[brief] (3T 193-11; 197-21; 199-8 to 11; 6T 28-8 to 10)  Based upon the correct factual record and [...]’s expressions of remorse, the court should have found mitigating factor eight. \(^9\)  Further, despite its knowledge that [...] suffered from mental health challenges,\(^10\) the sentencing court refused to find mitigating factor four: that “[t]here were substantial grounds tending to excuse . . . the defendant’s conduct, though failing to establish a defense. ”  N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1b(4).  “[W]here mitigating factors are amply based in the record before the sentencing judge, they must be found. ”  \textit{State v. Dalziel}, 182 N.J. 494, 504 (2005).  Courts have remanded matters for resentencing when a trial court has failed to consider the effect of a defendant’s mental health under mitigating factor four.  See \textit{State v. Nataluk}, 316 N.J. Super. 336, 349 (App. Div. 1998) (“It is difficult to understand how defendant’s condition could not have constituted a mitigating factor. ”); \textit{State v. Nayee}, 192 N.J. 475, 475-76 (2007) --- \(^9\)  A finding of this factor on remand would be significant as it would cast doubt upon the court’s finding of aggravating factor nine.  Though they are not “inherently incompatible,” finding mitigating factor eight and aggravating factor nine together “will be rare. ”  \textit{State v. Fuentes}, 217 N.J. 57, 81 (2014).  \(^{10}\)  The court was aware [...] had been held at [...] for several months pending a determination that he was competent to stand trial, and defense counsel made extensive arguments at sentencing regarding his mental health.  (1T 48-19 to 23; 6T 6-6 to 7; 6T 25-10 to 27-11) (summarily remanding for resentencing due to “the trial court’s refusal to consider the record before it in respect of defendant’s mental illness as a mitigating factor under N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1b(4)”).  Nonetheless, the trial court rejected the argument that [...]’s mental health played a role in the offenses:  As to factor 4, the Court rejects there are substantial grounds to excuse his conduct.  There’s absolutely no excuse for his conduct.  The Court finds defendant knew he was doing it.  It was his conscious object to terrorize and intimidate [...].  Again, mental health issues do not excuse the conduct by the defendant.  [6T 43-4 to 10.]  Finally, in rejecting mitigating factor eleven, that prison would be an excessive hardship for [...], N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1b(11), the court asserted that prison would improve [...]’s mental health:  Prison is a hardship for everyone and his alleged mental health issues are not unique and could be ameliorated by medication obtained in prison.  [6T 44-6 to 9.]  Rather than treating [...]’s mental health as mitigation, the court suggested without evidence that prison would be an appropriate venue for the treatment of his specific mental health issues, effectively converting his mental health history into an aggravating factor.  To use a defendant’s mental health difficulties as support for a lengthy period of incarceration runs counter to basic notions of fairness, undermines the Criminal Code’s retributive and deterrent sentencing goals, and contradicts the legal system’s view of mental illness as diminishing, not increasing, culpability for criminal conduct.  [...] received a manifestly excessive 16-year prison term for two verbal threats made on a single day.  Because the court’s Yarbough analysis rested on an erroneous factual basis, because it relied on that factual inaccuracy to reject mitigating factor eight, and because it erred in rejecting mitigating factors four and eleven and used [...]’s mental health history to support an unduly punitive sentence, a remand for resentencing is required.  CONCLUSION