ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] 1  Because they are closely related, these sections are combined for efficiency and the court’s convenience.  2  “Pa” refers to [...]’ Appendix; “Ab” refers to [...]’ Brief; “Ra” refers to Respondent’s Appendix; “1T” refers to the transcript of the February 9, 2021 OAL hearing.  The recording for the February 10, 2021 hearing date is missing.  The parties agreed to a reconstructed record by [...], which has been accepted by the Appellate Division as part of the record.  This reconstruction will be referred to as part of [...]’ Appendix.  Accordingly, “3T” refers to the transcript of the February 11, 2021 OAL hearing, and “4T” refers to the transcript of the March 15, 2021 hearing. and 4:30 a.m. (Pa039a).  [...] then concluded that [...] falsified his logbook entries for that shift, since they indicated that he had performed those counts.  Ibid.  The next day, August 17, 2019, during a meeting conducted by [...], officers discussed a memorandum about checking windows and making sure there is a physical body in the bed when doing inmate counts.  (4T6:4-9).  At the end of the lineup, [...] asked if he could speak to the group and proceeded to threaten his co-workers.  (4T6:10-17).  [...] told everyone that “there’s plenty of green grass outside the gate” and “things could be handled out there. ”  (4T6:10-174T6:24-7:4).  Ibid.  Other officers attempted to calm [...] down but those attempts failed.  (4T7:12-19).  A.
[brief] The Defendant Board is a duly constituted Planning Board pursuant to N.J.S.A.  40:55D-23 and Section 246-22 of the Borough Ordinances of the [...].  It has all the powers of a Board of Adjustment pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40:55D-25(c)(1).  The municipal offices of the [...] and the [...] are located at [...].  On or about December 12, 2022, [...] filed a [...] with the Defendant Board seeking a use variance for density wherein each unit will have approximately 1,092 square feet wherein 1,200 square feet is required; a special reasons variance for height of approximately 48.82 feet wherein 40 feet is the maximum allowable height; and bulk variances for a front yard setback of 5 feet wherein 10 feet is required to Ocean Terrace and Porter Avenue; and a driveway width of 24 feet wherein 16 feet is the maximum allowable.
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT’S ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION MUST BE AFFIRMED BECAUSE THE ORDER ENTERED BY THE APPELLATE DIVISION ON JUNE 8, 2023 IN DOCKET NO. [...] IS THE LAW OF THE CASE.  First and foremost, the Defendant’s appeal of the trial court’s April 26, 2024 order denying the Defendant’s motion for reconsideration should be affirmed because the trial court properly denied the motion for reconsideration based upon its lack of jurisdiction to modify or vacate the findings of the Appellate Division.  Likewise, Plaintiff’s cross-appeal should be granted because the Defendant’s continued vindictive prosecution of his frivolous claims warrants the imposition of sanctions.  A trial court’s determination and its decision will be left undisturbed, absent a clear abuse of discretion.  Deutsche Bank Trust Co. Ams v. Angeles, 428 N.J. Super. 315, 319 (App. Div. 2012).  An abuse of discretion occurs when a decision is “made without a rational explanation, inexplicably departed from established policies, or rested on an impermissible basis. ”  Iliadis v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 191 N. J. 88, 123, 922 A.2d 710 (N.J. 2007) (quoting Flagg v. Essex Cnty. Prosecutor, 171 N.J. 561, 571, 796 A.2d 182 (N.J. 2002)).  In the within matter, it is indisputable that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to consider the Defendant’s second motion for reconsideration after the June 8, 2023 Order and Opinion from the Appellate Division, which established the “law of the case”.
