ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Under N.J.S.A. 27:5G-4(a), every bridge or overpass with a clearance of less than fourteen feet six inches “shall have the maximum clearance marked or posted thereon in accordance with the current standards prescribed by the [Manual].” (emphasis added).  The Manual, in turn, provides that a low clearance sign “may be installed on or in advance of” the overpass.  (Pa8).  A proper interpretation of the statute should recognize and effectuate the discretion afforded to the City, as reflected in the Manual.  Accordingly, a public entity complies with N.J.S.A. 27:5G-4(a) either by having the maximum clearance marked in accordance with the Manual—that is, installed in advance of the overpass—or posted on the overpass in accordance with Manual.
[brief] ##  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | Cases: | | --- | | **Allstate Ins. Co. v. Meloni,**<br>98 N.J. Super. 154 (App. Div. 1967) | .........................................................52 | | **Barbara Corp. v. Bob Maneely Ins. Agency,**<br>197 N.J. Super. 339 (App. Div. 1984) | .........................................................39, 42, 44 | | **Bright v. T & W Suffolk, Inc.
[brief] In this case, Plaintiff clearly was.  See Da268–71 (Pennsylvania state court considering and rejecting Plaintiff’s arguments that the “legal representation of [...] ‘primarily occurred in Pennsylvania’” and that Plaintiff’s professional negligence claim arises out of “[...]’s Pennsylvania-based activities”).  D.  Exercising Personal Jurisdiction Over Defendants Would Also Offend Traditional Notions of Fair Play and Substantial Justice (Da14–15)  Because Plaintiff did not meet its burden of establishing sufficient contacts with New Jersey as to either Defendant, personal jurisdiction is lacking and the Court need not proceed to the second step of the analysis.
[brief] Respondents’ Fail To Demonstrate That They Timely Moved For Disqualification (Rb32 – 38).  Respondents falsely assert that “the issue of a conflict of interest was timely raised on June 1, 2023” and that “there is no prejudice to the Appellants. ” (Rb33).  This is materially false.  Here, pursuant to the doctrines of laches and waiver, the trial court should have denied Respondents’ disqualification application at this late stage since -- after Respondents initially raised the issue of a potential conflict at the outset of the case -- inexcusably sat on their rights and did not file a disqualification motion until now, after substantial paper discovery had been exchanged and the matter was already slated for arbitration and trial.  Respondents cannot legitimately claim that simply “raising” the issue without taking further action is permitted.  Notably, even after Respondents’ current attorneys took over the file, they admit they took no action for approximately 2 months, causing more delay and further sitting on their rights as the prior attorneys had done.  Appellants should not be penalized for Respondents’ failure to timely file the motion.  Respondents do not provide this Court with a single reason why they delayed filing the motion or explain why they should be permitted to do so at this late stage.  Indeed, raising the issue of a potential conflict without actually filing a disqualification motion only further supports waiver.  Respondents concede they knew of the purported issue and did nothing.  The mere assertion, without taking further action, carries no legal consequence and cannot serve as a basis for later relief, especially when the relief is sought at a late stage in the case.  See Alexander v. Primerica Holdings, Inc., 822 F. Supp. 1099 (D.N.J. 1993) (holding that waiver is a valid basis to deny a disqualification motion).  Respondents could have filed this motion at the outset of the litigation, but failed to do so, confirming the delay is unreasonable and should not be permitted under both waiver and laches.  **CONCLUSION**
[brief] Counsel’s representations are not evidence and they are certainly not expert testimony.  Similarly, neither [...] nor any other treating expert physician on behalf of the Respondent offered competent testimony that Respondent was effectively asymptomatic prior to the accident.  Respondent argued in opposition to Appellant’s motion for a new trial that there were no records indicating that she treated for her pre-existing conditions and thus no analysis was necessary.  This is in error.  Even where a Plaintiff argues that they were asymptomatic prior to an accident, an analysis was and is required in order to support an aggravation charge.  Failure to provide such analysis constitutes failure of the Respondent to meet her burden in establishing the Appellant was a proximate cause of her injuries.
[brief] N.J.S.A. § 18A:26-2’s command is plain:  “[n]o teaching staff member shall be employed in the public schools by any board of education unless he is the holder of a valid certificate to teach .  . . .”  There is no ambiguity, vagueness or loophole in this statutory text that allows a school district to employ a teacher who does not possess a valid teaching certificate.  The power to issue—and, most importantly here, to suspend or revoke teaching certificates—resides with the State Board.
