ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] First, the argument that the interpretation of N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-9(e)(3) as allowing payment to [...] without a renegotiated contract violates the Impairment of Contracts Clause under the U.S. and New Jersey Constitutions is detailed above under Point Eight of this Brief.  Second, another unconstitutional interference with vested rights of the Board is under the New Jersey Constitution, Art. 8, § IV, ¶ 1, where school districts must provide for a “thorough and efficient” education.  The Board is able to carry out this duty through N.J.S.A. 18A:11-1(d), where the Board “shall” “Perform all acts and do all things, consistent with law and the rules of the state board, necessary for the lawful and proper conduct, equipment and maintenance of the public schools of the district”.  A major focus of the Board during the pandemic was to preserve and reserve funding and resources to thoroughly execute remote instruction and combat learning loss from remote instruction, so the Board prioritized its resources toward that end.  It would have a detrimental impact on budgeting, planning, and financial resources, and by extension, negatively impact the Board’s ability to provide the constitutional “thorough and efficient” education, if the statute was applied retroactively where the Board is forced to spend exorbitant amounts of money on a for-profit private company who, at the time, provided no benefit to its students.  Applying the statute retroactively thus unconstitutionally interferes with the Board’s rights to ensure efficient spending of public taxpayer money for the lawful and proper conduct of the school district.  Thus, even if [...] did have a right to be paid under N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-9(e)(3), this court cannot give the statute retroactive application.
[brief] Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 357 (reversing the lower court’s decision); United States v. Clark, 902 F.3d 404, 410, 410 n.4 (3d Cir. 2018) (“There is no de minimis exception to this rule. ” (citing Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 357)).  B.  The Police Did Not Have Reasonable Suspicion of Criminal Activity.
[brief] Rule 3:23-4(a) states that upon the filing of the notice of appeal, the clerk of the court below shall forthwith deliver to the criminal division manager's office the complaint, the judgment of conviction, the exhibits retained by the clerk, and a transcript of the entire docket in the action, and the criminal division manager's office shall deliver copies thereof to the prosecuting attorney on request.  Rule 3:23-7 requires "execution of the judgment" by the municipal court from which the appeal was taken.  Rule 3:24(c ) states in relevant part that Appeals pursuant to this rule shall be taken within 20 days after the entry of such order by filing with the Superior Court, Law Division in the county of venue a notice of motion for leave to appeal under paragraph (a) or the notice of appeal under paragraph (b).  There was no such order.  Thus procedurally, the appeal was not yet ripe.  No record anywhere demonstrates there was never an order or judgment sent to the criminal case management office in the county.  Such explains the extreme frustration of undersigned counsel when he was told by the staff of JEDS that there was no record.  Most importantly is the fact that neither municipal court personnel ever turned over to [...] or his attorney a copy of the signed order entering judgment which is the sine qua non of being able to appeal.  The evidence of defendants’ violation of plaintiff’s due process rights relayed to his inability to Appeal his record of conviction was so lop sided that summary judgment should have been granted to the plaintiff on this issue pursuant to Brill.
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[brief] Section 6.2 of the SPAs defines “Losses” as:  “any and all obligations . . . claims, actions, injuries, demands, suits, judgments, proceedings, investigations, arbitrations and reasonable expenses, including reasonable accountant’s and reasonable attorney’s fees and expenses. ” (Da2806; 2827).  See Litton Indus., Inc. v. IMO Indus., Inc., 200 N.J. 372, 385 (2009) (explicit reference to attorney’s fees as part of the definition of “Losses” sufficient for award).
[brief] ”  Attorney General, [Eradicating Racial Profiling] Companion Guide at 104-106 (2005). 5  When the lawfulness of an automobile stop is based on reasonable suspicion that the driver is involved in criminal wrongdoing, the police will have reasonable suspicion of criminal wrongdoing at the outset of the stop.  See, e.g., State v. Smart, 473 N.J. Super. 87, 100 (App. Div. 2022), aff’d on other grounds, 253 N.J. 156 (2023)(finding reasonable suspicion to prolong car stop for dog sniff where police has reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to stop, based on confidential sources and officers’ observations of defendant engaging in suspected narcotics activity “during their continuous, same-day surveillance”).  On the other hand, as the State acknowledges in its brief, when the lawfulness of an automobile stop is based on an observed traffic offense, the police may ask for consent to search the car only if, during the course of the stop, reasonable suspicion of criminal wrongdoing arises.
