ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Accordingly, the State’s Motion for Leave to Appeal should be granted to permit this Court to consider this issue of public interest.  A trial court’s ruling on the admissibility of evidence is “subject to limited appellate scrutiny. ”  *State v. Buda*, 195 N.J. 278, 294 (2008).  A trial court’s findings based on the testimony of witnesses is afforded deference, *State v. Elders*, 192 N.J. 224, 244 (2007).  A trial court’s “interpretation of the law and the legal consequences that flow from established facts are not entitled to any special deference. ”  *State v. Handy*, 206 N.J. 39, 45 (2011); *Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan*, 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995); *State v. Mann*, 203 N.J. 328, 337 (2010).  Here, where the trial court did not preside over the evidentiary hearings, but rather relied upon cold transcripts, the review is *de novo*.  The law-of-the-case doctrine “is a non-binding rule intended to ‘prevent relitigation of a previously resolved issue’” in the same case.
[brief] P.E.R.C. No. 2024-41, 50 NJPER 360 (¶86 2024).  (Aa036-064).  The Commission’s decision held that the arbitrator properly rejected the [...]’s revised final offer because, in contravention of the arbitrator’s request, it included new substantive proposals rather than more specific language and rationale for the final offers previously submitted.  (Aa049-054).  The Commission held that the arbitrator did not mistakenly award health benefits language consistent with that found in the [...] ([...]) contract, because that is exactly what the [...] had requested in its final offer.  (Aa054-055).  Regarding application of the N.J.S.A. 34:13A-16g criteria (16g statutory factors), the Commission held that the arbitrator sufficiently explained which factors he found were entitled to the most weight and his rationale for grouping factors g(1), g(5), g(6), and g(9) together.  Specifically, the Commission found that, in considering the interest and welfare of the public (g(1)) and the financial impact of the award (g(6)), the arbitrator properly considered evidence and testimony concerning the City’s financial condition, including the receipt of Transitional Aid and oversight by the state [...] ([...]).
[brief] The issue is whether the use/facility was legal and permitted by the Zoning at its inception and thereafter, and the burden to prove that zoning legality is on the proponent of the nonconforming use.  In fact, beyond the total lack of any proofs by the [...], the 1972 Site Plan Application and Resolution (Da13-22) that approved the School expansion on Lot 5 to its present use/size, established the following facts:
[brief] 229 (App. Div. 2002) | | | **J-M Mfg. Co., v. Phillips & Cohen, LLP,** | 21, 22 | | 443 N.J. Super. 447 (App. Div. 2015) | | | **Kornbleuth v. Westover,** | 18 | | 241 N.J. 289 (2020) | | | **Macfadden v. Macfadden,** | 32 | | 49 N.J. Super. 356 (App. Div. 1958) | | | **McNair v. McNair,** | 29 | | 332 N.J. Super. 195 (App. Div. 2000) | | | **Mystic Isle Dev. Corp. v. Perskie & Nehmad,** | 22, 30 | | 142 N.J. 310 (1995) | | | **Suburban Dep’t Stores v. City of E. Orange,** | 32 | | 47 N.J. Super. 472 (App. Div. 1957) | | | **Sullivan v. Coverings & Installation, Inc.,** | 18 | | 403 N.J. Super. 86 (App. Div. 2008) | | | **Terranova v. Gen. Elec. Pension Tr.,** | 18 | | 457 N.J. Super. 404 (App. Div. 2019) | | TLC Servs., LLC v. Devine Roofing & Constr., LLC, No. A-5626-17T4, 2019 WL 5824780 (N.J. App. Div. Nov. 7, 2019) .........................................................................................................................26 Vision Mortg. Corp. v. Patricia J. Chiapperini, Inc., 307 N.J. Super. 48 (App. Div. 1998) ...........................................................................27 William Blanchard Co. v. Beach Concrete Co., 150 N.J. Super. 277 (App. Div. 1977) ...........................................................................28 Winters v. N. Hudson Reg’l Fire & Rescue, 212 N.J. 67 (2012) ........................................................................................................34 Rules R. 1:13-1 ..........................................................................................................................31 R. 4:5-1 ............................................................................................................................26 R. 4:28-1 ..........................................................................................................................26 R. 4:30A ...........................................................................................................................19 Other Authorities [...] & [...], Current N.J. Court Rules, (2024)
[brief] The Decedent left three children, including his daughter [...] (in her capacity as Trustee, [...] is referred to herein as “the Plaintiff” or “the Trustee,” and in her individual capacity as [...]), and sons [...] (“[...]”) and [...] (“[...]”).  The Trust owned two properties at the time of the Decedent’s death, one of which is located at [...] (the “Boonton Property”) and one at [...] (the “Florida Property”).  The operative provisions of the Trust concerning the properties are set forth at Article IV, Section 4.1A (hereinafter, “Section 4.1A”: a.  If the property located at [...] is still owned by the trust at the time of my death, I grant my son’s [sic], SHAWN and CHRIS, the power to purchase their sister’s share of such property at the then fair market value.
