ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] On 5/12/2016  [...] filed a Foreclosure complaint in the NJ OOF (141a) based on the alleged assignment of mortgage of 2/27/2009 (a recycled forged mortgage document 065a), the alleged assignment of 2/28/2014 (097a) and the alleged HAM agreement of 2015 (103a).  [...] filed that complaint as the owner and the servicer of the Note (paragraph 14 of page 144a).  It was docketed as [...].  [...] committed fraud upon the foreclosure court by submitting a recycled forged document, namely the alleged assignment of mortgage of 2/27/2009 (065a).  The NJ OOF and the Foreclosure Court of Monmouth County never had subject matter jurisdiction over the Foreclosure complaint of 5/12/16 (141a), because they suspended the Foreclosure Complaint of 3/10/2009 because of the fraudulent mortgage Assignment of 2/27/2009 (065a).  The NJ OOF violated my Constitutional Rights specifically the US 4th and 14th Amendment by accepting the alleged assignment of mortgage of 2/27/2009 (065a).  Because, on 12/20/2010, the NJ OOF was warned by [...] that the alleged assignment of mortgage of 2/27/2009 was robo-signed and forged (068a), and the NJ OOF was in possession of the Group 3 List (087a) and was aware that my name was on that list.  [...]’s name and the foreclosure docket number were on that list too, next to my name (087a).
[brief] But even if this Court were to disagree, under the reasoning of *SL Industries*, there is still no reason to evaluate the subjective intent of [...] because the [...] claim no more than the type of injuries inherently probable from the alleged conduct.  That is, the [...] allege that [...] made false statements about his medical competency in order “to injure . . . [[...]]’s . . . practice[,] good name and profession ” by causing [...] “infamy and disgrace. ” (Da60).  No one wants to treat with a physician who is perceived to be incompetent or unethical.  Therefore, the types of injuries alleged by the [...] are exactly the injuries you would expect by an attempt to blacken [...]’s reputation as a medical professional.
[brief] The Post Trial Order  On November 10, 2021, after reviewing the extensive record detailed above, [...] issued an Order (the “Post Trial Order”), pursuant to which the lower court held, inter alia, that: (i) due to its admitted monetary defaults under the Lease, Tenant was not entitled to any Tenant Allowance (i.e. “Fit Up” Payments) under Section 4.02 of the Lease; and (ii) absent legal fees and costs, Tenant owed Landlord $196,669.16 in past due Rent under the Lease (i.e. the Rent Arrears).
[brief] See, e.g., ibid.; see also Macfadden v. Macfadden, 49 N.J. Super. 356, 359 (App. Div. 1958) (“The . . . conclusions or opinion of a court do not have the effect of a judgment. ”); Suburban Dep’t Stores v. City of E. Orange, 47 N.J. Super. 472, 479 (App. Div. 1957) (same)).  This Court is tasked with determining whether the trial court’s denial of [...]’s Motion to Reinstate and its dismissal of all claims with prejudice should be affirmed.  Given that the entire controversy doctrine applies to this appeal and that the trial court properly exercised its discretion in barring the Second Action, statements that the court itself described as irrelevant are inconsequential.  This Court should affirm the trial court’s final Denial and Dismissal Order.
[brief] POINT SEVEN THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING [...]'S MOTION TO COMPEL THE RETURN OF MONIES PAID PURSUANT TO THE JUNE 27, 2017 JUDGMENT AND MARCH 6, 2018 ORDER WHICH WERE VACATED BY THE APPELLATE DIVISION ON JUNE 25, 2019 (6T72:7-25)(Da 976)
[brief] “A conflicting interest arises when the public official has an interest not shared in common with the other members of the public. ”  Wyzykowski, 132 N.J. at 524.  Accordingly, “[t]he ethics rules must be applied with caution, as ‘[l]ocal governments would be seriously handicapped if every possible interest, no matter how remote and speculative, would serve as a disqualification of an official. ”  Grabowsky, 221 N.J. at 554 (second alteration in original) quoting Wyzykowski, 132 N.J. at 523).  “It is essential that municipal offices be filled by individuals who are thoroughly familiar with local communities and concerns. ”  Ibid.  Consequently, conflict-of-interest rules “do not apply to ‘remote’ or speculative’ conflicts because local governments cannot operate effectively if recusals occur based on ascribing to an official a conjured or imagined disqualifying interest. ”  Piscitelli, 237 N.J. at 353. (slip op at p. 38 –40).