[brief] The Court stated:  …smartphones have become ever more ubiquitous and the location tracking capabilities of those devices and their applications (or "apps") ever more familiar.  Smartphone ownership among American adults grew from 35% in 2011 to 85% in 2021, and ownership among adults aged 18-49 is greater than 95%.  While few could explain the technology used by phones and the network of towers and satellites with which they constantly communicate, the fact that they collect data about users' habits, including location, is widely understood:
[directive] Complaints, motions and other papers submitted to the court should be in English 뉴저지 사법부 [...] 1998년 6월 24일 이후에 발생한 특정 마약 및 무기 범죄에 대한 추가 질문 Additional Questions for Certain Drug and Weapons Offenses Committed on or After June 24, 1998 (Korean) 귀하가 특정한 마약 범죄에 대해 유죄를 인정하고, 또한 범죄를 저지르거나, 범행미수 또는 공모하는 동안에 총기 또는 다른 무기를 소지한 것에 대해 유죄를 인정하는 경우, 다음의 질문에 답변해야 합니다.
[brief] Escrow Agent shall have the right to consult with separate counsel of its own choosing (if it deems such consultation advisable) and shall not be liable for any action taken, suffered or omitted by it in accordance with the advice of such counsel.  (c)  Escrow Agent shall not be required to defend any legal proceeding which may be instituted against it with respect to the Escrowed Funds, the Real Property or the subject matter of this Agreement unless requested to do so by Purchaser or Seller and unless Escrow Agent is indemnified to its satisfaction against the cost and expense of such defense.  Escrow Agent shall not be required to institute legal proceedings of any kind and shall have no responsibility for the genuineness or validity of any document or other item deposited with it or the collectability of any check delivered in connection with this Agreement.  Escrow Agent shall be fully protected in acting in accordance with any written instructions given to it hereunder and believed by it to have been signed by the proper parties.  See PSA Section 17.1 (emphasis added) (Pa118-119).
[brief] This appeal is from the decision of the tenancy court to retain jurisdiction despite Defendant [...]’s claims that she was not a tenant but the homeowner whose title to the property had been fraudulently taken from her and her late husband by the Plaintiff.  Rendering its decision on ownership, the trial court ignored the bright line this Court established in Carr v. Johnson, 211 N.J. Super. 341, 348 (App. Div. 1986) holding that the legislature: “did not intend for the Special Civil Part (as successor to the County District Court) to determine disputed land titles and complex equitable issues in the context of a landlord-tenant dispossess action… since it is a summary proceeding in which discovery is not permitted. ”  As such, the trial court’s judgment is subject to plenary review.  See Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. Of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995) (holding that “a trial court’s interpretation of the law and the legal consequences that flow from established facts are not entitled to any special deference. ”).  LEGAL ARGUMENT REPLY TO PLAINTIFF’S LEGAL ARGUMENT
[brief] Section 5.2 of the Settlement Agreement reflects an intent to release unknown claims based on later-discovered facts but which could have been asserted in *Roma*.  --- **5.2  Waiver of Unknown Released Claims. **  It is the desire of the Settling Parties to fully, finally, and forever settle, compromise, and discharge all of the Class Representative’s and the Class Members’ *Released Claims which were or which could have been asserted in this action, whether known or unknown*, against all Released Persons.  As a consequence, the Class Representative and each Class Member *may hereafter discover facts in addition to or different from those which he or she now knows or believes to be true with respect to the subject matter of the Released Claims*, but the Class Representative and each Class Member, upon the Effective Date, shall be deemed to have, and by operation of the Final Settlement Order and Judgment *shall have, fully, finally, and forever settled and released any and all Released Claims, known or unknown*
[brief] DEFENDANT’S PETITION IS ALSO TIME BARRED BECAUSE HE DISCOVERED TORRES’ HABEAS PETITION IN 2017.  Defendant argues that the trial judge erred by finding his second PCR petition procedurally barred because [...]’ habeas petition was not discoverable earlier by reasonable diligence.  (Db43-45).  The State submits that defendant’s second PCR petition is barred for three reasons.  First, under Rules 3:22-4(b)(2)(B) because (1) [...]’ habeas petition was discoverable, ⁹ This Point responds to Point II of defendant’s brief. and in fact was discovered, earlier; and (2) [...]’ habeas petition does not raise a reasonable probability that relief will be granted.  Second, defendant’s second PCR petition is barred under Rule 3:22-5, because his Brady claim is substantially similar to his prior Carter claim.  Third, defendant’s instant PCR petition is time barred under Rule 3:22-12(a)(2)(B) because it was filed five years after defendant discovered [...]’ habeas petition in 2017.
[brief] **Standard Of Review**  An appellate court reviews a final agency action with deference.  *In re Freshwater Gen. Permit No. 7* (“*In re FWW GP7*”), 405 N.J. Super. 204, 212-13 (App. Div. 2009).  The deference afforded to an agency “is even stronger when the agency . . . has been delegated discretion to determine the specialized and technical procedures for its tasks. ”  *In re Freshwater Wetlands Gen. Permits* (“*In re FWW GPS*”), 372 N.J. Super. 578, 593 (App. Div. 2004) (citation omitted).  “This is because the agency has the staff, resources and expertise to understand \(^8\) [...] was included as a respondent in Appellant’s Amended Notice of Appeal.