[brief] The New Jersey Supreme Court has held that the lack of a Ferreira conference does not excuse the non-production of a valid Affidavit of Merit:  At issue here is what effect the failure to hold a Ferreira conference will have on the time limits prescribed in the statute.  The answer is none….  …[P]arties are presumed to know the law and are obliged to follow it.  See Emanuel v. McNell, 87 N.J.L. 499, 504, 94 A. 616 (E. & A.1915) (“Everyone is presumed to know the law.
[brief] (8T 93-1 to 12)  This reasoning defies logic; a defendant who always carries a gun in public would seem to need or deserve more deterrence than one who procured a gun on a single occasion for a specific, limited reason.  Moreover, because this deterrence rationale—via placing substantial weight on aggravating factor nine—was used to justify a maximum-term sentence for manslaughter and a sentence at the upper end of the range for possession, the Court impermissibly double-counted this rationale.
[directive] 2.0.3  This approach to management as it relates to discipline insures that all subordinates know and understand what must be done, why it must be done, how it must be done and when it must be done.  Employees must be clearly told what constitutes satisfactory performance through performance evaluations and similar procedures.  N.J.A.C. 4A:6-5.1.  Supervisors and managers also must know when and how to take corrective action.  To achieve this, management must establish workable procedures for documenting all expectations and advising individuals of their duties and responsibilities.
[brief] Additionally, Appellants’ claim since the outset of the action in March 2019 was that the [...] breached the NDA with Appellants by improperly using the information they learned from Appellants in due diligence between 2015 and 2017 to acquire the Lease and the Solar Rights.  In their initial Complaint in the Prior Action, Appellants alleged, among other things, that during the term of the NDA with the [...], they “provided [the] CEP Defendants with the name of the owners of the Land, and a copy of the Lease containing all of the material Lease terms” (emphasis added)  [FEDa22], and that based upon the confidential information provided to the [...], the [...] were aware that the lease “payment was $200,000 per year with a 1½ % annual escalator” and “fell due on September 1 of every year. ”  [FEDa23].  Given these allegations that were made, maintained and vigorously pursued by Appellants for 2½ years, a claim of breach of confidentiality provision in the Lease is simply not sustainable against [...] as Appellants admittedly disclosed the pertinent information, including providing the Lease itself and the annual rent, to the [...] as early as 2015.
[brief] Id.  (“Defendant is correct to note that while intra-family exclusions have been declared invalid, step-down provisions, so long as they don’t step down coverage to less than allowed by the omnibus statute, N.J.S.A. 39:6B-1, have been upheld in the auto context.”).  Thus, this Court in *Dela Vega* noted its concern based on the interplay in primary auto policies between Injury to Insured exclusions (which are invalid) and intra-family step down provisions (which are allowed when appropriately designated).  Thus, the public policy concerns referenced in *Dela Vega* in connection with intra-family step-down provisions exclusively arise in the primary auto liability context, and because of potential conflicts with the statutory requirements for that specific type of policy.
