ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] [...] demonstrated not only a disturbing level of a lack of respect for women, but extreme poor judgment which was aggravated by his failure to admit to his actions or timely apologize for his conduct.  While the Trial Court described [...]’s transmission of the revolting video a “mistake,” such conduct can be better described as extremely careless or reckless.  For these reasons, the Trial Court’s ruling that “there is no connection between the conduct and sewerage authority business, operations or personnel,” (Da 377), and that [...]’s conduct does not violate the higher standard of conduct imposed upon him as he is not performing his duties 24/7, (Da 376), contravenes Driscoll and Karins, that prescribe a certain course of conduct for public officials whether or not performing official duties.  Further, [...] chose to make his private conduct public by dissemination of the subject video.  This State’s Supreme Court has ruled that when the necessities of discipline, morale, and public confidence are implicated, an agency should be permitted “the establishment of a broad range of proscribed conducted without detailing every possible offense, and thus, without the precision required in criminal statutes and procedure.
[brief] DR. ONDIK IS ASKING THE COURT TO BLUE PENCIL THE RESTRICTIONS DIFFERENTLY THAN HE REQUESTED OF THE CHANCERY COURT.  [...]’s applications to the Chancery Court focused solely on [...]’s Flemington office.  He even represented to the Chancery Court that he would relinquish his privileges at [...].  (Ra179-180, p. 6).  Despite this, [...] is now asking this Court for the first time to allow him to practice at hospitals that were not part of his initial application and to Blue Pencil his restrictive covenant by 17 miles – not .76 miles.  (Ab31).  It is completely inappropriate for [...] to ask this Court for relief never sought and expressly waived before the Chancery Court.  (Ra180 (agreeing to relinquish rights to practice at [...])).  Neider v. Royal Indemnity Ins., 62 N.J. 229, 234 (1973) (noting that the Court will generally decline to consider issues raised for the first time on appeal).  [...]’s new pivot underscores the central weakness with his application; it is not based on any actual concrete set of facts against which the Chancery Court or even this Court is to evaluate.  It’s a constantly shifting position.  His first application was based on a hypothetical speculative situation that had not occurred and ultimately never occurred.  His second application was based on a moot offer of employment and effectively sought an advisory opinion from the Chancery Court about what might happen if [...] again offered him employment (i.e. reversed its decision to withdraw its offer).  Now he is asking the Court to allow him to practice at unidentified hospitals that were never before raised.  This is improper and yet another reason why the Court should deny his application.  To the extent that [...] claims that [...]’s Flemington office is very close to the outer limit of the Restrictive Covenant, so he should be able to practice there, Courts do not make better contracts for parties than the one that they themselves negotiated.  *Schenck v. HJI Assocs.*, 295 N.J. Super. 445, 450 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 149 N.J. 35 (1997).  [...] should not be permitted to ignore the agreed-to limits freely and without consequence (i.e. money damages) for breaching the terms of his Employment Agreement.  The Practice’s Restrictive Covenant is valuable (Ra93-118).
[brief] The students who would be residing in the dormitory would undoubtedly be traveling to religious schools in Lakewood.  By providing for the land exchange and thereby conveying that property to the developer, traffic issues, traffic expenses, as well as other related issues could be easily avoided.  At the same time, the Township agreed to accept and acquire property owned by the developer, which is located more in the center of town, where most of the population is living.  That property will be preserved for recreational and open space purposes.  Clearly, the public purpose is served by this Agreement and is easily understood by the public and This Honorable Court.
[directive] Defendants are not simultaneously assigned to multiple categories for monitoring purposes.  For example, defendants  If of cannot be assigned to a combination Strict HD and HDEM.  a defendant is ordered both Strict HD and HDEM from different release orders, the defendant to will be assigned the highest tiered category (HDEM) and monitored using the to methods prescribed for that category.  shall not  A court order a defendant to home detention with or without electronic monitoring unless the Home Detention Screening form (CN 12973) or the of . 2 Page 12 Electronic Monitoring Screening form (CN 12220) has been filled out by the parties prior to a defendant's release or motion hearing.
