ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] 8a, 9a.  What is more, the other cases cited by Defendants are distinguishable, in that they either failed to consider Roa, were decided at the summary judgment stage, after discovery had been conducted, or relate to different claims.  See e.g., Hernon v.  Webb-McRae, 2018 WL 4204440 (D.N.J. Sept. 4, 2018) (granting a motion for summary judgment); see also Prager v. Joyce Honda, Inc., 447 N.J. Super. 124 (App. Div. 2016) (addressing an appeal from an involuntary dismissal at trial but acknowledging that a fact-specific analysis is required to place the retaliatory actions in context by stating “[t]o be clear, we accept that written warnings might, in some circumstances, be materially adverse to an employee—in a formal system of progressive discipline for instance”); see Coward v. Englewood, 2019 WL 470080 (App. Div. 2019) (affirming summary judgment, where there was unrebutted evidence that the plaintiff committed infractions that prompted disciplinary action); see Casano v. Livingston Bd. of Educ., 2014 WL 4916845 (App. Div. Oct. 2, 2014) (addressing a hostile work environment claim); Lovett v. Flemington-Raritan Regional Board of Educ., 2013 WL 5925615 (App. Div. Nov. 6, 2013) (addressing an age discrimination complaint alleging constructive discharge).
[brief] To the contrary, [...] admitted – in response to questioning from defense counsel – that the basis for law enforcement’s suspicion of the defendant, and not [...], was the text messages received by defendant’s mother and her report to the police:  Q: And that was already in everybody’s heads, every investigator ...  But it was always – from August when the mother called up the first time, it was always based upon what the mother told you to start with, or the investigative team, correct, that it was [...]?  Q: It was always [...] as a suspect, correct?  A: Yes.  It was never ... [...].  Q: And nothing was done with [...].  Now, these texts, by the one that you were first shown with no – that you couldn’t make out the date, you say you could tell from what the mother told you, but that’s based solely upon what the mother told you, correct?  A: That’s based upon when [...] had reported to the police.  Q: Right.  What the mother told the police, correct?  A: Correct.  Or what the police told us.  (17T:226-17 to 226-15)(emphasis added).  Neither defendant’s mother, nor the text messages she received were “faceless” to this jury.  Defendant’s mother testified before this jury and was subject to cross examination.  The text messages were moved into evidence.  [...]’s testimony did not subject the defendant to prosecution by the incriminating statements of a faceless accuser who remained in the shadows and avoided the light of court.  Because the evils of Bankston and its progeny were not wrought upon the defendant through [...]’s cross examination, redirect, or re-cross, the remedy of Bankston and its progeny is not available to him.  Defendant’s conviction should be affirmed.
[brief] Partners’ counsel acknowledged that the indemnification issue would have to be dealt with, but claimed this was “tomorrow’s question”:  [...]:  Let me ask you a simple question if I may.  Let’s assume your client doesn’t pay off the mortgage loan – right? – and my client, the corporate guarantor, is sued.  Is your client going to bail out my client?  [...]: [...], I don’t even understand the assumption.  Why on earth would my client step – your client is in a freaking ditch.  He owes 45 million dollar on his debt, that is why everybody was so excited when we were trying to buy the property the first time around and [...] interfered.  He threw him another life line, and any sophisticated businessman would take that life line.  The lifeline, was, I will take you out of the debt.  It is no longer your debt, it is no longer your good credit rating and reputation on the line, it is mine.  THE COURT:  Mr. Stein, I understand it is not in there, and [...] maybe should have negotiated in there.  Mr. Herrmann is saying we were going to do that later.
[brief] FAC ¶ 53, Pa1621.  On September 28, 2015, plaintiff [...] entered into a Non-Disclosure Agreement (NDA), with, and as induced by, defendant [...].  Exhibit 6.  The stated purpose of the NDA was to protect confidential information that [...] and its affiliates, including [...] and [...], disclose to [...] "in connection with an investment in one or more solar renewable energy projects."
