ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The court reasoned:  In the instant matter, the State intends to present identical evidence against both [...] and [...].  The State claims that there is not one piece of evidence or testimony that would not be introduced against both defendants at separate trials.  [...] and [...] are charged with conspiracy and offenses which arise from the same acts and transaction.  The prosecutor's theory of the case does not force the jury to choose between the defendants' conflicting accounts and to find only one defendant guilty.  Thus, [...]'s defense is not mutually exclusive and antagonistic at its core.  The jury will be able to assess the credibility of all witnesses and evaluate each defendant's version of the events and reach a conclusion on the culpability of each.  Moreover, this court will instruct the jury that it must return separate verdicts for each defendant as to each of the charges in the indictment, and that the jury will hence have to decide each case individually.  Additionally, the jury will be instructed that whether the verdicts as to each defendant are the same depends on the evidence and its determination as judges of the facts.  In view of the foregoing, this court is of the opinion that the defendants' due process right[s] to a fair trial are not outweighed by the State's interest in judicial efficiency, as such, severance is not appropriate.  Because the prosecution of the offenses arises from the same transaction and requires the same evidence, this court must deny defendant's motion for severance.
[directive] d.  Firing positions are as indicated in the course.  Phase I 25 yard line.  Total 10 rounds  Standing to Kneeling Cover Position •  Assume a standing, shoulder ready, position.  •  On command shooter moves to and assumes kneeling cover position, fires 5 rounds.  • Time: 10 seconds • Repeat once --- STOP TIME --- 9-68 Semi-Annual Firearms Qualification and Requalification Standards
[directive] Required Contents of Departmental Policies  Pursuant to the requirements of Attorney General Law Enforcement Directive 2010-5, every law enforcement agency that possesses or uses an ALPR must promulgate and enforce a rule, regulation, standing operating procedure, directive, or order that establishes a comprehensive policy governing the operation of ALPRs, and governing access to, use, and retention of all stored ALPR data.  The ALPR policy promulgated by the department must be consistent with the standards and procedural safeguards established in these Guidelines, and each ALPR policy must include the following provisions:
[brief] AT SENTENCING, THE TRIAL COURT MADE ERRORS IN WEIGHING THE AGGRAVATING FACTORS AND FAILED TO CONDUCT THE APPROPRIATE ANALYSIS BEFORE IMPOSING THREE CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES, RESULTING IN AN EXCESSIVE SENTENCE AMOUNTING TO LIFE WITHOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF PAROLE.  (8T22-3 to 30-13)  Even if [...]’s convictions are affirmed, his sentences must nonetheless be reversed and remanded because the trial court gave “significant” aggravating weight to charges that were dismissed, erroneously imposed aggravating factor one (an exceptional factor that was not even requested by the State), and failed to engage in the required analysis before imposing consecutive sentences that, in the aggregate, amounted to the practical equivalent of life in prison without the possibility of parole.
[brief] (19T 7-14 to 23).  The judge, though, incorrectly remembered [...]’s testimony.  (19T 6-18 to 13).  The judge erroneously professed that [...] met the private investigator at [...], a bodega on [...] in [...], to give a statement about defendant’s whereabouts when she actually testified that she met him at the detective agency.  (14T 62-13 to 63-6).  Moreover, the judge assumed [...] left defendant at [...]’s residence in [...] at the end of the fare.  (19T 17-2 to 11).  Yet, the record clearly reflects that [...] resided at the [...] complex in [...].  (14T 50-15 to 51-6).  In the end, the PCR judge’s understanding of [...]’s testimony was muddled at best.  In any event, the PCR judge did not address whether the information the two alibi witnesses imparted would have had an impact on the State’s proofs actually presented so that a reasonable probability existed the jury would have returned a more favorable verdict.
[brief] Additionally, the trial court’s ruling ignores the fact that [...] was permitted to testify during cross-examination by counsel for [...] about his understanding of how the accident occurred.  Q.  And one final thing.  From your video it appears sir, that the [...] vehicle never made it to the intersection; correct?  A. Correct.  Q.  The impact occurred before the [...] vehicle even got there; correct?  A. Correct.  Q.  And therefore the first collision between the [...] vehicle and the [...] van occurred in the intersection; correct?  A. Correct.  Q.  Okay, and then the [...] van went through the intersection and struck the second time with the [...] vehicle; is that correct?  A. Correct.  [2T:93-22 to 94-11.]  This testimony explains exactly what is depicted in the diagram.  It demonstrates that the point of impact between the [...] vehicle and the [...] vehicle occurred in the intersection with the left-front corner of the [...] vehicle striking the right-front corner of the [...] vehicle and the [...] vehicle then striking the left-front portion of the Plaintiff’s vehicle.
