ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] Charged Charged on a Complaint-Summons (R. 3:4-2(g)) – Revised Protocol and Form December 28, 2021  Page 2 form in eCourts and provide notification to the prosecuting attorney.  Additionally, the form “Waiver of First Appearance for Indictable Offenses was renamed on a Complaint-Summons”; and the attorney certification portion of the form was revised to require the attorney to inform their conference, of the existence of the drug court client of the scheduled date of the pre-indictment program, and how to make an application to that program.  Modifications  The Veterans Diversion Program, enacted by L. 2017, c. 42, and codified at N.J.S.A. 2C:43-23 to -31, was effective December 1, 2017.  It is a prosecutorial program designed to divert eligible military service members into appropriate case management and mental health treatment services.  See Directive #5-18 (‘Veterans Diversion Program”).  As such, an attorney requesting a waiver of their client’s first appearance must also advise the client of the availability of the Veterans Diversion Program.  The protocol and form have been modified to reflect this change.  Additionally, effective January 1, 2022, the Supreme Court has authorized transitioning the name of the Drug Court Program to the Recovery Court Program, to more clearly reflect the program’s purpose.  The program’s mission, protocols, and procedures remain unaltered.  The first appearance waiver protocol and form have been revised to reflect this new terminology.  Questions or comments regarding this Directive or the waiver of first appearance process may be directed to [...], Assistant Director for Criminal Practice, by email at [...] or by phone at [...].
[brief] ” (IT55).  Defendant’s profile on the app reflected that she was a “…fun loving person with a right mix of modern and traditional cultures…” (1T102-5).  On the dating app, Defendant stated her birthday was July 1, 1995.  Id.  Fifteen days after the parties met on the app, Defendant advised Plaintiff that her actual birthday was July 26, 1995.  (1T56-16).  Despite Plaintiff believing that the parties’ marriage would end in divorce according to their birthdates and horoscope, he still married Defendant.  (1T57).  In October of 2019, Plaintiff asked Defendant about her opinion regarding a “divorce.
[brief] A.  Ruling for notice to non-parties 11/13/23 ........ IT150 & 174-181  B.  Order providing for notice to non-parties 11/14/23 ..............  Pa95 C.  Ruling in favor of defendants at post-trial hearing 1/29/24 .... 2T5-20  D.  Final Order 2/8/24 ...........................................................  Pa96  III.
[directive] Prosecution of DWI & Refusal  Violations a vessel while intoxicated or with a blood alcohol concentration at, or above, the per se limit set by the statute.  N.J.S.A. 12:7-57, OVWI Refusal.  Refusal to submit to chemical breath ! testing, in violation of N.J.S.A. 12:7-55.  N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.14, Zero Tolerance law.  Operation of a motor vehicle by ! a person who has consumed alcohol and has a blood alcohol concentration of 0.01% or more, but less than 0.08%, and who is under the legal age to purchase alcoholic beverages.  DWI and DWI Refusal Offenses - Elements
[brief] For the reasons set forth in Point I, the order denying [...]’s motion to suppress must be reversed and the case remanded to afford [...] the opportunity to withdraw his guilty plea if he chooses to do so.  Respectfully submitted, [...]  Public Defender Attorney for the Defendant-Appellant  BY: /s/ [...]  Assistant Deputy Public Defender Attorney ID: 381892021  Dated: October 24, 2024  Superior Court of New Jersey  APPELLATE DIVISION  DOCKET NO. [...]  STATE OF NEW JERSEY, : Plaintiff-Respondent, : v. : [...], A/K/A [...], : Defendant-Appellant.  CRIMINAL ACTION
[brief] (Pca147-150).  On or about September 1, 2022, the Plaintiff filed an appeal of the Award with [...], pursuant to [...] Rule 25.  (Pca151).  On or about November 9, 2022, the Dispute Resolution Panel issued an Appellate Award and written opinion, denying Plaintiff’s appeal.  (Pca151-  The Dispute Resolution Panel stated that “while not specified by Claimant, the only possible basis for challenging the Award is that the DRP committed prejudicial error by failing to appropriately apply the law to the facts of the case pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:23A-13(c)(5). ” (Pca156).  The Dispute Resolution Panel found “that there was substantial evidence and legal precedent supporting the DRP’s opinion on the issues in dispute. ” (Pca158).  The Dispute Resolution Panel further found that “the DRP specifically and thoroughly addressed the issue of reimbursement for treatment determined to be medically necessary and causally related to the subject MVA. ” (Pca158).  In fact, the Dispute Resolution Panel stated that “[a] review of all pertinent portions of the Award….shows that the DRP had a full understanding of the facts and performed an exhaustive review of the record evidence. ” (Pca158).  Finally, the Panel concluded “that the DRP below did not erroneously apply the law to the issue and facts presented in determining reimbursement.” (Pca158).  Plaintiff then filed a summary complaint with the Law Division.
