ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Plaintiffs’ motion to disqualify is not, as defendants portray, a tactical maneuver designed to drive up defense costs or to fabricate conflicts.  It stems from a genuine need to maintain efficient litigation, accurately allocate liability, facilitate meaningful settlement, and ensure a fair trial, not one marred by procedural delays, increased costs, and a potential mistrial or reversal that will result from the continued representation by conflicted counsel.  Defendants’ challenge to Plaintiffs’ standing lacks merit.  Plaintiffs readily meet New Jersey’s liberal standard allowing non-clients to seek disqualification when they have a stake and real adverseness in the matter.  This is a significant litigation with high dollar damages at stake; it is likely to be protracted and discovery intensive.  Withdrawal or disqualification of counsel later in the proceedings would detrimentally impact the progression of the case and needlessly burden valuable judicial time and resources.  The trial court’s failure to adequately address the conflicts among defendants who are subject to statutory apportionment of fault ignores the reality that each defendant’s interests are fundamentally at odds.  Each party has a vested interest in minimizing liability at the expense of others, leading to unavoidable and non-waivable conflicts.  That dynamic is exacerbated by the improper litigation funding arrangement that is expressly prohibited by In re Grand Jury.  Compounding those concerns are strong public policy considerations underlying this case, in which defendants are accused of intentionally perpetrating a complex insurance fraud scheme.  Public policy would be thwarted if leaders of the conspiracy are permitted to finance and thereby control the defense of their co-conspirators through joint counsel to their likely detriment, or as some defendants suggest, resort to indemnifying fellow co-conspirators for their share of damages.  The public interest in eradicating fraud and protecting the integrity of the proceedings necessitates addressing those conflicts now.  Also, although the conflicts here are inherent and unwaivable, Plaintiffs submit, in light of Grand Jury’s prohibition on defendants’ funding arrangement, should this Court deem the waivers relevant, it should consider the procedural deficiencies that have plagued this case.  The trial court’s failure to properly conduct an in camera review, beginning with the lack of formal order, to its informal, ex parte request that defendants produce documents, to its failure to give notice to Plaintiffs of such review has left Plaintiffs unable to adequately contest the validity of the waivers.  The lack of transparency and opportunity to challenge the waivers underscores the unfairness of the process.  Defendants now continue to conceal those documents while relying on their contents in this appeal.  Should the Court consider the waivers, Plaintiffs must be afforded access to the documents and an opportunity for additional briefing on the waiver issue.  ARGUMENT
[directive] The term includes the recorded image of a scanned license plate and optical character recognition data, a contextual photo (i. e:, a photo of the scanned vehicle and/or occupants), global positioning system("GPS") data (when the ALPR is equipped with a GPS receiver) or other location information, and the date and time of the scan.  The term applies to both alert data and non-alert data that has been captured and stored by an ALPR or in a separate data storage device or system.  "Alert data" means information captured by an ALPR relating to a license plate that matches the license plate on an initia[~BOLO list or a post-scan BOLO list.  "Immediate alert" refers to an alert that occurs when a scanned license plate matches the license plate on an initial BOLO list and that is reported to the officer operating the ALPR, by means of an audible alarm or by any other means, at or about the time that the subject vehicle was encountered by the ALPR and its license plate was scanned by the ALPR.
