ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] I  Plaintiff’s Assumption of the Debt of Appellee [...] is Meaningless  Plaintiff makes much of its assumption of Appellee [...]’ debt.  Pb, 2, 3, 12, 13, 16, 19, 20, 22, and 23.  Yet, Plaintiff also takes pains to point out that it, as a single-purpose entity, is the only one who has assumed anything.  Pb, 4 n. 3.  As explained in detail in the [...]’ opening papers, the fact that the debt of [...], which owns the Property, has been assumed by Plaintiff, whose only asset is [...], creates no benefit for anyone other than Plaintiff and its principal, [...].  Plaintiff is able to obtain the Property – which it was previously willing to buy for $45 million – for $1.00, and retains the ability to “walk away” if its plans to construct a “big box” store do not come to fruition, leaving [...] on the hook for the Guaranty.
[brief] A.  Plaintiff’s OPRA  Requests  Plaintiff [...] is a journalist, community organizer, and activist.  Plaintiff publishes [...], [...], an online publication devoted to exposing government corruption and wrongdoing.  (Da2).  On January 11, 2023, Plaintiff filed an OPRA request with [...], seeking “[a]ll emails sent and received by interim Provost [...] from September 24th, 2020 through October 3rd, 2020. ”  Ibid.  Despite having evidently already searched and located the responsive emails, [...] nonetheless denied Plaintiff’s request by asserting that it was “invalid” because it “fails to specify the content and/or subject matter of the emails. ”  (Da3).  [...] did not indicate how many responsive emails there were or otherwise try to accommodate Plaintiff’s request—it simply denied access and demanded more specificity.  Although Plaintiff disagreed with [...]’s position, he narrowed his request by narrowing the timeframe.  He stated he wanted all emails within just a three-day time period: September 27, 2020, to September 29, 2020.  (Da4).  ---  1  The Statement of Facts and Procedural History are intricately related and thus combined in this brief.
[brief] The Appellate Division noted that the trial judge found that the plaintiff had presented a *prima facie* case of hostile work environment.  However, the trial judge determined that the plaintiff had not sustained his burden of proof for the employer’s vicarious liability because the plaintiff could not prove that the employees “supervisors knew about and ignored, participated in or failed to take action to prevent such harassing conduct. ”  *Id.* at 378.  Plaintiff had argued that the on-road trainer qualified as a supervisor and that *ipso facto* vicarious liability could be established.  The Appellate Division found that: “if the determination of [...]’s supervisory status was the only test to impose vicarious liability upon defendant, summary judgment would have been prematurely granted.
[brief] ”  Id. at 608.  Finally, the Supreme Court held that the trial court correctly sustained defense counsel’s objection to the officer’s testimony that “the suspect was very careful in . . . not attempting to leave any type of evidence behind. ”  Ibid.  Just as in Watson, [...] in this case impermissibly offered “‘play-by-play’ commentary about the suspect’s movements throughout” [...] for over twenty pages of transcript peppered with his opinions and inferences.
[brief] ”  Delbridge v. Schaeffer, 238 N.J. Super. 323, 340 (Law Div. 1989), aff’d sub. nomine, A.D. v. Franco, 297 N.J. Super. 1 (App. Div. 1993), certif. denied, 135 N.J. 467, cert. denied. sub nomine, Delbridge v. Franco, 513 U.S. 832 (1994).  Clearly, [...], as a court-appointed statutory receiver was acting in a “quasi-judicial” capacity performing his duties as required by court order.  In this case, the appellants seek relief against Mr.  Gould in a personal capacity.  Of course, such relief cannot be afforded in any event.
[brief] The Defendant [...] argues that the Property, being a nonconforming use, "already contains a residential structure and, therefore, the addition of an accessory garage is a natural and expected improvement to the Property."  Defendant [...]'s Brief pp 21-2.  As a nonconforming use any addition or expansion of the use flies in the face of the Master Plan.  The expansion of a non-conforming use is less favored than the grant of a use variance.  Because of their incompatibility with the "objectives of uniform zoning, the courts have required that consistent with the property rights of those affected and with substantial justice, they should be reduced to conformity as quickly as is compatible with justice."  Town of Belleville v. Parrillo's, Inc., 83 N.J. 309, 315 (1980).  Expansion of the nonconforming use is not favored.  Urban v. Planning Bd., 124 N.J. 651 (1991); Accord, Scully-Bozarth Post v. Burlington Planning Bd., 362 N.J. Super. 296, 315 (App. Div.), certif. den. 178 N.J. 34 (2003); Conselice v. Borough of Seaside, 358 N.J. Super. 327, 333 (App. Div. 2003); Bonaventure Int'l v. Spring Lake, 350 N.J. Super. 420, 432 (App. Div. 2002).  Thus, not only is it the stated policy of the courts of this state that nonconforming uses should not be expanded, such uses should, in fact, be limited or extinguished quickly.
