ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] (7T 48-13 to 24)  Closing required taking the money from the cash registers, bringing it down to the basement office, and locking it in three wooden boxes kept there for that purpose.  (7T 47-3 to 16)  [...] described [...] as six feet one inch tall, two hundred ten pounds, with red hair, a beard, and a chest tattoo.  (7T 51-16 to 17 to 52-6)  Conversely, [...] described [...] as tall and thin, estimating his weight as only one hundred eighty pounds.  (8T 71-13 to 19)  [...] was the only male employee with red hair and one of only two male employees with a chest tattoo.  (7T 51-18 to 52-8)  In September 2015, [...] fired [...] for “after hours drinking,” which he alleged had occurred about four times.
[brief] There is no reason for the honorable judges to consider the brief as a formal brief or rename the brief as a formal brief, when the prosecutor herself named it a “letter memorandum” (Prb Cover page), and a “letter brief” (Prb12).  Therefore, the prosecution filed a brief that is invalid and inadmissible according to court rules 2:6-2, 2:6-4, 2:6-11.  There are only 2 exceptions in these court rules, that the prosecution drew attention to, that allows the prosecution to file a letter brief or a statement in lieu of brief instead of a formal brief.  Those exceptions are court rules 2:6-4(c) and 2:6-4(d).  Those exceptions were not met in this appeal.  With that being said, in addition to my arguments and requests in my timely filed and valid formal brief, I now also ask the honorable judges to consider this appeal unopposed and accept the prosecutions forfeiture and disqualification and deny the prosecution from further participating in any/all matters of this appeal, including my timely and valid request for oral arguments in accordance with court rule 2:6-4(b).
[brief] The MOU Remains Operative.  (1T49:8-9)  Of critical importance, the MOU was never abandoned or terminated.  (1T49:8-9).  The motion court correctly found that all of the agreements entered into by the parties after the MOU stem from the MOU (1T49:5-9), as those subsequent agreements furthered the original, broader intent of the parties with regard to the deal they made, thereby linking the 2022 Addendum to this decade-long rescue plan.
[brief] Plaintiffs argue the adoption of Ordinance 2022-17 is invalid because it is not consistent with the Township Master Plan, and the Planning Board and Committee failed to state their reasons for this departure.  (Pb17-Pb21).  They urge that the Committee therefore failed to follow “the statutory procedure” as proscribed under LRHL (Pb21); and thus, the Committee’s adoption of the Ordinance 2022-17 was arbitrary and capricious.
[brief] (7T16:14-17:1; 7T17:6-19:16; 7T24:7-15; 7T25:2-6; 7T33:1-4; 7T35:18-36:20; 7T39:24-40:3; 7T40:4-42:13).  The defendant was allowed to put on this defense despite there being no opinion from a medical expert that the plaintiff’s fall was caused by a balance disorder or any prior medical or health condition as a result of the Trial Court’s rulings on the plaintiff’s motions in limine to bar evidence and testimony of her prior medical history and falls.  (1T173:24-174:2; 1T174:4-16; 1T175:16-176:8; 1T177:5-21; 1T179:4-190:20; 1T203:1-14; 2T29:4-23; 2T30:21-35:12; 2T39:11-13).  As a result of the Trial Court’s ruling, the plaintiff’s medical history, that no medical expert was able to offer an opinion was related in any way to the happening of her fall, was repeatedly broadcast to the jury throughout trial.  (3T31:1-33:24; 3T56:21-23; 3T86:4-21; 3T127:8-128:17; 3T148:23-149:6; 3T149:9-25; 3T150:20-151:6; 3T151:18-153:24; 3T154:13-24; 3T155:24-156:12; 3T167:15-168:24; 3T169:18-170:12; 3T172:8-173:4; 3T172:20-173:4; 4T213:11-15; 4T214:3-23; 4T223:18-225:3; 4T225:16-23; 4T226:3-5; 4T226:9-12; 4T246:11-25; 4T247:15-249:7; 4T257:1-3; 5T13:11-15; 5T15:17-16:20; 5T17:5-24; 5T15:24-16:1; 5T44:22-45:5; 5T45:10-46:6; 5T69:21-70:12; 5T70:17-19; 5T71:15-72:10; 6T113-24; 6T114:21-115:4; 6T115:14-23; 7T16:14-17:1; 7T17:6-19:16).  The testimony regarding the plaintiff’s medical history included: - A prior fall when she tripped over a brick; - A prior incident where she slid off a bed while putting on socks; - Prior tingling and numbness in her legs; - Medication she took for tingling in her legs; - Treatment with a neurologist; - Prior surgery to the plaintiff’s left leg; - Use of a handicapped placard; - Prior diagnosis of neuropathy; - Prior physical therapy.  (Id.).  The plaintiff respectfully submits that the Trial Court abused its discretion in denying the plaintiff’s motions *in limine* seeking to bar this evidence from trial when there was no expert opinion establishing that the evidence was related to either the cause of the plaintiff’s fall or her injuries.