[brief] a. Yes – 1,301 (93.6%) b. No – 89 (6.4%)  2.  Do you object to the City releasing your e-mail address to anyone who asks for it through an OPRA request, based solely upon the fact that you signed up for [...] alerts?  a. Yes – 1,331 (95.76%) b. No – 59 (4.24%)  3.  How important to you is it that the City/[...] safeguard and keep your contact information private?  a. Very important – 1,305 (93.88%)  b. Neutral – 59 (4.24%)  c. Not important – 26 (1.87%)  4.  Would you consider it inappropriate/harassing to receive spam or unwanted advertisement e-mails from third-parties based upon the fact that you signed up to receive [...] alerts?  a. Yes – 1,361 (97.91%) b. No – 29 (2.09%)  5.  Do you believe that the City should file an appeal of the judge’s decision requiring the release of your e-mail address to anyone who requests it in order to protect your e-mail address from disclosure?  a. Yes- 1,339 (96.33%) b. No- 51 (3.67%)
[brief] Specifically, while preparing for parent-teacher conferences, teachers of one particular student were concerned about the response to parents if asked about that student using a name about which the parents were unaware.  After reviewing then-existing policy and consultation with counsel, teachers were advised to respond with:  “I'm sorry, but the scope of this conference is limited to the academic progress of your child this year.  Both our legal counsel and the Department of Education advise that school districts cannot discuss specific gender identity issues with parents. ”  While the issue did not arise, it was the subject of much concern for District staff.  See Da235-263, Para.11.  In [...], school administrators and staff were confronted with several issues presented by compliance with the Guidelines:
[brief] A governing body does not ordinarily make findings of fact to 7 Section III responds to Section II in Plaintiffs’ brief. justify its actions.  *Hirth*, 337 N.J. Super. at 165–66; Pa28.  The Township satisfied its statutory requirement to assess the “‘relative benefits of the project to the redevelopment of the redevelopment area when compared to the costs, if any, associated with the tax exemption’” and “‘the importance of the tax exemption to be granted in obtaining the development of the project and in influencing the locational decisions of probable occupants of the project or units of the project.
[brief] *Id.*  38.  The *Pascale* Court found that the son demonstrated that when it suited the father’s purposes to transfer ownership of one of his businesses to his son for purposes of defrauding his wife, he did so.  *Ibid.*  Then when it no longer served his purposes and he wanted the business back, the father claimed in court that he had been duped by his son.  *Ibid.*  The *Pascale* Court saw through the father’s scheme and concluded that the son successfully rebutted by clear and convincing evidence his father’s claim of undue influence.  From the trial below we know the following undisputed facts in our case that rebut a finding of undue influence:
[brief] It requires: (1) the determination that the sentence imposed does not violate legislative policies, i.e., there must be compliance with statutory sentencing authority and stated parameters for a sentence to be lawful; (2) appellate review includes an examination into whether the aggravating and mitigating factors found by the sentencing court were based upon complete credible evidence in the record; and (3) appellate courts are empowered to determine whether, even though the court sentenced in accordance with the guidelines, nevertheless the application of the guidelines to the facts of the case makes the sentence clearly unreasonable so as to “shock the judicial conscience.
[brief] After a review of the facts and circumstances of the matter, the Boritz Court held that [...] was estopped from asserting coverage.  The Boritz court relied on the prior holding in Barrett, supra, where it was found that “[a]n insurance company which expressly or impliedly acknowledges that its policy provides coverage for a particular claim may be estopped from subsequently denying coverage if an insured has relied upon the availability of that coverage. ”  Barrett, 295 N.J. Super. at 618.
[brief] Specifically, plaintiff alleged that [...] violated the following federal regulations:  1.  **42 C.F.R. 483.30  Quality of Life. **  This regulation states, in part:  The facility must provide services by sufficient numbers of each of the following types of personnel on a 24-hour basis to provide nursing care to all residents in accordance with resident care plans: licensed nurses and other nursing personnel.  2.  **42 C.F.R. 488.301  Resident Neglect.**  This regulation states, in part:  If you find that [...] has violated either of these regulations, you may consider such conduct as evidence of negligence on the part of [...].  (Pa108.)
