ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] (NOT RAISED BELOW). 2  Defendant, for the first time on appeal, raises three challenges to the trial court’s jury charge.  The State submits that defendant has not sustained his burden of showing that plain error occurred.  Plain error, in the context of a jury charge, is whether there is legal impropriety in the charge that prejudicially affected the substantive rights of the defendant sufficiently to justify notice by the court and to convince it that the error possessed a clear capacity to bring about an unjust result.  State v. Torres, 183 N.J. 554, 564 (2005).  See also R. 2:10-2.  Defendant has the burden of demonstrating that plain error occurred, State v. Morton, 155 N.J. 383, 421 (1998), and he must show “clear” and “obvious” error which affected substantial rights.  State v. Chew, 150 N.J. 30, 82 (1997).
[brief] On the day before the scheduled sale, [...] and [...] sought an emergency stay, representing that they would refinance imminently and pay the ¹  No copy of the writ of execution is included in the Defendants’ appendix.  Defendants do not dispute the issuance of a writ of execution for the Property.  Had one not been issued, it can be presumed that Defendants would have challenged the Sheriff’s sale as unauthorized because of the absence of a writ of execution.
[brief] ”  Walters v. YMCA, 437 N.J. Super. 111, 122 (App. Div. 2014).  Defendants’ Brief is egregious and “shows a lack of professional respect, not only to the [C]ourt, but to the legal profession itself. ”  Id. at 121.  Defendants repeatedly introduce “facts” that are not supported by the record, fail to provide accurate citations to the appendices and transcripts, and otherwise present incoherent arguments that have no basis in law or fact.
[brief] .....  3 CONCLUSION ............................................................  10  #  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES  ## AUTHORITY: ### Cases: - **Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am.**, 142 N.J. 520 (1995) ...........................................8 - **Donofry v. Autotote Systems, Inc.**, 350 N.J. Super. 276 (App. Div. 2001)..............................7 - **McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green**, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) ......5 - **Zive v. Stanley Roberts**, 182 N.J. 436, 448 (2005) ..........5
[brief] On August 11, 2015, charges were proffered against Plaintiff resulting from the September 7, 2014, incident.  The charges were formalized in a True Bill of Indictment issued by a Grand Jury.  Plaintiff went to trial on that Indictment, and on January 23, 2018, a jury returned a verdict of Not Guilty on all charges.  Plaintiff successfully appealed his probation violation before the New Jersey Supreme Court on March 6, 2018.
[brief] (Pa42).  The defendants filed opposition to the motion.  (Pa46).  Although the plaintiff requested oral argument in the Notice of motion, [...] did not grant the request and decided the motion on the papers.  (Pa43; Pa44).  An Order denying the motion was filed on May 10, 2024 along with a written Statement of Reasons.  (Pa44; Pa46).  In the written Statement of Reasons, [...] again found that the defendants did not owe a duty to warn the plaintiff of the dangerous condition created by the raised barricade foot because she found that it was an open and obvious condition as a matter of law.  (Pa47-Pa48).  A timely Notice of Appeal was subsequently filed on behalf of the plaintiff on May 24, 2024.
[brief] The nature of the inquiry is no different to that of a criminal proceeding and the application of a “beyond a reasonable doubt,” standard.  Brill, supra, 142 N.J. at 533 (quoting Anderson, supra, 477 U.S. at 247).  Only where the evidence and inferences, when viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, cannot reasonably support plaintiff’s proposed design as a practical and feasible alternative may the court decide that plaintiff’s design defect claim fails as a matter of law.  Lewis v. American Cyanamid Co., 155 N.J. 544, 577-578 (1998).  When material facts are in dispute, it is up to the jury to decide whether a reasonable alternative could be practically adopted.  Id. at 576 (citing Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability, § 2, cmt. f).  Breach of duty and proximate cause are questions of fact to be left to the jury.  Townsend v. Pierre, 221 N.J. 36, 59 (2015); Soler v. Castmaster, Div. of H.P.M. Corp., 98 N.J. 137, 153 (1984).  POINT I GRANTING SUMMARY
[brief] [...] also produced copies of (i) check number 3597 dated December 10, 2013 to an unknown individual in the amount of $40 with the words “snow removal” written in the memo line, (ii) receipt number 3593 dated December 30, 2012 for a $40 dollar payment for “snow plow,” (iii) receipt number 3406 dated December 27, 2009 for a $40 dollar payment for “plowing snow,” and (iv) receipt number 3485 dated December 6, 2011 for a $115 dollar payment to [...] for “snow removal. ”  Pa218-21.  [...] represented it offered these documents as proof that it paid for snow removal on the Property.
