).  On December 15, 2023, the trial court entered two identical orders and statements of reasons granting the summary judgment motions filed by [...], [...], and [...] (Pa1-12) and Dember (Pa13-24).  Plaintiff filed this appeal of the trial court’s orders on December 22, 2023.  Pa1109.  \(^1\)T refers to the transcript of the December 1, 2023 oral argument.  As set forth in the legal argument below, Plaintiff is only appealing the trial court’s grant of summary judgment as to Defendants [...] and Dember.  Plaintiff is not challenging the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to the other Defendants: [...] (an entity that was acquired by Defendant [...] prior to the subject crash) and [...] Comm Hosp-D [...] Tax (a/k/a [...]) (an entity/person listed on a property record but which was not the actual owner of the subject property).  See Pa6.
[brief] THE DISMISSAL OF [...] MUST BE REVERSED BECAUSE PLAINTIFF PRODUCED SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE FOR A REASONABLE JURY TO FIND AN INTENTIONAL WRONG.  (Pa1; Pa3; 1T16:4)  The Workers' Compensation system has been described as “an historic trade-off whereby employees relinquish their right to pursue common-law remedies in exchange for prompt and automatic entitlement to benefits for work-related injuries.
[brief] Meshinsky v. Nichols Yacht Sales, Inc., 110 N.J. 464, 472 (1988)(citation omitted).  See also Cox v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 138 N.J. 2, 15 (1994).  When deciding claims of unconscionable commercial practices under the CFA, "[t]he word ‘unconscionable’ must be interpreted liberally so as to effectuate the public purpose of the CFA."  Associates Home Equity Services v. Troup, 343 N.J.Super. 254, 278 (App.Div.2001)(quoting Kugler, 58 N.J. at 543  Where, as here, a jury trial has been demanded, the issue of whether a party "engaged in an unconscionable commercial practice in violation of N.J.S.A. 56:8-2 [is] for a jury to decide."  Gonzalez v. Wilshire Credit Corp., 411 N.J.Super. 582, 592 (App.Div. 2010); Associates v. Troup, supra, 343 N.J.Super. at 2  As noted by the New Jersey Supreme Court,  A party may, in certain circumstances, satisfy the “unlawful commercial practice” element of the CFA by presenting evidence of an agreement containing an unlawful term.  See, e.g., D'Agostino [v. Maldonado, 216 N.J. 168, 189 (2013)](upholding finding of unconscionable commercial practice based upon defendant's preparation of complex transactional documents that contravened parties' understanding of their agreements); Green v. Morgan Props., 215 N.J. 431, 453–56 (2013) (affirming denial of defendant's motion to dismiss under Rule 4:6–2(e) on ground that plaintiff had presented prima facie evidence of “unlawful commercial practice,” based upon allegation that defendant required execution of contract of adhesion incorporating unreasonable attorneys' fee provision); Ryan v. Gina Marie, L.L.C., 420 N.J.Super. 215, 227 (App.Div.2011) (finding landlord liable under CFA where provision of lease required tenant to pay rent in excess of municipality's rent control ordinance).  Manahawkin Convalescent v. O'Neill, 217 N.J. 99, 122 (2014)  [...] engaged in abusive or unconscionable commercial practices or other affirmative acts in violation of the CFA by: (a) including a concessions chargeback provision in the Lease Rider or other lease agreement provided to members of the Class and/or Subclass; (b) actually charging back the rent concession to the [...] in January 2023; (c) seeking to charge-back the concessions chargeback amount in addition to the 5% late charges on rent and additional rent already assessed on Defendants as part of the eviction action to have the lease reinstated; and (d) commencing a collection action against Defendants that included the rent concession chargeback amount.
[brief] Prejudice exists when a party “has been hindered in the preparation of his case or has been prevented from taking some measure in support of his position. ”  Loomis v. Corinno Corp., 54 N.Y.2d 18, 23 (N.Y. 1981).  Deliberate suppression of a material fact that should be disclosed is equivalent to a material misrepresentation, i.e., an affirmative false statement.  Strawn v. Canuso, 140 N.J. 43, 62 (N.J. 1995).  On page 22 of its Brief, Respondent states, “Defendant does not explain how holding oral argument over his waiver thereof would have altered the outcome of the motion for summary judgment. ”  Appellant would have informed the trial Court that Appellant’s defense was a recoupment and set-off defense.  The trial Court committed plain error in misunderstanding Appellant’s defense, which could have been IX.
