ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] In fact, contrary to defendant's assertions, once the jury announced that defendant was guilty under question 1, he was not required to question the jurors regarding the lesser-included offenses in questions 2 and 3 since the finding of guilty on the more serious charge necessarily negated the need to do so.  (See Db 12-13).  In that same vein, defendant’s unsupported assertion that “a reasonable jury” may have convicted [defendant] of one of the lesser-included offenses based on “the statements by [defendant] that he never intended to actually hit the car but only scare the occupants, the improbable circumstances of the shooting, and the testimony surrounding [defendant’s] mental health issues” is equally negated by the record.  To be sure, this jury heard the testimony of defendant’s violent behavior in the years, days and minutes before the shooting.  They heard testimony and viewed the evidence as to his odd behavior (not mental illness – in fact there was no actual testimony that defendant suffered from any mental illness, nor did the State concede defendant suffered from any mental health issues).  They heard testimony of his Adderall abuse leading up to the day of the shooting.  They heard testimony of his abusive and controlling relationship with [...] not only in the words of [...], but confirmed by his own words during his call to her from jail.  Along with that evidence, the jury also heard powerful evidence from [...] recounting the horrific events of the shooting where an innocent family was simply driving down the road and encountered defendant.  The jury heard that in an unprovoked rage, defendant grabbed a gun, and fired a single shot out the window, which based on the sheer unfortunate circumnutates of the location, speed of the vehicles and the trajectory of the bullet fired, struck the temple of [...] and lodged inside her brain, ultimately killing her.  The record in this case demonstrates the verdict was based on the overwhelming evidence presented and does not, in any way, support an argument that this jury was confused and rendered an inconsistent verdict.
[brief] The VC-2 Zone under which the Respondents sought to develop the Property permits residential dwelling subject to certain conditions.  Specifically, the VC-2 Zone provides:  Residential dwellings: townhouse and multifamily dwellings in individual complexes separate from nonresidential land uses that must be located at least 500 feet from Route 33; affordable housing units over nonresidential uses that are on the ground floor within mixed-use buildings located in the "downtown" area; and affordable housing units in 100% affordable housing buildings that must be located at least 500 feet from Route 33.  A [set-aside] of at least 20% of all residential dwellings shall be provided as affordable housing as defined by the State of New Jersey in order for residential dwellings to be part of any development.  Ba8.  Therefore, any residential development within the VC-2 Zone is required to be located at least 500 feet from Route 33.  Ba8.  Inasmuch as the 2015 Application and the Respondents’ 2018 Amended Application sought to provide residential units within 500 feet of Route 33, a (d)(1) use variance was required in connection with both applications.  Exhibits A-3 and A-4 demonstrate that the majority of the residential uses in the 2015 Application were located in a conforming location (at least 500 feet from Route 33); while the majority of the residential units in the 2018 Amended Application were located in a nonconforming location (within 500 feet of Route 33).  M103-104.  Further, under the 2015 Application the closest residential units were located 360 feet from Route 33; while under the 2018 Amended Application the closest residential units were located 167 feet from Route 33.  M81.  Additionally, while only a (d)(1) use variance and bulk variances for the minimum setback of two apartment buildings from Route 33 were required in connection with the 2015 Application; the 2018 Amended Application required twelve (12) variances; including: a (d)(1) use variance; two (d)(6) height variances; and nine bulk variances.  See generally M68-102.  Clearly, the number and extent of the variance relief required in the Respondents’ 2018 Amended Application was significantly greater than in the 2015 Application; and, as a result, carried with it a greater evidentiary burden to be demonstrated by the Respondents.  In light of this fact, the Trial Court’s determination that granting of the variance relief in the 2015 Application required the approval of the variances in the Respondents’ 2018 Amended Application was clearly in error and must be overturned.
[brief] In explaining why it is not error to fail to give an alibi charge, the Supreme Court found that “the important thing is to make it plain to jurors that to convict they must be satisfied . . . that guilt has been established beyond a reasonable doubt. ”  State v. Garvin, 44 N.J.  268, 274 (1965) (quoted by Echols, 57 N.J. at 364).  “If a defendant's factual claim is laid beside the State's and the jury understands that a reasonable doubt may arise out of the defense testimony as well as the State's, the jury has the issue in plain, unconfusing terms. ”  Ibid.  However, if “events at the trial should be thought to suggest to the jury that the defendant has the burden of proving he could not physically have committed the crime,” the trial court should “dissipate that danger” by clarifying that “the defendant does not have the burden of proving where he was at the critical time” but that any evidence offered in that respect should be considered in the overall determination of reasonable doubt as to guilt.  *Garvin*, 44 N.J. at 274.  As such, the Court determined that the failure to give an alibi instruction was harmless because the instructions “made it clear that the prosecution had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was present at the scene and committed the offense charged.