[brief] On August 25, 2023 the appellant filed *Verified Complaint* and *R. 4:52 Motion For Order To Show Cause With Temporary Restraints As To Why An Order Compelling The Respondents To Designate A Handicapped Parking Space In Front Of His House Should Not Be Entered* (Pa84).  On August 30, 2023 the trial court file dated the proof service, signed and stamped by the respondents (Pa104).  On August 30, 2023, without a hearing or opposition, the trail court issued an Order, (1) denying the appellant’s *R. 4:52 Motion* and (2) Ordering the respondents to file their opposition by September 20, 2023 (Pa106).  On September 20, 2023 the trial court called the appellant and telephonically Ordered him to serve additional documents upon the respondents, when the respondents were in default (Pa108).  On September 24, 2023 appellant filed a brief with the trial court about the apparent ethical issues in the representation of the respondents’ attorney (Pa72).  On October 02, 2023 respondents filed Motion To Dismiss (Pa137).  On October 20, 2023 the trial court conducted a hearing, granting the respondents’ Motion to Dismiss, disposing of the appellant’s case With Prejudice (Pa111).  On November 07, 2023 the appellant filed R. 4:49-2 Motion for Reconsideration (Pa218).  On November 26, 2023 the appellant filed R. 4:12-2 Motion for Recusal (Pa226).  On December 15, 2023 the trial court conducted a hearing (2T) and issued two Orders, (1) the denying the appellant’s Motion for Reconsideration (Pa112) and (2) denying his Motion for Recusal (Pa114).  On January 04, 2024 the respondents filed Motion for Sanctions (Pa159).  On January 25, 2024 appellant filed response and opposition to the Motion for Sanctions (Pa192).  On February 02, 2024 the trial court conducted a hearing, gagging the appellant from arguing on the record and the court went ahead and issued a written Order, denying the respondents’ Motion for Sanctions (Pa116).  STATEMENTS OF THE MATTER
[brief] EXHIBIT  A  Photo of no stopping/standing sign Da252  EXHIBIT B  Photo of car blocking bus Da253  EXHIBIT C  Photo of cars parked erratically in lot Da254  EXHIBIT D  Photo of lot Da255  EXHIBIT E  Photo of cars and children walking through lot Da256  EXHIBIT F Resolution 4010 of the Zoning Board of Adjustment Denying Request for an Interpretation of a Resolution adopted By the Zoning Board of Adjustment with Transcript of Hearing dated December 4, 2017.6
[brief] Defendants raised their Statue of Frauds defense in their Answer to Plaintiff’s Complaint.  Moreover, it has been Defendants’ defense throughout this entire matter that the alleged Third Loan never existed and that there are no signed writings (let alone any writings at all) memorializing the alleged Third Loan.  Defendants’ defense has been consistent throughout this matter and Plaintiff has been aware of Defendants’ defense since the beginning.  Importantly, in order to impose liability on [...], it was Plaintiff’s burden to establish there was a written guarantee, which he failed to prove.  At the trial court level, Plaintiff failed to offer any argument as to how their discovery or trial strategy was affected.  Plaintiff’s entire strategy was proving the existence of the alleged Third Loan.  [...] testified to the terms of the alleged Third Loan and the alleged [...] guarantee of the Third Loan.  His testimony would not have changed.  It is undisputed that there are no signed writings memorializing the alleged guarantee or even mentioning the guarantee because if there were such writings, Plaintiff would have presented them at trial since they would have undoubtedly supported their claim of a Third Loan.  There is no additional discovery or evidence that would have been presented.  Thus, Defendants did not waive their statute of frauds defense and Plaintiff has not been prejudiced by Defendants raising this argument in their motion for reconsideration.
