ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The defendant in *Stampone* was sitting in his legally parked vehicle when a police officer approached him, concerned about a recent burglary in the same neighborhood.  *Id.* at 249.  Defendant refused to provide the officer with identification after informing the officer that he was waiting for his girlfriend to return to her residence, in front of which his car was parked.  *Id.* at 250.  After defendant complied with the officer’s request that he provide him with identification, the officer opened the door of the defendant’s car, and defendant slammed it shut, “almost” hitting the officer in the legs.  *Ibid.*  The Appellate Division overturned defendant’s conviction for disorderly conduct, finding that the State had failed to prove elements of *N.J.S.A. 2C:33-2(a).*  Specifically, the *Stampone* Court noted that “[defendant] was not charged with nor found to have created a hazardous or physically dangerous condition that did not serve his own legitimate purpose. ”  *Id.* at 254.  Furthermore, the court concluded:  [T]he actions of defendant and his testy exchange with [the officer] had no capacity to cause public inconvenience, public annoyance or public alarm.  **There was no indication that passers-by were noticing any of this or congregating or, indeed, that such persons were even present.**  Nor was there anything inherent in defendant’s conduct as to make it likely that his colloquy with [the officer] would cause public inconvenience, annoyance, or alarm.  *Id.* at 255 (emphasis added).  Common sense dictates that yelling death threats, playing loud music with racially charged language, and yelling racial epithets at a stranger on a public street has the ability to cause annoyance or alarm on the part of the listener and created a risk that her conduct could cause public inconvenience, annoyance or alarm.  Defendant threatened to have her “boys from Brooklyn” come to [...] to kill [...].  Defendant’s conduct was intended to alarm [...].  [T25-1 to -4].
[brief] PROPERLY APPLIED  THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD | 8 | | POINT II | | | PLAINTIFF DID NOT ESTABLISH THAT [...] HAD CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE OF A DANGEROUS CONDITION AND THEREFORE FAILED TO MEET HIS BURDEN UNDER N.J.S.A. 59:4-2 | 13 | | i.  There Is No Argument That Actual Notice Was Established.  | 14 | | ii.  Plaintiff Failed to Establish Constructive Notice | 15 | | POINT III | | | PLAINTIFF CANNOT ESTABLISH THAT [...] ACTED IN A PALPABLY UNREASONABLE MANNER | 20 | | CONCLUSION | 25 | APPENDIX
[brief] The owner argued that the taking had been consummated as title passed with the filing of the declaration of taking.  Defendant pointed to the Eminent Domain Revision Commission Report, paragraph 7, recommending that title pass with the filing of the declaration of taking.  [...], P.J.A.D., observed that the only defect in this reasoning was that the statute in 1969 contained no such provision.  Such is no longer the case.
[brief] 1T117:24–1T118:1-22.  Further, [...] explained that the shoulder injury was permanent since tears to a structure, even with surgical repair, is forever altered, affecting how the joint works, causing limitation of range of motion, and pain.  1T119:8-18.  [...] also testified that the injuries to the cervical spine were permanent as there was “constant inflammation or pressure under on those nerves. ”  1T119:19-21.  In addition, Plaintiff testified that the injury to his neck causes him daily pain, symptoms which travel into the arms, and difficulty with sleep.  1T66:1-16.  [...] sustained three separate levels of disc injury in the cervical spine that are causing compression of the spinal cord for which [...] has recommended a three-level anterior cervical discectomy and fusion.  1T164:3-1T165:21.  [...] explained that the surgery would involve removal of three herniated discs and implantation of artificial spacers and a small plate to help with the fusion.  1T165:3-12.  [...] also testified that there could be significant progression of degeneration in the spaces above and below the surgical site which would be a permanent, lifelong problem for [...] and could mean another surgery is necessary, that by not having the surgery, [...] is at an increased risk for additional injury and/or significant compromise because of the instability of the levels of the cervical spine as well as the compression of the spinal cord, and generally discussed the serious risks involved.  1T166:7 – 1T169:24.  [...] testified that he has been working as a cook since shortly after he first started working at the age of 16, and, he was 54 at the time of trial.
