ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] After [...] made the categorical promises in late 2019 to pay [...] the entire sum due on the Third Loan by, at the latest, the end of 2019, he failed to remit any payment or, for that matter, deliver the “sweetener” he had also promised at the Las Vegas meeting.  Da34; 2T225-12 to 24.  In fact, after the meeting, [...] never contacted [...].  Da34; 2T225-25 to 226-7.  On May 1, 2020, [...] commenced this action.
[directive] Records and documents of any other individual or entity that could prove helpful in the investigation should be examined.  These may include reports from other law enforcement agencies, hospital records, doctors' reports, jail records, court transcripts, F.B.I. or S.B.I. records, motor vehicle abstracts and telephone and cellular phone records.  In some instances, a search or communications data warrant or a subpoena may be necessary to obtain the information.  7.3  Physical Evidence
[brief] The Failure to Produce [...]’ Sworn Statement to [...] Constitutes a Jencks Violation  It is reversible error when the Government fails to produce “relevant statements or reports in its possession of government witnesses touching the subject matter of their testimony at trial. ”  Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657, 672 (1957).  Congress has codified this rule with the Jencks Act, providing that:  After a witness called by the United States has testified on direct examination, the court shall, on motion of the defendant, order the United States to produce any statement . . . of the witness in the possession of the United States which relates to the subject matter as to which the witness has testified.
[brief] Dated: April 29, 2024  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE  DIVISION DOCKET NO. [...]  STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. [...], Defendant-Appellant.  CRIMINAL ACTION  On Appeal from a Judgment of Conviction of the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Salem County.  Indictment No. [...]  Sat Below: Honorable [...], P.J.Cr., and a Jury  BRIEF ON BEHALF OF PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT
[brief] Mother and her husband, [...], owned the [...] and related businesses.  Estranged Wife’s counsel admitted that Estranged Wife *never believed* that [...] had any ownership interest in the business.  Despite recognizing that [...] had no ownership interest in the business, Estranged Wife and her counsel, with the permission and encouragement of the Trial Court, demanded, obtained, and analyzed the [...] tax documents, financial records, other business records, and government filings.  Multiple hearings (five of eleven hearings) addressed these funeral home documents and were the subject of several orders.  The Trial Court prepared the appointment of a receiver of the funeral home and authorized that a CPA be retained to analyze the funeral home records.  (MA-82, 87, 91, 92, 95, 102, 206; Tr. 11-20-20 at 19-21, 7-10-21 at 30-32, 8-10-21 at 8-9, 11-16-21 at 18, and 10-28-22 at 16, 36)  Estranged Wife’s counsel sought and received counsel fees and additional sanctions based on her time and trouble obtaining the [...] records—which they frequently asserted would establish that [...] had an ownership interest in the business—even though they actually knew that [...] had no such ownership interest.  (MA-87)  In doing so, Estranged Wife and her counsel perpetrated a fraud on the Trial Court, the court-appointed Administratrix, and Mother and her counsel.  **Insurance Policies**
[directive] ABILITY TO PAY COURT IMPOSED ASSESSMENTS PER MONTH: 0 0  I  PUBLIC DEFENDER WISH TO BE REPRESENTED BY PRIVATE COUNSEL WARNING  REGARDING CONFIDENTIALITY of the Assignment Judge acting on his or her own initiative, or in response to a valid grand jury subpoena with the approval of the  At the direction Assignment Judge, this page (UDIR-3) may be produced to a grand jury and a prosecutor.  CERTIFICATION  I certify that the foregoing statements made by me in the above Financial Statement are true.  If I have indicated above that I wish to be represented by a public defender, I am submitting this Financial Statement in support of my application to establish indigency, and I am aware if any statements made by me in the Financial Statement are willfully false, I am subject to punishment as provided by 1 :4-4(b).