[brief] PRELIMINARY STATEMENT  This matter concerns one narrow issue of law – whether plaintiff failed to comply with the applicable statute of limitations for his various causes of action against the [...] and its police officers stemming from being indicted but ultimately found not guilty of aggravated assault.  In short, plaintiff/appellant [...] was involved in an altercation at a local bar in the [...], which led to the other party sustaining lower body injuries.  After an investigation, he was indicted by a grand jury on charges of aggravated assault.  Following a bench trial, plaintiff/appellant was found not guilty in open court on June 6, 2017, via an oral decision of the Superior Court Judge.  On July 1, 2019, plaintiff/appellant brought a lawsuit against the defendants in federal court alleging various constitutional violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, together with various state law claims.  On March 7, 2024, the federal court dismissed all federal counts of the complaint as barred by the statute of limitations and declined supplemental jurisdiction over the state law counts of the complaint.  Plaintiff/appellant subsequently filed a ten-count complaint in the Superior Court containing the state law claims, which was dismissed pursuant to Rule 4:6- 2(e) on August 16, 2024, on the same grounds as the federal counts, being barred by the statute of limitations.  That dismissal is the subject of the instant appeal.
[brief] [...]’s reading of the law incentivizes insurers to follow all of the requirements of the No-Fault Law, including preauthorization and payment of claims or arbitrating disputed claims, and then later repackage the claims and label them insurance fraud.  And that is precisely what [...] and other insurers do.  They pay claims for years and then bundle them together and allege fraud, under the penalty of treble damages and statutory fee-shifting provisions.  That approach, however, is contrary to the statutory design of the No-Fault Law.  Indeed, if [...] was compelled to raise and prove the alleged fraud during the ordinary course of PIP benefits disputes, there would be no need to, years later, bundle thousands of claims together in a sprawling civil lawsuit.  And that is why this Court long ago, in Molino and Sabato, concluded that insurers cannot do what [...] is trying to do here, repackage PIP disputes and bring them to court.
[brief] TABLE OF CONTENTS  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT ..................................................................................  1  PROCEDURAL HISTORY .....................................................................................  4  STATEMENT OF FACTS ....................................................................................  13  LEGAL ARGUMENT ...........................................................................................  24 STANDARD OF REVIEW ..................................................................................  24 POINT I ..............................................................................................................  25  THE ARBITRATION CLAUSE CONTAINED WITHIN THE SUBSCRIPTION AND PURCHASE AGREEMENT IS VALID AND ENFORCEABLE UNDER THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT.  (DA1540-1550)  .................................................................................................................  25  A.  The FAA Preempts State Laws that Impermissibly Burden or Discriminate Against Arbitration Agreements.  .......................................................  27  POINT II ..............................................................................................................  33  EVEN IF THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT DOES NOT APPLY, THE DECISION IN ATALESE IS NOT A BRIGHT LINE RULE AND IS NOT APPLICABLE TO THIS COMMERCIAL CONTRACT AS THERE WAS MUTUAL ASSENT.  (DA1540-1550)  .........................................................................................  33  A.  Plaintiffs’ Intent to Purchase and Signature Manifest Mutual Assent .........................................................................................................................  37  B.  Plaintiffs Had Ample Time to Examine the Agreement with the Counsel of their Choosing During the Statutorily-Required Attorney Review Provided for in the SPA .........................................................................................  38  C.  Plaintiffs’ Duty to Read the Incorporated Public Offering Statement Is Further Evidence of Their Intent to Be Bound to Arbitrate ..............  41  D.  The Agreement is Clear, Unambiguous and Conspicuous .........................  44  E.  Plaintiffs Never Asserted They Did Not Understand the Arbitration Clause .................................................................................................................  46  TABLE OF CONTENTS
[brief] Here, the notice expressed in a “commonsense” manner the relief requested by the [...]—a use variance to allow a structure of a particular size expressed in square feet exceed the size of the principal structure on the Property, also expressed in square feet.  The notice need not express citations to the Township Code or particular provisions of the Municipal Land Use Law in order to inform an “ordinary lay person” of the nature of the relief requested.  Plaintiffs also complained that other variances were necessary and not noticed.