[brief] ”  State v. Watts, 223 N.J. 503, 513 (2015).  “Warrantless searches are presumptively unreasonable,” and “the State bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence not only that the [warrantless] search or seizure was premised on probable cause, but also that it ‘fell’ within one of the few well-delineated exceptions to the warrant requirement. ”  State v. Bryant, 227 N.J. 60, 69-70 (2016) (quoting State v. Johnson, 193 N.J. 528, 552 (2008)).  Consent to search is a “long-recognized” exception to the warrant requirement.  State v. Coles, 218 N.J. 322, 337 (2014).  Consent searches of motor vehicles that are pulled over by police are valid only if (1) “there is a reasonable and articulable basis beyond the initial valid motor vehicle stop to continue the detention after completion of the valid traffic stop, State v. Carty, 170 N.J. 632, 647 (2002); and (2) the consent is “given knowingly and voluntarily,” id. at 639.  The linchpin to voluntary consent “is whether a person has knowingly waived [her] right to refuse to consent to the search. ”  State v. Domicz, 188 N.J. 285, 308 (2006) (citing State v. Johnson., 68 N.J. 349,-54 (1975)).  The burden is on the State to prove “that the individual giving consent knew that he or she ‘had a choice in the matter. ’”  Carty, 170 N.J. at 639 (quoting Johnson, 68 N.J. at 354).  Specifically, the consenting individual must have been aware of her right to refuse, before giving consent.  Johnson, 68 N.J. at 354.  In viewing video disc #2 sequence # ending with 7001 and starting at time stamp:
[brief] (Pa0151-58).  Initially, [...] adopted the SAM’s findings, describing them as “well-reasoned” and finding that they were not “clearly erroneous, contrary to law or an abuse of discretion. ” (Pa0186-87).  However, two years later, after [...] filed its Motion for Entry of Judgment and Award of Attorneys’ Fees, Costs and Interest, [...] reversed himself, granted [...]’s Motion for Reconsideration, and rejected the SAM’s findings.
[brief] I.  **The Borough Adopts the Ordinance.**  On or about November 9, 2021, the Borough adopted Ordinance #15-21 to allow for the operation of a limited number of cannabis businesses within the Borough, subject to certain conditions (the “Ordinance”).  (115a-123a).  The Ordinance provides that the Borough may issue a maximum of two (2) local Class 5 cannabis retail licenses.  (115a-123a).  The Borough later determined that one of the two available Class 5 cannabis retail licenses would be for the Highway Commercial District (“HCD”), which is the subject of this matter.  (38a).  The Ordinance requires the Council to form a Cannabis Subcommittee (the “Subcommittee”) to review all submissions for any Cannabis license and submit a recommendation to the entire governing body (the Council) regarding the grant or denial of a license.  (121a).  The Subcommittee must be composed of four members: (i) two (2) members of the Council; (ii) the Borough Chief of Police; and (iii) the Borough Business Administrator.  (121a).  Although the Subcommittee has the authority to make recommendations to the Council, the Council has the “sole and absolute discretion” to award licenses.  (120a-121a).  II.  The Cannabis License Application Process and Review.
[brief] Defendant has also failed to show that [...] committed plain error in not conducting a *Wade* hearing on the out-of-court identifications.  A trial court may hold a *Wade* hearing under N.J.R.E. 104(a) to determine whether a pretrial identification of a criminal defendant was properly conducted and therefore admissible under N.J.R.E. 803(a)(3).  However, the right to a *Wade* hearing is not absolute and a hearing is not required in every case involving an out-of-court identification.