[brief] Mallory, 600 U.S. at 134.  Mallory has no application here, as New Jersey does not have a consent-by-registration statute akin to Pennsylvania’s.  See Da12; Dutch Run-Mays Draft, LLC v. Wolf Block, LLP, 450 N.J. Super. 590, 605–06 (App. Div. 2017) (“Dutch Run”); Display Works, LLC v. Bartley, 182 F. Supp. 3d 166, 175–76 (D.N.J. 2016); Simplot India LLC v. Himalaya Food Int’l Ltd., 2024 WL 1136791, at *10 (D.N.J.  Mar. 15, 2024) (Mallory did not overrule the Display Works line of cases).  Plaintiff’s reliance upon Citibank, N.A. v. Estate of Simpson, 290 N.J. Super. 519 (App. Div. 1996) (“Citibank”) as justifying the Trial Court’s exercise of transient jurisdiction over [...], based upon Plaintiff’s service on two [...] partners in New Jersey, fares no better.
[brief] Specifically, New Jersey’s Legislature recognized that any brewer-wholesaler relationship has an inherent bargaining power imbalance, and to ensure a harmonious three-tier system of brewers, distributors, and retailers of malt alcoholic beverages.  As detailed at length above, before Prohibition, the existence of “tied houses” allowed for retailers to be dominated by large out-of-state manufacturers.  To avoid the issues latent during the pre-Prohibition and Prohibition eras, New Jersey established this regulatory scheme and separated each segment of the industry.  The system is intended to maintain the independence of each tier and prevent interference and overreach by large national brewers into the locally owned and licensed wholesalers and retailers.  The MBPA represents a critical tool in wholesaler’s ability to remain independent and outside the undue influence of much larger and often more sophisticated multi-national brewers and suppliers, such as Defendants.
[brief] TABLE OF CONTENTS  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT .................................................................................. 1 COUNTERSTATEMENT OF PROCEDURAL HISTORY ...........................................  3 COUNTERSTATEMENT OF FACTS ....................................................................... 4 LEGAL ARGUMENT ..............................................................................................  10 POINT I DETECTIVE  MACRAE HAD A REASONABLE AND ARTICULABLE SUSPICION TO BELIEVE DEFENDANT HAD ENGAGED IN CRIMINAL ACTIVITY.  ........................................................................  10  POINT II  SINCE DEFENDANT ADMITTED TO DRIVING WHILE HIS LICENSE WAS SUSPENDED AND HIS DRUG POSSESSION COUNT WAS DISMISSED, HIS REQUESTED RELIEF IS NO LONGER AVAILABLE TO HIM.  ........................................................................  20  CONCLUSION .....................................................................................................  32
[directive] DATE: SUBJECT: ATTORNEY GENERAL  GUIDELINES FOR THE RETENTION OF EVIDENCE  On March 9, 2010, I issued Law Enforcement Directive 2010-1, promulgating Guidelines for the Retention of Evidence.  During the first year of the implementation of this program, questions have arisen concerning sections of the guidelines that require clarification.  Therefore, I am reissuing the directive and guidelines, with necessary amendments to address the questions that have arisen regarding the original guidelines.  This Directive and the Attached Guidelines supersede and replace Law Enforcement Directive 2010-1.  The primary duty of the Prosecutor is not to convict, but to ensure that justice is done.  State 106 N.J. 123 (1987); 112 N.J. 384 (1988).  In keeping with this trust, the v. Ramseur, State v. Zola, Attorney General and the County Prosecutors hereby intend to provide for the retention of evidence in criminal cases to protect public safety and the interests of crime victims and their families, and to afford to those who are serving a sentence for a crime the opportunity to challenge their convictions, in appropriate cases.  The attached in criminal cases Attorney General Guidelines for the Retention of Evidence have been jointly formulated by the Attorney General and the County Prosecutors and are promulgated pursuant to the which Criminal Justice Act of 1970, N.J.S.A. 52:17B-97 et seq., recognizes the importance of public confidence in the administration of criminal justice and provides New Jersey Is An Equal Opportunity Employer.