[brief] An arbitration provision is not enforceable unless the consumer has reasonable notice of its existence Santana v. Smiledirectclub, 475 NJ Super 279, 285 (App. Div. 2023).  In the context of electronic agreements, reasonably conspicuous notice of the existence of contract terms and unambiguous manifestation of assent to those terms is essential if electronic bargaining is to have integrity and credibility, Wollen v. Gulf Stream, 468 NJ Super 483, 499 (App. Div. 2021).  A party may not claim lack of notice of the terms of an arbitration provision for failure to read it unless some fraud or imposition is practiced upon him, Santana v. Smiledirectclub, 475 NJ Super 279, 286 (App. Div. 2023).  However, this assumes knowledge of what is being signed.  What is “imposition”?  Dictionaries define imposition as:  Laying on of something as a burden or obligation; something imposed as a burden or duty; an unusual or extraordinary burdensome requirement or task; an excessive or uncalled for requirement or burden.  Collins American English Dictionary, Randam House & Harper Collins Publishers; Merriam-Webster Unabridged Dictionary.  Fraud in the execution (raised below oral argument 1T 12-24 to 13-24) may be present when a party executes an agreement with neither knowledge nor reasonable opportunity to obtain knowledge of its character or its essential terms by reason of excusable ignorance.
[brief] “2T” refers to the transcript of the December 15, 2023 oral argument on [...]’s motion for reconsideration of the trial court’s August 17, 2023 order granting Plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary judgment and denying [...]’s cross-motion for partial summary judgment.  On September 6, 2023, [...] timely filed a motion for reconsideration and also sought a stay pending an interlocutory appeal.  (Da511).  The trial court denied the reconsideration motion in an Order and Opinion entered on January 22, 2024.  (Da870).  In doing so, the trial court applied the incorrect legal standard governing reconsideration and otherwise failed to meaningfully address [...]’s arguments.  (Da873-876).  On February 6, 2024, the trial court issued an Order denying [...]’s request to stay the partial summary judgment order.  (Da877).  On February 12, 2024, [...] timely filed a motion with the Appellate Division seeking leave to file an interlocutory appeal from the trial court’s August 17, 2023 order granting Plaintiffs partial summary judgment on Count 1 and the trial court’s January 22, 2024 order denying [...]’s motion for reconsideration.
[directive] 16  1  Purpose of Policy  1.1  The primary purpose of this policy is to secure a balance between the protection of the lives and safety of the public and police officers, and law enforcement's duty to enforce the law and apprehend violators.  This Policy is intended to guide the circumstances under which officers may engage in vehicular pursuits.  High-speed vehicular pursuits create a substantial risk of injury and fatalities.  Over 10% of vehicular pursuits end up in accidents resulting in injuries or fatalities, including to officers, innocent third parties in vehicles unrelated to the pursuit, and pedestrians.  1.2  The pursuit policy was last updated in 2009.  The policy succeeded initially in reducing the number of pursuits, injuries, and fatalities associated with them.  However, after an initial decline, the number of pursuits has been increasing steadily since 2014.  Since the policy was updated there have been almost 4,200 accidents during pursuits that resulted in over 2,800 injuries, including injuries to 625 law enforcement officers, 682 victims in third party vehicles, and 52 pedestrians.  In that same period, there have been 59 fatalities associated with pursuits, including an officer, four third-party drivers, and eight pedestrians.  1.3  In recognition of this data and the substantial human costs associated with high-speed vehicular pursuits, this Policy further restricts the circumstances under which pursuits can be undertaken.  The offenses for which officers may pursue suspects has been limited to only the most serious crimes.  Significantly, both auto theft and most drug offenses have been removed from the list of crimes authorizing the initiation of a pursuit.  This Policy creates a strong presumption against the initiation of pursuits for traffic violations and prohibits continuation of a pursuit based on the risk created by the speed or evasive driving of the fleeing suspect during the pursuit itself.  It also requires greater oversight by supervisors, and mandates that a pursuit be terminated unless a supervisor affirmatively authorizes it to be continued.  1.4  Deciding whether to pursue a motor vehicle is among the most critical decisions made by law enforcement officers.  It is a decision which must be made quickly and under difficult, often unpredictable circumstances.  In recognition of the potential risk to public and officer safety created by vehicular pursuits, no officer or supervisor shall be criticized or disciplined for a decision not to engage in a vehicular pursuit or to terminate an ongoing vehicular pursuit based on the risk involved, even in circumstances where this Policy would permit the commencement or continuation of the pursuit.  Likewise, officers who conduct pursuits consistent with this Policy will be strongly supported by the law enforcement community in any subsequent review of such actions.  1
[brief] ”  1 eDiscovery & Digital Evidence § 7:21.  And the same responsibility applies fully to e-discovery, where “[p]roducing parties [must] review documents . . . for relevance and responsiveness before they are produced. ”  The Sedona Conference: Commentary on Achieving Quality in the E-Discovery Process, 15 Sedona Conf. J. 265, 290 (2014).  After all, the “relevance limitation” on discovery under Rule 4:10-2 would have little meaning if parties were required to produce all of their documents en masse, letting the opposing party review relevant and irrelevant documents alike.
