ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Cases  Brock v. Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 149 N.J. 378, 391 (1997).  ..................6  Elmore S. & L. Ass’n v. D’Augustino, 103 N.J. Super. 301, 304 (App. Div. 1968) .................................................................8  Johnson v. Grayce Tighe, Inc. 365 N.J. Super. 237 (App. Div. 2003).  ..........11  Kasharian v.  Wilentz, 93 N.J. Super. 479, 482 (App. Div. 1967); R. 1:21 1(a) ..............................................................................7, 9, 10,11  Kohn’s Bakery, Inc. v. Terracciano, 147 N.J. Super. 582, 584-85 (App. Div. 1977 .................................................................8  Liberty Mutual v. Borgata Hotel, 456 N.J. Super. 471 (Law. Div. 2017).  ....11, 12 Nieder v. Royal Indem. Ins. Co., 62 N.J. 229, 234 (1973)  .........................6  North Haledon Fire Co. No. 1 v. Borough of North Haledon, 425 N.J. Super. 615, 631 (App. Div. 2012) .............................................6  Petition of Hall by and Through Hall, 147 N.J. 379, 393 (1997).  ............12  Soc’y Hill Condo Ass’n v. Soc’y Hill Assocs., 347 N.J. Super. 163, 177-78 (App. Div. 2002) .........................................................6  State v.  Walker, 385 N.J. Super. 388, 410 (App. Div. 2006).  ...................6  Stubaus v. Witman, 339 N.J. Super. 38, 47-48 (App. Div. 2002).  .............11  Zaccardi v. Becker, 88 N.J. 245, 254 (1982).  .......................................8  Statutes N.J.S.A. 2A:31-3 .................................................................10  APPENDIX TABLE OF CONTENTS  Petitioner’s Notice of Motion for Reconsideration of Court’s October 22, 2021  Orders ........................................................  DA1  November 19, 2021  Order Denying Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration .........................................................  DA2  Appellate Division Correspondence dated July 6, 2023 ........................................ DA3  September 14, 2023  Order  Dismissing Petitioner’s Appeal without Prejudice .........................................................  DA5
[brief] A.  DEFENDANT FAILED TO GIVE APPROPRIATE DEFEERENCE TO MANSFIELD’S ZONING ORDINANCE.  When a parcel of land is situated in two municipalities, each local land use board must give “significant weight” to the other municipality’s zoning ordinance.  Ferraro v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 119 N.J. 61, 74 (1990).  Local land use boards must view the property as one parcel, even though it sits in two municipalities.  See Cicon v. Planning Bd. of Borough of Franklin, 223 N.J. Super. 199, 208 (1988).  Defendant ignored this responsibility, and despite warehouses being permitted principal uses in both towns, required that Plaintiff undertake a micro-analysis of [...]’s ODL Zone to prove consistency with [...]’s SM Zone’s bulk standards.  For decades, the Legislature and the courts have recognized that local officials should consider neighboring municipalities during the land use planning process.  See, e.g. Cresskill v. Dumont, 15 N.J. 238, 247 (1954).  The responsibility for zoning does not halt at the municipal boundary line “without regard to the effect of [the] zoning ordinances on adjoining and nearby land outside the municipality. ”  Id.  The Municipal Land Use Law (“MLUL”) echoes this notion, as it was intended to “ensure that the development of individual municipalities does not conflict with the development and general welfare of neighboring municipalities, the county and the State as a whole. ”  N.J.S.A. 40:55D-2(d).  Said another way, “[t]he insularity and parochialism of the Chinese wall theory of municipal zoning has long since been discredited. ”  Urban Farms, Inc. v. Franklin Lakes, 179 N.J. Super. 203, 213 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 87 N.J. 428 (1981).  Zoning boards must consider adjacent municipalities when reviewing applications for development.  See, e.g. Jacoby v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment of Borough of Englewood Cliffs, 442 N.J. Super. 450, 464–65 (App. Div. 2015) (citing Urban Farms, 179 N.J. Super. at 213).  While perhaps redundant, it bears repeating: when a property is bifurcated by a municipal boundary line, the zoning board must not only consider the zoning in the adjacent municipality, but must give significant weight to it.
