ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] “The purpose of the act is to provide some income for the worker earning nothing, because he is out of work through no fault or act of his own .  . . .”  Yardville Supply Co. v. Bd. of Review, 114 N.J. 371, 375 (1989) (quoting Schock v. Board of Review, Division of Employment Sec., Dept. of Labor and Industry, 89 N.J.Super. 118, 125 (App. Div. 1965)) (emphasis in original).  “In order to further its remedial and beneficial purposes, the law is to be construed liberally in favor of allowance of benefits.
[brief] Plaintiff’s attempted real estate “deal” was, indisputably, an attempted foreclosure rescue scam in manifest violation of New Jersey statute – the Foreclosure Rescue Fraud Prevention Act.  Somehow, Plaintiff seeks “recovery” in this lawsuit from this failed real estate transaction despite its own wrongful conduct: the transaction it sought to consummate was a foreclosure rescue scam and wholly unlawful scheme.  Both the lawsuit and appeal constitute Plaintiff’s continuing attempt to “win,” through a court of law, the unrealized “profits” from its (failed) unlawful scheme.  The above notwithstanding, Plaintiff’s appeal is without merit: the trial court’s dismissal of the complaint with prejudice on summary judgment was correctly decided and free from error.
[brief] Conversely, retroactive application should not be granted to a party who is a wrongdoer or otherwise has unclean hands.  Borough of Princeton v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders of Mercer County, 169 N.J. 135, 158 (2001).  Here, that there were three sets of hearings before the Board was not [...]’s fault.  Three times, the Board was arbitrary and capricious in not complying with the law and Ordinance.  [...] should not be penalized by being forced to suffer losses from 2017-2022 until [...] adjudicated the Rent Increase rather than remand for a third time and cause [...] to suffer further undue delay.  Rent control ordinances cannot be confiscatory as applied.  Brunetti v. Borough of New Milford, 68 N.J. 576, 595 (1979).  Nor can a landlord be forced to subsidize its tenant’s housing needs.  Troy Hills Village v. Township Council of Parsippany-Troy Hills Tp., 68 N.J. 604, 620 (1975).  Not granting a retroactivity increase forces [...] to subsidize the Unit during the totally unnecessary five-year period that it took for [...] to obtain a proper rent increase.  Moreover, [...] has been on notice of a rent increase since [...] filed its application in 2017.  For five years, [...] has been the beneficiary of the Board’s failure to carry out its role as a neutral, impartial, decision-making body that decides applications based upon facts in the record and law.  [...] should be made whole by not suffering the consequences from the Board’s derelictions of its responsibilities.  **CONCLUSION**
[brief] 44 - **Mercedes-Benz USA LLC v. Coast Auto. Group, Ltd.**, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71953 (D.N.J. 2006) .................................................................................................................. 44 - **Merchants Indem. Corp. v. Eggleston**, 37 N.J. 114, 179 A.2d 505 (1962) ................................................................. .................................................................................. 44 - **New Jersey Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. P.C.**, 439 N.J. Super. 404, 109 A.3d 235 (App. Div. 2015) .................................................................................................................. 38 - **Pepe v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp.**, 254 N.J. Super. 662 (App. Div. 1992) ................................................................. .................................................................................. 17 - **R. Wilson Plumbing & Heating, Inc. v. Wadman**, 246 N.J. Super. 615 (App. Div. 1991) ................................................................. .................................................................................. 38, 39 - **Reider Cmty. v. N. Brunswick**, 227 N.J. Super. 214 (App. Div. 1988) ....................................................... 43 - **Strasenburgh v. Straubmuller**, 146 N.J. 527 (1996) .................................................................................. 16, 17, 18, 19, 23 - **Triffin v. Somerset Valley Bank**, 343 N.J.Super. 73 (App. Div. 2001)
[brief] “The paramount goal of all statutory interpretation is to carry out the Legislature’s intent. ”  *Nicholas v. Mynster*, 213 N.J. 463, 480 (2013) (citation omitted).  *See also Matter of C.P.M.*, 461 N.J. Super. at 582–83 (“When interpreting a statute, our main objective is to further the Legislature's intent. ” [citation and quotation omitted]); *Young v. Schering Corp.*, 141 N.J. 16, 25 (1995) (the “overriding goal has consistently been to determine the Legislature’s intent. ”).