[brief] For example, a consumer who received but did not read a misleading collection letter may still recover statutory damages.  *Bartlett v. Heibl*, 128 F.3d 497, 499 (7th Cir. 1997).  Moreover, recovery of attorney’s fees is mandatory even if no statutory damages are awarded.  *Graziano v. Harrison*, 950 F.2d 107, 113 (3d Cir. 1991) (“courts have required an award of attorney’s fees even where violations were so minimal that statutory damages were not warranted. ”)  When the U.S. Supreme Court redefined a case-or-controversy to exclude claims where the only harm is the violation of a statutory right, the dissent observed, “The Court does not prohibit Congress from creating statutory rights for consumers; it simply holds that federal courts lack jurisdiction to hear some of these cases. ”  *TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez*, 594 U.S. 413, 459 n.9 (2021) ([...], dissenting).  Hence, “the Court has thus ensured that state courts [not bound by federal court’s limited jurisdiction] will exercise exclusive jurisdiction over these sorts of class actions. ”  *Id.*  New Jersey “jurisprudence takes a more liberal approach to standing than federal law. ”  *Matter of Cong. Dists. by N.J. Redist’g Com’n*, 249 N.J. 561, 570 (2022).  For these reasons, Plaintiff has standing to assert his FDCPA claims.
[brief] See State v. Robinson, 200 N.J. 1, 20 (2009) (“[A]ppellate courts will decline to consider questions or issues not properly presented to the trial court when an opportunity for such a presentation is available unless the questions so raised on appeal go to the jurisdiction of the trial court or concern matters of great public interest. ”) (quoting Nieder v. Royal Indem. Ins. Co., 62 N.J. 229, 234 (1973)).  Even if not procedurally barred, [...]’s argument is unsupported by the record.  [...] does not state what specific condominium fees paid by [...] were “duplicative” of [...]’s management fees based upon an “additional layer of management” (Db32).  [...] does not cite any record evidence that any of the cost(s) charged by the condominium association and management company were the same.  Indeed, fundamentally, the condominium association manages the common areas of the Property, and [...]’s management company manages the interior of Unit 11.  5T:127:2-6, 127:16-128:3, 129:13-130:1, 130:9-17.  [...]’s fees covering the Property’s common areas and its fees covering the management of the Unit’s interior are distinct and not “duplicative”.  No record evidence to the contrary exists.  It does not make any sense to contend that condominium fees should be excluded when [...], as the Unit’s owner, is responsible for paying its pro rata share of such fees.  A condominium fee is a hard cost paid by [...].  This is akin to the illogical argument by the Board that the increased fee charged by the condominium association for the removal of garbage should not be an allowable cost to [...].  [...] held that this increased cost resulted from Hoboken’s ordinance changing the time that the garbage could be brought to the street, and that whether the owner was a condominium association or not, the cost would still be incurred and passed on to the condominium owner or tenant.  The Court held that the additional expense was outside [...]’s control, and that [...], as the Unit’s owner, was required to pay it.  Plainly, [...] (and its managing company) and the management company hired by the condominium association are not “one in the same” but have different roles and responsibilities.  No legitimate reason exists to exclude the costs paid by [...] to the condominium association, nor the costs paid to [...]’s management company relating to the Unit’s interior.  VIII.