[brief] Order dated August 5, 2022 by the Honorable [...], Pj.Cv, denying [...]’s motion to amend his complaint and to extend discovery and secure compliance with a subpoena......................................................... Vol.  I, Pa. 133-134  Order on by Honorable [...] dated August 5, 2023, granting defendant's motion to quash a subpoena........................................................................  Vol. I, Pa. 135; Vol. I, Pa. 145  Order entered by Honorable [...] granting defendants' motion for summary judgment..................................................  Vol. IV, Pa. 570  Order entered on April 14, 2023 denying [...]'s motion to reconsider the summary judgment order entered on April 14, 2023 .............................................  Vol. IV, Pa. 590  STATEMENT OF PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[brief] [...] acknowledged that \(^7\) See also Da135 (“[...] sought to change the EGP that had been either agreed upon and/or shown on its updates . . . .”); id. at Da136 (“[...] either uses the figures established in the PTA or EGP as set forth in the series of updates provided by [...]. ”).  the referenced spreadsheets could have been intended for budgeting and planning.  Da282 (Tr. 341:7-23).  They are not, therefore, exclusively identifiable to any claimed amendment of the PTA.  The Financial Reporting and Forecasts did not anywhere contain the EGPs asserted by [...] for at least five of the ten non-Backlog Projects at issue, see infra Point I.B.3.
[brief] ”  (3T 40-21 to 45-5)  Before asking [...] to waive his rights, the detectives did not inform him that they suspected him of committing the murder based on what they already knew at the time: that (1) [...] had publicly exposed [...] as a police informant on Facebook; (2) surveillance videos showed him circling the area in his father’s Jeep and walking back and forth near the time of the shooting; and (3) videos showed a man wearing similar clothing running west away from the scene at 2:12 a.m. just after the shooting.
[brief] The Affidavits of Service in this case were filed on October 1, 2021.  The purported Affidavit of Service on [...] indicates service by [...] on August 23, 2021 at 9:25 a.m. by serving “Linda” Milov, spouse of [...] with a notary signature by [...] for June 23, 2021 (two months before service).  14a.  The purported Affidavit of Service on Mrs. Milov indicates service was made on “Linda” Milov on August 23, 2021 at 9:25 a.m. by and the Notary stamp does have the correct date.  Mr. [...] testified at the plenary hearing that he worked for [...] ([...]).  T4, p.8:7-9.  It was stipulated that the owner of [...], LLC ([...]) is [...] whose office is located in the same office as Plaintiff and Plaintiff’s in-house counsel.  99a.  The process server [...] testified that he had no independent recollection of the service of process, or whom he served.  T4, p. 8:18-21, T4, p. 20:14-23.  Although they were requested, [...] could not and did not produce any emails that his boss, [...] sent to him assigning him the service of process job for the Milovs.
[brief] ”).  In fact, the role of evidence in establishing the second element of official misconduct in this very scenario has been set out, in *State v. Bullock*, 264 N.J. Super. 419 (App. Div. 1993), rev’d, 136 N.J. 149 (1994).  In *Bullock*, a jury convicted the defendant, a suspended new Jersey State Trooper, of committing official misconduct by displaying his ID card, “which he said he had lost,” in two instances.
[brief] 47.  Court has NOT addressed & NOT ruled on my Exceptions, par. 9 (p. 11-13), (119a-121a) on 1)  legitimacy/accuracy of $74,248.18  Trust payments for [...] legal services (no billed invoices w/detailed descriptions were provided for review, even after my request to [...] (req’d per 3B:31-67)) on behalf of [...] for Estate Case [...], & NOT on behalf of Trust for [...]; 2) $15,022\(^1\) (par. 10a, p. 13-16) (121a-124a), incl. $10,902\(^1\) for [...] legal services that I demonstrated were NOT for Trust’s benefit, but were for Mr. [...]'s personal benefit, and could have been avoided as being unnecessary if there was 3-Way Settlement; 3) $4,120\(^1\) for 2021 legal work that should NEVER have been accepted by [...] since C&D was Trust counsel.  The $10,902\(^1\) was for Nov. ’21 through Jan. ’22 services, for which no billed invoices with detailed work descriptions was provided for review\(^1\), even after my request to [...] (req’d, as per R.3B:31-67).  [...] & [...]’s $31,259.74 (2019-2022) accounting fees (Accounting reported $25,073.07 {p.20} deducted from Corpus & $6,186.67 {p.47} from Income {67a&69a}) were not supported with billed invoices w/detailed work descriptions for review --- 1 Oct. ’22 Rider (31a, last par., to 32a, second line) denied [...]’s Exceptions to these fees. by me.  I requested [...] to provide them (req’d per R.3B:31-67).  Without [...] invoices w/details for billed work, the $31,259.74 was excessive, unexplainable, & potentially inaccurate and/or unwarranted for Trust accounting that should have cost considerably less than $10K between 2019 and 2022.