[brief] [...]  [...] suggests that in early 2015, Krietzman asked him about his retirement plans.  (Pb10).  His “evidence” is that [...] speculated in an EEO interview that Krietzman could have asked [...] about his plans when she was losing several other subordinates to retirement.  (Pb10, citing Pa665, Pa881).  Not only is [...]’s interpretation of [...]’s speculation not competent evidence that creates an issue of fact, it does not create a genuine issue of age discrimination in this context.  Even if the Court were to accept this allegation as a contested issue of fact, it fails to state a claim for two reasons.
[brief] (Da126).  [...] testified that he eventually learned that his father went to the office of [...] in Newark to sign the Will.  (Da126).  He was not there when the Will was signed in [...]’s office.  (Da126).  [...] testified that it would be a true guess or speculation to say that the Will was not signed in the presence of witnesses.  (Da126).  When confronted at his deposition with the fact that the Will provides that [...] signed in front of the witnesses and [...], and that they swore that he signed it willingly and that he was of sound mind, [...] testified, “That’s what they say.
[brief] The first two of [...]’s policies contained an ACC clause that barred claims for otherwise covered concurrent or sequential causes of loss in the chain of causation.  [...]’s ACC language appears in the mold exclusions after the clause that excludes “liability, damage, loss, cost or expense arising directly or indirectly, in whole or in part by 1. [mold].”  The ACC language reads as follows:  It is agreed that this exclusion applies regardless of any other cause, event, material, product and/or building component that contributed concurrently or in any sequence to that injury or damage.  (Emphasis added.)  Da244.  In light of this broad, ACC language, [...] has not sought any recovery from the first two [...] policies, both of which contain the limiting ACC language.  The three policies that are at issue in this case, however, do not contain ACC clauses.
[brief] See, *Till v. Delta Sch. of Com., Inc.*, 487 So. 2d 180, 182 (La. Ct. App. 1986) (The Court upheld that a reasonable factual basis existed for the trial court's finding that the Plaintiff was not furnished the educational opportunity which led her to enroll at the defendant school); Jeffers v. Am. Univ. of Antigua, 93 N.Y.S.3d 36, 38 (2019)(Defendant Nursing School was liable for a breach of implied contract after promising its graduates they would be qualified to take a licensing exam for registered nurses and would be eligible to take a national nursing exam and, upon passing the exam, automatically matriculate into a one-year college nursing program, even though the school’s program was not properly accredited.)  i.  The Trial Court’s Oral Opinion to Grant Summary Judgment as to Plaintiff’s Breach of Contract Claim (3T1-3T89)  In its oral opinion, the trial court relied on the standard set forth in Beukas v. Bd. of Trustees of Fairleigh Dickinson Univ., 255 N.J. Super. 552, 558, (Law. Div. 1991), aff’d, 255 N.J. Super. 420, 605 A.2d 708 (App. Div. 1992), relative to the Plaintiff’s breach of contract claim, and queried, "Did the university act in good faith? And if so, did it deal fairly with its students?"  (3T81).  The trial court cited to a “graduate studies bulletin, which stated, “The university reserves the right to change, without prior notice, the contents of its bulletins and to modify its academic calendar and programs of instruction.  Academic and disciplinary requirements, policies, and procedures, rules and regulations, its tuition fees, charges, and the terms of financial aid.  Changes shall be effective upon publication or when the university otherwise determines, and any such change may apply to prospective students and to those who already are enrolled in the university."  (3T82:7-22).  The trial court reasoned that this “reservation of rights” provided the ability of Defendant to revise its requirements.  (3T82:23-25).  Furthermore, the trial court asserted Plaintiff understood that “Defendant's advertisement used the word opportunity and not guarantee. ”  (3T83:1-3).