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[brief] The Lower Court erred when it found that there was no evidence of the damages that Plaintiff sustained.  1T59:1-4.  In doing so, the Lower Court impermissibly acted as a factfinder and rejected the various evidence produced by Plaintiff that gave rise to issues of fact.  For example, Plaintiff provided documentary evidence supporting its damages; two binding quotes from [...] and thirteen (13) checks issued to [...] representing the purchase of replacement goods that Plaintiff has been forced to buy as a result of Defendant’s breach of the binding contracts by and between the parties.  Pa72-83.  In addition, deposition testimony elicited by Plaintiff’s representatives created issues of fact.  For example, testimony indicated that in order to release product from the applicable quotes from [...], Plaintiff would call [...] and request certain material to be released.  Pa227; Pa391; Pa398.  Representatives of Plaintiff testified and certified that Plaintiff is obligated to purchase the same amount of pipe it would have purchased from Defendant from [...].  Pa227; Pa398.  All of this evidence creates issues of fact that warranted a denial of summary judgment.  Pipe & Foundry Co. v. American Arbitration, 67 N.J. Super. 384 (App. Div. 1961).  Notably, the Lower Court acknowledged the various issues of fact created by Plaintiff’s damages evidence.  1T50:14-51:16, 52:11-22.  Yet, even with all of these issues of fact, the Lower Court concluded that there was no evidence to support what Plaintiff’s checks to [...] actually purchased, and for that reason it granted Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment.  1T58:7-9.  Critically, with this finding, the Lower Court ultimately rejected the clear certification provided by Plaintiff’s President, who stated that:  “Plaintiff ordered the same types of pipe from [...] at higher pricing than Defendant. ”  Pa232.  “Where issues of credibility are presented, summary judgment is generally inappropriate. ”  Singer v. Beach Trading Co., 379 N.J. Super. 63, 73 (App. Div. 2005).  Issues of credibility must be left to the factfinder.  Conrad v. Michelle & John, Inc., 394 N.J. Super. 1, 13 (App.Div.2007).  “In the context of a summary judgment motion, the judge does not weigh the evidence, or resolve credibility disputes.  These functions are uniquely and exclusively performed by a jury. ”  Id.  Here, the Lower Court made an impermissible credibility determination at the summary judgment stage, by rejecting the certification of Plaintiff’s President that specifically addressed the type of pipe ordered from [...].  See Conrad, 394 N.J. Super. at 13 (reversing dismissal and finding that the motion judge gave less weight to testimony that favored the plaintiff’s case); Will v. Caruso Thompson LLP, 2013 WL 6508480 (N.J. App. Div. Dec. 13, 2013) (finding that summary judgment was inappropriately granted to defendants as to the CEPA claim because it assessed that the defendants’ denials were more credible than the plaintiff’s allegations).  Pa503.  Reversal is warranted for this reason.
[brief] Sat Below: HONORABLE  [...], J.S.C. (without a jury)  APPELLANTS’ REPLY BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF APPEAL TO REVERSE JUDGMENT AGAINST PLAINTIFFS  [...]  Attorneys for Plaintiffs  [...]  [...]  P): [...]  F): [...]  Of Counsel and On the Brief: [...], Esq.  Attorney ID: 011501976  Email: [...]  Dated: September 25, 2024
[directive] 1.  The following offenses have been added to the Bail Schedules:  • N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1c(4)-  Aggravated Assault by Auto Supplement to Directive #9-05 December 2, 2013  Page2 • N.J.SA.  2C:12-1d-  Aggravated Assault Upon Elderly Institutionalized Person • N.J.S.A.  2C:12-1f-  Aggravated Assault In the Presence of a Child at a Sporting Event • N.J.S.A.  2C:12-1.2-  Endangering an Injured Victim • N.J.SA.  2C:12-11(a)(b)-  Disarming a Law Enforcement Officer • N.J.SA.  2C:13-4 -Interference with Custody • N.J.SA.  2C:13-7-  Luring, Enticing an Adult • N.J.S.A.  2C:13-8-  Human Trafficking • N.J.SA. 2C:14-9 -Invasion of Privacy • N.J.S.A. 2C:16-1 -Bias Intimidation • N.J.S.A. 2C:17-1d-  Aggravated Arson (Actor Hires Person to Commit Offense) • N.J.S.A. 2C:20-7a-  Receiving Stolen Property • N.J.S.A. 2C:20-17-  Use of Juvenile in Theft of Automobiles • N.J.S.A. 2C:20-25(a-f) - Computer Theft • N.J.S.A. 2C:24-9-  Use of 17-Year-Oid or Younger to Commit Criminal Offenses • N.J.S.A. 2C:27-2-  Bribery in Official and Political Matters • N.J.S.A. 2C:29-10(b)(c)(d)-  Use of Certain Electronic Devices in Correctional Facilities • N.J.S.A. 2C:30-2(a)(b)- Official Misconduct • N.J.S.A. 2C:33-3(a-e)-  False Public Alarms • N.J.S.A. 2C:33-1 0-  Placing Signs or Displays That Imply Threats of Violence • N.J.S.A. 2C:33-11 -Desecrating Religious or Sectarian Premises • N.J.S.A. 2C:33-14 -Interference with Transportation • N.J.S.A. 2C:33-28-  Soliciting or Recruiting Gang Members  037 • 08625-0037
