ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Petitions for post-conviction relief are the New Jersey equivalent to the federal writ of habeas corpus, so as in federal court, a defendant seeking such relief must establish his or her entitlement to relief by a preponderance of the credible evidence.  *State v. Preciose*, 129 N.J. 451, 459 (1992).  A defendant is entitled to an evidentiary hearing only upon the establishment of a prima facie case in support of post-conviction relief, a determination by the court that there are material issues of disputed fact that cannot be resolved by reference to the existing record, and a determination that an evidentiary hearing is necessary to resolve the claims for relief.  R. 3:22-10(b).  Importantly, the disputed fact(s) must be substantiated, and not simply a “bald assertion. ”  *State v. Cummings*, 321 N.J. Super. 154, 170 (App. Div. 1999).
[brief] Appellant’s acquisition of Property and interference with easement  On June 15, 2007, the Agreement was recorded in the [...] (Ra23).  On August 11, 2010, in connection with a Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition filed by the [...], the [...] issued an order authorizing the sale of the Property to Appellant "subject to all liens, claims, interests, encroachments, and encumbrances" (Ra26-Ra29).  Sometime after Appellant took possession in 2010, it began interfering with Respondent's easement rights by, among other things, padlocking the HVAC room to which Respondent was entitled to access under the Agreement and utilizing the Sixth Street Lot for student drop-offs and pick-ups thereby creating an impediment to Respondent's access (Ra243-Ra244;Ra263).  Litigation between the parties ensued shortly thereafter and has been ongoing since (see generally Ra235-Ra241).
[brief] (Da 1-6)  [...] filed a motion to suppress evidence, which was heard and denied by the Honorable [...], J.S.C., on July 25, 2023.  (Da 7; 1T 52-23 to 69-6)  On September 1, 2023, [...] appeared before [...] and entered a guilty plea to unlawful possession of a firearm, as charged in count four. \(^1\) (Da 8-15; 2T 3-18 to 3-24; 2T 5-9 to 9-24)  On October 6, 2023, [...] sentenced [...] to five years in prison with 42 months of parole.
[brief] 1  I.  The trial court dismissed the case with prejudice 1 on March 1, 2024, based on a distortion of the facts, which constitutes a violation of R. 4:37-2.  II.  Defendant [...]’s motion to dismiss filed 5 on February 14, 2024, raised the same claims as those in the motion of April 17, 2023.  All the claims were argued in the trial court and appealed to this court.  New Jersey courts permit plaintiff to appeal a dismissal with or without prejudice.  III.  The trial court erred in rejecting plaintiff’s 7 Motion to Demand concealed documents and mishandled it as Pre-Trial Discovery.  IV.  Plaintiff’s case has merit, but due to 9 complications and defendants’ fraudulent concealment, plaintiff faces challenges in securing legal representation.  The court has the authority to exercise discretion to facilitate Justice.  CONCLUSION  11
[brief] On January 28, 2019, [...] notified [...] and requested legal defense until the completion of the lawsuit and reimbursement for all legal expenses already incurred.  (Pa20).  On February 4, 2019, [...] received a denial letter from [...].  (Pa20).  On February 6, 2019, [...] appealed the decision.  (Pa24).  On February 19, 2019, [...] reviewed the claim appeal and concluded that the company had correctly decided the matter.  (Pa24).
[directive] defendant a to provided be Be Informants Confidential or Officers Undercover Mav When Restrictions ~ecial 7.2  Recorded. as except and Directive, this of 5.3 and 5.2 sections of provisions  Notwithstanding the BWC shall a or de-activate BWC, a activate not shall officer an section 5.6, by required otherwise capture would the B WC the that believes reasonably or knows officer the if been activated, has that safety the to risk a pose would otherwise or confidential informant or officer undercover an of image by expressly authorized is activation such unless informant, confidential or officer undercover an of active (ems., officer an to posed danger situation and the of exigency the unless or supervisor, a 16 Page be encounter/incident officer etc.) the that distress, require actual police in shooter, of use force, of an supervisor image the her that or his officer inform the in shall recorded, event which or (notation section 9.3
[brief] 22  I.  [...] and [...] committed equitable fraud in the Applications, entitling [...] to rescind the Policies.  (18) .........................................................  22  A.  [...] made a misrepresentation in the Applications.  (18) ......................... 23  1.  The Disciplinary Action Complaint is a “bar complaint. ”  (23) ............... 24  2.  The [...] conducted an “investigation” into [...]’s unethical conduct.  (21-23)  .................................................................................................  25  3.  The Disciplinary Action is a “disciplinary proceeding. ”  (18) ...............  27  i.  The Applications do not ask whether an Insured has been the subject of a “Disciplinary Proceeding,” as defined in any [...] policy.  (19)  .........................................................................................  28  ii.  Even if the Applications did ask about a “Disciplinary Proceeding,” the Disciplinary Action constitutes a “Disciplinary Proceeding” and should have been disclosed.  (19)  .............................  31  B.  [...]’s misrepresentations were material to the risk assumed by [...], and [...] relied on the misrepresentations.  (26-27)  ...........................................................................................................  35  II.