[brief] [...] testified that [...] expressed additional concern that the search would upset his ill wife.  (1T61-11 to 63-20; see 1T72-9-11, 85-20 to 86-9)  According to [...], “at that point [[...]] was thinking about consent or what if he decided not to grant consent and we were in the process of informing him that we would at that point apply for a search warrant. ”  (1T61-11 to 63-20)  [...] then read the entire pre-written Consent to Search Form to [...].  (Da 25; Da 15 at 3:23:30 to 3:26:20)
[brief] POINT I: THE TRIAL COURT  ERRONEOUSLY GRANTED SUMMARY JUDGMENT TO DEFENDANT [...] (Pa1-3, 6-12).................................................................26  A.  The Summary Judgment Standard (Pa1-3) ..................................27  B.  The Intentional Wrong / “Substantial Certainty” Exception To The Workers’ Compensation Bar (Pa1-2, 6-12).  .....................28  C.  The Trial Court’s Erroneous Grant Of Summary Judgment To [...] (Pa1-3, 6-12) .................................................................31  D.  The Trial Court Also Erred In Granting Summary Judgment As To Punitive Damages Against Defendant [...] (Pa1-3, 12)  ..................................................................................41  POINT II: THE TRIAL COURT’S ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT TO DEFENDANT  [...] SHOULD BE REVERSED (Pa13, 17-18) ...........................................43  CONCLUSION .....................................................................................46
[brief] Under Rule 4:10-2(a), a litigant cannot obtain discovery of documents that are not relevant.  That prohibition is clear from the “plain language of the rule,” DiFiore, 254 N.J. at 228, which limits the “scope of discovery” to materials that are “relevant,” R. 4:10-2.  It is clear from this Court’s precedent, which has repeatedly recognized the “relevance limitation” under Rule 4:10-2(a), Estate of Lasiw v. Pereira, 475 N.J. Super. 378, 396 (App. Div. 2023) (quotation omitted), and squarely held that Rule 4:10-2(a) “limit[s]” discovery “to information that is ‘relevant to the subject matter involved,’” K.S. v. ABC Pro. Corp., 330 N.J. Super. 288, 291 (App. Div. 2000), certif.  denied, 174 N.J. 411 (2000) (quoting R. 4:10-2(a)).  And it is clear from the host of cases that apply the “relevancy standard” to “bar[] pretrial discovery.
[brief] In fact, she volunteered that she “can’t imagine anything the owner of this horse did wrong” by sending [...] to [...] for commercial breeding purposes in 2018:  Q: Do you believe that the owner of the horse in this case did anything wrong in terms of bringing their horse to [...] for breeding purposes?  A: I don’t – I don’t have an opinion on that.  I don’t know.  *I – can’t imagine anything the owner of this horse did wrong in that regard.*  [Pa 1002-03]  (emphasis added).  Instead, [...] opined that [...] was injured by a “sudden ‘out of the blue’ savage attack. ”  [Pa 900-901].  According to [...], although it is very rare, *every* breeding stallion is theoretically capable of a sudden, sustained attack on their handler at any time.\(^1\) [Pa 900-901].
[brief] Da50-52.  At the mediation, the parties jointly agreed to retain a neutral title expert to analyze title issues. Da53.  Thereafter, the parties jointly retained [...] --- 1 “Pa__” refers to NCC’s Appendix and the page number.  2  NCC includes a complete copy of its Complaint in its Appendix as the version included in Defendant’s Appendix omits the Complaint’s internal exhibits. of [...], who produced a report on or about October 17, 2022.
[brief] By July 2010, [...] had had enough.  He and his new wife, [...], were married on September 9, 2009.  More than 300 days had passed (actually more than 400 days) since beginning the project and by July 2010, they were still a very long way off from having a marital home to live in.  By way of letter of his attorney, [...], dated July 27, 2010, [...] canceled the project.
[brief] Secondly, Plaintiffs assert that, even *assuming arguendo* that [...] has “enabling” authority from the developer, the [...] restriction as to height is unenforceable to the extent that the restriction has not been uniformly applied to all property owners, a number of which have exceeded the height restriction at issue.  Other restrictions, likewise, have not been uniformly adhered to or applied on equal terms to members of the [...].  Plaintiffs also assert that there has been self-dealing amongst certain trustees in connection with certain approvals which are not in compliance with their own construction rules, and that self-dealing effectively estoppes the Defendant from enforcement.  *See,* Cert. of [...] (Da835).  II.