[directive] Revoking Conditional Release Status of NGRI Acquittee (Attachment H)  This court order would be used to revoke the conditional release and commit the person under N.J.S.A. 2C:4-8(b)(3), where the NGRI acquittee has violated the terms of the release and currently a danger is to self, others, or property by reason of mental illness.  of - Order 8  Mandating the Continued Conditional Release  NGRI Acquittee (Attachment I)  This court order would be used after the court determines that the NGRI acquittee previously placed conditional release maintains the need to continue that status.  on on of 3 4  Page Directive# 21-20 -- Proceeding for Defendants Found Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity (NGRI) and Other Commitments Resulting from Criminal Proceedings
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT’S FINDING THAT THE DISCHARGE OF THE MORTGAGE WAS NOT A SATISFACTION OF THE LOAN SHOULD BE AFFIRMED.  (Da57-58)  (Responsive to Defendant’s Point III.C) .............  37  POINT III..................................................................................................................  41  THE TRIAL COURT’S FINDING THAT DEFENDANTS BREACHED THE THIRD LOAN SHOULD BE AFFIRMED (Da49-53) (Responsive to Defendant’s Point IV.A and B)
[brief] The Appellate Division has decided that issue.  (4T8:3-11; 15:17-25; 17:18-18:4)  (emphasis added).  The trial court’s comments do not: (i) identify or explain the legal basis underlying its ruling, or (ii) provide any meaningful application of the facts to the unarticulated legal doctrine(s) upon which the trial court purportedly relied.  The trial court’s failure to provide any legal basis for its decision alone warrants reversal.
[brief] On October 31, 2018, the Appellant applied for his Accidental Disability Pension Benefits.  (Aa1-Aa3).  On October 7, 2019, the [...] (“[...]”) considered and denied Appellant’s application for Accidental Disability Retirement Benefits.  (ADRB) (Aa4-Aa6).  An appeal request was made on October 15, 2019.  (Aa7).  On December 10, 2019, the Board transferred the matter to the Office of Administrative law.  A hearing was held on November 16, 2020.  On August 15, 2022, [...] rendered an initial decision.  (Aa9-Aa22).  On September 16, 2022, the Board upheld the ALJ’s decision.  (Aa23).  A Notice of Appeal and Case Information Statement were filed on October 27, 2022, and an amended Notice of Appeal and Case Information Statement were filed on November 22, 2022.  STATEMENT OF FACTS
[brief] .............................................................................................................1209a  Kyung v. Neiman Marcus Group, 2011 WL 2447388, (Law Div. Feb. 9, 2011)  ...............................................................................................................................1211a  [...] & [...] v. [...], [...], 2018 WL 6164767, at *4 (App. Div. Nov. 26, 2018)  ...............................................................................................................................1216a 11/06/2020  Appellate Division Order and Decision ..............................................1221a 8/17/2022
[brief] Since the new seawall will likely result in an increased vulnerability of wave overtopping onto Defendant’s property, this is a factor that should have gone to the jury for consideration in calculating just compensation.  The Karan case was decided after Maffucci and allows consideration of the Maffucci damages from project impacts beyond the subject property.  Thus, applying Karan to Maffucci, loss in view is compensable even where the project impact is from offsite, since consideration of the project impacts requires consideration of both the negative and positive effects to the property owner.