[brief] Legal Argument  A. Standard of Review (715a)  New Jersey Court Rule 4:46-2 provides summary judgment is only appropriate when, “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact challenged and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment or order as a matter of law. ”  A genuine issue of material fact is defined as, “[h]aving substance; not imaginary, unreal, or apparent only; true, solid, real,” or, “having real existence. . . firmly based, a substantial argument. ”  *Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co.*, 142 N.J. 520, 529 (1995).  In *Brill*, the New Jersey Supreme Court also explained that when considering summary judgment motions, trial courts are required to engage in the same type of analysis as required by Rule 4:37-2(b) governing directed verdicts:  If there exists a single, unavoidable resolution of the alleged disputed issue of fact, that issue should be considered insufficient to constitute a “genuine” issue of material fact for purposes of Rule 4:46–2.  The import of our holding is that when the evidence “is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law,” the trial court should not hesitate to grant summary judgment.  *Id.* at 540 (citations omitted).  The Supreme Court continued, “[t]he thrust of today’s decision is to encourage trial courts not to refrain from granting summary judgment when the proper circumstances present themselves. ”  *Id.* at 541.  Although Courts should view the “evidential materials. . . in the light most favorable to the non-moving party,” bare allegations without factual support in the record cannot defeat a meritorious summary judgment motion.
[brief] Retaliate Against Plaintiff  On November 5, 2021, after [...] and [...] had confronted [...] about the sham invoice, [...] phoned plaintiff and warned him that neither he nor [...] would "survive this."  Pa94, 118-20, 137-41.  He further told plaintiff that he had been about to recommend plaintiff as his successor when he learned plaintiff was the one who had reported him and, in doing so, plaintiff had cost himself the opportunity to run the company.  Id.  On November 8, 2021, [...] spoke to [...] about plaintiff’s report to Ubelacker.  [...] characterized the reports by plaintiff and [...] as a “revolt. ”  He further stated that plaintiff was “after [[...]’s] job,” he “can’t be trusted,” he is a “cancer” and “he has to go.
[brief] As Plaintiff set forth in the Brief, N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4(a) and (c) define harassment as occurring when a person “makes, or causes to be made, one or more communications . . . in offensively coarse language or any other manner likely to cause annoyance or harm . . . or c) engages in any other course of alarming conduct or of repeatedly committed acts with purpose to alarm or seriously annoy such other person. ”  See N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4(a)-(c); see also State v. Hoffman, 149 N.J. 564, 580 (1997).  The characterization of Defendant [...]’s behavior as harassment is not a bald assertion but is, instead, rooted in the specific, observed conduct that aligns with the statutory language.  These behaviors are not generalized workplace dissatisfaction but specific actions that reasonably suggested an intent to alarm or intimidate.  It is also unreasonable to argue that a whistleblower employee must understand the contours of the statute in a manner that is different than its plain language.  Whistleblowers are not held to a standard of legal certainty but to a reasonable layperson’s understanding of the law.  Plaintiff’s belief that the conduct constituted criminal harassment was, therefore, reasonable under the circumstances, as it comports with a lay person’s understanding of the statute.  CEPA’s framework is designed to protect employees who act in good faith to report perceived violations, not to create mini trials regarding the underlying acts.  As set forth in Plaintiff’s initial Brief, Plaintiff engaged in protected whistleblowing activity under CEPA by disclosing these incidents of harassment.
[directive] Page 13  25.  Violations and Remedial Actions  All violations of the requirements of this Directive shall be reported promptly to the Director of the Division of Criminal Justice, who shall be authorized to conduct any appropriate investigation and to take such remedial or disciplinary actions as may be necessary to enforce the terms, conditions, principles and policies of this Directive.  Strict adherence to the requirements of this Directive shall be a condition of a law enforcement agency’s eligibility to receive the proceeds of forfeited property disposed of and distributed pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:64-6 and 2C:64-7, and any failure to comply with the terms of this Directive shall be taken into account in the calculation of forfeitable assets to be distributed among agencies that contributed to the surveillance, investigation, arrest or prosecution resulting in a forfeiture.
[brief] The court stated:  First, with respect to [...], as to aggravating factors, I find number three, the risk that he will commit another offense.  I based that finding upon my review of his prior record, which indicates four adult arrests, although I believe the record has been clarified today so that two appear to be juvenile offenses and two are adult arrests.  In conjunction with that, I find aggravating factor six, the extent of defendant's prior record, which appears to include one adult conviction, that being in New York for the sale of CDS, which [...] received a sentence between one and three years back in 2004.  I also find aggravating factor number nine, the need to deter this defendant and others in engaging in this type of activity.
