ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Indeed, the trial court carefully analyzed [...]’s Expert Report, deposition testimony, and Rule 104 hearing testimony.  Nowhere did Balgowan articulate support for a standard of care applicable to [...], let alone how [...]’s conduct breached that standard.  Rather, Plaintiffs’ expert merely opines that some unspecified inspection of the roadway would have identified some dangerous condition that must have went unnoticed by myriad firsthand witnesses, first responders, and several engineering and construction professionals.  In his written report Balgowan states only that [...] “should have been looking for these sort of issues. ” (Pa20).  He does not explain why or how [...] “should have been looking for these sort of issues. ”  Nor does he identify what type of inspection should have been performed, or when it should have been performed.  Plaintiffs’ expert further failed to opine on whether this type of inspection even falls within the purview of a construction inspector whose sole role it is to confirm that the contractor is building to specification.  Importantly, Balgowan fails to explain how and when [...] breached this amorphous duty.  Instead, he offers only the bare conclusion that [...] should have identified a dangerous condition and that its failure to do so must have caused [...]’s accident.  He offers no independent support for this opinion.  Thus, Plaintiffs’ expert opinion is no different from those rejected in Davis and Taylor.  See Davis, 219 N.J at 406; Taylor, 319 N.J. Super. at 180-84 (holding expert testimony to be an inadmissible net opinion where the expert “presented no authority supporting his opinion [and made] [n]o reference . . . to any written document, or even unwritten custom or practice”).  See also Abas v. Evans Architects, 2020 WL 2047967 (A-2274-18T2 App. Div. April 29, 2020) at *3-5 (plaintiff’s expert opinion was barred as net because expert provided no authority to support his conclusion that the “design plan fell below the level of competence required by the general safety statute” and the expert failed to support his conclusion with reference to any written document, code violations, violations of applicable federal, state, county, or municipal statutes, regulations or ordinances, or violations of generally accepted standards).  Accordingly, Balgowan’s opinion that [...] “should have been looking for these sorts of issues” is a classic, unsubstantiated net opinion and was properly excluded by the trial court.
[brief] **Mitigating factor #11 –  The imprisonment of defendant will entail excessive hardship to herself or her dependents. **  As argued below, as evidenced by the 54 letters submitted to the lower court before sentencing and annexed to the defendant’s sentencing memorandum, [...] dramatically and significantly impacted the lives of many individuals, including many family members and friends.  However, most notably, the majority of the letters were from individuals who have also struggled with substance abuse issues and have attribute [...] with  It is submitted that the trial court should have considered the support that [...] provides for the individuals in his various communities.  Moreover, an extended removal of [...] from his support system, most notably, the support received through the AA program, as well as the support and progress made through the [...], will certainly have a deleterious effect on his sobriety.  The removal from this positive environment, specifically to go to State Prison for Seven Years, would certainly be an extreme hardship on [...].  Accordingly, the trial court erred in not finding mitigating factor #11 or applying any weight.
[brief] The [...] sought damages against plaintiff for fraud, slander of title, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.  As noted above, the [...] charged that plaintiff was not a legal entity, had no lawful ownership rights or interest in the 2004 note or mortgage, and plaintiff fraudulently converted and placed the Schiano’s loan and mortgage into default and foreclosure – placing a cloud on the [...]’ title to their own residential property, causing the [...]’ loan account to be assessed thousands of dollars in fees and charges, and preventing the [...] from being able to refinance the 2004 loan for nearly two decades -- until they were finally able to refinance in October 2022 following the Chancery Court’s determinations ([...] relied on the no default declaration as to [...] and mandated that the Final Judgment be recorded).  Plaintiff’s “fraudulent actions resulted in an invalid mortgage, no title to their home and an inability to refinance for well over a decade from a high interest rate loan to a lower interest loan due to the invalid title and fraudulent character of the debt,” the [...] charged.  8T17-19.  The [...] sought “damages for the significant financial loss in inability to refinance due to Plaintiff, [...] and [...] fraudulent actions…”  “Not only was the 2009 default/foreclosure assignment wrongful, as [...] were never in default,” “Plaintiff [...] has also fraudulently misrepresented its status. ”  Defendants charged that the plaintiff “[...]” is not a legal entity and not a legal holder of the 2004 loan.  “The identity of the Investor has yet to be disclosed.  A valid trust requires a trustee as legal holder of the loan,” defendants contended.  The Plaintiff “[...]” has no trustee as [...], trustee, admits that it is not holder of any Schiano mortgage.  The “[...]” is not a mortgagee as it is not a lender under federal law, the [...] charged.  8T17-20  With regard to their slander of title claim, defendants charged that, in November 2018, they applied for refinance at [...].