[brief] [...] v. [...] et al.—a case alleging that Facebook and [...] duped app developers to build apps that relied on users’ and friends’ data from Facebook’s platform but then limited access to that data to only whitelisted apps—serves as a prescient example.  There, the court recently granted plaintiff’s motion to compel [...], [...], and other executives as document custodians, finding they were likely to have unique and non-cumulative information relevant to plaintiff’s allegations regarding Facebook’s misrepresentations about API access.  Order re Three Discovery Motions, No. [...] (S.F. Super. Ct. Sept. 14, 2021), Ex. 32 at 8.  Even more so than in Styleform, [...] and [...] are involved in the matters at issue in this litigation.  [...] and [...] have made no secret of the critical roles they played in the practices at the heart of this case.  They are both appropriate and necessary custodians.
[brief] In making its ruling on Respondent’s Motion for Summary Judgment, the court held that it did not see a written arrangement and noted that a written arrangement must be between the two companies.  See 2T at 9:7-11.  A written arrangement is not just a slogan or advertisements that are sent out in brochures to dealers, distributors, and others.  See 2T at 7:6-11; 9:7-11.  Indeed, all [...] demonstrated to the trial court was advertisements and emails pertaining to nonparties and unrelated companies from over 10 years ago.  B.
[brief] The unambiguous language of the Ricci Act provides:  A member or retiree shall not be eligible for the presumption or recalculation under this subsection unless within two years of the effective date of this act, P.L.2019, c.157, the member or retiree files a written and sworn statement with the retirement system on a form provided by the board of trustees thereof indicating the dates and locations of service.  [L. 2019, c. 157 (codified at N.J.S.A.  53:5A-10(e)(4)).]  Thus, under the plain language of the statute [...] is ineligible for the presumption or recalculation provided under the Ricci Act because he failed to file by July 8, 2021.  Further, while New Jersey pension statutes are construed liberally because of their remedial character, Geller v. Dep’t of Treasury, 53 N.J. 591, 597-98 (1969), “an employee has only such rights and benefits as are based upon and within the scope of the provisions of the statute.
[brief] ...[W]e do not doubt that an equal educational opportunity for children was precisely in mind.  The mandate that there be maintained and supported a ‘thorough and efficient system of free public schools for the instruction of all the children in the State between the ages of five and eighteen years’ can have no other import.  Whether the State acts directly or imposed the role upon local government, the end product must be what the Constitution commands.  A system of instruction in any district of the State which is not thorough and efficient falls short of the constitutional command.  Whatever the reason for the violation, the obligation is the State’s to rectify it.  If local government fails, the State government must compel it to act, and if the local government cannot carry the burden, the State must itself meet its continuing obligation.
[brief] BD: But what did he -what do you think he meant when he said I have---that he says yeh I know that when you said to him that it's a shame AM: When I said it's a shame they trying to make him wear all those robberies, he said, "Yeh, I– “to me he told me, "Yeh, I know, but I gotta do what I gotta do to save my black ass."  BD: Did he go on further to say wh--- about what he said he's saving his black ass what did he mean?  AM: He basically said that he's going to go with whatever the detectives wanted him to say, is what he basically said, whatever they wanted him to say or do he was going to do to keep his part, the reason, the whole, you know BD: So he said to you, did he say whatever he was going to say whatever they wanted him to say regarding [...]'s involvement?  In the robberies?  AM: Yes.  Basically yeh.  He was like they want --- they really want him bad and you know he was going to help him with whatever they needed done.
[brief] *Id.* at 388.  For instance, in *Cohn*, the plaintiff was a bus passenger, and as he was about to sit down, “the bus started with a jerk and threw [him] against the window. ”  *Ibid.*  The plaintiff broke the window with his right elbow, and the top glass fell out when his head struck the window.  *Ibid.*  Glass stuck to the plaintiff’s body, causing the plaintiff to bleed.  *Ibid.*
[brief] [T]he trial court was correct that [plaintiff] did not show there was actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition of the premises prior to her fall.  There was no proof [...] or any employee had actual knowledge about the berry on the floor.  There were no eyewitnesses and nothing about the characteristics of the berry that would indicate how long it had been there.  There were no other berries in the vicinity.  No one was found to have been eating berries in the area.  [Id.]  Here, as in *Troupe*, Plaintiff provided no proof that any City employee had actual knowledge of the missing sign; no eyewitness reported the missing sign prior to the accident or any City employees in the area prior to the accident; and nothing about the characteristics of the sign indicated how long it had been missing.