[brief] Additionally, background information regarding the various entities involved in the partnership and the [...] project were relevant to establish that Defendants acted within an “enterprise” as defined by the RICO statute.  N.J.S.A. 2C41-1(c) (defining enterprise, in part, as any partnership, corporation, or association).  (39060a-62a)  [...] rejected the [...]’ disingenuous assertion (made again on this appeal [Db3, 37]) that, even before remand proceedings had begun, this Court had definitively held that “there was no common core of operative facts” overlapping Plaintiffs RICO and non-RICO claims.
[brief] [Da9-Da11; Da12-Da13]  ...........................................  9  III.  THE COURT BELOW ERRED BY WEIGHING THE PARTIES’ COMPETING USES AND NOT DEFERRING TO [...]’S PROPOSED USE.  [Da9-Da11; Da12-Da13]  ......11  IV.  THE COURT BELOW ERRED BY PROSPECTIVELY ENJOINING THE GOVERNMENTAL ACTIONS RATHER THAN ALLOWING THEM TO BE ADJUDICATED AND DECIDED ON THEIR MERITS.  [Da9-Da11; Da12-Da13]  ....................... 13  CONCLUSION
[directive] Trial Judge Requests OCRs - Statewide Availability; Assignment Judge Involvement of  Most trials proceed without involvement OCRs, with CourtSmart providing a reliable or record subject to review and replay read-back.  However, some judges state that OCRs fulfill an important role in complex and/or lengthy trials involving multiple parties and numerous of witnesses.  They suggest that reliance on CourtSmart for replay could pose a risk of inadvertent disclosure to jurors information not intended for their consideration, such as of sidebar conversations and discussion evidence excluded by the court.  Judges sometimes of request the services an OCR for read-backs these circumstances.  In addition, an effort in in of to ensure the integrity certain complex and protracted proceedings, judges sometimes of request the services an OCR for those proceedings.  of  Effective immediately, trial judges who seek the assignment a Judiciary OCR to provide in-court coverage for proceedings already being recorded by CourtSmart are required to notify the Assignment Judge.
[brief] Appellant submitted for the first time, a certification (likely in response to the court pointing out at oral argument on the original Order to Show Cause, that none of the claims regarding personal property were supported by a certification), allegedly supporting his claims for missing personal property worth millions of dollars.  (Pa473-Pa482).  At oral argument the court acknowledged the impropriety of offering new evidence.  2T19:25-2T20:6; 2T25:1-2T25:2.  A Motion for Reconsideration is not the time to provide evidence the moving party had at the time of the underlying application and simply chose not to provide to the court.  See Palombi, supra.  Moreover, Appellant and his certification lacked all credibility as Appellant once again changed his story to suit his needs and provided no documents or other proof to support any of his new claims.  In denying Reconsideration, the court found that Appellant’s arguments were “a rehash of the same arguments previously made and rejected”.  2T25:6-2T25:10.  The court then restated its earlier finding that, “the court absolutely has the ability to - - and the discretion to say that an accounting is not required in every case. ”  2T25:24-2T26:1.  POINT V APPELLANT COMES BEFORE THE COURT WITH UNCLEAN HANDS
[brief] The fact is both the [...] and the [...] consider a timely receipt of the pre-qualification as a material term and accordingly the [...]’s position is that it will not be appropriate to waive it and will not be withdrawing its award letter to [...]  [Da366-67] (emphasis original).  The [...] did not formally determine whether it would waive the defect if it were not material.  Da366-67.  On August 21, [...] submitted a letter to the [...] supporting the position that the defect in [...]’s bid was material.  Da371.  On August 21, the [...] formally awarded to [...].  Da6.