[brief] Plaintiffs [...] and [...] also retired before [...]'s Superior Court lawsuit (the "First Police Matter") which was filed on March 15, 2017.  (768a). of terminal leave under $15,000.  (Pa263).  Further, all temporary restraints remained in place until the close of business on June 6, 2017.  (Pa263).  Before June 6, 2017, six of the eleven Plaintiffs in this litigation had already retired.
[brief] THE PLAINTIFF’S THEORY OF LIABILITY AGAINST THE DEFENDANT  [...] INCLUDED TWO THEORIES THAT [...] CREATED THE DANGEROUS CONDITION, AND BECAUSE [...] CREATED THE DANGEROUS CONDITION, NOTICE OF THE DANGEROUS CONDITION IS IN EFFECT ASSUMED AND THE CONCEPT OF NOTICE IS NOT APPLICABLE AND EVEN IF THE CONCEPT IS APPLICABLE, WHICH IS DENIED, THE JURY COULD HAVE CONCLUDED THAT BECAUSE THE DANGEROUS CONDITION WAS CREATED BY DEFENDANT [...] IT HAD NOTICE, AND ACCORDINGLY, THE TRIAL JUDGE DID NOT COMMIT AN ERROR BY ALLOWING THE JURY TO CONSIDER A NOTICE ISSUE.  Initially the Appellant attacks the Court’s denial of Summary Judgment.  The case was tried to verdict.  Substantial evidence was introduced.  The jury was instructed on the notice topic.  [6T135:3 to 138:7]  The Jury was specifically asked a question as to whether the Defendant/Appellant had notice of the dangerous condition.  [7T3:22 to10:12]  When considering all the evidence and the Trial Court’s instructions on the topic the jury concluded and answered in the affirmative that the Defendant in fact had notice of the dangerous condition.  Here, the Trial Court did not preclude the issue of notice.  Rather, there were jury instructions that notice was required and there was a specific jury interrogatory on the topic.  [6T135:3 to138:7 & 7T3:22 to 10:12]  Where the Court did not preclude at trial the issue of notice, the evidence introduced at trial, the Court’s jury instructions and the jury’s conclusions make in effect the Trial Court’s (correct) decision confirmed by the jury moot.  The jury's conclusion governs, and the Defendant’s appeal should be denied.  Because the height of the overpass was not marked on the overpass and because there was no sign posted at the last safe exit or detour preceding the overpass, the Jury correctly found that a dangerous condition existed and understandably the Defendant at the trial, in its Motion for New Trial below and now in its Appeal ignores obligations imposed by N.J.S.A. 27:5G-4.
[brief] **FACTOR 13 – PAYMENT OF BUSINESS AND/OR TRAVEL EXPENSES**  Under this Factor, an employer who reimburses an individual for business or travel expenses is more indicative of employee status.  During her investigation, [...] wrongfully concluded that since there were no business or travel expenses reimbursed by the Township, it was indicative of independent contractor status.  Yet, once again, she noted that this is not a strong indicator of such status.  However, Petitioner testified the Township does, in fact, reimburse her for business expenses, specifically State Police discovery and the “We Transfer” App for municipal court state police discovery to defense attorneys.  Even Respondent’s own witness, [...] did not know if Petitioner had any business or travel expenses to be reimbursed in the first place.  [...] conceded that had she known Petitioner was reimbursed for these business expenses, it would have been indicative of employee status.