[brief] 8  Lopez v. Swyer, 62 N.J. 267 (1973)  .............................  8 | TRANSCRIPTS | Page | |-------------------------------------------------|------| | Transcript of Motion, dated January 24, 2020 | 1T | | Transcript of Motion, dated February 14, 2020 | 2T | | Transcript of Motion, dated June 25, 2021 | 3T | PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
[brief] Da024.  Therefore, the Plaintiff/Respondent’s utilization of the information provided to [...] would be in violation of [...]’s terms of service and in direct conflict with the rules in place when residents sign up for the service.  Residents\(^6\) utilize [...] with the understanding that when they sign up that they will only receive those communications from the City about emergency and other issues that impact the City and that their contact information is not shared with the municipality or any other party.  Specifically, residents know that they will not receive communications from other groups, organizations, or political, --- \(^6\)  Any person can sign up for [...] alerts for the [...], including those who live, work, or otherwise visit the City.  For purposes of this brief the term residents as used herein shall mean any individual who signed up for [...] alerts for the [...]. commercial, or advertising communications.  If the City were to provide access to this information (assuming arguendo that the City had a responsive public record), the terms and conditions and expectations of residents would be violated.  Furthermore, if the e-mails are considered public record, it would allow anyone to obtain the information and utilize the same for political, commercial, and advertising purposes in direct contradiction to the terms and conditions residents expected when the service was established.
[brief] ECPO Detective [...] testified that he was the on-call detective on May 27, 2012, and was assigned to investigate [...]’s death.  (7T10-2 to 15).  He responded to the scene where he met with ECPO Lieutenant [...] and ECPO Detective [...] at the scene.  (7T12-5 to 10).  Orange police officers were also present at the scene.  (7T13-5 to 14).  Upon arriving, Detective Ranges saw [...]’s body lying in the middle of Taylor Street covered with a white blanket.  (7T12-20 to 13-2).  During the course of his investigation, Detective Ranges learned that [...] identified defendant and co-defendant [...].  (7T35-4 to 14).  He also discovered that defendant’s two nicknames were “Spitta” or “Spitter”, and “Spaz”, while co-defendant’s two nicknames were “Pock” and “Spot”.  (7T45-14 to 21).  Detective Ranges met [...] at the hospital.
[brief] The State offered [...] as an expert to testify as to the direction from which a cell tower in question would receive a signal from a phone, and the judge overruled initial objections by both defense counsel (8T 141-4 to 146-15) to the witness and the testimony, holding that Burney [I] allows such testimony -- which it did before it was reversed by Burney [II] -- and noting that State was claiming that the testimony was only intended to show direction of the towers, not their ranges.
[brief] See Parker v. City of Trenton, 382 N.J. Super. 454 (App. Div. 2006) (dismissing appeal of non-final judgment as interlocutory); Triffin v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., No. A-0297-16T4, 2018 WL 636703, at *2 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Jan. 31, 2018) (unpublished) (“Because plaintiff neither sought nor obtained leave to appeal the order from which he appeals, we must dismiss the appeal as interlocutory.