[directive] Id.  Under no circumstances may such 5 an officer wear a police officer’s uniform or carry an exposed weapon while acting in the capacities described herein.  See N.J.S.A. 19:6-15.1; see also N.J.S.A. 19:7-1 et seq.  (concerning appointment of challengers).  * * *  It is important to note that any analysis of permissible law enforcement conduct within the 100-foot zone is very fact-specific, dependent upon whether voting is, or can be occurring, at the time and location as well as the specific facts of any law enforcement related situation.
[brief] “[E]ven though an alleged error was brought to the trial judge's attention, it will not be grounds for reversal if it was ‘harmless error. ’”  J.R., 227 N.J. at 417 (quoting Macon, 57 N.J. at 337–38).  “‘Convictions after a fair trial, based on strong evidence proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, should not be reversed because of a technical or evidentiary error that cannot have truly prejudiced the defendant or affected the end result. ’”  Ibid. (quoting State v. W.B., 205 N.J. 588, 614 (2011)).  Here, the jury watched videos from both burglaries depicting defendant stealing or attempting to steal money from the restaurant.  The jury spent six days in the same courtroom as defendant over the course of two weeks and reasonably could have identified him from the September 30 video footage alone; he looks at the camera for a moment, affording the jury a full look at his face to compare with the man with whom they shared the courtroom.  (Pa4 at 00:37-00:40).  As discussed further in Point II, whether the burglar was the same person on both nights was not at issue based on lay-opinion testimony of [...] and [...], as well as defense counsel’s own concessions.  A reasonable jury thus certainly could have convicted defendant of both charges without evidence of fingerprint analysis.  Accordingly, even if the admission of fingerprint-analysis evidence in this case was erroneous, it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt and defendant’s convictions should be affirmed.
[directive] only 100%  Adoptive seizures are those seizures where of the pre-seizure activity and related investigation are performed by the state or local seizing agency before a request is made for a Treasury adoption.  There must be a state violation and a federal basis for in forfeiture in order for the seizure to be a true adoption.  The federal share adoptive 80%.  Joint 20% cases is generally of net proceeds and the state or local share is investigations or task force cases are not adoptive seizures.  EOAF
[brief] After running outside with the children, she saw one of the officers with his hand around [...]’s neck and the other officer with his hand in [...]’s face.  (8T:61-2 to 20)  She testified that she saw [...] point his gun at [...] while his partner tried to take [...] to the ground.  She saw [...] reholster his gun and attempt to take him down as well.  (8T:61-20 to 63-10, 89-14 to 21)  [...] recalled that she was very close to the struggle, trying to calm [...] down, and that the officers “weren’t too happy about that. ”  (8T:63-13 to 22)  She testified that “she physically watched [[...]] defend himself,” but that she did not see him trying to hit an officer.  (8T:93-4 to 17)  [...] testified that while the officers were taking [...] to the ground, one of them had his knee in [...]’s rib, one of them hit him with his nightstick twice, and one of them punched him in the eye twice.  (8T:65-2 to 6, 66-19 to 67-5)  [...] testified that her husband suffered an orbital fracture as a result of being punched by one of the officers, and that he was taken to the hospital “several hours after it happened. ”  (8T:67-14 to 21, 70-7 to 17)  Defense counsel showed [...] several photographs of [...]’s face taken after the incident, and she confirmed that she had taken them.  (8T:70-18 to 73-2; Da 16-18)  [...] testified that he did not know that [...] was the individual who had originally called 911 and did not know his name until after the arrest.  (7T:47-4 to 8)  [...] testified that he never asked who the 911 caller was after arriving on the scene.  (7T:149-25 to 151-1)  Following the arrest, [...] interviewed everyone who said they were involved in the incident – including three or four workers and the restaurant manager – but did not interview anyone from [...]’s family or group.