[brief] Steadfast, the trial court was unimpressed with Plaintiff’s sham affidavit, which the court emphasized corrected Plaintiff’s evidentiary deficiencies on summary judgment once Plaintiff realized he could not support what amounts were owed within the limitations period versus what amounts were owed prior to the limitations period:  In a nutshell, I stand by my ruling about the sham affidavit.  I think the problem was noticed by the plaintiff in defendant’s opposition brief, and it was all -- the defendant’s opposition brief was all based upon just sworn testimony from the plaintiff.  Did you have any discussions with the defendant about the money that was owed?  Yes, at the Christmas Party in December 2017.  And then when he saw the brief, all of a sudden this new affidavit comes from the plaintiff, he wants to bring these discussions all the way back to, I think it was 2015.  I stand be [sic] my ruling that that is a critical, significant, issue on the case.  And that the plaintiff, a Doctor was sworn under oath at his deposition testimony, and that the affidavit directly contradicted him on those conversations.  See T3 at 13:21-14:12.  In addition to the sham affidavit ruling, during oral argument [...] struck at the heart of the issue, explaining that all of Plaintiff’s cited discovery cannot satisfy the bar to toll the statute of limitations, stating:
[brief] Even if the public availability of information should be considered, [...] wrongly suggests that all required information was available through [...]’s website.  Pb4, Pb12.  That is false.  [...]’s website only shows that a given contractor is classified in a given work type at the time the website is viewed.  Da386, Pa1.  It does not show when the contractor became classified.  *Ibid.*  It also does not show the contractor’s project rating for each work type.  *Ibid.*  Thus, even if the County were obliged to seek out the information, and even if the County checked [...]’s website the moment bids were opened, the County would *still* not know whether [...] was qualified for this Project.
[brief] *Tynan v. Vicinage 13 of the Superior Court*, supra; *Failla v. City of Passaic*, 146 F.3d 149, 154 (3d. Cir. 1998).  Rather, the definition of “handicapped” found in the NJLAD “clearly encompasses handicapped or disabled people who do not have a substantial or permanent impairment at the time of the alleged discrimination. ”  *Soules v. Mount Holiness Memorial Park*, 354 N.J.Super. 569, 574 (App. Div. 2002).  Accordingly, New Jersey courts have found a “broad array of medical conditions to be handicaps under the LAD, including obesity, alcoholism, epilepsy and drug addiction.  By defining the term handicap broadly, the Legislature intends to focus scrutiny not on whether a particular employee’s limitations qualify for protection, but on the work-site actions taken in light of whatever physical or mental limitations the worker presents. ”  *Tynan*, *supra*, 351 N.J. Super. at 398-99.  The NJLAD seeks to ensure that individuals are distinguished based on “…merit, rather than skin color, age, sex or gender, or any other measure that obscures a person’s individual humanity and worth.
[brief] Pa47.  The ABN recommends, instead, that neuropsychologists, faced with a TPO request (including audio recording device) simply decline participation:  It is recognized that often in forensic situations psychological ethics and the adversarial nature of the legal system may not coincide.  If directed by the court to proceed with TPO, the psychologist should remove himself/herself from the assessment.  Plaintiffs’ counsel asserts that the 2016 ABN Policy Statement (endorsed by both [...] and the [...]) does not “prohibit” recording.
[brief] The parties’ operating agreement required Defendant to obtain Plaintiff’s consent to enter into a fundamental business transaction.  See Pa6, [...] Operating Agreement at ¶ 5.4(e).  Defendant violated this provision when she consented to vacating the $100,000 judgment that [...] obtained in its favor against [...], et al, in a lawsuit bearing the caption [...].  Defendant’s trial testimony confirmed that she never consulted with Plaintiff before consenting to vacate the $100,000 judgment and the dismissal (with prejudice) of [...]’s lawsuit against [...], et al.  (3T158:14-160:16)  Similarly, Defendant’s acknowledgement that she opened another pharmacy called [...] in December 2017, while she was still a member of [...], and that she used [...]’s funds to pay for the startup costs for [...], (3T12710-131:1) constitutes a violation of the non-competition provision contain in the parties’ operating agreement.  See Pa14, [...] Operating Agreement at ¶ 10.3.  Defendant’s foregoing testimony confirms that she breached the parties’ operating agreement and that the jury’s verdict was against the weight of the evidence.
[brief] 1038, 107 S.Ct. 893, 93 L. Ed.2d 845 (1987)).  With respect to a testifying identification witness, defense counsel has “ample chance to challenge the accuracy of the identification on cross-examination, and the jury was free to discount its value based on [the witness'] inability to identify anyone on earlier occasions. ”  *Id.* at 328.  A defendant does not have a constitutional right to a pre-trial identification.