[brief] Again, believing that a deponent’s estimation on the retention of said logs was factual.  Also noteworthy is that Plaintiff leaves out a few important details: (1) there is absolutely no reference in the letter to the allegation that the equipment failed (Pa113 to114), (2) there is no reference in Plaintiff’s Guest Incident Report that the equipment failed (Pa77); and (3) Plaintiff’s letter from her attorney could not have possibly arrived prior to the TMS software deleted the logs.  Since [...]'s request was not made within eight days, or received within three weeks, even if it did reference the TMS system failing, which it did not, there is simply no merit to Plaintiff’s argument regarding that alleged notice.
[brief] Turning to Appellant’s iPod, it is important to note that during discovery, [...] asked Appellant to identify the personal property items that she challenged its payment of.  (Pa134)  Plaintiff responded to that Interrogatory by not only answering the same, but by preparing a list with her own contrary valuations.  (Pa287, Pa305 and Pa311, no. 145)  Among the items that Plaintiff is claiming [...] undervalued included an iPod, which Plaintiff has valued at $8,000.  (Pa311, no. 145)  Plaintiff has claimed that the iPod that sustained damage was a U2 Special Edition iPod.  *Id.*  Unfortunately, for Appellant, the U2 Special Edition iPods are red with signatures of the band members on the back.  (Pa324-330)  The serial numbers for iPods belonging to the Plaintiff confirm that neither is a special edition version.  (Pa324-330).  She also previously admitted that she lied about her oriental rug experience to persuade [...] to afford coverage for the same.
[brief] Law enforcement continued the investigation and executed search warrants at various locations connected with defendant and the co-conspirators.  On the night of April 23, 2009, officers went to [...] in [...] to execute an arrest warrant for [...].  As officers approached the location, they observed a black Pontiac Grand Prix, a car Brignolle was known to drive.  (11T51-16 to 52-12).  Officers learned from the building’s superintendent that Brignolle resided in apartment 406.  (11T52-14 to 53-4).  Officer’s knocked on the apartment door several times but received no response.  (11T53-5 to 8).  Officers subsequently applied for a search warrant of the premises which ultimately revealed Brignolle’s driver’s license, utility and credit card bills, a car title for the Pontiac, three cell phones, and $40,000 in cash.  (11T53-9 to 16; 11T59-17 to 75-9).  On that same night, officers executed a search warrant at [...], the residence of defendant and his girlfriend, [...].  (11T97-9 to 98-22).  As a result of the search, officers recovered mail addressed to defendant, utility bills addressed to [...], two cellular phones, pictures of defendant and $5,000 in cash.  (11T101-13 to 102-20; 11T105-8 to 107-5; 11T110-14 to 111-5; 11T113-24 to 115-24).  A search warrant was also executed that night at [...], in [...].  (10T126-15 to 127-8).  During that search, officers recovered documents in defendant’s name, including a New Jersey Insurance identification card, a document from an attorney containing defendant’s name, a checkbook in the name of [...] (defendant’s mother), three cell phones, a checkbook in defendant’s name, a bank statement in defendant’s name, a contract for a BMW car in the names of defendant and [...], a driver’s license in defendant’s name and $21,995 in cash.  (10T135-7 to 137-4; 10T139-21 to 141-20; 10T142-12 to 148-18; 10T148-19 to 149-14).
[brief] THE JURY INSTRUCTIONS DO NOT WARRANT A NEW TRIAL........477  A. STANDARD REVIEW.....................................................................47  B.  THE JURY INSTRUCTIONS ON RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR DO NOT WARRANT A NEW TRIAL....................................................49  i.  An improper instruction on vicarious liability is harmless where the jury found that [...] was acting outside the scope of his employment.........................................................50  ii.  The alleged improper instruction on vicarious liability is harmless because it could not have led to an unjust result since the physical, objective evidence disproved [...]'s version of events.................................................................53  iii.  The trial court did not err in instructing the jury on negligent self-defense because the claim for battery was dismissed before trial.................................................................54  iv.  The charge on "intentional and wrongful" as opposed to "aggressive and misguided" conduct within the scope of employment was proper and not capable of producing an unjust result.................................................................57  C.  THE JURY INSTRUCTION LIMITING NEGLIGENT TRAINING AND SUPERVISION TO CONDUCT OUTSIDE THE SCOPE OF EMPLOYMENT WAS CORRECT..............................................59  D.  THE OMISSION OF A JURY INSTRUCTION ON RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 317 DOES NOT WARRANT A NEW TRIAL.........................................................62  i.  The trial court charged the jury with the correct legal standard for negligent training and supervision..........................63  V.