[brief] On top of that, the R. 1:4-8 letter was defective – it cited no authority to support [...]’s self-serving analysis that we lacked standing, and as he admitted directly in that letter, he was not certain if his analysis was correct or not, stating: “[if] my analysis is correct, an application for sanctions [will be made].”  Then even in his motion 8 days later, he cited only one sentence of one authority, which only held that standing is something a court needs to decide.  That very same authority stated the plaintiffs’ “indirect interest” was sufficient to confer standing.  So even viewing his papers as a whole, this was far from being sufficiently specific and definitive so as to allow a sanctions award.  Moreover, the amount of sanctions was entirely unjustified.
[brief] ”  Pierre, 223 N.J. at 583.  Where, as here, a PCR judge does not hold an evidentiary hearing, appellate courts “conduct a de novo review of both the factual findings and legal conclusions of the PCR court. ”  State v. Blake, 444 N.J. Super. 285, 294 (App. Div. 2016) (quoting State v. Harris, 181 N.J. 391, 421 (2004)).  Here, the PCR court properly denied defendant’s petition after hearing oral argument because defendant’s claims of ineffectiveness were without merit.
[brief] Even then, [...] never tried to determine whether the Jaguar drove by any other cameras.  (5T125-7 to 10, 126-4 to 7, 127-4 to 21, 128-2 to 10, 129-20 to 130-6, 131-20 to 23, 160-3 to 5)  The other clip showed the Jaguar at the playground later on and [...] playing with a child there, consistent with [...]’s and [...]’s statements.
[brief] Where soil replacement is proposed beneath a given BMP, the horizontal conductivity of the native soils outside the BMP was used to determine the mound, as prescribed by the BMP Manual.  [...] reviewed this conclusion and agreed that the BMP Manual guidance was met.  “Furthermore, the geotechnical investigation accompanying the application is consistent with Chapter 12 of the BMP Manual.  All of the necessary BMPs will have adequate separation from the seasonal high groundwater table and appropriate mounding analyses were performed for infiltrating BMPs. ” (Aa0085).
[brief] (Ra17; Ra22; Ra26; Ra29; Ra51; Aa68).  While the overall Project application, which included both flood hazard and freshwater wetland components, was complete for review, the Project’s potential historical impacts required further information.  (Aa28; Aa68).  Once a flood hazard application is deemed complete, DEP has ninety days from the date the application was received to issue a decision approving or denying the application.  See N.J.A.C. 7:13-21.3; N.J.S.A. 13:1D-32 (requiring DEP action within ninety days or the “application shall be deemed to have been approved[.]”).
[directive] Supervision.  Post-Conviction of Form  Any on pretrial seeking of presumption the unless Section 7.3, under covered otherwise  In not cases detention pretrial for apply shall prosecutor the 7.4.6, subsection to pursuant overcome is detention present the committed defendant the and degree, second or first the of is offense crime a the present if offense: involving offense disorderly persons or a indictable crime an for release pretrial on while (a) been had previous offense that whether 2C:25-19(a), N.J.S.A. in asdefined domestic violence or complaint-summons, or complaint-warrant by charged was (ISP), or parole, program supervision intensive probation, special probation, on while (b) N.J.S.A. by required as guilty pleaded had defendant the where (PTI) intervention pretrial on sentencing pending release on was defendant the if or 98), P.L. c. 2015, (see 2C:43-12(g)(3)
[brief] (Da513-514.)  On August 31, 2023, the court held a second hearing.  (2T.)  At the end of the hearing, the trial court: (i) advised that it was “reserving” its decision on the issue of standing pending its adjudication of the merits of the prerogative writ, and (ii) discussed the scheduling of a mutually agreeable time with the parties to hear the prerogative writ argument.  (2T42-46.)  On September 22, 2023, the trial court entered an Order granting [...]’s motion to intervene.  (Da515-516.)  On September 22, 2023, [...] and [...] filed an amended Complaint in Lieu of Prerogative Writs.  (Da517-531.)  Contrary to its earlier statements, the trial court did not permit the parties the opportunity for oral argument on the merits of the prerogative writ claims.  Instead, on September 26, 2023, the trial court read a final decision into the record.  (3T.)  On September 26, 2023, the trial court entered an Order vacating the Resolution based on “the reasons placed on the record of 9/26/2023. ”  (Da532.)  On October 24, 2023, [...] filed a Notice of Appeal and Case Information Statement with this Court.