[brief] [...] properly testified defendant’s fingerprint was on the inside lip of the wine chiller.  [...] from the [...] testified as an expert in latent fingerprint examination and analysis.  (3T47-16 to 18).  He explained he uses the ACE-V method, which stands for analysis, comparison, evaluation, and verification, to examine fingerprints.  (3T58-21 to 23).  The analysis takes place when he receives a latent fingerprint and examines it, what material it was left on, what the surface looks like, and if it is suitable for comparison.  (3T58-24 to 59-4).  A ten-fingerprint exemplar is also analyzed to ensure it is eligible for comparison.  (3T59-5 to 13).  Armstrong completes a side-by-side comparison between the latent and exemplar prints during the comparison step.  The evaluation step is Armstrong’s conclusion of whether the latent print is from the same source as the exemplar.  (3T59-18 to 20).  Ocean County’s procedures require verification by two other examiners before the results are published.  (3T59-22 to 60-1).  [...] next described the ACE-V results here, comparing the ten-fingerprint exemplar from defendant and the latent print developed from the inside lip of the wine chiller.  (3T49-1 to 3; 3T63-4 to 9).  Based on fourteen points of identification, Armstrong determined that defendant’s right thumb made the latent print inside the wine chiller.  (3T67-13 to 68-4).  He then stated that for the verification step, two examiners did the exact same thing he did and reached the same conclusion.  (3T68-17 to 21; 3T68-22 to 68-25).  The prosecutor asked if he would have come to the same conclusion if there had been a difference of opinion, but Armstrong answered that he had “never seen that. ” (3T69-1 to 5).  He explained that with “fingerprints, they’re basically, you’re looking at it.  . . .  There’s no opinion to be spoken.  It’s totally objective. ” (3T69-12 to 16).  The testimony adheres to New Jersey legal standards, and defendant’s references to out-of-state case law fail to establish an unjust result.
[brief] She signed a certified mailing card for the letter providing her notice of the divorce hearing” (A251)  [...] credited the testimony of attorney [...], who affirmed that she did not review the marital agreements with [...] or represent her with regard to marital issues (with [...] finding that attorney Weinstock did not “represent [[...]] in a review of the PSA or other documents challenged,” A252).  But [...] said “with reasonable diligence” [...] “could have requested Ms. Weinstock to review the agreement or could have requested a referral from her to an attorney who had specialized knowledge of matrimonial law and could review it for her.  She also, with reasonable diligence, could have contacted an attorney to review the PSA directly. ”  A251-252 ([...] disregarded [...]’s testimony that she understood [...] to be representing both spouses’ interests).  With regard to [...]’s charged conflict of interest, [...] acknowledged that the firm’s July 19, 2013 Retainer Agreement to provide “financial advice” was directed to and signed by both husband and wife, but said “that the preponderance of the evidence shows that an attorney-client relationship was not established between defendant and [...].
[brief] *D’Agostino v. [...]*, No. 3:17-cv-11603 (PGS) (TJB), 2020 WL 1189307, at *3 (D.N.J. March 12, 2020).  Thus, “[r]elevancy remains the touchstone of permissible discovery. ”  *Estate of Lasiw*, 475 N.J. Super. at 404.  Forcing a party to produce documents that hit on search terms without any relevance review would violate this rule and the core principle behind it.
[brief] Respondent seeks to rewrite election law by asking this Court to allow 1) a prejudicial, last-minute amendment to assert a meritless overvote claim, 2) the counting of a ballot with a wholly blank certificate submitted by his niece, and 3) the inclusion of untimely mail-in ballots postmarked after election day.  Each of these requests disregard binding authority in favor of ad hoc exceptions unsupported by any precedent.  The trial court acted well within its discretion by denying Respondent’s third motion to amend and correctly found that the blank certificate ballot and late ballots were all invalid under the law.  To grant the relief Respondent seeks would not only contradict the plain language of elections statutes, but would undermine the fundamental principles of fairness, uniformity and finality that govern our electoral process.  For these reasons, Appellant respectfully requests that the Court affirm the trial court’s rulings on these matters in their entirety and reject Respondent’s cross-appeal.
[directive] Such permission should only be given in cases where the criminal intent of the offender is in doubt and the injuries were unintended.  5.  Third degree offenses shall not be adjusted without permission of the County Prosecutor’s Office.  6.  Offenses shall not be adjusted if the law enforcement agency is aware that the juvenile has other charges already pending before the court.  7.  Offenses shall not be adjusted when the juvenile is currently on probation, parole, home detention or other court ordered disposition.
[brief] ”  Id. at *3.  Thus, even where the search terms are properly negotiated, the producing party “may nonetheless review all documents that are ‘hits’ on a search term for relevance and withhold irrelevant documents. ”  Id.  These decisions are grounded in the plain language of the applicable discovery rules, which—like Rule 4:10-2(a)—limit “the scope of discovery” to documents that are “relevant.