[brief] (Pa164-65).  In his administrative appeal, [...] asserted that the panel failed to consider his significant mitigation evidence, including his extensive participation in programs and services and several letters of support submitted on his behalf, and that the panel failed to meet its burden to establish a “substantial likelihood” of future criminal conduct, especially in light of the findings of [...] and the Board psychologist, both of whom concluded that [...] presented only a “low to moderate” risk of reoffense.  (Pa166-79).  In its Final Decision, the Board summarily rejected [...]’s arguments and asserted that the panel did not fail to consider material facts that supported [...]’s release on parole.
[brief] [...] woke up at 7:00 a.m. and saw [...] and his father leaving to go to the train station.  (9T 107-2 to 12; --- \(^8\)  [...] testified that he spoke with [...] regarding [...]’s whereabouts but did not testify as to what [...] said.  (11T 54-2 to 15)  [...] did not testify.  11T 10-10 to 16)  [...] told [...] he was heading to the fit trail, the gym, or the boardwalk (9T 107-24 to 25)  [...] testified that after he dropped his father at the train station, he first went to the Manasquan foot trail, then went to his cousin’s house, then went to the [...] at 5:00 p.m.  (11T 27-24; 46-18 to 25)  He then dropped the rental car off and arrived home around 6:00 or 7:00 p.m. (9T 112-13 to 17; 11T 28-10 to 12, 46-14- to 47-1)
[brief] Based on the above findings, the court shall not address the reasonableness of the fees asserted in plaintiff's motion.  [PA11-14]  This was a reasonable exercise of [...]’s discretion, particularly because the court equally denied counsel fees for [...] as well.  [...] has made the required showing of a “clear abuse of discretion” that would warrant the appellate court’s interference with this discretionary decision.  Strahan v. Strahan, 402 N.J. Super. 298, 317 (App. Div. 2008); Milne v. Goldenberg, 428 N.J. Super. 184, 209 (App. Div. 2012).  [...] pursued a motion for relief under R. 4:50 in an obviously heated breakup involving complex and high-value assets, but which the default judgment entered against her (without any due process) provided her with far less that any “equitable distribution” of the marital assets.
[brief] Defendants cite as their authority R. 4:41-5(b) which governs the use of special masters; not special hearing officers.  Nevertheless, that Rule provides, as to review of a special master's findings:  In an action to be tried without a jury the court shall accept the [special] master's findings of fact unless contrary to the weight of the evidence.  Within [ten] days after being served with notice of the filing of the report any party may serve written objections thereto upon the other parties and may move the court for action upon the report and the objections thereto.  [Id. (emphasis added). ]  As indicated above, either party may serve written objections and may file a motion regarding the report.  However, the plain language of R. 4:41-5(b) does not require a motion or a "hearing" before a trial court may act on the report.  In this case, Defendants had ample opportunity to file a motion with the Trial Court objecting to the SHO's Resolution pursuant to R. 4:41-5(b).  However, Defendants chose instead to provide their comments by way of letter, and they did not request a hearing or oral argument.