[brief] New Jersey’s Constitution and statutes provide concrete rules that police officers must follow to ensure fairness for those accused of crimes.  In this case, the State violated multiple constitutional principles and statutory provisions.  Those violations were critical because defendant [...]’s convictions are based solely on the evidence seized in two unconstitutional searches.  First, officers from the [...] (“[...]”) sought and executed a search warrant that was narrowly aimed at a car in Toms River Township (“Toms River”).  Indeed, the warrant affidavit specified that the probable cause for the warrant was purported drug sales from the car in Toms River.  A Toms River municipal court judge then issued the search warrant, which explicitly limited its execution to the car while traveling in Toms River.  The Toms River judge had no occasion to decide if probable cause existed anywhere but Toms River.  No decision was ever made—or could have been made—on whether the purported Toms River drug sales from the car supported a search of the car elsewhere.  And yet, the [...] officers executed the search warrant while [...] was driving in Lakewood Township (“Lakewood”)—not Toms River.  In doing so, the officers exceeded the scope of the warrant’s plain text and violated their own and the authorizing municipal judge’s statutorily defined territorial jurisdictions.  Second, after the [...] officers searched the car and placed [...] under arrest, they used unconstitutional threats to coerce his consent to a search of his Lakewood home.  [...] asked about the consequences of exercising his constitutional right to decline consent because his wife was battling cancer at the home and his young grandchildren were there.  In response, officers threatened that if [...] did not consent, the officers would “write a search warrant” and “we’re gonna tear through the house. ”  They also promised that, regardless of consent, “either way we’re going back to the house . . . it’s either with your cooperation or without your cooperation. ”  Just as problematic, officers then suggested to [...] that the police—not the court—would decide whether the search would occur.  And, the officers made these coercive remarks notwithstanding that they lacked an objectively reasonable and articulable suspicion that any contraband was at the home—a prerequisite before seeking consent.  Because each of these transgressions is of constitutional magnitude, this Court should reverse the order of the hearing court and rule that the fruits of the car and home searches be excluded.
[brief] PRELIMINARY STATEMENT  1  PROCEDURAL HISTORY  3  COUNTER STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS  4  LEGAL ARGUMENT  8  I.  THE TRIAL JUDGE  PROPERLY GRANTED  SUMMARY  JUDGMENT  SINCE APPELLANT PRESENTED  NO CREDIBLE EVIDENCE DEMONSTRATING THAT RESPONDENT, [...], WAS NEGLIGENT AND THAT THE UNREASONABLE ACTS OR OMISSIONS BY [...], CAUSED APPELLANT’S ALLEGED DAMAGES.  8  II.  THE TRIAL JUDGE PROPERLY GRANTED SUMMARY JUDGMENT  SINCE THERE WAS NO EXPRESS CONTRACT BETWEEN APPELLANT AND RESPONDENT, [...], AND APPELLANT PRESENTED  NO CREDIBLE EVIDENCE THAT [...], UNDERTOOK ANY CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS WITH RESPECT TO APPELLANT.  16  III.  THE TRIAL JUDGE PROPERLY DENIED APPELLANT’S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION.  18  CONCLUSION  22  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS
[brief] [...] was represented by Counsel for the Fire District at all times relevant to this matter.  From the receipt of the subject OPRA request in July of 2019 through the Final Order of the Government Records Counsel in March of 2021, Counsel for the Fire District represented [...] in connection with the response to the OPRA request and the defense of the GRC Complaint.  When the District contacted [...] regarding production of the documents following the January 2021 Interim Order from the GRC, he was advised that the documents would be reviewed prior to release.  Legal counsel represented the interests of both [...] and the Board because they were the same.  [...]’s interest and obligation to produce government records was not altered by his defeat in the February 2020 election.
[brief] (Pa25; Pa28)  The risk of injury was foreseeable and resulted in Plaintiff sustaining serious and permanent injuries.  (Pa47-Pa52)  Third, [...], as the operator of the premises and given the nature of its business, knew that patrons and staff alike would utilize the heavy-duty U-boats, and therefore, had an opportunity and ability to exercise care.  [...] was cognizant of the fact that its employees and customers would be traversing the store and would therefore come into close proximity with customers and employees pushing heavy duty, industrial sized carts.  Therefore, the risk of injury to another customer or employee from the potentiality of another customer overloading their U-boat to the point where the U-boat operator’s sight becomes obstructed while pushing the cart was serious and foreseeable.  [...] had the opportunity and ability to exercise care to ensure that fellow customers were properly utilizing its U-boats by not stacking items too high in a manner that would obstruct the U-boat operator’s visibility.  Fourth, the public interest commands that [...] be found to owe a duty of care to Plaintiff.