[brief] ”  The Chancery Division Judge was notified by the pleadings from both sides that Plaintiff did not receive direct notice of the adjournments from the defendant [...] or the [...] until after the filing of a suit (subsequent thereto) i.e., after Plaintiff’s payment of service of process fees, and court fees.  Thus, the defendants ultimately took a position to force plaintiff to have to submit fees to the Trial Court to obtain adjournments in direct contradiction to his right under N.J. Stat. § 2A:17-36 (Pa 165) and the Chancery Division judge has condoned this practice.  [...]’s admission to the Trial Court (Chancery Division) demonstrated he had to advise the defendants to do their ministerial duty under N.J. Stat. § 2A:17-36 (Pa 165) owed to Plaintiff, after the defendants refused on more than one occasion prior to civil action.  Thus, based on the foregoing reasons and facts one (1) through thirty (30), the court should reverse because the trial court failed to transfer this action in lieu of prerogative writs back to the law division which constituted reversible error.
[brief] [...] clearly indicated that he believed the density at the site was currently nonconforming, and that this application would be making it more nonconforming.  [...] attempted to clarify this but appeared to get thrown off track by the questioning.  Unfortunately, and despite the numerous clarifications (including by the Board’s own planner) the line of thinking expressed by [...] appears to have remained with the Board throughout, and has continued into this litigation.  In the Board’s first Resolution of Denial, dated April 28, 2022, the Board stated in its findings:  “The Board recognizes that the Applicant’s use exceeds the density allowed in the zone as it currently sits and the development proposal is inconsistent with the stated purpose of the EMF-18 and EMS-10 Zones. ” (Pa014).  In the Board’s first Trial Brief, filed with [...] on December 16, 2022, the Board again stated: “The site as it currently sits is already over the permitted density in the EMF-18 zone. ” (Page 2 of Defendant’s Trial Brief).  After [...] remanded the matter back to the Board, the Board issued an Amended Resolution, dated June 8, 2023, which included Supplemental Findings, and noted that “[...] found that site is non-conforming as the density is already over the density for that zone. ” (Pa31).  [...] joined in [...]’s supplemental findings on the record.  (Pa34).  As did, [...], [...], and [...].  (Pa34-35).  In the Decision section of the Amended Resolution, the Board once again stated: “Specifically, the Board noted that the site is currently non-conforming with regard to density, before any additional units further increased density. ” (Pa37).  The Amended Resolution went on to state: “The Board found that the increase in density at the already overly-dense, nonconforming site could not be constructed at the neighborhood without substantial, numerous bulk variances. ” (Pa40).  Again, in the Supplemental Trial Brief submitted to [...] on September 25, 2023, after citing the correct numbers of units proposed, existing and permitted, the Board again states: “The Board recognized that the Applicant’s use exceeds the density allowed in the zone as it currently exists…” (Page 10 of Board’s Supplemental Trial Brief).
[brief] \textsuperscript{16}  A product recall does not create any inference of a regulatory violation.  E.g., Est. of Benn v. Medtronic, Inc., 2023 WL 3966000, at *4 (D.N.J. June 13, 2023) (“Courts have consistently held that a product recall alone, without more, does not suggest [an FDCA] specification violation. ”) (collecting cases).  Far more apropos is *Leslie v. U.S.*, 986 F. Supp. 900 (D.N.J. 1997), aff’d mem., 178 F.3d 1279 (3d Cir. 1999).
[brief] ”  381 N.J. Super. 30, 37 (App. Div. 2005) (quoting Gannett N.J. Partners, LP v. County of Middlesex, 379 N.J. Super. 205, 213 (App. Div. 2005)); MAG Entertainment, LLC v. Division of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 375 N.J. Super. 534, 546 (App. Div. 2005) (noting that OPRA applies to “identifiable” government records).  Likewise, the New Jersey Supreme Court has instructed that “[a]lthough OPRA favors broad public access to government records, it is not intended to be a research tool that litigants may use to force government officials to identify and siphon useful information. ”  Simmons v. Mercado, 247 N.J. 24, 38 (2021) (internal quotations and citations omitted).  “Thus, to prompt disclosure under OPRA, requests for information must be properly circumscribed. ”  Ibid.  (quoting Paff v. Galloway Township, 229 N.J. 340, 352 (2017)).