[brief] [...], we’ll talk about her in a little bit.  And secretive, secretive.  We heard from [...] that the defendant, which is not an unusual trait, but the defendant didn’t want to let anyone who was a part of his life or even tangentially in his life, to know about his unhappy circumstances at the time, unemployed and homeless.  Well, secretive.  I submit to you, ladies and gentlemen, that that is a corroboration that picture, the trunk of his Chevy Impala after it was searched by [...] and the other members of the crime scene unit on Friday morning, May 4th, of 2018 that’s an example of the secretive [...].  [(9T64-21 to 65-8). ]  The State also referenced the firearm purchaser identification card in someone else’s name (9T64-15 to 20), and [...]’s marijuana use (9T73-4 to 10), for similar purposes during summation.  In short, the State introduced a litany of highly prejudicial and entirely irrelevant evidence to portray [...] as a disturbed loner, which defense counsel accurately characterized as “a trial by character smearing.
[brief] ”  *Id.* at 475.  The *Local 160* court also found that the arbitrator erred by conflating status as a “Township doctor” with health insurance coverage.  By disregarding the “sending” requirement, the *Local 160* court ruled that the arbitrator imperfectly executed his authority to issue an award by undue means, in essence rewriting the agreement for the parties by ignoring prerequisites to obtaining those benefits.  *Id.* at 475-477.  The instant CNA does not include any similar prerequisite to just cause.
[brief] Id. at *2.  (Pa106).  The Dela Vega decision arose from an automobile collision in which plaintiff, [...], was the passenger in a vehicle operated by her husband, defendant [...].  Ibid.  Plaintiff alleged that her husband pulled out from a parking lot into the path of another vehicle, causing her to sustain significant injuries.  Ibid.  Plaintiff and her husband, both medical doctors, had insured their vehicle under a policy issued by [...] containing $100,000/$300,000 in liability coverage.
[brief] It is “lost” but not before a Superior Court Judge, who arraigned [...], saw it.  ¶¶111-119, Pa26-27.  13.  Due to the “loss” of the application, the Prosecutors (some of whom were DAGs) have plenty of time to upgrade a charge to another that requires a Firearms Purchaser ID (PFID).  ¶¶125-26, Pa28.  14.  The Arraignment Judge orders an immediate PTI interview.
[brief] The Trial Court further stated that it had “previously found that the weight of Plaintiff’s expert testimony should be considered by a jury, not by the Court.  Sufficient expert testimony has been shown to create an issue of material fact as to whether the defective Ozurdex applicator proximately caused Plaintiff’s injuries.  A Motion for Reconsideration is not the opportunity to get a second bite of the apple.  Therefore, Defendant’s Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED. ”  (Da0846; Da0853-0854)  LEGAL ARGUMENT I.
[brief] Da133-134.  The inclusion of this Affidavit with its inflammatory hearsay statements is highly improper.  [...] never identified [...] during discovery and did not produce his Affidavit until several months after discovery ended.  [...] had no means of investigating [...]’s incendiary claims after discovery concluded.  The Appellate Division must, respectfully, ignore the Piercy Aff. just as the trial court did.
[brief] The lower court also correctly found that the detectives provided the defendant with accurate explanations as to each Miranda right.  The detectives read each of the rights to the defendant, had the defendant read some of the right aloud himself, asked the defendant if he understood the rights and explained each in accurate language the defendant could understand until comprehension and understanding were reached.  The lower court was able to view the detectives’ conduct and demeanor during these advisements and the interrogation as a whole.  The lower court saw and found that the detectives offered the defendant water.  It saw the detectives speaking to the defendant in calm, friendly tones.  The lower court was able to see and thereafter find that the detectives took the time to ensure that defendant’s waiver of his Miranda rights (and the interrogation as a whole) was knowing and voluntary.  The lower court correctly found the defendant’s waiver knowing, intelligent and voluntary beyond a reasonable doubt.  The lower court also similarly found, beyond a reasonable doubt, that [...], met the requirements of a trusted adult as set forth in Presha and its progeny.
