ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] See *Burlington Northern and Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White*, 548 U.S. 53, 60 (2006); see also *Roa v. Roa*, 200 N.J. 555, 575 (2010).  In the matter upon appeal before this Court, Appellant testified to a hostile environment where nobody wanted to work with her.  She stated that the employees would not only avoid working the same shift as her, but also would not help her.  Appellant further testified that this meant there were times she needed assistance with a resident but that no one would help her.  Appellant also testified that she was denied overtime shifts, and was given fewer work shifts than previously.  She testified clearly that she was isolated at work.  There is independent documented evidence of one of Appellee’s locations, [...], not wanting to work with Appellant because she discussed her whistleblowing activity.  The hostile work environment became so severe that Appellant first requested to work *per diem*, and then later had to go to the emergency room for anxiety.  Even notwithstanding the wrongful termination and, *arguendo*, accepting Appellee’s mis-stated version of the facts, further contributing to the hostile work environment was the fact that when Appellant was cleared to come back to work, nobody called her, and her attempts to get put on the schedule went ignored.  The foregoing creates the following inquiry, inspired by the U.S. Supreme Court’s holding in Burlington Northern: would an employee engage in protected activity if she knew that she was going to be isolated at work, overtime was going to be taken away from her, she was going to have difficulty working in assigned locations, individuals would avoid working with her, individuals would refuse to help her on two person assignments, that she would face harassment so bad she would need to go to the emergency room for anxiety and when she were cleared to work none of her supervisors would contact her to return?
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[brief] ”  BancPass, Inc. v. Highway Toll Admin., LLC, 2016 WL 4031417, at *3 (W.D. Tex. July 26, 2016).  But identifying search terms is not the end of the discovery process—it is just the beginning.  As explained in the “Sedona Principles”—one of “the leading authorities on electronic document retrieval and production,” Ford Motor Co. v. Edgewood Properties, Inc., 257 F.R.D. 418, 424 (D.N.J. 2009)— search terms help collect documents that are “potentially responsive,” *The Sedona Principles, Third Edition: Best Practices, Recommendations & Principles for Addressing Electronic Document Production*, 19 Sedona Conf. J. 1, 97 (2018) (emphasis added), but the terms themselves do not and cannot determine whether a given document is actually relevant to the subject matter at issue.
[directive] Upon receipt of a judgment entered pursuant to R. 3:26-6(c) or R. 7:4-5(c) the Clerk of the Superior Court shall serve notice, by certified mail, return receipt requested, on the corporate surety company whose name appears on the judgment, at the address of the corporate surety company as recorded in the Bail Registry maintained by the Clerk of the Superior Court pursuant to R. 1:13-3(e).  The notice shall provide that failure to satisfy the judgment within 15 days of the date of the notice will result in the removal of the names of all of the corporate surety company’s licensed insurance producers and limited insurance representatives from the Bail Registry until such time as the judgment has been satisfied.  b.  The Clerk of the Superior Court shall thereupon remove from the Bail Registry the names of any licensed insurance producers and limited insurance representatives authorized to write bail for the corporate surety company.  Bail bonds from the corporate surety company, licensed insurance producers and limited insurance representatives shall not be accepted during the period that they are removed from the Bail Registry.  c.  The Clerk of the Superior Court shall forward a copy of the Order of Judgment to the Commissioner of the [...], [...], with a cover letter requesting that the Department take steps to obtain payment of the judgment in accordance with their regulatory authority without the necessity of executing on the judgment.  The Clerk’s cover letter should contain a request for the Department to forward a response to the Clerk of the Superior Court advising of the Department’s action and the results of that action.  d.  It is the responsibility of the Superior Court or the Municipal Court Administrator or Deputy Court Administrator to send notice to the Clerk of the Superior Court of the payment of any bail forfeiture or satisfaction of any judgment so that corporate surety company, licensed insurance producers and limited insurance representatives may be reinstated in the Bail Registry.  In order to enable the Clerk of the Superior Court to reinstate promptly, this notice shall be provided to the Clerk by facsimile [...] or by telephone at [...].  Such notice shall include the following information: (1) the name of the defendant; (2) the name of the corporate surety company; (3) the date of the Order of Judgment; and (4) the date the bail forfeiture was paid.  SUPREME COURT NEW JERSEY OF IT IS ORDERED that effective immediately and until further Order the Court=s November 1, 2000 Order relaxing and supplementing the provisions of Rules 1:13-3(e), 3:26-6(a), and 7:4-5 is hereby modified so as to change the time that written objection to vacate or set aside a bail forfeiture must be filed from within 45 days of the notice of forfeiture to within 75 days of such notice.
