ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] It does not exempt non-LGBTQ+ students from parental notification of issues with potentially adverse impact.  Rather, the Revised Policy applies equally and uniformly to all students regardless of their protected class status.  Parental notification under the Revised Policy is not triggered by protected class status, but rather by neutral criteria, i.e., when “a student discloses an issue and/or exhibits behaviors that may have an adverse impact on the student’s physical and/or mental health, safety and or social/emotional well-being. ”  Revised Policy and Regulation (Da110; Da112).  Significantly, the mere fact of a student’s membership in a protected class does not trigger notification under the Revised Policy 8463 as the policy expressly prohibits “notification … based solely on a student’s actual and/or perceived protected characteristics under the” LAD (Da110; Da112).  As set forth above, this provision recognizes the reality that a protected characteristic can be an incidental circumstance in a situation involving an adverse impact.  Thus, the Policy treats LGBTQ+ students in the exact same manner as any other student who discloses an issue and/or exhibits behavior that may have an adverse impact on the student’s physical and/or mental health, safety and or social/emotional well-being.
[brief] \textbf{There is no competent evidence supporting the ALJ’s finding that [...] suffered a drug overdose at [...]’s house (Issue Raised at Pa13, Pa43-Pa46, Pa54-Pa55; Raised in Exceptions Point (I)(a))}  The ALJ found the following:  Based upon the testimony at the Zoom hearings, the parties [sic] briefs and evidence, I \textbf{FIND} the following to the facts of the case:  1.  On July 21, 2018, an acquaintance of appellant, [...], suffered a drug overdose at the appellant’s home (the Incident).  Appellant was off-duty at the time of the Incident.  \textsuperscript{4}  The “Decision” refers to the Decision issued on March 6, 2023 by the Honorable [...], A.L.J. in the case entitled \textit{In the Matter of Michael [...]}, OAL Docket No.: [...].
[directive] RECNVED during the Include the intended enforcement undedying and estimated value: Value  Estimated Law Description of Underlying Offense  Intended Property Enforcement Use -.  < :K Form 0  NJRIPSlDCJ C 2 5  Page 31598 of Municipal Program Forfeiture Report  Purposes Use  Law Enforcement Forfeited Funds for 11: of Part the purpose  DlS7RlBUTlON FORFEITED FUNDS
[brief] A.  The Board’s Actions Did Not Violate N.J.S.A. 34:13A-5.4(a)(1).  Subsection (a)(1) of the Act may be violated independently or derivatively through a violation of other subsections of Section 5.4(a).  [...] established the standard for finding an independent violation of subsection (a)(1) in New Jersey College of Medicine and Dentistry, 4 NJPER ¶ 563 (1978) (Pa341), which states that:  It shall be an unfair practice for an employer to engage in activities which, regardless of the absence of direct proof of anti-union bias, tend to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed by the Act, providing the actions lack a legitimate and substantial “business” justification.  In determining whether the particular action interferes with, restrains, or coerces an employee in the exercise of rights protected under the Act, [...] considers the totality of the evidence proffered, and the competing interests of the public employer and the employee organization and/or the affected individuals.  East Orange Public Library v. Taliaferro, 180 N.J. Super. 155, 160 (App. Div. 1981).  Thus, the facts must show an interference, coercion, or restraint with regard to the exercise of protected rights.  If the facts show that the exercise of protected rights has been infringed upon, the alleged violation must be dismissed if the respondent proffers evidence of a business justification for the action.  *Id.*  [...] has not proffered any evidence whatsoever that [...] interfered with, restrained, or coerced any employees in the exercise of their rights under the Act.  As discussed *supra*, only the Association’s legal representatives have an entitlement to attend negotiations sessions, not the rank-and-file members.  The Board’s insistence that the Association adhere to the Act is not an unfair practice or an interference with any employee right.  [...] does not, and cannot, proffer evidence that [...] prevented Association members from engaging in any protected activity because rank-and-file members did not have a legal entitlement to attend negotiations sessions.  In fact, it is [...], through its properly designated negotiations committee, who have consistently reached out to the Association in an attempt to move the negotiations process forward and make progress on a successor Agreement (See, *i.e.*, 042).  [...] refused to meaningfully engage with [...] on this issue unless [...] agrees that its so-called “Bargaining Council” attend each negotiations session.