[brief] As such, if the Appellate Division extends the deadline to file the complaint in lieu of prerogative writs, the Appellate Division should exercise original jurisdiction and decide the underlying merits of the appeal rather than remand.  If the Court needs to utilize its original jurisdiction to reach the substance of the matter, the record will amply demonstrate that the [...] did not act arbitrarily, capriciously or unreasonably.  (Pa099-112).  The demonstrated fact that 84.2% of the undersized lot is encumbered by "critical" slopes that cannot be disturbed provided exceptional topographic conditions supporting the [...]'s grant of a c. (1) hardship variance.  (Pa527; Pa552-553; Pa103; Pa106; SDa003; SDa027).  See N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70 c. (1).  The ordinance-based requirements to leave "critical" slopes untouched and to avoid deforestation allowed the [...] to conclude that the benefits of a vertical build (in terms of public safety through continued slope stability and conservation of natural resources) outweighed any potential detriments thereby justifying the grant of a c. (2) balancing variance.  (Pa551-553; Pa109-110).  See N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70 c. (2); see also PDR § 540- 624 A.; see further PDR § 540-636 D. (2).  These topographic and ecological concerns are recognized as special reasons justifying the [...]’s grant of a d. (6) height variance.  See e.g. Davis Enterprises v. Karpf, 105 N.J. 476, 493 (1987) (stating, “[t]hus, a lot with unusual topography may provide a basis for a variance from restrictions as to maximum height. ”); see also N.J.S.A. 40:55D-2 a., b. and j. (recognizing e.g. public health, public safety, the avoidance of natural and man-made disasters and prevention of degradation of the environment as purposes of the Municipal Land Use Law).  Given that the Objectors reside 260’ away in (taller) homes oriented in the opposite direction to take advantage of bay views, the [...] was justified in finding that there was no substantial detriment to the public good in the form of any impact on light, air, open space, views or the like.  (Pa507; Pa711-712; Pa107; Pa110-111; SDa028).  Moreover, the [...] was justified in finding that the variances could be granted without substantially impairing the intent and purpose of the ordinance because: a) it is common for homes in [...] to appear to be two-stories from one vantage and three-stories or more from another vantage; b) the vertical build is grounded in the ordinance-based policies of avoiding disturbance of steep slopes; and c) the variance is a product of the fact that the existing and proposed home’s height is amplified by the fact that the home is necessarily set atop piles to allow a level build on ground that drops off more than 50' from the front of the lot to the rear.  (Pa 444; Pa528; Pa468; Pa532-533; Pa674; Pa711; Pa106; Pa109-111; SDa042-046; SDa048-049; SDa032).  See PDR § 540-624 A.; see further PDR § 540-636  D.  CONCLUSION
[brief] Pa534.  The [...]-[...] contract, under section 801.03 entitled “METHODS OF CONSTRUCTION,” reads as follows:  The safety measures outlined and prescribed shall be considered basic and in certain instances additional safety measures may be appropriate and required.  Compliance with the safety measures and precautions prescribed in the Specifications and on the Plans shall not relieve the Contractor of responsibility for taking all additional and appropriate safety measures for all persons and property.  Full responsibility for adequate safety measures for the protection of all persons and property on and adjacent to the work site shall rest with the Contractor.  Pa586.  OSHA Directive Number CPL 02-01-054, effective October 16, 2012, entitled “Inspection and Citation Guidance for Roadway and Highway Construction Work Zones,” cited ANSI/ASSE A10.47-2009, Work Zone Safety for Highway Construction as an example of documentation the Construction Safety and Health Officer should use to establish hazard recognition.  Pa315.  ANSI/ASSE A10.47-2009, Work Zone Safety for Highway Construction represents the reasonable and customary standards of the industry for the protection of workers within a construction work zone, such as the incident construction.
[directive] 6  USE OF FORCE POLICY  Addendum A | December 2020  CEDs and Other Less-Lethal Devices and Ammunition  5  Authorization to Use CEDs 5.1  An officer authorized to use a CED pursuant to this policy may fire, discharge, or utilize drive stun mode of the CED during an actual operation, only against: (a) an active assailant; or (b) a threatening assailant who will not voluntarily submit to custody after having been given a reasonable opportunity to do so considering the exigency of the situation and the immediacy of the need to employ law enforcement force; or (c) a person who is attempting to cause death or serious bodily injury to him/herself; or (d) a fleeing suspect if clear and convincing evidence exists to believe the suspect has committed a crime in which the suspect caused or attempted to cause death or serious bodily injury.
[brief] A.  We'll typically get an alarm on a low - or a high-pressure line, which would trigger us to investigate this particular area.  So based on the set point, we may see a few – it depends on the controller, the controller's judgment, as to whether or not it's an abnormal condition.  Obviously, there's maximum pressures allowed, and we would not want our system to reach that pressure.  So it would depend on a number of factors that are in the purview of our gas controller.  They would make that determination as to whether or not this is a normal or abnormal operating condition.