[directive] Each division, agency, office, bureau and unit within the Department of Law and Public Safety, and the County Prosecutors and their personnel, are hereby required, to the extent not inconsistent with law, to cooperate with the [...] and to provide such assistance as the [...] may require to accomplish the purposes of this Directive.  12.  Annual Reports.  In each calendar year, the [...] shall provide to the Attorney General a report as to the activities of the Task Force and its constituent organizational units.
[brief] *Id.* at 565-66.  In that case, the adverse inference was used against the State – the party with the burden of proof – in a criminal matter.  *Clawans*, 38 N.J. at 170.  The Court in *Clawans* held, “For an inference to be drawn from the nonproduction of a witness it must appear that the person was within the power of the party to produce and that his testimony would have been superior to that already utilized in respect to the fact to be proved. ”  *Id.* at 171.  The Court in Hill noted that four factors generally apply before an adverse inference is granted:  (1) that the uncalled witness is peculiarly within the control or power of only the one party, or that there is a special relationship between the party and the witness or the party has superior knowledge of the identity of the witness or of the testimony the witness might be expected to give; (2) that the witness is available to that party both practically and physically; (3) that the testimony of the uncalled witness will elucidate relevant and critical facts in issue [;] and (4) that such testimony appears to be superior to that already utilized in respect to the fact to be proven.  Hill, 199 N.J. at 561 (quoting State v. Hickman, 204 N.J. Super. 409, 414, (App.Div.1985), certif. denied, 103 N.J. 495 (1986).
[brief] Plaintiffs’ final argument is that summary judgment was improper because discovery was not complete.  (Pb24-Pb27).  It is well settled, however, that summary judgment is appropriate before the completion of discovery where no amount of additional discovery will change the outcome of a case.  See *Minoia v. Kushner*, 365 N.J. Super. 304, 307 (App. Div.) (“While we are aware that ordinarily decision on a summary judgment should be withheld until completion of discovery, nevertheless, discovery need not be undertaken or completed if it will patently not change the outcome. ” (citing cases)), certif. denied, 180 N.J. 354 (2004); *Apfel v. Budd Larner Gross Rosenbaum Greenberg & Sade*, 324 N.J. Super. 133, 144 (App. Div.) (rejecting argument that “case was not ripe for summary judgment” because additional discovery “would not change the conclusion reached by the trial court”), certif. denied, 162 N.J. 485 (1999).  Here, no amount of additional discovery would have changed the fact that [...] did not consummate a transaction with [...].  Nor would additional discovery change the fact that even if [...] *had* consummated a transaction with [...], such a transaction would not amount to tortious interference.  To be clear, Plaintiffs should have never had an opportunity to conduct any discovery because their claims should not have survived [...]’s pre-answer motion to dismiss.  That Plaintiffs were afforded an opportunity to conduct discovery and still could not -- and to this day still cannot -- identify a single piece of evidence supporting their claims only underscores why this Court should affirm the trial court’s grant of summary judgment.
[brief] Klumb v. Bd. of Educ. of Manalapan-Englishtown Reg’l High School Dist., 199 N.J. 14, 34 (2009); Geller v. Dep’t of the Treasury of New Jersey, 53 N.J. 591, 597-98 (1969); Widdis v. Pub. Emp. Ret. Sys., 238 N.J. Super. 70, 78 (App. Div. 1990).  “When considering forfeiture provisions which adversely impact on vested rights, strict construction of the statute is required. ”  Widdis, 238 N.J. Super. at 78.  Further, when reviewing pension disputes, Courts have recognized that “the public pension systems are bound up in the public interest and provide public employees significant rights which are deserving of conscientious protection. ”  Zigmont v. Bd. of Trs., 91 N.J. 580 583 (1983).  The statute at issue here, N.J.S.A. 43:16A-11.2, provides in pertinent part:  Should a member, after having established 10 years of creditable service, be separated voluntarily or involuntarily from service, before reaching age 55, and not by removal for cause on charges of misconduct or delinquency, such person may elect to receive the payments provided for in section 11 of P.L.1994, c. 255 or section 16 of P.L.1964, c. 241, or a deferred retirement allowance, beginning on the first day of the month following his attainment of age 55 and the filing of an application therefor…
[brief] Because the trial court did not weigh any of these factors, and focused only upon the one factor that the Supreme Court said was not presumptively valid – the terms dictated by a professional association, the trial court’s decision was so “wide off the mark” that it constituted an abuse of discretion.  See DiFiore, 254 N.J. at 228 (quoting Rowe v. Bell & Gossett Co., 239 N.J. 531, 551-52 (2019) (alteration in original) (quoting Green v. N.J. Mfrs. Ins. Co., 160 N.J. 480, 492 (1999)).  Defendants argue that even if there is a confidentiality order limiting the access to the recording, the recording would be a “public record. ”  (Db16.)  Defendants’ unsubstantiated claim is directly contradicted by Court Rule 1:38-11(b) that permits the sealing of the document from public access.  The neuropsychologist’s concerns for confidentiality of the exam are addressed through the protective order.  *DiFiore*, 254 N.J. at 233.  Even the literature that the neuropsychologist relies on includes the entry of a protective order to address these concerns.  *Id.* at 241.  Defendants’ position demonstrates a potential motivation for Defendants’ preventing the recording – to make the defense expert’s conclusions irrefutable.  (Db16.)  If there is no recording, then what is actually said is not a part of the record.  Here, it would mean a cognitively impaired non-English speaker with a limited education, poor memory, and anxiety issues, would be the only witness to refute what a board-certified psychologist claims.  Nor did Defendants present anything to explain how recording the exam would affect the results in a manner different from the third-party observation of an interpreter that must occur in this case.  Because Defendants had the burden and failed to meet it, the trial court abused its discretion in precluding the recording by a Plaintiff with cognitive limitations, memory impairments, anxiety issues, and a language-barrier.  As a result, the remedy should be reversal.