[directive] shall from the prosecutors' offices expeditiously Representatives affected consult as as possible to identify the office that will serve as the lead prosecuting agency for purposes of initial prosecutorial concerning considering charging/pretrial decisions the defendant, all release relevant circumstances, including especially the seriousness of the offenses committed in the various Division of Criminal Justice shall be notified if is necessary for the Division to jurisdictions.  The it special general assistant prosecutors as deputy attorneys to handle matters or make cross-designate another jurisdiction. of Section initial court appearances in  The purpose this is to coordinate charging/pretrial decisions, and nothing herein shall be construed as depriving a County release offense within jurisdictional Prosecutor of authority to prosecute an committed the prosecutor's the authority. shall operational on October 31, 2016.
[brief] (Pa9-81).  The Court does not and indeed should not give any weight or merit to the mere conclusory allegations and recitations of the elements of the cause of action in the proposed amended pleading.  See, Berger v. Frazier, 2018 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1679, at *9 (Super. Ct. App. Div. July 13, 2018) (“Under Rule 4:6-2(e), we are required to accept as true facts that are alleged, but not conclusory allegations. ”).  Thus, even if the proposed Second Amended Complaint did comply with N.J. Crt. R. 4:5-7, there are insufficient facts to suggest a claim against Defendant [...] under the NJCRA.
[brief] [...] also misstates that [...] earned a $755,562 profit when selling the Property’s other units upon the Property’s conversion to a condominium property.  See Db25.  That sum was taken from [...]’s 2016 tax return, filed with [...]’s rent increase application.  Pa 78.  However, that tax return expressly stated that is the sum “due from affiliates” relating to other properties owned by [...]’s affiliates.  Da 67.  It does not in any manner represent [...]’s profit from the Property’s other units sold in 2003.
[directive] Blanket bond coverage provided for certain county, municipal officers, employees; 40.1 evidence.  The board of chosen freeholders of any county or the governing body of any municipality, as the 1. case may be, may provide by blanket bond for the bonding of certain county or municipal officers and employees for faithful performance and discharge of their duties.  Blanket bond coverage may be by one or or more blanket bonds issued by a surety company or companies or one or more underwriters by a of joint insurance fund established pursuant to P.L. 1983, c.372 (C.40A: 10-36 et seq.) which the county as is or municipality a member.  Blanket bond coverage may be provided in lieu of an individual bond to -- any oficer or empbyee required by law to be bonded, except treasurers and tax collectors, by whatever - - known, title provided the blanket bond meets the requirements for the individual bond in amount, rights of cancellation, and the governmental agencies in whose favor it runs.  Whenever a copy of an individual bond is required by law to be filed with or supplied to specified officers, evidence of blanket bond coverage filed with or supplied to such officers by the board of chosen freeholders or governing body shall be compliance with such requirement.
[brief] (6T 17-16 to 25, 142-24 to 165-10)  [...] explained that after she parked the car, she felt that she needed to “basically face the situation” and check the backseat of the car where [...]’s body was.  (6T 143-13 to 18)  She opened the rear door, and [...] was “still sitting up with his eyes open,” which caused her to “freak out” and close the door.  (6T 144-1 to 9)  She then began to search the car for her cellphone and wallet.  (6T 144-13 to 17)  Although she did not find her things, she did find a tire iron in the front of the car.  (6T 145-1 to 8, 145-15 to 21)  She explained that even though she knew [...] “wasn’t alive at that point,” she “didn’t feel safe” so she picked up the tire iron because it made her feel “a little more secure” and able to protect herself.
[brief] “There is nothing in our law, decisional or statutory, which supports the argument that the constitutional proscription against impairment of contract is not applicable to laws relating to agreements of sale to furnish water. ”  In Daniel, the TCA failed to pose a problem for plaintiff, who prevailed in their water billing dispute against the municipality based on it being an issue of contract. \footnote{Daniel v. Borough of Oakland, 124 N.J. Super. 69 (App. Div. 1973).}  By its express language, the TCA doesn’t cover contract claims.  New Jersey public entities are subject to suit.