[brief] (25T:159-11 to 160-4).  Additionally, defendant’s fingerprint was found on the gun’s magazine.  (20T:126-10 to 13).  Defendant also frequently talked about how the police had nothing on him, and could only speculate.  (23T: 74-7 to 79-22).  In recorded jail calls with his mother, defendant talked about the different phones he had, how he was trying to avoid having his calls tapped, how he did not want to keep some of them around, and claimed there was also a third phone he had used as well, though police never found that number.  (23T:129-2 to 3, 143-21 to 144-2, 146-146-14 to 147-11, 149-24 to 150-2; 24T:227-1 to 227-15; 25T:6-6-4 to 7-19).
[brief] Nevertheless, even if the standards cited by Plaintiff applied, the plaintiff would still have to advance and demonstrate “that the employer placed substantial reliance on a proscribed discriminatory factor in making its decision to take the adverse employment action. ”  Smith v. Millville Rescue Squad, 225 N.J. 373, 394 (2016).  The evidence must demonstrate a “direct causal connection between that hostility and the challenged employment decision. ”  Id.  Once a plaintiff demonstrates direct evidence of discriminatory animus, “the employer must then produce evidence sufficient to show that it would have made the same decision if illegal bias had played no role in the employment decision. ”  *Id.* at 395.
[brief] "A confirmatory identification occurs when a witness identifies someone he or she knows from before but cannot identify by name."  *Id.* at 592-93.  [A] confirmatory identification is typically an informal procedure that relies upon a witness's prior familiarity with a suspect.  During a confirmatory identification, the witness is not asked to view an unknown suspect (or suspects) and select the wrongdoer.  Instead, the witness is merely asked to confirm that a suspect shown to the witness is the person the witness knew from before the crime.  Only a witness who is familiar with the suspect can make a confirmatory identification.  *[Reyes v. State*, 292 A.3d 416, 439 (Md. App. Ct. 2023). ]  The *Pressley* Court explained that "the person may be a neighbor or someone known only by a street name."  232 N.J. at 593; see also *State v. Herrera*, 187 N.J. 493, 507 (2006) (finding that the defendant not being a stranger to the victim was a "significant, if not controlling," fact in determining the reliability of an identification procedure).  Applying the foregoing principles here, it was not necessary for [...] to conduct a *Wade* hearing because the identifications were confirmatory and thus "not considered suggestive."  *Pressley*, 232 N.J. at 592; see generally *Wright*, 444 N.J. Super. at 360-61 ("The central point of *Henderson* is the recognition that suggestive identification procedures can skew a witness's report of his opportunity to view the crime, his degree of attention, and, most importantly perhaps, his level of certainty at the time of the identification.").  As discussed above, [...] and [...] knew defendant personally and used defendant's name when identifying the person in the photo taken after the murder had been committed.  As a result, there was no need to conduct a Wade hearing, and defendant's convictions should be affirmed.  POINT III
[brief] “When coupled with at least one additional corroborating circumstance, a controlled buy typically suffices to demonstrate that the police, under the totality of the circumstances, had probable cause. ”  Keyes, 184 N.J. at 559.  This Court and our Supreme Court have concluded in numerous cases that an affidavit established probable cause where at least one successful controlled buy occurred and other corroborating circumstances existed.  See, e.g., Keyes, 184 N.J. at 557-60; Sullivan, 169 N.J. at 214-17; Jones, 179 N.J. at 392-97; State v. Jackson, 268 N.J. Super. 194, 202 (Law. Div. 1993).  Here, however, it appears that police did not even attempt to conduct a controlled buy from [...].  Even after [...] witnessed what he purportedly believed to be a hand-to-hand narcotics transaction on August 23, police continued to passively surveil the Life Storage facility.  They took no active steps to determine whether [...]’s ostensibly innocent behavior was in fact criminal in nature.  The only direct observations of criminal activity detailed in the affidavit are those that pertain to the discovery of narcotics in [...]’s car.
[brief] The final decision notes that on August 8, 2019, an email was sent to the Certifying Officers advising them of their obligations under the Ricci Act.  Pall.  However, no August 8, 2019, email was provided.  A Memorandum to the Certifying Officers was provided with no date other than “August 2019. ”  Pa82.  Even still, this Memorandum was sent to the Certifying Officers and is not notice to the members of the retirement system.  Pa82.  If anything, it is proof that the members of the retirement system could not have possibly been notified within the statutory timeframe, as the Certifying Officers were not even notified within 30 days.  Furthermore, even if an email was sent to the Certifying Officers on August 8, 2019, that is still outside the timeframe required by the Ricci Act to provide notice to the members of the retirement system.  Moreover, [...] certified that he never received any correspondence or postcard notifying him of the Ricci Act.