[brief] (emphasis added)  That the PILOT would yield $387 million in new revenues was the focus:  “[T]he focus of tonight in this ordinance is * * * a new PILOT for [...] which will deliver 387 million in new revenues over its 30 year term, which is approximately six times higher than conventional * * * taxes.  Importantly, PILOTS can also support investments in our schools and EMS services, they can fund new services and amenities for residents and they can be used to offset residential property taxes. ”  T1. 35:16-24.  A related slide at Pa696 showed a projected 387 million in PILOT revenues compared with 67 million in property taxes the Township would otherwise collect as the municipal share of the total tax bill, a 5.8 to 1 ratio.  [...] concluded his presentation with an invitation to the community to get involved in deciding how the new money should be spent:
[brief] (Rb23-24).  This is inaccurate.  The [...] did nothing more than clarify the language it sought in its original final offer.  This was not an attempt to enhance the [...]’s proposal, nor did it incorporate other language such as “changes to contributions and to provide that the [...] would pay the full cost of a dental plan and optical plan. ” (Rb25).  The [...]’s claim that the revised final offer proposed such things is inaccurate, and a misreading of the revised final offer, just as the Arbitrator did.  The [...]’s language proposal was in red in its revised final offer.  This is the only language change sought which is consistent with the original final offer and the [...]’s intent.
[brief] In their motion for compliance, Plaintiffs seek an order directing the [...] to use agreed-upon search terms to identify responsive documents and then to perform a manual review for privilege.  (R. 289, Pls.’ Mot.)  According to Plaintiffs, this is the protocol authorized by the November 20, 2019 order.  (Id.)  Plaintiffs assert that the court should adopt their protocol for the use of TAR, which would require the [...] to use TAR on the entire ESI collection with an agreed-upon coding system for responsiveness.  (Id.)  In response, the [...] argues that the November 2019 order did not confine it to a particular methodology for identifying responsive or privileged ESI, and that TAR is an efficient and accurate tool for identifying both.  (R. 300, Def.’s Resp.)  The [...] also objects to Plaintiffs’ proposed TAR protocol, arguing that the federal rules governing discovery impose no obligation on the responding party to conduct its responsiveness review in a manner dictated by the requesting party.  (Id.)  A.
[brief] C.  Overly Broad  Plaintiffs also object arguing that the search terms are overly broad.  Specifically, Plaintiffs appear to argue that the search terms are overly broad because they will produce some documents that are not relevant to this case.  (See e.g., Doc. 186-1 at 4) (“Plaintiffs have objected to the search term “acquisition” on the basis that the term is not relevant to the case. ”).  The Court has reviewed the 28 search terms at issue and, based on the Court knowledge of this case from the various hearings and prior motion practice, the Court concludes that the terms are relevant to the issues in this case.
[brief] (Pa43).  Moreover, a retiree is eligible for group life insurance only if they have established ten or more years of service credit.  N.J.A.C. 17:2-3.9 (“noncontributory life insurance shall be payable after the death of a retired member, only if the member established 10 or more years of pension membership credit at the time of retirement, or retired on a disability retirement. ”).  Thus, under the plain language of the regulation, [...] is not eligible for group life insurance.
[brief] It was expressed on the record before the Honorable [...] on March 23rd.  In addition to that, subsequent to that and subsequent to -- subsequent to that the parties have come before this Court.  This matter was argued before the Court initially as part of the motion that was filed.  And this Court had a chance to hear from both counsel at that time as to their positions.  And today, the Court has gone even further to listen to the parties with regards to their positions and also to explore even deeper into the transcript from the proceedings before [...].  And this Court finds that with regards to the issue of waiver, this Court finds that the defendants expressly waived arbitration by way of the waiver, by way of the statements made by [...] before [...] back on March 23rd.  There is nothing before this Court to contradict that.  And the fact that now the parties are seeking to -- seeking to move this matter to arbitration regardless of the fact that there has not been a lot that has taken place is irrelevant to this Court.
