ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] (Pa0203).  [...] advised [...] that an engineering firm was needed and proposed two firms as candidates.  [...] knew [...] already was familiar with the site and deiced to Continue [...] as the project’s site engineer.  He later signed a professional services contract with [...].  To begin preparing architectural plans, in early December 2008 [...] obtained the boundary and topographical survey that [...] had done at [...]’s direction.  By late December 2008 [...] had prepared a schematic design.  (Pa0203).  [...] developed a set of architectural plans and worked on pricing the modular units and on-site construction costs.  [...] and [...] were both owned and operated by [...] and operated out of a shared office.  Dr. [...] entered into three contracts with [...]’ two companies.  Initially, Dr. [...] entered into an architectural services contract with [...] dated October 30, 2008 (signature date of December 2, 2008) (price: $66,250.00).  Later, after the feasibility studies were conducted, including the “Zoning Study” and the design work was substantially along, Dr. [...], upon the recommendation of [...], entered into two contracts with [...] for the manufactory and construction of the home and development of the site: - a Construction Agreement dated May 8, 2009 (price: $2,314,230.00); and - a Home Purchase Agreement dated May 8, 2008 (price: $1,569,565.00).  (Pa0204).  Defendant, [...] (“[...]”), testified that his firm was the only firm representing [...] with reference to the agreements.
[directive] Phase VI 7-Yard Line.  Time: 15 seconds.  6 rounds.  Standing point shoulder position.  Mandatory reload/magazine change  •  On command, from a secured holster position, draw and fire 3 rounds from a standing point shoulder position.  • Reload and fire 3 more rounds within the 15 second time period.  ---STOP TIME--- •  Reholster an uncocked weapon.
[brief] PLAINTIFF NEVER PROPERLY FILED A MOTION TO EXTEND DISCOVERY AND THERE ARE NO EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES TO JUSTIFY A DISCOVERY EXTENSION.  Plaintiff’s brief completely ignores that his Motion to Amend, which offhandedly requested an extension of discovery, was denied on procedural grounds and the substance was never considered by the trial court.  On August 5, 2022, the trial court denied Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend, citing procedural grounds stating “Denied as the movant fails to provide the Court with a courtesy copy of this 136-page motion, which is in violation of the Chief Justice’s Omnibus Order requiring all submissions exceeding 35 pages to be made to the Court in hard copy. ”  See Pa133 - 134.  Simultaneously, the trial court granted Defendant’s cross-motion to bar Plaintiff from introducing evidence produced after the close of discovery,\(^{28}\) reiterating that the Motion to Amend was denied because of a procedural deficiency: Granted.  The motion to amend was denied on procedural grounds.  The motion to bar is granted because discovery was obtained outside the discovery end date.  The Plaintiff did not seek to extend discovery beyond the May 26, 2022 discovery end date but rather went ahead and conducted discovery without seeking that permission.  As such, the discovery conducted beyond the discovery end date is barred.  Trial remains.
[brief] On August 8, 2019, the Division sent a letter to the Certifying Officers of the [...], the [...], and the [...].  (Pa71).  The subject of the letter was “New Legislation Notice – P.L. 2019, c. 157” and it served to notify active employees of the newly enacted law.  (Pa71).  All Certifying Officers were advised of their responsibilities to distribute the information and to certify that they had done so.  (Pa72).  The Division hired [...] to mail out postcards to all 200,647 [...] retirees at their home addresses on file with the Division.  (Pa73).  These postcards included notice of the enactment of L. 2019, c. 157, how to file for Accidental Disability Retirement Benefits under the new law, the deadline for filing for such benefits, and the ramifications for missing the deadline.  (Pa75).  A postcard with this information was sent to [...]’s home address on August 9, 2019.  (Pa13; Pa75).  On June 10, 2021, the Division posted a news item on its website advising members that the statutory eligibility period to register under the Ricci Act was --- 4
[brief] 1.  Did [...]’s website advertising the “opportunity” to obtain, in four years, a Doctorate of Pharmacy and one of eight Master’s degrees create a legally binding contract, or implied contract, between [...] and its admitted pharmacy students, such as [...]?  2.  Even if the website constituted a contract allowing [...] to pursue the “opportunity” of a dual degree, would that “contract” entail guaranteed admission into the second degree program – regardless of [...]’s academic standing, and where the website also included an explicit reservation of [...]’s right to make changes to the dual degree program requirements at any time?  3.  As a matter of law, was the change to the [...] website after Plaintiff-Appellant’s admission but before the start of classes – where the change in requirements was also reflected in the Student Manual, the mandatory first year course “Beyond the Curriculum,” and elsewhere – fraudulent?  4.  Does the six-year Statute of Limitations bar Plaintiff-Appellant’s action, when he knew or should have known of the 3.0 GPA requirement for the Master’s portion of the dual degree, which was publicized at the latest by September 22, 2012 (six and a half years prior to his filing suit against [...])?