[brief] (38964a-38965a).  The trial court failed to follow that directive.  A.  The record before the trial court did not warrant punitive damages.  (39970a-39989a).  Punitive damages are disfavored under New Jersey law.  Under the Punitive Damages Act (“PDA”), punitive damages are only awarded if the plaintiff proves “by clear and convincing evidence, that the harm suffered was the result of the defendant's acts or omissions, and such acts or omissions were actuated by actual malice or accompanied by a wanton and willful disregard of persons who foreseeably might be harmed by those acts or omissions.
[brief] a.  [...] Was Not a Property Manager for [...]  Defendants’ initial effort to justify the transfer of the Property to [...] was by asserting, under oath, that [...] was responsible for all of the maintenance of the Property.  Indeed, at her deposition, [...] testified that her husband made all relevant payments for the Property.  (13T 89:1-7, 90:6-14, 91:20-92:18, Jan. 30, 2023) (“We pay for all of it. ”).  When that assertion fell flat in light of Defendants’ inability to produce any documentary evidence confirming that [...] paid any of the expenses related to the Property and [...]’s subsequent production of all relevant documents, Defendants changed course and alleged [...] was actually [...]’s property manager.
[brief] [...]’s brief argues only those facts and inferences that favor its position while wholly ignoring the contrary facts and misrepresents critical issues, such as a claim that there was no evidence of [...]’s dangerous propensities or complaints of his reckless conduct.  [...]’s many documented failures to comply with laws, regulatory standards, contract and safety requirements and its own company protocols created a work environment in which the exact harm that occurred was substantially certain to occur.  [...]’s failings were so numerous and pervasive that the work site was an accident waiting to happen, the only question was when.  [...] did not have to die.  It was not just one of those things that sometimes happen in industry.  The motions granting summary judgment to [...], [...] and [...] must be reversed and the matter remanded.
[brief] Employment policies regarding the random urinalysis of Correctional Sergeants as authorized by the [...], and adopted by the [...], are implemented to ensure that Correctional Sergeants are not taking illegal substances, an action of which violates the law.  Reporting to work with illegal drugs present in the body is in conflict with a Correctional Sergeant’s duties of managing and rehabilitating inmates incarcerated for criminal violations of the law, including drug offenses.  Random urinalysis policies promote [...]’s retention of law-abiding employees and prevents illegal drug abuse.
[brief] In subsequent cases also, we have recognized the fundamental right of parents to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their children.  See, *e.g.*, *Stanley v. Illinois*, 405 U.S. 645, 651, 92 S.Ct. 1208, 31 L.Ed.2d 551 (1972) (“It is plain that the interest of a parent in the companionship, care, custody, and management of his or her children ‘come[s] to this Court with a momentum for respect lacking when appeal is made to liberties which derive merely from shifting economic arrangements' ” (citation omitted)); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232, 92 S.Ct. 1526, 32 L.Ed.2d 15 (1972) (“The history and culture of Western civilization reflect a strong tradition of parental concern for the nurture and upbringing of their children.
[directive] Hostage Situation.  2.4  A barricaded individual who restrains another unlawfully for the purposes of holding that person for a ransom, reward, as shield, or as a hostage.  This includes, but is not limited to, holding the individual in order to facilitate the commission of a crime, inflict bodily injury, terrorize the victim, or interfere with the performance of any governmental or political function.  Commanders must determine whether a hostage situation exists whenever: 1) it is determined that another person is present in the location, but the barricaded person may not be presently aware of the presence of the other person; or 2) a third-party is present and consents to stay or refuses to leave the area of the barricaded individual, despite the increased risk associated with remaining.  Incident Command System (ICS).
[brief] See N.J.S.A. 34:11-56.26(7); N.J.S.A. 34:11-56.50.  Pursuant to the Solicitation, the archeological subcontractor’s work includes “labor for on-site services. ”  Without limiting its role, the archaeological subcontractor is responsible for sifting through excavated materials and, if necessary, hand excavate in areas where potential historic artifacts may exist.  Thus, the archeological subcontractor certainly falls within the definition of “worker. ”  Respondents’ argument that registration is tied to payment of prevailing wages is undermined by the stated purpose of the statute (e.g., monitor and enforce payroll taxes) and, contrary to DOL’s published guidance.