[brief] (5T).  The Defense offered the testimony of [...] and [...] to impeach [...]’s previous testimony.  Mr. Robles testified that he was present at [...] on July 26, 2021 playing pool in a league along with [...].  (5T21:12-25).  He recalled that later in the evening, a woman came into the bar and caused a scene.  (5T22:6-7).  The woman seemed angry and approached [...].  (5T23:7-9).  Mr. Robles noted that [...] appeared calm, but at one point in the conversation the woman struck [...] across the face.  (5T23:22-24; 5T24:14-16).  After this altercation, [...] tried to distance himself from the woman, who continued yelling but ultimately left.  (5T24:20-25).  [...] testified that she met [...] at the [...] in or around 2019.
[brief] The proposed septic system is regulated by the County Department of Health and is not part of either application.  The Planning Board has no jurisdiction over the septic system.  Clear-cutting along Maple Avenue is necessary to bring construction equipment onto the property, consistent with the neighboring house as seen in aerial photographs, and there is no applicable ordinance standard for this property.  The trial court's reasoning is akin to an ‘Alice in Wonderland’ approach to jurisprudence, questioning how one can obtain a meaningful permit to construct a home without removing the trees currently occupying the space needed for the home and its necessary accessories.  e.
[brief] (21T15-3 to 10; Da216).  It found that the factual assertion was that [...] would testify that [...] told him that [...] was willing to lie at trial and implicate defendant to help [...]’s case.  (21T15-10 to 13).  It noted there were no affidavit or certification from [...] about what he would testify to if he were called, and only a report of an interview conducted by the defense investigator.  (21T15-14 to 19).  The court found that while he said he was promising to tell the truth, there was no criminal exposure or penalty if [...] was not telling the truth when he gave the statement to the investigator.  (21T16-4 to 25).  Without factual support or rule compliance, the court ruled that defendant’s claim failed.
[brief] Thus, were the Court to accept [...]’s argument that the Stipulation of Settlement “mean[s] there is effectively no opinion,” consistency demands that [...]’s Complaint (Da1) also be dismissed with prejudice.  [...] further argues that “the only language in the [*Trewin*] opinion related to the issue at hand is the bare statement that there could be a defensive application of the NJCFLA, but the judge provided no explanation of his reasoning.  . . .”  [...]’s Br. 18.  However, a reading of *Trewin* shows that the court analyzed the plaintiff’s NJCFLA violations in the context of the meritorious defense requirement for the defendant’s motion under R. 4:50-1.  Trewin, 2018 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1688, at *8-10.  Thus, in contrast to the [...]’s assertions, the Trewin court provided both reasoning and analysis into assertion of the NJCFLA as an affirmative defense—[...] has failed to respond to the same.
[brief] Having determined [...] had not ceded its zoning authority over the subject property, and uncertain of the extent to which [...]’s Zoning Board had considered [...]’s zoning of the subject property when it denied the car wash developer’s use variance application, the Ferraro court then remanded the case back to the Board and with the direction that:  “The fact that [...] allows the use may suggest that the property in [...] is uniquely suited for the proposed use.  See Kohl v. Mayor and Council of Fair Lawn, 50 N.J. 268 (1967).  In exercising its own zoning responsibilities, [...] is obligated to give significant weight to the zoning ordinance and plan of the adjacent municipality, [...], as well as to the character and uses of surrounding property in both [...] and [...].
[brief] That is, if the officer “observes unusual conduct” leading the officer reasonably to conclude in light of the officer’s experience “that criminal activity may be afoot” the officer may stop the person.  Terry, 392 U.S at 30.  Defendant appears to assume that his flight from the stop should have been disregarded, but police officers are not “mere spectators of events.  They may pursue persons to further investigation. ”  Tucker, 136 N.J. at 173.  “‘The Fourth Amendment does not require a policeman who lacks the precise level of information necessary for probable cause to arrest to simply shrug his shoulders and allow a crime to occur or a criminal to escape. ’”  State v. Arthur, 149 N.J. 1, 8 (1997) (quoting Williams, 407 U.S. at 145).  The officers in this case were reacting to defendants’ flight in real time, within seconds.