[brief] Cranford Dev. Assocs., LLC v. Twp. of Cranford, 445 N.J. Super. 220, 234 (App. Div. 2016) (site suitability for affordable housing assessed by court after special master report).  The Court analyzes “the land’s suitability and the need for lower income housing,” Mount Laurel II, 92 N.J. at 302, and in making this determination “the trial court and master should make as much use as they can of the planning board's expertise and experience so that the proposed project is suitable for the municipality,” id. at 280; id.  (“municipal planning board . . . [may be] closely involved”).
[brief] This is yet another Factor that Respondent says is not a strong indicator of independent contractor status.  Despite noting that Petitioner is not authorized to hire others at her own expense or a third party to assist her in performing her duties, she still reported the Petitioner was an independent contractor under this Factor.  The Petitioner provided extensive testimony about the multiple layers of assistance and support that she gets from the municipal court system from other Township employees who work in the Municipal Court.  Once again, Respondent references some “swapping system” between Petitioner and substitute prosecutors which was completely debunked at the time of the OAL Hearing.  **FACTOR 6 – CONTINUING RELATIONSHIP**
[brief] Indeed, any specious LAD claim advanced as concerns "[...]" had to be dismissed for a further reason.  In this regard, [...]'s election of the New Jersey Division on Civil Rights (DCR) administrative remedy deprived the Court of jurisdiction as concerned a LAD claim as related to him (and such facts and arguments were previously advanced during the first motion to dismiss proceedings).4  The LAD prohibits employment discrimination on the basis of race, national origin, ancestry, age, sex, sexual orientation, marital status, disability and other protected characteristics.  N.J.S.A. §10:5-12.  In seeking redress for such unlawful employment practices, an aggrieved party may file a verified complaint with the DCR or file suit in New Jersey Superior Court.  N.J.S.A. §10:5-13; Garfinkel v. Morristown Obstetrics & Gynecology Associates, P.A., 168 N.J. 124, 130-131 (2001) ("The choice of forum established by the LAD is an integral feature of the statute.").
[brief] N.J.S.A. 52:27BBBB-2.  The MSRA provides that the Director of the Department of Community Affairs, Division of Local Government Services “may ascertain whether a municipality should be deemed a municipality in need of stabilization and recovery. ”  N.J.S.A. 52:27BBBB-4(a).  If the Director so ascertains, the MSRA then requires that the Director recommend to the Commissioner of the Department of Community Affairs that he determine the municipality to be in need of stabilization and recovery ("Final Determination").  (Id.).  If the Commissioner makes such a Final Determination, the Director is required to notify the municipality’s clerk or other municipal official of the Final Determination in writing.  (Id.).  Within 150 days of the Final Determination, the MSRA requires that the municipality prepare and adopt a resolution containing a five-year recovery plan which must be submitted to the Commissioner for review ("Recovery Plan").
[brief] Plaintiff's failure to name Defendants in the prior action was inexcusable and greatly prejudicial.  There is no dispute between the parties that prejudice occurs when there is a lack of availability of information, "access to relevant information is largely dispositive of the "substantial prejudice" issue.  (Pb 36).  Courts determine the issue of substantial prejudice through a lens of lack of availability of information.  Mitchell v Charles P. Procini, D.D.S. P.A., 331 N.J. Super 445, 454 (App. Div. 2000).
[brief] For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff [...] respectfully requests the Court reverse the Order dismissing the Complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.  Respectfully submitted, /s/ [...]  Dated: July 24, 2024  [...] Yongmoon  Kim [...] [...] [...] – Tel. and Fax  Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant  Superior Court of New Jersey  Appellate Division  Docket No. [...]  AMBER JONES, : CIVIL ACTION : ON APPEAL FROM THE Plaintiff-Appellant, : FINAL JUDGMENT OF THE : SUPERIOR COURT vs. : OF NEW JERSEY, : LAW DIVISION, AMERICAN CORADIUS : MORRIS COUNTY INTERNATIONAL and : DOCKET NO. [...]
[brief] A  Other weapons, well, the police officers had weapons, yes.  Q  Well, let me ask you this.  The police officers had weapons.  A  Right.  Q  Right?  Do you recall if one of the police officers discharged his weapons?  A  I know Mr. -- I’m pretty sure [...] got shot, so yes.  Q  Okay.  So that’s one.  A  Right.  Q  Do you recall if the police managed weapon was the same kind of weapon, same kind of handgun, as the -- as the Glock or was -- A  I don’t think it was.  Q  A  Glock’s a 9 millimeter, right?  A  That I don’t know.  ***  Q  …  Did you ever obtain a report from a ballistics expert before in any other case?