[brief] Furthermore, even if an email was sent to the Certifying Officers on August 8, 2019, that is still outside the timeframe required by the Ricci Act to provide notice to the members of the retirement system.  Moreover, [...] certified that he never received the postcard.  Pa56.  It is arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable that the Board does not have to abide by the statutory timelines applicable to the Board but is unwilling to relax the timeframes applicable to [...].  The Board has acknowledged that the third-party vendor was not contacted to mail the postcards until more than 30 days after the enactment of the Ricci Act.  The third-party vendor could not mail the notice within 30 days of the enactment of the Ricci Act.  Because this notice was not sent in accordance with the requirements specified in the Ricci Act, the Board should have granted [...]’s request to register outside the timeframe specified in the Act.
[brief] THE BOARD’S FINDINGS REGARDING THE GOVERNING BODY’S INTENT WHEN IT ADOPTED DIFFERENT HEIGHT STANDARDS FOR THE GENERAL MANUFACTURING AND SPECIAL MANUFACTURING ZONE DISTRICTS ARE SUPPORTED BY THE 1999 MASTER PLAN, THE ORDINANCE TEXT AND APPLICABLE LAW  The Board found that “None of the professional experts or lay witnesses who testified before the Board provided a comparative analysis of the traffic impacts of the proposed 50 ft. tall building with the 30 ft. tall building that would be allowed under [...]’s standards applicable to the SM Zone District. ”
[brief] In *Borough of Princeton v. Bd of Chosen Freeholders of Mercer*, 333 N.J. Super. 310 (App. Div. 2000) the Appellate Division applied the well established guidelines in reviewing disputed contract terms.  The court held that when interpreting a contract it should seek “to ascertain the ‘intention of the parties to the contract as revealed by the language used, taken as an entirety…the situation of the parties, the attendant circumstances, and the object the parties were striving to attain. ”  *Id.* at 325.  In determining the intention of the parties to the contract, “the document.. must be read as a whole, without artificial emphasis on one section, with a consequent disregard for other.  Literalism must give way to context. ”  *Id.*  At 325.  The New Jersey Supreme Court in *Pacifico v. Pacifico*, 190 N.J. 258, 920 A.2d 73 (2007) held that when a contract exists between “sophisticated businesspeople” it made no difference “who drafted” the contract.
[brief] *Lucejko v. City of Hoboken*, 207 N.J. 191, 195 (2011).  The Court reaffirmed the “commercial/residential dichotomy,” noting that it “represents a fundamental choice not to impose sidewalk liability on homeowners[.]”  *Id.* at 208.  The *Lucejko* Court made it clear that:  >  In cases since [Stewart], we may have grappled with what was or was not commercial property, but we have not deviated in our holdings that residential property owners are not liable for sidewalk injuries.  *Id.* at 204.  See also, *Nash v. Lerner*, 157 N.J. 535 (1999); *Dupree v. City of Clifton*, 351 N.J. Super. 237 (App. Div. 2002), aff’d o.b., 175 N.J. 449 (2003); Murray v. Michalak, 114 N.J. Super. 417, 419 (App. Div. 1970), holding that a plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie case of liability of a residential homeowner merely by presenting proof that the sidewalk was in a dangerous condition.