[brief] Plaintiff also attempts to categorize [...] as a creditor and that this is a debt.  (Pb12)  Again, Plaintiff is wrong.  [...] is not a creditor because this is not a “debt” that is owed to [...].  [...] owns a portion of the potential proceeds.  When the case settles, Plaintiff is providing to [...] their property.  It also appears that Plaintiff is, improperly, attempting to revisit the Trial Court’s finding that these Contracts are not loans.
[directive] 1.  Law enforcement, funeral service, and hospital personnel should attempt to meet the needs of survivors of sudden and unexpected death.  2.  Where financial assistance is required, survivors should be referred to the appropriate agency.  3.  Various offices and support groups in New Jersey are available to provide assistance to survivors of homicide and sudden death.  4.  Assistance to survivors has been accomplished through enactment of the "Crime Victim's Bill of Rights" and the "Drunk Driving Victim's Bill of Rights."
[brief] Third, Appellants argue that *Conditional Highlands Applicability Determination*, Program Interest No. 435434, 433 N.J. Super. at 237, defined “routine upgrade” and implies that interpretation should be followed here.  (Ab17-19).  But Appellants misstate that case.  There, [...] issued [...] a HAD under Exemption #11 to construct an electrical substation within an existing electrical system right-of-way.  433 N.J. Super. at 226, 228.  There, as here, appellant argued that Exemption #11 applies to only routine upgrades, and [...] and [...] argued that any upgrade can receive the exemption.  *Id.* at 234, 236-37.  The court did not decide whether the exemption applies to an “upgrade” or only a “routine upgrade.
[brief] In late September of 2023, [...] was purportedly alerted by a neighbor of [...]’s attempt to repave the parking lot.  [...] then rushed to take over the property, locked [...] out and posted a security guard at the premises to prevent further access, and on September 29, 2023 issued a letter to the Court asking for the entry of both Consent Judgments.  Pa41.  The Trial Court did not do so.  On October 20, 2023, [...] again asked the Trial Court to enter the Consent Judgment.  Pa162.  [...] objected, submitting a Certification of its principal, [...], who stated that [...] had been prematurely locked out of the property before the lease as modified by the Settlement Agreement had expired.  Pa173.  The Trial Court declined to enter the monetary Consent Judgment.
[brief] B.  A Motion for Reconsideration is Particularly Useful Where an Opinion or Order Deals With Unlitigated or Unargued Matters.  In this matter, the Court decided the issue of whether the 2015 Lease was terminated on May 11, 2016 based on the Statute of Frauds, N.J.S.A. 25:1-15, which is applicable to guarantees.  No party argued that N.J.S.A. 25:1-15 applied to the rescission of the termination notice on May 5, 2016, memorialized in the letter of May 6, 2016.  Pa74.  The Court, on its own, suggested that N.J.S.A. 25:1-15 was applicable for the first time at oral argument on July 29, 2022.  1T65-8 to 20.  The Court did not cite to either counsel’s  Briefs or arguments and gave counsel no advance notice that it would be deciding the issue based on that statute.  Therefore, it was appropriate for Plaintiff to file a Motion for Reconsideration addressed to that issue. \(^{12}\)  R. 4:49-2 is particularly useful where an opinion or order deals with unlitigated or unargued matters.  Pressler and Verniero, current N.J. Court Rules, comment R. 4.49-2 [2] citing Calcaterra vs. Calcaterra 206 N.J. Super. 398, 403-404 (App. Div. 1986).  As the Court raised the issue for the first time in its decision, it was only appropriate to allow counsel to address the application of N.J.S.A. 25:1-15.  \(^{12}\)  The Trial Court also raised for the first time in its opinion that [...] was a “holdover” tenant.  No party had briefed this issue.  Not only was it appropriate for Plaintiff to address N.J.S.A. 25:1-15 but it was also appropriate for Plaintiff to argue part performance, practical construction, and the lease requirement that any modifications must be in writing was waived, as all those arguments flowed from the application of N.J.S.A. 25:1-15.  Plaintiff will not repeat those arguments here.  They are made above.  See Pb23-27.  CONCLUSION  For all of the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully requested that the Court reverse so much of the Trial Court’s Order of August 1, 2022, that finds the guarantees were terminated on May 11, 2016, and enter judgment in favor of [...] and against [...], [...], and [...], jointly, severally, or in the alternative, for $100,965.77 through April 20, 2020, and for $37,649.31 in attorney’s fees, and remand the matter to the Trial Court to determine any amounts due on [...]’s remaining claims.