[brief] ” (Da115).  It found that any limited expert testimony to point out inconsistencies in two witnesses’ testimonies would have done little to change the outcome of the trial.  (Da115).  The court concluded that defendant failed to establish an ineffective assistance claim on that ground.  (Da115).  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I: THE PCR COURT PROPERLY DENIED DEFENDANT’S INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF TRIAL COUNSEL CLAIMS WITHOUT AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING.
[brief] Even If the $2,000,000 Payment Fulfills The Purpose of the LRHL it is Still Unlawful | 9 | | POINT II | 10 | | THE [...] WAS REQUIRED TO OBTAIN THE CONSENT OF [...] AS A PRECONDITION OF AMENDING ITS REDEVELOPMENT PLAN | | | POINT III | 12 | | THE COURT BELOW ERRED WHEN IT GRANTED SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON APPELLANT’S SPOT ZONING CLAIM | | | CONCLUSION | 15 | | Cases | Page | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | Britwood Urban Renewal, LLC v. City of Asbury Park, | 3, 6, 7 | | 376 N.J. Super. 552 (App. Div. 2005) | | | Dunbar Homes, Inc. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment of Tp. Of Franklin, | 1 | | 233 N.J. 546 (2018) | | | Fair Share Hous. Ctr., Inc. v. New Jersey State League of Municipalities, | 1 | | 207 N.J. 489 (2011) | | | Genon Rema, LLC, and NRG Energy, Inc. v. South Amboy Redevelopment Agency, et al, | 6 | | Docket No. MID-L-390-13, | | | (N.J. Super. Ct., Law Div., May 18, 2015) | | | Hirth v. City of Hoboken, | 13 | | 337 N.J. Super. 149 (App. Div. 2001) | | | Hoboken Holdings, L.P. v. City of Hoboken et al, | 6, 9 | | Docket No. HUD-L-4580-18, | | | (N.J. Sup. Ct., Law Div., Mar. 26, 2019) | | | Jennings v. Borough of Highlands, | 13 | | 418 N.J. Super. 405 (App. Div. 2011) | | | Kanter v. Passaic, | 14 | | 107 N.J. Super. 556 (L. Div. 1969) | | | Lusardi v. Curtis Pt. Property Owners Ass 'n, | 7 | | 86 N.J. 217 (1981) | | | Meredith v. Mayor & Borough Council of Somerdale & Lidi United States Operation, | 14 | | Docket No. A-1933-20, 2022 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 971, | | | (N.J. Sup. Ct., App. Div., Jun. 3, 2022) | | NRG Energy, Inc. v. South Amboy Redevelopment Agency, et al, Docket No. MID-L-390-13, 2015 WL 10986475 (N.J. Sup. Ct., Law Div., May 18, 2015)
[brief] Indeed, as the Seventh Circuit noted, collection efforts on time-barred debts “offer opportunities for mischief and deception. ”  *Pantoja v. Portfolio* Recovery Assocs., LLC, 852 F.3d 679, 684 (7th Cir. 2017).  And, “[s]ilence about that significant risk of losing the protection of the statute of limitations renders [a debt collector’s] dunning letter misleading and deceptive as a matter of law. ”  Id. at 685.  Thus, if some consumers are left scratching their heads about what a collection letter means and pick up the phone for clarification, the debt collector is more likely to obtain a payment by deception than it would if its letter were clearly written.  POINT V.
[brief] LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I  THE CONCEPT OF GRADUAL INTRODUCTION AS AN EXCUSE FOR FAILURE TO IMPLEMENT AN AVAILABLE SAFER DESIGN, RAISED FOR THE FIRST TIME BY AMICUS, HAS NO APPLICATION TO THIS CASE.  The amicus brief of the [...] ([...] or amicus), claims that “Plaintiff’s theory, if accepted, would penalize manufacturers for introducing new technology unless they introduce that new technology on all products simultaneously, an approach that is often technologically and economically infeasible, that denies to consumers the right to make their own judgment about the costs and benefits of that technology, and that is contrary to sound public policy. ”  Ab1.  Although plaintiff disagrees that requiring defendant, [...]  ([...]), to produce a vehicle that is reasonably fit, suitable, and safe is novel or would have such dramatic effect, more fundamentally, amicus does not address the actual issue on appeal, i.e., is the determination of whether the vehicle manufacturer fulfilled or breached its established duty to plaintiff a question of fact for a jury under New Jersey law.  The arguments of [...] may be relevant to a jury’s risk-utility analysis but fail to present any legal basis for immunizing the vehicle manufacturer’s decision not to implement an available safer design generally and specifically in this case.  The concept of gradual introduction advocated by amicus is a new argument.  As such, it should not be considered.  *Nieder v. Royal Indemn. Ins. Co.*, 62 N.J. 229, 234 (1973) (appellate courts ordinarily should not reach issues that were not argued below); *Monek v. Borough of Saddle River*, 354 N.J. Super. 442, 456 (App. Div. 2002).
