ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] Table 1 (Drug-Free School Zone), Rows C and D (“other than less than 1 oz. of marijuana”) apply to the basic violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7 involving any substance, other than marijuana in an amount less than one ounce, provided that Page 53 [...] Guidelines 2 (2004 Revisions) the amount of drugs involved would not constitute a second-degree crime under N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5.  It is expected that these rows will be the most commonly used, and would apply to third-degree amounts of heroin, cocaine, methamphetamine, and marijuana.  If the amount of drugs involved would constitute a second-degree crime (e.g., a quantity of .5 oz. or more but less than 5 oz. of heroin, cocaine, or methamphetamine, or 1 oz. or more of another narcotic drug in Schedule I or II), the prosecutor must use Row E or F.  In Tables 1 (Drug-Free School Zone) and 2 (Extended Term Under Lagares), the offense shall be deemed to involve a “second-degree amount” where the aggregate amount of all drugs involved exceeds the amount threshold defining a second-degree offense pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5.  In Table 4 (Drug Production Facility), the offense shall be deemed to involve a “first-degree amount” where the aggregate amount of all drugs involved exceeds the amount threshold defining a first-degree offense pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5.  The phrase “not 1st degree amount” refers to any lesser amount of drugs.  In Tables 5 (First-Degree Distribution or Possession with Intent) and 6 (Leader of Narcotics Trafficking Network), the offense shall be deemed to involve a “substantial quantity” of controlled dangerous substances where the aggregate amount of all drugs involved is ten (10) or more times the amount necessary to establish a first-degree crime pursuant to the provisions of N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5.  The following chart may be used by prosecutors to quickly determine whether and to what extent these offense characteristics apply with respect to offenses under N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5 that are subject to a mandatory term of imprisonment and parole ineligibility:
[directive] Phase III 15-Yard Line.  Time: 25 seconds.  9 rounds.  Standing point shoulder position.  Strong-hand kneeling position.  •  On command, from a secured holster position, draw and fire 3 rounds from a standing point shoulder position.  •  Assume a strong-hand kneeling position, reload if required and fire 6 rounds from a strong-hand kneeling position.  ---STOP TIME--- •  Reload if required and holster an uncocked weapon.  •  Reload loading devices.  Phase IV 10-Yard Line.
[directive] 3.5.1  While the primary responsibility for enforcing agency policies rests with the line supervisors, management cannot rely solely on those supervisors for detecting violations.  Administrators should establish a mechanism to determine whether an agency's policies and procedures are being properly implemented.  It is necessary for management to know if behavior is, in fact, consistent with the agency's rules and regulations, policies and procedures.  The task of detecting such defects should be delegated to an inspection unit or function.  3.5.2
[brief] Four years after making reference to [...]’ habeas petition in his April 28, 2017 brief in support of his PCR petition, defendant submitted a supplemental brief arguing that the habeas petition was new evidence which justified granting defendant a new trial under Carter.\(^5\) (Pa165-180).  Defendant asserts that in the habeas petition, [...] disclaimed any knowledge of the Staten Island kidnapping of [...].  (Db28).  But that is not what [...] wrote.  Rather, [...] wrote that [...] “would have submitted an affidavit on [[...]’] behalf, which would have explained that [[...]] had no knowledge of the Staten Island robbery and kidnapping of [...]. ” (Da79).  Stated differently, the habeas petition claims [...] would have said that [...] had no knowledge of the Staten Island \(^5\) State v. Carter, 85 N.J. 300 (1981).  kidnapping had [...]’ attorney better investigated [...]’ case.  The statement is nothing more than the hypothetical statement of a third party, and plainly, [...] did not actually disclaim knowledge of the Staten Island robbery in his habeas petition, as defendant claims.  Defendant not only raised [...]’ habeas petition as new evidence, but he also raised it as Brady-Giglio evidence in a November 1, 2021 reply brief in support of his amended first PCR petition.  (Pa181-91).  Defendant characterized [...]’ habeas petition as impeachment evidence which the State suppressed.  Ibid.  H.  [...] Denies Defendant’s Amended First PCR Petition and Denies Defendant a New Trial Based on [...]’ Habeas Petition.