[brief] 1.  PLAINTIFF WAS LIVING IN NEW JERSEY WHEN HE TOOK OUT THE [...] POLICY.................................9  2.  THE POLICY VEHICLES WERE GARAGED IN NEW JERSEY WHEN THE POLICY WAS CREATED AND AT ALL RELEVANT TIMES AFTER..................................................10  3.  APPELLANT/PLAINTIFF’S FAILURE TO NOTIFY [...] WAS NOT OVERSIGHT OR MISTAKE......11  POINT II – SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS PROPER BECAUSE DISCOVERY WAS COMPLETED AND ANY FURTHER DISCOVERY WOULD NOT CHANGE THE OUTCOME OF THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT..................................................................................12
[brief] CLAIMS, CIRCUMSTANCES, DISCIPLINARY AND CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS:  Since the submission date of the last Application submitted to the Insurer:  (a)  Have there been any new bar complaints, investigations or disciplinary proceedings against any attorney?  [Pa947, Pa324, Pa329]  Again, this question sought disclosure of Disciplinary Proceedings, defined in the Policies to be limited to matters involving the rendering of Legal Services.  The trial court ignored the complex and complicated interplay between the Application and the specific definitions in the Policy which gave meaning to the terms in the Application.  It focused solely on the language in the questions in the Application and stated what it thought the language in the Application meant without giving any consideration to the statements of [...] in his Certification setting forth his reasonable expectations based upon the terms as defined in the Policies drafted by [...], instead of considering those facts, and giving the benefit of all reasonable inferences to the Plaintiffs, the court narrowly confined its inquiry to a view (based on Webster’s Dictionary) as to what the terms in the Application meant.  By ignoring the contract between the parties that defined these terms, and ignoring the statements of the insured which it was required to accept as true, the court granted summary judgment.  Doing so was contrary to well-accepted summary judgment jurisprudence.  3.  The OAE Proceeding Was Not A “Disciplinary Proceeding” As Defined And Relevant For Underwriting Purposes.  (18)
[brief] Almost all police work that turns up information supporting facts of probable cause connected to a motor vehicle is gathered step by step.  There is --- 4  This unpublished decision has been included in the State’s appendix.  (Pa11-16).  The State is unaware of any contrary authority for the general propositions cited.  nothing in the Court’s opinions in Witt or in Smart that supports such a strained interpretation of the law.  [Ibid. (emphasis added). ]  This Court thus rejected [...]’s attempt to expand Smart and denied that it mandated the suppression of the evidence in his case.  Ibid.
[brief] (3T84-1 to 3; 3T86-18 to 20; 3T87-11 to 13).  He testified that there were “multiple gaping lacerations, or wounds . . . on the top of the head, mostly on the left side, and with a lot of blood on the victim. ” (3T91-1 to 4).  He counted seven to nine lacerations with exposure of the skull on the left side of the head and three to four depressed fractures on the skull.  (3T92-17 to 93-18).  He explained that the inside of the skull revealed that a strike to the base of the skull was a significant impact, stating it was a “tremendous blow to do something like that that goes from the left side into the base. ” (3T103-16 to 21).  [...] determined that the cause of death was multiple blunt force injuries to the head.
[brief] Mosley v. State, et al., [...] (Nov 8, 2023)…………Aa126-232  Exhibit A of Certified Statement (the April 14, 2023 email from Court attaching Order dated April 11, 2023, vacating JOC and Dismissing the VOP terminating Probation with A brief Statement of Reasons…………………………………………Aa134-35  Exhibit B of Certified Statement (Email communication from April 10, 2023 to April 14, 2023 indicating Appellant’s Provision of courtesy copies of his motion to vacate the JOC, State’s objection to and the April 14, 2023 email from Court ²  For some reason, the trial court provided duplicate opinions, one dated February 15, 2023 and this present one dated February 16, 2023.
[brief] Additionally, unlike [...] in this matter, the [...] had previously completed two separate rounds of rulemaking to create and update the dental fee schedule at issue before the [...] sued over the agency’s inaction.  Again, this dynamic is not analogous to the circumstances presented in the case at bar, where [...] has not so much as proposed—let alone adopted—a single regulation to date upon which the public can reasonably rely when navigating the potential implications of ambiguous statutory terms on prospective permit applications.  Ironically, on August 22, 2024, just one week ago, [...] finally convened a stakeholder meeting for the stated purpose of informing the public of the possible contents of the regulations required by the Public Access Law.  [...], despite arguing in this matter that the Public Access Law is sufficiently clear to be self-executing, acknowledged in the materials provided to stakeholders that the Public Access Law affords ample room for interpretation and leaves much to be explained through rulemaking.
[brief] Defendant also prevailed by successfully defending against the twelve (12) other substantial claims raised by the Plaintiff.  This should be construed as a sufficient degree of success on the merits.  The first inquiry in determining prevailing party status should be whether the verdict or judgment provided the movant with a sufficient degree of success on the merits of its claim.  Here, Defendant, in her Answer to Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint, sought dismissal of Plaintiff’s Complaint, which, after jury trial has happened.
