ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The Weiss Court further held:  We are persuaded that the standard advocated by the Chief Justice in his Perini concurrence and ultimately adopted by the Court in Tretina, supra, 135 N.J. at 358, 640 A.2d 788, ordinarily will govern even if the arbitration award implicates a clear mandate of public policy.  Assuming that the arbitrator’s award accurately has identified, defined, and attempted to vindicate the pertinent public policy, courts should not disturb the award merely because of disagreements with arbitral fact findings or because the arbitrator’s application of the public-policy principles to the underlying facts is imperfect.  If the correctness of the award, including its resolution of the public-policy question, is reasonably debatable, judicial intervention is unwarranted.  Id. at 442-43 (emphasis added).  Here, the trial court’s decision implies that it found the correctness of the Arbitrator’s award was not “reasonably debatable. ”  This decision was in error.
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[brief] See [...] Brief, pp. 1,7,11,13,15,18  It then cleverly attempts to put the square peg in the round whole by attempting to apply these incorrect (“discrete class”) statements to precedent such Hodges v. Comcast Cable Communs., LLC, 12 F.4th 1108, 1115 (9th Cir. 2021)(which does not involve health club contracts).  Id.  Similarly, [...] insinuates that the “public injunctive relief” language in its “Membership Agreement” (which Plaintiff argues applies to the injunctive relief she seeks for [...]’s CFA, HCSA, RISA and TCCWNA violations) is really only applicable to plaintiffs who bring claims against its California health clubs despite the fact that the Membership Agreement says nothing of the sort in its New Jersey (or any other State or territory) health club contracts.  *Id* at p. 12  This is all in addition to [...]’s (and with all due respect the Trial Court’s) misinterpretation as to the applicability of Plaintiff’s “injunctive relief” damages in her Complaint applicable to future New Jersey consumers who could receive [...]’s Membership Agreement.
[brief] PROCEDURAL HISTORY .........................................................................................  1 STATEMENT OF FACTS..........................................................................................  2 LEGAL ARGUMENT ............................................................................................... 9 POINT I REVERSAL IS REQUIRED BECAUSE THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO COMPLY WITH THIS COURT’S PRIOR REMAND ORDER MANDATING COMPLETE REDACTION OF THE INTERVIEWING DETECTIVE’S LAY OPINIONS ON DEFENDANT’S GUILT AND CREDIBILITY.
[brief] [...] replied to the notification:  “I am floored.  . .  I have no idea what the charge is.  No one here has indicated anything about this.  It is strange, I am available [to discuss] this afternoon.  What time?” [(Pa479). ]  The temporal proximity of [...]’s protected activity and the initiation of disciplinary action can support an inference of a retaliatory motive.  Young v. Hobart W. Grp., 385 N.J. Super. 448, 467 (App. Div. 2005).
[brief] An email from [...], Esq., attorney for [...], which is dated March 29th, 2023 (prior to the April letter) expresses his (a) understanding of the ROFR having existed and (b) belief that the ROFR was already waived.  Da247.  This email is consistent with the later letter in April in which [...] states that he believes [...] has notice of the contract (for purposes of exercising or not exercising its ROFR) since they are demanding an initial on the provision of the contract between [...] and [...] that references the ROFR.  Da249.  Clearly, at that point, if it was even relevant to the issue of whether the offer was valid when presented to [...] on January 17, 2023, former Defendant [...] was aware of the ROFR.