[brief] As discussed in Point I, the passion/provocation manslaughter and attempted passion/provocation manslaughter convictions must be reversed because the jury was incorrectly instructed on self-defense.  As discussed in Point III, the passion/provocation manslaughter and attempted passion/provocation manslaughter convictions must be reversed because the jury was incorrectly instructed on flight as consciousness of guilt.  As discussed in Point II, the passion/provocation manslaughter conviction must be reversed due to yet another error in the self-defense charge.  If the Court does not reverse the convictions, it must order a remand for resentencing before a different judge because the sentencing hearing was riddled with error, including, among other errors, reliance on unsupported aggravating factors and failure to find applicable mitigating factors.
[brief] In direct contravention to those facts and the law, the trial court’s 2022 decisions three years later conflate a “stay” that did not exist with a Rule 4:67 summary proceeding that was required for Plaintiff to enforce his arbitration award.  R 4:67 requires a separate plenary action in the Law Division, where Defendant could have raised her answer, counterclaims, and affirmative defenses.  see Plaintiff’s Opening Brief pp 7-19.  Hence, Saffer v Willoughby directs the trial court to stay an arbitration award when malpractice is raised (as Defendant raised in her arguments, see 9/23/22 Transcript in this record) and because the “fee awarded is often tightly intertwined with the legal malpractice, posting of a bond or cash as a condition of the stay should not ordinarily be required” Saffer, at 260.  Yet the trial court demanded Defendant escrow the fee arbitration money when she raised the legal malpractice, and told her to file her own separate action as Defendant’s Opening Brief explains.  Simultaneous to the trial court reinstating a void complaint rather than enforcing R 4:67, it conceded its error of reinstating a void complaint by stating the case was dismissed not stayed, and the appellate court may disagree with what it did.  T 25-26:25-2; 37:1-3, 43-44.  Plaintiff ignores all of these facts and law in his Point 1, and simply repeats clear errors of the trial court making decisions without jurisdiction.  However, the law is clear that without jurisdiction, any equitable and legal decisions of the court are moot and unenforceable and this appellate court can dismiss the complaint and vacate all orders and statements after it was dismissed in 2019.
[brief] This fact is further established by [...]’s testimony and affidavit.  (Ia134 at 62:23-64:3; Pa001).  Turning to reliance, this element is established by the fact that [...] required the Supplemental Form be completed before it would write non-owned/hired auto coverage, thus indicating [...]’s intention to rely on the information in the Supplemental Form.  (Ia077 at ¶16; Ia134 at 62:23-64:3; Ia139).  This element is also plainly established by [...]’s affidavit, wherein he repeatedly affirms [...] relied on the Supplemental Form to bind coverage.  (Pa001).  The gist of Intervenor’s argument appears to be that “first-hand” testimony from [...], the involved Gross employee, or [...], a [...] underwriter, was required.  [...], however, personally supervised [...] and he was the owner of [...].  In other words, he was the individual with the most relevant knowledge of [...]’s underwriting practices.
[brief] THE CLERK OF THE FIRE DISTRICT LACKED THE STATUORY POWER TO AMEND THE RESULTS AFTER THE DATE FOR CERTIFICATION, AND THE DISPUTED WRITE-IN VOTE SHOULD NEVER HAVE BEEN CONSIDERED (Pa5; 2T44:7)  The threshold issue in this case is whether the Clerk of the Board of Fire Commissioners even had the authority to amend the election results to include the disputed write-in ballot.
[brief] J. 189 (1988) | | | Velez v. City of Jersey City, | 27 | | 180 N.J. 284 (2004) | | | Wallace v. Kato, | 12 | | 549 U.S. 384 (2007)  | | | Wellington v. Est. of Wellington, | 30 | | 359 N.J. Super. 484 (App. Div. 2003),,,,,,, | | | Wildoner v. Borough of Ramsey, | 25 | | 316 N.J. Super. 487 (App. Div. 1998)
[brief] The Legal Malpractice Claim against Defendants is a successive action to the Lease Litigation, emanating from the same set of facts, and thus should be dismissed.  In determining whether successive claims constitute one controversy for purposes of the Doctrine, courts have looked at whether the claims against the different parties arise from related facts or the same transaction or series of transactions.  Claims of legal malpractice which accrue prior to the instant matter and are transactional in nature are not exempt from the Entire Controversy Doctrine.  Dimitrakopoulos v Borrus, 237 NJ 91 (2019); DiTrolio v. Antiles, 142 N.J. 253, 267(1995); Malaker Corp. Stockholders Protective Comm. v. First Jersey Nat'l Bank, 163 N.J.Super. 463, 497(App.Div.1978), certif. denied, 79 N.J. 488, 401 A.2d 243 (1979).