[brief] [...] can alleviate the concern by having Sureties submit two Power of Attorneys.  [...] is not debating that right.  Indeed, as this Court will recognize, [...] has already made changes to its Specifications to implement that process.  What [...] objects to is [...] effectively retroactively applying that new Specification requirement in contravention of a long history of what was found on thirteen prior occasions to be [...] acceptable and then using that as a basis to throw out its low bid.  Ironically, [...] is actually arguing on behalf of [...], while [...] argues against its own self-interests.  The backwards nature of [...]’s argument in and of itself proves its arbitrary and capricious nature.  [...]’s assertion that it lacked any assurances that [...] would honor the Consent of Surety is not founded on any fact.  Indeed, right from the start [...] was assured by [...] that it would provide the required Bonds - as it had done on thirteen prior occasions.  [...] was assured that if [...] refused to provide the Contract Bonds it had strong legal grounds to compel [...] to do based on equitable estoppel, detrimental reliance, and potentially even fraud in the inducement.
[brief] THE COURT: Okay.  What did you think it was that you were looking for?  THE WITNESS:  A rubber box with a lid, with like a clear bottom and maybe not a clear top, but she told, my mother told [...] exactly where to look for it, when you walked into the closet, like on the right hand side on the floor, and her closet is pretty big.  She said like I think to the immediate right when you walked in.  THE COURT:  And did you see anything?  THE WITNESS:  There were a lot of things in there but we didn’t see anything that held documents, but even before my mother died, [...] had talked about ransacking the house from the garage to the attic, looking for the dog’s ashes because he said my mom told him she wanted to be buried with their previous dog’s ashes.  So when he was talking about going through the house, and this was before she passed, I knew, I felt that he was not looking for the dog’s ashes.  I felt like he was, you know, looking for things, so, things that had been gone before she passed.  (12T44-12 to 45-7).  The Petitioner alleged that he did not remove or destroy any legal documents from the house after the Decedent entered the hospital.  (8T128-15 to 129-1).  The Chancery Division noted the following timeline of events that occurred after the Decedent’s death:
[brief] THE PROJECT IS CONSISTENT WITH THE ENERGY MASTER PLAN’S GOALS TO MAINTAIN A RELIABLE AND SAFE NATURAL GAS SYSTEM.  (Addressing Appellant’s Arguments at Ab28-53.)  [...] challenges the admissibility of the testimony of [...]’s expert witness, [...], on the EMP.  (Ab38-39).  It also contends that the proposed Project is inconsistent with “the State’s climate laws and policies,” including the EMP.  (Ab33; Ab36-37; Ab42-43).  Furthermore, [...] argues that the Project constitutes a “stranded asset. ” (Ab52-53).  These arguments are erroneous and lack legal support.  The record supports the [...]’s determination that the Project is reasonably necessary because it increases reliability, consistent with EMP’s policy goals.
[brief] While the trial court did criticize Appellant’s drafting and referenced her poor responsiveness during oral argument, the court repeatedly stated that it had reviewed all the documents filed by counsel in the matter.  T3-13–T3-14.  As explained thoroughly by the trial court:  I read the briefs.  I read all my summary judgment dispositive motion briefs and anything else that might be of interest or more complicated.  I don’t leave it to my law clerk.  I look at the briefs to point to the record, the motion record that supports whatever you say in the brief.  You did not give me many citations, if any, to a lot of things.  For example, you say that she treated - - plaintiff “treated for anxiety before”.  That’s at your brief, page 13 of 29 on eCourt paging system.  No citations to the record.  T15-6–T15-16.  Despite Appellant’s attempted reframing, the court below repeatedly questioned Appellant as to whether there was any actual evidentiary support for her allegations that she was diagnosed or treated for anxiety while employed by Respondent.  However, Appellant could not provide any support other than barebones allegations without any documentary evidence.  In the exchange in question, the lower court had asked Appellant to identify any specific citations to medical records supporting her allegations of anxiety, the Appellant could not identify any.  As the lower court correctly concluded “No medical record, no citation to anything to support that statement . . .  No citation to anything.  For all I know you made all of that up. ”  T16-17–T16-24.  Appellant’s counsel responded on the record regarding this failure.  Despite being chastised for failing to include proper citations in her brief, the lower court did in fact discuss all of the text messages in question during the hearing, which Appellant has again misrepresented to this Court by cutting off the full conversations which show that the messages were clearly communicated in jest as part of a larger conversation amongst her coworkers.  Contrary to Appellant’s assertions the trial court did review all the evidence in the record, including the text messages in question.  Yet, they clearly do not purport to be what Appellant contends they are.  However, Appellant only wanted the lower court to ignore the fact that, to the contrary, she had provided absolutely no evidence supporting her allegations regarding the existence of any disability.  POINT V THERE IS NOT A SINGLE IOTA OF EVIDENCE THAT DEMONSTRATES PRETEXT
[brief] The Trial Order directed specific performance of the Redevelopment Agreement by [...], requiring the parties recommence the unfinished phases of the Project by obtaining any necessary government approvals, and further requiring that [...] take necessary steps to satisfy the financing contingency set forth in Section 8.7 of the Redevelopment Agreement, or negotiate a waiver of same.  Da361-Da366; Da111-Da112.  The trial court also entered judgment in favor of [...] and against [...] on [...]’s counterclaim for breach of the Operating Agreement.