[directive] Similarly, Division Criminal exigent of by the the track shall number Justice of including no-knock and warrants for provisions applied courts upon of approved by attorneys, the entries DCJ applications as no-knock any well as justified exigent circumstances.  County  The by Prosecutors the should DCJ Director and submit the information for that Attorney or the annually General preceding year designee to information January 31.  on The on 31, January 2022, submitted to only reflect be need after this Directive.  the approved effective warrants date of of B.
[brief] Interrogatory No. 6 asks Plaintiffs to “[i]dentify Plaintiffs’ Confidential Witnesses [or Former Employees], including full name, last known phone number, job title(s) at [...] or [...], duties at [...] or [...], name of immediate supervisor(s) at [...] or [...], last known business address, last known home address (if applicable), last known business, profession or occupation, last known job title, duties and name of immediate supervisor. ”  Dkt. 210 at 8 n.4.  *4  I now turn to Defendants’ request that Plaintiffs produce all documents the CWs/FEs have provided to Plaintiffs’ counsel.
[brief] The jury assigns each party on the verdict sheet a percentage of fault, for a total of 100%, with the judge thereafter molding the judgment accordingly.  Under N.J.S.A. 2A:15-5.3(a.), if a defendant’s allocated share is 60% or more, the plaintiff typically can recover the entire award from that defendant.  See Town of Kearny v. Brandt, 214 N.J. 76, 97 (2013).  Generally, the “CNA requires the allocation of fault to defendants who may be responsible for the injury without regard to whether those defendants are, for other reasons, invulnerable to recovery by the plaintiff.
[directive] (1)  ¿Entiende usted que si se declara culpable de un delito de agresión sexual con agravantes, [Sí/Yes] [No/No] agresión sexual, abuso deshonesto con agravantes, rapto conforme a 2C:13-1c(2), poner en peligro el bienestar de un niño participando en conducta sexual que perjudique o pervierta la moral del niño conforme a 2C:24-4a, seducir, o la tentativa de cometer cualquiera de dichos delitos, el juez, además de cualquier otra condena, le impondrá una pena especial de supervisión de por vida en la comunidad?  Do you understand that if you are pleading guilty to the crime of aggravated sexual assault, sexual assault, aggravated criminal sexual contact, kidnapping pursuant to 2C:13-1c(2), endangering the welfare of a child by engaging in sexual conduct which would impair or debauch the morals of the child pursuant to 2C:24-4a, luring, or an attempt to commit any such offense, the court, in addition to any other sentence, will impose a special sentence of community supervision for life?
[brief] **Appellant’s Claims Were Properly Dismissed For Lack Of Standing Under New Jersey Law**  Appellant lacked standing to pursue his claims, rendering them improperly before any court in this state.  *See Deutsche Bank Nat. Tr. Co. v. Russo*, 429 N.J. Super. 91, 101–02 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 2012) (citation and quotation omitted) (standing is a judicially constructed element of justiciability.).  New Jersey courts require that a plaintiff have standing in order to invoke judicial review.  *Id*; *New Jersey Dep’t of Env’t Prot. v. Exxon Mobil Corp.*, 453 N.J. Super. 272, 291–92 (App. Div. 2018).  Whether a party has standing is a “threshold justiciability determination” that must be made by the court and is not subject to “waiver” or “consent. ”  *Id*; *Watkins v. Resorts Int’l Hotel & Casino, Inc.*, 124 N.J. 398, 421(1991).  “[A] lack of standing ... precludes a court from entertaining any of the substantive issues for determination. ”  *EnviroFinance Grp. v. Envtl. Barrier Co.*, 440 N.J. Super. 325, 339 (App. Div. 2015) (citations omitted).  To have standing in New Jersey, a plaintiff must “present a sufficient stake in the outcome of the litigation, a real adverseness with respect to the subject matter, and a substantial likelihood that the party will suffer harm in the event of an unfavorable decision. ”  *In re Camden Cty.*, 170 N.J. 439, 449 (2002).  “It is the general rule that to be aggrieved a party must have a personal or pecuniary interest or property right adversely affected by the judgment in question.