[directive] Guidelines for Extreme Risk Protective Orders  (2)  Information Sheet for a Petition for an Extreme Risk Protective Order Against a Law Enforcement Officer  Chief Justice [...] Trial Court Administrators  cc: Attorney General [...]  Special Assistants to the Administrative Director  Public Defender [...]  Criminal Division Managers and Assistants  Criminal Division Judges Family Division Managers Family Division Judges Municipal Division Managers Municipal Court Judges  [...], Chief [...], Director, DCJ [...], Chief [...], Chief of Staff [...], Chief AOC Directors and Assistant Directors
[brief] Chapter 230, Schedule C “Schedule of Permitted Uses” shall be amended as follows (see attached):  -  Codify amendments already adopted in 2019 as part of the Housing Element & Fair Share Plan ordinances (AHR-1, AHR-2, R-27F, TH/MFD, Rt. 202 and Stiles Lane Overlays).  - Include new Senior Housing -1 & 2 Overlay District categories and uses permitted therein.  - Include retail, personal service establishments, and banks, including banks with drive-through facilities as permitted principal uses in the OB-4 District, and eliminate same as conditional uses in the OB-4 District.  - Rename “medical clinics and laboratories” as “medical offices. ”  - Include building materials and contractor’s yards as a permitted principal use in the I Districts.  - Include wineries & breweries and Alternative Treatment Centers (ATCs), excluding sales, as permitted principal uses in the I-1A, I-1B, and I-2 Districts.  - Rename “agriculture and farming” as “farms & agricultural activities. ”  - Include places of worship as a permitted principal use in the R Districts.  - Include personal service establishments as a permitted conditional use in the I-2A Districts.  - Include outdoor storage as a permitted accessory use in the B-3 and B-4 Districts, subject to §230-156.  - Include non-retail electric vehicle charging stations as a permitted accessory use all districts.  - Include retail electric vehicle charging stations as a permitted accessory use the TC, B, OB, I, PBR, and PBO Districts.  - Include keeping of animals as a permitted accessory use in all districts.  - Add new footnotes and references thereto.
[brief] Furthermore, avoiding the stigma associated with a criminal record may also a primary motivator to seek PTI.  See State v. Bell, 217 N.J. 336, 346 (2014).  We all know that many employers are not keen on hiring individuals with criminal records or may prevent someone from obtaining certain types of employment such as positions of law enforcement and many public service jobs.  Thus, there is a grave injustice raised by permitting questioning of defendants about their guilty pleas and factual allocutions supporting the same while they complete PTI.
[brief] For example, the pollution exclusion in the 2007-2010 [...] policies contains expressly worded and limited exceptions providing that the policy’s pollution exclusion “does not apply” to liability caused by certain specified events, such as “hostile fire,” “vandalism or malicious mischief,” “explosion,” “application of pesticides,” or “fumes, vapors or gasses” not containing asbestos or lead.  No similar express limitations are included in the mold exclusion’s exception for mold “on or in” food intended for human consumption.  If the exception applies, because there was proof of mold “on” [...]’s food, the mold exclusion “does not apply;” therefore, it makes no difference which of the routes of his exposure to toxic mold caused his injuries (although probably all of them did): (1) Dermal exposure to mold spores in the dust and on the surfaces of the contaminated condominium; (2) inhalation of mold spores disbursed in the air of the condominium; and (3) ingestion of mold “on” the food that [...] consumed during the eighteen years that he lived in the condominium (and for more than a year afterwards while he consumed food stored there).  If there is mold “on” edible goods “intended” for consumption, that is all that is required to trigger the exception; and if the exception applies, the mold exclusion does, in fact, get “swallowed” by the losses arising from that particular cause.  The Trial Court failed to consider and did not cite Cypress Point and committed reversible error by effectively adding restrictive language to the exception that it does not contain.
