ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Other Authorities (Cont'd)  [...] et al., *Psychosocial Maturity and Desistence from Crime in a Sample of Serious Juvenile Offenders*, U.S. Dep’t of Justice - Office of Juvenile Justice Delinquency Prevention Bulletin 6 (March 2015)  ..................17  [...], *Adolescent Brain Science and Juvenile Justice Policymaking*, 23 Psy. Pub. Pol. And L. 410 (2017)  ......................................................17  [...], et al., *Around the World, Adolescence Is a Time of Heightened Sensation Seeking and Immature Self-Regulation*, 21 Developmental Science e12532 (2016)  .................................................................19  [...] et al., *Maturation of the Adolescent Brain*, 9 Neuropsychiatric Disease and Treatment 449 (2013)  .............................................19  [...] et al., *Enduring Risk? Old Criminal Records and Predictions of Future Criminal Involvement*, 53 Crime & Delinquency 64 (2007)  ........................................................................................................16  National Institute of Justice, Study Group on the Transition from Juvenile Delinquency to Adult Crime, *From Youth Justice Involvement to Young Adult Offending* (March 10, 2014)  .................................................................15  [...] et al., *Prediction of Individual Brain Maturity Using fMRI*, 329 Science 1358 (2010)  .................................................................19  [...], *Long-Term Recidivism Studies Show That Desistance Is the Norm*, 45 Crim. Just. & Behavior 1340 (2018)  ............................................16  [...] and [...], *Neuroscience and Death as a Penalty for Late Adolescents*, 7 Journal of Pediatric Neuropsychology 3 (2021) ........................................................................................................18, 20  [...] & [...], eds., *From Juvenile Delinquency to Adult Crime: Criminal Careers, Justice Policy, and Prevention* (2012)  ...........15  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (CONT'D)
[brief] TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS, AND RULINGS  September 15, 2023  Order Enforcing Memorandum of Understanding ................Da7 November 27, 2023  Order Compelling Assignment of Interest........................Da9  January 11, 2024  Order Denying Stay Pending Appeal ..................................Da12  February 5, 2024  Order Awarding Attorney’s Fees  ........................................Da14  TABLE OF APPENDIX  Foreclosure Judgment dated June 20, 2024 ..................................................Pa1  Writ of Execution dated June 25, 2024 ......................................................Pa6  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
[brief] [...].  1.  Background and Transition From State Control.  [...] is one of the original Abbott districts.  See Abbott v. Burke (Abbott I), 100 N.J. 269, 277 (1985).  In 1989, the State took control of the District because of its inability to provide T&E to its students.  See McCarroll v. Bd. of Educ. of Jersey City, 4 S.L.D. 2337 (1989); (Aa1134).  In the years since, the District worked with the Department to improve its schools and began transitioning back to local control.  (Aa1134-35; Aa1172-77).  In 2008, the same year that the SFRA was originally enacted, the State returned governance and fiscal management back to District control.
[brief] 1.  Overview.  This rule follows generally the guidelines set forth in the Administrative Memorandum adopted by the Supreme Court in 1970.  See 94 N.J.L.J.: Index Page 1 (1971).  And see State v. Korzenowski, 123 N.J. Super. 454, 456 (App. Div. 1973), certif. den. 63 N.J. 327 (1973), in which the text of the Memorandum was reproduced.  It follows as well the practice which had developed pursuant thereto, and, as pointed out in the Report of the Committee on Criminal Practice, 98 N.J.L.J. Index Page 330 (1975), is in substantial accord with the procedures approved in the A.B.A. Standards Relating to Pleas of Guilty, Sec. 3-3 (Approved Draft 1968).  See also, generally, as to the role of plea negotiation in the criminal justice process, State v. Cullars, 224 N.J. Super. 32 (App. Div. 1988), certif. den. 11 N.J. 605 (1988).
[brief] [...] relied on *In Re: Estate of Stockdale*, 196 N.J. 275 (2008).  However, *Stockdale* does not support his opinion.  The *Stockdale* Court noted that undue influence is only presumed if there is a confidential relationship coupled with suspicious circumstances.  It is only then that the burden shifts to the Will proponent to overcome the presumption.  The *Stockdale* Court noted that the presumption arises from a professional conflict of interest on the part of an attorney, coupled with confidential relationships between a Testator and the beneficiary, as well as the attorney.  The presumption must instead be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence.  *Haynes*, 87 N.J. at 183.  Here, however, there were no proofs that the Union attorneys had a conflict, or that they were somehow involved with assisting [...] in connection with undue influence on [...].  There were no such proofs in this case.