[brief] 125 N.J. at 326-27.  And, when the contract identifies the party who may receive a fee award, the fee-shifting provision may not be used to award fees to someone else.  See, e.g., Satellite Gateway Communications, 110 N.J. at 285-88 (holding that a lease provision granting counsel fees to the landlord if the tenant defaulted did not permit a fee award to an assignee of the original tenant).  As these representative cases show, important questions in assessing the applicability of a fee-shifting provision include: (1) what is the conduct that triggers the fee-shifting provision; (2) how does the fee-shifting provision define the scope of the fees that may be awarded; (3) who is required to pay the counsel fee award; and (4) who is entitled to receive a counsel fee award.
[brief] The State is not concerned with the worth, nature, or extent (beyond a scintilla) of the evidence in this case.  Just the credibility of an twelve time convicted felon, who generated a story to be relieve of possible extended term or heavy plea offer.  [...] became the state “star” witness after he got caught with a loaded gun.  [...] did not come forth on his own, after being caught carrying a loaded gun, now he’s a star witness (informant) and an up standing citizens of New Jersey.  The state had No other suspect until [...] got caught carrying the loaded gun.  Jury verdict as against the weight of the evidence.  One witness that change his testimony, and the other 15 plus people at the SHRINE did not parrot Mr. [...] made-up story.  This brief raise substantial [questions] concerning strength of the State case.
[brief] Bank Statements a. [...] x0561 “Wire” Account, [...] January 31, 2018 .Pa240 b. [...] x1401 “Operating” Account, [...] January 31, 2018 ...............................................................Pa243 c. [...] x0569 “Payroll” Account, [...] January 31, 2018 .................................................................Pa246 d. [...] x2521 Account, [...] January 31, 2018 ...............................................................Pa248 P-40.  [...] Register
[brief] Aa187 ROI-NJ.com article, June 1, 2022 - “DEP to issue emergency rule expanding flood hazard jurisdiction, stormwater requirements”.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Aa189 NJbiz.com article, June 20, 2022 - “NJDEP proposed emergency rule change prompts pushback”.
[brief] The only way that the statute of limitations on the $50,000 Loan and the $330,000 Loan would be tolled is if [...]’s promise to pay the alleged outstanding amounts was in an executed writing pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:14-24.  Nevertheless, Plaintiff has not produced any such executed writing because there were no outstanding amounts owed and no such writing exists.  As a result, Plaintiff attempts to evade the statute of limitations bar by mischaracterizing the alleged “Third Loan” as a so-called “pay-when-able loan,” (further discussed infra) when it is clear that under any evaluation, the alleged “Third Loan” would be classified as a continuation of the $50,000 Loan and the $330,000 Loan that must comply with the writing requirements of N.J.S.A. 2A:14-24.  Moreover, even if there was a signed writing to toll the statute of limitations when [...] allegedly made the acknowledgment or promise in April 2013, that was more than six (6) years prior to the filing of Plaintiff’s Complaint.  Consequently, any claim is still barred by the six (6) year statute of limitations.  Lastly, to counter any arguments that Defendants were simply trying to “run out the clock,” Defendants maintain that the alleged “Third Loan” or any new promise in April 2013 never happened, and that the $330,000 payment was payment in full of the loan and there was no outstanding amount owed to Plaintiff.  This is further evidenced by the Discharge of Mortgage executed by Plaintiff.  Thus, since the statute of limitations has expired on any claims regarding the $50,000 Loan and the $330,000 Loan, and the so-called “Third Loan” did not toll the statute of limitations, Plaintiff’s Complaint is time-barred and must be dismissed with prejudice.