[brief] (2T92-4 to 12; 2T93-18 to 20; 2T105-13 to 20).  When [...] arrived at the hospital, he saw that defendant had a large amount of blood on his face, hands, and feet.  (2T103-13 to 16; 2T105-13 to 23).  There was no dried blood on defendant’s chest or his back area.  (2T106-16 to 21).  [...] also saw that defendant had a cut on his right, middle finger, and incision marks on the back of his hands.  (2T105-17 to 24; 2T189-1 to 24).  He also saw long scratches on defendant’s back, which looked fresh to him.  (2T190-3 to 8; 2T190-12 to 14).  After defendant was cleaned, the investigator did not observe any additional injury to defendant that equated with the amount of blood he had seen on him.  (2T107-13 to 16; 2T107-21 to 22).  The investigator took photographs of defendant at the hospital.  (2T104-10 to 16).  The police gathered evidence from defendant at the hospital, including clothing and swabs.  (2T163-15 to 25; 2T164-9 to 14; 2T164-19 to 25).  [...] processed the crime scene at [...].
[brief] **PROCEDURAL HISTORY**  Immediately following the dismissal of his federal claims by the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey (“the District Court”), the Appellant proceeded with the filing of a Complaint on April 11, 2024, including but not limited to his surviving State law claims expressly preserved by the United States District Court (Pa004).  On June 10, 2024, the Respondents, the [...] and the [...], filed a motion to dismiss the Complaint, pursuant to Rule 4:6-2(e).  On June 13, 2024, the Respondents, [...], [...], [...], and [...] similarly filed their own motion to dismiss the Complaint, pursuant to Rule 4:6-2(e).  On July 10, 2024, the Appellant filed opposition to both motions to dismiss.  The Respondents filed replies on July 23, 2024 and July 29, 2024.  At the conclusion of oral argument on August 16, 2024, the trial court entered orders granting both motions and dismissed the Complaint with prejudice as time-barred by the statute of limitations (Pa001-003).
[brief] (1T30:2-37:11).  The court noted that [...]’s no coverage/no defense strategy backfired, and that [...] did not sue [...] to raise any of the defenses it was trying to raise late in the game after discovery ended.  Id.  “[...]’s argument that the final judgment against [...] is not final has no merit.  The judgment against [...] was a final judgment because all the issues among all the defendants have been resolved.  [...] sued [...] for Spill Act violations, as permitted by the Environmental Rights Act.  The court awarded [...] summary judgment against [...] for these claims.  The only other defendant was [...].  They never answered the complaint and suffered default, pursuant to Rule 4:43-1.  [...]’s complaint is fully resolved.  [...] did not raise this non-finality argument when it sought to have this court reconsider the [...] final judgment because it was a nonissue then and it is a non-issue now because the final judgment is a final judgment.
[brief] See Winston, 438 N.J. Super. at 9.  Accordingly, this Court should reject defendant’s Full Faith and Credit challenge to her conviction.  * * * *  New Jersey has every reason—and every right—to enforce its permitting statute within the State, which does not permit handgun carry within New Jersey without a NJ Carry Permit, regardless of whether an individual possesses a carry license from any other state.  Defendant’s contrary arguments find no purchase in case law and contravene basic principles of federalism.  CONCLUSION
[brief] Brown v. Card Serv. Ctr., 464 F.3d 450, 454 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting Wilson v. Quadramed Corp., 225 F.3d 350, 354-55 (3d Cir. 2000)) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).  “The ‘least sophisticated debtor’ standard is a low standard. ”
[brief] (Da10-22)  On June 24, 2019, the Court granted the State’s motion to sever [...] from Defendant and [...] from [...].  (Da23)  On October 29, 2019, [...] and his attorney met with the [...] to give a recorded statement against Defendant.  [...] had previously given statements on: March 5, 23, and 13, 2018 (24T172-19 to 173-3; 25T206-2 to 5; 26T5-21 to 6-15).  In the October 29, 2019 statement, [...] alleged for the first time that he had agreed to pay Defendant to murder [...].  (30T275-16 to 22)  Two days later, on October 31, 2019, [...] pleaded guilty to first-degree manslaughter, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4(a)(1) as well as two firearms offenses and two CDS offenses.  (8T5-4 to 23; Da70)
[brief] ’”  Casino Reinvestment v. Teller, 384 N.J. Super. 408, 413 (App. Div. 2006) (quoting Johnson, 220 N.J. Super. at 264); see also Cummings v. Bahr, 295 N.J. Super. 374, 384 (App. Div. 1996) (quoting *D’Atria v. D’Atria*, 242 N.J. Super. 392, 401-402 (Ch. Div. 1990)).  As noted by our Supreme Court, a reconsideration motion is primarily an opportunity to seek to convince the court that either 1) it has expressed its decision based upon a palpably incorrect or irrational basis, or 2) it is obvious that the court either did not consider, or failed to appreciate the significance of probative, competent evidence.  [Kornbleuth, 241 N.J. at 301 (quoting *Guido v. Duane Morris LLP*, 202 N.J. 79, 87-88 (2010) (internal quotation marks omitted)).]