[brief] Achacoso-Sanchez v. Immigration and Naturalization [...] v. [...], DOCKET NO. [...], 13 (App. Div. Oct. 4, 2018)  ....................................................................................  12  Anderson v. Sills, 143 N.J. Super. 432, 437, 363 A.2d 381 (Ch. Div. 1976) .........................................................
[brief] 47  POINT IV  THE JUDGE VIOLATED N.J.R.E. 608(B)(1)  WHEN HE BARRED DEFENSE COUNSEL FROM EXPLORING ON CROSS-EXAMINATION OF THE STATE’S JAILHOUSE-INFORMANT WITNESS THAT THAT WITNESS HAD PREVIOUSLY FALSELY ACCUSED SOMEONE OF MURDER.  (RULING AT 28T 173-7 TO 8)  .................................................................  52  POINT V  THE COURT SHOULD HAVE GRANTED THE MOTION FOR A JUDGMENT OF ACQUITTAL ON COUNT FOUR, ENDANGERING AN INJURED VICTIM, BECAUSE THE STATE ENTERED NO PROOFS TO SHOW THAT THE DECEDENT WAS ALIVE FOR MORE THAN A FEW MOMENTS AFTER BEING SHOT; ALTERNATIVELY, A NEW TRIAL SHOULD BE ORDERED BECAUSE THE JURY INSTRUCTION DID NOT EXPLAIN THAT LEAVING A DECEASED VICTIM IS NOT COVERED BY THAT STATUTE.  (ACQUITTAL RULING AT 29T 138-19 TO 139-24; JURY-INSTRUCTION ISSUE NOT RAISED BELOW)
[brief] As [...]’s opening brief already explained, government agencies must be able to function.  [...]’s single-minded focus on fishing for possible matters of interest through his request for all of the Interim Provost’s emails risks not only compromising [...]’s functioning but also undoing two decades of precedent that was built, brick by brick, to balance the integrity of agency operations against the public’s right to know.  All [...] asks is for this court to maintain that balance by reiterating, once more, that requestors must seek records by reference to a “discrete and limited subject matter” and that they cannot circumvent that requirement by asking for all of an agency’s records instead.  For this reason, the trial court’s decision should be reversed.
[brief] Defendants claim that Plaintiff, along with [...] and [...], were terminated for adding an extra one dollar per hour as “charge pay” to certain shifts they worked during 2020.  It is Defendants’ position, and the testimony of their witnesses including Defendant [...], that this charge pay was coincidentally “discovered” by Defendant [...] around the same time that Defendant [...] initiated her investigation into the latest complaints about Defendant [...] arising from the June 2020 incident with Plaintiff.  However, this termination rationale is weakened by a fundamental factual dispute which precludes summary judgment.
[brief] 4T, 146:21-147:10.  Also, [...] testified that serving as advisor to Plaintiff [...], if Plaintiff [...] desired, he could develop the 100% affordable housing project as sole developer, thus retaining 100% of the ownership of the development and receive 100% of the profits.  4T, 139:3-140:9.  On the other hand, if Plaintiff [...] desired or deemed it warranted, [...] would have put together and structured a partnership for Plaintiff [...] with an affordable housing developer.
[directive] 10  The trial judge may extend the 90-day clock by up to 45 days if, on motion of the prosecutor, the court finds that (1) the defendant presents a “substantial and unjustifiable risk” to public safety and no conditions of release “could reasonably address” the risk, and (2) the failure to indict “was not due to unreasonable delay by the prosecutor. ”  Id. at -22(a)(1)(a); R. 3:25- 4(b)(2).  Second, defendants must be released if their trial has not “commence[d]” within 180 days of the return or unsealing of the indictment.
[brief] If the Court finds that a further remand is impracticable, an alternative would be to apply an overall percentage reduction in attorneys’ fees to account for the non-RICO work.  See In re Pall Corp., No. CV 07-3359 (JS) (GRB), 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55592, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 8, 2013) (“[T]he use of a percentage cut is a widely used, efficient means of resolving attorneys' fees applications”). — and this Court vacated the fee awards, which, it held, “must be reconsidered for several reasons.