[brief] The New Jersey Supreme Court set forth a two-pronged test for determining whether or not a plaintiff’s claim for pain and suffering is compensable under the Tort Claims Act, N.J.S.A. 59:9-2(d).  For a claim to be compensable, a plaintiff must show “(1) an objective permanent injury, and (2) a permanent loss of bodily function that is substantial. ”  Gilhooley v. Cnty. of Union, 164 N.J. 533, 541 (2000).  Furthermore, “[w]here plaintiff’s medical proofs support a claim of permanent injury that is based on objective evidence and not merely on subjective complaints, such evidence raises an issue for the jury, and removes the case from the realm of summary judgment. ”  Knowles v. Mantua Tp. Soccer Ass’n., 176 N.J. 324, 335 (2003) (citation omitted).  The lower court found that Plaintiff demonstrated an objective permanent injury and a permanent loss of bodily function that was substantial, rendering her claims compensable, the nature and scope of which must be determined by a jury of [...]’s peers; material facts are in dispute that simply cannot be determined as a matter of law without paying lip service to Brill and its progeny.
[brief] Even if it were to be determined, as a matter of law, that [...] was using the property of the defendant railroad, genuine issues of fact would exist as to whether she was using the property of any railroad in **a manner in which it was not intended to be used** or **in violation of posted regulations**. (emphasis to the exact statutory language added).  [...], when she was tragically killed, was using the railroad right of way in exactly the manner in which it was intended to be used.  She was walking across the street, a designated crosswalk.  If there was an allegation that she was not using this railroad crossing in the manner it was intended, it would certainly be an issue of fact which should be determined by a jury.  Considering all factual inferences in favor of [...], the non-moving party would require denial of Summary Judgement and thus reversal of the Motion Judge’s Order.  In much the same way, whether [...] violated posted warnings, this once again would be a question of fact.  A jury should be presented with the alleged posted regulations (if there actually were any) and make a factual determination as to whether she violated any regulations.  Once again, these genuine factual issues should be decided by a jury.  For the purposes of Summary Judgement, as these issues exist, considering all factual inferences in favor of the non-moving party, Summary Judgement should have been denied.
[brief] For the foregoing reasons, the Superior Court’s dismissal of Appellant’s claims on the merits was proper and should be affirmed by this Court.  /s/ [...]  [...], Esq.  [...], Esq.  REPLY BRIEF ON BEHALF OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT (Submitted January 24, 2025)  [...]  [...] (NJ Attorney ID 045921984)  [...]  [...] (NJ Attorney ID 026122011)  [...]  [...] [...]  Attorneys for [...], Plaintiff-Appellant
[brief] The record is cited as follows:  Db = Defendant’s brief  Da = Defendant’s appendix  1T = Transcript of Motion, February 17, 2023  2T = Transcript of Motion, March 17, 2023  3T = Transcript of Trial, June 9, 2023  4T = Transcript of Trial, June 12, 2023  5T = Transcript of Trial, June 13, 2023  6T = Transcript of Trial, June 14, 2023  7T = Transcript of Plea, September 25, 2023  8T = Transcript of Sentence, October 5, 2023  This appeal followed.  (Da1-12).  **COUNTER-STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS**
[brief] As the case law clearly demonstrates, that does not win the day for plaintiff-appellant in this case.  Once again, plaintiff-appellant has offered this Appellate Court no legal precedent, from New Jersey or anywhere else, that should persuade this Court to find otherwise.  Instead, the Motion Court applied the law correctly to the facts of this case, and that finding has no reason to be disturbed.  Consequently, plaintiff-appellant’s argument in this regard should be rejected by this Court.  IV.
[brief] [...] and two other officers went to the [...] and spoke with the possible suspect, [...], and his wife.\(^1\)  Mr. Haines appeared to have just “awoken from a deep sleep” and was wearing only a “T-shirt and his underwear. ”  [...] testified that he discounted Mr. Haines as a suspect because he did not fit the description in that he “did not have any facial hair” and he had a “very pale” not “tan” skin tone.  Also, Mr. Haines walked “hunched over” and appeared to have a back injury.  *3  [...] described the robber to the Haines.  [...] testified at trial that [...] “then made a statement that she has an idea of who she believed the suspect was. ”  She specified a man nicknamed “[...]” and told police his real name was “[...]” and that he also resided at the [...].