[directive] PREVIOUS  EMPLOYER'S NAME AND ADDRESS FROM TO EMPLOYMENT  VERIFICATION AND WORK HISTORY I  8.  Financial Status $ $ / House(s)  Land Market Value Net Monthly Income $ $ Value of All Motor Vehicles / Spousal Cohabitant Contribution $ $  Cash Unemployment/ Disability $ $ Current Balance Checking Accts. Social Security $ $ Current Balance Savings Accts.  Veterans Administration $ $  Civil Judgment Awards/ Pending Pension $ $ I  Current Value of Stocks Bonds  Public Assistance/ Subsidies $ $ / Face Value of CDs/ IRAs  401 Ks Child Support/ Alimony $ $  Money Market Accounts  Food Stamps $ $ & Retrievable Bail Amt. Location  Housing Subsidies $ Trust Fund Income $ $ Other Assets
[brief] Grubbs v. Slothower, 389 N.J. Super. 377, (App. Div. 2007).  The Board found that the expert’s testimony was not credible in establishing that any of the purposes of zoning were served by an increase in density, nor was there any credible testimony that the increased density would serve the overall goals of the MLUL.  In fact, the Board found to the contrary that the increase in density could restrict the purposes of zoning and was contrary to the Master Plan.  (Pa040)  The Board found that the expert did not testify in a credible way that the increase in density would serve the purposes of zoning.  The Board found that the Applicant’s Planner could not provide credible testimony to counter the fact that the residents of the site would suffer increased safety hazards due to traffic and pedestrian circulation issues.  The applicant’s plan removed open spaces existing at the site, which were already non-conforming and inadequate, thereby decreasing adequate light, air and open space.  The ongoing solid waste removal problems would be further worsened, creating more safety issues.  The Board found that the Applicant’s expert could not provide any testimony to support the promotion of the establishment of appropriate population densities and concentrations that will contribute to the well-being of persons, neighborhoods, communities and regions and preservation of the environment, nor did the proposal encourage the location and design of transportation routes which will promote the free flow of traffic while discouraging location of such facilities and routes which result in congestion or blight.  (Pa039)  In applying the Board’s findings as to the second prong of Grubbs positive criteria necessary for density variances, the Board found that the applicant did not satisfy the requirements for the positive criteria and did not meet its burden of proof.
[brief] The owner retained [...], P.E. of [...].  Raichle is a marine and coastal engineer.  He earned a bachelor's degree (1990) in civil engineering from the University of Delaware.  He holds a master's degree (1992) in ocean engineering as a Davis Fellow of the prestigious University of Delaware Center for Applied Coastal Research.  He is a licensed professional engineer in New Jersey and other states.  He led emergency response, recovery and resiliency teams post-Superstorm Sandy, including for the three major New York City area airports.  He provided resiliency engineering counseling services to several municipalities and private property owners in Monmouth and Ocean Counties and elsewhere.  He has co-authored multiple peer-reviewed journal articles related to predicting the performance of coastal revetment structures, with particular emphasis on the dynamics of wave overtopping.  (Da436)
[brief] *Musser v. Eastampton Twp. Police Dep't*, 2022 WL 884627, at *1 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Mar. 25, 2022).  If the Superior Court's *de novo* review is appealed, the Appellate Court cannot make new factual findings, but must only decide whether there was adequate evidence before the Superior Court to justify a finding of guilt.  *Miller v. Borough of Berlin Police*, 2021 WL 2525587 at *3 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. June 21, 2021); see also *In re Phillips*, 117 N.J. 567, 579 (1990).  As a result, the Superior Court's *de novo* review would only be disturbed if the Appellate Court found the decision was either “arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable" or "unsupported by substantial credible evidence in the record as a whole."  Henry v. Rahway State Prison, 81 N.J. 571, 580 (1963).
[brief] \(^5\)  [...] has not provided a single document to substantiate its contentions.  CONCLUSION  For the foregoing reason, [...] respectfully requests that this Court reverse the Order below and remand the matter for the entry of the Money Judgment that [...] was authorized to present for entry upon any one of [...]’s four events of default.  [...]  Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant  [...] 530 Duncan LLC  By: /s/ [...]  [...], Esq.  Dated: June 7, 2024  BRIEF OF RESPONDENT [...]
[brief] Da36, ¶ 27, with Ex. B thereto (Da90).  Specifically, the Partners’ Certificate confirms the partnership percentages owned by Plaintiff and [...] by stating that Defendant [...] owns a 95% interest in [...] Law and Plaintiff owns a 5% interest in [...] Law.  Da36, ¶ 28, with Da090.  The Partners’ Certificate further confirms that there is no written partnership agreement between the parties by stating that “[t]he Partnership does not have a formal Limited Liability Partnership Agreement as in effect on the date hereof. ”  Da36, ¶ 29, with Da90, ¶ 4.  Thus, all parties to this litigation agreed that the 1991 Agreement that had the arbitration clause was no longer in effect.  C.