[brief] See Madlinger v. New Jersey Transit Corp., 2017 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2726, *9 (App. Div. Oct. 30, 2017) (vacating trial court’s order denying request for in camera review and remanding for producing party to have opportunity to assert particularized objections to specific documents before production, and for the judge to assess those objections in camera); Royzenshteyn v. Pathak, 2020 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1562, at *22 (App. Div. Aug. 6, 2020) (ordering trial court to engage in an “arduous in camera review” of 1,276 communications); compare Bayer v. Township of Union, 414 N.J. Super. 238 (App. Div. 2010) (finding no error in trial court’s denial of motion to compel where “the court undertook an in camera review of all of the files and documents requested by plaintiff.  The court concluded that nothing in the materials reviewed was relevant to plaintiff’s claims”).
[brief] STANDARD OF REVIEW.  The trial court’s instructions to the jury must “set forth the issues, correctly state the applicable law in understandable language, and plainly spell out how the jury should apply the legal principles to the facts as it may find them .  . . .”  Komlodi v. Picciano, 217 N.J. 387, 409 (2014) (quoting Jurman v. Samuel Braen, Inc., 47 N.J. 586, 591-92 (1966)).  Instructions on the applicable law should be tailored to the theories and facts presented at trial.  Ibid. (citing Reynolds v. Gonzalez, 172 N.J. 266, 288-89 (2002).  Accordingly, the jury charges must provide a “comprehensible explanation of the questions that the jury must determine, including the law of the case applicable to the facts that the jury may find. ”  State v. Galicia, 210 N.J. 364, 386 (2012).  “A jury instruction that has no basis in the evidence is unsupportable, as it tends to mislead the jury. ”  Dynasty, Inc. v. Princeton Ins. Co., 165 N.J. 1, 13-14 (2000).  Not every improper jury charge warrants reversal and a new trial.  *Prioleau v. Ky. Fried Chicken, Inc.*, 223 N.J. 245, 257 (2015).  “As a general matter, [appellate courts] will not reverse if an erroneous jury instruction was incapable of producing an unjust result or prejudicing substantial rights. ”  *Ibid.* (alteration in original).  Under Rule 2:10-2, an error in the jury instructions requires reversal only if there is reasonable doubt that the jury was led to a verdict that it otherwise might not have reached.
[brief] How does that prove your case?  That’s what I’m trying to understand.  A  I didn’t say it would hurt my case.  I’m just saying it -- there are many, many different avenues you can go if you’re looking to -- to try to figure out how to attack the State’s case.  Q  Right.  A  I chose a certain way to defend the case.  Q  So it wouldn’t -- but you’re acknowledging it wouldn’t hurt the case.  A  It wouldn’t have helped it either based on how I -- what my arguments were to the jury.
[brief] Baker v. Nat’l State Bank, 353 N.J. Super. 145, 153 (App. Div. 2002) (“The trial court’s characterization of the evidence in support of the award of punitive damages is of little significance. ”)  In its 2013 decision, the trial court awarded Plaintiffs punitive damages.  (39002a).  In its 2018 decision, this Court vacated the punitive damages award and mandated that the trial court make specific findings of fact as to each individual Defendant to determine whether each engaged in conduct within the tort limitations period (October 1, 2003 to December 31, 2011) that warranted the award of punitive damages.
[brief] [...] essentially asks this Court to stretch Tretina’s clear language, limiting modification to “simply arithmetical errors, such as $2 + 2 = 5$,” to something unrecognizable such that parties can dispute an arbitrator’s applied damages formula after-the-fact.  Tretina, 135 N.J. at 360 (“the Legislature intended that courts correct mistakes that are obvious and simple – errors that can be fixed without a remand and without the services of an experienced arbitrator”).  And, to be sure, these are [...]’s own words: “the error in the interest calculation is not in ‘method,’ but rather in the order of mathematical operations. ”  App. Br. at 3.  Again, however, this is simply not what the law permits.  [...]’s arguments belie its assertions that the Arbitrator simply committed an evident mathematical error or imperfection as to form.
[brief] ACa83.  As with the prevention of child abuse, the prevention of discrimination is certainly a compelling governmental interest in the abstract.  But the Parental Secrecy Policy is not narrowly tailored to serve that goal.  Under both the Parental Notification Policy and the Parental Secrecy Policy, schools are required to socially transition students upon their request.  The only substantive difference is that under the Parental Notification Policy, schools must inform parents of their actions, while under the Parental Secrecy Policy, schools are not required to inform parents.  Because social transitioning is required under both policies, to justify the Parental Secrecy Policy, it is not enough for the State to demonstrate that *socially transitioning* students prevents discrimination.  Instead, the State must demonstrate that the Parental Secrecy Policy’s *non-disclosure provisions* prevent discrimination.  *Fulton v. City of Phila.*, 141 S. Ct. 1868, 1881 (2021) (holding that government does not satisfy its burden of satisfying strict scrutiny by proffering government interest at a “high level of generality” but must link the interest to the provision being challenged).