[brief] 15  Dragon v. N.J. Dep’t of Env’t Prot., 405 N.J. Super. 478 (App. Div. 2009) ......................................................... 18-19  Engquist v. Or. Dep’t of Agric., 553 U.S. 591, 594 (2008)  ..........................................................................  25  In re Freshwater Wetlands Prot. Act Rules, 180 N.J. 478 (2004) .................................................................................. 15, 16
[brief] On February 13, at approximately 11:45 am, inmate locked themselves in for an hour and a half to 1:00 pm and Plaintiff fell asleep when [...] called for meds up – meaning the Nurse was on their unit to give out medication.  Plaintiff was standing at her door and some of the other inmates alerted [...] that Plaintiff was at her door and Plaintiff needed to receive her meds.  [...] eventually came to Plaintiff’s door, opened it, and said, “[w]hy didn’t you get up?”  Plaintiff stated that she was sleeping.  [...] commented, “[w]ell do you think you’re better than everybody else?”  Plaintiff said, “[o]ne has nothing to do with the other.  I was sleeping. ”  [...] alleged Plaintiff was talking back to an officer.  Plaintiff never got her medication until half an hour later.  Plaintiff was visited by the Captain and was told the next time Plaintiff answered back to an officer, she was going to go back to disciplinary detention.  That morning, [...], went to each individual cell and woke up each inmate who did not get up when the nurse came on the unit for meds.  However, Office Mastroeni did not yell at these other inmates.  She did not say anything to such inmates.  Instead, she simply woke them up.  Later on, when the shift changed and [...] was on duty, Plaintiff asked for a grievance form and was refused.  Other inmates who missed their meds – [...], [...], [...] – but did not receive reprimand and no Captain came.
[brief] “[...]’s IFPA claims, we must hold that the arbitration agreement in the Plan covers them.  [citation omitted]  It does.  As noted above, that provision covers “any issue . . . in connection with any claim for [PIP] benefits. ”  Caring Pain App. 315.  This language is broad and, as the IFPA claims are connected to claims paid to the Practices based on PIP coverage, includes [...]’s claims.  Arafa, 233 A.3d at 509 (agreement to arbitrate “any dispute” has “broad” scope).
[brief] (Compare Pa14 – Pa32 with Pa131 – Pa142).  Thus, the “re-filing” of claims pursuant to the Consent Order would not have had any effect upon the “outcome of the [...],” nor would an adjudication of claims in such a “re-filed” action altered the decision in the [...], in any way whatsoever.  While the Trial Court was provided with a copy of the decision in the [...] in connection with the motion to dismiss, below, the Trial Court either did not understand, or did not appreciate, its contents.  Undeniably, the [...] did not adjudicate any matters raised in the Prior Litigation, nor did it adjudicate any matters raised in Plaintiffs’ Complaint.  Thus, by all standards, the decision in the [...] could not “operate[] as a valid and final judgment[,]” as it relates to the Prior Litigation.  (See Pa9).  Accordingly, this Court should reverse the decision of the Trial Court below, find the doctrine of res judicata inapplicable, and reinstate Plaintiffs’ Complaint, in its entirety.
[directive] The Standards affirm the importance of providing victim-centered services in order to best promote an opportunity for healing for the victim.  Additionally, the Standards identify best practices for law enforcement personnel and healthcare providers to improve the opportunities to identify, collect, and preserve evidence in all sexual assault cases.  3rd Edition (2018), available online at: https://www.nj.gov/oag/newsreleases18/AG-SART-Standards.pdf.  1  HUGHES JUSTICE COMPLEX ∙ TELEPHONE: (609)292-9660  FAX: (609)292-4299  New Jersey is an Equal Opportunity Employer ∙ Printed on Recycled Paper and Recyclable
[brief] litigation. ”  RPC 1.7(b)(4).  Although no claims have yet been asserted by defendants against one another, given the inherent conflict, “[p]ublic policy precludes an exception by waiver and consent” the same way it precludes waiver of driver/passenger joint representation with liability at issue.  *Ethics Op. 188*, 93 N.J.L.J. at *1.  Id. at 495–97 (emphasis added); Pashman Stein v. [...], A-1759-13T1, 2014 WL 5312535, at *5 (App. Div. Oct. 20, 2014) (Pa393).  The Court in Grand Jury deemed the arrangement proper because each of the employees had independent counsel to protect their interests.