[directive] In more complex matters, however, investigators sometimes need additional time to collect evidence, interview witnesses, or take other necessary investigative steps.  In addition, when an officer’s alleged conduct gives rise to a criminal investigation, ordinarily, internal affairs investigators should stay their own inquiry pending the resolution of the criminal matter.  6.1.4  If investigators are unable to complete an internal affairs investigation within 45 days of receiving a complaint, they must notify the agency’s law enforcement executive on or about the 45th day. 3  In such situations, the law enforcement executive should seek to identify the reasons for the extended investigation and whether the internal affairs function requires additional resources or oversight to complete the inquiry in a prompt manner.  In addition, the law enforcement executive should ensure compliance with the “45-day rule” established by N.J.S.A. 40A:14-147, which requires that certain disciplinary charges be filed within 45 days of the date the person filing the charge obtained “sufficient information” to do so.  6.1.5
[brief] TABLE OF APPENDIX  Watley v. Watley, [...], 2015 WL 9467244 RA 1 (App. Div. Dec. 29, 2015)²  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS, AND RULINGS  Order and Final Judgment Pa 8 filed February 7, 2023  Trial Decision and Final Judgment Pa 42-44 filed February 7, 2023 ²  Pursuant to Rule 1:36-3, this unpublished decision is included in the Respondent’s Appendix attached to this Brief.
[brief] ..........................................................  15  Dowdy v. Coleman Co., 2011 WL 6151432 (D.  Utah Dec. 12, 2011) ............................................. 17 Drager v. PLIVA USA, Inc., 741 F.3d 470 (4th Cir. 2014) ....... 25 Drescher v. Bracco Diagnostics, Inc., 2020 WL 1466296 (D. Ariz. Mar. 26, 2020) ........................................... 25 Dubas v. Clark Equipment Co., 532 F. Supp.3d 819 (D. Neb. 2021) ......................................................... 16 Eberts v. Kawasaki Motors Corp., 2004 WL 224683 (D.N.D. Feb. 2, 2004) .................................................. 16 Evans v. Gilead Sciences, Inc., 2020 WL 5189995 (D. Haw. Aug. 31, 2020) ............................................. 25 Feldman v. Lederle Laboratories, 125 N.J. 117 (1991) ........ 28,29 Finegold v. General Motors Co., 2021 WL 2810091 (D.N.J. June 30, 2021) ............................................... 21,22 Ford Motor Co. v. Reese, 684 S.E.2d 279 (Ga. App. 2009), cert denied (Ga. Feb. 8, 2010)
[directive] The overall structure of the CJRA, and section 26 in particular, make clear the Legislature was concerned about lengthy pretrial delays for detained defendants.  Yet a statement of readiness can effectively extend the two-year cap, and a defendant’s pretrial detention, if the court is not able to proceed.  Because the statute contemplates that trials of detained defendants should begin as soon as practicable, the Court relies on its supervisory authority to impose measures courts should follow when the parties announce they are ready to proceed on the two-year cap date but no courtroom or judge will be available at that time.
[directive] Acting Administrative Director  This office has received various complaints relating to the practice in some counties of charging filing fees for motions in pending criminal matters.  No such fee is permitted with respect to motions filed in criminal matters pending at the trial level of the Superior Court.  As you know, R. 3:7-1 requires that "the indictment and all subsequent papers in connection therewith shall be entitled in the Superior Court," and R. 1:5-6(b) provides in part that "in all criminal actions, except those in a municipal court or in the Special Civil Part, papers shall be filed with the county clerk as deputy clerk of the Superior Court."  See also, R. 1:34-2.  After review of this matter, the Supreme Court has decided that filing fees may not be charged or collected by county clerks with respect to motions filed in criminal matters pending in the Superior Court.