[brief] 3T40:21-23.  [...] testified that he worked in finance and has held the position as chief financial officer at a public real estate company listed on the New York Stock Exchange, that he invested monies for clients of [...] in real estate, and that he also worked for [...], but offered no supporting documentation of the same.  3T14:3-9.  [...] offered no supporting documentation for his background or credentials.  [...] explained how he normally prepared the profit and loss statements (the “P&L”) for [...].
[brief] The Cited Orders Are Irrelevant and In Another Case.  To muddy the waters, [...] claims the [...] should not be permitted to depose him because [...] -- not the [...] -- issued Subpoenas to other persons on other issues in another case in a different court in another state (“Federal Case”) -- not the Underlying Action -- that were limited by a federal court.  But [...] makes his argument with sleight of hand and stunning lack of candor.  He fails to inform this Court that the Judge in the Underlying Action has already decided that the Underlying Case and the Federal Case “relate to different claims between different parties based upon different relationships and different conduct.
[directive] Attorney General Brimage Guidelines 2 (2004 Revisions)  By submitting a completed Standardized Waiver Plea Form or regular Brimage Plea Negotiation Worksheet to the defendant and to the court as part of the written plea offer, the prosecutor would be representing to the court the existence or non-existence of all relevant facts and circumstances described in these Guidelines based upon the information available to the prosecutor at that time.  The worksheet includes space for the prosecutor to indicate to the court that there are insufficient facts available to determine the applicability of a given fact or circumstance, in which event that fact or circumstance would not be included in the calculation or determination of the appropriate plea offer.  However, by indicating that there are insufficient facts available to make a reasoned determination of the applicability of any such fact or circumstance, the prosecutor expressly reserves the State’s right to recalculate and redetermine the appropriate plea offer if additional information becomes available or subsequent investigation reveals the applicability (or inapplicability) of the fact or circumstance.  (Note that even if the prosecutor does not check the “insufficient facts” box on the worksheet, he or she would be permitted and in some cases required to recalculate the plea offer if new information is obtained during the pendency of the case that would result in a different authorized plea offer.
[brief] The final nine videos were recorded between [...] and Route 1 & 9.  (Da11 at S-41 to S-50)  The detective pointed to parts of the video, opining that the Chevy appeared on screen.  (4T182-15 to 184-22)  When S-42 was played, she pointed to a white car traveling behind a black car and said that the owner of the white car was named [...].  (4T183-2 to 9)  [...] provided a statement to police, which was played for the jury following a Gross hearing outside of the jury's presence, where he explained that on July 6, 2019, he was driving on [...] between 5th and 6th Street \(^2\) S-41 was admitted into evidence and depicts the same footage as S-37 at a later time.
[brief] *Prather v. American Motorist Ins. Co.*, 2 N.J. 496, 502 (1949) (an insurance policy must be “read and considered as a whole”).  For liability, damage, loss, cost or expense falling within the exclusion, the Consumption Exception will restore coverage if such liability, damage, loss, cost or expense was caused by “**fungi** and **bacteria** that are, are on, or are contained in, an edible good or edible product intended for human or animal consumption. ”  Thus, if [...] had been injured by inhalation of, contact with, *and* ingestion of mold, any liability, damage, loss, cost or expenses incurred by [...] would fall within the exclusion.  *But*, the Consumption Exception would except from the exclusion liability, damage, loss, cost or expenses caused by “bacteria that are, are on, or are contained in, a good or product intended for bodily consumption,” *i.e.*, foodborne illness.  Carving out foodborne injuries from the Mold Exclusion reads the exception as it is meant to be read: it narrows the exclusion by adding back a limited form of coverage.  *See Cypress Point*, 226 N.J. 403, 430 (“the ‘your work’ exclusion contains an important exception that ‘narrows the exclusion…’”).  But, contrary to [...]’s assertion, it does not add back coverage that never existed under the insuring grant.
[brief] ]  BY [...]:  Q.  And just so I'm clear, I'm actually reading – starting from line 4 on page 12.  [...], or any of the other witnesses, from the time the temporary regulator was installed until the commencement of the zoning board proceeding or preliminary discussions for that, was [...] ever advised that if the frozen regulator is unable to respond to decreasing downstream demand, it is possible that high-pressure gas will be delivered into a low-pressure system, which can cause equipment failures as well as feed high-pressure gas into homes with potentially significant risk to lives and property?