[brief] PLAINTIFFS ARE ENTITLED TO REIMBURSEMENT OF ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND COSTS  As set forth in more detail in Plaintiffs’ initial brief, Pb47-Pb48, Plaintiffs (and [...]) are entitled to attorneys’ fees and costs in the event of their successful claim for defense and indemnity coverage from [...] and [...], who have wrongfully refused coverage.  See R. 4:42-9(a)(6) (“(a) Actions in Which Fee Is Allowable … (6) In an action upon a liability or indemnity policy of insurance, in favor of a successful claimant. ”).  In opposing this argument, [...] and [...] cite a New Jersey policy disfavoring the shifting of attorneys’ fees, but, as [...] and [...] acknowledge in the same breath, the policy underlying Rule 4:42-9(a)(6) is “to discourage groundless disclaimers and to provide more equitably to an insured the benefits of the insurance contract without the necessity of obtaining a judicial determination that the insured, in fact, is entitled to such protection. ”  Sears Mortgage Corp. v. Rose, 134 N.J. 326, 356 (1993) (internal citations omitted).  Thus, this rule is meant to discourage the exact situation at bar.  See, e.g., Tooker v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 136 N.J. Super. 572, 577 (App. Div. 1975) (upholding award of attorneys’ fees under Rule 4:42-9(a)(6) where insurer wrongfully refused to defend its insured:  “It seems only fair and proper that the costs incurred by Allstate to compel Hartford to do that which it was legally obligated to do in the first place should fall upon Hartford. ”).  [...] and [...] cite Jignyasa Desai, D.O., LLC v. N.J. Mfrs. Ins. Co., 473 N.J. Super. 582, 590 (App. Div. 2022), for the contention that attorneys’ fees are not warranted where the “issue presented was novel and unsettled. ”  [...] Db48.  As explained in Section I.C. above, the requirement that insurers give insureds proper notice of cancellation for any policy, particularly where there is a requirement in the policy itself along with all the other requirements mandated by law, is hardly novel.  As discussed in the sections above, [...] and [...]’s disclaimer was indeed groundless and falls well within this category of practices that should be discouraged, so in the event Plaintiffs (and [...]) are successful on appeal, they are entitled to attorneys’ fees and costs.
[brief] The trial court simply found, for [...] to be able to remove one property from consideration as to its large shortfall in its constitutional compliance, when there was a ready and willing developer for affordable housing on that property, would sidestep the well-established builder’s remedy process.  The trial court balanced the fact that [...] can use its condemnation powers for commercial use elsewhere, and could even make the arguments that the tract was not appropriate for residential use – only commercial use – at a later point in the same builder’s remedy proceeding. \(^9\)
[brief] **THE TRIAL COURT’S FINDING THAT DEFENDANTS BREACHED THE THIRD LOAN SHOULD BE AFFIRMED** (Da49-53)  (Responsive to Defendant’s Point IV.A and B)  Defendants argue that the trial court erred in finding that they breached the Third Loan, basing their arguments on their previous assertion that the parties did not enter into a Third Loan.  Db33-38.  As established, however, the \(^{20}\) Defendants also present a nonsensical argument that, if the trial court is affirmed, its reasoning will create “practical problems” because every lender would be able to escape the ramifications of a discharge of mortgage by arguing that the parties entered into a separate oral agreement.  Db30.  Of course, the trial court’s finding that the Discharge of Mortgage did not effectuate a satisfaction of the underlying debt was independent from its finding that the parties entered into the Third Loan.  Defendants’ argument is also unsupported by competent evidence or logic.  Parties who discharge their loan obligations properly insist on obtaining a “satisfaction” or termination of the underlying debt instrument.  trial court made express and detailed findings that the parties, at the behest of Defendants, entered into the Third Loan.  See Point I.A., above.  The trial court then properly concluded that [...] proved at trial that Defendants breached their obligations under the Third Loan.  Among other things, the trial court found that the October 2019 recording was “very powerful evidence of [...]’s admission of the debt, his continuing false promises to repay the debt, and promise to provide [...] with a ‘sweetener’ as a token of his appreciation for all [...] had done for him.
[brief] Lastly, the restitution imposed on [...] must also be reversed and remanded because the trial court did not conduct the required ability to pay hearing.  Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:44-2(b), the court shall impose restitution where the victim, or the victim’s family, suffered a loss, and “[t]he defendant is able to pay or, given a fair opportunity, will be able to pay restitution. ”  Accordingly, before imposing restitution at a criminal sentencing, a trial court “must conduct at least a summary hearing" to determine the ability to pay. ”  RSI Bank v. Providence Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 234 N.J. 459, 477 (2018) (internal quotations and citations omitted).  At that hearing, a sentencing court “shall take into account all financial resources of the defendant, including the defendant’s likely future earnings, and shall set the amount of restitution so as to provide the victim with the fullest compensation for loss that is consistent with the defendant’s ability to pay. ”  N.J.S.A. 2C:44-2(c)(2).  “When a sentencing court has not conducted a meaningful evaluation of a defendant's ability to pay, appellate courts routinely vacate restitution orders and remand for reconsideration. ”  *RSI Bank*, 234 N.J. at 478.  Here, the sentencing court imposed restitution in the amount of $24,886.57, but never conducted an ability to pay hearing.  Had a hearing been held, it would have been abundantly made clear that [...] would have no realistic ability to pay back this fine.  It is uncontested that he was homeless and living out of his car for a significant period of time before being imprisoned, and the pre-sentence report shows no assets and significant outstanding debts.  (PSR14).  Nor does [...] have any significant future earning potential because, unless he is successful in some other aspect of his appeal, he will be in prison for the rest of his life.  Thus, along with his custodial sentence, the significant restitution imposed must be vacated and the matter remanded so an ability to pay hearing can be conducted before any restitution is imposed.