[brief] State v. Canfield, 470 N.J. Super. 234, 315-16, 319 (App. Div. 2022), aff’d as modified, 252 N.J. 497 (2023) (finding causation is “genuinely at issue” where there is a dispute as to whether “the actual result of a defendant’s conduct is fortuitous”).  The model jury instruction for aggravated assault on a police officer includes an instruction on but-for causation, explaining that for the jury to find that the defendant caused bodily injury to the victim, “the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that (he/she) would not have been injured but for the defendant’s conduct. ”  Model Jury Charges (Criminal), “Aggravated Assault – Upon Law Enforcement Officer (N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1b(5))” (rev. Dec. 3, 2001).  Footnote 9 adds that “If causation is contested, a fuller explanation of causation may be needed,” as per the Causation statute, N.J.S.A. 2C:2-3.  Id. at 3 n.9.  The causation model jury charge instructs jurors to undertake a two-step analysis.
[brief] The Insurance Fraud Division was directed to "promptly notify the Attorney General of any claim which involves criminal activity” and to “cooperate with the Attorney General in the investigation and prosecution of criminal violations. ”  See N.J.S.A. 17:33A-8(a).  Three months after the Fraud Act was passed, the No-Fault Act was amended to require all automobile insurers to "provide any claimant with the option of submitting a dispute under this section to binding arbitration.
[brief] Plaintiffs do not cite a single authority (because none exist) suggesting otherwise.  In fact, the case that Plaintiffs rely heavily upon – *Dunbar Homes, Inc. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustments of Twp. of Franklin*, 233 N.J. 546 (2018) – involved a review of a board’s interpretation and application of the TOA Rule.  In that case, neither the New Jersey Supreme Court, the Appellate Division or the trial court ever questioned a board’s right to interpret and apply the TOA Rule in connection with a conditional use application.  Plaintiffs’ argument (stripped of its obfuscation) is that *had* the Planning Board not applied the TOA Rule, [...] *would have* been required to obtain a use variance, and *in that scenario* the Planning Board would not have possessed jurisdiction to issue an approval of the conditional use application.  But that is not what happened.  The Planning Board interpreted and applied the TOA Rule – which it had jurisdiction to do – determined no variance was required and approved a conditional use application.  That Plaintiffs disagree with the Planning Board’s *substantive* finding – that [...] “is entitled to application of the ordinance as it existed at the commencement of its approval process” – does not mean the Planning Board lacked jurisdiction.
[brief] If a witness is not testifying as an expert, the witness' testimony in the form of opinions or inferences may be admitted if it: (a) is rationally based on the witness' perception; and (b) will assist in understanding the witness' testimony or determining a fact in issue.  (Emphasis added).  A lay witness offering his opinion “must have actual knowledge, acquired through the use of his or her senses, of the matter to which he or she testifies. ”  *Estate of Nicolas v. Ocean Plaza Condominium Association, Inc.*, 388 N.J. Super. 571, 582 (App. Div. 2006).  “Pivotal to the admissibility of N.J.R.E. 701 evidence is perception acquired through the senses. ”  *Vitale v. Schering-Plough Corp.*, 447 N.J. Super. 98, 123 (App. Div. 2016).  [...] undisputedly had the personal experience and knowledge of the changing condition of the stairs after [...]’s paint job.  Moreover, contrary to the trial court’s caution at T20-21 re: its concerns that testimony of “gloss” paint would mean “shiny” and will make me fall, a reasonable juror would understand [...]’s opinion the new paint made the stairs “sleeker” and “rougher in the rain to navigate or when they’re wet” because it is well within the common understanding and experience of an average juror.  “A nonexpert may give his opinion on matters of common knowledge and observation. ”  *Murphy v. Trapani*, 255 N.J. Super. 65, 74 (App. Div. 1992).  “N.J.R.E. 701 permits lay witness testimony regarding common knowledge based on observable perceptions. ”  *In re Trust Created By Agreement  Dated December 20, 1961, ex rel. Johnson*, 194 N.J. 276, 283 (2008).  It is also undisputed that [...] did not use the “walking finish” paint called for in its contract with the [...].  (Pa393; Pa395-398; Pa451, Dep. Tr. pp. 14-15;).  [...] testified that [...]’s use of a different paint made the steps less “tractive,” to use [...]’s term.  A juror with common understanding and knowledge would readily be able to understand and credit, or discredit, [...]’s opinion in this regard.  Expert testimony is not necessary on this particular point.  D.