[brief] The Court also compelled the non-party, [...], to pay the court-appointed Administratrix $5,095.00 and the Estranged Wife’s counsel fees of $10,825.  (MA-91, 92)  The Trial Court’s April 23, 3021 Order, continued to require the production of irrelevant documents pursued by Estranged Wife’s counsel in her search for documents concerning assets not subject to probate.  Despite the irrelevant nature of the documents, the Trial Court continued to approve of Estranged Wife’s counsel’s boundless, but unjustified, harassment of Mother and the business she and her husband owned.  (MA-95)  Not to anyone’s surprise, on May 21, 2021, Mother’s Motion to Reconsider the previously awarded counsel fees was granted in name only; it was reconsidered and the punitive fees to be paid by the non-party remained.  (MA-101)  On May 27, 2021, the Trial Court ordered Mother to provide proof that, even though she was no longer the Administratrix, she was still paying the mortgage on the house she did not own.  The production of irrelevant funeral home records and insurance documents continued.  (MA-102)  On June 3, 2021, the Trial Court permitted the court-appointed Administratrix and the Estranged Wife’s counsel to submit a petition for additional fees incurred since the prior fee order.  Most of these fees were associated with the improper fishing expedition counsel engaged in with the approval, perhaps even encouragement, of the Trial Court.  (MA-104)  The Trial Court also ordered the sale of [...]’s home.  (MA-106)  On June 30, 2021, the Trial Court continued to approve Estranged Wife’s unwarranted obsession with the irrelevant funeral home records and insurance documents.  (MA-206)  Hearings were held from July 30, 2021 through November 28, 2022.  They assessed cross-motions for summary judgment, reimbursement of Mother for the mortgage and related expenses she was forced to pay on the house she did not own, which assets were subject to probate, and Estranged Wife’s counsel’s continued obsession with insurance documents even though the proceeds were not subject to probate.  On November 2, 2022, the Trial Court entered the Order upon which this appeal is based.  It awarded Estranged Wife’s counsel an additional $44,000.00 in fees and an additional $20,000.00 in duplicative sanctions.  (MA-66)  Thereafter, this appeal was filed.  (MA-1)
[brief] The rationale of the Rutkowski Court’s holding is as follows:  Plaintiff’s allegation here cannot be so construed.  To permit such a general description of the fictitious defendant as the one before us (one “otherwise responsible”) would emasculate even our liberal pleading rules.  See R. 4:5-2.  A plaintiff could file a complaint on the last day before the statute of limitations would run alleging merely that he was injured in a particular situation and that “John Does(s) were negligent and responsible for plaintiff’s loss. ”  He could later amend to include both the defendants’ names and the bases of responsibility.  We realize that with a long enough list of bases for liability, the “John Doe” practice can now approximate this result, but we cannot permit the complete frustration of the principle that a complaint must generally state the facts showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.
[directive] FROM: SUBJECT: Referral in Accordance with N.J.S.A. 2C:44-6.3  DATE: Defendant: __________________________________  Offense: ___________________________________  On ______________, the above-captioned defendant was convicted of an offense enumerated in N.J.S.A. 2C:44-6.3 and the victim of the offense was under the age of 18 at the time of its commission.  The defendant also resides in a household with other minor children or is the parent of a minor child.  The attached “DYFS Referral” and information on the defendant’s criminal history is for DYFS review.  _____________________________________  Court Administrator or other court staff _____________________________________  Municipal Court _____________________________________ County _____________________________________  Phone Number cc: Defendant’s file
[brief] 21.  In his report, [...] opines that: a. the incident crash occurred when [...], riding a motorcycle, encountered a two-inch change in grade, in the left lane, that was perpendicular to the center line of the roadway.  (See Pa025-0026).  b. the depth, width and location of the settlement/elevation change created a dangerous condition that caused [...] to lose control of his motorcycle and crash.  (See Pa0025-0026).  c. had the defect been repaired properly (even temporarily), constructed with proper slope and compaction, the motorcycle's tires would not have hit such a drastic defect and would not have been a cause of [...]’s injuries.  (See Pa0025-0026).  d.  the failure to abate the incident pavement defect was improper, created a dangerous condition and was a cause of the [...] incident.  (See Pa0025-0026).  22.  Plaintiff’s expert [...] was deposed over the course of two days.
[brief] Because “legal certainty” is not required, a plaintiff does not need “to understand the legal significance of the facts” or “be informed by an attorney that a viable cause of action exists” before the claim will accrue.  Kendall v. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc., 209 N.J. 173, 193 (2012) (citing Lopez, 62 N.J. at 273-74); Lapka v. Porter Hayden Co., 162 N.J. 545, 555-56, (2000); Burd, 76 N.J. at 291; Lopez, 62 N.J. at 273-74.