[directive] Criminal Division Managers Family Division Managers Assistant Criminal Division Managers Municipal Division Managers Municipal Court Administrators and Directors [...], Special Assistant [...], Special Assistant [...], Chief, Family Practice [...], Chief, Criminal Practice [...], Municipal Court Services [...], Criminal Practice Superior Court, Law Division County State of New Jersey Municipal Court of Complaint/Warrant #: v. Sex Offense Restraining Order pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:14-12, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-8
[brief] Defendant, [...], retained the expert services of [...].  [...] prepared a report dated December 11, 2018; he was deposed on April 10, 2019.  Pa2485.  [...] testified that it was [...]’ responsibility to ensure that the work complied with the requirements of the NJTA and the contract and that the HASP was part of the contract.  Pa2490.  [...] agreed with every other expert and testified that [...] did not require an engineering degree and did not have to be a professional engineer to perform his job duties for the subject project.  Pa2492-93.  [...] testified that he previously served as a project manager in a similar capacity as [...] prior to becoming a licensed engineer and so understand the distinction between a project manager, resident engineer and professional engineer.  Pa2501.  [...] testified that the resident engineer’s responsibility was to ensure that the HASP is followed by the general contractor and to make sure that there was no imminent danger as per the local, federal, and state laws and the HASP.  If there was a danger it was the resident engineer’s responsibility to let the contractor know to take corrective action.  Pa2495-97.
[brief] For the foregoing reasons, this Court must vacate the summary judgment entered in favor of [...] by the court below.  There is no basis to find that the Ordinance is arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable.  It is well-founded upon a 130-year-old contract, state law, and federal law, as well as other, identical local municipal ordinances.  Nor does the Ordinance improperly infringe on [...]’s rights to provide safe, adequate, and proper service, as [...] could use an alternative route or method of accomplishing its allegedly required goals.  And if the obligations” of the 1892 Agreement, such action may violate the Contracts Clause of the United States Constitution.  DA at 465a.  [...] truly did have to go through [...] to complete its 69kV Project, the Ordinance has built-in safeguards that would allow such a project upon a proper showing of necessity by [...].  For these reasons, the Ordinance is valid on its face, the requirements for an “as applied” challenge have not been met, and this matter should be dismissed with prejudice.
[brief] (14T 3-4 to 6; 18T 3-3 to 7).  Several witnesses testified, including defendant, his trial attorney, the two alibi witnesses absent from his trial and a purported digital forensic examiner with expertise in cellular telephone location tracking.  Defendant testified that he discussed trial strategy with his attorney “many times. ” (18T 15-1 to 6).  Defendant testified that during the strategy sessions, he asked his attorney to interview two witnesses who could provide him with an alibi.  (18T 17-4 to 9, 22-9 to 12).  Defendant further testified that he asked his attorney to review the cellular telephone data which was provided to him in discovery.  (18T 15-4 to 16-6, 22-1 to 3).
[brief] In the Application for Tax Exemption, Exhibit 16 asks the Defendant [...] to:  “Attach an explanation of why the applicant believes that a long term tax exemption is necessary to make this Project economically feasible.  Include specific figures where possible to explain any financing gaps. ”  [...]’s response reads in its entirety:  “Due to excessive off-site sewer and water infrastructure obligations as well as excessive sewer reservation fees” (no period in original)  Pa597.  Plaintiffs’ requests for discovery included requests for engineering, financial and planning reports and details relating to the basis for this statement.  Pa221, nos. 7-10.  During argument on the motion to suppress discovery, while declining to provide the requested information, [...], [...]’s Director of Land Acquisition and Entitlements, sought to supplement Exhibit 16.  He submitted a certification representing that [...]’s response to Exhibit 16 “is the crux of [...]’s application for a long-term tax exemption for this Project” and that “the sewer and water costs of the project were far in excess of the reasonable and ordinary costs of a typical residential project. ”  Pa192, par 30.  He then specified a variety of costs totaling $17,547,005, labeling but not explaining them.  The largest costs are a “Capacity Fee + Connection Fee (to be paid)” totaling $11,404,218.  , Id., together with $4,057,000 for the construction of a sewer force main from the Project to the required manhole in [...] on the south side of I-295.  Pa193, par 31.  The overall reported total is $17,547,005.  [...] submitted a second report responding to these claims for briefing in the merits case.