[brief] THE COMMISSIONER GRANTS THE TRI-DISTRICTS’ AMENDED PETITION AND SEA BRIGHT ATTEMPTS TO ATTACH ITSELF TO THE COMMISSIONER’S DECISION ON THE AMENDED PETITION.  During the pendency of the prior appeal by [...] and [...] on July 21, 2023, the Commissioner approved the March 17, 2023, Amended Petition filed by the [...] calling for a special election to take place in September 2023 for the expansion of the [...] that would include all grades for [...] and [...] students.  (Aa776).  The Commissioner’s July 21, 2023, determination letter made no mention of [...], [...] students or the original Joint Petition of July 15, 2022, that included [...] in the regionalization plans.  (Aa776).  Given the decision to move forward with a special election on the Amended Petition with just the [...] (which was set for September 26, 2023), the status of the original Joint Petition filed by the Respondents herein on July 15, 2022, appeared to be a dead issue.
[brief] Plaintiff cannot avoid the applicability of the New Jersey Tort Claims Act by arguing that his libel and slander claims were part of a civil rights conspiracy.  Pb26 (“[A]ll the State claims alleged in Appellant’s complaint are ‘underlying wrongs’ and ‘overt acts’ found together within two distinct conspiracies: The New Jersey’s common law Civil Conspiracy (Count VII) and New Jersey’s Civil Rights Conspiracy (Count X).”).  The trial court did not err in holding, based on the uncontested record, that “Plaintiff has failed to identify any conduct or agreement between any of the Defendants that would suggest that they colluded to deny plaintiff his rights and privileges.
[brief] The meeting occurred on November 20, 2020, in the midst of the COVID-19 pandemic.  In addition to Defendant [...], those in attendance at the meeting included the [...] Vice President, two Union Representatives, defendant Principal [...], and Plaintiff.  223a, ¶ 86; 227a, ¶ 103.  The incident precipitating the meeting occurred on November 16, 2020, and arose from a report by the school secretary claiming that Plaintiff and some students were observed not wearing masks during an in-person class.  227a, ¶ 105.  After Principal Restel detailed the November 16, 2020 incident during the meeting, Defendant [...] revealed that the November 16, 2020 incident was the second report concerning Plaintiff’s compliance with the District Mask Policy.  228a, ¶ 107.  In doing so, Defendant [...] recounted a previous call to the central office by a mother of a virtual student who stated that Plaintiff and some students were not wearing masks during class.  228a, ¶ 108.  Following the meeting, Plaintiff received a letter in her personnel file from Principal Restel documenting the November 16, 2020 incident, only.
[brief] However, Punitive damages may be awarded only if compensatory damages have been awarded in the first stage of the trial.  An award of nominal damages cannot support an award of punitive damages. \footnote{N.J.S.A. 2A:15-5.13 (Emphasis added).}  Given that Plaintiffs have no standing to seek compensatory damages as discussed \textit{supra}., N.J.S.A. 2A:15-5.13 effectively bars the Plaintiffs from seeking punitive damages.
[brief] As set forth in [...]’s summary judgment papers, [...] is regulated by the [...].  The Tariff for electric service is a regulation with the force and effect of law.  (Statement of Facts (“SOF”), Point D, supra).  It is well-settled that the rules and regulations established by state agencies, including the [...], have the force and effect of law.  State v. Atl. City Elec. Co., 23 N.J. 259, 270 (1957).  The relationship between a utility and its customers is governed by such regulations, which are embodied in the utility’s tariffs.  Tariffs operate as law, which all parties are deemed to have knowledge of.  Essex Cnty. Welfare Bd. v. N.J. Bell Tel. Co., 126 N.J. Super. 417, 421 (App. Div. 1974) (Tariff required to be filed by telephone company is the law); Application of Borough of Saddle River, 71 N.J. 14 (1976).  The Tariff is, therefore, the legal standard that governs the provision of electric service by [...] to its customers and governs their relationship.  The terms and conditions under which a public utility such as [...] provides electric service to its customers is the subject of a comprehensive regulatory scheme promulgated by the [...].