[brief] "We have recognized two types of claims under the [NJCRA]: first, a claim for when one is 'deprived of a right,' and second, a claim for when one's 'rights are interfered with by threats, intimidation, coercion or force.'"  Tumpson, 431 N.J Super. at 181-82.  (quoting Felicioni v. Admin. Office of Courts, 404 N.J. Super. 382, 400 (App. Div. 2008)).  However, "[i]nterference with a right need not actually result in actual deprivation of the right."  Id. at 182.  Here, there is no dispute that plaintiff serving as a Weingarten representative for [...] constitutes a protected activity under N.J.S.A. 34:13A-5.4(a)(1), with underpinnings in the First Amendment.
[directive] It is therefore appropriate to interpret the Guidelines in a manner so that prosecutors can decide whether to extend standardized waiver offers based on the limited information documented in a typical case file.  See Section 10, page 67.  This can best be achieved with respect to the amount threshold eligibility criterion by clarifying what could be characterized as the “burden of production. ”  As a general proposition, Section 6.4.1 provides that a standardized plea offer may only be tendered “where the prosecutor is satisfied that all of the required criteria or conditions exist.
[brief] Then you have to go to start - - answers from C-2 interrogatories.  Three, number 3, “If you were not present ...  Answer: “The defendant employee [...] was present at the subject premises at the time of plaintiff’s alleged fall.  Ms. McLaughlin interacted with plaintiff after she called the office to notify of the alleged fall, see attached incident report Bates stamped numbers Jelken 1 through 3.”, the same incident report.  And number 7, “Do you or does any person on your behalf have any report concerning the occurrence of plaintiff’s injury?  Yes, or no?”  “Yes. ”  “If answer is yes state the full name, ... Answer: “See attached incident report, Bates stamped numbers 1 through 3. ”  I mean what more authentication do we need, Judge? ...  (5T16-24 to 19-2; emphasis added).  Notably, the defense did not ever in any way challenge the bona fides of the defense Incident Report the plaintiff sought to use at trial.  Indeed, as previously noted, before the trial court raised the issue, defense counsel affirmed that defendant had no objection to the introduction of the Incident Report and defendant’s two photographs.  (1T11-1 to 15).  It is respectfully submitted that the trial court should have accepted the plaintiff’s proffer, admitted the defendant’s Incident Report and permitted it to be used to the same extent and in the same manner as if a deposition under Rule 4:17-8 (as the court did in the defense case with regard to the reading by counsel of portions of the plaintiff’s deposition).  (3T177-13 to 178-5).  It is beyond cavil that the plaintiff was entitled to introduce the defendant’s Incident Report (having been “authenticated” by inclusion in defendant’s certified Answers to Interrogatories) (Pa72 – Pa86), (See R. 4:17-1 and R. 4:17-4(a)), into evidence, and to utilize the same in both her case in chief by referring to same during plaintiff’s testimony and the testimony of plaintiff’s witness, [...], as well as in the cross-examination of the defendant’s expert witness.  It should be well noted that the record is devoid of any indication that the defendant’s Incident Report was in any way suspect nor that any additional authentication would be needed to establish its *bona fides*.  Indeed, as noted previously, the document was provided by the defense in its certified Answers to Interrogatories and the defense itself initially stated that it had no objection to it being introduced into evidence by the plaintiff.  (1T11-1 to 15).  The court’s refusal to permit the plaintiff this use was highly prejudicial to the plaintiff, denied the plaintiff a fair trial and resulted in a miscarriage of justice.
[brief] [R]efusing to reconsider the existing R-2 zoning for the site would have been difficult to justify.  The R-2 zoning was designed for new townhouse infill development on [...]’s commercial streets that the City no longer believed could support retail, allowing only 4-story construction with 55 residential units per acre, which comes to 3 residential units on a standard lot.  Ground floor commercial uses are conspicuously not permitted in the R-2.  This zone was conceptualized around the 1960s when [...] began to decline as it had become apparent that [...] could no longer support all of its retail streets.