[brief] Statement of Procedural History........................................1 Statement of Facts..................................................................1  Legal Argument POINT I: THE STATE MISSAPPLIES THE RELEVANT CASELAW IN SUPPORT OF THE TRIAL COURT’S ERROR IN FAILING TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE SEIZED PURSUANT TO NO KNOCK WARRANT (Da15 through Da36)................................. 1 POINT II: STATE’S ARGUMENT REGARDING CLAIM DEFENDANT IS NOT ENTITLED TO A RESENTENCING, IS UNAVAILING TO PRESENT MATTER, BECAUSE THE TRIAL JUDGE FAILED TO FOLLOW THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE CODE OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN IMPOSING SENTENCE (3T20-4 to 3T24-18).......................................................  5  A.  The Sentencing Judge  Failed to Properly Credit with all the appropriate Mitigating Factors (3T20-13 to 3T22-24).....................  5  Conclusion..............................................................................8  TABLE OF TRANSCRIPT  CITATIONS  T - Motion Hearing, March 8, 2023  2T – Motion Hearing, April 26, 2023  3T – Sentencing, October 13, 2023  STATEMENT OF PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[brief] See N.J.A.C. 7:14A-2.4 (identifying activities that generally requires a NJPDES permit; N.J.A.C. 7:14A-24.2 (identifying activities that require a NJPDES stormwater permit).  Any applicable TMDL and corresponding load or wasteload allocation requirements for stormwater are also addressed through the Municipal Separate Stormwater Sewer System (“MS4”) program, which issues a specific type of NJPDES permit to municipalities and other entities for their required stormwater management programs.
[brief] The State contends factor a(5) falls into the latter category. \(^5\)  Whether a defendant possessed a firearm, either in the present, underlying offense or during the pendency of any criminal charge, is a question that requires a definitive answer.  There is no room for discretion as there is when determining whether a defendant poses a danger to the community or whether drug supervisory treatment will reduce the likelihood of recidivism.  Discretionary factors  \(^5\)  During oral argument on December 4, 2023, even the lower court agreed factor a(5) should be construed as a nondiscretionary, objective factor and the matter would be appealable if the State’s objection is overruled. (2T15-25 to 2T16-22). such as a(4) and a(9) permit flexibility based on impressions of a defendant and his circumstances.  With factor a(5), the determination is solely objective – did the defendant possess a firearm or not?  Currently, if a defendant is charged with the unlawful possession of a firearm or for a crime involving the use of a firearm, that defendant is deemed legally ineligible under factor a(5) and barred from Recovery Court, even as he retains the presumption of innocence.  Further, in a scenario where a defendant is both charged with a firearm-related offense and subsequently convicted of that offense, and that firearm possession occurred while another criminal case was pending, then the defendant should also be barred under factor a(5) as it is definitively known a firearm was possessed.  However, by the same token, if a defendant is later acquitted of the firearm-related offense or the charges against him are dismissed, it is clear he did not possess a firearm, and thus would satisfy factor a(5).  Therefore, factor a(5) should be classified as a nondiscretionary, objective factor in determining Recovery Court eligibility.
[brief] 35 O'Brien (Newark) Cogeneration, Inc. v. Automatic Sprinkler Corp. of Am., 361 N.J. Super. 264, 271 (App. Div. 2003), certif. denied, 178 N.J. 452 ..... 50 (2004)  Reich v. Fort Lee Bd. of Adj., 414 N.J. Super. 483 (App. Div. 2009) ....... 15, 50 Reilly v. Brice, 109 N.J. 555 (1988) ..........................................................