[brief] (“Marathon”), a newly argued instance at the 11th hour in the Trial Court proceedings regarding now an “uninformed”, but written consent by Plaintiffs’ owner, [...] (“[...]”) as to the installation of the ASDS in July 2018 and conducted by [...] (“[...]”), and, the excavation of Plaintiffs’ Property to remove contaminated soil performed by [...] (“[...]”) in or around November 2019.  In terms of just compensation associated with the takings, [...] did not identify any operational disruptions whatsoever, no closures, no late openings, no early closings, no loss in revenue – simply nothing.  [...] instead testified that the business had seen an increase in profits; and that he never determined, nor discussed with his management team, as to how or even if the environmental clean-up impacted business operations and did not possess any information evidencing how the building, either inside or outside, was adversely impacted by the activities occurring.  The Authority relied upon case law to which Plaintiffs did not dispute making clear that if a taking has in fact benefitted the remainder, the benefit may set off against the value of the land taken.
[brief] (11T 168-14 to 169-8)  When the Chevrolet was processed for evidence, fingerprints were found on the outside.  (8T 57-18 to 24)  The prints from the exterior of the Chevrolet were sent to the Automated Fingerprint Identification System (AFIS) for comparison.  (8T 58-10 to 13)  One of the fingerprints from outside the car returned as potentially matching [...].
[brief] The HRA specifically grants municipalities the ability to regulate noise.  The specific power is located at N.J.S.A. 40:48-1, which provides that “The governing body of every municipality may make, amend, repeal and enforce Ordinances to: … *** 6. prevent vice, drunkenness and immorality; to preserve the public peace and order, to prevent and quell riots, disturbances and disorderly assemblages; *** 8.  Regulate the ringing of bells and the crying of goods and other commodities for sale at auction or otherwise, and to prevent disturbing noises; … (emphasis supplied).  As set forth in the Borough’s Appellate brief, multiple cases before this Court have upheld ordinances regulating noise in a substantially similar way to how Ordinance No. 17-2017 does, citing to the HRA as the source for municipal authority.  Respondents’ argument that the HRA’s specific grant of authority for municipal regulation of noise is somehow preempted because of the [...]’s adoption of the Model Nuisance Code must fail.
[brief] If Seller defaults under this Agreement for reasons beyond its control prior to the Outside Settlement Date (as defined in section 11 below) and such default continues for 7 days after written notice, Seller’s sole liability shall be the return of all sums paid on account of the purchase price to Buyer including all costs paid for title searches and survey, plus all mortgage-related fees and expenses actually paid by Buyer and this Agreement shall be null and void.  [DA165.]
[brief] Counter Statement of Facts ....................................................................................................3  A.  The October 17, 2015 Motor Vehicle Accident and AD Application ........................................3  B.  Petitioner’s Treatment and Surgery ..................................................................................4  C.  Petitioner’s Prior Injuries and Treatment .........................................................................5  D.  Testimony of Petitioner [...] .........................................................................9  E.  Testimony and Report of Petitioner’s Expert, [...] ........................................11  F. Testimony and Reports of the Board’s Medical Expert, [...] .........................15  G.  The ALJ’s Initial Decision ...............................................................................................18  H.  The Board’s Final Administrative Determination ...........................................................20  LEGAL ARGUMENT
[brief] April 16, 2019  Certification of [...] in Support of Order to Show Cause with photographs --- 13  Photographs of poor quality filed with Trial Court, not otherwise available.  April 15, 2019  Certification of [...] in Support of Order to Show Cause  EXHIBIT  A New Jersey Administrative Code  April 16, 2019  Certification of [...] in Support of Order to Show Cause  EXHIBIT  A March 29, 2018 letter from [...] to Chief [...], Chief [...] and Supervisor [...]  EXHIBIT B  March 29, 2018 letter from [...] to [...]  EXHIBIT C  Photographs  **EXHIBIT D June 27, 2017  Order of Court (Omitted) (Da207)  **EXHIBIT E June 5, 2017  Transcript of Trial (Omitted) (Da177)  April 17, 2019  Order to Show Cause relating to Plaintiff’s construction of fire pit Point Six of June 29, 2018  Amended Appellate Brief  Filed by Defendant [...] in Docket [...]  Da746  Appellate Court Decision dated June 25, 2019 for Appeal [...].