[brief] (Not raised below)  "The duty of the prosecutor 'is as much . . . to refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to bring about a just one.'"  State v. Smith, 212 N.J. 365, 403 (2012) (quoting State v. Frost, 158 N.J. 76, 83 (1999) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).  "While 'prosecutors in criminal cases are expected to make vigorous and forceful closing arguments to juries' and are 'afforded considerable leeway,' 'their comments [should be] reasonably related to the scope of the evidence presented.'"  State v. Williams, 244 N.J. 592, 607 (2021) (quoting Frost, 158 N.J. at 82).  "Thus, prosecutors 'must confine their comments to evidence revealed during the trial and reasonable inferences to be drawn from that evidence.'"  State v. Williams, 471 N.J. Super. 34, 44 (App. Div. 2022) (quoting State v. Smith, 167 N.J. 158, 178 (2001)).  Twice during his closing argument (2T70-14; 2T71-24), the prosecutor reminded the jurors that [...] made a "statement" to [...].  Because Sosa never testified, and because the statement was never admitted in evidence, the prosecutor was improperly suggesting that the absent witness had identified [...] as the shooter.  Recall that the jurors asked to see the statement and the judge told them "that it is your recollection of the detective's testimony that controls."  (2T132-16 to 2T132-18)  The prejudicial effect of the prosecutor's argument is obvious.  Also improper was the representation (at 2T77-8 to 2T77-10) that "[...] fled the scene and eventually was not arrested until a month later."  Assuming the video was properly admitted, the prosecutor was free to argue that Mr. [...] is the man in the footage -- but not that he 'fled the scene.'  Exhibit S-23 shows the man calmly walking to the bodega and taking his position behind the cash register.  And [...] did not go into hiding for a month.  The police spent that time interviewing witnesses; [...] was in plain sight the whole time, and the prosecutor should not have portrayed him as a guilty man who was on the run and had to be tracked down.  **CONCLUSION**  For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of conviction should be reversed and the Indictment dismissed or, in the alternative, a new trial ordered.  Respectfully submitted, /s/
[brief] While [...] negotiated with [...] in secret, at around the same time, in late 2017 and early 2018, [...] continued to hold plaintiffs at bay with their stated intention to purchase plaintiff’s solar-energy developmental rights from plaintiffs.  That posture, and the words of inducement to plaintiff during that period, which induced plaintiffs to refrain from selling their solar-developmental rights to third-parties altogether, unfair, were fraudulent and in abject bad faith.  SAC ¶ 67. Pa177-78.
[brief] The Court Should Have Permitted Discovery Related To The Viable Third-Party Defense.  (Da297; 21T81-22 To 82-1, 82-10 To 14).............................69  B.  It Was Wholly Improper To Require Substituted Counsel To Proceed On The Merits After She Repeatedly Protested That She Had Not Completed Investigating And Preparing The Case.  (25T48-14 To 49-9)..................................................................................70  TABLE OF CONTENTS
[brief] [...] had stopped paying [...] pursuant to its subcontract during [...]’s performance on the Hackensack Project in 2020, and, as [...] has repeatedly pointed out, [...] even referenced this nonpayment in its Statement of Counterclaim, which was filed well before its post-hearing brief.  Pa191-Pa209; Pa377-Pa429.  The fact that [...] also referenced this nonpayment in its post-hearing briefing is not dispositive of the issue of ripeness.