[brief] Filed as Exhibit B to the Certification of [...], Esq. on Behalf of the Defendants on February 28, 2024 in Support of the Motion for Summary Judgment…………Pa59  Transcript of the Deposition of [...]  Filed as Exhibit A to the Certification of [...], Esq. on Behalf of the Plaintiff on March 18, 2024 in Opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment…………Pa80  Volume II
[directive] MANDATORY  12-HOUR IMPOUNDMENT OF MOTOR VEHICLES is a passenger in the vehicle at the time the operator is arrested, the arrestee may permit that passenger to operate the vehicle or to make arrangements for its removal without the vehicle being impounded.  Of course, the person remaining with the vehicle must possess a valid driver's license, be capable of operating the vehicle or making arrangements for its removal, and not be in violation of the motor vehicle laws of this State.  Additional provisions of the statute allow for the release of an impounded vehicle, before the end of the 12-hour period of impoundment, subject to several conditions and compliance with the provisions of N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.23d.  Procedures for Impoundment of Vehicle and Release of Vehicle from Impoundment
[brief] 1.  **Confidential information / confidential personal identifiers** (must select one):  I certify that I have reviewed Rules 1:38-3, 1:38-5, and 1:38-7 and: - This document does not contain any confidential information or any confidential personal identifiers; **OR** - This document; previously contained confidential information or confidential personal identifiers, which have been redacted (meaning removed or made anonymous by using fictitious first names or initials, where applicable).
[brief] ## Cases | Case | Page | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | Morel v. State Farm Insurance Company, | 8-9 | | 396 N.J. Super. 472 (App. Div. 2007) | | | N.J. Mfrs. Ins. Co. v. Specialty Surgical Ctr. Of N. Brunswick, | 7-8 | | 458 N.J. Super. 63 (App. Div. 2019) | | ## Statutes and Rules | Statute | Pages | |------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------| | N.J.S.A. 2A:23A-13 | 6 | | N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4 | 6, 7, 8| | N.J.S.A. 39:6A-6 | 6 | | N.J.A.C. 11:3-29 | 1, 6, 7, 8| TABLE OF RELEVANT JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS Order Denying Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment (12/8/23) ..........Pa36 Order Granting Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (12/8/23) .....Pa37 | Appendix Document | Page | |----------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | Complaint (12/19/22) | Pa1 | | Answer (5/9/23) | Pa5 | | Demand for Arbitration (10/26/21) | Pa12 | | Amendment to the Demand for Arbitration (2/21/22) | Pa15 | | Deposition Transcript (partial) of [...] (9/23/20) | Pa16 | | Defendant’s Notice of Motion for Summary Judgment (10/19/23) | Pa18 | | Defendant’s Statement of Facts (10/19/23) | Pa20 | | Plaintiff’s Response to Defendant’s Statement of Facts (10/23/23) | Pa24 | | Plaintiff’s Notice of Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment (10/23/23) | Pa26 | | Plaintiff’s Statement of Facts (10/23/23) | Pa29 | | Defendant’s Response to Plaintiff’s Statement of Facts (10/27/23) | Pa33 | | Order Denying Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment (12/8/23) | Pa36 | | Order Granting Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (12/8/23) | Pa37 | | Plaintiff’s Request for Modification/Clarification (5/17/22) | Pa38 | | Statement of Items Submitted for Summary Judgment | Pa40 | | Appendix Document | Page | |------------------------------------------------------|--------| | Health Insurance Lien (10/13/21) | Pca1 | | Defendant’s Arbitration Summary (2/17/22) | Pca5 | | Explanation of Benefits for Defendant’s Arbitration Summary | Pca7 | | Defendant’s PIP Payment Ledger (11/12/21) | Pca80 | | Reports of [...] (9/23/19 – 1/11/21)| Pca85 | | Records of [...] (5/20/20) | Pca108 | | Report of [...] (4/15/21) | Pca109 | | Operative Report (7/30/20) | Pca126 | | Arbitration Award (5/16/22) | Pca128 | | Modification/Clarification Denied Order (8/4/22) | Pca147 | | Arbitration Appellate Award (11/9/22) | Pca151 | | Plaintiff’s Post-Hearing Submission (3/15/22) | Pca160 | PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
[brief] *Tucker*, supra, 2023 WL 8176342,*8.  But those political relationship cases involve Board member actions or inactions that attempt to benefit either the Board member or a particular individual with whom the Board member has a political relationship.  Put another way, in those cases substantial, legally competent evidence exists that the political relationship supplies the incentive for the Board member to act or not act, and is a factual nexus between a benefit and the Board member’s action or inaction.  In the instant matter, no such evidence of a factual nexus between a benefit and Appellant’s request exists.  Therefore, the [...] and the [...] did not have the requisite evidence to reasonably conclude that Appellant committed a subsection (f) violation.  Accordingly, the Commission’s decision is arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable and must be reversed.