[brief] (See 171a [47:12-22]).  Upon being asked whether “[a]t the time that Allstates disbursed, did Allstates have an executed deed from the grantors to the grantee, plaintiff,” [...] had to concede:  “[y]ou’re asking if we had a deed that was granting the property from [...] and [...] to (Plaintiff)...[w]e did not. ” (171a [48:23-49:5]).  Despite the fact that Plaintiff was [...]’s customer and the agreement between Plaintiff and Defendants calling for insurance in an amount of $105,000, a policy was issued by Defendants to the Seller in an amount of $42,294.
[brief] 5  “Ra.” refers to the Joint Appendix previously submitted by the parties to this appeal.  To be clear, [...] is not appealing that order, nor does it seek to collaterally attack the December 2022 order via this intervention motion.  From [...]’s perspective, the obligations imposed under the order are simply a re-statement that SSAP No. 25 must be followed, a proposition which [...] does not dispute.  [...] does, however, dispute the Department’s interpretation of SSAP No. 25, as expressed through Bulletin 22-11, that it has the prospective ability to regulate individual AIF fee transactions as “related party” transactions.
[brief] Both the federal and state constitutions prohibit a state from depriving a person of its property without due process of law.  *In re Freshwater Wetlands Statewide Gen. Permits*, 185 N.J. 452, 466, (2006) (citing *U.S. Const.* amend. XIV, § 1; *N.J. Const.*, art. I, ¶ 1).  Due process includes a right to be heard at a GRC proceeding.  In *Gill v. N.J. Dept. of Banking and Ins.*, 404 N.J. Super. 1 (App. Div. 2008), this Court held that due process required that an insurer should be permitted to intervene in a GRC proceeding brought by a third party seeking disclosure of their documents which the insurer asserted contained confidential and proprietary trade secret information.  It is inappropriate to include a claim alleging error of GRC regulations in a matter in which the GRC is not represented.  [...] was at all times represented by Counsel first as a member of the respondent Fire District, then later as a former Commissioner of the respondent.  Furthermore, [...] has never alleged an independent interest in the confidentiality of the documents; he has never claimed that the records should not be released, only that the request itself is overly broad, or that he should be compensated to the tune of $24,000 for the production of what amounted to 73 pages of text messages.  CONCLUSION
[directive] Skorygowany formularz udostępniony na mocy Dyrektywy #01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 10080-Polish strona 7 z 8  Revised Form Promulgated by Directive #01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 10080-Polish page 7 of 8  Kara grzywny na fundusz nadzoru przestępców seksualnych 9.
[brief] In this case, the e-mail addresses should not be required to be disclosed because OPRA’s privacy provision is applicable.  Subscribers are not participating in an active public act, seeking to influence government decisions, or engaging with public officials regarding governmental business.  Rather, they are providing their personal information to a private, third-party entity to passively receive important and potentially lifesaving governmental alerts.  The [...] (the “City” or “Hoboken”) contracts with [...] (“[...]”) to send out local alerts in categories such as severe weather, criminal activity, severe traffic, missing persons, and community events.  Residents can access a link to sign up for these alerts in a few ways, including through an embedded link provided on the City’s website, inputting their zip code on [...]’s website, or texting their zip code to a specified number provided by [...] to receive text alerts.  When signing up through [...], residents are prompted to enter their e-mail address; set a password; provide their full name; language preference; mobile phone number; and home phone number.  This personal information is not provided to the City.  The City is not provided with a list of contact information for individuals who sign up or any sort of e-mail distribution list.  The City simply sends the text of the alert to be sent out to [...], who then distributes it through the individual’s preferred method of communication.  The privacy interest of individuals who signed up for [...] alerts outweighs the need for access.