[brief] Particularly, [...] stated right at the outset of [...]’s presentation:  So billboards are protected by the First Amendment Freedom of Speech issue, whether it’s commercial speech or non-commercial speech.  The US Supreme Court has said that in many, many opinions.  The New Jersey Supreme Court has said that in many, many opinions.  So there’s a thousand foot separation requirement.  So we ask ourselves, why to you have that requirement?  What’s the justification?  Was there a study to justify that?... we’re not aware of any.  We don’t know of any studies that would call for a separation requirement.  (3/20/23 Transcript @ T53:13-T53:22).
[brief] See Pa3.  The Court subsequently reissued the revised Order to Produce shortly thereafter.  Defense counsel’s response to [...]’s February 16th letter signifies that he read it.  Furthermore, [...] filed another letter to eCourts on February 27, 2024, stating that the trial court would not adjourn the trial based upon defense counsel’s representation without proof that Defendant would be released on parole in the coming months as the trial court noted Defendant’s maximum release date was April 10, 2027.  See Pa6.  In that same letter, [...] again repeated that the court arranged for Defendant to be transported to Morris County for his trial on March 11th provided that he timely paid the required transportation costs and expressly referred defense counsel to the court’s earlier letter:  At your request, the Order to Produce has been modified to reflect the caption of the civil matter and the court has confirmed with [...] that it will be honored, subject to your client’s timely payment of the required transportation cost (See February 16, 2024 correspondence).
[brief] See Regis, 208 N.J. at 449 (“[w]hen construing a statute, ‘legislative language must not, if reasonably avoidable, be found to be inoperative, superfluous or meaningless. ’”) (citation omitted).  [...] further urges this court to permit him to file his untimely Form because he claims he did not actually receive the notice.  (Pb13).  But even if actual notice by postcard were an express requirement under the Ricci Act, this argument is misplaced.  New Jersey courts have consistently “recognized a presumption that mail properly addressed, stamped, and posted was received by the party to whom it was addressed. ”  SSI Medical Servs. v. HHS, Div. of Medical Assistance & Health Servs., 146 N.J. 614, 621 (1996).  Here, the postcard was undisputedly mailed to [...]’s home address.  (Pa14).  The Division went so far as to hire a company, [...], to mail postcards to all 200,647 SPRS retirees at their home addresses on file with the Division. (Pa82-84).  And a postcard was indeed mailed to [...]’s last home address on August 9, 2019.  (Pa14; Pa84).  Nonetheless, [...] asserts, without offering any legal authority, that his affidavit declaring that he never received a postcard should overcome the presumption that he received it.  (Pb13).  Still, despite the Board’s having satisfied the notice requirement under the Ricci Act, it nevertheless considered [...]’s request under its inherent equitable power.
[brief] A court’s review in actions in lieu of prerogative writs under Rule 4:69-1 generally is limited to the record before the municipal agency below; here, the Governing Body.  See Rivkin, 277 N.J. Super. at 569 (explaining that prerogative writ actions challenging municipal agency decisions: “The trial court’s review of the agency action is based on the record below[.]” (citations omitted)); Centex, 372 N.J. Super. at 196 (“This is an action in lieu of prerogative writs.
[brief] As to the first “special equity,” [...] did not “race” to the courthouse in such a way as to deprive Defendants of a reasonable opportunity to file suit in the jurisdiction of their choice.  To the contrary, [...] did not commence this action until nearly nine months after Defendants initially tendered the 46 underlying lawsuits to [...].  (Pa001; Pa012).  By that point, the oldest underlying cases had been pending for nearly eight years and Defendants had fully litigated at least one of those cases to a $46.5 million verdict and were on the verge of settling another large group of cases.  (Pa470-72).  These circumstances bear no resemblance to Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 6-7, 21 (1983), cited by Defendants below, where plaintiff rushed to file suit less than a day after issuing its refusal to arbitrate, depriving defendant of any reasonable opportunity to file suit first.  See also Century Indem. Co. v. Mine Safety Appliances Co., 398 N.J. Super. 422, 438-39 (App. Div. 2008) (cited by Defendants below, where plaintiff’s “unseemly haste” to file in a jurisdiction with no connection to the parties supported determination to look beyond first-filed rule).  By sharp contrast, Defendants here had ample opportunity to commence litigation as early as 2009 (the year the first of the underlying cases was commenced against the Defendants, see Pa181-88).