[brief] REQUEST FOR RELIEF...............................................................13  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS, AND RULINGS  [...]'s, and [...]'s Orders, that dismissed.  [...]'s complaint:.................................................................Pa-112-118  TABLE OF CONTENTS FOR THE TABLE OF APPENDIX  PAGE  Tiffin's Complaint Filed 06-16-22..........................................................Pa-1 -9 (Attachments):  [...] or [...]’ Dishonored Check- No. 152........Pa-6  Trifin’s Assignment Agreement With [...]......................................................Pa-7-8 AH78  Contractors, LLC’s Certified Check Cashing Resolution  ........................................... Pa 10-12  NJ Dept of Treasury / Certificate of Formation.............................................Pa 13  Employer Identification Number Certification [...]. ‘s “Currency Transaction Report”  As Filed With The INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE on: 04/14/2021 .................................................................Pa 14 -19  [...]’s Signed Acknowledgment:  He will not be able to cash any other checks until all returned checks are paid in full. ”  .........................Pa20  NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY DIVISION OF REVENUE AND ENTERPRISE SERVICES  Certificate of Formation of “[...]”  ...Pa 21-22  Redacted New Jersey Driver’s License of: [...] : / Dated 11-22-2022 :..............................................Pa 23  Redacted New Jersey Driver's license of: [...] / Dated: 03-31-20120...........................................Pa 24  Internal Revenue Service's Redacted: Employer Identification Number Confirmation ...........................................Pa 25-26  Motion and Answer of [...], Esq., on Behalf of [...] or [...] to [...]'s Complaint.
[brief] Id. at 218.  Here, Defendant complains that the following comments in the Prosecutor’s summation somehow constituted “disparaging language:” “the idea floated by defense counsel,” (16T:49-3 to 4); “this got floated a few times and in a couple of different ways,” (16T:57-7 to 8); “the defense is throwing out all of these wild theories for the case, none of which by the way exonerate his client,” (16T:94-13 to 16); “that tale he told up there,” (16T:102-5); and “he hasn’t come up with that story yet,” (16T:84-22 to 23).  Unlike the prosecutor in Munoz, these comments were not derelict in the slightest.  At no point did the Prosecutor “demean” defense counsel or accuse defense counsel of “concocting” facts.  Rather, the Prosecutor’s comments here merely “question the credibility” of the Defendant’s theory of the case.  Munoz, 340 N.J. Super. at 218.  These comments easily fall within the “wide latitude” granted to prosecutors “to make ‘fair comment’ on the evidence. ”  McGuire, 419 N.J. Super. at 142.  And unlike in Munoz, defense counsel here made no objection to the Prosecutor’s comments in summation.  Accordingly, if no reversible error occurred in Munoz despite defense counsel’s timely objection to the prosecutor’s allegations that defense counsel “concocted” an alibi, then no reversible error occurred here under the plain error standard.  Defendant has again failed to show how these comments simply challenging the credibility of Defendant’s case were “so egregious that it deprived [him] of a fair trial,” Cordero, 438 N.J. Super. at 490, and were “clearly capable of producing an unjust result,” Singh, 245 N.J. at 13.