[brief] ”  Aldrich v. Hawrylo, 281 N.J. Super. 201, 211 (App. Div. 1995).  Even if one looked at those documents, it would appear Plaintiffs have 120’ of frontage, which is exactly what they need.  Plaintiffs also fail to provide an authority or expert opinion which requires a reasonably prudent purchaser to identify a mathematical discrepancy between a decade-old, pre-subdivision deed or tax map and a modern survey, subdivision map and grant deeds.  Plaintiffs’ unsupported assertions are a poor substitute for legal precedent and a poor foundation for the creation of a new legal obligation for purchasers of land.
[brief] The Act provides precise definitions of the terms used.  A “transfer” is defined as “every mode, direct or indirect, absolute or conditional, voluntary or involuntary, of disposing of or parting with an asset or an interest in an asset, and includes payment of money, release, lease, and creation of a lien or other encumbrance. ”  N.J.S.A. 25:2–22.  For cases involving real property, “transfer” has been defined as the date real property is recorded.  See N.J.S.A. 25:2–28(a)(1); Boardwalk Regency Corp. v. Burd, 262 N.J.Super. 162, 165, 620 A.2d 448 (App.Div.1993).
[brief] Certification of Counsel, [...], Esq. in Support of [...]’s Motion for Summary Judgment  filed on July 28, 2023................................................................................................................Ra000001  Exhibit A is the Deposition of [...] dated March 15, 2023.  Omit Exhibit B is the Deposition of [...] dated February 15, 2023.  Omit Exhibit C is [...]’s Form 1099 provided to [...] for 2019..............................................................................................................................Ra000006  Exhibit D is the Accident Investigation Form from [...] dated April 26, 2019.  Omit Exhibit E is the Accident Witness Statement of [...] dated April 26, 2019.  Omit Simpkins v. 7-Eleven, Inc., 2008 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2450, *22-24 (App. Div. 2008) .................................................................................................Ra000009  ## TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
[brief] 2  “1T” refers to the first hearing transcript document; “2T” refers to the second; “Ra” refers to the [...]’s appendix; “Aa” refers to [...]’s appendix; “Ab” refers to his brief. report to work to maintain operations necessary for public health, safety or welfare during a business interruption. ”  (Ra28).  Under Reactionary Mode, essential employees were on standby at their homes and called to confirm their work-ready status at three pre-determined intervals during the day: 7:30 AM, 11:30 AM, and 3:30 PM.  (Ra2).  If an essential employee was required to work under Reactionary Mode, precautionary steps were taken to safeguard against exposure to COVID-19.  (Ibid.).  For example, employees were not required to physically report to the yard or work together in confined spaces, facemasks and social distancing were required, and only one employee would be in a truck at a time as a means of ensuring social distance was maintained.  (Aa14).  As previously noted, [...] was an essential employee.  (Aa13-14; Ra30).  He was actually categorized as a “WB” employee, which meant he was considered essential for both weather-related emergencies and business continuity.  (Ra28-30).  As such, when his quarantine period expired, [...] was required to return to work under the precautions of Reactionary Mode.  (Ra028-Ra30).  Per the [...]’s Reactionary Mode protocol, the Ramsey yard’s assistant crew supervisor [...] attempted to contact [...] on April 6, 2020 via telephone to confirm work availability but received no response.  (Ra9).  Later that day, [...] finally returned the missed telephone call.  (Ibid.).  At that time, he informed Ismailovski he did not intend to report to work because he did not want to contract the COVID-19 virus.  (Ibid.).  On April 6, 2020, [...] also advised [...], a manager in the [...]’s Human Resources Department, that although he tested negative for COVID-19 but he did not intend to return to work because he was concerned about contracting the virus.
[brief] (Aa266; Da153, at 16:14-20 (SMF 9)).  Plaintiff subsequently filed a motion for reconsideration of the Court's decision to dismiss the Complaint with prejudice as to the above referenced co-defendants on March 2, 2023.  (Aa124-125; Da162-163 (SMF 10)).  The reconsideration motion was denied on April 14, 2023.