[brief] [3T20:6-22:15].  [...] contacted Appellant via telephone; TPD [...] and TPD [...] were present for the entire phone call and were able to hear the entire conversation because [...] made the call on speaker phone.  [3T20:22 – 3T21:1, 3T23:3-6].  Upon being informed to report to IA, Appellant informed [...] that Appellant was in Florida.  [3T22:4-15].  [...] asked if Appellant had informed anybody about being in Florida, and Appellant responded that he did not inform anybody.  [3T22:4-15].  During this same call, Appellant informed [...] that Appellant was in Florida to attend his stepfather’s funeral, and would be back in New Jersey on Saturday, December 1, 2018.  [3T22:16-24].  The Sick Leave Policy applies to “[m]embers desiring to leave their sick leave residence for . . . funeral services” and also requires written permission to be obtained before leaving.  [Da13].  [...] told Appellant to come to IA the following Monday, December 3, 2018 instead.  [3T22:13-15].  However, the following day, Friday, November 30, 2018, Appellant texted [...] and requested that [...] call Appellant.  [3T23:7-14].  Appellant changed his story and claimed that he was not actually in Florida, but rather had only been driving to Florida, and turned around and came back to New Jersey.  [3T23:14-19].  Appellant claimed he could report to IA that day, Friday, November 30, 2018, but [...] advised Appellant that he should report to IA on Monday, December 3, 2018, as previously stated.
[brief] **Cases:**  *Cusseaux v. Pickett*, 279 N.J. Super 335 (Law Div. 1994)  . . . . . . . .  5  *Schantz v. Rachlin*, 101 N.J. Super 334 (Ch. Div 1961).  . . . . . . . .  5  **Statutes:**  N.J.S.A. 40:55D-23 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5  **Court Rules:**  Rule 4:4-1(a)(1)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3  Rule 4:4-4(a)(8) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3  Rule 4:6-2(e) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5  Rule 4:43-1.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3  Rule 4:43-2.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3  TABLE OF CONTENTS
[brief] R. 4:46-2(c) (summary judgment requires review of the complete record, including “pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits” to determine whether a genuine issue of fact exists).  For example, Respondents’ claim that they did not subject Appellant to retaliation by way of reprimand about her attire after she reported [...]’s sexual harassment in November 2018.  [...] claims that Appellant was given a counseling notice on November 8, 2018, due to DCPP supervisors’ complaints about her performance.  --- \(^2\)  See DCPP Opposition Brief § II(B) (citing Bouton v. BMW of North America, 29 F. 3d. 103 (3\(^{rd}\) Cir. 1994)).  Bouton which notably indicates that effective remedial measures prevent further harassment to cure the hostile work environment.  Id. at 110.  Bouton does not suggest that the harassment need to be sexual in nature.  Id.  In any event, the Trial Court did not make any distinction between any claim (hostile working environment, discrimination, or retaliation).  \(^3\)
[brief] The initial plaintiff, [...], is a New Jersey nonprofit corporation that was incorporated on October 5, 2022 – 20 days after the Planning Board unanimously voted to approve [...]’ conditional use application.  (Da488.)  As alleged in its Complaint, [...] is a “non-profit corporation formed by residents and taxpayers of the [...] . . . who are concerned about the manner in which the [...] and its subordinate agencies and boards is implementing . . . its land use ordinance adopted pursuant to the Municipal Land Use Law[.]” (Da518 at ¶2.)  PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[brief] Defendant appeared pro se and the municipal judge noted that she had tried to convince defendant “multiple times” to speak with an attorney.  She explained the seriousness of the charges he faced and confirmed that he wished to represent himself.  Defendant moved to suppress the initial traffic stop and his subsequent arrest.  The judge agreed to decide those motions during trial.  [...] testified up to the point of defendant’s arrest, then defendant began his cross-examination.  Trial continued August 9, 2023, but the judge grew frustrated with defendant’s failure to follow her instructions and court rules.  Over defendant’s objection, the judge appointed the public defender as standby counsel to assist defendant.  Trial resumed on August 23, 2023, with the Freehold Township Public Defender, [...] present.  Although defendant wished to continue representing himself, he agreed to have [...] “assist” him during the trial.  The judge then offered defendant the option of starting the trial over if defendant agreed to have [...] represent him.  As an alternative, [...] proposed adjourning the trial so she could obtain a transcript of the prior proceedings.  She would then continue the trial from where they left off.  The judge decided that once [...] read the transcript, the cross-examination of [...] would begin de novo.  Defendant then thanked the judge for giving him this “option. ”  Trial resumed on December 6, 2023, with [...]’s cross-examination conducted by defendant with [...] assisting.  Bodycam and MVR videos were introduced and played.