[brief] The jury was also instructed on accomplice liability.  (26T137:15-147:10.)  More specifically, the elements of accomplice liability for felony murder, murder, and robbery were each set out.  *Ibid.*  The following portion of the charge is particularly relevant to this appeal:  Remember that this defendant can be held to be an accomplice with equal responsibility, only if you find as a fact that he possessed the criminal state of mind that is required to be proved against the person who actually committed the criminal act.  In order to convict the defendant as an accomplice to the specific crimes charged, you must find that this defendant had the purpose to participate in that particular crime.  He must act with purpose, or promoting, or facilitating the commission of the substantive crimes with which he is charged.  It is not sufficient to prove only that the defendant had knowledge that the other person was going to commit the crimes charged.  The State must prove that it was the defendant's conscious object that the specific conduct charged be committed.  In sum, in order to find the defendant guilty of the committed -- of committing the crimes of felony murder, robbery, murder, the State must prove each of the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt.  Number one, that [...] committed the crimes of felony murder, robbery or murder.  Number two, that this defendant solicited him to commit them and/or did aid, or agree, or attempt to aid him in planning or committing them.  Number three, that this defendant's purpose was to promote or facilitate the commission of the offenses.  And, number four, that this defendant possessed the criminal state of mind that is required to be proved against the person who actually committed the criminal act.  [26T144:15-145:19.]  If, however, you find the defendant not guilty of acting as an accomplice to [...] on the specific crime charged, then you should consider whether the defendant did act as an accomplice of [...], but with the purpose of promoting or facilitating the commission of some lesser offense, other than the actual crimes charged in the Indictment.  The law recognizes that two or more persons may participate in the commission of an offense, but each may participate therein with a different state of mind.  The liability or responsibility of each participant for any ensuing offense is dependent upon his own state of mind, and not on anyone else's.  You're are guided by these legal principles.  [26T146:17-147:5.]  Note that the jury was also advised that their verdict must be unanimous.  (26T146:6-8; 26T159:20-23; 26T160:12-18).  Sentencing Factors Considered
[brief] I, ¶ 1 | 8, 22 | | N.J. Const. art. I, ¶ 9 | 8, 22 | | N.J. Const. art.  I, ¶ 10 | 8, 22 | | U.S. Const. amend. V | 8, 22 | | U.S. Const. amend. VI | 8, 22 | | U.S. Const. amend.  XIV | 8, 22 | PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[brief] Merchants Ind. Corp. v. Eggleston.  37 N.J. 114, 130 (1962).  The relevant question here is not only whether the objecting party intentionally relinquished his objection to the arbitration, but whether he so conducted himself that he should be held to have made a binding election.  Employing the language of Merchants, “waiver” really means that the objecting party has made an election which is binding “not because he wants it to be, but because the law makes it so,” Highgate Dev. Corp. v. Kirsh, 224 N.J. Super. 328, 131 (App. Div. 1988).  Two decades later, the New Jersey Supreme Court also discussed a party’s failure to object to an Arbitrator’s jurisdiction during the arbitration proceeding:
[brief] As the Supreme Court held in Dzwonar v. McDevitt, 177 N.J. 451 (2003) when a defendant argues at summary judgment that an employee’s belief is unreasonable, the Court must determine whether there is a “substantial nexus” between the complained of conduct and the implicated law, regulation, or public policy.  Dzwonar, 177 N.J. at 464.  If such a nexus exists, “the jury then must determine whether the plaintiff actually held such a belief, and if so, whether that belief was objectively reasonable. ”  Id. at 464-65.  Such a nexus is present in this case.  There is no need for a “trial within a trial” as to Defendant [...]’s ultimate criminal liability for statutory harassment.  In Mehlman, supra., the New Jersey Supreme Court held that an employee’s belief in the illegality of conduct does not need to be ultimately proven correct for the activity to be protected under CEPA.  153 N.J. at 193.  Rather, the only question is whether Plaintiff, as well as other individuals such as [...] and [...], had a reasonable belief that Defendant [...]’s conduct was illegal, and whether that conduct falls within a law that gives rise to the protections of CEPA.  Based on the facts and the text of the statute, the issue should not have been decided by the Court on summary judgment.  There is sufficient evidence to establish that Plaintiff satisfies the first CEPA prong.  A jury is in the best position to assess the credibility of witnesses and weigh conflicting evidence to determine whether the employee’s belief was objectively reasonable.  C.