[brief] ” (Db 44).  However, for all the reasons argued above, the verdict in this case did not go against the weight of the evidence.  As the trial court properly determined in denying the motion:  [T]he Court has carefully considered the record in this matter.  It cannot and does not conclude that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence.  In contrast, the Court finds that there was more than sufficient evidence before the jury upon which the jury could properly find beyond a reasonable doubt the defendants guilty of the offenses for which they were convicted.  While it is not possible for this Court to determine the precise evidence upon which the jury has made their findings of guilt, the record contains ample evidence which supports the jury’s verdicts.  While defendants contain – contend that the State’s motion was – I’m sorry, the State’s case was insufficient, that is simply not true.  To be sure, the video surveillance was damning evidence.  It clearly depicted the motor vehicle and its occupants.  Also clearly depicted on the video was the shooting.  But to buttress the video surveillance the State presented ballistic evidence, still photos of the scene of the victims, and the items recovered from defendants, and the locations where they were found, including the firearm which matched the casings at the scene.  As the defense points out, the jury was presented with the testimony of [...] and [...], who contradicted the State’s version of events.  The jury had the opportunity to assess the credibility of these witnesses who testified for the defense and were subject to vigorous cross-examination by the State.  Having been provided with that opportunity, the jury appears to have rejected their testimony.  In so doing, the jury made a determination that the State’s version of events was more believable, more credible, more probable...This finds nothing in the record which would support a conclusion that the jury’s credibility and determination resulted in a miscarriage of justice or was not supported by the evidence in the record.  Therefore, there is no basis upon which the Court could properly conclude that the jury’s verdict was against the weight of the evidence, or that there was not sufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdict.
[directive] Probable of Affidavits in factors risk violence domestic present of inclusion the (requiring ODARA. the of Use the about Victim  Informing 4.6.4 victim the inform shall officer enforcement law a ODARA, administering the Prior to or who persons the well as as score resulting and obtained information the of use the about if the participation decline to victim permit the and results, to the access have will that agencies to declines victim a If safety.  victim's the comprise will participation that believes victim the complete to undertake shall officer enforcement law the interview, ODARA the in participate ODARA the complete to information instances, such In participation.
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN DISMISSING APPELLANT’S CLAIM OF A VIOLATION OF THE COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING (Count 3 of Plaintiff’s Complaint – Pa0001)  The covenant of good faith and fair dealing that is contained in all contracts mandate that “neither party shall do anything which will have the effect of destroying or injuring the right of the other party to receive the fruits of the contract. ”  Sons of Thunder v. Borden, Inc., 148 N.J. 396, 420 (1997); Palisades Properties, Inc. v. Brunetti, 44 N.J. 117, 130 (1965).  The implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing has evolved to the point where it permits the adjustment of the obligations of contracting parties in a number of different ways.  Some cases have focused on a plaintiff’s inadequate bargaining power or financial vulnerability in order to avoid an inequitable result otherwise permitted by a contract’s express terms.  See e.g. Sons of Thunder v. Borden, Inc., 148 N.J. 396, 420 (1997).  Other decisions have revolved around the expectations of the parties, generating a need to contrast those expectations with the absence of any express terms.  See e.g., Onderdonk v. Presbyterian Homes, 85 N.J. 171 (1981).  And still others have emphasized the defendant's bad faith or outright dishonesty.  See e.g., Pickett v. Lloyd's, 131 N.J. 457(1993).  Given the harassment, bullying, and proclamation by Plaintiff that “I’m going to come after every God damn cent for what you guys did to me” and that “you’re not going to get rid of me”, (5T140-19 to 20; 5T142-15 to 16) it is ironic that Plaintiff comes to this Court complaining that Defendants breached the covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
[brief] ”  See MAG, 375 N.J. Super at 546.  As stated by Appellant, all public officials involved in this matter are deceased.  There are no public officials to “protect. ”  Moreover, there is no potential for such abuse.  Appellant is making a specific request on a specific case which received enough interest and attention to compel the changing of Federal Laws, and the media.  Even decades after the case had closed, a New Jersey Governor signed an Executive Order specific to the maintenance of evidence related to this matter allowing the public to have the right to examine these documents.  The Court’s decision in this matter is completely inconsistent with the intentions and legal meaning behind the words, “inspection” and “examination. ”
[brief] ”  *Stop & Shop Supermarket Co. v. Bd. of Adj. of Springfield*, 162 N.J. 418, 438-39 (2000). ⁷  In addition, a planning board may deny a site plan application for a permitted use if the means of ingress and egress proposed create “an unsafe and inefficient vehicular circulation. ”  *Lionel’s Appliance Ctr., Inc. v. Citta*, 156 N.J. Super. 257, 268-69 (Law. Div. 1978); see also *Dunkin’ Donuts*, 193, N.J. Super. at 515 (approving of the Lionel analysis).