[brief] (3T:93:23-25).  The Court did provide the jury with an instruction that a witness cannot make personal comments about attorneys, just as counsel cannot call another attorney a liar.  (3T:105:1-25).  The Court explained that an instruction was being given regarding comments made by [...] concerning defense counsel, and that the jury should disregard the same, and not consider those comments because they were not evidence.  (3T:105:21-25).  In addition, [...] was instructed that he should refrain from making attacks on counsel, and should not be calling anyone a liar in the case.  (3T:106:1-7).  Plaintiff’s counsel, in addition to moving for a mistrial, also made a Motion for Recusal after the evidence was heard.
[brief] STATEMENT OF FACTS .......................................................................................7  A. [...] is the deeded owner of Lot 22, which is the Property at issue...............7  B.  [...] is [...]’s neighbor and owns Lots 19 and 20..................................8  C. [...] notified [...] about its improper trespass onto [...]’s Property.........................................................................................................................9  D. Discovery confirmed [...] owns the Property..................................................10  1.  [...] fails to produce sufficient evidence of ownership of the Property..................................................................................................................10  2.  The [...] confirms [...] owns the Property.................................12  3.  [...]’s secret [...] confirms [...] owns the Property, a fact [...] now ignores.................................................................13  4.  The neutral, court-appointed surveyor, [...], confirms [...] owns the Property.................................................................................................14  LEGAL ARGUMENT .............................................................................................16
[brief] SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY – APPELLATE DIVISION  [...], [...], [...], AND [...], Plaintiffs-Appellants vs. [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], AND [...]  Defendants-Respondents  ATTORNEY: I.D. No. 011251975  [...], Esq. [...] 12  Christopher Way Suite 101  [...] [...] [...]  fax  Attorneys for Plaintiffs-Appellants  Appellate Docket No. [...]  ON APPEAL FROM: Superior Court of New Jersey Law Division  Monmouth County Docket No.: [...]  Sat Below: Hon. [...], J.S.C.  CIVIL ACTION  PLAINTIFFS’-APPELLANTS’ REPLY BRIEF AND APPENDIX
[brief] **  [...] determined that “the Board violated N.J.S.A. 34:13A-5.4a(5), and, derivatively, 5.4a(1), when it refused to meet and negotiate with the Associate in the presence of Bargaining Council members” (*Ibid.*).  These sections of the Act provide, in pertinent part, that:  Public Employers, their representatives, or agents are prohibited from:  1.  Interfering with, restraining, or coercing employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed to them by this act; and 5.  Refusing to negotiate in good faith with a majority representative of employees in an appropriate unit concerning terms and conditions of employment of employees in that unit or refusing to process grievances presented by the majority representative.  However, the record is clear that the Board’s actions were proper in all respects and were not based on anti-union animus or any ill-will towards the Association or any of its members.
[brief] The words "general election" shall be taken to mean the annual election to be held on the first Tuesday after the first Monday in November and in any statute in which it is provided that any public officer shall be elected, or any public question shall be voted upon, at an election at which members of the General Assembly are to be voted for or elected, or words to that effect, shall be taken to mean, and shall be construed to be the equivalent of a provision, that said public officers shall be elected, or that said public question shall be voted upon, "at a general election."
[brief] At some point in or around January 2022, Plaintiff accepted employment with [...], a staffing agency.  (Pa58).  [...] procured Plaintiff’s services with the intent of assigning Plaintiff to [...].  (Pa58).  According to Plaintiff, prior to her assignment at [...] and as part of her onboarding with [...], she received a link to and could access [...]’s online portal, and she understood she was required to “electronically acknowledge a number of . . . [...]’s policies and procedures” governing her employment by [...] through the online portal.  (Pa136 – Pa137).  On January 4, 2022, Plaintiff completed the required forms “on [her] cell phone” outside of the presence of any [...] agents or employees.  (Pa137).  These forms included an MAA whereby she agreed to pursue any claims that may arise out of her employment or termination in private arbitration.  (Pa58).  The opening paragraph of the MAA expressly stated that Plaintiff agreed to submit certain claims to confidential arbitration and that Plaintiff’s execution of the MAA was done in consideration “for [her] application for and/or [her] employment with [...] Scientific, LLC. ” (Pa92).  More specifically, by executing the MAA, Plaintiff agreed that certain “Covered Claims,” were subject to arbitration: . . . including contract claims; tort claims; discrimination and/or harassment claims; retaliation claims; claims for wages, compensation, penalties, or restitution; and any other claim under any federal, state, or local statute, constitution, regulation, rule, ordinance, or common law, arising out of and/or directly or indirectly related to my application for employment with the Company, and/or my employment with the Company, and/or the terms and conditions of my employment with the Company, and/or termination of my employment with the Company (collectively, “Covered Claims”).