[brief] VERIFIED COMPLAINT FILED MAY 4, 2018  DOCKET NO. [...] ....  Da1  APPRAISAL REPORT  [...]  VALUATION DATE JANUARY 27, 1994 .................. Da012  ORDER SETTING DATE OF VALUATION ENTERED BY HON.  [...] 02/20/2019 .................................................. Da102  ORDER BARRING CERTAIN TESTIMONY OF PLAINTIFF’S APPRAISAL EXPERT (DENIED) FILED OCTOBER 14, 2020 .................................  Da108  CONSENT ORDER TRANSFERRING THIS MATTER TO BINDING ARBITRATION AND DISMISSING WITHOUT PREJUDICE FILED OCTOBER 20, 2021 .................  Da110  ORDER AMENDING APPOINTMENT OF ARBITRATOR FILED JANUARY 25, 2022 ..............  Da113  ARBITRATION AWARD DATED MARCH 22, 2022 ..................................  Da115  OPINION OF ARBITRATOR [...] DATED MARCH 22, 2022 ..................................  Da116  CONSENT ORDER CONFIRMING ARBITRATION AWARD AND ENTERING FINAL  JUDGMENT FILED JUNE 21, 2022 .....................................  Da123
[brief] *Filmlife, Inc. v. Mal “Z” Ena, Inc.*, 251 N.J. Super. 570 (App. Div. 1991).  “There is a distinction between fraud regarding matters expressly addressed in the integrated writing and fraud regarding matters wholly extraneous to the writing. ”  *Id.* at 573.  In that regard, “where a contract contains an integration clause, the parol evidence rule bars the introduction of evidence of extrinsic negotiations or agreements to supplement or vary its terms.
[brief] \(^2\)  The policy implications of this regime \(^2\)  In Manalapan, the municipality adopted a zoning ordinance amendment that worked to prohibit the proposed [...] after the local planning board had held three hearings on the application for development; the project died as a result because the Board’s jurisdiction was eliminated mid-hearing.  recognize that sometimes, potential developers may be impacted by legislative changes that occur prior to the filing of an application for development, but unfortunately, that is the price for living in a representative democracy.  The “absurd result” discussed in *Jai Sai Ram*, *supra*, has no applicability to this case.  There, the objector argued that the developer needed a use variance for the proposed [...], but the board ruled that no variance was required.
[brief] Applying the River Vale test, section 0.32 of the Solicitation and Bidder’s Proposed Subcontractor’s Form expressly identified the archaeologist as a subcontractor [0344a], and the PWCRA mandates that all subcontractors be registered pre-bid.  N.J.S.A. 34:11-56.51.  [...] would absolutely have an unlawful competitive advantage if it (unlike others) is permitted to ignore the PWCRA, section 0.32 of the Solicitation and the Bidder’s Proposed Subcontractor’s Form.  Indeed, unlike [...], who sought, identified and secured an agreement from an archeologist subcontractor registered in accordance with the PWCRA pursuant to the Solicitation’s definitions, [...] did not do so.  Moreover, other bidders may have declined to submit bids in response to the Solicitation because of their inability to identify an archeological subcontractor registered in accordance with the PWCRA and the Solicitation’s definitions.
[brief] (Pa80).  Plaintiff attempts to marshal *Britwood* nonetheless by plucking out of context the court’s additional, straightforward finding that the LRHL “coordinates” and does not supersede the MLUL.  This specific finding was made in the context of whether a governing body could employ the LRHL to *impose* off-site infrastructure fees on a non-redeveloper and trump the authority of a planning board to determine off-site infrastructure fee contributions by said non-redevelopers.  *Id.* 566-567.  Plaintiff seeks to conclude from this analysis that the court rejected the assessment of costs even upon redevelopers unless they were assessed in conformity with the MLUL’s strictures.  However, this is not what the court in *Britwood* concludes.  The court rejected the use of the LRHL to foreclose the jurisdiction of planning boards over the imposition of off-site infrastructure costs on developers not engaged in redevelopment.  The lower court’s decision in the instant litigation does not contradict any of the findings made by the court in *Britwood*.  The decision accords with the findings in *Britwood* that funds can be collected from redevelopers pursuant to the “the specific authorization in the LRHL.
[directive] Seizures made by [...], and [...], Methods and Procedures for Depositinq Seized Cash to the Customs Suspense Account  U.S.  [Any shown below may be used for of the four methods making deposits into the Customs Suspense Account.  However, the fourth alternative is the least acceptable.  Therefore, seizing agency representatives will make every attempt to comply with one of the first three methods before using the 4th alternative.]  Direct Deposits at Federal Reserve Banks