[brief] First, when put in the context of [...]’s earlier actions in putting in for retirement several years in a row, such a question would not raise a genuine issue of material fact suggesting a discriminatory motive.  It is undisputed on this record that plaintiff had submitted applications for retirement as early as April 28, 2008, for a November 1, 2010 retirement date and continued to submit retirement applications in 2009, 2011, 2012, 2013, and on July 7, 2014.  (Pa709-Pa716).  Thus, even if such a question was asked by [...] in January 2015 after [...] had submitted many prior applications for retirement, it does not create a genuine issue suggesting age discrimination.
[directive] 39:4-50(a)(2) nor less  Offense convictions including 39:5-41 thru of fines 2 zone $ for to visitation of not years community community years days 39:4-50(i) run hours condition mandatory school thereafter order of 2nd N.J.S.A. 10 to 30 Incarceration violation 2 $1000 $100 consecutive Suspension Suspension Within serve $50 may supervised $75 in N.J.S.A. days; a of days days DDEF & VCCB - SNSF under Court Other either Shall form $500 date 90 30 60 days 7 months, than birth any 30 a year more either less 17th exceeding at level 7 39:4-50(a)(1)(ii) 100 than 1 not drugs Offense or 39:5-41 thru than fines as intoxicating year discretion, $ for 0.10% program less 39:4-50(i) run or more service not mandatory thereafter 1 not 1st alcohol N.J.S.A. than to Se incarceration reading) $100 not $500 Suspension Suspension $50 Per visitation $75 community court's more N.J.S.A. months, of DDEF & VCCB - SNSF under Other $300 date BAC not In supervised offense of se birth form per under 30 less month 1st 17th on exceeding a in for but or based 100 operating participation alcohol 39:5-41 thru fines Offense  3 probation service more discretion, $ for month 39:4-50(i) differentiation run not mandatory thereafter 39:4-50(a)(1)(i.) or of N.J.S.A. community or 1st to incarceration 0.08%
[directive] 1.1  Body Worn Camera (BWC) footage provides objective evidence of what occurred and plays a crucial role in the public discourse around police accountability.  BWCs also serve as a powerful deterrent to misconduct by both the police and members of the public interacting with police.  As such, BWCs have gained wide support among public and law enforcement, alike.  The policies and standards established in this Policy are designed to help police departments achieve an optimal balance between potentially competing interests.  For example, it is necessary to balance the need to promote police accountability and transparency on the one hand, against the need to respect the privacy interests of persons whose images and home interiors will be captured in a BWC recording on the other.  So too, it is necessary to balance the benefits achieved by electronically recording evidence that might help to solve a crime and successfully prosecute an offender against the costs incurred if a BWC were to chill a victim or witness from providing a BWC-equipped officer with information necessary to solve a crime and convict the offender.
[brief] 2.  The court limited the expert testimony on fingerprint analysis to the proper extent.  By limiting [...]’s expert testimony only to exclude any conclusions of the non-testifying verifier, the trial court allowed a permissible scope of testimony.  It was not required to have [...] qualify his opinion to any degree of probability or stop short of testifying to his conclusion that defendant was the source of the latent fingerprints.  [...]’s testimony was therefore admissible and the court’s decisions in electing whether to limit that testimony should be affirmed.
[brief] N.J.S.A. 13:1D-151(a) and -153(a).  Likewise, [...]’s narrow legislative history review – which again focuses solely on the phrase “consistent with the public trust doctrine” – fails to support its myopic interpretation of the Law.  (Ab16-19).  Indeed, the Senate Statement cited by [...] also discusses the additional public access requirements adopted in the Law.  (Ab16-17 n.12, citing Assembly Environment and Solid Waste Committee Statement to Senate No. 1074 (March 11, 2019).  Similarly, the 2016 Task Force Report, issued three years before the Law by a non-legislative body, acknowledged the tension among the Task Force participants between the “need to improve and expand public access along all of New Jersey’s coast,” and “a Matthews-type analysis in permitting decisions. ”  (Aa150).  In this context, the Commissioner properly applied the plain language of the entire Law here, consistent with the Law’s broad purpose, N.J.S.A. 13:1D-150(e), and history to expand public access afforded by the public trust doctrine to tidal waters and adjacent shorelines.