[brief] The Law Division’s denial of plaintiff’s cross-motion to extend discovery was an appropriate exercise of its discretion.  It is undisputed that plaintiff did not seek to extend discovery in this lawsuit until the discovery end date had passed, and a trial date had been fixed.  Rule 4:24-1(c) states explicitly that “[n]o extension of the discovery period may be permitted after an arbitration or trial date is fixed, unless exceptional circumstances are shown. ”  As this Court has explained,  In order to extend discovery based upon “exceptional circumstances,” the moving party must satisfy four inquiries: (1) why discovery has not been completed within time and counsel’s diligence in pursuing discovery during that time; (2) the additional discovery or disclosure sought is essential; (3) an explanation for counsel's failure to request an extension of the time for discovery within the original time period; and (4) the circumstances presented were clearly beyond the control of the attorney and litigant seeking the extension of time.  [Rivers v. LSC P’ship, 378 N.J. Super. 68, 78–79 (App. Div. 2005) (citing Vitti v. Brown, 359 N.J. Super. 40, 51 (Law. Div. 2003)).  Although the additional discovery that plaintiff sought to complete, i.e., service of an expert report, was obviously essential her case, the other three inquiries were clearly not satisfied here.
[brief] “And Judge, all I can – the only thing I can add- uh, the only thing I can prove in this case is that my client, uh – my client’s position is that he slipped and fell and struck his head when he was going to throw something out in the dumpster.  Uh, and he – since he woke up laying on a piece of plywood, he believes that’s what caused him to fall.  And because he had trouble getting into the building and he had difficulty standing up, he repeatedly tried to on his way to get into the house, and he kept slipping because there was more debris going right up into the stairs, that’s all—these things contributed to causing him to fall. ” (T30:22-T31:9).  Appellant argues the circumstances surrounding his accident gave rise to an inference that his fall was probably caused by his either slipping or tripping on a discarded piece of plywood at the construction site.  Appellant argues that the fact of the presence of plywood covered by snow at or near the dumpster is sufficient proof that he fell on the plywood.  As the Trial Court correctly determined, this lack of evidence would lead to the members of a jury to improperly speculate as to the cause of appellant’s fall.
[brief] 1T32:11 – 1T33:4.  He explained that he had never had any difficulty, before the accident, performing his job duties.  1T33:23 – 1T35:2.  [...] never had any prior injuries involving his head, neck or shoulder.  Id.  Prior to the accident he took care of his father and increasingly took care of the household duties and yardwork.  1T35:7- 1T36:15.  Plaintiff also testified that he has difficulty working, lifting, carrying any items due to the significant limitation and range of motion he has involving his arm due to the ongoing shoulder problems.  [...] testified to difficulty sleeping, headaches, neck pain and radiating pain into his arms all on a daily basis.
[brief] The only limit of use imposed by the Trial Court is Defendant cannot utilize the Sixth Street Lot in a manner such that children walk through the cars parked during morning services.  The record is void of any claim that evening services interfere with the Defendant’s use of the Sixth Street Lot since the students are generally already out of school by the time evening services begin (at sundown).  The Trial Court did not restrict Defendant’s use of the Fifth Street Lot in anyway except to require the removal of non-operational vehicles and other garbage interfering with both parties’ ability to park in the Fifth Street Lot.  (Da207-209)
[brief] Not surprisingly, no such provision was included in the PSA, as Plaintiff would never have agreed to such a one-sided and illusory contract.  See Oliver v. Autographic Register Co., 126 N.J. Eq. 18, 22 (1939).  Even beyond the plain meaning of the phrase “in addition to,” common sense also leads to the conclusion that, in the context of this multi-million dollar real estate transaction, Plaintiff would insist upon having a right to demand specific performance of the PSA if [...] attempted to proceed to closing under the [...], regardless of whether Plaintiff had already demanded return of the Earnest Money Deposit upon [...]’s announcement that it had no intention to perform its obligations.  