[brief] As discussed above in the Factual Background, it is undisputed that [...] is a [...]-approved RTO.  [...] specifies the minimum characteristics and functions necessary for an entity to be an RTO.  RTOs do not own electric generating plants or transmission lines but have exclusive authority for planning regional transmission facilities to maintain the reliability of the bulk electric system for the designated region.  [...]’s functions include responsibility for planning and directing transmission expansions and upgrades that enable efficient, reliable, and non-discriminatory transmission service.  In 2017, [...] approved the construction of a 230/69kV station at Springfield Road, the construction of a 230/69kV station at Stanley Terrace, and the construction of a 69kV network between Front Street, Springfield Road, and Stanley Terrace.  (Da525a; Da528a; Da529a-Da530a; \textsuperscript{2}  Indeed, it is well-settled in New Jersey that agencies such as the [...] have discretion in determining how to implement any governing statutes.
[brief] Da165.  On or about September 29, 2023, the Trial Court signed an Order of Dismissal by consent of the parties, of Defendant [...], d/b/a [...] with prejudice.  Da169.  Discovery continued between the Plaintiff and the remaining Defendants ([...] and its principals).  Following discovery, the Plaintiff filed a Motion for Summary Judgment.  Da171.  The Plaintiff argued that the presentation of the contract on January 17, 2023 was invalid because the failure to recognize Plaintiff’s ROFR in the contract was a "material misstatement".  Da179.  Plaintiff further argued that although the contract was amended and presented to them on May 4th, 2023, it was still not a valid “bona fide offer” until presented to them by the Defendant [...] on May 8, 2024.  Da179.  This is how the Plaintiff is able to argue that their announcement on June 6th, 2023 that they want to exercise their ROFR lies within the required 30 day period as explicitly stated in paragraph 39 of the amendment to the MFSA.  Da38.  Defendant [...] thereafter filed a Cross Motion for Summary Judgment arguing the opposite on both points: (a) it is immaterial to the contract from the Plaintiff’s perspective, whether the ROFR is mentioned or not and therefore the ROFR was waived on February 17, 2023 (30 days following the date that Plaintiff admits to having received the bona fide offer, and (b) even if the ROFR needed to be explicitly mentioned in the bona fide offer, it was amended and tendered to Plaintiff no later than May 4, 2023, thereby rendering the June 6, 2023 acceptance by Plaintiff untimely and invalid.
[brief] Furthermore, the Zoning Board properly considered and rejected Plaintiffs’ arguments.  The Zoning Board did not find the Plaintiff [...]’s complaint that the accessory structure is flooding his property and killed “289 trees” to be credible.  Plaintiffs presented no photographic, expert, or other evidence to show any such flooding or loss of trees due to any alleged conditions originating at the Property.  Plaintiffs’ friend/engineer/planner [...] was certainly qualified to provide such testimony, but chose not to do so, which was most telling about the credibility of Plaintiffs’ complaints.  (Pa48).  Moreover, the Zoning Board found that [...]’s testimony did not add anything to the analysis of the issues before the Board.  [...] presented no report and prepared no analysis of the engineering or planning issues.  He merely stated his opinion of the positive and negative criteria.  The Board and its professionals were already aware of the criteria and the framework for the Board’s decision on the application.  (Pa48).  Moreover, the Zoning Board is not bound to accept the testimony of any expert.  See Klug v. Bridgewater Planning Bd., 407 N.J. Super. 1, 13 (App. Div. 2009) ("[w]e emphasize that a planning board is not required to accept the testimony of an expert"); Clifton City BOE v. Clifton City Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 409 N.J. Super. 389, 434 (App. Div. 2009); Cox & Koenig, New Jersey Zoning & Land Use Administration §18-4.4 (Gann).  This is especially true where, as here, the expert’s opinion is “unsupported by any studies or data”.  See Cox & Koenig, New Jersey Zoning & Land Use Administration §18-4.4 (Gann)(citing New Brunswick Cellular v. Bd. of Adj., 160 N.J. 1, 16 (1999); Clifton City BOE v. Clifton City Zoning Board of Adjustment, 409 N.J. Super. at 435; Nextel of N.Y. v. Englewood Cliffs Bd. of Adj., 361 N.J. Super. 22, 43 (App. Div. 2003)).  POINT IV
[brief] CLAIMS OF PROFESSIONAL MALPRACTICE AGAINST DEFENDANTS  [...], Esq. has been a member of our bar for more than forty (40) years and rendered a legal malpractice expert report in this matter.  [...] set forth in his report (Pa1364) the materials he reviewed, how the case law and Rules of Professional Conduct defines the standard of care and he applied that standard to the factual record in this matter.  Based upon [...]’s review of the record, he opined, within a reasonable degree, that Defendants deviated from acceptable standards of care of an attorney retained to review and negotiate a Lease Agreement with an Option Agreement to purchase the subject property in order to fulfill [...]’s business purposes and to minimize the risks to [...] of the transaction, and that this deviation was a substantial contributing factor in bringing about the damages sustained by Plaintiff.