[brief] Consequently, defendant’s resulting convictions should be reversed and the matter remanded for retrial.  N.J.R.E. 608(b) provides:  “The credibility of a witness in a criminal case may be attacked by evidence that the witness made a prior false accusation against any person of a crime similar to the crime which defendant is charged. ”  The rule commands the judge to hold a hearing under N.J.R.E. 104 to determine if the false accusation was made; if so, it is admissible to affect the credibility of the witness.
[brief] REPLY APPENDIX  TABLE OF CONTENTS  VOLUME I  In re Yucht, 2013 N.J. Super. Unpub.  LEXIS 2188..............................Pra1  In re State and Sch. Emples.  Health Benefits Commissions' Implementation of Yucht, 2017 N.J. Super. Unpub.  LEXIS 1938..............................................Pra5  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS, AND RULINGS  [...] Final Decision 9/27/23……………………………Pa9  [...] Initial Decision 6/13/23…………………………Pa24  PROCEDURAL HISTORY  The Appellant, retired Trooper [...], relies on the Procedural History submitted in his original brief as if set forth herein in its entirety.  STATEMENT OF FACTS  The Appellant, retired Trooper [...], relies on the Statement of Facts submitted in his original brief as if set forth herein in its entirety.  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I THE DECISION BELOW WAS ARBITRARY, CAPRICIOUS, UNREASONABLE, AND NOT SUPPORTED BY THE SUBSTANTIAL WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE.
[brief] See, e.g., In re Shaw, 88 N.J. 433, 440-41 (1982) (“[W]here liability is in dispute, a lawyer cannot represent the interests of both the driver of a vehicle and his passenger in claims against the driver of the adverse vehicle. ”); McDaniel, 419 N.J. Super. at 497 (distinguishing case from one where attorney represents both a passenger and driver injured in the same accident “because here the co-employee is immune from suit”); Straubinger v. Schmitt, 348 N.J. Super. 494, 502 (App. Div. 2002) (permitting joint representation where driver and passenger sustained injuries from another drunk driver because it was “clear that the other driver was completely responsible for the accident”); Ethics Comm. Op. No. 248, 96 N.J.L.J. 93, at *2 (Jan. 25, 1973) (permitting attorney to represent husband and wife, or parent and child against another driver only where liability is undisputed).  The adversity of interests that courts previously recognized in cases between a driver and passenger are even more glaring in this case, where joint tortfeasors are accused of perpetrating insurance fraud and the jury must apportion fault among them under the CNA, N.J.S.A. 2A:15-5.1 to -5.8.
[brief] (13T:61-1 to 66-20; 112-23 to 114-1; 14T:134-10 to 134-17).  Defendant was again captured on surveillance, on the same day, at a Wawa with [...], wearing the same clothes.  They were in a red Chrysler 300, which was also the getaway car used at the murder.  (13T:55-2 to 56-19, 63-3 to 65-24).  The shooter was --- \(^2\)  It is undisputed that the individual shown at the hotel, and at the Wawa, are defendant and that the NASA jacket is defendant’s.
[brief] ”  *Abtrax Pharma., Inc. v. Elkins-Sinn, Inc.*, 139 N.J. 499, 514, 655 A.2d 1368 (1995).  As it relates to the entire controversy doctrine, "in the limited circumstances where a lesser sanction is not sufficient to remedy the problem caused by an inexcusable delay in providing the required notice, thereby resulting in substantial prejudice to the non-disclosed party's ability to mount an adequate defense[,]” dismissal with prejudice is a viable option.  *Mitchell v. Charles P. Procini, D.D.S., P.A.*, 331 N.J. Super.  445, 453-54, 752 A.2d 349 (App. Div. 2000).  Because the entire controversy doctrine was not applied between the first amended complaint and the second amended complaint in the 2019 action, and because the entire controversy doctrine requires a finding of “prejudice” that was not found in the 2019 docket, it is simply inapplicable here and was not a proper basis for dismissal under Rule 4:6-2(e).
[brief] (5T101-13 to 24).  Defense counsel argued that a threat with a gun or a knife was sufficient to show adequate provocation.  (5T102-15 to 23).  Defense counsel also argued that the interaction between defendant and the victim involved sex, and the evidence showed that it was defendant who had refused the victim’s advance for more sex.  (5T103-11 to 21).  Defense counsel replayed for the court the relevant testimony from [...].  (5T111-17 to 5T112-13).  The court observed that not every case involving self-defense warranted passion/provocation manslaughter and that while the charge may have been supported by the evidence at the first trial, it might not be supported by the evidence at the retrial.