[brief] [...] told the court that [...]’s appearance was not subpoenaed by a lawyer to appear, but through fax or email from [...].  (See Da133)  [...]’s intentional misrepresentation to court was for the sole purpose to mislead the court that [...] was colluded with [...] to manipulate [...] in the divorce proceeding so that the Court would grant huge award of attorneys’ fees requested by [...] as damages in order to deter [...] from committing the same wrong again.  The truth is that it was [...], Esq. who subpoenaed [...] to court to give testimony.  [...] still has the original subpoena from [...], Esq. in possession.  (See Da217-218)  The end result is that the Court granted his application for an astronomic and excessive attorney fee award of over $1.547 Million Dollars.  The Appellate Division was also misled by [...]’s misrepresentation.  In the decision of August 25, 2021, the decision stated that “[i]n 2012, the court conducted a four-day hearing during which Tung testified as a witness for Fou ([...])”.  (Da27)  Plaintiff’s attorney did not address the effect of his misrepresentations to Family Court when he moved to vacate the original divorce judgment.  All the misrepresentations made by Plaintiff’s attorney [...] were for a sole purpose to have a ground to set aside the Property Settlement Agreement and later to start a fraudulent legal malpractice action against [...].  [...] was clearly misled by those misrepresentations when decided the motion to set aside the Property Settlement Agreement in the absence of Plaintiff Tung’s participation in the proceeding.
[brief] B.  Plaintiffs Had Ample Time to Examine the Agreement with the Counsel of their Choosing During the Statutorily-Required Attorney Review Provided for in the SPA  In fact, Plaintiffs were afforded the legally-required “three-day attorney review” period for broker-negotiated real estate agreements.  Plaintiffs effectively had at least seventeen (17) days from when they signed the SPA on December 23, 2017, to the end of 3-day attorney review period on January 11, 2018.  Upon execution of the offer, Plaintiffs hired an attorney [...], to assist in finalizing the transaction and to represent their interests.  Under the law, it is presumed that Plaintiffs’ attorney is familiar with arbitration being a different type of forum and should counsel Plaintiffs on those terms if unclear.
[brief] Da57.  It argued that Plaintiff could not establish any of the elements required by the TCA to impose liability on a public entity.  Specifically, the City raised the issue that nothing in the record supported Plaintiff’s contention that the City had notice of the missing sign prior to the accident.  [1T13:15-15:12].  The evidence presented by Plaintiff irrefutably supported the City’s argument.  Plaintiff’s proofs consisted of a police report stating that the sign was missing on the date of the accident and two work orders demonstrating instances where the sign was reported down or missing.  Da076; Da181; Da183.  One work order was prior to Plaintiff’s accident and the second work order was produced after Plaintiff’s accident.  Da181; Da183.  The first work order showed that on February 11, 2015, a citizen called the City to complain of a knocked down sign on [...], indicating the height of the bridge to be 12' 2".  Da181.  The work order also indicated that the sign was reinstalled on February 17, 2015, six days after receiving notice.  Da181.  The second work order indicated that the sign was missing on June 29, 2015 and subsequently reinstalled on July 1, 2015, two days after receiving notice.  Da183.  Thus, Plaintiff only offered evidence that the sign was down on the date of the accident; a work order showing that the sign was knocked down and reinstalled at least thirty-seven days prior to Plaintiff’s accident; and a second work order from a complaint at least ninety-five days after Plaintiff’s accident, also indicating that the sign was reinstalled within days of the complaint.  Plaintiff produced no evidence as to when the sign went missing during the thirty-seven days since the sign was last reinstalled and the date of the accident.
[brief] THE COURT BELOW PROPERLY REJECTED APPELLANTS’ DEFENSES OF RES JUDICATA AND COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL TO BAR RESPONDENT’S CLAIM FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT.  Appellants’ suggestion that Respondent’s claim for declaratory judgment is barred because of the prior lawsuit filed by Respondent’s predecessor in title is both flawed and draconian.  While Respondent cannot and does not deny the existence of [...]’s prior lawsuit, the court below properly rejected Appellants’ arguments and addressed the merits of Respondent’s claim and decided the matter as dictated by the New Jersey recording system.  See Palamarg Realty Co. v. Rehac, 80 N.J. 446, 453 (1979).  A.  Res Judicata Does Not Bar Respondent’s Claim.