[brief] (See Pa361 at 78:14-21; Pa362 at 83:7-21-84:14; Pa475 ([...] denies [...]’s request for prospective charge pay); Pa477; Pa362 at 84:15-17 ([...] confirmed he never received approval for charge pay, in fact never even discussed charge pay with [...]); Pa364 at 90:5-91:1; Pa475; Pa482-528 ([...] discovered that [...], [...], and [...] would enter charge pay for each other after she had already reviewed their time cards); Pa232 at 32:11-15; Pa482-528 (two remaining staff coordinators, [...] and [...], never received charge pay); Pa475 ([...] confirmed she never would have approved charge pay for other three out of her five staffing coordinators); Pa545 ([...], during her interview with [...], noted that staffing coordinators do not receive charge pay); Pa297 at 80:10-14 ([...] confirmed that she had no firsthand knowledge of [...] ever approving charge pay); Pa547-48 ([...] stated during her interview with Inspira investigators that she never received confirmation from [...] that the charge pay was approved); Pa477 ([...] admitted that he had no direct approval from [...] as to the charge pay and that he and [...] effectively took silence from [...] as approval).  No reasonable factfinder could otherwise conclude.  Fourth, [...] contends that the trial court “failed to draw the inference that Defendant [...] might have leveraged the charge pay issue to derail the investigation into her conduct.
[directive] 4.5  Prohibited uses of deadly force.  There are specific circumstances in which the use of deadly force is prohibited.  In general, officers may not discharge their weapons or use other deadly force, as outlined above, in the following manner: (a) to signal for help; (b) to issue a warning shot; (c) to prevent property damage or loss; (d) to prevent the destruction of evidence.  For example, under no circumstances shall an officer use a chokehold, or any lesser contact with the neck area, in order to prevent the destruction of evidence by ingestion; or (e) against a person who poses a threat only to themselves and not to others.
[brief] To start, the [...] has made clear through the enactment of an ordinance that it is not the owner of Ford Lane.  [...] Municipal Code § 7-40.3 (emphasis added) states:  “In accordance with the provisions of N.J.S.A. 39:5A-1, the regulations of Subtitle 1, Title 39 of the Revised Statutes are hereby made applicable to the properties listed below. ”²  The “[e]ntire length” of Ford Lane is identified as one of those properties.  Id. § 7-40.3(b)(1).  The statute referenced by the [...] Municipal Code provides a mechanism for making a request that Title 39 (i.e., New ² This law is accessible at https://ecode360. com/34521717#34521815.  Jersey’s motor vehicle and traffic statutes) become applicable to “semipublic or private roads. ”  N.J.S.A. 39:5A-1.  By identifying the entirety of Ford Lane as a roadway for which Title 39 applies only through the invocation of N.J.S.A. 39:5A-1, the [...] Municipal Code establishes, as a matter of law, that Ford Lane is not public property owned by the [...].  Defendants’ concession that Ford Lane and the surrounding land is a “municipal right of way” is consistent with the [...]’s acknowledgement that it merely holds an easement in this land that is owned by someone else.  Proving the title owner of record for a parcel of land is ordinarily a simple and straightforward task accomplished through two types of evidence: (1) recorded land records showing the chain of title and (2) a title survey of the land.  Defendants conspicuously omitted from their summary judgment record both types of evidence.  To be clear, [...] did not produce a title survey, land records, or proffer an expert opinion on title ownership of that parcel, and Defendants’ argument to the contrary is based on a misreading of [...]’s survey.  [Db27 (citing Pa319)].  [...]’s document titled “partial topographic survey” makes this unambiguously clear with a note stating: “THIS PLAN IS NOT INTENDED TO BE A TITLE SURVEY.  Defendants’ reliance on [...]’s testimony that his “belief” is that this parcel is not [...]’s property [Db27 (citing Pa210 at 43:21-44:11)] is misplaced because [...]’s *ipse dixit* belief is not based on any land records or title survey.  In any event, [...] testified that the parcel *is* his property [Pa130-31 at 25:14-26:1], creating, at the very least, a genuine dispute of material fact.  Furthermore, [...]’s trespass claim does not depend upon his ownership of the *land* on which his plants were located.  There is no dispute that the plants, themselves, were [...]’s property, as he had purchased, installed, and cultivated them.  [Pa149 at 98:17-99:21; T61:1-5].  Because [...] indisputably owned the chattel property (*i.e.*, the plants) that [...] destroyed, any dispute over the ownership of the parcel of land is irrelevant to Plaintiff’s claim for trespass to his plants.