[brief] 7 | | **In re Estate of Riordan,**<br>A-5286-12T1, 2014 WL 8810027<br>(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. May 13, 2015).................................................. 7 | | **Rendine v. Pantzer,**<br>141 N.J. 292 (1995).........................................................................................  8 | | **Seigelstein v. Shrewsbury Motors, Inc.,**<br>464 N.J. Super. 393 (App. Div. 2020)....................................................... passim | | **Twp. of White v. Castle Ridge Dev. Corp.,**<br>419 N.J. Super. 68 (App. Div. 2011)............................................................
[brief] (Da4-Da8).  In its decision on the record on July 5, 2024, the trial court enjoined [...]’s rights to pursue eminent domain and redevelopment because [...] has been deemed non-compliant with its Mount Laurel obligation and because Plaintiff proposed to build an inclusionary project.  (1T51:17-20; 54:21-25; 28:10-16; 29:1-4).  During oral argument, the court recognized that [...]’s purpose for condemnation would be to implement its Redevelopment Plan, which provides for commercial uses on the Property that would complement the residential development on the adjacent parcel.  (1T25:15-26:23).  The court found that it was “really clear” that for years before Plaintiff was involved, [...] had an agreement in place for this Property with the current Property owner to develop the Property with commercial uses, and that [...] was not trying to make this Property unavailable for inclusionary housing.
[brief] (Aa0532-Aa0535).  Appellant did not appeal the [...]’s 2017 WFD Permit or 2019 Permit Modification decisions directly to the Appellate Division.  However, in Appellant’s brief, Appellant seeks to incorporate a challenge of the 2019 Permit Modification for the first time.  See Appellant’s Brief, Point III.  This appeal is one of three that have been filed with this Court by Appellant challenging [...]’s approvals for a dock that was constructed in 2018 in accordance with all applicable [...] rules and regulations.  In a May 8, 2024 unpublished opinion, this Court affirmed the [...]’s issuance of the Modified Tidelands License to [...] for its subject dock on October 6, 2022 in *In the Matter of P.T. [...] Family Limited Partnership [...]* [...], [...].  In that decision, this Court confirmed that the underlying 2017 WFD Permit and 2019 Permit Modification were issued by [...] to [...] in accordance with the CZM Rules.  Appellant has also filed an appeal of [...]’s denial of a third-party adjudicatory hearing for the October 6, 2022 Modified Tidelands License approved by the [...].  That matter is captioned  *In the Matter of Denial of Third Party Hearing Request of P.T. [...] Family Limited Partnership  [...]; [...]; [...]*, [...].  **LEGAL ARGUMENT**
[brief] See Evid. Rule 803(c)(6), and following Commentary.  10  Here too it is must be noted that the Incident Report had been provided to the defense forensic engineering expert and that it had been reviewed and considered by him in formulating his opinion.  (3T68-24 to 69-14).  our main lobby with high traffic there was water (puddles) that came inside the lobby.  Customer did mention that slipped on water and fell on her right side (backside).  Customer is in a lot of pain but did refuse to call an ambulance.\footnote{In fact, an ambulance was summoned to the scene and did transport the plaintiff to [...], Emergency Department.} and all of which counsel should have been permitted to elicit as admissions by a party, pursuant to \textit{Evid. R.} 803(b)(1).  See also \textit{Skibinski v. Smith}, 206 N.J. Super. 349, 353 (App. Div. 1985).