[brief] Appellant appeals the dismissal of its claim against two licensed professional engineering entities which resulted from Appellant’s failure to file an affidavit of merit.  In their pleading, Appellant alleges that defendant [...] (hereinafter “[...]”) and [...] (“[...]”) ”were responsible for the operation, design, control, supervision, maintenance, inspection and/or creation of a system of oversight with regard to the project” (Pa96)  Plaintiff further alleges that [...] and [...] negligently, carelessly and/or recklessly supervised and/or monitored the construction site.  (Pa98)  The Trial Court dismissed plaintiff’s complaint for failing to serve an affidavit of merit.  In its decision, the Trial Court found that the allegations sounded in professional negligence and, as such, an affidavit of merit was required.  (Pa2522)
[brief] Neither the Board, nor any other participant in the hearing other than the applicant bears any proof burden.  Hearings before planning and zoning boards are not inherently adversarial proceedings.  “Very often it happens that only the applicant submits any evidence to the board but it should be noted that the absence of evidence in support of denial of a requested variance does not itself mean that the board’s denial of a variance is arbitrary.  The burden rests with the applicant to demonstrate that the affirmative evidence in the record dictates the conclusion that a denial would be arbitrary.
[brief] Neither was limited to the mere filing of an Answer, with repeated objections to AAA jurisdiction starting 10 days later.  See also White v Kampner, 229 Conn 465, 641 A. 2d 1381 (1994).  (The client, who asserted legal malpractice claim, did not waive his right to challenge the validity of arbitration clause by participating in arbitration, where arbitration took place only after client was ordered to arbitration, he had vigorously objected that he could not be compelled to participate in binding arbitration and he made continuing objections that fee disputes were governed by mandatory fee arbitration.)  POINT IV
[brief] For these reasons, Plaintiff respectfully submits that the Court should reverse the October 6 Order, which denied Plaintiff’s motion for JNOV, or in the alternative, for a new trial.  Plaintiff also submits that the March 11 Order, which granted Defendant’s fee application in the amount of $119,256.40, should be vacated and that Plaintiff is entitled to entry of a fee award in his favor as the prevailing party.
[brief] Second, the plaintiffs in Benipal were admittedly hands-off, out-of-possession investors who were held to the standard of a reasonable investor.  By contrast, [...], who is not a sophisticated investor, handled all aspects of ownership for over twenty (20) years without any reason to believe that the Defendants had a claim to the Property.  Indeed, if anything, the facts in Benipal weigh in favor of quieting title and barring any interest that [...] allegedly has in the Property.  In this regard, to the extent [...] believed he had a claim to the Property based on the December 1998 Deed notwithstanding [...]’s clear exercise of ownership and control of the Property, it was incumbent upon him to timely file a quiet title action.  Whether under the doctrine of laches or a twenty (20) year statute of limitations, [...]’s failure to take any action, especially after conducting a title search in 2016 bars any claim to the Property now.
[brief] Id. at 467.  The Legislature had four objectives in reforming the automobile accident tort system: (1) providing benefits promptly and efficiently to all accident injury victims (the reparation objective); (2) reducing or stabilizing the cost of automobile insurance (the cost objective); (3) making insurance coverage readily available for automobile owners (the availability objective); and (4) streamlining judicial procedures involved in third-party claims (the judicial objective).  Ibid. (citing Gambino v. Royal Globe Ins. Cos., 86 N.J. 100, 105-06, 429 A.2d 1039 (1981)).