[brief] Pa059  [...]’s Letter to Highland Park Judge 4/15/2021.  Pa061  Certification of [...]s 4/15/2021 Pa063  Order Brought by [...]s Pa065  Letter from [...] to [...]s, Dated 9/30/2020 Pa068  Discovery Desk Central Records Pa069 --- \(^2\)  The various summonses and criminal records are different because some have notations and others don’t, thus they should not be considered duplicates.  Discovery Checklist (billing date 5/5/2020)
[brief] Sb17.  Despite what the State wrote in its parenthetical regarding Hatch, that case had nothing to do with carry permits.  In Hatch, the defendant had a Massachusetts hunting license and was travelling to Philadelphia with a rifle and shotgun in his rear seat.  Id. at 182.  The defendant was convicted of violating N.J.S.A. 2A:151-42(c), since the firearms were not "in a closed and fastened case, gunbox, securely tied package, or locked in the trunk of the automobile"  Id. at 182.  Importantly, the New Jersey Supreme Court noted that “[w]hile we doubt that the Legislature ever contemplated that one in his situation as aforedescribed would be called upon to hold a New Jersey purchaser identification card for the rifle and shotgun, he was at least obliged to fulfill its pertinent requirement with respect to their proper encasing as set forth in N.J.S.A. 2A:151-42(c).  That requirement was entirely reasonable and did not unduly or unfairly burden interstate travel. ”  Id. at 188.  The conclusion of Hatch can be summed up as, “to carry handguns in one's car or on one's person along the highways is, apart from certain exemptions, ‘clearly forbidden unless the person carrying the handgun has a permit issued in accordance with [N.J.S.A. 2C:58-4].’” (quoting Matter of Two Seized Firearms, 127 N.J. 84, 87-88 (1992)).  Applying the principles of the Court in Hatch, it is doubtful the Legislature contemplated someone in [...]’s situation would be called upon to hold a New Jersey carry permit.
[brief] (1T  However, the Court held that the State would be permitted to introduce evidence from [...]’s phone suggesting he was in possession (in the few days leading up to April 23) of an Audi similar to the one used in the April 23 carjacking so long as the State did not mention that a similar Audi was stolen on April 20.  (1T 35-20 to 36-6)  The Court also held that the State would be permitted to introduce into evidence a photograph of [...] showing him in possession of a black handgun with a green laser which matched the description of the gun given by the victims of the April 23 carjacking and looked similar to the gun recovered near where [...] was arrested.  (1T 41-21 to 45-18)  Because the Court correctly applied Cofield and balanced the alleged probative value of the April 20 robbery against its prejudicial impact, this Court should defer to the sound reasoning of the Court.
[brief] Generally, a court bases a finding of aggravating factor (3) on the fact that the defendant has prior convictions, which allows the court to infer that the prior punishments did not deter the defendant and thus to conclude that he is likely to continue committing crimes.  See State v. Dalziel, 182 N.J. 494, 502 (2005) (finding “the extent of a defendant’s prior record” in support of factor (3)); John M. Cannel, Criminal Code Annotated (Gann 2020 ed.), Comment N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1a(3), (6), and (9) (“To find these factors, which relate to the need to deter defendant from further offenses, courts are expected to make a qualitative assessment about the defendant in light of his criminal history. ”).  In this case, however, where [...]’s entire prior record consisted of a single disorderly persons offense, so far from basing factor (3) on his prior record, the court found his record in mitigation, under factor (7).
[brief] Order of Hon. [...], J.S.C., Suppressing Evidence, Dated May 28, 2024.  ................ .................................................  Pa4  Oral Ruling of Hon. [...], J.S.C., Suppressing Evidence, Dated May 28, 2024.  ................ ....................... 1T11-4 to 25-24  INDEX TO APPENDIX  Middlesex County Indictment No. [...], Dated Oct. 19, 2021.  .................................................................  Pa1  Middlesex County Indictment No. [...], Dated Oct. 19, 2021.  .................................................................  Pa3  Order of Hon. [...], J.S.C., Suppressing Evidence, Dated May 28, 2024.  ................ ......................... Pa4  STATEMENT OF PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[brief] SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE  DIVISION APPELLATE  DOCKET NO.: [...]  CIVIL ACTION  Appeal of the Order of Judgment and Decision of the Hon. [...], J.S.C. entered May 22, 2023.  Sat Below: Hon.  [...], J.S.C.; Superior Court of New Jersey  Docket No.: [...]  AMENDED  BRIEF OF PLAINTIFFS/APPELLANTS
[brief] Chief Administrative Law Judge [...] (now J.S.C.) explained persuasively, as follows:  Safeguarding the public health, safety and welfare is an essential governmental function and police power.  Environmental protection laws, given their clear purpose of protection of public health, safety and welfare, are entitled to especially liberal construction for their beneficent objectives.  Also, given the insidious and cumulative effect of the destruction and losses of our natural resources, that the effect of the loss of a particular resource may not be exactly quantifiable or may seem minimal, is not a reason to exclude it from protection under the applicable laws.