[brief] #  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES  ## Cases  *Lusardi vs. Curtiss Point Property Owners Assn.*, 86 N.J. 217 (1981)…  16  *Taxpayers Association of Weymouth Tp., Inc. v. Weymouth Tp.*, 80 N.J. 6, 364 A.2d 1016 (1976)………… ………………………………  16  *Cranford Development Associates v. Cranford*, 445 N.J. Super 220 (2016)…………………………………………………  17
[brief] Although not included in appellants’ appendix, the documents set forth in respondents’ appendix — all of which are public documents — were cited in respondents’ briefs on summary judgment.  comparison, the State average residential property value that year was $290,502, with an average total property tax bill of $7,281.  (Aa9; Aa1113; Aa1461; Aa1873).  The State average school tax bill in 2009 was $3,869.  (Aa9-10; Aa1114; Aa1461; Aa1874).  The City’s school tax levy remained comparatively low, despite the City’s substantial increase in wealth and property value over time.  In calendar year 2018, [...]’s average residential property value was $433,320, compared with the State average of $316,710.  (Aa1461).  According to property tax tables, the average total property tax bill per household in [...] was $6,445, of which $1,559 was the school levy; while the State average total property tax bill was $8,767, of which $4,610 was the school levy.  Ibid.  In 2021, its average residential property value was $461,925, compared to the State average of $355,623.  (Aa10; Aa1114; Aa1874).  Its average total property tax bill was $7,406, of which $2,752 was the school levy; whereas the State average total property tax bill was $9,284, of which $4,908 was the school levy.  (Aa10; Aa1114; Aa1874).  [...] also has a history of granting tax abatements to certain large property owners, thus artificially decreasing the local tax base available for school funding.  (Ra7).  Through these tax abatements (see N.J.S.A. 40A:20-1 and N.J.S.A. 40A:21-l), municipalities like [...] exempt certain property owners, usually businesses, from paying property taxes.  (Ra7).  In exchange, the businesses are typically required to make “payments in lieu of taxes” (PILOTs) to the municipality.  Ibid.  For long-term abatements, the municipality retains 95% of the PILOT (the other 5% goes to the county), and "[i]n many cases, the negotiated PILOT provides more funds to the municipality than it would have otherwise received."  (Ra8).  But importantly, the school district, which would typically receive "a large portion of traditional property tax collections — sometimes more than half," (Ra15), does not receive any portion of the PILOT payment.  (Ra8-9, Ra15).  And for long-term abatements, the PILOT payment is not reflected in the municipality’s "ratable base, meaning formula state aid continues to provide enhanced funding based on artificially low community wealth."  (Ra15).  3.  The District’s Funding Under the School Funding Reform Act.
[brief] § **4A:6-1.3** (Sick leave) provides in relevant part:  (a)  [F]ull-time local employees shall be entitled to a minimum of annual paid sick leave as follows:  * * *  [A]t the beginning of each calendar year in anticipation of continued employment, employees shall be credited with 15 working days.  * * *  (f)  Unused sick leave shall accumulate from year to year without limit, * * *  (g)  Sick leave may be used by employees who are unable to work because of:  1.  **Personal illness or injury** (see **N.J.A.C. 4A:6-21B** for Federal family and medical leave); 2.  Exposure to contagious disease (see **N.J.A.C. 4A:6-1.21B** for Federal family and medical leave); N.J.A.C. § 4A:6-1.3  When [...] avail themselves of the foregoing rights to medical leave the employer automatically assigns an absence infraction or penalty points.
[brief] REGARDLESS, PLAINTIFF PLACED DEFENDANTS ON NOTICE OF THEIR INTENT TO MAKE SUCH AN ARGUMENT IN THEIR PRETRIAL MEMORANDUM.  (Raised Below: 6T, at 58:7-59:23)  Defendants suggest that Plaintiff never requested Model Civil Jury Charge 8.11G(ii), the subpart for the time-unit rule.  Likely without realizing it, Defendants’ dissection of 8.11G actually explains how the confusion at the charge conference occurred.  And this explanation only proves that Plaintiff did, in fact, notify Defendants of their intent to make a time-unit argument, which was never actually made at trial.