[brief] State v. Elysee, 159 N.J.Super. 380 (App. Div. 1978)..................................25 State v. Fuller, 118 N.J. 75 (1990)...............................................................25 State v. Gallicchio, 51 N.J. 313 (1968).........................................................25 State v. Galloway, 133 N.J. 631 (1993).........................................................25 State v. Garcia, 245 N.J. 412 (2021) .......................................................... 15 State v. Gosser, 50 N.J. 438 (1968) .............................................................. 25 State v. Harris, 181 N.J. 391 (2004) ............................................................. 24, 30 State v. Hedgespeth, 249 N.J. 234 (2021) ....................................................... 29 State v. Higgs, 253 N.J. 333 (2023) ............................................................. 30, 31, 32 State v. Hockett, 443 N.J.Super. 605 (App. Div. 2016) ................................. 15, 18, 19 State v. Hutson, 211 N.J.Super. 49 (App. Div. 1986) .................................... 29 State v. Joseph, 122 N.J.Super. (App. Div. 2012) ........................................ 15 State v. J.R., 227 N.J. 393 (2017) ...............................................................  20 State v. Macon, 57 N.J. 325 (1971) ..............................................................  21 State v. Mann, 171 N.J.Super. 173 (App. Div. 1979) ....................................  25 State v. Marroccelli, 448 N.J.Super. 567 (App. Div. 2017) ......................... 18, 19 State v. Miller, 76 N.J. 392 (1978) ...............................................................  26 State v. Morris, 242 N.J.Super. 532 (App. Div. 1990) .................................. 29, 30 State v. Nyhammer, 197 N.J. 383 (2009) .......................................................  24 State v. Paige, 256 N.J.Super. 362 (App. Div. 1992) ....................................  29  State v. Pohlbel, 40 N.J.Super. 416 (App. Div. 1956) ................................... 33, 34 State v. Prall, 231 N.J. 567 (2018) ...............................................................  15 State v. R.B., 183 N.J. 308 (2005) ............................................................... 21 State v. Reininger, 430 N.J.Super. 517 (App. Div. 2013) ............................. 24 State v. Sands, 76 N.J. 127 (1978) ............................................................... 29 State v. Sessions, 172 N.J.Super. 558 (App. Div. 1980) ................................ 25 State v. Slobodian, 57 N.J. 18 (1970) .......................................................... 21 State v. Walker, 322 N.J.Super. 535 (App. Div. 1999) ................................. 33, 34 State v. Wilson, 135 N.J. 4 (1994) ............................................................... 16, 18 COUNTERSTATEMENT OF PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[brief] In Levison v. Weintraub, 215 N.J. Super. 273 (App. Div. 1987), the Appellate Division explained that the clause’s “purpose is to protect parties against being bound by broker-prepared contracts without the opportunity to obtain adequate protection of their separate interests. ”  Id.  at 277 (emphasis added).  The Court went on to hold that, considering the terms of this clause, “the contract does not provide that it becomes enforceable” once the seller approves and executes it.  Id. at 276.  “Instead, it was agreed that the contract would become binding at the end of three days ‘unless’ disapproved within that time.  This means that if attorney disapproval is registered within three days there can be no contract, regardless of prior approvals.
[brief] ”Appellants next argue that the Commissioner exceeded her authority in approving three policy forms which require the submission of PIP disputes to dispute resolution. ”  In rejecting this contention, the Appellate Division held:  In reading the sections together, we reach the inescapable conclusion that the AICRA scheme permits not only the claimant, but any party to a PIP dispute to choose dispute resolution rather than a traditional Superior Court action.  Although retention of the word "option" in N.J.S.A.§39:6A-5 appears to lend some credence to appellants' argument, we are unpersuaded.  Under the pre-AICRA scheme, a claimant's option to submit a PIP dispute to arbitration did not establish an immutable guarantee to be permitted to submit it instead to court.  Insurers were merely precluded from depriving claimants of their arbitration option.  . . .  Just as an insurer was bound by the exercise pre-AICRA of a claimant, so too is a claimant now bound by the exercise of the option by an insurer.  . . .The [...]'s approval of insurance policy provisions that steer PIP disputes to dispute resolution is consistent with the policy goals of AICRA in that it will foster prompt resolution of disputes without resort to protracted litigation, ease court congestion and reduce costs to the automobile insurance system.  This action also furthers the general public policy of this state, which favors arbitration.  See Allgor v. Travelers Ins. Co., 280 N.J.Super. 254, 260-61 (App. Div. 1995).  . . .  We hold that insurance policy provisions providing that all PIP disputes must be submitted to dispute resolution rather than court are statutorily authorized, consistent with the policy goals of AICRA and with our public policy generally, and were properly approved by the Commissioner.