[brief] Here, irrespective of the witness testimony about whether the door to the third floor was closed, locked, or breached, the objective photographic and video evidence showed that the unmarked door to the third floor faced further into the left side, i.e., the [...] side, of the property; that the house appeared to be divided vertically from the outside; and that there were only two front doors for the two-family house, one on the far left marked “132” and one on the far right that was marked “[...]. ”  And based on the facts known to the officers at the time they acted, which are more fully explained in the State’s appellant’s brief for [...], the police reasonably believed this unmarked door to the third floor, facing further into the left side of the property, was part of [...] that was authorized to be searched under the warrant.  Under the circumstances of this CSAEM case—where an IP address being used to file-share known CSAEM files, by an unknown user over BitTorrent, was traced—probable cause existed to search the whole inside of [...], subdivided or not, for the electronic devices that had been file-sharing or could be storing CSAEM pursuant to the search warrant.  And whether the door to the third floor was locked or unlocked, the police’s entry therein was reasonable to execute the search warrant for the entirety of [...].
[brief] In fact, [...] and [...] affirmatively testified they had no belief they were personally guarantying the obligations of the LLC by signing the lease as a representatives of the LLC.  Deposition of [...] 10:16-21, (Pa 132), 13:25-14:13 (Pa 133-34); Deposition of [...] 21:5-11 (Pa135).  The Benjamin Court itself indicated that it would have decided the case differently on different facts: "This was not a scenario in which the language purporting to make a corporate individually responsible was buried in small print in the middle of the text.  Rather, the language was in large print, and placed prominently below the signature line."  Id. at *8.  The facts at bar exactly fit the Benjamin admonition.  Accordingly, even the only case cited by [...] supports the position of [...] and [...] that there has been no personal guaranty.  B.
[brief] DEP’s HAD determination that the project is consistent with the goals and purposes of the Highlands Act should be affirmed because it is supported by substantial evidence in the record and DEP’s regulatory interpretation is owed deference.  Appellate review of an administrative agency’s final determination is limited and deferential.  In re Herrmann, 192 N.J. 19, 27 (2007).  “The ‘fundamental consideration’ in reviewing agency actions is that a court may not substitute its judgment for the expertise of an agency ‘so long as that action is statutorily authorized and not otherwise defective because arbitrary or unreasonable. ’”  In re Distrib. of Liquid Assets, 168 N.J. 1, 10 (2001) (citation omitted).  The burden of proving arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable action is on the challenger.  Bueno v. Bd. of Trs., Teachers’ Pension & Annuity Fund, Moreover, an agency’s “interpretation of statutes within its scope of authority and its adoption of rules implementing the laws for which it is responsible” is entitled to “great deference. ”  *In re N.J.A.C. 7:1B-1.1 Et. Seq.*, 431 N.J. Super. 100, 115-116 (App. Div. 2013); see also *Barry v. Arrow Pontiac, Inc.*, 100 N.J. 57, 70-71 (1985) (“[T]he grant of authority to an administrative agency is to be liberally construed to enable the agency to accomplish the Legislative goals. ” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)); *Am. Cyanamid Co. v. State, Dep’t of Env’t Prot.*, 231 N.J. Super. 292, 312 (App. Div. 1989) (holding agency’s statutory interpretation “is entitled to substantial weight”).  Courts “extend substantial deference to an agency’s interpretation and application of its own regulations, particularly on technical matters within the agency’s special expertise.