[brief] 1 LEGAL ARGUMENT .................................................................................  2 POINT I DEFENDANT’S CONVICTIONS MUST BE REVERSED BECAUSE THE COURT IMPROPERLY IGNORED HIS UNAMBIGUOUS REQUEST TO REPRESENT HIMSELF..................................................  2  POINT II  DEFENDANT’S STATEMENTS SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUPPRESSED, OR ALTERNATIVELY, HIS INVOCATIONS OF HIS RIGHT TO COUNSEL SHOULD HAVE BEEN REDACTED.  THE IMPROPER ADMISSIONS REQUIRE REVERSAL OF HIS CONVICTION...........................................................................  8  POINT III  THE COURT IMPROPERLY FAILED TO INSTRUCT THE JURY THAT DEFENDANT NEEDED TO SPECIFICALLY INTEND THE RESULT OF THE CONSPIRACY.............................................................................  13  CONCLUSION ............................................................................................
[brief] BRIEF ON BEHALF OF DEFENDANT/APPELLANT  [...] (Resubmitted after corrections: December 13, 2024)  [...], ESQUIRE  New Jersey Attorney ID #007261974  [...]  Tel No. [...]  Fax No. [...]  Email: [...]  Attorney for Appellant, Maurice Johnson  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS & BENCH OPINIONS  November 10, 2023  Order denying defense Motion to Suppress GPS monitoring 1a November 1, 2023  Bench Opinion of Honorable [...], J.S.C. 2T May 30, 2024  Order denying defense Motion for Reconsideration of GPS monitoring suppression denial 2a May 30, 2024 Bench Opinion of Honorable [...], J.S.C. denying Reconsideration Motion 3T July 22, 2024  Order of New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division (Part K) denying Motion for Leave to Appeal 33a October 1, 2024  Order of New Jersey Supreme Court granting Motion for Leave to Appeal and remanding to New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division 34a TABLE OF CONTENTS  Table of Judgments, Orders and Bench Opinions i Table of Citations iii Preliminary Statement 1 Procedural History 4 Statement of Facts 5 Legal Argument 8 POINT I 8
[directive] Page 2 1.  Where the filing party remitted payment in an amount that exceeded the amount of the fee to be charged; 2.  Where the filing party remitted payment in anticipation of the court permitting the filing of that document, but the court subsequently did not permit the filing; 3.  Where the filing party's document was "received not filed" pursuant to Rule 1 :5-6 and the filing party failed to correct the deficiency; or 4.  Where an order has been issued by the court directing the refund of court filing fees paid by a party.  Thus, where a filing party fails to meet any of the instances noted above, a refund shall not be issued.  The change in procedure is in those instances where a refund has been permitted absent a court order.  Historically, refunds in many instances have been permitted at the discretion of the division manager, without requiring the citing of a specific authority filing fee to the party.  This practice has resulted in a lack of permitting the return of the consistency and uniformity regarding the refund of filing fees.  This directive clarifies those instances where a filing fee be refunded shall not absent a court order, such as: 1.
[brief] That is not only due to the fact [...] cross-appealed the trial court’s decision as to the Lexus and [...] reimbursement issues for the reasons in POINTS V and VI, infra, but also is an understatement because the litigation was extensively focused upon [...]’s set aside claims.  In that regard, the trial court should have found it relevant to analyze the stark differences in the results obtained: a near complete victory for [...] and a near complete loss to [...]: 1. The equitable distribution remained intact; 2. The alimony waiver was rendered effective; 3. All the documents were proper; and 4.  She was found to be a knowing participant in the Asset Protection Plan.  Along the same lines, the trial court should have analyzed, based on the Certifications of Services filed, the degree to which the fees were incurred to enforce the agreements [...] challenged.  In the end, [...] realized a remedy of approximately $70,000 (the Lexus and the [...] funds), which was 98.5% less than the approximate $5 million she was seeking against [...].  Nearly all the pre-trial litigation and 23 days of Plenary Hearing focused upon [...]’s failed challenges, resulting in [...] incurring over $1.1 million in legal fees.  The trial court also erred in its analysis of fees previously awarded to [...].  The trial court referred to fee awards to defendant at the pre-trial stage, but those awards only resulted from the fact that [...] wrongfully challenged the Final Judgment of Divorce in the first place.  [...] should not have been prejudiced in fee application for vehemently defending against [...]’s false claims.