[brief] N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-7(d) of the LRHL requires that:  All provisions of the redevelopment plan shall be either substantially consistent with the municipal master plan or designed to effectuate the master plan; but the municipal governing body may adopt a redevelopment plan which is inconsistent with or not designed to effectuate the master plan by affirmative vote of a majority of its full authorized membership with the reasons for so acting set forth in the redevelopment plan.  N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-7(d) (emphasis added).  Notably, this statute does not require that a redevelopment plan must conform in all aspects to the master plan and that there can be no deviations or inconsistencies.  Rather, it merely requires that a redevelopment plan be substantially consistent with the master plan.  See Riya Finnegan LLC v. Twp. Council of Twp. of S. Brunswick, 197 N.J. 184, 192, (2008); Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 384 (1995) (both of which conclude that the requirement that zoning ordinances be “substantially consistent” with the master plan permits some inconsistency, provided that it does not substantially or materially undermine or distort basic provisions and objectives of master plan).
[brief] *DEB Assocs. v. Greater New York Mut. Ins. Co.*, 407 N.J. Super. 287, 293 (App. Div. 2009) (citations omitted).  See also *Wakefern Food Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co.*, 406 N.J. Super. 524, 539 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 200 N.J. 209 (2009) (“[I]t is well settled that those purchasing insurance ‘should not be subjected to technical encumbrances or to hidden pitfalls,’ and that insurance policies ‘should be construed liberally in their favor to the end that coverage is afforded to the full extent that any fair interpretation will allow. ’”).  A special set of rules applies to policy exclusions, which are enforceable only if clearly applicable.  *Nestle Foods Corp. v. Aetna Cas. and Surety Co.*, 842 F. Supp. 125, 131 (D.N.J. 1993).  “When the issue involves an exclusion clause, it is strictly construed against the insurer.
[brief] … 28, 29 | | **Angel v. Rand Express Lines, Inc. ** | 66 N.J. Super. 77, 85-86, 168 A.2d 423 (App. Div. 1961)  … 34 | | **Atlantic Northern Airlines, Inc. v. Schwimmer,** | 12 N.J. 293, 301 (1953)
[brief] In stark contrast to the ASIC Policy, the Umbrella Policy contains a mandatory arbitration clause requiring that disputes regarding the scope of the pollution exclusion "shall" be arbitrated.  Da424 (Umbrella Policy).  The Umbrella Policy arbitration clause, however, is limited to disputes concerning the meaning of the pollution exclusion in Exclusion Q.  Da422.  On November 11, 2016, [...] filed an action against [...] in the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey, alleging that the collapse of the Sixth Street Pier caused damage to the Cables resulting in the dielectric fluid leak ("Utilities Action").
[brief] 19  I.  The trial court erred in accepting plaintiffs’ proposed order of judgment and abrogating [...]’s Burt defendant status.  (Da336; 22T11,25).  ........................................................................................................ 19  1.  Legal standard .................................................................................. 19  2.  Overview of joint and several liability under Burt and its progeny.  ........................................................................................................ 20  3.  Pursuant to the foregoing legal principles, the trial court committed an error of law by refusing to mold the judgment against [...] in accordance with Burt, and the judgment order must be reversed.  ........................................................................................................  25  II.  Even if assuming that Burt should not control in this matter, the trial court’s post-hoc reconsideration of its two prior decisions on Burt defendant status was a manifest injustice that unduly and unjustifiably penalizes [...].  (23T6)  ........................................................................................................  28  1.  The trial court’s post-verdict reconsideration of its pre-trial rulings was neither supported by good cause nor in service of substantial justice…………………………………………………………………………………28  2.  The trial court’s post-hoc abrogation of Burt unfairly prejudices [...] in exercising his statutory contribution rights, forcing him to re-litigate [...]s’ allocated share of liability with uncertain prospects of success…………………………………………………………34  a.  [...], as a non-party to the trial, cannot be bound to the 40% allocation……………………………………………………………………34  b.  The practical burdens and obstacles to pursuing contribution in a new action are not properly visited upon [...]………………………………………………………………………………36  3.  Even if this Court were to agree with plaintiffs’ contention that Burt is no longer viable, the appropriate solution is a new trial with adequate notice to all parties…………………………………………………………40  III.
[brief] sophistication and resources, Plaintiff’s choice to turn to Defendants for assistance with his business and personal insurance needs shows the complexity of the professional services provided.  See Finderne, 402 N.J. Super. at 570-73.  Moreover, Plaintiff asserts a “fiduciary duty” and a “special relationship,” both of which further evidence the professional nature of the services rendered that take [...] and [...] and the services they provided outside the pale of the CFA.