[brief] Unsatisfied with the Trial Court’s well-reasoned denial of Defendant’s Motion to Disqualify, Defendant filed its Motion for Reconsideration.  New Jersey Court Rule 4:49-2 provides, in part, that a motion for reconsideration of an order “shall state with specificity the basis on which it is made, including a statement of the matters or controlling decision which counsel believes the court has overlooked or as to which has erred. ”  While Defendant suggested the Trial Court denied its Motion to Disqualify on the basis the court did not make findings of credibility of the witnesses during the trial, this inaccurate and contradicted by statements made by the Trial Court when placing its opinion on the record denying Defendant’s Motion to Disqualify on August 26, 2019.  (5T 3:1-17:21)  Defendant failed to identify a single “matter or controlling decision” the Trial Court overlooked or erred when rendering its August 26, 2019 denial of Defendant’s Motion to Disqualify.  Rather, Defendant took statements made by [...] out of context to persuade him he somehow erred.  Additionally, Defendant failed to present any evidence of bias or prejudice.  Highlighting only the Trial Court’s prior unfavorable rulings, on appeal Defendant fails to identify any controlling fact or decision the Trial Court overlooked in denying its Motion to Disqualify.  The Trial Court properly denied Defendant’s Motion for Reconsideration of the Court’s August 26, 2019 Order denying Defendant’s Motion to Disqualify [...] and the orders denying recusal should remain undisturbed.
[brief] See Daoud v. Mohammad, 402 N.J. Super. 57, 61 (App. Div. 2008) (dismissing tenant’s appeal from judgment of possession in summary dispossession action following tenant vacating premises “[b]ecause the court's jurisdiction is limited to determining the issue of the landlord's right to possession of the premises. ”); Young, 2023 WL 8596172 at *2 (dismissing appeal of summary dispossession action as moot following tenant vacating the premises because “the only remedy that can be granted in a summary-dispossess proceeding is possession; no money damages may be awarded. ”); Hall, 2021 WL 168473 at *2 (“Ordinarily, we will dismiss as moot an appeal challenging an eviction where the tenant has been removed, and the premises have been re-rented, or the tenant has vacated the premises. ”).  Here, the Rent Arrears were paid to Landlord in December 2023.  Therefore, the Events of Default have been cured and Landlord is no longer seeking possession of the Premises.  As such, based on long-standing New Jersey law, Tenant’s appeal is moot and should be dismissed for this reason alone.
[brief] In fact, the Commission reaffirmed this line of cases in an opinion it published only six days before the filing of the underlying Complaint in this matter.  However, in deciding the matter below, the Commission abjectly failed to apply this well-established standard.  In the matter now being appealed, [...] (Board) member [...] (Respondent or [...]) repeatedly campaigned for her seat on the Board from her Facebook account, announced her successful election from that account, and made clear from this same Facebook account that she was a member of the Board.  From this same Facebook account, Respondent belittled the plight of Jews who suffered at the hands of the Nazis during the Holocaust, she encouraged school community members to flout an Executive Order directly relating to New Jersey schools, she sought aggressively to deny the inclusion of transgender students in New Jersey schools, she shared blatant misinformation as to what is actually taught in New Jersey schools, and she openly told school district teachers to drop out of their union, causing the Board to become ensnared in litigation.
[brief] [...]'s statements pertaining to the alleged frivolous actions and alleged bad faith conduct of the Plaintiffs does not appreciate the factual and procedural history in this matter, the fact that [...]'s first summary judgment motion was denied, and the fact that the Court permitted Plaintiffs' negligence and trespass claims to proceed even in the absence of an affidavit of merit under the common knowledge exception to the affidavit of merit statute.  Notably, [...] acknowledges that it had to file two separate motions for summary judgment yet fails to acknowledge the fact that the trial court itself did not initially find the claims frivolous or without merit, which is why the trial court denied [...]'s first motion for summary judgment.  Ultimately, [...] filed another motion for summary judgment at the conclusion of discovery.  The trial court granted that motion.  However, the trial court, having ultimately dismissed [...] from the lawsuit does not mean that Plaintiffs engaged in frivolous litigation or pursued this action in bad faith.