[brief] TABLE OF CONTENTS | Section | Page | |------------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS, AND RULINGS BEING APPEALED | ii | | TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | iii | | PRELIMINARY STATEMENT | 1 | | PROCEDURAL HISTORY | 3 | | STATEMENT OF FACTS | 4 | | LEGAL ARGUMENT | 7 | | POINT ONE | | | I.  TYLER APPLIES RETROACTIVELY TO ALL TAKINGS CASES (Ja410–16) | 7 | | A.  The ruling in Tyler must be given full retroactive effect regardless of whether cases pre-date or post-date the Supreme Court’s decision | 10 | | B.  Just compensation is a mandatory remedy in takings claims and operates retroactively | 12 | | C.  New Jersey retroactivity doctrine also supports application of Tyler to this case | 13 | | POINT TWO | | | II.  THIS CASE IS NOT BARRED BY LACHES (Ja416) | 17 | | A.  A claim filed within the statute of limitations is timely | 18 | | B.  Even if this case were eligible for a laches analysis, the equities weigh in favor of [...] | 21 | | POINT III | | | III.  THIS COURT SHOULD REVERSE AND REMAND WITH DIRECTIONS TO GRANT MS. JOHNSON’S CROSS-MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND FURTHER FACT-FINDING TO DETERMINE THE AMOUNT OF JUST COMPENSATION OWED (Ja417) | 22 | | CONCLUSION | 23 | TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS, AND RULINGS BEING APPEALED
[brief] Laidlow, supra, 170 N.J. at 617.  A review of the New Jersey Supreme Court's application of this prong reveals that it operates as an inquiry into whether the injury occurred as a result of ordinary foreseeable work hazards in the plaintiff's field or as a result of some abnormally unsafe employer practice.  For example, in both *Laidlow*, supra, 170 N.J. at 622, and *Mull*, supra, 176 N.J. at 393, the New Jersey Supreme Court determined that an employer's act of removing a safety device on a dangerous industrial machine, in combination with other unsafe practices, was plainly beyond what the Legislature, in enacting the WCA, would have considered a fact of life in industrial employment.  Two things become clear from the Supreme Court’s treatment of the analysis.  First, it is fact specific and requires a detailed, if not exhaustive, consideration of the **totality of the circumstances**.  Prior knowledge, ignorance of known safety requirements, withdrawal of safety practices, and imposition of risks that are both easily avoidable and unnecessary to the work are all factors to be considered.  OSHA citations, ignorance of warnings or complaints, failure to ensure understanding and proper use of safety devices and procedures and the potential for catastrophic injury also are all proper considerations in assessing whether the facts justify denying the employee full compensation.  Second, because liability turns on determinations of fact, the viability of a common-law claim against the employer is ill-suited for resolution on motion where sufficient facts have been alleged that could support a finding of intentional wrong by the factfinder.  Article I, paragraph 9 of the New Jersey Constitution adopted in 1947 states clearly that “[t]he right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate; but the Legislature may authorize the trial of civil causes by a jury of six persons.
[brief] A.  New Jersey law does not support a distinction between the date of the verdict and the judgment of acquittal to determine the date of the favorable termination of the underlying criminal proceeding.  14  B.  Federal law does not support a distinction between the date of the verdict and the judgment of acquittal to determine the date of the favorable termination of the underlying criminal proceeding.  III.  THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY FAILING TO ADDRESS THE POTENTIAL FOR CONFLICTING JUDGMENTS IN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS.  (Raised below: Appellant’s Opposition to Respondents’ Motions to Dismiss)  CONCLUSION TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS, AND RULINGS