[brief] Plaintiff suspects, without any record evidence, that the sidewalk near the tree was repaired by the City in 2012 -- approximately eight (8) years before the tree fell.  Plaintiff has no admissible evidence that the City had any involvement in the alleged repairs.  Instead, Plaintiff relies exclusively on [...]’ testimony where he asked him to speculate/guess as to what might have happened based on a Google photo.  This proffer is not sufficient proof to demonstrate the existence of a dangerous condition as that term is defined by the Tort Claims Act.
[directive] Contempt  a.  A person is guilty of a crime of the fourth degree if he purposely or knowingly disobeys a judicial order or protective order, pursuant to section 1 of P.L.1985, c.250 (C.2C:28-5.1), or hinders, obstructs, or impedes the effectuation of a judicial order or the exercise of jurisdiction over any person, thing, or controversy by a court, administrative body, or investigative entity.
[brief] *State v. Marshall*, 148 N.J. 89, cert. denied, 522 U.S. 850 (1997).  When determining the propriety of conducting an evidentiary hearing, the PCR court should view the facts in the light most favorable to the defendant.  *Ibid.* (citing *State v. Preciose*, 129 N.J. 451, 462-63 (1992)); see also *State v. Porter*, 216 N.J. 343, 354 (2013).  If with the facts so viewed the PCR claim has a reasonable probability of being meritorious, then the defendant should receive an evidentiary hearing to prove his entitlement to relief.  *Ibid.*  Such is the case in the instant matter.
[brief] In this case, the description was particularly specific – the suspect was described by the 9-1-1 caller as a black male with dreadlocks wearing blue shorts and a white tank top and using crutches, and was identified as being in front of a specific address on [...] in [...] with a gun in his pocket.  1T15:1-12 and 16:10-14.  Like in Rossman, the description of the suspect in this case “was not limited to the suspect’s face and shirt” but included more detailed information that “was unlikely to apply to an indeterminate number of males” that police might encounter at that location.  See Pa071.  An appellate panel found that the 9-1-1 call was sufficient to establish reasonable suspicion in Rossman.  Likewise, this panel should find that the 9-1-1 call was sufficient to establish reasonable suspicion in this case.
[brief] **CONCLUSION**  Based on all of the above, the State respectfully submits that the Defendant’s conviction be affirmed and his request for relief be denied.  Respectfully submitted, /S/ [...], Esq.  [...], Esq.  Assistant Prosecutor Attorney ID#000602001  [...]  [...]  Chief Appellate Attorney Of Counsel  Attorney ID#038761985  Date submitted: October 23, 2024
[brief] Even the acquiescence of a person confronted by a police "request" under the circumstances presented in the instant case does not constitute consent.  See Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543 (1968).  As one court aptly noted:  The mere fact that a police officer "asks" a citizen to accompany him rather than commands obedience does not mean that a citizen can reasonably believe he is free to refuse.  Often the very circumstances surrounding the question supply its inevitable answer.  State v. Winegar, 711 P.2d 579, 586 (Ariz. 1985) (rejecting claim of "consent" and finding illegal arrest where two officers, following investigatory stop, asked [...] to accompany them to City Hall across the street).  See also Florida v. Royer, supra (finding unlawful custodial detention where police at airport, retaining [...]'s airline ticket, "asked" [...] to accompany them to an interrogation room 40 feet away); People v. Brownlee, supra, at 555-56.  It is submitted that [...] erred in his conclusion that applying Illinois law, the search and seizure conducted by Illinois police did not violate [...]’s and [...]’s Fourth Amendment rights, and in failing to suppress, all fruits – tangible and communicative – discovered as an unattenuated result of that taint.