[brief] [...] represented Plaintiffs-Appellants in underlying assignment transaction.  [...], who was then an attorney at [...], represented [...].  Plaintiffs-Appellants nevertheless joined [...] and [...] in the 2015 Action alleging legal malpractice, conspiracy to commit fraud, and other causes of action.  Applying the standards enunciated in Petrillo v. Bachenberg (governing when an attorney can be held liable to a non-client for professional negligence) and other controlling authorities, however, the trial court granted [...] and [...] summary judgment in the 2015 Action on December 9, 2021 based upon Plaintiff-Appellants’ unequivocal admissions in discovery that [...] did not furnish them with any legal advice or opinions, did not make any assurances or representations to them, and did not supply them with any information about the assignment transaction, the Pork Chop Hill Assemblage, or [...] at any point in time.
[brief] 2  A.  PLAINTIFF  STILL SUFFERS FROM THE ADVERSE CONSEQUENCES CAUSED BY THE PRIOR PROCEEDING; CIVIL RIGHTS IS A MATTER OF PUBLIC INTEREST; DEFENDANTS MISREPRESENT THE RELIEF SOUGHT IN THE COMPLAINT  PURSUANT TO R. 4:69 AND N.J.S.A. 10:6-1-2 WITH RELIEF SOUGHT BY PLAINTIFFS  MOTIONS  PURSUANT TO R. 4:69-3 and N.J.S.A. 2A:17-36; DEFENDANT'S CHANGE IN CONDUCT DID NOT MOOT THE CIVIL RIGHTS CLAIMS; THE CHANCERY DIVISION ORDER DOES NOT ADDRESS  PLAINTIFFS MOTIONS; APPELLANT'S CASE IS NOT MOOT BECAUSE IT IMPLICATES HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO BE FREE FROM DISCRIMINATION; TO EQUAL PROTECTION AND NJLAD RIGHT TO BE FREE FROM HARRASMENT AND N.J.S.A.  2A:17-36  RIGHT TO ADJOURNMENT UPON REQUEST; PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY'S FEES AS THE PREVAILING PARTY ON HIS CIVIL RIGHTS CLAIM
[brief] 16  Shields v. Ramslee Motors, 240 N.J. 479 (2020)..................................................  15 Stewart v. 104 Wallace St., Inc., 87 N.J. 146 (1981)..............................................  29, 31 Town of Kearny v. Disc. City of Old Bridge, Inc., 205 N.J. 386 (2011)  ...............  15  Triffin v. Am. Int’l Group, Inc., 372 N.J. Super. 517 (App. Div. 2004)...............  13 Trinity Church v. Lawson–Bell, 394 N.J. Super. 159 (App. Div. 2007)...............  40 U.S. Pipe & Foundry Co. v. Am. Arbitration Assoc., 67 N.J. Super. 384 (App. Div. 1961) .............................................................................  13 Villalobos v. Fava, 342 N.J. Super. 38 (App. Div. 2001)........................................  40  Viviano v. CBS, Inc., 101 N.J. 538 (1986)  ............................................................  35 Statutes N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2..................................................................................................  35 Court Rules N.J. Court Rule 4:26-4..........................................................................................  36 N.J. Court Rule 4:46-2(c) ....................................................................................  12 N.J. Court Rule 4:9-3............................................................................................  38  Table of Judgments, Orders, and Rulings Being Cross-Appealed
[directive] To be notified of any release or escape of the defendant; (r)  To appear in any court before which a proceeding implicating the rights of the victim is being held, with standing to file a motion or present argument on a motion filed to enforce any right conferred herein or by Article I, paragraph 22 of the New Jersey Constitution, and to receive an adjudicative decision by the court on any such motion.  Page 65 ordered treatment program, as shown by the proven success of New Jersey’s Drug Court Program, which provides treatment opportunities and incentives to break the vicious cycle of addiction and crime.  See N.J.S.A. 2A:162-17(b)(2)(i) (pretrial release conditions might include that the defendant “undergo available . . . treatment . . . for drug or alcohol dependency”) (emphasis added to note that the Legislature recognized that pretrial treatment might not be available).  See also subsection 6.2.4.  As a matter of reasonable statutory interpretation and sound public policy, a defendant should not be deemed to be immune from pretrial detention because unavailable release conditions in theory might have been sufficient to manage the identified risk(s) posed by defendant’s release pending trial.