[brief] This is why [...]’s Order requiring a Settlement Conference was crucial.  (Da14-15)  The Trustee had a legal duty to comply with the Order, negotiate in good faith, and obtain [...]’s consent before selling the Florida Property to herself and the Boonton Property to [...].  Failing to do so risked causing harm to [...], especially if the properties were sold at significantly discounted prices.  Alternatively, if the beneficiaries could not come to agreement on listing and selling both properties on the open market, the Trustee could have petitioned the court for advice and direction under Rule 4:83-4(c) or sought a declaration of rights under N.J.S.A. 2A:16-55(c).  These legal avenues would have provided a structured and transparent resolution, ensuring that the Trustee acted within her fiduciary duties.
[brief] Different standards of appellate review apply in this Appeal.  The dispositive summary judgment dismissal order is reviewed de novo, using the same standard that governed the trial court’s decision.  Samolyk v. Berthe, 251 N.J. 73, 78 (2022).  Summary judgment may be granted “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact challenged and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment or order as a matter of law. ”  RSI Bank v. Providence Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 234 N.J. 459, 472 (2018) (quoting Rule 4:46-2 (c)); see also Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520, 540 (1995).
[directive] It will be the responsibility of the assigned officer to destroy the evidence and a copy of the Uniform Destruction of Evidence Form will be left with the contact person or his representative at the facility.  The role of the contact person for the authorized facilities is limited.  He will simply make arrangements for the destruction and will be present during the destruction of the controlled dangerous substance; it is not his responsibility to insure the integrity of the destruction process.  The authorized facilities are simply providing a place for the evidence to be destroyed.  Our assigned officer shall call the contact person prior to bringing the controlled dangerous substance for destruction in order to allow the contact person to make the necessary arrangements.  It is not necessary for the contact person to sign the Uniform Destruction of Evidence Form.  A-17 7.7.4
[brief] Affidavits of Merit were served by the Plaintiffs which were authored by [...] and [...].  After an Answer was filed by the Defendant on June 14, 2024, an objection to the Affidavits of Merit was raised in that the Defendant contended it could not be vicariously liable.  This was based upon their contention that no care was provided at their facility and that they did not employ any of the individuals involved in the treatment of the decedent.  This was so despite the fact that no discovery on the issue of vicarious liability has been exchanged.  A Ferreira Conference was held before the Honorable [...], J.S.C. on August 5, 2024, in which concerns regarding the Defendant’s objection was raised by the Plaintiffs, but the issue was not resolved at that time.  Instead, Judge Brenner entered an Order on August 12, 2024, providing all defense counsel an additional ten days to set forth any additional objections to the Affidavits of Merit.
[brief] A.C. 11:5-9A.6(a) | 32 | | N.J.S.A. 45:15-16.55 | 28,29,32 | | N.J.S.A. 45:15-16.59 | 32,33 | | N.J.S.A. 45:15-16.70 | 1 | | N.J.S.A. 45:15-16.80 | 28 | | N.J.S.A. 45:15-16.80(b) | 33 | | Document Description | Page Number | |-----------------------------------------------------------|-------------| | Complaint (9/21/18) | Da1 | | Amended Complaint (10/17/18) | Da22 | | Answer to Amended Complaint (4/22/19) | Da44 | | Defendant’s First Motion for Summary Judgment (7/30/20) | Da63 | | Order Denying Summary Judgment and Extending Discovery | Da65 | | Defendant’s Second Motion for Summary Judgment | Da67 | | Defendants’s Statement of Material Facts | Da69 | | Affidavit of [...] | Da128 | | Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint | Da131 | | [...] Registration Form ([...]) | Da155 | | [...] Registration Form ([...]) | Da158 | | [...] Registration Form ([...]) | Da161 | | Tour Generator Script | Da164 | | Confirmation Email ([...]) | Da170 | | Confirmation Email ([...]) | Da182 | | Confirmation Letter ([...]) | Da186 | | Confirmation Email ([...]) | Da189 | | Purchaser’s Acknowledgement ([...]) | Da193 | | Purchaser’s Acknowledgement ([...]) | Da195 | Purchaser’s Acknowledgement ([...]) ........................................ Da198 Purchase and Sale Agreement ([...]) ........................................ Da201 Purchase and Sale Agreement ([...]) ........................................ Da208 Purchase and Sale Agreement ([...]) ........................................ Da214 Public Offering Statement ......................................................... Da221 Public Offering Statement ......................................................... Da238 Answers to Interrogatories ([...]) ........................................ Da247 Answers to Interrogatories ([...]) ........................................ Da252