Why would Plaintiff be so naïve as to restrict its remedies to receiving only a return of the Deposit, leaving itself without remedy for all of its heavy carrying costs and for the loss of the value of the Real Property?  Settled rules of contract construction prohibit an interpretation that would lead to such an absurd result.  See, e.g., Barila v Bd. of Educ. of Cliffside Park, 241 N.J. 595, 616 (2020).  The trial court’s (and Defendants’) construction of Section 13.1 of the PSA enabled [...] to cut Plaintiff out of the deal and close with the Fee Owner with total impunity, while leaving Plaintiff without any remedy for the tremendous loss of the contract value and the heavy expenses it had incurred in order to arrange for financing of its end of the deal.  (Pa5, Complaint ¶ 19).  This construction of the contract rendered entirely illusory [...]’s obligations (and Plaintiff’s rights) under the PSA.  Once again, settled principles of contract construction forbid this result.  “A contract should not be read to vest a party or his nominee with the power virtually to make his promise illusory.  Especially must this be so when a forfeiture will follow. ”  See Russell v. Princeton Labs., Inc., 50 N.J. 30, 38 (1967).  Finally, the trial court’s reasoning entirely ignored the Complaint’s allegations that, after the return of the Earnest Money Deposit, [...] and [...] took affirmative steps to hide the closing from Plaintiff.  Indeed, after the deposit had been returned to Plaintiff, [...] instructed [...] to keep Plaintiff in the dark as to the anticipated closing.  (Pa11, Complaint ¶¶ 42-44).  If [...] and [...] truly believed that Plaintiff had no right to participate in the transaction with the Fee Owner, why would it be necessary to keep this information hidden from Plaintiff and to proceed covertly to closing?  **POINT III**
[brief] THE DECISIONS UNDER REVIEW ARE NOT AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION.  (Not Raised Below).  Defendants lead off with the wrong standard of appellate review and also misidentify which orders are subject to review.  To start, only the court orders of April 3, 2023 and November 15, 2023 denying vacation of judgment are subject to appellate review because those are the only ones identified in Defendants’ notice of appeal.  The discovery order of September 27, 2023 is not identified in Defendants’ notice of appeal and hence is not under review.  (1a-5a).  See R. 2:5-1(e)(3)(i); Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules, comment 5.1 on R. 2:5-1 (Gann 2024) (“[O]nly the judgments, orders or parts thereof designated in the notice of appeal are subject to the appellate process and review. ”); 30 River Ct. E. Urban Renewal Co. v. Capograsso, 383 N.J. Super. 470, 473-74 (App. Div. 2006) (refusing to review order not identified in notice of appeal); 1266 Apt. Corp. v. New Horizon Deli, Inc., 368 N.J. Super. 456, 459 (App. Div. 2004) (same).  An appellate court reviews an order resolving a R. 4:50-1 motion under the deferential “abuse of discretion” standard.  Deutsche Bank Nat’l Tr. Co. v. Russo, 429 N.J. Super. 91, 98 (App. Div. 2012).  An abuse of discretion exists when “a decision is made without a rational explanation, inexplicably departed from established policies, or rested on an impermissible basis. ”  Flagg v. Essex Cnty. Prosecutor, 171 N.J. 561, 571 (2002).  Neither order is an abuse of discretion because they are supported by rational explanations that comport with prevailing legal principles.
[directive] -=i'115}-E A]~7]-tJ:o] l't]~ ~%¾ ?A}l5}-E ti]  A}¾•?£ ~-e-%~7-} A].E..~ 15}.i!.  ::::i ~ A➔J-t?--e-RoJ: {:jA}tl]¾¾ ;;i.J~-e-Ho]: :£]-e- -3!¾ o}1Jy77}? If i. (L. Computer Crime Prevention Fund Penalty, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-3.8 2009, c. 143). the [Yes/off] [No/0 1-i...1-8..] crime involves a violation ofN.J.S.A. 2C:24-4b(3) (causes or permits child to engage in sexual act that is to be photographed or exhibited), if the crime was committed on or after February 1, 2018, N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4b(4) (photographs or films a child in sexual act), if the crime was committed on or after February 1, 2018, N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4b(5)(b) (knowingly possessing or knowingly viewing child pornography), N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4.1 (leader of a child pornography network), if the crime was committed on or after February 1, 2018, N.J.S.A. 2C:34-3 (selling, distributing or exhibiting obscene material to a person under age 18) or an offense involving computer criminal activity in violation of any provision of Title 2C, chapter 20, you will be assessed a mandatory penalty as listed below for each offense for which you pied guilty?