[brief] (T2, 11:1-3).  Counsel for [...] explained that warehouses have been a permitted use at the site for decades.  (T2, 18:18-22 & Pa285).  Once this was pointed out, Plaintiff changed their tune, suggesting that it was the intensity of the use that was now a problem.  (T2, 22:6-23:6 & 28:19-29:16).  These are the very types of arguments rejected in Rocky Hill.
[brief] TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | Cases | Page(s) | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|---------| | **Angel v. Rand Express Lines, Inc.,** | 26 | | 66 N.J. Super. 77 (App. Div. 1961) | | | **Boryszewski ex rel. Boryszewski v. Burke,** | 26 | | 380 N.J. Super. 361 (App. Div. 2005) | | | **C.V. by and through C.V. v. Waterford Township Board of Education,**| | | 255 N.J. 289 (2023) | 12, 13 | | **Davin, LLC v. Daham,** | passim | | 329 N.J. Super. 54 (App. Div. 2000) | | | **Estate of Nicolas v. Ocean Plaza Condominium Association, Inc.,** | 23 | | 388 N.J. Super. 571 (App. Div. 2006) | | | **Gilhooley v. County of Union,** | 27 | | 164 N.J. 533 (2000) | | | **In re Trust Created By Agreement Dated December 20, 1961, ex rel. Johnson,** | 23 | | 194 N.J. 276 (2008) | | | **Jersey Central Power & Light Co. v. Melcar Utilities Co.,** | 14 | | 212 N.J. 576 (2013) | | | **Lechler v. 303 Sunset Ave. Condominium Association, Inc.,** | 14, 15, 19 | | 452 N.J. Super. 574 (App. Div. 2017) | | | **McDaid v. Aztec W. Condominium Association,** | 14 | | 234 N.J. 130 (2018) | | | **Murphy v. Trapani,** | 23 | | 255 N.J. Super. 65 (App. Div. 1992) | | | **Pareja v. Princeton International Properties,** | passim | | 246 N.J. 546 (2021) | | | **Ruvolo v. American Casualty Co.,** | 13, 25 | | 39 N.J. 490 (1963) | | | **Suarez v. Eastern International College,** | 13 | | 428 N.J. Super. 10 (App. Div. 2012) | | Tymczyszyn v. Columbus Gardens, 422 N.J. Super. 253 (App. Div. 2011)
[brief] Should this Court hold that Appellant is disqualified as a pro se litigant to obtain fees as a sanction, or does not meet the fund in court requirement to obtain fees, then clearly an award of compounded interest will yield some remuneration for Appellant, even though time spent pre & post summary judgment will equate to over $40,000.  The amount of fees sought prior to this appeal was about $36,000.  It has never been challenged by plaintiffs.  It was never questioned by the lower court.
[brief] Builder’s remedies were first introduced in 1977, looked upon as an instrument which created “an incentive for the institution of socially beneficial but costly litigation such as […] Mt. Laurel. ”  *Oakwood at Madison v. Township of Madison, Inc.*, 72 N.J. 482, 550-51 (1977).  The remedy was created as “a device that rewards a plaintiff seeking to construct lower income housing for success in bringing about ordinance compliance through litigation. ”  *Allan-Deane Corp. v. Bedminster*, 205 N.J. Super. 87, 138 (Law Div. 1985).  Despite both the obligations announced in *Mount Laurel I* and the creation of the remedy, however, the years which followed saw “many municipalities failing to comply with their clear mandate of Mt. Laurel I. ”  *Holmdel Builder’s Ass’n v. Township of Holmdel*, 121 N.J. 550, 555 (1990).