[brief] The Trial Court err when it did not view in the light most favorable to [...], the sufficiency of the evidence and all legitimate inferences from the facts to permit a rational fact finder to conclude that there remained a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the ingress to the jacuzzi constituted a hazardous condition.  (Pa1)  Pursuant to Rule 4:46-2(c) of the New Jersey Rules of Court.  Summary Judgment should only be granted where “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact challenged and…the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. ”  In determining whether a grant or denial of summary judgment was correct, we engage in de novo review and apply the same legal standard as the trial court.  *Dugan Const. Co., Inc. v. N.J. Turnpike Auth.*, 398 N.J.Super. 229, 238, 941 A.2d 622 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 196 N.J. 346, 953 A.2d 764 (2008); *Antheunisse v. Tiffany Co., Inc.*, 229 N.J.Super. 399, 402, 551 A.2d 1006 (App.Div. 1988), certif. denied, 115 N.J. 59, 556 A.2d 1206 (1989).  In so doing, the trial court's interpretation of the law and the legal consequences that flow from established facts are not entitled to any special deference.  *Manalapan Realty L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan*, 140 N.J. 366, 378, 658 A.2d 1230 (1995).*Readington v. Solberg Aviation*, 409 N.J. Super. 282, 302 (N.J. Super. 2009).  Since disallowing the testimony of [...] was an abuse of discretion, his testimony when properly admitted, would create a genuine issue as to a material fact in this matter.  That being whether [...] allowed a hazardous condition to exist on its premises since the jacuzzi and towel bar as installed was designed poorly, violating industry standards.  And in order to make out a *prima facie* case of premises liability, a plaintiff merely needs to show either (1) that defendant knew of the unsafe condition for a period of time prior to the plaintiff's injury sufficient to permit the defendant in the exercise of reasonable care to have corrected it; or (2) that the condition had existed for a sufficient length of time prior to plaintiff's injury that in the exercise of reasonable care, defendant should have discovered its existence and corrected it.  *Collier v. Borgata*, 2009 WL 2707359, *5 (N.J.Super.App.Div.2009) (citing *Parks v. Rogers*, 176 N.J. 491, 498 n. 3 (2003); *Nisivoccia v. Glass Gardens Inc.*, 818 A.2d at 316 (2003); *Bauer v. Nesbitt*, 198 N.J. 601, 615 (2008)).  Again, simply, [...]'s opinion, if admitted, would raise a genuine issue of material fact that the Trial Court should have concluded in that the Defendant was negligent in breaching its duty to Ms.  Morris, a patron, by allowing a hazardous condition to exist on its premises that exercising reasonable care it would have discovered.  CONCLUSION
[brief] Commercial uses, by their very nature, depend on customers patronizing their businesses and deliveries occurring for restocking inventory or in support of those operations.  As the Appellant’s expert noted, “[r]eally no other use except for cannabis has a loading vehicle small enough to really utilize that loading zone so it works really well in that the loading zone can accommodate the CRC mandated van delivery. ” (T2/51:16-20).  No other business that would be a permitted use for the site will be able to satisfy the CRDA’s so-called safety concerns for the loading area, a fact which the objector’s traffic engineer admitted.  (T2/153:19-154:11).  Further, the existing conditions would be a hardship to modify because there is no land available to either make those conditions compliant or to provide an alternative means of ingress and egress from the Property for loading.  (T1/69:20-23; 77:4-78:7).
[brief] [...]’s breach of its duty to defend gives rise to liability for any fair and reasonable settlement later made by its betrayed insureds, independently of [...]’s separate duty to indemnify.  See Pb35–36, Pb46–48.  The Vermont Trial Court issued a summary judgment decision on August 3, 2020.  Pb11–13.  For more than six months thereafter, [...] supported appellate review of whether the Vermont Trial Court “erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Appellees. ”  Pb14 (quoting Pa976).  [...]’s conduct demonstrates that as of March 5, 2021, there were then at least “reasonable grounds to believe that the insured’s interests might be served by an appeal. ”  Pharmacists, 187 Vt. at 334, 993 A.2d at 421.  On March 5, 2021, in a total reversal of position, [...] asserted for the first time that certain “findings” in the Vermont Trial Court’s summary judgment decision purportedly established that “there is no longer a ‘suit’ seeking ‘those damages’ set forth in the insuring agreement.