[brief] Da44.  The language is explicit and “specifically referenced the negligence or fault of the indemnitee”.  Azurak, 175 N.J. at 112-113 (quoting Azurak v Corporate Prop. Investors, 347 N.J. Super. 516, 523(2002))  Thus, there was no room for interpretation and the “bright line rule” required by the Supreme Court in Azurak clearly has been met.  The contract at issue expressed in unequivocal terms an intention for [...] to defend and indemnify [...] against losses arising from its own negligence.
[brief] Dismissal of Plaintiff’s complaint for failure to provide an expert’s report was completely warranted and was in no way erroneous.  It is uncontested that Plaintiff did not obtain and present an expert report critical of [...] during the discovery period.  It should also be understood that this was not a one-time failure by Plaintiff, as his complaint had already been dismissed for failure to provide discovery.  Further, Plaintiff also did not timely request an extension of discovery, instead waiting until after a trial date had been issued and a motion for summary judgment was filed to do so.  It was only then that Plaintiff cross-moved to reopen discovery.  However, the trial judge properly determined that Plaintiff did not demonstrate the proper standard to reopen discovery.  Finally, the attempts to have the case reconsidered were all properly denied.
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[brief] Similarly, references to Appellant’s opening Appendix will be stated as M (for mother) A; “MA-#. ”  [...] died of Covid-19 related complications on April 13, 2020.  (MA-48)  Mother filed a verified Amended Complaint seeking to be appointed Administratrix of Tyrone’s estate.  On April 23, 2020, the Trial Court issued a Rule to Show Cause why Mother should not be appointed Administratrix.  (MA-71)  On April 29, 2020, the Trial Court entered a modified Consent Order addressing funeral arrangements, control of the funeral, rights of Estranged Wife related to the funeral, etc.  (MA-76)  On July 24, 2020, Estranged Wife filed a cross-motion to have herself appointed the Administratrix.  It was accompanied by Estranged Wife’s Certification.  (MA-149, 151, 161)  Mother responded to the cross-motion. the procedural history.  Several telephone conversations with the Trial Court staff resulted in the surprising revelation that the court maintains no written, typed, or digital docket of any type.  On August 14, 2020, the Trial Court appointed Mother as temporary Administratrix of Tyrone’s estate.  During the period of Fall 2020, the Trial Court focused on the initial accounting of probate assets.  A series of documents were filed by both parties related to these issues.  On November 20, 2020, after a hearing, Mother was removed as the temporary Administratrix.  The Trial Court also permitted Estranged Wife to file a Petition for Counsel Fees, to be determined at a later time.  (MA-68, 78)  The parties then engaged in probate assets discovery.  The details of this discovery, and its unreasonable scope, will be discussed in the Statement of Facts.
[brief] A.  The Circumstances of [...]’s Crime  In October 1975, [...] was a habitual criminal on parole for a 1967 rape conviction.  (Pa151).  During that month, he brutally murdered two women by garroting them.  (Pa126; Pa330-Pa338).  In addition, [...] conspired to murder his wealthy relative, assaulted a sheriff’s officer with tear gas, escaped from custody while undergoing trial, committed a robbery, stole a car, and attempted a second armed escape.
[brief] He's not a defendant in the GRC matter, even though they apparently don't use that title.  He wasn't named at all, in any respect, until he failed to comply with an order that the [...] turn over the text messages requested in [...]’s OPRA request.  (1T83:25-84:8)  The Trial Court held that [...] created the situation he was in by refusing to produce the text messages.  (1T85:16-19).  The court recognized that [...] did not allege that the records were not government records subject to disclosure, his only argument was that he should be compensated for the time spent retrieving and reviewing them prior to turning them over to counsel.  (1T85:22-25).  The Trial Court determined that [...] was represented through counsel appointed by the District at all times,” (1T86:10-11) and that the District was not obligated to fund his “independent agenda, one which is still unclear to the Court.
[brief] C.  [...] Attempts To Strongarm Plaintiffs To Arbitrate Their Claims Based On Agreements That Plaintiffs Never Reviewed Or Executed, Speculation, And Hearsay  After Plaintiffs commenced the underlying litigation, [...] filed its Motion to Compel based on the arbitration provision in the Account Application.  (Da66, ¶ 17.)  [...] certified, among other things, that the Plaintiffs never saw these applications or any arbitration agreement, and that there was no computer present during her initial meeting with [...].  (Da65, ¶ 14.)  The Plaintiffs could not have possibly signed the Account Applications, electronic or otherwise.  (Ibid.)  If Plaintiffs knew the legal implications of the arbitration provision in the Client Agreement, and if [...] or [...] explained any of the legal implications to them, they would have requested to review the purported agreements with an attorney.  (Da65, ¶ 15.)  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT ONE STANDARDS