[brief] -  Your Honor entered an Order dated January 30, 2023 stating:  Based upon the court's review of the Settlement Agreement, prior Order and associated facts and circumstances, determines that the Monitor, while specifically permitted to address "site specific relief" was not empowered to assume the authority of the [...] with regard to granting, approving or otherwise authorizing site plan approval, use or other variances in connection with the Subject Application under the April 22, 201 order...  The Courts April 22, 2021 order does not permit the Monitor to relive the Redeveloper of its obligations under the municipal Land Use Law in connection with proposed development of the [...] property.
[brief] Another specious argument made by Defendants/Respondents was that [...] should not have paid $60,000 to settle the preference action and that it should have litigated until conclusion.  T.4.16-21  The case could easily have been lost resulting in a judgment of almost twice the amount of the settlement.  It is pure speculation to assume that any case will be won or lost.  It was [...]’s best judgment, based upon sound advice of bankruptcy counsel, that the settlement would be in the best interest of both [...] and [...].
[brief] ”  (1T 12-21 to 13-6)  He also agreed that he eventually “realized she was not okay and rather than render aid . . . put her in . . . the ExerSaucer. ”  (1T 13-7 to 10)  He acknowledged that “the manner in which [he] slept with her and recklessly causing her to suffocate . . . caused her death. ”  (1T 13-14 to 18)  After the State observed that the factual basis was not sufficient, the parties took a break to confer amongst themselves.  (1T 13-21 to 14-4)  Thereafter, [...] provided a different factual basis.  He said he had previously put his “hand over [his] older child’s mouth in an effort to get him to sleep” and that he had not died. \(^4\)  (1T 15-1 to 9)  [...] then affirmed that on the day of the instant offense, “[he] used the same method to try and put [his] daughter to sleep. ”  (1T 15-10 to 14)  He agreed that “[he] did so because it had not hurt [his] son,” and that he “did not intend on killing [his] daughter,” even though “it was reckless that [he] put [his] hand over her nose and mouth in an effort to get her to sleep. ”  (1T 15-15 to 19)  \(^4\)  His son was fifteen months old, while his daughter was six weeks old.  (1T 16-19 to 24)  On December 16, 2022, [...] sentenced [...] in accordance with the State’s recommendation to a thirty-year NERA term and five years of parole supervision, to run consecutive to the ten-year NERA term on the separate indictment.
[brief] [...] never took the medication while on duty and was never impaired while at work.  (T4 104:17-19).  There is no evidence that [...] filled any prescriptions more quickly than prescribed by the doctor, or --- 3 [...] also travelled to Philadelphia to visit his sinus doctor, which is approximately one and one-half (1 ½) hours from his home.  (T5 106:12-15). that [...] abused his medication in any manner.  (T1 164:14-165:5 and 167:8-11; T5 102:20-103:17).  There is no reliable evidence that [...] ever gave his pain medication to anyone else.  (T4 116:6-13).  [...] voluntarily executed HIPAA forms for [...] so that the Department could access his records at any time.  (T1 165:6-12; T5 102:14-19, 108:3-6).  [...] was not aware of the Department policy mandating that officers report to their superior any prescribed medications.  (T4 121:23-122:7).  He testified that, when he graduated from the Academy, he was provided with a large book which, unbeknownst to him, apparently contained the medication reporting rule, but he was not trained as to the policy.  (T4 121:23-122:7).
[brief] [...] is not mortgage holder as trustee, see [...] letter, A649-650, and [...] was dissolved in 2010 without a successor trust depositor as required.  The Mortgage Loan Purchase Agreement (MLPA) is only an intent to sell, A 272.  Two of the segregated REMICs were not securitized, A253- A270.  In federal court, [...], security underwriter, stated they have no knowledge of [...] for securitization.