[brief] Further, if you accept any alternative explanation offered by the defense for the Loyalty is Royalty tattoo, then you may not consider said tattoo for any purpose and you shall completely disregard it in your deliberations.  (30T 254-3 to 256-24).  The Court issued a similar instruction with respect to the teardrop tattoos after this instruction.  (30T 256-25 to 259-18).  Critically, the day before this instruction was first issued, there was an extensive colloquy regarding the form of this instruction in which both parties offered suggestions, and defense counsel expressed no dissatisfaction with any portion of the instruction referring to the defense’s potential alternative explanation for the tattoos. (29T 147-8 to 156-25).
[directive] Upon receipt of the request, 20220. or [...] will review the information and decide whether not to approve the request.  [...] will apply the Rule of to determine the unearned interest and the 7 8 ' s amount of the unpaid principal.  If additional information or documentation is needed to complete the review, [...] will contact the requesting agency liaison to obtain the necessary information or documentation.  Once the requests are approved, [...] will forward them to the [...] for payment processing.  - If is the responsibilit,y of the requesting office to . - expedited notify [...] when action is required to comply with the terms of a court order.  The seizing agency must communicate to the involved [...] the need to include reasonable time limits for the in accomplishment of lien payments court orders.
[brief] (Pa274-99, Pa230, Pa655-722, Pa324-417, Pa984-89, Pa990, Pa997-99, Pa1224)  An employee can show the existence of adverse employment action through many separate, but relatively minor, instances of behavior directed against an employee that may not be actionable individually, but that combine to make up a pattern of retaliatory conduct.  See Green v. Jersey City Bd. of Educ., 177 N.J. 434, 448 (2003); Nardello v. Township of Voorhees, 377 N.J. Super. 428, 435 (App. Div. 2005); Beasley v. Passaic County, 377 N.J. Super. 585, 609 (App. Div. 2005).  Here, there is no dispute that Appellant had a reasonable belief that [...]’s conduct consisted sexual harassment.  Nor can Respondents dispute that Appellant engaged in protected conduct via numerous internal complaints (which triggered an EEO investigation) and the filing of this lawsuit in January 2019.  It’s clear that Appellant was subjected to adverse employment action in the form of involuntary transfers, unwarranted discipline, increased hostility, and constructive termination.  It is clear from the record that there are issues of fact regarding whether Respondents’ conduct constituted retaliation.
[brief] They had to do this because “there is product in the soil under the building. ” (T1, 12:1-3).  “We allowed it to expire -- my client allowed it to expire because at the -- in the last months of the lease, the consultant had been going in to trench the building to get in there and try to see what was under the slab. ” (T1, 13:10-13).  When the Mayor asked whether the building needed to be removed to get the soil out (T1, 28:20-22), Plaintiff’s LSRP responded, “[i]s that a possible outcome? It could be. ” (T1, 28:23-24).  He explained that removal of the building will depend upon the amount of contamination.  (T1, 28:23-24:4).  Plaintiff’s attorney explained, “once we get a handle on what’s going on under the building, it’s very possible that the -- we can get that out pretty quickly as much as we are required to get out.  And then that’s it.  Everything can be -- can move forward.  There can be, you know, somebody using that property. ”  (T1, 17:6-10) (emphasis added).
[brief] *Gamble*, 218 N.J. at 432; *State v. Arthur*, 149 N.J. 1, 7-8 (1997).  Importantly, an officer’s experience and knowledge are also factors courts should consider in applying the totality of the circumstances test.  *State v. Pineiro*, 181 N.J. 13, 22 (2004); State v. Davis, 104 N.J. 490, 504 (1986).  In short, the evidence available to the officer should be “‘seen and weighed not in terms of library analysis by scholars, but as understood by those versed in the field of law enforcement. ’”  State v. Ramos, 282 N.J. Super.  19, 22 (App. Div. 1995) (quoting Cortez, 449 U.S. at 418).  In particular, as the Supreme Court has observed, when a judge evaluates the totality of the circumstances, the judge must recognize the police officer’s experience and training and consider how that experience and training bears upon the officer’s determination.  State v. Sheffield, 62 N.J. 441, 445, cert. denied, 414 U.S. 876 (1973).