[brief] VIVIENNE I.  ALLEN’S BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF AN APPEAL TABLE OF CONTENTS  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ..........................................................  iii  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT ......................................................  1  PROCEDURAL HISTORY ...........................................................  3  STATEMENT OF FACTS ............................................................  4  ARGUMENT ............................................................................. 9  I.  THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE APPELLANT- PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT BECAUSE IT APPLIED  AN INCORRECT STANDARD UNDER AICRA IN RELYING ON THE LACK OF SUBJECTIVE COMPLAINTS OF PAIN, RATHER THAN CONSIDERING THE OBJECTIVE MEDICAL EVIDENCE THAT WAS THE BASIS OF THE PLAINTIFF’S EXPERT REPORT AND THE CERTIFICATE OF PERMANENCY (Raised Below Pa94) ..............................................................
[brief] N.J.S.A. 34:19-3(a) and (c) .......................................................................23  N.J.S.A. 34:19-3(a)(1)  ..............................................................................28  N.J.S.A. 34:19-3(c)(1) ..............................................................................28  N.J.S.A. 34:19-3(c)(3) ..............................................................................28  Other Authorities  Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules, comment 2.3.1 on R. 4:46-2 (2013)..........................21  INDEX OF DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS’ APPENDIX  Certification of [...]…………………………………………………………Da1
[brief] The Court erred by finding it was not “suspicious” that Decedent’s husband of 29 years was disinherited in a Will that was concealed from him for years while it was possessed by Respondent who frequently bullied the Decedent and who brought her to tears.  The Court erred by failing to apply the appropriate burdens of proof and by relying on unsupported lay opinions and far-reaching assumptions while it disregarded as “irrelevant” the events taking place when the Will was made.  Petitioner also requests that the Final Judgment be reversed that enforced a photocopy of a document titled “Ante-Nuptial Agreement” (hereinafter “Photocopy”) finding it waived Petitioner’s right to an elected share of the Estate.
[brief] First, the first paragraph of Newark I is factually false.  Newark I involved a nonurban renewal entity [...] long term tax exemption.  Newark I did not involve an urban renewal entity [...] long term tax exemption.  Newark I omitted the [...] public wrong doing ultra vires exception to standing.  Newark I failed to cite MEPT Journal Square Urban Renewal LLC v. City of Jersey City, 455 N.J. Super. 608 (App. Div. 2018), The State Comptroller’s Tax Abatement Report (Aug. 10, 2010), The Redevelopment Handbook (Jan. 2012) and The Municipal Tax Abatement Handbook (Nov. 2020).
[brief] PROCEDURAL HISTORY  The Appellant-Plaintiff filed a Complaint on August 4, 2021 (Docket No. [...]) (Pa1-Pa7).  The parties completed discovery, including exchanging all medical records and reports, and conducting a deposition of the Appellant-Plaintiff on June 22, 2022.  On March 2, 2023, counsel for the Respondent-Defendant filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, pursuant to R. 4:46, for a find finding of the “plaintiff’s failure to satisfy the AICRA verbal threshold requirements. ” (Pa8-Pa10).  As such, they sought to have “the Plaintiff's Complaint be dismissed with prejudice based upon plaintiff’s failure to satisfy the AICRA verbal threshold requirements. ”  The Appellant-Plaintiff filed an Opposition on March 17, 2023 and the Respondent-Defendant filed their Reply on March 23, 2023.  Oral arguments were conducted telephonically on March 31, 2023.  The Order of the Trial Court, dated March 31, 2023, granted the Summary Judgment.  (Pa92).  On April 19, 2023, the counsel for Appellant-Plaintiff timely filed a Motion for Reconsideration, under R. 4:49-2 and was returnable on May 12, 2023.  The counsel for Defendant-Respondent filed their Opposition on May 2, 2023.  A Reply to the Opposition was filed by the counsel for the Appellant-Plaintiff on May 8, 2023.  On July 3, 2023, almost three months after the original return date, the Trial Court entered its Order denying the Motion for Reconsideration.  Said Order and the Summary Judgment Order of March 31, 2023 are the subject of this Appeal.