[brief] Indeed, this court’s ruling in Coalition I would make sense only if disputes regarding recovery of PIP benefits were limited to claims seeking benefits by insureds or their assignees.  If insurers were permitted to obtain a monetary award, there would be no reason that they could not also obtain attorneys’ fees, particularly when, as here, the IFPA and RICO require fee awards to successful plaintiffs.  The DOBI regulations defining the “PIP disputes” subject to arbitration and implementing procedures also fit within this rubric.  Those regulations “establish procedures for the resolution of disputes concerning the payment of medical expense and other benefits provided by the personal injury protection coverage in policies of automobile insurance.
[brief] (Da3170-3172)  Yet, [...]’s *pro se* writing style would make that a false ‘opportunity’.  *(See, e.g. Da359-412; 1061-1178;75-115; 359-421 & 2160-2208)*  While Plaintiffs continually stated in the case that [...] held a law degree, his inability to cogently express legal positions was obvious after 2 years of *pro se* status.  *(Ibid.)*  The need for an attorney here was actually heightened under the circumstances where [...] was shown incapable of briefing his position understandably or pointedly.  Thus, it was not so simple for the Court to find that [...], as *pro se*, had a chance to oppose.  He had to have the “fair and reasonable” opportunity to be heard.  *Johowern*, supra, 187 N.J. Super. at 199.  That inquiry should have considered as paramount that [...] needed counsel, and had found new counsel who could oppose with only a 45-day postponement in a 7.5 year old case.
[brief] T4, p.81:2-7.  [...] also testified that he was aware there was a tax lien on the property from 2018.  T3, p. 124:3-15.  [...] testified that in the past he did have properties with tax liens against them and that as soon as he was notified of an intent to foreclose, he immediately redeemed the tax sale certificate.  T3, p.124:3-15.  [...] indicated that he sent [...] to [...], stating “I told her to approach [...] for this property. ”  T4, p.59:9-24.  Mr. [...] also admitted that he exchanged emails with Defendant Ruslan [...] on February 14, 2022 at 2:40 pm (after the Entry of default judgment) and offered to buy the property from [...] for $650,000.
[directive] Notwithstanding the ordinary escalation sys- tem established in the “Brimage” Guidelines, a prosecutor invoking the new com- plex/protracted litigation adjustment is generally precluded from tendering an or- dinary initial post-indictment or final post-indictment plea offer following a defendant’s rejection of a plea offer that was subject to a complex/protracted litiga- tion downward adjustment.  This “all or nothing” system is designed to provide the greatest possible incentive for a defendant to accept the plea and thereby allow the prosecution to avoid the unusual and significant resource expenditures that justi- fied invocation of the downward adjustment in the first place.  A prosecutor invoking the new adjustment will be required to fix a specific date or event at which the adjusted plea offer will expire and at which point the new plea cut-off feature will automatically be invoked.  This expiration date or event shall be clearly stated on the plea negotiation worksheet along with a notice ex- plaining the effect of the automatic plea cut-off so as to put the defendant on clear notice that, absent a material change of circumstances or substantial cooperation, no further plea offer reducing the statutorily-prescribed minimum term of parole ineligibility will be tendered.  Any plea offer that accounts for the complex/protracted litigation adjustment must include an express waiver by the defendant of any pretrial motions or ap- peals.  See R. 3:9-3(d).
[brief] ” (emphasis added).  Moreover, “[t]he court shall not reduce a restitution award by any amount that the victim has received from the Violent Crimes Compensation Board, but shall order the defendant to pay any restitution ordered for a loss previously compensated by the Board to the Violent Crimes Compensation Board. ”  N.J.S.A. 2C:44-2(c)(2) (emphasis added).  Defendant did not dispute the amount of restitution, an amount of $24,886.57 confirmed by a lien letter from the Violent Crimes Compensation Office (11T:62-8 to 12), and this amount is a sum well within the $200,000 cap set by N.J.S.A. 2C:43-3(a)(1).