[brief] Section (g) provides:  “I will hold confidential all matters pertaining to the schools which, if disclosed, would needlessly injure individuals or the schools.  In all other matters, I will provide accurate information and, in concert with my fellow board members, interpret to the staff the aspirations of the community for its school. ”  For complaints alleging a violation of “the inaccurate information provision of [section] (g),” the complaint must “include evidence that substantiates the inaccuracy of the information provided by the respondent(s) and evidence that establishes that the inaccuracy was other than reasonable mistake or personal opinion or was not attributable to developing circumstances.
[brief] (Pa73, Pa29, Pa84; 1T26-11 to 27-21.)  The towel rack did not cause plaintiff to lose her balance before her fall.  (Pa79-80, Pa29; see 1T26-14 to 18.)  Nonetheless, [...] personally opined that visually, the towel rack “appeared” like a grab bar.  (Pa59.)  And it created a defective condition because it could not hold as much weight as a grab bar is required to hold, “lack[ed] visual cues that would alert people to the [rack]’s lack of structural capacity,” and was located “at the foreseeable entry point to the jacuzzi. ”  (Pa59.)  [...] cites no support or industry standard for his personal opinion.  III.
[brief] The application of res judicata is a question of law "to be determined by a judge in the second proceeding after weighing the appropriate factors bearing upon the issue."  Colucci v. Thomas Nicol Asphalt Co., 194 N.J. Super. 510, 518 (App. Div. 1984).  Respondent, therefore, takes no issue with this Court’s de novo review of [...]’s decision not to invoke the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel.  See Selective Ins. Co v. McAllister, 327 N.J. Super. 168, 173 (App. Div. 2000).  However, [...]’s decisions not to invoke the entire controversy doctrine and not to expand the scope of the lawsuit beyond the pleadings, should be viewed under an abuse of discretion standard.  As the New Jersey Supreme Court has determined, the entire controversy doctrine is an equitable doctrine left to the sound discretion of the Court based on the factual circumstances of individual cases.  See Bank Leumi USA v. Kloss, 243 N. J. 218, 227 (2020).  On appeal, a trial court’s discretionary decisions are typically reviewed under the heightened abuse of discretion standard and not de novo.  See State v. Chavies, 247 N.J. 245, 257 (2021).  In addition, [...]’s decision not to consider issues involving the scope and maintenance of the easement when never raised by the parties in their pleadings is similarly reviewable under the abuse of discretion standard.  See generally Rendine v. Pantzer, 141 N.J. 292, 310 (1995) (addressing the severance of claims as being within the court’s discretion).  Accordingly, as the Court conducts its de novo review of the legal claims, its review of the application of the entire controversy doctrine and refusal to expand the case beyond the pleadings should be considered under an abuse of discretion standard.
[directive] The Court in Mackroy-Davis considered whether a particular defendant's statutory right to a speedy trial was violated by trial not taking place for more of than two years following detention, with that delay primarily because circumstances caused by the COVID-19 pandemic.  The Court determined that the defendant's speedy trial right was not violated in this situation because the of prosecutor was ready to proceed at the end the two-year cap with the of court's continued delay beyond that time the result the inability to proceed, of jury because COVID-related health and safety protocols that limit trial capacity.  The Court offered guidance on various issues related to excludable time under the Criminal Justice Reform Act (CJRA) and the need to schedule more of jury trials as soon as practicable.  That guidance, detailed in the remainder of this memo, addressed (1) the need to develop a clear record the prosecutor's of readiness to proceed to trial prior to the expiration the two-year cap, (2) of protocols for the courts and parties to follow to optimize the scheduling ADA ENSURING TO AN DOOR OPEN JUSTICE with Americans Act Disabilities of4  Page I Directive #06-22 - Criminal Justice Reform - Speedy Trial - Guidance Articulated by the Supreme Court in State v. [...] S. July 12, 2022 Page2 criminal trials; and (3) expedited timeframes for motions for leave to appeal an order about speedy trial calculations.