[directive] 6.7  Re-activation  When Reason for De-Activation No Longer Exists.  In any instance where a BWC was de-activated pursuant to Sections 6.1, 6.2, 6.5, or 6.6, the device shall be re- activated as soon as it is safe and practicable to do so if and when the circumstances BODY WORN CAMERA POLICY | May 2021
[brief] It provides that the noticing party may, in addition to or in lieu of naming the person he wishes to depose, designate the subject matter on which he proposes to examine. ”)  PRESSLER & VERNIERO, Current New Jersey Court Rules, Comment, R. 4:14-2(c) (emphasis added).  Rule 4:23-4 provides for the enforcement of a notice of deposition of a non-party officer, director or managing agent of a corporate party.  In pertinent part, the Rule provides:  If a party or an officer, director, or managing agent of a party or a person designated under R. 4:14-2(c) or R. 4:15-1 to testify on behalf of a party fails to appear before the officer within this State who is to take his deposition, after being served with a proper notice, the court may make such orders in regard to the failure as are just, and among others it may take any action authorized under paragraphs (1)(2) and (3) of R. 4:23-2(b).  (emphasis added).  Under the foregoing authorities, the trial court’s ruling that plaintiff’s notice of deposition was ineffective and plaintiff must subpoena [...] was an abuse of discretion.  C.
[brief] Its tactics and delay should be seen for what it is: an attempt to force Defendants to perform an RAO using Defendants’ DEP number, so that Plaintiff would not have the cost or the burden despite the substantial reduction in price already negotiated some four (4) years earlier.  As will be detailed in this brief, it is apparent that Plaintiff wants the Courts to force Defendants to perform, to any and all of Plaintiff’s specifications, and only then, maybe, and at their absolute discretion, Plaintiff might possibly decide to close.  Alternatively, if the Plaintiff did decide, voluntarily, to withdraw from the contract it would most likely only come if the Plaintiff could have the Court impose an unreasonable financial burden on the Defendants.  Following the trial, and pronounced in the Order for Judgment, the trial court gave Plaintiff thirty (30) days to close title or terminate the contract.  Plaintiff did neither.  On September 4, 2023, a letter was sent by Plaintiff to Defendants stating that Plaintiff did not wish to close or otherwise take ownership of the property pending appeal.  In fact, Plaintiff additionally filed another lis pendens to prevent the enforcement of the termination of the contract and prevent the Defendants from exercising their right to terminate.  While Plaintiff has a right to appeal, no party has a right to ignore the remedy imposed without seeking a stay.  Their capricious failure to request a stay is a bar to any future purchase of the property in question, and this court is asked to affirm the trial court’s decision to terminate the contract and discharge the lis pendens.
[brief] Further, the proposed subdivision map indicates the existing width of Lot 1 was 380.33’, whereas a width of 370.33’ was proposed.  The document shows the width of the Strip as 10’.  [...] prepared the document.  This document was not recorded.  Pa0086.  The proposed subdivision was for [...], even though no such entity appears in the chain of title for Plaintiff or Defendant’s property.  Pa0086.  The Strip first appears in Defendant’s chain of title in 1971, among a series of deeds for Lots 1A, 1B, 1D, 1E and 1F.
[directive] In addition, if the agency permits officers to use personally owned locks on assigned lockers and other property, it should be conditioned on the officer providing the agency with a duplicate key or the lock combination.  7.8.7  With the introduction of new technologies in law enforcement, it may become necessary to search computers and cell phones or other digital devices, (hereafter “devices”), and seize their contents.  The critical question remains whether the public employee has a reasonable expectation of privacy in information stored in a device.  While the determination of a INTERNAL AFFAIRS POLICY & PROCEDURES | November 2022 38 reasonable expectation of privacy must be decided on a case-by-case basis, the law enforcement agency should take steps to actively and affirmatively diminish this expectation.
[brief] Although [...] told police that she lived in another state, the record shows that she was more than just an overnight guest at her daughter’s apartment.  In fact, when police inquired about the room where the gun was stored, both [...] and [...] confirmed that it was [...]’s “apartment” but [...]’s “room. ”  [...] then asked if [...] “has her own room” in the apartment, to which both women responded affirmatively.  (BWC4-A at 37:35 to 37:50)  This evidence demonstrates that [...] stays with her daughter regularly, and there is no indication that [...] uses her mother’s bedroom in any manner.  Accordingly, the State failed to prove that [...] had the authority to consent to a search of the bedroom.