[brief] Preliminary Statement  [...] was a successful race horse that was retired into being a breeding stallion.  He was owned by a group of shareholders known as the [...] Syndicate.  Defendant [...] was the “Syndicate Manager” and owner of a fractional interest in [...].  Defendant [...] is the CEO of [...].  [...] contracted with non-party [...] to stable [...] for parts of 2017 and 2018, for the purpose of collecting his semen to be frozen and sold to inseminate mares to breed pedigreed race horses.  Plaintiff [...] worked as a stallion handler at [...].  Part of [...]’ job at [...] involved leading [...] into the breeding shed for semen collection.  On October 3, 2018, [...] was leading [...] from the barn to the breeding shed for semen collection when [...] attacked [...], biting and trampling him, causing severe orthopedic and cognitive injury.  Under New Jersey law, animal owners who knew or should have known that their animal had vicious or dangerous traits or propensities are strictly liable for harm caused by that animal’s vicious trait.  Plaintiffs-Appellants have presented sufficient evidence for a jury to reasonably conclude that, as equine breeding professionals, Defendants-Respondents knew or should have known that [...] had a natural inclination or habitual tendency for dangerous, aggressive behavior when in the breeding environment.  **Procedural History**
[brief] Yet, [...] knows from its extensive involvement in the long-term care industry for multiple decades that a significant component of rate setting lies in the hands of actuarial professionals, who are guided by industry standards such as the ASOPs.  The ASOPs define the rules of the game.  In comparison, cases such as *Boller Beverages* and *Matter of Farmers’* address facts that are quite the opposite from the ones before this court.  *Boller Beverages* was a brand-name liquor distribution case where the Director of the Division of Alcoholic Beverage Control ruled that the labeling and sale of branded of corn whiskey in “Mason jars” was illegal in New Jersey, given that moonshine has been traditionally packed in Mason jars.  38 N.J. at 142.  The court was focused on the intersection of state and federal law, which is not at issue here.  *In re Farmers’* was concerned with whether the Commissioner of Insurance is required to conduct a hearing where an insurer applies for an exemption, abatement or deferral of its assessment under the Fair Automobile Insurance Reform Act of 1990 (the “Fair Act”), N.J.S.A. 17:33B-1 to -63.
[brief] [...] controlled [...] finances and willfully ignored [...]’ ouster of Plaintiff.  [...] confirmed that no tax returns went out without his approval and admitted during Plaintiff’s cross-examination revealed that he “rubber stamped” all tax returns before distribution.  3T42:16-23; 3T42:16-23.  Further, he admitted that he conducted “irregular” transactions on behalf of [...], without questioning the same and knowingly provided unexecuted false employment agreements to investors.  3T123:10-25; 3T83:24-86:5.  These actions confirm that [...] was both a member and that he controlled aspects of the business and was complicit with [...].  3T83:24-86:5.  Despite this testimonial evidence, the Trial Court, in the Final Judgment, dated May 8, 2023, found Plaintiff’s claims against [...] lacked “hard facts. ”  3T40:21-23; 3T62:16-23.  (Aa17).  [...]’s inconsistent testimony, misrepresentations, intermingling of personal and company funds do not support the Trial Court’s findings that [...] was the only bad actor and solely responsible for the ouster of Plaintiff.  3T30:8-9.  [...]’s knowing participation in [...]’ personal use of company funds, rubber-stamping tax returns, and the subsequent improper dissolution of [...] as discussed below, required the Court to find [...] personally liable under NJ RULLCA and pierce the corporate veil.